Glass Etc 
 
 Book S 
 
, 
 
 THE ELEMENTS 
 
 OF 
 
 
 " 
 
 LOGIC. 
 
 . &Vw*/«t 1 J u 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: 
 
 PRINTED BY JOHN SMTTH, 
 
 Printer to the UnirersHy. 
 
 1826 
 
» 
 
 < 
 
 
Since Locke was the expounder of a new system of 
 opinions on a difficult subject, he was led to enforce 
 them by repetition, and to illustrate them by more 
 examples, and with greater diffuseness of language, than 
 he would probably have thought necessary, if he had 
 been writing at the present time. For the same rea- 
 son, it is not surprising that some of his statements 
 have been controverted by subsequent writers, and 
 shewn to be erroneous or defective. 
 
 Although therefore the substance of many of the 
 following Articles is derived from his Essay on the 
 Human Understanding, yet, to suit the purpose for 
 which this compendium of Logic has been made, it 
 was necessary to omit many parts of that Essay, and 
 to abridge the language of those parts that are retained; 
 also, some things are here advanced which are not 
 supported by the authority of Locke; but where this 
 is done in any matter of importance, a note of it is 
 annexed, lest the reader should be misled to ascribe 
 opinions to Locke, which more recent writers have 
 maintained in opposition to him- 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 ART, Page 
 
 1. The mind acquires ideas, Jirst, by Sensation; 
 secondly, by Reflection 1 
 
 2. Though the mind has no innate ideas, yet it has 
 some which may be said to be connatural ib. 
 
 3. Some ideas are simple, and some complex 2 
 
 4. The ideas produced by the qualities of an object 
 enter the mind simple and unmixed ib. 
 
 5. The mind cannot form new simple ideas at pleasure S 
 
 6. On the different ways in which simple ideas enter 
 
 the mind ib* 
 
 7. Distinction of qualities into primary and secondary 4 
 
 8. Solidity ib. 
 
 9. On the manner in which our knowledge of primary 
 and secondary qualities is gained . . . , ............ . 5 
 
 10. Perception r ,...., 6 
 
 11. Difference between perception and sensation ....... 7 
 
ART. Pagt 
 
 12. Our perception of secondary qualities is relative . . 8 
 
 13. Perception is sometimes fallacious ib. 
 
 14* In particular, perception by the sight is wholly 
 
 determined by experience . . , * . . 9 
 
 15. The manner in which impressions are made on the 
 mind is unknown ^ 10 
 
 16. Memory .. ... 11 
 
 17« Discerning 14 
 
 1 8. Abstraction *. ib. 
 
 19. Complex ideas of substances, modes, relations : 
 and first of substances 18 
 
 20. Distinction of modes into simple and mixed 20 
 
 21. Modes of space * ib. 
 
 22. On the place of bodies 21 
 
 23. Duration 23 
 
 24. On the means of measuring duration ib. 
 
 25. Number 24 
 
 26. Infinity , 27 
 
 27. Many modes are not distinguished by separate 
 names 28 
 
 28. Some ideas of mixed modes are acquired by 06- 
 servation ; some by invention ; some by definition 29 
 
Ill 
 
 ART. , Pag« 
 
 29. Relations 31 
 
 30. The association of ideas . . /. 34 
 
 31. On the importance of giving a right direction to 
 
 the thoughts 39 
 
 35. On the prejudices and antipathies which arise from 
 
 a wrong association of ideas * . » ib. 
 
 S3. Other instances of evil arising from the same cause 41 
 
 34. Words are the arbitrary signs of ideas 42 
 
 35. Words are, for the most part, general terms, so that 
 one name comprehends a great number of individual 
 objects . . . . P 44 
 
 36. The meaning of words may be explained in four 
 mays . . ib. 
 
 37. On the imperfections and abuses of language ...... 45 
 
 38. On the evil arising from the abuses of language ... 47 
 
 39* Knowledge is of two kinds, actual and habitual; 
 and, considered with respect to its evidence, it is 
 intuitive, demonstrative, or sensitive ib. 
 
 40. On the extent of human knowledge. .50 
 
 41. The causes of the narrow extent of human know* 
 ledge appear to be chiefly three ; the want of ideas; 
 the want of a discoverable connection between 
 the ideas we have ; and the want of examining 
 our ideas, to see whether they agree or not 51 
 
IV 
 ART. Page 
 
 42. On the reality of our knowledge 54 
 
 43. On the existence of God 55 
 
 44. Truth, whether necessary or contingent, cannot be 
 established without assuming some self-evident 
 principles 5& 
 
 45. Difference between demonstrative and probable 
 evidence 60 
 
 46* On the degrees of probable evidence •- 6i 
 
 47« On the grounds of probability in civil affairs, ..... 62 
 
 4S. On the probability arising from human testimony . . 63 
 
 49. In traditional testimony, each transmission weakens 
 
 the proof 64 
 
 50. On the probability which is derived from analogy ib. 
 
 51. In what cases error is unavoidable , , 65 
 
 52. Causes of error assigned by Lord Bacon. Some 
 arise from general principles of the human con* 
 stitution 66 
 
 53. Others, from something peculiar to individuals .... 68 
 
 54. Others, from the imperfections and the abuse of 
 language * 69 
 
 55* Lastly, some are owing to the tendency which men 
 
 have to frame groundless hypotheses 70 
 
 56. Dialectics : definitions of simple apprehension, 
 judgment, and reasoning 72 
 
57. Explanation of the terms subject, predicate, and 
 copula • 72 
 
 58. Propositions are affirmative or negative; universal 
 
 or particular . 73 
 
 5Q. Division of propositions into absolute and con- 
 ditional 74 
 
 60. Some propositions are simple ; others compound 75 
 
 61 . On copulative and disjunctive propositions ib. 
 
 62. On reasoning ...... 76 
 
 63. The manner of determining whether man is 
 accountable for his actions . , * 77 
 
 64. Definition of the premises and conclusion of a 
 syllogism ; the major and minor terms ; the major 
 and minor propositions. . ........ ib. 
 
 65. Example of a conditional syllogism : definition of 
 
 the antecedent and consequent * 78 
 
 66. Example of a disjunctive syllogism. 80 
 
 67. Enthymemes. ... „ , . ib. 
 
 68. Sorites 81 
 
 69. Dilemma $% 
 
 70. Argument by induction. . , SB 
 
 71. Direct and indirect arguments : arguments a priori 
 and a posteriori 85 
 
VI 
 ARf. Pare 
 
 72 « Sophisms: the sophism of inferring the falsity 
 of a conclusion from the falsity of certain premises ; 
 and, reversely, of inferring the truth of certain 
 premises from the truth of the conclusion 86 
 
 73. The sophism called ignoratio elenchi 87 
 
 74. The sophisms, petitio principii, and reasoning in a 
 circle 88 
 
 75 The sophism, non causa pro causa ......... ib. 
 
 76. Sophisms arising from ambiguity of language . . . . . 89 
 
 77* Other inconclusive modes of argument ...*..... 91 
 
 78. Methods of reasoning by synthesis and analysis* . . 92 
 
THE ELEMENTS 
 
 OF 
 
 LOGIC. 
 
 Art. 1. The term Logic is here used to denote the 
 science which treats of the operations of the mind in ac- 
 quiring ideas, and of the exercise of it by proper methods 
 of reasoning. 
 
 The mind acquires ideas, first, by Sensation. Our 
 senses, being acted upon by external objects, convey ideas 
 of those objects to the mind. Thus by sensation we ac- 
 quire the ideas of colours, sounds, and of all those which 
 are usually called the sensible qualities of matter. 
 
 Secondly, the mind acquires ideas by Reflection. 
 Reflection is the notice which the mind takes of' its own 
 operations, such as thinking, doubting, believing, reason- 
 ing, knowing, willing. The mind, being conscious of 
 these operations and reflecting on them, is furnished by 
 them with ideas which could not be obtained from exter- 
 nal objects. 
 
 2. Although the mind has no innate ideas, i. e. none 
 which are coeval with the mind and perceived by it before 
 the senses begin to operate, yet it has ideas which may be 
 said to be connatural : i. e. the constitution of man is such 
 that when he is grown up to the possession and exercise of 
 his reasoning powers, certain ideas will inevitably and ne- 
 cessarily spring up in him. Such are those of existence, 
 personal identity, time, number. The mind is endowed 
 
 A 
 
with faculties, the exercise of which is necessarily accom- 
 panied by such ideas, and also by the acknowledgement of 
 certain moral truths and practical principled of conduct. 
 These ideas are not the immediate objects of sensation and 
 reflection, though the senses may furnish the^r^ occasions 
 on which they occur to the mind. For example, the mo- 
 ment that a sensation is excited, we learn two facts at 
 once; — the existence of the sensation, and our own existence 
 as sentient beings : thus, the first exercise of consciousness 
 necessarily implies a belief of the present existence not 
 only of that which is felt, but also of that which feels and 
 thinks. But it is the belief of the former alone that can 
 properly be said to be obtained by sensation. The latter 
 is obtained by a suggestion of the understanding conse- 
 quent on the sensation, but so intimately connected with 
 it that the belief of both is generally referred to the 
 same origin. a 
 
 3. Some ideas are simple, and some complex. A 
 simple idea, (as of light, of heat, of hardness,) exists in 
 the mind under one uniform appearance, and is not 
 distinguishable into more than one idea. A complex idea 
 is made up of several simple ones : thus the idea of man 
 is complex, in which are united several simple ideas, such 
 as of figure, extension, solidity, thinking, life. 
 
 4. By the quality of an object is meant whatever in 
 that object is the cause of ideas. The qualities that affect 
 our senses are in the things themselves united and 
 blended, yet the ideas they produce in the mind enter by 
 the senses simple and unmixed. Thus the qualities of the 
 same piece of wax may cause, by the touch, the ideas both 
 
 * Stewart, Elem. of Phil. ch. i. §. 4. and Phil. Es. I. ch. i. Sup. 
 Encyc. Brit. Diss. vol. V. p. 30. 
 
of softness and of warmth : yet the simple ideas, thus 
 caused by the same object and conveyed to the mind by 
 the same organ of sense, are as distinct as those that come 
 in by different senses, as distinct as the smell and whiteness 
 of a rose, or as the smell of a rose and the taste of sugar. 
 
 5. When the mind is stored with simple ideas, it has 
 the power to repeat, compare, and unite them so as to 
 make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it cannot 
 acquire one new simple idea except by the ways above- 
 mentioned: (Art. 1. 2.) nor can it destroy those which it 
 has already acquired, though it may lose them by forget- 
 fulness. As in the visible material world, the power of 
 man reaches no farther than to compound and divide the 
 materials that are made to his hand, but cannot make the 
 least particle of new matter, or destroy an atom of what 
 is already in being; so in the mind new simple ideas 
 cannot be formed at pleasure ; as any one may learn, who 
 will endeavour to acquire the idea of a taste which has 
 never affected his palate, or of a colour which he has 
 never seen. A person born destitute of any one sense, is 
 destitute of all the ideas which belong to that sense : if he 
 be born deaf, he has no idea of sound ; if blind, he has no 
 idea of light and colours. Also, though he may possess 
 any sense in its utmost perfection, yet he cannot, except 
 by actual experience, have any particular idea belonging 
 to that sense. A person shut up all his life in a dark 
 room could have no idea of light ; if allowed to see no 
 other colours than black or white, he could have no ideas 
 of scarlet or green : he who has never tasted a pine-apple, 
 can have no idea of its peculiar flavour. 
 
 6. Some simple ideas enter the mind by one sense 
 only ; as those of colour by the eye, and of sound by the 
 ear. 
 
Other simple ideas are acquired by more senses than 
 one ; as those of extension, Jigure, rest, motion, both by 
 the sight and touch. 
 
 Others are acquired by reflection only; as those of 
 thinking, knowing, willing. 
 
 Others are acquired by all the ways of sensation and 
 reflection ; such as the ideas of pleasure or pain, which are 
 excited by almost every affection of our senses from 
 without, and every thought of our mind within. 
 
 7- The qualities that are in bodies are of two sorts : 
 (1) Primary qualities, such as solidity, figure, hardness, 
 softness, fluidity ; these exist in bodies, whether we per- 
 ceive them or not. (2) Secondary qualities. These are 
 of two kinds; first, the powers that bodies have, by 
 operating immediately on our senses, to produce in us 
 such ideas as those of colour, sound, taste, smell, heat, 
 cold ; secondly, the powers that are in any body to cause 
 such a change in the primary qualities of another body, as 
 to make it affect our senses differently from what it did 
 before. Thus fire, acting immediately upon us, gives us 
 the idea of heat; — acting on lead, it so changes it as to 
 make it fluid. 
 
 8. Solidity is that quality of a body by which it ex- 
 cludes all other bodies from occupying the same place 
 with it at the same time. Of the primary qualities of 
 bodies, none affects our senses more frequently than solid- 
 ity. Whether we move or rest, we feel something under 
 us that supports us and hinders our farther sinking down- 
 wards ; and the bodies which we daily handle, make us 
 perceive that while they remain between our hands, they 
 prevent by an insurmountable force the approach of those 
 parts of our hands that press them. Solidity differs from 
 hardness in this respect, that hardness consists in a firm 
 
Cohesion of the parts of a body, so as to make it difficult 
 to change the place of those parts as they respect one 
 another ; whereas solidity respects the whole mass, and is 
 as essential a quality of water or air as of adamant. A 
 drop of water, indeed, placed between two plane surfaces 
 of marble> will not, like adamant, prevent their contact; 
 because the parts of a drop of water, cohering loosely to 
 one another, give way to the pressure, and escape in a 
 lateral direction. But if this be prevented, and a drop 
 of water be confined on all sides, as in a globe of gold, it 
 is known by experiment that no force will bring the sides 
 of the globe together without forcing the water through 
 the pores of the metal. 
 
 Our idea of solidity is also distinguished from that 
 of pure space^ which is capable neither of resistance nor 
 motion. We may conceive two bodies approach one an- 
 other, without touching or displacing any solid thing, till 
 their surfaces meet ; and hence we obtain a clear idea of 
 space without solidity. Whether there be such a thing as 
 pure space is a different question ; but that we are able to 
 form an idea of it, cannot be doubted. For since the idea 
 of motion in one body does not include the idea of motion 
 in another; — if we suppose one body to move while 
 others remain at rest, then the place deserted by that 
 body gives us the idea of pure space, into which another 
 body may enter, without meeting with resistance from 
 any thing. 
 
 9. When it is said that Jire is hot, that snow is cold 
 a?id white, these expressions, strictly understood, must 
 mean that there is in fire and snow such a configuration 
 of their insensible particles as to have the power of pro- 
 ducing in us the ideas of heat, and of cold and whiteness. 
 But as bodies exist which are not capable, as lead is, of 
 
 a 3 
 
b* 
 
 being made fluid by the action of fire, in like manner 
 there is need of a certain formation of our organs of sense, 
 and a certain texture of the insensible particles of our 
 bodies conformable in some unknown manner to the in- 
 sensible particles of fire and snow, in order that the ideas 
 of heat, cold, and whiteness, may be produced in us. 
 
 Our knowledge therefore of secondary qualities is gained 
 solely by observing the effects of one body on another ; 
 whereas primary qualities are inherent in bodies, inde- 
 pendently of our sensation, or of any relation to other 
 bodies. Of primary qualities, we have by our senses a 
 distinct notion ; but secondary qualities are conceived only 
 as the unknown causes of certain sensations and of certain 
 known effects. 10 
 
 If we had senses acute enough to discern the minute 
 particles of bodies and the real constitution on which 
 their secondary qualities depend, they would produce 
 quite different ideas in us; and that which is now the 
 yellow colour of gold would disappear, and instead of it 
 we should see the texture of the minute parts, of a certain 
 size and figure. But our present organs of sense are 
 adapted to the nature of things around us ; and if they 
 were altered, while external things remained the same, it 
 cannot be doubted that our well-being would be affected 
 by the change, greatly to our disadvantage. 
 
 10. Perception is that act of the mind by which it 
 acquires ideas of the qualities of bodies. In sensation, 
 there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by 
 which the sensation is felt ; as, in smelling a rose, the 
 mind is affected by the sensation in a certain way, and 
 
 b Reid, Es. II. ch, xvii. 
 
this affection of the mind may be conceived without think- 
 ing of the rose or of any other object. But perception has 
 always an external object ; and the object of perception, 
 in the case here stated, is that quality in the rose which is 
 discerned by the sense of smell. Observing that the 
 sensation is excited when the rose is near, and ceases 
 when it is removed, We are led to conclude that there is 
 some quality in the rose which is the cause of this sensa- 
 tion. This quality in the rose is the object perceived ; 
 and that act of the mind by which we acquire the idea of 
 this quality, is called perception. 
 
 11. The senses therefore have a double province ; to 
 make us feel, and to make us perceive. They furnish us 
 with a variety of sensations, and at the same time they 
 give us a conception of the objects by which those 
 sensations are caused. As the perception and its cor- 
 responding sensation are produced at the same time, 
 and are never found disjoined in our experience, we 
 are led improperly to consider them as one thing, 
 and, through the imperfection of language, to give them 
 the same name. If the sensation be such as to cause 
 neither pleasure nor pain, and therefore, being indifferent, 
 draw no attention ;— -of which kind are the sensations 
 caused by all primary qualities ; — in speaking of those 
 qualities, it is usual to say that they are perceived, not 
 that they are felt. On the other hand, taste, and smell, 
 heat, and cold, have sensations that are often agreeable 
 or disagreeable in such a degree as to draw our attention ; 
 they are therefore commonly said to be felt, not to be 
 perceived: and when disorders of the body cause acute 
 pain, so that the painful sensation engrosses the atten- 
 tion, they are always said to be felt, not to be per- 
 ceived. 
 
8 
 
 12. The secondary qualities of bodies, not less than 
 the primary, are objects of perception: observing their 
 effects, the mind is led to form a conception of some 
 unknown cause that has produced them. The effect is 
 obvious to our senses ; but the quality or power is latent. 
 And in such cases, i. e. where the cause is not observed by 
 the senses, it is common to express in language, by active 
 verbs, effects on bodies wherein they are merely passive. 
 Thus we say that a ship sails ; though it is certain that a 
 ship has no inherent power of motion, but is impelled by 
 external force. In like manner, when it is said that 
 planets gravitate towards the sun, no more is meant than 
 that by some unknown power they are impelled in that 
 direction. This gravitation is not a power inherent in 
 bodies,, which they exert of themselves ; it is a force im- 
 pressed upon them to which they must necessarily yield. 
 The effect may be observed, but the nature of the force 
 which has caused the effect is unknown. And the same is 
 true of all the powers of matter : our perception of them 
 is relative ; relative, i. e. to the effects which the powers 
 are known to produce. 
 
 13. Perception is often fallacious, and requires cor^ 
 rection by experience and judgment. A man who has had 
 a limb cut off, many years after feels pain apparently 
 affecting the limb which he no longer possesses. The 
 sensation is real ; but he is misled, by his perception, as to 
 the locality of the disorder. Our perception of external 
 objects is connected with certain sensations. If the sen- 
 sation is produced, the corresponding perception follows 
 even when there is no object, and in that case deceives Us. 
 In like manner, our sensations are connected with certain 
 impressions made upon the nerves and brain : and when 
 the impression is made, from whatever cause, — the corres* 
 
9 
 
 ponding sensation and perception immediately follow. 
 Thus, in the case above supposed, a part of the nerve that 
 went to the limb was cut off along with it, and upon the 
 remaining part the same impression is made, which, 
 according to his experience in the natural state of his 
 body, was caused by a disorder of the limb : and this 
 impression continues to be followed by the sensation and 
 perception which had been previously connected with it. 
 It is probable that repeated convictions, impressed by a 
 new experience, might correct the erroneous perception. 
 
 14. In particular, perception, by the eye, of the size, 
 distance and figure of bodies, is wholly determined by 
 experience. A man born blind, who should suddenly be 
 made to see, would not at first have any idea of distance 
 by sight, but would think all bodies equally near to him. 
 When, however, by the aid of the touch and by constant 
 experience it is found that different sensations, occasioned 
 by different degrees of liveliness in the colours or by dif- 
 ferent dispositions of the pupils of the eyes, correspond 
 to different degrees of distance in the object, an habitual 
 connection is formed in the mind between those sensations 
 and the notions of greater or less distance. 
 
 Our perception of Jigure is acquired in the same 
 manner. Having experienced by the sense of touch that 
 one surface is a square and another a circle, that one body 
 is a cube and another a sphere ; and finding our sense 
 of sight differently affected by the square and the circle, 
 by the cube and the sphere; these different affections 
 become so closely connected in our minds with the figures 
 of the respective bodies, that when the affection is felt the 
 
 c Reid, Es. II. ch. xviii. 
 
10 
 
 idea of the corresponding figure is suggested to us at the 
 same moment. d Nor need we be surprised that this is 
 done with so little notice, if we consider how quick the 
 actions of the mind are, and how the facility of doing 
 things, which is acquired by habit, comes at length to 
 produce actions in us that escape our observation. 
 
 15. Impressions are made on the organs of sense, 
 either by the immediate application of the object itself, or 
 by some medium which passes between the object and the 
 organ. In two of our senses, viz. touch and taste, there 
 must be an immediate application of the object to the 
 organ. In the other three the impression is made by 
 means of a medium ; as, in vision, by the rays of light ; 
 in smelling, by the effluvia proceeding from the object; 
 and in hearing, by the vibrations of the air. The impres- 
 sion made on the organ of sense, being communicated to 
 the nerves and brain, rouses the mind ; and the united 
 action of the mind and of the object produces sensation. 
 And since we know by experience that the mind alone 
 cannot, by any effort of its own, produce sensation, and are 
 intuitively certain that nothing can begin to exist without 
 a cause, we infer from the existence of any new sensation, 
 the existence of some external cause from which that sen- 
 sation proceeds, and thus we are led by experience to a 
 perception of the external object. 
 
 But while we are thus taught by experience that cer- 
 tain impressions, produced on our organs of sense by 
 external objects, are followed by sensations, and these 
 again by corresponding perceptions, yet the manner in 
 which these effects are accomplished is unknown ; and 
 
 d Encyc. Brit. Art. Metaphysics. 
 
11 
 
 must remain so, unless we can discover what the mind is, 
 and by what laws it is united to matter, so that they are 
 qualified to act on one another. In the mean time we are 
 ignorant of the essence both of mind and of matter, and are 
 merely acquainted with a few of their properties ; on which 
 account, in observing their operations, we must often 
 remain satisfied with knowing that certain things are con- 
 nected with one another, without being able to discover 
 the chain that goes between them. It is to such connect- 
 ions that we give the name of the laws of nature ; and 
 when it is said that one thing produces another by a law 
 of nature, no more is meant than that one thing, which in 
 popular language is termed the cause, is invariably followed 
 by another which is termed the effect ; but how they are 
 connected is unknown . e 
 
 16. Memory is that faculty of the mind which 
 enables us to retain ideas already acquired, and to recall 
 them to our contemplation without the aid of the objects 
 by which they were originally excited. Sometimes ideas 
 recur to us spontaneously ; in other cases they are recalled 
 by some incident, or by an effort of the will. In the last 
 case, i. e. when the mind makes an effort in search of any 
 idea and after some labour recalls it, the operation is com- 
 monly distinguished by the term recollection. 
 
 Memory is of so great moment, that where it is defect- 
 ive, the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless. 
 If an idea be wholly lost, so far there is perfect ignorance ; 
 nor is the evil much less, if the memory retrieve ideas 
 slowly, so that they are not at hand when occasion calls for 
 them. 
 
 e Stewart, Elem. of Phil. ch. i. ^. 3. 
 
12 
 
 How the mind possesses this faculty, cannot be explain- 
 ed, any more than we can explain the causes of sensation 
 and perception. If it be supposed, according to the 
 ancient theory of ideas, that they are imprinted on the 
 brain by means of the organs of sense, and that, when 
 they are so imprinted as not to be destroyed by time, the 
 preservation of them is called memory ; it may be ob- 
 jected, first, that there is no evidence that the impressions 
 made upon the brain remain after the object is removed ; 
 secondly, that, supposing them to remain, all that can be 
 inferred is, that by the laws of nature there is a connection 
 established between these impressions and the remem- 
 brance of the object : but how the impressions contribute 
 to this remembrance is unknown ; it being impossible to 
 discover how thought of any kind can be produced by im- 
 pressions made upon the brain or upon any part of the 
 body. 
 
 When the memory is described as a repository in which 
 ideas are stored ; or when ideas are said to be engraven on 
 the memory, such expressions are not rightly used, unless 
 they be understood in a figurative sense; since they do not 
 afford any real explanation of the operations to which they 
 refer. 
 
 It is probable, however^ that the memory is dependent 
 in some manner on the temperament of the brain, since it 
 is observed that diseases of the brain impair or destroy it, 
 and that its vigour returns with the return of health. But 
 if it should ever be discovered what temperament is favour- 
 able to the memory, and by what remedies the disorders 
 of it may be removed, though the advantage of such a 
 discovery would be great, it would not in any degree ena- 
 ble us to understand why one state of the brain is favour- 
 able to the memory more than another. 
 
13 
 
 The powers of this faculty are different in different 
 persons; and in the same person they may be greatly 
 improved by exercise; by attention; and by a proper 
 arrangement of the subjects which he wishes to remember. 
 The effects of exercise in strengthening all the faculties 
 are known by every one's experience. It is equally known 
 that those ideas are easily remembered on which the atten- 
 tion of the mind was at first strongly fixed, either from its 
 natural vigour or from some casual association with the 
 passions. Hence, those who are able to connect feelings of 
 pleasure with the pursuit of knowledge, have little difficul- 
 ty in retaining what they have acquired ; while many who 
 complain of the weakness of memory ought rather to 
 ascribe the evil to a defect either of apprehension or of 
 curiosity. 
 
 The great advantage that may be derived from a pro- 
 per arrangement of the subjects of knowledge, is worthy 
 of particular notice. A number of ideas may be con- 
 nected by some mutual relation, and referred to one 
 general principle. The mind therefore is relieved from 
 the necessity of dwelling on detached facts, and by means 
 of a small number of general principles, it can recall, as 
 occasions may require, a great variety of particulars asso- 
 ciated with them ; each of which, considered separately, 
 would have been as burdensome to the memory as the 
 principle on which they are all dependent. In the 
 common business of life, in what confusion would the 
 merchant be involved if he were to deposit 'promiscuously, 
 in his cabinet, the various documents which pass through 
 his hands ! whereas, by a proper distribution of them, and 
 by referring them to a few general titles, an ordinary 
 memory is able to effect what the most retentive would 
 fail in, if unassisted by method. The advantages of 
 arrangement in treasuring up our ideas in the mind, are 
 
 B 
 
14 
 
 perfectly similar to the good effects of it in the instance 
 which has been stated. 
 
 But since, with every aid, the powers of the memory 
 must be limited, we shall do well to discriminate the 
 subjects of knowledge according to their importance, and 
 confine our aim to the acquisition of useful and connected 
 truths; instead of grasping at every thing by desultory 
 efforts, and distracting our attention by many detached 
 and insignificant objects/ 
 
 17. The mind, having gained ideas, has the faculty 
 of discerning ; i. e. of distinguishing one from another. 
 If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, 
 consists quickness of parts; in having them unconfused 
 and being able to distinguish one thing from another 
 where there is the least difference, consists the exactness 
 of judgment. And hence there appears to be some 
 ground for the common remark, that men of great wit and 
 prompt memory have seldom the clearest judgment, or 
 deepest reason. For wit consists in assembling ideas, and 
 putting together with quickness and variety those wherein 
 can be found any resemblance or congruity, so as to make 
 up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; 
 in doing which, no regard is paid to truth and right 
 reason, by whose severe rules, therefore, it will not bear 
 to be examined: judgment, on the contrary, consists in 
 separating ideas wherein can be found the least difference, 
 so that no confusion may arise from their apparent simili- 
 tude. 
 
 18. Every object which affects our senses is an indi- 
 vidual object ; but we perceive that two or more objects 
 which affect some of our senses differently, affect others of 
 them in precisely the same way. Thus paper, snow, and 
 
 f Reid, Es. III. Stewart, El. Phil. c. vi. 
 
15 
 
 milk, affect the senses of touch and taste differently, but 
 they present the same appearance to the eye. The differ- 
 ence we believe to proceed from different qualities in the 
 several objects; and their sameness of appearance we ascribe 
 to the possession of some similar qualities. To the similar 
 qualities one common name is given ; and every thing 
 which presents the same appearance to the eye that snow 
 does, is called white ; where the word white is the sign of a 
 quality inherent in each of numerous objects. 
 
 If it were necessary to give a distinct name to each 
 individual object, it is manifest that a complete language 
 could never be formed, adequate to the vast variety of 
 objects. The mind, therefore, comparing several indi- 
 viduals with each other, and discovering in them many 
 qualities in which they agree, combines them into one 
 class or species, and includes them all under a common 
 name. Thus, observing that many individuals agree in 
 having an erect form, and in being endowed with reason, 
 (omitting all those properties in which they disagree, 
 such as size, height, or complexion), we combine them 
 into one species, to which we give the name of man. 
 Again, observing that other objects have certain qualities 
 which belong to man, — laying aside the ideas of reason, 
 speech, and other differences, and retaining only the ideas 
 of organized body, sensation, and spontaneous motion, we 
 comprise all these, along with man, under the common 
 name of animal. By a similar process we comprehend 
 animals, plants, and other objects under the name of body, 
 and lastly of substance ; having omitted, successively, the 
 peculiar qualities by which the several classes of objects 
 are distinguished from one another. 
 
 This power of considering certain qualities of an 
 object apart from the rest is called Abstraction, and it 
 is of so great importance as to have been considered by 
 
1 6 
 
 some philosophers the charactenstical attribute of a 
 rational nature. 
 
 It was long disputed whether the mind is able to form 
 abstract ideas; whether, for example, it can form the 
 abstract idea of man, without attaching to the conceived 
 object some particular size, height, complexion; — which 
 particulars are not necessary attributes of man, but dis- 
 tinguish one man from another. It is now generally 
 admitted that the mind has no such power ; that it cannot 
 form the idea of any thing, without ascribing to it some 
 particular modification. In what manner then is it able, 
 from the consideration of these particular ideas, to make 
 its conclusions general ? By considering the particular 
 ideas to be signs or representatives of all other ideas of the 
 •same class. If the subject of our thoughts be man, and 
 we attempt to form the idea of an object corresponding to 
 this word, that idea must be particular ; but our reason- 
 ings will not on that account be the less correct, if they do 
 not in the least involve or depend upon those particular 
 qualities which distinguish individuals from each other, and 
 are not common to the species. When Euclid is proving 
 the method of dividing a line into two equal parts, he 
 draws a line, we may suppose, of an inch in length : this, 
 which in itself is a particular line, is nevertheless, with 
 regard to its signification, general ; since it is a sign or 
 representative of all particular lines, so that what is proved 
 of it is proved of all. And as that particular line becomes 
 general by being made a sign, so the name line, and the 
 idea of a line, either of which taken absolutely is particu- 
 lar, by being signs are made general likewise. 
 
 When it is affirmed that the whole is equal to the sum of 
 all its parts, if, in order to comprehend this, we recur to 
 ideas, all that we can do is to form a notion of some indi- 
 vidual whole, divided into a certain number of parts of 
 
17 
 
 which it is constituted; as of the year, divided into the four 
 seasons. From this instance we can discern nothing more 
 than the relation of equality between this particular whole 
 and its component parts. If we take another example, 
 we only perceive another particular truth. The same 
 holds of a third and of a fourth. But the perception of 
 ten thousand instances would not give us a knowledge of 
 the universal truth, if the mind had not the power of 
 considering things as signs, and particular ideas as repre- 
 senting an infinity of others, resembling one another in 
 those circumstances which are the subject of consideration, 
 though dissimilar in every other. And hence it is that 
 some ideas are particular in their nature, but general in 
 their representation. 
 
 It may be observed also that the attention of the mind 
 is frequently extended no farther than to words ; which 
 are the arbitrary signs of ideas. Our habits of thinking 
 and speaking have gradually established in the mind such 
 relations among the words we employ, as to enable us to 
 carry on processes of reasoning by means of them, without 
 attending in every instance to their particular signification. 
 In talking, for example, of government, church, negotiation, 
 conquest, we seldom present to our minds all the simple 
 ideas of which these complex ones are composed : but all 
 the common applications of these terms having become 
 familiar to us, any unusual application of them is immedi- 
 ately detected ; this detection induces doubt, and the mind 
 is thereby led to have recourse to the ideas themselves, 
 and to its knowledge of the things which the words signi- 
 fy. Thus if, instead of saying that in war the weaker have 
 always recourse to negotiation, we should say that they have 
 always recourse to conquest, our familiarity with these words 
 and with the relation of the ideas signified by them, makes 
 us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition. 
 
 b 3 
 
18 
 
 But in matters that are not familiar to us, or are treated in 
 an uncommon manner, and in such as are of an abstruse 
 nature, the case is different; and we shall be continually 
 liable to be imposed upon by words, unless we fully 
 apprehend their meaning, and attend to the ideas which 
 they are employed to represent. 5 
 
 19* The objects of Complex ideas may be classed 
 under three heads ; substances, modes, and relations. 
 
 The ideas of substances are such combinations of sim- 
 ple ideas as represent things that subsist by themselves ; 
 in which combination, the idea of substance, such as we 
 are able to form of it, is always the first and chief. Thus, 
 if to the idea of substance be joined that of a certain 
 colour, with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, 
 and fusibility, we gain the idea of lead; and the ideas of 
 spontaneous motion, thought, and of a certain figure, 
 joined to substance, form the idea of man. 
 
 Our knowledge of bodies is acquired solely by our per- 
 ception of their qualities ; but since we cannot conceive 
 how these qualities should subsist alone, we suppose them 
 to exist in, and be supported by some common subject ; 
 which support we denote by the name substance, though it 
 is certain that of the nature of it we have in reality no 
 distinct conception. And the same is true of the opera- 
 tions of the mind, such as thinking, knowing, doubting: 
 since we are not able to apprehend how they can subsist 
 
 s Encyc. Brit. Art. Metaph. Campbell's Phil, of Rhet. vol. II. 
 ch. vii. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, Part I. §. vii. 
 
19 
 
 of themselves or be produced by mere matter, we conclude 
 that they are the actions of some other substance, which we 
 call mind or spirit. So that, as we have no other idea of 
 matter than as being something wherein the qualities which 
 affect our senses subsist, if we suppose a substance wherein 
 thinking, knowing, doubting and other powers subsist, we 
 have as clear an idea of the substance of spirit, as we have 
 of matter ; the one being supposed to be (without knowing 
 what it is) the substratum to those simple ideas we have 
 from without, and the other supposed (with a like igno- 
 rance of what it is) to be the substratum to those operations 
 which we experience in ourselves within. It appears 
 then that our idea of material substance is not more dis- 
 tinct than that of the substance of spirit ; and therefore 
 from our not having a distinct knowledge of the substance 
 of spirit, we can no more conclude its non-existence than 
 we can, for the same reason, deny the existence of matter. 
 Some of the qualities or properties of both are known to us 
 from observation and experience ; but all attempts to ex- 
 plain the manner in which these qualities exist together, 
 and what is the cause, ground, or reason of their union, 
 have hitherto, with regard both to matter and spirit, been 
 made equally in vain. 
 
 The things then immediately perceived by us and of 
 which we have an adequate idea, are only qualities, which 
 must belong to a subject ; and all that we know about this 
 subject is, that it is that to which such qualities belong. 
 In this the philosopher has no advantage above the 
 vulgar : for as they perceive colour, figure, and motion by 
 their senses, as well as he does ; and as both are equally 
 certain that these qualities must have a subject in which 
 they inhere, so the notions which both have of this subject 
 are equally obscure. When the philosopher calls it a sub- 
 stance, a substratum, or a subject of inhesion, these words 
 
20 
 
 convey no further meaning than what is understood and 
 expressed by saying, in common language, that it is a 
 thing extended, solid, and moveable. It is therefore about 
 qualities alone that we can reason with certainty, and it is 
 sufficient for the purposes of life that we have of them an 
 adequate knowledge. For as the substratum of all bodies 
 seems to be the same, though we know not what it is ; 
 and as one body is distinguished from another only by 
 its qualities or powers, a knowledge of these is all that can 
 be necessary to direct us in our use of the objects with 
 which we are surrounded. h 
 
 20. Modes do not subsist by themselves, but are the 
 adjuncts or affections of things to which they are referred: 
 Thus inches and feet are modes of Space ; hours and days 
 of Duration; units of Number. Also beauty, grati- 
 tude, theft, murder are modes ; being the adjuncts of bodies 
 or substances, on which they are dependent. There are 
 two kinds of modes : (l) simple modes, our ideas of which 
 are merely combinations of the same simple idea, as 'of a 
 dozen, a score, which are only so many units added to- 
 gether : (2) mixed modes, such as beauty, theft ; our ideas 
 of which are formed by the combination of simple ideas of 
 several hinds. 
 
 21. Space is conceived as having three dimensions, 
 length, breadth, and thickness, which are generally called 
 the three simple modes of space. In this respect it agrees 
 with body : but the agreement proceeds no farther ; for 
 space is destitute of solidity, without which the existence 
 of body is inconceivable. Our idea of space is gained by 
 the sight and touch ; and it is so closely associated with 
 every visible and tangible object, that we cannot see nor 
 feel, without conceiving that the objects seen or felt 
 
 h Reid, Es. II. ch. xix. 
 
21 
 
 occupy so much of space. Had we never possessed the 
 senses of sight and touch, we could not have supposed 
 the existence of space to be necessary to the existence of 
 every thing. Our other senses as well as our internal 
 powers of thought would have given us a knowledge of 
 our own existence and of the existence of other things, but 
 no object of those senses or of thought would have been 
 conceived as occupying space. 
 
 Space may properly be called the privation of body ; 
 since it has itself no positive or actual existence. We have 
 indeed a positive idea of it, as we have of silence, darkness, 
 and other privations ; but it cannot be inferred from our 
 having such an idea of space, that space itself is something 
 real, any more than it can be inferred that darkness, 
 silence, absence are real things, and have as positive an 
 existence as light, sound, and body. 
 
 Each different distance is a different mode of space. 
 Men fix in their minds, for the use of measuring, the ideas 
 of certain lengths, such as an inch, a yard, a mile ; and 
 when these stated lengths are become familiar to their 
 thoughts, they can without difficulty repeat them, and by 
 adding them together enlarge their idea of space as much 
 as they please. This power of repeating the idea of any 
 distance and adding it to the former, without being ever 
 able to come to a limit, gives us the idea of infinity. 
 
