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 Copy 1 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 
 OP 
 
 R. M. " T. HUNTER, OF VIRGINIA, 
 
 ON 
 
 072 the resolution of notice to Great Britain to abrogate the convention of joint 
 occupancy relative to the Oregon territory. 
 
 DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 10, 1848. l^^ 
 
 Mr. HUNTER rose and addressed the House 
 as follows.: 
 
 Mr. Chairman: I was one of those who regretted 
 that this debate should have arisen when it did. I 
 regarded it as premature and unfortunate, and I 
 feared that it might add to the difficulties in the way 
 of a wise and dispassionate settlement of the ques- 
 tion before us. But, so much has now been said, 
 that a yet fuller development of the opinion of this 
 House is perhaps due to the country, and ourselves. 
 For myself, 1 have been the more anxious to ex- 
 press my opinions at an early stage of the debate, 
 because I foresaw that 1 should be separated from 
 many, perhaps from most of my political friends 
 upon the question before us. I am happy to believe, 
 however, that the differences between us are not so 
 wide and deep as to be irreconcilable. This differ- 
 ence relates not so much to the end which we all desire 
 to attain, as to the. means by which it is to be pur- 
 sued. From what I have gathered of the opinions 
 of this House, I believe that all desire the pos- 
 session of Oregon, not only up to the parallel of 49°, 
 but to that of 54° 40.' Nearly all, so far as I am 
 informed, believe that our title to this country is 
 good, not only to the 49th parallel, but up to that of 
 54° 40V I, for one, entertain that opinion. The 
 whole question between us is as to the be s t and 
 wisest means of attaining an end which we all equal- 
 ly desire. Mr. Chairman, 1 have expressed the 
 opinion, that, without regard to the distinctions *>f 
 party or of sections, all of us desire the possession 
 of the whole territory in Oregon, to which we are 
 entitled. There is no man with an American heart 
 in iu'a bosom who could be insensible to the pros- 
 pect of planting our flag and our settlements upon 
 the shores of the Pacific. There is no such bosom 
 which would not swell with emotions of hope and 
 of pride at the prospect of the influence, commercial, 
 political, and military, which we should derive from 
 a position on the shores of Oregon and California, 
 should we be so fortunate as to be able to obtain the 
 last by just and equitable means. Looking to the 
 map of the globe, and taking the world over with 
 a view to its social and political relations, and to 
 
 fmysical characteristics, there is no such position 
 01 military strong^ and commercial supremacy, us 
 
 we shall occupy if our settlements should cover the 
 whole breadth of the continent from the Atlantic, to 
 the Pacific ocean, underourpresent form of govern- 
 ment. In the centre, lies the vast valley of the Missis- 
 sippi,* destined to be not only the hive, but the 
 storehouse of nations, and impregnably secured be- 
 hind the Alleghanies on the one side, and the 
 Rocky mountains on the other. In time of 
 war, a mighty reserve, ready to debouch on 
 either the Atlantic or the Pacific slope, to over- 
 whelm with irresistible force any foreign invasion, 
 and able in time of peace — teeming, as it will be, 
 with people and resources — to cherish and sustain 
 a vast commerce on either sea. From the Chesa- 
 peake northward, our harbors and rivers, commu- 
 nicating with vast inland seas, give us the most 
 commanding commercial position on the vast basin 
 of the Atlantic, which receives the waters and the 
 commerce of most of the large rivers of the world. 
 With Oregon and California, our position on the 
 Pacific would be nearly as commanding. We should 
 hold the advanced posts on the line of commercial 
 interchanges between the civilized portion of the 
 world, and most of that which is semi-civilized or 
 barbarous; and we should probably become the 
 centre of commercial transit between the two seas. 
 The possession of Oregon, and the peaceful acqui- 
 sition of California, would place this Union in a po- 
 sition of impregnable strength and stable greatness, 
 with one arm on the Atlantic sea and the other on 
 the Pacific shore, ready to strike in either direction, 
 with a rapidity and an efficiency not to be rivalled 
 by any nsOon on the earth. 
 
 I know that these speculations on the future are 
 uncertain and often dangerous; but it would seem to 
 be next to impossible that, with this position, and^ 
 with all these elements of military strength and of 
 political and commercial greatness, we should not 
 be able, not only to command the largest share of 
 the commerce of both seas, but also to protect and 
 advance the march of civilization throughout the 
 entire extent of this continent. With these views 
 of the subject, how could I be insensible to the im- 
 portance of maintaining our claims to Oregon? But 
 shall we best promote our purpose by adopting the 
 recommendation of the Committee on Foreign Af- 
 
fairs in rektion to the notice? With great defer- 
 ence to their matured and, perhaps, better opinion, 
 I must say that I think not. To determine this 
 question, it will be necessary to ascertain, a3 far as 
 possible, the probable consequences of either course, 
 as we may give, or refuse to give, the notice for the 
 termination of the convention of joint occupancy. 
 
