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 MUTINY 
 
 CRIBNER & WELFORD 
 
THE 
 
 INDIAN MUTINY 
 
 OF 1857 
 
 COLONEL G. B: MALLESON, C.S.I. 
 
 AUTHOR OF ' THE DECISIVE BATTLES OF INDIA,' ' HISTORY OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA,' 
 
 ' LIFE OF LORD CLIVE,' ' THE BATTLEFIELDS OF GERMANY,' 
 
 'ambushes and surprises,' etc., ETC, 
 
 Wz't/i Portraits and Plans 
 
 SCRIBNER & WELFORD 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 1891 
 
\ 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 ^^Wjui^B '-^S" 
 
PREFA CE, 
 
 In writing this short History of the Indian Mutiny 
 of 1857 I have aimed at the compilation of a 
 work which, complete in itself, should narrate 
 the causes as well as the consequences of a 
 movement unforeseen, undreamt of, sudden and 
 swift in its action, and which taxed to the utmost 
 the energies of the British people. Preceding 
 writers on the same subject, whilst dealing very 
 amply with the consequences, have, with one 
 exception, but dimly shadowed forth the causes. 
 The very actors in the Mutiny failed to detect 
 them. Sir John Lawrence himself, writing with 
 the fullest knowledge of events in which he played 
 a very conspicuous part, mistook the instrument 
 for the chief cause. He stopped at the greased 
 cartridge. But the greased cartridge was never 
 issued to the great body of the troops, if indeed 
 to any. There must have been a latent motive 
 power to make of an unissued cartridge a 
 grievance so terrible as to rouse into revolt men 
 whose fathers and whose fathers' fathers had 
 
vl Preface. 
 
 contributed to the making of the British Empire 
 in India. The greased cartridge, too, did not 
 concern those landowners and cultivators of Oudh 
 and the North-western Provinces, who rose almost 
 to a man. What that latent motive power was 
 I have described fully, and I believe truly, in 
 this volume. 
 
 My belief in this respect is founded on personal 
 knowledge and personal observation. Locally 
 chief of the Commissariat Department at Kanhpur 
 when, in January 1856, Sir James Outram crossed 
 the Ganges to depose the King of Oudh, I had 
 witnessed the indignation which the very rumour 
 of his purpose caused among the sipahis of my 
 own guard. I reported their excited state to my 
 superiors, and was laughed at for my pains. But, 
 impressed with the accuracy of my forecast, viz., 
 that the annexation of Oudh would rouse indigna- 
 tion and anger in the sipahi army, I continued 
 then, and after my transfer, two months later, to 
 an appointment in the Military Audit Department 
 in Calcutta, to keep a careful record of the several 
 occurrences, all apparently of minor import, v/hich 
 supervened when the effects of the annexation of 
 Oudh had been thoroughly realised by the sipahis. 
 My observations led to the conclusion that they 
 were thoroughly angered, and, a little later, that 
 their minds were being mysteriously worked upon. 
 I kept copious notes of the matters I observed, 
 and I discussed them with mv brother officers, 
 
Preface. vii 
 
 without, however, finding that my views were 
 shared by any one of them. It would seem, 
 however, that the officer who held the responsible 
 post of Town Major, Major Orfeur Cavenagh, 
 had, from his own observation, arrived at con- 
 clusions not dissimilar. He has narrated in his 
 admirable work ^ the observations forced upon 
 him by the changed demeanour of the natives of 
 the North-western Provinces in 1856. But he, 
 too, stood, amongst high-placed Europeans, almost 
 alone in his convictions. The fact is that, up to 
 the very outbreak of the Mutiny at Mirath, no one, 
 from highest to lowest, believed in the possibility 
 of a general combination. Those, and they 
 could be counted on the fingers of one hand, 
 who endeavoured to hint at an opposite conclusion 
 were ridiculed as alarmists. j]Sa ingrained was 
 the belief in the loyalty of the sipahis, and so 
 profound w^as the ignorance as to the manner 
 in which their minds were affected, that neither 
 the outbreak of Mirath nor the seizure of Dehli 
 entirely removed itT^ The tone of the governing 
 classes was displayed when the Home Secretary 
 prated about 'a passing and groundless panic,' 
 and when the acting Commander-in-Chief, an old 
 officer of sipahis, babbled, in June 1857, of 
 reorganisation. But the fact, nevertheless, re- 
 
 1 
 
 Reminiscences of an Indian Official. By Sir Orfeur Cavenagh. 
 On the subject of the services rendered by this officer, in 1857, 
 I have entered fully in the sixth volume of my larger history. 
 
viii Preface. 
 
 mained. Circumstances had proved to me that 
 extraneous causes were at work to promote an 
 ill-feeHng, a hatred not personal but national, in 
 the minds of men who for a century had been 
 our truest and most loyal servants. When the 
 Mutiny had been quelled I renewed my researches 
 regarding the origin of this feeling, and, thanks 
 to the confidences of my native friends in various 
 parts of the country, I arrived at a very definite 
 conclusion. That conclusion I placed on record, 
 in 1880, when I published the then concluding 
 volume of a History of the Mutiny, begun by 
 Sir John Kaye, but left unfinished by that 
 distinguished writer. After the publication of 
 that volume I again visited India, and renewed 
 my inquiries among those of my native friends 
 best qualified to arrive at a sound opinion as to 
 the real origin of the Mutiny. The lapse of 
 time had removed any restraints which might 
 have fettered their freedom of speech, and they 
 no longer hesitated to declare that, whilst the 
 action of the Government of India, in Oudh 
 and elsewhere, had undermined the loyalty of 
 the sipahis, and prepared their minds for the 
 conspirators, the conspirators themselves had 
 used all the means in their power to foment 
 the excitement. tThose conspirators, they de- 
 clared, were the Maulavi of Faizabad, the 
 mouthpiece and agent of the discontented in 
 Oudh ; Nana Sahib ; one or two great personages 
 
Preface. ix 
 
 in Lakhnao ; the Rani of Jhansi ; and Kunwar 
 Singh. The action of the land system introduced 
 into the North-west Provinces by Mr Thomason, 
 had predisposed the population of those provinces 
 to revolt^ There remained only to the con- 
 spirators to find a grievance which should so 
 touch the strong religious susceptibilities of 
 the sipahis as to incite them to overt action. 
 Such a grievance they found in the greased 
 cartridge. By the circulation of chapatis they 
 then intimated to the rural population that the 
 time for action was approaching. This version 
 of the immediate causes of the Mutiny is known 
 to be true by some at least who will read these 
 pages ; it is known to be true by all who have 
 taken the trouble to dive below the surface. 
 I have accordingly given it a prominent place 
 in this volume. 
 
 The task of compressing within about four 
 hundred pages the story of a Mutiny which 
 abounded in scenes of action, so many, so varied, 
 so distinct from each other ; of a Mutiny in which 
 every station occupied by English men and 
 English women was either a camp or a battle- 
 ground ; in the outset of which our countrymen, 
 in the several sub-divisions of India, were in the 
 position of detached parties of a garrison, unable 
 to communicate with headquarters or with one 
 another, suddenly surprised and set upon by men 
 whom they had implicitly trusted ; has been one 
 
X Preface. 
 
 the difficulty of which I never reaHsed until I had 
 taken it in hand. When a writer has at his 
 command unlimited space, his task is compara- 
 tively easy. He can then do justice to all the 
 actors in the drama. But I have found it most 
 difficult to mention the names of all who have 
 deserved in a volume every page of which must 
 be devoted to the relation of events. And 
 although my publishers, with a generosity I can- 
 not sufficiently acknowledge, permitted me to 
 increase, by an additional fourth, the number of 
 pages allotted to the series of which this volume 
 is the second issue, I am conscious that I have 
 not sufficiently dwelt upon the splendid individual 
 achievements of many of those who contributed 
 to the final victory. The fact is that* there are so 
 many of them. There never has been an event 
 in History to which the principle of the Order of 
 the Day, published by Napoleon on the morrow of 
 Austerlitz, applies more thoroughly than to the 
 Mutiny of 1857. ' " It will be enough for one of 
 you to say," said the Emperor, in his famous 
 bulletin, '' I was at the Battle of Austerlitz," for all 
 your fellow-citizens to exclaim, " There is a brave 
 man ! " ' Substitute the words ' Indian Mutiny ' for 
 the ' Battle of Austerlitz ' and the phrase applies 
 to that band of heroes whose constancy, whose 
 courage, and whose devotion saved India in 1857. 
 One word as to the spelling I have adopted. 
 It is similar to the spelling which appears in the 
 
Preface, xi 
 
 cabinet edition of Kaye s and Malleson s History^ 
 to the spelling adopted by Captain Eastwick in 
 Murray's admirable guide-books for India, and 
 it is the correct spelling. Some critics have igno- 
 rantly remarked that the natives of India employ 
 no definite spelling for their proper names. But 
 this remark betrays the prejudice of the traveller 
 who disdains to learn. The natives use not only 
 a well-defined spelling for their proper names, 
 but every name has a distinct meaning. The bar- 
 baric method adopted by our forefathers a century 
 and a half since, when they were ignorant of the 
 native languages, and wrote simply according to 
 the sound which reached ears unaccustomed to the 
 precise methods of an Oriental people, totally alters 
 and disfigures that meaning. Take, for example, 
 the word ' Kanhpur,' written, in accordance with 
 barbaric custom, * Cawnpore.' Now, ^Kanhpur' 
 has a definite meaning. ' Kanh/ or ' husband,' 
 is one of the favourite names of ' Krishna.' 
 ' Pur' means ' a city.' The combination of the two 
 words signifies ' Krishna's city.' But what is the 
 meaning of ' Cawnpore' ? It does not even corre- 
 spond to the pronunciation as the name of the place 
 is pronounced by the natives. It serves to remind 
 us of a period of ignorance and indifference to 
 native methods over which it is surely kind 
 to draw the veil. The same reasoning applies 
 to every proper name in India. It is true I have 
 spelt ' Calcutta,' ' Bombay,' and the ' Ganges ' ac- 
 
xii Preface. 
 
 cording to the conventional method ; but the two 
 places and the river have a long European record, 
 and their names thus spelt are so ingrafted in 
 the connection between India and Europe that 
 it would be pedantry to alter them. But Kanhpur 
 and the places to the north-west and north of it 
 were but little known before the Mutiny, and it 
 seems becoming that the events which brought 
 them into European prominence should introduce 
 them under the names which properly belong 
 to them, and which no European prejudice can 
 permanently alter. 
 
 It remains for me now only to acknowledge 
 gratefully the courteous manner in which Messrs 
 W. H. Allen & Co. granted me permission to use, 
 in a reduced form, the plans they had prepared 
 for their larger history of the Indian Mutiny. 
 
 G. B. MALLESON. 
 
 27 West Cromwell Road, 
 October 10, icSgo. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PREFACE. _ ^ 
 
 PACK 
 
 I. INTRODUCTORY, .... I 
 
 II. THE CONSPIRATORS, . . . .21 
 
 III. THE FIRST MUTTERINGS OF THE STORM, . 34 
 
 IV. THE SPREAD OF THE EPIDEMIC, . . 43 
 
 V. BARRACKPUR, CALCUTTA, AND THE NORTH- 
 WEST TO THE 9TH OF MAY, . . 5 1 
 
 VI. THE REVOLT AT MIRATH AND THE SEIZURE OF 
 
 DEHLf, . . . . .64 
 
 Vn. THE EFFECT, THROUGHOUT INDIA, OF THE 
 
 SEIZURE OF DEHLI, . . .87 
 
 VIII. THE PROGRESS OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE 
 
 NORTH-WEST IN MAY AND JUNE, . . 99 
 
 IX. THE MARCH TO DEHLI, . . . .112 
 
 X. kAnhpur, lakhnao, AND allahAbad, . 128 
 
 XL CALCUTTA IN JUNE AND JULY, . . . 151 
 
 XII. THE LEAGUER OF KANHPUR, . . . T59 
 
 XIII. NEILL AT BANARAS AND ALLAHAbAd HAVE- 
 
 LOCK's RECOVERY OF kAnHPUR, . . 178 
 
 XIV. THE RESIDENCY OF LAKHNAO AFTER CHINHAT 
 
 HAVELOCK's FIRST ATTEMPTS TO RE- 
 LIEVE IT, . . , . , 203 
 
XIV 
 
 Contents. 
 
 XV. CALCUTTA AND WESTERN BIHAR IN JULY AND 
 
 AUGUST, . . . . .213 
 
 XVI. THE FIRST RELIEF OF THE LAKHNAO RESIDENCY, 23 1 
 
 XVII. THE LEAGUER OF AGRA, . . . 246 
 
 XVIII. EVENTS IN THE SAGAR AND NARBADA TERRI- 
 TORIES, CENTRAL INDIA, RAJPUTANA, THE 
 MIRATH DISTRICTS, ROHILKHAND, AND 
 THE PAN JAB, . . . .254 
 
 XIX. THE SIEGE AND STORMING OF DEHLI, . . 278 
 
 XX. FROM DEHLI TO AGRA AND KANHPUR SIR 
 
 COLIN CAMPBELL AT KANHPUR, . . 3T3 
 
 XXI. THE SECOND RELIEF OF THE LAKHNAO RESI- 
 DENCY — WINDHAM AND THE GWALIAR CON- 
 TINGENT, ..... 323 
 
 XXII. SIR COLIN CAMPBELL RECOVERS THE DUAB, . 340 
 
 XXIII. EASTERN BENGAL, EASTERN BIHAR, AZAMGARH, 
 
 ALLAHABAD, AND EASTERN OUDH, . 345 
 
 XXIV. THE STORMING OF LAKHNAO, . . -355 
 
 XXV. AZAMGARH — RECONQUEST OF ROHILKHAND, OF 
 OUDH, OF THE AZAMGARH AND WESTERN 
 BIhAr DISTRICTS, .... 370 
 
 XXVL WESTERN AND CENTRAL INDIA, . . . 381 
 
 XXVII. THE LAST EMBERS OF THE REVOLT, . . 398 
 
 XXVIII. CONCLUSION, ..... 403 
 
 INDEX, . . , , , ,413 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 PORTRAIT OF SIR COLIN CAMPBELL, AFTERWARDS LORD 
 
 CLYDE, ....... Frontispiece 
 
 PORTRAIT OF SIR HENRY LAWRENCE, . . . . 6o 
 
 PORTRAIT OF SIR HENRY HAVELOCK, . . . , 1 88 
 
 PORTRAIT OF SIR JAMES OUTRAM, .... 236 
 
 PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS C F THE BRITISH ARMY 
 
 BEFORE DEHLI IN 1857, ..... 278 
 
 SKETCH OF OPERATIONS FOR THE RELIEF AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
 OF THE LAKHNAO GARRISON, ..... 328 
 
 PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE OPERATIONS BEFORE LAKHNAO IN 
 
 MARCH 1858, ....... 358 
 
 V* The Portraits of Lord Ct;) de, Sir H. Laiircnce and Sir H. Hazelock are ergiavcfl 
 by perifiission 0/ Messrs Henry Graves ^ Co. 
 
The Indian Mutiny of 1857 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 In the history of the world there is no more wonderful 
 story than that of the making of the British Empire in 
 India. It was not the result of deliberate design. The 
 early English settlers on the coasts of India thought only 
 of protecting the small tracts of territory conceded to 
 them against aggression from native princes and Euro- 
 pean rivals. For a long time they never dreamt even 
 of questioning the sovereign rights of the native princes 
 who exercised authority in the territories nearest to their 
 possessions. The instructions which the agents on the 
 spot received from the directors of the parent Company at 
 home indicated, in the plainest language, that their busi- 
 ness was to trade ; that to trade advantageously, it was 
 necessary to humour the native princes, to display 
 courtesy and civility, to put away from them all thoughts 
 of aggression. The object of the Company was to pay 
 good dividends. Such a result could only be obtained by 
 the development of peaceful enterprise. 
 
 Suddenly there came a change in the action of the 
 English agents on the Coromandel coast. The English 
 
 A 
 
2 The Early European Settlements, 
 
 had been the third European nation which had sought to 
 open a profitable trade with India, and which, for that 
 purpose, had secured lodgments on her coasts. Of the 
 two nations which had preceded them, the Portuguese had 
 declined ; the Dutch were declining. The vigour and 
 energy of the race which inhabits England was producing, 
 in the rapid increase of the trade, the results which in- 
 variably follow the development of those qualities, when a 
 fourth power, France, the hereditary rival of England in 
 Europe, began, under the influence of MM. Dumas and 
 Dupleix, to develop, in an extraordinary manner, the 
 resources of a settlement which one of her children, 
 Francois Martin, had made, under very difficult circum- 
 stances, on the same coast. This settlement, called from 
 the town of which Martin had obtained possession Pondi- 
 chery, had reached a high state of prosperity under the 
 careful nursing of the immediate predecessor of Dupleix, 
 M. Benoit Dumas. This able man had known how to 
 conciliate the friendship of the native princes on the 
 coast. In return for many civilities and good offices, he 
 had been granted permission to enlist sipahis and to 
 erect fortifications. Between Pondichery and the English 
 settlement of Madras there had been in his time no 
 thought of hostility. Peace between the rival powers 
 reigned in Europe, and no temptation arose in India to 
 disturb the happy relations of friendship. 
 
 In October 1741 M. Dupleix succeeded Dumas at 
 Pondichery. A man remarkably gifted, endowed with a 
 genius which could conceive the largest schemes, he con- 
 tinued that system of ingratiating himself with the native 
 princes, which had been attended with such favourable 
 results in the time of his predecessor. The policy was 
 soon to bear the most brilliant fruits. In 1743 the 
 English and French had taken opposite sides in the war 
 
Rivalry between the French and English. 3 
 
 of the Austrian succession. The battle of Dettingen had 
 been fought (June 16, 1743) before war had actually been 
 declared. But the declaration soon followed, and it was 
 not long before warlike operations, begun in Europe, ex- 
 tended to India. 
 
 Both nations despatched squadrons to the Indian seas. 
 The English squadron, preceded by instructions from the 
 directors of the East India Company to its agent at 
 Madras, Mr Morse, to use it to destroy the French settle- 
 ment at Pondichery, arrived first. But before Morse 
 could carry out his instructions he was compelled to ask 
 the sanction to the undertaking of the ruler of the country 
 of which Madras formed a part, the Nuwab of the Karnatik. 
 But that prince was under the spell exercised by Dumas 
 and Dupleix. He refused the permission, and Pondichery 
 was saved. 
 
 Two years later the position of the two principal 
 European powers on the Coromandel coast was inverted. 
 The English squadron was absent : the French squadron 
 was on the spot. Dupleix then prepared for his rivals the 
 fate with which they had threatened him. In vain did 
 the English appeal to the Nuwab of the Karnatik. That 
 prince, gained by Dupleix, declined to interfere in the 
 quarrel between the settlers. The result was that, on 
 September 21, 1746, Madras surrendered to the French, 
 and was promptly occupied by a garrison composed of 
 French troops and of sipahis trained by French officers. 
 
 The capture of Madras by the French is an im- 
 portant event in the history of the connection of France 
 and England with India ; for it was indirectly the cause 
 of the development of that sipahi army, the great out- 
 break of which, against its masters, it is my object to 
 describe in this volume. It would seem that Dupleix, 
 when pleading to the Nuwab for permission to attack 
 
4 The First Sipdhi Army. 
 
 Madras, had promised that prince that he would transfer 
 it, after he had captured it, to the Nuwab for disposal. 
 But when the Nuwab called upon him to fulfil his pro- 
 mise, he displayed great unwillingness to comply. He 
 wished, at least, to level its fortifications, to dismantle 
 it before making it over. The Nuwab, however, had 
 despatched his son with a force to take possession. To 
 dismantle the place in the presence of that force was 
 impossible. Dupleix determined then to use every diplo- 
 matic means at his disposal to persuade the Nuwab to 
 allow him to retain it. But the young prince who re- 
 presented the Nuwab was impatient, and precipitated a 
 contest by cutting off the water supply of the town and 
 fort. The French governor, Despremesnil, despatched 
 then 400 men and two guns to recover the water springs. 
 It was the first contest on the Coromandel coast between 
 the settlers of either nation and the indigenous popula- 
 tion. Up to that time French and English had carefully 
 refrained from all acts of hostility towards the children 
 of the soil. In the princes of the coast they had recog- 
 nised their landlords, their masters, to whose complaisance 
 they owed the permission to maintain trading stations on 
 the coast. They were to be courted, persuaded, won over, 
 but never opposed. The sortie from Madras of the 2d 
 November 1746 was, then, a rude infringement of a custom 
 till then religiously observed. Its consequences were 
 momentous. The fire of the two French field-pieces, well 
 directed and continuous, put to flight the cavalry of the 
 Nuwab. The water springs were regained without the 
 loss by the French of a single man, whilst about seventy 
 Mughal horsemen bit the dust. 
 
 The son of the Nuwab, Maphuz Khan by name, was 
 not present on this occasion. When he heard of it he 
 attributed the result to accident, to bad leading, to any 
 
First Victory of the Ettropeans, 5 
 
 cause but the right one. He would show himself, he said, 
 how these Europeans should be met. He had heard, the 
 very day of the defeat of his cavalry, that a small force, 
 composed of 230 Frenchmen and 700 trained sipahis, was 
 approaching Madras from Pondichery, and would attempt 
 to cross the little river Adyar, near St Thome, on the 4th 
 (November). Maphuz Khan had at his disposal 10,000 
 men. He took at once a resolution worthy of a great 
 commander. He marched with his whole army to St 
 Thome, occupied a position on the northern bank of the 
 Adyar, so strong and so commanding that he could not 
 fail, if the combatants were at all equal in military 
 qualities, to crush the little force marching on Madras. 
 
 Maphuz Khan was on the chosen spot, eager for 
 combat, when the small French force appeared in sight. 
 Paradis, who commanded it, was an engineer, a man who 
 knew not fear, and who was not easily moved from his 
 purpose. He saw the serried masses in front of him, 
 barring his way. To attack them he must wade through 
 the river, exposed to their fire. Had he hesitated an 
 instant the story of the Europeans in India might have 
 been different. But Paradis recognised, as many English 
 commanders after him have recognised, that the one way 
 for the European to pursue when combating Asiatics is to 
 go forward. He did not hesitate a moment. Without 
 waiting even to reconnoitre, he dashed into the river, 
 scrambled up the bank, formed on it in line, delivered 
 a volley, and charged. The effect was momentous. Never 
 was there fought a more decisive battle, a battle more 
 pregnant with consequences. The army of the Nuwab 
 was completely defeated. Vigorously pursued, it vanished, 
 never again to appear in line against a European enemy, 
 unless supported by the presence of that enemy's European 
 rival. 
 
6 Consequences of the Victory. 
 
 It is impossible to over-estimate the effects on the 
 minds of the native princes and native soldiers of Southern 
 India of the victory gained by the French at St Thome. 
 The famous historian, Mr Orme, who was almost a con- 
 temporary, wrote of it that it broke the charm which had 
 invested the Indian soldiers with the character of being 
 ' a brave and formidable enemy.' Another writer^ has 
 recorded of it that, ' of all the decisive battles fought in 
 India, there is not one more memorable than this. The 
 action at St Thome completely reversed the positions of 
 the Nuwab and the French governor. Not only that, but 
 it inaugurated a new era, it introduced a fresh order of 
 things, it was the first decided step to the conquest of 
 Hindustan by a European power.' 
 
 There can be no doubt but that the result of the battle 
 gave birth in the mind of Dupleix to ideas of conquest, of 
 supremacy, even of empire, in Southern India. It is no 
 part of this work to follow the course he adopted to secure 
 the triumph of those ideas; but this at least has to be 
 admitted, that the scheme of forming a regular force of 
 trained native soldiers, if it did not actually date from the 
 victory of St Thome, acquired from it a tremendous im- 
 petus. Thereafter the spectacle was witnessed of the re- 
 presentatives of two European nations, longtime enemies 
 in Europe, taking opposite sides in the quarrels of native 
 princes in Southern India, and for that purpose employing 
 not only their own countrymen but natives armed and 
 drilled on the European system, led by European officers, 
 vying with their European comrades in deeds of daring 
 and devotion, and becoming by degrees the main supports 
 of their European masters. After the lapse of a few years 
 the European nation which inaugurated the new system 
 
 1 The Decisive Battles of India, from 1746 to 1849 inclusive. New Edition. 
 Page 16. 
 
A H^uldred Years Later. h 
 
 was completely vanquished by its rival. But before that 
 could be accomplished the system had taken a firm hold 
 of that rival. When, in 1756, Clive set out from Madras 
 to recover Calcutta from the hands of Suraju-daulah, he 
 took with him, in addition to his 900 Europeans, 1200 
 sipdhfs, natives of Southern India, armed and drilled on 
 the European system. These men formed the nucleus of 
 that glorious native army which, led by European officers 
 helped their English masters to win Bengal and Bihar 
 from the satraps of the Mughals ; to wrest Bandras and 
 the delta of the Ganges from the Nuwab Wazir of Oudh • 
 to expel the Marathas from the North-west Provinces ; to 
 establish a frontier on the Satlaj ; to invade Afghanistan ; 
 and, finally, to acquire the Panjab. 
 
 In another work^ I have told in detail the principal 
 achievements of that army up to the time when Lord 
 Dalhousie annexed the Panjab (1849). During that 
 period of a hundred years the organisation of the native 
 army had been more than once altered, but the spirit of 
 devotion to its European officers had been manifested 
 throughout all the changes on many memorable occa- 
 sions. In the time of Clive the sipahis had stood firmly 
 by their European masters (i;66) when the European 
 troops in India, officers and men, had mutinied. They 
 had never shrunk from following their European officer 
 whithersoever he would lead them. And if, on some rare 
 occasions, some few of them had displayed momentary 
 disaffection, that disaffection had been, up to 1857, the 
 result of feelings in which there was not the smallest 
 tinge of patriotism. Speaking broadly, the result in each 
 instance was the consequence of an attempt, well meant 
 but clumsily carried out, to graft western ideas upon an 
 
 ^ The Decisive Battles of India. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1888. 
 New Edition. 
 
8 Forcmp[ Western Ideas 
 
 <b 
 
 oriental people. The secret of the influence of the 
 Englishman in India has lain in the fact that he had so 
 conducted himself, in all his relations with the children of 
 the soil, that his word had come to be regarded as equal 
 to his bond. It was only when the sipahi, at Vellor in 
 1806, at Barrackpur in 1824 and again in 1852, in the 
 North-western Provinces in 1844, in the Panjab in 1849-50, 
 deemed that the promises made to him on his enlist- 
 ment had been deliberately violated, that he displayed an 
 obstinate determination to break with his master rather 
 than to continue service on terms which, it seemed to him, 
 could be disregarded at that master's pleasure. 
 
 Action of a different character, although based on the 
 same principle, so dear to the untravelled Englishman, 
 of forcing the ideas in which he has been nurtured upon 
 the foreign people with whom he is brought into contact, 
 assisted, especially after the first Afghan war, to loosen 
 the bonds of discipline, which, up to that period, had 
 bound the sipahi to his officer. In the time of Clive the 
 sipahi army had been officered on the principle which, 
 in India, is known as the irregular system. The men 
 were dressed in the oriental fashion, the companies were 
 commanded by native officers ; the European officers 
 attached to each battalion, few in number, were picked 
 men, selected entirely for their fitness to deal with 
 and command native troops. The powers of the com- 
 manding officer were large. He was, to the sipahi, the 
 impersonification of the British power in India. His word 
 was law. Beyond him the mind of the sipahi did not care 
 to travel. The sipahi did not concern himself with regu- 
 lations and appeals to the Commander-in-Chief. The 
 system had answered admirably. It was in force through- 
 out the reigns of Clive and Warren Hastings, and in no 
 single respect had it failed. 
 
upon an Eastern People. 9 
 
 But in course of time the idea came to the ruh'ng 
 authorities in India that great advantage would accrue 
 if the sipahi regiments were to be remodelled on the 
 system then prevailing in the British army. Just before 
 the great Marquess Wellesley, then Lord Mornington, 
 a/rived in India, such a scheme was carried into effect 
 /1796). The dress of the sipahis was assimilated to that 
 of his European comrades. The native officers, though 
 maintained, were relegated to an inferior position. The 
 English system, with its list of captains, lieutenants, and 
 ensigns, supervised by a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, 
 and a major, was introduced into the native army, and 
 that army was brought more completely than it had ever 
 been before into the European centralising system. 
 
 Fortunately for the tranquillity of British India it was 
 only gradually, almost imperceptibly, that the great powers 
 of the commanding officer were interfered with. Under 
 the new system the sipahis fought well against Tipu 
 Sahib, against the Marathas, against the Pindaris, and 
 against the Peshwa. They conducted themselves with 
 their accustomed courage and resolution in the first war 
 with Burma, 1825-6. Then came a period of peace, to be 
 broken only in 1838 by the first invasion of Afghanistan. 
 
 That the disasters of the first Afghan war had an 
 effect on the feelings with which the sipahi had until then 
 regarded his English master is undeniable. During that 
 war he had behaved with remarkable courage, self-denial, 
 and devotion. A distinguished officer who served in it 
 declared on a public occasion, after the return of the 
 troops, that his personal experience had convinced him 
 that, properly led, the sipahi would follow his English 
 oflicer anywhere, and would bear uncomplainingly any 
 amount of hardships. But the imagination exercises upon 
 the mind of an oriental an influence which is often not at 
 
lo The Fii'st Afghan War. 
 
 all understood by the colder nature of the Englishman. 
 Notwithstanding the triumphs of Nott and Pollock in the 
 last phases of the war, the sipahi recognised that for the 
 first time the enterprise of his English master against a 
 native power had failed. There was no disguising the 
 fact that the English troops had suffered greatly, and had 
 finally retreated ; that the soldiers of the Punjab, a terri- 
 tory which they had traversed on sufferance, had scoffed 
 and jeered at them whenever they came in contact with 
 them. They realised that a heavy blow had been dealt 
 to British prestige. Possibly, with that tendency to ex- 
 aggeration which characterises imaginative natures, they 
 thought the blow greater than it actually had been. 
 
 But the retreat from Afghanistan was but the begin- 
 ning of many evils. Within two years of the return of 
 the army Lord Ellenborough annexed the province of 
 Sind. The annexation was absolutely necessary, and had 
 the Government of India been ruled by men of Indian 
 experience, that is, by men possessing experience of the 
 natives of India north-west of Bengal, the annexation 
 might have been made a source of strength, instead of for 
 a time weakening the relations of the Government with 
 its native army, and in the end impairing its efficiency. 
 
 The first step taken by the Government shook the 
 confidence of the sipahis in its promises. Up to that 
 time certain extra allowances for food had been granted 
 to all sipahi regiments serving beyond the then British 
 frontier. Now, service in the hot and arid regions of Sind 
 had always been distasteful to the sipahi of the Bengal 
 Presidency, but he was reconciled to the discomforts by 
 the promise that, whilst employed in that province, he 
 should receive a considerable addition to his pay. But 
 the Government of India argued that the incorporation of 
 Sind within the British territories had cancelled the pre- 
 
Mistakes of the Indian Government, 1 1 
 
 vailing regulations referring to service beyond the Indus, 
 and they notified the fact to the several divisional com- 
 manders. The result was to create so great a revulsion 
 in the minds of the sipahis that the native regiments 
 under orders for Sind refused to march thither. 
 
 Ultimately the difficulty was got over, but in a manner 
 not very creditable to the Government. The Bengal troops 
 were relieved of the necessity of garrisoning Sind, and 
 their place was taken by native troops from Bombay. 
 One commanding officer was dismissed the service be- 
 cause, to induce his men to march, he had guaranteed 
 them the allowances to which they considered them- 
 selves entitled, as indeed, upon the principles of abstract 
 justice, they were. One regiment was disbanded. 
 Sipahis in others were selected for punishment. The 
 Government of India believed they had by these and 
 kindred measures staj/ed the plague, when in reality they 
 had shaken to the core the confidence of the sipahis in 
 their justice, and laid the foundation of the evils which 
 followed thirteen years later. 
 
 Those evils were precipitated by the conduct of the 
 Commanders-in-Chief sent out from England, often without 
 the smallest experience of India, to command, that is, to 
 administer, an army of sipahfs outnumbering, in the pro- 
 portion of five to one, the European garrison — men born 
 under a different sky, bred in a religion and in the respect of 
 customs regarding which the Commanders-in-Chief knew 
 nothing and desired to know nothing, and animated by 
 sentiments which prompted them either to be the most 
 docile of followers or the most importunate of solicitors. 
 These Commanders-in-Chief were, up to the close of the 
 Mutiny, men trained in the traditions of the Horse Guards, 
 and who, in their narrow view, regarded any deviation 
 from those traditions as an evil to be at all cost eradicated. 
 
1 2 Mistakes of Military A dministration. 
 
 For a long time they had chafed at the largeness of the 
 powers exercised by commanding officers of native regi- 
 ments. They were eager to introduce into the guiding of 
 those regiments the rule of red tape and routine. For 
 some time the Adjutants-General, men trained in the native 
 army, and placed at their elbow to prevent the too great 
 exercise of a mischievous zeal, had restrained their action. 
 But after the first Afghan war there arose a series of courtly 
 Adjutants-General who, far from checking, even stimulated 
 the narrow instincts of their chief. It gradually became 
 the fashion at army Headquarters to quote the Horse 
 Guards as the model for all that was practical and military. 
 When it is recollected that in those days the military in- 
 stincts of the Horse Guards had been displayed by devis- 
 ing a clothing for the European soldier so tight that if he 
 were to drop his bayonet he could scarcely stoop to pick 
 it up, that the weapon known as ' Brown Bess ' was lauded 
 up, from the Commander-in-Chief downwards, as the most 
 perfect of weapons, that inventions tending to improve our 
 military system were steadily discouraged, that the highest 
 authorities of the British army— the great Duke himself— 
 deliberately preferred to live in a fool's paradise, declaring 
 that because the British army had been able to go any- 
 where and do anything in 1814, therefore, without taking 
 advantage of the improvements developed in the course 
 of thirty years of peace, it could accomplish the same 
 results in 1844, it can easily be understood why the Com- 
 manders-in-Chief in India, the nominees and adulators of 
 one great man, should do their utmost to bring the native 
 army within the fold of red tape, the fold which they had 
 been taught to regard as the most perfect in the world. 
 
 By degrees, then, after the first return from Afghanistan, 
 and when the refusal of the sipahis to march to Sind 
 afforded an excuse for the contention that the discipline 
 
Discipline tmdermined. 13 
 
 of the native army required to be looked to, the Com- 
 manders-in-Chief in India reduced that army to the Horse 
 Guards' standard. They restricted the powers of the com- 
 manding officers ; they encouraged appeals to army Head- 
 quarters ; they insisted that promotion to the rank of 
 native officer should be regulated, not by merit, but by 
 seniority. They issued order after order the tendency of 
 which was to impress upon the mind of the imaginative 
 oriental the conviction that the Government desired to 
 pet the sipahi at the expense of his actual commandant. 
 In this way they undermined the discipline of the army, 
 and made their European regimental officers contempti- 
 ble in the eyes of their men. 
 
 The sipahis have always obeyed a master who knows 
 how to command. But they will not obey a lay figure. Nor, 
 equally, will they transfer their respect to an unseen 
 authority residing in the lofty hill ranges which overlook 
 the plains of Hindustan. They may use that unseen 
 authority, indeed, to vex and annoy and baffle their own 
 commandant. And that was the manner in which, for a 
 few years immediately prior to the Mutiny, the sipahis 
 did use it. By petitions against the rulings of the officers 
 appointed to command them, petitions examined and 
 acted upon by the authority in the hills who did not 
 know them, they in many cases rendered the enforcement 
 of a rigid state of discipline impossible. 
 
 Whilst the determination of inexperienced Com- 
 manders-in-Chief, that is, of Commanders-in-Chief unac- 
 quainted with the oriental mind, but tied hand and foot 
 to the traditions of the Horse Guards, was thus under- 
 mining the discipline of native regiments, other causes 
 were supervening to alarm them as to their personal in- 
 terests. The sipahis of the Bengal army were enlisted, 
 with the exception of those of six regiments, for service in 
 
14 Mistakes of the Government. 
 
 India only. They were never to be required to cross the 
 sea. It happened, however, in 1852, whilst the second 
 Burmese war was being waged, that the Governor-Gen- 
 eral, Lord Dalhousie, desired to send a native regiment 
 to that country in addition to those then employed there. 
 There were many ways of accomplishing this end without 
 riding roughshod over the rights and engagements of the 
 sipdhis. Lord Dalhousie might have despatched one of 
 the six regiments pledged to service across the sea, or he 
 might have called for volunteers. He did neither. He 
 arbitrarily selected a regiment stationed at Barrackpur, the 
 sipahis of which had enlisted on the condition that they 
 were to serve in Hindustan, and in Hindustan only. The 
 sipahis, whose minds had been emancipated, by the process 
 referred to in the preceding page, from all respect for 
 their commanding officer, had none for a Governor-Gen- 
 eral who trod upon their privileges. They flatly refused 
 to embark. Lord Dalhousie was placed by his own act 
 in the invidious position of having to succumb. The 
 story spread like wildfire all over India. The effect^ of it 
 was most disastrous to discipline. In the lines and huts 
 of the sipahis the warmest sympathy was expressed for a 
 regiment which could thus successfully defy a Governor- 
 General. 
 
 Then followed the crowning act : the act which touched 
 to the quick nine-tenths of the sipahis in the Bengal army, 
 and many of those serving in the Bombay Presidency. The 
 sipahis serving in Madras were not affected by it. When 
 the storm came, in 1857, the Madras sipahis then took no 
 part in the revolt. The case may thus be stated. The 
 majority of the sipahis serving in the Bengal Presidency, 
 and a proportion of those serving in the Bombay army, 
 were recruited from the kingdom of Oudh. The sipahi 
 
 ■^ I am writing from my own personal experience. 
 
The Aii7texatioii of Oiidh. 1 5 
 
 so recruited possessed the right of petitioning the British 
 Resident at the Court of Lakhnao (Lucknow) on all matters 
 affecting his own interests, and the interests of his family in 
 the Oudh dominion. This right of petition was a privilege 
 the value of which can be realised by those who have any 
 knowledge of the working of courts of justice in a native 
 state. The Resident of Lakhnao was, in the eyes of the 
 native judge, the advocate of the petitioning sipahi. The 
 advantage of possessing so influential an advocate was so 
 great that there was scarcely a family in Oudh which was 
 not represented in the native army. Service in that army 
 was consequently so popular that Oudh became the best 
 recruiting ground in India. Events subsequent to the 
 Mutiny have shown that the reason why it was so re- 
 garded lay in the enormous benefits accruing to the sipahi 
 from a system which made the British Resident his advo- 
 cate. 
 
 All at once this privilege was swept away. The 
 British Government decided to annex Oudh. Oudh was 
 annexed. Sir James Outram was sent from Calcutta to 
 take possession. I happened, at the time, to be the officer 
 at Kanhpur (Cawnpore) upon whom devolved the duty 
 of supplying carriage to the force which was to cross the 
 Ganges and march upon Lakhnao. Never shall I forget 
 the agitation which prevailed in the sipahi guard over my 
 official quarters when the object of the expedition oozed 
 out. Most of those forming it were Oudh men, and I 
 had to use all the influence I possessed to prevent an 
 outbreak. My native subordinates in the Commissariat 
 department assured me that a similar feeling was being 
 manifested in the lines of the sipahis. I reported the 
 matter to the general, and I mentioned it to one of the 
 highest of the new^ officials who passed through the station 
 to take up his post in Oudh. My warnings were dis- 
 
1 6 The Annexation of Ondh, 
 
 regarded ; but when the crisis at Kanhpur arose, and 
 when those regiments displayed against British officers, 
 their own included, a truculent hatred not surpassed, and 
 scarcely equalled, at any other station, they were re- 
 membered. 
 
 The annexation of Oudh was felt as a personal blow 
 by every sipahi in the Bengal army, because it deprived 
 him of an immemorial privilege exercised by himself and 
 his forefathers for years, and which secured to him a posi- 
 tion of influence and importance in his own country. 
 With the annexation that importance and that influence 
 disappeared, never to return. English officials succeeded 
 the native judges. The right of petition was abolished. 
 The great inducement to enlist disappeared. 
 
 Nor was the measure more palatable to the large land- 
 owners. The two officers to whom the Government of 
 India confided the administration of the newly annexed 
 province, Mr Coverley Jackson and Mr Gubbins, had been 
 trained in the school the disciples of which, endeavouring 
 to graft western ideas upon an eastern people, had done 
 their best in the North-west Provinces to abolish land- 
 lordism in the sense in which landlordism had flourished 
 in those provinces since the time of Akbar. The result 
 of their revolutionary proceedings was shown, in 1857, by 
 the complete sympathy displayed by the civil districts in 
 the North-west Provinces with the revolted sipahis. It 
 was shown in Oudh by the rising of the landowners 
 throughout the province. 
 
 The causes I have stated had brought the mind of the 
 sipahi, in 1856, to fever heat. He had lost faith in the 
 Government he served. The action of army Head- 
 quarters had deprived him of all respect for his officers. 
 He was ready to be practised upon by any schemer. 
 His mind was in the perturbed condition which disposes 
 
The Conspirators. i^ 
 
 a man to believe any assertion, however improbable in 
 itself. 
 
 Conspirators to work upon so promising a soil were not 
 wanting to the occasion. There was a large amount of 
 seething discontent in many portions of India. In Oudh, 
 recently annexed ; in the territories under the rule of the 
 Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces, revolu- 
 tionised by the introduction of the land-tenure system of 
 Mr Thomason ; in the Southern Maratha territory, the 
 chiefs of which had been exasperated to the very verge 
 of revolt by an inquiry, instituted under the auspices 
 of a commission, called the Inam Commission, into the 
 titles of estates which they and their forefathers had held 
 without question since the beginning of the century, 
 men's minds were excited and anxious. Suddenly, shortly 
 after the annexation of Oudh, this seething discontent 
 found expression. Who all the active conspirators were 
 may probably never be known. One of them, there can 
 be no question, was he who, during the progress of the 
 Mutiny, was known as the Maulavi? The Maulavi was 
 a very remarkable man. His name was Ahmad-ullah, 
 and his native place was Faizabad in Oudh. In person 
 he was tall, lean, and muscular, with large deep-set eyes, 
 beetle brows, a high aquiline nose, and lantern jaws. Sir 
 Thomas Seaton, who enjoyed, during the suppression of 
 the revolt, the best means of judging him, described him 
 ' as a man of great abilities, of undaunted courage, of stern 
 determination, and by far the best soldier among the 
 rebels.' Such was the man selected by the discontented 
 in Oudh to sow throughout India the seeds which, on 
 a given signal, should spring to active growth. Of the 
 ascertained facts respecting his action this at least has 
 been proved, that very soon after the annexation of Oudh 
 
 1 The word 'Maulavi' signifies 'a learned man/ also 'a doctor of law.' 
 
 B 
 
1 8 The Conspirators. 
 
 he travelled over the North-west Provinces on a mission 
 which was a mystery to the European authorities ; that he 
 stayed some time at Agra ; that he visited Dehli, Mirath, 
 Patna, and Calcutta; that, in April 1857, shortly after his 
 return, he circulated seditious papers throughout Oudh ; 
 that the police did not arrest him ; that the executive at 
 Lakhnao, alarmed at his progress, despatched a body of 
 troops to seize him ; that, taken prisoner, he was tried and 
 condemned to death ; that, before the sentence could be 
 executed, the Mutiny broke out ; that, escaping, he be- 
 came the confidential friend of the Begum of Lakhnao, 
 the trusted leader of the rebels. 
 
 That this man was the brain and the hand of the con- 
 spiracy there can, I think, be little doubt. During his 
 travels he devised the scheme known as the chapati 
 scheme. Chapatis are cakes of unleavened bread, the cir- 
 culation of which from hand to hand is easy, and causes 
 no suspicion. The great hope of the Maulavi was to work 
 upon the minds, already prone to discontent, of the 
 sipahis. When the means of influencing the armed men 
 in the service of the British Government should have been 
 so matured that, on a given signal, they would be prepared 
 to rise simultaneously, the circulation of chapatis amongst 
 the rural population of the North-west Provinces would 
 notify to them that a great rising would take place on the 
 first favourable opportunity. 
 
 It is probable that, whilst he was at Calcutta, the 
 Maulavi, constantly in communication with the sipahis 
 stationed in the vicinity of that city, discovered the in- 
 strument which should act with certain effect on their 
 already excited natures. It happened that, shortly before, 
 the Government of India had authorised the introduction 
 in the ranks of the native army of a new cartridge, the 
 exterior of which was smeared with fat These cartridges 
 
The Greased Cartridge. 19 
 
 were prepared in the Government factory at Dam-Dam, 
 one of the suburbs of Calcutta. The practice with the old 
 paper cartridges, used with the old musket, the ' Brown 
 Bess,' already referred to, had been to bite off the paper at 
 one end previous to ramming it down the barrel. When 
 the conspirators suddenly lighted upon the new cartridge, 
 not only smeared, but smeared with the fat of the hog 
 or the cow, the one hateful to the Muhammadans, the 
 other the sacred animal of the Hindus, they recognised 
 that they had found a weapon potent enough to rouse 
 to action the armed men of the races which professed 
 those religions. What could be easier than to persuade 
 the sipahis that the greasing of the new cartridges was a 
 well-thought-out scheme to deprive the Hindu of his caste, 
 to degrade the Muhammadan ? 
 
 If the minds of the sipahis had not been excited and 
 rendered suspicious of their foreign masters by the occur- 
 rences to which I have adverted, the tale told by the con- 
 spirators would have failed to affect them. For, after all, 
 they, up to January 1857, had had no experience of the 
 greased cartridges. A new musket had been partially issued, 
 and a certain number of sipahis from each regiment at Bar- 
 rackpur were being instructed in its use at Dam-Dam. But 
 up to that period no greased cartridges had been issued. 
 The secret of their preparation was, however, disclosed in 
 January, by a lascar employed in their manufacture to a 
 sipahi, and the story, once set rolling, spread with indescrib- 
 able celerity. In the olden days, the days before the confi- 
 dence between the sipahi and his officer had been broken, 
 the sipahi would at once have asked his officer the reason 
 for the change. But, in 1857, they sullenly accepted the 
 story. They had been told that the object of their foreign 
 masters was to make them all Christians. The first step in 
 the course to Christianity was to deprive them of their caste. 
 
20 The Sipdhi had been tmdermined. 
 
 This end could be accomplished insidiously by the defile- 
 ment to be produced by biting the greased cartridge. Ex- 
 istence without a religion was in their minds intolerable. 
 Deprived of their own, having become outcasts by their 
 own act, they must, in despair, accept the religion of their 
 masters. 
 
 That such was the reasoning which influenced them 
 subsequent events fully proved. In the times of the 
 earlier invasions of India by the Muhammadan princes 
 who preceded the Mughals the conqueror had employed 
 compulsion and persecution as the one mode of converting 
 the Hindus. The sipahis, alarmed and suspicious, could 
 conceive no other. It was in vain that, in the earlier 
 stages of the Mutiny, General Hearsey, an accomplished 
 linguist, addressing the sipahis in their own language, 
 told them that such ways were essentially foreign to the 
 Christian's conception of Christianity ; that the Christian's 
 religion was the religion of the Book ; and that conver- 
 sion could only be founded on the conviction of the mind. 
 They heard, but heeded not. What was this argument 
 but a wile to entrap them ? The conspirators had done 
 their work too well. Before the hot season of 1857 had 
 set in there were but few sipahis in the Bengal Presi- 
 dency who were not firmly convinced that the greased 
 cartridge was the weapon by means of which their foreign 
 masters had resolved to deprive them of their religion. 
 No sooner had it become certain that this idea had taken 
 a firm root in their minds than chapatis passed from 
 village to village in the rural districts of the North-west 
 Provinces, announcing to the population that grave events 
 were impending for which it became them to be prepared. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE CONSPIRATORS. 
 
 On the 29th of February 1856 Charles John, Viscount 
 Canning, succeeded Lord Dalhousie as Governor-General 
 of India. Lord Canning possessed many qualities which 
 fitted him for the onerous office. The second son of an 
 illustrious statesman, he had himself received the educa- 
 tion which trains a man to enter upon a Parliamentary 
 career. He had sat in both Houses, had filled with credit 
 some high offices, and had been a member of the Cabinet 
 of Lord Palmerston which had decided to annex Oudh. 
 To that annexation Lord Canning, as a member of the 
 Cabinet, had given his assent. He was a large-minded 
 man, possessing noble and generous instincts, a taking 
 presence, was a thorough worker, conscientious, scrupulous, 
 and resolute. The only objection which the most captious 
 critic could have made to the appointment was an objec- 
 tion which would have equally applied to the great 
 Marquess Wellesley, and to all the intermediate rulers 
 of India — he possessed no practical knowledge of India 
 and its people. 
 
 A statesman, however gifted, despatched from England 
 to rule a country with a population of two hundred and 
 fifty millions, must be for some time after his arrival 
 dependent on the councillors bequeathed to him by his 
 predecessor. Now, the predecessor of Lord Canning had 
 been a very masterful man : a born ruler of men ; a man 
 
2 2 Lord Canitine' and his CotmciL 
 
 t, 
 
 who required, not councillors with whom to consult, but 
 servants to carry out his orders. In one sense it was 
 a misfortune for Lord Canning that immediately after 
 his arrival he had to depend upon those servants for 
 advice. 
 
 Amongst them, doubtless, were some very able men. 
 The ablest of all, Mr John Peter Grant, was a member of 
 his Council. Mr Grant was, in every sense of the term, 
 a statesman. His views were large and liberal. He saw 
 at a glance the point of a question. He decided quickly ; 
 unravelled, with remarkable clearness, the most knotty 
 questions, and spoke out with the fearlessness which 
 becomes a real man. If Mr Grant had had a larger 
 personal experience of the people, he would have been 
 one of the greatest of the civil servants of India. But 
 his service had been mainly spent in close connection 
 with Calcutta, and he had no personal knowledge 
 of the country to the north-west of Patna, or of its 
 people. 
 
 The military member of Council, General Low, was 
 likewise a man of ability ; but he had passed the greater 
 part of his service as Political Agent or as Resident of 
 native Courts. His experience of the native army was, 
 therefore, somewhat rusty. 
 
 The legal member of Council, Mr Barnes Peacock, was 
 remarkable for his sound legal acquirements, but he had 
 no experience outside Calcutta. 
 
 Of the others, and of all the principal secretaries, it 
 must suffice to state that they were excellent clerks; but 
 not having been accustomed to act on their own initiative, 
 having been accustomed to take their orders from the 
 imperious lips of Lord Dalhousie, they were little fitted 
 to act as councillors to a newly arrived master at 
 a moment when the country was about to pass through 
 
Not a Cltrnd on the Horizon. 23 
 
 a crisis — a crisis the more terrible in that there was 
 not one of them who would allow himself to regard it 
 as possible ; not one of them, with the exception of 
 Mr Grant, who believed in its immensity even when it 
 was upon them. 
 
 But, at the moment of Lord Canning's arrival, it 
 seemed as though clerks would be as useful to him as 
 councillors. The surface was calm and unbroken. There 
 was not visible on the horizon even the little cloud no 
 bigger than a man's hand. On his journey homewards 
 Lord Dalhousie had written a minute, in which he had 
 painted in roseate hues the condition of India, the con- 
 tentment of the sipahis, and the improbability of disturb- 
 ance from any cause whatever. He had quitted India 
 amid the applause, largely mingled with regret at his 
 departure, of multitudes of sorrowing disciples By these 
 he was reverenced as the greatest of men. If some 
 captious subaltern dared to insinuate that the discipline 
 of the army had deteriorated, that the minds of the 
 sipahis were inflamed against their masters, he was 
 silenced by the contemptuous remark that it was im- 
 probable that his knowledge could be more deep-reaching 
 than was that of Lord Dalhousie. 
 
 On the 29th of Febuary, then, and for the rest of the 
 year 1856, all was calm and smiling on the surface, and 
 Lord Canning was well content with his clerks. 
 
 Nor, during the remaining months of 1856, did there 
 occur any overt act on the part of the many discontented 
 throughout India to weaken the impression that the pic- 
 ture painted by Lord Dalhousie in his elaborate minute 
 was absolutely correct. As far as appearances went, the 
 prevailing impression made on the minds of those residing 
 in the great centres of the several provinces was that it 
 was a year of more than ordinary humdrum. It was 
 
24 Sir Henry Lawrence sent to Oudh. 
 
 argued that the strong impression made by Lord Dalhousie 
 on the country and its diverse races remained active even 
 after his departure. Lord Canning simply administered 
 the country on the principles and by means of the men 
 bequeathed to him by his predecessor. He had experi- 
 enced, indeed, some difficulty with Oudh. Not, indeed, 
 that the question, which was recurring with increasing in- 
 tensity every day to the minds of the sipahis,^ as to the 
 injurious effects which the annexation had produced on 
 their prospects, ever presented itself to Lord Canning or 
 his councillors. The difficulty was caused by the squabbles, 
 amounting to a public scandal, between the two senior 
 members of the Commission whose administration had 
 supplanted that of the deposed king, Mr Coverley Jackson 
 and Mr Martin Gubbins. The scandal lasted throughout 
 the year, and was only terminated by the removal of Mr 
 Jackson, in January of the year following, and the appoint- 
 ment in his place of one of the most illustrious of the men 
 who have contributed to the securing on a firm foundation 
 of the British rule in India — the wise and virtuous Sir 
 Henry Lawrence. The task bequeathed to Sir Henry 
 was no light one ; for the principle which had sown dis- 
 content throughout the North-west Provinces, the principle 
 of grafting western ideas on an eastern people — a principle 
 which he had combated all his life — had made every land- 
 owner in Oudh a rebel at heart. 
 
 There was another event, outside India indeed, but con- 
 nected with India, which occupied the attention of Lord 
 Canning during the first year of his incumbency of office, 
 and which temporarily somewhat diminished his power of 
 grappling with any military difficulty which might arise. 
 I refer to the war with Persia. 
 
 Up to the year 1856, certainly, it had been a cardinal 
 
 ^ Vide page 15. 
 
The War with Persia. 25 
 
 principle of British policy that Persia was never to possess 
 Herat. Herat and Kandahar were the two points in 
 Western Afghanistan which commanded the lines always 
 followed, from the time of Alexander to that of Ahmad 
 Shah, by the invaders of India, and which, therefore, it was 
 necessary should be held by the friends of British India, 
 if not by British India herself. During the first war waged 
 by Great Britain with Afghanistan, Persia had posed as a 
 pawn pushed forwards by Russia to gain a dominant 
 position on the Indian frontier. But, in 1838, Russia was 
 disinclined to support her pawn. She was more prepared 
 for action when the Crimean war broke out. But when 
 the Shah of Persia realised the fact that the powerful 
 nation which had filched from him some of his most fertile 
 provinces was in deadly grip with England and France, he 
 suspended his insidious action regarding Herat until he 
 should be able to form a definite opinion as to the result 
 of the struggle. He resumed that insidious action as soon 
 as he recognised that the peace of Paris had given Russia 
 a free hand to subdue the barrier of the Caucasus. Re- 
 garding Russia as fully occupied, and England as ex- 
 hausted, he despatched an army to besiege Herat. The 
 ruler of the province of which Herat was the capital, 
 who occupied a position of semi-independence, at once 
 hoisted British colours, and implored the assistance of the 
 Amir Dost Muhammad. Various circumstances, into which 
 it is not necessary to enter, gave indications that the 
 Persians would be resisted to the last. However, it was 
 not so, and before any steps could be taken Herat had 
 fallen. 
 
 The clear mind of the then Prime Minister of Great 
 Britain, the resolute Lord Palmerston, had already recog- 
 nised the importance of the situation, and he resolved to 
 compel Persia to retire. The means he adopted were those 
 
2 6 Close of the Persian War. 
 
 best calculated to obtain the result aimed at with the 
 smallest expenditure of blood and money. He directed 
 the formation of a mixed force of English and Indian 
 troops, to be commanded by Sir James Outram, to attack 
 Persia on the side of the Persian Gulf, and he authorised 
 the Governor-General of India to come to a cordial un- 
 derstanding with the Amir of Afghanistan. 
 
 Before the army could land on the Persian coast, Herat, 
 I have said, had fallen. But very soon afterwards the 
 Commissioner of the Panjab, Mr John Lawrence, held at 
 Peshawar (January 1857) that interview with Dost Muham- 
 mad which resulted in a cordial understanding between 
 that sagacious prince and the stern and resolute repre- 
 sentative of the might of Great Britain. Later still, Out- 
 ram, landing at Bushir, gained two victories, which had 
 the effect of forcing the Shah to sue for peace. The 
 consequence was that, in May 1857, ^e resigned all 
 claim to Herat, which he surrendered, and signed, by 
 his agents, at Paris, a treaty of peace. The troops 
 composing Outram's force were thus available in May 
 for any service which Lord Canning might require at 
 their hands. 
 
 During the year the circumstances attendant upon the 
 refusal of the 38th Regiment N. I. to proceed by sea to 
 Burma had caused Lord Canning to look up an Act, 
 already drafted, having for its object the so altering of the 
 terms of the enlistment of the sipahi as to make, in the 
 future, every regiment available for service across the seas. 
 The Act did not touch the interests of sipahis already en- 
 hsted. It referred simply to those who might enter the 
 service thereafter. In July 1856 that Act became law. In 
 itself the Act was a just and righteous Act. Issued at any 
 other time, it would have caused no feeling whatever. 
 The men of the six regiments already enlisting for general 
 
Other Conspirators. 27 
 
 service were of as high a caste as were the men who engaged 
 only to serve locally. But the minds of the sipahis were 
 excited. The annexation of Oudh had caused them to 
 lose faith in their foreign masters. And it is quite 
 possible that the alteration, which did not escape the 
 watchful eyes of the men who were fomenting disorder, 
 acted as an additional argument to prove that gradual 
 steps were to be taken to deprive them of their 
 caste. 
 
 I have already referred to the action of the Maulavi of 
 Faizabad as being instrumental in creating and increas- 
 ing the undercurrent of hostility to British rule through 
 Bengal and the North-west Provinces. It is impossible, 
 however, to leave this subject without mentioning the 
 action of the son of the ex-Peshwa, Baji Rao, and his 
 agent, Azim-ullah Khan. It is the more necessary that 
 such mention should be made, because, whatever may be 
 the opinion of Europeans saturated with the western 
 ideas, and with the conceit those ideas often engender, 
 there can be no doubt but that, during the Mutiny, on the 
 morrow of the Mutiny, and at the present day, the culti- 
 vated natives of India attributed and attribute a great 
 deal of the bitterness attendant on the uprising to the 
 treatment meted out to Nana Sahib by the Government 
 of India. I know that it has been contended, and recently 
 most ably contended,^ that that treatment was absolutely 
 just. It was just according to western ideas. But the 
 oriental mind does not admit of the validity of an agree- 
 ment which deprives a man of his kingdom and makes 
 no provision for his family after his death. Such was the 
 grievance of Nana Sahib. He had no title in law. But 
 the natives of India believed then, they believe still, that 
 he had a moral claim superior to all law. 
 
 ^ Sir William Hunter's Dalhoiisie, 162-3. 
 
2 8 Nana Sahib. 
 
 The case may thus be stated. The Peshwa had been, 
 by virtue of his title, the lord of all the Maratha princes. 
 Of all the Peshwas, Baji Rao had been the most false to 
 his own countrymen, and the worst. But for many years 
 he had been loyal to the British. Tempted, however, in 
 1 8 17, by the rising of Holkar and the war with the Pindaris, 
 and hoping to recover the lost influence of his House, he 
 had risen, had been beaten, and, in 1 818, had thrown him- 
 self on the mercy of the British. He was deprived of his 
 dominions, and granted a pension for life of eight lakhs 
 of rupees. He took up his residence at Bithor, near the 
 military station of Kanhpur, adopted a son, and lived a 
 quiet life till his death in 1851. 
 
 The Government of India permitted his adopted son, 
 whose name was Dhundu Pant, but who was generally 
 known as Nana Sahib, to inherit the savings of Baji Rao, 
 and they presented to him the fee-simple of the property 
 at Bithor. But Nana Sahib had to provide for a very large 
 body of followers, bequeathed to his care by Baji Rao ; 
 and the two British Commissioners who, in succession, 
 superintended the administration of the estate supported 
 the proposal made from Bithor that a portion of the late 
 ex-Peshwa's allowance should be reserved for the support 
 of the family. They had some reason for their suggestion, 
 for when, some little time before his death, Baji Rao had 
 petitioned the Home Government that his adopted son 
 might succeed to the title and pension of Peshwa, whilst 
 the grant of the title was refused absolutely, the question 
 of the pension was reserved for future consideration, that 
 is, until the seat of the ex-Peshwa should be vacant. 
 
 It seems to me that high policy should have shown 
 some consideration for the heir of one who had been the 
 lord of Western India, and whose territories we had taken. 
 A slight relaxation of the hard and fast policy character- 
 
Nana Sahib. 29 
 
 istic of Lord Dalhousie's rule might have saved the British 
 from many future troubles. When, in 1844, the House of 
 Sindhia, defeated in battle, was at the feet of Lord Ellen- 
 borough, that nobleman imposed upon it no penalty. His 
 generosity bore splendid fruit in 1857-8. Far different 
 was the result of the policy pursued towards Nana Sahib, 
 Lord Dalhousie declared the recommendation made by the 
 two Commissioners in his favour to be ' uncalled for and 
 unreasonable.' He directed that ' the determination of the 
 Government of India may be explicitly declared to the 
 family without delay.' The determination was conse- 
 quently so declared. Ought we to wonder that, in 1857, 
 the crab-tree did produce the crab-apple ? 
 
 Nana Sahib appealed to the Court of Directors against 
 the decision of the Governor-General of India. His appeal 
 was couched in logical, temperate, and convincing lan- 
 guage. He asked why the heir to the Peshwa should be 
 treated differently from other native princes who had fallen 
 before the Company. He instanced the case of Dehli and 
 of Maisur ; and with reference to the assumption made in 
 argument against him that the savings of his father were 
 sufficient to support him, he asked whether it was just 
 that the economical foresight of the father should militate 
 against the moral claims of the son. The argument, which 
 would have been accepted in any native Court in India, 
 which was convincing to the two hundred and fifty millions 
 who inhabited that country, had no effect whatever on the 
 minds of the western rulers who governed the country 
 from Leadenhall Street. Their reply emulated in its curt- 
 ness and its rudeness the answer given by Lord Dalhousie. 
 They directed the Governor- General to inform the memo- 
 rialist 'that the pension of his adoptive father was not 
 hereditary, that he has no claim whatever to it, and that 
 his application is wholly inadmissible.' The date of the 
 
30 Azini-ullah Khan. 
 
 reply was May 1853. Its bore its fruit at Kanhpur in 
 June 1857. 
 
 Nana Sahib accepted it with apparent composure, but 
 it rankled in his bosom. To prosecute his claims he had, 
 early in the year, despatched to England a young Muham- 
 madan in his service, Azim-ullah Khan by name, of a 
 pleasant presence and a taking address. Before Azim- 
 ullah could reach England judgment had already been 
 recorded. Being in the receipt of a sufficient allowance 
 from his master, the young man stayed in England, and 
 entered freely into the pleasures of English life. But he 
 always had an eye to the interests of Nana Sahib. Whilst 
 he was yet in England the Crimean war broke out. Shortly 
 afterwards there came from the seat of war those stories 
 of suffering which, from his place in the House of Commons, 
 the late Lord John Russell described as 'horrible and heart- 
 rending.' The imaginative mind of the young oriental 
 came to the conclusion that some terrible disaster was 
 about to bsfall the British army. Were such to occur, 
 there might be some hope for Nana Sahib. He pro- 
 ceeded, then, to the seat of w^ar, entered into communica- 
 tion with foreigners of diverse nations, and from his con- 
 versations with them, and from his own personal inspection, 
 came to the conclusion that England, the England which 
 had asserted herself with so much haughtiness in India, 
 was on the brink of destruction, that it would require but 
 a united effort on the part of the princes and people of her 
 great dependency to ' push her from her stool' With these 
 convictions fresh and strongly rooted in his mind he re- 
 turned, in 1856, to the Nana at Bithor. Shortly after his 
 return the Nana paid a somewhat mysterious visit to 
 Lakhnao, accompanied by Azim-ullah and a considerable 
 following. I have called his visit ' mysterious,' for it so 
 impressed the English authorities in that city that Sir 
 
The Thoinasonian System. 31 
 
 Henry Lawrence, who was then Chief Commissioner, 
 wrote to Sir Hugh Wheeler, commanding at Kanhpur, 
 to caution him not to depend upon the loyalty of 
 Nana Sahib. It is not to be doubted that Nana Sahib 
 took advantage of his visit to enter into negotiations 
 with the discontented nobles of the province, and to 
 concert with them the outlines, at least, of a general 
 plan of action. 
 
 Whilst the province of Oudh and the district of Bithor 
 were" thus fast becoming hotbeds of conspiracy, a similar 
 process was taking place through the length and breadth 
 of the North-west Provinces. That the system known as 
 ' the village system,' under which the heads of villages 
 represented, before the law, the communities of which 
 they were the hereditary chiefs, may not have been a 
 system which recommended itself theoretically to a ruler 
 nurtured in western ideas may be conceded. But that 
 system was rooted in the soil. The great Akbar, when 
 engaged in the task of consolidating and systematising 
 the territories he had conquered, had attempted to intro- 
 duce reforms which would have tended to greater central- 
 isation. But, after a few months of experiment, he shrunk 
 from a task which, he recognised, would rouse against 
 him the feelings of his subjects. Where Akbar had feared 
 to tread, the English, guided by the rash hand of Mr 
 Thomason, had rushed in. The result was that through- 
 out the districts over which he had ruled, in Juanpur and 
 Azamgarh, in Agra, Kanhpur, and the adjoining districts, 
 throughout Bundelkhand, there reigned a discontent 
 which lent itself very readily to the schemes of the 
 major conspirators. The advocates of Mr Thomason's 
 reforms have endeavoured, under the shield of anonymous 
 criticism, to controvert this assertion. But facts are stub- 
 born things. I have had it from the mouths of many in- 
 
^ ^ The Rdni of yjidnsi. 
 
 V?- 
 
 fluential native gentlemen, and from English officials con- 
 cerned, that the grievance which caused disaffection was 
 the harsh introduction, and the still harsher enforcement, 
 of the Thomasonian system. And there remains the fact, 
 which cannot be controverted, that in India the dis- 
 affection was greatest, and the hatred against Europeans 
 most pronounced, in the districts to which that system 
 had been applied. 
 
 Not very far distant from Agra there was a powerful 
 chieftain who, from causes similar to those which had 
 influenced Nana Sahib, regarded herself as having been 
 grievously wronged, and who therefore hated the English 
 with all the bitterness of a woman who had been con- 
 temned. This chieftain was the Rani of Jhansi. She 
 was largely gifted, possessed great energy, had borne, up 
 to the period upon which I am entering, ' a high character,' 
 being ' much respected by everyone at Jhansi.^ But the 
 hand of the despoiler had lashed her into a fury which 
 was not to be governed. Under Hindu law she possessed 
 the right to adopt an heir to her husband when he died 
 childless in 1854. Lord Dalhousie refused to her the 
 exercise of that right, and declared that Jhansi had 
 lapsed to the paramount power. In vain did the Rani 
 dwell upon the services which in olden days the rulers of 
 Jhansi had rendered to the British Government, and quote 
 the warm acknowledgments made by that Government. 
 Lord Dalhousie was not to be moved. He had faith in 
 his legions. With a stroke of his pen he deprived this 
 high-spirited woman of the rights which she believed, 
 and which all the natives of India believed, to be heredi- 
 tary. That stroke of the pen converted the lady, of so 
 high a character and so much respected, into a veritable 
 tigress so far as the English were concerned. For them, 
 
 1 Report of the Political Agent at Jhansi. 
 
Action of the Conspirators. 33 
 
 thereafter, she would have no mercy. There is reason 
 to believe that she, too, had entered into negotiations 
 with the Maulavi and Nana Sahib before the explosion 
 of 1857 took place. 
 
 Such, then, were the conspirators. The inhabitants 
 of Oudh, directed mainly by the Maulavi and a lady of 
 the royal House known as the Begum, the inhabitants of 
 the North-west Provinces, goaded into bitter hostility 
 by the action of the Thomasonian system, and the Rani 
 of Jhansi. The executive council of this conspiracy had 
 arranged, in the beginning of 1857, to act upon the 
 sipahis by means of the greased cartridge, upon the in- 
 habitants of the rural districts by the dissemination of 
 chapatis. This dissemination was intended as a warning 
 that the rising was imminent. It was further decided 
 that the rising of the sipahis should be simultaneous, and 
 more than once the actual day was fixed. Providentially 
 something always happened to prevent the explosion on 
 that day. The splutterings which occurred on such occa- 
 sions served to give timely warning to the Government. 
 The delays which followed the warning were partially 
 utilised. It was not, however, till the rising actually took 
 place at Mirath that the Government realised the real 
 nature, though not the full extent, of the danger. That 
 they never realised it thoroughly until after the massacre 
 of Kanhpiir we have the evidence of their own words and 
 their own actions to prove. Indeed I may go so far as to 
 declare that many of the actors in the drama failed to 
 realise to their dying day that the outbreak was not 
 merely a mutiny which they had to combat, but a vast 
 - conspiracy, the threads of which were widely spread, and 
 which owed its origin to the conviction that a Govern- 
 ment which had, as the conspirators believed, betrayed its 
 trust was no longer entitled to respect or allegiance. 
 
 C 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE FIRST MUTTERINGS OF THE STORM. 
 
 The effects of the workings of the conspirators on the 
 minds of the population of the North-west Provinces soon 
 made themselves manifest by the change of their usually 
 respectful demeanour. Major Orfeur Cavenagh, an officer 
 of great shrewdness and perspicacity, who filled the im- 
 portant office of Town-Major of Fort William in Calcutta, 
 visited, in October and November 1856, the districts just 
 beyond Agra. He had been struck everywhere by the 
 altered demeanour of the sipahis, and loyal natives had 
 reported to him the great change which had taken place 
 in the feelings of the natives generally towards the English. 
 Disaffection, he was assured, was now the rule in all 
 classes. To the clear vision of this able officer it was 
 evident that, unless precautions were taken, some great 
 disaster would ensue. Feelings so evidenced as to be- 
 come the common talk of the community could not longer 
 be repressed. In the middle of January occurred that 
 incident regarding the greasing of the cartridges to which 
 I have referred in the first chapter. It happened in this 
 wise. A lascar engaged in the factory at Dam-Dam 
 asked a Brahman sipahi to let him have a drink of water 
 from his lotah, or brass pot. The sipahi indignantly re- 
 fused, on the ground that his caste would not permit him 
 to use the lotah afterwards if it should be defiled by the 
 drinking of a man of a lower position in. the Hindu hier- 
 
How the Sipdhis were worked tip on. 35 
 
 archy. The lascar, in reply, laughed at him for talking 
 of defilement, when he said, * You will all soon be biting 
 cartridges smeared with the fat of the cow and the pig.' 
 He then told the sipahi the method of the new cartridges. 
 The incident occurred when the minds of the sipahis had 
 been inflamed, in the manner already recounted, to a high 
 state of tension. The story spread like wildfire. Thence- 
 forward the sipahis were as soft clay in the hands of the 
 chief conspirators. 
 
 Some of these, it cannot be doubted, were to be found 
 amongst the numerous followers of the King of Oudh. 
 The Government of India had permitted that prince, on 
 his removal from the province of which he was still the 
 titular king, to take up his residence in a suburb of Cal- 
 cutta. He had arrived there in April 1856 with a numer- 
 ous following. His quarters had already become notorious 
 as the Alsatia of Calcutta. If, as is probable, he was no 
 party to the intrigues carried on in his name, or on his 
 behalf, there were yet many of those who adhered to him 
 who were less scrupulous. These men were the fellow- 
 countrymen of the majority of the men who served 
 the British, and entirely sympathised with them. Sub- 
 sequent events proved that communications between the 
 sipahis in Fort William and at Barrackpur and some of 
 the King's adherents had been frequent. It was unfor- 
 tunate that, at such a period, at a crisis so momentous, 
 so large a number of exiles from Oudh, sharing the 
 indignation generally felt among the natives at the an- 
 nexation of that province, should have been located 
 close to a populous city, dependent for its safety on one 
 weak European regiment. 
 
 Important consequences speedily followed the dis- 
 covery of the fact regarding the greased cartridges. On 
 the 26th of January the telegraph house at Barrackpur 
 
36 Majo7^ Orfeur Cavenagh. 
 
 was fired. The same day one of the sergeants attached 
 to Fort William reported to Cavenagh a remarkable con- 
 versation, between two sipahis, which he had overheard. 
 It was to the effect that the Europeans forming the gar- 
 rison were entirely in the power of the sipahis ; that it 
 would be easy to master the arsenal and the magazines, 
 to slay the Europeans as they slept, then to possess them- 
 selves of the fort. They added that the firing of the 
 telegraph house was the first incident in the far-reaching 
 plot. 
 
 Cavenagh, who, as Town-Major, was responsible to the 
 Governor-General for the safety of Fort William, took at 
 once measures to baffie the designs of which he had been 
 informed, and then drove straight to Lord Canning to 
 report the circumstance to him. Lord Canning listened 
 to Cavenagh with the deepest interest, and sanctioned 
 the measures he proposed. These were to transfer from 
 Dam-Dam, where one wing of the regiment which was 
 responsible for the safety of the Presidency, the 53d Foot, 
 was located, one company to Fort William. For the 
 moment the outbreak was deferred. 
 
 Many little circumstances came at this period to in- 
 timate to the few who preferred not to live in a fool's 
 paradise that something strange was impending. At Bar- 
 rackpur, on the left bank of the river Hugli, fifteen miles 
 above Calcutta, were stationed four native regiments — the 
 2d Grenadiers, the 34th N. I., the 43d Light Infantry, 
 and the 70th N. I. At Barhampur, 120 miles above Cal- 
 cutta and five below Murshidabad, the capital of the 
 Nuwab-Nazims of Bengal, was one native regiment, the 
 19th N. I. Between Calcutta and Danapur, in Bihar, 344 
 miles from the capital, there was but one English regiment, 
 the 53d, already referred to, and that was, as I have said, 
 distributed between Dam-Dam and Calcutta. The space 
 
Insufficiency of the English Garrison, 37 
 
 of 344 miles was thus without European guardianship. 
 For, though there was one regiment, the loth Foot, at 
 Danapur, there were also stationed there three regiments 
 of native infantry, the 7th, the 8th, and the 40th. 
 
 There is reason to suppose that communications had 
 passed at least as early as February between the men of 
 these several regiments, and even of those stationed fur- 
 ther north-westward. Small commands, treasure parties, 
 and the post afforded ample opportunities for such ex- 
 change of ideas. One of these communications gave to 
 the Government the first intimation of the general feeling. 
 On the 1 8th and 25th of February two small detachments 
 of one of the regiments stationed at Barrackpur, the 34th, 
 a regiment peculiarly tainted, arrived at Barhampur. The 
 men of the 19th N. I., there located, received their com- 
 rades of the 34th with effusion. The evening after the 
 arrival of the second detachment the talk between the 
 two parties was a talk of more than ordinary significance. 
 The men of the 34th poured into the willing ears of their 
 hosts all their grievances. They related the antecedent 
 causes, of which I have spoken, which had led them to 
 distrust their foreign masters. They then dwelt on the 
 story of the cartridges, of the alleged mission of Lord 
 Canning to force Christianity upon them, and added 
 their determination, and that of their brethren at Bar- 
 rackpur and elsewhere, to take the first opportunity to 
 rise in revolt. 
 
 This tale, told with all the fervour of sincerity — for 
 it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that throughout 
 these proceedings, and those which followed, the sipahis 
 were but the dupes of the able men who had planned the 
 conspiracy — produced a remarkable effect on the minds 
 of the men of the 19th N. I. They brooded over the 
 information all the day following. They had not received 
 
38 The Emeute at Barhdmpur. 
 
 the new rifle, and the cartridges in their magazine were 
 innocent of the sh'ghtest stain of grease. They were the 
 common paper cartridges to which they had been accus- 
 tomed for years, the only change being that the paper in 
 which they were wrapped was of a different colour. Yet 
 when, in the course of the day, their commanding officer, 
 Colonel Mitchell, ordered a parade with blank cartridges 
 for the following morning, a great perturbation was 
 visible in the lines. The men seriously believed that they 
 were about to be juggled out of their religion by means 
 of cartridges. How, they could not at the moment say. 
 But the suspicion which had fallen on their minds had 
 bred a great fear. Their non-commissioned officers first 
 refused to receive the cartridges. The threat that those 
 who should continue to refuse would be brought to a 
 court-martial had the effect of inducing them to take 
 them. But that night the whole regiment sat in delibera- 
 tion. They dreaded lest by the use of the cartridges 
 they should commit themselves to an act which might 
 deprive them of their caste. The reader may ask how 
 that was possible, considering that the cartridges were 
 similar to those they had used for a century. The answer 
 is that fanaticism never reasons. The Hindus are fanatics 
 for caste. They had been told that their religion was to 
 be attempted by means of the cartridges, and their minds 
 being, for the reasons already given, in an excited and 
 suspicious condition, they accepted the tale without 
 inquiry. They therefore rose in a tumult, resolved to 
 defy their officers. That same evening the information 
 that the sipahis of his regiment were in a state of great 
 excitement and perturbation, on account of the cartridges, 
 was conveyed to Colonel Mitchell. The officers of the 
 Bengal army, as a body, were distinguished by the trust 
 they reposed in their men. In estimating their conduct, 
 
/ 
 
 The Enieute at Barhampur. 39 
 
 it should be remembered that most of them had been 
 associated with the sipahis all their lives ; that they had 
 done their duty by them ; that in Afghanistan, in the 
 Panjab, in the wars in Central India, these men had 
 followed wherever they had led ; that they knew that in 
 the matter of proselytism the sipahis had no real reason 
 for their fears. Oudh had been annexed but little more 
 than a year, and the effect of that annexation on the 
 minds of the sipahis had not then been disclosed to them. 
 Colonel Mitchell was an officer with a good reputation ; 
 he understood the sipahis as the sipahis had been up 
 to 1857. But he was not more discerning than his 
 fellows ; not more prescient than the Government he 
 served. The news that the sipahis were in a state border- 
 ing on mutiny was a revelation to him. He could not 
 comprehend why they should rise, or why they should 
 even be excited. The cartridges, which he was told 
 formed the pretext for the sudden ebullition, were, he 
 well knew, the cartridges which had been used without 
 a murmur throughout the period of his service. But 
 what was he to do ? His men — the men of the regiment 
 for the good conduct of which he was responsible to the 
 Commander-in-Chief and the Government — were gesticu- 
 lating in front of the lines, and were in a state of incipient 
 mutiny. Mitchell did his duty like the good soldier that 
 he was ; he rode down to the lines, accompanied by his 
 adjutant, and sending for the native officers to the quarter- 
 guard, there addressed them. He told them that there 
 was no reason for the fears expressed by the men ; that 
 the cartridges were similar to those which had been served 
 out and used from time immemorial ; that there was no 
 question of asking the sipahis to bite them or to use them 
 in any other way but in that to which they were accus- 
 tomed. Having thus explained the groundlessness of the 
 
/ 
 
 40 The Emeute at Barhdmpur, 
 
 fears of the sipahis, he added that they were by their 
 conduct placing themselves in a position which the 
 Government could not tolerate ; that the men who, after 
 his explanation, should persist in refusing to obey his 
 orders would be brought to a court-martial, and suffer 
 the consequences. He concluded by urging the native 
 officers so to influence the men that the name of the 
 regiment should not be blackened. 
 
 Colonel Mitchell might as well have spoken to the 
 winds. He told his native officers what Sir John Hearsey 
 at Barrackpur, and what commanding officers all over the 
 country subsequently told theirs, but he told it in vain. 
 There is no terror like a religious terror ; and there can 
 be no doubt that the astute fomentors of the revolt — the 
 men of Oudh, of the North-west Provinces, and of the 
 Bundelkhand — had so saturated the minds of the sipahis 
 at Barrackpur and elsewhere with a real terror, that not 
 all the words of the most gifted men on earth would 
 have sufficed to expel it. The Barrackpur sipahis had 
 in a moment communicated their fears to those of Bar- 
 hampur. The native officers listened silently, and pro- 
 mised to do all they could to calm the excitement. 
 Mitchell returned to his quarters confident that he had 
 done all he was capable of, but that ' all ' was little 
 indeed. 
 
 However, there was the parade to be held the follow- 
 ing morning. To countermand that now would be an 
 act of weakness of which Mitchell was incapable. But 
 the thought never occurred to him. Scarcely had he 
 reached his home when information reached him that 
 the men had risen and were in open revolt. 
 
 It was too true. Whether the native officers had 
 correctly interpreted Mitchell's words to their men ; or 
 whether, as is more probable, their minds were under the 
 
The Emeute at Barhdmpur, 41 
 
 influence which swayed them, cannot be certainly known. 
 The fact remains that before midnight the regiment 
 rose as one man, the sipahis loading their muskets, 
 and shouting violently. 
 
 There were at Barhampur a detachment of native 
 cavalry and a battery of native artillery. It was pre- 
 sumable, at that early stage of the great revolt, that to 
 these the contagion had not extended. Mitchell then, as 
 soon as he reached his quarters, ordered these to turn 
 out The order had been given but a few moments, 
 when information reached him that his men had risen. 
 Resolved to stop the mischief, he gathered his officers 
 around him, and proceeded, accompanied by the guns, 
 to the parade ground. The cavalry had preceded him 
 thither. 
 
 There he met his men, excited but not violent, and 
 there he harangued them. He spoke well and to the 
 point, and finally wrung from them a promise that they 
 would return to their duty, provided the artillery and 
 cavalry were first ordered back to their lines. Mitchell's 
 hands were tied. With the 200 men behind him he 
 could not, even if they had been loyal, have coerced his 
 800 sipahis. After events proved that, had he resorted 
 to force, the men behind him would have joined the re- 
 volted regiment, and a catastrophe would have been pre- 
 cipitated which might, for the moment, have reduced the 
 English in India to the greatest extremities. With ad- 
 mirable prudence, then, Mitchell sent back the cavalry 
 and artillery. The men of the 19th then submitted, and 
 returned to their lines. 
 
 The following morning the excitement was apparently 
 forgotten by the sipahis. They fell in for parade, and 
 obeyed the orders given as in their palmiest days. But 
 their suspicions were not lulled. Every night they slept 
 
42 Blindness of the Government, 
 
 round the bells of arms^ in which their muskets were lodged 
 instead of in the huts which formed their lines. Mitchell 
 meanwhile reported the matter to his superior authorities. 
 A Court of Inquiry was ordered, and after an investigation 
 which, under the circumstances, may be styled prolonged, 
 the Government, missing the point, choosing to shut 
 their eyes to the fact that the conduct of the 19th was 
 a premature movement of a plot which had its roots all 
 over the country, determined to treat it as a local incident, 
 which had attained undue proportions owing to the violent, 
 measures taken by Colonel Mitchell.^ The Governor- 
 General in Council, therefore, resolved to disband the 19th, 
 and to make a scapegoat of Colonel Mitchell. Meanwhile 
 events were occuring under the very eyes of the members 
 of the Government which should have convinced them 
 that the Mutiny they were about to punish was not con- 
 fined to the 19th. 
 
 ^ The brick buildings in which the muskets of the sipahis were stored 
 after parade were called "bells of arms," they being built in the form of a 
 bell. 
 
 - Mitchell had committed no violence, nor had he used violent language. 
 But his words were misquoted in order to support the then fashionable 
 theory that there was no general feeling of mistrust among the sipahis. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE SPREAD OF THE EPIDEMIC. 
 
 The conduct of the men of the 19th N. I. at Barhampur 
 was known to the authorities in Calcutta on the 4th of 
 March. To them, I have said, it appeared to be rather the 
 consequence of the blundering of the commanding officer 
 than of a widespread feeling of discontent among the 
 sipdhis. But, whatever might be the cause, it was a fact 
 which they had to deal with, and to deal with promptly 
 and with effect. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief of the army, General Anson, 
 was in the Upper Provinces ; the Adjutant-General was at 
 Mirath ; but the Governor-General, Lord Canning, and all 
 the Secretaries to Government, were in Calcutta. These 
 had, then, all the administrative means at their disposal 
 for dealing promptly and effectively with revolt. 
 
 Of the terror which the notion of the greased cartridge 
 had spread throughout the minds of the sipahis they had 
 had evidence since the 22d of January, the day on which 
 the conversation of the lascar at the Dam-Dam factory with 
 the Brahman sipahi had been reported to them. The 
 general commanding at Barrackpur, General Hearsey, an 
 officer who had passed his career in the native army, 
 and who understood the character of the sipahis, their 
 language, and their idiosyncracies, had, when reporting 
 the circumstance, recommended that the difficulty might 
 be met by allowing the sipahis at the depot to grease their 
 
44 Ignorance in High Places^ 
 
 own cartridges. The Government had caught at the idea, 
 and on the 27th January the official sanction had been 
 given to the suggestion. It was ascertained at the same 
 time that, although many cartridges had been greased 
 at Dam-Dam, not one had been issued. The Govern- 
 ment then, whilst according their sanction to General 
 Hearsey's suggestion, transmitted orders by telegraph to 
 the Adjutant-General to issue to the several musketry- 
 depots only cartridges free from grease, and to permit the 
 sipahis to do the greasing themselves. But the concession 
 of the Government of India had the effect of bringing into 
 prominence the ignorance of the executive branch of the 
 army. The Adjutant-General, a man who had served the 
 greater part of his career with the sipahis, wired back that 
 the concessions of the Government would rouse the very 
 suspicion they were intended to allay ; that for years past 
 the sipahis had been using greased cartridges, the grease 
 being mutton fat and wax ; and that he begged that the 
 system might be continued. The Government, the Mili- 
 tary Secretary of which was likewise an officer who had 
 served with sipahis, raised no objection to this proposal, 
 but replied that the greased cartridges might be issued, 
 provided the materials were only those mentioned by the 
 Adjutant-General. 
 
 How the Adjutant-General managed to mislead the 
 Government, and how the Government permitted them- 
 selves to be misled on this occasion, seems extraordinary. 
 The Government had the fact before them that up to that 
 moment no greased cartridges had ever been issued to the 
 native army. That army still used the old ' Brown Bess ' 
 musket, and for that weapon unsmeared paper cartridges 
 were invariably employed. It is true that a {(tw regiments 
 had rifle companies, or one company armed with rifles, 
 and that, for facilitating the driving home of the bullet 
 
And, conseqtiently, Defective Action. 45 
 
 used with these, patches smeared with wax had been 
 served out No suspicion had ever attached to these 
 patches. But for the Adjutant-General, the right-hand 
 man of the Commander-in-Chief, seriously to argue that 
 the issue of these patches warranted him in remonstrating 
 with the Government against their order forbidding the 
 issue of greased cartridges, and for the Government to 
 accept his statement that for some years greased cart- 
 ridges had been issued, argued an ignorance and an 
 absence of common sense sufficient to account for the 
 many grave blunders which followed. 
 
 Such had been the condition of matters at the end 
 of January. There had been sufficient displays of dis- 
 satisfaction to cause grave suspicions, and that was all. 
 In those displays the Government had recognised no sign 
 of wide-spread disaffection. There were but two men 
 holding prominent positions in or near Calcutta who saw 
 in the action of the sipahis something more than a passing 
 wave of discontent, and one of these saw it but dimly. 
 The more prescient of these two men was Major Cavenagh, 
 the Town-Major of Fort William, and the representative 
 in that fortress of the Governor-General. The other was 
 the Commander of the Presidency Division, General 
 Hearsey. I have already recorded the action of the 
 former in January, and I shall have to write of his action 
 in March and April. For the moment I must narrate the 
 proceedings of General Hearsey at Barrackpur. 
 
 The revelations of the lascar at Dam-Dam, in January, 
 had deeply impressed that officer. He recognised that 
 the minds of the sipahis were in a state of great ex- 
 citement. The real cause, the basis of that excitement, 
 was not apparent to him. His intelligence was limited 
 to the matters which came under his eyes, and it was 
 not in his nature to probe the situation more deeply. 
 
46 General Hearsey at Barrackpur. 
 
 He really believed that the whole offence of the Govern- 
 ment had been the greasing of the cartridges for use 
 by the sipahis, and that the latter were under the 
 influence of terror lest their religion should be tampered 
 with. He did not ask how it was that, before a single 
 cartridge had been issued, before one sipahi had been 
 asked to defile himself by applying his teeth to the 
 greased paper, the demeanour of the men of the four 
 native regiments at Barrackpur had displayed unmistak- 
 able signs of the discontent which raged within their 
 minds. Believing that the greased cartridge was the 
 outward sign and inward cause of the evident discontent, 
 he had, with the sanction of Lord Canning, on the 9th of 
 February, paraded his brigade, and addressing the sipahis 
 of the four regiments in their own language, had endeav- 
 oured to dissipate their fears. He had told them that 
 the English were Christians of the Book ; that they 
 admitted no proselytes except those whom the reading 
 of that Book had convinced ; that the notion that any 
 other mode of conversion was possible was absurd ; that 
 baptism only followed conviction ; and he implored them 
 to dismiss from their minds the tale told them by design- 
 ing men that the English had any design to convert them 
 by a trick. 
 
 General Hearsey meant well, and he thought he had 
 succeeded in convincing his men of their delusion. But 
 he had missed the point. The conspirators, who had 
 fomented the ill-feeling of the sipahis all over India, had 
 not told their victims that the English would make them 
 Christians by force. They had rather impressed on their 
 minds that the object of their masters was to deprive 
 them, by the compulsory use of the cartridges, of the caste, 
 to which they adhered with the passionate conviction that 
 it was the one thing necessary for consideration in this 
 
He misses the Point. 47 
 
 life, and happiness in the life to come ; and that then, 
 scared and miserable by their degradation, they would 
 seek for admission into the ranks of a religion which had 
 established missions throughout the country for the very 
 purpose of converting them. General Hearsey's argument 
 that his religion was a religion of the Book was all very 
 well when addressed to Brahmans and Rajputs, whose 
 position was secure, whose caste was intact. But, when it 
 should be applied to men whose caste had been broken, 
 who had become pariahs and outcasts, deprived of con- 
 sideration in this world, and of all hope in the hereafter, 
 it would have a different signification. Then the men 
 who had lost the religion of their forefathers would be 
 glad to read the Book, and to gain renewed hope in the 
 religion of their masters. 
 
 The answer to General Hearsey's declamation was 
 given by the 19th N. I. at Barhampur. The news from 
 Barrackpur, carried to Barhampur by the sipahis of the 
 34th, had produced the fermentation and partial outbreak 
 described in the last chapter. And this was the news 
 which disturbed the Government of India on the 4th of 
 March. 
 
 It found that Government in a state of some perplexity. 
 Lord Canning was new to the country, and was perforce, 
 on all matters pertaining to the native army, dependent on 
 his military advisers. The capacity of his military advisers 
 may be judged from the fact that they were the very men 
 who had allowed him to be swayed by the shallow reason- 
 ing of the Adjutant-General regarding the issue of greased 
 cartridges. However, many facts had spoken too loudly 
 to be disregarded. There was the one fact that a native 
 regiment in the Presidency Division had mutinied ; an- 
 other fact that the troops at Barrackpur had displayed a 
 sullenness of demeanour difficult to account for ; a third 
 
48 The Z/^th Foot arrives from Btirina, 
 
 fact in the revelations of Major Cavenagh, described in the 
 last chapter ; and a fourth in the fact that between Calcutta 
 and Danapur, a distance of 344 miles from Calcutta, there 
 was but one weak English regiment. The disaffection at 
 Barhampur had, they knew, been produced by the com- 
 munications received by the sipahis of that regiment from 
 the men of a detachment which had marched thither from 
 Barrackpur. Who was to guard the line of 344 miles if 
 the sipahis of Barrackpur should emulate the conduct of 
 the men whom some of their comrades had perverted ? 
 These facts, and this consideration, produced the convic- 
 tion that it was necessary to strengthen the central posi- 
 tion. They resolved to strengthen it by ordering the 84th 
 regiment to proceed with all speed from Rangoon to the 
 Presidency. On the 20th of March that regiment arrived 
 in the Hugh'. Orders were then transmitted to Colonel 
 Mitchell to march the 19th N. I. to Barrackpur. 
 
 But there had been many significant occurrences before 
 the 84th reached the Hugh. Maharaja Sindhia had visited 
 Calcutta early in March, and, as a return for the civilities 
 showered upon him, had invited the elite of the society of 
 the Presidency to 2. fete at the Botanical Gardens, situated 
 on the opposite bank of the river Hugh', on the loth of the 
 month. There can be little doubt but that the leaders of 
 the conspiracy had resolved to strike their blow on that 
 day. During the absence of the official English across the 
 river they had planned to seize the fort and to strike terror 
 into the town. A circumstance, slight in itself, frustrated 
 their combinations. Rain, most unusual at that time of 
 the year in India, fell heavily the day before and on the 
 morning of the lOth, and the Maharaja, aware that an out- 
 of-door fete could be successful only when the weather 
 was propitious, sent out notices to postpone the entertain- 
 ment. It happened accidentally that no notice of the 
 
Mdlidrdjd Sindhid in Calcutta. 49 
 
 postponement reached the Town-Major, Major Cavenagh. 
 That ever vigilant officer had quitted the fort to cross the 
 river ; but, on arriving at the ghat, he learned for the first 
 time that r^o fete would take place that day, so he retraced 
 his steps. His sudden return, and the rumour to which 
 that return gave weight, that th.Q/ete had been postponed, 
 roused in the guilty minds of the conspirators the suspicion 
 that their plot had been discovered. Some of them, out- 
 side the fort, had indeed begun the part assigned to them 
 in the general programme, but, under the mysterious cir- 
 cumstances of the return of Cavenagh and the postpone- 
 ment of the garden party, the more astute members of the 
 conspiracy declined to move. They even assisted in the 
 capture of their misled comrades, who were brought at once 
 to trial, and suffered fourteen years of penal servitude for 
 their premature temerity. 
 
 A week later the 84th entered the Hugli, and landing 
 on the 20th, marched to the quarters assigned them at 
 Chinsurah, twenty miles north of Calcutta. The Govern- 
 ment immediately transmitted orders to Colonel Mitchell 
 to march his regiment, the 19th N. I., from Barhampur to 
 Barrackpur. 
 
 In the interval the Court of Inquiry, referred to in the 
 last chapter, had, as already stated, taken evidence, and 
 on its report the Governor-General in Council had re- 
 solved to punish the sipahis by disbanding the regiment. 
 Previous experience of that punishment had proved that 
 it was at best but a clumsy device. It was especially ill- 
 adapted to the actual circumstances, for it would dis- 
 tribute over areas already partially infected a thousand 
 men who regarded themselves, and who would be re- 
 garded by others, as martyrs for their religion. But in 
 the Council of Lord Canning there was not one man 
 upon whom had been bestowed the divine gift of imagina- 
 
 D 
 
50 Disbaridnient tiseless as a Punishment. 
 
 tion. No other remedy presented itself to their matter- 
 of-fact minds. So the order for disbandment was issued. 
 It was hoped that the impressive ceremony of disband- 
 ment, carried out in the presence of four native regiments, 
 and supervised by their English comrades, would produce 
 a great effect. But, unhappily for the theories of those in 
 high places, an event took place at Barrackpur, before the 
 arrival of the 19th there, which proved conclusively that 
 the evil, which the disbandment of the 19th was to cure, 
 was far more widely spread and deeply rooted than any 
 official had conceived. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 BARRACKPUR, CALCUTTA, AND THE NORTH-WEST 
 TO THE 9TH OF MAY. 
 
