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 THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 -X 
 
in 
 
 THE BATTLE 
 
 OF 
 
 aETTTSBUEa: 
 
 THE HISTOEY 
 
 CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 BY 
 
 THE COMTE DE "PAEIS. — -^ P\..v.v.„4. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE AUTHOR. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 PORTER & COATES. 
 
 -'..-f>T 
 

 5 
 
 i 
 
 Copyright, 1886, 
 BY PORTER & COATES. 
 
^ tj 
 
 PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. 
 
 The battle of Gettysburg was imdoubtedly one of the greatest 
 conflicts of modern times, not only from the number of comba- 
 tants engaged and the desperate nature of the struggle, but be- 
 cause on the now classic heights of Cemetery Ridge, Gulp's Hill, 
 and the Round Tops the future of the American Republic, for 
 weal or for woe, was fought and won on those memorable July 
 days. As decisive in its character and far-reaching results as the 
 battle of Waterloo, like it, it has been the subject of endless con- 
 troversy and military criticism, and has brought forth a multitude 
 of books, pamphlets, and letters, most of which serve but to be- 
 wilder and " darken visibly " the student of history. 
 
 Fortunately, amid the din and confusion of bitter polemical 
 warfare there is one historian to whom the general reader can turn 
 with confidence — one who has devoted to this battle years of 
 patient study and untiring research, has critically examined all 
 the official and unofficial documents, reports, and publications to 
 be obtained from reliable sources on either side of the controversy, 
 has thoughtfully sifted the evidence for every statement made, has 
 consulted with the surviving officers of either army, and then, 
 " with malice toward none and charity for all," and with an im- 
 partiality rare even in a foreigner of his exalted position and 
 pre-eminent ability, has sought, and not in vain, to write truly 
 the history of the greatest battle fought on American soil. The 
 account of the battle of Gettysburg occupies three chapters in the 
 Third Volume of the Comte de Paris' History of the Civil War in 
 America, and is acknowledged to be the fairest and most graphic 
 
VI PUBLISHERS' PREFACE. 
 
 description of tlic battle ever written, and in response to numerous 
 demands is now published separately. 
 
 To make the work still more complete, an Itinerary of the Army 
 of the Potomac and co-operating forces in the Gettysburg cam- 
 paign, June and «Tuly, 1863, which was a feature in the Appendix 
 to the first edition of the comte's great work, has been carefully 
 revised and enlarged from documents in the possession of the War 
 Department, giving the most complete organization of the Army 
 of the Potomac, and detailing the name of every general and sub- 
 ordinate commander on the field, with a return showing the casu- 
 alties by regiment and battery in the Union and Confederate 
 armies, July 1-3, 1863, gives to this book an official character 
 possessed by none other relating to the battle. 
 
 I 
 
 Extract from a letter of the Comfe dc Paris to his American Publishers, Porter & Coates. 
 
 Gentlemen : — It has been agreed between my publishers, Messrs. Levy, and 
 myself, to grant to the translation, since it is to be published by yourselves, the 
 exclusive copyright in England, according to the forms prescril>ed by inter- 
 national treaties, and in America the right of giving out your edition as the 
 only one authorized by myself. .... 
 
 Believe me, gentlemen, yours truly, 
 
 L. P. D'ORLEAXS, Comte de Paris. 
 
EDITOR'S NOTE. 
 
 In editing this volume I have endeavored to see that the 
 translation conformed to the original and made clear the author's 
 meiining, for it can be affirmed that he has sought to write with 
 truth and without bias for eitiier side. 
 
 The notes appended, I ho])e, will be understood as explanatory, 
 not controversial. 
 
 JOHN P. NICHOLSON. 
 Phii.adei.phia. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 BRANDY STATION. 
 Lee moves forward on the 3d of June. — Reorganization of his array. — 
 Ewell and A. P. Hill. — The artillery. — The cavalry. — Lee's plan. — 
 Hooker's situation. — He finds out Lee's movement. — His plan not ap- 
 proved of at Washington. — His hands are tied. — Howe crosses the Rappa- 
 hannock — Pleasonton's positions. — Lee at Culpeper. — Stuart and his 
 cavalry — Pleasonton's plan. — He crosses the Rapidan on the 9tli of 
 June. — Fight at P>everly Ford. — Dispositions taken by Stuart. — His 
 perilous situation. — The fight at Brandy Station. — Struggle at Fleetwood 
 Hill. — Side-arms. — Stuart's resistance. — He evacuates Brandy Station. — 
 Pleasonton's retreat. — Results obtaimd. — Hooker would attack Hill. — 
 Advantages of that plan. — Consequences of a march of Hooker on 
 Richmond and of Lee on Washington. — Halleck's orders. — Hooker's 
 hard task. — Scattering of the Federals. — Harper's Ferry and Washing- 
 ton. — Hooker marching on the 11th of June. — His uncertainty. — Lee 
 moves toward the Valley of Virginia. — Ewell takes the lead. — The 
 rapidity of his march. — Description of Winchester. — Milroy ignorant of 
 Ewell's approach. — His positions on the 13th of June. — Ewell appears 
 before Winchester. — :0n the 14th, Early carries Flint Hill. — Desjierate 
 situation of Milroy. — He evacuates Winchester by night. — Disastrous 
 retreat. — Results of Ewell's victory. — Hooker's movements. — Alarm in 
 Pennsylvania. — ^Jenkins at Chambersburg. — Lee's and Smart's move- 
 ments. — Encounter of tlie cavalry. — Position of Aldie. — Engagement at 
 Middleburg on the 17th. — Hooker is marching westward. — Fight at 
 Middleburg on the 19th. — Engagement of Cromwell Creek. — Fight at 
 Upperville on the 21st.^Information collected by Pleasonton. — Results 
 of these combats. — Pleasonton's retreat. — Lee on the banks of the Poto- 
 mac. — His letter to Mr. Davis. — Ewell marching on the 22d toward 
 Harrisburg. — Longstreet crosses the Potomac on the 2-5th. — Hill with 
 him at Chambersburg on the 27th. — Cumberland Valley. — Early on the 
 east of the Blue Ridge. — On the 26th he is at Gettysburg. — Burning 
 of the bridge at Columbia. — Hooker's movements. — The authorities at 
 Washington. — Hooker crosses the Potomac. — Lee is not informed of it. — 
 Stuart's expedition. — His plan. — Lee's instructions. — Stuart's situation on 
 the 26th. — He is separated from Lee. — He captures a Federal train on 
 tiie 28th. — Engagement at Westminster on the 29th. — He encounters 
 Kiii)atri(k. — Kilpatrick's movements. — Fight at Hanover on the oOth.— 
 Stuart before Carlisle. — Lee recalls him. — Hooker is replaced by Meade 
 on the 28th. — Halleck's conduct. — Meade's movements on the 29th. — 
 Situation of Gettysburg. — Meade's plan. — His cavalry on the 30th. — 
 
viii CONTENTS. 
 
 Biiford at Gettysburg. — Meade's orders for tlie 1st of July. — Tlie Pipe 
 Creek line. — On the 2Sth Lee resolves to cro.ss the mountains.— Onlers 
 of the 29tii. — Ewell's movement. — The Confederates are ont.stri])ped at 
 Gettysburg. — Causes of the first encounter at Gettysburg. — The Tennsyl- 
 vania militia. — Meade informed of Lee's movement. — Keyes' demon- 
 strations on the Virginia peninsula Page 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 OAK HILL. 
 Lee's entire army is marching on the 1st of July on Gettysburg. — The 
 battlefield of Gettysburg.— The three Jiills: Oak Hill, Cemetery Hill, 
 the Itound Toys. — Peach Orchard. — The crossway. — Buford's iiold resolu- 
 tion. — His fighting dispositions. — He is attacked by Heth. — Movements 
 of Hill and Keynolds. — Meade's dispositions on the moi-ning of the 1st 
 of July. — His orders to Reynolds. — The latter calls the First corps to 
 Gettysburg. — Wadsworth's arrival. — He saves the cavalry. — Reynolds' 
 death. — Rout of Archer's brigade. — Defeat of Butler's brigade. — Tho 
 Confederates are stopped. — The Federals are reinforced. — Heth's new 
 attack. — Howard at Clettysburg. — Position of the Eleventh corps. — Ewell 
 approaches Gettysburg. — Rodes occupies Oak Hill. — Howard's impru- 
 dent movement. — The First corps is attacked at the same time in front 
 and on the right. — Sanguinary struggle. — Rodes is repulsed.— Pender 
 comes to Heth's rescue. — Fight of the Eleventh corps and Ewell. — Easy 
 defeat of Schinnn el pfennig. — Early attacks Barlow. — Struggle around the 
 almshouse. — Barlow's defeat. — Rout of the Eleventh corps. — Perilous 
 position of Doubleday. — His energetic resistance. — He retreats on Gettys- 
 burg. — Position of the Federals on Cemetery Hill. — Meade's orders on 
 July 1st. — Hancock at Gettysburg. — He re-forms the army. — Lee should 
 have attacked Cemetery Hill without delay. — Ewell dares not attempt 
 it. — Lee's orders. — Movements of the Army of the Potomac on the 1st 
 of July. — Meade's orders on the night of the 1st. — Lee's plan. — Meade's 
 arrival. — His situation. — Distribution of his forces on the morning of 
 the 2d. — Distriljution of those of Lee. — Meade rectifi>.s his positions. — 
 Descri])tion of the ground.— The strong and the weak points of the 
 Unionist line. — Sickles' position pointed out by Meade. — Sickles wishes 
 to rectify it. — The Federal right. — Various plans presented to Lee: re- 
 treat on South ^Mountain; defensive battle; direct atiack; manoeuvres. — 
 Discussion of these plans. — Lee chooses the direct attack.— Faults in the 
 execution of that plan. — Loss of precious time. — Role assigned to Long- 
 street. — Orders given to Ewell. — Excessive length of the Confederate 
 line.^Delays in Longstreet's march. — Waiting of the two armies. — En- 
 gagement in the morning at Warfield. — At eleven o'clock Sickles orders 
 his corps to move forward. — Misunderstanding between Meade and him- 
 self. — His new position. — Weakness of his line. — New delays of Long- 
 street. — Lee's impatience. — Hood's movement. — At half-past three o'clock 
 he is on the point of attacking the Round Tops Page 
 
CONTENTS. is. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 Hood attacks Birney's division. — Struggle at Devil's Den. — Attack on Little 
 Eound Top. — Fight in the corn-field. — Hood's success. — McLaws' move- 
 ment. — Birney is reinforced. — New struggle. — Warren has Little Eound 
 Top occupied. — Vincent arrives in time. — Fierce struggle. — The Con- 
 federates are repulsed.— Losses on both sides. — Birney reinforced by 
 . Caldwell. — Struggle against McLaws. — Fresh attack on Round Top. — 
 It is repulsed. — McLaws attacks the orchard. — Sickles' line is broken. — 
 Anderson attacks Humplireys. — The Conftderate left. — Humphreys' re- 
 treat with the Unionist left. — Longstreet's victory. — New line formed by 
 Hancock. — Combat on the Eound Tops. — Longstreet's advance. — The 
 Federal artillery.— Concenti'ation of foi'ces on Meade's left. — Hill remains 
 motionless. — Last eflbrt of McLaws and Anderson. — They are not sup- 
 ported. — They are repulsed about eight o'clock at night. — Positions of the 
 Federal riglit. — Meade unmans it.— It is attacked by Johnson. — Fierce 
 struggle on Gulp's Hill. — .Johnson is repulsed at ten o'clock at night. — 
 Early attacks Cemetery Hill. — His defeat. — Eodes' inaction. — Movements 
 of the cavalry. — Situation of the Confederates. — Faults committed. — Forces 
 engaged by Lee. — Grave situation of the Federals. — Council of war. — 
 Preparations for the battle of the following day. — Dispositions of the 
 Confederates. — Lee's orders. — At daybreak on the 3d the fight is resumed 
 on Culp's Hill. — Sanguinary and fierce struggle. — Last effort of the Con- 
 federates at eleven o'clock. — Success of the Federals. — Interruption of the 
 battle. — Long preparations of the Southern right. — Pickett's position. — 
 Farnsworth's fight on Plum Eun.-^Lee's dispositions to su|iport Pickett's 
 attack. — General cannonading. — Positions of tlie Federal left. — Its artil- 
 lery. — Results of the cannonading. — The Federals cease firing. — Pickett's 
 movement. — He is supported right and left. — Description of the ground. — 
 Strength of the Federal positions. — Pickett makes the assault. — He is 
 isolated. — Fierce struggle with side-arms. — Mel^e on the hill. — Defeat of 
 Trimble and Pettigrew on Pickett's left. — Pickett's division annihilated. — 
 On the right Wilcox is repulsed. — Rout of the assailants. — Lee and 
 Longstreet in their midst. — The Fedi^-rals' situation. — INIeade dares not 
 take the ofiensive. — Eesults obtained. — Rtti'eat of Law and McLaws. — 
 The latter alone is disturbed. — The cavalry forces. — Stuart's plan. — Fed- 
 eral position. — Encounter of the cavalry forces. — Figlit of Cress' Ridge. — 
 Charges and counter-charges. — Stuart's movement is interrupted. — General 
 mel^e with side-arms. — The two parties are separated. — Lee's situalion 
 on the 3d at night: he is defeated. — Necessity of the retreat. — Fortune 
 deserts the Confederates' cause. — Concentration of the Soutiiern army. — 
 The Federals' situation. — The two adversaries during the day of tlie 
 4th. — Commencement of Lee's retreat. — Uncertainty and immobility of 
 Meade. — Causes of Lee's defeat. — Meade's faults. — Strength of the two 
 armies. — Their losses. — The news of the battle of Gettysburg in the 
 North and the South Page 160 
 
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 BRANDY STATION. 
 
 ON the 3d of June, 1863, Lee put his army in motion. The 
 future of America was about to be decided for ever. 
 Til is army bore but little raserablance to the brave but undis- 
 ciplined troops that had defended the Manassas plains two years 
 before. It had even become, through its organization and disci- 
 pline, its experience in fighting and marching, much superior 
 to what it was the preceding year, when its chieftain led it 
 into Maryland for the first time. The extreme confidence that 
 animated it, as we have observed, imparted to it immense strength 
 on the field of battle, but it also inspired it with an imprudent 
 contempt for its adversaries. From the day foUoMang the battle 
 of Chancellorsville the government and the generals had applied 
 themselves to the task of reinforcing and reorganizing it. The 
 return of the three divisions that had been besieging Suifolk, the 
 forwarding of new regiments which had been withdrawn from 
 points of least importance for defence, and, finally, the arrival of 
 a large number of recruits, had during the latter part of IMay 
 carried its effective force to eighty thousand men, 68,352 of 
 whom were infantry. The latter had been divided into three 
 army corps, each comprising three divisions. Up to this time 
 the nine divisions of the Army of Northern Virginia had been 
 partitioned between Longstreet and Jackson, to whom Lee allowed 
 srreat freedom of action over the whole extent of the battlefield 
 where each happened to be in command. Being deprived of the 
 services of him who, of his two lieutenants, was most accustomed 
 to exercise independent command, and obliged thenceforth to give 
 more personal attention to the management of battles, Lee felt 
 that it was necessary to reduce the size of his army corps in 
 order to render them more manageable. Longstreet retained the 
 
 1 
 
2 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 First ; Ewell and A. P. Hill were placed at the head of the Sec 
 ond and Third, and each of them had the rank of lieutenant- 
 general conferred upon him. If these last two officers, to recall 
 the comparison made after the death of Turenne, were the " small 
 change " for Stonewall Jackson, it might be said with truth that 
 the minor coins were of sterling value. 
 
 No one could dispute to Ewell the honor of succeeding Jackson 
 in the command of the Second corps. We have seen him at his 
 l^rilliant debut charging the gate of INIexico in 1847 Avith 
 Kearny's squadron. A Virginian by birth, like Lee and 
 Jackson, he possessed on that soil, so fruitful in valiant soldiers, 
 a beautiful residence near the city of AVilliamsburg, in the heart 
 of the old colony of English Cavaliers. This dwelling, of brick 
 and Avood, square built, with a lofty flight of steps, of sombre 
 aspect, and standing alone in the centre of a vast clearing, sur- 
 rounded by a magnificent forest, had been for a year in posses- 
 sion of the Federals. After having almost invariably played the 
 principal role in the operations directed by Jackson, Ewell, 
 severely wounded at Gainesville, had not been able to look on 
 liis domain for rest and health. Finally, after nine mouths' 
 absence, he rejoined on crutches the army which had not for- 
 gotten his services. JNlore fortunate than his old chief, he had, 
 thanks to his robust and active temperament, successfully borne 
 the sufferings consequent upon amputation, and seemed to be suf- 
 ficiently restored to health to fight for the recovery of his patri- 
 mony. Having lost one leg, he had himself fastened to his saddle 
 and resumed his command. B[e had the required energy, firmness, 
 and activity to be the leader of soldiers who, knowing their own 
 value, were severe judges of the qualities possessed by their chiefs; 
 but he lacked the unerring quickness of perception of his prede- 
 cessor, Avhich could discover instantaneously the weak point of an 
 adversary. 
 
 A. P. Hill, like Ewell, Avas a Virginian. Having also partici- 
 pated in all the labors of Jackson, he had been slightly wounded, 
 almost at the same time as the latter, in the terrible affair of 
 Dowdall's Tavern. Gifted with a degree of perseverance equal 
 to any emergency, he M'as always ready to take charge of the 
 most difficult undertakings, and inspired his chiefs, his comrades, 
 
BBAXDY STATION. 3 
 
 and his subordinates with equal confidence. His force of will 
 overcame the weakness of a shattered constitution, which had 
 emaciated his manly face. He was never sick on the day of 
 battle. We have stated that his name was the last uttered by 
 Jackson's lips as he lay on his deathbed. He waited for the 
 completion of his task to respond to this call and to join his 
 chief* The latter had fallen in the midst of victory ; A. P. 
 Hill perished in the last hour of the war, wlien all hope was 
 lost save the privilege of dying like a soldier with SAvord in 
 hand. 
 
 The reorganization of the artillery completed the changes 
 eifected by Lee in the distribution of his forces. Up to this 
 time the batteries were divided between the divisions, sometimes 
 even specially attached to some particular brigade : they had to 
 be detached in order to employ them singly or unite them in 
 groups, hence a miserable scattering on the battlefield. They 
 were all now placed under the command of General Pendle- 
 ton, a brave and energetic officer who had been tried under 
 fire. Some of these batteries formed an independent reserve ; 
 the rest, while still remaining under his control, were assigned 
 temporarily to the army corps. The artillery consisted of fif- 
 teen battalions, each composed of four batteries of four pieces — 
 sixteen guns in all. These battalions, commanded by experienced 
 officers, while remaining under the controlling direction of Gen- 
 eral Pendleton, were divided between the three corps, each receiv- 
 ing five — making eighty pieces of artillery. Three of the bat- 
 talions were each specially attached to a division, while the other 
 two formed a reserve. Five mounted batteries of six pieces each 
 composed the light artillery of Stuart's cavalry division. 
 
 The cavalry, reinforced and newly mounted under the super 
 vision of Stuart, had, after Chancellorsville, taken up its old 
 quartei*s at Culpeper, and occupied the triangle comprised between 
 the Papidan and the Rappahannock, watching the right wing of 
 the Federals along this latter river, and still menacing their lines 
 of communication. In this position it covered the roads that the 
 Confederate army had to follow if it desired to advance in the 
 direction of the North. In fact, as Lee could not think of 
 crossing the Rappahannock by main force in the face of 
 
4 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Hooker's army, he had only two plans of campaign to follow 
 if he assumed the offensive : either to tui'n his right wing in 
 order to forestall hira at Manassas and before Washington, or to 
 push forward toward ]\Iaryland by the valley of the Shenandoah, 
 masking liis movement behind the Blue Ridge. The first plan, 
 wdiich had proved successful the preceding year against Pope, 
 was too hazardous to be tried again a second time in the face of 
 an adversary taught by experience. Lee adopted the second, 
 which left the enemy in a state of uncertainty for a longer space 
 of time and enabled him to outvie the latter in speed. 
 
 This movement was not without danger, for it consisted in 
 turning the right wing of the Federals ; and in order to accom- 
 plish this the latter had to be detained before Fredericksburg by a 
 large display of troops while Lee's heads of column reached the 
 banks of the Shenandoah. His army was thus stretched along 
 a line which throughout its entire length exposed its flank to the 
 attaclvs of the enemy. The utmost secrecy could alone ward off 
 the danger of these attacks. 
 
 The forest of the Wilderness had resumed its wonted stillness, 
 disturbed only by the footsteps of Confederate scouts ; the grass 
 had covered the corpses and the debris of every kind which lay 
 scattered among the woods ; the Federal trenches, the torn and 
 shattered trees, and the vestiges of fires, alone recalled to mind 
 the conflict of the 3d of ISIay. Precisely one month to a day 
 had elapsed since this battle when Longstreet's First division, 
 under McLaws, penetrated this henceforth historical Wilderness. 
 Another division followed it closely ; the Third, under Hood, was 
 already on the banks of the Rapidan, and the whole army corps, 
 crossing this river, reached the neighborhood of Culpeper Court- 
 house on the evening of the 7th. 
 
 "~- A portion of Ewell's corps had started in the same direction 
 on the 4th ; the remainder moved forward on the morning of the 
 5th : Hill's corps, therefore, was the only one left to occupy the 
 positions from Taylor's Hill to Hamilton's Crossing in which the 
 army had passed the winter, and it had to be deployed along this, 
 line in order to conceal the departure of two-thirds of the army. 
 The vigilance of the outposts had, in fact, prevented Hooker's 
 spies from reporting this departure to him : no one had been able 
 
BRANDY STATION. 
 
 to cross the river for several days. But the movements of troops 
 caused by the removal of Hill's divisions could not altogether 
 avoid attracting the attention of the Federals. Besides, they 
 knew their adversaries too well not to anticipate an attack the 
 moment that they did not resume the aggressive themselves. 
 
 A few words on the situation of the Army of the Potomac for 
 the last mouth will enable the reader to understand why, contrary 
 to its tactics of the preceding year, it lay waiting, inactive in its 
 positions, for the Confederates to take the initiative of a new 
 campaign. 
 
 Whilst the latter saw their ranks filling up, those of the Union 
 army were thinning out in an alarming manner. The expiration 
 of their terms of service carried off five thousand well-tried men 
 in the month of May, and ten thousand in June ; the fatigues of 
 a short but distressing campaign and the first heats of summer 
 increased the number of sick ; desertions had not been entirely 
 stopped ; and the recruiting of regiments already organized was 
 almost at a standstill. 
 
 The active infantry force that Hooker had at his disposal was 
 thus reduced to eighty thousand men. The artillery was tlience- 
 forth too numerous, and out of proportion to the above figures. 
 The cavalry, on the other hand, Avorn out by Stoneman's raid, 
 needed a few weeks' rest to recuperate. The authorities at 
 Washington might have reinforced the Army of the Potomac 
 by discontinuing or reducing the number of useless posts and 
 garrisons, but the most sad experience had failed to induce 
 them to abandon this system of scattering the troops. At the 
 very moment when all the Confederate forces were leaving the 
 coast to join Johnston in the West or Lee in Virginia, a whole 
 army corps was left at Port Royal, one division at New Berne, 
 two at Suffolk, and one in the peninsula of Virginia, to waste 
 away without a purpose, without any plan of campaign ; whilst 
 in the district which the Army of the Potomac was called upon 
 to defend, entire corps, such as the Washington garrison under 
 Heintzelman, Stahel's six thousand cavalry in the neighborhood 
 of Manassas, and Milroy's division in the Valley of Virginia, 
 acted independently of Hooker and under the immediate direc- 
 tion of Halleck; the commander-in-chief of the Army of the 
 
6 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Potomac not being even informed of the orders these officers 
 received. Lee's projects could not have been more effectually 
 subserved. 
 
 Hooker no longer inspired his army with the same confidence 
 as before Chancellorsville : the council of war that was held prior 
 to the retreat had given rise to some painful retrospective discus- 
 sions among some of his generals, the knowledge of whicih had 
 reached Washington. Halleck, without daring to request Hook- 
 er's removal, shared the opinion of those who believed that the 
 burden of command was too heavy for his shoulders, and, far 
 from being urged to act, it was recommended to him to wait 
 for a favorable opportunity. 
 
 It was during this state of expectancy, about the end of INIay, 
 that vague rumors got afloat foreshadowing the impending move- 
 ment of the Confederates. The Federals were not alone to suffer 
 from the indiscretions of politicians and journalists : there were 
 also men iu the South who, for the silly satisfaction of being 
 considered well informed, worked incessantly in their endeavors 
 to fathom military secrets, and hastened to divulge them. The 
 Richmond papers published that Lee was about to undertake 
 an aggressive movement, and it was openly announced in the 
 streets of the capital that he would invade Maryland at the head 
 of eighty-five thousand men. Hooker thought justly that his 
 adversaries were not likely to come to attack him in his positions 
 at Falmouth, and try to turn him ; but he was under the impres- 
 sion that they were about to resume the campaign plan of the pre- 
 ceding year, and proceed toward Manassas by crossing the Rappa- 
 hannock near its source. He was confirmed in this opinion by the 
 gathering of Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper and the increasing bold- 
 ness of the guerillas who infested the country in his rear; for one 
 of these bands even attempted, at Greenwich on the 31st of May, 
 to capture a train intended for his army. It required, however, 
 the removal of the encampments of Hill's corps on the 4t]i of 
 June to induce him to suspect a serious movement on the part 
 of the enemy, and to decide to emerge from his inactivity in 
 order to make sure of the fiict. On the morning of the 5th 
 the poutonniers were ordered to throw two bridges over the 
 Rappahannock at the point known by the name of Franklin's 
 
"""'■'-'- 1 I 
 
BRANDY STATION. 7 
 
 Crossing. The Sixth corps, which was encamped in the neighbor- 
 hood, sustained them and held itself ready to cross the river. This 
 movement might be only a simple demonstration ; it might also 
 be the beginning of an operation which would have proved very 
 dangerous for the enemy. Hooker, with the same sagacity he 
 had shown in planning the battle of Chancellorsville, was fully 
 convinced that an attack upon the weakened lines of Fredericks- 
 burg while a portion of Lee's army was probably pushing forward 
 along the Culpeper road was the best means for preventing the 
 invasion projected by his adversary. If the movement of the 
 latter was not yet fully defined, he could thus stop him. If, on 
 the contrary, he allowed him time to advance farther toward the 
 North and to further separate his columns, he could then make 
 a sudden attack with superior forces upon the troops which his 
 presence at Falmouth detained on the Lower Rappahannock, and 
 crush in its isolation one of the army corps whose co-operation 
 was indispensable to Lee for an aggressive campaign. 
 
 Such a project was at once bold and well conceived : it had, in 
 our opinion, great chances of success ; but there was one obstacle, 
 more difficult to overcome than rivers, or even hostile batteries, 
 which did not allow Hooker to execute it : this was the instruc- 
 tions he had received along with the command of the army. 
 These instructions formally directed him to cover Washington 
 and Harper's Ferry. Washington, surrounded by formidable 
 fortifications perfectly armed, had a numerous garrison, while 
 Stahel's cavalry division, by clearing the approaches for a consid- 
 erable distance, did not permit the enemy to attempt a surprise 
 against the place. Harper's Ferry, we have already shown, had 
 no strategic importance whatever ; nevertheless, if it was desired 
 to preserve this position, which had been very unnecessarily forti- 
 fied, there could have been brought to the place five or six thou- 
 sand men who under Milroy occupied Winchester and the lower 
 part of the Valley of Virginia. But the requirements of General 
 Hal leek for the defence of these two points, after having fettered 
 the movements of McClellan on the Chickahominy and in the 
 Antietam campaign, were not likely to yield to Hooker's repre- 
 sentations. On the 5th of June the latter had asked for permis- 
 sion to act independently of these instructions, and to manoeuvre 
 
 B 
 
8 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 his army as he thought proper, in order to be able to strike the 
 enemy wherever he could fiud the occasion to fight him to advan- 
 tage were he to let him advance northward, while he himself 
 should menace the Confederate capital. This permission was re- 
 fused. Halleck tried to prove to him that it would be better to 
 follow in the wake of Lee's heads of column, whose direction no 
 one could as yet exactly foresee ; while Mr. Lincoln, recapitulating 
 the scientific demonstration of his military director by a homely 
 comparison, gave the form of an apologue to a telegram addressed 
 to the commander of the Army of the Potomac : " I would not 
 take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox 
 jum^jed half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs front 
 and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the 
 other." 
 
 These instructions were positive and formal. Hooker had no 
 other alternative than to conform to them. He had asked that all 
 the forces which might have to operate against Lee should be 
 united under one single command in order to combine their 
 efforts. General Halleck deemed the superior control exercised 
 by him from his office at Washington as quite sufficient for that 
 purpose. The Army of the Potomac, doomed to act on the 
 defensive, could not thenceforth prevent the enemy from accom- 
 plishing his design. 
 
 Hooker did his best not to allow himself to be surprised or 
 forestalled by Lee. The bridges had been thrown over the river 
 in the afternoon of June 5th, after a pretty sharp engagement 
 with the Confederate skirmishers. As the latter were harassing 
 the pontonniers a great deal, a Federal detachment had crossed 
 the river in boats and dispersed them, after taking about one 
 hundred prisoners. On the morning of the 6th, Hooker made 
 Howe's division cross over to the right side of the Rappahannock. 
 Lee, alarmed at this movement, caused a portion of Hill's corps 
 to advance, holding himself ready to recall Ewell, who had been 
 on the march since the day previous. But Hooker had his 
 hands tied ; when he saw the display of forces HoAve provoked, 
 he stopped the latter, without having been able to ascertain 
 whether he had the enemy's whole army before him or only a 
 portion of it. As to Lee, he soon discovered the weakness 
 
BRANDY STATION. 9 
 
 of this demonstration. Perfectly at ease on the point, he made 
 preparations to join Longstreet, instructing Hill to follow him as 
 soon as the movements of which he was about to take the direc- 
 tion had compelled the enemy to abandon the banks of the Rap- 
 pahannock. — 
 Hooker had determined to feel the enemy at both extremities 
 of his line at once. Whilst Howe was crossing the river he 
 made preparations for a large cavalry reconnoissance in the direc- 
 tion of Culpeper. He was not aware, as we have remarked, that 
 Lee's army was itself on the march toward this point. But he 
 knew that the enemy's whole cavalry was gathered there; that 
 Stuart, reinforced on all sides, had nearly ten thousand sabres 
 at his command ; and, even if the signs and rumors had not 
 informed him, he was too well acquainted with the character of 
 this young general not to feel convinced that he would not remain 
 long inactive with such forces at his disposal. In what direction 
 w^ould he strike ? Was he about to undertake a simple raid or to 
 cover the movements of the enemy's infantry ? It was necessary 
 to make sure of this, and if possible to baffle his plans by a sud- 
 den attack. Unfortunately, the Federal cavalry had not yet en- 
 tirely recovered from the long march it had made in the begin- 
 ning of ]May. In spite of the eiforts of its new chief. General 
 Pleasonton, who had deserved this position by his brilliant beha- 
 vior at Chancellorsville, the three divisions composing it scarcely 
 numbered seven thousand five hundred sabres. In order to make 
 up for Pleasonton's numerical inferiority, it became necessary to 
 add to his command the two infantry brigades under Ames and 
 Russell, detached from the Eleventh and Sixth corps, which 
 counted about three thousand men under arms. Notwithstand- 
 ing the excellent qualities of these foot-soldiers, their co-operation 
 interfered with the mobility of the column of cavalry, and con- 
 sequently destroyed part of its chances of success. The troops 
 under Pleasonton's command were all scattered : in order to afford 
 them time to concentrate. Hooker directed him not to cross the 
 Rappahannock until nine in the morning. While he was pre- 
 paring to strike a sudden blow in the direction of Culpeper, 
 Longstreet, unknown to him, had reached this village with all 
 his infantry on the evening of the 7th. The arrival of Lee, 
 
10 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 who joined him before evening, was hailed by eveiy one as sure 
 proof that the hour for important operations had arrived. The 
 general-in-chief found his cavahy thoroughly prepared for the 
 rdle it was about to play. 
 
 Stuart, justly proud of this splendid force, had some time 
 before asked Lee to come with some friends and review it. 
 " Here I am," said the general-in-chief to him, pointing with 
 his finger to the bivouacs of the First corps, — " here I am with 
 my friends, according to your invitation." It was agreed that 
 on the following day I^ee and his " friends " — that is to say, all 
 of Longstreet's soldiers — should witness the cavalry review. 
 
 With the exception of some regiments detached on outpost- 
 duty, all Stuart's cavalry was assembled on the 8th in a beau- 
 tiful open plain between Culpeper and Brandy Station. Gene- 
 ral Lee, motionless on his horse, his head covered with a broad- 
 brimmed hat, occupied an elevated position near a pole upon 
 which was flying a large Confederate flag. For the army 
 assembled around him, this man with a long gray beard, as 
 wise as he was brave, of dignified mien, whose profile stood out 
 in fine relief under a dazzling sky, brought by his mere pres- 
 ence a certain pledge of victory to the symbol of the Southern 
 cause which floated by his side. The simplicity of attire, the 
 immobility and serious countenance, of the general-in-chief, who 
 no doubt was already revolving in his mind the chances of his 
 new campaign, were in strong contrast with the brilliant uniform, 
 the gay deportment, and cheerful looks of Stuart as he passed, 
 sword in hand, with his troopers before their companions-in- 
 arms. As if real war, with its sufferings and risks, had not 
 been enough for him, Stuart omitted none of the features which 
 in times of peace constitute a sham fight, with its conventions 
 and improbabilities, such as dashing, headlong charges suddenly 
 stopped, cannonading against a fictitious enemy — for even pow- 
 der, so precious in warfare, was not spared — while the distant 
 sounds of this pretended battle reached the very banks of the 
 Rappahannock, to the astonishment of the Union scouts who 
 were watching along the course of the river. 
 
 The campaign was about to commence. Stuart was to menace 
 the Federals in the vicinity of Warrenton in (H'der to conceal 
 
BRANDY STATION. 11 
 
 from them the movements of the infantry, which was about to 
 tuyn its back almost completely upon them as it proceeded north- 
 westward, by way of Sperryvilie and Thornton's Gap, to reach 
 the valley of the Shenandoah. On the evening of the 8th the 
 Confederate cavalry bivouacked in the neighborhood of Brandy 
 Station, halfway between Culpeper and the Rappahannock. 
 Stuart established his head-quarters upon a barren hill of con- 
 siderable height, which under the name of Fleetwood Hill 
 stretches out north-east of Brandy Station perpendicularly to 
 the railroad, and overlooks the wooded country surrounding it. 
 Jones' brigade, composed of Virginia partisans recently attached 
 to Stuart's corps, watched the fords of the Rappahannock, while 
 Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, commanded by Colonel INIunford, its 
 chief being sick, had gone to encamp at Oak Shade on the other 
 side of Hazel River, along the road which all the cavalry had to 
 follow. The other three brigades, under the respective commands 
 of Generals Robertson, Hampton, and W. H, F. Lee, as well as 
 the mounted artillery, were assembled at. Fleetwood. Never 
 had Lee's young and brilliant lieutenant been in command of a 
 finer or more numerous body of men : these brigades contained 
 each from four to five regiments, almost equivalent to the Federal 
 divisions, constituting a total effective force of more than nine 
 thousand five hundred troopers, well mounted, v/ell accoutred, 
 and accompanied by thirty pieces of artillery perfectly equipped 
 and well served. 
 
 This time, however, it was the Federals' turn to outspeed and 
 surprise their adversaries. They had able and experienced com- 
 manders to lead them. Unassuming in his deportment, reserved 
 and reticent, Pleasonton possessed correct judgment, quickness 
 of perception, decision of character, and great determination of 
 purpose. The cavalry was divided into three divisions, under 
 Generals Buford and Gregg and Colonel Duffie. The two first 
 mentioned had already been accustomed to independent com- 
 mands : being fully acquainted with the kind of warfare they 
 were called upon to wage, they had succeeded in inspiring their 
 soldiers with the fullest confidence. Since the battle of Kelly's 
 Ford the Federal trooperg had ceased to believe in the superiority 
 of their advei-saries. This was one great advantage in their favor. 
 
12 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Pleiisonton, although fully aware that the bulk of the enemy's 
 forces was asseuibled at Brandy Station, knew nothing of the 
 disposition that Stuart had made of his troops: he had therefore 
 to c;lcar the principal movement directed against this point, and 
 to hold himself ready either to push forward and disperse the 
 hostile cavalry on every side if he should succeed in surprising 
 it, or to fall back in case of his not being able to dishxlge it. 
 He formed two columns : with the first, composed of Buford's 
 division and Ames' infantry, he proposed to cross the Rappa- 
 hannock at Beverly Ford, about two miles above Rappahannock 
 Station, and march directly upon Brandy Station, situated at a 
 distance of four and a half miles. The second column, com- 
 prising the other two divisions of cavalry and Russell's brigade, 
 under Gregg's command, was to cross the river at Kelly's Ford, 
 much lower down, and to divide afterward. r>uffie, taking a 
 south-westerly direction, was ordered to push as far as Stevens- 
 burg, to find out whether the enemy occupied the road between 
 Chancellorsville and Culpeper, and whether he had any troops 
 on the march along that road, and to cover the left against any 
 offensive movement on their part. In the mean while, Gregg, 
 with his division, was to ]>roceed toward Brandy Station in order 
 to strike the rear of the cavalry which Buford was to attack in 
 front, while Russell, bearing to the right in order to make short 
 work ^vith his infantr}^, would endeavor to assist the latter 
 between the railroad and Beverly Ford. 
 
 At daybreak on the 9th the two Federal columns crossed the 
 river, which was enveloj^ed in a dense morning mist. The Con- 
 federates, solely occupied with their own projects, had abandoned 
 the Rappahannock below the railroad line, and Gregg was able 
 to cross it not only without encountering any resistance, but even 
 without Stuart being informed of his presence on the right bank. 
 At Beverly Ford, Buford's head of column, formed by Colonel 
 Grimes* Davis' brigade, took advantage of the fog to surprise 
 and disperse Jones' outposts, stationed along the river. It came 
 near capturing by the same stroke the whole of Stuart's artil- 
 lery, four mounted batteries, which the latter, while preparing for 
 
 * Colonel Benjamin F. Davis, Eighth New York cavalry. By his army asso- 
 ciates he was familiarly called " Grimes" Davis. — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 13 
 
 the projected passage of the river, had imprudently caused to be 
 placed about half a mile in advance of the encampments occu- 
 pied by the brigade of Virginia partisans. These encampments 
 were located back of a wood, the edge of which extended twelve 
 hundred yards from the ford. No one suspected the approach of 
 the enemy : the horses were picketed, the men at work on fatigue- 
 duty, and the entire troop would have been captured but for the 
 protection of the wood, which enabled the skirmishers who had 
 been driven from the bank to form again on foot and to pour 
 a sharp fire into the Federals, which brought the foremost 
 squadrons to a halt. Jumping quickly into the saddle, a por- 
 tion of Jones' troopers come up at full gallop, and vigorously 
 resume the oiFensive against the Eighth New York. The two 
 bodies of troops become mixed up, a combat with sabre and pis- 
 tol follows, and the Federals are repulsed. Colonel Davis, in 
 trying to rally them, falls mortally wounded. This premature 
 death deprived the Federal cavalry of one of its best and most 
 brilliant officers. A captain in the regular army, highly esteemed 
 by his superiors and comrades, Davis had already distinguished 
 himself by his daring and sagacity in coming out of Harper's 
 Ferry a few days* before Miles' capitulation, thus saving the 
 brigade placed under his command. He is promptly avenged : 
 the Eighth Illinois, coming up in its turn, throws the Confeder- 
 ates into disorder, carries off a portion of Stuart's baggage, and 
 drives the fugitives across the wood and the remainder of their 
 bivouacs upon the main body of Jones' brigade, which the latter 
 has been forming in haste about two miles from the river. The 
 artillery, which, after the first discharge, has promptly fallen back, 
 supports the line. This time Jones steadily waits for the assailants, 
 for it is only a question of detaining them long enough to enable 
 Stuart to come up with reinforcements. The Confederates are not 
 accustomed to see their adversaries assume the offensive with so 
 much spirit. Ames' brigade, which has crossed the river, is de- 
 ployed along the edge of the wood and occupies it in front, while 
 Buford's second brigade, inclining to the right, prepares to attack 
 them in flank. But the fire of the Confederate artillery is imme- 
 
 * Colonel Davis led the Union cavalry out of Harper's Ferry during the night 
 immediately preceding the surrender. — Ed. 
 
 \ 
 
14 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 diately directed against the latter. The Fifth and Sixth regulars 
 succeed in relieving the rest of the brigade, without being able to 
 recover their advantage; for Stuart, who has just arrived from 
 Fleetwood with a portion of his forces, in his turn hurls two 
 regiments upon its flank, which compel the Federals to beat a 
 speedy retreat. 
 
 At the first news of the passage of Beverly Ford by the enemy, 
 the commander of the Confederate cavalry had hastened with most 
 of the forces at his disposal, W, 11. F, Lee's and Hampton's bri- 
 gades : Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, under Munford, was hastily recalled 
 from Oak Shade, while Robertson remained watching Brandy 
 Station. The forces so promptly gathered before Buford enabled 
 Stuart to resume the offensive at once. It was about ten o'clock 
 in the morning. But the Federals, strongly posted along the 
 edge of the wood and sustained by the fire of infantry, kept 
 him at a distance, while Munford vainly endeavored to turn 
 them by menacing the river-crossing. The combatants, instead 
 of coming to close quarters and crossing swords, remained thus 
 watching each other and exchanging a fire of artillery and small- 
 arjus. 
 
 Pleasonton had already secured the information which Hooker 
 had charged him to obtain on the right bank of the Rappahan- 
 nock. He had found in Stuart's baggage certain instructions 
 addressed to the latter which could admit of no doubt as to 
 the movement of the enemy's whole army to^vard the Valley of 
 Virginia ; he had learned from these that the Confederate cavalry 
 was to attempt a descent upon the Manassas and Fredericksburg 
 Railroad* in order to cover this movement. But, finding the 
 occasion favorable, he determined to strike a blow which should 
 paralyze this cavalry and prevent it from carrying out its 
 projected plan. Besides, he could not forsake his other two 
 divisions, and, seeing that he had to do with a strong force, he 
 decided to wait for the termination of the manoeuvre they had 
 commenced. 
 
 Stuart, on his part, was preparing to attack him vigorously, 
 when unexpected news was brought him which stopped him 
 abruptly. The signal-station established on Fleetwood Hill 
 * Orange and Alexandria Railroad. — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 15 
 
 apprised him of the approach of a large Federal column which 
 was coming up on his rear and was already menacing Brandy 
 Station. This was Gregg, faithfully performing the task which 
 had been assigned to him. Stuart's situation was a dangerous 
 one : having a numerous and enterprising enemy before him, 
 he saw himself threatened in his rear by a new adversary, who, 
 finding but a single brigade in his way, would not fail to place 
 him between two fires before long. It would soon be out of 
 his power to prevent Gregg and Buford from joining their 
 forces on the battlefield, and thus inflicting upon him a com- 
 plete defeat. There was no time to be lost to prevent this 
 junction. Following Lee's example at Chancellorsville, Stuart 
 does not hesitate for a moment. Availing himself of a slis-ht 
 advantage he has just obtained over Buford to leave only W. 
 H. F. Lee's brigade and that of Fitzhugh Lee before him, he 
 hastens with Hampton's and Jones' troops and a portion of his 
 light artillery to meet Gregg. 
 
 In the mean while, the latter liad become engaged in a despe- 
 rate struggle, and if the contrary wind prevented the Federals near 
 Beverly Ford from catching the sound of the combat that was 
 raging in that direction, its echoes reached him the more distinctly 
 and hastened his march. His scouts have penetrated unawares 
 into Brandy Station, nearly capturing a train as it was entering 
 the place. But Robertson, having formed his brigade, again 
 takes possession of it: for a short time, however, for one of 
 Gregg's two brigades, commanded by a brave English ojfiicer 
 whom we have already had occasion to mention, Colonel Percy 
 Wyndham, comes promptly to dispute it with him. While one 
 section of the Federal artillery is cannonading some of the enemy's 
 pieces posted back of Fleetwood Hill, Wyndham- hurls the First 
 Maryland against the station on the left. The Federal troopers 
 rush into it at a gallop, picking up a number of prisoners and dis- 
 lodging the Confederates from it. Wyndham's wliole brigade, 
 supported on the right by Kilpatrick's, then rapidly advances 
 upon Fleetwood Hill. Robertson charges them in vain. After 
 a brisk combat the Southern troopers are dispersed. Wyndham 
 captures three of the enemy's guns, as also a cluster of buildings 
 constituting Mr. Barbour's residence, which stands on the summit 
 Vol. III.— 30 
 
16 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 of the hill where Stuart had passed the uiglit. It is at this crit- 
 ical moment that the latter makes his appearance on this new bat- 
 tlefield. He must, at any cost, recapture Fleetwood Hill from 
 the enemy, who, master of this position, commands the whole 
 country. He hurls all the troops under his command against 
 Wyndhani, whose squadrons have been somewhat scattered dur- 
 ing the fight. The Federals are at first driven back, but they 
 form again, return to the charge, and recover their vantage- 
 ground. 
 
 The Confederate troopers are astonished at this unwonted 
 display of audacity on the part of their adversaries, but they 
 promptly recover themselves, and close upon them in their turn. 
 Swords soon take the place of pistols, which the combatants have 
 no time to reload. Wyndham, pressed by superior forces, has 
 fallen back near the station, taking with him his two guns, 
 together with the three pieces he has captured from the enemy. 
 Gregg, in order to relieve him, orders Kilpatrick's brigade to fall 
 upon the left flank of the Confederates. The latter, strong in 
 numbers, do not yield one inch of ground. Their leaders per- 
 form prodigies of valor, for this is a decisive moment. Along 
 all the slopes of Fleetwood Hill and around Brandy Station the 
 hostile lines are mixed in such a melee as was never before wit- 
 nessed in America : cannon are wrenched from each other's pos- 
 session, chauffino; hands several times. On both sides the losses 
 are heavy ; Colonels Hampton, Butler, and Young are wounded 
 on the Confederate side, and three superior officers in Wyndham 's 
 brigade alone. 
 
 Yet in the presence of forces twice as numerous as its own 
 Gregg's division maintained itself with difficulty north of the 
 railroad. There was no assistance within reach. On the left, 
 Duffie, who had been sent in an opposite direction, had found 
 one of rlie enemy's regiments at Stevcnsburg, and put it to flight 
 after a sharp engagement, during which he made a number of 
 prisoners ; but, although only within three or four miles of Brandy 
 Station, it does not appear that he thought of going to take part 
 in the combat which was fought by the Third division, and to whi'ih 
 he might have secured victory : at all events, he did not join it 
 in time, and only made his appearance in the evening on the 
 
BBANDY STATION. 17 
 
 banks of the Rappahannock.* On the right, Russell's infautiy, 
 notwithstanding their efforts to keep up with the cavalry, are still 
 too far behind to be able to sustain it. Finally, still more to the 
 right, Buford has indeed resumed the offensive, and is slowly 
 driving AV. H. F. Lee before him, who, while exposing himself in 
 order to conceal the weakness of his force, is seriously wounded. 
 But Lee's efforts are not in vain, for he has delayed the march 
 of Pleasouton, and the combat at Brandy Station will come to an 
 end without the latter being cognizant of the fact. A final charge 
 by General Young has driven Kilpatrick's brigade beyond the 
 railroad, and almost at the same time Wyndhara, after having 
 lost the five pieces of artillery so long disptited, has been obliged 
 to abandon Brandy Station. Kilpatrick's regiments return sev- 
 eral times to the charge, but this is only done to cover the move- 
 ments of the rest of the division. The Federals, moreover, have 
 soon cause to consider themselves fortunate in having got out of 
 the struggle in which they were engaged. Just as they are leav- 
 ing Brandy Station they see before them long trains of cars which 
 stop to unload, first one battalion, then several others. Swarms 
 of infantry, whose bayonets from afar are glistening in the sun, 
 form into line close to the road, and soon present an imposing 
 force. It is, in fact, the head of column of Ewell's corps, which 
 at the first news of the battle Lee has sent in great haste from 
 Culpeper to Brandy Station. Rodes' division is already de- 
 ployed, Early's follows it close ; but Gregg does not allow them 
 time to overtake him. He falls back by w^ay of his right in 
 order to find Russell and assist Buford, whom he has not 
 been able to meet in passing over the ground occupied by 
 the enemy. 
 
 During this time the forces of W. H. F. Lee had retired before 
 Buford, who was pressing them closer and closer, abandoning all 
 
 * Colonel Duffi^ arrived on the battlefield near Brandy Station about 4 o'clock 
 in the afternoon, in time to cover with his division the return of the other two 
 divisions to the nortli bank of the Rappahannock. In his report, dated June 
 12, 1863, Colonel Duffie says : " Upon my arrival near Beverly Ford, General 
 Pleasonton directed me to move with one brigade to support General Buford, 
 and send the Second brigade on the road leading to Rappahannock Ford to 
 cover the crossing of the Third division. My command crossed Beverly Ford 
 at about five p. m."— Ed. 
 
18 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 the positions tliey had defoiidcd until tlien ; so tliat Plcasonron 
 and himself soon united with both Russell's infantry and Kil- 
 patrick's cavalry. Stuart, on his part, following the movement 
 of the latter, had joined that portion of his forces which he had 
 left in order to repair to Brandy Station. The two hostile army 
 corps Avere therefore fronting each other, mutually watching and 
 cannonading. But Pleasonton, satisfied with the results he had 
 obtained and the ground he had gained, and not hearing anything 
 from Duffi6, did not wish to renew the combat. He had proved 
 to the Confederates that his cavalry were fully as good as theirs. 
 His sudden attack, the close fighting with small-arms, and the 
 losses he had inflicted upon the enemy, made Stuart relinquish 
 his design, if he had entertained such, of attempting a raid upon 
 the rear of the Federal army. On the other hand, Pleasontou's 
 reconnoissance had not only revealed to him the strength of the 
 Confederate cavalry, but also the presence of a numerous infantry 
 force at Culpeper. This was the most important result for the 
 future of the campaign : he was not, then, confronted by a mere 
 squadron of cavalry, but by a portion of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia. Lee's movement was unmasked. Pleasonton could 
 not communicate to his chief more important or more reliable 
 information : he hastened to forward it to him. It arrived in 
 time to enlighten Hooker and decide him to follow his adver- 
 sary. 
 
 About five o'clock Pleasonton gave the order for retreat, which 
 was effected without difficulty. Before dark all the troops had re- 
 crossed the Rappahannock. The losses on both sides were serious, 
 amounting to nearly six hundred men for each of the two adver- 
 saries, between two hundred and fifty and three hundred of whom 
 were prisoners, and most of them wounded. The Confederates 
 had captured two dismounted guns ; the Federals carried off a 
 stand of colors. But the importance of the battle of Brandy 
 Station cannot be measured by those figures, for it opens a new 
 era in the war we are describing. For the first time the Federal 
 cavalry, confiding in its own resources, has gone en masse to 
 attack that of the enemy. For the first time these two bodies of 
 troops have fought a regular pitched battle, in which the infan- 
 try and artillery have plaj^ed but an insigjiificant part; and, as a 
 
BRANDY STATION. 19 
 
 natural consequence of this change of tactics, sabres and pistols 
 have in these encounters taken the place of the musket ; for the 
 first time the sabre has made a large number of victims. 
 
 The conflict of the 9th of June could not thwart Lee's plans 
 nor seriously embarrass Stuart as to the role which had been 
 assigned to him, as it was his duty, above all, to cover the move- 
 ments of the infantry ; but he foresaw that this r6le would be 
 a difficult one in the presence of so stubborn an adversary. It 
 was a serious warning to the Confederate cavalry to be on its 
 guard and keep close together, in order that tlie veil which it 
 was charged to draw between the two armies might not be 
 pierced again. 
 
 With regard to Hooker, he knew on the morning of the 10th 
 that General Lee, with a portion of his infantry, was at Culpeper 
 the day before. But the information obtained by his troopers at 
 the cost of their blood not being under control like the news 
 gathered by the enemy through their intercourse with the inhab- 
 itants, all in sympathy with the cause of the South, was naturally 
 very imperfect. ThuSj while the two army corps of Longstreet 
 and Ewell were at Culpeper on the 9th, the Union general be- 
 lieved that the latter was still on the right bank of the Rapidan 
 in the neighborhood of Chancellorsville. Consequently, he could 
 not yet fathom the designs of his adversary. Did the latter intend 
 to make a descent into the A^alley of Virginia, supporting his 
 cavalry with a corps of infantry, or did he propose to renew the 
 movement which had secured him the victory of Manassas the 
 previous year, by boldly throwing himself between Washington 
 and the Army of the Potomac? Such were the two eventual- 
 ities which Hooker asked his government to be prepared for. 
 Without attempting to form an idea of the bold and brilliant 
 conception by which Lee, with all his army, was going to slip 
 through his hands in order to reach Pennsylvania before him, he 
 had fully understood that the valley of the Shenandoah might 
 be the scene of an expedition after Jackson's fashion. We have 
 stated that he had notified his superiors of the fact since the 
 5th : he renewed this warning on tlie 10th in announcing the 
 battle of Brandy Station. No notice was taken of it at Wash- 
 ington : we shall see presently the consequences of this neglect. 
 
20 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 It was evident that the enemy, whatever might be hisi ultf^rlor 
 plan, had commenced an aggressive campaign, and that by extend- 
 ing his left as far as Culpeper he weakened his right at Fredericks- 
 burg, Hooker, being master of the Rappahannock lords, had 
 only to march upon the positions at Hamilton's to capture all the 
 famous defences of Murye's Hill, which he had already caused to 
 be evacuated once by his manoeuvres. His army, admirably con- 
 centrated, possessed every advantage over the Confederates, who 
 were even more scattered than he had imagined. He would 
 have had only Hill's single corps to fight. Ewell, although 
 he was still unaware of the fact, was too far away to be able to 
 harass him during this operation. It is true that Longstreet 
 could have struck his rear from Culpeper and separated him 
 from Washington, but such a desperate attempt could neither 
 have afforded relief to Hill's corps, which a speedy retreat alone 
 could save, nor have seriously menaced the true base of oper- 
 ations of the Army of the Potomac, which was upon the river at 
 Aquia Creek. 
 
 Hill once dislodged, the road to Richmond was open. Hooker, 
 with that unerring judgment for which, unfortunately, he was 
 more distinguished in the council than on the battlefield, appre- 
 ciated all the benefit that could be derived from the movement 
 of his adversary. Why not march directly upon the capital of 
 the enemy ? It was an almost infallible means of cutting short 
 Lee's projects of invasion ; and if the latter, to use a comparison 
 which it is said he had just employed in talking with his generals, 
 should attempt to play " queen for queen," if he should sacrifice 
 Richmond in order to march upon Washington, all the advan- 
 tage would have redounded in favor of the Federals. In war, 
 as well as at chess, such play always benefits him who has most 
 resources. The game Avas not equal, for Washington with its 
 immense -fortifications, its formidable artillery, its garrison of 
 thirty-six thousand men, which Schenck's troops, coming from 
 Harper^s Ferry and Baltimore, would have increased to fifty 
 thousand, could have defied all Lee's efforts ; whilst without an 
 army to cover Richmond, President Davis could not have de- 
 fended his capital for five minutes, completely disgarnished as 
 it was at that time. The fifteen thousand men that General 
 
BHANDY STATION. 21 
 
 Halleck had unnecessarily left under Keyes' command in the 
 peninsula of Virginia since the siege of Suffolk had been raised 
 would then have swelled the ranks of the Army of the Potomac, 
 while the latter, as Hooker himself said, would have been greatly 
 the gainer by being farther away from Washington. 
 
 But, putting the capture of Washington out of the question, 
 the game would not have been equal. In fact, betAveen the 
 invasion of the North by the Southern armies and that of the 
 Soutli by the armies of the North there was a difference about 
 which too much cannot be said M'hen all the features of the 
 war are taken into consideration. The Federal armies could 
 attempt the conquest of the Southern States systematically. In 
 Virginia especially the coast afforded everywhere bases of ope- 
 ration which enabled them to establish themselves with more 
 or less strength throughout one-half of that State. The re- 
 sources of the Confederacy were limited in men, material, and 
 means of transportation. Being limited in men, Mr. Davis 
 was not able to improvise any kind of defence if Lee's army, 
 upon which the safety of the Confederacy depended, should be 
 engaged in wasrino: war in the Northern States. Limited in 
 material, there was not enough on hand to repair, as his adver- 
 saries could do, the losses which he might have sustained in that 
 region. Limited in means of transportation, these would have 
 been found completely wanting on the first serious trouble caused 
 by the enemy in the disarrangement of railroad lines, while the 
 damage, which in the North would only have proved an insig- 
 nificant trifle, would paralyze all the railroad service necessary 
 to the continuation of the Avar. Lee's army, freed for a Avhile 
 from the Army of the Potomac, could undoubtedly have caused 
 incalculable injury to the Northern States; but there Avas too 
 much to destroy, too many immense spaces of ground to traA'erse, 
 a hostile population too numerous to get through, for such injury 
 to compensate for the harm Avhich his adversaries Avould liaA'c 
 been able to inflict upon the Confederacy during the same period 
 of time. In order that the iuA^asion might produce decisiA^e results, 
 Lee should have been able, by a brilliant A^ictory previously 
 achieved, to cripple the Army of the Potomac for some time. 
 We shall refer again to this subject, to show how much the 
 
22 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Confederates had cause to regret having believed for a moment 
 that matters could have turned out dilferently. 
 
 All that we propose to demonstrate at present is that Hooker's 
 idea ^vas correct and suggestive. He did not succeed in convin- 
 cing either the President or General Halleck. He was told in 
 reply not to mind Richmond, but to attend to Lee's army, and to 
 pursue or attack the latter either on the march or in its encamp- 
 ments ; as if the movement against Hill was not the best way to 
 strike at the weak point of this army and to thwart all the proj- 
 ects of its chief ! 
 
 Hooker had nothing to do but to manoeuvre so as to follow 
 his adversary — to cover Washington and, if possible. Harper's 
 Ferry. He had to avoid, on the one hand, being taken in 
 the rear, as Pope had been ; on the other, not to allow him- 
 self to be drawn too far from the capital in some position 
 where the enemy might be able to concentrate all his forces 
 against him. 
 
 Such was, in fact, Lee's secret desire : his own report proves 
 it ; and if Hooker had followed the advice of Halleck and Lin- 
 coln, recommending him to try to cut the enemy's column in two, 
 he would have done precisely what his adversary most earnestly 
 wished. We will prove this when we shall have shown the posi- 
 tions subsequently occupied by the Confederate army. Thence- 
 forth, to accomplish this thankless and difficult task, Hooker 
 had to use as much vigilance as prudence. Allowing Lee to 
 assume the offensive role, he had to guess his movements, to fol- 
 low him, to be everywhere on his guard, and to prepare for a 
 great battle which circumstances might either hasten or delay; 
 in short, he had to learn not to dispute any apparent advantages 
 to the enemy, nor to allow himself to be disconcerted by the com- 
 motion that such advantages might rouse in the North. 
 
 Unfortunately, the position in which Hooker was placed by his 
 government rendered this task still more difficult. The chieftain 
 who had to hold such an adversary as Lee in check should have 
 had direct and entire control of all the troops that could be called 
 upon to take part in the campaign. Such was not Hooker's case. 
 We have stated elsewhere that a small army occupied the mouths 
 of the James and York Rivers. Since the raising; of the sieo;e of 
 
nUAXVY STATION. 23 
 
 Suffolk this force should have been reduced to such garrisous as 
 were necessary for the defence of strategic positions ; but whereas 
 Longstreet had brought back his army corps to Fredericlvsburg, 
 Keyes was left at Yorktown wdth forces too small to exercise 
 any serious influence over military operations, and yet sufficiently 
 numerous to make the Army of the Potomac bitterly regret their 
 absence. We have seen that Keyes, besides the garrison, had 
 a )0ut fifteen thousand available men : since the early part of 
 June he had formed the project of marching them against Rich- 
 mond, thinking that he would thus oblige the enemy to retain a 
 portion of the reinforcements intended for Lee in that city, or 
 that, finding the capital disgarnished, he might surprise and cap- 
 ture it. The Washington authorities, who had encouraged this 
 scheme, acknowledged that it was impracticable, but only after 
 Keyes had returned to Yorktown without having encountered a 
 solitary enemy or attempted aught against Richmond. As will 
 be seen presently, this fruitless ex])edition was brought to an end 
 on the very day wdien the fate of the nation was being decided 
 in Pennsylvania. At the North a body of troops of the same 
 strength found itself in a similar position : it consisted of INIil- 
 roy's and Tyler's divisions — one about six thousand nine hundred 
 strong, and the other numlx;ring nine thousand men — stationed 
 at Winchester and Harper's Ferry. 
 
 Since ]\IcClellan's departure for the Virginia peninsula in the 
 month of !March, 1862, we have witnessed a continuation of the 
 quarrel which broke ^out at that time between the commander of 
 the Army of the Potomac and the authorities at Washington con- 
 cerning the occupation of the Valley of Virginia : the latter still 
 desired to keep a small independent army on the borders of the 
 Shenandoah in order to close the outlet of this stream against the 
 enemy, as it afforded the easiest way for invading the Northern 
 States. 
 
 Fremont's defeats and Miles' disaster, which had caused this 
 valley to be dubbed in the North with the name of the " Val- 
 ley of Humiliation," had not enlightened the Secretaiy of War 
 regarding the danger of his plan. It was undoubtedly necessary 
 to protect the rich counties of Western Maryland and Southern 
 Pennsylvania against the incursions of Virginia partisans; the 
 
 C 
 
24 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which possessed a vast sti-ategic im- 
 portance, had to be secured against their depredations ; but these 
 troopers, so swift in their movements, and yet so few in number, 
 should have been opposed, as was done in the West, by small 
 posts ecJieloned in block-houses connected by active and well- 
 mounted regiments of cavalry. Amply sufficient for keeping 
 partisans in check, the troops in these posts, instead of offering 
 a temj)ting prey to the enemy, could have been withdrawn with- 
 out loss whenever a real invasion took place. Instead of this. 
 Harper's Ferry had been converted into a stronghold compri- 
 sing a vast range of fortifications to defend this crossing of the 
 Potomac, although the river was fordable in summer at various 
 points a short distance higher up : then, in order to protect the 
 railroad, Winchester had been fortified in the same manner. 
 Large quantities of materiel had been subsequently deposited in 
 these two places when it was found necessary to place strong 
 garrisons in them ; so that the sixteen thousand men under Tyler 
 and Milroy found themselves attached to two points which pos- 
 sessed no strategic value whatever in themselves, and which were 
 only thus guarded on account of their artificial importance. Of 
 cavalry, Avhich alone could have been useful to him, Milroy had 
 absolutely none : he could not clear his way for any distance 
 along the road which had once led Jackson's soldiers to victory. 
 Surrounded by a network of hostile partisans who defied capture, 
 he did not extend his rule south beyond the junction of the two 
 brandies of the Shenandoah. On the other hand, he exercised his 
 power, it is said, with extreme severity : his exactions and rigor- 
 ous measures against the inhabitants who refused to take the oath 
 of allegiance had been made the subject of protests on the part 
 of the Confederate government. 
 
 Milroy, Tyler, the Baltimore garrison, and General Kelley's 
 division, which occupied West Virginia, were subordinate to 
 General Scheuck. In Washington itself General Heintzelman 
 was in command, who, besides the depots, the regiments under 
 instruction, and the artillery of the forts, had under his control 
 several thousand infantry ready to take the field, and Stahel's 
 division of cavalry, numbering six thousand horses, whose only 
 task was to pursue Mosby and the few hundred partisans led by 
 
BRANDY STATION. 25 
 
 this daring chief. Heintzelman's total forces araouuted to no 
 less than thirty-six thousand men. 
 
 Keves, Schenck, and Heintzelman acted under the immediate 
 authority of Halleck, who sought thereby to add the command 
 of these detached corps to the supreme direction of the various 
 armies — a command which he did not relinquish even when he 
 seemingly allowed Hooker to exercise its functions for a while. 
 The latter, therefore, was in the same situation in which INIcClel- 
 lan was placed one year previously. 
 
 On the 11th of June the commander of the Army of the 
 Potomac began the movement which was rendered necessary by 
 that of his adversary. The presence of Lee with a portion of his 
 army at Culpeper obliged Hooker to extend his right wing along 
 the Upper Rappahannock, which his cavalry was no longer strong 
 enough to defend. His army had to prepare to face westward, 
 whether Lee's intention was to cross this river or to ascend it, in 
 order to reach the valleys which stretch out along the two slopes 
 of the Blue Ridge. 
 
 On the 11th the Third corps was ordered to take a position 
 along the Rappahannock between Beverly Ford and Rappahan- 
 nock Station. On the 12th two other corps were sent to occupy 
 positions whence they could aiford it speedy relief or dispute 
 the passes of the Bull Run Mountains to the enemy if the latter 
 should follow the road which Jackson had traced out the preced- 
 ing year. The First corps proceeded to establish itself at Beale- 
 t(5n Station, and the Second,* more in the rear, at Catlett's Station : 
 they reached these points on the 13th. The right wing, thus com- 
 posed of three corps, was placed under Reynolds, commanding the 
 First corps, an officer in whom Hooker justly placed the utmost 
 confidence. Echeloned along the railroad, this wing could easily 
 concentrate itself either on the Rappahannock or at Warrenton, 
 or at Manassas if Washington itself was menaced. Hooker re- 
 mained with the left wing, composed of the other four corps, 
 near Falmouth, facing south. 
 
 Tn the mean while, Lee, being under no obligation to discuss 
 his plan of campaign with his government, and exercising abso- 
 lute authority over the various bodies of troops which had to 
 * It was the Eleventh. — Ed. 
 
26 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 co-operate in its execution, pursued it with his wonted zeal. 
 The invasion of the Northern States being his object, he had 
 selected from the very outset the way he intended to follow, 
 from which he did not deviate until he had reached the banks of 
 the Susquehanna, We have described the valley of the Shenan- 
 doah at sufficient length to obviate the necessity of pointing out 
 in this place the advantages it oifered him. The ridges running 
 parallel to the Blue Ridge and the Bull Run Mountains, inter- 
 sected by a few defiles easily occupied, formed, at the east, a species 
 of screen, which entirely masked his movements, while the valley 
 itself, wide and possessing good roads, afforded him great facilities 
 for the performance of those long marches which constituted the 
 chief element of the superiority of his soldiers over their adver- 
 saries. It is true that by following this valley he got away from 
 Washington, but this was, in our opinion, the best reason for 
 choosing this route. The position of Washington on the border of 
 Virginia may at times have been a source of anxiety to the Fed- 
 eral government : owing to this exaggerated and thoughtless anx- 
 iety, it had proved a serious obstacle in all aggressive campaigns 
 undertaken against Richmond, but at the same time it has been an 
 incalculable advantage in a strategic point of view. Washington, 
 barely defended, had prevented Johnston's victorious army from 
 advancing as far as the Susquehanna in July, 1861, and enlisting 
 the whole of Maryland in support of the Confederate cause. A 
 few months later, the Federal capital, surrounded by powerful 
 works, became an impregnable base of operations for the Army 
 of the Potomac on the very boundary of the enemy's territory. 
 When Lee had driven Pope's troops, conquered at Manassas, back 
 into these works, he became convinced that his great victory did not 
 open to him the gates of Washington, and the next day he tm-ned 
 his back upon this city and pushed his way into Maryland. The 
 position of the capital, located near the seaboard and connected with 
 the coast by a line of railway to Annapolis and Baltimore, enabled 
 the Federals to keep it as a base of operations, even though the 
 invader should pass beyond it to the north : the latter could only 
 invest it and isolate it by making a complete circuit in order to 
 take a position along Chesapeake Bay. This manoeuvre exposed 
 him to attack in flank by the Federal army, which, remaining near 
 
BRANDY STATION. 27 
 
 the capital, occupied the interior of the circle he would have 
 to describe. If, oil the other hand, he passed near Washington 
 without stopping to lay siege to the place, he ran the risk of see- 
 ing this army fall upon his rear. It was therefore in Lee's inter- 
 est not to go near it, and to endeavor, while moving away from it, 
 to draw his adversaries after him. In fact, the more he separated 
 them from their base the more he weakened them, thereby increas- 
 ing his chances in the decisive battle he had to deliver either south 
 or north of the Potomac before he could make the free States 
 seriously feel the weight of the invasion. 
 
 We have stated elsewhere that the Blue Ridge and the Valley 
 of Virginia extended from the left bank of the Potomac under 
 the name of South INIountain and Cumberland Valley. From 
 Chambereburg the waters of tlie last-mentioned valley flow south 
 toward the Potomac : at about the same elevation as this village 
 the general direction of the adjacent mountains inclines strongly 
 to the north-eastward, while a slope trending in a contrary direction 
 from the preceding one conducts the water-courses which lave its 
 base toward the great Susquehanna River, into which they empty 
 in the vicinity of Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. The 
 Virginia Valley route had also the advantage, therefore, of con- 
 ducting the Confederates by the most direct route, enabling them 
 to cross the Potomac where it is always fordable in summer, and 
 masking their movements behind the South IMountain ridge, to 
 the very heart of the powerful commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
 Harrisburg, in fact, is not only the political superior of wealthy 
 Philadelphia : it is also one of the capitals of the iron and coal 
 trade, one of the centres of the large Carboniferous basin which 
 supplies all the workshops, as well as all the steamships of the 
 the United States, with anthracite coal. The destruction of the 
 railway lines which radiate from this basin, of the machinery 
 which extracts the combustible material, and of the forges that 
 consume it, would have dealt a terrible blow to the aggressive 
 power of the North. 
 
 It was again the Second corps ■\\hich was ordered to precede 
 the rest of the army into the Valley of Virginia, where nearly 
 eveiy village reminded it of some glorious combat. The memory 
 of Jackson sustained his old soldiers in this new campaign, and 
 
28 THE CIVIL WAE IN AMERICA. 
 
 the brave officer who had the honor to succeed him was about to 
 show himself worthy of being their leader. The Federals thought 
 that the bloody conflict of Brandy Station would not allow Lee 
 to extend his columns, and that he would hesitate to expose his 
 flank to an adversary who had just crossed the Rappahannock 
 in order to attack him near Culpcper, But he did not allow him- 
 ^If to be embarrassed for an instant by this demonstration. Stuart, 
 with four of the brigades that had fought at Brandy Station, Avas 
 directed to watch the euepiy's cavalry. If he had intended to 
 cross the Rappahannock, that project was abandoned : the task 
 of masking the movements of the infantry was sufficient occu- 
 pation for him, preventing a thought of undertaking a raid on 
 his own account. Longstreet remained at Culpeper with his 
 corps, to form the centre of the long column which was to 
 extend from Fredericksburg to within sight of the JVIaryland 
 mountains ; and on the morning of the 10th, Ewell resumed his 
 line of march. Two brigades of cavalry were ordered to clear 
 his way. Imboden's brigade, which was already among the 
 upper valleys of the Alleghanies above Romney, was instructed 
 to cover his left and destroy the track of the Baltimore and 
 Ohio Railroad, in order to prevent Milroy from receiving rein- 
 forcements from the West. Jenkins' brigade preceded the 
 infantry into the valley of the Shenandoah, which it had left 
 only a few days before. These two brigades, which had but 
 recently been really attached to the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia,* were admirably adapted for the performance of such a 
 task : not only did every soldier know the ground he was about 
 to travel over, but, as the event demonstrated, their presence 
 caused no alarm to the Federals, who for many months past 
 had been in the habit of coming in contact with them. 
 
 Accustomed to marching, not burdened with heavy loads — for 
 they carried only a blanket, some cartridges, and a little bread — 
 sleeping in the open air, relying upon the resources of the country 
 for food, Ewell's soldiers advanced rapidly toward the Valley of 
 Virginia. His three divisions and 'twenty batteries, Avhich had 
 left Culpeper on the 10th, passed through Sperryville, Gaines' 
 
 * Jones' brigade is reported as " attached" in the returns of this army for the 
 month of May. Imboden's brigade was never officially connected -vvitli it. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 29 
 
 Cross-roads, and Flint Hill, crossing the Blue Ridge at Chester 
 Gap, and, pushing beyond Front Royal, reached the banks of 
 the Shenandoah at Cedarville on the evening of the 12th. Ewell 
 immediately made all necessary arrangements for reaping the 
 greatest possible benefit from the ignorance which his adver- 
 saries were still laboring under in regard to his movements. 
 Although he had already marched fifty miles since the day 
 previous, Rodes led his division as far as Stone Ridge, five 
 miles farther on the direct road to Berryville. It was, in fact, 
 a question of surprising McReynolds' Federal brigade, which 
 Milroy had posted in this village for the purpose of connecting 
 Winchester with Harper's Ferry. Jenkins was directed to pre- 
 cede Rodes in this- movement. Ewell, with the rest of his corps, 
 proposed to gain the main road from Woodstock to Winchester 
 at the west, in order to reach that city by the front. Thoroughly 
 informed concerning the slightest details of the enemy's positions 
 by partisans who were constantly penetrating the Federal lines, 
 and particularly by an officer as bold as he was intelligent — Major 
 Harry Gilmor, whose military career was full of adventures — 
 Ewell was enabled to form his whole plan of attack in advance. 
 We have already described the configuration of the neighbor- 
 hood of Winchester on the occasion of the fight at Kernstown. 
 Between this village and the town itself, south-east of the latter, 
 stand the hills which the Federals occupied when Jackson received 
 a check : the highest of them is called Bower's Hill. The posi- 
 tion is covered by Abraham's Creek, which afterward turns north- 
 eastward, encircling a portion of the town. Bower's Hill is only 
 the extremity of a range of hillocks, similar to those to be found 
 in that country, which, under the name of Applepie Ridge, ex- 
 tends for a distance of about twelve miles in the direction of 
 Martinsburg and the Potomac. North-west of Winchester, Apple- 
 pie Ridge is composed of three parallel ridges, the farthest one 
 commanding the other two, and the nearest being almost within 
 a stone's throw of the city. It was upon this last-mentioned 
 ridge that the Federals had erected their system of defences the 
 preceding year. This consisted of a continuous enclosure and a 
 fortification forming a large redoubt. The intervening ridge, 
 called Flint Hill, had remained unoccupied during the whole 
 
30 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMEllICA. 
 
 winter. It was only within the last few weeks that the Federals 
 had begun to fortify it : the works, scarcely laid out, only mounted 
 a few field-pieces. This new fortification was the only one of 
 which Ewcll h:i(l no knowledge; consequently, his plan was to 
 send the Third division, under Early, to take possession of Flint 
 Hill, while llodes cut off the enemy's line of retreat toward the 
 Potomac;, and Johnson, with one division, detained them on the 
 old battlefield of Kernstown, so that they would find themselves 
 invested in Winchester as Miles had been the year before at Har- 
 per's Ferry. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, Early reached the main road near 
 Newtown, and pushed on toward Winchester, whilst Johnson was 
 marching in the same direction, following the Front Royal road 
 on his right. Milroy did not as yet have the least suspicion that 
 a force fully three times as large as his own, and composed of the 
 6lite of the Confederate army, would make an attack upon him 
 within a few hours. In order to obtain all available information 
 he had taken every precaution which the nature of the task en- 
 trusted to him required. He had organized a band of guerillas, 
 known by the name of "Jessie Scouts," whose members, dis- 
 guised as Confederate soldiers, overran the country and enacted 
 the part of spies as much as that of warriors. On the 12th he 
 sent out two strong reconnoissances on the Woodstock and Front 
 Royal roads. The first encountered a portion of Jenkins' bri- 
 gade in the vicinity of Newtown, and even succeeded in drawing 
 these troopers into an ambush where they sustained serious losses ; 
 but their presence in those localities was nothing unusual. The 
 second expedition was not pushed far enough, and INIilroy com- 
 mitted the error of attaching too little importance to the intelli- 
 gence it brought him regarding the arrival at Front Royal of one 
 of the enemy's corps. He could not imagine how a portion of 
 Lee's array should have been able to leave the banks of the Rap- 
 pahannock and come in search of him at Winchester without 
 General Halleck being informed of the fact, and notifying him 
 accordingly, with his instructions in regard to the matter. In 
 fact, we have shown that the general-in-chief had been apprised 
 since the 10th of the presence of Lee witli an army corps at Cul- 
 pepei^ — that Hooker, after vainly requesting to be allowed the 
 
BliANDY STATION. 31 
 
 control of all the troops in Virginia, had pointed out the valley 
 of the Shenandoah, to the authorities at Washington, as being the 
 point particularly menaced by this concentration of the enemy's 
 forces ; and the reports that Pleasonton sent him from the Upper 
 Rappahannock concerning the probable movements of the enemy, 
 all of which contained the same information, were forwarded 
 directly to Halleck. Yet the latter never gave the unfortunate 
 Milroy any intimation of tliese facts, and left him in utter 
 ignorance of the danger that menaced him. It is true that at a 
 later period, the 11th, when he was better informed, he sent a 
 despatch to General Schenck indicating Harper's Ferry as the 
 only point to be defended, and directing him to leave nothing 
 more in Winchester, either in material or troops, than he needed 
 to watch the valley ; but, by a still stranger oversight, he issued 
 his instructions in a general form, witliout alluding to the possible 
 approach of an army corps of the enemy or particularizing in any 
 way how those instructions were to be carried out. Consequently, 
 Schenck did not deem it necessary to direct Milroy to evacuate 
 Winchester. He revoked the order issued to that effect by his 
 chief of staff, who had received the despatch during his absence, 
 and, while prej)aring to leave the place himself, recommended 
 his lieutenant to remain there and defend it until he received 
 further instructions; which instructions were never destined to 
 reach him. 
 
 Such was the situation of tlie Federals on the morning of the 
 13th. From daybreak, Milroy, conforming to his instructions, 
 prepared to make a stand against what he believed to be a mere 
 incursion of the enemy's cavalry. McReynolds was recalled 
 from Berryville ; his two other brigades advanced south of Win- 
 chester and took position — that of General Elliott on the right, 
 and Colonel Ely's brigade on tlie left — on the battlefield of Kerns- 
 town : being obliged to leave a portion of their effective force in 
 the forts, these troops did not number altogether more than five 
 thousand men. Notwithstanding their numerical weakness, they 
 made a bold stand before the imposing forces which Ewcll de- 
 ployed in front of them. 
 
 Elliott occupied the hills on the other side of Abraham's Creek : 
 Early had to bring his whole division into line and outflank his 
 Vol. III.— 31 
 
32 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 right in order to dislodge him. The Federals, recrossing the 
 stream, occupied ]3o\ver's Hill in great force. Night was ap- 
 proaching; Early's soldiers, who had marched nearly seventy- 
 five miles in three days, were fatigued, and did not molest them 
 in this new position. On their right, Johnson encountered 
 Colonel Ely's line about two miles and a half from Winches- 
 ter, and after a brisk engagement drove it slowly before him. 
 
 One may form an idea of the astonishment of Milroy and his 
 officers on finding themselves attacked by such forces : the mys- 
 tery was soon unravelled. The first prisoner who fell into their 
 hands informed them that he belonged to Hays' brigade of the 
 Second corjjs of Lee's army. INIilroy might have evacuated Win- 
 chester during the night — he could undoubtedly have saved the 
 largest portion of his division and his artillery — but the instruc- 
 tions of his chief were explicit, and he was naturally ignorant of 
 the fact that at the very moment when Jenkins cut ofl' his retreat 
 in the afternoon of the 13th the telegraph was bringing him in- 
 structions of a different character. He thought that the Army 
 of the Potomac would follow close upon that of Lee, and that 
 the defence of Winchester would not be without effect. Besides, 
 his retreat would have seriously compromised the fate of Mc- 
 Reynolds' brigade, which was then on the march, and which 
 only joined him at ten o'clock in the evening. He decided to 
 remain. It was a misfortune for him, but he should not be 
 blamed for it. 
 
 During this time Rodes had been marching upon Berryville, 
 but the prey he had hoped to find there had escaped. McRey- 
 nolds was on his way to Winchester, not by the direct road, which 
 he knew to be too much exposed, except by making a large circuit 
 to the north. The Confederate cavalry alone was able to follow 
 him. Rodes, deceived as to the direction he had taken, and 
 having entirely lost his track, went to look for him toward 
 Martinsburg, and bivouacked on the evening of the 13th at 
 Summit Station, between Winchester and Charlestown. 
 
 The day of the 14th was to decide INIilroy 's fate and that of 
 his troops. Daylight having appeared, he could no longer think 
 of evacuating the place in the presence of the enemy's forces that 
 were menacing him ; but he had taken advantage of the night 
 
BRANDY STATION, 33 
 
 to abandon the positions he had occupied the day before, and to 
 concentrate his small band among the forts and in the noitheru 
 part of the city. Early in the morning Ewell had reconnoitred 
 the ground from the heights of Bower's Hill : he had noticed the 
 new works erected on Flint Hill. It was decided that Early 
 should carry them by assault whilst Jolinson drew the enemy's 
 attention in the direction of the south. The former started at 
 once with three brigades, beginning with a retrograde movement 
 in order the better to conceal his object, and by describing a large 
 arc of a circle west of Winchester through devious roads which 
 the inhabitants hastened to point out to him. 
 
 In order to avoid the enemy's patrols, and to keep constantly 
 hidden behind the swells in the ground, he thus retrograded 
 three miles from Winchester, traversed the Romney road 
 unperceived, and finally reached the foot of the third hillock, 
 Applepie Ridge, the highest and most distant from Winchester, 
 at four o'clock in the afternoon. The summit of this ridge, 
 situated a little more than a mile from the works of Flint Hill, 
 was crowned with a wood which admitted of its being secretly 
 occupied. After having reconnoitred the place, the heat being 
 intense. Early gave his troops some rest. In the mean time, 
 Ewell was directing attacks upon the Federal positions from 
 Bower's Hill — attacks which his numerical superiority rendered 
 most effective — but, hobbling about on his crutches, without 
 noticing the projectiles that were falling around him, he paid 
 but little attention to these attacks, turning all the time his 
 field-glass toward the heights which Early was to storm. As 
 to ]\Iilroy, posted upon a kind of observatory which stood in 
 the centre of the fort, he watched attentively the combat that 
 was taking place at the south, and, turning his back upon Flint 
 Hill, seemed to have no suspicion of the danger which menaced 
 him on that side. He had sent out a reconnoitring party on the 
 Pughtown and Romney roads, which, having no doubt gone a 
 little ahead of Early's column, returned Avithout having encoun- 
 tered a single enemy. Deceived by this report, he committed the 
 error — the only one for which he could be severely blamed — of 
 not clearing the approaches of Flint Hill and of not placing a 
 single post upon the surrounding heights. In other respects he 
 
34 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 could do uotliing but wait passively for the moment wheu it 
 should please the enemy to make a decisive attack. 
 
 In the mean while, the day is lingering out slowly in the midst 
 of partial engagements, though every one felt that some severe 
 blow would soon be struck. Finally, at six o'clock a discharge 
 of artillery is heard north-west of Flint Ilill. Ewell has recog- 
 nized Early's twenty pieces of artillery, which had been hauled 
 up the hill and placed in battery along the edge of the wood 
 fronting the enemy's works, without the latter having noticed the 
 circumstance. Milroy has only to turn round to see the unfinished 
 works of Flint Hill covered with shells and the fire of tlicir guns 
 speedily silenced : he issues an order to reinforce the garrison and 
 to attack the enemy's batteries ; but too late. In less than half 
 an hour after the latter have opened fire Hays' brigade, emerging 
 from the wood, rushes forward to the assault, scales the acclivity 
 of Flint Hill, and penetrates the works at the moment when 
 the defenders, too few in number to offer any serious resistance, 
 are falling back upon the place, protected by the fire from the 
 fort. Hays immediately directs the fire of the guns he has just 
 captured against this fort, and Milroy is compelled to acknow- 
 ledge the impossibility of repairing this disaster by an aggressive 
 return. 
 
 The Confederates, on their part, satisfied with, the results 
 obtained, and seeing night approaching, deemed it unnecessary 
 to attack the forts in which Milroy had gathered his troops. 
 From the position they occupied they could have demolished 
 these forts and covered the Federals with shot wherever they 
 might be looking for shelter : the latter, to fill up the measure 
 of their misfortune, had neither provisions nor ammunition left. 
 The investment of the place, therefore, could only result in an 
 immediate capture. 
 
 Fortunately, Milroy had the night before him to avoid — at the 
 cost of painful sacrifices, it is true — the disgrace of a capitulation 
 similar to that of Miles. Sustained by the advice of a council 
 of war — quite superfluous, however — he made immediate prep- 
 arations for evacuating the place. Leaving his sick, Avounded, 
 artillery, and wagons behind him, he set out with his cavalry 
 and infantry, avoiding the town of Winchester, whose inhabit- 
 
BRANDY STATION. 35 
 
 ants would not have failed to betray his movements, and gained 
 the jNIartinsburg road without being perceived by the enemy. 
 The Confederates seemed to have somewhat slackened in their 
 wonted vigilance, for the Union column had already marched 
 five miles in the stillness and darkness of the night when, just 
 as they were reaching Rocktown, General Elliott, who was at the 
 head, was received by a sudden volley of musketry fired at close 
 range from a wood and fields on the right of the road. This 
 time the Federals were again unlucky, for they did not succeed in 
 avoiding their adversaries. Ewell had wisely thought that they 
 would probably make an effort to get away from him ; but as he 
 was desirous, while barring their way to Harper's Ferry, to hold 
 his forces ready to invest them if they should remain in the place, 
 he directed Johnson to take position during the night, with three 
 brigades, about two miles and a half east of Wincheikr. John- 
 son, finding the road, which had been indicated to him as being 
 very rough, made a wide detour in order to plant himself along the 
 railroad at Stevenson's Depot, near Rocktown. He had reached 
 this point about half-past three o'clock in the morning with two 
 brigades — the third, under "Walker, having been delayed by some 
 misunderstanding — when from the station he heard the Federal 
 column passing along the Martinsburg road, only a few hundred 
 yards from the railroad. He started at once to attack it in flank. 
 But the Federals were sufficiently strong in numbers to hold him 
 in check : they were stimulated by the necessity of forcing a pas- 
 sage, and, the column having promptly closed up its lines at the 
 point which had been attacked, Milroy assumed the offensive, try- 
 ing at first to break the centre, then to effect a breach successively 
 into both of the enemy's wings. The Confederates, being hard 
 pressed, resisted with difficulty. This was the time for the Federals 
 to have continued their march. Milroy gave orders to that effect : 
 unfortunately, the darkness and confusion prevented their execu- 
 tion. He waited in vain for McReynolds' brigade, which formed 
 the rear-guard, and which had no doubt already been scattered. 
 This delay was ruinous. In fact, it gave Walker's brigade time 
 to join Johnson and to fall upon the left flank of his forces, whilst 
 Gordon, with one of Early's brigades, hastened at the sound of 
 battle toward the road they had just followed. Milroy, finding 
 
86 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 himself menaced on all sides, directed all the troops which yet 
 remained under his control to follow the Martinsburg road, which 
 was yet free, trying to delay the pursuit of the enemy in order 
 that he might then push forward to the right in the direction 
 of Harper's Ferry. But the column soon became divided. The 
 largest portion gained the Alleghany ridges on the left in great 
 disorder: it finally reached the Potomac at Hancock without 
 being pursued, but still continued its precipitate retreat as far 
 as Pennsylvania, where it caused consternation and alarm every- 
 where. Other bands of fugitives, among whom was Milroy, arrived 
 at Harper's Ferry without having been molested. They had thus 
 avoided Podes, who, following an imaginary enemy, had pushed 
 as far as Martinsburg, whence he had dislodged a detachment of 
 Tyler's division in the evening. He had captured from the latter 
 six guns and two hundred prisoners, but in consequence of this 
 march he had not been able to receive Ewell's instructions in time 
 to completely cut oif jNIilroy's retreat. The victory of Winches- 
 ter delivered into the hands of the Confederates, according to their 
 own reports, 3358 able-bodied prisoners, 700 sick and wounded, 
 23 pieces of artillery, and 300 wagons : the small amount of 
 provisions left behind by the Federals was seized by the fore- 
 most soldiers who entered the forts. These various engagements 
 cost the Second corps only 47 killed, 219 w^ounded, and 3 pris- 
 oners. It was a brilliant commencement of the campaign which 
 was about to open : it was tlie more fortunate because it struck 
 the Federals at a point about which they were particularly 
 sensitive. From the manner in which he had directed their 
 marches, combined their attacks, and gathered the fruit of their 
 manoeuvres, Ewell won the confidence of Jackson's old soldiers. 
 