 Let us, then, Mr. Chairman, examine this ques- 
 tion calmly and dispassionately. Let us view this 
 subject under none of the hallucinations of national 
 pride; let us approach it in no boastful or braggart 
 spirit, and with no disposition to use it as the mere 
 mean3 of flattering national vanity. Let us come 
 to it in that higher spirit which conscious strength 
 shouid inspire — with the feelings of those who are 
 too well satisfied of our title to the respect of the 
 world, and of our ability to hold our own, to be- 
 lieve that it can either be necessary or dignified to 
 deal in extravagant pretension or exaggerated asser- 
 tion. If there be such a spirit of inquiry in this body 
 to which I may address myself, I would ask, what 
 are to be the consequences if we give the notice? If the 
 notice begiven, the best result which can possibly flow 
 from it will be an adjustment of the difficulty by trea- 
 ty, upon the basis of a boundary on the 49th parallel 
 of latitude. Under existing circumstances, we can 
 ■expect no better treaty, and it is manifest that we 
 will take nothing worse. It is absurd to suppose 
 that Great Britain will offer to give us more than 
 "we have agreed to take. If this matter be amicably 
 adjusted, it is evident, under the existing slate of 
 the negotiations, that we get nothing beyond the 
 49ih parallel. Now, Mr. Chairman, such an ad- 
 justment, in my opinion, would be far better than 
 the doubtful chances of a war under the circum- 
 stances which at present surround us. But I should 
 certainly prefer the whole country up to 54° 40', if 
 there be means compatible with the peace and honor 
 of the nation, as I think there are, by which we 
 .should probably obtain the whole territory. But 
 how do those gentleman stand who support this 
 resolution as a peaceful measure, and yet maintain 
 that we can take nothing less than our whole claim 
 on Oregon. If the measure be peaceful, is it not 
 manifest that, by adopting it, they essentially aban- 
 don the whole country north of the 49th parallel? 
 If they adopt it as the means of obtaining the whole 
 country, they can only do so upon the supposition 
 that it is to lead to war, and that thus we shall ob- 
 tain the whole. I shall presently endeavor to ascer 
 tain what would be the probable consequences under 
 that conjuncture of circumstances. But here I must 
 pause to say, that I do not mean to disparage or 
 disapprove the proposition made by the administra- 
 tion to settle the question amicably upon the basis 
 of a boundary along the 49th parallel. Under the 
 circumstances, and from the course of previous ne- 
 gotiations, the President could have done no less 
 than to have made such an offer. It was due to 
 public opinion at home and abroad, it was due to 
 our national character, and the great interests of 
 humanity, that he should manifest a desire to do 
 much for an honorable peace. The terms which he 
 offered would have been considered by each party 
 to the dispute as falling short of the full measure of 
 their just claims, but in the more impartial, but, per- 
 haps, less informed opinion of. the residue of the. 
 civilized world, they would have been regarded as 
 fair, equitable, and honorable to both countries. He 
 would have done much, too, for the country in 
 thus securing, by peaceful and honorable means, 
 an advanced post for our population up to the 49th 
 
 parallel. He would have acquired, as far as I have 
 been able to inform myself, much the most valuable 
 portion of the country, both for commercial and 
 agricultural purposes. I know that the chairman 
 of the Committee on Foreign Affair3 has expressed 
 a different opinion. But with great deference and 
 respect for that opinion, I must be allowed to de- 
 clare my dissent from it. The opposite opinion ex- 
 pressed by Mr. Greenhow, to whose enlightened 
 researches the country is so much indebted, seems to 
 me to be sustained upon better grounds. The har- 
 bor of Port Discovery, of which Vancouver speaks 
 in terms so high, and the harbors on Admiralty 
 inlet, are said to be admirably adapted to the uses of 
 commerce. 
 
 As I am informed, they are better not only in nat- 
 ural capacity, but from position, than those higher 
 up on the coast. Of the superior agricultural ad- 
 vantages of the portion of the territory below the 
 49th parallel, I presume there can be no doubt, 
 and 1 think they are very generally admitted. The 
 President might well suppose that he would effect 
 much in securing the peaceful progress of our in- 
 fant settlement in Oregon up to the 49th parallel; and 
 this being done, he might safely leave it to time and 
 American enterprise to do the rest. But, Mr. 
 Chairman, let me return to the inquiry into the 
 probable consequences of giving this notioe. I have 
 said that the best possible result would be an adjust- 
 ment on the basis of a boundary along the 49th 
 parallel; but I have seen nothing as yet to convince 
 me that it was the most probable result. If the 
 minister from Great Britain refused to consider this 
 proposition, when made in the course of an amica- 
 ble and courteous correspondence, is it very proba- 
 ble that she will be more inclined to accept it when 
 we give the notice, under circumstances which im- 
 ply that she must either agree to our proposition, or 
 go to war for the whole country? If the British 
 minister represented the real views of his govern- 
 ment, is it probable that with their dispositions that 
 government will be the more inclined to accept our 
 offer on account of the threat which it may suppose 
 to be implied by our giving the notice? If she re- 
 ally designs to go to war, rather than compromise 
 upon the terms which we proposed, is there any- 
 thing unreasonable in supposing that she might 
 think the present time and circumstances as. favora- 
 ble as any likely to occur for striking the blow? If she 
 really attaches the importance to her whole claim on 
 Oregon, which many seem to imagine, and regards a 
 war for it as inevitable, will she not think that the 
 sooner she strikes the blow the better for her? Or if, on 
 the other hand, she is anxious to settle the question 
 amicably, and desires nothing more than terms 
 which may be regarded as honorable by her own 
 people and by the world, will this spirit be conciliated 
 by our giving the notice, and by the circumstances 
 under which it will be given? To sum up the whole, 
 is it not manifest, on the one hand, that if this step 
 should lead to war, we give to Great Britain, in- 
 stead of reserving it to ourselves, the advantage of 
 choosing her own time for it? If, on the other hand, 
 this be designed as a peace measure, is it not more 
 likely to defeat, than to encourage a renewal of ne- 
 gotiations in a sensitive and hi»h spirited people? 
 Such seems to me to be its probable ten- 
 dencies; and unless Great Britain should think 
 this disputed territory to be of little value 
 to her, however important it might be to us, 
 and unless she entertains a strong desire for peace, 
 I can see no other result to flow from this notice eo 
 