 Meanwhile, the excitement at Barrackpur was not 
 diminishing. Isolated actions on the part of the sipahis, 
 indicating a very mutinous spirit, were reported to the 
 Governor-General. The incident referred to in the last 
 chapter, which had led to the trial and sentence to four- 
 teen years' penal servitude of several sipdhis, had produced 
 considerable perplexity in the minds of the authorities. 
 But they still refused to believe that there was anything 
 like a general plot. They preferred to think that the dis- 
 affection was confined to some men of one regiment only, 
 or to a few men belonging to two regiments. The sus- 
 picions of the disaffected men were not, it was hoped, so 
 deeply rooted as to be proof against argument. The 
 Government was conscious of its own innocence. It 
 harboured no evil designs against the sipahis. It had 
 no desire to move to the right or to the left out of the 
 path it had undeviatingly followed for exactly a century. 
 If this could be made clear to the men, all would assuredly 
 go well. It was essentially a European argument, an 
 argument which proved the most profound ignorance of 
 the modes of thoughts of a race which was Asiatic, and 
 for the most part Hindu. But it was the argument which 
 naturally presented itself to the European mind. Lord 
 Canning had authorised General Hearsey to try the ex- 
 
52 Hearsey again addi^esses the Si pa his. 
 
 perlment once, and General Hearsey believed, as was 
 quite natural he should believe, that his arguments had 
 produced some effect. He was anxious to try once again 
 the powers of his oratory. He therefore persuaded Lord 
 Canning to authorise him to address the men of the four 
 regiments in language and in terms which he had talked 
 over with the Governor-General. 
 
 The parade took place on the Barrackpur plain, on the 
 17th of March, three days before the actual arrival of the 
 84th from Rangoon. General Hearsey spoke eloquently 
 and well. He pointed out to the men the childishness of 
 their fears ; he entered into full details regarding the 
 necessity to use lubricated cartridges with the new 
 muskets ; he told them that the Government were re- 
 solved to maintain discipline, and that they would mete 
 out stern justice to the 19th by disbanding that regiment. 
 He concluded by assuring the sipahis of the brigade that 
 they had nothing to fear, that their caste and religious 
 convictions were safe, and that their officers would listen 
 patiently to any complaint they might make. In the 
 abstract, nothing could be more to the point or more 
 satisfactory than the General's speech. 
 
 But it failed to touch the inner minds of the sipahis. 
 These were inspired by men who had a great object in 
 view — a political object of vast importance — the detaching 
 of the sipahi army from the foreign Government. But for 
 these men the question of the greased cartridge would 
 never have arisen. The waxed patches had been used 
 without complaint for years, why should the very rumour 
 regarding greased cartridges, which, be it always re- 
 membered, had not been issued, so excite the sipahi? 
 There could be but one reason. The emissaries of the 
 Maulavi and his comrades had done their work thoroughly. 
 The midnight conferences in the huts of the sipahis, not 
 
Reaso7t ivhy He failed. 53 
 
 at Barrackpur only but in all the principal stations of the 
 North-western Provinces of India, had gone to but one 
 point — the implanting of a conviction in the mind of the 
 native soldiers that the foreign masters who had annexed 
 Oudh would hesitate at nothing to complete their work of 
 forcing them to become Christians. They had discounted 
 beforehand the arguments of General Hearsey, for they 
 had pointed out that a Government which, in defiance of 
 treaties, had entered Oudh like ' a thief in the night,' and 
 deposed the native sovereign at the point of the bayonet, 
 would shrink from no means, however fraudulent, to 
 complete the scheme of which the annexation had been 
 the first move. It was not a logical argument, and the 
 European mind would have found it full of flaws ; but the 
 emissaries knew the men they were addressing. Senti- 
 ment goes much further than logic with Asiatics, and they 
 appealed to the sentiments which touched the sipahis to 
 the quick. It is not surprising, then, that the logical argu- 
 ments of General Hearsey produced no effect whatever. 
 
 Evidence of this was very speedily given. On the 
 29th of March, a Sunday afternoon, it was reported to 
 Lieutenant Baugh, Adjutant of the 34th N. I., that several 
 men of his regiment were in a very excited condition ; 
 that one of them, Manghal Pandi by name, was striding 
 up and down in front of the lines of his regiment, armed 
 with a loaded musket, calling upon the men to rise, and 
 threatening to shoot the first European he should see. 
 Baugh at once buckled on his sword, and putting loaded 
 pistols in his holsters, mounted his horse, and galloped 
 down to the lines. Manghal Pandi heard the sound of 
 the galloping horse, and taking post behind the station 
 gun, which was in front of the quarter-guard of the 34th, 
 took a deliberate aim at Baugh, and fired. He missed 
 Baugh, but the bullet struck his horse in the flank, and 
 
54 Maitghal Pdiidi and the 34M N. I. 
 
 horse and rider were brought to the ground. Baugh 
 quickly disentangled himself, and, seizing one of his pistols, 
 advanced towards the mutinous sipahi and fired. He 
 missed. Before he could draw his sword Manghal Pandi, 
 armed with a talwar with which he had provided himself, 
 closed with his adjutant, and, being the stronger man, 
 brought him to the ground. He would probably have 
 despatched him but for the timely intervention of a 
 Muhammadan sipahi, Shaikh Paltu by name. 
 
 The scene I have described had taken place in front 
 of the quarter-guard of the 34th N. L, and but thirty 
 paces from it. The sipahis composing that guard had 
 not made the smallest attempt to interfere between the 
 combatants, although one of them was their own adjutant 
 and the other a mutinous soldier. The sound of the firingf 
 had brought other men from the lines, but these, too, 
 remained passive spectators of the scene. At the con- 
 juncture I have described, just, that is, as Shaikh Paltu 
 had warded from Baugh the fatal stroke of the talwar, and 
 as Manghal Pandi, to make assurance doubly sure, was 
 attempting to reload his musket, there arrived on the 
 ground, breathless from running, the English serjeant- 
 major, one of the two English non-commissioned officers 
 attached in those days to each native regiment. The new 
 arrival rushed at the mutineer, but he was, as I have said, 
 breathless, whilst the sipahi was fresh and on the alert. 
 In the conflict between the two men Manghal Pandi had 
 no difficulty in gaining the mastery, and in throwing his 
 adversary. Still the sipahis of the regiment looked on. 
 Shaikh Paltu, faithful among the faithless, continued to 
 defend the two officers, calling upon the other sipahis to 
 come to his aid. Then these, on the order of the 
 Jamadar of guard, advanced. Instead, however, of en- 
 deavouring to seize Manghal Pandi, they struck at the 
 
Manghal Pdndi and the '^/^th N, I. 55 
 
 two prostrate officers with the butt-ends of their muskets. 
 They even threatened Shaikh Paltu, and ordered him to 
 let go his hold on Manghal Pandi. That faithful sipahi, 
 however, continued to cling to him until Baugh and the 
 sergeant-major had had time to rise. 
 
 Meanwhile rumour, as quick as lightning on such 
 occasions, had brought to General Hearsey an account of 
 the proceedings at the lines. That gallant officer, writing 
 hurried notes to the officers commanding at Dam- Dam 
 and Chinsurah, where were a wing of the 53d Foot and 
 the newly arrived 84th, to be despatched should occasion 
 demand it, galloped to the ground, accompanied by his 
 two sons. The scene that met his gaze was unpre- 
 cedented even in his long experience. He saw Manghal 
 Pandi, musket in hand, striding up and down in front of 
 the quarter-guard, calling upon his comrades to follow 
 his example. He saw the sipahis crowding about the 
 guard, waiting apparently for a leader to respond to their 
 comrade's call. He saw the wounded Baugh, and the 
 bruised sergeant-major, the commanding officer of the 
 34th, who had arrived just before him, and other English 
 officers who had hastened or were hastening to the spot. 
 The moment was a critical one. It depended upon his 
 action whether the Barrackpur sipahi brigade would then 
 and there break out in open mutiny. But Hearsey was 
 equal to the critical conjuncture. Riding straight to the 
 guard, he drew his pistol, and ordered them to do their 
 duty by seizing Manghal Pandi, theatening to shoot the 
 first man who should display the smallest symptom of 
 disobedience. For a second only was there hesitation. 
 But a glance at Hearsey's stern face, and at his two sons 
 by his side, dissipated it. The men of the guard fell in, 
 and followed Hearsey in the direction where Manghal 
 Pandi was still upbraiding them for their cowardice in 
 
56 Hearsey represses the Movejnent. 
 
 leaving him unsupported. Then the mutinous sipahi 
 recognised that with him the game was up. Turning 
 then the muzzle of the musket to his breast, he discharged 
 it by the pressure of his foot, and fell burned and bleeding 
 to the ground. 
 
 Hearsey then addressed the men, and reproached 
 them with their passive demeanour. The excuses they 
 made, that Manghal Pandi was mad, that he was intoxi- 
 cated, that he had a loaded musket, ought to have con- 
 vinced Hearsey that the hearts of the men were no longer 
 with their British officers. He felt, indeed, that the situa- 
 tion was becoming greatly strained. The 19th N. I. were 
 actually marching from Barhampur to be disbanded at 
 Barrackpur, and now the sipahis of the four regiments 
 of the Barrackpur brigade had displayed an indiscipline 
 at least equal to that for which the 19th were to be 
 punished in their presence. Rumours of all kinds filled 
 the air — the rumour that the outbreak of Manghal Pandi 
 had been preconcerted, but had broken out too soon ; 
 another that the arrival of the 19th would be the signal 
 for a general rising ; a third, a day or two later, that a 
 conference between emissaries from the 34th and the 19th 
 had taken place, on the 30th, at Barsat, one march from 
 Barrackpur. It is probable that these rumours were true. 
 But the mutinous army had no leader at Barrackpur, and 
 for want of a leader, and in the presence of divided counsels, 
 action collapsed. 
 
 On the 30th of March the Government concentrated in 
 Barrackpur the newly arrived 84th Foot, a wing of the 
 53d, two batteries of European artillery, and the Governor- 
 General's Bodyguard, which, though composed of natives 
 was then believed to be loyal. The next morning the 
 19th N. I. marched into Barrackpur. There, in presence of 
 the English regiments and the English-manned guns, and 
 
The igtk N. I. disbanded. 57 
 
 of the native brigade, the order of the Governor-General, 
 stating their crime, and declaring absurd their fears for their 
 religion, was read out to them. They were then ordered 
 to pile their arms, and to hang their belts upon the piled 
 bayonets. They obeyed without a murmur. They were 
 then marched to a distance from their arms, and the pay 
 due to them was distributed. They were allowed, mis- 
 takenly as it turned out, to retain their uniforms, and the 
 complaisance of the Government went so far as to provide 
 them with carriage to convey them to their homes. The 
 Government, despite all that had occurred, was still in a fog. 
 They could not see an inch beyond their own hands. 
 
 One or two circumstances showed the temper of the 
 Government at this conjuncture. The gallant conduct of 
 Shaikh Paltu, on the morning of the 29th of March, had 
 presented so great a contrast to that of his comrades that 
 Hearsey, with a true soldier's instinct, had then and there 
 promoted him to be a Hawaldar, or native sergeant. For 
 this act, which, though 'ultra vires', was justified by the 
 special circumstances of the case, he was reprimanded by 
 the Government. The general impression prevailed that 
 the disbandment of the 19th would produce so salutary 
 an effect throughout India that it was announced to the 
 whole army in terms which, to say the least, displayed 
 an absolute ignorance of the real feelings of the sipahis. 
 The Government thought that that disbandment had 
 closed the chapter of the Mutiny, when in reality it was 
 only the first page of the preface. 
 
 The wound of the mutinous sipahi Manghal Pandihad 
 not proved mortal. He recovered, was brought to trial, and 
 hanged. The Jamadar who had incited the sipahis of the 
 quarter-guard to refrain from assisting their officer met 
 the same fate a little later (April 22). Meanwhile, the 
 Government had made a searching inquiry into the con- 
 
58 The '^^tJi N. I. are disbanded. 
 
 duct of the men of the 34th N. I. generally, and after 
 much hesitation, moved also by events at Lakhnao, to be 
 presently referred to, Lord Canning came to the deter- 
 mination to disband that regiment also (May 4). Two 
 days later the seven companies of that regiment which 
 were at Barrackpur ^ were paraded in the presence of the 
 84th Foot, a wing of the 53d, and two batteries of Euro- 
 pean artillery, and were disbanded. They were not allowed 
 to keep their uniforms, but were marched out of the 
 station with every show of disgrace. Thus five hundred 
 conspirators, embittered against the Government, were 
 turned loose on the country at a very critical period. 
 
 The Government had, towards the end of April, been so 
 satisfied that the disturbances were purely local, and that 
 the disaffection displayed in Bengal had not penetrated to 
 the North-west, that they had resolved, as soon as the 
 34th N. I. should have been dealt with, to send back the 
 84th Foot to Rangoon, and they had actually engaged 
 transports for that purpose. Nor did the advices they re- 
 ceived from Oudh and the upper provinces, just before 
 the disbandment of the 34th, induce them to reconsider 
 the position and to change their plans. It required the 
 outbreak of the loth of May at Mirath to impress upon 
 them the reality of the danger. 
 
 The disbandment of the 19th N. I., on the 31st of 
 March, had sent back to Oudh nearly a thousand men to 
 preach disaffection and treason. The seeds of distrust 
 had already been sown there by the chief conspirators. 
 It wanted, then, but practical proof of the determination of 
 the Government to carry out their designs at all costs to 
 apply the spark to the material collected. The presence 
 of the disbanded men of the 19th supplied that spark. No 
 overt action had taken place in Oudh before their arrival 
 
 ^ The remaining three companies were on duty in Eastern Bengal. 
 
Sir Henry Lawrence in Oudh. 59 
 
 in that province. After their advent, Oudh became the 
 chief focus of the rebellion. 
 
 At Lakhnao, the capital of Oudh, ruled the chivalrous 
 and capable Sir Henry Lawrence. No man more than 
 he had lamented the tendencies of the time to introduce 
 a western system of local government among an oriental 
 people. No man had been more desirous to stand on the 
 ancient ways, the ways familiarised to the natives of India 
 by centuries of use : to employ the utmost care and dis- 
 cretion in introducing changes, however meritorious those 
 changes might appear to men of western race and western 
 training. Hence Sir Henry Lawrence was popular with 
 all classes of natives. He possessed a greater influence over 
 them than any man then living ; and, could the rill, then 
 breaking into a torrent, have been stemmed, he was the 
 one man to stem it. But Sir Henry Lawrence had come 
 to Oudh after the evil seeds sown by his immediate pre- 
 decessor had begun to bear fruit— when the native land- 
 owners had been alienated, the supporters of the native 
 rule had begun to conspire, and when the effects of the 
 annexation were being realised by the numerous families 
 which had sent a son or a brother into the sipahi army, 
 in order that he might procure for them the support of 
 the English Resident in their local Courts. When Sir 
 Henry arrived, then, the mischief had been done, and he 
 had had no power to repair it. 
 
 The events at Barhampur and Barrackpur had been 
 watched by Sir Henry Lawrence with the deepest interest. 
 Naturally, he had taken particular pains to satisfy himself 
 whether the causes which had produced the outbreaks I have 
 recorded at those stations had affected the three regular 
 native regiments, the 13th, the 48th, and the 71st N. I., 
 which garrisoned Lakhnao. But it was not till the end of 
 April, just about the time when the disbanded men of the 
 
6o Disaffection at Lakhnao, 
 
 19th N. I. were stealing into the province, that he detected, 
 or thought he detected, suspicious symptoms in the 48th 
 N. I. He reported the circumstance to Lord Canning, 
 and at once received permission to write to the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief to have the regiment removed to Mirath. 
 But to Sir Henry's mind the proposed remedy was no 
 remedy at all. He wrote in that sense, on May ist, to the 
 Governor-General. 
 
 Two days later he discovered that treasonable com- 
 munications were passing between the men of a local 
 regiment and the 48th, that the men of the 7th Irregular 
 Cavalry, stationed seven miles from Lakhnao, had pro- 
 ceeded to overt acts against their officers, and that 
 the greased cartridges were in both cases the alleged 
 cause of the ill-feeling. The act of the 7th Irregulars, in 
 the opinion of Sir Henry, required prompt repression. 
 Accordingly, he marched that night, with the three native 
 regiments I have enumerated, the 32d Foot, and a bat- 
 tery of eight guns, against the peccant regiment. The 
 men of that regiment, terrified by this demonstration, sub- 
 mitted without a blow. They laid down their arms at the 
 given order, and allowed their ringleaders to be arrested, 
 with every sign of penitence and submission. 
 
 On the 4th of May the electric wire flashed to Lord 
 Canning an account of this mutiny and its repression. It 
 was the receipt of this news which decided his vacillating 
 council to disband the 34th, a measure which, we have 
 seen, was carried out on the 6th. The effect which the 
 simple disbanding of a mutinous regiment produced on 
 the other native regiments of the same brigade was illus- 
 trated a few days later. A Jamadar of the 70th N. I. 
 was arrested at Barrackpur in the act of urging his men 
 to rise in revolt. Brought to trial before a court com- 
 posed of native officers of his own caste, he was sentenced 
 
9'- 7/". 9^ 
 
Effect of the disbanding of the ^/[th. 6i 
 
 merely to dismissal. Unfortunately this lenient punish- 
 ment for mutiny was approved and confirmed by the 
 Commander-in-Chief. The publication of this approval 
 produced the worst effects. 
 
 Unfortunately for Lord Canning, himself one of the 
 noblest of men, there was no one about him to tell him 
 that the punishment of disbandment in such times as 
 he was entering upon was no punishment at all. There 
 was not a native regiment in the Bengal Presidency 
 which was not at this period not only ready to disband 
 itself, but to turn with all the fury of men excited by 
 fancied wrongs against the masters they had served. But 
 the truth is there was not a man about him who had 
 penetrated below the surface, who had the wit to see that 
 this disaffection was no ephemeral feeling, to disappear 
 at the bidding of a few hard words. In the language of 
 the Home Secretary, employed when the discontent had 
 become infinitely more pronounced than it was at the be- 
 ginning of May, it was, in the eyes of his councillors, ' a 
 passing and groundless panic ' which required no excep- 
 tional action on the part of the Government. When, then. 
 Lord Canning punished a mutinous regiment by dis- 
 banding it, when the Commander-in-Chief announced to 
 the army that he considered simple dismissal as a fitting 
 punishment for a native officer caught red-handed in 
 preaching mutiny to his own men, and when, finally, 
 the Governor-General, notifying to the army the doom 
 of the 34th N. L, declared to the sipahis that similar 
 conduct on their part would subject them to punishment 
 ' sharp and certain,' the plotters in high places must have 
 smiled contemptuously at the conception of sharp and 
 certain punishment entertained by their rulers. 
 
 Notwithstanding the belief of the Government that the 
 discontent was local, almost every post brought informa- 
 
62 The First Move at Mirath. 
 
 tion that it was not confined to Bengal, that it had shown 
 itself in other places than Lakhnao, that regiments, widely 
 separated from one another, were equally infected. In 
 the important station of Mirath, situated nearly midway 
 between the Ganges and the Jamnah, thirty-six miles 
 from the imperial city of Dehli, the sipahis had become 
 impregnated with the idea that the flour sold in the 
 bazaars had been purposely mixed with the bones of 
 bullocks, ground to a fine powder. The conspirators who 
 had fabricated this story were the men who had invented 
 the tale of the greased cartridges, and they had fabricated 
 it with a like object. Nothing tended more to prove the 
 proneness of the minds of the sipahis to accept any story 
 against the masters they had served for a century than the 
 readiness with which they accepted this impossible rumour. 
 They were not to be persuaded that it was untrue. They 
 displayed more than ordinary care in the purchase of the 
 meal for their daily consumption, and, still unsatisfied, 
 vented their discontent by the burning of houses and by 
 the omission of the ordinary salute to their officers. They 
 soon took a very much more decided step in the path of 
 mutiny. A parade of the 3d Native Light Cavalry had 
 been ordered for the morning of the 6th of May. When, on 
 the preceding evening, the ordinary cartridges were issued 
 to the men, eighty-five troopers of that regiment declined 
 to receive them. In vain did their commanding officer ex- 
 postulate ; in vain did the Brigadier attempt to persuade 
 them. Such a breach of discipline could not be passed 
 over. The men were confined, were then brought with 
 all speed to a court-martial, composed entirely of native 
 officers, and were sentenced by the members of that 
 court to periods of imprisonment, with hard labour, vary- 
 ing from six to ten years. Under the orders of the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, to whom the question had been specially 
 
The Mtttineers punished. 63 
 
 referred, the General commanding the Mirath division, 
 General Hewitt, prepared to put into execution the find- 
 ing of the court-martial on the mutineers of the 3d N. L. C. 
 He ordered a general parade for the morning of the 9th. 
 There were present at that parade at daybreak, a regi- 
 ment of Carabineers, the 60th Rifles, the 3d Light 
 Cavalry (native), the nth and 20th regiments N. I., a 
 troop of horse-artillery, and a light field-battery. The 
 condemned mutineers were marched to the ground, were 
 stripped of their accoutrements, then every man was 
 shackled and ironed, and they were all marched to the 
 gaol, a building about two miles distant from the canton- 
 ment, and guarded solely by natives. There were sullen 
 looks among the armed troopers of the 3d, and an acute 
 observer might have detected sympathetic glances from 
 the sipahis. But there was no open demonstration. Like 
 Lord Canning and his advisers after the disarming of the 
 34th N. L, only three days earlier, General Hewitt and 
 the officers at Mirath congratulated one another on the 
 promptitude and success with which a sharp punishment 
 had been dealt out to men who had defied the authority 
 they had sworn to obey. 
 
 But the acts of the 19th N. I. at Barhampur, of the 
 34th at Barrackpur, of the men whom Major Cavenagh 
 was carefully watching in Fort William, of the deluded 
 sipahis near Lakhnao, and of the 7th N. L. C. at Mirath, 
 were but the precursors to a more terrible tragedy. The 
 great movement, of which those acts were only the pre- 
 monitory symptoms, was, on that 9th day of May, on the 
 eve of its outbreak, 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE REVOLT AT MIRATII AND THE SEIZURE OF DEHLI. 
 
 The parade at Mirath, the particulars of which are told in 
 the last chapter, took place on a Saturday morning. The 
 sipahis who assisted at it had then the remainder of that 
 day, the following night, and the early part of Sunday, 
 in which to mature the plans rising in their minds. 
 
 In their opinion the eighty-five men who had refused 
 to take the cartridges, and of whose degradation they had 
 been witnesses on that Saturday morning, were simply 
 martyrs for their faith. They had been a little bolder 
 than their comrades : that was all. The idea which had 
 prompted their refusal was common to all the sipahis at 
 Mirath. They, too, had lost faith in their masters, and 
 their minds had been equally ready to believe the stories 
 regarding bone dust and greased cartridges which design- 
 ing men were daily pouring into their ears. They had 
 not been insensible to the reproaches which their ironed 
 and shackled comrades had cast upon them as they 
 marched off, prisoners, to the gaol. They felt that they 
 should deserve these reproaches if they were to con- 
 tinue silent witnesses of their degradation. They knew, 
 though the Government wilfully shut their eyes to the 
 fact, that the feelings under which their comrades had acted 
 were wide-spread among the sipahis of the Bengal army. 
 That night's post would convey to every station in India 
 the story of the punishment of their comrades, and of 
 
Preparations for Revolt at Mirath. e^ 
 
 their own passive acquiescence. Such a disgrace was not 
 to be borne. They must, before the world was forty-eight 
 hours older, atone for their apparent acquiescence in the 
 punishment of the men whose views they shared by action 
 which should rouse all India. 
 
 In the consultations of that Saturday afternoon and 
 evening the sipahis of the three regiments called to mind 
 that it was the custom of the English to hold Church 
 parade on Sunday, morning and evening, and that on 
 such occasions the men wore only their side-arms. 
 The evening seemed to them more suitable for their 
 enterprise than the morning, for in India there is no 
 twilight, and the darkness which would rapidly super- 
 vene on the setting of the sun would greatly increase 
 the confusion which the surprise of the sudden rising 
 would produce. 
 
 But little occurred in Mirath on that eventful Sunday 
 to warn the English of the coming danger. It was re- 
 collected afterwards that the native servants, alike in the 
 barracks and in private houses, had strangely absented 
 themselves from their customary duties ; but no suspicions 
 were aroused. It was the very height of the blasting 
 season which scorches up vegetation, and renders the 
 outer air scarcely endurable until the time of sunset 
 approaches. The Sunday, then, passed like other Sundays, 
 and when the bells began to toll for the evening service 
 nothing had occurred to give any warning of the storm 
 which was ready to burst. 
 
 But as the residents and the troops marched to the 
 sacred edifice it became evident that some great event was 
 pending. The native nurse of the chaplain had warned 
 him, as he was setting out with his wife, that they would 
 have a fight with the sipahis. On their way the church- 
 goers heard the unwonted sounds of bugling and musket 
 
 E 
 
66 The Mirath Si pa his rise in Revolt. 
 
 firing. They saw bodies of armed men hurrying on their 
 way as if to a rendezvous. Then there succeeded columns 
 of smoke, as if many bungalows had been set on fire. In 
 a moment more the whole truth burst upon them. The 
 native troops at Mirath had revolted. 
 
 Far differently had that day been passed in the lines 
 of the native troops. There the utmost excitement 
 had prevailed. Conspiring makes conspirers suspicious. 
 Conscious of their own meditated treason, the sipahis 
 attributed to their masters designs not dissimilar to their 
 own. It is very doubtful whether there were at Mirath, at 
 this crisis, any of those who were deep in the conspiracy : 
 who had fostered the movement from its very birth ; 
 who were in the confidence of the Maulavi and his col- 
 leagues. Their place was occupied by the committees 
 they had caused to be formed in each regiment. But the 
 sipahis, excited, suspicious, ready to believe the idlest tale 
 as they were, required leading. On this occasion the men 
 of the nth N. I. seemed inclined to hang back. To 
 bring them to the right pitch, and to confirm possible 
 wavering on the part of any of the others, the regi- 
 mental committees took care that the most telling 
 rumours should be circulated. Nowhere in the world 
 does rumour rise so easily or take such exaggerated 
 forms as in India. It appeals to a people singularly 
 simple, and yet singularly superstitious. The fables of 
 their religion teach them to believe in the super- 
 natural, and for them the improbable is an ever-living 
 power. When, then, rumour told them that the Euro- 
 pean troops at the station were preparing for them 
 the fate of their manacled comrades, they believed the 
 rumour. Hence they determined to rise and rescue those 
 comrades whilst the Europeans should be unarmed and 
 unsuspicious. 
 
The First Phases of the Revolt. 6j 
 
 They waited, then, impatiently, how impatiently only 
 those can know who are waiting for a given signal to 
 launch themselves on an enterprise which shall ensure 
 glory or death, until the church bells should give intima- 
 tion that the coast was comparatively clear. Then, when 
 they heard the tolling, their impatience could not be re- 
 strained. Armed with sabre and pistol, the men of the 
 3d Cavalry galloped to the gaol to rescue their imprisoned 
 comrades, whilst the sipahis of the nth and 20th hurried 
 from their lines in tumultuous disorder. The troopers, on 
 reaching the gaol, loosened the gratings of the cells in 
 which their comrades were confined, the native guard 
 fraternising with and assisting them. It took but a short 
 time to drag out the manacled prisoners. A smith was 
 handy. In a few minutes the fetters were removed, and 
 the eighty-five rode back, mounted behind their deliverers, 
 to the regimental lines. 
 
 When they arrived there they found that matters had 
 progressed to a point from which there was no receding. 
 Some of the European officers of the 20th N. I. had been 
 shot, and Colonel Finnis of the nth had been riddled to 
 death by the sipahis of the 20th whilst endeavouring to 
 persuade the men of his own regiment to remain true to 
 their salt. Not for the moment only, but throughout that 
 long night, first the mutinous soldiery, then the scum of 
 the population and the prisoners whom They had released, 
 were absolute masters of the situation. The English 
 authorities, civil and military, taken by surprise, had ap- 
 parently lost their heads. Those in the highest places, the 
 General, the Brigadier, the officers of the staff, were 
 paralysed by the suddenness and tremendous character of 
 the shock. Colonel Custance, commanding the Cara- 
 bineers, on the first sound of the tumult, had ordered out 
 his men, and had sent to ask for instructions. After a 
 
68 The Authorities lose Their Heads, 
 
 long delay the General sent to order him to proceed, not 
 to the parade grounds of the mutinous regiments, which 
 were close by, but to a gaol at a distance of some miles. 
 The services of this gallant regiment were thus rendered 
 unavailable at the time and at the place when and where 
 they were most required. The night had well set in when 
 General Hewitt, Brigadier Wilson, the 6oth Rifles, the 
 artillery, and the officers of the mutinous regiments 
 reached the general parade ground. Across that ground 
 the troops deployed into line, and joined by the Cara- 
 bineers, who fortunately had lost their way and had re- 
 turned, marched in the full expectation of meeting the 
 revolted sipahis. But these had disappeared, and no one 
 knew whither they had gone. Believing that they had 
 moved round to attack the quarters of the Europeans, the 
 Brigadier, Archdale Wilson, advised the General to return 
 for the protection of the women, the children, and the 
 barracks. The General assented, and gave the necessary 
 orders.. On their way back the soldiers had some evi- 
 dence of the damage already done by the mutineers. 
 Lurid shoots of flame showed that many of the European 
 bungalows were blazing. Some unarmed plunderers were 
 seen, but no sipahis. Where were they ? Captain Rosser 
 of the Carabineers offered, if he were permitted, to lead a 
 squadron of his regiment and some H. A. guns along the 
 Dehli road, to ascertain if they had taken that route. 
 The suggestion was not accepted, and subsequently the 
 authorities denied that it had ever been made. It 
 would seem that the officers in high places were sadly 
 wanting in that spirit of enterprise and audacity which 
 constitute the essential element of a good soldier. 
 They would hazard nothing, not even the lives of a 
 reconnoitring party. Contenting himself with establish- 
 ing a few pickets, the General bivouacked his force 
 
Terrors of the Night at Mirath. 69 
 
 for the remainder of the night on the European parade 
 ground. 
 
 For the residents at Mirath, for the women, the children 
 the civil section of the Europeans and Eurasians, that night 
 was full of horror. The scum of the native population and 
 the unchained gaol-birds had the field to themselves. Most 
 thoroughly did they do their congenial work. The Com- 
 missioner, Mr Greathed, warned first by an officer of the 
 3d Native Cavalry, and afterwards by an Afghan pensioner, 
 had, with his wife and other English women, taken refuge 
 on the terraced roof of his house. Against a foe whose 
 weapon was fire that terrace was no sure hiding-place. 
 But for the fidelity — I am happy to add, the by no means 
 rare fidelity — of his native servants he and those with him 
 must have perished in the flames. One servant in par- 
 ticular distinguished himself He persuaded the rabble to 
 move off to search for his master in an outhouse some 
 distance off, and during their sudden absence Greathed, 
 his friends and family, had time to descend from their 
 perilous position and crouch in the empty garden. Others 
 were less fortunate. Wives, left without protection during 
 the enforced absence of their husbands, were butchered 
 without mercy, and children were slaughtered under the 
 very eyes of their mothers. Many instances of the devo- 
 tion and presence of mind of English women could be 
 given if space permitted. Those who did escape owed 
 their safety to the possession of these qualities, but the 
 roll of those who suffered was a long one. When day at 
 length dawned, it dawned over a dismantled Mirath. The 
 English men and women who had been saved crept from 
 their hiding-places to see, in the mangled corpses which 
 lay by the wayside, in the blackened ruins of houses, in 
 the furniture of European make thrown out of the dwelling- 
 houses, smashed and destroyed, abundant evidence of the 
 
Jo Feebleness of Action at Miratk. 
 
 thoroughness with which the ' scum ' and the gaol-birds had 
 done their work.^ But of those destroyers not one was to 
 be seen. They had done their deeds in darkness, and had 
 slunk away to their homes when light came. Nor was a 
 single sipahi visible. The quiet prevailing in the places 
 so recently the scenes of terrible outrage and disorder was 
 the quiet of the charnel house. 
 
 I left the English troops bivouacked on the European 
 parade ground. On that parade ground they slept whilst 
 the enormities, of which I have given an indication, were 
 being perpetrated in the civil lines. Nor, when day broke, 
 did the morning light give greater energy to the councils 
 of their commander. The General, it is true, speedily 
 recognised that the sipahis had quitted Mirath. He 
 presumed, also, that they had made for Dehli, thirty-six 
 miles distant. There was not now time for the most 
 energetic soldier to have followed and caught them, for 
 it was clear that, with a start of eight hours, the 
 3d Cavalry, at all events, would be there before them. 
 But the idea of pursuit never occurred to anyone. The 
 prevailing idea was how to secure the unthreatened Mirath. 
 There were some good men at Mirath, but on this morning 
 of the nth of May not one of those in high authority 
 was in the full possession of his faculties. The brains of 
 all were paralysed by the blow of the previous evening. 
 The General contented himself, then, with making a recon- 
 naisance to the right of the Dehli road. It was deemed 
 to be too late, and it was then certainly too late to send 
 a warning to the Dehli authorities of the danger awaiting 
 them. But the strangest thing of all was that no effort 
 
 ^ It deserves to be recorded that all the natives of Mirath did not join in 
 the outrages, an outline of which I have given. For instance, a Muhammadan 
 in the city sheltered two families at great danger to himself. The servants, 
 as a rule, showed the greatest devotion to their foreign masters. 
 
Inaction the Order of the Day, 7 1 
 
 was made to punish the marauders and murderers of the 
 previous night. ' It is a marvellous thing/ wrote, some 
 time later, the Commissioner, to whom the Government 
 entrusted the drawing up of a report of the proceedings 
 of that terrible night and of that shameful morning, * that 
 with the dreadful proof of the night's work in every direc- 
 tion, though groups of savages were actually seen gloating 
 over the mangled and mutilated remains of the victims, 
 the column did not take immediate vengeance on the 
 Sadr bazaar and its environs, crowded as the whole place 
 was with wTetches hardly concealing their fiendish satis- 
 faction.' But so it was. Inaction w^as the order of the 
 day. The authorities contented themselves with collecting 
 and placing in the theatre the bodies of the murdered 
 men and women, and left their murderers, unpunished, to 
 the full enjoyment of their ill-gotten gains. Civil and 
 military authorities vied with one another to attain per- 
 fection in the art of ' how not to do it' 
 
 Meanwhile the sipahis, having released their imprisoned 
 comrades, and set on the populace and the gaol-birds to 
 keep their late masters v/ell occupied during the night, 
 had taken the road to Dehli. It is due to some of them 
 to state that they did not quit Mirath before they had 
 seen to a place of safety those officers whom they most 
 respected. This remark applies specially to the men of 
 the nth N. I., who had gone most reluctantly into the 
 movement. Before they left, two sipahis of that regiment 
 had escorted two ladies with their children to the Cara- 
 bineer barracks. They had then rejoined their comrades. 
 Of these the troopers of the 3d Cavalry took the lead, 
 anxious to gain the bridge across the Jamnah before 
 tidings of the outbreak should reach the English authori- 
 ties. Knowing the English as they did, how, when en- 
 gaged with them on service, they had ever displayed a 
 
72 The MtUinccrs enter Dehli. 
 
 daring and an energy which had inspired their native 
 comrades, they listened for some time anxiously for the 
 sound of the galloping of the horses of the Carabineers. 
 But when hour succeeded hour, and silence still reigned 
 on all sides, they lost all apprehension, and galloping on 
 with a light heart, caught sight of the minarets of the 
 Jami Masjid glittering in the morning sun. Spurring 
 their horses, they reached the waters of the Jamnah, 
 crossed by the bridge of boats which spanned it, cut down 
 the toll-keeper on the other side, fired the toll-house, slew 
 a solitary Englishman whom they met ; then hastening 
 to the palace of the King, clamoured for admittance, 
 declaring that they had killed the English at Mirath, 
 and had come to fight for the Faith. We must leave 
 them there whilst we examine the relative positions 
 of the English and the Mughal Court at the Imperial 
 city. 
 
 The city of Dehlf had and has still a circumference 
 of five and a half miles. That of the King's palace, 
 within its walls, is nearly one and a half The city 
 itself I shall describe when I come to the operations 
 undertaken by the handful of soldiers who laid siege to 
 it. For the moment our attention must be riveted to the 
 palace. 
 
 The palace, more correctly called the inner fort or 
 citadel, was built by the Emperor Shah Jahan (1638-58). 
 It is a magnificent series of structures, reached by a flight 
 of 1 13 steps, and covered on its eastern face by the Jamnah. 
 It contained some magnificent buildings : the Diwani Am, 
 or public Hall of Audience, built of red sandstone ; the 
 Diwani Khass, or Privy Council Chamber, of white marble 
 ornamented with gold, and inlaid ; the King's Baths, the 
 Moti Masjid, or Pearl Mosque, a real architectural gem. 
 Above the entrance gate was a turret twenty feet high, 
 
The Palace — and the Kin^. 73 
 
 commanding, to the left, a magnificent view of the Jami 
 Masjid, of a white Jain temple, and of the town. Straight 
 in front of the entrance gate was the Chandni Chauk, or 
 Silver Market ; to the right, outside the walls of the city, 
 were the Jamnah, Hindu Rao's house, and the ridge, so 
 famous during the siege, at the moment indicating the 
 direction of the lines of the native infantry regiments 
 which constituted the British garrison. Within the fort 
 were gardens laid out in the formal style of the east, 
 and along the river front were a number of marble pavi- 
 lions, generally octagonal, covered with gilded domes, 
 some of them of great beauty. 
 
 The principal occupant of this inner citadel was 
 Bahadur Shah, titular King of Dehli, the twentieth suc- 
 cessor of the illustrious Akbar. He was King of Dehli 
 in name, and in name only. The empire had departed 
 from the feeble hands of his predecessors before the 
 English had become a power in India. The Khorasani 
 adventurer Nadir Shah had plundered the palace in 1739. 
 Less than ten years later, the Afghan Ahmad Shah 
 Durani had repeated the infliction. In 1788 the rebel 
 Ghulam Kadir had blinded, within the palace, the reign- 
 ing Emperor Shah Alam. For fifteen years the city had, 
 then, been occupied by the Marathas. The English had 
 made their first acquaintance with it in 1803, when Lord 
 Lake rescued the blinded representative of the Mughals 
 from the tyranny of the Central Indian conquerors. From 
 that date the English had maintained the representative 
 of the Mughal in splendour and comfort in the halls and 
 palace of his ancestors. There, in the citadel within 
 Dehli, his will was supreme. It did not extend an inch 
 beyond it. Wisely, then, the English—when, under the 
 able guidance of Marquess Wellesley, they assumed the 
 responsibilities of empire — did not restore to the Mughal 
 
74 Sentiments of the Kino^ tozuaj^ds the English 
 
 the power which he had ah-eady lost. Less wisely, per- 
 haps, they had permitted him to enjoy the shadow after 
 he had lost the substance. 
 
 At the moment, and for some time previously, the 
 feelings of the King and his family had been considerably 
 excited against the English ruler, in consequence of corre- 
 spondence which had taken place with reference to the 
 succession. Bahadur Shah was an old man. A rumour 
 had reached him, so far back as 1849-50, that Lord 
 Dalhousie had not been indisposed to deprive the House 
 of Taimur of the shadow of splendour still remaining to 
 it. Rumour had told the truth. The acknowledged heir 
 to Bahadur Shah, Prince Dara Bakht, had died in 1849. 
 The next in the strict line of succession. Prince Fakir-ud- 
 din, had been born a pensioner. Lord Dalhousie was 
 inclined to admit his accession to the chiefship of the 
 family upon less favourable conditions than those which 
 had been recognised in the case of his father. In plain 
 language, Lord Dalhousie believed that the natives of 
 India, the princes as well as the people, had become 
 ' entirely indifferent to the condition of the King of Dehli 
 or his position,' and, considering the danger of retaining 
 an ' imperiuni in imperio ' in the very heart of the ancient 
 capital of India, he had desired to take the opportunity of 
 the death of the immediate representative of the Llouse 
 of Taimur to sweep away all the privileges and preroga- 
 tives which had kept alive a pretentious mock royalty in 
 the heart of the empire. 
 
 The Court of Directors gave Lord Dalhousie full 
 power to act according to the views he had imbibed on 
 this subject, but there was much difference of opinion in 
 the India House, and Lord Dalhousie wisely deferred 
 action. Meanwhile, rumours of the impending change 
 had reached the palace, and had roused the most furious 
 
Warranted by Facts. 7 5 
 
 opposition, especially on the part of the favourite wife of 
 the old King. This lady, in the manner of favourite 
 wives generally, desired to secure the succession, with all 
 its privileges, for her son, Jawan Bakht, then (1850) a boy 
 of eleven. There existed at that time a strange ignorance 
 of native feeling and native habits of thought in the 
 Council of the Governor-General, and, notwithstanding 
 the passionate entreaties from Dehli, Lord Dalhousie and 
 his advisers wrote a despatch to the Home Government 
 recommending them to acknowledge the succession of 
 the eldest surviving son, Fakir-ud-din ; and urging that, 
 on the death of Bahadur Shah, the opportunity should 
 be taken to utilise the claims of the youngest son by 
 obtaining from the eldest the desired concessions. Prince 
 Fakir-ud-dm was induced to consent to this ignoble ar- 
 rangement, though he hated himself for his weakness. 
 But his death, in 1856, threw back matters into the 
 channel in which they were before his consent had been 
 obtained. 
 
 Lord Canning was then Governor-General, and at 
 that time Lord Canning could see only with the eyes of 
 the Councillors whom I have described. In reply to the 
 urgent solicitations of the Queen to nominate her son, he 
 determined not only to refuse her request, but to recog- 
 nise as heir-apparent the eldest surviving son of the King. 
 He determined likewise to exhort terms less favourable 
 to native ideas than those which had been wrung from 
 his deceased brother, for, in addition to the renuncia- 
 tions to which that brother had agreed, he stipulated 
 that the succeeding prince should renounce the title of 
 King. 
 
 It is right that the reader should bear in mind these 
 transactions when recollecting the conduct of the repre- 
 sentatives of the House of Taimur when, on that eventful 
 
Td The Mutmeers demand a?i Audience, 
 
 May morning (May ii, 1857) the troopers of the 3d 
 Cavalry stood under the windows of the King demanding 
 admittance and support. The King was an old man, 
 ruled to a great extent by a favourite wife, whose hopes 
 had been dashed to the ground by the British Govern- 
 ment. He himself, his courtiers, his sons, his depen- 
 dents, kne.v that the fiat had gone forth from Calcutta 
 which, on his death, would humble to the dust the House 
 of Taimur. We cannot wonder that their feelings should 
 have prompted them to seize any opportunity which 
 might present itself We cannot wonder that, with the 
 shadow of the despoiler before them, his threats ringing 
 in their ears, they should have decided to strike a blow 
 for the restoration of the family honours : to court death 
 rather than submit to disgrace. Neither in the past nor in 
 the present has a single man of the two hundred and fifty 
 millions of natives of India condemned them for their 
 action on that memorable morning. The reverse was 
 the case. The sympathy of India was with them, and 
 it was the conviction that it would be so which decided 
 them. 
 
 Attached to the citadel, and representing British 
 interests at the palace, were the Commissioner of Dehli, 
 Mr Fraser, and the Commandant of the Palace Guards, 
 Captain Douglas. No sooner did the aged King hear 
 the voices of the troopers under his windows than he 
 sent to summon Captain Douglas to inquire the mean- 
 ing of their presence. Captain Douglas pleaded ignor- 
 ance, but, confident in the magic of the appearance of 
 a British officer, declared he would go down to speak to 
 them, and send them away. The King, apparently ignor- 
 ant of their purpose, and yet dreading the reason of 
 their presence, begged the young Englishman not to 
 expose his life. The King's physician added his en- 
 
The British Residents are Massacred. 7 7 
 
 treaties to those of his master. Douglas contented him- 
 self, then, with entering the verandah and ordering the 
 troopers to depart, as their presence was an annoyance 
 to the King. The men scornfully defied him. It hap- 
 pened that the sipahis on duty at the palace belonged to 
 the 38th N. I., the regiment which had successfully defied 
 Lord Dalhousie's order to proceed to Burma but five 
 years before. They were disloyal to the core. When, 
 therefore, the troopers of the 3d Cavalry, maddened by 
 the sight of Douglas, attempted to force an entrance into 
 the palace, they admitted them as comrades. 
 
 The troopers, once admitted, made short work of every 
 Englishman they found there. They cut down to the death 
 Mr Fraser, Captain Douglas, the chaplain, Mr Jennings, his 
 daughter, and a young lady staying with them. Miss 
 Clifford. The collector, Mr Hutchinson, fell a victim also 
 to their barbarity. They were not alone in their thirst 
 for blood. Not only had the guards of the 38th N. I. 
 fraternised with them, but the orderlies of the King and 
 the rabble vied with them in their savage fury. There 
 is no reason to believe that the King gave any sanction 
 to their proceedings. For the moment the old man 
 was absolutely without authority. The soldiery had 
 forced their way into his splendid Diwani Am, and had 
 turned it into a barrack. At that crisis they were the 
 masters. 
 
 Outside the palace, especially in the quarter inhabited 
 by the European residents engaged in mercantile pursuits, 
 the carnage was even greater. The Dehli Bank, supposed 
 to contain treasure, was one of the buildings first attacked. 
 Defended with gallantry by the manager, Mr Beresford, 
 and his family, it was stormed and gutted, and the de- 
 fenders were slain. The Dehli Gazette press and its 
 inmates met the same fate. The English church was 
 
yS The Amative Regiments at DeJili 
 
 stormed and rifled. Every house, in fact, occupied by 
 European or Eurasian was attacked, and every Christian 
 upon whom hands could be laid was killed. There was 
 no mercy and there was no quarter. 
 
 Meanwhile, in the cantonments, matters were not going 
 much better. The cantonments for the native brigade at 
 Dehli was situated on the famous ridge, about two miles 
 from the city. There were quartered the 38th, the 54thj 
 and the 74th N. I., and a battery of native artillery. The 
 commanding officer was Brigadier Graves. On that event- 
 ful morning Graves had ordered a parade of the native 
 troops, to have read to them the proceedings of the court- 
 martial on Isri Pandi, the mutinous Jamadar of Barrackpur. 
 Some of those Vv'ho were present thought they detected in 
 the manner of the sipahis, whilst the proceedings were being 
 read, signs of sympathy with the condemned man. But 
 there was no overt act, and the sipahis were dismissed to 
 their lines in the usual manner. It subsequently transpired 
 that sipahis from Mirath had arrived in the Hues the 
 previous day, and had communicated to the regiments 
 located there the intentions of the Mirath native brigade- 
 But for the moment all was quiet. The officers had re- 
 turned to their quarters, and had eaten their breakfasts, 
 when they were suddenly startled by the intimation that 
 the native troops at Mirath had mutinied, and that the 
 advanced guard of them, the 3d Cavalry, had galloped 
 across the bridge. So great was the faith of the officers 
 in their own men, and in British superiority, that those at 
 Dehli never for a moment believed that the outbreak was 
 aught but an isolated mutiny, which would be speedily 
 quelled. The European force at Mirath must be, they 
 thought, on the heels of the mutinied sipahis, and whilst 
 their own native brigade would show them a bold front 
 the Carabineers and 60th Rifles would assail them from 
 
Gradually join the Revolt. 79 
 
 behind. With a h'ght heart, then, the officers of the 54ih 
 N. L, and of the battery of native artillery, accompanied 
 their men, to whom the sacred duty of defence had been 
 committed, towards the city gates. 
 
 Their dream of confidence was not of long duration. 
 Some men of the 38th, at the main-guard, set the example 
 of revolt. Ordered to fire on the approaching troopers, 
 they replied with insult. The 54th then fired, some in 
 the air, some on their own officers. Colonel Ripley was 
 w^ounded ; Smith, Burrowes, Edwards, and Waterfield were 
 shot dead. The 74th N. I. was then ordered to the front. 
 Their colonel addressed them, reminded them of their 
 past good conduct, and called upon volunteers to accom- 
 pany him to the Kashmir Gate, adding that now was the 
 time for the regiment to prove its loyalty. The sipahis 
 stepped forward to a man, and with the same hope which 
 had characterised the officers of the 54th, those of the 74th 
 led on their men. At the main-guard they found some 
 men of the 54th N. I. who had returned from the city. 
 The din within the walls of the city was now overwhelming. 
 The sipahis themselves evidently dreaded lest the strong 
 English force stationed at Mirath should have arrived As 
 deeply imbued as their comrades with the spirit of revolt, 
 they resolved, then, before they cast their lot with those 
 who had ' pronounced,' to wait the turn of events. They 
 remained halted, silent and thoughtful, at the main-guard. 
 They were still there when a terrible explosion within the 
 city shook that building to its foundations. 
 
 In the heart of the city, at no great distance from the 
 palace, was the great magazine, full of munitions of war. 
 On that morning there were in the magazine Lieutenant 
 George Willoughby, in charge of it. Lieutenants Forrest 
 and Raynor, of the Ordnance Commissariat department, 
 Conductors Buckley, Shaw, Scully, and Crow, and Ser- 
 
So Willoughby and the Dehli Magazine. 
 
 geants Edwards and Stewart. It would seem that at 
 about eight o'clock the magistrate of Dehli, Sir Theophilus 
 Metcalfe, came down to the magazine with the informa- 
 tion that mutineers were crossing the river, and asking 
 for two guns to defend the bridge. But it was soon 
 realised that the bridge was already in possession of the 
 mutineers. Metcalfe then proceeded with Willoughby to 
 ascertain whether the city gate had been closed to the 
 rebels. When it became known that not only had it not 
 been closed, but that the mutineers had been admitted 
 to the palace, Willoughby at once realised the situation. 
 Confident that his turn would soon come, he set to work 
 with his subordinates to render the magazine as defen- 
 sible as possible. The gates were closed and barricaded, 
 guns were placed at salient points, double charged with 
 grape, and a central position was established, from which 
 the guns could bear upon any point which might be forced. 
 Then came the crucial point. All the subordinate workers 
 in the magazine were natives. Willoughby and his com- 
 rades hoped for a short time that these men, associated 
 with their officers for so many years, would be faithful, 
 and directed that arms should be served out to them. 
 The manner in which these were received revealed to the 
 few Europeans the fact that they would have to de- 
 pend solely on their own energies. The natives, wrote 
 Lieutenant Forrest/ accepted the arms most reluctantly, 
 ' and appeared to be not only in a state of excitement, 
 but also of insubordination, as they refused to obey any 
 orders issued by the Europeans.' Knowing it to be quite 
 impossible to resist for long a serious attack, and re- 
 solved that so much valuable munitions of war should 
 not, if they could help it, fall into the hands of the Queen's 
 enemies, these gallant Englishmen then caused a train to 
 
 ^Lieutenant Forrest's Report, dated May 27, 1857. 
 
The Magazine partially exploded. 8 1 
 
 be laid, communicating with the powder magazine, to be 
 fired only when every other resource should be exhausted. 
 These arrangements had just been made when sipahis 
 from the palace came to demand the surrender of the 
 magazine in the name of the King of Dehli. No answer 
 having been returned to this summons, the King, or some- 
 one acting on his behalf, sent down scaling ladders. On 
 these being erected against the wall, the whole of the 
 native establishment, climbing to the top of the wall, 
 deserted by means of them, and joined the rebels. These 
 consisted chiefly of the sipahis of the nth and 20th N. I. 
 from Mirath. Against these a fire was kept up as long as 
 possible, but the superiority of numbers was overwhelm- 
 ing. Still, a gallant defence was maintained. Nor was it 
 until Forrest and Buckley had been disabled, and defence 
 had become hopeless, that Willoughby gave the order to 
 fire the train. Not one of the garrison expected to escape 
 with his life. But it was otherwise ordered. Scully, who 
 fired the train, and four of his comrades, were never seen 
 again. They certainly perished ; but Willoughby and 
 Forrest succeeded in reaching the Kashmir gate. Raynor 
 and Buckley, too, escaped with their lives. The loss of 
 the assailants was far more severe. It has never, I believe, 
 been mathematically computed, but it may be reckoned 
 by hundreds. Nor were the casualties caused by that 
 explosion the most important consequence of it. It was 
 the first reply to the general revolt ; it was the first warn- 
 ing to the King and to the sipahis of the nature of the 
 men whose vengeance they had dared ; the first intimation 
 to the rebels of the stern and resolute character of the 
 Englishman when thoroughly roused. It was the sound 
 of this explosion, occurring about four o'clock in the after- 
 noon, which startled the English ofificers and sipahis 
 assembled at the main-guard. It was the sign for action 
 
 F 
 
82 Escape of the Officers of the Native Regiments, 
 
 to the latter. To them it plainly indicated that the rebels 
 had penetrated to the heart of the city ; that, for the 
 moment, mutiny had triumphed. So, at least, thought the 
 sipahis of the company of the 38th N. I. which had moved 
 up to the main-guard. Raising their muskets to the 
 shoulder, the men of that company fired a volley into the 
 group of officers near them. Gordon, the field-officer of 
 the day, fell dead from his horse without a groan. Smith 
 and Reveley of the 74th N. I. shared the same fate. 
 There was nothing for it for the survivors but to run. 
 There was a way of escape, perilous indeed, but certain 
 for the time. This was to dash through the embrasure in 
 the bastion skirting the courtyard of the main-guard, to 
 drop thirty feet into the ditch, and ascending the opposite 
 scarp, to gain the glacis, and thence the jungle beyond it. 
 In an instant the conviction took possession of the minds 
 of the yet unwounded officers that this way of escape 
 must be attempted. Suddenly, however, the despairing 
 cries of the women in the upper room of the main-guard 
 reminded them that the escape which was easy to men 
 might be impossible for the other sex. However, there 
 was no other, so, conducting the women to the embrasure, 
 the officers fastened their belts together, and whilst some 
 of them descended first, the others from above helped 
 the women to slide down. The whizzing of a round-shot 
 over their heads hastened their movements, and at last, 
 in a shorter time than had seemed possible, the descent 
 was accomplished. More difficult was the climbing 
 to the glacis ; but this came to a fortunate end. 
 Then the fugitives pressed on into the jungle, thence 
 some to the cantonments, others towards the Metcalfe 
 House. 
 
 But in neither of these places was there safety. The 
 sipahis were by this time thoroughly roused. There was 
 
The Flight from Dehli. Z'^ 
 
 nothing for it but flight to some less threatened spot. So 
 men, women, and children sallied forth : alike those who 
 had remained and those but just arrived from the main- 
 guard. Their sufferings were terrible. They had to 
 undergo physical tortures, and the still less endurable 
 tortures of the mind. Tearing from their persons every- 
 thing in the shape of glitter or ornament, crouching in 
 by-ways, wading rivers, carrying the children as best 
 they could, hiding in hollows, enduring the maltreatment 
 of villagers, and the abuse of stray parties of wanderers, 
 hungry, thirsty, weary, at times hunted, they at length 
 reached shelter. Some found their way to Mirath, some 
 to Karnal, others to Ambalah. A few perished on the 
 way ; some giving up the struggle from fatigue, others 
 succumbing to disease. The behaviour of the women of 
 the party was such as to make the men proud of their 
 companions. When Captain Wood sank exhausted, un- 
 able to proceed, it was his wife, and his wife's friend, Mrs 
 Peile, who supported him to the haven of safety. Nor 
 was this a solitary instance. When it was found, on 
 arriving at the night's bivouac, that one or more were 
 missing, the less fatigued of the party went back to search 
 for and bring them in. Generally the search was fruit- 
 less, for the scum of the population, which would have 
 shrunk from attacking a party, had no mercy for a solitary 
 invalid. It is due, however, to the natives to add that 
 they were not all imbued with the hatred which animated 
 a section of them. There were instances of assistance 
 given by some of them, men of high and low caste alike, 
 \o the suffering and the wounded. There are those alive 
 now who owed their safety to the compassion felt for 
 them in their terrible straits by the kind-hearted Hindu 
 and the loyal Muhammadan. 
 
 Meanwhile, in and immediately around the Imperial 
 
84 Rebellion triumphant in Dehli, 
 
 city, rebellion was triumphant. And in those early days 
 rebellion had absolutely no mercy. Some fifty Christians, 
 Europeans and Eurasians, who lived in the Darya-ganj, 
 the English quarter of the Imperial city, had at the first 
 sound of alarm taken refuge in one of the strongest 
 houses of the quarter, and had there barricaded them- 
 selves. But a handful of men and women, ill-armed and 
 without supplies, was powerless against the roused rabble 
 of the revolted capital. The house was speedily stormed, 
 and the defenders were dragged to the palace, and lodged 
 there in an underground apartment, without windows, and 
 with only one door. After a stay there of five days they 
 were taken out, led to a courtyard, and there massacred. 
 Their bodies were thrown into carts, and were transferred 
 thence to the waters of the Jamnah. One woman, terrified 
 more for her three children than for herself, escaped, with 
 them, the fate of her companions by declaring herself a 
 convert to the faith of Islam. After that i6th of May 
 there remained not in Dehli a single Christian. 
 
 The King of Dehli, Bahadur Shah, had, meanwhile, 
 assumed the responsibilities of the position which had 
 been forced upon him. It is more than probable that the 
 old man, left to himself, would have shrunk from the posi- 
 tion. Outside of the walls of his citadel he had never 
 wielded power, nor, up to the morning of May nth, had 
 he ever conceived it possible that he should assert himself 
 against the western people who had conquered Hindustan. 
 Though such a question might have been mooted in his 
 harem, he had regarded the conversation as the wild 'chatter 
 of irresponsible frivolity.' Yet, on that memorable morn- 
 ing, the position had been forced upon him. The mutinied 
 sipahis, who had bivouacked in his Hall of Audience, who 
 had expelled the English from the city, who boasted their 
 determination to drive them into the sea, must have a 
 
Bahadur Shah is p7^o claimed. 85 
 
 leader. Who so fit for such a post as the representative 
 of the Mughal, the descendant of that illustrious Akbar, 
 who had accomplished the union of India ? From such 
 a position it was impossible that Bahadur Shah should 
 recoil. Had he desired ever so much to hang back, and 
 there is reason to suppose he was by no means eager to 
 assume the foremost post, with its dangers, its responsi- 
 bilities, its humiliations, he had a family the members of 
 which were resolved that he should bind round his head 
 'the golden round.' There was the ambitious Queen, 
 whose projects two Governors-General had in succession 
 thwarted ; her son, young, handsome, and full of ambi- 
 tion ; her step-sons, the eldest of whom knew that, though 
 in a certain sense the English would allow him to succeed 
 his father, he would be shorn of all that had made succes- 
 sion desirable, even of the royal title. In these, and in 
 the ambitious nobles by whom they were surrounded, and 
 in whose bosoms dwelt the traditions of a past which had 
 not been without glory, the 'irresponsible frivolity' of 
 which I have spoken loudly asserted its influence. Under 
 the pressure of that influence Bahadur Shah agreed to 
 assume the responsible position forced upon him. The 
 revolted soldiery throughout India were called upon to 
 fight for the restoration of the Mughal. The ' cry ' was 
 not altogether a happy cry for the revolters. Though it 
 might conciliate and bind together many Muhammadans, 
 it could scarcely fail to alienate the Maratha princes who 
 had contested empire with the Mughal family. The re- 
 sult proved that the princes of Central India preferred the 
 safe position they held under British suzerainty to aiding 
 mutinied soldiers to restore a dynasty which they had 
 been the first to trample under foot. Such thoughts did 
 not, in those early days, present themselves to the minds 
 of the ' irresponsible chatterers.' They believed that the 
 
86 The Beginning of the Sti^ife. 
 
 expulsion of the English from Dehli, and the proclamation 
 of Bahadur Shah as sovereign of India, was the consum- 
 mation of the movement prematurely set on foot at Mirath. 
 Unfortunately for their hopes it was only the untimely 
 beginning. 
 
CHAPTER VM. 
 
 THE EFFECT, THROUGHOUT INDIA, OF THE SEIZURE 
 
 OF DEHLI. 
 
 The story of the events of the loth of May at Mirath, and 
 of the nth at Dehh', came as a surprise alike to the 
 revolters all over India and to the Government. It came 
 as a surprise to the former because the astute men who 
 had fomented the ill-feeling against the British, which by 
 this time had become pretty general, had laid down as 
 a cardinal principle that there were to be no isolated out- 
 breaks ; that the explosion should take place on the same 
 day all over the Bengal Presidency ; and they had fixed 
 upon Sunday, the 31st of May, as the day of the general 
 rising. But the chief conspirators had to employ a large 
 number of instruments. The rashness or premature action 
 of a single instrument may destroy the best laid plot. 
 The heads of the conspiracy had corrupted the 3d Native 
 Cavalry and the 20th Regiment N. I., and had formed 
 their committees in these regiments. But, at a critical con- 
 juncture, these latter had been unable to restrain the rank 
 and file of the regiments from premature action. Excited 
 to fever pitch, eighty-five men of the 3d L. C. had, with 
 the sympathy of their comrades, refused to receive the 
 proffered cartridges. Brought to trial for the offence, they 
 had been condemned, sentenced, and lodged in gaol. This 
 sentence had been too great a stimulus to the passions of 
 the troopsrs to allow them to await patiently the day fixed 
 
88 The Revolt at Mh^ath prematttre. 
 
 upon. They saw that the English were unsuspicious, and 
 they bcheved that the plot, so far as Mirath was concerned, 
 might, by a prompt rising, be brought to a successful issue. 
 In that events proved them to be right. But they had 
 lost sight of the fact that, by acting solely for their own 
 hand, they were imperilling the great principle which had 
 been impressed upon them by their committees, and, with 
 it, the general success aimed at by their chiefs. This 
 premature action proved ultimately as fortunate for the 
 English as disastrous to the cause of revolt. A blow 
 which, struck simultaneously all over India, might have 
 been irresistible lost more than half its power when 
 delivered piecemeal and at intervals.^ 
 
 On the 1 2th of May a telegram from Agra conveyed 
 to the Government, in Calcutta, the information that the 
 native cavalry at Mirath had risen, had set fire to several 
 officers' houses and to their own lines, and had killed or 
 wounded all the English officers and soldiers they had 
 come across. It is not too much to record that the atti- 
 
 ^ This is not mere surmise. Mr Cracroft Wilson, of the Civil wService, 
 who was selected by the Government of India, after the repression of the 
 Mutiny, to ascertain who were the guilty and who deserving of reward 
 among the natives of the North-west, has recorded his conviction, derived 
 from oral information, that the 31st of May was the day fixed upon by the 
 conspirators for a general rising. Committees had been formed in each 
 regiment, and to these alone was intrusted the general scheme of the plot. 
 The sipahis were directed to obey only the orders of the regimental com- 
 mittees. It is probable that the very severe punishment dealt out to the 
 eighty-five men of the 3d L. C. so excited the men that they overrode the 
 directions of their committee and insisted upon prompt action. 
 
 From information I have obtained, in conversation with natives of the 
 Upper Provinces, I am convinced that the theory broached by Mr Cracroft 
 Wilson is true. It is very difficult to induce the natives who lived and took 
 a part in the great uprising of 1857 to open their minds regarding it. But 
 I have heard from some of them sufficient to produce conviction in my mind 
 that a day was fixed, and that the premature action of the loth and nth of 
 May was considered to have greatly damaged the chances of success. 
 
Loi^d Canning hears of the Mir at h Revolt. 89 
 
 tude of the Government on receiving this telegram was 
 one of blank dismay. It was so little expected. Only 
 two days before, Lord Canning had written a minute 
 strongly supporting disbandment as a severe punishment 
 to a regiment which should mutiny. Mr Dorin, the senior 
 of his colleagues, had recorded an opinion of the same 
 character. The military member of Council, General Low, 
 little realising the nature of the catastrophe he had to 
 face, had suggested that, after all, the conduct of the sipahis 
 might be due rather to actual dread of injury to their 
 caste than to disaffection. Yet, on the 12th, these rulers 
 were told that disaffection had reached its highest point ; 
 that a whole regiment, far from fearing disbandment, 
 had actually disbanded itself, after slaying its officers. 
 Then, indeed, they must have realised that, in their 
 dealings with the 19th, with the 34th, with the men 
 whose conduct Cavenagh had brought to notice, they 
 had been pitiably weak when they had thought they 
 had been strong ; that from the first they had misjudged 
 and misunderstood the whole business ; that the dis- 
 affection, far from being confined to Bengal proper, was 
 probably general — in a word, that they had been living 
 in a fool's paradise. 
 
 It is due to Lord Canning to state that, within a short 
 time of his perusal of the terrible news, he had not only 
 recognised the grave character of the crisis, but had taken 
 measures to meet it. On the 12th he did not know the 
 worst. Then it was the mutiny of the 3d Light Cavalry 
 that he had to meet. But two days later he received 
 fuller particulars. On the 14th he heard of the seizure of 
 Dehli. On the 15th and i6th particulars reached him of 
 the massacre of the Europeans, of the flight of the officers, 
 of the rallying round the resuscitated flag of the Mughal. 
 Then he stood forward as the bold, resolute, daring English- 
 
90 Projnpt Measures taken by Lord Canning. 
 
 man he really was. He telegraphed to the Governor of 
 Bombay, Lord Elphinstone, to hasten, as far as he could, 
 the return of the troops due in Bombay from the com- 
 pleted campaign against Persia. He telegraphed to the 
 Commander-in-Chief to ' make short work of Dehli? He 
 transmitted to the Chief Commissioner of the Panjab, Sir 
 John Lawrence, full powers to act according to the best 
 of his judgment. Not only did he countermand the return 
 of the 84th to Rangoon, but he sent for a second regiment 
 from that place and from Moulmein. He wrote to the 
 Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, to send him two 
 regiments. More than that, recollecting that a combined 
 military and naval expedition was on its way from 
 England to China, to support there, by force of arms, the 
 pretensions of the British, he took upon himself the 
 responsibility of despatching a message to Lord Elgin and 
 General Ashburnham to intercept that expedition, and to 
 beg them to despatch the troops under their orders with 
 all possible speed to India. 
 
 Having summoned those reinforcements. Lord Canning 
 took a searching glance at the actual situation. The 
 sudden outbreak at Mirath must have brought to his 
 mind the conviction that he micfht have to meet a g-eneral 
 rising of the Bengal army. What resources had he in 
 his hand, not counting the troops he had summoned to 
 his aid, to meet such a general rising ? A glance at those 
 resources was not calculated to inspire confidence. Be- 
 tween Calcutta and Danapur there were no English 
 regiments. At Calcutta and in its vicinity were the 53d 
 and the 84th. At Danapur was the loth Foot. Stretch- 
 ing north-westward from Danapur, the eye rested on 
 Banaras, with no English regiment, and but a few English 
 gunners. At Allahabad, with its important fortress, the 
 same state of things. The same likewise at Kanhpur, 
 
Resources at His Disposal. 91 
 
 the next military station beyond it. At Lakhnao, indeed, 
 there was one English regiment, but that regiment was 
 wanted to defend the whole province of Oudh. At Agra 
 there was but one English regiment. Beyond Agra and 
 Kanhpur came Mirath and Dehli. We know, and Lord 
 Canning knew, the condition of both those places. Beyond 
 them were the military stations of Ambalah, and the hill 
 stations between it and Simla, and Firuzpur, and beyond 
 these again, the Panjab, as the Panjab was then computed. 
 Here the bulk of the British troops was concentrated, but 
 their numbers were none too many for the needs of the 
 province. 
 
 If the reader, bearing in mind the allotment of British 
 troops I have just given, will study a map of India, he 
 will realise that the prospect immediately before Lord 
 Canning was far from reassuring. He had, as a statesman 
 versed in affairs, to regard the native garrisons in all the 
 stations mentioned, and in the smaller stations in their 
 neighbourhood, as at least untrustworthy. After the events 
 of Mirath and Dehli, he was bound even to class them in the 
 list of probable enemies, and to provide for them accord- 
 ingly. There were native troops at Barrackpur, in eastern 
 Bengal, at Dandpur, at Banaras, at Allahabad, at Kanhpur, 
 scattered all over the province of Oudh, at Agra, at Aligarh, 
 at Bareli, at Muradabad, and at other minor stations south- 
 east of Mirath and west of Agra„ In the districts in which 
 those native troops were located Lord Canning could at 
 the moment dispose of but four English regiments — the 
 53d and 84th at or near Calcutta, the loth at Danapur, 
 the 32d at Lakhnao, the 3d Europeans at Agra. Every 
 man of these regiments was required for the purposes of 
 the city or cantonment in which he happened to be. Lord 
 Canning could not fail to recognise, then, that between 
 Calcutta and Mirath he was absolutely powerless for ag- 
 
92 The Recovery of Dehli considered easy. 
 
 gressive purposes ; that it would be marvellous could he 
 succeed in maintaining his position until reinforcements 
 should arrive. 
 
 On the other hand, he had great faith, and I believe at 
 the time every Englishman south-east of Mirath had great 
 faith, in the power of the Commander-in-Chief to retake 
 the Imperial city. Past history afforded good reason for 
 that belief In September 1803 the troops of Sindhia had 
 not offered the semblance of a resistance to the small army 
 of General Lake. In the wars of the earlier Mughals with 
 the representatives of the dynasties which they supplanted, 
 Dehli had never offered any but the slightest resistance to 
 the army which had been victorious in the field. Even 
 amongst soldiers who had been stationed at that city the 
 idea that Dehli could present a prolonged resistance was 
 laughed at. The conviction prevalent at Calcutta,^ especi- 
 ally in military circles, was that the mutineers had played 
 the British game by rushing into a walled city, where they 
 would be as rats in a trap. It can easily be understood, 
 then, how it was that the hopes of Lord Canning that the 
 Commander-in-Chief would very soon be able to deal a 
 deadly blow to the mutineers, by capturing their strong- 
 hold, was shared by every Englishman, or by almost every 
 Englishman, at Calcutta. 
 
 As to the Panjab, though Lord Canning naturally felt 
 anxiety, it was an anxiety tempered by confidence in the 
 resolute man who there represented him, and in that 
 resolute man's subordinates. He had precisely the same 
 feeling regarding Oudh. If Oudh at this crisis could be 
 preserved to the British, Sir Henry Lawrence, who re- 
 presented there the Government of India, was the man to 
 preserve it. He had, and justly, an equal confidence in the 
 
 ^ I write from my own knowledge, having at the time been attached to 
 the Government of India, in Calcutta, as Assistant Auditor-General. 
 
Exterior Policy of Lord Canning admirable. 93 
 
 Governors of the minor Presidencies — in Lord Elphin- 
 stone and Lord Harris — a confidence which their splendid 
 conduct in all the phases of the rebellion more than 
 justified. 
 
 Looking back at the conduct of Lord Canning at this 
 period, I cannot withhold my conviction that in all that 
 related to his exterior policy, that is, in the efforts he 
 made to procure assistance from outside, it was admirable. 
 There was only one little thing, suggested to him by Lord 
 Elphinstone, which he might with advantage have done, 
 but which he did not do. In those days telegraphic com- 
 munication with England had not been established. 
 With the view, then, to secure the prompt arrrival of re- 
 inforcements from England by the overland route, Lord 
 Elphinstone suggested to Lord Canning the despatch to 
 England of a special steamer, ready to his hand, which, 
 steaming at her highest speed, should anticipate the 
 regular mail steamer by some days. For some reason 
 with which I am not acquainted Lord Canning declined 
 the suggestion. 
 
 Having thus, in the manner I have recorded, en- 
 deavoured to reassure his lieutenants beyond Mirath, and 
 to procure assistance from beyond India, Lord Canning 
 set to work to take the measures which might be necessary 
 to maintain his position within the country until re- 
 inforcements should arrive. In this attempt he was not 
 nearly so successful as he was in his measures of exterior 
 policy. 
 
 It was unfortunate that, in his measures of internal 
 policy, Lord Canning was compelled, from his previous 
 inexperience of India, to depend for his information on 
 men, for the most part, of the shallowest capacity : men 
 who, although they had served in India during periods of 
 from fifteen to thirty years, and longer, had served with 
 
94 His Internal Policy niise^^ible, 
 
 their eyes shut, and with a coil of red tape round their 
 minds. Calcutta and its suburbs contained, in 1857, a 
 native population exceeding half a million. In one of 
 the suburbs lived the deposed King of Oudh, with a large 
 following of retainers, not one of whom was disposed to 
 love the Government which had made them exiles. To 
 guard this large population there was but one weak wing 
 of an English regiment, occupying Fort William. But 
 there was a large body of Englishmen in Calcutta — 
 merchants, lawyers, traders, clerks in public offices — who, 
 apprehending the nature of the crisis far more clearly than 
 the Government had apprehended it, were ready and 
 anxious to place their services at the disposal of the 
 Governor-General for the repression of disorder. There 
 were also others — Frenchmen, Germans, Americans, — who 
 were inspired by a similar sentiment. The feeling which 
 animated these men was as simple as it was disinterested. 
 They said in so many words to the Government : ' The 
 situation is full of peril ; you are short of men, you have 
 to control a large population in Calcutta, and you have 
 within call but two English regiments ; there are three 
 armed native regiments at Barrackpur, ready to emulate 
 the conduct of their comrades at Mirath, why not utilise 
 our services ? We can furnish a regiment of infantry, a 
 regiment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery ; our in- 
 terests and your interests are identical : use us.' 
 
 There was not the smallest approach to panic among 
 these men. They were sincerely anxious to help the 
 Government in the terrible crisis. What panic there was 
 was confined entirely to the higher official classes and the 
 scum of the Eurasian population. It was in the exercise 
 of the purest patriotism, then, that the merchants and 
 traders of Calcutta, English and foreign, offered their 
 services, between the 20th and the 25th of May, to the 
 
Mr Beadons Insole ]it Rebuff. 95 
 
 Government. A wise Government would have met these 
 offers with sympathy. The Government of Calcutta met 
 them with language which was tantamount to insult. 
 Whilst the English merchants and traders were told that, 
 if they wished to enrol themselves as special constables, 
 they might apply to the Commissioner of Police, who, it 
 transpired, had been instructed to furnish them with clubs, 
 the French community received from the Home Secretary, 
 Mr Cecil Beadon, a reply which betrayed either infatua- 
 tion or a determined attempt to deceive : ' Everything 
 is quiet within six hundred miles of the capital. The 
 mischief caused by a passing and groundless panic has 
 been already arrested ; and there is every reason to hope 
 that in the course of a few days tranquillity and con- 
 fidence will be restored throughout the Presidency.' In 
 point of fact, the mischief had not been arrested ; every- 
 thing was not quiet within 600 miles of the capital ; and, 
 far from there being reason to hope that in the course of 
 a few days tranquillity and confidence would be restored 
 throughout the Presidency, there was the absolute cer- 
 tainty that disorder and insurrection would enormously 
 increase. 
 
 The reply of the Home Secretary, representing the 
 views of the Government, was alike untrue and impolitic. 
 At a critical moment it alienated the sympathies of the 
 Europeans of Calcutta. And it speaks largely in favour 
 of the patriotism and self-abnegation of the members of 
 that community that, about three weeks later, when the 
 boastings of the Home Secretary had vanished into thin 
 air, and the Government saw almost as clearly as the com- 
 munity had seen, at the time of their first offer, the danger 
 of the situation, they agreed to form volunteer corps 
 of the three arms to aid the Government in their dire 
 necessity. 
 
96 Lord Canning realises the Sihtaiion. 
 
 For the Home Secretary's vaunt had scarcely been 
 made pubHc when the ineptitude, or the wish to deceive 
 which had prompted it, became apparent His reply, 
 already quoted, had been written on the 25th of May. 
 Between that date and the 30th the native troops at 
 Firuzpur, at Aligarh, at Bulandshahr, at Itawah, and at 
 Mainpuri rose in revolt. The news from Agra, from 
 Lakhnao, from Kanhpur, from Banaras, was of a most 
 discouragincT character. It became evident, even to the 
 Government, that not only had the mischief not been 
 arrested, but that it was yet in its infancy. Under these 
 circumstances, Lord Canning could not but feel very 
 anxious regarding the movement of the Commander-in- 
 Chief against Dehli. The maintenance of the authority 
 left to the English, between the Hugh' and the Indus, 
 depended, he felt, on the promptitude of the action of 
 the gallant soldier who, on the first news of the revolt at 
 Mirath, had hastened to Ambalah to organise a force to 
 march aeainst the rebels. It was in this view that, on the 
 31st of May, he despatched to that officer a telegram 
 which clearly shows how, since the Home Secretary 
 had triumphantly 'snubbed' the French inhabitants of 
 Calcutta on the 25th, the views of the Government had 
 changed.^ 
 
 1 ' I have heard to-day that you do not mtend to be before Dehli until 
 the 9th. In the meantime Kanhpur and Lakhnao are severely pressed, 
 and the country between Dehli and Kanhpur is passing into the hands 
 of the rebels. It is of the utmost importance to prevent this, and to 
 relieve Kanhpur, but nothing but rapid action will do it. Your force of 
 artillery will enable you to dispose of Dehli with certainty. I therefore 
 beg that you will detach one European infantry regiment, and a small 
 force of European cavalry, to the south of Dehli, without keeping them for 
 operations there, so that Aligarh may be recovered and Kanhpur relieved 
 immediately. It is impossible to overrate the importance of showing 
 European troops between Dehli and Kanhpur. Lakhnao and Allahabad 
 depend upon it.' 
 
The AchLal Position of Lord Canning. 97 
 
 Nothing reveals more clearly than this telegram that, 
 at the very end of May, Lord Canning had but feebly 
 grasped the situation. He had, it is true, realised the 
 intense danger of the position below Dehli, but no soldier 
 himself, and having at his elbow men who were soldiers 
 only in name, he had realised neither the difficulties which 
 General Anson had to overcome before he could march 
 from Ambalah, the strength of Dehli, nor the extent of 
 the disaffection. A more correct forecast would have 
 made it clear to him that he had nothing to hope for 
 from the Commander-in-Chief, that he had to depend 
 solely upon God and his own right arm. 
 
 There was this advantage in the faultiness of his fore- 
 cast that it made him confident. Those about him assured 
 him that Dehli could not hold out, and that the capture 
 of Dehli would be the turning point of the disturbances ; 
 and he believed them. Could he maintain the weak 
 middle part, the unguarded country between Banaras and 
 Dehli, until succour from the North-west, from Persia, from 
 China, from Burma, should arrive, all must go well. He 
 had done what he could with the small means at his disposal 
 to strengthen that middle part. On the 20th of May he had 
 begun, and on following days he continued to despatch 
 the 84th by driblets, as many as could be accommodated in 
 a series of post-carriages, to Banaras and Kanhpur. On 
 the 23d of May the Madras Fusiliers arrived from Madras, 
 and were promptly despatched in the same direction. 
 The first week of June increased his hopes that the danger 
 might be yet averted. That week witnessed the arrival 
 in Calcutta of the 64th Foot and 78th Highlanders from 
 Persia, of a wing of the 35th Foot from Maulmein, of a 
 wing of the 37th and a company of artillery from Ceylon. 
 These were pushed forward with all possible celerity. 
 
 It is as certain as can be, judging from his after conduct^ 
 
 G 
 
98 The Councillors of Lord Canning. 
 
 that if Lord Canning, at this crisis, had been left to act 
 upon his own instincts, or even if he had trusted to the ex- 
 perienced advice of the one capable counsellor at his elbow, 
 Mr J. P. Grant, many of the mishaps which occurred during 
 this month and the following would not have happened. 
 But at this period he was under the influence of men 
 whose knowledge of the country in which they had passed 
 their lives was absolutely superficial. It was in deference 
 to the advice of these men that, at a period when a plain 
 and straightforward declaration, followed by plain and 
 straightforward action, would have relieved the situation, 
 he acted towards the sipahis in a manner the reverse of 
 both. Thus whilst he had three native regiments at 
 Barrackpur, in dangerous proximity to Calcutta, he pre- 
 ferred to maintain troops to guard them rather than to 
 disarm them. The case of Danapur was even worse. The 
 garrison of Danapur, consisting of one English and three 
 native regiments, was the guardian of the rich and popu- 
 lous province of Bihar. It was certain that, should the 
 three native regiments break away, as their comrades in 
 other places had broken away, a great danger would be 
 constituted for Bihar itself, and possibly for Calcutta. 
 Common sense urged that the first opportunity should be 
 taken to disarm them. But common sense was a quality 
 conspicuous by its absence among the Hallidays, the 
 Beadons, and the Birches, who had the ear of Lord 
 Canning. These men invented the policy of feigning 
 confidence when confidence had been lost, and of de- 
 clining to disarm men whom they knew to be rebels, lest 
 they should instigate a premature rising. The terrible 
 dangers which persistence in this policy — persistence in 
 spite of warnings and remonstrances — led to will be re- 
 corded in subsequent chapters. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 THE PROGRESS OF THE INSURRECTION IN THE 
 NORTH-WEST IN MAY AND JUNE. 
 
 The news of the insurrection at Mirath reached the station 
 of Firuzpur on the 1 2th of May. Firuzpur lies immediately 
 south of the river Satlaj, on the direct road from Dehli to 
 Lahor. There were stationed the 6ist Foot, the 45th and 
 57th Regiments N. I., the loth Native Light Cavalry, and 
 about 150 European artillerymen. The Brigadier, Colonel 
 Innes, had only arrived the day before, and had had no 
 opportunity of testing the temper of the native troops. 
 But on receiving, on the morning of the 12th, news of the 
 Mirath catastrophe, he ordered a brigade parade, that he 
 might judge for himself. The impression made by the 
 demeanour of the infantry was not satisfactory, but the 
 commandants of the three regiments reported favourably 
 regarding the disposition of their men. 
 
 That same afternoon information reached the Brigadier 
 of the startling events at Dehli. He at once directed 
 arrangements for relieving the sipahis of the 57th N. I. 
 of the charge they had held of the magazine and arsenal. 
 But his orders were either misunderstood or carelessly 
 carried out, for the sipahis, though relieved by a company 
 of the 6 1 stand some European gunners, were allowed to 
 remain in the intrenched position in which the magazine 
 was located. At five o'clock of the same day the Brigadier 
 paraded the native troops, with the intention of marching 
 
lOO MtUiny at Firtizpur. 
 
 them outside the cantonment. But as they approached 
 the intrenchment they halted, despite the orders and 
 entreaties of their officers, and endeavoured to escalade 
 it. The sipahis who had been allowed to remain within 
 threw to them scaling ladders, and about 300 of them 
 succeeded in effecting an entrance. The company of the 
 6 1st held them at bay until two other companies of that 
 regiment arrived. The mutinied sipahis made a last 
 desperate effort, and on the failure of that fled in con- 
 fusion. The Brigadier, instead of pursuing them, allowed 
 them to roam about for a time unmolested. Gaining courage 
 from the supineness of the authorities, the sipahis then 
 burned the church, the Roman Catholic chapel, the 6ist 
 mess-house, two vacated hospitals, and several bungalows. 
 The Brigadier, in sheer panic, then caused the regimental 
 magazines of the two mutinous regiments to be blown up. 
 Hardly had this been accomplished when information 
 reached him that the men of the 45th were about to start 
 for Dehli. Then, for the first time, he acted with vigour. 
 With one party he disarmed the 57th N. L, whilst with 
 another he pursued the 45 th, caught and dispersed them. 
 The greater number of them, however, and some of the 
 57lh, found their way to the revolted city. Few affairs 
 were worse managed during the rebellion than the affair 
 of Firuzpur. It almost matched the blundering at 
 Mirath. 
 
 At Aligarh the four companies of the native regiment 
 stationed there, the 9th N. I., considered one of the best 
 regiments of the Bengal army, mutinied on the 20th 
 of May. The circumstances were somewhat peculiar. 
 Aligarh lies on the grand trunk road eighty-two miles 
 to the south-east of Dehli. Apparently the events of the 
 loth and 12th of May, at Mirath and Dehli, had not 
 shaken the loyalty of the sipahis* They continued re- 
 
Mittinies at Aligark and Bttlaiidshahr. loi 
 
 spectful in their demeanour and assiduous in the perform- 
 ance of their duties. But, on the 20th, a parade had been 
 ordered to witness the infliction of the punishment of death 
 on a man caught in the act of endeavouring to seduce the 
 men from their allegiance. The man had been awarded 
 this sentence by a court-martial composed entirely of 
 native officers. It was carried out in the presence of the 
 sipahis, on that eventful morning, without a murmur or 
 sign of disapproval from them. But as they were march- 
 ing from the ground there arrived a detachment of men 
 of their own regiment, one of whom, on seeing the dangling 
 corpse, exclaimed, pointing to it, ' Behold a martyr to our 
 religion.' These few words were sufficient to light a flame 
 which had lain repressed in the bosoms of the sipahis. 
 They broke into open insurrection, and though they in- 
 flicted no injury on their officers, they plundered the 
 treasury, released the prisoners from the gaol, and went off 
 bodily to Dehli. 
 
 The detachments of the same regiment at Buland- 
 shahr, forty miles from Aligarh ; at Ttawah, in the Agra 
 Division, seventy-three miles from the city of that name ; 
 at Mainpuri, seventy-one miles from the same place, 
 followed the example of their comrades at headquarters. 
 The outbreak at Bulandshahr was unaccompanied by vio- 
 lence, though the men plundered the treasury ; that at 
 Mainpuri was chiefly remarkable for the courage, coolness, 
 and presence of mind displayed by the officer second in 
 command of the sipahis, Lieutenant De Kantzow. 
 
 Information of the revolt of the 20th at Aligarh had 
 reached Mainpuri on the evening of the 22d. The 
 magistrate, Mr Power, at once held a consultation with 
 Mr Arthur Cocks, the Commissioner, as to the course to 
 be pursued. It was resolved to despatch the ladies and 
 children into Agra, and to march the sipahis to a village 
 
I02 Mtttiny at Mainpuri. 
 
 some miles from the station. Early the following morn- 
 ing the ladies and children were duly despatched on their 
 journey, and reached Agra, unmolested, in due course. 
 
 Meanwhile, the two officers of the 9th N. I., Crawford 
 and De Kantzovv, were doing all they could to induce 
 their men to march from the station. The sipahis, how- 
 ever, steadily refused to budge one inch from the extreme 
 end of the parade ground. Finally, they warned their 
 officers that it was well for them to depart, and some of 
 them even discharged their muskets. In the confusion 
 that followed, the two officers got separated from one 
 another. De Kantzow had dismounted, and Crawford, 
 believing that he had been killed, rode back to warn the 
 civilians of the mutiny of the men, and to announce his 
 own intention to ride for Agra. 
 
 Crawford found assembled Mr Cocks, above referred 
 to, the elder Power, Dr Watson, and a missionary named 
 Kellner. The younger Power, just returned from escorting 
 the ladles on their first stage, joined them. After a brief 
 consultation. Cocks and Crawford decided to make for 
 Agra. The two Powers, Watson, Kellner, three sergeants 
 of the Road and Canal departments, Mitchell, Scott, and 
 Montgomery, and a clerk, Mr Glone, determined to remain. 
 The cousin of the Raja of Mainpuri, Rao Bhowani Singh, 
 with a small following, expressed his intention of standing 
 by them. 
 
 Meanwhile, De Kantzow, on foot, had been doing all 
 he knew to stem the torrent of mutiny. He had. In turn, 
 implored, upbraided, and menaced the turbulent sipahis, 
 In vain did they level at him their loaded muskets, 
 threatening to kill him ; still did he persevere. At length, 
 casting off the last bonds of discipline, they rushed to- 
 wards the treasury, carrying their officer with them. Just 
 as they reached the building, De Kantzow dashed forward 
 
At Itdzvah. 103 
 
 to its iron gates, and appealed to the civil guard on duty 
 there, consisting of thirty men, to be true to their salt, 
 and repel the unauthorised invasion. The men of the 
 guard responded; they rallied round him. The gaol 
 officials joined them, and, by their united resistance, the 
 torrent of the attack was stemmed. 
 
 More than that, it was stopped. Forbidding the men 
 of the gaol guard to fire, De Kantzow drew them up facing 
 the sipahis, and for three hours kept them at bay. At 
 the end of that period the Bhowani Singh, above referred 
 to, arrived on the spot, and induced the mutineers to retire. 
 The only condition made by the baffled men was that 
 Bhowani Singh should accompany them. He complied.^ 
 
 At Itawah the scene was more tragic and more bloody. 
 The force at this station, which lies nearly midway between 
 Agra and Kanhpur, though somewhat nearer to the latter, 
 was a company of the 9th N. I. The chief civil officers 
 were Mr Allan Hume and Mr Daniell. On hearing of the 
 events at Mirath these gentlemen sent patrolling parties 
 to watch the roads, and to intercept, if possible, any stray 
 mutineers. On the night of the i6th of May one of the 
 patrolling parties brought in as prisoners, though without 
 depriving them of their arms, seven troopers of the 3d 
 Native Cavalry, a regiment which had mutinied. The 
 patrols brought the prisoners to the quarter-guard of the 
 9th N. I., in front of which was drawn up the company of 
 that regiment, with its two officers at its head. Seeing the 
 state of affairs, the seven troopers suddenly levelled their 
 carabines and let fly at the two Englishmen. But the men 
 
 ^ On the news of this occiuTence reaching Calcutta, Lord Canning wrote 
 to De Kantzow an autograph letter, from which the following is an extract :— 
 ' Young in years, and at the outset of your career, you have given to your 
 brother soldiers a noble example of courage, patience, good judgment, and 
 temper, from which many might profit.' 
 
104 Mutmy at Itdwah. 
 
 of the 9th N. I. were staunch, and, replying vigorously, they 
 killed five of the troopers. The two survivors escaped for 
 the moment. 
 
 Three days later the patrols attempted to lay hands 
 upon and to disarm a larger body of troopers of the same 
 regiment well supplied with fighting material. But in 
 the struggle the men of the patrol were worsted. The 
 rebels, then, probably fearing an attack in force, took up 
 a position in a small Hindu temple, strong in itself, and 
 stronger still in the approaches, which rendered assault 
 difficult and dangerous. 
 
 Information of tliis action having been brought to 
 Messrs Hume and Daniell, they resolved, despite the fact 
 that assault was almost impossible, and that the villagers 
 had shown a disposition to aid the troopers, to venture on 
 an attack with the men of their police. But in reply to 
 the summons to follow them but one of that force obeyed. 
 He was promptly killed ; Daniell was shot through the 
 face. Hume, who was then left alone, forthwith retired, 
 supporting Daniell to his carriage, and returned with him 
 to Itawah. That night the troopers evacuated the temple. 
 Four days later, the company of the 9th, which had 
 remained quiet in the interval, suddenly mutinied, looted 
 the treasury, released the prisoners from the gaol, and in- 
 augurated a reign of terror. Fortunately timely warning 
 had enabled the civilians to ensure the safety of the 
 women and children. Two days later there was a change. 
 A regiment of the Gwaliar contingent, the ist Grenadiers, 
 which was to mutiny in its turn, arrived, and for the 
 moment restored order. 
 
 But these isolated mutinies, however deplorable in them- 
 selves, counted for comparatively little so long as British 
 authority remained supreme in the great station of Agra. 
 Agra was a very important place. Not only was it the 
 
Agra. 105 
 
 seat of the Government of the North-west Provinces, but, 
 as a royal residence in the times of the early Mughals, it 
 had great traditions, whilst its position, almost touching 
 the territories of Gwaliar and of Rajputana, made it a gate 
 the possession of which by the rebels would constitute an 
 enormous peril to British interests. A great deal, then, de- 
 pended on the /^rj-^;^;^^/ of the officials, civil and military. 
 
 The Lieutenant-Governor was Mr John Colvin, a 
 civilian trained in Bengal proper, but who had been 
 private secretary to Lord Auckland during the troublous 
 times of the first Afghan war. It is possible that in quiet 
 times Mr Colvin might have gained a great reputation. 
 He had a cultivated mind, and large intellectual faculties. 
 But to guide the State vessel through a storm, to sway 
 the minds of others in dangerous times, there was wanted 
 a man with iron nerves, complete self-confidence, one who 
 could impress his will alike on his friends and his foes. 
 The Great Revolt of 1857 did bring to the front some 
 men of that stamp — Havelock, Strathnairn, Nicholson, 
 Hodgson, Roberts, Napier, and some others — but amongst 
 them cannot be reckoned the amiable John Colvin. 
 
 The troops stationed at Agra consisted of the 3d 
 European Regiment, a battery of artillery (D'Oyley's), 
 and the 44th and 67th Regiments N. I. The officer com- 
 manding the brigade was Brigadier Polwhele. The 
 station was very straggling. The troops were cantoned 
 in the open ground between the fort and the civil lines. 
 The fort is a handsome quadrangle of red sandstone, built 
 by the illustrious Akbar. It was used as a magazine and 
 general emporium. 
 
 To the indications of ill-feeling and discontent given 
 by the 19th and 34th N. I. in Bengal Mr Colvin had 
 been as blind as the Government of India. Nor had 
 the circulation of the chapatis, which had taken place 
 
io6 Agra. 
 
 about the same time in Bundelkhand and elsewhere, 
 caused him any serious apprehension. Amongst minds 
 of a certain order there always is the conviction that, 
 however disturbed the surface may be, matters, if only 
 one remains quiet, will settle down of their own accord. 
 That feeling strongly prevailed at Agra during the early 
 months of 1857. 
 
 The news of the mutiny at Mirath, on the night of the 
 loth of May, followed by that of the easy occupation of 
 Dehli, came to give the first shock to those notions. 
 Never had men received a greater surprise. Nor was the 
 surprise unmingled with apprehension. Dehli is but 115 
 miles from Agra, and the first impression, based on infor- 
 mation actually received, was to the effect that the rebels, 
 after sacking Dehli, would march on Agra. Under the 
 influence of this impression, it was resolved, at a meeting 
 of the notables of the station summoned by Mr Colvin, 
 to secure the fortress by a detachment of the 3d 
 Europeans, to raise volunteers, horse and foot, and to 
 hold a brigade parade the following morning, when the 
 Lieutenant-Governor would address the troops. 
 
 The parade was held on the morning of the 14th, and 
 Mr Colvin did address the troops, English and natives. 
 He told the former not to distrust their native comrades, 
 but added : 'The rascals have killed a clergyman's daughter, 
 and if you meet them in the field you will not forget this.' 
 His address to the sipahis might have been spoken by 
 any of Lord Canning's councillors. It breathed the same 
 tone ; it expressed the confidence which was not felt. He 
 told them that he trusted them. The demeanour of the 
 sipdhis was eminently suggestive. ' Prompted by their 
 officers to cheer,' wrote Judge Raikes, who was present 
 ' the sipahis set up a yell ; they looked, however, with 
 a devilish scowl at us all.' 
 