 22. Our idea of the place of a body is gained by ob- 
 serving the relation of its distance from any two or more 
 points, which, being considered as at rest, keep the same 
 distance one from another. Thus, when we observe a 
 thing to be at the same distance now, at which it was yes- 
 terday, from two or more points with which it was then 
 compared, and which have not, since the comparison was 
 made, changed their position with respect to each other, 
 the thing is said to be in the same place ; and to have 
 
22 
 
 changed its place, if it have altered its distance from those 
 points. The place of any thing is therefore determined by 
 reference to the objects with which it is compared; and 
 on that account a thing may have remained in the same 
 place with regard to some objects, and at the same time 
 have changed its place with regard to others. Thus in 
 the cabin of a ship, different articles may have continued 
 in the same place with regard to each other, while all of 
 them, by the motion of the ship, may have changed their 
 place with regard to the neighbouring land. But this 
 modification of distance which is called place, being made 
 by men for their common use, in order that they may de- 
 signate the particular position of objects where they have 
 occasion for such designation, they determine the place of 
 an object by reference to such adjacent things as best serve 
 their present purpose, without regarding other things 
 which, for a different purpose, might better determine the 
 place of the same object. Thus in a chess-board, the use 
 of the designation of the place of each chessman being de- 
 termined only within that checquered piece of wood, to 
 designate it by reference to any thing else, would be use- 
 less ; but if these chessmen were put up in a box, and it 
 were asked where any particular chessman is, it would be 
 proper to determine its place by reference to something 
 else than the chess-board, such as the part of the room 
 or closet which contains the box. 
 
 That place is nothing but the relative position of things, 
 will be readily admitted, when it is considered that we 
 can have no idea of the place of the universe. Every part 
 of the universe has place ; because it can be referred to 
 other parts which we may suppose to be fixed. Thus 
 every planet of our system has a place, which may be 
 determined by ascertaining its distance from the Sun and 
 from the orbits of the other planets ; and the place of the 
 
23 
 
 system itself may be ascertained by referring it to two or 
 more fixed stars: but all the systems taken as one whole can 
 have no place ; because there is nothing else to which the 
 position of that whole can be referred. It is true that the 
 word place is sometimes used to denote that portion of 
 space which any particular body occupies; and the 
 universe has place in this sense, but not in the other and 
 proper sense of the word. 
 
 23. Hours, days, years, time, eternity, are modes of 
 duration. Our idea of duration, as. well as our belief of 
 it, is acquired by the faculty of memory. It is essential to 
 every thing remembered that it be something which is 
 past ; and we cannot conceive a thing to be past, without 
 conceiving some duration between it and the present. As 
 soon therefore as we remember any thing, we acquire both 
 an idea and belief of duration. 1 
 
 Having gained the idea of duration, the next thing to 
 be done is to get some measure of it, whereby we may 
 judge of its different lengths, and consider the distinct 
 order wherein things exist; without which our knowledge 
 would be confused, and History in particular would be 
 rendered useless. This consideration of duration, as 
 marked out by certain measures or periods, gives us the 
 idea of time. 
 
 In measuring extension, nothing more is required than 
 the application of some standard or measure to the thing 
 whose extension we wish to ascertain ; but in measuring 
 duration this cannot be done, because no two different 
 parts of duration can be put together to measure one 
 another, and therefore no standard of it can be kept 
 at hand, ready to be applied. Nothing then could 
 serve properly for a measure of time, but what has 
 
 1 Reid, Es. III. ch. iii. 
 
24 
 
 divided the whole length of its duration into equal 
 portions by constantly repeated periods. On which 
 account, the diurnal and annual revolutions of the Sun, as 
 having been from the beginning of nature equal, regular, 
 and observable by all mankind, have been with reason 
 made use of for the measure of duration. But the distinc- 
 tion of days and years having depended on the motion of 
 the Sun, men are apt to suppose that without motion there 
 could be no measure of time ; as if there were some 
 necessary connection between them : whereas any period- 
 ical appearance, if universally observable, would have 
 distinguished the intervals of time as well as those that 
 have been made use of. If the Sun, for instance, had been 
 lighted up as a fire, after the same intervals of time which 
 now pass between its successive arrivals at the same 
 meridian, and had been extinguished twelve hours after ; 
 —and if in the time of an annual revolution it had sensibly 
 increased in brightness and heat, and so decreased again ; 
 such regular appearances would have served to measure 
 the periods of duration as well without motion, as with it. 
 
 The idea of time is preparatory to that of eternity : for 
 having got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can 
 in our thoughts add them to one another as often as we 
 please, and apply them, so added, to duration past or fu- 
 ture; and this we can continue to do without limit, and 
 suppose a duration exceeding the periods we can reckon, 
 add as many as we will. 
 
 25. The idea of number is originally acquired by 
 observing the union of similar qualities in two or more 
 objects, and referring those objects, by abstraction, to the 
 same class, and giving them a common name. Thus ob- 
 serving a cow, a sheep, and a horse, we say that there are 
 three animals ; but if the cow, sheep, and horse had no 
 common properties, so that we could not reduce them to 
 
25 
 
 some common species, we should never gain from them 
 the idea of number. It is necessary to have observed that 
 two objects are in some respects of the same kind, before 
 we can number them, or make such a comparison of one 
 with the other as to gain a knowledge of the relations of 
 one and two. If a child saw a cow, a sheep, and a horse, 
 his senses would no doubt enable him to distinguish them 
 from one another ; and if he were asked the number of 
 them, he might probably, from having learnt the names of 
 number as signs, without affixing to them any idea of the 
 things signified, readily answer: three ; but if he were 
 further asked three what ? his answer would not be so 
 ready. They are not three cows, three sheep, or three 
 horses. When he has learnt that, from having some com- 
 mon properties, they may be classed under the same 
 species, then, and not before, he will be able to answer 
 that they are three animals. 
 
 In arithmetic, figures, which are combinations of units, 
 are used merely as symbols ; and it is not necessary that 
 the mind should concern itself with the things signified ; 
 and it is observable that, whatever difficulty we may have 
 had originally in acquiring the idea of number, the sim- 
 ple modes of it are of all others the most distinct. Every 
 the least variation makes each combination as clearly 
 different from that which approaches nearest to it, as from 
 the most remote ; two being as distinct from one as from a 
 hundred, and the idea of two as distinct from that of one, 
 as the idea of the magnitude of the earth is from that of 
 one of its particles. This is not the case in other simple 
 modes ; in which it is not easy to distinguish between 
 two modes that approach one another and yet are really 
 different. For who will undertake to discern accurately 
 the various shades of colour, or form distinct ideas of every 
 the least difference in extension ? 
 
 C 
 
2G 
 
 Since numeration consists in adding units together,, 
 and these combinations of units have no variety or differ- 
 ence except as being more or less ; names or marks for 
 each distinct combination are more necessary than in any 
 other sort of ideas. For without such names, we could 
 not make use of numbers in reckoning ; especially where 
 the combination is made up of a great multitude of units, 
 which, if put together without a name to distinguish each 
 precise sum, would form only a heap in confusion. 
 Hence, it has been observed that uncivilized tribes cannot 
 reckon far, on account of the scantiness of their language, 
 and when they wish to express greater numbers, they 
 point to the hairs of the head, to denote a great multitude 
 which they cannot number : — and also that children, for 
 want of names to mark the several progressions of num- 
 bers, and from not having yet the faculty to arrange them 
 in regular order and retain them in their memories, do not 
 begin to number very early, or proceed in it far, till after 
 they are well furnished with a stock of other ideas ; and 
 they are often known to reason well, and have clear con- 
 ceptions of other things, before they can reckon twenty. 
 For before they can have a clear idea of that number, they 
 must know the distinct names of all the preceding numbers 
 as they stand in order ; and wherever this fails, the chain is 
 broken, and the progress in numbering can go no farther. 
 So that to reckon right, it is required that the mind dis- 
 tinguish ideas which differ only by an unit, and also that it 
 remember in their exact order the names of the several 
 combinations from an unit to the number which is to be 
 reckoned: in either of which if it fails, the process of 
 numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only 
 the confused idea of multitude ; but the ideas necessary to 
 distinct numeration will not be attained. 
 
27 
 
 £6» By means of number we are furnished with the 
 most distinct idea of infinity that we are capable of ac- 
 quiring. For even in space and duration, when the mind 
 pursues the idea of infinity, it makes use of the repetitions 
 of number ; — as of millions of miles or years ; which are 
 so many distinct terms, kept best by number from running 
 into confusion; and when we have added together as 
 many millions as we please of known lengths of space or 
 duration, the clearest idea we can get of infinity is given 
 us by the incomprehensible remainder of numbers that 
 may still be added, affording no prospect of termination* 
 Hence, our idea of infinity is in a great measure negative. 
 For when we endeavour to form an idea of infinite space 
 or duration, we usually at first take some large idea as, 
 perhaps, of millions of miles or years, which possibly we 
 multiply several times. All that we thus amass in our 
 thoughts is positive, and is the assemblage of a great 
 number of positive ideas of space or duration. But of 
 what remains beyond this, we have no more a distinct 
 positive notion than a mariner has of the depth of the sea, 
 who having let down a large portion of his line reaches no 
 bottom: whereby he knows the depth to be so many 
 fathoms and more; but how many more, remains un- 
 known. And if he could always supply new line, and 
 find the plummet sink without ever stopping, he would 
 be in a situation similar to ours when we are endeavouring 
 to gain a complete and positive idea of infinity. So much 
 as the mind comprehends of any space or duration, it has 
 a positive idea of; but in endeavouring to make it infinite, 
 it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is 
 still imperfect and incomplete. For which reason it is not 
 an unmeaning subtlety to say that we ought to distinguish 
 between the idea of the infinity of space, and the idea of a 
 space infinite ; the first being nothing but the idea of a 
 
28 
 
 supposed endless progression of lengths of space repeated 
 as often as we please ; but to have in the mind the idea of 
 a space infinite,, is to suppose that the mind has already 
 passed over, and actually has in view the complete series 
 of the repeated lengths of space; which series must 
 therefore be terminated, in the mind's conception ; but to 
 be infinite, and at the same time terminated, involves a 
 manifest contradiction. 
 
 If our idea of infinity be gained from the power we have 
 of repeating without end our own ideas, it may be asked, 
 why we do not attribute infinity to other ideas as well as 
 to those of space and duration; since they may be as 
 easily repeated as the other, and yet no one ever thinks of 
 infinite sweetness or infinite whiteness, though he can 
 repeat the ideas of sweet or white, as frequently as those of 
 a yard, or a day. The answer is, that an idea of infinity 
 cannot be gained by the repetition of any ideas except 
 those which may be considered as having parts, and as 
 capable of increase by the addition of other parts ; because 
 by the repetition of such ideas alone, there is a continued 
 enlargement without end. To the largest idea of exten- 
 sion or duration that we at present have, the addition of 
 any the least part makes an increase ; but if to our idea 
 of whiteness we add another of equal whiteness, they 
 become as it were embodied, and the idea is not at all 
 increased. Those ideas therefore that consist not of parts, 
 cannot be augmented : but space, duration, and number, 
 being capable of increase by repetition and of progression 
 without end, lead our minds to the thought of infinity. 
 
 27. There is no limit to the variety of ideas which 
 may be classed under the head of modes : and few of 
 them, comparatively, have distinct names. Walking, run- 
 ning, leaping, and many others are modes of motion ; and 
 in like manner, of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, there is an 
 
98 
 
 endless variety of modes, a few of which are distinguished 
 by names, to serve the purposes of language ; and under 
 each name a large class of modes is comprehended, not 
 distinguished from one another by separate names. Thus 
 the term whiteness is applied to many shades of colour ; 
 and bitterness comprehends modes of taste affecting the 
 palate with many gradations of unpleasantness. Also of 
 pleasure and pain there are various modes, such as joy, 
 hope, fear, envy, shame. Reverie, attention, study, are 
 modes of thinking, corresponding to the degrees of remis- 
 sion or intention with which the powers of the mind are 
 exerted ; the term reverie being applied, when ideas float 
 in the mind without reflection or regard ; attention, when 
 the ideas that offer themselves are taken notice of, and, as 
 it were, registered in the memory ; and study, when the 
 mind with great earnestness fixes its view on any subject, 
 considers it on all sides, and will not be called off by the 
 ordinary solicitation of other ideas. Which different 
 degrees of intention and remission, of which the mind is 
 capable, lead us to conclude that thinking is the action, not 
 the essence of the soul, since the operations of agents easily 
 admit of intention and remission; but the essences of 
 things are not conceived capable of such variation. 
 
 28. Mixed modes are combinations of simple ideas of 
 several kinds ; and they are made for convenience, and 
 dispatch in language. Thus we express the whole cere- 
 mony of crowning a king by the word coronation, without 
 making an enumeration of every particular belonging to 
 it. Thus also the use of such words as revenge, reprieve, 
 appeal, facilitates our communication with one another, by 
 rendering unnecessary the mention of all the passions and 
 forms which are included in the complex ideas severally 
 expressed by those words. Mixed modes are therefore 
 made by the arbitrary combination of several ideas, 
 
 c3 
 
30 
 
 whenever it becomes convenient to comprehend them 
 under one name; although, naturally, those ideas may- 
 have no more connection with one another, than others 
 have, which have not been formed into similar combi- 
 nations. Thus parricide is used to denote the killing of 
 a father ; but no word is in use to denote the killing of a 
 son or a neighbour; though the idea of killing has no 
 more connection in nature with the idea of the former 
 relation, than it has with that of the other relations. It is 
 the having a name therefore that gives unity to a mixed 
 mode ; no combination of ideas being generally considered 
 as one complex idea, unless it have an appropriate word to 
 express it. Hence the act of killing a son or neighbour, 
 having no name affixed to it, is not taken for a particular 
 complex idea, nor as a distinct species of action from that 
 of killing any other person. 
 
 Our ideas of mixed modes are acquired 1. by observa- 
 tion of things themselves : — as by seeing men wrestle and 
 fence, we gain the idea of wrestling and fencing ; by see- 
 ing a king crowned, we gain the idea of coronation. 2. By 
 invention, or the voluntary combination of several simple 
 ideas in our own minds: — thus he that invented print- 
 ing or etching, had formed the complex idea of it in his 
 own mind, before it existed. 3. By explanation or defini- 
 tion, that is, by enumerating the several ideas of which 
 the mixed mode is composed; whereby clear ideas of 
 modes such as sacrilege or murder may be conveyed to the 
 minds of men who never saw those acts committed. 
 
 Since mixed modes are made by men for the purpose of 
 readily communicating their thoughts to one another, they 
 usually make such collections of ideas into complex 
 modes, and affix names to them, as they have frequent 
 use of in their business and conversation ; leaving others, 
 which they have seldom occasion to mention, uncombined' 
 
31 ' . 
 
 and without names. And if we examine which of our 
 simple ideas have had most mixed modes made out of 
 them and distinguished by names, we shall find that they 
 are those of thinking, motion, and power ; for these com- 
 prehend all actions both of body and mind, and as our 
 conversation and laws principally respect human actions, 
 it is necessary we should have modes relative to them, 
 that we may be able to express our thoughts concerning 
 them with convenience and expedition. 
 
 The purpose for which such modes are formed affords 
 a reason also why in every language many particular 
 words are in use, to which there are none that exactly 
 correspond in other languages. ' For peculiar customs 
 exist in every country and give rise to peculiar modes, 
 with names annexed to them; but in other countries, 
 where the same customs do not prevail, those peculiar 
 modes have not been made, and consequently they have 
 no words to express them. Thus oGTpaKKT^o^ being a 
 punishment peculiar to the Greeks, there is not in any 
 other language a word corresponding to it : and it is 
 manifest that such terms as jury, artillery, and the names 
 of all modern inventions, cannot be expressed in transla- 
 tion by any single words of Greek or Latin. Moreover, 
 customs are continually changing, so that while some 
 combinations of ideas fall into disuse, others are formed, 
 and new names are introduced to express them ; by which 
 means a continual and gradual change takes place in the 
 vocabulary of every language. 
 
 29. Under the term Relations those ideas are com- 
 prehended which arise from observing the relation or 
 comparison of things, one with another. Thus the idea 
 of Nobility is relative; since no one can be Noble, except 
 by comparison with others. When two terms as father 
 and child correspond to each other, so that the idea of one 
 
32 
 
 naturally introduces that of the other,, they are called 
 correlative terms : and where a correlative term is not in 
 use, the relation, though equally real, is often not per- 
 ceived. Thus the idea of a Dictator is relative, since the 
 word denotes a person exercising authority over others ; 
 but this relation is not so obvious as that implied in the 
 word King, which has the term subject correlative to it, 
 Also there are many words which seem to be absolute and 
 to stand for positive ideas, and yet imply a tacit relation, 
 Old, young, great, little, strong, weak, are of this sort; 
 which appear to denote positive ideas, and yet in reality 
 imply a tacit reference to certain standards settled in the 
 mind. Thus some animals are called old, at an age at 
 which others are young, and a horse, which in one country 
 would be called large, might be thought small in other 
 countries ; because reference is made to different ideas of 
 duration and size settled in the mind as belonging in the 
 course of nature to the several sorts of animals. 
 
 In order to have an adequate idea of the relation of 
 two things, it is not necessary that we know all the 
 qualities that belong to the things related, but such of 
 them only as form the grounds of the relation. These 
 may consist in a few simple ideas ; whereas to have a per- 
 fect knowledge of the substances related, we must know 
 all the qualities belonging to them. Thus, in comparing 
 two men in reference to a common parent, it is easy to 
 form the idea of brothers, without having a perfect idea of 
 man, in which are united the ideas of substance, figure, 
 thinking, willing, and others ; an accurate perception of 
 which is not necessary to an adequate idea of this relation. 
 And hence, persons may agree as to the grounds of 
 relation, who disagree in their ideas of the things related. 
 
 The ideas which may be classed under the head of 
 Relations are of almost infinite variety, since there is no 
 
33 
 
 simple idea which is not capable of a great number of 
 considerations in reference to other ideas; for example, 
 in the same person may be included the relations of 
 father, son, brother, friend, enemy, master, subject, and 
 many others ; on account of which variety, it is difficult 
 to comprehend them all under a few general classes. 
 Many have reference to time or place, and are expressed by 
 such words as old, young, above, below, near, distant. 
 The relations of cause and effect are also numerous ; as when 
 we observe that fluidity, which did not exist in lead, is 
 produced in it by the application of heat, we call heat the 
 cause, and fluidity the effect ; and in like manner the idea 
 of this relation is always presented to the mind, whenever 
 we consider one thing operating so as to produce another 
 which did not previously exist. 
 
 Other relations may be called proportional, which arise 
 from observing different degrees of the same simple idea, 
 and are expressed by such words as whiter, sweeter, less, 
 equal, more : others are natural relations, such as those of 
 father, brothers, countrymen, founded upon the considera«< 
 tion of their consanguinity or origin, and which being 
 unalterable, make the relations depending upon them as 
 lasting as the subjects to which they belong : others are 
 instituted relations, as those of a subject, a general, a patron; 
 which differ from natural relations by being alterable, and 
 separable from the persons to whom they have belonged, 
 though the persons themselves, between whom the relation 
 has ceased, may still exist ; as a general may resign the 
 command of an army, or a subject withdraw from his 
 country and pay allegiance to another king. — Lastly, 
 moral relations have reference to the conduct of men, and 
 arise from observing whether that conduct is conformable 
 or not to certain Rules or Laws by which our judgment is 
 formed of it. The Laws by which we thus judge of the 
 
34 
 
 rectitude of human conduct, are (1) the Divine Law ; 
 (2) the Civil Law ; (3) the Law of opinion or reputation ; 
 all of which are accompanied with necessary enforcements 
 of rewards and punishments. Of these the Divine Law is 
 the most perfect and comprehensive, and is the only true 
 test by which men ought to judge of their own actions, 
 whether they be morally good or evil ; that is, whether as 
 duties, or sins, they are likely to be followed by happiness 
 or misery, awarded to them by the Almighty. But since 
 it is not the object of this Law to prescribe minute regula- 
 tions respecting many transactions of men among one 
 another which are subjects not for moral precept but 
 conventional agreement, and, still more, since the penalties 
 annexed to the breach of God's Laws are reserved for a 
 future state, and it is often found that men disregard con- 
 sequences which are not immediate; — on both these ac- 
 counts the Civil Law is necessary, that the commonwealth 
 may be able to protect the lives, liberties, and possessions, 
 of those who live according to it, and may visit violations 
 of it with ready punishment. — Thirdly, the Law of opinion 
 ox reputation is that which greatly influences men, not 
 only as it pertains to many things of which the other Laws 
 do not take cognizance, but in more important cases in 
 which it is at variance with them. And though many are 
 able to banish reflection as to the consequences which will 
 follow the violation of the Divine Law, and flatter them- 
 selves with the hope of escaping punishments due from 
 the Civil Law, yet of those who offend against the Law pf 
 fashion and opinion, few are so insensible as to disregard 
 public censure, or be happy while they are the objects of 
 dislike with their own particular society. 
 
 SO. The Association of ideas is that connection of 
 them in the mind, by means of which the presence of one 
 naturally introduces others, which have been joined with it 
 
35 
 
 by some kind of relation. The principles on which the 
 association of ideas depends appear to be chiefly resem* 
 blance, contrast, contiguity of time or place, cause and effect, 
 and habit : but as there is no possible relation among the 
 objects of our knowledge which may not serve to connect 
 them together in the mind, every enumeration of the 
 principles of this association must be incomplete. It may 
 also be remarked that the association of ideas is an 
 expression which has been applied in a sense much more 
 extensive than the words themselves strictly justify ; 
 being made to comprehend not ideas only, but every 
 passion and affection of which the mind is susceptible : — \ 
 the memory also, the judgment, in a word every internal 
 operation of the mind is regulated in some degree by the 
 influence of this principle. 
 
 The effect of resemblance in directing the train of our 
 ideas is brought to our notice by instances of continual 
 occurrence. When we read of any event, we are 
 naturally led to think of other events which have occurred 
 similar to it : if we meet a stranger who resembles one of 
 our friends, the conception of that friend is immediately 
 suggested: the view of a landscape recalls the idea of 
 similar scenes which are familiar to us. To this principle 
 we must ascribe the use of similies, metaphors, and all the 
 figurative language of poetry. When the zephyrs laugh, 
 or the forest frowns, it is to the suggestion of objects by 
 analogous objects, that figurative expressions of this sort 
 owe their origin. Words also suggest other words of 
 similar sound ; and hence, from the accidental agreement 
 of their verbal signs, ideas are excited and trains of 
 thought, which otherwise would not have arisen. On 
 this account, our thoughts which usually govern our lan- 
 guage, are themselves in some measure governed by that 
 very language over which they seem to exercise unlimited 
 
36 
 
 command. In rhyme, one sound suggests another, and to 
 this recurrence of sounds it is evident that the train of 
 thought in the poet must be in a great degree subservient. 
 Alliteration also, or a similarity in the initial sounds of 
 words, has an influence on the succession of our thoughts 
 similar to that which is exercised by the concluding 
 syllables of verse. 
 
 The effects of contrast, as an associating principle, are 
 equally obvious. Intense cold makes us think of heat, 
 and wish for it ; the thoughts of a traveller in the desert, 
 suffering from hunger and thirst, naturally recur to the 
 abundance which he has formerly enjoyed, but which is 
 now beyond his reach. The palace and the cottage, the 
 cradle and the grave, poverty and wealth, severally suggest 
 one another in ready succession. Of moral reflections, 
 none are so common as those which are founded on the 
 instability of mortal greatness, the frailty of beauty, the 
 precariousness of life ; — all which reflections are evidently 
 the result of that principle of suggestion by contrast, 
 which we are considering. The Roman, who saw the 
 imperial victor move along in the splendour of conquest, 
 must have thought of disaster, before he was led to 
 moralize on the briefness of earthly triumph. And if a 
 feeling of melancholy has ever arisen at the sight of youth 
 and health, it can only have been suggested by the oppo- 
 site ideas of age and sickness which are destined to follow. 
 This transition, in our trains of thought, from one extreme 
 to its opposite, has the happy effect of tempering our 
 emotions ; so that while salutary reflections are excited in 
 some men, others are supplied, from the very excess of 
 misery, with internal sources of hope. 
 
 Contiguity of time or place is, of all the principles of 
 association, the most frequent and extensive in its opera- 
 tion. Contiguity of time forms the whole calendar of the 
 
3? 
 
 great multitude of mankind, who pay little attention to 
 aeras of chronology, but date events by each other, and 
 speak of what happened in the time of some rebellion, or 
 great Election, or frost, ov famine. Even with those who 
 are more accustomed to use, on great occasions, the stricter 
 dates of months and years, this association of events, as 
 near to each other, forms the bond for uniting in the 
 memory a multitude of scattered facts, which it would 
 have been impossible to remember by the separate relation 
 of each to an insulated point of time. — It is the same with 
 contiguity of place* To think of one part of a familiar 
 landscape, is to recall the rest in immediate succession. 
 On this species of relation have been founded systems of 
 artificial memory, which prove, by the facilities of remem- 
 brance which they afford, the influence that is exercised 
 on the train of our thoughts by local association. From 
 the same cause arises the pleasure we enjoy in visiting 
 classical ground ; in beholding the scenes of great events, 
 or places which have been dignified by the residence of 
 men whom we are accustomed to revere. "I know not" 
 (says Cicero, speaking of his visit to the academy at 
 Athens) " whether it be a natural feeling, or an illusion 
 of the imagination founded on habit, that we are more 
 powerfully affected by the sight of those places which 
 have been much frequented by illustrious men, than when 
 we either listen to the recital, or read the detail, of their 
 great actions. At this moment, I feel strongly that 
 emotion which I speak of. I see before me the form of 
 Plato, who was wont to dispute in this place : these 
 gardens not only recall him to my memory, but seem to 
 present his very person to my senses. I fancy to myself, 
 that here stood Speusippus ; there Xenocrates, and here, 
 on this bench, sat his disciple Polemo. To me, our 
 antient Senate-House seems peopled with the like visionary 
 
 D 
 
38 
 
 forms ; for, often, when I enter it, the shades of Scipio, o£ 
 Cato, and of Laelius, rise to my imagination/* — In Sparta, 
 an oration was every year pronounced at the tomb of 
 Leonidas. In such a scene, and with such an object 
 before them, we cannot doubt that deeper emotions were 
 felt by the orator and by the assembled nation who 
 listened to him, than would have been felt, if the same 
 language had been addressed from any other place, un- 
 connected with so sacred a remembrance. 
 
 The connection between cause and effect is so intimate 
 that it is scarcely possible to direct our thoughts to either 
 of them singly. When we hear of extraordinary conduct 
 in any person, we naturally conjecture the reasons of it, 
 and the probable consequences : when we see a wound, 
 we think of the accident that caused it, and of the pain 
 that follows; — when we hear of a battle, our thoughts are 
 turned to the causes which have preceded, and to its pro- 
 bable effects. 
 
 Lastly, ideas that have been often joined together in 
 the mind, though they have no natural connection, become 
 so associated that one of them will naturally introduce the 
 others, from the influence of habit. In language spoken 
 or w ? ritten, the mind passes imperceptibly from the words 
 heard or the characters seen to the things signified. Habit 
 gives to those who have long been practised in extem- 
 porary elocution the command not of words merely, but 
 of thoughts and judgments which appear like the calcula- 
 tions of long reflection. All the divisions of a subject 
 present themselves to the orator at once ; image after 
 image arises to illustrate it ; and proper words in proper 
 places embody his sentiments, without any apparent effort 
 
 
 k De Finibus, Lib. V. ad init. 
 
39 
 
 of his own. Other proofs of the power of habit may be 
 observed in the feats of the circus, and in playing upon 
 instruments of music. The musician must direct innu- 
 merable motions of the fingers in one particular succession. 
 There is only one arrangement of those motions that is 
 right, while there are thousands that are wrong and 
 would spoil the music. Yet the arrangement of those 
 motions gives him no trouble of thought : having a dis- 
 tinct idea of the tune, and a will to play it, the motions of 
 the fingers appear to arrange themselves, so as to answer 
 his intention. 
 
 31. Since the moral characters of men as well as their 
 intellectual attainments depend greatly on the trains of 
 thought which are allowed to occupy the mind, it is of the 
 highest importance to give them a right direction, as far 
 as the direction of them is in our power. For though 
 ideas are connected with one another by the laws of asso- 
 ciation, and often take their own course without check or 
 direction, yet by an active effort of the mind the connection 
 may be broken, and particular objects be fixed upon for 
 its attention in preference to others. Those whose minds 
 are occupied with a train of low and base thoughts, or with 
 visionary speculations, are not likely to become qualified 
 for any noble or active employment ; while others gain the 
 command over their thoughts, regulate them in the pursuit 
 of right objects, and arrive at excellence in morality and 
 knowledge. 
 
 32. When any ideas occur in connection with one an- 
 other, it is important to inquire whether there be any real 
 ground for the connection, in reason or nature. If there 
 be, it is the office of our reason to keep them united ; for 
 such associations constitute the greatest part of useful 
 truths, and the mind possesses them ever ready for applica- 
 tion. But other connections, formed by caprice or custom. 
 
40 
 
 are often the sources of error, superstition and misery ; and 
 if such associations have been long formed, they become too 
 strong to be broken. Thus, if children be frightened with 
 stories of ghosts appearing in the dark, the idea of ghosts 
 becomes in time so associated with the idea of darkness, 
 that it is often not in their power to separate them after they 
 have become men ; and it is difficult for them to retain per- 
 fect composure when they are alone in darkness, though 
 they are fully convinced in their judgments of the absurdity 
 of the tales which originally frightened them. In like man- 
 ner, many remarkable antipathies may be observed in men, 
 some of which appear to be natural, and to depend on 
 original constitution, but the greater part of them may be 
 traced to some accidental association : and it is probable 
 that of those which are accounted natural, many have 
 arisen from early impressions which would have been 
 acknowledged to be the causes of them, if they had been 
 noticed and remembered. A grown person, surfeited 
 with honey, cannot think of it afterwards without dislike 
 and sickness ; had this happened to him when a child, 
 the same effects would have followed, but the cause would 
 have been mistaken, and the antipathy accounted natural. 
 
 A person who has been injured, or fancies that he has 
 been injured, by another, sometimes ruminates upon it so 
 much that the idea of the aggressor never afterwards 
 occurs without being accompanied by an idea of the 
 injury, even though it has been repaired, and its effects, 
 otherwise, have long ceased to be felt. Hence hatreds 
 exist, and quarrels are propagated and continued, often 
 from slight occasions. 
 
 When a painful combination of ideas is settled in the 
 mind, it is frequently beyond the power of reason to 
 relieve us from the effects of it. The Mother, who has 
 lost her child, receives no consolation from intimations of 
 
41 
 
 the uselessness of sorrow : reason cannot prevail over it, 
 however apt she may be to hearken to it in other cases ; 
 time alone can wear away by disuse the sense of former 
 enjoyment of the child's presence, and at length separate 
 in her memory the idea of pain for its loss from the idea 
 of the child. 
 
 33. The effects of a wrong and groundless association 
 of ideas are perceived in matters even more important 
 than those which have been mentioned. What evils have 
 accrued to mankind from the idea of infallibility having 
 become annexed to persons or societies ! — whose doctrines, 
 through the influence of that idea, demanded assent with- 
 out inquiry, and held the world for many centuries in 
 ignorance and bondage. 
 
 In the schools, no philosophy was tolerated in op- 
 position to that of Aristotle ; insomuch that decrees were 
 issued, prohibiting all persons, under pain of death, 
 from teaching any maxim contrary to Aristotle, and other 
 ancient authors received and approved. A similar dread 
 of inquiry, with worse effects, prevailed with respect to 
 religion. Hence, in a long period of darkness, Christianity 
 was corrupted by the mixture of human opinions claiming 
 equal authority with the word of God. And the evil of 
 such debasement of truth is far from being confined to the 
 mischief of the error while it continues : if ever, by any 
 means, that part which is erroneous be detected, those 
 who have weakly and passively derived their most im- 
 portant opinions from habit or authority, are apt to lose 
 their reverence for the truth itself on which the error has 
 been grafted, and rashly fall a prey to that sceptical philo- 
 sophy, which teaches that all opinions and all principles 
 of action rest on authority alone, and owe their influence 
 to education and example. 
 
 d3 
 
42 
 
 Again, in political controversies, what effect is fre- 
 quently produced by a name, which, without any just or 
 ascertained grounds, has become associated with particular 
 opinions ! — a name originally affixed by the invention of 
 enemies, or perhaps from accident. Many, who are 
 unable to understand the distinctions which may have 
 given rise to opposite names, and though the dispute be 
 on subjects which neither they nor their opponents com- 
 prehend, yet are impelled to mutual dislike; — many, who, 
 but for the invention of the names, would scarcely have 
 known that their opinions differed. That which thus 
 captivates the reasons of men is the association of ideas 
 which have no real or natural alliance to one another, but 
 which, by education, custom, and the clamour of party, 
 have become so united in their minds that they appear to 
 be one idea, and have the force of an established and cer- 
 tain truth. This wrong association, whilst they are under 
 the influence of it, makes them incapable of conviction, 
 and they applaud themselves as champions for truth, while 
 they are contending for error ; their reasonings are per- 
 verted by it, and their minds disturbed by groundless 
 animosities. 1 
 
 34>. Words are the arbitrary signs of ideas. Since the 
 communication of thought can only be made by external 
 signs, and men are furnished with organs fitted to frame 
 articulate sounds, these are used by them as the means of 
 
 1 On the subject of the association of ideas , see Professor Brown's 
 Lectures, vol. II. p. 196 .... 456. Reid on the train of thought in the 
 mind, Es. iv., ch. iv. Stewart's Elem. Phil. ch. v. 
 
43 
 
 communication, and are the best that could be used for 
 that purpose, on account of their quickness and variety. 
 There is therefore no natural connection between words 
 and ideas, for, in that case, all nations would speak the 
 same language : the connection is arbitrary, and arises from 
 the people of a country agreeing to express, as nearly as 
 possible, the same idea by the same word, which by con- 
 stant use become so linked together that the word in- 
 stantly brings the idea to the mind. 
 
 Words are properly the signs of ideas in the mind of 
 the speaker. The purpose of language requires that they 
 should be so ; for when a man speaks to another, it is 
 with the intention of communicating his own ideas, and 
 not other ideas of which he has no knowledge. Hence 
 the same word is sometimes used by different persons with 
 different ideas annexed to it. A child, having noticed 
 nothing in gold but a yellow colour, applies the word gold 
 to the colour only, and therefore applies it to all objects 
 which have that colour : another observes great weight in 
 gold, and understands, by the word, a heavy, yellow 
 substance : a third adds fusibility and malleability to 
 these qualities, and understands, by the word, a heavy, 
 yellow, fusible, and malleable substance. Each of these 
 uses the word to express the exact idea which he has 
 applied to it, and no other. 
 
 But though words can properly signify nothing but 
 ideas that are in the mind of the speaker, yet in their 
 thoughts men give them a tacit reference to two other 
 things. First, they suppose their words to be marks of 
 the same ideas in the minds of those with whom they com- 
 municate, otherwise the purpose of language would be 
 defeated; and, in truth, many disputes have arisen in con- 
 sequence of the hearer and speaker attaching different 
 ideas to the same word. Secondly, they suppose that the 
 
44 
 
 ideas, expressed by their words, correspond to the reality 
 of things ; as, when the word sun is used, they suppose 
 that a real object exists, which has excited the idea 
 denoted by that word. 
 
 35. It is evident that the purpose of language cannot 
 be gained, unless the same word stand for the same 
 idea in the minds of the speaker and hearer. To effect 
 this, it is necessary that words, for the most part, be 
 general terms, so that one name may comprehend a great 
 number of individual objects. If every object had a dis- 
 tinct name applied to it, it would not only be impossible 
 for the human mind to retain the innumerable names that 
 must be framed, but, if it were possible, it would be use- 
 less ; for no two persons would have the same idea in their 
 minds, with the same name annexed, of any particular 
 thing which was known only to one of them; so that a 
 great part of their knowledge would not be communicable 
 to each other. Particular things are therefore not distin- 
 guished by names, except where convenience requires it ; 
 as, in their own species, men make use of proper names, 
 because they have perpetual occasion to distinguish one per- 
 son from another: countries also, cities, rivers, and other the 
 like distinctions of place have usually, for the same reason, 
 peculiar names; they being things which men have often 
 occasion to mark particularly, in their discourses with one 
 another. 
 
 36. Since there is no natural connection between 
 words and ideas, it is often necessary to have the 
 meaning of words explained. This may be done in four 
 ways, which are severally taken according to the nature of 
 the word, or as the occasion requires. 1. A word may be 
 explained by another word synonimous with it ; thus, if a 
 person wished to learn the meaning of the word albus, he 
 might be told that it meant white. 2. By naming the ob- 
 
45 
 
 ject, to the idea of which the word is annexed ; thus he 
 might be told that albus denoted the colour of snow or 
 milk. 3. By presenting to his senses the object itself; as 
 by shewing him snow or milk, and saying that albus 
 denoted their colour. 4. By definition, that is, explaining 
 the meaning of one word by the use of several other words 
 not synonimous with it. The word albus, being the sign 
 of a simple idea, cannot be explained by this method, 
 because the several terms of a definition signify distinct 
 ideas, and therefore cannot represent together an idea 
 which has no composition. 
 
 Words denoting complex ideas may be defined, by 
 enumerating the simple ideas of which they are composed. 
 Thus the idea of a rainbow may be communicated to a 
 person who has never seen one, by describing its figure 
 and the arrangement of its colours ; but this cannot be 
 done, unless he be able to conceive the several simple ideas 
 corresponding to the particular parts of the description. 
 If, being born blind, he has never gained the idea of 
 colour, it is evident that no description could communicate 
 to him a complex idea of which the idea of colour is ne- 
 cessarily a component part. 
 
 37. Though language furnishes the best means that 
 we possess for the communication of our thoughts, its re- 
 presentation of them is in many respects imperfect ; and 
 besides the unavoidable imperfections attached to it, men 
 are guilty of several faults and neglects, by which words 
 are rendered less clear in their meaning than naturally they 
 need be. 
 
 One fault is the use of words without any distinct 
 meaning at all, though perhaps, properly, very important 
 meanings belong to them. Such words as liberty, glory, en- 
 thusiasm, are in frequent use ; but if many of those who use 
 them were asked what they mean by them, they would be 
 
46 
 
 at a loss for an answer. This insignificancy in their words 
 makes the discourse of men often unintelligible, especially 
 in moral matters, where the words for the most part stand 
 for arbitrary collections of ideas not regularly and per- 
 manently united in nature, and are therefore frequently 
 used without any thought of their meaning, or at least 
 with very obscure and uncertain ideas annexed to them. 
 Hence, in disputation with men who use words without a 
 fixed meaning, it is impossible ever to convince them that 
 they are in the wrong ; it being as difficult to draw those 
 men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as 
 it would be to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who 
 has no settled abode. 
 