probable as that of war. One thing is perfectly j not only for Oregon, but Texas alao. The Indian 
 f relear; this measure must either lead to a settlement tribes beyond the Rocky mountains are known to be 
 on the basis of a boundary along the 49th parallel, ' under the influence of the Hudson Bay Company, 
 • or it must produce war. Our western friends say j and it is probable that most of the western Inuiaus 
 ^£that they will be content with nothing less than the ] would take sides with Great Britain in the event of 
 -'-whole extent of our claim; and if this be so, is not a war between her and this country. Under these 
 war inevitable, under present circumstances? If war circumstances, what would become of Oregon, and of 
 ie to be the mode of settling this question at last, it ' our infant settlements on the Columbia? 1 believe it 
 would seem to me that it would be far wiser to pre- j is the opinion of our best military authorities, and, 
 serve the present state of affairs, that we may be indeed, the very general opinion, that, during the 
 able to choose our own time for fighting, and select war, Oregon itself must be abandoned, and that we 
 a period when we were better prepared for the con- shouid have to strike in anada, and upon the seas, 
 test, and when the attendant circumstances might be And yet gentlemen coolly demand war, or what 
 more propitious. Let us look, Mr. Chairman, into ( will lead to war, as a duty which we owe our peo- 
 the circumstances under which this war would now pie in Oregon, when it is manifest hat the very first 
 be waged, and ascertain, if we can, its probable con- step of that war would be to abandon them unpro- 
 sequences. Have we made any of the military tected to British troops, to the Hudson Bay Corn- 
 preparations necessary for such an event? Would pany, and their savage allies — to a war, unless they 
 one, or even two years, suffice for the preparation i at once made terms for themselves, as likely to be 
 proper for such a contest? If war be inevitable, is signalized by all the circumstances of barbaric 
 notour internal condition such as to make delay atrocity as any of which we have an account. Those 
 desirable? The whole country is just recovering unfortunate people might well ask the chairman of 
 from a deep financial depression. Many of the Foreign Affairs if this be what he calls '-ackingof 
 States are either unable, or barely able, to pay their his friends?" In such a contest, is it not probable 
 own debts. They are not in a condition to bear , that Oregon would be lost only to be recovered, if 
 the weight of internal taxation, which must be one ; ever, by another war, to be undertaken at a more 
 of the main resources of the war. A few years auspicious period? If this struggle were now to be 
 hence, a different and more favorable state of things commenced, I do not believe that there would even 
 might be fairly expected. What, let me ask, would . be an effort made to send troop.? to Oregon. It 
 be our position in the public opinion of the world? : would be regarded as a w iste of men and means, at 
 We break off the negotiation because our proposi- | a time when, with Mexico to the southwest, with the 
 tion was not accepted, and we give the notice under Indian tribes on our western frontier, wi'h British 
 circumstances which proclaim that there must be and Canadian troops on our north, ami with British 
 war, unless she will settle the question upon our own j fleets covering the eastern and southern line of our 
 terms. She has offered us a mode of settling this j coast, we should be encircled as with a wall of fire. I 
 dispute, now universally regarded amongst civilized ( doubt not but that we should emerge from it victo- 
 nations as a fair and honorable method of adjusting I rious. It is not on the soil Which we occupy that 
 national controversies — I mean arbitration. This j we can be conquered, or even be worsted. I bare 
 we have already refused; nor do I disapprove of full faith in American spirit and pattjotism. But I 
 
 that refusal, under the circumstances then existing. 
 She will probably offer it again, and we shall again 
 refuse it. I do not stand here, Mr. Chairman, as 
 the advocate of arbitration; upon that question I 
 
 do not believe that we should pass unscathed thr.-.Uih 
 that fiery trial, nor ought we to task too highly 
 those great qualities of our people i>y exposing them 
 to unnecessary difficulties, as we. should do if w<- en- 
 hare nothing to say at present;' I am merely deal- j gage in a war before we are prepared for it. or if we 
 ing in facts, with a view to the consequences, make war to attain what might lie had far more <-er- 
 ~~ e shall again refuse arbitration, Mr. Chairman; and i tainly and honorably by peaceful mea s. That we 
 
 why? Because we say there are none of the nations 
 of the world whose governments are honest and im- 
 partial enough to decide this controversy between us 
 This may all be so; but will a refusal of arbitration 
 for such reasons be likely to win us much of the 
 sympathy of the world? Under these circum- 
 stances, am I wrong in supposing that the world 
 will be apt to regard us as the aggressor? The pub- 
 lic opinion of Christendom would be thus defied at 
 the time when Great Britain has a better under- 
 standing with the continental states of Europe than 
 she has ever enjoyed at any previous period of her 
 history, so far as I am acquainted with it. The 
 "cordial understanding" between herself and France, 
 her ancient enemy and our former ally, is notorious 
 throughout the world. Under these circumstan- 
 ces, what chance should we have for either sympa 
 thy or assistance from any of these powers in the 
 event of a war? But this is not the whole view of 
 the existing state of our foreign relations, and its 
 connexion with our prospects in a war. If we have 
 a war with Great Britain about this time, shall we 
 not probably have Mexico alao on our hands? It 
 ia known that she is sore under recent occurrences, 
 and it is equally notorious that she is much under 
 British influence. We should probably have a war 
 
 should cwmeoutof such a c nite^t with honor, I do 
 not doubt; but that we .should lose as much or more 
 of Oregon than would be given up by any treaty 
 likely to be made, 1 regard *>• also pRob-thle If war 
 be the only mode of maintaining our ri^h s in Ore- 
 gon, that war. ought to be d« frrred, as it is m uiifest 
 that our chances for success m'.st m iea-e with eve- 
 ry year of delay. Butif there be peaceful a»id hon- 
 orable means (as I shall end avoi to show hfreafn r) 
 which would more pro'.ahly give us the wh >ie terri- 
 tory, we owe it to ourselves and lothe world W adopt 
 them. 
 