Agra. 107 
 
 Wisdom dictated the disarming then and there of the 
 two sipahi regiments, but, alike at Calcutta and at Agra, 
 'wisdom was crying in the streets.' In both places this 
 policy was urged upon the Government by those who did 
 not wield authority. In both places the Government, to 
 the detriment of the country, and to the sacrifice of many 
 valuable lives, preferred to act the farce of feigning a 
 confidence which they did not feel. Noting the de- 
 meanour of the sipahis on that 14th of May, the Chief 
 Engineer of the Agra Division, Colonel Hugh Fraser, 
 advised Mr Colvin to recognise the emergency, to distrust 
 the native soldiery, and to move into the fort. But Mr 
 Colvin had not at all realised the nature of the crisis. 
 He believed he would be able to maintain order, and he 
 reported to this effect to the Government in Calcutta. 
 
 Far more astute was the native prince whose capital 
 lay but sixty-six miles from Agra. I have said that the 
 city of Agra almost touched the plains of the territory 
 known as the dominions of Sindhia. The actual repre- 
 sentative of that family, Maharaja Jaiaji Rao, possessed a 
 vigorous intellect, and a thorough knowledge of his country- 
 men. He had read much, conversed much, and thought 
 much, and the conclusion at which he had arrived had 
 satisfied him with the position which, as a protected prince, 
 supreme in his own territories, he held under the overlord- 
 ship of the British. Between him and them no discordant 
 clash had arisen. During his career he never ceased to 
 remember that it was to the statesmanlike moderation of 
 a Governor-General of India, Lord EUenborough, that he 
 was indebted for the complete inheritance of his immediate 
 predecessor. During the visit to Calcutta, of which I have 
 written in a previous chapter, this sagacious prince had 
 noticed, with an accuracy never at fault, the signs of the 
 times. He had observed the strong undercurrent of native 
 
io8 Afahdrdjd Sindhid. 
 
 feeling working- against the British. The impressions con- 
 ceived in Calcutta were more than confirmed after his 
 return to Gwaliar, and he had informed the Governor- 
 General's Agent at his Court that, in his opinion, the situ- 
 ation was extremely perilous. The news of the events at 
 Mirath and Dehli had driven fast into his mind these 
 convictions, and he was satisfied that a very evil time was 
 approaching for his overlord. 
 
 Could his great predecessor, M^dhaji Rao, have risen 
 from his grave, it is possible that, holding these convic- 
 tions, he might have used all the resources at his disposal 
 to drive home the blow which had been dealt at Dehli. 
 But Jaiaji Rao had had far more personal experience of 
 the English than had been granted to the greatest repre- 
 sentative of his house. He knew, from his own dealings 
 with them, that they were to be trusted implicitly. Under 
 their suzerainty he enjoyed all the internal authority his 
 ancestors had wielded, whilst his suzerain bound himself 
 to assure him against aggression from without. For what 
 compensating advantage was he to renounce this position? 
 To place himself and the resources of his State at the dis- 
 posal of mutinous soldiers or a puppet king? Who, too, 
 was that puppet king? He was no other than the de- 
 scendant of the Mughal sovereigns who had in vain tried to 
 sudue the Marathas, and whom the Marathas had instead 
 subdued. No ; there was no temptation to turn against 
 those whom he had proved to support others whom he 
 despised. Not for a moment did he hesitate. From the 
 hour he heard of the events at Dehli he threw himself 
 heart and soul into the cause of the British. 
 
 Sindhia had in this very month warned the British 
 Agent at his Court not only that the sipahi army was 
 undermined to the core, but that the men of his own regi- 
 ments, officered by British officers were not more to be 
 
Mr Colvin s Proclmnation, 109 
 
 depended upon. When, therefore, after the famous parade 
 at Agra, described in a previous page, Mr Colvin, believ- 
 ing that the mutiny was a Muhammadan movement, in 
 the repression of which those not imbued with the faith 
 of Islam would aid, applied to the Maharaja Sindhia 
 and to the Bhartpur regency for material assistance, 
 that assistance was indeed immediately afforded by the 
 despatch of native troops, alike from Gwaliar and 
 Bhartpur. But, whilst responding to the call, Sindhia 
 expressed to the British Agent his grave doubts as to the 
 consequence of his compliance. 
 
 The parade at Agra had been held on the morning of 
 the 14th of May. On the 21st Mr Colvin heard of the 
 mutiny at Aligarh, and two days later of the events at 
 Bulandshahr, at Mainpuri, and at Itawah. They were 
 serious events for Agra, as they severed direct communica- 
 tions with the North-west, but they brought to the mind 
 of the Lieutenant-Governor no solid conviction as to the 
 cause of the general uprising. 
 
 Still mistaking the signs of the times, still beating the 
 air, still hoping that an appeal to the reasoning powers of 
 the sipahis might induce them to reflect, Mr Colvin, at 
 this period, issued a proclamation which, though well 
 meant, was, to say the least, injudicious. The proclama- 
 tion was based upon the possibility that the majority of 
 the sipahis had been, and were being, misled by turbulent 
 ringleaders. It therefore offered a frank and free pardon 
 to all sipahis, irrespective of their offences. Naturally 
 enough the proclamation produced no effect whatever, 
 that is, it did not bring back a single penitent into the 
 fold. But it had the result of convincing the sipahis and 
 their leaders that they might continue their treasonable 
 work with impunity. 
 
 It is due to Lord Canning and his colleagues to add 
 
1 1 o The Sipdhis at Agra disarmed. 
 
 that they disapproved of Mr Colvin's proclamation, and 
 substituted another for it of their own composition. This, 
 though dealing largely with offers of mercy, made ex- 
 ceptions against men whose hands had been imbrued in 
 blood. But this proclamation was as ineffective as that 
 which it was intended to supersede. 
 
 Mr Colvin's proclamation was issued on the 25th of May. 
 Five days later three companies of sipdhis, constituting 
 the garrison of Mathura, thirty miles to the north-west of 
 Agra, mutinied, shot down one of their officers, wounded 
 another, plundered the treasury, fired the houses of the 
 English, released the prisoners from the gaol, and started 
 off for Dehli. Their example was followed by the bulk of 
 the troops sent to the aid of Mr Colvin from Bhartpur. 
 
 This outrage, known the same evening at Agra, roused 
 Mr Colvin to striking point. He directed the Brigadier to 
 hold a parade the following morning to disarm the native 
 troops. The parade was held (May 31), and in the pre- 
 sence of a battery of European artillery and the 3d Euro- 
 pean regiment, the sipahis of the 44th and 67th N. I. 
 were directed to pile their arms. There was a moment 
 of hesitation followed by sullen obedience. On examin- 
 ing the muskets afterwards many were found loaded with 
 ball. The disarming of these regiments was followed 
 by a resolution, promptly carried out, to raise volunteers, 
 horse and foot, from the planters, clerks, traders, merchants, 
 and others in the district. 
 
 Still the situation, though less immediately dangerous, 
 did not improve. The risings in the vicinity had left Agra 
 isolated. The power of taking an initiative had passed 
 from Mr Colvin. It was for him now to await the action 
 of the rebels. This, too, when he was to a great extent 
 ignorant of the events passing around him. Nor was this 
 all. The reports from Major Charters Macpherson, the 
 
The Gwdlidr Rising, 1 1 1 
 
 British Agent at Sindhia's Court, left no doubt upon his 
 mind that the sipahis of the Gwaliar contingent nnight 
 break out at any moment. Any insurrection in that 
 quarter must be full of danger for Agra. 
 
 The Gwaliar contingent was composed of four field- 
 batteries — one of which, under Captain Pearson, had 
 been sent to Agra — a small siege-train, two regiments 
 of cavalry, and seven of infantry, aggregating 8318 
 men. Some of these were absent on command, but 
 the bulk was at Gwaliar. 
 
 On the night of the 14th of June the whole of these 
 men broke out into insurrection. They rushed from their 
 lines in tumultuous disorder, murdering every European 
 they met. Seven British officers, one lady, wife of one 
 of the officers, an English nurse, the wife of a warrant 
 officer, three children, and six sergeants and pensioners, 
 fell victims to their fury. The remainder escaped to 
 Agra. They reached that place in driblets, and were 
 kindl}^ received. Mr Colvin, however, still maintained his 
 position in the plains ; nor was it until quite the end of 
 the month that the pressure of circumstances compelled 
 him to give the order to take refuge within the fort. 
 There we must leave him whilst we turn to notice the 
 action of the Commander-in-Chief 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE MARCH TO DEHLI. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief in India, General George Anson, 
 though he had had but a slight experience of the Bengal 
 sipahi, possessed in an eminent degree the gift of common 
 sense. If he did not penetrate the mysteries which baffled 
 men who had been trained in India, and who had spent 
 their lives with the sipahis, no blame can on that account 
 attach to him. He was conscientious, painstaking, self- 
 sacrificing, and gave to the work which had been entrusted 
 to him all his time and all his capacity. In intellectual 
 ability he towered above the men who surrounded him. 
 
 The summer headquarters of the army were at the 
 pleasant hill-station of Simla. Thither General Anson 
 was progressing in the third month of 1857, inspecting 
 troops and stations as he marched. Early in that month 
 he had reached Ambalah, fifty-five miles north of Karnal, 
 and thirty-seven from Kalka, immediately at the foot of 
 the Himalayan range. At Ambalah was one of the 
 depots of instruction in the use of the new rifle. Now, 
 although no greased cartridges had been served out to 
 the men, the instructors in the new drill had noticed 
 a general feeling of alarm and suspicion pervading their 
 minds, not only as to the nature of the grease, but as to 
 the materials of which the ungreased paper wrapped 
 round the cartridges was composed. The matter came 
 to the knowledge of General Anson. A circumstance, 
 
Genei'al Anson and the Cartridges. 1 1 3 
 
 slight in itself, convinced him that the suspicions of the 
 men, unless removed, might lead to great danger. Ac- 
 cordingly, on the 23d of the month, he inspected the 
 instruction depot, and after the inspection he sum- 
 moned round him the native officers, and, assisted by 
 the instructor, Lieutenant Martineau, an officer of great 
 intelligence, who spoke the language like a native, and 
 who translated to the native officers each sentence of the 
 Commander-in-Chief as it was uttered, addressed them 
 frankly and sensibly on the subject of the new rifle. He 
 told them that great improvements had been made of 
 recent years in the manufacture of small-arms, and that 
 it was with the view of placing in the hands of the sipdhi 
 a superior weapon that detachments from several regi- 
 ments had been sent to Ambalah for instruction ; that the 
 improved weapon required improved cartridges ; that it 
 was madness to suppose that the British Government, 
 which had no designs whatever on the religion of the 
 people, should take advantage of the improvement of 
 the cartridge to endeavour to subvert their caste by a 
 fraud ; that the Government of India would never coun- 
 tenance any scheme which would coerce the Hindu or the 
 Muhammadan in the matter of religion. In the case 
 before him, neither caste nor religion was involved ; but 
 another thing was, and that was discipline. That disci- 
 pline he was resolved to maintain, and he trusted that the 
 native officers present would exert themselves to allay the 
 fears of their men, would caution them not to give credit 
 to the insinuations of designing persons, and would thus 
 avert the shame which would overwhelm those who should 
 prove false to their colours and faithless to the oaths they 
 had taken to the Government. 
 
 It was a new thing in the history of the Bengal army 
 to see the Commander-in-Chief condescending to explain 
 
 li 
 
1 14 General Anson and the Cartridges. 
 
 the action of the Government, and the reasons for that 
 action, to a large number of regimental native officers. 
 That the native officers present were touched by General 
 Anson's act cannot be doubted. They listened respect- 
 fully, and, when the meeting was over, they expressed to 
 Martineau their high sense of the goodness of the 
 Commander-in-Chief, and of the honour he had done 
 them. ' But,' they added, ' it is not a mere question to us 
 of obedience or disobedience. The story has been so 
 generally circulated, and is so generally believed, not only 
 by the sipahis but by their relations and by villagers all 
 over the country, that the sipahis cannot use the cart- 
 ridges without incurring the certainty of social degrada- 
 tion, the consequence of their loss of caste.' They begged 
 Martineau to represent this fact to the Commander-in- 
 Chief. Martineau did so, and General Anson, who re- 
 cognised more plainly than anyone about him the dangers 
 staring him in the face, suspended the issue of the new 
 cartridges until a special report should have been prepared 
 of the composition of the paper with which they were 
 wrapped. 
 
 The secret agents of the vast conspiracy hatched by 
 the Maulavi of Faizabad and his associates had by this 
 time done their work so thoroughly, had roused to a 
 pitch of pent-up madness of which an oriental people 
 are alone capable, the feelings of the sipahis and the 
 population of the North-western Provinces generally, that 
 it is improbable that, if the Government had even gone 
 the length of withdrawing absolutely the new musket, and 
 the new cartridge with it, the plague would have been 
 stayed. The attempt of General Anson in that direction 
 was undoubtedly the best thing to be done. But, un- 
 happily, his scheme was not given a chance. Lord 
 Canning and his advisers wrote to say that they would 
 
Reasons of his Failtire. 115 
 
 regard any postponement of the target practice at the 
 drill depots as a concession to unreasonable fears. No 
 violation of caste would be caused by the use of the cart- 
 ridges, therefore the drill must be persisted in. The main 
 offence of the 19th N. I. had been the refusal to take the 
 cartridges. For that they had been punished, and it 
 would be inconsistent with discipline to go back on the 
 resolution then taken. Despite, then, the consequences 
 clearly shadowed forth by the assembled native officers to 
 Martineau, the drill instruction was continued. 
 
 In due time General Anson continued his journey to 
 Simla. He was there when the report reached him of the 
 behaviour of the eighty-five troopers of the 3d N. L. C. at 
 Mi'rath, already described. The Commander-in-Chief con- 
 sidered their offence so serious that he directed they 
 should be brought to trial before a court composed of 
 their own countrymen. How they were tried, how con- 
 demned, how lodged in confinement, has been already 
 told. It has been told, also, how the vindication of dis- 
 cipline led immediately to the revolt of Mirath and the 
 uprising of Dehli. 
 
 The news of this double catastrophe reached General 
 Anson in a bleared and imperfect form on the afternoon of 
 the 1 2th. His clear and practical mind recognised that 
 im^mediate action was necessary. He had three English 
 regiments near him, on three different spurs of the Hima- 
 layas. To that on the spur nearest to the plains, the 
 75th Foot, at Kasauli, he sent orders to march immediately 
 for Ambalah. To the two others, the ist Fusiliers and 
 the 2d Europeans, at Dagshai and Sabathu respectively, 
 he transmitted orders to hold themselves in readiness to 
 march at a moment's notice. Simultaneously he sent 
 expresses to desire that the fort at Firuzpur should be 
 secured by the 6ist, and that at Govindgarh by the 8ist, 
 
1 1 6 Difficulties of Genei^al Anson. 
 
 and to order two companies of the 8th Foot, from Jaland- 
 har, to secure Philaur on the Satlaj. Bethinking then of the 
 other means available to him, he ordered a Gurkha regi- 
 ment, known as the Nasi'ri battalion, stationed close to 
 Simla, to march, with a detachment of the 9th Irregular 
 Cavalry, to that important point (Philaur), in order to 
 escort thence the siege-train which, he recognised at a 
 glance, would be necessary for the operations he contem- 
 plated against Dehli. On the afternoon of the 14th he 
 started for Ambalah himself, and reached it early the 
 following morning. He, at least, had lost no time. 
 
 But it was there that his difficulties commenced. He 
 found the sipahis of the native regiments there ready to 
 break out in revolt. With the English force at his dis- 
 posal he could easily have disarmed them, and that course 
 was pressed upon him by Sir John Lawrence. It seemed 
 so natural that he should do so. He could not take 
 mutinous regiments with him. Still less could he leave 
 them at Ambalah, unwatched, to perpetrate untold mis- 
 chief in his rear. But General Anson was conscious that 
 his own local experience was limited whilst he was sur- 
 rounded by men who professed to understand the natives 
 amongst whom their lives had been spent. These men 
 protested that the disbanding of the sipahis would be 
 regarded as a breach of faith. The argument was absurd, 
 but it was accepted. 
 
 Another misfortune came at this moment to render 
 the situation more involved. The Gurkhas of the Nasiri 
 battalion, when ordered to march to Philaur, refused 
 point-blank, and made as though they would plunder 
 Simla. The residents there were terribly frightened, and 
 some of those who should have given an example of 
 courage and daring betrayed a strong capacity for leading 
 the way in pusillanimous flight. The fears, fortunately, 
 
Difficulties of General Anson. 1 1 7 
 
 proved unfounded. The Gurkhas of the Nasiri battaHon 
 were quickly satisfied, returned to their duty, and marched 
 gaily for Philaur. 
 
 Meanwhile, at Ambalah, General Anson began to 
 realise every day more keenly that the means at his hand 
 for the recapture of a strong fortress, garrisoned by a 
 superior number of disciplined troops, were very insuffi- 
 cient Not only were his European troops i^\M in numbers, 
 but the several war departments — the Commissariat, the 
 Medical, the Transport, the Ordnance, and Ammunition 
 — taken by surprise, were unprepared for a prompt move- 
 ment. On the 1 8th of May the men had no tents, but 
 twenty rounds apiece of ammunition, no artillery reserve 
 ammunition, no transport.^ Under these circumstances. 
 General Anson doubted whether it would be prudent with 
 his small means to risk an attack on Dehli. He wrote in 
 this sense to Sir John Lawrence, expressing not only his 
 own opinion but that of the chief officers of his staff. 
 The Commissary-General, he added, declared his inability 
 to provide the wherewithal for such a march under from 
 sixteen to twenty days. These views, backed as they 
 were by the highest military authorities on the spot, 
 found no acceptance either with Sir John Lawrence, with 
 Lord Canning, or with the self-constituted critics in other 
 parts of India. The idea widely prevailed that, because 
 Dehli had never, in the history of India, offered a serious 
 resistance to an armed force, it would not and could not 
 do so now. There Avas absolutely no reason for this 
 argument beyond that suggested by the notion that that 
 which had happened before must always happen again. 
 There was, I have already mentioned, a very indistinct 
 idea in military circles as to the defensive power of the 
 Imperial city. Everyone knew that it was encompassed 
 
 ^ Letter from General Barnard, dated Ambalah, May i8, 1857. 
 
1 1 8 Should Dehli be attacked ? 
 
 by walls. But, it was argued, with the superficiality which 
 was one of the signs of the times, that siege-guns were 
 cast in order that they might batter down walls. The 
 man would have been laughed at who should have asserted 
 that Dehli was as strong as Bhartpur had been. It was 
 expected, alike in Calcutta and in the Panjab, that General 
 Anson had but to appear with his British force before 
 Dehli to induce the rebels to surrender the city.^ I write 
 with the most absolute certainty when I state that this 
 was the main reason which incited alike Lord Canning 
 and Sir John Lawrence to urge the advance with a force 
 they knew to be insufficient for a great enterprise. I am 
 confident that if the givers of that advice had realised the 
 strength of Dehli, and its splendid capabilities of resist- 
 ance, they would have urged the advance, if they had 
 urged it at all, in language betokening far less confidence. 
 Undoubtedly they felt, and felt most keenly, the enor- 
 mous issues at stake. Sir John Lawrence did not attempt 
 to conceal his conviction that the maintenance of order in 
 the Punjab depended on the prompt reduction of Dehli. 
 Lord Canning knew that the safety of the long and weak 
 middle piece between Allahabad and Mirath would be 
 enormously affected by the retention by the rebels of a 
 place possessing such a history and such prestige. Yet, 
 keenly anxious as they wxre to strike the decisive blow 
 at the decisive point, I doubt much whether they would 
 have employed the language, almost of remonstrance, 
 which characterised their letters to General Anson if they 
 had imbibed anything like a correct idea of his difficulties, 
 and of the still greater resistance which was awaiting his 
 troops at their destination. 
 
 1 Sir John Lawrence wrote (May 21): 'My belief is that, with good 
 management on the part of the civil officers, it' (Dehli) 'would open its gates 
 on the approach of our troops.' 
 
General Anson resolves to attack. 119 
 
 Goaded by the tone and matter^ of the letters he re- 
 ceived, General Anson prepared to march. For the task 
 before him his force was singularly inadequate. It con- 
 sisted of the 9th Lancers, the 75th Foot, the ist and 
 2d European Regiments, two troops of horse-artillery, 
 and a native regiment, the 60th N. I. These troops were 
 at Ambalah. At Baghpat, one march from Dehli, they 
 would be joined, if the General's orders were carried out, 
 by the Mirath brigade, composed of two squadrons of the 
 Carabineers, awing of the 60th Rifles, one light field-battery, 
 one troop of H. A., and some sappers. At the same place, 
 where he expected to arrive on the 5th of June, General 
 Anson hoped to be joined by a small siege-train from 
 Lodiana. It was a great advantage to him that at this 
 critical period the Cis-Satlaj chiefs and the Nuwab of 
 Karnal decided to cast in their lot with the British. The 
 assistance they afforded in keeping open the communi- 
 cations and in influencing the populations of the several 
 districts cannot be over-estimated. 
 
 Providence did not permit General Anson to witness 
 the triumph of the measures he had organised with so 
 much diligence, so much forethought, and so much ability. 
 
 ^ For instance, such words as these from Sir John Lawrence : ' Pray 
 only reflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed when we 
 have acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded when guided by timid 
 counsels?' Lord Canning wrote him that everything depended 'upon 
 speedily disposing of Dehli, and making a terrible example.' To the letter 
 from which I have quoted he added a paragraph which showed how incom- 
 pletely he and his advisers had, at this period, grasped the situation : ' Your 
 force of artillery will enable you to dispose of Dehli with certainty. I there- 
 fore beg that you will detach one European infantry regiment and a small 
 force of European cavalry to the south of Dehli, without keeping them for 
 operations there, so that Aligarh may be recovered and Kanhpur relieved 
 immediately.' This request to a Commander-in-Chief whose troops were 
 already too few, and who had before him the hardest task ever allotted 
 to a British commander in Lidia ! 
 
1 20 Death of General Anson, 
 
 He waited at Ambalah until he had despatched all but 
 the very last of his troops, and with these, on the 25th of 
 May, he set out for Karnal. Shortly after his arrival there, 
 on the 26th, he was attacked by cholera, and a little after 
 midnight succumbed to that terrible disease. He was 
 succeeded by Sir Henry Barnard, who arrived just in time 
 to be recognised by his dying chief General Anson's 
 death was a great loss to the army. Those who least 
 cared for him have admitted that ' he was a brave soldier 
 and an honest gentleman.' He was that, and much more. 
 Those who knew him best were convinced that had he 
 lived through the Mutiny he would have gained a splendid 
 reputation. 
 
 Sir Henry Barnard was a worthy successor in com- 
 mand of the advancing force to General Anson. He, like 
 his late chief, had felt bitterly the criticisms and the carp- 
 ings levelled against the military plans by ignorant and 
 uninstructed outsiders. But, imbued with the conviction 
 that if a thing is to be done at all it must be done 
 thoroughly, Barnard threw all his energies into the work 
 which had devolved upon him. ' So long as I exercise 
 any power,' he wrote to Sir John Lawrence, on the 26th, 
 ' you may rest assured that every energy shall be devoted 
 to the objects I have now in view, viz., concentrating all 
 the force I can collect at Dehli, securing the bridge at 
 Baghpat, and securing our communications with Mirath.' 
 Determining not to wait for the siege-train, he set out 
 from Karnal, on the morning of the 27th, and reached 
 Alipur, twelve miles from Dehli, on the 6th of June. 
 There I must leave him for a moment to look after the 
 force which was to join him from Mirath. 
 
 The authorities at Mirath had taken some time to 
 recover from the effects of the horrors of the night of the 
 loth of May. The country seemed to be surging around 
 
Mirath, and its Districts. 1 2 1 
 
 them. The scum of the population had risen in the vil- 
 lages, the gaols had disgorged their prisoners, and, gener- 
 ally, except on the actual spot still occupied by Europeans 
 in Mirath itself, order had everywhere disappeared. In 
 the cantonment and the civil lines martial law had been 
 proclaimed. But a deep despondency had crept over all 
 minds — a despondency augmented by the news of the suc- 
 cess of the rebels in Dehli, and of outrages from outlying 
 stations. There had been risings at Rurki, sixty miles from 
 Mirath, the headquarters of the engineering science of the 
 country, at Saharanpur, and at Muzaffarnagar. There were 
 murmurings, to break a little later into open mutiny, in 
 the several stations of Rohilkhand. It is true that the 
 energy and firmness of Baird-Smith, a man whose name 
 will for ever be connected with the fall of Dehli, saved 
 Rurki ; and that the strong character and devotion of 
 Robert Spankie and Dundas Robertson maintained order 
 in Saharanpur. But the alarm created by the attempts at 
 rising there and elsewhere tended greatly to depress those 
 at Mirath, who apparently had been thoroughly unnerved 
 by the terrible night of the loth of May. 
 
 Nothing created so much surprise throughout India as 
 the inaction of the troops at Mirath during the days which 
 succeeded that night. Two splendid English regiments, 
 supported by two batteries of artillery, might surely, it was 
 argued, do something in the district. Those in authority 
 elsewhere, who argued thus, waited in vain for the develop- 
 ment of the action they were impatiently expecting. At 
 last Mr Colvin, who, from his post at Agra, the importance 
 of which I have pointed out, had the best reason in the 
 world to dread the consequences of inaction, noting its 
 continuance, addressed Brigadier Wilson, passing over his 
 senior officer. General Hewitt, and begged him, at the very 
 least, to keep open the main road, so as to prevent the 
 
122 The Miratk Brigade moves, 
 
 combinations of revolted troops pushing for Dehli. But 
 not from Wilson even did Mr Colvin receive the answers 
 he hoped for. 'The only plan/ replied that officer, 'is to 
 concentrate our forces and attack DehliV 
 
 That was all very well and very true. But, in his 
 general contention, Mr Colvin was right and Brigadier 
 Wilson was wrong. The force might have been kept 
 concentrated to join General Anson and yet have shown 
 itself in the district. Because it did not show itself, the 
 idea began to prevail in the villages round about that all 
 the English had perished on the night of the loth of May. 
 Much looting and much bloodshed occurred in conse- 
 quence. It was in repressing one of the outbreaks caused 
 by this belief that a promising civil officer, Mr Johnston, 
 lost his life. 
 
 At length orders arrived from the Commander-in-Chief 
 that the brigade should take the field and join the force 
 marching from Ambalah at Baghpat. It set out on the 
 27th of May. It consisted of two squadrons of the 
 carabineers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, Tombs's troop of 
 horse-artillery, Scott's light fiield battery, two eighteen- 
 pounder guns, manned by Europeans, some sappers and 
 irregular horse (natives). Three days' marching brought 
 the force to the town of Ghazi-ud-din Nagar, about a mile 
 from the left bank of the little river Hindan. Partly on the 
 opposite bank, and partly in the bed of that river, then a 
 fordable rivulet, abounding in quicksands and spanned by 
 a suspension bridge, they beheld a considerable body of 
 the mutinied sipahis, well equipped, their guns occupying a 
 strong position to the right of the bridge, commanding the 
 advance. The English had to march along a causeway 
 exposed to the enemy's fire. This opened at once, but 
 it was almost immediately replied to by the eighteen- 
 pounders and by Scott's field-battery. Under cover 
 
Combats on the Hindan, i 2 
 
 v) 
 
 of this fire the rifles advanced, and soon came in 
 contact with the enemy in the bed of the rivulet. The 
 sipahis fought well, and the contest was fiercely contested, 
 when the carabineers, making their way across the stream, 
 turned the enemy's left. This was the decisive moment. 
 Pressed in front by the 60th, and mauled in their left 
 flank by the carabineers, the rebels gave way, and fell 
 back on a walled village. The 60th, however, followed 
 them close, and expelling them from this position, forced 
 them to flight along the Dehli road. The sipahis lost 
 many men, and left in the hands of the victors five of 
 their guns. The British loss, though small in itself, was 
 large in proportion to the numbers engaged. The intense 
 heat prevented the following up of the victory. 
 
 Never was more clearly illustrated the truth of the 
 axiom that a victory not followed up is but half a victory. 
 Undaunted by their defeat, and possibly stimulated by the 
 taunts of their comrades, the sipahis returned the next 
 day to the battle ground. Taking up about midday a 
 position on a ridge to the right of the Hindan, they opened 
 fire from their guns on Wilson's force. The English guns 
 replied, and for two hours ensued a fierce artillery combat. 
 At the end of that period, Wilson, noticing that the fire 
 of the rebels was slackening, ordered a general advance. 
 The sipahis did not await it. Discharging into the ad- 
 vancing columns of the English a shower of grape-shot, 
 they limbered up and fell back in orderly array. The 
 intense heat, and the parching thirst suffered by the 
 English, prevented any pursuit. The English were much 
 exhausted, and there were some cases of sunstroke. But 
 great satisfaction prevailed in the camp from the fact that 
 the Mirath brigade, which had been the first to suffer from 
 the treachery of the sipahis, had been the first to retaliate. 
 
 The next day (June i) the camp was cheered by 
 
I 24 Junction of the Force near Dehli. 
 
 the arrival of the 2nd Gurkhas, 500 strong, commanded 
 by an officer who was to occupy a prominent position 
 during the siege, Major Charles Reid. The brigade, 
 after its two engagements, had halted for orders. These 
 were received on the 4th. In pursuance of these, Wilson 
 marched, on the 6th, to Baghpat. The day following he 
 effected the desired junction at Ali'pur. There also had 
 arrived the siege-train from Philaur, after having under- 
 gone some dangers from the contemplated treachery of 
 the mutinous sipahis of the 3d and 5th N. I. 
 
 The junction of all the then available forces had been 
 effected on the morning of the 7th of June. There was now, 
 therefore, no excuse for delaying to carry out the policy 
 insisted upon by Lord Canning and of Sir John Lawrence, 
 that of marching straight into Dehli. The one had ex- 
 pressed his opinion that the artillery with the force was 
 sufficient to deal with the place ; the other that, on the 
 approach of the English troops, the city would open its 
 gates. These theories were now put to the test. Early 
 on the morning of the 8th of June (one o'clock) General 
 Barnard gave the order to advance from Alipur. The 
 scouts had reported that the rebels had taken a strong 
 position at Badli-ki-Sarai, six miles to the north of Dehli, 
 a place where groups of old houses and walled gardens, 
 once the country residences of nobles of the Imperial 
 Court, supplied positions capable of prolonged defence. 
 Day was just dawning when Barnard came in sight of 
 this position. As far as he was able to judge, the salient 
 points were strongly armed with guns. To test their 
 strength he sent to the. front four heavy guns, a troop of 
 horse-artillery, part of a battery of field-artillery, and 
 directed them to open fire. A few rounds disclosed the 
 fact that the enemy's guns, which had promptly returned 
 the fire, were of heavier calibre than those Barnard had 
 
Battle of Badli-ki-Sardi. 125 
 
 sent to the front. The British gunners began to drop, 
 and it seemed doubtful whether they would be able to 
 hold their own. There was but one remedy for this 
 — a remedy which has never failed against Asiatics. 
 Barnard tried it. He sent the 75th deployed, and sup- 
 ported by the 2d Europeans, to charge the rebels' guns. 
 The charge was splendid, but the rebels displayed a stern 
 resolution, clinging to their guns and giving back thrust 
 for thrust. There was no flinching, and there was no cry 
 for quarter. 
 
 Whilst the 75th and the 2d Europeans were struggling 
 bravely for the guns, the second brigade, led by Brigadier 
 Graves, attacked the enemy's left, whilst, a minute later, 
 Hope Grant, with the cavalry and the horse-artillery, 
 appeared on their rear. The movement of Hope Grant 
 was decisive. The front defence collapsed almost imme- 
 diately, and the rebels fell back. At first it seemed as 
 though their retreat would be orderly, but the lancers 
 and the horse-artillery took care that this should not be 
 so. Making charge after charge, despite of water^ courses 
 and other obstacles, and firing round after round, they 
 compelled the beaten enemy to loose his hold on his guns 
 and his camp equipage, and to retire, baffled and humiliated 
 within the walls of the city. Barnard, with consummate 
 judgment, pushed on ; then having completed the rout 
 of the enemy, he turned to the ridge overlooking Dehh' 
 drove thence the rebels posted there, and encamped in the 
 position whence he could best direct his attacks on the 
 proud city, which, in spite of his appearance before it, 
 still defied his arms. He and his men had done good 
 work on that eventful day. He had driven the enemy 
 within the walls, with a loss to them of about 350 men 
 twenty-six guns, and some serviceable ammunition. He 
 had gained and firmly occupied the finest base of opera- 
 
I 26 Barnard seizes the Ridge. 
 
 tions against the city, a position open in the rear to the 
 reinforcements which he hoped to receive, whilst com- 
 manding the plain right up to the walls. What was, 
 perhaps, of scarcely less importance, he had distinctly an- 
 nounced to the rebels throughout India, avowed and 
 concealed, the plain issue between themselves and the 
 British. From this time forth there was no possibility of 
 doubt. The fate of Dehli would decide the fate of India. 
 
 Barnard had not accomplished his end without loss. 
 The killed and wounded amounted to 137. Amongst the 
 former was the Adjutant-General of the army, Colonel 
 Chester, shot down at the commencement of the action. 
 His death was a loss to the gallant soldier, who, fresh from 
 his service in the Crimea, had, without much Indian ex- 
 perience, assumed the command of the besieging army at 
 a moment's notice. 
 
 The day following the Corps of Guides, a regiment 
 composed of cavalry and infantry, stationed normally at 
 Hoti-Mardan, on the Panjab frontier, arrived in camp, led 
 by its commandant, Colonel Henry Daly. Soon after its 
 arrival it was despatched to the front to drive back parties 
 of horse and foot which had sallied from Dehli to attack 
 the advanced posts of the British. In the engagement 
 which followed the Guides carried all before them. They 
 had, however, the misfortune to lose their acting second- 
 in-command. Lieutenant Quintin Battye, an officer of 
 great promise and of far-reaching popularity. Mortally 
 wounded by a bullet through the body, he murmured to 
 the chaplain who tended him, and who had warned him 
 that but a very brief span of hfe yet remained to him : 
 ' Didce et decorum est pro pair id mori' A few minutes 
 later he died. 
 
 Leaving the besiegers on the ridge they had so gallantly 
 won, I propose, before returning to Calcutta, to take a 
 
The G tildes arrive. 127 
 
 glance at Kdnhpur and Lakhnao. I shall then visit Jhansi 
 and Bundelkhand, and then devote separate chapters to the 
 complete story of the places which bore the brunt of the 
 early conflict. These, in the Bengal Presidency, were Bihar, 
 Kdnhpur, Oudh, Agra, and Dehlf. Western, Southern, 
 and Central India will likewise demand a large share of 
 the attention of the reader. 
 
CHAPTER X. 
 
 KANHPUR, LAKHNAO, AND ALT.AHABAD. 
 
 KaNHPUR was the centre station in that weak middle 
 piece of which I have written as causing so much anxiety 
 to Lord Canning. It Hes on the right bank of the river 
 Ganges, 270 miles south-east from Dehh', and 120 above 
 the confluence of the Jamnah and Ganges at AUahabdd. 
 From Calcutta it is distant by rail 684 miles, somewhat more 
 by the river route. The station is long and straggling, the 
 houses having been erected more with the view to secure 
 pleasant and healthy situations than for military defence. 
 
 In 1857 the garrison of Kanhpur consisted of the ist, the 
 53d, and the 56th Regiments N. L, the 2d Native Light 
 Cavalry, and sixty-one English artillerymen, with six guns 
 — five nine-pounders, and a twenty-four-pounder howitzer. 
 The station also sheltered the families of the 32d Foot, 
 then stationed at Lakhnao. Kanhpur was the head- 
 quarters of a division. The general commanding was Sir 
 Hugh Massey Wheeler, an officer of the highest character 
 as a soldier. He had spent fifty-four years in India, had 
 served with the sipahis, under Lord Lake, in the Maratha 
 wars, in Afghanistan, and in the wars against the Sikhs. 
 He was very much esteemed, and it was thought that if 
 any man could unravel the mysteries which shrouded 
 the early events of 1857 that man would be Sir Hugh 
 Wheeler. 
 
 Sir Hugh had watched, with the deepest anxiety, the 
 
Sir Httgh Wheeler at Kdnhpttr. 129 
 
 early development of the action of the sipahis. It is due 
 to his memory to record that he had taken a far more 
 serious view of it than that which had commended itself 
 to the advisers of Lord Canning. In his eyes it was ' no 
 passing and groundless panic/ but a deliberate scheme for 
 the overthrow of the British power. He did not know, he 
 had no reason to suspect, that the principal conspirator 
 was within a few miles of him. The outward demeanour 
 of the Nana Sahib was never more suave than it was just 
 before the outbreak. He was the adviser, and the trusted 
 adviser, of the civil authorities. 
 
 Confident that the native army was infected from the 
 crown of its head to the soles of its feet. Sir Hugh, look- 
 ing round at the straggling station in which he com- 
 manded, recognising the utter impossibility of organising 
 a plan of general defence, resolved to select, partially to 
 fortify and store with provisions, one spot in the station, 
 which should be a rallying point, when the danger signal 
 should sound, for all the English and Eurasians, men, 
 women, and children, and which he might be able to 
 defend until succour should arrive. The idea showed 
 prescience and courage. It was the same idea which at 
 the same time occurred to, and was acted upon, by the 
 sagacious Mr Boyle at Arah, by Sir Henry Lawrence at 
 Lakhnao. 
 
 His great difficulty was to select a suitable position. 
 The station, I have said, was straggling, covering, as far 
 as the magazine at its further end, that is, the end nearer 
 to Dehli, a length of seven miles. The cantonment was 
 open, and possessed no kind of fortification. It was 
 separated by the Ganges from Oudh, and Sir Hugh 
 Wheeler was too experienced in the modes of thought 
 of the natives not to be absolutely certain that in the 
 men of Oudh the English would find their most per- 
 
 I 
 
130 The Defensive Position at Kdnhpttr. 
 
 sistent enemy. He had to choose a spot the situation of 
 whicli should lend itself easily to succour from the side of 
 Allahabad. From that direction alone was succour to be 
 expected. In a military sense, then, it was doubly advis- 
 able to select a locality the approaches to which from 
 the Allahdbad side should be easy. Such a locality 
 seemed to be at hand. In the centre of a large plain, with 
 a tolerably clear space all round them, were two barracks, 
 formerly used as the hospitals of the European regiment, 
 but at the moment unoccupied. The locality was about 
 the best he could have chosen. He has been blamed since 
 alike for not choosing the magazine and for not choos- 
 ing a place of refuge immediately on the river. But the 
 magazine was an impossible locality. It was seven miles 
 distant, and to reach it one had to traverse the lines of 
 sipahis and the native town. A barrack or large house 
 on the river bank would undoubtedly have been the best 
 place of refuge had any such of sufficient size existed, but 
 there was none. The position chosen fulfilled some neces- 
 sary conditions. It lent itself to aid from Allahabad. The 
 space around it was tolerably clear, the only drawback 
 being that on its left front, at a distance of about 400 
 yards, was a row of unfinished barracks then in course 
 of construction. These might be used either by the de- 
 fenders as an outwork, or by the rebels as a substantial 
 place of cover, for their attacking parties. 
 
 It is further due to the memory of Sir Hugh Wheeler 
 to add that no one then anticipated that the sipahis, if 
 they should mutiny, would endeavour to slaughter the 
 Europeans. After the events of the loth and 12th of 
 May, at Mirath and Dehli, the cry amongst the sipahis 
 had been to march to the centre point, to the ancient 
 capital of the Mughals. By attacking the position on the 
 plain they could gain neither loot nor glory. Such an 
 
Mr mile rs don and JVdnd Sahib . 1 3 1 
 
 attack, by chaining them to the spot, might ultimately 
 involve their own destruction. I shall have to relate that, 
 so far as the sipahis were concerned, this reasoning was 
 justified to the letter. No one dreamt at that time that 
 the smiling and obsequious prince, who was wont to drive 
 in from Bithor to aid the civil authorities with his advice, 
 would possess the influence and the inclination to turn the 
 fury of the revolted sipahis against the wives and children 
 of the officers they had followed in many a hard-fought 
 field. 
 
 Sir Hugh Wheeler made the selection I have spoken 
 of the very day that the sad story of the revolt at Mirath 
 reached him. From that date there reigned in his mind 
 the conviction that a rising at Kanhpur might take place 
 at any moment. He pushed on, therefore, the fortifying 
 and victualling of the two barracks with as much speed 
 as possible. The fortifications were to consist of earth- 
 works. But the rains had not fallen ; the soil of the 
 plain was baked almost to the consistency of iron, and 
 the progress was consequently slow. Whilst pushing on 
 these works, Sir Hugh communicated freely with the civil 
 authorities at the station, with Sir Henry Lawrence at 
 Lakhnao, and with the Government at Calcutta. 
 
 The Collector of Revenue at Kanhpur was Mr Hillers- 
 don. Between this gentleman and Nana Sahib there had 
 been considerable official intercourse, and the Englishman 
 had been pleased by the friendly and courteous manner and 
 conversation of the Asiatic. When the news of the Mirath 
 outbreak reached Kanhpur, the Asiatic showed his further 
 friendliness by advising Hillersdon to send his wife and 
 family to Bithor, where, he assured him, they would be 
 safe against any possible outburst on the part of the 
 sipahis. Hillersdon declined for the moment, but when, 
 a little later, the Nand offered to organise 1500 men to 
 
132 Critical Position of Wheeler. 
 
 act against the sipahis if they should rise, Hillersdon con- 
 sidered that the proposal was one to be accepted. To 
 a certain extent it was acted upon. 
 
 I have said that Wheeler, feeling that the storm might 
 burst any moment, pushed on with all his energy the pre- 
 paration of the barracks. His spies told him that every 
 night meetings of an insurrectionary character were taking 
 place in the lines of the 2d N. L. C. and of the ist N. I. 
 In ordinary times these meetings would have been stopped 
 with a high hand ; but the example of Mirath had shown 
 that, even with a strong force at the disposal of the 
 General, high-handed dealing was sure to precipitate 
 mutinous action, and Wheeler had but sixty-one men 
 to depend upon. On the 21st he received information 
 that the 2d N. L. C. would rise that night. He accord- 
 ingly moved all the women and children into the intrench- 
 ment, and attempted to have the contents of the treasury 
 conveyed thither ; but the sipahis would not part with 
 the money. Then it was that the General, much against 
 the grain, availed himself of the offer made by the Nana 
 to Mr Hillersdon, and agreed that 200 of the Bithor 
 chief's men should be posted at Nuwabganj, guarding the 
 treasury and the magazine. 
 
 The next day Wheeler was cheered by the arrival of 
 eighty-four men and two officers of the 32d, sent to him 
 in his dire strait by Sir Henry Lawrence. The week 
 that followed was a particularly trying one. The officers 
 of the native regiments, to show their sipahis that they 
 still trusted them, slept every night in the lines of their 
 men. The non-combatants meanwhile, that is, the trad- 
 ing Europeans, the Eurasians, and their families, had 
 removed, on the 22d, to the intrenchment. Towards the 
 end of the month the General had pitched his tent within 
 the position. Still, time went on and no move was made 
 
The Dangers seem to lessen. 133 
 
 by the sipahis, and when, on the mornings of the 31st 
 May and the ist and 2d of June, the first relays of the 
 1st Madras FusiHers and the 84th, despatched by Lord 
 Canning from Calcutta, reached Kanhpur, Wheeler con- 
 sidered that the crisis was past, that is, that the sipahis, 
 noting, from the arrival of English troops, that the country 
 to the south-east was open, would feel that mutiny was too 
 hazardous to be attempted. So great, indeed, was his con- 
 fidence that he passed on fifty of the 84th to Lakhnao. 
 
 It is possible, indeed, that, could the line between Cal- 
 cutta and Kanhpur have been maintained intact, this 
 result might, to a certain extent, have been obtained. 
 The sipahis, that is to say, might have been content to 
 march on Dehli without attempting to molest the English 
 at Kanhpur ; but early in June that line was broken, in 
 the manner to be described, at Allahabad ; it was men- 
 aced at Banaras ; and, later still, it was rent in twain at 
 Danapur. The consequences of the breaking of the line 
 at the place first named, and of the example set by 
 the sipahis there and elsewhere in the vicinity, were seen 
 when, on the night of the 4th of June, the men of the 
 2d Cavalry mutinied. I must ask the reader to permit 
 me to defer the story of the events which followed that 
 uprising until I shall have cleared the ground by narrating 
 the contemporaneous events at Lakhnao, at Allahabad, 
 and at Calcutta. 
 
 In a previous chapter I have narrated how Sir Henry 
 Lawrence met and suppressed the first attempts at mutiny 
 at Lakhnao (May 3d and 4th), Knowing the impression- 
 able character of the natives of India, and having at the 
 moment no means of judging the extent to which the ill- 
 feeling had been nurtured, or the depth to which it had 
 taken root. Sir Henry resolved to emphasise the first re- 
 pression of disloyal action by the holding of a grand 
 
134 »5'zV Hen7y Lawrence at Lakhnao. 
 
 Darbar, to be attended by all the English residents, by the 
 officers and men of the native regiments, and by all the 
 native officials. The announced reason for the holding of 
 the Darbar was the presentation to the native officer and 
 non-commissioned officers and men, who had behaved 
 with distinguished loyalty on the 3d of May, of honours 
 to mark the sense entertained by the Government of their 
 conduct. 
 
 The Darbar was held on the evening of the 12th of 
 May. Sir Henry seized the occasion to make to the 
 assembled natives, in their own language, an address 
 which, if it had then been possible for words to affect the 
 question, could scarcely have failed to produce great 
 results. He began by alluding to the fears which had 
 been expressed by the Hindus for their religion. Turn- 
 ing to them, he pointed out how, under the Muhammadan 
 rule prior to Akbar, that religion had never been respected ; 
 how Hindus had been forcibly converted, and cruelly per- 
 secuted ; how the third prince in succession to Akbar had 
 reverted to a similar system. Turning then to the Mu- 
 hammadans, he reminded them how the great sovereign 
 who had founded the Sikh kingdom would never tolerate 
 the exercise of the faith of Islam at Labor. Speaking 
 then to both sections, he asked them to contrast with 
 such actions the action of the British rulers. He referred 
 to the principle of toleration, acted upon for a century ; to 
 the manner in which Europeans and natives had worked 
 together with a common purpose, sharing the same toils 
 and the same dangers, and mutually congratulating one 
 another when reaching the goal at which each had aimed. 
 He then implored them not to allow themselves to be led 
 away by the devices of men who were trying to entrap 
 them, with the view of leading them, for their own selfish 
 purposes, to assured destruction. Calling then to the 
 
The Time for Action approaches, 135 
 
 front the native officer and the men who had signalised 
 themselves by their loyalty on the 3d, he bestowed upon 
 them, in the name of the Government, substantial tokens 
 of its appreciation of their conduct. 
 
 The solemn occasion, the character of the speaker, the 
 truth of the language he employed, combined to produce 
 a considerable effect. Those present were much moved; 
 but the conspirators had done their work too well to allow 
 their dupes to be baffled by a few eloquent and impres- 
 sive sentences. Whatever was the effect produced by the 
 speech of the 12th of May, that effect was entirely obliter- 
 ated when, on the i6th, the events of the loth and nth of 
 the same month, at Mirath and Dehli, became common 
 property. No one then recognised more clearly than Sir 
 Henry Lawrence that the days of parleying had gone 
 by, and that the differences between the sipahis and the 
 Government had entered upon a phase in which victory 
 would be to the strongest. Much, in Oudh, he realised, 
 would depend upon the action of those in whose hands 
 should be concentrated the supreme civil and military 
 authority. He possessed the first, but not the second. 
 Representing the case to Lord Canning, he received, on 
 the 19th, a notification of his appointment as Brigadier- 
 General, in supreme command in Oudh. Then he set to 
 work to prepare for the crisis which he knew might be 
 upon him at any moment. 
 
 The city of Lakhnao, built on the west bank of the 
 river Giimti, but having suburbs on the east bank, lies 
 forty-two miles to the east of Kanhpur, and 610 miles 
 from Calcutta. All the principal buildings lie between 
 the city and the river bank. Here also are the Residency 
 and its dependencies, covering a space 2150 feet long 
 from north-west to south-east, and 1200 feet broad from 
 east to west. A thousand yards to the west of it was the 
 
136 Sketch-D e scrip ti 071 of Lakhnao. 
 
 Machchi Bhawan, a turreted building used for the storage 
 of supplies. Close to it, and in the present day incor- 
 porated with it, is the Imambarah, a mosque, 303 feet by 
 160. The other palaces will be spoken of when it shall 
 be my task to describe the ' leaguer ' of this famous place. 
 It must suffice to state now that a canal which intersects 
 the town falls into the Gumti about three miles to the 
 south-east of the Residency, close to the Martiniere ; that 
 about three-quarters of a mile to the south-south-east of 
 this is the Dilkusha, a villa in the midst of an extensive 
 deer park. To the north-east of the Residency lay the 
 cantonment, on the left bank of the Gumti, communicating 
 with the right bank by means of two bridges, one of stone, 
 near to the Machchi Bhawan, the other of iron, 200 yards 
 from the Residency. Recrossing by this to the right bank 
 the traveller comes to the palaces, to be hereafter men- 
 tioned, between the Residency and the Martiniere. To the 
 south-west of the town, about four miles from the Residency, 
 is a walled enclosure of 500 square yards called the Alam- 
 bagh, commanding the road to Kanhpur. In May 1857 the 
 troops at Lakhnao consisted of the greater part of the 32d 
 Foot, about 570 strong, fifty-six European artillerymen, 
 a battery of native artillery, the 13th, 48th, and 71st 
 Regiments N. I., and the 7th Native Light Cavalry. Up 
 to the time of the receipt by Sir Henry Lawrence of the 
 patent of Brigadier-General these troops had been em- 
 ployed in the way then common in India, that is, the 
 sipahis had been entrusted with the care of important 
 buildings, the Europeans being sheltered as much as 
 possible from the heat of the sun. 
 
 Sir Henry at once changed this order. He reduced 
 the number of posts to be guarded from eight to four, 
 three of which he greatly strengthened. All the magazine 
 stores he removed into the Machchi Bhawan, to be guarded 
 
Sir Henry concentrates His Troops. 137 
 
 by a company of the 326 and thirty guns. At the 
 treasury, within the Residency compound, he stationed 
 130 Europeans, 200 natives, and six guns. At the third 
 post, between the Residency and the Machchi Bhawan, 
 commanding the two bridges, he located 400 men, 
 Europeans and natives, with twenty guns, some of them 
 eighteen-pounders. The fourth post was the travellers' 
 bungalow, between the Residency and the cantonment. 
 Here he posted two squadrons of the 2d Oudh Native 
 Cavalry, with six guns. 
 
 In the cantonment, on the left bank of the Gumti, 
 there still remained 340 men of the 3 2d Foot, fifty English 
 gunners, six guns, and a complete battery of native 
 artillery. The 32d were, towards the end of May, reduced 
 by eighty-four men, despatched to the aid of Wheeler at 
 Kanhpur. The 7th Native Cavalry remained at Miidkipur, 
 seven miles distant from the Lakhnao cantonment. 
 
 As soon as these arrangements had been completed. 
 Sir Henry, on the 24th of May, caused to be moved into the 
 Residency enclosure the ladies, the families, and sick men 
 of the 32d, and the European and Eurasian clerks. These 
 last he armed and drilled, and had them told off into 
 parties for night duty. On the 27th he wrote to Lord 
 Canning that the Residency and the Machchi Bhawan 
 ' were safe against all probable comers.' That very day, 
 however, he had evidence that the country districts were 
 surging around him, and he had to despatch one of the 
 ablest of his assistants, Gould Weston, to Maliabad, 
 fifteen miles from Lakhnao,' to restore order. Further, 
 also on the 27th, he despatched Captain Hutchinson, with 
 200 sowars and 200 sipahis, to the northern frontier of the 
 province, there to be under the orders of the civil officer 
 who had asked for them. The measure certainly ridded 
 Lakhnao of the presence of 400 disaffected soldiers, but 
 
13S The Lakknao Sipdhis rise, 
 
 it resulted in the murder by them of all their officers save 
 one. Hutchinson was able to return safely to his post. 
 
 Before this mutiny occurred (7th and 8th June) the 
 catastrophe at Lakhnao had come upon Sir Henry. On 
 the night of the 30th of May the greater number of the 
 sipahis of the 71st N. I. rose in revolt, fired the bungalows, 
 murdered Brigadier Handscomb and Lieutenant Grant, 
 wounded Lieutenant Hardinge, and attempted further 
 mischief The attitude of the European troops, vigilant 
 at the posts assigned them by the Brigadier- General, com- 
 pletely baffled them, and they retired in the night to 
 Miidkipur, murdering Lieutenant Raleigh on their way. 
 Thither, at daylight, Sir Henry followed them, and though 
 deserted by the troopers of the 7th N. L. C, who joined 
 the mutinied 71st N. I., and by some men of the 48th N. I., 
 drove them from their position, and pursued them for some 
 miles. Their action had, in fact, proved advantageous to 
 Sir Henry Lawrence. It had rid him of pretended friends, 
 and had shown him upon whom he could rely. The great 
 bulk of the 13th N. I. had proved loyal ; but the whole of 
 the 7th Cavalry, more than two-thirds of the 71st N. I., 
 a very large proportion of the 48th N. I., and a few of the 
 1 3th N. I. had shown their hands. Their departure enabled 
 Sir Henry still further to concentrate his resources. 
 
 Every day brought intelligence from the outlying 
 districts of the seriousness of the crisis. At Sitapur, fifty- 
 one miles from Lakhnao, there had been incendiarisms at 
 the end of May. On the 2d of June the sipahis of the 
 loth Oudh Irregulars, there stationed, had thrown into the 
 river the flour sent from the town for their consumption, 
 on the pretext that it had been adulterated with the view 
 of destroying their caste. On the 3d the 41st N. I. 
 and the 9th Irregular Cavalry broke out in mutiny, and 
 murdered many of their officers and of the residents, under 
 
Outbreaks in Otidh. 139 
 
 circumstances of peculiar atrocity. The number of men, 
 women, and children so murdered amounted to twenty- 
 four. 
 
 At Malaun, forty-four miles to the north of Sitapur, the 
 natives rose as soon as they heard of the events at the 
 latter place. At Muhamdi, on the Rohilkhand frontier, the 
 work of butchery on disarmed men, women, and children, 
 on the 4th of June, was not exceeded in atrocity by any 
 similar event during the outbreak. At Faizabad, at 
 Sikrora, at Gondah, at Bahraich, at Malapur, at Sultan- 
 pur, at Saloni, at Daryabad, at Purwa, in fact at all the 
 centres of administration in the province there were, 
 during the first and second weeks of June, mutinies of the 
 sipahis, risings of the people, and conduct generally on 
 the part of the large landowners which proved that their 
 sympathy was with the revolters. By the 12th of June 
 Sir Henry Lawrence had realised that the only spot in 
 Oudh in which British authority was still respected was 
 the Residency of Lakhnao. 
 
 We left Sir Henry chasing, on the morning of the 
 31st of May, the mutinied sipahis from the station of 
 Mudkipur. Between that time and the nth June his 
 health, undermined by long service in India, had given 
 way. But the measures of Mr Gubbins, the officer who 
 acted for him during his illness, and which were in direct 
 opposition to the principles which he had inculcated, had 
 the effect of rousing him from his bed of sickness. One 
 of his strong points was to maintain at Lakhnao as many 
 sipahis as would serve loyally and faithfully. Without 
 the aid of sipahis the Residency, he felt, could not be 
 defended against the masses which a province in insur- 
 rection could bring against it. Mr Gubbins, during his 
 illness, had despatched to their homes all the sipahis be- 
 longing to the province of Oudh. Sir Henry promptly 
 
140 Sir Henry calls in the Pensioners. 
 
 recalled them. What was more. Believing he might 
 successfully appeal to the memories of an imaginative 
 people, especially to that class which had in former years 
 enjoyed the benefits of British service, and in later 
 had not been subjected to the manoeuvres of the con- 
 spirators, he despatched circulars to all the pensioned 
 sipahis in the province inviting them to come to Lakhnao 
 to defend the masters to whom they owed their pensions, 
 and whose interests were bound up with theirs. The 
 response to these circulars was remarkable. More than 
 500 grey-headed soldiers came to Lakhnao. Sir Henry 
 gave them a cordial welcome, and selecting about 170 of 
 them for active employment, placed them under a separate 
 command. With these and the loyal sipahis he had now 
 nearly 800 able-bodied men fit for any work they might 
 be called upon to perform. 
 
 But many disloyal sipahis still remained in his vicinity. 
 Of these the cavalry and infantry of the native police 
 broke out on the night of the nth and the morning 
 of the 1 2th. Vainly did their commandant, the Gould 
 Weston of whom I have spoken, endeavour to recall them 
 to their duty. He owed his own life to his remarkable 
 daring. The 32d, sent in pursuit, followed up the muti- 
 nied policemen and inflicted some damage, but the ground 
 was broken, the heat was great, and the mutineers had a 
 considerable start. It was in many respects an advantage 
 to be rid of them. 
 
 In view of the great crisis now so near as almost to be 
 touched by the hand. Sir Henry had continued to strengthen 
 the slight defences of the Residency enclosure, and to make 
 the Machchi Bhawan as defensible as possible. He had 
 originally resolved to hold both places. But as soon as 
 he had realised the fact that the small number of his troops 
 would permit only of his retaining one portion against the 
 
Hears that Kdnhpu7' has fallen. 141 
 
 surging masses of the city and the provinces, he had de- 
 cided to concentrate all his forces within the Residency. 
 He still, however, for the moment held the Machchi 
 Bhawan, believing that the report of his preparations 
 there would have some effect on the rebels. 
 
 He was not quite certain, at this time, that he would 
 be besieged at all. Everything depended on Kanhpur.^ 
 If British reinforcements could reach that place whilst 
 Wheeler should still be holding it, then, he argued, the 
 people of Oudh, in face of an English force within forty- 
 two miles, would not dare to attempt the siege. He 
 feared very much, however, for Kanhpur. He would have 
 marched to succour the place if it had been possible, but, 
 in the face of the masses of the enemy holding the Ganges, 
 he could not have reached Wheeler's intrenchment, whilst 
 he would have certainly been destroyed himself At 
 length, on the 28th, he heard that Kanhpur had fallen, 
 and that the rebels of his own province, emboldened by 
 the news, had advanced in force to the village of Chinhat, 
 on the Faizabad road, eight miles from the Residency. 
 
 Sir Henry promptly decided to move out and attack 
 the rebels. He held, and I am confident he held rightly, 
 that nothing would tend so much to maintain the prestige 
 of the British at this critical conjuncture as the dealing of 
 a heavy blow at their advanced forces. Accordingly, he 
 moved his troops from the cantonment to the Residency, 
 and at half-past six o'clock, on the morning of the 30th of 
 June, set out in the direction of Chinhat, with a force 
 composed as follows : 300 men of the 32d Foot, 230 loyal 
 sipahis, a troop of volunteer cavalry, thirty-six in number, 
 120 native troopers, ten guns, and an eight-inch howitzer. 
 Of the ten guns four were manned by Englishmen and 
 
 1 ' If Kanhpur holds out, I doubt if we shall be besieged at all.' Sir H. 
 Lawrence to Lord Canning. 
 
142 The Action at Chinhat. 
 
 six by natives. The howitzer was on a hmber drawn by 
 an elephant driven by a native. 
 
 After marching three miles along the metalled road 
 the force reached the bridge spanning the rivulet Kukrail. 
 Here Sir Henry halted his men, whilst he rode to the front 
 to reconnoitre. Reining in his horse on the summit of a 
 rising ground, he gazed long and anxiously in the direction 
 of Chinhat. Not a movement was to be seen. Nor when 
 he turned his glass in other directions did he meet with 
 better fortune. There was no enemy. He sent back, then, 
 his assistant Adjutant-General to order the column to 
 retrace its steps. The column had begun to act on the 
 order when suddenly there was descried in the distance 
 a mass of men moving forwards. Instantly revoking his 
 first order. Sir Henry sent fresh instructions that the 
 column should advance. It advanced accordingly, and 
 after proceding a mile and a half plainly saw the rebels 
 drawn up at a distance of about 1200 yards, their right 
 covered by a small hamlet, their left by a village and 
 tank, whilst their centre rested, uncovered, on the road. 
 Just as the English sighted them the rebels opened fire. 
 
 Sir Henry at once deployed his men, and bidding 
 them lie down, returned the fire. The cannonade lasted 
 more than an hour, when suddenly it ceased on both sides. 
 Shortly after the rebels were descried, in two masses, 
 advancing against both flanks of the English. The 
 ground lent itself to such a movement, made by vastly 
 superior numbers. For, parallel to the line formed by 
 the men of the 3 2d, was the village of Ishmailganj, and 
 into it the rebels were now pouring. The seizure of this 
 village by one-half of the rebel force was a very masterly 
 manoeuvre, for it enabled the rebels to pour a concentrated 
 flanking fire on the English line, whilst the other wing was 
 threatened from the opposite side. Conspicuous success 
 
The Action at Cliinhat. 143 
 
 attended the movement. In an incredibly short space 
 of time the 32d had lost nearly half its numbers, and it 
 became clear that the English force would be destroyed 
 unless it could reach the bridge over the Kukrail before 
 the enemy could get there. The retreat was at once 
 ordered, and the British force, though pounded with grape 
 and harassed by cavalry all the way, pushed on vigorously. 
 Just, however, as the retreating troops approached the 
 bridge they noticed that bodies of the enemy's cavalry had 
 worked round and were heading them in that direction. 
 The commander of the thirty-six volunteers observing the 
 movement, and realising on the instant its importance, 
 dashed, at the head of his men, against the rebel cavalry. 
 The latter did not wait to receive the impetuous onslaught, 
 but giving way at the sight of the English, sought safety 
 in flight. Still the rebel infantry pressed on, and what was 
 worse, the gun ammunition of the British was exhausted. 
 In this crisis Sir Henry had recourse to one of those heroic 
 remedies of which only men are capable who have the 
 faculty of maintaining undaunted presence of mind in 
 dangerous circumstances. He pushed his men across the 
 bridge ; then placed the guns on it, and ordered the gunners 
 to stand beside them with the port-fires lighted. The ruse 
 produced the desired effect. The rebels shrunk back from 
 attacking a narrow bridge defended, as they supposed, by 
 loaded guns. The British force then succeeded in gaining 
 the shelter of the city, and in retiring in some sort of 
 order on the Machchi Bhawan and the Residency. But 
 their losses had been severe, and they had left behind them 
 the howitzer and two field-pieces. 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence, crossing the Kukrail bridge, 
 and disposing his guns in the manner related, had 
 galloped off, leaving Colonel Inglis to bring home the 
 force, unattended by anyone save his assistant Adjutant- 
 
1 44 Concentration within the Residency. 
 
 General, Captain Wilson, to the Residency. Arrived there 
 he despatched fifty of the 32d, under Lieutenant Edmon- 
 stone, to defend the iron bridge against the rebels. This, 
 despite the efforts of the elated enemy, they succeeded in 
 doing, though with some loss. The rebels, however, had 
 penetrated within the city, and, aided by the mass of the 
 population, began to loophole many of the houses in the 
 vicinity of the Residency and the Machchi Bhawan. They 
 went so far as to attack one of the posts of the Residency, 
 afterwards known, from the officer who ultimately com- 
 manded there, as ' Anderson's post' The house which 
 constituted the salient point of the post was the residence 
 of Mr Capper. That gentleman was standing in the 
 verandah when a shot from the rebels brought it down 
 and buried him in the ruins. He would have been lost 
 but for the determination to save him at all cost ex- 
 pressed by Anderson. Working with a will, under the con- 
 centrated fire of the rebels, this officer, aided by Corporal 
 Oxenham, 32d Foot, M. Geoffroi, a Frenchman, Signor 
 Barsotelli, an Italian, and two Englishmen, Lincoln and 
 Chick, succeeded, by incredible exertions, in rescuing him.^ 
 It was a very gallant deed. 
 
 The following evening Sir Henry, threatened at both 
 points by the enemy, caused the defences of the Machchi 
 Bhawan to be blown up, and concentrated his forces 
 within the Residency enclosure. From that date, the ist 
 of July, began that famous ' leaguer,' to the story of which 
 I shall, in its proper place, devote a separate chapter. 
 
 1 Oxenham received the Victoria Cross ; but Capper always felt that he 
 owed his life primarily to Anderson, who was left unrewarded. It was 
 Anderson who suggested the attempt to rescue, who summoned the others to 
 assist him, and who took the chief part in the operation. That operation 
 lasted three-quarters of an hour, during every second of which Anderson, 
 acting against the advice of his superior officer, exposed himself voluntarily to 
 imminent danger. 
 
The Story reverts to Allahdbdd, 145 
 
 Following the plan I have laid down 01 narrating in 
 as close order as possible the contemporaneous events in 
 the stations whose proximity rendered the action in one 
 more or less dependent upon the action in the others, 
 I propose to turn, for a short space, to Allahabad. That 
 place, situated at the junction of the Ganges and the 
 Jamnah, constituted the armed gate through which alone 
 succours from Calcutta could reach Kanhpur and Lakhnao. 
 Should that gate be closed, or should it be occupied, the 
 fate of both the places mentioned would have depended 
 entirely on the result of the operations before Dehli. 
 
 The fort of Allahabad, founded by Akbar in 1575, 
 lies on a tongue of land formed by the confluence of 
 the two great rivers above mentioned. It is 120 miles 
 distant from Kanhpur, seventy-seven from Banaras, 564 
 by the railway route, and somewhat more by water from 
 Calcutta. It touched the southern frontier of Oudh, 
 and was in close proximity to the districts of Juanpur, 
 Azamgarh, and Gorakhpur, the landowners in which had 
 been completely alienated from their British masters by 
 the action of the land and revenue system introduced 
 by Mr Thomason. 
 
 The news of the disasters at Mirath and Dehli reached 
 Allahabad on the 1 2th of May. The force there was entirely 
 native, the garrison consisting of the 6th Regiment N. I. 
 and a battery of native artillery. Additions to this purely 
 native force were made early in the month of May. On 
 the 9th a wing of the ' Regiment of Firuzpur,' a Sikh 
 regiment which had been raised on the morrow of the 
 campaign of 1846, and on the 19th a squadron of the 
 3d Oudh Irregular Horse, also natives, reached the place. 
 The bulk of these troops occupied a cantonment about 
 two and a half miles from the fort, to which they fur- 
 nished weekly guards. The commanding officer was the 
 
 K 
 
146 Slight Preparations for the Storm. 
 
 Colonel of the 6th N. I., Colonel Simpson, a polished 
 gentleman, but scarcely a born leader of men. The chief 
 civil officers were Mr Chester and Mr Court, both men of 
 ability — the last named, who was magistrate, one of the 
 most energetic, daring, warm-hearted, and enterprising 
 men in India. 
 
 These gentlemen had pointed out to the authorities 
 in Calcutta the great danger of leaving a place so im- 
 portant as Allahabad entirely in the hands of natives, and 
 they received permission, in May, to procure from Chanar, 
 a fortress on the Ganges, seventy-six miles distant, some 
 of the European invalided soldiers permanently stationed 
 there. Sixty-five of these arrived on the 23d of May, and 
 a few more later. They were at once placed within the 
 fort. 
 
 One of the most remarkable features of the great re- 
 bellion was the supreme confidence which officers of the 
 native army reposed to the very last in their own men. 
 This confidence was not shaken when the regiments 
 around them would rise in revolt. Every officer argued, 
 and sincerely believed that, whatever other sipahis might 
 do, the men of his regiment would remain true. This 
 remark applied specially to the officers of the 6th N. I. 
 I had shortly before been serving at the same station 
 with that regiment, and in no other had I noticed such 
 complete sympathy as existed in it between officers and 
 men. To make their men comfortable, to see that all 
 their wants were attended to, had been the one thought 
 of those officers. I am bound to add that the men, by 
 their behaviour, seemed to reciprocate the kindly feelings 
 of their superiors. 
 
 When, then, regiments were rising all over India, the 
 officers of the 6th boasted that, whatever might happen 
 elsewhere, the 6th N. I. would remain staunch and true. 
 
The 6th Regiment N.I. 147 
 
 So strong was this conviction among them that when, on 
 the 22d of May, a council was held of the chief civil and 
 military authorities, Colonel Simpson deliberately pro- 
 posed that the whole of his regiment should be moved 
 into the fort to hold it. Mr Court most strenuously, and 
 ultimately successfully, opposed this proposal. The day 
 following the invalids arrived from Chanar, and then all 
 the non-combatants of the station, those in the civil 
 -service excepted, moved into the fort with their pro- 
 perty. 
 
 A circumstance occurred towards the end of May 
 which seemed to justify the confidence of the officers of 
 the 6th N. I. The sipahis of the regiment, professing 
 the greatest indignation at the conduct of their brethren 
 in the North-west, formally volunteered to march against 
 Dehli. Their offer was telegraphed to Calcutta, and 
 afforded ground to the councillors of Lord Canning to 
 insist upon their contention that the mutinous spirit was 
 confined to but few stations. 
 
 About a week after the sipahis of the 6th had volun- 
 teered to march against the capital of the Mughals they 
 rose in revolt, and murdered many of their own trusting 
 officers, and some young boys, newly-appointed ensigns, 
 who happened to be dining at the regimental mess. It 
 happened in this wise. In reply to the offer to volunteer, 
 the Governor-General had thanked the regiment for 
 its loyalty. A parade was ordered for the morning of 
 the 6th of June to read the Vice-regal thanks to the 
 sipahis. Colonel Simpson read the words of Lord 
 Canning, and then, on his own behalf, spoke feelingly 
 to the men in their own language, telling them that their 
 reputation would be enhanced throughout India. The 
 sipahis seemed in the highest spirits, and sent up a ring- 
 ing cheer. But that evening, whilst the officers and the 
 
T48 The Rising at Allahdbdd. 
 
 new arrivals from England were dining at the regimental 
 mess, they rose in revolt, and whilst one detachment at- 
 tempted to secure the guns of the native battery, the bulk 
 of the men gathered in front of their lines and received 
 their officers as they rode to the spot with murderous 
 volleys. Amongst those who fell were Captain Plunkett, 
 an officer who loved his men, and who only that morning 
 had expressed to them his admiration of their loyalty, 
 the Adjutant, Lieutenant Steward, the Quarter-Master, 
 Lieutenant Hawes, and Ensigns Pringle and Munro. 
 Of officers not belonging to the regiment, the Fort Ad- 
 jutant, Major Birch, Lieutenant Innes of the engineers, 
 and eight of the unposted boys but just arrived from 
 England, were mercilessly slaughtered. Nor was the 
 attempt to capture the guns less successful. Despite the 
 exertions of Lieutenant Harward, commanding the battery, 
 who narrowly escaped with his life, and of Lieutenant 
 Alexander of the Oudh Irregulars, who was killed, the 
 guns were dragged into the lines of the mutineers. The 
 native gunners, in fact, and the troopers of the Oudh 
 Irregulars had fraternised with the rebellious sipahis. 
 The other officers of the 6th succeeded in securing refuge 
 within the fort. 
 
 But was the fort a sure refuge for them ? At the 
 moment it seemed very doubtful. And if the fort were to 
 go, the sacrifice of the lives of those behind its ramparts 
 would be the least part of the evil. The strongest and 
 most important link between Calcutta and Kanhpur would 
 in that case be severed. The bulk of the troops garrison- 
 ing the fort were x^siatics. There was one company of 
 the 6th N. I., and there was the wing of the Sikh regiment 
 of Firuzpur. On the other side were sixty-five European 
 invalided soldiers, the officers, the clerks, the women, and 
 the children. The temper of the Sikhs was known to 
 
Rcsohite Action of Brasyer. 149 
 
 be doubtful. News had arrived that, at Banaras, their 
 countrymen had been fired upon by EngHsh gunners. 
 Much, if not everything, depended upon the control pos- 
 sessed over them by their officers. 
 
 Fortunately their senior officer on the spot was a man 
 of great daring, of strong character, and absolutely fear- 
 less. This was Lieutenant Brasyer, an officer who had 
 been promoted from the ranks for his splendid conduct 
 during the Satlaj campaigns of 1846, and who had risen 
 to a high position in the regiment of Firuzpur. Brasyer's 
 keen instinct detected on the instant the necessity of 
 taking a quick and bold initiative. Bringing up, then, his 
 Sikhs, supported by the guns on the rampart manned by 
 the sixty-five invalids from Chanar, and on his flank 
 by the hastily armed Europeans and Eurasians, to a 
 point commanding the main gate, at which was posted 
 the company of the 6th N. I., he ordered the sipahis to 
 pile their arms. There was a moment of hesitation, but 
 then, sullenly and unwillingly, the mutinous soldiers 
 obeyed the order. The muskets were secured, and the 
 sipahis were expelled the fort. 
 
 The fort was secured, but the town, the civil station, 
 and the cantonments were for the moment in the power 
 of the rebels. Most cruelly did they abuse that power. 
 The gaols were broken open, and then the released scum 
 of the population perpetrated atrocities at which the 
 human mind revolts. Not only were the European shops 
 pillaged, the railway works destroyed, the telegraphic 
 wires torn down, but the Europeans and Eurasians, 
 wherever they could be found, were cruelly mutilated and 
 tortured. The death that followed their indescribable 
 torments was hailed by the sufferers as a blessed relief. 
 It need scarcely be added that the treasury was sacked. 
 Then the sipahis, glutted with blood and gold, abandoning 
 
150 Horrors perpetrated at Allahdbdd. 
 
 the intention they had previously announced of marching 
 to Dehh', formally disbanded themselves and made their 
 way, in small parties of twos and threes, each to his 
 native village. 
 
 Their departure did not for the moment affect the 
 state of affairs in the city and the station. The land- 
 owners, influenced mainly by their dislike of the system 
 known as the Thomasonian system, had risen about the 
 city and in the neighbourhood. A day or two later there 
 came to lead them a man who styled himself the ' Maulavi,'^ 
 and who possessed considerable organising powers. There 
 we must leave them, whilst we return to Calcutta to note 
 the impression which the events I have recorded in this 
 chapter made upon Lord Canning and his advisers. 
 
 ^ This man is not to be confounded with the Maulavl of Faizabad, of 
 whom I have spoken as having been one of the chief organisers of the 
 rebellion. The Allahabad ' Maulavl,' whose name was Laiakat All, had been 
 a schoolmaster, with a great reputation for sanctity. 
 
CHAPTER XL 
 
 CALCUTTA IN JUNE AND JULY. 
 
 I LEFT Lord Canning and his councillors, at the end of 
 May, endeavouring, by the despatch of troops by driblets 
 from the capital to the North-west, to strengthen that 
 weak middle piece upon the security of which, until rein- 
 forcements should arrive in sufficient strength, or until 
 Dehli should fall, the safety of the Empire seemed to 
 depend. For a moment the opinion prevailed that the 
 second of these contingencies would happen first. For, 
 as I have had occasion more than once to mention, the 
 strength of Dehli was greatly underrated, and the majority 
 of British residents, military as well as civil, believed that 
 the appearance of General Anson before the gates of the 
 city would suffice to induce the rebels to surrender it. 
 That was certainly the opinion of Lord Canning and his 
 councillors. It was under the influence of this convic- 
 tion that the Home Secretary had disdained the offers 
 of the Englishmen and foreigners who had volunteered 
 to enrol themselves, telling them that ' the mischief 
 caused by a passing and groundless panic had been 
 already arrested.' 
 
 But the first week of June saw the hopes of the Govern- 
 ment rudely shattered. Thick as hail, post by post, came 
 tidings of disaster. Accounts of the mutinies at Kanh- 
 pur, at Allahabad, at Lakhnao, of the defection of Oudh, 
 related in the last chapter, of revolts and murders at 
 
152 Lord Canning summons Sir Patrick Grant. 
 
 Azamgarh, at Juanpur, at Banaras, at Jhansi, to be yet 
 related, followed one another in quick succession. To 
 counterbalance these misfortunes came the news of 
 Brigadier Wilson's victory at Ghazi-ud-din Nagar on 
 the 31st of May. But the information, which reached 
 Calcutta about the same time, that General Anson had 
 succumbed to cholera at Karnal, on the 27th, seemed at 
 the moment a misfortune great enough to outweigh even 
 this victory. 
 
 Lord Canning and his councillors, however, made a 
 great attempt to repair it. They telegraphed to Madras 
 for Sir Patrick Grant, Commanding-in-Chief at that Pre- 
 sidency, to come up to Calcutta to replace Anson. Grant 
 was an officer in the Bengal army who had filled the 
 office of Adjutant-General, and it was supposed that, in 
 the existing terrible crisis, one who had been able to rise 
 to such a position would possess experience from which 
 the Government might profit. The mistake was a natural 
 one, but it was not the less a mistake. A clerk promoted 
 to the headship of the department in which he has served is 
 rarely able to lift his mind above routine. So it was with 
 Sir Patrick Grant. Sent for in the crisis of a mutiny, 
 whilst the entire country was surging with revolt, he ar- 
 rived with his mind full of reconstruction and reorganisa- 
 tion, and he was unable to the last to apply it to any 
 other consideration. For all the good he effected he 
 might as well have remained at Madras. 
 
 Before he arrived the news from the revolted districts 
 became daily more alarming. To the list already given 
 might be added Rohilkhand, Bundelkhand, and a part of 
 Central India. The Government was indeed to be pitied. 
 Little more than a fortnight had elapsed since they had 
 refused the offers of the British and foreign residents of 
 Calcutta to volunteer, on the ground that all difficulties 
 
Lord Ca7ini'iig enrols Volunteers. 153 
 
 had been arrested, and now insurrection was approaching 
 daily nearer to their doors. 
 
 For the state of the three armed native regiments, 
 within fifteen miles of Calcutta, was such as to cause 
 great alarm. The followers of the ex-King of Oudh, 
 considerable in number and hostile in feeling, swarmed 
 in a very near suburb of the capital. Lord Canning could 
 not but feel, under these circumstances, that he had been 
 somewhat hasty in rudely repulsing the offers made to 
 volunteer on the 25th of May. On the nth of June, 
 then, he sent for the Town-Major, Major Cavenagh, a 
 man possessing a singularly practical mind and quick 
 perceptions, and consulted with him as to the advisability 
 of conceding the prayer which he had previousljr rejected. 
 The advice of Cavenagh was in entire accordance with 
 his character. On the following day, then, the necessary 
 orders were issued. The enrolment began immediately, 
 and in an incredibly short space of time the Government 
 had at its disposal a serviceable body of gentlemen, horse, 
 foot, and artillery — men devoted, unselfish, desirous only 
 to serve their country, and serving it with all their 
 might, and whose enrolment permitted Lord Canning to 
 despatch to the threatened districts the troops which, 
 but for the volunteers, he would have been forced to 
 retain at the capital. 
 
 The order for the enrolment of the volunteers had been 
 issued on the 12th of June. On the 13th the Governor- 
 General and his councillors passed an Act to gag the 
 press. That some restraint was requisite for the native 
 press may be admitted, for it was preaching sedition all 
 over the country. But to include in the gagging measure 
 the loyal English press, which, whilst it had supported the 
 English interests, had not shrunk from indicating, in no 
 measured language, the mistakes and shortcomings of the 
 
154 * Panic Sti^iday ' in Calcutta. 
 
 Government, was considered as but a poor return to the 
 independent classes of Calcutta for the services which 
 the Government had but the day before accepted. The 
 feeling engendered by the inclusion of the English press 
 in this otherwise necessary Act was, then, very bitter, and 
 remained so to the very last. 
 
 The Act was read three times on one day, and passed. 
 The day was a Saturday. At a late hour that night Sir 
 John Hearsey, commanding at Barrackpur, sent an ex- 
 press to Lord Canning telling him that he had certain 
 information that the sipahis of his brigade would rise 
 the following day ; that he had therefore ordered down 
 from Chinsurah the 78th Highlanders, and that, with their 
 aid and that of the 35th Foot and a battery of guns, he 
 proposed to disarm the sipahis the following day. Loid 
 Canning gave him the required permission. 
 
 It is perhaps as well that I should state what I 
 witnessed in the capital on that eventful day, known 
 in history as ' Panic Sunday.' The morning was clear 
 and bright. There was nothing at the time to indicate 
 that a crisis was at hand. At eleven o'clock I pro- 
 ceeded, as was my wont, to the church within Fort 
 William. As the service there proceeded I was struck 
 by the continuous sound of the trampling of horses 
 and the rolling of gun-carriages, evidently quitting the 
 fort. On the conclusion of the service I drove to the 
 house of the Home Secretary, Mr Beadon, then residing 
 with two other gentlemen in Chauringhi. Mr David 
 Money, of the civil service, a relation of my wife, was 
 staying with him. Mr Beadon was in his shirt sleeves, 
 engaged in writing, and apparently much occupied. I 
 told him and his friends what I had heard in the fort, 
 but my remarks elicited no reply. I returned home to 
 luncheon, and remained in my house the rest of the day. 
 
' Panic Sttnday ' in CalctUta. 155 
 
 About four o'clock I was roused by a sound of the move- 
 ment of horses and carriages, and almost immediately 
 afterwards a note was placed in my hand. It was from 
 Mr David Money. It ran as follows : ' Come over with 
 M. at once; the regiments at Barrackpur have mutinied, 
 and are marching on Calcutta. There is no time to be 
 lost. We have a stone staircase, five good rifles, and 
 plenty of ammunition. Come without delay.' Proceeding 
 to the gate of my house, which was in Chauringhi, and 
 commanded the plain as far as the glacis of the fort, I saw 
 that plain covered with fugitives, some riding, some in 
 carriages of sorts, some in palanquins, some running, some 
 walking — men, women, and children all making for the 
 nearest fort gate. It was a sight, once seen, never to be 
 forgotten. Deeming that at such a crisis it was the duty 
 of every Englishman to stay at his post, I declined the 
 kind offer made me, and stood there for some time watch- 
 ing the extraordinary scene. I noticed, as I drove out 
 that evening, that many of the houses near me were 
 deserted, and that a terrible panic had taken hold of the 
 Eurasians. I ascertained, too, that many high-placed 
 officials had sent their families on board ship, that some 
 of them had proceeded thither themselves, whilst others 
 had been content to barricade their houses, to await, 
 without undressing, the events of the night. 
 
 There was just this reason for the alarm. The native 
 regiments at Barrackpur had contemplated rising on that 
 day. The admirable foresight and energy of General 
 Hearsey defeated their plans. That night, Saturday, he 
 summoned, by express, the 78th Highlanders from Chin- 
 surah. One wing of the regiment started at once, and 
 though misled by a guide, reached Barrackpur at day- 
 break. The other wing came in about three hours later. 
 At four o'clock in the afternoon Hearsey paraded the 
 
1 56 The King of Ottdh lodged in the Fort. 
 
 brigade — the three native regiments, a wing of the 35th 
 Foot, and the 78th, the two latter having their muskets 
 loaded with ball, and a battery of artillery, the guns of 
 which were also ready for action. The sipahis obeyed 
 without a murmur the orders given to them to pile their 
 arms, and the danger was over. It was the dread of 
 what might have happened which had led so many in 
 Calcutta to believe that it had happened. 
 
 Early the following morning the Foreign Secretary, 
 Mr Edmonstone, escorted by a party of English soldiers, 
 proceeded to the residence of the ex-King of Oudh at 
 Garden Reach, and, at the interview which followed with 
 that prince, informed him that the exigencies of the time 
 required that he should change his quarters to Fort 
 William. The ex-King behaved with dignity and pro- 
 priety, protesting in the most solemn manner that 
 neither by word nor deed had he encouraged the mutineers. 
 He declared himself ready to proceed whithersoever the 
 Governor-General might direct. Taken to the fort, accom- 
 panied by his late prime minister and a few other nobles, 
 he was lodged in the Governor-General's own house- 
 There his comforts were thoroughly attended to, and as, 
 even when he was residing at Garden Reach, he had never 
 quitted the domain allotted to him, it may be said truly 
 that never was captivity less felt. 
 
 The day after this event Sir Patrick Grant arrived in 
 Calcutta and took up the nominal command of the army. 
 He did not quit the city during his six weeks' tenure of 
 office. His presence there may then be passed over as an 
 incident not affecting the progress of affairs. 
 
 The next day, the 17th, the news of the action fought 
 by General Barnard before Dehli reached the capital. It 
 was even rumoured that the success was greater than that 
 which had been achieved, and that Dehli had fallen. 
 
The Darkness becomes intensified. 157 
 
 Everyone expected that it would be so. In the exulta- 
 tion caused by the impression, Lord Canning, four days 
 later, despatched a request to Barnard to send down 
 a column to clear the weak middle part of the Duab. But 
 the truth soon became known. Before many days had 
 passed the Government and the public alike realised that 
 General Barnard's task was only beginning, and that 
 assistance for the weak middle piece would be available 
 only from Calcutta. 
 
 Meanwhile, darkness was closing round them. At the 
 close of the third week of June, whilst they had heard of 
 further mutinies at Jhansi, at Naogang, at Nimach, and at 
 Juanpur, they had no news from Kanhpur and Lakhnao 
 later than the 4th. Agra was safe, they knew, on the loth. 
 They knew likewise that Banaras and Allahabad had been 
 made secure in the manner yet to be described. 
 
 During the next fortnight, up to the 4th of July, the 
 accounts became worse and worse. On the 2d of July 
 the Government heard of the mutiny of the native regi- 
 ments at Kanhpur, and that, joined by Nana Sahib and 
 his followers, they were besieging Wheeler in his intrench- 
 ment ; that Sir Henry Lawrence was about to be besieged 
 in the Residency at Lakhnao, but that all was well there 
 to the 30th of June ; that Agra was safe up to the 15th, 
 but that Bandah had gone ; that the troops of the 
 Gwaliar contingent had mutinied on the 15th ; and that 
 an uneasy feeling prevailed at Haidarabad. The next 
 day Lord Canning received a letter from Sir Henry 
 Lawrence, dated the 28th of June. The letter simply 
 stated that the writer had every reason to believe that the 
 English at Kanhpur had been destroyed by treachery. 
 Certain details, which eventually proved to be correct, 
 were added as native reports, but these reports, it was 
 said, were not believed at Allahabad or Banaras. 
 
158 The Situation alarming iji the extreme. 
 
 The Government had up to that moment hoped that 
 Wheeler would be able to hold out until they could relieve 
 him. One regiment had been despatched in May, under 
 Colonel Neill, and that officer had already secured Banaras 
 and Allahabad. It was even hoped that he would be able 
 to leave Allahabad for Kanhpur, somewtiere about the 
 25th of June, with the four regiments which had been 
 gradually collected at that station. Sir Henry Havelock, 
 fresh from his Persian campaign,- having come up with Sir 
 Patrick Grant on the i6th, had on the 24th been directed 
 to proceed to Allahahad to assume command of that 
 force. He had started the very next day. But if the 
 news received from Sir Henry Lawrence were true, he 
 must inevitably be too late to relieve Wheeler. The situ- 
 ation was alarming in the extreme. If Kanhpur were in- 
 deed gone, the weak middle piece was broken in twain. 
 With rebellious Oudh on the one side, and the mutinied 
 Gwaliar contingent on the other, what hope was there 
 that even Havelock, with his four English infantry regi- 
 ments, his scanty artillery, and his volunteer horsemen 
 could possibly prevail ? 
 
 In this state of terrible supense I must leave the 
 Government at Calcutta whilst I tell the sad story of 
 the ' leaguer of Kanhpur.' 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 THE LEAGUER OF KANHPUR. 
 
 In the tenth chapter I have described how, towards the 
 close of the month of May, a rising of the native troops at 
 Kanhpur seemed inevitable ; how the officer commanding 
 there, Sir Hugh Wheeler, had fortified, as a place of refuge 
 for the Europeans and Eurasians, two barracks in the 
 centre of a vast plain ; how he had stored in those 
 barracks supplies of all sorts ; how, on the 22d of May, 
 the non-combatant portion of the residents had crowded 
 to those barracks for refuge ; how, a day or two later, the 
 General himself, with his family, had repaired thither ; 
 how, on the 2 2d likewise, he and they^had been cheered 
 by the arrival from Lakhnao of eighty-four men of the 
 32d Foot ; how, on the 31st of May and the two follow- 
 ing days, the arrival from Allahabad of fifteen men of the 
 Madras Fusiliers, and a hundred of the 84th, bearing with 
 them the information that they were but the forerunners 
 of several regiments, for that troops were pouring into 
 Calcutta, had so influenced General Wheeler that, believ- 
 ing his position now to be secure, and feeling very anxious 
 regarding Lakhnao, he had forwarded on to that station 
 fifty men of the 84th ; how that, on the night of the 4th 
 of June, the native troops broke into open and violent 
 mutiny ; and how, from that date, the ' leaguer ' of Kanhpur 
 may be said to have begun. 
 
 The fifty men of the 84th had left for Lakhnao on the 
 
i6o The Sipdhis at Kdnhpztr 7'ise. 
 
 morning of the 3d of June. On the evening of the same 
 day half of the 3d Oudh field-battery, under Lieutenant 
 Ashe, which had been sent from Oudh to Fathgarh to 
 keep open the road between Kanhpur and Agra, but 
 which had been compelled to retreat on account of the 
 mutiny of the native troopers accompanying it, marched 
 into Kdnhpur. Their guns, two nine-pounders and a 
 twenty-four-pound howitzer, were at once placed in the 
 intrenchment. The native gunners had behaved so well 
 on the march that it was hoped that they would con- 
 tinue their good service. But the result showed that the 
 defection was almost universal. 
 
 On the following morning, the 4th, Wheeler received 
 certain information that the 2d Cavalry and the ist and 
 56th Regiments N. I. had resolved to rise within the next 
 four-and-twenty hours and murder their officers. This 
 information caused the issue of an order to the officers 
 of those regiments to discontinue the practice of sleeping 
 in the lines of their regiments. Wheeler saw, too, that 
 the guns in the intrenchment were placed in position, 
 and that arrangements were made to render a surprise 
 impossible. 
 
 On the night of the 4th the troopers of the 2d 
 Cavalry rose, with a great shout, and setting fire to the 
 sergeants' bungalows, mounted their horses, and rode to 
 the cattle-yard of the Commissariat department. Taking 
 thence thirty-six elephants, they marched to the treasury, 
 guarded by the soldiers of Nana Sahib. The two bodies 
 fraternised, and helped each other in packing the contents 
 of the treasury on the elephants and on carts. They 
 were still engaged in this congenial occupation when they 
 were joined by the sipahis of the ist N. I., who, refusing 
 to join their comrades at the first bidding, had been 
 unable to resist when they heard of the proceedings at 
 
Mutiny breaks out at Kdnkptir. 1 6 1 
 
 the treasury. Vainly had their English officers tried to 
 restrain them. But, whilst deaf to the call of duty, they 
 were not at the moment bloody-minded. They had 
 begged their officers to return to the intrenchment, adding 
 that they wished them no harm, but that their own course 
 had been decided upon. 
 
 But the mutineers were not content with the looting 
 of the treasury. They first secured the magazine, with 
 its priceless wealth of heavy guns and ammunition. 
 General Wheeler had placed there a warrant-officer with 
 instructions to blow it up as soon as the sipahis should 
 break out. But the guard over it was a sipahi guard, and 
 the warrant-officer, though he did his best, was prevented 
 by the men from carrying out his orders. The sipahis 
 then broke open the gates of the gaol and turned loose 
 on the abandoned station hundreds of miscreants of the 
 worst description. These made the night a night of 
 horror. The burning of bungalows, and the excited cries 
 of looting parties, gave to the Europeans in the intrench- 
 ment a clear idea of the storm which had burst upon them. 
 
 Through all this turmoil the sipahis of the two other 
 regiments, the 53d and 56th, remained apparently 
 quiescent. About seven o'clock in the morning Wheeler 
 despatched four officers to reconnoitre. They had pro- 
 ceeded two miles when they were fired upon, and one of 
 the number was hit. Wheeler then ordered to their sup- 
 port a company of Europeans and Ashe's half-battery, 
 but these had not moved far when the native officers of 
 the 53d and 56th arrived to report that their men could 
 no longer be depended upon. The troops, having picked 
 up the officers first sent out, then returned to the in- 
 trenchment. 
 
 It was now nine o'clock. The sipahis of the 53d and 
 59th, in response to a bugle call, turned out at this mo- 
 
 L 
 
i62 Mutiny of the Sipdhis at Kdnhpur. 
 
 ment, and ranging themselves in columns, made as though 
 they would march on the intrenchment. To prevent this, 
 Wheeler brought a gun to bear upon them. At the third 
 discharge the bulk of them dispersed to join their brethren 
 of the 1st N. I. at Nuwabganj, the suburb in which were 
 located the treasury, the magazine, and the gaol. But 
 a few sipahis, true to their salt, made their way by a 
 circuitous route to the intrenchment, and served there 
 loyally to the very end. 
 
 The station was now clear of insurgents. These, at 
 Nuwabganj, barred the road to Dehli. To the eastward, 
 the Allahabad road was open. It was from that quarter 
 alone that help could come. Wheeler, then, had no alter- 
 native. He must remain where he was. He still cherished 
 the hope that the sipahis, satiated with loot, and knowing 
 that but little in that respect could be gained by an attack 
 on the intrenchment, would march to swell the national 
 movement at Dehli. There were some, too, in the in- 
 trenchment who, not remembering the bitterness engen- 
 dered in the mind of Nana Sahib by the refusal of Lord 
 Dalhousie and the Court of Directors to continue to him 
 the pension of the prince of whom he was the adopted 
 son, hoped much from his loyalty to the foreign overlord. 
 
 Meanwhile, the assembled sipahis of the four regiments, 
 now united, had elected Nana Sahib as their leader, and 
 had tumultuously demanded to be led to Dehli. The 
 sipahis had no desire to kill their officers. Against them 
 they had no grudge. They had shaken off the bonds of 
 discipline, they were free, they had looted to their 
 hearts' content, and now they would join those com- 
 rades who had resuscitated the rule of the Mughal. 
 They were not to be thwarted. With loud shouts, then, 
 they set out that same afternoon and marched seven miles 
 to Kalianpur. 
 