 Another fault is inconstancy in the use of words. In 
 many books, especially of controversy, we may observe 
 the same words used sometimes for one collection of ideas, 
 and sometimes for another ; the effect of which is a per- 
 plexity similar to that which would take place if men, in 
 their accompts with one another, made the characters of 
 numbers stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for an- 
 other collection of units. 
 
 A third abuse of language is an affected obscurity, by 
 either applying old words to new and unusual significa- 
 tions, or introducing new terms without need, or, where 
 there is need, introducing them without explanation. 
 Since words are no man's private possession, but are de- 
 signed to be the means of common intercourse, it is not 
 for any one, at his pleasure, to change their meaning ; or 
 at least, if there be a necessity of using any word in a new 
 sense, he is bound to give notice of it. Propriety of 
 speech chiefly consists in adherence to the common use of 
 words ; it is that which makes our thoughts communicable 
 with the greatest ease and advantage, and therefore de- 
 serves some part of our attention and study. 
 
if 
 
 The use of figurative language in subjects which 
 require to be treated with accuracy and plainness, is a 
 great cause of obscurity. If the aim of a speaker or writer 
 be to give delight rather than information and improve- 
 ment, such ornaments can scarcely be condemned : but 
 where truth is concerned, and in all discourses which 
 profess to convey accurate knowledge, figurative ex- 
 pressions tend to mislead the judgment, and ought to be 
 avoided, as being unsuitable to such subjects. 
 
 38. A knowledge of these and other abuses of lan- 
 guage implies a knowledge also of the remedies which 
 may be applied to them ; and a powerful motive will not 
 be wanting to apply the obvious remedies, if we consider 
 what evils have arisen from such abuses, what bitter and 
 frivolous contests owe their origin to them, and how the 
 prevalence of real knowledge and truth has been thereby 
 impeded. Most disputes are merely verbal. If the terms 
 used in them were defined, and the same meaning affixed 
 to them by both parties, disputes would generally end of 
 themselves, and the way to knowledge as well as peace be 
 more open than it is. In the mean time, where shall we 
 find any, either controversial debate, or familiar discourse, 
 concerning government, liberty, faith, justice, and the like, 
 without observing the different ideas which the disputants 
 have annexed to these words ? Hence in the interpreta- 
 tion of laws, human or divine, there is no conclusion ; 
 comments have furnished matter for other comments: 
 and this evil is chiefly owing to caprice or negligence in 
 limiting, distinguishing, and varying the signification of 
 words. 
 
 39- Knowledge consists chiefly in the perception of 
 the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. When we 
 know that white is not black, we perceive that these two 
 ideas do not agree : when we know that the three angles 
 
48 
 
 of a triangle are equal to two right angles, we perceive 
 that equality to two right angles has a necessary agree- 
 ment with the three angles of a triangle. 
 
 Knowledge is of two kinds, actual and habitual. Ac- 
 tual knowledge is the perception which the mind has of 
 the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, from its pre- 
 sent view of them, without the assistance of memory. 
 Habitual knowledge is that which is lodged in the 
 memory, and is such that whenever it is recalled, the 
 mind apprehends and assents to it without hesitation. 
 Thus a man may be said to know all those truths which 
 are lodged in his memory; having been acquired by a 
 foregoing clear perception, and of which the mind is fully 
 assured, as often as it has occasion to reflect on them. 
 For our finite understandings being able to think distinctly 
 but on one thing at a time, if men had no more knowledge 
 than what actually occupied their thoughts, they would 
 all be very ignorant, since he that knew most would know 
 but one truth. 
 
 Habitual knowledge is of two kinds : the first is of 
 such truths laid up in the memory as the mind actually 
 and fully perceives, whenever they occur to it ; and this is 
 the case with all truths of which we have an immediate 
 knowledge, such as that the whole is greater than its part, 
 where a view of the ideas immediately discovers their 
 agreement. The other kind of knowledge is, when hav- 
 ing once been convinced of the agreement or disagreement 
 of any ideas, we retain the memory of the conviction, 
 without the proofs. Thus a man, to whom it has once 
 been proved that the three angles of a triangle are equal 
 to two right angles, still knows this to be true, though he 
 may have forgotten the proof. And, if reliance can be 
 placed upon the memory, this kind of knowledge is as 
 certain as the other. For the immutability of the same 
 
 
4.9 
 
 relations between the same immutable things, makes it 
 certain that what was once known to be true must always 
 be true. 
 
 39* Knowledge, considered with respect to its evidence, 
 is intuitive, demonstrative, or sensitive. Intuitive knowledge 
 is when the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement 
 of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the 
 intervention of any other. Thus we have an intuitive 
 knowledge that two straight lines cannot inclose a space, 
 and that the whole is greater than any of its parts. Such 
 truths the mind perceives at first sight, and this kind of 
 knowledge is the clearest and most certain of which we 
 are capable. 
 
 Demonstrative knowledge is that perception of the 
 agreement or disagreement of two ideas, which is acquired 
 by the help of intermediate ideas. Thus, we cannot im- 
 mediately perceive that the three angles of a triangle are 
 equal to two right angles, because they cannot be brought 
 to an immediate comparison by the application of one to 
 another, or juxta-position ; but finding some other angles 
 which are equal to the three angles of a triangle and at the 
 same time to two right angles, we thus gain a proof of the 
 proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to 
 two right angles. 
 
 Demonstrative knowledge is dependent on intuitive ; 
 for in the above process it is necessary that the perception 
 of the agreement between the three angles of a triangle 
 and the other angles, and of these with two right angles> 
 should be gained by several successive steps, the know- 
 ledge of each of which is intuitive. Hence demonstra- 
 tive knowledge is not so easily gained as intuitive; for 
 there are often many steps in a demonstration; all of 
 which it is necessary to remember, that we may at last 
 perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in 
 
 E 
 
50 
 
 question : whereas intuitive knowledge contains only one 
 self-evident step. And for this reason also, demonstrative 
 knowledge is not always so clear as intuitive ; for since the 
 intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
 the intermediate ideas, in every step of the demonstration, 
 must be carried exactly in the mind, and we must be careful 
 that no part is left out, which, in long deductions and the 
 use of many proofs, we cannot be certain that the memory 
 •will' always exactly accomplish, therefore it comes to pass 
 that this is not so clear as intuitive knowledge, and men 
 sometimes embrace error for demonstration. 
 
 Lastly, sensitive knowledge is derived from the percep- 
 tion of external objects, which correspond to ideas formed 
 of them in the mind. Since perception by the senses is 
 sometimes fallacious, and misleads men to think that 
 objects affect their senses when no such objects exist, this 
 kind of knowledge is, in particular cases, less certain than 
 the former. But when the evidence of one sense is con- 
 firmed by other senses, and when we have the accumulated 
 evidence of all men, agreeing that their senses are affected 
 in the same manner by particular objects, our knowledge 
 of the existence of such objects amounts to certainty, if 
 we are capable of arriving at certainty in any thing. 
 
 40. If knowledge consists in the perception of the 
 agreement or disagreement of our ideas, it follows that our 
 knowledge may be less extensive than our ideas, since the 
 perception of their agreement or disagreement is also 
 necessary. Our intuitive knowledge is evidently very 
 limited, there being few things whose agreement or dis- 
 agreement we can see without the help of intermediate 
 ideas. Nor does our demonstrative knowledge reach to the 
 whole extent of our ideas ; because the intermediate ideas, 
 necessary to form the connection between any two ideas 
 which we wish to compare, cannot always be found. We 
 
54? 
 
 cannot, for example, find intermediate ideas to prove why 
 thought in the mind should produce bodily motion; of 
 which therefore we should have no knowledge, were it not 
 proved by experience. Sensitive knowledge, reaching no 
 farther than to the actual existence of things present to the 
 senses, is more limited than either of the former. 
 
 41. The causes therefore of the narrow extent of our 
 knowledge appear to be chiefly three; the want of ideas; 
 the want of a discoverable connection between the ideas we 
 have; and the want of tracing and examining our ideas, 
 to see whether they agree or not. 
 
 First, we are ignorant of many things from the want of 
 ideas. Our senses, which are the chief inlets of know- 
 ledge, are disproportionate to the vast extent of things; 
 some of which are hid from us by being too remote, and 
 others by being too minute. When we consider the dis- 
 tance of the known visible parts of the world, and the rea- 
 sons we have to think that what lies within our view is but 
 a small part of the universe, we become sensible to what 
 a point, in comparison with the rest, our knowledge of 
 external objects is limited. Even if we confine our con- 
 templation to this system of our Sun and the bodies that 
 move around it, what innumerable vegetables, animals, and 
 intellectual beings, different from tliGse of our earth, pro- 
 bably exist in other planets, from the knowledge of which 
 we are who ly excluded ! And if numerous objects in the 
 universe are so remote as to escape our notice, others are 
 no less concealed from us by being minute. Our want of 
 precise and distinct ideas of the primary qualities of bodies, 
 keeps us in ignorance of their powers and operations. If 
 we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of 
 the constituent particles of bodies, we should know, with- 
 out trial, their operations upon one another as well as we 
 know the properties of a watch or a steam-engine. Thus, 
 
52 
 
 if we knew the mechanical affections of the particles of 
 hemlock and opium, we should be able to say beforehand 
 that hemlock will kill, and opium cause sleep, as well as a 
 watchmaker can say that, if certain parts of a watch be 
 filed off, it will lose its motion and be useless, or that if 
 any thing be laid on the balance, it will prevent the 
 watch from going, as long as it remains there. It 
 would then also be no more difficult to understand why 
 silver and gold are dissolved by particular fluids, than 
 it is for a smith to understand why the turning of one 
 key, and not the turning of another, will open a lock. 
 But while we are destitute of senses acute enough to 
 discover the minute particles of bodies, and to give us 
 ideas of their mechanical affections, we can have no 
 knowledge of their properties and ways of operation 
 beyond that which is acquired by slow and limited 
 experience. 
 
 And if our knowledge is thus imperfect with regard to 
 material things, it is still more so with regard to the exist- 
 ence and nature of spirits. By reflecting on the operations 
 of our own minds, we are able to form a few superficial 
 ideas of spirit, and thence, the best we can collect, of God 
 the eternal author of all Spirits ; but we have no certain 
 information even of the existence of other Spirits, except 
 by Revelation ; much less have we distinct ideas of their 
 several powers and conditions, wherein they differ from 
 one another and from us. 
 
 Secondly, another cause of ignorance is the want of a 
 discoverable connection between the ideas we have. In some 
 of our ideas, there are certain relations and connections 
 so implied in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we 
 cannot conceive them separable by any power whatever. 
 Thus the equality of the angles of a triangle to two right 
 angles is known to be an immutable relation, not depend* 
 
53 
 
 ent on any arbitrary power which of choice made it so, or 
 could make it otherwise. But the case is different with 
 respect to many of our ideas. We have ideas of the bulk, 
 figure, and motion of several objects around us, and we 
 have also, by sensation, the ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, 
 smells^ pleasure and pain, excited by those objects ; but 
 we cannot discover any affinity between these mechanical 
 affections of bodies and the ideas which they produce in 
 us ; there being no conceivable connection between any 
 impulse of a body and the perception in our minds corres- 
 ponding to it. And the action of thought on- matter is to 
 us equally inexplicable. We are so far therefore from 
 being able to comprehend the whole nature of the uni- 
 verse, that we cannot attain a perfect knowledge of the 
 bodies that are about us and make a part of us : concern- 
 ing their secondary qualities and operations we have no 
 universal certainty. For though several effects produced 
 by them are daily presented to our notice, and by analogy 
 we conjecture what effects similar bodies are, upon other 
 trials, likely to produce, yet the causes, manner, and cer- 
 tainty of their production cannot be ascertained. We 
 observe many things proceed regularly, as if by certain 
 laws ; we observe causes act, and effects constantly flow 
 from them; but the nature of these connections not 
 being discoverable by human faculties, we have only an 
 experimental, and therefore very limited knowledge even 
 of bodies with which we are most acquainted. 
 
 Thirdly, where we have adequate ideas, and where 
 there is a certain and discoverable connection between 
 them, yet we are often ignorant, for want of tracing those 
 ideas which we have, or may have, and for want of search- 
 ing out those intermediate ideas which may shew us what 
 agreement or disagreement they have w T ith one another. 
 Thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not from 
 
 e 3 
 
54 
 
 any imperfection of their faculties, but from disinclination, 
 and other causes. 
 
 42. Since our knowledge is gained by the interven- 
 tion of ideas, and is therefore real only so far as there is a 
 conformity between our ideas and the reality of things, it 
 may be asked, what shall be the criterion ? How shall the 
 mind know, that its ideas agree with things themselves ? 
 The answer is, first, that all knowledge must ultimately 
 rest on some self-evident principles ; one of which is, that 
 when ideas of external objects are received by the senses, 
 and the testimony of one sense is confirmed by the other 
 senses with innumerable repetitions, those ideas must be 
 the product of objects which exist, operating on our minds, 
 and producing therein those perceptions which the will of 
 our Maker has ordained and adapted them to produce. It 
 follows that our simple ideas, gained by the senses, are not 
 fictions of the fancy, but are the natural productions of 
 things without us, and have therefore all the conformity 
 which our state requires ; for they represent things to us 
 under those appearances which they are fitted to produce, 
 whereby we are enabled to distinguish the particular sorts 
 of substances; to discern their qualities, and so apply them 
 to our use. 
 
 Secondly, all our complex ideas, except those of sub- 
 stances, being made by the mind itself and not intended 
 to be the copies of any thing, nor referred to the existence 
 of any thing as their original, cannot but have all the con-> 
 formity that is necessary to real knowledge. They are 
 combinations of ideas which the mind puts together by its 
 free choice, without requiring that they have any connec- 
 tion in nature. Hence such ideas are not referred to 
 things ; but things are referred to them, and their con- 
 formity is thence admitted or denied. Thus if a man have 
 formed in his mind a certain idea of justice, he includes no 
 
55 
 
 acts under that name, except those that agree with the idea 
 which he has previously affixed to it. 
 
 Thirdly, our complex ideas of substances, consisting of 
 simple ideas that are supposed to be taken from objects 
 actually existing, may, it is true, vary from them, by hav- 
 ing more or different ideas united in them than are united 
 in the things themselves : and so, our knowledge may, and 
 often does fail of being exactly conformable to things them* 
 selves. The reality of our knowledge of substances re- 
 quires that our complex ideas of them be such and such 
 only as are made up of simple ideas which have been dis- 
 covered to co-exist in nature. And if our ideas be thus 
 true, though not perfect copies, they are the subjects of 
 knowledge; which, in comparison with the extent of 
 things, is very limited, but so far as it does reach, it is real 
 knowledge. 
 
 43. Every man has an intuitive knowledge of his 
 own existence, and he is convinced of the existence of 
 external objects by a species of evidence equally certain. 
 
 These things being admitted, a knowledge of the ex- 
 istence of God may be acquired by demonstration. 
 
 If any thing exists now, something must have always 
 existed; otherwise that thing which now exists must 
 either have been created by nothing, or it must have 
 created itself, acting before it existed; both which suppo- 
 sitions are absurd. We must therefore admit, either jthat 
 there is some independent being which now exists, and 
 always has existed, or that the things which we know to 
 exist at present were produced by something which had its 
 existence from something else, and so on in an infinite 
 series of successive beings. But this last supposition is as 
 absurd as the two former. For of this infinite series, either 
 some one part has not been successive to any other, or else 
 all the several parts of it have been successive. If some 
 
58 
 
 pne part of it was not successive, then that was the^r^ 
 part ; which is contrary to the supposition of the infinity 
 of the series. If all the several parts of it have been suc- 
 cessive, then have they all once been future ; and if so, a 
 time may be conceived when none of them had existence, 
 from which it would follow that all the parts, and conse- 
 quently the whole of this infinite series must have arisen 
 from nothing; which is absurd. From the impossibility 
 therefore of such an infinite series of successive beings, we 
 conclude that there must have existed from eternity some 
 independent Being ; independent, because that which never 
 had a beginning of existence cannot possibly have any 
 cause of that existence, or in any manner depend upon 
 any other being, but must be independent and self -existent. 
 This Being must also be omnipotent. That such a 
 Being has power in some degree, is proved by the same 
 means that we prove his existence ; and since he depends 
 upon no cause for his existence or his power, he cannot 
 depend upon any for the exertion of that power, and 
 therefore no limits can be applied to it. Limitation is an 
 effect of some superior cause, which in the present case 
 there cannot be : consequently to suppose limits where 
 there can be no limiter, is to suppose an effect without a 
 cause. For a Being to be limited or deficient in any 
 respect is to be dependent in that respect on some other 
 Being, which gave it just so much and no more : therefore 
 that Being which in no respect depends upon any other is 
 in no respect limited or deficient. In a Being naturally 
 capable of perfection or infinity, all imperfection, or finite* 
 ness, as it cannot flow from the nature of that Being, 
 seems to require some ground or reason ; which reason, as 
 it is foreign from the Being itself, must be the effect of 
 some other external cause, and consequently cannot have 
 place in the first cause. That the self-existent Being is 
 
57 
 
 Capable of perfection or infinity must be granted ; since he 
 is evidently the subject of one infinite attribute, viz. 
 eternity. His other attributes must therefore also be infi- 
 nite ; for to suppose them finite, when they are capable of 
 infinity, would involve the forementioned absurdity of 
 positive limitation without a cause. As therefore it is 
 evident that a Being which is the fountain of all power, 
 must itself have power in some degree ; we conclude far- 
 ther, from the argument above stated, that this power 
 must be unlimited or infinite. 01 
 
 The omniscience of the Deity may be proved in the 
 same manner. We know that we possess thought and in* 
 telligence, and we also know that we have not had them 
 from eternity. They must therefore have had a beginning 
 and consequently some cause, for the same reason that a 
 Being beginning to exist must have a cause. This cause, 
 as it is necessarily superior to its effect, must have superior 
 thought and intelligence ; and if it be the first cause, it 
 must have them in an unlimited degree, since limitation 
 without a limiter, would, as was shewn before, be an 
 effect without a cause. 
 
 It is indeed manifest that, as all things depend upon the 
 Supreme Being, and have received their existence and all 
 their powers and faculties from him, he must know not 
 only all things that are, but all the possibilities of things, 
 that is, all effects that can be. For having given to all 
 things all their powers and faculties, he must know per- 
 fectly what those powers and faculties, derived wholly from 
 himself, can produce. And seeing at one view all the 
 possible changes, circumstances, and dependencies of 
 things, all their possible relations one to another, and their 
 fitnesses to certain ends, he must know what is best in 
 
 ra King's Origin of Evil : remarks^ ed. 1731, p. 6% 
 
5ft 
 
 every possible method of disposing things, and understand 
 perfectly how to order means, so as to effect what he 
 knows to be, on the whole, the best and fittest end. This 
 is what is meant by infinite wisdom or omniscience ; and it 
 is the attribute of the eternal Being, the creator and ruler 
 of all things, 11 
 
 Thus, from the consideration of the existence of our- 
 selves and of other things, Reason leads us to the know- 
 ledge of this certain truth, that there is a God ; an eternal, 
 omnipotent, and omniscient Being. That such a Being 
 must be incomprehensible by us, is self-evident; for if we 
 do not understand the operations of our own finite minds, 
 we must be much less able to comprehend the operations 
 of that infinite mind on which, as their Author and 
 Preserver, all other existences, material and spiritual, 
 depend. 
 
 44. The truths that fall within human knowledge 
 may be reduced to two classes. They arc either necessary 
 and immutable truths, whose contrary is impossible; or 
 they are contingent and mutable, being the effect of some 
 will and power, which caused them to have a beginning, 
 and may cause them to have an end. The axioms in 
 Euclid, and all the conclusions drawn from them, are ne- 
 cessary truths. They are immutably true, and depend not 
 upon the will and power of any being. That the Sun is 
 the centre about which the Earth revolves, is a contingent 
 truth; for it depends upon the power and will of the 
 Being, who has so ordained it. 
 
 It is impossible to establish any either contingent 
 or necessary truth without assuming some self-evident 
 principles as the foundation of our reasoning. If doubt 
 
 ■ n Encyc. Brit. Met. Part III, ch. vi. Clarke on the Being and At- 
 tributes of God, Prop. 11, 
 
59 
 
 arise with regard to any principle, whether it is self- 
 evident or not; — still more, if one or two sceptical 
 persons deny that a principle is self-evident which the 
 rest of mankind have always thought to be so, it be- 
 hoves them to take care that the principles which they 
 assume as the foundation of their own reasoning be at least 
 equally evident, 
 
 As one of many principles which are generally allowed 
 to be self-evident, the following is selected, both as an 
 instance, and also because the remarks upon it may serve 
 as an illustration of the argument stated in the preceding 
 article. This principle is, That design and intelligence in 
 the cause, may be inferred, with certainty, from marks of 
 them in the effect. Intelligence is not an object of the 
 senses ; it can only be discerned by the effects which it 
 produces. A man's wisdom is known only by the marks 
 of it in his conduct ; his courage, and all his virtues and 
 talents are estimated in the same manner. From the con- 
 duct of one person, we are sure of his folly and ignorance ; 
 from that of another, we are sure that he possesses great 
 attainments and understanding. It is no less a part of the 
 human constitution to judge of men's characters, and of 
 their intellectual powers, from the marks of them in their 
 actions and discourse, than it is to judge of external 
 objects by our senses. Such judgments are absolutely 
 necessary in the conduct of life ; and every judgment so 
 made is only a particular application of the general prin- 
 ciple, that intelligence in the cause may be inferred from 
 marks of it in the effect. As this inference is unavoidable, 
 and is made with perfect security by all men, it has there- 
 fore the strongest marks of being a self-evident principle. 
 And, agreeably to it, the evidence of wisdom and power in 
 the constitution of the world as an argument for the being 
 and providence of the Deity, is that which has in all ages 
 
6o 
 
 made a stronger impression than any other, and been 
 allowed by most men to be conclusive. The notices which 
 God has given us of himself, — in the order, beauty, and 
 harmony of the several parts of the world ; in the struc- 
 ture of our own bodies, and in the powers of our 
 minds, — are so forcible and obvious, that an acknow- 
 ledgment of Him appears to be unavoidable. Meta- 
 physical demonstrations of the Being and Attributes 
 of God must fail in impressing conviction on the 
 minds of those who are unable to comprehend them; 
 but, for the same reason, men are bound not to 
 suffer themselves to be unsettled by the sophistries of 
 sceptical men, which they cannot perhaps answer, because 
 they cannot understand : they are bound to adhere to 
 those plain evidences and reasons of which they are able 
 to form a judgment ; and these are sufficient to guide the 
 opinions and practice of considerate men. 
 
 45. In demonstrative reasoning, the inference is 
 necessary, and we perceive it to be impossible that 
 it should not follow from the premises. Hence this 
 kind of reasoning has no degrees; nor can one de- 
 monstration be stronger than another, though, in relation 
 to our faculties, one may be more easily comprehended 
 than another. On the other hand, 'probable evidence has 
 all degrees, from the highest moral certainty to the very 
 lowest presumption. In common language, this is often 
 considered as an inferior degree of evidence, and is op- 
 posed to certainty ; but, properly, it is a species of evi- 
 dence opposed, not to certainty, but to another species of 
 evidence called demonstration. 
 
 Demonstrative reasoning can be applied only to neces- 
 sary truths ; these are sometimes capable also of probable 
 
 ° Reid, Es. VI. ch. vi. Clarke ; conclusion of the Demonstration. 
 
61 
 
 evidence ; and contingent truths are capable of probable 
 evidence alone. 
 
 Probable reasoning, for the most part, depends not 
 upon any one argument, but upon many, which unite 
 their force, and lead to the same conclusion. Any one of 
 them by itself might be insufficient to convince ; but the 
 whole taken together may have a force that is irresistible, 
 so that to desire more evidence would be absurd. Some- 
 times the judgment may be in suspense between two con- 
 tradictory opinions, when there is no evidence for either, or 
 equal evidence for both. The least preponderance on one 
 side inclines the judgment in proportion. Belief is mixed 
 with doubt, more or less, until we come to the highest 
 degree of evidence, when all doubt vanishes, and the 
 belief is immoveable. This degree of evidence, the high- 
 est the human faculties can attain, amounts to certainty. 
 
 46. Since in many speculations, and in all the con- 
 cerns of life, men cannot arrive at demonstrative know- 
 ledge, it is necessary for them to be guided by probability; 
 and the ground of probability is experience. If the ques* 
 tion relate to a matter of fact, the first thing to be con- 
 sidered is the previous probability of the fact, which will 
 vary according to our experience of the like having, more 
 or less frequently, taken place under the like circum- 
 stances. For in order to establish the same probability, it 
 is manifest that stronger evidence is necessary for one kind 
 of fact, than for another. When ihejprevious probability 
 has been determined, we proceed to estimate the testi- 
 mony which is given respecting the fact in question ; and 
 the probability, thence arising, will vary according to our 
 experience of the like testimony having, more or less fre- 
 quently, been found accurate in other cases. 
 
 First, therefore, if the previous probability be very 
 great, and the testimony also unimpeachable, the resulting 
 
 F 
 
62 
 
 probability is the highest possible. Thus if a number of 
 credible persons testify that there was frost in England 
 last winter, our belief so grounded arises to certainty. 
 Secondly, if the fact be indifferent, that is, if in the 
 nature of the thing there be nothing either for or against 
 it, yet when it is vouched by the concurrent testimony of 
 unsuspected witnesses, our assent is unavoidable. Thus, 
 that there is such a city as Rome ; that there once lived in 
 it a man called Julius Caesar ; that he was a General, and 
 conquered Pompey ; these or the like facts being related by 
 many Historians, and never contradicted, our belief of 
 them, as in the first case, amounts to certainty. Thirdly, if 
 the fact agree with our general experience, and it be attest- 
 ed by many undoubted witnesses, the probability is ex- 
 tremely great. Thus, if experience has taught us that the 
 authors of civil commotions are generally profligate and 
 wicked men, and if all Historians, who write of Catiline, 
 say that he and his associates were of that character, our 
 assent arises to a high degree of confidence. 
 
 In these cases, probability carries so much evidence 
 with it, that there is little or no room for doubt. The 
 difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experi- 
 ence, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with 
 the ordinary course of nature, or with one another ; these 
 are the cases in which diligence and exactness are required 
 to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to 
 the probability of the thing, which rises or falls according 
 as common observation in like cases, and particular testi- 
 monies in that particular instance, favour or contradict it. 
 
 47. In estimating the previous probability of a fact 
 which has reference to the conduct of men, we are guided 
 by our experience of the general principles of human 
 action, or by our knowledge of the individuals. If men be 
 of sound mind, we depend upon a certain degree of regu- 
 
63 
 
 larity in their conduct; and could imagine a thousand 
 different cases,, wherein we should feel the utmost confi- 
 dence that they will act in a particular way, and not in the 
 contrary. If men had no confidence in one another that 
 they will act such a part in such circumstances, it would 
 be impossible for them to live in society : for that which 
 makes men capable of living in society, and uniting in a 
 political body under government, is the assurance that 
 their actions will always be regulated in a great measure 
 by the common principles of human nature. It may 
 always be expected that they will regard their own inter- 
 est and reputation, and that of their families and friends ; 
 that they will repel injuries, and have some sense of good 
 offices ; and that they will have some regard to truth and 
 justice, so far at least as not to swerve from them without 
 temptation. It is upon such principles as these, that all 
 political reasoning is grounded. Such reasoning is never 
 demonstrative; but it may have a very high degree of 
 probability, especially when applied to great bodies of intel- 
 ligent men? 
 
 48. Probability, so far as it rests on uncontradicted 
 human testimony, varies according to the number of the 
 witnesses, their known integrity, their apparent motives, 
 their power of judging, and the consistency of the parts 
 of their narration. 
 
 As a reason for distinguishing between the general in- 
 tegrity of witnesses and their apparent motives in any par- 
 ticular case, it may be observed that the belief we give to 
 testimony in many cases is not solely grounded upon the 
 general veracity of the testifier. In a particular testimony, 
 
 p See Reid's Essays on the first principles of truths, and on probable 
 reasoning. 
 
64 
 
 we consider the motives a man might have to falsify. If 
 there be no appearance of any such motive, much more if 
 there be motives on the other side, his testimony has 
 weight independent of his moral character. 
 
 If the testimony be circumstantial, we consider how far 
 the circumstances agree with each other, and with things 
 that are known. It is so difficult to fabricate a story 
 which cannot be detected by a careful comparison of the 
 circumstances, that it acquires probability, by being able 
 to bear such a trial. And when there is an agreement of 
 many witnesses, in a great variety of circumstances, with- 
 out the possibility of previous concert, the evidence is 
 equal to that of demonstration. 
 
 49' In traditional testimony, each transmission 
 weakens the force of the proof. It is evident that no pro- 
 bability grounded on testimony can rise higher than its 
 first original. What has no other evidence than the testi- 
 mony of one witness, must stand or fall by his testimony 
 alone ; and though cited afterwards by a multitude of 
 others, it is so far from receiving strength that it is only 
 the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, and a num- 
 ber of other supposeable reasons may make one man mis- 
 quote the words of another. Hence, what in one age 
 was affirmed upon slight grounds, instead of becoming 
 more valid in future ages by being often repeated, becomes 
 Jess so, the farther it is removed from the original source. 
 And this shews the great value of numerous, independent, 
 and early documents in which important events are 
 recorded. 
 
 50. If the question relate to a matter of speculative 
 opinion, which is not capable of human testimony, our 
 belief is directed by analogy. Thus, knowing that the 
 whole earth abounds with animated beings, we think it 
 probable that other bodies in the universe are similarly 
 
65 
 
 inhabited. Also, if all nature, from a plant to a man, is 
 filled with diverse kinds of creatures rising one above 
 another by so easy an ascent that the transitions from one 
 to another are almost insensible, if the scale of beings rises 
 by such a regular progress as high as man, we may, by 
 analogy, suppose that it still proceeds gradually through 
 beings of a superior nature to him ; since there is an infi- 
 nitely greater space for different degrees of perfection 
 between the Supreme Being and man, than between man 
 and the lowest insect. In these and similar cases it is not 
 likely that men will ever arrive at certain knowledge, and 
 therefore our inferences from analogy are limited to con- 
 jecture ; but in subjects also which are proper for experi- 
 ment, and in which certain knowledge may at length be 
 attained, analogy is the best guide ; and cautious reasoning 
 from it has led to the discovery of many truths which 
 would otherwise have lain concealed.* 1 
 
 51. Error is sometimes unavoidable, because it is 
 often necessary to form opinions on uncertain grounds. In 
 many cases the probabilities on opposite sides are so nearly 
 balanced, that the preponderance either way is not easily 
 determined, and the danger of deciding wrong must be 
 greatly increased if the judgment be biassed by any previ- 
 ous inclination. Error does not therefore necessarily im- 
 ply a defect of the understanding, since the means of form- 
 ing a right decision may be beyond the reach even of those 
 who have both the will and leisure to seek, and the ability 
 to apply them* Errors are unavoidable where proof no 
 where exists, and therefore cannot be procured ; they are 
 also unavoidable, where men, bound to the necessity of 
 gaining their subsistence by manual labour, have not the 
 opportunity of observation, nor leisure to search for the 
 
 «J Addison, Spec. N°. 519, 
 
 f3 
 
66 
 
 proofs which are necessary to establish right opinions. 
 But, when every allowance has been made for unavoidable 
 errors, many will remain to be otherwise accounted for, 
 and which must be imputed to some disorder of the un- 
 derstanding. 
 
 52. To every bias of the mind by which it may be 
 drawn into error, Lord Bacon gives the name of an idol. 
 The mind, in its sound and best state, pays homage to 
 truth only. The causes of error are therefore considered 
 by him as so many false deities, who receive the homage 
 which is due only to truth. Without attempting to give 
 an enumeration of errors, which would be impossible from 
 their almost infinite diversity, he refers them all to four 
 classes, to which he gives the names of idola tribus, idola 
 specus, idola fori, idola theatri. 
 
 The first are such as beset the whole human species ; 
 so that every man is in danger from them. They arise 
 from principles of the human constitution which are useful 
 and necessary in our present state ; but by their excess or 
 defect, or wrong direction, may lead us into error. As 
 instances of this we may take the following: 
 
 1. Men are prone to fix their opinions too much by 
 authority. In the early part of life we have no other 
 guide; and without a disposition to receive what we 
 are taught, we should be incapable of instruction. Also, 
 when the faculties are matured, there are many things in 
 which we must be incompetent to judge. In such cases, 
 it is reasonable to rely upon the judgment of others whom 
 we believe to be competent and disinterested. 
 
 Authority ought to have more or less weight in any 
 case, according to the evidence on which our own judg- 
 ment rests, and the opinion we have previously formed, on 
 good grounds, of the judgment and integrity of those who 
 differ from us, or agree with us. Those who have a 
 
67 
 
 strong sense of their own fallibility in judging, are in 
 danger of yielding too much to authority; others more 
 arrogant are in danger of yielding too little. As therefore 
 our regard to authority may be either too great or too 
 small, the bias of human nature seems to incline to the 
 first of these extremes ; and it is certainly good for men 
 that it has that inclination rather than the other. Much 
 respect is due to authority in matters of opinion : but there 
 is a tendency to pay it in excess. Of a great part of man- 
 kind it can hardly be said that they form any judgment of 
 their own, except in things which concern their immediate 
 temporal interest; in other important matters, we may 
 conjecture, with a near approach to certainty, what their 
 opinions are, when we know where they were born, how 
 they have been educated, and in what society they have 
 lived. 
 
 2. Men are too much disposed to estimate things 
 less known and less familiar, by those that are better 
 known and more familiar. In this instance as in 
 the former, the principle is correct to a certain de- 
 gree, but there is a tendency to excess in the application of 
 it. As it forms the foundation of all analogical reasoning, 
 to which we owe a great part of our knowledge, it 
 would be absurd to lay it aside altogether ; the difficulty 
 is in determining how far we may venture upon it. The 
 bias of our nature seems to lead us to trust too much to it, 
 and to decide from too slight analogies. For example, the 
 objects of sense having engrossed our thoughts in the first 
 part of life and been most familiar through the whole of 
 it, men in all ages have been prone to attribute the human 
 Jlgure to superior intelligences, and even to the Supreme 
 Being. Again, for the same reason, there is a disposition 
 in men to materialize every thing ; that is, to apply the 
 notions we have of material objects to things of a different 
 
68 
 
 nature. Hence thought is considered as analogous to 
 motion in a body ; and as bodies are put in motion by 
 impulses, we are apt to conclude that the mind is made to 
 think in the same manner. 
 
 The mistakes in common life, which arise from the 
 erroneous application of this principle, are innumerable. 
 Men judge too hastily of others by themselves, or by the 
 small circle of their acquaintance. The selfish man 
 ascribes all professions of benevolence and public spirit to 
 hypocrisy or self-deceit. The generous and honest be- 
 lieve plausible pretences too readily, and are apt to think 
 men better than they really are. The profligate can hardly 
 be persuaded that there is any such thing as real virtue. 
 The rustic forms his notions of the characters of men from 
 those of his own village, and is easily deceived on his first 
 arrival in a great city. 
 
 3. In avoiding one extreme, men are apt to rush 
 into the opposite. Thus, in rude ages, they ascribe every 
 uncommon appearance to the immediate interposition of 
 invisible beings; but when philosophy has discovered 
 natural causes of many events which, in the days of 
 ignorance, were ascribed to the immediate operation of 
 gods or daemons, they are apt to think that all the pheno- 
 mena of nature may be accounted for in the same way, 
 and that there is no need of an invisible Maker and 
 Governor of the world. In this manner, by an immediate 
 transition they pass from the extreme of superstition to 
 that of atheism. And in general, when men abandon 
 opinions which they have held on weak grounds, they are 
 seldom seen to take a moderate course, but hasten to 
 maintain, with equal earnestness, and on grounds perhaps 
 equally insufficient, opinions directly opposite to those 
 which they held before. 
 
 53. By the idola speeds are meant causes of error not 
 
69 
 
 arising from the constitution of human nature, but from 
 something peculiar to the individual. As in a cave, ob- 
 jects vary in their appearance according to the form of the 
 cave and the manner in which it receives the light, and, 
 from these circumstances, often assume a delusive appear- 
 ance ; so, in the mind, errors arise from the particular way 
 in which a man has been trained, or from his particular 
 profession, or from something singular in the turn of his 
 mind. One whose thoughts have been confined to a cer- 
 tain track, is apt to judge wrong when he ventures out of 
 that track. He is apt to refer every thing to the maxims 
 of his own profession, and to judge, by them, of things 
 that have no relation to it. It is a common remark that 
 those who have been much accustomed to demonstrative 
 reasoning, often require it in subjects to which it is not 
 applicable. And, from a like reason, men who are 
 warmly devoted to a particular pursuit, are apt to hold all 
 other pursuits in undue contempt. 
 
 Some men have a great admiration of antiquity, and 
 contempt of whatever is modern ; others go into the con- 
 trary extreme. Some are afraid to venture a step out of 
 the beaten track, and think it safest to go with the multi- 
 tude; others are fond of singularities and paradox. Some 
 are changeable in their opinions ; others obstinate. These 
 things shew how important it is for every man to examine 
 the tendencies of his own mind, and not cherish pecu- 
 liarities which must vitiate his judgment. 
 
 54. The idolafori are fallacies which arise from the 
 imperfections and the abuse of language. On this sub- ■ 
 ject, little need be added to the remarks which have been 
 already made. 
 
 As language was not made by philosophers, but was 
 gradually formed by popular use, it has some imperfec- 
 tions which might be avoided if it were possible to bring 
 
70 
 
 it to a new beginning ; but to others no remedy could be 
 .applied, while our knowledge itself is imperfect. In the 
 mean time these imperfections are the manifest cause of 
 many errors. For language is an instrument of thought 
 . as well as of the communication of our thoughts, and we 
 find it impossible to pursue a train of thought without the 
 use of it : the bad effects therefore of ambiguous and inde- 
 finite language are not confined to our communications 
 with others, but extend to our private speculations. The 
 signs are so associated with the things signified, that the 
 last can hardly present themselves to the mind without 
 drawing the other along with them. Hence, that which 
 was intended to assist and minister to the understanding 
 frequently assumes the mastery : we cannot shake it off, 
 and therefore must direct our course, in some degree, as it 
 permits. 
 
