Class Th J" i o&. -T Book , Copyright N? CiSPHflGHT DEPOStR OTHER BOOKS BY DR. KEYSER A SYSTEM OF NATURAL THEISM. The Rational Proofs of the Divine Existence. Octavo; 144 pages; $1.00, net. "Dr. Keyser has given us a book of which he has no reason to be ashamed. It is clear, concise, up-to-date, comprehensive and con- vincing." — The Princeton Theological Review. "A most valuable apologetic handbook. . . . We know of nothing better adapted for the purpose." — Lutheran Church Work and Ob- server. A SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS. The Moral Teaching of Christianity. Octavo; 404 pages; $1.50, postpaid. "It is not like others. It is different, and it is better. In its arrangement, in its style, in its completeness, in its scholarliness, in its doctrinal saneness, it is a great book." — Dr. J. Henry Harms, President of Newberry College. THE RATIONAL TEST. Biblical Doctrine Upheld by Reason. 189 pages; 75 cents, net. Thq following subjects are discussed in a vital way: Theism, Biblical Inspiration, the Trinity, the Creation of Man, the Fall of Man, the Miraculous Conception of Christ, the Incarnation, the Vicarious Atonement, the New Birth, the Resurrection of the Body, the Last Judgment. In every case the evangelical doctrine is staunchly defended and maintained. ELECTION AND CONVERSION. Examined in the Light of Revelation and Reason. 12 mo; 184 pages; 75 cents, net. The author upholds the doctrines of justification by faith alone, salvation by grace alone, and election in view of a divinely begotten faith. Pelagianism and Synergism are totally rejected. A SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE. A Compend and Guide for College and Seminary Instruction. Paper covers; 43 pages (large); 25 cents; in lots of ten or more, 20 cents per copy. This text has been adopted in a number of colleges. THE LUTHERAN LITERARY BOARD, Publishers P. O. Box 573, Burlington, Iowa A SYSTEM OF GENERAL ETHICS LEANDER S. KEYSER, D. D. PROFESSOR OF ETHICS, THEISM AND CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE IN WITTENBERG COLLEGE AND OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY IN HAMMA DIVINITY SCHOOL, SPRINGFnXD, OHIO. AUTHOR OF "A SYSTEM OF NATURAL THEISM," "A SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS," "THE RATIONAL TEST," "ELECTION AND CONVERSION," ETC. BURLINGTON, IOWA THE LUTHERAN LITERARY BOARD 1918 COPYKIOHT 1918 T R. NEUMANN BURLINGTON, IOWA JAN "3 1919 ©(&A508839 PREFATORY NOTE HIS work aims to present a system of robust Ethics. Its purpose is to inculcate virile moral principles, produce stalwart moral character, and lead to the practice of uncompromising virtue. While the author is interested — deeply interested, indeed — in the philosophical and scientific aspects of the ethical scheme, he is frank to acknowledge that his interest has not been only, nor even chiefly, academic, but largely practical and earnest. A robust ethic does not mean a stern, unbending and ascetic system of rigorism. Far from it! True morality is surcharged with joy in contemplating ethical excellence and in trying to incarnate it in human life. It has Spartan sterlingness without Spartan austerity. By a robust ethical system the author has several distinct things in mind. He firmly believes that the Law of Right is the Law of God, and therefore that the Right is eternally and fundamentally Right. He also holds that the Right is inherently opposed to the Wrong; therefore he does not, will not, dare not blur or efface Moral Distinctions. He has no sympathy with those writers who make an apology or a semi-apology for wrong being and wrong doing. He regards the wrong as actual sin and guilt, and frankly calls it by those terms, whether they have a euphonious sound to modern ears or not. 4 A System of General Ethics He also believes that Conscience is a divinely implanted functioning power of the mind, a specialized faculty for perceiving and sensing Moral Distinctions. No less firmly does he advocate the freedom of the Will over against the Determinists of the day of whatever school or cult. Just as earnestly does he believe that man is in the world to per- form, willingly and gladly, a definite moral task, and to achieve a moral destiny which is eternal. Thus it will be seen that the author does not advocate a weak or emasculated morality — one that minimizes or ob- literates Moral Distinctions, or denies the supremacy of the Conscience, or teaches a namby-pamby doctrine of the Will. He feels very keenly that there is need today of sound and thorough-going moral teaching in the home, the school, the college, the university, and likewise in the civil and social relations of life. If we shall rear good, upright and incor- ruptible citizens for our country, we must instil clear and virile moral principles in the minds of the young. While they are in school and college is the psychological moment to do this. Therefore the author hopes that the present work will find its way as a text-book into the curricula of many of our colleges, alike those of the Church and those of the State; and this hope he cherishes out of the disinterested motive of real concern for the moral and spiritual welfare of the future citizenship of our country. He believes that the reader or student who masters the contents of this book will have a heightened appreciation of the Right and an in- creased abhorrence of the Wrong. Educators in some of our church colleges have expressed to the author a desire for a work on General Ethics, written in a simple and lucid style, that would not undermine the principles of Christian morality. The author has done his Prefatory Note 5 utmost to write such a work, and herewith submits it. He believes the Christian instructor will find that it prepares the way for Christian Ethics and Christian Practice. At the same time, teachers in other academic institutions will, the author sincerely hopes, find the work adapted to the preparation of their students for the highest and noblest service to their country and their age. The systematic arrangement of the ethical material, the articulated heads and subheads, and the various fonts of type will surely not mar the work for the intelligent gen- eral reader, and will be of much service, as the author knows by experience, to both teacher and student when the work is used for pedagogical purposes. If this book shall do some good in the world, shall give its readers clear conceptions of moral reality, shall help to make them more stalwart in virtue, and shall cheer them in the use of their ethical privileges and in the performance of their ethical tasks, the author will feel that his labor has achieved its greatest reward. Wittenberg College, The Author. Springfield, Ohio. CONTENTS Chapter Page Prefatory Note 3 General Outline of the System 9 An Articulated Outline 9 I. Introductory Data 17 II. Introductory Data (continued) 34 III. The Ground of Right 42 IV. The Ground of Right (continued) 50 V. The Law of Right 73 VI. The Law of Right (continued) 79 VII. The Law of Right (continued) 101 VIII. The Antithesis of Right 121 IX. The Antithesis of Right (continued) 139 X. The Antithesis of Right (continued) 154 XL Introductory Data (Practical Ethics) 161 XII. Man's Chief Duties (to himself) 168 XIII. Man's Chief Duties (to himself, continued) .. 180 XIV. Man's Chief Duties (to himself, continued) . .196 XV. Man's Chief Duties (to himself, continued) . .202 XVI. Man's Chief Duties (continued — to nature).. 2 16 XVII. Man's Chief Duties (ctd. — to his fellowmen) 224 XVIII. Man's Chief Duties (to his fellowmen, ctd.) 237 XIX. Man's Chief Duties (to his fellowmen, ctd.) 247 XX. Man's Chief Duties (to his fellowmen, ctd.) 258 XXL Man's Chief Duties ( continued— to God) 268 A Selected Bibliography 276 Index 279 A General Outline of the System PART I THEORETICAL ETHICS I. INTRODUCTORY DATA. II. THE GROUND OF RIGHT. III. THE LAW OF RIGHT. IV. THE ANTITHESIS OF RIGHT. PART II PRACTICAL ETHICS I. INTRODUCTORY DATA. II. MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES. 1. To Himself. 2. To Nature. 3. To His Fellowmen. 4. To God. An Articulated Outline PART I THEORETICAL ETHICS DIVISION I INTRODUCTORY DATA DEFINITIONS. 1. Importance of a correct definition. 2. Definition of General Ethics. 3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics. 4. Definition of Practical Ethics. 5. Defective definitions. 6. Definition of the text justified. 10 A System of General Ethics II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION. 1. The term "Ethics/ 2. The terms "Moral Science" and "Moral Philosophy. 3. Deontology. III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE. 1. Its distinctive data. 2. Its distinctive question. 3. Its distinctive vocabulary. IV. ETHICS AS A SCIENCE. 1. It deals with observed facts. 2. It assembles them into a system. 3. It makes legitimate inductions from them. V. METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS. 1. Definition. 2. Application to Ethics. VI. HISTORICAL SKETCH. 1. Moral intuitions innate. 2. Hebrew Ethics. 3. Heathen Ethics. 4. Earliest scientific efforts. 5. Later attempts. 6. From the first to the seventeenth centuries. 7. From the seventeenth century to the present time. VII. RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES. 1. To Psychology. 2. To Philosophy. 3. To Natural Science. 4. To Sociology. 5. To Natural Theism. 6. To Christian Theology and Ethics. DIVISION II THE GROUND OF RIGHT I. DEFINITION. II. THE TRUE VIEW. 1. Statement. 2. Rationale and argument (eight sub-divisions), 3. The Highest Good (Summum Bonum). (1) What it is. (2) Other views. An Articulated Outline 11 III. VARIOUS THEORIES EXAMINED AND ANALYZED. 1. The Sophists. 2. Socrates. 3. Plato. 4. Aristotle. 5. Hedonism (including Epicureanism and Eudemonism). 6. Stoicism. 7. Divine Absolutism. 8. Civil Authority. 9. Altruism. 10. Utilitarianism. 11. Opportunism. 12. Naturalistic Evolution. 13. Theistic Evolution. DIVISION III THE LAW OF RIGHT I. CONNECTING LINKS. 1. God created a cosmos. 2. He created it a moral economy. II. PROOFS OF MORAL ORDER IN NATURE. 1. The reign of law. 2. Design in nature. 3. Nature affords a moral arena for man. III. MORAL AGENTS. 1. Definitions. (1) Of moral agency. (2) Of a moral agent. 2. Man as a moral agent. (1) The only moral agent in the cosmos (known to Natural Ethics). (2) Source of man's moral character. (3) Man a unique figure in the cosmos. 3. Constituents of moral agency. (1) Rational intelligence. (2) Conscience. a. Definition. b. Other terms for conscience. c. Etymology of the term. d. Psychology of the conscience. (a) A perception. (b) A feeling. (c) Its relation to other psychical powers. 12 A System of General Ethics e. Origin of the Conscience. f. Conscience a distinct mental faculty. g. The supremacy of Conscience. (a) Definition. (b) Nature of its authority. (c) Why Conscience should be supreme. (d) Though supreme, Conscience is not infallible. (e) Conscience, though fallible, is man's ethical guide. (3) The Will. a. Definition of the Will. b. Its unique powers. (a) Of attention. (b) Of originating motion and action. (c) Of alternate choice. (d) Of execution. c. Freedom of Will a sine qua non of morality. d. Proofs of the freedom of the Will. (a) The testimony of consciousness. (b) The test of experiment. (c) The demands of man's environment. (d) The mind's intuitive distinction be- tween free and forced acts. (e) Determinism inconsistent with itself. (f) Experience versus speculation. (g) Harmful results of Determinism, (h) Objections stated and confuted, (i) Limitations of freedom. 4. Motives or Intentions. (1) Definition. (2) Motives essential to moral agency. (3) Varied relations of motives. a. To the Will. b. To the actor. c. To the action. DIVISION IV THE ANTITHESIS OF RIGHT I. CONNECTING LINKS. II. DEFINITION AND TERM. 1. Definition of Sin. 2. The term Sin. An Articulated Outline 13 III. THE FACT OF SIN. 1. Universal experience. 2. Moral Distinctions. (1) Definition. (2) Proofs. a. Universal consciousness. b. A postulate of human society. c. A postulate of human government. d. Argument from the constitution of the hu- man body. e. Difficulties considered. (3) The morally indifferent sphere (so-called). (4) A higher and a lower good. (5) Questions of casuistry. IV. THE GENESIS OF SIN. 1. Nature of the problem. 2. The true view. (1) Sin the act of a free moral agent. (2) Sin an eternal possibility, but not a necessity. (3) An adequate test necessary to moral agency. 3. Erroneous views. (1) God not the author of sin. (2) Sin not eternal. (3) Sin not posited in matter. (4) Sin not a lapse of the Infinite. (5) Sin not due to man's primitive animalism. (6) Agnosticism not satisfactory. V. THE CURE OF SIN. 1. The answer of Natural Ethics. (1) An enigma. (2) God might forgive sin. (3) God might help man morally. (4) Man may strive morally. (5) But assurance is lacking. 2. The answer of Christian Ethics. (1) God is loving and merciful. (2) God is also just. (3) The moral antimony adjusted through vicarious atonement. (4) God regenerates and sanctifies. (5) Assurance of the moral victory and goal. (6) The inner witness of the Spirit. 14 A System of General Ethics PART II PRACTICAL ETHICS DIVISION I INTRODUCTORY DATA I. DEFINITION OF PRACTICAL ETHICS. II. ITS RELATION TO THEORETICAL ETHICS. 1. A vital relation. 2. A vitally important relation. III. ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES. 1. Duties classified. 2. The term duty. 3. Duties and rights. DIVISION II MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (Individual Ethics). 1. To his body. (1) He should not despise his body. (2) He should preserve it in health. (3) He should control and regulate its passions. (4) He should remember its dignity. 2. To his mind. (1) The process of culture. a. The Intellect. b. The Sensibilities. c. The Will. (2) Motives for culture. a. Wrong motives. b. Right motives. 3. To his whole personality. (1) A strong personality. (2) A symmetrical personality. (3) A virtuous personality. a. Relation of virtue to character. b. Definition of virtue and virtues. c. Classification of virtues. d. List of virtues. (a) Positive content. (b) Antithesis. (c) Perversion. An Articulated Outline 15 II. MAN'S DUTIES TO NATURE (Nature Ethics). 1. To trace the divine purpose in her phenomena. 2. To study her scientifically. 3. To preserve, mould and develop her. 4. To show mercy to all her sentient creatures. III. MAN' 1. 5 DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (Social Ethics) General relation. (1) Love. a. Neighbor love. b. Patriotic love. c. Philanthropic love. d. Love for enemies. e. Other graces flowing from love. (2) Justice. a. In the industrial sphere. b. In the civic sphere. Specific relation. (1) The : family. a. Husband and wife. b. Parents and children. (2) The social organism. (3) The State. a. Duties of private citizens. b. Duties of public officials. (4) The Church. a. General Ethics and the Church. b. The duty of church membership. c. Duties of church members. d. Duties of ministers. IV. MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD (Theistic Ethics). 1. To believe in His existence. 2. To recognize Him in the affairs of life. 3. To trust and serve Him. 5. To anticipate eternal fellowship with Him. Summary and concluding observations. A System of General Ethics PART I THEORETICAL ETHICS DIVISION I INTRODUCTORY DATA CHAPTER I I. DEFINITIONS. 1. Importance of a correct definition. 2. Definition of General Ethics. 3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics. 4. Definition of Practical Ethics. 5. Defective definitions. 6. Definition of the text justified. II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION. 1. The term Ethics. 2. Moral Science and Moral Philosophy. 3. Deontology. III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE. 1. Its distinctive data. 2. Its distinctive question. 3. Its distinctive vocabulary. IV. ETHICS AS A SCIENCE. 1. It deals with observed facts. 2. It assembles them into a system. 3. It makes legitimate inductions from them. V. METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS. 1. Definition. 2. Application to Ethics. 18 A System of General Ethics I. DEFINITIONS. 1. Importance of a correct definition: At the beginning of the study of any theme a clear-cut and comprehensive definition is all-important. It may be compared to getting a proper general view of a landscape which is subsequently to be investigated in detail. It is get- ting the true geography of a subject. Not only at the be- ginning of our discipline, but also all along the way, a de- cided advantage will be gained if we can agree on a correct and lucid definition. 2. Definition of General Ethics: GENERALi ETHICS IS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN PRINCIPLE, CHARACTER AND CONDUCT. 3. Definition of Theoretical Ethics. Theoretical Ethics is the scientific treatment of the fun- damental principles of morality. It deals with the ground, nature and laws of right and wrong, and may therefore be called the profounder part of our science. 4. Definition of Practical Ethics: Practical Ethics is the systematic treatment of the appli- cation of moral principles to human life. It deals with life, duty and conduct, and thus may be called the plainer part of our science. 5. Defective Definitions: (1) "Ethics is the science of conduct; it considers the actions of human beings in reference to their Tightness or wrongness, their tendency to good or evil" (Mackenzie). 2 1. The word "General" is used in the title of this work, not to distinguish our science from Special Ethics, but from Christian Ethics. For reasons that are satisfactory to the author he prefers the adjective "General" in the title to either of the adjectives "Natural" or "Rational." 2. "Manual of Ethics," page 1. Introductory Data 19 First, this definition is defective because it limits Ethics to the sphere of conduct, whereas, in reality, our science deals primarily with principles, motives and character, and secondarily with outward deportment. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he," says a great ethical writer. "Blessed are the pure in heart : for they shall see God." The inside of the platter, and not merely the outside, should be made clean. A man's external conduct might be correct accord- ing to all the canons of Practical Ethics, and yet he might be a very immoral man, because his heart, his motives, were evil. It is, in fact, the intention that determines the mor- ality of the actor. The hypocrite, as soon as his true char- acter becomes known, is universally despised. "Ethics is quite as much a study of character as it is of conduct'*' (Hyslop). 3 In the second place, the above definition is defective be- cause it lacks philosophical foundation; it deals only with man, and does not go back to find the ultimate principle and home of the right and the good. (2) Ethics is "the science of the phenomena of human character and conduct, and the art of directing the human will toward the ideal order of life"' (Hyslop). 4 Acute and analytical as Dr. Hyslop is, we think this defi- nition, which is his formal one, lacks definiteness and proper limitation ; for every definition of Ethics ought to point out specifically, and in so many words, that it deals with moral realities and phenomena. Therefore it ought to contain the word "moral" or the phrase "right and wrong/' The phrase, "the ideal order of life," sounds well, but it is not specific enough, and itself needs explication. Besides, 3. "The Elements of Ethics," p. 3. 4. "The Elements of Ethics," p. 1. 20 A System of General Ethics as we shall try to show further on in this book, morality is not limited to the human world; it must also be sought in its ultimate philosophical basis. (3) "Ethics, or Moral Science, is the science of man's life of duty, or what man ought to do in the present world" (Gregory). 5 No! the noble science of Ethics does not deal only, or even chiefly, with what man ought to do, but with what man ought to be. Nor is it limited merely to the human realm; it must go back to the Primal Moral Personality. Moreover, to say that it treats only of duty and ought puts such a strain upon the moral life as to rob it of all joy and rebound. There is a realm of moral privilege and blessed- ness as well as a realm of duty. Neither is there good reason for believing that the uplifting principles of ethical science should be limited to "the present world ;" well may it have an outlook into futurity. 6. Definition of the text justified: We think the definition given under 2 above will be found to be the simplest and most inclusive that can well be framed, and that for a number of reasons : ( 1 ) It clearly determines and marks off the ethical sphere, namely, the realm of the right, and its opposite, the wrong, the concep- tion of which is easily grasped by human intuition. (2) It goes to the root of the matter by seeking the ultimate principle and the objective law of right, and also of it anti- thesis, the wrong. (3) The truly ethical must have its dwelling in the character of the moral agent, and must not be limited to the external deportment. (4) Yet the ethical in character must blossom out in true conduct in order to verify itself as genuine and prove of benefit to the world. 5. "Christian Ethics," p. 13. Introductory Data 21 Men are to "let their light shine," and not "hide it under a bushel." An objection must be dealt with at this point. There are persons who question whether a science of the wrong can be formulated. The objection is not valid for these rea- sons: First, we are able to investigate the ultimate prin- ciple and source of wrong, and in doing so we are obliged to use scientific and philosophical methods ; second, although wrong is per se the principle of moral anarchy, yet, on account of the superior power of God and the right, evil has not succeeded in throwing the world into chaos ; third, for this reason wrong — or sin — is capable of scientific treat- ment and classification ; thus the theologian is able to di- vide sins into various genera and species, as, for example, original sin and actual sin, sins of omission and sins of commission, inner sins and overt sins, etc. Therefore we conclude logically that the definition of Ethics ought to in- clude the word "wrong" as well as the word "right." 6 6. We do not wish to confuse the reader with definitions ; yet we believe it will be instructive to give a few others that are almost, if not quite, adequate from recent standard works : "Ethics is the sci- ence of rectitude and duty; it treats of the right and its obliga- tions" (Valentine: "Theoretical Ethics," p. 15). "The subject-matter of Ethics is morality, the phenomenon of right and wrong" (Thilly: "Introduction to Ethics," p. 5). "Ethics may be defined as the science of morality, or the science of moral distinctions" (DeLa- guna: "Introduction to the Science of Ethics," pp. 3, 4). "Ethics . . . the science of moral personality and of moral good" (Hyslop: "The Elements of Ethics," p. 4). The virtue of Dr. Hyslop's defi- nition is that it defines the science both concretely ("moral person- ality") and abstractly ("moral good"). It must be said, however, that the above definition is given incidentally by Dr. Hyslop, where- as his formal definition, given on page 1 of his book, is not so good, and therefore we have ventured to criticise it in a preceding section. We frankly admit that we have more than once been almost on the point of adopting the following definition as the formal one in this book: Ethics is the scientific treatment of the sources, prin- ciples and practice of right and wrong. At all events, this defini- tion would include all the topics treated in our ethical system. 22 A System of General Ethics II. TERMS AND THEIR DERIVATION. 1. The term Ethics: The term "Ethics" is derived from the Greek, r\0ixct, moral, which comes from n^oc;, character, which, accord- ing to Aristotle, grew from the root, e$oc„ meaning cus- tom or habit. However, the noble science of Ethics, as it is now developed, should not be judged by the etymology of the term, for it means far more than merely the habits or customs of the people. As we shall have occasion to show again and again in our work, the right and the wrong have a real and distinctive basis and place in the economy of the universe, and are not rooted in the shallow soil of mere social and civil convenances. 2. Moral Science and Moral Philosophy: Ethics used to be called Moral Science or Moral Philos- ophy. The word "moral" is derived from the Latin mos (adjective, moralis), which also means custom or usage. Here again it will be seen that the word "moral" has come to have a higher meaning than its derivation would indicate. The same is true of many other words in modern use, as, for example, virtue and conscience, as will be shown fur- ther on. The terms "Moral Science" and "Moral Philosophy" are seldom used at present to designate our discipline, but have given way to the briefer and more descriptive term "Ethics." 3. Deontology : This word has been suggested as a name for our science. 7 Its derivation is, to beov, what is due, and, Xoyoc;, dis- 7. See the remarks of Valentine in his "Theoretical Ethics," p. 16, footnote. Also Davis : "Elements of Ethics," p. 36. Introductory Data 23 course ; therefore a discourse about duty. The term, how- ever, has never come into vogue, and it would not be a good name, because Ethics deals with rights, privileges and moral joy, as well as with duties. III. THE ETHICAL SPHERE. 1. Its distinctive data: The science of Ethics deals with a specific and well-de- fined body of facts. Its data are not something nebulous, far-away, hard to define, and difficult to grasp with the mental faculties, as some men seem to think, but stand out clear and distinct. What are some of these outstanding phenomena? They are morality itself, the right and the wrong, the law of righteousness, moral distinctions, the conscience and its imperative, moral obligation, moral ap- proval, moral aversion, rewards and penalties, moral free- dom, the choice between good and evil. These are plain, every-day facts with which all rational men are familiar, and by which their lives are largely controlled and their characters largely moulded. Many of these data are known intuitively, just as men know themselves and outward real- ities by intuition rather than by rational processes. A few simple differentiations may be profitable at this point. Physical science deals with matter, its laws and varied phenomena ; Psychology deals with mind and its functioning powers ; Philosophy searches after the nature and essence of being itself, and tries to formulate a world- view ; but our science of Ethics treats solely of moral re- alities and phenomena, of the principles and practice of right and wrong. It should be observed, too, that ethical data are just as clearly recognizable in human life and experience as are 24 A System of General Ethics those of Physics, Chemistry, Astronomy, Psychology, or any other science. A little thought will make this thesis plain. You and I are just as vividly conscious that we ought to be true to our highest moral ideals ; that we ought to treat our fellowmen justly and kindly, — we are just as clearly conscious of these facts as we are that a tree is growing on the campus, that a bird is singing in the tree, and that the sun is shining in the sky. That we have a moral nature — a conscience and a will — is just as patent and persistent a fact of consciousness as that we have bodies and cognition and feeling. Indeed, long before many — or perhaps we should say, any — of the physical sci- ences were known, men obeyed the moral imperative within them; they recognized the authority of the Ought in their souls and above them. Besides, moral data are just as open for study and scien- tific classification as are those of botany and geology. Also, in formulating definitions we are able to delimit the ethical sphere just as clearly as the physical and psychical fields. Perhaps the reason some scholars have made so much of a "problem" of ethical phenomena is this : They have been too speculative; they have wanted to know ethical reality in its very essence — what it is in its inmost nature. Such an achievement, however, is impossible in any sphere of study and knowledge. Elementally we do not know any more about the substance of matter than we do about the substance of mind or spirit. What is matter? is just as much of a "problem" as is, What is morality? In the last analysis we know only phenomena in both the physical and psychical realms. The noumena, or the essence of things, we do not know. If it is an unsolved problem as to how the mind functions ethically, it is no less an unsolved prob- lem how the mind functions in other ways — in sense-per- Introductory Data 25 ception, in self-consciousness, in feeling, in volition. In all these matters we must simply fall back on consciousness and intuition. To deny the validity of human conscious- ness when it reports moral content and experience, and yet accept its testimony in other matters, is manifestly so incon- sistent and ex parte as to be irrational; and to doubt its witness altogether is to nullify the very basis of knowledge, render all thought abortive, make all science impossible, and land us in the mist and bog of absolute agnosticism. Still more, it would be perilous to the well-being of individuals, society and government. A concrete example will show how vividly ethical reality impinges on human experience. The author of this book has made the following test a number of times with his classes in the college and seminary in which he is engaged as a teacher of ethics : Suppose a member of this class should commit a mental error during the session, and should also tell a wilful falsehood ; now suppose both lapses should be exposed before the entire class — in which case would he feel the greater shame and humiliation? Every time the answer was prompt and emphatic : In the case of the false- hood. Could a more convincing proof be given that ethical facts stand out in human consciousness with unique dis- tinctness and power? The ethical "problem" is a problem only to the man who has left the sphere of plain, every-day experience, and has lost himself in the mistland of meta- physical speculation. 2. Its distinctive question: The distinctive question of Ethics is this : "Is it right ?" implying, of course, its obverse, "Is it wrong?" Whenever the student is in doubt as to whether a proposition belongs to the ethical sphere or not, let him test it with the simple 26 A System of General Ethics question, "Is it right?" In that way much confusion will be avoided. To impress the matter, let us differentiate between the fundamental question of Psychology and Ethics. In the former the primary question is, "Is it mental ?" This ques- tion may be expanded thus : What is mind ? What is the relation of mind to matter, or of mind to the brain ? What are the various faculties or functioning powers of the mind ? Thus all propositions that belong to mentality per se belong to the science of Psychology. Now, while the ethical prin- ciple runs through all psychic acts and relations, its funda- mental question is different, for here we must put the in- terrogation, "Is it right?" before every proposition. Thus: Is it right to use the mind in this way or that? Is it right to cultivate and employ the Intellect, the Sensibilities and the Will in the way I am doing? Is it right to make con- science supreme in all mental functioning? What is the highest good to be attained by human culture? Compare the fundamental question of Philosophy with that of ethical science? In Philosophy the elemental ques- tion is, "Is it ultimate ?" This means, Is it the ultimate re- ality? What is the essence of things, their inner nature and composition, their ontology, their very being? What is matter? What is mind? What is God? What is the ultimate unifying principle of the universe? 8 True, Ethics is also concerned with ultimate questions, but only insofar as they bear upon moral reality. In its own right it enters the field of philosophical inquiry, not to solve all problems, but only its own special problem of the ultimate ground of right. In the philosophical province Ethics will consider such questions as these: What is the moral status of the 8. Philosophy deals with experience as a whole (Cf. Jevons : 'Philosophy: What is it?"). Introductory Data 27 ultimate reality? Is it good or bad? Is the ultimate re- ality a moral personality or not? What is the law of right that holds its "categorical imperative" over the human con- science? Has the mind an innate moral constitution, and, if so, whence has it been derived ? Is the law of moral dis- tinctions based upon ultimate reality, or is it merely an il- lusory or arbitrary distinction? Thus Theoretical Ethics invades the sphere of Philosophy, but only to determine its own problem, that of moral reality. The ultimate question of Ethics is, therefore, sui generis. 3. Its distinctive vocabulary: It is interesting to observe that our science has a nomen- clature all its own. The more advanced a people become, the larger and richer will be their ethical terminology. A good discipline for the student would be to make as long a list of ethical words as he can; then, if he were to think of eliminating them from the language, under the notion that they do not stand for realities, but only for illusions, he would see how sadly human speech would be impover- ished. Indeed, it would lose most of its dignity, distinction and worth. We shall note a few of the more important ethical words. There is the word "moral." What a clear-cut conception it at once conveys to the mind! We speak of moral prin- ciple, a moral cause, a moral reform, a moral man, and every person of ordinary intelligence intuitively grasps the peculiar idea conveyed by the term. Note the interesting differentiation to be made among words formed from the word "moral" by means of prefixes — "unmoral," "non-moral," "immoral." The first two mod- ify objects or principles that have no moral quality at all, while the last signifies something that is positively evil. 28 A System of General Ethics You would say of a plant or an animal that it is unmoral or non-moral, but not that it is immoral. However, you would apply the word "immoral*' to a man of bad character and life. Again, the word "moral" is used in two different senses, a narrower and a wider; sometimes it means that which is good, as when we say a moral man or a moral cause; at other times it is used to designate the whole sphere of Ethics, as when, like the word "Ethics" itself, it includes a treatment of the wrong as well as the right. For instance, when we say, "Ethics is the science of morals or of moral- ity," the terms embrace both the right and the wrong. As a rule, we instinctively sense the correct meaning by the context in which the terms are used. The word "ought" is a most potent ethical word; one of the regal words of our language. It bears the scepter of the moral imperative over the human conscience. It is the word by which Immanuel Kant designated his well- known "categorical imperative," because, when the ought commands, it must be obeyed, or the offender must bear the condign punishment. If we know we ought to do a thing, that is, or at least should be, the end of all argument. A number of years ago an effective lecturer was wont to illus- trate the potency of the word "ought" in this way: Place the whole material world on one end of the scales, and the word "ought" on the other, and the word will outweigh the world ; again, place the whole material universe on one end of the balance, and the word "ought" on the other, and the mighty little word will tip the scales. This was simply a striking way of saying that the moral imperative out- weighs all other considerations. We may even speak with- out irreverence of what God ought to do. Observe the many ethical particles of every-day speech: Introductory Data 29 "should," "would," "must," "will," "shall," "can," each of which conveys its peculiar shade of meaning in the ethical realm. The word "should" is only a milder term for "ought." Other distinctively ethical terms are: "right," "righteousness," "good," "rectitude," "virtue," "purity," "chastity," "holiness," "sanctity," "uprightness," "veracity," "probity," "honesty," "courage" (moral), "conscientious- ness;" and their antitheses: "wrong," "evil," "sin," "un- righteousness," "wickedness," "vileness," "cowardice," "obliquity," "meanness," "mendacity," "perfidy," "two- facedness," etc. Besides, all the words that involve the action of the will bear a moral significance, like "freedom," "liberty," "choice," "volition," "decision," "steadfastness," "determination," "firmness," and many more. Even their opposites, like "thralldom," "bondage," "indecision," "vac- illation," and the like, connote an abuse of man's moral powers, and therefore have their ethical implications. A good many words belong to the moral sphere or the non-moral, according to their use. When we speak of a good apple, we refer only to a material quality, and thus use the word in its non-moral sense ; but when we speak of a good man, we predicate a moral attribute, and use the word in a moral sense. 9 In this connection the word "virtue" is an interesting one. Derived from the Latin vir, man, it originally meant manli- ness or masculinity. Today it has almost, if not quite, lost 9. In dealing with the word "good" Herbert Spencer revealed his lack of clear ethical discernment; for he seems to think that, when we speak of a good or bad knife, gun or house, we mean the same thing as when we speak of a good or bad man ! This is an instance in which speculation dulled the native intuitions of a great man's mind. Had Mr. Spencer but remembered the simple fact that we use many words in different senses, according to the context and circumstances, he would have been saved confusion of thought. Hyslop (ut supra, pp. 94, 95) criticises Spencer acutely. 30 A System of General Ethics that significance, for we may speak just as appropriately of a virtuous woman as of a virtuous man, although we would be repelled by the idea of a masculine woman. Masculinity is the glory of a man, while feminity is the crowning beauty of a woman. However, today the word "virtue" may properly be used in both a moral and a non- moral sense. We say of a medicine, "It has great virtue" — non-moral ; we say of a person, "He is a man of great virtue" — moral. The mind intuitively perceives the dis- tinction. Thus the distinctive ethical sphere has been vindicated ; Ethics deal with a distinct and outstanding body of facts in the world. It has a field that is all its own. IV. ETHICS AS A SCIENCE. 1. It deals with observed facts. 2. It assembles them into a system. 3. It makes legitimate inductions from them. All these are marks of a science. This is a good defini- tion: "Science is classified and verifiable knowledge." And here we maintain, as has been said before, that the data of Ethics are just as clearly perceived, just as capable of intel- ligent investigation, just as outstanding and dominating in their influence and benefit (sometimes much more so), as are the data of botany, chemistry, biology, psychology or any other of the accepted sciences. 10 Indeed, when seri- 10. Frank Thilly (''Introduction to Ethics," pp. 5, 6) : "It is a fact that men call certain characters and actions moral and im- moral, right and wrong, good and bad : that they approve of them and disapprove of them, express moral judgments upon them, eval- uate them. . . . Now this fact is as capable and as worthy of in- vestigation as any other fact in the universe, and we need a science that will subject it to careful analysis." Also page 9: 'That we place a value upon things, that we call them right or good, wrong or bad. is the important fact in Ethics; is what makes a science of Ethics possible." Introductory Data 31 ously considered, its facts are of superlative importance; for no civilization, however advanced, can long endure un- less it is founded on sound ethical principles and practices. To add emphasis to this argument, we may well say that a man might be a great scholar along scientific lines, but if he were an immoral man, his scholastic attainments would not make him a good and useful citizen of the community or country. On the other hand, a man of little scholarship might be a most desirable and useful citizen, providing he had a noble and upright character. From these facts we see that Ethics not only has a right to rank among the sci- ences, but also is a science of signal importance to humanity. It is true that our science must sometimes deal with and reason from a priori principles ; but even so those prin- ciples are first based on the observed or empirical facts of nature and thought ; then, having first been established by the inductive method, which is the recognized scientific method of the day, we have a right to use them in the a priori or deductive way. For example, any theory that is diametrically opposed to the fundamental laws of thought cannot rightly be regarded as a true view. All the sciences employ this method, namely : By an induction from a large number of carefully observed facts, an hypothesis is de- rived ; then this hypothesis is applied to other phenomena, and if it adequately and logically accounts for them, it be- comes an established theory, a working basis. So in Gen- eral Ethics. Ethics is called a normative science, 11 in contrast with physical science, because it sets forth a standard, rule, or norm — that is, the ideal of moral good, by which all actual character and conduct are to be tested ; whereas the physi- 11. Vide Mackenzie: "Manual of Ethics," pp. 4-8, 20-22; Mur- ray: "A Handbook of Christian Ethics," pp. 1-3. 32 A System of General Ethics cal sciences are purely empirical — that is, they are con- cerned with things simply as they are, and not with things as they ought to be. However, it is not correct to say, as one author does, that "Ethics is the science of the ideal as contrasted with the actual." No; our science also deals with actual conditions, and examines, classifies and tries to account for them; at the same time it treats as well of what ought to be. To put it in an epigram, Ethics deals with both moral reality and moral ideality. Its purpose as an art is to bring the imperfect up to the ideal or perfect standard, but its business as a science is adequately to treat both the actual and the ideal in the sphere of morality. V. METHODOLOGY OF ETHICS. 1. Definition: Methodology in general is the scientific method of classi- fying, co-ordinating and developing any science, either as a whole or in any of its branches. It is not often dealt with in a separate way, but its processes and results are em- ployed whenever an attempt is made to organize and un- fold a science. 2. Application to Ethics: Every ethicist uses his own method. An interesting dis- cipline would be to study the contents of a number of good works on the subject, making a general outline of the method of classification and order employed by each author. It would be found that some authors deal so fundamentally, vitally and logically with their subject that their Method- ology is easily mastered and remembered, while others have thrown their material together in a more or less cha- otic manner, creating only confusion of mind. An attempt has been made in this work to be fundamen- Introductory Data 33 tal, systematic, logical and progressive. Whether the effort has been successful or not, each reader must judge for him- self. Part I treats of the fundamental principles of Ethics, such as definitions, relations, the ultimate ground of right, the objective law of right, the origin and nature of wrong; while Part II seeks to apply these principles to the conduct of human life; the two Parts being related to each other as the tree to the fruit. An examination of the "general outline" and the "articulated outline" on preceding pages will indicate the main features to the student and show him how the details of the system are wrought out. We know of no other work on Ethics that is built up on this plan. 12 12. We are glad to acknowledge that Dr. Milton Valentine's book, "Theoretical Ethics," has been of much suggestive value to us in working out our system. To our mind, he treats the ethical prin- ciples and data in as fundamental a way as any writer on ethical themes with whom we are acquainted. His discussion of what he calls the "Proximate Ground" and the "Ultimate Ground" of Right is capable and most satisfying. However, he begins with the fact of moral distinctions and works down to the foundation. Our method is to begin with the foundation, namely, the theistic view of the universe, and build thereon the superstructure of the system. Moreover, Dr. Valentine deals only with the theory of Ethics, whereas we believe a scientific system requires also the inclusion of the practical treatment of the subject. How to apply the theoretical principles of morality to every-day life is sometimes the most diffi- cult problem, and requires scientific, as well as practical, insight. CHAPTER II VI. HISTORICAL SKETCH. 1. Moral intuitions. 2. Hebrew Ethics. 3. Heathen Ethics. 4. Earliest scientific efforts. 5. Later attempts. 6. From the first to the seventeenth century. 7. From the seventeenth century to date. VII. RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCIENCES. 1. To Psychology. 2. To Philosophy. 3. To Natural Science. 4. To Sociology. 5. To Natural Theism. 6. To Christian Theology and Ethics. VI. HISTORICAL SKETCH. 1. Moral intuitions: Moral intuitions date from man's creation, being innate. Both history and reason prove this to be so. As far back as any historical records can be found, men were moral be- ings, however undeveloped. Reason and science also teach us that the moral could not have evolved from the non- moral merely by resident forces, for that would have vio- lated the principle of casuality, which teaches that no effect can be greater than its cause. Hence human morality both in character and conduct existed long before any science of Ethics was attempted. The same may be said of all the other sciences — for example, botany, astronomy, mathe- matics, psychology and theology. 2. Hebrew Ethics: Among the Hebrews all men were considered capable of virtue, and a very high standard of morality was inculcated Introductory Data 35 by their prophets, although the practice of the people fell far below it. If we accept the Old Testament as a record of veritable history, man was created a moral agent, able to discern between right and wrong and determine himself by the use of his will toward them, and was subjected to a moral test, which was placed before him in the form of "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil," of which he was forbidden to eat. Whether the narrative is actual his- tory or not, it is evident that the Hebrews believed that man was created a moral being, with the power of self- determination and choice, and that is surely the highest and noblest conception that the human mind has yet reached. To many profound minds the exalted character of this eth- ical conception is one of the convincing proofs that the Bible is a divinely inspired book. 1 The fact is also to be noted that there was a progressive development and reve- lation of ethical ideals in Hebrew history, culminating in the marvellous ethical teachings of Christianity. 3. Heathen Ethics: Among the heathen peoples ethical ideals also prevailed, sometimes to a high degree with their leaders; but usually only a certain favored class were considered capable of virtue, while the rest were regarded as little better than animals, fitted only to be slaves. This exclusive, or, we might say, aristocratic, kind of ethics was taught even in Plato's work, "The Ideal Republic." 4. Earliest scientific efforts: The first attempts at a scientific and philosophic treat- ment of morality were made by Socrates, Plato and Aris- totle. Earlier sporadic efforts were made by the Sophists, 1. The author of this work accepts the view stated above. 36 A System of General Ethics but the results were almost negligible, and left little perma- nent impress on human history. 5. Later attempts. Later attempts at giving a philosophical and rational account of morality were made by the Epicureans (Hedon- ists) and Stoics. Among the Greeks we may mention Epi- curus and Zeno, and among the Romans, Seneca, Cicero, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. 6. From the first to the seventeenth centuries: From the establishment of Christianity to the seventeenth century, Ethics was usually included in Theology, and therefore was called Christian or Theological Ethics. 7. From the seventeenth century to date: Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, Ethics has taken a prominent place among the so-called normative sciences, along with Logic, Esthetics, etc. Christian Ethics has become a separate science in distinction from Christian Dogmatics, because the moral data were apt to be slighted when they were treated in connection with doctrines. Great and noble systems of Natural or General Ethics, based merely on nature and reason, have been developed by many writers in these modern times. 2 VII. RELATION OF ETHICS TO OTHER SCI- ENCES. All the sciences are inter-related. None of them can be isolated from the rest; they touch, overlap, integrate. It might be said that a close fellowship or fraternity exists among them. It is the business of science to distinguish 2. For a number of the facts stated in our historical sketch we are indebted to Valentine's "Theoretical Ethics," pp. 17-20. Introductory Data 37 them in thought, but not to separate them in fact and in practice. This will be seen as we proceed to show the re- lation of Ethics to some of its cognate sciences. 1. To Psychology: In so far as Ethics deals with man's moral constitution (the rational intelligence, the conscience and the will), it necessarily invades the province of Psychology. Therefore it is important that the student of Ethics should have had some drill in this discipline ; for the conscience and the will and their functioning powers cannot well be understood without a knowledge of the whole congeries of mental fac- ulties and their inter-relations. However, the chief inter- est of Ethics is not in Psychology per se, nor in formulat- ing a system of mental science, but only in the moral func- tioning of the several faculties and their relation to the conscience and the will ; that is, Ethics studies the psychical faculties primarily with an ethical interest, and only inci- dentally with a psychical interest. In order that the student may have before him the position of the conscience and the will in the psychical scheme, we subjoin here an outline of the functioning powers of the human mind: OUTLINE OF THE HUMAN MIND (Showing the Psychology of Man's Ethical Nature). I. THE INTELLECT. 1. The Sense: (1) Sight; (2) Hearing; (3) Touch; (4) Smell; (5) Taste. 2. The Understanding: (1) Reflection. (2) Memory. 38 A System of General Ethics (3) Imagination. (4) Scientific Faculty. (5) Logical Faculty. (6) Philosophical Faculty. 3. The Intuition: (1) Cognition of outward reality. (2) Cognition of self: self-consciousness. (3) Cognition of time and space. (4) Cognition of cause and effect. (5) Cognition of axioms. (6) Cognition of truth and error. (7) Cognition of beauty and repulsiveness : Esthetic Faculty. (8) Cognition of Right and Wrong: Conscience as Perception. (9) Cognition of God: theistic intuition. II. THE SENSIBILITIES (Emotions, Feelings). 1. The Sentient Emotions. 2. The Psychical Emotions. 3. The Intuitional Emotions. ( 1 ) Aff ectional. the Moral Sense. (2) Esthetic. (3) Scientific and philosophical. (4) Ethical : Conscience as Feeling (5) Theistic. III. THE WILL. 1 . The i Will in Liberty: (1) The power of attention. (2) The power of choice. (3) The power of execution. Introductory Data 39 2. The Will in Action: (1) Through the Sense. (2) Through the Understanding. (3) Through the Intuition. (4) In the Emotions. When we come subsequently to treat of man's moral con- stitution, we shall make use of the foregoing outline, and therefore it should be carefully studied. 2. To Philosophy: Whenever Ethics seeks to find the ultimate ground and principle of right and the basis of moral law and the moral imperative in man, it enters the sphere of Philosophy, and deals with one of its outstanding problems. There is a Philosophy of Ethics, and there is an ethical Philosophy. The first part of this work must touch on the philosophical section of our theme. The difference between Philosophy and Theoretical Ethics is this: The former seeks to solve the ethical problem, that is, what the good is ; having done which, it passes on to the discussion of its other problems, the problem of being (Ontology), the problem of knowl- edge (Epistemology), etc. 3 On the other hand, Theoretic- al Ethics not only tries to solve the problem of right and wrong, but also endeavors to assemble and organize all the data of morality into a system, making it a science as well as a philosophy. For the above reasons the discipline of Philosophy is of great value to the student of Ethics; it affords him mental training, and also throws much light on the profounder problems of our science. 3. To Natural Science: Scientific Ethics gladly accepts the established results of research in the realm of nature, which in many ways has 3. Vide Hibben's "The Problems of Philosophy," which is a lucid work. 40 A System of General Ethics proved helpful in solving the problems of Ethics. If our science did not willingly recognize truth wherever it finds it, it could not properly be called ethical, for one of the qualities of true morality is open-mindedness, receptivity to the truth. However, Ethics cannot accept mere un- proved speculations and theories in any realm of investi- gation. When Natural Science tries to account for "the data of Ethics" on purely naturalistic grounds, it leaves its specific field, that of the material world, and invades the realm of Ethics and Philosophy. The right to do this is not denied it; but in doing this, it should be thorough- going, and should take into account all the ethical phenom- ena, and not merely the physical conditions. It should be remembered, too, that the ethicist of today is in duty bound to deal with the modern scientific hypothesis of evolution. 4. To Sociology: This is a very important practical science, which has also its profound elemental principles, and therefore has a phil- osophical foundation. What is its relation to Ethics? In all sociological problems the question of right and wrong should always be a fundamental consideration. Sociology, which deals with men in their relations with one another, should not become merely utilitarian and economic and ma- terialise; it should see to it that all social relations are based on the principles of righteousness. Therefore, Ethics and Sociology are closely bound together, and should walk amicably hand in hand. One study will complement the other. Sociology will broaden and deepen the ethical insight and interest, and will endeavor to make out a pro- gram of social welfare, while Ethics will keep social science loyal to the principles of righteousness, and will never allow it to wallow in the mire of mere expediency and utilitarian- ism. Introductory Data 41 5. To Natural Theism: In so far as Ethics seeks for the ultimate ground of right in the being of God, it is a theistic science, and depends on the validity of the theistic arguments, and thus it is organ- ically related to Natural Theism. What is known in Theism as the Moral Argument is one of the outstanding proofs of the divine existence. 4 6. To Christian Theology and Ethics: In a Christian land Natural Ethics cannot avoid contact with Christian teaching, which sheds a radiant light upon all the ethical problems. Indeed, it would be unethical as well as unscientific for Ethics to ignore the most outstand- ing and potent ethical phenomenon in the world, namely, Christianity. Thus, while the ethicist may try to work only in the light of nature and reason, he may be uncon- sciously influenced by the Christian revelation which shines all around him. It cannot be denied that the best and clear- est systems of Natural Ethics have been wrought out in times and countries that have been illumined by Biblical teaching. Christian Ethics is broader than Natural Ethics, because the former accepts all the light and data that may be derived from nature and reason, and then adds to it the clearer light that comes from divine revelation. The God of the Bible, according to its own teaching, is also the God who created the physical cosmos, made man to fit into it, and still continues to preserve and care for it. 4. Readers who may wish to investigate the arguments for the divine existence are referred to such works as Flint's "Theism" and "Anti - Theistic Theories," Valentine's "Natural Theology," and Micou's "Basic Ideas in Religion." For a succint presentation of all these arguments the author would venture to call attention to his own work, entitled "A System of Natural Theism." DIVISION II THE GROUND OF RIGHT CHAPTER III I. DEFINITION. II. THE TRUE VIEW. 1. Statement. 2. Rationale and argument. 3. The Highest Good (Summum Bonum) (1) What it is. (2) Other views. I. DEFINITION. By the Ground of Right we mean the ultimate source and origin of the Right; in other words, its eternal dwelling place. These are the fundamental problems that must be considered in this thesis: What is the ultimate source of moral good? Why is one thing right and another wrong? What is the raison d f etre of moral distinctions P 1 1. We cannot agree with Dr. Hyslop ("The Elements of Ethics," p. 21) that all inquiries into the ultimate reality and nature of the ethical is to be relegated to Metaphysics. An ethical system that does not seek for a philosophical foundation surely cannot rightly be said to be adequate. Dr. Hyslop is inconsistent with himself, for he says in one place that such problems as the freedom of the will, etc., "must be deferred to Metaphysics ;" yet he devotes 73 pages to a discussion of the freedom of the will ! Important as this thesis is, it is still more important to find the ultimate basis of right and wrong. The Ground of Right 43 II. THE TRUE VIEW. 1. Statement: THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF RIGHT IS GOD, THE ETERNAL, PERSONAL, SELF-EXISTENT AND ALL-PER- FECT CREATOR AND PRESERVER OF ALL FINITE BEING.2 2. Rationale and argument: ( 1 ) What is known as the Proximate Ground of Right, 3 or the Moral Law, could not have originated, framed and authenticated itself. No other kind of law enacts and exe- cutes itself ; then why should the moral law be the sole ex- ception to the rule? To the fact that there is a moral law almost all nations and individuals bear witness, and they instinctively acknowledge its authority. Even those whose speculations have brought them mental confusion on this point still feel the moral imperative over them and within their consciences. The very fact that we have the term, "the moral law/' in common usage, recognized everywhere in society, proves that it must have objective reality, or else our noblest thoughts are only a snare and a delusion. Now, as has been said, a law connotes a lawgiver and an executor. A law does not belong to that class of realities that can originate and administer themselves, but that al- ways imply a personal power back of them. A law is sim- ply a mode of procedure, a modus operandi, not the power itself that operates in the prescribed way. Therefore we reason that the moral law must have back of it a personal source and administrant — that is, God. 2. One of the ablest proponents of this view was Dr. Milton Val- entine ("Theoretical Ethics," pp. 138-181). His work is sound and stimulating. John Fiske ("Cosmic Philosophy," II, p. 470) says that Deity is "knowable as the eternal source of a Moral Law which is implicated with each action of our lives." 