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-P,
THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR
OF 1812
THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES
ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
By the liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph.D., of New
York City, the Johns Hopkins University has been
enabled to provide an annual course of lectures on
Diplomatic History. The courses are included in the
regular work of the Department of History and are
published under the direction of Professor John
H. Latan6.
THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1914
THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR
OF 1812
BY
FRANK A. yPDYKE, Ph.D.
IRA ALLEN EASTMAN PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
BALTIMORE
The Johns Hopkins Press
1915
Copyright, 1915
By The Johns Hopkins Press
PRESS OF
THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY
LANCASTER, PA.
©CI,A401009
To E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS, LL.D.
TEACHER AND FRIEND
STRONG, FEARLESS, SINGLE-MINDED, LARGE-SOULED, WHOSE DEVO-
TION TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS HAS INSPIRED THE LIVES OF THOU-
SANDS TO HIGH INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ENDEAVOR
CONTENTS
Page
Preface ix
Chapter I. Impressment i
Chapter IL Neutral Trade 6i
Chapter III. Declaration of War and Peace
Proposals 125
Chapter IV. Acceptance of Great Britain's
Proposal for Direct Negotia-
tions 165
Chapter V. The Opening of Peace Negotia-
tions at Ghent 198 ~
Chapter VI. The Indian Question and the
Canadian Boundary 235
Chapter VII. Modification of British De-
mands 277 ^
Chapter VIII. Conclusion of the Peace Nego-
tiation 320 '^
Chapter IX. Ratification and Reception of
the Treaty 358 ■^'
Chapter X. The Execution of the Treaty
of Ghent 399
Chapter XL Settlement of Controverted
Questions Omitted in the
Treaty of Ghent 437
Index 479
vii
CHAPTER I
Impressment
■"^ The fundamental cause of the War of 1812 was the
irreconcilable conflict of the British navigation acts
with the commercial development of the United States.
The more concrete causes, all of which were connected
with the British naval and commercial policy, were the
right of search for deserters on neutral vessels and the
impressment of American seamen upon the high seas,
restrictions upon American trade through the revival
by Great Britain of the "Rule of 1756," and the pro-
mulgation of orders which established the principles of
blockade against neutral commerce where, in fact, no
legal blockade existed.
The treaty of peace of 1783 failed to bring about
an amicable relationship between Great Britain and the
United States. John Adams, the first American
minister to Great Britain, wrote to the American
Secretary of Foreign Affairs a few weeks after his
arrival in London, as follows : " The popular pulse
seems to beat high against America. The people are
deceived by numberless falsehoods industriously cir-
culated by the gazettes and in conversation, so that
2 IMPRESSMENT
there is too much reason to believe that, if this nation
had another hundred milhon to spend, they would soon
force the ministry into a war against us. . . . Their
present system, as far as I can penetrate it, is to
maintain a determined peace with all Europe, in
order that they may war singly against America, if
they should think it necessary."^ In another letter
written August 6, 1785, Adams said : " Britain has
ventured to begin commercial hostilities. I call them
hostilities, because their direct object is not so much
the increase of their own wealth, ships, or sailors, as
the diminution of ours. A jealousy of our naval
power is the true motive, the real passion which
actuates them ; they consider the United States as their
rival, and the most dangerous rival they have in the
world."- Later, on October 15, Adams wrote: "I
have the honor to agree fully with you in your opinion,
that ' it is manifestly as much the interest of this
country to be well with us, as for us to be well with
them;' but this is not the judgment of the English
nation ; it is not the judgment of Lord North and his
party; it is not the judgment of the Duke of Port-
land and his friends ; and it does not appear to be the
judgment of Mr. Pitt and the present set. Li short,
it does not at present appear to be the sentiment of
1 Adams to Jay, July 19, 1785 ; Works of John Adams, VIII.,
282.
2 Adams to Jay, Aug. 6, 1785; Works of John Adams, VIII.,
290-291.
IMPRESSMENT 3
anybody ; and, I am much inclined to believe, they will
try the issue of importance with us."^ In Adams's
last two letters to the Secretary of State, one in
November and the other in December, 1787, we find ,
the following passages : " If they can bind Holland in
their shackles, and France, by her internal distractions,
is unable to interfere, she [Great Britain] will make
war immediately against us." " No answer is made
to any of my memorials or letters to the ministry, nor
do I expect that any thing will be done while I stay."*
Great Britain failing to send a minister to the
United States, Adams, at his own request, was recalled
in February, 1788. It was not until 1792 that his post
was filled. Thomas Pinckney was then appointed
minister to Great Britain, a position which he retained
only two years. The causes of friction between Great
Britain and the United States steadily grew in volume
during the next two decades, culminating at last in the
War of 1812. The most aggravating and the most
persistent of these causes was impressment. For
twenty years it was the object of serious diplomatic
negotiations.
As early as 1792 we find Thomas Jefferson, Secre-
tary of State, advising Thomas Pinckney, American
3 Adams to Jay, Oct. 15, 1785; Works of John Adams, VIII.,
320.
4 Adams to Jay, Nov. 30, 1787; Works of John Adams,
VIII., 463. Adams to Jay, Dec. 16, 1787; Works of John
Adams, VIII., 467-468.
4 IMPRESSMENT
minister at London, to confer with the British Foreign
Secretary in order to make some satisfactory arrange-
ment upon the subject of impressment. The British
Government had proposed that American seamen
should be required always to carry about with them a
certificate of citizenship. Jefferson was opposed to
this requirement as it would be impracticable always
to carry such certificates. He upheld the position that
the vessel outside of foreign jurisdiction protected
the men on board, yet, in order to prevent a vessel
from becoming an asylum for fugitives, he was willing
that the number of men to a vessel should be limited
in proportion to the tonnage of the vessel and that one
or two officers be allowed to board a vessel to ascer-
tain the number of men on board. No press gang
should be allowed to go on board until it should be
found that there were more than the stipulated num-
ber of seamen on board, and until the masters had
refused to deliver the extra men, who were to be
named by the master himself. Even under these cir-
cumstances the American consul, in every instance,
was to be called in.^
Later, in referring to Pinckney certain complaints,
made by the merchants of Virginia, of sailors being
taken from American vessels on the coast of Africa
by the commander of a British armed vessel, Jefferson
5 Jeiiferson to Pinckney, June ii, 1792; American State
Papers, For. Rel, III., 574-
IMPRESSMENT 5
wrote: "So many instances of this kind have hap-
pened, that it is quite necessary that their Govern-
ment should explain themselves on the subject, and
be led to disavow and punish such conduct."^ A
month later he writes again with respect to the exercise
of the practice and says: "It is unnecessary to de-
velop to you the inconveniences of this conduct, and
the impossibility of letting it go on."''
The inconveniences of impressment were brought
to the attention of the American minister not alone
through the correspondence of the Secretary of State,
but through the hundreds of letters addressed to him
by prisoners in the various prisons in England and in
prison ships on the British coasts imploring his efforts
for their release. Pinckney was successful in securing
the discharge of most of the persons thus impressed,
but he was unable to secure from the British Govern-
ment any assurance of the discontinuance of the
practice.
When, in 1794, Jay was engaged in the negotiations
relating to""!, convention for indemnities and for com-
mercial arrangements, he alluded to the hardships suf-
fered by American citizens under the practice of im-
pressment. He expressed his confidence that the
^Jefferson to Pinckney, Oct. 12, 1792; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 574.
^Jefferson to Pinckney, Nov. 6, 1792; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 574.
O IMPRESSMENT
\ justice and benevolence of the King would lead him,
j immediately, to liberate American citizens wrongfully
detained and that His Majesty's officers, in the future,
would abstain from such proceedings.V'
Lord Grenville replied that if American seamen had
been impressed into the King's service, it had been con-
trary to the King's desire, though he admitted such
cases might happen, owing to the difficulty of dis-
criminating between British and American seamen.
, American citizens, he stated, were invariably released
and British officers understood that they were to use
proper precaution.*^ No statement, however, upon im-
pressment was contained in the treaty which was
signed by Jay and Grenville.
Impressment still continuing, the United States, in
order to make all possible accommodation to prevent
the excuse for the practice, passed a law. May 28,
1796, which provided for certification of American
seamen. Pickering, Secretary of State, transmitting
this law to Rufus King, American minister at London,
urged the importance of obtaining satisfaction from
the British Government upon the subject of impress-
ment. He expressed the opinion, as Jefferson had
before, that the vessel should protect the seamen on
8 Jay to Grenville, July 30, 1794 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., I., 481.
9 Grenville to Jay, Aug. i, 1794; American State Papers,
For. Rel., I., 481-482.
IMPRESSMENT 7
board ; but stated that he would regard it as a great
advance if this principle could be secured merely on
the high seas.^**
He argued that the principle was needed in the in-
terest of humanity, for the withdrawal of seamen on
the ocean exposed hves and property to destruction as
well as vessels, inasmuch as vessels usually carried no
more sailors than they actually needed. The same
principle, it was maintained, should operate also in the
British colonies and especially in the West Indies, be-
cause here the detention in consequence of impress-
ment was attended with serious loss of life and prop-
erty due to climatic conditions. The remoteness of
these districts from the place of supreme authority
made the danger of abuse greater than elsewhere. In
lieu of impressment, it was suggested that a law might
be passed requiring every master of a vessel, upon his
arrival in any port of the British colonies, to report
his crew at the proper office. If afterwards any addi-
tions were made in the way of British subjects, these
might be taken away. Impressment of British sub-
jects found in ports of Great Britain and Ireland
might be admitted, but this should be controlled by
proper regulations to prevent insults and injuries and
to insure prompt relief when mistakes occurred.^^
^° Pickering to King, June 8, 1796 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 574-575-
11 Ibid.
8 IMPRESSMENT
Pickering differentiated three classes of men whom
Great Britain had no right whatever to impress. These
were native American citizens, American citizens
wherever born who were such at the time of the
definitive treaty of peace, and foreigners other than
British subjects saiHng in American vessels. A fourth
class in connection with the question of impressment
consisted of British born subjects who had become
American citizens subsequent to the treaty of peace, or
might thereafter be admitted to the rights of citizen-
ship. These were not to be abandoned by the United
States, but certain classes especially deserved the pro-
tection of the American Government, such as those
who had served in American vessels public or private
for the same term of years as that in which foreigners
serving in British vessels acquired the rights of British
subjects, which was understood to be three years, and
those persons, originally British subjects, who had
resided in the United States for five years and had been
formally admitted to the rights of citizenship according
to the laws of the United States. Inasmuch as sailors
were likely to lose their certificates, Pickering believed
that some provision should be made for the admission
of other reasonable proof of their citizenship, such
as their own oaths with those of their masters, mates,
or other credible witnesses. He proposed that the
rolls of the crew should be authenticated by the col-
lector of customs and that these then should be ad-
IMPRESSMENT 9
mitted with equal validity with the individual cer-
tificates.^^
When reporting to King several cases of impress- x
ment of seamen from American vessels in the fall
of 1796, Pickering again urged the importance of
taking up the question with the British Government.^^
In a letter to King, October 26, 1796, he pointed out
that the British naval officers had impressed Swedes,
Danes, Portuguese, and French, which showed that
impressment of sailors was not confined to Americans,
who were claimed to resemble Englishmen so closely
that it was impossible always to distinguish.^* He
complained that Americans were not so promptly re-
leased as hitherto owing to the fact that writs of
habeas corpus taken out by American agents were
no longer given recognition by the British authorities.
In order to avoid the friction attendant upon the im-
pressment of American citizens under the supposition
that they were British subjects. Minister King pro-
posed to the British Government that American consuls
should be authorized to grant certificates of citizenship
to such American seamen as should prove themselves
entitled to receive them, and British naval officers
12 Pickering to King, June 8, 1796; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 574-575-
13 Pickering to King, Sept. 10, 1796; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 575-
1* Pickering to King, Oct. zd, 1796 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 575-
V
lO IMPRESSMENT
should be instructed by their Government to respect
such certificates.^^
The British Government objected to King's proposal
as afifording no sufficient security that British subjects
would not be protected under the guise of American
citizenship. They similarly objected to the general law
that Congress had passed with regard to certification
of American seamen and also to the order which the
President had issued to the collectors of the several
districts prescribing the evidence on which certificates
of citizenship might be granted by such collectors. It
was held that the proposed method was subject to the
greatest possible abuse and that practice founded on
this arrangement " would not differ at all in its effect
and consequences, though in name and appearance it
might, from a resolution to discharge at once every
British seaman on his own assertion, that he is an
American citizen."^®
In the spring of 1799 King again protested to Lord
Grenville, as he had on former occasions, against the
indiscriminate seizure of seamen from American
vessels on the high seas. Grenville gave no satisfaction
that it would stop, but promised that all Americans
who by mistake had been seized should be discharged
15 King to Grenville, Jan. 28, 1797 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., II., 147-148.
16 Grenville to King, March 27, 1797; American State Papers,
For. Rel., II., 148-150.
IMPRESSMENT II
upon application. The American minister considered
this of Uttle account. Indeed, said he, " to acquiesce
in it is to give up the right."^^
^ The following year John Marshall, then Secretary
of State, wrote a most able letter to King in which
he discussed the American position upon the subject of
impressment. He said : " The United States therefore
require positively that their seamen who are not British
subjects, whether born in America or elsewhere, shall
be exempt from impressments. The case of British
subjects, whether naturalized or not, is more question-
able ; but the right even to impress them is denied.
. . . Alien seamen, not British subjects, engaged in
our merchant service, ought to be equally exempt with
citizens from impressment."^^ Here we have set forth
the two principal objections which the United States
maintained to the British practice of impressment.
One was the actual seizure of American seamen under
the claim of taking British deserters, and the second
was the right of searching neutral vessels on the high
seas for deserting seamen. 1 If these two points could
have been kept distinct throughout the negotiations, it
might have been easier to come to an agreement upon
the subject of impressment. As to the impressment
of American seamen. Great Britain, in general, dis-
i''^ King to Pickering, March 15, 1799; American State
Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 583.
18 Marshall to King, Sept. 20, 1800; American State Papers,
For. Rel, II., 486-490.
12 IMPRESSMENT
claimed any such intention, so that it should not have
been impossible to adjust that point. With respect to
the right of search, each nation might have agreed to
enact a law compelling the commanders or masters of
vessels to surrender deserters to the nation from which
they had deserted.
Complaint was made by the British Government to
the so-called "protections" given American seamen,
on the ground that they were frequently fraudulent in
their intentions and were granted without a proper
examination of facts by inferior magistrates and
notaries. These, it was held, could easily be procured
by natural born British subjects who wished to desert
the service of their own country. Under such circum-
stances it was not to be expected that the commanders
of British ships of war should pay any regard to such
papers. As a means of allaying the present trouble it
was proposed that there be no refuge allowed in the
territory or vessel of either party to deserters from the
other state, and that all such deserters be delivered up
on demand to the commander of the vessel from which
the desertion had been made or to the commanding
officers of the ships of war of the respective nations, or
to such other persons as might be duly authorized to
make requisition on their behalf, provided proof were
made that the deserters so demanded were actually
part of the crew of the vessel in question. Consuls
and vice-consuls, it was stated, might cause the arrest
i
IMPRESSMENT 1 3
of those who had deserted from their country, apply-
ing to the courts for the necessary power, to be granted
upon proper proofs. Neither of the parties was to
demand the delivery of any sailors or subjects or
citizens belonging to the other party who had been
employed on board the vessels of either of the nations,
and who had in time of war voluntarily entered the
service of their own sovereign or nation, or who had
been compelled to enter such service. It was proposed
that the two states should agree to adopt effectual
measures for the apprehension and delivery of desert-
ing seamen, and that public ships of war, forts, garri-
sons, or posts should not forcibly be entered to compel
the delivery of such persons as might have deserted. ^^
This proposal would have appeared to recognize the
pretensions of the British claims to impressment with
reference to merchant vessels. The American Secre-
tary of State, being desirous of acceding to the main
proposition but unwilling to grant an indirect sanction
to the principle always denied by the American Gov-
ernment, offered a counter-project which contained
reciprocal engagements for the surrender of deserters
upon condition that the practice of impressment should
be discontinued in respect to private vessels as well as
public vessels.^"
i» Listen to Pickering, Feb. 4, 1800; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 5/6-577.
20 Pickering to Liston, May 3, 1800; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 577-578.
14 IMPRESSMENT
The purpose of the proposed scheme for the mutual
restoration of deserting seamen being so desirable in
order to remove the alleged necessity of Great Britain'^
resorting to impressment, the President submitted the
question to the other members of his Cabinet for sug-
gestions. Secretary Wolcott of the Treasury thought
that the British proposal did not sufficiently provide
against the impressment of seamen, and he proposed
a counter-project similar to that of the Secretary of
State. He suggested that the proof of desertion should
be required within two years from its occurrence. He
thought that the commander or other officers should
not be empowered to enter a public or private vessel
of the other party on the high seas ; and that it should
be " expressly declared to be the understanding of the
contracting parties, that the mutual restitutions of
persons claimed as deserters shall only be made by the
free and voluntary consent of the military officers em-
ployed in the land service, or the commanders of the
public or private ships or vessels of the two parties, or
in pursuance of the decisions of the courts.""^ The
Secretary of War objected to the British minister's
proposal that the United States should demand the de-
livery of such seamen as had been employed on board
British vessels and who had in time of war or threat-
ened hostilities voluntarily entered the British service,
21 Wolcott to Adams, April 14, 1800; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 579.
IMPRESSMENT
15
or who had been compelled to enter it according
to the law and practice of Great Britain.^^ The
Attorney-General expressed his concurrence with the
project as drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury.^^
The Secretary of the Navy agreed with the proposed
reply of the Secretary of State. He considered that
the British proposal secured to Great Britain all that it
could desire, but that it afforded no security to the
United States against the practice of which the United
States complained. The Secretary of the Navy pre-
ferred to have no article rather than not to include in
it the prohibition of impressment from merchant
vessels on the high seas.^* The opinions of the
Cabinet displayed the degree of unity of American
sentiment upon the subject of impressment. Great
Britain, however, paid little attention to American
feeling, and the proposal of the Secretary of State was
rejected; but when the general pacification of Europe
occurred in 1801, and the treaty of Amiens brought a
respite to British ships of war, impressment ceased for
the time as there was no need of the practice to secure
sailors.
Minister King, who during the war had endeavored V^
22McHenry to Adams, April 18, 1800; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 579-580.
23 Lee to Adams, April 30, 1800; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 581.
24 Stoddart to Adams, April 23, 1800; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 580.
1 6 IMPRESSMENT
to obtain an agreement that, after hostilities should
cease, neither party would upon the high seas impress
or take any seamen or other persons out of the vessels
of the other, continued to urge the subject upon the
British Government. When it appeared likely that
war between Great Britain and France would be re-
newed, King prevailed upon Lord Hawkesbury, British
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Lord Vincent, First
Lord of the Admiralty, to consent to a convention which
provided against impressment in the following terms:
" No seamen nor seafaring person shall, upon the high
seas and without the jurisdiction of either party, be
demanded or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging
to the citizens or subjects of one of the parties, by the
public or private armed ships or men of war belonging
to, or in the navy of the other party ; and strict orders
shall be given for the due observance of this engage-
ment."^^ Each state was to prohibit its citizens or
subjects from carrying away from the territories or
colonial possessions of the other any seamen belonging
to such other ports. The treaty was to be in force for
five years.
Before this treaty was actually signed the British
commissioners, after consultation with Sir William
Scott, the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, pro-
posed that the narrow seas should be excepted in the
25 King to Secretary of State, July, 1803; American State
Papers, For. Rel., II., 503-504-
IMPRESSMENT 1/
operation of the article. With that exception they ex-
pressed their willingness to sign the convention. King
considered this action as a mere subterfuge and an
extravagant pretension for Great Britain to revive the
doctrine of mare clausum. He felt compelled "to
abandon the negotiation, rather than to acquiesce in
the doctrine it proposed to establish." King returned
to the United States in the summer of 1803 and was
succeeded by James Monroe, who had been appointed
April 18 of that year.
In the instructions given to Monroe with reference
to a treaty, which it was hoped that he might be able
to negotiate, all other questions in dispute were to be
omitted, if only agreement could be secured on im-
pressment, blockades, visit and search, contraband, and
trade with the enemies' colonies. ^^
The Secretary of State enclosed a projet of a treaty
giving the articles both as the American Government
would prefer that they should be, and also as they
might ultimately be agreed upon, if the British Govern-
ment insisted. The first article of the projet dealt
with impressment. In the preferred form it was pro-
vided that no person should " upon the high seas and
without the jurisdiction of either party, be demanded
or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging to citizens
or subjects of one of the parties, by the public or
2*5 Madison to Monroe, Jan. 5, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 81-89.
f
1 8 IMPRESSMENT
private armed ships belonging to, or in the service of,
the other, unless such person be at the time in the
military service of an enemy of such other party."^'^
In the article used as an ultimatum it was provided, in
addition to the foregoing statement, " it is to be under-
stood that this article shall not exempt any person on
board the ships of either of the parties from being
taken therefrom by the other party, in cases where
they may be liable to be so taken according to the
laws of nations, which liability, however, shall not
be construed to extend in any case to seamen, or
seafaring persons being actually part of the crew of
the vessel in which they may be, nor to persons of any
description passing from one port to another port of
either of the parties." A second article provided that
subjects or citizens of one state, being in the dominions
of the other, should not be compelled to serve on board
of any vessel public or private belonging to the other
party; and all subjects or citizens serving under com-
pulsion should be liberated forthwith.
In communicating this project. Secretary Madison
discussed the alleged right of impressment on the
part of Great Britain. The right was denied, first,
because no treaties, British or other, could be found to
sanction it. ! Whilst treaties " admit a contraband
of war by enumerating its articles, and the effect of a
2'^ Madison to Monroe, Jan. S, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 81-89.
IMPRESSMENT 1 9
real blockade by defining it, in no instance do they
afifirm or imply a right in any sovereign to enforce his
claims to the allegiance of his subjects on board neutral
vessels on the high seas ; on the contrary, whenever
a belligerent claim against persons on board a neutral,
vessel is referred to in treaties, enemies in military!
service alone are excepted from the general immunity
of persons in that situation; and this exception con-*
firms the immunity of those who are not included \
in it."28
If there be a right of allegiance in time of war, it v^
was averred, the same must exist in time of peace,
and the exercise of sovereign rights outside of the
nation's jurisdiction in time of war would imply a
corresponding exercise of power in time of peace.
The law of allegiance upon which the principle of im-
pressment was built up by Great Britain, Madison
maintained, was a municipal law and as such was not
rightfully enforceable outside of the jurisdiction of
Great Britain; that if it might be enforced on board
foreign vessels on the high seas with regard to persons,
it might with equal propriety be enforced against
articles of property if these were exported in violation
of a domestic law. Thus every commercial regulation
in time of peace as well as of war would be obligatory
upon foreigners and their vessels, not only within the
28 Madison to Monroe, Jan. 5, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 81-89.
20 IMPRESSMENT
jurisdiction of a given state, but in every sea, at an)
distance, where an armed vessel might be met with.
The admission of the practice of impressment, it was
shown, impHed the right of search for such subjects,
and this was the source of serious inconvenience.
Madison argued that the alleged right was not only
unsupported by treaties, but that every principle of
justice and reason was against the practice. By its
exercise persons were deprived of a regular trial which
was granted when property was involved, and decisions
were left to the caprice and personal interest of
officers, when such decisions in the case of property
were made by an impartial court, not by the captain
himself.^^
It was pointed out that the very resemblance of
American and British seamen, which the British Gov-
ernment alleged as one of the reasons for the enforce-
ment of impressment, made it more important not to
leave the decision to interested officers. Madison de-
clared that, if the practice were to be allowed, the most
obvious and just rule would be to require that proof
of allegiance be made, instead of the reverse which
had been the British practice. The inconsistency of
Great Britain's action with reference to impressment
was clearly shown. She had herself refused to give
up American seamen who had voluntarily engaged in
29 Madison to Monroe, Jan. S, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 81-89.
IMPRESSMENT 21
her service ; she had also refused to release impressed
American citizens if they had either settled or married
within British dominions.^''
The Secretary of State held that the British practice
of impressment was much less needful than was com-
monly supposed, as the number of British seamen em-
ployed upon American vessels was never large. Of the
2059 cases of impressment from 1797 to 1801 only 102
had been detained as being British subjects; 1042 were
discharged as not being British subjects ; while 805
others were detained for further proof, with the pre-
sumption in favor of American citizenship. Thus it
was evident that for every British seaman gained
through impressment ten others were made victims
of this system. Monroe was instructed not to admit
the narrow sea jurisdiction which had been proposed
in the former negotiation.^^ 1_
In a letter a few weeks later Madison notified s^
Monroe that the boundary treaty negotiated by King
with Lord Hawkesbury, May 12, 1803, had been rati-
fied with the exception of the fifth article. Monroe was
instructed to proceed to the exchange of ratifications
if the British Government consented to accede to the
change.^^ The objection made to the fifth article
30 Madison to Monroe, Jan. 5, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel, III., 8i-8g.
31 Ibid.
32 Madison to Monroe, Feb. 14, 1804; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 89-90.
22 • IMPRESSMENT
arose from the fact that the signature and ratifications
of the treaty were made subsequent to the treaty with
France ceding Louisiana to the United States, and it
was feared that the line to be run in pursuance of the
fifth article might be found to abridge the northern
extent of the Louisiana acquisition. The British Gov-
ernment subsequently refusing to accede to this ex-
ception, the treaty remained unratified.
V', Monroe, on April 2, 1804, informed Lord Hawkes-
bury of his instructions to negotiate a treaty covering
the disputed maritime questions.] He found Hawkes-
bury friendly and apparently in sympathy with the
objects proposed. Hawkesbury requested from Mon->
roe a projet of a treaty which he promised upon receiv-
ing to submit to the Cabinet. Monroe complied with
the request, and submitted a projet in the form which
Madison had directed. This provided against im-'i
pressment on the high seas except in case of persons
at the time in the military service of an enemy of the
impressing state. , Provision was made against com-
pelling a subject or citizen of one state being within
another state to serve on board the vessels of the latter
state; and all so held were to be liberated and given
adequate compensation for their return home. As a
complementary article to that upon impressment was
one providing for the mutual restoration of deserters.
The treaty also included articles upon the procedure in
the exercise of the right of search and definition of
IMPRESSMENT 23
blockaded ports. It was proposed that the treaty
should be in force for five years.^^
Shortly after this pro jet was presented changes oc-
curred in the British Cabinet which postponed any con-
sideration of the American claims. Lord Harrowby
replaced Lord Hawkesbury as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and Lord Melville took the place of Lord Vin-
cent at the head of the Admiralty. During the last
weeks of the old Ministry, when a change was ex-
pected, Monroe thought it useless to press matters.
Two months passed after the new Ministry came into
power, and no attention was given to the American
pro jet submitted to Lord Hawkesbury, or to the con-
sideration of the treaty on boundaries which had been
referred to the British Government. Lord Harrowby
when informed of the change in the treaty of bound-
aries protested against the American method of ratify-
ing parts of a treaty, which he declared to be " new,
unautliorized, and not to be sanctioned."^*
Monroe found Lord Harrowby less friendly than his
predecessor. He reported to Madison that " the con-
duct of Lord Harrowby through the whole of this con-
ference was calculated to wound and to irritate. Not
a friendly sentiment towards the United States or their
33 Monroe to Madison. April 15, 1804; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 91-92.
34 Monroe to Madison, June 3, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 92-94.
24 IMPRESSMENT
Government escaped him.' . . . ' Every thing that he
said was uttered in an unfriendly tone, and much more
was apparently meant than was said."^^- Monroe ex-
pressed his surprise at a deportment of which he had
seen no example before since he arrived in the country.
He considered that the subjects of the negotiations
were indefinitely postponed.
The British Cabinet at this time were discussing a
coalition of Great Britain with the northern Powers,
especially Russia and Sweden. With such coalition
in view it was considered by Monroe that the tone of
the British Government to neutral Powers would be
less friendly. The American minister was, however,
strongly in favor of peace with Great Britain " from
a knowledge," as he wrote, "that much expense and
injury must result from war, while it is impossible for
us to derive any advantage from it," yet he asserted
the need of firmness in councils against Great Britain
to resist and to punish the injuries inflicted by her.^^
On August 3, Monroe had a conference with Lord
Harrowby during which he again urged the supreme
importance of a satisfactory adjustment of the im-
pressment question. A month later the subject was
again presented by Monroe in the form of a treaty
35 Monroe to Madison, June 3, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 92-94.
36 Ibid.
^11
IMPRESSMENT 2$
which he proposed for adoption. Lord Harrowby
promised to submit the proposition to the Cabinet. In
the proposed treaty Monroe omitted the article on
contraband which had been suggested by Madison, be-
cause he considered it hkely that such an article would
bring into discussion the subject of provisions, which
it was to the interest of the United States not to admit.
The article upon procedure in prize courts was also
omitted because it conformed to the existing practice,
and needed no agreement upon the subject.^'
Monroe, receiving no response from Lord Harrowby,
was in doubt whether to consider the negotiation at an
end or to consider it merely suspended.^^ He felt that
there were objections to the first course, because a
declaration to Lord Harrowby that the negotiation was
ended would imply that it had failed in its object and
might appear to be a sort of rupture between the two
countries; and in the second place a measure of such
tone was too strong for the previous note of the
British minister, which had sought only delay, and in
a conciliatory manner. It might, he thought, cause a
resentment on the part of the Ministry and perhaps
of the country in view of the condition of British
affairs at the time. Again, he considered that such a
measure with the implications connected with it was
^■^ Monroe to Madison, Sept. 8, 1804; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 95-97.
38 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 3, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 98-99.
26 IMPRESSMENT
not justified by fact or the true interest of the United
States. The negotiation had not failed in its great
objects, for American commerce never was so much
favored as during the last three years, nor was there
ever less cause of complaint furnished by impressment.
Such a declaration, it was conceived, would be contrary
to the spirit in which the negotiation had been begun,
and would not be authorized by the instructions.
Further, if the negotiation was kept open, it would be
easier for the United States to renew it at any time.
For these reasons Monroe decided to meet the friendly
sentiments of Lord Harrowby with like sentiments,
and, while regretting the delay, to admit that the state
of affairs might impose it.^^
Monroe thought that employing moderation while
still making earnest efforts to settle all differences by
peaceful measures would strengthen the American
Government in any of the most vigorous measures
which might be thought necessary. "A virtuous and
free people," said he, " will be more united in support
of such measures, however strong they may be, when
they see, by the clearest evidence, that the cause is not
only just, but that their Government has done every
thing in its power which the national honor and
interest would permit, to avoid such an extremity."*"
3» Monroe to Madison, Oct. 3, 1804; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 98-99.
40 Ibid.
IMPRESSMENT 2/
From the Treaty of Amiens, March, 1802, to the /
middle of 1804, the United States had had little cause
for complaint with regard to commerce and impress-
ment, but during the last six months of 1804 the
British practice again created a most serious condi-
tion, which steadily grew worse throughout the follow-
ing year. In the spring of 1805 Madison again wrote
to Monroe urging the necessity of securing some relief
from the practice of impressment. He said: "The
experience of every day shows more and more the
obligation on both sides to enter seriously on the means
of guarding the harmony of the two countries against
the dangers with which it is threatened, by a persever-
ance of Great Britain in her irregularities on the high
seas, and particularly in the impressments from Ameri-
can vessels."*/ He mentioned the growing sensibility
in the United States on the subject of impressment,
seen in the vote of the House of Representatives call-
ing upon the Department of State to submit papers
dealing with impressment and in the passage of an act
of Congress authorizing certain proceedings against
British officers committing on the high seas trespasses
or torts on board American vessels.
After the interruption in the negotiations between
Monroe and Lord Harrowby, in September, 1804, it
was nearly a year before the consideration of impress-
*i Madison to Monroe, March 6, 1805 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 99-101.
28 IMPRESSMENT
ment could be renewed. Monroe was absent from
London from October, 1804, until the following sum-
mer, having been appointed special minister to adjust
the controversy between the United States and Spain
with respect to the boundaries of the newly acquired
territory of Louisiana. Upon his return he attempted
to renew the negotiations with Lord Mulgrave, who
now held the office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
Monroe found this gentleman as little inclined as his
predecessor to agree upon any arrangement upon im-
pressment which would be satisfactory to the United
States."-
The American minister from the treatment which
he had received felt that the attitude of Great Britain
towards the United States at this time was one of
studied delay, designed to subject American commerce
to every restraint in its power. He attributed the
attitude of Great Britain to her great jealousy of the
increasing prosperity of the United States and to her
determination to leave nothing untried which would
tend to impair that prosperity.J Great Britain's indif-
ference to the United States, Monroe conceived, arose
from the general feeling in Great Britain that a popular
government, such as the United States, would be
utterly incapable of any vigorous or persevering action
and in consequence would be unable to resist a system
*2 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 18, 1805; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 106-108.
IMPRESSMENT 29
of commercial hostility on the part of Great Britain,
but must yield. Monroe, though in favor of peace,
would not shrink from war if that should be neces-
sary. [He urged that the United States ofifer resistance
to the British seizures even at the risk of war. " Per-
haps no time," said he, " was ever more favorable for
resisting these unjust encroachments than the present
one. ; The conduct of our Government is universally
known to have been just, friendly, and conciliating
towards Great Britain, while the attack by her Gov-
ernment on the United States is as universally known
to be unjust, wanton, and unprovoked. The measure
has wounded deeply the interests of many of her own
people, and is not a popular one. The United States
furnish them at all times one of the best markets for
their manufactures, and at present almost the only
one. Her colonies are dependent on us. Harassed
as they are already with war, and the menaces of a
powerful adversary, a state of hostility with us would
probably go far to throw this country into confusion.
It is an event which the ministry would find it difficult
to resist, and therefore cannot, I presume, be willing
to encounter."^^
With a change in the British Ministry, caused by the
death of Pitt in January, 1806, it was thought by
Monroe that American interests might receive more
favorable attention. While the King wanted to ap-
^3 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 18, 1805 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 106-108.
30 - IMPRESSMENT
point Lord Hawkesbury in Pitt's place, he was obliged
to yield to the opposition, and so appointed Lord Gren-
ville Prime Minister and Charles Fox Secretary of
■; Foreign Affairs. Though Fox was a man of liberal
views and had shown in the American Revolution
most pronounced favoritism for the United States, 'Jt \
was soon discovered that not even he could avail
against the pronounced and prejudiced views of the
body of English statesmen upon the subject of im-
pressment and neutral trade. In the Cabinet were
several who had differed with Fox on former occasions
in respect to the policy of 'Great Britain towards the
United States. In the first interviews with Fox, Mon-
roe was extremely hopeful of being able to accomplish
something satisfactory, especially with regard to the
trade with the colonies of England's enemies.^* In his
hopefulness of the outcome Monroe advised that for
the present no hostile measures be adopted by Congress,
and if any should have been adopted that their execu-
tion be postponed.*^ Monroe discussed with Fox the
various matters in dispute between the two countries,
such as the rights of neutral trade, impressment, and
boundaries. In reviewing the history of the negotia-
tion on impressment he explained the project which had
** Monroe to Madison, Feb. 12, 1806; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 112-113.
*5 Monroe to Madison, Feb. 28, 1806; American State Papers,
For. Rel, III., 113.
IMPRESSMENT 3 1
been offered to Lord Hawkesbiiry as intended "to
prevent abuses and the ill consequences incident to
them, not to acquire any advantage to the United
States by the establishment of controverted principles
in the one, or unreasonable pretensions in the other
case."
The seriousness of the situation, rather than con-
fidence in a friendly disposition on the part of the
British Ministry,'! led the American Government, in the
spring of 1806, to appoint William Pinkney and James
Monroe as Commissioners Extraordinary and Plenipo-
tentiary " to settle all matters of difference between the
United States and the united kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland, relative to wrongs committed between the
parties on the high seas, or other waters, and for estab-
lishing the principles of navigation and commerce
between them."*® In the instructions to Monroe and
Pinkney, given May 17, 1806, Madison stated that the
President insisted upon some adequate provision re-
garding impressment as indispensable to any stipula-
tion requiring a repeal of the act shutting the market of
the United States against certain British manufactures.
The commissioners might substitute for the ultimatum
upon impressment given in the instructions of January
5, 1804, the following: "No seamen nor seafaring
^6 Monroe to Fox, Feb. 25, 1806; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 113-114. Madison to Monroe, April 23, 1806;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 117.
32 . IMPRESSMENT
persons shall, upon the high seas, and without the juris-
diction of either party, be demanded or taken out of
any ship or vessel belonging to the citizens or subjects
of one of the parties, by the public or private armed
ships or men of war, belonging to or in the service of
the other party ; and strict orders shall be given for
the due observance of this engagement."*^ These were
the terms of the article agreed to by King and Hawkes-
bury, which had been frustrated through the insist-
ence by Lord St. Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty,
that an exception be made to its application in the case
of the narrow seas.
Shortly after the arrival of Pinkney, Fox was taken
seriously ill and the negotiation was in consequence
delayed. Finally, Lord Auckland and Lord Holland
were appointed commissioners to treat with the Ameri-
can ministers. This news was communicated to the
American commissioners at a dinner given b}^ Lord
Grenville at which were present, besides the Ameri-
cans, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Howick, Lord Auck-
land, Lord Holland, Erskine, and others of distinction.
At this meeting. Lord Auckland invited Monroe and
Pinkney to visit him in the country, saying, " I trust
we shall be able to do some good to mankind, if your
powers are sufficiently extensive."*^
^■^ Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 17, 1806; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 1 19-124.
48 Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Aug. 15, 1806; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 132.
IMPRESSMENT 33
In formally announcing the appointment of Lord
Auckland and Lord Holland, Fox observed that " His
Majesty, in this appointment of commissioners, has
given a fresh proof of his most anxious and constant
desire to bring to a speedy termination all discussions
between the two countries, and to form such arrange-
ments as may tend to render perpetual a system of
mutual friendship and cordiality so conducive to the
honor and interests of both."*^ This language was, of
course, purely formal.
On August 28 the commissioners of the two coun-
tries met and discussed the various controverted sub-
jects. Four days later the British requested to learn
more precisely the American views and particularly
to be informed as to what stipulation in connection
with impressment was proposed for restoring British
seamen who had deserted. The American commis-
sioners presented as a project on this point the form
contained in the instructions to Monroe in January,
1804, providing for the mutual restoration of deserters
and a renunciation of impressment.^^
The British ministers manifested a strong aversion
to any formal renunciation or abandonment of their
alleged claims to impressment, and they urged as a
49 Fox to Monroe, Aug. 20, 1806; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 132.
50 Monroe and Pinkney to Holland, Sept. 10, 1806; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 136-137.
34 ■ IMPRESSMENT
substitute for such an abandonment a promise that the
persons composing the crews of American ships should
be furnished with authentic documents of citizenship,
the nature and form of which should be settled by
treaty ; that these documents should completely protect
those to whom they related ; but that subject to such
protections,, the ships of war of Great Britain should
continue to visit and impress on the high seas as '
before. ^^ The American commissioners took the posi-
tion that it was impossible for the United States to
allow the practice as it was derogatory to the rights of
sovereignty.. An interval of two months now elapsed
during which the negotiations were suspended owing
to the critical illness and death of Fox, who was the
uncle of Lord Holland.
When the American commissioners again reported
to their home Government, November ii, 1806, they
had not yet abandoned all hopes of securing a satis-
factory arrangement upon some of the points in dis-
pute, but they admitted that there was an insurmount-
able difificulty attached to the subject of impressment.^".
They said that they had advanced every argument
possible and had proposed every suitable expedient that
they could devise, consistent with the principle, to
SI Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Sept. 11, 1806; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 133-135.
s2 Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Nov. 11, 1806; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 137-140.
IMPRESSMENT 35
obviate the inconveniences that were urged on both
sides as likely to result from its admission, but that
all their efforts had been without avail. ' The British
still insisted upon the right of their Government to
seize its subjects on board neutral merchant vessels
on the high seas, and maintained that the relinquish-
ment of the right at that time would go far to over-
throw their naval power, upon which the safety of their
state essentially depended.' The American proposition
to give the aid of the local authorities of the United
States to apprehend and restore deserters from their
vessels in exchange for a renunciation of the claim
to impressment, the British held, did not afford an
adequate remedy for the evil complained of. De-
serters, it was alleged, might go into the country, but
would more likely go on board American vessels im-
mediately putting out to sea, where the American flag
would then protect them. Desertions were also likely
to occur in neutral ports, in which case the law pro-
posed would be unavailing. The British urged the
American commissioners to stipulate that Congress
would pass a law (to be reciprocal) which should
make it a penal offense for the commanders of an
American vessel to receive British subjects deserting
from a vessel of Great Britain, and which should
provide that these be restored upon their arrival in
the United States on suitable application. The Amer-
ican ministers expressed their willingness to provide
2,6 IMPRESSMENT
a remedy, which they considered was found in the pro-
posed article for mutual restoration of deserters. The
British objecting that the term deserters was not suffi-
ciently broad and suggesting the addition of the words
" seafaring people quitting their service," the Ameri-
cans acquiesced in the change. The British commis-
sioners then appeared to give their consent to the
article upon impressment, but when it was presented to
the Cabinet it was at once rejected, the Board of
Admiralty and the Crown officers being opposed to it.
The American ministers no longer had hopes of secur-
ing any satisfactory stipulation on impressment.
Later, the British commissioners proposed as a
counter-project the passage of laws which, on the one
hand, should make it penal for British commanders to
impress American citizens on board American vessels
on the high seas, and on the other hand, should make
it penal for the officers of the United States to grant
certificates of citizenship to British subjects. As this
proposition would not stop the exercise of the practice
of impressing British subjects upon American vessels,
the American commissioners regarded it as inadequate
and refused to consider it. It would fail, they said, to
remedy the evils and would be an abandonment of their
rights.^* The British commissioners stated that, while
their Government could not disclaim or derogate from
S3 Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Nov. ii, 1806; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 137-140.
IMPRESSMENT 37
a right which had been uniformly maintained and in the
exercise of which the security of the British navy
might be involved, they had, nevetheless, authorized
their commissioners to give the most positive assurance
that instructions had been given and should be re-
peated and enforced for the observance of the greatest
caution in impressing seamen.^*
The British proposing that they proceed to the other
subjects, leaving impressment out of the question for
the time, the American commissioners consented, be-
lieving that it was the intention of the British Govern-
ment no longer to exercise the practice of impress-
ment, but that they were merely unwilling to renounce
a claim which had long been held valid. Monroe
believed that the informal explanation of the British
commissioners upon impressment was sufficient to
warrant the American commissioners in going forward
with the other questions. He considered such action
justifiable because by it the rights of the parties were
reserved and the negotiations could be continued on
those particular topics, after a treaty should have been
formed upon the others. Great Britain, he maintained,
would be bound not to trespass on those rights while
that negotiation was depending; and in case she did
trespass on them, in the slightest degree, the United
States would be justified in breaking off the negotia-
5* Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Nov. ir, 1806; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 137-140.
\.-
38 IMPRESSMENT
tions and appealing to force in vindication of her
rights.^'' " The mere circumstance," said he, " of
entertaining an amicable negotiation by one party for
the adjustment of a controversy, where no right had
been acknowledged in it, by the other, gives to the
latter a just claim to such a forbearance on the part of
the former. But the entertainment of a negotiation for
the express purpose of securing interests sanctioned by
acknowledged rights, makes such claim irresistible."^''
With impressment removed from the discussion, the
commissioners were not long in coming to an agree-
ment upon the other subjects and a formal treaty was
concluded. This treaty, signed December 31, 1806,
contained provisions which were in many respects
more favorable to the United States than those con-
tained in the Jay treaty of 1794.^^
While the negotiations were in progress news came
of the Berlin decree, which was issued November 21.
The purpose of this decree was to injure Great Britain
through an attack upon her commercial trade. The
British Government claimed that for neutrals to sub-
mit to this decree would be to concur in the hostile
object of the enemy. Therefore the British commis-
^5 Monroe to Madison, Feb. 28, 1808 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., i73-i83-
56 Ibid.
5" Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 3, 1807 ; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 142-147-
IMPRESSMENT 39
sioners were instructed to secure assurance from the
Americans that the United States would not allow
its trade with Great Britain to be interfered with
without resistance. The American commissioners
were unable to make any such assurances, which would
have virtually allied the United States with Great
Britain in hostile opposition to France. Holland and
Auckland, when signing the treaty, presented a protest
against the Berlin decree, reserving to the British Gov-
ernment the right, should the decree be actually en-
forced against neutrals and be submitted to by them,
to take such measures of retaliation as might be deemed
expedient.^® In transmitting the note to Washington
the American representatives said, " We do not con-
sider ourselves a party to it, or as having given it in any
the slightest degree our sanction. "^^ The treaty failed
to provide not only against impressment, but also for
the settlement of indemnities claimed by the United
States against Great Britain. The British had objected
to the American claims on the ground of the appear-
ance of coercion. An offer had been made to consider
them later.
President Jefferson, upon receiving intimation from ,
the American commissioners that they were about to ■
S8 Note from Holland and Auckland, Dec. 31, 1806; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 151-152.
^* Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 3, 1807; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 142-147
40 IMPRESSMENT
proceed to the negotiation of a treaty with merely an
informal understanding upon impressment, at once ob-
jected to the plan as not comporting with his views
of national sentiment or legislative policy.*''' In the
opinion of the President it was better that the negotia-
tion should terminate without any formal compact
whatever if no stipulation regarding impressment could
be secured. Under such circumstances the commis-
sioners were instructed to terminate the negotiation
with merely an informal, friendly understanding upon
the subjects under discussion. As long as this rela-
tionship should be duly respected in practice, particu-
larly with reference to neutral trade and impressment,
the United States would refrain from putting the non-
importation act into operation. The British commis-
sioners in the course of their negotiations had alleged
that there were no recent causes of complaint on im-
pressment. The Secretary of State refuted that asser-
tion, and declared that in American seas, including
the West Indies, impressments had never been more
numerous or vexatious.
Before these instructions had reached the commis-
sioners, however, the treaty had been signed. This,
when submitted to the President, was rejected by him
without being referred to the Senate. Jefferson re-
fused to sign a treaty with impressment omitted, be-
60 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, Feb. 3, 1807; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 153-1S6.
IMPRESSMENT 4 1
cause, he said, " a concession on our part would violate
both a moral and political duty of the Government to
our citizens."''^ In announcing the rejection of the
treaty the Secretary of State informed the American
commissioners that the President had authorized them
in case the British rejected every other arrangement
upon impressment to admit the following article : " It is
agreed that, after the term of months, computed
from the exchange of ratifications, and during a war
in which either of the parties may be engaged, neither
of them will permit any seaman, not being its own
citizen or subject, and being a citizen or subject of the
other party, who shall not have been for two years, at
least, prior to that date, constantly and voluntarily in
the service, or within the jurisdiction of the parties,
respectively, to enter or be employed on board any of
its vessels navigating the high seas ; and proper regula-
tions, enforced by adequate penalties, shall be mutually
established for distinguishing the seamen of the parties,
respectively, and for giving full effect to this stipula-
tion."«2
Soon after the proposed treaty was transmitted to
America and while the commissioners were negotiating
over a supplemental project respecting boundaries,
^1 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 20, 1807; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 166-173.
62 Ibid.
42 IMPRESSMENT
another change in the British Ministry occurred. Lord
Grenville and his associates were obliged to retire and
the friends of the late Pitt came again into power.
Canning succeeded Lord Howick in the Foreign
Office."^ The change in the Administration halted
diplomatic negotiations for several months. The much
praised efficiency of ministerial government was dis-
credited again.
\y The American commissioners had barely opened
negotiations with the new Ministry when word was
received of an occurrence which made the question of
impressment the one great object of the United States.
This event was the attack of the British ship of war
Leopard upon the American frigate Chesapeake, and
the impressment of four sailors claiming to be Ameri-
cans. This was the first instance of impressment
from a public vessel of the United States, and it
aroused the indignation of the country. It was con-
sidered the logical result of the illegal practice and
therefore to call for immediate resistance.
The President at once issued a proclamation inter-
dicting the use of American waters to all British armed
vessels, and he caused instructions to be sent to the
minister at London to make a demand for reparation
from the British Government. The least, said he, that
was to be expected in this regard was a disavowal of
^2 Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, April 22, 1807 ; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 160-162.
IMPRESSMENT 43
the act and a restoration of the men impressed. In
(■addition, an entire aboHtion of the practice of impress-
! ment was deemed " an essential and indispensable part
~of the satisfaction . . . and, if possible, without the
authorized rejection from the service of the United
States of British seamen who have not been two years
in it."*^* The American Government, it was stated,
had a right to expect not only ample reparation, but
reparation made without delay. Monroe was ordered,
in case the expectation of reparation should fail, to
hasten home all American vessels in British ports and
to communicate the state of affairs to all American
war vessels in the Mediterranean. He was instructed
to cease all negotiations with the British Government
on other subjects " until satisfaction on this be so
pledged and arranged as to render negotiation honor-
able."«=
There was a strong popular demand for war in the
United States, but Madison considered its unjustifiable
at that time, inasmuch as the act had probably been
that of a British admiral alone and unauthorized by
the British Government. A declaration of war at once
was, in Madison's judgment, tactically unwise because
of the numerous British cruisers in American waters
«* Madison to Monroe, July 6, 1S07 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 183-185.
65 Ibid.
44 IMPRESSMENT
which could have readily seized American ships as
they gradually returned from foreign seas.^^
Even before Monroe had officially learned of the
attack upon the Chesapeake, Canning had informed the
American minister of the fact and had hastened to
express his regret, giving assurances that, if the British
officers were found to be culpable, the American
Government should be offered a "most prompt and
effectual reparation " for the act."^
Monroe, before he had received his instructions,
thought it was incumbent upon him to press the British
Government for reparation. He, therefore, addressed
a note to Canning in which he referred to the attack
of the Leopard upon the Chesapeake as an attempt " to
assert and enforce the unfounded and most unjustifi-
able pretension to search for deserters." He asked for
a frank disavowal of the principle upon which the
search was made and an assurance that the officer who
had been responsible should suffer punishment.*'^
Canning, apparently irritated by Monroe's letter, re-
plied a few days later in a rather harsh tone, stating
that Great Britain would make reparation when all the
facts were known. He disclaimed any pretension on
^^ Madison to Monroe, July 6, 1807 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 183-185.
8'^ Canning to Monroe, July 25, 1807; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 187.
«8 Monroe to Canning, July 29, 1807 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 187.
IMPRESSMENT 45
the part of Great Britain of a right to search ships of
war in the national service of any state for deserters.
If the facts should prove as represented, he assured
Monroe, the British Government would disavow the
act and reprove the conduct of their officers.®^
The two countries were now on the verge of war.
The American people generally took a defiant attitude,
and in Great Britain there was a strong war party
made up of ship owners, the navy, East and West India
merchants, and leading politicians.''*' The British Gov-
ernment strongly resented the proclamation of the
President, which had been issued " without requiring
or waiting for any explanation "''^ from Great Britain.
This formed a pretext for delaying action on the part
of the British Government.
The special joint negotiation of Monroe and Pinkney
having been suspended by the affair of the Chesapeake,
Monroe alone made a formal demand upon the British
Government for reparation. In presenting this claim,
he urged the general question of impressment from
merchant vessels, maintaining with forceful argument
that the objections to impressment from ships of war
were equally applicable in the case of merchant ships,
^* Canning to Monroe, Aug. 3, 1807; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 188.
'''0 Monroe to Madison, Aug. 4, 1807; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 186-187.
'^'^ Canning to Monroe, Aug. 8, 1807 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 188.
46 IMPRESSMENT
for public law and private rights were violated in both
cases and the liability to individual suffering was the
same.'^^
Monroe suggested to Canning as a suitable way of
making reparation the return of the impressed men to
the ships from which they were taken, the punishment
of the officers involved in the affair, the suppression of
impressment from merchant vessels, and the announce-
ment of such reparation through the medium of a
special mission. The British Government held that
the proclamation of the President interdicting British
vessels from American waters was an act of redress,
while the American minister maintained that it was
merely a police measure and not an act of retaliation/V
Canning argued that the affair of the Chesapeake
was different from the practice which the British
alleged as a right, and should not be brought into a
discussion of the general question. The right to search
ships of war, Canning stated, was not insisted upon,
not because the employment and detention of British
marines on board national ships was any less injuri-
ous to Great Britain than on merchant ships, but
because the redress in the one case was to be sought
by the Government from the other Government and
72 Monroe to Canning, Sept. 7, 1807 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., iSgr-igi.
■^3 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 10, 1807; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 191-193,
IMPRESSMENT 47
need not be summarily enforced by the unauthorized
officer of a ship of war. Canning declared that it was
important to find out whether the Government of the
United States had been guilty of refusing to discharge
British seamen in its national service previous to the
hostile acts of the British officers. He expressed re-
gret that the American minister had coupled with the
discussion the question of impressment of seamen from
merchant vessels. This right, he maintained, had been
exercised by Great Britain from the earliest ages of
the British naval power, even without any qualifica-
tion or exception in favor of national ships of war,
and the distinction which had been omitted had been
observed for a century.'^*
Monroe proposed to take up the subject of impress-
ment informally, but Canning refused utterly to treat
of impressment until after the question of the Chesa-
peake had been settled. Canning refusing to treat of
the Chesapeake in connection with the general subject
of impressment, and Monroe refusing to separate the
two questions, the negotiations ended. Monroe shortly
after returned to the United States, leaving Pinkney
as his successor. He found upon reaching home that
his popularity had suffered because of the treaty which
he had signed, and that the friends of Madison had
■^^ Canning to Monroe, Sept. 23, 1807 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 199-201.
48 IMPRESSMENT
made much capital out of this in promoting Madison's
candidacy over him for the presidency.
The British Government now decided to send
George Henry Rose as a special minister to America
to adjust the differences over the Chesapeake affair.
This minister was instructed to confine himself to this
subject alone and to entertain no proposition respecting
the search of merchant vessels.. He was further for-
bidden to enter upon any negotiation for reparation,
until the proclamation of the President should be with-
drawn.'^^
Rose upon his arrival at Washington urged the im-
portance of the withdrawal of the alleged hostile act
of the President upon the grounds that it prejudiced
the interests of Great Britain ; that it was discreditable
to the British flag; and that it resulted in a spirit of
ill feeling and retaliation. It might be held, Rose
stated, " to affect materially the question of the repara-
tion due to the United States, especially inasmuch as its
execution has been persevered in after the knowledge
of His Majesty's early, unequivocal, and unsolicited
disavowal of the unauthorized act of Admiral Berkeley,
his disclaimer of the pretension exhibited by that officer
to search the national ships of a friendly Power for
deserters, and the assurances of prompt and effectual
reparation, all communicated without loss of time to
■^5 Monroe to Madison, Oct. lo, 1807 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 191-193. Rose to Madison, Jan. 26, 1808;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 213-214.
IMPRESSMENT 49
the minister of the United States in London, so as
not to leave a doubt as to His Majesty's just and
amicable intentions."'®
Secretary Madison replied to Rose that the demand
of the British Government that the proclamation of
the President be revoked before the negotiations for
reparation be entered upon might justly suggest the
simple answer, that, before the proclamation of the
President could become a subject of consideration,
satisfaction should be made for the acknowledged
aggression which preceded it, and that this was agree-
able to the order of time, to the order of reason, and,
it might be added, to the order of usage, as maintained
by Great Britain, whenever, in analogous cases, she was
the complaining party. The American Government
absolutely refused to withdraw the proclamation until ,
the British minister should disclose the exact nature "
of the reparation which he had been instructed to offer. ,
It was implied that such reparation should include a
pledge for the discontinuance of the practice of im-
pressment." The British minister having expressed
his inability to comply with the terms of the American
Government, the negotiation terminated, and Rose re-
turned home.
^6 Rose to Madison, Jan. 26, 1808; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 213-^14.
■'"Madison to Rose, March 5, 1808; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 214-217.
50 IMPRESSMENT
Secretary Madison in communicating the result of
the Rose mission to Minister Pinkney at London
stated that advances to renew the negotiation must be
made by the British Government either in London or
Washington. If they should be made in London,
Pinkney was authorized to accept the reparation of-
fered provided that it involved no condition and in-
cluded a disavowal of the attack on the Chesapeake;
the immediate restoration of the impressed seamen;
and the punishment of the guilty officers. The repara-
tion, it was added, would be the more acceptable if it
included also the restoration of the seamen to the very
ships from which they were taken and if provision
should be made for the wounded survivors and the fami-
lies of those whose lives had been lost in the encounter.
In case the reparation included the points which were
made as an ultimatum it was promised that the procla-
mation of the President should be revoked. Pinkney
was instructed, in the event of satisfactory pledges
for reparation for the aggression on the Chesapeake
and the repeal of the British orders, " to enter into in-
formal arrangements for abolishing impressments alto-
gether, and mutually discontinuing to receive the sea-
men of each other into either military or merchant
service.
Pinkney believed that it would be better that the
78 Madison to Pinkney, April 4, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 221^22.
IMPRESSMENT 5 1
British Government renew the negotiation relative to
the Chesapeake in Washington, and recommended that
the necessary powers be given to Erskine, British
minister in America.''' The British Government acted
upon this suggestion, and authorized Erskine to enter
into a special negotiation with the American Govern-
ment upon the subject of reparation.
Erskine wrote in his note to the Secretary of State
that since the British Government had been informed
that the United States Congress had shown an inten-
tion of placing the relations of Great Britain with the
United States upon an equal footing with the other
belligerent Powers, his Government had instructed him,
in event of such laws being enacted, to offer an honor-
able reparation for the attack upon the Chesapeake.
The reparation which he was prepared to propose con-
sisted of a restitution of the men forcibly taken from
the Chesapeake and a suitable provision for those who
had suffered from the aggression, in addition to the
disavowal of the act and the recall of the officers which
had immediately taken place after the act was com-
mitted.^** The American Government expressed its
satisfaction with this offer, but at the same time made
it plain that the removal of the non-intercourse act had
"^^ Account of unofficial conversation between Canning and
Pinkney, Jan. 18 and 22, 1809; American State Papers, For.
Rel., III., 299-300.
80 Erskine to Smith, April 17, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 295.
52 IMPRESSMENT
been decided upon from other and distinct considera-
tions.^^
Upon the success of this negotiation, and in view of
the repeal of the non-intercourse act, Erskine informed
the American Government that Great Britain purposed
sending an envoy extraordinary invested with full
powers to conclude a treaty on all the points of dispute
between the two countries.^^
The official note of the American Government con-
taining the acceptance of the proffered reparation con-
cluded with these reproachful words : " I have it in
express charge from the President to state, that, while
he forbears to insist on a further punishment of the
offending officer, he is not the less sensible of the
justice and utility of such an example, nor the less
persuaded that it would best comport with what is due
from His Britannic Majesty to his own honour."^^ The
words were considered impertinent and were so deeply
resented by the British Cabinet that the negotiations
with reference to the Chesapeake were broken off and
Erskine was severely censured for transmitting a note
containing language so discourteous and unbecoming.
Erskine was later recalled on the ground of his hav-
81 Smith to Erskine, April 17, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 295-296.
82 Erskine to Smith, April 18, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 296.
83 Smith to Erskine, April 17, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 295-296.
IMPRESSMENT 53
ing departed from his instructions in agreeing to a
stipulation for the repeal of the orders in council. He
was succeeded by Francis Jackson, who arrived at
Washington in October, 1809.
Jackson, in his first formal note to the Secretary of
State, made known his powers to renew the offer of
reparation made by Erskine.^* The American Secre-
tary pertinently inquired in what particular his offer
differed from the reparation tendered by Erskine and
accepted by the United States; and also in what re-
spects the reparation by the former British minister
differed from the instructions given to him.^^ Jackson
then presented a memorandum containing the condi-
tions on the basis of which he was authorized to draw
up an official agreement. This paper stated that, since
the President's proclamation had been annulled, the
British Government were willing to restore the seamen
taken out of the Chesapeake except such as might be
proved to be natural born citizens of Great Britain or
deserters from the British service; and that provision
would be made for the families of such as had been
killed on the Chesapeake provided that no bounty
should be extended to the family of any man who
had been a natural born subject of Great Britain or a
8^ Jackson to Smith, Oct. 11, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 308-311.
85 Smith to Jackson, Oct. 19, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 311-314.
54 IMPRESSMENT
■deserter from the service of that country.^" Such an
arrangement being entirely unsatisfactory to the
United States, no official notice was taken of it. Jack-
son's explanation of the disavowal by the British Gov-
ernment of the arrangement made under the negotia-
tion of Erskine was unsatisfactory. His insinuation
that the American Government had carried on negotia-
tions with Erskine while knowing that he was exceed-
ing his powers was denied ; and upon his reiteration of
that insinuation he was informed that no further com-
munication would be received from him. The Ameri-
can minister in London was ordered to request Jack-
son's recall. This was done by Pinkney, and the
British Government finally recalled Jackson after a
delay of a year and a half.
For more than a year the government of Great
Britain was represented at Washington by a charge
d'affaires. The American Government believed that it
was the purpose of Great Britain by this action to
humiliate the United States. Accordingly, Pinkney
left London in February, 1811, and left a charge in the
person of John S. Smith to represent the United States
there. Great Britain then decided to send a minister to
the United States. The person selected was Augustus
J. Foster, who arrived in America in June, 181 1.
Foster was instructed by his Government to make such
86 Jackson to Secretary of State, Oct. 27, 1809; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 316.
IMPRESSMENT 55
reparation for the attack upon the Chesapeake as the
American Government should require, not derogatory
to Great Britain. He offered again the disavowal on
the part of the British Government of the act of
Admiral Berkeley; the immediate restoration of the
impressed seamen to the deck of the Chesapeake ;
and suitable pecuniary provision for those wounded
and for the families of those slain.^^ The Ameri-
can Government, while intimating its displeasure that
the officer responsible for the attack had merely been
removed from one command to another, yet accepted
the offer and the negotiation was closed.*®
The general subject of impressment was introduced
a few months later when Foster complained to the
Secretary of State that certain British seamen desert-
ing from the service had received protection upon
American vessels, and that others had been seduced
from the British service by American citizens. He
expressed the hope that some measure might be dis-
covered to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and
declared his willingness to exert every effort to pro-
cure the release from British vessels of any persons
claimed as native American citizens. He requested
that a list of such be sent him.®^
8'^ Foster to Monroe, Nov. i, i8ii; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 499-500.
88 Monroe to Foster, Nov. 12, 181 1; American State Papers,
For. Rel, III., 500.
89 Foster to Monroe, April 15, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 454.
\v
56 IMPRESSMENT
Secretary Monroe stated in reply to Foster that the
deserting British seamen had received no encourage-
ment from the constituted authorities of the United
States ; that if they had received such encouragement
from American citizens it was a cause of regret, but an
act not cognizable by American laws. To Foster's offer
to secure the discharge of native American citizens
when impressed he answered : " It is impossible for
the United States to discriminate between their native
and naturalized citizens, nor ought your Government
to expect it, as it makes no such discrimination itself.
There is in this ofhce a list of several thousand Ameri-
can seamen, who have been impressed into the British
service, for whose release applications have, from time
to time, been already made ; of this list a copy shall be
forwarded you, to take advantage of any good offices
you may be able to render."^°
June I, Foster presented to the Secretary of State
several papers relating to English seamen claimed to
have been detained against their will on board certain
ships of war of the United States. This showed, the
British minister said, " that it is not on this side of the
water alone that the inconvenience necessarily resulting
from the similarity of habits, language, and manners
between the inhabitants of the two countries, is pro-
ductive of subjects of complaint and regret. These
8° Monroe to Foster, May 30, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 454-
IMPRESSMENT 57
are, however, at the same time, natural and strong in-
ducements for a conformity of interest, and most par-
ticularly for a readiness to give and receive mutual ex-
planations upon all subjects of difference." He stated,
in less qualified language this time, that the British
Government would continue to give positive orders
against the detention of American citizens on board
British ships, and that no difficulties, beyond what were
necessary for clearly ascertaining the national char-
acter of the individuals brought before the Lords Com-
missioners of the Admiralty, would be interposed to
prevent or delay their immediate discharge.^^
Monroe resented the attempt of the British minister
to deduce an analogy between American practice with
respect to seamen and the British practice in order to
derive a justification for the latter. He contrasted the
regulations of the two states as follows : The United
States prohibited the enlistment of aliens into their
vessels of war, while Great Britain did not ; the United
States forbade enlistments or impressments by force,
while Great Britain not only practiced that system
within her own legal jurisdiction, but had extended it
to foreign vessels on the high seas ; most of the States
in the United States had enacted laws providing for
the restoration of seamen deserting from merchant
vessels, while Great Britain had made no such pro-
vision whatever. With reference to the assurance
^1 Foster to Monroe, June i, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 459-460.
58 IMPRESSMENT
that the British Government would give orders against
the detention of American citizens on board British
ships of war, Monroe asserted that if these orders
were to prohibit the impressment of seamen from
American vessels at sea, they would show a disposition
on the part of Great Britain to do justice and to pro-
mote a good understanding between the two countries.
Should such action be taken the United States would
be ready to substitute for the practice the most liberal
arrangement on the subject. He maintained that the
proposal of the British minister offered objections, in
that it gave no assurance for the release of American
citizens, except those recognized as such by British
officers ; and further that it made no provision for the
release of aliens. There would be no security against
detention inasmuch as it was not sufficient to prove
that the seamen taken from American vessels were
not subjects of Great Britain or the subjects of the
enemy.^^
Ten days after this note was sent by Secretary
Monroe to the British minister, war was declared. In
his war message communicated to Congress June i,
Madison presented impressment as one of the justifi-
able causes for war with Great Britain. He said :
"Against this crying enormity, which Great Britain
would be so prompt to avenge if committed against her-
self, the United States have in vain exhausted remon-
^- Monroe to Foster, June 8, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 464.
IMPRESSMENT 59
strances and expostulations."^^ In the report of the
committee of the House recommending war, June 2,
impressment was mentioned as the principal cause of
the war. It said : " While this practice is continued, it
is impossible for the United States to consider them-
selves an independent nation. Every new case is a
new proof of their degradation. Its continuance is
the more unjustifiable, because the United States have
repeatedly proposed to the British Government an
arrangement which would secure to it the control of its
own people. An exemption of the citizens of the
United States from this degrading oppression, and their
flag from violation, is all that they have sought."^*
When, later, it became known that the other main V'
cause of the war, the British orders in council, had
been repealed before the announcement of war reached
England, the American Government still decided to
continue the war, unless the British Government should
renounce their practice of impressment. Russell, who
became charge d'affaires upon the departure of Pink-
ney from London in March, 181 1, proposed an arm-
istice, upon the condition that the British Government
would relinquish the practice of impressment, on the
assurance that the Government of the United States
would pass a law prohibiting the employment of British
83 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
499 et seq.
94 Report of Committee on Foreign Relations, June 3, 1812;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 567-570.
6o IMPRESSMENT
seamen in the public or commercial service of the
United States.^^ The British Government refused,
stating that " they cannot consent to suspend the exer-
cise of a right upon which the naval strength of the
empire mainly depends, until they are fully convinced
that means can be devised, and will be adopted, by
which the object to be obtained by the exercise of that
right can be effectually secured."®^
A proposal for an armistice made by Admiral
Warren, in September, 1812, was rejected by the
American Government because Warren was unable to
give any assurance that the practice of impressment
by his Government would be relinquished even during
the time of the armistice. A similar proposal made by
Sir George Prevost, Commander-in-Chief of the British
forces in America, was also declined by the President,
principally on the ground that it contained no provision
for redress against the practice of impressment.
Thus impressment, one of the principal causes for
which war was declared, because the sole cause for
which it was continued. Twenty years of diplomacy
conducted under twelve distinct negotiations and
carried on, at times, by the broadest minded statesmen
of America and England failed to bring about a satis-
factory adjustment of this vexed question.
^5 Russell to Castlereagh, Aug. 24, 1812 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 589.
^^Castlereagh to Russell, Aug. 29, 1812; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 589-590.
CHAPTER II
Neutral Trade
While the uncompromising attitude of Great Britain v
in her practice of impressment and the abuses of such
practice gave the sentimental basis for the second war
with England, that which brought the general support
of the country to hostile measures was the British
aggressions upon American trade. It mattered not
whether the British acts were conceived with hostile
intent toward the United States in order to thwart the
growth of the commerce and naval power of that
state, or whether they were merely retaliatory acts
upon France, the effects were the same. The United
States had from political considerations adopted a
policy of neutrality as between the belligerent Powers.
When Great Britain and France went to war with each
other the commerce of the United States, which was
becoming important and profitable, was seriously
affected by the various measures of retaliation adopted
by the two belligerent states.
The first restrictive acts affecting American trade \/
were those in connection with commerce carried on
between the United States and the colonies of the
belligerents. The colonial policy of all states in the
6i
62 NEUTRAL TRADE
1 8th century was to utilize the colonies for the benefit
, of the parent state. Colonies were allowed to trade
only with the mother-country and her possessions.
' Before the American Revolution there had grown up a
large trade between the United States and the British
West Indies. This trade consisted of lumber, live
stock, and provisions from the American colonies,
which were exchanged partly for molasses and rum,
and partly for specie. This was a trade highly bene-
ficial to both parties. When the treaty of peace ;
recognized the independence of the United States, the i
right of trade with the West Indies no longer belonged
to America as a part of the British Kingdom.
Had William Pitt been able to secure the passage
of a bill which he proposed in the House of Commons
in 1783 a broad foundation would have been laid for
an open commercial policy which would have brought
lasting peace and harmony between the two countries.