 55. The last class of idols in Lord Bacon's division 
 are the idola theatri, by which he meant hypothetical sys- 
 tems, in which we have been trained, or which we have 
 adopted. Before his time, the slow method of induction 
 from observation and experiment was little understood, 
 and men of genius had long been occupied, to little pur- 
 pose, in framing hypotheses to account for the phsenomena 
 of nature. These were considered by Bacon as worthy of 
 no more regard than fictitious representations produced in 
 a theatre. The world had been so long deceived by hypo- 
 theses in all parts of philosophy, that he renounced them 
 as the fictions of fanciful men, who thought themselves 
 able to unfold the mysteries of nature by the mere force 
 of their genius. When men first began to inquire into 
 the causes of things, it was natural for them to indulge 
 conjecture ; and accordingly, the most ancient systems of 
 philosophy were nothing but the conjectures of men 
 famous for their wisdom, whose name gave authority to 
 
71 
 
 their opinions. Some conjectured that this Earth is a vast 
 plain, surrounded by a boundless ocean ; — that from this 
 ocean, the Sun, Moon, and stars emerge at their rising, 
 and plunge into it again at their setting. Others in more 
 recent times have conjectured that the heavenly bodies 
 are carried round by a vortex of subtle matter, as straws 
 are carried round in a vessel of water. Thus, the experi- 
 ence of all ages has shewn how prone men are to invent 
 hypotheses founded on slight probabilities, and how eager 
 they are, by a kind of anticipation, to discover the secrets 
 of nature. This tendency, it is true, has been at length 
 checked by perpetual failures. The rule laid down by 
 Newton is acknowledged and followed, that no causes of 
 natural things ought to be assigned but such as can be proved 
 to have a real existence ; and that the proper method of 
 philosophy is, to collect the laws of nature by just in- 
 duction from ascertained facts, and to apply the laws so 
 discovered to the explanation of phenomena. It may be 
 expected that men will persevere in this course, in which 
 happy progress has been already made ; — that in all in- 
 quiries into the constitution of nature, they will be content 
 to act a subordinate part; to combine, not to fabricate; to 
 collect evidence, and not to supply the want of it by con- 
 jecture. 
 
 Lord Bacon, having explained the nature of these 
 idols, and shewn what delusions are caused by the respect 
 which is paid to them, exhorts men, resolutely to abandon 
 them; to free their minds from prejudice; and to seek 
 truth with the docility of children. 1 
 
 — * ' ' i ... 1. 1 n - 1 1 .1 i ... 
 
 r Bacon de augmentis scientiarum, lib. 5, cap. iv. Novum Or- 
 ganum, Aph. xxxix. Reid on Hypotheses, Es. II. ch. iii. and on Pre- 
 judices, Es. VI. ch. viii. See also Stewart. Elem. Phil. vol. II. ch. iv. 
 §. 1. on the difference between gratuitous and legitimate hypotheses. 
 
72 
 
 £>6. That part of Logic which treats of the exer- 
 cise of the mind according to practical rules, and by pro- 
 per methods of reasoning, is called Dialectics. 
 
 In explaining this Art, the operations of the mind are 
 commonly classed under three divisions, simple apprehen- 
 sion, judgment, and reasoning. 
 
 The simple apprehension of an object means the same 
 as having a notion, an idea, or a conception of it. It is ex- 
 pressed by a word, or by a part of a proposition, not mak- 
 ing a complete sentence ; as a king, the king of a faithful 
 people. Such words, taken alone, denote simple apprehen- 
 sions : they neither affirm nor deny ; they imply no 
 opinion of the thing signified by them, and therefore can- 
 not be said to be either true or false. 
 
 By the operation of judgment the mind compares any 
 two objects of thought, and determines their agreement 
 or disagreement. This operation is expressed by a propo- 
 sition, in which the agreement of the things compared is 
 affirmed or denied : as when we say, God is omnipotent ; 
 man is not perfect 
 
 The third operation is reasoning ; in which, from two 
 or more judgments, which are called premises, we deduce a 
 new and distinct judgment, which is called the conclusion. 
 Reasoning may consist of many steps ; the first conclusion 
 being a premise to a second, that to a third, and so on. 
 Hence, separate judgments may be compared to separate 
 stones prepared for the purposes of the builder; upon 
 each of which, while lying on the ground, a person may 
 raise himself to a small elevation. The same judgments, 
 when combined into a train of reasoning, resemble the 
 formerly unconnected stones when converted into the 
 steps of a staircase, leading to a summit which would be 
 otherwise inaccessible. 
 
 57. Since a judgment includes two ideas, the propo- 
 sition which expresses a judgment must have terms cor- 
 
73 
 
 responding to them. The term expressing the idea of 
 which we affirm or deny, is called the subject of the pro- 
 position. The term expressing the idea affirmed or denied, 
 is called the predicate. Thus in the proposition, God is 
 omnipotent ; God is the subject, it being of Him that we 
 affirm omnipotence ; and omnipotent is the predicate, be- 
 cause we affirm that the idea, expressed by that word, 
 belongs to God. 
 
 That word in a proposition which connects two ideas 
 together, is called the copula; and if a negative particle 
 be annexed, we thereby understand that the ideas are dis- 
 joined. The substantive verb is made use of for the copula ; 
 as in the proposition, God is omnipotent ; where is repre- 
 sents the copula, and signifies the agreement of the ideas 
 of God and omnipotence. In the proposition, man is not 
 perfect, the negative particle is inserted after the copula, to 
 signify the disagreement between the ideas expressed by 
 the subject and predicate. In popular language, proposi- 
 tions do not always appear in the logical form above stated, 
 but they may be reduced to it by the substitution of 
 equivalent terms. The copula and predicate are often in- 
 cluded in the same word ; as he comes, which is the same 
 as he is coming : and in Latin, one word, as venit, some- 
 times includes the whole proposition. For whenever two 
 ideas are joined or disjoined, though the expression be 
 only a single word, it may be resolved into an equivalent 
 expression containing a subject, predicate, and copula, 
 according to the logical form of a proposition. 8 
 
 58. A proposition is called affirmative, when the ideas 
 expressed by the subject and predicate are affirmed to 
 agree ; and negative, when they are affirmed to disagree. 
 
 s The substance of this and of some of the following articles is taken 
 from Duncan's Elements of Logic. 
 
 G 
 
/4 
 
 Thus of the propositions, God is omnipotent, and, man is 
 not perfect, the first is affirmative y the second negative. 
 
 A proposition is universal, when the subject is a 
 general term without any limitation, and the predicate 
 agrees or disagrees with each of the things comprehended 
 under the subject. Thus, men are mortal, is an universal 
 proposition; for mortality is affirmed of every individual 
 of the species man. 
 
 A proposition is particular, when the subject is a 
 general term, but with a mark of limitation added, to 
 denote that the predicate agrees only with some of the 
 things comprehended under the subject, Thus, some men 
 are virtuous, is a particular proposition ; for the idea ex- 
 pressed by the predicate agrees with only a part of the 
 general idea of the subject. 
 
 A proposition is singular, when the subject signifies 
 one thing only; as when we say Aristides was just. 
 Some logicians have classed these among universal^ and 
 others among particular propositions. They may be 
 reckoned universal, when the predicate agrees with the 
 ?vhole of the subject in its fullest extent ; as when we say, 
 Ccesar was a Homan : but if some qualifying word be in- 
 serted, to denote that we are not speaking of the whole of 
 the subject, as when we say, Ccesar was not wholly a 
 tyrant, the proposition may be reckoned particular. Since 
 therefore every proposition must be either affirmative or 
 negative; universal or particular; hence has arisen the 
 fourfold division of them into universal affirmative, and 
 universal negative; particular affirmative, and particular 
 negative ; which includes all their varieties. 
 
 59. Some qualities in bodies are essential, that is, in- 
 separable from them ; others are accidental. Thus weight 
 is an essential quality of a stone, as it is of all matter ; but 
 heat is accidental. From this distinction arises the divi 
 
 
75 
 
 sion of propositions into absolute and conditional. A pro- 
 position is absolute, when the predicate is affirmed to agree 
 always with the subject, as being essential to it; and con- 
 ditional, when the agreement of the predicate with the 
 subject is not essential, but depends on some condition. 
 Thus, a stone has weight, is an absolute proposition ; if a 
 stone be exposed to the rays of the Sun, it will contract heat, 
 is conditional. 
 
 60. A simple proposition is that which has only one 
 subject and one predicate. A compound proposition has 
 more than one subject, or more than one predicate, or 
 more than one of both. Thus in the proposition, God is 
 infinitely wise and infinitely powerful, there are two predi- 
 cates, both affirmed of the same subject ; and the proposi- 
 tion may be resolved into two others, affirming these 
 predicates severally. In like manner in the proposition, 
 neither kings nor people are exempt from death, the pre- 
 dicate is denied of both subjects, and may be denied of 
 them separately, in distinct propositions. If we say, 
 riches and honours are apt to elate the mind, and increase 
 the number of our desires, as there are two subjects and two 
 predicates, the proposition may be resolved into four: 
 riches are apt to elate the mind : riches are apt to increase 
 the number of our desires. And so of honours, 
 
 61. Some compound propositions are called copula- 
 tive, others disjunctive. A proposition is copulative,, when 
 the subjects and predicates are so linked together that they 
 may be all severally affirmed or denied one of another. 
 Of this nature are the examples given above. Riches and 
 honours are apt to elate the mind, and increase the number 
 of our desires. Neither kings nor people are exempt from 
 death. In the first of these, the two predicates may be 
 affirmed severally of each subject ; in the other, the same 
 
76 
 
 predicate being denied of two subjects may be also denied 
 of them in separate propositions. 
 
 A proposition is disjunctive, when, comparing several 
 predicates with the same subject, we affirm that one of 
 them necessarily belongs to it, but leave the particular 
 predicate undetermined. Thus if we say, the world is 
 either self -existent, or is the work of some wise and power- 
 ful cause, the proposition is disjunctive. In all propositions 
 of this sort, if we determine the particular predicate, the 
 rest are of course removed ; or if we remove all the predi- 
 cates except one, that one is necessarily established. As 
 in the example just given, if we allow that the world is the 
 work of some wise and powerful cause, we of course deny 
 •it to be self-existent ; or if we deny it to be self- existent, 
 we must necessarily allow that it is the work of some wise 
 and powerful cause. These propositions take their name 
 from the disjunctive particles which it is necessary to use 
 in stating them. 
 
 62. Reasoning has been defined above to be that 
 operation of the mind by which, from two or more judg- 
 ments, a new and distinct judgment is deduced. 
 
 In comparing ideas together, it often happens that 
 their agreement or disagreement cannot be discerned at 
 the first view. When, for instance, we wish to determine 
 the equality or inequality of two figures of a different 
 form, it is evident that by merely considering the figures 
 themselves we cannot arrive at an exact determination, 
 because it is impossible to apply them to one another so 
 that their several parts shall coincide. But as all right- 
 lined figures are reducible to squares, we may, by means of 
 them, measure the areas of such figures, and compare them 
 exactly in respect to magnitude. Thus if we find that one 
 figure is exactly equal to some square, and that another is 
 
77 
 
 less than the same square by a square-inch, we conclude 
 that the area of the first figure is a square-inch greater 
 than that of the second. 
 
 Every act of reasoning necessarily includes three dis- 
 tinct judgments ; two, wherein the ideas, whose relation 
 we want to discover, are severally compared with the 
 middle idea, and a third, wherein they are themselves 
 joined or disjoined according to the result of that compa- 
 rison. And as our judgments, when expressed in words, 
 are called propositions, so the expressions of our reason- 
 ings are called syllogisms, 
 
 63. If the question be proposed whether man is ac~ 
 countable for Ms actions, since the relation between the 
 ideas of man and accountableness comes not within the 
 immediate view of the mind, it is necessary to find some 
 third idea that will enable us to discover the relation. 
 First, therefore, on considering what hind of beings are 
 accountable for their actions, we determine that all are 
 accountable who possess reason to distinguish right from 
 wrong, and liberty to pursue the one and avoid the other. 
 Secondly, we know from experience that reason and liberty 
 belong to man. Having thus formed two judgments, viz. 
 that man is possessed of reason and liberty, and that reason 
 and liberty imply accountableness, a third necessarily follows, 
 viz. that man is accountable for his actions. And these 
 propositions, placed in due order, form the following syllo- 
 gism : 
 
 Every creature possessed of reason and liberty is 
 accountable for his actions : 
 
 Ma?i is a creature possessed of reason and liberty : 
 Therefore man is accountable for his actions. 
 
 64. The two first propositions in a syllogism are 
 called the premises, and the third proposition is called the 
 conclusion. Also, the two terms expressing the two ideas 
 
 g 3 
 
78 
 
 whose relation we are tracing (as, in the above syllogism, 
 man and accountableness) are called the extremes : and that 
 which expresses the intermediate idea (viz, the possession 
 of reason and liberty) is called the middle term. That ex- 
 treme which is the predicate of the conclusion, is called 
 the major term : the other extreme, which is the subject 
 of the conclusion, is called the minor term. And from 
 this distinction of the extremes, arises a distinction be- 
 tween the premises in which the extremes are severally 
 compared with the middle term. That proposition which 
 compares the major extreme, or predicate of the conclu- 
 sion, with the middle term, is called the major proposition : 
 the other, wherein the minor extreme, or subject of the 
 conclusion, is compared with the middle term, is called 
 the minor proposition. When a syllogism is proposed in 
 due form, the major proposition is placed first, the minor 
 next, and the conclusion last. 
 
 65. A syllogism is called conditional, when the major 
 proposition is conditional : thus 
 
 If God is infinitely wise and powerful, he does nothing 
 but what is best : 
 
 But God is infinitely wise and powerful : 
 
 Therefore he does nothing but what is best. 
 
 In every conditional proposition there are two parts, viz. 
 the antecedent and consequent, the first being that in which 
 the condition is stated, and the other making a consequent 
 assertion. As in the instance above given ; if God is infi- 
 nitely wise and powerful, is the antecedent ; and, he does 
 nothing but what is best, is the consequent. In syllogisms 
 of this kind, it is evident that if we admit the antecedent 
 we must admit the consequent, and if we reject the con- 
 sequent we must reject the antecedent. But the reverse 
 process of reasoning is not legitimate ; that is, we cannot 
 argue from the rejection of the antecedent to the rejection 
 
79 
 
 of the consequent, or from the admission of the consequent 
 to the admission of the antecedent. For although the 
 antecedent always expresses some cause or condition 
 which, if admitted, necessarily implies the consequent, yet 
 it does not follow that there is no other cause or condi- 
 tion ; and if there be, then after rejecting the antecedent, 
 the consequent may still remain. Thus when we say : if 
 a stone is exposed to the rays of the Sun, it will contract heat ; 
 the proposition is true, and admitting the antecedent, we 
 must also admit the consequent. But as there are other 
 ways by which a stone may contract heat, it will not 
 follow, from the removal of the above-mentioned condi- 
 tion, that therefore the consequent cannot take place : we 
 cannot argue, but the stone has not been exposed to the rays 
 of the Sun ; therefore neither has it any degree of heat ; 
 inasmuch as there are many other ways in which heat 
 may have been communicated to it. 
 
 And if we cannot argue from the removal of the 
 antecedent to the removal of the consequent, no more can 
 we from the admission of the consequent to the admission 
 of the antecedent. For the consequent may arise from 
 any one of a great variety of causes, and therefore the ad- 
 mission of it does not determine the precise cause, but 
 only that some one of them must take place. Thus in the 
 foregoing proposition, admitting the consequent, viz. that 
 the stone has contracted heat, we are not therefore bound 
 to admit the antecedent, that it has been exposed to the 
 rays of the Sun; because there are many other causes 
 whence that heat may have proceeded. 
 
 These two modes of arguing therefore are not correct, 
 unless the antecedent expresses the only condition on which 
 the consequent can take place; in which particular in- 
 stance, they may be applied without error. 
 
80 
 
 66. A syllogism is called disjunctive, when the 
 major proposition is disjunctive,, as in the following 
 example : 
 
 The world is either self-existent, or the work of some 
 finite, or of some infinite Being : 
 
 But it is not self -existent, nor the work of a finite 
 Being : 
 
 Therefore it is the work of an infinite Being. 
 
 In a disjunctive proposition, we affirm that one of 
 several predicates necessarily belongs to the subject, to 
 the exclusion of all the rest. Hence, as soon as the par- 
 ticular predicate is determined, all the rest are of course 
 to be rejected; or if we reject all the predicates except 
 one, that one necessarily takes place. When therefore, in 
 a disjunctive syllogism, the several predicates are enumer- 
 ated in the major proposition, if in the minor any one 
 of these predicates is established, the conclusion ought to 
 reject all the rest ; or if in the minor all the predicates, 
 except one, are rejected, the conclusion must necessarily 
 establish that one. Thus in the syllogism given above, 
 the major affirms that one of three predicates belongs to 
 the earth, viz. self-existence, or that it is the work of a 
 finite, or that it is the work of an infinite Being. Two of 
 these predicates are rejected in the minor, viz. self-exist^ 
 ence, and the work of a finite Being. Hence the conclusion 
 necessarily ascribes to it the third predicate, and affirms 
 that it is the work of an infinite Being. If the minor had 
 established one of the predicates, by affirming the Earth to 
 be the work of an infinite Being, then the conclusion must 
 have rejected the other two, by affirming it to be neither 
 self-existent, nor the work of a finite Being, 
 
 67. It often happens that one of the premises of a 
 syllogism contains an evident and familiar truth ; in which 
 
81 
 
 case it is sometimes omitted, and the syllogism, having 
 only two propositions, is, in respect to its form, incom- 
 plete. Thus if we say: all tyrants deserve death; there- 
 fore Ne?*o deserved death: the minor (Nero was a tyrant) is 
 omitted, as being a truth so well known that it need not be 
 expressed. Syllogisms of this abridged form are called 
 enthymemes, 
 
 68, The sorites is a compendious mode of reasoning, 
 in which a number of propositions are so linked together 
 that the predicate of one becomes continually the subject 
 of the next following, until at last a conclusion is formed 
 by bringing together the subject of the first proposition 
 and the predicate of the last. Of this kind is the follow- 
 ing argument : The son of Themistocles governs his 
 mother; his mother governs Themistocles; Themistocles 
 governs Greece ; Greece governs the world ; therefore the 
 son of Themistocles governs the world. 
 
 This sorites may be resolved into three syllogisms ; 
 and in general, a sorites may be resolved into as many 
 syllogisms as there are middle terms in it ; and if such re- 
 solution be made, it will always be found that the conclu- 
 sion of the last syllogism is the same as the conclusion of 
 the sorites. This kind of argument therefore stands on 
 the same foundation with the syllogisms of which it con- 
 sists, and may be continued to any length, without weak- 
 ening the ground on which the conclusion rests. 
 
 A series of conditional syllogisms may be condensed in 
 the same manner. If a number of conditional propositions 
 be joined together so that the consequent of one becomes 
 continually the antecedent of the next following ; — by 
 establishing the antecedent of the first proposition we shall 
 establish the consequent of the last, or by rejecting the 
 last consequent, we shall reject also the first antecedent. 
 The following is an example of this kind of argument : 
 
82 
 
 If the dead rise not, then is Christ not raised; if Christ is 
 not raised, our faith is vain ; if our faith is vain, our hope is 
 confined to the present life ; if our hope is confined to the 
 present life, we are of all men most miserable : therefore, if 
 the dead rise not, we are of all men most miserable. It is 
 evident that this sorites, as well as the former, may be 
 resolved into a series of distinct syllogisms, and that the 
 conclusion of the last syllogism in the series will be the 
 same as the conclusion of the sorites. 
 
 69' A dilemma is a conditional syllogism, by which 
 we prove the absurdity of some assertion. In order to this, 
 we assume a conditional proposition, the antecedent of 
 which involves the assertion which we wish to disprove, 
 and the consequent is a disjunctive proposition enumera- 
 ting all the possible suppositions upon which the assertion 
 can take place. If then it appears that all these supposi- 
 tions ought to be rejected, it is evident that the antecedent, 
 or the assertion itself, must also be rejected. Euclid fur- 
 nishes many examples of this kind of argument. When 
 he is about to show that two figures are equal, or, which is 
 the same thing, to prove the absurdity of asserting them to 
 be unequal, it is very common with him to assume, that if 
 the one is not equal to the other, it must be either greater or 
 less ; and having destroyed both these suppositions, upon 
 which alone the assertion of their inequality can stand, he 
 concludes that the assertion itself is false. The following 
 is a dilemma, in syllogistic form : 
 
 If the world be not the work of an infinite Being, it must 
 be either self existent, or the work of a finite Being. 
 
 But it is not self existent, nor the work of a finite Being. 
 
 Therefore it is the work of an infinite Being. 
 
 Here, the major is a conditional proposition, whose con- 
 sequent contains all the suppositions upon which the ante- 
 cedent can take place ; and as all these suppositions are 
 
 
83 
 
 rejected in the minor, it is evident that the antecedent 
 must be rejected in the conclusion. 
 
 By comparing this example of the dilemma with that 
 given above of the disjunctive syllogism, it appears that 
 they may easily be reduced to the same form. 
 
 70. Argument by induction is the derivation of a 
 general proposition from a number of particular instances. 
 It is evident that this kind of argument will amount to 
 demonstration, if it be founded on an enumeration of all 
 the instances which the general proposition comprehends : 
 but it is also evident that in this case the value of the 
 induction would cease, considered as a means of gaining 
 knowledge beyond that which is intuitive or demonstrative. 
 For to predicate of the whole what has been already pre- 
 dicated of all the parts conveys no additional information. 
 Thus, if we suppose the whole tribe of animals to be di- 
 vided into men, birds, beasts, fishes and insects, and then 
 argue in this manner: all men have the power of motion ; 
 all birds, beasts, fishes and insects, have the power of motion ; 
 therefore all animals have the power of motion : the argu- 
 ment is just, but it adds nothing to our knowledge. In- 
 duction therefore is generally and properly understood to 
 be a process of reasoning by which, from observation of cer- 
 tain known instances, we draw an inference with respect to 
 others that are unknown. By means of this, we are enabled 
 to supply in some degree, by probability, the defects of our 
 certain knowledge, and to conjecture truths, which have 
 not been certified, and perhaps cannot be certified by 
 actual experiment. 
 
 An induction in which every individual case is enu- 
 merated, is a perfect demonstration. And in general, the 
 more nearly we approach to the entire enumeration, the 
 higher is the degree of probability attained by the induc- 
 tion. 
 
84 
 
 The common error is, too great haste in drawing a con- 
 clusion, without having premised a sufficient number of 
 individual cases. Thus, many are apt too hastily to form 
 an opinion of a whole nation, from the characters of a few 
 who have fallen within their imperfect observation. Thus 
 also, the medicine of an empiric becomes popular, by in- 
 duction drawn from a few cures ; which, even if the report 
 of them were true, ought not to have much weight, espe- 
 cially if it be considered how many cases, in which trial 
 has been made of it, are not published ; the majority of 
 which, it is reasonable to suppose, were failures. On the 
 contrary, where experiment is the only test that can be ap- 
 plied of the utility of any art, it ought to be established by 
 a great number of instances of success, proper account also 
 being taken of instances of failure. And when the pro- 
 portion of failures to the successful cases has been ascer- 
 tained with the utmost care, and found to be small, the 
 beneficial effects of the art are far more undeniably estab- 
 lished, than they could be by vague assertions of its 
 universal and unerring efficacy. 
 
 Argument by induction is the same as a syllogism in 
 which the major proposition is suppressed. And in all 
 arguments by induction, the suppressed proposition is sub- 
 stantially the same, viz. that what belongs to the individuals 
 we have examined, belongs to the whole class to which they 
 are referred. The argument therefore, placed in the form 
 of a complete syllogism would be this : 
 
 What belongs to the individuals we have examined 
 belongs to the whole class : 
 
 But a certain quality belongs to the individuals we 
 have examined : 
 
 Therefore the same quality belongs to the whole class. 
 
 Induction therefore, so far as it is an argument, may 
 be stated syllogistically ; but so far as it is a process of 
 
85 
 
 inquiry with a view to obtain the premises of an argument, 
 it comes not within the province of syllogistic reasoning. 
 The difficulty consists in determining whether the major 
 proposition is duly established. Whether the induction 
 has been drawn from a sufficient number of individual 
 cases,, — whether the character of those cases has been cor- 
 rectly ascertained, — and how far the individuals we have 
 examined are likely to resemble the rest of the class, are 
 points that require judgment ; but this judgment cannot 
 be assisted by syllogistic rules, because it is employed in 
 deciding whether or not it is allowable to lay down certain 
 premises ; and syllogistic rules have no concern with the 
 truth or falsity of the premises, but merely teach us to 
 determine whether from given premises the conclusion is 
 rightly inferred.* 
 
 71. Some arguments are called direct, others indirect. 
 A direct argument is, when, setting out from self-evident 
 truths and definitions, we proceed till we arrive at the 
 proposition which we wish to prove. The argument is 
 indirect, when we assume a proposition contrary to that 
 which is to be proved, and proceed till we arrive at a con* 
 elusion from which we are able to infer that the assumed 
 proposition is false, and the contrary true. Of this kind 
 is the argument \ab impossibili, or reductio ad absurdum. 
 This mode of arguing depends on two principles; first, 
 that we never can arrive at an absurdity by reasoning 
 justly from true principles ; secondly, that when two 
 propositions are directly contrary to one another, and one 
 of them is proved to be false, the other must be true. 
 
 One mode of argument is said to be a priori ; another 
 a posteriori. The former is, when we argue from causes 
 
 1 Encyc. Metr. Art. Logic. Artis Logicae Rudimenta. Oxford ed. 
 1823, p. 175. 
 
 H 
 
86 
 
 to effects ; as from a man's disposition to his actions ; from 
 a writer's known style and ability, that he is, or is not, the 
 author of a certain book : from the existence of a God 
 with certain attributes, some have argued that the world 
 would be formed in this or that manner. The argument 
 a posteriori is directly the reverse : by it, we argue from 
 effects to causes; from a man's actions to his motives; 
 from the existence of the world and, marks of power 
 and wisdom in it, to the existence and attributes of 
 God. 
 
 This mode of argument necessarily precedes the other* 
 For, in arguing from cause to effect, as from a man's dis- 
 position to his actions, the question occurs, how is a man's 
 disposition to be known ? It can only be known from some 
 previous actions ; but when these have furnished sufficient 
 ground for determining his disposition, we are then able 
 to draw an inference from it as to his future actions, 
 and the argument a priori becomes both legitimate and 
 useful. 
 
 72. Sophisms are fallacious arguments, disguised under 
 the appearance of truth. Some of them may be re- 
 futed by the application of syllogistic rules ; others arise 
 from the ambiguity of language, and cannot be detected 
 except by definition, and careful regard to the meaning of 
 words. 
 
 One common error in argument is, to infer the falsity 
 of a conclusion from the falsity of certain premises ; and, 
 reversely, to infer the truth of certain premises from the 
 truth of the conclusion. 
 
 This is the same as to argue from the removal of the 
 antecedent to the removal of the consequent, or from the 
 admission of the consequent to the admission of the ante- 
 cedent : both which modes of argument have been already 
 shewn to be fallacious. If we attempt to establish any 
 
87 
 
 conclusion by arguments which are proved to be falla- 
 cious, nothing farther ought to be inferred than that this 
 conclusion cannot be established by those particular argu- 
 ments : the detection of the fallacy of one argument ought 
 not to invalidate other better arguments which may be 
 fully sufficient to warrant the conclusion. Yet it may be 
 observed that this is generally the effect of such detection. 
 The guilty often escape by having too much laid to their 
 charge, or by the production of a witness against them 
 who is discovered to be unworthy of credit; though 
 perhaps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, 
 the rest would have been sufficient for conviction. 
 
 73. That sophism which is called ignoratio elenchi, or 
 -mistake of the question, is also of frequent occurrence. It 
 consists in advancing arguments which, even if admitted 
 to be just, are not applicable to the matter in dispute. 
 This sophism is often practised in cases in which the ques- 
 tion relates to the choice between two evils, or to the com- 
 parison of two plans either of which is likely to produce 
 some good effects. The sophist dwells on the magnitude 
 of one of the evils, or the excellence of one of the plans, 
 and takes little or no notice of the comparison, which forms 
 the essential part of the question. Hence, when any plan 
 is proposed, he brings into exercise this fallacy, which may 
 be called the fallacy of objections ; that is, he shews that 
 there are objections against the plan, and thence infers 
 that it ought to be rejected ; when the proper question 
 is, whether there are more and stronger objections against 
 the adoption of the plan than against the rejection 
 of it. This fallacy is commonly resorted to by the 
 enemies of Revelation; a belief in which, they say, is 
 attended with great difficulties. But even if this be ad- 
 mitted to be true, the inference is fallacious ; for the pro- 
 per question is, which is attended with greater difficulties, 
 
88 
 
 the supposition of the truth of Revelation, or the supposi- 
 tion of its falsehood ? — The same fallacy is adopted by 
 two other classes of men, very opposite to one another ; 
 one composed of those who are for overthrowing what- 
 ever is established, as soon as they can prove an objec- 
 tion against it, without considering whether more and 
 weightier objections may not lie against their own 
 schemes : the other composed of men who oppose all 
 alterations indiscriminately ; not reflecting that their state- 
 ment even of real objections ought not to be conclusive, 
 since it is scarcely possible to propose any plan, however 
 excellent, against which strong and even unanswerable ob- 
 jections may not be urged ; so that unless the opposite 
 objections be allowed their due weight, no improvement 
 could ever be made. 
 
 74. The sophisms called petitio principii and reason- 
 ing in a circle are, for the most part, easily detected. The 
 first consists in taking for granted the proposition which 
 we undertake to prove, disguised perhaps under some 
 different form of words : as when, in order to prove that 
 the soul always thinks, we assume that thinking is essen- 
 tial to the soul ; which is the same in reality as the original 
 proposition, and equally difficult to be proved. The other 
 sophism is nearly similar, and consists in making two pro- 
 positions serve mutually as proofs of each other. Men 
 are most likely to be misled into these sophisms when 
 they attempt to prove things which are scarcely capable 
 of proof; such as their own existence, the existence of 
 matter, and other like truths which are generally allowed 
 to be self-evident. 
 
 75. The sophism called non causa pro causa consists 
 in assigning a false cause ; that is, in referring any effect 
 to a cause which either does not exist at all, or does not 
 exist as a cause in the case in question. To this class 
 
89 
 
 belong the false theories that have been formed respecting 
 the constitution of mind and matter ; such, for instance, 
 as the ancient method of explaining the operations of the 
 mind by supposing the existence of substantial forms, and 
 the modern theory of vibrations, and many others which 
 have been assumed without sufficient ground for the prin- 
 ciples on which they are founded. The same fallacy is 
 often introduced also into moral reasonings, and misleads 
 men to consider as a cause what is merely accidental and 
 adventitious. Through this error, Christianity has some- 
 times been decried as the cause of persecutions and other 
 great evils ; whereas it ought to have been called the pre- 
 text ; and the same or greater evils would probably have 
 been wrought on some other pretext. For the real cause 
 of such calamities is the wickedness of the authors of them, 
 and wickedness will seldom be at a loss for some pretext, 
 more or less plausible, to disguise its operations. In like 
 manner the opponents of the Reformation assumed that it 
 was the cause of the troubles which took place at that 
 period, and thence inferred that it was an evil. But the 
 reply was twofold : first, the fact was denied, that the 
 Reformation was at all the cause of those troubles ; and 
 secondly, that even if it were the cause, the evil was less 
 than that which the Reformation had removed. 
 
 In determining therefore the causes of events, it is a 
 very necessary caution not to assume too hastily that one 
 thing is the cause of another, when perhaps it is only an 
 
 accidental concomitants 
 
 ■ 
 
 76. The ambiguity of language furnishes numerous 
 opportunities for sophistical reasoning. Many fallacies of 
 
 w Butler's Analogy, Part IL ch. i. Encyc. Metr. Art. Logic, ch. y, 
 H S 
 
90 
 
 this class are founded on the supposition that words 
 derived from the same root have a precisely correspondent 
 meaning : which is by no means universally the case, as 
 will appear from observing the meanings which custom 
 has annexed to such words as project and projectors, pre- 
 sume and presumption, design and designing, art and artful. 
 The sophist proceeds on the supposition that he who forms 
 a project must be a projector, and argues thus : projectors 
 are unfit to be trusted : this man has formed a project ; 
 therefore he is unfit to be trusted : whereas the bad sense 
 of one of these words is not at all implied in the other. 
 Again he argues : to be acquainted with the guilty is a 
 presumption of guilt ; this man is so acquainted ; there- 
 fore we may presume that he is guilty. This argument 
 proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspondence 
 between presume and presumption, which however does 
 not exist ; for presumption is commonly used to express a 
 slight supicion ; whereas to presume amounts to absolute 
 belief. In this manner, the sophist will often be able to 
 misinterpret the propositions w T hich his opponent admits 
 or maintains, and employ theni, so misinterpreted, against 
 him. 
 
 Nearly allied to this fallacy is another, which arises 
 from supposing that the meaning of every word ought to 
 be determined by its etymological derivation. Thus the 
 sophist, assuming that the right meaning of the noun, re- 
 presentative, must correspond exactly with the original 
 sense of the verb, represent, argues that a representative 
 ought to be guided in all points by the opinion of his con- 
 stituents, and to be merely their deputy ; whereas law and 
 custom, which in this case ought to be considered as 
 fixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but 
 enjoin the representative to act according to his own judg- 
 
91 
 
 ment, and on his own responsibility. Custom, which is 
 generally the arbiter of language, is variable ; and there- 
 fore there can be no authority competent to pronounce 
 that the meaning of a word, now and for ever, must be 
 that which it originally bore. 
 
 77- There are some other modes of argument, which 
 often have effect in disputation, but are not conclusive for 
 the determination of truth. One of these is to appeal to 
 common opinion, or allege the decisions of men whose 
 learning has gained a name, and invested them with a 
 kind of authority. When opinions are recommended by 
 such high sanction, it is thought presumptuous to question 
 them ; and the disputant, who is able to support his tenets 
 by such authorities, is inclined to charge with a breach of 
 modesty the adversary who refuses to yield to them. 
 This is called argumentum ad verecundiam. All that can 
 be said against it is, that it is not conclusive : it must be 
 allowed that there is a strong presumption in favour of any 
 opinion which has received the consent of learned men for 
 many ages ; but this presumption may be overcome by 
 stronger reasons on the contrary side. 
 
 Another mode of argument, by which men endeavour 
 to gain assent to their opinions, is to require the adversary 
 either to assent to them, or to assign others more satisfac- 
 tory. This is called argumentum ad ignorantiam ; and is 
 of little value ; for the ignorance of one person affords 
 no presumption in favour of the accuracy of another 
 person's knowledge. 
 
 A third way is to press a man with consequences 
 drawn from his own principles or concessions. This is 
 called argumentum ad hominem ; and is sometimes an 
 allowable expedient for silencing those who will not yield 
 to fair argument. 
 
92 
 
 That which is called argumentum ad judicium is differ- 
 ent from all these ; being derived from the proper founda- 
 tions of knowledge or probability. This alone brings 
 true instruction with it, and advances us in our way to 
 knowledge. It argues not that one man's opinion is right, 
 because others, from respect, or from any other considera- 
 tion, will not contradict him. Nor does it prove that one 
 man is in the right way, because others know not a better, 
 or have been shewn to be in the wrong. But it appeals to 
 just proofs and arguments, and to evidence derived from 
 the nature of things themselves; not to the modesty, 
 ignorance, or errors of those to whom it is addressed. 
 
 78. Method is the arrangement of the thoughts, so 
 that their mutual relation and dependence may be most 
 easily seen. The chief objects of method are, the inves- 
 tigation of truth, and the communication of it. There are 
 accordingly two species of method, the analytic and the 
 synthetic, respectively adapted to these two objects : the 
 analytic being usually the method of invention, and the 
 synthetic the method of instruction. 
 
 - In Geometry, every proposition consists of two parts ; 
 one, in which certain suppositions are made ; and another, 
 in which a certain consequence is affirmed to follow from 
 those suppositions. If the particulars stated in the hypo- 
 thetical part of the enunciation be assumed as the princi- 
 ples of our reasoning, and from these principles a series of 
 consequences be deduced, till we at last arrive at the con- 
 clusion which the proposition affirmed, the demonstration 
 is called synthetic. If the steps of this reasoning be ar- 
 ranged in the reverse order, we assume hypothetically the 
 truth of the proposition which we wish to demonstrate, 
 and proceed to deduce from this assumption the conse- 
 quences to which it leads. If, in this deduction, we arrive 
 
93 
 
 at a consequence which we already know to be true, we 
 conclude that the principle from which it was deduced is 
 also true. But if, on the other hand, we arrive at a conse- 
 quence which we know to be false, we conclude that the 
 assumption on which the reasoning has proceeded is false 
 also. — Such a demonstration of the truth or falsity of a 
 proposition is called analytic. 
 
 The meaning of the terms analysis and synthesis, when 
 applied to Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics, has little 
 resemblance to that in which they are are applied to 
 Geometryj except that in those sciences, as in Geometry, 
 analysis is usually the method of discovery, and synthesis 
 the method of instruction. In them, the analytic method 
 begins with those things which are most known ; ex- 
 amines their properties and relations ; proceeds from effects 
 to causes ; and from particular causes to the most general. 
 The synthetic method proceeds from general to particular 
 truths, from causes to effects. In acquiring the know- 
 ledge of any physical science, we may adopt either of 
 these methods : we may either examine all the particular 
 things to which the science relates ; ascertain their various 
 properties; classify them by placing together those in 
 which there exists a striking similarity; review the 
 classes, and re-arrange them according to more compre- 
 hensive similarities ; and so on repeatedly, until we have 
 formed classes of the most general nature: — or, we may 
 begin by learning the most general classes, with their di- 
 visions and subdivisions, and the distinguishing proper- 
 ties of each, till we descend to the lowest species, and 
 thence to individuals. This is the synthetic, the former 
 is the analytic process. The original discoverer of the 
 science must proceed by analysis. But in communi- 
 cating the science to others, the synthetic mode is 
 
94 
 
 generally adopted, as it displays the whole science 
 at one view; and the general arrangement, seen from 
 the beginning, greatly assists the mind in apprehending 
 and remembering the several parts.* 
 
 * Artis Logicae Rudimenta. de methodo, Stewart's Elements of Phi* 
 josophy, vol. II. ch. iv. §. 3. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 Art. 1. There are two meanings of the word idea, a popular and 
 philosophical. In popular language, an idea is the same as a thought, 
 or a notion. But according to the meaning of the word, as it was 
 formerly used by philosophical writers, an idea is some object of 
 thought. 
 