 Butgeniemen have promised that if war be once 
 commenced with Great Britain, we shall terminate 
 it by driving her from this con incur, and depriving 
 her of all that she claims or possesses upon it. I 
 do not stand here, Mr. Chairman, to take issue with 
 that proposition; I mean neither to a(Ti m nor deny 
 it. 1 will not even ask if ''our old men see visions 
 and our young men dream dreams " 1 will suppose 
 the anticipation to be, true; and I shall endeavor to 
 trace such a war as this would be to its cm -sequen- 
 ces, to see if the chance or the certainty of acquiring 
 Oregon a few years sooner, would compensate us 
 for them. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, I know of no instance ifl wh. ch & 
 
4 
 
 nation, pretending to independence, and the equality- 
 supposed to result from it, has yielded up the 
 -whole subject of dispute which had led to the ware 
 There is, it is true, more than one shining instanc. 
 in which a nation has conquered its independence 
 without impairing the position of equality of its op- 
 ponent. There are instances, too, in which a con- 
 quered people have yielded all. But I know of no 
 treaty in modern times, between equals, in which 
 one of the parties, after a war, has given up the 
 whole subject in controversy without ail equivalent. 
 There may be such instances, but T do not remem- 
 ber one, even in the most successful period of the 
 career of Napoleon. Neither Marengo nor Auster- 
 jitz ever gave him such results in his treaties with 
 Austria. Of all the European nations, Great Brit- 
 ain is the most distinguished for the pertinacity with 
 which she has hitherto struggled for her rights and 
 her honor. Now, Mr. Chairman, is there a man 
 amongst us who supposes — does the wildest dream- 
 er of us all believe — that she would ever close 
 a war by yielding not only the whole subject in dis- 
 pute, but her own undoubted territory until she had 
 first waged it, and been defeated in it, as a war not 
 only of mastery, but of existence ? Would her sa- 
 gacious statesmen be slow to perceive that any 
 treaty which branded her with the visible stamp of 
 inferiority alter a war, would be the sure precursor 
 of her downfall? She knows that the hungry 
 and expectant eye of continental Europe is fixed 
 upon the prey which a division of her mighty em- 
 pire would afford. She is aware, too, that the cal- 
 culation has already been made as to how far the 
 invention of steam has destroyed the security of 
 her natural defences — of her insular position. She 
 no longer feels able to continue the proud boast that 
 "Britannia needs no bulwarks, no towers along the 
 steep;" for she is now engaged in constructing coast 
 defences. She must feel that the whole charm of her 
 power lies in the idea of her invincibility on the seas 
 and in her colonial possessions. To destroy by her 
 one act this idea, would be to hold forth the signal for 
 the eagles to gather to the banquet, and would involve 
 the loss of power, empire, and character itself. Can I 
 be mistaken in supposing that a war which brought 
 her to such a conclusion, would probably be the 
 longest and bloodiest ever known in the annals of 
 mankind ? Gentlemen have promised that this 
 thing shall be done. I do not stand her to dispute 
 it. in the event of a war, I wish that they may 
 be able to make good their words. But before 
 this can be accomplished, we must track the British 
 lion in his blood from the rising to the setting sun. 
 We must hunt him from stronghold to stronghold, 
 until we have pursued him throughout the circum- 
 ference of the globe. Every sea, every clime must 
 become familiar with the noise of the terrific 
 strife. Ear distant people, nations to whom as yet 
 ■we are scarcely known, must be startled at the 
 apparition of this new power which is to struggle 
 with Great Britain for the mastery in places where 
 she had long reigned the most supreme. Erom 
 Aden to the Ionian isles we must pursue her over 
 wave and through fortress, on one continuous line 
 of blood and fire, until we have swept her flag from 
 the seas, and buried her fleets in the ocean. We 
 jmust throw down her places of strength; we must 
 despoil even her gardens of "pleasaunce." Yes, 
 sir; to this dreadful extremity must we bring her, 
 before she can agree to conclude the contest upon 
 terms which would destroy her most cherished sen- 
 timent of national pride, and probably lead to the 
 
 destruction of the mightiest empire which, as yet, 
 the world has known. 
 
 If we are to obtain what gentlemen have promised 
 us, such must be the war which we are to' 
 wage. What, Mr. Chairman, must be the con- 
 sequences of such a war upon ourselves and our in- 
 stitutions? Who can foresee these consequences in all 
 their extent, or undertake to measure the results? 
 How great would be the danger of a centrali- 
 zation of all power in the federal govern- 
 ment, and of an obliteration of the lines of State 
 authority? How many hundreds of millions of 
 debt should we entail on ourselves and our posteri- 
 ty? How far should we fall into the lower depths 
 of the paper system? To how distant a day in the 
 Greek calends should we postpone those great 
 democratic reforms which we had fondly hoped we 
 were about to introduce, and for which we have 
 labored so long and often with such doubtful suc- 
 cess? We should go into the war a free, happy, 
 and moral people. Who can undertake to foretell 
 the extent and nature of the transformations which 
 we may undergo before wc come out of it, or who 
 can measure the waste of all the elements of hu- 
 man happiness and social order which such a war 
 would occasion? Should we be justified in the eyes 
 of God, or of mankind, for thus perilling the great 
 interests of our country and of humanity for the 
 sake of obtaining possession of Oregon a few years 
 earlier, when we are sure of acquiring it a little la- 
 ter by honorable and peaceful means? Could we 
 be justified in exposing the country to such ex- 
 tremity if there be even a probable chance of ac- 
 quiring the territory by means not only peaceful 
 but compatible with our honor? Or if war and such 
 a war be inevitable, ought we not to postpone it un- 
 til we hare more men, more means, more resources, 
 and more auspicious circumstances for its com- 
 mencement' But, Mr. Chairman, it may be said 
 that in my view of the probable consequences of 
 such a war as that must be which should lead to 
 such a conclusion as is promised, I have virtually 
 admitted that the republican system of policy is 
 practicable only in time of peace. Such is not my 
 opinion. Wc have not had time as yet to intro- 
 duce or mature our system. The ideas upon whi«h 
 they rest are not fully possessed by the public 
 mind. They require time and a period of peace for 
 their full development. But if once matured and 
 developed, I believe they would enable our govern- 
 ment and people to stand the shock and pressure of 
 war with far greater ease and buoyancy than under 
 any other course of policy. I, for one, am of the 
 opinion that if wewere now to plunge into war we 
 should fall into some of the worst forms of the paper 
 system, owing to the remains of what I believe to 
 be a wrong idea once implanted in the public mind; 
 and yet 1 believe that the expenses of a war could 
 be far better sustained without these abuses of that 
 system than with them. I have long thought that 
 we suffered almost as much in the last war from 
 such abuses as from the British troops. But, Mr. 
 Chairman, I have yet another answer. The genius 
 of our institutions is pacific — they were not organ- 
 ized for distant and offensive warfare. For defen- 
 sive war I believe they are the strongest in the world, 
 for they bring to its aid the united hearts of our peo- 
 ple. We were not organized for a career of war and 
 conquest, and I thank God for it; for then we should 
 have required a far more despotic form of govern- 
 ment, and we might have stood as fair a chance as 
 any to become the curse of mankind, instead of being 
 