3. Cf. Valentine, ut supra, pp. 168-178. 44 A System of General Ethics (2) To stop in our quest for the ground of right before we get back to the Absolute Being, or God, is superficial. For example, to posit the source of good and right in man's subjective rational being as Aristotle did, does not satisfy the mind, because we intuitively ask, Whence came man's rational nature? To say that the ground of right is in the objective moral law is also unsatisfactory, because we can- not help asking, Who framed the moral law? The dec- laration that the good consists merely in a regime of utility simply raises the question, Why is the good beneficial and why is evil harmful? No; thought can and does go back of all these considerations ; it can and does go back at least as far as the theistic ground of right — that is, to the abso- lute and eternal Moral Personality. To stop our quest be- fore we go back as far as thought can go is to adopt a superficial hypothesis. (3) However, when thought has gone back to God, the Absolute Personality, it has reached its limit, its ultima thule; for if you try to think farther back than He, you lose yourself in an indefinite series of causes and effects hanging upon nothing and without an ultimate cause — a thought which is intolerable. To ask the question, "Who made God ?" is a contradiction, for God is Himself the eter- nal Substance and Being; and therefore if some other being made Him, He would not be God. We repeat, human thought can go back to God, but no further — at least, it can go no further and find a rational resting place. Therefore, when we say that God is the ultimate source of right, we have gone back as far as we can, and have grasped the pro- foundest view that is possible to human thought. All else is haziness and unreality. (4) Morality must have an eternal ground. If there The Ground of Rig Jit 45 ever was a time when the moral was not, it never could have come into existence, for the moral never could have evolved from or been brought into being by the non-moral. That would be the case of an effect being greater than and different from its cause, which is absurd. Water cannot rise higher than its source by its own weight. But the only eternal being is God, as there can be only one eternal and absolute Being. (5) Morality can be predicated only of rational person- alities. You cannot properly attribute morality to mere things — to minerals, vegetables and animals. That being true, the ultimate ground of the moral must be a Person. This argument again leads us back to God. (6) Something exists now; therefore something must have always existed. If there ever was a time when there was nothing, nothing could have ever come into being. Ex nihilo nihil fit. But the cosmos, as we see it and study it, is found to be finite, contingent and dependent, and could not therefore be the ground and source of itself ; so it must have had an origin; therefore a Creator. 4 More- over, the cosmos is of such a character, especially in view of the moral personalities, namely, men, who inhabit it, as to indicate that its Creator must be a Moral Personality. 5 Again the argument leads us back to God, who must be the ultimate source of all things, and therefore of the right and the good. The universe is a rational one; therefore it must have a rational basis ; but only a Rational Personality could be a rational basis. A Rational Personality must be a Moral Personality — God. (7) The moral must be grounded, not only in the will 4. Cf. the author's "A System of Natural Theism," pp. 49-58. 5. Same as 4, pp. 64-75. 46 A System of General Ethics of God, but also in His very nature. He is holy in His essence, and has been so from eternity; for if He simply willed the right to be right, it would not be right per se and intrinsically, because then it would simply be His arbitrary choice. On the other hand, if He were not free to choose the right, He would not be a truly moral Being, for that which is determined by necessity cannot be considered moral. Morality can subsist only where there is freedom. Therefore God must will the right because it is right, and it must be right because He wills it. In the Absolute and Eternal Personality the ethically necessary and the ethically free must subsist in perfect harmony. This is a high and noble conception, and difficult to hold clearly in thought, but it must be grasped in its depth, reality and beauty, or the elemental ethical problem must be given up by the stu- dent; he can nowhere find the ultimate source of the good. Men who are accustomed to think only in terms of mater- ialism and worldly utilitarianism will not perhaps be able to lift their minds to this ideal ; hence they must be content either with no solution of the ethical problem, or with only a superficial one. That which is eternal must be self- existent and perfect; it cannot be conceived of as becom- ing, unfolding or evolving; only that which is finite, only that which had a beginning in time, can be thought of as developing. Therefore we maintain that God must have been from eternity what He is now; else He never could have become what He is now. If there ever was a time when He was not holy, He never could have become holy; if there ever was a time when He was not free, He never could have become free. God cannot evolve. Only what is created in time and space can be evolved. Our thesis, therefore, is established, that in God's being the ethically The Ground of Right 47 necessary and the ethically free have subsisted from eter- nity in perfect harmony, in absolute correlation. 6 (8) We are now ready to consider the question, What is the basis of moral distinctions? In other words, why is one thing right and another wrong? Answer: A thing is right when it is in conformity with the holy nature and will of God. WTien it is contrary to God's nature and will, it is wrong. The student should always put it fully — "the holy nature and will of God;" for, as was shown in the preceding section, God is not good merely by arbitrary choice, but is eternally good in His very essence; He is also eternally free to choose the good of His own being and to create finite beings who bear His own image. 7 With this foundation laid, our next theme will not be as difficult to treat as many ethical writers have supposed. 3. The Highest Good: (1) What it is: What is the Highest Good? That was the perplexing 6. We venture to think that Muirhead ("The Elements of Eth- ics," pp. 24, 25) falls into error in rejecting the theistic ground of moral distinctions. He mentions only the divine will as the source of right, and from that view-point argues that the doctrine is inade- puate. But he stops too soon. The ethical is also grounded in the very nature of the Supreme Being, as well as in His will. After- ward Dr. Muirhead indicates that the immoral is that which "is in- consistent with that system of mutual relations which we call social life." Surely that is stopping before the root of the matter is reached. What is the ground and source of that "system of mutual relations"? Did it come about by pure chance? Is the ethical, then, a mere happen-so in the world? No; so great and exalted a reality as moral excellence must go back to the Ultimate Source of all things ; and that Source must be personal in order to be moral. 7. Here we must also dissent from Dr. Noah K. Davis ("Ele- ments of Ethics," pp. 203-205, with footnotes), who, though much profounder than Dr. Muirhead, makes the nature of God alone the original ground of moral obligation, without including the divine will. For reasons given in the text, we hold that we must say both the nature and will of God constitute the ultimate source of right. 48 A System of General Ethics problem for all the Greek and Roman philosophers, espe- cially those who were earnest in their thinking and re- searches. Among the Greeks it was known as to ctyaOov, and among the Romans as Summum Bonum. In the light of the preceding discussion, we are justified in asserting that, in human thought or conception, the High- est Good is God Himself, for He is the Good One from eternity and the source of all created goodness. And this leads us to ask, What is the Highest Good for man's attain- ment ? And the answer must be, it is likeness to God. To become more and more like the good and holy God is the chief ethical privilege and task of human life. To put it more concretely, man's chief duty is to incarnate and culti- vate all those moral excellencies which he finds existing in ideal form in the character of God. At this point it is legitimate to quote from the world's greatest ethical Teacher : "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect." 8 God is the perfect Prototype ; we are to be conformed to His character. No higher good than this can be conceived by the human mind. (2) Other views: Although the problem of the Highest Good is bound up in every system of Ethics, and will be considered among other problems in the next subdivision, yet so important a theme should have some attention at this point. We will therefore give the gist of Dr. Noah K. Davis' admirable treatment of this topic. 9 The Hedonists made the passing pleasure of the moment the chief end of life; the Epicureans, the maximum pleas- ure throughout life; Plato, the greatest possible likeness 8. Matt. 5:48. 9. "Elements of Ethics," pp. 192-196. The Ground of Right 49 to God; Aristotle, happiness, based on rational or virtuous activity (not very definite) ; the Utilitarians, pleasure or profit, "variously and hazily defined;" the Evolutionists, especially Spencer, the securing of pleasure and the avoid- ance of pain; Wundt, "the continuous improvement of mankind;" the Kantian Intuitionalists, "obedience, pure and simple, to the objective moral law;" the Perfectionists, "excellence of moral character . . . attained by the active exercise of the intellect and sensitive nature under the pres- idency of reason." Dr. Davis hirrlself defines the Highest Good as "the harmonious and complete development of man" in his own personality and in loving service. All this is edifying ; but, somehow, most of these theories fail to go to the root of the matter ; they lack a true ethical and philosophical foundation. We believe that to make likeness to God the Highest Good will meet the whole situ- ation and afford the highest incentive to virtue. If there is no good and holy God, morality has no sure and satisfac- tory basis ; if there is such a God, He must be the ground and source of the good. Therefore, the attainment of like- ness to God will include every good that can be conceived of — loving and ethical fellowship with Him, pure service of Him, the highest development of individual character, pure and unselfish treatment of all our fellow-beings and of the natural cosmos, and all the blessedness and joy re- sulting from such moral achievance. True science de- mands that the Summum Bonum shall be all-inclusive; shall be, indeed and in truth, the Highest Good. CHAPTER IV III. VARIOUS THEORIES EXAMINED AND ANALYZED. 1. The Sophists. 2. Socrates. 3. Plato. 4. Aristotle. 5. Hedonism. 6. Stoicism. 7. Divine Absolutism. 8. Civil Authority. 9. Altruism. 10. Utilitarianism. 11. Naturalistic Evolution. 12. Theistic Evolution. III. VARIOUS THEORIES EXAMINED AND AN- ALYZED. 1. The Sophists: (1) Statement: The Sophists flourished during the fifth century B. C, at the time of the rise of democracy in Greece. They were probably the first to give serious attention to the basis of morality. It is somewhat difficult to define the under- lying and unifying principle in their moral speculations, because they differed so widely in their views. However, their chief question was, "If there is a permanent element (phusis) in morality, what is it?" Hippias held that there are "underlying principles of justice which are everywhere tacitly acknowledged, and which are the spontaneous dic- tates of human nature" (De Laguna, ut supra, page 108) j 1 1. A scholarly survey and exposition of the various ethical the- ories, from the Sophists to the Modern Schools, is found in De Laguna's "Introduction to the Science of Ethics," Part II. Al- though we have not found it convenient to follow his classification, we call the reader's attention to his valuable work. He classifies the The Ground of Right 51 but he did not make clear what this natural standard was. Protagoras maintained that the personal element in mor- ality was the moral feelings of shame and justice, which are not innate, but are passed from generation to genera- tion by tradition and education. This position was rejected by the skeptical Sophist, Thrasymachus, who held that "the interest of the stronger" is the only element that perdures — a kind of "might-makes-right" theory. (2) Criticism: It will be seen that these views are wavering, vague and superficial ; they fail to define the ultimate ground of right, to mark clearly and positively the objective moral law, to appreciate righteousness for its own sake, and to assert the supremacy of conscience. 2. Socrates. (1) Statement: In this great philosopher the moral consciousness of the Greeks rose to a fair degree of distinctness, and some at- tempt was made by him to give a rational account of moral phenomena in his philosophy. Dr. Harris E. Kirk (in "The Religion of Power") calls Socrates "the first ethical thinker among the Greeks." With him the ethical was Greek schools as follows : Hedonism, Energism and Rigorism. The theories of the first school are sufficiently explained in the text. To our mind, De Laguna does not make the distinction between the other two schools very clear. They might, we think, be differenti- ated in this way: The Energists, as their name would imply, put the stress on moral endeavor, true self-realization and the attain- ment of the Highest Good, without despising pleasure as a legiti- mate result. Plato, Aristotle and their followers were Energists. The Rigorists laid more emphasis on sternness, austerity and self- denial in order to achieve virtue, and would not permit the desire for pleasure in the least to color their motives. Thus their views tended toward asceticism. They were the Greek Puritans. The Cynics and Stoics were the Rigorists. Antisthenes and Diogenes were Cynics, and Zeno was the founder of Stoicism. 52 A System of General Ethics grounded in knowledge. Ignorance is the source of all vice. Teach men, enlighten them with rational knowledge, and they will be virtuous ipso facto. "A contradiction be- tween knowledge and volition is inconceivable," he declared. Again he said, "No man errs of his own free will." The central principle of his teaching is that "all virtue is knowl- edge" (De Laguna). "His remedy for evil is a sort of moral intellectualism" (Kirk). True, he tried to distin- guish between "knowledge" and "opinion," but his argu- ment was not convincing. (2) Criticism: To identify knowledge and morality, or to make the former the sole basis of the latter, is manifestly wrong, for experience teaches that mere intellectual culture is not suf- ficient to insure a truly ethical life. Most men have a good deal more ethical knowledge than they apply and practice. The fact is, all of us, it may be said, "know better than we do." Some of the greatest rascals in the world are edu- cated people; in fact, they use their superior knowledge to exploit their less educated fellowment. Said a great ethical teacher: "If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them" (John 13: 17), clearly implying that there may be a schism between knowing and doing. Ovid conceded: "I see the good and approve it, but deliberately practice the wrong." Even Aristotle cirticised Socrates for teaching as if "weakness of the will did not exist." As a modern writer says, Socrates did not have "a clear conception of human perversity" and was "ignorant of the power of a lawless will." Another defect of the Socratean ethics was that, while he recognized the Supreme Being more or less clearly, he never seemed to trace righteousness and moral law back to The Ground of Right 53 Him as the source and foundation of all good. Nor did he make any clear and positive declarations respecting the authority of conscience. 3. Plato. (1) Statement: The substance of Plato's philosophy, 2 including his eth- ical teaching, was this : The cosmos is the expression of the divine ideas ; to realize these divine ideas is the highest good to be attained by man. Therefore his system is seen to be theistic, and therefore is profoundly based philosoph- ically. He gave to the world the famous fourfold classifi- cation of the virtues, namely, wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. His Ideal Republic represents his highest con- ception of ethical principles applied to the practical affairs of life. (2) Criticisms: Though he held to the theistic view of the world, his phi- losophy was fundamentally defective in that he regarded matter as eternal and evil; therefore as eternally opposed to God, or at least as an irreducible burden on his hands. Matter cannot be eternal (see any standard work on The- ism), because there cannot be two Eternals, two Infinites, two Absolutes. Moreover, to make matter the source of moral evil is superficial, for moral evil cannot inhere in mere impersonal substance, but can be predicated only of personal and rational beings. In his "Republic" Plato made the State sovereign, con- tending that only as a citizen was the individual capable of realizing true morality. Even then only the intellectual and aristocratic classes, the elite, were capable of virtue, 2. Plato was the founder of "The Academy," which was the name of the grove near Athens where he held his conferences. 54 A System of General Ethics while the rest were little better than chattel, doomed to ser- vitude and slavery. This was a serious defect in Plato's scheme of practical ethics. His classification of the virtues (see above) was also lacking in scientific precision and completeness. Not all the virtues can be listed under these four heads without straining the meaning of the terms. Love is a cardinal virtue, indeed, the greatest of the virtues, but it seems to find no place in Plato's system. 4. Aristotle. (1) Statement: This great philosopher 3 found the source and norm of moral ideas in the rational spirit of man. Hence the high- est good with him was to think and live in conformity with the rational constitution with which man has been endowed. He believed in God, but held that He was not the Creator, but only the Framer, Mover and Orderer of the cosmos ; hence he believed that matter was eternal; but, differing from Plato, he did not teach that God and matter were antagonistic. Moral evil did not inhere in matter. It came from man's irrationality. He and his school taught that the best life is that which pursues the via media (the medi- um way), avoiding all extremes. (2) Criticisms: Aristotle's idea of the good was not fundamental enough. He posited it in the rational constitution of man, but failed to show whence man derived such rationality ; therefore he 3. Aristotle was a member of "The Academy" until sometime after Plato's death, when he partially severed his connection with that school and founded a rival school known as "The Lyceum." He is also known as the founder of the "Peripatetic" school, the word meaning "walking about." The Ground of Right 55 did not trace back to the ultimate ground of right, which, as we have shown, is the good and holy God. His conception of the eternity of matter, even though it was not regarded as the source of evil, was unphilosophical ; for there cannot be two Eternals lying side by side. Be- sides, if matter were eternal, God could not be the complete sovereign, and therefore matter would, after all, be an eternal obstacle to His will and power. Although less idealistic and more practical than Plato, his view of the State really amounted to civil absolutism. Man was made for the State rather than the State for man. This is not the true ethical conception of man's relation to social and civic institutions. The State exists only for the individual and collective welfare of its citizens. It is a means, not an end. 5. Hedonism. (1) Statement: Hedonism (from nbuc;, sweet, pleasant) might be called the pleasure theory of life. The Highest Good consists in securing pleasure and avoiding pain. "What makes the happy life worth living is the pleasure in it." 4 Some of the Hedonists were crass in their ideas of pleas- ure, caring only for the delights' of the passing moment, whatever they might be; but many of them distinguished between pleasures of a higher and a lower quality. They placed social and intellectual pleasures above the indulgence of the physical appetites and passions. The chief proponents of Hedonism were Aristippus, Ep- icurus, and Plato in his earlier years. This ancient theory of moral values has been variously classified by different writers on Ethics. One method is to call all of them Epi- 4. De Laguna, ibid, p. 124, interpreting Aristippus. 56 A System of General Ethics cureans (from the main advocate of the theory, Epicurus), who are subdivided into Hedonists, those advocating the coarse pleasures, and Eudemonists (from eu and bcuucov, a good or happy genius), those who make a qualitive distinction in pleasures, and teach that the higher ones should be pursued. The school established by Aris- tippus, of Cyrene, Africa, were called Cyrenaics. The latest mode of classification seems to be to include all these schools under the one head of Hedonists. (2) Criticisms: To make pleasure or happiness, whether of a high or low quality, the Highest Good is fundamentally wrong; it low- ers the standard of morality by making the motive calculat- ing, and hence mercenary and selfish. Moral excellence itself should be the chief end of life, whether it brings joy or sorrow. In the present world we know that good must often be purchased at the cost of enjoyment, and sometimes even at the price of pain. This proves, ipso facto, that the right is above the pleasure-giving, and not per se identical with it, and is therefore to be sought in its own behalf. "Virtue for virtue's own sake" (the motto of the Stoics) is a much higher and purer standard than "virtue for the sake of the pleasure it brings." We intuitively sanction the adage, "We should do right, though the heavens fall." Goodness, even more than beauty, "is its own excuse for being." The Hedonistic theory reverses the true order; it puts pleasure first, whereas moral excellence should have the the primacy. Happiness often is, and may ultimately be, the result of righteousness, but righteousness can never be the result of the mere seeking of happiness. That in the final issue, granting that man is immortal, virtue and happi- The Ground of Right 57 ness will dwell together in perfect accord, is simply the re- sult of the divinely ordained moral order of the cosmos. God did not make a moral chaos, but a moral cosmos, and hence one of the blessed consequences of virtue will be true joy forever. However, the purity of heaven is not the result of its joy, but its joy is the result of its purity. The very fact that the Hedonists — at least the best of them — made a qualitative difference among the various pleasures, calling some higher and some lower in the scale, proves that they were not consistent in making pleasure the real norm of the Highest Good ; for if some pleasures are of a nobler quality than others, then moral quality must be the standard, after all, by which the pleasures themselves are judged. It goes almost without saying, that the Hedonists, not recognizing any real moral standard, did not seek for the ultimate ground of right ; indeed, they did not even go back to find the source and rationale of the enjoyment they mis- took for the Highest Good in life. Hence it was a shallow as well as a sordid view. It reduced ethics to mere expedi- ency. 6. Stoicism. (1) Statement: . In Stoicism 5 the Greeks and Romans attained to their highest ethical ideals. This theory was the very opposite of Hedonism. They were, in fact, opposing schools. Its chief advocates were Antisthenes and Zeno among the Greeks, and Seneca, Cicero, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius among the Romans. Today we often associate Stoicism with stolidity, but the two terms are not synonymous when the former is used in its scientific sense. 5. The Cynics (not mentioned in the text, but in footnote 1 above) might be called an extreme wing of the Stoical School. 58 A System of General Ethics The maxim of Stoicism was, "Virtue for virtue's sake." It made virtuous character and conduct the Highest Good, the best achievement, which is to be sought, if need be, at the sacrifice of pleasure. Indeed, the Stoics were out- spoken opponents of the Epicurean theories, maintaining that they were wrong and debasing. Said the Stoics, " Sor- row, if it lies in the pathway of duty and rectitude, is to be borne with heroic and uncomplaining fortitude." This, it must be admitted, is a noble conception. No doubt there are people today who try to live by this standard, without troubling themselves to think any more profoundly about the chief ethical problem. However, in the light of the ethical conceptions of today, Stoicism had its defects, which must now be pointed out. (2) Criticisms: Stoicism did not really find, or perhaps did not seek to find, the ultimate ethical ground, but simply accepted virtue in a general way as the normal order of the rational life. It failed to push its quest back to the Absolute Personality, who is the eternal source of the Good. In this respect it, too, may be said to have been superficial. It did not seek with sufficient thoroughness to correlate true morality and true happiness. In fact, it made too wide a chasm between them. In its opposition to Hedonism, it became partisan and ultra, and even taught that men should despise pleasure; all desire for pleasure, it held, was in- nately selfish, and therefore immoral. Hence it is easy to see how this philosohy would degenerate into stoicism in the popular sense of the term, that is, into mere stolid en- durance, and even contempt of happiness, and accept as its motto, "Whatever cannot be avoided must be endured." For this reason it easily led to gloom, asceticism, and finally The Ground of Right 59 to pessimism and cynicism. Thus it was cold and stern — a system of "rigorism" — lacking the warmth, joy and ex- hilaration of the true conception of virtue. The Stoic says, "We bear trial because we must." The true ethicist says, "We bear trial because all things work together for the highest well-being of those who love and follow the good." No one should contemn true pleasure, or make a virtue of misery. There is no merit in making oneself unhappy merely for the sake of being unhappy. Pain should never be sought; but when it comes unavoidably in the pathway of rectitude, it should be borne without repining, and its re- fining and disciplinary purpose should be gladly accepted. 6 7. Divine Absolutism. (1) Statement: This theory grounds the ethical entirely in the will of God. The Good is good simply because God wills it. It is not inherently and eternally good in its character — per se. No reason for God's willing one thing to be good and another evil is to be sought. This was the view of the Scotists (the school of Duns Scotus) in the Middle Ages. With it agrees the Mohammedan conception of ,God, which regards Him merely as an arbitrary Sovereign, who knows no other rule than His own almighty will. (2) Criticism: We have already dealt with this view — see Chapter III, Section II, 2 (7). It needs only to be said here that God does not arbitrarily elect what is good and what is evil. He is holy and righteous in His very nature, including His will, and so He wills freely what is in harmony with His moral and spiritual essence. 6. For an admirable critique on Greek and Roman ethics see Harris E. Kirk, "The Religion of Power," pp. 81-143. 60 A System of General Ethics 8. Civil Authority. (1) Statement: This is the theory that the civil authority, or the author- ity of the State, is the only standard of ethical conduct. It was advocated in modern times by Thomas Hobbes. Dr. Valentine thus defines this view : "Duty rested on the legal statute, whose direction was final. It knew no higher law/' (2) Criticism: That men should be law-abiding and patriotic is to be taken for granted in Ethics. Christ, the great ethical Teacher, said: "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's." One of the apostles wrote: "Be subject to the powers that be." Under most circumstances citizens should not raise insurrections and stir revolutions. "Liberty reg- ulated by law," is a great and necessary motto for citizen- ship. However, devotion to one's country and the civil law should not be blind, any more than devotion to one's Church. No citizen can make the laws of his country the final arbiter in all questions of moral obligation, and that for the simple reason that all human enactments are fallible, and therefore may be wrong. Even the Church, though professing to be guided by the divine Word, has more than once committed error. So, in the history of the world, the civil authority has more than once commanded men to do things that were contrary, not only to their consciences, but also to the abso- lute law of righteousness. In such cases the higher ethical law should be obeyed. Here the saying of the apostles of Christ should prevail : "We ought to obey God rather than men." Thus we may lay down the rule: Wherever the civil law is in agreement with the law of right, it should be The Ground of Right 61 gladly and heartily obeyed; in cases of mere human wis- dom and judgment, it is more likely that the civil statutes, being the corporate verdict, will be right than the opinion of the individual citizen ; in cases of doubt, the citizen should give the government the benefit of the doubt; only in those cases in which the commands of the State are arbi- trary and in evident violation of the law of right, should the citizen say, "My conscience will not permit me to obey." In this connection we quote with approval Dr. Valentine's trenchant criticism on Hobbes' theory of Civil Authority: "The theory was a repetition of the travesty of Ethics in Plato's 'Republic' It has no following, and needs no con- futation." 9. Altruism. (1) Statement: Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was one of the earliest advocates of thorough-going Altruism 7 (from the Latin, alter, other). It might be defined as "Otherism" — that is, the pure seeking of the good of others without any thought of oneself. When it is used in the popular sense, that is, as opposed to egotism and selfishness, as it usually is, it is a noble view, and altogether to be commended; but as a scientific theory, and used in the absolute sense, it is right- fully subject to the following: (2) Criticisms: First: It is refined and impossible idealism in the realm of Ethics ; if it were carried out universally, no one would ever think of himself at all, but would be thinking solely of others — a regime under which society could not exist. Second : If this theory were to be practiced in the abso- 7. Cf. Valentine, "Theoretical Ethics," p. 154. 62 A System of General Ethics lute sense by a part of the community, it would encourage selfishness and dependence in the rest, who would impose on the philanthropy of their indiscriminate helpers. Char- ity workers find that they must constantly guard against such imposition. It is wrong, of course, to refuse help to the deserving poor; it is also wrong, and positively harm- ful to society, to pauperize people by injudicious benefac- tions. This matter of helping others so as to do them the greatest amount of good is a fine art. Sometimes it is bet- ter charity to give an able-bodied man work than money. Third: Positively stated, we believe that the Scriptural rule is the most rational, because it is in accord with the constitution of man : "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy- self." This rule does not preclude self-love and self- regard, which would be impossible, but makes it the norm of our love for others; and this, we believe, is as sane a rule as can be laid down. It properly safeguards each man's selfhood, and at the same time prevents selfishness. The Golden Rule is also a fundamental law of social Ethics : "Do unto others as ye would that others should do unto you." The apostle Paul strikes a fine ethical balance in Galatians VI, where in the first verse he enjoins, "Bear ye one another's burdens," and then says in the sixth verse: "Every man shall bear his own burden." This is right and practical. It is not Utopian and flighty. All men should be helpful to all others ; yet there is always a point where each man must bear his own burden of responsibiity ; where he must act for himself, and where another cannot act for him. Here, surely, we have true Egoism and true Altruism in their reciprocal and properly balanced rela- tions. The very fact that we should have so high a regard for other men's personalities proves that we should also The Ground of Right 63 make the proper appraisement of our own personality. If other people are of paramount importance, why are not you and I as well? 10. Utilitarianism. (1) Statement: As the term implies, Utilitarianism in Ethics is the theory that the Highest Good is simply and solely the useful, the beneficial; therefore, there is no absolute law of right, no right per se, and no wrong per se, nor is right to be sought and practiced for its own sake. If conduct is beneficial — that is the token by which it is known to be right; if it is not beneficial, it is wrong. This view is often called "the goods theory," because it is always on the alert for some good — for some advantage. "What benefit will it be to me?" is its primary inquiry. In modern phrase, it is Prag- matism in the sphere of Ethics. (2) Criticism: a. It is superficial; it does not seek or find the ultimate ground of right, but is indifferent to it. It does not even push back its inquiry far enough to ask why some things make for human weal and others for human woe. The theory is so shallow as almost to deserve to be called frivo- lous. b. This theory does not agree with the testimony of con- science, which feels the sense of obligation to do the right for its own sake and to avoid the wrong because it is wrong, apart from the question of mere utility or non- utility. Let any person ask himself the two questions re- specting a proposed action, "Is it right?" and, "Is it use- ful?" and see whether he does not instinctively make a sharp distinction between them. Morality and usefulness 64 A System of General Ethics may frequently go together, and in an ideal state they al- ways would, but the two ideas are not to be identified. The truly enlightened conscience first asks, "Is it right?" and then, if it raises the question of utility at all, it makes it subordinate. The very fact that the truly ethical man de- clares unequivocally, "I will do right, whether my act is useful to me or not," proves that he does not identify or confuse the issue between righteousness and utility. c. Utilitarianism reverses the relative positions of the right and the useful; it puts "the cart before the horse;" it subverts the law of cause and effect. Ultimately, no doubt, the right will be found to be the most useful; but even then the proper distinction will be this: A thing is useful because it is right, and not, A thing is right because it is useful. Its being right is the cause of its being use- ful, not the contrary, as the Utilitarians teach. d. If utility is the final norm in Ethics, why does the universal consciousness of mankind agree in calling certain kinds of states and actions right and others wrong ? Why use the words "right" and "wrong" at all, if the real truth is only that some actions are useful and others harmful? How did the human mind ever get the ideas of right and wrong, if they do not stand for realities ? Could the ethical have evolved, by means of resident forces, from the non- ethical? That would be making the effect greater and nobler than its cause, which is not only unscientific; it is absurd. The very nomenclature used intuitively by the human family affords prima facie proof of the reality of the objective law of right. It is most significant that al- most all men place the moral imperative in the imperial position, far above the question of mere utility. Only a The Ground of Right 65 few men, namely, such as have lost themselves in misty speculations, confuse the ideas of morality and utility. e. Practically considered, the fatal defect of all utilitar- ian schemes is this : They are subversive of disinterested motives; they are based on the principles of selfishness, which is an immoral motive power. A man who will al- ways stop to count the advantage that will accrue to him- self when he comes face to face with a question of right or wrong, will act immorally, whatever course he may pursue. True, on account of the sinfulness of the human heart, it is difficult for any man to be absolutely single in motive; but that is no reason why we should not hold up the ethical ideal, and especially no reason for dragging down the noble science of Ethics into the mire and mud of selfishness. A so-called system of Ethics that is based on calculating, mer- cenary and sordid motives is unethical by that very token, and is therefore a contradiction of terms. 11. Opportunism. (1) Statement: This is a term that is now considerably in vogue, although it is not treated in any system of Ethics so far as we are aware. It is defined as follows by Webster ("New Inter- national Dictionary," latest edition) : "Art, policy or prac- tice of taking advantage, as in politics, of opportunities or circumstances; or, often, of seeking immediate advantage with little regard for principles or ultimate consequences." (2) Criticism: In the good sense, it is to be commended ; men should al- ways be alert to use every opportunity to advance a right- eous cause in righteous ways ; but in the bad sense (the sec- ond definition given above), it must be condemned. Moral 66 A System of General Ethics principles are eternal, and never should be sacrificed to gain a temporary advantage, as has been said in previous sec- tions of this book. At heart Opportunism is Hedonistic and Utilitarian. 12. Naturalistic Evolution. (1) Statement: Naturalistic evolution is atheistic; it denies the existence of God, teaches that the material cosmos has always existed, and that its present status is the result of development by the operation of purely natural forces. This theory, in connection with Agnosticism, has given rise to a utilitarian scheme of morals, its best known exponent having been Herbert Spencer, who developed his view in his well-known work, "The Data of Ethics." It may be summed up as follows : In the evolution of the human race, it was found that some kinds of actions were beneficial to society ; others det- rimental. To illustrate, experience early proved that hon- esty promoted social order and happiness, while dishonesty was divisive and harmful. Veracity, chastity, etc., made for social welfare, while theft, lying, sensuality, etc., in- jured the social structure. By degrees mankind learned to call those actions that made for individual and social bet- terment right, and those that resulted balefully they called wrong. Thus the right is not something that is right per se, but only another name for the useful, the expedient, the desirable. (2) Criticism: Since this is a purely utilitarian scheme, the arguments set forth in the preceding section should be considered here. It should be remembered that all these theories obliterate the distinction between the merely useful and the morally The Ground of Right 67 excellent; therefore they destroy the real moral basis and standard. Let us pause to ask only one pertinent question at this point: Why did the whole human family agree to call those actions right and moral that helped to preserve human society, instead of calling them mere useful or bene- ficial? That was surely adding confusion of thought, for it introduced a wholly unique conception. We have plenty of words to designate the useful; why add other words, and especially such as convey a different meaning, and so becloud the issue? If the words "right" and "wrong" do not stand for realities, they are superfluous. The theory of evolution without an intelligent Involver and Evolver has not been scientifically proved, and is irra- tional from many viewpoints. It cannot account at all for the evolutionary process itself, and especially along intelli- gent, progressive and teleological lines. Why should a world that is here purely by chance have evolved into a world of order, a cosmos? Could mere fortuity pro- duce law and order? No; chance could bring forth nothing but a welter. No effect can be greater than nor different from its cause. One of the chief attributes of the world is that it is "a reign of law." How could chance produce its precise antithesis? However, our only concern here is for the ethical prob- lems involved. Suppose for a moment that there is no Moral Personality — that is, God — back of the cosmos as its Creator and Governor; then how did the moral ever come into being? Could the moral evolve from the non-moral? Could moral personalities, such as men are, evolve, by means of merely resident forces, from mere material sub- stance? If so, how? Would not that be contrary to the very doctrine of evolution itself? For nothing can be evolved that was not previously involved. 68 A System of General Ethics Again, morality can be predicated only of rational per- sonalities ; never of mere things. Then how could morality have a real basis in mere material substance? If there is nothing but the material universe, no other entity whatever, then it is not personal, and hence could not have within it any moral quality or character; then how could it ever in all the endless millenniums have given birth to moral per- sounalities with moral ideas and attributes? That surely would be a gross violation of the fundamental law of caus- ality — that no effect can be greater than its cause. It would be a case of "getting something out of nothing;" of water rising higher than its source. However, if you accept the theistic conception of the universe, namely, that a personal God is its Creator and Preserver, you have an altogether adequate ground for ethical reality from eternity, and an altogether adequate explanation of all the ethical phenomena of the cosmos. And we maintain with all our might, the only scientific hypothesis is the one that affords an adequate account of all the facts in the case. Materialistic evolution is both unscientific and immoral. It is of the earth, earthy. Crass in all its conceptions, it has no wings with which to rise into the truly psychical and ethical realms. 13. Theistic Evolution. (1) Statement: This view is held in two forms: First, in the beginning God created the pristine material ; in doing this, He endowed material substance with all the potencies needed for its subsequent development, including the personal, ethical and spiritual outcome; then He left the universe to be controlled and unfolded by secondary causes, namely, the "laws of nature." This is practically The Ground of Right 69 the view of Deism, transferred to the theory of modern evolution. Second, God created the primordial material in its simple or homogeneous form; then, instead of deserting it, He remained immanent in it; since the original creation, His mode of operating in the cosmos has been through the laws of progressive evolution. Therefore, according to this view, evolution is simply the divine modus operandi. (2) Observations: a. The theory of Deism first named above is open to most serious objections from the ethical view-point. It virtually pushes God out of His universe, and gives it up to secondary causes ; thus it leaves so little room for free- dom that the moral factor diminishes to the minimum, if it does not vanish entirely. A God who retires from His creation, abdicates His throne in favor of mere laws, and takes a long vacation, which He spends in idleness and vacuity, while His people are carrying on an unequal struggle in the world with elemental forces of evil, surely is not a God who would be likely to inspire moral effort and enthusiasm in the minds of His far-off, neglected foster children. No human father would thus forsake his off- spring. It is almost better to believe in no God at all than to encumber faith with a God who is indifferent and neg- lectful, or who cannot come to the help of His unfortunate and needy creatures. b. Regarding the second theory, that of theistic evo- lution, if it should ultimately be proven to be true scientifi- cally, it would not invalidate the ethical reality of the world; for the personal God, the Creator, would be its source and ground, and, being immanently active in the cosmos, would be the personal executor of the law of right- 70 A System of General Ethics eousness implanted therein and in the consciences of men. God back of and in the universe would adequately account for all the ethical phenomena appearing in the evolutionary process, as well as for the initiation and method of the pro- cess itself . The question, therefore, to be settled is simply this: Is it a scientifically established fact that pure evolution is God's method of working in the universe ? To put it more concretely, is there sufficient empirical evidence to prove that life was evolved from material substance by resident chemical forces and combinations without the introduction of anything new at any point in the process; that all the genera and species of the vegetable and animal kingdoms have been evolved from a single primordial germ or cell; that man has been evolved from the lower animals; that consciousness, sentiency, conscience and will have evolved in this way ; that in all this process, running through cycles and millenniums, God has never added any new force or substance to the original act of creation ? Has all this been proved, or even if it has not been proved by empirical dis- covery and experiment, is it rational to accept it as the true explanation of the cosmos and its present status? Let it be remembered that if, at any point in the whole process, God added any new force or entity, that would be an act of creation, or the obtrusion of a supernatural power, and therefore the process could not be properly called pure evolution; it would be evolution plus every supernatural act; it would be evolution, creation and miracle. 8 8. The author has often felt that the term "theistic evolution" is inaccurate and unscientific, connoting an impossibility. After all, does not scientific evolution mean a process of unfolding by purely resident or immanent forces? But if God carried on the process, He must have been constantly infusing new force into it from with- out, or there could have been no progress. Would that have been The Ground of Right 71 Our thesis here is especially concerned with the data of morality, and so we submit a few considerations. All theists agree that God first created the primordial material substance. However, it must have been mere impersonal substance, mere stuff, mere thing. Now, since morality can inhere only in rational personalities, could God have endowed mere impersonal stuff with a moral quality? Why, we ourselves, limited as our rational powers are, never think of attributing morality to slime, or mud, or a clod, or a stone, or even an animal. Should it be held that God, being all-powerful, could have endowed mere material substance with seminal moral qualities, our reply is, would it not, after all, have been absurd and even puerile for Him to work in so crude a way? A more rational procedure would, we think, have been the following: God created the material universe, unfolded it according to His own wis- evolution in the strictly scientific sense? Would not the word "de- velopment" be better when we connect God with the process ? That word would not exclude the injection of new energy, but would connote only a gradual unfolding, however it was accomplished. In a previous work ("A System of Natural Theism," p. 114) the author has taken the position that two terms should be used to ac- count for the cosmos as it is, namely, "creation" and "evolution." This has been criticised by a few persons to whom the very word "evolution" is objectionable. The author desires to explain that he used the word "evolution" in the sense of a gradually unfolding process (carried on, of course, by the divine will and energy), in distinction from a sudden and miraculous injection of supernatural power. He has never used the term in the sense in which Tyndal and Huxley employed it — that is, as a process of unfolding by pure- ly natural and resident forces. In many cases in both the natural world and the human realm God does use the gradual method, and has evidently done so ever since the creation of the primordial ma- terial; in other cases He brings in something new abruptly or sud- denly, and that we call creation or miracle. If the critics do not want to accept the word "evolution" to denote God's gradual way of working out certain results, we are willing to substitute the bet- ter word, "development." We do not wish to insist on, or higgle about, a word that has an ambiguous meaning. Wherever and whenever clearness is possible writers should avoid obscurantism. 72 A System of General Ethics dom, adding something new whenever an entity of a higher order was to be brought into being, and at last, when the world was ready for occupancy by human personalities, He created them, enduing them, in that very act, with those moral qualities which inhere in beings of so highly organ- ized a type. Taking all the facts into consideration, we must leave the reader to decide whether this view is not the most reasonable. Thus we have reviewed the various systems of Ethics, both ancient and modern, and have, we think, reached the conclusion that the theistic world-view is the only one that affords a sufficient rational and scientific basis, ground and explanation of the ethical data of the cosmos. DIVISION III THE LAW OF RIGHT CHAPTER V I. CONNECTING LINKS. 1. God created a cosmos. 2. He created it a moral economy. II. PROOFS OF MORAL ORDER IN NATURE. 1. The reign of law. 2. Design in nature. 3. Nature affords a moral arena for man. I. CONNECTING LINKS. 1. God created a cosmos: Our last main division of the Ethical System was, "The Ultimate Ground of Right," which we found to be the holy and free personality of God. Our next logical step will be to inquire whether God created a world or universe, or found in the riches of His own being alone eternal satis- faction and delight. Instantly we find that, for reasons of His own, He decided to create a universe having an ob- jective, though not an independent, existence; for the uni- verse is here, and we behold it, and recognize ourselves as part of it. 2. He created it a moral economy: Since God is righteous, since He is the ultimate ground of truth and morality, since righteousness and justice are the foundation of His throne, it is reasonable to believe that He would inscribe the laws of His own being on the uni- verse He brought into existence. This is, of course, the 74 A System of General Ethics a priori method of reasoning. Let us now scrutinize the cosmos, and see whether the proposition can be proved empirically. Did God, who is the ground of right, impress the law of righteousness on His creation? 1 Did He in- scribe it, first, on the natural realm; second, on the consti- tution of man, the moral agent He placed in the midst of the natural environment? We shall find that He did. II. PROOFS OF MORAL ORDER IN NATURE. 1. The reign of law: Everywhere in the natural realm we perceive the reign of law. The world is a cosmos, not a chaos. Modern sci- ence has firmly established this as a fact. But law in the universe not only implies a Lawgiver and an Executor back of and in it, but also connotes that a moral law must be reg- nant in its operations; for it is irrational to believe that the Creator would have made a world that was controlled by natural law and at the same time dominated by moral chaos. True, morality per se could not inhere in imper- sonal objects, yet a world governed by law would be the 1. In his profound work on "Theoretical Ethics," Dr. Valentine calls the objective moral law the Proximate or Immediate Ground of Right in distinction from the Ultimate Ground, which he holds is the Personal God, as we hold in this work. The distinction is worth making, and for this reason : Men frequently say, "We must do right, or we must obey the law of right," without going back in thought to God as the Lawgiver; just as in mathematics people speak about the mathematical laws of the universe, and solve many profound and intricate problems according to those laws, without going back in thought to the divine Author of the universe and its mathematical laws. Indeed, there are systems of Ethics wrought out on this principle; they recognize the law of right, but do not raise the question as to the divine Lawgiver. We have not thought it wise to emphasize the distinction between the Proximate and Ultimate Grounds of Right, because we think it is simpler to speak of only one Ground of Right — and there really can be only one — and then use the term Law of Right to designate the mode by which God governs the moral economy. The Law of Right 75 only kind of a realm that could be made the home of the moral beings who were subsequently to be introduced. Had the natural world been a chaos, ethical beings could not have dwelt therein ; they would not have fitted into it. So the reign of law in nature connotes, ipso facto, that the natural cosmos is part of a moral economy. 2. Design in nature: What is known in Theism as the teleological argument, or the argument from design, 2 is in place here. A few gen- eral statements will suffice. In the mineral and vegetable worlds there are obvious proofs of wise design. The var- ious chemical combinations that form the earth, the air, the clouds, the rivers, lakes and seas, display wonderful intelli- gence, especially in their fitness for sustaining the life of sentient beings. It does not seem possible that they would have come together in so marvellous a way merely by acci- dent or fortuity. If there was no Designer, how could and why should they have combined in an orderly manner? Why should mere blind forces produce a cosmos instead of chaos? Design is clearly shown in the adaptation of plants to specific purposes. The processes of cell growth, fertiliza- tion and reproduction of species — all afford evidences of intelligent design. Yet, since minerals and vegetables are not sentient entities, it is reasonable to believe that their wonderful adaptations were meant to serve some higher purpose than merely existence for their own sake. Therefore when we rise to the realm of animal sentiency, and note how admirably animal life is fitted into its mineral and vegetable environment, and how much delight it has in its life thus provided for, we are led to believe that the 2. Cf. the author's "A System of Natural Theism," pp. 34-48. 76 A System of General Ethics lower plane was wisely planned for the sustenance and felicity of sentient creatures. The fact that animals do not merely exist, but also have much pleasure in life, evinces a kindly purpose in the planning and preparing of the world. Such a purpose connotes a moral order, for kindli- ness is a moral quality, and moral quality can belong only to a moral personality. Moving up into the human realm, the evidences of design in the natural creation are still more convincing. Every- where there is clear proof that nature has been devised for the well-being of man, and that man has intentionally been constituted to fit into his natural environment. The min- eral, vegetable and animal worlds lay their tributes at his feet, affording him food, drink, clothing, shelter, and much comfort and enjoyment. Endued with his five senses, he has a vital and pleasurable connection with the whole nat- ural cosmos. A beneficent purpose runs through all this regimen. Making due allowance for all the casualties (a subject to be dealt with later in this work), man has much joy in the world, and there is everywhere a rule of kindli- ness, of tender consideration, and of ample provision for his needs and satisfaction. Now, beneficence, kindness, care — all these connote moral quality. Therefore we see distinct proof of moral order and teleology in the natural realm, implying a moral Designer back of it and in it. 3. Nature affords a moral arena for man: Nothing can be more striking than the fact that the nat- ural cosmos is so constituted as to afford to man an arena for moral conduct and achievement. How many times nature herself abets moral decisions and choices ! To illus- trate, here are two paths leading through a woodland. They are alike easy to pursue. But one leads to a place of The Law of Right 77 virtue, the other to a place of vice. So far as nature is framed, there are innumerable opportunities for human choice. She does not compel you to choose this way or that, but whatever your choice may be, she will afford you the stage on which to perform your self-elected part in the drama of life. Here we condense and simplify the language of a great ethical writer : 3 The order of the world is a moral order, in which nature is appointed to be the instrument and means of liberty. The law of nature is, what men sow that shall they also reap. Every abuse of liberty sooner or later brings its inevitable reaction. The law of the good and of conscience is at the same time the law of the universe. In it all things must work together for good to those who obey the moral law, and all must work together for evil to those who disobey. We may add, the natural economy might have been so constituted as to preclude all freedom of action on man's part; but, instead of such a regime of necessity, we find that it affords him innumerable opportunities for the exer- cise of both physical and moral choice. Still more, even the difficulties which nature often imposes, but does not make insuperable to human effort, give man a chance for moral discipline and schooling that he could not otherwise have. This fact may, at least in part, explain why there are obstacles, difficulties and afflictions in the natural cos- mos. The world really seems to be so framed as to bring out the highest and most virile moral qualities in man's character. A soft and easy world would not accomplish this result, but would make man morally inane. The cos- mos is not only a moral arena for man ; it is also a school 3. Martensen, "Christian Ethics," Vol. I, p. 131. 78 A System of General Ethics of moral discipline. The point is therefore established that the natural world bears the stamp of a moral order upon it, in that it is admirably adapted to be the dwelling-place and stadium of moral agents. This fact is all the more patent when we see that moral agents are actually in the world, and are working out upon it a moral destiny. We are thus led logically to our next division. CHAPTER VI III. MORAL AGENTS. 1. Definitions. (1) Of moral agency. (2) Of a moral agent. 2. Man a moral agent. (1) Man the only moral agent in the cosmos. (2) Source of man's moral character. (3) Man a unique figure in the cosmos. 