His proposed bill would have repealed all statutes of
regulation or prohibitions of intercourse which had
been enacted. It would have admitted to the ports of
Great Britain the ships and vessels of citizens of the
United States upon the same footing as before the
war. This would not only have placed the United
States upon the same footing as other sovereign states,
but would have allowed the products and merchandise
of American growth or manufacture to be imported
into England upon payment of the same duties as
NEUTRAL TRADE 63
were paid upon the property of British subjects im-
ported in British-built vessels navigated by British
natural-born subjects. The bill failed to become a law,
and no such favorable commercial arrangement was
made for more than thirty years. With respect to
trade with the British colonies Pitt's bill was equally
liberal, allowing freedom of trade between the United
States and these colonies, subject only to the same
duties as the same goods would be obliged to pay if
they were the property of British subjects and im-
ported in British vessels manned by British seamen.^
A vote of censure upon the peace negotiations of
1783 passing the House of Commons caused the
resignation of Lord Shelbourne and Pitt. The new
Ministry that succeeded, formed by a coalition of Lord
North and Charles Fox, demolished the entire system
of friendly intercourse with America. Because of
lack of unity in the Cabinet the whole regulation of
commercial intercourse was committed to the discre-
tion of the King in council.
One of the first results of this act was an order in
council which restricted the trade between the United
States and the British colonies to a very small number
of articles, and forced this to be carried exclusively in
1 [J. Q. Adams], "Documents from the Department of
State, relative to the Colonial Trade," in American Quarterly
Review, II., 267-306.
V
64 NEUTRAL TRADE
British ships. This order was dated July 2, 1783, and
was continued by annual acts of Parliament and orders
in council until February, 1788, when the prohibitions
were made permanent by a statute which took effect
April 2 of that year. When the first enactment of
these prohibitions was made it was feared by Great
Britain that the United States might retaliate, but Con-
gress under the Articles of Confederation did not have
the power. Four of the states, however. New Hamp-
shire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, did
pass discriminating laws against Great Britain. These,
naturally, had slight effect. One of the chief reasons
for the adoption of the new constitution and the
organization of a stronger government lay in the need
of a stronger concerted commercial policy against
Great Britain. Laws establishing discriminating duties
of tonnage and impost were passed by the first Federal
Congress in 1789.^
These discriminating measures were proposed by
Madison, who dwelt with great earnestness upon the
importance of teaching those nations which had refused
commercial treaties with the United States, particu-
larly Great Britain, to respect the new republic. He
expressed his own preference for freedom of com-
merce, but avowed his determination to meet interdict
2 [J. Q. Adams], "Documents from the Department of
State, relative to the Colonial Trade," in American Quarterly
Review, II., 267-306.
NEUTRAL TRADE 65
with interdict " until we should be allowed to carry to \
the West India islands, in our own vessels, the produce j
of America, which necessity compels them to take."^
Madison further believed that the discriminating ton-
nage duties would aid in the development of a navy
and seamen, which he conceived as necessary in view of
the maritime dangers. He said : " It is a tax, and a
tax upon our produce, but it is a tax we must pay for
the national security. I reconcile it to the interest of
the United States that this sacrifice should be made;
by it we shall be able to provide the means of defence,
and by being prepared to repel danger, is the most
likely way to avoid it. This tax, therefore, may pre-
vent the horror of a war, and secure to us that respect
and attention which we merit."^
After the passage of the discriminating impost and
tonnage duties, Washington authorized Gouverneur
Morris to hold informal conferences with the British
Ministry in order to learn whether they were disposed
to enter into an arrangement, by mutual consent, which
might regulate the commerce between the two nations
on a principle of reciprocal advantage. Though no
stipulation was obtained from Great Britain, the acts
did, to a very satisfactory degree, increase American
shipping and add to the commercial prosperity of the
United States.
3 Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., ist sess., 210.
*Ibid., 247,
66 NEUTRAL TRADE
n/ The first of the long series of executive orders which
restricted and eventually almost annihilated American
commerce was passed June 8, 1793. This order pro-
vided that all vessels laden wholly or in part with
breadstuffs for any port in France or place occupied by
the French armies might be seized and sent to England,
where their cargoes should be disposed of or security
given that they should be sold only in the ports of a
country at peace with Great Britain.^ Five months
later, November, 1793, a second order directed British
commanders to detain neutral vessels laden with the
produce of the French colonies and all vessels carrying
provisions or other supplies for the use of such col-
onies. This order claimed to revive the rule adopted
in the w^ar of 1756 which declared it unlawful for
neutral nations to carry on trade in time of war with
the colonies of a belligerent when such trade had been
prohibited in time of peace. This order was made the
more exasperating by the fact that it was put into
force without previous notice being given to American
merchantmen.
V January 8, 1794, the last order was revoked and re-
placed by another which directed all vessels to be
seized and brought in for adjudication which were
laden with merchandise of the French West India
Colonies and going from the said colonies to any port
in Europe. Vessels laden with merchandise no mat-
f' American State Papers, For. Rel, III., 264.
NEUTRAL TRADE 6/
ter to what port they were bound were ordered to be
seized if the merchandise was the property of a French
subject. All vessels attempting to enter the blockaded
ports of the said colonies were to be seized as well as all
vessels that had on board naval or military stores des-
tined to these ports.^
This order was continued until January 25, 1798,
when it was replaced by one which ordered all vessels
laden with merchandise of any possession of France,
Spain, or the United Provinces, and coming from any
port of such colonies to any port in Europe not a
port of Great Britain or of that country to which such
neutral ships belonged, were to be apprehended and
brought in for adjudication. In like manner, all ves-
sels having on board enemy's goods, vessels attempting
to enter blockaded ports, and vessels having on board
naval or military stores were to be seized.'^ March 18,
1794, the French West India islands were declared to
be in a state of blockade, and August 18 of the same
year the order of June 8, 1793, was revoked. From
this time ships laden with foodstuffs were taken with-
out any provision for the purchase of their cargoes
being made by the British Government.
The American Congress was in session when the
first news reached America of the action of the British
assizes and prize courts acting under the orders of
^ American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 264.
7 Ibid., 264-265.
68 NEUTRAL TRADE
November 6, 1793. Great indignation was felt and
petitions for redress poured into Congress. Retalia-
tory measures were urged. President Washington, in
order to prevent hostile legislation by Congress, acted
promptly and appointed John Jay, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, as a special envoy to the court of St.
James.
Jay was sent to England primarily to seek indemnifi-
cation for American vessels and goods confiscated
under the claim that foodstuffs were contraband, and
for injuries sustained and captures made in connec-
tion with blockades the existence of which was not yet
known in all quarters. A second object of the mis-
sion was to draw up an agreement upon all the points
of difference between the United States and Great
Britain concerning the Treaty of Peace. This task was
especially assigned to Jay because he had been one of
the signers of the treaty. A third subject mentioned
in the instructions was that of a commercial treaty
which he was to consider should the first two objects
be secured.^
Jay arrived in England June 8, and, as soon as pos-
sible, entered into negotiations with Lord Grenville.
He experienced some delay in the negotiations due to
a change in the Ministry.^ July 30, Jay addressed a
8 Instructions to Jay; American State Papers, For. Rel., I,,
472-474-
^Jay to Randolph, July 9, 1794; Amjsrican State Papers,
For. Rel., I., 478-479.
NEUTRAL TRADE 69
note to Grenville setting forth the American claims for
indemnities. He suggested that some less expensive
method than the present be adopted by which appeals
might be made from the Vice-Admiralty Courts; and
that at least all vessels captured might be permitted to
enter both their appeals and their claims. ^° Lord
Grenville, while replying in a general way, to the effect
that His Majesty wished to do the most complete and
impartial justice to the citizens of the United States,
showed in fact little inclination to grant anything.
The cases of persons referred to by Jay, who had pre-
viously omitted to prefer claims, Grenville referred
to the regular courts of law for settlement; the cases
of others who up to the present had made no appeals
from the sentences of condemnation in the first in-
stance might be allowed a longer time for preferring
their appeals. Apprehending that the cases thus men-
tioned would form a very considerable part of the in-
juries alleged to have been suffered by the Americans,
he proposed that no definite judgment be expressed
upon the remaining cases until the former ones should
have been settled in the courts. In very cautious lan-
guage he went on to say that, " if cases shall then be
found to exist to such an extent as properly to call for
the interposition of Government, where, without the
fault of the parties complaining, they shall be unable,
10 Jay to Grenville, July 30, 1794; American State Papers,
For. Rel., I., 481.
JO NEUTRAL TRADE
from zvhatever circumstances, to procure such redress,
in the ordinary course of law, as the justice of their
cases may entitle them to expect, His Majesty will be
anxious that justice should, at all events, be done, and
will readily enter into the discussion of the measures
to be adopted, and the principles to be established for
that purpose. "^^ While the negotiations turned, in the
main, to the subject of indemnities, a number of in-
formal interviews took place upon other points, such
as the carrying away of negroes contrary to article
seven of the Treaty of Peace and the failure of the
British to evacuate the military posts in the North-
west.^- Jay also presented to Grenville a projet of a
commercial treaty.
A treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation was
finally signed November 19, 1794." Jay believed that
in this he had secured all the concessions that Great
Britain would make. The treaty was approved by
President Washington and, after a long and spirited;
debate in the Senate, was ratified with the omission
of the twelfth article by a bare two-thirds vote. The
omitted article permitted direct trade between the
United States and the British colonies in the West
Indies in vessels not exceeding seventy tons, but ex-
11 Grenville to Jay, Aug. i, 1794; American State Papers,
For. Rel., I., 481-482.
12 Jay to Randolph, Sept. 13, 1794; American State Papers,
For. Rel., I., 485-487.
13 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 590-606.
NEUTRAL TRADE ^1
pressly prohibited American vessels from carrying cer-
tain articles, the produce of those islands, to any part
of the world except to the United States. To consent
to such restrictions would have been to deprive the
United States of a great part of the advantage which
she derived from her position as a neutral state. It
was better to run the risk of the trade with the West
Indies rather than to suffer such limitations even
though protected by treaty.
The other chief provisions of the Jay treaty as affect-
ing trade relations were as follows : American vessels
were allowed to trade with British ports in Europe and
the East Indies upon the same terms as British vessels ;
the colonial coasting trade, and trade between Euro-
pean and British East Indian ports, were left subject
to the permission of Great Britain ; the vessels of Great
Britain were admitted to American ports upon the most
favorable terms granted to any nation.
The treaty was assailed and its author denounced be-
cause, in addition to the fact that it contained no article
upon impressment, there was an omission of any
provision for the remuneration of slaveholders for their
negroes claimed to have been carried away during the
war, while, on the other hand, payment was allowed to
British citizens for debts contracted before the Revolu-
tion. The opposition to the treaty was largely polit-
ical, and was made by those who were strongly anti-
British in feeling and who were ready to condemn the
V
^2 NEUTRAL TRADE
treaty even before its provisions were made known.
Great Britain acceded to the omission of the twelfth
article, and ratifications were exchanged in London
October 28, 1795.
American trade continued to suffer at the hands of
Great Britain, France, and Spain. Neutral vessels
were seized by these belligerent nations for having on
board goods of the enemy, whether such goods were
contraband or not; for trading with ports declared to
be under blockade ; and for carrying goods claimed to
be contraband. In the early years of the war between
Great Britain and France, the most serious aggressor
was France. The vessels taken by Great Britain were
in nearly every case released upon application of the
American Government.^* Seizures of American
vessels by British cruisers steadily increased, however,
and February 24, 1801, the House of Representatives
called for a report upon the depredations committed on
the commerce of the United States by vessels of Great
Britain of which complaint had been made to the De-
partment of State. Secretary Marshall submitted a
report of seventeen cases complained of since January
I, 1800.^^
American trade with the West Indies particularly
suffered, British cruisers seizing American vessels and
"Report of Secretary of State, June 21, I797; American
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 28-29.
15 Report of Secretary of State, Feb. 27, 1801 ; American
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 345-346.
NEUTRAL TRADE 73
sending them into port. If there were found on board
any goods the produce or manufacture of any coun-
tries at war with Great Britain, the vessels were con-
demned. Property on board not belonging to Ameri-
can citizens was either confiscated or held till proofs
could be obtained of the citizenship of the owner. The
detention and expenses in connection with vessels not
found subject to condemnation, as well as the loss of
those confiscated, made the trade extremely precarious,
and insurance rates advanced from ten to thirty per
cent.^^ Secretary Marshall in instructions to Minister
King September 20, 1800, complained of the conduct
of the British Admiralty Courts, which he declared had
made unjust decisions and had failed to inflict penalties
upon those captains who made seizures without justifi-
able causes. The Courts of Vice-Admiralty, it was
alleged, whatever might be the case, seldom acquitted,
and when they did never awarded costs and damages
for detention. ^^ The American complaint against the
unjust decision of the lower courts was justified by the
statement of Lord Hawkesbury, in the House of Com-
mons April 29, 1 801, that out of 318 appeals from the
Vice-Admiralty Courts only 35 of the condemnations
were confirmed by the higher court,
16 Thomas Fitzsimmons to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 17,
1801 ; American State Papers, For. Rel., II., 347.
i'^ Marshall to King, Sept. 20, 1800; American State Papers,
For. Rel., II., 486-490.
V
74 NEUTRAL TRADE
The American minister protested to the British Gov-
ernment against the practice of the Vice-Admiralty
Courts of condemning all American vessels bound to an
enemy's colony provided they had on board any article
the growth or manufacture of a nation at war with
Great Britain. This particularly affected the American
trade with the Spanish colonies in the West Indies.
Minister King was able to secure from the British Gov-
ernment a modified interpretation of the rule of 1756,
to this effect : that trade between a neutral and the
enemy's colonies was permitted ; and that the produce
of the colonies of the enemy actually imported into a
neutral country might be re-exported thence to any
other place, even to the mother-country of that colony
which supplied the produce.^^ This opinion of the
King's Advocate, having been communicated to the
judges of the Vice-Admiralty Courts for their guid-
ance, brought great relief to American vessels ; and at
once there sprang up a large and lucrative commerce
by means of circuitous voyages from the United States
to the Spanish colonies, thence returning to the United
States, and thence going to Spain and France.
When, by the signing of the treaty of Amiens, 1802,
peace ensued between Great Britain and France, the
neutral commerce of the United States lost the advan-
tage which it had had during the war. Minister King
18 Report of the King's Advocate, May 23, 1801 ; American
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 49^497-
NEUTRAL TRADE 75
at London was urged to secure some relaxation of the
British navigation laws, in order that the United States
might be placed upon a more equal footing of trade.
Particularly was it to be desired that the United States
should be allowed to export to the British West Indies
certain articles which hitherto had been prohibited ; and
that the carrying of such articles, as well as of the
exports from the West Indies to the United States,
should be permitted to American vessels.^®
The American minister wrote to the Secretary of
State, August lo, 1802, that the British Government
had consented to the abolition of all discrimination in
duties affecting the navigation and commercial inter-
course between the United States and Great Britain;
but when the bill dealing with duties on exports and
imports and the tonnage on vessels was finally passed
it was discovered to work even greater hardship to
American commerce than that which was produced by
the former regulations." With respect to the West
India trade, King was unable to secure any positive
statement. Lord Hawkesbury said that no decision
could be reached until a more careful investigation
could be made of the condition of the West India
islands.^"/
In the spring of 1803, hostihties between Great
19 King to Hawkesbury, Feb. 3, 1802 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., II., 498-500.
20 King to Secretary of State, Aug. 10, 1802; American
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 501-502.
V
76 NEUTRAL TRADE
Britain and France broke out afresh, and the measures
employed by Great Britain in the last war affecting
neutral trade were, in general, renewed by orders in
council issued June 24 of that year. One modification
was made in this respect, that, while permitting
neutrals to carry on trade between their own country
and enemy's colonies, and between their own country
and that of the enemy in Europe, they were no longer
allowed to carry the produce of these colonies to Great
Britain as was permitted by the instructions of 1798.
Another principle which was now applied was that a
vessel upon a return voyage was liable to capture
by the circumstances of her having, on the outward
voyage, conveyed contraband goods to an enemy's
port.^^
In the renewal of the war France adopted a con-
certed policy of weakening Great Britain by attacking
her commerce. As the ports of Europe gradually be-
came closed to British trade the effects became felt by
British merchants, particularly by those of the West
Indies. Complaints were made that the hostile colonies
through neutral shipping had advantages over the
British colonies. A pamphlet published at this time
entitled, " War in Disguise," written by James
Stephens, advanced the argument that the immense
trade which was being carried on under the American
flag with the enemies of Great Britain was essentially
21 Report of Secretary of State, Jan. 25, 1806; American
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 728.
NEUTRAL TRADE 77
an act of war. Demands were made for the re-adop-
tion of the rule of 1756. Pitt proceeded cautiously,
fearing that a general war might result from the
attempt to establish the rule, and realizing also that
Great Britain was in fact materially benefited by the
trade, which the West India merchants, with mistaken
view, wished to be suppressed. The Lords of Appeal
brought about the change in policy, which suited the
British merchants. The influence that caused the
court to recede from its former decisions was com-
mercial. This change in policy was made in connection
with the determination as to what constituted a con-
tinuous voyage. In the case of the American ship
Essex, in May, 1805, it was held by the court that the
vessel in question was subject to condemnation on the
ground that the continuity of its voyage between the
enemy's colony and the parent state was established by
the fact that the duties on the cargo when imported
to the United States had not been actually paid in
money, and therefore the cargo was not a bona fide im-
portation.^- Previous to this decision the Lords Com-
missioners of the Appeals Court had held that it was
not a continuous voyage if the goods had been landed
in the United States and duties had been paid upon
them.^^
22 Alexander Baring, An Enquiry on Orders in Council,
page 82.
23 Robinson's Admiralty Reports, II., 368-270. Case of the
Polly.
78 NEUTRAL TRADE
'^ The decision with respect to the Essex, establishing
a change in policy, was not communicated to the
American Government, although British privateers and
cruisers soon learned of it, and at once busied them-
selves in apprehending American vessels which had
cleared in ignorance of the new principle established
by the Court of Appeals. Merchants of New York
presented a memorial to Congress, in December, 1805,
protesting against the new interpretation that had been
placed upon direct trade. They especially complained
because the ships had suddenly been seized ^while they
were "confiding in the justice and friendly dispositions
of the Government of Great Britain, and entertaining a
correspondent expectation that no unusual restrictions
would be imposed on neutral commerce without ade-
quate motives and the most ample notice : presuming,
especially, that commercial enterprises, commenced
under the sanction of established principles, would, on
no account, be affected by a change of system." The
memorialists denied that the rights of commerce which
they claimed were to be deemed as favors from Great
Britain, but said that they were based upon the law of
nations which recognized the principle " that the goods
of a neutral, consisting of articles not contraband of
war, in a neutral vessel, employed in a direct trade
between neutral countries and ports of a belligerent
country, not invested or blockaded, are protected."
The merchants did not wish to leave the impression
NEUTRAL TRADE 79
that they were appealing for their own financial in-
terests alone. They attempted to play upon the public
feeling for seamen's rights with these words : " The
constancy and valor of the seamen of the United States
are justly themes of patriotic exultation ; from their
connexion with us we consider their cause as our
cause, their rights as our rights, their interests as our
interests. Our feelings are indignant at the recital of
their wrongs, and we request, in addition to the protec-
tion of a naval force, that, at least in the American
seas, our brave countrymen may be permitted to display
their energy in their own defence."^* A similar
memorial was presented to Congress by merchants of
Philadelphia. These memorialists protested not alone
against the new enforcement by Great Britain of the
rule of 1756 in connection with the doctrine of " con-
tinuous voyage " ; but they complained even more
of the action of France and Spain in allowing Ameri-
can vessels to be seized and confiscated contrary to any
established principle of the law of nations and in
derogation of special treaty obligations. They urged
upon Congress to use every measure, not inconsistent
with the honor of the nation, to obtain redress and
security.^V
Monroe in the meantime, in London, complained to
24 Memorial of Merchants of the City of New York; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., II., 72,7-729-
25 Memorial of Merchants of Philadelphia; American State
Papers, For. Rel., II., 740-741.
80 NEUTRAL TRADE
the British Government of the seizures of numerous
American vessels under the rule of 1756, in accord-
ance with which colonial trade denied to neutrals in
time of peace was declared illegal in time of war. .He
also opposed the principle laid down by the British
court in the case of the Essex and other vessels. He
found the British Government unwilling to relax in the
slightest degree the doctrine laid down by the decisions
of the Admiralty Courts and Court of Appeals,' which
Monroe asserted had the effect of cutting up by the
roots American commerce in the produce of the
enemy's colonies except for consumption in the United
States. The British Government quite generally freed
the American vessels, when complaint was made; but
refused to give up the principle upon which the vessels
were seized. Monroe, thinking that more serious ac-
tion might be deemed necessary by the United States,
despatched American emissaries, Bowdoin and Erving,
to Paris and Madrid, respectively.^®
Monroe considered that the coalition with Russia
and Sweden had afifected the British policy upon
neutral trade. In her treaty of 1801 with Great
Britain, Russia had been compelled to abandon the
right to the direct trade between colonies of an enemy
and the parent country, and to agree to accept the posi-
28 Monroe to Madison, Aug. 20, 1805; American State
Papers, For. Rel, III., 105.
NEUTRAL TRADE 8 1
tion which the United States might hold in that
respect.^'^
^ When Fox became Secretary for Foreign Affairs in
the new Cabinet after the death of Pitt, in January,
1806, Monroe was hopeful of a more favorable con-
sideration of American trade. British captures of
American vessels had continued, until now the total
numbered between one and two hundred. Monroe
soon made the discovery that, while Fox was inclined
to meet the United States half way, the Cabinet of
which he was a member was an inharmonious body,
being in fact a' coalition, and that, therefore, no agree-
ment favorable to the United States could be expected.
Monroe in a letter to the Secretary of State suggested
that Congress adopt coercive measures, leaving to the
President's discretion putting them into operation,^^
In one of the interviews between Monroe and Fox,
the latter proposed that Great Britain suspend her
alleged right, leaving the United States in the enjoy-
ment of the colonial trade. He explained that this
would not call upon Great Britain to renounce her
rights nor afford the United States justification for
pressing her claims. Monroe refused to agree to this
plan, which would have meant an abandonment of the
2^ Monroe to Madison, Oct. 18, 1805; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 106-108.
28 Monroe to Madison, March 31, 1806; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 115.
82 NEUTRAL TRADE
United States claims for indemnities. He refused to
compromise.-^
V When instructions were issued to Monroe and Pink-
ney, who were commissioned to negotiate a treaty with
Great Britain, it was declared desirable that the gen-
jeral principle upon the right of neutral trade be laid
'jdown; but, if that was found to be impracticable, the
commissioners were authorized to abridge the right in
practice, as was done in the supplement of October,
1801, to the treaty of June of that year between Russia
and Great Britain; "not omitting to provide that, in
case Great Britain should, by her treaties or instruc-
tions, leave to any other nation the right in a greater
extent than it is stipulated to the United States, they
may claim the enjoyment of it in an equal extent."
The commissioners w^ere instructed to oppose the
British theory of " continuous voyagCj," and to demand
as a minimum in the West India trade the admission
of American vessels with American goods, which in
British vessels were not prohibited, on the same terms
on which British vessels laden with colonial produce
were admitted to American ports.^°
\iy The treaty which Monroe and Pinkney negotiated
with Lord Holland and Lord Auckland in 1806 con-
tained a provision in relation to colonial trade which,
29 Monroe to Madison, April 28, 1806; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 117-118.
20 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 17, 1806; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 1 19-124.
NEUTRAL TRADE 83
had the treaty been ratified, would have left no room
for misunderstanding upon the question of the con-
tinuity of neutral voyage. Article eleven of that treaty
provided that, during the period of a war, articles
which were the growth, produce, or manufacture of
Europe might be carried from the United States to the
port of any colony, not blockaded, belonging to His
IMajesty's enemies, provided such goods should previ-
ously have been entered and landed in the United
States, ' and should have paid the ordinary duties on
such articles and, on re-exportation, should, after the
drawback, remain subject to a duty of not less than one
per cent, of the value of the goods. In like manner
colonial goods might be shipped from the United States
to European ports, provided such goods should have
entered and landed, paid the ordinary duties, and, upon
re-exportation, should have paid a dut}^ of two per cent,
ad valorem.^V The levying of a special duty upon re-
exportation, particularly upon colonial goods, w^as to
foster competition with American shipping.
This treaty was rejected by the American Govern-
ment, mainly on two grounds : because it failed to pro-
vide any article upon impressment, and because on the
subject of colonial trade it restricted to the market of
Europe the re-exportation of colonial produce, and to
31 Treaty of Amity. Commerce, and Navigation, between His
Brittanic Majesty and the United States of America; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 147-151.
84 NEUTRAL TRADE
European articles the supplies to the colonial trade.^^
N/j British cruisers, under the new doctrine of continuous
; voyage, brought in for adjudication American vessels
; in large numbers. The British prize courts in some
instances held that American vessels trading with
France and complying with the French decree, which
required the use of certificates of origin in order to
bar out goods of British growth or manufacture, were
engaged in unneutral service and, therefore, were sub-
ject to confiscation.^^
The causes of complaint in relation to the capture of
American vessels were numerous prior to the begin-
ning of the year 1807, but after that date they were
vastly multiplied, and constituted, from this time on,
the most important factor determining the war between
Great Britain and the United States. ' The system of v
official orders and decrees, under which neutral rights
were disregarded and American commerce was crushed,
began when Great Britain, May 16, 1806, in order to
attack Napoleon, proclaimed the coast of the Continent
from the river Elbe to Brest in a state of blockade.
The strict enforcement of the blockade was to extend
from Ostend to the mouth of the Seine. Napoleon
six months later, November 21, 1806, exulting in his
victory at Jena, which brought Prussia into subjection,
32 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 20, 1807; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 166-173.
33 Officers of Insurance Companies to Secretary of State,
Dec. ID, 1805; American State Papers, For. Rel., II., 769.
NEUTRAL TRADE 85
issued a decree from Berlin declaring the British
islands under blockade, and prohibiting all trade in Eng-
lish goods. No vessel proceeding to or coming from
England, or the English colonies, was to be admitted
to any French port.^*. Great Britain, without waiting
to learn the effects of this impossible decree, retaliated
with an order in council, dated January 7, 1807, which
forbade all vessels to engage in the coastwise trade of
France and of her allies or of any ports to which
British vessels were denied access.^^ Later, alarmed at
the success of Napoleon in building up his Continental
system, and especially disturbed by the alliance of
Russia with France, cemented by the treaty of Tilsit,
July 7, 1807, the British Government adopted still
stronger measures for retaliating upon Napoleon and
for crippling American trade. The order in council
promulgated November 11, 1807, ordered a blockade
of all ports and places of France, of her allies, and of
all countries from which British ships were excluded.
All trade in articles produced or manufactured in such
blockaded countries was proclaimed unlawful, and
vessels engaging in it were subject to capture and con-
demnation together with the goods. It was further de-
clared that any vessel that carried a certificate of origin
3* Imperial Decree, Nov. 21, 1806; American State Papers,
For. Rel., II., 806.
35 Howick to Monroe, Jan. 10, 1807; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 5.
86 NEUTRAL TRADE
issued by France was to be considered good prize.^®
Another order of the same date permitted neutral
vessels to carry goods from the enemy's ports to the
ports of Great Britain upon payment of duties, and to
re-export from these, subject to British regulations.
V The British Cabinet held that the blockade which
the Berlin decree proclaimed was in violation of the
established law of nations and that in consequence
Great Britain was justified in retaliating upon the
enemy with a similar interdiction of commerce. The
ink had hardly become dry upon the British document
when Napoleon replied with a decree issued from
Alilan, December 17, 1807, declaring that every vessel
that should submit to search by an English vessel should
thereby become denationalized and hence be lawful
prize. The British islands, it was stated, were to be
under conditions of blockade, both by land and sea;
and any ship sailing from the ports of England or of
the EngHsh colonies or of the countries occupied by
English troops was to be regarded as lawful prize.
This decree was in turn declared by Napoleon to be in
retaliation upon Great Britain for her transgression of
the law of nations. "The provisions of the present
decree," it was announced, " shall be abrogated and
null, in fact, as soon as the English abide again by the
3*5 Order in Council, Nov. 11, 1807; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 29-31,
NEUTRAL TRADE 8/
principles of the law of nations, which are also the
principles of justice and of honor."^^
The United States refused to acquiesce in any of
these orders and decrees, and through both diplomatic
and legislative channels sought to make her resistance
felt. It is true that the British order creating a
blockade from the river Elbe to the port of Brest
was not considered especially inimical to the United
States. Our minister at London expressed the opinion
that the order showed a disposition to consider the
needs of the United States in that it put an end to
seizures, except within a special restricted blockaded
region from Ostend to the mouth of the river Seine,
leaving the remaining portion blockaded for purposes
of retaliation upon France, but not prohibiting therein
the trade of neutrals. The order was at first con-
sidered liberal, also, because it allowed neutral trade
in the productions of the enemy's colonies in every
route except the direct route between the colony and
the parent state.^® Monroe believed^^ that the author
of the measure, Charles Fox, had drawn it with a view
to meeting the American objection with regard to the
restriction upon American trade with enemies' colo-
37 Imperial Decree, Dec. 17, 1807; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 290-291.
38 Monroe to Madison, May 17, 1806; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 124-125.
25* Monroe to Madison, May 20, 1806; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 125-126.
88 NEUTRAL TRADE
nies. The results of the order later showed that Mon-
roe's optimism was ill founded.
The news of the Berlin decree reached London while
negotiations were pending between the American and
the British commissioners. It had a marked effect upon
the negotiation. The British would have been glad
to suspend negotiation until it could be ascertained
what attitude the United States would take in regard
to the decree. If the United States should submit to a
violation of their neutral rights by France, it was held
by the British commissioners that it would be im- *
possible for Great Britain to respect them. The
British commissioners proposed that the treaty which
they agreed upon should be subject to a reservation in
respect to its ratification, depending upon the resistance
of the United States to the French decree. The
American commissioners declared that this was inad-
missible. The British Cabinet insisted that, if the
American Government did not give the satisfaction
they desired, either by suitable assurances before the
ratification of the treaty or by its conduct afterwards,
the British Government would make a reservation of
their rights to counteract the policy of France.*" The
British commissioners, therefore, when offering to sign
the treaty, submitted a note which reserved to the
British Government the right to adopt retaliatory meas-
*o Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 3, 1807 ; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 142-147.
NEUTRAL TRADE 89
ures against France and affecting neutral commerce,
in the event that the United States should acquiesce in
the French decree.^^
The American commissioners, without giving their
consent, transmitted the note to their home Govern-
ment along w^ith the treaty, w^hich, we have seen, was
rejected. The promulgation of the order in council in
November of the following year, it was claimed by the
British Government, was rendered necessary because
" countries not engaged in the war had acquiesced in
the orders of France." As a matter of fact the United
States had not in any proper sense acquiesced in the
French decrees. , As soon as the American minister at
Paris had learned of the Berlin decree he demanded an
explanation as to its effects upon neutral nations, and
whether American vessels would be seized in the event
of their going to or from the ports of Great Britain.*^
The Minister of Marine and Colonies assured Minister
Armstrong that the imperial decree made no modifica-
tions of the regulations at present observed in France
with regard to neutrals or of the convention made
between France and the United States, September 30,
1800. He said that seizures contrary to the existing
regulations would not be allowed and that American
vessels would not be taken because of their going to or
41 Note from Holland and Auckland, Dec. 31, 1806; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 151-152.
*~ Armstrong to Minister of Marine and Colonies, Dec. 10,
1806; American State Papers, For. Rel., II., 805.
go NEUTRAL TRADE
coming from the ports of England. The regulations
set forth in the decree were, in his opinion, domestic
in their application.*^
The American Government was not satisfied with the
explanation of the Minister of Marine alone, but de-
sired to have this confirmed by the express authority of
the Emperor. Madison, Secretary of State, accordingly
directed Minister Armstrong to ascertain whether or
not it was the intention of the Emperor to execute the
decree in the limited manner explained by the Minister
of Marine. Should it appear that the decree was to
operate in all its latitude Armstrong was to ofifer a
protest, on the grounds of the principles of public law
and the express stipulation of the treaty of 1800. He
was to urge, on the supposition that the law was not
to be unfavorably interpreted, that the French Gov-
ernment despatch orders to their cruisers in every
quarter so as to prevent a construction of the decree
favorable to their cupidity.**
Armstrong, while apparently unable to secure any
unequivocal statement in relation to the decree as a
whole, did secure from the French minister, the Em-
peror still being absent from Paris, certain definite
modifications as follows: Vessels leaving ports of the
United States before a knowledge of the decree had
43 Minister of Marine and Colonies to Armstrong, Dec. 24,
1806; American State Papers, For. Rel., II., 805-806.
4-1 Madison to Armstrong, May 22, 1807; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 242.
NEUTRAL TRADE 9 1
been promulgated there were not subject to the rule;
vessels not coming directly from a British or French
port were not subject to the rule; cargoes of vessels
coming directly from a British to a French port and
offered for entry, on proof that the touching of the
ship in England was involuntary were to be sequestered
until the proofs offered should have been investigated.
The vessels themselves were in any case to- go free.
This was a modification of the former rule whereby
both ships and cargoes were sequestered.'*^
When a month later the Emperor returned to
Paris, Armstrong, on two occasions, secured an audi-
ence with him. In these interviews Napoleon's de-
sign of forming a union of all the commercial states
against Great Britain became apparent. One of
these audiences occurring just after the attack of
the Leopard on the Chesapeake, Napoleon, referring
to the attack, said to the American minister : " This is
abominable; they have pretended hitherto to visit mer-
chantmen, and that they had a right to do so ; but they
even they, have set up no such pretensions with respect
to armed ships. They would now arrange it by giving
up a right or usage which never existed; but they
will arrange it ; they are afraid to go to war with your
country."^'' Here was evident the desire which Na-
45 Armstrong to Monroe, July 7, 1807; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 242-243.
*6 Armstrong to Madison, Aug. 3, 1807; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 243.
92 NEUTRAL TRADE
poleon continued to cherish of arraying the United
States in war against Great Britain ; while Great
Britain's poHcy was no less that of forcing the United
States to break with France. A number of American
vessels having been seized and brought into Spanish
ports under color of a Spanish order issued in con-
formity to the French decree, the American minister
at Paris urged the French Minister of Foreign Affairs
to explain the French practice under the decree, as this
would regulate the practice in the Spanish prize courts.*^
The French minister, after referring the subject to the
Minister of Justice, replied to Armstrong that the Em-
peror regarded " every neutral vessel going from Eng-
lish ports, with cargoes of English merchandise, or of
English origin, as lawfully seizable by French armed
vessels."*^
This disavowal by the French Government of any
exception to be made in the treatment of American
vessels, followed, as it was soon after, by the confisca-
tion of the principal part of the cargo of the Horizon,
an American vessel shipwrecked on the coast of
France, greatly embarrassed the American Govern-
ment in its negotiations with Great Britain when it was
attempted to prove that the United States had not suf-
fered from the French decree. The confiscation of
*'' Armstrong to Champagny, Aug. 9, 1807 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 243.
*8 Champagny to Armstrong, Oct. 7, 1807 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 245.
NEUTRAL TRADE 93
these goods, openly declared to be in conformity to the
decree of November 21, brought forth a strong protest
from the American minister as being contrary to treaty
obligations and the assurances given earlier with re-
spect to the application of the decree. Armstrong's
letter was a cogent, strongly assertive document, which
made the British charge that the United States truckled
to France utterly groundless.*^
What the British Government desired most was to
bring about an estrangement between the United
States and France. War between the United States
and France would have been still more pleasing to
the British Government. To this end the ministers
insisted, practically, upon hostile resistance to the de-
cree of the French Government. The British minister
at Washington informed the Secretary of State that it
could not be expected that the British Government
would permit the commerce of their enemies to be
carried on by neutral nations, if they submitted to the
prohibition which France had decreed against the com-
merce of British subjects.^" Erskine at the same time
apprised the American Government of the British order
of January 7, 1807, which prohibited all trade between
any two ports of the enemy.
49 Armstrong to Champagny, Nov. 12, 1807; American State
Papers, For. Rel, III., 245-247.
50 Erskine to Madison, March 12, 1807; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 158.
94 NEUTRAL TRADE
Secretary Madison replied to Erskine that the Amer-
ican Government considered the British order illegal,
unless a genuine blockade were contemplated in con-
nection with each of the ports of the enemy from
which neutral commerce was interdicted. He de-
clared that even were the French decree to be enforced
in its literal sense, and contrary to the treaty between
the United States and France, the British order, being
peremptory in its import, and immediate in its execu-
tion, might justly be regarded as premature and un-
friendly; the uncertainty whether the French decree
was to be enforced in the sense in which it was taken,
and whether it might not embrace the commerce of the
United States, made the British order especially a
ground for serious complaint and remonstrance.^^
The British Foreign Secretary in London com-
plained to the American commissioners there with
reference to the failure of the American Government
to take efifectual steps against the decree of France. In
reply to the American note returning the unratified
s/ treaty, /Canning, October 22, 1807, stated that the
United States had not acted with reference to France
in such a way as to do away with the reservation con-
tained in the note delivered by the British commis-
sioners at the time of the signing of the treaty.^^ This
^1 Madison to Erskine, March 29, 1807; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III.. 159.
^2 Canning to Monroe and Pinkney, October 22, 1807;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 198-199.
NEUTRAL TRADE 95
statement was to prepare America for the announce- ,
ment which was to follow in the promulgation of the i
order in council of November ii, 1807.
When Pinkney was informed of the new order in
council he made a vigorous protest against it on the
ground of its effect upon American commerce and on
the ground that it was uncalled for. ^He took the posi-
tion that it was not justified by the Berlin decree, for
this, he maintained, was municipal in character, and had
made no modification of the regulations as they were
then observed in France with reference to neutrals.
He asserted, upon the authority of the French Minister
of Marine, that the declaration with regacd to the :
British blockade did not at all change the present <
French laws concerning maritime capture. He had,
of course, not learned of the later interpretation of the
French Emperor. ' The American minister maintained
that, while the French decree afifected neutral com-
merce but slightly, being limited to neutral ships pass-
ing from British ports to those of France and her i
allies, the British orders in council, on the other hand,
annihilated the whole of the public law of Europe in
relation to maritime prizes and substituted a sweeping
system of condemnation and penalty in its place. He
insisted that the United States had not submitted to
the French decree, but had done all within its power in
the way of protest.^^/
53 Pinkney to Madison, Nov. 23, 1807 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 203-206.
96 NEUTRAL TRADE
The British orders in council, now recognized to
have been a mistaken poHcy, were at the time popular
in England. Those who did not understand, and few
did, the policy which dictated them, supported them be-
cause they had the appearance of vigor suited to a
crisis. The peril at the hands of Napoleon was felt to
be very great; and unusual and extraordinary efforts
were deemed necessary. Some believed that the pro-
hibitive orders would create a pressure upon Napoleon
which would compel him to emancipate neutral com-
merce from restrictions ; but it is doubtful whether the
British Government were actuated by any motives
favorable to neutrals. .' President Jefferson, learning of
the new order in council before official communication
was received, urged upon Congress, December 18, the
passage of an embargo act. Congress acted promptly,
and such a measure was passed December 22. This
act resulted in more injury to the United States than
to Great Britain or France. January 26, 1808, Min-
ister Pinkney explained to the British Secretary the
nature of the embargo act. In the same interview he
complained of the hardship to American vessels result-
ing from the order in council which practically pre-
vented such vessels from returning home, after being
warned not to enter a British port.^* In a subsequent
interview, in which was discussed the question of the
duty imposed by the order in council upon the re-ex-
^* Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 26, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 206-207.
NEUTRAL TRADE 97
portation of cotton from British ports, Pinkney ob-
tained little satisfaction with respect to the orders in
council. He wrote the Secretary of State that,
" although Mr. Canning's manner was extremely con-
ciliatory, not a word escaped him to encourage a hope
that the orders of council would be in any degree
abandoned."^^
When the British minister at Washington informed
the American Government of the British order in
council, he stated that the British Government had great
reluctance in thus inconveniencing neutral commerce.
This was shown, he said, in the exceptions which had
been made especially affecting the United States. Such
exceptions were the permission to carry on direct trade
between the United States and the colonies of the
enemy, which, it was claimed, was a deviation from the
old established rule ; admission with the privilege of
re-exportation of colonial produce of the enemy into
the ports of Great Britain when brought from the
United States to Great Britain ; the issuance of licenses
for the importation of flour, meal, all grains, tobacco,
and other articles the produce of the soil of America,
with the exception of cotton, through the ports of Great
Britain to the enemies without payment of duty.^*^
^s Pinkney to Madison, Feb. 2, 1808 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 207.
56 Erskine to Madison, Feb. 23, 1808; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 209-210.
8
98 NEUTRAL TRADE
^ I The Secretary of State, writing to Erskine March
25, complained of the new order in counciLbecause it
disregarded the remonstrances of the American Gov-
ernment to the order in council of January 7 ; and
the British Government had now added restrictions
upon the commerce of a still more serious character.!
The order, it was stated, was based upon the false as-
sumption that the United States had acquiesced in an
unlawful application of the French decree, and that the
right of retaliation, accruing to one belligerent against
a neutral, through whom an injury is done by another
belligerent, is not to have for its measure that of the
injury received, but may be exercised to suit the pleas-
ure of the complaining party. The American Secre-
tary denied that the British Government at the time of
issuing the second order could have had any knowledge
of a single case of the application of the French decree
to the commerce of the United States. ^'^
The British minister at Washington being unable to
grant any satisfaction to the American Government,
diplomatic negotiations were transferred to London,
where, under the able and experienced Pinkney, it was
hoped that repeal of the British orders might be ob-
tained. Pinkney put forth his utmost efforts to secure
this result. In accordance with instructions which he
had received from Washington, he informed the British
s'^ Madison to Erskine, March 25, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel, III., 210-213.
NEUTRAL TRADE 99
Government that, if the orders should be revoked, the
United States would repeal the embargo act, as far as it
affected Great Britain. He said that such action would
be more comformable to the objects which the British
Government desired, and in accord with justice, for by
the repeal of the orders on the part of Great Britain
and the suspension of the embargo act by the United
States commercial intercourse would be restored, while
the embargo in its operation upon France would take
the place of the orders in council, unless France con-
sented to repeal her decrees, in which case all the rights
of trade would be secured. ^^ The American minister
expressed the wish that the carrying out of his sug-
gestion might not only remove the immediate obstacle
to trade between the two countries, but prepare the
way for a satisfactory adjustment of every question
important to their future friendship.
The proposal made by the American minister was
considered by the British Cabinet, and, after a month's
delay, the decision was communicated by Canning.
This was in effect that Great Britain could not consent
" to buy off that hostility, which America ought not to
have extended," to her " at the expense of a concession
made, not to America, but to France," and that Great
Britain felt herself obliged to adhere to the principle
58 Pinkney to Canning, Aug. 23, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 228.
lOO NEUTRAL TRADE
embodied in the orders in council so long as France ad-
hered to thait system by which the retaliatory measures
of Great Britain had been occasioned and justified.^^
It was claimed that the embargo act was unjust, for as
a measure of redress it should have been directed only
at the party which originated the wrong; that if the
measure were to be regarded only as a municipal regu-
lation, which afifected none but the United States, and
with which no foreign state had any concern, then
Great Britain had no right to complain, and did not;
that under this last view there was no assignable rela-
tion between the repeal of the measure of self-restric-
tion by the United States and the surrender by Great
Britain of her right of retaliation against her enemies.
The Berlin decree. Canning stated, was intended " not
merely to check or impair the prosperity of Great
Britain, but utterly to annihilate her political existence,
through the ruin of her commercial prosperity." In
this attempt, the minister maintained, practically all the
Powers of Europe had been compelled to assist ; and
the American embargo, while not so intended, had,
nevertheless, come to the aid of the blockade of the
European continent at the very time when, if the
blockade could have succeeded at all, this interposition
of the American Government would have contributed
to its success.^"
59 Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 231-232.
60 Ibid.
NEUTRAL TRADE lOI
Canning dwelt upon the seriousness of the British
struggle against the " Continental system " of France.
He regarded it as important that the system should be
broken up through the determination and ability of
Great Britain and in no way purchased by any con-
cession; and that, therefore, "no step, which could
even mistakenly be construed into concession, should be
taken on her part, while the smallest link of the con-
federacy remains undissolved, or while it can be a
question whether the plan devised for her destruction
has, or has not, either completely failed, or been un-
equivocally abandoned."''^ The orders in council, it
was admitted, might perhaps be altered to suit new
conditions, but not to abate their spirit or impair their
principle, in such a way as to combine practical relief to
neutrals with a more severe pressure upon the enemy.
The British Foreign Secretary avowed that Great
Britain had no less a desire than the United States that
the differences between the two countries should be ad-
justed ; that His Majesty the King desired to cultivate
the most friendly intercourse with the United States ;
that the prosperity of the United States was essentially
the prosperity of Great Britain, and that the strength
and power of Great Britain were not for herself only,
but for the world. He expressed the belief that when
the adjustments alluded to were made it would afford
a " pledge for the continuance of the good under-
^1 Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 1808; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 231-232.
102 NEUTRAL TRADE
standing between the two countries, that they will have
learned duly to appreciate each other's friendship ; and
that it will not hereafter be imputed to Great Britain,
either on the one hand that she envies American in-
dustry as prejudicial to British commerce, or on the
other hand that she is compelled to court an intercourse
with America as absolutely necessary to her own exist-
ence."*^- Great Britain, it was held, would not hesitate
to aid in the restoration of the activity of American
commerce, and would make any sacrifice for the repeal
of the embargo, if that could be done without appear-
ing to deprecate it as a measure of hostility.
The President's proclamation, issued after the attack
on the Chesapeake, interdicting the public ships of
Great Britain from the ports of the United States, was
alluded to by Canning as an unfriendly act, especially
since Great Britain had offered to remove the cause
upon which the measure was founded. This, he said,
was " an inauspicious omen for the commencement of
a system of mutual conciliation " ; and the American
minister's omission of any notice of the President's
proclamation was in itself a defect in the overture
which had been made. Canning concluded his note
with the statement that " on this, and every other point
in discussion between the two Governments, His
Majesty earnestly desires the restoration of a perfect
good understanding, and that His Majesty would de-
^2 Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 180S; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 231-232.
NEUTRAL TRADE IO3
cline no measure for the attainment of that object
which should be compatible with his own honor and
just rights and with the interests of his people."®^
In December, 1808, Great Britain modified her order
in council to the extent of suspending export duties on
articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any
state at amity with her where such articles had been im-
ported into Great Britain directly from a neutral state.
Such suspension of duties on exportation was also
made applicable to goods which had been or might be
condemned as prize.^* These changes did not meet the
American objection, and Minister Pinkney, after re-
ceiving information of the alterations, made known to
the British Government that the United States required
the repeal of the entire system, not a mere modification
of this or that order.^^
During the year the attitude of France in the en-
forcement of her decrees had been such as decidedly to
weaken the position which the United States had taken
in her negotiations with Great Britain when discussing
the efifect of the French decrees upon neutral com-
merce. In the case of the condemnation of tlie Hori-
zon the American Government still sought an explana-
tion in an extension of municipal law which could not
63 Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 1808; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 231-232.
6* Order in Council, Dec. 21, 1808; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 240.
65 Pinkney to Canning, Dec. 28, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 240.
I04 NEUTRAL TRADE
Strictly be regarded as an infraction of neutral rights,
N^ -but [after the Milan decree was issued, December 17,
1807, it was no longer possible to regard the French
decrees in the light of municipal laws, for in this latest
order instructions were given and executed which
violated not only the stipulations of the treaty of 1800,
but also the principles of public law. When the decree
became known the American minister in Paris was in-
structed to make a formal remonstrance in such lan-
guage as might either bring about a recall of the illegal
measure, so far as it related to the United States, or
might have the " effect of leaving, in full force, all the
rights accruing to them from a failure to do so." If it
should be contended that the decree was justified as a
retaliatory measure upon Great Britain, at the expense
of neutral states, because of the acceptance of the prior
measures of Great Britain, it was to be denied that the
United States had made any such acquiescence. Re-
taliation, it was urged, ought not to be enforced at the
expense of neutrals, without giving a reasonable time
for neutrals to choose between measures against the
prior wrong and an acquiescence in both. , The copy of
the American protestations against British action would
prove that the United States had not acquiesced in the
British orders ; and would also explain the grounds on
which the execution of the French order of November,
1806, had been an object of just remonstrance. The
French decree was the more objectionable, in that while
NEUTRAL TRADE IO5
the inability of France to enforce it made it only a
slight menace, it afforded a pretext for severe retalia-
tion on the part of Great Britain.*'''
A copy of the embargo act was sent to Minister Arm-
strong, which, he was to explain to the French Govern-
ment, was an act rendered necessary for the pro-
tection of American property and seamen in view of
the conduct of France and Great Britain, and was not
to be regarded as a hostile measure. The American
minister was to point out to the French Government
that the duration of the act was not fixed, but that its
revocation would follow the repeal of the unjust acts
of the belligerents.
The American minister was informed, shortly after""
the proclamation of the French decree of December 17,
that all American vessels brought into French ports
would be sequestered until a decision could be made
according to the disposition which the Government of
the United States should entertain toward Great
Britain.^^ The note of the French Foreign Minister
containing this statement, w^hen communicated to the
American Government, aroused much feeling. It was
regarded as presenting to the United States the alter-
native of acceding to France in her designs against
Great Britain, or incurring the confiscation of all Amer-
«6 Madison to Armstrong, Feb. 8, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 249-250.
^^ Champagny to Armstrong, Jan. 15, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 248-249.
I06 NEUTRAL TRADE
ican property carried into French Prize Courts. Such
a proposition, it was maintained, implied that the
United States was susceptible to suggestions which no
independent and honorable nation ought to entertain.
Armstrong was instructed to place the contents of
Minister Champagny's note before the French Gov-
ernment, and while letting it be clearly understood that
the American Government regarded the tone of the note
as most offensive, he was to leave the way open for
friendly and respectful explanation. Information re-
garding the action of Congress in giving power to the
President to suspend the embargo act, in whole or in
part, was furnished to the American minister, and he
was instructed to use his best endeavors to induce
France to repeal her decrees. If Great Britain, it was
stated, should revoke her orders and thereby prepare
the way for the removal of the embargo as it applied to
her, France could not persist in her decrees unless she
intended to force a conflict with the United States. On
the other hand, if France should be the first to set an
example of repeal, " Great Britain would be obliged,
either by following it to restore to France the full
benefit of neutral trade, which she needs, or, by per-
severing in her obnoxious orders after the pretext for
them had ceased, to render collisions with the United
States inevitable. "^^ Any action that might be taken
^s Madison to Armstrong, May 2, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 252-253.
NEUTRAL TRADE lO/
by France was to be at once reported to Minister
Pinkney in London and to the State Department at
Washington, since each Government had pledged itself
to follow the example of the other.
Armstrong acted in accordance with these instruc-
tions, but secured no satisfaction from the French
Government. In fact, by the issuance of the Bayonne
decree by Napoleon, April 22, 1808, the American
grounds of complaint against France were greatly in-
creased. This decree authorized the seizure and con-
fiscation of all American vessels then in France or
which might arrive there. This was in return for the
embargo act which the French minister said made it
imlawful for any American vessel to be abroad after
the date of its passage. This decree w^as aimed at
those American vessels that were trading under British
licenses and forged documents. ( Secretary IMadison
said that if the decree was aimed at all American
vessels on the high seas demands for reparation would
be extended; and that, if war with the United States
w^as to be deprecated, France ought to revoke her de-
crees, in so far at least as they violated the rights of the
seas and furnished a pretext to Great Britain to con-
tinue her retaliatory measures.*^^ ]\Iinister Armstrong
found that the embargo act upon which the American
•59 Madison to Armstrong, July 22, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 254-255.
v^'
V
I08 NEUTRAL TRADE
Government had counted to coerce Great Britain and
France into repealing their obnoxious measures had
no effect in securing such a result. Armstrong favored
the removal of the embargo. He advised putting in
its place a system of armed commerce. Pinkney, on
the other hand, after an unsuccessful attempt to per-
suade Great Britain to repeal her orders, expressed
himself strongly in favor of a continuance of the
embargo. In a letter to Madison he said : " The spirit
of monopoly has seized the people and Government of
this country. We shall not, under any circumstances,
be tolerated as rivals in navigation and trade,"^*^
In January, 1809, the British Government sent in-
structions to their minister at Washington authorizing
him to state to the American Government that the
orders in council of January and November, 1807,
would be raised with respect to the United States upon
three conditions. These were that the United States
should remove all its restrictive acts against Great
Britain, leaving them in force against France ; that the
United States should agree to renounce all claims to the
colonial trade and acquiesce in the rule of 1756; that
Great Britain should be at liberty to capture all Ameri-
can vessels which might attempt to trade with the ports
'^o Armstrong to Madison, Aug. 30, 1808; American State
Papers, For. Rel, III., 256. Pinkney to Madison, Sept. 21,
1808; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 228-230.
NEUTRAL TRADE IO9
of France or other countries acting under the French
decrees.''^
The British minister, conceiving that the all-im-
portant thing for his Government was the restoration
of free intercourse with the United States, disregarded
the specific conditions under which he had been in-
structed, and proposed the repeal of the orders in coun-
cil of January and November, 1807, with respect to
the United States, provided the President would issue a
proclamation for the renewal of intercourse with Great
Britain." The Secretary of State on the same day re-
plied, giving assurance that, should the British Govern-
ment remove the orders in council which were men-
tioned, the President of the United States would issue
a proclamation repealing the non-intercourse act in
accordance with the power given him by Congress/^
Minister Erskine, the following day, informed the Sec-
retary of State that the orders in council would be
withdrawn with respect to the United States on the
loth of June next.^* Thereupon, the Secretary of
State announced that the President would accordingly
71 Canning to Erskine, Jan. 23, 1809; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 300-301. " Correspondence Relative to
America," 9.
72 Erskine to Smith, April 18, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 296.
73 Smith to Erskine, April 18, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 296.
7* Erskine to Smith, April 19, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 296.
I I O NEUTRAL TRADE
repeal the non-intercourse act and renew trade between
Great Britain and the United States upon the same
date as the removal of the orders in council/^ The
President on the same day issued a proclamation de-
claring the renewal of the accustomed intercourse be-
tween the United States and Great Britain^®
The British Government later disavowed the
arrangement which Erskine had made, on the ground
that their minister had exceeded his instructions ; and
the President's proclamation, accordingly, was with-
drawn, August 9. ;' Erskine was censured for departing
from the letter and, more especially, the spirit of his
previous instructions. With regard to some of the
points of criticism made by Canning it is difficult to see
wherein these were covered by instructions given to
Erskine, and the objections appear hypercritical,
prompted by a determination to make the rejection of
the agreement as plausible as possible. Great Britain
was apparently more desirous of seeing America at
war with France than she was to see her at peace with
England.
»^ March, 1809, Congress raised the embargo as to all
other nations except Great Britain, France, and their
dependencies, and substituted a system of non-inter-
course and non-importation against them. This act
^5 Smith to Erskine, April 19, 1809; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 296.
''^ Proclamation of the President of the United States, April
19, 1809; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 297.
NEUTRAL TRADE III
prohibited all voyages to the British or French posses-
sions and all trade in articles of British or French
product or manufacture/^
May I, 1810, a law was passed which provided for
non-intercourse alone; and declared that if Great
Britain or France should so revoke or modify its edicts
before March 3, 181 1, as that these should cease to
violate the neutral commerce of the United States, and
if the other nation should not within three months
thereafter in like manner revoke or modify its edicts,
the provisions of the non-intercourse and non-importa-
tion law should be revived against the nation refusing
so to act.'^^
This act was communicated to the American min-
isters at London and Paris, with the instructions that
they present the same to the respective Governments
to which they were accredited. The American minister
at Paris, upon transmitting the act to the French Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, received a communication
from the French minister in which he declared that, if
England would revoke her orders in council, France
would revoke her decrees. With peculiar logic he
placed the responsibility for securing these results upon
the United States.^'' The French Government later
■^7 Annals of Congress, loth Cong., 2d sess., 1824-1830.
78 Annals of Congress, nth Cong., 2d sess., 2582-2583.
^9 Champagny to Armstrong, Aug. 22, 1809 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 325-326.
112 NEUTRAL TRADE
explained that the revocation of their decrees would
follow the previous revocation of the orders in council
in chronological sequence.^" Pinkney in London, being
informed by Armstrong of the conditions attached to
the repeal of the French decrees, endeavored to per-
suade the British Government at least to repeal so
much of their orders as affected the blockade of French
ports prior to the Berlin decree, in order that that
decree might in consequence be revoked by France.
The American Government considered itself justified
in insisting that the British orders anterior to the Berlin
decree be first repealed, inasmuch as the British Gov-
ernment had all along contended that the Berlin decree
was the original aggressor upon the neutral commerce
of the United States.^^ Upon the failure of the
American minister to induce the British Government to
repeal its earlier orders upon the assurance that France
would withdraw the Berlin decree, instructions were
given to Pinkney to urge upon the British Government
the consideration of the act of Congress of May i.^^
While this fruitless negotiation was going on in Lon-
don, the French Government was planning a cunning
scheme to deceive the United States and force her into
80 Armstrong to Smith, Jan. 28, 1810; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 326.
81 Smith to Pinkney, July 2, 1810; American State Papers,
For. Rel., 360-361.
82 Smith to Pinkney, July 5, 1810; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 362.
NEUTRAL TRADE I 1 3
hostile opposition to Great Britain. On August 6,
1810, Armstrong received a note from the Duke of
Cadore, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announcing that
the decrees of Berlin and Milan had been revoked and
that they would cease to have effect after November i
of that year.^^ Armstrong transmitted this informa-
tion to Pinkney, who immediately communicated it to
the British Government with the statement that he
should expect that the British orders in council would
at once be repealed. The British Ministry refused to
believe that the French decrees had in fact been re-
pealed. They gave assurance that " whenever the re-
peal of the French decrees shall have actually taken
effect, and the commerce of neutral nations shall have
been restored to the condition in which it stood previ-
ously to the promulgation of those decrees, His
Majesty will feel the highest satisfaction in relinquish-
ing a system which the conduct of the enemy com-
pelled him to adopt."*V
President Madison, relying upon the note of the
Duke of Cadore that the French decrees had been
revoked, issued, November 2, a proclamation in accord-
ance with the act of May i, declaring that all restric-
tions upon the commerce of France and her depend-
83 Cadore to Armstrong, Aug. 5, 1810; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 386-387.
s*Wellesley to Pinkney, Aug. 31, 1810; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 366.
114 NEUTRAL TRADE
encies should cease from the date of the proclamation.^^
Pinkney was unsuccessful in his efforts to secure the
repeal of the orders in council. ^ In a letter to the
Secretary of State, December 14, 1810, he expressed
his belief that the British Government intended to do
nothing. He, therefore, advised that "a very firm
tone " be assumed by the United States Government.*^^
The British Government held that the words in the
Duke of Cadore's note, announcing the revocation of
the Berlin and Milan decrees, implied as a condition to
the actual repeal that Great Britain should in conse-
quence of that declaration revoke the British orders
in council and renounce their principles of blockade.
The words of the French minister following the
declaration of the repeal of the decrees had been
these : " it being understood that in consequence of this
declaration the English shall revoke their orders in
council, and renounce the new principles of blockade
which they have attempted to establish. "s'^ Another
condition, which the British held was implied in the
French note, was that the decrees would be actually
repealed provided that the United States would resent
any refusal of the British Government to renounce the
85 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
481-482.
8" Pinkney to Smith, Dec. 14, 1810; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 375-
s^Wellesley to Pinkney, Dec. 29, 1810; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 408-409.
NEUTRAL TRADE I I 5
new principles of blockade and to revoke the orders in
council. The American Government insisted that no
conditions had been made, but that the decrees had
actually been repealed.
In February, 1811, Lord Wellesley again announced
that Great Britain would repeal her orders in council
whenever France should actually have revoked the
decrees of Berlin and Milan, and should have restored
the trade of neutral nations to the condition which
prevailed before the promulgation of those decrees.
He maintained that the relinquishment of them with
respect to the United States alone was not sufficient.
The refusal of Great Britain to comply with the re-
quest of the United States was especially assigned to
the alleged demand by France that the British prin-
ciples of blockade be renounced.^^ Pinkney now de-
cided to return home, for two reasons ; first, his mis-
sion had apparently failed, and second, he deemed it
expedient to place the diplomatic representation of the
United States in London upon the same basis as that
maintained by Great Britain in Washington. This
was a most unfortunate move, making it impossible
now for the differences between the United States and
Great Britain to be settled otherwise than by war.
Before Pinkney left London the British Government
announced the appointment of a minister plenipoten-
^8 Wellesley to Pinkney, Feb. 11, 181 1; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 412.
Il6 NEUTRAL TRADE
tiary to the United States in the person of A. J. Foster,
former charge d'afifaires in Sweden. Pinkney then
hesitated about withdrawing, but upon receiving from
Lord Wellesley an absolute refusal to repeal the orders
in council he thought it useless to remain longer.
The second of February, being three months after
the President's proclamation had been issued announ-
cing the repeal of the French decrees, Great Britain
still refusing to repeal the orders in council, the non-
intercourse and non-importation law was revived
against her. Congress, March 2, 181 1, confirmed the
action of the President, and authorized him to suspend
the non-intercourse and non-importation act with Great
Britain whenever that country would revoke her orders
in council.
The last negotiations between the United States and
Great Britain seeking a peaceful settlement of this dif-
ference were carried on in Washington by Secretary
Monroe and the British minister, Foster, from July,
181 1, to June, 1812. In these discussions Foster justi-
fied the British orders on the ground of their necessity as
retaliatory measures to counteract Napoleon's attempt
to crush British trade. He argued that France was
the aggressor in the issuance of retaliatory edicts. He
objected to the position of France with reference to
blockades, and stated that neither the practice of Great
Britain nor the law of nations sanctioned the rule that
NEUTRAL TRADE I I /
no place, excepting fortresses in a complete state of
resistance, could be lawfully blockaded by sea. The
blockade of May, 1806, he asserted, " was intended to
be maintained, and was actually maintained, by an ade-
quate force ... to enforce the blockade."*^ The
strongest argument offered by the British minister in
support of the refusal of his Government to repeal the
orders in council was the fact that proof was lacking
to show ithat France had really revoked her decrees,
that, in fact, there was evidence to the contrary. He
showed that an American vessel, the New Orleans
Packet, had been seized since the decrees were supposed
to have been revoked, and further, that the Emperor in
a speech to the deputies of the free cities of Hamburg,
Bremen, and Lubeck had declared that the Berlin and
Milan decrees should be the public code of France as
long as England maintained her orders in council of
1806 and 1807.
Secretary Monroe maintained that the British argu-
ment of retaliation was unjustifiable, for the retalia-
tory acts were far in excess of the acts which called
them forth, and that besides they fell with the greater
eflfect not upon the commerce of the enemy, but upon
that of neutrals ; that Great Britain ought, in keeping
with her own promise to proceed pari passu with the
Government of France in the revocation of her edicts,
^^ Foster to Monroe, July 3, 181 1; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 435-437-
I I 8 NEUTRAL TRADE
immediately to repeal her orders. Monroe held that
France had revoked her edicts as far as they violated
neutral rights, and upon that ground the United States
had a right to expect a similar revocation on the part
of Great Britain. He explained ihe seizure of the
New Orleans Packet on the ground that it had been
merely detained and not condemned ; and said that the
speech of the Emperor contained nothing incompatible
with the revocation of the decrees in respect to the
United States, but that it merely enunciated the French
policy to cease the French blockade in favor of those
nations in whose favor Great Britain should revoke
hers or those who should support their rights against
her pretension, as France considered the United States
would do by enforcing the non-intercourse and non-
importation act.®"
Monroe's position was difficult to maintain, for he
knew perfectly well that the French decrees had not
ceased to affect neutral vessels, and that American
ships were being seized almost daily. " The reports
of Minister Serrurier to the French foreign office, of
his interviews with Monroe, as revealed by the re-
searches of Mr. A'dams in the French archives, are
perfect evidence that the administration felt keenly the
hypocritical position which it was obliged to assume."^^
S'O Monroe to Foster, July 22,, 181 1; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 439-442.
91 Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality, 44.
NEUTRAL TRADE I 1 9
When the Emperor was informed of the action of
the President in reviving the non-intercourse and
non-importation act against Great Britain, he pro-
ceeded to admit American cargoes which had been
provisionally placed in deposit on their arrival in
France. Such cargoes were required, however, to be
exchanged for French goods of which two thirds must
be silks.^- All the American vessels that had been
sequestered in the ports of France after November 2,
1810, were ordered to be released, and at the same time
American vessels carrying only American products and
manufacture were admitted. The United States was
not satisfied with the response of the French Govern-
ment, and at once sent a minister plenipotentiary, Joel
Barlow, to Paris, July, 181 1, to secure more liberal
commercial arrangements and especially to present
American claims for losses resulting from the enforce-
ment of the French decrees. On May 10, 1S12, the
American Government was officially informed that the
French Emperor, under date of April 28, 181 1, had
issued a decree definitely repealing the Berlin and
Milan decrees and that to the first of the preceding
November they were considered as not existing in re-
gard to American vessels. A copy of this decree was
communicated to the British Government, May 21.
President Madison called the twelfth Congress in an
^2 Bassano to Russell, May 4, 181 1; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 505-506.
I20 NEUTRAL TRADE
extra session, November 4, 181 1, and on the following
day presented his third annual message. This message
recommended that provision be made to place the
United States upon a war footing.''^ Congress pro-
ceeded to pass certain measures preparatory to war.
Among these were a bill to increase the regular army
from ten thousand to twenty-five thousand, and a bill
to provide for a volunteer force of fifty thousand men.
On April i, 1812, Congress again passed an embargo
act for ninety days. This was a forerunner of the
actual war measure which was adopted June 18, 1812.
While Congress was debating the question of war,
the British minister and Monroe continued negotiations
with respect to the rehnquishment of impressment and
the repeal of the British orders in council. As late as
June 14, the British minister stated again that, if a full
and unconditional repeal of the French decrees could
be shown, the orders in council would be revoked.
This the American Government of course was unable
to produce, and so, while the United States had real
grievance against France which would have justified
going to war with that country as well as with Great
Britain, her suffering at the hands of Great Britain
was so much greater that she was warranted in declar-
ing war upon that country alone.
The United States had a complaint against Great
^3 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
491-496.
NEUTRAL TRADE 121
Britain in relation to the question of blockade apart
from the general orders in council. This was made
one of the causes of the war in Madison's war message
of June I, 1812, and repeated in the report of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations two days later.
As early as 1800 Marshall, then Secretary of State, \
protested against the English blockade of Dutch ports,
on the ground that they were " not effectually blockaded
by a force capable of completely investing them." The
British in this instance held that if the blockade was
generally maintained it was sufficient, and that an oc-
casional absence of a fleet from a blockaded port did
not impair it. Marshall conceded that if such absence
were occasioned by storm or accident that claim might
hold, but not when a fleet was applied only a part of
the time to maintain a blockade.^* A similar protest
was made by the United States in 1801, in connection
with the attempted blockade of Gibraltar by Spain.
Again, in 1803, the American Government protested
against the British order of June 17 of that year which
declared the islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe in a
state of blockade ; the question in this case being a lack
of previous notification and the fact that the islands
themselves, instead of specific ports, were declared
blockaded. In a note to the British representative at
Washington, Secretary Madison wrote that the United
^* Marshall to King, Sept. 20, 1800 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 370-371.
"Ny
122 NEUTRAL TRADE
States held such a blockade illegal ; that she accepted
as a proper definition of a blockade that which Great
Britain herself had agreed to in a treaty with Russia in
1801, namely : " That in order to determine what char-
acterizes a blockaded port, that denomination is given
only to a port where there is, by the dispositions of the
Power which attacks it with ships stationary or suffi-
ciently near, an evident danger of entering."^^' This
was the definition which the American Government in-
sisted upon in all the various negotiations carried on
with the British Government. All blockades which
were not confined to specific ports or places and which
were not backed up by a force sufficient to endanger an
attempt to enter were regarded as illegal and denomi-
nated mere fictitious or paper blockades. The United
States also claimed that a notification should be an-
nounced in advance, and that individual ships sailing
in ignorance of the blockade should be warned before
attempting to enter the blockaded port.
The draft of the treaty which, in 1804, Monroe was
instructed to present to the British Government con-
tained articles upon blockade which declared that the
term "blockaded port" should be appHed "only to a
port where there is, by the disposition of the Power
which attacks it with ships stationary or sufficiently
near, an evident danger in entering. ... It is agreed
8^ Madison to Thornton, Oct. 27, 1803 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 361-362.
NEUTRAL TRADE I 23
that no vessel sailing from the ports of either [party]
shall, although cleared or bound to a blockaded port, be
considered as violating in any manner the blockade,
unless on her approach towards such port she shall have
been previously warned against entering the same.^^
In the instructions given to Monroe and Pinkney May
17, 1806, Madison urged the importance of securing
from the British Government an agreement upon the
question of blockade. He dwelt especially upon the
point of notification. In the proposed treaty which was
signed by Monroe and Pinkney with Lord Holland
and Lord Auckland, provision was made with refer-
ence to notification of vessels, similar to that contained
in the Jay treaty of 1794; but no statement relative to
the definition of blockade was given. This was one of
the objections made by President Jefiferson^^ to the
proposed treaty. After its rejection by the President,
the American ministers attempted to secure an article
upon blockade exactly like the one included in the draft
of the treaty proposed in 1804.^^ ; Inasmuch as the
Monroe- Pinkney negotiations upon all subjects failed,
no advance was made on the subject of blockade.
In connection with the British order in council of
^8 Convention between the United States and Great Britain;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 82-83.
^^ Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 20, 1807; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 166-173.
^^ Monroe and Pinkney to Canning, July 24, 1807 ; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 194-196.
124 NEUTRAL TRADE
May 1 6, 1806, the United States held that Great Britain
attempted to establish a blockade contrary to the usages
of nations, and this became a subject of discussion in
all the subsequent negotiations over the orders in
council. Great Britain insisted that it was a legitimate
blockade which she was able to maintain with an ade-
quate force.