5 
 
 their benefactors, as I maintain we have been by i there are others, again, upon which peculiar and 
 the example of our institutions and our progress, sometimes transient circumstances give her the si;- 
 We have always been proud to believe that ours periority. In a war for Oregon, at this time, she 
 was a higher and more glorious destiny; we have possesses superior advantages in her long-estabiish 
 
 believed ic to be our destiny to achieve our triumphs 
 in the useful arts of peace, to subdue the difficulties 
 and master the secrets of nature, to adorn and culti 
 Tate the earth, to introduce a new and a higher civili 
 
 ed and sedulously-cultivated influence over the In- 
 dian tribes, in the command of the forces of the 
 Hudson Bay Company which are at hand, and in 
 the facility with which she couW transport troops 
 
 zation, to develop better forms of social and political from her various stations on the Pacific. But if we 
 organization, and to minister to the progress and the wait a few years, the balance of power muse change- 
 universal peace and happiness of mankind by the ' Circumstances will cast it on our side as they now 
 Leneficent example of a free and happy people, who ' do on hers; and in a contest — if contest there must 
 were wealthy without rapine, strong without crime, i be for Oregon — we shall be found the stronger party 
 great without war, and peaceful without fear. To- j in that territory. But it has been said that, if we 
 wards these great and benficent ends we have already ! refuse to give this notice, we shall violate our na- 
 done much- and in doing it we have won more true' tional honor. How? Has our sensibility on this 
 glory than if, like Tamerlane, we had left pyramids j point been just now awakened ? From 1818 to this 
 of human heads as the monuments of victory, or ; day we have never felt this joint occupation to be a 
 like Attiia or Alaric, the scourge of God and the pest stain upon our national honor. Has it ever been 
 of nations, ravaged and desolated the earth in the I pretended until recently that it was a disgrace to 
 storm of our warfare. Our thousand of miles of rail- j continue the convention ? Is there anything dishon- 
 roads and canals which have thrown down the bar- . orable in adjourning a dispute, without the least sur- 
 ficrs of nature to the affiliation ef our people, and to ! render of our rights, and upon terms which give us 
 the common and kindly interchange of so much that ' every chance of acquiring peaceably all that we 
 ministers to the happiness of man, are far nobler j claim? The other party, with her eyes open, has 
 monuments to the genius of a people than the col- \ insisted upon placing the determination of the con- 
 
 umn 6f Trajan or the palace of Blenheim. These 
 are the monuments which are worthy our name and 
 our destiny 
 
 troversy upon this issue, in which fhe advantages are 
 all on one side. Is it not a wiser as well as a more 
 moderate mode of disposing of the matter to abide 
 
 But, Mr! Chairman, I return to the inquiry which j by these terms? Let things remain, then, as they 
 I was pursuing. I have endeavored to give gentle- 1 are, and let us pass such measures as may encour- 
 jmen the advantage of their own suppositions; and j age our settlements in the disputed territory without 
 jn whatever way 1 have turned the tapestry for i contravening any treaty stipulations. Thousands, 
 them, the picture has seemed to be forbidding. But j or even hundreds of thousands, expended in judi- 
 most so in that aspect which gave us the picture of cious measures for colonization would do far more 
 War waged to such extremeties as some gentlemen for our ultimate possession of the territory, and be 
 have promised. But is there a real probability that far better appropriated than millions lavished on the 
 the war would be waged to such extremities by two uncertainties of an unnecessary war. I put it, sir. 
 
 nations whose powers of mutual annoyance are so 
 great, and whose capacities for mutual benefit are 
 so large? Is is not likely that both nations would 
 lire of a contest so destructive and bloody, and agree 
 
 to considerate western men — to those who desir^ 
 Oregon more than war — if such a course of policy be 
 not the wisest which we can pursue with reference 
 even to the single end of acquiring the territory which 
 
 to terminate it'by an arbitration which, in the univer- 1 they so much desire. I know that the gentleman 
 eal opinion of the civilized world, is considered a fair I from Indiana, [Mr. Owen,] has said that the Hud- 
 and honorable mode of adjusting national differences? son Bay Company would interpose obstacles to our 
 