 No one, however, at the North, when telegraphic communica- 
 tions with Winchester were cut oif in the afternoon of the 13th, 
 suspected the fate which menaced this place, and the Washington 
 authorities did not believe in the presence of Ewell in the Valley 
 of Virginia until the 14th, when ]\Iilroy's fate had already l^een 
 virtually settled. 
 
 On the 12th, however. Hooker, always vigilant, having learned 
 from a negro that Ewell's corps had passed by Sperryville, con- 
 cluded that, not being able to attack Hill near Fredericksl)urg, 
 
BRANDY STATION. 37 
 
 he ought not to allow himself to be detained any longer by him on 
 the Lower Rappahannock, and that it was time to follow the 
 movements of the enemy toward the North with all his forces. 
 On the 13th the several corps of his army were on the march. 
 The Second, Sixth and Twelfth corps, which he had kept within 
 reach of Falmouth, were directed toward Dumfries, and thence 
 to Fairfax Court-house, with the reserve artillery, the trains, and 
 all the materiel which had not been shipped on the Potomac, it 
 having been decided to abandon the Aquia Creek depot. The 
 three corps stationed along the Upper Rappahannock, and Meade, 
 who with the Fifth was watching the junction of the two rivers, 
 being thus placed between the enemy and the route followed by 
 the bulk of the army, were ordered to cover this movement, to 
 follow it, and to halt at INIanassas. Once in these new positions, 
 facing west. Hooker's right and left became inverted. It was a 
 retreat which could not be disguised, but which circumstances 
 rendered unavoidable : the initiative belonged thenceforth to the 
 Confederates ; and without taking into consideration the marches 
 he might have to perform, either forward or backward, nor the 
 ground he might be obliged to relinquish, Hooker thought of no 
 other duty but to hold himself ready to ward off the blows which 
 Lee w^as about to strike against the most vulnerable points. 
 
 The programme laid out by Lee was carried out in every par- 
 ticular. On the 13th his army was deployed over a stretch of 
 ground exceeding one hundred miles in length, or rather divided 
 into three parts, separated by thirty-five miles on one side and 
 about sixty-six on the other. In this disposition, apparently so 
 dangerous. Hill's corps, as we have show^n, was the only one 
 exposed. This corps, added to that of Longstreet, would have 
 been sufficiently strong to fight a defensive battle against Hooker, 
 but it would have found it difficult to resist long enough, sin- 
 gle-handed, to allow the First corps time to return from Cul- 
 peper. Longstreet, on the contrary, was not menaced as Hill, who 
 was watching the movements of his adversaries along the left 
 bank of the river, and holding himself ready to follow them; 
 so that on the morning of the 14th, when he saw that the latter 
 had abandoned the Falmouth heights, he promptly set out to 
 join Longstreet. 
 
38 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 On the 15tli the situation of the two armies was therefore con- 
 BiJorably changed. The movement of tlie Federals was being 
 completed : the Army of the Potomac, concentrated at Manassas 
 and at Fairfax, covered Washington, ready to fight the enemy if 
 he sliould advance against the capitaL This movement was accom- 
 plished very quietly. The Second and Sixth corps, which closed 
 up the march, reached the positions assigned them in the evening. 
 The army thus occupied the territory which up to that time had been 
 under the surveillance of Stahel's division, which had been added to 
 Hooker's cavalry : at this moment it was a useful reinforcement. 
 Pleasonton was watching at the west, along the Rappahannock and 
 near Warrenton, the point of contact with Jones' cavalry. 
 
 The news of Milroy's disaster, spreading like wild-fire, had 
 caused a profound sensation in the North. People saw in it the 
 sure sign of an impending invasion. On being informed of the 
 investment of Winchester the day before, the President, General 
 Hal leek, and the Secretary of War, in a series of despatches 
 bearing evidence of the confusion into which this news had 
 thrown them, had asked Hooker either to go to the relief of 
 Milroy or to adopt their favorite plan of cutting the enemy's 
 column in two. " If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and 
 the tail of it on the plank-road between Fredericksburg and Chan- 
 cellorsville," said the President, " the animal must be very slim 
 somewhere." On the 15th, Milroy's fate was known, and his con- 
 duct more severely criticised than it deserved to be. This time, 
 however, it was Harper's Ferry itself, the object of Halleck's pre- 
 dilections, which was thought to be menaced by the larger portion 
 of Lee's army, and the general-in-chief immediately advised Hooker 
 to march upon Leesburg in order to prevent Lee from crossing the 
 Potomac. North of this river, General Couch, having been ordered 
 in great haste to Harrisburg, was trying to organize the Pennsylvania 
 militia ; but the calls of the governor did not meet as yet with 
 many responses, and Couch's zeal could not compensate for the 
 ignorance of his recruits. Terror already prevailed throughout 
 the wliole Cumberland Valley. In fact, Jenkins' troopers fol- 
 lowed the fugitives so close that on the evening of the 14th 
 he compelled them to cross the Potomac at Williamsport, after 
 dislodging them from ISIartinsburg. The substantial population 
 
BRANDY STATTON. 39 
 
 of all the neighboring towns in Maryland, remembering the 
 incursions of the previous year, fled in crowds, with all they 
 could carry off with them ; horses, mules, and especially cattle, 
 which they knew the Confederates were greatly in need of, were 
 driven northward in large herds, and these caravans, increasing- 
 in size at every step by the fear they created on all sides, finally 
 reached Plarrisburg. 
 
 On the 16th the capital of Pennsylvania was in a great state 
 of excitement, and while the people worked day and night in 
 raising barricades and regular fortifications, which they would 
 probably have had no means of defending, a solid mass of fugi- 
 tives was hurrying along the left bank of the Susquehanna, think- 
 ing there was no safety except north of that river. Never, it is 
 stated, had the bridge-toll produced such heav}' receipts. It was 
 precisely in the hope of not finding Cumberland Valley com- 
 pletely deserted that Jenkins was pushing northward so rapidly. 
 On the morning of the 16th he entered Greencastle, the first 
 Pennsylvania village, and reached Chambersburg during the 
 night. He seized all the horses, cattle, forage, provisions, and 
 medical stores he found there, paying in Confederate paper for 
 part, and confiscating the rest ; but his soldiers did not commit 
 any act of plunder, and the inhabitants themselves were obliged 
 to do justice to their discipline and good behavior. It is as- 
 serted, however, that he took a number of free negroes, whom he 
 sent South to be sold as slaves. On the 17th, while people were 
 expecting to see him continue his raid, and the Federals already 
 believed that the whole of Lee's army v/as at his back, he sud- 
 denly retraced his steps and joined General Podes, %vho with three 
 brigades had taken position at Williamsport on the left bank of 
 the Potomac. In fact, Ewell's soldiers had to wait for the two 
 other corps, which they had left so far behind. Lee was obliged 
 to concentrate his forces before entering Pennsylvania, and to hold 
 them always ready for battle. EwelFs three divisions, therefore, 
 remained between AVilliamsport and Winchester until the 19th, 
 the day of Longstreet's arrival within reacli of the latter city. 
 Imboden, at the west, had made a movement on the 16th similar 
 to that of Jenkins, and, occupying Cumberland on the 17th, had 
 cut off General Kelley's communications with Maryland. 
 
40 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 As soon as Lee, who had remained at Culpeper, was apprised 
 that Hill Avas on the way to join him, feeling thenceforth at ease on 
 that point, he put all the troops about him in motion. To deceive 
 the Federals and cover the march of Hill, who was to follow 
 the route traced out by Ewell as far as Winchester, he ordered 
 Lougstreet to cross the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge as if he 
 was marching upon Leesburg, and not to return west of this 
 chain except through Ashby's Gap and Snicker's Gap. The 
 First corps — whose eifective force Pickett had raised to three 
 divisions by his arrival from North Carolina with three brigades 
 — took up the line of march on the 15th. Stuart was ordei-ed to 
 cover this movement by keeping on his right. The cavalry divis- 
 ion, reduced to four brigades by the departure of Imboden and 
 Jenkins, had been watching the Upper Rappahannock since the 
 combat of Brandy Station, carefully noting all the movements 
 of the Federals on this side. Stuart left Hamj^ton's brigade 
 alono; this river to continue watching it ; one regiment of W. H. 
 F. Lee's brigade remained a little lower down to accompany Hill ; 
 that of Fitzhugh Lee, commanded by Colonel Munford, clearing 
 the route which Longstreet had to follow, proceeded toward Bar- 
 bee's Cross-roads ; while Stuart, bearing more to the right, crossed 
 the Rappahannock at Hinson's Mills with Robertson and Colonel 
 Chambliss, the latter of whom commanded W. H. F. Lee's bri- 
 gade since the latter had been wounded at Brandy Station. Jones 
 was directed to watch Aestham River, and to join the rest of the 
 division after the whole army had crossed this water-course. The 
 next day Stuart struck the railroad from Manassas to Salem and 
 Piedmont without having met the enemy. 
 
 Pleasonton had followed the movement of the Federal infantry 
 in the direction of Washington, while Longstreet quietly planted 
 himself at the foot of the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge, with- 
 out having succeeded, as he had hoped, in drawing the attention 
 of the Federals, who did not even suspect his presence in that 
 locality. 
 
 As we have stated, Milroy's defeat had alarmed General Hal- 
 leck about the safety of Harper's Ferry. Believing every rumor 
 that was set afloat among the frightened population along the 
 left bank of the Potomac, he sent several despatches to Hooker, 
 
BRANDY STATION. 41 
 
 urging hira to relieve that place, which he already fancied to be 
 besieged and about to surrender. Consequently, the commander 
 of the Army of the Potomac, who appreciated the danger of 
 dividing his forces so near the enemy, issued the necessary orders 
 on the 16th (a day of rest granted to his troops) for putting all 
 his army corps in motion on the morning of the 17th, en echelon, 
 by the right bank of the river which waters Washington, in the 
 direction of Harper's Ferry, which place he expected to reach in 
 tAvo forced marches. But as soon as General Halleck was apprised 
 of this, being now enlightened in regard to Tyler's real position, 
 he disapproved of this movement, and Hooker had to halt his 
 army just as it was about to move. The Federals were not only 
 ignorant of the projects, but also of the real position, of their 
 adversaries. They knew that Lee's army was between Culpeper 
 and Winchester, but was it preparing to march upon Manassas 
 in order to compel the Army of the Potomac to resume the same 
 position it had occupied in 1861, or did it contemplate the inva- 
 sion of Pennsylvania? Nothing as yet foreshadowed the solu- 
 tion of this question. 
 
 Hooker wondered at the inactivity of the conquerors of Win- 
 chester, and although he thought, justly, that Lee would probably 
 march northward instead of eastward, he sometimes believed that 
 the only object of all this great movement Avas to cover a cavalry 
 raid beyond the Potomac. It is true that the government, far 
 from aiding him to solve this mystery, worried him by making 
 itself the echo of the most extravagant rumors, and by giving 
 him orders — let us rather say vague and contradictory instruc- 
 tions, as we have just seen. In Avhat concerned him, being ex- 
 clusively occupied with the idea of not allowing himself to be 
 cut off from Washington, he did wrong, in our opinion, in mov- 
 ing away too quickly from the enemy by a divergent march, and 
 by bringing back his cavalry as far as Manassas, rendering it 
 impossible for him to follow and watch Lee's movements. A 
 fortunate chance, ^'ithout relieving hira from this state of uncer- 
 tainty, enabled him at last to obtain some knowledge regarding 
 the positions of the enemy. 
 
 During the night of the 16th and 17th he had decided to wait 
 betAveen Manassas and Centre ville until Lee had defined his 
 
42 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 movements, thinking that as he could not prevent liim from 
 crossinjr the Potomac, it was therefore better to wait to attack him 
 until he had separated himself from his base of operations. In 
 order to watch and thwart his movements he would have desired 
 that Pleasonton, with his entire corps, had passed along the right 
 bank of the Potomac, and that a column of fifteen thousand men, 
 taken from the garrisons of Washington and Baltimore, might 
 come to form a junction with him when, following Lee's marcli, 
 he should have reached the eastern slope of South Mountain. 
 The first project was not relished by the President ; the second 
 met with all kinds of obstacles, which we will explain here- 
 after. 
 
 The counter-order issued to the army, however, did not reach 
 Pleasonton in time, as he had set oif at daybreak for the purpose 
 of clearing his march. He was already on his way to Aldie when 
 ordered to come back. The country he was passing through M^as 
 very rough, covered with woods, and consequently favorable to 
 sudden attacks and any secret movements which the enemy might 
 attempt : in front of him lay the range of high hills which Aldie 
 Gap divides. Appreciating the importance of having the other 
 slope reconnoitred, he asked and oljtained permission to continue 
 his march as far as the foot of the Blue Ridge : if he did not 
 encounter the enemy, he was to push forward, by way of Lees- 
 burg, as far as the neighborhood of Harper's Ferry. Gregg's 
 division was at the head, the Second brigade, under Kilpatrick, 
 forming the advance. Three regiments of this brigade, followed 
 very closely by a portion of the First, proceeded toward Aldie. 
 Colonel Daffie, with the First Rhode Island, detached by Kil- 
 patrick, had been at Thoroughfare Gap since morning, and was 
 to join him at Middleburg. 
 
 On the same day, Stuart, after receiving some detailed informa- 
 tion from ISIosby regarding tlie positions which the Federals had 
 occupied the day before, and believing them still far distant from 
 the Bull Run Mountains, left his bivouacs along the Manassas 
 Railroad to occupy the jxisses of these mountains. Chambliss, 
 following the road which crosses Thoroughfore Gap, was ordered 
 to post himself at Salem in order to watch this defile ; Munford 
 to pass through IMiddleburg and occupy Aldie ; and Robertson to 
 
BRANDY STATION. 43 
 
 stop at Rectortown, so as to be able to support either of them. 
 Men and horses were alike worn out, and the generals, belie-^n'ng 
 themselves to be far away from the enemy, abated somewhat of 
 that vigilance for which they were ordinarily noted. Munford, 
 who alone had a long road to travel, halted his column at Dover, 
 and only sent a few squadrons to occupy the village of Aldie. 
 Stuart had remained with his staff at Middleburg, where old 
 friends and new admirers vied with each other in entertaining 
 the young and brilliant general. 
 
 About two o'clock, however, the Federal scouts suddenly en- 
 countered those of ]\Iunford at a short distance from Aldie. Kil- 
 patrick, with the Second New York, his old regiment, at once 
 charges and pursues them, and takes possession of the village. 
 But, having been Avarued in time of the approach of the enemy, 
 Munford has hastened from Dover with his brigade. This en- 
 counter was a complete surprise on both sides. Their forces were 
 about equal, consisting of four regiments of cavalry and a battery 
 of artillery to each party. While Kilpatrick, coming out of the 
 village, deploys his brigade, Munford makes immediate prepara- 
 tions for the fight. After traversing the village of Aldie, situated 
 on a stream which flows through one of the gaps of the Bull 
 Run Mountains, the road divides, one branch of it running west- 
 ward toward JMiddleburg and Ashby's Gap, the other north-west- 
 ward in the direction of Snicker's Gap. Between the two there 
 is a hill, at the foot of which winds the JMiddleburg road, while 
 the other ascends tlie northern slope : it is upon this barren hill 
 that Munford plants himself, placing his artillery on the summit 
 and filling an enclosure, composed of a fence and a ditch back of 
 the dividing-point in the road, with dismounted cavalrymen. 
 
 The Federals attack this strong position with wonderful vigor : 
 the Second New York makes a rush against the enclosure, and, 
 dismounting, sabre in hand drives in the line of skirmishers, 
 taking a large number of prisoner, while the Federal artillery, 
 without noticing that of the enemy, directs its fire upon the cav- 
 alry reserve. But it is on the Snicker's Gap road that the strug- 
 gle is to be decided, for this road, ascending the hill, leads to the 
 culminating point of the position. Munford has fully under- 
 stood this, and unites all his forces on this side to fall upon the 
 
44 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Federal right. Tlie latter offers resistance, the officers setting an 
 example to tlieir soldiers : Colonel di Cesnola of the Fourth New 
 York, who had been ])laced under ari'cst, charges vuiarnied at the 
 head of his troo])s, and Kilpatrick, to reward him, hands liim his 
 own sabre in the very nudst of the figlit. But, seriously wounded, 
 he falls into the hands of the Confederates, and on this side the 
 Union cavalry is brought back in disorder. In the mean while, 
 the First INIaine, belonging to the First brigade, has been sent by 
 Gregg to the relief of Kilpatrick. The latter, with the aid of 
 this reinforcement, rallies his men and resumes the offensive on 
 tlie right. The two forces become intermingled ; they fight with 
 small-arms, and consideral)le losses are sustained on both sides. 
 Finally, su])])orted by his battery, which is firing canister, Kil- 
 patrick succeeds in making the enemy's column give way. The 
 Confederates fall back : on seeing this, the Federals press them on 
 all sides, taking possession of the position they have occupied. 
 At the same time, Munford learns from a des])atcli sent by Stuart 
 that he is menaced in the rear, and quickly falls back upon jNIid- 
 dleburg. Kilpatrick, feeling satisfied, halts on the field of battle : 
 he has lost a large number of soldiers and officers in this desperate 
 conflict ; he has taken about one hundred prisoners, and left as 
 many in the hands of the enemy. 
 
 It is the movement of Colonel Duffie by way of Thoroughfare 
 Gap, which was accomplished in the midst of the greatest dangers 
 and with wonderful daring, but also with heavy loss, which finally 
 led to the retreat of Munford. Duffie, with his two hundred and 
 eighty men, had unexpectedly made his appearance in front of 
 Chambliss' brigade, but he had succeeded in disguising his nu- 
 merical weakness from the Confederates, who were entirely worn 
 out and little desirous, undoubtedly, to bring on an action ; so 
 that, while Chambliss was under the impression that he had a 
 superior force to deal with, Duffie, stealing aw^ay in the night, Avas 
 rapidly marching upon INIiddleburg. Stuart, who happened to be in 
 this place, had barely time to make his escape and join Kobertson, 
 sendino; Munford the information which determined him to o-ive 
 up the game. Shortly after Duffie was in possession of Middle- 
 burg, and hastened to barricade its approaches. The Confederates 
 soon came to attack him. Stuart, burning with desire to revenge 
 
BRANDY STATION. 45 
 
 himself for the precipitate race he had been compelled to run, at- 
 tacked him at dusk with Robertson's entire brigade. After a 
 strong resistance, Duffie's small band was obliged to retire by 
 the same road it had come. Then it encountered Chambliss, and 
 only succeeded in effecting its escape after having again sustained 
 very serious loss. These two combats cost Duffie two-thirds of 
 his effective force. During the night Munford joined Stuart at 
 jMiddleburg, where the three Confederate brigades of cavalry 
 found themselves united. 
 
 At the news of these engagements, which clearly indicated the 
 direction followed by the bulk of the enemy's forces, Hooker re- 
 solved to cause his whole army, which he would not divide upon 
 any consideration, to make a movement westward in order to hold 
 it ready to cross either the defiles of the Blue Ridge or the fords 
 of the Potomac as circumstances might require. He sent the 
 Fifth corps to Aldie, with instructions to place Barnes' division 
 at Pleasonton's disposal in order to sustain him in his operations 
 against Stuart near the Blue Ridge. On the 18th the other army 
 corps were directed to take the following positions, which they 
 occupied that same evening or the next morning : the Twelfth 
 corps in the vicinity of Leesburg ; the Eleventh in the rear, along 
 the Aldie road, near Goose Creek ; the First near Herndon Station ; 
 the Third at Gum Springs; the Second remained at Centreville, 
 and the Sixth at Germantown. All these army corps were thus 
 drawn within a sector of a circle resting on the Potomac, facing 
 west, and all within mutual helping-distance. 
 
 In the mean while, the two bodies of cavalry were preparing 
 for a new conflict. Stuart, making Munford, whose troops had 
 been much under fire, pass to the rear at Union, had, in con- 
 junction with Robertson and Chambliss, taken position at Mid- 
 dleburg, where he hoped to see Jones' brigade, coming from the 
 Rappahannock, make its appearance during the day of the 18th. 
 Pleasonton, on his part, while waiting for the infantry reinforce- 
 ment promised, but which had not yet been able to join him, was 
 preparing to attack Stuart with his two divisions. He made his 
 appearance before Middleburg on the morning of the 18th : after 
 a few skirmishes it was sufficient for him to menace Stuart's left 
 flank to compel the latter to evacuate the village and retire west- 
 
46 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 ward toward Rector's Cross-roads. Jones not having yet arrived, 
 and iJanipton being expected on tlie following day, the Confed- 
 erate general did not wish to provoke a serious engagement. 
 Pleasouton, on his part, being desirous of allowing the infantry 
 time to join him, did not push matters to extremes. 
 
 On the 19th, having deployed his divisions, Buford on the 
 right and Gregg on the left, Pleasonton resumed his aggressive 
 movement;. Stuart, although he had not yet received the rein- 
 forcement he was expecting, determined to make a stand against 
 him, and, Avhether he relied on the valor of his soldiers, or, en- 
 couraged by the slowness of the enemy's movements during the 
 preceding day, he underrated his strength, he even thought of 
 attacking in his turn and planting himself in Middlcburg. He had 
 taken position, with Chambliss and Robertson, about fifteen hun- 
 dred yards back of IMiddleburg, resting his centre on an isolated 
 wood in the middle of the plain : back of this wood rose a hill 
 upon which he had posted his artillery. Gregg, with his two 
 brigades deployed, makes a vigorous attack upon this position 
 early in the morning. His dismounted troopers, outflanking the 
 enemy's line, direct their fire upon that portion of the line which 
 is unprotected, and make it give wa}^ : then the Federal centre 
 rushes forward to charge the wood, dislodging the Southerners 
 from it, who fly in disorder to the other side. Stuart's defeat 
 "would have been com])lete if the Ninth Virginia, which had 
 remained in reserve, had not rushed to the front to check the 
 Union troops, while the Confederate artillery poured a cross-fire 
 upon them. They are obliged to fall back into the wood ; but 
 they take a strong position in it, and from this place of shelter 
 deliver a severe fire upon the unprotected position of their adver- 
 saries. The latter make fruitless efforts to recapture the wood. 
 Stuart at last gives the signal of retreat, which is effected in good 
 order, and comes to a halt within a short distance of Middleburg 
 in a new and stronger position, where the Federals did not come 
 to look for him on that day. The combat had been bloody, the 
 heaviest losses being on Stuart's side. As usual when the situa- 
 tion became critical, he performed prodigies of valor : his chief of 
 staff. Major von Borcke, a Prussian officer, had been seriously 
 wounded by his side. Fortunately, he recovered, as his death 
 
BRAND Y STATION. 47 
 
 would have deprived us of one of the most interesting books 
 that has been written about the war. 
 
 In the course of this day, Munford, who was watching the 
 road between Aldie and Snicker's Gap from the other side of 
 Union, had been obliged to fall back toward the village before 
 the superior forces brought on by Buford along that route. We 
 have stated that in coming out of Aldie the road divides : both 
 branches, after crossing Goose Creek Valley, the chain of the 
 Blue E-idge, and the swift current of the Shenandoah, lead to 
 Winchester. But, whereas the former crosses the defile of 
 Snicker's Gap, the latter, more to the south, crosses Ash by 's 
 Gap after having successively passed through Dover, INIiddle- 
 burg. Rector's Cross-roads, Upperville, where several roads 
 converge, and finally Paris, located in the very gorge of the 
 mountain. It is this last-mentioned road that Stuart was fol- 
 lowing. 
 
 Jones' arrival on the 19th, and Hampton's on the following 
 day, gave the latter a numerical superiority over the enemy's 
 cavalry, of which he was fully determined to take advantage. 
 The day of the 20th, however, passed without any serious 
 encounter, because the last reinforcements that were expected 
 on both sides did not arrive until evening. On the side of the 
 Federals these reinforcements consisted of the infantry division 
 of General Barnes. Stuart had sent Jones to support Muuford 
 at Union, thus extending his left as far as the Snicker's Gap 
 road, and had kept Hampton, with his other two brigades, near 
 Rector's Cross-roads. 
 
 The Federals did not allow him time to assume the offensive, 
 most I'ortunately for him, for he has acknowledged since that he 
 would thereby have been exposed to a serious disaster. Leav- 
 ing Barnes with two brigades at Middleburg to cover his com- 
 munications, Pleasouton only took along with him one brigade 
 of infantry under General Vincent, which he added to Gregg's 
 division. While the latter, supported by a battery of artillery 
 under the immediate direction of the corps commander, was to 
 push the enemy along the Ashby's Gap road, Buford, who was on 
 the right, was ordered to menace his flank, so as to compel him to 
 fall back ujDon the defile. Before eight o'clock, Vincent's bri- 
 
 VoL. III.— 32 
 
48 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 glide mikI llic artilleiy, liikiiig tlic advance, attacked tlic })Osition8 
 that Stuart had ()e(nipied with his three brigades for the hist two 
 days oil a small stream called Cromwell Creek, rieasontou's 
 artillery soon silenced the Confederate guns, and tlic latter, find- 
 ing themselves attacked by infantry, abandoned their positions 
 so |)recipilalely that they left two dismounted pieces in the hands 
 t)f the assailants — trophies which wci-e the more precious to them 
 as being the first that had thus been ca|)tured by main force from 
 Stuart's batteries. Then Kilpatrick, with his fine brigade of cav- 
 alry, pushing forward to the front, presses close n])on the enemy 
 and takes possession of the bridge over Goose Creek before the 
 latter has been able to destroy it. Stuart, w'lio has rallied his 
 men, cliecks him a little farther olf in fn)nt of an excellent posi- 
 tion ; but the Union infantry having soon made its appearance, 
 lie giv(>s once iuoi(> the order of retreat, lie lias sent word 
 to ,]{n\v<. and iMuulonl (ni his left, directing them to fall back 
 upon Ui)perville, making the best resistance they could against 
 the forces in front of them. His troops having lost all hope 
 of success since thev found themselves confronting tlu; infan- 
 try, his only care is to delay the march of the ,l\'dcrals long 
 enough to give liis brigades on the left time to join him at 
 Ui>perville before he has been driven back upon Ashby's Gap. 
 A large o|k'u plain extends from Goose Creek to this village. 
 Stuart, who has twelve or thirteen regiments under his control, 
 makes them fall back by {•cJiclon — a man(euvre which the nature 
 of the ground seldom admits of being ])erforme(l in America, and 
 which was executed in order and coolness under the lire of the 
 Federal guns. It is true that this maiKcuvre was made easy by 
 the absence of the Union infantry, which was readily kejit at a 
 distance, so that Pleasonton had only his two cavalry brigades 
 left to follow an enemy su])erior in numbers. 
 
 In the mean while, l>uford with his division had attacked both 
 ' JNtunford and Jones, and, although both ])arties were nearly of 
 equal strength, the Federals soon obtained a marked advantage. 
 AVheu the Conlederates were ordered to fall back u]>on Ujiper- 
 villc, their retreat once more emboldened the assailants, while 
 Gamble's brigade, returning constantly to the charge, inflicted 
 upon them severe losses. It pressed them so closely that 
 
BRANDY STATION. 49 
 
 Stuart, dreading to see Buford's column come up after them 
 between Upperville and Paris, and thus cut off liis retreat in 
 the direction of the defile, determined to continue it at once, 
 without stopping at Upperville. 
 
 As his head of column was leaving this village, Hampton, aIio 
 liad just entered it with the rear-guard, waa again attacked by 
 Kilpatrick. He immediately wheeled about, charged the enemy, 
 and drove him back so vigorously that the Union general came 
 near being captured. But the rest of his brigade soon comes to 
 his assistance. A combat with small-arms follows between the 
 two forces, that are becoming more and more mixed up. They 
 push and jostle each other along a road bordered by fences, behind 
 which are posted Confederate skirmishers on the Upperville side, 
 while the other side also presents an array of dismounted Federal 
 troopers. Hampton finally falls back, and, rapidly pushing for- 
 ward in advance of Ilobertson's brigade, leaves to the latter the 
 task of covering the retreat. This brigade is soon attacked by 
 the Federals, who are emerging from Upperville, and is obliged 
 to gain the approaches of Paris in great haste. The efforts it 
 makes to delay the march of the enemy cost it dear, one of its 
 colonels being left wounded on the field. Chambliss, who has 
 come to its assistance on the left, also loses one of his colonels, 
 Lewis, who two days before had so valiantly led tlie charge of 
 the Ninth Virginia. 
 
 By thus falling back Stuart had lost about eight miles of 
 ground : he could not retrograde farther without abandoning 
 the defile and exposing Jones and Munford to be surrounded 
 and captured. Fortunately, the positions where he had placed 
 his artillery were good. Pleasonton's infjintry was far away and 
 his cavalry worn out. He halted and installed himself in the 
 village of Upperville. On his right, Buford had continued his 
 hot pursuit of Munford and Jones, who joined Stuart at Paris. 
 While the former was skirting the foot of the Blue Bidge slopes 
 with his division, his scouts climbed up the ridges. From the 
 summit of this natural observatory they had a full view of the 
 whole lo^fer valley of the Shenandoah : from Winchester to the 
 Bolivar Heights near Harper's Ferry nothing escaped their 
 observation. They saw long columns of infantry marching 
 
50 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 nortlnviird in tlio clirection of the PotomaCj while others weix 
 approuchiug Ashby's Gap. The former, as we shall explain 
 presently, comprised E well's corps, Avhich was on the march 
 toward Pennsylvania, the others being- the reinforcements sent 
 by Lougstreet to Stuart. The information that Pleasouton had 
 gathered was thus confirmed : the movements of the enemy's 
 infantry, Avhicli Stuart had, up to this time, so successfully con- 
 cealed, stood revealed. The success of the Union cavalry was 
 now complete, the moral advantages being as great as the mate- 
 rial results. It had attacked the enemy's cavalry wherever it was 
 found, and always came out victorious in the end. The highest 
 praise bestowed on the new attributes it had just displayed is to 
 be found in the rejjorts of its adversaries, who were all the time 
 under the impression that they had to cope with forces double 
 their own, whereas, in reality, the number of combatants was 
 about equal. The Federal troopers, after being taught expe- 
 rience in the hard school of defeat, feel thenceforth their own 
 worth, and, thanks to the confidence which these latter successes 
 have inspired them with, they will hereafter be a match for their 
 adversaries. 
 
 The combats fought between Aldie and xLshby's Gap cost the 
 Confederates 510 men, aud the Unionists about the same number. 
 
 While Stuart was engaged at Middlebui-g, Lougstreet had fol- 
 lowed the route which Lee had traced out for him. On the 19th 
 he passed through Upperville, while his columns occupied defiles 
 of the Blue Ridge — McLaws at Ashby's Gap, Hood at Snicker's 
 Gap, a connection being formed between them by Pickett, who 
 was posted on the summit of the ridge. On the 20th, Long- 
 street, having been ordered to hold himself in readiness to cross 
 the Potomac, deemed it expedient to draw near this river, and, 
 abandoning the Blue E,idge, he crossed the Shenandoah, The 
 next day, on learning that Stuart was in full retreat and pressed 
 on every sid.e by the enemy, he hastened to send McLaws back 
 to Ashby's Gap. The latter arrived toward evening, aud took 
 the place of Stuart's troopers, who fell back to the second line in 
 search of that rest of which they stood greatly in need,* Besides, 
 they had no longer any cause for trouble in that direction. 
 Unwillino; to allow himself to be drawn too far OAvav from 
 
BRANDY STATION. 51 
 
 "Washington, Hooker's instructions to Pleasonton were explicit. 
 The latter, satisfied with the information he had obtained, fell 
 back upon Aldie the following day, followed, or rather watched, 
 by some of the enemy's scouts. 
 
 The moment had arrived for Lee to give his impatient soldiers 
 the order of invasion. His forces were assembled along both 
 banlvs of the Potomac, and, since he could not draw Hooker 
 toward him in the Valley of Virginia, it was necessary for him 
 to march boldly northward in order to compel the Army of the 
 Potomac to change its tactics or make the free States pay heavily 
 for its wariness. He was at the head of an army even more 
 numerous, better disciplined and equipped, than that with which 
 he had penetrated into Maryland the preceding year ; but, on the 
 other hand, the enemy was also much more formidable than then. 
 Instead of having only to cope with the vanquished troops of 
 Manassas, driven back helter-skelter into Washington, he felt 
 that he was watched by an army ready for battle which a vig- 
 ilant chieftain handled with ease. Consequently, he could not 
 altogether get rid of many apprehensions on leaving the soil of 
 Virginia, in whose defence he had hitherto met only with success. 
 The proof of this will be found in the letter he wrote to Mr. 
 Davis on the 23d, just as he was ordering his army to cross the 
 Potomac. He was asking him earnestly to send on the last avail- 
 able man that could be spared, and to assemble at Culjjeper, under 
 Beauregard's command, all the forces that were to remain in Vir- 
 ginia : the army thus formed, more formidable on account of its 
 chieftain's name than for its numerical strength, would have made 
 a show of menacing Wasliington and effected a useful diversion 
 in favor of that other army which was about to invade the North- 
 ern States. Lee's idea Avas correct : it could not be realized for 
 want of troops, as all the generals of the Confederacy were ask- 
 ing for reinforcements at the same time ; and the reply of the 
 President, Avhich was intercepted in the early part of July by the 
 Federals, revealed to them this scarcity of men at the very mo- 
 ment when iif would have been of the utmost importance to the 
 Confederates to have been able to conceal the fact. 
 
 In the mean while, Ewell was already in full march toward the 
 North. Lee, believing himself still strong enough, with the rest 
 
52 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 of his troops, to hold Hooker's army in clicck if tlie latter should 
 attack him upon ground of his o\vn selection, had caused a por- 
 tion of the Second corps to cross to the left bank of the Potomac, 
 Avithout, however, moving it away from the river. On the 20th 
 of June, Early, leaving Winchester, took position along the right 
 bank at Shepherdstown, as if for the purpose of menacing Har- 
 per's Ferry and watching its garrison ; Johnson, crossing the 
 river, had posted himself at Sharpsburg, on that bloody battle- 
 field which contained the bones of so many Confederate soldiers ; 
 while Rodes, who was already on the other side, had advanced as 
 far as Hagerstown. This time Maryland was effectually occu- 
 pied, and the uneasiness which took possession of the public in 
 the North was justified. On the 21st, before knowing the result of 
 the battle of Ashby's Gap, Lee, wishing to take advantage of this 
 uneasiness in order to throw confusion in the ranks of his adver- 
 saries, adopted a bold resolve. He ordered Ewell to march as far 
 as Harrisljurg and take possession of this capital if possible. By 
 striking Harrisburg his object was to reach the White House and 
 disturb the deliberations of the Federal government. Rodes arrived 
 on the 22d,aud Johnson on the 23d, at Greencastle, whilst Jenkins, 
 preceding them, entered Chambersburg, and Early, bearing to the 
 right, occupied Cavetown at the foot of South Mountain. It was 
 on this same day, the 23d, that Lee, being apprised of Pleasonton's 
 retreat, issued marching orders to his other two army corps. 
 
 Hill, crossing the Potomac first, reached C-hambersburg on the 
 27th ; Longstreet, moving toward the Williamsport ford, and 
 forming the rear-guard on this occasion, crossed the river on the 
 25th and 26th, and on the evening of the 27th brought his three 
 divisions together a little south of Chambersburg. Lee, therefore, 
 had two-thirds of his army massed near this village, while Ewell 
 was pushing rapidly forward, covering as much ground as possible, 
 driving his troops across the rich section of open country before 
 him with a degree of audacity which was justified by the weak- 
 ness of the small number of adversaries he was likely to encounter 
 in that direction. 
 
 Imboden, who had extended his lines westward as far as the 
 Cumberland Mountains, returned to Hancock to operate on his 
 left and lay other districts in Pennsylvania under contribution : 
 
BRANDY STATION. 53 
 
 he occupied McConuellsburg, then brought his booty to Cham- 
 bersburg, a central point, whence it was forwarded south with 
 that of the rest of the army. Jenkins, on his part, w^as raid- 
 ing along the Harrisburg road. Ewell, having given one day's 
 rest to his troops at Chambersburg, had resumed his march, with 
 Johnson and Rodes, in the direction of this latter city; Early, on 
 the other hand, after rounding the west side of the mountains from 
 Cavetown to Greenwood, turned abruptly to the right to cross 
 them and descend upon Gettysburg, so as to fill Stuart's place, 
 whose absence we will soon explain. 
 
 The section of country thus invaded by Ewell was one of the 
 richest agricultural districts in Pennsylvania, and consequently in 
 the United States. For the first time the Confederate soldiers 
 found themselves in the enemy's open country. This country 
 had known nothing of the war except through the visits of pur- 
 chasing agents and the departure of large bodies of volunteers 
 who responded to Mr. Lincoln's call. Abundance reigned every- 
 where, striking the Southern troops with astonishment, wlio had 
 been accustomed to all sorts of privations in the valleys of Vir- 
 ginia, so long since devastated. 
 
 The requisitions of their chiefs, regularly imposed upon the 
 villages they occupied, soon satisfied their wants. They now 
 made the Northern population pay largely toward the cost of the 
 war which had so long weighed upon them and their families, 
 but no disorder was added to these exactions in the country thus 
 occupied : there was neither plundering nor incendiarism. Most 
 of the Southern papers, ho■\^'ever, forgetting the good behavior 
 of the Army of the Potomac in Virginia, exaggerating the un- 
 avoidable sufferings which the war had entailed upon the Southern 
 States, and magnifying the excesses committed under the Federal 
 uniform (for the most part b}^ partisans or isolated detachments), 
 demanded that Pennsylvania should be laid in ashes and blood. 
 But the Confederate generals, understanding much better the true 
 interests of the policy they were subserving, and not wishing to 
 exasperate the people of the North, were desirous of confront- 
 ing them under the most favorable auspices. The strictest orders 
 were issued by the commander-in-chief, prohibiting pillage un- 
 der any form wdiatever : his injunctions were even too rigorous 
 
54 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 to be scrupulously carried out. In fact, government officers were 
 alone authorized to make such requisitions upon the inhabitants 
 of the country as were necessary to the sustenance of the soldiers 
 — requisitions which were paid in Confederate bonds or notes: 
 the regimental officers, who, under certain restrictions, should 
 have been invested with this privilege, only exercised it with iso- 
 lated detachments. Following the same idea, the sale of spirit- 
 ous liquors was prohibited in all the towns occupied by the Con- 
 federates. Finally, his orders having been occasionally violated 
 or criticised, General Lee, when he saw his whole army gathered 
 together on the soil of Pennsylvania, issued a proclamation from 
 Chambersburg on the 27th recommending moderation, respect for 
 non-combatants, and the discarding of all thoughts of revenge — 
 a proclamation teeming with the loftiest sentiments, which the 
 biographers of this Christian soldier may always quote as a 
 model for such chieftains as may be called upon to lead an 
 army of invasion. 
 
 These injunctions did not prevent the Southern generals from 
 going in search of and collecting all the resources that could be 
 useful to the army : requisitions, laying all the small towns of 
 that part of Pennsylvania under contribution, supplied them with 
 shoes, hats, and goods of all kinds to replace their wornout habil- 
 iments ; large supply-trains filled with provisions and cattle were 
 sent into Virginia ; finally, in a few days, Jenkins and Imbodeu 
 had supplied all their troopers with fresh horses. It is said that 
 the latter found that Pennsylvania horses, much larger and better 
 fed, had less blood, and consequently less stamina, than those of 
 Virginia, which are so remarkable for their docility and powers 
 of endurance. 
 
 The mountains, a continuation of the Blue Ridge, which 
 border the Cumberland Valley at the east, incline, as we have 
 observed, north-eastward from Chambersburg, terminating at the 
 elevation of the town of Carlisle before reaching the Susquehanna. 
 A parallel chain of less importance, which is a continuation of 
 the Bull Run and Catoctin Mountains, extends east of the former, 
 forming between the Potomac and the Susquehanna a much larger 
 valley than the Cumberland. It is watered at the north by a 
 large number of small tributaries of the Susquehanna, and at 
 
BRA ND Y STA TION. 55 
 
 the south by the Monocacv, which rises in the vicinity of Gettys- 
 burg, and which, after passing near Frederick, empties into 
 the Potomac at Nolan's Ferry, below Point of Rocks. These 
 two valleys, which Nature had fashioned like those of Virginia, 
 have been greatly improved by man, especially in the northern 
 section of Pennsylvania. They are in a high state of cultiva- 
 tion : neither impenetrable forests, like those of the Wilderness, 
 nor even large wooded areas, such as surround Washington, are 
 to be met with ; villages abound ; the roads are numerous and 
 generally well kept. Two lines of railroad traverse this section 
 of country — one, that of the Cumberland Valley, between Harris- 
 burg, Chambersburg, apd Shippensburg, by way of Carlisle ; the 
 other, the Northern Central, connecting Baltimore with Harris- 
 barg, with two branches — one running west from Hanover Junc- 
 tion, by way of Hanover, to Gettysburg; the other eastward, 
 from York to Wrightsville, where it crosses the Susquehanna 
 over an immense wooden bridge about one mile and a quarter 
 long, to connect again with the Philadelphia line. This bridge, 
 available for vehicles, was the only one to be found at that time 
 on the river below Harrisburg. A third line of railroad passes 
 through the lower part of the valley of the Monocacy : it is a 
 part of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, which, passing close 
 by Frederick, runs down to Point of Pocks and thence follows 
 the course of the Potomac as far as Harper's Ferry. 
 
 Ewell, by a forced march, reached Carlisle with his two divis- 
 ions on the 27th : the next day a band of scouts, M^th some officers, 
 proceeded to reconnoitre the approaches of Harrisburg. Despite 
 all the efforts of the inhabitants of this city to put it in a state of 
 defence, the Confederates could probably have easily taken pos- 
 session of the suburbs on the left bank. Ewell was preparing 
 for this operation when an order from Lee suddenly put a stop 
 to his movement. 
 
 Early had been sent east of the mountains to cover the right 
 wing of the army and to watch the roads north of Baltimore 
 and w^est of Philadelphia. A glance at the map will show that 
 the Confederate army assembled in the Cumberland Valley in 
 jiroportion as it advanced northward moved farther away from 
 AYashington, and finally turned its back entirely upon the base 
 
 E 
 
56 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 of operations on wliicli the Federal army rested : it therefore 
 behooved Lee to cause all the avenues through which detach- 
 ments of the enemy's troops might fall upon his flank, from 
 either Washington or Baltimore, to be carefully reconnoitred. 
 It was for the cavalry to perform this duty, but Stuart having 
 remained in Virginia to keep a close watch over Hooker's 
 movements, this task w^as assigned to Early. Lee had not been 
 able to add more than one regiment to his division, comprising 
 a few hundred sabres, and his infantry, long inured to forced 
 mai-ches, had to make up for tlie absence of cavaliy by their 
 own activity. They left Greenwood on the 26th of June in two 
 columns, and reaching Gettysburg in the evening dislodged from 
 it, after a slight skirmish, about a thousand Pennsylvania militia,* 
 brought there in haste, who could not offer any serious resistance. 
 The division, after having bivouacked at Gettysburg and Mum- 
 masburo^, reached the neio;:hborhood of Berlin on the 27th and 
 York on the 28th. Gordon's brigade, following the railroad, had 
 marched with greater speed than the others, and arrived at York 
 at an early hour. Early immediately directed it to j^roceed to 
 Wrightsville, where the great bridge of the Susquehanna crossed 
 that stream, Lee had ordered Early to buru it, but the latter 
 general, meeting with no resistance, conceived the bold plan of 
 crossing the river by this bridge and ascending the left bank 
 in order to assist Ewell at Harrisburg. Consequently, Gordon 
 was instructed to take possession of it if possible. When within 
 a short distance of the village he encountered a detachment of 
 Unionists, which a few shells sufficed to disperse; but his sol- 
 diers, worn out with fatigue, could not vie with the enemy in 
 speed, and they had scarcely started in pursuit over the bridge 
 when they were driven back by the flames. The Federals, not 
 having succeeded in cutting the bridge, had determined to burn it : 
 in a few hours it was entirely destroyed, together with a portion 
 of the village, and the flames from this immense blazing pile, 
 lighting up the atmosphere on the evening of the 28th of June, 
 announced to the alarmed population on the right bank of the 
 Susquehanna that the enemy had reached the river. In the 
 mean time. Early Avas levying contributions upon York and 
 * The Twenty-sixth militia regiment, under Colonel Jennings. — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 57 
 
 gending detachments to destroy the Northern Central Railroad 
 and its branches to the largest practicable extent. 
 
 We shall leave him now to return to Virginia, wherCj on the 
 22d, we left the Federal army and Stuart's cavalry, which is 
 watching it, along the line of the Bull Run Mountains. On his 
 arrival at Fairfax, Hooker, foreseeing that he would have to go 
 through a campaign in Maiyland, had sent two bridge-equipages, 
 under proper escort, to the mouth of the INIonocacy, and on the 
 18th everything was ready for throwing these bridges over the 
 Potomac at Nolan's Ferry. The Second corps,* in taking position 
 at Leesburg the next day, as we have stated, was only within ten 
 miles of this point. Hooker, however, was yet ignorant whether 
 I^ee, by not marching either upon Manassas or Washington, 
 would decide to push northward ; and as he intended to assume 
 the offensive against his line of retreat if the occasion offered, 
 he did not wish to be drawn to the left bank of the Potomac 
 before being fully convinced that the whole Confederate army 
 had left the soil of Virginia. Consequently, he was waiting in 
 the positions taken on the 19th for positive information upon this 
 point, without allowing himself to be disturbed by the cries of 
 distress coming from Pennsylvania blaming him for his inaction. 
 He took advantage of this waiting to organize reinforcements 
 destined to join his army as soon as it had entered INIaryland : 
 in fact, from this moment it covered Washington and Baltimore 
 so completely that the garrisons of these two places could have 
 been safely reduced so as to form a column which would have 
 increased the effective force of the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 The authorities at Washington threw obstacles in the way of 
 this project: Butterfield who had been sent to organize this 
 column, could only secure tw^enty-five hundred men that Lock- 
 wood brought from Baltimore,t instead of fifteen thousand upon 
 whom he had counted ; and Hooker having sent for a brigade of 
 Crawford's division which had been assigned to him. General 
 Slough, military governor of Alexandria, where this brigade was 
 
 * The Twelfth corps took position at Leesburg on the 38th. The Second 
 corps was then at Sangster's Station, whence it moved on the 20th to Centre- 
 ville, and thence toward Thoroughfare Gap. — Ed. 
 
 f Lockwood's brigade was brought from the lower counties of Maryland, bor- 
 dering on Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac Eiver. — Ed. 
 
68 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 uselessly stationed, detained it in defiance of the order, and was 
 sustained by Hallcck in this act of insubordination. 
 
 The raoveincnts of the Southern cavalry north of the Potomac 
 had given rise, as we have stated, to the most extravagant rumors, 
 and the Federal autliorities had o;reat difficulty in distini^-uishino; 
 truth from fiction. As soon as Lee's battalions had set foot on 
 the soil of Maryland the Southern general experienced in his 
 turn some of those difficulties against which his adversaries had 
 hitherto to struggle. Instead of being wrapped up, thanks to 
 the connivance of an entire population, in an impenetrable veil, 
 through whi(;h he could perceive all the movements of his oppo- 
 nents, he found himself surrounded with voluntary spies, who, 
 after counting his regiments and talking with his soldiers, who 
 were constantly asking for something to drink, proceeded, as soon 
 as the latter had departed, to report to the enemy all they had 
 seen and heard. On the other hand, soldiers disgusted with the 
 profession of arms, who in Virginia would not have dared to 
 leave the ranks for fear of being betrayed by the inhabitants, 
 finding now a good opportunity for deserting, carried much valu- 
 able information to the enemy ; so that Ewell's movement upon 
 Hagerstown, which was executed on the 22d, was known to 
 Hooker on the 23d, and on the 25th the latter was fully informed 
 of the passage of the Potomac by Hill's corps at Sliepherdstown. 
 
 Two bridges had been thrown over the river by the Union 
 general at Edwards' Ferry, near the mouth of Goose Creek, and 
 in rear of the positions occupied by the Second corps at Leesburg.* 
 On learning of the arrival of Ewell at Hagerstown, he at once 
 despatched three army corps to hold the left bank of the Potomac 
 and to cover Washington. These were the First, the Third, and 
 the Eleventh, which happened to be nearest the bridges, and 
 which Hooker had placed temporarily under Reynolds' com- 
 mand. On the 25th they stationed themselves around Poolesville, 
 a village in Maryland situated not far from the river, at the inter- 
 section of several roads, and at an equal distance from Washing- 
 ton, Harper's Feriy, and Frederick. 
 
 That same day, on receipt of fresh intelligence, the commander- 
 in-chief determined to follow the Confederates into INIaryland 
 with the remainder of his army. Peynolds led his three army 
 * The Twelfth, not the Second, corps was at Leesburg. — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 59 
 
 corps toward the defiles of South Mountain, making some detach- 
 ments occupy Turner's Gap and Crampton's Gap, while the bull< 
 of his forces took position in the village of Middletown, on the 
 road between Frederick and Boonesboro'. The reader, by bear- 
 ing in mind the campaign of 1862, will appreciate the import- 
 ance of this movement, which shut out Lee from all access to 
 Eastern INIaryland, while it opened to the Unionists a passage lead- 
 ing to the communications of the Confederate army with Yirginia. 
 
 During this time the other four army corps, the reserve artil- 
 lery, and the cavalry,* converging in their turn toward Edwards' 
 Ferry, crossed the Potomac during the day of the 26th : the 
 Sixth corps, which had arrived from Centreville, having bivou- 
 acked at Dranesville, was the last to cross during the morning 
 of the 27th, and entered the valley of the Monocacy en echelon 
 near its mouth and below Frederick ; the Twelfth corps, which 
 had arrived from Leesburg, pushed farther on in the direction of 
 Harper's Ferry. The Army of the Potomac thus took, in June, 
 1863, the same position it had occupied under McClellan before 
 the battle of Antietam. Hooker could not have made a better 
 choice to harass his adversary. The operation had been well 
 conceived and admirably executed. The seven army corps, 
 with the artillery, cavalry, and the immense supply-trains, had 
 effected the passage of the Potomac over two bridges of boats in 
 two days and a half: thanks to their celerity, the movement 
 ordered upon receipt of the news that Lee's army had begun 
 crossing the river was accomplished in twenty-four hours after 
 the last of the enemy's battalions had left the Virginia shore. 
 The two adversaries, although separated by more than forty 
 miles, followed each other very closely. 
 
 From the first day the Confederates experienced all the dif- 
 ficulties to which an army of invasion is necessarily exposed — 
 difficulties that were new to them, for in the preceding year they 
 had not advanced far enough into the hostile country to encounter 
 them. On the one hand, being obliged to extend their lines in 
 order to occupy the country, destroy the resources of the enemy, 
 and gather provisions, they had nevertheless to be always ready 
 to concentrate for battle ; on the other hand, they were not sc 
 well informed as their adversaries. In fact, whilst Hooker, as 
 * Buford and Gregg, covering the rear, crossed into Maryland on the 27th. — Ed. 
 
60 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 we have sceu, was fully posted as to their march, Lee was com- 
 pletely ijjjnorant of the crossing of the Potomac by the Federal 
 army. On the 27tli of Jiiue, when this passage had been in 
 operation for two days, and the Federal army was already massed 
 at the foot of South Mountain, he believed it to be still in Vir- 
 ginia, lie trusted to Stuart's vigilance to apprise him of the 
 movements of the enemy, and if he had received from the latter 
 the information he was expecting, he would certainly not have 
 committed the imj)rudence of despatching Ewell's corps in the 
 direction of the Susquehanna. But the vigor with which Pleas- 
 outon had driven the Confederate cavalry beyond the Blue liidge 
 had completely masked the passage of the Unionists to the 
 left bank of the river. To make up for lost time, Stuart should 
 have thrown himself between the two armies, and thus dispelled 
 the uncertainty under which Lee had been laboring for some 
 days. It was at this moment that an unfortunate misunderstand- 
 ing deprived the general-in-chief of the useful co-operation of 
 his too-zealous lieutenant. 
 
 Stuart was burning with desire to avenge the checks that Pleas- 
 onton had just made him suifer. He could not think of attacking 
 the Federals, firmly posted as they were along the Bull Run jMouu- 
 tains, whence they overlooked the plains and watched all his move- 
 ments. The Second army corps having arrived from Ceutreville 
 on the 20th to take position at Thoroughfare Gap, he thought 
 that the whole Federal army was stretched behind this range of 
 hills, and that between it and Washington there were only some 
 storehouses, depots, and detached posts. He conceived the idea of 
 repeating the manoeuvre which had twice proved successful in the 
 precediug year, and to make a complete circuit of this army by 
 passing between it and Washington. He intended, by following 
 a southern direction, to outflank its left wing, then to proceed 
 northward, leaving Centreville on his right, reach Dranesville, 
 cross the Potomac, and join Lee in Maryland. This plan had 
 one serious defect : it was like an intermediate act in a play with- 
 out any connection with the principal piece. The two operations 
 of this kind performed by Stuart the year previous on the Chick- 
 ahominy and along the Potomac were undertaken while the two 
 armies were both stationary : they consequently partook of the 
 
BRANDY STATION. 61 
 
 character of extensive recounoissances. Uutil then, during the 
 active campaigns, Stuart's 7-6le had been either to cover or to clear 
 the army. This time he was undertaking a dangerous movement 
 at a moment when he must have expected to find the enemy on the 
 march ; consequently, he could not foresee what detours he w^ould 
 have to make to avoid him, and from the very first he started in 
 a contrary direction to that followed by the Confederate army. 
 He submitted his plan to Lee, and has stated in his report that 
 the latter authorized him to execute it, even pointing out to him 
 the contemplated movements of Swell's corps, that he might join 
 Early's division between Gettysburg and the Susquehanna. The 
 official account of the general-in-chicf, no less positive, is directly 
 at variance with this statement. According to this account, Stuart 
 did not propose the movement on the enemy's rear except as a 
 means for delaying his passage over to the left bank of the 
 Potomac. This consideration alone influenced Lee in allowing 
 him to penetrate into Maryland east of the Blue Ridge, but 
 upon the express condition that the cavalry should resume its 
 natural place on the right flank of the army as soon as the enemy 
 had started for the North. This, as it will be seen, was a conces- 
 sion made by Lee to the views of his lieutenant, and, as almost 
 always happens in such cases, the somewhat vague terms used by 
 the former were no doubt interpreted by the latter in a sense most 
 suitable to his wishes. Hence a misunderstanding which raised a 
 question of veracity between them, the consequences of which 
 proved fatal to their cause. In fact, when Lee alluded to the 
 rear of the Federal army as he was talking to his lieutenant, the 
 latter did not suppose that he meant the rear of his columns on 
 the march northward, but rather his base of operations at the 
 east ; when he mentioned York as the point near which he might 
 encounter Early and join the head of the Confederate army by 
 following its right flank without ceasing to cover it, Stuart looked 
 upon this last-mentioned city as a mere point of rendezvous to be 
 reached after he had accomplished the raid he contemplated. 
 
 Lee thought that he should only be deprived for a few days of 
 the important services such as his cavalry had rendered him since 
 the beginning of the campaign ; consequently, he had soon cause 
 to regret the authority he had too easily given to Stuart. The 
 
62 THE CrVIL WAR IX AMERICA. 
 
 latter lost not a single iiioniont in takint^ advantage of it. He 
 left about four thousand cavalry with Generals Robertson and 
 Jones, with the charge of watching the Blue Ilidgc and the 
 front of the enemy's array : then, without paying the least atten- 
 tion to Longstreet's directions, who had requested him to remain 
 within his reach, he set off during the night of the 24tli with 
 the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee and VI. H. F. Lee, commanded 
 by Colonels Munford and Chambliss, together with Hampton's 
 brigade. The troopers carried three days' rations for themselves 
 and one day's forage for the horses : six guns and a few- am- 
 bulances were the only vehicles that accompanied the division. 
 In coming out of Salem, where the latter had assembled, Stuart, 
 who headed the column in person, took the northern route ; then, 
 darting suddenly across the fields, he struck the eastern route 
 and reached one of the mountain-passes south of Thoroughfare 
 Gap, called Glascock's Gap. Turning north-eastward, he pro- 
 ceeded toward Haymarket. But here commenced the difficul- 
 ties he had not foreseen. Before reaching Haymarket he found 
 a whole Federal army corps on the march along the road he had 
 proposed to follow. It was the Second, on its way from Thor- 
 oughfare Gap to Gum Springs to relieve the Third, on the march 
 toward Maryland. Stuart, placing his artillery in position, had 
 the satisfaction of cannonading the column and of throwing con- 
 siderable disorder into the ranks ; but he did it no harm, and to 
 disguise his movement he was obliged to make a large circuit 
 southward. His horses having but little to eat, he had to halt 
 and let them graze. A single brigade pushed on as far as Gaines- 
 ville. Centreville was occupied : the whole section of country 
 which separated this point from the front of the enemy's array 
 was overrun by columns of troops which he might meet at any 
 moment. The plan he had formed could not therefore be car- 
 ried out : if he had relinquished it and retraced his steps, he 
 would have returned in time to discover the passage of the 
 Federals into Maryland, apprise Lee of the fact, and join Early 
 in Pennsylvania. He persisted in his project, and, not being able 
 to effect a passage west of Centreville, determined to force his 
 way at the east. Delayed by the necessity of letting his horses 
 graze again, he was unable to get beyond the Occoquan, which 
 
BBAADY STATION. 63 
 
 he reached at Wolf Euu Shoals on the 26th, and arrived in 
 two columns on the 27th at Burke's and Fairfax Stations. 
 He found everyAvhere traces of the departure of the Federal 
 army, gathered some provisions that had been left behind, and 
 had no encounter except with a regiment of cavalry, which he 
 quickly drove back into Washington after capturing two hun- 
 dred men. Pursuing his route in the track of the Unionists, 
 he arrived at Dranesville, which place the Sixth corps had 
 left in the morning. He had not succeeded, therefore, in turn- 
 ing the Federal army, which had crossed the Potomac before 
 him, and he simply found himself in its rear. He had only to 
 push on as far as Leesburg to ascertain the fact, and by ascend- 
 ing the right bank of the Potomac he could, without encounter- 
 ing any obstacle, have promptly carried the news of this passage 
 to Lee, with the valuable co-operation of his cavalry. But, mis- 
 takenly, he thought that the w^hole Federal army was march- 
 ing upon Leesburg along this bank, and fancied that he could 
 quietly join his chief by passing through Maryland. A ford 
 which was not watched by any of the enemy's posts was pointed 
 out to him near Dranesville : he determined at once to avail him- 
 self of it. 
 
 It was at a short distance from the magnificent falls of the 
 Potomac, at a place where the river, rushing down a precipitous 
 declivity, spreads out among stones and rocks which break the 
 force of its current. But this ford, which was easy for horees, 
 seemed impassable for artillery. Stuart did not allow himself to 
 be thwarted. The caissons were emptied ; the gun-cartridges 
 and shells were divided among the troopers, and the submerged 
 cannon and wagons were dragged across the river. Night had 
 supervened, and the watery moon' threw but a faint and uncertain 
 light over the agitated surface of the stream : the long line of 
 horses, sunk up to their breasts in the water, oscillated to and fro 
 under the pressure of the current and kept on their course with 
 difficulty. Nevertheless, at the end of a few hours the huge 
 shadows that were silently flitting across the river had all climbed 
 up to the other side. Thus, without firing a single shot, did 
 Stuart enter Maryland, and he hastened to destroy the canal adja- 
 cent to the river. On the 28th, after a few hours' rest, he re- 
 
 VoL. III.— 33 
 
64 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 sumed his march in two cohimns, in the direction of Rockville. 
 He had, in fact, been informed of the movement of the Army of 
 the Potomac, the whole of which lay between himself and that 
 of Lee, and was marching northAvard, being greatly in advance 
 of his own troops. It will thus be seen that Lee, Hooker, and 
 Stuart were all three pursuing a parallel course, the second being 
 between the two bodies of the enemy and separated from each of 
 them by ranges of hills. There was no means of conveying any 
 intelligence to Lee : the passes by which Stuart had calculated to 
 join him were blocked; there was nothing else to be done but to 
 beat the Federals in speed in order to find Early along the Sus- 
 quehanna. The Southern troopers were undoubtedly able to 
 throw the rear of the enemy's army into some confusion, but 
 these ephemeral and barren successes could not compensate for 
 the injury which their absence from the flank of the Confederate 
 army caused the latter at such a critical moment. 
 
 From their first entrance into Maryland, Stuart's men had 
 picked up isolated soldiers and wagons belonging to the adminis- 
 trative departments of the enemy, putting some small detachments 
 to flight, and, after trifling a while with one of them, entered the 
 town of Eockville, situated on the direct road connecting the Fed- 
 eral capital with Hooker's head-quarters at Poolesville,* with- 
 out striking a blow. They had scarcely dismounted when they 
 were informed of the approach of a supply-train loaded with 
 forage, coming from Washington. Chambliss, with his brigade, 
 in order to capture this rich prey, immediately gets back into 
 the saddle ; Stuart, who would not have missed such a feast for 
 anything in the world, leads the chase at a gall<')p. The supply- 
 train, composed of one hundred and fifty wagons, extends a dis- 
 tance of nearly two miles, and is within only one mile of Rock- 
 ville when the troopers who are clearing its march, rushing sud- 
 denly to the rear with the cry, " The enemy is upon us !" scatter 
 alarm and confusion through the long line of wagons. Each 
 driver is endeavoring to turn his team around : some get en- 
 tangled, others are upset across the road ; those who have been 
 able to recover the track leading straight to Washington dash 
 
 * At this time Meade was in command, with head-quarters at Frederick. 
 Rockville is on the main road from Washington to Frederick — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 65 
 
 forward at a frantic rate of speed, each trying to outstrip his 
 fellow-teamster in the race. The Confederates, flourishing their 
 sabres, arrive in the midst of this panic, and, cutting their way 
 through the wagons, reach those farthest off, which they stop 
 almost within sight of the forts of Washington. From this 
 moment the whole train is in their power : the wagons already 
 broken are burned ; about one hundred of them are carried off. 
 The troopers who accompanied the train never stopped until 
 they had reached the capital. For a moment Stuart was tempt- 
 ed to follow them, and by a bold dash between the forts heighten 
 the commotion which his presence at Rockville could not fail 
 to create. But night was approaching, his horses were tired, and 
 the necessity of speedily rejoining his chief prevailed over every 
 other consideration. 
 
 In spite of the exhaustion of both men and animals, it became 
 therefore necessary to resume the march during the night, and on 
 the morning of the 29th the two columns struck the Baltimore 
 and Ohio Railroad at Hood's Mill and Sykesville. They had 
 thus followed the eastern slope of the hills which form the 
 bouudai'y of the Mouocacy basin at the east. The occupation of 
 the railroad connecting Washington and Baltimore with the town 
 of Frederick, where the centre of the enemy's army was located, 
 might have proved a serious source of trouble to the latter if 
 it had intended to remain there, and if Stuart had had time to 
 destroy the track entirely. He only set fire to two small bridges, 
 being unable to capture any train, and having gathered new 
 information regarding the movement of the enemy toward the 
 north, he gave up the idea of continuing his Avork of destruction 
 to concentrate his thoughts in finding means of joining Early. 
 In the afternoon of the 29th he was on the march, pursuing a 
 north-westerly course toward Westminster, where he intended 
 to cross the hills and take the Gettysburg road. His advance- 
 guard met with a hot reception in this town from a squadi-on of 
 the First Delaware, and did not succeed in taking possession of 
 it until after an engagement in which it sustained some lo.sses. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th of June the whole division was 
 marching in the direction of Hanover, where Stuart hoped tc 
 find Early, or at least some reliable information concerning his 
 
6Q THE CIVIL WAR IX AMERICA. 
 
 position, and to be able to conunnnieate with head-quarters. 
 Six days of constant marching, nearly all that time without 
 sleep, food, or news from the rest of the army, were beginning 
 to impair the strength of this fine l)ody of troops. 
 
 The last night had to be employed in distributing hay to 
 the horses, which until then had eaten scarcely anything except 
 green grass : there were to be escoi'ted four hundred prisoners 
 and more than two hundred wagons picked up on the road. 
 This train was a great encumbrance, but Stuart would not be 
 separated from it. The ammunition was rapidly diminishing, 
 and finally it was known that a division of the enemy's cav- 
 alry * had encamped the night before at Littlestown. The leaders 
 felt uneasy on finding that, no matter how rapidly they pushed 
 northward, they could not succeed in getting ahead of that 
 enemy in whose rear they had so imprudently slipped. Cham- 
 bliss led the march with his brigade, followed by all the artil- 
 lery; Hampton formed the rear-guard, separated from the first 
 by a space of about two miles and a half, which was occupied 
 by teams ; Fitzhugh Lee covered the left flank of the route 
 traversed. 
 
 On reaching the hillocks which overlook Hanover, the Con- 
 federates perceived coming from Littlestown a long column of 
 the enemy's cavalry, which was iias^ing through the village in a 
 northerly direction, and thus occupying the road ^\'llich they were 
 themselves so anxious to follow. The situation was a trying one : 
 retreat was becoming impossible ; audacity was the only resort. 
 Chambliss began the attack. A few words will suffice to explain 
 this new encounter between Kilpatrick and Stuart, as unexpected 
 to them as was that of Aldie two weeks before. Stahel's cavalry, 
 added to Pleasonton's corps, had been reorganized and divided 
 mto two brigades under the command of two officers of great 
 distinction — Farnsworth, a man who had already acquired much 
 experience, and who perished within a few days without an 
 opportunity to show the full measTire of his worth ; and young 
 Custer, who, after having successfnlly passed through all the 
 perils of the great war, fell a victim thirteen years later to the 
 tomahawk of the red-skins. Kilpatrick, whom the late con- 
 flicts had brought conspicuously to the front, was assigned to 
 * Kilpatrick's. — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 67 
 
 the command. This new division was at Frederick when, on 
 the 28th, the news of Stuart's arrival at Rockville was promul- 
 gated. Pleasontou, who had unsuccessfully hunted the latter 
 the preceding year, adopted different tactics on this occasion 
 against him. Instead of sending his cavalry on his track in 
 order to harass him, he resolved to let him load himself with 
 booty, which could not fail to slacken his movements, and to 
 manoeuvre between him and the Confederate army, so as to 
 keep him away from it as long as possible. He could not 
 have adopted a better plan. This task was entrusted to Kil- 
 patrick. The new division commander set off on the same 
 day, and, following the Middleburg and Taueytowu road, he 
 encamped at Littlestown on the 29th, while Stuart, as we have 
 remarked, had brought his head of column to a halt a few 
 miles from this village. Whether it was that Kilj^atrick had 
 been too quick in his movements for the inhabitants to come 
 forward and supply him with information, or that they had 
 been struck with terror by the arrival of the Confederates, he was 
 not apprised of the proximity of the enemy's cavalry. Think- 
 ing only of maintaining his position on the right flank of Early, 
 who, as we have seen, was at York the day before, he started 
 for the latter place. Custer bore to the left with his brigade 
 toward Abbottsville, while Farnsworth followed the direct route 
 by way of Hanover. It was at this place that the two antag- 
 onists, marching in a different direction, found themselves face 
 to face about ten o'clock in the morning. 
 
 On perceiving the enemy the Federals sent a detachment 
 forward to reconnoitre; but Chambliss came up at a gallop, 
 drove it before him, penetrated into the town, and cut the 
 Unionist column in two before it had time to form again. If 
 the length of the train behind which Hampton was marching 
 had not detained the latter at too great a distance for him to 
 join his comrade in time, the Federal brigade would have been 
 annihilated. But the prompt arrival of help soon extricated 
 it from the dangerous situation in which it was placed. Kil- 
 patrick and Farnsworth, returning with the Fifth New York, 
 charge the Confederates in turn, who are occupied in picking 
 up prisoners, and after a sanguinary engagement drive them 
 
68 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 out of the town. Colonel Payne, at the head of the Second 
 North Carolina, tries in vain to resume the offensive by a flank 
 movement : this attack is repulsed, and he is taken prisoner. 
 Stuart takes position on a height south of the town, whence 
 his artillery keeps the enemy at a distance, and waits for his 
 other two brigades — not for the purpose of forcing a passage, 
 but to cover the movement by means of which he wishes to 
 get away, with his train, from a struggle which he considers 
 unequal. 
 
 Fitzhugh Lee is the first to arrive, and attacks the rear of 
 the enemy's column, which, by its formation in line of battle, 
 has become Kilpatrick's right. But the latter, who wishes, 
 above all, to cut off his adversaries from the Gettysburg road, 
 concentrates his forces upon this point, while Custer, coming 
 to his assistance, soon gains ground over the Southerners. 
 Stuart, on his part, hoping to find Early on the Susquehanna, 
 and not daring to venture between the bulk of the enemy's 
 infantry and cavalry, has decided to proceed eastward, by way 
 of Jefferson, in order to reach the neighborhood of York. 
 This is precisely the direction that Kilpatrick is most anxious 
 to see him take, so that he is not at all uneasy on account of 
 this movement. Hampton, who with scarcely any opposition, 
 has entered the town, which the Federals have abandoned for 
 the purpose of strengthening their right, covers once more 
 the march of the train. AVhile Kilpak'ick is giving some rest 
 to his worn-out troops, deferring till next day their departure 
 for Heidlersburg, Avhere he hopes to intercept Stuart, the latter 
 has not lost a moment's time in getting in advance of him. It 
 was indispensable, in fact, that by one of those extraordinary 
 efforts which select troops alone are capable of making he 
 should succeed in passing between his adversary and the insur- 
 mountable barrier of the Susquehanna before daylight. This 
 night-march was terrible : whole regiments, says Stuart, were 
 dozing on horseback, and men, tottering in their saddles, fell 
 off like so many masses of inert matter. Finally, at day- 
 bi'eak on the 1st of July, the column reaches Dover, but only 
 to experience a new and bitter disappointment. Stuart learns 
 that Early, after having occupied that whole section of country, 
 
BRANDY STATION. 69 
 
 has left it suddenly for the east. It becomes therefore necessary 
 to take up the line of march once more, in pursuit, not of the 
 enemy, but of that friendly infantry which seems the more 
 rapidly to vanish like a phantom as the efforts that are made 
 to approach it increase. Finally, in the afternoon of July 1st., 
 Stuart arrives at Carlisle with one brigade, after having ridden 
 more than one hundred and twenty-five miles since the previous 
 morning, having halted only long enough to fight the battle of 
 Hanover. There, again, instead of Swell's soldiers, he merely 
 finds traces of their march, without any cue to aid him in fath- 
 oming the mystery of their precipitate retreat. In the mean 
 time, his provisions are giving out, his ammunition is nearly 
 exhausted, and the town of Carlisle refuses to receive him. 
 Uneasy, irritated, having only a portion of his forces about 
 him, and deprived of his supply-train, which has remained 
 far in the rear, Stuart, in order to compel the town to yield, 
 fires into it the last shells which remain in the caissons ; but 
 to no purpose. Besides, new anxieties soon demand his atten- 
 tion and occupy his thoughts. 
 
 He receives at last instructions from his chief, from Avhom he 
 had been separated seven whole days. The information he was 
 able to give him taught him nothing, for the damages he had 
 caused to Hooker's rear had been of no assistance to the Con- 
 federate army. Instead of bringing news, it was he who was 
 coming in search of it, and that which reached him Mas of a 
 serious character. A battle was imminent; he had failed to per- 
 form the proper role of the cavalry toward the infantry before 
 the encounter; he must at least be near it at the critical moment. 
 The three brigades were immediately ordered to march sej)arately 
 upon Gettysburg. 
 
 We have left Hooker on the 27th of June concentrating his 
 army along the left bank of the Potomac between the ]\Ionocacy 
 and the slopes of South Mountain. Reynolds is at the head of 
 three army corps at the foot of these slopes, near INIiddletown ; 
 three other corps are in the rear, stationed around the town of 
 Frederick ; while Slocum, with the Twelfth, following the course 
 of the Potomac, has already reached Knoxville, and is within 
 only three miles of Harper's Ferry, Avhere there are nearly 
 
70 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 twelve tliousand men under General French ; the mountain- 
 defiles which had cost McClellan so dear the year previously 
 are under Hooker's control. lie can therefore either repeat the 
 manoeuvre of the latter, and, marching upon Harper's Ferry 
 and Sharpsburg, menace Lee's line of communication, or follow 
 still the movement of this general toward the North, and by 
 keeping him as much as possible west of the mountains oblige 
 him to extend his line still farther. The first of these two plans 
 is the boldest and most effective. It is, in fact, calculated to put 
 a stop to the invasion at once, and restores to the Federals the 
 double advantage of strategic aggression and the choice of ground 
 upon which they can compel their adversaries to come and fight 
 them. Slocum, having once reached Harper's Ferry, will find 
 his army corps increased by the addition of twelve thousand men, 
 whom he can lead into the Cumberland Valley by way of Sharps- 
 burg, while Reynolds has only a day's march to accomplish to 
 enter this valley by way of Boonesboro'. Finally, the bridges 
 which Lee may have on the Potomac, the supply-trains he is 
 sending South, the ammunition he must be expecting, will all Ml 
 into Hooker's hands by the same blow. Consequently, this is the 
 plan he has adopted, at least until fuller information regarding 
 the movements of the enemy can be obtained : he has even begun 
 to put it into execution by sending Slocum to Harper's Ferry, 
 and by going there himself on the 27th, when an unforeseen 
 occurrence suddenly puts a stop to this delicate operation. 
 
 The troops gathered at Harper's Ferry, as w^e have just stated, 
 were placed under his command. Thinking, very properly, that 
 the safety of the army and the cause he w^as defending might 
 depend upon the presence of an additional division on the field 
 of battle, he determined to sacrifice all secondary considerations 
 to the concentration of active forces, and was therefore desirous 
 of taking French with his army. In pursuit of this idea he 
 had ordered preparations to be made for carrying off all the 
 materiel at Harper's Ferry and in the fortifications on Maryland 
 Heights. We have already stated hoAV greatly General Halleck 
 had exaggerated in 1862 the importance of this point, which 
 guarded neither the Potomac fords nor the entrance into Mary- 
 land : Miles' disaster, brought on by his obstinacy in not evac- 
 
BRANDY STATION. 71 
 
 uating the place at that time, had not enlightened him in the 
 least. Conse(][uently, when, on the evening of the 26th, Hooker 
 telegraphed him that he intended to abandon this post, whose 
 garrison, wanted elsewhere, was only a useless bait for the enemy, 
 and asked him if he had any objection to this plan, he replied at 
 once, formally refusing his consent except in a case of absolute 
 necessity. This refusal was not prompted alone by military con- 
 siderations more or less plausible. Inasmuch as Hal leek imme- 
 diately granted to Hooker's successor what he had refused to the 
 former, we have a right to believe that the commandiCr-in-chief 
 had seized this opportunity to compel the commander of the Army 
 of the Potomac to resign by depriving him of all freedom of 
 action, without which he could not continue to perform the ardu- 
 ous task imposed upon him. Halleck's mistrust of Hooker was 
 "indeed no secret. The latter was fully aware of it, and, being 
 unwilling that the personal animosity of which he was the vic- 
 tim should again compromise the fate of the army, on receipt of 
 Halleck's reply — which he found at Frederick on his return from 
 Harper's Ferry — he requested to be relieved of his command. 
 
 While waiting for the President's decision he made the new- 
 dispositions which Halleck's instructions rendered necessary. 
 Unable to take French along with him, he relinquished his 
 project of attacking Lee's rear in the Cumberland Valley. 
 Slocum was recalled to INIiddletown,* and all marching orders 
 prepared so as to put the army on the march toward the 
 North, following the eastern slopes of the mountains. 
 
 On the morning of the 28th, General Hardie arrived at Fred- 
 erick with an order appointing General Meade to the command 
 of the Army of the Potomac in place of Hooker. For the sec- 
 ond time within the space of a year President Lincoln had 
 selected the worst possible moment for making a change in the 
 chief command of this army. This change might have been 
 reasonable on the day following the battle of Chancellorsville ; 
 it was singularly inopportune at present, when the two armies 
 were about to be engaged in a decisive conflict. 
 
 Far from justifying it, the manner in which Hooker had 
 handled his army for the last fortnight deserved nothing l)ut 
 * Slocum was ordered to Frederick (not Middletown) by Hooker. — Ed. 
 
72 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 praise : if the relations of the latter with some of the corps 
 coraraanclers were unpleasant, they had never done any injury 
 to the service ; and, on the other hand, the confidence with which 
 he inspired the soldiers was of itself a power for his army. More 
 fortunate than McClellan, Hooker was afforded new opportunities 
 to serve his country, and we shall soon again find this brave sol- 
 dier upon other battlefields. 
 
 General Meade, who is to command the Army of the Potomac 
 until the close of the war, was an officer of the engineer corps. 
 Quiet, modest, reticent, but possessing a correct judgment, a mind 
 clear and precise, together with a coolness which never faltered 
 in the midst of danger, he had risen by his own merit from 
 the grade of brigadier-general in. the Pennsylvania Reserves 
 to the command of the Fifth army corps. Pie was but little 
 known except to his subordinates and some other generals, for 
 neither his deliberate and methodical mind nor his tall, slender 
 figure, with eyes whose somewhat sad expression his glasses 
 but half concealed, was calculated to make a strong impression 
 on the masses and inspire enthusiasm. But he was esteemed by 
 his companions-in-arms and respected by his adversaries : when 
 his old comrades Avho wore the Confederate uniform, and who, 
 since the battle of Chancellorsville, professed a profound contempt 
 for Hooker, were told of his appointment, they said to each other 
 that they would have to look sharp after their new adversary. 
 
 The day Hooker transferred the Army of the Potomac to his 
 successor, this army, comprising French's forces, Lockwood's 
 brigade, which had arrived at Frederick on the 26th*, and all 
 available detachments, numbered little less than one hundred 
 and five thousand men under arms. Meade, who had not 
 aspired to his new position, was himself conscious how ill-timed 
 was the displacement of Hooker, and had the good sense to 
 make no changes in the personnel of his head-quarters, even 
 retaining his chief of staff. General Butterfield. With his 
 appointment he received the most unlimited power to dispose 
 of all the troops assembled in INIaryland, without taking into 
 consideration those imaginary divisions in departments which had 
 
 * Lockwood's brigade reached the vicinity of Frederick on the evening of 
 June 27th. — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 73 
 
 SO frequently embarrassed his predecessors. The first despatch he 
 received from Halleck authorized him to remove at his pleasure 
 the garrison of Harper's Ferry: the forces of Schenck and Couch 
 were also placed under his command. 
 
 His successor at the head of the Fifth corps was General 
 Sykes, an energetic officer who had particularly distinguished 
 himself at Gaines' Mill. Meade set to work at once on the 
 28th, without allowing the army time to feel the interregnum. 
 Hooker had informed him that Lee, not having brought along 
 his bridge-equipage, could certainly not think of crossing the 
 Susquehanna with his army, and that, consequently, after having 
 reached that river, his design must be to follow the right bank, 
 so as to cut off Baltimore and Washington from the Northern 
 States. While the enemy was describing this large arc of a 
 circle, the Federal army could, by keeping within an interior 
 arc, follow him, fall upon his flank whenever it pleased, and 
 at the same time cover these two cities without having to fight 
 a battle at their gates. Meade did not agree with Hooker on 
 this point ; and very justly, for it now appears that I.iee, taking 
 advantage of the shallow waters of the Susquehanna, was ready 
 to make a portion of his army cross to the other side of the 
 river to seize Harrisburg : the possession of this city would in 
 fact have secured him a permanent pass, together with the means 
 of penetrating to the very heart of Pennsylvania. But, although 
 he could freely dispose of French's troops, Meade did not dare 
 to follow out the bolder and more promising plan his predeces- 
 sor had conceived, the execution of which Halleck had prevented. 
 He had no intention of crossing South Mountain for the purpose 
 of placing himself between Lee and Virginia, for fear, no doubt, 
 of leaving Baltimore unprotected and Philadelphia itself exposed. 
 Whatever might have been the plans of the enemy, he thought 
 it necessary, before all, to follow Lee northward, and to harass 
 him sufficiently to oblige him to come and engage the battle him- 
 self. He had nothing to do, therefore, but to indorse and carry 
 out the orders issued by Hooker for the march of the 29th.* 
 
 AYe have stated that the valley situated east of South Moun- 
 tain parallel with the Cumberland Valley enlarges at the north, 
 * Hooker issued no orders for the marcli of the 29th. — Ed. 
 
74 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMEIlICA. 
 
 and almost assumes the form of a triangle wliose base lies on 
 the Susquehanna and the upper part at the mouth of the 
 Monocacy on the Potomac. From Frederick, whicli is situated 
 in the narrow section, several roads diverging from this point 
 follow a northerly and north-easterly direction : the main roads 
 are the Plarrisburg road, by way of Emmettsburg, Gettysburg, 
 and Ileidlersburg, at the north ; the York road, by way of ]Mid- 
 dleburg, Taneytown, Littlestown, and Hanover, at the north- 
 east, whicli separate in coming out of Frederick ; and the turn- 
 pike, already mentioned, which at Gettysburg branches off from 
 the first to the eastward to form a junction with the second at 
 York. These roads are intersected almost perpendicularly by 
 a large number of other roads, forming something like the 
 radius of a sector whose arc is tlie railroad of Cumberland 
 Valley, with Baltimore for its centre. All the roads in which 
 we are now interested start from Westminster. In 1863 this 
 village formetl the extremity of a branch railroad running 
 from Baltimore as far as the foot of the hills of which we 
 have spoken. The various roads starting from this point form 
 each a connection with one of the South Mountain passes : the 
 one running farthest south, by way of New Windsor and Fred- 
 erick, reaches Cramptou's Gap ; the next one, by way of Union, 
 JSIiddleburg, and Mechanicstown, the pass of Cavetown ; the 
 third, by way of Frizzellburg, Tane}i:own, and Emmettsburg, 
 that of Waynesboro' ; finally, the last, passing by Littlestown, 
 Two Taverns, and Gettysburg, crosses the mountains west of 
 Cashtown and descends to\A'ard Chambersburg by way of Green- 
 wood and Fayetteville. A glance at the map will show mucli 
 better than this explanation that the two centres of communi- 
 cation in this valley are Gettysburg and Westminster : each 
 of these two villages forms the terminus of a railway line, and 
 the former, besides the roads already enumerated, possesses four 
 or five others of less innx)rtance, which lead to Hanover at the 
 eastward, south-westward to Fairfield, north-westward to IMum- 
 masburg, and thence to Shippensburg by way of the mountain, 
 and north-eastward to Hunterstown. The to^vn of Gettysburg, as 
 we have shown, is situated almost at the dividing-point between 
 the waters' of the Susquehanna and those of the Potomac, but 
 
BRAND Y STATION. 75 
 
 it still belongs to the basin of the latter river. The small 
 streams of Rock Creek and Marsh Creek, which flow from 
 north to south within a few miles west and east of the town, 
 imite to form one of the branches of the Mouocacy ; a third 
 is the Big Pipe Creek, which, descending from the INIanch es- 
 ter hills, passing between Taney town and Frizzellburg and 
 watering Middleburg, flows west-south-west as far as its con- 
 fluence with INIarsh Creek. The rich valley which is intersected 
 by so many roads presents at the centre a compact layer of fer- 
 tile land ; on approaching South Mountain one finds an undu- 
 lating ground with a substratum of slate, the roughness of which 
 has been smoothed away by the action of time. Still nearer the 
 mountain, along a line which passes by Emmetttiburg and Gettys- 
 burg, there rises a long range of ridges running parallel with the 
 general direction of the chain. The very hard rocks of which 
 they are composed, having resisted the ravages of time better 
 than the slaty material which was their original covering, form 
 a series of groups of abrupt ridges and isolated peaks • which 
 frequently assume the most fantastic shapes, and present alter- 
 nately, as in the vicinity of Gettysburg, actual strongholds con- 
 structed by Nature, or, as at Emmettsburg, a confused mixture, 
 a veritable chaos, of natural ruins. 
 
 AVhen Meade assumed command, his first idea, while waiting 
 for the enemy's intentions to be more clearly developed, was to 
 prevent him from crossing the Susquehanna and marching upon 
 Baltimore. With this view he put his troops on the march in 
 three columns, pursuing divergent routes. The army was there- 
 by to be so distributed as to be able to deploy rapidly along 
 the line from Westminster to Waynesboro', and hold the Avhole 
 breadth of the valley by resting on South Mountain on the left, 
 whose passes it would guard, and with the right on the hills, 
 across which it would communicate with Baltimore and Wash- 
 ington. Two forced marches, which left too many stragglers 
 behind, brought him into these positions, some of which were 
 only occupied late in the evening of the 30th of June. 
 
 The left column,* under Reynolds, was composed of the First 
 
 * By the change of front executed after leaving the line of the Eappahannock 
 the right wing of the army, under Reynolds, had become the left wing. — Ed. 
 
76 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 and Eleventh corps : the former reached Emmettsburg on the 
 29th, and encamped the next day a few miles beyond the Gettys- 
 burg road on jNlarsh Creek, while the Eleventh took its place at 
 Emmettsburg. The Third and Twelfth army coi'ps formed the 
 central column : the latter established itself, with general head- 
 quarters, at Tancytown ; the former, leaving this point in the after- 
 noon of the 30th, on receiving intelligence of the appearance of the 
 enemy at Fairfield turned round to the left and proceeded to take 
 position near Emmettsburg, in order to strengthen the wing com- 
 manded by Reynolds. Finally, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth army 
 corps, composing the right, encamped at Frizzellburg, Union, and 
 New Windsor : the long distance they had to travel not allowing 
 the two last-mentioned corps to strike the road from Westminster 
 to Waynesboro', this wing found itself a little out of range. 
 Gregg's division of cavalry, which was to clear the way, was not 
 even able to reach the first of these last two villages, through 
 which, as we have stated, Stuart had passed the day before. 
 