CHAPTER III
Declaration of War and Peace Proposals
The negotiations of three administrations failing to
remove the causes of grievance of the United States
against Great Britain, the war cloud which had long
been upon the horizon now drifted nearer. If the
United States, prior to the declaration of war, had
been represented at the court of St. James by a minister
plenipotentiary of the ability of Albert Gallatin, instead
of by a mere charge d'affaires in the person of
Jonathan Russell, it is possible that the war might have
been averted ; but, under the circumstances, there was
much justification for the position of the ruling party
at Washington, that the honor and independence of the
United States were involved and that nothing short of
war would now avail. Though there were undoubtedly
sufficient reasons for war, not only with Great Britain,
but also with France, they all would have disappeared
upon the restoration of peace between those two
countries.
The question of war with Great Britain was not
settled wholly upon the grounds of justice or expedi-
ency. It became, fundamentally, a party issue. The
Democratic party, constitutionally averse to Great
125
I 26 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
Britain, and seeing in the sentimental causes of the war
an opportunity to appeal to the popular imagination,
became pronounced for war ; while the Federalist party,
being friendly to England, and located largely in the
commercial States, which would suffer most from the
operation of the war, vigorously opposed it. The war
passion of the Democrats was especially aroused by
the presentation to Congress by the President of a
message, on March 9, 18 12, in which he brought
charges against Great Britain of attempting to sever
the New England States from the Union and to
annex them to her own possessions.^ Transmitted
with the message were letters containing the cor-
respondence of John Henry, who, in a spirit of spite
for having been insufficiently rewarded, had made
known a mission, which he had undertaken to New
England in 1809 at the instigation of the Governor-
in-Chief of Canada, to investigate the state of affairs
and political feeling in the East. The British Govern-
ment denied having had any connection with the Henry
mission. No evidence was adduced from the papers
or from Henry's testimony before the Committee of
Foreign Affairs to prove that any plan of secession had
been contemplated by the New England States. The
Federalists claimed that the entire affair had been
trumped up by Madison to augment the war feeling,
1 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
498.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 127
and evidence was produced to show that the President
had paid $50,000 for the papers. -
On April 4, Congress passed its last hostile act short
of war. This was another embargo act, which, as its
supporters openly declared, was preparatory to war.
This measure, as in the case of the previous retaliatory
measures, affected American interests much more dis-
astrously than it did French or English.
All other efforts proving without avail, and urged
on by the young but popular leaders of his party, most
prominent of whom were the South Carolina repre-
sentatives, Calhoun, Cheves, and Lowndes, Madison,
at last, on June i, 181 2, sent a message to Congress in
which in vigorous language he discussed the various
grounds for war against Great Britain. He gave as
justifiable reasons for a declaration of war, impress-
ment, violation of the rights and peace of the American
coasts by British cruisers, illegal blockade, and the
British orders in council.^
The House of Representatives referred the message
to the Committee on Foreign Relations ; and, on June
3, the report of the committee was presented to the
House, convened in secret session, by John C. Calhoun,
in the absence of Porter, the chairman of the com-
mittee. Historians generally have attributed the
2 Baltimore Federal Republican, March 19, 1812.
3 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
499 et seq. American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 405-407.
128 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
authorship of this paper to Calhoun, but the discovery
and pubhcation of the Cralle papers by Gaillard Hunt
has at least thrown doubt upon the commonly accepted
view.
These papers, published by Mr. Hunt in the American
Historical Review for January, 1908, contain letters
from Gales, the editor and proprietor of the National
Intelligencer from 1810 to i860, to Richard K. Cralle,
the friend and literary executor of John C. Calhoun.
According to these letters, Monroe, Secretary of State,
was the author of the war manifesto, and not Calhoun.
Gales stated in evidence of this that the report was in
the handwriting of Monroe's private secretary and con-
fidential clerk; that the select committee had the sub-
ject referred to them at the close of the day's sitting
June I, and reported at the opening of the session
June 3 and, therefore, had not time in the interval to
have prepared such an exhaustive report ; and that the
report was similar in style to the President's message,
which showed that the sources of the two documents
were closely allied. Gales attributed the more vigorous
attitude taken by President Madison in his message of
November 5, 1811, to the influence of Monroe, who, a
few months before, had been added to the Cabinet.
Gales believed that the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, being composed of many young and inexperi-
enced men, consulted Monroe upon foreign affairs and
that, when the President's message was referred to
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 29
them, they prevailed upon the Secretary of State, as
being more fully possessed of the facts and merits of
the questions, to prepare the report. It was an elabo-
rate manifesto filling ten or twelve ordinary pages,
and contained language which Gales said no one who
had ever heard Monroe discourse upon the subject
could doubt was his.*
The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations
reviewed the history of the British acts of aggression
and of the unsuccessful negotiations to adjust the dif-
ferences between the two countries. In addition to
impressment and violation of neutral commerce as
reasons for war, there were added the attempt to dis-
member the Union, and the inciting of the Indians to
arms against the United States. The report concluded
with the following appeal to the sentiment of the nation :
" Your committee believing that the free born sons of
America are worthy to enjoy the liberty which their
fathers purchased at the price of so much blood and
treasure, and seeing in the measures adopted by Great
Britain a course commenced and persisted in which
must lead to a loss of national character and independ-
ence, feel no hesitation in advising resistance by
force, in which the Americans of the present day will
prove to the enemy and to the world, that we have not
only inherited that liberty which our fathers gave us,
* Gaillard Hunt, "Joseph Gales on the War Manifesto of
1812," in American Historical Review, Jan., 1908.
10
1 30 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
but also the will and power to maintain it. Relying on
the patriotism of the nation, and confidently trusting
that the Lord of Hosts will go with us to battle in a
righteous cause, and crown our efforts with success,
your committee recommend an immediate appeal to
arms."^
A bill declaring war, drawn by William Pinkney,
Attorney-General, was introduced into the House of
Representatives by Calhoun. After a lengthy debate in
the Committee of the Whole the following day, the
bill passed the House by a vote of seventy-nine to
forty-nine.®
In the Senate the measure was discussed in secret
session for several days, and was finally passed with
slight amendment on June 17.'^ The vote stood nine-
teen for and thirteen against the bill. The vote in
both houses represented almost precisely the party
division. This division was sectional as well as poli-
tical, the agricultural States of the West and South
favoring the war, the commercial States of the North,
and particularly the East, voting against it. The South
favored war because the British orders affected the
cotton trade most seriously. The bill passed the House
^ Calhoun's report for the Committee on Foreign Relations
to the House of Representatives, June 3, 1812; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 567-570.
^ Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., ist sess., 1637.
■^ Ibid., 297.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 3 I
as amended by the Senate, and, on the i8th, was sent
to the President, who signed the act the same day.
The following day he issued the war proclamation.^
The Federalist party, having opposed the Govern-
ment in all its previous acts designed to secure redress
without war, and having said that the Government
could not be " kicked into war," now opposed the act of
war itself. They asserted that the Administration took
this action merely to continue itself in power.^ It
was claimed that the war was directed by the South
and West against the commercial section of the
country.^" The House of Representatives of Massa-
chusetts published an address to their constituents
■which was distributed widely. New England assumed
an attitude of passive resistance to the war, furnishing
neither men nor money to any considerable extent.
This was the policy advocated by the leaders of the
Federalist party."
The Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut
denied that the Federal Government had the power to
make a draft upon the state militia for carrying on a
war which had in view no one of the three constitu-
tional objects, namely, "to execute the laws," "to sup-
^ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
512-513-
9 N. Y. Evening Post, June 15, July i, 1812.
10 Boston Weekly Messenger, June 26, 1812; Jan. 14, 1813.
11 Ibid., July 3, 1812.
132 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
press insurrection," and "to repel invasion." The
President feared to press the matter to its logical con-
clusion, and the difficulty was partially removed by
allowing the militia to remain under state officers. The
opposition of the Federalists hampered the Administra-
tion throughout the war.^- In Massachusetts, where
the Federalists were the strongest, petitions and re-
monstrances, from town after town, were sent to Con-
gress ; and the state legislature passed a " memorial "
denouncing the Administration and declaring the war
" improper," " impolitic," and " unjust." This re-
monstrance was presented to Congress June 14, 1813.^^
Memorials objecting to the war poured into Congress
from nearly every town in New England and from
many outside of that section. A large mass-meeting
held in Fanueil Hall, Boston, July 15, 1812, adopted
a series of resolutions maintaining the right of public
discussion of and individual expression on the war
policy. The clergy of all denominations generally pro-
nounced against the war, declaring it cruel and unpro-
voked. To such length was the opposition carried that
in Massachusetts, when the public funeral of Captain
Lawrence of the Chesapeake occurred, the state officers
and other leading Federalists refused to attend. The
victories of the war were either belittled or entirely
12 Boston Weekly Messenger, June 4, 1813; May 21, 1813;
Jan. 7, 1814. Salem Gazette, Jan. 11, 14, 18, 25, 1814. N. Y.
Spectator, April 22, 1814.
13 Boston Weekly Messenger, June 18, 1813.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 33
passed over by the Federalist press. This was the
attitude taken by the Senate of Massachusetts in 1813,
when it passed the following resolution: "Resolved,
as the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts, that,
in a war like the present, waged without justifiable
cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates
that conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is
not becoming a moral and religious people to express
any approbation of military or NAVAL exploits,
which are not immediately connected with the defense
of our sea-coast and soil."^*
A fair example of the tone and spirit of the Federal-
ist party throughout the war is given in the following
extract from the Boston Weekly Messenger, one of its
leading papers : " Will you lowly bow the suppliant
knee to an administration which is, in every particular
sense your enemy; whose profligate profusion is in-
volving you and your posterity in a redeemless debt of
countless millions ; who has already disgraced, and are
rapidly proceeding to ruin your country ? "^^ This
paper, even as late as September, 1814, kept up its
bitter attack, and declared that the causes of the war
sprang from the following sources : "First — To gratify
ancient hatred against G. Britain, and to assist the
French in subduing the English. Secondly — To give
that tone and strength to the Madisonian government,
^* National Intelligencer, June 26, 1813.
^^ Boston Weekly Messenger, April i, 1814.
I 34 DECLARATIOlsr OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
which might naturally be expected to arise out of a
state of war. Thirdly — To silence those men who had
opposed the Jeffersonian and Madisonian course of
policy, and to command their wealth for the purpose of
keeping them still. Fourthly — To take the chances of
the events which might arise out of this new state of
things, and from the noise, excitement and acclamation
of successful war, probably to estabish, by the help of
arms, a government not unlike that of Bonaparte.
Fifthly — To satisfy the people as to all the expenses
and sacrifices which might arise, by conquering the
Canadas, and making a great outcry as to our gains and
glory."^** The Boston Gazette, one of the most violent
of the Federalist papers, employed these words : " Is
there a Federalist, a patriot, in America, who conceives
it his duty to shed his blood for Bonaparte, for Madi-
son or Jefferson, and that Host of Ruffians in Congress
who have set their faces against the United States for
years, and have spirited up the brutal part of the popu-
lace to destroy us ? Not one ; shall we then any longer
be held in slavery and driven to desperate poverty by
such a graceless faction ! Heaven forbid ! " The
Democratic papers in equally extravagant and partisan
language strove to add fuel to the war flame, and to
overwhelm their adversaries with invective.^'^
1^ Boston Weekly Messenger, Sept. i6, 1814.
1'^ National Intelligencer. July 28, 1812. Philadelphia Au-
rora, June 8, 16, Aug. 19, 1812.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 3$
The declaration of war caused a great sensation in
Great Britain. It brought forth bitter denunciations
from Government and press. It was claimed that the
United States had seized the opportunity of attacking ^
Great Britain at the precise moment when all her
energies were taxed to the utmost in the struggle with
Napoleon. Holding, as the British did, that the policy
against which the United States protested was essential
to the maintenance of British naval supremacy, it
was natural that they should consider the action of the
United States unwarrantable. Not all, however, took
this position. The Liverpool Advertiser considered
Madison's message "one of the ablest state papers
which ever issued from the American Government,"
and said that it made out a strong case against Great
Britain " on the received principles of public law and
international justice. "^^ The Edinburgh Review, one
of the most influential periodicals of the time, criticized
severely the policy of Great Britain toward the United
States, and characterized the orders in council not
only as odious and unfriendly to the United States,
but as constituting an " everlasting stain on the char-
acter and policy of our country."^'' This periodical,
in common with the more liberal British sentiment,
regarded Great Britain's right to impress as undeniable,
but her practice of that right as immoderate and unjust.
^8 Liverpool Advertiser, Augst 8, 1812.
19 Edinburgh Review, Nov., 1812.
I 36 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
The people in general throughout Great Britain had
little knowledge of the real conditions in the United
States, and their friendship for Americans was slight.
The Edinburgh Review said that the Americans were
" less popular and less esteemed among us than the
base and bigotted Portugueze, or the ferocious and
ignorant Russians."-** There was, however, one ele-
ment in the British population that sincerely regretted
the war. This was the British manufacturers. Their
influence in the direction of peace later became
potent.^^
The American Government, in declaring war, enter-
tained the hope that Great Britain would remove the
causes of grievance sooner than take up arms against
the United States. In order to provide such an oppor-
tunity the Secretary of State, soon after the declara-
tion of war was proclaimed, empowered Jonathan
Russell, charge d'affaires at London, to arrange an
armistice between the two states, on condition that the
orders in council were repealed and orders given for
the discontinuance of the practice of impressment of
seamen from American vessels together with the
restoration of those already impressed.^- The pur-
pose of the armistice was to secure a cessation of
hostilities, pending negotiations for treaty arrangements
20 Edinburgh Review, Nov., 1812.
21 Ibid.
22 Monroe to Russell, June 26, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel.. III., 585-586.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 37
upon the subjects in dispute. Russell was instructed
to assure the British Government that, in return for a
discontinuance of the practice of impressment, a law
would be passed by Congress prohibiting the employ-
ment of British seamen in the public or commercial
vessels of the United States. Such a law, however,
was to be reciprocal as well on the part of Great
Britain. Acting under these instructions on August
24, Russell proposed to the English Government an
armistice-^ subject to the terms specified by Secretary
Monroe. Lord Castlereagh replied that the terms were
inadmissible, and declined to enter into discussion with
Russell, claiming that Russell had no adequate power
to negotiate. He rejected utterly the proposal that
Great Britain relinquish the practice of impressment
on the assurance that a law would be passed by Con-
gress to prohibit the employment of British seamen on
the public and merchant vessels of the United States.
Great Britain was willing, said Lord Castlereagh, " to
receive from the Government of the United States, and
amicably to discuss, any proposition which professes to
have in view either to check abuse in the exercise of
the practice of impressment, or to accomplish, by
means less liable to vexation, the object for which im-
pressment has hitherto been found necessary ; but they
cannot consent to suspend the exercise of a right upon
23 Russell to Castlereagh, Aug. 24, 1812; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 589.
138 DECLARATION OP WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
which the naval strength of the empire mainly depends,
until they are fully convinced that means can be de-
vised, and will be adopted, by which the object to be
obtained by the exercise of that right can be effectually
secured."2^
In the interval between the sending of his note to
the British Government and the receipt of the reply
from Castlereagh, Russell had received a second de-
spatch-^ from his Government. This contained in-
structions which differed slightly from the previous set.
They allowed an armistice to be agreed to without a
formal declaration on the points at issue. A clear and
distinct understanding upon those subjects was de-
clared sufficient. Russell, upon the basis of the new
instructions, made another attempt to arrange an
armistice, on the terms that the discontinuance of the
practice of impressment should begin simultaneously
with the operation in the United States of the law pro-
hibiting the employment of British seamen;-" but the
British Government found this proposal no less ob-
jectionable than the former, and refused-^ to consent to
an armistice on such terms. The difficulty of coming
24 Castlereagh to Russell, Aug. 29, 1812; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 589-S90.
25 Monroe to Russell, July 27, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 586.
26 Russell to Castlereagh, Sept. 12, 1812; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 591.
2' Castlereagh to Russell, Sept. 18, 1812; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 592,
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 39
to a clear understanding upon the subjects of im-
pressment, the discharge of impressed seamen, and
blockades, which Russell had proposed, was too great
to be imposed as a condition of an armistice. The
negotiations were broken off, and Russell in great dis-
pleasure left London. Before leaving he had a private
interview with Castlereagh, in which the latter assured
him of the utter impossibilit}- of the British Govern-
ment's agreeing to give up the right of impressment.-^
With the departure of Russell from London the only
representative of the United States left in the capital
was R. J. Beasley, who acted as the American agent
for prisoners of war.
The British orders in council, which formed one of
the principal causes of the war, as stated in Madison's
message to Congress on the first of June, were revoked,
as far as they affected American vessels, on the 23d of
June. This action was taken before the proclamation
of war had reached England. The orders in council
were recalled because of the disastrous effect which
they had upon English manufactures, not on account
of a desire to favor the United States. An inquiry,
voted by the House of Commons, as to the effects of
the orders in council upon business in England had
resulted in the passage of a resolution of Parliament
requesting the Prince Regent to repeal the orders.
28 Russell to Secretary- of State, Sept. 17, 1812; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 593-595-
140 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
This revocation was accomplished with the reservation
" that nothing in this present order contained shall be
understood to preclude His Royal Highness the Prince
Regent, if circumstances shall so require, from restor-
ing, after reasonable notice, the orders of the 7th of
January, 1807, and the 26th of April, 1809, or any part
thereof, to their full effect, or from taking such other
measures of retaliation against the enemy as may ap-
pear to His Royal Highness to be just and necessary."^^
A further condition of the revocation of the orders was
that the Government of the United States should re-
move all restrictions upon the public and private vessels
of Great Britain entering the ports of the United
States.
Since the war had been declared before the news of
the order of the 23d of June reached the United States,
the British Government felt confident that, upon the
receipt of the news, the Government of the United
States would be disposed to recall its declaration of
war. Accordingly, Admiral Warren, commanding the
British fleet in American waters, was instructed by his
Government to propose an armistice to the American
Government. Warren, therefore, directed a despatch
to the Secretary of State at Washington, informing him
of his power to agree to a cessation of hostilities. He
proposed that the United States " instantly recall their
letters of marque and reprisal against British ships,
28 American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 433.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS I4I
together with all orders and instructions for any acts
of hostility whatever against the territories of His
Majesty or the persons or property of his subjects;"
with the understanding that, as soon as this should be
done, orders of a like nature would be issued by him
to all British officers " to desist from corresponding
measures of war against the ships and property of the
United States." He wrote that, upon agreement of a
cessation of hostilities, he was authorized to make
arrangements for the revocation of the laws which
interdicted the commerce and ships of war of Great
Britain from the harbors and waters of the United
States, and that in default of such revocation, after
such time as might be agreed upon, in accordance with
the order of the 23d of June the orders in council of
January, 1807, and April, 1809, would be revived.^"
Secretary Monroe replied that the President would
be very glad to make arrangements to terminate hostili-
ties ''' on conditions honorable to both nations." Such
terms, it was stated, were the same as had been already
offered by Russell at London, and had been refused
by the British Government. The suspension of the
practice of impressment by Great Britain pending an
armistice, on consideration that the United States
provide by law for the exclusion of British seamen
from American vessels, was insisted upon as the first
30 Warren to Monroe, Sept. 30, 1812; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 595-596.
142 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
condition to a cessation of hostilities. " Experience has
evinced," said Monroe, " that no peace can be durable
unless this object is provided for."^^ The Secretary
added that, if Great Britain was willing to enter into
negotiations upon the subject of impressment, but un-
willing to suspend the practice during an armistice, the
United States stood ready to treat without an armistice.
Admiral Warren, however, refused to commit his Gov-
ernment to the relinquishment of the alleged right of
impressment, and the negotiations with regard to an
armistice ceased.
The Administration was criticised by the Federalist
party for its refusal to accept the British offer of an
armistice ; but since impressment was now made the
chief cause of the war, the demand that impressment
should cease during the period of the armistice was but
reasonable.
The next attempt to secure peace came from
Russia a year later. In a contest with so formidable
a Power as Great Britain the United States had felt
the need of the friendship of the other European states.
To this end it had directed its various representa-.
tives at foreign courts to use their best efforts to culti-
vate the friendship of the respective states to which
they were accredited. Russia and the other Bahic
Powers, it was believed, would especially sympathize
31 Monroe to Warren, Oct. 27, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 596-597-
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 43
with the United States in its struggle for maritime
rights against the far-reaching claims of Great Britain.
This confidence was somewhat shaken when Russia
joined herself as an ally with Great Britain in the
Napoleonic conflict ; yet the most cordial relations still
continued to exist between the United States and the
Empire of the Czar. The United States, fortunately,
had appointed three years before, to represent it at
the Court of St. Petersburg, one of its ablest statesmen
and most learned diplomats, John Quincy Adams. The
Russian Government, upon learning through the British
minister of the declaration of war by the United States,
in order to render a supposed service to her ally, Great
Britain, and to strengthen the ties of friendship with
the United States, and, as well, to guard her important
export trade, at once ofifered informally to the min-
isters of the United States and Great Britain a proposal
of mediation on the part of the Russian Emperor.^^
Adams, immediately upon the receipt of the de-
spatch of July I, 1812, from Secretary Monroe, ap-
prising him of the war and instructing him in his
diplomatic duties in connection therewith, sought an
interview with Count Romanzoff. In this interview,
in accordance with his instructions,^^ Adams assured
the Russian Chancellor of the desire on the part of the
32 Adams to Secretary of State, Sept. 30, 1812; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 625.
33 Monroe to Adams, July i, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel, III., 625.
144 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
Government of the United States that the war with
Great Britain should be confined to that Power alone,
and further, that the Government of the United States
had no intention of entering into any closer relation
with France than that which then existed. The Chan-
cellor expressed his pleasure with the statements of
Adams, especially that which referred to the relations
of the United States with France. The next day
Count Romanzoff sent for Adams and showed him a
draft of a note which he had drawn up embodying the
statement of the American minister. This note he pro-
posed, with Adams's consent, to send to Count Lievin,
the Russian Ambassador at London, with the instruc-
tion that he should impart the substance of the same to
Lord Castlereagh, and " use it for the purpose of
convincing the British Government of the error in sus-
pecting that of the United States of any subserviency to
France." Adams readily gave his consent to the send-
ing of this despatch, as he believed with Romanzoff
that the communication might tend to promote a spirit
of pacification in the British Cabinet. He, however,
expressly stipulated that in giving his consent he acted
merely in a personal capacity and not under authority
of the Government of the United States.^*
Count Romanzoff assured Adams that the Emperor
3* Adams to Monroe, Dec. ii, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 626-627. MS., Dept. of State, Bureau of In-
dexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 102.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 45
was very desirous that peace should intervene between
the United States and Great Britain, both for the sake
of these states themselves and for the interests of his
own empire. The American minister at this time en-
deavored to find out whether the British authorities
had indicated their acceptance or rejection of the
mediation offered by the Emperor. Romanzoff replied
"that, without accepting or rejecting it, they had inti-
mated the belief that it would not be acceptable in
America.""^ The knowledge of Russia's offer of media-
tion reached the Department of State, March 7, 1813,
through letters from Adams dated September 30 and
October 17, 1812.^^ On the following day, March 8,
1813, similar information was presented by Count
Daschkoff, the Russian charge d'affaires at Washing-
ton, who, in a note to the Secretary of State, com-
municated officially the offer of the Emperor to act
as a mediator between the United States and Great
Britain.^^
At the time that the proposal was received, there
were several circumstances which rendered the offer
35 Adams to Monroe, Dec. 11, 1812; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 626-627. MS., Bureau of Indexes and Ar-
chives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 102.
36 Adams to Monroe, Sept. 30, 1812 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 625. Adams to Monroe, Oct. 17, 1812; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 625-626.
3^ Daschkoff to Secretary of State, March 8, 1813; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 624.
II
146 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
especially attractive to Madison. Napoleon had met
with serious defeat in his Russian campaign; Great
Britain had shown a disposition not to relax, but rather
to increase her war measures against the United States,
as was shown by a blockade of the Chesapeake and
the Delaware ; and in her own internal government the
United States was experiencing the utmost difficulties
in the war and finance departments, made the more
serious by the disaffection of the New England States.
Under these conditions it was not strange that Madison,
who had never wanted war, should have eagerly
grasped at anything that looked toward peace.
Secretary Monroe replied to Daschkoff on March
II, 1813, announcing the acceptance of the offer of
mediation.^^ He stated that arrangements would be
made at once to enable the Emperor to carry out his
generous purpose. In keeping with the promise made
to the Russian charge d'affaires, the President pro-
ceeded without any delay to the appointment of John
Quincy Adams, United States Minister Plenipotentiary
at the Court of St. Petersburg, Albert Gallatin, Secre-
tary of the Treasury, and James Bayard, a prominent
member of the United States Senate, as Envoys Ex-
traordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary to meet
with persons similarly appointed by Great Britain, at
St. Petersburg under the mediation of the Russian
Emperor.
38 Monroe to Daschkoflf, March 11, 1813; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 624-625.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 14/
On May 25, the President called the Senate in special
session to consider the subject of the Russian media-
tion and the ratification of the persons whom he had
named.^^ The Senate approved of the action of the
President and at once confirmed the names of Adams
and Bayard, but refused so to act in the case of Gal-
latin. The technical objection to the confirmation of
Gallatin lay in the fact of his still holding the secre-
taryship of the Treasury. The Senate requested in-
formation of the President as to whether in the ap-
pointment of Gallatin to the mission the office of Sec-
retary of the Treasury would be made vacant. Madi-
son, desiring to retain the services of the efficient head
of the Treasury Department, replied that the office
would not be vacant, as the Secretary of War, William
Jones, would perform the duties of the Secretary of
the Treasury during the temporary absence of Gallatin.
The Senate, then, upon the recommendation of the
special committee, to whom the question of Gallatin's
appointment had been referred, passed the following
resolution : " Resolved, that in the opinion of the
Senate, the powers and duties of the Secretary of the
Department of the Treasury and those of an Envoy
Extraordinary to a Foreign Power, are so incompatible
that they ought not to be and remain united in the
3^ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents. I..
526 et seq.
^v.
148 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
samerperson."*" The Senate further voted that the com-
mittee to whom was referred the appointment of Gal-
latin should communicate the foregoing resolution to
the President and confer with him upon the subject
thereof.^^ The President refused to receive the com-
mittee, holding that the Senate had overstepped its
constitutional limits in making such a proposition.
The commissioners were not only appointed before
the convening of the Senate, but had received their
instructions and were well on their way before that
body met. The haste with which the President acted
in the matter of mediation, without knowing whether
it would be acceptable to Great Britain, and his ap-
pointment of Gallatin gave opportunity for severe criti-
cism on the part of the Federalists. Objections were
made to the expense of so uncertain a mission ; to the
right of the President to appoint to an office not yet
created by the legislature; to the commissioners' de-
parture before being ratified by the Senate; to the
President's acting practically without the advice and
consent of the Senate; and to locating in one pefeson>.
two offices deemed incompatible.*- It was very evi-
dent, however, from the heated discussions in the
Senate and the lengthy articles in the press that the
40 June 10,1813; Madison Papers, MS., XLIX., 78. In MSS.
Div., Library of Congress.
41 June 16, 1813; Madison Papers, MS., XLIX., 85.
42 Boston Weekly Messenger, Dec. 10, 17, 1813.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 49
real reason for the opposition*^ was the party feehng
against the Administration, the foremost personahties
of which were Aladison and Gallatin. Under these
circumstances Gallatin failed of confirmation by one
vote.**
Instructions had been drawn up and given to the
commissioners, under the date of April 15, 1813. This
notable document stated tliat as soon as Great Britain
should give satisfactory assurance that she would
abandon her claim with respect to impressment of sea-
men and " illegal blockades," warfare on the part of
the United States would cease. Nearly three fourths
of the paper was occupied with a discussion of the
subject of -impressment, and upon this point it was in-
sisted that a distinct and definite provision against the
practice was a sine qua non. Assurance was to be
given in return for such provision that the Govern-
ment of the United States would take such measures
as should secure Great Britain against the loss of
her seamen in the service of the United States.*^
It was also stated, as an essential condition, that a
precise definition of blockade be given by Great Britain.
The declaration of Great Britain, in 1803, "that no
blockade would be legal, which was not supported by
<3 N. Y. Herald. April 7, 1813.
4* Madison to Gallatin, Aug. 2, 1813; Madison Papers, MS.,
LIL, 58.
*5 Monroe to Peace Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 695-700.
I 50 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
an adequate force, and that the blockades which it
might institute should be supported by an adequate
force," were regarded as constituting a satisfactory
definition. These words, in substance, had been used
by the Lords Commissioners in 1803 with reference to
the British blockade of Martinique and Guadaloupe,
the legality of which the United States protested. The
British Government, in a letter to the Secretary of
State, wrote that they had sent orders to Commodore
Hood " not to consider any blockade of those islands
as existing unless in respect of particular ports, which
might be actually invested, and then not to capture
vessels, bound to such ports, unless they shall previ-
ously have been warned not to enter them." A second
definition suggested as a satisfactory alternative was
also derived from British sources. Great Britain, in
a convention with Russia in 1801, had agreed "that,
in order to determine what characterizes a blockaded
port, that denomination is given only to a port where
there is, by the disposition of the Power which attacks
it, with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident
danger in entering."**'
A third main subject for discussion given in the in-
structions to the commissioners was with reference to
the trade of the United States with enemy's colonies
and their parent country. If, however, it was stated,
an arrangement on the subject of such trade to a
^8 Monroe to Peace Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813 ; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 695-700.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 5 I
proper extent could not be secured by treaty provision,
silence should be maintained respecting it. Other ob-
jects deemed of importance in the instructions were:
regulation of search for contraband goods ; restriction
of articles to be regarded as contraband; guarantee of
rights of neutral commerce; prohibition of trade with
the Indians on the part of Great Britain; the non-
restriction of the United States in augmenting her
naval power upon the Great Lakes.'*^
While provision against the practice of impressment
was made a sine qua non, the commissioners were
allowed to agree to a provision limiting the arrange-
ment merely to the existing war in Europe. This con-
cession was permitted, since it was believed that Great
Britain, when the war was over, would not again re-
vive her claims to impressment. Instructions, how-
ever, were given the commissioners to make no arrange-
ment which would impair the right of the United
States, or sanction the British claim on this point.
Provision was also to be made for the mutual restora-
tion of territory.^^
In further instructions, given on April 27, Monroe
suggested the possibility, in the event of the acceptance
of the mediation by Great Britain, that the subject of
the Florida claims would come up for discussion. In
^^^ Monroe to Peace Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 695-700.
^s Ibid. Monroe Papers, MS., V., 562 et seq. Library of
Congress.
152 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
that case the commissioners were to base the claims of
the United States to West Florida on the ground of
cession from France, and to East Florida on the
ground of indemnity for spoliation.^^
The men who were appointed to the commission
were all men who were strongly in favor of peace.
Adams had from the beginning deplored the war with
Great Britain.^" Bayard, a Federalist, had openly op-
posed it in a speech in the Senate when the declara-
tion of war was voted f^ and Gallatin, bearing the re-
sponsibility for the national finances, welcomed a pos-
sible relief to the financial crisis then pending.
Bayard and Gallatin would have wished for more dis-
cretion, particularly upon the subject of impressment,
as they feared that too exact an insistence in that
matter might lead to a failure in the negotiation.
Bayard preferred an informal understanding merely,
if Great Britain should decline to make a formal con-
cession.^^ Both Bayard and Gallatin disapproved of
treating of the Florida Claims in the discussions as
being in their judgment entirely impolitic.
Secretary Monroe, in further correspondence with
*^ Monroe to Commissioners, April 27, 1813 ; Writings of
Albert Gallatin, I., 539.
^0 Adams to Russell, August 11, 1812; Russell Papers, MS.,
No. 1632. John Hay Library, Providence, R. I.
^1 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., ist sess., 287-288.
S2 Gallatin to Monroe, May 2, 1813; Writings of Gallatin,
I-, 539-540.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 53
the commissioners, stated that they were at liberty to
exercise their entire discretion as to the mode and
form of the provisions, if only there should be an
effective relinquishment of the practice of impress-
ment. Monroe was opposed to leaving the question of
impressment in silence, "trusting to a mere under-
standing," which, he said, was " liable to doubts and
different explanations," for this would fail to guarantee
that security which the United States had a right to
expect.^^ In a letter, dated May 6, 1813, he wrote
that unless a distinct statement could be secured with
reference to the relinquishment of impressment it
would be better that no further steps be taken in the
negotiation.^* Monroe considered the fate of the Ad-
ministration and the Republican party, as well as the
honor of the state, to be dependent upon the outcome
of the negotiations. The political consideration was
quite as important as the national to the mind of one
who aspired to be the candidate of the Administra-
tion party at the next presidential election.
The Secretary expressed his belief in a successful
issue of the negotiations ; but should they fail through
the refusal of Great Britain, he was confident that this
would have the effect of arousing the energies of the
53 Monroe to Gallatin, May 5, 1813 ; Writings of Gallatin,
!•» 540-541. MS., Dept. of State, Bureau of Indexes and
Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII.
5* Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813; Writings of Gallatin,
I., 542-544.
154 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
nation to a greater degree than had yet been seen and
that a more honorable termination of the war would
result, " by the complete expulsion of the British from
the continent."^^
Gallatin and Bayard, after receiving their commis-
sions from the President and their " full powers " to
negotiate with Great Britain for treaties of peace and
commerce, and with Russia for a treaty of commerce,
made immediate preparations to join Adams at St.
Petersburg. They sailed on May 9, from Philadel-
phia, on the merchant ship Neptune, which had been
engaged by the United States Government to convey
the commissioners to St. Petersburg. This vessel was
commanded by Captain Jones, a brother of the Secre-
tary of the Navy. Accompanying the commissioners
as secretaries were George M. Dallas, J. Payne Todd,
James Gallatin, George Millegan. Dallas alone re-
ceived a salary. The Americans reached their destina-
tion July 21.
The first intimation that the American Government
had that the mediation was not agreeable to Great
Britain was contained in a despatch from Adams,
dated June 26, 1813.^^ On the 22d of that month tlie
Russian Chancellor had informed the American min-
55 Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813 ; Writings of Gallatin, I.,
542-544.
56 Adams to Monroe, June 26, 1813; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 627; MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives,
Russian Despatches, II., No. 113.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 55
ister of despatches from Count Lievin, the Russian
Ambassador in London, stating that the British Gov-
ernment had replied that their differences with the
United States were of such a nature as to render
mediation inadmissible.^^
There were several reasons advanced in England
why the mediation should be rejected. There was
first the objection given by the British Government, to
the effect that the differences between the United
States and Great Britain involved important principles
of English internal policy.^® A second objection arose
from the belief that Russia would be disinclined to
favor the commercial policies of Great Britain. Her
position in the Armed Neutrality League of 1780
made her an object of distrust. Again, the British
Government saw no need of mediation, with a view
to a peace on terms of equality, when by continuing
the war for a few months longer, as they thought,
either the American Union would be divided, or tlie
Government would sue for peace upon any terms that
might be imposed. The English press opposed the
acceptance of the mediation on the ground that
America had not yet been sufficiently punished and
the power and majesty of Great Britain had not yet
been adequately displayed. Though Great Britain
had flatly refused the offer of mediation long before
Romanzoff disclosed the fact, the Russian Minister
^^ Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (1874 ed.), II., 479.
"Ibid.
156 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
Still hoped by renewing the offer to secure an ac-
ceptance.
The American commissioners the day after their
arrival, July 22, met with Adams and discussed the
procedure of business to be presented to the Russian
Government. They learned at this time the slight
hopes upon which their mission rested. On the 24th
Bayard and Gallatin were presented by the American
minister to the Russian Chancellor. Gallatin gave to
Count Romanzoff copies and translations of their
letters of credence and " full powers."^^ The Count
stated"^ that it would be necessary to transmit these
papers to the Emperor, at his headquarters, he being
at this time with the army in the field. The commis-
sioners had at once upon their arrival apprised the
Russian Government of the fact, and on the 30th of
July had sent an official note*'^ to the Chancellor an-
nouncing the acceptance of the offer of mediation by
the United States. They requested information as to
the measures that had been adopted by the respective
Governments of Great Britain and Russia to give
effect to the mediation.
In the preparation of this first important note the
59 American Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 17, 1813 ; MS.,
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, IV.,
No. I.
60 Ibid.
^1 American Plenipotentiaries to Romanzoff, July 30, 1813 ;
Russell Journals, V., 15-17.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 57
difficulties of negotiation by a commission presented
themselves. Adams, extremely annoyed, wrote : " It
has been the work of a week and might have been
done by either of us in two hours. ... It is a sufficient
specimen of the method of negotiating by commis-
sions. ... In the multitude of councillors there is
safety, but there is not dispatch. "^^
Albert Gallatin, with characteristic energy and fore-
sight, as soon as he arrived in Europe entered upon
an extensive correspondence with acquaintances at the
various European capitals in order to gain all the in-
formation that might assist in the negotiations. From
Gothenburg he wrote to the banking firm of Baring
Brothers, London, to ascertain if possible the intentions
of the British Government with respect to mediation.^^
Alexander Baring, in a friendly letter, July 22, wrote
that Great Britain had refused the mediation of a third
Power because the question at issue was purely of
a domestic nature of which no foreign Government
could fairly judge; that the war was a sort of family
quarrel where foreign interference would only do
harm and irritate.^* He stated that Great Britain's
refusal of mediation was not to be taken as a proof of
her unwillingness to make peace. The Government of
62 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 497.
63 Gallatin to Baring Brothers and Company, June 22, 1813;
Writings of Gallatin, I., 545-546.
64 Baring to Gallatin, July 22, 1813 ; Writings of Gallatin,
I., 546-552; Russell Journals, V., 93-106.
158 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
Great Britain, he was convinced, would willingly enter
into direct negotiations with the United States. To
this end it would be advisable that London or Gothen-
burg, Sweden, should be the seat of the negotiations, as
proximity to the seat of Government of Great Britain
might help greatly in bringing about mutual under-
standing between the two states.*'^ Gallatin replied to
Baring's suggestion of direct negotiations to the effect
that while the commissioners might be willing to con-
fer at London or Gothenburg they were limited by
their instructions to mediation under the agency of
Russia.*"' He expressed the hope that Baring's Gov-
ernment might yet consent to mediation. Baring in a
letter two months later wrote that feeling was favor-
able to negotiation with the L^nited States, but that
there was a fixed determination not to enter into
mediation.*'^ He considered, he said, the reservation
of the right of search essential, though such recogni-
tion on the part of the United States would not be
demanded. The practice, he maintained, could not be
given up without seriously impairing the naval power
of the Kingdom,
Gallatin, upon learning through his friend Baring
''s Baring to Gallatin, July 22, 1813; Writings of Gallatin, I.,
546-552; Russell Journals, V., 93-106.
66 Gallatin to Baring, Aug. 27, 1813; Writings of Gallatin,
I-, 564-567.
67 Baring to Gallatin, Oct. 12, 1813; Writings of Gallatin,
I-> 584-587. Russell Journals, V., 1 13-120.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS I 59
that the mission under Russian mediation was doomed
to failure, wrote at once to Secretary Monroe asking
for instructions and renewed powers, in case a change
in place and method of negotiations should be decided
upon.^^
The subject of impressment, which had been the
most emotional of the causes which led to the declara-
tion of war, and for which alone the war was con-
tinued after the orders in council had been repealed,
was the main difficulty in any negotiations between
the two states. Great Britain was determined not to
yield in the slightest degree in her claims to the alleged
right of impressment, while the United States held
that it would be an added disgrace for her to submit,
after having resisted the claim to the extent of war.
In this seemingly impossible dilemma in which the
United States found herself the statesmanship of
Albert Gallatin was shown. It was he who first
found the solution of the much debated impressment
question. Before it was known that mediation was
impossible, Gallatin in a letter to Emperor Alexander
had discussed, at great length, the questions involved
in the war, as these might, naturally, be considered in
the negotiations. With reference to impressment, he
stated that he was willing to leave the abstract prin-
ciple of the subject out of discussion; that the United
States would agree hereafter not to employ, even on
68 Gallatin to Monroe, Aug. 28, 1813; MS., Dept. of State,
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
l6o DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
board merchant vessels, any seamen subject to Great
Britain; that a suspension of the pretensions of Great
Britain, without renouncing them, would satisfy the
United States; but that the United States would not
under any circumstances acknowledge the right of
Great Britain to impressment. If agreement could
not be reached on that subject, Gallatin would favor
the postponement of discussion of impressment to a
more favorable time, as " maritime questions seem to
fall with the war ; and it is above all desirable that the
whole civilized world may breathe and, without any ex-
ception, enjoy universal peace."'''^ It was in accord
with the policy here set forth that the later peace nego-
tiations were carried on and a treaty of peace was
finally signed.
It has been stated that the American commissioners
upon their arrival at St. Petersburg learned from
Adams of the probable futility of their mission. It
was not until two weeks later that they were officially
informed of the substance of the reply made by Great
Britain. The Russian Chancellor still hoped that the
refusal of Great Britain was not absolute, but that
upon learning of the actual arrival of the American
ministers she would consent to the mediation. With
this hope in view the Chancellor stated that he had
sent another despatch to Count Lieven, the Russian
69 Gallatin to Emperor Alexander [June 19, 1813] ; Writings
of Gallatin, I., 629-631.-
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS l6l
Ambassador in London, instructing him to renew the
offer of mediation. '^'^ On August 14, an official note,
covering the American position on the points at issue
between the United States and Great Britain, which
the Russian Chancellor had requested, was presented,
together with a printed copy of the Act of Congress
of March 3, 1813, with reference to the non-employ-
ment of British seamen and other regulations to be-
come effective when the war was over. Five days
later, Adams, in an interview with the Chancellor,
urged upon him the importance of positive informa-
tion as to the acceptance or rejection of the Russian
proposal by Great Britain in order that Bayard and
Gallatin might not be unnecessarily detained. The
Chancellor replied that he could make no positive state-
ment. A few weeks later, November 2, in an official
interview he told Harris, the secretary of the mission,
that the Russian Ambassador had expressed his un-
willingness to present the second note which had been
sent him inasmuch as Great Britain had already an-
nounced her decision to the Russian Emperor." The
declination of the British Government was also learned
from Lord Walpole, the British Ambassador at St.
Petersburg. The commissioners endeavored to secure
from the Chancellor an official statement of the fact
'■<' American Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 17, 1813; Writ-
ings of Gallatin, I., 569-574.
''I Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 539.
12
1 62 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
of Great Britain's refusal. This he declined to make
on the ground that he had not been officially informed
by the Emperor.'^- Months passed and no official in-
formation was received by the mediation envoys.
The American commissioners were thus placed in a
most exasperating position. They had powers to treat
under the mediation, but no one with whom to treat.
They were conscious that the fruitlessness of the mis-
sion would add to the factional feeling at home.
Though annoyed at the evasive methods employed by
the Russian Government, they still felt obliged to re-
main at St. Petersburg until officially informed of the
refusal of Great Britain. There was less objection to
the delay, however, since they hoped to receive new
instructions from the President relating to the over-
tures of Great Britain for direct negotiations.'^^
Nevertheless, the commissioners at last grew restive,
and Bayard decided to remain no longer at St. Peters-
burg. He addressed a note^* to the Chancellor an-
nouncing his intention of leaving and asking for his
passports. He and Gallatin left St. Petersburg on
January 25, and proceeded to London.^^
" Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 539.
73 Adams to Monroe, Dec. 30, 1813; MS., Bureau of Indexes
and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 125.
■^* Bayard to Romanzoff, Jan. 7, 1814; Russell Journals, V.,
137-147-
75 Adams to Monroe, Jan. 29, 1814; MS., Bureau of In-
dexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 127.
DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 63
Two weeks passed and no official communication
came from the Russian Government with reference to
the British note. Adams, then, believing that the Em-
peror did not intend to make public Great Britain's
refusal of mediation, determined to prove the fact.
He accordingly requested of the Chancellor that he be
given a copy of the British Ambassador's note to which
reference had been made.'^" Romanzoff replied that
he had been informed by Count Lieven that Lord
Castlereagh had communicated directly with the Gov-
ernment at Washington suggesting that instructions
for a direct negotiation be sent to the American com-
missioners through the medium of Admiral Warren."
Count Lieven's despatch, containing this information,
was shown to Adams. The Chancellor was deeply
chagrined that the official papers received from Lon-
don had not been sooner communicated to him.'^® He
considered himself so ill treated in the matter that he
offered his resignation to the Emperor.'^ It was
shown later that the final refusal on the part of Great
Britain to accept mediation had been communicated the
■^s Adams to Clay, Feb. 2, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 137-
141.
''■'■Romanzoff to Adams, Feb. 4, 1814; Russell Journals, V.,
142.
'8 Adams to Gallatin and Bayard, Feb. 6, 1814; Russell
Journals, V., 150-154.
■^^ Adams to Monroe, Feb. 4, 1814; Russell Journals, V.,
147-149.
164 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS
first of September to Count Nesselrode, the Russian
Acting Minister of Foreign Afifairs, by Lord Cathcart,
the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.^" Count
Nesselrode was with the Emperor at his headquarters
with the army when the note was received, and he
failed to send it to the Chancellor, whose influence in
the Russian Government was waning. The annoying
circumstances in which the American commissioners
had been placed was due to Russian politics, the Em-
peror evidently wishing to force the resignation of
Count Romanzoff.
so Cathcart to Nesselrode, Sept. i, 1813 ; American State
Papers, For. Rel, III., 622.
CHAPTER IV
Acceptance of Great Britain's Proposal for
Direct Negotiations
While the American commissioners were delayed at
St. Petersburg in connection with the fruitless mission
of mediation, the British Government had been arrang-
ing for a direct negotiation. The Prince Regent, upon
learning that the commissioners were not averse to a
negotiation at London or Gothenburg, but that their
powers were limited to the negotiation under the media-
tion of Russia, ordered sent to the port nearest the seat
of Government of the United States a flag of truce,
with an official note offering direct negotiations. The
note, addressed by Lord Castlereagh, British Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, to the Secretary of State
of the United States, said^ that the British Govern-
ment was "willing to enter into discussion with the
Government of America for the conciliatory adjust-
ment of the differences subsisting between the two
States, with an earnest desire on their part to bring
them to a favorable issue, upon principles of perfect
reciprocity, not inconsistent with the established
maxims of public law, and with the maritime rights of
the British empire." This communication, brought
1 Castlereagh to Secretary of State, Nov. 4, 1813; Ameri-
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 621.
16S
1 66 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
Upon the British schooner Bramble, reached AnnapoHs
December 30, 181 3. It was received at Washington
at twelve o'clock the same night.-
In spite of the fact that the British Government
placed the " maritime rights of the British Empire " on
an equal footing with the " established maxims of
public law," and that the United States knew from past
experience that in any negotiations British maritime
rights would be regarded above all other rights, the
Government at Washington was disposed to meet any
overture that promised peace. There was, however,
a general feeling in the United States that Great
Britain, in making the proposal for direct negotiations,
acted with a view of interposing a delay. Secretary
Monroe, in reply to the British note, stated that the
President, while regretting the delay then interposed
in the peace negotiations, was willing to accept the
ofifer of the British Government, in order that he might
show the sincerity of his desire for peace. ^
Though anxious for peace, the Government of the
United States adhered with dignity to its purpose not
to compromise its principles for the sake of securing
peace. Monroe in his note said : " Wherever the
United States may treat, they will treat with the sincere
2 Boston Weekly Messenger, Jan. 7, 1814.
3 Monroe to Castlereagh, Jan. 5, 1814; American State Pa-
pers, For. Rel., III., 622-623. Russell Journals, V., 373-379-
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 6/
desire they have repeatedly manifested of terminating
the present contest with Great Britain, on conditions of
reciprocity consistent with the rights of both parties as
sovereign and independent nations, and calculated not
only to establish present harmony, but to provide, as far
as possible, against future collisions which might in-
terrupt it." We may not be far wrong in assuming
that this insistence upon the sovereign political inde-
pendence of the United States, maintained in all the
diplomatic negotiations of the war of 1812, is the rea-
son that there have been " no further collisions," at
least to the extent of war, during the century since.
The President, having accepted the offer of the
British Government, at once communicated this in-
formation in a message to Congress, January 7, 1814.^
A week later he nominated, "by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate," John Quincy Adams,
James Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell as
Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary
of the United States, " with authority to meet a min-
ister or ministers having like authority from the Gov-
ernment of Great Britain, and with him or them to
negotiate and conclude a settlement of subsisting dif-
ferences, and a lasting peace and friendship between
the United States and that Power."^ The Senate con-
* President's Message; American State Papers, For. Rel.,
III., 621.
5 Russell Journals, V., 165-166.
1 68 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
firmed the nominations four days later. Christopher
Hughes, Jr.,6 was appointed secretary to the mission ;
and WilHam Shaler was attached to it as bearer of
communications of the special ministers to the Ameri-
can ministers at the various courts of Europe.
Albert Gallatin was added to the mission later,
when it was learned that he was still in Europe. The
President had supposed that he was on his way home,
and therefore had not named him when the others
were appointed.'^ At this time there were no serious
objections to Gallatin's appointment, inasmuch as he
no longer held the position of Secretary of the Treas-
ury. His nomination was sent to the Senate on Feb-
ruary 8, and on the following day it was confirmed.
When Gallatin was nominated to the mission at St.
Petersburg the President had appointed the Secretary
of the Navy, William Jones, temporarily, to attend to
the duties of the Secretary of the Treasury, in addition
to his own duties. This power of temporary appoint-
ment was derived from an act of Congress passed
May 8, 1792. This provided that "in case of the
death, absence from the Seat of Government, or sick-
ness of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treas-
ury, or of the Secretary of the War Department, or of
^ Russell Journals, V., 172.
7 Monroe to Adams, Feb. 3, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes
and Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 69
any officer of either of the said Departments whose
appointment is not in the head thereof, whereby they
cannot perform the duties of their said respective
offices, it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, in case he shall think it necessary, to
authorize any person or persons, at his discretion, to
perform the duties of the said respective offices until a
successor be appointed, or until such absence or inability
by sickness shall cease."^ By an amendment to this act
passed February 13, 1795, it was provided that no
vacancy should be filled in the manner thus prescribed
for a longer term than six months.^ In accordance
with this law the portfolio of the Secretary of the
Treasury had become vacant through Gallatin's ab-
sence for more than six months. Shortly before sub-
mitting Gallatin's name a second time as peace minister
to the Senate for confirmation, Madison had nomi-
nated as Secretary of the Treasury, George W. Camp-
bell, and that gentleman received confirmation upon the
same day that Gallatin's appointment was sanctioned.
All five members appointed to the new commission
were men of large experience in national afifairs. Four
of them achieved an enduring rank among the fore-
most of American statesmen. John Quincy Adams,
the chairman of the mission, though at this time only
in middle life, had had, for an American of that period,
8 Annals of Congress, 2d Cong., 1st sess., 1385.
^ Annals of Congress, 3d Cong., 2d sess., 1499.
I/O ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S
an unusual diplomatic experience, which had given him
acquaintances in all the principal capitals of Europe.
As a boy of eleven, in 1778, he accompanied his
father to Paris upon a diplomatic mission. At the
age of fourteen he served as private secretary to
Francis Dana, who was the accredited envoy of Russia.
In 1783, Adams was again with his father at Paris
when the first peace treaty was negotiated. From
1794 to 1797 he was minister to Holland and from
1797 to 1801 minister to Prussia. While in Berlin he
successfully negotiated a commercial treaty with
Prussia. Upon the defeat of the Federalists in 1801
Adams was recalled. He then entered into political
life, first being elected United States Representative
and then United States Senator. His senatorship ex-
pired March 3, 18C9, and he was not reelected by the
Federalist party of which he had been a member, be-
cause he had voted for the embargo act, and had even
been a member of the committee which had introduced
it. Though his severance from the Federalist party
cost him his seat in the Senate, it brought him a reward,
so it was claimed, at the hands of President Madison,^"
in the form of an appointment as minister to the Court
of St. Petersburg. This position he had held, at the
time of the peace negotiations, for more than four
years.
Adams's talents and education, no less than his re-
10 Boston Weekly Messenger, Dec. 27, 181 1.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I/I
markable experience, fitted him admirably for his posi-
tion upon the peace commission. His thorough knowl-
edge of constitutional and international law ; his con-
scientious devotion to high ideals ; his indefatigable in-
dustry ; and his ability as a writer of forceful English
rendered him particularly fitted for the work. While
possessing these excellent characteristics, Adams had
others which were less commendable. He was easily
provoked ; rather ungracious in manner ; lacking in
sympathy with men of different character and training
from himself; and utterly devoid of a sense of humor.
These qualities, added to his cold intellectuality, isolated
him from the fellowship of other men. He possessed
few friends and these not of the closest. He himself
deplored the lack of friends and the fact of his incur-
ring the enmity of nearly all the men with whom he
had been associated in public service. It was due to
the characteristics which have been mentioned that
during the period of the peace negotiations Adams
rarely appeared upon friendly terms with the other
commissioners.
James A. Bayard of Delaware was a prominent
member of the Federalist party. His political experi-
ence at the time of his appointment on the peace com-
mission had been confined to service in Congress, cover-
ing a period of seventeen years, eight in the House of
Representatives and nine in the Senate. In 1801, he
had been offered by President Adams the position of
1/2 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S
minister to France, but had declined it. Bayard was
highly esteemed by his colleagues in the Senate and
possessed the confidence of both Federalists^^ and Re-
publicans.^- His legal ability, sound reasoning, and
good judgment, which made him a leader in Congress,
rendered him especially useful on the peace mission,
Henry Clay, the youngest of the commissioners, be-
ing now thirty-seven, had already for several years
been one of the leading politicians of the country. He
had entered the Senate when lacking several months
of the constitutional age, to fill out an unexpired term.
At the end of that term, 1811, he was elected to Con-
gress, and in the first session of his service became
Speaker of the House. This position he held at the
time of his appointment to the peace commission.
Clay represented the newer national life of the country,
in contrast to the sectionalism of New England, or
the exclusiveness of the South. He was brilliant, per-
suasive in speech, and gracious in bearing, though
strong in his enmities, and impulsive in action.
Jonathan Russell of Massachusetts, the least known
member of the mission, had had valuable experience in
diplomatic negotiations. He had been charge d'affaires
at Paris in 181 1 ; and had occupied a like position at
the Court of St. James from November, 18 11, to Sep-
11 Federal Republican, Sept. 19, 1814.
12 Clay to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS.,
XIV., 1807.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1/3
tember i, 1812. While in this capacity, at the out-
break of the war, it will be recalled, he had been
intrusted with power to arrange an armistice. His
negotiations were carried on with patriotism and in-
tegrity, though it may be with some narrowness of
spirit. His conduct, however, was quite generally ap-
proved at home. Russell's intellectual abilities were
not conspicuous, though he possessed a fair degree of
literary skill. His enemies were many, due in a large
degree, it would seem, to his own inordinate conceit.
This was most apparent in his jealous distrust of men
of larger caliber than himself, which led him to utter
reproaches and criticisms of their motives. Though
he was charged with double dealing and with making
personal profit out of his public positions, the charges
appear not to have been substantiated. When be-
sought^^ by his friends to give them secret information
of public affairs, from which they might profit com-
mercially, Russell honorably rejected and repudiated
such requests.^* His correspondence, dealing with tri-
fling personalities and empty compliments, shows a man
of rather ordinary ability.^'' At the same time with
Russell's nomination to Gothenburg, his nomination as
minister to Sweden was sent by the President to the
13 John Smith to Russell, Feb. 9, 1814; Russell Papers, MS.
1* Russell to Madison, Dec. 21, 1811; Russell Papers, MS.,
No. 2503.
15 Russell Papers, MS.
174 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
Senate. His nomination to the second position had
been made the year before, but the Federalists had at
that time succeeded in preventing his appointment.
Now his appointment to both positions was confirmed ;
to the first by a vote of 22 to 8, and to the second
by a vote of 16 to 14.^"
Albert Gallatin, the last member to be added to the
commission, was, in personal qualities and ability for
conducting a negotiation, perhaps the best equipped of
them all. His tact and humor on more than one
occasion prevented the breaking off of the negotia«
tions. No less important was his influence in main-
taining harmony among the members themselves.
Gallatin, though inexperienced in conducting diplo-
matic negotiations, had for many years been a promi-
nent figure in the Administration. Upon him, more
than upon any other man, had rested the burdens
and responsibilities of the Government during the pre-
ceding twelve years. As Secretary of the Treasury,
he had not only been the author of the various meas-
ures to meet the fiscal necessities of the Government,
but he had also maintained a commanding influence
in the other departments of the Government. The
Federalists, with much truth, considered him the origi-
nator of every measure inaugurated during these
16 J. B. Howell to Russell, Jan. 18, 1814; Russell Papers,
MS., No. 875.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1/5
years." Though for years unjustly and unreasonably
criticised, Gallatin refrained from that bitterness of
feeling and intemperate language which was so com-
monly indulged in by public men of his day.
The only common tie that existed between the mem-
bers of the commission was that of loyalty to their
country. In personal characteristics and tempera-
ment, in training and education, in political and re-
ligious beliefs, there was wide diversity. Accustomed
themselves to be leaders in their several spheres, they
ungraciously yielded to one another. Every member
of the mission save Bayard was personally disliked by
one or more of the others. Adams was disliked by
the other four, especially by Bayard, Clay, and Russell.
The public, in general, was well pleased with the
appointees.^^ They were men whose political opin-
ions were well known, and these, it was believed, were
in accord with the general feeling of the country.
There was much confidence that the ministers would
speedily negotiate a treaty of peace, provided that this
could be done consistently with the honor of the na-
tion, and without relinquishing principles deemed es-
sential to the sovereign character of the state. ^^
The commissioners were informed by Secretary
1^ N. Y. Evening Post, Sept. 25, 1812. Columbian Centinel
(Boston), Feb. 8, 1812.
IS Providence Patriot, Jan. 29, 1814.
19 Ibid., Feb. 19, 1814.
1/6 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
Monroe that the instructions issued April 15, 1813,
under the proposed Russian mediation, were to remain
in force for the negotiation, except for certain modi-
fications. With regard to impressment, the Secretary
stated that there had been no change in the sentiment
of the American Government on that question. It
maintained with as much force as ever that "this de-
grading practice must cease ; our flag must protect the
crew, or the United States cannot consider themselves
an independent nation." It was again mentioned that
the American Government was willing to pass a law
which would remove the pretexts for impressment
by the British Government by altogether excluding
British seamen from service in American vessels, and
even all British subjects, if necessary, except the few
already naturalized. A further provision of such a
law would be to stipulate, likewise, the surrender of
all British seamen deserting in American ports from
British vessels, public or private. If a treaty should
be negotiated, the commissioners were to secure, if
possible, a stipulation that American impressed seamen
be paid by the British Government the sum that their
wages would have amounted to in the merchant service
during the time of their detention.^"
Upon the subject of blockade the Secretary urged
the importance of obtaining a precise definition. Stip-
20 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 701-702.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I//
ulations were also to be made for indemnity for the
destruction, contrary to the laws and usages of war,
of all unfortified towns and other private property.
The commissioners were instructed to secure the
restoration to their owners of the slaves taken away
by the British during the war, or payment for them at
full value. The charge was made that "a shameful
traffic has been carried on in the West Indies, by the
sale of these persons there, by those who professed to
be their deliverers."-^ It was held that, if these slaves
were regarded as non-com.batants, they should be re-
stored ; if as property, they should be paid for.
Secretary Monroe declared in his instructions to the
commissioners that the sentiments of the President
were the same, in every instance, as at the time of the
former instructions; and that the reasons for main-
taining these sentiments had "become more evident
and strong " since the date of the former instructions.
If the negotiations, it was said, had proceeded under
the mediation of Russia, the United States would have
confidently expected the favor of other European
Powers, in case Great Britain had attempted to dictate
hard terms. Under the present circumstances a good
understanding with Russia and the Baltic Powers was
desirable.
The original manuscript containing these instruc-
21 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 701-702.
13
178 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
tions includes much that has been omitted in the
printed form. The portions that were omitted display
the intense feeling of the Administration at the time
upon the points at issue. One unprinted passage, re-
ferring to neutral rights, says: "The objects are the
same and the reasons for maintaining them have gained
great additional weight, by the vast amount of blood
and treasure which has been expended in their sup-
port."22
After discussing the two main points, those of im-
pressment and blockade, the original manuscript con-
tains a confidential article upon the Canadas, which, in
view of the charges made by the British in the treaty
negotiations, is interesting. The paragraph reads as
follows : " The reasons given in my letter of the 23d of
June and the ist of the month, in favor of a cession
of the Canadas to the United States, have also gained
much additional force from further reflection. Ex-
perience has shown that the British Government can-
not participate in the dominion and navigation of the
Lakes, without incurring the danger of an early re-
newal of the war. It was by means of the Lakes that
the British Government interfered with and gained an
ascendency over the Indians, even within our limits.
The efifect produced by the massacre of our citizens
after they were made prisoners, and of defenseless
-2 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814;
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc-
tions, VII.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1/9
women and children along our frontier need not now
be described. It will perhaps never be removed while
Great Britain retains in her hands the government of
those provinces. This alone will prove a fruitful
source of controversy, but there are others ; our settle-
ment had reached before the war from the northern
boundary with Lower Canada, along the St. Lawrence,
to the southwestern extremity of Lake Erie, and after
peace it can not be doubted, that they will soon extend
by a continued population to Detroit, where there is
now a strong establishment, and to the banks of the
Michigan, and even of the other Lakes, spreading
rapidly over all our vacant territory. With the disposi-
tion already existing, collisions may be daily expected
between the inhabitants on each side, which it may not
be in the power of either Government to prevent. The
cupidity of the British traders will admit of no control.
The inevitable consequence of another war, and even
of the present, if persevered in by the British Govern-
ment, must be to sever these provinces by force from
Great Britain. Their inhabitants, themselves, will soon
feel their strength and assert their independence. All
these evils had therefore better be anticipated, and
provided for by timely arrangements between the two
Governments in the mode prescribed. Should the
British Government decline cession of territory to an
extent to remedy the evils complained of, you will not
fail to attend to the injunction contained in my letter
l80 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
of the 15th: of April last, as the measures of mitigating
them as far as may be able."^'
A third omission in the printed instructions is found
in connection with the discussion of Great Britain's
refusal to accept mediation. This explains the reason,
in Monroe's mind, for the British rejection of the
Russian offer. The omitted confidential paragraph
reads : " I shall proceed to notice the conduct of the
British Government in declining the Russian mediation
and proposing to treat directly with the United States.
Its policy in so doing can not be mistaken. Indeed the
British minister explains it himself, in stating that the
object was to keep the business unmixed with the
affairs of the Continent. Whence this desire, suppos-
ing it to be the real and only object, unless it be
founded in an opinion, that on the most important
questions, which we have to treat with the British
Government, Russia and all the other Powers of the
Continent have a common interest with the United
States against Great Britain, and a dread thence aris-
ing, if any negotiation should be carried on under the
auspices of the Emperor of Russia, that it might pro-
duce a concert. To this cause alone, as is presumed,
is the conduct of Great Britain to be imputed. It is,
therefore, to the interest of the United States to avoid
becoming its victim, and to improve the occurrence, to
23 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814 ;
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc-
tions, VII.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS l8l
their advantage, as far as may be practicable. It is
believed that there is not a Power in Europe that v^ould
give the slightest countenance to the British practice of
impressment. Had that practice been brought into
discussion under the auspices of Russia, it may reason-
ably be presumed that it would have been treated by
the Emperor, so far as he might have expressed an
opinion on it, as novel, absurd, and inadmissible in
regard to other nations ; and that the British ministers
would have been forced to support it against the United
States by arguments drawn from their former con-
nection with and dependence on Great Britain. Had
the British Government supported the practice on the
ground of maritime right, applicable to all nations, it
would have offended, and might have excited, all
against Great Britain. Had it supported it as a right
applicable to the United States only, thereby degrad-
ing them below the condition of other nations, it was
easy to anticipate the effect here. The objection of the
British Government to a negotiation which formed an
appeal, on any question of neutral right, to the im-
partial judgment of Russia, or any other power, though
not as an umpire, would be still stronger, for all Europe
has long known and suffered under British violation of
neutral rights. It must have been on this view of the
subject, that the British Government declined a nego-
tiation, which could not fail to show in their naked
1 82 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
deformity the injustice of the British claims and
usurpation."
Two further paragraphs found in the original manu-
script, which were omitted in publication, deal with the
policy of the United States with reference to the Euro-
pean Powers. They are, it will be observed, in accord
with the early traditional policy of the American
Government. " By meeting this overture in the man-
ner in which it has been done, these Powers will
see the manifestation of a desire, to keep open the door
of communication with them ; and to this communica-
tion great facility will be afforded, by Mr. Adams and
Mr. Russell, who, while joined in the commission to
treat with England, may preserve a direct correspond-
ence with the Governments to which they are respec-
tively appointed. In availing yourselves of the good
offices of Russia and Sweden, as far as it may be prac-
ticable, on any of the points in question, in the pro-
posed negotiations, you will always recollect that the
object is to secure to the United States by means there-
of, a safe and honorable peace, and not to combine
ivith any Power, in any object of ambition, or in claim-
ing other conditions more favorable than that proposed
which may tend to prolong the war."-*
Further instructions were addressed to the peace
ministers January 30, February 10, February 14, and
2* Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814; MS.,
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instructions,
VII.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 83
March 22. Those of January 30 called attention to the
fact that American vessels and cargoes in the ports of
Great Britain, at the time of the declaration of war,
had been seized and condemned by the British Gov-
ernment without previous warning, while the United
States had given British vessels six months in which to
withdraw, in some instances even longer time. It was
suggested that a general provision be made for the
compensation for losses incurred by the subjects of
each nation at the hands of the other, without time
being given to remove their property to their own
country.-^
In a very brief note of February 10, Secretary
Monroe suggested that, if the commissioners found
themselves unable to conclude a treaty which would
provide definite arrangement on the subject of neutral
rights, they might agree to a provision that would place
the United States in the same position relative to such
rights as might be most favorably accorded by Great
Britain to any other state.^*'
In the despatch of February 14, Great Britain was
charged, in her refusal of mediation, with acting to pre-
vent a good understanding between the United States,
Russia, and Sweden on the subject of neutral rights.
25 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 30, 1814;
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc-
tions, VII.
26 Monroe to American Commissioners, Feb. 10, 1814;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 703.
184 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
This plan, it was stated, would be foiled in the
arrangement for the new negotiations. " In accepting
the overture to treat in Sweden this attempt of the
British Government has been defeated, as the oppor-
tunity is afforded to communicate with the Russian
and Swedish Governments almost with equal advan-
tage as if we had treated at St. Petersburg under the
Russian mediation. By accepting the British overture
to treat at Gothenburg, and not at London, as well as
by the manner, the utmost respect is shown to the
Emperor and likewise to the Government of Sweden.
You will not fail, as already instructed, to explain this
transaction and the motives that have governed the
President in it.""
In the matter of impressment Monroe went back
to the article in the previous instructions, which au-
thorized an agreement with reference to impressment
merely during " the present war in Europe,"^^ if no
stipulation could be secured from Great Britain that she
would forbear the practice of impressment for a defi-
nite term of years. The importance of such a stipula-
tion was dwelt upon in a paragraph which has been left
out of the published document. It reads as follows:
27 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Feb. 14, 1814;
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc-
tions, VII.
28 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 695-700.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 85
" To withdraw from the war without it, would be to
subject the United States to all the expense in blood
and treasure which has been and may be incurred,
without obtaining the security for which we have con-
tended, and leaving us under the necessity for con-
tending for it again at a like expense, whenever
another war shall break out in Europe, which will
probably not be distant, and may be very soon. In
every view of the subject it must be desirable to Great
Britain to remove the ground of controversy, if she
means to preserve peace, for it is essential to the right
and the honor of the United States. "^^
In the brief additional instructions of March 22, the
peace commissioners were told under no pretext to
allow British claims to territory south of the northern
boundary of the United States, or on the Pacific coast
about the Columbia River.^"
The members of the peace commission were at the
time of their appointment widely separated, two in
America and three in different parts of Europe. It
was nearly six months after their appointment before
they were all assembled in the place finally agreed
upon for the negotiation. Clay and Russell sailed
from New York, February 25, in the United States
29 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Feb. 14, 1814;
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc-
tions, VII.
^'^ Russell Papers (copy). No. 837.
1 86 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
corvette John Adams, and reached Gothenburg April
13.^^ They were 'the bearers of one copy of the
commissions. The day after their arrival they des-
patched a note to Adams informing him of the mis-
sion and of his own appointment. He was requested
to join them as soon as possible at Gothenburg.^^ A
note was also sent to Bayard and Gallatin notifying
them of their appointment. These gentlemen had also
been given official notification by Monroe.^^ Bayard
and Gallatin had left St. Petersburg January 25,^* and
after spending some time at Amsterdam, where they
received news of the acceptance by the United States
of the offer of direct negotiation, they had proceeded
to London.^^ They arrived in that city April 9, at a
time, as they wrote the new commissioners,^^ not
favorable for securing a hearing for American in-
terests. The allies had just taken Paris, and on the
31 Clay and Russell to Bayard and Gallatin, April 14, 1814;
Russell Journals, V., 174.
32 Clay to Russell and Adams, Apr. 14, 1814; Russell Jour-
nals, v., 175-1/6.
33 Monroe to Plenipotentiaries; MS., Bureau of Indexes and
Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII.
34 Adams to Monroe, Jan. 29, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes
and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 127.
3= Bayard to Clay and Russell, April 20, 1814; Russell
Journals, V., 183-184.
3« Bayard to Clay and Russell, April 20, 1814; Russell Jour-
nals, v., 184. Gallatin to Clay, April 22, 1814 ; Russell Papers,
MS., No. 829. Writings of Gallatin, I., 606-608.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 8/
19th news arrived of Bonaparte's formal abdication
of the thrones of France and Italy. London was in-
toxicated with joy, and proud of her successes. The
Americans found little to encourage their hopes of
restoration of peace between their country and Great
Britain. On the contrary, they believed that with the
release of large numbers of soldiers from the Euro-
pean struggle the war in America would be prosecuted
with much greater vigor than heretofore. They found
public feeling strongly against the United States and in
favor of the continuance of hostilities.^'^
Undismayed by the obstacles presented, Gallatin con-
tinued his peace efforts. He found his friend Baring
a favorable medium for learning the purposes of the
British Government.^^ Through him he was informed
that no commissioners had yet been appointed by
Great Britain; that the Government had waited until
officially notified of the appointment of the commis-
sioners by the United States and the arrival of the
same at the place of meeting. Baring^'' also gave the
information that, owing to the political changes in
Europe, Gothenburg was no longer considered a suit-
^^ Bayard and Gallatin to Monroe, May 6, 1814; Writings
of Gallatin, I., 611-613; Russell Journals, V., 231-234.