 Aristotle taught that all the objects of thought enter at first by 
 the senses; and since the sense cannot receive external material 
 objects themselves, it receives their images or forms without the 
 matter ; as wax receives the form of a seal without any of the 
 matter of it. In like manner, many modern philosophers conceived 
 that, since external objects cannot be the immediate objects of thought, 
 there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a 
 mirror, they are seen. And the name idea, in the philosophical sense 
 of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. 
 The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the idea, or 
 image of that object in the mind, is the immediate object, without 
 which we could have no perception of the other. 
 
 This opinion seems to have been held by Locke ; but it was con- 
 futed by Reid, and is now generally abandoned. Reid expresses his 
 belief that no man is able to explain how we perceive external 
 objects, any more than how we are conscious of those that are 
 internal. For this reason, after having shewn that the theories of 
 former philosophers on this subject are ill-grounded and insufficient, 
 he does not attempt to substitute any other theory in their place. 
 (See Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1, 2.) 
 
 Some writers have made a distinction between ideas and notions ; 
 and, as a reason for it, they appeal to the derivation of the words ; 
 the root of one being etZta to see, and the other yivcia-KO) to knowov 
 understand. In their primary sense, therefore, notion is more com- 
 
 I 
 
96 
 
 prehensive than idea, because we know many things which cannot 
 be seen. It is probable that, at first, the word idea was used to denote 
 only those images of external objects which are received through the 
 sense of sight. Its signification was afterwards extended to im- 
 pressions produced through the other senses; and, finally, it was con- 
 I founded with notion, which denotes the apprehension of whatever 
 may be known. We are told that Dr. Johnson was indignant at the 
 use of the word idea in this last sense, when, properly, it can only 
 signify something of which an image may be formed in the mind. 
 " We may have an idea or image of a mountain, a tree, or a building; 
 but not of an argument or proposition." (Encyc. Brit. Art. Metaph. 
 and Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. III. p. 406.) There is however 
 little probability that this distinction will ever be generally attended 
 to, in popular use. 
 
 The term Logic also is used by some writers in a sense much 
 more extensive than by others. It is by some defined to be an art, 
 which treats of practical rules for the exercise of the mind in reason- 
 ing. In this sense, it is called an art, not a science, because it relates 
 to something which is to be done, not to any thing which is merely to 
 be known; to practice, not to theory* By others it is made to con- 
 tain a description of the mental faculties, as well as the rules above- 
 mentioned. Others extend it so far as to comprehend all that relates 
 to the philosophy of the mind. When there exists such a variance in 
 the meaning of a word, it is proper for every writer who uses it, to 
 explain the meaning which he himself intends to annex to it. 
 
 Art. 2. Though Locke has written at great length against the 
 doctrine of innate ideas, it is not easy to determine in what sense the 
 word innate was understood by him. If by innate be meant coeval 
 with our birth, it can hardly be supposed that any person ever held 
 the doctrine which he controverts ; but if, in denying that man has 
 innate ideas, he meant that the mind is not so framed as that certain 
 ideas will necessarily accompany the exercise of its faculties, and 
 certain principles be approved by it in preference to others, he is not 
 only opposed to almost all other philosophers, but is inconsistent with 
 himself. "The First Book (says Dr. Beattie) of the Essay on the 
 Human Understanding tends to establish this dangerous doctrine, that 
 the human mind, previous to education and habit, is as susceptible of 
 any one impression as of any other : — a doctrine which, if true, would 
 go near to prove, that truth and virtue are no better than human con- 
 trivances; or, at least, that they have nothing permanent in their 
 nature ; but may be as changeable as the inclinations and capacities of 
 men. Surely this is not the doctrine that Locke meant to establish ; 
 but his zeal against innate ideas and innate principles, put him off his 
 
97 
 
 guard, and made him allow too little for instinct, for fear of allowing 
 too much." 
 
 The word connatural, as proper to denote certain of our ideas, is 
 given by Lord Shaftesbury. " Innate (he observes) is a word which 
 Locke poorly plays upon : the right word, though less used, is connatural. 
 For what has birth to do in this case ? — the question is not about the 
 time the ideas entered ; but whether the constitution of man be such, 
 that, being adult and grown up, at such a time, sooner or later (no 
 matter when) the idea and sense of order, administration, and a God, 
 will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him." 
 
 That Locke was far from holding such opinions as his language 
 respecting innate ideas might lead us to attribute to him, appears 
 from his distinct disavowal of them in different parts of his Essay. 
 " There is a great deal of difference (he says) between an innate law, 
 and a law of nature ; between something imprinted on our minds in 
 their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may 
 attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our 
 natural faculties." (Book I. ch. iii. §. 13.) Again (Book IV. ch, iii. 
 §. 20.) he speaks " of the candle of the Lord being set up by himself 
 in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man 
 wholly to extinguish." (For an account of Locke's opinions on this 
 subject and the discussions which they have excited, see Stewart's 
 First Dissertation prefixed to the Supplement of the Encyclopedia 
 Britannica, vol. V. p. 30.) 
 
 Locke refers the origin of all our ideas to two sources, sensation 
 and reflection : some writers have referred them to sensation alone. 
 Nihil est in intellectu quod nonfuerit in sensu, was the maxim of these 
 writers; and many of them have so far misinterpreted Locke as to 
 ascribe to him the credit of having established it. This maxim, ex- 
 tended by Leibnitz, became: nihilest in intellectu quod non fueritin 
 sensu, nisi ipse intellectus ; which conveys, in a concise form, the sub- 
 stance of Locke's doctrine. 
 
 But, taken in its most extensive sense, this account of the origin of 
 our ideas falls short of the truth. There are many ideas which cannot 
 be directly referred either to sensation or reflection ; and all that can 
 be said of them is, that the exercise of some particular faculty furnishes 
 the occasion on which, by the laws of our constitution, they are present- 
 ed to the mind ; nor does it seem possible for us to trace the origin of 
 them any farther than to ascertain what the nature of the occasion was, 
 which, in the first instance, introduced them to our notice. The feel- 
 ings of pleasure and pain, of desire and passion, are born with us, and 
 necessarily exist in a percipient mind. Thus, we are not only fur- 
 
98 
 
 nished by the constitution of our nature with capabilities of knowledge, 
 and proper organs for the attainment of it, but the principles which 
 impel us to the acquisition of knowledge, viz. the desire of pleasure and 
 the consciousness of enjoyment, are implanted in us, and exist in the 
 mind before it is excited by external objects. (See Stewart's Ele« 
 ments of Philosophy, vol. I. ch. i. §. 4. and Philosophical Essays, I. 
 ch. ii. also the Edinburgh Encyclopedia, Art. Logic.) 
 
 Art. 7. Extension and figure are classed by Locke, along with 
 hardness, softness, roughness, and other similar qualities, under the 
 general title of the primary qualities of matter. The propriety of 
 making some distinction between them has been pointed out by Pro- 
 fessor Stewart, who gives to extension and figure the title of the 
 mathematical affections of matter; restricting the phrase -primary 
 qualities to hardness, softness, and other properties of the same 
 description. "And (he adds) the line which I would draw between 
 these primary qualities and secondary is this ; that the former neces- 
 sarily involve the notion of extension, and consequently of externality 
 or outness; whereas the latter are only conceived as the unknown 
 causes of known sensations, and, when first apprehended by the mind, 
 do not imply the existence of any thing locally distinct from the sub- 
 jects of its own consciousness." (Philosophical Essays, IT. ch. ii.) 
 
 Art. 9. The name of every secondary quality signifies two things, 
 a sensation in the mind, and the unknown quality which excites that 
 sensation. When therefore a question is made whether fire is hot, or 
 grass green, the answer is given by explaining the meaning of the 
 words heat and colour. If we understand by them some unknown dis- 
 position or motion of the insensible particles of bodies, by which the 
 perception of heat or colour is caused in us, then fire is hot, and grass 
 green. But if we understand by those words, what we feel by fire, or 
 what we see in grass, — in that sense, fire is not hot, nor grass green ; 
 for the heat we feel, and the colours we see, are only in the soul. 
 
 Art. 10. It is remarked by Professor Stewart, that there is an 
 inseparable connection in every person's mind between the notions of 
 colour and of extension. The former of these words expresses a sensa- 
 tion in the mind ; the latter denotes a quality of an external object ; 
 so that there is no more natural connection betw T een the two notions, 
 than between pain and solidity ; and yet, in consequence of our always 
 perceiving extension at the same time at which the sensation of colour 
 is excited in the mind, we find it impossible to think of that sensation, 
 without conceiving extension along with it. 
 
 Similar to this misconception, by which we refer the sensation of 
 colour to an external object, is the reference which we always make of 
 
99 
 
 the sensations of touch to those parts of the body, where the exciting 
 causes of the sensations exist. If the hand be struck against a hard 
 object, we naturally say that we feel pain in the hand; though the 
 truth is, that we merely perceive the cause of the pain to be applied to 
 that part of the body. The sensation itself cannot be referred in point 
 of place to the hand, unless it be supposed that the soul is spread over 
 the body by diffusion. The misconception is still more remarkable, 
 when sensations of touch are referred to a place beyond the limits of 
 the body ; as in the case of pain which seems to be felt in an ampu- 
 tated limb. (Elements of Philosophy, Part II. ch. v. §.1. and Note P. 
 Professor Brown's Lectures, 25.) 
 
 The difference between perception and sensation (briefly stated in 
 Articles 10, 11.) is explained at great length by Dr. Reid ; whose 
 opinions on this subject, as on every other of which he treats, have the 
 recommendation, not only of their great intrinsic worth, but also of 
 being expressed in a plain and direct manner, and the most perspicu- 
 ous language. 
 
 Art. 16. Since it is impossible for us to understand how the mind 
 acquires the first perception of ideas, it must be equally impossible to 
 understand how it retains them. What Locke's opinions were on this 
 subject cannot be ascertained with certainty, for he expresses them in 
 metaphorical language, and he has not clearly explained whether he 
 intended the metaphors which he uses to be understood as merely 
 illustrative, or as representing literally the mental operations to which 
 they are referred. He speaks of ideas as pictures drawn in our minds, 
 and laid in fading colours ; and of the brain retaining the characters 
 drawn on it, in some cases like marble, in others like freestone, and m 
 others little better than sand; — which expressions are sufficiently 
 accordant with the opinion held by him and by many other philoso- 
 phers, that we perceive external objects by means of images of them 
 conveyed to the brain. 
 
 It has always been the common opinion that sensation, perception, 
 and all the other operations of the mind are produced by impressions 
 made on it by external objects. This opinion could only take its rise 
 from observing the constant connection which exists between certain 
 impressions made upon our senses, and our perception of the objects 
 by which the impression is made ; from which it is inferred, that 
 those impressions were the proper efficient causes of the corres- 
 ponding sensation. But because two things are always conjoined, 
 it is by no means a necessary consequence that one must be the cause 
 of the other. Day and night are joined in constant succession, but we 
 do not conclude from this, that day is the cause of night, or night the 
 
 12 
 
100 
 
 cause of day. Therefore it is not only impossible to conceive, but also 
 there is no real ground for supposing, that matter, by any motion or 
 modification, produces thought. 
 
 And if the nature of perception be thus inexplicable, we have equal 
 reason to make the same acknowledgement with respect to memory. 
 It is an original faculty given us by the Author of our being, of which 
 we can give no account but that we are so made. We are told by 
 Locke " that laying up our ideas in the repository of the memory sig- 
 nifies no more than this, that the mind has a power to revive percep- 
 tions which it once had, with this additional perception annexed to 
 them, that it has had them before ; and in this sense it is, that our ideas 
 are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere." 
 But when a thing is nowhere, the same thing cannot be again pro- 
 duced ; though another thing similar to it may. Hence, an ability to 
 revive our ideas, after they have ceased to be, can signify no more but 
 an ability to create new ideas similar to those we had before. Again, 
 he says, "that the mind, as it were, paints the ideas anew upon itself. " 
 This expression must imply that the mind, which paints the things 
 that have ceased to exist, has the memory of what they were ; as a 
 painter must have a copy, either before his eye or in his imagination 
 and memory. On the whole, Locke's chapter on memory, though con- 
 taining some fine remarks on the importance and the varieties of this 
 faculty, does not, in the least degree, enable us to understand how 
 we retain ideas by it. (See Reid, Essay II. ch. iv. and Essay III. 
 ch. vii.) 
 
 Art. 18. Since it was the prevailing opinion among ancient phi- 
 losophers that the qualities of external objects are perceived by means 
 of images transmitted to the mind by the organs of sense, and that these 
 images are the objects about which our thoughts are employed, it 
 naturally became a question, what is the nature of the idea or image 
 corresponding to a general term. When we think of any particular 
 object such as a particular man, tree, or mountain, we can understand 
 what is meant by an image of such objects. But what account can we 
 give, upon the principles of this theory, of the objects of our thoughts, 
 when we use the words, man, tree, mountain, as general terms ? For 
 all the things we have ever perceived are individuals ; and therefore the 
 ideas denoted by general words, cannot be copied from any originals that 
 have fallen under our observation. In answer to this question, it was 
 taught for many ages, by the followers of Plato and Aristotle, that, 
 although these general ideas are not copied from any objects perceiv- 
 able by sense, yet, as all the individuals which compose a genus must 
 possess something in common, this common thing forms the essence of 
 
101 
 
 each, and is the object of thought, when we reason concerning the 
 genus. Plato held that of every species of things there is one idea or 
 form, which existed from eternity, before any individual of the species 
 was formed : that this idea is the exemplar or pattern, according to 
 which the Deity formed the individuals of the species : that every indi- 
 vidual of the species partakes of this idea, which constitutes its essence; 
 and that this idea is an object of thought, when, by due abstraction, we 
 discern it to be one in all the individuals of the species. In this man- 
 ner, according to Plato, we form universal or abstract ideas. 
 
 In the eleventh century a new doctrine was introduced, that these 
 abstract ideas have no existence ; that words or names are universal 
 signs, but that every idea must be particular. The advocates of this 
 new opinion were called Nominalists, to distinguish them from the 
 Realists, who adhered to the ancient opinion that universal ideas exist, 
 corresponding to the universal words which are used to denote them. 
 A few formed themselves into a third sect called conceptualists, who 
 seem to have agreed with the Nominalists in denying the existence of 
 universal things, but to have thought in opposition to them, that, by 
 means of its conceptions, the mind has the power of reasoning con- 
 cerning genera, without the use of words, as signs of those concept 
 tions. The dispute among these sects was carried on with the 
 greatest animosity,' not by arguments only, but by bloody affrays, until 
 the Reformation turned the attention of men to more important sub- 
 jects. 
 
 Dr. Reid has classed Locke among the conceptualists; as having 
 maintained, not that there are things universal, but that we have 
 general or universal ideas, which we form by abstraction. In speaking 
 of these abstract ideas, Locke says that it is not so easy to form them, 
 as it is to form particular ideas. " For example, does it not require 
 some skill to form the general idea of a triangle ? For it must be nei- 
 ther oblique, nor right-angled, neither equilateral, nor scalene ; but 
 all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect 
 that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and 
 inconsistent ideas are put together." Surely (to use the words of 
 Campbell) the bare mention of this hypothesis is equivalent to a con- 
 futation of it. (CampbelFs Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol. II. p. 110. 
 Locke, Book IV. ch. vii. Reid, Essay V. ch. vi. Stewart. Elem. 
 of Phil. vol. I. ch. iv.) 
 
 Art. 39. It is stated in this Article that our knowledge chiefly 
 -consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our 
 ideas : and perhaps it would have been proper to make even a stronger 
 modification of Locke's doctrine, who refers all our knowledge to the 
 
102 
 
 perception of such agreement or disagreement. The accuracy of this 
 proposition depends on the sense in which the word idea is to be taken. 
 Sometimes it is used by Locke as synonymous with thought ; in one 
 place he defines it to be whatever is the object of thought ; — a defini- 
 tion which would comprehend both things which have a real existence, 
 and things which we either believe never existed, or which we think 
 of without regard to their existence ; and in this sense it is undoubtedly 
 true that all knowledge consists in perceiving the agreement or dis- 
 agreement of ideas. But we have a knowledge of external objects ; 
 and there is no reason to suppose that Locke held the opinion, which 
 was subsequently professed by Berkeley, that external objects are 
 nothing but thoughts or ideas. We must conclude therefore that, in 
 this proposition, he understood the word in a third sense, in which he 
 frequently takes it, viz. as the image or representative of an object, by 
 means of which image the object is perceived. But in this sense of 
 the word, the proposition is untenable; for if these ideas or images be 
 the only objects of knowledge, we could have no knowledge of the ex- 
 istence either of ourselves, or of external objects, or of the Supreme 
 Being. 
 
 The illustrations given by him of this proposition are borrowed 
 chiefly from mathematics, and the relations about which that science 
 is conversant. When applied to these relations, it is possible to annex 
 some meaning to such expressions as comparing ideas, the juxta-position 
 of ideas, the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas; but 
 in most other branches of knowledge, this language will be found to be 
 without meaning.^ (Reid, Essay VI, ch. hi. Stewart, vol. II. ch. ii. 
 
 §.1.) 
 
 Art. 43. This Article contains a very brief example of the meta- 
 physical arguments which Clarke and others have advanced as a proof 
 of the existence of God. As the summary of them is here given, it 
 agrees in substance with the proof given by Locke, but is not placed in 
 the same form nor expressed in the same language. 
 
 Locke comprises his proof, at first, in a few sentences, and then 
 restates and amplifies it. As it appears in its first form, it has little 
 force ; and in its second form, it is diffuse and ill-arranged, and some 
 parts of it inconclusive. For example, towards the conclusion of it, 
 he professes to prove that matter is notcoeternal with an eternal mind ; 
 but his proof amounts only to this, that the contrary proposition cannot 
 be proved. 
 
 These remarks,— and others which precede, directing the reader's 
 attention to some of Locke's opinions which are now generally deemed 
 erroneous, — are made because they seem to be required by the occa- 
 
103 
 
 sion ; and are certainly not offered with any disposition to disparage 
 the fame of that great Author. Any attempt of that sort, if such a 
 disposition should exist, must be fruitless. For those errors are pointed 
 out with proper freedom by Reid, Stewart, Campbell, and other emi- 
 nent philosophers; but their animadversions are accompanied with 
 such strong expressions of their general admiration of him, that we 
 may conclude, from the ample testimony rendered by men so capable 
 of forming a correct judgment, that the fame of Locke, as one of 
 the greatest ornaments of our nation, rests upon grounds which cannot 
 be shaken. 
 
 Art, 63. By the syllogistic art, we are taught how to draw just 
 conclusions from given premises. But the chief opportunity for the 
 exercise of judgment, is in determining whether the premises ought to 
 be granted or not ; and in this difficulty, the art of syllogizing affords 
 little assistance. In many examples which are given of syllogisms, the 
 premises contain affirmations which are not more evident or more easy 
 to be established than the conclusion -which is deduced from them. Fre- 
 quently the major-premise expresses a general truth, and the conclu- 
 sion expresses merely a particular instance of it. But those who admit 
 the general truth, will probably admit the particular instance, without 
 being impelled to it by the force of a syllogism. For example, when 
 it is said : All tyrants deserve death ; Nero was a tyrant ; therefore 
 Nero deserved death: if we suppose the three propositions of this 
 syllogism each to require proof, it is probable that the greatest difficulty 
 would be found in proving the first ; which, in the syllogism, is assumed 
 without proof. Hence, the common remark appears to be well-ground- 
 ed, that the syllogistic art, however useful it may be in enabling us to 
 detect error, cannot assist us to the discovery of any new truth. And 
 so great has been the change of opinion as to the utility of this art that, 
 after having been for a long period considered the bulwark of reasoning, 
 it is now generally neglected ; the authority of Bacon, of Locke, of 
 Reid, of Stewart having been sufficient to shake the credit of a system 
 which had been founded by Aristotle, and adopted by all learned 
 men, during many centuries, as the only test of just reasoning and 
 of truth. 
 
 Stewart, having expressed his opinion of the real value of the 
 syllogistic art, concludes with observing that he wishes it not to be 
 supposed, that he considers a general acquaintance with it as of no 
 value, even in these times. " The technical language connected with 
 it is now so incorporated with all the higher departments of learning 
 that, independently of any consideration of its practical applications, 
 some knowledge of its peculiar phraseology may be regarded as an 
 
104 
 
 indispensable preparation both for scientific and for literary pursuits." 
 He then quotes, with approbation, the following passage from the In* 
 troduction to the Compendium of Logic used in the University of 
 Dublin : Utrum haecce ars per se revera aliquem praestet usum, qui- 
 dam dubitavere. Quoniam vero in Auctorum insigniorum scriptis 
 saepe occurrant termini Logici. hos terminos explicatos habere, ideoque 
 et ipsius artis partes praecipuas, omnino necessarium videtur. (Stewart, 
 Elem. Phil. vol. II. ch. iii. §. 3. Ed. Encyc. Art. Logic.) 
 
AN 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 TO 
 
 me gtuirg 
 
 OF THE 
 
 HOLY SCRIPTURES. 
 
 BY THE 
 
 Rev. EDWARD BUSHBY, M. A. 
 
 FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE. 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: 
 
 PRINTED BY JOHN SMITH, 
 
 Printer to the University. 
 
 1829 
 
Sk 
 
 This Introduction to the Study of the Holy 
 Scriptures .has been prepared for the use of the 
 Students of St. John's College, and is intended to 
 occupy them only for a small part of one Term, 
 during which other subjects require their attention, 
 I have thought it necessary therefore to confine it 
 within narrow limits, from regard to the purpose 
 for which it is designed. 
 
 In the course of the work, references have 
 been made to the Authors from whom the materials 
 of it have been chiefly derived. Recourse may be 
 had to them for further information, on subjects 
 which the nature of my design has obliged me to 
 treat with great brevity. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 I. A Summary of the Principal Events in the Jewish 
 
 History 1 
 
 II. On the Forms of Government and Administration 
 
 of Justice among the Jews 22 
 
 III. On the Sects and other Orders of Men among the 
 Jews 32 
 
 IV. On the Jewish Priesthood 44 
 
 V. On the Jewish Sacrifices 54 
 
 VI. On the Jewish Festivals 62 
 
 VII. On the Places accounted Holy among the Jews 76 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 
 A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS IN THE 
 HISTORY OF THE JEWS. 
 
 1. Of the history of the human race before the 
 deluge,, and during many centuries subsequent to it, 
 no knowledge can be obtained by us, beyond that 
 which is given in the Holy Scriptures. For such 
 knowledge we must have recourse to the writings of 
 Moses, who was enabled by divine inspiration to relate 
 many important circumstances affecting the early genera- 
 tions of mankind, with which we must otherwise have 
 been unacquainted. From those writings alone, we 
 derive an authentic account of the creation of the world, 
 and of the introduction of sin and misery into it in 
 consequence of the disobedience of our first parents 
 to the command of their Maker. Respecting these 
 great events, and all that befel the nations of the earth 
 during a long succession of ages, profane history is 
 either altogether silent, or is so mingled with manifest 
 fable as to be entitled to no credit. In forming therefore 
 a summary of the history of the Jews, we shall be 
 occupied during a large period of it in making a statement 
 of the most important circumstances, the authority for 
 which is that of the Bible alone. 
 
 2. The Jews derive their name from Judah, one of 
 the sons of Jacob: Judah being also the name of that 
 tribe to which, in the division that was made of the 
 
 A 
 
2 
 
 Holy Land, the largest ancf best portion was allotted, 
 and of which Jerusalem became the capital. They were 
 sometimes called Hebrews, probably from Heber one 
 pf the ancestors of Abraham ; and Israelites from Israel, 
 a name which was given to Jacob. Although the 
 history of them as a nation begins properly at the 
 time when they departed from Egypt to take possession 
 of Canaan, it may be useful to make a brief mention 
 of some circumstances which are recorded in the Bible 
 prior to that period. 
 
 To Adam and Eve were born sons and daughters ; but 
 the number of them is not stated. The only three whose 
 names are mentioned are Cain, Abel and Seth ; and of 
 these three the sacred historian has chiefly confined himself 
 to the posterity of Seth, probably because he was the pro- 
 genitor of Noah, and therefore in his line the Messiah 
 was to be born. In the time of Noah, who was the ninth 
 in descent from Adam, God destroyed by a deluge all 
 the inhabitants of the earth, except Noah and his wife, 
 and his three sons and their wives, and two, male and 
 female, of every species of animals. This judgment 
 was inflicted upon mankind 2348 years before the birth 
 of Christ. When Noah descended from the ark, he 
 offered sacrifice as a thanksgiving for his preservation, 
 and God made a covenant with him that there should 
 not be any more a flood to destroy the earth. 
 
 3. The descendants of Noah soon multiplied so 
 greatly that a separation became necessary, and a part 
 of them journeyed from the east, and settled in the 
 land of Shinar, which is generally believed to be the 
 same as Chaldsea, of which Babylon was afterwards 
 the capital. Here they said, " Let us build us a city 
 and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven, and 
 let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad 
 
upon the face of the whole earth." Whatever the object 
 of this work might be, it was displeasing to God, who 
 by confounding their language so that they could not 
 understand each other, compelled them to abandon the 
 work, and to disperse themselves over the earth. 
 Call of Abraham, the tenth in descent from Noah, 
 
 Abraham* h as a l wa ys been regarded by the Jews as 
 their great progenitor. His father Terah went forth with 
 his family from Ur of the Chaldees, to go into the land of 
 Canaan ; but he did not proceed further than Haran or 
 Charran, in Mesopotamia, where he died. n Now the 
 Lord had said unto Abraham, Get thee out of thy country, 
 and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto 
 a land that I will shew thee ; and I will make of thee 
 a great nation, and in thee shall all the families of 
 the earth be blessed." In compliance with this command, 
 Abraham departed from Haran and went into the land 
 of Canaan, accompanied by Sarah his wife, Lot his 
 brother's son, and all their substance. This removal 
 took place 1921 years before the birth of Christ. " And 
 the Lord appeared unto Abram, and said, Unto thy 
 seed will I give this land;" — a promise which was 
 fulfilled 476 years after it was given, when the Israelites 
 took possession of Canaan under the command of Joshua. 
 4. The Bible records many interesting particulars 
 of the life of this patriarch, and also of Isaac and 
 Jacob; but the statement of them is not necessary here. 
 When Jacob went to live with his son Joseph in Egypt, 
 his whole family consisted of 70 persons. They were 
 placed near the head of the Delta on the eastern side 
 of the Nile in the district of Rameses or Goshen, a fertile 
 country, and well suited to their occupation as shepherds. 
 Here they and their descendants " increased abundantly, 
 and the land was filled with them. But at length 
 
 a2 
 
there arose a new king over Egypt, which knew not 
 Joseph." About 60 years after the death of Joseph, 
 this new king, afraid lest the Israelites might soon be 
 able to seize the whole kingdom, determined to check 
 their progress by cruel exactions and labour. He also 
 ordered the Hebrew midwives to put all the male infants 
 to death as soon as they were born, and when this was 
 not executed, he ordered that every male child of the 
 Hebrews should be cast into the river. But the designs 
 of the Almighty were now hastening to their accomplish- 
 ment, and he began to interfere in behalf of his chosen 
 people. And he called unto Moses out of the midst 
 of a flaming bush and said, "> The cry of the children 
 of Israel is come unto me: I will send thee therefore 
 unto Pharaoh, that thou mayest bring forth my people 
 out of Egypt." Being now increased to 600,000 men 
 capable of bearing arms, they with their families and 
 great possessions of flocks, herds, and other property, 
 departed from Egypt 1491 years before the birth of 
 Christ. 
 
 Departure of A direct journey would have led them to 
 the Israelites Canaan in a short time, but it pleased God to 
 from Egijpt. punish them for repeated acts of distrust and 
 disobedience, by causing them to wander in the wilderness 
 of Arabia for 40 years. Moses has recorded the transactions 
 of only three years, viz. the two first and the last, but he 
 has mentioned all the places where they pitched their tents 
 during the whole time they were in the wilderness. In 
 the first year they were conducted to Mount Sinai, from 
 which God delivered to them those commandments, statutes 
 and ordinances, which are generally called the law of 
 Moses, or the Mosaic Dispensation. When they arrived at 
 Kadesh Barnea, not far from the south border of Canaan, 
 Moses sent twelve men, a ruler from every tribe, to 
 
o 
 
 ascertain the quality of the land, the strength of the 
 inhabitants, and the state of the cities. They brought 
 back a favourable report of the fertility of the land, 
 but described the cities and people as so strong, that 
 the Israelites refused to attempt the proposed conquest. 
 Joshua and Caleb, two of the twelve spies, endeavoured in 
 vain to convince them that their fears were unreasonable, 
 and on account of their rebellion on this occasion, God 
 commanded that they should turn back and wander in 
 the wilderness 40 years, telling them also that, of all 
 who had reached the twentieth year of their age, not 
 one, except Joshua and Caleb, should ever enter the 
 promised land. Many memorable events occurred during 
 their subsequent wanderings, especially the rebellion of 
 Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, in the second year, and 
 in the fortieth year, the visitation of fiery serpents, by 
 which great multitudes perished. In this last year 
 Aaron died at mount Hor; and soon afterwards Moses, 
 having viewed the promised inheritance from Pisgah 
 the top of mount Nebo, died at the age of 120, when 
 none of his faculties were impaired : " his eye was not 
 dim, nor his natural force abated/' 
 
 5. Joshua, having now assumed the command, pro- 
 ceeded without delay to the conquest of Canaan. In 
 seven years he subdued 31 kings; the term king being 
 sometimes applied to a prince who reigned over a small 
 number of subjects within a narrow territory, and 
 consequently possessed little wealth or power. When 
 the conquest was nearly completed, the land was divided 
 by lot. To the tribes of Reuben and Gad, and to one 
 half of the tribe of Manasseh, Moses had already allotted 
 some conquered lands on the eastern side of the river 
 Jordan, upon condition that they should assist their 
 brethren to subdue the country on the western side of 
 
 A3 
 
that river, and having fulfilled the condition, they were 
 confirmed in the possession of those lands by Joshua, 
 No allotment, except 48 cities to dwell in, was made 
 to the tribe of Levi, because they were appointed to 
 the services of religion, and received the tithes of the 
 whole country for a maintenance ; but the whole country 
 was divided into 12 parts, the descendants of Joseph being 
 separated into two tribes, which from his two sons were 
 called the tribe of Ephraim, and the tribe of Manasseh. 
 Thus the great work was completed, u according to all 
 that the Lord sware unto their fathers. There failed not 
 aught of any good thing, which the Lord had spoken 
 unto the house of Israel : all came to pass/' 
 
 6. After the death of Joshua, the tribes were no 
 
 longer united under one command. They soon fell into 
 
 apostacy ; for, having begun to make the conquered 
 
 nations tributary, instead of utterly destroying them as 
 
 God commanded, they intermarried with the inhabitants, 
 
 and took a part in the worship of idols. On account 
 
 of their impiety, they were allowed to fall at different 
 
 times under the yoke of neighbouring nations. Cushan 
 
 king of Mesopotamia held them in subjection for more 
 
 than eight years, till Othniel, a son-in-law and nephew 
 
 of Caleb, raised an army against the oppressor, and 
 
 having effected a permanent deliverance for the Israelites 
 
 judged them in peace 40 years* In the person of 
 
 Othniel began a series of such deliverers called Judges, 
 
 who were raised at intervals, as public exigency required, 
 
 to rescue their nation from the tyranny of neighbouring 
 
 powers. This mode of government continued a little 
 
 more than 300 years. The most eminent of the Judges 
 
 were Deborah the prophetess, Gideon, Jephthah, Eli, 
 
 Samuel. In the time of Samuel, a complete change was 
 
 made in the form of government. When he was old 
 
„ 
 
 e appointed his two sons to a share of his authority, 
 and on account of their misconduct all the elders gathered 
 themselves together, and petitioned that like other nations 
 they might have a king. Samuel, by the command of 
 God, protested against their proceedings, and represented 
 the evils which would follow the establishment of regal 
 authority, but they persevered in their request, and Samuel 
 w r as therefore directed to anoint Saul, of the tribe of 
 Benjamin, to be king of Israel. 
 
 7. Saul began to reign 1095 years before the birth of 
 Christ. His distempered mind brought him into great 
 troubles, and the termination of his life was disastrous; 
 for he died by his own hand, after being defeated by the 
 Philistines. His reign continued 40 years, which was 
 also the period of David's reign, and of that of Solomon. 
 David experienced great variety of fortune, but the final 
 result was prosperous, and he terminated his life in glory, 
 having greatly extended the Israelitish power. The reign- 
 of Solomon was peaceful and glorious, being particularly 
 distinguished by the building of the temple, for which 
 great preparations had already been made by his father. 
 He laid the foundation of it in the fourth year of his 
 reign, and completed it in the eleventh. In the latter 
 years of his life, he tarnished his great name by resigning 
 himself to concubines, many of them taken from idolatrous 
 nations whose superstitions he adopted ; and he built high 
 places near to Jerusalem for all his strange wives, H which 
 burnt incense, and sacrificed unto their gods." This 
 conduct drew upon him the indignation of the Almighty, 
 who told him that his kingdom should be rent, and the 
 largest portion pass away from his family. 
 Separation of 8. This leads us to one of the most im- 
 
 S2KJ- portant events in the Jewish history ' the 
 
 Judah. departure of ten tribes from their allegi* 
 
8 
 
 ance to the house of David, and the consequent establish- 
 ment of the separate kingdoms of Judah and Israel. 
 As soon as Rehoboam the son of Solomon ascended the 
 throne, the people intreated him to lighten the yoke 
 with which they had been burthened by his father, but 
 he replied to their prayer, saying, " My father made 
 your yoke heavy, and I will add to your yoke: my 
 father also chastised you with whips, but I will chastise 
 you with scorpions." On receiving this answer, ten of 
 the tribes revolted and chose Jeroboam to be their king, 
 while the tribes of Judah and Benjamin remained faithful 
 to the son of Solomon. Thus originated a schism which 
 was never healed, and was terminated only by the over- 
 throw of the kingdom of Israel about 250 years after it 
 was established, when the ten tribes were carried captive 
 by Shalmaneser king of Assyria, and so scattered through 
 his vast empire, that they seem never afterwards to have 
 regained a separate and independent existence. This 
 period of 250 years was occupied with frequent wars be- 
 tween the kings of Judah and Israel, and between them 
 and the neighbouring kings, and is marked in general by 
 a series of murderous usurpations of the throne, idolatries, 
 and oppressions of the people. This is chiefly observable 
 of the kings of Israel, of whom there were 1& and it is 
 said of them all, " that they did evil in the sight of the 
 Lord, and made Israel to sin." Of these kings, the most 
 conspicuous in the history are, (1) pmri, who built Sama- 
 ria (923 B. C.) and made it his capital ; (2) Ahab his 
 son and successor, who married Jezebel daughter of the 
 king of Sidon, and in whose time Elijah and Elisha 
 announced the divine judgments, and wrought many 
 remarkable miracles ; (3) Jehu, who was raised by God 
 as an instrument of his vengeance on the house of Ahab ; 
 (4) Hoshea the last king, who was carried by Shalma- 
 neser into captivity. 
 
9 
 
 During this same period, some of the kings of Judah 
 were remarkable for their obedience to the law of God. 
 The most worthy of mention are Jehoshaphat (contem- 
 porary with Ahab,) who was eminent alike for regard to 
 religion and success in arms ; and Hezekiah. in the sixth 
 year of whose reign Shalmaneser put an end to the 
 Israelitish monarchy. 
 
 9. Thus the kingdom of Judah remained alone. An 
 attack was made upon it about ten years after the cap- 
 tivity of the ten tribes, while Hezekiah was yet king, 
 by Sennacherib who had succeeded Shalmaneser on the 
 throne of Assyria. When he was threatening to destroy 
 Jerusalem, c< an angel of the Lord went forth, and smote 
 in the camp of the Assyrians 185,000 men" in a single 
 night. Sennacherib was compelled to retreat, and was 
 soon afterwards put to death at Nineveh by two of his 
 own sons. The reign of Hezekiah is further memorable 
 for his miraculous recovery from sickness, and for the 
 intimation made to him by the prophet Isaiah of the 
 approaching Babylonian Captivity ; — an intimation given 
 for the purpose of checking the pride which he had 
 exhibited in displaying the treasures of his house to a 
 Babylonian embassy. The kings who succeeded Heze- 
 kiah, with the single exception of Josiah his great 
 grandson, concurred in filling up the measure of Judah's 
 crimes by their wickedness and folly. "And the Lord 
 said, I will remove Judah also out of my sight, as I have 
 removed Israel; and will cast off this city Jerusalem 
 which I have chosen, and the house of which I said, 
 My name shall be there." Accordingly, Nebuchadnezzar 
 king of Babylon invaded Judaea and took Jerusalem. On 
 this occasion the children of the royal family and many 
 of the people were sent captives to Babylon, and from 
 this time, (606 years- B. C.) is to be dated the com-^ 
 
10 
 
 mencement of the Babylonian Captivity,, which, according 
 to the prediction of Jeremiah, was to continue 70 years. 
 18 years after this first capture of Jerusalem, the Jewish 
 monarchy was finally terminated, in the reign of Zede- 
 kiah, who was sent in chains to Babylon. The walls 
 of Jerusalem, the temple and all the buildings were 
 destroyed ; and the inhabitants were carried away captive, 
 except the poor of the land who were left to be vine- 
 dressers and husbandmen. Thus ended the sovereignty 
 of the house of David. 
 
 Return of the 10 ' When C ? rus the Great ' havin S COn - 
 
 Jews after the quered Babylon, issued his decree for the 
 
 Babylonian restoration of the Jews, about 42,000 of them 
 Captivity. an( j 7 000 servan t s placed themselves under 
 
 the conduct of Zerubbabel, and returned to their country. 
 In the beginning of the second year after their return 
 they began to rebuild the temple upon the old founda- 
 tions, and finished it in 18 years, having met with great 
 interruption from the Samaritans. These Samaritans 
 were descended from a mixed race w r hich had been 
 drawn from various parts of the east, and planted by Shal- 
 maneser in the country previously occupied by the ten 
 tribes. They received the Mosaic law ; but united with 
 the observance of it the idolatrous rites of their own 
 countries. Being informed that the Jews were preparing 
 to build a temple, they expressed a desire to take a part 
 in the work, as being worshippers of the same God; 
 but the offer was refused, and thereby that enmity be- 
 tween the two nations was inflamed, which had taken 
 its origin in the schism of the ten tribes and was never 
 afterwards extinguished. 
 