 Meade's plan being once adopted, these dispositions were wise ; 
 but it is difficult to account for the instructions given by him to 
 French, whom a strange caprice of Halleck had just restored 
 to the Army of the Potomac with his eleven thousand men. It 
 seems that a reinforcement of so much importance should have 
 been immediately incorporated into this army : Meade did not 
 decide either to take it with him or to leave it at Harper's Ferry. 
 He ordered French to evacuate this position, to send all the mate- 
 rial found in it, with four thousand men as escort, to Washington, 
 and to plant himself with his other seven thousand men at 
 Fredericlv. This half measure was a great mistake : if its ob- 
 ject was to avoid displeasing Halleck, it was taken in vain, for 
 the evacuation of Harper's Ferry caused much excitement at 
 Washington, and deprived the Army of the Potomac of a fine 
 division which might have played an important role on the 
 field of battle.* 
 
 Pleasonton had distributed his cavalry very judiciously for the 
 purpose of covering the movement of the army and clearing it 
 on all sides, without following Stuart's example, who, through 
 
 * For instructions from ]Meade to French relative to the movements of the 
 latter, see despatches of June 29 and July 1, in Addenda, by Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 77 
 
 his indiscreet zeal, had put it out of his power to render the 
 same service to his chief. It has been stated that Meade 
 wished Pleasonton to undertake an expedition of the same cha- 
 racter, and that the latter had pointed out its dangers : if such 
 was the case, he had no great difficulty in persuading him. His 
 real merit consisted in handling his cavalry during the few days 
 intervening between the passage of the Potomac and the close 
 of the battle of Gettysburg with a degree of skill, foresight, 
 and decision which contributed largely to the victory of the 
 Federals. 
 
 Whilst Gregg was bearing to the right, and Kilpatrick per- 
 forming the double task of keeping Stuart at the east and clear- 
 ing the advance, Pleasonton had placed Buford's division on his 
 left. It was the strongest of the three, and its chief, a thorough 
 soldier, justly inspired it with entire confidence. Kilpatrick, as 
 we have stated, after having pushed rapidly as far as Littlestown 
 on the 29th, had on the oOth remained at Hanover, the scene of 
 the bloody combat he had fought with Stuart. Buford, on his 
 part, after having sent General Merritt, with his new command 
 (the regular cavalry brigade) to watch the outlet of the Hagers- 
 town road in the valley of the INIonocacy at INIechanicstown, made 
 a bold dash along the western slope of South Mountain in order 
 to ascertain if the enemy had lingered on the borders of the An- 
 tietam on the left flank of the Army of the Potomac. Leaving 
 Middletown* at daybreak on the 29th, and descending toward 
 Boonesboro', he followed the range of the mountains in a north- 
 erly direction as far as Waynesboro', and, crossing them again at 
 the Monterey defile without having encountered the enemy, halted 
 at Fountain Dale, situated halfway. It was scarcely dark when 
 this vigilant chief perceived in the distance, along the Fairfield 
 road, the bivouac-fires of a hostile body of troops, probably 
 Davis' brigade of Heth's division. Before daylight on the 
 3Gth he bore down upon Fairfield for the purpose of attacking 
 it, but after a few shots he became convinced that he could not 
 accomplish his object without artillery; and while the enemy 
 was falling back toward the north, Buford, not daring to engage 
 in an artillery-fight whose echoes might arouse the Confederate 
 * With Gamble's and Devin's brigades. — Ed. 
 
78 , THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 columns, left the direct Gettysburg road, and, following his 
 instructions, overtook Pleasonton* at Emmettsburg. 
 
 Several indications made the latter believe that the enemy 
 was preparing a movement against the Army of the Potomac, 
 and being aware that it was to push its left wing as far as 
 Gettysburg the next day, he could not allow the Confederates 
 to establish themselves in the place. He therefore ordered 
 Buford to repair speedily to that city, take possession of it, and 
 maintain himself in it until the arrival of the First corps. This 
 order was executed in the afternoon. On reaching Gettysburg, 
 Buford learned that a brigade of the enemy, coming from Cash- 
 town, had appeared in front of the place one hour before him, 
 but that at his approach it had suddenly retired in the same 
 direction. 
 
 Information of a somewhat va2;ue character p;atliered bv 
 Meade seemed to show that for the last two days Ewell had 
 made no farther advance northward, and that the rest of the 
 Southern army lay between Chambersburg and Cashtown, The 
 speedy retreat of the enemy corroborated this intelligence in 
 the mind of the general-in-chief, leading him to think that 
 Lee, apprised of his movement, was about to give up the 
 invasion m order to devote his attention exclusively to the 
 Army of the Potomac. He did not know, however, upon 
 which of the mountain-slopes, and with what intentions, Lee 
 was going to concentrate his forces. Buford 's encounter seemed 
 of itself to indicate that this concentration would take place 
 on the eastern slope. From this moment, thinking that Harris- 
 burg and Philadelphia were no longer in danger, and that 
 the first object of his rapid march northward was conse- 
 quently attained, he determined not to manoeuvre any fur- 
 ther except in preparing for the battle which was thenceforth 
 inevitable. His troops were tired ; some army corps of new 
 formation had been unable to keep up with the pace of the 
 soldiers experienced in marching for the last year oi" two ; the 
 regular supplies had failed in consequence of the interruption 
 of travel on the Baltimore and Ohio Pailroad ; it was neces- 
 s;iry to re-establish communications with Baltimore, first by 
 
 * Reynolds. — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 79 
 
 the "Westminster line, then by that of Hanover. For all these 
 reasons combined, Meade decided upon continuing to advance 
 slowly until he was fully jjosted in regard to the designs of 
 the enemy, and, in case the latter should come to meet him, to 
 take a defensive position which might secure him all tactical 
 advantages in the fight, either by speedily concentrating his 
 forces upon the point most menaced, or by bringing his columns 
 one day's march to the rear. His marching-orders were issued 
 to this effect on the evening of June 30th, to be executed the 
 following day at daybreak. They directed Reynolds to pro- 
 ceed with the left column to Gettysburg, making the First 
 corps occupy this village, ^^^hile the Eleventh remained some- 
 what in the rear, leaving tlie Third at Emmettsburg for the 
 purpose of covering his rear along the Greencastle road. The 
 Twelfth, which alone has remained in the centre at Taney- 
 town, is to march toward Two Taverns in order to connect 
 Reynolds with the right, whilst the Second will leave Frizzell- 
 burg to form, in conjunction with the latter, the central column, 
 and relieve him at TaneytoAvn. Finally, the Fifth and Sixth 
 have each a long march to perform — the one from Union to 
 Hanover, where it will form the first line on the right ; the other 
 from New Windsor to jNIanchester, where it will occupy the 
 second line, within supporting-distance oY the latter. The army 
 will thus present a broken line to the enemy — who may be sta- 
 tioned either west or north — facing in both these directions, the 
 upper part of the angle resting upon Gettysburg. The posi- 
 tion of the roads converging upon this town makes it especially 
 the capital point of this line, and INIeade has very judiciously 
 stationed throe army corps out of seven in the neighborhood. 
 This movement, however, is only 'ordered as a new step in 
 the advance which he is pursuing cautiously, intending to 
 push as far as the Susquehanna if necessary. He does not 
 know at this hour that the larger portion of Lee's army 
 has crossed South Mountain, and if he occupies Gettysburg 
 it is not with the intention of blocking the principal outlets 
 along the eastern slope of this chain against him. In fact, 
 foreseeing the possibility of the enemy coming to attack him 
 on this slope, he advises Reynolds to assemble all his forces 
 Vol. III.— 34 
 
80 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 either at Gettysburg or at Emmcttsburg, in order to delay 
 his march ; but he h9lds himself ready, by a rapid concentration 
 in the rear, to take a position, selected in advance, which will 
 enable him to cover Washington and Baltimore, and to wait 
 steadily for the assaults of the Confederate army. The occu- 
 pation of Emmettsburg, Gettysburg, and Hanover has no other 
 object than to cover this concentration and to detain the enemy 
 until it is accomjjlished. The position thus selected extends 
 along the left bank of Pipe Creek from Manchester to Middle- 
 burg. Having no knowledge of the topogra])hic details of 
 the country, nor of the remarkable position to which chance 
 was about to lead him at Gettysburg, he makes a judicious 
 choice upon a simple examination of the map. 
 
 On the morning of the 1st of July he addressed detailed 
 instructions to his corps commanders, indicating the positions 
 they were to take along Pipe Creek in case circumstances should 
 oblige him to remain on the defensive. Some of them objected 
 to this backward movement on the first encounter with the en- 
 emy, alleging that it might have the eifect of demoralizing the 
 soldiers; others, wdth more plausibility, remarked that the posi- 
 tion was too exclusively defensive, that Lee w^ould certainly not 
 come in search of the Army of the Potomac, and that the only 
 way to compel Lee to fight an aggressive battle was to throw 
 themselves boldly across his path. The fortune of war cut short 
 all these discussions by bringing the two combatants into a field 
 which neither of them had chosen. 
 
 We will therefore leave the various Federal columns Vvhich on 
 the 1st of July were occupied in executing the movements that 
 had been prescribed to them, in order to show w^hat were the 
 movements of the Confederate army at the same time. We have 
 mentioned the positions it occupied during the 28th. In the 
 evening a spy brought Longstreet news of the passage of the 
 Potomac by the enemy's army : it was the first intelligence the 
 Confederates had received of such an important movement 
 executed behind them during the last two days. Lee, know- 
 ing nothing of Stuart's imprudent venture, believed him to be 
 still occupied in watching Hooker, and concluded from his silence 
 that the latter had not stirred since the battle of Ashl)y's Gap. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 81 
 
 Tlie pi'eseuoe of the Federal army in the valley of the Monocacy 
 cut short his invading march northward : he understood, as well 
 as his adversary, the danger to which he was exposed if this 
 army crossed South Mountain to fall upon his rear in the Cum- 
 berland Valley and cut him oif from Virginia. Ewell, being 
 already near the banks of the Susquehanna, could not come 
 back quick enough to defend his communications directly. He 
 adopted a course which was both daring and wise (the merit of 
 which Lougstreet in his report arrogated to himself), and decided 
 either to forestall or to impede this manoeuvre of the enemy by 
 crossing the eastern slope of the mountain himself. In this way 
 he menaced Baltimore, and even Washington, by way of the 
 north, making it impossible for the Federals to move westward 
 away from their capital, and obliging them to come back to 
 defend the communications of the latter city with the free States. 
 The Army of the Potomac being once brought back in pursuit 
 of him, he hoped to be able to draw it northward behind him, 
 and probably not be obliged to fight it except within sight of 
 Philadelphia. Therefore, on the 29th, just as Meade was taking 
 up his line of march, he ordered his several army corps to assem- 
 ble between Cashtown and Gettysburg. 
 
 An examination of the map will show that this latter town, 
 being at about an equal distance from York, Chambersburg, and 
 Carlisle, and located at the intersection of nearly all the roads 
 traversing South Mountain, was the point around which the Con- 
 federate army would naturally concentrate itself. It presented, it 
 is true, the serious inconvenience of being outside of the territory 
 the army then occupied, but this inconvenience was the almost 
 inevitable consequence of the relative positions of the two armies. 
 Indeed, the Confederates in pushing their invasion northward 
 almost turned their backs upon their adversaries, and conse- 
 quently, if they faced about in order to concentrate by getting 
 near their base of operations, they were forcibly taken out of this 
 territory. Besides, Lee, not knowing the direction that Meade 
 had just given to his columns, could not foresee that the latter 
 was going to Gettysburg for the precise purpose of intercepting 
 the road from Chambersburg to York. Early had passed over it 
 two days before without encountering any serious resistance ; con- 
 
82 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 sequently, the goueral-in-chief, attaching no importance at that 
 time to the occupation of this town, gave no positive instructions 
 to his generals in regard to the matter : intcniding to concentrate 
 his forces a little nearer the niountaii!s, he gave them no precise 
 directions either for taking possession of it or to come to a halt 
 before reaching the place. Lee's instructions reached Ewell early 
 on the 29th, just as he was preparing to attack Harrisburg. In 
 order to gather all his troops in front of the capital of Pennsylva- 
 nia, he had called Early back to Carlisle; and the latter, promptly 
 obeying orders, encamped on the 30th about three miles east of 
 Heidlersburg. A fortunate chance made him fall in with his 
 chief, who had arrived with Rodes' division, near this village. 
 This and Johnson's division had started on the 29th for the pur- 
 pose of reaching the neighborhood of Cashtown and Gettysburg 
 in pursuance of instructions from the geueral-in-chief : while the 
 former marched directly southward, leaving South Mountain on 
 the right, the latter was retracing its steps along the Cumberland 
 Valley from Carlisle to the vicinity of Chambersburg, and, turn- 
 ing to the left at Green Village, halted on the evening of the 
 30th not far from Scotland, at the foot of the western slope of 
 the mountain, on a road connecting Avith the Gettysburg turnpike 
 at the entrance of the Cashtown defile. Johnson intended to 
 cross this defile the next morning, in order to join the remain- 
 der of the Second corps near the sources of the IMonocacy. 
 
 The movements prescribed to the rest of the army were much 
 slower. The whole of Longstreet's corps being at Chambersburg, 
 and Hill's a few miles farther east, near Fayctteville, Lee deter- 
 mined to make both of them debouch through the same pass upon 
 Cashtown and Gettysburg by placing them en echelon along the 
 road w^liieh Johnson was looking for on his side. In order to 
 avoid throwing this enormous column of more than sixty thou- 
 sand men into confusion, it was necessary to regulate and shorten 
 the stages of the march, and to advance with the greater precau- 
 tion because there was not a single regiment of cavalry left to 
 clear the march. Heth'sclivision of Hill's corps took the lead, 
 and encamped at Cashtown on the 29th ; on the 30th, Heth 
 ordered Pettigrew's brigade to push on as far as Gett}^sburg, in 
 order to make a requisition for shoes, of which, it was said, 
 
BRANDY STATION. 83 
 
 this town still possessed large supplies, notwithstanding Early's 
 recent visit. 
 
 This brigade, having no suspicion of the proximity of the 
 Federals, was about to enter the place with the numerous wagons 
 that followed in its wake, and was preparing quietly to take pos- 
 session of it, when its scouts signalled the approach of Buford's 
 column. The latter, after the interruption to his march, as we 
 have seen, liad quickened the pace of his horses in order to make 
 up for lost time, and entered Gettysburg before eleven o'clock in 
 the morning. Pettigrew had not looked for him : surprised at 
 this unexpected encounter, ignorant of the enemy's forces, and 
 finding himself too much exposed eight miles away from the rest 
 of his division, he fell back upon Marsh Creek, halfway to Cash- 
 town. He' halted his troops near this stream, and hastened to 
 apprise his chiefs of the presence of the enemy in Gettysburg; 
 so that the two parties, which had an equal interest in being first 
 to take possession of this town, had successively neglected to do so 
 during the morning of the 30th of June ; but, thanks to Buford's 
 promptness, the Federals still retained the advantage. Pettigrew's 
 forces were too small numerically for him to take advantage of 
 his position on JSIarsh Creek and attack the Union cavalry at 
 Gettysburg without waiting for the arrival of Heth's division, 
 which had remained at Cash town. 
 
 Pender, on his part, had reached this village during the even- 
 ing of the 30th. Anderson, who was following h'nii, did not 
 arrive till the next day. Finally, Longstreet, leaving Pickett's 
 division at Charabersburg, made a march with the other two, and 
 halted at Greenwood at the entrance of the mountains. The 
 march of the column, therefore, had been very slow, and on the 
 evening of the 30th, forty-eight hours after Lee had determined 
 upon his movement, he was not yet master of the point of con- 
 centration he had chosen. It was even a strange circumstance, at 
 variance wdth his instructions, which put on the march the troops 
 that were to dispute the possession of the place with the Federals. 
 In fact. General Hill, having received Pettigrew's report, under- 
 stood at once that the latter had encountered a mounted advance- 
 guard, not infantry troops, and thought it would be easy to dis- 
 lodge it. Being obliged, on the one hand, in tlie absence of 
 
84 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Stuart, to employ infantry to clear his march, and desirous, on 
 the other hand, to secure the distribution of shoes to his men, of 
 wliich they stood so much in want, he ordered Heth to march 
 upon Gettysburg at daybreak on the 1st of July "svith his whole 
 division — a remarkable instance of the influence which the most 
 trifling incidents frequently exercise over the fate of war. Lee, 
 in his turn, as soon as he was informed of the presence at Gettys- 
 burg of Meade's cavalry in force, without suspecting as yet that 
 he was going to encounter his infantry there, felt the importance 
 of this point. He ordered Hill with his Second division, under 
 Pender, and the eight batteries of the Third corps, to follow Heth. 
 Anderson, Hood, and McLaws, posted en echelon behind him, were 
 directed to follow his movement. Ewell, on his part, knowing 
 Hill to be at Cashtown, and not having been informed in time of 
 the movement of his entire corps upon Gettysburg, led his col- 
 umns, according to the instructions he had received on the 29th, 
 toward the first mentioned of these two villages. Rodes took the 
 most direct route, while Early was ordered to make a detour south- 
 eastward, in order to strike a road passing by Hunterstown and 
 Mummasburg, a village situated only about five miles north of 
 Gettysburg. With regard to Johnson, separated from his chief 
 by the massive proportions of the mountains, he could not receive 
 his instructions ; and, besides, he had no choice as to the route to 
 be followed : he had to come to Greenwood to take his place in 
 the rear of the rest of the army along the turnpike. Ewell bit- 
 terly regretted the detour he had caused it to make in order to 
 reach this route, instead of taking it along with him over the 
 eastern slope of the mountains. He would thus have reached 
 the battlefield half a day's march sooner, in time to decide the 
 victory. 
 
 This summary, which the reader may find somewhat long, was 
 necessary to show how the two armies, each marching in ignorance 
 of the movements of the other, both suddenly changing their direc- 
 tion, while their cavalry crossed their paths, alternately missing 
 each other or meeting unexpectedly, had finally on the 1st of 
 July taken a direction which brought them f;ice to face at Gettys- 
 bnro;. The recital of the battle thev are about to fight will form 
 the subject of the next two chapters. Before closing the present 
 
BRANDY STATION. 85 
 
 one we will mention in a few words what was done during those 
 few days by the detachments of Federal troops which, without 
 belonging directly to the Army of the Potomac, were neverthe- 
 less within its sphere of action. 
 
 We left General Couch at Harrisburg, busy in preparing, to the 
 best of his ability, for the defence of that city, and endeavoring, 
 with the aid of another general whose name is equally familiar to 
 us (W. F. Smith), to organize the Pennsylvania militia. He did 
 not pretend to oppose the march of the Confederates with these 
 troops, but by pressing them and watching them closely wherever 
 they went he could, without ever being drawn into a fight, keep 
 the run of their movements and furnish the Federal authorities 
 with valuable information. This is what he did. On the 29th 
 he apprised Halleck of the time when the stoppage in Ewell's 
 march occurred ; on the morning of the 30th, as soon as the latter 
 had commenced his backward movement, he also sent word to the 
 authorities at Washington, and despatched Smith at the same time 
 in pursuit with all the cavalry he could muster. It is this 
 detachment, following Ewell's track, which had just occupied 
 Carlisle when Stuart made his appearance before that city on 
 the 1st of July. Through his firmness and excellent defensive 
 arrangement Smith succeeded in organizing a resistance which, 
 as we have stated, deceived the Confederate general : after 
 having withstood the fire of the enemy's artillery without being 
 able to reply to it, he managed with his raw troops to hold the 
 Slite of the Southern cavalry in check. 
 
 The communications between Halleck and Meade, frequently 
 interrupted by Stuart, were often slow and difficult ; nevertheless, 
 on the evening of the 30th the cliief of the Army of the Potomac 
 received the first intelligence of Ewell's movement. Chambers- 
 burg was mentioned as the probable point of concentration of the 
 Confederates. Upon this information, Meade, thinking that they 
 M'ould assemble west of South Mountain, made all his arrange- 
 ments for the 1st of July. In the mean time, a dii'eetor of tlie 
 Pennsylvania Railroad Company, INIr. Scott, who subsequently 
 became Assistant Secretary of War,* and who had organized a 
 
 * Thomas A. Scott was appointed Assistant Secretary of War by Secretary 
 Cameron in 1861. — Ed. 
 
86 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 thorough system for gaining information in the country oepu})icd 
 by the Confederates, told Couch on the night of the 3{jtli that 
 they were concentrating on Gettysburg instead of Chambers- 
 burg. It Avas impossible to be more promptly or more correctly 
 informed. Unfortunately, this intelligence, forwarded by a courier 
 from Frederick, did not reach Meade until the evening of the 1st, 
 when it was no longer of any value, for the events of that day 
 had but too clearly revealed the intentions of the enemy. 
 
 While preparations were thus being made for the decisive 
 conflict in Pennsylvania, and all the forces that the Federals 
 were able to raise north of the Potomac were at last animated 
 by a common impulse, and while French himself, abandoning 
 Harper's Ferry on the 30th with all its garrison,* was pro- 
 ceeding toward Frederick to take an active part in Meade's 
 opei-atious, the troops that Halleck had so improperly left in the 
 peninsula of Virginia had likewise taken the field. The Fourth 
 army corps, assembled at Yorktown and Williamsburg under 
 Keyes, was transported by water about the 20th of June to 
 White House, where a brigade of cavalry had preceded it by 
 land. The instructions given to Keyes directed him to start 
 from this point for the purpose of cutting the railroads running 
 from Richmond northward, and to menace the enemy's capital. 
 Many people had hoped that by a bold stroke the Fourtli army 
 corps might be placed in possession of this city. The Confederate 
 government had sent all the troops it could dispose of to Lee, 
 reducing those which guarded the capital and the coast to a figure 
 which, compared with the garrison of Washington, was indeed 
 insignificant, but less so than the clamors of the inhabitants of 
 Richmond had led the Federals to suppose. Only three brigades 
 had been left in North Carolina : Clingmau at Washington, Col- 
 quitt at Kinston, and Martin at Weldon. But five brigades 
 were stationed at Richmond and in its vicinity : Ransom and 
 Jenkins, at the south, extended their lines as far as Petersburg ; 
 Wise and Cook along the suburbs of the city ; finally. Corse at 
 Hanover Junction. It is true that on the 24th the latter was 
 
 * French moved to Frederick with only two brigades (Kenly's and Morris'), 
 while the others (Elliott's and Smith's) guarded the materiel taken from the 
 fortifications of Maryland Heights to Washington. — Ed. 
 
BRANDY STATION. 87 
 
 sent to Gordonsville, leaving only one regiment behind him ; but 
 notwithstanding his departure the Confederates could yet muster 
 eight or nine thousand men in the works which surrounded the 
 capital : it was more than was necessary to protect it from any 
 sudden attack. 
 
 On the 25th, Colonel Spear was sent by Keyes, with about one 
 thousand cavalry, to destroy the railroad-bridge over the South 
 Anna near Hanover, to which allusion has already frequently 
 been made. Crossing the river by fording, he attacked at once, 
 on both sides, the regiment that Corse had left to guard the 
 crossing : dispersing it, after having inflicted upon it some heavy 
 losses, he burned the bridge and returned to White House on the 
 28th. This operation, well conducted, but without any. import- 
 ance, inasmuch as Lee w^as no longer at Fredericksburg or Cul- 
 peper at the end of the railroad line, was the only incident of 
 the campaign. After Spear's return Keyes despatched General 
 Getty on the 1st of July, wdtli eight thousand men, to Hanover 
 Court-house, and on the same day he started himself, with five 
 thousand, in the direction of Kichmond as far as Baltimore 
 Cross-roads. But these two columns advanced very cautiously. 
 While the city of Richmond was in a state of excitement, Keyes, 
 after a skirmish in which he lost about. twenty men, seeing the 
 uselessness of the campaign he had been made to undertake, fell 
 back upon AVhite House on the od. Here he found Getty, whose 
 venture had been productive of no other result than the capture 
 of the Confederate general W. H. F. Lee, wounded at Brandy Sta- 
 tion, in a farm-house w'here he was being cared for. After this 
 expedition the Federal government did at last what it should 
 have done before : the largest portion of the Fourth army corps 
 w^as incorporated with the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Q 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 OAK HILL. 
 
 O'N the 1st of July, 1863, the whole Southern army, as we 
 have seen, was on the march since morning to concentrate 
 itself at" Gettysburg. Ewell, who had at first proceeded in the 
 direction of Cashtown by cross-roads, having learned that Hill 
 was going beyond this village, immediately took the direct roads 
 converging upon Gettysburg, where he intended to assist the 
 Third corps. Lee's army, Avhich had been divided for the last 
 eight days, was then about to be massed, either on that or the 
 next day, east of South Mountain, thus menacing Baltimore and 
 Washington : its chief relied upon this demonstration to bring 
 back the Army of the Potomac, which he believed to be yet at 
 a considerable distance in pursuit of him, and oblige it to attack 
 him in a defensive position which he thought he had ample 
 time to select and occupy. It is stated that he had assured his 
 lieutenants that he should not take the offensive on the field of 
 battle. 
 
 The Federal array Avas arrayed en echelon at greater distances, 
 and Meade, equally desirous of securing the advantages of a 
 defensive position, held himself ready to assemble it by a con- 
 centrating movement in the rear; but, whatever might have 
 been his final determination, it was necessary for him to occupy 
 Gettysburg, either for the purpose of covering this movement 
 or for advancing. We have seen that his cavalry, forestalling 
 the enemy, had established itself in this village on the previous 
 evening, while the First and Eleventh army corps, starting at the 
 same hour with Hill's and Ewell's soldiers, were marching, like 
 them, toward this point. Fortunately, being fully acquainted 
 with the character of liis former comrades, who had become 
 
OAK HILL. 89 
 
 his subordinates within the last three days, Meade entrusted the 
 task of clearing and directing his left to two men equally noted 
 for quickness of perception, promptness of decision, and gal- 
 lantry on the battlefield — Buford and Reynolds. So that, by 
 one of those singular chances which play so important a part 
 in war, at the very moment when the Southern general, believ- 
 ing that he was mustering his army at a considerable distance 
 from the enemy, had selected for this purpose a point which one 
 of his army corps had just crossed without difficulty, this point 
 was precisely the one selected by his adversary, while the latter, 
 who did not wish to expose himself to the dangers of a concen- 
 tration in front of his lines, had so conducted the march of his 
 troops that his left wing was about to rush unexpectedly against 
 the heads of column of the whole Confederate army. 
 
 The end of June had been rainy, with frequent storms, which, 
 while imparting the freshness of spring to the leaves of the forest 
 and the grass of the meadows, had at the same time brolceu up 
 the roads over which the combatants of both armies were march- 
 ing in close column. Before bringing them face to face in hostile 
 array Ave will leave them for a while, pursuing their way with 
 the carelessness of the soldier, who is too familiar with the mul- 
 titudinous risks of war to ponder over them, and devote a few 
 lines to the description of the surroundings of Gettysburg, a rich 
 and beautiful country, whose atmosphere at this early morning 
 hour was so strongly surcharged with warm vapors that the 
 sun found it difficult to dispel them, while its slanting rays, 
 piercing through heavy, opaque clouds, flashed over the long 
 and solid wall of South Mountain, a lofty barrier which shuts 
 out the whole horizon at the west. 
 
 The irregularities of the ground, as we had occasion to remark 
 in regard to the entire region of country adjoining this chain, are 
 due to the prevalence of rocky ridges lying parallel to its general 
 direction, sometimes emerging from the soil in steep, ragged 
 notches resembling ruined castles or fantastic pyramids. A 
 hard-working population settled upon this fertile land has 
 almost entirely cleared it, so that the woods, much more scarce 
 than in Maryland, and the rocks, less numerous than at Em- 
 niettsburg, only constitute isolated points of support in the 
 
90 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 centre of a territoiy adapted for deploying armies and the 
 evolutions of artillery. 
 
 The streams which traverse this section of country were at this 
 season altogether insignificant. The principal ones, Willoughby 
 Run and Rock Creek, pursue a parallel coui'se from north to 
 south, one west and the other east of Gettysburg, emptying 
 themselves lower down into Marsh Creek. The banks of 
 these two resemble each other. Covered with woods, those 
 of Rock Creek, as its name implies, are bristling with rocks, 
 which, rising as high as one hundred and twenty, and even 
 one hundred and fifty feet, above its bed, have prevented the 
 woods from being cleared. Those of Willoughby Run are not 
 so high nor so steep, and are less wooded. The battlefield is 
 comprised between the right bank of the former and the left 
 bank of the latter. The hills that are met on this ground may 
 be divided into two groups, disposed in analogous fashion, whose 
 formation reveals a geological law which is common to the whole 
 section of this country. Each group forms a combination of 
 three ridges starting from a common point, alike in elevation and 
 abruptness. The central ridge, the highest and longest, follows 
 a southerly direction ; another, equally straight, but less elevated, 
 south-south-westward ; the third, extending east-south-eastward, 
 is short, and split into two sections, as if, by the general direc- 
 tion in the upheaving of the ground, it had been thwarted in 
 its formation. The starting-point of the first group is a ridge 
 situated one and a quarter miles north-west of Gettysburg, in 
 the direction of jNIummasburg, called Oak Hill, on account of 
 the thick forest of oaks which covered it. Its central ridge 
 is about two miles long and very narrow, with considerable ele- 
 vation for two-thirds of that distance, being throughout inter- 
 spersed with small woods, farms, and couutry-houses. Among 
 these habitations there is a Lutheran seminary (which has given 
 it the appellation of Seminary Hill), the belfry of which, located 
 on the culminating-point, overlooks the whole surrounding coun- 
 try. The south-western ridge is, at first, only separated from the 
 one last mentioned by a narrow strip of land which deepens in 
 proportion as they diverge. It borders the course of Willoughby 
 Run. The third consists of several round hillocks which grad- 
 
OAK HILL. 91 
 
 ually decrease in size as far as Rock Creek. Amid the vast 
 cultivated iiekls covering these hinocks thei'e may be seen a few 
 farm-houses, the Crawford farm-house among the rest, and at 
 six hundred feet from Rock Creek the almshouse. The second 
 group is situated south-east of the first; its starting-point is 
 twenty-eight hundred yards from Oak Hill. It was well knoAvn 
 before the battle by the name of Cemetery Hill, on account of 
 the cemetery which crowns the summit, as if in advance, by 
 some ominous forethought, it had been placed there upon a point 
 where so many victims were to perish at once. This rock-girded 
 pinnacle rises abruptly about eighty feet above a large valley 
 Mhieh is watered by Ste^'ens' Run, a small stream that flows 
 from -west to east and connects with Rock Creek after havinar 
 wound around the foot of the hillock occupied by the Craw- 
 ford farm-house. The small town of Gettysburg is situated in 
 this valley on the south side of Stevens' Run, and its streets, 
 lined with houses behind which some fine orchards are seen 
 stretching out, rise in gentle acclivities to the base of Ceme- 
 tery Hill. The principal ridge, which starts from this point 
 with a southerly direction, soon decreases in size; the rocks 
 disappear ; the slopes, bare at the west, became less rugged on 
 this side : at the east, on the contrary, the bed of Rock Creek 
 deepens still more rapidly between declivities that are covered 
 with thick forests. At a distance of sixteen hundred yards 
 from the extremity of Cemetery Hill the line of elevation has 
 lessened by about twenty yards ; then it rises again to the length 
 of two-thirds of a mile, to terminate at last in the shape of two 
 hills with bold outlines which proudly command all the neigh- 
 boring localities, and whose fantastic rocks seem, from a distance, 
 absolutely inaccessible to man. That farthest south, which is the 
 highest, rises to a height of not less than two hundred and ten 
 feet above Gettysburg ; it is known by the name of Round Top ; 
 the other called-Little Round Top, separated from the first by a 
 distance of five hundred and fifty yards, is less in height by one 
 hundred and five feet. Both of them, connected by a- narrow 
 defile, form at the west a declivity, at the foot of which flows a 
 small marshy stream. Plum Run, whose bed is more than three 
 hundred feet below the summit of Round Top. The opposite 
 
92 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 bank of this stream, although not so high, is as wild and steep as 
 the sides of the Round Tops, and the colonists, jealous, no doubt, 
 of the legends of the mother-country, in the middle of the eight- 
 eenth century gave the name of Devil's Den to one of the numer- 
 ous caverns that are to be found there. On both sides a strong 
 ven-etation, which derives its sustenance from the fertile soil that 
 is fed by the decomposition of syenite rocks, penetrates through 
 the blocks of stone that are piled up in every direction, while 
 gnarled and knotty oaks cover the irregularities of the ground 
 with their thick foliage. This wood extends westward as far as 
 the undulating plateau, where it stretches out, zigzag fashion, to 
 the very centre of the cultivated fields. The eastern ridge, very 
 short, as in the other group, and terminating likewise on the banks 
 of Hock Creek at a distance of about seventeen hundred yards 
 south of the almshouse, presents the same features as the heights 
 of the Round Tops. It is a ridge wdiich, possessing steep accliv- 
 ities at the north, connects Cemetery Hill with the wood-covered 
 rocks of Culp's Hill, then, suddenly decreasing in altitude with- 
 out losing any of its steepness, inclines toward the south by 
 following the course of Rock Creek, which the equally wooded 
 slopes of Wolf's Hill command from the opposite side. A large 
 o-ap separates Culp's Hill from an eminence situated tw^o-thirds 
 of a mile fiirther south, called Power's Hill. The third ridge, 
 still resembling that of the other group by its direction and 
 paucity of elevation, detaches itself from the first at a distance 
 of about five hundred and fifty yards from the central point, and 
 pursuing a south-westerly course, gradually diminishes in size and 
 spreads out like the latter. At about one thousand or fifteen hun- 
 dred yards from this place these ridges are reduced to an almost 
 imperceptible rise in the ground, the one at the west attaining a' 
 height of from forty to fifty feet, and the other from twenty to 
 thirty, above the depression w'hich separates them, and in which 
 Plum Run takes its source. The first, therefore, commands the 
 second for a distance of about seven or eight hundred yards; 
 which is not enough, in an artillerist's point of view, to impart to 
 it a tangible superiority in an open country. It is in the midst 
 of these slight undulations that the link of connection between 
 the two groups is to be found : the central section of the first, 
 
OAK HILL. 93 
 
 which prolongs the ridge of Seminary Hill by its depression, 
 becomes amalgamated with the eastern section of the second near 
 the point where the latter has less elevation. Eight or nine hun- 
 dred yards more to the south, at a point which has become histor- 
 ical under the name of Peach Orchard — which we will call " the 
 Orchard " — the line of altitude turns suddenly westward, form- 
 ing a slight gap, and at the end of four hundred yards pursues 
 a southerly direction by following a narrow ridge almost entirely 
 covered with w^oods, the eastern slope of which commands Wil- 
 loughby Run as far as its confluence with Marsh Creek. 
 
 The town of Gettysburg is naturally the centre of all the roads 
 traversing this section of country. At the north three roads 
 become separated even before having crossed Stevens' Run : the 
 first, at the north-west, leads to Mummasburg by crossing the 
 prolongation of Oak Hill ridge ; the second, at the north, leads 
 to Carlisle, leaving the almshouse on the right ; the third, at the 
 north-east, which passes in front of this institution and crosses 
 Rock Creek shortly after, bears toward Harrisburg. The Han- 
 over railroad approaches the town from the east, following 
 the right bank of Stevens' Creek: it was not running beyond 
 Gettysburg, but the work intended for its extension toward 
 Chambersburg was progressing outside of the town, w-est-north- 
 westward, intersecting, by means of deep trenches, the two ridges 
 which descend from Oak Hill toward the south and south-west. 
 Two roads also cross these two ridges: the first is the turnpike, 
 which follows the unfinished railroad-track very closely ; the other 
 is a common cross-road, which at the west-south-west runs in the 
 direction of Fairfield and Hagerstown, crossing Marsh Creek at 
 the ford called Black Horse Tavern. The seminary stands be- 
 tween the two, above their dividing-line. As at the north and 
 west, three roads start south and two east of Gettysburg. The 
 latter are those of Hunterstown, north-eastward, and of Hanover, 
 south-eastward, which Early had followed in his march upon 
 York. The highw^ays southward are, in the first place, the Bal- 
 timore turnpike, south-south-east, wliich on leaving Gettysbm-g 
 ascends the summit of Cemetery Hill, leaving Gulp's Hill on 
 tlie left, and descends upon Rock Creek between the base of 
 this hill and the slopes of Power's Hill ; then, at the south, the 
 
94 THE CIVIL WAB IN AMERICA. 
 
 Tanoytown road, which crosses the main section of the second 
 group above Cemetery Hill, and follows halfway the eastern slope 
 of this section, leaving the summits of the Round Tops on its 
 right; finally, at the south-south-west, the Emmettsburg road, 
 which follows precisely the line of elevation of the third ridge 
 across vast cultivated fields only divided by fences, and inter- 
 spersed with farms as far as the Orchard, where it pursues its 
 original direction by crossing a ravine which connects with Plum 
 Creek below Devil's Den. 
 
 This enumeration would not suffice to make the reader under- 
 stand the importance which so many converging roads must have 
 given to Gettysburg if we were not to add that in times of war 
 in the United States the turnpikes play a role similar to that of 
 the highways which traversed France and the Flemish provinces 
 during the wars of the seventeenth century ; in fact, the other 
 roads, being miserably constructed and poorly kept, are not avail- 
 able for heavy transportation, and the macadamized highways 
 necessarily attract armies, which in order to move with rapidity 
 are obliged to follow them ; therefore, as we have seen, three of 
 these highways — those of Chambersburg, Baltimore, and York — ■ 
 centred at Gettysburg. 
 
 Such is the ground upon which unforeseen circumstances were 
 about to bring the two armies in hostile contact. Neither Meade 
 nor Lee had any personal knowledge of it ; and if, by examining 
 the maps, they had some idea of the importance which the com- 
 bination of ten roads and one railway imparted to Gettysburg, 
 they had no information concerning the strong positions that 
 Nature had created at will, as it were, all around this town. 
 Early, who had passed through it a few days before, did not appear 
 to have made any report to his chief on the subject. Buford, who, 
 when he arrived on the evening of the 30th, had perceived at one 
 glance the advantage to be derived from these positions, did not 
 have time to give a description of them to ]\Ieade and receive his 
 instructions. 
 
 The unfailing indications to an officer of so much experience, 
 however, revealed to Buford the approach of the enemy. Know- 
 ing that Reynolds was within supporting-distance of him, he 
 boldly resolved to risk everything in order to allow the latter 
 
OAK HILL. 95 
 
 time to reach Gettysburg in advance of the Confederate army. 
 This first inspiration of a cavahy officer and a true soldier 
 decided in every respect the fate of the camj)aigu. It was 
 Buford who selected the battlefield where the two armies were 
 about to measure their strength : it must be granted that he was 
 sure of the approbation of his two immediate commanders, both 
 being animated by the same zeal which prompted his own action — 
 Pleasonton, who had sent him from Emmettsburg to Gettysburg 
 at the first news of the enemy's appearance on the Cashtown road, 
 and Reynolds, whom he knew to be determined to provoke the 
 conflict as soon as he should find an opportunity. Buford did 
 not deceive himself in regard to the perils of his situation. The 
 unexpected encounter he had with Pettigrew's brigade the day 
 before in sight of Gettysburg, the information obtained from 
 stragglers who had been left in his hands by the latter, convinced 
 him that he stood in the presence not of detached parties, but of 
 infantry columns of the enemy marching with the confidence 
 imparted by superiority of numbers. It was easy to arrive at the 
 conclusion that at least a large portion of the Confederate army 
 was about to concentrate at Gettysburg. This is Avhat made it at 
 once so important and difficult for him to retain possession of this 
 point with the two brigades of cavalry which constituted all his 
 force. " Rest assured," he said in the evening to General Devin, 
 who commanded one of his brigades, " that the enemy will attack 
 us in the morning. Their skirmishers will come thundering along 
 three lines deep, and we shall have to fight like devils to main- 
 tain ourselves until the arrival of the infantry." 
 
 It was with this forethought that Buford took advantage of the 
 last hours of daylight to post his small force in such a manner as 
 to conceal his weakness as much as possible. He had not at that 
 time more than forty-two hundred mounted men with him : to 
 cope with the enemy's infantry these had to be fought on 
 foot, while the necessity of holding the led horses necessarily 
 reduced by one-fourth his effective force on the battlefield. Dis- 
 posing of his troops in a circular arc from west to north-east of 
 Gettysburg, Gamble's brigade on the left, Devin's on the right, 
 he pushed his scouts far ahead along all the roads the intersection 
 of which he held. After having apprised Meade and Reynolds 
 
96 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 of the dispositions he had made and of the supposed movements 
 of the enemy, he waited for dayliglit, Avhosc dawn was to mark 
 the great battle for whieh preparations were being made on both 
 sides. 
 
 His anticipations were soon realized, and from six o'clock in 
 the morning his scouts along the Cashtown road reported the 
 presence of the heads of column of Heth's division, which, after 
 overtaking Pcttigrew's brigade, was rapidly advancing upon Get- 
 tysburg. Buford hastened to make the final arrangements for 
 the battle. Devin, having uo one before him at the north, left 
 only a few patrols on that side, and took position between the 
 Mummasburg road and the railway-cut. Gamble, on his left, 
 pushed his first line to the banks of Willoughby Run, extend- 
 ing his lines as far as the Hagerstowu road ; the reserve troops, 
 dismounted like the rest and ready to take part in the combat, 
 were massed along the ridge which descends from Oak Hill at 
 the west, and consequently in advance of Seminary Hill. The 
 mounted artillery which accompanies the division has taken a 
 position so as to enfilade three roads : it opens fire a little before 
 nine o'clock. Heth immediately deploys his two advance bri- 
 gades, Davis' on the left and Archer's on the right, both of them 
 south of the Chambersburg road. About eight o'clock in the 
 morning this first line, preceded by a close column of skirmish- 
 ers, openly descends the slopes of the right bank of Willoughby 
 Run, confirming Buford's prediction by the vigor with which its 
 attack is made. The Federal cavalry, well ambushed, rejily by a 
 well-sustained fire, which stops the assailants, making their lead- 
 ers believe that they have an infantry corps to cope with. This is 
 the first serious encounter of the two armies upon the soil of the 
 free States. A murderous struggle takes place at once on the 
 banks of the stream. The Union cavalry is less numerous than 
 that of their adversaries, for tliey have to deal with two strong 
 brigades ; but they are as solid and determined, with carbine iu 
 hand, as well-trained as infantry, while their artillery, perfectly 
 well served, sustains them by means of a most effective fire. In the 
 mean time, Buford, who is aware that Hill's whole corps has 
 encamped at Cashtown, and who perceives in the distance the 
 long columns of the enemy along the road, calculates with anx- 
 
OAK HILL. 97 
 
 iety tlie length of time during wliich his small band may be able 
 to check the march of the enemy. Fortunately, the latter has 
 no idea of the immense advantages he might secure at a small 
 cost by taking possession of the town of Gettysburg and the 
 heights that command it before the arrival of the Federal infan- 
 try. Heth has been ordered by Lee not to press the enemy if he 
 finds him in force, in order to give the other divisions time to 
 come up : in view of the unexpected resistance he has encountered, 
 he leaves Archer and Davis fighting with the Federals, unwilling 
 to engage the rest of his division until Pender's troops are within 
 supporting-distance of him. Buford, on his part, causes his last 
 reserves to advance up to the first line, which is beginning to suffer 
 seriously from the enemy's fire : he directs the fire of his artillery 
 in person and encourages the combatants by his example, thus 
 prolonging the struggle while preparing to lead back his small 
 band to the natural citadel of Cemetery Hill whenever the con- 
 flict becomes too unequal. This moment is dravriug near : A. P. 
 Hill, although sick, has hastened forward at the sound of the 
 cannon. Pender's column follows him close ; the combat is about 
 to assume a new aspect. 
 
 It is, however, at the very moment when the sacrifices made by 
 Buford in order to preserve his position appear to be useless that 
 he reaps the reward of his tenacity. Reynolds' soldiers have 
 marched as rapidly as those of Hill, and the officer of the signal 
 corps, who, stationed in the belfry of the seminary, turns his 
 anxious looks from the Cashtown road, which is covered with 
 hostile troops, to that of Emmettsburg, finally discovers in the 
 distance a large column of infantry. In that direction none but 
 friendly troops could be expected. Buford, having come up in 
 full haste in order to verify this glorious news, which will pre- 
 clude him from giving the order of retreat, has scarcely reached 
 the observatory when he hears his name called by a well-known 
 voice. It is Reynolds, who, having been informed of the enemy's 
 attack half an hour before, proceeded in advance of his columns, 
 and following the sound of battle has come at full gallop to 
 bring the assurance of speedy relief to the Federal cavalry and 
 its valiant cliieftain. Wadsworth's division, encamped upon 
 Marsh Creek, about five miles from Gettysburg, had been the 
 
98 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 first to start at eight o'clock in the morning on receiving the 
 news forwarded by Buford to Pleasonton the previous evening : 
 the two other divisions of the First corps, commanded by Row- 
 ley and Robinson, got under way half an hour later, under the 
 direction of Doubleday, making a forced march to join him. 
 The Federal soldiers and their leaders arc fired by extraor- 
 dinary zeal : like Antaeus, who gathered new strength whenever 
 he touched the earth, it seems that the idea of fighting on the 
 soil of the free States, in the midst of a friendly population threat- 
 ened with a terrible invasion, doubles their energy and their 
 activity. The hesitations, the delays, and the frequent discour- 
 agements which seemed to paralyze the best-conceived plans in 
 Virginia have given place to a noble emulation which urges them 
 to dispute with each other the honor of dealing the swiftest and 
 heaviest blows to the enemy. "Without taking any account of 
 their numbers, Reynolds himself, notwithstanding the immense 
 responsibility weighing upon him, gives them an example of this 
 zeal by contributing more than any one else to inspire them with 
 it. Sad and dejected, it is said, before the meeting of the two 
 armies, he has become invigorated Jis soon as he has felt his 
 proximity to the adversaries with whom he desired to come to 
 blows since the opening of the campaign. 
 
 We have already mentioned what were INIeade's intentions and 
 the instructions he had sent to his lieutenants on the evening of 
 the 30tli. Before beginning a naj'rative which Ave shall not again 
 be able to interrupt before the close of the day, we must say a 
 word about the dispositions he made on the morning of the 1st 
 of July, although they were speedily modified by subsequent 
 events. The news of the encounter between Buford and Petti- 
 grew's brigade at Gettysburg, which had been sent by the former 
 on the evening of the 30th to Reynolds, his immediate chief, had 
 not yet reached head-quarters. Buford in his despatch conveyed 
 positive information regarding the positions of the enemy's three 
 corps, which no longer admitted of any doubt that their concen- 
 tration was to be effected at Gettysburg by way of the northern 
 and western routes. The information his army had picked up to 
 the present hour, and the advices which Couch had forwarded 
 from Harrisburg, already clearly revealed to Meade the move- 
 
OAK HILL. ' 99 
 
 inent by which Lee, collecting his scattered columns in the val- 
 ley of the Susquehanna, was preparing to fight the Army of the 
 Potomac; but the bloody conflict in which Stuart had just been 
 engaged with Kilpatrick in the village of Hanover induced him 
 to think that the concentration would take place in the district 
 occupied by Ewell, north-east of Gettysburg, which would render 
 it impossible for his army to sustain itself in this latter position. 
 He felt, therefore, that the formidable adversary who had already 
 so frequently snatched the victory from his predecessors was ap- 
 proaching him, without being able to guess on which side his 
 blows would fall. Having only been invested with the supreme 
 command within the last three days, he felt disposed to act with 
 the utmost circumspection. He had already obtained an import- 
 ant result. Lee, had he been able to ignore the Army of the 
 Potomac, would hitherto haxe preferred an aggressive campaign 
 in the free States rather than a veritable invasion. Adopting 
 the latter course, he now finds himself menaced by this army, 
 and comes to a halt, forced to preserve on the field of battle the 
 role of assailant which he had assumed in crossing the Potomac. 
 Meade, extremely perplexed, feared that he had advanced too far 
 by pusliing his left to Gettysburg and his right to Planover. He 
 would not, however, countermand the movement already in prog- 
 ress, nor order a retrograde march for the morrow upon Bal- 
 timore. He confined himself, therefore, to the task -of sending 
 detailed instructions to his corps commanders regarding the manner 
 of performing, as soon as he should order it, this march as far as 
 the line of Pipe Creek. Believing the enemy to be far more dis- 
 tant than he was in reality, he thought that he had time to make 
 his choice and to determine either upon a retrograde movement or 
 an aggressive manoeuvre. His despatch to Reynolds especially 
 showed distiiactly the state of uncertainty he was laboring under, 
 manifesting at the same time the confidence he had in the judg- 
 ment of his old comrade,* to whom he allowed great latitude in 
 the direction of the left wing. It is probable that Reynolds did 
 not receive this last despatch, which was forwarded too late to 
 
 * At tlie breaking out of the war Meade and Keynolds each commanded a 
 brigade in McCall's division, where the author had the good fortune to make 
 their acquaintance. 
 
100 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 reach liini before his departure from Marsli Creek. He had start- 
 ed, therefore, in compliance with the ordci'S received the day pre- 
 vious. These orders directed him to station himself at Gettys- 
 burg or in its vicinity with the Fii'st and Eleventh corps, but 
 contained no instructions as to what he should do in the presence 
 of the enemy. Meade merely told him that he did not contem- 
 plate advancing beyond the positions indicated for the march of 
 July 1st, and that he should wait for the movements of the enemy 
 to determine his own. In view of the intelligence which Rey- 
 nolds had received from Bnford in the morning, these indications 
 w^ere no longer of any account to him, for it was evident that 
 hostilities would commence at some point or other before Meade 
 would be able to accomplish all the movements he had projected. 
 But his cavalry was menaced on the very ground he had been 
 formally ordered to occupy. All hesitation, therefore, was im- 
 possible for him : he must reach Gettysburg in advance of the 
 Confederate column which had been reported by Buford, compel 
 his adversaries to show their strength, and, if possible, preserve 
 the important strategic position he had been ordered to occupy, 
 until JNIeade should otherwise determine. It appears that on 
 approaching Gettysburg he immediately noticed the magnificent 
 position of Cemetery Hill, which has been described above : it 
 could not, in ftict, have escaped his trained military eye, and 
 it may be that, on seeing it, he understood that by maintaining 
 himself there he would secure for the Army of the Potomac 
 the most favorable battlefield that it could have possibly desired. 
 The confidence reposed in him by IMeade and the absence of 
 any positive instructions justified him in making the attempt. 
 Although death did not allow him time to explain his views to 
 his chief, we may be permitted to believe that this idea prompted 
 the dispositions he adopted on his arrival. 
 
 It is three-quarters past nine : wdiile rapidly descending the 
 stairs of the belfry to go meet Reynolds, Buford cries out to him, 
 " The devil is to pay ;" — " But we can hold on till the arrival 
 of the First corps ;" and the two chieftains, starting at a gallop, 
 rush into the midst of a shower of balls to revive the zeal of 
 Gamble's men, who have been struggling on foot for the last hour 
 and a half. Finding their position a good one, Reynolds sends 
 
OAK HILL. 101 
 
 au order to Wadsworth's division to come up and relieve them. 
 At the same time he sends a message to the other two divisions 
 of the First corps, urging them to push forward, and also to 
 Howard, who has left Emmettsburg with the Eleventh corps 
 after the latter, requesting him not to stop on the road, as he 
 had been directed, but to come and take* position near them at 
 Gettysburg.* In a few hours two army corps will therefore be 
 assembled at Gettysburg. In the mean time, the enemy must 
 be imposed upon and held in check with the few troops that are 
 already on the ground. The First division of the First corps, 
 commanded by Wadsworth, following the direction that Reynolds 
 had marked out before leaving it, has not entered Gettysburg. 
 It has turned to the left, and at ten o'clock has ascended the 
 eastern slope of Seminary Hill. Wadsworth, who at an advanced 
 age had joined McDowell's staff as a volunteer, and whom we 
 shall see fill gloriously in the "Wilderness the following year, has 
 acquired through practice some of the necessary qualities for the 
 command he is exercising. Doubleday, to whom Reynolds has 
 transferred the command of the First corps, and who in the 
 course of this day will exhibit as much tenacity as presence of 
 mind, has come to join him, leaving behind him the other two 
 divisions, which are making a forced march. But Wadsworth 
 has only two small brigades under him — one commanded by 
 Cutler; the other, called the "Iron Brigade," by jSIeredith. 
 
 The Federal cavalry still occupy the slopes bordering Wil- 
 loughby Run on the west between the two roads to Hagerstown 
 and Cashtown : north of the latter they maintain their posi- 
 tion on horseback along the cutting of the unfinished railroad, 
 about fifty yards back of the stream, along the ridge which 
 descends south-west of Oak Hill. This ridge, of which we have 
 already spoken, and which will play an important part in the 
 battle, extends far beyond the Hagerstown road : being entirely 
 bare and only interspersed here and there with fences, it is not so 
 
 * One of Eeynolds' aides-de-camp, Captain Kosengarten, has even asserted 
 that Eeynolds had designnted Cemetery Hill as the point which Howard was 
 to occupy, but the latter has formally denied it, claiming all the honor of 
 having selected this historical plateau for the purpose of placing his reserves 
 thei-e. 
 
102 THE CIVIL WAR IX AMERICA. 
 
 high as the ridge of Seiiiiiiuiy Hill, and forms somethiug like a 
 first line of defence in advance of the latter, from which it is 
 only separated by a strip of land sufficiently deep to afford shel- 
 ter to reserves. There is but a single obstacle to be met with 
 along its western slope: it is a small wood, triangularly shaped, 
 whose base rests upon Willoughby Run, and rises, by following 
 a slight depression in the ground, almost to the summit of the 
 ridge, the extremity of which, on this side, is about one hundred 
 yards south of the Cashtown road. It is called McPhersou's 
 Wood, after the name of the owner of the adjacent farm. The 
 infantry has not a moment to lose, for, north of this road and the 
 railway, Davis' Confederate brigade is advancing in good order, 
 and its well-sustained fire is having a crushing effect upon the 
 weak line of Federal skirmishers, who can find no shelter in this 
 direction. South of the road Archer has crossed the stream with his 
 brigade, the larger portion of which rushes' into the wood in order 
 to reach under its cover the summit of the slope it has to carry. 
 Cutler's brigade is at the head of the Federal column. Reynolds 
 leads it in person on the Cashtown road, which must be abso- 
 lutely barred against the enemy, advising Doubleday to j^lace 
 Meredith's brigade, which is following the first, on the left, and 
 to extend his line as far as the Hagerstown road. The division 
 artillery, relieving Calef's mounted battery, takes a position along 
 the Cashtown road, which it enfilades, while Cutler deploys his 
 brigade to the right under the very fire of the enemy.* The 
 infantry finds itself engaged along the whole line even before it 
 has got into position, for on the left Doubleday, understanding 
 at a single glance the importance of the wood into which Archer 
 has just penetrated, has ordered jSIeredith to take possession of it. 
 This wood, in fact, if it remains in the hands of the assailants, 
 gives them a foothold in the centre of the Union line, wdiich it 
 cuts in two ; whereas if the Federals are masters of it they will 
 find in it a point of support which, like a bastion, will flank 
 this line both nortli and south. At the moment that ]\feredith 
 
 * General Cutler, writing November 5, 1863, to the governor of Pennsylvania, 
 accords the honor of the opening infantry-tire to tlie Fifty-sixtli Pennsylvania, 
 Colonel J. Wm. Hofmann commanding, and requests that the fact be recorded 
 in the archives of the State. — Ed. 
 
OAK HILL. 103 
 
 begins his attack, Reynolds, leaving to Wadsworth the task of 
 leading the right, recrosses the road, and, seeing the extreme 
 right of the Iron brigade approach the point of the wood, 
 advances with its chief under the well-sustained fire of the 
 enemy's skirmishers hidden in the bushes. While he is encour- 
 aging his soldiers by his own example, at a distance of less than 
 sixty paces from the latter he is struck in the head by a ball, and 
 expires without uttering a word. 
 
 Reynolds was undoubtedly the most remarkable man among all 
 the officers that the Army of the Potomac saw fall on the battle- 
 field during the four years of its existence ; and Meade could say 
 of him that he was the noblest and bravest of them all. A grad- 
 uate of AYest Point, he had early distinguished himself in that 
 ISIexican army which was destined to become the nursery of staif 
 officers both North and South. His former comrades, who had 
 become either his colleagues or his adversaries, held him in the 
 greatest estimation on account of his military talents, for under 
 a cold exterior he concealed an ardent soul ; and it was not the 
 slowness, but rather the clearness, of his judgment that enabled 
 him to preserve his coolness at the most critical moments. The 
 confidence he inspired, alike in his inferiors, his equals, and his 
 commanders, would no doubt soon have designated him for the 
 command of one of the Union armies. It would have been a 
 fortunate thing for the cause he was serving with devotion and 
 earnestness without having ever sought to elicit appreciation of 
 his merits. His untimely death — he was forty-three years old 
 — was not without some benefit to that cause, for by making a 
 vigorous fiffht in the battle which cost him his life he secured 
 the possession of Cemetery Hill to the Army of the Potomac, 
 against which the full tide of Southern invasion broke. We 
 will cite, in conclusion, as the most beautiful homage paid to his 
 character, the unanimous regrets of the inhabitants of Frede- 
 ricksburg, of which town he had been the military governor, who, 
 although passionately devoted to the cause of the South, mourned 
 him as if he had been one of their own people. 
 
 Reynolds is struck at a quarter-past ten. Fortunately, the 
 Federal soldiers, carried away by the excitement of battle, do not 
 perceive the loss they have just sustained. ISIeredith has pushed 
 
104 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 forward into the wood at the liead of his first regiment, without 
 even waiting for the rest ; the latter follow him en echelon. His 
 soldiers push forward with a dash which astonishes the Con- 
 federates, and, breaking their line, capture more than one thou- 
 sand prisoners — among whom is General Archer himself — drive 
 the remnants of the enemy's brigade beyond the stream, and, 
 pushing these disorganized troops at the bayonet's point, plant 
 themselves along the slopes bordering the opposite bank. 
 
 This is a brilliant beginning for the Federals, but this success 
 is counterbalanced by the check Avhich Cutler, at the same time, 
 has just experienced at the other extremity of the line. In fact, 
 Wadsworth has scarcely placed three regiments* of this brigade 
 to the right of the railroad, when the latter are obliged to sustain 
 Davis' entire effort on ground, which, as we have stated, affords 
 them no support at all. Consequently, in a very short space of 
 time they are obliged to abandon the first line of the heights to 
 Davis, and to fall back from two to three hundred yards on the 
 main ridge which connects Oak Hill with Seminary Hill. They 
 find shelter in a thick wood, which at this point covers the two 
 acclivities of the ridge ; their retreat, however, has been effected 
 with so much haste that one of these regiments, the One-hun- 
 dred-and-forty-seventh New York, which was nearest to the rail- 
 way-cut, delayed by the death of its colouel,t finds itself almost 
 surrounded ; the other two regiments, the Fourteenth| and 
 Ninety-fifth New York, which Reynolds had posted between 
 the Cashtown road and the wood, remain isolated, while the 
 battery stationed on the road cannot be withdrawn except by 
 sacrificing one of its pieces. This retreat, however, does not stop 
 here, and a portion of Cutler's soldiers are brought back to the 
 rear, almost to the very outskirts of Gettysburg. Doubleday, on 
 being informed of Reynolds' death, which throws all the responsi- 
 bility of the command on his own shoulders, hastens in this direc- 
 tion in order to redeem the fortunes of the day. The Sixth Wis- 
 consin, which has been left by Meredith in reserve at the seminary, 
 
 * The Fifty-sixth Pennsylvania, Seventy-sixth and One-hundred-and-forty- 
 seventh New York. — Ed. 
 
 t Lieutenant-colonel Francis C. Miller, commanding the One-hundred-and- 
 fbrty-seventh New York, was severely wounded, not killed. — Ed. 
 
 X State mi\itia (Fourteenth Brooklyn).— Ed. 
 
OAK HILL. 105 
 
 > 
 
 eagerly rushes to the front, bears to the right, overtakes that por- 
 tion of Cutler's brigade which has remained on the left of the rail- 
 road, and Mdth the aid of a piece of artillery opens a murderous 
 fire upon Davis' brigade. The latter, which is advancing in line 
 against the wood where the Fourteenth and Ninety-fifth New 
 York have taken refuge, is thrown into confusion by his enfila- 
 ding fire. The Confederates try to front about to the right and 
 cross the railway-track, in order to face this new enemy, biit they 
 are driven back into the cut, almost two entire regiments being 
 surrounded and captured with their colors. This new success might 
 have been still more complete if Cutler's whole ])rigade had re- 
 mained within reach. However that may be, the debris of the 
 One-hundred -an d-forty-seventh New York are freed and the en- 
 emy driven back in the direction of Willoughby Run. 
 
 It is about eleven o'clock. The combined attacks of Davis 
 and Archer have completely failed. These two brigades have 
 lost more than one-half of their effective force. Heth has come 
 to a halt in order to replace these vanquished troops with his 
 two other brigades, under Pettigrew and Brockenbrough, which, 
 being deployed to the right, have not, up to the present time, 
 been much under fire. The energy of the Federals and the 
 losses they have inflicted upon him have led him to exaggerate 
 their numbers and to act with greater circumspection. 
 
 The Confederates are bcQ-innino- to find out that their sudden 
 attacks en masse are more dangerous and more difficult of execu- 
 tion along the open, hilly country of Pennsylvania than among 
 the thickly- wooded settlements of Virginia, where they did not 
 stand in dread of slanting fires. Doubleday avails himself of 
 this respite to rectify and strengthen his line ; Meredith, under 
 the orders of the latter, resumes his position east of the stream, 
 and occupies the edge of INIcPherson's Wood ; Cutler is brought 
 back by him to his former position, and he causes the division bat- 
 tery to be relieved by a mounted battery. He knows thatthe remain- 
 der of his corps is approaching, and impatiently waits its arrival. 
 
 Fortunately, while the Confederates are contenting themselves 
 with a very fruitless cannonade, Doubleday, about half-past eleven 
 o'clock, at last sees in the distance Rowley's and Robinson's 
 divisions, each containing two brigades and presenting a total 
 
106 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 of between five and six thousand men. For tlie purpose of rein- 
 forcing the line of battle, the first is divided and posted on both 
 sides of the wood conquered by IMcredith — Stone's brigade on 
 the right, and Biddle's on the left, with a portion of the corps 
 artillery. The other division remains in reserve near the Sem- 
 inary, around which it hastily digs a few trenches. The arrival 
 of this reinforcement is opportune, for Heth will soon renew the 
 attack, and tliis time with all his forces combined. While 
 Brockenbrough is trying to outflank Biddle's left and to 
 capture the Herbst farm, where the latter has stationed an 
 advance detachment, Pettigrew, taking with him all that is left 
 of Davis' brigade, makes an impetuous assault upon Stone's sol- 
 diers : the latter, recruited from among the sturdy lumbermen 
 of the great forests of Pennsylvania, form one of the finest 
 brigades in the Federal army, and are known by the name of 
 " Bucktails," in consequence of tlie ornament appended to their 
 caps. Animated by the idea that they are defending the soil of 
 their native State, they all cry out with one accord in planting 
 themselves in the position to which they have been assigned, 
 " We have come to stay !" "And," adds General Doubleday 
 while narrating this incident of the battle, "they kept their 
 word ; for the ground was open, the position extremely exposed, 
 and a large number of them fdl upon that spot, never to leave it 
 again." 
 
 Their first check has deprived the Confederates of some of 
 their daring, and after an hour's fighting they give up the idea 
 of carrying the Unionists' positions. Hill has Pender's division 
 of four brigades under his control, which, with Heth's other 
 four, would secure him a considerable numerical superiority 
 over the six brigades of the Fu'st Federal corps. He is sup- 
 ported by a formidable artillery, for, besides the two division 
 battalions, he brings with him all his reserve pieces — ten bat- 
 teries in all. The battle, however, has been brought on in so 
 strange and unusual a manner that Hill, kuoAving nothing of the 
 strength of his adversary and the designs of his chief, hesitates, 
 no doubt, to bring all his troops into line, and merely concentrates 
 the fire of his eighty guns upon the positions of the Federals, on 
 whom he inflicts some heavy losses. 
 
OAK HILL. 107 
 
 The latter, however, soon receive new reinforcements. How- 
 a]"d, with Barlow's division, has left Emmettsburg soon after the 
 First corps, sending his other two divisions, under Schurz and 
 Steinwehr, by way of the Taneytown road, in order to expe- 
 dite the movement. On receipt of Eeynolds' first message he 
 ordered each of these divisions to press forward, and, following 
 the example of those who have preceded him, he hastens to 
 Gettysburg in person. At half-past eleven we find him on the 
 top of one of the houses of the town observing the localities in 
 order to select positions for his troops, when he hears of Rey- 
 nolds' death, and finds himself by right of seniority called upon 
 to succeed him in the command of all the forces assembled on 
 the battlefield. 
 
 It was a heavy task for an officer who had not even yet made 
 his appearance on that battlefield, and who possessed no informa- 
 tion regarding the movements of the enemy and the preliminaries 
 of the fight. But from his observatory he perceives a number 
 of roads converging toward him from every point in the horizon, 
 and may therefore arrive at the conclusion that these roads will 
 soon be crowxled with a large portion of Lee's army marching 
 upon him, whilst no other corps from the Union army can, 
 according to given orders, come to join him at Gettysburg. 
 Seeing that the First corps keeps the enemy well in check, he 
 very wisely allows Doubleday to complete the task in the per- 
 formance of which he has been so successful up to this moment, 
 and occupies himself with the measures to be taken in order to 
 support him. He has no more hesitation than Buford and 
 Reynolds regarding the necessity of defending Gettysburg as 
 long as possible, and of bringing together for that purpose all 
 the forces within reach. As Buford called upon Reynolds, and 
 he upon Howard, so the latter calls in his turn upon Sickles, 
 who is to reach Emmettsburg in the morning with the Third 
 corps, and to stop there, for Reynolds has been killed before 
 sending him any message, intending no doubt to have done 
 so at a later period. Now urgent instructions are forwarded to 
 the division commanders of the Eleventh corps, with a verbal 
 report addressed to ISIeade. The combatants of the First corps 
 are unacquainted with these details, but soon the occupant of the 
 
108 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 observatory, precisely as he bad signalled the opporlime arrival 
 of llcyuolds, informs Buford of the approach of the Eleventh 
 corps, the corps flags which bear its distinguishing mark having 
 enabled him to recognize it with certainty. In fact, at a quarter 
 before one Schurz enters Gettysburg with his division. Howard, 
 who leaves hira in command of the Eleventh corps, directs him 
 to take this division, henceforth under the command of Schim- 
 melpfennig, and Barlow's, by the Mummasburg road to the right 
 of Doubleday, and to leave Steinwehr's division, with the corps' 
 artillery, on the heights of Cemetery Hill. 
 
 But the approach of a new adversary does not allow Schurz to 
 afford the assistance to the First corps which he was preparing 
 to bring it. Devin's cavalry, who are clearing the roads at the 
 north for a considerable distance, see looming in sight several 
 columns of the enemy, but find it difficult to delay the march of 
 their advance-guard. It is Kodes' division, which, after having 
 marched during the morning in the direction of Cash town, has 
 received instructions from Hill at Middletown directing it to pro- 
 ceed to Gettysburg. This detour has caused Rodes to lose two 
 precious hours. Ewell, who accompanies him, astonished at 
 finding the enemy at Gettysburg, becomes still slower and more 
 circumspect in his movements than Hill, and allows himself to 
 be detained for a while by the Federal cavalry. He does not 
 wish to be drawn fully into the fight before hearing from Early, 
 whom he has directed to march upon Gettysburg from Heidlers- 
 burg. Nevertheless, at the first glance he has recognized the 
 importance of the position of Oak Hill, and has directed Hodes 
 to plant himself there. N( thing could have been more danger- 
 ous for the Unionists, and the arrival of Ewell by way of the 
 northern routes, changing as it does all the conditions of the 
 fight, is in no way equalized by the reinforcement which Howard 
 has just brought upon the ground. 
 
 Two parallel ridges which intersect west of Gettysburg the Mum- 
 masburg, Cashtown, and Hagerstown roads offer, it is true, some 
 excellent defensive positions against any enemy coming from that 
 direction ; and the number of combatants with which Hill attacks 
 Doubleday might be doubled if Howard could hold them in check 
 by extending his line to the right as far as the culminating height 
 
OAK HILL. 109 
 
 of Oak Hill. But the roads followed by Ewell take the whole of 
 this line precisely in flank and in the rear, and would lead him to 
 Gettysburg in the rear of Doubleday while the latter would be 
 engaged in front by Hill. In order to avoid this danger the two 
 Federal corps should either be taken back to the rear of Gettys- 
 burg and led to the summit of Cemetery Hill, where they will 
 present a formidable front on every side without the risk of 
 being turned, or form a line sufficiently strong to stop Ewell 
 before Gettysburg, and en potenoe above Doubleday. The first 
 manoeuvre would be premature, for Ploward cannot yet foresee 
 Avhat forces he is about to encounter, and, knowing that Sickles 
 is on the way to join him, he must try to maintain his position 
 until the arrival of this important reinforcement. The second 
 alternative does not yet occupy his mind, for at the moment when 
 Rodes is preparing to take position on Oak Hill he is ignorant of 
 the danger that threatens him on the north side, believing that 
 he has only to contend with the troops that are fighting on Double- 
 day's right near the Cashtown road. Consequently, he has ordered 
 Schurz to post Schimmelpfennig's division among the oak-coppices 
 from which Oak Hill derives its name, and two batteries of artil- 
 lery between this division and the extremity of the line of the 
 First corps. As to Barlow, he no doubt intends to leave him on 
 the second line, or place him on the right along the prolongation 
 of Schimmelpfennig's line. After having taken his measures and 
 addressed, an urgent request for assistance to Slocum, he finally 
 leaves the height on which he had tarried back of Gettysburg, 
 and toward two o'clock visits the line formed by the First corps ; 
 but his only instructions consisted in recommending Doubleday 
 to hold fast in his positions, assuring him that the Eleventh corps 
 would take care to repulse all the attacks of the enemy on the 
 right. This encouraging promise will not be so easily carried 
 out as Howard imagines. 
 
 In fact, Bodes is already advancing to occupy Oak Hill. It is 
 a quarter-past two o'clock. In order to seize upon this position 
 with more certainty, and to command the whole of the enemy's 
 line, he has left the Newville road and deployed his division 
 across the ridge whose direction he is following. O'Neal's bri- 
 gade is in the centre; Doles' line extends to the left as far as 
 
110 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 the road ; Iverson is on the right, sustained in the second line by 
 Raraseur and Daniel, who are ready to prolong his front in order 
 to give assistance to Hill's left. The five batteries of this division, 
 having gone into position at once, concentrate the fire of one hun- 
 dred guns upon the battle-front of the Federals. Oak Hill is thus 
 occupied at the very moment that Schimmelpfennig's skirmishers 
 are starting in the direction of this hill. Howard, returning from 
 the left, learns at this juncture that the enemy is reported as 
 almost on his rear in the direction of Heidlersburg. Whether it 
 is fear of this new danger or that he deems the position naturally 
 too strong, he does not venture to attack it with his infantry. He 
 merely causes his two batteries to open a not very eifective fire 
 from a distance against Ewell's artillery, which has taken imme- 
 diate possession of the most commanding point and is beginning 
 to rake Doubleday's line by a slanting fire. Since he declined to 
 occupy Oak Hill, Howard should have brought back the Eleventh 
 corps to the rear in order to form a strong connection between his 
 left and the right of the First corps. He could thus on this side 
 have rested it upon the railway-cut, and by keeping his right 
 more and more disengaged as far as Rock Creek have covered it 
 by the stream which flows at the foot of the almshouse. Instead 
 of this, he leaves unoccupied between these two corps a space 
 battered by the guns of Oak Hill, to which his two batteries 
 cannot reply effectively, and instead of closing up his line 
 by a retrograde movement of Schimmelpfeunig, divides it by 
 carrying forward his extreme right, formed by Barlow's divis- 
 ion. Being no longer able, as he had at first intended, to place 
 it in position along the extension of Doubleday's front, he tries 
 to post it perpendicularly . to the latter. This manoeuvre has 
 become necessary in order to check the march of Doles, who is 
 making his appearance on the eastern slope of Oak Hill, But 
 the ground he has to defend, comprised between this ridge and 
 the course of Rock Creek, presents no strong position to which 
 he can cling; it slopes down in gentle undulations from the hills 
 to the stream, while the character of the soil, thoroughly open, 
 under excellent cultivation, and traversed by numerous roads, 
 will favor whichever of the two adversaries has the superiority 
 of numbers and ffuns. Seeing but few enemies before him. 
 
OAK HILL. Ill 
 
 inasmuch as Doles' brigade is the only one that hajipens to be 
 on this side at the moment, and entirely forgetting the danger 
 that threatens him in the direction of Heidlersburg, Schurz 
 endeavors to push his line as far as the border of a small stream 
 which derives its source from Oak Hill, intersects the Carlisle 
 road near the dividing-line, of the Newville road, and empties 
 into Rock Creek below Blocker's farm. This position is marked 
 on the right by a small wood which commands the last-mentioned 
 water-course, but it has no real strength, and, being more than 
 thirteen hundred yards distant from Gettysburg, it has the incon- 
 venience of being exposed on both sides : taken in flank on the 
 left by the extremity. Oak Hill and the Mummasburg road, it is 
 equally liable to be turned on the right by way of the Heidlers- 
 burg road, which passes back of the wood, and along \vhich the 
 enemy has already been reported to Howard. 
 
 But before Schurz has completed his movements a new and 
 violent attack on the part of the Confederates against all Double- 
 day's positions invites our attention to this point. It is half-past 
 two : four of Rodes' five brigades and five batteries of artillery 
 posted along the summit and the western slope of Oak Hill 
 menace, not the Eleventh corps, but rather the flank of the 
 Fu'st. At the sight of this reinforcement Hill determines to 
 renew the fight with Heth's soldiers, who have had time to 
 recover breath, while Pender's troops are ready to support them. 
 Rodes, on his part, deploys his right in order to form connection 
 with him. Iverson, Ramseur, and Daniel, crossing the Mum- 
 masburg road, make a semi-diversion to the left for the purpose 
 of attacking Cutler's troops in front. These troops, in fact, are 
 facing west along the edge of the coppice situated north of the 
 railway, in which they have taken refuge early in the day. This 
 manoeuvre is almost entirely accomplished under shelter of the 
 woods Avhich for a long distance extend along the western slope 
 of Oak Hill. During this time Rodes' artillery is crushing with 
 its projectiles the guns that Doubleday has posted along the Cash- 
 town road, and, after having compelled them to take refuge near 
 the seminary, he opens fire upon Cutler's right flank. 
 
 Doubleday, finding his line menaced on this side, and the enemy 
 about to penetrate within the space which separates him from the 
 
112 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Eleventh corps, calls for liis reserves, and scuds one of the two bri- 
 gades of Robinson's division, which has remained on the Seminary 
 heights up to the present moment, to prolong this line on Cutler's 
 right. Those troops, under General Baxter's command, proceeded 
 beyond the wood, and, following the ridge of the hill, reached the 
 Mumraasburg road at its culminating point despite the fire of the 
 enemy's artillery. Rodes, who sees them thus advancing openly, 
 deems the occasion favorable for driving them back, and hurls 
 O'Neal's brigade upon their flank. But this body of troops, under 
 bad management, and already shattered by the fire of Howard's 
 two batteries, ventures, while in a disordered state, to attack the 
 Federals, who, making a rapid change of front to the right, wait 
 for it steadily behind a stone wall running parallel to the road. 
 The Confederates are repulsed with heavy loss, and the remnants 
 of O'Neal's brigade, thrown into the greatest confusion, find it 
 very difficult to rally beyond reach of the Unionists' fire. Nev- 
 ertheless, the movement of Ilodes' right is accomplished, and 
 Iverson comes in his turn to assail Cutler's and Baxter's positions 
 from the west. If these manoeuvres had been less desultory and 
 unconnected, the simultaneous attack of Rodes' troops would cer- 
 tainly have been crowned with success ; but on this occasion he 
 seems to have been very poorly supported by his subordinates. 
 Baxter, who sees Iverson coming, has had time to face about to 
 the left again, and he fortunately finds another wall perpendicular 
 to the first, which affords his soldiers a solid protection. Double- 
 day, who is attentively watching the much-contested battlefield, 
 sends him at this moment a timely reinforcement. By his order 
 General Robinson pushes his second brigade, under General Paul, 
 to the right, and takes a position with Baxter in the angle of the 
 two ^valls. South of the Cashtown road Doubleday has main- 
 tained the positions conquered in the early part of the day on 
 Willoughby Run. Meredith, covered on the left by Biddle, still 
 occupies McPherson's wood, and Stone, more to the north, extends 
 his lines as far as the Cashtown road ; and, as his right at this 
 point is placed at about two hundred and fifty yards in advance of 
 Cutler's left, he has drawn up this right triangularly, or en potence, 
 making it face Oak Hill. Cooper's battery, posted behind the 
 ridge occupied by Meredith so as to enfilade the entire slopes of 
 
OAK HILL. 113 
 
 Seminary Ridge from south to north, batters Cutler's front from 
 a distance of about one thousand yards. 
 
 Iverson's attack falls upon Robinson's two brigades ; but, whilst 
 the latter check him in front. Cutler, sui)ported by Stone's fire and 
 Cooper's guns, emerges from the wood and takes him in flank. 
 The small Confederate force makes a vigorous defence, but is 
 almost annihilated, leaving a large number of men upon the fatal 
 threshold of the wood where it had become engaged, together 
 with about one thousand prisoners — that is to say, two-thirds of 
 its effective force — in the hands of the Unionists. Daniel, who 
 has a larger space of ground to traverse, arrives too late to save 
 Iverson. He pushes forward, however, toward Stone, whose sa- 
 lient position is more exposed, approaching him by way of the 
 north. A desperate combat takes place near the railway-cut: 
 Daniel takes possession of it, for Stone, who has only three regi- 
 ments in hand, is menaced at the same time on his left by Pet- 
 tigrew, whom Heth has posted in front of him for several hours. 
 Daniel, however, gains but a small space of ground, and the two 
 antagonistic forces continue to fire at each other, without being 
 able to eifect a break into each other's lines. 
 
 It is about a quarter to three. The three brigades, engaged 
 without concert of action by Rodes, have not been successful. 
 INIore to the right, Heth, taking advantage of the renewal of the 
 conflict, has made a fresh attempt against McPherson's wood, but 
 Brockenbrough's brigade, to which he entrusted the execution of 
 this task, has been, after a vigorous attack, repulsed with losses 
 by Meredith. 
 
 The combat, however, is soon to assume a diflPerent aspect. 
 Ramseur comes up to Daniel's assistance, and Hill determines at 
 last to support the hitherto fruitless efforts of Heth with three 
 brigades of Pender's division, which has not as yet been under 
 fire, keeping only Thomas' in reserve. 
 
 While the Confederates are thus preparing for a concerted 
 movement which their numerical superiority renders certain of 
 success, they obtain an easily-achieved advantage on their left 
 which renders the situation of the First corps more and more 
 dangerous. 
 
 In fact, the two brigades of Schimmelpfennig's division, as 
 
114 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 they are advancing between tlie Oak Hill slopes and the Carlisle 
 road, are taken in flank by llodes' artillery, and so fearfully 
 shaken by the fire that Doles has only to push forward against 
 the first, comnaandcd by Colonel von Amsberg, to drive it back 
 upon the second. He thus compels the whole division to fall back 
 as far as a cross-road connecting the Carlisle road with that of 
 Muramasburg — a road lined with fences, which enable Schim- 
 melpfennig momentarily to re-form his troops. To the right of 
 the Carlisle road Von Gilsa's Federal brigade has promptly dis- 
 lodged the enemy's skirmishers from a small wood upon which 
 Barlow has to rest, and the latter loses no time in sustaining him 
 \w\i\\ his second brigade. But the decisive moment has arrived ; 
 the battle, which began at the west, then reached the north, is 
 now about to extend north-eastward. While Ewell, from the 
 summit of the ridge w^hence he overlooks the whole country, is 
 watching Eodes' brigades wasting their energies in vain efforts 
 against Doubleday's right, he finally discovers eastward Early's 
 division coming up by way of the Heidlersburg road, and deploy- 
 ing along the slightly wooded hills whose bases are washed by the 
 waters of Rock Creek. Three brigades are drawn up in front 
 line — Hays in the centre, along the road ; Hoke on the left ; 
 Gordon on the right ; the fourth brigade, under Smith, is held 
 in reserve. The division artillery opens fire against Barlow, who 
 at this moment is manoeuvring to relieve Schimmelpfennig by 
 taking Doles in flank. Gordon, on his part, is advancing for the 
 purpose of crossing Rock Creek, and attacks the position which 
 Gilsa has just occupied. His Georgian soldiers, marching in bat- 
 tle-array and in perfect order, disappear for an instant among the 
 large scroves of willow trees which line the banks of the stream : 
 the firing of musketry follows, but this does not prevent tJiem 
 from reappearing, still in the same order, on the other side of the 
 stream. Their bayonets form a dazzling line amid the sheaves 
 of golden wheat which they trample under foot in their passage. 
 At last they fire a volley and rush to the assault. After an ener- 
 getic resistance the Federals, finding themselves about to be sur- 
 rounded by Doles on one side and Early's troops on the other, 
 are obliged to yield ground, leaving a large number of killed 
 and wounded behind them, the valiant Barlow among the rest. 
 
OAK HILL. 115 
 
 Notwitlistanding this reverse, his division forms again upon his 
 reserves, at about four or five hundred yards distance. His left, 
 reaching as far as the Carlisle road, is endeavoring to form con- 
 nection with Schimmelpfennig ; his right is drawn across the Hei- 
 dlersburg road, while its centre rests upon the massive masonry of 
 the almshouse buildings. 
 
 This position, better than the former one, might have been 
 defended for a greater length of time if the Eleventh corps had 
 intrenched itself within it at once ; but the already vanquished 
 troops which sought a tardy refuge there could not hope to pre- 
 serve it long in the presence of the superior forces of the enemy. 
 In fact, Hays and Hoke have crossed Rock Creek in their turn, 
 and take the defenders of the almshouse in flank, while Gordon 
 attacks them in front. Everything gives way before them. 
 Doles, following Early's movement and encouraged by his 
 example, drives before him the whole of Schimmelpfennig's 
 division, which has not been able to withstand the attack of 
 this single brigade, and which in its precipitate flight outvies 
 in speed the runaways of the other division. It is about half- 
 past three o'clock, and it is only at this moment that Howard 
 thinks of ordering the retreat of the Eleventh corps. If he 
 had not delayed so long in giving this order, the retrograde 
 movement in the presence of an enemy who had shown but 
 little enterprise could have been executed without difficulty or 
 any serious loss, and consequently the position of Cemetery Hill 
 would have been more strongly occupied. 
 
 The Eleventh corps, already so unfortunate at Chancellorsville, 
 was once more completely routed, so that the order of retreat in 
 its present existing condition must have appeared to those who 
 received it a perfect mockery. Such was not the case with the 
 First corps, which could have executed this movement in good 
 order, and thus have avoided useless loss, if the notice had been 
 forwarded to it a little sooner. Unfortunately, this notice did 
 not reach Doubleday, who sent to Howard for instructions several 
 times, but in- vain. The officer despatched by the latter either 
 lost his way or did not properly deliver the verbal message with 
 which he had been entrusted, probably confounding the two almost 
 homonymous elevations of Seminary and Cemeteiy Hill. 
 
no THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Be that as it may, at half-past three o'clock, when the Eleventh 
 corps was already completely routed, the First was still continuing 
 the struggle in the positions it had been defending since morning. 
 But Doubleday, who appreciated the new danger to whi(th he was 
 about to be exposed, sent his chief of staff to Howard to ask 
 either for an immediate reinforcement or the order of retreat. 
 Howard, who fronr the summit of Cemetery. Hill beheld all the 
 phases of the conflict at a glance, and saw the enemy's battal- 
 ions on all sides preparing to surround the First corps was not 
 willing, it is said, to issue this necessary order,* at the risk of sacri- 
 ficing all that yet remained of Reynolds' brave soldiers ; and the 
 only reinforcement he offered to Doubleday was Buford's cavalry. 
 He knew, however, that a portion of this division was already en- 
 gaged on the left of the First corps, and that the remainder, under 
 Devin, was covering with difficulty the retreat of his own corps on 
 the extreme right. The task of the Union cavalry in this direction 
 Avas the more hard because they were not only exposed to the fire 
 of the enemy's artillery, but also to the Federal guns posted on 
 Cemetery Hill, whose projectiles fell into their midst. Buford 
 — Avho, like Howard, was surveying the whole battlefield, but 
 whose quick and energetic mind was not hampered in its judgment 
 by the weight of responsibility — had much sooner recognized the 
 magnitude of the danger, and was at that very moment addressing 
 a despatch to Meade urging him to send reinforcements, adding 
 that, in his opinion, the troops were without leaders. Howard 
 himself, however, was soon made to realize the perilous condition 
 of the First corps. 
 
 In fact, whilst Pender, after having replaced the exhausted 
 and discouraged troops of Heth, falls with his whole division 
 upon the three small brigades of Stone, Meredith, and Biddle, 
 now reduced to less than five hundred men each, Rodes, finding 
 his left disengaged by Schurz's defeat, gives the order for a 
 general attack. The remnants of Iverson's and O'Neal's brigades 
 
 * See Bates' Baitk of Gettyahurff, pp. 87, 88. Some persons have thought that, 
 seeing from a distance the line of the Second Confederate corps advancing in 
 good order, and having lost sight of iiis own troops, he mistook the enemy's line 
 for that of tiie Eleventli corps in retreat, believing that the First was sufficienllji- 
 protected to obviate the necessity of its immediate recall. 
 
OAK HILL. 117 
 
 form again upon that of Ramseur, and these troops, supported by 
 the fire of more than thirty pieces of artiller}', make a rapid 
 descent upon the stone wall behind which Robinson's division 
 is posted. The latter defends itself to the best of its ability : its 
 chiefs — one of whom, General Paul, is seriously wounded — set 
 the men a good example ; but the retreat of the Eleventh corps 
 has left Robinson completely isolated. Consequently, it is unjust 
 on the part of Howard, after having neglected to assume the 
 proper direction of the First corps, to have accused it, in his 
 first despatch to Meade, of having allowed its left to be turned, 
 and by yielding ground to have forced the Eleventh to a prem- 
 ature retreat. On the contrary, it was the disorderly disbanding 
 of this latter corps, and especially of Schimmelpfennig's division, 
 which compelled Robinson to abandon the position which until 
 then he had so bravely defended, thereby involving the loss of 
 Doubleday's ■ position. In fact, Robinson, hemmed in on three 
 sides, is obliged to fall back upon the wood occupied by Cutler. 
 This retreat is executed in good order, and, although sorely 
 pressed, the Federals succeed in maintaining their position in 
 the wood. But the conflict sustained by his right against supe- 
 rior forces having exhausted all his reserves, Doubleday can 
 no longer advantageously resist the new assault which Hill has 
 just directed against his centre and left. At four o'clock the 
 three brigades which Pender has pushed forward occupy the first 
 line, leaving Heth's worn-out troops behind them. These are 
 deployed south of the Chambersburg road — Lane on the right; 
 McGowan's brigade, commanded by Colonel Perrin, in the cen- 
 tre ; Scales on the left, near the road. The latter, after having 
 relieved Brockenbrough's brigade, boldly descends the slopes 
 facing McPherson's wood, in the direction of Willoughby Run. 
 But Meredith's soldiers, hidden in the bush, receive the assailants 
 at eighty paces with a fire which carries consternation into their 
 ranks. Pender and Scales are slightly wounded ; the soldiers of 
 the latter retreat in disorder, their chiefs being unable to bring 
 them back to the combat. On the right Lane has allowed him- 
 self to be intimidated by the fire of a Union detachment of 
 cavalry which General Gamble has caused to dismount : he has 
 halted, thus leaving Perrin to continue the movement alone. 
 