28 Gallatin to Baring, April i, 1814; MS., British Foreign
Office, 5, 103.
39 Baring to Gallatin, April 22, 1814; MS. (copy), British
Foreign Office, 5, 103.
1 88 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
able place for the negotiation, and that a change to
London or to some place in the Netherlands would be
much more acceptable to Great Britain.
Bayard and Gallatin addressed letters respecting the
proposed change of place to Clay and Russell at
Gothenburg, and requested their opinion as to whether
the question of change was within the discretion of the
mission, and whether they deemed such a change ex-
pedient. They expressed their own conviction that
the change was desirable. Colonel Millegan, private
secretary of Bayard, was despatched with this com-
munication to Russell and Clay, with instructions to
return as soon as possible with the reply of those
gentlemen and with the official papers confirming the
commission in order that these, together with the noti-
fication of the arrival of the American commissioners
at Gothenburg, might be communicated to the British
Government.^"
Russell, upon arriving in Europe, had at once pro-
ceeded to Stockholm to present his credentials to the
Court of Sweden, in accordance with instructions from
the Department of State.^^ In the absence of Russell,
Clay was obliged to take the responsibility of replying
40 Bayard to Clay and Russell, April 20, 1814; Russell Jour-
nals, v., 186-187. Gallatin to Clay, April 22, 1814; Russell
Journals, V., 187-189.
41 Monroe to Russell, Feb. 5, 1814; MS.; Bureau of Indexes
and Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 89
to Bayard and Gallatin. In his reply^- he held to the
opinion that the instructions, being unrestricted, did
not prevent negotiations from being conducted at some
place other than Gothenburg, and said that he would
favor a change to some place in the Netherlands, but
not to London, provided the British Government pro-
posed the change. The only objection that he saw to a
change of place was the possibility of offense which
Sweden might take, after having been notified that
negotiations were to take place within her territory.
Any such feeling, he thought, might be prevented by
diplomatic tact, especially if it could be made to ap-
pear that the United States did not take the initiative
in the proposed change, but only acquiesced, in the
interests of peace, in a proposal made by Great Britain
to this effect.*^ With these reservations Clay gave his
consent to a change of place, subject to the approval
of the other members of the mission. He ordered a
messenger to bear to Russell and Adams at Stock-
holm the letters received from Gallatin and Bayard,
together with a copy of the reply which he had made
to these. He informed them that he had ordered
Captain Angus, with the John Adams, to be in readi-
ness at Gothenburg to convey them to the port nearest
*2 Clay to Bayard and Gallatin, May 2, 1814 ; Russell Jour-
nals, v., 197-205. Writings of Gallatin, I., 608-611.
^^Clay to Russell, May i, 1814; Russell Papers, MS., No.
1660.
190 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S
Ghent.^* Gallatin and Bayard, upon the receipt of the
letter of reply and other papers from Clay, on the 13th
of May communicated to Lord Castlereagh, Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs, the fact of the appoint-
ment of the American ministers, and enclosed copies
of their powers.*^ On the i6th a reply was made to
this note by Lord Bathurst, stating that commissioners
would be forthwith appointed.^*'
The American commissioners in London then sent
a note to Bathurst in which they expressed*^ their
willingness to agree upon any other neutral place,
which might be more eligible and convenient, for the
seat of the negotiations. They expressed their willing-
ness to proceed to Ghent, which had been suggested
as a place of meeting.
The other three commissioners were notified of the
change and requested to proceed to Ghent as soon as
convenient. Adams had left St. Petersburg April 28,
and had reached Stockholm May 25, where he found
4* Clay to Russell and Adams, May 31, 1814; Russell Jour-
nals, v., 222-224.
45 Bayard and Gallatin to Castlereagh, May 13, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 103.
46 Bathurst to Bayard and Gallatin, May 16, 1814; MS.
(copy), British Foreign Office, 5, 103. Lord Bathurst was
Secretary for War and Colonies in the Cabinet of Lord Liver-
pool (1812-27).
47 Bayard and Gallatin to Bathurst, May 17, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 103.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I9I
Russell.*- Russell had notified Count d'Engestrom,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Swedish
Government, of the change in the place of the negotia-
tion, and that Government had shown no ill feeling
on this account.'^ Russell and Adams left Stockholm
June 7, and reached Ghent on the 24th, GaUatin and
Bayard had remained in London awaiting the appoint-
ment of the British commissioners, but the British
Government acted with the utmost slowness, failing to
make the appointment tmtil May 17.^ Full powers of
the commissioners were issued two days later.^^ After
the appointment of commissioners there was a similar
policy of delay on the part of the British Government
in sending their representatives to the place appointed
for the negotiations. This gave a just cause for criti-
cism, and for the belief expressed by the American
commissioners that these delays were made designedl)'^^
by the British in order that they might have the prestige
of militar}- success in America, of which they were
confident, before entering upon the peace negotiation.
-- Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 634. Adams to Monroe^
May 28, 1814: MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Russian
Despatches, III., 134.
-sRussel to d'Engestrom, May 5, 1814; Russell Pacers,
MS. (copy).
^Beasley to Russell, May 17, 1814; Russell Papers. MS.,
Xo. 16-14.
"^ MS., British Foreign Omce, j, 102.
^-J. Q. Adams to John Adams, Oct 27, 1814; Madison
Papers, MS., LIIL, 76.
192 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S
On June 11, Gallatin addressed a note to Lord
Castlereagh informing him that Clay, Adams, and
Russell were on their way to Ghent and that he and
Bayard were ready to proceed at a moment's notice.
He requested information as to the time when the
British commissioners might be expected to arrive.
This note was answered by Hamilton, British Under-
Secretary of State^^ for Foreign Affairs, to the effect
that the British commissioners would leave Sweden for
Ghent about the first of July.^* Clay reached Ghent
June 25, one day after the arrival of Adams and
Russell. Bayard arrived tlie 27th, while Gallatin did
not reach there until July 6.
The city of Ghent, the old capital of Flanders, with
its interesting history and picturesque buildings, was
well chosen as the place for the peace negotiations.
Situated thirty-five miles east of Ostend, the seaport of
the country, and about an equal distance from the cities
of Brussels and Antwerp, it had good means of com-
munication with all the leading capitals of Europe.
The neutrality of the Flemish provinces had been pro-
claimed by the treaty of London, May, 1814, which
united them in national government with Holland.
The people of Ghent were most cordial to the Govern-
S3 Gallatin to Castlereagh, June 11, 1814; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, 102.
s* Hamilton to Irving, June 15, 1814; MS. (copy), British
Foreign Office, 5, 102.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I93
ments of both Great Britain and the United States.
This cordiality was shown in the generous hospitahty
which was extended to the ministers of the two coun-
tries.^^ The American ministers were elected hono-
rary members of the various learned societies: Adams,
Gallatin, and Bayard of the Society of Beaux Arts;
Clay, Russell, and Hughes of the Society of Agriculture
and Botany. After the treaty was signed Adams, Gal-
latin, and Bayard were also elected members of the
latter society. Adams had the additional honor of
an invitation to inscribe his name in the Livre d'Or, a
book containing the names of illustrious persons con-
nected with the history of Ghent.^^
The American commissioners stopped first at the
Hotel des Pays-Bas, but shortly removed to quarters
on the Rue des Champs, corner of Rue des Foulons.
Their first meeting was held in Adams's room on the
30th of June. The next meeting took place on July
9, after the arrival of Gallatin. At this conference
it was decided that meetings of the commissioners
should be held daily, and that a journal should
be kept by each commissioner in which should be
copied all papers of which there was but one copy.^'''
^^ Papers on Treaty of Ghent, sent by Thomas Wilson,
Consul at Ghent, April 28, 1822, to Secretary of State; MS.,
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Consular Reports, 1882.
56 Ibid.
57 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 656 et seq.
14
194 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S
The members themselves were required to provide
for the work of 'transcribing for their own uses, as the
Government had furnished only one secretary for the
entire mission. Adams, in anticipation of the meeting
of the commission, had represented to Secretary Mon-
roe that it would be unwise for the Government not
to provide an adequate secretarial force. In the ab-
sence of such provision, he averred, either ministers
themselves must be burdened with a vast amount of
writing or they must employ unofficial secretaries to
do the work, who would be under no obligation to
observe secrecy upon the matters coming under their
observation.^^
The British Government either possessed an extra-
ordinary degree of confidence in the superiority of
their position in any negotiation with the United States,
or else they failed utterly to appreciate the character of
the statesmen whom the American Government had
sent to treat with the British negotiators. It is diffi-
cult to understand the reason for the appointment of
men of such mediocre ability as Lord Gambier, Henry
Goulburn, and William Adams, the British commis-
sioners. The British Ministry may have intended to
choose men whom it could easily control ; or, what is
more likely, the Congress of Vienna bulked so large in
^s Adams to Monroe, April 25, 1814; MS., Bureau of In-
dexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 133.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I95
the public view that the meetings at Ghent appeared
to be of little importance. At any rate, it is generally
conceded by American and English historians alike
that while the United States appointed to the mission
its very best men, Great Britain chose only second-
rate men. The foremost writer upon this period has
said: "Probably the whole British public service, in-
cluding Lords and Commons, could not at that day
have produced four men competent to meet Gallatin, J.
Q. Adams, Bayard, and Clay on the ground of Ameri-
can interests; and when Castlereagh opposed to them
Gambier, Goulburn, and Dr. Adams, he sacrificed what-
ever advantage diplomacy offered ; for in diplomacy as
in generalship, the individual commanded success. "^^
Lord Gambier, the head of the mission, had attained
some distinction in His Majesty's navy. He had been
granted a peerage in 1807 as a reward for his services
in the bombardment of Copenhagen on September 2,
1807.®° His knowledge was not profound even in
those subjects in which he had most experience, and
in dealing with diplomatic matters he had little skill.
Henry Goulburn, the second named in the British
commission, was a member of Parliament and Under-
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. He had
previously been Under-Secretary for Home Affairs.
59 Henry Adams, History of the United States (1813-1817),
IX., 14.
6" Dictionary of National Biography, XX., 393-394-
196 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S
He was a graduate of Trinity College, Oxford. He
was the ablest of the three members of the commis-
sion and enjoyed most the confidence of the British
Ministry. That he possessed considerable ability is
shown in the fact that in 1821 he was made a member
of the Privy Council and Chief Secretary to Wellesley,
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland ; that in 1828, in the Duke
of Wellington's administration, he was appointed
Chancellor of the Exchequer; that in Peel's first
cabinet he was Home Secretary; and in the second,
again Chancellor of the Exchequer.^^ William Adams,
LL.D., was also a graduate of Trinity College, Ox-
ford, and a scholar of considerable repute. As a
lawyer he had gained some reputation for the mastery
of legal details. He served on a commission appointed
in 181 2 to regulate the procedure of vice-admiralty
courts abroad. Later, from 1815-24, he served on a
similar commission appointed to investigate the courts
of justice and ecclesiastical courts of England. In the
Ghent commission Adams was given the sole prepara-
tion of the despatches which related to maritime war.^^
In addition to the paper containing their instruc-
tions, the British commissioners were provided by their
Government with the following papers: full powers,
treaty of Paris (1783) ; treaty of commerce, London
61 Dictionary of National Biography, XXII., 283-284.
62 Ibid., I., 108.
PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 9/
(1794) ; explanatory article, Philadelphia (1796) ; ex-
planatory article, London (1798) ; convention, London
(1802); convention (not ratified), London (1803);
correspondence and proposed treaty (1806-1808) ;
declaration of war (1812) ; proclamation, London
(1814).^^
63 MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
CHAPTER V
The Opening of Peace Negotiations at Ghent
The British ministers reached Ghent Saturday even-
ing, August 6, 1 814. All of the American ministers had
been waiting there a full month, and some of them much
longer. On the next day after their arrival, Anthony
St. John Baker, secretary of the British mission, called
upon Bayard and informed him of the arrival of the
British ministers and of their desire to exchange " full
powers." It was proposed that the meeting for this
purpose should take place at the rooms of the British
ministers at the Hotel Lion d'Or the next day at one
o'clock. Bayard promised Baker that this communica-
tion should be laid before the other commissioners and
an answer returned during the evening.^
When the Americans learned of the proposal of the
British to meet at their hotel they were much disturbed,
for they regarded it as a pretension of superiority on
the part of the British commissioners for them to set
the place for the first meeting. Adams cited inter-
national law authority to show that the course taken
by the British was the usage of ambassadors to min-
1 Russell Journals, V., 236-237.
198
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 1 99
isters of an inferior rank. Bayard also brought for-
ward a case of a similar character when commissioners
of Spain and England met at Boulogne in 1600. On
that occasion the Spanish commissioners made, and
the English resisted, a proposal much like the one that
was now made by the British commissioners.^ Bayard
and Gallatin, however, were disposed to take no notice
of the matter, as they were averse to obstructing the
negotiation with any question of "mere ceremony."
Adams proposed that Hughes should call in the even-
ing on Baker and inform him that the American com-
missioners would be glad to confer and exchange " full
powers " at any time the British commissioners would
indicate, and at any place other than their lodgings.
At Gallatm's suggestion, the phrase, "at any place
other than their own lodgings," was changed to "at
any place which may be mutually agreed upon." With
this change Adams's proposition was agreed to, and
Hughes was authorized further, in case any difficulty
should arise as to a suitable place, to suggest the Hotel
des Pays-Bas. Hughes delivered this communication,
and was promised a reply before one o'clock of the
next day. About ten o'clock of that same evening
Baker called and informed the American ministers
that the Hotel des Pays-Bas, which had been suggested
by Hughes, had been accepted by the British com-
2 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 3-4.
200 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
missioners, and that they would meet the Americans
there at one o'clock the next day.^
On the 8th of August, at the hour agreed upon, the
commissioners of the two states met at the Hotel des
Pays-Bas. After introductions had taken place and
" full powers " been exchanged,* Gambler, the British
minister first named, addressed the American minis-
ters, expressing the regret which the British nation felt
for the existence of the war and the sincere desire of
the British Government " that the negotiation might
result in a solid peace honorable to both parties."^ He
stated, also, that he and his colleagues were personally
very anxious for this desirable object and hoped that
they might aid in putting " an end to a state of things
so contrary to the interests of the two nations, and to
restore again those amicable relations, which he hoped
under the blessings of a kind Providence, might ad-
vance the happiness of both nations."^ The other
British ministers merely stated that Lord Gambler had
expressed their own sentiments,
John Quincy Adams, the first named of the Ameri-
can commissioners, replied with similar words of as-
surance as to the strong desire of the American people
and Government that the negotiation might result in
'3 Russell Journals, V., 237-238.
* Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 4-5.
5 Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1814; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 705-707.
"Russell Journals, V., 238.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 20I
a solid peace. Adams promised for himself and col-
leagues to bring to the discussion the " disposition to
meet every sentiment of candor and conciliation with
the most cordial reciprocity."'^
After these preliminary remarks, Henry Goulburn,
whom the British commissioners had appointed to
open the conference, expressed the opinion that it
would be proper for him to mention those points which
seemed likely to be brought into discussion, and upon
which the British commissioners had been instructed.
He added that if any of these which he should men-
tion should be considered unnecessary by the American
ministers, or if there were others not mentioned which
they might consider essential, that fact should be
stated.^ Goulburn presented three principal subjects
for discussion in the negotiations.
I. " The forcible seizure of mariners on board mer-
chant vessels, and, in connection with it, the claim of
His Britannic Majesty to the allegiance of all the
native subjects of Great Britain."
n. "The Indian allies of Great Britain to be in-
cluded in the pacification, and a definite boundary to
be settled for their territory." This point was made
a sine qua non.
HI. " A revision of the boundary line between the
United States and the adjacent British colonies."
7 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 5.
8 Russell Journals, V., 239.
202 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
After having stated these three points, the British
minister added that the British Government would
not accord again to the United States the special fish-
ing privileges within the limits of British jurisdiction,
granted by the treaty of 1783, without requiring an
equivalent.^ These points having been stated in ac-
cordance with their instructions," the British ministers
inquired whether the American ministers were able
to entertain a discussion of them.
John Quincy Adams, in reply, repeated the points
mentioned by the British in order to learn whether he
rightly understood them. He questioned them as to
whether the British Government thought the impress-
ment of seamen and the incidental claim of allegiance
a point proper for discussion. Goulburn replied that
the British Government did not regard it as a neces-
sary point to be discussed, but had included it as a
point which might naturally be supposed to arise in the
course of the negotiation. Bayard questioning the in-
tention of Great Britain with reference to the boundary
line, Goulburn stated that Great Britain did not have
in view the acquisition of any territory, but that the
revision was intended to remove the causes for dis-
putes over the uncertainties of the present boundary.
^ Commissioners to Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1814; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 705-707.
1° Castlereagh to Commissioners at Ghent, July 28, 1814;
Memoirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 6Q-72.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 2O3
With reference to the Indian territory which had been
proposed, it was stated that there was no intention of
making any change in the nature of the sovereignty of
the Indians over the country set apart for them.
Adams, after going over each point, said he wished
to have an opportunity to confer with his colleagues
as to their instructions before giving a reply and
before proposing other points which they might con-
sider proper to bring forward.^^ The British wished
an immediate answer as to whether the American
ministers were instructed upon the point which they
had made a sine qua non ; but upon the refusal of the
Americans to reply,^^ they assented to the request of
Adams, and the conference adjourned until eleven
o'clock the following day. It was agreed that the con-
ferences should be held alternately at the lodgings of
each mission and that the British ministers should meet
at the lodgings of the Americans the next day at the
hour determined upon.
Of the four subjects brought forward by the British
ministers for consideration, impressment was the one
which they cared least to discuss, while to the Ameri-
cans it was the most important. By turning the nego-
tiations to the questions of Indian pacification and
territory, of boundaries and fisheries, subjects not
entering into the causes of the war, the British hoped
11 Russell Journals, V., 241-242.
12 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 6.
204 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
that they might score a diplomatic victory. Aside from
the point of diplomacy, however, these questions had
been pressed upon the attention of the British Govern-
ment in a very practical way. With reference to the
Indian pacification, promises had been made to the
Indians by the British generals which obligated the
British Government to see that the Indians were in-
cluded in the pacification; and the Indian territorial
question had been presented to the Government as a
practical means of defending the British possessions in
North America. There were also commercial reasons
for the establishment of a permanent Indian territory,
which were urged by merchants in London who carried
on trade with the Indians. These merchants in a
memorial to the Government, under the pretext of
safeguarding the interests of the Indians, suggested
four different boundary lines, either one of which
would have given a large increase of territory to Great
Britain. They pointed out the commercial importance
to England of the trade with the Indians, the annual
export of the fur trade before the war being £250,000,
and the duties to the Government amounting to from
i20,ooo to £50,000."
The subject of boundary, besides being of interest
to these London merchants, was also of much con-
^3 Memorial of Committee of Merchants trading with the
Island of Newfoundland and its Dependencies to Liverpool;
MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 103.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 20$
cern to British subjects in the Provinces. Almost con-
stant conflict had arisen between British and American
subjects over boundaries which the treaty of peace
had inaccurately or indefinitely described. Again, the
fisheries were of great importance to the British sub-
jects, and it was with much displeasure that they saw
American fishermen sharing in these within their own
territorial waters. When it became known that peace
negotiations were to be carried on by the two coun-
tries, memorials and petitions were sent to the British
Government by the inhabitants of Nova Scotia and
by London merchants urgently imploring that in the
new treaty American fishermen be excluded from the
privileges granted by the treaty of 1783.^*
The American ministers, after returning to their
rooms from the first meeting, deliberated upon the
answer that they should make and the points that
they should propose at the next conference. Des-
patches from the Secretary of State, written June 25
and 2^], were received that same evening. The in-
structions of June 25 stated that the rights to the
fisheries " must not be brought into discussion " ; if
they were insisted upon, negotiations were to cease.
The commissioners were given authority to propose an
article postponing impressment to a future negotiation.
The despatch of June 27 allowed the commissioners, if
1* Petition of the Committee of the Inhabitants of Nova
Scotia to Bathurst; MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 103.
206 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
it should be found necessary, to omit altogether any
stipulation on the subject of impressment. Adams,
Gallatin, and Hughes, according to Adams's memoirs,
worked half the night deciphering these despatches ;
but as they gave instructions on no new points, merely
giving greater latitude in regard to those already
authorized, they did not affect the reply which had
already been determined upon. The next day the
American mission met at Bayard's room at ten o'clock,
and agreed finally upon the answer and the points to be
presented to the British ministers.
At the second meeting of the two missions, Adams,
for the American commissioners, stated that upon the
first point, that of impressment, which had been sug-
gested by the British plenipotentiaries, the American
ministers had instructions ; that upon the second point,
the Indians, they had received no instructions; but
that they had reason to believe that commissioners had
already been appointed to treat of peace with the In-
dians, and, in any event, the war with them would
cease upon peace being made with Great Britain ; that
upon the third point, namely, boundaries, they had in-
structions ; and that upon the fourth, '' the fisheries,"
they were without instructions. Adams presented two
additional subjects which the American commissioners
were instructed to propose for discussion. These
were: a definition of blockade and, as far as could
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 20/
be agreed upon, neutral and belligerent rights; and
secondly, claims to indemnity for captures both before
and during the war. The British were informed that
there were a number of other points which the Ameri-
can ministers were at liberty to bring into discussion,
either in the negotiation of the peace, or in that of a
treaty of commerce, which, in case of a propitious
termination of the conference, they were also author-
ized to conclude. The Americans maintained that it
was not to be expected that they should have been
instructed upon the second and fourth points pro-
posed by the British commissioners, since these had
never formed a subject of dispute between the two
states, and had not been the causes of the war.
Adams, however, expressed the willingness of his col-
leagues to hear what the British had to say upon these
points. They would then decide whether these, under
any possible form, could be brought within the scope of
their discretionary powers, though he admitted that they
did not deem it likely. The British inquired whether
these points might not, under the general powers pos-
sessed by the American commissioners, be made the
subject of a provisional arrangement. The American
ministers believed that they could agree to no such
proposition. They stated that their Government had
had no thought of such points being brought forward
by Great Britain ; not only because these did not enter
into the causes of war, but because in the tenor of
208 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
Lord Castlereagh's proposition of the negotiation no
expectation of such points could be found.^^
The British ministers repHed that Castlereagh's des-
patch was not a place for the suggestion of the points
for discussion, as that could not have contemplated
ulterior events, and it was not to be expected that they
would leave out the Indians, their allies, in any peace
settlement that should be made. Gallatin again assured
the British that a peace with the Indians would inevi-
tably follow that with Great Britain, and that a peace
might have already been made; as to a boundary line
between the United States and the Indians, inasmuch as
there had always been one, it was natural to suppose
there would be one at the close of the war.^®
The American ministers maintained that the pro-
posed stipulation of an Indian boundary was without
precedent in the history of the European states. In
reply to this, the British held that tlie Indians were to
be regarded in a certain sense as an independent people,
and that this position was indicated by the treaties made
with them by both Great Britain and the United States.
The Americans explained that there was an important
difference between treaties made with the Indians living
within the territory of the United States, and a treaty
made respecting them with a foreign Power which had
15 Russell Journals, V., 243-246.
1^ Ibid., 246-247.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 2O9
acknowledged the territory on which the Indians re-
sided to be a part of the United States.^''
The British ministers, when asked if they intended
an acquisition of territory from the Indians, or any
change in the attributes of sovereignty which the In-
dians had heretofore enjoyed, replied that they did not.
Later, in reply to a question of Bayard as to the pur-
pose of the boundary line, and whether the United
States was to be restricted from purchasing land of
the Indians, the British minister, Adams, said that they
wished the Indian territory set apart as a sort of a
barrier between the possessions of Great Britain and
the United States, to prevent friction between the
peoples of the two countries ; that the Indians were
to be restricted from selling land both to the United
States and to Great Britain, but that they might sell to
others. The British were asked whether it was to be
understood that the pacification and the settlement of a
permanent boundary for the Indians were both made a
sine qua non. They answered that they were.^^ In
this the British ministers went beyond their instruc-
tions, for these had merely suggested the proposal to
the American ministers of an arrangement for the
mutual guarantee of the Indian possessions without ex-
pressing it in the objectionable terms proposed by the
!'■ American Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1814;
American State Papers, For, Rel, III., 705-707.
18 Russell Journals, V., 247-248.
15
2IO OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
British ministers.'^^ The American ministers regarded
the proposition for Indian boundaries, as it had been
given by the British, as tantamount to a cession of
rights, both of sovereignty and of soil, and were
unanimously opposed to granting it.-*'
After offering a temporary adjournment, to give
the Americans time for consultation, which was de-
clined, the British ministers stated that, inasmuch as
the American ministers were not instructed to discuss
the points mentioned, including the one which had
been presented as a sine qua non, and as the Americans
thought it unlikely that they could agree to any provi-
sional article, they would be obliged to report to their
Government and await further instructions. The
American ministers expressed their regret at the danger
of breaking off the negotiation at its very commence-
ment, and said that, although they were unable to urge
the discussion on the points of greatest difficulty, they
were confident that a disclosure of the views on both
sides on that subject would lead to a satisfactory
understanding. If a reference to the British Govern-
ment was necessary, it was urged that as short a time
as possible might intervene.^'-
It was agreed, in order to prevent misconception on
1^ Castlereagh to Commissioners at Ghent, July 28, 1814;
Memoirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 67-72.
2" Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 705-707.
21 Russell Journals, V., 248-249.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 211
the points which had been proposed by each side, that
a protocol should be drawn up, and that for this pur-
pose each commission should prepare a written statement
of what had passed at the two meetings. The joint
mission arranged to meet the next day at twelve o'clock
at the lodgings of the American ministers to compare
the respective protocols. That evening, at the request
of the other ministers, Adams worked out a draft of
a protocol, which, after being subjected to corrections
by Bayard, Gallatin, and Clay, was given to Secretary
Hughes to copy.-- The commissioners of the two
states met on the loth to compare their respective
protocols. The one drafted by the American ministers
was more explanatory than that of the British, since
it stated the reasons why instructions had not been
given by the American Government upon the sub-
jects of Indian boundaries and fisheries. This caused
much discussion, the British ministers contending
that the protocol should contain merely a statement
of the points proposed by either side, without intro-
ducing anything of an explanatory or argumentative
character. The American ministers admitted that a
protocol " ought not to contain reasons at large, which
might be urged during the conference, but that im-
portant facts ought to enter into it and the reasoning
merely explanatory of them."^^ It was at last agreed
that the statements of each commission as made by
22 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., lo.
23 Russell Journals, V., 249-250.
212 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
itself, upon the points which were considered Hkely to
enter into the negotiations, should constitute the pro-
tocol.2*
The proposed protocol of the American commis-
sioners had included what the members of the British
commission had said with respect to the Indian terri-
tory's being made a barrier between the British posses-
sions and those of the United States and to the pro-
hibition of the sale of Indian lands within the said
territory to the United States and Great Britain. The
British commissioners, while not denying the truth of
these statements, objected to the insertion of them
in the protocol. They said that these explanatory re-
marks had been made by them frankly and gratuitously
and ought not to enter into the protocol. After a
vigorous attempt on the part of the American min-
isters to have these statements retained, they finally
yielded, on condition that the British ministers would
consent to a slight modification of their second point.
This proposition was to read as follows: "That the
peace be extended to the Indian allies of Great Britain,
and that the boundary of their territory be definitely
marked out as a permanent barrier between the do-
minions of Great Britain and the United States. An
arrangement on this subject to be a sine qua non of a
treaty of peace."-^ This modification, the American
2* Russell Journals, V., 250-251.
25 Protocol of Conference, Aug. 8, 1814; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 708.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 213
ministers considered, made the point more definite.
The Americans were determined, if unable to negotiate
terms of peace, to have the issues between the two
states clearly set forth to the world.
The British ministers objected to the statement in the
proposed protocol of the Americans that they had
offered to discuss all the points suggested ; that the
British had declined so doing unless the American min-
isters would agree to a provisional article ; and that they
had proposed to adjourn the conference until they
should be able to obtain further instructions.^^ The
British stated that they had acted in a spirit of candor
and frankness, which could not continue if the Ameri-
can ministers made such use of their free communica-
tion. The American ministers, accordingly, agreed to
strike out everything to which the British made objec-
tion. It was, however, distinctly understood that in
reporting to their respective Governments neither party
was to be limited to the protocol agreed upon ; but it
might state any of the facts and circumstances in con-
nection with the conferences during the negotiations.-^
The protocol at last was agreed to ; and it was given to
the secretaries of the two missions to draw up, accord-
ingly, from the two drafts. The British ministers
despatched a messenger the same night with a com-
munication to their Government asking information as
26 Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1814; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 705-707.
27 Russell Journals, V., 253-254.
214 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
to whether the negotiations should continue if the
American ministers adhered to their determination not
to sign a provisional article; and if so, upon what
points.-^
In the interval of waiting for the British reply, the
American ministers were busily engaged for a week in
preparing a despatch to be sent to their Government.
Adams and Bayard each prepared a draft, but neither
was wholly acceptable to all the mission. The task
was then assigned to Gallatin to revise the draft that
Bayard had presented and to alter and amend it so that
it might receive the concurrence of all the mission.
Russell had suggested many amendments and altera-
tions in the drafts of Bayard and Adams, which the
latter regarded as trifling and inconsequential. The
final draft of the despatch drawn up by Gallatin, with
some amendments, was adopted August 17.-^
The American ministers, on the 13th, sent a note
to the British ministers requesting them to secure from
the Lords in Admiralty a cartel for the Chauncey,
Captain Angus commanding. The captain was di-
rected to be ready to sail for the United States on the
25th with the despatches.^" Dallas was to be sent as
28 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Aug. 8, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
29 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 15-16.
30 American Commissioners to British Commissioners, Aug.
13, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of
Ghent."
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 21 5
the bearer of these. The British ministers forwarded
the request for a cartel to their Government, and the
requisite papers were at once returned to them.^^ The
evening of the 13th the Americans gave a dinner at
their hotel to the British ministers and distinguished
citizens of Ghent.^^
Lord Castlereagh arrived at Ghent on the i8th on his
way to the Congress of Vienna. He remained until the
morning of the 20th. He brought with him new in-
structions which were more pleasing to the British
ministers than the original ones had been.^^ Lord
Castlereagh in his conference with the British ministers
had objected, however, to the proposition which they
had made to the American ministers relative to the
Indian territory, that neither state should acquire by
purchase or otherwise any of the Indian lands in the
territory mentioned. Castlereagh said that this would
prevent the American Government from taking land
from the Indians by conquest, which might become
necessary as punitive measures.^*
On the morning of the 19th, Baker, secretary of the
31 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Aug. 14, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
32 Amsterdam Courant, Aug. 27, 1814, quoted in Weekly
Messenger, Oct. 14, 1814.
33 Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 19, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 188-189.
34 Ibid.
2l6 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
British mission, called upon the American ministers
and invited them to a meeting at the hotel of the British
ministers that afternoon at three o'clock.^^ At that
meeting Goulburn presented the substance of the in-
structions which had just been received. He stated
that it was with surprise that the British Government
had learned that the American ministers were not pro-
vided with instructions with reference to Indian paci-
fication and boundary; and that the least that they
could require was that the American ministers should
consent to a provisional article on that subject. Such
article would be subject to the approval of the Ameri-
can Government, and if it failed to be ratified the
treaty should be null and void.^^ Discussion upon any
other point was declared useless until the American
ministers should consent to sign the proposed article.
A permanent Indian boundary, as well as Indian paci-
fication, was again stated as a sine qua non, while the
instructions had insisted only on the Indian pacifica-
tion. A fuller explanation was made at this time of
the purpose of the proposed Indian boundary. It was
declared to be chiefly for defense, to furnish a barrier
between the territory of the two states. Provision
against the purchase of Indian lands by the United
States or by Great Britain was again declared to be
■35 Russell Journals, V., 259.
^8 American Ministers to Monroe, Aug. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 708-709.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 21/
essential. As a boundary for the Indian territory, the
British ministers proposed the lines of the treaty of
Greenville, subject to modifications to be mutually
agreed upon.^'^
The British ministers had three propositions to make
with respect to the settlement of the boundary between
the possessions of the United States and Great Britain :
I. " The United States should hereafter keep no armed
naval force on the western lakes from Lake Ontario
to Lake Superior, both inclusive; that they should
not erect any fortified or military post or estab-
lishment on the shores of those lakes ; and that they
should not maintain those which were already exist-
ing." n, " The boundary Hne west of Lake Superior,
and thence to the Mississippi, to be revised; and the
treaty-right of Great Britain to the navigation of the
Mississippi to be continued." IIL " A direct commu-
nication from Halifax, and the province of New
Brunswick, to Quebec to be secured to Great Britain. "^^
The first of these propositions was made on the
ground that since Great Britain was the weaker Power
in North America her possessions were in danger of
attack from the United States while that state held
possession of the Great Lakes. The British ministers
3^ Russell Journals, V., 25^261. British to American Com-
missioners, Aug. 19, 1814; American State Papers, For. Rel.,
III., 710.
38 American Ministers to Monroe, Aug. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 708-709.
21 8 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
stated, upon being questioned, that it was the intention
that Great Britain should have all the rights with re-
spect to the lakes which the United States was to
relinquish ; but that both states should enjoy the com-
mercial navigation of the lakes as heretofore. With
reference to the western boundary line proposed, the
American ministers asked if it was not the line from
the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi that was
intended. The British replied that it was " the line
from Lake Superior to the Mississippi." When ques-
tioned how the third subject was to be accomplished,
the British ministers stated that a cession should be
made to Great Britain of that portion of territory
intervening between New Brunswick and Quebec which
cut off direct communication between the British
provinces.^^
After mentioning these points, the British ministers
added that if the conference should be broken off in
consequence of the refusal of the American ministers
to agree to a provisional article, Great Britain would
not be bound, upon a renewal of negotiations, to abide
by the terms which she now proposed ; " but would be
at liberty to vary and regulate her demands according
to subsequent events, and in such manner as the state
®9 Russell Journals, V., 261-263, 265. British to American
Commissioners, Aug. 19, 1814; American State Papers, For.
Rel., III., 710.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 2I9
of the war, at the time of renewing the negotiations,
might warrant."^"'
The British ministers were questioned as to the in-
tention of Great Britain relative to Moose Island and
other islands in Passamaquody Bay which had re-
cently been taken by the British. They replied that as
Great Britain had always considered them hers she
certainly would not give them up or allow them to be
brought into discussion. Bayard asked whether the
proposition relative to the lakes was also a sine qua
non. Doctor Adams replied that one sine qua non had
been given, and when that had been disposed of it
would be sufficient time to take up the consideration of
the other.*^ No reference was made at this time to the
fisheries, as the instructions to the British ministers
had been silent on that point. The American ministers
having left out of their discussions the subject of the
fisheries, it was thought by the British ministers that
the Americans were prepared to yield that point.
The American ministers requested that, before giving
their reply, the British ministers would reduce their
propositions to writing. This they consented to do,
and promised to transmit the note to the American
*o American Ministers to Monroe, Aug. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel, III., 708-709. Memoirs of J. Q.
Adams, III., 18.
41 Russell Journals, V., 263-264. American Commissioners
to Monroe, Aug. 19, 1814; American State Papers, For. Rel.,
III., 708-709.
220 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
mission at an early hour.^^ The official note from the
British ministers was received the following day. A
copy of this, together with an account of the proceed-
ings of the conference of the 19th, drafted by Gallatin,
was sent at once to America by the John Adams .^^
Hopes of a successful termination of the negotia-
tion were no longer entertained by the American min-
isters.^* They expected now merely to exchange the
usual formalities for closing the negotiation. Clay
alone thought it barely possible that the negotiations
might be continued through the lowering of the British
demands ; but how faint the hope that even he enter-
tained is shown in a letter which he wrote at this time
to Secretary Monroe. "The hope of their retracting
their demands is," said he, " too remote to warrant the
smallest calculation upon it; the reliance will be much
better placed on the firmness and energy of the Ameri-
can people to conquer again their independence."*^ It
was the unanimous opinion of the American ministers
that Great Britain's policy was to consume as much
*2Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 21, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 188-189.
^3 Russell Journals, V., 265.
44 Russell to George Blake, Aug. 19, 1814; Russell Papers,
MS., No. 1726. Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 21.
4^ Gallatin to Monroe, Aug. 20, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS.
Writings of Gallatin, I., 637-640. Clay to Monroe, Aug. 18,
1814; Russell Papers, MS., copy of Clay's Journals, 1781.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 221
time as possible before the termination of the negotia-
tion, in order that some decisive victory might be gained
in the war which would make it easier for her to insist
upon her demands. This, it was deemed, was the
object of the sine qua non, that time might elapse while
the American ministers were waiting for new instruc-
tions upon the Indian question, which would be neces-
sary if that point should be insisted upon. Clay
thought that if the American ministers refused to refer
the question the British would not break off negotia-
tion on this point.*^
For four days the American ministers labored over
the note which was to be their answer to the one pre-
sented by the British ministers on the 19th. It was in
these conferences among themselves, in decisions of
procedure, and in the preparation of notes and des-
patches, that the greatest difficulties were encountered,
owing to the size of the mission and the temperamental
differences and personal antipathies of its members.
Adams, as the head of the mission and a diplomat
of wider experience than the others, expected to be
deferred to in the preparation of state papers. He was
soon shaken out of this illusion, as has been seen in the
previous discussions over the despatches to the Secre-
tary of State.
The preparation of the note to the British ministers
^6 Clay to Monroe, Aug. 18, 1814; Russell Papers, MS., copy
of Clay's Journals, 1781.
222 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
illustrates the 'hard, conscientious work that the com-
missioners performed. Adams spent an entire day
making a draft of the answer; Gallatin and Clay both
prepared notes, and these were read and discussed on
the2ist. With reference to his own draft Adams says:
" I found, as usual, that the draft was not satisfactory
to my colleagues. On the general view of the subject we
are unanimous, but in my exposition of it, one objects
to the form and another to the substance of almost
every paragraph. Mr. Gallatin is for striking out every
expression that may be offensive to the feelings of the
adverse party. Mr. Clay is displeased with figurative
language, which he thinks improper for a state paper.
Mr. Russell, agreeing in the objections of the two other
gentlemen, will be further for amending the construc-
tion of every sentence; and Mr. Bayard, even when
agreeing to say precisely the same thing, chooses to say
it only in his own language."*^ Adams's note was given
to Gallatin to revise, and on the 23d this note, with cor-
rections and amendments, together with the paragraph
prepared by Clay and an entire new draft made by
Bayard, were all read and discussed. The secretary
of the mission was directed from all of these to make a
new draft. Adams says that about one half of his
note was stricken out and nearly one half the remainder
was left for consideration.^^ On the 24th the mission
*7 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 21.
48 Ibid., 22.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 223
had a short meeting in the morning and one after
dinner which lasted until eleven o'clock at night.
Adams records that they erased, patched, and amended
until all were wearied, though none of them were
" satiated with amendment." He states that not more
than one fifth of his original draft was retained in the
final draft, with " scraps from Gallatin, scraps from
Bayard, and scraps from Clay, all of whom are dis-
satisfied with the paper as finally constructed." On the
25th the note was finally adopted and presented to the
British ministers.
Ten days passed with no word from the British com-
missioners. On the 23d the Americans had dined with
the British at the Intendant's. At this dinner the con-
versation of the Americans made it evident that they
did not expect the negotiations to continue. Clay in-
formed Goulburn that they intended to refer to their
Government for instructions, and that they considered
the British proposition equivalent to a demand for the
cession of territory. Bayard also told Goulburn that
peace could not result. He intimated to him that such
proposals as the British had made not only destroyed all
prospects of peace, but sacrificed the Federal party,
to which he belonged, to its political adversaries. He
maintained that a conciliatory spirit would have
strengthened that party, which, he intimated, it was to
the advantage of the British interest to support, and to
make peace was the only method of efifectually accom-
224 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
pushing that result. He assured him that Great Britain
had nothing to fear on the part of Canada, upon what-
ever terms peace was made. He also gave him to
understand that there would be no trouble about alle-
giance and impressment ; but the British demands were
such as the United States never could grant.*^ On the
27th the British ministers gave a return dinner to the
American ministers, but no assurance was expressed of
any more conciliatory terms on the part of the British
Government.
The note from the American ministers to the British
ministers bearing the date of August 24 called attention
to the fact that Castlereagh in his despatch of Novem-
ber 4, 181 3, to the American Secretary of State had
written that Great Britain was willing to negotiate with
the United States " for the conciliatory adjustment of
the differences subsisting between the two States," with
the purpose of securing a successful termination " upon
principles of perfect reciprocity, not inconsistent with
the established maxims of public law, and with the
maritime rights of the British empire." Since this was
the avowed purpose of the negotiation, the American
commissioners said it was not to be expected that the
United States would go beyond the terms stated by
Lord Castlereagh, and furnish them with powers re-
specting the Indians. That the British Government
^^Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 23, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 189-190.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 22 5
had not changed their purpose, the note declared, was
to be inferred from the statement made by the British
ministers at the first conference to the effect " that no
events subsequent to the first proposals for this nego-
tiation had, in any manner, varied either the disposition
of the British Government, that it might terminate in
a peace honorable to both parties, or the terms upon
which they would be willing to conclude it."°°
It was well known, the Americans said, that the
differences between the two states were wholly of a
maritime nature, and that the boundary of the Indian
territory never had been a subject of dispute between
Great Britain and the United States. " Neither the
principles of reciprocity, the maxims of public law, nor
the maritime rights of the British empire could require
the permanent establishment of such boundary." Again,
the proposition to demand a permanent territory for
the Indians was " contrary to the acknowledged princi-
ples of public law, and to the practice of all civilized
nations." It was not founded on " perfect reciprocity,"
and it was wholly unnecessary. It was further de-
clared that the universal practice of European Powers
possessing territories in America had been to allow the
interference of no foreign state in matters arising
between the acknowledged sovereign of the territory
and the Indians dwelling therein. The Indians could
^"American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713.
16
226 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
not be considered an independent Power, especially by
Great Britain, which, by the treaty of 1783, solemnly
acknowledged them to be within the dominions of the
United States, and, further, the Indians themselves
had acknowledged the ultimate sovereignty of the
United States in the treaty of Greenville, 1795 ; for in
that treaty and subsequent Indian treaties the relation-
ship with the United States was thus defined : " that the
Indian tribes shall quietly enjoy their lands, hunting,
planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they please,
without any molestation from the United States; but
that when those tribes, or any of them, shall be dis-
posed to sell their lands, they are to be sold only to the
United States ; that, until such sale, the United States
will protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoy-
ment of their lands against all citizens of the United
States, and against all other white persons who intrude
on the same; and that the said Indian tribes again
acknowledge themselves to be under the protection
of the said United States, and of no other Power what-
ever," It was maintained that the proposed stipula-
tion was not reciprocal, for while professing to place
both nations on an equality as to the prohibition im-
posed respecting the purchase of Indian lands, it, in
reality, affected only the United States, which alone
had enjoyed that privilege heretofore. Further, the
measure proposed was unnecessary, for the United
States had always adopted a liberal policy toward the
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 22/
Indians. There was no desire to continue the war with
the Indians; and peace with them would inevitably
follow peace with Great Britain.^^
The note stated that the American ministers would
assent to a provisional article "engaging that each
party will treat for the Indians within its territories,
include them in the peace, and use its best endeavors
to prevent them from committing hostilities against the
citizens or subjects of the other party"; alid that
another provisional article might also be'^^sented to
" which should preclude the subjects or citizens of each
nation respectively from trading with the Indians re-
siding in the territory of the other. But to sur-
render both the rights of sovereignty and of soil over
nearly one-third of the territorial dominions of the
United States to a number of Indians, not probably
exceeding twenty thousand," was beyond their powers,
and they assured the British plenipotentiaries that any
arrangement for that purpose would be at once rejected
by their government.^^
It was further declared with reference to the military
occupation of the lakes by Great Britain that that was
equally inadmissible, and it was impossible to discover
by what rule of " perfect reciprocity " the United States
could be called upon " to renounce their equal right of
maintaining a naval force upon those lakes, and of for-
^1 American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713.
52 Ibid.
228 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
tifying their own shores, while Great Britain reserves
exclusively the corresponding rights to herself."^'
It was denied that Great Britain could, in point of
fact, as far as military preparation went, be regarded
as the weaker Power in North America in comparison
with the United States; it was held that, upon the
argument of " weaker Power," the United States might
with more consistency make the demand which Great
Britain was making of the United States. It was
asked whether Great Britain would be willing, " in rela-
tion to another frontier, where she has the acknowl-
edged superiority of strength," to consent to reduce her
equipment to a condition of equality with the United
States.^*
With reference to granting land for communication
between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the
change in the western boundary proposed by the
British ministers, the note stated that the American
ministers had "no authority to cede any part of the
territory of the United States, and to no stipulation to
that effect will they subscribe." The objections to the
propositions of the British ministers, colored by the
personal feeling of the Americans, is summed up in the
following words of their note: "The conditions pro-
posed by Great Britain have no relation to the subsist-
ing differences between the two countries ; they are in-
^3 American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713.
54 Ibid.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 229
consistent with acknowledged principles of public law ;
they are founded neither on reciprocity, nor on any of
the usual bases of negotiation, neither on that of titi
possidetis nor of status ante bellum. They would inflict
the most vital injury on the United States, by dismem-
bering their territory, by arresting their natural growth
and increase of population, and by leaving their north-
ern and western frontier equally exposed to British
invasion and to Indian aggression ; they are, above all,
dishonorable to the United States, in demanding from
them to abandon territory and a portion of their citi-
zens ; to admit a foreign interference in their domestic
concerns, and to cease to exercise their natural rights
on their own shores and in their own waters." A
treaty founded on such terms, it was maintained, could
not be permanent. Instead of settling the differences
it would give rise to new ones, " sow the seeds of a
permanent hatred, and lay the foundation of hostilities
for an indefinite period." The United States desired
peace on " terms of reciprocity honorable to both coun-
tries," and only upon such terms would peace be
permanent. In concluding the note the American min-
isters offered to agree to a treaty which should be
based upon the principle of status ante bellum, and
which should reserve to both parties " all their rights,
in relation to their respective seamen."^^ This conces-
sion, in willingness to agree upon a treaty which should
^^ American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713.
230 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
be silent upon the subject of impressment, had been
proposed by Secretary Monroe in his latest instruc-
tions to them, June 27.^"
This retrogression in the policy of the American
Government was due to the following circumstances:
The European conflict had ended, and the actual prac-
tice of impressment for the time being had ceased ; the
American Government was experiencing extreme diffi-
culty in obtaining men and money for the war; and
information had been received from Bayard and Gal-
latin of the determined attitude of Great Britain upon
impressment. In view of these facts, President Madi-
son had called a meeting of his Cabinet and had sub-
mitted the question whether a treaty of peace, silent
upon the subject of impressment, should be author-
ized.^^ All the Cabinet members present were unani-
mous in favor of such authorization, and the American
ministers were instructed accordingly.
The American note of August 24 went to the length
of offering to discuss all points involved in the difiFer-
ences which had interrupted and might again tend to
interrupt the harmony of the two countries, without
making the conclusion of peace depend upon agree-
ment upon these. The American ministers with spirit
refused to consider the propositions contained in the
56 Monroe to American Commissioners, June 27, 1814;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 704-705.
"Writings of Madison (1865 ed.), III., 408.
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 23 1
British note of August 19, and declared that these
would only be a fit subject of deliberation when it
became necessary to decide upon the expediency of an
absolute surrender of national independence.^^
The American ministers expected an immediate re-
ply which would terminate the negotiations ; but not
until September 4 did they receive an answer. Mean-
time despatches had been sent by George M. Dallas to
America announcing the failure of the negotiations.
On the day before the American note was received,
the British ministers had written to their Government
asking whether, in case the American ministers re-
fused to accept the basis of uti possidetis, even for a
provisional article, they should break off negotiations.^''
The note of the American ministers was sent to Cas-
tlereagh, then in Paris, for information as to the nature
of the reply that should be made.''" He answered that
no written reply should be given to the American note
save under instructions of the British Cabinet ; but that
a verbal communication should be made to the Amen-
ds American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713.
59 Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 24, 1814 ; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 190-191.
•'o Goulburn to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; Wellington's
Suppplementary Despatches, IX., 193-194. British Commis-
sioners to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; MS., British Foreign
Office, 5, 102.
232 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
can ministers apprising them of the fact that their note
had been referred to the British Government."^
Castlereagh at once sent the despatches and letters
from the British ministers to the Prime Minister, Lord
Liverpool. In a personal letter he stated that in his
discussions with the British ministers at Ghent he had
proposed that the proposition on Indian limits should
be given less peremptorily, especially the phrase " it is
equally necessary " ; but that the British ministers had
opposed any change for fear of appearing to weaken.
Upon the words " purchase or otherwise " he had also
cautioned them from committing themselves without
further authority. He considered the whole territorial
question one of expediency, not to be insisted on if
it would result in a rupture of the negotiations. For
the war to be continued on the part of Great Britain for
territorial aggression, as it would be represented, would
make the war popular in America. Castlereagh made
the suggestion of proposing to the American ministers
a provisional article for them to sign on the subject of
Indian pacification, separate from the question of terri-
torial limits."-
Before the papers from Castlereagh reached Lon-
don, the Cabine't had had under advisement despatches
^^Castlereagh to Goulburn, Aug. 28, 1814; Wellington's
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 196.
82 Castlereagh to Earl Liverpool, Aug. 28, 1814; Welling-
ton's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 192-193,
OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 233
and notes which had been sent direct from Ghent, and
the general outhne of the answer proposed by the
British ministers was approved ; but the peace ministers
were criticized in so presenting the British poHcy in
their notes as to have made a rupture possible on the
territorial question alone. The members of the Cabi-
net expressed the fear that a break on that basis
would unite all the parties in America in favor of the
continuance of the war. It was declared important to
place the responsibility of the rupture, if it was to take
place, clearly upon the American ministers.^^ The re-
cent military successes in Canada, however, mitigated
against the Cabinet's consenting to lower appreciably
the British demands.
When sending the American note to their Govern-
ment the British ministers had enclosed a projected
reply.*^* In the letter of the same date they expressed
embarrassment over the words "perfect reciprocity,"
which the Americans had insisted were used in Castle-
reagh's note of November 4, 1813, but which were not
found in the copy which had been given them of the
63 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 2,1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 214. Liverpool to Wellington,
Sept. 2, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX.,
211-213.
«4 Goulburn to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 193-194. Memoirs and Corre-
spondence of Castlereagh, X., 99-100. British Commissioners
to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; MS., British Foreign Office,
5, 102.
234 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT
document in the Foreign Office relating to the same
matter of the date of Octoiber 30, 181 3. The ministers
requested a copy of the letter of November 4, 181 3.
The American version was shown to be correct, When
the British note was later published.
In view of the British insistence upon the establish-
ment of an independent Indian territory as a sine qua
non, the American commissioners gave up all hope of
agreement upon a treaty. They decided to give up
their house at the end of the month, though later they
concluded to keep it until the middle of September, and
Adams discussed with his colleagues the advisability of
his return to St. Petersburg. The two missions gave
the usual formal dinners in anticipation of the closing
of a negotiation.
CHAPTER VI
The Indian Question and the Canadian Boundary
The American ministers, after sending their note of
August 24, were kept waiting a week before any word
was returned from the British ministers, and then there
came only the announcement that the American note
had been referred to the British Government. The
Americans had attributed the delay to the desire of the
British ministers " to give a greater appearance of
deliberation and solemnity to the rupture." As a
matter of fact, it only illustrated what was shown
throughout the negotiations : that the British commis-
sioners were mere puppets in the hands of the British
Cabinet.
On the first of September, Adams had an extended
conversation with Goulburn about the British propo-
sals. This interview was by no means reassuring to
Adams, and in his report of it to Secretary Monroe he
wrote : " In the whole tenor of his discourse I perceived
not only an inflexible adherence to the terms which we
had rejected, but, under the cover of a personal deport-
ment sufficiently courteous, a rancorous animosity
against America which disclosed that there was nothing
235
236 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
like peace in his heart."^ In their conversation Goul-
burn explained Great Britain's necessity of insistence
upon the Indian boundary as being not, primarily, for
the sake of the Indians, but for the protection of Can-
ada. He stated that disarmament on the lakes by
the United States was likewise essential to the safety
of Canada. 2 To this Adams replied, that Canada was
in no danger from the United States; that the American
Government had no intention of conquering and annex-
ing that province, and that the invasion of Canada had
been a war measure, and nothing more. Goulburn re-
ferred to the proclamation of General Hull as showing
the intention of the American Government with refer-
ence to Canada. To this Adams answered that the
American Government was no more responsible for
Hull's proclamation than the British Government was
responsible for Admiral Cochrane's proclamation.
Adams presented here the charge against British
officers of taking away negroes and selling them in the
West Indies. The mention of this fact had been au-
thorized by the Government instructions of January
28. Adams wrote that " the whole of this conversa-
tion was on both sides perfectly cool and temper-
ate in the manner, though sometimes very earnest on
ij. Q. Adams to Monroe, Sept. 5, 1814; MS., Bureau of
Indexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 139
2 Ibid.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 23/
mine, and sometimes with a hurry of reply and an em-
barrassment of expression on his, indicating an effort
to control the disclosure of feelings under strong ex-
citement."^ In reporting the conversation to the Sec-
retary of State, Adams said that, while the avowed pur-
pose of the Indian boundary was changed from the
Indians to the security of Canada, the real one, though
not acknowledged, was discernible, namely, " no other
than a profound and rankling jealousy at the rapid in-
crease of population and settlement in the United
States, and an impotent longing to thwart their prog-
ress and to stunt their growth. . . . With this temper
prevailing in the British commission it is not in the
hour of their success that we can expect to obtain
peace upon terms of equal justice and reciprocity."
On September 2 the British ministers received from
their Government a draft* of the reply to be presented
to the American ministers. Permission was granted to
make such alterations in the style, and in the facts, if
they were incorrectly stated, as might seem proper to
the British ministers.^ Two days later, the British
note, with a few slight changes, was sent to the Ameri-
can ministers. It w^as received by Gallatin and given
3 Adams to Monroe, Sept. 5, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes
and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 139.
* Bathurst to Goulburn, Sept. i, 1814; Wellington's Supple-
mentary Despatches, IX., 245-249.
s Goulburn to Castlereagh, Sept. 5, 1814; MS., British For-
eign Office, 5, 102.
238 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
to Adams. The following day it was read at a meet-
ing of all the American ministers. Adams records in
his diary the sentiment with which it was received:
" Mr. Bayard pronounced it a very stupid production.
Mr. Clay was in favor of answering it by a note of
half a page. I neither thought it stupid nor proper to
be answered in half a page."*' Gallatin proposed to an-
alyze its contents and to make a minute of the reply
that should be made. Clay was so thoroughly dis-
gusted that the following day he sent a note to the
British commissioners asking for a passport to return
home.'^
The British note was no more conciliatory than the
last one of the American ministers. It stated that,
while the war was ostensibly declared by the United
States on account of the maritime claims of Great
Britain, it had not been carried on for these purposes
only; that the United States had on the contrary, by
declaration and act, shown a disposition to wage war
for the annexation of Canada; that it was on this
account that the boundary question had assumed so
much importance ; that, inasmuch as the United States
had aimed at acquisition and aggrandizement, it was
no more than right that Great Britain should retain
territory which British valor had placed in her power ;
« Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 31.
^Goulburn to Bathurst, Sept. 5, 1814; Wellington's Supple-
mentary Despatches, IX., 221-222.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 239
that the United States had manifested such a spirit of
aggrandizement by " their progressive occupation of the
Indian territories, by the acquisition of Louisiana, by
the more recent attempt to wrest by force of arms from
a nation in amity the two Floridas, and, lastly, by the
avowed intention of permanently annexing the Canadas
to the United States," that it became necessary for the
British Government to endeavor to secure its domin-
ions in North America against the attempts at con-
quest on the part of the United States.^
The note again presented the argument of the
" weaker Power," in accordance with which it claimed
that Great Britain's command of the lakes was essen-
tial to the defense of Canada. With respect to the
boundary of the district of Maine and of the Northwest,
the British ministers maintained that the objection
made by the American ministers to the effect that they
had no authority to cede any part of the territory of
the United States was inconsistent with their previous
declaration " that they were instructed to treat for the
revision of their boundary lines." The boundary of the
district of Maine, it was stated, had not been definitely
determined, and the one claimed by the United States
was not the one which was contemplated in the treaty
of 1783. With reference to the northwestern frontier,
a proposal for settling the boundary, which had been
mutually acknowledged to be a necessity, could not
s British to American Ministers, Sept. 4, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 713-715.
240 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
be regarded as a demand for a cession of territory
" unless," as the note sarcastically added, " the United
States are prepared to assert that there is no Hmit
to their territories in that direction, and, that avail-
ing themselves of the geographical error upon which
that part of the treaty of 1783 was formed, they
will acknowledge no boundary whatever; then, un-
questionably, any proposition to fix one, be it what it
may, must be considered as demanding a large cession
of territory from the United States."^ The note
stated that, with respect to the boundary west from
the Lake of the Woods, the line which was agreed to
in the unratified treaty of 1803 would be acceptable
to the British Government ; or their ministers were pre-
pared to discuss any other proposed boundary line.^°
The Indian boundary was insisted upon as essential
to the permanent tranquility and security of the Indian
tribes. The renewal of the stipulations contained in
the treaty of 1795 between the United States and the
Indians, respecting the boundaries of the Indian terri-
tory, would be regarded as sufficient on that subject.
The note disclaimed that the proposition respecting
the Indian boundaries had been arbitrarily demanded
without off"ering an opportunity for discussion and
mutual agreement upon the boundaries to be fixed. If,
as the American note affirmed, an agreement to the
9 British to American Ministers, Sept. 4, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 7i3-7i5-
10 Ibid.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 24 1
proposal would cede one third of the territory of the
United States, then "the American Government itself
must have conveyed it away by the Greenville treaty
of 1795." That treaty, it was asserted, hy its provi-
sions placed the Indians on the plane of independent
nations. For the American Government to declare
that all the Indian nations within its boundary lines
were subjects of the United States, " living there upon
sufferance on lands which it also claims the exclusive
right of acquiring," was to threaten the extinction of
the Indian nations. Great Britain would be willing to
enter into the same engagement with respect to the
Indians within her own territory as she had proposed
to the United States, and, therefore, the proposition
could not be regarded as not being reciprocal. Neither
could it, with any truth, be considered " as contrary to
the acknowledged principles of public law, as deroga-
tory to the honor, or inconsistent with the rights of the
American Government."^^
The British ministers, as they had been instructed,
sought to throw the responsibility for the rupture upon
the American ministers. They closed their note with
these words : " It will be for the American pleni-
potentiaries to determine whether they are ready now
to continue the negotiations, whether they are disposed
to refer to their Government for further instructions,
I'- British to American Ministers, Sept. 4, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 713-715.
17
242 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
or, lastly, whether they will take upon themselves the
responsibility of breaking off the negotiation alto-
gether."i2
This arrogant language was used at a time when the
British Cabinet confidently expected that the war
would speedily be brought to a close with the aid of
the additional forces that had been despatched to
America, and that the United States, in utter defeat,
would sue for peace upon any terms. Lord Castle-
reagh, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the leading
figure in the Cabinet, had successfully dictated terms
at the treaty of Paris. He saw no reason why, in
what he considered to be a minor affair, he should not
be as peremptory.
The British ministers reported to their Government
a draft of the note which they had presented to the
Americans. They stated that no change was likely to
be proposed by the American ministers, who, they de-
clared, had no real intention of making peace. The
negotiation, they said, had been entered into "-with the
sole view " of gaining some advantage which would
draw the people of the United States together in con-
ducting the war, and the question of Indian boundary
had been taken by them for this object. This point, it
was asserted, was shown by a letter written by Craw-
12 British to American Ministers, Sept. 4, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 713-715. British Commissioners
to Castlereagh, Sept. 5, 1814; MS., British Foreign Office,
5, 102.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 243
ford, American minister at Paris, to Count Hoogendorf
of Holland, a copy of which, sent to the British min-
isters by Lord Clancarty, British minister to Holland,
was now enclosed for the information of the British
Government. The letter of Crawford had attempted
to show how Great Britain had violated the rights of
neutrals in her method of warfare, and especially in
her system of blockade, while the United States had
conscientiously respected the rights of neutral states.^^
September 6 the American mission met, and the
analysis of the British note, together with a minute
of points made by Gallatin, was discussed. It was
voted to authorize Gallatin to draft an answer to be
presented at the next meeting. Bayard was the only
one of the mission that was inclined to make any con-
cession. He proposed to offer for the Indians the
status quo ante bellum, or a declaration that the
treaty of Greenville should not be considered as abro-
gated by the war. Clay and Adams were for no
stipulation respecting the Indians in a treaty with
Great Britain. Gallatin proposed that they should
offer to refer to their Government a stipulation for
mutual disarmament on the lakes, while Adams op-
posed this as being outside of their instructions. He
maintained that Great Britain had a sufficient guar-
^3 Copy of a letter of W. H. Crawford to Count Hoogen-
dorf enclosed in a letter of Goulburn, Sept. 5; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, 102.
244 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
antee for the security of Canada in her ability to attack
the commerce of the United States.^*
On the 7th, the discussion upon the British note was
renewed. Gallatin's draft was presented and referred
to the other members individually for amendments
and additions. Adams having insisted upon introduc-
ing paragraphs complaining of the employment of the
Indians by Great Britain as contrary to the laws of
civilized warfare, it was voted that he should prepare
a paragraph on that subject. Upon the question rela-
tive to the Indian boundary Adams also made a draft
of several paragraphs. On the 8th, a final draft was
made from the sketches of all. Adams's paragraph re-
specting Indian rights was adopted. The one concern-
ing the employment of savages was adopted in substance
with amendments. On the 9th, the concluding para-
graph and a few others, which had been previously un-
settled, were adopted. The note was copied by Hughes
and taken to the British ministers the same af ternoon.^^
The American note of the 9th indignantly dis-
claimed any unjust action on the part of the United
States in the acquisition of Louisiana, or in the treat-
ment of Spain in the question of the Florida bound-
aries. It also denied the charge that the annexation of
Canada had been the declared object of the United
States Government. The note asserted that the United
States had from. the commencement of the war been
1* Memoirs of J. G. Adams, III., 31-32.
15 Ibid., 32-33-
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 245
willing to make peace without obtaining any cession
of territory, on the sole condition of the satisfactory
settlement of maritime rights ; that the United States
could not consent to leave its own frontier unpro-
tected in order to protect the frontier of Canada; that
an invasion of Canada on the part of the United
States was impracticable, for it could not occur with-
out leaving the Atlantic shores exposed to more de-
structive attacks by the British fleet ; that Great Britain
was, at the commencement of the negotiation, in pos-
session of only two ports on the lakes, and that this di'd
not give her a claim to any large cession of territory
founded on the right of conquest should the United
States be willing to treat on such a basis, which it was
not, for the principle of status quo ante bellum was
the only basis to which it would consent.^^
The justice of including allies in the treaty of peace
and of providing for their security was not questioned ;
but the right of Great Britain, "according to those
principles and to her own practice, to interfere in any
manner with Indian tribes residing within the terri-
tories of the United States, as acknowledged by her-
self, to consider such tribes as her allies, or to treat
for them with the United States, "^'^ was denied. In
reply to the statement of the British ministers that the
American claim to sovereignty over the Indians and
19 American to British Ministers, Sept. 9, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 715-717.
" Ibid.
246 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
their lands within the American borders was unheard
of and invahd, the American note proceeded to show
that it was not inconsistent with the acknowledged prin-
ciples and practices of other countries, and notably
of Great Britain herself. This could be seen in all the
colonial charters from that of Virginia to that of
Georgia. The treaty of Utrecht, which described the
Indians of the five nations as subject to the dominion
of Great Britain, and the treaty of the Cherokees, by
which the members of that tribe were granted the
privilege of living where they pleased, were evidence
that Great Britain regarded itself as sovereign over
Indian lands. The British proclamation of 1763, which
declared " all purchases of lands from the Indians null
and void, unless made by treaties held under the sanc-
tion of His Majesty's Government," had no meaning
"if the Indians had the right to sell their lands to
whom they pleased." The various boundary lines
were settled in former treaties without consulting the
Indians, and those now proposed showed that the
Indians were not considered as independent nations.
Again, it was shown that the relationship claimed by
the United States toward the Indians did not originate
with the treaty of Greenville; that that treaty neither
took from the Indians the right, " which they had not,
of selling lands within the jurisdiction of the United
States to foreign Governments or subjects, nor ceded
to them the right of exercising exclusive jurisdiction
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 24/
within the boundary Hne assigned." It was merely de-
claratory of the public law in relation to the parties,
founded on principles previously and universally recog-
nized. The note declared that there was nothing in
the treaty of Greenville to warrant the proposition
which the British ministers had made, and showed
that the reciprocity proposed in the last British note
respecting Indian territories, by which each state
should agree to purchase no lands from the Indians
within its own territory, was merely nominal, being, in
actual fact, unequal. It was held to be of no concern
what policy Great Britain adopted in her territory ; but
the United States could not consent to any interfer-
ence in its own policy respecting the Indians living
within its borders. The acceptance of a permanent
Indian boundary line, beyond which settlement should
never be made, would arrest the natural growth of
the country, and leave the frontier forever exposed
to savage incursions.^^
It was repeated that there was no objection to the
question of peace with the Indians ; but that no pro-
vision in the treaty was necessary to secure that result.
Following upon a peace with Great Britain, it was
said, a peace would at once be made with the Indians,
restoring them to the same position in which they were
before the commencement of the war, provided the
Indians themselves would consent to a peace. The
^8 American to British Ministers, Sept. 9, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 715-717.
248 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
note spoke with abhorrence of the atrocities committed
by the Indian allies of Great Britain, and suggested,
as being of more benefit to the Indians than a boundary
provision, an article by which Great Britain and the
United States should reciprocally stipulate, in the
future, if at war with each other, to refrain from
employing Indians.^^
In regard to cession of territory for a way of com-
munication between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia,
the American ministers maintained in their note that
there was a very great distinction between their agree-
ment to discuss revision of boundary lines and the
question of the cession of any portion of territory ;
that their declaration " did not imply that they were
instructed to make any cession of territory in any
quarter, or to agree to a revision of the line, or to any
exchange of territory, where no uncertainty or dis-
pute existed." They denied that there was any uncer-
tainty in the treaty of 1783 with respect to the bound-
ary of the district of Maine ; and said that it never had
been known "that the British plenipotentiaries who
signed that treaty had contemplated a boundary dif-
ferent from that fixed by the treaty," and that nothing
more was required to ascertain definitely the boundary
than that it be surveyed in accordance with the provi-
sions of the treaty. It was insisted that upon this
point the instructions of the American ministers did
19 American to British Ministers, Sept. 9, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 715-717.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 249
not enable them to treat, particularly as the territories
in question were a part of the State of Massachusetts.-''
The American ministers offered no objection to a
discussion of the northwestern boundary after the
question of the Indian boundary should be settled.
They concluded their note by reiterating their definite
rejection of both the proposition to establish a perma-
nent Indian boundary and that to secure "the exclu-
sive military possession of the lakes to Great Britain."
They considered it useless to refer these subjects to
their Government. With this understanding, they
offered to continue the negotiation, and " to discuss all
the points of difference, or which might hereafter tend
in any degree to interrupt the harmony of the two
countries. "^^
The American ministers when sending their note of
the 9th had almost no hope of peace resulting from
the negotiations. They gave the British ministers to
understand that unless their demands were lowered a
rupture would ensue. At a dinner on the 15th, Gam-
bier having asked Adams if he would return imme-
diately to St. Petersburg, the American minister's reply
was: "Yes; that is, if you send us away."—
The British ministers, upon the receipt of the Ameri-
can note of the 9th, referred it to their Government,
20 American to British Ministers, Sept. 9, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 715-717.
21 Ibid.
22 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 36.
250 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
adding these words : " As the American ministers have
stated that they consider both propositions contained in
our note of the 19th of August, and the 4th of Septem-
ber, inadmissible, and that they deem it useless to refer
to their Government any arrangement containing either
of these propositions, we request to be favored with
instructions as to the line of conduct which it may be
proper to adopt with respect to the continuance of the
negotiation."-^ The British Cabinet viewed with dis-
appointment the apparent certainty of failure of the
negotiations. They felt that their commissioners had
pressed their demands too far, and that more concilia-
tory means must be adopted. While the British Gov-
ernment were not eager for peace with the United
States until British arms should have gained some
brilliant victories in America, yet they wished to avoid a
rupture in the peace negotiations over terms which
were sure, when known, to react against them, and
to be the means of uniting the people in the United
States in the prosecution of the war. A draft of a
note of reply to the American ministers was drawn up
and forwarded to the British ministers the i6th of
September.-*
23 British Ministers to Castlereagh, Sept. 9, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
2* Draft of note from Foreign Office to British Ministers,
Sept. 16, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX.,
263-265.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 2$ I
The British ministers received the despatch from
their Government September 19.-^ After making a
few sHght changes in the wording, they presented the
note to the Americans the same day. The note, re-
verting again to the question of the boundary Hne of
the district of Maine contended that the American
ministers, by assuming the right to decide what bound-
ary was, or was not, a subject of dispute, had rendered
their powers useless, or exceedingly partial in their
operation. It stated that the refusal of the American
ministers to allow any boundary line between their
territory and that of the Indians, because it would
arrest the natural growth of the United States, was
sufficient proof of a spirit of aggrandizement on the
part of the United States. The declaration was re-
peated concerning the avowed purpose of the United
States to annex Canada. This was asserted on the basis
of the proclamation made by General Hull, July 12,
1812, and that by General Smyth, November 17, 1812.