3. Constituents of moral agency. (1) Rational intelligence. (2) Conscience. a. Definition. b. Other terms. c. Etymology of the term Conscience. d. Psychology of the Conscience. (a) A perception. (b) A feeling. (c) Its relation to the other psychical powers. e. Origin of the Conscience. f. Conscience a distinct mental faculty. g. Supremacy of Conscience. III. MORAL AGENTS. 1. Definitions: (1) Of moral agency: Moral agency is the ability of a personal being to per- ceive the right and wrong and to choose between them. (2) Of a moral agent: A moral agent is a person who is capable of perceiving the right and wrong and of choosing between them. 2. Man as a moral agent: (1) Man the only moral agent in the cosmos: 80 A System of General Ethics Considering God as above and immanent in the uni- verse, but not a part of it, Natural Ethics knows of only one kind of moral agent in the creation, and that is man. True, Christian Theology and Ethics uphold the doctrine of angels, and represent them as ethical beings, capable of choosing between good and evil ; but Natural Theology and Ethics can make no assertion for or against this doctrine, which is purely a matter of revelation. (2) Source of mans moral character: In Division II we have already established the fact that the Ultimate Ground of Right is God, who is the Creator of the cosmos, of which man is a part. Therefore, just as nature is God's handiwork, and is in part an expression of His character, so man must have come from the creative hand of God. Science (physical, psychological and ethical) proves that man is the crowning work of creation; the highest and most nobly endued being in the world. And what is it that distinguishes him from the purely natural creation? It is his rational and moral nature. The min- eral and vegetable kingdoms exhibit the intelligence and ethical character of the Creator, but possess no such qual- ities themselves; they are mere automata. Animals pos- sess instinct, which is a kind of intelligence, sufficient to fit them for their Maker's purpose in the cosmos; but they do not attain to that degree of intelligence which amounts to actual rationality. Some nature-students think they dis- cern hints of a crude, instinctive morality in some of the animals; but, after all, this is mere surmise and specula- tion, and cannot be established beyond question. However, concerning the moral character of man there can be no rea- sonable doubt. Whence, then, came man's ethical nature — his intelli- The Law of Right 81 gence, conscience and freedom? There can be but one answer: In the very act of creating man, God endowed him with these moral qualities. They are a part of his original constitution. While Christian Theology teaches clearly that man was made in the divine image (Gen. 1 : 26- 30), we believe that this view can also be established by reason. If God is the source of righteousness and the Creator of man, it is rational to believe that, in the very making of a rational being, He would make him like Him- self, so that He might hold a personal and moral relation to him. On the other hand, it is more than unreasonable, it is absurd, to believe that God would have made man utterly unlike Himself in psychical and ethical attributes. No more reasonable is it to hold that man's moral nature is the result of mere natural evolution, for the non-moral could never evolve by means of merely resident forces in- to the moral. That would be a case of water rising higher than its source. It would violate the universal law of causality, namely, that no effect can be greater than, nor essentially different from, its cause. (3) Man a unique figure in the cosmos: Man belongs to the cosmos ; is an integral part of the creation. The natural realm is fitted to him and he to the natural realm. With his body he is organically connected with the mineral and vegetable kingdoms; his natural in- stincts and appetites, of which he has many, also ally him to the animal kingdom. Psychically he is so organized as to correlate with the natural world; for, by means of his sense organs, his mind is able to perceive and hold vital relation to material things. To this end, his mind has been so constituted that it can make use of the nervous system of the body in dealing with material nature. 82 A System of General Ethics However, these are not the only powers that the mind possesses ; it has higher enduements ; it is able to function in pure thought ; to transcend the physical realm, the realm of mere sensation ; to perceive moral excellence and delight in it ; to hold true spiritual communion with God and man. No other creatures of the cosmos are able to function in these rational and ethical ways. Thus man, though a part of the universe, is a unique being in it, and by means of his psychical enduements is able to transcend it, and hold relations to the infinite and absolute. Therefore,, in the next place, we are logically led to consider those nobler powers that constitute man an ethical being. 3. Constituents of moral agency :i (1) Rational intelligence: This term is used to designate the normal functioning power of the mind. The scientific study of the human mind proves it to be a unitary entity. It is not made up of parts, as is material substance. In all its functioning it acts as an integer. In the Intellect it functions by cogni- tion, in the Sensibilities by feeling, in the Will by self- movement, choice and execution. Therefore, while as a quiddity the mind is a unit, it is correct to say that it func- tions in a variety of ways. When the word "faculty" is used in this work, we mean by it a special functioning power of the mind, not a part of the mind. Now, when the intellect functions normally and sanely, we say it is endowed with rational intelligence. While it is true that the conscience is the power of the mind which enables it to function morally, it is evident that, at the same time, the conscience is dependent on the rational action of 1. Cf. the excellent discussion on this topic by Valentine: "The- oretical Ethics," Chapter IV, pp. 100-118. The Law of Right 83 other faculties of the soul. Hence we never predicate morality of an object that is not rationally intelligent, like a clod or a plant or an animal. Martineau says: "We neither applaud the gold-mine, nor blame the destructive storm" (quoted by Thilly). We do not regard an idiot or a lunatic as a morally responsible agent. The law does not punish demented persons, but takes care of them in asy- lums. However, whenever a person is rational, we hold him to be a responsible being. (2) Conscience: a. Definition : Conscience is that faculty of the human mind which per- ceives and senses the right and wrong and their fundamen- tal antagonism. b. Other terms : Other terms are often used to designate the Conscience: the Moral Consciousness; the Moral Faculty; the Moral Sense; the Moral Intuition. c. Etymology of the term Conscience: It is derived from the Latin, con, with, and scire, to know. It is plain, though, that its derivation does not give a real clue to its meaning. The word "Consciousness" has precisely the same derivation; but how different and dis- tinct their significance ! Consciousness is that power of the mind by which it is aware of itself, of its own processes, and of other objects; Conscience is the moral faculty of the soul, and that only. If these distinctions seem to be arbitrary, yet, to avoid confusion, we must employ these terms according to custom. d. The psychology of Conscience: 84 A System of General Ethics (a) It is a perception: By examining our "Outline of the Human Mind" (Chap- ter II, VII, 1) the student will see that Conscience is first placed in the Intellect, subdivision 3, the Intuitions (8), where it is called "Cognition of right and wrong, or, Con- science as perception." That this is the proper order is evident from the fact that the mind must first perceive a thing to be right or wrong before it can have any feeling regarding it. This is true of all men's mental processes: first cognition, then emotion. It is so in the Sense, the Understanding and the Intuition. At first thought, the order might seem to be reversed in the action of the Senses ; but such analysis confuses mere physical impressions with psychical functioning; for the sense impression must first come into the light of the consciousness before any feeling can be observed. Suppose the connection between a nerve and the brain were destroyed, the nerve might be injured and even lacerated, and the mind would not be conscious of it. This order — first perception, then feel- ing — is more clearly observed in all the higher psychical functioning. With this view of the Conscience agrees the popular usage of the word, for we often say, "My Con- science perceives this action to be right or wrong." Ethical perceptions may be thus classified: 2 First, the perception of right and wrong, or of moral dis- tinctions, which is the primary cognition of the Conscience : the perception that right and wrong are fundamentally and eternally opposed to each other. Second, the perception of obligation or of duty: the moral imperative; the command of the Ought to the Con- science. Whenever Conscience stands, as it were, in the 2. Cf. Valentine, ibid, pp. 62-72. The Law of Right 85 presence of the right and the wrong, it perceives its obliga- tion or duty to choose the right and to reject the wrong. Third, the perception of moral quality in principles and actions: moral judgments. When there is no doubt about the ethical character of a principle or action, the Conscience will pronounce a swift and infallible judgment. In this world of mixed good and evil, however, there are times and circumstances of doubt — when it is not immediately clear which course is right and which is wrong. In such cases the Conscience no longer operates as a mere Intuition (see "Outline of the Human Mind"), but carries its per- ceptions over into the Understanding, where, by the use of reflection, memory and imagination, logical, scientific and perhaps philosophical analysis, it arrives at length at a reasoned moral judgment. Fourth, a perception of merit and demerit. In this action the Conscience perceives that right and wrong are not without consequences, and therefore that the right should be rewarded and the wrong punished. This is pri- marily a clear intuition ; the kind and degree of recompense is usually a matter of reasoned judgment. (b) Conscience as a feeling: Conscience is not a simple, but a complex functioning power of the mind. It belongs to the Sensibilities as well as to the Intellect. In our "Outline" (Chapter II, as above) it is placed under the Intuitional Emotions, Number (4). In popular usage we often say, "I feel in my Conscience that this is right or wrong." It must be admitted that some- times when the perception is hazy, the feeling may be quite strong; which simply means that the case is of such a nature that the ethical judgment has not yet been able to reason the matter through, and thus the emotion seems to 86 A System of General Ethics veer to the safe side. The full complement of moral reality is reached only when the perception becomes positively clear and the corresponding emotion has been proportion- ately aroused. A schism between the ethical perception and the ethical feeling is apt to lead to undecided action, to hesitancy, and mental distress. It will not be out of place to give the advice here that when one feels that a certain course is right, he should pursue it, and when he feels that a course is wrong, he should avoid it, even though at the time he may not be able to give a clear reason for the one or the other. In the interest of scientific analysis we give here a table showing a classification of the ethical emotions : 1. Classes: (1) Moral love: delight in and approval of the right. (2) Moral aversion: hatred of the wrong. (3) Before an action: feeling of obligation or duty. (4) After an action: a. If right: approval, satisfaction, ethical joy. b. If wrong: disapproval, shame, guilt, remorse. 2. Degrees of intensity: (1) Vary with heredity and temperament. (2) Vary with environment and education. (3) Vary with ethical effort or neglect. 3. Feeling as a motive power: (1) It furnishes an incentive for right and wrong doing; mere cold perception would have no mov- ing force. (2) Classes of right motives: a. Desire for the true benefits of righteousness. b. Love of the right for its own sake. c. Love of God as the true source of the good. The Law of Right 87 Only a few remarks need to be made on this outline. It is evident that all the feelings listed are distinctively ethical emotions, and therefore stand out clearly as different from all other feelings, proving, as has been previously main- tained, that the Conscience is a unique and highly specialized faculty, and not merely the sum of other faculties, nor the result of an accumulation of experiences. Concerning No. 2, "Degrees of intensity," every one must admit the facts in the case. Some people have a better moral heritage than others; some have a natural temperament that is more sensitive to the distinction between right and wrong; some are born in a better environment and have better opportuni- ties for education along moral lines; all these are undeni- able facts. However, instead of puzzling our minds over them, and growing cynical or disheartened, let us take the braver and more sensible position: first, those of us who have superior opportunities should give all the aid we can to those who are less favorably situated, remembering that that may be part of our divinely appointed task in life; second, that God, the final Arbiter, will judge all men, not according to what they have not, but according to what they have, whether it be in the way of heredity, environ- ment, education, or any other cirucumstance. We should have confidence that, in the final outcome, "the Judge of all the earth will do right." Those persons who cannot trust the Power in the universe that "makes for righteous- ness" certainly must go through life as men "who have no hope," and "of all men, they must be the most miserable." They will inevitably land in pessimism, and that spells gloom, bitterness, weak complaining and resentment against the constitution of things, without any incentive to moral endeavor. 88 A System of General Ethics (c) Relation of Conscience to the other psychical powers : First, it is dependent on them in several respects. It depends on the Senses for its vital relation with the physical world, which is its present sphere of activity. Psy- chology and physiology are vitally related branches of science. The human mind is so constituted that it is able to use the sensory system as a means of communication with the outer world ; and the human body is so framed that it fits into the original structure of the mind. Without this mutual adaptation of the psuche and the soma, man would not be an organic part of the cosmos in which he has been placed, but would be an alien, a misfit. Conscience itself could not have the world for its field of operations, but, if it functioned at all, some other sphere would have to be provided. The moral faculty is also dependent on the Understand- ing for reflection, memory, imagination, and logical and scientific accuracy (see our "Outline of the Human Mind"). It is evident, prima facie, that if the mind did not possess these powers, Conscience would be useless and helpless. Suppose, for example, the mind could hold no moral per- ception in Reflection and Memory, how could Conscience function at all? So, also, the Conscience must rely on the other Intuitions for the cognition of reality. There is the cognition of self, or self-consciousness, how could the Conscience operate if the Ego were not conscious of itself and its thinking pro- cesses ? So all the other Intuitions are necessary, for with- out the cognition of outer reality, of material substance, of time and space, of cause and effect, etc., our present exist- ence would be impossible. Whether any other kind of exist- The Law of Right 89 ence would be possible, human reason has no means of knowing, and it would be idle to speculate. If Ethics is to have any practical value whatever, men must accept the conditions and environments in which they have been placed, and must make the most of them. It is plain, too, that Conscience is dependent on the Will to execute its behests. If the mind had no power to choose the right and carry out its choices, Conscience would be like a monarch on a throne with no power to execute any of its mandates. Every government must have at least three fundamental functions — the administrative, the judi- cial and the executive. So with the human mind. This subject will receive more attention later. Second, Conscience transcends the other faculties in some very important respects. It should regulate and direct them in all their ethical functioning. In this respect, therefore, all the other fac- ulties are dependent on Conscience, thus reversing the order and relation described in the preceding section. Whenever the question of right or wrong arises, no matter which faculty or faculties are involved, Conscience should step forward and assert its authority. Let us illustrate this point, taking the sense of sight for an example. Conscience does not decide for you whether the object you are looking at is a bird, a tree or a mountain; that must be decided by the sense of sight, which is regulative in its own sphere; but if the question whether it is right or wrong to look at an object should come to the fore, then Conscience ought to attend promptly and decide for the right use of the eyes. Further illustration is not necessary, for the student can apply this principle to all the other faculties of the mind. Again, Conscience is the highest and noblest of the rational powers, except perhaps the theistic, with which it 90 A System of General Ethics should always be correlated. Perhaps moral excellence is even the highest divine attribute. At all events, we can conceive of none that is higher. Therefore, our proposi- tion is proved, namely, that Conscience is the transcendent faculty of the human soul. e. Origin of Conscience: We maintain that Conscience is an innate mental faculty. Just as the whole mind is a divinely created entity, so the Conscience, as a part of the mind, is of divine origin. As soon as man had a mind, he was a moral being. If he had not been, he never could have developed morality, for the moral never could have evolved from the non-moral. At some point in history, therefore, God must have implanted the moral faculty, and it seems to us to be most reasonable to believe that it was part of man's psychical constitution as he was originally created. There is no satisfactory his- torical and scientific evidence that God first made man a mere animal, without moral character, and afterward in- serted the moral faculty into his psychical constitution ; and, somehow, to many minds the thought of God's employing that method seems to be absurd, not to say revolting. For God first to get the world ready for man's occupancy and delectation, and then create him a moral and spiritual being to fit into his habitation, and hold intelligent fellowship with his Maker, — that seems to be the nobler and more up- lifting conception, and explains best his high enduements and his exalted aspirations for an immortal destiny. We do not see why the higher view should not be accepted in preference to the lower. Here we must notice an erroneous notion. There are speculative writers who contend that Conscience is not a native human endowment, but only an acquired capacity, which is the resultant of varied experiences throughout the The Law of Right 91 past. This theory goes with the utilitarian evolutionism of Herbert Spencer and others, who hold that the right is only that which has been found to be useful and expedient, as has been seen in a previous section (Chapter IV, III, 11). As experience in social development found that some things were beneficial and others harmful, men somehow agreed to call the first right and the second wrong. In this way Conscience was gradually developed or evolved. A little reflection will, we think, prove that this is an inadequate account of the origin of Conscience. How could a uniquely moral faculty evolve from an absolutely non-moral ground? Can anything be evolved that was not previously involved? Can water run uphill, or rise higher than its source ? Can an effect be greater than its cause or totally different from it? Can you get something out of nothing? Ex nihilo nihil fit. Again, what good reason can be assigned for the evolu- tion of a special ethical faculty at all, when the other judg- ment faculties can very readily distinguish between the use- ful and the harmful? Conscience is not needed to make this distinction; we have other faculties that are compe- tent for that. Then why, we would inquire, did nature endow man with a superfluous faculty, and thus make his life unnecessarily complex ? What could have made nature produce a faculty for which there was no need? Such an exploit is contrary to the very basis of evolution itself as it is expounded by its own proponents. Let us remember, too, that the Conscience intuitively differentiates between the ethical and the purely useful or harmful. For example, disease microbes are harmful, but the Conscience never calls them ethically evil. However, lying, theft, slander, envy, hatred, and murder belong en- tirely to a different category, namely, the morally evil, and 92 A System of General Ethics Conscience at once says that they are wrong, not merely pernicious. And, moreover, it declares that they are per- nicious because they are wrong, and not wrong because they are pernicious. We may be pardoned for saying that the utilitarian scheme of Ethics always "puts the cart before the horse ;" always mistakes cause for effect and effect for cause. Acceptance of it always seems to dull the edge of both the mental and moral perceptions. f. Conscience a distinct mental faculty: Even at the risk of some repetition we desire to discuss this proposition. First, the moral perceptions are unique — sui generis. The mind intuitively perceives the right and the wrong and their fundamental antagonism. Is not this just as distinctive a cognition as the cognition of beauty, or utility, or objective reality? If so, the mind must have a special capacity for such cognition. It would be passing strange if the human mind should have specialized faculties for other things, and none for ethical facts and truths, when, after all, the latter are the noblest and the most vital to human welfare. Surely the cosmos was not made on an irrational plan. If it has been, all our thinking and reason- ing is useless ; yes, worse than useless ; it is farcical and even tragical. Compare our ethical perceptions with our other percep- tions — with sense-perception, consciousness, memory, imag- ination, logical praxis, intuitions of time, space, substance, causality, utility and God. A moment's thought will con- vince the mind that all of them are different from the per- ceptions of Conscience, which have to do solely with the categories of right and wrong. The moral feelings are no less unique than are the moral perceptions. There is the feeling of moral obligation or duty, the moral imperative, the commanding character of The Law of Right 93 the "Ought" — is not that feeling different from every other emotion? The feeling of satisfaction and self-approval for right-doing is unique ; no less distinctive are the feel- ings of guilt, compunction and remorse for wrong-doing. It requires no great mental acuteness to perceive that the ethical feelings are different from the feelings of mere pleasure, whether sensuous or intellectual; from feelings regarding the truth ; from feelings regarding utility, beauty, and scientific and philosophical research. Thus we have proved, we think, that the Conscience is a distinct faculty of the human soul. However, in order to canvass the whole situation with entire frankness and fairness, we must here note a difficulty that puzzles certain speculative minds. It is this : There is great diversity of moral judgment among men. Freely do we concede such diversity. It is patent on every hand. The very fact that moral progress is possible, and has been achieved in the world's history, implies changes in moral judgment. Nations and tribes often differ widely in their ethical standards. Certain practices which are regarded as right in some countries are looked upon with aversion in others. It has often been said that Conscience is one thing north of the Pyrenees and another south. 3 Moreover, individuals living in the same community often differ quite widely in their ethical judgments, one commending what another condemns. These diversities of view lead some men to think that, after all, man does not have a distinct moral faculty and that there is no real basis for moral dis- tinctions. But we must avoid hasty and superficial conclusions, es- pecially respecting problems that so vitally affect human 3. Valentine, ibid, attributes the saying to Pascal. 94 A System of General Ethics welfare. Let us think more deeply and discriminatingly, taking all the facts into account. First, in spite of this diversity of moral judgment, Conscience still persists ; its judgments may often be in error, but it still utters its voice; it does not vacate its throne; it still declares that some things are right and others wrong. Second, almost all people agree as to the great cardinal virtues — that is, there are no nations or tribes where mur- der, theft, falsehood, etc., are not regarded as wrong per se; while honesty, chastity and love are regarded as right in themselves, however crude may be the application of the primary principles. Third, even where startling differences exist on the sur- face, there is a deep underlying agreement as to right, duty and other virtues. For example, the Hindu mother in her ignorance once thought she ought to sacrifice her babe to the gods. The imperative of Conscience was there, how- ever sadly mistaken the moral judgment. Suppose after- ward she became a Christian; then her moral judgment was wholly changed; but that change did not destroy her moral sense, her Conscience. Nay, it rectified her moral judgment, and then her Conscience told her that she ought not to throw her babe to the crocodiles, but, on the con- trary, ought to consecrate and rear it according to the Christian standard. Note well this fact : despite the change in her moral judgment, her conscience and the moral im- perative over it were still there; which proves our propo- sition. Fourth, it should be remembered that all man's faculties are fallible, and that there is wide diversity of judgment in all realms, just as in the ethical sphere; yet we do not, on that account, assert that man has no distinct mental facul- ties, or no mind at all. When men differ in their judgments The Law of Right 95 as to objects of beauty, we do not straightway declare that man has no esthetic faculty. Why, men differ on scientific, psychological, philosophical and even mathematical propo- sitions ; yet who thinks of denying that men have special capacities for these varied subjects? Fifth, the primary perception of right as right and wrong as wrong prevails everywhere ; it is only the secondary judgments that differ. Or, to put the same thing differ- ently, the primary ethical standard holds everywhere; but the application of the standard to concrete cases varies. The intuition of moral distinctions exists among all individ- uals and in all nations ; but just how to draw these distinc- tions in life gives rise to diversity of judgment, because the wrong has come into the world and has wrought more or less ethical confusion. 4 Thus, we hold, the fact of diversity of moral judgment does not disprove the fact that the human Conscience is a distinct faculty. g. The supremacy of the Conscience: (a) Definition: The supremacy of the Conscience is its right to exercise a moral control over man's whole personality. (b) Nature of its authority: Its authority is not original, but derived or deputed. The ultimate authority is God and His law. Therefore Con- science does not in itself have the right of command over the other faculties, but is simply the divinely appointed faculty that discerns the supreme authority, and then de- clares it. The Conscience is not a norma normans, but a norma normata. 4. Hence Desdemona's well-known saying : "I do perceive here a divided duty." 96 A System of General Ethics It is supreme only in its own peculiar sphere, that of moral issues. It does not decide in other spheres. Except when moral considerations are involved, it does not com- mand the actions of the Sense, the Understanding, the In- tuitions, the Sensibilities and the Will. Its rule is advisory, not coercive. It does not "lord it over" the other faculties. Its function is to counsel, per- suade and command, but not to compel obedience. Hence its voice may be obeyed or disobeyed. Here is where other motives besides considerations of right may enter the mind, and present temptations to wrong-doing. Then the right and the wrong motives will come into conflict, Conscience urging the right motives and selfish pleasure or interest the wrong, and finally the ego through the will must decide and choose. Hence Conscience can only advise, persuade and urge. We cannot say that Conscience always is supreme, but only that it always ought to be supreme. Here is where the normative character of our science becomes evident. (c) Why Conscience should be supreme: First, as its sphere is the sphere of right and duty, its voice is the highest voice of the soul, the voice of the moral imperative ; hence its mandates should always be obeyed, no matter what the cost. Man would better lose everything else than his moral character. In every conflict between Conscience and the other faculties, Conscience should rule. Second, since Conscience derives its authority directly from the moral law, which is the law of God, the Supreme Lawgiver, its behests should be final. Third, other faculties are supreme in their own spheres. It would be inconsistent with the nature of things if the human soul did not have a power that was supreme in the moral sphere, which is the highest and noblest of all reali- The Law of Right 97 ties. If this were not so, the world would not be a rational world. Fourth, no other faculty of the mind could rationally be assigned the primacy: the senses and appetites could not, for that would make man bestial ; the desire for enjoyment could not, for that would make man selfish, which would destroy the very foundations of morality; even the benev- olent affections could not be given the supreme jurisdiction, for, noble as they are, they must be regulated by the prin- ciples of righteousness. Love and charity which are not so controlled are mere sentimentality, and may lead to vast moral harm. God's love is not mere sentiment; it is pure and holy love, permeated and regulated by the law of right ; and man's love should be patterned after its divine arch- etype. (d) Conscience, though supreme, is not infallible: Some speculative thinkers feel that this is an insuperable difficulty, which they put in this form: If Conscience is fallible, how can it be man's supreme guide in the sphere of morality? However, the difficulty is not so serious as is frequently supposed. First, all man's faculties are fallible and limited, and that in their own spheres. How often the senses are in error! Frequently we do not see aright nor hear accurately; our touch, taste and smell often become diseased, and do not function normally. Yet no one thinks that, because the senses are fallible, they are not our best and only guides each in its own sphere. Although the eye frequently errs, it is still man's highest authority in the realm of sight. The same is true of man's other psychical powers. Memory is frequently defective, yet in its own sphere it must be our guide. The mathematical faculty is often at fault ; yet for 98 A System of General Ethics its own science it is our only reliance. In the same way the Conscience is fallible, liable to error, but that does not invalidate its supreme place as man's guide in the ethical field. Indeed, if man's Conscience were infallible, it would be totally unlike all the rest of his mental outfit, and that would be absurd. Moreover, a large part of his moral en- deavor, achievement and discipline consists in the very fact that he must constantly seek to correct the errors and broaden the limitations of Conscience and his moral judg- ments, and thus advance step by step, just as he must in all other spheres of worthy and progressive effort. Second, let us put this argument concisely : Each faculty, though fallible, is regulative in its own sphere: the Intel- lect for knowledge ; the Sensibilities for feeling ; the Intu- itions for immediate cognition; the Will for self-determi- nation and choice; lastly the Conscience for moral dis- tinctions. (e) The Conscience, though fallible, is man's ethical guide : Even though fallible, should the dictates of the Con- science always be obeyed? Our answer is, Yes. First: To disregard the voice of Conscience would be to sin against our own primary perception and sense of right, and would, therefore, be the most fundamentally im- moral act that a man could commit. Just reflect for a moment: If a man sins against the very power that God has given him for discerning right and wrong, how can he commit a more grievous sin? Second: Whatever moral light the mind receives comes in and through the Conscience; therefore its guidance should be followed, whether the light be great or small. Third: In case of error of judgment, the mistake is of The Law of Right 99 the head and not the heart. Judged by the absolute stand- ard of right, the action in such circumstances would be wrong, but the person himself, who has acted in good faith, that is, from a sincere motive and according to his best knowledge, cannot be held guilty. Note, however: As soon as the truly honest man sees his mistake by means of increasing light, he will reverse his judgment and change his conduct accordingly. The apostle Paul is a conspicuous example. As he himself declares, he was sincere before his conversion, and acted "in all good conscience;" but no sooner did the better light come than he acknowledged his error, and changed the whole tenor of his life. Had he been insincere before his conversion, it would be difficult for the world to believe that he was sincere afterward. Fourth: The other faculties of the mind, though their mistakes must often be corrected and their decisions re- versed, yet are our only guides in their respective spheres. After the correction has been made, we still must rely on them in their peculiar vocations. Fifth: Like other psychical faculties, the Conscience is educable. Indeed, the human mind is so constituted that all its faculties must be enlightened, developed and disci- plined. It would be strange if the Conscience were the sole exception, for then it would not fit into the quiddity of which it is an integral part. Sixth: This mode of reasoning will not excuse crime, persecution and fanaticism in the name of Conscience ; for, when closely analyzed, the motives back of such acts are passion and hatred, not the calm and judicial action of the moral judgment. Note the enraged, howling mob vehe- mently clamoring for the blood of its victim. It cannot be truthfully said that a good, clean Conscience, "void of offense toward God and man," and a pure desire for the 100 A System of General Ethics triumph of truth and righteousness alone, are the moving power actuating such crimes. In this fact consists the deadly wrong of all mob violence and religious persecution ; it is the product of passion, not of Conscience. Seventh: At this point a practical suggestion is perti- nent. In doubtful and difficult cases of conscience, 5 de- cisions should not be made hastily. We should wait for more light. Here we can afford to hesitate, to "make haste slowly ;" indeed, it is highly immoral to push forward pre- sumptuously into action before the moral judgment is clear. We should reflect seriously, pray, ask advice, read good books, especially the Bible, until we have all the light that is possible on the situation. If we act in haste, we may be compelled to repent at leisure. "Be sure you are right, then go ahead," is a homely but wise maxim. 5. See the discussion of casuistry in a subsequent section. For the precise place consult the Index. CHAPTER VII III. MORAL AGENTS (continued). 3. Constituents of moral agency (continued). (3) The Will. a. Definition. b. Its unique powers. c. Freedom of the Will a sine qua non of morality. d. Proofs of the freedom of the Will. (a) Testimony of consciousness. (b) The test of experiment. (c) The demands of man's environment. (d) The mind's intuitive distinction. (e) Determinism inconsistent with itself. (f) Experience versus speculation. (g) Harmful results of Determinism, (h) Objections stated and confuted, (i) Limitations of freedom. 4. Motives or intentions. (1) Definition. (2) Motives essential to moral agency. (3) Varied relations of motives. a. To the Will. b. To the actor. c. To the action. III. MORAL AGENTS (continued). 3. Constituents of moral agency (continued). (3) The Will: a. Definition : The Will is the self-determining power of the mind. Other definitions might be given, thus : the capacity of the mind to choose and execute; the autonomy of the Ego or Self. 102 A System of General Ethics b. Its unique powers: First, the power of attention. By a capacity that is en- tirely sui generis, the Will is able to compel the self to give heed ; to "stop, look and listen," as it were ; to draw in the wandering faculties and concentrate them on a special ob- ject or subject. When the teacher gives the command, "Attention!" he furnishes a motive for the student to give heed, but at the same time the student knows that he can and must exert his own will in order to obey the injunction. The ability to attend is a matter of conscious experience, not of mere speculation. Second, of originating motion and action. This is another peculiar functioning power of the Will. Mind through the Will is the only entity that can originate and create; that is capable of self -movement and self-direc- tion. Matter is inert. Of itself it can initiate no action and motion, but, once at rest, it can never move itself purely by its own power, and, once in motion, it can never cease to move unless acted upon by some force outside of itself. Not so with the Will. By an ability that is inherent it is able to move itself, to push and pull itself, as it were, and to cause material substances to move at its behest. So far as we know, there is nothing else in all the universe that possesses this unique power. How it does this we do not understand, but we do know that it does. It is a fact of experience, and may be tested in a thousand ways. Take just one simple experiment, which is just as patent as an experiment in a physical or chemical laboratory: Let your arm hang loosely by your side for a moment; now make an effort of the Will, and see whether you cannot lift it to a horizontal position ; then to an oblique, then to a perpendicular position; then you The Law of Right 103 can drop it to your side again. Note, all the time in your consciousness you are vividly aware of an effort to use your will power, and also conscious that you are successful. If your consciousness deceives you in a matter so patent, its testimony is worthless in all other matters. Third, of alternate choice. This unique power can also be tested in many ways. You can choose one of two paths, one of two courses of action, as you will. Your awareness bears witness that you can choose between good and evil. You know that matter has not this power of self-determi- nation. It belongs only to that entity we call mind ; it is sui generis. Fourth, of execution. This simply means the power of the Will to carry into effect the choice previously made by the mind's decision. If the Will could not go further than to choose among alternatives, it would still be ineffective; it would stand helpless at the parting of the ways. c. Freedom of will a sine qui non of morality: This point will require no labored argument. If the Will has no power of self-determination, morality is only a name, a delusion of the brain, just as the consciousness of freedom itself must be. Kant said: "Thou canst be- cause thou ought est" The hypothesis that denies the freedom of the Will is called by two names : Determinism and Necessitarianism. The former means that the Will is determined by some- thing else than its own volitional power — by temperament, environment, heredity, physical causes, or overwhelming motives ; the latter means that all actions of the Will, how- ever free they may seem to be, are governed, after all, by inevitable necessity. The terms are two names for the same theory of the Will. Herbert Spencer was an expo- 104 A System of General Ethics nent of this view. He held that if the Will is free, no science of Psychology is possible. 1 Just as if free acts, as well as those that are necessitated, could not be examined, analyzed, classified and organized into a system! Accord- ing to this view, there could be no science of Ethics, for a morality that is coerced is no morality at all; it is a mis- nomer. And yet Mr. Spencer wrote an elaborate work en- titled, "The Data of Ethics." Let us note the following points : First: An unfree being would not be a responsible be- ing. He could not choose freely between good and evil. Whatever choice he might make would be coerced. There- fore he would be a mere automaton, not a moral being. Second: An unfree being could not execute its options, even if it could make them. Supposing it would even be possible for the Conscience to discern between the right and the wrong, yet, if the Will were not able to execute the de- cisions of Conscience, the latter would be a useless and inane faculty; it would be like a government without an executive department; like a monarch upon a throne, with no power to carry out his decrees. Such a theory would make the human mind an irrational quiddity. Let us note that the Deterministic theory is an absurdity: The human mind is endued with moral perception and feeling, so that it can differentiate between right and wrong, and actually feels their fundamental antagonism; and yet it has no 1. "Principles of Psychology," Vol.I, p. 503 : "Psychical changes either conform to law or they do not. If they do not conform to law, this work, in common with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense; no science of psychology is possible. If they do con- form to law, there cannot be any such thing as free will." Of course, when a man has no higher conceptions of law and causality than mere physical and mechanical force, he cannot grasp the idea of freedom, whose laws belong to a higher realm, that of the psy- chical and ethical. The Law of Right 105 power to choose between them ! And then, if it should de- lude itself into believing that it had freely chosen the right, it would have a feeling of peace and self-approval; or if it should be so credulous as to fancy that it had elected the wrong, it would be smitten with compunction and remorse ! That is the reductio ad absurdum of Determinism. It means that the human soul is irrational in its very consti- tution, made so by the Power that brought it into being. Men may believe this, if they will ; but they should not call themselves rational when they do. d. Proofs of the freedom of the Will: (a) The testimony of consciousness: All rational men are clearly conscious of being moral agents, and if you should tell them that they are not re- sponsible beings, they would be deeply insulted. If they are not free, their consciousness deceives them, and that, too, in the paramount issues of life. This would rob life of its high and holy purpose. If consciousness is under a delusion in matters of morality, it is under similar delusion in all other matters. If it is not, why not? We cannot believe that we men are irrational beings placed in an ir- rational universe. No! we think better of ourselves, the universe, and its Maker! (b) The test of experiment: In these scientific days experiment is the touchstone of truth. Just as you can experiment with physical and chem- ical elements, and thereby demonstrate their reality, com- position and nature, so you can perform experiments with the Will, and the results will be just as clear and patent to your consciousness in the latter case as in the former. We have shown how this may be done in the movements of the arm. Test your power of selection in another way. Place 106 A System of General Ethics a chair in the center of the room, and determine to pass around it in various ways for the express purpose of prov- ing your ability to choose. Remember that your only motive is to demonstrate your freedom. Now elect to pass around it to the left; now to the left again, just to prove that you have the option and ability ; now to the right or left just as you choose; now will to stand before it in any atti- tude you please ; now will to step upon the seat and stand there. Have you not demonstrated your power of choice? You are aware that you chose freely and were not coerced, not even by an overpowering motive. Should it be objected that these tests belong to the realm of the senses, we will go a step higher in the psychical sphere. Use your imagination; think of your childhood home, of Japan, China, Germany, England, the sun, the moon, Jupiter, Sirius, the Pleiades. Do you note how you can freely direct your imagination? In a similar way you find you can control your memory. Next, move up into the abstract realm, the realm of pure thinking: think of thought, of virtue, of truth, of being itself. Note your ability to determine your own thoughts by a simple effort of the Will. The question is not how you perform these acts of volition, but that you do. (c) The demands of man's environment: First: As has been shown in a previous section, the natural realm is so framed that man must constantly exer- cise the power of choice in order to preserve health, happi- ness, sanity, moral character, and even life itself. Second: Society is so constituted that it holds every rational person responsible for his character and conduct. Otherwise social order would be impossible; social chaos would reign. Would it not be passing strange, nay, more, The Law of Right 107 would it not be preposterous, to believe that the very thing that conserves the social organism, and makes social life at all worth while, should be a delusion and a snare? Third : Human government is based on the fundamental principle that men are free, and therefore responsible, be- ings. If men were not free, how puerile it would be to threaten them with punishment for wrong-doing, and then actually punish them when they were driven by necessity to criminal action ! Xo government built on the principle that men are mere automata could long endure. Xo nation has ever yet dared to take the risk of establishing a govern- ment on such an hypothesis. (d) The mind's intuitive distinction: The mind intuitively differentiates between free and forced actions. The author has used the following illus- tration in the class-room. Suppose, first, that a pupil, after the class had been dismissed, walks voluntarily out of the room into the hall. Some one asks him, "Did you come out of the class-room of your own free will and accord?" He replies, in tones of surprise, "Certainly I did!*' But suppose, secondly, that he has been disorderly, and some one ejects him by force from the room, and then he is asked the same question, "Did you come out of the room of your own free will and accord?" his answer would be, "No, I was thrown out by force !" A child intuitively knows the difference between a voluntary and a forced action. What clearer practical evidence can be adduced for the doctrine of freedom? (e) Determinism inconsistent with itself: Those who deny the freedom of the Will do not and dare not live and act according to their own theory. Insult or strike a determinist, and see whether he will excuse you on 108 A System of General Ethics the ground that you were not free and "couldn't help it!" Should any determinist read these lines, he may resent our use of this practical argument, and chide us for employing ad-hominem methods; but just to give him a taste of his own theory, we reply, "We cannot help it!" A theory of the Will that cannot be applied to practical life is only of speculative interest; it has no real value. 2 (f) Experience versus speculation: Freedom rests on direct and positive experience, on the testimony of consciousness ; while all forms of Determin- ism are based on speculation; on a vain attempt to figure out mental processes by merely physical and mathematical methods. (g) Harmful results of Determinism: If all men were to deny the freedom of the Will, the consequences would be baleful. Such a theory would pro- duce moral flabbiness, and men would everywhere, when guilty of misdemeanor, plead that they "couldn't help it." It would let down the moral bars, and open the sluices of license and vice. The morally strong and upright men of history have always held to strict views of the freedom of the Will, whereas only the moral weaklings have doubted 2. We cannot help feeling amused at Mr. Thilly's efforts to prove the deterministic view and to disprove the libertarian view in his 'Introduction to Ethics." On pages 337, 338 he says: "The deter- ministic theory is not, however, a discouraging and paralyzing doc- trine. On the contrary, the knowledge that we are determined must determine us to avoid certain conditions, and seek others more favorable." The very words "avoid" and "seek" connote the power of free choice, and prove that, as we have said in the text, it is im- possible for the Determinist to be logically consistent. He always reaches a point in his analysis where he has to admit the fact of freedom, whether he wants to or not. The Law of Right 109 or denied it. A bracing motto for all men would be the couplet : "I'm the captain of my soul, I'm the master of may fate." Emerson's lines are worth pondering well: "For He that worketh high and wise, Nor pauseth in His plan, Will tear the sun out of the skies, Ere freedom out of man." (h) Objections stated and confuted: First: The Necessitarian says that freedom is an insol- uble mystery. How can the Will determine itself? How can anything start itself, move itself, initiate action by its own inherent powers? "How can these things be?" We cannot see into the inner process; we cannot prove it step by step. Our reply is: True enough, freedom is a mystery, and we cannot understand the mind's inner power of self- movement. But all mental phenomena are mysteries. Sense-perception is a marvellous mystery. No one under- stands just how men see, hear, taste, touch and smell. How can an external object impinge an image on the retina? How does the optic nerve convey the image back into the brain center? How does it then blossom out into the con- sciousness? How is the connection between the molecular action in the cerebrum and the mental awareness estab- lished? How can material things be translated into terms of mentality? These are insoluble mysteries to psychol- ogists and physiologists alike. Then there are the prob- lems of reflection, memory, imagination, and the intuitions. Is not the problem of Epistemology one of the outstanding, and as yet unsolved, problems of philosophy? In all these 110 A System of General Ethics matters we can do nothing but fall back on experience. We know that we see, hear, reflect, remember and perceive. No less clearly do we know that we choose between alter- natives, and do so without compulsion. Second objection: In nature every effect must have its cause; and cause and effect are not the same force or entity, but something outside of or different from each other. So if the Will is on a balance, that is, if it is per- fectly equilibrate, something outside of itself must move it one way or the other; it could not move itself. Reply: The above is the argument of Materialism, which fails to distinguish between psychical and physical actions and categories. It can grasp the doctrine of cause and effect only in terms of material substances, which can be perceived by the senses only. But thinkers should re- member that, in the psychical realm, there are often moral and spiritual causes, utterly impalpable to sense perception, that are more potent, decisive and epoch-making than any or all of the physical forces in the universe. We have al- ready seen that the Ought, if placed in the scales, would outweigh the whole material cosmos. So the mind, being spiritual, is swayed by spiritual considerations, and is there- fore endued by its Maker with a capacity that in many ways, and those the most vital and exalted, far transcend mere material forces. Now, since the soul is so constituted that it can weigh and compare both moral and material values, it would be passing strange if it were not endowed with the power to distinguish the more worthy from the less worthy, and to choose between them. Therefore when the human Ego acts in the way of self-determination, it does not act without sufficient cause; but the causes that influence it lie in a realm that is higher and nobler than mere materiality. Rational beings, made in the image of The Law of Right 111 their Creator, ought to be able to think in ethical and spir- itual terms and realities, not merely in those that are me- chanical and materialistic. Third objection: A certain class of theorists contend that the strongest motive must prevail in every case. If the Will is swayed by motives, as it must be, it surely must be pushed forward, nolens volens, by the strongest motive. If a number of motives are pressing upon the mind, the most powerful one must finally prevail. Thus there is no freedom, no choice, but merely a battle of motives in the soul, the strongest ultimately winning the victory. This is the argument from causality carried up into the purely psychical realm, and is therefore the astutest argument that Determinists can adduce. Reply: We have already shown that the rational mind does not act without rational motives ; it would not be rational if it did. However, the argument that the strong- est motive must coerce the Will does not go deep enough in its analysis of the psychical process. Let us assume a case, a very common one in human experience. Here is a man who meets with a temptation to do wrong. At least two motives press upon his mind — first, the immediate pleasure to be derived from the act; second, the urging of conscience to resist the evil and do the right. Now note the process carefully: What is it that stops, gives atten- tion, and weighs and compares the alternatives before act- ing? Is it not the soul itself? Does not that fact of itself connote freedom of will? If the soul were not free, the individual would not pause and debate for a moment when the temptation comes, but would yield to it per force at once. After balancing and counter-balancing the motives of pleasure and righteousness for a time, what is it that must finally decide between the two, that must turn the 112 A System of General Ethics scales? Is it not the mind itself? Yes, it must decide which is the stronger motive — that of pleasure or that of moral integrity. Observe discriminatingly : it is not the strongest motive that forces the Will, but it is the mind which decides which is the strongest motive, and then the Will executes the mind's behest. In thus deciding, the soul exercises its freedom. It is not something outside of the soul that determines which is the strongest motive, but the soul itself by means of the conscience and the rational faculty. If it is the soul itself that weighs, balances and decides between motives, then the soul is not pushed on- ward by any compulsion, but acts of its own accord, using the powers with which it has been endued. This is the marvel of those mental struggles which have made or marred many a man in the moral conflicts of life. 3 Suppose we analyze the experience that comes to the soul after such a mental wrestling match. If the man yields to the allurement, he feels a sense of shame and guilt, for he knows that he was not forced to do wrong; his Con- science urged him to resist; and now it is his Conscience that upbraids him because he disobeyed its voice. Would he have this feeling of guilt and humiliation if he were not conscious of being a free agent? Therefore his conscious- ness itself bears him inner witness that he is to blame for the wrong choice he made. On the other hand, if he with- stands the temptation, and preserves his integrity, he is conscious of moral approval; the "still, small voice" within him commends his action as noble, strong and praiseworthy, and that is a distinctively ethical satisfaction. Why should 3. Jean Valjean's terrific wrestle with his conscience, so dramatic- ally described by Victor Hugo in "Les Miserables," is a notable example in fiction, and has, no doubt, been duplicated more than once in real life. The Law of Right 113 he have such a feeling of approval if he was a mere autom- aton played upon by irresistible forces? If man is con- scious of freedom, and yet is not free; if he is conscious of guilt when he does wrong, and yet is not guilty; if he is conscious of moral approval when he does right, and yet is not deserving, then the mind of man is irrational in its very roots, in its very constitution. Then, too, even those who hold that the Will is not free have no rational ground for their contention. Fourth objection: Next we note the objections from heredity, temperament and environment. On these loci the champions of Determinism present what they regard as some of their strongest arguments against the libertarian view. They insist that men are born under the handicap of heredity, and cannot help being what they are and doing what they do. All the lines of ancestry converge to make them just what they are, and they cannot be otherwise. They are victims rather than free agents. It is also main- tained that natural temperament 4 (which must come largely from heredity) holds every man in its inexorable leash. Those Determinists who do not attribute man's moral status wholly to inheritance and temperament lay the account largely to environment and education. For example, how can a child born and reared in the slums be other than what he is — a moral outcast? Perhaps from his earliest con- sciousness he has been taught to lie and steal. What chance has such a child to develop moral freedom and character? On the other hand, the child who is well-born, who is sur- rounded all his life by wholesome influences, cannot help 4. The following are the several kinds of temperament: San- guine, Melancholic, Bilious, Nervous, Phlegmatic and Tempered. Of course the classes often intergrade and vary in degree. The Tempered Temperament is that of the well-balanced man. The other classes are self-explanatory. 