118 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 But the latter is more fortunate tlian tlie rest of Pender's divis- 
 ion. Biddle's Federal brigade, which is opposed to hira, has not, 
 like Meredith, found a wood to rest upon so as to disguise its 
 weakness. Exposed in an open country without any reserve, in 
 vain it riddles the assailants with bullets, sustaining an equal 
 amount of losses with them and utterly unable to check them. 
 Perriu, after having re-formed his line on the other side of Wil- 
 loughby Run, advances against it without paying the least atten- 
 tion either to Lane or Scales. Biddle is obliged to fall back in 
 great haste before him, and to find a refuge among the slopes 
 of Seminary Hill. The defenders of ISIcPherson's wood, finding 
 themselves taken in flank, evacuate a portion of the wood in 
 order to face the enemy who is threatening to turn their lines. 
 On perceiving this movement Scales' soldiers gather fresh cour- 
 age : throwing themselves upon Meredith and Stone with renewed 
 eagerness, the latter are taken between two fires, and sustain ter- 
 rible losses, for Perrin's left is already manoeuvring to cut off their 
 retreat. 
 
 Fortunately, Doubleday, although he has not yet received any 
 instructions, understands that he has not a moment to lose in 
 v^^ithdrawing if he does not wish to see th^ retreat degenerate into 
 a rout. He hastily recalls Meredith and Stone to Seminary Hill, 
 which affords him an excellent support for covering this retreat. 
 While Robinson occupied the seminary he surrounded it with 
 improvised trenches. Doubleday gathers the decimated battal- 
 ions of Meredith, Stone, and Biddle behind these defences, 
 although these troops have lost two-thirds of their effective 
 force, and places a few cannon near them : he thus, by a well- 
 directed fire of infantry and artillery, succeeds in checking the 
 enemy, who is cautiously advancing. The energetic defence of 
 Robinson and Cutler in the wood north of the railroad has 
 enabled all the Federal batteries, which were in extremely 
 exposed positions, to Avithdraw, leaving behind them only a 
 dismounted piece. On the extreme left, south of the Hagers- 
 town road. Gamble still holds Lane in check, who is trying to 
 turn Doubleday's line by way of the south ; but the stalwart 
 resistance around the seminary cannot be prolonged before the 
 united efforts of Pender's division : it could have no effect but 
 
OAK HILL. 119 
 
 to facilitate the retreat. It is near four o'clock when the 
 extremely attenuated lines of the First corps descend the eastern 
 slopes of Seminary Hill, the possession of which is abandoned, 
 it being deemed useless to make any further sacrifices to retain 
 it. Hill, after having taken possession of it, has no serious 
 intention of going in pursuit of the Federals, whose excellent 
 behavior brings Perrin to a halt, he alone having ventured to 
 follow in their track. Doubleday thus succeeds in crossing 
 Stevens' Run by following the convergent roads of Cashtown 
 and Hagerstown, and he soon finds himself inside of Gettys- 
 burg. The disorderly crowd of the two divisions under Barlow 
 and Schimmelpfennig has preceded him, and is crowding the 
 streets of this little town, which are fortunately both wide and 
 straight. E well, more enterprising than Hill, has closely followed 
 his adversaries. Ramseur and Doles have kept pace with the 
 movements of the First corps ; Hays and Hoke, driving before 
 them Devin's troopers, who are vainly endeavoring to check 
 their course, approach the city on the eastern side. Fortunately, 
 Howard, who is performing feats of valor at this critical moment, 
 has caused Costar's brigade of Steinwehr's division to come down 
 from Cemetery Hill, posting it in front of the J:own. He thus 
 succeeds, with the aid of a few troops of the First corps, in 
 holding the enemy in check for a short time. But at last, not- 
 withstanding all their eiforts, Floward and Doubleday are obliged 
 to abandon the place, where they are in great danger of being 
 hemmed in. All the troops that have preserved good order fall 
 back on Cemetery Hill. The whole of the First corps reaches 
 the place, w^ith the exception of Stone's brigade — which has wit- 
 nessed successively the fall of two commanders and a large number 
 of its officers — the remnants of which, being the last to penetrate 
 the streets of Gettysburg, are lost among the crowd of fugitives 
 with which they are encumbered. The Confederates, who enter 
 the town by two sides at once, fall in the midst of this crowd, 
 picking up nearly four thousand prisoners. The remainder scatter 
 about the country, reaching the Federal bivouacs the best way 
 they can. General Schimmelpfennig himself, mixed up with the 
 crowd, had barely time to conceal himself under a load of wood, 
 and kept out of 'sight in Gettysburg for three days before he was 
 
 I 
 
120 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 able to join his corps. Two oaunon were abandoned in the streets 
 and fell into Swell's possession. 
 
 The situation of the Federals was critical in the extreme. 
 They had brought into action ten brigades of infantry, two of 
 cavalry, and ten batteries, about sixteen thousand five hundred 
 men in all, against fourteen brigades of the enemy's infantry and 
 twenty batteries of artillery, aggregating more than twenty-two 
 thousand men, for the Confederate brigades were much stronger 
 than those of the Federals. Of these they had no more than 
 five thousand men left in a fighting condition. The First corps 
 was reduced to twenty-four hundred and fifty men. Out of the 
 eleven thousand missing, nearly four thousand had been left on 
 the field of battle and about five thousand were taken prisoners ; 
 the rest had scattered. The fugitives crowded the road leading 
 out of Gettysburg for the purpose of scaling the slopes situated 
 south of the city, and without pausing near their leaders along 
 the ridge of Cemetery Hill they hurried in the direction of 
 Taneytown and Westminster, carrying confusion and discourage- 
 ment into the ranks of the regiments that were coming to their 
 assistance. It is true that on the heights of Cemetery Hill there 
 was a nucleus of troops still fresh which would not have aban- 
 doned this position without a fight, and which could have served 
 as a rallying-poiut to the debris of the First and Eleventh corps. 
 These were Von Steiuwehr's two brigades and a few reserve bat- 
 teries of the latter corps. While in the occupancy of Cemetery 
 Hill, General von Steinwehr had not allowed himself to be dis- 
 tracted by the grand and thrilling spectacle of the battle which 
 he witnessed from a distance : taught in the thoroughly practical 
 school of the Prussian army, he had understood that this position 
 would soon afford a last rallying-point to his comrades fighting in 
 front, and he had applied himself to the study of its strength and 
 weakness. Slopes of considerable ruggedness, overtopped here 
 and there by sharp acclivities, rendered this position easy to 
 defend against any direct attack from infantry; but the open 
 plateau which these slopes encompassed on three sides was visible 
 to and dominated by the neighboring heights within reach of 
 cannon-shot; consequently, he had made good use of his sol- 
 diers in constructina; bastions and earth'\\ orks, behind Avhi(!h he 
 
OAK HILL. 121 
 
 had posted his artillery. Despite these wise precautions, how- 
 ever, there were still wanting sufficient forces to occupy the 
 position thus prepared, and troops determined to defend it. 
 
 The reinforcements that could be relied upon were yet far 
 away. But sometimes at a critical moment a single individual 
 may bring a moral force on the battlefield worth a multitude of 
 battalions. This individual arrived opportunely, just as How- 
 ard, after performing prodigies of valor, was slowly leaving Get- 
 tysburg. This was General Hancock. It was, we believe, a few 
 ininutes to four o'clock; according to Hancock's testimony, it 
 was only half-past three; Howard, in his despatch to Meade, 
 written on that very day, and consequently more autheutic than 
 the articles published by him since, says that it was four o'clock. 
 There is but little difference in the affirmations of the two most 
 important witnesses thereon. It was one o'clock in the afternoon 
 when Meade, at his head-quarters in Taneytown, was successively 
 informed of the battles fought by Buford against Hill's corps, of 
 Keynolds' arrival on the battlefield, and of his death. During 
 the entire morning he had received numerous despatches appris- 
 ing him in a positive manner of the approach of the enemy, and, 
 not knowing as yet on which side he would make his appearance, 
 he had made every preparation for bringing back his various col- 
 umns to Pipe Creek. In the event of Reynolds coming back to 
 Taneytown with the three corps under his command, which were 
 the most exposed, positive instructions had been given to the 
 Second and Twelfth, directing them to support him in his retreat 
 by advancing toward Gettysburg. The route to be followed by 
 each corps had been designated. This early news, therefore, 
 had decided Meade to fall back upon the line selected by him a 
 few days previously. But presently, on being made acquainted 
 with the gravity of the struggle going on at Seminary Hill, he 
 saw that it was too late to draw back. His concentrative move- 
 ment upon Pipe Creek was greatly compromised by the sudden 
 appearance of the enemy at a point which his left was to occupy 
 before beginning the movement. The strategic position of Get- 
 tysburg had to be defended by a whole army, or simply occupied 
 by a squad of soldiers ready to retire at the first serious attack. 
 From the moment that INIeade hesitated about taking the ad- 
 
122 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 vance against Lee with all bis forces, the despatch of two army 
 corps to near this town was an error which could only be ex- 
 cused on the score of his ignorance of the latest movements of 
 the enemy. Buford and Reynolds, in provoking the battle for 
 the possession of Gettysburg, had obeyed the spirit of the instruc- 
 tions he had given them, but they would certainly not have done 
 so if they had not found ground admirably suited for delivering 
 the decisive battle which was impending, Meade, although a 
 native of Pennsylvania, was not aware of the advantages of this 
 ground, which he had never visited. It was, however, necessary 
 for him to decide at once either to bring back the troops that 
 were engaged, and concentrate all the other corps upon Pipe 
 Creek or some adjacent position, or, as he had himself intimated 
 to Reynolds in a despatch written the day previous, take the 
 whole army to Gettysburg, concentrating his forces upon the 
 point of attack selected by the enemy. In order to take so 
 serious a step, Meade should have gone in person to reconnoitre 
 the localities around which the conflict was carried on, being 
 only separated from it by about thirteen miles. But, as we have 
 already stated, the Union generals-in-chief, notwithstanding their 
 activity and courage, left their head-quarters reluctantly, for, 
 making constant use of the telegraph for the transmission of 
 their orders, they found it inconvenient to be at any great dis- 
 tance from the office. Unwilling to go to Gettysburg himself, 
 Meade sent General Hancock in his place. The latter had just 
 arrived at Taneytown with the Second corps from Frizzcllburg, 
 where he had passed the night. INIeade, who rejiosed a Avell- 
 deserved confidence in this cliieftain, had just explained all his 
 plans to him : he had selected him, although the junior of Howard 
 and Sickles, to replace Reynolds in the command of the left Aving, 
 requesting him to decide, after an inspection of the ground, 
 whether it was expedient to deliver a battle either at Gettysburg 
 or at some neighboring point back of the town, or to fall back 
 upon Pipe Creek. From the moment that Meade declined as- 
 suming the responsibility of this decision he could not have 
 selected a more competent officer to act in his place than Han- 
 cock. Howard was no doubt endowed with as much coolness as 
 
OAK HILL. 123 
 
 courage, but he had not yet exhibited all those military qualities 
 which at a later period distinguished him as Sherman's lieutenant. 
 He had almost always been unlucky : the remembrances of the 
 recent rout of the Eleventh corps — a rout for which he alone 
 was wrongfully held responsible — still weighed heavily upon 
 him ; in short, he did not possess that indescribable gift, that 
 ardor and contagious self-reliance, wdiich imparts to a chieftain 
 a boundless authority over those surrounding him — qualities for 
 which General Hancock was especially distinguished. 
 
 The latter as soon as he arrived assumed the command and 
 applied himself to the task of restoring order among the troops 
 who were hurrying in great confusion toward Cemetery Hill. 
 The Eleventh corps, under the personal direction of Howard, re- 
 forms around Von Steinwehr, ^vhose forces are drawn up across the 
 Taneytown and Baltimore roads : the fugitives who cover these 
 roads are brought back into the ranks. Howard had ordered 
 Doubleday to place himself on his left; Hancock points out to 
 him with precision the position which two of his divisions are to 
 occupy on the heights at the foot of which the Emmettsburg 
 road winds, taking from him Wadsworth's division in order to 
 place it over the dominating hillock of Gulp's Hill. As we have 
 already mentioned, this wooded hill commands the valley of Rock 
 Creek, faces the heights of Wolf's Hill and Benner's Hill, and 
 completely flanks the plateau of Cemetery Hill, with which it is 
 connected by a ridge with steep acclivities. About five o'clock 
 \Yadsworth Avas taking possession of this important position. 
 Order had gradually been restored in the Federal lines. The 
 soldiers, encouraged by the sight of a powerful artillery firmly 
 planted, got back to their ranks. They were again ready to 
 wait for the enemy without flinching and to make an energetic 
 defence. 
 
 But it had taken them one hour thus to re-form under the eyes 
 of the Confederates ; and the historian will now ask, as the Union- 
 ists themselves were then asking each other in astonishment. How 
 is it that these adversaries, generally so prompt in striking blow 
 after blow and to take advantage of the first success, have allowed 
 them this precious respite, instead of gathering by a final effort 
 the fruits of their victory ? When Ewell entered Gettysburg in 
 
124 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 the midst of a mass of fugitives disarmed by fear, and was ])ick- 
 ing up prisoners by tlie thousand, the sun, which was still high 
 in the heavens, promised liim more than three hours of daylight: 
 he had time, therefore, to deliver and to win a new battle. The 
 two divisions of Early and Pender — that is to say, one-half of 
 the Confederate forces — had not been in action more than one 
 hour ; two of their brigades had not been at all engaged ; vic- 
 tory, moreover, imparted strength and confidence to the most 
 exhausted. In short, more fortunate than their adversaries, the 
 Confederates had in their midst the respected chieftain whose 
 slightest wishes had hitherto been eagerly obeyed. Lee was on 
 the ridge of Seminary Hill before half-past four, whence he sur- 
 veyed the battlefield around him so stubbornly disputed by Hill — 
 at his feet i\\Q town of Gettysburg, which Ewell had just entered, 
 and in front of him the slojies of Cemetery Hill, which the Fed- 
 erals were scaling in great confusion. Hill and Longstreet were 
 at his side, Ewell only two-thirds of a mile from his post of 
 observation. Hill's corps, as we have stated, had not seriously 
 harassed Doubleday's retreat. Lee did not order him to cross 
 the wide and open valley which separates the heights of Seminary 
 Hill from those of Cemetery Hill in order to attack the Federals 
 in the position along which they were forming with so much dif- 
 ficulty. This valley and the opposite slopes, which the next day 
 were to be so thoroughly drenched in blood, did not, however, 
 present any formidable obstacle. It is true that the Southern 
 general, on perceiving that Ewell was pressing the enemy closer, 
 sent him an order by Colonel Taylor to attack the hill, if he 
 could do so with any chance of success, as soon as he saw his 
 troops in the town ; but he had himself very serious doubts on 
 the subject. Colonel Long, whom he had charged to make as 
 thorough an examination of the enemy's positions as possible, 
 having reported that they were very strong. So that, while 
 ordering Ewell to make the attack, he recommended him at the 
 same time, according to the language of his report, to avoid a 
 general engagement so long as the army had not arrived on the 
 ground. According to Colonel Taylor, who was the bearer of 
 the despatch, the order to attack the enemy was much more per- 
 emptory, and Johnson has since stated to the latter that he did 
 
OAK HILL. 125 
 
 not Tiuderstaud why it was not carried out. Lee would seem to 
 have been disposed to aim at a partial success by dislodging the 
 Federals from their last retreat, but in order to achieve this result 
 he did not wish at this moment to risk a new battle with the only 
 forces under his control. It was for this reason that he had not 
 pushed the Third corps forward. This extreme caution may be 
 condemned, but the motives can be easily understood. 
 
 Lee had not in the heart of Pennsylvania the same freedom of 
 movement as in Virginia. He had to think of his communica- 
 tions and a possible retreat. Stuart, from whom he had not heard 
 for the last eight days, was no longer at his side to keep him 
 acquainted with the strength of the enemy's forces and to trace 
 out the route for his battalions to follow. The latter had so sud- 
 denly come in contact with the enemy in the morning that the 
 Confederate generals were in constant expectation of some new 
 surprises. They perceived, along the ridge of Cemetery Hill, by 
 the side of the fugitives who were still in great confusion, other 
 soldiers in serried ranks supported by heavy artillery, and sup- 
 posed that Howard had just been reinforced on coming out of 
 Gettysburg. Good order having been fully restored in all the 
 Union ranks completed the deception. 
 
 It has been said, and very justly, we think, that if Jackson had 
 been alive and in command of his army corps on the 1st of July, 
 he would not on that day have left Cemetery Hill in the hands 
 of the Federals. The fact is, that Lee, having the utmost con- 
 fidence in his lieutenant, would not have hesitated to risk a great 
 deal in order to afford him the means of striking a decisiv^e blow: 
 he would not probably have waited for Jackson to ask him to 
 direct Hill to make a useful diversion to the direct attack on 
 Cemetery Hill. 
 
 Early, however, who had penetrated into Gettysburg at the 
 head of Hays' brigade, had an idea of undertaking this attack as 
 soon as he found himself master of the town ; but, notwithstand- 
 ing Hays' solicitations, he did not dare to take the responsibility. 
 He referred the matter to Ewell, sending at the same time a 
 message to Hill requesting the latter to sustain him ; which mes- 
 sage, being received in Lee's presence, did not naturally deter- 
 mine any serious movement of the Third corps. But while he 
 
126 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 wiis waiting for instructions froni liis ininicJiate chief his atten- 
 tion was directed elsewhere. General Smith, whose brigade had 
 not been in action, and who, consequently, should have passed to 
 the first line, had halted on the left in the rear, close to the York 
 road, upon the mere rumor that a nc^v corps of the enemy was 
 coming up by way of that road. Although he did not put much 
 faith in this news. Early sent Gordon with a second brigade in 
 that direction, less for the purpose of stopping this imaginary 
 enemy than to take command of the two united brigades. Thus 
 deprived of one-half of his division. Early by himself could 
 no longer attempt anything against Cemetery Hill. Matters 
 would not have proceeded thus under Jackson. Ewell did not 
 exercise the same influence over his lieutenants as Jackson did, 
 and on this occasion was poorly served by some of them. O'Neal 
 had allowed his brigade .to take part in the fight without his per- 
 sonal direction. Iverson, in the heat of the struggle, had caused 
 his chief to be informed that he had seen one of his OM^n regi- 
 ments i^ass over to the enemy : finally. Smith, through his cre- 
 dulity, paralyzed Early's movements. 
 
 Rodes' troops having suifered fearfully, and his artillery not 
 being yet in position, Ewell had really only two brigades at his 
 disposal ; consequently, he thought he was acting in conformity 
 with Lee's instructions by waiting for Johnson's arrival with the 
 Third division to make the attack. Hill's immobility and the 
 very text of his own instructions convinced him that Lee was 
 less anxious to take possession of Cemetery Hill than to avoid a 
 general engagement at that time. Johnson, who had passed the 
 night with the corps artillery, not far from Chambersburg, between 
 Scotland and Greenwood, had had about eighteen miles to travel 
 over a road encumbered with vehicles of every description, and 
 notwithstanding his speed he only reached Gettysburg a little 
 before sunset. He had been preceded on this road by Ander- 
 son's division of the Third corps, which being hastily sent for in 
 the morning by Hill from Fayetteville, where it had bivouacked, 
 reached the borders of Willoughby Run before six o'clock, when 
 it was brought to a halt by an order from its chief. 
 
 Lee, having determined not to provoke a decisive battle until 
 the concentration of his army was accomplished, must naturally 
 
OAK HILL. 127 
 
 have resorted to every device in order to complete this concentra- 
 tion before that of his adversary. This was easy for him to do ; 
 for, as we perceive, two of his three army corps were entirely 
 under his control at the close of the day. Longstreet was still 
 absent. Pickett's division had remained at Chambersburg for the 
 purpose of covering the defiles of South Mountain : an order to 
 join the army was forwarded to him, but it could not reach him 
 before the next day. The other two divisions, under INIcLaws and 
 Hood, had started from Greenwood in the morning, after having 
 successively aided in the passage of Johnson's division, all the 
 supply-trains of the Third corps, which occupied a space of no 
 less than thirteen miles, together with Anderson's troops. They 
 followed the same road as the latter at a certain distance from 
 each other. Messengers were sent to expedite their movements, 
 but the extraordinary order which had directed the supply-train 
 to pass before them had caused a great loss of time which could 
 not be repaired ; in fact, the road, muddy and broken up, was 
 encumbered by vehicles loaded with provisions and ammunition 
 that were proceeding in the direction of the battlefield, and by 
 others that were already returning with some of the wounded. 
 Consequently, McLaws' head of column did not reach Marsh 
 Creek till nine o'clock in the evening, when it halted, while 
 Hood's division was unable to establish its bivouac near it until 
 midnight. 
 
 From five o'clock in the evening the position of the Federals 
 had been greatly improved ; Culp's Hill, which Early could have 
 taken possession of without striking a blow, and whence he could 
 have struck them in the rear, was occupied by Wadsworth. A 
 quarter of an hour later the arrival of the first fresh troops, so 
 impatiently looked for, was finally communicated to Hancock. 
 It was Sickles and Birney, who were coming from Emmetts- 
 burg with a brigade of the Third corps. The urgent call that 
 Howard had addressed him about half-past twelve o'clock was 
 the first intimation that Sickles had received of the battle that 
 was being fought at Gettysburg. His marching orders, dated 
 the day previous, directed him to make preparations to occupy 
 this town; Meade's instructions, on the contrary, forwarded in 
 the morning, marked out for him a retrograde march toward Pipe 
 
128 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA: 
 
 Creek. In short, he learned that subsequently to the sending of 
 these instructions a battle had commenced in which two corps 
 might have to struggle against the whole of the enemy's army. 
 Among so many contradictory directions, Sickles, always eager 
 for a fight, could not hesitate : he determined to hasten to the 
 assistance of his comrades. The corps, the command of which 
 he had resumed during the last three days, was only two divisions 
 strong. Leaving one brigade from each division at Emmettsburg 
 under De Trobriaud and Burling to cover the outlet of tlie moun- 
 tains, he set out about three o'clock. He brought along Bir- 
 ney's, Graliam's, and Ward's brigades, sending Humphreys, who 
 was then engaged in reconnoitring, an order to follow with the 
 rest of the Second division. The latter, without waiting for its 
 chief, started before four o'clock, but it was delayed by the sup- 
 ply-trains of the First and Eleventh corps, and, taking the wrong 
 road, came near falling in with the rear of the Confederates near 
 Marsh Creek at Black-Horse Tavern, and, in short, only reached 
 Cemetery Hill about one o'clock in the morning. But scarcely 
 had Graham fallen into position on the left of the First corps 
 when a new reinforcement — a most important one this time — 
 enabled Hancock to give more extension and solidity to his line. 
 Slocum, according to the general plan, had led the Twelfth corps 
 from Taueytown to Two Taverns since morning. He had hardly 
 reached this point, which is only five miles from Gettysburg, when 
 he received Howard's despatch asking for assistance, and had im- 
 mediately made his whole corps resume the line of march in the 
 direction of Gettysburg. Reaching the borders of Rock Creek 
 about half-past four o'clock, he had noticed the wooded heights 
 along the left bank of this stream, which, under the name of 
 Wolf's Hill, dominate all the neighboring localities; and not 
 knowing on which side the battle was rasfino^, the sound of 
 whose cannon he heard, he had ordered his First division, under 
 Williams, to take possession of it. The latter, ascending the left 
 bank of the stream, soon fell in with Ewell's scouts, and was 
 preparing for an attack when he was informed that the enemy 
 being master of Gettysburg, the possession of Wolf Hill w;is no 
 longer of any importance. He halted on the banks of the 
 stream a little below Gulp's Hill, the slopes of which Wads- 
 
OAK HILL. 129 
 
 worth had just occupied. In the mean while, Geary's divis- 
 ion, which was following Williams, had continued its march 
 upon Gettysburg, arriving near Cemetery Hill at about half-past 
 five. In compliance with Hancock's directions, it occupied the 
 immense space extending between Graham's small brigade and 
 the lofty hillock of Round Top, whose importance had not failed 
 to attract the notice of the commander of the Second corps. Half 
 an hour later, Slocum, who had left Williams as soon as he under- 
 stood the situation of the combatants, arrived in person at Ceme- 
 tery Hill. Hancock, in compliance with Meade's orders, turned 
 over the command to him. His task Was accomplished. From 
 the moment of his arrival on the ground he saw that the position 
 of Cemetery Hill, completed, in a tactical point of view, the 
 strategic advantages presented by Gettysburg : it commanded the 
 town and all the roads adjoining it. Instead, therefore, of fall- 
 ing back, at the risk of greatly discouraging the soldiers, for the 
 purpose of taking a defensive position before which Lee would 
 probably not appear, another and much better position was found, 
 inasmuch as it M^as more compact and that this time the enemy 
 could not avoid making an attack without acknowledging him- 
 self vanquished. About half-past four o'clock Hancock sent a 
 message to Meade, telling him that he believed the position easy 
 to defend with good troops, although on the left it was not very 
 strong. At a quarter past five he sent him the same message in 
 writing ; finally, at seven o'clock he started himself for Taney town 
 in order to give him a verbal account of the situation. 
 
 Meade had not waited for his arrival to determine what course 
 to pursue. At last clearly divining the play of his adversary, he 
 had not allowed himself to be disconcerted about the unforeseen 
 incidents of that day ; and as soon as he had been able to ap- 
 preciate the gravity of the situation, toward five o'clock — that 
 is to say, even before receiving Hancock's first report — he had 
 deliberately adopted the simplest course of action, whicli was 
 also most in conformity with the principles of war : this was to 
 concentrate his army between Gettysburg and Taneytown. He 
 had at once sent for the Sixth corps, which was entering IMan- 
 chester at that very moment. From very proper prudential rea- 
 sons he had merely directed Sedgwick, who was in command 
 
130 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMimiCA. 
 
 of this corps, to halt on the borders of Willoway Creek, a strong 
 intermediate position between Pipe Creek and Gettysburg, if he 
 shoukl hear tluit the troops engaged at that point had been obliged 
 to beat a retreat. About half-past six he received Hancock's two 
 messages, and decided at once in favor of Gettysburg. Since two 
 o'clock in the afternoon the Second cor})s had been on the march 
 toward this point, so that Hancock met it only a few miles from 
 the battlefield : he brought it to a halt, in order that his troops 
 might protect, in case of need, the rear of the army against any 
 flank movement on the part of the enemy. Tiiere was no neces- 
 sity of making any changes in the orders already issued to enable 
 the whole army to march upon Gettysburg, exce})t in two instances: 
 the Fifth and the Sixth corps. One had left U,nion in the morn- 
 ing, and could not fail to be in the neighborhood of Hanover ; 
 the other must already have left Manchester. The concentration 
 tlius commenced by the initiative action of the several chiefs, even 
 before it had been decided upon by IMeade, was then much easier 
 to accomplish than a retrograde movement of any kind. 
 
 As will be seen, the night-time was considered on both sides 
 as the favorable moment, not for rest, but for preparing for the 
 great struggle that was to take place the next day. If darkness 
 had prevented Johnson from delivering the assault on Cemetery 
 Hill, it could, on the other hand, aid him in taking possession of 
 a position flivorable to the projected attack. This position was 
 Gulp's Hill, which some Confederate officers had ascended when it 
 was not yet occupied by Wadsworth. He was desirous of planting 
 himself upon it before daylight, but the detachment which recon- 
 noitred the place having fallen among Federals and been almost 
 entirely captured, he gave up his project. These incidents exer- 
 cised a powerful influence over the battle of the folloAviug day. 
 
 In fact, Lee, finding a portion of the Federal army in front of 
 him, and arriving on a battlefield that had been gained in a man- 
 ner which was as glorious as it was unexpected, had no idea either 
 of planting himself in a defensive position or of manoeuvring so as 
 to compel his adversary to attack him. He had discarded the plan 
 — a most dangerous one in our opinion — which Longstreet had 
 suggested to him, of turning the left of the Federals: lie held 
 his adversary before him, and was anxious to strike him. It was 
 
OAK HILL. 131 
 
 upon the right of the latter that he proposed to direct his decisive 
 blow. The obstacles were greater than on the other side, but the 
 wooded country was also much more favorable to a bold manoeuvre 
 and a sudden attack like that of Jackson at Chancellorsville : the 
 wood neutralized the superiority of the Federal artillery. Lee, 
 however, having visited Ewell during the evening, the latter 
 explained to his chief that the principal forces of the enemy 
 were massed in front of him, and that he should certainly avail 
 himself of the niglit to intrench on that side. Lee, not impressed 
 by these arguments, determined to look out for a point of attack 
 along the Federal left. He even thought for a moment of aban- 
 doning Gettysburg, in order to bring back the Second corps to 
 his right and concentrate all his forces in that direction ; it would 
 have been the wisest and most skilful course to pursue. He dis- 
 carded this idea upon the assurances given by Ewell that his 
 troops could attack and carry Cemetery Hill as soon as Longstreet 
 had broken the lines of the Federal left. He moreover attached 
 great importance to the capture of this height, which seemed to 
 him to be the key to all the enemy's positions. The objective 
 point was all marked out and designated to his soldiers on the 
 right. It was the Round Tops, whose uneven summits were seen 
 rising like two dark towers over the valley lighted by the rays 
 of the moon, which was then at her full. 
 
 This light favored the march of the Federal soldiers, who were 
 hastening by every road in the direction of the town (almost un- 
 known till then) where the destinies of America were about to be 
 decided. It threw a lurid glare over the cemetery, surrounded 
 by tall pines, which the vanquished of the previous day occupied 
 around Hancock, and which Meade, arriving at last from Taney- 
 town to assume the direction of the battle, was traversing with 
 his numerous staff about one o'clock in the morning. The cold 
 rays of the moon, flitting playfully through the trees, whitened the 
 large tombstones in the shadow of which the living, oppressed by 
 fatigue, were lying like dead men for whom a powerful magical 
 influence had, by the waving of a wand, conjured these mournful 
 monuments into existence. Occasionally a soldier would rise up, 
 his eyes haggard, abruptly wakened by the tramping of horses' 
 feet, or some wounded man turned on his side with a groan on 
 
132 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 the damp ground which was absorbing his blood. Then every- 
 thing was still again, waiting for the sun to revive the energies 
 of the combatants, a large number of whom were destined to see 
 it rise for the last time. 
 
 The critical hour had arrived. The battle was about to be 
 fought under different conditions from any of those that had 
 preceded it; and, if it sliould accrue to the advantage of the 
 Confederates a new phase of the war would be inaugurated. 
 For the first time the Federals found themselves reduced to 
 play a purely defensive rdle north of tlie Potomac River. 
 When, during the preceding year, the clashing of arms 
 had ten heard along this bank, it was McClellan attack- 
 ing his adversary, already driven back to the river and ready 
 to recross it. This time, on tlie contrary, the Army of the 
 Potomac was the only barrier which still interposed obstacles 
 between the large Northern cities and an invader stimulated by 
 the hope of seizing so rich a prey. Everything seemed to con- 
 spire against it, even the government whose last hope it w^as. 
 The chieftain that the government had just given to this army 
 had only been in command for the last three days: how could 
 one expect of him that quickness of perception, that precision in 
 his orders, and from his subordinates that blind confidence so 
 necessary on the battlefield ? Lee, who had exercised the su- 
 preme command for the last thirteen months, and had already 
 won four great victories, possessed on that very account a supe- 
 riority which was worth many battalions to him. The supe- 
 riority of numbers was undoubtedly on the side of the Fed- 
 erals, but it was not sufficient to guarantee them success; and 
 INIeade, deceived by exaggerated reports regarding the strength 
 of his adversaries, was even ignorant of this advantage. Con- 
 sequently, during this night, full of anxiety, how much must 
 he have regretted the scattering of the Federal forces against 
 which all his predecessors had vainly protested ! Out of the 
 sixty thousand men, more or less well organized, who were in 
 Washington, the Federal government could easily have detached 
 ten thousand to reinforce the Army of the Potomac: the same 
 thing may be said of the fourteen thousand under Peck, who 
 since the 1st of JNIay had scarcely had an enemy before them 
 
OAK HILL. 133 
 
 at Suffolk, and from eight to ten thousand of the twelve thousand 
 who under Keyes were occupying their leisure hours in the lines 
 of Yorktown in projecting a sudden descent upon Richmond. 
 In short, by leaving in Baltimore the thirty-five hundred men 
 charged with holding the Secession element in check, and by 
 employing a thousand men in escorting the materiel of Har- 
 per's Ferry as far as Washington, General Halleck might have 
 ordered French to join Meade, instead of leaving him at Fred- 
 erick, where his presence would have been henceforth purposeless. 
 Out of the ninety -seven thousand men thus divided, there were at 
 least sixty thousand in a condition to take part in the campaign, 
 thirty-eight or forty thousand of whom, perfectly useless where 
 they were stationed, could have been added to the Army of the 
 Potomac before the 1st of July. Thus reinforced, the Union 
 general would have been certain of conquering his adversary, 
 who was too much compromised to fall back, and even to inflict 
 upon him an irreparable disaster. But Lee was right in rely- 
 ing upon the military sluggishness of the Federal government. 
 Meade, without wasting his time in vain regrets, had not a mo- 
 ment to lose in preparing, with the resources placed in his hands, 
 for the supreme struggle, of which the battle of the 1st of July 
 was only the prelude. 
 
 Let us see what was, on the morning of the 2d of July, the 
 distribution of these forces., of which only a portion, as we have 
 seen, was collected near Gettysburg when INIeade reached Ceme- 
 tery Hill before midnight. The Eleventh corps occupied this 
 hill, along which it had rallied — Schurz's division across the 
 Baltimore road ; Steinwehr's on the left ; on the right and 
 rear that of Barlow, then commanded by Ames. The First 
 corps was divided : Wadsworth, on the right of Ames, held 
 Gulp's Hill ; Robinson, on the left of Steinwehr and across the 
 Taneytown road, extended as far as a clump of trees called Zieg- 
 ler's Grove; Doubleday, who had transferred the command of 
 the corps to General Newton, was in reserve with his division in 
 the rear of Schurz. The combined artillery of these two corps 
 covered their front, sheltered to a great extent by the light earth- 
 works constructed on Cemetery Hill the previous day. South of 
 Ziegler's Grove, Hancock had, since the evening of the 1st, pro- 
 
134 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 longed the Federal left with the troojrs he had at liis disposal as 
 far a.s the sugar-loaves of the lloiiiid Tops, so as to present a solid 
 line to the enemy's troops, M^iich he then perceived on Seminary 
 Hill. Birney, with Graham's and Ward's brigades of the Third 
 corps, Ijearing to the left of Robinson, extended along the ridge 
 which prolongs Cemetery Hill as far as the depression where the 
 latter seems to lose itself for a while, to rise again afterward 
 toward the Round Tops. Geary, in this direction, with a divis- 
 ion of the Twelfth corps, was developing on Birney's left as far 
 as the smallest of these two hills, which he liad caused to be 
 occupied by two regiments.* Williams, with the other division 
 of the same corps, had halted within a mile and a quarter in the 
 rear of Cemetery Hill, on the left bank of Rock Creek, near the 
 point where the Baltimore road crosses this stream. Finally, 
 Humphreys, who had been on the march since four o'clock in 
 the afternoon, arrived on the ground, and the darkness not 
 allowing him to select his place, he massed his two brigades a 
 little in the rear and to the left of Birney 's line. 
 
 In the mean while, after a long conference with Hancock, 
 Howard, and some generals of his staff, INIeade had not waited 
 for daylight to reconnoitre i\\Q position where the fortune of war 
 had just brought him. Being very near-sighted, he required 
 considerable time to study the ground. The moonlight enabled 
 him to visit the positions of his soldiers with ease, but it was 
 only toward four o'clock, when the early rays of the sun imparted 
 to the objects around their natural appearance, that he could form 
 a correct idea of the whole. He was at once struck with the weak 
 points they presented : being convinced, however, that it was too 
 late to look for others, he thought only of drawing the best pos- 
 sible advantage from those which circumstances had placed within 
 his reach. At this moment, in fact, all the troops that had not 
 already gathered around him were about to start for the purpose 
 of joining him. 
 
 The Second corps, which had halted a few miles from Gettys- 
 burg, on the Taneytown road, resumed its march ; De Trobriand's 
 and Burling's brigades left Emmettsburg ; and the Fifth corps had 
 arrived the day before at Bonaughtown, a village about six miles 
 * Fifth Ohio and One-hundred-and-forty-seventh Pennsylvania, — Ed. 
 
OAK HILL. 135 
 
 from Gettysburg, ou the Hanover turnpike. In the course of three 
 consecutive days, from the 29th of June to the 1st of July, this 
 corps had marched over sixty-two miles from Frederick, Maryland, 
 but notwithstanding the fatigue of his men, General Sykes had 
 pushed them forward in the direction of Gettysburg since break 
 of day. The Sixth corps, which, on the 1st of July, was station- 
 ed at Manchester, more than thirty miles from Gettysburg, had 
 been on the march since seven o'clock in the evening, and, owing 
 to this forced march, was expected to arrive in the afternoon. The 
 cavalry, ou its part, was preparing to cover the positions which 
 the ariuy had first occupied : Buford, with Gamble's brigade, 
 cleared it on the left, along the Emmettsburg road ; but on the 
 right Devin's brigade, not being able to maintain its ground be- 
 fore Ewell, near Gettysburg, had passed to the second line on the 
 Taneytown road. Merritt, with the regular cavalry brigade, had 
 been hastily called from JNIechanicstown ; Kilpatrick, who fol- 
 lowed Stuart as far as the neighborhood of Heidlersburg, had 
 been ordered to fall back on Two Taverns ; Gregg, who was at 
 "Westminster with his division, had left Huey's brigade to protect 
 the depots and the line of the railway, and was advancing with 
 the other two brigades in order to take position on the right of 
 the army. The reserve artillery, which had halted at Taneytown 
 oil the morning of the 1st of July, had been placed on the march 
 by Meade, and was to join him on the morning of the 2d. 
 
 These night-marches were extremely trying to the soldiers, 
 reducing, to a great extent, the bodies of troops that were 
 dragging along in the rear, the darkness of the night crowding 
 the roads W"ith stragglers. Those who had halted during the 
 night had, for the most part, as will be seen, long distances to 
 travel. Consequently, the troops reached Gettysburg very much 
 exhausted — a bad condition to be in for fighting ; but the first 
 thing to be done was to reach the place, and it was not paying too 
 dear for such an important result. Thanks to these forced marches, 
 the whole army was assembled by nine o'clock in the morning, 
 with the exception of fifteen thousand men of the Sixth corps, 
 and even the latter were sure to arrive in time if the conflict lasted 
 a few hours. This concentration, effected with so much rapidity, 
 
 was as creditable to INIeade as to his soldiers. 
 
 K 
 
136 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Lee, on his part, was also gathering liis forces, the following 
 being the positions they occupied at daybreak : Swell's entire 
 corps was drawn up on the battlefield, with Johnson on the left, 
 resting on Rock Creek, upon lienner's Hill; Early, in the centi-e, 
 facing the ridge which cpnuects Gulp's Hill with Cemetery Hill; 
 Eodes, on the right, at the foot of the last-mentioned hill, his 
 main force occupying the town of Gettysburg, while his right 
 formed a connection with the Third corps on Seminary Hill. 
 The two divisions of the latter corps, which had fought on 
 the previous day, retained the positions that had been taken before 
 sunset. Pender was on the left, above the seminary; I loth, on 
 the right, along the ridge ; Hill's third division, under Ander- 
 son, was posted about one and a half miles in the rear, on the 
 Cash town road, between Marsh Creek and Willoughby Run. A 
 large portion of the First corps — that is to say, McLaws' and 
 Hood's divisions, with the exception of Law's brigade — had fol- 
 lowed close upon Anderson along the same road, and had halted 
 three-quarters of a mile on the right bank of Marsh Creek; 
 before four o'clock Anderson was proceeding toward Seminary 
 Hill; Hood and McLaws, after giving their soldiers only two 
 hours' rest, had, like Andei'son, put their columns in motion 
 also, and were advancing toward Gettysburg while waiting for 
 orders assigning them their proper place on the battlefield. At 
 the same time, Pickett was leaving Chambersburg, and Law 
 the village of New Guilford, where Longstreet had sent him the 
 day before. We have seen that Stuart, having at last received 
 his instructions, was leaving the neighborhood of Carlisle in great 
 haste for the purpose of joining his chief at Gettysburg. By 
 nine o'clock in the morning the whole Confederate army was 
 therefore assembled around the town, with the exception of Stu- 
 art's cavalry and the six thousand infantry which Pickett and 
 Law could bring into line. The opportunity of attacking the 
 Federal army while still divided had vanished with the last 
 glimmer of daylight on the 1st of July ; but in resuming the 
 battle on the morning of the 2d, Lee had the great advantage of 
 finding his adversaries scarcely recovered from the combat of the 
 previous day and the rapid marches they had undergone — of sur- 
 prising soldiers worn out by fatigue, and officers utterly unac- 
 
OAK HILL. 137 
 
 quainted with the ground, within lines still wretchedly formed, 
 and in positions miserably selected, and deprived of the support 
 of a large portion of their own artillery. In bringing his troops 
 into action at nine o'clock in the morning he could hardly have 
 exacted an effort equal to those he had obtained from them at 
 Manassas and Chancellorsville. 
 
 We must pause at the juncture when Meade, after examining 
 the ground, has issued his orders. The Federals are beginning 
 to rectify their positions. The First and the Eleventh corps have 
 not altered theirs, but the Second, having arrived at seven o'clock, 
 has been placed by Hancock, in pursuance of Meade's instruc- 
 tions, to the left of the First ; Hays' division, on the right, is 
 resting upon Ziegler's Grove ; Gibbon's division is in the centre ; 
 on the left Caldwell's reaches out alono- the dividino; water-line 
 between Plum Run and Kock Creek, as far as the height on which 
 stood the Humelbaugh house, his skirmishers occupying the Co- 
 dori house on the Emmettsburg road : each of these three divisions 
 possesses a front of two deployed brigades, the third being kept in 
 reserve. In order to make room for them, the Third corps has closed 
 its ranks, and is bearing to the left. The ground upon which it is 
 about to take position will be the scene of so important and des- 
 perate a struggle that it is necessary to complete the general de- 
 scription we have heretofore given by details the usefulness of 
 which the reader will at once acknowledge. 
 
 We have stated that a line from the upper strata of rocks formed 
 by a slight convulsion of the earth eight hundred feet in length, 
 much less elevated than the ridge of which it is the continuation, 
 rises gradually as far as the commanding point occupied by the 
 farms of Want and Sherfy — to which we have given the appella- 
 tion of "orchard " — where it is suddenly interrupted by declivities 
 of considerable steepness. The line of rocks, broken at the west, 
 becomes again united, through a depression in the ground of only a 
 few yards, to a new ridge which, by its direction, its declivity to the 
 eastward, and the wooded character of its western front, resembles 
 that of Seminary Hill. The culminating point of this ridge is 
 occupied by a few houses which Ave shall designate by the name 
 of Warfield, one of their proprietors. Willoughby Run waters 
 the foot of the hill at the west. The road from Gettysburg to 
 
138 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 EmmcttsLurg, after passing below Ziegler's Grove as far as the 
 Want liouse, with the exception of a strip of huid about nine 
 liundred yards in length between the houses of Codori and 
 Smith, inclines to the westward and intersects directly the head 
 of the little valley where it has its source. The hillock, as its 
 English name of " Peach Orchard " implies, is thickly covered 
 with peach trees, wdiich are largely cultivated in that country, 
 where the fruit is distilled. It is a commanding position, possess- 
 ing extensive views, but was covered by the position of Seminary 
 Hill ; consequently, strong at the east, weak at the west, and com- 
 manded for a distance of over five hundred yards by the Warfield 
 ridge, behind which the enemy could make preparations for his 
 attacks with impunity. A road, called the Millerstown road, 
 branching off from the Hagerstown road near IMarsh Run, at the 
 Black Horse Tavern, crosses Willoughby Run, ascends the left 
 bank until it strikes an isolated schoolhouse, when, winding up 
 to the Warfield farm, it intersects the Emmettsburg road at the 
 Peach Orchard, and subsequently pursues a south-easterly course 
 to cross Plum Run, and finally to connect with the Taney town 
 road north of the Little Round Top ; the road skirts the Peach 
 Orchard hillock by following the base as far as Plum Run. This 
 sti-eam, after taking its source near the Trostle brick house, runs 
 from north to south through a valley interspersed with isolated trees 
 and bushes : before striking the road it passes between two woods, 
 one of which, at the east, rests upon the AYeikert house, wdiile the 
 other, at the w'est, triangularly shaped, skirting the north side of 
 the road, runs as far as the Trostle house. Below the crossing the 
 stream, being marshy, rushes into the wild gorge comprised between 
 the Round Tops and the rocky hill of the Devil's Den. This 
 hill forms the continuation, at the south, of the rocky line which 
 the road follows after leaving Peach Orchard, and which it aban- 
 dons to cross Plum Run. The woods by which it is covered are 
 separated from this road by a large field of wheat, adjoining on one 
 side the wood of the Trostle house, which stretches down as far as 
 a little valley where an insignificant tributary of Plum Run flows 
 from north-west to south-east. That portion of the Devil's Den 
 facing this valley is more woody and less rocky than that fronting 
 Round Tops. At the extreme end of the wheat-field two 
 
OAK HILL. 139 
 
 branches of the small tributary form a junction, one of them 
 rnmiing through the field itself; the other, taking its source 
 west of tlie Emmettsburg road and following the base of the 
 Peach Orchard, leaves the Rose farm on the right and crosses, 
 before reaching the above-mentioned wheat-field, a wood which 
 covers both its sides. This wood, bounded at the east by the 
 wheat-field, at the west by these slopes, extends, at the point of 
 its longest distance, from the borders of the road above mentioned 
 as far as the neighborhood of the Timber farm ; south of this trib- 
 utary of Plum Run there i^re open fields and fenced-in meadows 
 sloping down by gentle gradations in front of Round Top, and 
 which a by-road traverses, forming a junction between the Slyder 
 farm on the borders of the stream and the Emmettsburg: road 
 near the point -SN'here the latter intersects the Warfield ridge, 
 below the gorge by means of which Plum Run works out a 
 passage through tlr^ rocks just mentioned — a country easy of 
 access and under general cultivation, stretching out as far as 
 the Taneytown road, completely enveloping tliis rocky section 
 on the south side. 
 
 By following this description on the map it will be seen that 
 the Round Tops were to serve as a resting-point for the left of the 
 Federal army, like Gulp's Hill on its right and Cemetery Hill in 
 its centre. The direct line connecting them with this last hill 
 passed through the lower flat country, and was but little adapted 
 to artillery manoeuvres. The commanding hillock of the orchard 
 seemed from its very position to invite the Federals to plant 
 themselves there. It covered their left, preventing the enemy 
 from approaching them in front or from disguising any flank 
 movement ; in short, the stream which watered the base of the 
 hill towards the south constituted a strong^ line as far as 
 the Devil's Den. But, notwithstanding these apparent advan- 
 tages, the occupation of the orchard presented many inconveni- 
 ences to the Federals ; it allured them through the collective at- 
 tractions of positions which they could not dispute to the enemy 
 without endangering the whole battlefield. 
 
 Entirely isolated at the north and north-west from the line adopt- 
 ed by Meade, indifferently connected with the latter at the w^est, the 
 orchard presented a salient angle which was the more difficult to 
 
140 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 defend, being commanded on one side, while its elevatiou on the 
 other side rendered it impossible for the Federals to recapture it 
 when they had once lost it. It would have been necessary, there- 
 fore, in order to take practical possession of the place, either to 
 occupy it with a considerable portion of the army, and surround 
 it with iutrenchmcnts, as Steinwehr had done at Cemetery Hill, or 
 simply to place a few troops with instructions to fall back as soon 
 as they had compelled the enemy to disclose his forces. 
 
 At four o'clock in the morning, Meade, being desirous of rein- 
 forcing his right, which, being nearer the enemy, seemed to him 
 destined to play the principal part, had ordered Geary to abandon 
 his position near Sickles in order to occupy the eastern slopes of 
 Gulp's Hill to the right of Wadsworth. AVilliams being already 
 at Rock Creek, the whole of the Twelfth corps was to be thus 
 assembled on this side. Geary had taken up the line of march 
 at five o'clock, leaving vacant all that portion of the line he had 
 occupied, from Sickles' left to the Little Round Top. The ar- 
 rival of the Second corps, which came to take position between 
 the First and the Third, enabled the latter to bear to the left in 
 this direction. Between six and seven o'clock in the morning 
 Meade sent his sou to Sickles with orders to take the position 
 which Geaiy had just left. This position, as we have stated, 
 extended as far as the slopes of the Little Round Top, which 
 Geary had strongly occupied since the previous evening. The 
 order was most positive, and Meade has been blamed for not 
 having attended to the execution of said order in person ; 
 nor did he endeavor to ascertain if the occupation of the 
 summit of Gulp's Hill had been . effected, relying upon Slocum 
 and Wadsworth to do that ; besides, the commanding aspect of 
 this hill indicated it sufficiently as the most important point to 
 hold along the Federal left. But, Geary having started at an 
 early hour, Sickles, entirely occupied with his own troops, had 
 no knowledge of the position held by Geary, nor of the extent 
 of his line, and, as no one had been left behind to supply the 
 necessary explanations, JNIeade's order no longer possessed the 
 same clearness in his estimation that it did when received. The 
 Little Round Top, which he- perceived at a consideral)le distance, 
 was separated from him by low grounds which offered no ad van- 
 
OAK HILL. 141 
 
 tage for posting his four brigades, no commanding point for pla- 
 cing his artillery. Consequently, when Colonel Meade arrived, 
 between eight and nine o'clock, to ascertain if the order which 
 he had brought from his father had been executed. Sickles 
 answered him that he could not distinguish the position in 
 which he was to replace Geary. Nevertheless, like an obedient 
 lieutenant, he had not waited for fresh orders to extend his 
 line to the left, and before nine o'clock Birney was deploying 
 Graham's and Ward's brigades in the direction of Little Round 
 Top. At the same time, he saw the two other brigades of his 
 own corps arriving. De Trobriand and Burling, who had left 
 Emmettsburg at daybreak, being still ignorant of the situation 
 of the two armies near Gettysburg, had followed the direct road 
 leading to this town, and thus passed between the lines of skir- 
 mishers of both armies over the hillock of the orchard ; they had 
 exchanged a few shots with the Confederate skirmishers, leaving 
 in their hands a certain number of stragglers, who had not been 
 able to keep up with their pace; but they arrived without encoun- 
 tering any serious resistance. De Trobriand took position be- 
 tween Graham on the right and Ward, who had been resting 
 upon the base of the Little Round Top, on his left. Bur- 
 ling joined Humphreys' division, which had remained massed 
 with the artillery of the Third corps on the left and a little in 
 the rear of the Second, which was posted on the hill of Ziegler's 
 Grove. So that, toward nine o'clock, Sickles occupied the posi- 
 tion designated by Meade ; but, as he had only deployed one 
 of his two divisions, he could not reach beyond the base 
 of the Little Round Top, and did not set foot upon the hill 
 itself. The blame which may be attached to the Union general- 
 in-chief does not consist in his having designated in an insufficient 
 manner a position which the character of this hill clearly indi- 
 cated, but in having entrusted a line of too great extent to a sin- 
 gle corps. In fact, this line, which required a stronger force in 
 consequence of its presenting points extremely vulnerable, should 
 have possessed a development of at least one and a quarter miles, 
 even if the Little Round Top had been occupied ; whilst on the 
 right of Sickles the Second corps had only a front of a little over 
 twelve hundred yards to defend. But Meade, believing that the 
 
142 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 decisive struggle would take place on his right, was not disposed 
 to Aveaken cither this wing or his centre for the benefit of the 
 left, and did not seem to attach sufficient importance to the de- 
 fensive dispositions which the latter might adopt. Sickles, how- 
 ever, after having deployed Birncy's troops, sought to complete 
 the formation of his corps from the moment that the arrivaLof 
 Burling's brigade had filled up the ranks of Humphreys' divis- 
 ion : not being entirely satisfied with the position where the latter 
 was massed, although it was sufficiently flanked both on the right 
 and left, he only left Burling in it, and caused the other brigades 
 to advance about four hundred yards along the direct prolongation 
 of the Second corps. This new jDOsition was much worse thau the 
 preceding one ; for Humphreys was located at the very extremity 
 of the valley of Plum Run, and was commanded still closer by the 
 ridge ^vhich the Emmettsburg road follows. Leaving a second 
 line, composed of five regiments massed, at an equal distance be- 
 tween Burling and his first line, he formed the latter by deploy- 
 ing the seven regiments which were left him, and pushed forward 
 his advance-posts at once as far as this road, which he was anxious 
 to clear. The Federal skirmishers, after having occupied the 
 Rogers mansion, pulled down all the fences which covered the 
 ground on that side — a precaution which, at a later period, facili- 
 tated the movements of the division. 
 
 During this time the Federal right was taking a firm position 
 and receiving important reinforcements. The Fifth corps, hav- 
 ing arrived before six o'clock in the morning on Rock Creek, 
 had temporarily taken position on the right of Williams' divis- 
 ion ; but at eight o'clock, when Geary came to post his troops 
 on Gulp's Hill, Slocum, who was in command of these two corps, 
 brought back all his forces on the west bank of the stream. 
 Geary planted himself upon the wooded flank of Gulp's Hill, 
 which commanded this side of the creek as far as the streamlet 
 flowing from Spangler's Spring. AVilliams prolonged his line 
 in the same direction by resting his right on the conical hillock 
 called McAllister's Hill, taking advantage of the natural rough- 
 ness of the ground, which we will describe in detail presently. 
 These two divisions speedily made intrenchments along their front. 
 The Fifth corps took position near the main road, in sight of 
 
OAK HILL. 143 
 
 the bridge of Eoek Creek, thus forming a reserve which, while 
 su])porting the right, could, by means of direct paths, hasten with 
 equal rapidity to the assistance of the left or the centre of the 
 line. Finally, the reserve artillery, which arrived at the same 
 time, was parked, by Meade's orders, in a position not less central 
 between the Taneytown and the Baltimore roads. 
 
 By nine o'clock in the morning the Federal line was there- 
 fore rectified. All the corps save one had arrived, and, not- 
 withstanding their exhausted condition, each had taken the 
 positions assigned by the general-in-chief. Through the one 
 which he had designated for the Fifth corps he was already 
 prepared to take great advantage of the very form of this 
 line, the two extremities of which had fallen to the rear. The 
 enemy had not, during these first five important hours of the day, 
 fired a single cannon-shot to annoy the Federals or to interrupt 
 their preparations. Astonished at this inexplicable silence on 
 the part of an adversary ordinarily so active, Meade concluded 
 that Lee had not finished his concentration, and had only the 
 forces engaged the previous day about him. He at once con- 
 ceived the idea of taking the offensive in his turn, and of antici- 
 pating him by attacking the positions of Ewell on Benner's Hill 
 with the Twelfth and Fifth corps. This bold project was justi- 
 fied by appearances, and the point of attack well chosen : the 
 Confederate Second corps was, in fact, the easiest of approach, 
 the open country extending between the rest of the Southern 
 army and the Federal positions being an obstacle in the way of 
 such an attack, the importance of which Lee was soon to experi- 
 ence in turn. But appearances alone were favorable ; for Long- 
 street's two divisions, being at that moment within reach of Get- 
 tysburg along the Cashtown road, could have formed a junction 
 with Hill in order to defend Ewell. Fortunately for Meade, 
 Generals Slocum and Warren having deemed the country very 
 difficult to be traversed, he decided to wait for the arrival of the 
 Sixth corps. The enemy did not allow him to resume his 
 project. 
 
 Lee, in fact, has the greatest interest in striking quickly and 
 heavily. We must now see how he is employing the morning 
 of the 2d of July, during which the Federals are preparing to 
 
144 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 receive him, to present the various pliins he can adopt, and examine 
 the motives which determine his choice. We have shown that 
 before continuing his march northward he had been obliged to 
 measure strength with the Federal army. In order to preserve 
 his communications, to receive ammunition, to send back his 
 booty and sick, and to transform his movement into a positive 
 invasion, it was necessary as soon as practicable to render it impos- 
 sible for this army to attack him. He has drawn it into a pursuit, 
 and then has suddenly turned against it, while the simultaneous 
 arrival of Hill and Ewell before Gettysburg has enabled him to 
 crush two Federal corps. Lee, however, was not able to gather 
 the fruits of his victory that same evening, and on the morning 
 of the 2d of July he found the greater portion of the Union 
 army in front of him. He has four alternatives to select from : 
 he has the choice to retire into the gaps of the South IMouutaiu 
 in order to compel Meade to come after him ; or to wait steadily 
 in his present positions for the attack of the Federals ; or, again, 
 to manoeuvre in order to dislodge them from those they occupy 
 by menacing their communications by the right or the left; 
 or, finally, to storm these positions in front, in the hope of carry- 
 iu<>- thorn by main force. The best plan would undoubtedly have 
 been the first, because by preserving the strategic oifensive Lee 
 would thus secure all the advantages of the tactical defensive. 
 Once master of the mountain-passes, he may cover his retreat upon 
 Hagerstown or Hancock on the one side, v/hile still menacing the 
 very heart of Pennsylvania on the other. Meade, being hard 
 pressed by public opinion, will be compelled to attack him in as 
 formidable positions as those of Crarapton's and Turner's Graps, 
 where the preceding year a handful of men so long resisted Mc- 
 Clellan's assaults. Lee, by way of excuse for not having adopted 
 this plan, has alleged the impossibility of bringing to the rear in 
 time the supply-trains which were crow^ding ou the road from 
 Chambersburg to Gettysburg : this excuse does not seem to us to 
 be admissible, for the same trains were able to retrograde, with- 
 out obstruction, during the night of the 4th and 5tli, and such a 
 movement wcmld have been less dangerous after the victory of 
 the 1st than after the defeat of the 3d. The truth is, that the 
 ardor and assurance of the Confederate army, the mutual confi- 
 
OAK HILL. 145 
 
 deuce of the chieftains and soldiers, together with their contempt 
 for their adversaries, do not allow Lee to take a step backward 
 which would have the appearance of a retreat. To wait unflinch- 
 ingly for Meade's attack in the position which the chances of war 
 have just afforded to the Confederates is a middle course, full of 
 inconveniences and without any advantages. The position of Sem- 
 inary Hill is a very strong one, it is true, but it is isolated ; it can- 
 not mask a movement either toward the Potomac or the Susque- 
 hanna, and may be easily turned. Besides, Lee could not remain 
 motionless upon these hills, for, drawing as he does his resources 
 from the country, he cannot supply his army with rations except 
 by scattering it : to wait would therefore be fatal to him ; it 
 would redound entirely to Meade's advantage, who can promptly 
 receive the supplies he requires, and the reinforcements which 
 are increasing daily his numerical superiority. In short, in the 
 midst of an offensive campaign suddenly interrupted the temper 
 of the Confederate army would not brook inaction any more 
 than retreat. It is expedient, therefore, either to manoeuvre for 
 the purpose of dislodging the enemy or to attack him in his posi- 
 tions. He adopts the second of these plans : he will fail, but 
 that is not a sufficient reason for believing that he has made a bad 
 choice. The principal survivors among Lee's lieutenants have 
 publicly made known their opinions regarding the advantages 
 and disadvantages of these two plans, and are divided in their 
 preferences. In order to carry out the first, so as to compel Meade 
 to abandon his positions without wrenching them from him by 
 main force, it would have been necessary to menace his base of 
 operations at Westminster, east-south-east of Gettysburg; but. 
 this cannot be done in turning it by way of the north without 
 becoming absolutely isolated and abandoning the entire line of 
 retreat, and consequently without encountering more dangers than 
 the Federals would be subjected to. It is therefore by way of 
 the south that the Confederates are obliged to manoeuvre ; but on 
 this side the difficulties are equally great. In order to strike the 
 Westminster line it is necessary, first of all, to deliver the town 
 of Gettysburg to the enemy — an important position and dearly 
 bought ; afterward a change of base must be effected in order to 
 rest upon the Fairfield and Emmettsburg roads, and to describe 
 
146 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 at least one-third of a complete circuit around the Federal army — 
 a flank march the more dangerous because it would be undertaken 
 in a hostile and open country ; finally, it is necessary to wait for 
 the cavalry, whose co-operation is indispensable. It is true that 
 Meade, who must be acquainted with his weak points, greatly 
 dreads this movement, but it is also true that he has taken every 
 necessary measure to avert the most serious consequences to him- 
 self. In fact, if the positions he occupies near Gettysburg are 
 impregnable, everytiiing should be tried to drive him out of them, 
 rather than to storm them in front ; but they are not better than 
 those of Willoway and Pipe Creeks, upon which he is ready to 
 fall back. Lee therefore cannot be blamed for having preferred 
 a direct attack. His whole army, with the exception of some of 
 his generals, demands that this attack shall be made ; a resistless 
 impulse seems to spur it on to battle. It believes itself iuvin- 
 \ cible — a powerful element of success when this blind confidence, 
 ^ which makes it forget all thoughts of retreat, neglect all cal- 
 culations of numerical force, and scorn the adversary, is not 
 shared by the leaders. But in the Confederate army nearly 
 all these generals have undergone the contagion. Lee himself, 
 the grave and impassive man, will some day acknowledge that 
 he has allowed himself to be influenced by these common illu- 
 sions. It seems that the God of armies has designated for the 
 Confederates the lists where the supreme conflict must take place : 
 they cheerfully accept the alternative, without seeking for any 
 other. 
 
 If Lee cannot be blamed for the decision he has adopted, it 
 is impossible not to recognize the faults he commits when tliis 
 determination has once been settled. We have seen how import- 
 ant it is for him to carry out this determination without delay ; 
 yet when he returns from his conference M'ith Ewell on the even- 
 ing of the 1st of July he docs not appear to have as yet clearly 
 decided upon his plan of battle for the following day. He no 
 doubt desires to wait for daylight in order to reconnoitre the 
 ground, but this uncertainty causes him to lose much precious 
 time. At daybreak of the 2d he is in the saddle : he has de- 
 cided to make the attack on the right, and orders Lougstreet to 
 place his two divisions on that side, along the prolongation of 
 
OAK HILL. 147 
 
 Hill's line, so as to be able to begin it at once. But lie does 
 not appear to have as yet determined either upon the hour 
 when it is to be made, the point against which it is to be 
 directed, or the number of troops to take part in it. Accus- 
 tomed to find in Jackson a lieutenant to whom it was not neces- 
 •sary to give any precise instructions — ^who upon a mere sugges- 
 tion would adopt all necessary measures for striking the point 
 designated for his attack with the greatest rapidity and ,with 
 the utmost possible vigor — Lee on this occasion did not take 
 into consideration Longstreet's character, with whose strong and 
 weak points, his energy and tardiness, he must, however, have 
 been well acquainted. It is evident to us that from the evening 
 of the 1st of July there was a misunderstanding between these 
 two generals. On his return from his conference with Ewell, 
 Lee, having decided to entrust the main attack to Longstreet, 
 had made him some suggestions, but had given him no orders. 
 
 Instead of making himself thoroughly acquainted with the 
 ^\isl^es of his chief, and preparing for making the attack at an 
 early hour, the commander of the First corps only thinks of sug- 
 gesting a new plan of battle. At dawn, with this object in view, 
 he has hastily repaired to head-quarters. This time he has re- 
 ceived orders, although still of a very vague character; Lee did 
 not give his instructions the precise and peremptory form which 
 should characterize all that emanates from a general-in-chief. 
 Consequently Longstreet, not seeing any advantage in pressing 
 the attack, loses much precious time, either through design or 
 mental sluggishness, while his chief, relying entirely upon his 
 promptness, proceeds to examine in person the Federal right, 
 which Ewell is still preparing to attack. 
 
 Lee does not return from this errand until nine o'clock in 
 the morning, and we must believe that he finds Longstreet still 
 delayed in his preparations by difficulties of execution Avhich 
 add to his own reluctance, for the rest of the morning is devoted 
 to reconnoitring with him the ground upon which the First 
 corps is to advance, as far as the Warfield ridge. It is not until 
 eleven o'clock, therefore, that he gives him formal instructions. 
 He, however, merely directs Longstreet, according to a statement 
 of the latter, to envelop the enemy's left, and to begin the attack 
 
148 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 against this point by following as much as possible the Emmetts- 
 burg road. If these assertions are correct, he must have been 
 enlightened by means of verbal explanations, because the Em- 
 mettsburg road runs almost parallel with the front of the two 
 armies, and it was then only occupied by a few Federal pickets; 
 consequently, we shall find Lougstreet deviating in a singular 
 manner from the letter of his instructions. It is evident, how- 
 ever, that Lee, convinced of how much the position of the orchard 
 will be useful for the decisiv^e attack, has been under the impres- 
 sion that he should begin by taking possession of it, inasmuch as 
 it Avould be the first point to be met on the Emmettsburg road. 
 The Kound Tops are no doubt too prominent for the general- 
 in-chief to deem it necessary to call the attention of his lieu- 
 tenant to this double sugar-loaf, the profile of which Ewell had 
 shown him by moonlight the day before, where on the tops the 
 flags of Meade's signal corps were seen flying ; but he had not 
 the least suspicion that such a position was at that moment only 
 occupied by a dozen men, and what an easy prey it would be for 
 Longstreet to seize if he could reach the place unnoticed. 
 
 By directing the First corps to storm the extreme left of the 
 enemy, Lee assigns Longstreet, therefore, a role analogous to that 
 which Jackson had so well performed at Chancellorsville. But the 
 ground being more open than in the forest of the Wilderness, ren- 
 ders the manoeuvre more difficult and less effective, inasmuch as it 
 cannot altogether escape the enemy's notice. Besides, Lee has not 
 placed in the hands of Longstreet the means of action which two 
 months previously had secured Jackson's success. In fact, having 
 at that time only five divisions with him, he gave his lieutenant 
 three of them, and kept but two to hold Hooker in check. There 
 is no doubt that in order to occupy the attention of the adversary 
 a larger display of force is required on the cultivated hills of 
 Gettysburg than around Chancellorsville; but it must also be said 
 that, owing to the nature of the ground, the artillery could supply 
 the absence of a numerous force of infantry. The very disposi- 
 tion of the two lines of the enemy ought to decide Lee to concen- 
 trate all his means of action upon a single point in order to strike 
 a decisive blow, should he be obliged even to strip the rest of his 
 front to accomplish this purpose. In fact, from Benner's Hill, 
 
OAK HILL. 149 
 
 along the left bank of Rock Creek, as far as the extremity of 
 Seminary Hill, the Confederates form an extensive and concave 
 line, which will be still further lengthened when Longstreet, de- 
 ploying beyond the Emmettsburg road, shall try to outflank the 
 Federal left : this line will possess a development of about five and 
 a half miles, and its extremities, placed face to face at a distance of 
 about three miles, will be separated by the whole mass of the enemy's 
 army. This army occupies, therefore, an inverse and convex posi- 
 tion along an arc of little less than four miles, the chord of which 
 is only two thousand two hundred yards in length. If it be 
 always dangerous for the smallest army to approach the adver- 
 sary by two Avings at once, the form of the Union line renders the 
 execution of such a plan particularly difficult for the Confeder- 
 ates. Yet Lee has not dared to diminish the too-extended front 
 occupied by his left wing, and still less to strip it under the very 
 eyes of the enemy in order to reinforce his right. He has there- 
 fore left three divisions of the Confederate Second corps on this 
 side, although he has declined to assign it the first role in this 
 day's work. He cannot, however, doom the entire corps to 
 absolute inaction, and before leaving Ewell has directed him to 
 attack the enemy with vigor when the sound of cannon shall 
 announce the commencement of the battle on the right wing. 
 The Confederate Third corps, placed in the centre, will have to 
 support its two neighbors as soon as the Federal lines shall appear 
 to be shaken by either attack. So that, by a train of errors inti- 
 mately connected with each other, Lee deploys his army upon a 
 more extended front than that of Meade, without concentrating 
 anywhere the necessary force for breaking up the enemy's lines. 
 The first attack is to be made on the right with only two divis- 
 ions; then, without any other notification than the clashing of 
 arms in this battle — a sign always unreliable — three divisions will 
 undertake the second attack at the other extremity of the line ; 
 Inally, if success appears to favor them, the right centre, by con- 
 necting these two attacks, shall take part in the battle. Shall ^^^e 
 find in these dispositions a proof of Lee's hesitation regarding the 
 point where it is expedient for him to strike his adversary, or 
 should we rather think that he does not dare to entrust to any- 
 body a mission fully as important as those which Jackson had 
 
150 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 so well performed at JNIaiiassas aud ChanccUorsville ? This 
 last supposition is justified by the part which Lee will take iu 
 the direction of the battle, and Avhicli we should be tempted to 
 designate as insignificant, if we could do so without intending to 
 cast blame upon him. Once the game opened, he continues to 
 leave an extraordinary latitude to his lieutenaats, just as if Jack- 
 son were still living : the absence of a sufficient general staff — the 
 great defect of American armies — made this, perhaps, a matter of 
 necessity on his part. After having allotted to each man his 
 separate role in the action which is about to take place, he will 
 remain, so to speak, a spectator of the struggle, receiving hai'dly 
 any message and scarcely issuing any order. The intricacies of 
 the machine he has to manoeuvre make it too difficult for him 
 to guide it properly wdien it is on the march. 
 
 The plan adopted by Lee has the inconvenience of increasing 
 this very defect by making success dependent upon the com- 
 bined action of several corps between which there is absolutely 
 no connection ; thus he commits, in his turn, the fault he made 
 Hooker and Sedgwick pay so dearly for on the banks of the 
 Rappahannock; and this fault, the consequences of which we 
 shall see developed during each phase of the battle, will be ag- 
 gravated, as it frequently happens, by the hesitations of his lieu- 
 tenants, who are obliged, for the first time, to manoeuvre in sight 
 and under the fire of the enemy : this will prove to be the prin- 
 cipal cause of his defeat. 
 
 Longstreet, as we have stated, did not approve of the plan of 
 attack which he was charged to execute, and, before receiving 
 detailed instructions, did not display much alacrity in preparing 
 himself for it : he found his forces reduced, at that time, to six 
 brigades, altogether insufficient for such a task, and he was in 
 hopes that the attack would be deferred till next day, in order to 
 allow time for Pickett's division and Law's brigade to join him. If 
 Lee had given him a formal order, or if he had himself felt the 
 necessity of beginning the action as soon as possible, he could 
 have brought seven brigades into line by nine o'clock in the 
 morning. At this hour, indeed, the sixteen pieces of artillery 
 of his artillery corps, which had left Greenwood under the 
 direction of Colonel Alexander, arrived at Seminary Hill, while 
 
OAK HILL. 151 
 
 "Wilcox's brigade, which had been left by Hill on Marsh Creek, 
 behind the bivouacs of the First corps, had reached the adjoining 
 woods of Warfield without being seen by the enemy, where Mc- 
 Laws came to relieve it toward four o'clock in the afternoon. 
 Longstreet preferred to wait, finding, no doubt, that through one 
 of those long days of July he had no need of hurrying in order 
 to conquer and gather the fruits of victory. It is true that Lee, 
 beginning to be impatient, directs him to attack without Law's 
 brigade, which can only arrive at noon ; but the general-in-chief 
 soon yields to his pressing request, and allows him to wait for 
 Law. Three-quarters of an hour have scarcely elapsed when 
 Law joins Hood's other brigades, which are massed back of Sem- 
 inary Hill at the west, behind the right of the Third corps. The 
 latter, as well as Alexander's batteries, lias long been in position : 
 Ewell is waiting for the signal agreed upon. 
 
 The sun, the burning sun of July, has already crossed the zen- 
 ith, and the same silence continues to prevail along both armies. 
 Meade, becoming more and more astonished at the inaction of 
 the enemy, tries in vain to guess the cause. The post of obser- 
 vation on little Round Top signals the movements of troops 
 toward the south. The Union general suspects, not without some 
 cause, that the Confederates are seeking to disguise a flank march, 
 their object being to turn his position between Taneytown and 
 Gettysburg ; for he cannot otherwise account for their delay in 
 making the attack. Having abandoned the idea of taking the 
 offensive, he must foresee all that can tempt the enemy. If the 
 latter succeeds in turning him, it will be necessary to make the 
 army fall back, either upon Willoway or Pipe Creek. He there- 
 fore directs his staif to examine the position of each corps and 
 the roads by which they can fall back ; the chief of staiF, Gen- 
 eral Butterfield, is preparing at the same time a general order 
 indicating the direction which each of these corps will have to 
 take. Finally, wishing to be informed by his lieutenants regard- 
 ing the condition of his troops, and the character of the ground 
 which each of them will have to defend, as well as the various 
 measures to be adopted according to what the enemy may do, Meade, 
 who is still treating them as confidants, summons them to meet in 
 
 council at his head-quarters near Ziegler's Grove. It has been 
 
 L 
 
152 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 since attempted to find in these measures a proof that Meade 
 was preparing to abandon the positions of Gettysburg, and also 
 pretended that ou that very day he would have executed this proj- 
 ect, which was already settled in his miud, if he had not been 
 prevented by the attack of which we shall speak presently. 
 Meade, on the other hand, has asserted that the order, drawn up 
 by Butterfield and shown to several officers, had been written 
 without his knowledge. But if the reverse had been the fact, we 
 could only see in these preparations the proof of an extremely wise 
 forethought : the measures adopted on the ground by the Union 
 general-in-chief formally contradict the idea attributed to him. 
 Nevertheless, one of those blunders that frequently occur on 
 the battlefield was the means of compromising the safety of the 
 Federal line just in that part which will be the first to be men- 
 aced. Meade, believing that Gregg's division of cavalry had 
 joined him and was clearing his left flank, had authorized Pleas- 
 onton to send back to Westminster Buford's two brigades, which 
 had been so severely tried the day before. He had been wrongly 
 informed : Buford alone covered this flank. Meade only learned 
 this fact at one o'clock ; he immediately directed Pleasonton not 
 to strip him entirely ; but it is too late. Buford is gone ; Merritt, 
 who is coming from Emmettsburg, is still far away, and Sickles 
 has therefore only the skirmishers of his infantry to watch the 
 movements of the enemy, whose numerous indications reveal his 
 presence in force on that side. In fact, since nine o'clock in the 
 morning Birney's skirmishers have been attacked by those of Wil- 
 cox from among the trees with which the Warfield farm is cov- 
 ered at the east, and the whole Confederate brigade comes forward 
 for the purpose of supporting them. When, shortly after. Sickles, 
 being apprised of the untimely departure of Buford, decided, 
 in order to ward off all surprise, to replace him, by causing 
 his whole line of skirmishers to advance as far as the Emmetts- 
 burg road. This general, whose military instinct has fathomed 
 the enemy's intentions, justly suspecting that Lee's maiu efibrt 
 would shortly be directed against that portion of the Federal line 
 which has been entrusted to him, is not satisfied with this move- 
 ment. In order to protect the important position of the orchard, 
 he has charged Colonel Berdan to push forward a reconnoissance 
 
OAK HILL. 153 
 
 with two regiments along the Millerstown road as far as the small 
 wood, where musket-shots have been exchanged with the enemy. 
 Toward noon he penetrates into the midst of these clusters of trees, 
 but being soon attacked by Wilcox's brigade and badly punished 
 by Poague's battery of Hill's corps, he is obliged to fall back 
 upon the orchard. This engagement cost him severely, but it has 
 revealed the presence of a numerous enemy, who is masking his 
 movements and seems disposed to turn the Federal left. 
 
 INIeanwhile, Sickles, thinking only of the attack with which he 
 believes himself menaced, has requested Meade to send him fresh 
 instructions : finally, about eleven o'clock, receiving no reply, he 
 rei^airs to head-quarters for the purpose of obtaining them. He 
 informs Meade that Geary has left him no clearly-defined position 
 to defend : not finding any standpoint along the line which he 
 occupies, he M'ould desire to advance with all his forces as far as 
 the Emmettsburg road ; and he immediately requests his chief 
 either to ascertain for himself the necessity for making this move- 
 ment or to send General Warren to settle the matter in his place. 
 ]\Ieade, being under the impression, no doubt, that the attack of 
 the enemy would not be aimed at his left, and probably also kept 
 back by the vicinity of the telegraph-office, declined either to 
 leave his head-quarters or to separate himself from General War- 
 ren. He merely repeated to Sickles the order to remain in the 
 positions taken the day before by Geary, and, according to an eye- 
 witness; he even pointed out to him with his finger the hillocks 
 of the Round Tops as the point on which he should align himself. 
 This was an error on his part, for if he entertained any confi- 
 dence in Sickles' sagacity he should have taken his objections into 
 consideration, and, in the contrary case, to control them without 
 delay. In fact, whether the commander of the Third corps was 
 or was not mistaken in his estimates, he simply desired to receive 
 positive instructions, instead of mere suggestions which allowed 
 him a latitude the limits of which seemed to him very vague. 
 Finally, he obtains permission to take along with him General 
 Hunt, chief of artillery, and, quickly returning, makes a recon- 
 noissance of the line along which he would have liked to place his 
 troops. Hunt points out the positions which appear to him the 
 best for his arm of the service, but, in consideration of the plan 
 
154 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 of the general-in-chief, lie refuses to prouounee a formal opinion 
 regarding the occupation of this new line, which modifies the 
 entire order of battle. He returns to head-quarters, com])letiug 
 the examination of the ground as far as the Little Round Top, 
 and requests Meade to go himself to the left before approving the 
 proposed movement. Several hours have thus elapsed ; INIeade, 
 who has summoned -all his corps commanders, and is waiting for 
 Sickles among the rest, expects, no doubt, to have then a better 
 understanding with him. But the latter, on learning the result 
 of Berdan's reconnoissance, has no longer any doubt regard- 
 ing the projects of the enemy, and becomes more and more 
 uneasy at having to receive his attack upon the ground which he 
 actually occupies. Being left in a state of uncertainty by Hunt's 
 departure, he determines at last to take possession of the Emmetts- 
 burg road as far as the orchard with his whole corps a little before 
 two o'clock. 
 
 He thus finds himself, as we have stated, in a more command- 
 ing position than if he had remained within the line from Ziegler's 
 Grove to Little Round Top, especially if he had left Humphreys 
 in the low grounds Avhicli descend toward Plum Run. Never- 
 theless, it presents such serious difficulties that one cannot approve 
 of the initiative steps taken by General Sickles in planting him- 
 self there. On one side, in fact, the Emmettsburg road plung- 
 ing into a piece of ground between the Codori and Smith houses, 
 it would be necessary to reach out as far as the ridge within two 
 hundred yards more to the west in order to. prevent the line from 
 being commanded at this point ; on the other side, the position of 
 the orchard presents a very salient angle, easy to attack on both 
 sides, having no morasses, and being situated about four hundred 
 yards from a wooded ridge a little more elevated, behind which the 
 enemy can prepare for his attacks ; finally, this curved line, run- 
 ning from Ziegler's Grove to the Little Round Top by way of the 
 orchard, has a development nearly double the preceding one, which 
 is already too long : the result will be that the front of the Third 
 corps, thus extended, will lose its power of resistance, while it 
 will be impossible to fall back sufficiently with the two Avings in 
 order to reach their natural resting-points both on the right and 
 left. If the enemy, as there is reason to fear, attempts a flank 
 
OAK HILL. 155 
 
 movement by way of the south, and seeks to conceal his march 
 behind the Warfield ridge, it is this very ridge that should be 
 occupied, because it completely masks the view of the orchard. 
 But it is on his front, and not on his extreme left, that Sickles 
 seems to have anticipated an attack. Consequently, he causes the 
 line of battle of Birney's division to advance about five hundred 
 yards, thus abandoning the left bank of Plum Run and the slopes 
 of the Little Round Top, the importance of which he does not 
 appear to have then fully appreciated, in order to place himself 
 on a line with Humphreys : subsequently, he makes the whole 
 division perform a left half-wheel by taking Ward as a pivot, so that 
 Graham with the marching wing may come to occupy the orchard; 
 the three brigades, with the exception of the extreme right of the 
 latter, find themselves facing south. It is not without regret that 
 the soldiers of Birney's left give up the positions they occupy to 
 go into action upon ground which affords much greater facilities to 
 the enemy for approaching them. This general, wishing to occupy 
 the line of the stream running from the Rose house to Plum Run, 
 pushes them forward without allowing them to complete the con- 
 version entirely. Ward takes position in the wood which covers 
 the flank of Devil's Den above this stream ; his left rests upon 
 the left of Plum Run, thus finding itself separated from the 
 Little Round Top, which remains exposed without means of 
 defence to a surprise on the part of the enemy ; his right extends 
 as far as the summit of the triangular wheat-field of which we 
 have already spoken. De Trobriand, coming to his assistance in 
 this field, forms his line across the w^ood situated up the stream, 
 along the slope adjoining the left bank of the tributary, prolong- 
 ing it through the fields by ascending in the direction of the 
 Peach Orchard hillock, upon which Graham is posted ; but in 
 order to connect with this position he is obliged to deploy a whole 
 regiment, the Third Michigan, as skirmishers. Birney's division, 
 thus formed, presents its right flank to the enemy along the 
 Emmettsburg road : in order to cover it as much as possible, 
 Humphreys, by Sickles' order, proceeds in the direction of this 
 same road, with all his force, a little before three o'clock. But 
 the position which is thus assigned to him presents serious dangers 
 in its turn. In fact, to strengthen the too-extended line of Bir- 
 
156 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 uey, Sickles takes from him Burling's brigade, wliicli he places 
 iu reserve in the rear of \\^ard and De Trobriand ; Humphreys, 
 leaving to his two other brigades the formation which he has given 
 them ill the morning, rests his left on Graham, near the Sherfy 
 house, his right resting, without any connection, on the patch of 
 ground where the road is commanded from the enemy's side, while 
 his line having already nearly eight hundred and fifty yards of 
 development, he cannot even extend it as far as the Codori house 
 on the other side of the valley. Gibbon, who commands the divis- 
 ion on the left of the Second corps, finding himself thus separated 
 from Humphreys' right by a space of over five hundred yards, 
 naturally does not follow this movement, the object of which he 
 cannot understand. This break in the battle-front of the Federals 
 is the more dangerous because the Codori house and the surround- 
 ing fiirms situated upon a commanding point are easily accessible to 
 the enemy, owing to a large cluster of trees adjacent thereto within 
 a few hundred yards. Gibbon, feeling the danger, and yet unable 
 to prolong his line as far as the road without exposing it to be 
 enfiladed, directs two regiments to occupy the house, so as to serve 
 as a connecting-link between the two corps. Humphreys, on 
 his part, sends his skirmishers to free the ground in his front 
 of the fences and trunks of trees which might intercept his fire 
 and harass his movements. Finally, the five batteries of the 
 Third corps, soon reinforced by three others taken from the 
 reserve artillery, are placed in such a manner as to cover the weak 
 points of the line as much as possible. On the right Seeley's bat- 
 tery is posted near the Smith house, commanding the valley into 
 which the Emniettsburg road descends ; Turnbull comes shortly 
 after to take position on the left. Randolph occupies the front 
 of the western angle itself, behind the Slierfy house, while the 
 south front bristles with the batteries of Clark and Bigelow, that 
 are posted over an intrenchment dug out along the road which 
 runs in the direction of Plum R,un : thirty pieces of cannon thus 
 defend the position of the orchard. Wiuslow, with twelve how- 
 itzers, very formidable at short range, is planted in the wheat- 
 field behind De Trobriand ; finally. Smith has succeeded in scal- 
 ing the hill of Devil's Den with his battery, whence he commands 
 tl\e gorge of Plum Run and all the wooded slopes extending as 
 
OAK HILL. 157 
 
 far as the Emmettsburg road. Sickles, having been summoned 
 to head-quarters, has left the command of his troops to Birney. 
 But at the very moment when the generals are about to assemble, 
 the cannon's voice, which is heard on the left, calls each of them 
 to his post. Sickles has had no time to dismount from his horse. 
 Meade on this occasion does not hesitate to follow him. It is 
 half-past three o'clock : the battle is at last about to commence. 
 The interminable preparations of the Confederates are now 
 completed. We have seen how much precious time has been lost 
 up to noon. At this hour Law joins Hood and McLaws, who 
 have stacked arms and are waiting for him on the right bank of 
 Willoughby Run, between the roads to Chambersburg and 
 Hagerstown, fronting the battlefield of the previous day. The 
 two divisions take up the line of march. McLaws at the head, 
 under the lead of Colonel Johnston of the general staff, proceeds 
 toward the schoolhouse on Willoughby Run. Thence a road wind- 
 ing through the woods will lead him to the Emmettsburg road 
 beyond the orchard, thus enabling him to surround the Federal 
 left. But, having reached a halfway point, the Confederates per- 
 ceive the summit of the Little Round Top between two hills, as 
 also the flags that are being waved by the Federals on the look- 
 out who occupy it. As Lee has given formal instructions to dis- 
 guise the march of the First corps, INIcLaws is brought to a halt 
 while M'aiting for orders ; finally, the column makes a retrograde 
 movement in the direction of the Hagerstown road, to follow it 
 as far as the Black Horse Tavern, and there to take the Millers- 
 town road, in order to reach the schoolhouse by a deviation of 
 about five miles.* 
 
 * Longstreet has blamed Colonel Johnston for having caused his first division 
 to make tliis hmg and useless detour. McLaws and Johnston assert, on the con- 
 trary, that the direction of the Black PTorse Tavern was given by Longstreet 
 himself. We cannot reconcile these diflierent allegations; but we will observe 
 that, in either case, the responsibility belongs to the commander of the First 
 corps, who should have been near the head of his column in order to direct its 
 movements. Johnston adds that the detour imposed upon McLaws' division 
 was an insignificant one, which did not cause him to lose much time. An exam- 
 ination of the map is sufficient to prove that this assertion is inadmissible. But 
 the consequences of the delay in Longstreet's attack were so serious that we 
 have not desired to withhold any of the excuses alleged by the various inter- 
 ested parties. 
 