 Many of the sacred vessels and treasures of the 
 temple were carried back from Babylon by Zerubbabel, 
 and the rest a few years afterwards by Ezra, to whom 
 
11 
 
 the Jews were chiefly indebted for the re-establishment 
 of their worship and of civil order. To him also we owe 
 the revision of the sacred writings and the arrangement 
 of them in the order which they yet retain. Ezra was 
 succeeded by Nehemiah, who obtained authority from 
 the king of Persia to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, 
 which he completed in 52 days. He also exerted great 
 diligence in completing the reformation of the State; 
 and people having been brought from other parts of the 
 land to re- occupy the city, it was seen again in something 
 like its ancient splendour. 
 
 11. It is probable that, after Nehemiah, no separate 
 governor of Judaea was appointed, its affairs being admi- 
 nistered by the high priests under the control of the 
 prefects of Syria. In this state it continued till the 
 overthrow of.the Persian empire by Alexander the Great, 
 who treated the Jews with great lenity, allowing them 
 to live under their own laws, and in the free exercise 
 of their religion. From the time of his death, (323 B. C.) 
 to the time when they were made tributary to the 
 Romans by Pompey, (63 B. C.) they underwent a great 
 variety of fortune, being sometimes favourably treated, 
 at other times oppressed by the kings of Egypt and 
 Syria, who held them successively in subjection. Ptolemy 
 Lagus, (Alexander's general, and first of the family of 
 the Ptolemies who were kings of Egypt,) having gained 
 possession of Jerusalem by a stratagem, carried above 
 100,000 of the Jews captives into Egypt; where however 
 they were treated with great kindness both by himself, 
 and afterwards by his son who permitted many of them 
 to return to their own country. This son was Ptolemy 
 Philadelphus ; a prince endowed with excellent qualities, 
 and eminent, above all, for the translation of the Holy 
 Scriptures into Greek, which was made at Alexandria 
 
12 
 
 under his patronage by 72 learned Jews. This work 
 was finished about the year 277 B. C, and from the 
 number of translators has been ever since called the 
 Septuagint. 
 
 The family of the Ptolemies retained authority over 
 Judaea about a hundred years, and were then compelled 
 to resign it to Antiochus the Great, king of Syria. To 
 him succeeded, first, his eldest son Seleucus, and then 
 another son, Antiochus Epiphanes ; from whose tyranny, 
 for three years and a half, the Jews underwent dreadful 
 sufferings. During the reign of this oppressor (about 
 166 years B. C.) arose the Maccabees, a family of 
 brave men whose struggle with him and his successors 
 ended in the complete liberation of their country from 
 the Syrian yoke. This was effected about 129 years 
 B. C; after which time the Maccabees held supreme 
 authority, uniting in themselves the dignities of king 
 and high priest, till the year 63 B. C. A contest having 
 then arisen between two brothers, Hyrcanus and Aris- 
 tobulus, respecting the succession, and application for 
 support being made by both parties to Pompey, he ended 
 the dispute by leading his army into Judaea and making 
 it tributary to the Romans. Hyrcanus was made high 
 priest and honoured with the title of prince; but he 
 possessed little more than nominal power, and willingly 
 allowed the government of the country to be conducted 
 by Antipater, who was an Idumaean by birth, but had 
 become a Jewish proselyte. 
 
 Aristobulus and his sons made repeated efforts to 
 displace their opponents, and gained temporary successes ; 
 but in the end they were wholly discomfited. After the 
 death of Antipater, the contest was carried on between 
 his son Herod (generally distinguished by the name of 
 Herod the Great) and Antigonus one of the sons of 
 
13 
 
 Aristobulus; and though the greatest part of the Jewish 
 nation was attached to the latter, probably from respect 
 to him as being of the Maccabaean family, yet the fortune 
 of Herod prevailed. Having fled to Rome and gained 
 from the Senate, chiefly through the influence of Mark 
 Antony, the title of king of Judaea, he returned to the 
 contest : at the end of three years, Jerusalem was taken : 
 Antigonus having been made prisoner was ordered by 
 Mark Antony to be put to death : the Maccabaean dynasty 
 after having continued nearly ISO years was thus finally 
 overthrown, and Herod (37 B. C.) was established in 
 full exercise of the power which his new title denoted. 
 
 13. As Herod is a name that occurs frequently in 
 the New Testament, and is applied to different persons 
 of the same family, it is necessary that care be taken to 
 distinguish them one from another. Herod the Great 
 was approaching to the close of his reign, when our 
 Saviour was born. Expecting that the Messiah was to be 
 a temporal prince who might wrest the sovereignty from 
 himself or his family, he determined to destroy him, and 
 with that view ordered that all the children at Bethlehem, 
 of two years old and under, should be put to death ; but 
 his design was frustrated by the flight of Joseph with the 
 young child and his mother into Egypt. In the second 
 year after the birth of our Saviour, Herod the Great died. 
 He is represented by historians as having possessed great 
 abilities and courage, splendid in every exhibition of 
 royalty, and especially in the magnificence of his build- 
 ings. Samaria which he rebuilt, and called Sebaste in 
 honour of Augustus ; the port and city of Caesarea on the 
 coast of Phoenicia which he greatly improved and adorn- 
 ed ; superb palaces ; and, above all, the rebuilding of the 
 
 B 
 
14 
 
 temple at Jerusalem, are proofs of his grandeur in this 
 respect. But these good qualities were more than coun- 
 terbalanced by extreme inhumanity. His disposition, 
 naturally bold and ferocious, seems to have been irritated 
 into frenzy by domestic troubles, and the difficulties 
 which beset his throne. His wife Mariamne, an excellent 
 princess, and once greatly beloved by him, was led to 
 a public execution; the most powerful of his subjects, 
 many of his friends, and even the greatest part of his 
 own family fell victims to his cruel jealousy. When 
 he was suffering by a painful disease, and saw that 
 death was at hand, expecting that it would be hailed 
 by his subjects with joy, he determined to leave them 
 some cause for mourning. Having summoned all the 
 chief men of his kingdom, and caused them to be 
 surrounded with troops, he ordered that as soon as he 
 expired they should be put to death. His successor 
 however declined to execute this barbarity. 
 
 14. Three sons of Herod the Great are mentioned 
 in the New Testament, between whom by his will he 
 divided his dominions, viz. (1) Archelaus, to whom he 
 gave the kingdom of Judaea, together with Idumaea and 
 Samaria; (2) Herod Antipas ; whom he appointed tetrarch 
 or governor of Galilee and Peraea; (3) Philip; whom 
 he also made tetrarch of Ituraea, Trachonitis and some 
 other small districts situated beyond Jordan. 
 
 Archelaus was acknowledged king by the people with 
 loud acclamations, but their joy seems to have been of 
 short continuance, for when he went to Rome shortly 
 afterwards for the purpose of soliciting from Augustus 
 a confirmation of his regal title, a deputation of Jews 
 arrived to oppose his application, requesting that their 
 country might be annexed to the province of Syria, and 
 that they might be allowed the exercise of their own 
 
15 
 
 religion and laws under Roman governors. Augustus 
 however thought fit to ratify Herod's will, except that he 
 withheld from Arehelaus the regal title, and gave him 
 that of tetrarch, with a promise that the other should 
 be granted when he had proved himself worthy of it. 
 Having however after his return continued to act with 
 great cruelty and injustice, at length, in the tenth year, 
 of his government, such complaints were made against 
 him by the chief men among his subjects, that Augustus 
 banished him to Vienne in Gaul, where he died. Judaea, 
 with Samaria and Idumaea, was made a Roman province 
 and governed by Roman magistrates called Procurators, 
 who were subordinate to the president of Syria. Coponius 
 was the first procurator of Judaea, and the president of 
 Syria at that time was Quirinus, (called by St. Luke 
 Cyrenius) who, by the order of Augustus, made a taxing 
 in Judaea and Syria. 
 
 In the mean while, Herod Antipas and Philip 
 remained in possession of their Tetrarchies. Herod 
 Antipas is chiefly memorable for having put to death 
 John the Baptist, and for having taken a part in 
 questioning and mocking our Saviour before his con- 
 demnation. Having deserted his wife the daughter of 
 Aretas king of Arabia, he married Herodias the wife 
 of his brother Philip; and this marriage was the cause 
 of his ruin. For when the emperor Caligula had given 
 the title of king to Agrippa, who was the nephew of 
 Antipas, Herodias not being able to bear that Antipas 
 should remain contented with the inferior dignity of 
 tetrarch, urged him to go to Rome and solicit the title of 
 king. But Agrippa countermined him, by giving Caligula 
 just reason for suspecting his loyalty; so that instead of 
 making him king, he banished him to Lyons, and after- 
 wards to Spain, after he had held his tetrarchy 43 years, 
 
 b2 
 
16 
 
 Of his brother Philip, who was tetrarch of Ituraea 
 and Trachonitis, little - mention is made in the New 
 Testament. Josephus commends him as a mild and 
 just prince. He died in possession of his tetrarchy, 
 having held it 37 years. 
 
 15. The next Herod of this family, is the Agrippa 
 above-mentioned, sometimes called Agrippa the Great; 
 who is spoken of in the Acts as having stretched forth 
 his hands to vex certain of the Church, and as having 
 killed James the brother of John with the sword, and 
 cast Peter into prison. He was grandson of Herod the 
 Great; being son of Aristobulus, who was one of those 
 children of Herod the Great before alluded to as having 
 fallen victims to their father's cruelty. To this Agrippa, 
 Caligula gave, first, the title of king with the tetrarchy 
 which had been held by Philip, and afterwards added 
 the tetrarchy from which Herod Antipas was deposed. 
 The emperor Claudius, who succeeded Caligula, further 
 gave him Abilene, Judaea, and Samaria; so that his 
 dominions became nearly the same as those of his grand- 
 father Herod the Great. Like him, he delighted in 
 great and magnificent buildings. Josephus represents 
 him also as liberal, courteous, merciful: with which 
 character however, his zealous persecution of the Christians 
 cannot easily be reconciled. It is admitted by the 
 historian, that some of his subjects retained little respect 
 for his memory; and in the Acts of the Apostles, we 
 find his death specially ascribed to the displeasure of 
 God. In the fourth year after he had obtained from 
 Claudius the kingdom of Judaea, when he was attending 
 a public spectacle at Caesarea, and had made an oration 
 to certain deputies, "the people gave a shout, saying, 
 It is the voice of a god, and not of a man." For accepting 
 this impious adulation, he was immediately smitten with a 
 dreadful disease, which in a few days terminated his life. 
 
17 
 
 16. The last of the family of Herod, whose name 
 occurs in the New Testament, is Agrippa the younger, 
 son of Agrippa the Great. As he was only seventeen 
 years old when Agrippa the Great died, the emperor 
 Claudius did not consider him competent to undertake 
 the government of his father's dominions, but soon 
 afterwards made him king of Chalcis, a small territory 
 situated in the mountainous district by which the 
 northern part of Judaea is separated from Syria. His 
 government was afterwards extended over a part of 
 Galilee; and in Judaea his influence was great, though 
 he was never invested with the supreme authority. The 
 appointment of the high priest belonged to him, and 
 he had the care of the temple and of the sacred treasure. 
 In what year he died is uncertain ; but it is known that 
 he survived his country, having in vain endeavoured 
 to prevent the fall of it by his prudent counsels. It 
 was before this Agrippa, attended by Bernice and Festus, 
 that St. Paul made his defence, before he was carried 
 prisoner to Rome. 
 
 On reviewing that part of the Jewish history which 
 brings before us the family of Herod, and which is 
 most interesting to us, as comprising the period of our 
 Saviour's life, it appears, (1) that, during the infancy 
 of Christ, Herod the Great was ruler both in Judaea 
 and Galilee; (2) that, during all the remaining part 
 of the life pf Christ, Herod Antipas was ruler in Galilee ; 
 (2) that, in Judaea, after the death of Herod the Great, 
 Archelaus held the chief power nearly ten years; and 
 that afterwards it was governed by Roman procurators; 
 except during the short reign of Agrippa the Great, 
 whose government of Judaea commenced about eight 
 years after the crucifixion of Christ. 
 
 17- The corruption and wickedness of the Jews 
 B3 
 
18 
 
 became general and excessive in the times which im- 
 mediately preceded their final overthrow. The severe 
 rebukes addressed to them by our Saviour are in perfect 
 accordance with the representations given by Josephus. 
 He speaks of it " as a time fruitful of all sorts of wicked- 
 ness., so that no evil was left unpractised. All were 
 corrupt both in their private and public characters. They 
 strove to exceed each other in impiety toward God, and 
 injustice toward their neighbour ; the chiefs oppressed 
 the people, and the people strove to ruin the chiefs. 
 The former were ambitious of dominion and power ; the 
 latter had an insatiable thirst of violence and plunder." 
 When they had filled up the measure of their iniquity 
 by putting to death the Messiah, their dreadful impreca- 
 tion that his blood should be upon them and upon their 
 children did not tarry long for its completion. 
 
 Many intimations are given in the New Testament 
 of the impatience with which they bore the Roman 
 yoke. To a people so proud and licentious any regular 
 authority would have been galling : but the rapacity 
 of some of the Roman governors was unbounded, and 
 their injustice and cruelty so wanton, that the most 
 virtuous and patient subjects must have been excited to 
 resistance. Many local tumults, in which great numbers 
 perished, preceded the general revolt. The country for 
 several years was in a state bordering upon anarchy; 
 pillaged by robbers, and agitated by false prophets, 
 who fanned the flames of discontent. The last of the 
 Roman governors was Gessius Florus, in comparison 
 with whose tyranny the conduct of all preceding 
 oppressors appeared merciful. When Cestius Gallus 
 the president of Syria visited Jerusalem, above 300,000 
 of the Jews went out to meet him, imploring him to 
 succour their afflicted country, and banish Florus who 
 
19 
 
 was the very pest of their nation. Being exhorted to 
 continue in obedience to the Romans, they cried out that 
 they meant not to take arms against the Romans and 
 Caesar, but against Florus who had used them so cruelly. 
 Destruction of 18. The war began in the twelfth year of 
 Jerusalem. t ] le re ig n f Nero. The Roman garrison at 
 Jerusalem was put to the sword, and. the revolt soon 
 became general throughout Judaea. Cestius Gallus, roused 
 by the rapid progress of the insurgents, assembled an army 
 of 25,000 men, and advanced to the walls of Jerusalem; 
 but, having hesitated to make the assault, he thought fit 
 suddenly to retreat, and being pursued by the Jews he 
 sustained great loss. When intelligence of these events 
 reached Rome, Nero perceived that the most vigorous 
 measures must be adopted to reduce the rebellious pro- 
 vince to submission; and he appointed Vespasian, who 
 had been long distinguished in the wars of Germany and 
 Britain, to the command of the army of Syria. Vespasian 
 repaired thither without delay, and led into Judaea an 
 army of 60,000 men. More than two years were spent in 
 reducing cities and fortresses, before the way was open to 
 Jerusalem; the Jews every where fighting with obstinate 
 bravery, and in many cases preferring a voluntary death 
 to submission, when all hope of successful resistance was 
 at an end. In the mean time Vespasian, having been 
 elected Emperor, returned to Rome to secure his new 
 dignity and left his son Titus to finish the contest. In 
 the beginning of April (A. D. 70) it being now the fourth 
 year of the war, Titus began the siege of Jerusalem, at 
 a time when great numbers were collected there to 
 celebrate the Passover. Three separate factions occupied 
 the city, and fought with more bitter hostility against 
 each other than against the common enemy. Famine 
 also and disease aggravated the misery of the besieged : 
 
20 
 
 yet, though repeated efforts were made by Titus to 
 induce them to save the city and themselves by submis- 
 sion, they replied only with threats and insult. At 
 length on the eighth of September, the Romans were in 
 possession of every part of the city. Thousands of the 
 Jews perished in the flames, and still more by the sword 
 of the enemy, who spared neither sex nor age, nor 
 desisted till their hands were fatigued with slaughter. Of 
 those who escaped death, some were sent into Egypt to be 
 employed in the public works, others were dispersed 
 through the provinces of the empire, to fight as gladiators 
 or with wild beasts in the Theatres. The whole city was 
 levelled with the ground, so that those who had not seen 
 it before could not suppose that it had been ever inha- 
 bited : nothing was left standing except a part of the wall 
 and three towers; which were intended partly as a 
 defence for the garrison that remained there, and partly 
 as monuments of the Roman valour which had mastered 
 a city so strongly fortified. Such was the end of the 
 Jewish nation. 
 
 From the statements given by Josephus it has been 
 computed that nearly a million and a half of the Jews 
 perished in this war, the greater part of them in Jeru- 
 salem itself; and it is probable that the miseries which 
 they underwent during this period have not been paral- 
 leled in any age of the world. 
 
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 
 
 ** B. C. 
 
 Creation 4004 
 
 The Deluge . 2348 
 
 Building of Babel 2247 
 
 Call of Abraham 1921 
 
 Arrival of Jacob in Egypt 1706 
 
 Departure of the Israelites from Egypt 1491 
 
 Saul, the first king of the Jews, began to reign. . . 1095 
 
 Revolt of the ten tribes 975 
 
 The ten tribes carried away captive by Shalmaneser 721 
 
 The Jews carried captive to Babylon 606 
 
 Restoration of the Jews by Cyrus 536 
 
 Alexander the Great went to Jerusalem. 332 
 
 Rise of the Maccabees 166 
 
 Invasion of Judaea by Pompey 63 
 
 Herod the Great began to reign 37 
 
 Our Saviour born four years before the vulgar aera. . 4 
 
 A. D. 
 
 Christ's first visit to the Temple, in his 12th year. . . 8 
 
 John the Baptist began his ministry " in the 15th 1 ^ 
 
 year of Tiberius." J 
 
 Christ began his ministry 28 
 
 Death of Christ 31 
 
 Beginning of the Jewish war 67 
 
 Jerusalem taken by Titus 70 
 
 These dates are given according to the vulgar asra, by 
 which the birth of Christ is placed four years too late. 
 Unless notice be taken of this, the reader may be led into 
 error. For example, it is stated in the table that Herod 
 the Great began to reign 37 B. C. and since it is agreed 
 that he lived one year at least after Christ was born, it 
 might be inferred that his reign continued at least 38 
 years, whereas it did not continue more than 34. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 ON THE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
 OF JUSTICE AMONG THE JEWS. 
 
 1. X HE maintenance of the worship of one God 
 was a fundamental principle of the Mosaic legislation. 
 In order to secure attention to this principle in the 
 minds of the Jews, Moses engaged them by a solemn 
 covenant to accept God as their King; so that every 
 act of idolatry was not only an apostacy from true 
 religion, but a direct crime against the State. For 
 this reason it was ordered that the idolater, having 
 incurred the guilt of high treason, should be punished 
 with death. Their commonwealth therefore was at 
 first a theocracy ; for God was the founder of it, and had 
 been acknowledged by them in a solemn covenant, not 
 merely as the Sovereign of the universe, but as their 
 own special Ruler, to whose protection they committed 
 their national as well as individual prosperity. Accord- 
 ingly they are often represented in Scripture as a chosen 
 generation, a peculiar people, a holy nation, the portion 
 of God. In the time of Moses, He vouchsafed to indicate 
 his presence as their Ruler by the most conspicuous 
 tokens. When the Law was delivered from Sinai, the 
 Lord descended upon it in fire, the whole mount quaked 
 greatly, and God answered Moses by a voice. He was 
 visible also in the pillars of cloud and fire ; He decided 
 questions of justice by oracles, and inflicted punishments, 
 
23 
 
 not according to the secret procedure of Providence, but 
 with immediate and the most ostensible manifestation 
 of his power. And in subsequent times he continued 
 to issue his decrees, and to signify his will from the 
 tabernacle. 
 
 As the sovereignty was thus assigned to God himself, 
 the form of government established by Moses did not 
 prescribe the appointment of an earthly king. The 
 governor of the nation admitted of change as to the 
 name and nature of his office, it being of inferior moment 
 whether he was called a general, or a judge, or a king; 
 and it appears that at certain times the tribes which 
 composed the nation had no common ruler. They 
 adhered to the patriarchal mode of life, as far as was 
 compatible with the circumstances of a nation; living 
 according to their tribes and families ; every tribe forming 
 a lesser commonwealth, with its own peculiar interests, 
 and all of them united in one great State. Every tribe 
 had its own chief; and as we do not find that Moses 
 appointed them, it is probable that this institution had 
 existed among them in Egypt. The tribes were sub- 
 divided into families; the heads of which are probably 
 the same as the elders who are mentioned in the book 
 of Exodus, as being gathered together by Moses and 
 Aaron, and informed of their approaching release from 
 bondage. These families were again sub-divided into 
 households; so that a regular subordination was 
 established in their civil and religious polity, all the 
 degrees of which were alike subject to divine laws, and 
 to the especial government of God. Hence it will appear 
 how the State might subsist, not only without a king, 
 but even occasionally without that magistrate who was 
 denominated a Judge, and without any supreme council 
 of the nation. Every tribe had always its own chief 
 
24 
 
 magistrate, subordinate to whom were the heads of 
 families ; and if there was no general ruler of the whole 
 people, there were yet twelve lesser commonwealths, 
 which upon great emergencies united together, and 
 in their general convention would take measures for 
 the common interest. And all these separate bodies 
 were maintained in unity, by their respect for the same 
 object and ceremonies of worship, and also by their 
 regard to God as having separated them from the rest 
 of mankind, and exercising over them a peculiar 
 sovereignty. 
 
 In conformity with this theocratic principle of govern- 
 ment, we find that Moses and Joshua, and many of 
 the leaders who succeeded them under the name of 
 Judges, were appointed to their office, not by the people 
 but by the nomination and authority of God. These 
 Judges were not invested with legislative power, but 
 acted as magistrates in peace or, as commanders, they 
 led out the people in the divine strength to war, pro- 
 fessing to exercise a delegated authority and guided in 
 their steps by the immediate dictation of the divine 
 Spirit. They held their office for life: but it was not 
 hereditary, nor were they appointed in regular succes- 
 sion; there being intervals of several years in which 
 there were no such governors. It is also probable, 
 that their authority did not in every case extend over 
 all, but merely over particular tribes. Thus the Gilead- 
 ites chose Jephthah as Judge and general, without 
 waiting for the concurrence of the other tribes a : and 
 on many important occasions, even in the conduct of 
 wars, particular tribes seem to have acted independently 
 and distinctly from the rest. 
 
 a Judges xi. 6. 
 

 25 
 
 2. When this mode of government had continued 
 more than 300 years/ the Israelites, perceiving that 
 Samuel was broken with age and being dissatisfied 
 with the administration of his sons, had the boldness 
 to require a king like all other nations. Samuel expressed 
 his displeasure at this demand, as it seemed to declare 
 that they would no longer have God for their king; 
 and he represented in strong terms the oppressions 
 and the mischiefs they should suffer-under the kingly 
 government. w Nevertheless, the people refused to obey 
 the voice of Samuel; and the Lord said, Hearken unto 
 their voice, and make them a king/' They did not, 
 however, attempt to elect a king themselves, but waited 
 for the divine appointment, so that care was taken to 
 preserve in its full force the theocracy originally esta- 
 blished. Although therefore the administration of the 
 government was committed to the hands of kings, yet 
 they were only the vicegerents of God, who was still 
 looked upon as the supreme director, and reserved to 
 himself the chief legislative authority. In one view 
 this change was beneficial, as it secured an uninterrupted 
 succession of governors, so that the nation after this 
 period was never without a common head : but in 
 other respects, it appears to have been a change in the 
 name of the first magistrate, rather than in the functions 
 of the office, and the kings, at the beginning at least, 
 had little more power than the Judges who had pre- 
 ceded. It is difficult, however, to collect from the Old 
 Testament what were the precise powers with which 
 the kings were intrusted, nor indeed is it likely that 
 the Israelites were anxious to guard their liberties 
 by stipulations of any sort. In their first eagerness 
 to have a king like all the other nations, they would 
 probably have been satisfied with a kingly despotism; 
 
 C 
 
26 
 
 that being the most prevalent form of government among 
 the oriental nations. There is some ground for supposing 
 that Samuel was more provident than themselves for the 
 well-being of their State. For when Saul was appointed 
 king, it is said that Samuel told the people the manner 
 of the kingdom, and wrote it in a book, and laid it up 
 before the Lord b . But the purport of the articles con- 
 tained in this writing is no where stated. 
 
 ^ , , As to the order of succession to the throne, 
 
 Order of sue- ... 
 
 cession to the there was considerable irregularity : Saul 
 throne. was ma( J e king by divine appointment, and 
 
 by the same authority David succeeded him ; Saul's family 
 being excluded from the succession by the express com- 
 mand of God, as a punishment for his disobedience. 
 Afterwards the succession was hereditary, but not ne- 
 cessarily by the right of primogeniture; for David 
 caused Solomon, who was not his eldest son, to be 
 anointed as his successor, and the people confirmed the 
 king's will, though Adonijah, the eldest son, was - sup- 
 ported by Joab the commander of the army. But it is 
 plain from the history of David's reign, that this arbi- 
 trary right of selecting a successor, instead of appointing 
 him according to an invariable law, was dangerous to 
 his own security, as well as to the peace of the State : 
 and since we do not find that any of the following 
 kings acted upon this right, it is probable that they 
 abstained or were prohibited from the exercise of it, on 
 account of the experience which had been felt of its 
 mischievous effects. 
 
 Power of The power of the kings, estimated from 
 
 the kings. their practice, was unsettled and precarious; 
 — very limited on some occasions, whether by express 
 
 b 1 Sam. x. 25. 
 
27 
 
 compact or by the dread of popular resistance; while 
 at other times, it is certain that they acted in an abso- 
 lute and very tyrannical manner. On the one hand, 
 they were checked by a fear of the army and of its 
 commanders, and also by the chiefs of the tribes, which, 
 even under the kings, exercised the right of making 
 war, independently one of another and without the king's 
 sanction. Thus, Saul was prevented by his army from 
 inflicting death upon Jonathan as he had threatened 6 : 
 and David, unable to punish Joab his nephew for the 
 murders committed by him, lamented that he was weak 
 although anointed king, and that his nephews "the 
 sons of Zeruiah were too hard for him d ." On the other 
 hand, as proofs of the power which they sometimes as- 
 sumed, we find that Saul, at the very beginning of his 
 reign, without any consultation of his subjects made war 
 upon the Ammonites and commanded his whole people 
 to appear in arms, under a threat of severe punishment 
 if they disobeyed e . And acts of summary and even 
 tyrannical judicial procedure were committed by him, 
 and also by David and Solomon; such acts as betoken 
 the possession and the harsh exercise of unrestrained 
 authority. From these opposite indications we may infer 
 that the power of the Jewish kings was not defined 
 by stipulated forms, such as have been devised by the 
 precautions of modern legislation, and of which long 
 experience has taught mankind the utility ; and therefore, 
 theoretically, the Jewish monarch might consider himself 
 invested with power little less than absolute. But on 
 the other hand, practically, he would in most cases be 
 restrained from a capricious abuse of it by reverence 
 for the laws of Moses, which enjoin upon all men the 
 
 c 1 Sam. xiv. 45. d 2 Sam. iii. 39. e 1 Sam. xi. 7. 
 
 c2 
 
28 
 
 observance of equity; by regard to the ancient usages 
 of the nation ; and, lastly, by respect for that sense of 
 justice which has force among men, and which warns 
 rulers that the excesses of uncontrolled power must at 
 length be fatal to themselves. 
 
 3. After the Babylonian captivity, while the Jews 
 were subject to Persia, their kingly government was 
 extinct. When the reformation of the State had been 
 accomplished by Ezra and Nehemiah, the chief conduct of 
 affairs was committed to the high priests, and the pay- 
 ment of tribute was the only token of subjection, Never 
 probably did the Jews enjoy so long a course of prospe- 
 rity as under the mild rule of Persia ; governed by their 
 own magistrates, according to their own laws, and allowed 
 to obserye their own forms of worship. Under their 
 Egyptian and Syrian rulers they were less fortunate; but 
 their forms of government underwent no material change, 
 till Antiochus Epiphanes attempted to deprive them of 
 every vestige of liberty. The princes of the Maceabaean 
 family, who had rescued them from this oppressor, were 
 allowed to unite in their own persons the regal and 
 pontifical dignity. They were next made subject to the 
 dominion of Rome, under which they experienced many 
 changes of condition. Rome itself during this period was 
 submitted to rule in different forms and to masters of 
 various character; the effects of which variety would extend 
 in some degree to the provinces. And whatever be the 
 uniformity of the government at home, the fortune of 
 distant provinces must necessarily be much influenced by 
 the particular conduct of the individual who has been 
 deputed to be their governor. In general, however, under 
 the procurators, the Jews enjoyed a large measure of 
 liberty. Except in a very few instances, no offence was 
 given to their religious scruples: they worshipped in the 
 

 29 
 
 temple and in their synagogues, followed their own cus- 
 toms, and lived according to their own laws. The procu- 
 rators dwelt principally at Csesarea, but on the great 
 festivals or when any commotion was apprehended, they 
 repaired to Jerusalem that they might maintain order. 
 It was their duty to collect the imperial revenue, and to 
 repress tumults; they also took cognizance of all capital 
 causes. For the purpose of supporting their authority, 
 a considerable Roman garrison was always stationed in 
 the province. These were the chief circumstances in 
 which the presence of foreign power was felt, and the 
 Jews reminded of their loss of independence. 
 Courts of 4. Moses delivered a multiplicity of laws 
 
 judicature. which were so sacred as to be unalterable; 
 nothing was to be added to the word which had been 
 commanded, nor aught diminished from it: but he did 
 not prescribe as unalterable any order of judges or 
 courts of judicature by which the law was to be ad- 
 ministered. He seems to have left to the people a dis- 
 cretionary power of altering these, and adapting them 
 to the varying circumstances of the nation. We are 
 left therefore to form our opinion upon the constitution 
 of the Jewish magistracy and courts of justice from 
 facts incidentally mentioned, rather than from any de- 
 tailed description of them given either in the Holy Scrip- 
 tures, or by any writer of sufficient authority. 
 
 Moses himself was for some time the sole judge 
 of the Israelites. But the duty was greater than he 
 was able to perform; and therefore at the suggestion 
 of Jethro his father-in-law, <c he chose able men out 
 of all Israel, and made them heads over the people, 
 rulers of thousands, rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, 
 and rulers of tens. And they judged the people at all 
 seasons : the great matters they brought unto Moses, 
 
 c3 
 
so 
 
 but every small matter they judged themselves'." The 
 appointment of judges according to this precise arith- 
 metical principle was suited to the military system 
 under which they lived in the wilderness, but could 
 not be applied so well to their condition when they 
 should become settled in the country; he therefore 
 ordered that they should appoint judges and officers, 
 seven in every city throughout the tribes g . Some 
 Jewish writers assert that there was a court of twenty- 
 three judges in every town that had 120 inhabitants, 
 and a court of three in every place where there were 
 fewer than that number. The first decided all affairs 
 of justice arising within their respective cities, but an 
 appeal was open from them to the great Council or 
 Sanhedrim, which sat in Jerusalem. The court of three 
 was for the determination of disputes respecting sales, 
 contracts, and other such matters of common right 
 between man and man. Neither in the Scriptures nor 
 by Josephus is any mention made of either of these 
 courts. 
 
 The highest tribunal of the Jews, at least after the 
 Babylonian captivity, was the Sanhedrim above-men- 
 tioned. It consisted of 71 members, of whom the 
 high priest was generally president. Some have referred 
 the origin of this assembly to the time of Moses, who 
 instituted a council of 70 persons, to assist him in 
 the government at a time when he was harassed by a 
 rebellion of the Israelites in the wilderness : but from 
 the death of Moses to the Babylonian captivity there 
 is no trace of this council, even in great commotions 
 of the State, when it must naturally have interposed 
 
 f Exod. xviii. 25, 26. 
 
 s Deut. xvi. 18. Josephus, Ant. Book IV. Chap, viii. 
 
1 
 
 31 
 
 
 had it been in existence. It is probable therefore that 
 the council instituted by Moses during a rebellion, and 
 intended for his own particular service and security, 
 did not remain a permanent judicial body, but ended 
 with the occasion for which it had been formed. 
 
 The Sanhedrim, as it existed in the time of our 
 Saviour, possessed great power. It presided over the 
 affairs of the whole nation, received appeals from the 
 inferior courts, interpreted the laws, and regulated the 
 execution of them. Most of the members were priests 
 and Levites; some were scribes; but any one was 
 admissible into it, provided he was of a good family 
 and unblameable life. This is the council by which 
 our Saviour was arraigned before Pilate. The authority 
 of the governor was necessary to pronounce His con- 
 demnation, for the Sanhedrim had been deprived of 
 the power of deciding in capital causes; and their 
 authority, though still great, was in many respects much 
 reduced after Judaea became a province of the Roman 
 empire. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 ON THE SECTS AND OTHER ORDERS OF MEN 
 AMONG THE JEWS. 
 
 1 . As the Mosaic dispensation was in many 
 of its parts figurative of the Christian and pre- 
 paratory to it, so especially it was the office of the pro- 
 phets to excite in men an expectation of the Messiah, 
 and to give intimations of the approach of him who was 
 to be the Saviour of the world. But the duty with 
 which the prophets were charged did not necessarily 
 imply, and certainly was not confined to, the prediction 
 of future events. They were sometimes commissioned by 
 God to be the messengers of his rebukes and threatenings, 
 sometimes of his commands and exhortations to particular 
 individuals, to nations, or to mankind. He sent them 
 to teach, or to reprove, or to foretell things to come, 
 and sometimes empowered them to confirm the prophecies 
 they delivered, and to afford manifest proofs of their 
 divine mission, by the working of miracles. The title 
 therefore of Prophet is given in the Holy Scriptures 
 to men possessing the gift of inspiration in various 
 degrees, according to the various occasions to which 
 the supernatural communication was to be applied. 
 Abraham is the first to whom the name is given in the 
 Old Testament. But Adam, Noah, and others had been 
 favoured with extraordinary intimations of the divine 
 will, so that the name might be properly applied to 
 

 33 
 
 them, in the same extensive sense in which it was given 
 to many others after the time of Moses. 
 
 Mention is made in the Old Testament of companies 
 of prophets a . These were probably assembled in schools, 
 in which the truths of religion were particularly taught 
 and the study of the divine law formed the chief occupa- 
 tion. It is not certain that all who were in these schools 
 had the power of predicting future events, or were 
 endued with any supernatural knowledge. But it is 
 certain that to many individuals during a long series 
 of years, from Moses to Malachi, peculiar communications 
 were vouchsafed by the Almighty, in furtherance of the 
 great scheme of his dispensations to mankind. Individuals 
 were selected to execute important commissions, and 
 foretelling events which were beyond the reach of human 
 penetration they gave thereby the strongest proof that 
 the dispensation of which they were the ministers pro- 
 ceeded from God. 
 
 Some of the prophets, as Elijah, Elisha, and others, 
 committed nothing to writing: their predictions, being 
 chiefly of a temporary nature, are inserted in the historical 
 books together with an account of their fulfilment. 
 But those who were appointed to deliver prophecies 
 the accomplishment of which was far distant, were 
 directed to commit them to writing. The prophetic 
 books of sixteen of these yet remain, and form a part 
 of the sacred canon* They are usually divided into 
 two classes, the greater and the minor prophets; not 
 from any supposed difference in their authority, but 
 because the writings of one class are of greater length 
 than those of the other. Jonah, the earliest of them, 
 lived about 800 years B. C. ; and Malachi the latest, with 
 
 a 1 Sam. x. 5. and xix. 20. 
 
34 
 
 whose work the Old Testament is closed, lived about 
 
 400 years after him. 
 
 2. It is remarkable that so long as there 
 Sadducees. , , _ 1 
 
 were prophets among the Jews, there arose no 
 
 sects among them; the reason of which probably is, that 
 
 . the prophets learnt God's will immediately from himself, 
 
 and therefore the people must either obey them and 
 
 receive from them the interpretation of the law, or no 
 
 longer acknowledge the God who inspired them. But 
 
 when the law of God came to be explained by fallible 
 
 men who disagreed in their opinions, a separation into 
 
 sects was the unavoidable consequence. The most ancient 
 
 sect was that of the Sadducees, whose founder Sadoc 
 
 lived about 250 years B. C. He was a disciple of 
 
 Antigonus Sochaeus president of the Sanhedrim, who 
 
 taught that men ought to serve God disinterestedly, 
 
 from love and reverence^ and not from servile fear of 
 
 punishment or hope of reward. Sadoc, misapplying 
 
 these instructions, inferred that there was no future 
 
 state of rewards or punishments, thus far agreeing with 
 
 the doctrine of Epicurus: but he admitted that God 
 
 made the world, and governs it by his providence, and 
 
 that, for the support of this government, he has ordained 
 
 rewards and punishments in the present life. For this 
 
 reason he enjoined the worship of God, and obedience 
 
 to his laws. Whatever were the opinions of Sadoc 
 
 himself, it appears from the New Testament that his 
 
 followers in the time of our Saviour maintained that 
 
 there is no resurrection, neither angel nor spirit b . They 
 
 rejected all traditions, acknowledging the authority of 
 
 the written law alone. It has been argued by some 
 
 writers that they also rejected all the Scriptures except 
 
 b Acts xxiii. 8, 
 
35 
 
 the five books of Moses, while others suppose that they 
 did not wholly reject them, but preferred the books of 
 Moses to the rest : for these opinions however there does 
 not appear to be sufficient ground. On the subject of 
 free-will and predestination they held, in opposition to 
 other sects, that man is absolute master of his own actions, 
 and perfectly free to do either good or evil according to 
 his own choice. Thus thinking that every man has full 
 power in himself to avoid whatever the law of God 
 forbids, and to do what it commands, it was remarked 
 of them that they were always inclined to severity when 
 they sat in judgment upon criminals. The members 
 of this sect were few in number, but they were in general 
 eminent for wealth and dignity. Several of them were 
 appointed to the high priesthood. Josephus, however, 
 says that they had not much power, for when they 
 were in the magistracy they were obliged to conform 
 to the measures proposed by the Pharisees, who were 
 supported by a great majority of the common people . 
 
 3. The Pharisees derive their name from 
 
 Pit CL V I S €€S 
 
 P haras, a Hebrew word which signifies sepa- 
 rated or set apart, because they separated themselves from 
 the rest of the Jews, and affected a peculiar degree of 
 holiness. Most of the common people were on their side ; 
 but the title of Pharisee seems to have been almost en- 
 tirely appropriated to men of leisure and substance, the 
 rest being considered rather an appendage than a part of 
 the sect, and always called plainly the people, the multi- 
 tude, and the like. The time of their origin cannot be 
 accurately determined. Their rise was probably very 
 gradual, as they do not appear to have acknowledged 
 any particular founder. The earliest account of them 
 
 c Jos. Ant. Book XVIII. Chap. ii. 
 