Copies of these proclamations were transmitted along
with the British note.-® General Hull's proclamation"
had urged upon the inhabitants of Canada non-resist-
ance to the American invasion, promising to all such,
25 British Ministers to Castlereagh, Sept. 19, 1814; MS,,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
26 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718.
27 Hull's proclamation, July 12, 1812; Russell Journals, V.,
439-441.
252 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
protection under the Government of the United States,
while General Smyth's proclamation to his soldiers
contained a definite avowal of the purpose of con-
quest and annexation.-^
The charge, which had been made in the American
note, that Great Britain had been instrumental in in-
ducing the Indians to withdraw from the protection of
the United States and to wage war against it, was
strongly disavowed. To prove this fact, it was pointed
out that the Indians had been at war with the United
States before that Power had declared war against
Great Britain. As a result of the war between the
Indians and the United States all treaty rights had
been abrogated, and in consequence the Indians were
no longer under the protection of the United States.
It could only be on the supposition that the Indians
were subjects of the United States that the American
ministers could be authorized to deny the right of
Great Britain to treat for the Indians in the peace
negotiations; but such claim, it was repeated, was in
opposition to the treaties which had been concluded,
and particularly that of Greenville, which recognized
the sovereignty of the Indians.^^
The note assumed that the American ministers had
received no new instructions since the general pacifica-
28 Smyth's proclamation, Nov. 17, 1812; Russell Journals,
v., 442-445-
29 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 253
tion of Europe, which had materially changed the
aspect of the negotiation from what it was when the
original instructions had been given. The failure of
the American Government to furnish new instructions,
it was stated, was a proof of no sincere desire to
make peace.^°
After reaffirming the fixed purpose of Great Britain
not to abandon the Indians, her allies, in any peace
arrangement, the statement was made that the British
Government was willing to sign a treaty of peace with
the United States on terms honorable to both parties.
" It has not offered," the note said, " any terms which
the United States can justly represent as derogatory
to their honor, nor can it be induced to accede to any
which are injurious to its own"^^
The note then proceeded to restate the sine qua
non. This no longer included an arrangement of a
permanent Indian boundary and prohibition of the
purchase of Indian lands by the United States, to
which unalterable objection had been made by the
American ministers; but the sine qua non, as now
given, was limited to securing to the Indians the
restoration of peace, with " the rights, privileges, and
territories w^hich they enjoyed in the year 1811, pre-
vious to the commencement of the war." With refer-
ence to the purchase of Indian lands, while the British
30 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-/18.
31 Ibid.
254 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
ministers had been instructed not to include it in a
sine qua non, they were instructed to propose for dis-
cussion an article on the subject by which the two
states should reciprocally bind themselves to purchase
no lands of the Indians within the boundaries which
should be agreed upon. By making this arrangement
subject to revision at the expiration of a certain period,
it was hoped that the objection on the part of the
American ministers to a permanently fixed boundary,
beyond which the settlement of the United States
should not extend, might be removed. ^^
The British ministry, alarmed at the way the nego-
tiations were tending, in their draft^^ of the note re-
quired the British ministers to deny that they had ever
intended that the exclusive military possession of the
lakes by Great Britain was to be considered a sine
qua non. The note presented to the American min-
isters, accordingly, contained this statement. It was
followed by the further statement that, whenever the
question relative to the pacification of the Indians —
which, subject to the explanations already given, was a
sine qua non — should be adjusted, the undersigned
would be authorized to make a final proposition on the
subject of Canadian boundaries, "so entirely founded
32 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718.
33 Draft of note from Foreign Office to British Ministers,
Sept. 16, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX.,
263-265.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 255
on principles of moderation and justice, that they feel
confident it can not be rejected." This proposition, it
was stated, would be made as soon as the American
ministers should have consented to " include the Indian
nations in the treaty, in the manner above described,"
and should have declared that they were authorized
to treat upon the proposed subject,^*
The British ministers had, in several instances,
changed the wording of the note in a manner which
rendered it less conciliatory than the British Cabinet
had intended. They were severely criticized by the
Ministry when the nature of the changes became
known, although it was by no means certain that the
commissioners were not acting with the knowledge of
the Ministry in most cases. In the draft of a note,
September 19, from the Foreign Office the following
words had been employed : " It will not insist on any
terms which the United States can justly represent as
derogatory to their honor," instead of the words, "it
has not offered any terms derogatory to their honor."
Again, in the statement of the sine qua non in the orig-
inal draft, the British ministers had added after the
words, " whenever the question which relates to the
pacification of the Indian nations,"^^ the words,
34 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718.
35 Draft of note from Foreign Office to British Ministers,
Sept. 16, [1814]; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX.,
263-265.
256 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
"which, subject to the explanations already given, is
a sine qua non,"^® and further in the same paragraph
for the original words, "consented to include the
Indian nations in the treaty," were substituted the
words, " consenting to include the Indian nations in the
treaty, in the manner above described."
The last note, as well as those which preceded it, was
in harmony with the character of English diplomacy
at the beginning of the 19th century. A distinguished
American writer has said: "At this time English
diplomacy cultivated very few of the arts and none at
all of the graces ; there is hardly an important state
paper in the whole correspondence between England
and America from 1806 to 1815, which, if addressed
to the United States government today, would not lead
to blows."37
The American mission considered the note " over-
bearing and insulting in its tone." Though a part of
the sine qua non was abandoned, the rest was so
rigidly clung to that the American ministers were de-
jected in spirit, believing that peace was utterly im-
possible. Gallatin was sure that the sine qua non, as
given by the British ministers, would be rejected by
the American Government; yet he considered it a
bad point to break off upon. He thought that they
^•5 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718.
37 Adams, Life of Albert Gallatin, 500.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 25/
might be obliged to admit the principle at last. Bayard
shared the opinion of Gallatin and wished to break
off on some point that would unite the people in sup-
port of the war. All agreed to this sentiment.
Adams thought it possible that Great Britain might yet
abandon her sine qua non, and, if not, that it would
be no worse to break off on that point than on any
other.^^
The American ministers again intrusted to Gallatin
the work of making an analysis of the British note and
a minute of the proposed answer. These he presented
to the mission on the 21st. Gallatin was further in-
structed to prepare a complete draft of a reply. This
was presented to the mission two days later. Adams
also prepared a reply, and from these two the final note
was drawn up. Adams records that the arguments
with reference to the boundary line of the district of
Maine and to the condition of the Indians were largely
Gallatin's work, while the reply to the accusatory
matter of the British note and the proposed article of
amnesty to include the Indians were his own. After
new drafts had been made, corrected, and amended
from day to day, a final draft was agreed upon Sep-
tember 25. This was copied by the secretary, and on
the next day was signed by all. Hughes delivered it
at once to the British ministers.^^
38 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., yj-
39 Ibid., 38-42.
18
258 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
On the 29th, despatches from Washington reached
the mission. Papers were also received containing the
account of the treaty of Greenville, July 16, with the
Indians. It was proposed by Clay to send at once to
the British ministers these extracts from the papers,
but the others objected.*'' That evening the American
ministers entertained guests to the number of one hun-
dred and fifty. The British ministers, though invited,
were not present, having designedly left the city that
day to visit Brussels.
The note sent by the American ministers to the
British on the 26th contained a strong argument in
reply to each of the points of the last British note. It
was denied that the American ministers assumed to
decide what was or was not a subject of uncertainty
and dispute with regard to the boundary of the district
of Maine; but it was claimed that, until the British
[ministers should show that the boundary was a sub-
ject of dispute, it was their duty to assume that it
was not. The treaty of 1783 was cited to show what
were the boundary lines, as agreed upon, and the points
upon which questions had arisen. By that treaty the
boundary was described to be " a line to be drawn
along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth,
in the bay of Fundy, to its source, and from its source
directly north to the Highlands, which divide the rivers
that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which
^'^ Memoirs of J. Q, Adams, III., 43.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 259
fall into the river St. Lawrence ; and thence, along the
said Highlands, to the northwesternmost head of Con-
necticut river." Doubts having arisen as to what river
was the St. Croix designated in the treaty of 1783,
provision was made in the treaty of 1794 to settle that
question. As this was the only point provided for
with reference to the northeastern boundary in that
treaty, it was natural to infer that there existed no
other subject of controversy over the boundary from
the source of that river. The note proposed that,
since the river and its sources had been determined,
a joint commission should now be appointed by the
two Governments "to extend the line to the High-
lands, conformable to the treaty of 1783." Objection
to the British proposition was made because, instead of
seeking to ascertain what the boundary was, it required
an alteration in the mutually recognized line ; this
could not be effected without the cession of territory
that was unquestionably included within the limits
fixed by the treaty of 1783. It was in view of this
point that the American ministers had declined to
treat. They were, on the other hand, willing to dis-
cuss any actual boundary that was uncertain or in
dispute.^^
The statement of the British note " that the United
States will admit of no line of boundary between their
41 American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721.
26o INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
territory and that of the Indian nations, because the
natural growth and population of the United States
would be thereby arrested," was declared untrue. On
the contrary, the United States had always secured to
the Indians definite boundaries for the land which they
inhabited, mutually agreed upon in the treaties between
the Indians and the United States. What they did
refuse to do was " to assign, in a treaty of peace with
Great Britain, a definite and permanent boundary to
Indians living within the limits of the United States."
The United States never intended to acquire lands
from the Indians other than by peaceful means and
with their consent, but in this way they did propose
to purchase Indian land as the needs of the popula-
tion required.*^
With reference to the proclamations of General
Hull and General Smyth, copies of which had accom-
panied the note of the British ministers to the Ameri-
can ministers, the American commissioners stated that
these were not to be considered as acts of the American
Government any more than the proclamation of Ad-
miral Cochrane was to be taken as an act of the British
Government. A copy of Admiral Cochrane's procla-
mation was enclosed with the note. This proclama-
tion had offered to receive on board British vessels, or
at British military posts, any persons wishing to leave
the United States, and to give to such persons a choice
*2 American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 26 1
either of joining His Majesty's sea or land forces, or
of being sent as free settlers to the British possessions
in North America, or to the West Indies. Though the
negroes were not specifically mentioned in the procla-
mation, it was well understood that it was they who
were intended.*^
It was again asserted that peace with the Indians
would follow that with Great Britain, and that they
would be restored to the same condition as before the
war. The Americans were, however, unwilling to
treat concerning the Indians as allies of Great Britain,
for in so doing they would practically admit the In-
dians to be independent nations, a condition which
they refused to accept. To acknowledge the Indians
would be to transfer to them all rights of soil and
sovereignty over the territory which they inhabited.
Further, to do this at the demand of Great Britain
would be to transfer the protection of the Indians to
that state. The right of protection over the Indians
was acquired by the United States, not by treaties with
the Indians, as the British ministers had argued, but in
consequence of the sovereignty and independence of
the United States. Before the treaty of 1783 these
Indians, Hving within the same territory, were regarded
as being under the protection of His Britannic Majesty,
and had been so treated. When a similar proposition
had been made to consider the Indian tribes as inde-
^3 American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721.
262 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
pendent nations, to serve as a barrier between French
and English territories in North America, England had
immediately rejected it, " on the express ground that
the King would not renounce his right of protection
over the Indians within his dominions." Great Britain,
having recognized the sovereignty of the United States
and agreed to its boundaries, ought not to regard any
persons or communities within such territory as being
independent of the United States.^
The American ministers, it was stated, did not re-
quire that the British plenipotentiaries should depart
from the regular practice of the British nation of
insisting upon the inclusion of their allies in terms of
peace, for the Indians, not being independent nations,
could not be in the true sense allies. Furthermore, the
British Government had no authority from the Indians
to treat for them, and no power to bind them to agree
to accept the peace or to secure the continuance of it.
The proposition made by the British ministers looked
to the Indians as subjects rather than as allies. It was
agreed that Great Britain in her treaties with France
in 1763, and with the United States in 1783, had made
no provision for the Indians, though in each of these
instances the Indians had taken part in the war which
preceded the treaty ; that the United States was, there-
fore, pursuing a course consistent with the former
practice of Great Britain. The Americans held that
4* American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 263
the only basis for considering the Indians in a treaty
between the United States and Great Britain would be
the principles by which amnesties are stipulated in
favor of persons who in time of war have aided the
enemy of the state to which they belong. On this basis
the American ministers promised to do all they could
in securing peace to the Indians, and they offered a
stipulation, " that no person or persons, whether sub-
jects, citizens, or Indians, residing within the dominions
of either party, shall be molested or annoyed, either in
their persons or their property, for any part they may
have taken in the war between the United States and
Great Britain ; but shall retain all the rights, privileges,
and possessions which they respectively had at the com-
mencement of the war; they, on their part, demean-
ing themselves peaceably and conformably to their
duties to the respective Governments." The Ameri-
can ministers stated in closing their note that they
should be glad to discuss the proposition concerning
the Canadian boundary which the British ministers
said that they would offer when the Indian question
was settled.^^
This note was forwarded by the British ministers to
their Government the same day on which it was re-
ceived.*^ It was highly objectionable to the British
45 American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721.
4^ British Ministers to Castlereagh, Sept. 26, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
264 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
ministers, who considered that to assent to the Ameri-
can proposition would be to abandon the whole prin-
ciple upon which their argument with reference to the
Indians had been based. In submitting the note to
their Government, the British ministers suggested that
in the reply there should be, first of all, a specific
article with respect to Indian pacification which would
be satisfactory to Great Britain. They were opposed
to the proposal for the appointment of commissioners
to determine the boundary dispute. They thought it
would be best to refer as little as possible to the treaty
of 1783 as to territorial boundaries, "considering it as
founded throughout, in this respect, on very erroneous
principles."^^
Before this note was received by the British Govern-
ment, news of British successes in America had reached
London. The negotiations had been purposely pro-
longed by the British Cabinet, that an opportunity
might be given to hear the results of the new cam-
paign in America.*^ The favorable news made the
English people even more desirous of continuing the
war, that the United States might be thoroughly
punished for what they considered its unwarranted
attack upon Great Britain. The London Times, in an
editorial of September 16, represented the feeling
^■^ Goulburn to Bathurst, Sept. 26, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 287-288.
48 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 2, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 214.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 265
which was at this time entertained by the larger part
of the Enghsh people: "We owe it not only to our-
selves but to posterity, in the war provoked by
America, and engaged in for the most unjust purposes,
to make such an impression upon their fears as shall
curb the desire of aggression and conquest for many
years to come. America ought in this contest to be
fully and explicitly taught that a false neutrality, the
sacrifice of character to interest, and a subservience
to an ignorant but violent populace are crimes in a
government which, though they may promise immedi-
ate advantage, must, nevertheless, be followed by
merited chastisement, and the loss of those just inter-
ests, which they might have permanently secured, had
they not in the spirit of rapine grasped at that which jus-
tice had closed as the right and property of another."^^
The British Ministry, however, though they had
taken more vigorous measures for prosecuting the war
than during the first year of its continuance, and
though important successes attended the British arms,
were still earnestly desirous of peace. The Govern-
ment were even more disposed to make peace amid
successes than they would have been had events been
the reverse.^" The financial problems of the country
also made a speedy peace desirable.
^9 London Times, September 16, 1814.
so Liverpool to Wellington and Castlereagh, Sept. 27, 1814;
Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 290.
266 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
The news of British victories in America was re-
ported to the British ministers at Ghent by the British
Cabinet, and they were instructed to communicate this
news to the American ministers. They were at the
same time to inform the American ministers that the
success of British arms would not afifect in any way
the purpose of the Enghsh Government to secure a
termination to the war which should be honorable to
both parties ; nor would the terms which had been
offered with regard to the Canadian frontier be
changed by reason of British successes in those parts.
The ministers were authorized, in case the American
ministers asserted that they had no instructions either
to include the Indians in the treaty of peace or to enter
into any negotiations with respect to the boundary of
Canada and that they were unable to sign even a
provisional article on the Indians, to consent that the
negotiation should be suspended until the American
ministers should receive further instructions from
their Government. ^^ It was thought that under the
circumstances the American Government would now
be willing to yield.
The note of the American ministers of September 26
was received at London the 28th. Instructions were
not returned to the British ministers with reference to
the reply which they were to make until October 5.
°i Bathurst to Commissioners, Sept. 27, 1814; Memoirs and
Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 138-139; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, loi.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY id"]
These instructions were received at Ghent three days
later, October 8, and constituted the note which the
British dehvered to the American ministers on that
same day.
The American ministers during the interval of wait-
ing, in connection with a note which they addressed to
the British ministers requesting a passport for the
return to the United States of the schooner Transit
with a bearer of despatches to their Government, had
enclosed extracts from papers relative to a treaty which
commissioners of the United States had signed with
the Indians the i6th of July of that year.^" A long
debate occurred over the question of sending the
papers relative to the Indians. Clay thought they
should be sent, and also a copy of Admiral Cochrane's
refusal to grant a passport to a cartel ship when re-
quested by the Secretary of State. Gallatin and
Adams believed that the sending of these papers was
improper, especially the newspaper articles, which had
no authority in public law.''
Expecting that they would be obliged to break ofif
the negotiations, and wishing to justify themselves
before the other Powers, the American ministers, while
awaiting the reply from the British Government, pre-
pared papers to the Russian and French Governments.
52 American to British Ministers, Sept. 30, 1814; Russell
Journals, V., 460-461.
53 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 44.
268 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
They had received instructions to this effect from Sec-
retary Monroe.^* Adams prepared the paper to be
sent to the Russian Government, and Clay the one to
the French Government. The latter was to be pre-
sented through Crawford, the American minister at
Paris.
Lord Bathurst in his letter to the British ministers,
the 5th of October, enclosed a project of an article
respecting Indian pacification. This the ministers
were authorized to alter, " without changing the sub-
stance or spirit of the article," with respect to any
word or phrase which they might think would render
it more acceptable to the American ministers. They
were instructed to confine themselves wholly to the
question of Indian pacification, not even admitting an
article on amnesty for disaffected subjects, until the
Indian article should be agreed upon. In case the
ministers of the United States would agree to sign the
article only sub spe rati, that is, subject to the sanction
of their Government, the British ministers were still
authorized to accept it. If the American ministers
should propose to suspend the negotiation in order to
await further instructions, His Majesty's ministers
were authorized to assent. If neither of these proposi-
tions were made by the American ministers, the British
representatives were to make them, " in order to have
^4 Monroe to American Commissioners, July 9, 1814; MS.,
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instructions,
VII.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 269
on record that no expedient was omitted in order to
prevent the breaking off of the negotiation." In case
the American ministers could be induced neither to
accept the article nor to suspend the negotiation, for
the purpose of referring to their home Government for
instructions, the British ministers were instructed to
announce that the negotiation was closed and that they
would return home.^^
The note which the British ministers addressed to
the American ministers the 8th of October, while
designed primarily to present the project of Indian
pacification, did not refrain from discussing other
topics that had been subjects of controversy in the
previous notes between the two commissions.
The first paragraph attempted to show the illegality
of the purchase of Louisiana and the spirit of terri-
torial aggrandizement on the part of the United States
which that act manifested. The charges of avarice
and oppression were reiterated against the United
States also in her acquisition of the Florida territory.
The British ministers in their last note had complained
that the American ministers were acting under instruc-
tions which had been given before the pacification of
Europe, May 30, 1814, an event which had materially
changed the practical consequence of the maritime
^5 Bathurst to Commissioners, October 5, 1814; Memoirs
and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 148-149; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, loi.
2/0 IXDIAX QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
questions, with reference to which the American in-
structions had been mainly given. The American
ministers in their note of September 26 had asserted
that they had received instructions since the pacifica-
tion of Europe, and that under these instructions they
were acting; and further, that they had informed the
British ministers of their later instructions of the 25th
and 27th of June. In this note the British denied
any recollection of the American ministers having made
such communication to them, and held that the note
of September 9 distinctly stated that they were acting
under instructions of January, 1814. Complaint was
made that the American ministers should act under
those instructions, if they had any of a later date
which were drawn up under changed conditions.^^
The note declared that, with reference to cession of
territor}- in the district of Maine, all that the British
Government required was merely what was requi-
site to afford communication between Halifax and
Quebec. It refused to assign any significance, as far
as the present negotiation was concerned, to the procla-
mation of Vice-Admiral Cochrane, a copy of which
proclamation had been enclosed in the last American
note ; and at the same time it denied that the statement
of the American ministers that the proclamations of
Generals Hull and Smyth were not authorized by the
American Government was conclusive evidence that
58 British to American Ministers, Oct. 8, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel, III., ^2l-^2Z■
IXDIAX QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 271
annexation had not been intended. The failure to
declare a public disapprobation of the acts of these
officers, it was maintained, indicated the real attitude
of the United States.^"
The American Government was called upon to give
the proof of any attempt by the British Government to
incite the Indian nations against the United States
before the declaration of war was made. The claim
was put forth that instead of inducing the Indian
nations to begin the war, as charged in the notes of
August 24 and September 9, the British Government
had endeavored to dissuade them from commencing it.
The note again repeated the argimient that the United
States in its treaties with the Indians had practically
acknowledged their independence. If the United
States, as in effect it admitted, maintained that the
Indian nations were independent in their relations with
the United States, but that they might not form any
alliance witli a foreign Power which should " entitle
that Power to negotiate for them in a treat}- of peace,''
tlie British held that such claim was without sanction.
Such an assumption, claimed by Germany in con-
nection with cities which had cooperated with France,
was rejected in the treaty of iNIiinster. The note re-
fused to accept tlie American claim with reference to
the absolute rights of the United States to the territorv"
^" British to American Ministers, Oc:. S. 1S14: American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 721-723.
2/2 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
of the Indians. The fact that Great Britain in former
treaties had not thought it necessary to provide for
the pacification of the Indian nations did not preclude
her from now negotiating for them. The American
contention that the Indians, while not citizens, were
not aliens, but were subjects of the United States was
assailed.^^
It was stated that the American ministers had mis-
understood the negotiation between France and Great
Britain, to which they had referred as showing an
example of a refusal of a proposition such as Great
Britain was now making ; that this proposal of Indian
territory between the dominions of Great Britain, made
by the French Government, formed no part of an ulti-
matum. The English Premier, at the time, had not
objected to the proposition. It was rather to the pro-
posed line of boundary between the two parties that
objection had been made.^^
The article submitted on Indian pacification, it was
held, would remove the two objections made by the
American ministers : that the proposal for Indian paci-
fication was not reciprocal, and that, "as the United
States could have no security that the Indian nations
would conclude a peace on the terms proposed, the
objection would be, in effect, unilateral."^^
The proposed article was as follows : " The United
^8 British to American Ministers, Oct. 8, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 721-723.
69 Ibid. 60 Ibid.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 2/3
States of America engage to put an end, immediately
after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostihties
with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom
they may be at war at the time of such ratification,
and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations re-
spectively, all the possessions, rights, and privileges,
which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to, in
1811, previous to such hostilities. Provided, always,
That such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from
all hostilities against the United States of America,
their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the
present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations,
and shall so desist accordingly.""^ The article was
made reciprocal as well for Great Britain in regard to
the Indians who had been at war with her.®^
The last paragraph of the British note, stating that the
proposed article was their ultimatum, was expressed in
rather stronger language than that of the draft which
had been sent by the British Cabinet to their ministers.
The concluding words were : " Whatever may be the re-
sult of the proposition thus offered, the undersigned de-
liver it as their ultimatum, and now await with anxiety
the answer of the American plenipotentiaries, on which
their continuance in this place will depend. "'^^
"1 British to American Ministers, Oct. 8, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 721-723.
62 Ibid. Goulburn to Bathurst, Oct. 10, 1814; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, 103.
19
2/4 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
The note was principally the work of Lord Bathurst,
with some slight modifications by Lord Liverpool.
These both were agreed that the negotiation should be
brought to a point. Liverpool had wished to make
the charges against the United States respecting the
Floridas so strong that it would frighten the American
ministers into submission.*^^ He stated that there was
but one sentiment throughout Europe, which was to
the effect that, considering the transaction itself, and
the occasion when and circumstances under which it
took place, it was to be regarded as " one of the most
immoral acts recorded in the history of any country."^*
This declaration was softened somewhat in the note
presented. The British note reached the American
ministers on the evening of October 8. A reply was
framed on the 13th, and presented the day following,^^
As in the case of each of the other notes, the Ameri-
can mission spent many hours in discussion of the
projects for the reply. They all considered it ob-
jectionable to be obliged to admit a preliminary article
without knowing what the substance of the whole
treaty was to be; but none of them were ready to
break off on that point. Bayard, who was very anxious
for peace, advised the acceptance of the article ; Clay
<'•'* Liverpool to Bathurst, Oct. i, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 298-299.
64 Ibid.
65 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 52.
INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 2/5
was in favor of rejecting any proposition for disarma-
ment on the lakes. If this article was to be admitted,
Clay and Gallatin favored a short reply; Adams
thought it should be long, at least as long as the note
presented by the British ministers. Adams favored
the use of stronger language than the Americans had
hitherto used in their notes. He complained because
he could not prevail on his colleagues " to insert any-
thing in the style of retort " to the British notes, whose
tone, he declared, was "arrogant, overbearing, and
offensive."*'"
After four days of discussion, the American minis-
ters decided to accept the article now offered as an
ultimatum. There was, however, a difference of opin-
ion as to the manner of its acceptance, whether, as
Gallatin suggested, it should be adopted as perfectly
conformable to the views of the American ministers
themselves, or whether, as Adams urged, it should be
made to appear as a great concession, and made for the
sake of securing peace. Adams wished also to avow,
as the sentiments of the American Government, that the
cession of Canada would be for the interest of Great
Britain as well as the United States. A paragraph
which had been drawn up to this effect was rejected
by his colleagues. Adams, Gallatin, and Clay all pre-
ss Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III, 51.
2/6 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY
sented drafts of an answer. The one offered by Clay,
with some modifications, was finally adopted.®'^
After two months of negotiations the settlement of
the Indian question had now been reached, and with
this obstacle removed, the first prospect of a treaty of
peace began faintly to appear.
67 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 51-52.
CHAPTER VII
Modification of British Demands
At the time that the American ministers were
struggling with the question of the acceptance of the
article on Indian pacification and the reply to be made
to the British note, public opinion in America, which
was to aid materially the work of the peace ministers,
was rapidly forming. The capture of Washington
on August 24 and the burning of the public build-
ings by the British called forth general indignation,
and the reception of the despatches from Ghent, con-
taining the proposition of the British ministers, aroused
the people even more.^ The war sentiment at once
became more pronounced, and even the Federalists
acknowledged that peace was impossible under the
terms proposed by the British Government.
The despatches brought by George M. Dallas on
the John Adams reached New York at ten o'clock the
evening of October 5. Early the next morning Dallas
started for Washington to present the despatches to
the Secretary of State.^ These, accompanied by an
1 R. M. Patterson to Russell, Nov. 6, 1814; Russell Papers,
MS., No. 1708.
2 New York Spectator, Oct. 6, 1814.
277
278 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
address, were transmitted by Madison to Congress
October 10.^ Congress had been called in secret
session to consider the despatches, and to act with
reference to new instructions, which were submitted by
the President on the 13th.* The House of Representa-
tives ordered ten thousand copies of the despatches to
be printed and distributed widely.
The public communication of the despatches of the
negotiation, before it was known definitely whether or
not negotiations were broken off, caused the severest
criticism in England. Madison had thus acted in order
to unite all parties in a more vigorous support of the
Administration in the prosecution of the war, and his
plan was, in a large measure, successful. All agreed
that the proposals of Great Britain were inadmissible,
being inconsistent with the sovereign rights of the
United States. Many regarded the terms as absolutely
dishonorable and arrogant.^ The legislature of New
York passed a resolution " That the House of As-
sembly of the State of New York view, with mingled
emotions of surprise and indignation, the extravagant
and disgraceful terms proposed by the British commis-
sioners at Ghent — that however ardently they may
desire the restoration of peace to their country, they
3 New York Herald, Oct. 13, 1814.
* Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
551-
5 Providence Patriot, Oct. 24, 1814.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 2/9
can never consent to receive it at the sacrifice of
national honor and dignity — that they therefore
strongly recommend to the National Legislature, the
adoption of the most vigorous and efficacious measures
in the prosecution of the war, as the best means of
bringing this contest to an honorable termination, and
of transmitting unimpaired to their posterity, their
rights, liberty, and independence."^
The popular objections to the terms were well stated
in the Philadelphia Aurora of October 24 : " It is im-
possible our commissioners can listen to such terms
without indignation, and we feel warranted in saying,
that to restrain the United States from treating with
the Indians ; that to despoil them through Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Ohio, and the Lakes of their
natural frontier and soil; to admit Great Britain into
an exclusive right to arm the Lakes and to a military
occupation of both shores ; to erect an independent
savage power on our confines and within our domain ;
and to curtail our fisheries, sacred by the treaty of
1782, are demands, attempts, or pretensions which the
United States will never submit to, but with the loss of
her freedom."^
The territorial demands of Great Britain aroused the
greatest indignation in the United States. The land
that was exacted by Great Britain, either in the form
« New York Spectator, Oct. 29, 1814. Federal Republican,
Oct. 21, 1814.
^ Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 24, 1814.
280 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
of a permanent Indian territory or for communication
between Halifax and Quebec, it was pointed out, meant
the cession by the United States of some 233,000,000
acres, an extent of country larger than England,
Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. This territory, it was
estimated, was worth, at the government price of land,
nearly $500,000,000.^
The Federalist papers, while laying the blame of the
ill success of the mission upon Madison, opposed the
British pretensions as vigorously as the Republicans.
The United States Gazette in an editorial of October
19, 1814, said: "England now turns upon us in the
fullness of her wrath and power. No alternative is
left us but to resist with energy or submit with dis-
grace. As the latter is not possible to Americans, we
must prepare our minds for an extremely long, ardu-
ous, and sanguinary war."^ The Federal Republican,
also, in its issue of October 21, said: "We all agree in
opinion that the terms proposed by Great Britain are
inadmissible, and that her pretensions as stated by her
Commissioners at Ghent ought to be resisted to the
last. To be restrained from ever hereafter obtaining
land from the Indians by fair and voluntary treaty
would be to surrender an essential right of sovereignty
and to submit to a degradation which nothing short of
conquest ought to impose upon us."^" Another
8 Providence Patriot, Nov. 12, 1814.
» United States Gazette, Oct. 24, 1814.
^"Federal Republican, Oct. 21, 1814.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 28 1
Federalist paper, the Norfolk Ledger, had the follow-
ing editorial : " Comment is unnecessary ; every Ameri-
can head and heart will make the same comment.
There is nothing from which some good may not be ex-
tracted ; our surprise is over ; now we know what we
have to depend on, and we trust in God, the manly
and patriotic spirit of the nation will teach an insolent
foe, that a people who in their infancy could break his
chains, will in their sturdy youth meet his arrogant
demands with firmness, that will prove that they are
sons worthy of their illustrious sires. ... To meet the
crisis, requires the united wisdom, talents, and integrity
of the nation ; and to bring these into operation, party
distinctions must cease. The people (as their fathers
did in the days of trial) must select men of talents
and virtue."^^
The objections to the British proposals were em-
phasized differently in different sections of the
country. New England took most exception to the
question of the fisheries; the Middle and Southern
States to the Indian territory and boundary question.^^
The American commissioners at Ghent had realized
that the discord at home was a serious obstacle in the
way of securing favorable terms of peace, and they
wrote frequent letters to their friends urging them to
" Quoted in the National Intelligencer, Oct. 22, 1814, from
the Norfolk Ledger.
12 New York Herald, Oct. 13, 1814.
282 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
use all effort to bring about unity in prosecuting the
war. Russell in a letter to Henry Wheaton wrote as
follows : " Cannot you arouse the country to more gen-
erous and united effort? I will not forgive the man
who indulges the prejudice of party in times like these.
All must rally now in defense of their country. Hope
for nothing but what you can command by spirit and
energy."^^
On October 19, Monroe addressed a letter to the
ministers approving their action in rejecting the terms
proposed by the British ministers. He sent them also
copies of the despatches and instructions which had
been printed, to be used as they saw fit in Europe. It
was thought that the negotiations might have been
already closed before the papers reached Ghent, but
in case they were not, the American ministers were
instructed, provided the British ministers were disposed
to agree to the status ante helium, to make that the
basis of a treaty.^* Gallatin in a letter to Monroe,
June 13, had urged this as a basis, inasmuch as no
better terms appeared obtainable.^^
The publication of the British demands upon the
13 Russell to Wheaton, Oct. 26, 1814; Russell Papers, MS.
14 Monroe to Commissioners, Oct. 19, 1814; MS., Bureau of
Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII. Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., TZ^.
1' Gallatin to Monroe, June 13, 1814; Writings of Gallatin,
I., 627-629. Correspondence of the Commissioners of the
Treaty of Ghent; MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Un-
classified Instructions, VII.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 283
American commissioners was a most politic stroke on
the part of Madison, and resulted, not only in uniting
America in stubborn resistance, but also in rendering
public sentiment in Great Britain more favorable to
the United States.
The ultimatum which was given by the British
ministers on October 8 was answered by the American
ministers five days later. The American ministers
had decided that it would not be wise to break off
negotiations upon the Indian article as now proposed ;
and in their note of the 13th they expressed their will-
ingness to accept the substance of the article which
the British ministers had offered, since this proposi-
tion left the United States " free to effect its object in
the mode consonant with the relations which they have
constantly maintained with those tribes . . . and ac-
cords with the views uniformly professed by the un-
dersigned of placing those tribes precisely, and in every
respect in the same situation as that in which they
stood before the commencement of hostihties."^*' The
article, it was to be understood, was agreed to sub-
ject "to the approbation or rejection of the Govern-
ment of the United States," inasmuch as no definite
instructions had been given them upon the subject.
Should peace not ensue, this article was to be of no
effect, and was not to be brought forward by way of
argument or precedent in any subsequent negotiation.
16 American to British Ministers, Oct. 13, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., ^21-72^.
284 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
While endeavoring to make the reply brief, the
American ministers could not refrain from discussing
some other topics adverted to by the British in their
note. The British ministers had made the charge that
the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States was
illegal, Spain having offered a remonstrance against its
cession and the right of France to make it. To this
the American note replied that, although the Spanish
minister at Washington had made such remonstrance,
at that very time orders were given by Spain for the
deHvery of Louisiana to France. So France was in
actual possession of the territory when she disposed of
it to the United States."
The American ministers maintained that the argu-
ment employed by the British in their last note in
denying the existence of an ultimatum respecting an
Indian barrier on the part of France to Great Britain
in 1 76 1 tended rather to confirm the American state-
ment of September 26. The quotation from a letter
of Pitt, that " the fixation of the new limits to Canada,
as proposed by France, is intended to shorten the ex-
tent of Canada, which was to be ceded to England, and
to lengthen the boundaries of Louisiana, which France
was to keep," was interpreted as establishing the
American position. The purpose of this boundary
arrangement, it was held, was to establish what was
not to be admitted, that all which was not Canada was
1'' American to British Ministers, Oct. 13, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 723-724.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 285
Louisiana, whereby all the intermediate nations and
countries, the true barrier of each province, would be
given up to France. This, the Americans asserted,
was the exact principle supported by them, that is,
that the recognition of a boundary gives up to the
nation in whose behalf it is made all the Indian tribes
and countries within the boundary. In accordance
with this principle the United States relied upon the
treaty of 1783, which without reservation fixed the
boundaries for Indian tribes. The American note
further refused to admit what the British had cited in
argument, that the German states formed an analogy
to the status of the Indians. ^^
In offering to accept the article upon Indian pacifica-
tion, which had been proposed as an essential pre-
liminary, the American ministers requested the British
to present to them a projet of a treaty which should
embrace all the points considered essential by Great
Britain ; and the American ministers agreed on their
part to present a contre-projet."
Upon receipt of the American note, the British min-
isters transmitted it to their Government, asking for
further instructions now that the American ministers
had accepted their ultimatum.^"
18 American to British Ministers, Oct. 13, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 723-724-
19 Ibid.
20 British Ministers to Castlereagh, Oct. 14, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
286 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
Two qualifications made by the American ministers
in the article were noted in the letter of Goulburn to
Bathurst, namely, the stipulation not to consider their
acceptance as an argument or precedent in future nego-
tiations ; and the statement of their willingness to ac-
cept the substance of the article. It was suggested by
the British ministers that objection be made to the first
qualification, and that the understanding of the article
be limited "to its not being obligatory upon either party
in a future negotiation. "^^ The second qualification it
was thought best to leave unnoticed. Uncertainty was
expressed as to whether they should accede to the
demands of the American ministers for a complete
projet or require the Americans to present one first.
Information was requested on that point.
The British Government sent instructions, on Oc-
tober i8, to their peace commissioners. This despatch
was received at Ghent the 20th, accompanied by letters
and papers which communicated unfavorable news of
British operations in America.-^ The news disheart-
ened the British ministers, who had counted on British
successes to enable them to secure the acceptance of
their peace terms by the American ministers. They
had attributed the acceptance of the article respecting
the Indians to the British victories which had been
21 Goulburn to Bathurst, Oct. 14, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 344-345.
22 Goulburn to Bathurst, Oct. 21, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 366.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 287
previously reported, particularly the taking of Wash-
ington.^^
By the despatch of October i8 the British ministers
were instructed to reply to the American plenipoten-
tiaries that there were three material points remaining
for consideration. There was, first, the subject of the
right of naturalization and the question of impress-
ment, and other topics relating to maritime laws.
These questions, it was stated, might be altogether
omitted if the United States so desired; but, if they
were to be inserted in the treaty, Great Britain would
insist that these points should be definitely stated, and
she would not recede from the position which she had
repeatedly declared to be based on the established law
on these points.^*
The second subject was that of the fisheries, with
regard to which the British ministers were instructed
to say that Great Britain admitted the right of the
United States "to fish on the high seas without the
maritime jurisdiction of the territorial possessions of
Great Britain in North America ; that the extent of the
maritime jurisdiction of the two contracting parties
must be reciprocal ; that Great Britain is ready to enter
into an arrangement on that point ; and that, until any
23 Goulburn to Bathurst, Oct. 21, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 366.
2* Bathurst to Commissioners, Oct. 18, 1814; Memoirs and
Correspondence of Castlereagh.X., 168-170; MS., British For-
eign Office, 5, loi.
288 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
arrangement shall be made to the contrary, the usual
maritime jurisdiction of one league shall be common to
both the contracting parties."^^ They were again in-
structed to declare that Great Britain could not renew
the privilege, granted in the treaty of 1783, of drying
and curing fish on the unsettled shores. This privilege,
it was maintained, had been annulled by the war, and
Great Britain was under no obligation to renew it.
The third point to be considered was that of bound-
aries. The northwest boundaries, it was stated, might
be regarded as settled " by the admission of the Ameri-
can Plenipotentiaries that the British Government is
willing to treat on the basis of uti possidetis, subject
to the modifications for mutual accommodation." The
British commissioners were instructed, in case the
American commissioners admitted this principle, to
proceed to state the " mutual accomodation " which
might be entered into conformable to these points :
the United States to agree to restore the two forts
of Fort Erie and Fort Amherstberg ; Great Britain to
restore Forts Custine and Mahias, retaining Fort Ni-
agara and Fort Michilimakinac, " leaving the boundary,
on the side of the Province of Main (sic), running
thus : From the river St. Croix, including Moose Island,
which was always a part of New Brunswick, along the
line established by the Commissioners in 1798, running
25 Bathurst to Commissioners, Oct. 18, 1814; Memoirs and
Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 168-170; MS., British For-
eign Office, 5, loi.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 289
astronomically north, until it is intersected by the
river Ristook, up to its source ; and then along the high
ridge of mountains, and running a westerly course,
until they abut upon the heights which formed the
present boundary." The British commissioners were
instructed to refrain from referring to the topics
which had in the previous note been discussed without
accomplishing anything further than to promote irrita-
tion on each side.^*'
On the 20th, another despatch was sent from the
British Foreign Office to the British commissioners.
This despatch countermanded that part of the instruc-
tions of the despatch of the i8th requiring the British
ministers " not to detail the modifications " which they
were authorized by their government to propose on
the principle of uti possidetis until the American
ministers should have admitted that principle as the
basis of the treaty. The instructions now permitted
such explanation with reference to the boundary ques-
tions, provided that the American ministers should
make a " qualified or provisional admission of that
principle." It was further suggested that it might be
expedient not to make the other proposition at the
outset. A change in the boundary was proposed, that
instead of the river St. Croix the river Passamaquoddy
26 Bathurst to Commissioners, Oct. 18, 1814; Memoirs and
Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 168-170; MS., British For-
eign Office, 5, loi.
20
290 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
should be taken as the boundary as far as latitude 46
degrees, and this latitude should be continued as the
boundary until it reached the boundary of lower
Canada. It was to be demanded, in consideration of
the superior value of the country restored by Great
Britain, that the United States should make a cession
of the island of Carleton, near Lake Ontario ; and in
connection with Michilimakinac the island as well as
the fort was to be understood; further a cession of
territory, at least five miles wide, around Fort Niagara
should be required.^^
On the 2ist, after receiving the instructions of the
i8th, the British ministers sent their note to thei
American ministers. They did not present a complete
projet, as the American ministers had requested, but
referred to the statement made at the first conference
as containing the points which, in the judgment of the
British Government, remained to be adjusted.^^
With regard to the maritime questions it was pro-
posed in this note to waive all stipulations, inasmuch
as the maritime pacification of Europe had rendered
these questions no longer pertinent. For the view of
Great Britain with respect to the fisheries the state-
27Bathurst to Commissioners, Oct. 20, 1814; Memoirs and
Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 172; MS., British Foreign
Office, 5, loi. " The island of Carleton, near Lake Ontario,"
is one of the islands in the mouth of the St. Lawrence.
28 British to American Ministers, Oct. 21, 1814; MS., Bu-
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American
State Papers, For. Rel., IIL, 724-725-
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 2gi
ment made in the first correspondence was referred to.
The matter of the marine league which had been men-
tioned in the instructions of the i8th was not covered
by that statement at the first conference ; but the min-
isters thought it would be better to leave the mention of
this until the fisheries should again be brought into dis-
cussion. They thought that repetition or detail of the
subject of the fisheries might seem to imply a doubt
as to the right of Great Britain to act upon her views
of the subject.-^ The note stated in regard to the third
point, that of boundaries, that it was expected, from the
previous discussion, that the northwestern boundary,
from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi, would
be admitted without objection by the United States ; that
as to the other boundaries, the British Government were
willing to accept the basis of uti possidetis, inasmuch
as the American ministers had objected to the former
boundary proposition because it was not based on that
principle. The acceptance of the principle of uti possi-
detis was to be " subject to such modifications as
mutual convenience may be found to require."^"
On October 24, the American ministers replied to
the British note of the 21st. The note, written by
Gallatin, with some suggestions from Bayard and Clay,
29 British Ministers to Castlereagh, Oct. 24, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
'30 British to American Ministers, Oct. 21, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 724-725. MS., Bureau of In-
dexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
292 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
rejected the imputation made by the British ministers
that the American ministers on August 24 had sug-
gested the principle of uti possidetis as the basis for
negotiations, when they had merely remarked that the
propositions of the British commissioners " were
founded neither on the basis of uti possidetis nor on
that of status ante helium." It was held that they
had specifically stated that they were instructed to treat
on the principle of both parties making restoration of
whatever territory they might have taken during the
war; that it had been previously declared that the
American ministers had " no authority to cede any
part of the territory of the United States ; and that to
no stipulation to that effect would they subscribe."
The American note explicitly refused to treat upon the
basis of uti possidetis, or upon any other principle in-
volving a cession of any part of the territory of the
United States. It declared again that the American
ministers had power to treat only " upon the principle
of a mutual restoration of whatever territory may have
been taken by either party." The request was repeated
that the British ministers should present a projet
" embracing all the other specific propositions which
Great Britain intended to offer." The American min-
isters expressed their willingness, if it was so desired,
to offer simultaneously a projet on their part.^^
31 American to British Ministers, Oct. 24, 1814; MS., Bureau
of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 725-
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 293
This note, when referred to the British Government,^-
caused a general feehng of disappointment in London.
Lord Liverpool was vexed that the American ministers
would not accept the principle of uti possidetis.^^ In
order to gain time the Government decided to require
the American ministers to make a full pro jet of all the
conditions upon which they were ready to make peace. ^*
It was evidently expected that the American ministers
would advance such extreme claims that Great Britain
would feel justified, in the eyes of the world, in break-
ing off the negotiations.
At Ghent the two missions were dispirited. The
British were annoyed that the Americans would make
no concessions ; the Americans were provoked that the
British sought means to prolong the negotiations to
gain time.^^ It was believed to be Great Britain's pur-
pose to continue the negotiation until the Congress at
Vienna was over, and then to prosecute the war with
renewed vigor.^^ Social functions continued, but little
32 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Oct. 24, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
33 Liverpool to Wellington, Oct. 28, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 384.
34 Ibid.
35 J. Q. Adams to John Adams, Oct. 25, 1814; Madison
Papers, MS., LIIL, 7(}. Adams to Monroe; MS., Bureau of
Indexes and Archives, British Despatches, III., No. 142. Mon-
roe to Adams, Nov. 20, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes and
Archives, British Despatches, III., No. 143.
36 Russell to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS.,
XIV., No. 1804.
294 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
cordiality existed between the American and the British
ministers. A dinner given by the British to the Amer-
icans on the 26th is described by Adams as " dull."^^
On the 31st, the British ministers returned their
answer to the American note of the 24th.^^ The
American victories at Plattsburg and BaUimore, and
the growing opposition of the British people to the war
led the Ministry to soften their policy in their new
note. In this note the British ministers took the
ground that their note of October 21 had been in
reality a projet of the points which remained to be
treated of in the negotiation. They insisted that the
American ministers should present a contre-projet con-
taining all the objections which they had to offer to the
points submitted by the British ministers. They desired
also a statement of " such further points as the
Government of the United States consider to be
material." The British ministers stated that they had
no further demands to make and no other stipulations
upon which they were required to insist than those
previously given. They requested the American min-
isters to present specific propositions upon which they
were instructed to sign a treaty.^^
That there were many and difficult problems in-
37 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 58.
28 British to American Ministers, Oct. 31, 1814; MS., Bureau
of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 726.
39 Ibid.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 295
volved in the negotiations may be seen from the series
of questions which was directed to the Secretary of
State by Gallatin at this period of the negotiation.
These questions were as follows : —
I. Would it be proper to break on the point of the
privilege of trading with the Indians granted to the
British in the treaty of 1794?
II. Should the right of preserving an unlimited naval
force on the lakes be insisted upon?
III. Should they insist upon the renewal of the
rights to the fisheries as defined by the treaty of 1783,
or should they rest the rights upon the American con-
struction of the treaty which said that it had not been
abrogated by the war?
IV. Was an agreement upon the northern bound-
ary of the territory of Louisiana necessary, or should
a proviso be inserted that the article on the north-
western boundary, from the Lake of the Woods to
the Mississippi, should not afTect the boundary of
Louisiana ?
V. Might the boundaries of Louisiana be assumed
without referring to them ?
VI. If a boundary was to be fixed for Louisiana,
what should it be?
VII. If Great Britain, agreeing in general to mutual
restoration of territory, should except the settlement
on the Columbia River, what should be done?
VIII. What should be the claim respecting the
296 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
country between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific
Ocean?
IX. Should consent be given to an arrangement
for the appointment of commissioners to decide upon
the question of territorial possession of the islands in
Passamaquoddy Bay? If so, how should the commis-
sion be constituted, and should insistence be made on
the restitution of the islands until the question was
settled?
X. With reference to territorial desires by Great
Britain in the northern part of the district of Maine,
the boundary line to which, the British claimed, was
uncertain, should consent be given to the appointment
of commissioners to settle such boundary?
XL If an exchange of territory were proposed, how
far could that be agreed to, in view of the claim of
Massachusetts to the possession of said territory?
XI I. If a maritime war should be renewed in
Europe, what steps were to be taken relative to the
subject of impressment?*"
Not only were the American ministers occupied with
such questions as these, but they were also engaged in
writing letters and drawing up papers to place before
the representatives of the various European countries ;
and Gallatin, at least, concerned himself with questions
of the internal as well as foreign policies of the United
^'^ Gallatin to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS.,
XIV., 1806.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 29/
States. In the same letter in which he propounded so
many diplomatic questions he expressed his views on
the financial and military situation in the United States.
Gallatin thought that the war was likely to continue
some time and that, as the United States could make
no loans in Europe, a deficiency would occur. To
meet this he made the following suggestions : —
I. To extend indirect international taxes as far as
practicable.
II. To limit nominal loans and to borrow on stock
at a rate not to exceed eight per cent.
III. To apply exclusively the moneys arising from
these two sources to loans and revenues, to the pay-
ment of the civil list, interest on the public debt, and
the support of the regular army and navy and of the
militia employed on offensive operations.
IV. Not to increase the Treasury notes receivable
in payment of taxes and payable one year after date;
but, to meet deficiencies, to issue long term notes not
legal tender, bearing interest at six to eight per cent.
These to be funded if the war should continue.
V. With reference to the military situation, Gallatin
advised that the States should be authorized to raise
state troops for self-defense, and that these, as well as
the militia called for defensive purposes, should be paid
and supported by the States respectively, the United
States ultimately reimbursing the expense, after the
298 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
war. Unless such suggestions should be adopted to
relieve the financial situation, Gallatin apprehended an
overissue of paper money. Another means suggested
was the creation of a national bank and the making of
loans on the Government lands.*^
These suggestions of Gallatin were called out by the
urgency of the financial and military situation in the
United States. The Government began the war with
inadequate financial measures, and the policy of short
term loans and issue of paper money had brought the
country to a financial crisis. The raising of soldiers
was also difficult. The uncertain value of the pay, the
ill success that had generally followed the land forces
in the war, and above all the absence of great patriotic
zeal contributed to the smallness of the enlistments.
All sorts of propositions were made in Congress for
the raising of soldiers. That patriotic motives were
largely wanting is shown by the attempts to present at-
tractive financial ones. One of these propositions was
that every ten men should provide a substitute for a
year at a time, paying fifty dollars each, while the
United States Government would give a bounty of one
hundred and twenty-four dollars, and eight dollars a
month. At the end of a year's service one hundred
and sixty acres of government land were also to be
granted to each soldier thus serving.
*i Gallatin to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS.,
XIV., 1806.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 299
The American ministers, after sending their note of
October 24, had prepared a joint letter to Secretary
Monroe and several private letters. These communi-
cations, with copies of all the notes that had passed
between the two missions since the John Adams sailed,
were, on October 26, given to Connell to bear to
America. Connell left Ghent the same day for Os-
tend. Here, according to instructions, he detained the
Chauncey until the British reply to the American note
of the 24th could be delivered to him. The British
note being presented on the 31st, Payne Todd, one of
the secretaries of the legation, took the despatches to
Ostend, and the Chauncey sailed the next day, No-
vember i.^^
The letter which the American ministers sent to
Monroe declared that there was no hope that peace
was likely to result from the negotiations. In spite
of the fact that the sine qua non upon the Indian
question had been reduced to a mere pacification of
the Indians and an article embracing this point had
been agreed upon, the American ministers considered
the terms of the uti possidetis brought forward in the
British note, October 21, as inadmissible and wholly
incompatible with the previous declaration of the
British ministers.*^
42 New York Spectator, Nov. 30, 1814.
*3 American Commissioners to Monroe, Oct. 25, 1814;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 710-71 1; MS., Bureau
of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
300 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
The British note of October 31, by omitting the
principle of uti possidetis, made the peace prospects
somewhat brighter. Clay, with shrewd foresight, had
predicted that the British would abandon the uti
possidetis and hold fast to the islands of Passama-
quoddy Bay and to the way from Halifax to Quebec,
if successful on the Mobile or at New Orleans. Just
as they had abandoned the Indian sine qua non piece-
meal, so, he thought, they would abandon the terri-
torial question.^*
From October 30 to November 10 the American
mission met each day to work out a projet of a treaty
to be offered to the British. Every member of the
mission took an active part in the discussions and in
the formation of the various articles. Gallatin and
Adams, as heretofore, performed the largest construc-
tive work. Both of them prepared complete drafts
for consideration by the commissioners. There was
unanimity on scarcely one of the articles proposed, but
those dealing with the fisheries and the navigation of
the Mississippi were most hotly debated. Gallatin's
draft of the projet suggested the renewal of the two
privileges, one as a compensation for the other. Clay
was bitterly opposed to allowing Great Britain the
privilege of the navigation of the Mississippi. He
contended that this was of far greater value than the
4* Clay to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS.,
XIV., 1807.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3OI
fisheries. Adams was in favor either of adopting
Gallatin's article or of taking " the ground that the
whole right to the fisheries was recognized as a part
of our national independence, that it could not be
abrogated by the war, and needed no stipulation for
its renewal." Gallatin's article was at first adopted,
with a minority consisting of Clay and Russell dis-
senting. Clay's stubborn opposition and the declara-
tion of his refusal to sign the treaty containing the
artic!^ mentioned caused a reversal of the previous
vote and the adoption of a substitute paragraph pro-
posed by Clay himself, which left the fisheries out of
the discussion.*^ Clay drafted the article upon im-
pressment, which was adopted by the mission by a vote
of three to two, Clay, Adams, and Russell favoring,
Bayard and Gallatin opposing. The article upon in-
demnities was the work of Adams, and so also was
the article offering to conclude a treaty of peace on the
basis of the state existing before the war, applied to all
the points in dispute between the two countries, leaving
their adjustment to future negotiation. The article
upon ratification was drawn jointly by Gallatin and
Adams. The remainder of the projet was, in general,
the work of Gallatin. The draft of the treaty, finally
adopted and signed by all on November lo, was taken
45 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 60-64.
302 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
the same afternoon by Hughes to the hotel of the
British ministers.*^
The British Cabinet were in the meantime troubled
at the way matters were progressing both at Ghent
and at Vienna. The slowness of the negotiations at
Vienna especially gave concern. Added to the diffi-
culties of foreign diplomacy were those of a financial
nature at home. British loans were at a discount.
The property tax, which had been the main source of
revenue to meet the extraordinary expenses of the
Government, was to expire within a few months, and
its reenactment was almost impossible, as the measure
had been most unpopular. ^^ The American war had
^^cost far more than had been contemplated, and there
appeared no favorable sign that the necessary expendi-
tures in that direction would cease for some time.
The cost for the next year was estimated at i 10,000,-
000. The British debt had reached the largest figure
in the history of the nation. The interest alone upon
it amounted to £30,000,000 a year.
In view of these circumstances, and apprehending
that the negotiations at Ghent might suddenly termi-
nate, when the necessity of laying the papers before
Parliament to call a vote upon them would arise,
British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Nov. ii, 1814;
MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
«i Ibid.
"2 Goulburn to Bathurst, Nov. 10, 1814; WelHngton's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 427.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3 II
peace except on the principle of status quo ante bellum.
They wrote to their Government that to secure peace
it would be necessary to accede to the American
proposition, " placing things upon the same footing in
the point of privileges as well as rights, as they stood
when war was declared." They believed that insistence
either upon the retention of territory or upon the
fisheries would cause the negotiations to be broken off.
The question in their minds was upon which of the
two it would be more advantageous to break. They
believed that the fisheries would be the more favorable
point of dispute, for it was of great interest to British
subjects, while only a small part of the American
people were interested in it. The British ministers
thought that the articles respecting the appointment of
commissioners to settle the boundary disputes should
be rejected in toto. The objection, it was stated, should
not be made " on the real ground, which is, that Ameri-
cans always cheat us " ; but on the ground that " the
plenipotentiaries on both sides are more competent to
decide such points." They would reject the article
relative to islands in the Passamaquoddy Bay on the
ground that it was inadmissible because it raised a
doubt as to the title of Great Britain to those islands.
The article with reference to indemnities as far as it
affected indemnifications for losses previous to the war
was also regarded as inadmissible.*'^
«3 Goulburn to Bathurst, Nov. 14, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 432-433.
312 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
The British Cabinet considered the American projet
for some time before giving instructions to their min-
isters as to the nature of their reply. They finally
decided to withdraw the principle of uti possidetis
which had been advanced in the note of October 21.
They were led to this decision, as has been indicated
before, by the unsatisfactory condition of the nego-
tiations at Vienna, and by reason of the financial dif-
ficulties in Great Britain.^* The property tax upon
which the main reliance had been placed for raising
revenue to meet the extraordinary expense of the Gov-
ernment was extremely unpopular, and it would be
quite impossible to secure consent to its continuance
after the expiration of the present law.
Further, in view of the general depression of rents,
which appeared inevitable, it seemed to the British
Cabinet desirable to bring the war in America to a
close.^^ The debate in Parliament had shown that to
continue the war on the question of territorial claims
only would meet with bitter opposition. The Duke of
Wellington, too, had influenced the Cabinet very
greatly by his assertion that no material military ad-
vantage could be expected as the war went on, and that
he would be reluctant to accept the command unless a
6* Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 18, 1814; Wellington's
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 438-439.
66 Ibid.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3 1 3
serious effort to obtain peace should be made without
insisting upon keeping any part of the conquest.*'''
One of the strongest influences in bringing about a
change in the demands of the British Cabinet was the
constant fear of a renewal of the war in Europe.
There was a strong presentiment of the occurrence of
the event which took place the following March. With
this fear in mind, Wellington had been stationed as
ambassador at Paris. In the event of the renewal of
the war in Europe, Great Britain needed all her mili-
tary strength. Again, in the Congress of Vienna,
Castlereagh had been forced to be less aggressive in
British demands owing to the existence of the war with
America. Later, the British press gave reports from
Vienna in which it was stated that the conclusion of
peace between Great Britain and the United States
had produced a more vigorous tone in the notes of
Lord Castlereagh.*'^
While the Cabinet were considering the reply that
should be made to the American note and projet, the
news reached Great Britain of the publication in the
United States of the first part of the negotiations.
The American Government was severely criticized for
publishing diplomatic papers before the negotiations
were completed. November 19, both Houses of Par-
se Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 18, 1814; Wellington's
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 438-439.
67 London Morning Post, Jan. 23, 1815 (quoted in Inger-
soll's Historical Sketch of the Second War, p. 313).
314 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
Hament took up the discussion of the correspondence
that had passed between the representatives of the
two states, with the result that the Cabinet was severely
censured for instructing the British commissioners to
make such excessive demands. Alexander Baring, a
friend of peace and of America, said in the House of
Commons that he thought no man in the country-
could have expected that America would ever have
yielded to such pretensions at a time when Great Britain
had gained no advantage over her in the war. On
November 21, in the House of Lords, the Marquis of
Lansdowne, after inquiring of Earl Liverpool whether
the Ghent correspondence as published in America was
authentic, and receiving an affirmative answer, declared
that the pretensions set up by Great Britain called
loudly for the interference of Parliament. He said that
he was willing to support the dictum of perpetual
British allegiance and impressment, but not a war for
conquest or territory, for the lakes or the Indians,^^
All of these influences combined forced the Cabinet
to lower the demands, and the British commissioners
accordingly were instructed in this view. Despatches
bearing dates of November 21 and 22 were sent from
the Foreign Office to the British ministers communi-
cating the change in the Ministry's demands. These
were received at Ghent November 25. The British
commissioners discussed the points to be made in their
^^ Ingersoll's Historical Sketch of the Second War, 300.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3 I 5
reply to the Americans. Goiilbiirn believed that if,
after receiving a declaration of what the American
ministers maintained as their right to the fisheries,
no answer were made upon that point, it would be
practically an admission of the United States to the
fisheries as enjoyed by them before the war, and that
they could not be excluded from them. Doctor Adams
and Lord Gambier held a contrary view. All three
were opposed to the admission of any article that would
favor America's fisheries.^^ The British commis-
sioners made a few changes in the wording of the
pro jet in addition to the points noted for change by the
Department of Foreign Affairs,^" but only in the article
upon amnesty was there any important alteration.
In the note accompanying the amended projet re-
turned by the British commissioners comment was
made upon several of the articles, and numerous verbal
changes were suggested. The article relating to the
Indians, which provided that both Powers should
pledge themselves not to employ the Indians in any
subsequent war, was declared inadmissible on the
ground that it was impossible for the British ministers
to bind their Government in regard to its conduct in
any future war. The articles which the American
^9 Goulburn to Bathurst, Nov. 25, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 452-454.
'■** Letter from the British Foreign Office to British Com-
missioners, Nov. 21, is missing from the despatches in the Pub-
lic Record Office.
3l6 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
commissioners had proposed with respect to impress-
ment and blockade, the British commissioners main-
tained, were unnecessary, since the British Government
were wilhng to conclude the treaty without any stipula-
tion upon the subjects included in those articles, and
the American ministers had stated that the conclusion
of the peace would not depend upon those points.
The British commissioners objected to the article upon
indemnities, stating that the indemnifications proposed
were unprecedented and were so objectionable that if
insisted upon, all hope of bringing the negotiations to a
favorable issue must prove in vain. The declaration
was made that, as the British Government made no
claim for losses sustained by British subjects in con-
sequence of the war, neither could they consent to make
compensation for losses sustained by the citizens of
the United States in the war.'^^
The British note suggested that a stipulation be
made by which the courts of justice in each state
should be open to all the claimants of the other state,
and that " no obstruction be thrown in the way of their
recovery of the rights, claims, or debts of any kind,
respectively due or belonging to them." The article
with reference to amnesty was declared to be wholly
unnecessary. The British ministers stated with refer-
^1 British to American Ministers, Nov. 26, 1814; MS., Bu-
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 740-741.
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 317
ence to particular alterations in the various articles,
that they were prepared to make such explanations
as might be required with a view to reconciling the
pretensions of the two Governments. In the conclud-
ing paragraph of the British note the former demand
of the principle of uti possidetis was reluctantly with-
drawn in these words : " The undersigned have fore-
borne to insist upon the basis of uti possidetis, to the
advantage of which they consider their country fully
entitled. But should this negotiation terminate in a
way contrary to their hopes and just expectations, they
must protest against any claim or demand being urged
by the American Government in any future negotia-
tion, in consequence of the facilities which His
Majesty's Government have now shown themselves
willing to afford to the speedy restoration of peace."^-
The amended projet returned by the British com-
missioners provided that the notification for the cessa-
tion of the war be issued after ratifications of the
treaty should have been exchanged rather than at the
time of the signature. This was designed, it was
supposed, to give time for the completion of the British
plans against New Orleans, the successful outcome
of which was never doubted. The date from which a
limitation would be placed upon the capture of prize
^■2 British to American Ministers, Nov. 26, 1814; MS., Bu-
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 740-741.
3l8 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS
vessels was changed from the signing of the treaty to
the exchange of ratifications. In the article provid-
ing for boundary commissioners the British substituted
two for three commissioners, and provided that, in case
of a failure of the two commissioners to agree, refer-
ence should be made to a friendly Power whose deci-
sion should be accepted as final. It was expected that
two partisan commissioners would not agree upon
all, if any, of the points in dispute, and that in conse-
quence the settlement of the questions would be sub-
mitted to the arbitration of a European Power with
whom the influence of Great Britain would naturally
be greater than that of the United States.
The article concerning the northwest boundary was
changed from the wording, " a line drawn due north or
south (as the case may be) from the most north-
western point of the Lake of the Woods, until it shall
intersect the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, and
from the point of such intersection due west along and
with the said parallel, shall be the dividing line between
His Majesty's territories and those of the United
States to the westward of the said lake, so far as the
said respective territories extend in that quarter," to
the following : " a line drawn due west from the Lake
of the Woods, along the forty-ninth parallel of north
latitude, shall be the line of demarcation between His
Britannic Majesty's territories and those of the United
States to the westward of the said lake, so far as the
MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3 I9
territories of the United States extend in that quarter."
The British added to this article a guarantee to British
subjects of the privilege of the navigation of the Mis-
sissippi RiverJ^
An additional article relating to the prisoners of war
was proposed by the British commissioners. Instead
of a mere statement that '* all prisoners on both sides
shall be set at liberty," the British offered the follow-
ing : " All prisoners of war, taken on either side as well
by land as by sea, shall be restored as soon as prac-
ticable after the ratifications of this treaty shall have
been exchanged, on their paying the debts which they
have contracted during their captivity. The two con-
tracting parties respectively engage to discharge in
specie the advances which may have been made by the
other for the sustenance and maintenance of such
prisoners. "^^
By abandoning the principle of uti possidetis, as
well as the Indian boundary and the exclusive military
control of the lakes, the British Government cleared
away what had proved to be the chief obstacles in the
way of peace.
■^3 Copy of projet of treaty of peace; American State Papers,
For. Rel., III., 735-740.
74 Ibid.
CHAPTER VIII
Conclusion of the Peace Negotiation
The British note presenting the amended projet of
the treaty and giving up the principle of uti pos-
sidetis was received November 27. For three days
thereafter the American ministers were engaged in
discussing the alterations made in the projet and for-
mulating their reply. The principal discussion was over
the article with regard to the northwest boundary, par-
ticularly that part added by the British note grant-
ing to Great Britain the navigation of the Mississippi.
This provision was vehemently opposed by Clay, the
champion of the West. Gallatin, out of regard for
the feeling in New England, was in favor of granting
the navigation of the Mississippi in exchange for the
fishing privilege. Clay with much fervor argued
against this plan, asserting that the fishing privileges
were of much less value than the navigation of the
Mississippi ; Adams, on the other hand, considered that
the privilege of navigating the Mississippi was of
small importance.^ Clay maintained that to require a
stipulation on the fisheries was inconsistent with the
claim already advanced that the rights respecting these
1 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 71.
320
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 32 1
were guaranteed by the treaty of 1783 and needed no
renewal. Bayard held that there was a distinction
between the American rights to the fisheries secured by
the treaty of peace of 1783 and those which Great
Britain possessed in the privilege granted to her of
navigating the Mississippi ; Gallatin proposed to offer
an article making the navigation of the Mississippi an
equivalent for the fisheries.- This proposal was agreed
to by a vote of 3 to 2, Clay and Russell voting against
the proposition.
In the preparation of the note to be presented to the
British ministers Gallatin, Adams, and Clay drew up
drafts of the proposed note, and these were read before
the mission. The draft as finally adopted was more
largely the work of Gallatin than of any other member
of the mission. It was Gallatin's suggestion that they
should waive the claims of indemnities for losses sub-
sequent to the war incurred by vessels in British ports
which were not given the customary six months' notice ;
that these claims should instead be taken up for dis-
cussion with the British ministers. Adams proposed
sending a copy of the deposition respecting the carry-
ing away and sale of negroes by British officers. To
this all the others objected. The American note was
adopted and signed on the 30th. It was immediately
taken by Hughes to the British ministers.^
2 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 7I-7S-
3 Ibid., 76-78.
22
322 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
This note consented to the substitution of the day of
exchange of ratifications for that of the signature of
the treaty as the time for the cessation of hostihties
and for regulating the periods when prizes at sea
should be restored, "it being understood," the note
stated, " that measures shall be adopted for a speedy
exchange of ratifications, and that the periods in the
second article shall be fixed in a manner correspond-
ing with this alteration."*
The new article respecting prisoners, and the change
in the composition and procedure of the boundary com-
missions, which had been proposed by the British com-
missioners, were accepted. An additional suggestion
was made that a time limit be fixed within which the
commissioners must make their decision and report.
The note consented to drop entirely the articles relat-
ing to the non-employment of Indians in any future
hostilities ; the definition of blockade and general
amnesty; and also that part of the article concerning
indemnities for losses and damages received after the
commencement of the war. The American commis-
sioners expressed their desire to " discuss the cases
of vessels and property in port when war was de-
clared or known " ; and in that connection submitted " a
copy of the provision made in that respect by the
4 American to British Ministers, Nov. 30, 1814; MS., Bureau
of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent "; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 741.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 323
United States." They consented to the withdrawal of
the article upon impressment with the understanding
" that the rights of both Powers on the subject of sea-
men, and the claims of the citizens and subjects of the
two contracting parties to indemnities for losses and
damages sustained prior to the commencement of the
war, shall not be affected or impaired by the omission
in the treaty of any specific provision with respect to
those two subjects."'
To most of the verbal alterations made by the
British in the articles the American commissioners as-
sented, but from some they dissented. These and
other changes they expressed their desire to discuss ;
and to this end they requested a conference, at such
time and place as might be convenient for the British
plenipotentiaries, in order to consider these points, and
to agree upon the " places and time left in blank in
several of the articles."®
The British ministers replied to this note the same
day, and named the Chartreux, their hotel, for the
meeting place the next day at twelve o'clock.'^ This
was the first meeting of the two missions since August.
All the negotiations since that time had been carried
on by the interchange of notes. In this conference
s American to British Commissioners, Nov. 30, 1814; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel, III., 741.
«Ibid.
■'^ British to American Ministers, Nov. 30, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 742.
324 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
the chairman of each mission opened his respective
side; Gambier for the British, and Adams for the
American.^
The American ministers objected to the changes in
the first article, where the words " belonging to either
party " and " taken by the other " were substituted for
*' taken by either party from the other." They ob-
jected to the insertion because it would make the
restoration of territory to depend not upon right, but
upon possession at the commencement of the war.^
They maintained tljat the " retention of possessions
obtained by force was so far setting up a title for
conquest " ; that possession was prima facie evidence
of right ; that if either party had a right, or both parties
had an equal right, the possessor could not be ousted
by the other claimant. The British ministers main-
tained that temporary possession until the right could
be ascertained was of little consequence, and proposed
that "both parties should retain possession of any
territory the right to which was in dispute."^** The
Americans objected on the ground that it would place
it in the power of the party in possession of any terri-
tory to claim that such territory was in dispute. They
insisted that the words which they had originally pro-
8 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 79.
9 Ibid., 80.
10 Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes,
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 325
posed, which stipulated for the restitution of all posses-
sions, should be adopted,^^ and that any other arrange-
ment would be inconsistent with the principle of status
quo ante bellum, upon which alone they had stated they
were authorized to treat. The British plenipotentiaries
refused to strike out the alteration, but agreed to refer
the question to their Government.^^
The significance of this discussion was that the
British Government were determined to retain the pos-
session of certain islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy
which had been taken by the British during the war.