158 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Tills countermarch causes McLaws to lose more than two hours. 
 Lee, who for the hist hour lias been expecting to see him emerge 
 every moment, does not understand the cause for this delay, and 
 becomes impatient to no purpose. On his own part, Ewell, who 
 receives no instructions, wishing to make the most of his time, 
 plants his artillery upon Benner's Hill, fires a few shots against 
 Gulp's Plill, and sends forward reconnoissauces to feel the Fed- 
 eral jjositions. I^ongstreet, who has proceeded by a more direct 
 road with his columns to the spot where they are to form, finally 
 shares this impatience on the part of his chief, and repairs to the 
 front of his troops in order to accelerate their march. He can 
 cause McLaws to turn back from the road which he has so un- 
 fortunately taken, but he still finds Hood at the point where the 
 latter has been brought to a halt. The commander of the First 
 corps, finding that there is no longer any reason for concealing his 
 march, inasmuch as the whole column must have been signalled a 
 long time since from the summit of the Little Round Top, orders 
 Hood to strike the Emmettsburg road direct by passing behind 
 the War field ridge. Hood thus precedes McLaws along this 
 road, and by taking his right wing he may begin the attack even 
 before the latter has fallen into line. Lee, to whom Longstreet 
 has hastened to announce his speedy entrance into line, has caused 
 Ewell to be told to hold himself in readiness to support him 
 about four o'clock. Hood, on his own part, leaving on his 
 left the wood which Wilcox occupies in front of the orchard, where 
 McLaws will have to form, has drawn up his four brigades in 
 line of battle west of the Emmettsburg road. Law on the right, 
 with Benning behind him ; Robertson on the left in the first line, 
 with Anderson in the second line. At three o'clock he receives 
 the order to attack in conformity with Lee's instructions ; that is to 
 say, by keeping his left near the road. But the reports of his skir- 
 mishers make known to Hood the difficulties of the road he has 
 been directed to follow. It is known, in fact, that the left of the 
 Federals, instead of terminating, as the Southern general-iu-chief 
 had thought, in the neighborhood of the orchard, was prolonged 
 in return from this point as far as Plum Run, thus forming a con- 
 vex line of great strength and difficult of access. More to the 
 south the open fields which extend from the Emmettsburg road. 
 
OAK HILL. 159 
 
 by winding around the rocky base of the Round Tops as far as the 
 Taueytown road, where the enemy's supply-trains are parked, 
 seemed to invite the Confederates to surround tlie extremity of 
 the Union line on that side. The ground is favorable for a flank 
 movement of this limited character, which would not compromise 
 the whole army into making a flank march. Hood has been ask- 
 ing from his immediate chief permission to make the attempt. But 
 Lee's order is peremptory : the plan of battle cannot be changed 
 without his consent; and Longstreet has already lost so much 
 time that he dares not assume the responsibility of further delay. 
 Althougli it is not witliin the conditions foreseen by Lee, he 
 applies himself to cause the instructions given by the latter to be 
 executed literally, and comes to show Hood the direction he is to 
 follow. The objective point is the Devil's Den hill, and the 
 task of attacking the orchard both in front and in flank falls 
 again upon McLaws. At half-past three o'clock the four bri- 
 gades of the former talce up the line of march by descending 
 toward Plum Run, their right extending in the direction of the 
 road connecting the Slyder house with the Emmettsburg road. 
 The two armies facing each other are about coming to blows at 
 last. 
 
CHAPTEK III. 
 GETTYSBURG. 
 
 THE importance of tlie battle of Gettysburg has compelled us 
 to divide its narrative into two chapters, but this second part 
 is only a continuation of the first. The great struggle has been 
 going on since the morning of the 1st of July, uotwithstaudiug the 
 temporary cessation which occurred during the earlier part of the 2d. 
 The movements of Lougstreet's corps which we have just described 
 have been noticed by the Federals posted at the orchard ; their 
 artillery opens fire upon the adjoining woods of Warfield ; several 
 batteries of I^ongstreet's which have taken position near this farm 
 reply to them ; Wilcox on one side, Graham on the other, cause skir- 
 mishers to advance, and the musketry-fire becomes rapidly intense. 
 It is at this moment that ISIeade, accompanied by Sickles, reaches 
 the new line -which the latter has caused his troops to occupy. Struck 
 with its extension, he sees that a single corps is not sufficient to 
 defend it ; he prepares at once to reinforce it, and sends General 
 Warren, whose quickness of perception inspires him with the 
 utmost confidence, to select the points which stand most in need 
 of assistance. Sickles, finding that his chief does not approve of 
 his recent movement, proposes to fall back. But INIeade, showing 
 him the woods on their left, answers that it is too late : in fact, 
 while the artillery-fire against the orchard is increasing, the vol- 
 leys of musketry announce that more to eastward Hood has 
 opened the fight. The latter was to have caused his front to 
 make a half-wheel to the left in order to attack that portion of 
 the Federal line occupied by De Trobriaud and Ward; but 
 while advancing beyond the Emmettsburg road he has at once 
 recognized the importance of Little Round Top, and, direct- 
 ing Law to bear no longer to the left, but to the right, he orders 
 
 ICO 
 
rl jjj~j.v^ ys- JBigtaiaw ;:-'ii:|i; ^jj piiaYtrJa«a aaaai>a gi»v * 'a.- " 
 
/ 
 
GETTYSBURG. 161 
 
 him toward this point. Robertson, perceiving this movement, 
 imitates it at ouee iu order not to break up tlie line, and, crossing 
 the tributary of Phira Run in front of the western part of the 
 Devil's Den, he dashes forward to attack this position a few 
 minutes before four o'clock, preceded by a swarm of skirmishers. 
 The Federals, who have seen on the opposite slopes the serried 
 lines of the assailants advancing with their flags flying and shout- 
 ing their war-cry, are ready to receive them. "Ward waits for 
 their attack in good positions and without flinching, but as he 
 has sent Berdan with the Third Maine to the orchard, his brigade 
 is reduced to five regiments. A desperate struggle takes place 
 along the rocky slopes which the Confederates are beginning to 
 climb : fortunately for Ward, Robertson, in extending his left for 
 the purpose of surrounding him, exposes his flank to De Tro- 
 briaud, and on this side his soldiers begin to fall back. He is 
 obliged to take the remainder of his force to their assistance, and 
 Ward, thus freed, recovers the ground he has just lost. The 
 First Texas, which was trying to seize the nearest guns of Smith's 
 battery, redeems the combat on the left, but the Federal guns, 
 being thenceforth free, inflict severe losses upon the assailants, 
 who are trying in vain to capture them. During this time, Ander- 
 son, who was to support Robertson, has not followed his move- 
 ment on the right, and is about to strike the centre of De Tro- 
 briand's line, which is its strongest part. Being obliged to cross 
 the ravine under the enemy's fire, he has been repulsed with great 
 loss. Besides, two regiments having become separated from 
 Robertson's brigade, and continuing to march with Law's troops, 
 this brigade would find itself isolated and in a most critical posi- 
 tion but for the timely arrival of Benning. This general, hav- 
 ing, like Anderson, adhered to his original direction, thus finds 
 himself in the rear of Robertson. These three brigades at the 
 same time renew the attack. De Trobriand and Ward offer the 
 most desperate resistance ; Smith's and Winslow's batteries sup- 
 port them as much as the nature of the ground will allow. The 
 woods, the rocks, and the slopes give the defenders great advan- 
 tage, but they are much weaker numerically than the Southern- 
 ers, who rush to the attack with desperate energy ; consequently, 
 their losses follow in quick succession, and their line is speedily 
 
162 THE CIVIL WAR iN AMERICA. 
 
 thinned, there being no reserve to reinforce it. The combat tlius 
 begun does not cause Hood to lose sight of the Kound Tops. 
 The higliest seems inacccssilile, and, moreover, the view of the 
 enfilading Federal line is hidden from him by the smallest; it is 
 this one, together with the surrounding slopes, that it is necessary 
 to take possession of. Law, entrusted with this task, penetrates 
 into the small valley of Plum Run, to ascend it again between 
 the slopes of Devil's Den and those of the Round Tops ; his bri- 
 gade is reinforced by the two regiments that have been detached 
 from that of Robertson ; he has under his command soldiers from 
 Texas and Alabama, tried in various combats, ardent as the sun 
 under which they were born, indefatigable and insensible to dan- 
 ger, — resembling, in one word, the brilliant Hood, who has long 
 been training them and is encouraging them by his presence. 
 Ward had only placed a single regiment, the Fourth ]Maine, 
 before Little Round Top in the bottom of the valley where the 
 Plum Run flows, but he has had time to reinforce it with the 
 Fortieth New York, which De Trpbriand has sent to his assist- 
 ance when attacked by Robertson, and the Sixth New Jersey, 
 detached from Burling's brigade. The three regiments, soon 
 increased to four by a new contribution from this brigade, go 
 into ambuscade behind the rocks and resist Law's furious attack ; 
 nevertheless, they lose ground and uncover the approaches of the 
 Little Round Top. In order to support their retreat. Ward is 
 obliged to strip his right ; De Trobriand, compelled, in his turn, 
 to extend his left in order to fill up the space thus formed, places 
 the Seventeenth Maine in the wheat-field behind the wall which 
 at the south separates this field from that portion of the wood 
 abandoned by Ward. AViuslow fires his guns against this w^ood. 
 By thus increasing the length of his line De Trobriand only 
 keeps two small regiments in the centre, for he cannot call in the 
 Third Michigan without breaking all connection with Graham. 
 He, however, holds out against Anderson's second assault ; the 
 latter is wounded and his troops are repulsed. But Benning's 
 arrival has dealt a fatal blosv at Ward. The Confederates once 
 more climb the hill, driving the Federals, who defend them- 
 selves foot by foot, ending by taking possession of three pieces 
 of Smith's artillery. The Federal infantry in falling back leaves 
 
GETTYSBURG. 163 
 
 almost without support the rest of the battery, posted more in 
 the rear upon a steep hillock ■\vheuce it commauds the Plum 
 Run gorge. 
 
 At the same time, a portion of McLaws' division falls into 
 line. Longstreet's orders directed this division, once out of the 
 wood it occupied, to deploy in two lines across the Eramettsburg 
 road, with Kershaw, then Semmes, on the right, Barksdale on the 
 left, and Wofford behind him : it was thus to follow this road 
 in order to attack the position of the orchard as soon as Hood 
 had turned it. But the latter, having extended his line to the 
 right at a great distance from the road, McLaws cannot follow 
 this direction without exposing his own flank. After waiting for 
 some time, he decides to modify his dispositions. About five 
 o'clock Kershaw is ordered to cross the Emmettsburg road, 
 instead of following it in a northerly direction, to support Hood's 
 left ; Semmes is to march in his wake. Kershaw soon reaches 
 the Rose house, but from this point forward the nature of the 
 ground retards his movements; fiually, he crosses the upper part 
 of the tributary of Plum Run, and shortly after half-past five 
 o'clock he attacks the wooded hill occupied by De Trobriand's 
 centre ; he extends his left against the weak line connecting the 
 latter with Graham and covering Clark's and Bigelow's batteries. 
 Near the Emmettsburg road the Confederates, not having yet 
 brought their infantry into action, direct the fire of all the guns 
 which they can place on the Warfield ridge against Humphreys' 
 two brigades and that of Graham. Finally, a portion of the ar- 
 tillery of Hill's corps cannonades the positions of the Second 
 corps of the Army of the Potomac. The Union batteries reply 
 to them with great vigor. 
 
 As we have stated, Meade, being convinced since his arrival 
 upon the ground that Sickles could not defend his position single- 
 handed, had promised him immediate reinforcements. He had 
 authorized him to ask Hancock for a division from his right, 
 and had informed him of the approaching arrival of the Fifth 
 corps. In fact, before leaving his head-quarters he had ordered 
 Sykcs to come with this corps to the support of the left of the 
 Third, which seemed to him thenceforth to be especially men- 
 aced. Sykes, going in search of his troops to a distance of over 
 
164 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 one mile back of the Round Tops, had put them at once on the 
 march. He was ordered to place them on the extreme left, along 
 the prolongation of Biruey's line ; so that when the latter, seeing 
 Hood's attack foreshadowed, asked him with great earnestness 
 for some immediate help, he would not at first allow any of his 
 regiments to be turned from the direction he had given them. 
 But having crossed Plum Run with Barnes' division, he was 
 able to reconnoitre the ground in person : soon after, about half- 
 past four o'clock, he proposed to Birney to have the centre of his 
 line reinforced by Barnes, provided that this line, extending to 
 the left, should cover Smith's battery, which was at the time 
 greatly exposed, and the valley of Plum Run. Birney readily 
 accepts the proposition, and sends Burling's two regiments, with 
 that of De Trobriand, which Ave have seen opportunely arrive in 
 this new position. Sykes, on his part, pushes forward Tilton's 
 and Sweitzer's brigades of Barnes' division, which he had halted 
 in the rear of De Trobriand. Sweitzer takes position on the 
 right of the latter in the wood where the combat is going on, 
 his left adjoining the ravine and facing south, the rest of the 
 line forming a right angle and facing west ; Tilton prolongs his 
 front in this direction along the cleared slope which rises as far 
 as the orchard. 
 
 While this movement is being executed, Kershaw, crossing the 
 ravine, as we have mentioned, advances against these very posi- 
 tions. His attack is at first directed against Sweitzer, but the 
 latter, being posted on fiivorable ground, offers resistance. He 
 then turns against Tilton's brigade, which is much more exposed. 
 It has no support, its right is unprotected, and it fulls back. 
 Its retreat is followed by that of Sweitzer, despite the energy 
 with which it defends itself in the wood. The troops of the 
 Third corps that are fighting on the left of these two brigades, 
 whose arrival had brought them assistance, are again compro- 
 mised, ^till farther on the extreme left the combat has extended 
 its area and assumed greater importance ; all the troops at Sykes' 
 disposal are successively directed toward that portion of the line 
 which Meade has entrusted to his care. 
 
 In order to show how the slopes of Little Round Top, but 
 lately stripped, are rapidly swarming with defenders, Ave must 
 
GETTYSBURG. 165 
 
 go back to the condition of affairs two hours before. About a 
 quarter to four o'clock, Warren, following Meade's instructions, 
 had reached this hill, and was climbing it for the purpose of sur- 
 veying the country. The officers of the signal corps stationed on 
 the top having informed him that they thought they had seen 
 the enemy's lines in the woods between Plum Run and the 
 Emraettsburg road, he had ordered Smith's battery to fire a shot 
 in that direction. Just as the projectile passed whistling above 
 the trees all the Confederate soldiers had instinctively raised their 
 heads, and this simultaneous movement being communicated to 
 the polished arms they held in their hands, Warren had caught 
 their reflection, like a streak of lightning, winding with a 
 long trail among the leaves. This momentary apparition had 
 been a revelation to him; he had divined the danger which 
 menaced Little Round Top, and understood, by the same token, 
 the importance of this position. It was necessary to hasten in 
 order to find defenders for it. Following in the wake of Sykes, 
 who had just crossed the hill on foot with Barnes' division, he 
 had found him near the wheat-field completing the rccoimoissance 
 of which we have spoken. The commander of the Fifth corps 
 had immediately ordered Colonel Vincent, who was in command 
 of Barnes' Third brigade, to proceed to occupy the foot of Lit- 
 tle Round Top ; Hazlett's battery was to co-operate with him. 
 AVarren, going in advance of them, had reached his post of 
 observation to witness the first attack of Law against the four 
 regiments which alone are defending the gorge of Plum Run. 
 One moment later the bulk of these troops was falling back upon 
 the flank of the Devil's Den hill, while a party of sharpshooters 
 was trying to find shelter among the rocks scattered along the 
 "western flank of Little Round Top. The Confederates were 
 hastening in pursuit of them ; their projectiles already reached 
 the elevated post whence Warren was watching this exciting 
 scene. He could not, however, see Vincent's brigacTe, which, 
 encompassing the hill at the west, had disappeared in the woods. 
 This position, easy to defend and impossible to recapture, whose 
 importance Warren alone seems to have then understood, was 
 therefore about to fall into the hands of the enemy without 
 striking a blow. The young general of engineers makes a last 
 
166 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 effort to save it. He directs the officers of the signal corps, who 
 are preparing to abandon a post without defenders, tq continue 
 waving their flags, in spite of the enemy's fire, in order to 
 deceive him and detain liim for a few moments while he is 
 going to ask for assistance from a body of troops whose col- 
 umn he sees moving along the road followed a short time since 
 by Barnes. It is the Third brigade of Ayres' division of the 
 Fifth corps, under command of General Weed, and is preced- 
 ina: the rest of the division at a considerable distance. Weed 
 has gone forward in advance to ask for instructions from Sickles ; 
 but the first regiment that Warren encounters is commanded 
 by Colonel O'Rorke, his friend, and during a certain period 
 of time his subordinate, Avho does not hesitate to respond to 
 the pressing demands of his former chief. While the rest of 
 the brigade is continuing its march, O'Rorke causes the column 
 of the One-huudred-and-fortieth New York, which, fortunately, 
 is of considerable strength, to scale directly the acclivities of 
 Little Round Top. 
 
 During this time, Vincent, hastening the pace of his soldiers, has 
 reached the southern extremity of this same hill. On this side 
 it is not so steep as on the other sides, being prolonged by a ridge 
 which about halfway presents a horizontal stretch of nearly one 
 hundred yards in length, descending thence by gentle gradations 
 as far as the foot of the large Round Top. This ridge affords an 
 excellent position to Vincent for barring the passage to Law's 
 soldiers, who are rapidly advancing in his direction. He posts 
 himself along the western slope, with the Sixteenth Michigan on 
 the right, below the very summit of the hill, the Forty-fourth 
 New York and the Eighty-third Pennsylvania in the centre, and 
 the Twentieth INIaine, under Colonel Chamberlain, on the left, along 
 the extremity of the ridge. These troops could not have arrived 
 more opportunely. Hood, after being for some time held station- 
 ary by the difficulty of keeping his soldiers in the ranks under the 
 fire of a Federal battery posted at the bottom of the gorge, has 
 at last reached the foot of Little Round Top, which lie points 
 out to them as a prey thenceforth easily captured. A great yell 
 goes up from the ranks of the assailants, who rush with impet- 
 uosity upon the centre of Vincent's brigade. But upon this 
 
GETTYSBURG. 167 
 
 ground all the advantages are in favor of the defence, while the 
 fire of the Unionists, sheltered among its inaccessible recesses, 
 stops the Confederates, who stumble at every step they take in 
 their efforts to reach them. They do not turn back on that 
 account, but, posting themselves in their turn behind the rocks, 
 engage in a murderous encounter with Vincent's brigade, which 
 defends itself almost at the point of the muzzle. Law, seeing the 
 resistance which this small band makes in front of him, determines 
 to turn it. He extends his left for the purpose of outflanking the 
 Sixteenth Michigan, and attacks it with so much vigor that it can- 
 not resist the onslaught. The situation is becoming serious for the 
 Federals: Vincent is entirely isolated from the rest of the army, 
 and no longer protects the principal point of the position, the 
 summit of Little Round Top, on M'hich the officers of the signal 
 corps are bravely continuing to wave their flags. 
 
 At the very moment when the Sixteenth Michigan is succumb- 
 ing, 0'E,orke's soldiers, by a really providential coincidence, reach 
 at a full run this summit, which Warren points out to them as 
 the citadel to be preserved at any cost. At their feet lies the 
 vast battlefield, whence are heard vague noises and savage 
 cries, the rattling of musketry, the cannon's roar, and where 
 all the incidents of the combat are seen through a cloud of 
 smoke; but they have no leisure to contemplate this spectacle, 
 for they find themselves face to face with Law's soldiers, who 
 are climbing the hill on the opposite side. A few minutes' delay 
 among the Federals would have sufficed to put the Confederates 
 in possession of the summit. Never perhaps was seen the win- 
 ner of a race secure such a prize at so little cost. The Unionists, 
 although surprised, do not, however, hesitate. They have time 
 neither to form in line of battle nor even to load their guns or 
 fix bayonets. O'Eorke calls them and pushes them forward. A 
 large number of them fall at the first fire of the enemy ; the rest 
 rush down upon the latter at a run, brandishing their muskets 
 aloft ; and this movement suffices to stop the Confederates. The 
 Federals take prisoners those among the assailants who had been 
 ibremost in the race, and open a brisk fire of musketiy upon the 
 others. Vincent's right, having recovered from its check, comes 
 to their assistance. Hazlett's battery has scaled Little Round 
 
 M 
 
168 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Top with the One-hundrcd-and-fortieth New York ; the most 
 extraordinary efforts, together with the co-operatiou of a portion 
 of the regiment, have been required to liaul the pieces of artil- 
 lery as far as the summit. Although the position is very danger- 
 ous, for showers of bullets are falling around the guns, which 
 cannot be depressed enough te reach the enemy along the slope 
 which he is scaling, Hazlctt boldly takes his position and 
 directs his fire against the Confederate reserve in the valley : 
 he knows that the presence of his guns encourages the Union 
 infantry. The Federal line, thus strengthened, presents an im- 
 pregnable front to Hood's assaults ; the position of Little Round 
 Top is safe for the present. But this advantage has been dearly 
 bought : in a few minutes the One-hundred-and-fortieth New 
 York has lost more than one hundred men, a large number of 
 officers being wounded. The valiant O'Rorke has paid with his 
 life for the example of bravery which he set to his soldiers. Hav- 
 ing left West Point two years previously with the highest honors, 
 he had been destined, in the judgment of all his comrades, for the 
 most elevated positions in the army. 
 
 A personal and desperate struggle takes place along the 
 whole front of the two bodies of troops. They watch each other, 
 and aim from behind the rocks and bushes ; some of the com- 
 batants are seen here and there climbing trees in order to secure 
 better shots ; the balls whistle in every direction ; two pieces 
 of Smith's Federal battery take the line of the assailants 
 obliquely, throwing shells into their midst. The dead and 
 wounded disappear among the rocks. On both sides the officers 
 perform prodigies of valor, for they feel the importance of the 
 disputed position. Law is not satisfied with musketry-fire, 
 which may be prolonged withoj^ any decisive success : he 
 wishes to pierce the enemy's line, and brings back against the 
 One-hundred-and-fortieth New York the soldiers of his com- 
 mand who had been stopped by the unexpected arrival of this 
 regiment ; but Vincent, who had assumed command of the whole 
 line, hastens with a few reinforcements, and the attack is re- 
 pulsed. The combatants are beginning to be exhausted on both 
 sides ; the Federals have seen Vincent fall gloriously with a large 
 number of his men : the losses of the Confederates are also 
 
GETTYSBURG. 169 
 
 heavy ; the most serious one is that of Hood, who, being always 
 at the post of danger, has been badly wounded in the arm. 
 
 AVe have reached a period when, on the other side of Plum Eun. 
 K{!rshaw's arrival causes Barnes' two brigades to lose the ground 
 they had recovered, and compromises once more the positions 
 so stubbornly defended by Ward and De Trobriand. The for- 
 mer, weakened by his struggle with Robertson, can no longer 
 resist Beuning, who is pressing him on the right and left at the 
 same time; Smith with great difficulty saves the three guns 
 remaining in his possession; the entire hil] of Devil's Den is aban- 
 doned by the remnant of Ward's brigade and the three regiments 
 that had joined it. The Confederates, crowding the wood, take 
 the Seventeenth Maine, posted behind the wall, in flank, and, 
 proceeding to the wheat-field, force Winslow to remove his 
 guns to the rear, and menace the flank of De Trobriand's weak 
 line. The latter is assailed at the same time in front by An- 
 derson's troops, and outflanked on the right by Kershaw, who, 
 driving back Tilton and Sweitzer, advances in the wood until 
 close upon their rear. De Trobriand is compelled to give ground 
 in turn, his brigade being reduced to a handful of men. The 
 troops posted on his right, near the orchard, cannot aiford him 
 any assistance, for the artillery which they defend, long exposed 
 to the fire of Longstreet's batteries, which take him almost in flank, 
 is seriously threatened by Kershaw's left. On this side the Eighth 
 South Carolina bravely advances against the guns of Clark and 
 Bigelow, who appear to be poorly supported ; but just as it 
 approaches, the One-hundred-and-forty-first Pennsylvania, which 
 was hidden in a sunken road, rises suddenly and stops it by a 
 murderous fire. Notwithstanding this success, the Unionists, 
 anxious about their artillery, take it back beyond the sunken 
 road, thus still further uncovering De Trobriand's right. For- 
 tunately, Caldwell's strong division, which Meade has detached 
 from the Second corps as soon as he had realized the importance 
 of Longstreet's attack, arrives in time to relieve the soldiers of 
 Birney and Barnes. One of his brigades, commanded by the 
 valiant Cross, supports the remnants of De Trobriand's com- 
 mand. Another, under Kelly, which forms the left of the divis- 
 ion, and has crossed Plum Run near the road, supports Ward 
 
170 THE CTVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 along the slopes bordering on the right bank of this stream a 
 litlle lower down. It is the Irish brigade, which, organized by 
 ]\Ieagher, has already followed through many a battlefield the 
 old golden harp embroidered on the green flag of Erin. It will 
 fight with its wonted gallantry, for each soldier is ready to sacri- 
 fice his life with the more readiness that he has been prepared to 
 die as a Christian. As the moment is drawing near for marching 
 against the enemy all the ranks are kneeling, and the chaplain, 
 mounted uptJn a rock which affords him a natural pulpit, has pro- 
 nounced a general absolution to the whole brigade in the midst of 
 a religious silence only interrupted by the fire of artillery. The 
 command " Forward !" immediately follows the sacred word of 
 the priest, and the Irish have at once rushed into the thickest of 
 the fight. They suddenly stop Anderson's brigade in its advance. 
 In the mean while, Biruey, rallying around Cross a portion of 
 De Trobriand's soldiers and Burling's two regiments, which have 
 been driven back on that side, })laces himself at their head and 
 leads them against Kershaw, whose long line cannot sustain this 
 shock. It is forcibly driven back upon Semmes' brigade, which 
 has followed Kershaw very closely, and, fortunately for him, is 
 within one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of his right. These 
 fresh troops advance against the first line of Caldwell's division, 
 which has only achieved this success against Kershaw and Ander- 
 son at a great sacrifice. Cross being among the first to be killed. 
 But they soon encounter new adversaries ; for Caldwell, seeing 
 the losses of his 'first line, has caused the second, composed of 
 Zook's and Brooke's brigades, to advance. Semmes' troops are 
 driven back to the other side of the ravine before they have been 
 able to set foot upon the hill, whence Kershaw^, on the left, is 
 likewise dislodged. The latter, persisting in not giving the 
 order of retreat, sees his brigade divided into squads fighting 
 isolated on a rough and wooded ground ; the Confederates, almost 
 surrounded in their turn, retire toward the Rose house, where 
 Kershaw is rallying the largest portion of his brigade : his left 
 wing maintains its ground and has not been shaken. Reinforce- 
 ments, equally needful, arrive about the same time on the extreme 
 Federal left, in front of Little Round Top. Before the combat 
 had begun at this point Sykes had directed Ayres' division 
 
GETTYSBURG. 171 
 
 toward this position : Weed's l)ri<^;ide, which preceded the otlier 
 two at a considerable distance, had been turned aside, without tlic 
 knowledge of the commander of the Fifth corps, by a pressing 
 call from Sickles, and it was going to the assistance of the Third 
 corps wlien Warren went to seek O'Rorke and his regiment. 
 As soon as Sykes was informed of this fact, he ordered Weed, 
 who had not yet fallen into line, to return with all possible haste 
 to take the position already occupied by the One-hundred-and- 
 fortieth New York. This order was promptly executed. Weed 
 reached Little Round Toj) at the moment when Vincent was mor- 
 tally wounded, and when both sides were preparing to renew the 
 struggle which had been temporarily suspended. Pie takes posi- 
 tion on the right of Vincent's brigade, of which Colonel Rice 
 has assumed the command, thus enabling him to reinforce his 
 left. Chamberlain, on his part, in order to keep the enemy in 
 check, has been obliged to ])lace a portion of the Twentieth 
 Maine en poterwc above the defile which separates the two summits. 
 It is, in, fact, against this point that LaNt directs all his efforts, 
 and the cond^at is resumed with fresh vigor, without allowing 
 Weed time to deploy his battalions. His soldiers, having speed- 
 ily recovered, rush to the assault with the earnestness of men who 
 have never encounteivd an obsta(!le without breaking it down. He 
 strives to outflank the Federal line in order to reach Little Round 
 Top by way of the eastern side of the ridge : his troops have 
 been under less fire on this side, but they have to do with the 
 Twentieth Maine, which defends its position with all the vigor 
 of the strong race of backwoodsmen from whom it has been re- 
 cruited : again they fight hand to hand, the assailants still try- 
 ing to turn their adversaries during the combat, the latter pro- 
 longing their line and bringing it more and more to the rear iu 
 order to frustrate this manoeuvre. 
 
 In the mean while, the battle, confined up to this moment to 
 the ground comprised between Plum Run and its tributary, rap- 
 idly assumes extensive dimensions. Meade has ordcj-ed all the 
 force at his disposal to take position on his left. The Sixth corps, 
 whose heads of column have arrived at about two o'clock at the 
 Rock Creek bridge, and are resting after a long and fatiguing 
 march, has relieved the Fifth in this position. V^'e have already 
 
172 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 seen Sykes hastening to throw four brigades of this latter corps 
 into the light ; the other five brigades, under Ayres and Craw- 
 ford, are on the way to join them. From the left his position 
 fortunately approaches the extreme Federal right, which in its 
 turn is stripped for his benefit. At five o'clock Williams' division 
 has moved from the banks of Rock Creek, and is following in 
 the tracks of the Fifth corps ; half an hour later a despatch to Geary 
 also puts him in motion with the brigades of Kane and Candy, leav- 
 ing only Greene's brigade to cover the front which was lately occu- 
 pied by the Twelfth corps. Humphreys has long since sent Bur- 
 ling to the left; Sickles takes away from hiiu two more regiments, 
 and borrows one from De Trobriand, in order to reinforce the 
 position of the orchard, which the enemy's artillery and Barks- 
 dale's skirmishers are riddling with balls. The Second, corps has 
 furnished Caldwell's division to defend the line occupied by Ward 
 and De Trobriand. The latter, by making so long a resistance, 
 have thus enabled Meade finally to place on his left much more 
 numerous forces than those of the assailants. 
 
 In fact. Hood's division has for a long time alone sustained the 
 burden of the attack. It is exhausted. Robertson has been 
 wounded, together with all the superior officers of his brigade ; 
 Benning, menaced in flank by Caldwell, dares not go beyond the 
 summit of Devil's Den; McLaws, who has been in position 
 since four o'clock, has as yet only brought into action in front of 
 the orchard two of his brigades to support Hood, and one of them 
 only within the last quarter of an hour. The other two have not 
 attacked the orchard, expecting that the defenders of this posi- 
 tion had either been turned or that Colonel Alexander's artillery 
 had broken their lines by his fire. It is six o'clock, and Hill, 
 in order to follow, is waiting in vain for the troops posted on 
 his right to take up the line of march : the large open space 
 which separates him from the enemy will not permit him to 
 advance except by a collective movement, when his right flank 
 would be protected. Besides, as we have stated, McLaws, who 
 is to follow Hood's movement, must, on the contrary, accord- 
 ing to Lee's orders, determine that of Anderson;* and the 
 
 * The reader must not confound Anderson's division of Hill's corps with An- 
 derson's brigade of Hood's division. 
 
GETTYSBURG. 173 
 
 latter will be followed by Pender if the opportunity is favor- 
 able, Heth, with Hill's third division, remaining then alone in 
 reserve. 
 
 At last, McLaws, seeing Semnies and Kershaw forced back in 
 disorder by Caldwell, decides to attack the orchard. Sickles has 
 given to Graham the eifectives of two brigades to defend it, 
 but it would require strong intrenchments to cover a position so 
 destitute of natural shelter on its two flanks. The Confederates 
 slacken the fire of their artillery; the infantry is in motion. 
 Barksdale advances against that one of these two flanks which 
 lies opposite to the west. Woiford, placed in the rear of his 
 right, comes by a half-wheel to attack the south front by assist- 
 ing some of the battalions of Kershaw's brigade Avhich have not 
 joined in his retreat. Graham, Avrapped in a vortex of fire, sees his 
 troops rapidly diminish around him. It is in vain that a regular 
 battery has come to relieve that of Ames at the point most exposed 
 — that Randolph has silenced some of the enemy's guns — that all 
 the Federal guns are firing canister into the ranks of the assail- 
 ants, for the Confederate infantry penetrates into the orchard and 
 takes possession of it ; Graham is wounded and taken prisoner ; 
 his soldiers share his fate or are dispersed along the slopes of the 
 hillock, which they rapidly descend ; Sickles hastens from the 
 Trostle house, but a bullet breaks his leg, and he is obliged to 
 transfer the command to Birney. The batteries posted on the 
 right along the Emmettsburg road abandon positions which it is 
 no longer possible to defend. Those on the left continue to fire 
 almost at short range, causing the guns after each fire to be drawn 
 back a few paces. But nothing can prevent the defeat of Birney's 
 division, Avhich, out of scarcely five thousand men, has lost two 
 thousand. Barksdale, followed closely by several batteries, rushes 
 into the open breach between Humphreys' left and Barnes' right, 
 and, leaving to the troops that are to support him the task of 
 striking these divisions in the rear, he still pushes forward. The 
 canister thins the ranks of his soldiers, but his example sus- 
 tains their courage. On his right, Woiford, following his success, 
 bears to the eastward to take in flank the enemy's regiments 
 that are holding Kershaw in check. It requires less than an 
 hour for the Confederates to achieve this success, which changes 
 
174 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 the aspect of the combat; they liave two hours of daylight tc 
 tiike advantage of it. 
 
 In the centre, Hill, following strictly Lee's instructions, has- 
 tens to push forward in rapid sucx?ession Anderson's three bri- 
 gades, commanded l)y Wilcox, Perry, and Wriglit, against Hum- 
 phreys. The lirst-mentioned commander, -who has been shown 
 by the general-in-chief himself since four o'clock what direction 
 to take, inclines at first to the left, in order to avoid meeting at 
 the orchard McLaws' line, running almost perpendicularly to hxA 
 own ; then he faces to the right in line of battle, for the purpose 
 of attacking in front that portion of the Emmettsburg road 
 occupied by Humphreys. The other two brigades form on his 
 left. 
 
 At the extreme left Ewell has at last put his. columns in motion 
 against Gulp's Hill, whose defenders can certainly receive no fur- 
 ther assistance. As Me have stated, he was to begin the attack 
 as soon as he should hear the sound of Longstreet's guns ; but he 
 found how imprudent it was to put any trust in such a signal : the 
 contrary wind did not allow the sound of the cannonade — which 
 had been in progress against the orchard since half-past three 
 o'clock — to reach him. He has only heard Hill's artillery, which 
 opened fire about five o'clock ; he immediately prepares for 
 battle. Six batteries posted on Benner's PTill support the attack 
 of Johnson's division against the slopes of Gulp's Hill. But at 
 the end of one hour these guns, utterly unprotected, are silenced 
 by those of the Unionists, sheltered inside of the works con- 
 structed the day before ; the young and gallant IMajor Latimer, 
 who commands them, is killed ; a single battery still sustains the 
 fire. Johnson, finding the north and north-east fronts of Gulp's 
 Hill too strongly defended, determines to attack the Federals in 
 the very gorges of Rock Creek in order to turn their positions by 
 the way of the south-east. He requires some time to bear to the 
 left and reach these gorges. When, finally, about half-past six 
 o'clock, the firing of musketry is heard among the rocks, whose 
 loud echoes repeat for the first time such sounds, the battle is in 
 progress along the whole front of the two armies. Between 
 Johnson on the left and Anderson on the right the Gonfederate 
 infantry, it is true, has not yet taken part in the combat; but 
 
GETTYSBURG. 175 
 
 Ewell's and Hill's guns, encompassing the heights of Cemetery 
 Hill and Ziegler's Grove on both sides, cover them with pro- 
 jectiles, thus connecting the two attacks. 
 
 Before describing Johnson's attack we must follow Long-street's 
 progress. Whilst Barksdale leaves Humphreys almost behind 
 him, Wilcox and Perry advapce directly against the front of the 
 latter, while farther on Wright menaces his flank. It is near 
 seven o'clock. Humphreys has only two brigades with him; his 
 left is turned ; his right, poorly connected with the Second corps, 
 Avhich Caldwell's departure has weakened, is only covered by two 
 regiments of Harrow's brigade, and three strong brigades are on 
 the march to attack him. lu order to anticipate them, Hum- 
 phreys, like a true warrior, desires to go forward to meet them. 
 But Birney, foreseeing a disaster to his own division, orders him 
 to fall back, keeping hie left from participating in the movement 
 and bringing his right back to the Second corps. This move- 
 ment, difficult of execution in the midst of the tumultuous sounds 
 of battle, is accomplished with wonderful precision : the battal- 
 ions are massing in double column, and execute a backward march 
 in line ; then, making a quarter-wheel without accelerating their 
 pace, and, halting at the point indicated to them by their chief, 
 they resume the line of battle, and open at once a well-sustained 
 fire of musketry against the assailants, who are almost upon them. 
 Humphreys also succeeds in taking position along the line which 
 it is important above all to preserve. But the trial was a hard 
 one ; he will himself acknowledge hereafter that he thought at 
 one time all was lost. He has left one-half of his effective force 
 upon the battlefield, and it is necessary to count the flags that are 
 floating along his line in order to realize the fact that it represents 
 ten regiments. The detachment from the Second corps, under 
 Colonel Devereux, which covered his right, has found no less 
 difficulty in retiring in good order among the wounded lying 
 on the ground and stragglers wandering over the field of battle. 
 
 The consequences of the loss of the orchard are, however, as 
 fatal to Barnes as to Humphreys. Sweitzer has posted himself 
 on the right of Zook in that part of the road which has just 
 been recaptured from Kershaw. Tilton has again formed his 
 line, farther up on the ground which the latter has already cap- 
 
 VoL. III.— 40 
 
176 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMEBICA. 
 
 tiirecl from liiin : as ou that occasion, his right wing is without 
 support. It is against this wing that Wc^liord, after the cap- 
 ture of the orchard, descends with all the intrepidity tliat recent 
 success has given to his soldiers. Tilton's brigade, not yet 
 recovered from the combat in which it has been engaged, suc- 
 cumbs under their effort. Kershaw immediately takes advantage 
 of it in order to resume the offensive against Sweitzer and Zook; 
 Semmes joins him. Barnes' two brigades, hard pushed in front 
 and in flank, are driven out of the wood. Caldwell's soldiers, 
 Avho in their turn are placed in the same position, and are more- 
 over menaced on the left by Hood's troops, evacuate the wood and 
 the W'heat-field, the bloody soil of which is covered with the dead 
 and dying. Zook is killed ; the losses are enormous. The Con- 
 federates, posted in the wood, command all its approaches ; their 
 artillery, descending the slopes of the hillock of the orchard, takes 
 the Unionists in flank. Brooke charges it with his brigade in vain ; 
 he is repulsed and seriously wounded.* The Federal line is ir- 
 revocably broken, and all the forces which have until then held 
 Longstreet in check on the left are unable to re-form it. Out of 
 eight brigades brought into action by the commander of the First 
 Confederate corps, six are making desperate attacks ujion them. 
 The Union troops, most of them in complete disorder, fall back 
 on the w^ooded hillocks which line the left bank of Plum Run. 
 
 But Kershaw and Semmes, exhausted in their turn, have 
 halted in the wood whence Barnes and De Trobriand have 
 just been dislodged. Only two brigades have passed over the 
 Millerstown road : on the left, that of Wofford pushes forward in 
 order to support Barksdale on the right ; that of Anderson, who 
 has just been wounded, occupies the wood beyond the road, bring- 
 ing several of the enemy's guns which it has captured back of the 
 Trostle house, and even tries to cross Plum Run, but in vain. 
 
 In the mean while, Hancock, who on the news of Sickles' 
 wounds has been entrusted by Meade w'ith the command of the 
 Third corps, is endeavoring to unite the two parts of the 
 Federal line. Humphreys has just completed his movement. 
 Most of the guns attached to his division, having lost all 
 
 * Colonel Brooke was severely bruised, but did not relinquish his com- 
 mand.^ — Ed. 
 
GETTYSBURG. 177 
 
 their horses, have been abandoned in the patch of ground 
 behind which he has posted himself, but they remain within 
 the circle of his fire as a tempting prize for the enemy. 
 Bigelow's battery, having no longer a single soldier to sup- 
 port it, takes position in front of the Trostle house and fires 
 canister upon the Confederates, who are advancing from every 
 direction against it : one after the other the gunners fill near 
 their wounded chief, their pieces being sacrificed ; but they have 
 succeeded in delaying the march of the enemy on the left. These 
 examples of bravery would not, however, have sufficed to Save 
 the Federals if at this critical moment they had not been firmly 
 established on Little Round Top, the real point of support for 
 all their left. Ayres, bringing the two regular brigades of 
 Day and Burbank, has crossed Plum Run and occupies the 
 crest of Devil's Den on the right bank with a portion of Ward's 
 soldiers, who have not been dislodged from it. The retreat of 
 Barnes and Caldwell uncovers his right flank, thus leaving him 
 isolated in advance of the rest of the line ; but, although attacked 
 on three slides by Hood's and McLaws' troops, he forces a pas- 
 sage through their oblique fires. His regular troops once more 
 justify their old reputation ; not a single man has left the ranks, 
 and thev allow themselves to be decimated without flinching. 
 Eleven hundred combatants ojily out of an effective force of two 
 thousand are left standing when, falling back gradually, they 
 finally take position on the right of Weed, east of Plum Run, 
 along the northern base of Little Round Top. 
 
 About an hour since we left the two parties in conflict along 
 the flank opposite to this elevated position, and Law's soldiers, 
 in spite of their reduced number, rushing against the Twentieth 
 Maine. The firing of musketry is again heard along the whole line. 
 Weed, who sets an example to all around him, is mortally wound- 
 ed near Hazlett's battery, whose commander, stooping to receive his 
 last words, is struck in his turn, and falls lifeless upon the body 
 of his chief; nearly all the superior officers are either killed or 
 wounded. But the enemy is also exhausted : in order to sur- 
 round the left (>f the Federals he has prolonged his line to too 
 great an extent Colonel Chamberlain takes advantage of it to 
 charge the enemy in his turn. The Confederates, surprised by 
 
178 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 this attack, arc repulsed, leaving behind them more than three 
 liuudred wounded and prisoners. It is at this moment that Gen- 
 eral Ayres takes position, with his two brigades of regulars, on 
 the right bank of Plum Run. Although he cannot long main- 
 tain himself in this position, his presence, which closes entirely 
 the gorge of the stream, is sufficient to deter the Confederates 
 from making any fresh attack against Little Hound Top. At the 
 very moment when he is obliged to fall back, General Crawford, 
 brino;in<r McCandless' brigade on the hill that Vincent and Weed 
 have saved at the cost of their lives, assists its brave defenders in 
 driving back the assailants to the -other side of Plum Run. The 
 remainder of this small division is not long in joining its chief. 
 The latter, placing McCandless on the right of Barnes' soldiers, 
 and Fisher with his second brigade on the left, forms a solid line 
 on the western slope of the hill, which the regulars prolong across 
 the ISIillerstown road. On this side, therefore, Plum Run sepa- 
 rates the combatants. Longstreet, satisfied with the advantage he 
 has obtained, does not display so much eagerness in attacking 
 positions so strongly occupied by the left of the Unionists. 
 
 But Barksdale and Woiford threaten to separate this left from 
 all the rest of the Federal army, and thereby to demolish the 
 defences upon which it rests. These two brigades, that have as yet 
 suffered but little, advance rapidly, driving before them stragglers 
 and groups of soldiers belonging to all the corps, over an open 
 country which secures a vast field of action to the Confederate 
 artillery. The latter has taken advantage of it : while Hill's 
 guns, with a portion of those belonging to Longstreet, are endeav- 
 oring to absorb the attention of the Federal pieces, the five bat- 
 teries of Alexander follow the Southern infantry step by step, 
 and are beginning to riddle Humphreys' weak division with balls. 
 In order to fill up the gap that has been made in their line, the 
 Unionists are obliged to re-form along the very positions that 
 Sickles had abandoned a few hours before. If he thought thera 
 unsuitable in the morning, how will they be able to maintain 
 themselves in them after the check they have just experienced? 
 Although commanded by the Emmettsburg road, these positions 
 nevertheless present advantages of which the soldiers eagerly 
 avail themselves. The little valley of Plum Run, which sepa- 
 
GETTYSBURG. 179 
 
 rates them from this road, is, as has been stated, full of bushes 
 and trees. The Confederates have found there a shelter agaiust 
 the fire of the artillery of the Second corps, which, in proportion 
 as they advance, takes them more and more in flank. In order to 
 get out of the place they will have to climb an acclivity of about 
 thirty feet. Although very gentle, this acclivity affords a certain 
 advantage to the Federals, It is a last chance, of which they 
 must avail themselves if they do not wish to see the enemy take 
 possession of their communications with Baltimore. The more 
 the position they have taken favors the defence so long as they 
 maintain it, the more irreparable will be the loss if they happen 
 jto lose it. Consequently, Hancock brings all the forces at his 
 disposal to the point thus menaced. Although the Second corps 
 is already deprived of Caldwell's division, which, being extremely 
 weakened, has not been able to resume the place it occupied in 
 the morning, as Meade had directed, he detaches two regiments 
 from Hays' division for the purpose of supporting Humphreys, 
 and, taking with him Willard's brigade of the same division, 
 pushes it more to the left, to the very centre of the open space it 
 is sought to fill. Finally, General Hunt brings forward thirty 
 or forty pieces of reserve artillery, forming the brigade of IMajor 
 McGilvery, v/hich, having been hastily called at the time of 
 the attack upon the orchard, have not been able to arrive in time 
 to defend this point, but render a still greater service by taking / 
 position along the left bank of Plum Kun. This formidable/ 
 battery, the centre of which faces the Trostle house, commandsV 
 along a front of about six hundred yards, all the slopes of th^ 
 bank, and is able to cross fire with Hancock's artillery : it covers 
 the remnant of the three divisions that Longstreet has just 
 driven back beyond the stream, and closes like a solid bastion 
 one-half of the breach which they have left open. Meade also 
 hastens forward, his abrupt departure from the central point 
 where he was stationed even causing a certain panic at his 
 head-quarters. In the mean while, the troops he has sum- 
 moned from the right are already in motion. Williams' divis- 
 ion has struck the cross-road which directly connects the Taney- 
 town and Baltimore roads near tlie field of conflict: this divis- 
 ion is closely followed by one of Geary's brigades under Candy, 
 
ISO THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 but the other strays off, and finally comes to a halt beyond 
 Rock Creek. General Lockwood, who has arrived from Balti- 
 more and joined the Twelfth corps with two regiments on that 
 day, has gone in advance of Williams, affording a useful support 
 to McGilvery's guns. More to the south, Bartlett's brigade of 
 the Sixth corps is marching on the track of Crawford, and two 
 other brigades, forwarded by Sedgwick, will soon follow in the 
 same direction. Finally, Meade, seeing the danger increase, calls 
 upon Xewton to weaken Cemetery Hill as much as possible in 
 order to assist Humphreys. 
 
 All these troops, once assembled upon the field, will be greatly 
 superior in numbers to those of the assailants ; but will they< 
 arrive in time to check the progress of the enemy, or will they be 
 beaten in detail ? This is what Meade at half-past seven o'clock 
 is anxiously asking. In the mean time, it would be the very 
 moment for the Confederates to attack him simultaneously at all 
 points. If the discharges of the artillery posted on Seminary Hill 
 were not an obstacle to both sight and hearing, Hill and Lee 
 would perceive the smoke and hear the sound of the conflict that 
 Johnson is prosecuting upon Culp's Hill. Two brigades of 
 Anderson's and the whole of Pender's division are only waiting 
 an order to continue the attack which is progressing from the 
 right to the left, and make an attempt to carry Ziegler's Grove by 
 assault, the success of which would be decisive. This order is 
 not given, and the troops which might perhaps achieve a victory 
 remain motionless. Generals Posey and Mahone, who, being on 
 the left of Wright, ought to be the first to follow him, have, as 
 it appears, received instructions not to advance unless the success 
 of the attack seems to them certain : they wait in vain for an 
 order from Anderson, their immediate chief. Pender, being 
 posted more to the left, hastens to the right of his line for the 
 purpose undoubtedly of leading it against the enemy, but he is 
 mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and General Lane, 
 w^ho succeeds him, only takes command after the fight is over. 
 In the mean while, the three brigades led by Anderson, seeing 
 nothing but stragglers before them, and dead and wounded men 
 and spiked guns around them, believe that victory is sure, and 
 boldly advance to reap the fruits. In this rapid movement the 
 
GETTYSBURG. 181 
 
 lines are broken and all directions confused : they follow Hum- 
 phreys, and although, according to Hill's orders, they ought to 
 take the right as their guide, they soon find themselves separated 
 from Barksdale, whose objective point is the breach that Willard 
 is endeavoring to close. These three brigades no longer march at 
 the same pace. At the moment when they pass beyond the strip 
 of wooded land back of which Humphreys has taken position 
 their ardcu* is increased by the sight of the abandoned guns, which 
 the latter has not been able to drag after him ; but Perry's 
 Floridians come to a halt near these pieces, and cannot afterward 
 recover their dash. Anderson's front is therefore reduced to two 
 
 brigades ; he extends it for the purpose of forming a junction with 
 that of McLaws, thus weakening it at the very moment when he 
 has most need to be strengthened. The confusion over the battle- 
 field increases; the contending lines become mixed amid the smoke 
 which envelops them. One of Wilcox's regiments reaches Hum- 
 phreys' left uuperceived : Hancock encounters it, and hurls against 
 it the First Minnesota, which stops its progress, but at a great 
 sacrifice. Willard, whose two wings are equally deprived of all 
 support, sees his brigade decimated ; he soon falls dead among 
 the corpses that surround him. Hancock prodigiously exerts 
 himself in order to restore the line. More to the left, Meade 
 places himself at the head of Lockwood's soldiers. These t\vo 
 regiments penetrate into the wood situated north of the Millers- 
 town road, on the other side of Plum Run, and attack Ander- 
 son's brigade. McCandless supports them, so as to connect them 
 with the rest of Sykes' troops. Finally, Bartlett's, Nevin's, and 
 Eustis' brigades of the Sixth corps arrive in time to reinforce the 
 line formed by the Fifth from Little Round Top to INIcGilvery's 
 batteries : they take the place which Lockwood occupied on the 
 right near these guns, relieve the troops that have suffered most 
 on the left, assist them in repulsing the last attempts of Law, 
 and protect the whole of this wing from a new attack. 
 
 The day is waning. The sun darts its oblique rays across 
 Seminary Hill and over the smoke-wrapped slopes of Cemetery 
 Hill,and the Round Tops. Without feeling at all disconcerted, the 
 
 . brigades of McLaws and Anderson, which form the left of the 
 Confederate attack, make a last efibrt almost at the same moment. 
 
182 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Their leaders feel that it is necessary to break the new line of the 
 enemy before he lui.s had time to look around him, but they are 
 too much divided to strike a heavy blow. McLaws, with two 
 brigades, is separated on his right from Hood, mIio can no longer 
 advance, and on his left from Anderson, who is inclining north- 
 wai'd. 
 
 During this time their adversaries are rapidly re-forming and 
 fortifying themselves. Chamberlain has scaled the slopes of the 
 Great Hound Top with a few soldiers, and captured a squad of 
 the enemy which had come to reconnoitre. Fisher's brigade 
 joins him in occupying this commanding position, thus closing 
 all access to the Confederates at this point. At the extreme left 
 Sedgwick has placed himself behind this rocky eminence, ready to 
 support the three brigades he has sent toward Plum Run. On his 
 right, Williams at length strikes the Taneytown road and masses 
 his troops behind McGilvery's artillery. Finally, Newton, prompt- 
 ly responding to jMeade's call, has brought Doubleday's division, 
 with a portion of Robinson's, to the weak point at the depres- 
 sion in the ridge connecting the Round Tops with Cemetery Hill. 
 He covers the right of AVillard's brigade, and gathers around him 
 the batteries and scattered troops that cannot maintain themselves 
 M'ithout assistance, thus forming a line capable of frustrating Mc- 
 Laws' efforts. The fiery Barksdale, still young despite his long 
 white hair, seems to brave death on his horse, which is plunging 
 through the thickest of the fight, but he falls at last under the 
 fire of one of Burling's regiments. His soldiers, who, carried 
 aM^ay by his example, rush upon the Federals, are too few in 
 number, and, being repulsed, leave their dying chief in the hands 
 of the enemy. Wofford, who supports them on the right, cannot 
 go beyond the flats of Plum Run ; Anderson's brigade is not 
 within reach. Longstreet, who directs the combat in person, is 
 waiting in vain for the brigades of Kershaw and Semmes, that 
 have suffered too much to abandon the ground they have captured 
 from Caldwell, to renew the attack. At this juncture Anderson's 
 division scales at last the slopes along which Humphreys and 
 Gibbon are posted. Wilcox, on the right, followed at a consider- 
 able distance by Perry, is the first to make the attack. On the 
 left, Wright, i*eceiving the oblique fire of several guns posted on 
 
GETTYSBURG. 183 
 
 the edge of a small wood above Gibbon's front, rushes forward 
 and captures them ; but AVebb's brigade emerges from its position 
 to dispute their possession : a desperate struggle ensues at this 
 point. 
 
 A timely reinforcement would probably suffice to secure the 
 possession of Ziegler's Grove to Anderson's two brigades, and, 
 consequently, of the very centre of the Federal line. The 
 remainder of Hill's corps is watching all the incidents of the 
 conflict from the summit of Seminary Hill, and is anxious to 
 participate in it ; Lee, Hill, and Anderson are spectators of this 
 exciting scene ; and yet nobody stirs. Anderson does not summon 
 Posey and JNIahone to come to him ; Hill does not give the order 
 for the attack to Pender's division : he waits for the night, 
 and then only causes it to advance, as if he were yielding to a 
 kind of tardy and useless remorse. Finally, Lee, who for some 
 time had been in the vicinity of Posey's brigade, approves of this 
 inaction by his silence, and assumes all its responsibility before 
 history. Wright, encouraged by the sight of the crowds that are 
 encumbering the Baltimore road, and believing himself already 
 master of the northern ridge of Cemetery Hill, fights w^ith des- 
 perate energy ; but in the space of a quarter of an hour he loses 
 nearly two-thirds of his effective force, and falls back before 
 Gibbon's division, which is arrayed against him. Wilcox, taken 
 in flank by McGilvery's artillery, instead of the retreating soldiers 
 he was pursuing meets Humphreys in good order on one side 
 and Hancock's reserves on the other, thus finding himself with- 
 in a circle of fire where he leaves five hundred men out of the 
 sixteen hundred which composed his command. Rather forsaken 
 than vanquished, these two brigades strike once more the 
 Emmettsburg road. The last effort of the Confederates against 
 the Federal left wing has failed. Twilight has come ; the firing 
 of musketry ceases ; that of the artillery languishes ; the smoke 
 clears away. But in proportion as silence prevails there, the 
 sound of the battle which is progressing along the opposite wing 
 is more distinctly heard. 
 
 We left Johnson at six o'clock preparing to attack Gulp's 
 Hill throudi the fforg-es of Rock Creek. Neither of the con- 
 tending parties can bring artillery to this point, which is an 
 
 N 
 
184 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMKRICA. 
 
 advantage to their respective infantry. Early and Rodcs, posted 
 at the foot of the open slopes of Cemetery Hill, must wait until 
 the Federal left has been broken in order to attack in their turn. 
 If this movement is not effected at the same time as that of Long- 
 street's, it is not a preconcerted omission, as has been pretended, 
 for the purpose of making Meade strip his right, but because 
 Ewell, as we have stated, has not heard the booming of the guns 
 of the First corps. Perhaps- it may also be proper to attribute 
 his delay to the absence of Smith's and Gordon's two brigades of 
 Early's division, detached the previous evening along the York 
 road for the purpose of fighting an imaginary enemy : they have 
 remained during the night in their peculiar position. Ewell, hav- 
 ing committed the error of believing a rumor which no doubt orig- 
 inated with the movements of Kilpatrick's Federal cavalry, does 
 not decide to summon Smith's and Gordon's brigades until the very 
 moment he should have begun the attack, and is obliged to wait for 
 them before giving Johnson the order of attack. We must, before 
 all, describe in this place the ground the possession of which Ewell 
 is about to dispute with the Federals, and the manner in Avhich 
 it is occupied by the latter. Howard and a portion of Robinson's 
 division are posted on Cemetery Hill with a numerous artillery. 
 This height is connected by a continuous ridge with the rocky 
 and wooded summit of Gulp's Hill, of which AYadsworth holds 
 the north front : he has erected a little below the summit strong 
 breastworks, composed of trunks of trees, stones, and earth. 
 The culminating point of Gulp's Hill does not exceed in height 
 by more than two yards that of Cemetery Hill ; it commands by 
 thirteen yards the lowest point of the ridge, and by more than fifty 
 the waters of Rock Greek. At the foot of this hill this stream 
 winds eastwardly, then resumes its course southerly. The wooded 
 and rocky slopes are gentler toward the east than toAvard the north ; 
 they extend farther at the south, forming a small plateau, cleared at 
 the west, intersected by a ridge, and terminating at the south-east, 
 above the stream, in a steep hillock. Two small valleys descend from 
 the loAvest point of this ridge — one eastwardly, toward Rock Greek, 
 the other southerly. The last-mentioned crosses a field bounded 
 by a stone wall, then penetrates the flank of an acclivity covered 
 witli bushes, meeting with a marshy swale which descends in the 
 
GETTYSBURG. 185 
 
 direction of Rock Creek from the Spangler house by following 
 the base of Gulp's Hill. A fresh and shady spring, called 
 Spangler's Sj^ring, spouts out at the base of the hillock, presently 
 losing itself in this marsh. 
 
 Before Meade had stripped his right, Geary's division, and 
 more to the south that of INIcDougall* of tlie Twelfth corps, occu- 
 pied the east front of Gulp's Hill to the right of Wadsworth, as 
 far as Spangler's Spring. They have erected intrenchments 
 which follow this front as far as the edge of the valley, descend- 
 ing in the direction of Rock Greek, are continued on the other 
 side south-eastward by skirting, for a distance of about fifty yards, 
 the stone wall above mentioned, and terminate finally betM'een 
 Rock Greek and the spring. On the other side of the swamp, 
 which is almost impassable at this point, the Golgrove and Lock- 
 wood brigades had intrenched themselves along the stream, extend- 
 ing their right as far as the vicinity of the Baltimore turnpike. 
 This position is a strong one, but too much extended, and too 
 near "the turnpike, which it is important to defend at any cost, it be- 
 ing the line of retreat of the army. At the south it is covered by 
 Power's and McAllister's Hills, which are occupied by Slocum's 
 artillery ; but more to the north a triangular wood, intervening 
 between the marshy swale, the small valley which descends 
 at the south, and a cross-road, M'ould enable the enemy to reach 
 the Spangler house by surprise, and thence the road itself. At 
 this juncture Lockwood's and Williams' brigades are summoned to 
 the left. Two of Geary's brigades that have followed them do 
 not arrive in time to participate in the fight on this side, and their 
 absence is sensibly felt on tlie right, for the third, under Greene, be- 
 ing left alone, cannot furnish with troops the whole line of intrench- 
 ments, extending to a distance of nearly sixteen hundred yards. 
 
 It is at the moment when nearly the whole Twelfth corps is 
 abandoning this position that Johnson puts his columns in motion 
 to attack it. Leaving the open slopes Avhich he occupied, he 
 descends in the direction of Rock Greek, and soon finds himself 
 masked by the woods that are lining the right bank : his division, 
 drawn up in two lines, the left resting on the Taney house, crosses 
 without opposition the numerous fords of the stream. His artil- 
 * McDougall commanded iheFirfst brigade of Euger's division.— Ed. 
 
186 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 lery has been left ou Benuer's Hill ; the infantry penetrates the 
 wood and advances in the.dircction of the plateau, Jones' brigade 
 ou the riglit, followed by that of Nichols ; Steuart on the left, 
 followed by Walker. The intrenchineuts constructed by McDou- 
 gall from the ravine to Spangler's Spring are no longer defended 
 except by the small detachments of Greene's brigade. Steuart, 
 driving back the Federal skirmishers, carries all that part extend- 
 ing south of the ravine ; but he is taken obliquely by the Fede- 
 rals who have remained in the other portion of the works. 
 Greene, seeing the right wing thus turned, prolongs the line 
 which he still occupies toward the west, and posts his right on 
 the other side of the ravine, which descends at the south toward 
 the triangular wood. He thus affords it a point of support, cov- 
 ering on the most dangerous side the approaches to the turnpike. 
 He immediately asks the generals who occupy Cemetery Hill for 
 reinforcements ; but his dispositions are scarcely completed when 
 the Confederates advance against him on all sides at once. Steu- 
 art and Walker reach the stone wall, and take possession of the 
 entire southern portion of the plateau extending as far as the 
 front of the small wood on which Greene's right is resting. The 
 latter could not offer them any resistance ; but the approaching 
 nightfall having rendered them cautious, and being ignorant of 
 the proximity of the Baltimore turnpike, Steuart and Walker 
 remain in the works that have been captured, exchanging from 
 thence useless volleys of musketry with the enemy. Jones, sup- 
 ported by Nichols, precipitates himself upon Greene's left. The 
 Federals are greatly inferior to them in number, but the 
 intrenchments they occupy crown a real wall of rocks : lying in 
 ambush behind the highest blocks and the knotty trunks Avhose 
 roots are interwoven with the stone, they firmly wait for their 
 adversaries. The latter, being obliged to climb the slopes of 
 Gulp's Hill in line of battle, have been unable to keep within 
 their ranks among the rocks and gaping holes hidden by the 
 foliage. Their efforts break down before the obstacle, from the 
 summit of which their adversaries receive them with a well-sus- 
 tained fire. The Federals, being completely sheltered, lose but 
 few men ; the assailants, ou the contrary, make immense though 
 useless saciifices. Jones is wounded ; Nichols comes to relieve 
 
GETTYSBURG. 187 
 
 lus troops, despite the darkness. But Greene has been reinforced 
 by one brigade from Schurz's division ; Wadsworth has extended 
 his right to sustain him; finally, Kane returns in time from his 
 unfortunate march over the Baltimore turnpike to check Steuart's 
 skirmishers on the other side. Nichols' assault is repulsed ; all 
 the efforts of the Confederates are frustrated ; and, although a fev/ 
 musket-shots are still exchanged, the conflict is ended about ten 
 o'clock in the evening. 
 
 Swell's attack has not been confined to this part of the Fed- 
 eral line, and if the order of the narrative obliges us to give suc- 
 cessive descriptions, the reader will not forget tiiat these separate 
 combats take place at the same time on the left, on the right, and 
 in the centre. In fict, the commander of the Second Con- 
 federate corps has scarcely seen Johnson plunge into the thick 
 copse wood with which Culp's Hill is covered than he gives the 
 order of attack to Early and Rodes. But again the Southern 
 generals cannot execute their movements with that collective 
 energy indispensable to success. Nothing is easier, apparently, 
 .than to combine Early's movements with those of Rodes : the 
 former has deployed his troops to the left of Gettysburg, in the 
 direction of Rock Creek ; the latter is posted in the town itself; 
 no obstacle intervenes either between themselves or alono; their 
 front. Yet while the two brigades of Hoke and Hays are 
 advancing in magnificent order on the left of the city, Rodes 
 has not yet deployed his division on the other side. The lat- 
 ter general has either been too slow or Early too quick, and 
 the orders transmitted by Ewell to these two generals have not 
 been issued or construed in the same manner. Rodes was under 
 the impression that he was to use his own judgment concerning 
 the opportunity for making the attack, while Early, going fully 
 into a(;tion, relies upon his immediate co-operation. The result 
 is that Cemetery Hill is only attacked by two brigades. Smith 
 having remained on the Hanover road for the purpose of assisting 
 Stuart, who has at last made his appearance : Gordon alone has 
 responded to Early's summons, who keeps him in reserve. 
 
 At seven o'clock in the evening Hoke and Avery (who is in 
 command of Hays' troops) scale the eastern front of Cemetery 
 Hill under a terrific fire of artillery. They are soon received by 
 
188 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 a brisk discharge of musketry, but uotliiiig stops their progress; 
 they pierce the liues of Barlow's two small brigades. These, 
 commanded by General Ames, have not yet fully recovered 
 from their check of the previous day ; the assailants drive them 
 back in disorder upon the iutrenchments mounted Avith cannon 
 which form the second line along the ridge of the hill, and, pass- 
 in": almost without anv effort in the midst of the disordered Fed- 
 erals, they penetrate the works. The remainder of the Elev- 
 enth cor])s, reduced to three brigades, is posted along the west 
 front of Cemetery Hill, back to back with Barlow's division. 
 Finding themselves thus menaced in the rear, Steinwehr 
 and Sclmrz cause a portion of their troops to about-face and 
 come to the assistance of this division. They find the enemy in 
 possession of the northern extremity of the hill, which stretches 
 toward Gettysburg, and disputing to the Union artillerists the 
 works which constitute the key to the whole position. For the 
 space of one hour the two Confederate brigades are stubbornly 
 struggling against the Federals, who, being superior in num- 
 ber, are endeavorinoc to drive them back to the foot of the hill. 
 But no one comes to their assistance, while their adversaries 
 receive new reinforcements. It is near nine o'clock in the even- 
 ing. A short time before, Hancock, hearing the sound of Early's 
 attack, has spontaneously sent two regiments of the Second corps 
 to Wadsworth, with Carroll's brigade to Howard's assistance. 
 The latter brigade arrives just at the moment when the issue of 
 the desperate struggle that is going on around the guns seems 
 exceedingly doubtful. After vainly soliciting Lane's co-opera- 
 tion, Rodes has at last deployed his division ; his skirmishers 
 scale the west flank of Cemetery Hill, which Steinwehr and 
 Schurz have just stripped, and are already opening fire, when 
 Raraseur, who commands the brigade on the right, comes sud- 
 denly to a halt, thus interrupting the whole movement. 
 
 It appears that, seeing Lane's troops, which have also got near 
 the enemy, remain motionless, Ramseur has been unwilling to push 
 beyond their lines without fresh instructions. During the time 
 thus wasted Carroll captures the position conquered by Hoke and 
 Avery; the latter is killed. Early, not finding himself supported 
 by Rodes, dares not put his last brigade in jeopardy, and the 
 
GETTYSBURG. 189 
 
 assailants are finally obliged to fall back. It is only then that 
 Rodes is ready to take part in the combat ; but finding, in his 
 turn, no one to support him, he allows himself to be overtaken 
 by the night without leaving his deployed position east of Gettys- 
 burg. The attack directed against the Federal centre has com- 
 pletely failed, because out of seven brigades that were present on 
 the field of battle two only have been engaged. 
 
 While the two armies were thus contending, Stuart's and Kil- 
 patrick's cavalry, which had been pressing close upon each other 
 for some days, were getting near the field of battle. On the 
 evening of the 1st, Stuart, as we are aware, has finally received 
 Lee's orders in the neighborhood of Carlisle. His several detach- 
 ments are at once directed upon Gettysburg from all the points 
 they occupy. Kilpatrick, who has been unable to go beyond 
 Berlin, guessing Stuart's intentions, hastens to Heidlersburg for 
 the purpose of getting in advance of him ; but he arrives too 
 late, and night overtakes him in the vicinity of this village. 
 Horses and men are both in want of rest, and only start south- 
 ward at a late hour the following day for the purpose of covering 
 the right of the Union army, in conformity with Pleasonton's 
 orders. Their route leads them in the track of Stuart, who, 
 knowing himself to be pursued, has left Hampton's brigade in 
 the suburb of Hunterstown in order to prevent them from falling 
 upon E well's rear. About four o'clock in the afternoon Kil- 
 patrick finds Hampton drawn up in line of battle back of this 
 village, across the Gettysburg road : he immediately deploys his 
 two brigades. Farnsworth is on the right ; Custer is forming in 
 front of the enemy, and soon assumes the offensive. He is 
 promptly driven back by Hampton, who, charging in his turn, 
 is likewise repulsed. The Confederates, satisfied with having 
 blocked the way to the Federals, do not renew the struggle, and 
 the latter, having received new instructions, resume the march 
 after losing about thirty men. They will arrive toward three 
 o'clock in the morning at Two Taverns, whence they will go and 
 take the position on the extreme left which Buford has prema- 
 turely abandoned, by making the tour of the array. The last- 
 mentioned general encamps on the evening of the 2d at Taney- 
 town, whence he will start on the following day for Westminster. 
 
190 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Gregg, who commands the second division of cavalry, has left 
 Huey's brigade in this village to guard the supply-trains. He 
 had left Hanover, -with the other two brigades, at daybreak, and 
 has already taken up the position on the right of the army Avliich 
 Pleasontou had assigned to Kilpatrick. 
 
 This position will be the scene of an important battle the 
 next day; it is proper therefore to describe it in a few words. 
 The space comprised between the York and Baltimore turnpikes 
 forms a triangle, having Gettysburg for its apex, and for its base 
 a road called the Dutch road,* which connects these t\\'0 high- 
 ways at distances respectively of six and four miles from the city. 
 The Hanover road divides the apex of the triangle, and crosses 
 the base about three miles east of Gettysburg, near the Reever 
 house. In this triangle the ridge of Benner's Hill prolongs that 
 of Gulp's Hill, while the defile of E,ock Creek alone separates 
 McAllister's Hill from Wolf's Hill. This eminence becomes 
 more extended toward the north, forming terraces from west to 
 east, of which the highest, called BrinkerhofP's Ridge, commands 
 a view of Gettysburg, and even Cemetery Hill, and terminates in 
 an abrupt incline studded with woods and rocks. The traveller 
 who, following the Hanover road, reaches this summit, sees 
 before him an undulating and cultivated plain wdiich extends 
 eastward as far as the eye can reach. At his feet a narrow and 
 deep valley is separated from this plain by a smaller range which 
 does not intercept his view. This range and the creek which 
 waters the valley bear the same name : one is called Cress' Ridge, 
 the other Cress' Run. The open country situated west of these 
 elevations offers an easy passage to the cavalry, and allows Stuart 
 to gain the Baltimore road by concealing himself behind Brin- 
 kerhoiT's Ridge. A cross-road branching off from the York 
 road at about two miles and a half from Gettysburg envelops 
 the extremity of this ridge, crosses Cress' Run, passes over Cross' 
 Ridge, and, striking the Dutch road a little to the north of 
 the Reever house, seems to be expressly built for the purpose 
 of facilitating the march of his squadrons and artillery. The 
 Federals understand this perfectly. • Gregg, therefore, on arriv- 
 ing from Hanover, has not halted at the village of Bonaugh- 
 * Its '.Dcal designation is the Low Dutch (or Salem Church) road. — Ed. 
 
GETTYSBURG. 191 
 
 to^vn. He has pursued his way as far as the viciuity of the 
 Reever house, situated on a hill whence a very extended view 
 can be obtained : his pickets are posted on Cress' Ridge, while 
 he extends his line south-west, in order to join Slocum's right 
 near Rock Creek. Stuart is yet some distance ofP, but Lee, 
 justly fearing that the Union cavalry, whose presence has been 
 revealed at Hanover, may harass his left, has ordered Jenkins 
 to cover this wing. When Johnson advances in the afternoon 
 for the purpose of attacking Gulp's Hill, he is instructed to 
 make a reconuoissance with his brigade as far as the summit 
 of Brinkerhoif's Ridge. But Gregg, apprised of his approach 
 in time, sends some of Mcintosh's cavalry to oppose him. 
 The latter reach the ridge at the same time as their adver- 
 saries, and after a short fight, in which Jenkins is seriously 
 w^ounded, they remain masters of the position. In the mean 
 time, the Confederate cavalry, so imprudently scattered by I^ee, 
 are hastening from every direction — to precede him if he should 
 push forward, or to cover his retreat if he should be vanquished. 
 Imboden has left McConnellsburg, after destroying the bridges 
 of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad ; Jones and Robertson, left 
 by Lee among the defiles of the Blue Ridge, have at last been 
 summoned by him, and cross the Potomac at Williamsport. They 
 are all to join him in the course of the following day. 
 
 As two electric clouds, driven by contrary winds, are attracted 
 toward each other by an irresistible force until the lightning, 
 flashing at the point of their contact, gives the signal of the 
 approaching storm, so in the same way the two hostile armies, 
 both marching somewhat at random, find themselves forcibly 
 drawn toward the spot which a fortuitous encounter had desig- 
 nated, and the spark ignited on the morning of the 1st of July 
 near Gettysburg has speedily brought about the terrible storm of 
 the 2d. We have stated the reason why the Confederates have 
 not given up the aggressive role. They have acquitted them- 
 selves during its performance with the courage and ardor that 
 have so frequently secured victory to them. Nevertheless, they 
 have not achieved the results which they thought themselves 
 entitled to expect from their enormous sacrifices. The condition 
 of the battlefield has been against them, and in favor of the Fed- 
 VoL. III.— 41 
 
192 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 eruls, whose artillery and infantry, being placed on the defensive, 
 have had the advantage of firing steadily, frustrating the attacks 
 of the Confederates, which were frequently disconnected when 
 not directed by the great Jackson, their principal element of suc- 
 cess ; but it must also be acknowledged that serious faults have 
 been committed — faults calculated to astonish any one who, after 
 having followed the Army of Northern Virginia through all its 
 great struggles, is studying the manner in which it has been 
 handled at Gettysburg during the 2d of July. 
 
 Lee's first error was in giving too excessive a development to his 
 line. He justly abandons the idea of making his princijxd attack 
 on the left, because Cemetery Hill is too much exposed and too 
 well fortified, while Culp's Hill, too rocky, is inaccessible to 
 artillery ; but he should from that moment have confined his 
 efforts on that side to a simple feint, and, instead of extending 
 that wing to the valley of Rock Creek, have rested it on Gettys- 
 burg, in order to be able to place the most potent means of action 
 in the hands of Lono;street. 
 
 The attack made by the latter was too long delayed. If he 
 had commenced sooner, he would have found the Federals not 
 so well posted on the ground, not having yet located all their 
 artillery nor received the reinforcements of the Sixth corps. 
 After Hood's delay comes that of a portion of jNIcLaws' division : 
 the position of the orchard, which the latter is to carry, is at once 
 the most accessible and the most important. If he had pushed 
 all his troops forward at the moment when Kershaw, single- 
 handed, brought on the conflict on his right, the success achieved 
 on that side would have been less, dearly bought and more 
 decisive for the assailants. 
 
 The inaction of Anderson's two brigades and of Pender's 
 division has been productive of still more serious consequences 
 General Hill has testified to the fact in his report, without giving 
 any explanation. INIust we conclude from his silence that at the 
 time of giving the order of attack to this division he finds it yet 
 too much disordered from the losses of the previous day to be 
 engaged in such an assault? Lane having been relieved of his 
 temporary command by General Trimble on the following day, it 
 may be supposed that his discontented chieftains held him respou- 
 
GETTYSBURG. 193 
 
 sible for the inaction of his troops. Anderson and his two lieu- 
 tenants, Posey and Mahone, have declared that their instructions 
 left them full latitude to judge of the chances of an attack, and 
 that they had not deemed them sufficiently favorable to justify 
 them in giving the order for making it. Whoever takes into 
 consideration the efforts made by their neighbors at the same time 
 will no doubt look upon this excuse as insufficient, revealing, on 
 the other hand, a want of harmony in the orders issued by the 
 i^Lueral-in-chief. Whoever may be blamable, the error cannot 
 be repaired. At last, Ewell has been enabled to secure better 
 harmony in the movements of Early and Rodes ; the latter, hoAV- 
 ever, has not been better able to sustain the troops fighting by his 
 side til an Lane. 
 
 In the course of this day, which should have been a decisive 
 one, Lee has only brought into action seventeen brigades out of 
 the thirty-seven composing his infantry. It is true that among 
 the other twenty there are three of them yet absent, and fourteen 
 that have been in action the day before ; but the Confederate vet- 
 erans would have considered themselves insulted if they had been 
 told that they could not fight two days in succession. Hood has 
 scaled the slopes of Little Hound Top ; McLaws has struck the 
 weakest point of the enemy's line ; Anderson has scaled Ziegler's 
 Grove ; Early has disputed the possession of the intrenchments 
 of Cemetery Hill to the Federal artillerists ; Johnson occupies a 
 portion of Culp's Hill ; and, to use Lee's own language, the advan- 
 tages gained are of sufficient magnitude to induce him to renew 
 the struggle on the following day. In short, if the Confederates 
 have not penetrated into the really defensive positions of the 
 enemy, they have been so near proving successful that Lee can- 
 not be blamed for having assumed the offensive on that day. 
 
 In fact, the situation of IMeade at the close of the battle is 
 alarming, in spite of the advantages he has obtained. Sickles' 
 movement has brought on a conflict outside of the line he had 
 chosen in the morning. The occupation of Devil's Den has 
 undoubtedly postponed the hour when the Confederates might 
 be able to strike this line, but the reinforcements that are con- 
 stantly arriving in these eccentric positions have been exhausted 
 without succeeding in their effiarts to preserve the orchard from 
 
194 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 the mniiKMit tliat Lee made a resolute attack upon it. If the 
 Federals had waited for him, massed between the Round Toi)S 
 and Cemetery Hill, supported by two powerful batteries of artil- 
 lery, they would have inflicted upon him, on the 2d of July, the 
 the check Avhich he experienced the next day. ISIeade, however, 
 has taken full advantage of the condition of the ground to con- 
 centrate his forces u))on the point menaced. Out of ilfty-two 
 brigades, forty-two of whicli have been engaged, thirty-six of 
 them seriously, the general-in-cliief cannot be blamed for having 
 stripped his right so much in his anxiety to reinforce the left. 
 The losses of the army are, unfortunately, very great. They 
 amount to more than twenty thousand for the two days' fighting, 
 witliout counting the stragglers that are crowding the Baltimore 
 road and the men dispersed by the combat who have not been 
 able to rejoin their commands. The enemy has not spoken his 
 last word, and Meade has cause to fear that another day's fighting, 
 equally as murderous, may cause his whole army literally io melt 
 away. Without ordering a retreat, his duty is therefore to autici- ^ 
 pate and to prepare for it. In the evening, before the combat has j 
 ended on the right, he summons a council of war at his head- | 
 quarters for the purpose of ascertaining the opinions of the corps | 
 commanders, the condition of their troops, and taking measures \ 
 for the morrow. He asks them, "1. Under existing circura- ^ 
 stances is it advisable for this army to remain in its present posi- 
 tion, or to retire to another nearer its base of supplies? 2. It be- 
 ing determined to remain in present position, shall the army attack 
 or wait the attack of the enemy ?" While maintaining certain 
 mental reservations, they declare against any aggressive movement, 
 impossible at this hour, and against retreat, which was alone in 
 question. INIeade, while adding, it is said, that the actual position 
 of the army seemed bad to him, coincides with this opinion. If 
 he had found that his lieutenants inclined to the opinion that 
 their troops had suffered too much to continue the struggle, he 
 would undoubtedly have given the order of retreat. But it is 
 of no consequence, for, whatever may be the opinion of a council 
 of war, the general-in-chief, being alone responsible, should, if 
 the decision is a good one, receive all the credit of it. 
 
 Every one, therefore, is preparing for the battle that is to be 
 
GETTYSBURG. 195 
 
 fought on the following day. The moon seems lo be shining 
 with the same splendor as on the previous night, for the purpose 
 of favoring those soldiers who are overrunning the field of car- 
 nage to cany oif the wounded. The Federals are re-forming 
 their ranks among the dead, too numerous to occupy their atten- 
 tion at this moment. Each man takes his position in silence, for 
 the exaltation of victory is not felt to cause men to forget their 
 fatigue, the suffering of their comrades, and their own chances of 
 being killed the next day. " I wish I were already dead," said 
 the gallant Biruey, whispering to one of his lieutenants, at the 
 sight of the small number of determined soldiers who surrounded 
 him. In the mean while, Meade's orders are being promptly 
 executed. The four brigades of the Twelfth corps, marched from 
 the left to the right, reach the Baltimore turnpike about eleven 
 o'clock at night, but they find the enemy in the woods they occu- 
 pied before their departure. Kane's brigade, making a detour, 
 goes to join Geary in the positions defended by Greene. Wil- 
 liams' division, increased to three brigades by the arrival of 
 Lockwood, is waiting for daylight in order to dispute to John- 
 son the intrenchments in which he had planted himself, without 
 striking a blow, on the previous evening. The Sixth corps sup- 
 plies reserves to portions of the line that are most seriously men- 
 aced, and sends Shaler's and Neill's brigades to the extreme right, 
 along the east side of Rock Creek. On the left, the Fifth corps, 
 which happens to be alone in the first line, extends itself so as to 
 occupy the steep acclivities of the Great Round Top and to antici- 
 pate any flank movement on the part of the enemy. The Third, 
 which is the most disabled corps, is kept in reserve : its officers 
 stop the progress of the stragglers, bringing together all isolated 
 commands and picking up those that have strayed from the ranks. 
 Caldwell's division has resumed its position on the left of the 
 Second corps, but it is greatly weakened ; and Hancock, deprived 
 of Carroll's brigade, which has remained on Cemetery Hill 
 between Ames and Wadsworth, can scarcely arm the front, which 
 was easily occupied in the morning with strong reserves, by deploy- 
 ing all his men. The three divisions of the First corps are sepa- 
 rated : Wadsworth is on the right, upon Gulp's Hill ; Robinson, 
 with all his force, on Cemetery Hill, between the Eleventh and 
 
19G THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Second corps. Doubleday, who was posted between Gibbon and 
 the Fifth corps, having been relieved during the evening by Cald- 
 well, is bearing to the right, and places Stannard, who has just 
 joined him Avitli a strong brigade from Vermont, between Cald- 
 well and Gibbon, a little in advance of the line of the Second 
 corps. He occupies the small wood in which Webb and Perry 
 have been contending over a few pieces of artillery. Pleasonton's 
 orders are to wait for Kilpatrick at Two Taverns. He will send 
 back Custer to the right in order to form a junction with Gregg's 
 division, and will go with Farnsworth's brigade to take position 
 on the left, where INIerritt will join him with his regular troopers : 
 once united, they wall cause much trouble by watching the right 
 of the enemy. Buford remains at Westminster. 
 
 The Confederates, on their side, are preparing to renew the 
 battle. They can neither retreat — for that would be to, acknow- 
 ledge themselves beaten — nor wait for the attack of the Federals 
 along Seminary Ridge, as it would be necessary to abandon all 
 the positions they have just secured. The flank movement is as 
 impracticable on the 3d as on the 2d, but without making a flank 
 march tlie Federal left wing might be outflanked. It would 
 require, it is true, to contract the line of battle, to reinforce it on 
 the right, which would involve the evacuation of Gulp's Hill : 
 it is a sacrifice the more necessary because the army Avould thus 
 abandon the concave line which has paralyzed its operations ; 
 besides, any other attack would be attended by great difficulties. 
 The advantages obtained on the left are more apparent than real, 
 for Johnson cannot take his artillery on the plateau he is about 
 to reach, and which is swept by the Federal guns. At the centre, 
 from Cemetery Hill to the vicinity of Little Round Top, the 
 ground is open and swept by the cross-fire of the Union artillery. 
 On the right the rocks of the Round Tops are imj^regnable 
 citadels M'hieh could not have been carried except by a surprise ; 
 a little moi'e to the south, on the contrary, the ground, rough yet 
 passable, would perfectly suit the tactics of the Confederates : 
 Longstreet, master of the banks of Plum Run, could easily cross 
 it below the Round Tops for the purpose of surrounding them, 
 as Hood had proposed to do before the battle of the 2d. 
 Although this manoeuvre would be somewhat lengtliy, all the 
 
GETTYSBURG. 197 
 
 necessary forces could be brought together in order to execute it 
 during the afternoon. It appears that Lee had at first adopted 
 this plan, but, influenced by the advantages obtained over the 
 Third Federal corps, he decided simply to resume on the 3d the 
 movement he had performed the day before. A fatal and inex- 
 plicable resolution ! He thus persisted in adhering to the tactics 
 of a double attack by way of the two wings, without thinking 
 that the more ground they gained the easier it would be for 
 Meade to lead his forces from one wing to the other in order to 
 repulse them successively. The instructions he gave to his lieu- 
 tenants were, moreover, so vague that he seemed to leave to each 
 commander the task of fighting a separate battle according to his 
 own fancy. In fact, he apprised Ewell that the battle would 
 commence on the right at davbreak, directing him to take the 
 oifensive at the same hour, and yet it was only on the morning 
 of the 3d, long after the hour specified, that Longstreet received 
 the necessary orders to put his troops in motion. 
 
 Ewell, in the mean while, is concentrating all his efforts upon 
 his left. Johnson is reinforced by Smith's brigade, which has 
 been detached from Early's division since the 1st ; Rodes sends 
 his old brigade and Daniel's to support him on the extreme left, 
 thus enabling Johnson to resume the offensive with seven bri- 
 gades ; the remainder of the Second corps, thus reduced to five 
 brigades, will only support him in case of his succeeding in dis- 
 lodging the Federal right and turning Cemetery Hill. These 
 movements have been promptly executed ; but at the other 
 extremity of the line there is nothing ready for an early 
 morning attack. Pickett, coming from Chambers burg by a 
 forced , march, has halted at a distance from the field of battle 
 on the evening of the 2d ; Longstreet, informed of his arrival, 
 has given him no information regarding the operations of the 
 next day ; consequently, he only comes at seven o'clock in the 
 morning to announce in person the approach of his head of col- 
 umn, wdiich he has forestalled. It is only at this juncture that 
 Ivce issues positive orders for the attack which Longstreet is to 
 dirc^,t. In or<ler that this attack might be executed by the 
 extreme right, it would be necessary to reinforce the two divis- 
 ions that have been so much under fire on this side the day 
 
198 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 before. If the gencral-iu-clncf lias thouo;ht of doing so, he 
 gives up tlic idea, and designates the heights which Anderson 
 has attacked on the evening of the 2d as the most favorable point 
 for breaking the Federal line. Several hours of the morning 
 thus pass before any measure has been adopted on the right for 
 reuewiuo; i\\Q struo-^le. 
 