36 
 
 is in Josephus, who says that they were a considerable 
 sect at the time when John Hyrcanus the high priest 
 forsook them and became a Sadducee, that is, about 
 110 years B. C d . The distinguishing character of this 
 sect was a zealous adherence to the traditions of the 
 elders,, to which they ascribed even greater authority 
 than to the written law. They pretended that Moses 
 received from God two laws, one written, the other 
 oral; that this oral law had been handed down uncor- 
 rupted from generation to generation, and was to be 
 taken as a supplement and explanation of the written law, 
 which they represented to be in many places obscure 
 and defective. But from the frequent reproaches ad- 
 dressed to them on this point by our Saviour, it is 
 evident that under pretence of explaining the law by 
 their traditions, they had in reality made it of none 
 effect. Their religion consisted chiefly in the observance 
 of external ceremonies; in ablutions and purifications; 
 in frequent fasting, and long prayers which they made 
 ostentatiously in public places ; in avoidance of all com- 
 munication with reputed sinners; in scrupulous payment 
 of tithe of the least thing; and in rigorous observance 
 of the sabbath, so as to reckon it unlawful to pluck a few 
 ears of corn, or to heal the sick on that day. In order to 
 attract attention, they made broad their phylacteries e , and 
 enlarged the fringes of their garments. By this outward 
 appearance of sanctity they gained the esteem and venera- 
 tion of the multitude : but omitting the weightier matters 
 
 d Jos. Ant. Book XIII. Chap, xviii. 
 
 e Phylactery (derived from (pvXdrToi) signifies a memorial or 
 a preservative. Phylacteries were long and narrow pieces of parch- 
 ment, on which were written passages out of Exodus and Deuter- 
 onomy. These they bound,' to their foreheads and left-arms, in 
 memory of the law. 
 
37 
 
 6i thfc law, judgment, mercy, and faith, and veiling pride, 
 malice, and impurity under the garb of extraordinary 
 piety, they were frequently rebuked by Christ in the most 
 severe language as a generation of hypocrites. 
 
 Their doctrines, though more pure than their practice, 
 were mingled with much error. On the subject of 
 predestination and free will they were opposed to the 
 Sadducees, but their own opinions are no where clearly 
 stated so as to be intelligible. According to Josephus, 
 they ascribed all things to God and fate, and yet left to 
 man in many things the freedom of his will f . How they 
 made one part of this doctrine compatible with the other 
 is not explained. The Holy Scripture testifies that they 
 believed in the resurrection, and in the existence of angels 
 and spirits g . But from the account given by Josephus, it 
 seems probable that their opinion respecting these matters 
 was derived not from the Holy Scriptures but from the 
 philosophy of Pythagoras, and that the resurrection meant 
 by them was the transmigration of the souls of good men 
 into other bodies h . This notion had become prevalent in 
 Judaea in the time of Christ, and according to it, his 
 disciples asked him in the case of the man that was born 
 blind, " who did sin, this man (that is, this man in some 
 antecedent state of being) or his parents, that he was born 
 blind?" And when the Jews were forming conjectures on 
 the character of our Saviour, some said that he was Elias, 
 others Jeremias, or one of the prophets: that is, they 
 thought that the soul of one of these had re-appeared in 
 him. It remained for Christ himself, who brought life 
 and immortality to light, to teach the true resurrection of 
 the body and soul together. 
 
 f Jos. de Bell. Jud. Book II. Chap. vii. s Acts xxiii. 8. 
 
 h Jos. ibid. 
 
 D 
 
3$ 
 
 S. A third sect among the Jews was that of 
 
 iliSSBTlCS 
 
 the Essenes. Of these there is a full account in 
 Josephus and Philo, who are very copious in praising 
 them; but they are no where mentioned in Scripture^ 
 probably because, living chiefly in solitude and taking no 
 part in public affairs> they did not fall under our Saviour's 
 notice. Their number also was small : Philo says that 
 there were about 4000 of them in Syria and Palestine. 
 It is supposed that they had their origin in the time of 
 Antiochus Epiphanes, by whose tyranny great numbers 
 of the Jews were driven into the wilderness, and became 
 inured to a temperate and laborious mode of life. Philo 
 divides them into two classes, the practical, who lived in 
 Judaea and Syria, and the contemplative, who were dis- 
 persed through many parts of the world, but were most 
 numerous in Egypt. The practical Essenes did not alto- 
 gether abandon the society of the rest of mankind, and in 
 some respects were less rigid than the contemplative; sub- 
 stantially, however, their maxims were the same. They 
 believed in the immortality of the soul, and held the Scrip- 
 tures in the highest reverence, but considered them as 
 mystic writings and expounded them allegorically. It does 
 not appear that they placed any reliance upon tradition. 
 They sent gifts to the temple, but offered no sacrifices. 
 They held the doctrine of absolute predestination, not 
 allowing that man has freedom of will in any of his 
 actions. In the regulations of their society they observed 
 the greatest strictness. None gained full admission 
 among them till after a probation of three years. In 
 their mode of living they were extremely temperate ; they 
 attended to no secular occupation except agriculture, and 
 held all things in common. All were considered equal; 
 yet great order was maintained among them, by means 
 of the voluntary respect which they paid to the elders. 
 
39 
 
 Although no express mention is made of this sect in 
 the New Testament,, it is supposed that they are alluded 
 to both by our Saviour and St. Paul 1 . If this supposition 
 be correct, they are spoken of, by the apostle at least, 
 with disapprobation. It is clear indeed, even from the 
 favourable description of them given by Josephus and 
 Philo, that they were led into many superstitious usages, 
 and indulged in fanciful and enthusiastic speculations. 
 It is remarked by Prideaux that almost all their 
 peculiar tenets are condemned by the spirit of Christi- 
 anity 11 . Such were their "voluntary humility" and 
 " neglecting the body/' their superstitious washings, their 
 abstinence from meats which God created for man's use, 
 and other like usages which God never required of them. 
 And, in maintaining that men are bound down in all their 
 actions by irresistible fate and necessity, they destroyed 
 the very foundations of religion and virtue. 
 
 4. These are the three sects into which the Jews were 
 divided. There were among them other classes of men 
 not distinguished by peculiar religious tenets, but either 
 professional, as the scribes and publicans, or political, as 
 the Herodians and Galileans. 
 
 Scribes, doctors of the law, and lawyers, appear 
 to have been different names for the same class of 
 persons. The scribes are mentioned very early in the 
 Sacred History l . Their occupation originally was to tran- 
 scribe copies of the law, as their name imports ; but, from 
 the knowledge thus acquired, they soon became in- 
 structors of the people, and were made judges in their 
 sanhedrims, or teachers in their schools and synagogues. 
 Most of them were attached to the sect of the Phari- 
 
 1 Matt. xix. 12. Col. ii. 18— 2a. * Prideaux, Part II. Book 5. 
 J % Sam. viii. 17. 
 
 V2 
 
40 
 
 sees, for they were the authors of those numberless com- 
 ments and opinions which the Pharisees received as tra- 
 ditions transmitted by Moses ; and the learning and skill 
 of the scribes were chiefly exercised in explaining the 
 oral law which they had themselves fabricated. 
 
 5. The publicans were employed by the Romans 
 to collect the taxes and customs. The Roman 
 publicans are mentioned by Cicero as being the flower of 
 the equestrian order m ; but those were probably men who 
 farmed the revenues of whole provinces, and certainly very 
 different from the class so often introduced under the title 
 of publicans in the New Testament. These were inferior 
 agents, generally Jews of low condition, whose office was 
 accounted disreputable. The people bore with extreme 
 impatience the taxes imposed by the Romans, and there- 
 fore all who were engaged in collecting them were 
 viewed with hatred, especially their own countrymen, 
 whom they regarded as traitors that were conspiring with 
 the Romans to enslave their nation. And this feeling was 
 aggravated by the extortions practised, and by the rigorous 
 manner in which the taxes were usually exacted. Hence 
 the whole body was held in detestation, insomuch that the 
 Pharisees imputed it as a great crime to our Saviour that 
 he sat at meat with . Publicans, whom they themselves 
 avoided with abhorrence. 
 
 ' ,. 6. Respecting the Herodians, whom we find 
 
 HcvodicLiis 
 
 mentioned in the gospels as having gone with 
 
 the Pharisees to ensnare Christ 11 , we have no means of 
 
 determining by what peculiar opinions they were distin-^ 
 
 guished. Some have thought that they were so called 
 
 because they believed Herod to be the Messiah; others, 
 
 with more probability, that they were a set of men attached 
 
 » Orat. pro. Plancio. n Matt. xxii. 16. Mark xii. 13. 
 
41 
 
 to the family of Herod, and followers of his policy. It is 
 
 probable that like him they advocated submission to 
 
 the Romans, by whose support Herod was made and 
 
 continued king, and also were inclined to conform to 
 
 the Roman customs and the forms of heathen worship 
 
 in particulars which the Jewish law would not allow. 
 
 It is further probable that they were chiefly of the sect 
 
 of the Sadducees, since that which is called in one 
 
 gospel the leaven of the Sadducees, is called in another 
 
 the leaven of Herod . 
 
 7- The Galilaeans were a political faction 
 Galilceans. , . . _ . . . , ., 
 
 which had its origin at the time when Cyrenius, 
 
 after the expulsion of Arehelaus, first laid a tax upon 
 
 Judaea. They were distinguished by an extreme zeal for 
 
 liberty, but in all their principles they accorded entirely 
 
 with the Pharisees. Their chief was one Judas of Galilee 
 
 who laboured to excite the people to rebellion, alleging 
 
 that submission to the tax would be an acknowledgement 
 
 of slavery and inconsistent with their duty to God, 
 
 who was their only sovereign. Topics of this sort 
 
 operated upon the Jews with peculiar force at this 
 
 time, when their expectation of a Messiah, or triumphant 
 
 deliverer, inspired them with disdain as well as hatred 
 
 of the Roman yoke. Judas perished, and his followers 
 
 were for a time dispersed p.* but he may be considered 
 
 as one of the earliest and chief movers of that spirit of 
 
 turbulence which became general among the people and 
 
 was not extinguished till it had wrought the ruin of the 
 
 Jewish nation. 
 
 _ 8. Frequent mention is made in the New 
 
 Proselytes. ^ ^ 
 
 lestament 01 proselytes, lnese were Gentiles 
 
 who embraced the Jewish religion either in whole or in 
 
 e Matt. xvi. 6. Mark viii. 15. P Acts v. 36. 
 
 d3 
 
42 
 
 part; for they are usually divided into two sorts, Pro- 
 selytes of the gate, and Proselytes of righteousness. 
 The former were permitted by the Jews to live within 
 their gates, without being bound to the whole law, 
 but only to comply with the seven precepts, which, as 
 the Jewish writers pretend, God gave to Adam and 
 afterwards to Noah, who transmitted them to posterity. 
 These precepts were (1) To abstain from idolatry; (2) 
 from blasphemy; (3) from murder; (4) from adultery; 
 (5) from theft; (6) to appoint upright judges ; (7) not to 
 eat the flesh cut off from any animal while it retained 
 life. They were allowed to worship in the temple, but 
 were forbidden to enter farther than into the outer 
 court, which was called the court of the Gentiles. It 
 does not appear that any ceremony was performed on 
 the admission of Proselytes of this order. 
 
 The Proselytes of righteousness, or, as they are 
 sometimes called, Proselytes of the covenant, undertook 
 the observance of the whole law, and were initiated 
 with three ceremonies, circumcision, baptism, and a 
 sacrifice: after which they were admitted as adopted 
 children to all the ceremonies and religious privileges 
 used by the Jews. But though they were thus adopted, 
 and though great zeal was shewn, especially by the 
 Pharisees, in making proselytes, yet they were consi- 
 dered inferior to those who were Jews by birth and 
 descent, were admitted to no office, and were treated in 
 general with great contempt. 
 
 It must be added that this distinction of the prose- 
 lytes into two classes rests upon the authority of ancient 
 Jewish writers, but in the Scriptures there does not 
 appear to be any foundation for it. Hence, some are 
 of opinion that proselytes were those, and those only, 
 who took upon themselves the obligation of the whole 
 
43 
 
 Mosaic law. Gentiles were allowed to worship in the 
 outer court of the temple, and some of them probably 
 renounced idolatry without embracing the Mosaic law; 
 but such persons do not appear to be called proselytes, 
 in Scripture or in any ancient Christian writer q . 
 
 q Lardner, vol. VI. p. 522. Tomline, vol. I. p. 266. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 ON THE JEWISH PRIESTHOOD. 
 
 1. It has been already stated that when the pro- 
 mised land was divided among the tribes, no allotment 
 was made to the tribe of Levi, because the Levites were 
 appointed to the service of religion, and a peculiar kind 
 of provision was made for them. In the earliest times 
 the priesthood appears to have belonged to the first-born 
 of every family ; and when God smote all the first-born 
 of the Egyptians but spared those of the Israelites, he 
 was pleased to ordain that for the future all the first-born 
 males should be set apart unto himself, that the memory 
 of the miracle and of their deliverance from bondage 
 might thereby be preserved. But when the tribe of 
 Levi on a remarkable occasion discovered great zeal 
 against idolatry, he appointed that whole tribe, instead 
 of the first-born of Israel, to the honour of attending 
 his immediate service a . On their first institution in the 
 wilderness, their chief duty consisted in taking down 
 the tabernacle, carrying it about with all the instruments 
 and sacred vessels belonging to it as the Israelites 
 removed from place to place, and setting it up again 
 when they pitched their tents. But when the Israelites 
 were settled in Canaan, and the tabernacle was no longer 
 carried about as before, the service of the Levites was 
 
 a Exod. xxxii. 26. 
 
45 
 
 changed,, and required less bodily labour. On which 
 account, from the time of David, they entered on the 
 discharge of their duty at an earlier age, and continued 
 in it later, than according to the original appointment 
 of Moses. They were from the beginning divided into 
 three classes, Gershonites, Kohathites, and Merarites, so 
 called from Gershon, Kohath and Merari who were the 
 sons of Levi. Each of these classes had its peculiar 
 duties. When David had fixed the tabernacle at Jeru- 
 salem, he added several regulations respecting their 
 different employments, and made a new division of them. 
 The tribe was numbered by his order, and (without 
 including the priests) was found to contain 38,000 men, 
 from the age of 30 years and upwards 6000 of these 
 were made officers and judges. The rest were divided 
 into three equal classes. To one class (containing 
 54,000) he assigned the duty of assisting the priests by 
 preparing flour, wine and oil for the sacrifice, and other 
 services of that kind ; the second class (containing 4000) 
 had to perform the music prescribed in the divine service ; 
 and the third (containing 4000) had to keep a constant 
 guard about the temple. Each of these classes was 
 divided into 24 courses, which in successive weeks 
 attended to the duty. While one course was attending 
 to the service of the temple, the rest were dispersed 
 among the tribes, in the 48 cities which were allotted 
 for their residence. They were then occupied in teaching 
 the people, and explaining to them the law : they also 
 kept the public records and the genealogies of the several 
 tribes. 
 
 Those who were on duty at the temple had 
 Nethinim. * . J 
 
 under them some persons called Nethinim, that 
 
 b 1 Chron. xxiii. 3. 
 
46 
 
 is, given ; because they were given to them as servants. 
 Their business was to carry the water and wood, and what- 
 ever else was wanted in the temple. The Gibeonites were 
 at first employed in this work, as a punishment for the 
 artifice by which they obtained a league of peace with the 
 Israelites ; and those who in subsequent times continued 
 to be condemned to this servitude were probably the 
 descendants of these, along with some of the captives 
 from other nations. 
 
 2. The priests, who were to be taken from a 
 Pvicsts 
 
 particular family of the tribe of Levi, viz. that of 
 
 Aaron, were appointed to an office more sacred and of 
 higher dignity than the common Levites. They also were 
 divided into 24 courses, which performed the divine 
 service weekly by turns. Each of them had a president; 
 and it is probable that these presidents were the same as 
 the chief priests so often mentioned in the New Testa- 
 ment. The order in which the courses were to serve 
 was determined by lot; and each course was, in all 
 succeeding ages, called by the name of him who was its 
 president at the time of the first division. Thus Zacha- 
 rias is said by St. Luke to be of the course of Abia, 
 because Abia was president of the course in the time of 
 David. The whole number of Priests in David's time 
 was probably about 5000, but when Josephus wrote, 
 there were not less than four times that number d . Since 
 the law enjoined that they should belong to a particular 
 family, all who aspired to the office were required to 
 establish their descent from that family; on which account 
 the genealogies of the priests were inscribed in the public 
 registers and preserved in the temple. It was necessary 
 also, before they were admitted to the office, that they 
 
 & Josh, ix, d Jos. contr. Ap. cap. 2. ' 
 
47 
 
 should be declared free from bodily blemish, and be 
 
 purified from any legal pollutions which they might have 
 
 contracted. Celibacy was not enjoined upon any of the 
 
 sacerdotal order, but the law respecting marriage was 
 
 in some particulars more strict to them than to the 
 
 common people. 
 
 The duties which they had to perform were of great 
 
 variety, and were assigned by lot four times every day 
 
 to those whose turn it was to be in attendance. It was 
 
 their business to serve immediately at the altar and offer 
 
 the sacrifices; to guard the inner part of the temple; 
 
 to light the lamps in the sanctuary ; to burn the incense ; 
 
 to keep a continual fire upon the altar of burnt-offerings, 
 
 and to offer the loaves of shew-bread, which were 
 
 changed every sabbath. Other important parts of the 
 
 priestly office were : to preserve the volumes of the law, 
 
 and pronounce a blessing on the people in the name of 
 
 God; to instruct the people; to judge of controversies, 
 
 of leprosy and other pollutions, and of the fitness or 
 
 unfitness of victims ; to fix the price of redemption for 
 
 the persons and things that were devoted to God; to 
 
 proclaim the sabbath and solemn feasts; to call assemblies, 
 
 and in war to animate the people. These and other 
 
 duties were assigned to them and specified with great 
 
 minuteness. 
 
 3. There were among them several degrees 
 High Priest. „ ,. . - , , ,- • * i i 
 
 of distinction and subordination. At the head 
 
 was the high priest, who had great authority, being ac- 
 counted next in rank to the king or prince, and sometimes 
 uniting the regal and pontifical dignities in his own person. 
 After the institution of the Sanhedrim, he was generally 
 the president of it. Aaron was the first person appointed 
 to the high priesthood. From him it passed to Eleazar 
 his eldest son, whose descendants held it through several 
 
48 
 
 successions till the time of Eli, who was of the family 
 of Ithamar, Aaron's second son, and was the first in that 
 line who was made high priest. In the reign of Solomon, 
 it returned into the family of Eleazar in the person of 
 Zadok, and remained in it until the Babylonian captivity. 
 During this period the high priest was usually elected 
 by the other priests, or by an assembly consisting chiefly 
 of priests; but sometimes by the king. Thus Zadok 
 was appointed by Solomon in the room of Abiathar, 
 whom Solomon had deposed 6 . After the captivity, they 
 were generally appointed by the kings of the countries 
 to which Judaea was subject. According to law, the 
 office was held for life. But under the Roman govern- 
 ment this was disregarded, and the dignity and authority 
 of the high priest were greatly reduced. The office was 
 now frequently transferred from one to another according 
 to the caprice or interest of those who held the supreme 
 power, and was given or sold to young, illiterate, and 
 obscure persons, sometimes even to men who were not 
 of the sacerdotal race. Very different from this was 
 the care taken in earlier times to support the honour of 
 this sacred office. According to the Law of Moses, if 
 any one, not of the family of Aaron, attempted to execute 
 the duties of the high priest, he was put to ddath. It 
 was necessary also that he should be of an honourable 
 family, and that he himself should be perfectly without 
 blemish. The strictest injunctions were given by Moses 
 with regard to the purity both of him and of his family. 
 
 He was consecrated, on his institution to the office, 
 with a solemnity suited to his sacred character. (1) He 
 was presented to the Lord at the door of the tabernacle, 
 in the presence of all the people: (2) he was purified 
 
 e 1 
 
 Kirres ii- 35. 
 
49 
 
 with water; (3) he was invested with the pontifical 
 garments, which were of great splendour, and different 
 from those of the other priests; (4) he offered various 
 sacrifices; lastly, he was anointed with the sacred oil, 
 the composition of which was prescribed by God, and was 
 not to be used for any other purpose. These ceremonies 
 were repeated seven days successively. The other priests 
 and even the common Levites were also consecrated, on 
 their admission to office, with particular ceremonies. The 
 Levites were distinguished from the rest of the Israelites 
 by a robe of white linen ; but all ranks of the sacerdotal 
 order put off the vestments peculiar to them, when they 
 were not engaged in the divine service. 
 
 The high priest could perform any of the functions 
 of the other priests, but that which peculiarly pertained 
 to him was to make expiation for the people ; which he 
 did once a year with great solemnity in the Holy of 
 Holies. It was also granted to him alone to consult the 
 oracle of God in the sanctuary; but in the second temple 
 this mode of declaring the divine will was discontinued. 
 When he was incapable of attending the service through 
 sickness or any legal pollution, a deputy called Sagan 
 was appointed to supply his place. Some think that the 
 office of the Sagan was not occasional but permanent, and 
 that it was his business to assist the high priest generally, 
 in superintending the service and the affairs of the temple. 
 The title of high priest seems to have been sometimes 
 given to this officer; which will explain an expression 
 of St. Luke who mentions Annas and Caiaphas as being 
 high priests at the same time f . Annas was probably the 
 Sagan. It is probable also that when the office was 
 
 f Luke iii. 2. 
 E 
 
50 
 
 transferred from one to another, those who had once held 
 it retained the title after they had resigned the power. 
 
 The Jewish writers mention other sorts of sacerdotal 
 officers superior to common priests, but inferior to the 
 high priest and Sagan. It was the business of the priest 
 of the camp to exhort the army. There were two, called 
 Catholics, who were assistants or substitutes for the Sagan, 
 and were next to him in station and honour ; and seven, 
 who kept the keys of the court of the priests. To others 
 were committed the sacred vessels and vestments, the 
 treasures of the temple, and the revenues arising from the 
 oblations : regulations of this sort being absolutely neces- 
 sary in a service of such great length and variety. 
 Mention is made of another sort of ecclesiastical persons 
 called stationary men : these were chosen out of the several 
 tribes as representatives to attend at the sacrifices offered 
 for all Israel ,* the Law requiring that the persons for 
 w T hom sacrifices were offered should be present at the 
 offering. But it being impossible that all the people 
 should be present, representatives were chosen for the 
 whole body, who were divided, like the priests and 
 Levites, into twenty-four courses, and attended by rotation. 
 4. As the tribe of Levi was to be interspersed 
 among the other tribes, and was prevented by 
 an express law from having any share in the division of 
 the country, it remains to be stated in what places they 
 dwelt, and what provision was made for their subsistence. 
 Forty-eight cities, with their suburbs, were assigned to 
 them : of which thirteen belonged to the priests and were 
 all situated near Jerusalem, one belonging to the tribe of 
 Simeon, four to Benjamin, and eight to Judah. Some of 
 the cities of the Levites were fixed among each of the 
 other tribes, in order that being dispersed they might 
 more conveniently perform the duties to which they were 
 
51 
 
 appointed. Around the cities a small portion of land was 
 given them for gardens, fields and vineyards, from the 
 produce of which arose part of their subsistence, when 
 they were not attending at the temple: but their chief 
 support was derived from the tithes which the Law 
 allotted to them; — a tenth of all the vegetable produce 
 of the earth and also of the cattle. The Levites collected 
 these tithes and gave a tenth of them to the priests. 
 There were many other sources of revenue for the sup- 
 port of the national worship. The first-born of living 
 creatures and the first-fruits of all kinds of corn and 
 fruit were consecrated to God. A price of redemption 
 was paid for the first-born of men and of unclean animals. 
 To the priests were assigned also certain parts of many 
 of the victims that were offered in sacrifice. It must 
 be remarked, however, that some portion of the payments 
 above-mentioned was applied not directly as a provision 
 for the priests and Levites, but for the building, the 
 ornaments, and other public expences of the temple. 
 Nor can it be doubted, that the revenues prescribed by 
 the divine Law were adequate both to support the dig- 
 nity of the service, and to relieve its ministers from all 
 secular employment, that they might devote themselves 
 wholly to the discharge of their sacred duties. 
 
 Of the cities assigned to the Levites, three on each 
 side of Jordan were appointed to be cities of refuge 
 for those who had committed involuntary homicide. 
 When a person who had caused the death of another 
 fled to one of these, the judges proceeded to examine 
 whether the act had been committed designedly or not. 
 If designedly, he was condemned to death; if not, he 
 remained in the city of refuge till the death of the high 
 priest, when he was at liberty to return home. 
 
 5. These regulations with regard to the tribe of 
 e2 
 
52 
 
 Levi afford a striking proof of the divine wisdom of 
 their author, and certainly have no parallel in any system 
 of heathen legislation. It is true, soothsayers and diviners 
 and ministers of religion were found in every State; 
 but they attempted nothing beyond the performance 
 of religious ceremonies, or employing the influence which 
 their sacred functions gave them to promote private gain 
 or the schemes of political parties : to instruct the people, 
 they seem not to have considered any part of their duty. 
 But the Jewish legislator set apart the entire tribe of 
 Levi, one-twelfth of the nation, not merely to perform 
 the rites and sacrifices which the ritual enjoined, but 
 to diffuse among the people religious and moral instruc- 
 tion. For this purpose the peculiar situation and 
 privileges of the tribe of Levi admirably fitted them. 
 Possessing no landed property, but supported by tithes 
 and offerings, they were little occupied with labour or 
 secular care: they were also deeply interested in the 
 support of the worship and laws of God, since if these 
 were neglected, the sources of their maintenance would 
 necessarily fail. Their cities being dispersed through 
 all the tribes, they were every where at hand to admonish 
 and instruct : exclusively possessed of all religious offices, 
 taking a large part in the administration of justice, and 
 guardians of the cities of refuge to which those who were 
 guilty of homicide fled for an asylum,, they must have 
 acquired such influence as could not fail to secure attention 
 to their instructions. Thus circumstanced, they were 
 assuredly well calculated to answer the purpose of their 
 institution, to preserve the union of all the other tribes, 
 and to promote their improvement in knowledge, virtue, 
 and piety. Considering indeed the rank of the priests 
 and Levites, as ministers of religion, as the men of 
 best understanding and knowledge in the laws, as of 
 
53 
 
 great interest in the nation, and influence in the adminis- 
 tration of justice, an apprehension might arise that the 
 power committed to them was too great to be possessed 
 by a single tribe. But this danger was effectually guarded 
 against by the manner in which they were dispersed 
 among the other tribes. They were so separated from 
 one another, that they could not prosecute in concert 
 any ambitious design: and it was in the power of the 
 people, on suspicion of any ill designs of the Levites, 
 to put a stop to their means of subsistence, and seize 
 on all their persons at once. Hence, whatever power 
 the Constitution gave them to do good, the same carefully 
 provided to put it out of their power to do harm, either 
 in disturbing the peace or endangering the liberties of 
 their country g . 
 
 * Graves, Vol. I. p. 294. Lowman, ch. vi. 
 
 e3 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 ON THE JEWISH SACRIFICES. 
 
 It cannot be determined with certainty that sacrifice 
 was offered originally by the command of God ; this being 
 a point on which the Scriptures are silent. But that 
 it was so, may reasonably he inferred from the strong 
 attestation which God gave of his acceptance of sacrifice 
 in the case of Abel, again in that of Noah, afterwards 
 in that of Abraham, and above all, from the systematic 
 establishment of it by divine authority in the dispensation 
 of Moses. We are warranted by Scripture in concluding 
 that the sacrifices prescribed in the Mosaic law, were 
 ordained by God as a type of the sacrifice of Christ a ; 
 this being a true and effective sacrifice, whilst those of 
 the law were but faint representations intended for its 
 introduction. It is probable, therefore, that the rite was 
 at the beginning ordained by God, as a type of that 
 great sacrifice in which all others were to have their 
 consummation b . The object of the Mosaic sacrifices was 
 principally typical ; but the institution of them compre- 
 hended other excellent uses, besides that for which we 
 have authority to believe that they were principally 
 designed. 
 
 It is not however intended to treat, in this chapter, 
 of the origin or design of sacrifice; — subjects which admit 
 
 * Heb. ix. and x, b Magee, Vol. I. p. 46. 
 
55 
 
 of much discussion ; but to give a brief account of the 
 principal offerings and sacrifices prescribed by Moses, 
 what they were and on what occasions presented. They 
 may be classed under two general heads, bloody offerings, 
 or sacrifices strictly so called; and unbloody offerings, as 
 of corn, wine, and perfumes. 
 
 1. Bloody offerings were subdivided into three sorts: 
 (1) whole burnt-offerings, (2) sin or trespass- offerings, 
 (3) peace-offerings. A whole burnt-offering, was the most 
 excellent of all the sacrifices, since it was all consecrated 
 to God, the victim being wholly consumed upon the 
 altar; whereas some parts of the others belonged to the 
 priests, and to those who offered the victims. Of this kind 
 was the daily sacrifice : four lambs, all of the first year, 
 were offered every day, two in the morning, and two 
 in the evening. The whole burnt-offering seems to have 
 been the most ancient kind of sacrifice, since we find 
 that it was offered by Noah, Abraham, and other 
 patriarchs . It is not stated in the Bible what was 
 the peculiar design of it: but as we are taught by 
 St. Paul that the sacrifices under the law were 
 typical of the great sacrifice of Christ, the whole burnt- 
 offering appears to be a type particularly expressive, 
 since nothing less than the full and perfect sacrifice 
 of the Son of God could atone for the sins of the 
 world. 
 
 Between sin-offerings and trespass-offerings, there 
 seems to have been little difference. Some suppose 
 that sin-offerings were for acts which were admitted to 
 be against the law, but had been done undesignedly; 
 and that trespass-offerings were for acts respecting which 
 there was reason to doubt whether they were sinful or 
 
 c Gen. viii. 10. and xxii. 13. Job i. 5. 
 
56 
 
 not. Others think that sin-offerings were made for 
 sins of commission ; and trespass-offerings for sins of 
 omission d . In both of them, the person who offered 
 the sacrifice placed his hands on the victim's head, 
 and confessed his sin or trespass over it, saying, " I have 
 sinned, I have trespassed, and do return,, by repentance 
 before thee, and with this I make atonement." The 
 victim was then considered as bearing the sins of the 
 person by whom it was offered, who received forgiveness 
 from God upon condition of repentance, without which 
 there could be no remission. The appointed occasions 
 for these offerings were not only for acts of sin or 
 trespass, but also on account of certain legal pollutions, 
 as at the purification of a leper, of a woman after child- 
 birth, and others which the law specified. There were 
 also sin-offerings of a more solemn nature offered on 
 extraordinary occasions, not on the altar but without 
 the camp. Such was the sacrifice of the red heifer, 
 whose ashes mixed with water, served to purify those 
 who had been polluted by touching a dead body e . The 
 heifer was to be carried out of the camp, where the 
 high priest killed it, and sprinkled of the blood seven 
 times towards the sanctuary: it was then burnt, and 
 the ashes were gathered and laid up for use. Whoever 
 had touched a dead body was to be sprinkled with water, 
 with which some of these ashes had been mixed. As 
 Jerusalem became afterwards to the Jews, what the camp 
 had been during their abode in the wilderness, those 
 victims which were ordered to be burnt without the 
 camp, were, after the building of the temple, to be 
 burnt beyond the walls of the city. Wherefore Jesus 
 
 d Mich, on the Laws of Moses, Art. 187. 
 e Numb. xix. 
 
57 
 
 also,, says the Apostle, suffered without the gate, that 
 he might sanctify the people with his own blood f . 
 
 Peace-offerings were so called, because they were 
 offered in token of peace between God and man. Whole 
 burnt-offerings and sin or trespass-offerings were made 
 under the notion of some guilt having been contracted, 
 which they were the means of removing ; but in peace- 
 offerings, the offerer was supposed to be at peace with 
 God, and they were made either as an acknowledgement 
 for mercies received, or as joined with supplication for 
 further blessings. 
 
 With respect to all the three kinds of sacrifices, it 
 may be observed that there were only five sorts of 
 animals which could be offered, viz. oxen, sheep, goats ; 
 and among birds, pigeons and turtle-doves. In the 
 selection of victims, the utmost care was taken to choose 
 such as were free from blemish. Sacrifices at first 
 were offered at the door of the tabernacle; but after 
 the temple was built, it was unlawful to sacrifice any 
 where but in it, except in one or two specified cases g : 
 (It seems however that this command was frequently 
 transgressed, even under the best of the Jewish kings h .) 
 The law required that all the victims should be sprinkled 
 with salt before they were laid on the altar, and that 
 the priest should sprinkle the blood upon the altar, 
 which was the most essential part of the sacrifice; for 
 the blood is the life, and by the sprinkling of it the 
 atonement was made. In common sin-offerings and in 
 peace-offerings the fat alone was burnt: in sin-offerings 
 all the flesh belonged to the priest; in peace-offerings the 
 
 f Heb. xiii. 12. 
 
 « Deut. xii. 3— -14. Levit. xiv. 49. Deut. xxi. Numb. xix. 2. 
 
 h 1 Kings xxii. 43. 2 Kings xii. 3. xiv. 4. xv. 4. Mich. Art. 188. 
 
58 
 
 breast and right- shoulder belonged to the priest, and the 
 rest to the person who made the offering. 
 
 2. Unbloody offerings, which are called in the Bible 
 meal-offerings, consisted of meal, bread, cakes, ears of 
 corn, and parched grain, accompanied with libations of 
 wine and sometimes mixed with oil and frankincense. 
 They were offered along with the bloody sacrifices; a 
 certain quantity of flour, wine, and oil, being presented 
 with every animal that was sacrificed. The wine was 
 partly poured upon the brow of the victim to consecrate 
 it, and part of it was allotted to the priests. Some of 
 these offerings were also presented singly and apart, as 
 (1) those which were offered as sin-offerings by the poor, 
 whose means were not sufficient to provide two turtle- 
 doves or two young pigeons; (2) incense, consisting of 
 several spices which are specified in the law 1 : this was 
 offered in the sanctuary every morning and evening by the 
 priests, and once a year by the high priest in the Holy 
 of Holies ; (3) the shew-bread, twelve loaves of which 
 were placed every sabbath on the golden table in the 
 sanctuary ; (4) the sheaf of the first-fruits of the harvest, 
 offered at the celebration of the passover ; (5) two loaves of 
 leavened bread offered at the feast of pentecost. 
 
 Various oblations which the law prescribed may be 
 classed under the head of unbloody offerings. The firsts 
 fruits of corn, wine, and oil, were consecrated to God for 
 the use of the priests. They had also the first of the 
 fleece of sheep k . The Law did not fix the quantity of 
 these first-fruits: the liberal gave a fortieth and even a 
 thirtieth, others a sixtieth part. After the first-fruits 
 were offered, every one paid the tenth of his produce to 
 the Levites, who gave a tenth of what they received to 
 
 Exod. xxx. 34. k Deut. xviii. 4. 
 
 
59 
 
 the priests. Besides this tithe which the people paid 
 to the Levites, they set apart another tenth., which was 
 carried to Jerusalem and consumed with festivity in the 
 temple, as a token of thankfulness to God. To these feasts 
 they were required to invite the Levites, widows, orphans, 
 strangers, the poor, and their own servants, and thus give 
 them a day of rejoicing. But every third year, instead 
 of carrying this tithe to Jerusalem, the owner kept the 
 feast at home, in order that such of the poor as were aged 
 and infirm might not be wholly excluded from this feast 
 of thanksgiving. 
 
 The laws relative to sacrifices and offerings 
 Synagogues. ... _ _ _, . . . 
 
 were delivered by Moses with great minute- 
 ness, and in the observance of them consisted the national 
 worship of the Jews. If it should be thought that the mul- 
 tiplicity of them must have formed a system exceedingly 
 burdensome to the people, let it be remembered that it 
 was administered by a body of men set apart for the duty, 
 and that it was a ritual of national, not of personal 
 worship, limited to one temple and one altar at the place 
 which God had chosen. It was not established in towns 
 and cities throughout the land, and therefore could not 
 be designed to be a system of individual or of family 
 devotion for the whole Jewish people. In regard to 
 this, it is necessary to make a distinction between the 
 worship in the temple and that which was performed in 
 the synagogues. These were instituted at a much later 
 period, and probably originated in the. public reading 
 of the Law after the sacred writings had been collected 
 by Ezra. Conscious that the calamities which had be- 
 fallen the people arose from their wickedness, and that 
 this was greatly owing to their ignorance of the Scrip- 
 tures, they were led to the institution of synagogues, one 
 
60 
 
 in every place where there were ten persons of sufficient 
 age and leisure,, that the people might meet for prayer, 
 and hear the Scriptures read and explained. The syna- 
 gogues were opened three days in the week, and thrice 
 on each of those days. The Pentateuch was divided 
 into sections, and the reading of them so arranged that 
 the whole was finished at the end of the year. The 
 other sacred writings were not all read, but at every 
 meeting such parts were selected as had relation to 
 what had been previously read from the books of Moses. 
 The ministration of this service was ,not confined to the 
 sacerdotal order, but was committed to any one of com- 
 petent learning. But, that order might be preserved, 
 elders were appointed in every synagogue, who were 
 solemnly admitted to their office by the imposition of 
 hands. In the New Testament these are called rulers 
 of the synagogue. Next to them was the minister, 
 whose office it was to offer up public prayers to God 
 for the congregation. There were other inferior minis- 
 ters, who had the care of the sacred books, and of the 
 building and all things belonging to it. The service 
 consisted of prayers, reading and expounding the Scrip- 
 tures, and preaching. For the prayers they had public 
 liturgies. When the time came for reading the Scriptures, 
 the rulers of the synagogue called out some one to 
 officiate; a priest first, and then a Levite, if such were 
 present, and then any other of the people, till the number 
 seven was completed. Hence every section of the law 
 Was divided into seven parts, each reader having his 
 assigned portion. As Hebrew had ceased to be the com- 
 mon language, an interpreter was appointed, whose duty 
 consisted in interpreting the lessons into Chaldee, as they 
 were read to the congregation in Hebrew. It does not 
 appear that any fixed ministers were appointed for ex- 
 
61 
 
 pounding the Scriptures and for preaching : this duty was 
 done by the scribes or any learned men, authorized by 
 the rulers of the synagogue without any permanent 
 appointment. 
 