114 A System of General Ethics being upright; no credit is due him for not becoming a moral reprobate. Some years ago a rather crass material- ist declared that " a man is the result of every circumstance that ever touched him." Reply: We have tried to state the objector's argument as strongly as possible, and have not intended in any way to weaken or blur his viewpoint. Our purpose is to be helpful to the thinker rather than polemical in argumenta- tion. So our refutation must be as frank, fair and thor- ough as we can make it. First : Let it be candidly admitted that heredity, temper- ament and environment exercise a strong influence on all persons, and, to a large extent, determine their moral and spiritual status. It must be conceded, too, that, in this world, which has been so sadly affected by sin and evil, men do not have an equal chance to be moral and upright. No one who is at all acquainted with social and economic con- ditions can help making these concessions to the Determin- ist. Hence they are honestly made here. Second: If, on account of bad birth and environment, there are human beings who are totally lacking in rational intelligence, moral sense and freedom of will, such persons cannot be regarded as responsible for their condition and actions; and therefore they should be treated accordingly by society and the civil law. We have institutions for the feeble-minded, the idiotic and the maniacal. Society usu- ally is not so obtuse as to regard irresponsible people as amenable to the law or capable of moral conduct. Our faith in God also leads us to believe that He will not hold such defective persons to account. Third : There are degrees of freedom. People who are born well, and are reared in favorable moral and spiritual The Law of Right 115 conditions, have a larger degree of optionality than have those who are more or less handicapped by bad birth and surroundings. This does not mean, however, that the latter class have no freedom at all. But they are respon- sible only for the light and freedom they possess, not for what they do not possess. You do not expect a child to lift as much as a man; you expect him to lift only a child's burden. So the person who has a small degree of intelligence, freedom and opportunity cannot carry as large a burden of responsibility as the person who is more favorably born and situated. In all justice there must be a fair and gradient measure of requirement and accountability. A correct and most judicial principle is that laid down by Christ: "To whom much is given, of him shall much be required' (Luke 12:48). Hence both God and society will not demand as much from persons who are meagerly equipped by nature and environment as from those whose opportunities are better. "According to that a man hath, not according to that he hath not" (2 Cor. 8: 12), is the true norm of responsibility. After all, society does not treat the people of the slums (taking them as examples of persons most encumbered with moral handicap) as if they were wholly irresponsible. If they were, the law would not permit them to be at large, but would confine them in asylums and reformatories. This proves a consensus of opinion that they have some degree of freedom and accountability. True justice will make due allowance for their disadvantages, but will not wholly exonerate them for plain wrong-doing. There is an old saying that "there is honor even among thieves," which means that everywhere in the human world there is some degree of moral discernment and liberty. It would be a misfortune for philanthropists, however kind and char- 116 A System of General Ethics itable, to regard their beneficiaries as wholly irresponsible, and to treat them so. This leads us to an important con- sideration. That part of the community which has a better heritage and environment owes it as a solemn duty to give all pos- sible aid to the so-called lower classes. That is part of their moral task in the world. They should not despise the poor, nor look upon them as hopelessly reprobate; nor should they selfishly neglect them. And they should give them more than mere material help. This should not be neglected; but if it should be made the whole sum of charity, it would simply tend to pauperize the beneficiaries. The help that is given should also consist of moral and spir- itual uplift and inspiration; it should seek to stir the con- science into activity, to arouse the ability of freedom and the sense of responsibility, to create the desire to conquer the evil and attain the good. Hence the best help is that which leads to self-help. In many cases it is better to give people honorable work than material charity. Let us in- dicate the difference between the Determinist and the true ethical helper and reformer. If there are people in the community who are under the handicap of a poor moral opportunity, the Determinist will fold his hands, declare that they are not responsible, complain about nature's in- equalities, and so do nothing to aid them ; whereas the gen- uine libertarian will go to their succor, offer them help and encouragement, appeal to the meager conscience and sense of freedom they have, and try to awaken them into real moral action. Nothing so effectually cuts the nerve of humanitarian endeavor as does the philosophy of Deter- minism; whereas the true principles of ethics will furnish abundant motive for all kinds of philanthropic effort. The Law of Right 117 (i) Limitations of freedom: The proponent of freedom frankly admits that the Will is limited in many ways; but that is no reason for believ- ing that man has no freedom at all. Man's powers are all finite, and so is the will, since it belongs to the same entity. Yet who would say that the intellect can know nothing be- cause it does not know everything? So men would reason very lamely who would say that the Will has no liberty be- cause it is not omnipotent. Let us illustrate. You have some strength, but your strength is limited. You can easily lift the book lying on your desk, but you cannot uproot one of the giant oaks growing on the campus. Another illustration is this : Driving along a country road, you have seen a horse teth- ered to a stake in a pasture-field by the wayside. The ani- mal can graze anywhere within the circle to the end of his rope, but beyond the periphery of that boundary he cannot go. So with the human will. It is free within its divinely prescribed limits, but further it cannot range; and that circle of limitation is also the limit of every man's responsi- bility. God will not hold him amenable beyond the bound- ary of his freedom, and society and human government should not do so. 5 5. For a powerful vindication of the freedom of the will consult Professor L. Franklin Gruber's recent book (1918), "Creation Ex Nihilo," pages 97 and 98 — a work of the highest merit, most schol- arly and well reasoned. Consult also Dr. A. S. Pringle - Pattison's "The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy" (1917, page 31), where the author, interpreting Kant, says: "First of all, the imperative of duty involves, as its self-evident condition, the free- dom of the being on whom the command is laid. 'Thou canst be- cause thou oughtest.' Kant . . . says that the being who can con- ceive of the idea of a law possesses, by virtue of that very fact, the power of realizing it. We accept such responsibility when we con- demn ourselves, as we do, for our own failures. So understood, freedom and intelligence go together." 118 * A System of General Ethics 4. Motives or Intentions: (1) Definition: A motive or intention is the reason why a moral agent lives and acts as he does; it is the purpose of his life and conduct, the end he has in view. The motive might be called the inside of an action. (2) Motives essential to moral agency: In a psychical outline it is difficulty to locate motives. One superficial critic thinks they should be placed in the Will; but that is too obviously wrong to need reasoned refutation. The motives are evidently in the reason and the feelings. Men often are impelled by pure processes of reason for doing things ; at other times men are controlled by their emotions, and sometimes they are moved partly by reason and partly by emotion. The Will is simply the executive functioning power of the mind, and therefore only carries out the behests of reason, conscience and emo- tions. Now, since the motives lie in the reason and the feelings, they must be essential to moral agency, because if men acted without motive or purpose, they would not be rational beings, and would for that very reason not be re- sponsible. Think for a moment of a being who would live without a purpose ; you can see at once that he would not be a rational being. (3) Varied relations of Motives: a. To the Will : In a preceding section (consult "Motives" and "Will" in the Index), we have given this point sufficient discussion, and need simply to repeat here that motives influence, but do not coerce, the Will. If they did, the Will would not be free, and hence man would not be a moral agent. The Law of Right 119 b. To the actor: This is a most interesting thesis in Ethics. The motive determines the moral status of the actor, but not of the act. A man might do a wrong act with a sincere motive; in which case he would not be guilty, because he acted ac- cording to his best light. In common language we say, he did wrong, but he was sincere; "it was a mistake of the head and not of heart." By this we mean that, an account of the difficulty of the situation, his intellectual judgment was at fault, but his intention was honest. Again, a man might perform an act that was right in itself, but might do it with an ulterior motive of selfishness ; then he would have no merit; rather, all the more demerit, because he used the garb of truth for purposes of deception. While these are vital distinctions in Ethics, and should always be kept in mind, they should never excuse men for being careless in examining the ground and moral status of any course of action merely because they are sincere. It is not a sufficient reason for ill-considered conduct for a person to protest his honesty of purpose ; for had he been so pellucidly honest as he professes to be, he would not have acted prematurely, but would have investigated more thoroughly or waited for more light. The utterly sincere man will also, as soon as he is con- vinced of an error, reverse his decision and order his life accordingly. In brief, true, thorough-going Ethics de- mands that men shall constantly seek for more knowledge of all ethical reality, just as true scholarship impels men to constant and larger investigation in any chosen sphere of study. c. To the action : True Ethics holds that there is an absolute law of right, 120 A System of General Ethics a real moral standard, and that all conduct must be meas- ured by that norm, irrespective of the motive that impels the actor. Even though the motive of the actor may be sincere, that does not make a wrong act right in itself ; nor will a wrong motive change a right act into a wrong one. In the first case those who have more light should show the actor that, though he was sincere, his action was wrong, so that he may rectify it and may not repeat it; while in the second case the motive should be rebuked and corrected, but the act itself commended. True Ethics ever seeks to uphold the ideal both of the motive and action. DIVISION IV THE ANTITHESIS OF RIGHT CHAPTER VIII I. CONNECTING LINK. II. DEFINITION AND TERM. 1. Definition of sin. 2. The term sin. III. THE FACT OF SIN. 1. Proved by universal experience. 2. Proved by the fact of moral distinctions. (1) Definition. (2) Proofs of moral distinctions. a. Universal consciousness. b. A postulate of human society. c. A postulate of human government. d. Argument from the constitution of the human body. e. Difficulties considered. f. The morally indifferent sphere. g. A higher and a lower good, h. Questions of casuistry. I. CONNECTING LINK. In the development of our ethical system thus far we have considered, first, the Ground of Right, second, the Law of Right in the Creation. In all our discussions some- thing has been implied, and in more than one instance has even had to be mentioned. It has not been like a haunting, shadowy specter, but, rather, has been a grim and terrible reality. It has been the fact of the antithesis or opponent of the Right, namely, the Wrong, the unethical, what we 122 A System of General Ethics shall plainly call Sin. The very conception of the Right would connote at least the possibility, if not the actuality, of the Wrong. As the world is at present constituted, we cannot think of the Right without thinking of its opposite. That there is something wrong with the world of humanity goes without saying; every one must admit it. Since the science of Ethics deals with moral questions, and its main thesis is the Right, it must also, in order to be complete and thorough-going, deal fundamentally with that which opposes the Right and seeks to destroy it — namely, Sin. There are works on ethics, it must be admitted, that deal very slightingly with this theme. You will look in vain in the indexes of some such works for the word "sin." It is either treated under some milder and more euphonious term, or is practically ignored. But it is this very thing which we call sin that makes our moral tasks difficult and our moral problems perplexing and sometimes almost in- soluble. We must not shirk our duty here; we must not shrink from dealing with this vital problem with all the frankness, fairness and thoroughness we can command. To this difficult but absorbing task we must now apply our- selves. Let us do so with sincere, serious and reverent minds, for sin is a grave reality. II. DEFINITION AND TERM. 1. Definition of Sin: Sin is any principle, state or act that is contrary to the Law of Right, or the moral law of God. 2. The term Sin: In this work we shall deliberately use the term sin (Greek, au-apria, a missing, a failure). It is a stronger word than the word "wrong," and always connotes the idea The Antithesis of Right 123 of a willful transgression of the law of righteousness, thus involving real guilt. It is probably the best and most familiar word we have in the English language to desig- nate the fundamental antagonism of the wrong to the right and the heinous character of the former. The ethi- cist who uses this term cannot look lightly upon the wrong, but must regard it as a very serious and vital obliquity. A less sturdy ethical view, one that minimizes the distinction between right and wrong, will not be likely to use the word "sin;" but, in our view, it is better and honester to call things by their right name. It is a disservice to humanity to employ euphemisms in describing things that are wrong and baleful. Although, as will be seen later, there are varying degrees of sinfulness, we must look upon sin as real guilt, as an inexcusable violation of the moral law. III. THE FACT OF SIN. 1. Proved by universal experience: Were it not for the fact that some ethical writers try to minimize the wrong, and either blur or obliterate moral distinctions, it would not be necessary to argue the question of the reality of sin. However, in view of the fact that the consciousness of sin is practically universal, it is vain to deny the sad and stern reality of the presence of sin in the world. However men may speculate as to the origin of sin, it is here, and all of us must recognize its deadly character. It is the moral virus of the world. In the ethical realm it is what poison, disease and corruption are in the natural realm. There is a law written large and graven deep on the consciences of men that tells them they have done wrong and are responsible for their misdeeds. They cannot wipe out the smiting of the conscience. Even 124 A System of General Ethics when men go so far as to deny the existence of God, they still cannot ignore the "still, small voice" of conscience within them. If sin is not a reality, why should men be so constituted as to feel culpable for wrong doing? Such a delusion and lie would make man's psychical nature ir- rational. We come now to one of the basic themes of the science of Ethics — the fact of moral distinctions. By considering this vital theme we shall adduce further proofs of the re- ality of sin, for it is the actuality of moral evil that brings out this difference between right and wrong in sharp relief. 2. Moral Distinctions: (1) Definition: BY MORAIi DISTINCTIONS WE MEAN THE FUNDA- MENTAL DIFFERENCE AND ANTAGONISM BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG. We desire to lay emphasis on the word "antagonism" in the above definition, because right and wrong are basally opposed, and must ever seek to destroy each other's influ- ence and rule. Forever and forever there can be no truce between right and wrong. In their very nature they are deadly foes. It is only a weak, indeterminate kind of Ethics that in any way belittles or blurs this distinction. 1 (2) Proofs of Moral Distinctions : a. Universal consciousness: Just as the fact of sin is proved by the universal con- sciousness of the human family, so with the fact of moral distinctions. Everywhere individuals and nations differ- 1. The Christian Scriptures speak in clarion tones on this sub- ject: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that put darkness for light, and light for darkness ; that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter" (Isa. 5:20). The Antithesis of Right 125 entiate intuitively between right and wrong. However they may differ in the application of moral principles to specific cases, they agree on the primary fact that right is good and wrong is evil, and that right and wrong are per se opposed to each other and mutually destructive. True, the child just budding into consciousness may have to have this difference suggested to him by parents and teachers, but he has an innate disposition to accept the fact, his con- science responding to it, just as the mathematical faculty responds to mathematical teaching. If the discriminating psychologist wishes to distinguish between the content and faculty or capacity, we have no objection whatever, because, while the content may come to the mind by suggestion from the outside, in every normal human being there must be the innate capacity or function- ing ability to which the suggestion makes successful appeal. Otherwise the suggestion could never find a lodgment in the mind; it would fall on sterile and unreceptive soil. Dr. Milton Valentine, in his excellent work on "Theo- retical Ethics" (pp. 28-36), proves most effectively that the fact of moral distinctions is involved, not only in personal consciousness, but also in the social organism, human his- tory, literature, anthropology and religion. Society agrees collectively on the broad principle that right and wrong are opposed, and that right makes for human welfare and wrong for human decay and ruin. While in human history wrong often prevails for a time, and there has not always been steady moral progress, yet, in a most fundamental and often striking way, the right is vindicated sooner or later, while a kind of Nemesis pursues the individual or the nation that does wrong. How few people who live corruptly and selfishly are long remem- bered after they are dead! Even if they are remembered, 126 A System of General Ethics it is not with affection and respect. On the other hand, the men and women who have been great in goodness, as well as in genius, are the ones whose praises are rung by succeeding generations. The best and most enduring literature is that which up- holds the right and condemns the wrong. The morally pernicious book soon falls under sentence of reprobation. Ethnology impresses the same lesson, for no nation or tribe has yet been found that does not make moral distinc- tions. In some countries religion and morality are not as closely allied as they should be ; but in every religion there dwells this basal idea — that some things are right and salu- tary and others are wrong and baleful. And this is true in heathen lands as well as Christian. The apostle Paul, an ethical writer of deep insight, says of the heathen: "They show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness therewith, and their thoughts either accusing or else excusing one another" (Rom. 2:15). Now, since the universal consciousness testifies that right and wrong are fundamentally opposed, it is reasonable to believe that this distinction is an objective reality, not merely a subjective delusion. If it is the latter, it certainly is a widespread one, and practically the whole world is de- ceived by the native intuitions of the mind. Such a view would make the world an irrational one, and the best and noblest human intuitions a hallucination. To such a belief we cannot subscribe. It is much more reasonable to accept the view that the universal consciousness bears witness to a basal moral reality. b. Moral distinctions a postulate of human society: The social organism is largely built upon the fact that The Antithesis of Right 127 some things are right and others wrong per se } and we do not believe that these distinctions are merely artificial and arbitrary. Men who are interested in human welfare may well ask themselves seriously how long human society would endure were moral distinctions to be obliterated. No social circle has ever yet dared to try the experiment of breaking down all distinctions between right and wrong. Moreover, the best social organizations, and the most per- during and useful, are those that insist most urgently upon true virtue in their members. This is a cogent argument for the objective reality of moral distinctions. c. Moral distinctions a postulate of human government : All enduring civic institutions are erected on the principle that right and wrong are realities, not mere phantasms. We have already dealt sufficiently with this point. No gov- ernment could long exist that did not recognize this prin- ciple and build upon it. If right is not right and good, why are laws so framed as to reward and honor right doing? And if wrong is not wrong and pernicious, why does civil law reprobate and punish the offender? It is because gov- ernments perceive that they cannot stand if they abolish the distinction between good and evil. No truer epigram was ever written than this : "Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people" (Prov. 14:34). d. Argument from the constitution of the human body: The human body is so constituted that the selfsame ac- tions which the conscience pronounces sinful are harmful to it, while those that are perceived to be right make for health, exhilaration and happiness. Note the terrible con- sequences to the human body of sexual lust and all kinds of excess and debauchery. Every insurance company looks upon good, upright and temperate people as the best "risks." 128 A System of General Ethics While some good people are compelled to suffer, often through little or no fault of their own, yet they do not suffer from those ruinous diseases that are the result of sinful indulgence. The suffering of the innocent is a prob- lem that mere human philosophy can do little toward solv- ing; but there is enough wreckage of the human body caused by sinful indulgence to prove that it is framed to fit into an economy of moral distinctions. The speculatist in Philosophy and Ethics is prone to raise problems ; and so our next task will be to try to resolve some of his difficulties. e. Difficulties considered: First: In practical life it is not always easy to discrim- inate between right and wrong; indeed, in some cases it is quite difficult to do so. Often the person who really de- sires to do right is puzzled to know which course to pursue. Besides, right and wrong often seem to be blurred and mixed, so that motives and actions are partly right and partly wrong. In other words, the line of demarkation cannot always be sharply drawn. Does not this prove that the doctrine of moral distinctions is, after all, only a fig- ment? In reply we would say, first, that sin has come into the world, and its very nature is to cause ethical turbulence, to blur the distinction between right and wrong, and thus make man's moral task in the world a trying and laborious one. That is sin's business. If it did not create moral disturb- ance, it would not be sin, just as, if there were no physical disease in the world, there would be no people who are partly well and partly ill. Again, it is the nature of sin to blind men's moral perceptions and dull their sensibilities, so they cannot always clearly discern the right and delimit it from the wrong. The Antithesis of Right 129 Nor is that all. If sin had not come into the world, men would have no real moral tasks, no difficult ethical prob- lems ; the right would always be clearly perceived, because there would be no evil to cloud the moral issues, to obscure the moral vision, and to handicap the moral powers. Then doing right would always be the easy and natural course. Thus we should not puzzle ourselves unduly over this problem, but should remember that, in spite of sin, the cos- mos is a rational one, and therefore cherishing and doing the right will enable men more and more clearly to differ- entiate it from the wrong, and will also give the ego more and more the habit of right thinking and right doing. Diffi- cult as it often is to apply the law of right to special cases, yet the primary perception and feeling that some things are right and others wrong persists, proving that the difference between them is real, not fanciful. Because mathematical problems are difficult, and the tyro makes frequent errors in mastering this discipline, does not prove that mathemat- ical rules and laws are only a delusion of the mind. The same method of reason holds with reference to moral dis- tinctions. Second : Another difficulty is that there is so much di- versity of moral judgment among men and nations. We have already considered this topic in our discussion of the Conscience. Here we simply repeat that the primary intuitive perception of a fundamental difference between right and wrong still holds good the world over; it is only in the secondary moral judgments and in the application of the primary principle to specific cases that diversities of view arise. It is the same with truth. All normal persons believe that there is such a quality as truth; also an abso- lute standard of truth; yet, in practical life, how many, many times it is hard to distinguish truth from error! In 130 A System of General Ethics Esthetics the same principle obtains. That there is a real objective standard of beauty no one will deny; yet how much difference prevails in the application of the norm to specific objects ! So, since morality is a part of the world, and not something aloof and set off by itself, we should not feel unduly agitated because we cannot always agree in specific cases just what is right and what is wrong. (3) The "morally indifferent" sphere: Is there such a sphere? Strictly and fundamentally speaking, when the reference is to man's states and acts, there is not. Every state and act must be either right or wrong, or a mixture of the two. That is, a moral being can never be in a non-moral state — at least, not so long as he is conscious. However, the term "morally indifferent" has been ap- plied to certain conditions and choices of life, though not with strict accuracy. For example, there are two equally distant ways from my home to the recitation hall. In many cases it is morally indifferent which of the two ways I se- lect, and so I often take one way or the other as I list, without giving even to myself any specific reason for my choice. This morning I came one way, and I did right in doing so, and did not do wrong because I did not elect the other way. If men choose to call such a circumstance an instance of the "morally indifferent," it may be regarded as an allowable mode of speech or an usus loquendi. We shall show presently why it is not strictly accurate. Let us ask just now why God has left in human life such a sphere — that is, why there are so many times and places in life when we may choose either alternative without doing wrong. He had a good and sufficient reason. If the ques- tion of right and wrong were brought sharply before our The Antithesis of Right 131 consciences every moment of our lives; if we could not take a step without being confronted by it, life would be a constant duress and bondage, a wearisome debate, an unen- durable struggle; there would be no room for any spon- taneous movement of life. Think how large a sphere there is where we can do right without effort; where we need not be in fear of violating the moral law or of offending God, whether we choose one course or another. We ought to be grateful to God that He has established so kindly a regime, and has not made life too strenuous for us. The moral imperative is not intended to crush us, but to develop us in a joyful life of righteousness. Still, it behooves us to be watchful lest we widen this sphere unduly, so as to blur our perception of moral dis- tinctions. Therefore we must sound a warning note here. Let us again cite the example of the two equi-distant walks to the college hall. Suppose I knew there was some one on one of the ways whom it would be my duty to meet, then it would be wrong for me to choose the other way, for that would be evading my duty. Thus, whenever there is a moral reason for electing one alternative rather than the other, then the choice between them cannot rightly be called morally indifferent. We have said, however, that in reality there is no morally indifferent sphere for moral beings. Let us go back to our illustration of the equi-distant ways to the recitation build- ing. Under ordinary circumstances, whether I shall take this way or that is not a matter of choice between right and wrong at all. The question of right only enters in. It is right for me to go either way. So, instead of being a ques- tion of right or wrong, it is a question of choosing between two rights of equal value. However, such a situation is not removed from the moral sphere, because, whether I 132 A System of General Ethics choose one way or the other, I am doing right, I am per- forming my duty. Therefore, accurately speaking, there is no place in human life for the "morally indifferent." It is a misnomer for those loci in human experience when the choice lies between rights of balanced value, and when the wrong does not obtrude itself at all. We should call it the sphere of the "altogether right," which is the realm of the highest virtue. Otherwise those who are walking in the way of righteousness without strain and temptation would be in a state of "moral indifference," which would be absurd. (4) A higher and a lower good: Some speculative writers hold that the only ground of moral distinctions is the difference between a higher and a lower good. James Martineau was an expounder of this doctrine, for he says : "Every action is right which, in the presence of a lower principle, follows a higher ; every ac- tion is wrong which, in the presence of a higher principle, follows a lower." 2 There is an obvious truth here. In this world of moral complications there are loci which are neither wholly right nor wholly wrong, but a mixture of good and evil. Al- most everywhere we find more or less turbulence. So sometimes one good has less of the evil element in it than another. In such cases we are in duty bound to choose the higher good, and if we do not do so, we do wrong; we commit sin. A sterling ethic must insist on this principle. However, Martineau's statement does not exhaust the doctrine of moral distinctions, but is only a partial truth, and therefore may do harm by its very superficiality. It would obliterate the real antagonism between right and 2. "Types of Ethical Theory," Vol. II, Sec. 15. The Antithesis of Right 133 wrong; it would also tend to minimize the heinousness of the wrong, its corrupt and evil character per se. If men should generally hold the idea that sin, after all, is only a lesser good, or making a choice of a lesser good in the pres- ence of a greater good, they would, by that very token, have lost their sense of the "exceeding sinfulness of sin." No! men's intuitions are surer guides than the "cobwebbery" of some speculative minds; for men hold that lying, stealing, adultery and murder are not lower goods, but evils per se of the most positive character, and are in nowise and no degree to be extenuated. Right and wrong must be called by different names, and must be looked upon as utterly antagonistic. (5) Questions of casuistry: The term "casuistry" is used in a good sense and a bad sense. In the good sense it is a branch of ethical science which deals with difficult cases of conscience (casus con- scientiae). All will admit that there are many situations in life where, as Desdemona said, we "do here perceive a divided duty." The line between right and wrong is not clearly marked. In a sin-smitten world like ours, this must be the case. We should accept as part of our moral task and discipline the necessity of using our mental faculties in applying the moral law to concrete cases. If we are sin- cere, and yet fall into error, we may well believe that God will overrule our mistakes for our ultimate good. It is perhaps better to err now and then than to have no mental and moral schooling at all. However, the more complex the situation, the more time should be taken in coming to a decision. On the topics, "Collision of Duties" and "Col- lision and Casuistry," Dr. R. F. Weidner 3 gives some help- ful suggestions: 3. "Christian Ethics," p. 114. 134 A System of General Ethics "There can be no collision when the matter is considered in a purely objective and ideal light. To the individual, however, such a collision may arise. But, in the ordinary course of life, the collision of duties most frequently has its cause in previous neglect, or in the fact that life has not been teleologically planned. In all collisions of duties the claims of justice must be preferred to those of affection. For example, a man should pay his debts first, and then from what remains to him give to those who need. The opposite was the course of Saint Crispin, who took leather which did not belong to him to make shoes for the poor. In real life cases of casuistry must be solved either by . . . the happy inspiration of the moment, or by sustained reflec- tion. Resolute, impulsive natures are best fitted for the first mode of decision ; cautious and thoughtful natures for the second." In its bad sense the word "casuistry" has at least three significations: First, a false, sophistical or equivocal mode of reasoning relative to moral obligations; second, making finespun distinctions merely for intellectual amusement or to display dialectical skill; third, higgling, or teasing the conscience, over matters of trivial concern, that is, over mere subtleties. 4 Of course, all these motives should be condemned as unworthy. However, when the exercise is engaged in for real intellectual and moral discipline, and with the purpose of helping men to a correct decision in practical life, it is to be commended. The warning may also be relevant here that mere intellection in dealing with 4. A most valuable discussion of the subject of casuistry is to be found in Dr. J. Clark Murray's "A Handbook of Christian Ethics," pp. 311-315. He says that the practical man will often "unceremo- niously sweep aside all the intellectual cobwebbery of the casuist," and do his duty through a direct call of the moral intelligence. The Antithesis of Right 135 ethical matters is apt to lead to irresoluteness in the per- formance of evident duties — duties that would be quite plain to the common normal intuitions. Via media is the best path to pursue. 5 Under the head of difficult cases of conscience would come the question of "doubtful" amusements or "debat- able" indulgences. In a general work like this we cannot go into details, but must refer the reader to such special monographs as he may be able to procure. 6 In the settle- ment of such problems, sometimes quite perplexing to the young, we would advise, first, that one should have an en- lightened conscience, which will be more helpful in solving ethical problems than many pages of winding logic. Sec- ond, having such a conscience, one should be thoroughly conscientious in following its dictates and directions. The author has no disposition to be a purist, and certainly be- lieves in all forms of healthful and innocent diversion ; yet he would suggest that, instead of asking the question concerning certain forms of amusement, "Why, what is there wrong in them?" it would be more ethical to ask, "What is the good in them?" While they afford recrea- tion, which all people need at times, will they, at the same time, uplift one morally, and fit one afterward to do more effectively the serious and necessary work of life? Let us have wholesome recreation, by all means, and as much of it as we need to keep life from becoming irksome and humdrum. And let us be thankful that there are so many kinds of diversion that are of a perfectly right and 5. The subject of casuistry might have been discussed in the chapter on Conscience, but it seems to be more easily understood after the treatment of Moral Distinctions. 6. John H. Vincent, "Better Not;" James H. Brooks, "The Modern Dance." 136 A System of General Ethics innocent character, and that afford just the kind of relax- ation that human nature requires. But it must be said, too, that there are other forms of amusement that are too exciting, too engrossing, and take too much time from the real work of life. They wear one out, so that, instead of resting the worker, they unfit him for resuming his duties with zest and effectiveness. The pursuit of pleasure to the point of dissipation and exhaustion is always wrong, as are pleasures that are followed as the chief business of life. Let this be our guiding ethical principle: The main track of life is our serious and useful employment; the side tracks are for rest and relaxation, so that we may, at the proper time, come back to the main track with a fresh rebound. A vexing question pertaining to cases of conscience is this: "Is a lie ever justifiable?" Here again we must refer the reader to special monographs. 7 Our reply would be, "A lie, properly defined, is never justifiable." How- ever, the phrase, "properly defined," must be explained. What is a lie in the root sense of the term? It is an un- truth told for the purpose of deception with a cowardly, selfish, spiteful or other evil motive. There are many things that are not true, but they are not lies. Aesop's fables are not true, but they are not lies. The parables of the Bible are not true stories, but no one would call them lies. Bunyan's allegories, "The Pilgrim's Progress" and "The Holy War," are not true narratives, but they cer- tainly are not lies. All these are not lies, because they do not deceive any one, and are not meant to deceive, but are intended to illuminate and symbolize the truth. 7. Henry Clay Trumbull, "A Lie Never Justifiable;" Robert E. Speer, "The Marks of a Man," Chap. I. The Antithesis of Right 137 The conscientious physician who disguises certain facts from his patients in extremely critical circumstances, when the shock of the blunt truth might prove fatal, is not a liar, because his purpose is a beneficent one, not a selfish or rep- rehensible one. Neither can it rightly be said that he "does evil that good may come," because his course is not "evil," but, rather, a procedure that belongs to the order of things as God has framed them. He withholds a part of the truth for the important purpose of saving life. It would be brutal for him to blurt out the truth in a way that would almost immediately cause death. Of course, the conscientious physician will always speak the whole truth when his judgment tells him that such is the wisest and best course. If he were to disguise the truth except in very grave and exceptional circumstances, he would have to be classed with liars. For a general in a righteous war to disguise his plans from the enemy, and resort to tactics that lead the enemy astray, would be called legitimate strategy, and would not be characterized as a lie. No just war could be won with- out strategy. Are football players who employ ruses to win the game to be called by the harsh name of liars? Our answer is, No; not when the artifice is a part of the game to which the players on both sides have agreed. In such a case the umpire never calls "foul," no matter how much one side is victimized by the other. But note — when the player resorts to a subterfuge that is not agreed upon as a rule of the game, he has acted a lie ; and if his trick is discovered, he is justly penalized, and all his colleagues must suffer with him. We believe that people's natural intuitions usually enable them to differentiate between what are properly termed 138 A System of General Ethics lies, and what are known as justifiable ruses, strategems and disguises. We know that "camouflages" of all kinds must be carefully guarded, or they will be abused; and it is for that very reason that we should so train our con- sciences and school our moral judgments as to be able to discriminate between the use and the abuse. This again is a part of the discipline of life. If our moral task were always easy, it would not be a task. There may be situa- tions in which it will be very difficult to distinguish be- tween a lie and mere artifice or strategem; in which cases we would offer this advice: It is better to err, if err you must, on the side of safety — that is, on the side of strict veracity. Let it be remembered, too, that it is the motive more than anything else that makes the lie. It is not always the mere form of the words. A person may tell the truth in such a way — with a shrug, or a laugh, or a peculiar emphasis — as to convey a false impression. It is a lie, however, be- cause the purpose of the speaker is to deceive. We have known people to deceive in this way, and then, when they were accused, to declare that they had spoken the precise truth. They were the worst kind of falsifiers, however, because they used the truth itself to coin a lie. CHAPTER IX IV. THE GENESIS OF SIN. 1. Nature of the problem. 2. The true view. (1) Sin the free act of a moral agent. (2) An eternal possibility, but not a necessity. (3) An adequate test necessary to moral agency. 3. Erroneous views. (1) God not the author of sin. (2) Sin not eternal. (3) Sin not posited in matter. (4) Sin not a lapse of the Infinite. (5) Sin not due to man's primitive animalism. (6) Agnosticism not satisfactory. IV. THE GENESIS OF SIN. 1. Nature of the problem: This is one of the outstanding problems of Ethics and Philosophy. No less puzzling is it to the practical mind. Nor is it an easy problem. In order to gain true insight into it, men must think beneath the surface, must be able to appreciate the unique character of ethical questions ; in other words, must be able to think in ethical categories and terms. One must rise above the merely material and me- chanical. The ethical problems cannot be solved by means of physics, chemistry and mathematics. Ethics belongs to a realm of its own — its data are sui generis. This is true even while it interpenetrates all other spheres. Another word is patent at this point. The man who is able to appreciate nothing but pleasure, who is a mere eudemonist or opportunist, can never rise to that elevation of thought and motive which will enable him to appreciate 140 A System of General Ethics moral values and excellencies for their own sake ; can never see and feel that morality is its own excuse for being. For this reason the facts of sin and suffering in the world form an insoluble enigma for the mere utilitarian in Ethics. We shall deal frankly with the ethical problem before us, set- ting forth first the true view, then the erroneous views. 2. The true view: (1) Sin the free act of a moral agent: Consider carefully the exact nature of sin. It must be a free act, or it would not be sin, for sin always implies guilt. If it were something that was coerced, something that could not be avoided, it would not be reasonable to call it sin and hold the offender responsible. Conversely, if, as conscience bears witness, sin is something that ought not to occur and that might be avoided, then sin has its right name, and the word stands for a reality; then also there is a real basis and an adequate reason for the universal feel- ing of guilt when sin is committed. Moreover, the feeling of responsibility for our moral status and conduct connotes freedom, with ability to perform the good and repel the evil. Now, bearing in mind that a moral act is the free act of a moral agent, we already see some dawning light on the problem of the genesis of sin. Christian Theology and Ethics, following the teaching of the Bible, tells us specific- ally about the genesis of sin in the world; yet we are con- strained to think that Natural Ethics, which is based on reason, can at least indicate how sin must have originated. 1 1. Possibly some readers will think that we make too large a claim here for human reason ; and we are not disposed to argue the question. Perhaps unaided reason never could have discovered how sin originated; but this much is undoubtedly true: since its genesis has been revealed in the Bible, reason can show that the Bible gives the only adequate explanation. The Antithesis of Right 141 While it cannot point to a definite historical act, as Chris- tian Ethics can, it can and does reason that, since sin is a free act or it would not be sin, it must have had its genesis in the free act of the first human moral agent whom God created and who was the progenitor of the human family. If this is not true, the problem is insoluble for Natural Ethics. Do you ask why? Because a being who was not a moral agent could not have sinned. If the first man had been a mere automaton, he never could have violated a moral law, and therefore sin never could have entered the world. But sin is here; no one can deny its presence. And, therefore, being a moral act, it must have had a moral inception — that is, must have been the free act of a moral agent. Now, science teaches the doctrine of the unitary origin of the human race. It rejects the idea of a multiple origin. Therefore, since all men have descended from the primitive man, and since all men are congenitally sinful in disposition, the rational conclusion must be that the progenitor of the race brought sin into the world. We must deal frankly with another problem of sincere minds : Why did not the Creator so constitute the first man that he could not sin ? Why did He not make the first man impeccable ? Our reply is : God can do nothing that is contrary to the nature of things, to their fundamental structure — at least, so far as we can understand, He cannot do so; for, like God Himself, the nature of things is eternal. In fact, the nature of reality is the very basis of God's eternal being. He could not be what He is and at the same time be some- thing else ; and what He is now He must have been from eternity, for if there ever was a time when He was not what He is now, He never could have become what He now 142 A System of General Ethics is. True, God is omnipotent; but a basal element of His omnipotence is that He is able to preserve inviolate the ab- solute and eternal constitution of things as they ought to be. If He could or would act contrary to this principle, it would prove, ipso fact, that there was imperfection in His nature, and therefore He would not be the perfect and all-wise God. Moreover, divine omnipotence also includes the abi- ity to restrain His power whenever the eternal ought de- mands it. When a great athlete holds his strength in check by an act of his will, that does not mean that he does not possess that strength in full measure. So divine almighti- ness is capable of almighty self-restraint. Still again, for God to invade the free and ethical realm by acts of mere physical omnipotence would be a wrong and capricious use of His power, and that would make God a sinner. Therefore it does not mean that God is limited in power because He permits a degree of freedom in the hu- man realm ; it does mean that He is so powerful that He is able to restrain His power when He sees fit to do so. Now let us apply these deep and fundamental principles. So far as we can rationalize on the problem, two options were open to God : First, He might have created mere good and happy automata, such as would have done His will simply because they could not have done otherwise; they would have been good by necessity; they would have had no choice in the matter; therefore they would not have been moral agents, and would have had no moral character. If the reader will pardon the expression, they would have been mere happy "Jumping Jacks." Second, He might have created beings with a will in lib- erty — beings who could choose or refuse to do His will; who could elect the right or its opposite ; therefore beings who were intelligent, rational, free, and possessed of real moral character and ability. The Antithesis of Right 143 Now, which alternative did God choose? Historically we know that He chose the second, for man is here, and he is a moral agent. Whether we like God's decision or not, we shall have to put up with it ! To rebel against the divine regime is like the ox kicking against the goads. But is it not more rational to believe, even though we may not un- derstand perfectly, that the marvellous Power that made the universe, and placed man in it, and endued him with intelligence and freedom, acted wisely and ethically? Is not that, we ask in all earnestness, a saner position than to fall into pessimism, whimper and complain, and look upon the world as a lapse and misfortune? But, penetrating to the bottom of the problem, did the Power that made man do the best and wisest thing in en- dowing man with so great a responsibility as that of moral freedom? We reply, Yes — and because of the following facts: moral excellence is the highest good; freedom is a nobler enduement than mere mechanism; a moral being is better than an automaton ; moral character is the very thing that makes man superior to minerals, vegetables, and the brutes around him. To repeat for emphasis, when God made minerals, vegetables and animals, He made automata ; when He made man, He made a higher species of being; and this He did by endowing him with the high prerogative of freedom. Will any one indicate why He should have made a universe of mere automata ? What worthy purpose would have moved Him to make such a universe? But if He made the automatic part of the cosmos to provide a habitation for moral beings, then His adventure was worth while. It cannot be denied that God made an adventure — we use the word advisedly, yet reverently — when He decided to 144 A System of General Ethics create moral beings. Nothing great and high was ever done without some risk. It is a great risk to establish a repub- lican or a democratic form of government, for liberty may so easily be perverted into license — but will anyone, es- pecially here in America, say that the adventure has not been worth while? However, let the critics of the divine order remember one thing: God will bear His part of the responsibility; you and I will never be held accountable for His act in creating moral agents ; He will see to that ; 2 the only thing for which He will hold us amenable will be our use of the moral powers with which He has endowed and blessed us. Are we unwilling to do that much? If we are, we must be moral weaklings indeed. Of course, the Epicurean, who looks upon mere pleasure as the chief good, and can never lift his thoughts and aspi- rations to anything higher, will find fault with God's method — and will also thereby expose the "yellow streak" in his own character. But the true and stalwart ethicist, who looks upon moral excellence as the highest good, will gladly approve of God's election, and will thereby exemplify his higher and finer mould. Men's theories are usually an in- dex to their character. (2) Sin an eternal possibility, but not a necessity: Another problem that often causes intellectual confusion to people who do not think deeply enough is this: How could evil get its inception? If nothing can be evolved that was not previously involved, must not evil have had an eternal root ? How could it have been evolved from a non- evil source? This is indeed a topic that merits our profoundest and most serious thought. Difficult though it is, we must essay 2. Theodicy is the technical name for a defence of God and His ways. The Antithesis of Right 145 the task before us. Let us remember, as has been said, that we are dealing with ethical, not mechanical and mater- ialistic, subjects. Sin or evil is a moral fact and quality, not a material entity ; therefore our thinking and reasoning about it must be in terms of the ethical. Being a moral fact, it is evident that it must get its start in an act of free choice; for if it were the result of coercion, it would not be moral evil. But free will is creative. As we have seen in a previous section, the Will has the power of origination, of bringing into actuality something new. If that is not true, even the divine Being never could have created anything. There- fore, when the first human being made a wrong choice by a free act of his will, He brought something new into the world, something that had not been before — namely, sin or moral evil. If we are going to think lucidly on ethical subjects, this thought of the creative power of a free Will cannot be emphasized too greatly. The same mode of reasoning obtains regarding moral good as well as moral evil. Though man was created good, his goodness was a created goodness, and was therefore only automatic, and not in the deepest sense moral goodness (though of course it was real goodness). Now, had man by his own volition chosen to continue in his original good- ness, to practice goodness, and to increase his powers for higher attainment, He would have brought something eth- ically new into actuality — that is, he would have converted his created goodness into truly moral goodness for himself by taking it freely into his own will. Appropriating his created goodness by his free choice, he would have made it intrinsically his own. So with evil. When man chose the opposite of the good- ness with which he was created, by that very act he brought 146 A System of General Ethics something new into actuality — namely, moral evil, or sin. It was not necessary for him to do so; it was not God's desire that he should make a wrong choice ; it was his own free act. Whatever may have been the test placed before him, it (the test) was not evil; it was simply a necessary touchstone of his free moral agency. Let it be remembered, too, that evil is not an entity, but a quality ; also that it is not a positive quality, like the good, but a negative. Hence it is eternal only as a possibility, not as an actuality. Note: the right always connotes the possibility of the wrong; else it would be mechanical and coerced, not ethical. However, the wrong should never become an actuality, but should forever remain only a pos- sibility. Take the idea of truth; that idea connotes the possibility of error or falsehood; but error and falsehood should never come into existence. Suppose we take an illustration : In this class-room there is good order. Does not that fact connote the possibility of disorder? Yet every right-minded person will admit that the possible disorder should not become a reality ; nor is it necessary that it should. So it is in the ethical sphere. The right, or the good, has existed from eternity as a pos- itive and actual quality, belonging to the very nature of God. On the other hand, the wrong has been only a pos- sibility from eternity. It is therefore out of the germ of possibility that the wrong came into the world through the act of a free moral agent. Thus we say that sin is not eternal ; it had a beginning. (3) An adequate test necessary to moral agency: In order to bring out moral quality into complete realiza- tion, one thing more was necessary — an adequate test of the moral agent. It stands to reason that, if God had The Antithesis of Right 147 made man a moral being, and then had set him in the midst of an environment that would have given him no opportu- nity to exercise his power of choice, the Creator would Himself have been guilty of a puerile and ineffective act. You might compare it to a teacher who would ask a well- trained college Senior to solve a problem in simple addi- tion, to test his advanced mathematical standing and skill. So a moral agent must be subjected to an adequate test in order to prove his moral agency. The test must be ade- quate to be a real test. You would not test a giant's strength by requesting him to lift only a pound. What was the test that was applied to the progenitor or progenitors of the race ? Natural Ethics can go no further than to say that sometime and somewhere within the era of human history there must have been such an ordeal, but our science cannot tell when and where the transaction occurred. The Christian Scriptures reveal this fact defi- nitely, namely, in the garden of Eden when the man and woman ate of the forbidden fruit. Those who will not accept that narrative as historical must be content to leave the problem of the time, place and circumstances an open question. Natural Ethics goes no further than to say that such a trial of freedom must have been an historical event. 