 Ewell was not apprised of this delay : he has urged Johnson 
 to attack as soon as he has received the three brigades that have 
 been assigned to him. But even if Lee had ordered him to wait 
 he could not have postponed the battle, for the darkness of the 
 night alone prevents the Federals assuming the offensive on that 
 side : they cannot allow the enemy to remain in the works he has 
 just taken ; he must be dislodged before he discovers how near 
 he is to the Baltimore turnpike. Williams, with w^hom Slocum, 
 commanding the entire right wing, has left the Twelfth corps, 
 plants his artillery on the Power and McAllister Hills, whence it 
 sweeps the distant front of the wooded plateau occupied by John- 
 son, liuger's division menaces the Confederate left by way of 
 the south along the banks of Spangler's streamlet. During this 
 time, Geary, resting his right on the triangular wood, strikes in 
 the rear with his left that portion of the intrenchments occupied 
 by the enemy. At early dawn the fire of the Union artillery demol- 
 ishes these weak intrenchments, stopping at the end of a quarter 
 of an hour to allow the infantry to advance. But Johnson fore- 
 stalls the Federals, hurling his battalions against them. The 
 Confederates come up in three lines, scarcely separated from each 
 other, and attack their adversaries with vigor. They have at 
 last obtained a view of the Baltimore road covered with wagons, 
 troopers, and straggling infantry, who are pushing toward the 
 south in crowds, seized with a foolish terror in spite of the efforts 
 of several squadrons of Union cavalry to preserve order along 
 this important highway. This sight stimulates their ardor. The 
 shock is terrific, and a desperate struggle takes place among the 
 rocks with which the ground is thickly covered. All the batteries 
 of Meade's reserve that have not been summoned to the left con- 
 centrate their fire upon the slopes occupied by the assailants. 
 Sedgwick, south of the road, is preparing to co-operate in case 
 the enemy should succeed in obtaining a foothold upon the open 
 
GETTYSBURG. 199 
 
 ground wliicli extends to the right of Geary. The marshy 
 stream ^vhieh runs down from the Spangler house stops Ruger's 
 progress, but Lockwood, who has just been joined by the rest 
 of his brigade, proceeds to assist Geary. The conflict is pro- 
 longed without losing any portion of its desperate character. 
 Cannon-balls and shells pour upon the Confederates, who have 
 not a single gun with which to reply. The Unionists, being 
 reinforced, present to them an impenetrable front on all sides. 
 The hours are slipping away ; the sun, which is rising higher and 
 higher, is absolutely scorching. At times the combat languishes, 
 then is renewed again with fresh violence. During the intervals 
 of silence Johnson tries in vain to catch the sound of Longstreet's 
 attack, which would relieve him by distracting the attention of 
 the enemy. He alone sustains all the brunt of the struggle — a 
 terrible struggle, hand to hand, man to man, impossible to 
 describe, for it is made up of incidents as numerous as the com- 
 batants themselves. But Jackson's soldiers, accustomed never to 
 back out, are still unwilling to give up the hope of victory. On 
 the right, Jones and Nichols maintain their position Avithout gain- 
 ing or losing ground. Walker has been detached at the extreme 
 left on the banks of Rock Creek to watch Ruger's movements. 
 Steuart and the largest part of the reinforcements sent to John- 
 son occupy the position which is at once the most menacing and 
 the most exposed at the entrance of the wood, for if Ruger 
 becomes entirely separated from Geary they receive the cross-fire 
 of artillery and musketry without shelter. Finally, after seven 
 hours' fighting, the Confederates, feeling that they are wasting 
 their resources in vain, make one last effort to break the right of 
 Geary so as to reach the Baltimore pike. But Kane, having been 
 reinforced by Shaler's brigade, is ready to receive them. Steu- 
 art, wishing to outflank his right, extends his line as far as the 
 stream, and after having re-formed it leads his men to the charge. 
 The bravest among them would perhaps have hesitated if he had 
 not set them an example, for they know that they are called to 
 perform a desperate act ; but they all follow him with a rush 
 into the circle of fire Avhere the enemy is awaiting them. Useless 
 heroism, for the skirmishers that Ruger has thrown across the 
 stream open a murderous fire of musketry against their left flank 
 
 
 
200 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 wliile they are fighting Geary's troops in fro)it, and after a stub- 
 born resistance they are finally repulsed. linger immediately 
 crosses the stream, Geary penetrating the wood with him. The 
 Southerners, exhausted, cannot withstand this combined move- 
 ment of the Twelfth corps; they are driven out of the in- 
 trenchments thrown up on the slopes of Gulp's Hill, and pushed 
 back on the left bank of Rock Creek, leaving three stand of 
 colors and about five hundred prisoners in the hands of the 
 enemy : the success of the Federals on the right wing is complete. 
 It is eleven o'clock, and the combat is over on that side ; it has 
 not yet commenced along the rest of the line. 
 
 It is now the hottest time of day ; a strange silence reigns over 
 the battlefield, causing the Federal soldiers, worn out by fatigue, 
 to look upon the impending general attack, which they have 
 anticipated since early dawn, as extremely long in coming. Gen- 
 eral Lee says in his report that by harmonizing the action of his 
 several corps he had reason to rely upon success ; but it is pre- 
 cisely this concert of action that he was not able to establish. In 
 fact, between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, when the 
 conflict had been progressing along the left for at least four hours, 
 he is still occupied in assigning places to the troops that are to 
 make an attack upon Ziegler's Grove. Moreover, he does not 
 even appear to have come to any positive decision regarding this 
 attack ; Longstreet is endeavoring to make him resort to a flank 
 movement against the extreme left of the enemy. Duri,ng the 
 long examination which absorbs the attention of the two generals 
 Pickett's fresh troops, which have long since reached Seminary 
 Hill, and are destined to play the first rdle in the combat at 
 whichever point it may be delivered, remain with their arms at 
 rest, vainly waiting for their orders. It is only at ten o'clock 
 that they take position in the vicinity of the orchard, a little in 
 the rear of the Emmettsburg road. 
 
 The troops engaged the day before have abandoned a large 
 portion of the open space extending in front of the new position 
 of the enemy. Their pickets are on the left, along the Emmetts- 
 burg road ; they stretch bevond it on the right for a distance of 
 a few hundred yards. Anderson occupies the South and Rogers 
 houses with the commanding ground on this side of the Codori 
 
GETTYSBURG. 201 
 
 house ; but, leaving only some detatcliments on the ridge, he has 
 brought back the bulk of his forces to the western slope and to 
 the woods, which aiford them some shelter. Longstreet's left holds 
 the orchard ; Wofford, at the centre, has re-entered the wood sit- 
 uated west of the wheat-field which he had abandoned the even- 
 ing of the previous day ; the right joins the Millerstown road, 
 resting on the Emmettsburg road, and extending along the east l)ank 
 of Plum Run in front of the Round Tops, at the foot of which 
 Robertson and Law have passed the night. The Confederates 
 thus occupy the line along which the Third Federal corps had 
 formed the day before. At daybreak Colonel Alexander places 
 the six reserve batteries of the First corps along the Emmetts- 
 burg road ; the rest of the artillery of this corps is presently 
 posted in their vicinity by Colonel Walton, forming a slight con- 
 cave line of seventy-five pieces of artillery from the orchard to 
 the point which commands the road east of the Codori house, 
 arming all the ridge from which Humphreys was dislodged the 
 day before, at a distance of from nine hundred to thirteen hundred 
 yards from the enemy's line. The batteries of Major Henry to 
 the right of the orchard cross their fire with that of the rest of 
 the line ; those of Alexander are ranged above this position, at 
 the summit of the slope running down to the Trostle house ; on 
 his left, and somewhat in the rear, is located the Washington 
 Artillery, with Dearing's and Cabell's battalions. This artillery, 
 thus placed ahead of the infantry, is, according to Lee's instruc- 
 tion, to batter the enemy's position which he proposes to attack. 
 In the mean while, all the troops that are to participate in the 
 attack take position back of the ridge, so that the Federals cannot 
 see them distinctly. Wilcox has been drawn up in line of battle 
 since daybreak, about one hundred and fifty yards west of the 
 road, above the house of H. Spangler. Pickett plants himself 
 behind Wilcox in the strip of ground which separates Warfield 
 Ridge from that of Seminary Hill. Kemper's and Garnett's 
 brigades are deployed, the former immediately behind the ridge, 
 which is crowned by artillery ; the latter on its left. Armistead 
 posts himself at first still more to the left, but he is soon obliged 
 to abandon this position, which is too much exposed to the fire of 
 the Federal artillerv, and to take shelter behind the other two 
 
202 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 brigiulcs, ready to move iuto liue at the first signal. A liglit bat- 
 tery of Hill's corps accoinpauies these brigades. All the artillery 
 of this corps, crowning the ridges of Seminary Hill, is preparing 
 to sii2>port the assault ; finally, a portion of Ewell's artillery will 
 also open fire against Cemetery Hill. 
 
 About eleven o'clock, Pickett having caused the Codori house 
 and some stacks of straw which might embarrass his march to 
 be set on fire,* brisk volleys of musketry are exchanged between 
 the skirmishers of both sides : the artillery participates, but after 
 three-quarters of an hour this useless cannonade is gradually 
 brought to an end. The two armies remain immovable ; it seems 
 as though both dreaded the solemn moment when victory would 
 be declared in favor of one of them. 
 
 During this time the Federal cavaliy makes its appearance 
 in the rear of Hood's division. Kilpatrick, having reunited 
 ]Merritt's and Farusworth's brigades, has crossed Plum Run 
 below the Round Tops at about eleven o'clock, has turned the 
 hill situated south-west of this rocky eminence, and is emerging 
 iuto^h^^^n fields extending for a long distance on this side. 
 Ac^^mg^ju a contrary sense, the plan which Hood had formed 
 in order to reach the Federal supply-trains, he endeavors to strike 
 the Emmettsburg road, along which those of the enemy are to be 
 found. At the first news of this movement. Law, who takes 
 Hood's place, has detached Robertson's brigade to stop him. 
 Farnsworth, stimulated by the hope of capturing from the en- 
 emy a portion of the reserve ammunition and supplies that are 
 so precious to him, charges the Southern infantry with three regi- 
 ments, but, after crossing two stone fences in pursuit of the enemy's 
 skirmishers, his bold attack breaks down before the well-sustained 
 fire of their line of battle. His troopers, whom he is trying to 
 retire by the right toward the Slyder house, are driven back into 
 a rough piece of ground, wandering about in a state of confusion 
 across the roads, barriers, and thickets, and falling at last one after 
 the other under the enemy's fire. The last to arrive with their 
 chief in the vicinity of Plum Run find themselves shut up within 
 a network of fences, where they are either captured or killed. 
 Farnsworth is among the latter. His death was a great loss to 
 the Federal army. Distinguished for dashing bravery, full of 
 
 * The 14tli Connecticut infantry claims to have set fire to the property. — Ed. 
 
GETTYSBURG. 203 
 
 forethought and vigilance, he possessed all the qualities essential 
 ibr a cavalry officer. 
 
 Merritt was not more successful on the Emmettsburg road, 
 "which he is following on leaving the last-mentioned village : on 
 this side the supply-trains and the parks of artillery of the 
 Confederates are protected by Anderson's brigade. The Federal 
 regulars, having vainly attempted to turn his position, dismount 
 for the purjiose of attacking it in front, but they are repulsed 
 after a brisk volley of musketry. Early in the afternoon Kil- 
 patrick orders Merritt back, and leads him to the left of the army 
 with the remnants of Farnsworth's brigade. The losses of the 
 Federals are heavy, but they have obtained an important result : 
 by drawing toward them two of the enemy's brigades they have 
 weakened Longstreet's right to such an extent that the latter can- 
 not even attempt a diversion at the moment when the decisive 
 attack is made. 
 
 In the mean time, Lee is making the final preparations for this 
 attack. After having designated since morning Pickett and his 
 gallant Virginians to sustain the principal charge, he has not yet 
 selected the troops that are to support him, nor settled the order in 
 which the rest of the army is to take part in the combat. He 
 wishes with Longstreet to examine once more the ground before 
 making the attack. He seems to have relied at first upon Hood's 
 and McLaws' divisions to sustain Pickett's, for no order has yet 
 been given to Hill's troops, Avhich alone, in case of their failure, 
 can accomplish this task.' SeveraL officers of the general staif 
 have asserted that this plan was even adopted, and that Lee 
 ordered Longstreet to see it carried out — an assertion which the 
 latter denies in the most emphatic manner. Inasmuch as Lee 
 would not have allowed his lieutenant to violate his order under 
 his own eyes, we are to believe that the examination of the 
 positions of the First corps and those of the enemy caused him to 
 abandon this plan entirely. This supposition is the more probable 
 in view of the fact that the general-in-chief, having under those 
 circumstances visited the positions of Woffiard in company with 
 Longstreet, asked the former if he could attack the acclivities 
 which he had failed to carry the day before, and that Woffi3rd 
 plainly declared the thing to be impossible. It is therefore the 
 
204 27//!: CIVIL WAR IN A3IERICA. 
 
 salient point formed by the front of tlie Federal Second corps 
 that it is expedient to attack in spite of the defences ^ith which 
 it seems to be covered : not only does the formation itself render 
 it more accessible, biit its loss would j)rove more fatal to the Fed- 
 erals than that of any other portion of their line ; for if the Con- 
 federates succeed in posting themselves there, they take the defenders 
 of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill in the rear. But in order that 
 Hood and JNIcLaws might be able to co-operate in this attack, 
 they would be obliged to abandon the positions conquered with 
 so much difficulty on the right, and leave the ground free to the 
 extreme left of the Federal army. The sounds of the battle in 
 which Robertson and Anderson are engaged near the Emmetts- 
 buro; road reach Lee's ears to remind him of the danger which 
 menaces him on that side. Finally, Longs^treet has since as- 
 serted that the two divisions led by him the day before had suf- 
 fered too much to again undertake a decisive effort. They 
 might, at all events, have assigned to them a very useful and 
 less perilous task than the assault on Ziegler's Grove by causing 
 a portion of these two divisions to make strong demonstrations 
 against the left wing of the enemy. The nature of the ground 
 would have enabled troops relatively few in number to draw 
 Meade's attention without compromising themselves, and thus to 
 turn aside a portion of his forces from the point designated to 
 Pickett. But Lee does not appear to have thought of this 
 diversion. Longstreet, who disapproves of his plan, does not 
 assume the responsibility of making it, and the soldiers of Hood 
 and McLaws, after having fought almost alone the previous day, 
 are doomed in their turn to remain inactive spectators of the pow- 
 erless efforts of their comrades. 
 
 It is to Hill that Lee applies for the force necessary to support 
 Pickett. Anderson, whose division forms the right of the Third 
 corps, has deployed, as w^e have stated, Wilcox's brigade above 
 Pickett's line. The other four brigades are formed in the rear, in 
 the same order as on the previous day : Perry, then Wright on 
 the right, partly masked by the left of the latter ; Posey, next 
 Mahone, on the left, along the extremity of Seminary Hill, 
 occupy the positions which they did not leave during the com- 
 bat of the 2d. The brio;ades of Thomas and Perrin having 
 
GETTYSBURG. 205 
 
 come forward iu the course of the preceding evening, Pender's 
 division finds itself formed in two lines, while its front, reduced 
 by one-half, enables Hetli to take position between it and Ander- 
 son. Hill's troops, however, in this deployed order could not 
 effectually sustain Pickett's attack. Consequently, Lee orders 
 General Trimble, Pender's successor, to bring the two brigades 
 of his second line, under Lane and Scales, to the rear of Heth's 
 troops, actually commanded by Pettigrew. In this way six bri- 
 gades support Pickett on the left, attacking with him the Fed- 
 eral positions at the same time. Wilcox, in order to protect* 
 Pickett's right flank, will advance as soon as he receives the 
 order. All the troops of the Third corps destined to participate 
 in the attack are placed under Longstreet's command, and the 
 latter is authorized, if he deems it necessary, to push Perry's and 
 Wright's brigades forward. He directs Pickett to designate to 
 each officer the exact place that has been assigned to him. This 
 concentration no doubt weakens, but does not entirely strip, the 
 defensiv-e line which the general-in-chief is obliged to preserve in 
 case of a reverse : the positions which Pickett and Wilcox are 
 about to abandon are covered Avith a powerful artillery. Ander- 
 son, drawn up iu line of battle behind Heth and the two brigades 
 of Trimble, is ready to fill the space which the latter will leave. 
 This line has, from one wing to the other, a development of at 
 least five miles : it is therefore weak at all points, and if the pro- 
 jected assault does not succeed there is no reserve left to prevent 
 a counter-attack. 
 
 Longstreet learns at last that everything is ready ; his orders 
 are awaited to open the fire which is to precede the assault. 
 He has placed Colonel Alexander at the entrance of the wood 
 near ^Varfield's to watch the effects of the cannonade and to apprise 
 Pickett when the moment for making the charge arrives ; but, 
 having no faith in the success of the attack, he writes to Alexan- 
 der, advising him not to give the order unless the enemy is driven 
 from his positions, or unless he deems the latter sufficiently dis- 
 organized to secure the success of the attack. Alexander naturally 
 declines to assume the responsibility which his chief wrongly 
 desires to impose upon him ; his ammunition is limited, and he 
 will not open fire unless the attack is determined upon. Long- 
 
206 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 street, thus driven to the necessity of declaring his intentions 
 formally, sends word at last to Colonel Walton, directing him to 
 give tlie signal agreed upon. Much time has been lost, for it is 
 already one o'clock in the afternoon. Two cannon-shots fired on 
 the right by the Washington Artillery at intervals of one minute 
 suddenly break the silence which was prevailing over the battle- 
 field. It means "Be on your guard !" which is well understood 
 by both armies. The solitary smoke of these shots has not yet been 
 dispersed when the whole Confederate line is one blaze. To the 
 seventy-five pieces of cannon of the First corps are added sixty- 
 three of the Third corps which Hill has placed in line, and 
 which, with the exception of Poague's battery, ranged within the 
 line of the former, are posted along the prolongation of Semi- 
 nary Hill at d distance of about thirteen hundred yards from the 
 Federals. One hundred and thirty-eight pieces of cannon there- 
 fore obey Longstreet's signal. The Federals are not at all sur- 
 prised at this abrupt prelude : they have had time to recover from 
 the shock of the previous day, and have made good use of it, 
 Meade, assisted by Hancock and his several corps commanders, 
 has spent all the morning in rectifying the line ; the general dis- 
 position is not changed, but the whole portion of the front which 
 the enemy seems to be menacing is occupied by a stronger force. 
 Stanuard's brigade of Doubleday's division is formed in first 
 line in column of regiments deployed ; behind it the rest 
 of the division is drawn up in the same order. Birney, 
 who has reorganized the Third corps, holds the space of merely 
 tAVO hundred and fifty yards which Doubleday has left vacant in 
 drawing his lines closer : the three brigades of his own division 
 are likewise formed in cokunns by regiments ; that of Hum- 
 phreys is massed in the second line, more to the left. Two bri- 
 gades of the Sixth corps, under Torbert and Nevin, have taken 
 position on the right above Caldwell, so as to cover McGilvery's 
 artillery on the left. General Hunt is examining and rectifying 
 with untiring zeal the position of his batteries. Those of the 
 reserve, engaged somewhat at random, have been consolidated. 
 Those army corps which have left the largest portion of their 
 supply-trains in the rear find their guns short of ammunition ; 
 the reserve artillery supplies this deficiency. At the extreme left 
 
GETTYSBURG. 207 
 
 hvo batteries of the Fifth corps crown the steep ridge of Little 
 Round Top. ]\IcGilvery, with his eight reserve batteries, occu- 
 pies the position in which he rendered such valuable service the 
 day before, from the Weikert house on the left to the depression 
 which separates the base of Little Round Top from that of Ceme- 
 tery Hill. This depression, which affords no good positions, sepa- 
 rates him from the four batteries of the Second corps, placed by 
 Major Hazzard in the rear of the infantry along the rocky line 
 which gradually trends northward ; one of them is placed half- 
 way on the left; the other three, under Arnold, Gushing, and 
 Brown, are located on the high ridge. Woodruff's regular bat- 
 tery occupies Ziegler's Grove. Finally, to the right of the front 
 exposed to the enemy's fire a regular battery, and eight others 
 belonging to the First and Eleventh corps, form under IMajor 
 Osborne an irregular line turning north-westward and northward. 
 The Union artillery is thus divided into three groups : McGil- 
 very on the left, with forty-four pieces, along the prolongation 
 of the slopes of Little Round Top ; Hazzard in the centre, Avith 
 thirty pieces, resting on Ziegler's Grove ; Osborne to* the right, on 
 Cemetery Hill, w;ith about fifty pieces, a large part of which, it is 
 true, do not command a view of that portion of the line that is 
 chiefly menaced. Finally, five reserve batteries hold themselves 
 ready to take the place of those it will be necessary to relieve. 
 The Federals therefore have eighty pieces of artillery to reply to 
 the enemy. In conformity with Hunt's orders, they wait a quar- 
 ter of an hour before replying, in oixler to take a survey of the 
 batteries upon which they will have to concentrate their fire. 
 They occupy positions affording better shelter than those of the 
 Confederates, but the formation of their line gives the latter the 
 advantage of a concentric fire. 
 
 ]\Iore than two hundred guns are thus engaged in this artillery 
 combat, the most terrible the New World has ever witnessed. 
 The Confederates fire volleys from all the batteries at once, whose 
 shots, directed toward the same point, produce more effect than 
 successive firing. On the previous day their projectiles passed 
 over the enemy ; they have rectified the elevation of their pieces 
 and readily obtain a precision of aim unusual to them. The 
 plateau occupied by the Federals forms a slight depression of the 
 
 Vol. III.— 42 
 
208 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 ground in tlie centre, which hides their movements, but affords 
 them no shelter from the enemy's fire ; the shells burst in the 
 midst of the reserve batteries, supply-trains, and ambulances ; the 
 houses are tottering and tumbling down ; the head-quarters of 
 General ]Meade are riddled with balls, and Butteriield, his chief 
 of staff, is slightly wounded. In every direction may be seen 
 men seeking shelter behind the slightest elevations of the ground. 
 Nothing is heard but the roar of cannon and the whistling of 
 projectiles that are piercing the air. A still larger crowd of 
 stragglers, Avounded, and non-combatants than that of the day 
 before is again making for the Baltimore turnpike with rapid 
 haste. 
 
 INIcanwhile, the Federal inflintry, motionless under this fire, 
 stands the trial with remarkable composure. The artillerists 
 are sustained by the excitement of the conflict, but they are also 
 the most exposed. The men who are serving the guns must be 
 relieved, and presently the guns themselves are successively dis- 
 mounted. The reserve batteries come to take their places, silen- 
 cing the guns of the enemy, who is advancing too boldly upon 
 Gettysburg for the purpose of taking Cemetery Hill by enfilade. 
 During this struggle, so desperate and murderous, despite the 
 distance intervening between the combatants. Nature seems 
 inclined to favor the Confederates, for a slight breeze from the 
 north-east, driving the smoke over their positions, covers with 
 a thick veil their batteries and the valley through which they 
 are advancing to the assault. This assault, as we have stated, 
 is directed against the salient point occupied by Hancock. It is 
 against this point, therefore, that fhe Confederates should concen- 
 trate their fire, but, on the contrary, they scatter it along the 
 whole extent of the enemy's line. This error was noticed with 
 astonishment by the Union artillerists ; so that when, a few years 
 later, peace had brought them into close contact with their adver- 
 saries, General Hunt met General Long, Lee's secretary, who had 
 formerly been his pupil at \Yest Point, and asked him to explain 
 the cause of it. " It was owing to the interference of the gene- 
 rals " (commanding the ^J^X. corps and divisions), replied Long. 
 In n^ticino; this error he added: "I said to mvself that vou must 
 have been entirely forgetful of the principles you had inculcated 
 
GETTYSBURG. 209 
 
 upon -ttft in your teachings." The losses of the Confederates, how- 
 ever, although inferior to those of the Unionists, are not the less 
 severe. Longstreet's artillery has suffered greatly; Kemper's 
 brigade, posted in the rear of Wilcox, loses in a few minutes more 
 than two hundred men — a sacrifice that could easily have been 
 avoided. Lee and Longstreet, always at the post of danger, visit 
 the batteries in person under a shower of shells. The sight of 
 them encourages the soldiers. They say to one another, " It is 
 true that Longstreet does not approve the plan of battle, but he 
 waits for the signal of attack with no less ardor." In the mean 
 time, the ammunition- wagons being too much exposed, it becomes 
 necessary to place them at a distance ; hence a great difficulty in 
 supplying the batteries, that have scarcely more than sixty rounds 
 apiece, including canister. The total amount in reserve being less 
 than one hundred rounds, it becomes necessary, moreover, to econ- 
 omize the ammunition in future. Consequently, Colonel Alex- 
 ander, hoping speedily to silence the Union guns, intends to give 
 Pickett the signal of attack after a quarter of an hour's cannon- 
 ade. But time is flying; the caissons are getting empty, while 
 the fire of the Federals, concentrated upon certain points by 
 Hunt's orders, is still as regular and precise as at the commence- 
 ment. The matter, however, must be brought to a close ; it is 
 near two o'clock. Alexander writes to Pickett, saying that if he 
 wishes to charge, the moment has arrived, notwithstanding the 
 intensity of the enemy's fire, for he no longer hopes to be able 
 to silence it. The latter calls upon Longstreet, but cannot obtain 
 any instructions from this general, who is cruelly tried between 
 his own convictions and the orders of his chief: he leaves him, 
 stating that he is going to put his troops in motion ; Longstreet 
 makes no other reply except by nodding affirmatively. On return- 
 ing to his division Pickett is at all events waiting for new direc- 
 tions or a favorable opportunity when an urgent message from 
 Alexander decides him at last to give liis soldiers the signal of 
 attack. He is informed — what he might have found out himself 
 in spite of the roaring of the Confederate cannon — that the 
 enemy's guns scarcely make any reply. The Federal artillery 
 appears to be silenced from the lack of ammunition. The 
 opportunity so long waited for has therefore at last arrived — a 
 
210 THE CIVIL W'AR IN AMERICA. 
 
 mistake Avlik-li the assailants will soon lind out to their sorrow. 
 In i'aet, about a quarter-past two o'clock, Meade, believing that 
 enough ammunition has been expended, and wishing to provoke 
 the attack of the enemy, orders the firing to cease; Hunt, who 
 is watching the battlefield in another direction, issues the same 
 order at the same moment, and causes two fresh batteries, taken 
 from the reserve in the rear of Hancock's line, to advance. For 
 a while the voice of the Confederate cannon is alone heard. 
 
 But new actors are preparing to appear on the scene. Pickett 
 has caused the object of the charge they are about to execute to 
 be explained to his soldiers. As the ranks are re-forming many 
 of them can no longer rise ; the ground is strewn with the dead, 
 the wounded, and others that are suffering from the heat, for a 
 burning sun, still more scorching than that of the day before, 
 lights up this bloody battlefield. But all able-bodied men are at 
 their posts, and an affecting scene soon elicits a cry of admiration 
 both from enemies and friends. Full of ardor, as if it were rush- 
 ing to the assault of the Washington Capitol itself, and yet march- 
 ing with measured steps, so as not to break its alignment, Pickett's 
 division moves forward solidly and quietly in magnificent order. 
 Garnett, in the centre, sweeping through the artillery line, leaves 
 Wilcox behind him, whose men, lying flat upon the ground, are 
 waiting for another order to support the attack. Kemper is on 
 the right ; xVrmistead is moving forward at double-quick to place 
 himself on the left along the line of the other two brigades ; a 
 swarm of skirmishers covers the front of the division. The 
 smoke has disappeared, and this small band perceives at last the 
 long line of the Federal positions, which the hollow in the ground 
 where they had sought shelter had, until then, hidden from its 
 view. It moves onward full of confidence, convinced that a 
 single effort will pierce this line, which is already wavering, and 
 feeling certain that this effort will be sustained by the rest of the 
 army. Taking its loss into consideration, it numbers no more 
 than four thousand five hundred men at the utmost, but the aux- 
 iliary forces of Pettigrew, Trimble, and Wilcox raise the number 
 of assailants to fourteen thousand. If they are all put in motion 
 in time, and well led against a particular point of the Federal 
 line, their effort may triumph over every obstacle and decide the 
 
GETTYSBURG. 211 
 
 fate of the battle. Marching in the direction of the salient posi- 
 tion occupied by Hancock, which Lee has given him as the ob- 
 jective point, Pickett, after passing beyond the front of Wilcox, 
 causes each of his brigades to make a half-wheel to the left. This 
 manoeuvre, although well executed, is attended with serious diffi- 
 culties, for the division, drawn up en echelon across the Emmetts- 
 burg road, presents its right flank to the Federals to such an 
 extent that the latter mistake the three echelons for three suc- 
 cessive lines. 
 
 The moment has arrived for the Federal artillery to com- 
 mence firing. McGilvery concentrates the fire of his forty 
 pieces against the assailants, the Federals even attributing the 
 change in Pickett's direction to this fire — a wrong conclusion, for 
 it is when he exposes the flank that the enemy's shots cause the 
 greatest ravages in his ranks. If the thirty-four pieces of Haz- 
 zard bearing upon the salient position could follow McGilvery's 
 example, this artillery, which Pickett thought to be paralyzed, 
 would suffice to crush him. But, by order of his immediate 
 chief, Hazzard has fired oftener and in quicker succession than 
 Hunt had directed, and at the decisive moment he has nothing 
 left in his caissons but canister. He is therefore compelled to 
 wait until the enemy is within short range. Pickett, encouraged 
 by his silence, crosses several fields enclosed by strong fences, 
 which his skirmishers had not been able to reach before the can- 
 nonade ; then, having reached the base of the elevation he is to 
 attack, he once more changes his direction by a half-wheel to the 
 right, halting to rectify his line. The Confederate artillery is 
 endeavoring to support him, but is counting its shots, for it is 
 obliged to be sparing of its ammunition : the seven light pieces 
 intended to accompany the infantry, being wanted elsewhere, 
 fail to appear at the very moment when they should push for- 
 ward, and no other battery with sufficient supplies can be found 
 to take their place. 
 
 But, what is still more serious, orders do not seem to have been 
 clearly given to the troops that are to sustain Pickett. On the 
 left Pettigrew has put his men in motion at the first order, 
 but, being posted in the rear of Pickett, he has a wider space of 
 
212 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 ground to go over, and naturally finds himself distanced ; more- 
 over, his soldiers have not yet recovered from the combat of the 
 previous day : from the start their ranks are seen wavering, and 
 they do not advance with the same ardor as those of Pickett. 
 Covered by a line of skirmishers, the four brigades of Archer, 
 Pettigrew, Davis, and Brockenbrough are deployed from right 
 to left on a single line. But such a line of battle is always diffi- 
 cult to maintain. The left slackens its pace ; the right, on the 
 contrary, urged on by the two brigades of the intrepid Trimble, 
 is endeavoring to join Pickett, whom his half-wheel conversion 
 has drawn near it; the four brigades thus find themselves 
 ranged en Echelon, like those of Pickett, although in an inverse 
 order. Scales, on the right, in rear of Archer, with Lane 
 on his left, following Pettigrew's brigade, is in second line 
 abreast of the last-mentioned echelon. Presently, these troops, 
 through their imposing appearance, attract a portion of the 
 enemy's attention and fire, and at a distance of two hundred and 
 fifty yards they stop to reply with volleys of musketry. On the 
 right, Wilcox has remained inactive a considerable time, being 
 probably detained by a diversity of opinion among the chieftains 
 regarding the role that is assigned respectively to them. In fact, 
 while Pickett, who is too much engaged to watch his movements, 
 depends upon him to cover his right during the attack. Hill, his 
 proper chief, does not desire to bring him into action unless the 
 principal assault is successful. Finally, in pursuance of an order 
 from Pickett at the moment when the latter has halted in the 
 vicinity of the Codori house, Wilcox pushes his brigade forward 
 in a column of deployed battalions. In order to get sooner into 
 line, and thus to draw a portion of the enemy's fire, he marches 
 directly on. He cannot, however, recover the distance that sepa- 
 rates him from the leading assailants, the latter having disappeared 
 in a hollow ; then, becoming enveloped in smoke, he loses sight 
 of them, and, following alone his direction to the right, does not 
 succeed in covering their flank. 
 
 In the mean while, Pickett, causing his skirmishers to fall back, 
 has again put his troops in motion, without waiting for his echelons 
 to get completely into line : the artillery and infantry posted along 
 the ridge he is to capture open a terrific fire of canister and mus- 
 
GETTYSBURG. 213 
 
 ketiy against him at a distance of two hundred yards, -while the 
 shot and shell of McGilvery take his line again in flank, causing 
 frightful gaps in its ranks, killing at times as many as ten men by 
 a single shot. 
 
 Before narrating the terrible encounter that is impending we 
 must give a sketch of the ground which is about to be so desper- 
 ately disputed. In the prolongation at the south-west of the 
 hillock properly called Cemetery Hill stands the plateau design 
 nated by Lee as the objective point of the attack, which we shall 
 call Ziegler's Grove, from the name of a small wood which 
 descends the slope opposite to Gettysburg. The ridge of this 
 plateau, the summit of which is very level, is bordered at the 
 west by rocks which project from the soil, sometimes to a height 
 of four or five feet, forming a wall, as on the summit of Gulp's 
 Hill. The wood is defended by Woodruff's guns, posted along 
 the lower edge, masking the right of the Third division of the 
 Second corps, commanded by Hays. Farther on, the natural 
 wall aifords the latter strong defensive positions; fifty yards south 
 of the wood' above a spring called Bryan's Well, it is crowned 
 for a distance of nearly three hundred yards by an ordinary 
 stone wall. Back of this line is deployed the remainder of Hays' 
 infantry ; two batteries are posted along the ridge. To the left 
 the wall follows a Avesterly course, of about eighty yards, to form 
 a junction with another ridge emerging from the soil. Gibbon's 
 division, whose front is four hundred and fifty yards in length, is 
 covered by another wall surmounted by a common post-and-rail 
 fence. Owen's brigade, commanded by General Webb, is on the 
 right, in an angle above Hays' position, Hall in the centre. 
 About one hundred yards farther up the wall terminates abruptly 
 behind the small wood, an iutrenchment prolonging the line of 
 the fence in the direction of the level grounds which Birney occu- 
 pies, and which are covered by the Federal artillery. In the 
 salient angle formed by the wood Doubleday has placed Stan- 
 nard's brigade. The four brigades are ranged in two lines : 
 three batteries, posted along the ridge near the second line, fire 
 over the first, their front being flanked by Hays on the right and 
 Birney on the left. 
 
 Seeinff their adversaries advancino; asrainst these formidable 
 
214 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 positions, tliose amongst the Federals who fought under Burn- 
 side have the same opinion : they are at hist to be avenged for 
 the Fredericksburg disaster. The assaihmts also understand the 
 perils that await them. On the left, Pettigrew is yet far off; 
 on the right, "Wilcox strays away from them and disappears 
 amid the smoke. Pickett therefore finds himself alone with 
 his three brigades. Far from hesitating, his soldiers rush for- 
 ward at a double-quick. A fire of musketry breaks out along 
 the entire front of Gibbon's division. The Confederate ranks 
 are thinning as far as the eye can reach. Garnett, whose brigade 
 has kept a little in advance, and who, although sick, has declined 
 to leave the post of honor, falls dead within a hundred yards of 
 the Federal line ; for an instant his troops come to a halt. They 
 are immediately joined by Kemper, who at a distance of sixty 
 yards in the rear has allowed their right to cover his left. The 
 two brigades form a somewhat unsteady line, which opens fire 
 upon the enemy. But the Confederate projectiles flatten them- 
 selves by thousands upon the strata of rocks, which is soon cov- 
 ered with black spots like a target, and upon the wall behind 
 which the Unionists are seeking shelter. The game is too 
 uneven : they must either fly or charge. These brave soldiers 
 have only halted for a few minutes, allowing Armistead the 
 necessary time to get into line. Encouraged by the example 
 set by their chiefs, they scale the acclivity which rises before 
 them : their yells mingle with the rattling of musketry ; the 
 smoke soon envelops the combatants. Gibbon, seeing the enemy 
 advancing with such determination, tries to stop his progress by 
 a counter-charge, but his voice is not heard ; his soldiers fire in 
 haste, without leaving their ranks ; the Confederates rush upon 
 them. Unfortunately for the assailants, their right not being 
 protected by Wilcox, their flank is exposed to the little wood 
 which stretches beyond the Federal line. Stannard's soldiers, 
 concealed by the foliage, have suflcred but little from the bom- 
 bardment; Hancock, always ready to seize a favorable oppor- 
 tunity, causes them to form en potcnce along the edge of the wood 
 in order to take the enemy's line in flank. Two regiments from 
 Armistead's right thus receive a murderous fire which almost deci- 
 mates and disorganizes them. The remainder of the brigade 
 
GETTYSBURG. 215 
 
 throws itself in the rear of the centre of Pickett's line, which, 
 following this movement, momentarily inclines toward Hays in 
 order to attack the Federals at close quarters. Armistead, urging 
 his men forward, has reached the front rank between Kemper and 
 Garnett — if it be yet possible to distinguish the regiments and 
 brigades in this compact mass of human beings, which, all cov- 
 ered with blood, seems to be driven by an irresistible force supe- 
 rior to the individual will of those composing it — and throws 
 himself like a solid body upon the Union line. The shock is ter- 
 rific : it falls at first upon the brigades of Hall and Harrow, then 
 concentrates itself upon that of Webb, against which the assail- 
 ants are oscillating right and left. The latter general in the midst 
 of his soldiers encourages them by his example ; he is presently 
 wounded. The struggle is waged at close quarters; the Con- 
 federates pierce the first line of the Federals, but the latter, dis- 
 lodged from the wall, fall back upon the second line, formed of 
 small earthworks erected on the ridge in the vicinity of their 
 guns. These pieces fire canister upon the assailants. Hancock and 
 Gibbon bring forward all their reserves. To the left of Webb, 
 Hall, seeing his right outflanked, has rectified his line by means 
 of a half-wheel to the rear, which places him on the flank of the 
 assailants; farther on, HarroM^, not being directly attacked, 
 advances with his left, and, in spite of the disorder inevitable 
 under such circumstances, he succeeds in almost taking Pickett's 
 line in reverse. The troops posted on the right and left hasten 
 toward the point menaced. Humphreys sends Carr's brigade to 
 the assistance of the Second corps. The regiments become mixed ; 
 the commanders do not know where their soldiers are to be 
 found ; but they are all pressing each other in a compact mass, 
 forming at random a living and solid bulwark more than four 
 ranks deep. A clump of trees, in the neighborhood of which 
 Gushing has posted his guns, commanding the whole plateau, 
 is the objective point that the Confederates keep in view. Arm- 
 istead on foot, his hat perched on the point of his sword, rushes 
 forward to attack the battery. With one hundred and fifty men 
 determined to follow him unto death he pierces the mass of com- 
 batants, passes beyond the earthworks, and reaches the line of guns, 
 which can no longer fire for fear of killing friends and foes indis- 
 
216 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 criminately. But at the same moment, l)y the side of Gushing, 
 his young and gallant adversary, he falls pierced with balls. They 
 botli lie at the foot of the clump of trees which marks the extreme 
 point reached by the Confederates in this supreme eifort. These 
 few trees, henceforth historical, like a snail on the strand stru(;k 
 by a furious sea, no longer possessing strength enough to draw 
 back into its shell, constitute the limit before which the tide of 
 invasion stops — a limit traced by the blood of some of the bravest 
 soldiers that America has produced. 
 
 In fact, if the Federals have thus seen a large number of their 
 chieftains fall, and their artillery left without ammunition, the 
 effort of the assailants, on the other hand, is exhausted. On 
 the right Wilcox has started in great haste to cover Pickett's 
 flank, but the direction he is following leads him to the low 
 grounds interspersed with bushes whence Plum Pun derives its 
 source, separating him from this division, to which he can no 
 longer afford assistance. Pcttigrew, on the left, does his best to 
 support him. His own brigade and that of Archer have reached 
 Hays' line, but have failed to effect a breach. Trimble, who is 
 following them closely, sustains them vigorously. Lane has 
 already penetrated the first line of the Federals, drawn up, as 
 it is elsewhere, at the foot of the acclivity, and, beginning to scale 
 it, he dra^vs near the wall which, as we have stated, stands at this 
 point about halfway from the summit. Archer and Scales, cov- 
 ered on their right by the movement of Pickett, who has passed 
 the same w^all at the point where it skirts the plain, have pre- 
 ceded Lane by a few minutes. But Pettigrew's two brigades of 
 the left, having remained in the rear, cannot or will not arrive 
 in time to support them. After a combat at short range — very 
 brief, but extremely murderous, in which Trimble is seriously 
 wounded — his troops and those of Pettigrew retire, even before 
 the two brigades under Thomas and Perrin have reached their 
 position, and while Pickett is still fighting on the right. The 
 regular fire of Hays' impregnable line drives the assailants from 
 that point in the greatest disorder as soon as they have taken one 
 step in retreat. The four brigades of the Third Confederate 
 <3orps that have thus been repulsed leave two thousand prisoners 
 and fifteen stands of colors in the hands of the enemy. A few regi- 
 
GETTYSBURG. 217 
 
 ments of Archer's and Scales' brigades, which outflank Hays on the 
 left, throw themselves on the right and unite with Pickett's soldiers, 
 who are still contending with Gibbon. This reinforcement is, how- 
 ever, quite insufficient for the Confederates, who thus find them- 
 selves isolated, without support and without reserves, in the midst 
 of the Federal line. Kemper is wounded in his turn. Out of 
 eighteen field-officers and four generals, Pickett and one lieuten- 
 ant-colonel alone remain unharmed : there is hardly any one left 
 around them, and it is a miracle to see them yet safe and sound 
 in the midst of such carnage. The division does not fall back ; 
 it is annihilated. The flags which a while ago were bravely float- 
 ing upon the enemy's parapets fall successively to the ground, only 
 to be picked up by the conquerors. A number of soldiers, not 
 daring to pass a second time the ground over which the Federals 
 cross their fire, throw down their arms : among those who are 
 trying to gain the Southern lines many victims are stricken clown 
 by cannon-balls. The conflict is at an end. Out of four thou- 
 sand eight hundred men that have followed Pickett, scarcely 
 twelve to thirteen hundred are to be found in the rear of Alex- 
 ander's guns ; three thousand five hundred have been sacrificed 
 and twelve stands of colors lost in this fatal charge. 
 
 In the mean Avhile, Wilcox, having lost sight of Pickett, has 
 reached the foot of the acclivities along which the Third Federal 
 corps is massed. After having re-formed his brigade in the low 
 ground covered with bushes which borders these acclivities, he 
 deploys it and resumes his march in order to support Pickett, 
 whom he believes to be still fighting on his left. The Unionists, 
 who from their commanding position overlook the whole battle- 
 field, are astonished at the display of so much audacity, for at 
 this juncture the great struggle is already ended. At a distance 
 of two hundred yards from Wilcox's line, and within its compass, 
 stands the wood into which Stannard has just brought back the 
 troops that have performed so useful a diversion against Pickett 
 on the other side. Seeing a new adversary, he causes them to go 
 through the same manoeuvre in an opposite direction, pushing 
 forward as far as a strong fence two regiments whose fire 
 takes the whole Confederate line in flank. The latter come to a 
 halt, replying to the fire of the enemy ; but they soon realize 
 
218 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 their isolation : tlie Federal artillery riddles tliem with shot ; the 
 guns that should have sup])()rted them are silent for want of 
 ammunition. They recall to mind the disaster of their comrades 
 and retire precipitately, leaving two hundred of their men on the 
 ground. During this time Pickett's soldiers, mixed up with 
 those of Pettigrew and Trimble, have taken the shortest way to 
 cross the valley, and instead of making for their point of depart- 
 ure have thrown themselves more to northward, along the extrem- 
 ity of Seminary Hill, not far from the spot selected by Lee for 
 watching the battle. 
 
 The combat was so quickly determined that the reinforcements 
 intended for the assailants have not had time to cover their retreat. 
 To the right of Pickett's old position, which is no longer occupied 
 except by artillery and the remnants of Wilcox's brigade, Mc- 
 Laws makes Woiford's and Barksdale's brigades, commanded by 
 Colonel Humphreys, advance a little : the latter deploys a portion 
 of his forces as skirmishers to the right of Wilcox, forming in 
 the vicinity of the Confederate guns a barrier which would prove 
 very weak, no doubt, if the Federals made a serious effort to 
 pierce it. More to the left, Perry and Wright are only Avaiting 
 for orders to renew the combat. But Longstreet forbids their 
 advance, justly declaring that a new attack would only result 
 in the useless shedding of precious blood. In fact, it is no longer 
 a question of renewing the assault, but rather to put a stop to the 
 disorganization of the army. Seated impassively upon a wooden 
 fence, he thence directs the members of his staif, who are pro- 
 ceeding in every direction, to gather, up the stragglers. In 
 the midst of the latter Lee quickly mounts his horse and 
 endeavors to retain them by his speech, uttering a word of 
 encouragement for each, and even taking upon himself the 
 whole responsibility of the disaster. 
 
 These men, always accustomed to follow, and full of blind 
 admiration for him, stop short at the sound of his voice. But 
 the disorder is great ; on every side the wounded are forming sad 
 processions that are pressing forward in the direction of the ambu- 
 lances. The Confederate generals only succeed in rallying a small 
 number of combatants, whom they range in haste close to the 
 guns, against which they expect to see the enemy advance with 
 
GETTYSBURG. 219 
 
 troops elated by victory. This artillery, without support, per- 
 forms, it is true, prodigies of valor iu order to conceal its weak- 
 ness ; and one of Henry's batteries, posted alone in advance of 
 the line to the right of the orchard, continues the fight under the 
 concentrated fire of the enemy's guns. 
 
 On the side of the Federals there is great anxiety during the 
 struggle. INIeade, who was on the left, has hastened to the s})ot 
 at the moment of Pickett's defeat, followed by the reduced bat- 
 talions of the Third corps. It is not to be believed, however, 
 that Lee risked the fate of the battle in this partial attack, and 
 that he will not yet make a decisive effort with all the rest of his 
 army. Every one, therefore, is waiting ; the wounded are carried 
 oif and the ranks re-formed. Along the front, where the struggle 
 has been carried on hand to hand, the combatants, coming from 
 the right and left, are all mixed up. Humphreys has massed his 
 troops behind the Second corps ; a portion of Birney's division, 
 which, like himself, has folloMcd Meade, has taken position on 
 the left, ready to strike the enemy in flank should he attempt to 
 advance farther ; the whole of Doubleday's division has marched 
 toward the elevated point occupied by Stannard ; while Robinson 
 arrives at the same time to reinforce the right of the Second 
 corps. Two brigades of the Twelfth corps, summoned by Meade 
 from the other extremity of the line, appear shortly after the ter- 
 mination of the struggle. The general-in-chief confers upon New- 
 ton the command of the First, Second, and Third corps, in the 
 place of Hancock,* and charges him to restore order on the scene 
 of the last combat. But Pickett's experience having proved how 
 dangerous it was to cross the open space intervening between the 
 enemy and Ziegler's Grove, Meade hastens to the left in the hope 
 of taking the offensive on that side. This wing is composed of 
 the Fifth corps and the largest portion of the Sixth. The for- 
 mer, which is fortified on the summit of the Round Tops and at 
 their bases, can reinforce Crawford's division, which has suffered 
 but little as yet. Sedgwick, after leaving two brigades east of the 
 Great Round Top — Shaler's near Geary, and Neill's along Rock 
 Creek — has still three brigades (one under Wright and two under 
 Wheaton) that have not yet been engaged, and which occupy the 
 space comprised between the Fifth corps and McGilvery's artillery. 
 * Who was wounded. — Ed. 
 
220 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Wheaton on the left and Wright on the right are formed several lines 
 deep. On their right Caldwell's division, by order of Hancock, 
 holds itself ready to take tlie offensive. Among the troops that 
 have suffered, like it, on the previous day, there are many 
 which, encouraged by the success they have just witnessed, might 
 renew the combat against an enemy that has been still worse 
 punished. The soldiers, although fatigued by long marches, 
 are yet able to make a vigorous effort. Against which point of 
 the enemy's line should this effort be directed? An English 
 officer. Colonel Freemantle, who was with Longstreet, and could 
 form a cool judgment of passing events, has declared that, despite 
 the disorder of the infantry, the artillery would have sufficed, in 
 his opinion, to put a stop to any direct attack. But it was feasible 
 to manoeuvre offensively without repeating the error .committed 
 by the enemy, who had only succeeded in the attacks made under 
 cover of the woods and ravines adjoining Plum Run : it was 
 expedient to operate in this direction. The forces arranged in 
 front formed a vast semicircle, the two extremities of which rested 
 on the Emmettsburg road, and whose summit touched the slopes 
 of the Great Round Top : from this height one could perceive 
 the six or seven brigades ranged along this long line and isolated 
 from the rest of the army by the disorganization of the centre. 
 It is Hood and McLavvs, therefore, who must be surprised, 
 struck, and destroyed. 
 
 Such is, no doubt, Meade's idea as he is proceeding to the left. 
 But he dares not hazard a great movement, which alone could 
 prove effective. Being but recently placed in command, he does 
 not possess self-reliance enough to risk a great deal in order to gain 
 a great deal. Where are the old colleagues whose advice might 
 have inspired him with a bold determination ? Reynolds was the 
 first and most illustrious victim of this great conflict; Hancock, 
 the master-spirit of the defence, is wounded : he has indeed been 
 able to dictate from his couch a note imploring his chief to take 
 the offensive, but he is not on the spot to execute what he sug- 
 gests ; Gibbon has received a serious wound in return for the 
 glory he has acquired ; Sickles, who on the previous day com- 
 mitted an error which may well be pardoned, but whose clear 
 judgment, coolness, and irresistible ardor have so frequently fired 
 
GETTYSBURG. / 221 
 
 the hearts of his conipauious-iu-arms, — Sickles, now lying muti- 
 lated on his bed of sickness, is lost to the Army of the Potomac ; 
 and Butterfield, although only slightly wounded, is for the pres- 
 ent unfit for active service. 
 
 Besides, nothing has been prearranged for the offensive. If 
 Pleasonton, who has neither command nor responsibility on the 
 battlefield, exhorts Meade to seize this opportunity to show him- 
 self at one stroke a great leader, on the other hand hesitation is 
 marked upon the countenances of many — a hesitation very natural, 
 for some months afterward a number of general officers come for- 
 ward to declare under oath before the Committee of Congress on 
 the Conduct of the War that in their opinion any attack would 
 have failed. 
 
 They are under the impression of having escaped from a ter- 
 rible danger, and of having done enough for the occasion. The 
 invasion is repulsed ; by attempting any further eifort everything 
 might be compromised. In short, they are all paralyzed by the 
 common error of the Union chiefs, who believe the enemy to be 
 much stronger numerically than he is in reality. The aggressive 
 audacity of the Confederates has achieved the result, always so 
 important in war, of deceiving the enemy regarding their real 
 strength, thus protecting them at the critical moment. Under 
 this impression Meade is desirous of feeling them before making 
 a serious attack. He gives Sedgwick no instructions, merely 
 directing Sykes to push a reconnoissance on the left over the 
 ground which should have been occupied in great force, Mdthout 
 even pointing out the importance of such movement. This oper- 
 ation is thus entrusted to a single brigade of Crawford's division, 
 Avhich, under McCandless, has held since morning that portion of 
 the Trostle wood adjoining the right bank of Plum Run. Leav- 
 ing Bartlett to keep guard over this wood, Crawford and McCan- 
 dless advance across the wheat-field on which hundreds of dead, 
 dying, and wounded soldiers have been lying since the day before. 
 Without stopping to contemplate this sad spectacle, the Fed- 
 erals penetrate about five o'clock into the wood situated west of 
 this field. 
 
 As we have before observed, the position of the Confederates is 
 very much exposed on this side. I^aw, having sent Anderson's 
 
222 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 brigade to keep Kilpatrick iu check on the Emmettsburg road, 
 has been obliged to deploy the remainder of his division upon a 
 long, attenuated line. His old brigade (under Robertson) on the 
 right faces eastward, along the lower slopes of llound Top ; Ben- 
 ning occupies the hill of Devil's Den, supporting Kershaw, who 
 forms the right of McLaws' division. The rest of this division 
 covers the position of the orchard : Semmes and Wofford have 
 their troops massed close to the houses ; Barksdale's are deployed 
 as skirmishers, whose line extends as far as the positions occupied 
 by Wilcox before the attack. Toward four o'clock, shortly before 
 McCandless receives the order to advance. Law, who understands 
 the danger to which Pickett's check exposes him, decides to bring 
 his troops to the rear. The two brigades on the right fall back 
 toward the Emmettsburg road without molestation. . Kershaw, 
 having received a similar order from McLaws, abandons the wood 
 he has captured the day before from Caldwell, and starts in the 
 direction of the orchard. Benuing has misunderstood his instruc- 
 tions, and instead of following this movement he prolongs his 
 line to occupy the position which Kei'shaw has just left. His 
 left, being thus extended, encounters INIcCandless, who after a 
 short engagement captures from him about one hundred prisoners, 
 compelling the whole brigade to make a speedy retreat. Kershaw 
 finds himself isolated in his turn, and, believing himself already 
 surrounded, in order to escape from the enemy resorts to a 
 manoeuvre which we mention on account of its singularity. He 
 sends the color-bearers of his regiments to plant their flags a few 
 hundred yards in the right-rear, across the tributary of Plum 
 Run, subsequently ordering his soldiers to break ranks and 
 to re-form in this new position. An active enemy would 
 not have allowed them to again get together, but ISIcCaudless, 
 not daring to venture farther without support, stops before 
 the ravine, satisfied with having recaptured nearly the entire 
 battlefield of the previous day and picked up more than 
 two hundred and fifty prisoners. The sad task of carrying 
 off the large number of wounded, who had remained without 
 care or assistance for the space of twenty-four hours, detains him 
 at every step, and keeps him occupied until the night is far 
 advanced. 
 
GETTYSBURG. 223 
 
 The darkne&s which envelops the battlefield renders any serious 
 undertaking henceforth impracticable. WheatoUj who has at last 
 been ordered to support McCandless, advances on the right of the 
 latter Avith Nevin's brigade, followed by that of Bartlett ; but it 
 is too late, and he comes to a halt at a considerable distance from 
 the orchard. When the information obtained by McCandless 
 finally reaches Meade neither party thinks of anything but to 
 calculate the results of the day's conflict. 
 
 Before proceeding to describe the occurrences of the next day we 
 must mention a cavalry coml)at which, during the great straggle, 
 took place east of Gettysburg and south of the York road. Stuart, 
 not being able to participate in the infantry fight, has since morn- 
 ing been making preparations to take advantage of the victory 
 if it should crown Lee's efforts. The latter has directed him 
 to get around the Federal right, in order to strike the enemy's 
 columns in flank if they should retire in the direction of West- 
 minster — a well-conceived plan which would have been product- 
 ive of disastrous consequences to the Federals had they been 
 beaten on the heights of Gettysburg. 
 
 At three o'clock in the morning Stuart, leaving the positions he 
 has occupied to the right of Rock Creek and north of the York 
 road, follows the road which leads from the York road to the 
 Reever house. He thus covers the left of the Second corjDs and 
 reaches the extremity of Brinkerhoif 's Ridge. Rapidly ascend- 
 ing the summit of this ridge, he perceives the enemy's cavalry 
 posted along the slopes upon which stands the Reever house. He 
 at once proposes to separate it from the right of the Army of the 
 Potomac and to strike the road to Westminster between the bridge 
 over Rock Creek and that over White Run, a stream which re- 
 ceives the waters of Cress' Run a little before reaching this road. 
 In order to accomplish this it is necessary for him to conceal his 
 movement from the enemy and detain him in the vicinity of the 
 intersection of the Hanover and Dutch roads. Sheltered behind 
 the high ground of Cress' Ridge, while a screen of skirmishers oc- 
 cupies the edge of the woods which cover a portion of them, and at 
 the same time keep off those of the enemy, the Confederate troopers 
 will be able to reach the Baltimore turnpike unobserved. Without 
 waiting for the issue of the great struggle, they may be able to 
 
 Vol. III.— 43 
 
224 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 create a pauic in the rear of tlie Union army, the effect of Avhich 
 will be decisive on the battlefield. Stuart puts Chambliss' and 
 Jenkins' brigades, which are with him, on the march along the 
 western slopes of Cress' Ridge. Fitzhugh I^ee and Hampton 
 have remained behind, near the York road. He sends tliem an 
 order to join him by following closely in his tracks, so as not to 
 attract the attention of the enemy. 
 
 The troops which Stuart has seen near the Reever house belong 
 to Kilpatrick's division. After sunset of the previous day, Gregg, 
 being summoned back by Pleasonton, has left this position in 
 order to take another in the rear of the army. He has bivou- 
 acked near the bridge over White Run on the Baltimore road ; 
 but in the mean time, Kilpatrick, returning from Huuterstown 
 and finding the important highway from Bonaughtown unoccu- 
 pied, has left Custer's brigade there. On the morning of the 3d, 
 Gregg, having been ordered to advance again, so as to cover 
 the right flank of the army, has proceeded along Cress' Run, 
 south of the Hanover road. He thus keeps in view the eastern 
 
 . slopes of Wolf's Hill, on which Stuart must debouch if he passes 
 beyond Brinkerhoff's Ridge. On learning of Custer's presence 
 near the Bonaughtown road he sends him word to go into posi- 
 tion on his right, which seems to him to be much exposed, and 
 to extend his line in front of the Reever house. Although he 
 lias been ordered by Kilpatrick to repair to Two Taverns, Custer 
 complies with Gregg's request. Stuart thus has three brigades in 
 front of him, numbering about five thousand troopers. Pie has 
 himself no less than six thousand sabres in the four brigades 
 placed under his command. He knows nothing of the ])osition of 
 Gregg, who will doubtless soon discover the march of Chambliss 
 and Jenkins. But this march is interrupted from the beginning 
 by an unforeseen incident : Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee, impru- 
 dently showing to the enemy a portion of their forces, have 
 
 * unmasked it. 
 
 The Dutch road north of the highway follows a ridge but 
 slightly elevated and running parallel Avith Cress' Run. The 
 plain which stretches out, a little more than half a mile in width, 
 between these elevations, cultivated and intersected by some 
 fences, is watered by a small stream, Little's Run, the som-ce of 
 
GETTYSBURG. 225 
 
 which is found in the Ruminel farmyard at the foot of Cress' 
 Ridge, four hundred yards south-west of the cross-road connect- 
 ing the Dutch road with the York turnpike. This cross-road 
 passes through two small pieces of wood situated on either 
 side of the plain — one on the slopes of Cress' Ridge, the other 
 on the hillocks that the Dutch road follows. On the south the 
 plain is bounded by hills adjoining Cress' Run, and which the 
 Hanover road traverses near the Howard house before reaching 
 the cross-road. 
 
 Along these hills Custer has taken position. About ten o'clock 
 in the morning Hampton aud Lee, following the cross-road 
 beyond the point where Stuart has left it, debouch from the 
 woods on Rummel's farm. Their artillery immediately opens 
 fire upon Custer. The latter, menaced on his right, deploys en 
 potence a portion of his brigade which he has till then kept in 
 reserve, and his guns soon silence those of the Confederates. 
 Hampton and Lee, finding out their mistake, speedily fall back 
 behind the wood, where Custer takes good care not to follow 
 them. But at the sound of the conflict Stuart, who has already 
 advanced somewhat, stops : if the enemy menaces his flank he 
 cannot proceed farther. He sends for Hampton and Lee to 
 show them from the summit of Briukerhoff' s Ridge the lay of 
 the ground and to explain his plan to them. But his messengers 
 lose their way, and he Avaits for his lieutenants in vain. Mean- 
 while, Custer, having received new orders from Kilpatrick, has 
 set oiF to join his division on the left of the army beyond Round 
 Top. Gregg has sent one of his two brigades, under Mcintosh, 
 to relieve Custer. He has i-emained with the other, commanded 
 by his namesake, Irvin "Gregg, in the positions taken in the 
 morning. It is near two o'clock. The echoes from the hills 
 which separate the two bodies of cavalry from the field of battle 
 around Gettysburg have been relocating for the last hour the 
 sounds of the cannonade which precedes the great attack of 
 Longstreet. The Federals, who have dismounted, anxiously 
 listen to the distant roar of cannon. They feel that the critical 
 moment of the battle has arrived. Although they cannot take 
 part in the combat, nor even follow its movements with the eye, 
 this thought seems to fire their ardor. In fact, Mcintosh, scarcely 
 
226 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 establislicd in the position wliicli Caster has just vacated in the 
 vicinity of the Howard house, determines to take the offensive — 
 a happy inspiration, for lie thereby baffles Stuart's plan at the 
 very moment when he is about to execute it. The Confederate 
 general, equally urged on by the sound of the combat, would 
 like to continue his movement with the brigades of Chambliss 
 and Jenkins under the shelter of Cress' Ividge, while Plamp- 
 tou and Lee detiiin the enemy north of the Hanover road. 
 
 Mcintosh, in advancing upon Rummel's farm, has obliged these 
 two last-mentioned brigades to deploy in order to hold him in 
 check. General Lee is in command of both, M'hile Hampton is 
 vainly endeavoring to join Stuart. He has placed his dismounted 
 troopers behind a strong fence. His artillery unmasks, and ]\rc- 
 Intosh stops, soon realizing the fact that he has to contend wdth 
 too strong a force. 
 
 Gregg, summoned in haste, meets Custer, and brings him back 
 to the aid of his first brigade. Irvin Gregg, posted a consider- 
 able distance oif, reaches the cross-roads a little later, and re- 
 mains in reserve. Custer could not arrive more opportunely with 
 his four splendid Michigan regiments. Stuart has seen them 
 from a distance. Finding the enemy's forces, which are massing 
 on his flank, increasing, he determines to send Jenkins' brigade 
 against them, retaining only that of Chambliss to continue his 
 movement. The sole object of this movement, however, is now 
 limited to the task of turning the left flank of the Union cav- 
 alry in order to assure its defeat : he is, in fact, obliged to begin 
 by fighting it before striking the rear of the Army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 In the mean time, Gregg is preparing to attack the Confeder- 
 ates, although the latter, posted along the slopes of Cress' Ridge 
 and within the enclosures of the Hummel farm-buildings, have 
 every advantage of position. Two of Custer's regiments, the 
 Fifth and Sixth jNIichigan, reinforce Mcintosh's line, which rests 
 to the right on the Avoods situated along the Dutch road, and, to 
 the left, on the Hanover road : the other two regiments are kept 
 in reserve. The artillery is posted on the hill near the Howard 
 house, and opens fire upon the Kummel farm-buildings, occupied 
 by Fitzhugh Lee's skirmishers. Lee, who has vainly tried to 
 
GETTYSBURG. 227 
 
 turn Mcintosh's right, has gradually brought into action the 
 greater portion of his brigade. Jenkins' men are in position on 
 his right, extending as far as the Hanover road. Custer's troop- 
 ers, on foot, with carbine in hand, are marching in skirmishing 
 order against the enemy, who is speedily dislodged from the 
 farm-buildings by the Federal guns. Gregg, leaving his right 
 firmly established on the wood on the Dutch road, brings his left 
 toward Cress' Kidge, thus drawing near the positions occupied by 
 Stuart. The greater portion of Jenkins' brigade, deployed as 
 skirmishers like the Federals, soon comes forward to meet them. 
 But Giving to some strange negligence it soon finds itself short of 
 ammunition, and the Sixth Michigan sends it rapidly to the right- 
 about. Gregg, taking advantage of its withdrawal, sends for- 
 ward in the centre a portion of Mcintosh's brigade. Fitzhugh 
 Lee's men, who have lost their hold on the Rummel farm- 
 buildings, fall back in their turn, becoming separated from those 
 of Jenkins. Stuart, finding that the latter are in great jeopardy, 
 orders Chambliss to go to their assistance. The latter dismounts 
 one of his regiments and directs it against the Federal centre ; 
 the others hold themselves in readiness to support it. The prog- 
 ress of the Unionists is stopped, but Stuart has no one left with 
 wdiom to accomplish the manoeuvre he has undertaken. The 
 :ombat, brought on in spite of him, is of too serious a character 
 jot to engage thenceforth his whole attention. Indeed, the regi- 
 ment sent out by Chambliss has found the Federals strongly 
 posted behind a fence near Little's Run. The Fifth Michigan, 
 armed with repeating carbines, receives it with a well-sustained fire : 
 the attack of the Confederates is repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee, who, 
 from his position on the left of the Rummel farm, has anxiously 
 watched all the phases of the combat, thinks that the moment has 
 arrived for striking a decisive blow. He orders the First Vir- 
 ginia to charge mounted upon Mcintosh's right. The First New 
 Jersey, whose ammunition is exhausted, has no time to retire in 
 good order ; it is quickly driven back upon the side of the woods. 
 Custer most opportunely hurls against the assailants the Sev- 
 enth Michigan, which comes to meet them mounted, but stops 
 behind a fence and opens an ineffective fire upon them ; the 
 Virginia troopers reply in the same manner. During this firing 
 
228 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 Lee causes a portion of his men to advance on foot, who soon 
 demolish the obstacles and put the Federals to a speedy retreat. 
 Their centre falls back in disorder, their lefb being obliged to form 
 en potencc behind a fence in order not to be taken in flank. 
 
 But this very success ha»s exhausted the strength of the First 
 Virginia. The fusillade takes it in flank, while tlie shells are 
 pouring into its ranks. It falls back, dragging along with it 
 beyond the Rummel house the whole of Lee's brigade. Hamp- 
 ton, having returned to his command without finding Stuart, 
 concludes that he can no longer remain inactive, for Cham- 
 bliss on his right is as hard pressed as Lee on his left, the 
 defeat of the latter having decided the Federals to resume the 
 offensive along the whole line. Consequently, he orders two 
 regiments, the First North Carolina and the Jeff. Davis Legion, 
 to charge the enemy. The latter come up at a gallop, sabres in 
 hand, and rush upon one of the Federal batteries, without allow- 
 ing themselves to be staggered by its rapid and murderous dis- 
 charges. But Gregg hurls against them the First Michigan, 
 which has till now been kept in reserve. Custer leads it with 
 spirit against the Confederates, much superior in number, but 
 whose front ranks have been decimated by the Union artillery. 
 The latter does not cease firing till the two bodies of cavalry 
 meet almost in front of the cannons' mouths. The Southern 
 column is repulsed after a bloody struggle, but it receives prompt 
 assistance. Lee mounts all of his troopers that are left him and- 
 gives the signal for the charge. In compliance with an order 
 from one of Hampton's aides-de-camp, the brigade of the latter 
 follows his example. This strong reinforcement is soon in the 
 middle of the plain in which Custer continues to fight : its arrival 
 gives the Confederates a momentary advantage. ]\Ieanwhile, 
 before even becoming engaged, the new-comers are exposed to the 
 fire of the artillery and of the Union skirmishers posted on their 
 right behind the fences. Gregg and ]McIntosh call their reserves, 
 remount a portion of their skirmishers, and hurl them upon 
 both flanks of the Southern column.* The combat with the 
 
 * On tlie part of Mclntosli's brigade, 'tlie Third Pennsylvania and First New 
 Jersey caviilry regiments had tlie heaviest part of the fighting, and in the final 
 charge assisted the First Michigan hy also charging inoiuiied with the sabre npon 
 both flanks of the Confederate colinnn. These regiments suffered severely. — Ed. 
 
GETTYSBURG. 229 
 
 steel becomes general ; the two columns force and repel each 
 other with desperate fury, without achieving any decided success. 
 Hampton, who has joined his brigade, is seriously wounded ; a 
 large number of officers of both armies fall around him. At 
 length the Federals fall back, but they thus unmask their artil- 
 lery, which compels the Southerners to beat a still more speedy 
 retreat. The ground so stubbornly disputed is abandoned by 
 both parties.* The Unionists have lost 736 men, of whom 112 
 are killed, 289 wounded, and 335 taken prisoners : Custer's 
 brigade has suifered the most. They have, hoAvever, accom- 
 plished their object and frustrated the plan of their adversaries. 
 By their first attack, and subsequently by their vigorous resist- 
 ance, they have interrupted Stuart's flank movement. The latter, 
 it is true, watches till evening to hear the sound of the cannon 
 which is to announce the defeat of the enemy. He still hopes to 
 be able to strike tlie Westminster road in the midst of the flying 
 Federals; but night at length comes to dissipate this pleasing 
 dream. He withdraws to the York road, for it is no longer an 
 object with him to destroy shattered battalions or to achieve a vic- 
 tory, but rather to cover the retreat of a decimated army and long 
 columns of wounded men. 
 
 In fact, when the sun sets over this bloody field for the third 
 time the decree of the God of armies has been irrevocably pro- 
 nounced. The Confederates feel themselves conquered; there- 
 fore, such must be the case. Their heroic efforts and the enor- 
 mous losses of their adversaries have not sufficed to secure victory 
 to them. The positions which the Federals have so well defend- 
 ed are in a strategic point of view only of secondary importance ; 
 but it having been rendered necessary for Lee to attack the 
 Army of the Potomac on the spot where he met it, these positions 
 have acquired a fortuitous value by enabling it to defend itself 
 with advantage. In order to drive this army completely van- 
 
 * In the official reports of Generals Pleasonton, Gregg, and Custer it is stated 
 that the Union cavalry remained masters of the field of the engagement, while 
 General Stuart claims in his report that tliey were driven from it. A detailed 
 account of this brilliant engagement is given by Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel 
 William Brooke-Rawle in The Bight F^lank at Oeitysburg. That writer, wlio was 
 present, asserts that the Confederates were driven back beyond tlie Eunimel 
 farm-buildings, which in the beginning of the fight had been in their posses- 
 sion, and that the position was held by the Unionists until the end. — Ed. 
 
230 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 quishcd on the Baltimore road, it Avould have been necessary to 
 conquer at least one of the three commanding points of its line 
 of defence — Gulp's Hill on the right, Cemetery Hill in the cen- 
 tre, or the Round Tops on the left. Everything has been tried ; 
 nothing has succeeded. Since the 2d, and, still later, the next 
 day, it was noticed that the troops did not go a second time into 
 action with the same ardor they had displayed in the first com- 
 bat, and on the evening of the 3d of July there only remained 
 two brigades that had not been engaged. Moreover, the anni- 
 hilation of Pickett's division, accomplished under the eyes of a 
 large portion of the army, leaves a profound impression among 
 all the spectators. A new hecatomb is all the advantage accruing 
 to the Union army, more numei'ous and more easily recruited 
 than that of Lee. In short, material considerations prevent the 
 Confederates from renewing the struggle. On the one hand, they 
 have to carry into Virginia all the booty gathered on the soil of 
 the free States, not for the mere sake of lucre, but through a 
 sagacious foresight, because the shoes, the clothes, and the cattle 
 obtained in Pennsylvania through requisitions will contribute 
 more to prolong the struggle than a barren victory. On the 
 other hand, the infantry ammunition has greatly diminished, 
 while that of the artillery is so reduced that the latter could not 
 keep up for more than an hour a cannonade like that of the 
 3d. Communications with Virginia are too uncertain for the 
 Confederates to rely on the arrival of supply-trains sent from 
 Richmond. Lee as a conqueror would have procured provisions 
 at the expense of the enemy ; being repulsed, he is obliged on 
 that account alone to return to Virginia ; an inexorable logic wills 
 it so. One may imagine the anguish of that heart so entirely 
 devoted to the cause it has espoused, and more passionately still 
 to the glory of the army which it animates with its own ardor 
 and which it has sustained in the midst of every trial. At the 
 moment when the stragglers are surrounding the general-in-chief 
 like an irresistible flood he has, so to speak, sacrificed himself in 
 order to rally his soldiers by telling them that he alone was 
 responsible for the disaster. But when the first emotion has 
 passed away, and the fear of an aggressive movement on the 
 part of the enemy has subsided, how bitter must have been his 
 
«!>• 
 
 GETTYSBURG. 231 
 
 own reflections ! Yonder, in front of him, in the midst of the 
 enemy's guns, lies that small clump of trees at the foot of which 
 Armistead has fallen mortally wounded ; there it is that the 
 onward march of the Army of Northern Virginia came to a 
 stop. Master of this point, it would undoubtedly have seen the 
 enemy's army abandon the battlefield to it, and would have been 
 able to cast a victorious glance over the Capitol of Washing- 
 ton and the spires which overlook the city of Philadelphia. 
 Peace imposed upon the government in the White House, every 
 one returning to his home happy and triumphant. — all this 
 brilliant vision, which he believed to be on the point of realiza- 
 tion, has vanished with the smoke that enveloped the combatants. 
 It has given place to gloomy prospects : the relinquishment of 
 that invasion which alone could save the Confederacy; the 
 avowal of defeat at the moment when Vicksburg, exhausted, is 
 about to deliver the keys of the Mississippi into the hands of 
 Grant ; the return to that unfortunate Virginia, unable to feed 
 her children in return for the blood they have shed for her. In 
 short, at the close of these trying campaigns, which have reduced 
 his brilliant army to a handful of veterans, does not Lee's per- 
 spicacity yet enable him to foresee as an inevitable result the 
 painful capitulation which in less than two years will mark the 
 fall of the Confederacy, and at the bottom of which he will be 
 obliged to affix his signature, a victim to his own self-devotion ? 
 Those who on that evening approach the general-in-chief may 
 indeed believe th^t a prophetic glance into the future has revealed 
 to him the end of the great drama, so much moral suffering is 
 depicted upon his features. ]\Iay he not say to himself that this 
 turn of the wheel of fortune, so rapid and irrevocable, would 
 not have taken place if the movements of his army had been 
 better managed, if it had not been developed on too long a line, 
 and if all his lieutenants had carried out his instructions with 
 their wonted zeal? 
 
 Fortunately for them, his soldiers do not share these gloomy 
 presentiments : while acknowledging their defeat, they entertain 
 no doubt as to the final success of the campaign, and are satisfied 
 that a new manoeuvre after Jackson's fashion will take them to 
 Baltimore. But Jackson is no longer in their midst, and while 
 
 Q 
 
232 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 these hopes of victory allay the agonies of the wounded, who are 
 lying in all the houses of the village and the adjoining farms, 
 since sunset the able-bodied soldiers have been ordered to take 
 the first step in retreat. The inhabitants of Gettysburg, who have 
 passed two days and a half in a terrible state of suspense, and 
 who, in order to follow the progress of the battle and to guess 
 on which side victory is leaning, have anxiously questioned the 
 countenances of their enemies located in their midst, find them- 
 selves suddenly delivered from doubt. Ewell, called back by 
 Lee, quickly abandons all his positions, and before daybreak he 
 has posted his three divisions north of the seminary on the Cash- 
 town road. Longstreet, on his part, has fallen back to the rear 
 of the orchard and the Emmettsburg road, so that on the morn- 
 ing of the 4th the whole Southern army occupies from north to 
 south, along the ridge of Seminary Hill, a straight line not much 
 extended and very solid. Intrenchments rapidly made render it 
 still stronger. Lee only seeks for temporary protection, for he 
 knows full well that every day of inaction in the presence of the 
 enemy will make his situation worse ; but while waiting for the 
 hour of retreat he can in this position brave his adversary if the 
 latter is imprudent enough to seek him there. His powerful 
 artillery, which is ranged along the ridge and is resting on the 
 edge of the wood, commands all the approaches ; his infantry, 
 placed in the rear, is completely sheltered ; Longstreet, with his 
 troops massed west of the orchard, no longer allows his right to 
 be turned. The Confederate cavalry protects the two ^vings of 
 the army ; Stuart, who has been obliged to make a detour north- 
 ward, not having been informed in time of Ewell's retreat, covers 
 the left flaiik with three brigades; Fitzhugh Lee, with the fourth, 
 has gone to Cash town to guard the supply-trains assembled at 
 that point ; Imboden, who, after a very useless effort at McCon- 
 nellsburg, has just joined the army with one brigade of cavalry, 
 a battery, and some infantry, protects on the south the extremity 
 of Lnngstreet's line ; finally, Robertson and Jones, returning to 
 the rear, occupy on the morning of the 4th the defiles of South 
 Mountain, which the army is about to cross. 
 
 In the mean time, as soon as nightfall has put an end to the 
 conflict, the Federals have applied themselves to the task of re- 
 
GETTYSBURG. 233 
 
 forming their regiments, rectifying their positions, and collecting 
 the wounded : Birney about nine o'clock has made a portion of 
 his soldiers, who are following the tracks of Wheaton's troops, 
 advance toward the battlefield, which is still covered with their 
 dead comrades. The night is cloudless, the full moon casts its 
 quiet light upon the motionless forms of those who are already 
 enjoying the sleep of eternity, or who, too weak to complain, are 
 awaiting death as a deliverance. But in spite of the horror of 
 such a spectacle this calm night is chiefly employed by the 
 exhausted combatants in resting safely. Every one is waiting 
 for daylight to see what the enemy is going to do. In the morn- 
 ing his concentration on Seminary Ridge is noticed. On the! 
 right, Slocum advances as far as the York road ; on the left, Sedg- 
 wick occupies the whole battlefield of the 2d; in the centre, 
 Howard, with a portion of the Eleventh corps, comes down from 
 his citadel into the town of Gettysburg. The cavalry is alone 
 pushed forward to feel the enemy. Buford and his first two 
 brigades start from Westminster early in the morning for Fred- 
 ericlv ; Merritt, with the third, leaves the battlefield to join him 
 at that place, whence they proceed in the direction of Williams- 
 port; Kilpatrick, taking with him Huey's brigade of Gregg's 
 division, besides his own two brigades, marches upon Monterey 
 by way of Emmettsburg ; Gregg's brigade watches the right, and 
 presently follows the Cash town road, the terminus of which 
 INIcIntosh occupies at the entrance of Gettysburg. As the day 
 is advancing, the Federals are enabled to examine the position of 
 their adversaries, and they soon find that, notwithstanding the 
 prestige of victory, by attacking it they would expose themselves 
 to as bloody a check as that which Magruder experienced when 
 he hurled his troops intoxicated with success upon the slopes of 
 IMalvern Hill. It is evident that, although imperceptible to 
 their view at this moment, Lee is nevertheless preparing for a 
 great movement. But is it a retreat or that grand flank march 
 which they have been dreading for the last two days ? In the 
 latter case they cannot abandon the positions whose preservation 
 has cost them so dearly before seeing the enemy in motion, in 
 order to surprise him in the midst of the operation. In the 
 former case, however expedient it might be to get in advance of 
 
234 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 the Confederates along the line of the Potomac, it is still neces- 
 sary, so long as they are within reach, to protect against an 
 aggressive return the thousands of wounded men who are lying 
 on the battlefield. If Meade had been aware of the numerical 
 superiority of his army, he might, while maintaining his posi- 
 tions, menace one of the enemy's flanks and thereby embarrass 
 his movements, wliatcver might be their object. The Sixth 
 corps, whi(;h has not suffered severely, reinforced by Crawford's 
 division, might from seven in the morning operate against Leo's 
 extreme right, and would thus be advantageously posted for the 
 purpose of harassing him during liis retreat. 
 
 The indications by which the instincts of a true soldier enable 
 him to fathom tlie projects of his adversaries should not have left 
 Meade in any kind of uncertainty regarding the impending retreat 
 of the Southern army : the movements of the supply-trains of the 
 enemy, and the reports of the inhabitants coming from within 
 the Confederate lines, must have enlightened him : in short, he 
 should have listened to the almost unanimous sentiment of his 
 army, which only asked to be led forward, for in such cases the 
 judgment of all is generally correct. But the Federal staff, 
 attributing very different designs to the adversary, is only 
 preparing against fresh attacks. Toward noon, while the two 
 armies are thus watching each other, torrents of rain pour down 
 upon them, breaking up the roads and fields and rendering it 
 impossible for the artillery to manoeuvre with rapidity. This is 
 a new source of suffering for the fatigued and ill-fed soldiers, 
 and each man only thinks of securing shelter to the best of his 
 ability against the storm thus suddenly let loose. 
 
 Lee avails himself of this respite imposed by the elements to 
 complete his preparations for the slow and methodical retreat 
 which he has no longer any interest in delaying. All the neces- 
 sary orders are issued for the army to be on the march at sunset. 
 The large supply-trains, containing provisions and booty, assem- 
 bled at Cashtown, are directed toward Chambersburg. The 
 facility with which they again cross the chain of South JNIoun- 
 tain shows that Lee did not mention the real motives of the 
 attack of the 2d when he alleged the impossibility of falling 
 back as far as the w^estern slope of the mountains with his sup- 
 
GETTYSBURG. 235 
 
 ply-trains. There are two routes behind him — that of Chani- 
 bersburg at the north, and that of Fairfield at the south : the 
 latter is the shortest and covers the first. This is the one which 
 the entire army will follow — Hill at the head, followed by I^ong- 
 street, and the latter by Ewell, who closes the march. During 
 this time the wounded who can bear transportation are crowded 
 into all kinds of vehicles : with the exception of those loaded 
 w4th ammunition all the wagons that have followed the aimy 
 join this convoy, which starts along the Cashtown road, where 
 it overtakes the remainder of the train of the army. Imboden, 
 with fresh troops of both infantry and cavalry, is entrusted 
 with the difficult mission of escorting through a hostile country 
 this immense column comprising ten thousand beasts of burden 
 and nearly sixteen miles in length : he conducts it, without any 
 halt, by way of Chambersburg and Hagerstown, to the banks 
 of the Potomac, crossing the river over the bridge of boats which 
 the army has left at Williamsport, and brings it to Winchester. 
 Lee gives him several batteries of artillery to assist in the execu- 
 tion of this task, and entrusts him with his first report to President 
 Davis. At four o'clock in the afternoon the head of column 
 takes up the line of march westward, and when, about midnight, 
 it overtakes the other supply-trains on the other side of Cash- 
 town, the rear has not yet left the neighborhood of the battle- 
 field. It is a terrible night for the thousands of victims whom 
 a ftxlse point of honor urges forward, either willingly or unwill- 
 ingly, in the track of the vanquislied army. Happy those who 
 are deemed so seriously wounded as to be left in the hands of the 
 enemy ! The mournful procession moves slowly along the rough 
 roads in the midst of the storm, which is drowning the complaints 
 of the wounded, and an intense darkness which screens their pale 
 countenances from observation. There is no one near to assist 
 them, for all able-bodied men have remained in the ranks ; only 
 at long intervals a platoon doing guard-duty is marching silently 
 alongside of the wagons wdth head bent, but musket ready, for 
 some kind of surprise may be expected any moment. When the 
 march is interrupted by some obstacle, the occasion is taken 
 advantage of to unload the bodies of those who have just expired 
 and give them a hasty burial. Another column, composed of two 
 
236 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 thoiisand able-bodied Federal prisoners, whom Lee cannot take 
 along M'ith him, and whom he releases on paroles irregularly- 
 given, is ])roeeeding at the same time in the direction of Harris- 
 burg, with an escort wliich is to deliver them to the proper 
 authorities at the first Union post. 
 
 While the Confederates are thus beginning their retreat, Meade 
 has summoned anotlier council of war : he wishes to consult his 
 generals regarding the condition of the army and what may be 
 expected from it the next day. The seven army corps, which a 
 few days before the battle numbered eighty-six thousand men 
 under arms, both infantry and artillery, and which had since 
 received a reinforcement of four thousand, can only produce a 
 total effective of fifty-one thousand five hundred and fourteen 
 men on the morning of the 4th. There are therefore thirty- 
 eight thousand wanting at the roll-call. Out of this number, 
 about fifteen thousand are neither killed nor wounded nor taken 
 prisoners : they are stragglers left along the roads during the 
 late marches, deserters who have left their comrades, or men that 
 have strayed and been separated from their regiments during the 
 fight. They will all no doubt again join their colors, but they 
 will not be present the next day to take part in any operation, 
 while their number shows the disorganization of certain army 
 corps. " Must we remain at Gettysburg, or, without waiting 
 for the movements of the enemy, undertake to-morrow either a 
 manoeuvre on his flank or make an attack against his front ? If 
 he retires, must we follow him directly, or try to reach Williams- 
 port in advance of him by way of the Emmettsburg road ?" Such 
 are the questions put by Meade to his council. The unanimous de- 
 cision is not to approach the enemy, either directly or by attack- 
 ing him, if he remains in his positions, nor follow the same route 
 if he retires. Opinions in regard to other points being divided, 
 Meade determines to wait twenty-four hours longer, and if the en- 
 emy retreats to follow him on his flank by way of Emmettsburg. 
 The Confederate general does not allow him to remain long in 
 suspense : on the morning of the 5th his army had ditappeared, 
 Seminary R.idge was deserted, and the battle of Gettysburg ended. 
 
 We have seen how this battle was brought about, and, without 
 pretending to say that the Confederates ought to have come out 
 
GETTYSBURG. 237 
 
 victorious, we have pointed out the errors which rendered their 
 defeat inevitable : we will once more rapidly enumerate those 
 errors. The principal cause of the defeat was the absence of 
 Stuart, which produced the fortuitous encounter at Gettysburg, 
 delaying the concentration of the army, and rendering it impos- 
 sible for that army either to resume a defensive position along 
 South ]\Iountain, where IMeade would have been obliged to attack 
 it, or to manoeuvre in order to dislodge him from those he oc- 
 cupied. Lee, who had four brigades of cavalry with him, failed 
 to turn them to account : he left Robertson and Jones in Vir- 
 ginia, and sent Imboden as far as possible from the enemy, only 
 retaining Jenkins, who at the critical moment found himself in 
 the rear of the infantry. After the battle of the 1st of July the 
 excessive confidence which most of his lieutenants and all his 
 soldiers shared with him made him forget the numerical inferior- 
 ity of his army and the difficulties which the ground interposed 
 against his usual tactics. This open country, affording command- 
 ing positions, rendered all disguised marches and sudden attacks 
 impracticable, and required a perfect harmony of action in the 
 movements in order to secure success. Lee did wrong in giving 
 his line too large an extension and a concave form, which ren- 
 dered all communications from one extremity to the other very 
 slow : he made matters worse by directing the principal attacks 
 by his two wings. Desiring to strike Gulp's Hill and men- 
 ace the Round Tops at the same time, he was unable to suf- 
 ficiently outflank either of these two points ; then, after having 
 failed in both instances, he hurled a portion of his troops, com- 
 paratively so weak as to be doomed to certain destruction, against 
 the centre of Lleade's line, where the latter could easily bring 
 together a large portion of his army; finally, whether his orders 
 were issued too late, or that he was unable to make himself under- 
 stood or obeyed by his subordinates, he lost two days, the 2d and 
 3d, in making useless preparations. The extreme independence 
 which he encouraged among his corps commanders, and Avhich 
 the division and brigade generals imitated in their turn, rendered 
 the best conceived plans and the most daring efforts fruitless. 
 During the day of the 2d, Longstreet, after beginning his attack 
 too late, failed to engage the whole of McLaws' division in time 
 
238 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 to sui)port that of Hood ; Eodcs and Early, although close to 
 each other, did not attack Cemetery Hill together; the Third 
 corps, with the exception of three brigades, afforded no assistance 
 to the troops engaged on its right and left. On the 3d, Long- 
 street, while reluctantly executing the orders of his chief, did not 
 give to Pickett's desperate attack the support of all the force 
 placed at his disposal, and did not cause any diversion to be made 
 in his favor by the two divisions under Hood and ]McLaws. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac undoubtedly achieved a victory 
 because it had the double advantage of numbers and the defen- 
 sive ; but this advantage had not prevented its being beaten at 
 Chancellorsville. It conquered at Gettysburg because chance 
 afforded it strong positions, which Buford and Reynolds pre- 
 served for it, and which Meade turned to excellent account. 
 Eight days after his appointment this fortunate chieftain gave 
 his soldiers a decisive victory: there was the less reason for 
 begrudging him his glory because, being born on European soil, 
 he could not aspire to the Presidency,* which fact prevented poli- 
 ticians who were ambitious of attaining that position from harbor- 
 ing jealousy toward him. He was not indebted for this victory 
 either to the inspirations of genius or to the possession of extra- 
 ordinary qualities. But he knew how to use all the forces under 
 his command : his lieutenants, according to their own testimony, 
 felt that they were at last well handled, while, on their part, hav- 
 ing always entertained pleasant relations with their old comrade, 
 
 * Gen. Meade was born Dec. 31, 1815, at Cadiz, Spain, where his parents, who 
 were American citizens, temporarily resided. His father, Richard W. Meade, 
 at the time held the appointment of United States Naval Agent at the port of 
 Cadiz, and Gen. Meade was born under the American flag. 
 
 Whatever question there may be as to what tlie law might have been at the 
 time of Gen. Mende's birth, the reverse of what is stated in the text seems to 
 have bten settled by the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855, the passage of 
 which was brougiit about by a pamphlet written by the late Horace Binney in 
 1853, on The AUtnigenos. of the United States. That act provides that "all chil- 
 dren heretofore born .... out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, 
 whose fathers were .... at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to 
 be citizens of tlie United States;" that is, they are declared to be naturnl-born citi- 
 zens as contradistinguished from naturalized citizens, and the Constitution pro- 
 vides that " no person except a natural-born citizen shall be eligible to the office 
 of President." — Ed. 
 