 Sir, 1 believe that if there should be war, it will 
 most probably terminate in an arbitration, and thus 
 we should have an arbitration and war, when we 
 
 settlement north of the Columbia river, by buying 
 out those of our citizens who attempted to plant 
 themselves on that side. He has mentioned one 
 
 we might have had an arbitration without a war. case in which he hag known that to be done. Pos- 
 Could any man hesitate between such alternatives? sibly there may have been more; but is not thatdis- 
 But gentlemen here are against an arbitration, i tinguished gentleman too well aware of the great 
 I myself wish to avoid it, and I believe this may laws of trade to suppose that they wouiu long keep 
 easily be done by means which most probably ; up that game? Besides, this is a game at which more 
 
 would secure us the whole territory in peace and 
 honor. Let us refuse to give the notice; leave 
 the negotiations to stand where they are; for we 
 have now done all that it becomes us to do in the 
 line of negotiation. We have offered a compromise 
 upon liberal terms which has been refused, and we 
 have manifested a proper desire for peace. Let us 
 now rely upon our superior means of colonization. 
 
 than one might play. Does he, or any other marv 
 believe that if our settlements are once firmly planted 
 south of the Columbia the crack of our American 
 rifles, and the sound of the axe of our western pio- 
 neer will not, in due time, be heard not only north 
 of that river, but north of the 4Uth parallel? 
 
 But it is said that England will not allow this, and 
 that if this course of policy be attempted, she will 
 Great Britain has elected to leave the ultimate pos- ■ ere long give notice herself, and declare war up- 
 session of the territory to depend on our relative ca- j on us. Let her if she chooses; let her if she dares. 
 pacities for settling it. In this contest, the advan- She then would become the aggressor, and in such 
 tages are on our side, and it must end in putting us j a war we should be sustained not only by our own 
 in possession of all that we claim. We thus avoid i conviction of right, but by the general sympathies 
 the chance of losing the territory altogether. There of mankind. It would unite our people instantly 
 are gentlemen, I know, who are disposed to smile at and effectually; and with one heart and with one 
 this; but let me remind them that, in comparing our- j mind, they would rally to the rescue of national 
 selves with Great Britain, they must remember that j rights and national honor with all the advantages of 
 
 there are some theatres where we are her superior, | previous preparation, and with the spirit which has 
 
 equal, and heretofore distinguished them. But is it probable 
 
 there are others where we are her 
 
5 
 
 lhat she would do this? Is she in a position to do 
 it with her own expressed views of the grounds of 
 her title.' She claims a right to joint occupation in 
 Oregon under the conve n'inn mado in 1813, and in- 
 definitely continued in 1827. Whilst this conven- 
 tion continues, she enjoys the joint occupancy by a 
 title to which we assent. Suppose she were to 
 put an end to this convention, she would but revert 
 to her title under that of Nootka Sound, by which 
 she herself claims Only a right of joint occupancy, 
 and under which her own commissioners have dis- 
 claimed a title ti> exclusive sovere'gnty in any por- 
 tion of the territory. If she were to give the notice 
 to term:n?."e. our convention, under these circum- 
 stances she would stand in the attitude of abandon- 
 ing a right which she held Ly a title to which we 
 assented, to claim it again by another which we re- 
 fused to acknowledge. She would thus place her- 
 self before the world as seeking war for war's sake, 
 and assume the position of an unprovoked and wan- 
 ton aggret-sor. In this attitude'of affairs, h^w could 
 she hold up her head in the face of Christendom, or 
 invoke the blessing's of the God of battles in a con- 
 test which she had so insolently and wantonly pro- 
 Toked? But could she have any adequate motive 
 for so wanton an outrage? She can have no in- 
 terest in the permanent possession of this north- 
 west coast. She; finds far more eligible sites 
 of colonization in New Holland, New Zealand, the 
 Cape of Good Hope, and in the Canadas. These 
 colo.ifs would contribute to the consolidation and 
 Strength of her empire. They lie, too, En the path- 
 way of hfr commerce. She has here territory 
 enough to absorb all her immediate and prospective 
 means of colonization for a century, perhaps for 
 centuries to come. It may be important to her to 
 hold there for a time certain subordinate right-; of 
 occupation short of the sovereignty of the country 
 in Oregon But of what use cat! it be to her to set- 
 tle her citizens on the north Pacific coast? It is 
 not in the pathway of her commerce, although it 
 is invaluable to us for curs. She ha? no back coun- 
 try to supply through the little strip of settlement 
 which she might attempt upon the coast; but v/e 
 have, and its products seek an outlet by our com- 
 merce oti the western ocean. But grant that she 
 desires it ever so much; must she not know per- 
 fectly well that the thing is hopeless? She may 
 desire it as tie means of keeping us out, but with 
 what probability of success? The mighty wave of 
 our ponulatiori is yearly advancing westward at the 
 rate of halfad^gre'e of longitude on a line of more 
 than three hundred le gues. Could she expect her 
 feeble settlements o-i the western coast to resist the 
 ■vast, inert esiiig; and resistless pressure, when, with 
 the mighty weighi of our populeuionjfrom the Atlan- 
 tic to the Rocky mountains, this wave shail pour 
 down the Pacific slope? Her statesmen are too 
 wise to expect it; and it is not likely that, for the 
 sake of the little advantage which she miirht have in 
 that quarter, she would expose herself to the con- 
 stant hazitu of a war with U3. Our mutual means 
 of annoyance are too great; our mutual interests in a 
 reciprocal commerce are too vast for her to be wil- 
 lin°- to ri.-k the consequences of a war for an object 
 so pe'.y to her, however important it might be to 
 us. 
 
 But it hr.sbeen said by some gentlemen that Great 
 Britain possesses as great facilities for colonization 
 in Oregon as we do; and it has been apprehended ' 
 that she mi;-ht give this new direction to the tide of 
 her emigration. I have no fears upon thi3»subject. 
 