Nana Sahib brings back Sipdhis. 163 
 
 Nana Sahib had been powerless to prevent this march. 
 A too great insistance on his part would have shaken to 
 pieces his newly assumed authority. He had, then, ap- 
 parently acquiesced in the propriety of the policy. But 
 recognising that, if the movement were to continue, his 
 labour had been in vain ; that at Dehli he, a Maratha, 
 would be a cypher, whereas at Bithor it might be possible 
 for him to play the part of a sovereign prince ; that the 
 first essential to the success of his plans was to root out 
 the hated English, to infuse his own hatred of them into 
 the minds of the sipahis, so that with them also it should 
 be a race hatred ; that to leave the English masters at 
 Kanhpur was to leave open a gate upon the closing of 
 which depended the success of his schemes, he and his 
 agents employed all that night in endeavouring to persuade 
 the sipahis that their work was but half done so long as 
 one English person remained alive at Kanhpur. Not 
 that he and they were so unwise as openly to oppose the 
 march to Dehli. * By all means,' they said in so many 
 words, ' let us march to Dehli ; but let us first exterminate 
 the English now at Kanhpur. If you do not exterminate 
 them, they will soon receive reinforcements and march on 
 your track. At present they are few in number ; they 
 have women and children with them ; the position they 
 occupy cannot be long defended. In a few days you v/ill 
 be able to wreak your vengeance upon them. Then we 
 will march to Dehli — I first of all at your head. If you 
 decide to march thither now, you can never be sure how 
 quickly they may recover, and then you will all be 
 marked men. But dead men tell no tales.' Whether 
 the precise arguments used were in these words cannot 
 be affirmed, but that they were in this sense is certain. 
 They were effectual, for on the morning of the 6th the 
 rebelled sipahis marched back from Kalianpur to Kanhpun 
 
164 Proceedings of the Rebels. 
 
 On arriving there the Nana pitched his camp in the centre 
 of the station, hoisted two standards — one to propitiate the 
 Hindus, the other to humour the Muhammadans. He 
 then sent out fifty troopers to kill any Christians who 
 might be found, and directed the looting of the houses of 
 those native gentlemen -whom he suspected of being 
 favourable to the English. Within his position he threw 
 up works and mounted heavy guns. 
 
 General Wheeler had hoped, when he heard of the 
 march to Kalianpur, that his difficulties were practically 
 over. But in the return of the sipahis he recognised the 
 hand of the Maratha chief Even if he had had any 
 doubts on the subject, such doubts would have been no 
 longer possible on the 7th. On the morning of that day 
 he received a letter from Nana Sahib intimating his in- 
 tention to attack the garrison. It was soon recognised 
 that this was no idle threat, for two guns began at once 
 to play upon the intrenchment. On the 8th three more 
 guns opened fire, and on the i ith the rebels had in position, 
 playing upon the garrison night and day, three mortars, 
 two twenty-four-pounders, three eighteen-pounders, two 
 twelve-pounders, the same number of nine-pounders, and 
 one six-pounder. Their numbers had, meanwhile, consider- 
 ably increased. From Allahabad, from Oudh, from the 
 districts evil-disposed men had flocked in. Nana Sahib 
 assumed, during these operations, the position of, and re- 
 ceived the honours due to, a sovereign prince. In this 
 capacity he appointed Subahdar Tika Singh of the 2d 
 Cavalry to be general of that arm, and Subahdar Ganga 
 Din and Jamadar Dalganjan Singh of the native infantry 
 to be colonels of the infantry brigades. 
 
 The garrison which had to sustain the attacks 
 directed by these men was composed of 210 English 
 soldiers, and nearly a hundred officers and civilians. The 
 
The Garrison. 165 
 
 railway engineers, traders, and clerks were another hun- 
 dred, and there were some forty Christians besides, 
 including the drummers. They had six guns of differ- 
 ent calibres. Had the 450 men above enumerated been 
 alone, they could have fought their way to Allahabad. 
 But they had with them 330 women and children, many 
 of them reared tenderly, and some unable to travel. 
 Their lot, indeed, in the terrible contest was the hardest 
 of all. 
 
 The defences which, since the 14th of May, Wheeler 
 had been able to throw up were far from formidable. The 
 earthworks were little more than four feet high, and were 
 not bullet proof at the crest. The apertures for the 
 artillery exposed alike the guns and the gunners, whilst 
 in the unfinished barracks on the left front an enterpris- 
 ing enemy could easily find cover for attack. The scanti- 
 ness of the earthworks was mainly due to the iron-like 
 hardness of the ground, baked by a sun which had shone 
 uninterruptedly for seven months, and unmoistened during 
 that period by a drop of rain. Within the intrenchment 
 supplies calculated to last four weeks had been stored. 
 But these, like everything else behind the feeble earth- 
 works, were subject to destruction from the various causes 
 incidental to war. 
 
 From the very first the sufferings of the garrison were 
 intense. The heat was great, the space was scanty, the 
 fire of the guns of the rebels was incessant, the abso- 
 lutely necessary exposure of the officers and men to 
 that fire was deadly. From the first day the casualties 
 were considerable. Then rose the question how to 
 dispose of the dead. There was a well, outside the 
 intrenchment, not far from the unfinished barracks. 
 This was appointed to be the cemetery. The bodies 
 of those killed during the day were placed at once 
 
t66 The Gallant Defenders. 
 
 outside the verandah, amoncr the debris, until the fall 
 of night should afford the required opportunity to the 
 fatigue party. Then they were carried to the well and 
 let down. 
 
 Prominent among the officers who distinguished them- 
 selves in the defence of the intrenchment may be men- 
 tioned Captain Moore of the 32d, a soldier of the highest 
 class and the most undaunted courage ; Captain Jenkins 
 of the 2d L. C, one of the bravest and best of the party ; 
 Lieutenant Daniell of the same regiment, full of pluck 
 and fire ; Captain Whiting of the engineers, gifted with 
 a clear brain and coolness unsurpassable ; Major Vibart 
 of the 2d L. C, determined, unyielding, and ever watchful 
 at the post assigned him, one of the most exposed and 
 difficult of the defences ; Mowbray Thomson of the 56th 
 N. I., daring even to rashness, ever longing to be where 
 the fight was the thickest ; Delafosse of the 53d N. I., 
 cool and calm in danger, ready to sacrifice his own life if 
 that sacrifice could benefit his comrades ; Glanville of the 
 2d Europeans ; Ashe of the artillery, as daring as devoted ; 
 Jervis of the engineers, proud of his race, and maintain- 
 ing to his last gasp its glorious prestige ; Sterling, whose 
 splendid feats with his rifle were the terror of the rebels. 
 Worthy to be classed with these and others like them, 
 soldiers by profession, were the civilian Mackillop, one 
 of the noblest of men, and throughout the siege a hero ; 
 Heberden the railway engineer, Moncrieff the chaplain, 
 and others whose names have not survived their deeds. 
 The women of the garrison, too, displayed, under all cir- 
 cumstances, the pride and endurance of their race. Where 
 all behaved nobly it is difficult to distinguish. But con- 
 spicuous amongst them all was the wife of the leader of 
 the sallying parties, Mrs Moore. Her splendid courage 
 and fortitude endeared her to every man, woman, and child 
 
Life in the Intrenchment, 167 
 
 within the intrenchment. Nor must I omit to record the 
 stalwart courage of Bridget Widdovvson, wife of a private 
 of the 3 2d, who stood sentry, sword in hand, for some time 
 over a batch of prisoners, bound only by a rope, and took 
 care that not one of them escaped. 
 
 It would serve no purpose to enter into the details of 
 a siege of three weeks, the circumstances of every day of 
 which differed only in minor details from the circumstances 
 of its predecessor. The sufferings of the defenders through- 
 out that period were terrible. On the second day of the 
 attack the garrison realised that the supply of water 
 would present great difficulties. There was but one well, 
 in the middle of the intrenchment, and its locality was 
 known to the rebels. Upon that spot they kept so con- 
 tinuous a fire that to attempt to draw water exposed the 
 daring volunteer to almost certain death. So great was 
 the danger that, after the second day, it was resolved that 
 every man should draw water for himself and his belong- 
 ings. There was generally a cessation of fire about dusk, 
 and then the space round the well became crowded with 
 men, who endeavoured to utilise the fleeting moments by 
 filling their buckets. 
 
 After the fire of the first few days the barracks became 
 so riddled with shot as to afford little or no shelter. To 
 secure some sort of refuge a great many made holes under 
 the walls of the intrenchment, and covered them with 
 deal boxes, cots, or the first suitable article they could 
 lay hands on. The heat in these was, however, very 
 oppressive, and many died from apoplexy. At night 
 every person in turn was required to take watch. The 
 women and children belonging to them then slept under 
 the walls of the intrenchment, near to their relatives. 
 Here the bombshells kept them in perpetual dread, for 
 during nearly the entire night these were seen flying 
 
1 68 ^t/^ ^^^ i^^^ Intrenchment. 
 
 through the air and bursting, often doing mischief. 
 Another source of misery was caused by the stench 
 arising from the dead horses, and, what was even worse, 
 by the myriads of flies they collected. Still the garrison 
 bore up without a murmur. There was not a man who 
 was not a hero. Hillersden, the Collector, who had nego- 
 tiated the treaty with Nana Sahib, fell dead at the feet of 
 his wife, killed by a round-shot. She survived him but a 
 few days. A round-shot likewise carried off the head of 
 the General's son. Lieutenant Wheeler, as he lay wounded 
 in the room occupied by his mother and the members of 
 his family. Another round-shot mortally wounded Major 
 Lindsa)^ He, too, was soon followed to the grave by his 
 wife. Colonel Williams of the 56th was carried off by 
 apoplexy, whilst his wife died from the effect of a wound 
 which had completely disfigured her. Colonel Ewart of 
 the 1st was disabled early in the siege. Captain Halliday 
 was shot dead, whilst carrying some horse-soup for his 
 famishing wife, midway between the intrenchments and 
 the barracks. Mackillop, of whom I have spoken, and 
 who, in his unselfish anxiety to contribute to the neces- 
 sities of the suffering, had in the last week constituted 
 himself captain of the well, was mortally wounded at his 
 post. Death was very near him, yet in his last moments 
 he begged a bystander to carry the water he had drawn 
 to the lady to whom it had been promised. Nobly, indeed, 
 did the sons of the island-heart of the British Empire do 
 their duty. 
 
 In not one single respect did they fail. They suc- 
 ceeded to the very last in holding the outposts formed of 
 the unfinished barracks, which, if the position of besieger 
 and besieged had been reversed, they would not have per- 
 mitted their enemy to retain for a single day. The 
 officers who commanded the small detachments which 
 
Cruelties of N and Sahib. 169 
 
 held those outposts were Jenkins and Glanville of the 
 2d Europeans. The latter, after holding number two 
 barrack, with sixteen men, for almost as many days, was 
 incapacitated by a severe wound. Mowbray Thomson 
 succeeded him. Needless to add that the defence did 
 not lose from being entrusted to his capable hands. 
 
 All this time the rebels were receiving reinforcements. 
 Revolted sipahis from Oudh,from Azamgarh, from various 
 stations in the vicinity, swarmed in constantly. Every 
 day, on the other hand, saw a diminution of the resources 
 of the besieged. Towards the end of the third week the 
 supply of food had become very short. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Nana, puffed up with his brief 
 authority, was venting on stray captives his hatred of 
 the British race. In the early days of the attack his 
 myrmidons had dragged from hiding, in a house near the 
 ddk-bungalow, an old gentleman, supposed to be a mer- 
 chant, his wife, and two children, both in their teens. He 
 caused them to be shot on the spot. A like fate was 
 meted out to four clerks found in a house on the bank 
 of a canal. Another European, whose name could not be 
 traced, was similarly treated. Later on, on the loth of 
 June, an English lady, travelling with her four children 
 from the North-west Provinces to Calcutta, and arriving, 
 unsuspicious of evil, at Kanhpur, was taken before Ndna 
 Sahib. They were all shot. The same fate was dealt out 
 to another lady who arrived there under similar circum- 
 stances the day following. 
 
 On the 1 2th information reached the Nana that a party 
 of Europeans was approaching by water from the North- 
 west. He at once despatched cavalry and infantry to 
 reconnoitre. These returned to report that they were 
 European fugitives from Fathgarh, mostly women and 
 children. These, likewise, numbering 126, were murdered. 
 
1 70 The Rebels constantly repulsed. 
 
 Flushed with his easy conquest over unarmed women 
 and children, Nana Sahib urged on his generals to push 
 their attack on the intrenchment with vigour. For some 
 time past his gunners had been firing shells in the hope 
 of setting fire to the barracks. On the evening of the 
 13th their labours were to a certain extent crowned with 
 success, for at five o'clock on that day they succeeded in 
 kindling the roof of the hospital barrack. As this barrack 
 sheltered not only the sick but the families of the English 
 soldiers, the advantage to the Nana was considerable, for 
 the fire spread so rapidly that some forty of the inmates 
 were burned to death, and nearly all the medicines and 
 surgical instruments were destroyed. The sipahis took 
 advantage of the evident confusion to advance, 4000 in 
 number, to deliver an assault which should be final. But 
 what were 4000 Asiatics against one-tenth of their number 
 of Englishmen ? Afraid to try the hand-to-hand encounter 
 which the latter invited, and daunted by the fire of the six 
 guns, they slunk back, without daring an assault, dis- 
 comfited, to their lines. 
 
 Between the 13th and the 21st the rebels tried attacks 
 or rather advances of the same character, and invariably 
 with the same result. But on the 23d, the anniversary of 
 Plassey, having received large reinforcements from Oudh 
 and the districts, they made the most serious attack 
 in force they had ever tried. They gained possession of 
 three of the empty barracks, and attempted to dislodge 
 Moore from the remainder, but that gallant officer was 
 quite equal to the occasion. With twenty-five men he 
 advanced, under cover of a discharge of grape, and after a 
 desperate contest expelled the rebels from the barracks 
 they had seized. Meanwhile, under cover of some bales 
 of cotton which they had appropriated, the rebels advanced 
 to within 150 yards of the intrenchment, which they then 
 
The Situation becomes desperate. 1 7 r 
 
 attempted to carry with a rush. But the steady discharge 
 of canister, and rounds of file-firing from the infantry, 
 speedily induced them to change their minds. They fell 
 back, leaving about 200, including their leader, dead or 
 dying, on the field. 
 
 The next day Lieutenant Delafosse particularly dis- 
 tinguished himself by an act of combined coolness and 
 courage. About midday one of the English ammunition 
 waggons had been ignited by the enemy's fire. Whilst the 
 waggon was still burning, and endangering by its proximity 
 the other waggons, the fire of the rebels, who had noticed 
 the catastrophe, was concentrated on that one spot. The 
 situation was critical, for unless the fire should be ex- 
 tinguished it could not fail to cause immense damage. 
 In this crisis Delafosse crept up, and lying at full length 
 under the burning waggon, pulled away from it all the 
 loose splinters he could reach, at the same time throwing 
 earth on the flames. Two soldiers, animated by his ex- 
 ample, joined him with buckets of water, and by their 
 united efforts the flames were extinguished. 
 
 From the 21st to the 24th of June the defenders were 
 subjected to an incessant bombardment. The time for 
 the commencement of the rainy season had arrived, and 
 it was evident to them that the initial storm, generally 
 a fall of great severity, would bring down with a run the 
 walls and roofs of the riddled barracks. They had already 
 been for some time on half rations, and their supplies were 
 now so attenuated as to threaten famine at a very early 
 date. It was clear to all that, if the lives of the garrison 
 were to be preserved, there must be a new departure. 
 Had there been a single sign of relief from the direction 
 of Allahabad they might have decided to fight on as they 
 had fought, hoping that any day might bring relief. But 
 since the arrival of the men of the 84th, on the 31st of 
 
172 N and Sahib offers Terms ^ 
 
 May, a dead calmness, significant of disaster, had fallen 
 on the district around them. They felt it must have gone 
 hard with their countrymen in Oudh, to the east and to 
 the west, since they were left unaided to perish. The 
 bolder spirits talked, at times, of a sortie in force, but in 
 their cooler moments even they rejected a measure which 
 would have entailed the destruction of the women and the 
 children, and which did not offer one chance in a thousand 
 of success. 
 
 I have spoken of the splendid repulse of the rebels 
 on the 23d. This blow, severe as it was, seemed to the 
 garrison almost the last they would be able to strike. 
 Their guns were fast becoming unserviceable, ammunition 
 was failing them, starvation was staring them in the face. 
 They were in this position when, on the 24th, a slip of 
 paper was brought them by Mrs Greenway, wife of one of 
 the merchants of Kanhpur, who had been made prisoner, 
 on which the following words, written by Azimullah, were 
 traced : ' All those who are in no way connected with the 
 acts of Lord Dalhousie, and are willing to lay down their 
 arms, shall receive a safe passage to Allahabad.' 
 
 The idea of capitulation was revolting to every soldier 
 of the garrison. Sir Hugh Wheeler, the first to speak, 
 protested strongly against it, and he was supported by 
 the younger combatants. The Nana, they felt, was not 
 to be trusted. To him they owed their actual position. 
 But Moore and Whiting, who had borne the brunt of the 
 defence, thought otherwise. It would be impossible, they 
 knew, to prolong the defence. Their ammunition and 
 their food supplies were alike all but exhausted. The one 
 chance of saving the women and children was to capitu- 
 late. For themselves they cared not. They would have 
 preferred to die sword in hand, but in that case the women 
 and children would perish too. If there were but one 
 
Which are accepted. 173 
 
 chance in a thousand of saving these, that chance, they 
 thought, should be taken. They did not know how the 
 Nana had dealt with the stray travellers from the North- 
 west, or with the fugitives from Fathgarh, and they 
 believed that, faithless as he might be in other respects, 
 he was not the man to war with women and children. 
 A message was therefore sent to the Maratha chieftain to 
 the effect that a reply would be given on the morrow. 
 
 An armistice was then proclaimed for the 26th, and 
 on that day AzimuUah and Jawala Parshad, a Hindu 
 high in his master's confidence, met Moore, Whiting, and 
 the postmaster, Roche, outside the intrenchment. An 
 arrangement was easily arrived at. The Nana agreed to 
 allow the British to march out with their arms and sixty 
 rounds of ammunition ; to escort them safely to the river 
 side, where, at the Sati-Chaura Ghaut, boats stored with 
 provisions should be ready to take them to Allahabad. 
 The Nana wished to carry out the arrangement that very 
 night, and for a time strongly insisted on the point, but 
 he ultimately gave way. Mr Todd, who had been his 
 tutor, was sent to his headquarters to obtain his signa- 
 ture to the agreement, now fixed to take effect on the 
 morning of the 27th. He found him courteous in manner, 
 and full of pretended compassion for the sufferings of the 
 English ladies and children. 
 
 On the morning of the 27th the members of the 
 garrison set out, escorted by numbers of the rebel force. 
 The distance to the ghaut was but a mile, but to the 
 women and children the time to traverse it seemed an 
 eternity. When, at length, about eight o'clock, they reached 
 the ghaut, their hearts bounded with joy. The forty 
 boats were there, and to them the boats promised safety. 
 The river was very low, as the periodical rains, though 
 overdue, had not begun to fall, and our countrywomen 
 
174 Treacheiy of Nana Sahib. 
 
 had to wade ankle-deep in the water before they could be 
 pulled on board. The embarkation lasted about an hour; 
 then- some of the Englishmen began to push off. Two or 
 three boats only had just moved, when suddenly, from the 
 platform of a Hindu temple from which the ghaut takes 
 its name, on which sat enthroned Tantia Topi, the military 
 adviser of the Nana, there issued a bugle note. Instantly 
 the boatmen hurried from the boats, climbing over their 
 sides, whilst upon the European passengers the assembled 
 sipahis opened a concentrated fire of grape and musketry. 
 Vainly did the men on board exert themselves to push 
 off. Some, whose boats were under weigh, managed to 
 reach the opposite bank, only to find there the mutinied 
 sipahis of the 17th N. I. and the rebel cavalry of Oudh. 
 The sipahis on the Kanhpur side, meanwhile, were running 
 along the bank and pouring in shot after shot. There 
 was no escape ; defence was impossible. In many cases 
 the fire kindled the thatch which formed a covering to 
 the boats. Then all was over. Those who took to the 
 water were shot. All the males, in fact, were massacred. 
 The women, reserved for a worse fate, were dragged on 
 shore and lodged in a brick building near the bungalow 
 which for many years had served as the residence and 
 office of the commissariat officer of the division. 
 
 Of the forty boats so treacherously provided thirty- 
 nine were now in the hands of the rebels. One, however, 
 had managed to run the gauntlet. On board of this were 
 Moore, Vibart, Whiting, Mowbray Thomson, Ashe, 
 Delafosse, Bolton, and others. The thatch of this boat 
 had fortunately escaped ignition, and, vigorously propelled 
 by its English crew, it for a short time escaped the notice 
 of the murderers, busily intent upon the other thirty-nine. 
 Not for long, however. Soon sipahis were discerned 
 running along the bank in pursuit, whilst others, embark- 
 
Efforts of one Boat's Crew to escape. 175 
 
 ing on two boats, followed the fugitives. Their aim was 
 but too deadly. Moore, Ashe, and Bolton were shot dead 
 as they were propelling the boat with the only implement 
 available, a long pole, for the oars had been taken away. 
 During the first day and the first night the pursuit con- 
 tinued, varied occasionally by the launch of a blazing 
 fire-boat of smaller tonnage. One pursuing boat, armed 
 with fifty natives, was rapidly approaching when it 
 grounded, to the joy of the pursued, on a sandbank. 
 For them this was an opportunity. Disembarking, they 
 attacked the rebels on the sandbank so vigorously that 
 but {^\N were left to tell the tale. They then seized their 
 boat, which they found well provided with ammunition; 
 then casting it on the stream, they slept whilst it drifted 
 down stream. 
 
 They woke soon after midnight to find the wind had 
 risen, and that the boat was still drifting, whither they 
 knew not. The hope that it might have descended be- 
 yond the enemy's range was dissipated as soon as the 
 day broke. They found to their despair that the boat 
 had been carried out of the main channel into a small 
 creek, on the banks of which the enemy were huddled, 
 with muskets loaded. In such an extremity there was 
 but one chance — the English charge, which has never 
 failed. The few able-bodied survivors tried it. There 
 were but two officers unwounded capable of such a service, 
 Mowbray Thomson and Delafosse ; but they had with 
 them a few stalwart men of the 32d and 84th. Wading 
 through the water, they dashed at the astonished sipahis, 
 rushed through them, then back again to the place where 
 they had left the boat. But the boat was no longer there. 
 They saw her in the distance, drifting down the stream. 
 
 The two officers and their companions pushed at once 
 down the river-bank in the direction taken by the boat, but 
 
176 Fotcr of Them escape. 
 
 seeing no chance of overtaking her, and still followed by 
 the sipahis, they made for a Hindu temple which seemed 
 to offer a position of vantage. The door of this temple 
 they defended so fiercely against the advancing enemy, 
 with their bayonets, that there was soon formed in front 
 of it a barrier of corpses, which served to them as a ram- 
 part. Within the temple they obtained a little putrid 
 water, which refreshed them. Meanwhile, the assailants, 
 despairing of other methods, heaped up beneath the walls 
 of the temple leaves, faggots, and other combustible 
 materials, with the intent to smoke out the little garrison. 
 But the wind was on the side of the English. It blew the 
 smoke strongly in the eyes of the assailants. Under cover 
 of it, the besieged made a sudden spring forward, and 
 firing a volley, charged them. In the hand-to-hand fight 
 seven of the English were struck down. The remain- 
 ing seven, unhurt, dashed into the stream, the sipahis 
 following along the bank, and firing as they ran. Pre- 
 sently two of the swimmers were shot through the head ; 
 a third was caught on a sandbank and killed, but the 
 remaining four, Mowbray Thomson, Delafosse, and privates 
 Murphy and Sullivan, struck vigorously down the stream, 
 and, aided by the current, succeeded in evading their pur- 
 suers. They pushed on till, panting and exhausted, they 
 reached, on the Oudh side, the territories of a raja friendly 
 to the British, who befriended them until they could rejoin 
 the army in the field. 
 
 It is a sad supplement to this story to add that the 
 boat from which they had issued to charge the sipdhis on 
 the bank was captured, and its living cargo taken back to 
 Kanhpur. The number of the survivors of the massacre 
 at the ghaut and in the boats amounted to eighty-four. 
 Four of these, as we have seen, escaped. The remaining 
 eighty were carried before the Nana. That chieftain 
 
Fate of the Prisoners. 177 
 
 now regarding himself as reigning by divine right, had 
 the men shot, and the women and children confined in 
 the little house of which I have spoken. 
 
 Thus sadly terminated the ' Leaguer of Kanhpur.' On 
 the 1st of July the Nana proceeded to Bithor and there, 
 with great pomp and circumstance proclaimed himself 
 Peshwa. There, for the moment, I must leave him, whilst 
 I relate the circumstances which prevented the timely 
 arrival of relief to the devoted garrison, and which ulti- 
 mately led to the chastisement of the men who had 
 treacherously worked its destruction. 
 
 M 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 NEILL AT BANARAS AND ALLAHABAD — HAVELOCK'S 
 RECOVERY OF KANHPUR. 
 
 I HAVE told In a previous chapter how, on the 23d of 
 May, the ist Madras Fusiliers, commanded by Colonel 
 Neill, an officer of great decision of character, reached 
 Calcutta, and how the regiment was despatched with all 
 the expedition possible to the North-Wcst. Neiil reached 
 Bandras, the morning of the 4th of June, at a very critical 
 nioment. To understand the crisis it will be necessary to 
 explain the state of affairs in that important centre. 
 
 The city of Banaras lies nearly midway between Cal- 
 cutta and Dehli, being 469 miles north-west of the former 
 and 485 south-east of the latter. The normal population 
 is about a quarter of a million, but the number ebbs and 
 flows with the arrival and departure of pilgrims. The city 
 lies picturesquely on the left bank of the Ganges, which, 
 in 1857, was crossed by a bridge of boats. The district 
 of which the city is the capital has an area of 998 square 
 miles, and a population of, in round numbers, 900,000. It 
 is bounded to the north by Ghazipur and Juanpur, to 
 the west and south by Mirzapur, and to the east by the 
 Shahabad district of Western Bihar. 
 
 At the time of which I am writing the garrison of 
 Banaras consisted of half a company of European 
 artillery — some thirty men — of the Sikh regiment of 
 Lodiana, and of the 13th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry. 
 
Influence of Mr Gubbins in Bandras. 179 
 
 The cantonment for the infantry was at Sikrol, three 
 miles from the city, that of the cavalry was some five 
 miles distant. The force was commanded by Brigadier 
 George Ponsonby. a man who had rendered excellent 
 service in his day ; but he had only just assumed com- 
 mand, and was suffering from ill-health and increasing 
 years. 
 
 The citizens of Banaras had always had the character 
 of being a turbulent people. They required a master who 
 would be obeyed. Fortunately, in 1857, they had such 
 a master in the person of Mr Frederick Gubbins, of the 
 Civil Service, then District Judge. Some years before, 
 when that gentleman filled the office of Magistrate of 
 Banaras, he had inaugurated sanitary and other improve- 
 ments within the city. The inhabitants showed their 
 appreciation of these improvements by receiving Mr 
 Gubbins, on the occasion of his next visit to the city, with 
 a shower of stones, and by compelling him to run for his 
 life. But Mr Gubbins was not the man to be baffled. 
 He persisted in carrying out his reforms. The people, on 
 their side, seemed equally determined. They closed their 
 shops, and declined to sell grain or other wares. But Mr 
 Gubbins was firm. He procured supplies from Mirzapur, 
 and when, three days later, he heard that the leaders of 
 the movement were about to hold a meeting in the city, 
 he proceeded to the spot with two companies of sipahis, 
 arrested them, and lodged them in gaol. The next 
 morning he rode through the city and opened all the 
 shops. From that moment Mr Gubbins was lord of 
 Banaras. 
 
 In 1857 Mr Henry Carre Tucker was the Commis- 
 sioner of Banaras. But, from, the moment affairs there 
 assumed a threatening attitude, the strong character of 
 Mr Gubbins asserted itself, and he became practically 
 
i8o The Situation in May '57. 
 
 supreme. Well supported by the Magistrate, Mr Lind, 
 by the assistants, Mr Archibald Pollock and Mr Jenkin- 
 son, by a loyal native nobleman, Rao Devndrain Singh, 
 by a brave and resolute Sikh gentleman, detained in 
 Banaras for complicity in some of the troubles in the 
 Panjab, Surat Singh, and to a considerable though lesser 
 extent by the Raja of Banaras, and by an influential 
 Brahman, Pandit Gokal Chand, he maintained order in 
 the populous city until the arrival and action of Neill and 
 his troops removed the pressing danger. 
 
 For very soon after the information of the events 
 at Mirath and Dehli reached Banaras it became clear 
 that the sipahis of the 37th N. I. were infected, and 
 would break out on the first convenient opportunity. 
 They were somewhat restrained by the presence of the 
 Sikhs, who were believed to be loyal to the core. Of the 
 probable behaviour of the 13th Irregulars few except 
 the officers of that regiment entertained the smallest 
 doubt. The position, then, was critical, and it was recog- 
 nised to be so specially by those civilians upon whom it 
 devolved to maintain peace and order within the city. 
 
 One resolution Mr Gubbins and his friends stood by 
 in the darkest hour of the crisis, and that was to remain 
 at their post. In the early days proposals were made 
 to abandon the position and retreat to the fortress of 
 Chanar. But Messrs Gubbins and Lind, Gordon, who 
 commanded the Sikhs, Dodgson the Brigade-Major, and 
 one or two others opposed this plan so resolutely that it 
 was abandoned. Nor when the districts round and near 
 to Banaras broke out into rebellion did they swerve a 
 hair's-breadth from that determination. The one pre- 
 caution which, in concert with the military authorities, 
 they did take was to fix upon a strong central post to 
 serve as a place of refuge for the ladies and children. The 
 
Neill reaches Ba^tdras. 1 8 1 
 
 mint, a large, oblong, fire-proof brick building, capable 
 of holding out against men unprovided with guns, was 
 selected for this purpose. 
 
 Towards the end of May the English at Banaras were 
 cheered by the arrival of 150 men of the lOth Foot from 
 Danapur, and on the 3d and 4th of June, Colonel Neill, 
 with some sixty men of the ist Madras Fusiliers, followed. 
 On the morning of the 4th news reached the place of the 
 mutiny of the 17th N. I. at Azamgarh. A council was 
 then called of the chief civil and military authorities to 
 consider the advisability of disarming the 37th N. I. 
 Gubbins, Gordon, Dodgson, and all the bolder spirits 
 were in favour of carrying out that necessary measure at 
 once. They were listening to the strong recommenda- 
 tions of Mr Gubbins on this point when Neill himself 
 entered the room, and in his plain, blunt way insisted 
 that delay would be fraught with imminent danger. 
 Orders then were issued for a parade of the troops of 
 the garrison at five o'clock that afternoon. 
 
 The lines of the 37th N. I. were in the centre of the 
 general parade ground, about midway between those 
 occupied by the Sikhs and by the artillery. The question 
 was how, with the 250 Europeans, to disarm a native 
 regiment, nearly a thousand strong, in the presence of 
 three or four hundred cavalry, suspected of sympathy 
 with them, and of a Sikh regiment, believed to be 
 loyal, but whose loyalty must remain unproven until it 
 had been tried. It was a difficult question, and I am 
 bound to add that it was solved in a very clumsy fashion. 
 Before the men of the 37th had formed up in front of 
 their lines, the artillery and the few men of the lOth and 
 the Madras Fusiliers had taken up a position on their 
 right, the Sikhs and irregular cavalry on their left. 
 Colonel Spottiswoode and the English officers of the 37th 
 
1 82 The Sipdhis are disarmed. 
 
 then walked down the lines of their regiment, and directed 
 the men to lodge their muskets in the bells of arms 
 attached to each company. Some of them quietly obeyed, 
 but others, calling out that the Europeans were coming 
 to shoot them down unarmed, incited the rest to resist. 
 Their appeal was responded to, for suddenly the sipahis 
 grasped their muskets, and noticing the Europeans ap- 
 proaching from the right, faced towards them and opened 
 a brisk fire. At the first fire some eight men of the loth 
 Foot were shot down. This was more than could be borne. 
 The English infantry returned the fire, still moving on, 
 whilst the guns, unlimbering, poured in a volley of grape. 
 Meanwhile, a shot from a sipahi of the 37th had killed 
 Captain Guise, commandant of the 13th Irregulars. Dodg- 
 son, the Brigade Major, as brave a man as ever lived, and 
 as modest as he was brave, rode up to the men, and tak- 
 ing command, ordered them to advance. Instead of obey- 
 ing, one trooper drew his pistol and fired at Dodgson. 
 Another attempted to cut him down. At this crisis one 
 of the Sikhs fired upon his colonel, Gordon. The rest of 
 them, not knowing apparently what to make of the 
 position, began shouting and firing indiscriminately, their 
 muskets levelled in the direction in which the guns were- 
 posted. The guns were unsupported, for the English 
 infantry was following the 37th N. I., and it seemed as 
 though the Sikhs and the irregulars were about to charge 
 them. But the commandant of the artillery, William 
 Olpherts,^ was quite equal to the occasion. He turned 
 the fire of his battery upon the Sikhs. These then wildly 
 charged, only, however, to be broken and to flee in dis- 
 order. The troopers of the 13th accompanied them. The 
 
 ^ It was of this officer that the late Lord Napier of Magdala said to me, 
 that ' Wilham Olpherts never went into action without entitling himself to 
 the Victoria Cross.' 
 
rieill and Gitbbms trmniph. 183 
 
 men of the 37 N. I. were already dispersing in wild 
 disorder. 
 
 But the danger was not yet over. So clumsy had been 
 the programme that the sipahis had been allowed to escape, 
 with arms in their hands, in close vicinity to a populous 
 city, the inhabitants of which were renowned for their tur- 
 bulent character. In this crisis Frederick Gubbins, Surat 
 Singh, Devnarain Singh, and other loyal men were able to 
 render splendid service. The Sikhs on guard over the as- 
 sembled non-combative Europeans were pacified by Surat 
 Singh, himself a Sikh. Gubbins, entering the city, exerted 
 the supreme influence which his character as a resolute but 
 just man had gained for him. The citizens preferred to 
 trust him rather than cast in their lot with rebellious 
 sipahis. His vigorous action, that of Surat Singh, sup- 
 ported by Devnarain Singh, by the Raja of Banaras, and 
 by Pandit Gokal Chand, preserved the great city of 
 Banaras to the British.^ 
 
 Meanwhile, Neill was not idle. In the midst of the 
 contest he had assumed command. Some of the 13th 
 Irregulars had remained faithful. The Sikhs, recovering 
 from their mad escapade, returned to their duty. The 
 indigo planters of the district, prominently Mr F. C. 
 Chapman, volunteered their services. In a few days 
 order was restored in the immediate vicinity of the holy 
 city. The presence of Mr Gubbins and his companions 
 was a voucher that that order would not be again dis- 
 turbed. Other European troops were coming up from 
 below. On the 9th of June, then, Neill, full of resolution 
 to save Allahabad and to recover Kanhpur, set out for 
 the former place. 
 
 ^ For their conduct during these trying times Mr Gubbins was made 
 a Companion of the Bath ; Rao Devn^riin Singh and Surat Singh received 
 titles and rewards. The Raja, too, received the thanks of the Government. 
 
184 Azanigai'k^ yttdnpur^ Gordkhpur. 
 
 While he Is hastening to it, I must ask the reader to 
 glance at the districts which, with Banaras, face the south- 
 east frontier of Oudh — the districts of Juanpur, of Azam- 
 garh, and of Gorakhpur. I will not detain him long. 
 
 The landowners of those districts had been made 
 hostile to British rule by the introduction of that land 
 system with which Mr Thomason, forcing European ideas 
 upon an oriental people, had superseded the time-honoured 
 methods which not even Akbar had dared to repeal. 
 Azamgarh was the first to display disaffection. The 
 bulk of the 17th Regiment N. I. stationed there rose on 
 the 3d of June, and though the place, abandoned by the 
 civilians, was afterwards recovered by two men cast in 
 the heroic type, Messrs Venables and Dunn, it continued 
 for a very long time to be a festering sore in the British 
 side. At Juanpur, nearly midway between Banaras and 
 Azamgarh, the Sikhs stationed there, excited by the 
 story of the manner in which their countrymen had been 
 mowed down at Banaras, rose on the 5th of June. That 
 place, though constantly reoccupied, continued to give 
 trouble until the autumn of the following year. Gorakh- 
 pur, on the Nipal side of Azamgarh, saved for a long time 
 by the splendid daring and cool judgment of its Judge, 
 Mr William Wynyard, gave way in July. Few districts 
 gave more trouble during the revolt, or afforded more 
 scope for the display of the noblest qualities of the British 
 race, than did those three districts — bounded to the north- 
 west by Oudh, to the north by Nipal, to the south by 
 the city of Banaras, and to the south-east by the in- 
 flammable division of Western Bihar — represented by 
 Juanpur, Azamgarh, and Gorakhpur. 
 
 Meanwhile, Neill, accompanied by forty-three men of 
 his splendid regiment, had left Banaras by post, on the 
 night of the 9th of June, to assume command at Allahabad. 
 
Neill at Allahabad. 185 
 
 His journey was a difficult one, for the road was deserted, 
 the post-horses had been carried off, and the district was 
 full of marauders. It was not, then, till the afternoon of 
 the nth that he and his party reached Jhusi, a village on 
 the high bank overlooking the junction of the Jamnah and 
 the Ganges, and the point where the road from Banaras 
 passed over the bridge of boats then maintained across 
 the former river. But Neill found the bridge partially 
 destroyed, and the further end of it occupied by the rebels. 
 He noticed that Daryaganj, a suburb of Allahabad, which 
 commanded that further end, was also in their possession. 
 He knew, too, that his men were worn out by fatigue. 
 But the great aim of Neill's life was to conquer difficulties. 
 Descending the Ganges, he espied and hailed a fisherman 
 pursuing his craft in a solitary boat. He bought the man, 
 and was about to trust ' Caesar and his fortunes ' to the 
 frail canoe when the English guard on duty on the ram- 
 parts of the fort of Allahabad recognised his men. Boats 
 were then sent over in sufficient numbers. 
 
 Neill entered the fort. He was aware that the task 
 before him was a heavy one ; that to restore order the 
 means at his disposal were scanty. In his journey from 
 Banaras he had noticed that the entire country along the 
 Ganges was in a state of anarchy. He now found the fort 
 invested : the troops who mainly formed the garrison — the 
 Sikhs of the same regiment he had laid his hand upon at 
 Banaras — coaxed into the appearance of subordination : 
 confusion and disorder in every department : an unchecked 
 enemy without, vacillation ruling within. 
 
 He immediately assumed command. Notwithstanding 
 his fatigue, and the exhaustion consequent upon it, he did 
 not sleep until he had arranged his plans for the morrow. 
 The day of the 12th had scarcely dawned when he opened 
 fire from the fort on the suburb of Daryaganj, held by a large 
 
1 86 Neilts Restorative Measures. 
 
 body of insurgent rabble. When he had cleared the outskirts 
 with a few rounds he despatched the forty-three men of his 
 own regiment, three companies of Sikhs, and forty native 
 horsemen to expel the rebels from the suburb and secure 
 the bridge of boats. This they accomplished without loss. 
 He then repaired the bridge, and placed a company of 
 Sikhs to guard it. A company of the fusiliers from 
 Banaras crossed it that same afternoon to enter the fort. 
 
 The next day and the day following he continued his 
 reorganising measures. With great tact he moved the 
 Sikhs to a position outside the fort. He bought up all 
 the liquor, and lodged it in the Government stores. On 
 the 15th he despatched by steamer to Calcutta the numer- 
 ous women and children, and then cleared of the enemy 
 the villages in immediate vicinity to the fort. The effect 
 of these strong measures was quickly visible. On the 17th 
 the Magistrate, Mr Court, proceeded to the city, and re- 
 installed his own officials at the Kotwali. Not only was 
 there no resistance, but the whole place seemed deserted. 
 The Maulavi himself had fled to Kanhpur. Neill improved 
 the occasion by marching the following day, with his whole 
 force, to the cantonment, the scene of the massacre of their 
 own officers by the men of the 6th N. I. He found that a 
 complete reaction had set in, that terror had taken the 
 place of insolence, that the desire to escape punishment 
 had succeeded to the love of killing. 
 
 Leaving to the authorities appointed under the martial 
 law, which had been proclaimed, to deal with rebels and 
 murderers, Neill proceeded to develop the plan he had 
 arranged in his own mind, viz., a march, as soon as possible, 
 to the relief of Kdnhpur. On the i8th his force amounted 
 to 360 English soldiers. The same day 150 more arrived. 
 He had placed on a serviceable footing the Commissariat 
 and Transport departments. These had procured carts and 
 
Havelock assttmes Command. 187 
 
 camels, and more were coming in. His executive officers, 
 Captain Russell, in the Ordnance department. Captain 
 Davidson of the Commissariat, Captain Brown of the 
 artillery, were working with a will. The natives, too, 
 were now displaying untiring energy on behalf of the 
 British cause. Messrs Chester and Court, of the Civil 
 Service, were rendering invaluable aid. Cholera, though 
 it came, did not stop the efforts of a single man of that 
 heroic band. On the 24th the force had attained some- 
 what larger proportions, so much so that Neill could talk 
 of the advance on Kanhpur as a matter of a few days. 
 That same day he heard that the Government had de- 
 cided to entrust the command of the relieving force 
 to Havelock. Bitterly as he felt the supersession, he 
 did not in the least relax his efforts. On the after- 
 noon of the 30th of June he despatched an advance 
 force of 400 Europeans, 300 Sikhs, and 120 troopers, 
 under one of his best officers, Major Renaud, on the road 
 to Kanhpur. He arranged, also, to embark a hundred 
 men and two guns, under Captain Spurgin, on a river 
 steamer, under orders for the same destination. This 
 intention was carried out — but by Havelock. 
 
 Havelock, in fact, reached Allahabad on the 30th of 
 June, the day on which Renaud started. A very capable 
 soldier, possessing large experience, and gifted with the 
 power of leadership to a rare degree, Havelock was the 
 very man for the situation. One may sympathise with 
 Neill in his disappointment, and yet recognise that Henry 
 Havelock was the fittest soldier in all India for the occa- 
 sion. He at once took up the thread of Neill's prepara- 
 tions, despatched Spurgin and his steamer on the 3d of 
 July, and at four o'clock of the evening of the 7th started 
 at the head of his small brigade for Kanhpur. 
 
 Rumours of disaster at that place had reached Alia- 
 
i88 Havelock marches to KdnlLpiir. 
 
 habad on the 2d. Neill disbelieved tliem. Even Have- 
 lock doubted. But not many hours elapsed after he set 
 out ere the state of the districts gave to his mind the 
 fullest confirmation of the worst reports. 
 
 The force led by Havelock from Allahabad, on the 
 afternoon of the 7th of July, consisted of seventy-six 
 artillerymen, 979 English infantry, taken from the 64th, 
 the 78th, and the 84th Foot, eighteen volunteer cavalry, 
 Englishmen, 150 Sikhs, and thirty irregular cavalry. 
 He was preceded by Renaud's small detachment, already 
 noted, and by Spurgin's 100 men on board the steamer. 
 He left behind him Neill and the remainder of the 
 1st Madras Fusiliers, with instructions to follow as soon 
 as another column should be organised and he should be 
 able to consign the fort to proper hands. 
 
 In the selection of his staff Havelock had been par- 
 ticularly happy. From the loth Foot he had taken his 
 son, a daring soldier, full of resources, and eager for 
 opportunities, as his Aide-de-Camp. Stuart Beatson, a 
 man instructed, able, and devoted was his assistant 
 Adjutant-General. Eraser Tytlcr, an excellent cavalry 
 officer, was his assistant Quartermaster-General. 
 
 Assured that Kanhpur had fallen, and advised that the 
 station of Fathpur, seventy-one miles from Allahabad and 
 forty-nine from Kanhpur, had fallen into the hands of the 
 rebels, Havelock transmitted orders to Renaud to halt 
 where he was, fourteen miles to the east of Fathpur. 
 Pushing on as rapidly as possible, Havelock reached 
 Khagah, nineteen miles from that place, on the nth. 
 There he received information from Renaud, then only 
 five miles in advance of him, to the effect that the 
 mutinied regiments of Kanhpur, reinforced by other 
 rebels, were marching on Fathpur, with the apparent 
 intention of holding that place against the advancing 
 
y^yr- r7l^yri^'?j. <^ta/i'^fL>cK. 
 
The Rising at Fathpit7\ 1 89 
 
 British. Havelock then broke up his camp at midnight, 
 joined Renaud an hour and a half later, and pushed on 
 to Balindah, four miles to the east of Fathpur. 
 
 The story of the mutiny at Fathpur may be told in 
 a few words. The native troops stationed there, consist- 
 ing of fifty men of the 6th N. I., had, after a show of 
 loyalty, joined other rebels and mutineers in a general 
 outbreak on the 9th of June. The Europeans, who for 
 more than a fortnight had been daily expecting a rising, 
 escaped, with one exception, to Bandah. That exception 
 was Mr Robert Tucker, the Judge. He, after defending 
 himself with great gallantry, and, if the testimony of a 
 native Christian is to be believed, slaying sixteen men 
 with his own hand, was captured, subjected to the forms 
 of trial, and executed on the spot. The natives of Fath- 
 pur and of the districts around it, under the guidance of 
 one Hikmat-ullah, a Deputy Magistrate under British 
 rule, rose in revolt, and declared their readiness to submit 
 to the authority then paramount at Kanhpur. It was 
 to secure this place that Nana Sahib now despatched a 
 force composed of 1400 trained sipahis, 1500 local levies, 
 500 trained cavalry, and 100 artillerymen, with twelve 
 guns, to bar the road to the English. It was commanded 
 by Tika Singh, a Subahdar of the 2d L. C, who had 
 taken a prominent part in the leaguer of Kanhpur. 
 
 On reaching Balindah Havelock sent Tytler to the 
 front to reconnoitre. Tytler came upon the rebels as they 
 were marching, having passed through Fathpur, towards 
 the British position. Their infantry, in column of route, 
 held the high road, with three guns in front of the 
 column, the remainder in the rear, and the cavalry on 
 both flanks. These latter, noticing Tytler almost as soon 
 as he saw them, dashed at him. Tytler had to ride hard 
 to give timely information to Havelock. The latter, who 
 
igo Combat of FatJipur. 
 
 was resting his troops after their early march, at once 
 formed them in order of battle. He placed the guns, 
 eight in number, commanded by Captain Maude, R.A., 
 in front ; in the same line with them a body of skirm- 
 ishers, in loose order, armed with the Enfield rifle, then 
 new in India, ready to open fire on the enemy as soon 
 as he should appear. Behind the guns he disposed 
 the several detachments of infantry, forming a line of 
 quarter-distance columns ready to deploy. The eighteen 
 volunteer-horse guarded the right flank ; the bulk of the 
 irregulars the left. 
 
 These dispositions had not quite been completed when 
 the enemy's guns, now well within distance, opened fire, 
 whilst their cavalry, galloping round, threatened the flanks 
 of the English. For a few seconds their fire was un- 
 answered. Only, however, for a few seconds. Then 
 Maude, moving his battery to the front, opened fire, and 
 in a second it became a species of duello at a distance of 
 400 yards between the rival guns, those of the British 
 being backed up by the fire of the Enfield rifles. Very 
 soon this double fire silenced that of the rebels, and 
 Maude, pushing on to within 200 yards of the rebel 
 infantry, poured upon them the fire which had silenced 
 the guns. The English infantry advanced at the same 
 time, and although the rebels seemed as though they 
 would stand to protect their heavy guns, their resolution 
 faded away in the presence of the advancing British, and 
 they turned and fled. 
 
 During this time the rebel cavalry had been steadily 
 manoeuvring on both flanks. Their efforts on the British 
 left were checked by the handful of volunteers ; but on 
 the right, where the horsemen were, with the exception of 
 the officers, entirely natives, a disaster threatened. Some 
 eighteen or twenty of the rebel cavalry, advancing at 
 
HavelocJc s First Victo7y. 191 
 
 a trot, called out to the men serving under Havelock to 
 turn and join them. They seemed to hesitate, when 
 Palliser, who commanded them, sounded the charge. He 
 was followed by Simpson, the Adjutant, but by only three 
 or four of the men. Noticing this, the rebels charged in 
 their turn. In the scrimmage which followed Palliser was 
 unhorsed, and it would have gone hard with him but that 
 some of the men who had refused to follow him rallied 
 round him and brought him off. The irregulars then 
 fled, followed by the rebel cavalry. 
 
 Meanwhile, the main body of the infantry had pushed 
 into Fathpur. Just as the right column entered it, 
 Beatson, who was with it, noticed the handful of irre- 
 gulars dashing towards it, followed by the mutinied 2d 
 Cavalry. To halt, to allow the fugitives to pass through, 
 then to pour upon the enemy a volley which sent them 
 reeling back, was the work of a few moments. Whilst he 
 was engaged in this, the centre and left had pushed 
 through the one narrow street of the town, attacked the 
 rear-guard of the rebels, driven it into flight, and captured 
 all the baggage. Amongst the latter were two new six- 
 pounders, large quantities of ammunition, and two tum- 
 brils laden with specie. It was past midday when a 
 final parting shot was sent after the retreating foe. The 
 heat was intense. The sun, in fact, proved more deadly 
 than the fire of the rebels. For though the casualties 
 amounted to twelve, these had all been caused by sun- 
 stroke. It was one o'clock before the men of the little 
 force, which had marched nineteen miles, and foup-ht a 
 pitched battle on an empty stomach, reached the en- 
 camping ground. They had captured twelve guns, and 
 had given the perpetrators of the Kanhpur massacre a 
 first lesson of retaliation. There was but one drawback 
 to complete success. A victory, not followed up, can 
 
192 He finds the Rebels at A oung. 
 
 never be reckoned as complete. Havelock had no cavalry 
 to follow up his victory. Eighteen volunteers — and he 
 could then trust only Englishmen — were all insufficient 
 to pursue thousands. 
 
 On the 13th Havelock gave his men a rest. The day 
 following he resumed his advance, and as he marched 
 received abundant ocular demonstrations of the pre- 
 cipitancy of the rebels' flight. The road was strewed with 
 properties hurriedly cast away. The only event of im- 
 portance which marked the day was the disarming of the 
 native irregular cavalry. To mark his sense of the 
 behaviour of these men in the Fathpur fight, Havelock 
 had placed them on duty as baggage guards. It hap- 
 pened that as the force was marching, on the 14th, a re- 
 port was made that the enemy were occupying a village in 
 front. The guns were therefore brought up, and opened 
 fire. The report turned out to be unfounded, but the 
 native troopers took advantage of the firing of the guns 
 to plunder the baggage. They were caught in the act, and 
 promptly disarmed and dismounted. Havelock utilised 
 their horses for the public service. 
 
 As the force was encamping that evening, information 
 was brought to its leader that the rebels were in force at 
 Aoung, a village some six miles distant. He marched, 
 then, early the following morning, confident that he would 
 have to fight them. The volunteers commanded by Captain 
 Barrow, who formed the advance, descried them about day- 
 break, their position covered by an intrenchment thrown up 
 across the road, and ready for the contest. Barrow galloped 
 back with the information, followed by round-shot, and 
 by a body of 700 sipahis, who promptly took possession of 
 a hamlet, several hundred yards m front of their position, 
 and opened from it a smart musketry fire. Havelock at 
 once made his dispositions. Remaining with the rear- 
 
Havelock beats the Rebels at Aoung, 193 
 
 guard himself, he sent Tytler to the front with about a 
 third of the force. Tytler ordered two companies of the 
 Madras Fusiliers, under Renaud, to dislodge the rebels 
 from the hamlet they had seized. Renaud started on this 
 errand with his habitual gallantry, and carried it out 
 thoroughly, though at the cost of his own life. He was 
 struck in the thigh by a bullet, and died two days after- 
 wards. Meanwhile, Maude's battery had come to the front 
 and had begun to play on the intrenchment. The issue 
 of his fire was not long doubtful. After a few rounds the 
 rebels gave way. In the interval their cavalry had made 
 a wide detour, in order to come round and plunder the 
 baggage of the advancing force. A sergeant of the High- 
 landers, who had charge of it, saw them coming, and 
 collecting his men, received them with so sharp a fire that 
 they were glad to make off. Again did the enemy's guns 
 fall into the hands of the victors. But they had fought 
 better, and their fire had inflicted more damage, than had 
 been the case at Fathpur. 
 
 But the work of the day was not yet over. The fight 
 had lasted fully two hours. As the soldiers were resting 
 after it, in the position whence they had dislodged the 
 rebels, reports were brought to Havelock that the latter 
 had retired to a very strong position, covered by a rivulet, 
 swollen by the rains, known as Pandu Nadi. As the 
 rivulet was unfordable at the season, Havelock recognised 
 the importance of securing the stone bridge which crossed 
 it ere it should be destroyed by the rebels. He therefore 
 pushed on without delay, and after marching three miles 
 came in sight of the rivulet, the stone bridge intact, and 
 the rebels in force, covered by earthworks, on the opposite 
 side. Another second and a puff of smoke, followed by 
 the pounding shot, revealed the fact that the bridge was 
 guarded by a twenty-four-pound gun and a twenty-five- 
 
 N 
 
194 And at Pdnciii Nadi. 
 
 pound carronade. Again was the order given to bring 
 the guns to the front. Whilst a detachment of men, armed 
 with the Enfield, moved down the lateral ravines and 
 opened a steady musketry fire, Maude, moving forward 
 under the fire of the enemy, held his reply until he had 
 placed his guns in positions whence they could envelop 
 the intrenchment in a concentric fire. No sooner had 
 these opened than the fire of the rebels ceased as if by 
 magic. It transpired that the very first discharge from 
 Maude's guns had smashed their sponge staffs, and having 
 none in reserve they could no longer load their pieces. 
 They made one desperate effort to blow up the bridge — 
 an effort which failed — and then gave way. Simultane- 
 ously the Madras Fusiliers advanced, followed by the 
 Highlanders, and rapidly crossing the bridge, caught the 
 rebel gunners ere they could escape, and bayoneted them 
 as they stood or ran. Maude followed with his guns, and 
 pounded the enemy as they fled. Havelock pushed on 
 for a mile beyond the bridge, and then halted for the 
 nio'ht. The British loss in the two actions was about 
 thirty men killed and wounded. The most regretable 
 of these was that of Major Renaud, an excellent officer, 
 always to be depended upon. 
 
 The soldiers bivouacked that night on the spot whence 
 the last gun was fired at the retreating enemy. That even- 
 ing Havelock received information that Nana Sahib, at the 
 head, it was said, of 7000 men of all arms, would oppose 
 his entry into Kanhpur on the morrow. But other infor- 
 mation, to the effect that there were still alive in that station 
 some 200 women and children of British blood, who had 
 escaped the massacre of the 27th of June, cheered him and 
 his men. ' With God's help, men,' he exclaimed, ' we shall 
 save them, or every man of us die in the attempt' Such was 
 his spirit, such, also, the spirit of the men he commanded. 
 
Position taken by Nana Sahib. 195 
 
 Kanhpur was twenty-two miles distant from the spot 
 on which the handful of British troops was encamped. 
 For them there was but little sleep that night. The 
 knowledge that some of their countrywomen were alive, 
 and that it might be theirs to rescue them, had excited 
 them to feverish impatience. Very early the following 
 morning they were ranged in marching order. A tramp 
 of sixteen miles brought them to the village of Maharajpiir. 
 The sun was well up in the heavens, and the heat was 
 fearful— greater than on any previous day. Halting there, 
 Havelock despatched Barrow to the front for information.' 
 Barrow had not proceeded far when he met two loyal 
 sipahis on their way, at the risk of their lives, to convey 
 to the leader of the avenging force the particulars they 
 had carefully noted regarding the dispositions of Nana 
 Sahib. The information they gave was of the last im- 
 portance. Nana Sahib, they said, was in front, occupying, 
 with about 5000 men and eight guns, a position about 
 800 yards in rear of the point where the branch road into 
 Kanhpur leaves the grand trunk road. His left rested 
 on an intrenched village, standing among trees on high 
 ground, within a mile of the Ganges, and was defended 
 by three twenty-four-pounders. His centre was covered 
 by swampy ground, and by a low-lying hamlet, on the 
 edge of which, commanding the trunk road, ' were a 
 twenty-four-pound howitzer and a nine-pounder, covered 
 by mud earthworks. His right was covered by a village 
 in a mango grove, surrounded by a mud wall, through 
 the embrasures of which two nine-pounders pointed their 
 muzzles towards the fork. The sipahfs further reported 
 that the rebels, certain that Havelock would advance 
 towards the fork, had taken the measurements from their 
 positions to that point very carefully, and had laid their 
 guns with the view of meeting him with a concentrated fire. 
 
196 Havelock turns the Position. 
 
 This timely information decided Havelock to attempt 
 a turning movement He halted long enough to allow 
 his men to have their dinners, then ' remembering/ as 
 he said, ' old Frederic at Leuthen,' he advanced, covered 
 by his cavalry, until he reached a point where a line of 
 groves, on his right, promised to cover a flanking move- 
 ment in that direction. This point was within half-a-mile 
 of the forking of the roads. Directing Barrow to move 
 straight on, accompanied, to deceive the rebels, by a 
 company of the Madras Fusiliers, in skirmishing order, on 
 either side of the road, he marched with the bulk of the 
 force to his right, covered by the groves spoken of. The 
 enemy, meanwhile, believing that in the horse and foot 
 in front of them they beheld the heads of the British 
 columns, opened a concentrated fire on the fork. This 
 lasted the time it took the main body to march half-a- 
 mile. Havelock's leafy screen then failed him, and the 
 rebels discovered to their surprise that their left flank 
 had been all but turned, and they at once changed, as 
 best they could, the direction of their fire. The English 
 general, however, recognising that the turning movement 
 was not completed, withheld all reply to the shot and 
 shell, which soon came whizzing about him, until he 
 had reached a point at a right angle to the enemy's 
 position. He then wheeled into line and advanced 
 against it. 
 
 The occasion was one which permitted a general to defy 
 the rules which chain down pedants. Havelock had aban- 
 doned his baggage, his communication with Allahabad, 
 and he had placed his army between his enemy and the 
 mighty Ganges, at the full swell of her power. In taking 
 each of these steps he deliberately broke the rules of 
 war. But never was there a clearer proof given that such 
 rules are not made to bind, and never will bind, a man of 
 
He smashes the Rebel Left. 197 
 
 genius. And certainly, on that i6th of July, Havelock 
 amply vindicated his claim to that title. 
 
 The time which had elapsed since the enemy caught 
 sight of Havelock's turning movement and his completion 
 of it, short as it was, had yet been sufficiently long to 
 enable them to change their alignment, and to bring their 
 guns to bear in the new direction. They had no longer, 
 however, the exact knowledge of the distance, which they 
 had hoped to utilise in the first position. But as Have- 
 lock advanced their superiority in weight of metal became 
 perceptible, and Havelock recognised that there was no- 
 thing for it but the bayonet. When within eighty yards 
 of the rebel batteries, then, he gave the order to charge. 
 Like an eager pack of hounds racing to the kill the High- 
 landers dashed forward. In a few seconds they were over 
 the mound covering the rebel position and into the vil- 
 lage which they had held. They did not fire a shot or 
 utter a shout, so fierce was their anger ; but they did the 
 work with the bayonet. It need scarcely be added that 
 the slaughter was proportionate. But the great gun in 
 the enemy's centre was now turned against the victorious 
 soldiers. Havelock, noticing this, galloped up to the 
 Highlanders, and with a few cheery words incited them 
 to make one more charge. Then, indeed; they cheered, 
 and scarcely waiting to make a regular formation, dashed 
 on against the gun, led by the General in person. They 
 carried it, completely smashing the rebel centre as they 
 had smashed his left. Then they halted, impatient to 
 direct their prowess in a new direction. 
 
 Nor had success been less pronounced on the right. 
 There the 64th and the 84th, the Sikhs and Barrow's 
 handful of volunteers, had forced back the rebels, and 
 compelled them to concentrate in a village about a mile 
 in the rear of their first position. To drive them from 
 
198 The Rally of the Rebels. 
 
 this position, a very strong one, was now the work before 
 the undaunted infantry. The 64th approached it from 
 the left, the Highlanders from the centre, whilst on the 
 extreme right the Madras Fusiliers were carrying all 
 before them. When the soldiers, tired and panting, 
 arrived within charging distance, Havelock, appealing to 
 the regimental spirit of rivalry, called out : ' Who is to 
 take that village, the Highlanders or the 64th ? ' Instantly 
 the two regiments raced for the village, and carried it 
 without a check. 
 
 The battle now seemed won. After the storm of the 
 village Havelock halted to reorganise his line, and then 
 advanced up the low rise which covers the entrance into 
 Kanhpur. But scarcely had he crowned the summit when 
 a fierce fire opened upon him, and he beheld, drawn up at 
 a distance of half-a-mile, straight in front of him, the re- 
 united masses of rebel infantry. From their centre a 
 twenty-four-pounder gun belched forth its fire, whilst two 
 smaller pieces on either side of it followed its example. 
 Conspicuously seated on an elephant was Nana Sahib, 
 moving about amongst the troops, encouraging them with 
 sounds of native music and appeals to their fanaticism. 
 The sight was as unexpected as it was formidable, for 
 Havelock had fain hoped that the serious part of the 
 business was over. 
 
 He had, indeed, need of all his coolness and self-pos- 
 session. His men, who had marched twent}^ miles, and 
 fought one fierce battle, were worn out. His guns were 
 a mile in the rear, and the horses which had drawn them 
 were knocked up. It was asking a great deal of the 
 infantry soldier to require him to charge those masses 
 and those guns. But Havelock recognised that there 
 was nothing else to be done. He recognised, moreover, 
 that if to be done at all it must be done at once, for the 
 
The Charge of the 6'/\th. 199 
 
 spirits of the soldiers were still high, and the sight was 
 one calculated to discourage men not on the move. 
 Realising the situation on the moment, he rode to the 
 front on his .pony — for his horse had been shot under 
 him — and turning round to the men, sitting between them 
 and the enemy's fire, he said in a high-pitched voice : 
 ' The longer you look at it^ men, the less you will like it. 
 Rise up. The brigade will advance, left battalion leading.' 
 The left battalion was the 64th. I shall follow the 
 example of the last of the biographers^ of Havelock, to 
 whose vivid and picturesque account of the battle I am 
 much indebted, and describe the action that followed in 
 the words of the General himself: ' The enemy sent round- 
 shot into our ranks until we were within 300 yards, and 
 then poured in grape with such precision and determina- 
 tion as I have seldom witnessed. But the 64th, led by 
 Major Sterling and by my Aide-de-Camp ' — his son, the 
 present Sir Henry Havelock-Allan — 'who had placed him- 
 self in their front, were not to be denied. Their rear showed 
 the ground strewed with wounded ; but on they steadily 
 and silently came, then with a cheer charged and cap- 
 tured the unwieldy trophy of their valour. The enemy 
 lost all heart, and, after a hurried fire of musketry, gave 
 way in total rout. Four of my guns came up, and com- 
 pleted their discomfiture by a heavy cannonade ; and as 
 it grew dark the roofless barracks of our artillery were 
 dimly descried in advance, and it was evident that Kanh- 
 pur was once more in our possession.' The little force 
 bivouacked for the night on the edge of the plain which 
 marks the entry into the station, about two miles from 
 the town. They had neither food nor tents ; they had 
 marched twenty miles, and had defeated an enemy, 
 stronger in all arms, outnumbering them by nearly five 
 
 ^ Havelock. By Archibald Forbes. Macmillan, 1890. 
 
200 Nana Sahib massacres His Prisone7^s. 
 
 to one, and occupying a carefully prepared position, but 
 they lay down happy because conscious of deserving. 
 Well might Havelock tell them, as he did in the order 
 he issued on the occasion, that ' he was satisfied and 
 more than satisfied with them.' The troops and the 
 general were alike worthy of one another. The loss sus- 
 tained by the victors in this fierce contest was about lOO 
 killed and wounded. Amongst those who passed away 
 was Stuart Beatson, the Adjutant-General of the force, 
 a daring and most accomplished officer, who fell a victim 
 to cholera. Knowing his end approaching, he had yet 
 insisted in following, on a tumbril, Barrow's cavalry into 
 action. So keen was his soldierly perception that, despite 
 his agony, he had pointed out to Barrow, at a critical 
 phase of the action, an opportunity for a cavalry charge. 
 That officer had promptly availed himself of the hint. 
 In the very presence of the destroyer, whose clutch he 
 knew to be upon him, Beatson could yet devote all his 
 energies to the interests of his country. Such men are 
 priceless. But the campaigns of the Crimea and Indian 
 Mutiny proved that Great Britain had a store of them. 
 
 Meanwhile, Nana Sahib had by a foul and barbarous 
 massacre deprived the troops who had defeated him in 
 the field of the most ardently desired fruits of their 
 victory. When he saw, on the 15 th, that the British 
 soldiers were not to be withstood, when they had forced 
 his position on the Pandu Nadi, and when he recognised 
 that they would assail him in Kanhpur, he gave orders 
 for the massacre of the women and children still confined 
 in the little house I have described. These, with some 
 fugitives from Fathgarh, numbered nearly 200. They 
 were all, without one exception, brutally murdered by the 
 myrmidons of the Nana, and their bodies were cast into 
 a deep well adjacent to the house. The massacre was 
 
Have lock enters Kdnhpur. 201 
 
 accompanied by circumstances of peculiar barbarity. It 
 was a massacre which the Nana and those about him 
 must have known was absolutely without excuse, even 
 the excuse, which some crocheteers, eager to excuse the 
 enemies of England, have urged, of self-preservation. 
 For those who were acquainted with the English 
 character knew well that such an outrage, far from in- 
 ducing Havelock to retire ' because there remained no 
 one to be rescued,' would only stimulate his determina- 
 tion to exterminate the perpetrators. 
 
 So, in fact, it was. The next morning Tytler, who 
 had been sent forward to reconnoitre, returned to report 
 that the rebels had evacuated the city and its environs. 
 Shortly before a concussion which shook the plain had 
 conveyed the information that the magazine had been 
 blown up. It was the last parting shot of the rebels. 
 They retired, then, on Bithor. 
 
 After breakfast the troops marched into the station 
 to witness the horrible and heart-rending sight I have 
 spoken of It was sufficient to stir up the mildest among 
 them to revenge. But before that vengeance could be 
 wreaked many things required to be accomplished. 
 Havelock stood, indeed, victorious at Kanhpur. But it 
 was a position, so to speak, in the air. Close to him, at 
 Bithor, was, he was informed, the army of Nana Sahib, 
 still largely outnumbering his own. The Ganges alone 
 separated him from the revolted province of Oudh, one 
 spot in the capital of which, still held by Englishmen, was 
 besieged and in imminent danger. At Kalpi, to the 
 south-west, forty-five miles from Kanhpur, the mutinied 
 Gwaliar contingent was gradually concentrating, and their 
 presence there was a menace to his left rear. He had but 
 1 100 men all told. On the 15th, presaging his early 
 reoccupation of Kanhpur, he had directed Neill to bring 
 
202 Position of Havelock at Kdnhpur, 
 
 him all the reinforcements he could. Neill brought him 
 227 men on the 20th, a mere handful. The position was 
 difficult in the extreme. To hold Kanhpur at all with 
 such a force as his, with an enemy in front, an enemy on 
 his right flank, and an enemy making for his left rear, 
 was against all rules. But Havelock, we have seen, knew 
 when to discard rules. With a noble courage he resolved, 
 then, first to storm the position of the rebel chieftain who 
 had ordered the massacre of his countrymen, and then to 
 make a desperate effort to ward from the English, nobly 
 defending the Lakhnao Residency, the fate which had 
 overtaken Wheeler and his party at Kanhpur. He had 
 the right to hope that the troops which he knew were 
 daily reaching Calcutta would be sent on to strengthen 
 him. 
 
 Before describing his action it is necessary to bestow 
 a glance on the position of affairs within the Lakhnao 
 Residency. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE RESIDENCY AT LAKHNAO AFTER CHINHAT— 
 HAVELOCK'S first attempts to RELIEVE IT. 
 
 I LEFT Sir Henry Lawrence, on the 1st and 2d ot 
 July, concentrating his troops within the Residency of 
 Lakhnao. He had, on the evening of the ist, caused the 
 Machchi Bhawan to be blown up, and its garrison, guns 
 and treasure to be withdrawn. to the enclosure which he 
 had fixed upon as the place most capable of offering re- 
 sistance to the rebels. Within that enclosure he had, on 
 the morning of the 2d of July, 535 men of the 32d Foot, 
 fifty of the 84th, eighty-nine artillerymen, 100 English 
 officers attached to the loyal sipahis, or unattached, 153 
 civilians, covenanted and uncovenanted servants of the 
 State, and 765 natives. The place these held was, from 
 a military point of view, not defensible. The slight for- 
 tifications, in the shape of earthworks, which had been 
 contemplated, were still incomplete, whilst distant from 
 these less than the width of the Strand were houses cap- 
 able of being occupied in force by the rebels. The west 
 and south faces of the enclosure were practically unde- 
 fended, the bastion commenced at the angle of the two 
 faces having been left unfinished. The position may, in 
 a few words, be roughly described as comprising a num- 
 ber of houses built for ordinary domestic purposes, separ- 
 ated originally from one another by small plots of ground, 
 but now roughly united by mud walls and trenches. 
 
204 The Residency, 
 
 These houses were contained in a space called, from the 
 chief house within it, the Residency, 2150 feet long from 
 north-west to south-east, and 1200 broad from east to 
 west. The defences, as they were gradually constituted, 
 beginning from the Baillie guard at the eastermost point, 
 and continuing northward, were (i) Alexander's battery, 
 (2) the water-gate battery, (3) the Redan battery, (4) a 
 palisade. From that point southward there followed 
 (i) Innes's garrison, (2) the bhusa guard, (3) Gubbins's 
 garrison and Gubbins's battery, (4) the Sikh square. 
 Thence eastward (i) the Kanhpur battery, (2) Thomas's 
 battery, (3) Anderson's garrison, (4) the post-office garri- 
 son, (5) the judicial garrison, (6) Sago's guard, (7) the 
 financial garrison. The defences were not, I have said, 
 complete when the blockade began. They were, at the 
 best, very rough, run up under great difficulties, and never 
 in their finished state deserving the character of regular 
 fortifications. It was only gradually that the several 
 houses and their occupants came to be distinguished by 
 the names I have appended to each. 
 
 From the day when Lawrence concentrated his troops 
 within the enclosure the fire of the rebels upon it had been 
 continuous. The mutinous sipahis, the old aristocracy, 
 the dispossessed landowners, the discontented middlemen 
 in the districts, all contributed their quota to the memor- 
 able leaguer. In the cause to the triumph of which they 
 devoted their energies they displayed a persistence, a per- 
 severance, and a resolution which gave evidence of the 
 strength of their convictions. Night and day, from the 
 tops of the houses in close vicinity to the intrenchment, 
 from every point where cover was available, they poured 
 in an unremitting fire of round-shot, of musketry, of 
 matchlock balls. From the howitzers they had filched 
 from the British they sent shells hissing into the Resi- 
 
Death of Sii^ Hen7y Lazvrence, 205 
 
 dency itself. One of these, the very first day of the siege, 
 caused to the assailed a calamity which was mourned 
 wherever the English language is spoken. 
 
 Sir Henry Lawrence had occupied in the Residency 
 a room convenient for noticing the movements of the 
 enemy, but much exposed to their fire. Seated in this 
 room, the day after the fight at Chinhat, conversing with 
 his Secretary, Mr Couper, he was startled by the bursting 
 within the room of an eight-inch shell. No harm followed 
 the explosion, but the danger to the most precious life 
 in the garrison made a deep impression on his staff, and 
 Sir Henry at length agreed to remove to a less exposed 
 room on the morrow. The following morning, the 2d, he 
 went out early to arrange the disposition of the force 
 which had come in from the Machchi Bhawan. He re- 
 turned, tired, about eight o'clock, and lay on his bed whilst 
 he transacted business with his Adjutant-General, Captain 
 Wilson. Lying near him was his nephew, George Law- 
 rence. Suddenly there came a sheet of flame, a terrific 
 report and a shock, followed by intense darkness. It was a 
 shell from the howitzer which had been fired in the morn- 
 ing. It left George Lawrence, as it burst, unscathed, it tore 
 off the shirt from the back of Captain Wilson, and it mor- 
 tally wounded Sir Henry Lawrence. He lingered in ex- 
 treme agony to the morning of the 4th, and then died. 
 
 The death of this great man was felt by the garrison 
 as a loss only not irreparable, because they inherited the 
 splendid courage which had animated him from the first 
 hour of the insurrection to the moment when he was 
 called away. They felt, one and all, that they could best 
 testify their respect for his memory by carrying out their 
 stern defence on the lines he had laid down. He was 
 succeeded, as chief commissioner, by Major Banks, an 
 officer of rare merit, who had been his friend and con 
 
2o6 Casttalties ainone[st the Garrison. 
 
 fidant. The command of the troops, however, devolved 
 upon Brigadier Inglis of the 32d. 
 
 Whilst Havelock was fighting his way from Allahabad 
 to Kanhpur, in the manner described in the preceding 
 chapter, the garrison of the Residency was exposed to the 
 unremitting attacks of an enemy vastly superior to it in 
 numbers and strength of position. The compass of this 
 volume will not permit me to give in full detail a history 
 of the several assaults. It must suffice to refer to those 
 of the greatest importance. From the very outset the 
 damage done to life and material were great. Sir Henry 
 Lawrence died, as I have told, on the 4th of July. Mrs 
 Dorin and Mr Ommanney, the latter one of the prominent 
 members of the Civil Service, were killed or mortally 
 wounded the same day. Major Francis, of the 13th N. I., 
 a very gallant officer, who had successfully brought in the 
 garrison of the Machchi Bhawan, and Mr Polehampton, 
 the Chaplain, succumbed to the rebels' fire on the 7th. 
 Before the dawn of the 20th of the month the casualties 
 had been increased by Mr Bryson, at one time Sergeant- 
 Major 1 6th Lancers, shot through the head on the 9th; 
 by Lieutenant Dashwood, 48th N. I., who succumbed the 
 same day to cholera ; by Lieutenant Charlton, 32d Foot, 
 shot through the head on the 13th; by Lieutenant Lester, 
 mortally wounded on the 14th ; by Lieutenants Bryce 
 and O'Brien, wounded on the i6th ; by Lieutenant 
 Harmer, wounded, and Lieutenant Arthur, killed, on 
 the 19th. 
 
 Nor was the damage less to the materials which formed 
 the component parts of the defences. On the 15th Ander- 
 son's house was entirely destroyed by round-shot. The 
 garrison, however, still continued to hold the ground on 
 which it had stood. On the i8th many round-shots were 
 fired into the post-office, Fayrer's house, commanded by 
 
Prominent Events of the Defence. 207 
 
 Gould Weston, Gubbins's house, and the brigade mess- 
 house. At one time the rebels nearly succeeded in setting 
 fire to the Residency house by means of carcasses.^ 
 
 The difficulties the garrison had to contend with were 
 enormous. They had, in addition to the work of active 
 defence, to dig out and carry stores, to shift the guns, to 
 dig trenches, to sink shafts for mines, to bury the dead, 
 especially the dead animals, whose putrifying carcasses 
 contaminated the air, to repair damages. In all these 
 duties the officers shared equally the labours with the 
 men, and all exerted themselves to the utmost. 
 
 Sometimes they made a sortie. They attempted the 
 first on the 7th. The sallying party succeeded in driving 
 out the enemy from a position they held commanding the 
 defences. Lieutenant Lawrence, who led it, obtained for 
 his cool daring the coveted Victoria Cross. 
 
 I have given-the casualties of the officers and others 
 up to the 20th, because on that day the rebels made their 
 first grand assault. Their movement began at half-past 
 eight in the morning, was sustained vigorously for several 
 hours, and was finally beaten back at four o'clock. 
 Several officers and men covered themselves with glory. 
 Conspicuous amongst them was Ensign Loughnan of the 
 13th N. I., against whose post, Innes's house, the weight 
 of the attack was directed. The garrison here consisted 
 of twelve men of the 32d Foot, twelve of the 13th N. L, 
 and some clerks. They repulsed an enemy vastly superior 
 in numbers. Another attack, made simultaneously against 
 the Redan, was repelled with equal courage and equal 
 determination. 
 
 Of this general attack, the first grand assault against 
 the garrison, it has been remarked that it was a triumph 
 of British coolness and pluck over Asiatic numbers and 
 
 ^ A carcass is a hollow vessel, filled with combustibles. 
 
2o8 Death of Major Banks. 
 
 swagger ; of the mind over matter. The writer^ adds 
 that, in another sense, it was still more important. It 
 proved to the mutineers that they had miscalculated 
 their chances ; that, unless famine should come to aid 
 them, they and their countrymen would never triumph 
 over that handful of Europeans. 
 
 The result of that day's action, doubtless, greatly 
 encouraged the garrison. Their losses, four killed and 
 twelve wounded, had been small, whilst the casualties of 
 the rebels had been severe. The day following, however, 
 they suffered a bereavement second only to that which 
 they had experienced when Sir Henry Lawrence died. 
 His successor. Major Banks, whilst reconnoitring from the 
 top of an outhouse, was shot dead through the head. He 
 had been an invaluable colleague to Brigadier Inglis, and 
 it was felt there was no one left who could replace him. 
 The office he had held was accordingly left vacant until 
 the Government of India could be communicated with. 
 
 The garrison had no certain knowledge of the events 
 passing at Kanhpur. They had despatched many letters 
 by native messengers believed to be faithful, but up to the 
 25th of July no reply had been received. Three days pre- 
 viously, however, on the 22d, their most trusted messenger, 
 a pensioned sipahi named Angad, arrived to state that he 
 had seen the victorious English regiments at Kanhpur; 
 but it was not till the 25th that the same messenger, who 
 had been sent out again, returned with a letter from 
 Tytler stating that ' Havelock was advancing with a force 
 sufficient to bear down all opposition, and would arrive in 
 five or six days.' Inglis replied by despatching, by Angad, 
 to Havelock a plan of his position and of the roads by 
 which it could be approached. This reply reached Have- 
 
 ^ Kaye's and Malleson's History of the Indian Mzitiny, Cabinet edition, 
 vol. iii., page 303. 
 
The Story rehirns to Havelock. 209 
 
 lock at Mangalwar, a village five miles from the Ganges, 
 in the province of Oudh. To reach Lakhnao there still 
 remained forty miles to traverse. Before describing the 
 further progress of the leaguer of the Residency it is 
 necessary that I should return to Kanhpur, and narrate 
 how it was that Havelock had been able to push 
 on so far, and yet failed to accomplish the entire 
 journey. 
 
 Neill, I have said, had joined Havelock, with a few 
 troops, on the 20th of July. Five days later Havelock 
 crossed the Ganges with the intention of endeavouring 
 to relieve the Residency. In the interval between the 
 two dates he had despatched Major Stephenson to de- 
 stroy Bithor, evacuated by Nana Sahib and his troops. 
 Stephenson burned down the palace, blew up the maga- 
 zine, and brought back to Kanhpur twenty cannon 
 abandoned by the Nana. Simultaneously Havelock had 
 designed, armed, and nearly finished at Kanhpur a forti- 
 fied work commanding the river, large enough to accom- 
 modate the 300 men, all he could spare to hold the place 
 in his absence. The command of these he intrusted to 
 Neill. He had begun, on the 21st, his preparations for 
 crossing the river ; had sent over his guns on that day, 
 the infantry on the succeeding days. On the 25th he 
 crossed himself, and moved that day to Mangalwar, five 
 miles. There he halted to complete his arrangements for 
 the carriage of his ammunition and supplies. These were 
 completed by the 28th, and he made his first move for- 
 ward the following morning. 
 
 For the purpose which he had in view his force was 
 small indeed. It was composed of less than 1500 men, 
 of whom barely 1200 were Europeans. His cavalry con- 
 sisted of sixty volunteers and mounted soldiers, his 
 artillery of ten small field-pieces, his infantry of portions 
 
 O 
 
2IO Havelock crosses the Ganges, 
 
 of the 64th, the 84th, the 78th, the Madras Fusihers, and 
 Brasyer's Sikhs. 
 
 At five o'clock, on the 29th, this Httle force began its 
 forward movement. After a march of three miles Have- 
 lock discerned the rebels occupying a strong position in 
 front of and in the village of Unao. From this position 
 he dislodged them after a fierce conflict, in which they 
 lost fifteen guns and about 500 men. He then pushed on 
 to Bashiratganj, six miles distant. Bashiratganj was a 
 walled town, intersected by the high road, its entrance 
 protected by a turreted gateway, with lateral defences, and 
 a wet ditch in front. Still more to the front of it was a 
 large jhil, or shallow pond, whilst another, still larger, lay 
 behind the town, on the road to Lakhnao, traversed by 
 a narrow causeway. Havelock conceived the idea of 
 sending round the 64th to cut off the enemy from the 
 causeway, whilst he should assail it in front. Unfortu- 
 nately the turning movement took longer than was ex- 
 pected, and the troops with Havelock made their front 
 assault before the 64th had completed it. The result was 
 that, though the rebels suffered severely, the bulk of them 
 escaped across the causeway. 
 
 The British loss in the two actions had been severe 
 also. Eighty-eight men had been placed hors-de combat, 
 and eighty-eight men represented nearly a twelfth of his 
 European fighting strength. A nearly equal number of 
 sick reduced that strength still further. Havelock had 
 used up, too, one-third of his gun ammunition, whilst he 
 had accomplished but fifteen miles out of the forty-five 
 necessary to traverse. In front of him were positions 
 which would be held against him still more steadfastly, 
 and by a greater number of troops. Then, too, the question 
 forced itself upon him, how could he carry his sick and 
 wounded ? He could not leave them, because he could 
 
Beats the Rebels, and retttrns, 2 1 1 
 
 spare no troops to guard them. Just at the moment 
 moreover, he had received information of that fatal mutiny 
 at Danapur, the consequence of the imbeciUty of the Cal- 
 cutta Government, which came at the mornent to add 
 terribly to the existing complications. There were, also, 
 rebel troops in the districts, any number of whom com- 
 bining might, if he were to advance further, cut him off 
 from the Ganges. Feeling that these difficulties were too 
 great to be encountered with the force at his disposal, 
 he fell back, on the 31st, to Mangalwar, and despatched 
 thence his sick and wounded into Kanhpur, with a letter 
 to Neill informing him of the reason of his retreat, and 
 adding that, to enable him to reach Lakhnao, it was 
 necessary he should receive a reinforcement of 1000 men 
 and another field-battery. 
 
 To this letter Neill wrote a most intemperate, even an 
 insulting reply. Havelock was very angry. He contented 
 himself, however, for the moment with warning Neill that 
 considerations of the public service alone prevented him 
 from placing him under arrest. But it is the opinion of 
 Havelock's latest biographer^ that Neill's letter may so 
 have operated on a high-strung temperament, made sensi- 
 tive by disappointment following on an inspiriting sequence 
 of brilliant successes, as to induce Havelock to attempt 
 another advance without adequate reinforcements. At all 
 events Havelock did attempt a second forward movement. 
 Setting out on the 4th of August, he found himself the 
 following morning in front of Bashiratganj ; occupied it, 
 but could not prevent the rebels from carrying off all 
 their guns, and taking a strong position a little further on. 
 He then recognised that to advance further would prob- 
 ably involve the loss of his whole force. Fortified by the 
 opinion of the three officers of his staff whom he con- 
 
 ^ Archibald Forbes. 
 
2 12 Is foiled by the Action of the Government. 
 
 suited, Tytler, Crommelin, and young Henry Havelock, he 
 determined then to fall back. He had once again reached 
 Mangalwar, on the loth, when he heard that the rebels 
 were making a great show at Bashiratganj. Glad to 
 seize the chance of inflicting upon them a severe blow be- 
 fore he should cross, he promptly marched on that place, 
 caught his enemy, killed 200 of them, and captured two 
 guns ; then turning again, he recrossed the Ganges into 
 Kanhpur on the 13th. There he read the details of that 
 insane action of the Government of India by which the 
 much desired and needful reinforcements had been with- 
 held from him at the most critical period of his command. 
 To understand how this happened I must ask the 
 reader to return with me to Calcutta, and to accompany 
 me thence to Danapur and Patna. 
 
CHAPTERXV. 
 
 CALCUTTA AND WESTERN BIHAR IN JULY AND AUGUST. 
 
 Reports of the terrible fate of the Engh'sh men and 
 English women who had been besieged by the rebels at 
 Kanhpur had reached Calcutta early in July, but it was 
 not until Havelock telegraphed, on the 17th of the month, 
 the account of his victory, and of their murder, that all 
 hope of their survival disappeared. Then, for a moment, 
 the crushing blight of despair succeeded to the agony of 
 suspense. Only, however, for a moment. Almost in- 
 stantly there rose in its place an intense eagerness to 
 place in the hands of the avenging General all the avail- 
 able resources of the State— resources which should make 
 him strong enough to push on to ward off from other 
 threatened garrisons, especially from the garrison of the 
 Residency of Lakhnao, a similar calamity. For the mo- 
 ment the Government, the press, the mercantile bodies, 
 pubhc opinion generally, seemed to unite in concentrating 
 their efforts to obtain this wished-for result. Lord Can- 
 ning had, in the last days of July, sanctioned the raising 
 
 in Calcutta of a corps of yeomanry cavalry a corps 
 
 which, led by a very resolute and able officer. Major J. 
 F. Richardson, was destined to render excellent service. 
 He had, further, in conjunction with the Lieutenant- 
 Governor of Bengal, directed similar enlistments from 
 the unemployed sailors to meet the troubles then threat- 
 ening in Bengal and Bihdr, and he had concluded an 
 
2 14 ^^^ Means available to the Government. 
 
 arrangement with Jang Bahadur, Prime Minister and 
 virtual ruler of the State of Nipal, for the despatch of 
 a body of Gurkha troops to the districts of Gorakhpur 
 and Azamgarh. 
 
 So far he had done well. But none of those acts, praise- 
 worthy as they were, touched the crucial point. They did 
 not provide immediate succour to Havelock. Yet at that 
 moment, besides the 53d, which garrisoned Fort William, 
 there was a wing of the 37th regiment available; the loth 
 Foot garrisoned Danapur ; whilst on the 5th of July, two 
 days before Havelock started from Allahabad on his 
 memorable campaign, the 5th Fusiliers, 800 strong, landed 
 in Calcutta from the Mauritius. 
 
 Havelock, we have seen, wanted on the 5th August, 
 according to his own estimate, another thousand men to en- 
 able him to reach Lakhnao. Now, on the 5th of July there 
 were 1200 men available, either at Calcutta, or on their 
 way, steaming towards Allahabad (for the wing of the 37th 
 had been despatched just before) without weakening the 
 garrisons of Calcutta and Danapur. With a little manage- 
 ment that number could have been considerably increased. 
 We left Havelock, in the last chapter, on the 13th August, 
 stranded at Kanhpur for want of such troops. Why, in 
 the terrible crisis which interrupted his victorious career, 
 were the troops which might have been available not 
 promptly despatched to him ? 
 
 To this question there is an answer, and that answer 
 indicates the difference which arose between the Govern- 
 ment and the rest of the European community, and with 
 respect to which the Government adopted a course, timid, 
 shrinking, and politically ruinous. For the sake of a 
 sentiment they risked the temporary loss of the Empire. 
 Indeed, it will be proved that but for the heroic conduct 
 of one man, the late Vincent Eyre, the country between 
 
The Position of Ddndpttr and Patnd, 2 1 5 
 
 Calcutta and Banaras would have been overrun by the 
 rebels. 
 
 The water-line between Calcutta and Allahabad, about 
 664 miles hi length, had one weak middle point at Ddndpur 
 and Patna, two places only twelve miles apart. Danapur 
 was 3-44 miles from Calcutta, the city of Patnd was twelve 
 miles nearer to the capital. At Danapur there were, as 
 I have already stated, three native regiments, the 7th, 8th, 
 and 40th N. L, one company of European, one of native 
 artillery, and the loth Foot. The position of the two 
 places was a most important one. The province. Western 
 Bihdr, of which Patnd was the capital, was one of the 
 richest provinces in India. It contained a considerable 
 number of native landowners, men of large estates and 
 ancient lineage. English merchants, too, had invested 
 large sums in the province in the cultivation of indigo, one 
 of its staple exports. It touched on the one side, to' the 
 north-west, the revolted districts of Ghdzipur, Azamgarh, 
 Juanpur, and Mirzapur ; to the north, it touched Nipal ; to 
 the east, the division of Eastern Bihar, not only com- 
 bustible itself, but open to invasion by the sipahis in 
 Eastern Bengal, then in a state of incipient mutiny. 
 
 It will be recognised, then, that it was of paramount 
 importance that the division of Western Bihar, the middle 
 piece between Calcutta and Allahabad, should be pre- 
 served from outbreak by a Government anxious to 
 despatch English troops to Allahdbdd, thence to pro- 
 ceed to reinforce Havelock at Kanhpur. 
 
 Up to the period at which I have arrived the province 
 had been preserved from revolt by the energetic measures 
 taken by its Commissioner, Mr William Tayler. Harassed 
 by the fussy interference of his superior at Calcutta, Mr 
 Frederick Halliday, Mr Tayler had, nevertheless, with 
 resources he had made for himself, put down insurrection 
 
2 1 6 Mr William Tayler. 
 
 in the most Inflammable city in India, the headquarters 
 of the intriguing Wahabis, and had preserved, amid great 
 difficulties, complete order in the districts, those of Patna, 
 Gaya, Shahdbdd, Saran, Champaran, and Tirhut, which 
 went to make up the division of which he was the pro- 
 consul. His services have never been acknowledged, he 
 has been treated with contumely and insult, but he con- 
 tributed as much as any man, in that terrible crisis called 
 the Indian Mutiny, to save the Empire. 
 
 To the mind of William Tayler there was, towards the 
 end of June, but one possible danger to the province. That 
 danger would be very great if the sipahis at Danapur, 
 numbering nearly 3000 men, were to break out in revolt. 
 If the Government would but order that they should be 
 disarmed all would go well. For that he would answer. 
 
 The opinion of Mr Tayler on this point was also the 
 opinion of all intelligent men in Calcutta, that is, of the 
 united merchants and traders, men who had shown their 
 loyalty and devotion by raising the corps of volunteers, 
 of the three arms, of which I have spoken, of the great 
 majority of the members of the services, and of the loyal 
 natives. It was the opinion, in fact, of everyone who 
 was not a secretary to Government, or who hoped, by 
 time-serving and subserviency, to become a secretary to 
 Government. The question had been mooted at an earlier 
 period. The reply, demi-official, of the Government then 
 had been that, with only a sufficient number of European 
 troops to preserve order close to the capital, it did not 
 feel justified in proceeding to a measure which, unless 
 there were sufficient white troops on the spot, might pre- 
 cipitate the evil it was intended to heal. That answer 
 sufficed for the moment. But when the 37th had started, 
 and when preparations v/ere being made to despatch the 
 5th Fusiliers, in steamers which must pass Patna and 
 
The Government evades Responsibility. 2 1 7 
 
 Danapur, it was felt that the time had arrived when the 
 disarming process might be carried out in an effective 
 manner, under circumstances which would render resist- 
 ance impossible. 
 
 These ideas took possession of the English community 
 in Calcutta, and were ventilated by the press. It was 
 believed, at the outset, that the Government would 
 welcome the suggestion as tending to relieve them from 
 a great difficulty. The Government had acknowledged 
 that the weakness of the middle piece constituted at the 
 moment the great difficulty in despatching reinforcements 
 to Havelock. Now that great difficulty could be removed. 
 Great, then, was the surprise when the rumour pervaded 
 the city that the Government had resolved to decline the 
 responsibility which devolves upon all governments — the 
 responsibility of directing the carrying out of a measure 
 which each member of it knew to be essential to the well- 
 being of the Empire. 
 
 Great, I say, was the astonishment. Was it for this, 
 men asked one another, that Lord Canning had summoned 
 from Madras Sir Patrick Grant to advise him ? Nothing, 
 it was true, had been seen or heard of Sir Patrick Grant 
 since his arrival. It was known that he was occupying 
 comfortable quarters at Government House, and that he 
 was babbling about reorganisation, when the question was 
 the suppression of the Mutiny. But in military matters 
 he was, nominally at least, the chief councillor of the 
 Governor-General, and it was supposed that he, an officer 
 trained with sipahis, would at least understand the neces- 
 sity of the position. But rumour further stated that Lord 
 Canning was greatly guided by his advice, and by that of 
 the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Mr Halliday. In the 
 latter no one had any confidence. It was felt, then, that 
 the time had arrived when the leading members of the 
 
2i8 The Responsibility cast on General Lloyd. 
 
 mercantile community, all of whom, as proprietors of in- 
 digo factories, had large interests in Western Bihar, should 
 ask to be allowed to make a personal appeal to Lord 
 Canning. They made a request to this effect on the 17th of 
 July. Lord Canning agreed to receive them on the 20th. 
 
 He did receive a deputation from them on that date, 
 listened to their statements, heard from their mouths 
 that the disarming of the native regiments at Danapur 
 was the one measure necessary to restore public confi- 
 dence in Bihar; that a favourable opportunity now pre- 
 sented itself for the carrying out of such a measure, 
 inasmuch as the 5th Fusiliers, which had quitted Calcutta 
 by steamer on the 12th, would reach Danapur about the 
 22d ; and that then the disarming could be accomplished 
 in two hours. Lord Canning listened to them without 
 interrupting them, then told them very curtly, using the 
 fewest words he could command to express his meaning 
 that he would not comply with their request. 
 
 The Government of India had, in fact, previously 
 decided to attempt one of those half-measures which 
 weak and incompetent men cling to in an emergency. 
 Unable to brace themselves to the resolution of directing 
 the disarming of the native regiments, they had, on the 
 1 2th of July, by the hand of Sir Patrick Grant, cast the re- 
 sponsibility of disarming or of not disarming on the 
 officer commanding the Danapur division. That officer, 
 General Lloyd, was to be the sole judge of the advis- 
 ability or the inadvisability of the measure. * If,' wrote to 
 him Sir Patrick Grant, on the 12th July, 'when the regi- 
 ment' (the 5th Fusiliers) 'reaches Danapur, you see 
 reason to distrust the native troops, and you entertain 
 an opinion that it is desirable to disarm them, you are at 
 liberty to disembark the 5th Fusiliers to assist you in that 
 object.' 
 
Such Action invites Disaster. 219 
 
 The reader will not fail to comprehend the position. 
 The native troops in Bengal and in the North-west 
 Provinces of India had generally mutinied or had been dis- 
 armed. At Ddnapur, twelve miles from the inflammable 
 city of Patna, the centre of the richest province in India, 
 were three native regiments still carrying their arms. 
 Havelock was at Kanhpur crying for reinforcements. 
 The arrival at Kdnhpur of such reinforcements depended 
 on the continued tranquillity of the middle piece of country 
 of which Danapur and Patna were the centres. The con- 
 tinued tranquillity of that middle piece could only be 
 insured by the prompt disarming of the three native regi- 
 ments at Danapur. The public voice, the great mercantile 
 community, besought the Government to issue positive 
 orders for such disarming. The Government absolutely 
 refused, but, as a sop, they threw the responsibility of 
 the action to be taken upon an aged soldier, whose 
 nerves were utterly unequal to the task ; who, in fact, 
 emulating the action of his superiors at Calcutta, endeav- 
 oured to reconcile the responsibility thrust upon him, with 
 the evident reluctance of the Government that he should 
 exercise it, by devising another half- measure, which 
 brought about the very catastrophe which strong and 
 resolute action would have avoided. Well might Lord 
 Dalhousie write, as he did write, when the news of the 
 catastrophe and its causes reached him : ' Why was it left 
 to General Lloyd, or to General or Mister Anybody, to 
 order measures so obviously necessary to safety ? ' 
 
 For, be it remembered, throughout the period from 
 the outbreak of the mutiny at Mirath and the casting 
 upon the shoulders of General Lloyd of responsibilities 
 which properly belonged to the Government, it had been 
 with the utmost difficulty, and by the display of the rarest 
 qualities of courageous statesmanship, that Mr William 
 
2 20 The Senile Action at Ddndpur. 
 