3. Erroneous views: (1) God is not the author of sin: Lacking in depth of ethical thinking, some people argue that, since God created man, and man fell into sin, there- fore God must be the author of sin. They reason that there must have been something evil injected into man's nature by creation, or he would not have yielded to an allurement. We cannot allow that this method of argument is legiti- 148 A System of General Ethics mate. Of course God created man, and made him a free agent; but He did not create him sinful; He did not put a bad streak, as it were, into his nature, a weakness that necessitated his fall. No; He made man free, but good; good in his constitution ; setting his will at equilibrium, but without bias and imperfection; so that he had the ability to decide to continue in the right way, if he chose to do so. At the same time, in order to complement his freedom, he had the ability to choose the opposite way, and thus make the possible wrong the actual wrong. If such freedom is an imperfection, then man was, ipso facto, imperfect by creation ; rather it was a higher kind of perfection than mere mehanical and automatic goodness; in brief, it was the great glory of man that he was endued with the highest and noblest prerogative in the universe, the power of free choice, which lifted him above the mere material and me- chanical forces around him. Another thought is germain here. Had God put an evil strain into man's nature in his creation, then, indeed, man would not have been truly and perfectly free, for then his will, instead of being perfectly equilibrate, would have been inclined toward evil, and his fall would have been inevit- able — unless God had forcibly interposed. No; we must rise to the conception that man was created good, with his will set on a perfect balance, and that he himself had the mysterious power to dip the scales one way or the other. Does the reader say he cannot understand how that can be? Very well ; but he himself (the reader) knows that, even though he is more or less inclined to evil by his inherited nature, yet he has the power of choosing among alterna- tives. How much more a being whose will was perfectly equilibrate ? The Antithesis of Right 149 But if the first man did not have an evil principle within him — a "yellow streak" — how could he be tempted to do wrong? This is one of the fundamental objections of un- ethical thinkers. To this objection we reply: To be tempted is not a real sin. As long as the will does not consent to the temptation, does not choose it, does not incorporate it into the soul's inner being, there is no sin either of thought or action. On the other hand, the very fact that the soul is thus tested, and yet withstands the enticement, constitutes its true moral glory and power. In the name of reason, how else could a free agent achieve moral character save by being capable of and submitted to an actual test? Why, the need of an ordeal of some kind lies at the very heart of moral agency. Even if God determined the ordeal, He did not create the evil; he simply sought to prove and establish man's true moral character. God did not desire that man should make a wrong choice, and thus uncenter his life, but that he should choose the right, and so preserve his moral center of gravity. We know that this must be true, because God has so constituted man that even now, when- ever he resists temptation and upholds the right, he has the answer of a good conscience within him, and becomes more firmly established in moral character; and if that is God's desire now, it is reasonable to believe it was His desire in the beginning of human history. Sometimes the rather childish objection is raised that a human parent would not put a temptation in the way of his child. Certainly not! The parent ought to know that, since evil has come into the world, both he and his child are set in the midst of enough temptations to test their free- dom, and therefore it is not necessary to set any artificial tests in the child's way; indeed, it would be wanton to do 150 A System of General Ethics so. But this is a very different case from that of the first human being, whose moral agency had to be proved and established by some kind of moral discipline. However, in the interest of virile Ethics, as opposed to the flabby sort, the argument may be carried further: Every sensible par- ent knows that, if his children are too much sheltered — "brought up in a bandbox," as the saying goes — so that they know nothing of the discipline of life, they will grow up to be moral and intellectual weaklings. Hence parents often do place their children in the school of severe train- ing, and the children are all the better for it. Our heav- enly Father ought to be credited with as much sense and reason as earthly parents possess. The summary of the argument respecting the genesis of sin, then, is this : God created the moral agent, but the moral agent was himself the author of sin. (2) Sin is not eternal: If sin were eternal, it would not be sin; it would be something necessitated, something that had to be. There- fore it would not belong to the category of the ethical, which can dwell only in the realm of freedom. Moral good is eternal because, as we have shown, God combines in His personality from eternity the ethically necessary and the ethically free. He has forever and ever chosen the right because it is right, and it has been right forever and ever because He has chosen it. Had God ever chosen the wrong, He would have Himself originated sin, but even then it would have had a beginning. Again, if sin and error were eternal, there would be no hope of their final extermination and the ultimate triumph of righteousness and truth; for the eternal can have no end. Besides, if both good and evil were eternal, that The Antithesis of Right 151 would mean there were two eternal opposites and anti- theses; which is an absurdity in itself. (3) Sin is not posited in matter: This was the error of Plato, the Manicheans and the Gnostics. Sin cannot have its source in matter, because sin is a moral evil, and so cannot be predicated of material substance. Moral evil can be assigned only to psychical, rational and free beings. Morality does not have its seat in the body, but in the mind, which is the only entity that man can think, reason and choose. So far as we can see by the rational process, the physical cosmos may have been affected by the sin of the moral agent, who was made its head and crown, so that it may now suffer from disorder, disintegration and decay; but that is not moral evil, which could never have had its inception in unconscious and im- personal matter. (4) Sin is not a lapse of the Infinite: This is the view of Hinduism and Buddhism, which are pantheistic ; it is also the view of certain forms of modern Pantheism and particularly of Pessimism. Here we must refer the reader to works on Theism for a thorough refu- tation of these fallacious theories. 3 So far as regards Ethics, this view would totally annihilate morality, because it would make both good and evil the outgrowth of neces- sity. Pantheism recognizes no free, intelligent Personality back of the universe, but identifies God and the universe. That is, the All is not a Person, but a Thing. Those pan- theists who speak about the "Unconscious Intelligence" and the "Unconscious Will" are using self-contradictory terms. 3. We would recommend Flint's "Theism" and "Anti-Theistic Theories" and Sheldon's "Unbelief in the Nineteenth Century." See also the author's "A System of Natural Theism," pp. 94-99, 137-139. 152 A System of General Ethics Therefore all the "becoming" and all the "developing*' of the god of Pantheism are necessitated, not free; hence not really moral. How, then, could a mere lapse or accident of such an unfree, unrational something be a moral act, and give rise to moral evil. It is an absurd philosophy. The moral could never evolve from the non-moral, nor the free from the non-free. If Pantheism, with its doctrine of the unfortunate "lapse of the Infinite,'' is true, all Ethics is a delusion and a snare. (5) Sin is not due to man's primitive animalism. If sin arose from man's primitive animalism, then God is Himself the author of sin, for He gave man his primitive animalism. It must then have been a part of his original constitution, part of his inherent being, and therefore must have been implanted in him by the Power that made and developed him. If man's yielding to his animal nature when he began to evolve into a free being was the primeval sin, then God made man's animalism sinful, and is the re- sponsible party for the evil in the world. Moreover, this program would not have given the prim- itive man a fair chance, because his animalism was the re- sult of cycles upon cycles of evolution, and must have been extremely powerful in his nature. If man gradually devel- oped a moral nature, it must have been very feeble at its inception, the mere glimmering of freedom and moral sense, and therefore it was simply inevitable that his age- long animal nature should prove too strong for his poor and meager moral equipment. So, according to this crass and earthy view, God was not only the author of sin, but did not even give man a fair chance. Such a theory would destroy the very foundation of Ethics. (6) Agnosticism not satisfactory: The Antithesis of Right 153 Why not simply give up the ethical problem? It is full of mystery, anyway. For several reasons : First, the mind cannot rest satisfied in the agnostical position ; it craves a rational hypothesis ; it wants science ; wherever possible, it seeks definiteness and perspicuity. Second, conscience is too insistent a faculty to be put off and silenced by the simple assertion, "We do not know." There are problems that we may well permit to go un- solved, for they have only a negligible effect on our lives; but those so vitally connected with the moral imperative of the soul as this one demand a solution. Third, moral considerations are so practical, so neces- sary to individual, social and civic welfare, that the human mind demands some consistent and adequate account of the rise and origin of moral reality. It makes a great deal of difference in men's characters and lives whether they be- lieve that God is the author of sin, or whether it had its origin in man's fault. Fourth, Agnosticism in Ethics, as well as in Theology, spells the daunted mind; the mind that gives up its prob- lems instead of thinking them through to a consistent end. In matters on which such paramount issues for life and destiny depend, men ought not to acknowledge themselves defeated too soon or too easily. 4 4. Says Dr. James Orr ("The Christian View of God and the World," p. 51) : "Agnosticism is not a state in which the mind of an intelligent being can permanently rest. It is essentially a con- dition of suspense — a confession of ignorance — an abdication of thought on the highest subjects. It is not, in the nature of things, possible for the mind to remain in this neutral, passive attitude." CHAPTER X V. THE CURE OF SIN. 1. The answer of Natural Ethics. (1) An enigma. (2) God might forgive sin. (3) God might help man morally. (4) Man may strive morally. (5) But assurance is lacking. 2. The answer of Christian Ethics. (1) God is loving and merciful. (2) God is also just. (3) The moral antimony adjusted through vicarious atone- ment. (4) God regenerates and sanctifies. (5) Assurance of the moral victory and goal. (6) The inner witness of the Spirit. V. THE CURE OF SIN. 1. The answer of Natural Ethics: (1) For Natural Ethics this question is an enigma. Much as the natural reason may desire to solve every ethi- cal problem, it is compelled to confess its limitations. This is one of its most perplexing problems — the remedy for sin. It has no clear and certain answer. The most it can hope to do is to offer a few tentative suggestions, which we would state as follows: (2) It would seem to be reasonable that, if God created man a free moral agent, and man fell into sin, and then would come back to God in true repentance, God would forgive his transgressions and restore him to divine favor. However, here is reason's difficulty: If God should for- give sin without reparation to the moral law, how could the principle of justice be upheld and respect for the divine The Antithesis of Right 155 government be maintained? Would not pure forgiveness without satisfaction to justice create a schism between di- vine mercy and justice? The great and puzzling difficulty would be how to get such an antinomy adjusted. There- fore, even one of the wisest of the Greek philosophers, Plato, said he did not know whether the gods would forgive sin or not, and even if they would, whether they ought. That was profound ethical insight; but even with all his depth, Plato could not elucidate the problem. Thus the answer of mere reason cannot be clear and positive. Neither can it be said that any man ever received explicit assurance of pardon merely through the light of natural reason. (3) It would also seem to be reasonable that the God who made man would come to his help morally, if man would return to Him in contrition and desire His aid. It certainly would be a satisfying experience if men knew that He would do so. Natural reason might, if it would or could believe this doctrine firmly, receive some help and inspiration from such a faith; and perhaps there have been men who have been made better by cherishing this be- lief and making the effort to live accordingly. The diffi- culty, however, is that there is no definite experience of such divine help coming to man through natural reason alone. The issue is vague and intangible, and has no sure foundation in experience. It is a light, perhaps, but only a faint and glimmering light. Nor does history give any clear testimony on this point. We do not read of any men having received clear and absolute certitude of divine for- giveness only through reason. (4) Again, it seems to be reasonable that, if God is im- manent and affords man moral assistance in some way, then 156 A System of General Ethics man might overcome evil by degrees through moral striv- ing. That some men, by believing this earnestly and act- ing upon it, have made a fair degree of advancement in morality can hardly be denied. If no such achievement were possible to the natural man, society would doubtless in time become so corrupt as to cease to exist ; it would de- stroy itself through the elements of disintegration and de- cay within it. No one can deny that some men of the world are fine and lovable specimens of moral integrity in many ways ; that they are good and patriotic citizens ; that they are not to be classed with the debauched and salacious and dishonorable. Christian theology does not put all per- sons who do not accept the Christian religion into the same category so far as what is known as "civil righteousness" is concerned. And there is such a righteousness, as even Augustine taught, 1 that helps to conserve society for this world. Perhaps, too, the natural reason might vaguely hope that all things will work together for good to them that love and practice uprightness. However, the trouble with such reasoning is, it is vague and uncertain; it is only guesswork and surmise; it leads to no sure goal; it gives no positive assurance. Judging from the ineffective efforts of natural reason to reach any certain conclusions, it is even doubtful whether it could have discovered all that has been tentatively indicated above. (5) Let us summarize our results thus far: Reason teaches clearly enough that there is a Personal Ground of Right, that there is a Law of Right in the cosmos, that man has a moral constitution, that sin, or moral evil, has come 1. See also the Augsburg Confession (Article XVIII), the creed of the Lutheran Church. The Antithesis of Right 157 into the world, and that man ought to conquer sin and obey the law of right. But just how to accomplish his moral task, just how to overcome evil and achieve the highest good — that is not clear to man's unaided reason. May we be permitted, even in a work on General Ethics, to appeal to another source for help in solving this most vital and serious ethical problem? Whatever the worldly mind may think about the venture, the author does not feel in his conscience that he has discharged his duty to himself and his fellowmen, until he has pointed out what he be- lieves to be the true solution. 2. The answer of Christian Ethics: (1) God is loving and merciful: The Christian Scriptures teach this doctrine clearly, pos- itively, "line upon line, precept upon precept," and thus give ample assurance that God is not only willing, but anxious, to forgive men their trespasses, if they will repent of their sins and believe the gospel. (Cf. Isa. 1: 18; 55: 6-13; Psalm 103:8-14; John 3: 14-17; Luke 15:7, 10, 11- 24; Rom. 2:4; 1 John 1:9.) Christianity also teaches that God does not hold Himself aloof, but actually comes to man in various earnest and beneficent ways, pleads with him, and offers him help, grace and pardon. (2) God is also just: No less clearly do the Christian Scriptures assert that God is just, and will therefore punish every transgression of His holy law. Just as the civil officer cannot wink at crime, cannot simply pardon the criminal without repara- tion to the law, so God must be just, and punish sin, if He would uphold and preserve the moral economy of the uni- verse which He has created. Who would respect God's government should He simply waive aside the eternal prin- 158 A System of General Ethics ciple of justice and forgive sin without reparation? "Right- eousness and justice are the foundation of His throne." But if the foundation of the universe were destroyed, — the results dare not be contemplated. (3) The adjustment of the moral antinomy through vicarious atonement: If divine mercy seeks to pardon and save the moral offender, and divine justice at the same time demands the exaction of the penalty, how can the moral antinomy be re- solved? The answer of the Christian Scriptures is explicit. Because God so loved the world He sent a Substitute — One who was divine, so that all His work would be of infinite value ; also human, so that He could organically unite Him- self with humanity and truly take up humanity's task; and He came into the world, kept the law perfectly, and suf- fered the penalty of man's transgression in man's stead. Thus eternal and infinite justice has been upheld and satis- fied, and eternal love is free, ready and anxious to save all persons who accept the gracious Substitute and His work. This method is known in Christian Theology and Ethics as the vicarious atonement. In this way, as the Scriptures teach, "God could be just, and yet the justifier of every one who believes on His Son." Thus Plato's moral enigma as to whether divine forgiveness could be righteously bestowed or not, has been resolved. Divine love and mercy save men from their sins, but accomplish this result in an ethical way, not in a superficial and mechanical way. (4) God regenerates and sanctifies: According to the Christian Scriptures, God not only made the moral adjustment, so that He could righteously pardon sin and save the sinner, but He also offers to come lovingly and effectively to man's aid in the performance of his moral The Antithesis of Right 159 task. Through the Word of God the Holy Spirit implants a new ethical and spiritual life and begets a living faith in the receptive heart, and this gives to man the ability to con- quer in every battle with evil. Then, having conferred on the believer the "new birth" — for it is called by that term in the Bible — God will continue to help him by His sanc- tifying Spirit and grace. (5) Assurance of the moral goal: The Christian Scriptures are also clear in teaching that the truly moral and spiritual life will lead to a definite con- summation — eternal victory over evil and eternal posses- sion and enjoyment of the Highest Good. This goal in- cludes an immortal residence in a place and condition of absolute purity and bliss. To many minds, and those among the noblest in the world, this assurance is an inspir- ing incentive to ethical endeavor. The Scriptures them- selves frequently appeal to it. 2 (6) The inner witness of the Spirit: The doubter may think that there is still a lacuna in our reasoning. He may insist that we have merely cited the testimony of the Bible, which is the very matter in dispute, and may be of no more value than any other teaching. We reply that Biblical testimony is unique in this special respect : the Holy Spirit accompanies the divine Word, and impinges its message as true and real upon the receptive soul's inner consciousness ; that is, the Spirit through the Word begets an experience, an inner assurance of truth. To illustrate, the Bible teaches that God will forgive the penitent sinner (1 John 1:9); but note — God will not keep the joyful fact to Himself; He will send His Spirit into 2. Vide John 14:1-3; 1 John 3:2,3; Rev. 2:10; 14:13; Ps. 17:15. 160 A System of General Ethics the sinner's heart to tell him that his sins are pardoned. So also, when sinners are willing to accept Christ as their Redeemer, the Holy Spirit assures them in their conscious- ness that Christ is their Redeemer. That the Bible is the divine Word is also part of the content of Christian cer- tification. What we have thus briefly described is the ex- perience of regeneration or conversion, to whose reality millions of Christians bear glad testimony; whereas the objections of those who have never had it, and have never seriously tried to get it, are of little or no force. The Bible teaches explicitly about this experience, and tells how it may be obtained. 3 Thus, in the interest of frankness and scientific thor- oughness, we have set forth the Christian life plan and hope. Whether Christianity holds the true view or not, Natural Ethics may not be competent so say. It is the bus- iness of Christian Theology and Apologetics to prove and defend the Christian system of religion. Yet Natural Ethics ought to admit that to ignore the profound moral teaching of the Christian religion would be both unethical and unscientific. We have now set forth as fully as was consistent with our plan a System of Theoretical Ethics. It might be ad- visable for the student at this point to review the method- ology pursued by consulting the "General Outline" near the beginning of the book. The principles laid down in Part I must now be applied to the various conditions of human life. 3. Vide Ps. 53:10-13; 119:18.130; John 7:16.17; 8:31.32; Acts 2:38; Rom. 8: 16; 1 Cor. 2:9-12; 1 John 9:5-12. PART II PRACTICAL ETHICS DIVISION I INTRODUCTORY DATA CHAPTER XI I. DEFINITION OF PRACTICAL ETHICS. II. ITS RELATION TO THEORETICAL ETHICS. 1. A vital relation. 2. A vitally important relation. III. ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES. 1. Duties classified. 2. The term duty. 3. Duties and rights. I. DEFINITION OF PRACTICAL ETHICS. Practical Ethics is the systematic treatment of the appli- cation of moral principles to human life. 1 1. The contention is sometimes made that Practical Ethics is an art, not a science (vide Valentine, ut supra, p. 23). We would say that the actual practice of ethical principles is an art, while the sys- tematic treatment and classification of the material and the discus- sion of the relation of the practice to the principles is a science. At all events, a system of Ethics would be very incomplete if it omitted the important duty of applying to actual life the principles found and established. The really earnest ethicist has more than a mere scholastic interest in the noble science of Ethics. Even if he cannot always distinguish between science and art in an academic way, yet his ultimate purpose should be to be of practical service to the world. 162 A System of General Ethics II. ITS RELATION TO THEORETICAL ETHICS. 1. A vital relation: This relation is a living one ; it is like that subsisting be- tween a tree and its fruit. A well-known aphorism may be applied here : "By their fruits ye shall know them." Theories of Ethics that do not and cannot, by their very nature, bear good fruit in outward conduct (and inward life as well) are not likely, by that very token, to be true. They will not bear the test of experiment. There are sys- tems of Ethics that rather confuse the mind on the ethical problems than throw light upon them ; that blur moral dis- tinctions rather than set them forth clearly and enforce them earnestly. Such theories will not bear good fruitage in wholesome and upright lives. In making these state- ments we are not veering upon pragmatic and utilitarian ground ; for the results we demand of any theory of Ethics are true moral character and conduct, not merely a selfishly calculating ethical scheme; which, after all, would be a contradiction of terms. 2. A vitally important relation: First: A correct theory of Ethics is of paramount im- portance. The doctrine that a man can believe what he pleases, and at the same time live a truly moral life, is a fallacy. Belief cannot be dismissed in that lightsome way, with a mere toss of the hand. Those who look deeply into the heart and essence of things will see that even belief itself has a moral quality, so that if a man believes an error, he is just that far unethical. Neither can he be in an ethi- cal frame of mind if he is not vitally concerned for the truth ; and to be indifferent as to his beliefs and convictions is prima facie proof of such unconcern. In this work we have maintained that Ethics has a the- Introductory Data 163 istic basis. Can any one who thinks seriously about it sup- pose that it makes no difference to God, who sees into men's hearts and motives, what they believe, and whether they believe the truth or not? Is it a matter of indifference to Him whether men believe in His existence and loving and just character or not? We should have deep and inner thoughts about ethical realities and states; we should not be superficial. A man's theories of life will and must have a direct bear- ing on his practice. For example, if a man does not be- lieve in God, he surely will not lead a God-fearing life. If a man does not believe in the reality of moral distinctions, it is evident that he will not live according to the law of right as he should, nor hate and eschew the wrong. The man who regards morality as a mere matter of expediency — that is, the utilitarian — will surely not have very high and noble conceptions of the beauty and glory and intrinsic ex- cellence of righteousness, and his low views cannot help exercising a degrading influence on his life. For the sake of his good name, or some other selfish advantage, he may observe the canons of conventional morality, and be a fairly decent citizen; but that will be the extent of his practice. Therefore, in view of the foregoing reasons, let no one de- ceive himself into thinking that he can believe just as he pleases, and yet live a truly ethical life before God and man. Second : On the other hand, correct practice is also nec- essary. A thorough-going ethic requires true and consci- entious effort in carrying out the principles of morality into all the practical relations of life. At first thought, it might seem unnecessary to insist on this topic. Some persons might think that, if your theories and beliefs are correct, the right kind of a life will flow out spontaneously from such a source, as water would flow from an open spring. 164 A System of General Ethics However, practical experience proves that such is not the case. It might be so in a perfect and ideal state; but as we are constituted and as the world is constituted, we know that we must often make an effort, and sometimes a stren- uous one, to put our theories into practice. Important as correct views and knowledge are, they do not automatically effect the true life. Men must use their wills in the prac- tice of morality ; they must put forth an effort to live up to their standards. Practical Ethics is just as important as theoretical principles. The fatal defect, as we have seen, in the Ethics of Socrates was that he thought knowledge was the one thing needful, and overlooked the fact that the will must also be used. Again, strange and inconsistent as it may appear, there are men who seem to have only an academic interest in ethical theories. They care only about working out a finely wrought scientific scheme, but have little or no con- cern about the practical affairs of life. A man of specu- lative tendencies might spin out a wonderful ethical sys- tem, and one, too, that might be essentially correct, and yet he might make a recluse of himself, and show no interest in social and civic affairs. Such a man would not be living a truly moral life, because his life would be one of selfish- ness. Perhaps, too, the reader has known persons who had very fine ideas of right and wrong, and could talk glibly about them, and yet were far from scrupulous about telling the truth, keeping their promises, or paying their debts. There are even preachers who preach beautifully, but live unbeautifully. In this way we see that, in order to stabil- ize their lives for good, men must have both a correct the- ory and a correct practice. Introductory Data 165 III. ITS SUBJECT-MATTER: MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES. 1. Duties classified: Man's chief duties may be conveniently classified and assembled in the following way: 1. His duties to himself, or Individual Ethics; 2. His duties to nature, or Nature Ethics; 3. His duties to his fellowmen, or Social Ethics; 4. His duties to God, or Theistic Ethics. In the interest of clearness we would remark that the classification here given cannot be said to be strictly scien- tific, in the sense that the several kinds of duty are sharply differentiated from one another. Speaking precisely, du- ties overlap. For example, all duties of whatever classes are duties to God, for He is the Source of the moral law and the Creator of the cosmos that is governed by it ; there- fore he cannot be indifferent to any of man's actions, be they good or evil. A good act toward our fellowmen must be a good act toward God whose children they are, just as a kindly act toward an earthly parent's children would be looked upon as a similar act toward himself. Man's duties to himself and his fellowmen also blend and overlap. If a man owes it to himself to keep himself pure and' make himself strong morally, he owes the same obliga- tion to his fellowmen; for the better his life is the more wholesome and salutary will be his influence on them. The same principle obtains regarding man's treatment of the natural cosmos. Since God made nature, and placed man in vital relation with it, every duty to it is also a duty to Him, because it is obedience to the law that He has or- dained. Any abuse of nature, whether of the sentient or non-sentient parts, is also a sin against Him, for He made it. In like manner, a duty performed to the natural econ- 166 A System of General Ethics omy that will make it more pliant, usable and beautiful is also a service to one's fellow-beings. However, while the various classes of duties cannot be sharply differentiated, yet our divisions will be found to be convenient for orderly presentation. 2. The term duty: Is the word "duty" the best word that can be used in working out a System of Practical Ethics ? This is a ques- tion that has caused the writer not a little concern. The objection to the word "duty" is that, in popular usage, it carries with it the thought of strain, or constraint, or some- thing burdensome and unpleasant to perform. If men look upon duty merely as a task, they will not be likely to perform it with much rebound and exhilaration, and that will rob their effort of much of its ethical value. Doubtless it is better to do one's duty by constraint than not at all, but such a performance falls far below the ethical ideal. To illustrate, if a man should tell his wife that he loves her merely because it is his duty to do so, she would feel more pain than pleasure in the statement. The same thing would be true of love to God and one's fellowmen. There- fore, if a better word than "duty" could be found, one that would bear in it the idea of joy as well as of obligation, we should much prefer to use it. However, such a term has not been found, and so we retain the common term as a matter of convenience and brevity. With a little effort we may, we think, make the word "duty" acceptable. Only those who have not attained to the moral elevation implied in the term will find it irk- some. To those who are in happy accord with moral re- ality and the infinite Source of moral good, duty is a de- light, not a task; they rejoice in the performance of every Introductory Data 167 moral obligation; the doing of their duty is regarded by them rather as a privilege than as a burden. In this world of sin and moral turbulence even the good man may often find duty difficult, but he performs it with a sincerity and willingness that convert it into victory and delight, and afterward feels the "answer of a good conscience toward both God and man." Love of the right and the good trans- forms the whole idea of moral obligation, making duty a delight. Let this temper dwell in the mind of the reader as we pursue our study of duty together. As much as pos- sible let us banish all thought of irksomeness and strain. 3. Duties and right: Another idea will brighten the thought of duty : Man has rights as well as duties. While he owes duties to his fel- lowmen, they also owe duties to him, and these become his rights. If he treats nature properly, he has a right to the fruits of his efforts, so far as he has had a share in pro- ducing them; and nature usually responds generously. If a man performs his duty as a citizen, he has a right to the protection of the State. Indeed, it might be scientifically more complete to make the subject-matter of Practical Ethics "Man's Rights and Duties," instead of only "Man's Chief Duties," and the author confesses that he has at times almost decided to use the former plan; but further thought has convinced him that the idea of duty, properly conceived, implies in every case the corresponding right; and therefore to treat man's rights first and then his duties would require much need- less repetition. So the original plan must stand. DIVISION II MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES CHAPTER XII MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (Individual Ethics). 1. To his body. (1) He should not despise his body. (2) He should preserve it in health. a. By cleanliness. b. By proper food and drink. c. By judicious exercise. d. By needed rest and sleep. (3) He should control and regulate its passions. (4) He should remember its dignity. I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (Individual Ethics). In order to clear up a speculative difficulty, a few prefa- tory remarks are apropos at this point. Men who indulge unduly in speculations are apt to question everything. And so, strange as it may seem, there are those who contend that an individual cannot owe a duty to himself. This was the view of James Martineau, whose objection was purely speculative, not practical. He argued that it was absurd to think that the self could owe a duty to the self. He puts his objection in this way: "Duties to self can be saved from contradiction only by an impossibility, namely, the splitting of oneself in two, susceptible of reciprocal obliga- tion." 1 However, the objection is not valid. It arises from a wrong idea of the self, of the nature of personality. We 1. Quoted by Davis in his "Elements of Ethics," p. 148. Mans Chief Duties 169 know by experience that the self, that is, the ego, can ob- jectify itself; that the mind can and does think of itself. The mind is the only entity that can perform this wonder- ful and mysterious exploit. It does this by that function- ing power of the ego which we call self-consciousness. How it does this we do not understand, any more than we understand how the mind can cognize external objects; but it is a clear fact of experience that the mind can know itself and can watch its own operations. It can, as it were, "split itself in two." Now, if the self can know the self, can think of the self, then surely the self can owe to the self a duty ; and there- fore the apparent a priori difficulty turns out to be no diffi- culty at all — unless the speculatist should go so far as to deny the possibility of self-consciousness. We may push the argument still further. The individ- ual is keenly sensible of moral obligations to himself. Often we hear a man say: "I owe it to myself to do this. I cannot afford for my own sake to do other than what is right. I must act worthy of myself." A man, tempting another, once said, "No one would ever know it;" but the other replied: "I would know it myself, and could never look myself honestly in the face if I were to do this un- worthy act." He realized that he owed a duty to himself. Again, personality is a most distinct and persistent thing. Every individual is marked off by most clear-cut lines of cleavage from all other persons and objects. Every man thinks of himself, plans for himself. Even among a mil- lion people no individual loses his identity. The years may bring many changes in circumstances, experiences and opinions to the individual, but his personality — his Ihood — perdures and defies all mutations. He still says, "I am I, and I am the identical person I was when I was a lad." 170 A System of General Ethics This being so, it is evidently the divine plan that each per- son is under obligation to preserve his own egoity and to make the most of it. Thus it is reasonable to believe that the individual owes a duty to himself. 2 Let us, then, consider man's chief du- ties to himself as a moral personality. 1. To his body: (1) He should not despise his body: Man should not contemn his physical organism, as Plato, the Gnostics and the Ascetics did, for they looked upon it as the seat of all lust and defilement. This view is wrong, for the body is part of man's natural constitution, and is vitally connected with the mind. Seeing what a marvel- lous mechanism it is, we may reasonably believe that its Maker designed it for a wise and noble purpose. If He did not, He certainly took a great deal of pains for little or naught. It has a dignity at its best, too, that differentiates it from all other organisms of the natural world, and that clearly marks its superiority. It is at the same time the organ and home of the mind. Natural reason would surely agree with the Christian revelation, which teaches that the body is "the temple of the Holy Spirit." Let us re- member, too, that moral evil could not have its source in the corporeal. There may be physical evil — that is, weak- ness, decay and corruption — in the body, but moral evil must have its locale in a self-conscious, rational and per- sonal entity, which attributes can be predicated only of 2. Dr. Noah K. Davis (ut supra, p. 147, 148, footnote) says: "With Kant duties to self are even the source of all other duties." Then he makes this direct quotation from Kant: "Supposing that there are no duties of this kind, then there would be no duties of any kind ; for I can think myself under obligation to others only as far as I am under obligations to myself." Man's Chief Duties 171 mind. We shall classify for convenience the specific duties that man owes to his body. (2) He should preserve it in health: a. He should do this by cleanliness. There surely is sound ethics in keeping the body clean and wholesome. The person who is habitually untidy in body is not like to be particular about keeping his mind immaculate. Physi- cal and ethical purity go together, because man's whole be- ing consists of body and soul organically united into one personality. True indeed is the popular adage: "Cleanli- ness is next to godliness." At all events, we may well say: "Cleanliness is a vital part of godliness." John Wesley said wittily: "Religion is a great face-washer." He ob- served that, as soon as thriftless and untidy people were converted, they began to appreciate the value and need of water and soap. The daily papers once reported that a woman had sued for a divorce on the ground that her hus- band would never take a bath ! Can you blame her very much? Besides the disgust felt in such a case, the vital point is that a man who would be so filthy in body would likely be corrupt morally as well. Good health cannot go with filth, and it is man's duty to preserve his health so that he can do the work in the world he ought to do, both for his own sake and the sake of others. A great ethical Book enjoins, "Having your hearts sprinkled from an evil con- science, and your bodies washed with clean water" 3 — that is, be both mentally and physically clean. b. Good health is also promoted by the use of proper food and drink. As to quantity, many people, who are otherwise good people, are guilty of over-eating and exces- 3. Heb. 10:22. 172 A System of General Ethics sive drinking. In so far they are unethical. Think of the coarseness of a man's making a gormand of himself! To bring on indigestion by gluttony is more than merely repel- lent; it is positively sinful. The cause of much mental sluggishness among students, of much sleepiness in church services, and of much general stupidity, is over-indulgence in food and drink. On the other hand, every person should have plenty of good, plain, wholesome food, and should drink freely of pure, fresh water. The reasonable cravings of the normal appetite should be satisfied. To go half-starved surely is not natural, and therefore must be unhygienic. Ordinarily the natural appetite can be trusted to give warning when sufficient food and drink have been taken. The danger lies in vitiating the palate with too many dainties, condi- ments and sweetmeats and the use of malt and alcoholic beverages. It should be remembered that everything that passes over the palate, no matter how delicious its taste, must afterward be taken in charge by the digestive organs. How unethical it is to abuse their good offices ! How wrong for a man or woman to mar or destroy his or her usefulness in life by bringing on dyspepsia through so coarse a habit as voracity! A simple rule may be observed here. If you eat plain and nutritious food, and never gormandize, your appetite will always warn you when you have eaten sufficient, for, its cravings satisfied, you will no longer relish food. You will declare that you "do not care for another mouthful." But if you add dainties that flatter the palate, you can of course swallow a good deal more than you need, all of which will have to be digested by the stomach. If you drink pure cold water — not ice water — you will not care Man's Chief Duties 173 for any more the moment your thirst is quenched; indeed, you can scarcely force more down your throat. But you can swallow a great deal of spiced and flavored drinks, even when you are not in the least thirsty; and such indulgence will sooner or later undermine the foundations of health. All these reflections are relevant in a work on Ethics, be- cause it is every man's duty to himself, to his fellowmen and to God to preserve his health as far as possible, so that he can perform his appointed work in life. There is more saintliness in soundness than in sickliness of body. c. Another way to conserve the health is by proper exer- cise. Manual toilers need no special advice here, for their employment gives them plenty of physical exercise. Per- haps they might need counsel rather to rest their bodies more, if possible, so that they may have more time for meditation, reading and wholesome diversion. If there is no absolute need, and if mere worldly gain is the objective, it is unethical for any man to undermine his health and shorten his life by over-work; it is almost next door to suicide. However, students and all persons of sedentary occupa- tion need the precaution to take plenty of physical exercise. The body must be kept in healthy condition in order that the mind may do its best work. No person can study well and think clearly whose digestion is sluggish, or who is suf- fering from aches and pains. The best place for exercise and recreation, summer and winter, is out in the open air. Gymnasiums are good in their place, and we would not dis- parage them in the least; but they should not be made a substitute for outdoor exercise. Nothing can be more in- vigorating than brisk walks for a few hours along the country roads, when one can commune with nature and de- 174 A System of General Ethics light himself with pastoral scenery, even while he is breath- ing in health from the pure air of heaven. To have some pleasant occupation for the mind during your "constitution- als," so that you do not think so much about taking exer- cise for its own sake, is apt to be more beneficial than merely walking as a task. The college man or the scholar who "studies too hard" is not truly moral. Perhaps, as a rule, little warning is needed in this respect, but here and there you will find an over- ambitious student who makes a sort of virtue of neglect- ing his body in order to develop his mind. He should be reminded that he has a mistaken idea of virtue, and that good health is of more value than mere scholasticism. The pale and sickly cast of scholarship is not of great benefit to the world, or even to the possessor himself. "A sound mind in a sound body" — that is the true maxim. At this point the subject of college athletics might be discussed at much length, but we deem a few words sufficient. The via media of Aristotle is the proper course. College athletics should be encouraged. It is a mark of narrowness, prejudice or selfishness to take no interest in them. The members of the faculty should be spectators of such manly sports. Besides the vigorous exercise, bringing robustness, suppleness and strength of body to the players, there is a real disciplinary value in base-ball, foot-ball, bas- ket-ball, rowing, and other forms of college athletics. They cultivate alertness of mind, quickness of decision, accuracy of judgment, concert of action with others, and sturdiness and independence of will, — all of which are exceedingly helpful to young men in their training for life. A good moral discipline also goes with the acquirement of physical mastery and prowess; for the young men who indulge in any kind of vice, such as over-eating, drinking intoxicants, Man's Chief Duties 17 S smoking cigarettes, and sexual abuse, will soon unfit them- selves for the gridiron and the arena. Nor can it be denied that many college athletes are just as masterful in scholar- ship as in physical strength and skill. Note that among the best lawyers, legislators, physicians, ministers, and captains of industry, you will often find those who were famous as athletes in their college days. In most colleges, a certain standard of scholarship is required of those who are ad- mitted to the regular games. Still, we must look at the other side of the question of athletics. Human nature is prone to go to extremes. Col- lege games are so exciting, so fascinating, that it is not al- ways easy to stay on the golden via media. So many people thrive on excitation, and the more intense it is, the more they are led away by it, until it becomes a furor with them. It becomes necessary, therefore, to point out briefly the harmful and unethical character of excess in college sports. First, there is danger of too much physical development, so that, according to a well-known law of physiology, the blood must expend all its material in making brawn to the neglect of brain. The writer, himself a college instructor, has noted this fact more than once — that young men who had developed themselves into physical giants through ath- letic exertion were sometimes quite indifferent students, were dull and listless in the class-room, and certainly did not "graduate with honors/' The trouble was, they ex- pended all their energy on the athletic field. Second, when the student's interest in athletic sports grows too intense, it occupies his mind to such an extent as to crowd out any real zest and relish for his studies. Even in the class-room he is sighing for the athletic field. One cannot serve two masters. Third, it is not very creditable for a college to be more 176 A System of General Ethics famous for the development of brawn than of brain, of physical giants than of mental experts. The primary pur- pose of colleges and universities is scholarship, not athletics. These suggestions are made by one who is a friend, not an opponent, of college games, and who attends them with not a little enthusiasm ; but one, too, who is trying to strike the proper balance. So fairness requires us to add that sometimes students who do not care for college recreations and sports, and take no part in them, are among the dullest students ; whereas the athlete more than once carries off the college honors in scholarly achievement. So the way to keep the proper balance in these matters is to be both athletic and scholarly. Perhaps it may be said, after all, most students do not become athletic in the sense of actually going upon the ath- letic field. And that is true, and it should be so. How- ever, this is no reason why every student should not take sufficient exercise of a vigorous kind to develop his mus- cular strength and keep his body in robust health. There is the gymnasium of the well-equipped college, which is accessible to every student; and there are the country roads, fields and woods for walking, tumbling, climbing, and all kinds of calisthenics, and at the same time for cul- tivating acquaintance with nature. Few kinds of exercise are more health-giving to the body and more exhilarating to the mind than a "hike" through the country. Let us make the outdoors our chief gymnasium. d. Health is also conserved and promoted by taking needed rest. Some persons, students as well as others, need no special admonition to secure enough rest, for their chief aim in life seems to be to avoid real strenuous study and work. They dally, lounge and sleep so much that they Man's Chief Duties 177 become both physically and mentally stupid. There are few cemeteries in which you will find the epitaph, "He died from over-work." For loafers the whip of a strong in- centive needs to be applied. For them Solomon's counsel would be pertinent: "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; con- sider her ways, and be wise." 4 However, there are other persons who, in their greed for money, knowledge or honor, toil too hard, and thus bring upon themselves premature exhaustion and death. This is unethical. The man who does not take enough rest and sleep cannot do his best work in his waking hours. Some mental workers sin in this respect. So much study, and more frequently so many social engagements, rob them of their needed sleep, so that, instead of being alert and vigor- ous, they go languidly about their tasks. We have even known young students to go to sleep during the 7 :45 A. M. recitation, which, we take it, was a sure sign of their hav- ing kept late hours. The student can do more deep and accurate thinking in three hours of the morning, after a refreshing night's rest, than in five or six hours of "burn- ing the midnight oil." Faithful brain workers need plenty of sleep, and they owe it to themselves and to others to get it. If we cannot spare more time from our work and study, then let us have fewer social dissipations, and thus conserve the golden hours. Our work should be so systematized, and our social affairs so arranged, that nothing will rob us of the rest and sleep our bodies require. (3) Man should control and regulate the passions of the body: On this topic the apostle Paul gives excellent ethical counsel: "I keep my body under" (1 Cor. 9: 27) ; "Through 4. Prov. 6 : 6. 178 A System of General Ethics the spirit mortify the deeds of the body" (Rom. 8: 13) ; "The body is not for fornication, but the body is for the Lord and the Lord for the body" (1 Cor. 6: 13) ; "Or know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom ye have from God" (1 Cor. 6: 19) ? It should be borne in mind that no natural passion is wrong per se, as the fanatics and ascetics think, but is in- tended for a good and useful purpose. Sexual love and sexual passion are necessary for the procreation of the hu- man family; the appetite for food and drink for the main- tenance of life itself. However, the perversion and abuse of these passions and appetites are grossly sinful and in- jurious, and therefore Ethics can in nowise and no degree condone them. They must be condemned outright. So far as regards sexual desire, the social economy is so con- stituted — and divinely, no doubt — that a "pure life for two" of opposite sexes is possible, providing they have true con- jugal love for each other and have been properly and law- fully joined in hymeneal bonds. Nature herself seems to have placed her stamp of approval upon monoganous mar- riage, for the best civilizations in the world go with such a regimen; whereas history and experience prove that any other arrangement brings dire consequences in its train. Here nature's teaching and the experience of the human family agree with the teaching of Jesus Christ, our great ethical Teacher, who laid down the rule that one man and one woman should constitute the marital relation, basing His doctrine on the original creation of only one individual of each sex. Polygamy is apt to run into lust and many other excesses, and always entails much marital trouble. Above all, Ethics must rebuke and condemn with a stern voice all secret abuse and all patronage of the brothel. The terrible penalties which nature imposes for salacious in- Man's Chief Duties 179 dulgences speaks against them with no uncertain voice as wrong and baleful. Happy are the man and the woman who, coming together in lawful wedlock, can truthfully say that they have kept themselves pure and uncorrupted for each other. (4) Man should also remember the dignity of the body: Perhaps Natural Ethics is not competent to describe the exact process by which the Creator formed and organized the human body; that must undoubtedly be referred to Biblical Theology; but our science can point confidently to the insignia of dignity which He has stamped upon the body. Compare man's body with that of the lower animals ; while it has many points of resemblance to them, yet its upright position, its graceful form and movements, and es- pecially its expressive physiognomy — all these mark it with a distinction that is all its own. Is it not reasonable, there- fore, to conclude that the human body was made for a high and noble purpose? May it not even have been framed for an immortal destiny ? At all events, moral science must maintain that man is of too exalted a mien to grovel corpor- eally in the mire. There is a voice within him bearing wit- ness to the fact that bodily purity and soul purity must go hand in hand. It is for this reason, no doubt, that the great apostle wrote : "I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable to God, which is your spiritual service*' (Rom. 12: 1). Here the word "spiritual" includes the idea of the ethical. CHAPTER XIII MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 2. To his mind. (1) The process of culture. a. The Intellect. b. The Sensibilities. c. The Will. I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 2. To his mind: (1) The process of culture: a. The Intellect: At this point the "Outline of the Human Mind," given in Chapter II, should be consulted. In this work we accept the view that the mind is a distinct entity, fitted by creation for sustaining vital relations with the body ; we also hold to the theory that man is a dichotomy, not a trichotomy (a dual being, not tripartate), because we believe that the terms mind, soul and spirit are only different names for the same quiddity. Therefore we shall proceed without further de- lay or argument to consider the ethical culture of man's psychical powers. First, the Sense should receive attention. It is the men- tal functioning power that sustains a direct relation to the body; the meeting place, so to speak, of body and mind. Much, indeed, very much, of the mind's content and furni- ture comes to it through the avenues of the physical senses. The sensory system furnishes the mind with its material data. Man's Chief Duties 181 A very practical subject is this: the ethical culture and control of the Senses. Even here it is evident that man is not a mere automaton, but a moral agent, his will being able in many respects to regulate sensuous desire and action. Take the sense of sight. Note in how many ways we can see or not see, as we choose. An old adage runs, "None are so blind as those who do not want to see." Therefore we may and should look upon the things which it is right for us to behold, and turn away from those that are wrong and harmful. The same is true of hearing. As the idiom goes, we should "turn a deaf ear" to the voice of every tempter. So all the senses may be ethically brought under the control of the will, and made to obey the commands of conscience. It is idle to say, "I cannot help it!" That is the excuse of the moral weakling. On the positive side, all the senses should be properly developed ; the eyes to perceive quickly, accurately, and appreciatingly all the beauties of nature and art; the ears to delight in beautiful and refining eloquence, rythm and music; the palate to relish the most nutritious food (the Lord pity the poor dilettant in eatables and beverages), so that every person may have as his motto, "Plain living and high thinking," instead of the reverse. Next in our schedule of the mental powers (see Chapter II) is the Understanding. How important it is to cultivate the power of reflection! Many people do almost every- thing but meditate. They cannot train their minds on one subject for more than a few moments, but simply flit from one trifle to another. Sermons and addresses are, no doubt, often prosy enough, but more frequently they seem to be dull to people simply because, as listeners, they cannot con- centrate their mental faculties on one theme for more than a few minutes ; they have never schooled themselves to 182 A System of General Ethics logical, consecutive and continuous thinking, and so they miss the beauty and power of many an instructive discourse. To grow old without knowing how to meditate and to dwell with one's own thoughts, is a sad misfortune. Learn to reflect ; cultivate the power of thinking on good and uplift- ing themes; they will be an invaluable asset to you when dreary days and old age come ; then you will never need to be lonely. Learn to use the will in carrying on thought processes. The cultivation of the memory also has great ethical value. To commit something worth while every day would be a good rule. Great is the moral benefit of storing the memory with apt and inspiring maxims and proverbs, es- pecially in youth. Many a man has been kept true and firm in the path of virtue because he learned in youth such trite but bracing epigrams as these: "Be sure you're right, then go ahead ;" "Whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing well ;" "The Lord knoweth the way of the righteous, but the way of the wicked shall be turned upside down." Par- ents and teachers should engraft such helpful maxims in the minds of children and youth, for often at the proper psychological moment they will spring up in the mind, and will act like a tonic to the moral nature. There is an expelling power in good suggestions and thoughts. One of the best ways to crowd evil imaginations out of the mind is to crowd in good ideas. If the reader does not know how Dr. Chalmers received the suggestion for his classical sermon on "The Expulsive Power of a New Affection," it would be worth while to acquaint him- self with the story. On the same principle, Paul gave ex- cellent ethical advice when he wrote, "Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with good" (Rom. 12:21). In another place this acute teacher emphasized the value of Man's Chief Duties 183 filling the mind with ennobling thoughts, so that no room would be left for the ignoble : "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things" (Phil. 4:8). In still another way the cultivation of reflection and memory have great ethical value. When the conscience is puzzled as to the proper course of action, as it often is, its problem, which in such a case cannot be settled by mere in- tuition, is carried over into the Understanding, and is placed under the analysis of reflection — and possibly the logical faculty, too — and after weighing the pros and cons, the mind arrives at a conclusion, which we call a moral judgment. Here there is much opportunity for moral de- velopment and discipline. Man also has a scientific faculty, which we include in the Understanding. What is the use of the study of science for the practice of ethical principles ? It is this : Surely it would be unethical to ignore the teaching of the science of the day in framing our ethical theory, just as it would be unethical to disregard any other body of related truth. The ethicist must ever have an open mind ; for a mind closed by prejudice or willful ignorance is not moral. Whether the ethicist agrees with certain scientific conclusions of the day or not, he must not close his eyes to them, but must try to appraise them at their own value. If they are false, it is his duty as an ethicist to point out their error, and to show as clearly as possible in what way they undermine the foundations of truth and morality. The study of science has a real value for Ethics in this regard : it trains the mind in inductive processes ; it is ex- perimental, and keeps close to facts and realities; if it be 184 A System of General Ethics true science, it does not first form aprioristic notions, and then try to square the facts with them. It is well for the ethicist to form the scientific habit in this respect, and thus save himself from being led into vain speculations. Theo- retical Ethics has no mission if it does not remain with the facts and lead to clearer thinking and better living. The study of Logic is also of importance in the practice of ethical principles, for it is the study of the laws of cor- rect thinking and reasoning. While it does not discover the ultimate truth, it does aid in reaching correct conclusions from true premises, and in detecting fallacies. So it is men's duty to discipline themselves in the study that will enable them to avoid sophistries and reach true conclusions. The next division of the Intellect is the Intuition. By this we mean the functioning power of the mind which cog- nizes certain truths by immediate perception, without a rea- soning process and without being able to explain logically how the cognition takes place. In the "Outline of the Human Mind" the various kinds of Intuition are named in their order as nearly as we can determine them. There might be some difference of opinion among psychologist as to the order, but most of them would agree that these are the chief objects of immediate and spontaneous perception. There is the cognition of outward reality — that is, the reality of the external world. Probably the first intuition of the child is the cognition of the outer world through the sense of sight. It seems to recognize other objects before it comes to a clear recognition of self, for it will speak of itself in the third person for some time after it has learned to use language; only by and by does it begin to use the pronouns of the first person. But what is the ethical import of these various spontan- eous cognitions ? It is this : Practical Ethics is of supreme Man's Chief Duties 185 importance to individual and social life, and therefore it must have a substantial basis in reality ; but if a man holds to a speculative philosophy like Phenomenalism, Positivism or Idealism, he will doubt the reality of the physical world ; and if he doubts that, it is only a step to doubting the valid- ity of his moral intuitions. Doubting them, he will soon lose his sense of right and wrong. If he cannot trust his consciousness of the outer world, why should he pay any heed to the voice of conscience? And more, the person who holds the idealistic view will be likely to move in a dreamy, unreal world of mere speculation, instead of the world as it is; therefore, he will feel little interest in the practical and real needs of the world. The day-dreamer is of little use to humanity. Next in order is self-consciousness, which should also be properly cultivated. In order to be forceful in the world people must develop their personality. One of the marks of strong men the world over is their clear recognition of their own ego, which sometimes seems to amount almost to egotism. They assert their own individuality, perform their own work in the world, and live their own life; and if their powers are consecrated to the welfare of humanity, they are all the more potent for good on account of their keen self-consciousness. However, there are many persons who are excessively self-conscious, so that they care little for others, except as they can make some selfish use of them; and nothing is more centrally unethical than selfishness and egotism. Again, undue self -consciousness leads people to act unnat- urally in the company of their fellowmen, as if they were the chief center of attention. The cure for such an ab- normal psychical state is to use the will in reflecting that one is not of so great importance as to engross general in- 186 A System of General Ethics terest, and also that, while you are thinking of yourself, perhaps others are just as much preoccupied with them- selves. These simple suggestions, if heeded, would save many persons from being so painfully backward, con- strained and unnatural in society. Most of us may well forget ourselves by becoming absorbed in matters and per- sons of more importance. It may be humbling to you and me to recall that we are only one among many, yes, among millions and millions, but it is good moral discipline. The intuitions of time and space, cause and effect, and mathematical and other axioms have at least this bearing on ethical practice, that, to cognize them as part of the re- alities of the world, and not as mere mental delusions, will have a tendency to keep men sane and practical in the per- formance of the every-day duties of life. The next intu- ition, the cognition of truth and error, has a direct bearing on morality, in that it is imperative for all men to seek the truth, accept and cherish it, conform their lives to its prin- ciples, and to recognize error, reject and avoid it, and warn others against it. Men should never become indifferent to the truth. Even when it is difficult to find, one should be earnest in one's search for it. Nor should one permit one- self to become cynical about it, as Pilate had evidently be- come when he asked the question, "What is truth?" Bet- ter far is it to accept the great Teacher's estimate of truth, when He said to His followers: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." The culture of the esthetic faculty also has its ethical value; it is plainly man's duty to appreciate and develop beauty in the world, both in nature and art. "Beauty is its own excuse for being." Then it has been put in the world for some good use. The love of the true and the beautiful must go hand in hand with love for the good. Part of Man's Chief Duties 187 beauty's ethical value lies in its refining influence on char- acter. The extremes to be avoided in this connection are dilettantism and affectation. For Practical Ethics one of the most important of the Intuitions is the cognition of right and wrong, or Con- science in perception. First, the Conscience should always be obeyed. Even when it is comparatively unenlightened, it is the best guide the soul has. As was shown at the proper place in Part I of this work, to disregard the voice of Conscience is the most inner and vital sin the individual can commit. But, laying aside all bemisting speculations, men should seek all the light that is possible, so that they may not err in moral judgment. This means that the whole mind, including the Conscience, should be enlightened by all available knowledge, in order that the moral faculty may be keen and sensitive and loyal to the law of righteousness. It is a sad fact of human experience that the Conscience may become calloused or atrophied, "seared as with a hot iron," 1 so that it no longer utters its warning, or at least does so in a feeble way. This immoral state is the result of frequent or continued disregard of the admonitions of the inner voice, just as all the powers of the mind become enfeebled by neglect and misuse. There is nothing more perilous than to tamper with one's moral nature. The sin against the Holy Ghost, of which the Bible speaks, is un- doubtedly the result of the hardening process that comes from long-continued disregard of the warnings and appeals of the good Spirit through the moral faculty. It is germain to say at this point that many persons are not as scrupulous as they should be ; or perhaps it would be more exact to say, they are scrupulous about some things, 1. 