GETTYSBURG. 239 
 
 they gave him the most devoted support. If success, however, 
 covered the faults committed by Meade, which may be palliated 
 on account of his recent appointment, that is no reason M'hy we 
 should ignore them. On the 1st of July he should have gone to 
 Gettysburg himself, instead of sending Hancock there : the con- 
 centration of the army would have been effected with more speed ; 
 on the morning of the 2d he indicated in too vague terms the 
 position which Sickles was to occupy, and on finding that this 
 general considered that position bad he should have gone to 
 examine it in person, without waiting to be summoned there by 
 the combat ; at a later period he should not have deprived the 
 right wing of Geary and his two brigades ; on the 3d, when he 
 saw Pickett advancing, he had a quarter of an hour's time to pre- 
 pare for his reception : he does not appear to have had the slight- 
 est idea of the point where his line would be attacked, and con- 
 sequently came very near having it pierced ; finally, if in the 
 evening, instead of throwing a single brigade forward, he had 
 launched three divisions against Longstreet's right, as he coidd 
 have done, his victory would have been more decisive. 
 
 The strength of the two armies has given rise to lively discus- 
 sions. The returns, used at the North and South in similar forms, 
 have been increased by some and reduced by others at their own 
 pleasure. These returns were under three heads : the first rep- 
 resented the total number of officers and soldiers inscribed on the 
 rolls, whether absent or present ; the second represented those 
 present on active duty, comprising all men who were in the 
 field-hospitals, under arrest, or detached on special service ; the 
 third contained the real number of combatants present under 
 arms. The first head was therefore cjuite fictitious ; the second 
 mentioned the number of men to be fed in the army, including 
 non-combatants ; the third, the effective force that could be 
 brought on the battlefield. The latter number is evidently the 
 most, important to know, but, as we have observed, it varied 
 greatly, for a long march in a week of bad weather was sufficient 
 to fill the hospitals. In ordinary times it was from twelve to 
 eighteen per cent, less than under the second head. It did not 
 even always represent exactly the precise number of combatants : 
 in fact, when, after a long march, the stragglers did not answer 
 
 Vol. III.— 4i 
 
Hurk ( Arf'Ir.dy' I'l'-I'" 
 
240 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 to roll-call, tliey were not immediately set down as deserters, 
 which would have caused them to lose a portion of their pay ; 
 a few days' grace were granted to them, and the result was that 
 thousands of soldiers separated from their commands followed the 
 army at a distance, unable to take part in any battle, and yet fig- 
 uring ou the returns as able-bodied combatants. In this respect 
 there was much more tolerance shown in the Union army than 
 among the Confederates ; on this account the falling off in the num- 
 ber of combatants is a new source of mistakes and discussions. 
 
 We have stated that this diminution amounted to thirteen thou- 
 sand for the Army of the Potomac between the 10th of June and 
 the 4th of July. We will spare the reader the details of our 
 calculations, simply presenting the figures that have been given 
 us, which we believe to be as near the truth as possible. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac, without French's division, which 
 had not gone beyond Frederick, numbered on its returns on 
 the 30th of June 167,251 men, more than 21,000 of whom 
 Avere ou detached service and nearly 28,000 in the hospitals. 
 The number of men present with their corps was 112,988, and 
 that of men under arms, 99,475; but this last figure included 
 those doing duty at head-quarters, who formed a total of 2750 
 men who could not be counted among the combatants. Stan- 
 nard's and Lockwood's brigades having brought Meade a rein- 
 forcement of about five thousand men on the 1st of July, the 
 effective forces borne on the returns may be stated as follows: 
 
 Troops taking no part in battle 2,750 
 
 Artillery 7,000 
 
 Cavalrv 10,500 
 
 Infantry 85.500 
 
 Total 105,750 
 
 And 352 pieces of artillery. 
 
 The artillery and infantry, which were alone seriously engaged, 
 even on the battlefield of Gettysburg, form, therefore, a total of 
 about ninety-one thousand men and three hundred and twenty- 
 seven pieces of cannon, Meade having left twenty-five heavy 
 guns in reserve at Westminster. But in order to ascertain the 
 real number of combatants that the Union general could bring 
 into line, it is proper to deduct from three to four thousand 
 left as additional guards near the supply-trains, the batteries 
 
GETTYSBURG. 241 
 
 remaining at Westminster, and for all men detached on extra 
 duty, and from four to five thousand for the stragglers entered 
 on the returns. The latter were the much more numerous on 
 account of the fact that, the returns having only been prepared at 
 the end of July, all those who joined the army after the battle 
 were entered as being j^resent ; so that these rolls only represent 
 the number of those absent without leave at the totally insignif- 
 icant figure of 3292. This deduction makes the effective forces of 
 Meade amount to from eighty-two to eighty-four thousand men. 
 
 The Army of Northern Virginia on the 31st of May, 1863, 
 contained an effective force of 88,754 officers and soldiers present, 
 74,468 of whom were under arms. The latter consisted of — ■ 
 
 General staff and infantry 59,420 
 
 Cavalry 10,292 
 
 Artillery 4,756 
 
 Total 74,468 
 
 And 206 pieces of artillery. 
 
 During the month of June its effective force was increased by 
 the return of a certain number of sick, who, thanks to the mild 
 weather, had been restored to health, and those who had been 
 wounded at the battle of Chancellorsville, by the arrival of 
 recruits, the result of the conscription law, and by the addition 
 of four brigades — two of infantry under Pettigrew and Davis, 
 one of cavalry under Jenkins, and one made up of mixed troops 
 under Imboden. The first was nearly four thousand strong; 
 that of Davis, consisting of four regiments which are not borne 
 on the returns of the 31st of May, although two of them had for- 
 merly belonged to the army, numbered about twenty-two hun- 
 dred men ; the other two contained each about the same effective 
 force. The increase of artillery amounted to fifteen batteries, 
 comprising sixty-two pieces of cannon and about eight hundred 
 men. On the other hand, this effective force was diminished 
 first by the absence of Corse's brigade of Pickett's division and 
 one regiment of Pettigrew's brigade left at Hanover Junction, 
 and three regiments of Early's division left at Winchester — 
 say, about three thousand five hundred men ; then by the losses 
 sustained in the battles of Fleetwood, Winchester, and Aldie, 
 amounting to fourteen hundred men ; finally, by the admission 
 to the hospitals of men unable to bear the fatigue of the long 
 
242 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 marches ■whicli the army liad to make, and by the absence of those 
 who, vokmtarily or otherwise, reiiiahied beliind durhig these 
 marches. It is difficult to reckon precisely the number of the 
 disabled, of strag^'lcrs, and of deserters that the tirmy had lost dur- 
 ing the month of June. Private information and the comparison 
 of some figures lead us to believe that it was not very large, and 
 did not exceed five per cent, of the eifectivc force of the army — 
 say three thoasand seven hundred and fifty men in all. A^^e can 
 therefore estimate the diminution of the army at about three 
 thousand seven hundred men on the one hand, and its increase 
 on the other hand, by the addition of three brigades and some 
 artillery, at seven thousand. We believe that the difference of 
 seventeen hundred between these two figures must be lessened at 
 least from one thousand to twelve hundred by the return of the 
 sick and wounded and the arrival of a number of conscripts; 
 that, consequently, the Army of Northern Virginia arrived on 
 the battlefield of Gettysburg wdth about five thousand combat- 
 ants more than it had on the 31st of May, 1863 — that is to say, 
 in the neighborhood of eighty thousand men. As we have done 
 in regard to the Federal army in order to find out the amount of 
 force really assembled on the battlefield, we will deduct the num- 
 ber of mounted men, which was increased by Jenkins' and Imbo- 
 den's forces, and reduced in the same proportion,* making about 
 eleven thousand men ; and we may conclude that during the first 
 three days of July, 1863, Lee brought from sixty-eight to sixty- 
 nine thousand men and two hundred and fifty gunsf against the 
 eighty-two or eighty-four thousand Unionists with three hundred 
 guns collected on this battlefield. Meade had, therefore, from 
 eighteen to nineteen thousand men more than his adversary — ^a 
 superiority of nearly one-fourth, which, unfortunately for him, 
 he was unable to turn to advantage. 
 
 The losses on both sides were nearly equal, and enormous for 
 the number of combatants engaged, for they amounted to twenty- 
 seven per cent, on the side of the Federals, and more than 
 
 * Twelve hundred cavalrymen lost in the battles of Fleetwood, A Idle, Upper- 
 ville, and Hanover, two hundred maimed or sick. 
 
 f These figures relate to the guns actually on the battlefield, deducting those 
 attached to Stuart's command on the one hand and to Pleasonton's on the other. 
 
GETTYSBURG. 243 
 
 thirty-six per cent, for the Confederates. Upon this point also 
 the official reports are precise. The Federals lost 2834 killed, 
 13,709 wounded, and 6645 prisoners — 23,186 men in all; the 
 Confederates, 2665 killed, 12,599 wounded, and 7464 missing — 
 22,728 men in all ; which, with the 300 men killed or wounded 
 in the cavalry on the 2d and 3d, foot up their total losses at a 
 little more than 23,000 men ; that is to say, precisely the same 
 number as those of their adversaries. These figures, however, do 
 not yet convey a correct idea of the injury the two armies had 
 inflicted upon each other in these bloody battles. Thus, while the 
 Federal reports acknowledge only 2834 killed, the reports made 
 by the hospitals bear evidence to the burial of 3575 Union 
 corpses : the number of dead in the Army of the Potomac may 
 be estimated at about four thousand, one thousand or eleven hun- 
 dred having died of their wounds. On the other hand, Meade has 
 13,621 Confederate prisoners, but, as there are 7262 wounded 
 among them, there only remains 6359 able-bodied men ; the num- 
 ber of 7464 reckoned by Lee as the number of men missing must 
 therefore represent, besides these able-bodied prisoners, most of 
 the men seriously wounded during the attack made by Pickett 
 and Heth and abandoned on the battlefield. We must therefore 
 estimate the number of Confederate wounded to more than thir- 
 teen thousand six hundred. It is reasonable to suppose that 
 after the combat the number of their dead increased more rap- 
 idly for a few days than in the Union army. 
 
 The battle wdiich was so murderous for all was particularly so 
 for those superior officers who had most gallantly exposed them- 
 selves on both sides and had fallen by the hundreds. The Con- 
 federates lost seventeen generals, thirteen of whom were wound- 
 ed, three killed, and one captured. The Federals had ten gen- 
 erals wounded, two of them slightly, two more being left in the 
 hands of the enemy, without counting Schimmelpfennig, who 
 remained concealed for three days in Gettysburg. Five generals 
 were wounded, one of whom was a corps commander ; four col- 
 onels in command of brigades were killed and one wounded — 
 twenty officers in all wearing the stars of generals or performing 
 the duties of that rank. The Confederates left forty-one stands of 
 colors and three guns in the hands of their adversaries; a few flags 
 
244 THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA. 
 
 less and five or six guns constituted the trophies which bore evidence 
 to their gallantly Avithout compensating them for their defeat. 
 
 In the mean while, the North was anxiously waiting for the 
 result of the great conflict. Uneasiness and excitement were per- 
 ceptible everywhere ; terror prevailed in all those places believed 
 to be witliin the reach of the invaders. Rumor and fear exag- 
 gerated their number, and the remembrance of their success 
 caused them to be deemed invincible. In those localities where 
 devotion to the Union or the anti-slavery sentiment predominated 
 all able-bodied men were arming and enlisting. But there were 
 many districts whose secret sympathies w^ere in favor of the 
 Secessionists: people only waited for Lee's victories to openly 
 announce them. Fortunately for the Federal government, the 
 most turbulent individuals had joined the Southern army at the 
 beginning of the war; leaders were wanting to entice the rest. 
 But this was not the case in the large cities of the East, which 
 contained all the elements for a terrible insurrection. This 
 insurrection was expected to break out iu New York, despite 
 Lee's defeat : one may judge from this wliat it would have been 
 if Lee had achieved a victory. On the 4th of July, the day 
 when America celebrates the anniversary of her independence, a 
 proclamation of President Lincoln, wa-itten in that simple and noble 
 style of which at times he seemed to possess the secret, announced 
 to the people of the North that the invasion of the free States 
 had been stopped. Three days later it was learned that at the same 
 hour Pemberton had capitulated with his army and the citadel of 
 Vicksburg. Joy was the more keenly felt because the danger had 
 been so great. The war was about to enter into a new phase. 
 
 The South, however, on learning her disasters, did not allow 
 herself to become discouraged. She had gone too far to stop, 
 and still believed in her ability to tire out her adversaries. The 
 latter, it is true, were very far as yet from having achieved that 
 decisive success which alone could put an end to the war to their 
 advantage, while the inhabitants of the North, who, in the plen- 
 itude of their joy, already believed Lee's army ready to lay down 
 its arms, were harboring great illusions. This compact army, 
 resolute and formidable despite its losses, was destined to hold in 
 check for a long time yet the conquerors of Gettysburg. 
 
<^ 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Itinerary of the Army of the Potomac and Co-operathig Forces in the 
 Gettysburg Campaign, June and July, 1863. 
 
 June 5. 
 The Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major-general Joseph Hooker, 
 with headquarters near Falmouth, was posted on the north bank of the Rappa- 
 hannock River, confronting the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, under 
 General Robert E. Lee, mainly concentrated about the town of Fredericksburg, 
 on the south bank of the river. The several commands of the Army of tiie 
 Potomac were distributed as follows: Fii-st corps (Reynolds'), in the vicinity 
 of White Oak Church; Second corps (Couch's), near Falmouth; Third corps 
 (Birney's), at Boscobel, near Falmouth; Fifth corps (Meade's), in the vicinity 
 of Banks', United States, and adjacent fords on the Rappahannock ; Sixth corps 
 (Sedgwick's), near White Oak Church, with the Second division (Howe's) thrown 
 forward to Franklin's Crossing of tlie Rappahannock, a little below Fredericks- 
 burg, near the mouth of Deep Run; Eleventh corps (Howard's), near Brooke's 
 Station, on the Aquia Creek Railroad; and the Twelfth corps (Slocum's), near 
 Stafford Court-house and Aquia Landing. The cavalry corps (Pleasonton's, 
 with headquarters at- Manassas Junction) had two divisions (Duffie's and Gregg's), 
 and the cavalry reserve brigade, all under Buford, in the vicinity of Warrenton 
 Junction, and one division (Davis') in the neighborhood of Brooke's Station. 
 The artillerj' reserve (R. O. Tyler's) was near Falmouth. 
 
 June 6." 
 Howe's (Second) division. Sixth army corps, crossed the Rappahannock at 
 Franklin's Crossing, and after a skirmish occupied the enemy's rifle-pits. 
 Wright's (First) and Newton's (Third) divisions of the same corps moved to the 
 same point from White Oak Church, taking position on the north bank of the 
 river. 
 
 June 7. 
 Wright's (First) division. Sixth corps, was sent across the Rappahannock at 
 Franklin's Crossing, relieving Howe's (Second) division, which returned to the 
 north side. 
 
 June 8. 
 The cavalry corps (Pleasonton's), consisting of Buford's (First), D. McM. 
 Gregg's (Third), and DufSe's (Second) divisions, and the regular reserve brigade, 
 supported by detachments of infantry under Generals Adelbert Ames and David 
 A. Russell, moved to Kelly's and Beverly Fords, preparatory to crossing the 
 Rappahannock on a reconnoissance toward Culpeper. 
 
 Copyright, 1886, by Porter & Coates. 
 
 245 
 
246 ^ ADDENDA. 
 
 June 9. 
 
 Newton's (Third) division, Sixth corps, relieved Wright's (First) division on 
 tlie soutii baniv of the Kappahannock at Franklin's Crossing. The cavalry 
 corps, supported by Generals Ames' and Russell's infantry, crossed the Kappa- 
 liannock at Kelly's and Beverly Fords, fought the enemy at or near Beverly 
 Ford, Brandy Station, and Stevensburg, and recrossed the river at Kappahan- 
 nock Station and Beverly Ford. 
 
 June 10. 
 
 The cavalry corps took position in the neighborhood of Warrenton Junction. 
 Its infantry supports in the reconnoissance of the day previous rejoined their 
 respective commands. Howe's (Second) division, Sixth corps, moved from 
 Franklin's Crossing to Aquia Creek. 
 
 June 11. 
 The Third corps marched from Boscobel, near Falmouth, to Ilartwood Church. 
 
 June 12. 
 
 The First corps marched from Fitzhugh's plantation and White Oak Church 
 to Deep Run ; the Third corps, from Hartwood Church to Bealeton, with llum- 
 phreys' (Third) division advanced to the Rappahannock ; the Eleventh corps, 
 from the vicinity of Brooke's Station to Hartwood Church ; and headquarters 
 cavalry corps, fi'ora Manassas Junction to W^arrenton Junction. 
 
 The advance of the Confederate Army skirmished with the Union troops at 
 Newtown, Cedarville, and Middletown in the Shenandoah Valley. 
 
 June 13. 
 The First corps marched from Deep Run to Bealeton ; the Fifth corps, from 
 the vicinity of Banks' Ford, vid Grove Church, toward Morrisville ; Wright's 
 (First) and Newton's (Third) divisions, Sixth corps, from Franklin's Crossing 
 to Potomac Creek ; the Eleventh , corps, from Hartwood Church to Catlett's 
 Station ; the Twelfth corps, from near Stafford Court-house and Aquia Creek 
 Landing en route to Dumfries ; Wyndham's brigade of Gregg's cavalry division, 
 from W^arrenton Junction to Warrenton ; and the artillery reserve, from near 
 Falmouth to Staflbrd Court-house. McReynolds' (Third) brigade of Milroy's 
 division. Eighth army corps, marched from BeiTyville to Winchester. 
 
 Combats: Skirmishes at "White Post, Perryville, Opequon Creek, and at Bunker Hill, and 
 engagement (first day) at Winchester, Virginia. 
 
 June 14. 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from near Falmouth to Dumfries ; 
 the First and Third corps marched from Bealeton to Manassas Junction ; the 
 Fifth corps arrived at Morrisville, and marched thence, vid Bristersburg, to Cat- 
 lett's Station ; Wright's (First) and Newton's (Third) divisions. Sixth corps, 
 moved from Potomac Creek to Stafford Court-house ; the Eleventh corps, from 
 Catlett's Station to Manassas Junction, and thence toward Centreville; the 
 Twelfth corps reached Dumfries ; and the artillery reserve moved from Stafford 
 
ADDENDA. 247 
 
 Court-house to Wolf Eun Shoals. Daniel Tyler's command, of the Eighth army 
 corps, fell back from Martinsburg to Maiyland Heights. 
 
 Combats : Skirmishes at Martinsburg and Berry ville, and engagement (second day) at Win- 
 chester, Virginia. 
 
 June 15. 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Dumfries to Fairfax Station ; 
 the Second corps (Hancock's * ) moved from Falmouth to near Aquia ; the Fifth 
 corps, from Catlett's Station,' vid Bristoe Station, to Manassas Junction ; the 
 Sixth corps, from Aquia Creek and Stafford Court-house to Dumfries ; the 
 Twelfth corps, from Dumfries to Fairfax Court-house; the cavalry corps f 
 (except Wyndham's brigade, which marched from Warrenton to Manassas 
 Junction, and thence, on 16th, to Union Mills), from Warrenton Junction to 
 Union Mills and Bristoe Station ; the artillery reserve, from Wolf Eun Shoals 
 to Fairfax Court-house ; and the Eleventh corps arrived at Centreville. 
 Milroy's (Second) division of the Eighth army corps evacuated Winchester 
 and fell back to Maryland Heights and Hancock, Maryland. 
 
 Combats : Skirmish near Williamsport, Maryland, and engagement (third day) at Winchester, 
 Virginia. 
 
 June 16. 
 
 The Second corps marched from near Aquia, vid Dumfries, to Wolf Eun 
 Shoals, on the Occoquan ; the Sixth corps, from Dumfries to Fairfax Station ; 
 and the cavalry corps, from Union Mills and Bristoe Station to Manassas Junc- 
 tion and Bull Eun. 
 
 June 17. 
 
 The First corps marched from Manassas Junction to Herndon Station ; the 
 Second corps, from Wolf Eun Shoals to Sangster's Station ; the Third corps, 
 from Manassas Junction to Centreville ; the Fifth corps, from Manassas Junc- 
 tion to Gum Springs ; the Eleventh corps, from Centreville to Cow-Horn Ford, 
 or Trappe Eock, on Goose Creek ; and the Twelfth corps, from Fairfax Court- 
 house to near Dranesville. The cavalry corps moved from Manassas Junction 
 and Bull Eun to Aldie. 
 
 Combats: Action at Aldie, Virginia, and skirmishes at Catoctin Creek and Point of Rocks, 
 Maryland, and at Thoroughfare Gap and Middleburg, Virginia. 
 
 June 18. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Fairfax Station to Fairfax 
 Court-house ; the Sixth corps, from Fairfax Station to Germantown ; and the 
 Twelfth corps, from near Dranesville to Lecsburg. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade 
 advanced from Aldie to Middleburg, and returned to a point midway between 
 the two places. 
 
 Combats: Skirmishes at Middleburg and Aldie, Virginia. 
 
 * General Hancock assumed command of the Second corps June 9, 1863, succeeding General 
 Couch, who was assigned to the command of the Department of the Susquehanna. 
 
 + By orders of June 1.3, 1863, this corps was reduced from three to two divisions, commanded 
 by Brigadier-generals John Buford and D. McM. Gregg. 
 
 B 
 
248 ADDENDA. 
 
 June 19. 
 
 Tlie First corps marclied from Herndon Station to Guilford Station ; the Third 
 corps, from Centreville to Giini Springs; and the Fifth corps, from Gum Springs 
 to Aldie. Gregg's cavalry division, except Mcintosh's (late Wyndham's) brigade, 
 advanced to Middlebnrg. Mcintosh's brigade moved from Aldie to Haymarket. 
 
 Combats: Action at Middleburg, Virginia. 
 
 June 20. 
 
 The Second corps moved from Sangster's Station to Centreville, and thence 
 toward Thoroughfare Gap ; the Second division (Howe's), Sixth corps, from 
 Germantown to Bristoe Station. ^ 
 
 Combats: Skirmisli at Middletown, Maryland. 
 
 June 21. 
 The Second corps arrived at Gainesville and Thoronghfare Gap. The cavalry 
 corps (except Mcintosh's brigade of Gregg's division), supported by Barnes' 
 (First) division, Fifth corps, marched from Aldie and Middlebvirg to Upperville. 
 Mcintosh's cavalry brigade marched from Haymarket to Aldie, and thence to 
 Upperville. Stahel's division of cavalry, from the defences of Wasliington, 
 moved from Fairfax Court-house, vid Centreville and Gainesville, to Buckland 
 Mills. 
 
 Combats: Skirmislies at Gainesville, Tiiorouglifare Gap, and Haymarket, Virginia; Fred- 
 erick, Maryland ; and engagement at Upperville, Virginia. 
 
 June 22. 
 
 The cavalry corps and Barnes' (First) division of the Fifth corps returned 
 from Upperville to Aldie. Stahel's cavalry division moved from Buckland 
 Mills, vid New Baltimore, to Warrenton. 
 
 Combats: Skirmishes near Dover and Aldie, Virginia, and at Greencastle, Pennsylvania. 
 
 June 23. 
 Stahel's cavalry division moved from Warrenton, vid Gainesville, to Fairfex 
 Court-house. 
 
 June 24, 
 
 Newton's (Third) division, Sixth corps, moved from Germantown to Centre- 
 ville, and the Eleventh corps, from Cow-Horn Ford, or Trappe Rock, on Goose 
 Creek, to the south bank of the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry. Stahel's cavalry 
 division moved from Fairfax Court-house to near Dranesville. 
 
 Combats: Skirmisli at Sharpsburg, Maryland. 
 
 June 25. 
 The First corps marched from Guilford Station, Virginia, to Barnesville, 
 Maryland ; the Third corps, from Gum Springs, Virginia, to the north side of 
 the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry and the mouth of the Monocacy ; the Eleventh 
 corps, from Edwards' Ferry, Virginia, to Jefferson, Maryland ; and the artillery 
 reserve, from Fairfax Court-house, Virginia, to near Poolesvilie, Maryland. 
 These commands crossed the Potomac at I-xlwards' Ferry. The Second corps 
 marched from Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville to Gum Springs. Howe's 
 
ADDENDA. 249 
 
 (Second) division, Sixtli corps, moved from Bristoe Station to Centreville ; Craw- 
 ford's division (two brigades) of Pennsylvania Reserves, from the defences of 
 Washington, marclied from Fairfax Station and Upton's Hill to Vienna. Stan- 
 nard's Vei'mont brigade, from the defences at Washington, left the mouth of the 
 Occoquan en route to join the Army of the Potomac. Stahel's cavalry division 
 moved from near Dranesville, Virginia, vid Yotmg's Island Ford, on the Poto- 
 mac, en route to Frederick City, Maryland. 
 
 Combats: Skirmishes at Thorouglifare Gap and Hayinarket, Virginia, and near McCounells- 
 burg, PeDDsylvania. 
 
 June 26. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Fairfax Court-house, Vir- 
 ginia, vid Di-anesville and Edwards' Ferry, to Poolesville, Maryland ; the First 
 corps, from Barnesville to Jefferson, Maryland ; the Second corps, from Gum 
 Springs, Virginia, to the nortli side of the Potomac at Edwards' Ferry; the 
 Third corps, from the mouth of the Monocacy to Point of Rocks, Maryland; the 
 P'ifth corps, from Aldie, Virginia, vid Carter's Mills, Leesburg, and Edwards' 
 Ferry, to within four miles of the moutii of the Monocacy, Maryland; the Sixth 
 corps, from Germantown and Centreville to Dranesville, Virginia; the Eleventh 
 corps, from Jefferson to Middletown, Maryland ; the Twelfth corps, from Lees- 
 burg, Virginia, vid Edwards' Ferry, to the mouth of the Monocacy, Maryland ; 
 and tlie cavalry corps (Buford's and Gregg's divisions), from Aldie to Leesburg, 
 Virginia. Stahel's cavalry division was en route between the Potomac and Fred- 
 erick City, Maryland. Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves moved from Vienna 
 to Goose Creek, Virginia. 
 
 Combats: Skirmish near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. 
 
 June 27. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Poolesville to Frederick, 
 Maryland ; the First corps, from Jefferson to Middletown, Maryland ; the Sec- 
 ond corps, from near Edwards' Ferry, vid Poolesville, to Barnesville, Maryland ; 
 the Third corps, from Point of Rocks, vid Jefferson, to Middletown, Maryland! 
 the Fifth corps, from a point between Edwards' Ferry and the mouth of the 
 Monocacy to Ballinger's Creek, near Frederick City, Maryland ; the Sixth corps, 
 from Dranesville, Virginia, vid Edwards' Ferry, to near Poolesville, Maryland; 
 the Twelfth corps, from near the month of the Monococy, vid Point of Rocks, to 
 Knoxville, Maryland ; Buford's cavalry division, from Leesburg, Virginia, vid 
 Edwards' Ferry, to near Jefferson, Maryland ; Gregg's cavalry division, from 
 Leesburg, Virginia, vid Edwards' Ferry, toward Frederick City, Maryland ; and 
 tbe artillery reserve, from Poolesville to Frederick, Maryland. Stahel's cavalry 
 division reached Frederick City, Maryland. Crawford's Peimsylvania Reserves 
 moved from Goose Creek, Virginia, vid Edwards' Ferry, to the mouth of the 
 Monocacy, Maryland. 
 
 Combatji: Skirmish near Fairfax Court-house, Virginia. 
 
 June 28. 
 
 The First corps marched from ]Middletown to Frederick City ; the Second corps, 
 from Barnesville to Monocacy Junction ; the Third corps,* from Middletown to 
 
 * Major-general D. E. Sickles resumed command of the Third corps, relieving Major-general 
 D. B. Birney, who had been temporarily in command. 
 
250 ADDENDA. 
 
 near Woodsboro' ; the Sixth corps, from near Poolesville to TTyattstown ; the 
 Eleventh corps, from IMiddletown to near Frederick ; and tlieTwelftli corps, from 
 Knoxville to Frederick City. Buford'8 cavalry division moved from near Jeflfer- 
 son to Middlelovvn ; (iregg's cavalry division reached Frederick City, and marched 
 thence to Newmarket and Kidgeville. Crawford's Pennsylvania Keserves 
 marched from the mouth of the Monocacy, and joined the Fifth corps* at 
 Ballinger's Cret^k. Stahel's cavalry division was assigned to the cavalry corps 
 as the Third division, under Brigadier-general Judson Kilpatrick, with Brigadier- 
 general Elon J. Farnsworth commanding the First brigade, and Brigadier-general 
 George A. Custer commanding the Second brigade. 
 
 Combats: Skirmishes between Oflfutt's Cross-roads and Seneca, and near Rock ville, Mary- 
 land, and at Fountain Bale, Wrightsville, and near Oyster Point, Pennsylvania. 
 
 June 29. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Frederick to Middleburg; 
 the First and Eleventh corps, from Frederick City to P^mmittsburg; the Second 
 corps, from Monocacy Junction, vid Liberty and Johnsville, to Uniontown ; the 
 Third corps, from near Woodsboro' to Taneytown ; the Fifth corps, from Bal- 
 linger's Creek, v/d Frederick City and Mount Pleasant, to Liberty ; the Sixth 
 corps, from Hyattstown, vid Newmarket and Eidgeville, to New Windsor ; the 
 Twelfth corps, from Frederick City to Taneytown and Bruceville ; Gamble's 
 (First) and Devin's (Second) brigades, of Buford's (First) cavalry division, from 
 Middletown, ind Boonsboro', Cavetown, and Monterey Springs, to near Fairfield ; 
 Merritt's reserve cavalry brigade, of the same division, from Middletown to 
 Mechanicstown ; Gregg's (Second) cavalry division, from New Market and 
 Eidgeville to New Windsor ; Kilpatrick's (Third) cavalry division, from Fred- 
 erick City to Littlestown ; and the artillery reserve, from Frederick City to 
 Bmceville. 
 
 Cdinbals : Skirmishes at Muddy Branch and Westminster, Maryland, and at McConnellsburg 
 and near Oyster Point, Pennsylvania. 
 
 June 30. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Middleburg to Taneytown ; 
 the First corps, from Emmittsburg to Marsh Eun ; the Third corps, from Taney- 
 town to Bridgeport ; the Fifth corps, from Liberty, vid .Tohnsville, LTnion Bridge, 
 and Union, to Union Mills; the Sixth corps, from New Windsor to Manchester; 
 the Twelfth corps, from Taneytown and Bruceville to Littlestown ; Gamble's and 
 Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, from near Fairfield, vid Emmitts- 
 burg, to Gettysburg; Gregg's cavalry division, from New Windsor to Westmins- 
 ter, and thence to I\Lnnchester; Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Littlestown 
 to Hanover ; and the artillery reserve, from Bruceville to Taneytown. Kenly's 
 and Morris' brigades, of French's division, left Maryland Heights for Frederick 
 City, and Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of the same division, moved from the 
 Heights, by way of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, for Washington City. 
 
 Combats: Action at Hanover, Pennsylvania, and skirmishes at Westminster, Maryland, and 
 at Fairfield and Sporting Hill, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. 
 
 * Jlajor-general George G. INIeade relinquished command of the Fifth corps to Major-gen- 
 eral fieorge Sykes, and assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, relieving Major-gen- 
 eral Joseph Hooker. 
 
ADDENDA. 251 
 
 July 1. 
 The First corps moved from Marsh Kun, and the Eleventh corps from 
 Emmittsburg to Gettysburg ; the Second corps, from Uniontown, vid Taneytown, 
 to near Gettysburg; the Tliird corps, from Bridgeport, vid Emmittsburg, to the 
 field of Gettysburg ; the Fiftli corps, from Union Mills, vi'd Hanover and McSher- 
 rystown, to Bonaughtovvn ; the Sixth corps, from Manchester en route to Gettys- 
 burg ; and the Twelfth corps, from Littlestown, vid Two Taverns, to the field of 
 Gettysburg. Gregg's cavalry division marched from Manchester to Hanover 
 Junction, whence Mcintosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades proceeded to Hanover, 
 while Huey's brigade returned to Manchester. Kilpatrick's cavalry division 
 moved from Hanover, vid Abbottsville, to Berlin ; and the artillery reserve 
 (Ransom's and Fitzhugh's brigades), from Taneytown to near Gettysburg. 
 Stannard's Vermont brigade, from the defences of Washington, joined the First 
 corps on the field of Gettysburg. W. F.Smith's (First) division, of the Depart- 
 ment of the Susquehanna, marched from the vicinity of Harrisburg to Carlisle. 
 Kenly's and Morris' brigades, of French's division, reached Frederick City. 
 Combats: Battle of Gettysburg (first day), and skirmish at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 
 
 July 2. 
 
 The Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps, Lockwood's brigade from the Middle 
 Department, Mcintosh's and .J. I. Gregg's brigades of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry 
 division, Kilpatrick's cavalry division, and the artillery reserve reached the 
 field of Gettysburg. Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, 
 marched from Gettysburg to Taneytown, and Merritt's reserve brigade from Me- 
 chanicstown to Emmittsburg. 
 
 Combats: Battle of Gettysburg (second day), and skirmishes at Hunterstown and near 
 Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. 
 
 July 3. 
 
 Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, moved from 
 Taneytown to Westminster; Merritt's reserve brigade, from Emmittsburg to 
 the field of Gettysburg ; and Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from 
 Manchester to Westminster. 
 
 Cuinbais : Battle of Gettysburg (third day), and action at Fairfield, Pennsylvania. 
 
 July 4. 
 
 Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, marched from 
 Westminster, and Merritt's reserve brigade from Gettysburg, en route to Fred- 
 erick City ; Huey's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Westminster, vid 
 Emmittsburg, to Monterey ; J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade, from Gettysburg to 
 Hunterstown ; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Gettysburg, vid Euimitts- 
 burg, to Monterey. Smith's division, of Couch's command, moved from Carlisle, 
 vid Mount Holly, to Pine Grove, and the remainder of Couch's troops fi-om the 
 vicinity of Harrisburg toward Shippensburg and Chambersburg. Elliott's and 
 Smith's brigades, of French's division, arrived at Washington from Maryland 
 Heights and moved to Tennallytown. Morris' brigade, of French's division, 
 marched from Frederick City to Turner's Gap in South Mountain. 
 
 Combats : Action at Monterey Gap, Pennsylvania, and skirmishes at Fairfield Gap, Pennsyl- 
 vania, and near Emmittsburg, Maryland. 
 
252 ADDENDA. 
 
 July 5. 
 Leaving CJett_v.«l)iirg, the Second corj)s nuu-died to Two Taverns; the Fifth 
 corps, to Marsli Kiin ; the Sixth cor{)s, to Fairfield ; the Eleventh corps, to Rock 
 Creek ; the Twelfth corps, to Littlestown ; Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry- 
 division, to Eniinittsbiirg ; and the artillery reserve, to Littlestown. Buford'e 
 cavalry division reached Frederick City. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade moved 
 from Hnnterstown to Greenwood. Kilpatrick's cavalry division and Iluey's 
 brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, marclied from Monterey, vid Smitlisburg, 
 to Boonsboro'. 
 
 Combats: Skirmishes at or lu-ar Pniithsburg, Maryland, and Green Oak, Mcrcersbiirg, Fair- 
 field, Greencastle, Cunninghaiu's Cross-roads, and Stevens' Furnace (or Caledonia Iron Works), 
 Pennsylvania. 
 
 July 6. 
 
 The First corps marched from Gettysburg to Emmittsburg; the Fifth corps, 
 from Marsh Run to Moritz Cross-roads ; the Sixth corps, from Fairfield to 
 Emmittsburg, except Neill's (Third) brigade, of Howe's (Second) division, 
 which, in conjmiction with Mcintosh's brigade of cavalry, was left at Fairfield 
 to pursue the enemy ; the Eleventh corps, from Rock Creek to Emmittsburg ; 
 Buford's cavalry division, from Frederick City to Williamsport, and thence back 
 to Jones' Cross-roads; Kilpatrick's cavahy division and Huey's brigade of 
 Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro', vid Ilagerstown * and Williamsport, 
 to Jones' Cross-roads; Mcintosh's brigade, of Gi'egg's cavalry division, from 
 Emmittsburg to Fairfield ; and J. I. Gregg's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry divis- 
 ion, from Greenwood to Marion. Smith's division, of Couch's command, 
 moved from Pine Grove to Newman's Pass. Kenly's brigade, of French's 
 division, marched from Frederick City en route to Maryland Heights. Elliott's 
 and Smith's brigades, of French's division, left Tennallytown, vid Washington 
 and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, en, route to Frederick City. 
 
 Combats: Actions at Hagerstown and Williamsport, Maryland. 
 
 July 7. 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Gettysburg to Frederick 
 City ; the First corps, from Emmittsburg to Hamburg ; the Second corps, from 
 Two Taverns to Taneytown ; the Third corps, from Gettysburg, vid Emmittsburg, 
 to Mechanicstown ; the Fifth corps, from Moritz Cross-roads, vid Emmittsburg, 
 to Utica; the Sixth corps, from Emmittsburg to Mountain Pass, near Hamburg; 
 the Eleventh corps, from Emmittsburg to Middletown ; the Twelfth corps, from 
 Littlestown to Walkersville ; and the artillery reserve, from Littlestown to 
 Woodsboro'. Buford's and Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions and Huey's brigade, 
 of Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Jones' Cross-roads to Boonsboro'. J. I. 
 Gregg's cavalry brigade was moving en route from Chambersburg to Middletown. 
 Mcintosh's brigade of cavalry and Neill's brigade, of the Sixth corps, moved 
 from Fairfield to Waynesboro'. Smith's division, of Coucli's command, marched 
 from Newman's Pass to Altodale. Kenly's brigade, of French's division, with 
 other troops forwarded by Schenck from Baltimore, reoccupied Maryland 
 
 * Richmond's brigade, of Kilpatrick's division, remained at Hagerstown, whence it retired 
 toward Boonsboro'. 
 
ADDENDA. 253 
 
 Heights. Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of French's division, reached Freder- 
 ick City from Washington. 
 
 Combat.i: Skirmishes at Downsville and Funkstown, Maryland, and at Harper's Ferry 
 West Virginia. 
 
 July 8. 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Frederick City to Middle- 
 town ; the First corps, from Hamburg to Turner's Gap in South Mountain ; the 
 Second corps, from Taneytown to Frederick City ; the Third corjis, from 
 Mechanicstown to a point three miles south-west of Frederick City ; the Fifth 
 "corps, from Utica to Middletown ; the Sixth corps, from near Hamburg to 
 Middletown ; the Eleventli corps, from Middletown to Turner's Gap in South 
 Mountain, Schurz's (Third) division being advanced to Boonsboro' ; the Twelfth 
 corps, from Walkersville to Jefferson ; and the artillery reserve, from Woods- 
 boro' to Frederick City. J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade was moving en route from 
 Chambersburg to Middletown, Smith's division, of Couch's command, moved 
 from Altodale to Waynesboro'. Campbell's and Mulligan's brigades, of Kelley's 
 command, Department of West Virginia, were concentrated at Hancock, whence 
 they moved to Fairview, on Noi'th Mountain. 
 Combats : Action at Boonsboro' and skirmish near Williamsport, Maryland. 
 
 July 9. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Middletown to Turner's 
 Gap ; the Second corps, from Frederick City to Eohrersville ; the Third corps, 
 from near Frederick City to Fox's Gap in South Mountain ; the Fifth corps, 
 from Middletown, vid Fox's Gap, to near Boonsboro' ; the Sixth corps, from 
 Middletown to Boonsboro' ; the Twelfth corps, from Jefferson to Rohrersville ; 
 and the artillery reserve, from Frederick City to Boonsboro'. J. I. Gregg's 
 cavalry brigade reached Middletown from Chambersburg. Elliott's and Smith's 
 brigades, of French's division, marched from Frederick City to Middletown. 
 
 Combats: Skirmish at Benevola (or Beaver Creek), Maryland. 
 
 July 10. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Turner's Gap to Beaver 
 Creek, beyond Boonsboro' ; the First corps, from Turner's Gi\p to Beaver Creek, 
 where it was joined by Kenly's brigade, of French's division, from Maryland 
 Heights; the Second corps, from Rohrersville to near Tilghmanton ; the Third 
 corps, from Fox's Gap through Boonsboro' to Antietam Creek, in the vicinity 
 of Jones' Cross-roads, where it was joined by Elliott's and Smith's brigades, of 
 French's division, which marched from Middletown, and Morris' brigade, of the 
 same division, which marched from Turner's Gap ; the Fifth corps, from near 
 Boonsboro' to Delaware Mills, on Antietam Creek ; the Sixth corps, from 
 Boonsboro' to Beaver Creek ; the Eleventh corps, from Turner's Gap to Beaver 
 C'reek ; and the Twelfth corps, from Eohrersville to Bakersville. Buford's and 
 Kilpatrick's cavalry divisions moved fi'om Boonsboro' to Funkstown; Huey's 
 brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro' to Jones' Cross-roads, and 
 Mclntosli's cavalry brigade, from Waynesboro', vid Smithsburg and Leitersburg, 
 to Old Antietam Forge, and back to Waynesboro'. 
 
 Combats : Skirmishes at or near Old Antietam Forge (near Leitersburg), Clear Spring, 
 HagerstowD, Jones' Cross-roads (near Williiimsport), and Funkstown, Maryland. 
 
254 ADDENDA. 
 
 July 11. 
 
 The Second corps moved from near Tilghmanton to the neighborhood of 
 Jones' Cross-roads ; tlie Twelfth corps, from Bakersville to Fairplay and Jones' 
 Cross-roads ; Gamble's and Devin's brigades, of Buford's cavalry division, from 
 Funkstown to Bakersville; J. I. Gregg's cavalry brigade, from Middletown to 
 Boonsboro' ; Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Funkstown to near Hagers- 
 town ; the artillery reserve, from Boonsboro' to Benevola ; Neill's brigade, of 
 the Sixth corps, and Smith's division, of Couch's command, from Waynesboro' 
 to Leitersburg. 
 
 Condiats: Skirmishes at or near Hagerstowu, Jones' Cross-roads (near Williainsport), and 
 Funkstown, Maryland. 
 
 July 12. 
 
 The First, Sixth, and Eleventh corps moved from Beaver Creek to Funks- 
 town ; Mcintosh's cavalry brigade, from Waynesboro', vld Leitersburg, to 
 Boonsboro' ; Kilpatrick's cavalry division and Ames' (First) division. Eleventh 
 corps, occupied Hagerstown ; Neill's brigade, of the Sixth corps, moved from 
 Leitersburg to Funkstown, where it rejoined its corps ; Smith's division (except 
 one brigade, left at Waynesboro'), from Leitersburg to Cavetown ; Dana's (Sec- 
 ond) division, of Couch's command, from Chambersburg to Greencastle ; and 
 Averell's cavalry brigade, Department of West Virginia, from Cumberland, en 
 route to Fairview. 
 
 Combats: Skirmislies at or near Hagerstown, Jones' Cross-roads (near Williamsport), and 
 Funkstown, Maryland, and Ashby's Gap, Virginia. 
 
 July 13. 
 
 The Sixth corps moved from Funkstown to the vicinity of Hagerstown ; the 
 artillery reserve, from Benevola to Jones' Cross-roads, two brigades remaining 
 at the latter place, and the others returning to Benevola ; Smith's division, of 
 Couch's command, from Waynesboro' and Cavetown to Hagerstown and Beaver 
 Ci'eek. Averell's cavalry brigade joined Kelley's infantry at Fairview. 
 
 Combats: Skirmishes at Hagerstown, Jones' Cross-roads, and Funkstown, Maryland. 
 
 July 14. 
 
 The First corps marched from Funkstown to Williamsport; the Second corps, 
 from near Jones' Cross-roads to near Falling Waters ; the Third corps, from 
 Antietam Creek, near Jones' Cross-roads, across Marsh Creek ; the Fifth corps, 
 from the vicinity of Koxbury Mills, on Antietam Creek, to near Williamsport; 
 the Sixth corps, from the neighborhood of Hagerstown to ^Villiamsport ; the 
 Eleventh corps, from Funkstown, via Hagerstown, to Williamsport ; and Wil- 
 liams' First division, of the Twelfth corps, from Jones' Cross-roads to near Fall- 
 ing Waters, and thence to near Williamsport. Buford's cavalry division moved 
 from Bakersville to Falling Waters ; Mcintosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of 
 D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Boonsboro' to Harper's Ferry ; Huey's 
 brigade, of same division, from Jones' Cross-roads, vid Williamsport, to Falling 
 Waters ; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, from Hagerstown, vid Williamsport, 
 to Falling Waters. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, marched 
 from Fairview to Williamsport. 
 
 Combats: Action at Falling Waters, Maryland, and skirmishes near 'WilUamsport, Mary- 
 land, and Harper's Ferry, West Virginia. 
 
ADDENDA. 255 
 
 July 15. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Beaver Creek to Berlin ; the 
 First corps, from Williamsport to Rohrersville ; the Second corps, from near 
 Falling Waters to near Sandy Hook-; the Tliird corps, from Marsh Creek to 
 near Burnside's Bridge, on the Antietam ; the Fifth corps, from near Williams- 
 port to Burkittsville ; the Sixth corps, from Williamsport to Boonsboro' ; the 
 Eleventh corps, from Williamsport, vid Hagerstown, to Middletown ; and the 
 Twelfth corps, from Fairplay and near Williamsport to Sandy Hook. Two 
 brigades of the artillery reserve moved from Jones' Cross-roads, and, joining 
 the remainder of the reserve at Benevola, the whole command marched thence, 
 vid Middletown, to Berlin. Buford's cavalry division moved from Falling 
 Waters to Berlin ; Mcintosh's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's 
 cavalry division, from Harper's Ferry, vid Halltown, to Shepherdstown ; Huey's 
 brigade, of same division, from Falling Waters to Boonsboro' ; and Kilpatrick's 
 cavalry division, from Falling Waters, vid Williamspoit and Hagerstown, to 
 Boonsboro'. Kelley's command. Department of West Virginia, marched from 
 Williamsport to Indian Spring. 
 
 Combats : Skirmishes at Halltown and Shepherdstown, West Virginia. 
 
 July 16. 
 
 The First corps marched from Rohrersville to near Berlin ; the Third corps, 
 from Burnside's Bridge to Pleasant Valley, near Sandy Hook ; the Fifth corps, 
 from Burkittsville, vid PetersviUe, to near Berlin ; the Sixth corps, from Boons- 
 boro' to near Berlin ; the Eleventh corps, from Middletown, vid Jefferson, to 
 Berlin ; and the Twelfth corps, from Sandy Hook to Pleasant Valley. Buford's 
 cavalry division moved from Berlin to PetersviUe ; Huey's brigade, of Gregg's 
 cavalry division, from Boonsboro', vid Harper's Ferry, to Shepherdstown ; and 
 Kilpatrick's division from Boonsboro' to Berlin, whence De Fcu-est's (First) 
 brigade proceeded to Harper's Ferry. 
 
 Combats: Action at Shepherdstown and skirmish at Shanghai, West "Virginia. 
 
 July 17. 
 Tlie Third corps moved from near Sandy Hook, crossed the Potomac at Har- 
 per's Ferry, and proceeded to a point three miles south of the ferry ; the Fifth 
 corps moved from near Berlin to Lovettsville, crossing the Potomac at Berlin. 
 Gregg's cavalry division marched from Shepherdstown to Harper's Ferry ; Kil- 
 patrick's cavalry division, from Berlin and Harper's Ferry to Purcellville, Cus- 
 ter's brigade crossing the Potomac at Berlin, and De Forest's brigade the She- 
 nandoah at Harper's Ferry. Kelley's command. Department of West Virginia, 
 moved from Indian Spring, Maryland, to Hedgesville, West Virginia, crossing 
 tlie Potomac at Cherry Run. 
 
 Combats : Skirmishes near North Mountain Station, West Virginia, and at Snicker's Gai), 
 Virginia. 
 
 July 18. 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Berlin, Maryland, to Lov- 
 ettsville, Virginia ; the First corps, from near Berlin to Waterford, crossing the 
 Potomac at Berlin; the Second corps, from near Sandy Hook to Hillsboro', 
 
256 ADDENDA. 
 
 crossing the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers at Harper's Ferry ; the Third 
 corps, from near Harper's Ferry to Hillsboro' ; the Fifth corps, from Lovetts- 
 ville to near Pnrcellville; the artillery reserve, from Berlin to AVheatland; 
 and Buford's cavalry division, from Petersville to Purcellville, crossing the 
 Potomac at Berlin. 
 Combats: Skirmishes at and near Iledgesvillo and Martinsburg, West Virginia. 
 
 July 19. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Lovettsville to Wheatland ; 
 the First corps, from Waterford to Hamilton ; the Second and Third corps, 
 from Hillshoro' to Woodgrove; the Filth corps, from near Purcellville to a 
 point on the road to Philomont; the Sixth corps, from near Berlin to "Wheat- 
 land, and the Eleventh corps, from Berlin to near Hamilton, both corps cross- 
 ing the Potomac at Berlin ; the artillery reserve, from Wheatland to Purcell- 
 ville ; and the Twelfth corps, from Pleasant Valley to near Flillsboro', crossing 
 the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers at Harper's Ferry. Buford's cavalry 
 division moved from Purcellville, via Philomont, to near Eector's Cross-roads. 
 Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Hai'per's Ferry 
 toward Hillsboi'o', and Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of the same division, 
 from Harper's Ferry to Lovettsville. Kilpatrick's division of cavalry marched 
 from Purcellville to Upperville. Kelley's command. Department of West Vir- 
 ginia, fell back from Fledgesville to the Maryland side of the Potomac at Cherry 
 Run. 
 
 Combats : Skirmishes at and near Hedgesville and Martinsburg, West Virginia. 
 
 July 20. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Wheatland to Union ; the 
 
 First corps, from Hamilton to Middlebnrg ; the Second and Third corps, from 
 
 Woodgrove, the former going to Bloomfield and the latter to Upperville ; the 
 
 •Fifth corps, from a point on the Purcellville and Philomont road, vid Union, to 
 
 Panther Skin Creek ; the Sixth corps, from Wheatland to near Beaver Dam ; 
 
 the Eleventh corps, from near Hamilton, rid Mount Gilead, to Mountville ; the 
 
 Twelfth corps, from near Hillsboro', vid Woodgrove, to Snickersville ; and the 
 
 artillery reserve, from Purcellville to Union. Buford"s cavalry division moved 
 
 from near Eector's Cross-roads to Rectortown, Gamble's brigade going thence to 
 
 Chester Gap, Devin's brigade to Salem, and Merritt's brigade to Manassas Gap. 
 
 Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, reached Hillsboro', and marched 
 
 thence toward Purcellville. Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of same division, 
 
 moved from Lovettsville to Goose Creek. 
 
 Combats : Skirmishes near Berry's Ferry and at Ashby's Gap, Virginia. 
 
 S 
 
 July 21. 
 
 Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, 
 moved from Goose Creek to Bull Run ; Mcintosh's brigade returned to Hills- 
 boro' ; Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, recrossed the Poto- 
 mac from Maryland into Virginia at Cherry Run. 
 
 Combats : Skirmishes at Manassas and Chester Gaps, Virginia. 
 
ADDENDA. 257 
 
 July 22. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Union to Upperville ; the 
 First corps, from Middleburg to White Plains ; the Second corps, from Bloom- 
 field to Paris ; the Tliird corps, from Upperville, vid Piedmont, to Linden ; the 
 Fifth corps, from Panther Skin Creek to Rectortown ; and the Sixth corps, from 
 near Beaver Dam to Eectortown. Devin's brigade, of Buford's cavalry division, 
 moved from Salem to Barbee's Cross-roads ; Huey's and J. I. Gregg's brigades, 
 of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Bull Run to Broad Run ; and Kil- 
 patrick's cavalry division, from Ui)perville to Piedmont. 
 
 Combats: Skirmishes at Manassas and Chester Gaps, Virginia. 
 
 July 23. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Upperville to Linden ; the 
 First corps, from White Plains to Warrenton ; the Second corps, from Paris to 
 Linden ; the Third corps, fi-om Linden to Manassas Gap ; the Fifth corps, from 
 Rectortown, vid Markham Station, Farrowsville, and Linden, to Manassas Gap ; 
 the Sixth corps, from Rectortown to White Plains and Barbee's Cross-roads; the 
 Eleventh corjjs, from Mountville to New Baltimoi-e ; the Twelfth corps, from 
 Snickersville to Ashby's Gap, and thence to Markham Station ; and the artillery 
 reserve, from Union to near Rock Creek. Buford's cavalry division concen- 
 trated at Barliee's Cross-roads ; Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, 
 moved from Hillsboro' to Snickersville ; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division from 
 Piedmont to Amissville. 
 
 Combats : Action at Wapping Heights, Manassas Gap, and skirmishes near Gaines' Cross- 
 roads, Snicker's Gap, and Chester Gap, Virginia. 
 
 July 24. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Linden to Salem ; the Second 
 corps, from Linden to Markham Station ; the First division (Wright's), Sixth 
 corps, from White Plains to New Baltimore; the Second division (Howe's), 
 Sixth corps, from Barbee's Cross-roads to Markham Station, and thence to 
 Orleans; the third division (Bartlett's), Sixth corps, from Barbee's Cross-roads 
 to Thumb Run ; and the Twelfth corps, from Markham Station to Linden, 
 countermarching, vid Markham Station, to Piedmont. Huey's and J. I. Gregg's 
 brigades, of D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, moved from Broad Run to 
 Warrenton Junction. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, ad- 
 vanced from Cherry Run to Hedgesville. 
 
 Combats: Skirmish at Battle Mountain, near Newhy's Cross-roads, Virginia. 
 
 July 25. 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac moved from Salem to Warrenton ; the 
 First corps, from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction, the Second division (Rob- 
 inson's) going on to Bealeton ; the Second corps, from Markham Station to 
 White Plains ; the Third corps, from Manassas Gap to near Salem ; the Fifth 
 corps, from Manassas Gap, via Farrowsville and Barbee's Cross-roads, to Thumb 
 Run ; the Sixth corps concentrated at Warrenton, Wright's (First) division 
 moving from New Baltimore, Howe's (Second) division from Orleans, and 
 Bartlett's (Third) division from Thumb Run ; the Eleventh corps moved from 
 
258 ADDENDA. 
 
 New Baltimore to Warrenton Junction ; ami the Twelfth cor[)s, from Piedmont, 
 vid Reotortown and White Plains, to Thoroughfare Gap. The artillery reserve 
 readied Warrenton. Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, occupied 
 Martinsburg. 
 Combats: Skirmish at Barbee's Cross-roads, Virginia. 
 
 July 2G. 
 The Second corps marched from White Plains to near Germantown ; the 
 Third corps, from near Salem to vicinity of Warrenton ; the Fiftli corps, from 
 Thumb Kun to vicinity of Warrenton, Crawford's (Third) division taking posi- 
 tion at Fayetteville ; and tlie Twelfth corps, from Thoroughfare Gap, via Green- 
 wich and Catlett's Station, to Warrenton Junction. Buford's cavalry division 
 took position at Wan-enton and Fayetteville. Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's 
 cavalry division, marched from Snickersville, vid Upperville, to Middleburg. 
 Kelley's command, Department of West Virginia, occupied Winchester. 
 
 July 27. 
 The Fifth corps encamped between Warrenton and Fayetteville. Mcintosh's 
 brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, marched from Middleburg, vid White 
 Plains, New Baltimore, and Warrenton, toward Warrenton Junction. 
 
 July 28. 
 Mcintosh's brigade, of Gregg's cavalry division, moved, vid Warrenton Junc- 
 tion, to Catlett's Station. 
 
 July 29. 
 D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division moved from Warrenton Junction and Cat- 
 lett's Station to Wan-enton. 
 
 July 30. 
 Kenly's (Third) division, First corps, moved from Warrenton Junction to 
 Rappahannock Station ; the Second corps, from near Germantown to Elk Bun; 
 D. McM. Gregg's cavalry division, from Warrenton to Amissville ; and Kil- 
 patrick's cavalry division, from Amissville to Warrenton, 
 
 July 31. 
 
 The Second corps marched from Elk Run to Morrisville ; Howe's (Second) 
 division, Sixth corps, from Warrenton to near Waterloo ; the Twelfth corps, 
 from Warrenton Junction to Kelly's Ford; and Kilpatrick's cavalry division, 
 from Warrenton to Warrenton Junction. 
 
 Combats: Skirmish at Kelly's Ford, Virginia. 
 
ADDENDA. 259 
 
 Organization of the Army of the Potomac, Commanded by Major- 
 general George G. Meade, at the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsyl- 
 vania, July IS, 1863. 
 
 GENEKAL HEADQUAETEKS. 
 
 COMMAND OF THE PROVOST-MARSHAL GENEKAL. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Mabsena E. Patrick. 
 
 93d New York Infantry* Col. John S. Crocker. 
 
 2d Pennsylvania Cavalry Col. E. Butler Price. 
 
 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry Company E,Capt.EmlenN. Carpenter. 
 
 Company I, Capt. James Starr. 
 
 8th United States Infantry * Capt. Edwin W. H. Eead. 
 
 Detachment Eegular Cavalry. 
 
 engineer brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Henry W. Benham. 
 
 15th New York (battalion)* Maj. Walter L. Cassin. 
 
 50th New York* Col. William H. Pettes. 
 
 Battalion United States* Capt. George H. Mendell. 
 
 guards and orderlies. 
 Oneida (New York) Cavalry Capt. Daniel P. Mann. 
 
 FIEST AEMY COEPS. 
 
 Maj. -gen. John F. EEYNOLDS.f 
 Maj.-gen. Abner Doubleday. 
 Maj.-gen. John Newton. 
 
 general headquarters. 
 1st Maine Cavalry, Company L, Capt. Constantine Taylor. 
 
 FIRST division. 
 
 Brig.-gen. James S. Wads worth. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Solomon Meredith. % 
 
 (2) Col. William W. Eobinson. 
 
 19th Indiana Col. Samuel J. Williams. 
 
 24th Michigan Col. Henry A. Morrow. 
 
 Capt. Albert M. Edwards. 
 2d Wisconsin Col. Lucius Fairchild. 
 
 Maj. John Mansfield. 
 
 Capt. George H. Otis. 
 
 6th Wisconsin Lieut.-col. Eufus E. Dawes. 
 
 7th Wisconsin Col. William W. Eobinson. 
 
 Maj. Mark Finnicum. 
 
 * Not engaged. AVith the exception of the Regular battalion, the Engineer brigade, whUe 
 at Beaver Dam Creek, six miles north of Liberty, Maryland, on July 1st, was ordered to 
 Washington, District of Columbia, where it arrived July 3d. . -. , 
 
 t General Reynolds was killed July 1st, while iu command of the left wing of the army ; 
 Major-general Abner Doubleday commanded the corps July Ist, and Major-general John 
 Newton on the 2d and 3d. 
 
 X Wounded. 
 
260 ADDENDA. 
 
 Second Bri<jade. 
 Brig.-gen. Lysander Cutler. 
 
 7th Indiana Col. Ira G. Grover. 
 
 76th New*York Maj. Andrew J. Grover. 
 
 Ca[>t. .Joliii E. Cook. 
 
 84th New York (14th Militia) Col. Edwifrd B. Fowler. 
 
 95th New York Col. George H. Biddle. 
 
 Maj. Edward Pye. 
 147th New York Lieut. -col. Francis C. Miller. 
 
 Maj. George Harney. 
 56th Pennsylvania (9 companies) Col. J. William Hut'niann. 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. John C. Kobinson. 
 First Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Gabriel R. Paul.* 
 
 (2) Col. Samuel II. Leonard.* 
 
 (3) Col. Adrian R. Root.* 
 
 (4) Col. Richard Coulter.*' 
 
 (5) Col. Peter Lyle. 
 
 (6) Col. Richard Coulter. 
 
 16th Maine Col. Charles W. Tilden. 
 
 Maj. Archibald D. Leavitt. 
 13th Massachusetts Col. Samuel H. Leonard. 
 
 Lieut.-col. N. Walter Batchelder. 
 94th New York Col. Adrian R. Root. 
 
 Maj. Samuel A. Mofiett. 
 
 104th New York Col. Gilbert G. Prey. 
 
 107th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. James Mac Thomson. 
 
 Capt. Emanuel D. Roath. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Henry Baxter. 
 
 12th Massachusetts Col. James L. Bates. 
 
 Lieut.-col. David Allen, Jr. 
 
 83d New York (9th Militia) Lieut.-col. Joseph A. Moesch. 
 
 97th New York Col. Charles Wheelock. 
 
 Maj. C^harles Northrup. 
 11th Pennsylvania t Col. Richard Coulter. 
 
 Capt. Benjamin F. Haines. 
 
 Capt. John B. Overmyer. 
 88th Pennsylvania Maj. Benezet F. Foust. 
 
 Capt. Henry Whiteside. 
 90th Pennsylvania Col. Peter Lyle. 
 
 Maj. Alfred J. Sellers. 
 
 Col. Peter Lyle. 
 
 * Wounded. + Transferred on afternoon of July 1st to First brigade. 
 
ADDENDA. 261 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 Maj.-gen. Abner Doubleday.* 
 
 Fi7-iit brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Thomas A. Rowley. 
 
 80th New York (20th Militia) Col. Theodore B. Gates. 
 
 121st Pennsylvania Maj. Alexander Biddle, 
 
 Col. Chapman Biddle. 
 142d Pennsylvania Col. Robert P. Cummins. 
 
 Lient.-col. Alfred B. McCalmont. 
 151st Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. George F. McFarlaud. 
 
 Capt. Walter L. Owens. 
 
 Col. Harrison Allen. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 (1) Col. Roy Stone.f 
 
 (2) Col. Langhorne Wister.f 
 
 (3) Col. Edmund L. Dana. 
 
 143d Pennsylvania Col. Edmnnd L. Dana. 
 
 Lieut.-col. John D. Musser. 
 149th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Walton Dwiglit. 
 
 Capt. James Glenn. 
 150th Pennsylvania Col. Langhorne Wister. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Henry S. Huidekoper. 
 
 Capt. Cornelius C. Widdis. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. George J. Stannard.f 
 
 (2) Col. Francis V. Randall. 
 
 12th Vermont t Col. Asa P. Blunt. 
 
 13th Vermont Col. Francis V. Randall. 
 
 Maj. Joseph J. Boynton. 
 
 Lieut.-col. William D. Munson. 
 
 14th Vermont Col. William T. Nichols. 
 
 loth Vermont t Col. Redfield Proctor. 
 
 16th Vermont Col. Wheelock G. Veazey. 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Col. Charles S. Wainwright. 
 
 Maine Light, 2d Battery Capt. James A. Hall. 
 
 Maine Light, 5th Battery Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens. 
 
 Lieut. Edward N. Whittier. 
 1st New York Light, Battery L ^ Capt. Gilbert H. Reynolds. 
 
 Lieut. George Breck. 
 
 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B Capt. James H. Cooper. 
 
 4th United vStates, Battery B Lieut. James Stewart. 
 
 * General Doubleday commanded the corps on July 1st, General Thomas A. Eowley being 
 in command of the division and Colonel Chapman Biddle of the First brigade. On July 3d, 
 Rowley was wounded, and Biddle assumed command of the brigade. 
 
 t Wounded. t Not engaged; guarding trains, 
 
 j Company E, First New York Heavy Artillery, attached. 
 
262 ADDENDA. 
 
 SECOND ARMY CORPS. 
 Maj.-gen. Winfield S. Hancock.* 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 
 6th New York Cavalry, Companies D and K, Capt. Riley Johnson. 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. John C. Caldwell. 
 
 Fird Brigade. 
 
 (1) Col. Edward E. Cross.f 
 
 (2) Col. H. Boyd McKeen. 
 
 5th New Hampshire Lient.-col. Charles E. Hapgood. 
 
 61st New York Lieut. -col. K. Oscar Broady. 
 
 81st Pennsylvania Col. H. Boyd McKeen. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Amos Stroh. 
 148th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Robert McFarlane. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. Patrick Kelly. 
 
 28th Massachusetts Col. Richard Byrnes. 
 
 63d New York (2 companies) Lieut.-col. Richard C. Bentley. 
 
 Capt. Thomas Touliy. 
 69th New York (2 companies) Capt. Richard Moroney. 
 
 Lieut. James J. Smith. 
 
 88th New York (2 companies) Capt. Denis F. Burke. 
 
 116th Pennsylvania (4 companies) Maj. St. Clair A. Mulliolland. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Samuel K. Zook.f 
 
 (2) Lieut.-col. John Eraser. 
 
 52d New York Lieut.-col. Charles G. Freudenberg. 
 
 Capt. William Scherrer. 
 
 57th New York Lieut.-col. Alfred B. Chapman. 
 
 66th New York Col. Orlando H. Morris. 
 
 Lieut.-col. John S. Hammell. 
 
 Maj. Peter Nelson. 
 140th Pennsylvania Col. Richard P.Roberts. 
 
 Lieut.-col. John Eraser. 
 
 * After the death of General Reynolds, General Hancock was assigned to the comiMnd of 
 all the troops on the field of battle, relieving Cieneral Howard, who had succieded General 
 Reynolds. Cieneral (Mbbon, of the Second division, assumed command of the corps. These 
 assignments terminated on the evening of July 1st. .Similar changes in commanders occurred 
 during the battle of the '2d, when Gener.al Hancock was put in command of the Third corps, 
 in addition to that of his own. He was wounded ou the 8d, and Brigadier-general William 
 Hays was assigned to the command of the corps. 
 
 t Killed. 
 
ADDENDA. 263 
 
 Fourth Brigade. 
 Col. John R. Brooke. 
 27th Connecticut (2 companies) Lieut.-col. Henry C. Merwin. 
 
 Maj. .James H. Coburn. 
 
 2d Delaware Col. William P. Baily. 
 
 64th New York Col. Daniel G. Bingham. 
 
 Maj. Leman W. Bradley. 
 
 53d Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Eichards McMichael. 
 
 145th Pennsylvania (7 companies) Col. Hiram L. Brown. 
 
 Capt. John W. Reynolds. 
 
 Capt. Moses W. Oliver. 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. John Gibbon.* 
 
 (2) Brig.-gen. William Harrow. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. William Harrow. 
 
 (2) Col. Francis E. Heath. 
 
 19th Maine Col. Francis E. Heath. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Henry W. Cunningham. 
 15th Massachusetts Col. George H.Ward. 
 
 Lieut.-col. George C. Joslin. 
 1st Minnesota Col. William Colvill, Jr. 
 
 Capt. Nathan S. Messick. 
 
 Capt. Henry C. Coates. 
 82d New York (2d Militia) Lieut.-col. James Huston. 
 
 Capt. John Darrow. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Alexander S. Webb. 
 
 69th Pennsylvania Col. Dennis O' Kane. 
 
 Capt. William Davis. 
 
 71st Pennsylvania Col. Richard Penn Smith. 
 
 7 2d Pennsylvania Col. De Witt C. Baxter. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Theodore Hesser. 
 106th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. William L. Curry. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Col. Norman J. Hall. 
 
 19th Massachusetts Col. Arthur F. Devereux. 
 
 20th Massachusetts Col. Paul J. Revere. 
 
 Lieut.-col. George N. Macy. 
 
 Capt. Henry L. Abbott. 
 7th Michigan Lieut.-col. Amos E. Steele, Jr. 
 
 Maj. Sylvanus W. Curtis. 
 
 42d New York Col. James E. Mallon. 
 
 59th New York (4 companies) Lieut.-col. Max A. Thoman. 
 
 Capt. William McFadden. 
 
 Unattached. 
 
 1st Company (Mass.) Sharpshooters Capt. William Plumer. 
 
 Lieut. Emerson L. Bicknell. 
 * Wounded. 
 S 
 
264 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 THIRD DivisroN. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Alexander Hays. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Col. Samuel S. Carroll. 
 
 14th Indiana Col. John Coons. 
 
 4th Oliio Lieut.-col. Leonard W. Carpenter. 
 
 8tii Oliio Lieut.-col. Franklin lawyer. 
 
 7th West Virginia Lieut.-col. Jonathan H. Lockwood. 
 
 Second Brigade, 
 
 (1) Col. Thomas A. Smyth.* 
 
 (2) Lieut.-col. Francis E. Pierce. 
 
 14th Connecticut Maj. Theodore G. Ellis. 
 
 1st Delaware Lieut.-col. I-Idward P. Harris. 
 
 Capt. Thomas B. Hizar. 
 
 Lieut. William Smith. 
 
 Lieut. John T. Dent. 
 
 12th New .Jersey Maj. Jolin T. Hill. 
 
 10th New York (battalion) Maj. George F. Hopper. 
 
 108th New York Lieut.-col. Francis E. Pierce. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 (1) Col. George L. Willard.f 
 
 (2) Col. Eliakim Sherrill.f 
 
 (3) Lieut.-col. James M. Bull. 
 
 39th New Y''ork (4 companies) 
 111th New York 
 
 12.5th New York . 
 12Gth New Y'ork. 
 
 ...Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt. 
 ...Col. Clinton D. MacDougall. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Isaac M. Lusk. 
 
 Capt. Aaron P. Seeley. 
 ...Lieut.-col. Levin Crandell. 
 ...Col. Eliakim Sherrill. 
 
 Lieut.-col. James M. Bull. 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Capt. .John G. Hazard. 
 
 1st New York Light, Battery B Lieut. Albert S. Shelden. 
 
 Capt. James McK. Rorty. 
 
 Lieut. Robert E. Rogers. 
 
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A Capt. William A. Arnold. 
 
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B Lieut. T. Fred. Brown. 
 
 Lieut. Walter S. Perrin. 
 1st United States, Battery I Lieut. George A. Woodruff. 
 
 Lieut. Tully McCrea. 
 4th United States, Battery A Lieut. Alonzo H. Cushing. 
 
 Sergt. Frederick Fuger. 
 
 * Wounded. t Killed. 
 
ADDENDA. 265 
 
 THIRD AEMY CORPS. 
 
 ^1) Maj.-gen. Daniel E. Sickles.* 
 (2) Maj.-gen. David B. Birney. 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 (1) Maj.-gen. David B. Birnev. 
 
 (2) Brig.-gen, J. II. Ilobart Ward, 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Charles K.Graham.* 
 
 (2) Col. Andrew H. Tippin. 
 
 57th Pennsylvania (8 companies) Col. Peter Sides. 
 
 Capt. Alanson II. Nelson. 
 
 63d Pennsylvania Maj. .John A. Danks. 
 
 68th Pennsylvania Col. Andrew H. Tippin. 
 
 Capt. Milton S. Davis [?] 
 
 lOoth Pennsylvania Col. Calvin A. Craig. 
 
 I14th Pennsylvania Lient.-col. Frederick F. Cavada. 
 
 Capt. Edward R. Bowen. 
 14l8t Pennsylvania Col. Henry J. Madill. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig-gen, J. H. Hobart Ward. 
 
 (2) Col. Hiram Berdan. 
 
 20th Indiana Col. .John Wheeler. 
 
 Lieut, -col. William C. L. Taylor. 
 
 3d Maine Col. Moses B. LaUeman. 
 
 4th Maine Col. Elijah Walker. 
 
 Capt. P^dwin Libby. 
 
 86th New York Lieiit.-col. Benjamin L. Iliggins. 
 
 124tli New York Col. A. Van Home Ellis. 
 
 Lieut„-col. Francis M. Cummins. 
 
 99th Pennsylvania Maj. Jolm W. Moore. 
 
 1st United States Sharpshooters Col. Hiram Berdan. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Casper Trepp. 
 2d United States Sharpshooters (8 cos) Maj. Homer R. Stoughton. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Col. P. R. de Trobriand. 
 
 17th Maine Lient.-col. Charles B. Merrill. 
 
 3d Michigan Col. Byron R. Pierce. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Edwin S. Pierce. 
 
 5th Michigan Lieut.-col. John Pulford, 
 
 4Uth New York Col. Thomas W. Egan. 
 
 UOth Pennsylvania (6 companies) Lieut.-col. David M. Jones. 
 
 Maj. Isaac Rogers. 
 
 * Wounded. 
 
266 ADDENDA. 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Andrew A. Humphreys. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Joseph B. Carr. 
 
 1st Massachusetts Lieut.-ool. Clurk R. Baldwin. 
 
 lltli Massachusitts Lieut.-col. Porter D.Tripp. 
 
 16th Massachusetts Lieut.-col. Waldo Merriam. 
 
 ('apt. Matthew Donovan. 
 
 12th New Hampshire Capt. John F. Langley. 
 
 11th New Jersey Col. Eoljcrt McAllister. 
 
 Lieut. John Sciioonover. 
 Capt. William H. Lloyd. 
 Capt. iSamuel T. Slcej)er. 
 Lieut. John Schoonover. 
 
 2fith Pennsylvania Maj. Robert L. Bodine. 
 
 84th Pennsylvania* Lieut.-col. Milton 0pp. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 CoL William K, Brewster. 
 
 70th New York Col. J. Egbert Farnum. 
 
 71st New York Col. Henry L. Potter. 
 
 72d New York Col. John S. Austin. 
 
 Lieut.-col. John Leonard. 
 
 73d New York Maj. Michael W. Burns. 
 
 74th New York Lieut.-col. Thomas Holt. 
 
 120th New York Lieut.-col. Cornelius D. Westbrook. 
 
 Maj. John E. Tappen. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Col. George C. Burling. 
 
 2d New Hampshire Col. Edward L.Bailey. 
 
 5th New Jersey CoL William J. Sewell. 
 
 Capt. Thomas C. (iodfrey. 
 
 Capt. Henry H. W^oolsey. 
 
 6th New Jersey Lieut.-col. Stephen R. Gilkyson. 
 
 7th New Jersey Col. Louis R. Francine. 
 
 Maj. Frederick Cooper. 
 8th New Jersey Col. John Ramsey. 
 
 Capt. John G. Langston. 
 115th Pennsylvania Maj. John P. Dunne. 
 
 ARTILLEBY BRIGADE. 
 
 (1) Capt. George E. Randolph.! 
 
 (2) Capt. A. Judson Clark. 
 
 New Jersey Light, 2d Battery Capt. A. Judson Clark, 
 
 Lieut. Robert Sims. 
 
 1st New York Light, Battery D Capt. George B. Winslow. 
 
 New York Light, 4th Battery Capt. James E. Smith. 
 
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E Lieut. John K. Bucklyn. 
 
 Lieut. Benjamin Freeborn. 
 
 4th United States, Battery K Lieut. Francis W. Seeley. 
 
 Lieut. Robert James. 
 * Not engaged ; guarding trains. t Wounded, 
 
ADDENDA. 267 
 
 FIFTH ARMY CORPS. 
 Maj.-gen. George Sykes. 
 
 PROVOST GUARD, 
 
 12th New York, Companies D and E, Capt. Henry W. Rider, 
 
 FIRST DIVISION, 
 
 Brig.-gen, James Barnes, 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. William S. Tilton. 
 
 18th Massachusetts Col. Joseph Hayes. 
 
 22d Massachusetts Lieut.-col. Thomas Sherwin, Jr, 
 
 1st Michigan Col. Ira C. Abbott. 
 
 Lieut.-col. William A. Throop. 
 118th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. James Gwyn, 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. 
 
 9th Massachusetts Col. Patrick R. Guiney. 
 
 32d Massachusetts Col. George L. Prescott. 
 
 4th Michigan Col. Harrison H. Jeflbrds. 
 
 Lieut.-col. George W. Lumbard, 
 62d Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. James C. Hull. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 (1) Col. Strong Vincent.* 
 
 (2) Col. James C. Rice. 
 
 20th Maine Col. Joshua L. Chamberlain, 
 
 16th Michigan '. Lieut.-col. Norval E. Welch. 
 
 44th New York Col. James C. Rice. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Freeman Conner. 
 83d Pennsylvania Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward. 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. Hannibal Day. 
 
 3d United States (6 companies) Capt. Henry W. Freedley. 
 
 Capt. Richard G. Lay. 
 
 4th United States (4 companies) Capt. .lulius W. Adams. 
 
 6th United States (.5 companies) Capt. Levi C. Bootes. 
 
 12tli United States (8 companies) Capt. Thomas S. Dunn. 
 
 14th United States (8 companies) Maj. Grotius R. Giddings, 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. Sidney Burbank. 
 
 2d United States (6 companies) Maj. Arthur T. Lee. 
 
 Capt. Samuel A. Mckee. 
 
 7th United States (4 companies) , Cajit. David P. Hancock. 
 
 10th United States (3 companies) Capt. William Clinton. 
 
 11th United States (6 companies) Maj. Delancey Floyd-Jones. 
 
 17th United States (7 companies) Lieut.-col. J. Durell Greene. 
 
 * Mortally wounded. 
 
268 ADDENDA. 
 
 Third Brujade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Stephen H. Weed.* 
 
 (2) Col. Kenner Garrard. 
 
 140th New York Col. Patrick K. O'Rorke. 
 
 Lieut. -col. Louis Ernst. 
 146th New York Col. Kenner Garrard. 
 
 Lieut.-col. David T. .Jenkins. 
 
 91st Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. .Joscpli II. 8inex. 
 
 155th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. John II. Cain. 
 
 THIRD DIVISION, f 
 
 Brig.-gen. Samuel W. Crawford. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. William McCandless. 
 
 1st Pennsylvania Reserves (9 companies) Col. William C. Talley. 
 
 2d Pennsylvania Reserves Lieut.-col. George A. Woodward. 
 
 6tli Pennsylvania Reserves Lieut.-col. Wellington 11. Lnt. 
 
 13th Pennsylvania Reserves Col. Charles F. Taylor. 
 
 Maj. William R. Hartshorne. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Col. Joseph W. Fisher. 
 
 5th Pennsylvania Reserves Lieut.-col. George Dare. 
 
 9th Pennsylvania Reserves Lieut.-col. James McK. Snodgrass. 
 
 10th Pennsylvania Reserves Col. Adoniram J. Warner. 
 
 11th Pennsylvania Reserves Col. Samuel M. Jackson. 
 
 12th Pennsylvania Reserves (9 companies) ..Col. Martin D. Hardin. 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Ca^jt. Augustus p. Martin. 
 
 Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C) Lieut. Aaron F. Walcott. 
 
 1st New York Light, Battery C Capt. Almont Barnes. 
 
 1st Ohio Light, Battery L Capt. Frank C. Gibbs. 
 
 5th United States, Battery D Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett. 
 
 Lieut. Benjamin F. Rittenhouse. 
 5th United States, Battery I Lieut. Malbone F. Watson. 
 
 Lieut. Charles C. MacConnell. 
 
 SIXTH ARMY CORPS. 
 Maj.-gen. John Sedgwick. 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 
 New Jersey Cayalrv, Company L 1 (. ^^y .^u^j^ g_ ^raft. 
 Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company t± j ^ 
 
 1st 
 1st 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Horatio G. Wright. 
 
 Provost Guard. 
 
 4th New Jersey (3 companies), Capt. William R. Maxwell. 
 
 * Killed. 
 
 t Joined corps June 28. The Second brigade was left in the Department of Washington. 
 
ADDENDA. v 269 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Brig.-geii. Alfred T. A. Torbert. 
 
 1st New Jersey Lieut.-col. William Henry, Jr. 
 
 2d New Jersey Lieut.-col. Charles Wiebecke. 
 
 3d New Jersey Lieut.-col. Edward L. Campbell. 
 
 15th New Jersey Col. William H. Pem-ose. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Joseph J. Bartlett. 
 
 1 6th Maine Col. Clark S. Edwards. 
 
 121st New York Col. Emory Upton. 
 
 9oth Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Edward Carroll. 
 
 96th Pennsylvania Maj. William H. Lessig. 
 
 Third, Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. David A. Kussell. 
 
 6th Maine Col. Hiram Burnham. 
 
 49th Pennsylvania (4 companies) Lieut.-col. Thomas M. Hulings. 
 
 119th Pennsylvania Col. Peter C. Ellmaker. 
 
 5th Wisconsin Col. Thomas S.Allen. 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Albion P. Howe. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. Lewis A. Grant. 
 
 2d Vermont Col. James H. Walbridge. 
 
 3d Vermont Col. Thomas O. Seaver. 
 
 4th Vermont Col. Charles B. Stoughton. 
 
 5th Vermont Lieut.-col. John E,. Lewis. 
 
 6th Vermont Col. Elisha L. Barney. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Neill. 
 
 7th Maine (6 companies) Lieut.-col. Selden Connor. 
 
 33d New York (detachment) Capt. Henry J. Gifibrd. 
 
 43d New York Lieut.-col. John Wilson. 
 
 49th New York Col. Daniel D. Bidwell. 
 
 77th New Y'^ork Lieut.-col. Winsor B. French. 
 
 61st Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. George F. Smith. 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 (1) Major.-gen. John Newton.* 
 
 (2) Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Alexander Shaler. 
 
 65th New York Col. Joseph E. Hamblin. 
 
 67th New York Col. Nelson Cross. 
 
 122d New York Col. Silas Titus. 
 
 23d Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. John F. Glenn. 
 
 82d Pennsylvania Col. Isaac C. Bassett. 
 
 * Assumed command of First army corps July 2d. 
 
270 ADDENDA. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. Henry L, Eustis. 
 
 7th Massachusetts Lieut.-col. Franklin P. Harlow. 
 
 10th Massachusetts... Lieut.-col. .Joseph K. Parsons. 
 
 37th Massaciiusetts Col. Oliver Edwards. 
 
 2d lihode Island Col. Horatio Kogers, Jr. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton. 
 
 (2) Col.' David J. Nevin. 
 
 62d New York Lieut.-col. Theodore B. Hamilton. 
 
 98d Pennsylvania Maj. John I. Nevin. 
 
 9Sth Pennsylvania Maj. John B. Koliler. 
 
 102d Pennsylvania* Col. John W. Patterson. 
 
 139th Pennsylvania Col. Frederick H. Collier. 
 
 Lieut.-col. William H. Moody. 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Col. Charles H. Tompkins. 
 
 Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A) Capt. William H. McCartney. 
 
 New York Light, 1st Battery Capt. Andrew Cowan. 
 
 New York Light, 3d Battery Capt. William A. Ham. 
 
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C Capt. Richard Waterman. 
 
 1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G Capt. George W.Adams. 
 
 2d United States, Battery D Lieut. Edward B. Williston. 
 
 2d United States, Battery G Lieut. John H. Butler. 
 
 5th United States, Battery F Lieut. Leonard Martin. 
 
 ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS. 
 Maj.-gen. Oliver O. Howard.! 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 
 1st Indiana Cavalry, Companies I and K, Capt. Abrara Sharra. 
 8th New York Infantry (1 company), Lieut. Hermann Foerster. 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Francis C. Barlow. J 
 
 (2) Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Col. Leopold von Gilsa. 
 
 41st New York (9 companies) Lieut.-col. Detleo von Einsiedel. 
 
 54th New York Maj. Stephen Kovacs. 
 
 . [?] 
 
 68th New York Col. Gottliilf Bourry. 
 
 153d Pennsylvania Maj. John F. Frueauff. 
 
 * Not engaged. 
 
 t During the interval between the death of General Reynolds and the arrival of General 
 Hancock on the afternoon of .Inly 1st all the troops ou the field of battle were couinianded by 
 General Howard, General Schurz taking command of the Eleventh corps and General 
 Schimmelfeniiig of the Third division. 
 
 J Wounded. 
 
ADDENDA. 271 
 
 Second Brigade, 
 
 1) Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames. 
 
 2) Col. Andrew L. Harris. 
 
 17th Connecticut Lieut. -col. Douglas Fowler, 
 
 Maj. Allen G. Brady. 
 25th Ohio Lieut.-col. Jeremiah Williams. 
 
 Lieut. William Maloney. 
 
 Lieut. Israel White. 
 75th Ohio Col. Andrew L. Harris. 
 
 . [?] 
 
 107th Ohio Col. Seraphim Meyer. [?] 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Adolph von Steinwehr. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. Charles R. Coster. 
 
 134th New York Lieut.-col. Allen H. Jackson. 
 
 154th New York Lieut.-col. Daniel B.Allen. 
 
 27th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Lorenz Cantador. 
 
 73d Pennsylvania Capt. Daniel F. Kelley. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. Orland Smith. 
 
 33d Massachusetts Col. Adin B. Underwood. 
 
 136th New York Col. James Wood, Jr. 
 
 5oth Ohio Col. Charles B. Gambee. 
 
 73d Ohio Lieut.-col. Richard Long. 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 Maj.-geu. Carl Schurz. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. A. Schimmelfennig.* 
 
 (2) Col. George von Amsberg. 
 
 82d Illinois Lieut.-col. Edward S. Salomon. 
 
 45th New York Col. George von Amsberg. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Adolphus Dobke. 
 
 157th New York Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr. 
 
 61st Ohio Col. Steplien J. McGroarty. 
 
 74th Pennsylvania Col. Adolph von Hartung. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Alexander von MitzeL 
 
 Capt. Gustave Schleiter. 
 
 Capt. Henry Krauseneck. 
 
 * Captured. 
 
272 ADDENDA. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. W. Krzyzanowski. 
 
 58th New York Lient.-col. August C tto. 
 
 Ca|)t. VauU Koenig. 
 119th New York Col. John T. Lockman. 
 
 Lieiit.-col. I'dward F. Lloyd. 
 82d Ohio Col. .Janios S. Kohinson. 
 
 Lieut. -eol. David Tlioinson. 
 75th Pennsylvania Col. Francis Maliler. 
 
 Maj. August Ledig. 
 26th Wisconsin Lieut.-col. Ilans IJoebel. 
 
 Capt. John W. Fuchs. 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Maj. Thomas W. Osborn. 
 
 1st New York Light, Battery I Capt. Michael Wiedrich. 
 
 New York Light, l.Sth Battery Lieut. William Wlieeler. 
 
 1st Oliio Light, Battery I '. Capt. Hubert Diiger. 
 
 1st Ohio Light, Battery K Capt. Lewis Ilecknian. 
 
 4th United States, Battery G Lieut. Bayard Wilkeson. 
 
 Lieut. Eugene A. Bancroft. 
 
 TWELFTH ARMY CORPS. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Alpheus S. W^illiams.* 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 
 10th Maine (battalion), Capt. John D. Beardsley, 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Ruger. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. Archibald L. McDongall. 
 
 5th Connecticut Col. Warren W. Packer. 
 
 20th Connecticut Lieut.-col. William B. Wooster. 
 
 3d Maryland Col. Joseph M. Sudsburg. 
 
 123d New York Lieut.-col. James C. Rogers. 
 
 Capt. Adolphus H. Tanner. 
 
 145th New York Col. E. Livingston Price. 
 
 46th Pennsylvania Col. James L. Selfridge. 
 
 Second Brigade.f 
 Brig.-gen. Henry H. Lockwood. 
 
 1st Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade Col. William P. Maulsby. 
 
 1st Maryland, Eastern Shore Col. James Wallace. 
 
 150th New York Col. John H. Ketchara. 
 
 * During the battle Major-general Henry W. Sloeum, the propfer commander of this corps, 
 held temporary command of the right wing of the army. 
 
 t Unassigned during progress of battle ; afterward attached to First division as Second 
 brigade. 
 
ADDENDA. 273 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Col. Silas Colgrove. 
 
 27th Indiana Lieut.-col. John E. Fesler. 
 