 Tayler had been able to preserve order at Patna and 
 throughout his division. He had put down an uprising in 
 the city itself, had baffled the machinations of the Wahabi 
 leaders, had instilled fear and discouragement in the ranks 
 of the seditious, and by his splendid example had given 
 confidence to his subordinates. Amongst those who 
 had been acting with him in the districts was a very 
 gallant officer, Major John Holmes, commanding the I2th 
 Irregular Cavalry stationed at Sigauli, in the Champaran 
 district. Holmes, like most officers serving with the native 
 troops, believed implicitly in the loyalty of his own men, 
 and certainly for some weeks they justified his confidence 
 by their obedience and energy. It is just possible that, if 
 the sipahis at Danapur had been quietly disarmed, those 
 troopers would have remained loyal. The result showed 
 that they could not be proof against the successful rising 
 of their brethren at the chief station. 
 
 It would serve no good purpose to dwell at length 
 upon the incompetent action which threw the middle piece 
 between Calcutta and Kanhpur into a condition of un- 
 paralleled disorder, and delayed the advance of the troops 
 for which the heart of the gallant Havelock was preying 
 upon itself Under the weight of the responsibility thrust 
 upon him the mind of General Lloyd vacillated like the 
 pendulum of a clock. When, on the 22d, the main body 
 of the 5th Fusiliers arrived off Danapur, the pendulum 
 was at the left corner, and he would not order them to 
 disembark. Two days later, when two companies of the 
 37th reached the station, the pendulum had veered to the 
 right, and he ordered them to land. The day following, 
 the 25th, he resolved not to disarm the sipahis, but to 
 deprive them of the percussion caps which had been 
 served out to them, and of those in the magazine. By 
 a display of force he succeeded in securing the caps in 
 
Rising of KiLHwar Singh. 221 
 
 the magazine. Then, beHeving he had scored a triumph, 
 he dismissed the European troops, and went comfortably 
 to his luncheon. But when an hour or two later the 
 officers, by his direction, endeavoured to persuade the 
 sipahis to surrender the caps in their actual possession, 
 the latter broke into open mutiny, and went off towards 
 the river Son, in the direction of Arab. The European 
 troops were at once called out, but there was no one pre- 
 sent to give any orders. The General had gone on board of 
 one of the steamers, and in the matter of taking upon them- 
 selves the smallest responsibility in his absence the two 
 officers next in command took example from the Govern- 
 ment of India. Nothing, or next to nothing, was done. The 
 mutineers got off scot free. It was one of the most painful 
 incidents of those troublous times. 
 
 Nor was the calamity confined to Danapur. The 
 telegraph did its work. The very evening of the day on 
 which these events occurred the troopers of the 12th 
 Irregulars rose in mutiny and murdered their command- 
 ing officer and his wife. Similarly, Kunwar Singh, a large 
 landowner, who had considerable estates at Jagdispur, not 
 far from Arab, and who had had bitter reason to complain 
 of the action of the law courts of Calcutta, intimated to 
 the sipahis, by some very practical assistance, his sympathy 
 with their movement. It seemed probable that, unless the 
 British should take prompt action, the whole of Western 
 Bihar would be in a blaze. 
 
 There were two officials in the province upon whom, 
 at this period, devolved enormous responsibility. The 
 one was ready to take that responsibility, and did 
 take it. The other had completely lost his head. The 
 action of these two officials will now be related. It was 
 the obvious duty of General Lloyd to despatch English 
 troops at once in pursuit of the rebels. He had a sufficient 
 
O O 9 
 
 Dunbar marches against the Rebels. 
 
 number at his disposal. But the heavy weight of responsi- 
 bih'ty had made his brain slow, and his arm powerless 
 to strike. He did, indeed, despatch a few riflemen the 
 following day, in a river steamer, to the mouth of the river 
 Son. But there the draught of water was insufficient, 
 and the men returned, having accomplished nothing. 
 Then the General wrote to Mr Tayler to the effect that, 
 far from pursuing the mutineers, he intended to intrench 
 himself at Danapur, as he feared that, joined by Kunwar 
 Singh, they would return to attack him. Then it was 
 that the nature of William Tayler showed itself. He was 
 a civilian ; the other was a soldier. The soldier, sad 
 to recount, his moral faculties overborne, proposed to 
 intrench himself against an enemy who had no thought 
 of attacking him. The civilian, with all his wits about 
 him, his strong faculties never so clear as in the time of 
 danger, deprecated the resolution of the soldier with all 
 the eloquence he could command. He implored him to 
 lose no time in pursuing the rebels, showed that there was 
 yet time to catch them, and that vigour and energy 
 might yet retrieve the disaster. 
 
 Tayler's strong exhortations convinced the General. 
 They impressed upon him some of the passionate con- 
 viction which animated the daring Commissioner. He 
 despatched then a body of troops, 415 in number, with 
 fifteen officers, commanded by Captain Dunbar, to be 
 conveyed by steamer to a point not far from the spot 
 where the road to Arab strikes the river Son. Thence 
 they would march to the former place, where, it was 
 believed, the sipahis would be found. 
 
 Leaving these men marching, I must return to the 
 sipahfs. 
 
 The rebel native soldiers, surprised at being allowed 
 to escape without pursuit, reached the banks of the Son 
 
The L ea^tter of A rah . 223 
 
 on the early morn of the 26th. For want of boats in 
 which to cross they were delayed there till the evening. 
 'Then, having received meanwhile most comforting assur- 
 ances from Kunwar Singh, they were, thanks to the means 
 provided by that chief, conveyed to the western bank. 
 They then marched to Arah, released the prisoners from 
 the gaol, plundered the treasury, and set forth to hunt 
 for the Europeans. These, however, thanks to the pre- 
 science of one of their number, had taken timely precau- 
 tions to meet their attack. 
 
 The story of the leaguer of Arah is a story of foresight, 
 gallantry, perseverance, energy, and devotion unsurpassed 
 in the world's history. The prescient organiser of the 
 successful resistance to the bloodthirsty sipahis was Mr 
 Vicars Boyle, an engineer connected with the railway. 
 But his companions, Herwald Wake, Colvin, Halls, 
 Combe, Littledale, and the rest, for there were fifteen 
 Englishmen and Eurasians, besides the Deputy Collector, 
 a Muhammadan gentleman named Sayid Azim-ud-dm 
 Khan, fifty Sikhs, inclusive of native officers, a water- 
 carrier and a cook, were all worthy of association with 
 him. They had long regarded the outbreak of the 
 sipahis at Danapur as possible, and when it did occur 
 they collected in the house which Mr Vicars Boyle had 
 prepared, provisioned, and to a certain extent fortified. 
 The presence of the Sikhs among them was due, abso- 
 lutely and entirely, to the prescient care of Mr William 
 Tayler of Patna, a circumstance which was much appre- 
 ciated at the time, but which, like many other of the 
 noble acts of that gentleman, has been since conveniently 
 forgotten. 
 
 The mutinous sipahis, aided by the levies of Kunwar 
 Singh, crowded to attack the little house on the evening 
 of the 27th. They were met by a stern resistance such as 
 
2 24 Defeat of Dunbar. 
 
 they evidently had not expected. They changed their 
 tactics then, and brought up guns to assist them. They 
 used these on the 28th, and during the day of the 29th. 
 But that night there was a lull, and the garrison was 
 cheered by hearing a musketry fire in the direction from 
 which they expected assistance — the direction of 
 Danapur. 
 
 The musketry fire was indeed the consequence of the 
 proximity of Dunbar's force, but, alas ! it was produced 
 mainly by the muskets of the revolted sipahis. Dunbar, 
 in fact, marching carelessly, and without the precautions 
 essential to a night march in a country occupied by an 
 enemy, had fallen into an ambuscade. He and other 
 officers were killed ; the men, surprised, became dis- 
 couraged, and attempting to retrace their steps to the 
 Son, they were pursued by almost the full force of the 
 rebels. It was a rout as complete as it was disgraceful. 
 Many men were killed and wounded during the retreat. 
 When the survivors reached the Son, they experienced 
 the greatest difficulty in forcing their way to its eastern 
 bank. They at last succeeded ; the steamer which had 
 brought them to a certain point was still waiting for them 
 there. On that steamer, in lieu of the 415 men and fifteen 
 officers whom she had carried, full of hope, the previous 
 morning, there were now only fifty men and three officers 
 who had been untouched by the enemy's fire. 
 
 The repulse of the force which, at the instance of Mr 
 Tayler, General Lloyd had despatched to relieve Arah 
 added greatly to the despondency of that officer. It 
 would be difficult to exaggerate the gloom, not to say the 
 terror, which fell upon Danapur. Upon Mr Tayler the 
 effect was very different. It seemed, indeed, impossible to 
 doubt that Arah must fall. If Arah should fall, then the 
 several stations, isolated, each depending on its own re- 
 
Vincent Eyre. 225 
 
 sources, must inevitably be overrun. Under these circum- 
 stances, Mr Taylef, acting like a skilful general who feels 
 that his detachments would be liable, when separated 
 from one another and unsupported, to be cut up in 
 detail, but would successfully resist the enemy if united, 
 authorised his several subordinate officers at the isolated 
 stations to fall back upon Patna, bringing the contents of 
 their treasuries with them, unless in so doing their 
 personal safety should be endangered. It was a wise and 
 statesmanlike order, and it would have been so accepted 
 by all the world but for the sudden appearance on the 
 scene of a man whose genius and daring suddenly changed 
 disaster into triumph. 
 
 Such men are born seldom. The man who accom- 
 plished this feat was a major in the artillery, who had 
 served in the first Kabul war, had been kept there a 
 prisoner, who had written a story of the events which 
 led to and followed the disaster to the English, and who 
 had since served in Gwaliar and in Burma. His name 
 was Vincent Eyre. He had but just been recalled from 
 Burma, and had been despatched with a European battery, 
 on board a steamer from Calcutta bound for Allahabad, 
 on the loth of July. 
 
 Eyre had reached Danapur the evening of the 25th, 
 the day memorable for the successful rising of the three 
 regiments. He had gone on shore and off'ered his services 
 to the General, but as these were not required, he had 
 proceeded the next day to Baksar, forty-three miles from 
 Arah. There he heard that the mutinied sipahis were 
 advancing by way of Arah towards Baksar. As this 
 place was the headquarters of the Government stud, and 
 was but thirty miles from Ghazipur, Eyre decided to 
 detain the tender of the steamer at Baksar, whilst he 
 should proceed in the latter to Ghazipur to ensure the 
 
 P 
 
2 26 Resolves to relieve A rah. 
 
 safety of that place. This he did on the 29th ; left two 
 guns and his only subaltern to protect Ghazipur, took 
 instead twenty-five men of the 78th on to his steamer, and 
 returned that night to Baksar. There he found 154 men 
 of the 5th Fusiliers, who had arrived that afternoon, under 
 the command of Captain I^Estrange. As the informa- 
 tion he received conveyed to the mind of Eyre the impres- 
 sion that the rebels had stopped at Arah to besiege our 
 countrymen there, he determined to endeavour to induce 
 L'Estrange to combine with him to march to the relief of 
 that place. He wrote to him to that effect. L'Estrange 
 replied that if Eyre, as senior officer, would send him 
 a written order to that effect, and would take upon him- 
 self the entire responsibility, he would obey him. Eyre, 
 who had not graduated in the school of the Calcutta 
 statesmen, issued the order forthwith. He knew, of 
 course, that he was, so to speak, risking his commission, 
 for his orders were to proceed to Allahabad, and the 
 march to Arah would take him nearly fifty miles off his 
 direct road. But to the courageous mind of Eyre the 
 occasion was one in which it was imperative to risk his 
 all — and he risked it. 
 
 Eyre's force consisted of forty gunners and three guns, 
 154 men of the 5th Fusiliers, six officers, including him- 
 self, two assistant surgeons, eighteen volunteers, mostly 
 mounted, of whom three were officers, one the Magis- 
 trate of Ghazipur and one a veterinary surgeon. The 
 twenty-five Highlanders he had borrowed from Ghazipur 
 he left at Baksar to take the first opportunity of returning 
 to their .station. His total force, it will thus be seen, 
 amounted only to 220 men and three guns. With that 
 he set out, on the 31st of July, to attempt a task which 
 had already, less than forty-eight hours before, though he 
 knew it not, baffled 430 officers and men. 
 
Eyres Fighting March. 227 
 
 The news which reached him, on the night of the 31st, 
 at his first halting ground of the defeat of Dunbar's party 
 had no effect upon Eyre and his men. They pushed 
 on all the next day without seeing any enemy, and 
 bivouacked for the night at the village of Gujrajganj, 
 some six miles from Arah. After marching a mile the 
 next morning the rebels appeared in great numbers, occu- 
 pying a wood which Eyre and his men must traverse. He 
 reconnoitred their position, and then attacked them. The 
 rebels had the advantage of numbers, and of position, and 
 they were inspired by their defeat of Dunbar. But Eyre's 
 first attack was so well directed and so sustained that he 
 forced his foe to abandon his position, only however, he 
 discovered to his vexation, to take a far stronger one 
 about a mile in the rear. As this position was strong 
 enough to repel a front attack, Eyre, under cover of the 
 fire of his three guns, made a flank movement to gain the 
 nearest point of the new railway embankment which had 
 been constructed from Arah. The rebels, however, dis- 
 covered the movement and its object, and commanding 
 as they did the inner chord of the circle, rushed forward 
 to gain it first, at the same time detaching Kunwar Singh's 
 levies to harass the rear of the British. The rebels gained 
 the decisive point first, and stationing themselves behind 
 the trees of a wood which flanked the embankment, 
 opened a severe musketry fire on the British as they 
 approached. Eyre's position was now extremely critical. 
 He must carry that wood, or be lost. Everything de- 
 pended upon his coolness and self-possession ; and, under 
 difficult circumstances, no man ever gave greater evidence 
 of the possession of both these qualities. Calmly survey- 
 ing the position, he formed his men in skirmishing order, 
 whilst his guns played upon the wood. The damage these 
 effected was not great, as the rebels were well sheltered 
 
228 Eyre relieves A rah. 
 
 by the trees. Twice, indeed, they sallied forth to charge 
 the guns, but each time they were repulsed. But they 
 had all the advantage in musketry fire from behind 
 shelter, and at the end of an hour Captain Hastings of 
 the volunteers brought word to Eyre, who, having no 
 subaltern, was obliged to stay with the guns, that the 
 position of the Fusiliers was becoming critical. For such 
 a state of affairs there was but one remedy — recourse to 
 that splendid weapon which, wielded by British hands, 
 has never failed. The order was given to close up and 
 charge. Promptly was it executed. Led on one flank by 
 L'Estrange, on the other by Hastings, the men of the 5th 
 closed up, and rushing forward with a cheer, cleared the 
 brook which separated them from the wood, and dashed 
 at the enemy. The rebels did not stand to meet the 
 encounter ; they gave way in tumultuous disorder. Eyre 
 pushed rapidly on after them, hoping to reach Arah that 
 night, but he was stopped on the way by an impassable 
 torrent. He spent the whole night in improvising a cause- 
 way. Over this, in the early morning, he passed his troops 
 and his guns, and an hour later had the gratification of 
 rescuing from their danger the gallant garrison which, for 
 eight days, had successfully defied an enemy fifty times 
 more numerous than themselves. 
 
 The rebels, meanwhile, had fled to Jagdispur, the 
 stronghold of Kunwar Singh. Thither Eyre, who was 
 not the man to consider a task completed so long as any- 
 thing remained to be accomplished, followed them on the 
 nth of August, and stormed and captured it the following 
 day. 
 
 Such was the man, and such was the deed which 
 changed the despair of the British residents of Western 
 Bihar into triumph. Eyre, descending apparently from 
 the clouds, had turned defeat into victory, despair into 
 
Skameftd Treatment of Mr Tayler. 229 
 
 rejoicings. The Government acted precisely as govern- 
 ments without a backbone will always act. The action 
 of the victorious Eyre was upheld. But his companion 
 in pluck and energy, William Tayler, who had, de- 
 spite his transcendent services, become obnoxious to 
 the Calcutta clique, was removed from his office and 
 ruined, avowedly because at a critical period, before Eyre 
 had redeemed Dunbar's disaster, and when it seemed 
 certain that the rebels would overrun the province, he 
 had advised concentration at Patna of the resources in 
 men and money of the province. The same Government 
 took the opportunity to reward an officer serving under 
 Mr Tayler, Mr Alonzo Money, for a theatrical display 
 which was really damaging to the interests of the country. 
 This gentleman had left his station for Patna, but had re- 
 pented and returned to it. Then taking advantage of the 
 arrival of a company of British troops, he marched with 
 them and the contents of the treasury, not to Patna, which 
 was near, and where they were wanted, but to Calcutta, 
 which was more than 300 miles distant, and where they 
 were not wanted — this, too, at a time when Havelock was 
 earnestly crying out for more soldiers. 
 
 Eyre left Arah for Allahabad on the 20th of August. 
 The failure of the Government to disarm the three regi- 
 ments had thus wasted a month at the most critical period 
 of the operations in the vicinity of Kanhpur. But the mis- 
 chief done to the British cause was not entirely repre- 
 sented by that loss of time. The disturbances in Western 
 Bihar continued. They kept for some time in the province 
 troops who were required in the North-west, nor were 
 they entirely suppressed until a very late period of the 
 following year. 
 
 But by this time fresh troops are pouring into Calcutta ; 
 a new Commander-in-Chief has arrived to displace Sir 
 
230 A Glance at the Sitidation. 
 
 Patrick Grant; Sir James Outram, appointed to command 
 the united Danapur and Kanhpur divisions, is on his way 
 to Allahabad ; Captain Peel and Captain Sotheby are form- 
 ing naval brigades from the crews of the Shannon and the 
 Pearl; the Residency of Lakhnao is still holding out ; Agra, 
 after a calamity, which will have to be recorded, is in a 
 state of siege; the British troops before Dehli are holding 
 their position on the ridge; Sir John Lawrence is despatch- 
 ing from the Panjab Nicholson, with a compact force, to 
 join them ; Lord Elphinstone is bearing himself bravely at 
 Bombay, Lord Harris in Madras, Sir Bartle Frere in Sind; 
 there have been disturbances in Rajputana and in the 
 dominions of Holkar; Maharaja Sindhia remains loyal, 
 but his troops are gathering against the English at Kalpi. 
 The situation is on the whole more hopeful than it was in 
 June and July, because it is more defined. The wiser 
 statesmen have recognised that the real enemies of the 
 British are the sipahis and the populations of the North- 
 western Provinces, of Bundelkhand, of Rohilkhand, and 
 of Oudh. To crush these the recently arrived resources 
 of Great Britain must be directed. But, first of all, it is 
 incumbent to attempt the relief of the Residency of 
 Lakhnao, too long delayed by the action of the Calcutta 
 Government, recorded in this chapter. I must, then, re- 
 turn to Kanhpur. 
 
CHAPTER XV L 
 
 THE FIRST RELIEF OF THE LAKHNAO RESIDENCY. 
 
 I HAVE recorded in a previous chapter^ how the garrison 
 of the Lakhnao Residency had been cheered, on the night 
 of the 25 th of July, by the receipt of a letter from Tytler 
 telling them that Havelock was advancing with a force 
 sufficient to bear down all opposition, and that he would 
 arrive in five or six days. The six days passed and no 
 Havelock came. The sound of firing was occasionally 
 heard in the direction of Kanhpur, and this sound tended 
 to confirm the hopes already raised. But they were 
 doomed to be disappointed for the moment. We have 
 seen how Havelock, on the 13th of August, finally re^ 
 crossed the Ganges. 
 
 Three days before that happened the rebels, en- 
 couraged doubtless by his retreat from Bashiratganj, 
 made their second grand assault on the position of the 
 Residency. It began about half-past ten in the morning, 
 by the successful springing of a mine, which made a 
 great breach in the defences. Against this they marched 
 in considerable numbers, and with great resolution. But 
 the men of the garrison were on the alert. A heavy 
 musketry fire from the roofs of the adjacent houses was 
 kept on the advancing foe, whilst a stern resistance met 
 their front attack. Eventually they were driven back 
 with enormous loss. A second attack on another point, 
 
 ^ Chapter xiv., page 208. 
 
232 The Leaotcer of the Residency. 
 
 Sago's house, and a third, on Innes's, Anderson's, and 
 Gubbins's posts, met with a like result. But the attacks 
 had lasted twelve hours. Again the loss of the garrison 
 was small. 
 
 Two days later a sortie made by the garrison was 
 repulsed. Six days after that, the i8th, the besiegers 
 made their third grand assault. 
 
 The springing of the mine on this occasion, under one 
 of the Sikh squares, was most effective. It made a breach, 
 some twenty feet wide, in the defences. Against this the 
 rebels came with extraordinary enthusiasm. Again, how- 
 ever, the men of the garrison were ready for them, and 
 again did they drive them back with heavy loss. 
 
 Still the rebels persevered. They believed it was but a 
 question of time. They knew to some extent of the suffer- 
 ings of the garrison ; how the necessity to be constantly 
 on the alert must tell upon them. They kept up, then, a 
 fire almost unremitting, varied by sudden rushes on points 
 which they regarded as weak or likely to give way to 
 pressure. In one sense the conviction they held as to the 
 wearied condition of the garrison was too true. Their ranks 
 were rapidly thinning. They had to repair the defences 
 daily, to remove supplies from the buildings which had 
 either fallen in or which succumbed to the enemy's shot, 
 to countermine the rebels' mines, to remove guns, to erect 
 barricades, to bury corpses, to serve out the daily rations, 
 and, with the weak and daily diminishing garrison, to 
 supply fatigue parties of eight or ten men each to do work 
 for which, under ordinary circumstances, ten times that 
 number would not have been considered excessive. The 
 garrison, however, performed all these duties with cheer- 
 fulness and resolution. In their ranks there was never 
 a sign of faltering. 
 
 Their hopes of relief were becoming less bright. On 
 
The Leaguer of the Residency. 233 
 
 the 28th of August a letter from Havelock informed them 
 that he had no hope of being able to relieve them for five- 
 and-twenty days. Much might happen in that period. 
 One result of the letter was a diminution of the rations. 
 
 Eight days later the rebels made their fourth assault. 
 They attacked two points simultaneously, but in vain. 
 Again were they compelled to turn their backs. On this 
 occasion the loyal sipahis of the 13th N. I. behaved 
 splendidly. 
 
 That these repeated failures dispirited the assailants 
 was shown by the relaxation of their efforts on the morrow 
 of their repulse. They never tried a grand assault after 
 that of the 5th of September, but contented themselves 
 with pouring in an unremitting fire of guns and musketry, 
 with mining, with attempting surprises, and with assailing 
 isolated points. But the labour of the garrison was by no 
 means diminished. The season was the most unhealthy 
 season of the year. Scarcely a day passed but some 
 portion of one or other of the posts crumbled under the 
 enemy's fire. Some idea of the incessant nature of that 
 fire may be gathered from the fact that, on the 8th of 
 September, 280 round-shot, varying in size from a twenty- 
 four to a three-pounder, were gathered from the roof of the 
 brigade mess-house alone. 
 
 On the 1 6th the messenger Angad was again sent 
 out for news. He returned, on the night of the 22d, 
 with information that help from outside would certainly 
 arrive within a fortnight. The next day a smart cannon- 
 ade was heard in the direction of Kanhpur. The following 
 morning firing was again heard. That night a messenger 
 who had gone out returned with the information that the 
 relieving force was in the outskirts of the city. The next 
 day it was clear that a tremendous struggle was going on 
 within the city. When, about half-past one, people were 
 
2 34 The Residency is relieved, 
 
 noticed leaving the city with bundles on their heads, and 
 when, half-an-hour later, sipahis and other armed bodies 
 were observed to follow them, it became clear that the 
 end was at hand. The garrison brought every gun and 
 mortar to bear on the retreating foe. At four o'clock the 
 report arose that some English officers, dressed in shoot- 
 ing coats, and some soldiers, wearing blue pantaloons, had 
 been seen in the vicinity of the Moti Mahall. An hour 
 later volleys of musketry, rapidly growing louder, were 
 heard in the city. Soon the bullets were whistling over 
 the Residency. Five minutes later and the British troops 
 were seen fighting their way through one of the principal 
 streets. Once fairly seen the long pent-up feelings of the 
 garrison found vent in a succession of deafening cheers. 
 Even from the hospital many of the wounded crawled 
 forth to join in that shout of welcome. ' Soon,' continues 
 Captain Wilson, from whose graphic journal I have 
 abridged the account in the text, ' soon all the rear-guard 
 and heavy guns were inside our position ; and then ensued 
 a scene which baffles description. For eighty-seven days 
 the Lakhnao garrison had lived in utter ignorance of all 
 that had taken place outside. Wives who had long 
 mourned their husbands as dead were again restored to 
 them. Others, fondly looking forward to glad meetings 
 with those near and dear to them, now for the first time 
 learned that they were alone. On all sides eager inquiries 
 for relations and friends were made. Alas ! in too many 
 cases the answer was a painful one.' 
 
 But the Residency had been relieved, or, to speak 
 more correctly, had been reinforced. For, after the de- 
 lirium of joy had given place to sober considerations, it 
 was recognised that the combined troops were not strong 
 enough to escort the non-combatant portion of the garrison 
 through the city, still thronged with armed rebels, and 
 
Or^ rather, reinforced. 235 
 
 thence to Kanhpur. For that the strengthened garrison 
 must await the arrival of the new Commander-in-Chief, 
 Sir Colin Campbell. His action will be described in due 
 course. Meanwhile it becomes my duty now to describe 
 how it had become possible for Havelock and Outram to 
 accomplish the splendid feat of arms which had brought 
 joy and consolation to the beleaguered garrison of the 
 Residency. 
 
 I left Havelock, just returned to Kanhpur, on the 
 13th of August. He gave his men a rest on the 14th and 
 15th, then on the i6th marched against Bithor, at which 
 place nearly 4000 rebels, mostly revolted sipahis of various 
 regiments, had congregated in his absence. Havelock 
 attacked and defeated them, though only after a very stub- 
 born fight. However, the victory was complete, the position 
 was captured, and two guns were taken. But the British 
 loss was heavy, amounting to between sixty men killed 
 and wounded, and twelve who succumbed to sunstroke. 
 
 It was on the day following that Havelock read in 
 the Calcutta Gazette the appointment of Outram to the 
 command of Kanhpur. Outram's arrival could not be 
 very distant. This nomination removed Havelock from 
 the position of independent commander to that of a locum 
 tenens for his superior officer. In such a case a sense of 
 responsibility must necessarily weigh upon a commander. 
 I have already pointed out that the position at Kanhpur, 
 with a small force, fronted on one side by Oudh in re- 
 bellion, in front by provinces in a state of insurrection, 
 to the left rear by the gradually concentrating Gwaliar 
 contingent, was not, in a military sense, defensible except 
 by a large force. It had one merit, it was central. In the 
 eyes of Havelock that fact alone almost compensated for 
 the other disadvantages. He wrote, then, to the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief to announce that if hopes of speedy 
 
236 Reinforcernents reach Kdnhpur, 
 
 reinforcements were held out to him he would continue 
 to hold Kanhpur, otherwise he would be forced to retire 
 on Allahdbad. The reply of Sir Colin was of a nature to 
 decide him to remain at Kanhpur. 
 
 Since the 3d of August reinforcements, in small parties, 
 had been gradually arriving at that station. Outram him- 
 self came only on the i6th of September. This illustrious 
 man had reached Allahabad on the 2d of that month, and 
 had despatched thence, on the 5th, to Kanhpur the 5th 
 Fusiliers, Eyre's battery of eighteen-pounders, and had 
 started himself the same evening with the 90th. On the 
 way up Eyre, with 160 infantry and two guns, crushed a 
 body of insurgents who had crossed over from Oudh with 
 the view of cutting Outram's communications. This action 
 completely cleared the road, and enabled Outram to reach 
 Kanhpur with the much-needed reinforcements on the i6th. 
 
 His first act illustrated the character of the man. 
 Feeling that, under extraordinary difficulties, Havelock 
 had made a most daring attempt to relieve the garrison of 
 the Lakhnao Residency, and that but for his own arrival 
 that general would have been enabled to renew the at- 
 tempt under favourable conditions, he resolved that the 
 credit of the relief should still belong to him above all 
 others. He therefore on his arrival issued a divisional 
 order, in which he declared that, ' in gratitude for, and 
 admiration of, the brilliant deed of arms achieved by 
 Brigadier-General Havelock and his gallant troops,' he, 
 Outram, ' will cheerfully waive his rank in favour of that 
 officer on this occasion, and will accompany the force to 
 Lakhnao in his civil capacity, as Chief Commissioner of 
 Oudh, tendering his military services to Brigadier-General 
 Havelock as a volunteer.' 
 
 This generous offer was accepted in fitting terms by 
 Havelock. 
 
cv^?^ e_ya/?rie^i U^tfy'^/. 
 
Have lock marches to Lakhnao. 237 
 
 The force now at Havelock's disposal consisted of 
 3179 men of all arms. It was constituted as follows. The 
 first infantry brigade, composed of the Madras Fusiliers, 
 the 5th Fusiliers, the 84th, and two companies of the 
 64th, was commanded by Neill. The second, composed 
 of the 78th Highlanders, the 90th, and Brasyer's Sikhs, 
 was led by Colonel Hamilton of the 78th, with the rank 
 of Brigadier. The artillery brigade, composed of Maude's 
 battery, Olpherts' battery, and Eyre's battery of eighteen- 
 pounders, was commanded by Major Cooper. Barrow 
 led the cavalry, consisting of 109 volunteers and fifty-nine 
 native horsemen. Crommelin was the Chief Engineer. 
 
 With this force, leaving Colonel Wilson of the 64th, 
 with the headquarters of his regiment and some details of 
 convalescents, in all about 400 men, to hold Kanhpur, 
 Havelock crossed the Ganges, on the 19th, under cover of 
 Eyre's heavy guns. Those guns followed the next day. 
 On the 21st Havelock drove the rebels from Mangalwar, 
 then halting at Unao for a mouthful of food, pushed on 
 to Bashiratganj, already the scene of three contests, and 
 bivouacked there for the night. It was raining heavily, 
 and not a man but who was wet to the skin. However, 
 the mipedimenta arrived two hours later, and with it the 
 luxury of dry clothes and a dinner. The rain was still 
 falling as the little force set out at half-past seven the 
 next morning. Marching sixteen miles, it came in sight 
 of the bridge of Banni, a very defensible position had the 
 rebels had the heart to defend it. But badly led, or 
 believing in the greater capabilities of the narrow streets 
 of Lakhnao, they had neither broken down the bridge 
 over the river Sai nor manned the two half-moon batteries 
 which they had constructed on the further side of it. 
 Havelock then crossed the bridge, bivouacked for the 
 night on its further bank, and fired a royal salute to inti- 
 
238 The Fighting in Lakhnao begins. 
 
 mate to the defenders of the Residency the near approach 
 Z)f reHef. 
 
 The 23d promised to be a day of action. Lakhnao was 
 but sixteen miles distant. The wind no longer bore to the 
 British Camp the customary sound of the booming of heavy 
 guns against the Residency. It was plain that the rebels 
 were concentrating their resources for a stern defence of the 
 city. Havelock gave the men their breakfasts, and then 
 moved forward. It was half-past eight. For some time 
 no enemy was visible. But as the troops approached the 
 Alambagh, some infantry appeared on their flanks, and 
 they soon had evidence that the rebels were prepared to 
 receive them at and near that walled garden. Havelock 
 then halted his men, changed the order of his march from 
 right to left in front, bringing Hamilton's brigade to the 
 left front, their route lying across broken and heavy 
 ground. Eyre's heavy battery then opened on the enemy's 
 batteries, which occupied a tope of trees in front of his 
 centre and left, whilst Olpherts was despatched to the left 
 to cover the movement of the second brigade (Hamilton's) 
 against the right, Barrow's cavalry leading. Overcoming 
 every obstacle, Olpherts' battery took a position on the 
 rebels' right flank and opened fire. The rebels on the left 
 and centre, crushed meanwhile by the play of Eyre's guns, 
 then gave way ; but the Alambagh remained, and two 
 guns were firing on the British force from embrasures in 
 its wall. To capture these Neill sent forward a wing of 
 the 5th Fusiliers. The 5th, with their habitual gallantry, 
 stormed the wall. Whilst they were engaged in a fierce 
 fight for the two pieces, Captain Burton of the 78th had 
 forced the main entrance, and rushed to their aid, taking 
 the defenders of the guns in reverse. The Madras 
 Fusiliers followed. The men of the three regiments did 
 their work so well that in ten minutes the Alambagh was 
 
The Decisive Day dawns. 2^g 
 
 cleared of its defenders, and Barrow and Outram and 
 their companions were galloping in pursuit of the flee- 
 ing enemy. As they were returning from pursuing the 
 rebels to the Yellow House, near the Charbagh bridge, 
 a despatch was placed in Outram's hands. It told him 
 that our countrymen had stormed Dehli. He galloped 
 to Havelock with the news a few minutes later, and 
 Outram, bareheaded, announced the glad tidings to the 
 hurriedly collected soldiers. The ringing shouts with 
 which they received it might almost have been heard in 
 the Residency. 
 
 No tents were up, no food was forthcoming, but the 
 day's work had been eminently satisfactory, and the men, 
 exhilarated by their success and by the news, were content 
 to wait until food should arrive. The next day they rested 
 whilst their general made his last arrangements for the 
 advance of the morrow. The rebels kept up a heavy fire 
 all day in their direction, but Havelock had thrown back 
 his line so as to be beyond its range. 
 
 At last the decisive day dawned. The final scheme 
 adopted was to force the Charbagh bridge, then to follow 
 a winding lane skirting the left bank of the canal, thence 
 to make a sharp turn to the left and push through the 
 fortified palaces and bazaars which covered the ground 
 extending to the very gates of the Residency. It was 
 certain that the Charbagh bridge and every inch of 
 ground beyond it would be desperately defended. The 
 sick and wounded, the hospital, the baggage, and the food 
 and ammunition reserves would meanwhile be left in the 
 Alambagh, guarded by 303 men, mostly footsore, com- 
 manded by Major M'Intyre of the 78th. 
 
 At half-past eight o'clock the advance sounded, and 
 the first brigade, with Maude's battery in front, accom- 
 panied by Outram, moved ofi' towards the Yellow House, 
 
240 The C heir bag h Bridge, 
 
 in column of sections, right in front. Soon the rebel fire 
 opened upon them. Maude, however, quickly cleared the 
 way with his guns, and the men pushing on, forced their 
 way to a point near the bridge. There they were halted 
 whilst Outram, with the 5th Fusiliers, should make a detour 
 to the right to clear the Charbagh garden, with the view 
 of bringing a flanking fire to bear on the strong defences 
 of the bridge. 
 
 The position of the rebels, indeed, could scarcely have 
 been stranger. The Charbagh bridge was defended on 
 its farther side by an earthen rampart about seven feet high, 
 stretching completely across it, but having in the centre 
 an opening through which only one man at a time could 
 pass on foot. On this parapet were mounted six guns, 
 two of them twenty-four-pounders. To the right of the 
 bridge, on the side of the canal by which the British were 
 advancing, were some enclosures occupied by the rebels. 
 
 Such was the position. The men behind it were 
 numerous, their guns were loaded, and there was every 
 appearance that it would be desperately defended. On 
 the British side were Maude's two guns in front ; to their 
 left, thrown forward, twenty-five men of the Madras 
 Fusiliers, under Lieutenant Arnold, endeavouring to beat 
 down the musketry fire from the tall houses on the other 
 side ; behind Maude's guns, close by, covered by a bend 
 of the road and a wall, were the remainder of the Madras 
 Fusiliers, lying down and waiting till Maude's guns should 
 have done their work ; to the right, Outram had led the 
 5th Fusiliers, for the purpose already indicated. These, 
 I need hardly add, were not in sight. In a bay of the 
 wall of the Charbagh garden stood Neill and his Aide- 
 de-Camp, waiting until Outram's flank movement should 
 make itself felt. On the other side of the road, mounted, 
 was young Havelock. 
 
ro?e;f^ Havelock and His Comrades. 24 i 
 
 The duel between Maude's guns and those of the 
 rebels had raged for some time. The enemy had all the 
 advantage of fighting under cover, and they had made 
 deadly havoc wth Maude's gunners. One after another 
 hese had fallen their places being supplied from the 
 mfantry behind them. So great was the pressure that 
 Maude and h,s Lieutenant, Maitland, were doing the work 
 hemselves. At the end of half-an-hour Maude recognised 
 hat he was making no impression. Then he called out 
 o young Havelock that he could not fight his guns much 
 longer, and begged him to 'do something.' Havelock 
 rode at once to NeiU and suggested that he should charge 
 the bridge But Neill, feeling himself hampered by the 
 presence of Outram, with his brigade, declared that in his 
 absence he could not take the responsibility; that Outram 
 . must turn up soon. Tytler then attempted to persuade 
 him to give the order, but with the same result 
 
 th.^.t™*^!'' "°""'"^ ^"'^ ^^'=" '^^^■•d of Outram and 
 T^A f P°"'"'°" ^^^ "'^'^'^^- Maude could not 
 
 hold on much longer. A charge alone could remedy 
 the position. Recognising this, young Havelock, full of 
 ardour, despairing of overcoming in any other way the 
 obstinacy of Neill, attempted a ruse. Riding to the rear 
 a short distance, he suddenly turned his horse, and gallop- 
 ing back rode up to Neill and. saluting him, said, as 
 though the order had come from his father. 'You are to 
 carry the bridge, sir.' Neill gave the order, directing 
 
 Arnold dashed forward with his handful on to the brid<.e 
 and made for the barricade. Young Havelock and Tyttei' 
 were by his side in a moment. Then the hurrican^ 
 opened. Arnold fell, shot through both thighs. Tytler's 
 horse was killed, and he himself shot through the groin 
 Of the twenty-eight men who had dashed forward, Have- 
 
 Q 
 
242 They clear the Bridge, 
 
 lock and a private named Jakes alone were unwounded. 
 Unable to pass the barricade, Havelock, erect on his horse, 
 waved his sword and called on the main body to come 
 on. Jakes stood by his side, loading and firing as fast as 
 he could. There they stood, the hero officer and the hero 
 private, for fully two minutes exposed to the full fire of 
 the enemy. They stood unharmed. Then suddenly 
 there was a rush, and the Madras Fusiliers dashed for- 
 ward, cleared the bridge, stormed the barricade, and 
 bayoneted the rebel gunners where they stood. The 
 bridge was gained. The entrance gate into Lakhnao 
 was won. 
 
 On the regiments of the second brigade closing up, the 
 whole force crossed by the bridge, and then, in pursuance 
 of the plan indicated, turned sharp to the right along the 
 canal. There was one exception to this movement. The 
 78th was sent with orders to hold the end of the direct 
 Kanhpur road, cover the advance of the heavy guns, and 
 then to follow the column as its rear-guard. The main 
 body meanwhile, followed the lane along the canal for 
 two miles, then turned northwards near the Dilkusha 
 bridge, when its progress was suddenly checked by a 
 formidable obstacle. Before them, under lee of the 
 Kaisarbagh, was a narrow bridge across a nullah, com- 
 manded by guns and musketry fire from that building. 
 The bridge could not hold more than two abreast. How- 
 ever, a rush was made, and the men who crossed opened 
 a fire on the rebels to cover the passage of their comrades. 
 Many men were here struck down, when suddenly the 
 situation was mended by the 78th in a manner presently 
 to be related. Then the crossing was effected, and the 
 men, reuniting, halted under cover of some deserted build- 
 ings near the Chatr Manzil. 
 
 Darkness was now coming on. Outram, who had 
 
And enter the Residency, 243 
 
 found the clearing of the Charbdgh garden more serious 
 than he anticipated, and who had come up after the 
 bridge had been stormed, then proposed that the force 
 should halt where it was — at the Chatr Manzil — to 
 await there the arrival of the rearmost guard, of which 
 they had no tidings, and of those it was escorting. 
 There were many considerations in favour of such a 
 plan, and there was only a sentimental reason against it. 
 But Havelock considered that the importance of joining 
 the beleaguered garrison outweighed every other con- 
 sideration. So they pushed on through the Khas bazaar, 
 crowded with the enemy. From an archway in this 
 bazaar Neill was shot dead in the act of giving an order 
 to his Aide-de-Camp. Still the British forced their way, 
 despite the continuous musketry fire, until at length they 
 emerged from the bazaar. Then they were gladdened by 
 the sound of cheering from the Residency. The 78th, and 
 others who had pushed their way through other streets, 
 appeared on the scene directly afterwards and joined 
 in the cry. They were not yet, however, within the 
 Residency. The night was dark, and a way had to be 
 made for them before they could enter. At last the de- 
 fences which had so long bidden defiance to the rebels at 
 the Baillie guard were removed, and there was no obstacle 
 to a joyful union between the relievers and the relieved. 
 
 Not all entered that night. Many of the men lay 
 on the ground between the Baillie guard gateway and 
 the Farhatbakhsh palace, and rejoined their comrades 
 early in the morning. It remains now to recount the 
 course of the 78th. That regiment had had a hard 
 time of it. Directed by Havelock to see to the safety 
 of the heavy guns, it had diverged from the main 
 body, and reached a point indicated on the Kanhpur 
 road. There, for a time, the men remained unmolested, 
 
244 The Rear- Gttard conies Up, 
 
 when suddenly swarms of natives set upon them. For 
 three hours they resisted every attack ; then, the number 
 of the rebels increasing, they stormed a temple, and held 
 it against the infuriated enemy. Vainly did the latter 
 bring up three brass guns. The British soldiers, led on 
 by Webster, Herbert Macpherson, and other gallant 
 officers, charged and captured these, and threw them into 
 the canal. Still the fight went on, and it required another 
 charge before the rebels could be compelled to renounce 
 their hopes of success. The Highlanders then, seeing 
 nothing of the heavy guns, pushed on, with the idea of 
 rejoining their comrades of the main body, but taking a 
 shorter road, through the Hazratganj quarter, they arrived 
 in close vicinity to the Kaisarbagh just as the guns from 
 that building were playing on the Fusiliers in the manner 
 related. The 78th dashed into the battery, and made the 
 road easy by its capture. They then pushed on in an 
 alignment with the rest to the Baillie guard. 
 
 But the heavy guns ? Their progress had been ren- 
 dered very difficult by the deep trenches which the rebels 
 had cut across the road. But under the guidance of 
 Lieutenant Moorsom, who knew every inch of the ground, 
 sent by Havelock to direct them, they had deviated from 
 the main road and went by a shorter cut, unopposed, to 
 the Baillie guard. The rearmost guard, however, with 
 two big guns, still remained unaccounted for. To search 
 for and rescue these, Outram, who had assumed command, 
 despatched, on the 26th, a force under Colonel Robert 
 Napier.^ Napier found them holding the passage in 
 front of the Moti Mahall, and brought them in the follow- 
 ing morning. It is sad to have to record that the 
 wounded who had reached that palace were not so for- 
 tunate in their attempt to reach the Residency. The 
 
 ^ The late Lord Napier of Magdala. 
 
Outram wisely decides to remain. 245 
 
 volunteer escort mistook the way, and some forty helpless 
 men were done to death, some by the daggers of the 
 rebels, some by the fire wantonly applied to their doHs.^ 
 
 The losses sustained in this glorious operation were 
 heavy. The official return puts them at 196 killed and 
 535 wounded, and there is every reason for believing that 
 that return is accurate. Those losses were incurred in 
 the hope that, as a satisfactory result of them, the de- 
 fenders of the Residency would be relieved. As it was, 
 they were merely reinforced. At first Outram inclined 
 to the belief that it would be possible to fall back upon 
 Kanhpur. But his better judgment prevailed. Subse- 
 quent experience proved most clearly that the women 
 and children could not have been withdrawn by the force 
 under his orders except at a tremendous risk. If it had 
 cost him over 500 men to make his way into the Resi- 
 dency, unencumbered by non-combatants of that stamp, 
 the reader may judge for himself how far he could have 
 succeeded in making the reverse journey under circum- 
 stances infinitely more complicated. Eager as was 
 Outram to return to place himself and his troops at 
 the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, he was surely 
 right, situated as he was, not to attempt it. Circum- 
 stances were too strong, even for a man who, through- 
 out his career, had never flinched at either danger or 
 responsibility. 
 
 Whilst he remains besieged in the Residency, his 
 troops occupying some of the adjacent palaces, and the 
 Alambagh held by a small detachment, I propose to take 
 a survey of the events which had been passing in that part 
 of the country in which British interests were represented 
 almost solely by the men who occupied the fortress of 
 Agra. 
 
 1 A doli is an inferior kind of palanquin, used for carrying a wounded man. 
 
CHAPTER XVI I. 
 
 THE LEAGUER OF AGRA. 
 
 In the eighth chapter I have given a brief account of the 
 risings at Firuzpur, at Ahgarh, at Bulandshahr, at Itawah, 
 at Mainpuri, and of the consequent movements at Agra. 
 I have shown how, in consequence of the rising at Mathura, 
 on the 30th of May, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North- 
 west, Mr Colvin, had caused the sipahis of the 44th and 
 67th N. I. to be disarmed (May 31); how he had directed 
 the raising of volunteers; how, on the 14th of June, the 
 sipahis of the Gwaliar contingent had mutinied at GwaHar ; 
 and how the EngHsh men and women who had survived 
 the massacre consequent upon that mutiny had found 
 refuge at Agra ; and, finally, how it was not until the 
 end of June that Mr Colvin had deemed it wise that the 
 Europeans and Eurasians should abandon their houses 
 in the station and take up their abode in the fort of red 
 sandstone built by Akbar in 1565-73. He did not move 
 thither himself till the 4th of June following. I propose 
 now to take up the story, briefly, from that date. 
 
 Mr Colvin's order to concentrate the resources in men 
 and supplies of the English at Agra, within the fort, had not 
 been issued a day too soon. Indeed it is to be regretted 
 that it was not issued earlier, and that, when issued, it was 
 accompanied with restrictions. Mr Raikes, a member of 
 the Civil Service occupying a high position at Agra, records 
 that the order directing the move to the fort forbade the 
 
Position of Affairs in the Noi^'th-west. 247 
 
 transfer to that place of refuge of ' any property beyond 
 the sort of allowance which a French Customs House 
 officer at Calais or Marseilles passes under the term of a 
 sac de nuit! This extraordinary prohibition, adds the 
 same authority, entailed ' the loss 'and destruction of 
 books, furniture, archives, records, public and private, and 
 the ruin of hundreds of families/ The victualling of the 
 fort proceeded, however, with great energy. 
 
 By the end of June Agra was completely isolated. 
 The entire country between the Jamnah and the Ganges 
 was ' up,' whilst to the west of the former river Bundel- 
 khand was surging with rebels ; Rajputana and Central 
 India had become difficult to hold. Communications with 
 the north, south, west, and east had been severed. In fact, 
 in what direction soever Mr Colvin might turn his glance, 
 the horizon was gloomy in the extreme. 
 
 Nor was the position mended by the news which 
 reached him on the 2d of July. This was to the effect 
 that a strong rebel force had reached Fathpur-Sikri, 
 twenty-three miles from Agra. To meet these he had 
 within the fort the 3d European regiment and one battery 
 of European artillery. But he had also native allies upon 
 whom he believed rather fatuously that he could rely. 
 These were a body of 600 Karduli match) ockmen, com- 
 manded by Saifulla Khan, a native official of high char- 
 acter, some levies from Bhartpur, and a detachment of the 
 Kota contingent. Mr Colvin at once brought the last 
 named within the cantonment, whilst he placed the others 
 at Shahganj, four miles on the road to Fathpur-Sikri, to 
 watch the movements of the rebel force at that place. 
 
 The following day, the 3d, Mr Colvin being ill, a 
 council of three gentlemen, Mr Reade, the senior member 
 of the Board of Revenue, Major Macleod of the Engineers, 
 Military Secretary to Mr Colvin, and Brigadier Polwhele, 
 
248 T/ie Situation becomes more defined. 
 
 commanding the troops, was appointed to administer 
 affairs. These gentlemen at once took active measures for 
 the public safety. Some of these may sound strange, but 
 they were probably justified under the circumstances. For 
 instance, dreading lest the rebels might enter the station, 
 and let loose upon it a number of hardened criminals, 
 they conveyed the prisoners in the gaol across the J am n ah, 
 and released them. Then they broke down the pontoon 
 bridge communicating with the fort, they brought in all 
 the native Christians, they directed that the Karauli and 
 Bhartpur levies should be required to give up their guns, 
 two in number, and they directed the officer commanding 
 the Kota contingent to march against the rebels. These 
 orders sufficed to clear the air. The Bhartpur and 
 Karauli men, angered by the removal of their guns, re- 
 moved themselves from the scene. It was the best course 
 for the English they could adopt, for an open enemy is 
 better than a pretended friend. Similarly with the Kota 
 contingent. No sooner did the men composing it receive 
 the order to advance than they shot down the English 
 sergeant in charge of their military stores, and firing 
 hastily at their European officers, rushed off to join the 
 enemy they had been directed to combat. They did not, 
 happily, effect their full purpose, for whilst a loyal gunner 
 named Mathura managed unseen to spike their guns, 
 their English doctor, Mathias by name, calm and collected 
 amid dangers, strewed in the sand their powder, ammuni- 
 tion, and case-shot. A party sent out from Agra brought 
 the guns into the fort. 
 
 That same evening Mr Colvin entered the fort and 
 resumed authority. The next day, the 5th, the rebels 
 marched in from Fathpur-Sikri and took up a position 
 at the village of Sassiah, some five miles from the fort. 
 They were reported to consist of 4000 infantry, 1500 
 
Polwhele marches against the Rebels. 249 
 
 cavalry, and eleven guns. Brigadier Polwhele, after pro- 
 viding for the defences of the fort, could take into the 
 field against them 568 English infantry, a battery with 
 sixty-nine Englishmen, including officers, and fifty-four 
 native drivers, fifty-five mounted militia, and fifty English 
 volunteers, mostly officers, making a total of 742 English- 
 men, besides the officers of the European regiment and 
 the staff. It was a force sufficient, if well handled, to 
 drive the rebel force to Jericho. 
 
 Believing that he could so handle it, Polwhele marched 
 from the fort at one o'clock, and proceeded to Shahganj. 
 There he halted till his reconnoitring parties should come 
 in. These arrived at half-past two with the information 
 that the rebels were still halted at Sassiah. Towards that 
 village Polwhele then moved. When within half-a-mile 
 from it the enemy's left battery opened fire. 
 
 There is only one true method of fighting Asiatics. 
 That mode is to move straight on. To play the game of an 
 artillery duello with them, when they have nearly double 
 the number of guns and the advantage of position, is 
 simply madness. The experience of a hundred years 
 would have been reversed if Polwhele, pushing on against 
 the village of Sassiah, had failed to drive the rebels from it. 
 But he did nothing of the sort. Far from profiting from 
 the teachings of history, he tried a plan in which he was 
 bound to be beaten. He halted his infantry, and made 
 them lie down, whilst he engaged in an artillery duello 
 with his six guns against the enemy's eleven. His men 
 were in the open, the rebels were protected by the village 
 of Sassiah. The logical consequences followed. Although 
 the British guns were directed by two of the most gallant 
 and skilled officers the splendid Bengal Artillery ever 
 produced. Captain D'Oyley commanding half the battery 
 on the right, Captain Pearson the other half on the 
 
250 Battle of Sassiah. 
 
 left, the larger calibre of the enemy's guns asserted its 
 superiority. They had, moreover, the exact range. In 
 a short time they succeeded in exploding two tumbrils, 
 and in inflicting considerable damage among the drivers 
 and horses of the British. Vainly did D'Oyley and Pear- 
 son send messages to Polwhele to tell him that a persist- 
 ance in those tactics would exhaust their ammunition 
 without securing for him any corresponding advantage. 
 Polwhele heeded not. Eyre, at Arah, had been in a posi- 
 tion somewhat similar, but the moment he had realised 
 that pounding with guns would not win the day against 
 an enemy strongly posted, he had tried the never-failing 
 British charge. But Polwhele would not. Probably he 
 was hampered by the considerations which hampered 
 Lawrence at Chinhat. The infantry he had with him 
 constituted the sole means at his disposal for the defence 
 of the fort. At all events he persisted in waiting until 
 another tumbril had been exploded by the enemy's fire, 
 and until their cavalry, gathering courage from his inac- 
 tivity, charged Pearson's half-battery. Cool and collected, 
 Pearson awaited their approach, whilst the company of the 
 Europeans nearest to him rose to their feet, their muskets 
 levelled. A simultaneous fire, well directed, from the 
 guns and the infantry sufficed to ward off the attack, and 
 to send the survivors reeling back to the place whence 
 they had ridden. A similar attempt threatened against 
 D'Oyley's half- battery was defeated by the volunteer 
 horsemen. These, eighteen in number, charged the 
 200 of the rebels, and though they lost one-third of 
 their number, they forced the rebels to retire. 
 
 Two hours and a half had now elapsed. The rebels 
 still occupied their unthreatened position. The English 
 had effected nothing to drive them from it. D'Oyley 
 reported to the Brigadier that his ammunition was all but 
 
The British forced to retire. 2 5 1 
 
 exhausted. Then, and then only, did the Brigadier issue 
 the order which, given two hours and a half before, could 
 scarcely have failed to achieve success. He ordered the 
 line to advance. The line did advance, and, despite the 
 fire from men stationed in most advantageous positions in 
 Sassiah, the men fought their way into the village. They 
 even captured and spiked one of the enemy's guns. But 
 in advancing to and in taking the village the British 
 losses had been heavy. D'Oyley was mortally wounded.^ 
 Major Thomas of the Europeans met the same fate. 
 Several men were killed, but at last the village was 
 gained. It required but the support of the guns to com- 
 plete the victory, but by this time every round had been 
 fired away. In his anxiety for the safety of his men Pol- 
 whele had prematurely, and despite of repeated warnings, 
 exhausted the one means by which he could assure success. 
 
 For the rebels were not slow to recognise the cause of 
 the silence of the British guns. They at least had ten, and 
 still some, though not an abundance, of ammunition. They 
 at once made a demonstration with the three arms against 
 the village. Polwhele could not defend it with infantry 
 alone, and he ran a great risk of being cut off from the 
 fort. Under those circumstances, he had no other course 
 but to retreat. The retreat was effected in good order; 
 the infantry, though savage with their commander, to 
 whose fatal tactics they rightly attributed the loss of the 
 day, preserving their traditional calmness, and repulsing 
 every attack. Fortunately, before the retreat was con- 
 cluded, the rebels likewise fell short of gun ammunition. 
 
 In this fight the British had lost forty-five men killed, 
 and 108 wounded and missing. They had, also, left one 
 
 ^ Overcome by the intense pain of the wound, he turned to the man 
 nearest him and said, ' They have done for me now ; put a stone over my 
 grave, and say that I died fighting my guns.' 
 
252 Consequences of the Defeat. 
 
 gun on the ground, though they recovered it a day or 
 two later. The rebels signalised their triumph by set- 
 ting fire to every building within their reach. They then 
 returned to Sassiah, took a hasty meal, and set off for 
 Dehli. Arriving there, on the 8th, they were greeted with 
 a grand salute as ' the victors of Sassiah.' 
 
 For the English the blow was severe. Though the 
 rebels had departed, their allies, the rabble and the gaol- 
 birds, finished what they had begun. They ruthlessly 
 plundered the city, the cantonments, and the civil lines, 
 burning the materials they cared not to take away. The 
 following morning the town-crier, by order of the Kotwal, 
 proclaimed the inauguration of the rule of the Mughal. 
 
 Of Polwhele's battle it only remains to be said that 
 it should stand out in history as a warning of the manner 
 in which Europeans, or, I would rather say, the British 
 race, should not fight Asiatics. From the date following 
 that on which it was fought began, for the English at 
 Agra, that long and tedious life in the fort, which was ter- 
 minated only by the arrival of a force, under Greathed, on 
 the loth of October, made disposable by^the fall of Dehli. 
 In the interval, September the 9th, Mr Colvin died. 
 He was succeeded temporarily, and until the orders of 
 the Government of India should be known, by the senior 
 Civil servant, Mr E. A. Reade, a man of lofty character — 
 the type of a hard-working, unselfish English gentleman. 
 More than two months later (September 30th), the 
 Government, thinking that the times required a soldier 
 rather than a civilian at the head of affairs, nominated 
 Colonel Hugh Eraser of the Engineers to be their Chief 
 Commissioner for Agra and its dependencies. Colonel 
 Eraser held the office till the 9th of February following. 
 
 The slight sketch I have given of the proceedings at 
 Agra, till the fall of Dehli had released avenging columns 
 
Dehli the Centre of the Sitttation. 253 
 
 to reconquer the North-west, will probably have brought 
 home to the mind of the reader that, to the north and 
 north-west of Allahabad, Dehli was the central point, the 
 place upon the occupation of which the fate of the towns 
 and districts in those provinces, the fate of Central India, 
 the fate of the Panjab itself, depended. The whole of the 
 North-west, including Bundelkhand and Rohilkhand, had 
 risen because Dehli was held by the rebels. The assertion 
 in that Imperial city of the rule of the Mughal was the 
 cause : — insurrection all over the country was the conse- 
 quence. The truth of this axiom was felt more clearly 
 every day by those who were responsible for the main- 
 tenance of British authority in the provinces and districts 
 which remained loyal. Equally was it felt by the native 
 princes who adhered to the British connection, by those 
 who had shaken it off, and by the watchers of the atmo- 
 sphere. If the British should be compelled to abandon 
 their position before Dehli, it would be scarcely possible 
 to prevent a tremendous conflagration. Most certainly the 
 Panjab would have risen. In that event, most probably, 
 the districts to the north-west and west of Allahabad would 
 have been completely severed, for a time, from the British. 
 Dehli being thus the centre of the situation, the point 
 on the possession of which depended the fate of the sur- 
 rounding districts, it becomes me, before detailing the 
 result of the struggle before its walls, to take a bird's-eye 
 view of the provinces and districts in which its influence 
 had made itself the most felt. I propose, therefore, to 
 glance at the events which had occurred in the Sagar and 
 Narbada territories, in Central India, in Rajputana, in the 
 districts dependent upon Mirath, in Rohilkhand, and, 
 finally, in the Panjab, before I describe the 'crowning 
 mercy ' which was vouchsafed to the British arms in the 
 city which had become the kernel and focus of the revolt. 
 
CHAPTER XVII I. 
 
 EVENTS IN THE SAGAR AND NARBADA TERRITORIES, 
 CENTRAL INDIA, rAjPUTANA, THE MIRATH DIS- 
 TRICTS, ROHILKHAND, AND THE PANJAB. 
 
 The S^gar and Narbada territories, immediately south 
 of, and adjoining, the North-west Provinces, comprised, 
 in 1857, the districts of Sagar, Jabalpur, Hohsangabad, 
 Sioni, Damoh, Narsinhpur, Betul, Chanderi, Jhansi, Nagod, 
 and Mandlah. When, in 1843, the Gvvah'ar Darbdr com- 
 menced those hostihties against the British which culmi- 
 nated in the battle of Maharajpur, the chiefs and people of 
 those districts, moved partly by their dislike to the foreign 
 system of administration, partly incited by the Gwdliar 
 Darbar, broke into rebellion. On the conclusion of the 
 peace which followed Maharajpur, the then Governor- 
 General, Lord EUenborough, made a clean sweep of the 
 officers who had administered the territories, and deputed 
 Colonel Sleeman to inaugurate a better system. Colonel 
 Sleeman, working on eastern ideas, completely succeeded. 
 His successor, Mr Bushby, continued his system with 
 marked success. But after a rule of five or six years Mr 
 Bushby was promoted. Then, in an evil hour, the Sagar 
 and Narbada territories were placed directly under the 
 Government of the North-west Provinces. 
 
 That transfer caused the introduction of the system 
 called after its inventor Mr Thomason. But for the ear- 
 nest exhortations of the ablest man in the Commission, 
 
The Thomasonian System. 255 
 
 Major Ternan, that system would have been introduced in 
 all its strictness. Even wi-th some of its most stringent 
 provisions softened down, it worked in a manner to cause 
 great discontent among the chiefs, without satisfying the 
 people. 
 
 The mode in which this system worked may be illus- 
 trated by the story of the Raja of Dilheri, the feudal lord 
 of all the Gond clans. This chief had ever been a loyal 
 supporter of the British connection. For his fidelity in 
 the trying times of 1843 the Government had presented 
 him with a gold medal. Like many of his tribe, he had 
 been rather extravagant in his expenditure, and had in- 
 curred debts. These, however, by exercising a strict 
 economy, he had paid off a very short time after the 
 transfer of the Sdgar and Narbada territories to the North- 
 west Government. Now, it was one of the principles of 
 that Government to discourage large landowners. Accord- 
 ingly, in 1855, just after the Raja had paid off his debts, 
 Captain Ternan, then in charge of the district in which his 
 estates were situated, received instructions to inform the 
 Raja that, inasmuch as he had shown himself unfit to 
 hold the title he had inherited, and to manage the estates 
 which had descended to him, he would be deprived of 
 both ; that his title would be abolished, and his property 
 distributed among his tenants, he receiving a percentage 
 from the rents. When Ternan, most reluctantly, an- 
 nounced this order to the Raja, the old man drew from 
 his belt the medal bestowed upon him for his conduct in 
 1843, and requested him to return it to those who had 
 granted it, as they were now about to disgrace him before 
 his clan and the entire district. With great difficulty 
 Ternan pacified him, but his heart was deeply wounded. 
 Many thought that he would rebel. But, despite the 
 treatment he had received, he was loyal to his British 
 
256 Events in Bttndelkhand. 
 
 overlord. He sought, indeed, every opportunity of dis- 
 playing his gratitude to Ternan, who had been censured 
 by the Agra Government for his persistent advocacy of 
 his claims.! 
 
 The Raja of Dilheri was the type of many land- 
 owners in the Sagar and Narbada territories, in fact, 
 throughout the territories subject to the Government of 
 the North-west, who had been ruined by the Thomasonian 
 system. Space does not allow me to give other instances, 
 but in Juanpur, in Azamgarh, in the delta of the Ganges, 
 in Oudh, in Rohilkhand, they abounded. It was they who 
 roused the country, which offered so stout a resistance to 
 Sir Hugh Rose, between Indur and Kalpi. 
 
 I must pass lightly over the events which happened in 
 the territories of which I am writing. It must suffice to 
 state that three companies of the Gwaliar contingent 
 garrisoning Lalitpur mutinied and expelled their European 
 officers on the 13th of June; that a detachment of native 
 infantry sent out from Sagar, under Major Gaussen, rose 
 on the 23d ; that the 3d Irregulars and the 42d N. I., 
 stationed at Sagar, broke out on the ist of July. The 
 last-mentioned mutineers were, however, expelled the day 
 following by the loyal 31st N. I., a regiment loyal to the 
 last. From that moment, and until they were relieved by 
 Sir Hugh Rose, the English men and women, and the 
 
 ^ When the Narsmhpur district was in a state of rebellion, the house of 
 Ternan, who had refused to quit it, was surrounded early one morning by 
 a considerable body of matchlockmen. Ternan saw at a glance that they 
 belonged to the Dilheri clan. He at once summoned the chief, and asked 
 him the reason for such a display. The chief replied : ' You behaved kindly 
 to us, and fought our battle when the title and the estate were confiscated, 
 and you were abused for so doing. Now we hear disturbances are rife, and 
 we come to offer you our services. We will stick by you, as you stuck by us. 
 What do you wish us to do ? ' Ternan accepted their offer, and the members 
 of the large clan remained loyal, and rendered good service to the British 
 Government throughout the trying events of 1857-8. 
 
yiidnsi. 257 
 
 loyal sipahis occupied Sagar, but not one foot of terri- 
 tory beyond it. The districts of Sagar, Chanderi, Jhansi, 
 Lalitpur, and Jalaun continued until that period to be 
 overrun by rebels. The Raja of Banpur, and others of 
 lesser note, boldly asserted their independence. 
 
 At Jabalpur, the headquarters of the territories, the 
 5 2d N. I. continued for a long time in the performance of 
 their duty. But in September they too mutinied. They 
 were attacked, however, and completely defeated by a 
 body of Madras troops which had been sent up from 
 Kamthi. They then dispersed, but nevertheless refrained 
 from ravaging the country. 
 
 The energetic and far-sighted Ternan, of whom I have 
 already spoken, managed, by means of his good under- 
 standing with the natives, to clear the rebels from his 
 district, that of Narsinhpur. The district of Nagod was 
 not so fortunate. The 50th N. I., there located, feigned 
 loyalty for a time, but broke out on the 27th of August, 
 when they coolly dismissed their officers and inaugurated 
 a system of plunder. They, too, formed a part of the rebel 
 force which resisted the progress of Sir Hugh Rose. 
 
 It remains now to speak of Jhansi. The city of Jhansi 
 was the capital of a dependency which, in the break-up of 
 the Mughal empire which followed the death of Aurangzib, 
 had been appropriated by one of the Maratha officers 
 serving the Peshwa, and to him confirmed by sanad} The 
 territory so appropriated comprised nearly 1 608 square 
 miles, and a population of a quarter of a million. As 
 long as the Peshwa continued to exercise authority in 
 Western India the Maratha officer and his successors ad- 
 ministered the territory as vassals of that prince. But on 
 the downfall of the Peshwa, in 18 17-8, Jhansf, with its 
 other territories, was transferred to the British. The ruler, 
 
 ^ Sanad, a patent grant or charter issuing from the Government. 
 
 R 
 
^5^ The Claims of the Rani refused. 
 
 with the title of Subahdar, accepted the protection of the 
 foreign overlord, and agreed to pay an annual tribute of 
 74,000 rupees. In return, the British declared his title 
 and position to be hereditary in his family. Fifteen years 
 later, to mark their approval of his rule, they allowed 
 him to assume the title of Raja. This prince, whose 
 name was Ram Chand Rao, died without heirs, natural 
 or adopted, in 1835. The Government of India, how- 
 ever, had, as we have said, bestowed the hereditary rule 
 upon his family. They therefore appointed his nearest 
 relative, who happened to be his uncle, to succeed him. 
 
 This man was a leper, and incapable. After three 
 years of unpopular rule his death left the quasi-royal seat 
 vacant. There was a lengthened inquiry regarding a suc- 
 cessor, and then the Government nominated his brother, 
 Baba Gangadhar Rao, to succeed him. 
 
 It unfortunately happened that this man was also an 
 imbecile. To prevent the country falling into irremedi- 
 able confusion the Government then carried on the 
 administration by means of British agency. When, in 
 1843, a financial equilibrium had been restored, the 
 Government was handed over to the Raja. After a rule, 
 conducted neither wisely nor well for eleven years, this 
 chief died in 1854, the last surviving member of the 
 family to which the Government of India had, in 18 18, 
 guaranteed the succession. There remained only his 
 widow, a young, high-spirited, and ambitious lady. But 
 Lord Dalhousie was of opinion that the guarantee did not 
 extend to any person in whose veins the blood of the 
 founder of the dynasty did not run. In spite, then, of the 
 protestations of that lady he declared the state of Jhansi 
 to have lapsed to the East India Company. 
 
 The Rani, like Nana Sahib, never forgave that which 
 she considered an insult and an outrage. Powerless, she 
 
Central India. 259 
 
 nursed her resentment, until the revolt of Mirath and the 
 seizure of Dehli gave her the long-wished-for opportunity. 
 She then, in June 1857, gained to her cause the sipahis 
 stationed at Jhansi, enticed the English officers and their 
 families to accept her protection, and had them foully- 
 murdered. On the 9th of June she caused herself to be 
 proclaimed Rani of Jhansi. 
 
 Bundelkhand, and Rewa or Baghelkhand, include, 
 besides Rewa, the territories of Tehri or Urchah, Datia, 
 Chatrpur, Pannah, and Ajaigarh. The area of the com- 
 bined territories is 22,400 square miles, and the popula- 
 tion 3,200,000. More than half of this belongs to Rewa. 
 The Raja of Rewa was loyal to the British connection in 
 1857, ^^<^ having the good fortune to have at his elbow, 
 as his adviser, an officer of marked ability, the late Major 
 Willoughby Osborne, he was able not only to put down 
 mutiny within his territory, but to assist in repressing 
 it outside its borders. The Rajas of Urchah and of 
 Ajaigarh rendered likewise all the assistance in their 
 power to their British overlord. The territories of the 
 Rajas of the other places mentioned were subjected to 
 the invasion and plundering of the rebels, but in their 
 hearts they too were loyal. 
 
 Between Chatrpur and the Jamnah lies the district 
 represented by the stations of Naogang and Bandah, occu- 
 pied by native regiments, and by several small states ruled 
 by native chiefs. The sipahis at Naogang, belonging to 
 the regiments stationed at Jhansi, mutinied as soon as 
 they had heard of the action of their comrades at that 
 place. The British officers and their wives, forced to flee, 
 were hospitably received by the Raja of Chatrpur, but 
 had to quit that place, and eventually succeeded in reach- 
 ing Bandah. The Nuwab of Bandah received them and 
 other British fugitives kindly. The time arrived, however, 
 
2 6o Central India — Holkar. 
 
 when the Nuwab, unable to contend against the excited 
 passions of his followers, was forced, nominally at least, 
 to cast in his lot with the rebels. The same charge was 
 made against the unfortunate Rao of Kirwi, a small 
 state in the Bandah district. Though the territories of 
 the chief were overrun by rebels, his sympathies were with 
 his British overlord. He was a minor, and had no more 
 power to repress the insurrection than a child has to 
 knock down a prize-fighter. Yet the time was to come 
 when, because he and others had not repressed the rebels, 
 they were classed and punished as rebels. This was par- 
 ticularly the case with the innocent Rao of Kirwi. 
 
 Speaking generally, it may be said that, in July and 
 during the following months of 1857, the Sagar and 
 Narbada territories, and the country to the west of the 
 Jamnah generally, Rewah and the town of Sagar excepted, 
 were in the hands of the rebels. It seemed to depend upon 
 the result of the operations before Dehli as to whether the 
 rebellion would assume a more aggressive form. 
 
 To the south-west of Jhansi lay the territories of 
 Maharaja Holkar. These territories comprised the im- 
 portant city of Indur, situated on a tributary of the Sipra, 
 with a population of 15,000; the British cantonment of 
 Mau, between thirteen and fourteen miles ^ distant from 
 the Residency at Indur ; Mandu, an ancient and famous 
 city, with numerous ruins, once the capital of Dhar, and 
 at a later period the residence of the Muhammadan kings 
 of Malwa ; Dipalpur, twenty-seven miles to the north-west 
 of Mau ; and Mehidpur, on the right bank of the Sipra, 
 a town garrisoned by a contingent composed of the three 
 arms, officered by British officers. 
 
 At Mau there were stationed, in 1857, the 23d Regi- 
 ment N. I., a wing of the 1st Native Cavalry, and a field- 
 
 1 A new road has since been made, reducing the distance to ten miles. 
 
Hoik a r and Dtirand. 261 
 
 battery of artillery, with European gunners but native 
 drivers. At Mehidpur the troops, with the exception of 
 the officers, were natives. 
 
 The acting British Resident, or, as he was styled in 
 official language, the Agent for the Governor-General, 
 was Colonel Henry Marion Durand, one of the ablest and 
 most prescient of the officers serving the Government of 
 India. His career had been one of strange vicissitudes. 
 The unselfishness of his nature had been the cause of his 
 missing chances which seldom recur twice to the same 
 individual. 
 
 The events of the loth of May at Mirath, and the con- 
 sequences of those events at Dehli, had produced an un-- 
 paralleled commotion in the native mind in the territories 
 of Holkar. Durand felt his position to be one of peculiar 
 importance. The maintenance of order in the country 
 north of the Narbada depended upon one of two con- 
 tingencies : one was the fall of Dehli, the other the 
 arrival of reinforcements from Bombay. Now, the road 
 from Bombay to Agra crossed the Narbada at a point 
 just below Indur, and ran thence through Central India to 
 a point on the Chambal directly to the north of Gwaliar. 
 The maintenance of this road was the prominent feature 
 in the plan of Durand. He resolved, then, to maintain his 
 own position as long as was possible ; to sever, as far as 
 he could, all communications between men of the regular 
 army and those of the native contingents ; to secure the 
 Narbada and the important road I have described ; and 
 to reassure the native princes ^ under his superintendence. 
 
 But events were too strong even for Durand. Dehli 
 did not fall, and the reinforcements despatched from 
 Bombay, under circumstances presently to be described, 
 
 1 These were Holkar himself, the rulers of the States of Bhopal, Dhar, 
 Dewas, and Barwani. 
 
262 D 71 rand is forced to leave Indttr. 
 
 halted at Aurangabad. The rumour that Dehh' had fallen 
 greatly aided his efforts to maintain order for a period of 
 fifty-one days after the Mirath outbreak ; but, on the ist 
 of July, he was attacked in the Residency by the native 
 troops of Holkar. The native troops forming the garri- 
 son of the Residency either coalesced with the rebels or 
 refused to act against them. No reinforcements, though 
 they had been sent for, came from Mau ; and after a 
 brilliant defence of two and a half hours' duration Durand 
 was compelled to evacuate the Residency, with his small 
 European garrison and the eleven women and children 
 under his charge. His first idea was to retreat on Mau, 
 but as his native escort refused to follow him thither, he 
 had no option, eventually, but to retire on Sihor. He and 
 his companions "reached that place on the 4th July. 
 Thence he set out, with the briefest possible delay, to 
 urge upon the commander of the Bombay column the 
 necessity of making safe the line of the Narbada, so as, 
 to use his own words, 'to interpose a barrier between the 
 blazing north and the smouldering south.' 
 
 On the night of the day on which Durand had been 
 compelled to evacuate the Residency at Indur the sipahis 
 at Mau mutinied, killed three of their officers, and made 
 their way to Dehli. Captain Hungerford, who commanded 
 the field-battery, remained in occupation of the fort of 
 Mau, and assumed the duties of the Governor-General's 
 Agent, until the arrival of Durand with the Bombay 
 column enabled the latter to resume his duties. 
 
 The Mehidpur contingent remained passively loyal 
 until November. On being attacked then by a rebel 
 force superior in numbers, they displayed mingled 
 cowardice and treachery. Ultimately the majority of 
 them fraternised with the rebels. The station, however, 
 was held for the British up to that period. 
 
BhopdL 263 
 
 With the exception, then, of Bhopal, now to be re- 
 ferred to, and Mehipiir, that part of Central India repre- 
 sented by the dominions of Holkar had become hostile to 
 the British from the ist of July. 
 
 Bhopal, indeed, was a brilliant exception. The then 
 reigning Begum, Sikandar Begum, had assumed office, in 
 February 1847, as regent for her daughter. She was 
 a very remarkable woman, possessing great resolution, 
 and a more than ordinary talent for aff'airs. In six years 
 she had paid off the entire public debt of the State, had 
 abolished the system of farming the revenue, had put 
 a stop to monopolies, had reorganised the police, and had 
 reformed the mint. When she scented the breaking out 
 of the rebellion of 1857, she at once made up her mind 
 to fight for her trusted overlord. As early as April she 
 communicated to the British Agent the contents of a litho- 
 graphed proclamation, urging the overthrow and destruc- 
 tion of the English, which had been sent her. In June she 
 expelled from her territories a native who was raising men 
 for a purpose he did not care to avow. In July she 
 afforded shelter to Durand and those whom he was 
 escorting. She did all these things under enormous diffi- 
 culties. Her nearest relations were daily urging upon her 
 an opposite course ; her troops mutinied, her nobles mur- 
 mured. But Sikandar Begum never wavered. She caused 
 the English fugitives to be escorted safely to Hoshangabad, 
 she allayed the excitement in her capital, put down the 
 mutinous contingent with a strong hand, restored, and 
 then maintained, order throughout her dominions. Like 
 Sindhia, she clearly recognised that the safety of the 
 native princes depended upon the maintenance of the 
 beneficently exercised power of the British overlord. 
 
 But Bhopal was the exception. In the other portions 
 of the dominions of Holkar the class whose taste is plunder 
 
264 The Dominions of Sindhid, 
 
 assumed the upper hand. Their further action depended 
 upon the result of the operations before Dehh'. 
 
 Nor, although the Maharaja Sindhia was loyal to the 
 core, was it otherwise in the dominions of that potentate. 
 The straggling dominions of Sindhia contained an area 
 of 19,500 square miles, and comprised the towns of 
 Gwaliar, Ndrwar, Bhilsa, Ujjain, Rutlam, and the British 
 cantonment of Nimach. 
 
 We have seen how the Gwaliar contingent mutinied 
 on the 14th of June. The contingent represented the 
 feelings of the people over whom the Maharaja ruled. 
 But he never wavered. Contrasting the British overlord- 
 ship with the probable result of the triumph of the sipahis 
 — and of the Mughal — he recognised that the welfare of 
 himself and his people depended upon the ultimate success 
 of the British arms — and he acted accordingly. 
 
 The station of Nimach lies 371 miles to the south-west 
 of Dehli. The garrison there consisted of the 72d Regi- 
 ment N. I., the 7th Regiment of the Gwaliar contingent, 
 and the wing of the ist Bengal Cavalry. These troops 
 rose in revolt the 3d of June. The officers and their fami- 
 lies escaped to Udaipur. Subsequently Nimach was the 
 scene of many events pertaining more to the history of Raj- 
 putana. The sipahis ultimately made their way to Dehli. 
 
 To the north-west of the territory which bears the 
 geographical name of Central India lies the province of 
 Rajputana, one of the most interesting provinces of India. 
 From the time of the departure of the great Lord Wellesley, 
 1805, to the close of the Pindari war, 18 18, the princes 
 and people of Rajputana had suffered from the want of an 
 overlordship which should protect them against a foreign 
 foe. The treatment which they endured at that period 
 was still fresh in the memory, alike of princes and people, 
 when the mutiny of 1857 broke out. From the moment 
 
Rdjp2ttdna. 265 
 
 of its commencement, then, the princes of Rajputana 
 clustered round the waning fragments of the British 
 power, to protect them against an enemy more terrible 
 even than Amir Khan and the Pindaris. It is true that 
 the contingents furnished by Bhartpur and Kota revolted. 
 Subsequently, too, the mutinied soldiers of Kota murdered 
 the British Resident, Major Burton, and his two sons. 
 But the Raja of Bhartpur was a minor, and it has never 
 been proved how far the Maharao of Kota was coerced 
 by his soldiers. Certainly the Rajas and Raos of the 
 other sixteen principalities were entirely loyal, and they 
 proved their loyalty on many a trying occasion. 
 
 The station of Nasirabad, in the Ajmir-Mairwara dis- 
 trict of Rajputana, 150 miles nearer to Dehli than was 
 Nimach, was garrisoned by the 15th and 30th Regiments 
 N. I., a battery of native artillery, and the ist Bombay 
 Lancers. The infantry broke into revolt on the 28th of 
 May ; the men of the other arms followed suit. Two 
 officers were killed, and two were wounded. The re- 
 mainder retreated to Biaur, a town in Ajmir-Mairwara, 
 escorting the women and children. 
 
 At a later date, August 22d, the contingent at Erin- 
 puram, near Mount Abu, also revolted, and attempted, 
 without much success, to surprise the Europeans, invalided 
 or sick, resting at that sanitarium. 
 
 There was one other exception to the general loyalty 
 of the princes, nobles, and people of Rajputana. That 
 exception was a Thakur or baron of Jodhpur. But that 
 Thakur's grievance was not against the English, but 
 against his liege lord the Raja. To coerce him, he used 
 the revolted sipahis — very much, as the result proved — 
 to his own detriment. 
 
 But throughout those troublous times the chief figure 
 in Rajputana was the Governor-General's representative, 
 
2 66 George St Patrick Lawrence, 
 
 George St Patrick Lawrence, not the least gifted member 
 of a family which had rendered splendid services to India. 
 So long as George Lawrence remained in Rajputana it 
 was certain that that province would remain firm and 
 steadfast in its loyalty to its overlord. 
 
 It did remain so, despite the risings at Nimach, at 
 Nasirabad, at Erinpuram. Yet, even in loyal Rajputana, 
 much depended upon the issue of contest before Dehli. 
 In a population of nine millions there were many needy men 
 who coveted the property of the wealthy. These doubtless 
 looked forward with eagerness to the reports of the victories 
 and defeats, of the sorties and the attacks, which daily 
 inundated the bazaars. And if Dehli had not fallen, if the 
 English army had failed in its final assault, the encourage- 
 ment which would have raised the populations elsewhere 
 might not have been without an effect even in Rajputana. 
 
 In Mirath and the adjoining districts to the east the 
 subversion of British authority had not been so complete 
 as might have been expected. In Mirath itself authority 
 had soon been restored. And, thanks to the energy dis- 
 played by Mr Dunlop, by Mr Brand Sapte, and others, 
 successful attempts were made to re-establish the British 
 power in the villages near it. In June the energetic 
 Magistrate, Mr Wallace Dunlop, had organised a troop 
 of volunteers, composed of officers without regiments, of 
 members of the Civil Service, and of others who happened 
 to be at Mirath. Major Williams, Captain Charles 
 D'Oyley, and Captain Tyrrhitt occupied the positions of 
 commandant, second in command, and adjutant. Styled, 
 from the colour of the uniform adopted, the Khaki i 
 Risala, this troop, from the end of June to the fall of Dehli 
 scoured the country, retook villages, punished marauders, 
 and did all that was possible to restore and to maintain 
 
 ^ Khaki i.e. dust-colour. 
 
Spankie, Robertson, Keene, Sapte. 267 
 
 tranquillity. The Risala was often assisted by regular 
 troops, cavalry as well as infantry. 
 
 The adjoining station of Saharanpur was administered 
 by two men possessing rare capacity and great courage, 
 Mr Robert Spankie and Mr Dundas Robertson. These 
 gentlemen, cast upon their own resources, not only main- 
 tained order among a rebellious and stiff-necked people, in 
 very difficult circumstances, but they lent their aid to the 
 adjoining districts. To use the words of the lamented 
 Baird-Smith, Chief Engineer of the force besieging Dehli, 
 Mr Spankie, aided by his energetic subordinates, ' made 
 law respected throughout the district, saved life and pro- 
 perty within and beyond it to almost an incalculable extent.' 
 Major Baird-Smith added: 'The ability to complete the 
 works necessary for the capture of Dehli, within the short 
 time actually employed, was not more a consequence of 
 the indefatigable exertions of the troops in the trenches 
 than of the constant and laborious preparations system- 
 atically carried on for months beforehand. To the latter 
 your' (Spankie's) 'aid was frequent and most important.' 
 
 Equally successful were the efforts of Mr H. G. Keene 
 in Dehra Dun ; of Mr R. M. Edwards in Muzaffarnagar. 
 In Bulandshahr the splendid exertions of Mr Brand Sapte 
 restored order temporarily; but that station, Sikandarabad, 
 Malagarh, and Khurja were so much under the control of 
 the disaffected and turbulent Gujar population that it was 
 not possible to retain them permanently until the fate of 
 Dehli should be decided. The same remark applies to 
 Aligarh, to Gurgaon, to Hisar, and to the district of 
 Rohtak. The country likewise between Aligarh and 
 Agra, notwithstanding the splendid exertions of the Agra 
 volunteers, and the country between Agra and Dehli, by 
 way of Mathura, remained in a state of rebellion during 
 that long period of uncertainty. 
 
268 Rohilkhand. 
 
 In the province of Rohilkhand matters were even 
 worse. From the districts and stations of Bijnaur, of 
 Muradabad, of Badaon, of Bareh', of Shahjahanpur, the 
 Enghsh had been expelled under circumstances of great 
 cruelty, and with much shedding of innocent blood. 
 Then a pensioner of the British Government, Khan 
 Bahadur Khan by name, the descendant and heir of 
 the last ruler of the Rohilahs, proclaimed himself Viceroy 
 of the province, under the King of Dehli, and despatched 
 the sipahis he had helped to corrupt, under the orders of 
 Bakht Khan, a Subahdar of artillery, with the title of 
 Brigadier, to Dehli. Bakht Khan subsequently became 
 Commander-in-Chief of the rebel forces in the Imperial 
 city. Khan Bahadur Khan governed the province for 
 three months and a half His rule drove to despair all 
 the honest men in it. The nature of that rule may be 
 gathered from the proverb the inhabitants repeated when 
 describing it after the restoration of British rule. ' Life 
 and property were equally unsafe,' they said ; ' the buffalo 
 was to the man who held the bludgeon ' 
 
 A glance at the map, then, will show that whilst the 
 province immediately contiguous to Dehli on the east, 
 the province of Rohilkhand, with a population of over 
 five millions, was absolutely held for the King of Dehli ; 
 whilst the Gujar villages between Mi'rath and the be- 
 leaguered city, and the districts of Rohtak and Hisar to 
 the north of it, were in the possession of the insurgents ; 
 whilst Mirath, Saharanpur, and Muzaffarnagar were held 
 with difficulty by the British ; whilst the country between 
 Dehli and Agra had pronounced for the rebels ; whilst 
 Central India, and the Sagar and Narbada territories, 
 were overrun by mutineers ; whilst Rajputana itself alone 
 remained true to its traditionary fidelity ; whilst, in a 
 word, whether before Dehli, or in Mirath and the adjoining 
 
The Panjdb. 269 
 
 stations, or at Sagar and Mau, the British held only the 
 ground occupied by their troops, there was yet a most 
 important province to the north and north-west of the 
 city, containing a numerous and warlike population, which 
 had not yet declared itself. That province was the Pan- 
 jab. The question which was uppermost in every man's 
 mind was how long the Panjab would remain quies- 
 cent, Dehli being unsubdued. To the consideration 
 of the means adopted to answer that question favour- 
 ably to the British I now invite the attention of the 
 reader. 
 
 Sir John Lawrence was at Rawalpindi when the wires 
 flashed to him the story of the outbreak at Mirath and 
 the seizure of Dehli. Believing, in common with almost 
 every soldier then in India, that, if promptly assailed by 
 a British force, Dehli would succumb as readily and as 
 promptly as it had succumbed in the time of Lord Lake, 
 he endeavoured by all the means in his power to impress 
 upon General Anson the urgent necessity of marching 
 upon the rebellious city without the smallest delay. He 
 expressed the most unbounded confidence in the imme- 
 diate result of such a movement. ' I served for nearly 
 thirteen years in Dehli,' he wrote, on the 21st of May, 
 when General Anson had expressed his doubts as to the 
 wisdom of attempting, with the means at his disposal, an 
 enterprise against Dehli, ' and know the people well. My 
 belief is that, with good management on the part of the 
 civil officers, it would open its gates to us on the approach 
 of our troops.' In a subsequent letter he wrote : ' I still 
 think that no real resistance at Dehli will be attempted ; 
 but, of course, we must first get the Mirath force in order, 
 and, in moving against Dehli, go prepared to fight. My 
 impression is that, on the approach of our troops, the 
 
270 Sir yohn Lawrence in the Panjdb. 
 
 mutineers will either disperse, or the people of the city 
 will rise and open the gates.' 
 
 Sir John Lawrence impressed these opinions upon 
 Lord Canning, and in the fourth week of May Lord 
 Canning, under their influence, despatched the most 
 emphatic orders to General Anson to make short work 
 of Dehli. That he shared the ideas of Sir John Lawrence 
 as to the easy occupation of that city has been shown in 
 a previous page.^ 
 
 Enough has been written, I imagine, to show clearly 
 that Sir John Lawrence was the author of the plan of 
 campaign the first object of which was the recapture of 
 Dehli. No blame is due to him for having underrated 
 the difficulties of such an enterprise. Dehli had become 
 the heart of the rebellion, and it was necessary to strike 
 at the heart. But, the step having been taken in com- 
 pliance with his urgent solicitations, it became incumbent 
 upon him to employ all the resources of the province he 
 administered to render the success of the enterprise 
 absolutely certain. 
 
 To do this required the possession of a moral courage 
 greater than is ordinarily allotted to mortals. The position 
 of Sir John Lawrence in the Panjab was unique. But eight 
 years had elapsed since the fighting classes of that province, 
 led by some of their most powerful chiefs, had contested 
 its possession with the British, on the fields of Chilianwala 
 and Gujrat. Never had the English encountered a foe so 
 determined, so daring, and, despite the unskilfulness of 
 their commanders, so hard to defeat. The English had con- 
 quered and had annexed the province. Now, only eight 
 years later, Sir John Lawrence would have to call upon 
 the same fighting classes to aid him in resisting the pre- 
 tensions of the sipahis by whose assistance they had been 
 
 1 Page 96. 
 
His Difficulties and His Lieutenants. 271 
 
 conquered. It was, I repeat, a unique position. Sir John 
 Lawrence had to consider whether he could afford to risk 
 the departure from the province of some of the EngHsh 
 regiments which were there for its protection, in order to 
 enable him to despatch to the force besieging Dehli the 
 assistance without which, as events were soon to make 
 clear, that city could not be taken. He had to recollect 
 that he, too, was encumbered by a large garrison of sipahis 
 imbued with the leaven of mutiny ; that he would have to 
 deal with these; that it would be incumbent upon him 
 to repose a trust nearly absolute in the Sikhs ; that, in 
 a word, he would have to risk everything to ensure the 
 success of that march against Dehli, of which he had been 
 the persistent advocate. 
 
 A brave man, morally as well as physically. Sir John 
 Lawrence even courted the ordeal. From the very first 
 he devoted all his energies to the employment of the 
 resources of the Panjab in the subduing of Dehli. One of 
 his first acts was to despatch thither the splendid Guide 
 corps, composed entirely of frontier men, and consisting 
 of cavalry and infantry. That corps quitted the frontier 
 on the 13th of May, and, as already related, joined the 
 force before Dehli the day after Barnard had made good 
 his position on the ridge. His lieutenants at Pashawar, 
 Herbert Edwards, Neville Chamberlain, and John Nichol- 
 son, had, in concert with General Reed, commanding the 
 division, and Sydney Cotton, commanding the brigade, 
 jotted down the heads of a plan for the formation of 
 a moveable column. This scheme was approved by 
 Lawrence, and acted upon somewhat later. 
 
 Meanwhile, his lieutenant at Labor, Robert Mont- 
 gomery, had taken the wise precaution of disarming the 
 sipahis at Mian Mir (May 13th); the general at Pashawar 
 carried out a similar policy on the 22d, and generally, by 
 
272 Outbreaks in the Paiijdb. 
 
 the enlistment of old Sikhs as gunners, and by the timely 
 securing of important places, Sir John made the province, 
 which was to be the base of his operations, as secure as, 
 under the circumstances, it could be made. 
 
 That some outbreaks should take place was, in the 
 excited state of the minds of the sipahis, but natural. 
 These will be related in their proper place. 
 
 The first indication of actual outbreak on the part of 
 the sipahis occurred at Mardan, when the 55th N. I., who 
 had replaced the Guide corps at that station, rose in re- 
 bellion rather than surrender their arms, and rushed off 
 towards the hills of Swat. Nicholson pursued them with 
 a few trusty horsemen, caught them on their way, killed 
 120 of them in fair fight, made 150 prisoners, and forced 
 the remainder to take refuge in the Lund-khur hills. On 
 the 7th of June the native regiments stationed at Jalandhar 
 rose in revolt, and swept on to Lodiana, on their way to 
 Dehli. An energetic member of the Civil Service, George 
 Ricketts, in concert with Lieutenant Williams of the Indian 
 army, made a most determined and gallant effort to 
 prevent the passage by them of the Satlaj. But the 
 levies at their disposal were {^\n, and some of these 
 crumbled in their hands. After a fight of two hours' dura- 
 tion the rebels had their way. Williams was shot through 
 the lungs. The rebels, on reaching Lodiana, roused the 
 population to revolt, released the prisoners, and pushed 
 on to Dehli. The British troops at Jalandhar pursued 
 them, but with so little energy that, alike at the passage 
 of the Satlaj and at Lodiana, they were always too late. 
 
 Meanwhile, Sir John Lawrence had gradually realised 
 that, in predicting the immediate fall of Dehli on the 
 appearance before it of the British troops, he had been 
 over-sanguine. As day succeeded day, and the force of 
 the rebels was augmented by the arrival of the mutinied 
 
Proposal to evacnate Pashdzvar. 273 
 
 regiments, whilst that of the besiegers decreased by casu- 
 alties, the outlook assumed very serious proportions. 
 Still more than ever John Lawrence adhered to his 
 resolution at all costs to pierce the heart of the enemy's 
 position. He had had too much experience of the Sikhs 
 not to know that their fidelity depended upon success; 
 that it would be dangerous to prolong indefinitely a situa- 
 tion which already was becoming critical. Impressed with 
 these views, he wrote, on the 9th of June, to Edwardes, 
 suggesting the advisabiHty, under certain circumstances, 
 of relinquishing the British hold on Pashawar, and with- 
 drawing the British forces across the Indus. Edwardes, 
 Nicholson, and Sydney Cotton replied (June 11) by a 
 joint protest against such a scheme. ' Pashawar/ wrote 
 Edwardes, Ms the anchor of the Panjab, and if you take 
 it the whole ship will drift to sea.' Eight days later 
 Edwardes repeated his objections, supporting them with 
 cogent arguments. 
 
 But Sir John would not give way. He regarded 
 Dehli as the decisive point of the scene of action, and 
 argued that the importance of holding Pashawar must 
 yield to the superior necessity of recapturing Dehli. 
 'There was no one thing,' he wrote (June 22d), 'which 
 tended so much to the ruin of Napoleon, in 18 14, as the 
 tenacity with which,^ after the disaster at Leipsic, he 
 clung to the line of the Elbe, instead of falling back at 
 once to that of the Rhine.' So impressed had he been, 
 almost from the first, of the wisdom of making the 
 sacrifice, under certain circumstances, that he, on June 
 loth, had written to Lord Canning for permission to carry 
 his plans into effect should the necessity arise. 
 
 On the 25th of June he believed that the necessity had 
 
 ^ This should surely read 'before.' Napoleon did fall back on the 
 Rhine after Leipsic, 
 
2 74 Critical Condition of the Panjdb. 
 
 almost arisen, and he telegraphed to Edwardes, detailing 
 the bad news that had arrived, and adding, 'if matters get 
 worse, it is my decided opinion that the Pashawar arrange- 
 ment should take effect. Our troops before Dehli must 
 be reinforced, and that largely.' Against this Edwardes, 
 Cotton, and Nicholson strongly protested. The question 
 was set at rest some weeks later by the receipt from Lord 
 Canning of a telegram containing the words : ' Hold on to 
 Pashawar to the last' 
 
 Before that telegram had arrived events had occurred 
 to show that the position was becoming more and more 
 serious. On the morning of the 7th of July the 14th 
 Regiment N. I. mutinied at Jhelam, and, taking a strong 
 position, repulsed with some loss two attacks made upon it 
 by the English troops. That night the sipahis evacuated 
 their position and fled. It is supposed that most of them 
 ultimately perished. But the affair was managed in a 
 manner which reflected but little credit on the authorities. 
 The day following the native troops at Sialkot followed 
 the example of their brethren at Jhelam. The station had 
 been denuded of European troops for the formation of the 
 moveable column. The native regiments were the 46th 
 N. I. and the 9th Cavalry. These men, summoned to 
 Dehli by the King, were apparently anxious to reach that 
 place, their hands red with the blood of English men and 
 women. They therefore murdered as many of the race as 
 they could find. The survivors took refuge in an old fort, 
 once the stronghold of a Sikh chief, Tej Singh. Then 
 the mutineers, having plundered the treasury, having 
 released the prisoners, and effected all the damage they 
 could, started for Dehli. I shall tell very shortly the fate 
 which befell them on the way. 
 