The British claimed that these, though in the pos-
session of the United States at the commencement of
the war, originally belonged to Nova Scotia and,
therefore, should rightfully be retained by Great
Britain. The Americans on the contrary maintained
that these islands belonged to the United States, being
a part of the State of Massachusetts; and they claimed
that the territory should be given up on the principle of
mutual restitution, as was done in other similar cases.
The American commissioners proposed for time to
be allowed for cessation of hostile operations after the
ratifications of the treaty had been exchanged, " fifteen
days in the Channel, in the North seas, in all parts of
11 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. I, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office 5, 102.
12 Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes,
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 742.
326 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
the Atlantic Ocean to the equinoctial line or the
equator, and in all parts of the Mediterranean. Two
months in the Atlantic ocean to the latitude of the
Cape of Good Hope, and three months in all other
parts of the world." The British ministers proposed
four different territorial areas within which the time
allowed was to be twelve, thirty, forty, and one hundred
and fifty days respectively. The American plenipo-
tentiaries reserved the British proposal for considera-
tion.^^
The American ministers proposed the following
change in the wording of the article redrafted by the
British, relating to the settlement of the disputed
ownership of the islands in the Bay of Fundy : In place
of the wrords, " whereas claims have been made by the
Government of the United States to certain islands
in the bay of Fundy," substitute the words, " whereas
the several islands in the bay of Passamaquoddy,
which is a part of the bay of Fundy, and the island of
Grand Menan in the said bay of Fundy, are claimed by
the United States as being comprehended within their
aforesaid boundaries."^* The American ministers be-
lieved that the v^^ording of the article as stated by the
^^ Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes,
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526; American State
Papers, For. Rel., III., 742.
1* Ibid.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 327
British had been intended to exclude Moose Island
in Passamaquoddy Bay from coming within the dis-
puted boundary. This change and the article in which
it belonged were agreed upon.^^
The change proposed by the American ministers in
the articles upon boundaries, limiting the time within
which the commissioners were required to act, was ob-
jected to by the British. The blanks in the boundary
articles for the insertion of the place where the re-
spective commissioners should meet were filled in at
this conference. St. Andrews, in the Province of New
Brunswick, was agreed upon for the commissions ap-
pointed for the settlement of the question of disputed
islands in the Bay of Fundy and the northeastern
boundary. Albany was to be the meeting place of the
commission for the settlement of the northern bound-
ary.^^ The article containing the provision with re-
spect to British navigation of the Mississippi caused
the sharpest discussion. With regard to this subject
the American ministers maintained that Great Britain
had made a new demand without offering an equiva-
lent; that, if the demand was based on the treaty of
1783, the fishing liberty ought in Hke manner to be
revised ; if the demand did not rest upon that treaty,
then, no equivalent being offered for the privilege, it
15 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 84.
16 Ibid.
328 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
was " without reciprocity."^^ Gambier, for the
British, held that the arrangement regarding the north-
west boundary, contained in the first part of the article,
to which the British ministers had given their con-
sent, furnished an equivalent.^® The Americans re-
fused to concur in that opinion and proposed, as an
alternative, to expunge the whole article.^^ The
British ministers stated that they would refer it to
their Government. As another alternative the Ameri-
can ministers proposed that British subjects might
have access to the Mississippi River at a single ap-
pointed place upon payment of regular custom dues.^*^
In connection with the question of the navigation of
the Mississippi, the American ministers again argued
the claim of the United States to the fisheries. They
maintained that the treaty of 1783 differed from ordi-
nary treaties in that it did not confer, but only recog-
nized, advantages enjoyed under both by Great Britain
and the United States and, therefore, no stipulation
was necessary to secure the full enjoyment of the
fisheries to the United States as stipulated in the treaty
of 1783. If, however, any stipulation were to be made,
they said that they would propose one which would
1'^ Official Statement of the Conference by Secretary Hughes,
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526.
18 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. I, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
19 Ibid.
20 Protocol of Conference by Secretary Hughes, Dec. i, 1814;
American State Papers, For. Rel., HI., 742.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 329
make the two privileges offset each other. A memo-
randum, containing an article to this effect, was left
with the British by the American ministers at the close
of this discussion. This article was as follows : " The
inhabitants of the United States shall continue to
enjoy the liberty to take, dry, and cure fish in places
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Great Britain, as
secured by the former treaty of peace; and the navi-
gation of the river Mississippi within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States shall remain free
and open to the subjects of Great Britain, in the
manner secured by the said treaty."^^ This article,
also, was refused by the British plenipotentiaries.
There was an ardent discussion over the article
with regard to indemnity for vessels and effects seized
in British ports w^ien the war was first declared or
known. The American ministers demanded the resti-
tution of the value of such seizures. They enforced
their demand on the ground of the " law of nations "
to abstain from the capture of private property at the
breaking out of a war. This general law, they con-
tended, was shown by the frequent clauses in treaties
stipulating for a timely notice of hostilities."^
21 Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes,
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526. Protocol of Con-
ference of Dec. I, 1814; American State Papers, For. Rel.,
III., 742.
-2 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. i, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
330 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
This claim was further pressed inasmuch as the
United States at the time of the declaration of war had
given sixty days' notice for British vessels to leave
American ports. The British commissioners main-
tained that it was the practice of civilized nations to
capture and condemn all private property taken afloat,
or the proceeds of it, whenever a state of war actually
existed, without any reference to the time when it
began. They maintained that periods fixed in order to
apprise persons of hostilities were matters of conveni-
ence only, and did not affirm any general law or usage
on the subject. Further, that the principle of demand,
more than the value of the property, was of im-
portance : " that restitution of value could not take
place without the implication that such ships and goods
had been improperly or irregularly seized ; . . . that it
was wholly unprecedented for any nation that had de-
clared war against Great Britain even to ask and much
less to receive indemnity, for the direct and necessary
consequences of their own act."-^ They asserted that
the United States, being the party which declared the
war, had no right to indulgence on this point, and that
the act of Congress, which had been communicated to
them, merely authorized the President to grant pass-
ports, but did not make it obligatory for him to do so.
The British commissioners informed the Americans
23 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. i, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 33 1
that their Government would reject such demands and
that it would be useless to submit them.-'*
On the day of the conference, the British commis-
sioners transmitted a copy of the American note of
November 30 to their Government. In a note to
Castlereagh they expressed satisfaction that the Ameri-
can ministers had agreed to abandon all the articles
that had been declared to be inadmissible, with one
modification. They mentioned the two objections on
which alone the American ministers " evinced a dis-
position to insist." With reference to the first ob-
jection, which was to the alteration made by the British
ministers in the first article of the projet, that one aimed
at "limiting the restitution of territory to the pos-
sessions belonging to either party which had been taken
by the other during the war," the British ministers
stated that they saw the design of the American min-
isters " to obtain occupation of the islands in Passama-
quoddy Bay during the time between the ratification
of the treaty and the decisions upon the claims of the
United States, together with the fair advantage which
might result from the fact of possession."-^ The
British commissioners reported the second main ob-
jection of the American ministers, that of the free
-* Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes,
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526.
25 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. i, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102
332 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
navigation of the Mississippi by British subjects,
together with the arguments which the American min-
isters had used in connection with that matter, and also
the American claim to the fisheries.
The British ministers considered that, in drawing
from the American ministers an offer of an equivalent
for the fisheries, they had secured an advantage, since
this was a departure from the American argument that
the fishing privileges were not abrogated by the war.^"
In their note of December i they asked for specific
instructions from their Government upon the follow-
ing points : —
First. As to their adherence to the words of the
first article, "belonging to either party and taken by
the other."
Second. As to the retention of any part of article
eight, which dealt with the northwestern boundary.
Third. As to insisting upon the latter part of that
article relative to the Mississippi.
Fourth. As to accepting the navigation of the Mis-
sissippi with the very limited access offered in the
American proposal as an equivalent for the privileges
of the fisheries.^''
With reference to the first of these points the British
thought that the American ministers would yield. They
26 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. i, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
27 Ibid.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 333
themselves were inclined to give up the free naviga-
tion of the Mississippi, since they considered they had
secured a tacit admission from the American ministers
that the navigation and fishing privileges rested on the
footing of a stipulation in the treaty of 1783. There-
fore, they reasoned, giving up this privilege would
place them in a position to exclude the United States
from the fishing privileges.^^ They urged that as
little delay as possible should be allowed in the reply,
as it was important that the negotiations should be
completed speedily, for the United States Senate would
adjourn March 2, and the concurrence of this body was
necessary to the ratification of the treaty.-^
On the second of December the British Government
sent a despatch to the peace ministers instructing them
to demand of the American ministers the proofs that
the British naval officers had taken slaves from the
coast of America and sold them in the West Indies.^"
The British ministers, accordingly, made this demand.
They stated in their note that they were instructed to
assure the American plenipotentiaries that, upon re-
ceiving the proofs in question, the British Government
would adopt every means in their power to bring to
28 Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. i, 1814; Wellington's Supple-
mentary Despatches, IX., 460-461.
29 Ibid.
3** Bathurst to Commissioners at Ghent, Dec. 2, 1814; Mem-
oirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 213; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, loi.
334 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
justice any British subjects guilty of the offense charged
against them by the Secretary of State.^^ The Ameri-
can ministers, conscious that the proofs which they had
were meager, and unwilHng to provoke irritation, de-
ferred their answer to the British note.
In view of the favorable prospects for peace, the
American commissioners thought that every precaution
ought to be taken to prevent discord in the future
negotiations. To this end, the mission, at Russell's
suggestion, decided to divulge nothing of the discus-
sions which took place either at their own meetings or
at the conference of the two missions, and agreed that
the papers should be communicated to no one except
the Secretary, Christopher Hughes, Jr.^^ It was in
consequence of this policy that William Shaler, who
was attached to the mission, became offended and left
Ghent.^^ He proceeded to Paris, carrying with him
despatches from the Department of State for Minister
Crawford. He was also the bearer of a letter from the
mission to Crawford containing the information that, in
view of the present state of the negotiations, the
American ministers wished to revoke their former
opinion with respect to the employment of French
31 British to American Commissioners, Dec. 7, 1814; MS.,
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
32 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 90.
^3 Ibid., 91.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 335
aid.^'* Crawford previously had suggested to them the
advisability of employing French officers and soldiers,
who, he wrote, could easily be obtained.^^ The Ameri-
can ministers had in an earlier letter given an opinion
favorable to such a plan.^*'
On the 6th of December the British Government sent
the requested instructions to their commissioners.
Upon the two special points of dispute the British
ministers were instructed to insist on the retention of
the words " belonging to either party and taken by the
other" in the first article and to impress upon the
American commissioners that the alteration in no way
was inconsistent with the principle of status quo ante
bellum upon which they had agreed to treat, as there
was a "manifest difference between the restitution of
territory which unquestionably belonged to either
party, previous to the war, and the restitution of that
of which either party may have had temporary posses-
sion immediately preceding the war."^^ In order to
avoid the inconveniences that might arise in the restora-
tion of territory situated in dififerent places, which the
3* American Commissioners to Crawford, Dec. 2, 1814;
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
25 Crawford to American Commissioners, Oct. 14, 1814;
Russell Journals, V., 483-485.
3*^ American Commissioners to Crawford, Oct. 19, 1814;
Russell Journals, V., 483-486.
s^Bathurst to Commissioners at Ghent, Dec. 6, 1814; Mem-
oirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 214-217; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, loi.
336 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
party in possession might claim the right to retain, the
British ministers were authorized to consent to Hmit
" the application of the Article to such possessions only
as are by the tenour of the Treaty itself, liable to dis-
pute ; " more especially, to hmit its application to such
possessions as were to be decided upon by the commis-
sioners on the disputed boundaries. Every facility in
wording the limitations was to be allowed, if only
"the object for which the alteration was proposed be
obtained," namely, the retention of the islands in
Passamaquoddy Bay during the time of reference to
the commissioners.^^
The Cabinet approved of the conduct of their com-
missioners in admitting that the free access to the navi-
gation of the Mississippi was no- longer a right belong-
ing to Great Britain under the treaty of 1783, but was
to be considered as granted by the American Govern-
ment in return for the favorable arrangement of the
northwestern boundary to which Great Britain had
given consent. The British commissioners were to
object to the proposal to make the fishing privileges
and the navigation of the Mississippi offset each other.
It was stated that, if they were to be considered equiva-
lent, the manner in which they had been proposed by
the American ministers was very unequal ; for the
American commissioners had proposed a " limited and
3^ Bathurst to Commissioners at Ghent, Dec. 6, 1814; Mem-
oirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 214-217; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 101.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 33/
restricted renewal " of the one privilege, in return
for an " unlimited and unrestricted renewal " of the
other.39
With the instructions were enclosed two articles for
the commissioners to propose. By the first, the north-
western boundary was defined as had already been
agreed upon; by the second, the conditions on which
Great Britain would renew the fishing liberty hereto-
fore enjoyed by the United States and the privilege
enjoyed by Great Britain with reference to the naviga-
tion of the Mississippi were to be left to future nego-
tiation.*'' The commissioners were authorized not to
sign the treaty with the omission of the amended pro jet
of article eight with reference to the relinquish-
ment of the fishing privileges; nor with the omission
of the latter part of the article concerning the naviga-
tion of the Mississippi. Instructions were further
given them that, in case they were unable to secure the
accession of the American ministers to the proposition
as ofifered by the British Government or to some other
written document which should acknowledge that the
fishing liberty was no longer in force, they should refer
home for further instructions.*^
39 Bathurst to Commissioners at Ghent, Dec. 6, 1814; Mem-
oirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 214-217; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, loi.
^o Ibid.
" Ibid.
23
33^ CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
The British ministers upon receiving these instruc-
tions from their Government sent their secretary to
the American mission requesting a conference at such
time and place as might be convenient for the Ameri-
can ministers. The American commissioners named
the next day, December lo, as the time and their own
rooms as the place for the meeting.*^
At the conference on the loth, after the protocol of
the conference of the first of December had been agreed
upon, the British ministers stated that they were in-
structed not to consent to allow the words in the first
article, " belonging to either party and taken by the
other " to be changed unless some modification should
be made, either by excepting from mutual restitution
all those territories which were made by any article of
the treaty the subject of reference to commissioners,
or by excepting alone the islands in Passamaquoddy
Bay.*^ This was suggested to remove the objection
made by the American commissioners that under the
former British proposal each party would be given the
right to judge in the first instance of what did, or did
not, belong to the other. The American commission-
ers took this statement under consideration.** The
42 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III, 93.
43 Protocol of conference of Dec. 10, 1814; MS., Bureau
of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IIT., 743.
** Ibid.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 339
British commissioners said with reference to article
eight that their Government offered in Heu of the
American proposals to retain the amended article as
to the boundary from the Lake of the Woods to the
Stony Mountains, and to insert the following stipula-
tion : "His Britannic Majesty agrees to enter into
negotiation with the United States of America, re-
specting the terms, conditions, and regulations under
which the inhabitants of the said United States shall
have the liberty of taking fish on certain parts of the
coast of Newfoundland, and other of His Britannic
Majesty's dominions in North America, and of drying
and curing fish, in the unsettled bays, harbors, and
creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen islands, and Lab-
rador; as stipulated in the latter part of the third article
of the treaty of 1783, in consideration of a fair equiva-
lent to be agreed upon between His Majesty and the
said United States, and granted by the said United
States, for such liberty as aforesaid.
" The United States of America agree to enter into
negotiation with His Britannic Majesty respecting the
terms, conditions, and regulations under which the
navigation of the river Mississippi from its source to
the ocean, as stipulated in the eighth article of the
treaty of 1783, shall remain free and open to the sub-
jects of Great Britain, in consideration 01 a fair
equivalent, to be agreed upon between His Majesty and
340 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
the United States, and granted by His Majesty."*"
These propositions to reserve for future negotiations
the subjects both of the fisheries and the navigation of
the Mississippi were received by the American min-
isters for consideration.
An article relative to the slave trade was proposed
by the British ministers, namely, " Whereas the traffic
in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of human-
ity and justice, and whereas both His Majesty and the
United States are desirous of continuing their efforts
to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed, that
both the contracting parties shall exert every means
in their power to accomplish so desirable an object."*^
This was received by the American ministers for con-
sideration.
The British ministers also offered a provision with
reference to suits by the subjects of one nation in the
courts of the other, namely, " That the citizens or sub-
jects of each of the contracting parties may recipro-
cally sue in the courts of the other, and shall meet with
no impediment to the recovery of all such estates,
rights, properties or securities as may be due to them
45 Report of conference of Dec. lO, 1814; British Commis-
sioners to Lord Castlereagh, Dec. 10, 1814; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, 102. Protocol of conference, Dec. 10, 1814;
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent";
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 743.
46 Ibid.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 34 1
by the laws of the country in whose courts they shall
sue." This also was received for consideration.*^
The American ministers suggested that doubts might
arise as to the accuracy of the words in article eight
which read, " a line drawn due west from the Lake of
the Woods along the forty-ninth parallel of north lati-
tude," and it was agreed that an alteration should be
made to guard against any possible misunderstanding.
The American commissioners also proposed some
minor alterations in the article with respect to the
various periods for the cessation of hostilities.*^
The British ministers after this conference reported
to their Government that they were confident that the
American plenipotentiaries would accept all their
propositions with the exception of that part which
placed the right to the fisheries on the treaty of 1783.
They thought that the suggestion made in conversation
after the formal conference indicated that the Ameri-
can ministers expected the treaty to be signed, for
Adams had suggested the signing of the treaty in
triplicate to provide against possible accidents.'*^ The
British ministers considered it hopeless to expect a
renunciation of the fisheries in return for the renuncia-
tion of the Mississippi. They believed that the Ameri-
*'^ Protocol of conference, Dec. 10, 1814; MS., Bureau of
Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
*s Ibid.
^'^ Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. 10, 1814; WelHngton's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 471-472.
342 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
can ministers would not make such an offer ; and they
thought it unwise for them to offer it as it would imply
a 'doubt of the right of Great Britain to exclude the
United States from the fisheries without such a re-
nunciation. In their judgment the record of the pro-
tocol of the last conference, December i, in which
the American ministers proposed to give the free navi-
gation of the Mississippi as an equivalent for the
fisheries, would be sufficient evidence that the American
ministers doubted their right to enjoy the fi-sheries
without a stipulation. If now the American ministers
should reject the British proposition, it might be used
as an argument in favor of the claim of the United
States.^^'^
On the nth, the American commissioners sent
Hughes to request of the British commissioners a con-
ference at their house the following day. At this con-
ference the American ministers stated that they could
not accede to the alterations in the first article relative
to the words " belonging to either party and taken by
the other," or to either of the modifications which
had been proposed by the British ministers. They said
that they considered the Passamaquoddy islands as part
of the State of Massachusetts, and that any agreement
which would give to Great Britain the possession of
them would be equivalent to a temporary cession of
so Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. lo, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 471-472.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 343
territory, which, as had been previously intimated, was
entirely beyond their power to make except with the
consent of the State of which it formed a part.^^ The
American ministers indicated, however, that they
would be " willing to admit such a modification as
should secure the right of Great Britain from being
affected or impaired by yielding possession of the
islands to the United States." The value of the
islands, it was said, was comparatively insignificant,
but the principle upon which Great Britain required
the possession of them was the point which they felt
called upon to resist.^-
To this the British ministers replied that the Ameri-
can ministers had assumed that a clause whose con-
sequential effect would produce to Great Britain a
continuance of the possession she now held implied
cession of territory for America, and they had assumed
this for the sole purpose of entangling this question
with the suggested difficulty of ceding without the con-
sent of the United States any part of its territory;
that such a clause could not justly be so interpreted, as
the United States would not be required to do any act
which could prejudice her ultimate right. The British
ministers declared that in fact no act whatever would
be required of the United States, while Great Britain
51 Report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by the Brit-
ish Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 13, 1814; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, 102.
52 Ibid.
344 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
would be obliged to yield a possession the right to which
was known under other title than that of war. They
were willing, if need be, to accede to a clause which
would especially guard the ultimate right against the
prejudice which the American ministers feared might
arise from the continued possession by Great Britain.
The British ministers also admitted the comparatively
small value of the territory in question, but claimed
that yielding possession of the islands involved a point
of honor on the part of Great Britain, and, if insisted
upon, might make the conclusion of peace impossible.^''
The British commissioners maintained that in accord-
ance with the principle of the objection made by the
American ministers Great Britain could not be assured
of the fulfillment of any award which might be made
by commissioners with respect to the islands adversely
to the claims of the United States. To this the Ameri-
cans replied that the award, if made in favor of Great
Britain, could not be defeated on the principle which
they had stated, but it would determine that those
islands had not been a part of the State of Massa-
chusetts, and, therefore, no cession would occur. On
the other hand, if the United States gave consent to
Great Britain to have possession of the islands and it
should turn out that they belonged to the State of
Massachusetts, then, without its consent, a temporary
^3 Report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by the Brit-
ish Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 13, 1814; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, 102.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 345
cession would have been made of a possession the right
to hold which belonged to that State. The American
ministers also repeated their objection to the altera-
tion on the ground that it was not in accordance with
the principle of status quo ante bellum.^*
The American ministers declared that they were not
authorized to admit the substitution proposed in the
latter part of the eighth article, that the fisheries and
the navigation of the Mississippi by British subjects for
fair equivalents be left for future negotiation. They
considered it unnecessary as it merely stipulated a
future negotiation which might take place just as well
without it. The only effect of such stipulation, they
considered, was to abandon the ground upon which
they claimed the right to the fisheries. Further, they
objected strongly to the words of that article which
sought to make the right appear dependent solely on a
provision of the treaty of 1783; and said that the pro-
position had been annulled by the war. Those prin-
ciples they had opposed and still would emphatically
oppose. Gallatin stated again the American argument
of the special character of the treaty of 1783 which
prevented it from being abrogated, like ordinary
treaties, by war ; he said that the treaty constituted one
great whole, and that all its parts partook of its general
character and could not be separated from it or made
the subject of different and distinct construction. As a
5* Russell Journals, V., 531-532.
34^ CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
substitute for the paragraph in the eighth article of-
fered by the British ministers the American plenipo-
tentiaries proposed a general article to treat from time
to time on all unsettled questions. ^^ To this proposi-
tion the British objected.
The American ministers said that they would not
object to the omission of the last clause of the eighth
article and the substitution of another "if it were pos-
sible so to word one as to make the fisheries and the
Mississippi the subject of future negotiation without
prejudice to either party as to the manner in which its
rights were derived. "^^
The British ministers replied that, if Great Britain
were allowed to retain the possession of the Passama-
quoddy islands, they would be willing to consider any
proposition relative to the fisheries and the Mississippi
in accordance with the view suggested by the Ameri-
can ministers ; " provided such an article were worded
so as to merely refer those subjects to future negotia-
tions without tending to preclude either party from
acting hereafter on his own view of those subjects."
The British assured the American ministers that in this
they went to the limit of their instructions.^^
With reference to the new articles which had been
55 Russell Journals, V., S31-532.
56 Report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by the Brit-
ish Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 13, 1814; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, 102.
5^^ Ibid.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 347
proposed by the British, the American ministers ex-
pressed their wilHngness to adopt, at least in substance,
the one with regard to the slave trade; but they ob-
jected to the one relative to the courts as unnecessary.^^
The conference ended with an intimation on the part
of the American ministers that they would present in
writing their ultimate decision on the two subjects
presented by the British commissioners at the last con-
ference.^^
Upon returning to their rooms the American com-
missioners took up at once the discussion of the reply
to be made. Gallatin and Clay thought a single page
note would be sufficient, while Adams as usual pre-
ferred making a long reply.*"* The discussion con-
tinued in meetings of the American ministers during
the next two days. A great diversity of opinion pre-
vailed among the commissioners. Adams proposed a
draft of a reply which insisted upon the rejection of
both demands of the British Government. If, how-
ever, the islands were made an ultimatum by the
British, that point might be conceded, but not the
fisheries. Bayard was in favor of explicitly granting
the point with regard to the islands, but insisting to
the last upon the fisheries ; Clay was in favor of reject-
's Russell Journals, V., 531-532.
'^Report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by the British
Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 13, 1814; MS., British
Foreign Office, 5, 102.
60 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 112.
348 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
ing both demands but eventually, if necessary, yield-
ing both. He thought that by insistence upon both, one
would be likely to be obtained. The draft presented by
Gallatin indicated that the question of the islands
would be yielded, and that the fisheries possibly would
be.^^ Russell was for insistence upon the fisheries, but
would yield them rather than have the war continue.^^
While Adams, Gallatin, and Clay all ofifered drafts, it
was reserved for Gallatin again to prepare the final
one. This with corrections and amendments was
adopted on the 14th. It was copied and despatched to
the British ministers that afternoon. The British sec-
retary replied the same evening that the note had been
referred to the British Government.^^
The American note consented to the proposal of the
British commissioners to omit the words which were
oiginally proposed by them. It stated, with reference
to the ofifer of the British commissioners tO' omit the
words originally proposed by them in the first article
on condition that the American commissioners would
except the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay from the
principle of mutual restoration, that the American min-
isters were willing to agree to the proposed exception,
provided that the claim of the United States should
not thereby in any way be affected. To insure this
«^ Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 114-115.
«2Ibid., 117.
^3 Ibid., 119.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 349
result, and to prevent a temporary possession from
being converted into a permanent possession, the
American ministers proposed a clause providing that
the title to the islands, if not settled witliin a given
period, should revert to the party in whose possession
they were at the commencement of the war ; and,
further, that " No disposition made by this treaty of
the intermediate possession of the islands and terri-
tories claimed by both parties, shall, in any manner what-
ever, be construed to aflfect the right of either.""*
The American ministers refused to accede to the
substitute offered in the last of article eight concern-
ing the fisheries and the navigation of the Mississippi.
With regard to their former proposition, they stated
that for " the purpose of meeting what they believed to
be the wishes of the British Government, they pro-
posed the insertion of an article which should recog-
nize the right of Great Britain to the navigation of
that river, and that of the United States to a liberty in
certain fisheries, which the British Government con-
sidered as abrogated by the war." They viewed this
article as merely declaratory and would accede in this
manner; but wanted no new article on either of those
subjects. They referred to their previous offer to be
silent with regard to both questions ; but stated that
^'^ American to British Ministers, Dec. 14, 1814; MS., Bu-
reau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent " ; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 743-744.
350 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
to the stipulation now proposed, or to any other aban-
doning, or implying the abandonment of, any right in
the fisheries claimed by the United States they could
not subscribe. The stipulation that the parties here-
after would negotiate concerning those subjects was
declared to be unnecessary. They would, however, be
willing to consent "to an engagement, couched in gen-
eral terms, so as to embrace all the subjects of differ-
ence not yet adjusted, or so expressed as to imply in no
manner whatever an abandonment of any right claimed
by the United States." They agreed to accede to the
substance of the article on the abolition of the slave
trade, but refused to admit the necessity of the article
upon the courts. They maintained that the courts of
the United States without such an article would be
equally open to the claim of British subjects, and they
depended upon the British courts for the same liberty
for the citizens of the United States.®^
The British commissioners upon receipt of the
American note transmitted it at once to their Govern-
ment.^^ In a letter to Bathurst, Goulburn expressed
the belief that the proposition made by the American
ministers regarding the Passamaquoddy islands would
be satisfactory, provided the stipulation for the
"5 American to British Ministers, Dec. 14, 1814; MS., Bu-
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 743-744.
6^ British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 14, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 35 1
restoration of those islands to America in case a de-
cision respecting them was not made within a certain
Hmited time should be withdrawn ; but said that the
proposal should be rejected unless this change was
made.^^ With respect to the fisheries he thought that
an article like the one mentioned in the last despatch
was the best arrangement that they could make, un-
less it should be deemed better to omit altogether any
stipulation respecting the fisheries and the Mississippi
and to make a statement distinctly of British rights.
Bathurst replied to the British commissioners that
with respect to the alteration which was proposed in
the first article, whereby Great Britain might remain in
temporary occupation of the islands in Passamaquoddy
Bay, there was no objection except the provision for
the surrender of the islands to the United States in
case no decision should be reached within a given num-
ber of years. This, it was stated, might occasion the
postponement of any decision on the subject. There
was no objection if a stipulation as to the rights of the
islands should be a point of reference first to be de-
cided by the commissioners.
Since the article on the fisheries appeared now the
only point of great difficulty, the British ministers were
instructed to accept the proposition made by the com-
^■^ Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 479.
352 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
missioners of the United States in the protocol of De-
cember I, which was to omit the article altogether.
Instructions were also given not to insist on the article
which guaranteed to the subjects of each country the
right to prosecute suits in the courts of the other
country.
On December 22, the British ministers sent a note
in reply to the American note of the 14th. In this
they expressed their willingness to agree to that part
of the article of the American ministers which made it
imperative upon the boundary commissioners to decide
the question of the ownership of the islands within a
fixed time. They expressed the hope that the Ameri-
can ministers would be satisfied with the declaration
" that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government
to do all that belongs to them to obtain a decision with-
out loss of time." They agreed to withdraw the pro-
posed article on the fisheries, and offered to adopt the
proposal of the American ministers, made at the con-
ference the first of December, and repeated in their
last note, namely, to omit altogether the article dealing
with navigation of the Mississippi and the fisheries.*'^
The American ministers now saw peace in sight,
although some of them, notably Clay, were not satis-
fied with the terms upon which it was to be concluded.
68 British to American Ministers, Dec. 22, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 744-745-
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 353
Orders were sent to Captain Boyd to have the
Transit in readiness to start for the United States at
a moment's notice."^
At a meeting of the American ministers on the even-
ing of the 22d it was decided to ask for another con-
ference with the British commissioners, although Clay
was opposed to it. The request was made, and the
next day the British ministers sent a note stating that
they would meet at the house of the Americans at
twelve o'clock that day, December 23. At this confer-
ence the American ministers agreed to the proposals
made in the note of the British ministers of the 22d,
and certain verbal alterations in the various articles
were accepted.'^''
That portion of the first article of the treaty which
had caused so much controversy as finally agreed upon
read as follows : " Such of the islands in the bay of
Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties shall
remain in the possession of the party in whose occupa-
tion they may be at the time of the exchange of the
ratifications of this treaty, until the decision respecting
the title to the said islands, shall have been made in
conformity with the 4th article of this treaty.
" No disposition made by this treaty as to such pos-
session of the islands and territories claimed by both
69 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 120.
■^0 Ibid., 122-124.
24
354 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
parties shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to
affect the right of either."^^
The American ministers made strong objection to
that part of the article which stipulated for the
payment in specie of the advances made by each Gov-
ernment for the maintenance of prisoners of war, on
the ground of its imposing on the United States an
unnecessary burden and of its requiring a mode of
payment different from that in which by far the
largei part of the advances had been made. The
British, however, insisted, and it was allowed. The
American commissioners saw in this a design on the
part of the British to secure a profit of from fifteen to
twenty per cent, upon the advances which they had
made for American prisoners, these originally having
been made in paper money."
The British plenipotentiaries urged the article with
reference to the prosecution of suits of law by the citi-
zens or subjects of one nation in the courts of justice
of the other. The Americans refused to consent to
this article on the ground that their courts were open
to all nations, and the acquiescence in such an article as
this might imply that the subjects of Great Britain
were not able to prosecute suits in the courts of the
■^1 British to American Ministers, Dec. 22, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel, III.. 744-745.
72 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 24, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102; Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III.,
124.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 355
United States without such provisions. The British
at last gave way on this point." The conference was
adjourned until the next day for the signing of the
treaty.
The British Ministry had hoped that their last com-
munication would enable the commissioners to close
the negotiations with a treaty of peace. They were,
however, suspicious of President Madison, and feared
he might not sign the treaty. For this reason it was
stipulated that the war should not cease until after
the exchange of ratifications at Washington. They
counted upon having a strong English fleet in the
Chesapeake and the Delaware at the time that Baker,
the bearer of the British copy of the treaty, would
reach Washington ; and they also counted upon the dis-
position of the Eastern States to secede from the Union
as likely to " frighten Madison." It was suggested
that if Madison should refuse to ratify the treaty, the
British Government should immediately propose to
make a separate treaty with the New England States,
which it was believed could be accomplished.'^*
The evening of the 24th the ministers of the two
states met at the house of the British ministers for the
purpose of attaching their names to the treaty. As
previously agreed, it was signed in triplicate, the
■^3 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 124-125.
■^■* Liverpool to Castlereagh, Dec. 23, 1814; Wellington's
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 495.
356
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION
British mission furnishing three copies and the Ameri-
can commissioners furnishing three. These were
signed and exchanged, Lord Gambier delivering the
three British copies to Adams, and Adams in turn
delivering the three American copies to Lord Gambier.
Lord Gambier expressed the hope that the treaty would
be permanent, and Adams replied that he " hoped it
would be the last treaty of peace between Great Britain
and the United States."^^ Upon the ratification of
either copy by the two Governments hostilities were to
cease.
The British ministers at the conference the day be-
fore had consented to date the cessation of hostilities
from the ratification by the two states, instead of the
exchange of ratifications, which before they had de-
manded. However, they had insisted that such rati-
fications should be without alteration by either of the
contracting parties.''^ They were criticized by their own
Government for inserting this clause.
It was agreed by the two commissions that the
fact of the signing of the treaty should not be made
known until noon of the following day, when Baker
should be able to make the announcement at London.
A carriage was in readiness to convey him, immediately
75 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 126.
■^6 Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. 30, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., S16-517.
CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 35/
upon the signing of the treaty, to Ostend, where a
vessel was waiting to take him to England. '^^
This eventful day prompted Adams to make the
following entry in his diary : " I cannot close the
record of this day without an humble offering of grati-
tude to God for the conclusion to which it has pleased
him to bring the negotiations for peace at this place,
and a fervent prayer that its result may be propitious
to the welfare, the best interests, and the union of my
country. "^^
77 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 126.
78 Ibid., 127.
CHAPTER IX
Ratification and Reception of the Treaty
At once upon the signing of the treaty Anthony
St. John Baker set out for London, carrying with him
a copy of the treaty and despatches from the British
commissioners to their Government. One of these
despatches informed the British Foreign Office that
Christopher Hughes, Jr., secretary of the American
mission, had been furnished with a certificate of his
being the bearer to the United States of one copy of
the treaty of peace.^ It was recommended that Henry
Carroll, the bearer of a duplicate copy of the treaty, be
permitted to proceed to the United States on the same
ship which might be assigned to carry to America His
Majesty's ratification.
The next day, December 25, the American min-
isters communicated to their Government the substance
of the negotiations since the last despatches were sent
on the Chauncey and announced the final result. The
joint letter, in giving the account of the proceedings
with reference to the fisheries and the Mississippi, stated
1 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 24, 1814; MS.,
British Foreign Office, 5, 102.
358
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 359
that the offer to exchange the one privilege for the
Other was that of the majority of the mission.- This
wording was inserted at the request of Russell, upon
the suggestion of Clay.
On the 28th, the American ministers sent a note to
the British in reply to the request made by the latter
in a note of December 7, which had asked for proofs
of the charges made by the American Government with
reference to the carrying away and sale of negroes by
British officers. The American ministers stated that,
not having been instructed to communicate proofs to
the British Government for the purpose which the
British Government had in contemplation, they would
transmit the British note to the American Government
to decide upon the propriety of its co-operation in
that object which the British now had in view.^
Before leaving Ghent the American ministers gave
a public dinner to the British ministers at which the
Intendant of Ghent and numerous other officials were
present. At the dinner Lord Gambier arose to give
the first toast : " The United States of North America,"
but Adams courteously anticipated him in offering the
toast: "His Majesty the King of England." At the
same moment the band struck up " God save the King."
2 American Ministers to Monroe, Dec. 25, 1814; American
State Papers, For. Rel., III., ^2>^-^^^•, Russell Papers, MS.,
No. HID.
3 American to British Commissioners, Dec. 28, 1814; MS.,
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
360 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
When Lord Gambler afterwards arose to give his toast
the band played the American patriotic air, "Hail,
Columbia." The citizens of Ghent also gave a grand
fete to the ministers of the two missions in celebration
of the signing of the treaty. This was given in the
beautiful Hotel de Ville of that city.*
Carroll, whom the American ministers had com-
missioned to be the bearer of a copy of the treaty to
the United States, left Ghent for London, December
26. He sailed from London, January 2, in the British
ship of war Favorite in company with Baker, who had
been authorized to be the bearer of the British copy
of the treaty to America, and to act in the name and
behalf of His Britannic Majesty for the exchange of
ratifications of the treaty.^ The copy of the treaty
which he carried had been ratified by the Prince Re-
gent in council at Carleton House,^ December 27.
This ratification was, however, merely nominal, be-
cause full powers had been granted to the British com-
missioners, unlike those of the American commission-
ers, to bind the Government to " accept, ratify, and con-
* Adams gave as a toast at this banquet : " Ghent, the city
of peace; May the gates of the temple of Janus, here closed,
not be opened again for a century!" (Memoirs of J. Q.
Adams, III., 131, 139.)
^ Castlereagh to Baker, Dec. 23, 1814; Memoirs and Corre-
spondence of Castlereagh, X., 230-231.
^ London Globe, Dec. 27, 1814.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 36 1
firm " whatever'^ the commissioners should sign. Baker
was empowered, upon the exchange of ratified copies
of the treaty, to adopt measures for forwarding naval
and military despatches, with which he was supplied,
commanding the cessation of hostilities.^ He was in-
structed to proceed to Washington with all possible
speed and, upon his arrival there, to present to the
American Secretary of State his letters of credence.
He was to proceed to an exchange of ratifications pro-
vided no alteration or addition to the treaty was made
by the American Government. Should the President
refuse to ratify the treaty, Baker was ordered to con-
tinue to Halifax and there make known throughout the
American States in every possible way the terms of the
treaty.^ If peace should ensue, he was to remain at
Washington as charge d'affaires until the restoration
of diplomatic relations between the two countries.^"
The Favorite arrived at New York, Saturday even-
ing, February 11, but Baker did not reach Washing-
ton until the 17th. Christopher Hughes, bearing the
unratified copy of the treaty, arrived at Washington by
way of Annapolis, February 14. On the evening of
that date the treaty was considered by the Cabinet,
^ Full Powers of the British Commissioners ; MS., British
Foreign OflSce, 5, 102.
8 Bathurst to Baker, Dec. 31, 1814; Memoirs and Corre-
spondence of Castlereagh, X., 231-233; MS., British Foreign
Office, 5, IDS.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
362 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
and on the following day the President communicated
it to the Senate for its advice and approval.^^ The
Senate requested the President to transmit all the papers
connected with the negotiations which had not previ-
ously been communicated. The next day, February
16/- the President submitted all the papers received
since December i, the date of the last transmission.
The Senate, thereupon, voted unanimously to ratify the
treaty,^^ so that when Baker, the bearer of the British
copy of the treaty, arrived at the State Department at
eleven o'clock on the evening of February 17, every-
thing was in readiness for the exchange of ratifications,
which at once took place between Baker and Secretary
Monroe.^* The next day the treaty was proclaimed and
published.^^ In the exchange of ratifications it was
agreed that the boundary commissioners to be ap-
pointed in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
should act upon the same principles as were observed
in the treaty of 1794.^*^ The Favorite, returning to
Great Britain, reached London March 13, and the ratl-
in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
552.
12 American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 730.
^3 Boston Weekly Messenger, Feb. 17, 1815.
1* Baker to Castlereagh, Feb. 19, 1815; MS., British Foreign
Office, 5, 106.
15 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
560.
IS Baker to Castlereagh, Feb. 19, 1815 ; MS., British Foreign
Office, 5, 106.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 363
fied treaty was delivered to Lord Castlereagh.^^
Knowledge of this event was immediately communi-
cated to the Lord Mayor.^^
The celerity with which approval was given to the
treaty indicates clearly the attitude of the United States
Government witli reference to it. The Republicans,
undoubtedly, were glad to bring to an end a war which
had brought the Government into extreme difficulties,
political and financial ; while the Federalists, who had
consistently opposed the war, naturally welcomed peace,
especially as they hoped that it would restore again the
commercial prosperity of New England. The Federal-
ist press, it is true, which before had criticized the Gov-
ernment for not making peace, now criticized the terms
of the treaty. It claimed that nothing had been secured
save the cessation of hostilities, but even this, it ad-
mitted, was worth rejoicing over.^^ The Republican
papers considered the treaty most acceptable, and eulo-
gized the American commissioners in highest terms.
Even the Federalist papers had nothing but commenda-
tion for the American representatives. The Philadel-
phia Gazette, before the treaty was signed, paid this
high compliment to the American commissioners :
17 Adams to Monroe, March 22, 1815; MS., Bureau of In-
dexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 147.
18 Bathurst to Baker, March 21, 1815; MS., British Foreign
Office, 5, 105. St. James Chronicle, March 14, 1815.
19 Boston Gazette, Feb. 16, 20, 27, 1815. New England Pal-
ladium, Feb. 24, 1815. Federal Republican (Georgetown),
Feb. 20, 24, 1815.
364 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
" After a most careful and dispassionate survey of the
correspondence which has taken place between the
American and British commissioners at Ghent, every
American with feelings of just pride and exultation,
must confess that their Representatives on this occa-
sion have manifested a power of reasoning, added to
forcibleness of demonstration, chastity and compre-
hensiveness of language, which entitle them to a supe-
rior rank as able and intelligent diplomatists. The
manner in which they have handled the subjects pre-
sented for their consideration; the promptitude and
facility with which they have met and overcome every
impediment in the course of their discussions, are evi-
dence not only of a deep study and research, but of
minds intrinsically devoted to the true interests of
their country. In all the correspondence that has ap-
peared, the American ministers evidently maintain a
vast superiority, as much in the matter as in the style
of the communications."^"
High praise was universally accorded the American
commissioners for the able way in which they had con-
ducted the negotiations. Not only had they appeared
to be superior to the British commissioners in diplo-
matic tact, but also in the character of their notes.^^
20 Philadelphia Gazette, quoted in the National Intelligencer,
Dec. 15, 1814.
21 Madison to Adams, Dec. 17, 1814; Madison Papers, MS.,
VII., 81. G. W. Hay to Monroe, Jan. 6, 1815; Monroe Papers,
MS., XIV., 1862.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 365
The favorable reception of the treaty was reflected
not only in the action of the Government and the
language of the press, but in the spontaneous rejoicing
of the people in city and town throughout the United
States. As soon as the news of peace reached America
it was quickly communicated to the cities and towns of
the country by means of express riders who were paid
large sums for their services.
In New York, where the news was first received,
there was at once a great demonstration. A large pro-
cession was formed, and brilliant illuminations were
seen throughout the city. Guns were fired, the public
buildings were decorated, and every possible mani-
festation of joy was shown. The news of the treaty
came eight days after Jackson's brilliant victory at
New Orleans, and the two events were celebrated
together ; a transparency on the City Hall suggestive of
the two showed the American eagle bearing in one
talon the thunderbolts of war and in the other the
olive branch of peace.^-
The news of peace reached Philadelphia on Sunday,
February 12, as the people were returning from church.
There was general rejoicing, strangers greeting one
another with good wishes, mutual congratulations, and
hand shaking.'^ Here, too, a public celebration took
22 New York Spectator, Feb. 13, 1815.
23 Patterson to Russell, Feb. 20, 1815; Russell Papers, MS.,
No. 1067.
366 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
place commemorating both the peace and the victory
at New Orleans. In Boston, where the news arrived
on the 13th, the schools were dismissed, business was
suspended, a procession immediately formed of the
military organizations of the city, and a general cele-
bration was voted by the legislature.-* Similar demon-
strations also occurred in the smaller places of the
country.
At Washington the ratification of the treaty came in
time to enable the restoration of peace to be celebrated
on Washington's birthday. A large procession, in
which all the trades were represented, took place. The
proclamation of the ratification of the treaty was read
and speeches were delivered. A banquet in the evening
closed the day's celebration.^^ March 4, the President
issued another proclamation appointing the second
Thursday in April as a day of national thanksgiving
for the establishment of peace. ^^
The treaty was the more acceptable to the public
because by the victory of New Orleans the war closed
with great credit to the American forces. This feel-
ing was shown in a letter to one of the commission-
ers in which satisfaction was expressed "because in
2* Patterson to Russell, Feb. 20, 1815; Russell Papers, MS.,
No. 1067. Otis Ammidon to Russell, Feb. 20, 1815; Russell
Papers, MS., No. 1362. Boston Gazette, Feb. 16, 1815.
25 Boston Weekly Messenger, Feb. 24, 1815.
26 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
560-561.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 36/
the fulness of our glory we grant peace to a worsted
enemy. -^
The American commissioners themselves, though
disappointed in not being able to secure any promise
on the part of the British of a discontinuance of the
practice of impressment or of fictitious blockades, and
though they failed to secure in the treaty any renewal
of the fishing privileges in British territory, were, never-
theless, satisfied that the treaty was, on the whole,
honorable and fairly favorable to the United States.
Adams in a letter to Monroe on the day of the signing
of the treaty wrote as follows : " If the treaty is not
precisely such as we could have wished, I firmly be-
lieve it is all which under the circumstances of the
times, it was possible to obtain. . . . On our part we
have yielded only that without which Peace would have
been impracticable."-^ Gallatin in a letter to Monroe,
December 25, said : " The treaty of peace we signed
yesterday with the British ministers is, in my opinion,
as favorable as could be expected under existing cir-
cumstances, as far as they were known to us."^^
Clay wrote: "The terms of this instrument are un-
doubtedly not such as the country expected at the
2'' John L. Smith to Russell, April 2, 1815; Russell Papers,
MS., No. 585.
28 Adams to Monroe, Dec. 24, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes
and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 144.
29 Gallatin to Monroe, Dec. 25, 1814; Writings of Gallatin,
I., 645-647.
368 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
commencement of the war. Judged of, however, by
the actual condition of things, as far as is known to
us, they cannot be pronounced very unfavorable; . . .
judged from the pretensions of the enemy at the open-
ing of the negotiation the conditions of the peace re-
flect no dishonor on us."^" Russell, writing to Craw-
ford, said : " I believe we have done the best, or nearly
the best, which was practicable in existing circum-
stances."^^
Public opinion in the United States, in general, was
most favorable to the treaty.^^ The failure to secure
any statement relative to impressment and paper
blockades was not regarded as so important since these
practices on the part of the British Government had
ceased with the overthrow of Napoleon, and it was the
general opinion that they would not be carried on
again.^^ A few here and there whose financial in-
terests were affected by the fall in prices which ac-
companied the news of peace were not pleased with
the treaty. In New York brown sugar fell from $26
per cwt. to $12.50; tea from $2.25 to $1 per pound.
Specie dropped from 22 per cent, advance to 2 per cent.
30 Clay to Monroe, Dec. 25, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS.,
XIV., No. 1822.
31 Russell to Crawford, Dec. 23, 1814; Crawford Tran-
scripts, MSS. Div., Library of Congress.
32 J. Smith to Russell, May 6, 1815; Russell Papers, MS.,
No. 2041. National Intelligencer, Feb. 16, 23, 1815. Madison
to Benj. Austin, March 7,1815; Madison Papers, MS., VII., 84.
33 Ibid.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 369
Tin fell from $30 a box to $25. Public stocks rose 19
per cent. Treasury notes appreciated 13 per cent.^*
A sudden depression in the price of gunpowder and all
kinds of military and naval stores was noted.
The British Government, as has been shown, were
glad to conclude peace even though they had been
obliged to surrender practically every demand that they
had made. The English press for the most part con-
sidered the treaty derogatory to Great Britain. The
London Globe, the next day after the news was re-
ceived from Ghent, said, after enumerating the condi-
tions of the treaty: " In this description of the treaty,
we read the humiliation of ministers in every line. It
forms indeed a deplorable contrast with the high sound-
ing threats and boasts of that part of the public press
devoted to their service. The waiving of some rights,
and the mere retention of others, is a miserable finale
to a war that we were told must not cease until after
the Americans had been ' confoundedly well flogged ' ;
which, it was boasted, must dismember the union, over-
throw the Government and sweep the American navy
from the ocean, not leaving a single bit of bunting or a
rag or stitch behind. But after the state to which
ministers had brought the country by their extrava-
gance, and the war by their incapacity, if they had been
able to terminate it upon any terms not absolutely dis-
honorable and ruinous, if they had effected a lasting
34 National Intelligencer, Feb. 23, 1815.
25
3/0 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
peace, although not an advantageous one, and not
merely purchased a short and precarious respite, with
a certainty of the renewal of war with increased force
and violence at a time when America shall have, both
internally and in her relation with the European
Powers, many advantages which she does not now pos-
sess, we would not be disposed to complain."^^
The London Times, also of the opposition press, was
bitterly opposed to the ratification of the treaty.^® In
its issue of December 27 it announced what it called
" the terms of the deadly instrument."^'' In an edi-
torial of December 31^® it professed to believe that the
ratification of the treaty by Madison depended upon
the outcome of the campaign against New Orleans. It
denied that general satisfaction had been produced by
the signing of the treaty, which could be shown from
the fact that the funds had remained at a " dead level "
instead of rising as might have been expected if general
satisfaction and confidence prevailed.
To accept peace in the midst of reverses was
humiliating to the English people. Peace would have
been more palatable, it was said, had it come earlier
when the British arms were successful.^^ The bril-
ls London Globe, Dec. 2"], 1814.
36 London Times, Dec. 30, 1814.
37 Ibid., Dec. 27, 1814.
38 Ibid., Dec. 31, 1814.
39Beasley to Russell, Oct. 20, 1814; Russell Papers, MS.,
No. 1847.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 37 1
Hant success won by the small American navy, which
had been an object of derision at the beginning of the
war, wounded the pride of the British, which centered
in their navy, then, as now, the first in the world. The
Naval Chronicle of that date had as a motto : " The
winds and waves are Britain's wide domain and not a
sail but by permission spreads."*" It was declared
that the law of nations had always been the law of the
strongest; that England was, therefore, de jure the
dictator of the maritime law of the civilized world.*'-
After the first victories of the American navy, the Eng-
lish papers stated that the United States navy must
be crushed to atoms ; that peace must not be enter-
tained until that object shoiild have been achieved.*^
The press with few exceptions had been very severe
in its denunciations of the United States and, par-
ticularly, of Madison, who was supposed to have been
the cause of the war.*^ The papers had throughout
the peace negotiations insisted that peace should not
be made until America should have been " beaten into
submission."** Peace made at New York or Wash-
ington,*^ and " at the point of the bayonet,"*^ was pref-
^^ National Intelligencer, Nov. i, 1814.
^1 London Evening Star, quoted in the National Intelligencer,
April 3, 1813.
*- London Times, July 2, 1814.
43 Ibid., May 17, 1814.
** London Sun, July 22, 1814.
*^ London Times, July 2, 1S14.
*^ London Sun, Aug. 23, 1814.
3/2 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
arable to negotiations at Ghent. After the British
victories of August and September it had been de-
clared that the fancied conquerors of Canada would
"be mighty glad to come on their knees and cry
' Paenitet. Miserere nostrum.' "*''' The separation of
the New England States from the Union and the
alliance of these with Great Britain was declared as
likely to follow.^^
The popular British demands, which the British
commissioners had presented at Ghent, as we have
seen, had included the recognition by the United
States of the maritime claims of Great Britain ; the
restitution of Louisiana ; the rearrangement of the
boundary in accordance with the wishes of Canada;
the establishment of a permanent Indian territory ; and
the exclusion of the United States from all participa-
tion in the fisheries of British North America.*^
In view of all these claims it was difficult to become
reconciled to a treaty which secured scarcely one of the
things expected and which concluded a war which had
been far from creditable to British arms. In this war,
according to one of their own papers, with a navy on
the American coast exceeding that of the enemy in
the proportion of ten to one. Great Britain had lost
^■^ London Times, Oct. 15, 1814.
*8 London Star, Sept. 29, 1814; London Times, April 15,
1814.
49 National Intelligencer, April 28, 1814; Boston Weekly
Messenger, Aug. 5, 1814.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 373
two out of every three fights and had lost three times
as many men. She also had had seventeen hundred
merchant vessels captured.^" To make peace with this
record, made vastly worse by the closing campaign of
the war, was thought to invite the scorn of other
nations. The London Times said :^^ " They will reflect
that we have attempted to force our principles on
America, and have failed. Nay, that we have retired
from the combat with the stripes yet bleeding on our
backs — with the recent defeats at Plattsburg, and on
Lake Champlain, unavenged. To make peace at such
a moment, they will think, betrays a deadness to the
feelings of honor, and shows a timidity of disposition,
inviting further insult. If we could have pointed to
America overthrown, we would surely have stood on
a much higher ground at Vienna, and everywhere else
than we possibly can do now. Even yet, however, if
we could but close the war with some great naval
triumph, the reputation of our maritime greatness
might be partially restored : but to say that it has not
hitherto suffered in the estimation of all Europe, and
what is worse, of America itself, is to belie common
sense and universal experience. ' Two or three of our
ships have struck to a force vastly superiot" ! ' — No, not
two or three, but many, on the Ocean, and whole
squadrons on the Lakes ; and the numbers are to be
viewed with relation to the comparative magnitude of
s° Edinburgh Review, Nov., 1814.
51 London Times, Dec. 30, 1814.
374 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
the two navies. Scarcely is there one American ship
of war which has not the boast of a victory over the
British flag, scarcely one British ship in thirty or forty
that has beaten an American, Our seamen, it is urged,
have on all occasions fought bravely. Who denies it?
Our complaint is, that with the bravest seamen, and
most powerful navy in the world, we retire from the
contest when the balance of defeat is so heavily against
us. Be it accident, or be it misconduct, we enquire not
now into the cause; the certain, the inevitable con-
sequences are what we look to, and they may be
summed up in a few words — the speedy growth of the
American navy — and the recurrence of a new and
much more formidable American war. . . . We are well
convinced, that every ship, and every sailor, employed
in maintaining the vital contest for our maritime as-
cendency, far from diminishing, will add a propor-
tional weight to our influence at Vienna ; but in truth,
Vienna and its fetes, and all its negotiations, are in-
finitely insignificant to us now, compared with the
growth of the American navy and the probable loss of
our transatlantic provinces. With respect to the latter
point, it is certain that the present treaty will produce
the most serious discontent among the Canadians, when
they find that the great object of their wishes, a secure
frontier communication, is referred to the decision of
commissioners."^^
22 London Times, Dec. 30, 1814.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 375
The prediction of this paper that the treaty would
not be satisfactory to Canada proved true. The people
of British North America had been clamorous for a
change in the boundary between those provinces and
the United States which should give them absolute
control of the navigable rivers and lakes lying between
the two, with the adjacent territory, which would pre-
vent invasions from the United States by water.^^
They were also no less insistent upon excluding the
Americans from the former fishing privileges. A me-
morial from Newfoundland, a few months before the
peace negotiation began, pointed out the advantages
that had accrued to Canadian fishermen with the elimi-
nation of American competition during the war.
It strongly urged the permanent exclusion of for-
eign fishermen from the Newfoundland fisheries, giv-
ing as an additional reason for such action that the
increased numbers of native fishermen afforded larger
facility for national defense.
The anti-ministerial papers, the London Morning
Chronicle and the London Courier, were favorable to
the treaty, and considered the terms as most honorable
for the country inasmuch as Great Britain had yielded
nothing in the treaty with reference to the maritime
^3 Quebec Gazette, quoted in New York Spectator, July 2,
1814; Quebec Mercury, Nov. 8, quoted in New York Herald,
Dec. 2, 1814.
3/6 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
questions.^* Party feeling so strongly actuated the
press that it affords no sure index of the public senti-
ment. That the people, however, rejoiced in the
restoration of peace was seen in the demonstrations
with which they greeted the first news.^^ At Birming-
ham a large crowd witnessed the arrival of the mail
which brought the news of the treaty. They imme-
diately took the horses out and drew the coach to the
post-office with loud acclamations.^^ The manufactur-
ing and mercantile classes were especially glad to see
peace, for it gave promise of renewed prosperity.
The British commissioners were not the recipients
of such universal commendation as that bestowed upon
the representatives of the United States. When the
treaty was discussed in the House of Commons, April
II, 1815, in connection with a motion which had been
made proposing an address of thanks to the Prince
Regent for the treaty of peace, the British commis-
sioners were severely censured for having acted with
" gross mismanagement " in the negotiations. The
basis of the criticism was that " in this treaty no one
subject of dispute between the two countries that
existed before its signature does not still exist and all
the pretensions advanced by His Majesty's ministers
^* London Morning Chronicle, Dec. 27, 1814; London Cou-
rier, Dec. 27, 1814.
^5 Boston Weekly Messenger, Feb. 17, 1815.
s*' Adams, History of the United States, IX., 54-55. Lon-
don Courier, Dec. 30, 1814.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 3//
in the course of the negotiations were, one by one,
abandoned by them." Alexander Baring and others
spoke in a similar condemnatory way. Goulburn
spoke in defence of himself and his colleagues. The
motion was carried by a vote of 128 to 37.°^ In the
House of Lords two days later the ministers were
censured when discussion arose over a motion made
by the Marquis of Wellesley for an address to the
Prince Regent requesting him to place before the House
copies of the correspondence between His Britannic
Majesty's plenipotentiaries and those of the United
States. Earl Bathurst, Secretary for War and the
Colonies, had great difficulty in defending the minis-
ters and in preventing the passage of the motion.^^
One feature that marred the negotiations at Ghent
that is indissolubly connected with the treaty and with
its negotiation is the unpleasant feelings that were
aroused and that continued to be manifested in later
years by certain members of the commission in their re-
lations to each other. The smouldering personal ill
feeling which flashed up during many of the discus-
sions of the commissioners broke into a flame in the
last conferences. The most violent controversies arose
over the fisheries and the Mississippi question, but
even such a small matter as the final disposal of the
papers and documents caused a bitter quarrel in the
mission. Gallatin thought that the papers should be
"Annual Register, 1815, 15-17.
58 Ibid., 17-18.
3/8 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
sent to Beasley, the charge d'affaires at London, for
the use of the commissioners engaged in negotiating a
commercial treaty. Clay, on the other hand, thought
that all the papers should be sent by the Neptune to
Washington. ^^ At a meeting on December 30,
Bayard, Clay, and Russell, Adams being absent, voted
that Adams should transmit all papers, maps, and other
articles of the mission to Washington, and a letter was
addressed to him to that effect. Adams replied to this
communication on January 2.^^ He maintained that it
was in accordance with general usage in such cases
for the head of the mission to retain all papers unless
directed by his Government to make some special
disposition of them. He claimed responsibility for the
papers, and expressed his unwillingness to deliver them
except to some one authorized to receive them. He
refused to consider the paper signed by Bayard, Clay,
and Russell as the act of the majority of the mission
since it had been signed without consultation of the
whole mission. In consequence of the retention of
these papers beyond the time of the sailing of the
vessel which carried the treaty, the papers connected
with the final negotiations were not presented to Con-
gress at the time of the ratification of the treaty.
It was not until the spring of 1822 that these last
59 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 129-130.
60 Adams to Bayard, Clay, and Russell, Jan. 2, 1815 ; Russell
Journals, V., 559-56o.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 379
papers were given to the public. At this time John
Quincy Adams was a candidate for the Repubhcan
nomination for the Presidency. Jonathan Russell, then
a member of Congress, and chairman of the Committee
on Foreign Relations,*'^ was bitterly opposed to the
candidacy of Adams, favoring instead that of Clay.^^
Russell thought that he might prejudice the West
against Adams by making it appear that in the nego-
tiations at Ghent Adams had been willing to sacrifice
the western interests for those of the East in offer-
ing to grant to the British the right of navigating the
Mississippi in exchange for the fishing privileges.
Russell succeeded in getting one of his colleagues in
Congress to propose a resolution requesting the Presi-
dent to have laid before Congress all the correspond-
ence in connection with the treaty of Ghent which had
not been made public. The resolution was laid on the
table until the next day, January 17, when it was
passed.^^
On February 21, the President communicated to
Congress the papers.*^* These failed to give the op-
ponents of Adams the material for criticism which they
had expected. Later, April 19, the letter of Russell
written to Monroe February 11, 1815, giving the
reasons why he had differed from the majority on the
81 Clay to Russell, Jan. 2, 1822 ; Russell Papers, MS., No. 419.
62 Russell Papers, MS., No. 1724.
^3 Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., ist sess., 733-734'
^*Ibid., 1147.
380 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
exchange of the Mississippi privileges for the fisheries,
was called for by Congress. The Secretary of State
reported to the President that the letter called for was
not to be found in the archives of the State Depart-
ment, but that Jonathan Russell had left at the State
Department what purported to be a copy of that letter,^^
However, before this was given to Congress the
original was found by Adams among the private
papers of President Monroe. The original letter had
been marked private by Russell and so had not been
filed witti the public documents. Monroe communi-
cated to Congress, May 4,^*^ the knowledge of the two
letters, but considered it unwise to submit the letters
themselves and the remarks which Adams had added
unless the House should specially call for them. Con-
gress then made a second call, which Russell claimed
was at the instigation of Adams. The President then
sent the letters in a message of May 7.^''
Russell was greatly censured for attempting to con-
vert a private letter into a public document.^^ Adams
and he carried on a most undignified controversy in
the public press.*^^ The purported copy which Russell
6^ Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., ist sess., 1791.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 2170.
68 Niles' Register, XXII., 220.
69Niles' Register (Russell's reply), XXII., 296-304. Niles'
Register (Adams's rejoinder), XXII., 327-336.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 38 1
left with the Secretary of State unfortunately con-
tained many variations from the original. Adams pub-
lished in a pamphlet these letters in parallel columns.'^'*
Of 172 variations pointed out by Adams, only two or
three were of any real consequence, most of them being
the underlining of a word, the order of the words, or
shght change in phrasing. The most important change
in the copy was found where Russell enlarged upon the
reasons which actuated the minority in opposing the
exchange of the two privileges. Here he placed the
emphasis, as he had not in the original letter, upon the
fact of its being contrary to the instructions of April
15, 1813. Russell's explanations were never wholly
satisfactory even to his friends. He claimed that the
difference was immaterial and that he had purposed to
present to the State Department an exact copy in-
dicating the variations, but that before he saw Adams
and had an opportunity to present such a copy, which
he had prepared and had in his pocket, the original
had been found.'^^ When Clay'^^ expressed regret at
the divergence in Russell's letters and refused to side
with him in his controversy with Adams, Russell bit-
''o Duplicate letters of J. Q. Adams; British and Foreign
State Papers, IX., 563-565.
''I Russell to Pay, August 7, 1822; Russell Papers, MS.,
No. 817.
72 Clay to Russell, Sept. 4, 1822; Russell Papers, MS., No.
421.
382 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
terly denounced him/^ although he had been hereto-
fore a great admirer of the brilliant young Kentuckian.
At the close of the negotiations Russell, in a letter to
Crawford, American minister at Paris, gave expression
to his feeling toward his colleagues, and more espe-
cially toward Adams, in these words f^ " In noticing
the diversity of opinion which may occasionally occur,
on particular points, between the members of the mis-
sion to which I belong and which undoubtedly arises
from a difference of the impression which the same cir-
cumstances make on different men however sincerely
united in the pursuit of the same ultimate object, I by
no means set up for infallibility, nor am I confident
that the course of which I may be the advocate, is the
best. I am still farther from intending tO' insinuate
any reproach against the patriotism, or integrity or in-
telligence of my colleagues because I happen to be so
unfortunate as not to accord with them in my views
of all the subjects, which, in the course of this negotia-
tion, are presented for discussion. My only object in
communicating to you these things is to make you
better acquainted with the character of our proceed-
ings, to show you that both sides of a question have
been examined, and to profit by your information and
advice, if it is possible to be obtained in season to in-
^3 Russell to Crawford, Dec. 23, 1814; Crawford Tran-
scripts, Library of Congress.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 383
fluence the final decision, (i) There are so many
agents informing the opinions and producing the con-
victions of a man, besides his reason, that his argument,
however sincere and plausible, may hold only a sub-
ordinate rank, and be but the instrument of constitu-
tional infirmity, prepossession or prejudice. (2) The
texture of the nerves is a great thing even with great
men, the fear or the firmness that results from it may
have more concern in giving direction to the policy of
an able statesman than his understanding. (3) Great
irritability of fibre is still more dangerous. It sports
with the judgment and sometimes the character of its
victim. It betrays him into inconsistency and ex-
travagance and, after raising him into flights of eccen-
tricity, and perhaps of eloquence, leaves him a prey to
error and absurdity. If this unfortunate man should,
at the same time, be tainted with family pride or in-
fected with the conceit of literary acquirement or of
local importance, his reasoning faculties and his
patriotism are necessarily circumscribed within very
narrow limits and he is liable to mistake the tasteless
ostentation of pedantry for science and his little per-
sonal pretensions and the motives of his vicinage for
the great interests of his country.
" The influence of habit and of education is also
unsafe, and the wisest and best of men may in vain
believe themselves free from the prejudices it neces-
sarily engenders. A long cooperation with a party or
384 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
a sect imbues the very soul with their colour and what-
ever purity we may affect, or sincerely endeavor to
attain, we still give the same tinge to everything which
we touch. A professional education is, likewise, apt to
impose fetters on the mind and to give a mechanical
and artificial character even to our reasoning. The
tanner believed that leather was the best material for
fortification and the common lawyer will cite, authori-
tatively, a black letter maxim as a clincher on a point
of public right.^*
"Aware of these and other frailties of human na-
ture, if I am disposed perhaps to distrust too much the
opinions of others, I am taught a salutary diffidence in
my own. When, however, I encounter a man in whose
heart all the noble passions have found their home,
and whose head is unobscured by the fogs of a false
education, whose great object is the welfare of his
country and who pursues this object with an instinctive
good sense that never deceives, I listen to him with un-
suspecting confidence, and promptly accord to in-
genuousness that implicit faith which I am apt to deny
to mere ingenuity."'^^
Five days after the treaty of peace was signed the
American commissioners sent a note to the British
commissioners with reference to a commercial conven-
tion which they stated they had power "to treat or
'^^ Russell to Crawford, Dec. 23, 1814; Crawford Transcripts.
75 Ibid.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 385
negotiate for, and, in the name of the United States,
with a minister or ministers of His Britannic Majesty,
furnished with the like power, concerning the general
commerce between the United States and Great Britain
and its dominions and dependencies and concerning all
matters and subjects connected therewith which may
be interesting to the two nations, to conclude and sign
a treaty or convention touching the same premises."^"
The British commissioners replied the following day
that their powers had expired and, therefore, they
could make no answer to the American note, but that
they would transmit it to their Government for con-
sideration.'^''
As soon as the ratification of the treaty of peace be-
came known Gallatin and Clay went to London in order
to learn the disposition of the British Government
toward a commercial treaty.''^ Soon after their arrival
they were invited by Lord Castlereagh to an interview
in which he expressed his desire that the commis-
sioners who had negotiated the treaty of Ghent, to-
gether with Sir Frederick John Robinson, should,
unofficially, talk over the subjects of the proposed
■^6 American to British Ministers, Dec. 29, 1814; MS., Bu-
reau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
■^"British to American Commissioners, Dec. 30, 1814; MS.,
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent."
■^sciay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10.
26
386 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
commercial treaty to find out whether it was likely that
any general principle could be agreed upon as a
basis.'^'' It was recommended that the American com-
missioners should consult together upon this and other
subjects suggested by Lord Castlereagh. The follow-
ing day Gallatin and Clay reported to Goulburn their
willingness to meet the British commissioners for an
unofficial conference. They heard no more from the
British Government for nearly three weeks. Gallatin
and Clay then intimated their intention of leaving.^''
A few days after they were invited by Robinson to
call at his office.'' This they did and found there
Goulburn and Dr. Adams. Upon the British commis-
sioners requesting to hear the propositions which
the American commissioners had to offer, it was re-
marked by the American commissioners that there
were, commonly, in a treaty of commerce two classes
of subjects: commercial regulations applicable to a
state of peace as well as of war, and regulations refer-
ring to the rights and duties of the two parties when
one was at war and the other at peace. The American
commissioners stated that they had been instructed
on both these subjects by their Government. They
presented as subjects to be included in a commercial
79 Conversation between Castlereagh and Clay and Gallatin,
April i6, 1815; American State Papers, For Rel., IV., 11.
80 Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10.
81 Ibid.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 38/
treaty the following :^^ That the two states with respect
to each other should be placed on the footing of the
nation most favored ; that all discriminating duties on
tonnage or merchandise, whether of imports or ex-
ports, should be abolished ; that the trade between
America and the British West Indies should be regu-
lated and placed on a more permanent basis ; that the
nature and kind of intercourse between America and
the adjoining British provinces should be defined and
provided for ; and that trade with the Indian posses-
sions of Great Britain should be open to America
without being restricted to direct intercourse in the
outward and return voyage. They expressed their de-
sire to provide for the question of impressment, and
stated that the American Government was willing to
prohibit merchant vessels of the United States from em-
ploying British seamen. The recent act of Congress
on this subject, it was declared, would largely remove
the difficulties, and, therefore, Great Britain should be
willing to abandon the practice.®^ An arrangement on
the trade between the United States and the colonies
of a state at war with Great Britain was proposed,
and also a definition of blockade was suggested as
desirable.
The British commissioners were unwilling to discuss
82 Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10.
83 Ibid.
388 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
the points under the subject applying to a belHgerent
state of one of the parties. They wished to consider
commercial relations in time of peace only. They ob-
jected to the discussion of impressment; but stated
that their Government would receive favorably any
proposition for the abolition of discriminating duties.