1 Tim. 4:2. 188 A System of General Ethics and have elastic consciences about other things. To specify, they would not think of defrauding an individual or a busi- ness firm, but have little scruple about cheating the gov- ernment, especially by making false returns of their money and property to the assessor. They forget that a lie is a lie, no matter to whom it is told. Moreover, the govern- ment of the country is not a mere abstraction; it is in the hands of the people, and is supported by them; and there- fore every person who defrauds the State in any way de- frauds his fellow-citizens, and compels some one else to pay an unjust share of the public tax. It is true, too, that some people who would not cheat an individual will take a dishonest advantage of a company or a corporation. Here again they forget that companies and corporations are composed of people, every one of whom is defrauded when the concern itself is defrauded. You have known people, no doubt, who, if the conductor over- looked the collection of their tickets, had no compunction about taking a free ride on the street-car or the railway train. The trouble is, lack of downright honesty. Some persons who are kind enough to their fellowmen are cruel to poor, hard-driven beasts of burden — one-sided ethics again. Some people have such distorted ethical principles that they are extremely conscientious about church-going on Sunday, and then on Monday morning they resume the week's business of grinding down and defrauding their fel- lowmen in work or trade. Thus we might continue to specify, but it is not necessary. The truly ethical person is conscientious in all respects, in all relations and transac- tions. Man's duties to God will be discussed at length in a sub- sequent chapter. It need only be said here that the theistic intuition, like all the other intuitions, should be cultivated Man's Chief Duties 189 duly, or man's moral development will be deficient and one- sided. b. The Sensibiities : It goes without saying that man is largely emotional ; he is often swayed by his feeling ; sometimes more than by his reason and judgment. The Sensibilities are that part of man's psychical consti- tution that gives him pleasure or pain, and that imparts warmth and enthusiasm to his life, speech and actions. Without feeling the world would be a stolid world indeed. We speak of some people as being "cold," because they are lacking in kindly and generous feeling. This fact becomes palpably evident in public speaking. Two men may address the same audience : one is "coldly intellectual," and, though he may say brilliant things, he arouses little interest in his auditors; the other may be no less intellectual, but his thoughts are charged with true feeling, and he grips his lis- teners, holds their attention, and moves their hearts. The emotions are important in helping to furnish man with motive power, for it is not likely that man would ac- complish much even along intellectual lines if he had no feeling to spur him, no interest to engage him. To put it in paradoxical form, it is probable that an "intellectual ice- berg" would not be intellectual. Hence the feelings, like all other mental powers, perform an important function in human life. Again, feelings are to be cultivated for the sake of one's influence on others, who are often largely swayed by them, and therefore can be touched and moved by an appeal to them. The true and strong man will, therefore, stir their emotions in the right way, and will direct them along the right lines by the genuine and hearty flow of his own ethic- 190 A System of General Ethics ally guided feelings ; whereas if he were cold and phleg- matic, he would be unable to make any appeal to them what- ever. How much there is in heart touching heart! Yet the caution must be given here that feeling is not to be man's guide and norm. What is known as "emotional- ism" is emotion "gone to seed," carried to extremes, un- controlled. While we are to have fire in the heart, it is not to be zvild fire. To carry the metaphor further, we do not want a fire that burns down the house, but one that burns brightly in the stove or furnace, under proper control, and warms the building. Reason, judgment and conscience have been given us for the direction of our lives; but the emotions were never intended to occupy that ruling posi- tion; they were simply meant to give warmth and ardor and pleasure to our inner lives and outward actions. When the Intellect and the Sensibilities are in accord, when pleas- urable feeling goes with the proper intellectual exercise and direction, then the life is harmonious and happy, because then there is no schism in the mind. However, as the world and human nature are constituted, such concord does not always exist. Sometimes the judgment points in one direction, and the feelings prompt in the opposite direc- tion ; in which case the mind is more or less rent with con- flict. What is the advice to be given by true ethics in such a situation? The judgment, reason and conscience should always decide the course to be pursued, and the feelings should suffer the sacrifice. Never should men follow their feelings in opposition to the verdict of the moral judgment. Just here is where the ethical culture of the feelings is re- quired, in order that they may be brought into subjection to the enlightened reason, and so chastened and developed that the heart will by and by feel genuine pleasure in the performance of every duty, whether it is immediately agree- Man's Chief Duties 191 able or not. The attractive feature in this principle is this: experience teaches that it is possible so to school the feelings that they will take delight in every judgment of the reason and conscience. In this achievement the great glory of the ethical culture consists, namely, to bring the whole being of the moral agent into harmonious life and action, so that no internal schism occurs. We have thus treated the emotions in a general way. It is not necessary to go into details. Attention is simply called to the classified outline of the human mind in Chap- ter II, where the emotions are divided into the sentient, the psychical and the intuitional, corresponding with the same divisions of the Intellect. The intuitional emotions are sub- divided into the affectional, the esthetic, the philosophical, the ethical and the theistic. All these various feelings should be harmoniously and symmetrically cultivated, and each brought into subjection to the corresponding percep- tion and judgment in the Intellect. Happy the man who can achieve such a poised state of mind ! However, it can be accomplished only by the proper use and development of the last great functioning power of the mind, namely, the Will, which is now to be considered. c. The Will: In a system of Practical Ethics no thesis is more impor- tant than the ethical culture and discipline of the Will (for its position see the psychical outline in Chapter II). The profound ethical significance of a Will in liberty has been sufficiently emphasized in Theoretical Ethics. Accepting the conclusions there drawn, our practical task now is to insist on the strenuous use of this vital power of the human mind. To attain Christian morality the Will must be dis- enthralled by the Holy Spirit in regeneration or conversion ; 192 A System of General Ethics but in the present discipline we are dealing only with the ordinary morality of the natural life. For this kind of morality — sometimes called "civil righteousness" 2 in Chris- tian theology — the Will has some degree of freedom; if it did not have, human society and government would not be possible. Now, it is this peculiar power, which we call will power, that every man is under the moral imperative to use. Spec- ulations about the freedom of the Will, and the conclusion that it is under bondage to the law of necessity, will excuse no man's moral delinquencies before the bar of his own con- science or that of society or of the civil government. Man knows that he is a responsible agent, and society and gov- ernment treat him as if he were. True enough, it is some- times difficult to choose and do the right; but that is pre- cisely the reason why man has been endued with volitional power ; for a will that is never put to the test is no will that is worthy of the name ; the fact is, in that case there would be no opportunity for the exercise of option. The severer the strain of temptation, the stouter must be the resistance, and the greater will be the merit and sense of approval if the victory is won. Men must not be weaklings. There is something despicable about the moral weakling. God will hold each one of us responsible for the heroic use of our self-determining and executive functioning capacity. If we make the excuse, "I cannot help yielding to tempta- tion," the reply is, "Your will has been given to you for the very purpose of enabling you to withstand evil, and you must use it." Each one of us is called upon to be "a hero 2. Vide Augsburg Confession. Art. XVIII ; The Apology of the Augsburg Confession, XVIII, 70; Schmid: "Doctrinal Theology." page 266; Jacobs: "A Summary of the Christian Faith," page 259. Mans Chief Duties 193 in the strife." "I could not help it," is the excuse of moral flabbiness. Above all things, let us not accept, teach or preach a pu- erile, inane, sentimental kind of morality — one that whim- pers and complains, grows lachrymose, and cannot cour- ageously endure the stress and storm of life's rigorous discipline. The world needs virile men, heroes; men of sterling and robust virtue ; soldiers of the right ; men who can invariably say yes to the appeal of right and no to the wrong. It is nauseating to see men, who ought to be strong and brave, going around maundering about " the irony of fate" and "the pathos of life." Let them assert their man- hood, get into the work of life, and do something that is worth while. This world is not, as the poor pessimist whines, "the worst world," or "worse than no world at all," or "a misfortune," or "a sad lapse of the Infinite." No! it is a splendid stadium for moral achievement. Again we assert that the excuse, "I couldn't help it," is the plaint of the moral weakling. In view of the foregoing preachment, a few practical suggestions as to how the will may be reenforced are rel- evant : First: You are endued by the Divine Being with the power of reflection, as well as with the power of volition. Therefore when a temptation to wrong-doing assails you, do not yield to the impulse, as if you were a mere automa- ton or a straw in the wind, but stop and consider. Re- member, first of all, that it is wrong to succumb to the evil enticement, and to do wrong is the one crime in the world ; a sin against the highest part of your nature, the Con- science ; a sin against God and His holy law ; one for which He will hold you responsible at His final judgment bar; a crime against the moral economy of the universe ; a 194 A System of General Ethics crime, indeed, that, if it could become sufficiently extended to go beyond divine control, would wreck the universe and hurl God Himself to destruction. Second: In the face of temptation reflect that it is not zvise to yield. Wrong-doing will bring its punishment and shame sooner or later, and in some form or another. If it were not so, the world would not be under a moral regi- men. So in the end it will not make for your best and most enduring welfare to do wrong. This reflection, like the first, will prove a spur to your will, and will furnish a motive for resistance of the evil. Third: Remember that the pleasures that come from wrong-doing usually are short-lived, bring nausea, discon- tent and ennui, and often much discomfort from a smiting conscience. Fourth: The reflection that one act of wrong-doing will tend to weaken the will just that much, will set both body and mind in the groove of evil habitude, and thus open the way for a final moral bondage from which you cannot free yourself — this reflection will also help to potentialize the will. An evil habit is more easily formed than broken — remember that. Fifth: A most wholesome thought will be that of your influence on those around you. If you do right under stress of temptation, your conduct will inspire others to be strong; but if you yield, you will help to spread moral flabbiness like a contagion. Do you wish to be a moral leper in your community? Stop and think about it seri- ously. It is on this principle of influence that a great ethical book says of the righteous, after they have passed into eternity, "And their works do follow them." 3 What a 3. Rev. 14 : 13. Man's Chief Duties 195 stimulus to the will it is to think of our influence over others both now and hereafter, perhaps even forever! Surely, if we possess true nobility of soul, we shall want to live in such a way in this world that, when we leave it, as all of us must sooner or later, we shall join "the choir invisible," whose music shall continue to make the world better and happier. Sixth: Always remember that you have a will; that it has been given to you for use; that you can use it if you make the effort; that you are not a puppet, driven hither and yon by circumstance; that society expects you to play the heroic part, and, if you do not, it will write you down as a moral imbecile; that God expects you to employ your volitional powers, and will hold you responsible for your use of them; that He will help you, both directly, and me- diately through His law, to choose the right path in life. Seventh: All your faculties have been given to be cor- related and to abet one another, in order to bring about true unity of moral life; therefore you are in duty bound to use every means in your power to develop and reinforce your will, placing back of it all possible right incentives for ethical being and doing. With all these facilities at our command, you and I are "without excuse" if we live and act like moral weaklings. Having now dealt with the process of culture though the Intellect, the Sensibilities and the Will, our next thesis will be no less important and engaging, namely, the motives for culture. CHAPTER XIV MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 2. To his mind (continued). (2) Motives for culture. a. Wrong motives. (a) To gratify pride and ambition. (b) To secure a life of ease. (c) To gain a dishonest advantage. b. Right motives. (a) To gratify the normal desire for knowledge. (b) To supplant evil thoughts with good ones. (c) To serve God and humankind more effectively. I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 2. To his mind (continued): (2) Motives for culture: The question here is paramount for the young student: What are the proper motives for seeking mental culture? Or, to phrase it differently, why should a young person seek an education? Methods of culture belong to the de- partment of Pedagogy, and are of great importance. The proper motives for mental development, however, consti- tute a vital question in Practical Ethics. Let us classify our material. a. Wrong motives: The young person who seeks an education merely to gratify his pride and ambition is not actuated by worthy motives. It is possible that the words "pride" and "ambi- tion" may be used in a good sense. When "pride" means proper self-respect, or a true appraisement of oneself over against loss of self-respect, it is right; and when by "am- bition" is meant the noble aspiration to be of some value in Man's Chief Duties 197 and to the world, it is also right. But when these terms are used in the selfish sense, the motive is unethical, and soils the whole purpose of the educated life. The man who seeks culture merely to minister to his own fame and aggrandizement, will be an egotist and pedant, and will be likely to trample on the rights of others. Likewise the desire for a mere life of ease is an unethical motive for acquiring an education. Sometimes young per- sons are actuated by this unworthy motive. Parents, too, are sometimes controlled by this thought ; they want to give their children an education to save them from a life of manual toil. They cherish the false idea that it is easier to "make a living" by using the mind than by working with the hands. That is a wrong motive, because it is sordid and selfish. Children who are driven to school under such a regime will never become truly educated, for in order to secure real culture the heart must be interested as well as the intellect. Besides, it is a mistaken notion to suppose that a living can be made more easily with brain work than with manual work. To do real and successful work with the mind is just as difficult as to work with the hands. If this is not true, why do not more boys and girls pass through the high-school, and then go to the college and the university? Is it not chiefly because they find mental toil too difficult for them? How often you hear young people say that they "would rather work than go to school!" In- deed, the people who make a good living and achieve true success purely by intellectual effort are proportionately few, and all of them know the exhaustion of onerous mental labor. Brain work, remember, is fully as difficult and wearing as brawn work. Therefore, it is both wrong and foolish for young people to seek for mental culture as an easy means of gaining a livelihood. 198 A System of General Ethics Another perverted motive for acquiring education is to enable one to secure a dishonest advantage over others who have less mental acuteness. Mere intellectual training, minus the proper development of the moral nature, may lead to harmful results for society and the State. In itself it is no guarantee against a corrupt life. Indeed, in these days a man must be well educated to be a successful rascal. In many ways a knowledge of chemistry, physics, mechan- ics, mathematics, business, rhetoric and literature may be used by an expert to carry on fraudulent purposes. Some years ago, when extensive efforts were made to cleanse our municipal and state governments from corruption, the as- tounding discovery was made that most of the grafters and boodlers convicted of civil crime were graduates of our leading colleges and universities ! Does not this fact prove that a course in true, stalwart Ethics is needed in the curri- cula of our academic institutions? It is not enough to say merely, with Lyman Beecher, "We must educate ! We must educate !" but our motto should rather be, "We must edu- cate all the powers of our coming citizens, their consciences as well as their intellects. " b. Right motives: (a) To gratify the normal desire for knowledge: While many people, sad to say, do not appreciate knowl- edge for its own sake, there are many others who are thirsty for the springs of true mental acquisition. They delight in learning and in the exercise and discipline nec- essary to secure it. This in itself, other motives being pure, is a worthy motive. It is divinely implanted, and therefore it is right to gratify it, and wrong not to do so. All knowl- edge that the human mind acquires must first have been possessed by the divine mind, and thus the pursuit of true Man's Chief Duties 199 learning is simply trying to find out God's thoughts and purposes. To realize this truth vividly is to add an inspir- ing incentive to the search for knowledge. And no one need ever to fear that God is jealous of man's reverent and sincere pursuit of truth. The greatest ethical book in the world gives this excellent counsel: "Wisdom is the prin- ciple thing ; therefore get wisdom ; and with all thy getting, get understanding" (Prov. 4:7). (b) To supplant evil thoughts with good ones: This thought is indeed worth emphasizing. It expresses the great ethical value of culture. When we see school children bending over their books, or hear them conning their lessons, we might ask, "What is the use of it all?" Much of it seems to be so mechanical, such a pointless "grinding of gerunds." However, we should reflect that it is much better for the youth to be thus employed, filling their minds with thoughts from books, than for them to idle away their time, and spend it on the streets or in the haunts of vice. It certainly is better to spell, read, write and cipher than to learn to use profane and obscene lan- guage. While pupils are laying the foundations of schol- arship, they certainly are not engaged in mischief, but are cultivating habits of industry. In and of themselves mental disciplines have their moral value, and prepare the young for the appreciation of the higher pleasures of life rather than for those of a gross and groveling nature. (c) To serve God and humankind more effectively: Not for a moment would we imply that unlettered people cannot be useful; indeed, many of them serve the world in ways that are most praiseworthy; and sometimes much better than some of the educated class. However, other things being equal — mark the qualification — the educated 200 A System of General Ethics man multiplies his power for doing good. This is true in almost all lines of life. For example, the farmer who is educated, and is at the same time a practical and successful farmer and a man of good character, is apt to be a most useful man in the community; for he has the talent and training to do many things that others who are less dis- ciplined cannot do; he has the gift of leadership along many lines of economic, civic, moral and religious advance- ment. The housewife who has mental training will find many opportunities for employing her gifts in a salutary way, rearing her own family aright, and leading the com- munity in social and religious service. Think, too, what a dull and humdrum world this would be without men and women of culture ; there would be no inspiring books, sermons, lectures, poetry, art and music. Even the labor-saving machinery of the day would have been impossible had it not been for the years of investiga- tion and experiment in mechanics, physics, chemistry, en- gineering, etc., which have been carried on in the labora- tories of our colleges and universities. Nearly every use- ful discovery and invention may be traced back to the teach- ing of the schools. Thus we see how education has been of great practical value to the world, and, with proper moral and spiritual culture, is the producer of a high civ- ilization, a secure form of government, and many of the amenities of life. Now, the highest motive that can inspire the man who seeks mental culture is the ambition to contribute his share to make the world better and happier. If all educated men were impelled by this lofty motive, how rapidly the human race would advance ! How much human suffering would be prevented and ameliorated ! No higher ethical note has ever been struck than that of the Biblical prophet who Mans Chief Duties 201 wrote: "The Lord God hath given me the tongue of the learned, that I might speak a word in season to him that is weary" (Isa. 50:4). There is much selfishness in the human heart, and no one is able in the present world to eliminate all of it from his nature; yet the highest motive for culture is the altruistic one, and all educated people ought to strive for it more and more. Of all people in the world, those who have had the advantage of culture should be the most unselfish, the most devoted to the good of their fellowmen. To be haughty and self-centered, to look with condescension and contempt upon the unlettered, is to de- feat the very purpose of education and of all true educa- tional institutions in the land, whether they be supported by the State or the Church. An intellectual aristocracy ot' caste is unethical and paganish, unpatriotic and un-Amer- ican. The doctrine of the universal brotherhood of man should be cherished and practiced by the educated classes, whose responsibilities are greater than those of their less favored fellows. Culture should never run into conceit. The person who is vain of his erudition has really not learned enough to know how little he knows, or to realize the limits of human thinking. The more one investigates, the more one recog- nizes the mysteries of the universe ; the more insoluble are its most fundamental problems. Thus true culture will im- plant the ethical graces of humility and teachableness. This section concludes our thesis on man's duties to his body and his mind. However, man must not be treated only in this piecemeal way; he must also be dealt with as an integer; for his personality binds all his parts together in an organic unity. Logically, therefore, our next thesis will be man's duties to himself in his entirety. CHAPTER XV MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 3. To his whole personality. (1) A strong personality. (2) A symmetrical personality. (3) A virtuous personality. a. Relation of virtue to character. b. Definition of virtue and virtues. c. Classification of virtues. d. List of virtues. (a) Positive content. (b) Antithesis. (c) Perversion. I. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF (continued). 3. To his whole personality: (1) A strong personality: It is every man's right and duty to develop as strong a personality as possible. Should it be asked, "How can this be done?" we reply, by the vigorous use of the will. It is too late to ask how a man can be other than he has been born, or than nature and circumstance have made him ; for we have already shown that man is a moral agent, not a mere automaton, puppet or victim. Therefore, he must take a hold upon himself by an effort of the will, and lift himself out of his natural inanity and inertia. We do not mean that every man can become a genius by a mere effort of the will ; nor is such the design of the Creator, who evi- dently has a great affection, as Lincoln once said, for the "common people," of whom there are vast numbers. How- Man's Chief Duties 203 ever, no rational man needs to be inane — that is, without some power for good in his community. In some mys- terious way there are implanted in our psychical natures certain latent resources upon which we may call by an effort of the will. In psychology these latent powers may be considered a part of our "sub-conscious" minds — though the writer has often wondered whether "super-conscious" would not be an apter term. Who knows but that, by an effort of the will, we may be able to draw upon the inex- haustible resources of the Power that made the universe? At all events, moral agents are endued with this mysterious faculty of reinforcing their mental and moral powers. Let us illustrate how men may thus potentialize their personality. Take the public speaker as an example. At first he may be afraid of his audience; may feel daunted before an assembly. Now, if he permits this feeling of trepidation to prevail, he will become panic-stricken, or "stage-struck," as it is often called, and will have to retire in deep humiliation. But if he will, as it were, "gather himself together," master his fear by an effort of the will, reflect that he has a message for his audience that they should hear, remind himself firmly that he is perhaps more capable than any of his auditors to handle the subject on which he has specialized, and, above all, determine by pure grit to win the victory, he will presently vanquish his timid- ity, replenish his powers, grasp his theme firmly, and at the same time grip the attention of his hearers, and so prove himself the master of the situation. This is simply an example of what may be called the capacity for self-poten- tialization. It may be applied in many other experiences of human life. (2) A symmetrical personality: 204 A System of General Ethics The Psalmist exclaims, "The righteous shall flourish like the palm tree" (Ps. 92: 12). This is an apt way of symbol- izing the symmetry of the truly ethical character and life. Think of the strong, straight, tapering bole of the palm, lifting its coronal of leaves toward the sun, its roots strik- ing deep into the soil of the desert, drawing refreshment from the subterranean waters. What a suggestive picture of the upright man who develops a well-poised character! There are people who are one-sided and warped in their moral natures. They cultivate one virtue to the exclusion of others that are just as important. For example, some men pride themselves on their honesty and frankness, but are harsh and gruff, thus giving unnecessary offense to those around them. They should be both honest and kind. Some men who are brave physically are moral cowards ; others are the reverse. Both kinds of courage should be cultivated. The temperance advocate should also be tem- perate in eating and speaking. Occasionally you will find a man who is pious in many ways, but he is not scrupulous in paying his debts. One person said : "I am kind to other people ; that is my religion instead of going to church. " That is one-sided, for people should do both — be kind to other people and attend church services. On the other hand, no amount of Sunday piety will make up for every- day meanness ; neither will every-day humanitarianism ex- cuse the neglect of the worship of God on Sunday. The writer once overheard a man conversing in a hotel lobby in an extremely profane and vulgar way; indeed, his speech was so vile that a policeman should have been called to arrest him and conduct him to the lockup ; then he turned toward some of the rest of us, and declared, with much gusto, "Well, I'm no hypocrite, anyway!" As if not being Mans Chief Duties 205 a hypocrite would excuse, or in any way extenuate, such vileness of speech ! Let it be remembered that no virtue can be played over against a vice. It is the duty and privilege of every man to cultivate all the virtues and graces proportionately, making the character beautiful and well- balanced. Men should avoid ethical lopsidedness. While there may be some overlapping of this division and the next, yet we find it most convenient in assembling our data to make a new section. It is a man's duty to cul- tivate — (3) A virtuous personality: a. Relation of virtue to character: Virtue is the essence of true character. In its ethical sense, it is virtue that makes the true man ; the man who is genuine through and through, and not merely in his ex- ternal life ; "an Israelite in whom there is no guile ;" a man who is too high-minded to think mean thoughts or do mean and dishonest acts. Virtue is the very heart of morality. b. Definition of virtue and virtues : Virtue is rectitude and virility of character. Derived from the Latin vir, virtus, it originally meant manliness or masculinity, and later valor; but it has now come to have a purely ethical significance, and may be predicated of the feminine character as well as the masculine ; for we speak of a virtuous woman as appropriately as of a virtuous man. While virtue is the generic term, the virtues may be re- garded as the species. Therefore we must define further. The virtues are those various ethical qualities that go to make up the character of the truly upright man. c. Classification of virtues : It is doubtful whether a strictly scientific classification 206 A System of General Ethics of the virtues can be made at this stage of ethical analysis. Plato's four cardinal virtues were Wisdom, Courage, Tem- perance and Justice. Perhaps not all of them were used in precisely the same sense as we use the terms today. This list, however, is not comprehensive enough. For instance, the great virtue of love is omitted. If all the virtues are to be included in these four, the definition of each would have to be greatly expanded beyond its real meaning. No other method of classification, however, seems to be satis- factory. Therefore, we think it would be best for each virtue to be treated separately, remembering that all of the virtues have their unity in the generic term Virtue. How- ever, in a work on General Ethics lack of space forbids the treatment of all the virtues, and so we must be content with some outstanding examples, which will indicate the method by which all the rest may be dealt with. d. List of virtues: In this world of mixed good and evil an analysis of the virtues leads to the discovery that each virtue has its pos- itive quality or content, its antithesis and its perversion. A few of the virtues seem to be so imbedded in the ethical solidarity as apparently to have no perversions. The fol- lowing is a partial list of virtues, with their antitheses and perversions, which will be suggestive of further study and expansion : Positive Content Antithesis Perversion Love Hatred Sentimentality Faith Unbelief Credulity Hope Despair Ultra-optimism Humility Pride Servility Firmness Vacillation Obstinacy Courage Cowardice Foolhardiness Self-respect Self-contempt Conceit Man's Chief Duties 207 Fidelity Perfidy Indiscriminate Loyalty Veracity Falsehood None Sincerity Insincerity None Enthusiasm Lethargy Fanaticism Diligence Sloth fulness Ultra-assiduity Affability Surliness Sycophancy Neatness Slovenliness Fastidiousness Individuality Inanity Erraticism Patience Impatience Stolidity Conscientiousness Unscrupulousness Squeamishness Politeness Boorishness Effusiveness Liberality Stinginess Prodigality Dignity Vulgarity Superciliousness Chastity Licentiousness Prudery Self-denial Self-indulgence Asceticism It would be superfluous to expand on the entire forego- ing list. In general it should be said that each positive virtue should be cultivated in its proper sense and propor- tion, while both the antithesis and the perversion should be conscientiously avoided. As a rule, the antithesis will be clearly marked and distinguished, but the perversion of a virtue may often require the exercise of nice discrimination and moral judgment. Therefore it would be a good mental and moral discipline for students to write theses on the list given above. Let us specify briefly. Pure, strong love is nobly ethical, and calls out that which is best in men and women. It is one of the primary virtues, and should be cultivated in the home, the social organism, the Church, the State, and in international affairs. There is no doubt that, if this virtue were truly developed and exercised, no more wars among the nations would arise. Such love, however, would have to be mutual and international in order to be effective; for if even one nation refused to be controlled by this principle, conflicts 208 A System of General Ethics would still arise that might force even the most peaceful country into a war of self-defense. The idea of inter- national good-will, however, should not be cast aside as Utopian and sentimental, but should be promoted by every right and wise means by men and women of large hearts and brains, and especially by statesmen and diplomats. The opposite of love, which is hatred, should never be cherished. No matter how wicked a fellow-being may be, we should not hate him, nor contemn him, though, of course, we should disapprove of, and even rebuke, his wrong conduct. To discriminate in both our judgment and our affection between the sinner and his sins is a divine gift, and connotes the highest ethical character. To cher- ish ill-will against a fellowman, to hold a grudge, to seek revenge — these not only are sins against the moral law, but are undermining to one's own moral nature, and will open the sluices for many other evils. The person who "keeps spite" is also unhappy himself. On the other hand, how happy are those persons who can look upon all their fellow- men with true and heartfelt affection ! They never live on a low and sullen plane. Even among nations that have taken up arms against one another, how magnanimous, how generous-minded, it is if any of them can act on the high ethical principle of "making war without rancor !" However, beautiful a virtue as love is, it is capable of perversion. It may degenerate into mere sentimentality, which is love that lacks ethical quality. For example, the parent who declares that he loves his children too well to correct their faults and punish their wrong-doing is really actuated, not by true love, but by mere sentiment, because true ethical love would lead him to seek the highest welfare of his offspring. The judge who would weep over the convict, declare he could not find it in his heart to sentence Man's Chief Duties 209 and punish him, and would therefore set him free to do more injury to society, would be a mawkish sentimentalist, not a true lover of mankind. The truly ethical judge would, indeed, love the criminal, and tell him so in tones of genuine feeling, but he would also remind him that he has done wrong, has violated the civil and moral law, and must therefore suffer the condign penalty of his offense, because justice must be upheld and satisfied, and society must be portected. True love is always ethical; always surcharged with righteousness. We may subject the virtue of hope to the same analysis. Every one should, within reasonable limits, cultivate a hope- ful spirit. It is right always to "hope for the best," and under sore trial to "hope against hope." Such a temper will have a reflex influence on one's own life, making him happy and cheerful, and at the same time will shed an in- spirating radiance on other's lives. The right kind of "hope maketh not ashamed." The hope of a better day for this life and the hope of a future life of blessedness — both of them are right, and have an inspiring influence on those who cherish them. The antithesis of hope is despondency, or, to put it still more strongly, despair. Under discouraging circumstances, some persons lose hope. In such cases much can be done to hearten and cheer oneself by cultivating hope, by an effort to look on the bright side; by remembering a good old adage which says, "Long is the lane that has no turn." The hope of the future life, such as is set forth in the Christian revelation, affords comfort to many people in their affliction, and so has much ethical value, keeping them from becoming bitter, pessimistic and cynical. The reason Judas hung himself was that, after he had sinned by be- traying his Master, he thought he could not be forgiven, 210 A System of General Ethics and therefore he permitted himself to fall into despair. On the other hand, Peter, though he denied his Lord, afterward repented of his sin, threw himself on divine mercy, was forgiven, and restored to divine favor, and thus lived to much purpose throughout his subsequent career. But even hope may be perverted, and in this way : People may be so sanguine that everything will turn out well as to become careless, and simply drift. They may declare glibly, as many do, "The truth will take care of itself," and so may try to shift the responsibility of defending and pro- moting the truth. They may exclaim, "All's well with the world," and thus may minify the terrible character and ex- tent of the evil that exists. Ultra in their optimism, they indulge a hope that is not rationally grounded, and is there- fore doomed to disappointment. In order to cure the evils of the world, men must recognize them in their real enor- mity, and must put forth all their efforts to eliminate them. It is idle and fantastic to hope that they will cure them- selves, or will be cured in some magical way. An example of false hope is that of continuing year after year in wrong- doing, expecting that in some way forgiveness and salva- tion will be granted on a dying-bed. So hope, like nearly all the other virtues, must be guarded from abuse. A most interesting virtue is that of individuality. One might ask, "What is the difference between individuality and personality?" It is this: Personality is the ego, the self per se; whereas individuality is that peculiar quality or characteristic of each self that distinguishes him from all others. If it were not for this peculiar vein or trait of each person, all persons would be alike; all would be pre- cise replicas of all others ; each would have his own per- sonal substance, but there would be no difference in qual- ity. Looking over an audience of ten thousand people, the Man's Chief Duties 211 orator would note that all of them looked precisely alike. But — and we should be thankful for it — the human family- has not been so constituted ; no two faces are exactly alike ; no two temperaments ; there is infinite diversity, making the study of human nature endlessly interesting. The positive content of this trait is a good element, and should be properly cultivated. There is an important sense in which each person "should be himself" — that is, act ac- cording to his own peculiar natural bent. He should not be affected; nor should he ape someone else. As a rule, the imitator hits upon some peculiarity of the person whom he admires, and makes himself ridiculous by trying to copy it. The peculiarity may be entirely natural and becoming to its original possessor, but may not fit the imitator at all, any more than another man's clothes would be likely to fit him. An old adage, derived from the Holy Scriptures, is pertinent here: "David cannot fight in Saul's armor." Every man should cultivate the vein of originality with which he has been endued by nature. If he seeks the schol- arly life, he should write his own compositions, develop his own style of expression, and deliver his own sermons and addresses. An essay plagiarized from a great author might be much superior to anything you might compose, but people want to read or hear what you can produce, what has been sifted through your individuality, even though it may not be of so high a character and value. The plagiar- ist is a thief and a pretender ; he steals from other men's thinking, and tries to pass for more than he is worth. The opposite of individuality is what we have called inanity in our list. Certainly there are degrees of origin- ality, and nature has set its own limits to it in every case. Yet no rational being has a right to permit himself to be or to become inane, but should assert whatever original 212 A System of General Ethics power he has, make something out of himself for his own sake and the sake of society, and thus contribute his share, even though it be small, to the advancement of human welfare. Yet individuality may be carried to an extreme; it may run into eccentricity or erraticism. And therein lies the temptation of the man who is naturally gifted with strong individuality; he may become too erratic or individualistic to adjust himself to his social environment, and may insist on carrying out his views or plans regardless of the opin- ions of others. As the saying goes, the eccentric man is "hard to get along with." He is known as a "peculiar" person or "an odd genius." The man who declared that he was "the easiest man in the world to get along with, if people would only give him his own way," belonged to this difficult class. While individuality in its positive sense is an excellent trait, and distinguishes the strong character from the inane, "individualism" is an extreme, an over- assertion of one's selfhood, an affectation of idiosyncrasy, an overweening ambition to be "different." Persons of this type can seldom fit amiably into any social organiza- tion, whether it be a college, a college class, a literary so- ciety, a civil community, or a church. In the last-named organization there are people who are known as "church tramps," which means persons who become dissatisfied or "disgruntled" in every church with which they unite, until at length they drop out entirely, and ever afterward have a "pick" at all religious organizations. Here and there you will find a minister who, on account of his selfishness and eccentricities, cannot live in harmony with the members of his own vocation. To put our proposition in an epigram, you and I should cultivate individuality, but should avoid individualism. Man's Chief Duties 213 Let us consider for a moment another virtue — humility. It is said that "humility is an angel virtue." Over against pride or haughtiness, a humble spirit makes for individual and social happiness. A great many of the ills of social life come from pride, leading to false and harmful social distinctions. "Oh, why should the spirit of mortal be proud?" is a sentiment that all men should endorse. "Be clothed with humility," wrote the apostle, and good advice it was. "Pride goeth before a fall," issued from the pen of another observing writer. One of the finest of the beati- tudes is, "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Yet humility may degenerate into a fawning, obsequious temper, which is very offensive. It is a fine art to be able to be humble and at the same time preserve one's dignity and self-respect ; but it can be done, and it is part of every person's moral task to accomplish it. Let us treat a few other virtues in a very concise way. What a desirable virtue is firmness as against over-pliancy ! Yet there are people who pervert this virtue too, and mis- take obstinacy for it. You might define obstinacy as hold- ing on to small ideas or unworthy aims with a death-grip. All persons should possess and cultivate courage, both physical and moral, for any kind of a coward is weak and despicable ; yet to run into unnecessary danger, on account of recklessness or vainglory, is not a mark of true heroism, but of foolhardiness. From this spirit is derived the say- ing about men who "would rush in where angels scarce would dare to tread." The reason our Lord would not cast Himself from the pinnacle of the temple at Satan's behest was that it would have been an unnecessary adven- ture, as well as undignified, an attempted exploit merely for its own sake, and therefore would have been a case of "tempting God;" it would have been foolhardy, not cour- ageous. 214 A System of General Ethics A strong trait of character is conscientiousness, and it needs much emphasis in this day and age, for there are few people who are over-scrupulous ; yet there are persons here and there who are squeamish; who let their consciences trouble them about little things, trifles, mere peccadilloes, that have no special moral character. A nice distinction is also to be made with reference to fidelity, which is the noble trait of loyalty to a friend, a country, or a cause. Almost above all other persons, the perfidious or treacherous man is to be despised. If he is disloyal to his country, we call him a traitor, as was Ben- edict Arnold. Yet, strange as it may seem, even so noble a virtue as fidelity may be abused, or carried to an extreme — that is, one may defend his friends or his country in transactions that are wrong; whereas one should be so true to their best interests as to try to set them right. There is the noble virtue of self-denial. It is closely connected with altruism in the proper sense of the term. In individual ethics it is right and dutiful for one to deny himself a lower indulgence for the sake of a higher good, and it is imperative that one crucify the "lusts of the flesh" in order to save one's better life. Therefore the true idea of self-sacrifice for one's own good and for the good of others is right and commendable, and is to be pitted against sensual and selfish indulgence. On the other hand, there is no virtue in asceticism, which is the perversion of self- denial. It is a mistake to think that we have no right to the good and pleasant things of life, as long as we use them temperately and unselfishly. Would it not be strange if God had surrounded us with wholesome and appetizing natural products, social amenities, intellectual pleasures, and esthetic attractions only to tempt and mock us? Aus- terity of life has nothing in itself to commend it. A re- Man's Chief Duties 215 ligion that "makes us miserable in this life in order that we may be happy in the next" is not a well-balanced religion, but one of the fanatical sort. Better is a religion that gives us true joy and inspiration in every good and perfect gift in both this world and the world to come. One of the beautiful minor virtues is affability, which is almost a synonym of courtesy. It is a trait that greatly smooths the pathway of social, business and civic life. No man has a right to be surly or cross-grained, which is an index of a churlish disposition. When people declare that they are afraid of you on account of your snarling temper, it surely means no compliment to you. Sometimes people think they can excuse their over-bluntness by pretending that they are honest and outspoken, and are "not two- faced," but "always say just what they think." As a rule, though, they grow angry if other people express themselves with like frankness and brusqueness about their faults. The abuse of affability is sycophancy, which leads a person to bow and scrape and almost crawl before his fellowmen in order to curry favor. Such conduct only excites disgust. Generally speaking, people want others to preserve their dignity and self-respect, and not to flatter and cringe. Here, as with all the other virtues, we should remember Aristotle's "golden mean" — the via media. In general we may say, in concluding this section, Culti- vate the positive quality of every virtue, and avoid both the antithesis and the perversion, and thus develop a well- poised and fully rounded character. CHAPTER XVI II. MAN'S DUTIES TO NATURE (Nature Ethics). 1. To trace the divine purposes in her phenomena. 2. To study her scientifically. 3. To preserve, mould and develop her. 4. To show mercy to all her sentient creatures. II. MAN'S DUTIES TO NATURE (Nature Ethics). 