 Meanwhile, the moveable column had been formed, 
 and on the 22d of June John Nicholson, with the rank 
 
yohn Nicholson. 275 
 
 of Brigadier-General, had assumed command of it It 
 augured no small courage on the part of Sir John Law- 
 rence to take a regimental captain from Civil employment, 
 and place him in command over the heads of men his 
 seniors. But the times were critical, and at all costs the 
 best man had to be selected if Dehli was to be relieved. 
 
 The force commanded by Nicholson consisted of the 
 5 2d Light Infantry, Dawes's troop of horse-artillery, 
 Bourchier's field-battery, the 33d and 35th N. I., and a 
 wing of the 9th native light cavalry. Nicholson joined the 
 force at Jalandhar, and marched straight to Philaur. Under 
 the walls of the fort of that name he disarmed the two 
 sipahi regiments, then retraced his steps to Amritsar, a 
 central position commanding Lahor, the Jalandhar Duab, 
 and the Manjha. He was there when news reached him 
 of the mutiny at Jhelam. His first step was to disarm the 
 native regiment, the 59th N. I., located at Amritsar. The 
 next day brought him information that the 58th N. I. and 
 two companies of the 14th, the regiment which had fought 
 at Jhelam, had been disarmed, though in a very clumsy 
 manner, at Rawalpindi. On the 9th of July he heard of 
 the insurrection at Sialkot, in which the left wing of the 
 regiment, the 9th native cavalry, the right wing of which 
 was with him, had taken a very prominent part. He 
 promptly disarmed that wing; then learning that the 
 Sialkot mutineers were marching on Giirdaspur, forty 
 miles distant from him, he resolved to intercept them in 
 the course which he felt convinced they would take, via 
 Niirpur and Hoshiarpur, to Jalandhar. Quitting Amritsar 
 on the loth, he made a forced march to Gurdaspur, reached 
 it the evening of the nth to find that the rebels were at 
 Nurk6t, some fifteen miles from the Rdvi, on its northern 
 side. As they would have to cross that river, Nicholson, 
 commanding the inner line, waited until their movement 
 
"jd Defeats the Rebels on the Ravi, 
 
 had been pronounced ; then learning that they were cross- 
 ing at Trimmu-ghat, he threw himself upon them, and 
 after a contest so severe that it became necessary to try 
 conclusions with the bayonet, drove them back upon the 
 river, with a loss of between three and four hundred men. 
 Unable, from the intense heat and the exertions to which 
 his men had been exposed, to follow them further, he left a 
 party to guard the ghat, and returned with the bulk of the 
 brigade to Giirdaspur. The river, meanwhile, had risen, 
 and the rebels, unable to reach the further bank, had taken 
 a position on an island in its centre, whence, by the aid 
 of an old gun they had brought from Sialkot, they hoped 
 to defy all enemies. Nicholson, however, was resolved to 
 give them a lesson. Devoting the three following days 
 to the procuring of boats, watching the rebels carefully 
 during that period, he embarked his infantry, on the morn- 
 ing of the i6th, and landed them at one extremity of the 
 island, whilst he placed his guns so as to cover their ad- 
 vance against the enemy at the further end. These 
 tactics completely succeeded. The rebels were defeated 
 with very heavy loss, many were drowned in attempting 
 to escape, and the few who reached the shore were given 
 up by the villagers. 
 
 Nicholson then returned to Labor, met there Sir John 
 Lawrence, and learned that on his way to and beyond the 
 Satlaj his column would be reinforced by 2500 men, of 
 whom 400 belonged to the 6ist Foot, 200 to the 8th 
 Foot, 100 to the artillery, and the remainder were Sikhs or 
 Baluchi's. On the 24th he received his orders to march for 
 Dehli, crossed the Bias on the 25th, and pushing forward 
 with all speed, taking up his reinforcements as he marched, 
 reached Bara, in Sirhind, on the 3d of August. There he 
 received a despatch from General Wilson, commanding the 
 force besieging Dehli, telling him that the rebels had 
 
Nicholson reaches Dehli. 277 
 
 established themselves in force on the Najafgarh canal, 
 with the intention of moving on Alipur and his com- 
 munications to the rear, and requesting him to push 
 forward with all expedition to drive them off. Nicholson 
 did push on, reached Ambalah on the 6th, and thence 
 wrote to Wilson to promise that the column should be at 
 Karnal on the 8th, and would push on thence to Panipat, 
 where he would rejoin it. Meanwhile, he hurried on in 
 advance to see Wilson. He stayed in camp a few days, 
 took note of all that was going on, then returning, met 
 his column, and marched into camp at the head of it on 
 the 14th of August. There for the moment I must leave 
 him. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 THE SIEGE AND STORMING OF DEHLI. 
 
 At the close of the ninth chapter we left General Barnard, 
 and the British force under his orders, taking possession, 
 on the 8th of June, of the ridge, whence he was to direct 
 his operations against the rebellious city. He was joined, 
 as I have also pointed out, the day following by the 
 splendid corps of Guides. The experience he had had of 
 the temper of the garrison had been but short, yet it had 
 been sufficient to show him how futile were the anticipa- 
 tions of Lord Canning and Sir John Lawrence that the 
 city would surrender without a struggle. 
 
 I propose, before describing the operations of the siege, 
 to set before the reader a bird's-eye view of the relative 
 positions of the combatants. 
 
 The city of Dehli lies on a plain on the right bank of 
 the river Jamnah, and is surrounded on three sides by a 
 lofty stone wall, five and a half miles long. The fourth 
 side, nearly two miles in length, runs parallel to and is 
 covered by the river. On this face, the eastern, it is well 
 protected. To the north-east it was defended by the 
 fort of S^limgarh, the circuit of the high and massive 
 walls of which covered three-quarters of a mile. In this 
 were two gates, called respectively the Calcutta and the 
 North gate. Adjoining the Salimgarh, to the south, was 
 the Citadel or King's palace, built by Shah Jahan, having 
 walls of red sandstone, very high, and with a circumference 
 
■^ i9 « S „^ uj 
 
 
The Defences of D eh It. 279 
 
 of nearly a mile and a half. The entrance to this is from 
 the west, by a gate opening on to the Chandni Chauk, 
 known, in 1857 as the Lahor gate. The other gates were 
 the Kashmir, to the north, near the English church and 
 the Kachahri or Court of Justice ; to the west of this, 
 though facing northward, the Morf gate ; to the proper 
 west, at the angle formed by the north and west faces, the 
 Kabul gate ; then, midway between the two angles of the 
 western face, the Lahor gate, forming the entrance to 
 the famous Chandni Chauk, leading through the city to 
 the Citadel ; further to the south, just after the wall of 
 defence makes a bend inwards, was the Farash-khana 
 gate ; at the angle beyond it, the Ajmir gate ; then, form- 
 ing entrances to the southern face, the Turkoman, and 
 beyond it the Dehli gate ; beyond again, facing the river, 
 was the Raj -ghat gate. 
 
 The fort had been strengthened by English engineers 
 and provided with perfect flanking defences. Round the 
 walls, twenty-four feet in height, ran a dry ditch, some 
 twenty-five feet in breadth and somewhat less than twenty 
 in depth, the counterscarp being an earthen slope of very 
 easy descent, much water and weather worn. There was a 
 kind of glacis, but it scarcely merited the name, being but 
 a short slope, seventy or eighty feet in breadth, spring- 
 ing from the crest of the counterscarp, and provided 
 with no special means of obstruction. The place was gar- 
 risoned by some 40,000 sipahis, armed and disciplined by 
 the British. Its walls were mounted with 114 pieces of 
 heavy artillery, capable of being supplied with ammunition 
 from the largest magazine established by the British in 
 the upper provinces. The garrison had, in addition, some 
 sixty pieces of field-artillery, and were well supplied with 
 gunners, drilled and disciplined by the British. 
 
 To take this strongly defended city the English general 
 
2 8o The British Position. 
 
 had under his orders some 3000 British soldiers, a battalion 
 of Gurkhas, the corps of Guides, some remnants of nativ^e 
 infantry sipahis, whose fidelity was not assured, and twenty- 
 two field-guns. He had, as we have seen, taken his position 
 on the ridge, an elevation of from fifty to sixty feet above 
 the general level of the city, extending along a line of 
 rather more than two miles, its left resting upon the Jamnah 
 some three or four miles above Dehli, its right extremity 
 approaching the Kabul gate at a distance of about a 
 thousand yards. The ridge intersected the old canton- 
 ment towards its left centre. Following its front towards 
 its right was a road which joined the grand trunk road 
 from Karnal, beyond its extremity, and led down, through 
 a mass of suburban gardens and ancient edifices, to the 
 Kabul gate. Two other roads, also leading from Karnal, 
 diverged through the old cantonment to different gates of 
 the city. The position was open to the rear, and com- 
 manded a splendid supply of water from the Najafgarh 
 canal. The English tents, pitched on the left and centre 
 of the ridge, obliquely to the front of attack, were con- 
 cealed from the view of the enemiy by the houses very 
 recently occupied by the officers of the Dehli brigade, still 
 left standing. The weakest point of the position, that 
 nearest the enemy, was the right. Here a strong body of 
 troops were posted. There was an extensive building 
 known as Hindu Rao's house. This house had been left 
 empty by its owner, and was promptly occupied. Nearly 
 in the centre of the position was a round tower called the 
 Flagstaff Tower, double storied, and offering a good point 
 for observation. Between that tower and Hindu Rao's 
 house was an old mosque, with good masonry walls, 
 admirably adapted as an outpost. This, too, was occu- 
 pied. Further along the ridge road, at a distance of 
 some 200 yards from the position on the extreme right, 
 
The British Position. 281 
 
 was the Observatory, also capable of being utilised. 
 Beyond Hindu Rao's house again, to the rear of the 
 position, was the suburb of Sabzimandi, a cluster of 
 houses and walled gardens, which an active enemy might 
 occupy. Beyond this the plain was covered with gardens, 
 groves, houses, and walled enclosures, bordering upon the 
 grand canal. Stretching from the Sabzimandi to the 
 Kabul gate of the city were the villages of Kishanganj, 
 Trevelyanganj, Paharipur, and Taliwari, too far off to be 
 occupied in force by the besiegers, and therefore afford- 
 ing a convenient shelter to a daring foe. Somewhat to 
 the south of the Flagstaff, but more to the east, was 
 Metcalfe House, on the Jamnah, with substantial outbuild- 
 ings, and a mound in its rear. Between that house and 
 the city was an old summer palace of the Mughal sove- 
 reigns, called Kudsiya Bagh, with lofty gateways and 
 spacious courtyards ; whilst more remote from the river, 
 and almost in a line with the Kashmir gate of the city, 
 was Ludlow Castle, on the crest of a ridge sloping down 
 towards the city walls, with the dry bed of a drainage 
 canal at its base. Further, on the line of the Jamnah, 
 between the Kudsiya Bagh and the water-gate of the 
 city, was a spacious house surrounded by trees and shrubs, 
 but so close to the city walls that they seemed almost to 
 overhang it. 
 
 Such was the position, or, rather, such were the relative 
 positions. We cannot wonder that, as Barnard surveyed 
 the city and the country between it and his camp, on the 
 morning of the 9th of June, he recognised that he had 
 done rightly not to follow the rebels into the city two 
 days previously. But he knew what was expected from 
 him. He had in his hand the written opinions of Lord 
 Canning and Sir John Lawrence that, with proper action 
 on the part of the British leader, the place must fall. He 
 
282 Progress of the Siege. 
 
 ordered, then, an assault for the 12th. The scheme had 
 been drawn up by Greathed, Maunsell, and Chesney of 
 the engineers, and by Hodson, afterwards known as 
 ' Hodson of Hodson's Horse/ an officer of great in- 
 trepidity. It had been arranged that the troops told off 
 for the attack should assemble between one and two in 
 the morning, and then, under cover of the darkness, should 
 proceed noiselessly to the gates, blow them open, and 
 effect an entrance. At the appointed time and place all 
 the troops were assembled, with the exception of 300 of 
 the 1st Europeans, to be commanded by Brigadier Graves. 
 These never came, and in consequence the enterprise was 
 abandoned. Graves had received no written orders, and 
 as the verbal notice he received would have involved 
 leaving the Flagstaff picket in the hands of natives, he 
 declined to act upon it. It was fortunate he did so, for 
 after events proved that, even had the gates been carried, 
 the force was not nearly strong enough to hold Dehli. 
 A repulse would possibly have involved the destruction 
 of the besieging force, and the evil consequences of this 
 to British authority in India it is difficult to over-estimate. 
 On the 14th June General Reed, the senior divisional 
 commander, arrived on the ridge to assume command. 
 For the moment, however, on account of his health, he 
 did not supersede Barnard. That officer continued to 
 direct the operations till his death. In Reed's tent the 
 question of a coup-de-niain was discussed for several days. 
 The civilian who was consulted, Mr Hervey Greathed, 
 brother of the engineer of the same name, was in favour 
 of adopting a revised plan drawn up by his brother, to 
 be put into execution without delay. But all the senior 
 soldiers, Barnard, Archdale Wilson, and Reed were against 
 it. It is fair to add that they did not object to the plan 
 itself so much as to the moment of executing it. They 
 
Progress of the Siege. 283 
 
 believed that in the course of fifteen days the force would 
 be so strengthened in numbers as to render it possible to 
 hold all that might be gained. There can be no doubt 
 but that their decision was a wise one. 
 
 The decision was arrived at on the i8th, and though 
 Greathed (of the engineers) again subsequently urged 
 a reconsideration, the generals were not to be tempted. 
 In the interval there had been a great deal of fighting. 
 On the 1 2th the rebels had attacked the British camp in 
 front and rear, and had almost penetrated to its very 
 heart. They were, however, ultimately driven back, and 
 pursued through the grounds of Metcalfe House to the 
 very walls of the city. From that date a strong picket 
 was posted at that house, the communications being main- 
 tained from the Flagstaff Tower. The same day attacks 
 made upon Hindu Rao's house and the Sabzimandi were 
 repulsed with great loss to the rebels. A regiment of 
 irregular cavalry, however, seized the opportunity to ^o 
 over to them. It was perhaps fortunate, as, under the 
 circumstances in which the British were, it was better to 
 have an open than a secret foe. The day following the 
 rebels made another attack, the 60th Regiment N. I., which 
 had joined them the previous day, taking a leading part 
 in it. They were, however, repulsed. On the 17th the 
 besiegers took the initiative, their attack being led most 
 gallantly by Reid of the Gurkhas, from Hindu Rao's house, 
 and by Tombs of the horse-artillery, from the camp. The 
 assailants destroyed a battery the rebels were erecting, 
 and drove them back headlong into the city. But the 
 fire from the heavy guns of the rebels prevented a 
 complete following up of the success. 
 
 On the 1 8th, the day on which the decision not to 
 attempt a coup-de-main was arrived at, the rebels were re- 
 inforced by the mutinied sipahi brigade from Nasirabad. 
 
284 Neville Chamberlain arrives. 
 
 They brought six guns with them. To celebrate the 
 event, the rebels came out in force, and attacked the 
 British camp in the rear. The contest was most desperate, 
 and the loss on both sides was heavy. Yule of the 9th 
 Lancers was killed ; Daly of the Guides and Becher, the 
 Quartermaster-General, were wounded. Night fell upon 
 a drawn battle, the rebels maintaining their position till 
 the early morning. On the 23d, the anniversary of 
 Plassey, the day foretold as that which would witness the 
 downfall of British rule, they made a supreme effort to 
 verify the prophecy. Fortunately the English had re- 
 ceived that day a reinforcement of a company of the 75th 
 Foot, four companies of the 2d Fusiliers, four H. A. guns, 
 and part of a native troop, with some Panjabi infantry 
 and cavalry, in all 850 men. The right bore the brunt of 
 the attack, which was conducted with great courage and 
 a coolness worthy of English troops. Reid and his 
 Gurkhas, however, maintained their position, the 60th 
 Rifles added to the imperishable glory they had previously 
 acquired, and the Guides vied with them in cool courage. 
 But for the steadiness displayed by Reid and the officers 
 and men generally, it would have been impossible to hold 
 the position. They did hold it, however, but it was only 
 as the night fell, and after most desperate fighting, that 
 the rebels fell back. 
 
 On the 24th Neville Chamberlain came from the 
 Panjab to assume the post of Adjutant-General. Rein- 
 forcements, too, sufficient to raise the effective strength of 
 the British force to 6600 men, poured in from the Panjab. 
 But the rebels likewise had their share of fortune. On 
 the 1st and 2d of July the Bareli brigade, consisting of 
 four sipahi regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, a horse- 
 battery, and two post-guns, and commanded by a Sub- 
 ahdar of artillery, Bakht Khan by name, who was almost 
 
B air d- Smith arrives. 285 
 
 at once nominated Commander-in-Chief of the rebel forces 
 in the city, marched in. Meanwhile, the arrival of rein- 
 forcements within the camp had revived the question of 
 assault. Once more the plans had been arranged, the 
 regiments told off, the date, the 3d of July, had been fixed, 
 when, suddenly, the information that the rebels contem- 
 plated a serious attack on the weakest part of the British 
 position that very day caused its postponement. 
 
 To partake in the contemplated assault on the city, the 
 rumour of which had reached him, there had hurried on, 
 from the small detachment he was leading from Riirki, a 
 man destined to take a leading part in the eventual storm- 
 ing of the place. This was Baird-Smith of the engineers. 
 Summoned from Riirki to take his place as senior officer 
 of his scientific regiment, he arrived, by hard riding, at 
 three o'clock on the morning of the 3d, to find that the 
 assault had been postponed. 
 
 Baird-Smith found that, as far as ordnance was con- 
 cerned, the British force was in a very unenviable position. 
 The heavy guns consisted of two twenty-four-pounders, 
 nine eighteen-pounders, six eight-inch mortars, and three 
 eight-inch howitzers. The rebels, on the other hand, could 
 bring to bear on any point thirty guns and twelve mortars. 
 What was still worse, the English had in store only suffi- 
 cient shot for heavy guns for one day, whilst the rebels 
 had the almost inexhaustible supplies of the Dehli maga- 
 zine in their midst. To add to the gravity of the position, 
 the day after his arrival in camp, Barnard was seized with 
 cholera. The fell disease carried him off on the 5th. He 
 was a conscientious man and a brave soldier, and his 
 death was universally lamented. General Reed, who had 
 remained in camp since we last saw him there, succeeded 
 to the command. 
 
 Before Barnard had been attacked by cholera, Baird- 
 
286 « Gallantry of yames Hills. 
 
 Smith, keenly alive to the difficulty of carrying on a 
 regular siege with resources in guns and material so obvi- 
 ously inadequate, had written to that officer to suggest 
 the advisability of an assault. ' The probabilities of 
 success,' he wrote, ' are far greater than those of failure, 
 and the reasons justifying an assault stronger than those 
 which justified inaction.' Barnard died before the pro- 
 posal could be considered, and it devolved upon Reed to 
 give the necessary decision. Reed neither rejected nor 
 accepted the plan ; ^ but he kept it so long ' in contempla- 
 tion ' that the opportunity passed away. 
 
 On the 9th the rebels made another grand attack in 
 force. They despatched the 8th Irregulars, the regiment 
 which had mutinied at Bareli, through the right of the 
 British camp, by the rear, and as their uniform was the 
 same as that of the loyal irregular regiment in the camp, 
 they were allowed to pass unchallenged. The conse- 
 quences of this mistake were alike deplorable and glori- 
 ous. They were deplorable in that the cavalry picket at 
 the Mound, half-way between the Ridge and the canal, 
 on discovering their error, turned and fled. Not so the 
 artillery, commanded by James Hills, one of the most 
 gallant and daring soldiers in the world. Hills promptly 
 ordered out his two guns for action. But the rebels were 
 upon him, and he had not time to fire. Then, with the 
 cool courage of a man determined at all cost to stop the 
 foe, he dashed into the midst of the advancing troopers, 
 cutting right and left at them with splendid effect. At 
 last two of them charged him and rolled over his horse. 
 Hills speedily regained his feet, just in time to renew the 
 combat with three troopers — two mounted, the third on 
 
 ^ Four months afterwards Baird-Smith wrote that he thought then, with 
 the full experience before him of the actual capture, that if an assault had 
 been attempted between the 4th and 14th of July it would have succeeded. 
 
Desperate Fighting. 287 
 
 foot. The two first he cut down ; with the third the con- 
 flict was desperate. Hills had been shaken by his fall, 
 and was encumbered by his cloak. Twice did his pistol 
 miss fire. Then he missed a blow at his opponent's 
 shoulder, and the latter wrested his sword from his tired 
 hand. But Hills was equal to the occasion. Closing 
 with his enemy, he smote him several times with his 
 clenched fist in the face until he fell. Just at the moment 
 Tombs, who had found his way through the enemy, seeing 
 Hills's danger, shot the trooper dead. It was a splendid 
 pistol shot, fired at a distance of thirty paces. To reach 
 that point Tombs had cut his way through the enemy, whose 
 advance Hills had checked, but not completely stopped. 
 The danger to them was not over then. It required the 
 sacrifice of another native trooper to insure perfect safety. 
 But this was only accomplished at the cost to Hills of 
 a sword-cut, which clave his skull to the brain.i 
 
 By this time the whole British camp was roused, and 
 after a while the rebel troopers were driven back towards 
 Dehli. A fierce battle had been going on, meanwhile, in 
 the Sabzimandi. This likewise ended in the repulse of 
 the rebels, but not until 233 men had been killed or 
 wounded on the British side. 
 
 Five days later there was another hard-fought en- 
 counter. This time the rebels attacked Hindu Rao's 
 house. After a battle which lasted from eight o'clock in 
 the morning till close upon sunset, Neville Chamberlain, 
 with the 75th, Coke's Rifles (Panjabis), and Hodson's 
 Horse, drove back the rebels to the gates of Dehli. But 
 again was the loss severe, amounting to seventeen men 
 killed and 193 wounded, of whom sixteen were officers, 
 
 1 The wound was not mortal. Hills recovered to render splendid service 
 to his country in India, in China, in Abyssinia, in Afghanistan. He is now 
 Sir James Hills-Johns. 
 
2 88 Baird-SmitJi and Archdale Wilson. 
 
 among them Chamberlain, whose left arm was broken. 
 In the week the besiegers had lost, in killed and wounded, 
 twenty-five officers and 400 men. 
 
 Meanwhile, Gerald Reed's health had completely 
 broken down. On the 17th, then, he made over com- 
 mand to Archdale Wilson. The day following the rebels 
 made another sortie, but they were repulsed by Colonel 
 Jones of the 60th Rifles. The attack had been made, as 
 often before, on the Sabzimandi. To prevent future 
 attacks in that quarter, the engineers cleared away the 
 houses and walls, which had aflbrded cover to the rebels, 
 and connected the advanced posts with the main pickets 
 on the Ridge. The effect of this was most salutary. 
 There were no more attacks on the Sabzimandi. 
 
 It was the day before this attack, the day, in fact, on 
 which Wilson assumed command, that a report reached 
 the Chief Engineer, Baird-Smith, that the question whether 
 circumstances did not require the raising of the siege, in 
 consideration of the great losses incurred, and the im- 
 possibility of taking the place without further reinforce- 
 ments, would be mooted at the next meeting of the 
 General and his staff. Impressed with the absolute 
 necessity of retaining the 'grip we now have on Dehli',' 
 Baird-Smith took the very earliest opportunity of speaking 
 to Wilson on the subject, and of pointing out the enor- 
 mous calamities which the raising of the siege would entail. 
 The result of the conversation was to confirm Wilson in 
 his resolution to prosecute the siege, and to render its 
 success certain, by ordering up a siege-train from Firzupur. 
 
 On the 23d the enemy made a final attack before the 
 arrival of Nicholson. This time it was directed aeainst 
 
 o 
 
 Ludlow Castle. The attack was repulsed, but the British, 
 pursuing the rebels too closely to the city walls, suffered 
 very severely. 
 
Nicholson beats the Rebels at Najafgai^h. 289 
 
 On the 7th of August Nicholson arrived, as stated in 
 the last chapter, in advance of his troops. On the 12th 
 Showers expelled the rebels from Ludlow Castle, which 
 meanwhile they had managed to occupy. On the 14th 
 Nicholson's column arrived. On the 25th he marched, 
 with a strong force, to attack the rebels, who had moved 
 from Dehli in great strength to intercept the siege-train. 
 The march took him through marshy ground, intersected 
 with swamps, and lasted a good twelve hours. At length, 
 close upon sunset, the weary soldiers espied the rebels, 
 composed of the Nimach brigade, occupying two villages 
 and a caravansarai, protected by guns and covered by deep 
 water, fordable only in one place. The British, however, 
 waded through the ford, which was breast high, under a fire 
 from the guns at the caravansarai. Against this Nicholson 
 directed his own attack, whilst he sent his other troops 
 against the villages. Addressing his men a few cheering 
 words, he ordered them to lie down. Then the batteries 
 of Tombs and Remmington opened fire. After a few 
 rounds he ordered the men to rise, and he led them 
 through the still marshy ground, they cheering loudly. 
 Needless to say, they carried the position. At the same 
 time the other troops had driven the rebels from the two 
 villages. The sipahis fought well, but only the Nimach 
 brigade was there, that from Bareli, which had been 
 ordered to support it, not having come up in time. 
 When they found that they were beaten, the sipahis 
 limbered up their guns and made for the bridge crossing 
 the Najafgarh canal. But Nicholson pursued and caught 
 them, killed about 800 of them, and captured thirteen 
 guns. Pie then blew up the bridge, and the troops 
 returned next day to Dehli, taking their spoils with them. 
 Ten days later, the 4th of September, the siege-guns 
 arrived, the remainder of the 60th Rifles on the 6th, and 
 
 T 
 
290 TJie Qtiestion of Assault, 
 
 the Jammu contingent, led by Richard Lawrence, one of 
 the four famous brothers, on the 8th. 
 
 The arriv^al of reinforcements had increased the 
 number of troops at the disposal of General Wilson to 
 8748 men, of whom 3317 were British. Barnard had 
 directed the coup-de-inaiii of the 12th of June, when his 
 entire force scarcely exceeded half that number. Yet, up 
 to the 20th August, Wilson could with difficulty make up 
 his mind to hazard the assault, which, if successful, would 
 break the back of the Mutiny. On that date he wrote to 
 Baird-Smith a letter, to be subsequently forwarded to the 
 Governor-General, in which he freely stated the reasons 
 on which his hesitation was based, and asked that officer 
 to return the letter, 'with such remarks and emendations 
 as your experience as Chief Engineer suggests.' The 
 answer given by Baird-Smith was empathic, clear, and 
 decided. He gave his voice for prompt and immediate 
 action. True, he argued, the rebels are more numerous 
 than the assailants ; true that their position is formidable, 
 their resources are unlimited, their defences strong. But 
 in war something must be risked. In his opinion, the 
 risk of a repulse, in an attack well contrived and well 
 organised, was less than the risk of further delay. The 
 Panjab, he argued, on the authority of Sir John Lawrence, 
 denuded of its European troops, was quivering in the 
 balance. To wait for reinforcements would involve in- 
 action, at a time when action alone, in all human pro- 
 bability, could secure the continued acquiescence of the 
 Sikhs. And if the Sikhs were to rise the danger would 
 extend to the very camp in which Wilson commanded. 
 
 These reasons, clear, pointed, logical, decided Wilson. 
 Though he still believed that the results of the proposed 
 operations would ' be thrown on a hazard of a die,' he 
 was willing, on the advice of the Chief Engineer, to try 
 
The Defences to be assailed, 291 
 
 that hazard. For the decision to assault the rebelHous 
 city Baird-Smith, then, was responsible. He at once, in 
 conjunction with his second in command, Alexander 
 Taylor, drew up the plan of assault. 
 
 To understand the plan the Chief Engineer worked 
 out it is necessary that I should lay before the reader 
 a short and concise description of the defences to be 
 assailed. I cannot do this better than in the very words 
 of Baird-Smith. 
 
 ' The eastern face,' he wrote, ' rests on the Jamnah, and 
 during the season of the year when our operations were 
 carried on the stream may be described as washing the 
 base of the walls. All access to a besieger on the river 
 front is therefore impracticable. The defences here con- 
 sists of an irregular wall, with occasional bastions and 
 towers, and about one-half the river face is occupied by 
 the palace of the King of Dehli and its outwork, the old 
 Mughal fort of Salimgarh. The river may be described 
 as the chord of a rough arc formed by the remaining 
 defences of the place. These consist of a succession of 
 bastioned fronts, the connection being very long, and the 
 outworks limited to one crown work at the Ajmir gate, 
 and martello towers, mounting a single gun, at such points 
 as require additional flanking fire to that given by the 
 bastion themselves. The bastions are small, generally 
 mounting three guns in each face, two in each flank, and 
 one in the embrasure at the salient. They are provided 
 with masonry parapets, about twelve feet in thickness, and 
 have a relief of about sixteen feet above the plane of site. 
 The curtain consists of a simple masonry wall or rampart, 
 sixteen feet in height, eleven feet thick at top, and fourteen 
 or fifteen at bottom. The main wall carries a parapet, 
 loopholed for musketry, eight feet in height and eight 
 feet in thickness. The whole of the land front is covered 
 
292 The Engineei^s begin their Work. 
 
 by a berme of variable width, ranging from sixteen to 
 thirty feet, and having a scarp wall eight feet high. 
 Exterior to this was a dry ditch, of about twenty-five feet 
 in width, and from sixteen to twenty in depth. The 
 counterscarp is simply an earthen slope, easy to de- 
 scend. The glacis is a very short one, extending only 
 fifty or sixty yards from the counterscarp. Using general 
 terms, it covers from the besiegers' view from one-half to 
 one-third of the walls of the place.' 
 
 Such being the defences, the plan of assault traced out 
 may be thus stated. 
 
 It was necessary that the attack should be directed 
 against the northern face — the face represented by the 
 Mori, Kashmir, and Water bastions, and the curtain wall 
 connecting them. Fortunately the carelessness of the 
 rebels allowed the besiegers to concentrate on the curtain 
 wall a fire sufficient to crush that of the defence, and thus 
 to effect breaches through which the infantry could be 
 launched. The plan of the Chief Engineer, then, was to 
 crush the fire of the Mori bastion. That fire silenced, the 
 advance on the British left, which was covered by the 
 river, would be secure, and there the assault would be 
 delivered. The evening of the 7th was fixed for the 
 commencement of the tracing of the assailing batteries. 
 
 That day Wilson issued a stirring order to the troops, 
 telling them that the hour was at hand when, as he 
 trusted, they would be rewarded for their past exertions 
 by the capture of the city. That evening the engineers 
 began their work. For No. i battery a site had been 
 selected below the Ridge, in the open plain, within 
 700 yards of the Mori bastion. This battery was divided 
 into two sections, the right one to be commanded by 
 Major Brind, a real hero of the siege, intended to silence 
 the Mori bastion ; the left one by Major Kaye, designed 
 
Brind. Kaye, and Lock hart. 293 
 
 to keep down the fire from the Kashmir bastion until the 
 'order for the delivering of the assault should be given. 
 
 The engineers worked with so much energy at these 
 sections that, on the morning of the 8th, whilst still un- 
 finished, and mounting but one gun, the enemy discovered 
 Brind's section, and opened upon it a fire so concentrated 
 and so incessant that to venture from its protection was 
 to invite almost certain death. A little later the rebels 
 tried to improve the opportunity by despatching a body 
 of infantry and cavalry from the Lahor gate. This diver- 
 sion really favoured the English. For, whilst it lasted, 
 the men in the new battery worked wath such a will that 
 they succeeded in completing five platforms. As each 
 platform was completed the gun mounted on it opened 
 against the enemy. It is needless to add that the sortie, 
 which had thus given badly-wanted time to the defenders, 
 was beaten back with loss. The first section of No. i 
 battery had no sooner been completed than its fire, well 
 directed by the energetic Brind, rendered the Mori bastion 
 harmless. Nor had the gallant Kaye done his work with 
 less zeal. The fire directed from the left section had done 
 good work against the Kashmir bastion, when, at noon of 
 the lOth, the half-battery caught fire from the constant 
 discharge of the guns. For a moment or two it seemed 
 that the hard work of the three previous days would be 
 thrown away, for the rebels at once directed on the 
 burning battery every gun they could command. 
 
 But from such a catastrophe the battery was saved by 
 the gallantry of Lieutenant Lockhart, on duty on the spot, 
 with two companies of the 2d Gurkhas. As soon as he 
 saw the fire, Lockhart, apprehending its fatal consequences, 
 suggested to Kaye whether it might not be possible to 
 save it by working from the outside, and on the top of the 
 parapet. Kaye replied that something might be done if 
 
294 ^/^^ Batteries are completed. 
 
 a party were to take sandbags to the top, cut them, and 
 smother the fire with the sand. But the attempt, under 
 the concentrated fire of the rebels, involved almost certain 
 death. Lockhart nobly thought that the occasion was 
 one to justify the risk. Calling for volunteers, he jumped 
 on the parapet, followed by six or seven Gurkhas, and set 
 himself to the task. The enemy's fire immediately re- 
 doubled. Two of the Gurkhas were shot dead. Lock- 
 hart rolled over the parapet, with a shot through his jaw, 
 but the survivors persevered, and by incredible exertions 
 succeeded in extinguishing the fire. 
 
 Meanwhile No. 2 battery had been traced, also on the 
 evening of the 7th, in front of Ludlow Castle, 500 yards 
 from the Kashmir gate. This, too, was divided into two 
 sections, at a distance from each other of 200 yards. 
 They were both directed against the Kashmir bastion, 
 and intended to silence its fire, to knock away the parapet 
 to the right and the left that gave cover to its defenders, 
 and to open a breach for the stormers. Before dawn of 
 the nth it had been completed and armed, and was then 
 unmasked. Major Campbell commanded the left section, 
 the right was first entrusted to Major Kaye, transferred to 
 it from the ignited left section of No i ; but on that officer 
 being wounded, on the nth, it was placed in the capable 
 hands of Major Edwin Johnson. 
 
 The third battery required in its construction a large 
 amount of skill and daring. It was traced, under the 
 directions of Captain Medley of the engineers, within 
 160 yards of the Water bastion. This battery was finished 
 and armed by the night of the nth. 
 
 A fourth battery, commanded by the gallant Tombs 
 for four heavy mortars, was traced in the Kudsiya Bagh. 
 It was completed on the nth, ready to open fire when its 
 fire might be required. 
 
The Rebels zvake tip. 295 
 
 The rebels had been neither bhnd nor indifferent to 
 the active movements in the camp of the besiegers. Re- 
 cognising at last that the meditated attack would be 
 directed against their left, they adopted measures which, 
 if carried out sooner, would have added enormously to 
 the difficulties of the attack, if, indeed, they had not 
 rendered it impossible. They at once set to work to 
 mount heavy guns along the curtain between the bas- 
 tions on the northern face. In other convenient nooks 
 they mounted light guns. Taking advantage, too, of the 
 broken ground, they made in one night an advanced 
 trench parallel to the left attack, and 350 yards from 
 it, covering their entire front. This trench they lined 
 with infantry. 
 
 A tremendous fire from both sides continued from the 
 opening of the new batteries till the afternoon of the 13th, 
 the damaore done to assailants and defenders being tre- 
 mendous. Never was there displayed in the British army 
 greater energy, more splendid determination. Men fear- 
 lessly exposed themselves to repair damages. Each man 
 felt that on his own personal exertions the issue greatly 
 depended. At length, on the afternoon of the 13th, 
 Wilson and Baird-Smith came to the conclusion that 
 two sufficient breaches had been made. Wilson directed, 
 accordingly, that they should be examined. 
 
 This dangerous duty was performed by four young 
 engineer officers — Medley and Lang for the Kashmir 
 bastion, Greathed and Home for the Water. The two 
 first named reached the edge of the ditch undiscovered, 
 descended into it, and although they saw the enemy was 
 on the alert, carefully examined the breach. They re- 
 turned, pursued by a volley, to report it practicable. A 
 similar report reached Baird-Smith from Greathed and 
 Home. He therefore advised Wilson not to delay a single 
 
296 The Order of the Assault. 
 
 day, but to assault the coming morning. Wilson, agree- 
 ing with him, issued forthwith the necessary orders. 
 
 The order of the attack was as follows. Nicholson, 
 with 300 men of the 75th, under Lieutenant - Colonel 
 Herbert; 250 men of the ist Fusiliers, under Major 
 Jacob; 450 men of the 2d Panjab Infantry, under Captain 
 Green, was to storm the breach near the Kashmir bastion, 
 and escalade the face of the bastion. The engineers 
 attached to this column were Medley, Lang, and Bingham. 
 
 At the same time Brigadier William Jones of the 61 st, 
 commanding the second column, composed of 250 men of 
 the 8th Foot, under Lieutenant-Colonel Greathed; 250 men 
 of the 2d Fusiliers, under Captain Boyd ; 350 men of the 
 4th Sikh Infantry, under Captain Rothney, was to storm 
 the breach in the Water bastion. The engineers with 
 this column were Greathed, Hovenden, and Pemberton. 
 
 Similarly, Colonel Campbell of the 5 2d Light Infantry, 
 commanding the third column, composed of 250 men of the 
 52d, under Major Vigors ; 250 Gurkhas of the Kumaon 
 battalion, under Captain Ramsay ; 500 men of the ist 
 Panjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Nicholson, was to 
 assault by the Kashmir gate after it should have been 
 blown open. The engineers were Home, Salkeld, and 
 Tandy. 
 
 Major Reid of the Sirmur battalion commanded the 
 fourth column, composed of the Sirmur battalion (2d 
 Gurkhas), the Guide corps, such of the pickets, European 
 and native, as could be spared from Hindu Rao's house, 
 and 1200 men of the Kashmir (Jammii) contingent, led by 
 Captain Richard Lawrence, was to attack the suburb of 
 Kishanganj, and enter by the Labor gate. The engineers 
 attached to this column were Maunsell and Tennant 
 
 The fifth, or reserve column, was commanded by 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Longfield of the 8th Foot. It con- 
 
The Assault begins. ^97 
 
 sisted of 250 men of the 6ist, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
 Deacon ; 450 men of the 4th Panjab Infantry, under 
 Captain Wilde ; 300 men, Baluch battalion, under Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Farquhar ; 300 men of the Jhi'nd auxiliary 
 force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunsford. To these were 
 subsequently added 200 men of the 60th Rifles, under 
 Lieutenant-Colonel John Jones of that regiment. This 
 column was to support the first column. Its engineers 
 were Ward and Thackeray. 
 
 In a work which professes to give merely a com- 
 pendium of the story of the great Indian Mutiny space 
 will not allow me to follow the several columns step by 
 step. I must content myself with giving a summary of 
 the tremendous conflict that followed. At three o'clock 
 in the morning the columns of assault were drawn up. 
 There was not a man amongst those who composed them 
 who did not feel that upon the exertions of himself and 
 his comrades depended the fate of India. There was a 
 slight but inevitable delay ; then, as day was dawning 
 the columns advanced, and quietly took up the positions 
 assigned them until signal to advance should be given. 
 Meanwhile, an explosion party, consisting of Lieutenants 
 Home and Salkeld, Sergeants Smith and Carmichael, 
 Corporal Burgess, Bugler Hawthorne, and eight native 
 sappers, covered by 100 men of the 60th Rifles, sped their 
 way to the front to attach kegs of powder to, and blow 
 up, the Kashmir gate. The bugle-sound from this point 
 was to be the signal of success, and for the advance of 
 the third column. 
 
 Nicholson, after one glance to see that the first and 
 second columns were in position, gave the order just after 
 daybreak to advance. The first column moved steadily 
 forward at a walk, until it reached the further edge 
 of the jungle ; then the engineers and storming party 
 
298 The Sto7'niing of Deiili. 
 
 rushed to the breach near the Kashmir bastion, and in 
 a few seconds gained the crest of the glacis. Upon them 
 there the whole fire of the rebels seemed to be concen- 
 trated. So fierce was it that for ten minutes it was im- 
 possible to let down the ladders. At last they let down 
 two, and down these the officers led their men. Once in 
 the ditch, to mount the escarp and scramble up the breach 
 was the work of a few seconds. There the rebels, who 
 had been so bold up to that point, did not await them. 
 They could not stand the hand-to-hand encounter, but fell 
 back on the second line. The breach at this point was won. 
 
 Simultaneously the second column, its engineers in 
 front, pressed forward towards the breach in the Water 
 bastion, whilst the storming party, carrying the ladders, 
 moved to the appointed spot, and though exposed to 
 a tremendous fire, which made great execution in their 
 ranks, let down their ladders and carried the breach ; their 
 supports, by mistake, rushed to the counterscarp of the 
 curtain, slid into the ditch, climbed the breach, and won 
 the rampart. The mistake was a fortunate one, for al- 
 though the actual storming party had been reduced by the 
 fire concentrated upon it in its advance to twenty-five, 
 the supports entering into a vital point of the defences, 
 where an attack had not been anticipated, paralysed the 
 rebels. Jones promptly seized the situation to clear the 
 ramparts as far as the Kabul gate, on the summit of which 
 he planted the column flag, carried that day by Private 
 Andrew Laughnan of the 6ist.i 
 
 Meanwhile, the forlorn hope, composed of the two 
 officers and their following, whose names are given in 
 a preceding page, had advanced straight on to the 
 Kashmir gate, in the face of a very heavy fire. Arrived 
 
 1 This flag was subsequently, the 1st of January 1877, presented by Sir 
 William Jones to Her Majesty. 
 
The Forlor7i Hope. 299 
 
 in front of it, Home and Salkeld, and their followers, each 
 carrying a bag containing twenty-five pounds of gun- 
 powder, crossed the ditch by a barrier gate, which they 
 fortunately found open, to the foot of the great double 
 gate. The enemy seemed completely paralysed by the 
 audacity of the proceeding, and for a moment suspended 
 their fire. Home and Salkeld used the opportunity to 
 attach the bags to the gateway, then to fall back as fast as 
 they could. The bags were laid when the rebels, recover- 
 ing their senses, reopened their deadly fire. Home had 
 time to jump into the ditch unhurt. Salkeld was not so 
 fortunate. He had laid his bags, when he was shot 
 through the arm and leg, and fell back disabled on the 
 bridge. He handed the port-fire to Burgess, bidding him 
 to light the fusee. Burgess, in trying to obey, was shot dead. 
 Carmichael then seized the port-fire, lighted the fusee, 
 and fell back mortally wounded. Then Smith, thinking 
 Carmichael had failed, rushed forward to seize the port- 
 fire, but noticing the fusee burning, threw himself into 
 the ditch.^ The next moment a tremendous explosion 
 shattered the massive gate. Home then told the bugler, 
 Hawthorne, to sound the advance. The bugle-call, re- 
 peated three times, was not heard in the din. But the 
 gallant commander of the third column, Campbell, noticing 
 the explosion, at once ordered the advance of the column. 
 It dashed forward, crossed the bridge, and entered the city 
 just as the first and second columns had won the breaches. 
 Campbell at once pressed on to the main-guard, cleared 
 the Water bastion, forced his way through the Kashmir 
 
 1 Of the six British engaged in this deed of valour two were killed, 
 Burgess and Carmichael. Salkeld died a few days later. Home was killed, 
 during the same month, at the assault of Malagarh. Smith and Hawthorne 
 alone survived. They both received the Victoria Cross. Home and Salkeld 
 were also recommended for it, but they did not survive to get it. 
 
300 Failure of the Fourth Column. 
 
 gate bazaar, reached the gate opening on the Chandni 
 Chauk, forced it, and pressed on till a sudden turn brought 
 him within sight of the great mosque, the Jami Masjid, its 
 arches and gates bricked up, and impossible to be forced 
 without powder bags or guns. He waited in front of it 
 for half-an-hour, in the expectation of the successful ad- 
 vance of the other columns. But as there were no signs 
 of such approach, he fell back on the Begam Bagh, a large 
 enclosure. There I must leave him to relate the progress 
 of the fourth column. 
 
 An unfortunate incident, a failure on the part of the 
 department concerned to carry out the General's instruc- 
 tions, interfered greatly with the success of the fourth 
 column. It was formed up, composed as already detailed, 
 at 4.30 A.M., in front of the Sabzimandi picket. But the 
 four H. A. guns which had been ordered to accompany 
 it had not arrived. When at last they did come they 
 brought with them only sufficient gunners to man one gun. 
 Reid was waiting until gunners could be procured when 
 he heard the explosion at the Kashmir gate. He dis- 
 covered immediately afterwards that 500 of the Jammu 
 troops, despatched two hours earlier for the purpose of 
 effecting a diversion by occupying the Idgar, had become 
 engaged. No time was to be lost, so he pushed on with- 
 out any guns at all. 
 
 On this point it must suffice to state that the assault 
 failed. Reid, who was greatly embarrassed by the want 
 of guns, facing, as he had to face, the unbroken wall of 
 Kishanganj, eighteen feet high, lined with guns and 
 marksmen, had gained the canal bridge with the head of 
 his column, and was meditating a diversion to draw off 
 the attention of the rebels from the main attack when a 
 musket ball, coming from a slanting direction, struck him 
 on the head, and knocked him into the ditch, insensible. 
 
John Nicholson, 301 
 
 How long he remained so he never knew. Those about 
 him thought he had been killed. When he returned to 
 his senses, he found himself on the back of one of his 
 Gurkhas. He was very weak, but he had still strength 
 enough to send for Captain Lawrence, and to direct him 
 to take command, and to support the right. The delay, 
 however, had been very injurious, and the disorder was in- 
 creased by the fact that Captain Muter, seeing Reid fall, 
 and regarding Lawrence in the light of a political officer, 
 had assumed command of the portion of the column with 
 which he was serving. By the time that Lawrence had 
 asserted his authority success had become impossible. 
 He withdrew his men, therefore, leisurely and in good 
 order, on the batteries behind Hindu Rao's house. The 
 attack on the Idgar, made by the Jammu troops alone, 
 was still more unfortunate. They were not only repulsed, 
 but lost four guns. 
 
 The repulse of the fourth column added greatly to the 
 difficulties of the other three. To these I must return. 
 
 I left the first and second columns victorious inside the 
 breach. Nicholson at once massed his men on the square 
 of the main-guard, and turning to the right, pushed on 
 along the foot of the walls towards the Labor gate, whence 
 a galling fire was being kept up on his men. Beyond the 
 Kabul gate, which, as we have seen, had been occupied by 
 the second column, he hoped to feel the support of the 
 fourth column. But, as just related, the attack of that 
 column had failed, and it was this failure which rendered 
 his advance difficult and dangerous. 
 
 To reach the Labor gate Nicholson had to push on 
 under the fire of the Burn bastion, then to force his way 
 through a long lane, every building in which was manned 
 by sharpshooters — the further end of it commanded by 
 two brass guns, one about 160 yards from its opening, 
 
o 
 
 02 Nicholson pushes on. 
 
 pointed in the direction of the advance, the other about 
 100 yards in rear of and commanding it. Behind both 
 was a bullet-proof screen, whilst projecting, as it were, 
 from the wall was the bastion commanding the Labor 
 gate, armed with heavy pieces, and capable of holding a 
 thousand men. 
 
 In his advance Nicholson had been exposed to a con- 
 tinuous fire, but he had a position at the Kabul gate 
 which was strong enough for him to maintain until the 
 movements of the other columns should facilitate his 
 advance. But Nicholson, though urged to halt there, was 
 so fully impressed with the necessity of taking the fullest 
 advantage of the so far successful assault that he resolved 
 at all costs to push on to the Labor gate. He felt this 
 the more because he was convinced that the repulse of the 
 fourth column had renewed the hopes of an enemy pecu- 
 liarly liable to be affected by success or its opposite. He 
 directed, then, his men to storm the narrow lane of which 
 I have spoken. 
 
 Gallantly did his men respond. With a rush not to 
 be withstood they cleared the space up to the first brass 
 gun, and captured it. Then they dashed on the second. 
 But within ten yards of this they were assailed by a fire of 
 grape and musketry, by volleys of stones and round-shot, 
 thrown by hand, so severe that they recoiled under the 
 terrible and ceaseless shower. Not quite all, indeed. Lieu- 
 tenant Butler, who many a time on the field of battle 
 earned the Victoria Cross, which could be bestowed only 
 once, penetrated beyond the second gun, up to the bullet- 
 proof screen. How he escaped with his life was a miracle, 
 but he rejoined his men. 
 
 The men had recoiled only to form again, and once 
 more rush forward. Again did they capture the first gun, 
 which this tim.e Greville (ist Fusiliers) spiked, and again 
 
Is Mo7^tally Wotmded. 303 
 
 did they dash at the second. Never has there been a 
 greater display of heroism, of contempt for death. The 
 leader of the assault, Jacobs, of the ist Fusiliers, was 
 mortally wounded. Wemyss, Greville, Caulfield, Speke 
 (the brother of the African traveller), Woodcock, Butler, 
 all attached to the same regiment, were in turn struck 
 down. The men, greatly discouraged by the fall of their 
 officers, were falling back a second time, when an inspiring 
 voice called upon them to follow where their general led. 
 It was the clear-sounding voice of Nicholson. But the 
 broken order could not be restored in a moment, and 
 before a sufficient number of men could respond to the 
 inspiring cry, a bullet pierced the body of the illustrious 
 leader. 
 
 The wound was mortal, and Nicholson knew it to be 
 so. But neither the pain he suffered, nor the conscious- 
 ness of approaching death, could quench the ardour of 
 his gallant spirit. He still called upon his men to go on. 
 But he was asking that which had now become impos- 
 sible. He had no guns, and already eight officers and 
 fifty men had fallen in the attempt. There was nothing 
 for it but to retire on the Kabul gate. This was done, 
 and Jones assumed the command of the two columns. 
 
 We have left the third column in front of the Jami 
 Masjid, without artillery to beat down its defences. Camp- 
 bell maintained this position for an hour and a half, ex- 
 posed to a heavy fire of grape, musketr}^, and canister. 
 The failure of the attack of the fourth column was fatal 
 to a longer maintenance of that position. The Labor 
 gate being in the hands of the rebels, he was liable to be 
 cut oft". He fell back, then, in a soldierly manner, on the 
 Begam Bagh, resolved to hold it till he could communi- 
 cate with headquarters. An hour and a half later, how- 
 ever, learning that the fourth column had failed, and that 
 
304 Hope Grant, Tombs, Boiirchiei\ 
 
 the first and second had been unable to advance beyond the 
 Kabul gate, he fell back on the church, and disposed his 
 men for the night in it and in the houses in the vicinity. 
 
 Scott's field-battery which had entered the city by 
 the Kashmir gate, had during all this time rendered 
 splendid service to the several columns, but at a large 
 expenditure of life. 
 
 Meanwhile, the failure of the fourth column had become 
 known to the English leaders outside the city, and Wil- 
 son had directed Hope Grant to move down, with 200 
 of the 9th Lancers and 400 Sikh cavalry, to cover the 
 Sabzimandi defences and Hindu Rao's house, laid open 
 to attack. At the same time Tombs's battery, under 
 Grant's order, opened fire on the advancing rebels. In 
 so far as related to the checking of the rebels' advance 
 these measures were successful, but Tombs's fire pro- 
 voked a reply from the heavy guns on the Burn bastion, 
 and this fire, at a distance of 500 yards, made terrible 
 openings in the ranks of the cavalry. Six officers and 
 forty-two men were struck down. Rosser of the Cara- 
 bineers fell with a bullet through his forehead. Nine 
 officers of the Lancers had their horses shot under them. 
 But for two long hours they stood to receive fire. They 
 felt that by drawing upon themselves the attention of the 
 rebels they were serving the common cause. In vain 
 did the battery of the gallant Bourchier come up to aid 
 them with its fire. The blazing from the Burn bastion 
 still continued. Nor did they move until information 
 came that the stormers had established their positions 
 for the night. They then fell back on Ludlow Castle, 
 conscious that they had not only prevented the disastrous 
 results which the defeat of the fourth column might have 
 entailed, but that they had occupied the rebels' attention 
 with very considerable advantage to the main operations. 
 
Summary of the First Days Operations. 305 
 
 The reserve column, meanwhile, led by Longfield, had 
 followed the third column through the Kashmir gate, and 
 cleared the college gardens. One portion of the column 
 had occupied those gardens, the other held the Water 
 bastion, the Kashmir gate, Skinner's house, and another 
 large building. 
 
 Thus ended the first day's operations. The result may 
 thus be briefly summarised. The entire space inside the 
 city, from the Water bastion to the Kabul gate, was held 
 by the first, second, third, and fifth columns. The fourth 
 column, outside the city, held the batteries behind Hindu 
 Rao's house. It was clear, then, that within the city a 
 solid base had been obtained for further development. 
 But the cost had been enormous. In the day's fight the 
 assailants had lost sixty-six officers and 1104 men in 
 killed and wounded. Four out of the five assaulting 
 columns were within the walls, but the position they 
 held was extended, and their right flank was very open 
 to attack. The rebels were still strong in numbers, in 
 guns, and in position. They, too, had had success as 
 well as reverses, and they had no need to abandon hope 
 of ultimate victory. 
 
 To the British general the result of the day's work 
 was discouraging. The plan which had been so urgently 
 pressed upon him had failed to secure success ; his 
 columns had been stopped and driven back ; instead of 
 the whole city, his troops held simply a short line of 
 rampart. Very doubtful as to whether it was not his 
 duty to withdraw to the ridge, he asked Baird-Smith if 
 he thought he could hold what had been taken. The 
 reply of Baird-Smith was decisive : ' We must do so.' 
 Neville Chamberlain also wrote in the same sense to the 
 General. The opinions of these two strong men sufficed 
 to decide Wilson. 
 
 U 
 
3o6 The Action of the Following Days. 
 
 The 15th was employed by the troops within the 
 city in securing the positions gained, in preparing the 
 means to shell the city, in the restoration of order, 
 and in putting a stop to indiscriminate drinking and 
 plundering. The rebels, strange to say, interfered but 
 slightly with this programme. The result showed how 
 thoroughly Baird-Smith and Chamberlain had mastered 
 the nature of Asiatics. The stationary position of the 
 British cowed them. A retreat would have roused them 
 to energetic action. 
 
 The 1 6th gave further evidence of the marked effect 
 on their spirits of the British lodgment. In the early 
 morning of that day they evacuated Kishanganj, whence, 
 on the 14th, they had repulsed the fourth column. The 
 British then stormed the great magazine, the scene of the 
 heroic action of Willoughby and his comrades on the 
 nth of May. It was found to be full of guns, howitzers, 
 and ammunition. Vainly did the rebels, during the after- 
 noon, make a desperate attempt to recover it. They were 
 repulsed with loss. 
 
 If the progress made was, in the desponding language 
 of General Wilson, 'dreadfully slow work,' it was sure. 
 Bit by bit the important positions in the city were wrested 
 from the rebels. On the 17th and i8th the bank, Major 
 Abbott's house, and the house of Khan Muhammad Khan, 
 were occupied, and the besiegers' posts were brought close 
 to the Chandni Chauk and the palace. On the evening 
 of the 1 8th the position occupied by the besiegers was as 
 follows. Their front was marked by the line of the canal, 
 on the banks of which light guns were posted at the main 
 junction of the streets, and sandbag batteries erected. 
 The right and left, indicated respectively by the Kabul 
 gate and the magazine, communicated by a line of posts. 
 The rear was secure against attack. It had been attempted, 
 
The Ldhor Gate occupied, 307 
 
 during that day to extend the right, in the manner con- 
 templated by the gallant Nicholson, to the Lahor gate, but 
 the attack, directed by Greathed of the 8th, had failed. 
 
 It had become absolutely necessary to take that gate, 
 now twice attempted. The Burn bastion, which com- 
 manded it, was no longer supported, as on the 14th, by 
 rebels in Kishanganj and Taliwari. The General then 
 authorised Alexander Taylor of the Engineers to work 
 his way, on the morning of the 19th, to the Burn bastion. 
 Whilst Taylor, with a party of men, was engaged in 
 this somewhat slow process. Brigadier William Jones held 
 himself in readiness to proceed, with 500 men from the 
 8th, 75th, and Sikh regiments, to attack the Labor gate. 
 This time success crowned the joint efforts. Taylor 
 worked his way through the buildings to the summit of 
 a house commanding the bastion. Then Jones advanced, 
 and finding it abandoned, took up his post there for the 
 night. Early the following morning he launched his 
 troops from it, and carried the Labor gate with a rush, 
 then the Garstin bastion. After that success, dividing his 
 force, he detached one portion up the Chandni Chauk to 
 capture the J ami Masjid, the other to gain the Ajmir 
 gate. Major Brind arrived opportunely with reinforce- 
 ments to command in the carrying out of the first of these 
 operations. He entered the mosque without difficulty. 
 Simultaneously Jones occupied the Ajmir gate. 
 
 Brind, when he had carried the Jami Masjid, had 
 noticed, with the eye of a true soldier, that the one thing 
 wanting to assure complete success was to storm the 
 palace at once. He sent for and obtained permission to 
 attempt it. His success was complete. The famous fort^ 
 palace of Shah Jahan was not even defended. The gates 
 were blown in, and British troops entered. The Salimgarh 
 had been previously seized by the brilliant forethought of 
 
o 
 
 08 Demonstration of the Rebels. 
 
 a young lieutenant named Aikman. The same afternoon 
 Wilson took up his quarters in the Imperial palace. 
 
 Dehli was now virtually won. But there still remained 
 in the vicinity, even in the city itself, thousands of armed 
 rebels, ready to take advantage of the slightest slack- 
 ness on the part of the victors. So large had been the 
 casualties that Wilson had fit for service but little over 
 3000 men. From these the guards of the several posts 
 had to be provided. The King of Dehli was still at large, 
 a rallying point to the disaffected. It seemed to the 
 General essential that a determined effort should be made 
 to capture his person. 
 
 The King and his principal advisers had been painfully 
 affected by the success which had depressed General 
 Wilson. The lodgment effected at so much cost, on. the 
 14th, which had caused Wilson to doubt the advisability 
 of proceeding further, had produced in the mind of the 
 King and his surroundings the conviction that, unless the 
 British should retire, the game of the revolters was up. 
 Fortunately he had no Baird-Smith at his elbow to 
 whisper to him how the small hours of the night might be 
 advantageously employed. And although he felt that as 
 long as the Labor gate, the magazine, and the fort should 
 hold out there was still hope, yet the success of the British 
 on the 14th, partial though it was, had taken all the fight 
 out of the rebels. The men who, whilst the British were 
 on the ridge, had been so daring in sortie, so unremitting 
 in attack, had been completely demoralised by the display 
 made by the British on the 14th. The reader will notice 
 how lacking in force and energy were the blows they 
 struck after the British troops had displayed their enor- 
 mous superiority in hand-to-hand fighting on that day. 
 The fact that the lodgment effected on the ramparts on 
 the first day of the assault had cowed them, accounts for 
 
Flight and Captiu^e of the King of Dehlt. 309 
 
 the remarkable ease with which the British were able to 
 push forward on the 15th, i6th, 17th, i8th, and 19th. 
 
 When at last, on the 19th, the Burn bastion had 
 been captured, the Commander-in-Chief, the old artillery 
 Subahdar, Bakht Khan, represented to the King that 
 his only way of safety lay in flight ; he begged him to 
 accompany the sipahi army, which still remained intact, 
 and with it to renew the war in the open country. That 
 was the course which the descendant of Babar, had he 
 been young, would have undoubtedly followed. But the 
 King was old— other influences were at work — and the 
 King was persuaded to reject the bold counsels of his 
 general and to accept those of his Queen and courtiers. 
 He allowed the sipahi army to depart, whilst he took 
 refuge at the tomb of Humayiin, three miles and a half 
 south from the city, prepared to submit to the conqueror. 
 
 Information of this retreat was conveyed to an officer 
 who throughout the siege had made himself conspicuous 
 for his love of adventure and daring, Hodson, of Hodson's 
 Horse. Hodson asked and obtained the General's per- 
 mission to bring in the old man, on the condition that his 
 life should be spared. Hodson performed his task with 
 tact and discretion. That night, the 20th, the King slept 
 a prisoner in the Begam's palace. 
 
 But there were still his sons, the princes, to whom 
 rumour had ascribed an active participation in all the 
 bloody deeds which had characterised the early days of 
 the rebellion. Hodson learned the day following that two 
 of these, and a grandson, lay concealed in Humayiin's 
 tomb, or in the vicinity. Again did he ask and obtain per- 
 mission to bring them in. This time there was no stipu- 
 lation for their lives. Hodson rode out with a hundred 
 armed troopers, found them, persuaded them to surrender, 
 disarmed their numerous following, placed the arms on 
 
3 1 o Slaughter of the Princes, 
 
 carts, the princes on a native akka (or gig), and led the 
 long cavalcade in the direction of the Lahor gate. They 
 had safely accomplished five-sixths of the journey to that 
 gate when Hodson, on the pretext that the unarmed ^ 
 crowd was pressing too closely on his troopers, halted the 
 carts, made the three princes descend, stripped them, and 
 shot them with his own hand. It was a most unnecessary 
 act of bloodshed, for it would have been as easy to 
 bring in the princes as it had been easy to bring in 
 the King. 
 
 Whilst these events were occurring outside the walls, 
 Wilson had commissioned Brind to clear the city of the 
 murderers and incendiaries who, to the number of many 
 thousands, still lurked within it. Brind accomplished 
 this task with the completeness which was necessary. 
 
 On the 2 1st the restoration of regular rule was 
 announced in the appointment of Colonel Burn to be 
 Governor of the city. The day following John Nicholson 
 died from the effects of the wounds he had received on the 
 14th. He had lingered in agony for eight days ; but, as 
 fortunate as Wolfe, he had lived long enough to witness 
 the complete success of the plans to the attempting and 
 accomplishing of which he had so much contributed. He 
 died with the reputation of being the most successful 
 administrator, the greatest soldier, and the most perfect 
 master of men in India. The reputation w^as, I believe, 
 deserved. He was of the age which a great master, whom 
 in face he resembled, the late Lord Beaconsfield, has 
 called 'that fatal thirty-seven.'^ 
 
 ^ The crowd had been disarmed at the tomb. Hodson was not the man 
 to allow armed men to collect with impunity. 
 
 ^ Arguing that 'genius, when young, is divine,' the author ot Coningshy 
 proceeds to illustrate his argument by quoting the names of Alexander the 
 Great, Don John of Austria, Gaston de Foix, Conde, Gustavus Adolphus, 
 
Moral of the Storming of Dehli. 311 
 
 * In the history of sieges/ I wrote in a work published 
 at the time/ and which correctly recorded all the impres- 
 sions of the hour, 'that of Dehli will ever take a pro- 
 minent place. Its strength, its resources, and the prestige 
 attached to it in the native mind, combined to render for- 
 midable that citadel of Hindustan. Reasonably might the 
 Northern Bee or the Invalide Russe question our ability to 
 suppress this rebellion if they drew their conclusions from 
 the numerical strength of the little band that first sat 
 down before Dehli. But the spirit that animated that 
 handful of soldiers was not simply the emulative bravery 
 of the military proletarian. The cries of helpless women 
 and children, ruthlessly butchered, had gone home to the 
 heart of every individual soldier, and made this cause his 
 own. There was not an Englishman in those ranks, from 
 first to last, who would have consented to turn his back 
 on Dehli without having assisted in meting out to those 
 bloody rebels the retributive justice awarded them by his 
 own conscience, his country, and his God. It was this 
 spirit that buoyed them up through all the hardships of 
 the siege ; that enabled them, for four long months of 
 dreary rain and deadly heat, to face disease, privation, and 
 death without a murmur.' 
 
 The siege was indeed calculated to bring out all 
 the great qualities which distinguish the British soldier. 
 
 Duke Bernhard of Weimar, Banner, Cortez, Maurice of Saxony, Nelson, 
 Clive, John de Medici, Luther, Ignatius Loyala, John Wesley, and Pascal. 
 ' Pascal,' he continues, ' wrote a great work at sixteen, and died at thirty- 
 seven.' Then, 'Ah! that fatal thirty-seven, which reminds me of Byron.' 
 Pie shows, further, how Raphael died at thirty-seven ; and, still supporting his 
 argument that ' genius, when young, is divine,' brings forward the names of 
 Richelieu, Eolingbroke, Pitt, Grotius, and Acquaviva. To this long list 
 Nicholson, the greatest by far of all the Panjab school, might most properly 
 be added. 
 
 1 The Red Faniplilef, published in 1857. 
 

 
 12 T/ic Heroes of the Siege. 
 
 Vying with him, alike in his endurance of hardships, his 
 contenapt of death, his eagerness for enterprise, were the 
 Gurkhas of the Himalayas, the frontier men of the Guides, 
 the hardy Baluchi's, the daring Sikhs, the resolute Pathans. 
 Nor will English-speaking races soon forget the names of 
 those gallant officers who contributed so much to the 
 success of the undertaking. There were many besides 
 those I am now mentioning. But a careful and impartial 
 examination of correspondence, public and private, has 
 especially brought before me, amongst the most deserving, 
 the names of Baird-Smith, of Nicholson, of Barnard, of 
 Neville Chamberlain, of Charles Reid, of James Brind, 
 of Frederick Roberts, of Hope Grant, of John Jones, 
 of Edwin Johnson, of Alec Taylor, of Tait, of Lockhart, of 
 Turnbull, of Seaton, of Hodson, of Dighton Probyn, 
 of Daly, of Tombs, of Renny, of Jacob, of John Coke, of 
 Speke, of Greville, of Watson, of Medley, of James Hills, 
 of Quintin Battye, of Rosser, of Aikman, of Salkeld, of 
 Home. There are many others, for the list is a long 
 one. 
 
 These men have now broken the back of the rebellion. 
 We shall see them display equal energy in the task 
 which supervenes on the morrow of victory — the follow- 
 ing of it up. 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 FROM DEHLI TO AGRA AND KANHPUR — SIR COLIN 
 CAMPBELL AT KANHPUR. 
 
 No sooner had the capture of Dehh' been thoroughly 
 assured than Wilson despatched a corps of 2790 men, 
 under the command of Colonel Edward Greathed of the 
 8th Foot, to open the country between Dehli and Agra, 
 and to join Sir Colin Campbell at Kanhpur or its 
 vicinity. 
 
 Greathed set out on the morning of the 24th of Sep- 
 tember, crossed the Hindan, and marched, by way of 
 Dadri and Sikandarabad, on Bulandshahr, punishing on 
 his way the inhabitants proved to have committed atro- 
 cities, reassuring those who had remained loyal. He arrived 
 before Bulandshahr on the 28th, attacked and completely 
 defeated a rebel force which attempted to cover that town, 
 then pushing on, occupied it and Malagarh. In destroy- 
 ing the fortifications of the latter he had the misfortune to 
 lose, by an accident. Lieutenant Home of the Engineers, 
 one of the survivors of the gallant men who had blown 
 up the Kashmir gate on the 14th. Thence, still pushing 
 on, Greathed reached Khiirja, a considerable town. Here 
 the passions of the troops were roused to extreme fury 
 by the sight of the skeleton, pronounced by the medical 
 officers to be the skeleton of a European female, stuck up 
 on the roadside exposed to public gaze, the head severed 
 from the body. They were for taking instant vengeance 
 
314 G7^eathed receives imploring Messages from Agra. 
 
 on the inhabitants. But, in deference to the remonstrances 
 of the civil officer accompanying the force, who repre- 
 sented the impolicy of destroying a place of considerable 
 importance, and which paid a large revenue to the State, 
 Greathed spared Khurja, 
 
 From Khurja Greathed marched on Aligarh, defeated 
 there a body of the rebels who had so long dominated 
 the district, and marching in the direction of Agra, 
 reached Bijaigarh on the 9th of October. There he re- 
 ceived the most pressing solicitations from the authorities 
 at Agra to hasten to their relief. A formidable body of 
 rebels, he was told, was threatening the sandstone fort, 
 • and his credit would be at stake if Agra were attacked 
 and he so near.' Greathed was but forty-eight miles from 
 Agra. He accordingly despatched that night the cavalry 
 and horse-artillery, with instructions to hurry on by 
 forced marches. Four hours later he followed with the 
 infantry, mounting his men on elephants, carts, and 
 camels to get over the ground the more quickly. Whilst 
 he is thus hurrying on I propose to ask the reader to 
 take a bird's-eye glance at Agra. 
 
 Of the condition of Agra after the defeat of Polwhele 
 and the death of Mr Colvin I have wTitten in a previous 
 chapter.^ Ever since that time, whilst the life within the 
 fort had been dull and monotonous, the country around 
 had been occupied and reoccupied by roving bands of 
 rebels. The mutineers from Mau and other parts of 
 Central India, though detained for a time at Gwaliar, 
 thanks to the loyalty of Maharaja Sindhia, had broken 
 loose from his hold early in September, and marched on 
 to Dholpur. Thence they had gradually spread detach- 
 ments over the districts of Khairagarh, Fathpur-Sikri, 
 Iradatnagar, and Fathabad. The news of the doubtful 
 
 ^ Chapter xvii., page 252. 
 
Greathed at Agra. 3 1 5 
 
 success, as it seemed, of the British in the storming of 
 Dehh', on the 14th, had not discouraged them. The suc- 
 cess of the British on the following days had even had 
 the effect of releasing from Dehli a considerable body of 
 men who hoped to renew their tactics elsewhere. A 
 number of these had reached Mathura, on the 26th, and 
 joined there by a large body of mutinied sipahis, effected 
 a day or two later a junction with the rebels from Central 
 India. These were the men whose threatening attitude 
 was now causing consternation in Agra, though so indiffer- 
 ently was the Intelligence department managed that no 
 one within the fort knew exactly where they were. 
 
 Meanwhile, Greathed, pushing on with speed, crossed 
 the bridge of boats under the walls of the fort at sunrise 
 on the morning of the loth. Inquiring as to the position 
 of the rebels, he was told by the authorities within the fort 
 that ' the insurgent force from Dholpur was beyond the 
 Karl Nadi, ten miles from cantonments, across which they 
 would find difficulty in passing.'^ The same authorities 
 wished Greathed to encamp in a ' series of gardens over- 
 grown by brushwood, where their guns would not have 
 had a range of fifty yards, and where the cavalry could 
 not possibly act.'^ But Greathed was too good a soldier 
 to accede to such a proposition. He insisted on encamp- 
 ing on the parade ground, a magnificent grassy plain, with 
 not an obstacle within three or four hundred yards of it, and 
 at that distance only some high crops. There the camp was 
 pitched, the horses were picketed, and the men proceeded 
 to divest themselves of their accoutrements, preparatory 
 to taking their well-earned breakfasts. Between the camp 
 
 1 Major Norman, who adds: 'This information was given in positive 
 terms.' 
 
 2 Bourchier's Eight Months' Campaign^ a book which everyone should 
 read. 
 
3 1 6 Gi^eathed^ s Force surprised by the Rebels. 
 
 and the fort a lively communication was opened, and con- 
 scious of security, the authorities took few if any precau- 
 tions regarding the characters they admitted. 
 
 But the rebels, instead of being, as the Agra authori- 
 ties believed, ' beyond the Kari Nadi, ten miles from 
 cantonments,' were in the cantonment itself, hidden from 
 the sight of the troops by the long crops which bounded 
 the view of Greathed's force. Taking advantage of the 
 security into which the men of that force had been lulled, 
 and of the facilities permitted to strangers of every degree 
 to go in and out of the camp, four of them, dressed as 
 conjurors, came strolling up to the advanced guard of the 
 9th Lancers. The sergeant in charge of the post ordered 
 them off, whereupon one of them drew his tahvdr and cut 
 him down, and another who rushed to his rescue. Eventu- 
 ally these four men were despatched by the troopers, but 
 before the occurrence had become known to everyone in 
 the camp round-shot, from the leafy screen in its front, 
 came pouring in. The alarm sounded, but there was 
 scarcely need for it. The soldiers of Dehli, accustomed 
 to sudden attacks, turned out with all possible speed. 
 But though they used every despatch,^ before they were 
 ready, the rebel cavalry, springing from no one knew 
 where, appeared as if by magic on the scene. They had 
 charged the still motionless artillery, and had sabred the 
 gunners of one gun, when a squadron of the 9th Lancers, 
 which had formed up very rapidly, dashed on them and 
 drove them back in disorder. The charge cost the 
 squadron dear, for French, who led it, was killed ; Jones, 
 his subaltern, was dangerously wounded, and several men 
 were killed or wounded. But it gave the respite that was 
 wanted, and allowed Greathed, who had hurried from the 
 
 ^ For a lifelike description of this surprise, and the events connected with 
 it, everyone should read Bourchier's Eight Months' Campaign. 
 
splendid Victory of the British. 317 
 
 fort, to deploy his line and to despatch Watson, with a 
 portion of his cavalry, to turn the left flank of the rebels, 
 whilst he should advance from the centre. He was joined, 
 as he advanced, by a battery of artillery, which Pearson 
 had manned, experimentally, with men of Eurasian ex- 
 traction, and which on this occasion rendered excellent 
 service. The prompt advance of the force, the celerity 
 with which it had been transformed from a heterogeneous 
 mass of individuals sleeping or lounging into a living 
 machine, upset the calculations of the rebels, and the 
 British cavalry, gallantly led by Ouvry, Probyn, Watson, 
 and the guns, splendidly managed by Bourchier, Turner, 
 and Pearson, completed the confusion which this celerity 
 had produced. They fell back in disorder, pursued in 
 front by the infantry, which had been joined by the 
 3d Europeans from the fort — under Colonel Cotton, 
 who, by virtue of his seniority to Greathed, took the 
 command — and on the flanks by the cavalry and artillery. 
 The infantry followed them as far as their camp, which 
 was found standing midway between Agra and the Kari 
 Nadi, and there halted, dead tired ; but the pursuit was 
 continued as far as that stream by the two other arms. 
 Only once did the rebels attempt to make a stand, but 
 then a few rounds of grape sent them flying. They were 
 unable to carry a single gun across the stream. For 
 seven miles the road was one continued line of carts, guns, 
 ammunition waggons, camels, and baggage of every de- 
 scription. The whole of this fell into the hands of the 
 victors. Much that was useless they destroyed ; but they 
 brought back into camp thirteen pieces of ordnance and 
 vast quantities of ammunition. No victory could have 
 been more rapid or decisive. It was a splendid perform- 
 ance, especially if one takes into consideration the circum- 
 stances under which the battle was engaged. Bourchier's 
 
3 1 8 The Force enters Oitdh. 
 
 nine-pounder battery had marched thirty miles without a 
 halt before the action began. From first to last Great- 
 hed's cavalry and artillery had marched over sixty-four 
 miles, the infantry fifty-four, in less than thirty-six hours, 
 to be then surprised in camp, to beat off the surprisers, 
 and to follow them up ten miles. It was a great perform- 
 ance — well marched, well fought, and well followed up. 
 The force did not return to its encamping ground till 
 seven o'clock in the evening. 
 
 The victory secured the restoration round Agra of law 
 and order. The return of law and order, again, was illus- 
 trated by a change in the command, contrived and carried 
 out in a very mysterious manner, Greathed had not given 
 satisfaction either to the Agra authorities or to the re- 
 presentative of a very powerful military clique in his camp. 
 Under their joint influence the Secretary to the Agra 
 Government wrote to Dehli to request that Hope Grant 
 of the 9th Lancers might be sent down to assume com- 
 mand. Hope Grant was sent, and travelling rapidly, 
 joined the column at Firuzabad, the third march from 
 Agra on the Kanhpur road, and with it reached Kanhpur 
 on the 26th October. At Kanhpur Grant found that Sir 
 Colin Campbell had made arrangements to increase the 
 column to the divisional strength of about 5000 men. 
 On the 30th Hope Grant crossed the Ganges into Oudh, 
 and in consequence of orders received from Sir Colin, 
 encamped his force in a plain beyond the Banni bridge, 
 within a few miles of the Alambagh, to await there further 
 instructions. 
 
 Whilst Hope~ Grant was marching into Oudh, other 
 columns, despatched from Dehli, were doing excellent 
 work in the districts contiguous to that city. In all of 
 these the authority of the Mughal had been recognised, 
 and sharp actions were requisite to prove to the revolted 
 
Order is restored in the Dehli Districts. 319 
 
 populations that the power of that family had ceased for 
 ever. Whilst Van Cortland t, an excellent officer, with 
 native levies, cleared the ground to the north-west of the 
 city, Showers, with a mixed column, marched to the west 
 and south-west, forced the chief of Ballabgarh to submit, 
 and took in succession Riwari, Jajhar, and Kanauri. He 
 returned to Dehli, on the 19th of October, with three rebel 
 chiefs as prisoners, and much booty, specie of the value 
 of ;^8o,ooo, seventy guns, and a large quantity of 
 ammunition. 
 
 Scarcely had Showers returned when the mutinied 
 troops of the Jodhpur legion, fresh from a victory over 
 the soldiers of the loyal Raja of Jaipur, invaded the 
 territories he had but just overrun, and occupied Riwari. 
 Against them Gerrard, an officer of conspicuous merit, 
 was despatched with a strong column.^ Gerrard, march- 
 ing from Dehli, the lOth of November, reoccupied Riwari 
 on the 13th, and pushed on to Narnul, which the rebels 
 had occupied in considerable force,, So strong, indeed, 
 was their position there that, had they had the patience 
 to await attack, Gerrard would have found that all his 
 work had been cut out for him. But, either from sheer 
 incapacity or from utter recklessness, no sooner had it 
 been reported to him that the British were in sight than 
 the rebel leader advanced to meet him in the plain. The 
 cavalry fight which followed was most desperately con- 
 tested ; the Guides, led by Kennedy, and the Carabineers 
 by Wardlaw, fighting splendidly against considerable odds. 
 The rebels, too, fought well, but eventually they gave way. 
 On the left the Multani horse, new levies, had at first dis- 
 played considerable reluctance to join in the fray. Roused 
 
 1 The 1st Fusiliers, the 7th Panjab Infantry, Cookworthy's troop of horse- 
 artillery, Gillespie's heavy battery, the Carabineers, the cavalry of the Guides, 
 the Multani horse. 
 
320 Sir Colin Campbell. 
 
 at length by the example of their officers, and by the 
 success achieved by the Carabineers and the Guides, they 
 joined in the combat, and took their proper place in 
 the front. Meanwhile, the infantry and the artillery had 
 been following up the advantage gained by the defeat of 
 the rebel horse. The enemy was now in full flight. At 
 this crisis Gerrard, riding in front, conspicuous on his 
 white Arab charger, was mortally wounded by a musket- 
 ball. In the momentary confusion which followed, the 
 rebels, rallying, made a desperate effort to restore the 
 fortunes of the day. In vain, however. The Fusiliers 
 charged and drove them into flight, and completed their 
 expulsion from the fort of Narnul. Caulfield, who had 
 succeeded to the command, followed up his advantage. 
 He, however, a few days later, was relieved by Seaton, 
 and, under orders from headquarters, that officer led back 
 the force to Dehli, preparatory to taking part in the 
 measures which Sir Colin Campbell was devising for the 
 recovery of Oudh, Fathgarh, and Rohilkhand. 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell had arrived in Calcutta on the 
 13th of August. Already at that period, although Dehli 
 had not fallen, the position for an advance from Kanh- 
 pur, though far from perfect, had, thanks to the splendid 
 efforts of Neill, Frederick Gubbins, William Taylor, Vin- 
 cent Eyre, Havelock, and Outram, materially improved. 
 There was, however, still much to be accomplished. The 
 line of 600 miles, the security of which had been pro- 
 minently put forward by Mr Secretary Beadon in the 
 early days of the Mutiny, was not only insecure, but was 
 being daily broken. The evil had been intensified for 
 a time by the refusal of the Government to disarm the 
 native regiments at Danapur, and by the consequences 
 of that refusal. Then, too, the division of Chutia Nagpur, 
 a mountainous territory lying between Southern Bihar, 
 
Sir Colin Campbell starts for Kdnhpttr, 321 
 
 Western Bengal, Orisa, and the Central Provinces was 
 surging with revolters, and these were constantly travers- 
 ing the grand trunk road, impeding communications, and 
 rendering travelling- dangerous. However, none of these 
 difficulties daunted Sir Colin. His aim was to despatch 
 troops, and to proceed himself, to Kanhpur, thence to 
 march to relieve Outram and Havelock. Under the 
 pressure of his requisitions the Government organised a 
 bullock-train for the despatch of troops to Allahabad, 
 whilst he sent out strong parties to patrol the road. 
 The opportune arrival of the British troops intended for 
 China, but which the patriotism of Lord Elgin had placed 
 at the disposal of the Government of India, enabled Sir 
 Colin to utilise the means thus prepared for their despatch. 
 Then the Shannon and the Pearl arrived, and Captain 
 William Peel, of glorious memory, proceeded to organise 
 his famous brigade from the crew of the former, whilst 
 Captain Sotheby did the same from the crew of the Pearl. 
 Troops arrived from England in October. On the 27th of 
 that month Sir Colin, having completed all his arrange- 
 ments for the prompt despatch of regiments as they might 
 arrive, set out for Allahabad. Narrowly escaping capture on 
 his way from a body of rebels who had broken the famous 
 line, he arrived there the evening of the ist of November. 
 He found matters in good progress. The Naval 
 brigade had left Allahabad for Kanhpur in two detach- 
 ments, on the 23d and 28th October. The 53d and drafts 
 for other regiments had accompanied the second detach- 
 ment, the whole commanded by Colonel Powell of the 53d. 
 Sir Colin, having organised a party, under Longden of the 
 1 0th, for the clearing of the Azamgarh district, set out for 
 Kanhpur on the 2d, and arrived there on the 3d. He 
 found the position there, in a military point of view, 
 dangerous. Oudh was still teeming with rebels, whilst 
 
 X 
 
322 Sir John enters Oiidh, 
 
 to the south-west of him, within a distance of forty-five 
 miles, the trained soldiers of the Gwdliar contingent were 
 threatening his communications. The road which he had 
 but just traversed, between Allahabad and Kanhpur, was 
 liable to invasion from Oudh, and was far from safe. Only- 
 two days before he had proceeded along it Powell and 
 Peel had a very sharp encounter with the rebels at Kajwa, 
 twenty-four miles from Fathpur, in which, though it termi- 
 nated in a victory, Powell had been killed, and ninety-five 
 men killed and wounded. The problem Sir Colin had to 
 consider was whether, with the road communicating with 
 Allahabad liable to invasion, and his left rear seriously 
 threatened, he could venture to engage in an operation 
 which would occupy many days, and the duration of 
 which any untoward accident might prolong. The rebels 
 were well served by spies, and Sir Colin well knew the 
 opportunities which his invasion of Oudh with the bulk of 
 his force would open to men possessing soldierly instincts. 
 In war, however, it is always necessary to risk something. 
 The rescue of the garrison of the Residency seemed to 
 Sir Colin's mind the most pressing necessity. He resolved, 
 then, to attempt it with as little delay as possible. 
 
 We have seen how he had ordered Hope Grant, with 
 a portion of the Dehli force, to await further instructions in 
 the plain beyond the Banni bridge. There he formed the 
 point d'appiii of the invading army, upon which all carts 
 and supplies were to concentrate. Thither, too, he had 
 despatched all his available troops. Arranging to leave 
 behind him at Kanhpur about 500 European troops, under 
 Windham of Crimean fame, and some Sikhs, and giving 
 authority to Windham to detain a brigade of Madras 
 sipahis, under Carthew, expected the next day, Sir Colin 
 and his staff quitted Kanhpur on the 9th, and joined 
 Hope Grant beyond the Banni bridge the same afternoon. 
 
CHAPTER XXL 
 
 THE SECOND RELIEF OF THE LAKHNAO RESIDENCY — 
 WINDHAM AND THE GWALIAR CONTINGENT. 
 
 Before describing the proceedings of Sir Colin Campbell 
 and his force it will be well to cast a glance at the occu- 
 pants of the Residency, increased in numbers since the 
 25th of September by the arrival of the troops so gallantly 
 led by Outram and Havelock. 
 
 These troops had, as I have said, scarcely entered the 
 defences when it was universally realised that their advent 
 had constituted not a relief but a reinforcement ; that 
 means of transport for the ladies and children, the sick and 
 wounded, were wanting; that an enormous addition had 
 been made to the hospital list ; and that, even had trans- 
 port been available, the combined force was not strong 
 enough to escort them to Kanhpur. Compelled thus, 
 perforce, to remain, Outram devoted all his endeavours to 
 the providing of accommodation for the increased force. 
 With this view he caused to be occupied the palaces 
 along the line of river, the Tarawala Kothi, the Chatar 
 Manzil, and the Farhatbakhsh. These he consigned to 
 the newly arrived troops, under the command of Havelock, 
 whilst the old troops continued to occupy their former 
 posts. The care of the important post of the Alambagh he 
 consigned to Major Mclntyre of the 78th, with 250 men 
 fit for duty, and others who, although sick at the time, 
 speedily became convalescent. The orders to Mclntyre 
 
324 The Blockade of the Residency. 
 
 were to hold the place as long as he could, and only in 
 case of absolute necessity to fall back upon Kanhpur. 
 
 The six weeks that followed have not incorrectly been 
 termed a blockade. No longer did the rebels make those 
 desperate assaults from postswhich dominated the defences. 
 The attacks rather came now from the defenders. They 
 came in the shape of sorties, of countermining, of extend- 
 ing their borders. To write a history of the sorties would 
 require a volume. It must suffice here to state that they 
 were frequent and successful. It is true that an attempt 
 made on the 3d of October, and one or two following days, 
 to open communications with the Alambagh, by way of 
 the intermediate houses, was relinquished. But even this 
 attempt resulted in a certain advantage to the garrison. 
 Boring through a number of houses, they seized a large 
 mosque just beyond them, and made of it a permanent 
 outpost. This was held successfully, and with great ad- 
 vantage, until Sir Colin arrived. By these and similar 
 means the limits of the British position became gradually 
 extended. Extension meant relief to the old garrison 
 from all molestation on its east, north-east, and south-east 
 faces ; that is, from the Kanhpur road to the commence- 
 ment of the river front. Meanwhile, the defences of 
 the original Residency were repaired, and new batteries 
 were constructed. No longer was heard that incessant 
 musketry fire from a distance not exceeding the width 
 of the Strand. From the posts occupied in a vicinity 
 so close the rebels had been driven so far that their 
 musketry fire could no longer effect mischief within the 
 intrenchment. But they did not even then feel baffled. 
 Withdrawing to a convenient distance, they so planted 
 their guns that the balls might be sure to clear the outer 
 defences and lodge within the intrenchment. To annoy 
 still further the garrison they constantly shifted their point 
 
Means for communicating with Sir Colin. 325 
 
 of fire. They knew not, apparently, the deadly result to 
 the garrison of this mode of attack, for they displayed 
 no continuity in the working of it. 
 
 On the 9th of October the garrison was cheered by 
 the news of the complete success obtained at Dehli, and 
 of the successful march of Greathed's column as far as 
 Bulandshahr. Then it was that, realising that Sir Colin 
 Campbell's march to his relief had now become a question 
 of three or four weeks, Outram set to work to devise a 
 plan to communicate with him as he should approach. 
 Already he had forwarded to the Alambagh a despatch 
 for Sir Colin, containing plans of the city and the ap- 
 proaches to it, and his own idea as to the best mode 
 of effecting a junction. But though written despatches 
 might tell much, something more, something in the shape 
 of personal communication with Sir Colin, by an intelli- 
 gent man who knew every point of the position of the 
 blockaded garrison, seemed to Outram to be almost 
 essential. But how to secure to Sir Colin such personal 
 communication ? It could be accomplished only by one 
 of the garrison, and by that one having recourse to dis- 
 guise. But for a European to disguise himself, and to 
 attempt to penetrate in that disguise the hostile masses 
 which surrounded the blockaded position, which guarded 
 every avenue, and carefully watched every approach, was 
 apparently to court certain and ignominious death. No 
 one could be asked to incur such a risk. Indeed, it would 
 have required, on the part of Outram, a conviction that 
 the chances of success were at least equal to those of 
 failure to allow him to accept the offer of a volunteer. 
 
 The anxiety of Outram for some such personal com- 
 munication was greater when he learned that Sir Colin 
 was on the point of joining the force between the Alam- 
 bagh and the Banni bridge, and there can be no doubt 
 
326 Thomas Henry Kavmtagh. 
 
 that his anxiety on this head became generally known 
 Amongst others it reached the ears of one Thomas Henry 
 Kavanagh, a clerk in one of the civil offices. Kavanagh 
 at once communicated to Outram his readiness to assume 
 the role. To all appearance there were few men less quali- 
 fied than Kavanagh to escape detection. For he was a fair 
 man, much taller than the general run of the natives of 
 Oudh, and his red hair glittered like gold. On the other 
 hand, he possessed a courage that nothing could daunt, a 
 perfect knowledge of the native patois, and a will of iron. 
 No one loved a brave man more than Outram. The offer 
 made by Kavanagh was an offer after his own heart. But, 
 humane beyond the ordinary run of men, he hesitated to 
 expose a fellow-creature to almost certain death. Whatever 
 doubts he may have entertained on this head were, however, 
 dissipated after his first interview with Kavanagh. In him 
 he recognised a man whose innate pluck and iron resolu- 
 tion would carry him through all dangers. He accepted, 
 therefore, his offer, and bade him prepare for his enterprise. 
 
 Kavanagh then had his hair and his skin stained with 
 lamp-black ; the hair he also cut short. Then, donning 
 the dress of a Badnidsh — a native ' swashbuckler,' a type 
 very common in those days — he set out, on the evening 
 of the 9th of November, accompanied by a native spy of 
 proved fidelity, Kanauji Lai by name. 
 
 Mr Kavanagh subsequently published an account ^ of 
 his journey, which may yet be read with deep interest. 
 It was not without its alarms. He did not reach the Alam- 
 bagh that night, but, on the morning of the lOth, he fell 
 in with a party of the Panjab cavalry, and this party con- 
 ducted him to Sir Colin, who, as we have seen, had reached 
 the plain beyond Banni bridge the previous evening.^ 
 
 ^ How I Won the Victoria Cross, Ward & Lock. After a somewhat 
 chequered career, Kavanagh died in St Tliomas's Hospital in 1883. 
 
Plan of Sir Colin Campbell. 32^ 
 
 Sir Colin Campbell had, on his arrival, despatched 
 Adrian Hope of the 93d, with a large convoy of pro- 
 visions, to the Alambagh. The sick and wounded he had 
 despatched in carts to Kanhpur. On the loth he halted 
 to confer with Kavanagh, and to complete his arrange- 
 ments. On the nth his engineer park arrived, and he 
 issued orders for an advance the following day. At 
 sunrise on the 12th the troops marched. Sir Colin's plan, 
 based mainly on that which Outram had sent him, was to 
 move on the Alambagh, to store there all the impedunenta ; 
 then, drawing to himself the detachments still in the rear, 
 to make, with a wide sweep, a flank march to the right on 
 the Dilkusha park and the Martiniere ; then to force the 
 canal close to its junction with the Gumti ; then, covered 
 by that river, to advance on the Sikandarabagh. This 
 point once secured, he would detach a portion of the force 
 to seize the barracks to the north of Hazratganj, and 
 plant there batteries to play on the Kaisarbagh. During 
 that time he would move, with the main body, on the Shah 
 Najaf and Moti Mahall, and forcing these, would effect 
 a junction with Outram. That officer would support this 
 operation by opening a heavy fire on all the inter- 
 mediate positions held by the rebels. Forcing these, he 
 would then move out, with all his sick and wounded, 
 women and children, and effect a junction with Sir Colin. 
 
 The first day's march had the object of placing the 
 force solidly in communication with the Alambagh, the gar- 
 rison of which, still commanded by the gallant Mclntyre, 
 had been gradually increased to 930 Englishmen, a few 
 Sikhs, and eight guns. This having been effected at the 
 cost of one or two successful skirmishes with the rebels, 
 Sir Colin proceeded to arrange for his decisive advance on 
 the morrow. First, he despatched Hope to seize the fort of 
 Jalalabad, to the right rear of the Alambagh. He then 
 
328 Force at His Disposal. 
 
 stacked within the Alambagh all the camp equipage not 
 required for the hard work in prospect. His last rein- 
 forcements arriving that evening, he placed the 75th, 
 which had suffered much, and the strength of which had 
 been reduced to something under 300, within the Alam- 
 bagh, to relieve the men till then located there. He 
 gave them, also, a few Sikhs from Brasyer's regiment and 
 some guns. Counting up his men, he found that, after 
 deducting those sent back with sick and wounded and the 
 garrison of the Alambagh, he had fit for service about 
 4700 men. These he divided into six brigades. There 
 were the Naval brigade, commanded by William Peel ; the 
 Artillery brigade, comprising the batteries of Blunt, Rem- 
 mington, Travers, Bridge, and Bourchier, commanded by 
 Brigadier Crawford ; the Cavalry brigade, led by Brigadier 
 Little, and comprising two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, 
 one each of the ist, 2d, and 5th Panjab Cavalry, and 
 Hodson's Horse; the 3d Infantry brigade, com.manded by 
 Greathed, and composed of the remnant of the 8th, of a 
 battalion formed of detachments of the three regiments 
 shut up in the Residency, and the 2d Panjab N. I. ; the 
 4th, led by Adrian Hope, and consisting of the 93d, a wing 
 of the 53d, the 4th Panjab Infantry, and a battalion also 
 formed from men proceeding to join the regiments to be 
 relieved ; the 5th, led by Russell, and comprising the 23d 
 Fusiliers and a portion of the 82d. Hope Grant, with the 
 rank of Brigadier-General, directed the operations, under 
 the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 The following morning the troops, having breakfasted, 
 set out at nine o'clock, and after some skirmishing carried 
 the Dilkusha. Not halting there, they pressed on to the 
 Martiniere and carried that also. Sir Colin proceeded to 
 secure the position thus gained by placing in the gardens 
 of the Martiniere Hope's brigade and Remmington's troop. 
 
The Troops sectu^e the Martiniere. 329 
 
 Russell he placed on the left, in front of the Dilkusha, 
 whilst he directed Little, with the cavalry, to occupy a 
 line drawn from the canal on his right to a wall of the 
 Dilkusha park on his left. With him he posted likewise 
 Bourchier's battery. Somewhat later in the day, Russell, 
 under his orders, occupied, with some companies, two 
 villages on the canal covering the left of the advance. 
 