Trade with the East Indies might be conceded; but
upon that with the West Indies it was not practicable to
enter into any stipulation. The British commissioners
announced that they would refer the substance of the
conversation to the Cabinet.^*
Five days later, April i6, again upon the invitation
of Robinson, the American commissioners called at the
office of the former and met there the British com-
missioners. These had received instructions from the
Cabinet to reply to the topics before mentioned by the
American commissioners. They stated that of com-
mercial intercourse between the two states the British
Government were willing to treat on the footing of
the most favored nation, and were willing to agree
upon arrangements for the abolition of discriminating
duties; they were also willing to admit the United
States to the East India trade without restrictions of
direct trade on outward voyage ; but should be obliged
to insist on that with respect to the return voyage, as
was contended in the treaty of 1794. The British com-
missioners claimed that if the United States were to
84 Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 389
offer no equivalent for the privilege, it should, at
least, show a spirit of accommodation in the other
parts of the commercial arrangement, in the fur trade
for instance. They maintained that the West India
trade policy was so fixed that it could not well be
changed, but that trade with the North American pos-
sessions would be willingly discussed and arranged to
the satisfaction of both states. Any proposition that
the American commissioners might have to offer relat-
ing to conditions where one state was at war would be
considered. Definition of blockades was declared to be
unnecessary, as any question arising in connection with
them must relate to fact rather than to principle. It
was held that difficulties existed in connection with any
arrangement of colonial trade inasmuch as it was not
known what policy France had adopted. Impressment
was also declared to be impracticable for discussion.^^
The American commissioners asserted, with refer-
ence to the suggested fur trade, that they were posi-
tively forbidden to consent to any renewal of trade
between British subjects and the Indians. They main-
tained that the reasons for this were political, not com-
mercial. The commissioners offered to enter upon
the negotiation, reserving the right to withdraw if cir-
cumstances should make it eligible to do so, and to
leave Adams, who was daily expected, to conclude it.®^
^5 Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10.
86 Ibid.
390 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
The British commissioners, thereupon, agreed to pro-
vide themselves with the necessary powers for the
negotiation.^'^ Adams had in the meanwhile reached
London. He arrived there May 25 from Paris, where
he had been since the signing of the treaty of Ghent,
waiting for his commission as Ambassador to Great
Britain. On June 5, the British commissioners sent
an invitation for a meeting on the 7th, At the confer-
ence which was held on that date their powers were
exchanged. The American commissioners delivered a
projet of a commercial convention consisting of six
articles. In this projet they gave up all reference to
seamen and maritime rights, as it appeared impossible
to secure any arrangement on that subject. Adams
had previously interviewed Lord Castlereagh, and had
become convinced that nothing could be arranged on
the subject of impressment.^® The proposed treaty
was confined strictly to commercial subjects. In draw-
ing up the projet, the treaties of 1794 and 1806, the
instructions given the commissioners in 1807, and re-
cent legislation of Congress were used.®^
The articles of this projet provided for the follow-
ing objects : freedom of intercourse between the
^^ Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10.
88 Adams to Monroe, June 22, 1815; MS., Bureau of In-
dexes and Archives, British notes, 19, No. i.
89 Gallatin to Monroe, Nov. 25, 1815; Writings of Gallatin,
I., 662-665.
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 39 1
United States and the British possessions in Europe;
the aboHtion of all discriminating duties in trade be-
tween the United States and the British possessions in
Europe ; liberty to the United States of trade with the
British East Indies ; trade without discriminating
duties between the subjects of the United States and
the British North American possessions, including
freedom of navigation on all waters entering those
possessions ; the mutual recognition of consular rights ;
each state with respect to the other to be placed on
the basis of the " most favored nation."
The British ministers presented a contre-projet
which consented to the article with respect to the aboli-
tion of discriminating duties ; to that concerning free-
dom of intercourse between the United States and
British European possessions with certain omissions ;
and to the article respecting consular arrangements. In
the article with respect to liberty of trade with the
British East Indies restrictions were made to certain
ports and to direct trade on the return voyage between
such ports and the United States. The article with
reference to the East India trade was made a separate
article outside of the treaty, as the duration of it was
to be for two years only. The " most favored nation "
arrangement was to be confined to the United States
and the British European possessions.'-'*' The provision
80 Gallatin to Monroe, Nov. 25, 1815 ; Writings of Gallatin,
I., 662-665.
392 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
for trade with the British North American possessions
and that for freedom of navigation were limited.
The American plenipotentiaries in reply to the
contre-projet of the British proposed to reinstate the
clauses which the British plenipotentiaries had omitted,
notably that which provided that neither the inter-
course between the United States and His Britannic
Majesty's possessions in the West Indies nor that by
sea between the United States and His Britannic
Majesty's possessions in North America should be
affected by any article in the treaty.°^
Conferences between the two missions occurred the
nth and the 21st. The American commissioners de-
clined to accept the arrangement limiting the trade
privilege with the East Indies to two years, and instead
proposed the inclusion of that privilege in the treaty
itself and the duration of the treaty for four years.
The commissioners being unable to agree upon terms
of trade between the United States and Canada, the
article upon that subject was dropped at the proposal
of the American commissioners, as was also the " most
favored nation " article. The arrangement for the
abolition of discriminating duties, in conformity with
the recent act of Congress, was proposed by the Ameri-
can commissioners and accepted by the British. On
the 29th the British announced their readfiness to
91 American to British Plenipotentiaries, June 17, 1815 ;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., IS-
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 393
agree to a convention for four years which should con-
tain the whole of the article with reference to the aboli-
tion of discriminating duties and also the separate
article with reference to the East Indies as proposed
by Great Britain ; the latter article was to be in force
for four years. ^-
On June 30, the American commissioners agreed
to the treaty as finally arranged, but reserved the right
for either state, at the expiration of four years, to re-
fuse to renew, or to modify, any of the stipulations of
the treaty.^^ The treaty was signed July 3. The signa-
tures followed the reciprocal arrangement which Sec-
retary Monroe had urged in his letter to Adams,''*
March 13, 1815. In the projet offered by the Ameri-
can commissioners the name of the United States was
placed first in the preamble and ratifying clause. In
the contre-projet presented by the British commis-
sioners His Britannic Majesty appeared first. The
American commissioners insisted on the use of the
alternative principle. The British commissioners ob-
jected on the ground that with these variations the
two copies could not be the exact counterparts of
each other. They claimed to be ignorant of any gen-
eral usage of such a principle. The American com-
92 British to American Plenipotentiaries, June 29, 1815;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 17-18.
^2 American to British Plenipotentiaries, June 30, 1815;
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 18.
94 Monroe to Adams, March 13, 1815; Writings of Monroe,
v., Z1i-zn.
394 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
missioners referred them to their own Foreign Office
to prove that usage. The British at last consented to
yield the point. In the copy of the treaty which was
carried by Gallatin to America, therefore, the United
States was named first in the preamble, ratifying
article, and other articles where the two states were
mentioned together, and the signature of the Ameri-
can plenipotentiaries appeared first, while in the copy
of the treaty delivered to His Britannic Majesty the
reverse order obtained.
The treaty, as at last arranged, contained five articles.
The first provided for freedom of intercourse between
the United States and Great Britain's European pos-
sessions. Article two contained an agreement upon
the abolition of all discriminating duties and the in-
clusion of the "most favored nation" arrangement as
to trade between the United States and the dominions
of Great Britain in Europe. Intercourse between His
Britannic Majesty's possessions in the West Indies and
on the continent of North America was declared to be
unaflfected by any of the articles of the treaty. By the
third article American vessels were admitted to the
principal settlements of the British dominions in the
East Indies, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Prince of
Wales Island, and trade was allowed to American
citizens at these places in all except prohibited articles,
except that in time of war between Great Britain and
any state special permission of the British Govern-
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 395
ment should be necessary for trade in military and
naval stores and in rice. No discriminating duties
were to be placed on American vessels, and the United
States was to be granted the same privilege in the
East India trade as the most favored European nation.
United States vessels were excluded from the coasting
trade of these territories, though they might proceed
from one principal station to another in direct trade.
They were also allowed to touch at British ports for
refreshment in their passage to and fro. Article
four provided for consular arrangements in the terri-
tories of the two states. The last article contained
provisions for ratification and the duration of the
treaty, which was to be four years from the date of
signing.®^
The ratification of the treaty by the British Govern-
ment was delayed^® owing to the strength of the opposi-
tion party. The provisions of the treaty were severely
criticized. It was claimed to be disadvantageous to
Great Britain and in every respect favorable to the
United States.^^ The British charge d'affaires at last
notifying the Department of State that he was ready to
exchange ratifications,''® President Madison, as soon as
95 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 624-627.
96 Bathurst to Baker, Sept. 6, 1815; MS., British Foreign
Office, 5, 106.
9^ J. Q. Adams to Monroe; MS., Bureau of Indexes and
Archives, British notes, 19, No. 17.
98 Baker to Monroe, Nov. 24, 1815 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 18.
39^ RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
the Senate convened, laid before that body the treaty
accompanied by letters connected with it.^^ The treaty
was at once ratified. It was proclaimed by the
President in a message to Congress December ii.^°°
Though the British North American and West Indian
trade was not provided for and impressment was
omitted from the treaty, still upon the whole the treaty
was regarded as favorable to the United States.^"^
With the signing of the commercial treaty the duties
of the American commissioners as a mission were
ended. As has been shown, only three of the five
commissioners negotiated for the commercial treaty.
Bayard was ill at this time and had returned to the
United States. He died at his home in Wilmington,
Delaware, shortly after reaching there. Jonathan
Russell, after the completion of the negotiations at
Ghent, had returned to Stockholm after visiting Paris
on the way. The reason which he assigned for not
going to London with his colleagues was his disbelief
in the possibility of securing a commercial treaty at
that time.^*^^ It was quite likely that his animosity
towards Adams had much to do with his unwillingness
to serve further on the mission.
3* American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 7-8.
1"* Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I.,
569-570.
101 Madison to Gallatin, Sept. 11, 1815; Writings of Gallatin,
I., 652-653.
102 Russell to Monroe, May 30, 1815; Russell Journals, VI.,
56 (copy).
RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 39/
Clay and Gallatin left England^"^ on July 23, and re-
turned to the United States. They were upon their
arrival the recipients of many social honors and dis-
tinctions."* Clay resumed his old position in Con-
gress, to which he had been re-elected while absent.
Gallatin was offered his former position as Secretary
of the Treasury. He declined this position, and was
soon after appointed minister to France, where he re-
mained for seven years. He was the third member of
the mission to continue in diplomatic service through
appointment to a foreign court. It was Madison's
purpose to appoint Bayard minister to the Court of
St. Petersburg, but Bayard's health prevented the
execution of this plan.
In neither the treaty of peace nor_,the commercial
convention is there any mention of the subjects over
which the two nations professedly went to war. Great
Britain did not relinquish by the terms of these docu-
ments her maritime claims of right of search and im-
pressment, of the rule of 1756, of fictitious blockades,
and of the principles in her orders in council. These,
though not mentioned in the treaties, were never sub-
sequently enforced. It has been declared, therefore,
that the maritime rights for which the United States
contended were practically gained. The results of the
103 Russell to Harris, Aug. 12, 1815; Russell Papers, MS.
(copy), No. 1955-
104 Hughes to Russell, Nov. 20, 1815; Russell Papers, MS.,
No. 1329.
398 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY
war were manifest in a greater consolidation of the
Union and a national spirit which was thereafter
divided on questions not of foreign but of domestic
policy, such as a national bank, the tariff, and internal
improvements.^"^
105 N. M. Butler, The Effect of the War of 1812 upon the
Consolidation of the Union; Johns Hopkins University Stud-
ies in Historical and Political Science, Series V., No. 7.
Histoire des Etats Unis, 278. Scheffer (Paris, 1825).
CHAPTER X
The Execution of the Treaty of Ghent
The carrying out of the various provisions contained
in the treaty of Ghent covered a period of many years
and became the subject of numerous commissions and
treaty arrangements. The usual forms found in a
treaty of peace were speedily executed, but one pro-
vision contained in the article designed to establish
the status quo ante bellum occasioned much dispute.
This was the provision requiring the restoration of
slaves. The United States maintained that by the
terms of the treaty Great Britain was required to make
restitution of or compensation for the slaves who, at
the time of the ratification of the treaty, were in the
possession of the British forces and within the limits
of the United States.^ The British Government held
that the provisions of the treaty related only to the
restoration of slaves and private property which were
at the date of the ratification within places directed
by the treaty to be restored ; and that the restoration
of slaves from the public vessels of Great Britain was
1 Monroe to Baker, April i, 1815; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 106-107.
399
400 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
not required.^ Under this interpretation of the treaty
the British Government refused to order their naval
commanders to deliver up the slaves which had prior
to the ratification of the treaty been received upon
British war vessels.
Neither the United States nor Great Britain being
willing to recede from its respective position, the
President instructed the American minister in London
to propose to the British Government that a reference
of the disputed question be made to a friendly Power.^
September 17, 1816, Minister Adams made such an
oflfer in connection with a proposal to enter upon a
negotiation for a treaty of commerce.* Several of the
members of the British Cabinet being absent from
London, Lord Castlereagh promised that the British
Government would give consideration to the proposal
at a later time.^
Richard Rush, when appointed to succeed Adams at
the Court of St. James in 18 17, had full power to con-
clude a commercial treaty. A few months later, May
22, 1818, Gallatin, the American minister to France,
2 Castlereagh to Adams, April 10, 1816; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 125-126.
3 Monroe to Adams, May 21, 1816; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 126.
4 Adams to Castlereagh, Sept. 17, 1816; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 363.
B Castlereagh to Adams, Sept. 28, 1816; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 364.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 4OI
was appointed with Rush to negotiate a treaty for the
extension of the commercial provisions of the treaty
of 181 5 and for the adjustment of other differences
between the two states. "^ One of the special subjects
which they were expected to adjust was the claim of
the United States for indemnity " to the owners of the
slaves carried away from the United States by British
officers, after the ratification of the peace of Ghent,
and contrary to a stipulation in the first article of that
treaty."^
The British Government accepted the proposal to
refer the subject to the decision of some friendly
Power. They proposed, however, that it first be re-
ferred to two commissioners, appointed in the same
manner, and with like powers, as those provided for in
the treaty of Ghent for the settlement of the boundary
disputes. The American Government objected to the
British proposition on the ground that the questions of
indemnification for the slaves carried away and the
settlement of boundaries were entirely different in
principles and in character of evidence, and ought not
to be referred to the same sort of commission.^ The
American representatives offered to refer the subject
6 Commission of Rush and Gallatin; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 3/2.
''Adams to Gallatin, May 22, 1818; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., ZT^-i'72.
s Adams to Gallatin and Rush, July 28, 1818; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 375-378.
27
402 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
to an independent commission to be composed of three
members, but the British commissioners preferred to
have reference to some friendly sovereign or state, as
the United States had at first suggested. The American
commissioners proposed that such reference be made to
the Emperor of Russia. To this the British objected ;
and the article upon the subject of claims for restitu-
tion of slaves included in the treaty signed October 20,
1 818, provided that the question as to whether the
United States was entitled to compensation, in accord-
ance with the American interpretation of the first
article of the treaty of Ghent, should be left to the
decision of " some friendly sovereign or state," and
that both states should agree to abide by such decision
as final and conclusive.^ Later the two states agreed
to refer the matter to the Russian Emperor, who, April
22, 1822, rendered his decision in favor of the United
States. He gave as his decision that the United States
was entitled to a just indemnification from Great
Britain for all private property, including slaves, that
had been carried away by the British forces from the
places and territories the restitution of which was stip-
ulated in the treaty. The Emperor further expressed
the opinion that the United States was "entitled to con-
sider as having been so carried away all such slaves as
may have been transported from the above mentioned
territories on board of the British vessels within the
° Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 633.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 403
waters of the said territories, and who, for this reason^
have not been restored." The Emperor proffered him-
self as a mediator in the negotiations which would be
necessary as a result of his decision.^"
Under the mediation of Russia a convention was
signed, July 12, 1822, and later ratified by the United
States and Great Britain, which made provision for
carrying out the intent of the Emperor's decision. In
accordance with the arrangements of this instrument
two commissioners and two arbitrators were ap-
pointed, one commissioner and one arbitrator by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and one commissioner and one arbitrator by His Brit-
annic Majesty. The treaty provided that these four
commissioners and arbitrators should act as a board
for examining all claims and should hold their sessions
at Washington. In case of a disagreement they were
empowered to draw the name of one of the two arbi-
trators, who should render a decision. Upon failure
of the two Governments to agree upon the average
value of a slave the mixed commission was to decide ;
and if they failed to agree, recourse was to be had to
the arbitration of the minister or other agent of the
mediating power accredited to the United States. The
treaty was proclaimed by the President,^^ January 16,
1° Award of Emperor of Russia, April 22, 1822; American
State Papers, For. Rel, V., 220.
11 Convention with Great Britain; American State Papers,
For. Rel., V., 214-217.
404 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
1823. The two Governments appointed as commis-
sioners Langdon Cheves and George Jackson respec-
tively. These men entered upon their labors in August,
1823, but broke off four months later because of the
refusal of the British commissioner to act with refer-
ence to a majority of the claims presented.
These claims continued to be a source of constant ir-
ritation between the two Governments until 1826, when
the disagreement was finally settled by the treaty of
November 13 of that year/^ signed by Albert Gallatin
for the United States and William Huskisson and
Henry Addington for Great Britain. By the terms of
this treaty Great Britain agreed to pay an indemnity
of $1,204,960 in satisfaction of all claims. This
amount was to be paid in two installments. Upon the
exchange of the ratifications of this convention, the
joint commission appointed under the convention of
July 12, 1822, became dissolved. With the payment
of this indemnity by Great Britain the execution of
article one of the treaty of Ghent became complete.
The exchange of prisoners as provided in the third
article of the treaty also became a subject of contro-
versy between the two states. The American Govern-
ment interpreted the words of the article " shall be re-
stored "^^ as implying the conveyance of prisoners to
their own country by the state detaining them. Great
12 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 641-643.
13 Ibid., 614.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 405
Britain refused to accede to this interpretation, as the
expenses sustained by her under such an arrangement
would be far greater than those of the United States.
The United States, it was pointed out, would be obliged
to defray expenses only from the United States to
Bermuda or Halifax, while Great Britain would be
bound to pay the cost of conveyance of American
prisoners from Great Britain to America and of her
own prisoners from America to Great Britain.^*
While the exchange of prisoners was being delayed
on account of the differences in the construction of the
treaty, a disturbance among the American prisoners at
Dartmoor prison occurred. The British soldiers in-
discriminately fired upon them and killed or wounded
a large number. The British Government immediately
proposed that an inquiry be made into the affair by
commissioners, one to be appointed by each Govern-
ment. This proposal was accepted, and Charles King
and Francis Larpent were appointed by the United
States and Great Britain respectively. These men
proceeded at once to the investigation, and made their
report April 26, eight days after their appointment.
Their report, while criticizing the British authorities
for excessively harsh and severe treatment of unarmed
prisoners, failed to locate the responsibility for the
1* Minute of conversation between Castlereagh and Clay
and Gallatin, April 16, 1815; American State Papers, For.
Rel., IV., 19.
406 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
affair or to suggest any means of redress or punish-
ment.^^ The British Government, attaching a degree
of blame to their soldiers, ordered the commanding
officer to be censured for the conduct of his troops.
Compensation was also offered to the widows and fam-
ilies of the sufferers.^" The American Government
felt that the report of the joint commission did not do
sufficient justice to the American side of the affair, and
it declined to accept the provision offered by Great
Britain." A proposal made by the British Govern-
ment that the prisoners be transported at the joint
expense of the two states was accepted. Under this
arrangement the exchange speedily took place.
The tenth article of the treaty was concerned with
the slave trade and read as follows: "Whereas the
traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of
humanity and justice, and whereas both His Majesty
and the United States are desirous of continuing their
efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby
agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their
best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object."
No immediate action was taken by the United States
15 Report of Larpent and King, April 26, 1815; American
State Papers, For. Rel, IV., 21-23.
16 Castlereagh to Clay and Gallatin, May 22, 1815 ; American
State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 23.
17 Monroe to Baker, Dec. 11, 1815; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 24.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 407
to give effect to this article. Congress had by law in
1807 forbidden the importation of African slaves into
the United States, but to some degree the slave trade
still continued, in an indirect way, to be carried on.
On December 3, 1816, President Madison in his
annual address to Congress recommended some amend-
ment to the existing law to prevent the violations and
evasions which were being made by those who, trading
under foreign flags and with foreign ports, were
secretly importing slaves into the United States.^^ The
Committee on Foreign Relations, January 10, 1818,
also reported the need of the adoption of more re-
strictive measures to put a stop to the further intro-
duction of slaves into the United States. It was sug-
gested by this committee that the law would be more
effective if provision were to be made granting to the
informer a part, or the whole, of the forfeited vessel
or goods, instead of allowing the whole amount to re-
vert to the United States."
In 1818 American commissioners were engaged in
negotiations with Great Britain relative to subjects
omitted in the treaties of peace and of commerce of
1814 and 1815, and to the continuance of the commer-
cial arrangements of the treaty of 181 5, which would
cease by limitation in 1819. The question of the slave
trade came up in the course of the negotiation, and the
18 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 96-98.
19 Ibid., 132-134.
408 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
British Government proposed that the United States
accede to certain regulations which had been included
in the treaties between Great Britain and the states
of Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. This pro-
posal being referred to the Government at Washington,
the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, in reply
set forth the principles under which the United States
acted in its effort to abolish the slave trade. He ob-
jected to the British proposal upon the grounds of the
constitutional provisions of the United States Govern-
ment and the principles of public law. For the en-
forcement of the regulations the establishment of a
mixed court would be necessary, whose judges would
be amenable to impeachment for corruption and who
would be qualified to decide upon the statutes of the
United States without appeal. It was questionable,
Adams said, whether Congress had the power to in-
stitute such a court, which would carry into execution
the penal statutes of the United States beyond the
territories of the country. Again, the proposal that
officers of ships of war of either party be allowed to
enter, search, capture, and carry into port for adjudica-
tion the merchant vessels of the other was repugnant
to the views held by the United States upon the right
of search. If the exercise of that power by foreign
officers in time of war was obnoxious to the feeling of
the country, much more would that be the case if
the power were exercised in time of peace.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 4O9
Another special objection raised by Adams to the
proposed treaty arrangement upon the slave trade was
the difficulty of dealing with the slaves which might
be found on board the vessels condemned by the mixed
courts. Being freemen, such negroes could not, but by
their own consent, be employed as servants or laborers ;
but since the condition of the blacks in the United
States was regulated by the municipal laws of the
separate States, the Government of the United States
could "neither guaranty their liberty in the States
where they could only be received as slaves, nor con-
trol them in the States where they would be recognised
as free."-" The question of the slave trade was dropped
from the negotiation and was not again renewed until
1824.
On May 15, 1820, Congress passed an act which
declared slave trading to be piracy and to be punish-
able with death. 2^ This was designed to enable the
United States to join in the movement then being made
to place the slave trade upon the same basis as piracy,
both in its punishment and in its method of repression.
The movement, however, was unsuccessful on account
of the opposition to any arrangement that would recog-
nize the right of the practice of visitation and search
in time of peace. In 1823 the House of Representa-
20 Adams to Gallatin and Rush, Nov. 2, 1818; American
State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 399-401.
21 Revised Statutes, III,, 601.
41 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
tives adopted a resolution " that the President of the
United States be requested to enter upon, and to prose-
cute from time to time, such negotiations with the
several maritime powers of Europe and America as
he may deem expedient for the efifectual abolition of
the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation
as piracy, under the laws of nations, by the consent of
the civilized world."-- In pursuance of this resolution,
instructions for carrying it into effect were given to
the various American ministers in South America and
Europe. Special instructions upon the subject were
sent to Minister Rush in London, and full power was
given him to conclude with the British Government
a convention for the complete suppression of the slave
trade. As a preliminary to the conclusion of the pro-
posed convention, should it meet with the approval of
Great Britain, would be the enactment of a statute by
the British Parliament declaring the crime of African
slave trading to be piracy by British law.^^ The Ameri-
can minister was instructed to propose to the British
Government that the two Powers should endeavor to
get the consent of the other nations to the general
outlawry of this trafifiic as piracy, and that in the mean-
time the two states should duly authorize and instruct
their armed vessels " to capture the slave-trading ves-
22 Moore, Digest of International Law, II., 922-923.
23 Adams to Everett, Aug. 8, 1823 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., V., 338.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 4I I
sels which may assume the flag of cither, and, if not
of their own nation, to deliver over the captured slave
trader to the officers or tribunals of his own country
for trial and adjudication."-*
The purpose on the part of the United States in
attempting to make slave trading piracy was to bring it
definitely within the pale of international law. As
long as the ofifense was made only a domestic crime it
was considered that the Constitution of the United
States did not admit of the submission of the question
to any foreign tribunal.
A negotiation upon the slave trade was reopened
by Minister Rush with the British Government in Jan-
uary, 1824. Rush first proposed to the British com-
missioners the plan which Adams had outlined,
namely, that slave trading be declared piracy and
punished as such in the courts of each nation. The
British commissioners preferred rather the plan which
admitted of a reciprocal right of search. After several
weeks of negotiation an agreement was reached which
was a compromise of the American and British
methods of dealing with the slave trade problem.-^ By
the convention signed March 13, 1824, slave trading
was recognized as piracy except that the captain and
crew of a captured vessel were to be placed on trial
24 Adams to Everett, Aug. 8, 1823; American State Papers,
For. Rel., V., 338.
25 Rush to Adams, Jan. 23, 1824; American State Papers,
For. Rel., V., 31S-316.
412 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
only in the courts of their own country. In order to
carry out the purpose of the convention the cruisers
of both countries were empowered under certain con-
ditions and restrictions to visit and search each other's
vessels " on the coast of Africa, of America, or of the
West Indies."26
In order that the concession here made with respect
to visit and search might not affect the general prin-
ciple maintained by the United States, the American
minister secured the inclusion of an article definitely
limiting its application to the slave trade. This article
was as follows : " The high contracting parties declare
that the right which in the foregoing articles they have
each reciprocally conceded of detaining, visiting,
capturing, and delivering over for trial the merchant
vessels of the other engaged in the African slave trade,
is wholly and exclusively grounded on the considera-
tion of their having made that traffic piracy by their
respective laws; and further, that the reciprocal con-
cession of the said right, as guarded, limited, and
regulated by this convention, shall not be so construed
as to authorize the detention or search of the merchant
vessels of either nation by the officers of the Navy of
the other, except vessels engaged or suspected of being
engaged in the African slave-trade, or for any other
26 A Convention for the Suppression of Piracy, committed
by the African Slave Trade; American State Papers, For. Rel.,
v., 319-322.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 4I3
purpose whatever than that of seizing and dehvering
up the persons and vessels concerned in that traffic for
trial and adjudication by the tribunals and laws of
their own country ; nor be taken to affect in any other
way the existing rights of either of the high contract-
ing parties. "^^
When the convention was submitted to the Senate
of the United States it was amended by that body so
as to provide that either party should be free to de-
nounce it at any time upon giving six months' notice.
The Senate also amended the article permitting cruisers
to visit and search vessels of the other party " on the
coast of Africa, of America, or of the West Indies"
by striking out the words " of America." It was voted
to strike out all of article two and that part of article
seven which provided that vessels or persons of either
nation engaged in the slave trade, even though not
under the flag of that nation, should be proceeded
against in the same manner as any other vessel or
person might be.-^
When the convention, as amended by the Senate,
was reported to the British Government, it was re-
fused, the chief objection being made to the striking
27 A Convention for the Suppression of Piracy, committed
by the African Slave Trade; American State Papers, For.
Rel., v., 319-322.
28 American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 361-362.
414 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
out of the words " of America."^^ In fact, the British
charge d'affaires at Washington, Addington, was given
authority to conclude and sign a treaty verbatim, the
same as the returned treaty would be with all the
alterations introduced into it by the Senate, excepting
only the proposed omission of the words " of Amer-
ica."^" Addington made this proposal to the Secretary
of State, who replied that the whole subject was to
be referred by the President to Congress.^^
President Monroe in his annual message to Congress
December 7, 1824, submitted all the documents relating
to the negotiations upon the slave trade in order to
secure the sentiments of Congress upon the subject.^^
The committee in the House of Representatives to
which that portion of the President's message dealing
with the suppression of the slave trade was referred,
made to the House an exhaustive report which they
concluded with the statement that they would not
consider a negotiation to be dissolved which had ap-
proached so near a consummation, nor a convention
as absolutely void which had been executed by one
20 Rush to Adams, Aug. 9, 1824 ; American State Papers,
For. Rel., V., 364.
^0 Canning to Rush, Aug. 27, 1824; American State Papers,
For. Rel., V., 364-365.
31 Adams to Addington, Dec. 4, 1824; American State
Papers, For. Rel., V., 367-368.
32 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II.,
250.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 415
party and which the United States, having first ten-
dered, should be the last to reject.^^ This shows that
even then the opposition to slavery was much stronger
in the House than in the Senate. This fact is further
disclosed by the discussion in the House at this time
over a bill for the colonizing of free people of color
of the United States.
Addington, the British charge, March 2, 1825, ad-
dressed Secretary Adams requesting that he be in-
formed as to the intention of the President with respect
to the proposition which the British Government had
previously offered. The reply tO' this request was
not made until after Clay became Secretary of State
under Adams. April 6, 1825, Secretary Clay ad-
dressed a long note to the British representative in
which he stated that, owing to the persistent opposi-
tion of the Senate to a convention of the character pro-
posed, it would be inexpedient longer to continue the
negotiation respecting the slave convention with any
hope of a satisfactory conclusion.^*
In 1833 and 1834 the Governments of France and
Great Britain endeavored to secure the adherence of
the United States to a convention made between those
Powers November 30, 1831, and a supplementary
arrangement of March 22, 1833, for the suppression
33 American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 629-632.
34 Addington to Adams, March 2, 1825; American State
Papers, For. Rel., V., 782. Clay to Addington, April 6, 1825 ;
American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 783-784.
41 6 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
of the African slave trade. The American Govern-
ment held that the convention and supplement were
open to the same objections as had previously been
"deemed insuperable," and that the statement of the
British minister in his note of December 25, 1833,
"that in the act of accession it would be necessary
'that the right of search should be extended to the
coasts of the United States ' " made it more imperative
for the President to decline the invitation.^^
In December, 1841, the representatives of England,
France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria signed at Lon-
don a treaty for the suppression of the slave trade.
The cruisers of each nation were authorized to detain
and search any vessels of the others that should "on
reasonable grounds be suspected of being engaged in
the traffic in slaves." General Cass, then American
minister in Paris, published a pamphlet in which he
deplored the treaty on the ground that it tended
toward the re-establishment of the practice of visita-
tion and search. In February, 1842, Cass sent a
communication to M. Guizot, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, protesting against the quintuple treaty. The
French Government in consequence refused to ratify
the treaty, but later, in 1845, agreed to support an
35 Mr. McLane, Secretary of State, to Mr. Vaughan, Brit,
min., March 24, 1834; MS. Notes to For. Leg., V., 191. Quoted
in Moore, Digest of International Law, IL, 927.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 41/
effective fleet on the African coast as the United States
had done under the Webster- Ashburton treaty.^^
By the eighth article of this treaty, signed August
9, 1842, Great Britain and the United States agreed
that each would maintain on the coast of Africa a
sufficient number of ships " to enforce, separately and
respectively, the laws, rights, and obligations of each
of the two countries for the suppression of the slave-
trade." The two squadrons were to be independent
of each other, but to act in " concert and cooperation "
as circumstances might arise. By the ninth article of
the same treaty the two powers agreed to unite in
making remonstrances to those states offering a market
for slaves and to urge upon such states " the propriety
and duty of closing such markets effectually, at once
and forever."^^ President Tyler when communicating
this treaty to the Senate said : " The treaty which I
now submit to you proposes no alteration, mitigation,
or modification of the rules of the law of nations. "^^
Cass criticized that portion of the treaty which dealt
with the question of the slave trade, not on the grounds
of its admission of a right of search, but because the
abandonment of that claim was not made " a previous
36 Moore, Digest of International Law, II., 928.
3" Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 655.
38 Webster's Works, VI., 353. Quoted in Moore, Digest of
International Law, II., 931. Richardson, Messages and Pa-
pers of the Presidents, IV., 168.
28
41 8 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
condition to any conventional arrangement upon the
genera] subject." Webster answered the criticism of
Cass as follows : " Inasmuch as the treaty gives no
color or pretext whatever to any right of searching
our ships, a declaration against such a right would
have been no more suitable to this treaty than a decla-
ration against the right of sacking our towns in time
of peace, or any other outrage."^^
When Cass himself became Secretary of State the
old question of visitation and search arose again. In
1858 in a note to Lord Napier, British Minister at
Washington, relative to measures for the suppression
of the slave trade, Cass referred to a statement made
by the British minister "to the effect that the use of
the American flag by a vessel did 'not protect the slaver
from visit, but exonerates her from search.' " This
distinction between " ' the right of visitation and the
right of search, between an entry for the purpose of
examining into the national character of a vessel and
an entry for the purpose of examining into the objects
of her voyage,' could not, said Mr. Cass, 'be justly
maintained upon any recognized principle of the law^
of nations. . . . The United States deny the right
of the cruisers of any other power whatever, for
any purpose whatever, to enter their vessels by force
in time of peace. . . . No change of name can change
39 Moore, Digest of International Law, II., 931.
EXECUTION' OF TREATY OF GHENT 4I9
the illegal character of the assumption. Search, or
visit, it is equally an assault upon the independence
of nations.'"^"
As a result of certain reports concerning orders that
were alleged to have been given to British and French
cruisers to visit and search vessels as suspected slavers
in the Gulf of ^lexico, the United States Senate, June
16, 1858, adopted a resolution declaring "that Ameri-
can vessels on the high seas, in time of peace, bearing
the American flag, remain under the jurisdiction of the
country to which they belong, and therefore any visita-
tion, molestation, or detention of such vessels by force,
or by the exhibition of force, on the part of a foreign
power, is in derogation of the sovereignty of the
United States."" When Cass transmitted this resolu-
tion to the American minister at London he re-empha-
sized the American position in these rather threatening
words : " The immunity of their merchant vessels upon
the high seas will be steadily maintained by the United
States under all circumstances, as an attribute of their
sovereignty never to be abandoned, whatever sacrifices
its protection may require."*-
^° Cass to Lord Napier, April 10, 1858 ; S. Ex. Doc. 49, 35th
Cong., 1st sess., 42. 47, 48. Quoted in Moore, Digest of Inter-
national Law, IL, 942-943.
*i Foreign Relations, 1874, 963. Quoted in Moore, Digest of
International Law, II.. 946.
42 Cass to Dallas, June 17, 185S ; H. Ex. Doc. 7. 36 Cong.,
2d sess., 97. Quoted in Moore, Digest of International Law,
XL, 946.
420 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
Notwithstanding the language of the Senate resolu-
tion, four years later, under the administration of
Lincoln and Seward, there was concluded a treaty be-
tween the United States and Great Britain by the
terms of which the two states agreed to allow their
naval vessels to visit such merchant vessels of the two
nations as should, upon reasonable grounds, be sus-
pected of conducting a traffic in slaves, or of having
been fitted out for such a purpose. Any vessel of this
character was to be detained and sent in for trial. It
is also to be noted that in this treaty the United States
consented to the establishment of mixed courts, which
in the earlier negotiations had been considered highly
objectionable. These mixed courts were, however,
abolished in 1807, and the courts of the respective na-
tions took their place. By a supplemental article, con-
cluded February 17, 1863,*^ the reciprocal right of
search and detention was permitted within thirty
leagues of the coast of Cuba, which was practically
upon the American coast. This was agreed to in spite
of the vigorous objection to such extension made by
the United States throughout a long period of years.
With this treaty, the execution of the article in the
treaty of Ghent with respect to the slave trade may be
regarded as complete. The abolition of slavery in the
United States and the elimination of any possible
market in America dealt its final blow. Since then
43 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 674-679, 687-^8.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 42 1
the United States has been interested in the effort to
suppress the slave trade in Africa, and to this end it
became a party to the general act signed at Brussels
July 2, 1890, which provided comprehensive regula-
tions for the suppression of the African slave trade.
The most important arrangements of the treaty of
Ghent were those in relation to the settlement of the
boundary disputes. The treaty has frequently been
called a " treaty of boundaries." Five of the eleven
articles, covering more than two thirds of the text,
were concerned with provisions for the establishment
and operation of boundary commissions. Four joint
commissions were thus provided: the first to decide
upon the ownership of the islands in the Bay of
Passamaquoddy ; the second to arbitrate with respect
to the Maine highlands and the northwesternmost
source of the Connecticut River and the location of the
45th parallel; the third to settle upon the boundary
through the St. Lawrence and the lakes as far as
the inlet of Lake Huron and to arrange for the division
of the islands in the said waters; the fourth to de-
termine the boundary westward from the inlet of
Lake Huron to the Lake of the Woods and the owner-
ship of the islands in the said waters.
The first of these commissions, to which John
Holmes, American, and Thomas Barclay, British, were
appointed, was successful in its efforts. Agents for
the two states presented the respective claims of each
422 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
before the commissioners. The claims advanced by
the United States were that the islands in the Bay of
Passamaqnoddy were within territory bounded by the
treaty of 1783 and included in the twenty leagues of
shore provision ; that all islands within twenty leagues
of the shores of the United States had been confirmed
to it; and lastly, that the said islands were not within
the meaning of any exception made in the treaty of
1783. It was further claimed by the American agent
that in following the ship channel all islands would be
found to be on the American side, with the exception of
Deer Island. It was held that by the American grants
and charters it could be shown that the islands in
question were within the limits of Massachusetts and
never had been within those of Nova Scotia. The
arguments of the American agent covered over five
hundred pages, and the arguments in the rejoinder on
the part of the British agent were contained in a
memorial** of four hundred pages.
The British memorial claimed, first, that the islands
never were, nor were intended to form, a part of the
twelve contemplated provinces of New England ;
second, that they never were nor could be included in
the territory granted to the Duke of York in 1664, nor
the territory lying between Sagadehock and Nova
Scotia mentioned in the charter of the Province of
^* MS., Dept. of State, Bureau of Rolls and Library, Execu-
tion of " The Fourth Article of the Treaty of Ghent."
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 423
Massachusetts Bay, 1691 ; third, that the islands were
by the express provisions of the charter of 1691 an-
nexed to that integral part of the Province of Massa-
chusetts Bay which before had formed the province
of Nova Scotia under the grant of 1621 ; fourth, that
these islands thus annexed were precisely the same
islands that were within the limits designated in the
grant of 1621 ; fifth, that Nova Scotia, under the
charter of 1691, was re-ceded to the Crown and be-
came a separate province and so remained until the
treaty of peace, 1783 ; sixth, that the islands never
belonged to Massachusetts except as a part of the
Province of Nova Scotia; seventh, that the river St.
Croix designated in the grant of the Province of Nova
Scotia was the river intended under that name in the
treaty of 1783 ; and eighth, that all the islands in
question were excepted by provisions of the treaty of
1783 from coming within the boundary described by
the treaty ,^^
The commissioners rendered their decision Novem-
ber 24, 1817. They decided that Moose Island, Dudley
Island, and Frederick Island in the Bay of Passama-
quoddy belonged to the United States and that all of
the other islands, including the Island of Grand Menan,
belonged to Great Britain.^'^ No steps were taken
45 MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library, Execution of "The
Fourth Article of the Treaty of Ghent."
*^ Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 619.
424 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
to mark this boundary until 1891. At that time nego-
tiations were entered upon which resuked in a treaty
conchided between the United States and Great Britain,
July 22, 1892, which provided for a joint commission
of two, " to determine upon a method of more ac-
curately marking the boundary line between the two
countries in the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay in
front of and adjacent to Eastport, in the State of
Maine, and to place buoys, or fix such other boundary
marks as they may determine to be necessary," each
country to defray one half of the cost.^'^
Cornelius P. Van Ness for the United States and
Thomas Barclay for Great Britain were appointed
commissioners under the provisions of the fifth article
of the treaty " to determine and mark the boundary
from the source of the St. Croix to the river St.
Lawrence, on the 45th parallel." The commissioners
met at St. Andrews, September 22, 18 16, and after a
two days' session adjourned, the season being too far
advanced for the necessary surveying to be done. The
next meeting was to be held in Boston on the 4th of
the following June.*®
The commissioners met at the time and place agreed
upon, and drew up a set of instructions which they
presented to the surveyors of the respective govern-
ments. On June 14 the commissioners adjourned to
4^ Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 63-64.
48 Ibid., 7Z.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 425
meet in New York the 5'th of May the following year,
unless in the meantime they should agree upon some
other place and time to come together. The next meet-
ing was by agreement held May 15, 1818, at Burling-
ton, Vermont, instead of in New York, since it became
necessary to be at St. Regis about the first of June
in order to begin the survey of the line between the
Iroquois and Connecticut Rivers. The commissioners
subsequently held meetings also at Montreal and St.
Regis. On June 12 they adjourned to meet in New
York the 30th of the following November. Before
that time arrived it became evident that the surveyors
and astronomers employed in the survey would not be
ready to report, and so the conference of the commis-
sioners was postponed until May 3, 1819, in New
York. When that day came the surveys were still in-
complete, and the commissioners moved an adjourn-
ment to Boston on the first Monday in May, 1820.
This date was later changed to May 11. Following the
meeting in Boston the commissioners met next in New
York, November 23, when it was decided that no more
surve3^s were necessary, and the agents were ordered
to attend the next meeting and present their argu-
ments. The board adjourned to meet in New York
May 14, 1821, in order to give the agents time to make
the necessary preparation. On this last date the com-
missioners came together to hear the arguments.*^
^9 Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 74-76.
426 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
The most difficult question that called for decision
in connection with the boundary was as to the location
of the " highlands " mentioned in the treaty of 1783,
which were said to divide the rivers that emptied into
the St. Lawrence from those that flowed into the
Atlantic Ocean. The treaty of 1783 required the
line to be run upon such "highlands." The British
Government contended that the boundary line should
be run upon the highlands to the south of St. Johns;
but that line of highlands turned no water into the St.
Lawrence. The United States maintained that the
line should be run on the highlands to the north of the
river St. John, since that was the only watershed that
turned its northern waters into the St. Lawrence and
its southern waters into the Atlantic Ocean, although
through the Bay of Fundy. Failure to agree upon
what should be taken as the " highlands " made it im-
possible to agree upon the " northwest angle of Nova
Scotia," for that, by the treaty of 1783, was said to be
at the point where " a line drawn due north from the
source of the St. Croix River " strikes the " highlands
which divide those rivers that empty themselves into
the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the
Atlantic Ocean." When all the evidence had been
presented by the agents of the two states, the commis-
sioners found themselves unable to agree upon the
location of the northwesternmost head of the Con-
necticut and the location of the forty-fifth parallel of
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 42/
north latitude, as well as that of the northwest angle
of Nova Scotia, which were definitive points of bound-
ary mentioned in the treaty of 1783. The commis-
sioners, failing to agree, filed their dissenting opinions
with their respective Governments, and at the same
time presented lengthy reports upon the work of the
commission.^"
Since the joint commission failed to agree upon the
northeastern boundary question, it became necessary,
in accordance with the provision in the treaty of Ghent,
to refer the " reports of the said commissioners to
some friendly sovereign or state." There was some
delay in carrying out this provision, during which time
the district of Maine, with the consent of Massachu-
setts, was admitted to the Union.^^
In 1826 Albert Gallatin, commissioned as Minister
Plenipotentiary from the United States to Great
Britain, was empowered to adjust, as far as possible,
the various differences between the two countries. In
regard to the northeastern boundary he was instructed,
if possible, to arrange a direct negotiation upon the
subject at Washington ; but, should he fail in that, he
was to agree to submit the matter to arbitration.
After a long and tiresome negotiation Gallatin, in the
nineteenth conference which he had with the British
representatives, secured the acceptance of a convention
s° Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 78-82.
51 Ibid., 85.
428 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
which he had drafted. This convention, signed Sep-
tember 29, 1827, made it obHgatory on the part of the
two states to choose some friendly sovereign or state
as arbiter, and to use their best endeavors to obtain a
decision, if practicable, within two years after the
arbiter should have signified his consent to act as such.
The treaty provided that the decision of the arbiter
should be taken as final and conclusive and should be
carried, " without reserve, into immediate effect."^^
It was agreed to depart from the procedure pre-
scribed by the treaty of Ghent, which stipulated that
the reports of the commissioners, in case of disagree-
ment, should be presented to the arbitrator, and in-
stead to substitute for the reports of the commissioners
new and separate statements by each of the contracting
parties. This change was considered necessary inas-
much as the reports of the commissioners and the
documents connected therewith were " so voluminous
and complicated as to render it improbable that any
sovereign or state would be willing or able to under-
take the office of investigating and arbitrating upon
them." The time within which the statements of the
contracting parties should be presented to the arbi-
trator was limited to two years. The ratifications of
this convention were exchanged at London, April 2,
1828, and soon thereafter the King of the Nether-
lands was chosen to act as arbitrator.^^
52 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 646-649.
53 Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 88-90.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 429
The statements of the case were duly submitted to
the arbitrator by the representatives of the two states.
Albert Gallatin prepared the American statement, a
most able and exhaustive report, upon which he spent
two years. The case was treated by both sides under
the same topics that were the points of difference in
the joint commission originally appointed. These sub-
jects, as mentioned before, were: (i) the northwest
angle of Nova Scotia and the " highlands " ; (2) the
northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River; (3)
the boundary line from the Connecticut River along
the forty-fifth parallel of north latitude to the river
St. Lawrence.
The King of the Netherlands gave his award Janu-
ary 10, 1 83 1. The arbitrator failed to adjudicate the
differences presented to him, and instead rendered his
decision in the form of an arbitrary compromise
boundary. This award gave to the United States
about eight thousand square miles of the territory in
dispute and to Great Britain about four thousand
square miles. Two days after the announcement of
the award, Prebel, the American minister at The Hague,
addressed a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
protesting against the award, on the ground that the
arbitrator had exceeded his powers. The British Gov-
ernment recognized that the award was recommenda-
tory in character rather than mandatory, but acquiesced
in the decision. At the same time the British minister
430 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
at Washington was authorized to give the United
States to understand privately that Great Britain would
not consider a formal acceptance of the award by the
two Governments as precluding a modification of the
line by mutual agreement. President Jackson was
reluctant to accept the decision, and, since it was un-
satisfactory to both Maine and Massachusetts, he sub-
mitted the question to the Senate, which by a large
majority voted that the award was not obligatory and
recommended a new negotiation with Great Britain.^*
The United States attempted to secure an agree-
ment from Maine by which the American Government
might have a free hand in dealing with the boundary
question as it afifected the territory of that State. The
State of Maine refused to accede to such arrangement.
Negotiations were continued with the British Govern-
ment over the boundary dispute during the year fol-
lowing the award of the King of the Netherlands, but
no agreement was reached. In 1838-39 occurred
what was known as the Aroostook war, which was a
conflict between New Brunswick and Maine growing
out of the unsettled boundary dispute. War became
imminent, and General Winfield Scott was sent by the
United States Government to mediate. He persuaded
the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick to re-
move their forces from the disputed territory while
^* Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 1 19-138,
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 43 I
negotiations should be carried on looking to a settle-
ment of the boundary.^^
Correspondence between the United States and
Great Britain was renewed, which, after three years,
resulted in a settlement of the dispute by the signing
of the Webster-Ashburton treaty, August 9, 1842.
This agreement was reached wholly by diplomatic
negotiation in which both parties evinced a willingness
to compromise rather than to prolong the dispute
further. The boundary line was, like that in the award
of the King of the Netherlands, a compromise. In
fact, by the treaty of 1842 the United States was given
less of the disputed territory than was assigned by the
arbitrator's award. By it New Hampshire, Vermont,
and New York gained certain territory formerly sup-
posed to belong to them, but which was, actually, above
the forty-fifth parallel. As a compensation to the
States of Maine and Massachusetts, which suffered by
the arrangement, a sum of three hundred thousand
dollars was paid by the United States Government.
Maine was also pacified by a provision in the treaty
which granted to her the privilege of transporting the
lumber and agricultural products of the State upon the
waters of the St. John. The boundary, as thus agreed
upon, was later traced and marked as follows : from the
source of the St. Croix to the intersection of the St.
John ; thence to the mouth of the St. Francis ; thence to
°5 Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 145-146.
432 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
the outlet of Lake Pohenagamook ; thence to the North-
west Branch of the St. John; thence to the parallel of
latitude 46° 25' on the Southwest Branch; thence to
the source of the Southwest Branch of the St. John;
thence to the source of Halls Stream; thence to the
intersection of the line of Valentine and Collins ; thence
to the St. Lawrence near St. Regis along the line of
Valentine and Collins.^"
The third boundary commission provided for by the
treaty of Ghent was to determine the northern bound-
ary through the St. Lawrence River and Lakes Ontario,
Erie, and Huron. The commissioners appointed for
this undertaking were Peter B. Porter for the United
States and John Ogilvy for Great Britain. The first
preliminary meeting of the joint commission was held
at Albany, New York, November 18, 181 6. Meetings
were held during the next three years at St. Regis,
Point Amity, Hamilton, and Ontario. September 28,
1819, the British commissioner died. His successor
was Anthony Barclay, son of Thomas Barclay, who
had been the British commissioner on the northeast-
ern boundary commission. Barclay did not qualify
until January 3, 1820. Not until November of the
following year were maps of the surveys ready. Sev-
eral meetings were then held in New York City. Sub-
^^ Report of the joint commission of boundary appointed
under the treaty of Washington of Aug. 9, 1842; Richardson,
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV., 171.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 433
sequently the commissioners met in Philadelphia and
at Utica, New York. At the last place on June i8,
1822, they reached an agreement. By this agreement
the boundary was arranged to follow in the main the
channel throughout the water communications. The
islands lying in the rivers, lakes, and water communi-
cations between the boundary line and the adjacent
shores of Upper Canada were adjudged to belong to
Great Britain, and all islands between the said boundary
line and the adjacent shores of the United States were
declared to belong to the United States.^^
The treaty of Ghent stipulated that the portion of
the northern boundary from Lake Huron to the most
northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods should
be referred to the same commissioners who might be
chosen to act in settlement of the boundary through
the river St. Lawrence and Lakes Ontario, Erie, and
Huron. As soon, therefore, as Porter and Barclay
had completed their work in connection with the
boundary mentioned, they proceeded upon their second
task. They issued instructions to the surveyors to
ascertain the position of Long Lake, or the chain of
waters referred to by that name in the treaty of 1783,
and, if those waters did not communicate with Lake
Superior, to discover what rivers or bodies of water
divided by a height of land and emptying, one into
57 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 620-623.
29
434 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
Lake Superior and the other into the Lake of the
Woods, corresponded most nearly to the line described
in the treaty. Partial surveys were made during the
summers of 1822 and 1823, and reports were made to
the joint commission in February, 1824, at a meeting
at Albany. The following summer the surveys were
completed, and were reported at a meeting of the com-
missioners in Montreal in October. Upon the results
of these surveys and the evidence presented by the
agents the commissioners endeavored to reach an agree-
ment, but upon two points they found this impossible.
The first of these differences was in connection with
the claims of the respective Governments relative to
certain islands in St. IMary's River, particularly the
island of St. George. The second difference was in
relation to the running of the boundary from a point
near Isle Royal in Lake Superior to the Chaudiere
Falls in Lac La Pluie, which is between Lake Superi-
or and the Lake of the Woods. On the remainder
of the boundary line from Lac La Pluie to the north-
westernmost head of the Lake of the Woods the com-
mission was in agreement.^^ The commissioners
made separate reports to their respective Governments
on the points of agreement and disagreement. Pro-
58 MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library, Journal of Proceed-
ings of Commissioners appointed to carry into effect the sixth
and seventh articles of the Treaty of Ghent; Moore, Inter-
national Arbitrations, I., 171 et seq.
EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 435
positions of a compromise nature which each com-
missioner had presented were also included in the re-
ports, with a view to a possible arrangement without
reference to a third party. These reports were made
in the fall of 1827, and for ten years thereafter no
action was taken, either to submit the questions to arbi-
tration, or to renew the negotiation. During this period
the northeastern boundary question was the impor-
tant issue.
When, in 1842, Webster and Ashburton entered
upon their negotiation to settle the various differences
existing between the two countries, the boundary from
Lake Huron to the north westernmost point of the
Lake of the Woods was included in the questions to
be settled. An agreement was quickly reached by the
two negotiators by which they adopted so much of the
boundary as had been agreed upon by the joint com-
mission in 1827. With reference to the remainder of
the line they arranged a compromise, by which the
difference over the islands in St. Mary's River was
decided in favor of the United States, while the second
point of difference, with regard to the route to be fol-
lowed from a point near Isle Royal in Lake Superior
to Chaudiere Falls in Lac La Pluie, was settled, in the
main, in accordance with the British claim. The line
as agreed upon northward from Isle Royal ran from a
point north of Isle Royal for one hundred yards to the
north and east of Isle Chapeau; thence southwesterly
436 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT
to the mouth of the Pigeon River; thence along the
line of the Grand Portage by land and water to Lac
La Pluie. The treaty provided that all the water com-
munications embraced in the boundary line and all the
various channels in the St. Lawrence and Detroit
Rivers should be free and open to the citizens of both
countries.^^
The Webster-Ashburton treaty completed the last of
the boundary arrangements provided in the treaty of
Ghent, and with this settlement all the provisions of
that treaty were completely executed, after a lapse of
nearly thirty years.
s9 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 652.
CHAPTER XI
Settlement of Controverted Questions Omitted
IN the Treaty of Ghent
The statement has often been made that the war of
1812 secured none of the objects for which it was
fought. This is true if one looks to the treaty of
peace alone to discover results, for that treaty con-
tains not a word as to the settlement of the avowed
causes of the war. The commissioners of peace, in
order to secure what was most essential, that is, the
restoration of the blessings of peace, left to the ad-
justment of time the questions upon which agreement
then was impossible. Has time justified their action?
Let us consider the subsequent arrangements upon the
leading questions in dispute in 1814.
Impressment, which was the principal cause of the
war, occupied, as has been seen, comparatively little
time in the negotiations at Ghent. It was brought for-
ward in the first conference of the American and
British commissioners, but the discussions, soon turn-
ing upon Indian territory, disarmament on the lakes,
and boundaries, and later upon the fisheries and navi-
gation of the Mississippi, left the more abstract ques-
437
438 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
tions in abeyance. However, in the projet of the
treaty proposed by the American commissioners there
was an article providing for the abolition of impress-
ment, but this was rejected by the British commis-
sioners. The American commissioners consented to
waive the article, with the understanding that the omis-
sion of a specific proposition in the treaty of peace on
the subject of impressment should not impair the right
of either Power.^ The treaty, therefore, was signed
with no provision upon this subject. The American
commissioners believed that impressment would receive
a more favorable consideration after the war was over,
when the two countries came to arrange other ques-
tions not included in the treaty of peace.
Eight days after the ratification of the treaty of
Ghent, President Madison sent a message to Congress
recommending the passage of a law (to permit the em-
ployment upon American vessels- of only native
American citizens and persons already naturalized^J
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom this
message was referred, reported favorably upon the
recommendation of the President, but advised that the
question be postponed until the next session of Con-
gress.^ Such a law was never passed, the general paci-
^ American to British Commissioners, Nov. 30, 1814; Amer-
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 741.
2 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 555.
3 Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., 1255.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 439
fication of Europe obviating the necessity for such
action.
When entering upon the negotiations for a commer-
cial treaty with Great Britain the American commis-
sioners stated to the British that they were instructed
by their Government upon two general subjects which
might properly be discussed: commercial regulations
applicable to a state of peace as well as of war, and
the rights and duties of states when one was at war
and the other at peace. In connection with the second
subject the American commissioners mentioned im-
pressment as being the most important question. They
called the attention of the British commissioners to the
law that had been passed by Congress* March 3, 181 3,
which, after the war, excluded the employment of for-
eign seamen on American vessels. They also men-
tioned the recommendation of the President in respect
to the passage of a more rigid law on the subject. It
was pointed out that such action by the American
Government, should it result in an absolute exclusion
of British seamen, would remove all ground for the
claim of impressment ; and that this method would be
more satisfactory to Great Britain inasmuch as it
would operate upon every American vessel, and not
merely upon those with which a British warship might
come in contact. The American commissioners con-
tented themselves with this explanation, and did not
* United States Statutes at Large, II., 809-810.
440 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
insist upon the inclusion of an article upon impress-
ment in the commercial treaty which was signed July
3, 1 815. All the more disputable questions which en-
dangered the success of a commercial treaty were
eliminated and reserved for future negotiation. Jef-
ferson, in writing to Madison March 23, 1815, had
advised a convention upon impressment apart from the
commercial treaty. If included in such a treaty, he
thought, it might be at the price of injurious conces-
sions.^
After the signing of the commercial treaty, Adams,
American minister at London, was engaged in a pro-
tracted correspondence with the British Government
upon the questions of the restoration of slaves, the
abolition of the slave trade, and the reciprocal rights
to the Newfoundland fisheries and to .the navigation of
the Mississippi. On January 25, 1816, Adams, propos-
ing to the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs that a
negotiation be entered upon to secure an additional
convention, was asked upon what subjects he wished
to treat. He replied that impressment was the first
and most important question. When the Am,irican
minister adverted to the President's policy of confin-
ing the navigation of American vessels to American
seamen, and the solicitude of the President that such
a law might lead to a total discontinuance of the prac-
5 Jefferson to Madison, March 23, 1815; Writings of Jeffer-
son, IX, 511-514-
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 44 1
tice of impressment, the British Foreign Secretary,
Lord Castlereagh, intimated that if such a law were
successful there would be no need of any arrangement
upon impressment. He remarked that as the incon-
venience did not exist during peace it might be doubt-
ful whether it was the most seasonable time for a
discussion of a subject upon which such a different and
opposite view in the matter of principle was entertained
by the two Governments. Adams urged the point
that a time of peace was more favorable for such a
discussion, but Castlereagh still disagreed. He gave
Adams to understand that there was still strong feeling
in Great Britain upon the subject, and that the Gov-
ernment would not dare to incur the responsibility of
any concession in connection with it. It was more ex-
pedient, said he, to wait and see the result of the
American policy for " encouraging their own native
seamen," and whether this would remove the need
for Great Britain to exercise the practice of impress-
ment to protect herself from the loss of her own
seamen. As a result of this conference Adams re-
ported that there appeared to be "no prospect that,
under the present ministry, any conventional arrange-
ment for renouncing the practice of impressment will
be attainable."^
A few months later Adams was informed by Castle-
« Adams to Monroe, Jan. 31, 1816; American State Papers,
For. Rel, IV., 360.
442 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
reagh that the British Government were adverse to
treating with respect ,to any of the conflicting claims
of neutral and belligerent rights, but would be willing
to entertain proposals in relation to impressment.'^
September 17, 1816, Adams renewed the proposal
for the negotiation of a treaty of commerce, specifying
the several objects which the American Government
considered desirable to be included in a further con-
vention. Upon the subject of impressment he pro-
posed that both states should stipulate that they would
not employ in their naval or merchant service any
native citizens or subjects of the other state, with the
exception of those already naturalized. This proposi-
tion, it was stated, was made, not to secure any ad-
vantage to the United States, but as a means for Great
Britain to reserve to herself the services of all her
own native seamen, and to remove forever the neces-
sity of resorting to means of force, either by her
naval officers in taking men from the vessels of the
United States, or by the United States in resisting the
renewal of that practice in the event of any future
maritime war in which it might be neutral.^ Not
until the following March did Adams receive a reply
to his proposal, and then Castlereagh expressed a
7 Adams to Monroe, Aug. 24, 1816; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 361.
8 Adams to Castlereagh, Sept. 17, 1816; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 363.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 443
willingness to treat only in a limited way with respect
to commercial arrangements.
When Rush was sent to Great Britain to succeed
Adams in 1817, he was given full power to negotiate
and sign a commercial treaty which might deal with
neutral rights as well as commercial privileges. For
instructions upon the questions embraced in neutral
rights he was referred to the original instructions given
to the peace plenipotentiaries.^
As the time approached when the commercial treaty
of 181 5 would expire, no agreement having been
reached to extend its provisions, the importance of
practical commercial arrangements again transcended
the more academic questions of neutral rights. Adams
in a letter to Rush, May 30, 1818, wrote: " Tt is not
our desire to embarrass the proposed commercial nego-
tiation with any of the questions of maritime regula-
tions adapted to a state of warfare. We do not wish
that blockade, contraband trade with enemies or
their colonies, or even impressment, should be drawn
into the discussion, unless such a wish should be mani-
fested on the British side."^"
Before this letter reached him, Rush had already
made two proposals to the British Government upon
s Adams to Rush, Nov. 6, 1817; American State Papers, For.
Rel., IV., 370.
10 Adams to Rush, May 30, 1818; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 2,72-2,72>-
444 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
impressment. On April i8 he proposed the reciprocal
restriction of the naturalization of sailors in return for
a definite stipulation against the practice of impress-
ment ; and again, on June 20, he attempted to secure a
renunciation of the practice by proposing that each
nation should exclude altogether the seamen of the
other from its service, the rule to apply to public as
well as merchant vessels. The British Government at
first rejected both proposals, but later, August 13,
Castlereagh intimated to Rush that the second proposi-
tion might, with two modifications, be accepted, al-
though, he said, he had not consulted the other mem-
bers of the Cabinet upon the subject. The modifica-
tions which he proposed were, first, that either party
might withdraw from the agreement after three or six
months' notice; the second, that if a British officer
should enter an American vessel for the purposes ad-
mitted to be lawful, and should discover there a sea-
man whom he suspected to be English, he should be
allowed to make a record or proces verbal of the fact,
which might be brought to the attention of the Ameri-
can Government, though the officer himself would not
be allowed to take the man.^^
This proposition being referred to Washington,
President Monroe laid it before his Cabinet for their
11 Moore, Digest of International Law, II., 997. Rush to
Secretary of State, Aug. 15, 1818; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 379.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 445
opinions upon the modifications proposed by Lord
Castlereagh. Two members of the Cabinet, Crawford
and Wirt, were incHned to accede, while the two
others, Adams and Calhoun, were opposed to the pro-
posal. The members of the Cabinet being evenly
divided upon the subject, President Monroe took a
midway course. He decided to reject the second
modification, "because it implied that the boarding
ofBcer should have the power of mustering the crew
of an American vessel and passing them individually
under his inspection " ; and also, " because it implied a
suspicion that we should not faithfully and sincerely
carry our own laws into execution." He had less
objection to the first modification, for he believed that
if the British Government once agreed not to impress
seamen from American vessels, even though it should
be for a short period, they would never be likely to
resort to the practice again.^- The President, how-
ever, was willing to consent to the first modification
only on the condition that a provision be made that
the notification of the withdrawal of the agreement
should not take place until after the treaty had been
in force two years. The President's decision was
communicated to Minister Rush.^^
In the summer of 1818 Albert Gallatin, American
12 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, IV., 146-149. Moore, Digest of
International Law, II., 998.
13 Adams to Rush, Dec. i, 1818; American State Papers,
For. Rel, IV., 401-402.
44^ SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
minister in Paris, had been requested by his Govern-
ment to proceed to London and to join Minister Rush
in the negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain.
Gallatin reached London August i6, and on the 22d
the first informal conference took place between the
American ministers and the representatives of the
British Government, who included Lord Castlereagh,
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Goulburn and Robin-
son, specially appointed plenipotentiaries.
On August 27, 181 8, the American and British
plenipotentiaries held their first conference with re-
spect to treaty arrangements. The British stated that
they were ready at once to sign a treaty renewing the
commercial convention of 1815, or if the American
plenipotentiaries wished to discuss other topics, they
were willing to delay the signing of the treaty; but
they declared that their instructions did not allow them
to consent to any partial or separate consideration of
such topics " as an appendage to a renewal of the
existing commercial convention." The American
ministers expressed their unwillingness to sign the
treaty renewal immediately.^*
At the second conference, held August 29, the Ameri-
can ministers stated that whenever the British min-
isters were ready to submit their projet on the im-
^* Protocol of the first conference between the American
and British plenipotentiaries, Aug. 27, 1818; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 383.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 447
pressment question they would bring forward their
propositions respecting the other maritime points.^^
On September 17, the British commissioners presented
a projet of six articles upon impressment. The
scheme provided for the exclusion by each state of the
natural-born subjects of the other from service in its
public or private marine. This restriction was not to
apply to natural-born subjects of either state natural-
ized by the other before the signing of the treaty. An
enumeration of such persons as were thus exempt was
to be made by each state and the list communicated to
the other. It should be agreed that during the con-
tinuance of the treaty neither Power would impress
or forcibly withdraw any person or persons from the
vessels of the other upon the high seas. The treaty
was to run for ten years, but might be abrogated at any
time upon six months' notice.^**
The American commissioners offered amendments
to the British projet. Most of these were merely
verbal changes ; but two points, upon which insistence
was made, proved sufficiently serious to break off the
negotiation relative to impressment. Objections were
raised to the article which required that the place of
15 Protocol of the second conference between the American
and British plenipotentiaries, Aug. 29, 1818; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 383.
1^ Protocol of the third conference between the American
and British plenipotentiaries, Sept. 17, 1818; American State
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 383-388.
448 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
birth and date of naturalization of all persons ex-
empt from the exclusion law should be specified. To
this the Americans objected because it would be im-
possible in every case to comply with such requirement,
particularly as there was no national naturalization law
prior to 1789, and minor children of naturalized
persons were not required to take out papers to be-
come American citizens. They proposed as a substi-
tute that no natural-born subject or citizen of either
Power whose name should not be included in the list
should be deemed to fall within the exception unless he
produced proof of his having been duly naturalized
prior to the exchange of ratifications of the treaty.
The second important change proposed by the Ameri-
can commissioners was that which provided for the
exemption from the law of persons naturalized by
their respective laws " previous to the exchange of
ratifications," instead of " previous to the signature," of
the treaty, as the British had proposed. The British
refused to acquiesce in the changes which the Ameri-
cans offered, and the negotiation failed. Rush ex-
pressed the belief that, had Lord Castlereagh been
present in London throughout the negotiations, a suc-
cessful termination of the subject of impressment
might have resulted. Impressment failing of settle-
ment, all other subjects of a maritime nature were
withdrawn from discussion. Rush found at this time
that, in spite of the failure to make any arrangement
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 449
relative to impressment, public opinion, as expressed
by the ship-owners of London and British naval officers,
was steadily tending towards a change in British
policy.^'^
In the convention relating to the slave trade which
was agreed upon by the representatives of the United
States and Great Britain in 1824, but later rejected by
the two states, reservation was made that the right
allowed with respect to the forcible seizure of slave
vessels should not be construed to sanction the right
of search and impressment.^^
In May, 1826, the House of Representatives passed
a resolution requesting the President to lay before the
House " any information in his possession, touching
the impressment of seamen, from on board American
vessels on the high seas, or elsewhere, by the com-
manders of British or other foreign vessels or ships of
war, since the i8th of February, 1815." The Presi-
dent, on January 15, 1827, communicated all the
knowledge upon the subject in his possession, which
embraced only two specific cases of alleged impress-
ment, and these, as it subsequently appeared, were
persons who voluntarily entered the British service and
1^ Protocol of the fourth conference between the American
and the British plenipotentiaries, Sept. 25, 1818; American
State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 388-390. Rush, Memoranda of a
Residence at the Court of London (1833), 445-446.
18 American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 321.
30
450 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
were transferred from an American to a British ship
without any objections being interposed by the officer
in charge of the American vessel.^^
The United States continued sensitive upon the sub-
ject of impressment, although no actual cases of the
practice can be discovered. In connection with cer-
tain alleged instances of impressment in 1828, Clay,
Secretary of State, in a letter of January 26, 1829, ad-
dressed to the American minister to Great Britain
said: "If these proceedings have had the sanction of
the British Government, you will inform it that the
American Government can not tolerate them ; that, if
persisted in, they will be opposed by the United States ;
and that the British Government must be answerable
for all the consequences, whatever they may be, which
may flow from perseverance in a practice utterly
irreconcilable with the sovereign rights of the United
States. If these proceedings have taken place without
the sanction of the British Government, you will de-
mand the punishment of the several British naval
officers at whose instance they occurred, and the im-
mediate adoption of efficacious measures to guard the
navigation of the United States against the occurrence
of similar irregularities."-^
1^ Congressional Debates, Vol. II., Part II., 2666. Richard-
son, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II., 368.
20 Clay to Barbour, Jan. 26, 1829; MS., Inst. U. S. Ministers,
XII., 186. Quoted in Moore, Digest of International Law,
II., 998-999-
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 4$ I
When Webster and Lord Ashburton entered into
negotiations to settle various differences between their
respective states, impressment was one of the subjects
upon which they exchanged notes. In a note of
August 8, 1842, addressed by Webster to Lord Ash-
burton, the American Secretary discussed the history
of impressment and the general principles upon which
it was founded. He declared that the Government of
the United States had reflected on the past; had
pondered upon the condition of the present; and had
endeavored to anticipate, as far as was within its
power, the probable future ; and that the result of such
deliberation was that the American Government was
" prepared to say, that the practice of impressing sea-
men from American vessels cannot be hereafter al-
lowed to take place. That practice is founded on
principles which it does not recognise, and is invari-
ably attended by consequences so unjust, so injurious,
and of such formidable magnitude as cannot be sub-
mitted to." He declared that the only rule which could
be " adopted and observed, consistently with the rights
and honor of the United States and the security of
their citizens," was that the nationality of the vessel
should protect the seamen on board. This was an-
nounced to be the principle that hereafter would be
maintained by the American Government. Webster
also upheld the contention of the United States that the
right of search by one nation of the vessels of another
452 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
for the purpose of impressment was contrary to the
law of nations. He said: " Every merchant vessel on
the seas is rightfully considered as part of the territory
of the country to which it belongs. The entry, there-
fore, into such vessel, being neutral, by a belligerent, is
an act of force, and is prima facie, a wrong, a trespass,
which can be justified only when done for some pur-
pose, allowed to form a sufficient justification by the
law of nations. But a British cruiser enters an Ameri-
can merchant vessel in order to take therefrom sup-
posed British subjects; oflfering no justification there-
for, under the law of nations, but claiming the right
under the law of England respecting the king's pre-
rogative. This cannot be defended. English soil, Eng-
lish territory, English jurisdiction is the appropriate
sphere for the operation of English law ; the ocean is
the sphere and any merchant vessel on the seas is, by
that law, under the protection of the laws of her own
nation, and may claim immunity, unless in cases in
which that law allows her to be entered or visited. "^^
Lord Ashburton in reply stated that the object of
his mission had been to settle existing subjects of
difference; that no differences on the subject of im-
pressment had arisen within recent years because the
practice had, since the war, wholly ceased and could
not, consistently with existing laws and regulations for
21 Webster to Ashburton, Aug. 8, 1842 ; Niles' Register,
LXIIL, 62-63.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 453
manning her Majesty's navy and under the present cir-
cumstances, be renewed. He admitted the desirability
of coming to some agreement in time of peace upon
the principles underlying impressment in order to re-
move all apprehension and anxiety as to the future.