 I reason from the past to the future. If she has not 
 done it heretofore, it is not likely that she will do it 
 hereafter. She can have no stronger inducements 
 to this policy for the future than she has already 
 had in the past. Emigrants from the Old World 
 would no more suit Oregon than Oregon would suit 
 them. It is only by a people trained like our west- 
 ern pioneers, that this territory can ever be reduced 
 to the permanent use and occupation of man. The 
 superiority of our means for colonization is already 
 evinced by the difference in the character of the set- 
 tlements of the two countries. Our people do not go 
 to Oregon to hunt and fish, and take up a temporary 
 abode there. They ^o to settle the country — 
 to cultivate and improve the soil — and to 
 leave an inheritance to their posterity. The Brit- 
 ish settlements, on the other hand, are temporary 
 and fugitive. They go their for hunting and for In- 
 dian trade. It is no part of the British policy to 
 colonize Oregon,- and it never will be. The fart that 
 she rests her title on the Nootka Sound convention, 
 and claims nothing more than the right of joint oc- 
 cupancy under it, would seem to indicate that she 
 considers it as a temporary station, and looks for- 
 ward to its ultimate abandonment. If this country 
 is fit for agricultural settlements, and our people 
 should seek it for that purpose, then by a most 
 "manifest destiny" it must be ours. 
 
 Mr. C. J. Ingersoll speaking across. How, if 
 they should set up for themselves? 
 
 The honorable chairman has asked me whether 
 the people of Oregon will set up an independent gov- 
 ernment for themselves. I have no idea that they 
 will. If this nation shall proceed in its present 
 course, gradually occupying and taking possession, 
 of the entire breadth of the continent, from the At- 
 lantic to the Pacific coast, we shall possess a cohe- 
 sive strength, from our social organization, and phys- 
 ical and geographical position, which must bind us in 
 an indissoluble union. Instead of forming separate 
 and independent communities, our population would 
 present to the world the glorious spectacle of a re- 
 public, the greatest and the widest that the earth 
 ever saw, with interests different, but not hostile, 
 with regions distinct, indeed, but not in opposition, 
 each ancillary to the other, and all contributing to 
 the general strength and prosperity. 
 
 Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, speaking across. But 
 how, if there should be a black tariff? 
 
 Mr. H. continued. Let this state of things once 
 come, and I tell the gentleman that we shall hear no 
 more about the "black tariff." Open to us the vast 
 Pacific market in addition to that which we now 
 enjoy on the Atlantic, let the productions of the 
 country take their natural and unrestricted course 
 to pour themselves into both, and there will be no 
 danger of hostile rivalry, of separation, or of anew 
 republic setting up for itself. The ties of union, 
 would strengthen with every hour — mutual benefits 
 and mutual interests would link us indissolubly to- 
 gether. There is no danger of disunion. Our great- 
 est present danger is from rushing into a war before 
 we are prepared for it. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, I again appeal to all candid and 
 reflecting men from the West — to those who go for 
 Oregon, and the whole of Oregon — to those who 
 might desire war for Oregon, but who do not desire 
 Oregon for war — I appeal to these men to say if the 
 course of policy which would lead to such a con- 
 summation as I have described, be not the proper 
 line to be pursued? If we would see thia prospect 
 realized certainly, though gradually, we must let 
 
this controversy remain as it ie. Let us not renew 
 the negotiation; make no more offers to Great 
 Britain; but let us trust to the process of coloniza- 
 tion now so rapidly in progress, and we shall 
 quietly, peaceably, and certainly obtain the whole 
 of what we claim. I care not how glorious 
 the war may be, it would be better to avoid it; for 
 it is in this way alone that we may reasonably hope 
 to obtain what gentlemen eo ardently desire — "the 
 •whole of Oregon." Let things remain ns they are. 
 It would seem to be impossible that Great Britain 
 should pat an end to the joint occupancy as long as 
 she rests her title on the Nootka Sound convention, 
 under which she claims joint occupancy, and noth- 
 ing more. In the meantime, let us go on and fill 
 the country; let us pass such measures as, without 
 violating the treaty, would contribute to that end; 
 and then if we should find it necessary ultimately to 
 eo to war, we can choose our own time for do- 
 ing it. 
 
 But my v/estern friends seem disposed to reproach 
 the South in this matter, as if it were ungrateful in 
 them to resist that mode of obtaining Oregon which 
 so many of them regard as the best. Nothing could 
 pain me more than such an imputation. The South 
 acknowledges its obligations to our western friends; 
 we feel it, feel it deeply and strongly, and would 
 most gladly requite it. This I believe we may do 
 by pursuing such a course of policy as presents the 
 only hope of obtaining all Oregon, whilst it would 
 save us from the dangers and sacrifices of a war for 
 which we are unprepared, and into which we must 
 enter under circumstances less propitious than they 
 are ever likely to be hereafter. But whilst I advo- 
 cate this as the wisest and most statesmanlike poli- 
 cy, I trust that my western friends will understand 
 me. Whilst in this matter I pursue the path which 
 I have taken iwider convictions of duty quite as 
 deep and strong as their own, 1 hope they will per- 
 mit me to follow it without reproach, so long as I 
 cast no reproaches on them for choosing a different 
 route, which I regard as much more perilous, not 
 only to the great interests of the country, but to our 
 chances for the ultimate possession of Oregon. 1 
 will aid them in such measures as I believe would 
 •most certainly enable us to obtain possession of the 
 whole country; but I cannot assist in those which 
 would probably defeat that object. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, I am not one of those who have 
 ever said or thought that Oregon was not worth a 
 "war. I:* it were a barren rock in the ocean, if it 
 were a mere idle strip of seashore sand, the coun- 
 try ought to fight for it sooner than suffer itself to 
 be dispossessed by violence. To depress the na- 
 tional tone, to degrade the national spirit, would be 
 far worse than w.ir itself. I feel the solemn respon- 
 sibility which rests upon us to defe:id by war, even, 
 (if war should be necessary as the only means for 
 that purpose,) every inch of American soil, through- 
 out the whole length of our possessions, from the 
 extreme regions of the frozen north down to the sun- 
 ny slopes which look to the burning line, through- 
 Cut their whole breadth, from the rising to the set- 
 ting sun, from the "steep Atlantic stream" to the 
 far Pacific wave. But whilst we admit the 
 truth of these sentiments, let us rememb-er, 
 at the same time, that war is never justifiable 
 until it becomes necessary; and before that can be 
 shown we must first have exhausted all honorable 
 and proper measures to preserve o«r rights in peace 
 I maintain, sir, that there are such means at our dis- 
 posal, and by adopting thens we may not only avoid 
 