 But the rebels had no intention to allow the British 
 general to remain in peaceful occupation of his line of 
 attack. No sooner had they realised the exact nature 
 of his dispositions than they massed their troops towards 
 their centre, with the intention of making a grand assault. 
 Little, noticing the gathering, sent an officer, Grant, to 
 reconnoitre. On receiving Grant's report he despatched 
 to the front the gallant Bourchier, supporting him with 
 his cavalry. It was seen that the rebels had lined the 
 opposite bank of the canal, and had only been prevented 
 from making their forward movement by the timely occu- 
 pation by Russell of the two villages above referred to. 
 . Bourchier's guns quickly sent back their skirmishers, and 
 his fire reaching their supporting masses, these in their 
 turn also fell back. A second attempt, made about five 
 o'clock, on the Martiniere was baffled by the vigilance of 
 Adrian Hope and the successful practice of Remmington's 
 guns. Here, again, Bourchier's battery and Peel's guns 
 rendered splendid service, literally ' crushing,' by their 
 flank fire, the rebels out of their position. 
 
 The troops bivouacked for the night in the places they 
 had gained. The next day, the 15th, was devoted to pre- 
 parations, though it was not altogether free from desul- 
 tory skirmishing. In the evening Sir Colin signalled to 
 Outram, by a code previously arranged, that he would 
 advance on the morrow. 
 
 Accordingly, early on the morning of the 1 6th, a 
 
330 The Advance on the Sikandardbdgh. 
 
 strong body of cavalry, with Blunt's horse-artillery and 
 a company of the 53d, forming the advance guard, 
 marched from the right, crossed the canal, then dry, 
 followed for about a mile the bank of the Gumti, then, 
 turning sharply to the left, reached a road running parallel 
 to the Sikandarabagh. Sir Colin had so completely 
 deceived the enemy as to his line of advance that this 
 movement, followed though the advance guard was by 
 the main body of the infantry, was absolutely unopposed, 
 until the advance, making the sharp turn mentioned, 
 entered the parallel road. Then a tremendous fire from 
 enclosures near the road, and from the Sikandarabagh, 
 opened on their flank. Their position was very dangerous, 
 for they were literally broadside to the enemy's fire. The 
 danger was apparent to every man of the advance. It 
 served, however, only to quicken the resolve to baffle the 
 rebels. The first to utilise the impulse was the gallant 
 Blunt. Noticing that there was a plateau whence he could 
 assail the Sikandarabagh on the further side of the road, 
 hemmed in by its banks, apparently impossible for artillery 
 to mount, he turned his horses' faces to the right bank, 
 galloped up it, gained the open space on the plateau, and, 
 unlimbering, opened his guns on the Sikandarabagh. It 
 was one of the smartest services ever rendered in war. 
 It at once changed the position. 
 
 For, whilst Blunt was drawing on himself the fire 
 of the rebels by his daring act, the infantry of Hope's 
 brigade had come up with a rush and cleared the en- 
 closures bordering the lane and a large building near 
 them. There remained only the Sikandarabagh itself 
 Against the massive walls of this building the light guns 
 of Blunt's battery, and the heavier metal of those of 
 Travers, who had joined him, were doing their best to 
 effect a breach. No sooner was this breach believed to 
 
Ewart, Cooper, Ltmisden, Burrottghs, 331 
 
 be practicable than there ensued one of the most wonder- 
 ful scenes witnessed in that war. Suddenly and simul- 
 taneously there dashed towards it the men of the wing of 
 the 93d and the Sikhs, running for it at full speed. A 
 Sikh of the 4th Rifles reached it first, but he was shot 
 dead as he jumped through. A young officer of the 93d, 
 Richard Cooper by name, was more fortunate. Flying, 
 so to speak, through the hole, he landed unscathed. He 
 was closely followed by Ewart of the same regiment, by 
 John I. Lumsden, attached to it as interpreter, by three 
 privates of the same regiment, and by eight or nine men, 
 Sikhs and Highlanders. Burroughs of the 93d had also 
 effected an entrance, for he was in the enclosure before 
 Ewart, but he was almost immediately wounded. The 
 enclosure in which these officers and men found them- 
 selves was 150 yards square, with towers at the angles, 
 a square building in the centre, and was held by 2000 
 armed men. It seemed impossible that one of the assail- 
 ants should escape alive. 
 
 But what will not the sons of this little island do when 
 the occasion demands it } It must suffice here to say that 
 they rushed forward and maintained a not unequal contest 
 till reinforcements poured in through the gate. Lumsden 
 was killed. Cooper received a slash across his forehead at 
 the moment that he laid his antagonist dead at his feet. 
 Ewart, attacked by numbers, preserved his splendid pre- 
 sence of mind and slew many. He was still holding his own 
 against enormous odds when the front gate was burst open 
 and reinforcements dashed in. Then the struggle increased 
 in intensity. It was a fight for life or death between 
 the rebels and the masters against whom they had risen. 
 For, it must not be forgotten, the defenders were all 
 sipahis who had rebelled. Nor did the struggle cease 
 so long as one man of the 20DD remained alive. 
 
^^2 The Advance on the Shdh Najaf. 
 
 Whilst this bloody scene was being enacted at the Sik- 
 andarabagh a detachment of the same brigade had captured 
 the large building known as the Barracks, Captain Stewart 
 of the 93d greatly distinguishing himself Then Sir Colin 
 made preparations to storm the Shah Najaf, a massively 
 built mosque in the direct road to the Residency, situated 
 in a garden surrounded by very strong loopholed walls. 
 
 It was at the Shah Najaf that the rebels had counted 
 to stop the British advance. They almost succeeded. 
 For three hours the front attack made no way. Worse 
 still, the road along which the force had advanced became 
 so jammed that retreat by it was impossible. All this 
 time the troops were exposed to a deadly fire of heavy 
 guns and musketry. From other points, too, heavy 
 guns were brought to play upon the baffled soldiers of 
 England. A shot from one of these blew up one of Peel's 
 tumbrils. The men were falling fast. Even the bright 
 face of William Peel became overclouded. Sir Colin sat 
 on his white horse, exposed to the full fire of the enemy, 
 his gaze bent on the Shah Najaf, upon whose solid walls 
 not even the heaviest guns could make an impression. As 
 a last resource he collected the 93d about him, and told 
 them that the Shah Najaf must be taken, that he had not 
 intended to employ them again that day, but that as the 
 guns could not open a way they must make one. In carry- 
 ing out this necessary work he would go with them himself. 
 
 But neither the dashing gunners of Middleton's battery, 
 the daring of the Highlanders and the Sikhs, the persistent 
 fire of the heavy guns of Peel, could effect the desired end. 
 The Shah Najaf baffled them all. The shades of evening 
 were falling fast. Success seemed impossible. Then 
 Adrian Hope, collecting about him some fifty men, stole 
 silently and cautiously through the jungle to a portion of 
 the wall on which, before the assault, a sergeant of his 
 
The Caphu^e renders Success certain. ^'^'^ 
 
 regiment had thought he had detected a sign of weakness. 
 On reaching it unperceived, Hope found there a narrow 
 fissure. Up this a single man was with difficulty pushed. 
 He helped up others. More men were sent for. Then 
 those who had entered moved forward. The surprise to 
 the rebels as these men advanced was so thorough that 
 they made no resistance, but evacuated the place. The 
 fight was then over. Adrian Hope's victorious stormers 
 had but to open the main gate to their comrades outside. 
 
 The British force halted there for the night. The 
 occupation of the Shah Najaf had rendered success on 
 the morrow certain. In the capture of that place they 
 had accomplished an action declared by their leader to 
 be ' almost unexampled in war.' The same praise might 
 be given to the wonderful storming of the Sikandarabagh. 
 It is impossible to discriminate narrowly when almost 
 every man was deserving. But it may at least be affirmed 
 that the conduct of Cooper, Ewart, Lumsden, and the 
 privates Dunley, Mackay, and Grant at the Sikandara- 
 bagh; of Stewart at the Barracks; of Sergeant Baton, who 
 first pointed out to Adrian Hope the weak point in the 
 wall of the Shah Najaf; of Adrian Hope himself; of Blunt, 
 who made possible the attack on the Sikandarabagh ; of 
 William Beel, of Travers, of Middleton, of Bourchier, of the 
 two Alisons, of Anson, and of many others, for the list is 
 a very long one, gave ample proof that the race which, from 
 the basis of a little island in the Atlantic, had made the 
 greatest empire the world has seen had not degenerated. 
 
 The next morning the force, thoroughly refreshed by 
 sleep, advanced to complete its work. To reach the 
 Residency the troops had yet to carry the mess-house and 
 the Moti Mahall, and to do this whilst the guns of rebels 
 posted in the Tdra Kothi and the Kaisarbagh were playing 
 on their left flank. To secure his left, then, Sir Colin de- 
 
334 Hopkins^ Roberts, Wolseley, 
 
 tached the 5th Brigade, under Russell, to seize Banks's 
 house and four bungalows close to the Barracks, and to 
 convert them into military posts. By this process his left 
 rear would be secured, and his retirement with the impedi- 
 menta from the Residency made safe. He then proceeded 
 to cannonade the mess-house. 
 
 No sooner had the musketry fire of the enemy been com- 
 pletely silenced than the order to storm was given. This feat 
 of arms was most gallantly achieved by Captain Hopkins 
 of the 53d — one of the bravest men that ever lived, a man 
 who literallyrevelled in danger — who carried the place with 
 a rush. He had just reached the entrance when Roberts, 
 now the Commander-in-Chief in India, handed him a Union 
 Jack, and requested him to hoist it on one of the turrets. 
 Hopkins, assisted by one of his men, did this twice in suc- 
 cession. Twice was the Jack shot down. Hopkins was 
 about to hoist it the third time when he received an order 
 from Sir Colin to desist. The flag was attracting too ear- 
 nestly the attention of the enemy. In an equally gallant 
 manner Captain Garnet Wolseley had carried the houses 
 to the right of the mess-house, and pushing on his enter- 
 prise, had stormed the Moti Mahal). It was a great 
 feat. 
 
 An open space, nearly half a mile in width, still inter- 
 vened between the assailants and the advanced posts of 
 Outram and Havelock. On this space the fire of the 
 guns from the Kaisarbagh played with unintermitting 
 fury. To cross it was to run a great risk. But in those 
 days risks when an object was to be gained were not 
 considered. Outram, Havelock, Napier,^ Vincent Eyre, 
 
 ^ The late Lord Napier of Magdala. Sitwell v/as A.D.C. to Outram ; 
 Russell, a very gallant ofificer of the Engineers. Dodgson was, and happily 
 is, one of the bravest and most retiring men that ever lived. No one has 
 suffered so much from the innate modesty of his nature. Young Havelock 
 is the present Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, 
 
Preparations for Withdrawal. 335 
 
 young Havelock, Dodgson, Sitwell, Russell, and Kavanagh 
 attempted it. They did not all pass the ordeal unscathed ; 
 Napier, young Havelock, Sitwell, and Russell were struck 
 down. The others reached the Moti Mahall uninjured. 
 Then, to use the language of Sir Colin, 'the relief of the 
 garrison had been accomplished.' 
 
 The conversation between the Commander-in-Chief 
 and his visitors was short. When it was finished, again 
 had the visitors to traverse the terrible space. Sir Henry 
 Havelock, leaning on Dodgson, could, from the weak 
 state of his health, walk but slowly, but amid the con- 
 tinuous storm of bullets the two returned unscathed. 
 It was Havelock to whom Outram had consigned the 
 task of working out towards the relieving force so as to 
 give it a hand as soon as the mess-house and Moti Mahall 
 should be carried ; and right well had the gallant veteran 
 performed the task allotted to him. 
 
 It remained now to Sir Colin to devise a plan for the 
 withdrawal of the women and children. It was no easy 
 task even after he had by his advance made a way for 
 the movement. It seemed to him, at first, absolutely neces- 
 sary to silence the fire of the Kaisarbagh. The plan he 
 adopted was the following. 
 
 I have told how, on the first day of the advance, he 
 had directed Russell to occupy Banks's bungalow and the 
 bungalows adjoining. This had been done. But to com- 
 plete the communications it was necessary also to seize 
 a building known as the Hospital, between the bungalows 
 and the Barracks, already taken. In attempting to take 
 this Russell was wounded, Biddulph was killed, and Hale, 
 who succeeded, though he took the Hospital, was unable 
 to maintain himself there. Whilst this attack was pro- 
 gressing, the rebels, gathering heart, attacked the pickets 
 between the Barracks and the Sikandarabagh in consider- 
 
336 Sir Colin rehtrns to Kdnhpur. 
 
 able force. They were repulsed after some hard fighting, 
 in which Remmington and his troop covered themselves 
 with glory. 
 
 The line of retirement by Banks's house proving dif- 
 ficult and dangerous, Sir Colin reconnoitred the ground 
 between the positions actually held by the British and the 
 canal, and finally resolved to move by that. He carried 
 out the operation on the 20th and four following days. 
 Turning the fire of William Peel's heavy guns on the 
 Kaisarbagh, so as to lead the rebels to expect an assault, 
 he moved the women and children from the place in which 
 they had been so long defended, and on the evening of 
 the 22d had them safely landed in the Dilkusha. Hale, 
 who commanded the rear-guard, joined him there on the 
 23d. On the 24th, whilst he was halting, though not 
 resting there, the gallant Havelock passed away. He had 
 indeed fought a good fight, and he had died as he had 
 lived, in the performance of his duty. On the 26th the 
 noblest of his comrades followed his remains to his grave 
 in the Alambagh. 
 
 That place had been reached on the 25th. There Sir 
 Colin made a fresh distribution of his force, leaving Outram, 
 with rather less than 4000 men, at the Alambagh, threaten- 
 ing the still rebellious Lakhnao, whilst he should return to 
 look after Windham at Kanhpur. About that place he was 
 very anxious, for he had no news, and the reports received 
 were to the effect that heavy firing had been heard in that 
 direction. On the 27th, then, at eleven o'clock in the 
 morning. Sir Colin started for Kanhpur. He slept at 
 Banni, and really alarmed, started early the next morning 
 on his forward march towards the Ganges. On his way 
 he received despatches which showed him that the place 
 was in great peril. At Mangalwar he halted his troops, 
 fired three salvoes to announce his approach, and galloped 
 
Windham at Kdnhpur. 337 
 
 forward, with his staff, in mingled fear and hope as to the 
 state of the bridge of boats. To his joy he saw, by the 
 pale evening light, that it was intact. Vast sheets of flames, 
 arising from burning buildings, showed to him as clearly 
 that the rebels must have beaten Windham and occupied 
 Kanhpur. How it had all happened I must tell whilst 1 
 leave my readers watching Sir Colin and his staff crossing 
 the bridge, on the late evening of the 28th, to find out the 
 reason, and to remedy the catastrophe. 
 
 Windham had been left with about 500 Europeans 
 and a few Sikhs, a number that would be largely aug- 
 mented, to occupy and improve the intrenchment erected 
 by Havelock on the river, and to watch the movements 
 of the Gwaliar rebels then threatening from Kalpi, forty- 
 five miles distant. Between the 9th and the 15th Wind- 
 ham received reinforcements in the shape of Carthew's 
 brigade of Madras sipahis, largely reduced in numbers ; 
 and, between that date and the 26th, of drafts from several 
 European regiments, and half a native regiment of Car- 
 thew's brigade. Anxious regarding the movements of the 
 Gwaliar rebels, commanded, he believed, by Tantia Topi, 
 he took up, on the 17th, with his augmented force, a posi- 
 tion, at the junction of the Kalpi and Dehli roads, cover- 
 ing Kanhpur, and whence he could closely watch the 
 movements of the rebels. He occupied that position up 
 to the 20th. He had heard then of the successful capture 
 of the Sikandarabagh and the Shah Najaf But, on the 
 22d, having in the interval received no further news, he 
 was disquieted by the rumour that the police guard left 
 at the Barmi bridge had been surprised and defeated. 
 Sensible of the all-importance that Sir Colin's communi- 
 cations with Kanhpur should be maintained intact, he 
 despatched, on the 23d, a wing of a sipdhi regiment, with 
 two guns, to re-occupy the bridge at Banni. Had he con- 
 
 Y 
 
i,;2^S Wiiidham is driven Back. 
 
 tented himself with doing that, and with maintaining his 
 watchful position, it is possible that the catastrophe which 
 followed might have been avoided. 
 
 But Windham, brave as a lion, was anxious to do 
 something. He accordingly transmitted to Sir Colin a 
 plan he had devised of meeting the advance of the Gwaliar 
 rebels by a system of ' aggressive defence,' by which he 
 might destroy them in detail. Receiving no reply to that 
 proposal, he resolved to carry it out. Early on the 24th, 
 then, he marched six miles down the Kalpi road, and 
 took a position so decidedly threatening to the rebels 
 that, regarding it as a challenge, they took up the glove, 
 and resolved to try to beat Windham at his own 
 game. 
 
 Of the action which followed, fought on the 26th, 27th, 
 and 28th, it must suffice to state that, whilst the early 
 advantage lay with Windham, the astute leader opposed 
 to him quickly perceived that the very success of his 
 enemy might, with the numerical superiority he possessed, 
 be used against him. Windham, though he had suc- 
 ceeded, had been compelled, by the nature of the ground, 
 to fall back for the night to a position he considered he 
 could hold until Sir Colin should arrive. It was a weak 
 position, however, and Tantia Topi saw that it offered 
 many advantages to a superior force which should attack 
 it. Having that superior force, he attacked him then the 
 following morning, and after a contest, in which there 
 were many changes of fortune, and the display of much 
 soldierly ability on the part of Brigadier Carthew, drove 
 Windham back into Kanhpur. Not content with that, 
 he renewed the attack the following day, seized the 
 station of Kanhpur, fired the bungalows, burned the 
 clothing prepared for the relieved garrison of Lakh- 
 nao, and the stores for the British army, and forced 
 
How Sir Colin found Kdnhpur. 339 
 
 Windham to take refuge within the intrenchment. This 
 was the position of affairs at Kanhpur when Sir Colin 
 Campbell crossed the Ganges on the evening of the 28th 
 of November.^ 
 
 ' In my larger history (Kaye's and Malleson's History of the Indian 
 Mutiny, cabinet edition, vol. iv., pages 159 to i8i) I have given a detailed 
 account of this famous action, of which Cardew was the real hero. I cannot 
 quit the subject of the final relief of the Residency without mentioning the 
 names of those gallant men whose exertions so greatly contributed to its de- 
 fence before their reinforcement by Havelock and Outram. They were, 
 according to the report of the coiiimander of the garrison, Colonel Inglis, 
 Lieutenant James, of the Commissariat, of whom it was written : ' It is not 
 too much to say that the garrison owe their lives to the exertions and firm- 
 ness of this officer ' ; Captain Wilson, the D. A. Adjutant-General, ' ever to 
 be found where shot was flying thickest ' ; Lieutenants Ilardinge, Barwell, 
 and Birch; Mr, now Sir George, Couper; Mr Capper; Mr Martin ; Colonel 
 Master; Major Apthorp ; Captain Gould Weston ; Captains Sanders, Boileau, 
 and Germon; Lieutenants Loughnan, Aitken, Anderson, Graydon, Long- 
 more, and Mr Schilling, commanding posts ; Lieutenants Anderson, Hutchin- 
 son, and Innes, of the Engineers; Lieutenants Thomas, M'Farlane, and 
 Bonham, of the Artillery, and Captain Evans, employed with that arm ; 
 Major Lowe, commanding the 32d ; Captain Bassano ; and Lieutenants 
 Lawrence, Edmonstone, Foster, Harmar, Cork, Clery, Brown, and Charlton 
 of that regiment ; of other regiments. Captain O'Brien, Kemble, Edgell, 
 Dinning ; Lieutenants Sewell, Worsley, W^arner, Ward, Graham, Mecham] 
 and Keir. In the Medical Department, Superintending - Surgeon Scott ; 
 Surgeons Brydon, Ogilvie, and Campbell ; Assistant-Surgeons Fayrer, Bird, 
 Partridge, Greenhow, and Darby; and Apothecary Thompson. In other 
 departments. Captain Carnegie ; the Rev. Messrs Harris and Polehampton ; 
 Mr M'Crae, Mr Cameron, and Mr Marshall. 
 
CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 SIR COLIN CAMPBELL RECOVERS THE DUAB. 
 
 As soon as Sir Colin Campbell had mastered the extent 
 of Windham's disaster he recrossed the Ganges to Mangal- 
 war, then pushing forward with his convoy of women and 
 children, well covered by his troops, baffled an attempt of 
 the rebels to destroy the bridge of boats, and re-entered 
 Kanhpur. His convoy he encamped, on November 30, on 
 the further side of the canal, near the mouldering remains 
 and riddled walls of the position Wheeler had held so 
 long, and then turned to look at the position occupied by 
 the rebels. 
 
 It was a strong one. Numbering 25,000 men, of whom 
 rather less than one-half were trained sipdhis, they rested 
 their centre on the town, separated from the British force 
 by the Ganges canal, and interspersed with bungalows, high 
 walls, and cover of various kinds. Their right stretched 
 out behind the canal into the plain, and was covered in 
 front by lime-kilns and mounds of brick. Over the canal 
 they had thrown a bridge, but the extreme right flank 
 was uncovered. Their left rested on the Ganges. They 
 were very resolute, and very confident. 
 
 Before attacking them Sir Colin spent two days in 
 making preparations for the despatch of his large convoy 
 of women and children, of sick and wounded, to Allahabad. 
 He sent them off on the night of the 3d, then, waiting 
 until they had placed some miles between themselves and 
 
Sir Colin attacks the Rebels. 341 
 
 Kanhpur, he carefully examined the rebels' position, 
 and concluded that, strong as it was on the left and 
 in the centre, it might be possible to turn the right and 
 roll them up. He had with him, inclusive of recently 
 arrived troops, about 5000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and 
 thirty-five guns. The infantry of this force he divided 
 into four brigades. The third, commanded by Greathed, 
 counted the 8th, the 64th, and the 2d Panjab Infantry. 
 The fourth, under Adrian Hope, contained the 53d, the42d, 
 the 93d, and the 4th Panjab Rifles. The fifth, under 
 Inglis, counted the 23d, the 32d, and the 82d. The sixth, 
 led by Walpole, was formed of the 2d and 3d Battalions 
 Rifle Brigade, and a part of the 38th. The cavalry, com- 
 manded by Little, consisted of the 9th Lancers, and details 
 of the 1st, 2d, and 5th Panjab Cavalry and Hodson's 
 Horse. The artillery counted Peel's Naval brigade, the 
 troops of Blunt and Remmington, the batteries of Bour- 
 chier, of Middleton, of Smith, of Longden, and of Bridge, 
 under the chief command of Dupuis. To Windham was 
 consigned the charge of the intrenchment. 
 
 With this force Sir Colin attacked the rebels on the 
 morning of the 6th of December. After an artillery fire, 
 which lasted two hours, he directed Greathed to make 
 a false attack on the centre whilst Walpole, Hope, and 
 Inglis should turn the right. Walpole thereupon crossed 
 the canal, and attracted the fire of the rebels, whilst Adrian 
 Hope, supported by Inglis, took a long sweep to the left, 
 and then, wheeling round, charged the unprotected flanks 
 of the rebels' right. In this movement the 4th Panjab 
 Rifles and the 53d covered themselves with glory. They 
 drove the rebels from mound to mound despite a resist- 
 ance resolute and often fierce. At length they reached 
 the bridge which the rebels had thrown over the canal. 
 This the enemy had well cared for. Upon it they had 
 
342 And completely defeats Them. 
 
 concentrated so strong an artillery fire that it seemed 
 almost impossible to force the way across. But the 
 gallant men, who had pushed the rebels before them up 
 to that point, were not to be daunted by appearances. 
 They rushed at the bridge with a stern determination to 
 carry it. The rebels seemed equally resolved to prevent 
 them. For a moment the struggle seemed doubtful, when 
 a rumbling sound was heard, and William Peel and his 
 sailors, dragging a heavy twenty-four-pounder, came up 
 with a run, planted the gun on the bridge, and opened 
 fire. The effect was decisive. Whilst it roused the 
 assailants to the highest enthusiasm, it completely cowed 
 the rebels. With loud shouts Highlanders, Sikhs, and 
 53d men rushed past the gun, dashed at the rebels, and 
 drove them before them in wild disorder. The Gwaliar 
 camp was now almost within their grasp. But before 
 they could reach it the gallant Bourchier, always in the 
 front, passed them at a gallop, and, unlimbering, opened 
 fire. A few minutes later the assailants repassed the 
 guns, and the Gwdlidr camp was their own. 
 
 The victory was now gained. The Gwdliar portion of 
 the rebel force made, in wild flight, for the Kalpi road. 
 In that direction they were pursued by Sir Colin in 
 person to the fourteenth milestone. They had lost their 
 camp, their stores, their magazines, a great part of their 
 material, and their prestige. 
 
 The remainder of the rebels, composed for the most 
 part of the armed retainers of revolted princes, had fallen 
 back on the Bithor road. The pursuit of these Sir Colin 
 had entrusted to the chief of his staff, General Mansfield. 
 Mansfield advanced to a position from which he might 
 have forced the surrender of the whole of the rebel force 
 as it passed him. But Mansfield was shortsighted, and 
 he cared not to trust to the sight of others. Consequently, 
 
Sir Colin follozvs up His Victory, 343 
 
 to the intense indignation of his men, he allowed the rebels 
 to defile close to him, unpunished and unpursued, taking 
 with them their guns. What Sir Colin said to the chief 
 of his staff may not be known. But he despatched, on 
 the 9th, a force under Sir Hope Grant to remedy his tre- 
 mendous mistake. Hope Grant marched in pursuit of 
 them, discovered their line of retreat by the articles which 
 the heavy roads had compelled them to abandon, caught 
 them on the banks of the river just as they were about 
 to escape across it into Oudh, and completely defeated 
 them, taking all their guns. He pushed on further to 
 Bithor, found it evacuated, and, as far as it was possible, 
 destroyed it. 
 
 Thus did Sir Colin avenge the defeat sustained by 
 Windham. He was anxious to push on at once to recover 
 the Duab, but he had to wait a fortnight for the arrival of 
 carriage. It reached him on the 23d. Meanwhile, learn^ 
 ing that Seaton was advancing from Aligarh with a por- 
 tion of the Dehli force, he detached Walpole's brigade 
 to occupy Itawah and Mainpiiri. Seaton, about the same 
 time, defeated the rebels between Gangari and Kasganj, 
 and had pushed on to Patiali, where they were reported 
 to be in force. Here he attacked, and inflicted upon them 
 a defeat which crashed the life out of many and the heart 
 out of all. Advancing rapidly towards Mainpiiri, he de- 
 feated on the way a rebel Raja, and by means of a very 
 daring expedition made by Hodson and M'Dowell opened 
 communications with Sir Colin, then with his force at 
 Miran-ki-sarai (December 30). Four days later Seaton 
 effected a junction with Walpole. 
 
 Meanwhile, the necessary carriage having arrived, Sir 
 Colin had marched from Kanhpur, the 24th December. 
 He had reached, we have seen, Miran-ki-sarai on the 30th. 
 On the 2d of January he forced a passage across the bridge 
 
344 Preparations f 01'' the Ozidh Cainpaign, 
 
 over the Kali Nadi, in face of a very strong opposition, 
 and drove the survivors of the rebels into Rohilkhand. 
 The next day he occupied the fort of the rebel Nuwab of 
 Fathgarh, a man who had almost equalled Nand Sahib in 
 his cruelties towards Englishmen, and who was now a fugi- 
 tive. There, the following day, the junction of Walpole 
 and Seaton's divisions raised his force to more than 
 10,000 men. Sir Colin was anxious now to push on at 
 once to the recovery of Rohilkhand. But Lord Canning, 
 who, now unfettered by the mischievous Calcutta coun- 
 cillors who had misled him, was at Allahabad, strongly 
 insisted, and rightly insisted, that the reconquest of Oudh 
 demanded the earliest consideration. Sir Colin gave 
 way, and made immediately preparations for carrying 
 into effect the determination of the Governor-General. 
 Manoeuvring so as to induce in Rohilkhand the belief 
 that he intended to invade that province, he directed 
 Seaton to hold Fathgarh and the Duab, Walpole to 
 make a demonstration against Rohilkhand, whilst, on 
 the sandy plain between Unao and Banni in Oudh, he 
 massed infantry, cavalry, engineers, artillery, commissariat 
 waggons, and camp followers. By the 23d of February 
 he had collected there seventeen battalions of infantry, 
 fifteen of which were British ; twenty-eight squadrons of 
 cavalry, including four English regiments ; fifty-four light 
 and eighty heavy guns and mortars. There we must 
 leave them waiting for the order to advance whilst we 
 examine the events which had occurred in the interval in 
 Eastern Bengal, in Eastern Bihar, and, finally, in the 
 Banaras districts, and in Eastern Oudh. The operations 
 in these latter served as adjuncts to the great movement 
 Sir Colin was contemplating against Lakhnao. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 EASTERN BENGAL, EASTERN BIHAR, AZAMGARH, 
 ALLAHABAD, AND EASTERN OUDH. 
 
 When Sir Colin Campbell had started for Allahabad and 
 Kanhpur to carry out, in the North-west Provinces, those 
 great military measures which I have described in the 
 three chapters immediately preceding, he was well aware 
 that he had left behind him many districts smouldering 
 with revolt, others in which rebellion was raising its head, 
 and which would require sharp measures of repression. 
 With these I propose now briefly to deal. 
 
 In Eastern Bihar, presided over by a gentleman of 
 marked energy of character, Mr George Yule, there had 
 been, up to the time of the revolt of the native garrison of 
 Danapur, no outbreak on the part of the two sipahi regi- 
 ments located there — one, the 63d, at Barhampur, the other, 
 the •32d, at Bansi. Some men of the 5th Irregular Cavalry, 
 stationed at Rohni, had indeed made a dastardly attempt 
 to murder their officers, but their commandant, Major 
 Macdonald, had frustrated their attempt, and had displayed 
 an energy and a promptness of action which had com- 
 pletely dominated the restless spirits of the disaffected. 
 Mr Yule, ever watchful, had, with the aid of a small party 
 of Europeans, maintained order in his division. But when 
 Western Bihar, sympathising with the revolted sipahis of 
 Danapur, rose he deemed it wise to secure the important 
 posts of Bhagalpur and Munger, posts necessary to assure 
 
34^ Eastern Bihar and CImtid Ndgpttr. 
 
 the free navigation of the Ganges. These places secured, 
 he could hear with comparative indifference of the rising 
 of the 5th Irregulars, on the 14th of August, more especi- 
 ally as the men of that regiment failed to induce either of 
 the two native regiments in his division to join them. His 
 position, however, was full of peril, for those regiments 
 were not to be depended upon,i and he was exposed to 
 the inroad of mutineers from Chutia Nagpur on the one 
 side and from Eastern Bengal on the other. 
 
 Chutia Nagpur, a mountainous district lying between 
 Southern Bihar, Western Bengal, Orisa, and the Central 
 Provinces, and inhabited by aboriginal tribes, possessed 
 four principal military stations, Hazaribagh, Ranchi, 
 Chaibasa, and Parulia. The troops stationed there were 
 a detachment of the 8th N. I. and the local Ramgarh 
 battalion, composed of horse, foot, and artillery. The 
 Commissioner was Captain Dalton, a man of energy and 
 ability. 
 
 Regarding this district it is merely necessary to record 
 that its difficulties commenced when the native troops of 
 Danapur were allowed to rise in revolt. From that time 
 to the very close of the rebellion it remained a festering 
 sore in the heart of the country, the mutineers harassing 
 the neighbouring district, and interrupting communica- 
 tions along the grand trunk road. Major English of the 
 53d, despatched by Sir Colin Campbell to deal with them, 
 inflicted a^ great defeat on their main body at Chatra, on 
 the 2d of October, and thus temporarily relieved the 
 grand trunk road. When English was compelled to march 
 north-westwards, Rattray, with his Sikhs, replaced him, 
 and maintained in the most salient posts a rough kind 
 of order. But the danger was not wholly averted until 
 
 ^ Two companies of the 32d mutinied a fortnight later, and all but 
 captured Sir Colin Campbell as he was journeying up country. 
 
Eastern Bengal. 347 
 
 the repression of Kunvvar Singh and his brothers, after 
 the fall of Lakhnao, pacified Western Bihar. 
 
 In Eastern Bengal there had been, first, manifestations, 
 then outbreaks, quite sufficient to cause considerable alarm. 
 On the 1 8th of November the sipahis stationed at Chit- 
 ragaon, and which belonged to the regiment which had 
 made itself conspicuous for its disloyalty at Barrackpur, 
 the 34th N. L, mutinied, released the prisoners from the 
 gaol, and quitted the station, carrying with them the con- 
 tents of the treasury, and three elephants. They made 
 for Hill Tiparah, avoiding British territory, hoping thus 
 to reach their homes. Four days later the authorities at 
 at Dhaka attempted to disarm the sipahis stationed there, 
 numbering 350 men. The attempt failed, for the sipahis 
 resisted, and although in the contest which followed they 
 were beaten, yet, as at Danapur, the majority got off with 
 their muskets, and started for Jalpaigiiri, where was located 
 the headquarters of their regiment, the 73d. 
 
 The Government of India had been alive to the im- 
 portance of taking measures to provide against the con- 
 sequences of an outbreak in Eastern Bengal. The natural 
 run of successful revolters would, they knew, be for the 
 important stations at Purnia, Dinajpur, and Rangpur. 
 To avert the danger from these, which may be described 
 as the gates of Bengal and Eastern Bihar, Mr Halliday 
 had obtained the sanction of the Government of India 
 to enlist bodies of sailors, then lying idle in Calcutta, to 
 serve as garrisons in those and other places. The pre- 
 caution was not taken an hour too soon. But it was 
 taken in time, and by means of it, and of the gallant and 
 loyal conduct of the Silhat Light Infantry, led by Byng — 
 who was killed — and after him by Sherer, the rebels from 
 Chitragaon were intercepted and destroyed. 
 
 Those from Dhaka \\ere, in a certain sense, more 
 
34^ George Sherer and George Yule. 
 
 fortunate. Baffled by Mr Halliday's precautions in their 
 original intentions, they apparently resolved to make for 
 Jalpaiguri, to effect there a junction with the main body 
 of their regiment, the 73d. That regiment had been kept 
 from outbreak by two circumstances ; the first, that they 
 were located in an isolated station, cut off from their 
 comrades, and they had but a dim perception of what was 
 passing in the world beyond them ; and, secondly, by the 
 splendid firmness of their commanding officer. Colonel 
 George Sherer,^ who, on the first symptoms of mutiny had 
 seized the ringleaders, brought them to a court-martial, 
 and, in pursuance of the sentence recorded, had had them 
 blown away from guns, despite the order of the cowed 
 authorities in Calcutta that he should release them. The 
 execution of those three rebels had saved many hundreds 
 of lives, and had helped to maintain order. But not even 
 the haughty bearing of Sherer would have kept his men 
 to their allegiance had their mutinied comrades reached 
 Jalpaiguri. It became, then, a great object to prevent 
 them, and this task was entrusted to the capable hands of 
 George Yule. 
 
 With a company of the 5th Fusiliers, a few local levies, 
 and the officers of the district at his disposal, Yule marched 
 to meet and baffle the Dhaka mutineers. Joined by the 
 Yeomanry Cavalr}^, to be presently referred to, he pre- 
 vented them from entering Purnia, barred to them the 
 road to Jalpaiguri, and, finally, compelled them to cross the 
 frontier into Nipal. Thence, after suffering many hard- 
 ships, they made their way into Oudh, only to fall there 
 by the bullet and the sword. 
 
 In Western Bihar, and in the districts belonging to 
 the commissionership of Banaras, those of Juanpur, 
 Azamgarh, and Gorakhpur, abutting on Eastern Oudh, 
 
 1 Father of the Sherer referred to in the page preceding, 
 
Ktmwar Singh and Western Bihar. 349 
 
 the danger had been more pronounced and more 
 serious. 
 
 The removal of Mr William Tayler from the adminis- 
 tration of the affairs of Western Bihar had given a marked 
 impetus to the rebellion. The feeble men who succeeded 
 him, Mr Samuells and Mr Alonzo Money, were as 
 shuttlecocks in the hands of Kunwar Singh and his 
 partisans. The difficulties of the situation were, too, con- 
 siderably aggravated by the action of the landowners of 
 Azamgarh and Gorakhpur, and by the exposure of the 
 districts of Chapra, Champaran, and Muzaffarpur, to the 
 incursions of rebels from Oudh. The arrival of the 5th 
 Irregulars, and, a little later, of the two mutinied companies 
 of the 32d N. L, from Eastern Bihar, still further increased 
 the difficulties of the situation. Vainly did Rattray, with 
 his Sikhs, pressed by Alonzo Money, attempt to bar the 
 way to the 5th. He was compelled to fall back on Gaya. 
 The victors, but for the prompt action of Skipwith Tayler, 
 the son of the far-seeing man whom personal spite had 
 removed from the scene of his triumphs, would have 
 massacred all the residents at that station. After that 
 there was a slight change of fortune, and Rattray avenged 
 his defeat, by the 5th, by annihilating a body of rebels at 
 Akbarpur (October 7), and by compelling the retreat of 
 the two companies of the 32d at Danchua (November 6). 
 
 The Government of India had, in the meantime, 
 accepted the offer of the able ruler of Nipal, Jang Bahadur, 
 to despatch, to co-operate with their own troops in the 
 Azamgarh districts and in Eastern Oudh, a division of 
 Gurkhas, led by their own officers. The Government had ^ 
 also raised a regiment of cavalry, styled the Yeomanry 
 Cavalry, composed for the most part of European adven- 
 turers, and commanded by Major J. F. Richardson, a very 
 
 ^ Vide page 213. 
 
350 Arrival of the Nipdl Troops. 
 
 gallant officer of the regular army. They had, further, 
 directed Brigadier Rowcroft to co-operate, with a force 
 under his command, on the eastern frontier of Oudh, and 
 they had ordered to him Richardson and his yeomanry 
 corps, fresh from aiding Yule in his pursuit of the Dhaka 
 mutineers. The Naval brigade of Captain Sotheby had 
 likewise been directed to join Rowcroft. 
 
 The Nipal troops, to the number of 3000, had entered 
 the Gorakhpur division at the very end of July, had dis- 
 armed the sipahis stationed at Gorakhpur on the ist of 
 August, had occupied Azamgarh on the 13th, Juanpur on 
 the 15th of the same month. Joined there by three 
 officers deputed for that purpose by the British Govern- 
 ment, by the lion-hearted Venables, and by the high- 
 spirited Judge of Gorakhpur, William Wynyard, they had 
 surprised and defeated the rebels at Manduri, and had 
 followed up their victory by occupying Mubarakpur and 
 Atraolia. They beat them again at Kudya on the 19th 
 of October, and at Chanda on the 30th. Just after the 
 last-named action they were joined by a small European 
 force, composed of 320 men of the loth Foot, two guns, 
 and 170 men of the 17th Madras N. I., the whole com- 
 manded by Longden of the loth. Three days later the 
 Oudh rebels again crossed the border, but again were they 
 driven back. By this time the conclusion had forced 
 itself on the Government that successfully to combat the 
 rebellion in those mutinous districts more troops were 
 required, and they arranged with Jang Bahadur for the 
 co-operation of a further body of 9000 picked Gurkhas, 
 to be commanded by Jang Bahadur in person, but to 
 which a British officer, Colonel MacGregor, should be 
 attached as Brigadier-General. They arranged, likewise, 
 to increase Longden's force, and to place it under General 
 Franks, C.B., an officer of tried merit. Whilst these two 
 
Rower of fs Force clears the Groimd, 351 
 
 bodies, united, should clear the ground to the north of 
 Banaras and to the east of Oudh, and then march on 
 Lakhnao, to co-operate with Sir Colin Campbell in the 
 operations against that city, which we have seen him con- 
 templating, the force above referred to, under Rowcroft, 
 should move from Tirhut along the Gandak towards Gor- 
 akhpur, and remain in observation on the frontier. It 
 is necessary first, whilst the others are assembling, to deal 
 with Rowcroft's force. 
 
 That force, composed of thirty men of the Royal 
 Marines, 130 of the Sotheby's Naval brigade, 350 Nipal 
 troops, fifty of the police battalion, and four twelve-pound 
 howitzers, was, in December, at Mirwa, forty-nine miles 
 from Chapra. Seven miles distant from him, at Sobanpur, 
 was a force of 1200 regular sipahis, supported by 4000 
 armed adventurers. These Rowcroft attacked on the 
 26th, defeated, followed up to Mijauli, and drove across 
 the Gandak. Thence, in obedience to orders, Rowcroft 
 marched to Burhat-ghat, on the Gogra, to await there 
 further instructions. On the approach of Jang Baha- 
 dur with his army (December 23 to January 5) he was 
 directed to ascend the Gogra, to co-operate with the Nipal 
 leader, who had signalised his advance by defeating the 
 rebels at Gorakhpur. Rowcroft reached Barari, in close 
 vicinity to Jang Bahadur's camp, on the 19th January, 
 and was joined by a brigade of Nipal troops the day 
 following. The next day, to assure the passage of the 
 river by the main body of the Gurkhas, he drove the 
 rebels from Phulpur. Joined then by the Yeomanry 
 Cavalry, he proceeded to enter upon the second part of 
 his instructions, to keep open the communications whilst 
 Jang Bahadur should march on Lakhnao. 
 
 The task was no light one, for the surrounding dis- 
 tricts were surging with revolters. Rowcroft and his 
 
35^ Lord Canning at Allahabad, 
 
 comrades, however, displayed a skill and energy not to 
 be surpassed in the carrying out of their duties. Captain 
 Sotheby, on the i8th February, captured the strong fort 
 of Chandipur. On the 28th Rowcroft defeated the rebels 
 at Gorakhpur. The force then crossed the Oudh frontier 
 and occupied Amorha. There it repulsed with great 
 loss an attack made upon it by a greatly superior body 
 of rebels. In this battle the Yeomanry Cavalry greatly 
 distinguished themselves. There I must leave Rowcroft, 
 waiting for reinforcements which had been promised, 
 whilst I record the movements of the Governor-General, 
 and the final clearing of the districts round Allahabad 
 Fathpur, and Kanhpur, which preceded the advance of 
 Sir Colin Campbell into Oudh. 
 
 In the third week of January 1858 Lord Canning 
 quitted Calcutta for Allahabad, to assume there the ad- 
 ministration of the Central Provinces. Freed from the 
 pernicious influence of his Calcutta councillors. Lord 
 Canning displayed at Allahabad a vigour, a wisdom, 
 and an energy in marked contrast to the narrow policy 
 which had characterised his action when he had deferred 
 to advice thrust upon him by the councillors he had in- 
 herited from his predecessor. He reached Allahabad the 
 9th of February, and at once made his presence felt. The 
 districts to the west and south of that place and Kanhpur 
 had been to a great extent cleared of the rebel bands 
 which had infested them by the united efforts of Carthew, 
 of Barker, and of Campbell. Early in March moveable 
 patrols were appointed, under the direction of Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Christie, still more completely to clear the district. 
 By degrees the country to the west and north-west of 
 Allahabad was quieted. But the districts to the east of 
 it, the turbulent districts of Azamgarh and Ju^npur, re- 
 mained a danger to Lord Canning for some time after he 
 
yang Bahddur mid F^^anks, 353 
 
 had moved his headquarters to Allahdbad. How that 
 danger was averted by the skill and gallantry of Lord 
 Mark Kerr I shall tell in another chapter. 
 
 I left Jang Bahadur crossing the Gogra, at Phulpur, on 
 the 2 1st of February. He marched forward on the 25th, 
 and pushing on, reached the vicinity of Lakhnao, ready 
 to co-operate with Sir Colin Campbell, on the loth of 
 March. There, for the present, I shall leave him. Franks's 
 force, which, as I have stated, was an amplification of 
 Longden's, had been organised by the end of December, 
 After temporarily clearing the Azamgarh district, ii moved 
 forward, hampered by the want of cavalry, on the 21st of 
 January. At Sikandra Franks came in sight of a large 
 rebel force. It was the day on which it had been arranged 
 that his cavalry should join him, the 22d. He waited for 
 them till the evening, when, to his delight, they came up, 
 accompanied by four H. A. guns. There was no more 
 hesitation. Early the next morning Franks attacked the 
 rebels, and defeated them. Obliged then, in obedience to 
 orders, to send back his cavalry to Allahabad, Franks 
 moved to Singramao, and waiting there until the arrival 
 of Rowcroft at Gorakhpur should enable Jang Bahadur 
 to advance, set out the same day, the 19th of February, 
 in the direction of Sultanpur. He reached Chanda the 
 same day, and inflicted, in front of it, a severe defeat on 
 the rebels. Occupying Chanda, he pushed on to Rampiira, 
 halted there for two hours, then moving to Hamirpur, 
 defeated another body of rebels, marching to the assist- 
 ance of those disposed of at Chanda. Pushing on thence, 
 he occupied the strong fortress of Budhayun in the face 
 of the rebels, and completely defeated them in the hard- 
 fought battle of Sultanpur^ (February 23). The Labor 
 
 ^ In this battle Macleod Innes of the Engineers gained the Victoria Cross 
 by a deed of splendid daring. 
 
354 Franks reaches Lakhnao, 
 
 Light Horse joined him that evening, and the Jdlandhar 
 Cavalry the following morning. Franks pushed on rapidly 
 after the battle. On the ist of March Aikman, who 
 commanded the Jdlandhar Cavalry, heard of the pre- 
 sence three miles off the road of a rebel chief who had 
 long been 'wanted.' Aikman dashed after him, caught 
 him, killed more than a hundred of his men, and drove the 
 remainder into the Gumti, capturing two guns. It was 
 the resolute courage of Aikman that did it all, and for 
 his daring and persistence he was awarded the Victoria 
 Cross. 
 
 On the 4th Franks had reached Amethi, within eight 
 miles of Lakhnao. Hence he proceeded to attack the 
 fort of Daurara, two miles off the road. But, in striking 
 contrast to his usual tactics, he made the attack in a 
 slovenly manner, and was repulsed. It was unfortunate 
 for him, for it was believed he was to have held the 
 command in the storming of Lakhnao, which Sir Colin, 
 after the repulse, conferred upon Outram. 
 
 The assaulting army, numbering 20,000 men and 
 180 guns, is now collected round the doomed city. In 
 the next chapter I shall have to relate how Sir Colin 
 Campbell employed it. 
 
CHAPTERXXIV. 
 
 THE STORMING OF LAKHNAO. 
 
 The army concentrated by Sir Colin Campbell before 
 Lakhnao consisted of the troops which, as I have told 
 
 of tt TT ■'" ''' P'""^ ^^'"^^" Un^o and Bann/,' 
 of the N.pal troops, of Franks's division, and of the 
 
 oZ" nlV"" *' ^'^"^'^'^'^ ""'^^ 'he command of 
 Outram. _ Of the three first I have written in the three 
 chapters immediately preceding. It remains now to sav 
 a word regarding the last. ^ 
 
 with'^hf ^f '"" ''''' °" *^ ^^"^ °f November, 
 
 vth between three and four thousand' men of all arras 
 
 twenty-five guns and howitzers, and ten mortars to 
 
 rebeTof'thT""" ''""''^ ^'°""^ ^^"'■"^ ''^^ Lakhnao 
 
 locate a 1 th '"""? 1 ^""'^'^ '^°°P^- "« ^id not 
 locate all these m the Alambagh, but occupying that 
 
 royal garden-a square of about 500 yards-w4 f suffi 
 
 half a""";'K'^r^^'^ '""^ ^^"^■"^- -•" 'he open abot 
 half^ „,,,e behmd ,t. He thus occupied a positfon across 
 
 fehf "ir Z'- '°" •"'"-^ *^ '°^' °^ J^'^'^hdd with h 
 nght. Where th.s position was not naturally covered by 
 swamps he placed batteries, dug trenches, and planted 
 abattis to protect it. ^ a"i.cu 
 
 The rebels in Lakhnao had been so severely handled 
 by S,r Cohn ,n his relief of the Residency that for some 
 
 .0 ^rz:t:^:: ""°" ^°°°' ^"' -^ ">- ^'-' 50° ^.h be™ se„. 
 
356 Outram at the Alambdgh. 
 
 time they made no attempt to disturb Oiitram. But as 
 time passed the memory of the losses they then sustained 
 faded, and on the 22d December they made a skilfully 
 conceived attempt to sever Outram's communications with 
 Banni. But the British general was well served by his 
 spies, and catching the rebels whilst marching to execute 
 their plan, he inflicted upon them a very severe defeat 
 
 About a fortnight later Outram despatched to Kanhpnr 
 a convoy of empty carts, guarded by 530 men and four 
 guns. The rebels soon obtained information of this move- 
 ment, and believing that the force resting on the Alambdgh 
 had been severely crippled, they determined to make a 
 supreme effort to destroy Outram. Accordingly, on the 
 1 2th, they issued from Lakhnao to the number of 30,000. 
 They massed this body opposite to the extreme left of 
 Outram's position, then gradually extended it so as to 
 face his front and left. To the front attack Outram 
 opposed two brigades, the one consisting of 733 English 
 troops, the other of 713, whilst he directed the ever-daring 
 Olpherts to take four guns, and, supported by the men of 
 the military train, to dash at the overlapping right of the 
 rebels. Olpherts fell on them just as they were develop- 
 ing their overlapping movement, and not only compelled 
 them to renounce it, but to fall back in confusion. The 
 two brigades operating against the centre were equally 
 successful. They not only drove back the rebels, but foiled 
 an insidious movement which their leader was planning 
 against the right of the British position. By four o'clock 
 the rebels were in full flight. Their losses were heavy. 
 
 But the famous Maulavi, one of the chief authors of 
 the rebellion, was in Lakhnao, and the Maulavi had sworn 
 that he would capture the convoy despatched with empty 
 carts to Kanhpur, but now returning with the carts laden. 
 Accordingly, on the night of the 14th, he quitted Lakhnao 
 
OiUram at the Alanibdgh. 357 
 
 with a considerable force, in very light marching order, 
 turned the British camp, and occupied a position whence 
 he could fall upon the convoy as it marched. Fortune 
 seemed to favour him, for a violent dust-storm concealed 
 his presence from the leader of the covering party, who, 
 moreover, had no warning of his presence. But the care- 
 ful watchfulness of Outram foiled him. Noting how the 
 weather favoured an attack, he despatched Olpherts, with 
 two guns and a detachment of infantry, supported by 
 others troops, to aid in bringing in the convoy. Olpherts 
 cleared the ground of the Maulavi and his troops, and the 
 convoy reached the camp in safety. On the i6th another 
 attack made by the rebels was repulsed with loss. From 
 that date till the 15th of February they made no sign. 
 
 Then, directed by the Maulavi, they made an attack 
 in force, only to be repulsed. They followed it up by a 
 second the following day, with a like result. On the 21st 
 they made a third, and on the 25th a fourth and very 
 serious one. In all they were completely beaten. The 
 last defeat apparently convinced them that it was hopeless 
 to attempt to dislodge Outram. 
 
 Thus did that illustrious man, aided by his capable 
 officers, by Berkeley, his chief of the staff, by Vincent 
 Eyre, by Olpherts, by Maude, by Dodgson, by Macbean, 
 by Moorsom, by Gould Wqston, by Chamier, by Hargood 
 by Barrow, by Wale, and by that excellent officer of the 
 Engineers, Nicholson, by Brasyer, and by many others, 
 for the list is a long one, maintain, with a comparatively 
 small force, the position assigned to him by the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief. Towards the end of February his force 
 had been increased, but it never equalled 5000 men. 
 It was computed, on the other hand, that the rebels had 
 at their disposal no fewer than 120,000 men. Of these 
 27,550 were trained sipahis, and 7100 trained cavalry 
 
358 Description of Lakhnao. 
 
 soldiers. Of the remainder, 5400 were new levies, 
 5150 were Najibs, or men drilled and armed in the 
 native fashion, 800 belonged to the camel corps they had 
 organised, whilst the armed followers of the talukdars 
 numbered 20,000. Such was the force which guarded the 
 city the storming of which by Sir Colin Campbell I shall 
 now briefly describe. 
 
 The city of Lakhnao stretches, in an irregular form, on 
 the right bank of the Giimti for a length from east to west 
 of nearly five miles. The extreme width of it on the 
 western side is a mile and a half. The eastern side 
 diminishes to the width of rather less than a mile. Two 
 bridges, one of iron, the other of masonry, span the Gumti, 
 whilst a canal of deep and rugged section, enclosing the 
 city on the east and south sides, bears away to the south- 
 west, leaving the approach there open, but intersected by 
 ravines. Towards the north-east, where the canal joins 
 the Gumti, its banks are naturally shelving and easy. 
 
 The strong positions held by the rebels within the city 
 were the Kaisarbagh, a palace about 400 yards square, con- 
 taining several ranges of buildings. It had been completed 
 only in 1850, and was not originally fortified. The rebels, 
 however, had greatly strengthened it. To the east of the 
 Observatory, overlooking the river, were the Farhatbakhsh 
 palace and the palaces adjoining, the Residency, the ruins 
 of the Machchi Bhawan, the great Imambarah, the Jam- 
 aniabagh, the Shesh Mahall, All Naki's house, extending 
 to the west along the banks of the river, the Musabagh, 
 a mile and a half beyond it, the little Imambarah, and 
 a range of palaces stretching from the Kaisarbagh to the 
 canal. Beyond the canal, on the east of the city, was the 
 Martiniere. Overlooking this and the eastern suburbs, on 
 the brow of a table-land, stood the Dilkusha. 
 
 The rebels, profiting by their experience of the British 
 
"5 
 
 ce: 
 
 >'. h 
 
 «* 
 
 *i, o* 
 
 X 
 
 1-5 S 
 
 w 
 
 ^i 
 
 H 
 
 
 DC 
 
 jg 
 
 m 
 
Sir Colin s Plan of Attack. 359 
 
 action in the previous November, had greatly strengthened 
 the Hne by which Sir CoHn had then advanced. They 
 had, too, formed three h'nes of defence. The first rested on 
 Hazratganj, at the point where the three roads into Lakh- 
 nao converge. The right of the second line rested on the 
 little Imambarah, thence, embracing the mess-house, it 
 joined the river bank near the Moti Mahall. The third 
 covered the Kaisarbagh. These defences were protected 
 by a hundred guns. All the main streets were likewise 
 protected by bastions and barricades, and every building 
 of importance, besides being loopholed, had an outer work 
 protecting the entrance to it. 
 
 Whilst thus protecting the city on three sides, the rebels 
 had neglected the northern side. Sir Colin detected this 
 error, and resolved, in his plan of attack, to take full ad- 
 vantage of it. 
 
 Whilst, then, he determined to cross the Giimti with 
 his main force, and to march by the Hazratganj on the 
 Kaisarbagh, he would employ a strong division, under 
 Outram, to turn those defences. He could not, with the 
 force at his disposal, completely hem in the city, but he 
 hoped that, as he pushed on the main body in the line in- 
 dicated, Outram would be able to move round the angle 
 on one side, whilst Jang Bahadur and the force at the 
 Alambagh would close up round the corresponding angle 
 on the other. 
 
 Having resolved on this plan, he advanced, with his 
 main body, on the Dilkusha park and captured it. Whilst 
 he erected batteries there to keep down the rebels' fire, he 
 continued to bring up his troops. By the 4th he had 
 assembled there the whole of the siege-train, and had the 
 bulk of his force, Franks's division and the Nipalese ex- 
 cepted, thoroughly in hand. That force now occupied 
 a line which touched on the right the Gumti, at the village 
 
o 
 
 60 Oidrani s Turning Movement. 
 
 of Bibiapur, then, Intersecting the Dilkusha, stopped at 
 a point nearly two miles from Jalalabad. The interval 
 was occupied by Hodson's Horse, 1600 strong. Outram 
 still continued to occupy his former position. On the 5th 
 Franks and the Nipalese arrived. 
 
 During the night of the 4th Sir Colin had directed the 
 throwing of two bridges over the Giimti near Bibiapur. 
 One of these was completed by the morning of the 5th, 
 and across it a picket had been sent to cover the comple- 
 tion of the remaining works. These were finished by 
 midnight on the 5th. Sir Colin then sent Outram and 
 his division across the river. He was very anxious for 
 the success of the movement he had consigned to that 
 officer, for he had resolved not to stir a step until Outram, 
 charged to turn the rebels' position and to take them in 
 reverse, should have marched beyond, and thus have 
 turned the first line of defence. 
 
 Outram crossed and marched up the Gumti for about 
 a mile. The river makes a sharp bend at that point ; so 
 Outram left the sinuosities of the river, and marched 
 straight on in the direction of the city. He encamped 
 that evening about four miles from it, facing it, his left 
 resting on the Faizabad road, about half a mile in advance 
 of the village of Chinhat. 
 
 The following day and the 8th were spent in skirmish- 
 ing, but on the 9th Outram made his spring. Preluding 
 it with a heavy fire from the batteries he had constructed, 
 he sent Walpole to attack the rebels' left, whilst he led 
 his own left column across the Kokrail stream. Waiting 
 there till Walpole had completed the task allotted to him, 
 he then stormed the Chakar Kothi, the key of the rebels' 
 position, and thus turned and rendered useless to them 
 the strong line of intrenchments they had thrown up on 
 the right bank of the Giimti. In the attack on the 
 
Great Advantages obtained by It. 361 
 
 Chakar Kothi, Anderson of the Sikhs and St George of 
 the 1st FusiHers greatly distinguished themselves, whilst, 
 in opening communications with Adrian Hope's brigade 
 on the opposite bank, young Butler of the ist Fusiliers 
 performed a deed of cool intrepidity which won for him 
 the Victoria Cross. The result of the day's operations 
 was that Outram occupied the left bank of the Gumti as 
 far as the Badshahbagh. His position took the rebels 
 completely in reverse. 
 
 Sir Colin had waited the three days, the 6th, 7th, and 
 8th, whilst Outram was making his preparations ; but, on 
 the 9th, he too advanced, carried the Martiniere, and 
 moved Adrian Hope's brigade from the vicinity of 
 Banks's house to a point whence, some six hundred 
 yards from the river, it could communicate, as thanks to 
 the gallantry of Butler it did communicate, with Outram 
 on the opposite bank. Sir Colin completed the opera- 
 tion the next day by storming Banks's house. The two 
 army corps were then in complete communication. 
 
 During the night of the loth Outram erected batteries 
 to cover his projected movement of the following day ; 
 then, when that day dawned, he carried all the positions 
 leading to the iron bridge — the bridge leading to the 
 Residency — and established batteries close to it. In this 
 operation he lost two most gallant officers, Thynne of the 
 Rifle Brigade, and Moorsom of the Quartermaster- 
 General's department. He continued to carry out the 
 operations entrusted to him on the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 
 15th. He established himself, that is to say, in a position 
 which enabled him, during those days, to rake and attack, 
 by artillery fire in flank and rear, the positions which Sir 
 Colin was assailing in front. It is impossible to over- 
 estimate the value of the assistance which Outram thus 
 rendered to the main attack. 
 
362 Adrian Hope captures the Begimi KothL 
 
 Meanwhile, Sir Colin, having stormed Banks's house 
 on the loth, occupied without opposition the Sikandara- 
 bagh on the nth, and, owing to the happy audacity of 
 three engineer officers. Medley, Lang, and Carnegy, took 
 possession, also without fighting, of the Kadam Rasul, and 
 of that Shah Najaf which had almost foiled him during 
 his advance in November. But the Begum Kothi promised 
 to offer a fierce resistance. It belched forth fire and flame, 
 and it was so strong as to seem capable of repelling a 
 direct attack. Lugard, however, who commanded the 
 force in front of it, resolved to attempt one. The troops 
 he employed were those companions in glory, the 93d 
 Highlanders and the 4th Panjab Rifles, led by that model 
 of a soldier the chivalrous Adrian Hope. The assault, 
 made at four o'clock in the afternoon, though opposed 
 with a fury and discipline almost equal to that of the 
 assailants, was successful. But, to use the language of 
 Sir Colin, ' it was the sternest struggle which occurred 
 during the siege.' Six hundred corpses testified to the 
 unerring force of the British and Sikh bayonet. 
 
 The capture of the Begum Kothi gave to the Chief 
 Engineer, Brigadier Napier, the opportunity of pushing his 
 approaches, by means of sappers and of heavy guns, through 
 the enclosures, to the mess-house, the little Imambarah 
 and to the Kaisarbagh. The 12th, then, was chiefly an en- 
 gineers' day. Some changes, however, were made in the 
 disposition of the troops ; Franks's division relieved that of 
 Lugard as the leading division, and the Nipalese troops 
 were brought into line. They were placed on the extreme 
 left, so as to hold the line of the canal beyond Banks's 
 house. The 13th w^as, likewise, an engineers' day. On 
 that day the Nipalese were moved across the canal against 
 the suburb to the left of Banks's house, so as to attract the 
 attention of the rebels to that quarter. By the evening 
 
Storming of the Kaisarbdgh. 363 
 
 the engineers' work was completed. All the great build- 
 ings to the left, up to the little Imambarah, had been 
 sapped through, and by nine o'clock the next morning the 
 heavy guns had effected a breach in its walls. Franks was 
 then directed to storm it. He carried out the operation 
 with brilliant success. 
 
 The storm of the little Imambarah had whetted the 
 martial instincts of the men. Following up the rebels as 
 they evacuated it, they forced their way into a palace which 
 commanded three of the bastions of theKaisarbagh. Thence 
 they brought to bear on the rebels below them so heavy a 
 fire that one by one they deserted their guns. Their flight 
 left the second Hne of defence virtually at the mercy of the 
 British. It was turned. A daring advance alone was neces- 
 sary to gain it. The rebels, recognising this, had no thought 
 but to save themselves. They ran then for security into 
 the buildings between the little Imambarah and the Kaisar- 
 bagh. But the 90th and Brasyer's Sikhs, who were in the 
 front line of stormers, had equally recognised the advant- 
 ages of their position. Led by young Havelock and 
 Brasyer, they forced their way, cheering, under a terrible 
 fire, into a courtyard adjoining the Kaisarbagh, driving 
 the rebels before them. At this conjuncture young 
 Havelock, seeing with a soldier's eye the extent of the 
 possibilities before him, ran back to the detachment of 
 the loth in support and ordered it to the front. Annesley, 
 who commanded it, led it forward with alacrity, nor did 
 his men halt till, driving the rebels before them, they had 
 penetrated to the Chini bazaar, to the rear of the Tara 
 Kothi and the mess-house, thus turning the rebels' third 
 line. The rebels, congregated in the Tara Kothi and 
 mess-house, numbering about 6000, realising their position, 
 evacuated those buildings, and made as though they 
 would re-enter the city through an opening in the further 
 
364 Stonning of the Kaisarbdgh, 
 
 gateway of the Chini bazaar, and thus cut off the Sikhs 
 and the 90th. But Havelock, with great presence of 
 mind, advanced with some Sikhs to the support of 
 Brasyer, and seizing two adjoining bastions, turned the 
 six guns found upon them with so much effect against 
 the rebels that their attempt was checked, and they 
 abandoned it. By this time the fourth note sent by 
 young Havelock^ had reached Franks, and that gallant 
 officer pushed forward every available man in support of 
 the advance. The results already achieved far surpassed 
 in importance those which had been contemplated for the 
 day, and the question arose whether the advantage should 
 be pursued. After a brief consultation Franks and Napier 
 decided in favour of pushing on. Some necessary re- 
 arrangement of troops followed. Then, whilst those on 
 the right advanced and occupied in succession, with but 
 little resistance, the Moti Mahall, the Chatar Manzil, and 
 the Tara Kothi, Franks sent his men through the court 
 of Saadat All's Mosque into the Kaisarbagh itself The 
 resistance there was fierce, but of short duration. The 
 stormers were wound to a pitch which made them irre- 
 sistible. They stormed, one after another, the courts and 
 the summer-houses which made up the interior of the palace, 
 and drove the rebels headlong into the garden. There 
 those who failed to escape — and they were the majority — 
 soon found the rest from which there is no awakening. 
 
 I will not attempt to describe the plundering which 
 followed the capture of this newest of the palaces of the 
 Kings of Oudh. Rather would I dwell on the great 
 military result thereby obtained. In the morning of that 
 14th of March the British line had stretched from the 
 Shah Najaf to Hazratganj. That evening it ran from the 
 
 1 The ' young Havelock ' alluded to in the text is the present Sir Henry 
 Havelock-Allan, son of the general v.'ho first relieved the Residency. 
 
Sir Colin checks Outrams Mai^ch. 365 
 
 Chatar Manzil to the Residency side of the Kaisarbagh. 
 Two strong defensive Hnes of works, including the Citadel, 
 on which the second line rested, defended by nearly 
 40,000 men, had been stormed. All honour to the men 
 who planned and carried out so magnificent a work : to 
 Havelock and Brasyer, to Franks and Napier, to 
 Annesley, to the men of the loth and 90th, and to the 
 Sikhs. All honour, also, to those who gave their lives in 
 the noble enterprise. 
 
 The rebels would have been completely destroyed, 
 
 and the whole of Lakhnao would have lain, helpless, 
 
 the next morning at the feet of Sir Colin Campbell if, 
 
 whilst Franks and Napier were storming the Kaisarbagh, 
 
 Outram had crossed by the iron bridge and cut off those 
 
 who escaped from the several places as they were stormed. 
 
 That this did not happen was no fault of Outram. He 
 
 recognised the advantage to be gained, and applied during 
 
 the day for permission to execute such a manoeuvre. The 
 
 reply was the most extraordinary ever received by a 
 
 general in the field. It consisted of a short note from 
 
 Mansfield, chief of the staff, telling him he might cross 
 
 by the iron bridge, but that ' he was not to do so if he 
 
 thought he would lose a single man.' Such a proviso was 
 
 a prohibition, for not only were guns posted to defend the 
 
 bridge, but the bridge was commanded by a mosque and 
 
 several loopholed houses. The loss, then, would have 
 
 greatly exceeded that of one man. That the proviso was 
 
 dictated by a very shortsighted policy can be realised by 
 
 the slightest reflection. The ultimate pursuit of the rebels 
 
 who escaped because Outram did not cross caused an 
 
 infinitely greater loss of men to the British army than the 
 
 storming of the bridge and the taking of the rebels in 
 
 rear would have occasioned. 
 
 On the right bank of the Gumti Sir Colin devoted the 
 
366 Otttram carries all before Hi?n, 
 
 15th to the consolidating of the position he had gained. 
 On the left bank, sensible, too late, of the error he had 
 allowed to be committed by the despatch to Outram 
 of the absurd order on which I have commented, he 
 despatched Hope Grant, with his cavalry, and Campbell, 
 with his infantry brigade and 1500 cavalry, to pursue the 
 rebels on the Sitapur and Sandila roads respectively. 
 But the rebels had taken neither of these roads ; the 
 pursuit, therefore, was fruitless. It was not till the 1 6th 
 that Sir Colin directed Outram to cross the Gumti, near 
 the Sikandarabagh, and to join him, with Douglas's 
 brigade, at the Kaisarbagh, leaving Walpole, with Hors- 
 ford's brigade, to watch the iron and stone bridges. 
 Outram crossed as directed, was joined by the 20th and 
 Brasyer's Sikhs, and was then ordered by Sir Colin in 
 person to push on through the Residency, take the iron 
 bridge in reverse, and then, advancing a mile further, 
 storm the Machchi Bhawan and the great Imambarah. 
 Outram carried both places without much opposition ; 
 but before he had accomplished his task the rebels, with 
 the design of retreating on Faizabad, had made a strong 
 attack on Walpole's pickets. They had been unable to 
 force these — probably they never seriously intended to 
 do so — but they held them in check whilst the bulk of 
 their comrades made good their retreat on to the Faizabad 
 road. I need not point out how impossible retreat by that 
 road would have been had Sir Colin permitted Outram to 
 cross on the 14th. 
 
 The rebels attempted the same day another diversion, 
 by suddenly attacking the Alambagh, but Franklyn, who 
 commanded, Vincent Eyre, with his heavy guns, Robertson, 
 with the military train, and Olpherts completely foiled 
 them. 
 
 Whilst the operations I have described had been 
 
And captures the Miisdbdgh. 367 
 
 carried out in the advance, Jang Bahadur and the Nipalese 
 had, on the 14th and 15th, moved up the canal and taken 
 in reverse the positions which, for three months, the 
 rebels had occupied in front of the Alambagh. Jang 
 Bahadur performed this task with ability and success. 
 One after another the positions held by the rebels, 'from 
 the Charbagh up to the Residency, on that side, fell into 
 his hands. 
 
 On the 17th Outram, pursuing his onward course, 
 occupied without resistance the Huseni Mosque and the 
 Daulat Khana. In the afternoon he caused to be occupied 
 a block of buildings known as Sharif-ud-daula's house. 
 The rebels evacuated it hastily, but an accidental ex- 
 plosion, caused by the careless unpacking of gunpowder 
 found there, caused the deaths of two officers and some 
 thirty men. On the i8th he proceeded to clear the streets 
 in front of the position he had secured, when he received 
 Sir Colin's orders to drive the rebels from the Miisabagh. 
 Whilst he should march against that place, Campbell of the 
 Bays was to take 1500 cavalry, and a due proportion of 
 guns, and be ready to pounce upon the rebels as Outram 
 should drive them from the Musabagh. The Nipalese 
 were likewise so placed as to cut off their retreat in the 
 other direction. 
 
 Outram, as usual, did his part thoroughly. He 
 captured All Naki's house and the Musabagh. The rebels 
 fled from the last-named place by the road which Camp- 
 bell should have guarded. But Campbell was not to be 
 seen. He had engaged a part of his force in a srnall 
 operation which had given Hagart, Slade, Bankes, and 
 Wilkin, all of the 7th Hussars, an opportunity of display- 
 ing courage of no ordinary character, followed though their 
 splendid deed was by the severely wounding of the second 
 and the death of the third; but as to the main object of 
 
368 Lord Canning s Proclamation, 
 
 his mission he did nothing. It was officially stated that 
 he had lost his way.^ The rebels, consequently, escaped. 
 
 Not all, however. Outram was there to repair to a 
 certain extent Campbell's error. Noticing that the rebels 
 were preparing to escape from the Musabagh, he had 
 despatched to cut them off the 9th Lancers, followed 
 by some infantry and field-artillery. These killed about 
 100 of them, and captured all their guns. 
 
 This was the concluding act of the storming of 
 Lakhnao. The day following was issued Lord Canning's 
 proclamation confiscating the entire proprietary right in 
 the soil of Oudh, save in the case of six comparatively 
 inferior chiefs. To rebel landowners who should at once 
 surrender immunity from death and imprisonment was 
 promised, provided that they could show that they were 
 guiltless of unprovoked bloodshed. To those who had 
 protected British fugitives special consideration was pro- 
 mised. The principles embodied in the proclamation were 
 just, and when the time came they were acted upon with 
 such consideration as to secure the loyalty which had been 
 alienated by the enforcement of the stern code which had 
 immediately followed the annexation ; but at the moment 
 the effect was to embitter the hearts of those against whom 
 the proclamation was directed. 
 
 It having been ascertained that the famous Maulavi 
 was still in Lakhnao, and that from Shadatganj, in the 
 heart of the city, he still bade defiance to the conqueror, 
 Lugard was sent, on the 21st, with the 93d and 4th Panjab 
 Rifles, to attack him. He and his followers were effec- 
 tively dislodged, and were pursued by Campbell, this time 
 on the spot. But the Maulavi escaped. Two days later 
 Hope Grant, sent after the rebels who had fled by the 
 
 ^ Hope Grant {Incidents of the Sepoy War) is very, but not unjustly, severe 
 on Campbell. 
 
What remained to be accomplished. 369 
 
 Faizabad road, caught a considerable number of them at 
 Kursi, cut up many, and captured thirteen guns. 
 
 Lakhnao had fallen, but the province of which Lakhnao 
 was the capital still remained to be subdued. How this 
 was accomplished, how Rohilkhand was recovered, and 
 how the rebels were driven from Azamgarh into Western 
 Bihar, and there annihilated, I shall show in the next 
 chapter. 
 
 2 A 
 
CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 AZAMGARH — RECONQUEST OF ROHILKHAND, OF OUDH, 
 OF THE AZAMGARH AND WESTERN BIHAR DISTRICTS. 
 
 Whilst Sir Colin Campbell was putting the last finishing 
 stroke to his operations against Lakhnao there occurred an 
 event in the Azamgarh district which taxed very severely 
 the resources immediately available to Lord Canning. 
 On the 27th of March an express informed the Governor- 
 General that, on the 22d, Kunwar Singh, the famous 
 chieftain of Western Bihar, had surprised the British force, 
 under Colonel Milman, near Atraolia, twenty-five miles 
 from Azamgarh, had forced it to fall back on the last- 
 named place, and was there besieging it. It was too true. 
 Milman, whose force consisted of 2o5 men of the 37th Foot 
 and of 60 Madras Cavalry, had been caught napping ; 
 had fallen back, first on Koilsa, then on Azamgarh ; had 
 received there reinforcements in the shape of 46 men 
 of the Madras Rifles (natives) and 280 men of his own 
 regiment, the 37th Foot, under Colonel Dames, who, 
 as senior officer, then assumed command. On the 27th 
 Dames had attempted a sortie, and had been beaten 
 back. 
 
 The situation was a difficult one for Lord Canning, 
 for Azamgarh was not very distant from Allahdbad, where 
 he was, and if Kunwar Singh were to compel the surrender 
 of the force behind the walls of Azamgarh the conflagra- 
 
Coolness and Courage of Lord Mark Kerr. 371 
 
 tion might reach even Banaras. ReaHsing to the fullest 
 extent the possibilities which Kunwar Singh might utilise, 
 whilst Oudh still remained unsubdued, Lord Canning took 
 prompt and efficient measures to nip the evil in the bud. 
 There happened to be at Allahabad awing of the 13th 
 L. L, commanded by a most gallant soldier, Lord Mark 
 Kerr. Lord Canning sent for Lord Mark, explained to 
 him the situation, and authorised him to take the measures 
 he might consider necessary to deal with it That night 
 Lord Mark started, with his wing, 391 strong, for Banaras, 
 picked up there a troop — fifty-five men and two officers — 
 of the Queen's Bays, seventeen gunners and one officer, 
 with two six-pounder guns and two 5-|-inch mortars, and set 
 out for Azamgarh the night of the 2d of April His entire 
 force consisted of twenty-two officers and 444 men. On 
 the evening of the 5th he had reached Sarsana, eight miles 
 from Azamgarh. Kunwar Singh had notice of his arrival 
 there, and prepared an ambush for hiai, to entrap him 
 whilst he should be pushing on in the early grey of the 
 next morning. Lord Mark did so push on, and became 
 entangled in the ambush, but by a display of combined 
 coolness and courage, very remarkable under the circum- 
 stances, largely outnumbered as he was, not only extri- 
 cated his men, but inflicted upon the rebels a crushing 
 defeat, and relieved Azamgarh. It was one of the most 
 brilliant achievements of the war. 
 
 The Commander-in-Chief had received news of 
 Milman's disaster on the 28th of March. Realising, as 
 Lord Canning had realised, its full significance, he de- 
 spatched at once General Lugard, with three English 
 regiments, 700 Sikh sabres, and eighteen guns, to march, 
 by way of Atraolia, to Azamgarh, there to deal with 
 Kunwar Singh. To Lugard's operations I shall refer 
 presently. Meanwhile, I propose to take up the story 
 
372 Movement of Hope Grant and Walpole^ 
 
 of the measures decided upon for the pacification of 
 Rohilkhand and of Oudh. 
 
 For the reconquest of Oudh Sir CoHn detailed one 
 army corps, under Hope Grant, to march to Ban', twenty- 
 nine miles from Lakhnao, to expel thence the rebels col- 
 lected there under the Maulavi, to march eastward thence 
 to Muhammadabad, and, following the course of the Gogra, 
 to reconnoitre Bitauli, thence to cover the return to their 
 own country of the Nipal troops, under Jang Bahadur. 
 Whilst Hope Grant should be moving in that direction, 
 Walpole, with a moveable column, was to march up the 
 Ganges, await near Fathgarh the arrival of Sir Colin, who 
 would draw to himself as he advanced other columns 
 converging to the same point. 
 
 Hope Grant carried out his instructions to the letter. 
 He defeated the Maulavi at Ban', found Bitauli evacuated, 
 saw Jang Bahadur on his way to the frontier, and then 
 returned to protect the road between Kanhpur and 
 Lakhnao, seriously threatened at Unao. Walpole was 
 less successful. Obstinate, self-willed, and an indifferent 
 soldier, he led his column against the fort of Ruyia, two 
 miles from the Ganges, and fifty-one west by north from 
 Lakhnao, attacked it on its only unassailable face, and after 
 losing several men, and the most gifted soldier in the 
 British army, the accomplished Adrian Hope, allowed the 
 defenders to escape from the face which he himself should 
 have assailed. He moved on thence, expelled the rebels 
 from Sirsa, and was joined on the Rohilkhand side of 
 Fathgarh, on the 27th of April, by Sir Colin. 
 
 Seaton, who had been left at Fathgarh, noticing that 
 the rebels had collected in considerable force in front of 
 him, had issued from that place on the 6th April, and had 
 inflicted on them a crushing defeat at Kankar, between 
 Aliganj and Bangaun. By this victory he secured the 
 
Of Seaton, of Penny, and of Coke. -^-jx 
 
 gates of Dudb against an enemy issuing from either of 
 the menaced provinces. Whilst he was keeping that door 
 closed Penny, with another column, was moving down 
 from Bulandshahr. Penny met Sir Colin at Fathgarh, on 
 24tii April, then crossed the Ganges and marched on 
 Usehat. Fmding that place deserted, and being told 
 that his march to Buddun would not be opposed. Penny 
 started on a night march for that place. But the rebels 
 ay m ambush for him and surprised him, and although 
 his column defeated them, he was slain. Colonel Jones 
 of the Carabineers succeeded him, and under his orders 
 the column marched to join Sir Colin at Mirdnpur Katra 
 on the 3d of May. 
 
 _ Whilst these columns, united under Sir Colin, should 
 mvade Rohilkhand from its eastern side, it had been 
 arranged that a brigade, under Colonel Coke, should enter 
 .t from Rurkf. Coke had arrived at Rvirki the 22d of 
 February, but so disorganised was the country that 
 April was approaching before he could complete his 
 commissariat arrangements. When he was ready Sir 
 Co m made the command a divisional one, and sent 
 Colonel John Jones to lead it. The change, however, did 
 not affect the order of the proceedings, for the good under 
 standing between Coke and his superior in rank remained 
 perfect to the end. 
 
 The division crossed the Ganges at Hardwdr on the 
 17th of April, defeated the rebels at BhogniwdIA Cl7th) 
 and at Naghi'nd (21st), and reached the vicinity of 
 Muradabad on the 26th of April. Entering that place 
 Coke was able to seize the persons of several notorious 
 rebels, and then pushed on to take part in the operations 
 which Sir Colm was directing against Bareli', 
 
 . ^'''..^cu"J°/"^'^ °" *^ ^7th of April by Walpole, had 
 entered Shahjahdnpur the 30th. He had hoped to find 
 
374 '^^'^' Colin Campbell in Rohilkand. 
 
 there the Maulavi and Ndna Sahib, but both had fled he 
 knew not whither. Leaving there a small detachment, 
 under Colonel Hale, he moved then on Miranpur Katra, 
 picked up there, as I have told, the brigade but recently 
 commanded by Penny, and marched on Bareli. There 
 Khan Bahadur Khan still tyrannised. It seemed as 
 though he had resolved to strike a blow for the per- 
 manence of his sway. 
 
 It was seven o'clock on the morning of the 5th of May 
 when Sir Colin led his troops to attack the rebel chieftain. 
 In his first line he had the Highland brigade, composed 
 of the 93d, 42d, and 79th, supported by that excellent 
 Sikh regiment the 4th Panjab Rifles, and the Baluch 
 battalion, with a heavy field-battery in the centre, and 
 horse-artillery and cavalry on both flanks. The second 
 line, composed of the 78th, seven companies of the 64th, 
 and four of the 82d, and the 2d and 22d Panjab 
 Infantry, protected the baggage and the siege-train. The 
 enormous superiority of the rebels in cavalry required 
 such a precaution. 
 
 It was apparently the object of the rebels to entice 
 the British to the position they had selected as the best 
 for their purposes, for they abandoned their first line as 
 Sir Colin advanced, and fell back on the old cantonment 
 of Bareli, covering their movement with their cavalry and 
 guns. Sir Colin, inclined to humour them, anxious only 
 to bring them to action, crossed the Nattia rivulet, and 
 was advancing beyond it, when the Ghazis, men who de- 
 voted their lives for their religion, made a desperate on- 
 slaught on a village which the 4th Panjabis had but just 
 entered. With the ela7t of their rush they swept the sur- 
 prised Sikhs out of the village, and then dashed against the 
 42d, hastening to their support. Sir Colin happened to 
 be on the spot. He had just time to call out, 'Stand firm, 
 
Sir Colin occitpies Bai^dli. 375 
 
 42d ; bayonet them as they come on ! ' when the Ghazis 
 were upon them. But vain was their rush against that wall 
 of old soldiers ! They killed some indeed, but not a single 
 man of the Ghazis survived. Some of them, however, 
 had got round the 42d, and inflicted some damage. But 
 they, too, met the fate of their comrades. The first line 
 then advanced, and for about a mile and a half swept all 
 before it. Just then the information reached Sir Colin 
 that the rebel cavalry had attacked his baggage, but had 
 been repulsed. He halted to enable the second line, with 
 the baggage and heavy guns to close up, sending only the 
 79th and 93d to seize the suburbs in their front. This 
 attempt led to fresh fighting with the Ghazis, which, 
 however, ended as had the previous attacks. In a very 
 important particular the halt made by Sir Colin, desirable 
 as it was in many respects, was unfortunate, as it enabled 
 the rebel chief to withdraw, with his troops, from the 
 town. It would even have been better had the attack been 
 delayed for a single day ; for on the following morning, as 
 Sir Colin entered the evacuated town on the one side, 
 the division commanded by Jones and Coke entered it 
 on the other. Khan Bahadar Khan eventually escaped 
 into Nipal. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Maulavi, who had evacuated Shah- 
 jahanpur on the approach of Sir Colin, had no sooner 
 learnt that the British general was approaching Bareli, 
 than he turned back from Muhamdi, and resolved to 
 surprise Hale at Shahjahanpur. It is more than probable 
 that, had he marched without a halt, he would have suc- 
 ceeded. But when within four miles of the place he stopped 
 to rest his men. This halt gave to a loyal villager the 
 opportunity to hasten to apprise Hale of his approach, and 
 that officer had time to take measures to meet his enemy. 
 Giving up the town, he fell back on the gaol. The Maulavf, 
 
^y6 General yones and the Manlavi, 
 
 who had eight guns, followed him to that place, invested it 
 and from the 3d to the morning of the nth of May kept 
 up against it an all but incessant cannonade. 
 
 Information of the position of Hale reached Sir Colin 
 on the 7th. He at once despatched John Jones, with the 
 60th Rifles, the 79th, a wing of the 82d, the 22d Panjab 
 Infantry, two squadrons of the Carabineers, the Multani 
 horse, and guns in proportion, to dispose, if he could, of 
 the most persistent of all the rebels. Jones started on the 
 8th, reached the vicinity of Shahjahanpur the nth, drove 
 the rebel outposts before him, and effected a junction with 
 Hale. But the Maulavi was too strong in cavalry to 
 permit of his being attacked with any chance of success. 
 Jones halted, then, until he should receive from Sir Colin 
 troops of the arm of which he stood in need. The 
 Maulavi, meanwhile, occupied the open plain, whither 
 rebels who had been elsewhere baffled flocked to him 
 from all sides. Matters continued so till the morning of 
 the 15th, when the Maulavi, whose following had greatly 
 increased, attacked Jones. The fight lasted all day with- 
 out his having been able to make the smallest impression 
 on the serried ranks of the British. Sir Colin, meanwhile, 
 deeming the campaign at an end, had distributed his 
 forces. He was himself on his way to Fathgarh, with a 
 small body of troops, when he received Jones's message. 
 Sending then for the remainder of the 9th Lancers, he 
 turned his course towards Shahjahanpur, and effected a 
 junction there with Jones on the 18th. 
 
 Even then he was too weak in cavalry to force the 
 rebels to a decisive battle. A skirmish, however, brought 
 on a partial action near the village of Panhat. It resulted 
 in the repulse of the rebels, and in nothing more. But 
 the Maulavi, realising that he could make no impression 
 on the British infantry, fell back into Oudh, to await there 
 
Death of the Maulavi. ;^JJ 
 
 better fortune. Sir Colin then distributed the troops, 
 and closed the summer campaign. He had reconquered 
 Rohilkhand, but a great part of Oudh still remained 
 defiant. 
 
 A fortunate chance rid him, a few days later, of his 
 most dangerous and persistent enemy. No sooner had 
 the Maulavi realised that Sir Colin had put his troops 
 in summer quarters than, with a small following, he at- 
 tempted on the 5th of June to effect a forcible entrance 
 into the town of Powain. The Raja, a supporter of the 
 British, had refused him entry, and when the Maulavi, 
 seated on his elephant, pressed forward to force the gate, 
 the Rajas brother seized a gun and shot him dead. 
 Thus ignominiously, by the hands of one of his own 
 countrymen, terminated the life of one of the principal 
 fomentors of the Mutiny, and its ablest and most per- 
 sistent supporter. 
 
 It will be recollected that when Sir Colin, after the 
 capture of Lakhnao, distributed his forces for the pur- 
 suit of the rebels, he despatched a strong column, 
 under General Lugard, to Azamgarh to dispose there 
 of Kunwar Singh. To the proceedings of that general 
 and of his successors I must now ask the reader's 
 attention. 
 
 Lugard left Lakhnao on the 29th of March, and made 
 straight for Juanpur. When approaching that place he 
 learned that the rebels had collected a few miles off to the 
 number of 3000. He reached Tigra on the afternoon of the 
 nth of April, after a march of sixteen miles, attacked the 
 rebels the same evening, and defeated them, with the loss 
 of eighty killed, and two guns. The victors lost but one 
 killed and six wounded ; but the killed man was the gallant 
 Charles Havelock, nephew of the renowned General. Lu- 
 gard then marched for Azamgarh, still invested by Kunwar 
 
^yS Luga^'d and Kitmvar Singh, 
 
 Singh with 13,000 men. That wily chieftain was resolved 
 not to stake the issue of the campaign on a single battle. 
 Whilst ranging his troops, therefore, so as apparently to 
 guard the Tons, he really left there a widely spread out 
 screen, whilst with the main body he hastily retreated to- 
 wards the Ganges. Lugard forced (April 15) the passage 
 of the Tons, but the ' screen ' left by Kunwar Singh had 
 made so resolute a defence that the main body had gained 
 some twelve miles before they were overtaken. They 
 were mostly old sipahis, and on this occasion they did 
 credit to the training they had received. Forming up, on 
 the approach of the British, like veterans, they repulsed, 
 whilst still retreating, every attack, and finally forced the 
 pursuers to cease their efforts. The latter had to mourn 
 the death this day, from wounds received in the fight, of 
 the illustrious Venables, the famous indigo planter, who, 
 with his comrade Dunn, had almost single-handed held 
 his district when it had been abandoned by those to whose 
 care it had been committed. On this day Middleton of 
 the 29th Foot greatly distinguished himself by the rescue 
 from crowds of the rebels of young Hamilton of the 3d 
 Sikhs, who lay seriously wounded, and who ultimately 
 died of his wounds. 
 
 Lugard, on entering Azamgarh, had found for the 
 moment sufficient occupation cut out for him in the dis- 
 trict. He therefore committed the pursuit of Kunwar 
 Singh to Brigadier Douglas. But before Douglas could 
 make much way the rebel chief had reached the village of 
 Naghai, where, in a strong position, he awaited his pursuer. 
 Douglas attacked him there on the 17th, but though he 
 forced the position, it was only to find himself baffled. 
 Kunwar Singh had defended it long enough to secure two 
 lines of retreat to his troops. By these his divided army 
 fell back, misleading the pursuers, and reuniting when the 
 
Kunwar Singh in Western Bihdi\ 379 
 
 pursuit ceased. On the 20th, however, Douglas succeeded 
 in catching the rebels whilst halted at Sikandarpur, almost, 
 indeed, in surprising them. But again they disappeared 
 by several paths, to reunite again at some fixed spot. Not 
 only did they so reunite, but, succeeding in putting on a 
 false scent the officer who had been charged to pounce 
 upon them should they attempt to cross the Ganges, they 
 actually crossed that river, and reached Jagdispur un- 
 molested. There Kunwar Singh received a large addi- 
 tion to his force. His first overt act was to completely 
 defeat, with considerable loss, a party of troops led 
 against him by Captain Le Grand of the 35th Foot (April 
 23). Again did Western Bihar seem at the mercy of the 
 rebels. Expresses were sent across the river urging 
 Douglas to come to the rescue. Douglas at once crossed 
 into Shahabad, but, before he could act, the veteran chief, 
 who had been driven by his wrongs into rebellion, and 
 who had more than repaid the British for the insults he 
 deemed they had showered upon him, was no more. 
 Kunwar Singh died three days after he had defeated 
 Le Grand. 
 
 From that date till the pacification at the close of the 
 year the contest in Western Bihar assumed all the char- 
 acter of a guerilla warfare. The rebels were surrounded, 
 they were beaten, they were pursued, only again to re- 
 appear. From the end of April to the end of November 
 they kept the district in continuous turmoil. To the 
 genius of the present Sir Henry Havelock-Allan, then 
 Captain Havelock, it was due finally that they were ex- 
 pelled. That officer devised a system of mounted infantry 
 who should give them no rest. In three actions, fought 
 on the 19th, 20th, and 21st of October, he killed 500 of 
 them, and drove 4400 across the Kaimur hills. In those 
 hills, on the 24th of November, Douglas surprised these, 
 
380 Pacification of Western Bihar. 
 
 killed many of them, and took all their arms and ammu- 
 nition. Before the close of the year he could boast 
 that the districts he had been sent to pacify had been 
 completely cleared. But it had taken a long time, and 
 had cost many lives. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 WESTERN AND CENTRAL INDIA. 
 
 Amongst the few matters on which the British had reason 
 to congratulate themselves when the Mutiny broke out 
 there stood out prominently the fact that the administra- 
 tion of the Western Presidency was in the hands of a man so 
 capable, so brave, so resolute, and so unselfish as was Lord 
 Elphinstone. From the very hour the news of the rising 
 of the loth of May, at Mirath, reached him he displayed 
 a power equal to every emergency. He arranged to 
 despatch to Calcutta the 64th and 78th regiments, then 
 on their way from Persia ; he telegraphed to Mr Frere, 
 Commissioner of Sind, to send the ist Bombay Fusiliers 
 from Karachi to the Panjab ; he urged General Ash- 
 burnham to proceed to Calcutta to place at the disposal 
 of Lord Canning the troops proceeding to China ; he 
 chartered steamers, he wrote for troops to Mauritius 
 and to the Cape, he entrusted the care of Bombay to the 
 wise supervision of Mr Forjett, and he formed a moveable 
 column with the object of saving the line of the Narbada 
 and of relieving Central India. 
 
 In his own Presidency Lord Elphinstone had need for 
 the exercise of the greatest prudence combined with the 
 greatest decision. The nobles and landowners of the districts 
 known as the Southern Maratha country, comprising the 
 territories of Belgdon, Jamkhandi, Kolapur, Miraj, Mudhal, 
 Dhdrwdr, Sangli, and Satdrah had been alienated by the 
 
382 The SoiUhern Mardthd Country, 
 
 action of the Inam Commission — a commission instituted 
 to search out titles to property obtained during the 
 decadence of the Mughal Empire. In these districts 
 Lord Elphinstone was represented by a very able member 
 of the Civil Service, Mr George Berkeley Seton-Karr, 
 a gentleman whose sympathies were greatly with the 
 class who had suffered from the Imperial legislation, and 
 whose influence over them enabled him to repress for a 
 time their excited feelings. His task was a difficult one, 
 for treason was stalking abroad, and the sipahis of the 
 regiments in the Maratha country, mostly Oudh men, 
 were displaying symptoms akin to those which had been 
 so largely manifested in the Bengal Presidency. But, con- 
 sidering the means at his disposal, he did wonders. In 
 June he arrested an emissary from the rebels in the North- 
 western Provinces. Having, in July, obtained from the 
 Governor enlarged powers, he prevented an outbreak in 
 Belgaon, and despatched from that station the two com- 
 panies of the 29th N. I., whose presence there might have 
 been fatal. Finding, then, that the conspiracy had its 
 ramifications all over the province, he gradually disarmed 
 the districts under his charge, and succeeded, amid a 
 thousand difficulties, in maintaining law and order. But, 
 even so late as April 1858, he recognised that the fire was 
 still smouldering, and was forced to apply for increased 
 powers. Instead of granting to the official who had con- 
 ducted the affairs of a difficult province with marked 
 success the powers he asked for, the Bombay Government, 
 whilst maintaining him in his civil duties as administrator, 
 relieved him of his political functions, and bestowed these 
 upon a gentleman who had been a member of the detested 
 Inam Commission, Mr Charles Manson. Almost immedi- 
 ately followed the rebellion of the Chief of Nargund, the 
 murder of Manson, the despatch to the districts of troops. 
 
Mr Forjett in Bombay. 383 
 
 under Colonel George Malcolm and Brigadier Le-Grand 
 Jacob, and finally the suppression of the rebellion in the 
 August following. 
 
 In Bombay itself the danger had been no slight one. 
 Fortunately the arrangements for the maintenance of in- 
 ternal order had been entrusted to the competent hands 
 of Mr Charles Forjett, Superintendent of Police. That 
 most able and energetic officer detected the conspiring of 
 the sipahis stationed there ; brought it home to some of the 
 sipahi officers, theretofore incredulous, that his suspicions 
 had been well founded ; prevented by his daring courage, 
 an outbreak when it was on the point of explosion, and 
 literally saved the island. That this is no exaggerated 
 statement is proved by the terms of address made to 
 Mr Forjett by the native mercantile community of 
 Bombay when, on his retirement, they presented him 
 with a testimonial. ' They presented it,' they wrote, ' in 
 token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic 
 powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive 
 forces of native society that they seemed to have be- 
 come permanently subdued.' Lord Elphinstone likewise 
 recorded a minute expressive of his deep sense of the 
 services rendered by this able, energetic, and honest 
 servant of the Government. 
 