He promised to transmit Webster's note to the British
Government that it might receive proper attention. ^^
When transmitting the Webster-Ashburton treaty to
the Senate, August ii, 1842, President Tyler also
sent with it the correspondence between the negotia-
tors on the subject of impressment. In his message
accompanying the documents he said : " The impress-
ment of seamen from merchant vessels of this country
by British cruisers, although not practiced in time of
peace, and therefore not at present a productive cause
of difference and irritation, has, nevertheless, hitherto
been so prominent a topic of controversy and is so
likely to bring on renewed contentions at the first
breaking out of a European war that it has been
thought the part of wisdom now to take it into serious
and earnest consideration. The letter from the Secre-
tary of State to the British minister explains the
ground which the Government has assumed and the
principles which it means to uphold. For the defense
of these grounds and the maintenance of these prin-
ciples the most perfect reliance is placed on the in-
22Ashburton to Webster, Aug. 9, 1842; Niles' Register,
LXIII, 63.
454 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
telligence of the American people and on their firm-
ness and patriotism in whatever touches the honor of
the coimtry or its great and essential interests. "^^
The protest made by the British Government against
the seizure of Mason and Shdell on the British
steamer Trent in the Civil War has been held to
denote an abandonment on the part of England of a
right to take from neutral vessels, on any pretext
whatever, persons " not within the conceded exception
of military persons in the actual service of the
enemy."2*
The doctrine of inalienable allegiance, upon which
the alleged right of impressment was founded, was
abandoned by Great Britain in 1870 when Parliament
passed a naturalization act which conceded the right
of voluntary expatriation and recognized the efiicacy
of the naturalization laws of foreign states to change
the status of former subjects of Great Britain. This
law removed what, heretofore, had proved an insuper-
able obstacle to any agreement between the United
States and Great Britain upon legislation which should
mutually protect the interests of both states.
The United States Navy Regulations (ed. 1896, par.
410) contain the following provision: "Commanders
of public vessels of war are not to suffer their vessels
23 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV.,
169.
2* Lawrence's Wheaton (1863), 217-218. Quoted in Moore,
Digest of International Law, II., looi.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 455
to be searched by any foreign power under any pre-
text, nor any officers or men to be taken out, so long
as they have power of resistance. If force be used,
resistance must be continued as long as possible. If
overcome, they are to yield their vessel, but not their
men without the vessel."-^
The second important subject included in the causes
of the war, and upon which the American peace com-
missioners were instructed to secure a satisfactory
arrangement, was blockade. They were instructed to
secure an agreement upon a precise definition of legal
blockade. Such a definition, it was maintained by the
American Government, should include previous warn-
ing to vessels sailing to the blockaded ports and the
maintenance of the blockade by a force sufficient to
render hazardous any attempt to enter. The commis-
sioners, however, found it necessary to abandon mari-
time questions in the discussion of the peace treaty
and of the later commercial treaty. Great Britain
admitted the validity of the contention that a blockade
to be binding must be maintained by an efi^ective force,
but she claimed that the blockade established by the
order in council of May, 1806, was efficiently main-
tained, and that the later order of November, 1807, was
a necessary act of retaliation against the enemy. The
Berlin and Milan decrees were likewise claimed by
2s Quoted in Davis, Elements of International Law (ed.
1908), 499-500 (footnote).
456 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
Napoleon to be retaliatory acts against Great Britain
to punish her for a violation of the lav^ of nations.
In 1816 the United States had occasion to restate
its position concerning blockade. When notified by
the Spanish minister at Washington of a declaration
of the blockade of "the ports of the Viceroyalty of
Santa Fe," the American minister in Madrid was in-
structed to advise the Government of Spain " that ' a
blockade, to be acknowledged as valid by the United
States, must be confined to particular ports, each having
a force stationed before it sufficient to intercept the
entry of vessels; and no vessel shall be seized, even
in attempting to enter a port so blockaded, till she has
been previously warned away from that port.' " Again
in 1825 and 1826, in connection with certain blockades
established by Brazil, the American Government,
through diplomatic channels, pressed its position upon
the Brazilian Government, particularly that part which
called for notifications to be given to each vessel
attempting to enter the blockaded ports.-° In 1846,
when the United States established a blockade of the
west coast of Mexico, Buchanan, Secretary of State,
wrote Pakenham, the British minister, to assure him
that there was no intention of setting up a paper
blockade, since this would be unwarranted by the prin-
ciples which the United States had maintained in re-
26 Raguet to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Dec. 13,
1825; American State Papers, For. Rel., VI., 1023-1025.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 45/
gard to blockades ever since it became an independent
nation. In order to insure consistency in the Ameri-
can position the commanding officers of the United
States Navy in the Pacific were informed by Mason,
Secretary of the Navy, that "a lawful maritime
blockade requires the actual presence of a sufficient
force stationed at the entrance of the ports sufficiently
near to prevent communication. The only exception
to this rule, which requires the actual presence of an
adequate force to constitute a lawful blockade, arises
out of the circumstance of the occasional temporary
absence of the blockading squadron, produced by
accident, as in the case of a storm, which does not
suspend the legal operation of a blockade."^^
Paper blockades, against which the United States
protested, were placed under the ban by the Declara-
tion of Paris in 1856. Article 4 of that convention
adopted the proposition that " blockades in order to be
binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained
by a force sufficient really to prohibit access to the
enemy's coast." This was agreed to by seven states,
namely, Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Rus-
sia, Sardinia, and Turkey. In the second Hague Peace
Conference in 1907-^ an attempt was made to secure
the adhesion of the participating Powers to the prin-
27 Moore, Digest of International Law, VII., 790-791.
28 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899-1907, I.,
721-725.
458 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
ciple laid clown in the Declaration of Paris and to
define more strictly the meaning of " effective "
blockade, proper notification, and circumstances of
violation. The discussions in the conference disclosed
the fact that there were two practices in the matter
of notification of blockade, the Anglo- American and the
Continental. As it seemed that agreement was impos-
sible at that time, the subject was dropped; but a pro-
position was adopted providing for the establishment
of an International Prize Court which should apply the
rules of international law. In order to come to an
agreement upon some of the important rules which
such a Prize Court would be obliged to apply, the
London Naval Conference of 1909 was convened. The
subject of blockade was one of the matters definitely
included in the Declaration of London, which was the
result of that conference. By this international agree-
ment the Declaration of Paris was adopted in relation
to the definition of blockade, and the question of ef-
fectiveness of blockade was declared to be a matter
of fact ; declaration of blockade must include the date
when it began, the limits included, and the period with-
in which neutral vessels may come out; notification
must be given to the Governments of the neutral states
and to the local authorities by the officer commanding
the blockading force.
The subject of disarmament on the Great Lakes,
which was brought into the discussions at Ghent
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 459
through the insistence by the British commissioners
that the United States dismantle its forts and with-
draw its vessels from the lakes, had a happy sequel
in the subsequent arrangement for the limitation of the
naval forces of both countries upon the boundary
waters.
Shortly after the treaty of Ghent was signed, the
British Government issued orders for the increase of
their naval force upon the lakes. The American Gov-
ernment conceived it to be unwise to enter into a rival
policy of naval increase, and accordingly instructed
its minister at London to propose to the British Gov-
ernment such an arrangement respecting the naval
force to be kept on the lakes by both Governments as
would demonstrate their pacific policy and secure their
peace. It was suggested that this might be done by
limiting the size and number of armed vessels to be
kept by each nation upon the lakes, or by abstaining
altogether from keeping an armed force there beyond
that used for the revenue service.-^
Adams presented this profifer of the American Gov-
ernment to Lord Castlereagh, who was unwilling to
accede to it on the ground that a mutual stipulation
against armament on the lakes would, because of the
advantage of position of the United States, be unequal
29 Monroe to Adams, Nov. i6, 1815; MS., Inst. U. S. Minis-
ters, VIII., 3; 56th Cong., ist sess., H. Doc. 471; Moore,
Digest of International Law, I., 691-692.
460 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
and disadvantageous in its operation to Great Britain
in time of war. On March 21, Adams renewed the
proposal to "mutually and equally disarm upon the
American lakes." He expressed the hope that the
offer might be received in the same friendly spirit in
which it was made, and " he emphasized the fact that
there were abundant securities against the possibility
of any sudden attack upon the colonies which the
' guarded and cautious policy ' of Great Britain might
fear."3o
Great Britain, however, apprehensive of another war
with the United States, and accepting the opinion of
Wellington and other experts that the control of the
lakes would determine the ultimate issue of any such
war, was disposed to continue her policy of prepara-
tion for future contingencies. Both in Great Britain
and America there was a strong element which urged
the policy of preserving peace by being prepared for
war. Goulburn, one of the British commissioners at
Ghent, wrote Clay as follows : " You are fighting the
same battle in America that we are here, i. e., putting
peace establishments on a footing not unbecoming the
growth of population and empire in which they are to
be maintained. It is impossible that either country
^''Callahan, The Neutrality of the American Lakes, 69;
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political
Science, sen XVI., nos. 1-4. Moore, Digest of International
Law, I., 692.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 46 1
should feel jealous of the other so long as the aug-
mentation does not exceed the necessity of the case,
and I have not heard an argument anywhere to prove
that it does so exceed in either case. I can relieve
your apprehensions as to the hostile movement of Eng-
land in any part of the globe." Adams, who followed
with greatest anxiety the discussions in Parliament in
connection with the military and naval establishment,
was apprehensive that the augmentation of equipment
foreshadowed war. In a letter to Monroe on March 30
he wrote : " In all the late debates in Parliament upon
what they call their Military and Naval Peace Estab-
lishment the prospect of a new war with the United
States has been distinctly held up by the ministers and
admitted by the opposition as a solid reason for
enormous and unparalleled expenditure and preparation
in Canada and Nova Scotia. We hear nothing now
about the five fir frigates and the bits of striped bunt-
ing. The strain is in a higher mood. Lord Castle-
reagh talks of the great and growing military power
of the United States. The Marquis of Lansdowne, an
opposition leader and one of the loudest trumpeters for
retrenchment and economy, still commends the min-
isters for having been beaten into the policy of having
a naval superiority upon the lakes. And one of the
lords of the admiralty told the House of Commons last
Monday that bumboat expeditions and pinchbeck ad-
ministrations would do no longer for Canada; that
462 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
Englishmen must lay their account for fighting battles
in fleets of three-deckers on the North American lakes.
All this is upon the principle of preserving peace by
being prepared for war. But it shows to demonstra-
tion what will be the fate of the proposal for dis-
arming."^^
Adams had argued against the policy of armament
on the lakes that, besides the expense, the tendency
would be to arouse suspicion and ill-will between the
peoples of both nations. He believed that the " moral
and political tendency of such a system must be to war
and not to peace." He felt, under the circumstances,
that there was very little likelihood of the acceptance
of the proposal which he had made to the British
Government. However, a few weeks later, Adams
was happily surprised when he was informed by Lord
Castlereagh that the British Government were ready to
meet the proposal of the United States, " so far as to
avoid everything like a contention between the two
parties which should have the strongest force" on the
lakes, and that they did not desire to keep any vessels
in commission or in active service except those needed
" to convey troops, occasionally." Adams did not feel
himself properly instructed to conclude a treaty upon
the subject, and so it was agreed that the negotiations
should be transferred to Washington. Accordingly,
instructions were sent to Charles Bagot, the British
31 Callahan, Neutrality of the American Lakes, 70-71.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 463
minister to the United States, who was given power
to act with reference to armament on the lakes, and
also in the matter of the fisheries.^-
The formal opening of negotiations in Washington
began when, on July 26, Bagot sent a note to Monroe
informing him that the British Government were pre-
pared to " cheerfully adopt " any reasonable system in
connection with the naval armament on the lakes which
would diminish the expenses, reduce the chance of col-
lision, and prevent jealousy between the two countries.
He requested information as to the specific arrange-
ments proposed by the American Government.^^
Secretary Monroe replied, August 2, that the Ad-
ministration was willing, "in the spirit of the peace
which so happily exists between the two nations, and
until the proposed arrangement shall be cancelled, . . .
to confine the naval force to be maintained on the
lakes, on each side, to the following vessels ; that is, on
Lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding one hun-
dred tons burden, and one eighteen-pound cannon ; and
on the upper lakes, to two vessels of like burden and
force; and on the waters of Lake Champlain, to one
vessel not exceeding the like burden and force; and
that all other armed vessels on those lakes shall be
forthwith dismantled ; and, likewise, that neither party
32 Callahan. Neutrality of the American Lakes, 7^-73-
33 Bagot to Monroe, July 26, 1816; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 203.
464 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
shall build or arm any other vessel on the shores of
those lakes." It was further provided that the naval
force thus retained by each party on the lakes should
be restricted in its duty to the protection of its revenue
laws, the transportation of troops and goods, and to
such other services as would not in any way interfere
with the armed vessels of the other party.^^
The British minister, while conceiving it necessary
to transmit to his Government the project put forth by
the American Government, informed Monroe that he
was prepared to suspend immediately the further con-
struction and equipment of armed vessels upon the
lakes pending the outcome of the negotiations.^-"^
Monroe then sought to secure a provisional agreement
of the project presented by him ; but the British min-
ister expressed his inability to subscribe, even provi-
sionally, to any precise agreement as to the exact
manner in which the respective naval forces upon the
lakes should be limited.^^ Monroe then accepted
Bagot's offer to suspend further augmentation of the
naval armament until the British Government should
make tlieir reply to the American project.
It was not until the spring of the following year,
3* Monroe to Bagot, Aug. 2, 1816; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 203.
35 Bagot to Monroe, Aug. 6, 1816; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 203-204.
36 Bagot to Monroe, Aug. 13, 1816; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 204.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 465
after Monroe had become President, that the actual
reduction of the armament on the lakes took place.
On April 28, 1817, Bagot informed Rush, then Acting
Secretary of State, that the British Government had
consented to reduce the naval armament upon the
American lakes in the manner proposed by the Amer-
ican Government.^'^ Rush, in acknowledging the re-
ceipt of the British note, reciprocally pledged his Gov-
ernment to the acceptance of the project.^^ It was
agreed that the stipulation should remain in force until
six months after either party should have given notice
to the other of its desire to terminate it.
Orders were immediately issued by both Govern-
ments for carrying out the arrangement. Not until
a year later, April 6, 1818, was the convention com-
municated to the Senate. It was ratified by the Senate
on April 16, and proclaimed by the President on the
28th. No exchange of ratifications occurred. The op-
eration of the convention was made effective through
executive order from the date of the original exchange
of notes.^^
This arrangement for mutual disarmament on the
37 Bagot to Rush, April 28, 1817; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 205-206.
38 Rush to Bagot, April 29, 1817; American State Papers,
For. Rel., IV., 206.
39 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 202; 56th Cong.,
1st sess., S. Doc. 301; 56th Cong., ist sess., H. Doc. 471, 15;
Moore, Digest of International Law, I., 692.
31
466 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
lakes has undoubtedly been the greatest single factor
in the continuance of peaceful relations between the
United States and Great Britain during the last one
hundred years.
A fourth subject which was earnestly discussed in
the peace negotiations was the northeastern fisheries.
This question remained open for nearly a century after
the treaty of Ghent was signed, and was the occasion
of a very large number of specific negotiations.
The British commissioners at Ghent took the posi-
tion that the fishing privileges had become abrogated
by the war, and they refused to renew them to the
United States except for an equivalent. The Ameri-
can commissioners held that the fishing "privileges,"
or " rights," as they preferred to consider them, were
unaffected by the war since they were not granted by
the treaty of 1783, but had been recognized by that
treaty as belonging to the United States along with its
independence.^" They did, however, ofifer, by a di-
vided vote, to grant to the British a renewal of the
privilege of the navigation of the Mississippi in return
for the renewal of the rights to the fisheries. They
also offered to sign a treaty omitting both subjects.
The last proposition was the one finally accepted by
the British commissioners. They thought that by
drawing from the Americans the proposition to ex-
*<> Extracts of letter from American Commissioners to
British Commissioners; Monroe Papers, MS., XIV., 1810.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 46/
change the one privilege for the other they had gained,
practically, the admission that the fishing privilege
needed renewal to render it effective.*^ Nevertheless,
the American commissioners argued so adroitly that the
British were able to make little use of the American
proposal as an argument against the claim of the Amer-
ican commissioners. The alternative proposal of the
American commissioners to drop the question altogether
having been accepted by the British, the question of
the fisheries was thus left subject to the interpretation
of each state.
When explaining to their Government their conduct
with reference to the proposal to exchange the Missis-
sippi privilege for that of the fisheries, the American
commissioners stated that they regarded both subjects
as unafifected by the war ; that when the British asked
for the navigation of the Mississippi as a new claim,
they had refused to grant it without an equivalent ; that
if the request were made by Great Britain because it
had been granted in 1783, then the claim of the United
States to the liberty of the fisheries must be recog-
nized ; that, " to place both points beyond all future
controversy," the proposal to confirm both rights by
treaty provisions had been presented by a majority of
the mission. A proof that they considered the fishing
privilege to stand on the same basis as before the war
" Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. 10, 1814; Wellington's Sup-
plementary Despatches, IX., 471-472.
468 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
was the fact that they had rejected the proposal of the
British commissioners to refer both questions, the
fisheries and the Mississippi, to future negotiations,
although the acceptance of that proposition would have
secured the 49th parallel as the boundary west of the
Lake of the Woods.*-
The fact that in the negotiations at Ghent the treaty
of 1783 had been referred to, and that in the treaty of
Ghent provision had been made to carry out stipulations
as to the boundaries laid out by the treaty of 1783, was
taken to prove that this treaty was still in force and,
if in force in part, must be in force in its entirety. So
the argument ran.*^
When plans were maturing for a commercial treaty,
Adams attempted to secure the confirmation of the
fishing privileges in that treaty in order to avoid future
conflicts between the two states. The British Govern-
ment refused to grant such confirmation, much to the
displeasure of Adams, who in a letter to Monroe wrote :
" It is impossible for me to express in terms too strong
or explicit my conviction that nothing can maintain the
rights of the people of the United States in the Ameri-
can fisheries but the determined and inflexible resolu-
*2 American Plenipotentiaries to Monroe, Dec. 25, 1814;
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., TZ^-TZZ-
43 Floyd to President Monroe, March 8, 1815; Russell Pa-
pers, MS., No. 1119. Article from Canadian Courant; British
Foreign Office, 5, 106. Adams to Bathurst, Sept. 25, 1815;
MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 106.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 469
tion of themselves and the Government to maintain
them at every hazard."** Adams continued a vigor-
ous correspondence with Lord Bathurst over the sub-
ject, but secured no assurance of any new arrange-
ment.
In the summer of 1818 Richard Rush and Albert
Gallatin were appointed to negotiate for the renewal
of the commercial convention between Great Britain
and the United States, which would expire by limitation
the next year. They secured this object in a conven-
tion signed October 20, 181 8. In addition to provid-
ing for the continuance of the former convention for a
period of ten years, the treaty embraced articles upon
the settlement of the northwestern boundary ; an ar-
rangement with reference to the Columbia River and
joint occupation of the northwest coast; reference of
the indemnity claims for slaves to a friendly Power ;
and the renewal of the fishing liberty with some cur-
tailment from that granted by the treaty of 1783.
The treaty of 1818 granted the liberty to the inhabi-
tants of the United States " forever " to " take fish of
every kind on that part of the southern coast of New-
foundland which extends from Cape Ray to the
Rameau Islands, on the western and northern coast
of Newfoundland, from the said Cape Ray to the
Quirpon Islands on the shores of the Magdalen Islands,
**J. Q. Adams to Monroe, Sept. 5, 1815; Bureau of Indexes
and Archives, British notes, 19, No. 12.
470 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
and also on the coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks from
Mount Joly on the southern coast of Labrador, to and
through the streights of Belleisle and thence north-
wardly indefinitely along the coast." American fisher-
men were allowed " to dry and cure fish in any of the
unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of the southern
part of the coast of Newfoundland hereabove described,
and of the coast of Labrador." as long as such territory
should be unsettled. The United States renounced
for its fishermen any right " to take, dry, or cure fish
on, or within three marine miles of any of the coasts,
bays, creeks, or harbours of His Britannic Majesty's
dominions in America not included within the above
mentioned limits ; Provided however, that the Ameri-
can fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or
harbours for the purpose of shelter and of repairing
damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtain-
ing water, and for no other purpose whatever. But
they shall be under such restrictions as may be neces-
sary to prevent their taking, drying or curing fish
therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the
privileges hereby reserved to them."*''
The treaty of 1783 had stated the privilege with re-
spect to the fisheries within British jurisdiction in
this way : " The inhabitants of the United States shall
*^ Hertslet, Treaties and Conventions between Great Britain
and Foreign Powers, V., 392 et seq. Malloy, Treaties and
Conventions, I., 631-633.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 4^1
have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of
the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall
use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island)
and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of all other of
His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and
that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry
and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours and
creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labra-
dor, so long as the same shall remain unsettled ; but so
soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it
shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or
cure fish at such settlements, without a previous agree-
ment for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors
or possessors of the ground."*"
It will be noted that by the provisions of the treaty
of 1818 the territory within which Americans might
fish was greatly curtailed, and the privilege of drying
and curing fish within British territory was practically
withdrawn. The American fishermen petitioning that
they be granted the privilege of the inshore fisheries,
the right to which had been renounced in the convention
of 1818, the question again became the subject of ne-
gotiation. A reciprocity treaty for the temporary ad-
justment of the subject was signed at Washington,
June 5, 1854. The negotiators were William L. Marcy,
Secretary of State of the United States, and Lord
Elgin, special plenipotentiary of Great Britain. By
4" Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 588.
4/2 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
the provisions of this treaty American fishermen were
again admitted to the inshore fisheries as described in
the treaty of 1783, and the British fishermen were ad-
mitted to the inshore fisheries on the eastern coast of
the United States north of the 36th parallel of north
latitude. In each case it was expressly declared that
the " liberty " applied to sea fisheries, and that " the
salmon and shad fisheries and all fisheries in rivers
and the mouths of rivers " were reserved to each
country exclusively for its own fishermen.^'^ It was
provided that this reciprocal arrangement might be
terminated by either party on twelve months' notice.
This treaty was terminated in the year 1864 by an
act of Congress. The fishing rights reverted again to
the treaty arrangements of 1818. Between 1864 and
1 87 1 a system of licenses was adopted by the Canadian
Government granting American fishermen the right to
fish in waters from which they were excluded by the
treaty of 1818. In 1869 the Canadian Government
enacted exclusive laws against American fishermen
forcing them to keep outside the three mile limit.*^
Conflicts arising between the fishermen of New-
foundland and the United States, negotiations were
47 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 668-672. Moore,
Digest of International Law, I., 791-792.
*s Correspondence respecting the Newfoundland fisheries;
Parliamentary Papers, U. S., No. i. Speech by Sir R. Bond,
58.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 4/3
again renewed which resulted in the so-called treaty of
Washington, which was signed May 8, 1871. It was
stipulated that this treaty should continue for ten years
or until terminated by twelve months' notice by either
state.*^ By this treaty American fishermen were again
allowed the privilege of the inshore fisheries in the
waters of British North America. In return for that
privilege the markets of the United States were opened
to the fishery products of Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia. This treaty was terminated by the American
Government, July i, 1885. Once again the fishing
privilege reverted to the basis of the treaty of 1818,
and a modus vivendi was entered upon.^"
In 1888 Great Britain attempted to negotiate another
reciprocity treaty. These negotiations resulted in what
is known as the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty. This
was signed February 5, 1888, but was subsequently re-
jected by the Senate. In the year 1890 the Govern-
ment of Newfoundland, with the permission of Great
Britain, entered upon direct negotiations with the
United States. As a result an agreement, which has
been called the Bond-Blaine convention, was reached.
This arrangement, similar to the unratified treaty of
1888, provided, in exchange for the fishing privilege,
that the fishing products and crude copper ores of
Newfoundland should be admitted free into the United
^^ Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 700 et seq.
s*' Moore, Digest of International Law, I., 808-809.
474 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
States. The Dominion of Canada objected to the
arrangement, and the convention was never submitted
to Great Britain, out of deference to the wishes of
Canada. Attempts were again made in 1898 by Great
Britain to bring about a reciprocal trade treaty, but
these also failed. ^^
In 1902, as a result of a long series of negotiations, a
convention known as the Hay-Bond treaty was signed.
This treaty was made upon the same lines as those of
1888 and 1890. It was opposed by the fishing interests
of Massachusetts, and, after being before the Senate
for three years, it was finally rejected. From October
12, 1905, to October 6, 1906, an extended correspond-
ence was carried on between the Department of State
and the British Foreign Office over the fishing privi-
leges. This resulted in an agreement upon a new modus
vivendi, which was ratified by the American Govern-
ment, October 6, 1906.'- By the terms of this agree-
ment the Newfoundland Foreign Fishing Vessels Act
of 1906, which imposed certain restrictions upon Amer-
ican fishing vessels, and parts of an act of the previous
year against which American fishermen had com-
plained, were not to be enforced against American fish-
ing vessels. The use of purse seines by the American
^^Correspondence respecting the Newfoundland fisheries;
Parliamentary Papers, U. S., No. i, Speech by Sir R. Bond, 59.
^-Correspondence respecting the Newfoundland fisheries;
Parliamentary Papers, U. S., No. i, Whitelaw Reid to Sir
Edward Grey, Oct. 6, 1906, 42 et seq.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 475
fishermen, which had been prohibited by law, was now
allowed during the ensuing season ; and the " ship-
ment of Newfoundlanders by American fishermen out-
side the three mile limit was not to be made the basis
of interference or to be penalized. "^^
On April 4, 1908, the United States and Great
Britain concluded a general arbitration treaty. Acting
under this treaty, the two countries signed a special
agreement on January 27, 1909, which was formally
ratified by both Governments, March 4, 1909, to submit
to the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague
the settlement of certain questions growing out of the
fisheries controversy. The United States maintained
that its rights to the Newfoundland fisheries were
based upon the treaty of 1818, which had never been
abrogated, and that the Government of Newfoundland
in the passage of restrictive laws had infringed upon
privileges guaranteed under that treaty.^*
The Hague tribunal was, in particular, called upon
to decide seven distinct points: One, had the Govern-
ment of Newfoundland the right to restrict the Ameri-
can fishery rights in Newfoundland by its own laws,
without the consent of the United States; two, might
American fishing vessels while exercising their fishing
53 Correspondence respecting the Newfoundland fisheries;
Parliamentary Papers, U. S., No. i, Whitelaw Reid to Sir
Edward Grey, Oct. 6, 1906, 42 et seq.
54 Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi-
tration; 6ist Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. 870, Vol. VIII., lo-ii.
4/6 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
privileges be prohibited from employing as members
of their crews persons who were not inhabitants of
the United States; three, might the inhabitants of the
United States be subjected, without the consent of the
United States, to the requirements of entry or report
at custom-houses, or the payment of light or harbor or
other dues, or any other similar requirements or con-
ditions or exactions; four, might restrictions be im-
posed upon American fishermen, making the exercise
of the privileges granted them by the treaty of entering
certain bays and harbors for shelter, repairs, wood, or
water, conditional upon the payment of light or harbor
or other dues, or entering or reporting at custom-
houses, or any similar conditions ; five, from what point
should the three mile limit be measured in the case of
bays which were more than three miles wide, from
a line drawn from promontory to promontory, or from
a line paralleling all irregularities of the coast ; six, did
the treaty of 1818 give the inhabitants of the United
States the same liberty to take fish in the bays, harbors,
and creeks of Newfoundland as of Labrador; seven,
were the fishermen of the United States to have for
their vessels, when duly authorized by the United
States in their behalf, the commercial privileges on the
treaty coasts accorded by agreement or otherwise to
United States trading vessels generally.
55
^^ Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi-
tration; 6ist Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. 870, Vol. VIII., 13, 87,
97, 113, 117, 225, 257.
SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 47/
Of the seven points discussed five were decided in
favor of the United States and two in favor of Great
Britain. The two questions interpreted favorably to
Great Britain, or rather to Newfoundland, were the
first and the fifth. By the decision relative to the first,
Newfoundland was allowed to make reasonable regula-
tions of the fisheries, such as determining the time
during which and the methods by which fishing might
be carried on along her coasts. The decision of the
Arbitration Court upon the fifth question construed
the three mile limit to be from a line drawn from head-
land to headland and not from the coast indentations
of the bays. The decision upon all points has justified
the wisdom of the creation of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, for not only was a most vexed question
of long standing settled, but settled in such a fair
manner that the United States, Great Britain, Canada,
and Newfoundland were all satisfied. The award was
made September 7, 1910. The court in connection
with its decision recommended the adoption by the
United States and Great Britain of certain rules and
methods of procedure under which all questions that
might arise in the future with reference to the exercise
of the liberties referred to in Article I of the treaty
of 1818 might be settled in accordance with the prin-
ciples laid down in the award. On July 20, 1912,
representatives of the two countries signed an agree-
ment which provided for the publication of laws, ordin-
478 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS
ances, or rules for the regulation of the fisheries, and
for the creation of a Permanent Mixed Fishery Com-
mission of three, which should decide upon the reason-
ableness of future regulations. This treaty also gave
effect to the decision of the Court of Arbitration rela-
tive to bays by providing that the rule established by
the said court should apply in all bays where the width
of the entrance did not not exceed ten miles. Ratifica-
tions over this convention were exchanged November
15, 1912, and it was proclaimed by the President No-
vember 16, 1912.^''
With the establishment of the Permanent Mixed
Fishery Commission it is believed that all future dis-
putes over the fishing privileges will find speedy ad-
justment. This commission and the recently established
International Boundary Commission illustrate a tend-
ency toward permanent commissions to deal with
questions as they arise, in place of special and tempor-
ary commissions called into existence after differences
have been augmented through a period of years. With
permanent commissions of the character mentioned,
with arbitration treaties, and the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague, the prospects for continued
peace with Great Britain are far more assuring than
they were when the commissioners signed the treaty of
Ghent one hundred years ago.
56 Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi-
tration; 6ist Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. 870, Vol. XII., 2376-2380.
INDEX
Adams, John, 2, 3.
Adams, John Quincy, minister to
Russia, 143-145; mediation en-
voy, 146, 147; attitude toward
the war, 152; reports British
attitude, 154; comments on ne-
gotiation by commission, 157;
urges reply of Russian Gov-
ernment on mediation pros-
pects, 161, 163; appointed
peace minister, 167; services
and abilities of, 169-171;
leaves St. Petersburg, 190;
use of private secretaries, 194;
opposes British dictation of
meeting place, 198; spokes-
man for American ministers,
200-202; presents nature of
American instructions, 206,
207; drafts protocol, 211;
drafts despatch to Secretary
of State, 214; prepares reply
to British, 222; considers re-
turn to St. Petersburg, 234;
discusses British proposals,
235, 236; records sentiment
of Americans on British note
of September 4, 238; opposes
stipulation on Indians, 243;
considers mutual disarmament
on lakes beyond instructions,
243; prepares note on In-
dians and Indian boundary,
244; opinion on British note
of September 19, 257; pre-
pares note, 257; prepares de-
spatch to Russia, 268; frames
reply to British, 275; state-
ment on cession of Canada,
275; drafts projet, 300, 301;
opposes impressment article,
301; position on navigation
of Mississippi, 320; prepares
draft of note to British, 321;
proposes presenting British
with deposition regarding ne-
groes, 321; opens conference
of December i, 324; opposes
British demands, 347; signs
and exchanges copies of
treaty, 356; comments on
signing of treaty, 357; opin-
ion of treaty, 367; refuses to
recognize vote ordering send-
ing of papers to Washington,
378; negotiation for treaty of
commerce, 390-396; fisheries,
468, 469; discusses disarma-
ment on lakes, 462; nego-
tiation on slaves, 400-403 ;
states American position on
slave trade, 408, 409; negotia-
tions for convention on im-
pressment, 441 ; instructs Rush
on commercial treaty, 443 ;
opposes British proposal on
impressment, 44s; candidate
for president, 379; Russell
duplicate-letter controversy,
379-381; submits to Congress
alleged cases of impressment,
449.
Adams, William, British peace
minister, 194, 196, 219; opin-
ion on fisheries, 315.
479
48o
INDEX
Addington, Henry, signs treaty for
settling slave claims, 404; au-
thorized to conclude treaty on
slave trade, 414; addresses
note to Adams, 415.
Allegiance, law of, 19; naturali-
zation act of Great Britain,
454-
Amnesty, article on, 308; amended
by Great Britain, 315; United
States consents to drop arti-
cle on, 322.
Angus, Captain, 189, 214.
Arbitration, treaty between Great
Britain and United States,
475 ; international court for
settlement of fisheries dispute,
475. 476, 477-
Armistice, proposed by Russell,
59, ^27, 138; refused by Cas-
tlereagh, 137, 139; proposed
by Admiral Warren, 60, 140;
refused by Madison, 141; pro-
posal of Sir George Prevost
rejected, 60.
Armstrong, John, minister to
France, demands explanation
of Berlin decree, 89; protests
against French action in case
oi Horizon, gz; against French
decrees, 104-106; fails to se-
cure satisfaction from France,
107; opposes the embargo,
108; notified of revocation of
French decrees, 113.
Aroostook war, 430.
Auckland, Lord, 32, 33.
Bagot, Sir Charles, 463-465.
Baker, Anthony St. John, 198,
199, 2iSi 216, 355, 356, 360,
361, 362.
Barclay, Anthony, 432-434.
Barclay, Thomas, 421, 424.
Baring, Alexander, 157, 158, 314.
Barlow, Joel, 119.
Bathurst, Lord, gives instructions
on Indian pacification, 268;
author of British note of Oc-
tober 8, 274; urges Welling-
ton to go to America, 304;
instructs commissioners on
islands and fisheries, 351, 352;
defends British commissioners
in Parliament, 377; negotia-
tions with Adams over fish-
eries, 469.
Bayard, James, mediation envoy,
146, 147; attitude toward
war, 152; leaves for St. Pe-
tersburg, 154; leaves St. Pe-
tersburg for London, 162,
186; peace plenipotentiary,
167; services and abilities of,
171, 172; attitude toward
British proposal of meeting
place, 188; questions British
ministers on boundary line,
202; corrects protocol, 211;
drafts despatch to Secretary
of State, 214; attitude toward
British note of September 4,
238; favors concession, 243;
opinion on British note of
September 19, 257; favors
acceptance of article on In-
dian pacification, 274; amends
American note of October 24,
291; opposes impressment ar-
ticle, 301; position on fish-
eries and navigation of Mis-
sissippi, 321; favors yielding
on islands but not on fish-
eries, 347; votes that Adams
transmit papers to Washing-
ton, 378; sickness and death
of, 396.
Beasley, R. J., 139, 378.
Blockade, directed against French
West Indies, 67; illegal block-
INDEX
481
ades, 68; effected by French
decrees and orders in coun-
cil, 85, 86; British position
on. It 6, 117; one cause of the
war, 121; protest of Secre-
tary Marshall in 1800, 121;
of American Government in
1801 and 1803, 121; position
of United States on, 122, 123;
notification of, 123; United
States protests against British
order of May 16, 1806, 124;
cessation of illegal blockades
demanded as a condition of
peace, 149; definition of
blockade insisted on, 149,
150; instructions to peace
ministers, 176; article in pro-
jet, 308; rejected by British
ministers, 316; Americans con-
sent to drop article, 322; in
negotiations for treaty of
commerce, 387, 389, 455;
American position restated in
1816, 456; protest against
Brazilian blockades, 456; Mex-
ican blockades, 456; defined
by Mason, Secretary of Navy,
457; Declaration of Paris on,
457; discussion in second
Hague Conference, 4s 7, 458;
London Naval Conference,
458; defined in Declaration of
London, 458.
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 91, 368.
Boston, celebration of treaty, 366;
meeting place of boundary
commissioners, 424, 425.
Boundary commissions, discussion
of and arrangement for, 296,
307. 311, 318, 322, 327, 362,
421; questions to be decided
by, 421; settlement of dis-
puted islands in Passama-
quoddy Bay, 421-424; dis-
agreement on boundary from
St. Croix to St. Lawrence,
424-427 ; submission of dis-
puted questions to arbiter,
427-429; dissatisfaction with
award, 429, 430; further ne-
gotiations with Great Britain,
430. 431; commission on
northern boundary from St.
Lawrence through Lake
Huron, 432, 433; failure to
agree on boundary from Lake
Huron to Lake of the Woods,
434; later settlement, 435.
Boundary controversies, Indian,
208-210, 212, 216, 217, 225-
227, 237, i4o, 241, 251, 260;
Maine, 217, 228, 248, 251, 258,
259, 270, 288, 296; northeast-
ern, 288-290, 428-431; British
arguments on, 239, 240; Brit-
ish instructions on, 288, 289;
British proposal, 291; Ameri-
can rejection, 307; commis-
sions proposed, 307, 310; ar-
ticles on, 318, 319.
Buchanan, James, 456.
Cadore, Duke of, 113, 114.
Calhoun, John C, 127, 130, 445.
Campbell, George W., 169.
Canada, discussion of cession of,
178; attitude on fisheries, 205,
375; annexation of, 236, 238,
239.244.251,271,275; bound-
aries, 254, 25s, 288, 372, 375.
Canning, George, British secretary
for foreign affairs, 42; nego-
tiation over Chesapeake, 44,
46, 47; discusses effect of
French decrees, 94, 100; com-
plains of American embargo,
100; justifies British orders in
council, loi; criticises inter-
diction of British ships, 102.
32
482
INDEX
Carroll, Henry, 358, 360.
Cass, General, minister at Paris,
416; protests against treaty
of London, 416; criticises ar-
ticle on slave trade in treaty
of 1842, 417; discusses right
of visitation and search, 418,
4:9.
Castlereagh, Lord, rejects propo-
sal of armistice, 137, 139;
proposes direct negotiations,
165; notified of appointment
of American peace ministers,
190; of their arrival at Ghent,
215; communicates with Brit-
ish ministers, 231, 232; pro-
poses provisional article on
Indian pacification, 232; in-
fluence of treaty of Paris on,
242; ratified treaty delivered
to, 363; invites Gallatin and
Clay to interview, 385; nego-
tiations over impressment, 390,
440-444; negotiations over
commercial treaty, 446; posi-
tion with regard to Great
Lakes, 459-462.
Cathcart, Lord, 164.
Chesapeake, the attack on, 42; ne-
gotiations concerning demands,
44-50; reparation offered by
Great Britain, 51, 53, 55.
Cheves, Langdon, 127, 404.
Clancarty, Lord, 243.
Clay, Henry, appointed peace min-
ister, 167; services and abili-
ties of, 172; leaves United
States, 185; favors change of
meeting place, 189; correction
of protocol, 211; opinion on
success of mission, 220, 221;
prepares reply to British, 222;
attitude toward British note
of September 4, 238; opposes
any stipulation on Indians,
243; prepares despatch to
France, 268; favors rejection
of disarmament on lakes, 275;
prepares draft of American
note, 276; predicts abandon-
ment of uti possidetis, 300;
opposes privilege of naviga-
tion of Mississippi, 300, 301,
320, 321; drafts article on
impressment, 301; attitude on
fisheries, 320, 321; prepares
draft of note to British, 321;
disappointment with proposed
treaty, 352; opposes plan for
conference, 353; wishes rec-
ord of vote on fisheries and
other questions, 359; opinion
of treaty, 367, 368; favors
papers being sent to Wash-
ington, 378; friendship with
Russell broken, 381, 382; goes
to London, 385; negotiations
at London, 385, 386; leaves
England for United States,
397; Speaker of House, 397;
Secretary of State, 415; re-
plies to British note on slave
trade, 415; presents alleged
cases of impressment, 450.
Cochrane, Vice-Admiral, 260, 261,
270.
Colonial trade, 61, 63, 66, 67, 70,
71. ISO, 387. 389-
Commercial treaty, preliminary ne-
gotiations, 384-390; projet of
American commissioners, 390,
391; conferences of American
and British commissioners,
329. 393; treaty agreed upon,
393; provisions, 394, 395;
ratifications, 39s, 396.
Committee on Foreign Relations,
report of, on impressment,
59; recommending war, 129-
130.
INDEX
483
Congress of Vienna, 293, 302, 312,
3t3, 374-
Continuous voyage, 77, 78, 83.
Contraband, 25, 68, 76, 151.
Convention, of 1818, commerce
and fisheries, 469; of 1822,
indemnity under award of
Emperor of Russia, 403; of
1824, slave trade, 411-414;
of 1827, to submit boundary
dispute to arbiter, 428; of
19 12, northwestern fishery
regulations, 477, 478.
Cralle, Richard K., 128.
Crawford, William H., 242, 243,
334. 335. 368, 382-384, 445.
Dallas, George M., 154, 214, 231,
277.
Dartmoor prison, killing of pris-
oners, 405, 406.
Daschkoflf, Count, 145.
Declaration of London, on block-
ades, 458.
Declaration of Paris, 457; signa-
tory Powers, 457.
Duties, discriminating, purpose of,
64, 65; proposed abolition of,
387, 388; provision in com-
mercial treaty, 391-394.
East India trade, discussion of, in
negotiations for treaty of
commerce, 387, 388, 391, 392;
provision in treaty of com-
merce, 394, 395.
Elgin, Lord, 471.
Embargo Act, passed by Con-
gress, 96; proposal for re-
peal, 99; second act, 120;
third act, April 4, 1812, 127.
Erskine, Lord, 32, 51, 93, 109,
110.
Expatriation, 454.
Federalist party, opposed to war,
126, 131-133, 142; criticises ap-
pointment of mediation en-
voys, 148; opposed to Madison
and Gallatin, 149; effect of
British demands on, 223, 227,
280; attitude on treaty of
peace, 363.
Fisheries, northeastern, Canadian
protest against, 205; Ameri-
can instructions, 205; British
instructions, 287, 288; question
of rights to, 295, 300, 307,
328, 345; opinion of British
ministers, 315, 332, 333, 342;
position of American minis-
ters, 320, 321, 327; proposal
of articles on, as offset to
navigation of Mississippi, 329;
articles rejected by British,
329; British report to home
government, 332; British in-
structed not to renew privi-
leges in exchange for naviga-
tion of Mississippi, 337; pro-
posal to leave for future
negotiations, 337, 339; Ameri-
cans unwilling to renounce
claim, 341; discuss proposi-
tion, 345-348; reject British
proposal, 349; proposal to
omit in treaty, 349, 350;
British agree, 351, 352; vote
on proposal for mutual con-
cession, 359; omitted from
treaty, 372; Canadian de-
mands, 375; negotiations in
proposed commercial treaty,
468; privileges renewed in
treaty of 1818, 469, 470;
comparison with provisions of
treaty of 1783, 470, 471;
modus vivendi of igo6, 474,
475 ; agreement to submit dis-
pute to Court of Arbitration,
484
INDEX
475; claim of United States,
475; settlement by Court of
Arbitration, 475-477; conven-
tion of 1912, 477, 478; Per-
manent Mixed Fishery Com-
mission, 477.
Florida, territory, 151, 152; Brit-
ish accusation, 239, 269, 274;
refutation by American min-
isters, 244.
Foster, August J., 54, SS-S7-
Fox, Charles, 30-34, 63, 81, 87.
French decrees, Berlin, Novem-
ber 21, 1806, 38; attitude of
Great Britain toward, 39; pro-
visions of, 85; Milan decree,
December 17, 1807, 86; effect
of Berlin decree on diplomatic
negotiations, 88; protest of
United States, 89; explana-
tions of French minister, 89;
modifications of, 90, 91; re-
versal of French position, 92;
attitude of France in enforce-
ment of decrees, 103, 104;
remonstrance of American
minister, 104-106; Bayonne
decree, April 22, 1808, 107;
offer to revoke decrees upon
recall of orders in council,
iii; final repeal of decrees,
119; effect of decrees on
blockade, 455, 456.
Gales, Joseph, 128, 129.
Gallatin, Albert, appointed media-
tion envoy, 146; Senate re-
fuses to confirm, 147; attitude
toward war, 152; leaves for
St. Petersburg, 134; sounds
feeling in European capitals,
157; informs Baring of na-
ture of instructions, 158;
seeks new instructions, 159;
favors omission of impress-
ment, 159, 160; leaves St.
Petersburg for London, 162;
peace plenipotentiary, 168;
vacates ofEce of Secretary of
Treasury, 169; services and
abilities of, 174; correspond-
ence with Baring, 187; favors
change of meeting place, 188;
corrects protocol, 211; revises
despatch to Secretary of State,
214; prepares reply to Great
Britain, 222; attitude toward
British note of September 4,
238; proposes mutual dis-
armament on lakes, 243;
drafts reply to British note,
244; opinion of British note
of September 19, 256, 257;
prepares reply, 257; favors
acceptance of article on In-
dian pacification, 275; pre-
pares draft of note, 276; fa-
vors principle of status quo
ante bellum, 282; prepares
note, 291; propounds ques-
tions to Secretary of State,
29s, 296; suggestions on in-
ternal policy, 297; drafts pro-
jet, 300; opposes article on
impressment, 301; position on
fisheries and navigation of
Mississippi, 320, 321 ; prepares
draft of note to British, 321;
proposes partial waiving of
indemnities, 321 ; argument on
fisheries, 345; drafts reply to
British, 348; opinion on treaty,
367; goes to London, 385;
invited by Castlereagh to an
interview, 385; negotiations
for treaty of commerce, 386;
bearer of treaty of commerce
to United States, 394; offered
former position, 397; ap-
pointed minister to France,
INDEX
485
397; appointed with Rush to
arrange commercial treaty,
400, 401, 445, 446; signs
treaty on slave claims, 404;
appointed minister to Great
Britain on boundary disputes,
427; secures agreement to re-
fer them to arbiter, 428; pre-
pares statement on boundary,
429; negotiations for com-
mercial treaty and other sub-
jects, 469.
Gallatin, James, 154.
Gambler, Lord, British peace min-
ister, 194, 195; addresses
joint mission, 200; opinion
on fisheries, 315; opens con-
ference of December I, 324;
signs and exchanges copies of
treaty, 356.
Ghent, place of peace negotiation,
190; arrival of American min-
isters, 192; suitability of
place, 192; treaty signed, 355,
356; celebration of citizens
of, 360.
Ghent, Treaty of. See Peace Ne-
gotiations.
Goulburn, Henry, British peace
minister, 194-196; states points
of British instructions, 201,
202; presents substance of
new instructions, 216; dis-
cusses British proposals with
Adams, 236; opinion on fish-
eries, 315; defends British
commissioners in Parliament,
377; special plenipotentiary on
commercial arrangements, 446;
writes Clay about armament,
460-461.
Great Lakes, augmentation of na-
val power on, 151; disarma-
ment on, 217, 218, 459; Amer-
ican opposition to British pro-
posal, 227, 228, 24s, 259;
British position, 239, 460; re-
jection of British demands,
249; withdrawal of sine qua
non, 254; parliamentary dis-
cussions concerning, 461,462;
negotiations, 461-465; con-
vention ratified, 465.
Grenville, Lord, 10, 30, 42, 68-70.
Guizot, M., 416.
Hague Peace Conference (1907),
on blockade, 457-458.
Hamilton, William R., 192.
Harris, Levett, 161.
Harrowby, Lord, 23-27.
Hawkesbury, Lord, 16, 21-23, 32,
TZ, 75-
Henry, John, 126.
Holland, Lord, 32-34.
Holmes, John, 421.
Horizon, cargo confiscated by
France, 92.
Howick, Lord, 32, 42.
Hughes, Christopher, 168, 199,
211, 244, 257, 302, 321, 334,
342, 358, 361.
Hull, General, proclamation of,
236, 251, 252, 260, 270.
Huskisson, William, 404.
Impressment, American claims, 4-
34, 45 ; complaints of, 5-10,
27; certification of seamen, 4,
8, 12; negotiations on, 5-24,
30-36; registry of crew, 7, 8;
limitation of men to vessel,
4; surrender of deserters, 12-
t4. 35, 36, 56, 57; incon-
sistency of British practice,
20, 21, 26; British position
on, 28, 35, 36, 47, 60, 137,
158; British proposals, 34, 36;
American position on, 40, 41,
43, SO, 59, 60, 149; discon-
486
INDEX
tinuance a condition of armis-
tice, 137, 141; sine qua non
in peace restoration, 149, 153;
concession allowed, 151; Gal-
latin's position on, 160; in-
structions to peace ministers,
176, 184, 185, 205, 206; pro-
posal of American ministers,
229, 230; reasons for modera-
tion of American demands,
230; instructions to British
ministers, 287; British waive
stipulations, 290; negotiations
in connection with treaty of
peace, 308, 323, 368, 438;
with treaty of commerce, 387-
390, 439-448; change in Brit-
ish sentiment, 449 ; alleged
cases in 1828, 450; Clay's
statement on, 450; discussion
of subject by Webster, 451,
452; Ashburton refuses to
consider subject, 452, 453;
President Tyler's statement,
453. 454; case of Mason and
Slidell, 454", naturalization
act of Great Britain, 454;
United States navy regula-
tions, 454, 455.
Indemnities, instructions to peace
ministers, 177; for losses in-
curred without proper noti-
fication of war, 183; article
drafted by Adams, 301; ar-
ticle in projet, 308, 309; in-
admissible for losses before
war, 311, 316; Gallatin pro-
poses partial waiving of, 321,
322; discussion over article,
329-331; for slaves, 401, 404.
Indians, trade with, 151, 295,
389; territorial arrangement,
203; discussion over territory
of, 204, 208-210, 216, 217,
225, 227; British position on
territory of, 240, 241; Amer-
ican position, 243-247, 261-
263; peace with, 247; non-
employment of, 248, 308, 315,
322; rejection of British de-
mands concerning, 249; Brit-
ish denial of inciting, 252,
271; British claim of abroga-
tion of treaties of, 252; with-
drawal of demand for bound-
ary of, 253; proposal for mu-
tual restitution, 254; British
denial of American sover-
eignty over territory of, 271,
272; proposed article on paci-
fication of, 272, 273; accept-
ance of article, 275, 276, 283.
Jackson, Andrew, 365, 430.
Jackson, Francis, 53, 54.
Jackson, George, 404.
Jay, John, 68-70.
Jefferson, Thomas, on impress-
ment, 3, 4, 39, 40, 440; urges
embargo act, 96; objects to
proposed treaty of i8o6, 123.
Jones, William, 168.
King, Charles, 405.
King, Rufus, American minister
at London, negotiations on
impressment, 6, 9, 10, 15; re-
turns to United States, 17;
treaty signed in 1803, 21, 32;
secures modification of rule
of 1756, 74.
Landsdowne, Marquis of, 314,461.
Larpent, Francis, 405.
Lee, Charles, 15.
Lievin, Count, 144, 156.
Liston, Sir Robert, 13.
Liverpool, Lord, 232, 274, 293,
303.
London Naval Conference, 458.
INDEX
487
Louisiana, 239, 244, 259, 269, 284,
310. 372-
Lowndes, William, 127.
McHenry, James, 14, 15.
Madison, James, on impressment,
18-21; notifies Monroe of
ratification of treaty of 1803,
21; instructions to Monroe,
25, 31, 37; candidate for
presidency, 47, 48; note to
British minister, 49; instruc-
tions to Pinkney, 50; war
message, 58, 127; proposes
discriminating duties, 64, 65;
seeks explanation of Berlin
decree, 90; replies to Erskine
as to British order, 94; re-
moves restrictions on French
commerce, 113; calls Con-
gress in special session, 119,
120 ; defines American posi-
tion on blockade, 122; ac-
cepts Russian mediation and
appoints envoys, 146; calls
special session of Senate, 147;
appoints Adams minister to
Russia, 170; consults Cabinet
on impressment, 230; trans-
mits despatches of peace min-
isters to Congress, 278; dis-
trusted by British, 35s, 370;
transmits treaty of Ghent to
Senate, 361; transmits papers
of peace negotiations to Sen-
ate, 362; issues thanksgiving
proclamation, 366; denounced
by English press, 371; trans-
mits Ghent papers to Con-
gress, 379; transmits treaty
of commerce to Senate, 396;
proclaims treaty of commerce,
396; recommends amendment
to slave-trade act, 407; au-
thorized to negotiate on slave
trade, 410; recommends pro-
hibition of employment of for-
eign seamen, 438.
Maine, boundary dispute, 430;
Aroostook war, 430; negotia-
tions over boundary, 217, 228,
248, 251, 258, 259, 270, 288,
296; Webster-Ashburton treaty
on, 431, 432.
Marcy, William L., 471.
Marshall, John, secretary of state,
on impressment, 1 1 ; submits
cases of vessels seized, 72;
instructs King on British seiz-
ures, 73; protests against Brit-
ish blockade, 121.
Mason, John Y., 457.
Mediation, proposed by Russia,
143, 14s; accepted by LTnited
States, 146; envoys appointed
on, 146; instructions to en-
voys, 149-152; reasons for
British rejection, 155, 180-
183.
Melville, Lord, 23.
Middle States, interest in Indian
territory and boundaries, 281.
Millegan, George, 154, 188.
Mississippi, navigation of, British
privilege discussed, 217, 300,
319-321, 327-329, 332, 336,
337; proposal for future nego-
tiations on, 339, 340, 346;
British proposal rejected, 349;
offer to omit in treaty, 349;
offer accepted by British, 352;
vote on mutual concession,
359.
Monroe, James, American minis-
ter to Great Britain, 17; in-
structed by home government,
21; negotiations on impress-
ment, 22-31, 37, 56-58; nego-
tiations over Chesapeake, 44-
47; objects to seizure of ships.
488
INDEX
under rule of 1756, 80; nego-
tiations on neutral trade, 81;
objects to British retaliation,
117; maintains revocation of
French decrees, 118; nego-
tiations on impressment and
repeal of British orders, 120;
author of war manifesto, 128,
129; accepts Russian media-
tion, 146; instructs mediation
envoys, 149-153; accepts of-
fer of direct negotiation, 166;
instructs peace ministers, 176-
184; commends action of
American ministers, 282; in-
structs ministers on status
quo ante bellum, 282; ex-
changes ratification of treaty,
362; transmits papers to Con-
gress, 380; urges reciprocal
method in commercial treaty,
393; proposes submission of
slave question to arbitration,
400 ; transmits papers on slave-
trade negotiation, 414; nego-
tiations over disarmament on
lakes, 463, 464; submits Brit-
ish proposal on impressment
to Cabinet, 444; opinion on
British proposal, 445.
Morris, Gouverneur, 65.
Mulgrave, Lord, 28.
Napier, Lord, 418.
Navigation, freedom of, 391, 392.
Negroes, alleged carrying away by
British, 236, 321, 333, 334,
359. 399-404; colonization of,
415.
Nesselrode, Count, 164.
Neutral trade, affected by bellig-
erency, 72, "jT,; under prin-
ciple of continuous voyage,
74; decision in case of Essex,
Tj; complaint of United States
against Essex decision, 78;
effect of rule of 1756, 80;
effect of coalition of Russia
and Sweden, 80; instructions
to Monroe and Pinkney, 82;
provisions of unratified treaty
of 1806, 82, 83; seizure of
vessels a cause of war, 84;
British orders in council and
French decrees, 85, 86; ob-
jections of United States to
French decrees, 87; explana-
tion of French minister, 89,
90; reversal of French posi-
tion, 92; exceptions in orders
in council, 97; complaints of
United States, 98; instruc-
tions to mediation envoys,
150, 151; proposals in nego-
tiations for treaty of com-
merce, 387; British position
on, 387-389-
New England States, concerned
in the fisheries, 281; sug-
gested plan of making treaty
with, 355; British view of
separation of, 372.
New York, celebration of treaty
of Ghent in, 365; financial
conditions after signing of
treaty, 368; meeting of north-
eastern boundary commission-
ers at, 425 ; meeting of north-
ern boundary commissioners
at, 432.
New York legislature, condemns
British demands, 278; urges
more vigorous measures, 279.
Non-Intercourse Acts, repeal on
condition of revocation of or-
ders in council, 109; repeal
of, 110; withdrawal of repeal
of, no; Act of May i, 1810,
in; revived against Great
INDEX
489
Britain, ii6; effect on France,
119.
North, Lord, 63.
Northeastern boundary dispute,
258, 259, 288-290; commis-
sioners appointed, 424; meet-
ing of commissioners, 424,
425; points involved, 426;
failure to agree, 426, 427; ne-
gotiations at London, 427;
agreement to refer to arbiter,
428; statements of case, 429;
decision of arbiter, 429;
United States protests award,
429; Great Britain consents
to disregard award, 430;
award rejected by Senate,
430; negotiations with Great
Britain renewed, 430, 431;
Webster- Ashburton treaty, 431 ;
line agreed upon, 431-432.
Northern boundary, commission on
line from St. Lawrence
through Lake Huron, 432,
433; on line from Lake
Huron to Lake of the Woods,
433, 434-
Ogiivy, John, 432.
Orders in council, prior to 1800,
64, 66, 67; effect on neutral
trade, 76; order of May 16,
1806, 84; order of January 7,
1807, 85; order of November
II, 1807, 85; policy of British
Government, 96; complaints
against, by United States, 98;
refusal of Great Britain to
repeal, 99; order of Decem-
ber, 1808, 103; proposal to re-
peal on conditions, 108, 109;
justified by British minister,
116; adverse opinion of Brit-
ish press, 135; revocation of,
139; reasons for revocation,
139; conditions of revoca-
tion, 140, 141; relation to
blockade, 455.
Pakenham, Richard, 456.
Passamaquoddy Bay, islands in,
discussion over rights to, 219,
311, 325, 326, 331, 336, 338,
342, 343-352; article agreed
upon in treaty, 353, 334.421;
American claims, 422; British
claims, 422, 423; decision of
commissioners, 423 ; bound-
ary marked, 424.
Peace negotiations, offer of Great
Britain, 165; acceptance by
United States, 166; appoint-
ment of American peace min-
isters, 167; relations of min-
isters to one another, 175; at-
titude of public toward, 175;
instructions to, 176-185; de-
lay of British Government in
appointing ministers, 187, 191;
place of meeting, 187-190; ar-
rival of ministers at Ghent,
192, 198; character of British
ministers, 194, 195; British
proposals at first meeting,
201-203; discussions at second
meeting, 206-210; at third
meeting, 216-219; unfavorable
prospects of peace, 220; dif-
ferences between American
ministers, 221-223; American
opposition to proposed Indian
boundary, 225-227; discussion
of disarmament on lakes, 227,
228; summary of American
opposition to British demands,
228, 229, 231; attitude of
British Cabinet, 233; immi-
nence of rupture, 234; delay
of British, 235; new instruc-
tions to British, 237, 238;
490
INDEX
charges against United States,
238; explanation of British
demands, 239-241; responsi-
bility for rupture placed on
Americans, 241, 242; Ameri-
cans reject Indian boundary
and British possession of
lakes, 249; rupture in nego-
tiations expected, 249; British
seek additional instructions,
250; British Cabinet attempts
to avoid rupture, 250; British
ministers present new note,
251,252; modifications of sine
qua non, 253, 254; character
of British diplomacy, 256;
sentiment of American min-
isters, 256; American note of
September 27, 258-263; pro-
posal for Indian pacification,
262, 263; effect of war news
on negotiations, 264-266; Brit-
ish ministers present projet
on Indian pacification and
discuss other subjects, 269-
273; opinion of American
ministers upon British ulti-
matum, 274, 275; effect of
publication of despatches in
America, 278-280; attempt of
American ministers to arouse
feeling in United States, 281,
282; effect on Great Britain
of publication of despatches,
283; Indian article accepted,
283; British note of October
21,290,291; proposal of prin-
ciple of uti possidetis, 291;
Americans deny recognition of
principle, 291, 292; propose
status quo ante bellum, 292;
propose mutual presentation
of projet, 292; effect in Lon-
don of American rejection of
uti possidetis, 293; feeling of
the two missions, 293 ; effect
of American victories on Brit-
ish ministry, 294; British re-
quest contre-projet, 294; Amer-
ican ministers believe peace
treaty impossible, 299; influ-
ences effecting change in Brit-
ish demands, 302; American
ministers submit projet, 306 ;
reply to British proposition
on fisheries, northwest bound-
ary, and uti possidetis, 306-
308; Americans request contre-
projet, 309; British refer pro-
jet to home Government, 309;
British withdraw principle of
uti possidetis, 312; reasons for
withdrawal, 312-314; British
object to articles on non-
employment of Indians, im-
pressment, blockade, and in-
demnities, 315, 316; suggest
article on courts, 316; on
prisoners of war, 319; Ameri-
cans discuss fisheries and
navigation of Mississippi, 320,
321; consent to modification
of projet, 322, 323; object to
British article on restoration
of territory, 324; differences
over wording of article, 324,
325; amendments to time limits
for cessation of hostilities,
325, 326; to article on islands
in Passamaquoddy Bay, 326,
327; to article establishing
boundary commissions, 327;
discussion of fisheries and
navigation of Mississippi, 328,
329; of article on indemnities,
329-331; British receive in-
structions, 335-337; request
conference, 338; state in-
structions on article on resti-
tution, 338; offer to leave
INDEX
491
fisheries and navigation of
Mississippi to future negotia-
tions, 339, 340; minor changes
in projet agreed upon, 341;
British report prospects of
peace treaty, 341; Americans
reject British alterations in
article on restitution of terri-
tory, 342; British refute Amer-
ican objections, 343, 344;
American position restated,
344. 345 ; Americans propose
general article on all unset-
tled questions, 346; British
refuse, 346; discussion over
islands, 346-349; American
ministers reject article on
courts, 350; reject article on
fisheries and navigation of
Mississippi, 349-350; British
ministers accept proviso in
article on islands and omit
fisheries and navigation of
Mississippi, 352; peace pros-
pects brighten, 352, 353; con-
ference arranged, 353; altera-
tions agreed upon, 353; war
to cease upon ratification of
treaty, 356; treaty signed in
triplicate, 355, 356.
Peace plenipotentiaries, American,
appointment of, 167; charac-
ter of, 169-17S; instructions
to, 176-185; arrival at Ghent,
191; negotiations at Ghent,
198-356; commendation of,
364; differences and personal
animosities, 377, 378, 382-384;
explain power to negotiate
commercial treaty, 385; offer
projet of treaty of commerce,
390; mission ends with sign-
ing of treaty of commerce,
396.
Philadelphia, celebration of treaty
of Ghent, 365, 366.
Pickering, Timothy, 6-9, 13.
Pinckney, Thomas, 3, 5.
Pinkney, William, instructed on
impressment negotiations, 31;
minister to Great Britain, 47;
instructed on Chesapeake ne-
gotiation, 50; requests recall
of Jackson, 54; leaves Lon-
don, 59; protests against
British order in council of
November 11, 1807, 95; ex-
plains embargo act, 96; nego-
tiates for repeal of orders,
97-99. 103. 112; fails to con-
vince British Government of
revocation of French decrees,
113; decides to return home,
115; drafts war proclamation,
130.
Pitt, William, proposed commercial
policy of, 62, 63; resigns as
prime minister, 63; views on
Canadian boundary, 284; death
of, 29, 81.
Porter, Peter B., 127, 432-434.
Preble, William R., 429.
Prevost, Sir George, 60.
Prince Regent, 376, 377.
Prisoners of war, 319, 322, 354,
404-406.
Prize Court, International, 458.
Prize vessels, time limitation of
seizure, 317, 318, 322, 323.
Republican party, in favor of war
of 1812, 12s, 126; reception
of treaty of Ghent by, 363.
Right of search, in connection
with impressment, 444, 445;
in connection with slave trade,
408, 409, 412, 413, 416, 449;
protest of United States
against treaty of London, 416;
492
INDEX
article in treaty of 1842, 417;
resolution of Senate on, 419;
limited right in treaty of
1862, 420; statement of Web-
ster on, 451, 452. See also
Peace Negotiations.
Robinson, Sir Frederick John, 385,
446.
Romanzoff, Count, 143-145, 155,
156, 160-163.
Rose, George Henry, 48, 49.
Rule of 1756, applied in 1793, 66;
modifications secured, 74; doc-
trine of continuous voyage in
connection with, 80.
Rush, Richard, succeeds Adams as
minister to Great Britain, 400,
443; given power to conclude
commercial treaty, 400, 443;
instructed to conclude treaty
on slave trade, 410, 411; ne-
gotiations on slave trade, 411;
on impressment, 444, 447, 448;
learns of British acceptance
of disarmament on lakes, 465;
pledges American Government
to proposal, 465; negotiates
for commercial treaty and
other objects, 469.
Russell, Jonathan, charge d'affaires
in London, 125; proposes ar-
mistice, 136-138; leaves Lon-
don, 139; appointed peace
minister, 167; services and
abilities of, 172, 173; ap-
pointed minister to Sweden,
173; arrives at Stockholm,
188; notifies Swedish Govern-
ment of change of meeting
place, 191; leaves Stockholm,
arrives at Ghent, 191; amends
despatch to Secretary of State,
214; favors impressment arti-
cle, 301; opposes privilege of
navigation of Mississippi, 321 ;
insists upon fisheries, 348;
requests record of vote on
the two privileges, 359; opin-
ion of treaty, 368; votes that
Adams transmit papers to
Washington, 378; returns to
Stockholm, 396; member of
Congress, 379; opposes Adams
for presidency and favors
Clay, 379; secures resolution
calling for papers of treaty
of Ghent, 379; letter to Mon-
roe and duplicate letter of,
379. 380; controversy over
letters, 380, 381; explains di-
versity of opinion in mission,
382-384.
Russia, Emperor of, offers media-
tion, 143; arbiter on slave
claims, 402.
St. Croix River dispute, 424-426.
Scott, General Winfield, 430, 431.
Scott, Sir William, 16.
Serrurier, French minister, 118.
Shaler, William, 168, 334.
Shelbourne, Lord, 63.
Slave trade, article upon, pro-
posed by British, 340 ; ac-
cepted by American ministers,
347; article in treaty, 406;
act of Congress, 407; amend-
ments to law proposed, 407;
discussions in negotiations for
commercial treaty, 407; Amer-
ican principles on, 408, 409;
law making slave trade pi-
racy, 409; instructions to Rush,
410, 411; negotiations by
Rush, 411; convention on,
411, 412; amended by Senate,
413 ; rejected by Great Britain,
413, 414; report of House
committee, 414, 415; British
note on, 415; reply to Clay,
INDEX
493
415; attempt to secure adher-
ence of United States to con-
vention on, 415; American
Government declines, 416;
London treaty on, 416; Web-
ster-Ashburton treaty, 417;
criticism of article, 417; de-
fended by Webster, 418;
treaty between Great Britain
and United States on, 420;
United States party to gen-
eral act to suppress African
slave trade, 421.
Slaves, restoration of, discussion
over, 399, 400; proposed ref-
erence of question to friendly
Power, 400; claim of United
States for indemnities, 401;
Great Britain accepts proposal
of reference, 401, 402; re-
ferred to Emperor of Russia,
402; mediation of Russia,
403; treaty between Great
Britain and United States,
403; claims settled by treaty,
404.
Smith, John S., 54.
Smyth, General, proclamation of,
251, 252, 270.
Southern States, interest in In-
dian territory and boundaries,
281.
Status quo ante bellum, proposed
by American ministers, 229,
24s, 307, 308; accepted by
British, 312, 317.
Stoddart, Ben, 15.
Territory, restitution of, 151, 324,
32s. 331. 335, 336, 342, 343-
Todd, J. Payne, 154.
Treaty, of Amiens, 15, 2T, 74;
of arbitration between Great
Britain and United States,
475 ; of commerce with Great
Britain (1815), 396; of 1803
(proposed), 16, 21, 22; of
1806 (unratified), 40, 41, 82-
84; of i8i8, on fisheries and
commercial arrangements, 469,
470; of 1826, on slave claims,
404; of Ghent, signing of,
355, 356; ratification of, 360,
362; proclamation of, 362;
reception of, by Republicans,
363; by Federalists, 363, 364;
commendation of American
commissioners, 364; public
demonstration over, 365, 366;
opinion of, 366-368; effect on
prices of, 368, 369; attitude
of Canada on, 375; execution
of, 399-436; of Greenville,
226, 241, 246, 247, 252, 258;
Hay-Bond (1902), 474; Jay
(1794), 70-72; of peace
(1783), failure to settle dif-
ferences, I, 63, 68; of Wash-
ington (187 1), 473; Webster-
Ashburton (1842), 417, 431,
435, 436, 453-
Trent, affair of the, 454.
Tyler, President, 417.
Uti possidetis principle, proposed
by British ministers, 291; re-
jected by Americans, 307;
withdrawal of, 312, 317, 320;
reasons for withdrawal of,
312, 313-
Van Ness, Cornelius P., 424.
Vincent, Lord, 16, 23, 32.
Walpole, Lord, 161.
War of 1812, causes of, 1-3, 58,
59, 61, 127, 129; premonitions
of, 29, 43, 45 ; measures pre-
paratory to, 120; declaration
494
INDEX
of, S8, 130; vote upon, 130,
131; political aspects of, 125,
126; sectional aspects of, 130,
131; Madison's message, 127;
British attitude toward, 135,
136; difficulties of American
Government, 298; financial
difficulties of Great Britain,
312; British losses, 372-374;
British fears of American
navy, 374; results of, 397,
398; treaty of peace, 355, 356;
discussion on cessation of hos-
tilities, 317, 322, 32s, 361.
Warren, Admiral, 60, 140.
Washington, George, 65, 70.
Washington, City of, burning of.
277; copy of treaty arrives
at, 361; celebration of treaty,
366.
Webster, Daniel, defends article
on slave trade in treaty of
1842, 418; negotiates Web-
ster-Ashburton treaty, 431,
435^436; statement on im-
pressment, 451; on right of
search, 452.
Wellesley, Marquis of, 377.
Wellington, Duke of, 303-303, 312,
313, 460.
West India trade, 70-72, 74, 387-
389, 392, 394. 396.
Wirt, William, 445.
Wolcott, Oliver, 14.
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