 the dangers of war, but probably the chance of lo- 
 sing Oregon. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, 1 will go farther. If from the ac- 
 tion of this House, or from any other circumstances, 
 war should occur, although there may be southern 
 men who believe that it could have been avoided, yet 
 I take this occasion to say to the West, that when 
 it becomes clearly necessary and presents the only 
 remaining mode of obtaining our rights, they will 
 find the South standing by the country and by them 
 with heart and hand. Yes, when that hour comes — 
 and God grant that there may never be a necessity 
 for it — the maxim of the gallant Decatur will find 
 one universal acceptation amongst the whole 
 American people — "our country, right or wrong." 
 Many may be found deeply deploring, in- 
 deed, the mismanagement, or the necessity, 
 which has plunged the country into war, but 
 they will not pause to settle the question of 
 responsibility until ihey have first done all that be- 
 comes them to preserve national rights and honor. I 
 must, however, here declare, in a spirit of entire 
 frankness, that if, by giving this notice, we should 
 ultimately either lose Oregon or be led into an unne- 
 cessary war to obtain it, those who give this notice 
 will be held responsible, at the proper time, for all 
 its consequences. It. is the undoubted duty of every 
 section of this confederacy, North, South, East, and 
 West, to defend the national soil, and protect the 
 national honor. But we owe it to ourselves, to our 
 posterity, and to the great interests of humanity, to 
 exhaust all honorable mean3 of peace before we 
 plunge the nation into war. Wo to the people 
 amongst whom war becomes a familiar and 
 a household word, and wo to the statesman 
 who cultivates a spirit of violence amongst 
 those whom he influences, instead of cherish- 
 ing a disposition to peace. In this connexion, 
 Mr. Chairman, I must be permitted to express the 
 profound regret with which I have heard some of 
 the remarks made in this debate. There are ele- 
 ments enough of strife abroad in the public mind 
 without enlisting the passions further in the work of 
 havoc and ruin. It was with the deepest regret that 
 1 heard members upon this floor taunting the admin- 
 istration, and declaring the belief that it would 
 "back out," and that it could not be "kicked into a 
 war." These sounds fell on my ear like the echoes 
 of something of which I had heard before, and 
 which contributed to the same result upon another 
 occasion — a result for which a necessity then ex- 
 isted, however unfortunate it might be now. 
 
 There never was, there never can be, an admin- 
 istration elected by the people of this country, 
 which could refuse a war, if national rights and 
 honor required it. None but a timid administra- 
 tion can be "kicked into a war" by domestic oppo- 
 nents. It requires far more courage to resist a war- 
 cry than to yield to it. It sometimes requires 
 more moral firmness and greater and higher qualities 
 of mind to withstand the first outburst of the war 
 feeling, and calmly to appeal to the sober second 
 thought of a reflecting people for ultimate in- 
 structions, than to be the hero of a hundred 
 fields. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, I will now say, and I desire my 
 words to be noted, that if any gentleman here be- 
 lieves that this notice will lead to war, and yet votes 
 for it under the hope that the President will back 
 out sooner than face the result, he is utterly mista- 
 ken. This administration will not back out from 
 any position which it has taken in the face of the 
 
s 
 
 world, and before the American people. Whoev- 1 
 cr, therefore, votes for this measure, foreseeing, but j 
 not desiring its consequences, will be far more res- j 
 ponsible for the result, in a moral point of view, than 
 the administration which has acted, as I believe, j 
 from an honest though erroneous conviction of? 
 duty. 
 
 Mr. Chairman, I will conclude by observing, j 
 that I am fully aware that nothing which I can say j 
 will influence the action of this House. 1 never ex- 
 pected that it would. But I have presented my j 
 views upon this subject fully and frankly, in order j 
 that I may place myself fairly before my constitu- j 
 ents and friends, who alone feel an interest in my ; 
 course. My sole aim has been to vindicate myself 
 with them. Would to God that I had the power to j 
 reach the heart of the House and the nation ! 
 Would to God that I could persuade them to be- 
 Ware, ere they precipitated themselves into a war, I 
 and exposed themselves to consequences which no j 
 eye but that above can measure or pursue. 1 would J 
 beseech my countrymen first to exhaust all the j 
 means of preserving peace with honor. They owe ! 
 
 this to themselves and their posterity, to the char- 
 acter ofthe country, to the hopes of our race, and 
 the great interests of humanity. If these measures 
 should fail, and war should become inevitable, we 
 should go into it a united people, with one heart 
 and with one mind. We should go into it with 
 those high feelings with which conscious rectitude, 
 and an outraged spirit can alone inspire a man or a 
 people. We should carry with us the sympathies 
 of Christendom; and, more than all, we might de- 
 voutly invoke the blessing of the God of battles in a 
 contest which we had alone nothing to provoke, 
 and we had sought by all honorable means to avert. 
 If war should become the only remedy for wound- 
 ed honor and violated right, all will rally to the res- 
 cue of the country, and to avenge its wrongs. As 
 devoted as any in the glorious band, I will venture 
 to say, the sons of the South will be found at thu 
 post of duty — not standing by. as cold-hearted 
 spectators, or as laggards in the day of trial. No, 
 sir; they will be found 
 
 True to tbe last of their blood and their breath, 
 And like reapers descend to the harvest of death. 
 
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