 I have stated that among the earlier acts of Lord 
 Elphinstone was the despatch in the direction of Central 
 India, of a column composed of the troops then available. 
 This column marched from Puna on the 8th of June, 
 under the command of Major-General Woodburn, whose 
 orders were to proceed to Mau. Woodburn reached 
 Aurangabad the 23d of June, disarmed there a cavalry 
 regiment of the Haidarabad contingent which had 
 mutinied, but lost much precious time by halting to try 
 the prisoners he had taken. Fortunately sickness com- 
 
384 Sir HitgJi Rose arrives at Indur. 
 
 pelled him to resign his command. His successor, 
 Colonel C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, a very capable 
 officer, quitted Aurangabad the 12th of July, and reached 
 Asirgarh the 22d. There Stuart was met by Colonel 
 Durand, who had hurried westward to meet his column. 
 From Asirgarh Stuart marched to Mau,and then proceeded 
 to recover Gujri, to protect Mandlesar, to bombard and 
 capture the fort of Dhar, to disperse the rebels who had 
 advanced from Nimach, to crush rebellion in Malwa, and 
 to re-enter Indur in triumph (14th December). On the 
 17th Sir Hugh Rose arrived to take the command of 
 the force which was to reconquer Central India. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose was eminently qualified for the task 
 committed to him. He was a diplomat as well as a 
 soldier ; and in Syria, at Constantinople, and in the 
 Crimea he had displayed a firmness, an energy, a resolu- 
 tion which marked him as a man who required only the 
 opportunity to distinguish himself. He found himself 
 now in command of two brigades. The first, composed 
 of a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, a troop of the 
 3d Bombay Cavalry (native), two cavalry regiments of 
 the Haidarabad contingent, two companies of the 86th 
 Foot — ^joined a little later by the remaining companies, — 
 the 25th Bombay N. I., an infantry regiment of the 
 Haidarabad contingent, three light field-batteries, and 
 some sappers, was commanded by Brigadier Stuart. The 
 second, consisting of the headquarters of the 14th Light 
 Dragoons, the headquarters of the 3d Bombay Cavalry, a 
 regiment of cavalry of the Haidarabad contingent, the 3d 
 Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay N. L, an infantry 
 regiment of the Haidarabad contingent, a proportion of 
 field-artillery, and a siege-train, was commanded by Briga- 
 dier Steuart of the 14th Light Dragoons. Troops from 
 Bhopdl, to the number of 800, formed also part of the force. 
 
Conqiiering March of Sir Hugh Rose. 385 
 
 Sir Hugh marched with the second brigade from Sihor, 
 on the i6th of January, for Rahatgarh ; the first, which 
 set out from Mau on the loth, marching in a parallel line 
 to it in the direction of Gunah. Sir Hugh invested 
 Rahatgarh on the 24th, took possession of the town on 
 the 26th, defeated the rebel Raja of Banpur, who had 
 advanced to relieve the fortress on the 27th, and found 
 the place evacuated on the morning of the 28th. Having 
 discovered, two days later, that the same rebel Rdja was 
 posted, with his forces, near the village of Barodia, fifteen 
 miles distant, he marched against and completely defeated 
 him. He then pushed on Sagar, which had been held, 
 isolated in the heart of a rebel country, mainly through 
 the loyalty of the 31st Regiment N. I., faithful amid the 
 faithless, for more than six months ; reached it on the 3d 
 of February ; marched on the 9th, after pacifying the sur- 
 rounding country, against the strong fortress of Garhakotd, 
 twenty-five miles distant, compelled the rebels to evacuate 
 it, pursued, and cut them up. Waiting there until he 
 should hear that a column which, under the orders of 
 Brigadier Whitlock, should have quitted Jabalpur, and 
 gathering in meanwhile supplies for his campaign, he 
 marched, on the 26th of February, for Jhansi. On his 
 way he inflicted a very severe defeat on the rebels at 
 Madanpur, despite a most determined resistance. This 
 defeat so daunted them that they evacuated, without resist- 
 ance, the formidable pass of Malthon, the forts ol Narhat, 
 Surahi, Maraura, Banpur, and Tal-Bahat, and abandoned 
 the line of the Bina and the Betwa, retaining only, on the 
 left bank of the latter, the fortress of Chanderi. 
 
 Meanwhile, Brigadier Stuart, with the first brigade, 
 had, as we have seen, quitted Mau on the loth of January, 
 and marched upon Gunah, the road to which had been 
 cleared in a most gallant and effective manner by a de- 
 
 2 B 
 
386 Stuart storms Chanddrl. 
 
 tachment of the Haidarabad contingent, directed by- 
 Captains Orr and Keatinge. The fort of Chanderi, men- 
 tioned in the preceding paragraph, lies about seventy miles 
 to the east of Gunah. The town and the fort have alike 
 been famous since the time of Akbar. Against it Stuart 
 marched from Gunah, and, on the 5th of March, reached 
 Khukvvasa, six miles from it, that distance being repre- 
 sented by a dense jungle. This jungle Stuart forced 
 not without resistance — though a resistance neither so 
 fierce nor so effective as the nature of the ground made 
 possible — and encamped to the west of the fort. The 
 next few days he spent in clearing the surrounding 
 country and in placing his guns in position. On the 
 13th his batteries opened fire, and on the i6th effected 
 a breach in the defences. On that date the bulk of 
 the 86th was still twenty-eight miles from him. Stuart 
 sent to the commanding officer an express informing him 
 of the situation. The express reached the 86th just as 
 they had completed a march of thirteen miles. Neverthe- 
 less they at once set out again, and, marching quickly, 
 reached Stuart by ten o'clock on the 1 6th. Early the 
 next morning Stuart stormed the fort of Chanderi, with 
 the loss of twenty-nine men, two of whom were officers. 
 He then pressed on to join Sir Hugh Rose before Jhansi. 
 Sir Hugh had reached Chanchanpur, fourteen miles 
 from Jhansi, when he received a despatch from the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief directing him to march against the fort 
 of Charkhari, some eighty miles from the spot where he 
 stood. The Agent to the Governor-General, Sir Robert 
 Hamilton, who accompanied Sir Hugh, received from 
 Lord Canning a despatch couched in similar terms. To 
 obey would be to commit an act of folly scarcely con- 
 ceivable, for Jhansi was the objective point of the cam- 
 paign — the seat of the rebellion — the stronghold of one of 
 
Sir Hugh Rose and yhdnsi. 387 
 
 the authors of the Mutiny — and Jhansi was within fourteen 
 miles. To leave the objective point, when so close to it, 
 in order to attack a distant fortress against which it was 
 probable Whitlock was then marching, would be an act 
 so devoid of common sense that Sir Robert Hamilton 
 courageously resolved to give Sir Hugh the means by 
 which he could evade obedience to the order, positive 
 though it was. He wrote, accordingly, to Lord Canning, 
 stating that he had taken upon himself the entire respon- 
 sibility of directing, as Governor-General's Agent, Sir 
 Hugh Rose to proceed with his operations against Jhansi. 
 
 Fortified by this order, Sir Hugh set out for and reached 
 Jhansi on the 21st. The strength of the fortress struck 
 him as remarkable. Standing on an elevated rock, built 
 of massive masonry, with guns peeping from every eleva- 
 tion, it commanded the country far and near. The city, 
 from the centre of three sides of which the rock rises, the 
 rock forming the fourth side, sheer and unassailable, was 
 four and a half miles in circumference. It was surrounded 
 by a massive wall, from six to eight feet thick, varying 
 in height from eighteen to thirty feet, having numerous 
 flanking bastions armed as batteries, and was garrisoned 
 by 11,000 men, commanded by a woman who possessed 
 all the instincts, all the courage, all the resolution of a 
 warrior of the type so well known in consular Rome. 
 
 Satisfied by a reconnaissance that it would be neces- 
 sary to take the city before thinking of the fortress, Sir 
 Hugh, joined the same night and on the 24th by his first 
 brigade, invested it on the night of the 22d. For the 
 seventeen days which followed the defensive works rained 
 without intermission shot and shell on the besiemnsr force. 
 It was evident that the Rani had infused some of her lofty 
 spirit into her compatriots. Women and children were seen 
 assisting in the repair of the havoc made in the defences 
 
388 Tdntid Topi marches to relieve yiidnsi. 
 
 by the fire of the besiegers, and in carrying food and water 
 to the soldiers on duty. It seemed a contest between the 
 two races, under conditions unusually favourable to the 
 besieged. 
 
 By the 29th a breach in the outer wall had been 
 effected, though it was barely practicable. On the even- 
 ing of the 31st information reached wSir Hugh that an army 
 was advancing from the north, led by Tantia Topi, to the 
 relief of the fortress. 
 
 Since his defeat by Sir Colin Campbell at Kanhpur, 
 in the preceding December, Tantia Topi had fallen back 
 on Kalpi, had issued thence some time in February, with 
 900 followers, to besiege Charkhari, had captured it, and, 
 his force increased by the junction of five or six regi- 
 ments of the Gwaliar contingent and some local levies to 
 22,000 men and twenty-eight guns, was now responding 
 to a request sent him by the Rani of Jhansi to march to 
 her relief 
 
 The situation in which the advance of Tantia placed 
 Sir Hugh Rose, critical as it was, was a situation with 
 which that bold and resolute leader was peculiarly qualified 
 to grapple. He met it with the hand of a master. Recog- 
 nising that to interrupt the siege operations would give the 
 rebels a confidence sufficient to impel them to resolutions 
 more perilous to himself than any which boldness would 
 be likely to cause, he resolved still to press the siege, 
 whilst, with the troops not on actual duty, amounting to 
 1500 men, of whom only one-third were Europeans, he 
 would march to intercept Tantia Topi. This plan he car- 
 ried out. At four o'clock the following morning (April i) 
 Tantia advanced towards the point where the 1500 men of 
 Sir Hugh's force lay ready for action. When the rebels 
 came within striking distance Sir Hugh opened fire, then 
 simultaneously attacking their right and left, doubled both 
 
Sir Hugh defeats Tdntid. 389 
 
 up on the centre, and then sent his infantry to charge it 
 These three blows, delivered with the most perfect pre- 
 cision, so surprised the rebels that their first line broke 
 and fled. There still remained the second line, covered by 
 a belt of jungle, and led by Tantid in person. Recognising 
 his danger, and anxious to save his second line and guns 
 J. antia fired the jungle and retreated. The men with him 
 were the men of the Gwdlidr contingent, and these, drilled 
 m olden days by British officers, were true to the teaching 
 they had received. So orderly and well-conducted was 
 the.r retreat that they succeeded in carrying their g,ms 
 and some of the fugitives of the first line across the Betwa. 
 But the Bnt.sh cavalry and horse-artillery, splendidly 
 ed were not to be baffled. Dashing at a gallop through 
 
 nor d.d they cease until they had captured every one o 
 his twenty-eight guns. ^ 
 
 The garrison at Jhansi' was proportionately depressed 
 by the fai ure of Tdntia Topi' to relieve them, a' d sfr 
 
 Storm Ttt 'r '''^ ^'^^"'^^^^ °^ ^"^^'^ depression to 
 storm at the earliest possible date. This was the second 
 
 day after his victory over Tantid. At three o'clock in the 
 
 morning of the 3d of April the stormers marched on the 
 
 positions assigned to them. The left attack, divided into 
 
 two CO umns, the right led by Colonel Lowth, the ri^h" 
 
 by Major Stuart, both of the 86th, and having i^ its ranks 
 
 Brockman, Darby, and Jerome of the same regiment sue 
 
 ceeded, after a desperate fight, in storming the wal and 
 
 seizing the positions assigned to them. The right attack 
 
 the left column of which was led by Colonel LiddeTthe' 
 
 left by Captain Robinson, both of the 2d European had 
 
 tremendous difficulties to overcome. The rampart t^ 
 
 had to escalade was very high, and their scaling ladders 
 
 were too short. Thanks, however, to the splendid gallantry 
 
390 y hdnsi is stormed. 
 
 of three officers of the engineers, Dick, Meiklejohn, and 
 Bonus, and of Fox of the Madras Sappers, they succeeded 
 in gaining a footing there. Just then Brockman, from the 
 left attack, made a timely charge on the flank and rear of 
 the defenders. Their persistence immediately diminished, 
 and the right attack made good its hold. The stormers 
 now marched on the palace, gained it after a stubborn 
 resistance, and drove the rebels helter-skelter from the 
 town. There they were set upon by the 24th Bombay 
 N. I. and dispersed. But desultory fighting continued all 
 night. The Rani took advantage of the darkness and dis- 
 order to ride with a small following for Kalpi, where she 
 arrived safely. Early the next morning Sir Hugh occupied 
 Jhansi. Its capture had cost him 343 killed and wounded, 
 of whom thirty-six were officers. The rebels' loss he put 
 down roughly at 5000. 
 
 Leaving a small but sufficient garrison in Jhansi, Sir 
 Hugh marched on the 25th of April for Kalpi, a place 
 whence throughout the Mutiny the rebels had sallied to 
 harass and destroy. On the 5th of May he stormed Kunch, 
 defeating the rebels in its vicinity, but, owing to the heat 
 of the day, he could not prevent their seizing the Kalpi 
 road and marching along it. He sent, however, his 
 cavalry in pursuit, and these, gallantly led by Prettijohn 
 of the 14th Light Dragoons, pursued the enemy for miles. 
 Pushing on, he established himself at Gulauli, near Kalpi, 
 on the 15th. 
 
 Sir Hugh had been strengthened, on the 5th, by the 
 addition of the 71st Highlanders, and at Gulauli he came 
 in touch with Colonel G. V. Maxwell, commanding a 
 column composed of the 88th, the Camel Corps, and some 
 Sikhs, on the left bank of the Jamnah. The rebels, too, 
 had been considerably strengthened, and their position at 
 Kalpf being very formidable, intersected by labyrinths of 
 
Sir Hvgh defeats the Rebels at Kalpi, 39 1 
 
 ravines, impossible for artillery and cavalry, their con- 
 fidence had returned. The natural advantages of their 
 position they had improved by throwing up intrenchments 
 at all the salient points. 
 
 Sir Hugh spent the five days following his arrival at 
 Gulauli in establishing his batteries, in effecting a junction 
 with Maxwell, and in constant skirmishes with the rebels. 
 On the 2 1st his batteries opened fire, and on the 22d he 
 delivered his attack. The battle that ensued was one of 
 the fiercest and most hotly contested of that terrible war. 
 At one phase of it the rebels, strongest on the decisive 
 point, gained an actual advantage. The thin red line 
 began to waver. The rebels, animated by a confidence 
 they had never felt before, pressed on with loud yells, the 
 British falling back towards the field-guns and the mortar 
 battery. Then Brigadier C. S. Stuart, dismounting, 
 placed himself by the guns, and bade the gunners defend 
 them with their lives. Just at the moment, when the 
 British were well-nigh exhausted, 150 men of the Camel 
 Corps came up and turned the tide. At the moment the 
 rebels had advanced within twenty yards of the battery 
 and of the outpost tents, the latter full of men struck down 
 by the sun. Another quarter of an hour and there would 
 have been a massacre. But the timely arrival of the 
 Camel Corps saved the day, converted defeat into victory, 
 and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to close with glory the first 
 part of his dashing Central Indian campaign. 
 
 For the defeat he inflicted on the rebels was decisive. 
 They dispersed in all directions, broken and dispirited. 
 In five months Sir Hugh had, under many difficulties, 
 traversed Central India, crossed deep rivers, stormed 
 strong fortresses, defeated the rebels in the field, and 
 re-established British authority in an important region 
 of India. It was impossible to have done this better 
 
392 
 
 W hillock and Kirwi. 
 
 than Sir Hugh Rose did it. As a campaign his was 
 faultless. 
 
 Meanwhile, the column under Whitlock had moved, on 
 the 17th of February, from Jabalpur towards Bundelkhand. 
 The movements of this officer were as slow as those of Sir 
 Hugh had been rapid. On the 19th of April, however, he 
 appeared before Bandah, and defeated the troops which 
 the Nuwdb of that place had collected. From Bandah he 
 intended to march to Kalpi, every step in the road hav- 
 ing been cleared for him by Sir Hugh. But on his way 
 thither he received instructions to turn from his course 
 and march against Kirwi, the Rao of which, an irre- 
 sponsible minor, a ward of the British, was charged with 
 having rebelled. The little Rao, who had no idea of 
 rebellion, displayed his confidence in his overlord by 
 riding out to Whitlock's camp to welcome him. Whitlock 
 then occupied Kirwi without the semblance of opposition, 
 and declared all the enormous treasures it contained to be 
 spoils of the victors. In this contention he was supported 
 by the Government of India, and the spoil was subse- 
 quently divided. But to the ordinary reader the decision 
 will always remain a puzzle. 
 
 Sir Hugh Rose, after his five months' campaign, had 
 the right to hope that he might be allowed some rest, and 
 he had applied for leave on medical certificate, accompany- 
 ing his application with the formal resignation of his 
 command. But, on the ist of June, there occurred, dose 
 to Gwaliar, an event which upset all his calculations. The 
 news of it reached him on the 4th. It was to the effect 
 that Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi, re-collecting 
 their scattered followers, had marched on Morar ; that 
 Sindhia, marching to meet him at the head of 6000 
 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and his own bodyguard, 600 
 strong, had had the mortification to be deserted by his 
 
Sir Htigh marches to Gzvdlidr. 393 
 
 troops, and had fled, without drawing rein, to Agra. Sir 
 Hugh had previously despatched a party, under Colonel 
 Robertson, on the track of the rebels he had defeated at 
 Kalpi7 On the ist that officer had notified to him that 
 Tantia and his followers had taken the road to Gwaliar. 
 Sir Hugh had at once sent forward the remainder of 
 Brigadier Stuart's brigade. On the 5th he started himself, 
 with a small force, to overtake Stuart. 
 
 Sir Hugh overtook Stuart at Indurki on the 12th, and, 
 pushing on, reached Bahadurpur, five miles to the east of 
 Morar, on the i6th. There he was joined by General 
 Robert Napier and by a portion of the Haidarabad con- 
 tingent. The following morning he attacked and com- 
 pletely defeated the rebels posted at Morar. General 
 Smith's brigade of the Rajputana field force, which had 
 been ordered to proceed to Gwaliar, attacked them the 
 following m.orning on the hilly ground between Kotah-ki- 
 sarai and Gwaliar, and after a severe contest forced them 
 to retreat. In this action the famous Rani of Jhansi was 
 killed, fighting boldly to the last. The rebels, however, 
 though beaten, were still numerous, and the position 
 taken up by Smith for the night left him exposed to the 
 attack of their united force. Sir Hugh then resolved to 
 finish with them. Accordingly, leaving Napier, with one 
 column, at Morar, Sir Hugh, on the i8th, opened com- 
 munications with Smith, and cutting off the rebels from 
 Gwaliar, sent, on the 19th, Stuart to attack their left, 
 whilst Raines should amuse them on the right. The 
 action which followed was completely successful. In it 
 
 1 During this expedition Major Gall, of the 14th Light Dragoons, an 
 officer whose leading had been conspicuous throughout the campaign, was 
 despatched with Brockman and two companies of the 86th to seize the guns 
 in the palace and fort of Jalaun, This service Major Gall performed with 
 his usual skill and daring. 
 
394 Napier s Victory at yaurd-Alipur. 
 
 Brockman of the 86th again greatly distinguished himself. 
 One consequence of it was the capture of the city of 
 Gwaliar the same evening. The fort still defied the 
 victors ; but by an extraordinary act of daring on the 
 part of two British officers, Rose and Waller, with a 
 small following, this apparently impregnable place fell 
 into their hands in the grey dawn of the 20th. 
 
 When, on the 19th, Sir Hugh had recognised that 
 his attack on the rebels was succeeding, he had sent a 
 despatch to Napier to pursue and follow them up as far 
 and as closely as was possible. Napier set out at nine 
 o'clock on the morning of the 20th, and the following 
 morning came up with the enemy, about 12,000 strong, 
 posted at the village of Jaurd-Alipur. He at once attacked 
 and defeated them, taking from them twenty-five guns 
 and all their ammunition, tents, carts, and baggage. This 
 victory was, for the time, their death-blow. Apparently 
 it finished the campaign. 
 
 His work accomplished by the restoration of Sindhia, 
 Sir Hugh Rose resigned his command, and proceeded, 
 covered with laurels, to Bombay, to assume there the 
 office of Commander-in-Chief of that Presidency. He 
 was replaced in command of the Central India force by 
 Robert Napier. This officer was soon to find that the 
 security which had seemingly followed the victory of 
 Jaura-Alipur was but temporary. 
 
 Tantia Topi, escaping from that field, had fled in a 
 north-westerly direction. Finding, however, that his escape 
 would be difficult, he had turned and made for Jaipur. 
 There were ranged round the area in which he would be 
 likely to move Napier's force at, and in the vicinity of, 
 Gwaliar itself, a smaller force at Jhansi, another at Sipri, 
 a fourth at Gunah, a fifth at Nasirabad, and a sixth at 
 Bhartpur. There were other forces round the outer ring 
 
Pursttit of Tdntici Topi. 395 
 
 of this girdle. It seemed, therefore, that the chances of 
 escape for Tantia were small indeed. 
 
 Yet so extraordinary was the vitality of this remark- 
 able man that for more than nine months he kept all the 
 troops I have mentioned, and many others, in a state of 
 perpetual movement against him. On the 28th of June 
 1858 he and his small following were baffled by Brigadier 
 Roberts in his attempt to gain Jaipur. Two days later 
 Holmes foiled him in an attempted raid on Tonk ; on the 
 7th of August Roberts caught and defeated him near 
 Sanganir. This action was a type of all the actions fought 
 by Tantia. It was his wont to occupy a strong position 
 covered by skirmishers. These skirmishers held the 
 position long enough to ensure the retreat of the main 
 body. On this occasion Tantia escaped ; fought Roberts 
 again, on the 14th, on the Banas, and again escaped. As 
 he fled towards the Chambal the pursuit was taken up by 
 Parkes, who, however, was misled by false information. 
 Tantia then moved on Jhalra-Patan, of which he took 
 possession. Levying there a heavy contribution, he made 
 as though he would march on Indur, but finding two 
 British columns at Nalkerah, he moved on Rajgarh. 
 Thence, on the approach of Michel, who had succeeded 
 Roberts, he fled into the jungles, was followed, caught, 
 and defeated by Michel, again fled, and for a moment dis- 
 appeared from view. Napier, meanwhile, had had troubles 
 of his own to contend with. Man Singh, Raja of Nar- 
 war, had rebelled against Sindhia, and Napier had de- 
 spatched Smith to coerce him. Smith not being strong 
 enough, Napier had followed, had compelled the evacua- 
 tion of Narwar, and had despatched Robertson in pursuit 
 of the rebels. Robertson had caught and defeated a 
 division of them, commanded by Ajit Singh, on the 
 Parbati river (September 4), and had then returned to 
 
39^ Pursuit of Tdntid Topi. 
 
 Gunah. Some of the fugitives succeeded in joining 
 Tantia. 
 
 That chief, after a rest of eight days at Sironj, to 
 which place he had made his way through the jungles, 
 had marched against Isagarh, taken thence the supplies 
 he wanted, and had attempted the strong place of 
 Chanderi. The Maratha chief who held the fortress 
 for Sindhia was deaf alike to his promises and his threats, 
 so Tantia made for Migrauli. There he was encountered 
 by Michel, completely defeated, and lost his guns. 
 Then he fled to join Rao Sahib, nephew of Nand Sahib, 
 at Lalitpur. The two chiefs met only to separate. Then 
 Rao Sahib was caught and beaten by Michel. The two 
 chiefs met once again and resolved to cross the Narbada. 
 They conducted this operation with great skill, and though 
 Tantia's right wing was annihilated by Michel at Kurai, 
 he escaped across the river, and caused an alarm which 
 spread even to Bombay. There, pursued by a column 
 under Sutherland, he crossed and recrossed the river, and 
 was caught and attacked at Kargun, only to escape with 
 the loss of the guns, with which he had been mysteriously 
 re-supplied. He then took the bold step of marching on 
 Barodah, arrived within fifty miles of it, when finding the 
 pursuit too hot, he turned, recrossed the Narbada, and 
 reached Chota Udaipur. There Parkes caught him and 
 beat him. Tantia then fled to the Banswara jungles. 
 There his position was desperate, for the cordon around 
 him was complete. But, bold as he was able, he broke 
 out to march on Udaipur. Finding Rocke with a force in 
 the way, he returned to the jungles ; suddenly emerging 
 thence, he baffled Rocke, and took his way toward Man- 
 desar. Caught at Zirapur, he fled to Barod ; was pursued 
 thither by Somerset there and beaten ; then, when his for- 
 tunes were desperate, was met by the rebel chief Man 
 
Tdntid Topi is betrayed and hanged. 397 
 
 Singh, and another famous rebel, Prince Firsuzhah, re- 
 cently completely defeated by Napier Ranod. 
 
 Man Singh did not stay with Tantia, and the case of 
 the latter, completely surrounded, again seemed hopeless. 
 Attempting to creep out in a north-westerly direction, 
 he was surprised by Showers at Dewasa, and again 
 (January 21) by Holmes at Sikar. The surprise was 
 so complete that the rebel force broke up, and Tantia, 
 'tired of running away,' took refuge with Man Singh in 
 the Paron jungles. There an attempt was made by the 
 British authorities to persuade Man Singh to make his sub- 
 mission. Man Singh not only submitted, but was induced 
 by hopes of personal advantage to betray the hiding-place 
 of his old comrade. At midnight, on the 7th of April, 
 Tantia was surprised there as he slept, taken into Sipri, 
 brought to a court-martial, charged with having waged war 
 against the British Government, condemned, and sentenced 
 to be hanged. The sentence was carried out on the i8th 
 of April. 
 
 Tantia Topi was a marvellous guerilla warrior. In 
 pursuit of him. Brigadier Parke had marched, consecu- 
 tively, 240 miles in nine days ; Brigadier Somerset, 230 in 
 nine days, and, again, seventy miles in forty-eight hours ; 
 Colonel Holmes, through a sandy desert, fifty-four miles 
 in little over twenty-four hours ; Brigadier Honner, 
 145 miles in four days. Yet he slipped through them 
 all — through enemies watching every issue of the jungles 
 in which he lay concealed, only to fall at last through the 
 treachery of a trusted friend. His capture, and the sur- 
 render of Man Singh, finished the war in Central India. 
 Thenceforth his name only survived. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 THE LAST EMBERS OF THE REVOLT. 
 
 In Haidarabad, throughout the Mutiny, the loyalty of 
 the Nizam and of his able minister, Salar Jung, had been 
 the surest guarantees of peace. In the early days of July 
 1857 the turbulence of the foreign troops in the service 
 of the Nizam had caused an attack upon the Residency. 
 But the able representative of British- authority in that 
 territory, Major Cuthbert Davidson, warned by Salar Jung, 
 had time to make preparations which terminated not only 
 in the discomfiture of the rebels, but in the capture and 
 punishment of the leaders. Of the necessity of disarming 
 one of the cavalry regiments at Aurangabad I have spoken 
 in its place. But the aberration of the mutineers was but 
 temporary. The men returned to their duty, and rendered, 
 with their comrades in the contingent of the three arms, 
 excellent service to the State. A little later, the Raja of 
 Shorapur, a Hindu tributary of the Nizam, broke out into 
 treacherous revolt. But Major Davidson, acting in concert 
 with Lord Elphinstone, called up from the Southern 
 Maratha country the column serving under Colonel 
 Malcolm, whilst the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, 
 despatched to the spot a force under Major Hughes. The 
 troops of the Haidarabad contingent, under Captain 
 Wyndham, proceeded likewise to aid in the coercion of 
 the deluded prince. The latter, after a vain attempt to 
 lure Wyndham to his destruction, surrendered himself as 
 
Sam Browne in Rohilkhand. 398 
 
 a prisoner. There can be little doubt but that his mind 
 was affected, for he committed suicide when it was 
 announced to him that, after four years of detention, he 
 would be allowed to resume his position.^ 
 
 Meanwhile, Sir Hope Grant, under orders from Sir 
 Colin Campbell, had proceeded in carrying out his plan 
 for the pacification of Oudh. I last quitted him near 
 Lakhnao, on the i6th of May. From that date to the 
 end of August he continued his operations, beating the 
 rebels in every encounter, and finally halting at Siiltanpur. 
 There he thought it wise to suspend operations till the 
 close of the rainy season. He resumed them in the middle 
 of October. 
 
 Meanwhile, there had been some fighting in Rohil- 
 khand. At Philibhit it became known that the rebels 
 were concentrated in force at Nuriah. Thence they were 
 dislodged by a force commanded by Captain Sam Browne, 
 under circumstances of great gallantry, which gained for 
 that officer the coveted cross. In the turbulent district of 
 Azamgarh, too, the rebels had again raised their heads. 
 They were, however, cleared from the district by a force 
 under Brigadier Berkeley, who, pushing his success, re- 
 covered Eastern Oudh as far as Sultanpur, where he 
 touched Hope Grant's force. Rowcroft, meanwhile, with 
 his own troops and the sailors of the Pearl brigade, had 
 defeated the rebels at Amorha and Harha ; Eveleigh had 
 punished them between Husenganj and Mohan ; Dawson 
 had captured Sandela. The British forces rested during 
 two months of the rainy season, but that period was 
 employed by sending Sikhs in steamers up the Ganges 
 to clear the banks of that river. 
 
 In October operations were resumed. The rebels 
 
 ^ Oi this episode Colonel Meadows Taylor has written a most interesting 
 account : Stoiy of My Life. 
 
zj oo The Pacification of Oudh. 
 
 began by attacking Sandal a. They were held in check 
 by Dawson until, first, Major Maynard, then Brigadier 
 Barker, arrived and inflicted upon them a crushing defeat. 
 In the same month Eveleigh defeated them at Mianganj, 
 and Seaton near Shahjahanpur, whilst the Raja of Powain 
 repulsed an attack made upon his fortified town. Sir 
 Colin Campbell, now become Lord Clyde, then resolved 
 to clear the entire province of rebels by acting by columns 
 in all its districts simultaneously. Whilst one column, 
 drawn from Rohilkhand, should clear the north-west of 
 Oudh, and, sweeping all before it, should establish itself 
 at Sitapur, four columns should clear the Baiswara 
 country, another column should guard the Duab, another 
 the Kanhpur road, whilst smaller columns, radiating from 
 Lakhnao, Nuwabganj, Daryabad, and Faizabad should 
 clear the districts around them. 
 
 This plan was acted upon with complete success. On 
 the 3d of November, Wetherall, marching to join Hope 
 Grant, stormed Rampur Kasia. Hope Grant, joining him 
 there, moved against Amethi on one side, whilst Lord 
 Clyde attacked it on another. The place surrendered on 
 the 8th. The strong fort of Shankarpur was evacuated by 
 Beni Madhu, a noted rebel, on the night of the loth, and 
 occupied the next day. Eveleigh, following Beni Madhu, 
 caught him two days later at Dundia Khera, and defeated 
 him, taking three of his guns. On the 24th that rebel 
 was again encountered, this time by Lord Clyde, and 
 completely defeated. In the meanwhile the strong places 
 in Eastern Oudh had fallen in succession, and by the end 
 of November that part of the province was completely 
 subdued. Nor had the columns sweeping the north- 
 western districts been less successful. Troup had cleared 
 the ground as far as Sitapur ; Gordon, Carmichael, and 
 Horsford had done the same in the districts south of the 
 
The Closivg Act of ike Di-ama. 40, 
 
 Gogra, whilst Hope Grant, catching the rebels beaten by 
 Rowcroft at Tuls.pur, had swept them into Nipal. The^ 
 Lord Clyde moving on Sikr6ra, and in touch with Gran" 
 on the one s.de and Rowcroft covering Gordkhpur on the 
 
 t^^t:TiL rrr' '''"' ^^■^■'^ berore'hi. "rl^ 
 Mrd and thfr' '.f'"' ''" country between Nan- 
 
 the Ni oil ro . ^''' " '""■■^'''■"^ °" B^nk.', close to 
 the Nipal frontier, surprised and defeated the rebels and 
 swept the survivors into Nipil. Jang Bahddur loya to 
 the core, informed the rebels who crossed that th y must 
 not look to him for protection. He even permitted BrTtish 
 troops to come over and disarm any considerable body of 
 rebels who might have sought refuge there 
 
 Lord Clyde, rightly regarding the pacification of Oudh 
 as completed, quitted the province, leaving it to Hope 
 Gran to carry out such operations as might be necessary 
 
 mtt''Sor srer'crtrer itV"- ~^ 
 
 fheT fi^ P" '"^^^^cre, Grant himself pursued 
 
 the terrified remnant across the hills into Nipal dTs od' 
 ment alone was necessary, for they had neithe afms "or" 
 money, nor food. Contenting himself with locating t oops 
 to prevent their return, Grant reported (May 8,9 Zl 
 Oudh was at ast at oearp Tho„i ^ .>. 'oiW tnat 
 
 pursued hv T n.H r '° *'"' ^^"erous policy 
 
 pursued by Lord Canning, in confiscating that he mic^ht 
 
 TuTJarTofV-?; ""^' '"''' ""'' ^^- -- -S 
 a Duiwark of British supremacy. 
 
 The pacification of Oudh was the closing act of the 
 drama the curtain of which had been raised in [g,, 
 n the interval Sir John Lawrence had, wiU ch rfc 
 tenstic energy, put down an attempted rising in the Gu. 
 haira district, turbulent even in the time of Akbar hf 
 brother. George Lawrence, had dispersed Lfe^ ma 
 
402 Oudh — the Beginninoandthe End of the Revolt. 
 
 contents in Rajputana ; the rebels had been crushed, 
 though after a tedious and desultory warfare, in the Chutid 
 Nagpur districts ; whilst Western Bihar had, as related, 
 been pacified by the dispersion of the last adherents of the 
 family of Kunwar Singh. When Sir Hope Grant finally 
 cleared Oudh of the last remnants of the rebels,^ in May 
 1859, then, and then only, could it be said that the Mutiny 
 had been absolutely stamped out. 
 
 ^ It is believed that amongst these was Nana S^hib, It was always a 
 matter of regret that this man's fate was never certainly known. Many 
 reports regarding him were circulated afterwards : that he had died in Nipal ; 
 later, that he had been seen in Gwdhdr. But the uncertainty regarding his 
 fate has remained to this day. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII I. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 On the 27th of January 1858 the King of Dehlf had been 
 brought to trial in the Privy Council chamber of his 
 palace, charged with making war against the British 
 Government, with abetting rebellion, with proclaiming 
 himself as reigning sovereign of India, with causing, or 
 bemg accessory to, the deaths of forty-nine people of 
 British blood or British descent; and with having subse- 
 quently abetted others in murdering Europeans and 
 others. After a patient trial, extending over forty days 
 the King was declared to be guilty of the main points of 
 the charges, and sentenced to be transported for life. 
 Ultimately he was sent to Pegu, where he ended his days 
 in peace. 
 
 Meanwhile, in England, it had been found necessary 
 as usual, to find a scapegoat for the disasters which had 
 fallen upon India. With a singular agreement of opinion 
 the scapegoat was declared to be the Company which had 
 won for England that splendid appanage. In consequence 
 It was decreed to transfer the administration of India 
 from the Company to the Crown. An Act carrying out 
 this transfer was signed by the Queen on the 2d of 
 August 1858. 
 
 Her Majesty thought it right, as soon as possible 
 after the transfer had been thus effected, to issue to her 
 Indian subjects a proclamation declaratory of the principles 
 
404 The Qiieens Proclmnation. 
 
 under which she intended thenceforth to administer their 
 country. To the native princes of India she announced then, 
 in that proclamation, that all treaties in force with them 
 would be accepted and scrupulously maintained ; that she 
 would respect their rights, their dignity, and their honour 
 as her own ; that she would sanction no encroachments 
 on the rights of any one of them ; that the same obliga- 
 tions of duty which bound her to her other subjects 
 would bird her also to them. To the natives of India 
 generally Her Majesty promised not only complete 
 toleration in matters of religion, but admission to office, 
 without question of religion, to all such persons as might 
 be qualified for the same by their education, ability, and 
 integrity. The Queen declared, further, that she would 
 direct that, in administering the law, due attention should 
 be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of 
 India ; that clemency should be extended to all offenders 
 (in the matter of the Mutiny) save to those who had been 
 or should be convicted of having taken part in the murder 
 of British subjects ; that full consideration should be given 
 to men who had thrown off their allegiance, or who had 
 been moved to action by a too credulous acceptance of the 
 false reports circulated by designing men ; that to all 
 others who would submit before the ist of January 1859 
 unconditional pardon should be granted. 
 
 This proclamation virtually conceded the right the 
 denial of which had so greatly unsettled the minds of 
 native princes, the right of adoption. It was hailed every- 
 where as a binding charter. In the large centres of India 
 natives of every religion and creed, Hindus, Muham- 
 madans, and Parsis, met in numbers to draw up loyal 
 addresses expressive of theirdeep sense of the beneficent 
 feelings which had prompted the proclamation, of their 
 gratitude for its contents, and of their loyalty to the person 
 
T/ie Punishments inflicted during the MtUiny. 405 
 
 of the illustrious lady to whose direct rule they had been 
 transferred. 
 
 Published on the ist of November 1858, this proclama- 
 tion immediately followed the complete collapse of the 
 Mutiny. Practically there remained only the capture of 
 Tantia Topi and the expulsion of the remnant of the rebels 
 from Oudh. How these ends were accomplished I have 
 told in the two chapters immediately preceding. In both 
 these cases the conclusion was foregone. It was but a ques- 
 tion of a brief time. The rebels in Central India and in 
 Oudh, as well as those i^w still remaining in Western Bihar 
 and in Chutia Nagpur, represented the dying embers of a 
 fire which had been extinguished. It now remains for 
 me to sum up in a few words the moral of the Mutiny, 
 the lessons which it taught us, and its warnings. 
 
 But before I proceed to this summing up, I am 
 anxious to say a word or two to disabuse the minds of 
 those who may have been influenced by rumours current 
 at the period as to the nature of the 'retaliation dealt out 
 to the rebels by the British soldiers in the hour of their 
 triumph. I have examined all those rumours — I have 
 searched out the details attending the storming of Dehli, 
 of Lakhnao, and of Jhansi — -and I can emphatically de- 
 clare that, not only was the retaliation not excessive, it 
 did not exceed the bounds necessary to ensure the safety 
 of the conquerors. Unfortunately war is war. It is the 
 meeting in contact of two bodies of men exasperated 
 against each other, alike convinced that victory can only 
 be gained by the destruction of the opponent. Under 
 such circumstances it is impossible to give quarter. The 
 granting of quarter would mean, as was proved over and 
 over and over again, the placing in the hands of an enemy 
 the power to take life treacherously. It was well under- 
 stood, then, by both sides at the storming of the cities I 
 
4o6 The Pzcnishnient not excessive. 
 
 have mentioned, that no quarter would be granted. It 
 was a necessity of war. But beyond the deaths he in- 
 flicted in fair fight, the British soldier perpetrated no un- 
 necessary slaughter. He merited to' the full the character 
 given to his predecessor in the Peninsular War by Sir 
 William Napier. He proved by his conduct that, ' whilst 
 no physical military qualification was wanting, the fount 
 of honour was still full and fresh within him.' 
 
 It has been said that, in certain cases, a new kind of 
 death was invented for convicted rebels, and that the 
 punishment of blowing away from guns was intended to 
 deprive the victim of those rites, the want of which doomed 
 him, according to his view, to eternal perdition. Again, I 
 assert that there is absolutely no foundation for this 
 statement. The punishment itself was no new one in 
 India. It was authorised by courts-martial, the members 
 of which were native officers. Its infliction did not neces- 
 sarily deprive the victim of all hope of happiness in a 
 future life. The fact, moreover, that the Government of 
 India, jealously careful never to interfere with the religious 
 beliefs of the natives, sanctioned it, is quite sufficient to 
 dispel the notion I have mentioned. The blowing away 
 of criminals from guns was a punishment which was re- 
 sorted to only when it was necessary to strike a terror 
 which should act as a deterrent. It was in this sense that 
 Colonel Sherer had recourse to it at Jalpaigiiri ; ^ and it 
 is indisputable that he thus saved thousands of lives, and, 
 possibly, staved off a great catastrophe. 
 
 Whilst on the question of punishments, I am desirous 
 to disprove an assertion so often repeated that it has 
 been accepted as true — that the term ' Clemency Canning ' 
 was invented in Calcutta by the men who opposed the 
 policy of the Government of India. The term ' Clemency 
 
 ^ Page 348. 
 
The Lessons of the MtUiny. 467 
 
 Canning' had its origin in a phrase, 'the Clemency of 
 Canning/ applied by the Times newspaper of October 17, 
 1 857, to a circular issued by the Government of India, dated 
 the 31st July of that year, and intended to restrain, pre- 
 maturely, as the Times considered, the hands of its officers. 
 The phrase was not intended to denounce clemency in the 
 abstract, but the offer of clemency to men who believed 
 they were triumphing, who had still possession of the 
 North-west Provinces, and of Oudh. In that sense, and 
 in no other, was it applied. The argument of those who, 
 alike in India and in England, denounced the circular 
 may be expressed in these words : ' Put down the Mutiny 
 first, that you may exercise clemency afterwards.' 
 
 I proceed now to deal with the two questions I have 
 indicated in a preceding page — ^The lessons which the 
 Mutiny has taught us, and its warnings. 
 
 The gradual conquest of India by a company of 
 merchants inhabiting a small island in the Atlantic has 
 ever been regarded as one of the most marvellous achieve- 
 ments of which history makes mention. The dream of 
 Dupleix was realised by the very islanders who prevented 
 its fulfilment by his countrymen. But great, marvellous 
 even, as was that achievement, it sinks into insignificance 
 when compared with the reconquest, with small means, of 
 that magnificent empire in 1857-8. In 1857 the English 
 garrison in India was surprised. There were not a dozen 
 men in the country who, on the ist of May of that year, 
 believed that a catastrophe was impending which would 
 shake British rule to its foundations. The explosion 
 which took place at Mirath ten days later was followed, 
 within five weeks, by similar explosions all over the 
 North-west Provinces and in Oudh, not only on the part 
 of the sipahis, but likewise on the part of the people. The 
 rebel sipahis were strong in the possession of many 
 
4o8 The Lessons of the Mutiny, 
 
 fortified places, of a numerous artillery, of several arsenals 
 and magazines. In trained soldiers they preponderated 
 over the island garrison in the proportion of at least 
 five to one. They inaugurated their revolt by successes 
 which appealed to the imagination of an impulsive 
 people. At Dehli, at Kanhpur, at Jhansi, in many parts 
 of Oudh, and in the districts around Agra, they proved 
 to them the possibility of expelling the foreign master. 
 Then, too, the majority of the population in those dis- 
 tricts, landowners and cultivators alike, displayed a marked 
 sympathy with the revolted sipahis. For the English, 
 in those first five weeks, the situation was bristling 
 with danger. A false move might have temporarily 
 lost India. In a strictly military sense they were too 
 few in numbers, and too scattered, to attempt an offensive 
 defence. It is to their glory that, disregarding the strictly 
 scientific view, they did attempt it. The men who ad- 
 ministered British India recognised at a glance that a 
 merely passive defence would ruin them. They displayed, 
 then, the truest forecast when they insisted that the re- 
 sources still available in the North-west and in the Panjab 
 should be employed in an offensive movement against 
 Dehli. That offensive movement saved them. Though 
 Dehli offered a resistance spreading over four months, yet 
 the penning within her walls of the main army of the 
 rebels gave to the surprised English the time necessary 
 to improvise resources, to receive reinforcements, to 
 straighten matters in other portions of the empire. 
 
 The secret of the success of the British in the stupen- 
 dous conflict Vv'hich was ushered in by the Mutiny at Mirath 
 and the surprise of Dehli, lay in the fact that they never, 
 even in the darkest hour, despaired. When the news of the 
 massacre of Kanhpur reached Calcutta, early in July, and 
 the chatterins: Bengalis, who would have fainted at the 
 
The ' Race ' the Main Factor ijt Sticcess. 409 
 
 sight of a sword drawn in anger, were discussing which man 
 amongst them was the fittest to be Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer under the King of DehliV there was not an 
 Englishman in that city who did not feel the most 
 absolute confidence that the cruel deed would be avenged. 
 There was not one cry of despair — not one voice to 
 declare that the star of Great Britain was about to set. 
 In the deepest distress there was confidence that the sons 
 of Britain would triumph. The same spirit was apparent 
 in every corner of India where dwelt an English man or 
 an English woman. It lived in the camp before Dehli, 
 it was strong in the Residency of Lakhnao, it prevailed 
 in every isolated station where the few Europeans were 
 in hourly dangers of attack from rebels who gave no 
 quarter. Nowhere did one of them shrink from the 
 seemingly unequal struggle. As occasion demanded, 
 they held out, they persevered, they pressed forward, 
 and, with enormous odds against them, they wore down 
 their enemies, and they won. The spirit which had sus- 
 tained Great Britain in her long contest against Napoleon 
 was a living force in India in 1857-8, and produced 
 similiar results. 
 
 How did they accomplish the impossible ? The 
 answer must spring at once to the lips of those who 
 have witnessed the action of our countrymen in every 
 part of the world. The energy and resolution which 
 gave the Britain which Caesar had conquered to the 
 Anglian race ; which almost immediately brought that 
 Britain to a preponderant position in Europe ; which, on 
 the discovery of a new world, sent forth its sons to 
 conquer and to colonise ; which, in the course of a brief 
 time, gained North America, the islands of the Pacific, 
 and Australasia ; which, entering only as third on the 
 
 ^ I can personally testify to this fact. 
 
4 1 o The ' Race ' the Main Factor in Success. 
 
 field, expelled its European rivals from India ; that 
 energy and that resolution, far from giving evidence of 
 deterioration in 1857, never appeared more conspicuously. 
 It was a question of race. This race of ours has been 
 gifted by Providence with the qualities of manliness, of 
 endurance, of a resolution which never flags. It has 
 been its destiny to conquer and to maintain. It never 
 willingly lets go. Its presence in England is a justifica- 
 tion of its action all over the world. Wherever it has 
 conquered, it has planted principles of order, of justice, 
 of good government. And the Providence which inspired 
 the race to plant these great principles, endowed it with 
 the qualities necessary to maintain them wherever they 
 had been planted. Those principles stood them in good 
 stead in 1857. It was the sense of the justice of England 
 which, in the most terrible crisis of her history in India, 
 brought her the support of the Sikhs, conquered but eight 
 years before ; of the princes and people of Rajputana, 
 rescued from oppression but twenty-nine years before ; of 
 that Sindhia, whose great ancestor was England's deadliest 
 enemy ; of the Nizam, our ally since the time of Clive ; of 
 Maisur, restored by Marquess Wellesley to its ancient ruler; 
 of Nipal, our nearest independent neighbour. But for 
 the consequences of that sense of the justice of England, 
 we might have been temporarily overwhelmed. Sup- 
 ported by it, the race did the rest. It showed itself equal 
 to difficulties which, I believe, no other created race would 
 have successfully encountered. 
 
 So much for the moral of the story. Mistakes doubt- 
 less were made, especially in certain details at the outset 
 of the rebellion. Some injustices were committed, mainly 
 by the men who made the mistakes. But, taking it as a 
 whole, there is no epoch in the history of Great Britain in 
 which the men and women of these islands shone with 
 
The Warnings conveyed by the Mutiny. 4 1 1 
 
 greater lustre than throughout this period of 1857-9. 
 From the moment he quitted the pernicious air of 
 Calcutta Lord Canning stood in the van, the far-seeing, 
 courageous, resolute Englishman. Lords Elphinstone and 
 Harris, at Bombay and Madras, were in all respects worthy 
 of their chief. The three Lawrences in the Panjab, at 
 Lakhnao, and in Rajputana, upheld the glory of that sister 
 island irrevocably united to Great Britain. Scotland 
 contributed Sir Colin Campbell, Sir Robert Napier, Adrian 
 Hope, Lumsden, killed at the Sikandarabagh, Charles 
 MacGregor, and hosts of kindred warriors. Frere in 
 Sind, William Tayler at Patna, Wynyard at Gorakhpur, 
 Spankie and Dunlop in the Mirath districts, showed what 
 great things Englishmen, untrained to arms, left to their 
 own resources, could accomplish. Their action prevailed 
 all over India. There was scarcely one exception to it. 
 To name every man and his achievements would require 
 a volume exceeding in bulk the present record. 
 
 So much, I repeat, for the moral of the Mutiny. One 
 word now regarding its lessons and its warnings. The 
 determining cause of the Mutiny of 1857 was the attempt 
 to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people. This was 
 especially the case in the North-western Provinces, where 
 the introduction of the Thomasonian system unsettled the 
 minds of noble and peasant. It was the case in Oudh, 
 where the same system suddenly superseded the con- 
 genial rule of the ex-King. Nowhere else in India was 
 the rebellion more rampant and more persistent than in 
 those provinces. Three hundred years previously the 
 great Akbar had attempted to interfere with the village 
 system, but, after a short experience, he had recoiled. He 
 recognised in good time that custom is nowhere so strong 
 as in India, and that interference with that system would 
 uproot customs as dear as their lives to the children of the 
 
4 1 2 The Warnings conveyed by the Mutiny. 
 
 soil. The English, rushing in where Akbar had feared to 
 tread, met their reward in a general uprising. It is 
 scarcely too much to assert that in the provinces I have 
 mentioned the hand of almost every man was against us. 
 
 More than thirty years have elapsed since the Mutiny 
 was crushed, and again we witness a persistent attempt 
 to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people. The 
 demands made by the new-fangled congresses for the 
 introduction into India of representative institutions is a 
 demand coming from the noisy and unwarlike races which 
 hope to profit by the general corruption which such a 
 system would engender. To the manly races of India, to 
 the forty millions of Muhammadans, to the Sikhs of the 
 Panjab, to the warlike tribes on the frontier, to the Rohilas 
 of Rohilkhand, to the Rajputs and Jats of Rajputana and 
 Central India, such a system is utterly abhorrent. It 
 is advocated by the adventurers and crochet-mongers 
 of the two peoples. Started by the noisy Bengalis, a 
 race which, under Muhammadan rule, was content to 
 crouch and serve, it is encouraged by a class in this 
 country, ignorant for the most part of the real people of 
 India, whilst professing to be in their absolute confidence. 
 The agitation would be worthy of contempt but for the 
 element of danger which it contains. I would impress 
 upon the rulers of India the necessity, whilst there is 
 yet time, of profiting by the experience of the Mutiny. 
 I would implore them to decline to yield to an agitation 
 which is not countenanced by the real people of India. 
 I entreat them to realise that the Western system of repre- 
 sentation is hateful to the Eastern races which inhabit the 
 continent of India ; that it is foreign to their traditions, 
 their habits, their modes of thought. The people of India 
 arc content with the system which Akbar founded, and on 
 the principles of which the English have hitherto mainly 
 
■ The Warnings conveyed by the Mntiny. 413 
 
 governed. Our Western institutions, not an absolute 
 success in Europe, are based upon principles with which 
 they have no sympathy. The millions of Hindustan 
 desire a master who will carry out the principles of the 
 Queen's proclamation of 1858. Sovereigns and nobles, 
 merchants and traders, landlords and tenants prefer the 
 tried, even-handed justice of their European overlord to a 
 ustice which would te the outcome of popular elections. 
 India is inhabited not by one race alone, but by many 
 races. Those races are subdivided into many castes, 
 completely separated from each other in the inner social 
 life. If the higher castes are the more influential, the lower 
 are the more numerous. The attempt to give representa- 
 tion to mere numbers would then, before long, provoke re- 
 ligious jealousies and antipathies which would inevitably 
 find a solution in blood. A rising caused by such an 
 innovation on prevailing customs would be infinitely more 
 dangerous than the Mutiny of 1857. Concession to noisy 
 agitation on the part of the ruling power would place the 
 lives, the fortunes, the interests of the loyal classes of India 
 at the mercy of the noisiest, most corrupt and most de- 
 spised race in India. Against such concession — the inevit- 
 able forerunner of another rising — and equally against 
 fussy interference with the Hindu marriage-law — I, inti- 
 mately associated on the most friendly terms, for thirty- 
 five years, with the manlier races of India, make here, 
 on their behalf, my earnest protest. 
 
 THE END. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Agra, earlier events at, 105-11 ; events at, to 
 the defeat at Sassiah, 246-53 : events at, to 
 and including the surprise of Greathed, 314-18. 
 
 AiKMAN, Lieutenant, secures the Salimgarh, 
 308 ; gains the Victoria Cross, 354. 
 
 Ali'garh, mutiny at, loo-i. 
 
 AllahAbAd, sketch description of, 145 ; mutinj' 
 at, 147-9 ! fort of, saved by Brasyer, 149 ; 
 atrocities of the rebels at, 149-50 ; Neill re- 
 stores order at and about, 185-7. 
 
 Anderson, gallantry of Captain, and his 
 comrades, 144, and note. 
 
 Annesley, at the storming of the Kaisarbagh, 
 
 363-4- 
 
 Anson, General, Commander-in-Chief, con- 
 firms a too lenient sentence for mutiny, 61 ; 
 action of, towards the sipahis at Ambalah, 
 112-14; hears of the mutiny, 115 ; prepara- 
 tions made by. 1 16-19 ; marches from Am- 
 balah 119 ; dies at Karnal, 120. 
 
 Aoung, battle of, 192-3. 
 
 Arah, story of the siege and relief of, 223-8. 
 
 Ashe, Lieutenant, reaches Kanhpur, 160 ; 
 gallantry of, 166-77. 
 
 Augad, the spy, 208, 233. 
 
 AzAMGARH, events at, 184, 350-2, 370-2. 
 
 Azim-ullah-KhAn, proceeds to Europe as 
 Nana Sahib's agent, 30 ; the instrument of 
 the Nana for inveigling the English, 172-3. 
 
 B. 
 
 BADLf-Ki-SARAi, battle of, 124-6. 
 Baird-Smith, first mention of, 121 ; influence 
 
 of, in determining the storming of Dehli, 285, 
 
 288, 290 ; presses upon the Commander the 
 
 necessity of persevering, 305. 
 Bakht KhAn, takes the Bareli brigade to 
 
 Dehli, 268 ; advice of, to the King of Dehli, 
 
 309- 
 
 BanAras, short description of, 178 ; story of 
 the events at, prior to the mutiny, 179 ; after 
 the mutiny at Mirath, 180-1 ; story of the 
 disarming of the 37th N. L at, 180-3 ; good 
 conduct of the Raja of, 183. 
 
 Bandah, action of the Nuwab of, 259. 
 
 Bankes. Captain, gallantry of, at Lakhnao, 367. 
 
 Banks, Major, succeeds to chief civil authority 
 at Lakhnao, 205 ; death of, 208. 
 
 Barnard, Sir Henry, succeeds General Anson 
 
 in command of the Dehli force, 120 ; defeats 
 
 the rebels at Badli-ki-sarai, 124-6; takes a 
 position on the ridge, 126 ; death of, 285. 
 Barrackpur, disarming of the sipahis at, 
 
 155-6. 
 Barrow, efficiency of the volunteers of, 190-2, 
 
 195-6, 200. 
 Battye, Quintin, death of, 126-7. 
 Baugh, Lieutenant, is cut down by Manghal 
 
 Pandi, 53-4. 
 Beadon, Mr Cecil, Home Secretary, insults the 
 
 European citizens of Calcutta and declines 
 
 their offers, 94-6 ; the famous line of, 320. 
 Beatson, Stuart, Havelock's assistant Ad- 
 jutant-General, 188, 191 ; gallantry and 
 
 death of, 200. 
 Bengal Army, vide SipAhis. 
 Bengal, Eastern, events in, 347-8. 
 BerhAmpor, story of the mutiny of the 19th 
 
 at, 37-42, 50. 
 Bhopal, story of the Begum of, 263-4. 
 BihAr, Western, events in, 215-29 ; suffers by 
 
 the removal of Mr Tayler, 348-9 ; final 
 
 campaign in, 378-80. 
 Bingham, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 296. 
 Blunt, Captain, readiness and gallantry of, at 
 
 Lakhnao, 330. 
 Bonus, Lieutenant, 390. 
 Bourchier, Captain, joins Nicholson's force 
 
 with his battery, 275 ; gallant conduct of, 
 
 304 ; excellent book of, 315, note ; 316, note ; 
 
 gallantry of, 317 ; at Lakhnao, 328-9 ; at 
 
 Kanhpur, 341-2, 
 Boyd, Captain, before Dehli, 296. 
 Boyle, Vicars, splendid foresight of, justified, 
 
 223-8. 
 Brasyer, Captain, gallantry and ready- 
 
 mindedness of, at Allahabad, 149 ; at the 
 
 Alambagh, 357 ; at the storming of the 
 
 Kaisarbagh, 362-5. 
 Brind, Major James, 'a real hero of the siege,' 
 
 292 ; captures the Jansi Masjid, 307 ; and 
 
 the palace, 307-8. 
 Brockman, Captain, 389-90, 393-4. 
 Browne, Sam, gallant action of, at Nuriah, 399. 
 Burgess, Corporal, gallantry of, 297-9. 
 Burn, Colonel, appointed Governor of Dehli, 
 
 310. 
 Burroughs, Lieutenant, at the Sikandarabagh, 
 
 331- 
 BuTLKR, Lieutenant, gallantry of, 302-3. 
 
4t6 
 
 Index. 
 
 c. 
 
 Calci'TTA, results of the King of Oudh's 
 abode near, 35 ; account of disasters re- 
 ceived at, 151-2 ; ' Panic Sunday' at, 154-6. 
 Calvin, Mr John, character of 105 ; action of at 
 Agra, 105-11 ; action of, 246-8 ; death of, 252. 
 Campbell, Colonel, before TDehli, 296 ; action 
 
 of, at the storming of Dehlf, 299, 300-3. 
 Campbell, Colonel, of the Bays, defective 
 action of, at Lakhnao, 367-8, and note ; im- 
 proved action of, 368. 
 Campbell, Sir Colin, arrives in Calcutta, 320; 
 proceeds to Kanhpur, 321 ; immediate plans 
 of, 322 ; marches into Oudh, and receives 
 Kavanaeh. 327 ; relieves the Residenrv, and 
 returns to Kanhpur. 327-37 ; retrieves Wind- 
 ham's defeat at Kanhpur, 340-3 ; forces the 
 Kali Nadi, 343-4 ; prepares to reconquer 
 Oudh. 344 ; storms Lnkhnao, 359-69 ; sends 
 Lueard against Kunwar Singh, 372 ; enters 
 Rohilkhand, 373 ; drives the rebels from 
 Bare'i, 374 ; marches to rescue Jones and 
 Hale, 376-7 ; pacifies Oudh, 390. 
 Canning, Lord, arrives in India, 21 ; coun- 
 cillors hf found there, 22 ; finds Oudh his 
 only difficulty, 24 ; supersedes Mr Jackson bv 
 Sir Henry Lawrence, 24 ; makes all sipahi 
 regiments liable to fore'gn service. 26; dis- 
 bands the TQth N. L, 50; and the 34th N. L, 
 58 ; is misled by his councillors as to the 
 severity entailed by disbandment, 61 ; learns 
 of the events at Mirath and Dehli, 89-90 ; 
 takes the promptest measures possible, 90-1 ; 
 the prospect immediately before him not re- 
 assurinsT, 91-3 ; external policy of, splendid, 
 93; internal policy, feeble, 04-6; difficulty 
 of, to grasp the complete situation, 97 : sends 
 for Sir Patrick Grant, 152; at last authorises 
 raising of volunteers, 153 ; gags the press, 
 153-4; li2S the Barrackpur brigade disarmed, 
 155 ; hears of mutinies in all directions, 157 ; 
 takes active measures, 158 ; raises a corps of 
 yeomanry cavalry, 213 ; refuses to disarm 
 the sipahis at Danapur, 214-20 ; insists on 
 the reconouest of Oudh before touching 
 Rohilkhand, 344; makes his presence felt at 
 Allahabad, 352 ; sends Lord Mark Kerr 
 against Kunwar Singh, 370-1 ; summary of 
 conduct of, 405-7. 
 Carthew, Brigadier, fights well at Kanhpur, 
 
 337-9; clears the districts, 362. 
 Carmichael, Sergeant, gallantry of, 297-9. 
 Cattlfield, Major, gallantry of. 303 ; succeeds 
 Gerrard in command of a Narniil column, 
 320. 
 Cavenagh, Major Orfeur, insight andprudence 
 of, preface and 34 ; reports the action of the 
 mutineers to Lord Canning, 36 ; probably 
 saves Calcutta from an outbreak, 49. 
 Chamberlain, Neville, joins camp before 
 Dehli, 284 ; is wounded, 287-8 ; urges Wilson 
 to persevere. 305. 
 ChArbAgh bridge, glorious conduct of young 
 
 Havelock and Jakes at the, 239-43. 
 Chesney, Captain, before Dehli, 282. 
 Chester, Colonel, killed before Dehli, 126. 
 Chester. Mr, good conduct of, at Allahabad, 
 146-7, 187. 
 
 Chinhat, action of, 142-4. 
 
 ChitragAon. mutiny at, 347. 
 
 ChutiA NAgpuk, sketch of events in, 346-7. 
 
 Clemency Canning, origin of nickname of, 
 explained, 406. 
 
 CoKK, Colonel, splendid service of, in Rohil- 
 khand, 373. 
 
 Conspirators, policy of the, 33 ; are taken 
 aback by the premature outbreak at Mirath, 
 88, and note. 
 
 Cooper, Richard, splendid feat o*", 331. 
 
 Cotton, Colonel, takes command from Great- 
 hed and pursues the rebels, 317-18. 
 
 CoL'KT. Mr M,, energetic and wise action of, 
 at Allahabad, 146-7, 187. 
 
 D. 
 
 Dalhousie, the Marquess of, orders a sipahi 
 regiment to Burma, and has to recall his 
 order, 14; character of, 22; minute of, re- 
 garding the sipahi army, 23-4 ; decision of, 
 reearding Nana Sahib, 20 ; and the Rani of 
 Jhansi. 32 ; comments of, on the action of 
 Sir Patrick Grant, 21Q. 
 Daly, Major H., at Dehli, 126, 284. 
 DAn.^pur, position of, and fatal events at, 215- 
 
 229. 
 Daniell, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at Kanh- 
 pur, 166. 
 Darby, Captain, 389. 
 Davidson, Major Cuthbert, prudent conduct 
 
 of 398. 
 De Kantzow, splendid conduct of, T02-3. 
 Deacon, Lieutenant-Colonel, at Dehli. 297. 
 Dehli, circumference of", and description of 
 the palace of, 72-3 : storv of the negotiations 
 of the King of, with Lords Dalhousie and 
 Canning, 73-5 ; massacre of English officers 
 attached to the King of, 76-7 ; in the canton- 
 ments of, 78-9, 82-4 ; the blowing up of the 
 mngazine of. 79-81: the King of. Is proclaimed 
 lord of India, 85 ; effect of the seizure of, 
 throughout India, 87 ; General Barnard takes 
 position on the ridge of, 126 ; how, became 
 the central and decisive point, 253-4 ! ^^ 
 siege and storming of, 279-312 ; capture of 
 the King of, 309 ; heroes of the siege of, 312 ; 
 trial of the King of, 403. 
 Delafosse, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at Kanh- 
 pur, 166, 171 ; escape of, 174-7. 
 DevnArAin, Singh, splendid conduct of, at 
 
 Banaras, 180-3. 
 DhAkA, the mutineers of, 347-8. 
 Dick, Lieutenant, 390. 
 DiLHi^Ri, Raja of, the case of the, 255-7. 
 Disbandment, the fallacy of calling, a punish- 
 ment exposed, 61, 89. 
 DoDGSON, Major, the type of a brave and 
 modest soldier, 180-2 ; brave conduct of, 
 
 3-4-5- 
 Douglas, Brigadier, pursuit of Kunwar .Singh 
 
 bv, 377-8o- 
 D'Oyley, ijallantry and death of, 249-51. 
 Dumas, develops the resources of French 
 
 India, 2. 
 Dunbar, Captain, surprise and defeat of, 224. 
 DuNLOP, Wallace, energy of, 266. |j 
 
Index. 
 
 417 
 
 Dunn," Mr, 'cast in the heroic type,' 184. 
 DuPLEix, how, came to conceive the idea of 
 
 establishing a French empire in India, 3-7. 
 DuRAND, Colonel, action of, at Indur, 261-3.' 
 DuRNSFORD, Colonel, before Dehli, 297. 
 
 E. 
 
 Early European settlers in India, i. 
 
 Edwards, Mr R. M., successful efforts of, at 
 Muzaffarnagar, 267. 
 
 Elphinstone, Lord, foresight and prompt 
 action of, 93, 381 ; despatches a column to 
 Central India, 383 ; orders troops to Shorapur, 
 398 ; summary of the conduct of, 405. 
 
 Ewart, Major, at the Sikandarabagh , 331. 
 
 Eyre, Vincent, splendid relief of rah by, 
 225-9; action^of, on the way to and in Oudh, 
 236 ; at the Alambagh, 357, 366. 
 
 F. 
 
 Farquhar, Lieutenant-Colonel, before Dehli, 
 297. 
 
 Fathpur, mutiny at, 189; battle of, 190-1^ 
 
 Firuzpur, mutiny at, 99-100. 
 
 Franks, Ijrigadier-General, action of, between 
 Azamgarh and Lakhnao, 353-4 ; at the storm- 
 ing of Lakhnao, 361-8. 
 
 Eraser, Colonel, is invested temporarily with 
 authoritj' at Agra, 252. 
 
 FoRjETT, Mr, great services rendered by, 383. 
 
 Fox, Lieutenant, 390. 
 
 Gall, Major, splendid services of, 393, note. 
 
 Gerrard, Colonel, defeats the rebels at Nar- 
 nul, 319 ; is killed, 320. 
 
 Glanville, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at 
 Kanhpur, 166-77. 
 
 GorAkhpur, events at, 184. 
 
 Grant, Hope, draws to himself the guns of 
 the rebels before Dehli, 304 ; takes command 
 of Greathed's column, and marches into 
 Oudh, 318 ; at Lakhnao, 328 ; retrieves 
 Mansfield's error at Kanhpur, 343 ; at the 
 storming of Lakhnao, 355-69 ; pursuit of the 
 rebels by, 372 ; completes the pacification of 
 Oudh, 399-402. 
 
 Grant, Sir Patrick, arrives in Calcutta, 152 ; 
 the presence of, there, useless, 156 ; conduct of, 
 218 ; commented on by Lord Dalhousie, 219. 
 
 Graves, Brigadier, 282. 
 
 Greased cartridge, the, what it was, 19 ; the 
 Maulavi resolves to use it as a means to 
 his end, 19-33 ; contradictory action of the 
 authorities regarding, 44-5- 
 
 Greathed, Harvey, escape of, 69 ; counsels 
 o*, 282. 
 
 Greathed, Lieutenant-Colonel, before Dehli, 
 296 ; fails to take the Burn bastion, 306 ; 
 leads a column to Agra, 313-16; surprise of, 
 316-18; is superseded by Hope Grant, 318; 
 action of, at Kanhpur, 341-2. 
 
 Greathed, Mr H., before Dehli, 282-3, 295-6. 
 
 Green, Captain, before Dehli, 296. 
 Greville, Captain, gallantry of, 302-3. 
 Gubbins, Frederick, splendid conduct of, at 
 
 Banaras, 178-83. 
 Guides, corps of, arrive before Dehli, 126. 
 Gurkhas, the 2d, join the Mirath force, 124 ; 
 
 gallantry of, 293. 
 GwAliAr, mutiny at, ni. 
 
 H. 
 
 Hagart, gallantry of, at Lakhnao, 367. 
 
 HaidarAbAd, events in, 398. 
 
 Hale, Colonel, is left at Saharanpur, 374 ; is 
 all but surprised by the Maulavi, 375 ; is 
 rescued, 376-7. 
 
 Halliday, Mr, shameful treatment by, of Mr 
 William Tayler, 229 ; obtains the sanction of 
 the Government to the enrolment of sailors, 
 347- 
 
 Hamilton, Sir Robert, splendid ex-ercise of 
 authority by, 386-7. 
 
 Harris, Lord, furnishes troops for Shorapur, 
 398 ; summary of the action of, 405. 
 
 Havelock, Sir Henry, is ordered to Alla- 
 habad, 158 ; reaches that place, 187 ; marches 
 for Kanhpur, 188 ; defeats the rebels at Fath- 
 pur, 190-1 ; and at Aoung, 192-3 ; and at 
 Pandu Nadi, 193-4 ; and at Kanhpur, 196- 
 200 ; position of, at Kanhpur, 201-2 ; crosses 
 into Oudh, 209 ; beats the rebels at Unao, 
 210 ; and at Bashiratganj, 210 ; returns to 
 Kanhpur, 211 ; warns Neill, 211 ; recrosses 
 and again returns, 211-12 ; relations of, and 
 Outram, 235 ; reUef of the Residency by, 
 237-45 j defence of the new posts by, 323 ; 
 meets Sir Colin Campbell, 334-5 ; death of, 
 336. 
 
 Havelock, young, splendid conduct of, at 
 Kdnhpur, 199 ; at the Charbagh bridge, 
 240-2 ; at Lakhnao, 334-5, 363-8 ; splendid 
 result of the brain working of, 379-80. 
 
 Hawthorne, Bugler, gallantry of, 297-9. 
 
 Hearsey, General, harangues the sipahis at 
 Barrackpur, 46 ; reasons why he failed to 
 impress them, 47 ; again harangues them, 52 ; 
 and again fails, 53 ; action of, in the Manghal 
 Pandi case, 55-7 ; disbands the 19th N. I., 
 57 ; is reprimanded for promoting a loyal 
 sipahi, 57 ; disarms the Barrackpur brigade, 
 155-6. 
 
 Heberuen, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at 
 Kanhpur, 166-77. 
 
 Herbert, Lieutenant-Colonel, before Dehli, 
 296. 
 
 Hewitt, General, brings the mutinous troopers 
 at Mirath to a court-martial, and carries out 
 the sentence of imprisonment, 63 ; dilatory 
 conduct of, at Mirath, 68-71 ; subsequent 
 conduct of, 121-2. 
 
 Hillersden, Mr, negotiations of, with Nana 
 Sahib, 131-2 ; is killed, 168. 
 
 Hills, James, gallantry of, 286-7. 
 
 Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, 282 ; captures 
 the King of Dehli, 309 ; and shoots his sons, 
 310. 
 
 HoLKAR, position and action of, 260-2. 
 
 Holmes, Colonel, pursuit of Tantia Topi by, 
 397- 
 
 2 D 
 
4i8 
 
 Index. 
 
 Home, before Dehli, 295-7 ; gallantry of, 299 ; 
 
 death of, 313. 
 Hoi'E, Adrian, at Lakhnao, 328 ; vigilance of, 
 
 329 ; splendid action of, at the Shah Najaf, 
 
 332-3 ; gallant leading of, at Kanhpur, 341-2 ; 
 
 at the storming of Lakhnao, 361-8 ; the life 
 
 of, sacrificed at Ruyia, 372. 
 Hopkins, Captain, carries the mess-house, and 
 
 hoists the Union Jack, 334. 
 HovENDEN, before Dehli, 296. 
 Hughes, Major, marches to Shorapur, 398. 
 
 I. 
 
 ItAwah, mutiny at, 103-4. 
 
 J. 
 
 Jacob, Colonel Le-Grand, pacifies the Southern 
 
 RIaratha countrj^, 383. 
 Jacob, Major, before Dehli, 296 ; gallantry and 
 
 death of, 303. 
 Jakes, Corporal, vide Charbagh bridge. 
 Jang Bahadur agrees to assist the British 
 
 Government, 349 ; leads troops into the field, 
 
 350-2 ; to Lakhnao, 353-4 ; at the storming of 
 
 Lakhnao, 365-8. 
 Jenkins, Captain, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
 
 166-77. 
 Jenkinson, Mr, renders good service at 
 
 Banaras, 180. 
 Jerome, Captain, 389. 
 Jervis, Captain, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
 
 166-77. 
 Jhansi, grievances and character of the Rani 
 
 of) 32-3, 257-9 > siege of the town and fortress 
 
 of, 387-9 ; storniing of, 389-90 ; successful 
 
 march of the Rani of, against Sindhia, 392-3 ; 
 
 death of the Rani of, 393. 
 Jones, Brigadier William, before Dehli, 296 ; 
 
 clears t.ie ramparts as far as the Kabul gate, 
 
 298, atid note ; carries the Labor gate, 307 ; 
 
 and Ajmir gate, 307. 
 Jones, Lieutenant-Colonel John, before Dehli, 
 
 297 ; in Rohiikhand, 373 ; is sent to relieve 
 
 Hale, 376. 
 JuANPUR, events at, 184. 
 
 K. 
 
 KaisarbAgh, the storming of the, 362-4. 
 
 Kalpi, sanguinary battle at, 391. 
 
 KAnhfur, position and garrison of, 128 ; events 
 of the mutiny at, 160-77 '■> Havelock beats the 
 rebels at, 196-200 ; massacre of the prisoners at, 
 200-1 ; position ot Havelock at, 201-2 ; defeat 
 of Windham at, 337-9 ; victory of Sir Colin 
 Campbell at, 340-3. 
 
 Kavanagh, Thomas Henry, daring achieve- 
 ment of, 326-7. 
 
 Kaye, Major, at the storming of Dehli, 292-4. 
 
 Keene, Mr H. G., successful efforts of, at 
 Dehra Dian, 267. 
 
 Kennedy, splendid leading of, 319. 
 
 Kerr, Lord JNIark, splendid achievement of, 
 
 371- 
 KhAki RisAlA, the, 266-7. 
 
 Ki'rwi, the Rao of, position of, 260 ; is defrauded 
 of his property, 392. 
 
 KuNWAR Singh, assists the revolted sipahis of 
 Danapur, 221 ; the fortress of, stormed by 
 Eyre, 228 ; the removal of Mr Tayler makes 
 the way easy for, 349 ; drives Milman before 
 him, 371 ; entices Lord Mark Kerr into an 
 ambush, but is deleated, 371 ; campaign of, 
 in Azamgarh and Western Bihar, 377-9 ; dies 
 379- 
 
 Lakhnao, sketch description of, 135-6; only 
 Residency of, held by the British, 204 ; (jiide 
 Residency) storming of, 355-69. 
 
 Lang, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 295-6. 
 
 Laughnan, Andrew, plants the column flag 
 on the summit of the Kabul gate, 298. 
 
 Lawrence, Captain Richard, before Dehli, 
 296 ; assumes command of the fourth column 
 on Reid being wounded, 301 ; withdraws, 
 301. 
 
 Lawrence, George St Patrick, splendid ser- 
 vice of, 265-6. 
 
 Lawrence, Sir Henry, appointed Commis- 
 sioner of Oudh, 24 ; arrives after the mischief 
 has been done, 59 ; suppresses the mutiny 
 of the 7th Irregulars, 60; holds a Darbar 
 at Lakhnao, 134 ; is appointed Brigadier- 
 General, 135; draws in his forces, 137; pur- 
 sues the mutineers, 138 ; invites the pensioners 
 to come to Lakhnao, 140 ; moves to attack 
 the rebels at Chinhat, 141 ; is defeated, and 
 holds only the Residency, 142-5 ; position of, 
 at the Residency, 203 ; death of, 205. 
 
 Lawrence, Sir John, arranges a cordial alli- 
 ance with the Amir of Kabul, 26 ; urges 
 General Anson to march on Dehli, 1 17-19 ; 
 position of, in the Panjab, 269-71 ; feels he 
 has been over-sanguine, 272 ; notions of, re- 
 garding retention of Pashawar, 273-4 ; sends 
 Nicholson to Dehli, 274. 
 
 Lessons of the Mutiny, 408-10. 
 
 LiDDELL, Colonel, 389. 
 
 Lind, Mr, splendid conduct of, 180. 
 
 Lloyd, General, the half-measure of, at 
 Danapur, 219-21 ; despatches Dunbar after 
 the sipahis, 222 ; panic of, 222-4. 
 
 Lockhart, gallantry of Lieutenant, 293-4. 
 
 LoNGDEN, Colonel, action ol", in the Azamgarh 
 district, 350. 
 
 LoNGFiELD, Lieutenant-Colonel, commands re- 
 serve column of assault at Dehli, 296; action 
 
 of, 305- 
 LowTH, Colonel, 389. 
 LuGARD, General, at the storming of Lakhnao, 
 
 362 ; is sent against Kunwar Singh, 371 ; 
 
 pursuit of Kunwar Singh by, 377-8. 
 LuMSDEN, John, at the bikandarabagh, 331. 
 
 M. 
 
 Mackillop, Mr, splendid conduct of, at 
 
 Kanhpur, 166, 168. 
 Mainpuri, mutiny at, 102-3. 
 MalAun, mutiny at, 139. 
 
Index. 
 
 419 
 
 Malcolm, Colonel, aids In pacifying the 
 Southern Maratha country, 383 ; proceeds to 
 Shorapur, 398. 
 
 Manghal Panui, the case of, 53-8. 
 
 Mansfield, General, inaction of, at Kanhpur, 
 
 342-3- 
 
 Manson, Mr, murder of, 382. 
 
 MakAthA country, effect of the Inam Com- 
 mission on the people of the southern, 17 ; 
 occurrences In the, 381-3. 
 
 Maude uses his guns splendidly, 190, 193-4, 
 237. 235-41, 357. 
 
 Maulavi, the, account of, 17 ; conspiracy of, 
 18-19 ; at Lakhnao, 356-8, 368-9 ; strategic 
 movement of, 375 ; its consequences, 376 ; 
 death of, 377. 
 
 Maunsell, Lieutenant, at Dehli, 282-96. 
 
 Maxwell, Colonel G. V., joins Sir Hugh 
 Rose and Lights at Kalpi, 390-1. 
 
 McIntyre, Major, at the ..lambagh, 323-27. 
 
 Medley, Captain, at Dehli, 294-6. 
 
 Meiklejohn, Lieutenant, 390. 
 
 Michel, General, pursuit of Tantia Topi by, 
 
 395-6- 
 
 MiDDLETON, Captain, at Lakhnao, 328-32. 
 
 Milman, Colonel, retreats before Kunwar 
 Singh, 370. 
 
 MiRATH, discontent at, 62 ; story of the tra- 
 gedy of the loth and nth May at, 63-71 ; 
 the authorities at, take time to recover from 
 their panic, 121 ; Influence brought to bear 
 on the authorities at, 122 ; late occurrences 
 at, 266. 
 
 MoNCRiEFF, the chaplain, devotion of, at 
 Kanhpur, 166. 
 
 ]\IoNEY, Alonzo, theatrical display of, 229; 
 futile action of, 349.' 
 
 Montgomery, Robert, disarms the sipahis at 
 Mian Mir, 271-2. 
 
 Moore, Captain, daring and devotion of, at 
 Kanhpur, 166-77. 
 
 Moore, Mrs, noble conduct of, 166-7. 
 
 MooRSOM, Captain, death of, 361. 
 
 Mutiny, lessons of the, 408-10 ; warnings of 
 the, 410. 
 
 N. 
 
 NAnA SAhib, grievances of, 27-30 ; Intrigues 
 of, at Lakhnao, 31 ; negotiations of, with Mr 
 Hlllersden, at Kanhpur, 131-2 ; persuades 
 the rebel sipahis to attack Wheeler at Kanh- 
 pur, 162-3 > assumes the dignities of a sove- 
 reign prince, 164 ; vents his fury on batches 
 'of English captives, 169 ; urges his generals 
 to renewed exertions, 170 ; sends a message 
 to the garrison, 172 ; promises safety to those 
 who will agree to his terms, 173 ; foul 
 treachery of, 173-7 ; beaten at Kanhpur, 
 195-9 ; massacres the prisoners, 200 ; disap- 
 pearance of, 402, note. 
 
 NAogAng, events at, 259-60. 
 
 Napier, Robert, at the first relief of the Resi- 
 dency, 244 ; at the storming of Lakhnao, 
 361-8 ; joins Sir Hugh Rose, 393 ; defeats 
 Tantia Topi, 394 ; further action of, in Central 
 India, 394-7. 
 
 NasirAbAd, mutiny at, 265. 
 
 Neill, General, Is despatched to Banaras, 
 158, 178 ; decides the action at that place, 
 181 ; takes command, 183 ; pushes on to 
 Allahabad, 184 ; restores order there, 185-6 ; 
 despatches Renaud towards Kanhpur, 187 ; 
 is superseded by Havelock, 187-8; joins 
 Havelock, 209 ; writes an intemperate letter 
 to Havelock, 211 ; at the Charbagh bridge, 
 240-2 ; is shot dead, 243. 
 
 Nicholson, John, appointed to command a 
 force to march to Dehli, 274 ; action of, in 
 the Panjab, 274-6 ; reaches i)ehli, 277 ; beats 
 the rebels at Najafgarh, 289 ; commands first 
 column of assault, 296 ; gives the order to 
 advance, 297 ; wins the breach, 298 ; pushes 
 for the I^ahor gate, 301 ; Is mortally wounded, 
 303 ; death of, 310 ; author's estimate of, 310, 
 and note. 
 
 Nicholson, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 296. 
 
 NiMACH, action at, 264. 
 
 NipAl troops, action of the, 350-2. 
 
 North-west Provinces, effect of the Intro- 
 duction of Mr Thomason's land system on the 
 population of the, 16, 31 ; events in the, 105- 
 II, 246-53, 266-9. 
 
 O. 
 
 Olpherts, William, ready presence of mind 
 of, 182, and note ; in Oudh, 238, 356-7, 366. 
 
 Osborne, Willoughby, good service rendered 
 by, 259. 
 
 Oudh, effect of the annexation of, on the 
 sipahis, 15-16 ; on the population of, 16 ; the 
 King of, confined to Fort William, 156 ; 
 events In, 59-60, 134-45, 203-8, 231-5, 237-45, 
 323-36. 
 
 OuTRAM, Sir James, commands in the war 
 with Persia, 26 ; Is sent to command in 
 Kanhpur, 230 ; declines to deprive Havelock 
 of the honours he deserved, 235-6 ; accom- 
 panies Havelock in command of the cavalry, 
 237-45 ; resumes command, 244 ; wise con- 
 clusion of, 245 ; defence of the Residency by, 
 323-6 ; sends Kavanagh to communicate with 
 Sir Colin, 326 ; meets Sir Colin, 334-5 ; at 
 the Alambagh, 355-7 ; action of, at the 
 storming of Lakhnao, 359-68. 
 
 OuvRY, readiness and gallantry of, 317. 
 
 PAndu Nadi, battle of, 193-4. 
 
 Parke, Brigadier, pursuit of Tantia Topi by, 
 
 396-7- 
 PatnA, position of, and story of events in the 
 
 division of which was the capital, 215-29. • 
 Paton, Sergeant, prescient vigilance of, at the 
 
 Shah Najaf, 322-3. 
 Pearl Brigade, formation of the, 321 ; action 
 
 of, at Lakhnao, 328-9 ; In Azamgarh district, 
 
 351-2, 399. 
 Pearson, Captain Alfred, splendid conduct of, 
 
 at Sassiah, 250 ; and at Agra, 317-18. 
 Peel, Captain William, organises the Shannon 
 
 brigade, 321 ; at Kajwa, 322 ; at Lakhnao, 
 
 327-36 ; at Kanhpur, 341-2. 
 Penny, General, march and death of, 373. 
 
420 
 
 Index. 
 
 Persia, sketch of causes of the last war with, 
 
 25 ; close of war with, 26. 
 Pollock, Mr Archibald, renders good service 
 
 at Banaras, 180. 
 PoLWHELE, Brigadier, defeat of at Sassiah, 
 
 249-52. 
 Probyn, Major, splendid conduct of, 317. 
 Punishment, question of the, awarded to the 
 
 rebels considered, 406. 
 
 Q- 
 
 Queen's Proclamation, the, 403-5. 
 
 R. 
 
 Raikes, Judge, testimony of, as to affairs at 
 
 Agra, 107, 246. 
 RAjputAna, events in, 264-6. 
 Ramsay, Captain, before Dehli, 29^6. 
 Rattray, Major, the men of, at Arab, 223-8 ; 
 
 in Chutia Nagpur, 346 ; in Western Bihar, 
 
 349- 
 
 Reade, Mr E. a., position and character of, 
 at Agra, 247, 252. 
 
 Reed, General, at Dehli, 282, 286 ; makes over 
 command to Arcbdale Wilson. 288. 
 
 Reid, Charles, joins Wilson's force, 124 ; gal- 
 lantry of, 283-4 ; commands fourth column of 
 assault, 296 ; is delayed by the absence of 
 gunners, 300 ; is badly wounded, 300-1. 
 
 Remmington, Captain, at Lakhnao, 328-9 ; 
 at Kanhpur, 341. 
 
 Renaud, Major, is despatched by Neill to- 
 wards Kanhpur, 187 ; is joined by Havelock 
 and fights at Fathpur, 89-91 ; death of, 193. 
 
 Residency, the, of Lakhnao, Sir H. Lawrence 
 moves into the, 142-5 ; posts at the, 204 ; 
 causalties at, 206 ; events of defence of, 207 ; 
 the garrison of, receive a message from 
 Havelock, 208 ; further events of the defence 
 of, 231-5 ; relief of, by Havelock and Outram, 
 237-45 ; second relief of, 323-37. 
 
 Retribution, question of, considered, 406. 
 
 R6\vA, loyalty of the Ra;a of, 259. 
 
 Richardson, Major, appointed to command 
 the yeomanry cavalry, 213, 349. 
 
 Ricketts, George, gallantry of, 257. 
 
 Roberts, action of, against Tantia Topi, 395-6. 
 
 Robertson, Colonel, follows Tantia Topi, 393, 
 
 395- 
 
 Robertson, Dundas, devotion of, 121, 267. 
 
 Robinson, Captain, 389. 
 
 RocKE, Major, pursuit of Tantia Topi by, 396. 
 
 ROHILKHAND, affairs in, 268-9, 373-77- 
 
 Rose, Sir Hugh, takes command of the central 
 Indian column, 384 ; victorious march of, to 
 Sagar, 385 ; is hindered in his march by an 
 order from the Commander-in-Chief, 386 ; 
 how, overcame the difficulty, 387 ; besieges 
 Jhansi, 387 ; is roused by an attempt of 
 Tantia Topi to relieve it, 388 ; defeats him, 
 388-9; storms Jhansi, 389-90 ; storms Kunch, 
 and marches to Gulauli, 390 ; defeats the 
 rebels at Kalpi, 391 ; when on the point of 
 leaving hears of the march of Tantia Topi on 
 Gwaliar, 392 ; hastens to the scene of action 
 and defeats Tantia, 393 ; and hands over com- 
 mand to Sir R. Napier, 394. 
 
 Rosser, Captain, offers to lead a reconnais- 
 sance but is refused, 63 ; death of, 304. 
 
 RoTHNEY, Captain, before Dehli, 296. 
 
 RowcROFT, Brigadier, useful action of, and his 
 troops, 350-3, 399. 
 
 Russell, Brigadier, at Lakhnao, 328-9 ; carries 
 the barracks, 334. 
 
 SAgar AND NarbadA territories, action in 
 
 the, 254-7. 
 SAgar, condition of, during 1857, 254-5 ! ^'^^ 
 
 lieved by Sir Hugh Rose, 385. 
 SahArani'UR, energy of officials at, 121, 267. 
 Salkeld before Dehli, 296-7 ; gallantry and 
 
 death of, 299, and note. 
 Satte, Brand, energy of, 266-7. 
 Sassiah, battle of, 249-52. 
 Scott's field-battery, renders splendid service 
 
 at Dehli, 304. 
 Seaton, Brigadier-General, takes command of 
 
 a force at Dehli, 320; action of, in the Duab, 
 
 343. 372-3- 
 
 Seton-Karr, George Berkeley, splendid ser- 
 vice rendered by, 382. 
 
 ShAh Najaf, terrible struggle at the, 332-3. 
 
 ' Shannon ' brigade, the formation of, 321 ; 
 action of, 322, 328-37, 341-2. 
 
 Sherer, Captain, gallant action of, 347. 
 
 Sherer, Colonel, gallant liearing of, 348. 
 
 ShorApur, episode of the Raja of, 398-9. 
 
 Showers, General, clears the country to the 
 west and south-west of Dehli, 319; defeats 
 Tantia Topi, 396. 
 
 SikandarAbagh, storming of the, 329-32. 
 
 SindhiA, Maharaja, visits Calcutta, 48 ; happy 
 consequences of the postponement oi \.h.e/ete 
 given b}', 49 ; sagacious warnings and action 
 of, 107-9 ' i'' deserted by his troops when 
 attacked by Tantia I'opi, 393. 
 
 SipAhis, the Bengal, origin of, 4-7 ; develop- 
 ment of, as an army, 7-9 ; effects of the first 
 Afghan war upon, 9-10 ; effects of the latter 
 restrictions upon, lo-ii ; effects of the intro- 
 duction of the Horse Guards system among, 
 11-13 ; effects of Lord Dalhousie's action 
 upon, 14 ; effect of the annexation of Oudh 
 upon, 15-16 ; the greased cartridge suggested 
 to, by conspirators, 19 ; reasoning of, 20 ; 
 reasons why General Hearsey's arguments 
 failed to impress, 47, 53 ; conduct of the, in 
 the Manghal Pandi case, 53-6 ; did not re- 
 gard disband ment as a punishment, 61-89 5 
 discontent of, at Mirath, 62 ; mutiny there, 
 68-71 ; enter and take possession of Dehli, 
 72-86 ; at Barrackpur, disarmed, 155-6 ; 
 mutinies of, at Aligarh, loo-i ; at Itawah, 
 Eulandshahr, and Mainpuri, 103-5 '■> ^^ Alla- 
 habad, 147-9 ' ^^ Kanhpur, 160-77 > ''^ Oudh, 
 137-205 ; at Nimach and Nasirabad, 264-5 ; 
 about Agra, 246-53 ; at Mardan, 272 ; at 
 Jhelam, 274 ; at Sialkdt, 274. 
 
 SitApur, mutiny at, 138-9. 
 
 Slade, Captain, gallantry of, at Lakhnao, 367. 
 
 Smith, Brigadier, action of, against Tantia 
 Topi, 393-4. 
 
 Smith, Sergeant, gallantry of, 297-9. 
 
Index. 
 
 42 
 
 Somerset, Brigadier, pursuit of Tantia Topi 
 
 by, 396-7- 
 
 SoTHEBY, Captain, organises the jP^-ar/ brigade, 
 321 ; useful action of, 351-2. 
 
 Spankie, Robert, devotion of, 121, 267. 
 
 Speke, gallantry of, before Dehli, 303. 
 
 Spurgin, Captain, is sent on by steamer to- 
 wards Kanhpur, 187-8. 
 
 Sterling, Captain, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
 166-77. 
 
 Stewart, Captain, of the 93d, 332. 
 
 Stuart, General, commands the column sent 
 to Central India from Puna, 384 ; joins Sir 
 Hugh Rose, 384-5 ; marches against Chan- 
 d^ri and takes it, 386 ; splendid conduct of, 
 at Kalpi, 391 ; is despatched after Tantia 
 Topi, 393. 
 
 Stuart, Major, 389. 
 
 Surat Singh, splendid conduct of, at Banaras, 
 180-3. 
 
 Sutherland, Capta'n, pursuit of Tantia Topi 
 by, 396. 
 
 T. 
 
 Tandy, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 296. 
 
 Tantia Topi superintends the massacre at 
 Kanhpur, 174; defeats Windham, 337-9; is 
 defeated by Sir Colin Campbell, 340-3 ; 
 marches to relieve Jhansi, 388 ; is defeated 
 by Sir Hugh Rose, 388-9 ; marches against 
 Sindhia, and drives him from his capital, 
 393 ; is defeated by Sir Hugh Rose, 393 ; 
 and by Napier, 394 ; subsequent pursuit of, 
 394-7 ; is betrayed and hanged, 397. 
 
 Tayler, Mr William, energy of, 215 ; advises 
 disarming of sipahis at Danapur, 216 ; rouses 
 the general to action, 222 ; order issued by, 
 to his subordinates, 224-5 ; disgraceful treat- 
 ment of, 229. 
 
 Taylor, Captain Alexander, draws up the 
 plans of assault on Dehli, 291 ; splendid ser- 
 vice of, 307. 
 
 Tennant, before Dehli, 296. 
 
 Tern an, Major, foresight of, 255 ; action of, 
 with respect to native landowners, 255-7. 
 
 Thackeray, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 297. 
 
 Thomason, Mr, effect of the land system of, 
 17, 24, 31, 184. 
 
 Thomson, Mowbraj^, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
 166, 169 ; escape of, 174-7. 
 
 Tombs, Captain Henry, gallantry of, 287, 
 289-304. 
 
 Tr avers. Captain, at Lakhnao, 328-30. 
 
 Tucker, Henry Carre, reference to, 179. 
 
 Turner, Major, energetic conduct of, 317. 
 
 Tytler, Fraser, Havelock's Quartermaster- 
 General, 188-9, i93j 201, 20S. 
 
 V. 
 
 Van Cortlandt clears the ground to the 
 
 north-west of Dehli, 319. 
 Vibart, Major, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
 
 166-77. 
 Vigors, Major, before Dehli, 296. 
 
 Venables, Mr, ' cast ni the heroic type,' il 
 Volunteers, the, of Calcutta, 153. 
 
 W. 
 
 Wake, Herwald, splendid conduct of, 223-8. 
 
 Walpole, General, at Kanhpur, 338-9, 341 ; I3 
 sent on separate command, 343 ; unsoldier- 
 like attack on Ruyia, 372 ; joins Sir CoHn, 
 373- 
 
 Ward, Lieutenant, before Dehli, 297. 
 
 Wardlaw, Major, splendid leading of, 319. 
 
 Warnings of the mutiny, 408-10. 
 
 Watson, Captain, good conduct of, 317. 
 
 Wemyss, Captain, gallantry of, at the storming 
 of Eehli, 303. 
 
 Weston, Captain Gould, services of, 137, 357. 
 
 Wheeler, General Sir H. M., endeavours to 
 save the lives of the English at Kanhpur, 
 128-33 ; is informed that the revolt is about 
 to break out, 160 ; prompt measures taken by, 
 161 ; the son of, is killed, 168 ; opposes the 
 idea of negotiation with the Nana, but ulti- 
 mately agrees, 172-3 ; is murdered with the 
 rest, 174-7. 
 
 Whiting, Captain, gallantry of, at Kanhpur, 
 166-77. 
 
 Whitlock, General, proceedings of the column 
 of, 392. 
 
 Widdowson, Bridget, resolute conduct of, at 
 Kanhpur, 167. 
 
 Wilde, Colonel, before Dehli, 297. 
 
 Wilkin, Lieutenant, gallantry of, at Lakhnao, 
 367- 
 
 Williams, Lieutenant, gallantry of, 257. 
 
 WiLLOUGHBY, Lieutenant, devoted conduct of, 
 and companions, in the magazine at Dehli, 
 79-81. 
 
 Wilson, Captain, at the Residency, 144, 
 205. 
 
 Wilson, General Archdale, dilatory action of, 
 at Mirath, 68-71 ; answer of, to Mr Colvin, 
 122; marches from Mirath, 122; defeats the 
 rebels, 123-4 \ joins General Barnard, 124 ; 
 assumes command before Dehli, 288 ; influ- 
 enced by Baird-Smith, 288 ; is persuaded by 
 Eaird-Smith to attempt an assault, 290 ; 
 directs the cavalry to support the stormers, 
 304 ; discouragement of, 305 ; is urged to 
 persevere by Baird-Smith and Chamberlain, 
 305- 
 
 Windham, General, at Kanhpur, 337-9, 
 341- 
 
 Wolseley, Captain Garnet, carries the Moti 
 Mahal], 334. 
 
 Woodcock, Lieutenant, gallantry of, 303. 
 
 Wyndham, Captain, energetic conduct o'", at 
 Shorapur, 398-9. 
 
 Wynyakd, William, daring and cool judgment 
 of, 184, 350. 
 
 Yeomanry Cavalry, the, raised by Lord 
 
 Canning, 213, 349. 
 Yule, George, in Eastern Bihar, 345-6. 
 
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