 It is remarkable that after the Babylonian captivity 
 the Jews were strongly averse to idolatry, though they 
 had been very prone to it before that event : the probable 
 reason of which appears to be that after the captivity 
 a greater knowledge of the Holy Scriptures was diffused 
 among them by means of the institutions above-mentioned. 
 While they had no places for public worship or instruc- 
 tion, except the temple at Jerusalem or the cities of the 
 Levites, the laws of God were imperfectly known, and on 
 that account the people were easily misled to adopt the 
 usages of neighbouring nations. But when in every city 
 synagogues were erected in which the Holy Scriptures 
 were read, and the people regularly instructed in their 
 duty and exhorted to the performance of it, an abiding 
 dread of God's displeasure was impressed upon their 
 minds, and the seductions of idolatry were opposed by an 
 effectual barrier 1 . 
 
 Graves, Vol. I. p. 328. Prideaux, Part I. Book 6. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 ON THE JEWISH FESTIVALS. 
 
 1. The year was distinguished by the Jews into the 
 civil and the ecclesiastical year. The civil year began 
 with the month Tisri, about the middle of our September ; 
 there being an ancient tradition among them that the 
 world was created at that time. All contracts were dated 
 and the Jubilees computed according to this year. The 
 ecclesiastical year began with the month Nisan or Abib, 
 about the middle of our March; that being the time of 
 the year when the Israelites came out of Egypt. 
 
 The beginnings of their months were not determined 
 by astronomical rules, but by the phasis or actual appear- 
 ance of the new moon; and their ordinary year consisted 
 of twelve of these lunar months. But since the sum of 
 them fell short of the solar year by eleven days,, it was 
 necessary to intercalate an additional month in the third 
 year, or sometimes in the second, in order that their 
 months, and consequently their festivals, might always 
 fall nearly at the same season. It has not been ascer- 
 tained with certainty what rule they had for determining 
 which new moon should mark the beginning of the year ; 
 but, whatever the rule was, they could not make their 
 festivals always fall exactly at the same season, according 
 to their method of reckoning by lunar months. 
 
 The Jews had two sorts of weeks, the ordinary one 
 of seven days, and another of seven years which occurs in 
 the prophetic writings and is called a week of years. 
 
63 
 
 Their days were also distinguished into natural, reckoned 
 from one sun-set to another; and artificial or civil, 
 reckoned from the rising to the setting of the sun. The 
 civil day was divided into four parts, each of which 
 consisted of three hours, and therefore, since one of these 
 hours was a twelfth part of the time which the sun 
 continued above the horizon, their hours in summer were 
 longer than in winter. The night was also divided into 
 four parts called watches, each consisting of three hours. 
 The first began at sun-set and was called the beginning 
 of the watches or the evening; the second was called the 
 middle watch or midnight; the third the cock-crowing ; the 
 fourth the morning 7vatch. 
 
 2. The Jewish Sabbath began at sun-set in the evening 
 of Friday, and ended the next day at the same time. 
 It was a festival instituted by God in memory of the 
 creation of the world, and also as a day of rest for men 
 and their cattle, that they might not be exhausted by 
 uninterrupted labour. In the first view, it was calculated 
 to prevent idolatry and the worshipping of creatures, by 
 setting one day apart for the service of the one true God, 
 the Creator of all things. As a day of rest, it was 
 observed with the utmost strictness : they were forbidden 
 to gather the manna which had fallen from heaven, to 
 kindle a fire, and to sow or reap a . It was commanded 
 that " no man should go out of his place on the sabbath- 
 day b ;" that is, according to the interpretation given by 
 the Jewish doctors, that no man should go above 2000 
 cubits (about two -thirds of a mile) ; which in Scripture 
 is called a sabbath-day's journey. Many regulations were 
 introduced for which tkere was no authority in the laws 
 of Moses. They were taught that it was not lawful to 
 
 a Exod. xvi. 22. xxxv. 3. xxxiv. 21. b Exod. xvi. 29. 
 
 f2 
 
64 
 
 fight, even in self-defence, on that day. For this notion 
 they suffered severely in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, 
 and afterwards from Pompey, who taking advantage of 
 their superstition carried forward his works against the 
 city on the sabbath without opposition. Our Saviour 
 taught us the true meaning of the Law of God concerning 
 rest on the sabbath, when he said (e The sabbath was 
 made for man, and not man for the sabbath;" that is, 
 it was intended for man's benefit, for his rest and religious 
 improvement, and not as a yoke of bondage restraining 
 him from works of necessity or mercy. 
 
 The law enjoined that the sabbath-day should be kept 
 holy. It is not stated in what way, further than by cessation 
 from labour, this should be done, except that a sacrifice 
 of two lambs was to be offered on that day in addition to 
 the morning and evening sacrifices. But reason alone 
 taught men that God having reserved this one day for 
 his service, it ought to be spent in religious exercises 
 and meditation. That the command was understood in 
 this sense by the Jews of every age, may be inferred from 
 various parts of the Sacred History c . 
 
 The sabbatical year, which was every seventh year, 
 was first celebrated by the Jews in the fourteenth year 
 after their entrance into Canaan; seven years having 
 been spent in conquering and dividing the country, and 
 six in the cultivation of it. They were commanded by 
 Moses to sow their fields and prune their vineyards, and 
 gather the fruit thereof for six years successively, and 
 to let the land rest on the seventh d . During the sabba- 
 tical year there was a total cessation from agriculture, 
 and the spontaneous products of the ground were enjoyed 
 
 c 2 Kings iv. 23. Luke iv. 16. Acts xiii. 14. & xv. 21. Jennings* 
 Jewish Antiquities, Book 3. ch. iii. d Levit. xxv. 3, 4. 
 
65 
 
 in common, by the proprietor of the ground, his servants, 
 the stranger that was sojourning with him, and the 
 cattle. This then being a year of leisure, Moses com- 
 manded the priests the sons of Levi and the elders of 
 Israel, that in the solemnity of the year of release in 
 the feast of tabernacles the Law should be read before 
 all Israel in their hearing, that they might learn to fear 
 the Lord their God, and observe to do all the words of 
 his law e . The observance of this year further consisted 
 in the remission of all debts from one Israelite to another ; 
 and, according to some writers, in the release of all 
 Hebrew servants; but it is more probable that masters 
 were obliged to release their servants at the end of the 
 seventh year, whether it happened to be the sabbatical 
 year or not; unless they renounced their liberty, and 
 made a formal declaration before the judges that they 
 voluntarily embraced a continuance of servitude- As 
 there was little produce from the land during the 
 sabbatical year, it was necessary to make provision for 
 it in the six preceding years, and God was pleased to 
 promise that he would command his blessing upon the 
 land in the sixth year, and that it should bring forth 
 fruit for three years f . But the Jews frequently violated 
 the laws regarding this institution, which was one 
 among their national sins that caused them to be led 
 into captivity, that the land might enjoy the sabbaths 
 of which it had been defrauded. After they had been 
 thus punished for their disobedience, they became scru- 
 pulous in observing the law on this subject; but it 
 does not appear that God renewed the extraordinary 
 blessing which he first promised, and on that account 
 the sabbatical year was always a year of scarcity. There- 
 
 e Deut. xxxi. 10. ' Levit. xxv. 21. 
 
 F3 
 
66 
 
 fore when Christ told his disciples, Pray ye that your 
 flight be not on the Sabbath, some have supposed him 
 to allude to the sabbatical year, when sustenance could 
 not easily be procured, and thence the necessity of 
 quitting their habitations would be attended with aggra- 
 vated suffering. 
 
 The j ubilee was celebrated every fiftieth year, and 
 was similar to the sabbatical year in many of its 
 observances. Debts were cancelled, and slaves and 
 prisoners set at liberty. Even those mentioned above 
 as having submitted to a continuance of servitude, were 
 yet made free at the jubilee; for then liberty was to be 
 proclaimed throughout all the land to all the inhabitants^ 
 Lands which had been sold returned to their original 
 proprietors, so that an estate could not be alienated for 
 more than fifty years, and therefore no family could be 
 sunk in perpetual poverty. From this law, however, 
 houses in walled towns were excepted : these were to be 
 redeemed within a year, otherwise they belonged to the 
 purchaser and could never be reclaimed. The effect of 
 the institution of the jubilee was favourable to the poor, 
 since it prevented perpetual slavery, and tended to pre- 
 serve an equality of possessions. Being also a year of rest 
 from labour, since all cultivation of the ground was 
 forbidden, its commencement was proclaimed with public 
 tokens of joy, and hailed, by the poor at least, with great 
 delight. 
 
 3. Of the other Jewish festivals some were of divine, 
 and others of human institution. The most solemn of 
 those that had been instituted by God were the passover, 
 the pentecost, and the feast of tabernacles ; each of which 
 was to be celebrated every year at the place which the 
 
 8 Levit. xxv. 10. 
 
 
67 
 
 Lord should choose, that is, at Jerusalem after the sanc- 
 tuary had been fixed there; and all the Israelites were 
 obliged to attend, unless they had good reason for being 
 absent. Women were exempt from this obligation, and also, 
 it may be presumed, children and old men; but Scripture 
 is silent with regard to any fixed limitation of age. 
 
 The passover derived its name from God's 
 Passover. . _ 
 
 passing over the houses of the Israelites, and 
 
 sparing their first-born, when those of the Egyptians were 
 put to death. The name of passover was given to the lamb 
 slain in memory of that deliverance; and sometimes to the 
 feast-day on which the paschal lamb was slain, or lastly, to 
 the entire continuance of the festival, which commenced 
 with the slaying of the lamb and continued for seven days. 
 On the fourteenth day of the month Nisan, in the evening, 
 the festival began with killing the lamb, which was to be 
 a male of the first year, and without blemish. If one 
 family was not large enough to eat the whole lamb, two 
 or more were united. The victims were slain by persons 
 belonging to these several families, and the blood was 
 poured by the priests at the bottom of the altar. The 
 fat was consumed on the altar, after which the lamb was 
 returned to the person by whom it had been offered. 
 It was to be roasted whole, without a bone being broken, 
 and was to be eaten with unleavened bread and bitter 
 herbs. None of it was to remain till the morning: if it 
 were not all eaten, that which remained was consumed 
 with fire* Those who were prevented by illness or by 
 any legal pollution from celebrating the passover on the 
 day appointed, were commanded to do it on the four- 
 teenth day of the next month 11 . During the whole 
 continuance of this festival it was not lawful to eat any 
 
 Numb. ix. 11. 
 
68 
 
 leavened bread, nor even to have it in their houses ; and 
 on that account it is sometimes called in Scripture the 
 feast of unleavened bread. In general the fifteenth day 
 of the month (but in one or two places the fourteenth, in 
 the evening of which the paschal lamb was killed) is 
 called the first day of the feast 1 . On the sixteenth was 
 offered the sheaf of the first-fruits of the barley-harvest, 
 which in Judaea was usually ripe at that season. This 
 was done in acknowledgement of the goodness of God 
 <c who gives rain, both the former and latter rain, in its 
 season, and reserves to men the appointed weeks of 
 harvest k ." On all the days of the festival peculiar 
 sacrifices were offered in behalf of all the people: but 
 the first and last days (the fifteenth and twenty-first) 
 were solemnized above the rest by abstaining from servile 
 work, and by holding a holy convocation. That the 
 passover had a typical reference to our Saviour is inti- 
 mated both by St. John and St. Paul 1 . Christ is our 
 passover: his blood was shed to protect mankind from the 
 divine justice, like as that of the paschal lamb, sprinkled 
 on the door-posts of the Israelites, saved their first-born, 
 while those of the Egyptians were destroyed. 
 Feast of The feast of pentecost (irevTrjKoo-Trj) was so 
 Pentecost, called because it was kept on the fiftieth day 
 after the feast of unleavened bread, that is, after the fif- 
 teenth of the month Nisan. It was sometimes called the 
 feast of weeks, because it was celebrated seven weeks after 
 the passover ; and also the feast of harvest or of the first- 
 fruits, because on it the first-fruits of the wheat-harvest, 
 viz. two loaves of leavened bread made of the new corn, 
 were offered as a token of thankfulness to God for the 
 
 1 Numb, xxviii, 17. Matt. xxvi. 17. Mark xiv. 12. 
 
 k Jerem. v. 24. 1 John xix. 36. 1 Cor. v. 7. 
 
 
69 
 
 bounties of harvest 111 . This offering was accompanied with 
 a number of animal sacrifices and with several other offer- 
 ings and libations. The festival continued but one day, 
 and was kept with great rejoicing. The chief design 
 which Moses had in the institution of it seems to have 
 been that they might acknowledge the goodness of God in 
 giving the fruits of the earth; but it was celebrated by 
 the Jews with a further view, viz. in commemoration of 
 the Law having been given from mount Sinai on that day. 
 And in either view it appears to have had a typical refer- 
 ence to the first-fruits of the Holy Spirit, which descended 
 upon the Apostles on the day of Pentecost, and enabled 
 them to be effectual ministers of the new law of the gospel, 
 which its divine Author had recently given for the salva- 
 tion of the world 11 . 
 
 Feast of The feast of tabernacles began on the fif- 
 
 Tabernacles. teenth of the month Tisri and lasted seven 
 days. It was instituted for a memorial of the Israelites 
 having dwelt in tents or tabernacles while they were 
 wandering in the desert. The design of it was also to 
 return thanks to God for the fruits of the trees, especially 
 of the vine, which were gathered about this time, and to 
 beg a blessing on those of the ensuing year. On this 
 account it was called the feast of in-gathering; and an 
 eighth day was added, to which their rejoicings for the 
 fruit-harvest appear to have been chiefly appropriated. It 
 is probable indeed that the feast of tabernacles was wholly 
 distinct from the feast of in-gathering, but as they were 
 kept in a continued succession of days, they are mentioned 
 as one festival, and the name of either of them is applied 
 indifferently to both . The principal ceremonies observed 
 
 Exod. xxiii. 16. Lev. xxiii. 15—21. Numb, xxviii. 26—31. 
 Acts. ii. ° Jennings' Antiquities, Book III. Chap. vi. 
 
70 
 
 were the following: (1) during the festival they dwelt 
 in tents, which were placed on the flat roofs of their 
 houses; (2) numerous sacrifices were offered peculiar to 
 each day of the festival ; (3) they carried in their hands 
 branches of palm-trees, olives, myrtles, and willows, 
 and with these they walked in procession round the 
 altar, singing some words of an appropriate hymn, in 
 which they prayed for the coming of the Messiah p ; (4) a 
 remarkable libation (not commanded in the law of Moses 
 but introduced at some later period) was offered every 
 day of the feast, at the time of the morning sacrifice. 
 Water drawn from the pool of Siloam, was mixed with 
 wine and poured upon the sacrifice as it lay on the altar, 
 the people singing in the mean time these words of Isaiah, 
 with joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation* 1 . 
 Our Saviour is supposed to allude to this ceremony, when 
 on the last day, the great day of the feast of tabernacles, 
 he stood and cried saying, If any man thirst let him 
 come unto me and dri?ik r . 
 
 No festival was attended with greater rejoicings than 
 this: and as it happened to take place at the time of 
 vintage, some ancient authors were led to believe that 
 it was celebrated in honour of Bacchus 8 . 
 Fast of 4. The fast of expiation or day of atonement 
 
 Expiation, began in the evening of the ninth day of the 
 month Tisri and lasted till the evening of the tenth. It 
 differed from the festivals above-mentioned, in that they 
 were days of joy and thanksgiving, but this was a day of 
 fasting, humiliation, and confession of sins; and it was the 
 only one, of that kind, of divine appointment. It was to 
 be kept with all the religious regard of a sabbath, and 
 
 p Psal. cxviii. 25. q Isai. xii. 3. r John'vii. 37. 
 
 s Plutarch. Sympos. Lib. IV. quaest. 5. Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. 5. 
 
71 
 
 with the offering of sacrifices,, first for the high priest and 
 his family, and then for the people. Of the numerous 
 victims offered on this day the most remarkable were the 
 two goats which the high priest was to receive from the 
 congregation, and to present before the Lord at the door 
 of the tabernacle ; casting lots which of the two should be 
 sacrificed as a sin-offering, and which should be sent as a 
 scape-goat into the wilderness. The service of this day 
 was chiefly performed by the high-priest; it being his 
 duty to kill and offer the sacrifices, and sprinkle their 
 blood with his own hands. This was the only day in the 
 year in which he was permitted to enter into the Holy of 
 Holies; and therefore he was obliged to prepare himself 
 for that great solemnity several days beforehand with par- 
 ticular care. On the day of the fast, he first entered with 
 a large quantity of incense, that the smoke of it might fill 
 the place so as to cover the mercy-seat from sight: he 
 then came out and dipped his fingers in the blood of the 
 bullock which he had offered for himself, and went and 
 sprinkled it towards the mercy-seat seven times. This 
 done, he killed the goat as a sin-offering for the people, 
 and went and sprinkled the mercy-seat with the blood 
 of it as he had done with that of the bullock, and by 
 these aspersions the tabernacle was purified from the 
 pollution of the people's sins and transgressions. Next, 
 the scape-goat was brought to him, and having confessed 
 his own sins and those of the whole nation, and laid them 
 as it were upon its head, he sent it into the wilderness*. 
 
 The whole of this ceremony had a typical reference 
 to the atonement made for the sins of the world by Jesus 
 Christ. The expiatory sacrifices were typical of the true 
 expiation made by Him ; and the high priest's confessing 
 
 Levit. xvi. 
 
72 
 
 the sins of the people and laying them upon the head of 
 the scape-goat was figurative of the imputation of sin to 
 Christ, c ' who was made sin for us" and " on whom is laid 
 the iniquity of us all u ." The entering of the high priest 
 into the Holy of Holies with the blood of the sacrifice, is 
 interpreted by St. Paul to be typical of Christ's ascension 
 to heaven, and of his intercession for mankind in virtue 
 of the sacrifice of his death x . 
 
 Moses appointed other festivals, which were observed 
 with less solemnity than the preceding; and it was not 
 required that all the Israelites should be assembled to 
 celebrate them at the place of the sanctuary. The new 
 moons, that is, the first days of the several months, were 
 regarded as holy, yet so that work on them was not 
 forbidden. The celebration of them consisted in certain 
 additional sacrifices and offerings 7 . But one particular 
 new moon was distinguished from the rest and ordered 
 to be kept as a sabbath, by the intermission of all manner 
 of work. This was the new moon of Tisri, the first 
 month of the civil year. It was called the feast of 
 trumpets; for besides sounding the trumpets over the 
 sacrifices as on other new moons and festivals, this was to 
 be "a day of blowing the trumpets/' that is, as the ancient 
 Jewish writers understand it, they were to be blown from 
 morning to evening, or at least more on this day than on 
 any other 2 . The reason of this festival is no where given 
 in Scripture. Some have conjectured that it was to 
 commemorate the creation of the world, which was sup- 
 posed to have taken place at this season ; others, that it 
 was to render the beginning of the civil year more 
 
 u 2 Cor. v. 21. Isai. liii. 6. * Heb. ix. 
 
 y Numb, xxviii. 11. z Levit. xxiii. 23. Numb. xxix. 1. 
 
73 
 
 observable, since by it were regulated all their contracts 
 as well as their sabbatic years and jubilees a . 
 
 3. Besides the festivals instituted by Moses, many 
 were introduced by the Jews in later times. The follow- 
 ing chiefly deserve notice : (1) the feast of lots, called in 
 Hebrew Purim, celebrated on the fourteenth and fifteenth 
 of the month Adar * in commemoration of the deliverance 
 of the Jews from the cruel designs of Haman b , who had 
 procured an edict from the king of Persia to destroy 
 them; and had inquired by lot what time would be fittest 
 for carrying his designs into effect . (2) The feast of 
 dedication, instituted by Judas Maccabeus as a grateful 
 memorial of the purifying of the temple and altar, after 
 they had been profaned by Antiochus Epiphanes. It 
 continued eight days, beginning on the twenty-fifth of 
 the month Chisleu,* and was spent in singing hymns, 
 offering sacrifices, and in all kinds of rejoicing. (3) The 
 fasts of the fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth months, kept 
 respectively in memory of the taking of Jerusalem by 
 the Babylonians; of their burning the temple and city; 
 of the murder of Gedaliah, who had been appointed ruler 
 over those Jews that remained in the country when the 
 rest were carried captive to Babylon, and had gained 
 their esteem by his benevolent government; of the com- 
 mencement of the siege of Jerusalem, which was begun 
 by Nebuchadnezzar on the tenth day of the tenth month d . 
 
 Benevolent The celebration of the passover and of the 
 
 desttrn of the 
 
 festivals. feast of tabernacles continued several days ; but 
 
 * Adar corresponds to part of our February and March ; Chisleu 
 to part of November and December. 
 
 a Univ. Hist. Vol. I. p. 609. * About 500 years B. C. 
 
 c Esth. vii. d 2 Kings xxv. 
 
 G 
 
74 
 
 the law did not command that all of them should be ob- 
 served with equal strictness. The first and last were sab- 
 baths on which there was to be no work ; yet the prohi- 
 bition, even with regard to them, was less rigorous than 
 with regard to the weekly sabbath. On the intermediate 
 days labour was not prohibited, and it is thought by some 
 writers that the great yearly fairs of the nation were held on 
 these days, when there was so great an assemblage of people 
 from all parts of the country e . There can be no doubt that 
 they were celebrated with mirth and festivity. In a former 
 chapter it was stated that a second tithe and the first- 
 fruits were to be appropriated for offerings, and since 
 these could only be made at the sanctuary, the Israelites 
 were obliged to go thither and set on foot offering-feasts, 
 in order to consume the tithe and first-fruits. In this 
 way the festivals were days of pleasure; and entertain- 
 ments were given or received, in the joys of which the 
 poor and the slaves were entitled to participate. The 
 benevolent design of these festivals is apparent, and their 
 influence on the community was in many respects most 
 salutary. By means of them the people of the different 
 tribes became more closely connected; they learnt to 
 regard each other as fellow-citizens, and were less likely to 
 be separated into a number of small States. As each tribe 
 was regulated by its own laws and had its own peculiar 
 interests, there was danger lest jealousies should arise, 
 which in process of time might completely alienate them 
 from one another. The yearly festivals were calculated 
 to have a great effect, for the prevention of this calamity. 
 While the tribes frequently assembled for the purposes 
 of religious worship and social enjoyment, they became 
 more intimately acquainted with each other; intermar- 
 
 . . ... ... — — - — . ...i t i. ■> 
 
 e Mich. Art. 197. 
 
75 
 
 riages took place, whereby the interests of families 
 belonging to different tribes became intermixed, and thus 
 the twelve petty States were united into one powerful 
 people. Jeroboam was well aware of this, when he was 
 appointed king of the ten tribes which had separated 
 from the tribe of Judah. Sensible that the separation 
 could not be permanent if the people continued to pay 
 their annual visits to Jerusalem, he issued a prohibition 
 of them, and, contrary to the law of Moses, appointed 
 two places for divine service within his own territories. 
 
 It may be further remarked of these festivals, and 
 particularly of the sabbatical year and the jubilee, that 
 in the very institution of them is implied a strong 
 argument of their divine origin f . When all the Israelites 
 were assembled, as they were three times every year, in 
 Jerusalem, what defence was left in the country against 
 foreign invasion? And when cultivation of the ground 
 was forbidden every seventh year, whence were the 
 people in that year to procure subsistence ? God had 
 promised " that no man should desire their land when 
 they should go up to appear before the Lord their God 
 thrice in the year g ;" and it is remarkable that no such 
 evil ever befel them on these occasions: he had also 
 promised with regard to their subsistence that " he would 
 command his blessing upon them in the sixth year, and 
 that the land should bring forth fruit for three years V 
 But no legislator would have ventured to propose such 
 institutions, except in consequence of the fullest conviction, 
 on the part both of himself and the people, that God had 
 really so promised, and that they were under the pro- 
 tection of his peculiar providence. 
 
 * Graves, Vol. I. p. 170. e Exod. xxxiv. 24. k Lev. xxv. 21. 
 
 G 2 
 
CHAPTER VII. 
 
 ON THE PLACES ACCOUNTED HOLY BY THE JEWS. 
 
 From the earliest ages of the world, particular 
 places have been appropriated to the exercise of religious 
 worship. In ancient times it was usual to seek for that 
 purpose the retirement of groves and mountains. Thus 
 it is said of Abraham, when he dwelt at Beer-sheba, that 
 he planted a grove there, and called upon the name of 
 the everlasting God a . And it was upon one of the 
 mountains in the land of Moriah, that God ordered him 
 to offer in sacrifice his son Isaac. But when the worship 
 of false gods had become prevalent among men, the 
 solitude of such places was found to be favourable for 
 the practice of dreadful crimes and impurities, with 
 which idolatry has been ever associated. And the strong 
 tendency which the Israelites had to adopt the idolatrous 
 customs of heathen nations is amply testified in the sacred 
 history. It is recorded of them that they set up images 
 and groves in every high hill and under every green 
 tree, and there burnt incense in all the high places, and 
 wrought wickedness to provoke the Lord, as did the 
 heathen b . It was with the view therefore of preserving 
 them from idolatry that they were prohibited from ofFer- 
 
 a Gen. xxi. 33. b 2 Kings xvii. 11. 
 
77 
 
 ing worship in groves or in high places, and were 
 commanded to make sacrifices and oblations in that place 
 only which God should choose, 
 
 1. In the first year after the departure from Egypt, 
 Moses received orders respecting the construction of the 
 tabernacle. It was built in the form of an oblong, thirty 
 cubits in length, and ten in height and breadth*. The 
 interior of it was divided by a veil into two parts, one 
 of which was called the Sanctuary or Holy Place, and the 
 other the Holy of Holies. The sanctuary contained the 
 table of shew-bread, the golden candlestick, and the 
 altar of incense. The Holy of Holies contained the ark 
 of the covenant. This ark was a small chest, in which 
 were placed the two tables of stone, having the ten 
 commandments engraven upon them by the finger of 
 God. In the time of Solomon it contained nothing 
 besides, but St. Paul seems to speak of it as containing 
 also the golden pot that had manna and Aaron's rod 
 that budded : probably the contents of it were not always 
 the same ; or his expression may be interpreted to signify 
 that those articles were near, not within the ark c . The 
 lid of the ark was called the Mercy- Seat, at the extremities 
 of which were two cherubim with their faces looking 
 towards each other, and their wings expanded. It was 
 between them that the cloud used to appear, which was 
 a visible token of the shechinah or divine presence ; and 
 hence God is frequently represented in Scripture as 
 dwelling between the cherubim a . 
 
 A court of one hundred cubits in length and fifty 
 in breadth surrounded the tabernacle. In this court 
 
 * A cubit was nearly equal to twenty-two inches. 
 
 c Exod. xvi. 33. Numb. xvii. 10. 1 Kings viii. 9. Heb. ix. 4. 
 
 a Psal. lxxx. 1, xcix. 1. 
 
 g3 
 
78 
 
 stood the altar for burnt-offerings, and the brazen laver 
 in which the priests washed their hands and feet when- 
 ever they were about to offer sacrifice or to enter the 
 tabernacle. When Aaron presented his first burnt- 
 sacrifice for himself and the people, the fire was kindled 
 from heaven in token of acceptance, and God commanded 
 that it should be kept continually burning on the altar, 
 without ever going out 6 . 
 
 The tabernacle was carried about by the Israelites in 
 all their marches until they arrived at the land of Canaan. 
 It was then fixed first at Gilgal, where it remained seven 
 years, and afterwards in Shiloh. In the reign of David 
 and at the beginning of Solomon's reign, it was at Gibeon 
 in the tribe of Benjamin ; after which time the Scriptures 
 are silent respecting it. The ark of the covenant had 
 been separated from it at the time when Eli was judge, 
 and was probably never replaced in it. Having been 
 brought from the tabernacle into the camp, it was taken 
 by the Philistines, and was afterwards removed from 
 place to place till David prepared a tent for it at 
 Jerusalem. Lastly, it was placed in the temple of 
 Solomon and was probably consumed along with it, when 
 Jerusalem was destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar f . 
 
 2. The temple was built by Solomon on Moriah, 
 a part of mount Sion, which was the general name of 
 a range of hills near Jerusalem. The plan of it was formed 
 after that of the tabernacle, but it was of much larger 
 dimensions. The temple itself, strictly so called, formed 
 only a small part of the sacred building, for it was 
 surrounded with spacious courts, making a square of half 
 a mile in circumference. The first court, which encom- 
 passed the temple and the other courts, was called the 
 
 • Lev. vi. 13, t Home's Introduction, Part III. Chap. i. 
 
79 
 
 Court of the Gentiles, because the Gentiles were allowed 
 to come into it, but were prohibited from advancing 
 further. It was surrounded with porticoes or cloisters ; 
 the eastern side of which was called Solomon's Porch, 
 because it stood upon a vast terrace which Solomon built 
 up from the valley beneath, in order to enlarge the area 
 on the top of the mount, and make it equal to his 
 intended building. Within the court of the Gentiles on 
 higher ground was the court of the women, so called 
 because women were not allowed to proceed beyond it. 
 From this there was an ascent to the inner or men's 
 court, within which again was the court of the priests, 
 separated from the former by a low wall, one cubit in 
 height. This wall inclosed the altar for burnt- offerings, 
 and to it the people brought their oblations and sacrifices, 
 but the priests alone were allowed to enter the inclosure. 
 From the court of the priests they ascended by twelve 
 steps to the temple properly so called. This consisted 
 of a portico, the sanctuary, and the Holy of Holies. The 
 portico was adorned with several valuable offerings made 
 by kings and princes, and with spoils and trophies taken 
 in war. The sanctuary and Holy of Holies in the temple 
 were furnished in the same manner as in the tabernacle. 
 They were separated one from the other by a double 
 veil, which is supposed to have been the veil that was 
 rent during our Saviour's crucifixion. Into the Holy of 
 Holies no person was ever admitted except the high 
 priest, who entered it once a year on the great day of 
 atonement. 
 
 This temple, built by Solomon, retained its original 
 magnificence only for a short period. During the reign 
 of Rehoboam, Shishak king of Egypt carried away its 
 treasures, and it was finally plundered and burnt by the 
 king of Babylon. The second temple, built under the 
 
80 
 
 direction of Zerubbabel, was greatly inferior to the first, 
 as appears from the questions put by the prophet Haggai : 
 " Who is left among you, that saw this house in its first 
 glory? and how do you see it now? is it not in your 
 eyes, in comparison of it, as nothing &?" It is said to 
 have wanted five remarkable things which were the chief 
 glory of the first temple, viz. the ark of the covenant, 
 the shechinah, the holy fire on the altar which had been 
 kindled from heaven, the urim and thummim *, and the 
 spirit of prophecy. In the eighteenth year of his reign, 
 Herod the Great undertook to repair this second temple 
 or rather gradually to rebuild it, and vast labour was 
 expended in adding to its magnitude and splendour. 
 Josephus says, that he finished it in nine years, which 
 must be understood of the main body of the building; for, 
 long after Herod's death, the Jews continued to enlarge 
 and adorn it, and the workmen were not dismissed till 
 the time of Agrippa the younger, Herod's grandson, 
 about sixty years after the birtfr of Christ. The Jews 
 therefore might say to our Saviour with perfect truth 
 that the temple was forty and six years in building, 
 exactly so many having elapsed since Herod commenced 
 the work. Tacitus says that it was a temple of immense 
 opulence, and Josephus represents it as the most astonish- 
 ing structure he had ever seen or heard of, as well on 
 account of its architecture as its magnitude and likewise 
 the richness of its various parts and the reputation of its 
 
 8 Haggai ii. 3. 
 
 * These were contained in the breast-plate of the high priest, but 
 no explanation respecting them is given in Scripture. The opinion 
 most generally received is, that they were twelve precious stones on 
 which were engraven the names of the twelve tribes of Israel, and 
 that the oracle was delivered by causing such letters as formed the 
 answer to shine with a superior lustre, or to appear prominent above 
 the rest. See Jennings, Book I. Chap. v. Graves, vol. I. p. 318. 
 
 ! 
 
81 
 
 sanctity h . When the disciples of our Lord shewed him 
 the grandeur of its buildings, he warned them of its 
 approaching downfall, and not many years passed away 
 before the foundations of it were ploughed up by the 
 Roman soldiers. 
 
 3. Jerusalem is frequently called in the Scriptures 
 the holy city, as being hallowed in a peculiar manner 
 by the presence of God in the temple. It was formerly 
 called Jebus from one of the sons of Canaan 1 , and some 
 authors suppose, without any certain authority, that it 
 was the ancient Salem, of which Melchizedek was king. 
 After it had been taken by Joshua, it was inhabited both 
 by Jews and Jebusites till the time of David; who, 
 having driven the Jebusites out of it, greatly enlarged it, 
 and built a palace there, in which he fixed his residence. 
 On this account it is sometimes called the city of David. 
 It was divided into the upper and the lower city : the 
 upper (according to the general opinion) being towards 
 the south on mount Sion, the lower to the North on the 
 hill Acra. Eastward from Acra was the site of the 
 temple; at one corner of which stood Fort Antonia, 
 which overlooked the courts of the temple, and com- 
 municated with them by passages, so that the Roman 
 garrison could readily descend to quell any tumult which 
 might arise during the festivals. The circumference 
 of the city in the time of Josephus was thirty-three 
 stadia, or nearly four miles and a half; and Hecataeus, 
 who wrote about three centuries earlier, says, that the 
 number of its inhabitants in his time was 120,000 k . 
 
 The mount of Olives, from which Christ ascended 
 to heaven, was on the east side of Jerusalem, fronting the 
 
 h Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. viii. Jos. de Bell. Jud. Lib. VI. c. iv. 
 1 1 Chron. xi. 4. k Jos. contr, Ap. 
 
82 
 
 temple, and was about a mile distant from it. The 
 village Gethsemane was at the bottom of the mount; 
 and on the further side were Bethphage and Bethany. 
 Between the mount of Olives and Jerusalem there was 
 a valley, through which ran the brook Kedron. Mount 
 Calvary or Golgotha, the scene of our Saviour's crucifixion, 
 was on the western side of the city at a short distance 
 beyond the walls; to which the Apostle alludes when 
 he says that "Jesus also suffered without the gate.' 9 
 
 4. All Judaea was accounted holy, as being the 
 inheritance of God's chosen people, and specially appointed 
 for the performance of his worship. In modern times 
 also, it has obtained the name of the Holy Land, on 
 account of its having been the abode of the lioly 
 Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles, and consecrated above 
 all by the presence and sufferings of Jesus Christ. 
 Anciently it was called the land of Canaan, from Canaan, 
 the youngest son of Ham, who settled here after the 
 dispersion from Babel, and divided the country among 
 his eleven children: and Palestine from the Philistines, 
 who, having migrated from Egypt, settled on the borders 
 of the Mediterranean and gave their name to the whole 
 country, though they never possessed more than a small 
 part of it. In Scripture it is frequently distinguished 
 by other names, such as the Land of Promise, the Land of 
 God, the Land of Israel. 
 
 It is impossible to give, within the necessary limits 
 of this work, any satisfactory description of the 
 boundaries and provinces of Judaea, or of its numerous 
 cities, and many circumstances pertaining to it which are 
 worthy of notice: the few remarks therefore which follow, 
 will relate merely to its general aspect and the produc- 
 tiveness of its soil. 
 
 It is described by Moses as " a good land, a land of 
 
83 
 
 brooks of water, of fountains and depths, that spring 
 out of valleys and hills; a land of wheat and barley, 
 and vines, and fig-trees, and pomegranates, a land of 
 oil-olive, and honey 1 ." It even exceeded the land of 
 Egypt, so much celebrated for its fertility by ancient 
 wrijters; especially in the number of cattle which it 
 produced, and in the quantity and excellence of its wine, 
 oil, and fruits. Those parts of it which in Scripture are 
 called deserts or wildernesses were not desolate, as the 
 words appear to imply: many of them, though unfit 
 for tillage, were inhabited, and afforded pasturage for 
 cattle. Some districts are mountainous and rocky, but 
 the industry of the Jews, whose attention was occupied 
 chiefly with agriculture, made the most barren places 
 yield some kind of produce. The very rocks which 
 now appear quite bare and naked, were made fruitful, 
 being covered by the ancient proprietors with earth, 
 which has been since washed away; and there were 
 few spots in the whole land that were not improved, 
 to the production of something or other ministering to 
 the support of human life m . Besides therefore supporting 
 its own great population, it was able to supply other 
 countries with large quantities of corn and fruits 11 . Such 
 is the description of the ancient fruitfulness of Judsea, 
 given in the Scriptures, and also by many profane 
 writers . Nor, even in its present decayed and neglected 
 state, are indications wanting of its natural richness and 
 fertility, sufficient to show that want of cultivation is the 
 chief if not the only cause of the comparative poverty 
 in which it is now seen. This poverty is not owing 
 
 1 Deut. viii. 7, 8. m Maundrell, p. 65. 
 
 n 1 Sam. xxiv. 1 Kings v. 11. Acts xii. 20. 
 Hecat. apud. Joseph, contr. Ap. Tacit. Hist. Lib. V. c. vie 
 Plin. Lib. V. c. xiv, xv. 
 
84 
 
 to the unfruitfulness of the soil,, but to the want of 
 inhabitants,, and the aversion to industry in those few 
 who possess it. Otherwise, were it as well , peopled 
 and cultivated as in former times, it would still be capable 
 of supplying its neighbours with corn and other products, 
 as it did in the time of Solomon p . Its present state, so 
 far from affording ground for calling in question the 
 accounts of its fertility given in the sacred writings, 
 confirms their authority ; for all these evils were predicted 
 and denounced against the Israelites, if they should 
 forsake the covenant which God made with their fathers 
 when he brought them out of Egypt q . And the exact 
 accomplishment of these prophecies verifies the declaration 
 of the Psalmist, that God turneth a fruitful field into 
 barrenness, for the wickedness of them that dwell therein r . 
 <c The Lord rooted them out of their land in anger and 
 in wrath, and in great indignation, and cast them into 
 another land, as it is this day. The secret things belong 
 unto the Lord our * God : but those things which are revealed 
 belong unto us and to our children for ever, that we may 
 do all the words of his law V 
 
 p Shaw's Travels, p. 336. quarto. <i Levit. xxvi. 32. 
 
 * Psal. cvii. 34, ■ Deut. xxix. 28, 29. 
 
 On the subjects of this and the preceding chapters, see Beausobre's 
 Introduction to the New Testament, and Reland's Antiquitates 
 Hebraorum. 
 
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