1. To trace the divine purposes in her phenomena: Abstractly considered, man cannot be said to owe a duty to impersonal nature, because, as has been said so often in this work, the moral inheres only in rational personality; but when the natural realm is looked upon as God's pos- session and handiwork, we may owe it a duty because it belongs to Him; or, in other words, we are under obliga- tion to Him and to ourselves to treat it in its relation to its Creator and Preserver. A superficial view of nature may lead to atheism. Many men see in nature only the working of inexorable law, which is made to account for all phenomena; as if laws were not simply modes of operation; the method of the lawgiver and executor ! Law is an abstract term, the name for a modus operandi, not the name of a concrete person who can initiate movements and carry out purposes. It certainly gives zest to the study of nature when men can feel that they are not investigating a mere machine, but are also tracing the thoughts of the Great Artificer. Man's Chief Duties 217 2. To study her scientifically: By this we mean that we should investigate nature sin- cerely and judicially and as profoundly as possible, so that we may discover the actual laws that govern her. We should not read into nature what is not in her constitution ; should not idealize her, or go into sentimental rhapsodies over her, and so give to her a false glamour. On the other hand, we should appreciate and love her in all her varied forms. Many people today are so steeped in the artificial- ities of social life that they have no relish for the study and contemplation of the natural world ; they see no beauty in the sunset, the landscape, the panorama of mountain and ocean ; they bow down, rather, to the gods of gold, fashion and social frivolity. Persons of this type surely live meager and one-sided lives. There are persons who study nature, it is true, but per- mit themselves to grow pessimistic over some of her phe- nomena; that is, they see no beauty and kindliness in her operations, because their whole vision is filled with the strange, mysterious and seemingly cruel things that occur in her realm. To them, she is almost a monster, a sort of Minotaur, crushing everything with inexorable law. This is a one-sided view, and therefore unscientific, for he who will study nature in all her varied forms will surely find a preponderance of beauty and beneficence. Not only so, but the cynical conception of nature usually has an ethical basis in the critic himself, who centers his thoughts merely on physical and earthly pleasures, instead of on the higher moral and spiritual values that make for real character and happiness. It is a notable fact that materialists often turn pessimists; and "there is a reason for it." It must also be admitted that there are men who idealize nature, and rhapsodize over her as if she were perfect in 218 A System of General Ethics all her moods and tenses. Many of the poets, romancers and nature-writers commit this error, and thus, as it were, inveigle people out into nature's realm, only to find them- selves speedily disenchanted, with the result that ever after- ward they scoff at nature and those who praise her marvels and beauties. When Rousseau advocated a return to simple nature and the ways of nature-peoples, he should have gone to live for a few weeks in the dense forests of Africa, to fight with noxious insects, venomous serpents and man- eating animals. All too soon he would have been disen- charmed, and would have hurried back to the comforts and security of civilized and cultured communities. He thought that savagery was the highest estate of mortals, but for some reason, an evident one, he never took up his abode with the Hottentots and Bushmen ; never even went among them as a missionary! Even so engaging a nature writer as Thoreau, who sometimes scoffed at civilization and man- kind, and belauded nature in her raw state, did not live very long in his secluded shanty at Waldo Pond, but soon returned to the haunts and amenities of a civilized com- munity, where he fared much more comfortably. And even while he was "roughing it" at Waldo, he was glad to avail himself of many of the inventions and conveniences of art. Even the nails which held the planks of his shanty together were made by human machinery, and the planks themselves were the product of the sawmills of the civilization he affected to despise. James Russell Lowell and Sidney Lanier wrote beautiful poems on "The Marsh," nor did they overdraw their attractions ; but it is worth mentioning that they did not take up their residence there among the gnats and mosquitos ; they simply made brief visits to such haunts, usually under the most favorable weather condi- tions. Besides, their marshes were comparatively small Man's Chief Duties 219 areas in the midst of well-cultivated farms, and were very different from the Everglades of Florida or the dank and quaking swamps of Louisiana. To most people, it must be admitted, raw nature is not attractive, but is rather repellent and fearsome. The nature which they really admire is that which is more or less cul- tivated and moulded by human art. As a matter of fact, nature must be tamed and developed before it can be made serviceable and attractive to the vast majority of mankind. When nature and art are properly combined, the most sat- isfactory condition is obtained. The Bible teaches that our first parents, though placed in the beautiful garden of Par- adise, were to "dress and keep it." It also represents God as saying to the original pair: "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it." That word "sub- due" is a very significant word. Rational investigation in a large and comprehensive way proves that the teaching of the Bible in this respect is correct. Why nature in her native state is not all that we might desire is a problem of Theism and Theoretical Ethics, and has been dealt with elsewhere in this volume ; but we suggest here that perhaps the moral discipline acquired by man in subduing and moulding the natural realm was one of the primary pur- poses of the Creator. So let us study nature sanely and sincerely — in other words, scientifically — and not permit ourselves to become pessimistic, on the one hand, nor over- sentimental, on the other. We can be nature-lovers with- out being "nature-fakirs." Another word of caution is needed in a treatise on prac- tical morality. The nature-lover should never permit him- self to grow cynical toward his fellowmen. It is only too true that some persons who consort with nature are given to more or less scorn of mankind. Apparently they cannot 220 A System of General Ethics love man and nature at the same time and with real fervor. This marks a narrow and one-sided frame of mind. Thoreau was something of an offender along this line. It certainly is not necessary nor ethical to cry down man in order to cry up nature. Man and nature are not rivals in our affections, or, at least, should not be. Both are a part of the same cosmos, and the offspring of the same Creator. The truly balanced ethical attitude is that of love for nature, man and God. It remains to be said, to offset any misunderstanding from the remarks previously made, that in many respects nature, even in her primitive state, is most beautiful and ethically inspiring. Witness the glory of the sunset and the sunrise ; the silvery path of the moon on the ocean ; the scintillant glancing of the rising sun on the fretted waters of the river or the lake; the panorama of snow- capped peaks and snow-filled gorges among the Rockies, the Alps and the Andes; the star-paved dome of the sky at night. Truly the Psalmist was correct when he ex- claimed: "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handiwork." Moreover, nature is always fascinating to the seasoned and earnest investigator, whether her mood is stern or gentle. Agassiz spent enraptured days in the study of a worm or a snake, from which most people would have shrunk with disgust and fear. John Muir and Enos Mills fairly revelled in the fierce storms of the Alpine heights of the Rocky Mountains and the Sierra Nevadas. Thus, as a scientific study, all nature presents a captivating field. A further duty of man to nature will occupy the next section. 3. To preserve, mould and develop her: The wanton destruction of nature is wrong, a grievous Man's Chief Duties 221 outrage of the law of practical morality. Hewing down the forests in a wasteful way is a sin against God, man and nature. The more ethical men become, the more they will provide for the conservation of our woodlands, soil, min- erals, and all other natural resources. No generation has a moral right to overlook the needs of the generations that are to follow. It is downright selfishness to do so. It is also man's plain duty to cultivate and mould nature into forms of utility and beauty. Apparently God has pur- posely made nature somewhat "in the rough" — that is, in an unformed and undeveloped state, and no doubt His de- sign in doing so was to give to man the useful task of sub- duing and moulding her to his need. The forest must be hewn down, the soil broken up, the desert irrigated, the swamps drained, the level fields tiled, the ground tilled and fertilized, and the noxious animals, serpents and insects destroyed. Only in this way, speculate about it as we may, can nature be brought under the dominion of man and made to subserve his purposes; and so we are justified in concluding that such a regime of toil and conquest is ac- cording to the divine decree and will. Not only is man's physical and mental condition improved in this way, but the discipline of the thought and labor he must give to the subjection of nature is of incalculable moral value to him. Suppose for a moment that nature were brought to him all ready-made; then he would be little more than a happy creature, a sort of frisking animal, without true and virile moral character. Ethically man would have been inane. But nature should be cultivated not merely for utilitarian purposes ; there should be room for beauty as well, such as nature and art in proper co-ordination can produce. A public park, well planned and well kept, is of as much service to the people of a city as is a store or a factory; 222 A System of General Ethics for in such a resort they may come into direct contact with nature as modified by art, and may draw therefrom refresh- ment, rest, and, above all, moral and spiritual uplift. The wise farmer will not merely grow corn and wheat and po- tatoes, nor raise only cattle and swine, but will also cultivate a lawn and a garden, and will add touches of beauty here and there to his acres, to prevent him and his family from becoming mere "groundlings," as Shakespeare puts it. Small natural, untrimmed spots should be left at intervals on every farm, where useful and beautiful birds may find residence, shelter and breeding-places, in order that they may destroy the noxious insects and rodents of the place, and furnish cheer for the workman by their sweet lays. Another duty of man to nature is — 4. To show mercy to all sentient creatures: ''Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy," is a beatitude that is germain to man's treatment of the sentient creatures around him. The disposition to kill, to shed blood merely for wanton pleasure, seems to be a part of man's original savagery and sin, and should be restrained by the quality of mercy. The people of Israel were not to muzzle the ox that trod the corn. Said the wise man : "A righteous man regardeth the life of his beast" (Prov. 12: 10). True, there are harmful creatures that must be elimi- nated, for that is a part of the order of nature; there are also many creatures that must be killed for food; but the most merciful modes of slaughter should always be adopted, and all torture should be most conscientiously avoided. The trapping of animals in wild countries is one of the most cruel of sports, and it is a serious question whether man should not deny himself some comforts, and especially some Man's Chief Duties 223 luxuries, rather than inflict such great suffering on inno- cent creatures. Nothing could be more inhuman than the slaughter of parent egrets for their plumes, while thousands of their helpless broods are left to die of slow starvation. And all this cruelty is inflicted to gratify the vain and sense- less craving for fashionable ornamentation! At the judg- ment day it will be only right if all human monsters will have to give an account for their wanton cruelty to helpless creatures. Domestic animals should also be treated with kindly con- sideration. To neglect and abuse them is a sign of a coarse and cruel nature. To lash a poor horse unmercifully or over-drive it is almost as great a wrong as to abuse a human being. Kindness to animals will have a reflex influence upon men's conduct toward their fellowmen. The man who is unmerciful to animals will be likely to show the same dis- position to the people with whom he comes in contact, if he feels that he can safely indulge his savage propensity; and, on the other hand, the man who is considerate toward animals will be apt to accord the same kind of treatment to his fellowmen. CHAPTER XVII III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (Social Ethics). 1. General Relations. (1) Love. a. Neighbor love. b. Patriotic love. c. Philanthropic love. d. Love for enemies. e. Other graces flowing from love. (2) Justice. a. In the industrial sphere. b. In the civic sphere. III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN. (Social Ethics). 1. General Relations: (1) Love: If we remember that true love is not a weak, namby- pamby quality, but a strong, ethical emotion, we think there will be general agreement in giving it the first place in our list of social virtues. One of the greatest ethical writers of the world has put it thus : "Love is the fulfilling of the whole law ;" also : "And now abideth faith, hope and love, and the greatest of these is love." Is it not obvious that love, surcharged with righteousness, would soon imparadise the world? For convenience of treatment let us classify the various kinds of love for our fellowmen. a. Neighbor love: One of the greatest ethical commands of all time is this : "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." If reason could Mans Chief Duties 225 not have discovered this rule or expressed it, reason can at least sanction it. The parable of the Good Samaritan teaches that every person in need is a neighbor and that every man who aids another displays a neighborly spirit. Not only are those who live in our immediate community, or who belong to our social set, or to our own race or na- tion, — not only are they our neighbors, but all men in the world who are in any kind of need. Hence even the heathen are our neighbors, and we are debtors to try to lift them out of their state of fear and superstition. To love our neighbor as ourselves does not mean that we are re- quired to hate or despise ourselves, but simply that we shall do them good as we desire good for ourselves. It means to obey the Golden Rule in our dealings with our fellow- beings. In its positive form, this rule leads to a strong and active life in the service of mankind. We know how we desire to be treated. That is to be the norm of our treat- ment of our fellows. How this rule, if generally practiced, would transform the social, economic and political spheres ! b. Patriotic love: There dwells in the normal heart the love of country. It is according to the laws of nature and of God that the true citizen should have a peculiar love for his own land, her form of government and her institutions, and should be willing to serve her faithfully in peace, and, in case of peril, to make any sacrifice, even to the shedding of his blood and the laying down of his life, for her preservation. The American, for example, who cannot heartily join in saying or singing, "My country, 'tis of thee," is lacking in both patriotism and morality. Nor does such virile and righteous affection mean that the citizen must uphold his country in the wrong. His 226 A System of General Ethics very loyalty ought to move him to try to set her right, for he knows that no country can prosper long if it runs in the way of wrong-doing. "Righteousness exalteth a nation, but sin is a reproach to any people" (Prov. 14:34). We think Carl Schurz's well-known aphorism is the most eth- ical expression of patriotic love with which we are ac- quainted: "My country right or wrong; if right, to be kept right; if wrong, to be set right." Criticism of public pol- icies, not definitely settled in our constitution, should never be characterized by those who want to usurp authority as a lack of patriotism ; for it is only by public discussion and the free expression of honest opinion that advancement in righteous government can be made; and this is especially true in a free Republic like ours. The public man or the private citizen who wishes to put a padlock on the exercise of free speech that is honest and aboveboard is the man who is a peril to the country; for he is trying for personal advantage to inject the spirit of autocracy into our Repub- lic and her institutions. He is not a true American, not a true patriot. On the other hand, freedom of speech may be greatly abused ; it may be the expression of a merely cavilling tem- per, or of a partisan purpose ; and in the time of a nation's peril, it may be of such a character as to afford "comfort to the enemy," and tend to weaken the cause of righteous- ness for which the nation stands. While it might be un- American to suppress by force even such expressions of opinion, for that would endanger our liberty in this country; yet it should be noted that all unjust and unwise criticisms of a government's policies are an index of an unpatriotic spirit, and it would be the true citizen's duty to rebuke such criticisms in plain and cogent terms. Man's Chief Duties 227 c. Philanthropic love: Perhaps neighbor love, strictly speaking, would include all love of a general character ; yet there seems to be some- thing distinctive about love for mankind, or philanthropic love. It is the love of humanity in its entirety ; for man as such for the sake of his human quality; it is love for the genus homo. It is therefore the most comprehensive kind of human love — that is, it is humanitarian. Thus, it is opposed to all selfishness, clannishness, sectarianism, and all provincial, racial and national narrowness, which cannot see and appreciate the human quality outside of its own class or circle. Nor is this kind of love in the least incon- gruous with the love of home and country. Such cosmo- politan love should be cultivated by all persons, for only in that way can the era of universal peace, good-will and brotherhood be ushered in. d. Love for enemies : Can a man love his enemies, and do good to them that despitefully use him? Many persons regard this as an ex- tremely difficult duty, and others even think it impossible. They declare that it is against nature to love those who mistreat them, and so they want to reserve to themselves the right to follow their natural impulses to cherish resent- ment, or, to put it colloquially, to "get even," to give "tit for tat," to return "a Roland for an Oliver," and to "pay back in the same coin." What has Natural Ethics to say regarding this matter? To love people who mistreat us with the love of compla- cency and approval is impossible, nor is it required by any ethical law. When they have done actual and intentional wrong against you or any one else, you certainly cannot and should not approve of their conduct. Indeed, you 228 A System of General Ethics should do the very opposite. It is always wrong to con- nive at and condone wrong, whoever is the guilty party. However, you can hold toward your enemies the love of compassion and sympathy, if you will, and can be willing to forgive them and to win them from their wrong think- ing and doing to the better way of righteousness. That means that you can be generous, magnanimous, too big- souled to cherish a grudge, or show a petulant spirit, or seek revenge. Indeed, life is too short to permit any part of it to be spent in holding resentment. Remember, again, that no one can be happy, and do his best work in and for the world, while he is harboring ill- will against any of his fellowmen, because such a temper always depresses the mind, clogs its free activity, and wastes valuable time; while a forgiving spirit gives joy, peace and buoyancy to life, and leaves the mind free to perform its worthy tasks. True, your enemy is not justi- fied in mistreating you, and will sooner or later have to give an account for his misdemeanors ; but neither are you justified in "keeping spite," or seeking an opportunity for wreaking revenge. Let it be borne in mind, too, that resenting an insult will never mend matters, but will rather aggravate and continue the quarrel between you and your tormentor. If you in- sult him in return, you will simply afford him a chance to add another offense to the list. Thus the wrangle will never end. Suppose, on the other hand, you do not return reviling for reviling, but good for evil — "heap coals of fire" on your enemy's head — in most cases you will shame him into silence or reconciliation, and may even win him to a better life. Where one will not, two cannot quarrel. Perhaps it would be helpful to make a distinction here. In rare instances men of so peculiar a disposition may be Man's Chief Duties 229 found that there is no "getting along with them." In such cases, after we have made all reasonable efforts to concili- ate and win them, we may be compelled simply to "let them alone," at least, for the time being; for by obtruding our kindly offices upon them we may only increase their bitter- ness and wrath. However, we should be sure in our own minds that this "let alone" policy is not the outgrowth of ire or indifference on our part, but the calm and kindly judgment that it is the best way to deal with our enemy, until he can be brought in some more indirect way to a better frame of mind. Finally, let it be remembered that there is nothing so destructive of peace and good-will in the home, the social circle, the neighborhood, the school, the college, and the Church as the disposition to harbor spite and return evil for evil. A kindly and gracious temper toward our enemies is entirely consistent with manly and womanly self-respect and dignity. Yes, you can treat your enemy in a magnani- mous way without displaying a soft, lachrymose and cring- ing spirit. There is always the beautiful via media. You and I can prove that we are too large-souled to be either petty or petulant. e. Other graces flowing from love: Some of the most engaging graces flow from the principle and practice of love. There is the grace of charitableness. The apostle has a fine saying: "Charity thinketh no evil." By this is meant that we should cherish a kindly temper toward our fellowmen, credit them with sincerity just as far as possible, put the best construction we can on their conduct, and avoid a harsh, suspicious and censorious judg- ment. All of us know people who always suspect other people of ulterior motives, usually selfish or sordid ones, 230 A System of General Ethics no matter what they do. A suspicious disposition is very likely to arise from a consciousness of the impurity of one's own motives. As the colloquialism goes, such a person "measures other people by his own yardstick." Said the world's greatest ethical teacher : "Judge not, that ye be not judged; for with what judgment ye judge ye shall be judged, and with what measure ye mete, it shall be meas- ured unto you again" (Matt. 7: 1,2). This means, for one thing, that society will be likely to appraise a man accord- ing to his estimate of his fellowmen. Probably its more ultimate meaning is that, if we are harsh in our judgment of others, we will have no right to expect merciful judg- ment at the great assize of the last day. There is also the beautiful grace of courtesy, which flows from the fountain of love. Sometimes it is called urbanity. This virtue helps to make the course of social, commercial and civil life flow smoothly. When it is not allowed to de- generate into flattery, affectation and obsequiousness, it is a mark of unselfishness. To "scrape" and "cringe" to people, however, will only excite their disgust. But sin- cere courtesy is a noble virtue, and is opposed to gruffness, churlishness, rudeness, over-bluntness, all of which, when analyzed, have their root in a selfish and inconsiderate spirit. Politeness — otherwise, good manners — is also a result of kindly affection. No one has a right carelessly to run counter to the decent social convenances — to dress, talk, eat and act in a rude and offensive way. True social etiquette is necessary to refined society. Indeed, it is not going too far to say that good manners are a mark of a gentle and unselfish spirit, and therefore have more than a trifling ethical significance. The extreme to be avoided is that Man's Chief Duties 231 of over-nicety and affectation. Here again the via media is to be followed. A rare grace is that of true appreciativeness, which is by no means a minor virtue. The kindly temper is not first of all critical, but seeks primarily to see the meritorious in every person, act and performance. There are persons who are critical of others first and last — critical of sermons, books and whatnot. How would they advertise their own acuteness if they did not pick out small faults ? Sometimes the book-reviewer, for example, will miss the large theme and main purpose of a book, and will use up all his space in quibbling about a few minor points or purely academic distinctions. In this way men who ought to stand side by side in fighting a great evil sometimes fall to haggling about points that would have no particular value, even if they could be settled. May all of us be delivered from the hyper-critic ! Sincerely to express appreciation to one who deserves it, is right; in fact, it is a duty. True, some shallow natures may be spoiled by praise, but this need not happen often if the commendation is discriminatingly bestowed. It is our plain duty to cheer struggling virtue. Flagellating sin has its place and its value, but it is negative, and often causes more anger and resentment than encouragement to well- doing. Better far to spend one's time and energies in the constructive business of helping people to overcome evil with good, and then give them credit when they show any marks of progress. The easiest and cheapest kind of preaching is castigating the evils of society ; it requires little acumen to discover obliquities and none to denounce them; but to find and proclaim the sovereign remedy — that re- quires grace, brains and true goodness of heart. The word "criticism," however, may be used in a good sense, or what 232 A System of General Ethics might be called the scientific sense ; as, for example, literary- criticism is not the same as literary fault-finding, but often consists more in pointing out excellencies than shortcom- ings. It means a true and sincere evaluation of a work of literature. Gratitude is also a mark of ethical love. An ingrate is a most repulsive character. "How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is to have a thankless child!" moaned poor King Lear. On the other hand, what a beautiful frame of mind is indicated by gratitude to God and our fellowmen for every favor conferred! Opposed to the principle of love are all such acts as scandal, slander, backbiting and gossip, all of which should be conscientiously avoided and severely condemned. To rob a man of his good name is worse than to rob him of his property; and therefore not all people who are guilty of the gravest kind of grand larceny are in the penitentiary, much as they deserve to be there. (2) Justice: Justice is not inconsistent with love, but rather gives strength, dignity and uprightness to it. As has been said, love unregulated by justice and righteousness would be mere sentimentality, and would lead to the violation of all the moral commandments. In God's character the infinite attributes of love and justice are perfectly co-ordinated. Let us now proceed to apply the principle of justice in sev- eral ways, remembering that it should always be tempered with love. a. In the industrial sphere: If the law of simple justice, permeated by love, should prevail in the economic sphere, there would be no occasion for "labor troubles ;" for then the relations between work- Man's Chief Duties 233 men and their employers would be characterized by mutual good-will, forbearance and sympathy. The capitalist who despises labor, and the laborer who hates capital, are actu- ated by the same unethical temper, being alike impelled by selfish and unjust motives. If real peace and prosperity are to prevail in the industrial world, there must arise the spirit of mutuality between employers and employes. Let us apply this principle. First, the capitalist who grinds down his workmen to the lowest pittance, and takes no interest in them beyond forc- ing out of them the maximum of labor, is not moral, but decidedly the reverse. His selfish and grasping disposition is one of the most fruitful causes of strikes and other forms of agitation among working people. For him and his family to roll in wealth and luxury, while his workmen must sweat and toil and live in squalid poverty — this causes much discontent among the poor, and can you wonder that it does? We appeal to our great ethical authority: "The laborer is worthy of his hire" (Luke 10: 7) ; "Come now, ye rich, weep and howl for your miseries that are coming upon you. Your riches are corrupted and your garments are moth-eaten. . . . Behold, the hire of laborers who mowed your fields, which is kept back of you by fraud, crieth out; and the cries of them that reaped are entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth. Ye have lived del- icately on the earth, and taken your pleasure; ye have nourished your hearts in the day of slaughter" ( Jas. 5 : 1- 5) ; "Thou shalt not oppress thy neighbor, nor rob him; the wages of the hired servant shall not abide with thee all night until the morning" (Lev. 19: 13) ; "And I will come to you in judgment, and will be a swift witness against those that oppress the hireling in his wages" (Mai. 3:5). Thus morality requires of the employer that he treat his 234 A System of General Ethics employee justly and equitably, neither stinting him in his wages nor holding them back. To "get rich quick" by ex- ploiting other people is criminally immoral, and merits the most unqualified condemnation. On the other hand, the laborer owes just duties to those for whom he labors. He should not envy his employer, for the spirit of envy will be likely to lead to many kinds of wrong-doing. He should not "soljer," as the saying goes, in his work, but should seek to do his work well, whether his employer is present or not, and should take a genuine interest in the success and efficiency of the firm that em- ploys him and gives him an opportunity to earn an honest livelihood for himself and his family. Much of the labor trouble in the industrial world is due to jealousy, suspicion and inefficiency on the part of many of the laborers. "An honest day's wage for an honest day's work" should be the guiding principle for all employes ; and of course it should be the guide for their employers as well. While labor unions have a right to secure as good wages as are justly due them, they should also make efficiency and honest work one of their slogans. The science of Ethics cannot lay out a detailed social pro- gram; that function belongs to the science of Sociology. The sole province of our science is to insist that all parties in the industrial world shall be governed by the principles of justice and considerateness. That there are evils in the capitalistic system which call imperatively for redress and correction, no sensible ethicist will deny; and he knows only too well that the many abuses carried on by plutocracy constantly invite the peril of revolution. The demands, yes, the crying needs, of the poor and downtrodden will have to be met, or our country will face inevitable ruin and anarchy. And the well-to-do and wealthy are the ones who Man's Chief Duties 235 can the most easily bring about the required reforms, if they will only lay aside their selfishness, their love for show and pleasure, and will cherish the feeling of humani- tarianism. Whether the proposed program of the socialistic party would prove a real remedy or not, may be questioned by the sober-minded publicist; but there is no doubt that the abuses imposed by luxurious and selfish wealth are re- sponsible for the rapid progress that Socialism has made in our land. Cannot all parties unite on the principles of humanitarian love and justice? Is it not only too true that heretofore the opposite principles — those of suspicion, jeal- ousy and competition — have been too much in evidence, and have been the cause of most of our divisions and hard- ships? Surely the time has come when the leaders of all parties in the industrial sphere ought to begin in earnest the propaganda of the gospel of good-will. b. In the civic sphere : The element of justice is vitally concerned in preserving the sacredness of the civil law, in seeing that it is faithfully obeyed, and in bringing all violaters to its bar for condign punishment. "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," is a good motto for all the citizens of a country. To "be in subjection to the powers that be," because gov- ernment is ordained of God and is necessary in the nature of things, is an excellent general rule. The only exceptions would be in case the government became despotic, and would command its citizens to do acts that were in violation of the law of righteousness; as, for example, if a ruler should command his subjects to worship a false god, or, for that matter, worship any god contrary to the dictates of their consciences. In instances of that kind the good citzen would have to obey conscience, even though he might have 236 A System of General Ethics to pay the price of martyrdom. It must be remembered, though, that in cases of a mere difference of human judg- ment in regard to civil or political policies, the citizen should waive his judgment, and be obedient to his government. We believe that sober thought will enable most men to make the distinction between a difference of judgment and a command to commit an absolute sin. In this Republic, however, where "liberty" is so much of a slogan, we are in danger of losing respect for law and becoming a lawless nation. As is well known, there are citizens who obey only such laws as they must, and either surreptiously or openly violate the rest. Is it any wonder that liberty so often degenerates into license? Can we expect to have a strong and well-ordered government and a happy, upright and prosperous nation, when there are so many people in both public and private life who are trying to defeat the ends of justice? The emphasis cannot be put too strongly or too frequently on the apt proverb, "Right- eousness exalteth a nation, while sin is a reproach to any people." Our motto should be, "Liberty regulated by law." In a subsequent section we shall treat this subject more fully. CHAPTER XVIII III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (continued). 2. Specific relations. (1) The family. a. Husband and wife. b. Parents and children. III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (continued). 2. Specific relations: (1) The family: 1 It need not be argued, we think, that the family is an institution demanded by nature and reason. Taking the constitution of the human family as it is, without going into misty speculation, we do not see how the race could be perpetuated except through the family. Reason, com- mon sense and the common conscience testify that the pro- miscuous mixture of the sexes would invite speedy ruin. Reason also teaches that monogamous marriage is the best, and that both polygamy and polyandry are wicked, not to say adulterous. There is such a thing as "a pure life for two" of opposite sexes, but not for more. At all events, the highest conception of the family today is the union of one man and one woman in lawful wedlock, bound together by true sexual love. Reason teaches that any other regime w r ould be immoral, and the experience of the human family 1. For an excellent discussion of the family see Dr. Noah K. K. Davis. "Elements of Ethics," pp. 222-236. Our only regret is that we cannot transfer it to these pages. 238 A System of General Ethics confirms the judgment of reason. 2 Let us first treat of the relation of — a. Husband and wife: This is a very tender and intimate relation, with pro- found ethical obligations on both sides. Indeed, this thesis is so important that it should have much more extended treatment than can be given to it here. We can touch on only a few of the chief matters. Marriage should, first of all, be based on true and pure sexual love, which has its physical, psychical and spiritual elements. Such love is sui generis. Platonic love between men and women may do very well for purely social and intellectual fellowship, but for the marital relation some- thing that is different in kind, something more intimate and ardent, is needed — namely, what is known as sexual or hymeneal love. No marriage should ever be contracted between parties who do not feel toward each other this peculiar kind of affection, which can subsist between only one man and one woman. Where marriage is thus grounded, it will be likely to last until death severs the bond. But where true sexual love is lacking to begin with, nausea will soon arise between the contracting parties, for no relation in life is so intimate as that between husband and wife. This fact is written into the very substance of human nature. A young man would do wrong to marry 2. "Polyandry or polygamy, common among brutes, is inadmis- sible among person, it being inconsistent with the moral equivalence of the sexes. If more than one of either sex be bound to one of the other, the plurality is severally deprived of the rank of equal fellowship, and degraded to a thing useful merely as a means." Davis, ut supra, p. 227; also p. 223: "It (nature) sets apart a pair, male and female, for each other, their exclusive bond being spon- taneously guarded by hygienic barriers, and by a prompt jealousy, fierce and fatal." Man's Chief Duties 239 the best woman in the world if he cannot love her in the conjugal way; and of course the same principle holds for the young woman. You will often hear the normal young man put his thought in something like this language: "I have great admiration for such and such a young lady, and think she will make an excellent wife for some worthy young man; but as for me, I cannot feel the kind of love for her that I think a man should feel for the girl he would make his wife." The same language on the lips of a young woman, with a change of pronouns, would be just as rel- evant. And these expressions only indicate that which is elemental in human nature; it is human instinct, and is divinely implanted. Let it be freely and frankly admitted that true sexual love is, to some extent, physical ; yet it has other elements that are just as essential, as we shall now proceed to point out. The Greeks were mistaken in representing Cupid as blind. No other god should have keener and more dis- criminating sight than the god of love. The weak, namby- pamby, sentimental notion that "love is blind" has been re- sponsible for many hasty, ill-advised marriages among young people, resulting in unhappy domestic relations and frequent divorces. Young folks should not allow them- selves to fall in love indiscriminately, but should learn to "look before they leap." An attractive face may hide a bad character or a petty, nagging disposition. So it is well to keep the eyes open, and fall in love with beauty of char- acter and temperament even more than with physical charms. No true woman could live happily with a moral leper, even though he were an Apollo; nor could the most saintly man make a happy home with the most beautiful woman, if she had a small and sulking disposition or were lax in sexual morality. 240 A System of General Ethics By many sentimental people it is thought that hymeneal love is beyond control and direction. It is not! This is the bane of all kinds of emotionalism in religious, social and sexual life — the notion that feeling cannot be controlled by the will. Every transgressor who yields to his feelings offers the weak excuse, "I couldn't help it !" Then why did God endue you with a will and a conscience, and put them in the regnant place in your psychology? Do you suppose that all virtuous people around you have never been tempted by wrong impulses and emotions? If you knew their lives better, you would find that every one of them has had to say more than once to his passion, "Thus far shalt thou go and no farther! Here shall thy proud waves be stayed !" If young people would remember that all the feelings should and can be regulated by the will and the moral fac- ulty, there would not be so many conjugal misalliances ; and if a good many married people would exercise com- mon-sense and self-control, there would be far fewer broken families, leading to infelicity for all parties con- cerned. How foolish and weak people are! A married man, for example, permits himself to become infatuated with another woman than his lawful wife. Instead of re- sisting the impulse or passion like a strong man, because he knows it would be wrong and imbecile to yield, he imagines that he is helpless in the grip of his passion, and so gives way to it. If the woman is likewise weak and sentimental, the result in nearly every case will be as follows : The man seeks a separation from his lawful wife, marries the object of his illicit love, and imagines himself very happy for a short time; but all too soon he wakes up to find himself disenchanted ; he discovers that, after all, the charmer is far from being an angelic creature ; that she is, indeed, like Man's Chief Duties 241 other women, very human, and therefore very faulty. A similar disillusionment soon transpires in the woman's ex- perience. Now, the very fact that both of them were so weak as to yield to temptation causes them to lose respect for each other; then will follow mutual contempt, the breeder of every kind of domestic infelicity. Let it be re- membered that sexual love is pure and genuine only when it is under the guidance of the highest moral law. Like all other emotions and passions, it is not to sit on the throne, but is to be the subject of the will under wise judgment. When all is said, it is still a matter for rejoicing that there are so many happy marriages in the world — mar- riages which, as the saying goes, were "first made in heaven." Yet, since imperfection inheres in all human re- lations, married couples, no matter how well mated, must make up their minds to exercise mutual forbearance, and not expect perfection of each other. Above all, true sexual morality demands that they be true to each in all the relations of life, and in every way preserve and perfect the bond of love between them. As for divorce, it should be the very last resort, and should be sought only on the ground of the grossest violation of the marriage compact. We believe that adultery on the part of one party justifies the wronged party in securing a divorce, for such an act is of itself a nullification of the marriage bond; but whether the person thus obtaining a divorce should marry another person is, to our mind, extremely doubtul, because, in so many cases, the desire for the second marriage might cor- rupt the motive in seeking the original separation. This may be rather stern ethics, and we have no desire to speak ex cathedra, but we think the proposition is at least worthy of serious consideration. And which should be the "boss" in the home, the husband 242 A System of General Ethics or the wife? We answer, Neither! There should be mu- tuality there, if anywhere, and neither party should tyran- nize over the other. It is true that normally the husband should be the "head of the house," which simply means that he should be the man there, and should in many ways bear the chief responsibility. The glory of a man is his masculinity; the beauty of a woman is her femininity. It is difficult to respect a feminine man or to admire a mas- culine woman. Therefore, in the normal household the man performs the more difficult tasks, while the woman engages in the more gentle ministries. In this world of mixed good and evil, it sometimes happens that the woman is the stronger character and the man the "weaker vessel;" but most persons will acknowledge that this is a reversal of the normal status. It need not be considered a wicked situation, if the couple live together amicably, but it is not the normal order. b. Parents and children: First, is is an honor and a duty to have children. This is God's way of perpetuating the race without sin. To foil His purpose in this regard for merely selfish ends is a most grievous wrong, and leads to what is known as "race sui- cide." Many fashionable people, — mere pleasure-mongers they are — frustrate nature's plan, simply because children would interfere with their participation in the whirl of social enjoyment, the dance, the wine party, the "joy ride," and so on. This is downright selfishness, and means in the end an empty, blase life. No good can ever result from such violations of the laws of nature, which are the laws of God. On this vital point civic reformers and men of public spirit should exercise their best thought. And no mere prudery should seal their lips. What is to become of the Mans Chief Duties 243 State if the better class of people refuse to have offspring, while the slums swarm with children? What will this order mean for the future citizenship of the country? Surely these considerations must "give us pause." One remedy that we suggest is a propaganda to make father- hood and motherhood and the rearing of families fashion- able in the best circles of society, and to make the failure to have children more or less of a reproach, even as it was in the ancient times. In this Christian land we should never let the mother of the Gracchi — and she only a Roman pagan — shame us. Children being born in the home, the chief duty of the parents is to rear them in the way of righteousness, to be honorable themselves, useful members of society, and noble and patriotic citizens of the State. The regime of the home should be kind but firm. Children should be taught obedience in the home. The old-time command, "Children obey your parents," is far too often reversed in these over- liberal days. Many parents seem to be actually afraid of their children, afraid to correct them, to cross their desires, and to assert parental authority. Hence many children are spoiled by over-leniency and indulgence. They become so angry and headstrong, when their wishes and whims are not gratified, that their parents often humor them only to pre- vent constant petulance and friction in the home. As a rule, such exhibitions are the result of failure to begin in time to control the children. A good adage is, "As the twig is bent, the tree's inclined." Solomon's proverb is not superceded even in these advanced days : "Train up a child in the way that he should go, and when he is old he will not depart therefrom." This matter of child training is vital for every sphere. Children who never learn to respect parental authority will 244 A System of General Ethics not be likely to respect authority of any kind, whether that of the school-room, of the State, or of God Himself. The first lesson in self-government and the government of others is obedience, oneself, to properly constituted author- ity. It would be well for the General Government to take recognition of this fact, and endeavor to impress upon all our citizens the need of seeing to it that the children in home and school learn the lessons of respect and obedience to law and order. If this principle is not carried out more insistently and consistently than has been done in these latter years, our standard of citizenship will sink lower and lower, and in time the very foundations of the government will be sapped. No false ideas of "Liberty" should lead our people to forget that true freedom is that, and that only, which is regulated by law. A state of civil and moral anarchy is the most galling kind of bondage. From child- hood to maturity our people should be taught the differ- ence between liberty and license. The home is the proper place to begin this wise course of nurture and training. Let the American people be sure that their homes are not the nurseries of the principles of anarchy. Thus far we have advocated a somewhat firm regime in the home. Let it be remembered, however, that firmness should always be coupled with love and kindness. Parents should not be harsh and petulant with their children; they should not nag them. Such a temper will inculcate the same ill-grained disposition in the children. A significant injunction is that of the apostle: "Fathers, provoke not your children, that they be not discouraged" (Col. 3:24). Many a child has been embittered for life, simply because his parents were "cross" with him, ever ready to reprimand him sharply for every mistake, however trifling, and never disposed to praise him when he did well. If a child im- Mans Chief Duties 245 bibes the notion that, whatever he may do, he cannot please his parents, he will cease trying to please them, and will grow morose. Parents should commend their children oftener than they reproach them. Even correction may be done in such a way as to keep the child's temper unruffled ; but that means that the parents must control their own spirits. The "sex problem'' is ever with us, and is a matter of such vital concern that it should not be overlooked in a work on Practical Ethics. Just "what a boy ought to know," or "what a girl ought to know," or whether books dealing minutely with sexual physiology should be put into the hands of boys and girls, are, we think, debatable ques- tions ; but there can be no doubt that parents should in- struct their children in the beautiful virtue of sexual chas- tity. Perhaps a good way would be for the father to give counsel to his sons and the mother to her daughters in these important matters. Just at the age when children are coming into sexual desire, and have not yet developed strong powers of will, it would not be advisable, we think, to enter into details in giving them instruction here, for in that way parents might set the imagination of their chil- dren on fire by suggesting too much, and thus simply stir prurient passions in them; but it is plain that parents should, by the use of more general, yet clear, definite and carefully chosen words, tell their children of the need, beauty and honorableness of self-control and absolute sexual purity; they should also no less insistently warn them of the sin, the shame, the disgrace and the danger of unlawful indulgence. No prudery, no feeling of false modesty or delicacy, should keep parents from performing their duty in this regard to their offspring, whose well-being for life may depend on their being rightly directed at this 246 A System of General Ethics most fictile and critical period. There is, we are aware, a natural shrinking on the part of parents from speaking di- rectly to their children on these delicate sexual matters, but it is, nevertheless, one of the necessary duties of parent- hood. Timely advice to children may save all parties con- cerned lifelong regret and shame. As to the duties of children, they should honor and obey their parents. At a certain age — that of adolescence — children are apt to become headstrong and conceited. It is usually a time of trial and of contending emotions with the child. The boy is neither a boy nor a man, and it is difficult for him to adjust himself to his own feelings and environments and to control his awkwardness. He de- serves sympathy at this time, and should be dealt with wisely. He should not be ridiculed and humiliated for what he cannot help. On his part, he should remember his inexperience with life, and also that his parents and teach- ers are more matured in judgment than he. Their years of experience have taught them many lessons which he has not yet had the opportunity to learn. Reflections of this kind may spare him many humiliating and perhaps even serious blunders. "Old men for counsel, young men for action," might be a good adage to remember at this time of the young person's life. The time should never come when children do not love their parents and treat them with becoming deference. Parents may grow old and feeble, even as their children will by and by, but they still have the claim of filial respect from their children. It is especially encumbent on children that they should deport themselves in such a way as never to bring dishonor on their parents. Happy are the parents who can point with just and laudable pride to their chil- dren, and never need to blush for their conduct in the pres- ence of neighbors and acquaintances. CHAPTER XIX III. MAN'S CHIEF DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (continued). 2. Specific relations (continued). (2) The social organism. (3) The State. a. Duties of the private citizen. b. Duties of the public official. III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (continued). 2. Specific relations (continued): (2) The social organism: That man is a social being needs no argument. Even his family relations, important as they are, should not erase his duties to society. True, the domestic relation should never be neglected, but should be especially cultivated and developed in these lax days; yet it is possible for a family to be self-centered, and to become clannish, care for no one outside of the relationship, and thus plot and scheme for their own advancement. Every person owes a duty to the social organism. He should be neighborly, and should add his quota to the social life about him. He should go to parties, and attend social gatherings and reunions as often as other engagements will permit, always taking it for granted that the commingling is of the proper kind. To be sociable is every person's privilege and obligation. No man has a right to think only of himself, and regard himself as "the hub of the universe." Such a spirit is disgustingly egotistic. 248 A System of General Ethics Sometimes persons plead this excuse: "I am too back- ward to go into society." They would better put it, "Too self-conscious and selfish!" Let people of this order stop making themselves the sole center, go among their fellow- men, take a genuine interest in their welfare, and see how quickly their false reserve will melt away; and they will soon "feel at home," as the saying goes, in every properly constituted social company. Men who are "not socially inclined," as they put it, should bear in mind that a selfish disposition is their "besetting sin," and they should cure themselves of it as soon as possible. The social recluse lives an unethical life. Socially speaking, "it is not good for man to be alone." However, there is another side to this question, and therefore certain discriminations should be made. There are people who overdo the matter of sociability ; they want to be going all the time. So many lodges, parties and other social gatherings leave no room for self-culture, nor for the cultivation of the domestic relations and affections. Worst of all, is the habit of so many men to loaf on the streets and frequent the saloons. The saloon has been absurdly called "the poor man's club." A very poor kind of club indeed ! Sometimes a club in more senses than one ! Why should not these men stay at home with their wives and children, and contribute their share to making home a pleasant place? It would be quite to the point to popular- ize the sentiment that "the home is the poor man's club." It is said sometimes that the homes of the poor men are not attractive, and therefore they are not to blame for seek- ing social pleasures elsewhere. We reply that their homes are surely as attractive as the ordinary salooons and dog- geries which they frequent. The man who has a poor and squalid home would not be likely to be a welcome guest in Man's Chief Duties 249 the so-called "gilded saloon." Therefore the excuse that his home is not attractive is a mere pretext. What is there engaging, anyway, about a saloon whose floors are covered with sawdust and other ingredients too coarse to be men- tioned, and whose air is malodorous with the fumes of to- bacco and all kinds of strong and adulterated liquors ? Be- sides, the men's wives and children must remain in their poor homes a much larger part of the time than the men themselves are obliged to. Why are not their homes as good for the men as for their wives and children? And, besides, if they would not spend their money in saloons, they would be able to beautify their homes and make them attractive ; and the time they worse than idle away in liquor dens might be spent in cleaning and brightening up their homes, and making them inviting places for the entire fam- ily. We see no excuse whatever for men to become habitues of the saloon. Sometimes well-meaning social and civic reformers tell you that, if you take away the saloon from the men, you must replace them with some kind of respectable and re- fined club-rooms where the men can spend their evenings. That may be a wise plan, and should be carried out to a reasonable extent. But why not, at the same time, organize a crusade in favor of the home? Why not popularize the domestic virtues and graces? ' Why not even go so far as to make it a "fad' for men to spend their evenings at home with their families in pleasant converse, reading good books, and playing innocent games ? What a change would come over the face of society if such a propaganda could be pushed to success ! Let writers and orators and reformers advocate the home more than the club or the lodge or the social resort. We reiterate with all our might, let us make the home popular. 250 A System of General Ethics A word about the young. They should have plenty of social pastime of the right kind. It is according to nature that they should come together in a social way, and it is the duty of their elders to see to it that they have sufficient op- portunity to gratify this normal craving of their constitu- tion. True, there should be wise direction and restriction, yet there should not be too much espionage, and the matter of chaperones should not be overdone; for young people should not be made to feel that the policeman's club is al- ways dangling over them. On the other hand, wise counsel for the young people of today is in place. Some associations, by overdoing the social features of life, cultivate the spirit of discontent with home life in the minds of the young, making them feel that they must always be "going somewhere." It is rare now- a-days to find a young man or woman who is content to stay at home for an evening with his or her parents, to be- guile the time in pleasant conversation, innocent games and useful reading. We are becoming a nation of "gad-abouts." It is only too true that many of our people have lost all relish for home, quiet, meditation and reading. Even "sen- sational literature" is becoming "too heavy" for many of the youthful flitters of the day; they must be forever go- ing somewhere, to a show, a frolic, a dance, a loafing place on the street, or to the saloon, because the home, the church and the library are "too dull for anything." We repeat, it is high time to begin a crusade in favor of the home. The woman who neglects her husband and children for the ail-too- frequent and all-too-prolonged eucher party is treading upon most unethical ground; not so much, per- haps, because the games are positively wrong — unless there is gambling — as because so much precious time is frittered away, and matters of real value are neglected. The passion Man's Chief Duties 251 for gaming is also destructive of relish for higher and nobler ocupations. How few of the gaming crowd are able to sit down with you and converse on the subject of good literature! To sum it all up, let us cultivate the social nature within proper limits, and take an interest in our community and our friends, but never let social functions encroach on our other duties. (3) The State: Just as the family and the social organism are institu- tions of the natural economy — in other words, divine insti- tutions — so a civil government in some form is grounded in the nature of things human, and is necessary for the per- petuity and good order of the human race. Let us again classify our material. a. Duties of the private citizen: The first duty of the private citizen is respect for and obedience to the civil law in so far as it is righteous, or in other words, loyalty to the government under whose pro- tection he lives. Unhappily there are too many people in the United States who disregard certain laws that do not please them; and when the officials themselves connive at such violations, a condition that tends toward anarchy threatens. It is little wonder that we have so much license in this country, and so little sense of the true idea of civil liberty, which does not mean that every man has a right to whatever he pleases, but only to every just and right- eous privilege granted him by law. It is not what is often known as "personal liberty" — the "do-as-you-please" idea — that is the bulwark of our Republic, but what is known as "civil and religious liberty," meaning that liberty which always has regard for other people's rights, for the general 252 A System of General Ethics welfare of the nation, and for the laws that are enacted directly by the vote of the people, or by their properly con- stituted representatives. We are persuaded that some reform is needed to regu- late the ballot in this country. Although unable to mark out a program, we call attention to a palpable wrong: In our present system the vote of the thug and the debauchee and the illiterate person counts just as much at the elections as the vote of the most intelligent, patriotic and upright citizen. Is not a government based upon such a principle resting on an insecure foundation? Does it not seem that something should be done to circumvent its collapse? For good citizens to protest against unjust legislation is their patriotic duty; but that is very different from permitting the corrupt classes to trample upon the just laws of the State. At this point an important distinction should be made. While Christian people should be interested in civic affairs, and should take an active part in them as patriotic citizens, it should always be remembered that there is to be no union of Church and State in this Republic, whatever may be the situation in other countries. Every movement in the di- rection of such a combination should be firmly and stead- fastly resisted. It is right that truly Christian principles should pervade the body politic, yet this should be brought about only by moral suasion, and never, never by force. No man can become a Christian save by his own choice. He might be coerced to perform certain outward acts and ceremonies, but at heart he might be very far from being a Christian; he might, indeed, be a veritable pagan or un- believer. You cannot make people Christians by legal en- actments and processes. The sphere of religious freedom is too sacred a domain for the intrusion of "the mailed Man's Chief Duties 253 fist." Vice is to be restrained by law for the protection of society and the government, but people cannot be made re- ligious in that way. Therefore religion reaches its best status only when it is left to develop itself freely without coercion from the State or civil statutes of any kind. Every citizen should take an interest in public affairs. He should inform himself sufficiently to be able to vote in- telligently at the polls, for our free institutions depend on the intelligence and morality of the people who exercise the right of franchise. No man has a right to evade his duties to the State, or to shift his political tasks to his neighbor's shoulders. The man who does not go to the polls on election day and cast an honest ballot is not a true patriot, not only because he fails to cast his vote for good officials, but also because his example, if followed generally, woul destroy our republican form of government. Sometimes religious people become fanatical. They be- come so absorbed in heavenly things that they take no in- terest in mundane affairs. The writer once knew a man who refused to go to the polls to vote on a great moral issue in the community, because he thought the world was going to come to an end in 1915, and therefore he would have no part in "worldly affairs." Oddly enough, however, he spent election day in building a coop for his chickens! The prospect of the speedy coming of the judgment day did not seem to interfere with his looking after his own little "worldly affairs." Whatever may be said of such religi- osity, it is not in accord with the true teaching of the Holy Scriptures, for Christ taught us to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," and the apostle declared that "godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come." The Christian religion is not only other-worldly; it is also this- 254 A System of General Ethics worldly, using the terms in the good sense. A religion that will not teach us to live well and sensibly in this world will hardy fit us for a strong and felicitous and useful life in the next stage of existence. If it is the citizen's duty to exercise his civil privileges, it is no less his duty to help support his government to the extent of his pro-rata share. It is just as dishonest to cheat the State as to cheat your neighbor. To refuse to report your money and property at the actual value as required by the statute, when the assessor calls upon you, is positively dishonest, whether you are rich or poor. All grafters, who cheat the government and grow rich dishonestly at its ex- pense, are disloyal citizens, traitors to their country's wel- fare, and ought to be discovered and punished condignly. To defraud the government is not to defraud an abstrac- tion, but the people themselves, especially those who are honest; for it stands to reason that every embezzler in- creases the taxes of the honest citizens of the country. We repeat, the man who gets money dishonestly from the public treasury is a crook, a despicable thief, stealing from all the honest folk of the land. He should be put into the pen where he belongs. Unless he repents and makes restitu- tion, he should not be permitted to move in decent society. b. The public official: If private citizens are to be loyal and obedient subjects, it is all-important that public functionaries should set them a good example, should formulate just, salutary and equi- table laws, administer and execute them faithfully, and en- deavor in every way to instil the principles of patriotism and respect for law in the country far and wide. Let us lay down a few fundamental principles : First, the official is not to look upon himself as a kind of Man's Chief Duties 255 lord or autocrat for whom people are to slave and to whom they are to make obeisance. This is especially true in this Republic, where the people are the real rulers. Rather, the man in a public capacity should regard himself as the servi- tor of the people ; and this conception will not detract one iota from his honor and dignity. A greater One than any president, magistrate, king or kaiser made this statement respecting Himself : "The Son of man came not to be min- istered unto, but to minister." What an example to men in public positions ! Note the men who stand highest on the scroll of history; they are not the tyrants and self- seekers, but the men who were most unselfish in the service of their fellowmen, their country and the race. The Neros and Caligulas are consigned to obloquy, while the Washing- tons and Lincolns have won deathless fame. A well-known president of the United States was wont to say to the people: "Do not call me your President; call me your Public Servant!" That was the true ideal of political and civic life. We continued to call him our president, but we loved him all the more because he made himself "the ser- vant of all." We need in our country less of officialdom and more official service; less "bossism" and more attend- ing to the just needs and wishes of the people. Secondly, the public officer should conscientiously carry out the terms and oath of his office. Sad to say, the oath among officials has largely become a perfunctory matter. Many functionaries take it with mental reservation, which is downright perjury, and then perform only such duties as suit their convenience. Some laws they will enforce; others they will simply ignore. Such practices simply lead to a spirit of general lawlessness and corruption, inculcat- ing disrespect for law as law. If officials would look upon their oaths as sacred obligations, to which they will be held 256 A System of General Ethics to account by God and man, many more people would look upon obedience to law as a sacred duty. Third, public men should not toady to the moneyed in- terests, on the one hand, nor to the base elements of society, on the other, but should administer their duties in strict accord with the principles of equity and righteousness. This is a high ideal, but not too high ; it is the only way to conduct a government for the real well-being of the people. True, the official should have regard for the opinions of his constituents, and should carry them out as far as he con- scientiously can; but he should not be a servile bondsman; rather, a moulder of public sentiment; a leader, not a sub- altern and a truckler. Only too true is it that public men often bend the knee to the vile and lawless element, instead of considering the views of the better class of citizens. This is the peril of a popular form of government, and therefore good citizens must ever be on their guard. "Eter- nal vigilance is the price of liberty." Yes, and of a stable and righteous government, as well. Again, we must hold up the high ideal in another respect. For magistrates, sworn to do their duty to the best of their knowledge and ability, to count votes when a moral issue is at stake in the community or the State, and rule accord- ingly, regardless of the law and the right, is unethical and craven; nay, it is criminal; it is absolutely unpatriotic. We have known public men who were extremely anxious for re-election, and who would, therefore, truckle to the majority, or what they thought was the majority, without regard to the moral character of the issues at stake. That is moral cowardice, and also disloyalty to our republican institutions. Not all the traitors to our country have been dealt with as they deserve. Better a thousand times for a public man to be retired to private life for doing right and Man's Chief Duties 257 obeying his conscience, than to continue in office by cater- ing to corruption. Then, we have known men who courted the baser elements of society in order to secure an office, in the hope that, when once elected, they would enforce the law and uphold righteousness; but we have never known such trimmers and time-servers to succeed, because, having secured the office by the suffrages of the unprincipled fac- tion, they were under obligation to carry out its corrupt policies. No ; a righteous cause is never advanced by com- promising with the wrong. The principle that "the end justifies the means" is absolutely unethical, whether in so- ciety, Church or State. We have set forth a high standard, but it is the only po- sition for practical morality to take. To sum up, true ethical principles applied to public life would prevent, on the one hand, all despotic rule ; and, on the other, all cring- ing to the corrupt elements of society, whether in high or low stations. CHAPTER XX III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (continued). 2. Specific relations (continued). (3) The Church. a. General Ethics and the Church. b. Duty of church membership. c. Duties of church members. d. Duties of ministers. III. MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOWMEN (continued). 2. Specific relations (continued): (3) The Church: a. General Ethics and the Church: There are people who may think that man's relation to the Church should not be treated in a work on General Ethics. There is a sense in which this view might seem to be plausible, namely, that General Ethics deals with moral principles and practices only in the light of nature and reason, and not in the light of revelation. However, in a wider sense the above position is not correct. Surely it would not be scientific nor ethical for our discipline to ignore so great and outstanding a moral phenomena as Christianity, as taught by the Sacred Scriptures and rep- resented by the Christian Church. True science must take into account all the data. While it is true that General Ethics cannot take the Holy Scriptures as its chief or only norm, as Christian Ethics does, yet General Ethics should not ignore the moral teaching of Christianity. It must ex- Man's Chief Duties 259 press its relation to it. There are certain great fundamen- tal principles relative to the Christian system which Gen- eral Ethics is in duty bound to recognize. b. The duty of church membership: General Ethics would not be justified in asserting that all people ought to unite with some branch of the Christian Church. It is the function of Christian Ethics to do that, and to make its argument as cogent as possible. However, our science has this duty to perform: Every person living in a land such as ours, where Christian teaching is so large a factor, especially so potent an ethical factor, is under ob- ligation to examine the Christian system thoroughly and judicially, without prejudice or rancor, to see whether it is true or not. If he is not willing to do this, he is not acting ethically; he is giving way to mental bias. Considering the historical character of Christianity, its extension far and wide in the world, its moral influence on millions of individuals and many nations, and its claim to give to man an ethical salvation — that is, salvation from sin unto right- eousness — surely no man can assume to be truly ethical or scientific until he has given such a stupendous moral phe- nomenon a frank, honest and thorough-going investigation. In his researches, the ethicist should take into account the testimony of millions of the best people in the world respect- ing the transforming and salutary influence of the Chris- tian religion upon their own experiences and lives. If he finds that every person who has truly experienced the sav- ing power of the gospel commends it, and declares it to be real, not fanciful, and that only those who have never had this experience, and have never seriously tried to secure it, are unbelievers and opponents — he should take these facts into earnest account. On the other hand, he must also 260 A System of General Ethics consider the crimes and persecutions that have been perpe- trated in the name of religion and by the so-called Christian Church. Here he must try to balance his judgment. How- ever, regarding these evils, he should try to see whether they are inherent in Christianity itself, or are the outgrowth of the natural wickedness of the human heart and its tend- ency to pervert everything good. He should judicially look at the ethical teaching of Christ and His apostles, and see whether, if they were actually practiced by individuals, communities, social and economic organisms, nations, and international diplomacy, they would not imparadise the world. Would not the doctrine of the universal father- hood of God and the universal brotherhood of man, taught in the New Testament, solve all our ethical, social, indus- trial, political and international problems? A generous- minded ethicist will carefully examine all these points. If any man becomes thoroughly convinced of the truth of the Christian system, it will be his duty to join the Chris- tian Church, bear his testimony before his fellowmen, and help to promulgate the principles he has accepted. It would not be ethical for him to "hide his light under a bushel." However, let it be said, with all possible empha- sis, that no person should identify himself with the Chris- tian Church unless he is a sincere believer in the doctrines and principles for which it stands. There are already too many hypocrites within its pale; no more are needed or wanted. Still, the fact that there are false professors in the Church should not lead any man to condemn that institu- tion. There are frauds everywhere — in lodges, business, politics, all kinds of social organizations, and if a man will not belong to anything that has hypocrites in it, he would better get out of the world; and even then he might not Man's Chief Duties 261 escape association with them! The vital question is this: Are dishonesty, fraud and hypocrisy inculcated in the New Testament, or are they categorically condemned there? Does the Christian Church stand for good principles and practices or not? Every informed person can answer these questions for himself. Some persons reject Christianity for moral reasons — that is, it rebukes their bad lives and sometimes their wicked business. As long as they do not want to amend their lives and change their business, they are only too glad to find, or manufacture, an excuse for rejecting the Christian faith and finding flaws in the Christian Church. The person outside of the Church should not be a mere fault-finder. That is an easy business, requiring no capital, no brains and no grace. It is purely destructive, not constructive. Every person ought to be able to give a good reason for the faith that is in him, whether he is inside or outside of the Chris- tian Communion. General Ethics demands that much, at least, of every member of the community where the Chris- tian Church exists and exercises any influence whatever. c. Duties of Church members: First, they should be sincere. Nothing is wickeder than pretension, than "wearing the livery of heaven to serve the devil in." Of all persons, none injure the cause of religion so much as the hypocritical church member. All the in- fidels of the world have never done half so much injury to the Church and the cause she represents as the inconsistent and dishonest people who openly profess the Christian faith. It is a mark of the virility, not to say the truth, of the Christian religion that she was not destroyed long ago by the many traitors within the walls of Zion. Church people ought to furnish the best translation of the teaching 262 A System of General Ethics of the gospel. For this reason the apostle's injunction is very apropos: "For this is the will of God, that by well- doing ye should put to silence the ignorance of foolish men" (1 Pet. 2: 15) ; also: "Let none of you suffer as a mur- derer, or a thief, or an evil-doer, or as a meddler in other man's matters; but if a man suffer as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God on this account" (1 Pet. 4:15,16). Second, the church member should not be a mere nominal Christian. If he intends to be a confessing Christian, he should be a regenerated man; he should have a clear and satisfactory religious experience. General Ethics must in- sist on this point in view of the fact that the Holy Scrip- tures, in which the church member confesses faith, posi- tively teaches that God's people must have the spiritual mind. We quote only two passages, and refer to others: "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except one be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God" (John 3:5); "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" (John 3:6; also John 14:25-27; 15:1-9; 16:7-14; Acts 2:38; Rom. 5:5; 8:1-17; 14:1; 1 Cor. 2:9-16, and many others). Third, church members should be faithful and earnest in promulgating their faith; and they will be so if they are thoroughly sincere. One trouble with the Church is, she has too many members who are only half-hearted, only nominal Christians; their names are on the church roll, but unlike their Master, they are not engaged in their Father's business. Fourth, it is the duty of church people to support the Church financially. The Scriptures say: "The liberal soul shall be made fat." Tithes and offerings are to be brought to the Lord's storehouse. Every person should "give as Man's Chief Duties 263 the Lord has prospered him." A religion that does not open a man's purse-strings is not the genuine kind. The minister should not desire a "royal" salary; he should leave such motives to worldlings; but he must have a physical livelihood, if he is to devote himself to the work of the Church in the pulpit and in the pastoral office. Moreover, missionary work is to be done ; the cause of Christian edu- cation must be upheld ; and many eleemosynary institutions need fiscal support. d. Duties of ministers: Confesssing their belief in the Holy Scriptures as the divine Word, ministers should preach it faithfully, sin- cerely, earnestly. They have no ethical right to stand in an evangelical pulpit and preach a doctrine that undermines the very principles for which the Church stands. If they take ordination vows at all, they should take them sincerely. It is unethical, hypocritical, to take them with mental res- ervation; and if, after a minister has been ordained, his mind should undergo a change of conviction regarding the fundamental doctrines of the Church to which he belongs, he should not continue to draw his support from it, but should withdraw, and go where he belongs, and then he will have an ethical right to preach whatever he believes. This principle holds good, whatever the religious denomination to which the minister belongs. Above all men, the Chris- tian minister should practice Christian ethics. Even Gen- eral Ethics must insist on that principle. The minister's life should comport with the faith he con- fesses. An inconsistent minister may do more harm in a community, not only against religion, but also against mor- ality, than a dozen infidels, no matter how outspoken they may be. Why should a man want to enter the Christian 264 A System of General Ethics ministry, or remain in it, if he does not intend to exemplify its ethical and spiritual teachings before the world? Good and helpful sermons should be proclaimed from the pulpit. No kind of performance is more repellent and malapropos than poor preaching. We say malapropos ad- visedly, for when one considers the exalted themes with which the minister deals in the pulpit, how utterly out of accord with them it is to set them forth in a dull, inane, apathetic and ineffective way ! To the end that we may have good sermons in our pulpits, ministers should be well trained for their vocation. Four years in a first-class cul- tural college and three years in a theological school of high order are none too much to equip men now-a-days men- tally, morally and spiritually for their work, considering all the demands that the age justly makes upon their powers. Conscientious training under a good instructor in public speaking is also essential; only care should be taken that such training does not make the preacher artificial and affected and over-ambitious to be a "pulpit orator." Every young man who desires to become a public speaker has faults of delivery that should be corrected, and virtues that need to be cultivated and enhanced. A good, sane instruc- tor in elocution will not efface or deface the native powers of his students, but will develop them, and faithfully cor- rect defects in delivery. A good many ministers — and other public speakers as well — mar the effectiveness of their messages by certain faults that divert attention and that might easily have been corrected by wise teaching in youth. But let all ministers remember that, after all, the matter, and not the manner, is the chief concern in their sermons. In these days trite sermons are inexcusable. The preacher should be a thinker; should have individuality; should have a vein of originality in him which indicates that what- Man's Chief Duties 265 ever he presents has been worked through the laboratory of his own mind. He should not be a homiletic plagiarist — otherwise a thief. Lucidity is also a fine virtue in pulpit discourses. Ministers should have something to say, and should say it so that it can be understood. Most of the hazy preaching of the day is merely the result of hazy thinking. A preacher has no business to go into the pulpit with a theme which he has not first thought out clearly in his mind. Let him lay such a subject aside until he gets a clear-cut view of it. Reasonable brevity is also a virtue to be commended in pulpit ministrations. We do not be- lieve in little, lavender-hued essays fifteen minutes long, but we think the twenty-five or thirty minute limit is a good one. A great preacher wrote in his diary, "Not many con- versions after thirty minutes!" In the interest of spiritual effectiveness, sermonizers should remember that many people are so constituted by nature that they cannot long carry on consecutive processes of thought. Ministers should be wise enough to accommodate themselves to human limitations. Professedly believing that the gospel is the panacea for the evils of the world, the Christian minister should preach the gospel only in his pulpit. He should be a man of eru- dition, the more the better, but all his knowledge should be used, nor for its own sake nor for the sake of display, but only to enforce and illustrate the gospel message. In the pulpit he is a spiritual teacher, not a pedagogue in the class- room, not a lecturer on economics, civics, socialism, or pol- itics. He should have some knowledge of all these impor- tant matters, so that he may apply the solvent of the gospel to them ; but it is not his function to deal with them per se, or to make out detailed programs for workers along those lines. As a citizen, he should be interested in every civic 266 A System of General Ethics and industrial problem, and should contribute his share to their solution; but in the pulpit his vocation is the procla- mation of the spiritual remedy for sin. In accord with this principle we quote a paragraph from one of the most incisive writers and thinkers of the day: "I am 'root and branch' a Single Taxer. I believe heart and soul in the social and economic philosophy of Henry George. . . . And I take every opportunity offered by the public press and platform to recommend and propagate, according to the best of my ability, this particular program of social righteousness. That is my privilege and duty as a man and a citizen, and also as one who has made some slight study of social and economic questions. "But I never preach Single Tax from any Christian pul- pit, and never shall. There I stand as a 'steward of the mysteries of God/ a prophet of the Word, a messenger and embassador of Christ. I do not find that the Single Tax, or any other particular economic program or social philos- ophy, is a part of the gospel, and I will not inject it into the gospel. ... In the pulpit I must deal, not with the acci- dental modes and methods of reform, but with the essential principles and motives of righteousness and justice." Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the fact that ministers and their people should adhere strictly to the American principle of keeping the Church and State sep- arate. True, there are points where their functions come together. For example, the State should protect the Church in its property rights and in its right to worship God with- out molestation, so long as it does not encroach on civil matters, or teach any doctrines that are subversive of good morals, good citizenship and good government. On the other hand, the pulpit is in duty bound to preach social and civic righteousness. But the minister has no right in this Man's Chief Duties 267 free land to lead his Church as an ecclesiastical organiza- tion into the realm of party politics, or to seek to secure political power and aggrandizement, or to try to manipulate civic matters in such a way as to force religion on unwilling people by legislative enactment. As has been said before, no man can be converted by coercion into a real Christian. Here the "mailed fist" is utterly out of its sphere. The only kind of influence the Christian Church should ever exert on the State is that of moral suasion. If the State and her magistrates will not accept and practice Christian principles voluntarily, the Church must not resort to force or intrigue to propagate them. The Church's chief office is the cure of souls, to proclaim the gospel of love and good-will and righteousness. CHAPTER XXI IV. MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD (Theistic Ethics). 1. To believe in His existence. 2. To recognize Him in the affairs of life. 3. To trust and serve Him. 4. To discover His purposes in the universe. 5. To anticipate eternal fellowship with Him. Summary and concluding observations. IV. MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD (Theistic Ethics). 1. To believe in His existence: It will be remembered that, in the theoretical part of this work, we proved that morality must be grounded in the holy nature and will of God; that is, unless we accept the theistic view of the universe, there is no true ground of right, no real basis for morality, and no rational foundation for moral distinctions. Now, if there is no basis for morality on any other view, it certainly becomes every man's duty to accept the fact of the divine existence. Either he must stand upon a theistic basis, or give up all thought of moral reality. But the lat- ter alternative surely must be untenable. Our own con- sciences bear indisputable witness to the distinction between right and wrong, and therefore morality must have a se- cure basis in the Moral Personality in and back of the uni- verse. If any doubt remains in the ethicist's mind as to the di- vine existence, he is in duty bound to study carefully, by Man's Chief Duties 269 the help of some cogent work on the subject, the arguments for the being of God. In such a work he will become ac- quainted with the General, Teleological, Cosmological, On- tological, Moral and Esthetic proofs. These ought to con- vince him intellectually. If he still lacks assurance of the divine existence, we feel it to be only our duty as a teacher of Ethics, to refer him to the Christian revelation in the Bible, where he will find the method clearly set forth by which to gain a spiritual experience. The genuine ethicist will be thorough-going in his researches and experimenta- tion. He will be satisfied with nothing less than certitude of truth. Man's next duty to God is — 2. To recognize Him in the affairs of life: Convinced of God's existence, it follows logically that man should recognize Him in the affairs of life, should thank Him for His benefactions, and ask Him for direc- tion in times of need. He is our heavenly Father, and, whether we can always understand His ways or not, He must love us and care for us. It is unreasonable to believe that He is, and that He is the fountain-head of righteous- ness and truth, and yet refuse to believe in His fatherly affection and solicitude. Suppose a son should live in his father's home, eat at his table, share his bounty, and yet would ignore him from day to day and year to year ; would never speak to him, nor show by any sign that he appreci- ated his paternal interest and care — would you call him a filial son? Would you not declare that his conduct was ungrateful and wicked? Apply the illustration to our re- lations to God, our heavenly Father. 3. To trust and serve Him: There is something inherently beautiful and ethical about trusting God, just as, when you think of it fundamentally, 270 A System of General Ethics there is something intrinsically wrong about refusing to trust Him. Somehow, the attitude of atheism is haughty, resentful and presumptuous. The position of agnosticism is not so bad; and yet agnostics are seldom real humble people, but quite assertive and arrogant, as if, with all their professed lack of knowledge, they knew more than most other people ; indeed, know so much as to be sure that God is unknowable, that He is only an "inscrutable power." It certainly requires vast knowledge of the universe to know that. Yes, atheism, materialism, and agnosticism are al- most always arrogant, bearing an air of intellectual super- ciliousness; seldom humble, contrite and docile in spirit. After all, we do not know that any person has ever been a worse husband, father, neighbor and citizen because he believed in God, especially a personal and holy God, and trusted in Him to make truth and righteousness finally pre- vail over error and sin, and to turn all our afflictions into a greater good. We have never found that a man who once had such a faith, and lost it, was made a better or a happier man through his unbelief. In truth, our observa- tion has invariably been that such a man deteriorated in moral quality, if he did not become an absolute moral wreck. The atheists of a community are never conspicu- ous for their elevated standards of morality, nor for their numerous philanthropic deeds. When Job was sorely afflicted, his wife lost faith, and said to him: "Curse God, and die!" But Job replied bravely: "Yea, though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him." Does any one think that Job's moral character would have been improved if he had heeded his wife's advice? No; then the great epic of Job would never have been written, and the world would have missed its valuable lesson of theistic faith. And if men lose faith in God, cui bono? In what, then, Man's Chief Duties 271 will they put their trust? In a blind, inscrutable power? Will that give them more help, inspiration and comfort than to believe in a personal God of righteousness, who really cares for them ? Such have not been the history and experience of mankind. All in all, it is better to trust the Power back of the universe, and to trust Him, too, as the Absolute One, who is all-wise and beneficent, who will cause "all things to work together for good to them that love Him." To serve God is a plain ethical obligation. Reason teaches that, since God has given us a being in this wonder- ful universe, and has also made us in so marvellous a way, He must have placed us here for a wise purpose ; therefore we ought to discover His plan, and endeavor to serve Him in carrying it into effect. And since He must be wise and good, we may be sure that our willing and loving service will not be in vain ; will receive its proper recompense in some sphere of existence. At all events, such belief has a morally wholesome influence on those who accept it. 4. To discover His purposes in the universe: The cosmos is here. It is a marvellous mechanism. Taking into account all its phenomena, including man, its only adequate explanation is that it was brought into exist- ence by an all-wise and all-powerful God, who is a personal being. That being true, it becomes our duty to inquire what His purposes may have been in making such a uni- verse, and giving human beings so prominent a place in it. True, some persons may enter the caveat that, if there is a good and all-wise God, He should have written His pur- pose very plainly on the universe, and not left us to puzzle our minds over so many problems. That is one way of reasoning, but not the best. Perhaps God's reason in leav- 272 A System of General Ethics ing so much mystery in the universe has been twofold: first, to lead us to trust in His wisdom and love ; second, to develop our mental and moral powers by giving us prob- lems to solve. We may depend upon it, if God had seen that it was best for us for Him to make all the world as plain and simple as a primer, He would have done so; but the fact that He has not pursued that course is prima facie proof that such an economy would not have been best for moral beings and for His universe. Therefore, practical morality demands that we, as rational and moral agents, find out as far as possible what was God's great puropse in making the universe. To this end, it is encumbent upon us to study such a book as the Bible, to see whether His design may not be set forth there more clearly than anywhere else. Of course, this does not mean that we must accept any professed revela- tion in a credulous way, but simply that we should examine this system judicially, to see whether it does not give a rational explanation of the world and the divine purpose in it. Moreover, if God has given to the world a plan of sal- vation, it is our bounden duty to find out what it is, and when we find it, to accept it gratefully, and then proclaim it to others. Remember, we are not taking any program for granted here, but are simply pointing out the rational im- plications in our efforts to solve the problem of our lives and their purpose. Reason ought to convince us that the divine intention must be a noble and worthy one ; that we have not been placed here for a petty purpose, merely to be the football of an arbitrary, fatalistic and non-moral power. The immensity of the universe and its marvellous mechan- ism are an argument in favor of attributing a large, wise and beneficent plan to its Maker. Ethics requires that we seek to know what His plan is ; and we should not betray Mans Chief Duties 273 so little moral earnestness as either to rest in ambiguity and indeterminateness, or prematurely to throw up our hands, give up the quest, and drop off into the abyss of agnosticism. The latter course would not be untying, but cutting, the Gordian knot. If there is a possible way to know the truth, we ought to find it. — A further duty to God is — 5. To anticipate eternal fellowship with Him: Is there a goal for all our striving? Or, after all our seeking and marvelling and aspiring, are we doomed to sink into eternal oblivion? If we must choose the latter alter- native, we may well ask pessimistically, Cui bono? Life would then be full of mystery; nay, the mystery would be so appalling, that even the noble science of Ethics could scarcely say that life is worth living, or that all our moral striving and discipline are worth the effort. On the other hand, if Ethics may teach that God is good, that He desires us to serve Him in righteousness, to pro- mote His cause in the world, and so to discipline our moral and spiritual faculties that we may be fitted for eternal fel- lowship with Him in a state of purity and felicity — then, indeed, our science has an exalted mission, and may confi- dently urge men to continue their moral striving, finish their life's purpose, and anticipate a destiny that will be in accord with all their highest aspirations. Historically considered, the best ethical results have ac- companied belief in immortality. Very few men who have believed in the annihilation of the individual at death have achieved true nobility of character, or accomplished much for the moral uplift and betterment of the world. As a rule, they have sooner or later sunk into a cynical frame, and nil admirari has been their motto. However, the men who have had a sure, undaunted hope in personal immor- 274 A System of General Ethics tality, an immortality of purity as well as of bliss, have been the men who have been of the greatest moral and spiritual service to the world. Therefore we maintain that a truly virile and earnest System of Rational Ethics demands that man shall so con- duct himself in the present life as to be able to anticipate with joy an eternal fellowship of blessedness with God. We have now come to the conclusion, albeit many topics might have been almost indefinitely expanded. No doubt there will be persons who will not be convinced by some parts of our reasoning; others may think we have used a priori methods too freely, and have delved too much into philosophy and speculation. We doubt not there are lacunae here and there in the rational processes, and some minor scientific and historical inaccuracies may occur. Yet, in the main, we have this contention to make in favor of our system: To find the ultimate ground of right in the holy being and will of God ; to establish the fact of an ob- jective moral law in the universe which holds its imperative over the conscience; to insist without evasion or compro- mise on the reality of moral distinctions ; to treat man as a responsible moral agent, with a will in liberty, and not a mere football of circumstance and environment ; to show him in a practical way how to pursue the straight road of virtue, turning neither to the right nor to the left; to set forth clearly his duties in the varied relations of life ; and, finally, to point him to the bright and happy eternal goal of his ethical faith and striving — to do all these things is, we maintain, to teach a virile ethic ; one which, if honestly and earnestly carried out into practice, will produce human Man's Chief Duties 275 character of the noblest order; virtuous husbands and wives, parents and children, friends and neighbors, social communities and Christian congregations, and citizens and civilians of which our great Republic, with its manifest destiny in the world, need never be ashamed. While we have sought as far as possible for scientific principles and precision, our purpose has not been merely an academic one, but also, and perhaps it should be said primarily, an earnest and a practical one. Our prayer and hope are that this volume will bring cheer, suggestion and moral uplift to all who peruse its pages, and especially that it may prove helpful to the educators of our country and the youth who come under their tutelage. FINIS A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY WORKS ON GENERAL ETHICS Plato: "Apology of Socrates," "Georgias," "Crito," "Phaedo," "Republic." Xenophon: "Memorabilia of Socrates." Aristotle: "Nichomachean Ethics," "Eudemian Ethics." Cudworth, R.: "Treatise on Eternal and Immutable Morality." Janet, P.: "The Theory of Morals." Martineau, James: "Types of Ethical Theory." Spencer, Herbert: "The Data of Ethics." Huxley, Thomas: "Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays." Calderwood, Henry: "Handbook of Moral Philosophy." Porter, Noah: "Moral Science." Wundt, W.: "Ethics." Hickok, L. P.: "A System of Moral Science." Hamilton, E. J.: "The Moral Law, or, The Theory and Practice of Duty." Davis, Noah K.: "Elements of Ethics." Paulsen, F.: "A System of Ethics." Westermarck, E.: "The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas." Seth, J.: "A Study of Ethical Principles." Ladd, G.: "The Philosophy of Conduct." Moore, G. E.: "Ethics," "Principia Ethica." Rashdall, H.: "Ethics," "The Theory of Good and Evil." Read, C: "Natural and Social Morals." Watson, J.: "Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer." Alexander, S.: "Moral Order and Progress." Bourne, B. P.: "The Principles of Ethics." Valentine, Milton: "Theoretical Ethics." Day, Henry N.: "The Science of Ethics." A Selected Bibliography 277 James, IV.: "The Will to Believe." Green, T. H.: "Prolegomena to Ethics." Palmer, G. H.: "The Field of Ethics," "The Nature of Goodness." Irons, D.: "Psychology of Ethics." Mackenzie, J. S.: "A Manual of Ethics." Bradley, F.: "Ethical Studies." Dewey and Tufts: "Ethics." Stephen, L.: "The Science of Ethics." Robinson, E. G.: "Principles and Practice of Morality." Fite, W.: "Introductory Study of Ethics." Mezes, S. E.: "Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory." Rogers, R. A. P.: "A Short History of Ethics, Greek and Modern." Perry, R. B.: "The Moral Economy." Hadley, A. T.: "Standards of Public Morality." Sidgwick, H.: "Methods of Ethics," "Practical Ethics," "Outlines of the History of Ethics." Rand, Benjamin: "The Classical Moralists." Dewey, J.: "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics." Hobhouse, L. T.: "Morals in Evolution." Sorley, W. R.: "The Moral Life." Meyers, P. V. N.: "History as Past Ethics." Steele, Geo. M.: "Rudimentary Ethics." Mac Cunn, John: "The Making of Character." Muirhead, J. H.: "The Elements of Ethics." Bennett, IV.: "The Ethical Aspects of Evolution." Hyslop, J. H.: "Elements of Ethics." Stork, T. B.: "The Will in Ethics." Thilly, Frank: "Introduction to Ethics." Drake, Durant: "Problems of Conduct." De Laguna, Theodore: "Introduction to the Science of Ethics." II WORKS ON CHRISTIAN ETHICS Dorner, J. A.: "A System of Christian Ethics." Wuttke, Adolph: "Christian Ethics." Martensen, H.: "Christian Ethics." Harless, C. A.: "A System of Christian Ethics." 278 A System of General Ethics Luthardt, C. E.: "History of Christian Ethics," "Moral Truths of Christianity," "Kompedium der Theologischen Ethik." Sartorius, E.: "The Doctrine of Divine Love." Haering, Theodore: "Ethics of the Christian Life." Weidner, R. F.: "Christian Ethics" (based on Martensen). Strong, T. B.: "Bampton Lectures on Christian Ethics." Robins, H. E.: "The Ethics of the Christian Life." Murray, J. C. "A Handbook of Christian Ethics." Gregory, D. S.: "Christian Ethics." Davidson, W. L. "Christian Ethics." D'Arcy, C. F.: "Christian Ethics and Modern Thought." Kendrick, A. C: "The Moral Conflict of Christianity." Keyser, L. S.: "A System of Christian Ethics." Stalker, James: "The Ethics of Jesus." INDEX Absolute Being, the, 44, 53, 58, 59, 270. Absolutism, divine, 59. Abuse, sexual, 175. Academy, Plato's, 53, 54. Adjustment, the moral, 158. Adolescence, 245. Affability, 214. Affectation, 212, 231. Agency, moral treatment of, 79- 120; definition, 79; constitu- ents, 82-120. Agent, moral (see man). Agassiz, 220. Agnosticism, 25, 152, 153, 270, 272. Altruism, 61-63. Ambition, 196, 197, 212. Amusements, doubtful, 135, 136. Anarchy, 236, 244. Animals, treatment of, 221-223. Animalism, man's primitive, 152. Annihilation, 273. Antisthenes, 51, 57. Antithesis of Right (Sin), 121- 160 (see Sin). Apologetics, 160. Appreciativeness, 231, 232. A priori, 31, 74, 169, 184. Arena, nature affords man an, 76-78. Aristippus, 55. Aristocracy, 201. Aristotle, 22, 35, 44, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 174. Art, Ethics as an, 32, 161 ; works of, 219. Asceticism, 3, 51, 58, 170, 178, 214. Astronomy, 24, 34. Atheism, 270. Athens, 53. Athletics, 174-176. Atonement, 158. Augsburg Confession, 192; Apology of, 192. Augustine, 156. Austerity, 3, 214. Authority, 60, 61, 243, 244. Autocracy, 226, 255. Automaton and automata, 104, 107, 113, 142, 143, 148, 193, 202. Ballot, 252. Beauty, 186, 220-222. Beecher, 198. Bentham, Jeremy, 61. Beverages, 172, 174. Bible, the, quoted or referred to, 35, 41, 60, 62, 100, 124-127, 140, 147, 157-160, 164, 177-179, 182, 183, 186, 187, 194, 195, 199-201, 204, 209, 210, 213, 219, 220, 222- 230, 233, 235, 236, 240, 243, 244, 253, 255, 258, 260, 261, 263, 266, 269, 270, 271, 272. Bibliography, 277-279. Biology, 30. Birds, 222. Bluntness, 215. Body, duties to, the, 170-179; its dignity, 179; its passions, 177, 179. Book reviews, 231. Bossism, 255. Botany, 24, 30, 34. Brothel, 178. Brotherhood, universal, 260. Buddhism, 151. Bunyan, John, 136. Causality, law of, 34, 45, 68, 81, 91, 92, 104, 186. Casuistry, 100, 133-138. Calisthenics, 176. Capitalism, 233-235. Categorical imperative, 27, 28. Chalmers, Thomas, 182. Chance, 67. Character, 19, 20, 34, 106, 143, 149, 162, 215. 280 Index Chaos, 74, 75, 106. Charitableness, 229. Chemistry, 24, 30, 198. "Choir invisible, the," 195. Christ, 60, 115, 158, 178, 186, 209, 213, 230, 253, 255, 260, 266. Christianity, 35, 41, 126, 160, 170, 258, 259, 260, 261. Christian Ethics, 5, 36, 41, 80, 94, 140, 141, 157-160. Christian experience, 159, 160, 259, 269. Christian morality, 191. Christian religion, 156, 253, 254, 261, 263. Church, the, 4, 60, 201, 207, 229, _252, 257, 258-267. Church-going, 88. Church members, 261-263. Cicero, 36, 57. Cigarettes, 175. Citizens, duties of, 251-254, 265, 266, 275. Civic sphere, the, 235, 236. Civil righteousness, 156, 192. Colleges, 4, 5, 171-176, 198, 200, 212, 229. Common people, the, 202. Conceit, 201. Conduct, 19, 20, 34, 106, 162. Conscience, 4, 22-24, 43, 63, 70, 112, 133, 135, 149, 153; treat- ment of, 83-100; definition, 83 ; other terms, 83 ; etymology, 83 ; psychology of, 83-90; as per- ception, 84; as feeling, 85,86; origin of, 90, 91 ; a distinct fac- ulty, 92-95; not infallible, 97, 98; supremacy of, 95-100; man's ethical guide, 98 - 100 ; other references, 185, 187, 190, 194, 235, 237, 240, 257, 274. Conscientiousness, 214. Consciousness, 24, 25, 64, 70, 83, 105, 126, 185. Conversion, 160, 191. Cosmos, the, 67, 69, 70, 72-74, 79- 82, 110, 129, 143, 156, 220, 271. Country, our, 214, 226, Z43. Courage, 204, 206, 213. Cowardice, 206, 213, 256. Creation, 71, 178, 216, 272. Creator, 45, 54, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 80, 81, 111, 141, 145, 147, 148, 157, 160, 170, 178, 179, 202, 203, 216, 219, 220. Criticism, literary, 231, 292. Cruelty, 223. Culture, motives for securing, 196-200. Cupid, 239. Cure of sin, 154-160; enigma to Rational Ethics, 154-157 ; meth- od of Christian Ethics, 157- 160. Cynicism, 51, 57, 59, 186, 209, 217, 219, 273. Davis, Noah K., 22, 47, 48, 49, 168, 170, 237, 238. Data, Introductory of Theoret- ical Ethics, 18-41 ; of Practical Ethics, 161-167; Distinctive of Ethics, 23-25. Definitions, importance of, 18; of Ethics, 18; defective defi- nitions, 18-20; that of text justified, 20, 21 ; of the Ground of Right, 42; of the Highest Good, 47, 48; of moral agency, 79; of a moral agent, 79; of Conscience, 83 ; of supremacy of Conscience, 95 ; of the Will, 101; of sin, 122; of moral dis- tinctions, 124; of Practical Ethics, 161. Deism, 69. Design, 75, 76. De Laguna, Theodore, 21, 50, 51, 52, 55. Deontology, 22, 23. Desdemona, 95, 133. Despondency, 209. Index 281 Despair, 209. Destiny, 4, 179, 273, 274, 275. Determinism, 4, 103-116, 107, 108, 113, 114, 116. Dichotomy, 180. Diogenes, 51. Divorce, 239, 242. Drink, 170-173, 178. Duties, Man's chief, 20; treat- ment of, 165-274; classified, 165; term, 166; rights and, 167, 168; to self, 168-215; to nature, 216-223 ; to his fellow- men, 224-267; to God, 268-274. Ease, a life of, 197. Eccentricity, 212. Eden, 147. Education, motives for securing an, 196-200, 275. Ego, the, 110, 169, 210. Egoism, 62. Egotism, 185, 197, 243, 247. Egrets, 229. Emerson, 109. Emotions, 180-191, 240, 241. Employers and employes, 232-235. Enemies, 227, 228. Energism, 51. Epicureans, 36, 48, 55, 56, 58, 144. Environment, 103, 113-116. Epictetus, 36, 57. Epistemology, 39, 109. Erraticism, 212. Esthetics, 36, 46, 186, 214. Ethically necessary and ethically free, the, 46, 47. Ethics, definitions, 18-21 ; term defined, 22; sphere, 23-30; the word "ethics," 18, 28; as a science, 30 - 32 ; methodology, 32, 33; Hebrew, 34, 35; Hea- then, 35; Theoretical, 17-160; Practical, 161-274; Individual, 168-215 ; Nature, 216-223 ; So- cial, 224-267; Theistic, 268-274. Eudemonists, 56, 139. Eucher parties, 250, 251. Evolution, 34, 40, 46, 49, 64; naturalistic, 66-68, 70, 71, 81, 90, 91 ; theistic, 68-72, 144. Evil thoughts, 199. Exercise, 173-177. Experience, 25, 102,108,123,155, 159, 160, 168, 187. Ethnology, 126. Experiment, 105, 106, 112. Faculty (of the mind), the word explained, 82; Conscience a distinct, 92-95; all faculties fallible, 97, 98; use of, 125. Family, the, 237-246, 247, 251. Fanaticism, 178, 215, 253. Farmer, the, 200, 222. Fatherhood, human, 243 ; of God, 260. Feelings, the, 189-191. Fellowship, eternal with God, 273, 274. Fidelity, 214. Fiske, John, 43. Flint, 41, 151. Food and drink, 171-173, 178. Foolhardiness, 206, 213. Forests, waste of, 220. Forgiveness, 154, 155, 158. Fornication, 178. Freedom, 4; a sine qua non for morality, 103-105; proofs, 105- 109; objections refuted, 109- 116; limitations of, 117; sin a free act, 140-144; other refer- ences, 145, 150, 226, 244. Genesis of sin, 139-153. Genus homo, 227. General Ethics, defined, 18 - 21 (see Ethics). Geology, 24. George, Henry, 266. Gnostics, 151, 170. Goal, the eternal, 274. Golden Rule, 225. 282 Index God, general references, 3, 20, 21, 36, 41, 95-97, 105, 110, 111, 114, 115, 130-133, 141-144, 146, 149, 150, 152-154, 160, 163, 188, 193. 194, 199, 214, 216, 220, 221, 232, 235, 240, 256, 266; the Ground of Right, 43-47, 73, 80, 150, 268, 274; His nature and will, 45- 47, 59, 274 ; the Highest Good, 48; our Prototype, 48; Source of good, 53-55, 58, 73, 269; obedience to, 60, 244; Creator, 68-73, 80, 81, 90; our Judge, 87; duties to, 268-274. Good, the word, 29, 44, 53-55, 58, 73 ; the Highest, 47-49, 50, 54- 57, 63. 159. Gospel, the, 259. Gormandizing, coarseness of, 172. Government, human, 107, 127, 144, 187, 192, 200, 226, 235, 236, 244, 252, 253, 254, 256. Graces flowing from love, 229- 232. Grafters, 198, 254. Gratitude, 232, 269. Greeks, the, 36, 57, 155. Gregory, D. S., 20. Ground of Right, the, 3, 26, 33; treatment of, 42-72; meaning of, 42; definition, 43; ration- ale of, 43-47, 58; other refer- ences, 73, 74, 80, 121, 143, 146, 147, 156, 268, 269, 274. Gruber, L. Franklin, 117. Gruffness, 230. Gymnasium, 173, 176. Habit, 194, 195. Hatred, 208. Haughtiness, 213. Health, bodily, 171-177. Heathen Ethics, 35, 50-59. Hebrew Ethics, 34, 35. Hedonism, 36, 48, 51, 55-57, 58, 66. Heredity, 103, 113-116. Hibben, John G., 39. Higher and Lower Good, a, 132, 133. Highest Good, the, 47-49 (see Good). Hinduism, 151. Hippias, 50. History, appeal to, 125, 126. Historical sketch of Ethics, 34- 36. Hobbes, Thomas, 60, 61. Holy Spirit, 159, 160, 170, 187, 191. Home, the, 243, 245, 248-250. Hope, 209. Housewife, 200. Hugo, Victor, 112. Humility, 213. Husband and wife, 238-242, 275. Huxley, Thomas, 71. Hymeneal love, 240. Hyper-criticism, 231. Idealism, 185. Ihood, 169. Imitator, the, 211. Immortality, 20, 159, 179, 273, 274. Inanity, 211. Individual Ethics, 168-215. Individualism, 212. Individuality, 185, 210-212, 264. Induction, 30-32, 183. Industrial sphere, the, 232-235, 266. Influence, 194, 195, 223. Intellect, the, 26, 37, 38, 82, 84, 85, 96, 98, 180-189, 190, 191, 195. Intelligence, rational, 82, 83. Introductory data, 18-41, 161-167. Intuitionalists (Kantian), 49. Intuitions, the, 34, 38, 83, 85, 88. 91, 95, 96, 98, 107, 126, 137. 184-189. Jacobs, Henry E., 192. Jevons. 26. Job, 270. Judas, 209. Justice, divine, 157, 158, 232; human, 206, 232-236. Index 283 Kant, 28, 49, 103, 117, 170. Kirk, Harris E., 51, 52, 59. Knowledge, Socrates' view, 51, 52; general reference, 198. Labor troubles, 232-235. Labor-saving machinery, 200. Lanier, Sidney, 218. Law, obedience to, 243, 244, 251, 252, 254. Law of right, the, references, 3, 20, 23, 27, 33, 63, 69, 70, 121- 123, 156, 235; discussion of, 73-120. Law, reign of, 74, 75. Lear, King, 232. Liberty, 144, 226, 236, 244, 251, 252, 256. Lie, a, 136-138, 188. Lincoln, 202. Logic, study of, 36, 184. Logical faculty, 38, 183. Love, general references, 53, 97, 207, 208; to fellowmen, 224- 232; to neighbor, 224, 225; patriotic, 225, 226; philan- thropic, 227; for enemies, 227- 229 ; other graces flowing from love, 229-232. Lowell, 218. Loyalty, 226, 251, 254, 256. Lyceum, Aristotle's, 54. Mackenzie, John S., 18, 31. "Mailed fist," the, 252, 253, 267. Man, a moral agent, 79-120, 143. Manicheans, 151. Marcus Aurelius, 36, 57. Marriage, 237-242. Martensen, 77. Martineau, James, 83, 132, 168. Materialism, 110, 145, 217, 270. Mathematics, 34, 129. Matter, Plato's view of, 53; Aristotle's view, 54, 55; not source of evil, 151. Memory, 37, 182, 183. Mercy, 157, 158, 222, 223. Metaphysics, 42. Methodology in Ethics, 9-15, 32, 33. Micou, R. W., 41. Mills, Enos, 220. Mind, the human, outline of, 37- 39; sub-conscious, 203; super- conscious. 203 ; culture of, 180- 201 ; duties to, 180-201 ; an en- tity, 103, 180. Ministers, 164, 212, 263-267. Modus operandi, 43, 216. Monogamy, 237. Moral, the word, 22, 27, 28; or- der, 74-78; law, 43, 44, 74, 123; "morally indifferent sphere," 130-132; discipline, 150, 174, 219; imperative, 43; evil, 145. Moral agency and moral agents, treatment of, 79-120; defini- tions, 79; constituents of, 82- 120; freedom of, 101-117; other references, 78, 142, 143, 146, 147, 150, 274. Moral argument for the divine existence, 41. Moral distinctions, treatment of, 124-138; definition, 124 ; proofs of, 124 - 130 ; general refer- ences, 3, 4, 23, 27, 33, 42, 47, 84, 95, 98, 162, 163, 268, 274. Moral discipline, 150, 174, 219. Moral economy, the world a, 73- 78, 157. Moral faculty (see Conscience). Moral judgment, the, 85, 93-95, 98, 99, 187, 190, 207. Moral philosophy, 22. Moral science, 20, 22. Moral weaklings, 108, 144, 181, 192, 193, 195. Motherhood, 243. Motives (or Intentions), 19, 65, 86, 96, 138, 195, 233 ; influence but do not coerce the Will, 111-113; treatment of, 118-120; definition, 118; of culture, 196- 201. 284 Index Muir, John, 220. Muirhead, J. H., 47. Murray, J. C, 31, 134. Nature, duties to, 216-223. Nature- fakirs, 219. Nature-lovers, 219. Natural science, 39, 40. Necessitarianism, 103, 109. Neighbor love, 224, 225, 275. Nil admirari, 273. Normative sciences, 31, 32, 36. Noumena, 24. Oaths, official, 255, 256. Obsequiousness, 213, 230. Officials, public, 253-257. Opportunism, 65, 66, 139. Orr, James, 153. Ought, 20, 24, 28, 84, 94, 96, 110. Ovid, 52. Pantheism, 168, 169. Parents and children, 242-246. Park, public, 221, 222. Particles, ethical, 28, 29. Pascal, 93. Passions, bodily, 177-179. Patriotism, 60, 156, 225, 226, 253, 254, 256, 275. Pedagogy, 5, 196. Perfectionists, 49. Perfidy, 214. Personality, 168-170, 185, 202- 215 ; strong, 202, 203 ; symmet- rical, 203-205; virtuous, 205- 215. Peripatetic School, 54. Pessimism, 59, 87, 151, 193, 209, 217, 219. Peter, 210. Phenomena, 24, 31, 70, 216, 271. Phenomenalism, 185. Philanthropy, 227. Philosophy, 23, 26, 27, 39, 40, 109, 128, 155, 274. Physiognomy, 179. Physiology, 88, 175. Plagiarist, the, 210. Plan of salvation, 157-160, 272. Plato, 35, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 61, 151, 155, 158, 170. Platonic love, 238. Politeness, 230. Politics, 267. Polyandry, 237. Polygamy, 237. Positivism, 185. Practical Ethics, definition, 18, 161; treatment of, 161-274; relation to Theoretical Ethics, 162-164; as an art and a sci- ence, 161. Pragmatism, 63, 162. Preaching, 264-267. Preserver, God as, 216. Pride, 196, 197, 213. Primordial material, the, 71. Pringle-Pattison, A. S., 117. Proofs, the theistic, 269. Protagoras, 51. Prudery, 242, 245. Psychology, 23, 24, 26, 30, 34; outline of system, 37-39, 80 ; of Conscience, 83-90; culture of psychical powers, 180-201, 240. Question, of Ethics, 25-27. Rational intelligence, 82, 83. Reason, 156, 157, 170, 190, 191, 237, 238, 271, 272, 274. Reflection, 37, 181-183, 193. Regeneration, 158-160, 191. Relation of Ethics, treatment of, 36-41; to Psychology, 37-39; to Philosophy, 39; to Natural Science, 39, 40; to Sociology, 40; to Natural Theism, 41; to Christian Theology and Eth- ics, 41 ; of Theoretical and Practical Ethics, 162-164. Religion, 126, 215. Repentance, 154. Republic, Plato's, 35, 53, 61 ; our own, 226, 236, 251, 252, 255, 275. Index 285 Rest, 176, 177. Revenge, 228. Right and Wrong, 3, 4, 18-21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 33, 42, 63, 66, 67, 79, 84, 85, 91, 95, 96, 98, 104, 121- 125, 128, 130-133, 146, 164, 187, 268. Rigorism, 3, 51. Romans, 35, 57. Rousseau, 218. Saloons, 248, 249. Sanctification, 158, 159. Schmid, Heinrich, 192. Scholarship, 175, 176. Schurz, Carl, 226. Science, physical, 23, 24, 31, 32, 39, 40, 80, 183; Ethics a sci- ence, 30-32; normative, 31, 32, 36. Scientific faculty, 38, 183. Scientific study of nature, 217- 220. Scotists, the, 59. Scotus, Duns, 59. Self-consciousness, 24, 38, 168, 169, 186. Self-culture, 248. Self-denial, 214. Selfishness, 164, 211, 221, 229, 230, 242, 247, 248. Seneca, 36, 57. Sense, the, 37, 180, 181. Sensibilities, the, 26, 38, 82, 85- 87, 96, 98, 189-191, 195. Sentimentality, 208, 209, 217, 219, 239, 249. Sermons, 264. Sheldon, Henry C, 151. Sexual love, 237, 238, 239, 241. Sex problem, 245. Sin, 3, 21; treatment of, 121-160: definition, 122 ; term, 122, 123 fact of, 123, 124; genesis of 139-153; a free act, 140-144 an eternal possibility, 144-146 erroneous views of its origin 147-153; God not its author 147-150; not eternal, 150; not in matter, 151 ; not a lapse of the Infinite, 151, 152; not due to man's primitive animalism, 152; agnosticism not satisfac- tory, 152, 153; cure of sin, 154-160. Single tax, 266. Sleep, 176, 177. Slums, 243. Social functions, 177. Socialism, 235. Social organism, the, 207, 247- 251. Sociology, 40, 234. Socrates, 35, 51-53, 164. Sophists, the, 35, 36, 50, 51. Speculation (philosophical), 24, 25, 102, 108, 128, 164, 168, 169, 184, 237, 274. Speer, Robert E., 136. Spencer, Herbert, 29, 49, 66, 91, 103, 104. Sphere, the ethical, 23-30, 146. Spirit, the Holy, 159, 160, 170, 187, 191. Squeamishness, 214. State, the, Plato's view, 53, 54; Aristotle's view, 55; Hobbes' view, 60; modern view, 188, 198, 207, 243, 251-257, 266, 267, Stoics, the, 36, 51, 56, 57-59. Strategy, legitimate, 137. Strikes, 233. Sunday piety, 204. Sycophancy, 215. Symmetry of character, 203-205. Summum Bonum, 48, 49. To Agathon, 48. Taxes, 188, 254. Temperament, 113-116, 211. Temperance, 53, 206. Test necessary for moral agency, 146-149. Theism, 41, 71, 80, 151, 219. Theistic faith, 270. Theistic intuitions, 38, 188, 189. 286 Index Theistic world-view, 33, 53, 72, 268. Theodicy, 144. Theology, 34, 36, 41, 80, 140, 153, 156, 158, 160, 179. Theoretical Ethics, definition, 18 ; treatment of, 18-160; relation to Practical Ethics, 162-164. Theories of Ethics reviewed, 48, 49, 50-72. Thilly, Frank, 21, 30, 53, 108. Thoreau, 218, 220. Thrasymachus, 51. Time and space, 38, 186. Traitor, 214. Trichotomy, 180. Trimmers and time-servers, 256, 257. Trumbull, H. C, 136. Truth and error, 38, 186. Tyndal, John, 71. Understanding, the, 37, 38, 181- 184. Universities, 4, 176, 198, 200, 201. Universe, the, 26, 70, 71, 73, 74, 81, 143, 151, 157, 193, 194, 201, 203, 268, 271, 272, 274. "Unconscious Intelligence," 151. "Unconscious Will," 151. Utilitarianism, 49, 63-66, 140, 162, 163. Valentine, Milton, 21, 22, 23, 33, 36, 41, 43, 60, 61, 74, 82, 93, 125, 161. Via media, 54, 174, 215, 229, 231. Vile speech, 204, 205. Virile ethics, 3, 150, 274. Virtue and virtues, general ref- erences, 22, 29, 30, 56, 193, 204, 230, 274, 275; Plato's list, 53, 54, 206; virtuous personality, 205-215; relation of virtue to character, 205 ; definitions, 205 ; classification, 205, 206; list of virtues, 206, 207 ; antitheses and perversions, 206-215. Vocabulary, ethical, 27-30. Votes, counting, 256. Wages, 233. 234. Walking, 173, 174. War, 207, 208. Weidner, R. R, 133, 134. Wesley, John, 171. Wife and husband, 238-242, 275. Will, the, 4, 26, 38, 39, 98, 142; treatment of, 100-117; defini- tion, 100; unique powers, 102- 105 ; freedom of vindicated, 105-117; limitations, 117; mo- tives and the Will, 111-113, 118; in respect to sin, 140-146; equilibrate, 146; discipline of, 191-195, 240, 274. Wisdom, 53, 206. Working men, 232-235. Wundt, W. 49. Zeno, 35, 51, 57. Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (724)779-2111 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ■ I I ■ •.'♦•■ 013 544 409 1 ■ M'-> *.*•-:*.* V H i ■ ■ ■ M ^^H ■•x I r .r.K'fi&a.-- ■