 2d Massachusetts Lieut.-col. Charles R. Mudge. 
 
 Maj. Charles F. Morse. 
 
 13th New Jersey Col. Ezra A. Carman. 
 
 l()7th New York Col. Nirom M. Crane. 
 
 3d Wisconsin Col. William Hawley. 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. John W. Geary. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Col. Charles Candy. 
 
 5th Ohio Col. John H. Patrick. 
 
 7th Ohio Col. William E. Creighton. 
 
 29th Ohio Capt. Wilbur F. Stevens. 
 
 Capt. Edward Hayes. 
 
 66th Ohio Lieut.-col. Eugene Powell. 
 
 28th Pennsylvania Capt. John Flynn. 
 
 147th Pennsylvania (8 companies) Lieut.-col. Ario Pardee, Jr. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 (1) Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 
 
 (2) Brig.-gen. Thomas L. Kane. 
 
 (3) Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 
 
 29th Pennsylvania Col. William Eickards, Jr. 
 
 109th Pennsylvania Capt. Frederick L. Gimber. 
 
 111th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Thomas M. Walker. 
 
 Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Thomas M. Walker. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. George S. Greene. 
 
 60th New York.. Col. Abel Godard. 
 
 78th New York Lieut.-col. Herbert Hammerstein. 
 
 102d New Y'"ork Col. James C Lane. 
 
 Capt. Lewis E. Stegman. 
 
 137th New York Col. David Ireland. 
 
 149th New York Col. Henry A. Barnum. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Charles B. Eandall. 
 
 AUTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg. 
 
 1st New York Light, Battery M Lieut. Charles E. Winegar. 
 
 Pennsylvania Light, Battery E Lieut. Charles A. Atwell. 
 
 4th United States, Battery F Lieut. Sylvanus T. Eui 
 
 6th United States, Battery K Lieut. David H. Kinzie 
 
 »»• 
 
274 ADDENDA. 
 
 CAVALRY CORPS. 
 
 Maj.-gen. Alfred Pleasonton. 
 
 ■ FIR8T DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. John Buford. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. William Gamble. 
 
 8tli Illinois Maj. John L. Beveridge. 
 
 12th Illinois (4 companies) ) ^, , ^ ^t /-,i 
 
 3d Indiana (G companies) | Col. George H. Chapman. 
 
 8th New York Lieut.-col. William L. Markell. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. Thomas C. Devin. 
 
 6th New York Maj. W^illiam E. Beardsley. 
 
 9th New York Col. William Sackett. 
 
 17th Pennsylvania Col. Josiah H. Kellogg. 
 
 3d West Virginia (2 companies) Capt. Seymour B. Conger. 
 
 Reserve Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Wesley Merritt. 
 
 6th Pennsylvania Maj. James H. Haseltine. 
 
 1st United States Capt. Robert S. C. Lord. 
 
 2d United States Capt. T. F. Rodenbough. 
 
 5th United States Capt. Julius W. Mason. 
 
 6th United States Ma,j. Samuel H.Starr. 
 
 Lieut. Louis H. Carpenter. 
 
 Lieut. Nicholas Nolan. 
 
 Capt. Ira W. Claflin. 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. David McM. Gregg. 
 
 Headquarters Guard. 
 1st Ohio, Company A, Capt. Noah Jones. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. John B. Mcintosh. 
 
 1st Maryland (11 companies) Lieut.-col. James M. Deems. 
 
 Purnell Legion Maryland, Company A Capt. Robert E. Duvall. 
 
 1st Miissachusetts * Lieut.-col. Greely S. Curtis. 
 
 1st New Jersey Maj. Myron H. Beaumont. 
 
 1st Pennsylvania Col. John P. Taylor. 
 
 3d Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. Edward S. Jones. 
 
 3d Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery, Section 
 
 Battery Hf Capt. William D. Rank. 
 
 * Detached from brigade. t Serving as liglit artillery. 
 
ADDENDA. 275 
 
 Second Brigade.* 
 Col. Pennock Huey. 
 
 2d New York Lieut.-col. Otto Harhaus. 
 
 4th NeAv York Lieut.-col. Augustus Pruyn. 
 
 6th Ohio (10 companies) Maj. William Stedman. 
 
 8th Pennsylvania Capt. William A. Corrie. 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Col. J. Irvin Gregg. 
 
 1st Maine Lieut.-col. Charles H. Smith. 
 
 10th New York Maj. M. Henry Avery. 
 
 4th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. William E. Doster. 
 
 16th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. John K. Kobison. 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Judson Kilpatrick. 
 Headquarters Guard. 
 1st Ohio, Company C Capt. Samuel N. Stanford. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Elon J. Farnsworth.f 
 
 (2) Col. Nathani'el P. Kichmond. 
 
 5th New York Maj. John Hammond. 
 
 18th Pennsylvania Lieut.-col. William P. Brinton. 
 
 1st Vermont Lieut.-col. Addison W. Preston. 
 
 1st West Virginia (10 companies) Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond. 
 
 Maj. Charles E. Capehart. 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. George A. Custer. 
 
 1st Michigan Col. Charles H. Town. 
 
 5th Michigan Col. Russell A. Alger. 
 
 6th Michigan Col. George Gray. 
 
 7th Michigan (10 companies) Col. William D. Mann. 
 
 HOKSE ARTILLERY. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Capt. James M. Robertson. 
 
 9th Michigan Capt. Jabez J. Daniels. 
 
 6th New York Capt. Joseph W. Martin. 
 
 2d tinited States, Batteries B and L Lieut. Edward Heaton. 
 
 2d United States, Battery M Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington. 
 
 4th United States, Battery E Lieut. Samuel S. Elder. 
 
 Second Brigmde, 
 Capt. John C. Tidball. 
 
 1st United States, Batteries E and G Capt. Alanson M. Randol. 
 
 1st United States, Battery K Capt. William M. Graham. 
 
 2d United States, Battery A Lieut. John H. Calef. 
 
 3d United States, Batteiy C Lieut. William D. Fuller. 
 
 * Not engaged, + Killed. 
 
276 ADDENDA. 
 
 ARTILLERY* 
 Brig.-gen. Henry J. Hunt. 
 
 ARTILLERY RESERVE. 
 
 (1) Brig.-gen. Robert O. Tylcr.f 
 
 (2) Capt. James M. Robertson. 
 
 Fird Regular Brigade. 
 
 Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom'. 
 
 1st United States, Battery H Lioiit. Cliandler P. Eakin. 
 
 Lieut. Philip D. Mason. 
 
 3d United States, Batteries F and K Lieut. Jolin (t. Turnbull. 
 
 4th United States, Battery C Lieut. Evan Thomas. 
 
 5th United States, Battery C Lieut. Gulian V. Weir. 
 
 Fir at Volunteer Brigade. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Freeman McGilvery. 
 
 Massachusetts Light, hxh. Battery (E) % Capt. Charles A. Phillips. 
 
 Massachusetts Light, 9th I]attery Capt. John Bigelow. 
 
 Lieut. Richard S. Milton. 
 
 New York Light, 15th Battery Capt. Patrick ILirt. 
 
 Pennsylvania Light, Batteries C and F Capt. James Thompson. 
 
 Second Volunteer Brigade. 
 Capt. Elijah D. Taft. 
 
 1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery B ? Capt. Albert F. Brooker. 
 
 1st Connecticut Heavy, Battery M ^ (apt. Franklin A. Pratt. 
 
 Connecticut Light, 2d Battery Caj)t. John W. Sterling. 
 
 New York Light, 5th Battery Capt. Elijali D. Taft. 
 
 Tliird Vohmleer Brigade. 
 
 Capt. James F. Huntington. 
 
 New Hampshire Light, Ist Battery Capt. Frederick ]\[. Edgell. 
 
 1st Ohio Light, Battery H Lieut. George W. Norton. 
 
 1st Pennsylvania Light, Batteries F and G.X'apt. R. Bruce Ricketts. 
 West Virginia Light, Battery C Capt. Wallace Hill. 
 
 Fovrth Vohmleer Brigade. 
 
 Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh. 
 
 Maine Light, 6th Battery Lieut. Edwin B. Dow. 
 
 Maryland Light, Battery A Capt. James H. Rigbv. 
 
 New .Jersey Light, 1st Battery Lieut. Augustin N. Parsons. 
 
 1st New York Light, Battery G Capt. Nelson Ames. 
 
 1st New Y'^ork Light, Battery K\\ Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh. 
 
 Train Guard. 
 
 4th New Jersey Infantry (7 companies) Maj. Charles Ewing. 
 
 Headquarters Guard. 
 
 32d Massachusetts, Company C Capt. Josiah C. Fuller. 
 
 * All organizations of artillery except the Reserve will be found in the rosters of the com- 
 mands with whioh they served. 
 t Disabled. 
 1 10th New York Battery attached. gNot engaged. || 11th New York Battery attached. 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 277 
 
 Eeturn of Casualties in the Anmj of the Potomac, commanded by 
 Major-general George G. Meade, U. S. Armij, at the Battle 
 of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, July IS, 1863.^ 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 1 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or missing. 
 
 V 
 
 Command. 
 
 u 
 O 
 
 •a 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 % . 
 
 -aa 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 sa 
 
 
 IS 
 
 .2 <o 
 ■53 
 
 £ 
 
 < 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 FIRST ARMY CORPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maj.-gen. John F. Reynolds. 
 M:ij.-gen. Abner Doubleday. 
 Maj.-gen. John Newton. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 '" i 
 
 1 
 
 '"""2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Ist Maine Cavalry, Company L 
 
 3 
 
 FIRST division. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. James S. Wadsworth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Solomon Meredith. 
 Col. William W. Robinson. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 "'25 
 
 50 
 25 
 
 28 
 28 
 
 1 
 12 
 18 
 11 
 
 7 
 10 
 
 "i'ii 
 201 
 
 144 
 
 109 
 
 95 
 
 "4 
 3 
 5 
 
 "i 
 
 "'"4*6 
 
 . 88 
 47 
 22 
 51 
 
 1 
 
 
 210 
 
 24th Michio'an .... 
 
 363 
 
 
 233 
 
 6th Wisconsin 
 
 168 
 
 7th Wisconsin 
 
 178 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 149 
 
 54 
 
 670 
 
 13 
 
 254 
 
 1153 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Lysander Cutler. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 "2 
 
 "3 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 30 
 13 
 
 7 
 
 40 
 13 
 
 i'e 
 
 6 
 8 
 9 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 116 
 
 99 
 
 54 
 
 125 
 
 55 
 
 "i 
 "2 
 
 3 
 70 
 99 
 45 
 92 
 54 
 
 10 
 
 76th New York 
 
 234 
 
 84th New York (14th Militia) 
 
 95th New York 
 
 217 
 115 
 
 147th New York 
 
 269 
 
 66th Pennsylvania 
 
 130 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 6 
 
 105 
 
 44 
 
 454 
 
 3 
 
 363 
 
 975 
 
 Total First division 
 
 19 
 
 254 
 
 98 
 
 1124 
 
 16 
 
 617 
 
 2128 
 
 * Also includes losses la skirmishes July 4th. 
 
278 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Poto)nac, etc. — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or luissiug. 
 
 
 Command. 
 
 o 
 
 13 
 
 0) 
 
 g 
 
 o 
 
 1 
 
 "3 a 
 
 2 
 
 
 •3 
 .2 
 
 = a 
 
 a 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Jolin C. Kobinson. 
 Staff 
 
 "i 
 
 ...„. 
 
 7 
 12 
 11 
 
 1 
 11 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 5 
 4 
 6 
 10 
 2 
 8 
 
 1 
 54 
 73 
 52 
 81 
 12 
 48 
 
 2 
 
 11 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 10 
 
 "e 
 
 1 
 
 153 
 
 98 
 167 
 
 82 
 
 '"92 
 
 1 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Gabriel R. Paul. 
 Col. Samuel H. Leonard. 
 Col. Adrian K. Root. 
 Col. Ricliard Coulter. 
 Col. Peter Lyle. 
 Col. Richard Coulter. 
 
 Staff 
 
 5 
 
 16th Maine 
 
 232 
 
 13tli Massachusetts 
 
 185 
 
 94th New York 
 
 245 
 
 104th New York 
 
 194 
 
 
 15 
 
 107 th Pennsylvania 
 
 165 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 2 
 
 "i 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 "i 
 
 49 
 
 ...„. 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 36 
 
 "i 
 
 I 
 
 6 
 3 
 3 
 
 321 
 
 ""45 
 15 
 27 
 
 44 
 51 
 
 42 
 
 40 
 
 1 
 3 
 
 "3 
 
 "4 
 
 1 
 
 593 
 
 ""59 
 58 
 75 
 62 
 45 
 39 
 
 1041 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 12th Massachusetts 
 
 119 
 
 83d New York (9th Militia) 
 
 82 
 
 97th New York 
 
 126 
 
 
 117 
 
 88th Pennsylvania 
 
 106 
 
 90th Pennsylvania 
 
 93 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 7 
 
 32 
 
 31 
 
 224 
 
 12 
 
 338 
 
 644 
 
 Total Second division 
 
 9 
 
 31 
 
 68 
 
 1 
 
 545 
 
 52 
 
 931 
 
 1686 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Thomas A. Rowley. 
 Maj.-gen. Abner Doubleday. 
 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 * Transferred on afternoon of July 1st from the Second to the First brigade. Its losses after 
 July 1st are reported with the latter brigade. 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 279 
 
 Return of Casualties in the A 
 
 rmy 
 
 of the Potomac, etc 
 
 — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or missing. 
 
 
 Command, 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 
 u 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 -a 
 
 
 
 0) . 
 
 ca 
 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Col. Cliapman Biddle. 
 Brig.-gen. Thomas A. Rowley. 
 Col. Cliapmau Biddle. 
 
 Staff 
 
 
 "32 
 12 
 10 
 29 
 
 1 
 
 15 
 
 5 
 
 11 
 
 7 
 
 ""96 
 
 101 
 117 
 195 
 
 "i 
 1 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 ""23 
 
 60 
 
 68 
 
 100 
 
 1 
 
 80th New York (20th Militia) 
 
 1 21 st Pennsyl van ia 
 
 3 
 
 "3 
 
 2 
 
 170' 
 179 
 
 142d Pennsylvania 
 
 211 
 
 151st Pennsylvania 
 
 335 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 
 83 
 
 20 
 33 
 
 27 
 
 39 
 
 10 
 12 
 10 
 
 509 
 
 130 
 159 
 141 
 
 6 
 
 "4 
 4 
 
 251 
 
 91 
 127 
 
 80 
 
 896 
 
 Second Brigade. ■ 
 
 Col. Roy Stone. 
 
 Col. Langhorne Wister. 
 
 Col. Edmund L. Dana. 
 
 143d Pennsylvania 
 
 252 
 
 149th Pennsylvania 
 
 336 
 
 150th Pennsylvania 
 
 264 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 4 
 
 "i 
 1 
 
 80 
 
 '"16 
 18 
 16 
 
 32 
 
 2 
 4 
 1 
 5 
 
 430 
 
 ""99 
 66 
 97 
 
 8 
 
 298 
 
 '"io 
 21 
 
 1 
 
 852 
 
 Tliird Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. George J. Stannard. 
 Col. Francis V. Randall. 
 
 Staff 
 
 2 
 
 1 3th Vermont 
 
 123 
 
 14th Vermont 
 
 107 
 
 16th Vermont 
 
 119 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 • 44 
 
 12 
 
 262 
 
 ... 
 
 32 
 
 351 
 
 Total Third division 
 
 13 
 
 207 
 
 '""3 
 
 1 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 84 
 
 "2 
 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 
 1201 
 
 18 
 11 
 14 
 ■8 
 29 
 
 14 
 
 581 
 
 1 
 '""3 
 
 2100 
 
 ARTII.1.ERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Col. Chas. S. Wainwright. 
 
 Maine Light, 2d Battery 
 
 Maine Light, 5th Battery 
 
 18 
 23 
 
 1st New York Light, Battery L*... 
 1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B.. 
 4th United States, Battery B 
 
 17 
 11 
 36 
 
 Total Artillery brigade 
 
 
 8 
 
 6 
 
 80 
 
 
 11 
 
 105 
 
 Total First army corps 
 
 42 
 
 551 
 
 257 
 
 2952 
 
 82 
 
 2140 
 
 6024 
 
 * Company E, 1st New York Heavy Artillery, attached. 
 T 
 
280 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the A 
 
 rmy 
 
 of the Potomac, etc 
 
 . — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or missing. 
 
 « 
 
 Command. 
 
 o 
 
 % . 
 
 B S 
 
 t 
 
 m 
 
 
 
 u 
 
 m 
 
 
 « a 
 
 ~ 0) 
 
 = 5 
 
 w 
 
 bo 
 
 SECO^'D ARMY CORPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maj.-geu. WiNFiELD S. Hancock* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Slaff 
 
 
 "i' 
 
 3 
 
 " ""3 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 6th New Yurk C:ivalry,Cos. D and K 
 
 4 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. John C. Caldwell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 F'lr^i Brigade.' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. Edward E. Cross. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. H. Boyd McKeen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 i" 
 
 "26" 
 
 6 
 5 
 
 18 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 6 
 5 
 6 
 
 '"49 
 50 
 44 
 95 
 
 ... 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 oth New Ilampsliire 
 
 80 
 
 61st New York 
 
 62 
 
 
 1 
 
 62 
 
 148th Pennsylvania 
 
 125 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 2 
 
 55 
 
 22 
 
 238 
 
 ... 
 
 13 
 
 330 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 Col. Patrick Kelly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28th Massachusetts 
 
 i 
 
 8 
 5 
 5 
 6 
 2 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 56 
 9 
 13 
 16 
 11 
 
 
 35 
 
 7 
 6 
 4 
 8 
 
 100 
 
 63d New York 
 
 23 
 
 
 25 
 
 88th New York 
 
 28 
 
 116th Pennsylvania 
 
 22 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 1 
 
 26 
 
 4 
 
 105 
 
 2 
 
 60 
 
 198 
 
 TJiird Brigade. 
 
 
 Brig.-wen. Samuel K. Zook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Litut.-col. John Eraser. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 "'"1* 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 ""23 
 26 
 
 
 "io" 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 52d New York 
 
 38 
 
 57th New York 
 
 34 
 
 66th New York 
 
 2 
 3 
 
 3 
 34 
 
 5 
 
 8 
 
 24 
 136 
 
 i 
 3 
 
 9 
 
 57 
 
 44 
 
 140th Pennsylvania 
 
 241 
 
 Total Third briaade 
 
 7 
 
 42 
 
 18 
 
 209 
 
 4 
 
 78 
 
 358 
 
 ' See foot-note, p. 262. 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 281 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or missing. 
 
 
 Command. ^ 
 
 o 
 
 1 
 
 O 
 
 •a 
 
 o 
 
 
 2 
 o 
 
 la 
 
 eg 
 
 a 
 
 to 
 bo 
 
 Fourth Brigade. 
 
 Col. John R. Brooke. 
 
 27th Connecticut 
 
 2 
 2 
 4 
 
 "i 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 11 
 
 7 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 7 
 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 19 
 
 54 
 57 
 56 
 58 
 
 ... 
 
 4 
 12 
 19 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 37 
 
 2d Delaware. 
 
 84 
 
 64th New York 
 
 98 
 
 58d Pennsvl van ia 
 
 80 
 
 145th Pennsylvania 
 
 84 
 
 
 
 Total Fourth brigade 
 
 9 
 
 44 
 
 37 
 
 244 
 
 
 49 
 
 383 
 
 Total First division 
 
 19 
 
 167 
 
 ""28 
 20 
 47 
 42 
 
 81 
 3 
 
 1 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 14 
 12 
 
 796 
 
 155 
 
 89 
 159 
 120 
 
 6 
 
 i 
 
 200 
 
 ■■■■4 
 
 28 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 1269 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig. -gen. John Gibbon. 
 Brig.-gen. William Harrow. 
 
 Staff 
 
 3 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. William Harrow. 
 Col. Francis E. Heath. 
 
 Staff 
 
 "i 
 
 3 
 3 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 19th Maine 
 
 199 
 
 15th Massachusetts 
 
 148 
 
 1st Minnesota 
 
 224 
 
 82d New York (2d Militia) 
 
 192 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 10 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 137 
 
 36 
 19 
 42 
 
 8 
 
 46 
 
 8 
 3 
 7 
 9 
 
 523 
 
 72 
 
 55 
 
 138 
 
 45 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 3 
 
 47 
 
 7 
 
 16 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 764 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Alexander S. Webb. 
 69th Pennsylvania 
 
 129 
 
 71st Pennsvlvania 
 
 98 
 
 7 2d Pennsv 1 vania 
 
 191 
 
 106th Pennsylvania 
 
 64 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 9 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 105 
 
 7 
 
 28 
 19 
 15 
 
 6 
 
 27 
 
 9 
 8 
 3 
 6 
 3 
 
 310 
 
 52 
 86 
 41 
 49 
 25 
 
 5 
 
 26 
 
 7 
 3 
 
 "■■■4 
 
 482 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 Col. Norman J. Hall. 
 
 1 9th IMassachusetts 
 
 77 
 
 20th Massachusetts 
 
 7th Michisjan 
 
 127 
 65 
 
 42d New Yf)rk 
 
 74 
 
 69th New York 
 
 34 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 6 
 
 75 
 
 29 
 
 253 
 
 
 14 
 
 377 
 
282 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured or 
 uiissiiig. 
 
 
 CosraAND. 
 
 a) 
 
 o 
 
 -2 . 
 
 S 
 
 si 
 
 
 
 ■aa 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 < 
 
 Unattached. 
 1st Co. (Mass.) Sharpshooters 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 Total Second division 
 
 25 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 319 
 
 6 
 7 
 
 17 
 5 
 
 105 
 
 3 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 1 
 
 1092 
 
 22 
 16 
 73 
 40 
 
 6 
 
 87 
 
 ....„ 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1634 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Alexander Hays. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. Samuel S. Carroll. 
 
 14th Indiana 
 
 31 
 
 4th Ohio 
 
 31 
 
 8th Ohio 
 
 102 
 
 7th West Virginia 
 
 47 
 
 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 3 
 
 i 
 
 2 
 ■3 
 
 35 
 
 10 
 9 
 
 21 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 15 
 
 10 
 10 
 4 
 ... 
 10 
 
 151 
 
 42 
 44 
 79 
 4 
 76 
 
 "i 
 
 4 
 
 12 
 
 9 
 
 211 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 Col. Thomas A. Smyth. 
 Lieut.-col. Francis E. Pierce. 
 
 1 4th Connecticut. 
 
 66 
 
 1st Delaware 
 
 77 
 
 12th New Jei'sey 
 
 115 
 
 10th New York (battalion) 
 
 lOSth New York 
 
 6 
 
 102 
 
 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 3 
 2 
 5 
 
 55 
 
 14 
 
 55 
 24 
 35 
 
 34 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 6 
 9 
 
 245 
 
 77 
 169 
 
 98 
 172 
 
 1 
 
 25 
 
 "14 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 366 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 Col. George L. Willard. 
 Col. Eliakim Sherrill. 
 Lieut.-col. James M. Bull. 
 
 39th New York 
 
 95 
 
 111th New York 
 
 249 
 
 125th New York 
 
 139 
 
 126th New York 
 
 231 
 
 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 11 
 
 128 
 
 26 
 
 516 
 
 
 33 
 
 714 
 
 
 
 Total Third division 
 
 20 
 
 218 
 
 75 
 
 912 
 
 1 
 
 65 
 
 1291 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 283 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc 
 
 . — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured or 
 missiug. 
 
 
 Command. 
 
 8 
 o 
 
 .2 3 
 ■53 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 2 
 8 
 
 a 
 
 
 a 2 
 W 
 
 to 
 U) 
 
 <i 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Capt. John G. Hazard. 
 1st New York Light, Bat. B*... 
 1st Rhode Island Light, Bat. A.. 
 1st Ehode Island Light, Bat. B.. 
 
 1st United States, Battery I 
 
 4th United States, Battery A 
 
 1 
 
 "i 
 "i 
 
 9 
 3 
 6 
 1 
 5 
 
 
 15 
 
 27 
 18 
 23 
 31 
 
 ... 
 
 2 
 
 26 
 32 
 28 
 25 
 38 
 
 Total Artillery brigade 
 
 3 
 
 67 
 
 24 
 
 5 
 
 114 
 
 
 3 
 
 149 
 
 Total Second army corps 
 
 729 
 
 269 
 
 2917 
 
 13 
 
 355 
 
 4350 
 
 THIRD ARMY CORPS. 
 Maj.-gen. Daniel E. Sickles, 
 Maj.-gen. David B. Birney. 
 
 Staff 
 
 
 ""'9 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 25 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 9 
 3 
 9 
 14 
 1 
 6 
 
 "37' 
 
 26 
 
 117 
 
 101 
 
 85 
 97 
 
 "3 
 "3 
 
 "55 
 
 4 
 
 19 
 
 9 
 
 67 
 
 21 
 
 2 
 
 FIRST division. 
 
 Maj.-gen. David B. Birney. 
 Brig.-gen. J. H. Hobart Ward. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Charles K. Graham. 
 Col. Andrew H. Tippin. 
 Staff 
 
 
 3 
 
 67th Pennsylvania 
 
 2 
 
 '3 
 
 1 
 
 115 
 
 63d Pennsylvania 
 
 34 
 
 68th Pennsy 1 van ia 
 
 152 
 
 105th Pennsylvania 
 
 132 
 
 1 1 4th Pennsvl vania 
 
 154 
 
 141st Pennsylvania 
 
 149 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 6 
 
 54 
 
 "30 
 
 17 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 24 
 
 17 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 45 
 
 1 
 9 
 
 2 
 3 
 3 
 3 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 
 463 
 
 *io5 
 
 57 
 56 
 48 
 54 
 77 
 33 
 19 
 
 6 
 
 "4 
 1 
 
 "i 
 
 165 
 
 "10 
 
 45 
 
 70 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 11 
 
 6 
 
 14 
 
 739 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. J. H. Hobart Ward. 
 Col. Hiram Berdan. 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 20th Indiana 
 
 2 
 1 
 2 
 1 
 4 
 1 
 1 
 
 156 
 
 3d Mai ne 
 
 122 
 
 4th Maine 
 
 144 
 
 86th New York 
 
 66 
 
 r24th New York 
 
 90 
 
 
 110 
 
 1st United States Sharpshooters.. 
 % 2d United States Sharpshooters... 
 
 49 
 43 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 12 
 
 117 
 
 33 
 
 449 
 
 6 
 
 164 
 
 781 
 
 * 14th New York Battery attached. 
 
284 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the x 
 
 I rmy 
 
 of the Potomac, etc. 
 
 —Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wou 
 
 iided. 
 
 Captured or 
 missing. 
 
 
 Command. 
 
 2 
 
 a 
 
 O 
 
 
 a 
 
 
 .2 S 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 < 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 Col. P. Kegis de Trobriand. 
 
 17th Maine 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 17 
 7 
 
 17 
 22 
 
 8 
 
 7 
 3 
 8 
 4 
 6 
 
 105 
 28 
 78 
 
 116 
 39 
 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 ' 4 
 
 7 
 
 133 
 
 3d Michigan 
 
 45 
 
 5th I\!ichigan 
 
 109 
 
 40th Nfew York 
 
 150 
 
 110th Pennsylvania 
 
 53 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 4 
 
 71 
 
 28 
 
 366 
 
 
 21 
 
 490 
 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 "l 
 1 
 3 
 1 
 3 
 1 
 
 242 
 2 
 
 .15 
 22 
 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 
 29 
 
 106 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 7 
 4 
 5 
 9 
 10 
 
 1278 
 
 7 
 
 75 
 
 89 
 
 49 
 
 62 
 
 115 
 
 166 
 
 12 
 "2 
 
 350 
 
 "21 
 
 8 
 
 13 
 
 11 
 
 12 
 
 7 
 
 2010 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Andrew A. Humphreys 
 Stall" 
 
 11 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Joseph B. Carr. 
 Staff 
 
 2 
 
 1st Massarhnsetts 
 
 120 
 
 11th Massachusetts 
 
 129 
 
 Ifitli Massachusetts 
 
 81 
 
 12th New Hampshire 
 
 92 
 
 11th New Jersey 
 
 153 
 
 26th Pennsvlvania 
 
 213 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 10 
 
 "]" 
 
 "4 
 "7 
 
 105 
 
 '20 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 47 
 
 12 
 
 23 
 
 45 
 
 2 
 8 
 6 
 7 
 
 11 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 556 
 
 "85 
 62 
 72 
 92 
 68 
 
 144 
 
 2 
 
 72 
 
 "'4 
 13 
 
 28 
 8 
 3 
 
 19 
 
 790 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 Col. William E. Brewster. 
 
 Staff 
 
 2 
 
 70th New York 
 
 117 
 
 
 91 
 
 72d New York 
 
 114 
 
 73d New York 
 
 74th New York.. 
 
 162 
 
 89 
 
 120th New York 
 
 203 
 
 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 12 
 
 118 
 
 50 
 
 523 
 
 
 75 
 
 778 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 285 
 
 Return of Casualties in the . 
 
 Army 
 
 of the 
 
 Potomac, etc 
 
 — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wouuded. 
 
 Captured or 
 missing. 
 
 6 
 
 Command. 
 
 
 -d 
 
 
 -a 
 
 c/3 
 
 '& 
 
 
 
 2 
 8 
 
 So 
 o 
 
 -53 
 
 o 
 
 
 sa 
 
 o 
 
 ■Sq 
 
 ■-a a 
 
 bo 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. George C. Burling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2d New Hnmpshire 
 
 8 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 
 119 
 
 
 36 
 
 193 
 
 5th New Jersey 
 
 2 
 
 11 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 7 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 10 
 
 7 
 
 60 
 29 
 76 
 31 
 18 
 
 
 16 
 8 
 
 13 
 2 
 3 
 
 94 
 
 6th New Jersey 
 
 41 
 
 7th New Jersey 
 
 114 
 
 8th New Jersey 
 
 47 
 
 115th Pennsvlyania 
 
 24 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 6 
 
 53 
 
 43 
 
 333 ... 
 
 78 
 
 513 
 
 Total Second division 
 
 28 
 
 278 
 
 140 
 
 1419 
 
 2 
 
 225 
 
 2092 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 
 Capt. George E. Eandolph. 
 Capt. A. Judson Clark. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 New Jersey Liglit, 2d Battery... 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 3 
 
 20 
 
 1st New York Light, Battery D.. 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 8 
 
 18 
 
 New York Liglit, 4th Battery.... 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 1st Khode Island Lioht.Batterv E. 
 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 24 
 
 
 1 
 
 30 
 
 4th United States, Battery K 
 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 18 
 
 
 4 
 
 25 
 
 Total Artillery brigade 
 
 
 8 
 
 3 
 
 78 
 
 
 17 
 
 106 
 
 Total Third army corps 
 
 50 
 
 528 
 
 251 
 
 2775 
 
 14 
 
 592 
 
 4210 
 
 FIFTH ARMY COEPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maj.-gen. George Sykes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. James Barnes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. William S. Tilton. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18tli Massachusetts 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 23 
 
 
 3 
 
 27 
 
 22d Massachusetts 
 
 "i 
 1 
 
 3 
 4 
 2 
 
 3 
 6 
 3 
 
 24 
 27 
 16 
 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 3 
 
 31 
 
 1st Micliigan 
 
 42 
 
 llSth Pennsylvania 
 
 25 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 12 
 
 90 
 
 ... 
 
 11 
 
 125 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9th Massachusetts 
 
 "i 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 12 
 24 
 24 
 
 "i 
 
 9 
 10 
 
 6 
 55 
 55 
 97 
 
 "i 
 
 5 
 
 75 
 40 
 
 7 
 
 32d Massachusetts 
 
 80 
 
 4th Michigan 
 
 165 
 
 62d Pennsylvania 
 
 175 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 6 
 
 61 
 
 26 
 
 213 
 
 1 
 
 120 
 
 427 
 
286 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or missiug. 
 
 05 
 
 Command. 
 
 1 
 
 O 
 
 T3 
 V . 
 
 "53 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 .- 4) 
 
 ~ 3 
 
 (V 
 
 
 = 3 
 B 
 
 bO 
 
 2 
 
 bO 
 bO 
 
 < 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 Col. Strong Vincent. 
 
 Col. James C. Rice. 
 
 Staff 
 
 
 "'"29 
 
 20 
 
 24 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 2 
 5 
 3 
 
 ""85 
 32 
 
 77 
 42 
 
 , 
 
 """'"5 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 20th Maine 
 
 "3 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 125 
 
 
 60 
 
 44tli New York 
 
 111 
 
 83d Pennsylvania 
 
 55 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 6 
 
 82 
 
 17 
 
 236 
 
 
 11 
 
 352 
 
 Total First division 
 
 14 
 
 153 
 
 ""e 
 
 10 
 4 
 
 7 
 18 
 
 55 
 
 "4 
 2 
 
 1 
 4 
 2 
 
 539 
 
 1 
 62 
 28 
 39 
 67 
 108 
 
 1 
 
 142 
 
 ""{ 
 
 ""'13 
 4 
 
 904 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Roiueyn B. Ayres. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 Col. Hannibal Day. 
 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 3d United States 
 
 
 73 
 
 4th United States 
 
 40 
 
 6th United States 
 
 12tli United States 
 
 i 
 
 44 
 92 
 
 14th Unitfd States 
 
 132 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 3 
 1 . 
 
 45 
 
 5 
 11 
 15 
 16 
 
 24 
 
 13 
 
 4 
 3 
 5 
 
 7 
 13 
 
 305 
 
 51 
 
 42 
 
 27 
 
 85 
 
 105 
 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 2 
 3 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 382 
 
 Col. Sidney Burbank. 
 2d United States 
 
 67 
 
 7th United States 
 
 59 
 
 10th United States 
 
 51 
 
 11th United States 
 
 120 
 
 17th United States 
 
 150 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 7 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 71 
 
 "*25 
 4 
 3 
 6 
 
 32 
 
 "5 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 310 
 
 ""84 
 22 
 14 
 11 
 
 
 27 
 '""18 
 
 447 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Stei)hen H. Weed. 
 Col. Kenner Garrard. 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 140th New York 
 
 133 
 
 146tli New Y^ork 
 
 28 
 
 91st Pennsylvania 
 
 155th Pennsylvania 
 
 19 
 19 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 2 
 
 38 
 
 11 
 
 131 
 
 
 18 
 
 200 
 
 Total Second division 
 
 10 
 
 154 
 
 56 
 
 746 
 
 
 63 
 
 1029 
 
ADDENDA. 287 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, e<c.— Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Samuel W. Crawford. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. William McCandless. 
 
 1st Pennsylvania Reserves 
 
 2d Pennsylvania Reserves 
 
 6tli Pennsylvania Reserves 
 
 13th Penna. Reserves (1st Rifles).. 
 
 Total First brigade. 
 
 KUled. 
 
 _ Thii-d Brigade. 
 
 Col. Joseph W. Fisher, 
 
 5th Pennsylvania Reserves.., 
 9th Pennsylvania Reserves.. 
 10th Pennsylvania Reserves, 
 lltli Pennsylvania Reserves. 
 12th Pennsylvania Reserves. 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 Total Third division.... 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 Capt. Augustus P. Martin. 
 
 Massachusetts Light, 3d Battery (C) 
 
 1st Oliio Light, Battery L 
 
 5th United States, Battery D 
 
 5tli United States, Battery I 
 
 Total Artillery brigade. 
 
 Ambulance Corps. 
 
 Total Fifth army corps _28 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 18 
 
 23 
 
 14 
 
 17 
 
 337 
 
 129 
 
 Captured 
 or missing. 
 
 35 
 31 
 21 
 31 
 
 118 
 
 2 
 5 
 3 
 35 
 1 
 
 46 
 
 164 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 18 
 
 32 
 
 1482 
 
 
 1 210 
 
 46 
 37 
 24 
 
 48 
 
 155 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 41 
 
 2 
 
 55 
 
 210 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 22 
 
 43 
 
 2187 
 
288 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties hi the A^-my 
 
 of the Poto 
 
 nac, etc 
 
 . — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured or 
 missing. 
 
 9 
 
 Command. 
 
 o 
 
 .a v 
 
 "53 
 
 w 
 
 a 
 S 
 
 o 
 
 r3 
 
 .2 S 
 -53 
 
 w 
 
 O 
 
 r3 
 
 to 
 
 SIXTH ARMY CORPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maj.-gen. John Sedgwick. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 B^g.-gen. Horatio G. Wright. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Alfred T. A. Torbert. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2d New Jersey 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 3d New Jersey 
 
 ... 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 15th New Jersey 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 ... 
 
 
 3 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Joseph J. Bartlett. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121st New York 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 9-3tli Peiinsvl vania 
 
 ... 
 
 i 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 9(>tli Peiinsvl vaiiia 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 1 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 Tliird Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. David A. Russell. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 119th Pennsylvania 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 - 1 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 Total First division 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. AUnon P. Howe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. Lewis A. Grant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4th Vermont 
 
 ... 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 289 
 
 Return of Casualties in the 
 
 Army of the Potomac, etc 
 
 . — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured or 
 
 missing. 
 
 
 Command. 
 
 2 
 o 
 
 to ^ 
 
 ■53 
 
 g 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 
 "Ha 
 
 a 
 bo 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Neill. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7tli Maine 
 
 4o(i iSew York 
 
 "i 
 
 ""i 
 
 
 6 
 2 
 2 
 1 
 
 
 ""1 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 49tli Kew York 
 
 6lBt Pennsylvania 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 1 
 
 ] 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 2 
 
 15 
 
 Total Second division 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 12 
 
 
 2 
 
 16 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 
 Maj.-gen. John Newton. 
 Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Alexander Shaler. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65th New York 
 
 67th New York 
 
 122d New Y'^ork 
 
 i 
 
 4 
 
 ""io 
 
 "2 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 ""36 
 
 12 
 
 6 
 
 
 ""i 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 44 
 
 2od Pen nsy 1 vania 
 
 14 
 
 82d Pennsylvania 
 
 6 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 1 
 
 14 
 
 8 
 
 53 
 
 
 3 
 
 74 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. Henry L. Eiistis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7th Massachusetts 
 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 "i 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 25 
 
 5 
 
 
 5 
 
 19 
 1 
 
 6 
 9 
 
 37th Massachusetts 
 
 47 
 
 2d Ehode Island 
 
 7 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 39 
 
 
 25 
 
 69 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Frank Wheaton. 
 Col. David J. Nevin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 B'^l New York 
 
 
 1 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 
 10 
 9 
 9 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 9.Sd Pennsylvania 
 
 98th Pennsylvania 
 
 139th Pennsylvania 
 
 10 
 11 
 2C 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 
 2 
 
 7 
 
 44 
 
 
 
 53 
 
 Total Third division 
 
 1 
 
 19 
 
 12 
 
 136 
 
 
 28 
 
 196 
 
290 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casiudties in the /. 
 
 rmy 
 
 of the 
 
 Putu 
 
 nac, etc. — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or missiug. 
 
 
 Command. 
 
 o 
 
 m 
 o 
 
 
 m 
 
 o 
 
 .2 a 
 
 £2 
 
 s 
 
 m 
 
 
 5 . 
 
 .2i 
 = 3 
 
 g 
 
 to 
 <5 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. Charles H. Tompkins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 New York LigJit, 1st Battery 
 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 f) 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 Total Artillery brigade 
 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 Total Sixth array corps 
 
 2 
 
 25 
 
 14 
 
 171 
 
 
 30 
 
 242 
 
 ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maj.-gen. Oliver 0. Howard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 Ist Indiana Cavalry, Cos. I and K.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Francis C. Barlow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. Leopold von Gilsa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 ""ii 
 
 7 
 
 9. 
 
 "'"56 
 45 
 
 4 
 
 """2 
 44 
 
 1 
 
 41st New York 
 
 75 
 
 54tli New York 
 
 102 
 
 6Sth New York 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 4 
 
 59 
 
 2 
 
 65 
 
 138 
 
 15.Sd Penns vl vania 
 
 1 
 
 22 
 
 7 
 
 135 
 
 
 46 
 
 211 
 
 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 4 
 
 50 
 
 21 
 
 289 
 
 6 
 
 157 
 
 527 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Adelbert Ames. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. Andrew L. Harris. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 17th Connecticut 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 8 
 
 14 
 
 23 
 
 4 
 5 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 77 
 
 95 
 
 67 
 
 103 
 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 
 94 
 
 72 
 92 
 
 77 
 
 197 
 
 25th Ohio 
 
 184 
 
 
 186 
 
 107th Ohio 
 
 211 
 
 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 5 
 
 63 
 
 24 
 
 342 
 
 9 
 
 335 
 
 778 
 
 Total First division 
 
 9 
 
 113 
 
 46 
 
 631 
 
 15 
 
 492 
 
 1306 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 291 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, e/c— Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or missing. 
 
 aj 
 
 Command. 
 
 '2 
 8 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 
 B 
 
 
 
 C3 
 
 to 
 
 60 
 
 iso 
 
 < 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Adolpli von Steinwehr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Staff 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 Col. Charles E. Coster, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 134th New York 
 
 1 
 
 41 
 1 
 3 
 
 4 
 1 
 3 
 
 147 
 20 
 26 
 
 2 
 9 
 1 
 
 57 
 
 169 
 
 76 
 
 252 
 
 154th New York 
 
 200 
 
 
 111 
 
 73d Pennsylvania 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 34 
 
 
 52 
 
 8 
 
 220 
 
 12 
 
 302 
 
 597 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. Orland Smith. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33d Massachusetts 
 
 ... 
 
 7 
 17 
 
 6 
 21 
 
 "i 
 1 
 3 
 
 38 
 
 88 
 
 30 
 
 117 
 
 "i 
 
 1 
 
 ""2 
 
 11 
 
 4 
 
 45 
 
 136th New York 
 
 109 
 
 55th Ohio 
 
 49 
 
 73d Ohio 
 
 145 
 
 
 3 
 
 51 
 
 5 
 
 273 
 
 2 
 
 17 
 
 348 
 
 Total Second division 
 
 103 
 
 14 
 
 493 
 
 14 
 
 319 
 
 946 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maj.-gen. Carl Schurz. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. A. Schimmelfennig. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. George von Amsberg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 82d Illinois 
 
 "4 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 11 
 
 23 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 1 
 8 
 6 
 4 
 
 18 
 34 
 158 
 30 
 36 
 
 4 
 
 14 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 85 
 
 164 
 
 108 
 
 10 
 
 58 
 
 112 
 
 45th New York 
 
 224 
 
 157th New York 
 
 307 
 
 61st Ohio 
 
 54 
 
 74th Pennsylvania 
 
 110 
 
 Total First brisade 
 
 8 
 
 50 
 
 20 
 
 276 
 
 28 
 
 425 
 
 807 
 
292 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army 
 
 of the Potomac, etc. 
 
 — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured or 
 missing. 
 
 .• 
 
 Command. 
 
 V 
 
 e 
 
 o 
 
 1^ 
 
 c 
 
 •- 2 
 
 a " 
 
 e 
 
 
 -a 
 
 a 3 
 H 
 
 S 
 
 s. 
 
 u 
 to 
 
 60 
 
 < 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. W. Krzyzanowski. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58th New York 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 9 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 13 
 
 66 
 
 i 
 
 3 
 
 58 
 
 20 
 
 119th New Y(.rk 
 
 140 
 
 82(1 Ohio 
 
 4 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 71 
 
 »> 
 
 
 181 
 
 75th Pennsvlvania 
 
 8 
 
 16 
 
 5 
 
 84 
 
 
 3 
 
 111 
 
 2(itli Wisconsin 
 
 2 
 
 24 
 
 11 
 
 118 
 
 2 
 
 60 
 
 217 
 
 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 12 
 
 63 
 
 36 
 
 352 
 
 5 
 
 201 
 
 669 
 
 
 
 Total Third division 
 
 V,0 
 
 113 
 
 56 
 
 628 
 
 33 
 
 626 
 
 1476 
 
 ARTILLKRY BRIGADE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Major Thomas W. Osborn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1st New York Lis;ht, Butterv T... 
 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 New York Liirht, 13th Batterv... 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 1st Ohio Liiiht, Batterv 1 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 1st Ohio Liuht, Batterv K 
 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 
 2 
 
 15 
 
 4th United States, Battery G 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 ... 
 
 11 
 
 
 4 
 
 17 
 
 Total Artillery brigade 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 50 
 
 
 9 
 
 69 
 
 Total Eleventh army corps.. 
 
 33 
 
 335 
 
 120 
 
 1802 
 
 62 
 
 1449 
 
 3801 
 
 TWELFTH ARMY CORPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Alpiieus S.Williams 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Thomas H. Riigor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FirHt Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. Arcliibald L. McDougall. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5th Connecticut 
 
 i 
 
 """5 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 22 
 
 6 
 
 
 5 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 2()th Connecticut 
 
 28 
 
 3d Mar viand 
 
 8 
 
 128d New York 
 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 
 14 
 
 145th New Yf)rk 
 
 10 
 
 46th Pennsvl vania 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 11 
 
 4 
 
 56 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 80 
 
ADDENDA. 293 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued, 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wouuded. 
 
 Captured or 
 missing. 
 
 
 Command. 
 
 o 
 
 .- a 
 c - 
 
 1 
 
 
 Id 
 
 .2 S 
 
 '1 
 
 C 
 
 
 1 
 
 to 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Henry H. Lockwood. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1st Md., Potomac Home Brigade. 
 
 3 
 
 20 
 
 3 
 
 77 
 
 
 1 
 
 104 
 
 1st Maryland, Eastern Shore 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 IS 
 
 
 2 
 
 25 
 
 150th New York 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 23 
 
 
 15 
 
 45 
 
 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 3 
 
 32 
 
 3 
 
 118 
 
 
 18 
 
 174 
 
 • Third Brigade. 
 
 
 Col. Silas Colgrove. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27th Indiana 
 
 2 
 
 23 
 
 21 
 
 1 
 
 .....^ 
 
 8 
 8 
 3 
 
 "i 
 
 78 
 
 101 
 
 17 
 
 2 
 
 / 
 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 110 
 
 2d Massachusetts 
 
 136 
 
 loth New Jersey 
 
 21 
 
 l(»7th New York 
 
 ?, 
 
 3d Wisconsin 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 2 
 
 47 
 
 20 
 
 205 
 
 
 5 
 
 279 
 
 
 
 Total First division 
 
 6 
 
 90 
 
 27 
 
 379 
 
 1 
 
 30 
 
 533 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. John W, Geary, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col, Charles Candv. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5th Ohio 
 
 1 
 "2 
 
 "i 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 5 
 
 ""3 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 "3 
 1 
 
 15 
 17 
 31 
 14 
 
 20 
 15 
 
 
 """3 
 
 18 
 
 7th Ohio 
 
 18 
 
 29th Ohio 
 
 38 
 
 66th Ohio 
 
 17 
 
 2Sth Pennsylvania 
 
 27 
 
 147th Pennsylvania 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 4 
 
 14 
 
 5 
 
 112 
 
 
 3 
 
 138 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Thomas L. Kane. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29th Pennsv 1 vania 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 "i 
 
 43 
 
 6 
 
 16 
 
 
 8 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 66 
 
 109th Pennsylvania 
 
 10 
 
 111th Pennsylvania 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 2 
 
 21 
 
 1 
 
 65 
 
 
 98 
 
294 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Pototnac, etc. — Continued. 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured 
 or missing. 
 
 
 Command. 
 
 u 
 
 O 
 
 "a 3 
 
 ^1 
 
 1 
 
 
 "53 
 
 SB 
 
 
 "s 3 
 W 
 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. George S. Greene. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60tli New York 
 
 "2 
 
 4 
 
 11 
 
 6 
 2 
 
 30 
 6 
 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 3 
 3 
 
 39 
 20 
 16 
 84 
 43 
 
 "i 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 
 3 
 
 52 
 
 78th New York 
 
 30 
 
 102(1 New York 
 
 29 
 
 137tli New Y'ork 
 
 137 
 
 149tli New York 
 
 55 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 6 
 
 61 
 
 10 
 
 202 
 
 1 
 
 23 
 
 303 
 
 Total Second division 
 
 12 
 
 96 
 
 16 
 
 379 
 
 1 
 
 35 
 
 539 
 
 ARTILLERY BRIGADE. 
 
 
 Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pennsylvania Light, Battery E 
 
 4th United States, Battery F 
 
 5th United States, Battery K 
 
 ... 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 5 
 
 
 
 3 
 1 
 5 
 
 Total Artillery brigade 
 
 ... 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 Total Twelfth army corps 
 
 18 
 
 186 
 
 43 
 
 767 
 
 2 
 
 65 
 
 1081 
 
 CAVALEY CORPS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Maj.-gen. Alfred Pleasonton. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FIRST DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. John Buford. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 jPtV.s< Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. William Gamble. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8th Illinois 
 
 "i 
 
 1 
 4 
 5 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 3 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 16 
 
 7 
 
 12th Illinois (4 companies) 
 
 3d Indiana (6 companies) 
 
 20 
 32 
 
 8th New York 
 
 40 
 
 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 6 
 
 52 
 
 
 28 
 
 99 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 Col. Thomas C. Devin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6th New York , 
 
 
 '""2 
 
 
 1 
 2 
 
 
 8 
 
 7 
 4 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 9th New Y'^ork..... 
 
 11 
 
 17th Pennsylvania 
 
 3d West Virginia (2 companies)... 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 23 
 
 28 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 295 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 Reserve Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Wesley Merritt. 
 
 6th Pennsyl van ia 
 
 1st United States 
 
 2d United States 
 
 5th United States 
 
 6th United States* 
 
 Total Keserve brigade 
 
 Total First division 
 
 SECOND DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. David McM. Gregg. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Col. John B. Mcintosh. 
 
 1st Maryland 
 
 1st New Jei-sey 
 
 1st Pennsylvania 
 
 3d Pennsylvania 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 Col. J. Irvin Gregg. 
 
 1st Maine 
 
 10th New York 
 
 16th Pennsylvania 
 
 Total Third brigade 
 
 Total Second division 
 
 THIRD DIVISION. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Judson Kilpatrick. 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Elon J. Farnsworth. 
 Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond. 
 
 Stafi' 
 
 5th New York.... 
 
 18th Pennsylvania 
 
 1st Vermont ■ 
 
 1st West Virginia 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Total First brigade. 
 
 13 
 
 27 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 12 
 
 7 
 9 
 6 
 4 
 23 
 
 Captured 
 or missiug. 
 
 49 
 
 104 
 
 10 
 
 19 
 
 12 
 
 31 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 22 
 
 1 
 
 28 
 
 = a 
 
 2 
 5 
 6 
 1 
 203 
 
 217 
 
 268 
 
 11 
 
 27 
 3 
 
 42 
 
 * Losses occurred at Fairfield, Pa. 
 U 
 
 12 
 
 15 
 
 17 
 
 5 
 
 242 
 
 291 
 
 418 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 2 
 
 2J_ 
 
 33 
 
 20 
 
 53 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 14 
 
 65 
 
 12 
 
 98 
 
:96 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the 
 
 Potomac, etc 
 
 . — Continued, 
 
 • 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 nnssiug. 
 
 
 Command. 
 
 to ' '^ 
 
 
 rs 
 
 -rt 
 
 a 
 
 
 ^ 
 
 m a 
 
 Ih 
 
 M a 
 
 2 
 
 
 t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■a 
 
 = a 
 
 s 
 
 ca 
 
 e 
 
 ca 
 
 bo 
 
 
 o 
 
 a 
 
 c 
 
 u 
 
 c w 
 
 < 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. George A. Custer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1st Micliisxan 
 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 37 
 
 • .« 
 
 20 
 
 73 
 
 5th Micliii^an 
 
 i 
 
 7 
 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 1 
 2 
 4 
 
 29 
 24 
 44 
 
 ..• 
 
 18 
 
 1 
 
 39 
 
 56 
 
 6th Michigan 
 
 28 
 
 7th Michigan 
 
 100 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 1 
 
 31 
 
 13 
 
 134 
 
 
 78 
 
 257 
 
 Total Third division 
 
 4 
 
 49 
 
 19 
 
 162 
 
 1 
 
 120 
 
 355 
 
 HORSE ARTILLERY. 
 
 
 Fird Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Capt. James M. Robertson. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9th Michiijan 
 
 ■•• 
 
 1 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 6th New Yorlv 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 2d United States, Battery M 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 4th United States, Battery E 
 
 ... 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 Total First brigade 
 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Capt. .Tohn C. Tidball. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1st United States, Batterv K 
 
 ... 
 
 2 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 2d United Stales, Battery A 
 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 Total Second brigade 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 Total Cavalry corps 
 
 5 
 
 85 
 
 37 
 
 315 
 
 8 
 
 399 
 
 849 
 
 AETILLERY RESERVE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Robert 0. Tyler. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Capt. James M. Robertson. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 First Regulur Brigade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Capt. Dunljar R. Ransom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ist United States, Batterv H 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 8d United States, Bats. F and K.. 
 
 i 
 
 8 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 1 
 
 24 
 
 4th United States, Piatterv C 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 5th United States, Battery C 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 Total First Regular brigade.. 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 4 
 
 49 
 
 
 2 
 
 68 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 297 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, e<c.— Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 First Voluiiieer Brigade. 
 Lieut.-col. Freeman McGilvery. 
 
 Massachusetts Light,5tli Bat.(E)* 
 Massachusetts Light, yth Battci-y. 
 ISTew York Light, loth^ Battery... 
 Penna. Light, Bats. C and F 
 
 Total First Volunteer brigade.. 
 
 Second Volunteer Brigade. 
 
 Capt. Elijah D. Taft. 
 
 Connecticut Light, 2d Battery.... 
 New York Light, 5th Battery.... 
 
 Total Second Volunt'r brigade 
 
 Third Volunteer Brigade. 
 
 Capt. James F. Huntington. 
 
 Kew Hampshire Light, 1st Bat... 
 
 1st Ohio Liglit, Battery H 
 
 1st Penna. Light, Bats. F and G 
 "West Virginia Light, Bat. C 
 
 Total Third Volunt'r brigade- 
 
 Jo «.r</i Volunteer Brigade. 
 
 Capt. Eobert H. Fitzhugh. 
 
 INfaine Li.srht, 6th Battery 
 
 New Jersey Light, 1st Battery.. 
 1st New York Light, Battery G. 
 1st New York Light, Battery Kf 
 
 Total Fourth Volunt'r brigade 
 
 Total Artillery reserve 
 
 Killed. 
 
 15 
 
 10 
 
 40 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 10 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 16 
 11 
 
 18 
 
 61 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 13 
 
 2 
 
 23 
 
 13 
 
 7 
 7 
 7 
 
 34 
 
 172 
 
 Captured or 
 missing. 
 
 "c 5 
 w 
 
 13 
 
 21 
 28 
 16 
 
 28 
 
 93 
 
 23 
 4 
 
 37 
 
 13 
 9 
 
 7 
 7 
 
 36 
 242 
 
 lOth New York Battery attached, whose loss, here included, was two men killed and three 
 men wounded. J 11th New York Battery attached. 
 
298 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac, etc. — Concliuled. 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 Command. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured or 
 missing. 
 
 General Headquarters 
 
 First ariuy cnvym 
 
 Hecond army corps 
 
 Third army corps 
 
 Fifth army corps 
 
 Sixth army corps 
 
 Eleventh army corps 
 
 Tvvell'th army corps 
 
 Cavalry corps 
 
 Artillery reserve 
 
 Total Army of the Potomac, 
 
 551 
 
 729 
 
 528 
 
 337 
 
 25 
 
 335 
 
 186 
 
 85 
 
 40 
 
 2 
 
 257 
 
 269 
 
 251 
 
 129 
 
 14 
 
 120 
 
 43 
 
 37 
 
 15 
 
 247 
 
 2,816 
 
 1,137 
 
 2 
 
 2,952 
 
 2,917 
 
 2,775 
 
 1,482 
 
 171 
 
 1,802 
 
 767 
 
 315 
 
 172 
 
 2,140 
 
 355 
 
 592 
 
 210 
 
 30 
 
 1,449 
 
 65 
 
 399 
 
 13 
 
 4 
 
 6,024 
 
 4,350 
 
 4,210 
 
 2,187 
 
 242 
 
 3,801 
 
 1,081 
 
 849 
 
 242 
 
 13,355 
 
 182 
 
 5,253! 22,990 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 293 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, eoimnanded 
 by General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, at the Battle of Gettysburg, 
 Pennsylvania, July 1-3, 1863. 
 
 Note. — Where the sum of the regimentiil losses does not tally with the brigade " totals," the 
 discrepancy is due to disagreements between the detailed statement furnished by Surgeon L. 
 Guild, Medical Director of the Army, and the numbers reported by brigade and other superior 
 commanders. Owing to the absenoe of subordinate reports, such disagreements cannot be 
 explained. In computing the "grand total" the figures supplied by bri^;ade, division, and 
 corps commanders have generally beeu adopted; but whether takeu in detail or as a whole, 
 the compilation can only be regarded as approximate. Several of the reports indicate that 
 many of the "missing" were killed or wounded; especially is this the case with Pickett's 
 division of Longstreet's corps. 
 
 Command. 
 
 1 
 
 '6 
 
 S 
 3 
 
 
 
 6 
 I 
 
 V 
 
 to 
 so 
 <5 
 
 FIEST ARMY CORPS. 
 
 Lieut.-gen. James Longstreet. 
 
 McLaws' Division. 
 
 Maj.-gen. Lafayette McLaws. 
 
 Kershaivs Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Joseph B. Kershaw. 
 
 2d South Carolina 
 
 27 
 18 
 18 
 21 
 21 
 10 
 
 125 
 63 
 85 
 79 
 98 
 33 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 7 
 
 '"is 
 3 
 
 154 
 
 3d South Carolina 
 
 83 
 
 7th South Carolina 
 
 110 
 
 8th South Carolina , 
 
 100 
 
 J 5th South Carolina 
 
 137 
 
 3d South Carolina Battalion 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 115 
 
 """9 
 
 10 
 
 8 
 
 15 
 
 483 
 
 1 
 
 77 
 68 
 47 
 72 
 
 32 
 
 630 
 
 Semmes' Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Paul J. Semraes. 
 Col. Goods Bryan. 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 
 86 
 
 50ih Georgia 
 
 51st Georgia 
 
 78 
 55 
 
 53d Georgia 
 
 87 
 
 Total 
 
 55 
 
 1 
 28 
 40 
 18 
 16 
 
 284 
 
 137 
 160 
 
 82 
 87 
 
 91 
 
 430 
 
 Bai-ksdak's Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. William Barksdale. 
 
 Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys. 
 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 
 165 
 
 17th Mississippi 
 
 200 
 
 18th Mississippi 
 
 100 
 
 21st Mississippi 
 
 103 
 
 Total 
 
 105 
 
 550 
 
 92 
 
 747 
 
300 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army oj Northern Virginia, etc. — Contimied. 
 
 Command. 
 
 Wofford^s Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. W. T. \Vofibrd. 
 
 Ifilh Georgia 
 
 18th (ieorgia 
 
 24tli Geoigiii 
 
 Cobb's Georgia Legion 
 
 Pliillips' Georgia Legion 
 
 Total ... 
 
 A rt 1 1 levy Battalion. 
 Col. Henry C. Cabell. 
 
 Carlton's Georgia Battery (Troiip Artillery).... 
 Fraser's Georgia Battery (Pulaski Artillery)... 
 McCartliy's Battery (1st Richmond Howitzers 
 Manly's North Carolina Battery 
 
 Total 
 
 Total MeLaws' division 
 
 Pickett's Division. 
 
 Maj.-gen. George E. Pickett. 
 
 Gwnetf's Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Richard B. Garnett. 
 
 • (?) 
 
 Staff 
 
 8th Virginia 
 
 ]8th Virginia 
 
 19th Vir.iiinia 
 
 2Sth \'iri:inia 
 
 56 til Virgniia 
 
 Total 
 
 ^-1 rmiatead's Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Lewis A'. Armistead. 
 Col.' W. R. Aylett. 
 
 Staff 
 
 9th V^irginia 
 
 14th Virniiiia 
 
 3Stli Virginia 
 
 53d Virginia 
 
 57th Virginia 
 
 Total 
 
 •30 
 
 8 
 313 
 
 1 
 6 
 10 
 10 
 19 
 22 
 
 78 
 
 17 
 23 
 17 
 20 
 
 88 
 
 Ki 
 
 192 
 
 29 
 
 1538 
 
 48 
 77 
 34 
 58 
 40 
 
 324 
 
 71 
 91 
 147 
 87 
 95 
 
 460 
 
 
 112 
 
 327 
 
 539 
 
 643 
 
 61 
 19 
 36 
 22 
 
 28 
 
 334 
 
 7 
 
 18 
 5 
 
 7 
 
 37 
 
 2178 
 
 1 
 
 54 
 87 
 44 
 
 77 
 62 
 
 941 
 
 1 
 
 71 
 108 
 170 
 104 
 121 
 
 1191 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 301 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, etc. — Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 * Kemper's Brigade. 
 
 Erig.-gen. James L. Kemper. 
 
 Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr. 
 
 Staff........ 
 
 1st Virginia 
 
 3d Virginia 
 
 7th Virginia , 
 
 11th Virginia .. 
 
 24th Virginia 
 
 Total. 
 
 Artillery Battalion. 
 
 Maj. James Bearing. 
 
 Blount's Virginia Battery 
 
 Caskie's Virginia Battery (Hampden Artillery).., 
 Macon's Battery (Eiclunond Fayette Artillery)..., 
 Stribling's Virginia Battery (Fanqnier Artillery). 
 
 Total* 
 
 Total Pickett's division.. 
 
 Hood's Division. 
 Maj.-gen. John B. Hood. 
 
 Staff. 
 
 L'lw's Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. E. Mclver Law. 
 Col. James L. Sheffield. 
 
 4th Alabama... 
 15th Alabama. 
 44th Alabama. 
 47th Alabama. 
 48th Alabama. 
 
 Total. 
 
 Anderson's Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. George T. Anderson. 
 
 Col'. W. W. White. 
 
 Staff 
 
 7th Georgia 
 
 8th Georgia 
 
 9th Georgia 
 
 11th Georgia 
 
 Olith Georgia 
 
 Total.. 
 
 16 
 15 
 12 
 
 17 
 
 58 
 
 17 
 17 
 24 
 10 
 
 74 
 
 25 
 28 
 32 
 18 
 
 105 
 
 62 
 51 
 79 
 97 
 111 
 
 356 
 
 317 
 
 1157 
 
 49 
 
 66 
 64 
 80 
 67 
 
 276 
 
 1 
 
 15 
 
 114 
 
 115 
 
 162 
 
 92 
 
 512 
 
 1499 
 
 4 
 
 64 
 
 67 
 
 94 
 
 109 
 
 128 
 
 731 
 
 25 
 
 2888 
 
 t66 
 183 
 tS8 
 40 
 t75 
 
 146 
 
 54 
 
 496 
 
 1 
 
 15 
 
 139 
 
 t]43 
 
 tl94 
 
 fllO 
 
 671 
 
 * Not rei'orted in detail. 
 
 t According to reKinicntal reports the total loss was: 4th Alabama, 87; ^^th Alabama, ]fil' 
 4-lth Alabama, 94; 48th Alabama, 1U2; 'Jth Georgia, 189; Uth Georgia, 204; o'Jth Georgia, 116.' 
 
302 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northei'n 
 
 Virginia, etc- 
 
 -Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 "S 
 
 
 o . 
 
 <0 
 
 1 
 
 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 P.3 
 
 5" 
 
 IS 
 
 Roberison^s Brigade. 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 Brig. -gen. J. B. Kobertson. 
 
 
 
 
 
 3d Arkansas 
 
 1st Texas 
 
 26 
 24 
 14 
 23 
 
 116 
 54 
 73 
 
 86 
 
 
 142 
 
 *78 
 
 4t h Texas ' 
 
 87 
 
 oth Texas 
 
 109 
 
 Total 
 
 84 
 
 393 
 
 120 
 
 597 
 
 Benning's Brigade. 
 
 
 Brig.-gen. Henry L. Benning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2d Georgia 
 
 25 
 
 8 
 
 15 
 
 21 
 
 66 
 64 
 75 
 83 
 
 
 91 
 
 
 *72 
 
 
 90 
 
 20th Georgia i 
 
 *104 
 
 Total 
 
 76 
 
 299 
 
 122 
 
 497 
 
 Artillery Battalion. 
 
 
 Maj. M. W. Henry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bach man's South Carolina Battery (German Art.) 
 Garden's South Carolina Battery ( Palmetto Lt. Art.) 
 Latham's North Carolina Battery (Branch Art.)... 
 Eeillv's North Carolina Battery (Kowan Art.).... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total t 
 
 4 
 
 23 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 Total Hood's division 
 
 343 
 
 1504 
 
 442 
 
 2289 
 
 RESERVE ARTILLERY. 
 
 
 Col. J. B. Walton.J 
 
 
 
 
 
 Alexander'' s Battalion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Col. E. Porter Alexander. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Jordan's Virginia Battery (Bedford Artillery) 
 
 Moody's Louisiana Battery (Madison Lt. Art.) 
 
 Parker's Virginia Battery 
 
 
 
 
 
 Khett's Soutli Carolina Baltery (Brooks Art.) 
 
 Taylor's Virginia Battery . 
 
 
 
 Woolfoik's Virginia Battery (Ashland Artillery)... 
 
 
 Total t 
 
 19 
 
 114 
 
 6 
 
 139 
 
 * According to regimental reports the total loss was : 1st Texas, 93 ; 15th Georgia, 171 ; 20th 
 Georgia, 121. 
 t Not reported in detail. 
 i Chief of corps artillery. 
 
ADDENDA. 303 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army 6/ Northern Virginia, p/c— Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.2 
 
 I'i 
 
 bO 
 
 E 
 
 < 
 
 Washington {Louisiana) Artillery. 
 
 Maj. B. F. Eshleman. 
 
 1st Company (Squires') 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total ^ 
 
 3 
 
 23 
 
 16 
 
 42 
 
 
 22 
 
 137 
 
 22 
 
 181 
 
 Total First army corps 
 
 910 
 
 4336 
 
 2290 
 
 7536 
 
 SECOND AKMY CORPS. 
 Lieut.-gen. Eiohard S. Ewell. 
 
 Rfnflf" 
 
 5 
 5 
 8 
 8 
 10 
 
 1 
 
 31 
 34 
 43 
 54 
 39 
 
 13 
 21 
 6 
 13 
 23 
 
 1 
 
 early's division. 
 Maj. -gen. Jubal A. Early. 
 
 Hay^ Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Harry T. Hays. 
 
 49 
 
 
 60 
 
 
 57 
 
 
 75 
 
 9th Louisiana = 
 
 72 
 
 Xotal 
 
 36 
 
 20 
 9 
 6 
 
 201 
 
 131 
 
 65 
 20 
 
 76. 
 
 21 
 37 
 36 
 
 313 
 
 Hoke's Brigade. 
 Col. Archibald C. Godwin. 
 
 172 
 
 
 111 
 
 57th North Carolina 
 
 62 
 
 Xotal 
 
 35 
 ""12 
 
 216 
 
 20 
 78 
 15 
 
 94 
 
 7 
 10 
 
 345 
 
 Smith's Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. William Smith. 
 
 27 
 
 
 100 
 
 52d Virginia 
 
 15 
 
 Total 
 
 12 
 
 113 
 
 17 
 
 142 
 
 * Not reported in detail. 
 
304 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, etc. — Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 13 
 
 a 
 
 
 c-'a 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Gordon's Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. John B. Gordon. 
 
 13th Georgia 
 
 20 
 2 
 9 
 
 12 
 4 
 
 24 
 
 83 
 4 
 34 
 51 
 29 
 69 
 
 ""5 
 
 29 
 5 
 
 103 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 43 
 
 38 th Georgia 
 
 92 
 
 
 38 
 
 
 93 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 71 
 ■"2" 
 
 270 
 
 1 
 5 
 
 89 
 
 380 
 
 Artillery Battalion. 
 Lieut.-ool. H. P. Jones. 
 
 Carrington's Va. Battery (Charlottesville Art.) 
 
 Garber's Virginia Battery (Stauntini Artillery).... 
 
 Green's Battery (Louisiana Guard Artillery) 
 
 Tanner's Virginia Battery (Courtney Artillery)... 
 
 ""i 
 
 7 
 
 Total 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 Total P>arlv's division 
 
 156 
 
 25 
 4 
 
 29 
 4 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 806 
 1 
 
 119 
 
 48 
 127 
 17 
 14 
 44 
 
 226 
 1 
 
 1188 
 
 Johnson's Division. 
 
 Maj.-gen. Edward Johnson. 
 
 Staff 
 
 2 
 
 Steuaj-t's Brigade. 
 1st Marvland Battalion 
 
 144 
 
 
 52 
 
 
 156 
 
 10th V irginia 
 
 21 
 
 23d Virginia 
 
 18 
 
 37th Virginia 
 
 54 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 83 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 14 
 
 9 
 
 2 
 
 409 
 
 30 
 52 
 77 
 56 
 36 
 
 190 
 
 682 
 
 Nichollt^ Brigade. 
 
 Col. J. M. Williams. 
 
 1st Lou isiana 
 
 39 
 
 2d Louisiana 
 
 62 
 
 10th Louisiana 
 
 91 
 
 14th Louisiana 
 
 65 
 
 loth Louisiana 
 
 38 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 43 
 
 309 
 
 36 
 
 388 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 305 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, (?^c.— Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 . 
 
 f 3 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Stonewall Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. James A. Walker. 
 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 5 
 
 7 
 
 11 
 
 13 
 
 78 
 46 
 34 
 37 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 86 
 
 
 51 
 
 
 41 
 
 33d Virginia 
 
 48 
 
 Tntnl 
 
 35 
 
 " 6 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 
 3 
 
 15 
 
 13 
 
 208 
 
 2 
 29 
 37 
 48 
 14 
 43 
 47 
 
 87 
 
 330 
 
 Jones' Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. John M. Jones. 
 
 Lieut.-col. R. H. Dungan. 
 
 Staff 
 
 2 
 
 
 *35 
 
 
 *40 
 
 
 56 
 
 
 *17 
 
 
 *58 
 
 50tli Virginia 
 
 *60 
 
 Total 
 
 58 
 
 ■■■■4 
 5 
 1 
 
 302 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 19 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 61 
 
 
 421 
 
 Artillery Battalion. 
 Capt. C. I. Eame. 
 
 1 
 
 Brown's Maryland Battery (Chesapeake Art.) 
 
 16 
 
 24 
 
 5 
 
 
 4 
 
 Total 
 
 10 
 
 40 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 229 
 
 26 
 21 
 46 
 13 
 29 
 
 1269 
 
 116 
 126 
 173 
 104 
 124 
 
 375 
 116 
 
 1873 
 
 EoDEs' Division. 
 Maj.-gen. Robert E. Rodes. 
 
 Daniel's Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Junius Daniel. 
 
 32d Nortli Carolina 
 
 142 
 
 
 147 
 
 
 219 
 
 
 117 
 
 2d North Cai'olina Battalion 
 
 153 
 
 
 165 
 
 635 
 
 916 
 
 44th 
 
 According to regimental reports the total loss was: 21st Virginia, 50 ; 25th Virginia, 70 ; 
 1 Virginia, 56 ; 48th Virginia, 7G ; oUth Virginia, 99. 
 
306 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 
 
 Virginia, etc.— 
 
 -Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 3 
 
 -a 
 o 
 
 u 
 o . 
 
 a 
 
 to 
 
 Iverson's Brigade. 
 
 Brij^.-gen. Alfred Ivcrson. 
 
 5th North Carolina 
 
 31 
 10 
 2!) 
 41 
 
 112 
 4() 
 93 
 93 
 
 
 143 
 
 
 56 
 
 
 122 
 
 2od North Carolina 
 
 134 
 
 Total 
 
 130 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 328 
 
 29 
 35 
 11 
 49 
 
 308 
 
 . 7 
 
 10 
 
 5 
 
 9 
 
 820 
 
 Do/es' Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. George Doles. 
 
 45 
 
 
 49 
 
 21st Ge(ir"'ia 
 
 17 
 
 44th Georgia 
 
 68 
 
 Total 
 
 24 
 
 4 
 8 
 5 
 (i 
 
 124 
 
 27 
 24 
 37 
 34 
 
 31 
 
 1 
 24 
 
 2 
 5 
 
 179 
 
 Fuimsew^s Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. S. D. Eamseur. 
 
 32 
 
 
 56 
 
 
 44 
 
 30th North Carolina 
 
 45 
 
 Total 
 
 23 
 
 12 
 21 
 18 
 13 
 5 
 
 122 
 
 79 
 
 109 
 
 113 
 
 65 
 
 41 
 
 32 
 
 177 
 
 O'Neal's Brigade. 
 Col. Edward A. O'Neal. 
 
 91 
 
 
 *130 
 
 l''th Alabama .. -. 
 
 131 
 
 *78 
 
 26th Alabama 
 
 *46 
 
 Total 
 
 73 
 
 430 
 
 193 
 
 696 
 
 Artillery Battalion. 
 
 Lieut.-col. Thomas H. Carter. 
 
 Carter's Virginia Battery (King William Artillery) 
 
 Fry's Virginia Batterv (Orange Arlillery) 
 
 Page's Virginia Battery (Morris Artillery) 
 
 Eeese's Alabama Battery (Jeff. Davis Artillery)... 
 
 
 Total t 
 
 6 
 
 35 
 
 24 
 
 65 
 
 Total Eodes' division 
 
 421 
 
 1728 
 
 704 
 
 2853 
 
 * According to regimental reports the total loss was: 5th Alabama, 209; 12th Alabama, 83 
 26th Alabama, l;50. 
 t Not reported iu detail. 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 307 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 
 
 Virginia, etc. - 
 
 -Conti 
 
 nued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 '6 
 
 3 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Captured or 
 
 missing. 
 
 Aggregate. 
 
 Reserve Artillery. 
 
 Col. J. Thompson Brown.* 
 
 Broicn's Balialion. 
 
 Capt. Willis J. Dance. 
 
 Dance's Virginia Eattery (Powlnitan Artillery).... 
 
 Hupp's Virginia Battery (Salem Artillery) 
 
 Graham's Virginia Battery (Rockhridge Artillery) 
 
 Smith's Battery (3(1 Richmond Howitzers) 
 
 Watson's Battery (2d Eichraond Howitzers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total t 
 
 3 
 
 19 
 
 
 22 
 
 Nelson's Battalion. 
 
 Lieut. Col. William Nelson. 
 
 Kirkpatrick's Virginia Battery (Amherst Art.).... 
 
 Massie's Virginia Jjattery (Fluvanna Artillery) 
 
 Milledge's Georgia Battery 
 
 
 Total J 
 
 
 
 
 
 Total reserve artillery 
 
 3 
 
 19 
 
 
 22 
 
 Total Second army corps 
 
 809 
 
 3823 
 
 1305 
 
 5937 
 
 THIRD ARMY CORPS. 
 Lieut.-gen. Ambrose P. Hill. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Anderson's Division. 
 
 Maj.-gen. Richard H. Anderson. 
 
 Wilcox's Brigade. 
 
 Brig. -gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox. 
 
 22 
 3 
 
 13 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 139 
 55 
 91 
 69 
 41 
 
 
 161 
 
 
 58 
 
 lOlh Alabama 
 
 104 
 
 
 75 
 
 14th Alabama 
 
 48 
 
 Total 
 
 51 
 
 '""i 
 
 2 
 1 
 2 
 
 469 
 
 3 
 12 
 
 7 
 11 
 10 
 
 257 
 
 777 
 
 Brig.-gen. William Mahone. 
 
 3 
 
 
 14 
 
 16th Viro'inia 
 
 9 
 
 
 12 
 
 61st Virginia 
 
 12 
 
 Total 
 
 8 
 
 55 
 
 39 
 
 102 
 
 J Loss, if any, not reported. 
 
308 ADDENDA. 
 
 Betum of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, e<c.— Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 ri 
 2 
 
 i 
 
 "2 
 S 
 ^ ! 
 
 
 2 
 
 a 
 tc 
 
 to 
 to 
 
 Wright's Briyade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. A. R. Wright. 
 Col. William Gibson. 
 Brig.-gen. A. E. Wright. 
 
 ""21 
 
 16 
 3 
 
 100 
 75 
 74 
 46 
 
 
 
 100 
 
 22d Georgia -. 
 
 96 
 90 
 
 2d Georo"ia Battalion.. 
 
 49 
 
 Tntnl 
 
 40 
 
 11 
 12 
 10 
 
 295 
 
 70 
 63 
 84 
 
 333 
 
 668 
 
 Perry^s Brigade. 
 Col. David Lang. 
 
 9fl Flr»ri(l*\ 
 
 81 
 
 Kt\. FlnridM 
 
 75 
 
 
 94 
 
 "Pytal 
 
 33 
 
 ""2 
 
 4 
 6 
 
 217 
 
 7 
 
 17 
 23 
 24 
 
 205 
 
 455 
 
 Posei/'s Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Carnot Posey. 
 
 7 
 
 
 19 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 30 
 
 
 12 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 71 
 
 7 
 5 
 9 
 
 
 83 
 
 Maj. John Lane. 
 
 8 
 
 
 7 
 
 Conipanv C (Wingtield's) 
 
 9 
 
 Total 
 
 3 
 
 21 
 
 6 
 
 30 
 
 
 147 
 
 1128 
 1 
 
 840 
 
 2115 
 
 Heth's Division. 
 
 Maj.-gen. Henry Heth. 
 Brig.-gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew. 
 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 309 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 
 
 Virginia, etc.— 
 
 -Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 "6 
 
 '6 
 
 •a 
 
 a 
 3 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 to 
 
 < 
 
 First Brigade. 
 Brig. -gen. J. Johnston Pettigrew. 
 Col. James K. Marshall. 
 11th North Carolina 
 
 50 
 86 
 21 
 33 
 
 159 
 502 
 140 
 114 
 
 
 209 
 
 2(ith North Carolina 
 
 588 
 
 
 161 
 
 62d North Carolina 
 
 147 
 
 Total. 
 
 190 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 8 
 
 3 
 
 915 
 
 38 
 3S 
 26 
 21 
 
 
 110; 
 
 Second Brigade. 
 Col. J. M. Brockenbrough. 
 
 42 
 
 
 48 
 
 65th Vii'gin ia 
 
 34 
 
 22d Virginia Battalion 
 
 ■ 24 
 
 Total : 
 
 25 
 
 6 
 
 ■""2 
 
 5 
 3 
 
 123 
 
 36 
 26 
 40 
 18 
 24 
 
 
 148 
 
 2'hird Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. James J. Archer. 
 Col. B. D. Fry. 
 
 13th Alabama 
 
 42 
 
 5th A labama Bat tal ion 
 
 26 
 
 1st Tennessee (Provisional Arrav) 
 
 42 
 
 
 23 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 16 
 
 49 
 32 
 60 
 39 
 
 144 
 
 183 
 170 
 205 
 159 
 
 517 
 
 677 
 
 Fourth Brigade. 
 
 Brig.-gen. Joseph R. Davis. 
 
 2d Mississippi 
 
 232 
 
 11th ^lississippi 
 
 202 
 
 42d ilississippi 
 
 265 
 
 65th North Carolina 
 
 198 
 
 Total 
 
 180 
 
 717 
 
 
 897 
 
 Artillery Battalion. 
 
 Lieut.-col. John J. Garnett. 
 
 Grandv's Virginia Baty. (Norfolk Lt. Art. Blues).. 
 
 
 Maurin's Louisiana Baty. (Donaldsonville Art.)... 
 Moore's ^ irginia Battery 
 
 
 
 Total* 
 
 
 5 
 
 17 
 
 22 
 
 Total Heth's division 
 
 411 
 
 1905 
 
 534 
 
 2850 
 
 * Not reported in detail. 
 
310 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 
 
 Virginia, etc.— 
 
 -Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 '6 
 
 3 
 
 "? 
 
 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 -3 to 
 
 £.| 
 
 Is 
 
 6 
 
 a 
 bo 
 
 j; 
 
 to 
 
 < 
 
 PpjNUEit's Division. 
 Maj.-gen. ^\^illianl D. Pender. 
 Erij^-gen. .James J I. Lane. 
 Maj.-gen. Isaac K. Trimble. 
 Brig.-gen. James II. Lane. 
 Staff. 
 
 1 
 
 20 
 
 2 
 
 20 
 
 31 
 
 27 
 
 4 
 
 75 
 
 9 
 
 112 
 
 99 
 182 
 
 
 5 
 
 First Bri(j<i(h. 
 
 Col. Abner Perrin. 
 
 1st Rout li Carolina 
 
 95 
 
 1st South Carolina Rifles 
 
 11 
 
 12tli South Carolina 
 
 132 
 
 13th South Carolina 
 
 130 
 
 14th South Carolina 
 
 209 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 100 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 12 
 10 
 10 
 
 477 
 
 84 
 41 
 92 
 53 
 
 78 
 
 
 577 
 
 Second BrigiuJe. 
 Brig.-gen. James H. Lane. 
 Col. C. M. Avery. 
 Brig.-gen. Jamis H. Lane. 
 Col. C. M. Avery. 
 7th North Carolina ." 
 
 89 
 
 18th North Carolina 
 
 45 
 
 28th North Carolina 
 
 104 
 
 3;-»d Nortii Carolina 
 
 63 
 
 37th North Carolina 
 
 88 
 
 Total* 
 
 41 
 
 5 
 6 
 
 "'"'5 
 
 348 
 
 27 
 42 
 35 
 32 
 
 
 389 
 
 Third Brigade. 
 14th Georgia 
 
 32 
 
 35th Georgia 
 
 48 
 
 45th Georgia 
 
 35 
 
 49th Georgia 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 16 
 
 ""29 
 16 
 20 
 16 
 21 
 
 102 
 
 136 
 
 1 
 
 97 
 50 
 69 
 
 48 
 58 
 
 
 152 
 
 Fourth Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Alfred M. Scales. 
 Lieut -col. G. T. Gordon. 
 Col. W. Lee J. Lowrance. 
 Staff 
 
 1 
 
 13th North Carolina 
 
 126 
 
 16th Nortli Carolina 
 
 66 
 
 22d North Carolina 
 
 89 
 
 34tli North Carolina 
 
 64 
 
 3Sth North Carolina 
 
 79 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 323 
 
 110 
 
 535 
 
 * General Lane reports his entire loss at 660. 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 311 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern 
 
 Virginia, etc.— 
 
 -Conti 
 
 lued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 i 
 
 3 
 
 -i 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 
 -s si 
 
 .a 
 
 i 
 
 OS 
 
 Artillery Battalum. 
 
 Maj. William T. Poague. 
 
 Brooks' Viro'inia Battery . ... 
 
 
 
 
 
 Graham's North Oarolina Battery 
 
 Ward's Mississip))! Battery (Madison Lt. Art.)... 
 Wyatt's Virginia Battery (Albemarle Artillery)... 
 
 
 
 Total* 
 
 2 
 
 24 
 
 6 
 
 32 
 
 Total Pender's division 
 
 262 
 
 1312 
 
 116 
 
 1690 
 
 Reserve Artillery. 
 Col. R. Lindsay WalUer.f 
 
 McIntosh^s Batt(dion. 
 
 Maj. D. G. Mcintosh. 
 
 Hurt's Alabama Battery (Hardaway Artillery)... 
 
 
 
 
 
 Rice's Virginia Battery (Danville Artillery) 
 
 
 
 Total* 
 
 7 
 
 25 
 
 
 32 
 
 Pef/ram\s Battalion. 
 
 Maj. W. J. Pegram. 
 
 Ca|)t. E. B. Brimson. 
 Brander's Virginia Battery (Letcher Artillery)... 
 Brunson's South Carolina Battery (Pee Dee Art.).. 
 
 Crenshaw's Virginia Battery 
 
 McGraw's Virginia Battery (Pnrcell Artillery) 
 
 Marye's Virginia Battery (Fredericksburg Art.)... 
 
 
 Total* 
 
 10 
 
 37 
 
 1 
 
 48 
 
 Total reserve artillery 
 
 17 
 
 62 
 
 1 
 
 , 80 
 
 
 837 
 
 4407 
 
 1491 
 
 6735 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 Stu.art's Division. 
 Maj. -gen. J. E. B. Stuart. 
 
 Huinpton'!^ Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. Wade Hampton. 
 Col. Lawrence S. Baker. 
 Staff 
 
 ■■■"2 
 
 1 
 1 
 8 
 4 
 1 
 
 1 
 17 
 9 
 6 
 6 
 
 10 
 9 
 
 ■■■■4 
 4 
 
 •••■■7 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1st North Carolina 
 
 23 
 
 1st South Carolina. 
 
 14 
 
 2d South Carolina. ... 
 
 7 
 
 Cobb's Georgia Legion 
 
 21 
 
 Jeff Davis Legion 
 
 15 
 
 Phillips' Georgia Legion 
 
 10 
 
 Total 
 
 17 
 
 58 
 
 16 
 
 91 
 
 * Kot reported in detail. 
 
 t Chief of corps artillery. 
 
312 ADDENDA. 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, e<c.— Continued. 
 
 Command. 
 
 Fitz. Le^s Brigade. 
 Brig. -gen. Fitzhvigli Lee. 
 
 1st Virginia... 
 2d Virginia... 
 3d Virginia... 
 4th Virginia.. 
 5th Virginia* 
 
 Total., 
 
 IF. H. F. Lee's Brigade. 
 Col. John R. Chambliss, Jr. 
 
 2d North Carolina*. 
 
 9th Virginia 
 
 10th Virginia 
 
 13th Virginia 
 
 Total. 
 
 Jonei Brigade. 
 Brig.-gen. William E. Jones. 
 
 6th Virginia... 
 7th Virginia... 
 11th Virginia 
 
 Total 
 
 Jenkins' Brigade. 
 Col. M. J. Ferguson. 
 
 14th Vii'ginia 
 
 16th Virginia 
 
 17th Virginia 
 
 34th Virginia Battalion., 
 35th Virginia Battalion.. 
 
 Total* 
 
 Stuart Horse Artillery. 
 
 Breathed's Maryland Battery 
 
 Gritfin's 2d Maryland Battery 
 
 McGregor's Virginia Battery 
 
 Total* 
 
 Total Stuart's division 
 
 12 
 
 36 
 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 9 
 
 11 
 
 26 
 
 19 
 21 
 
 40 
 
 
 10 
 1 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 29 
 
 22 
 5 
 6 
 
 17 
 
 50 
 
 12 
 12 
 17 
 
 13 
 
 140 
 
 41 
 
 28 
 30 
 
 58 
 
 64 240 
 
 * Loss, if any, not of record. 
 
ADDENDA. 
 
 313 
 
 Return of Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia, etc. — Concluded. 
 KECAPITULATION. 
 
 Command, 
 
 First army corps 
 
 Second army corps 
 
 Third army corps 
 
 Stuart's Cavalry division 
 
 Grand total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 o . 
 
 
 -% 
 
 ^a 
 
 
 r3 
 
 
 1 
 13 
 
 a 
 o 
 
 la 
 
 910 
 
 4,336 
 
 2,290 
 
 809 
 
 3,823 
 
 1,305 
 
 837 
 
 4,407 
 
 1,491 
 
 36 
 
 140 
 
 64 
 
 2,592 
 
 12,706 
 
 *5,150 
 
 7,536 
 
 5,937 
 
 6,735 
 
 240 
 
 20,448 
 
 * The records of prisoners of war on file in the office of the Adjutant-general U. S. Army 
 bear the names of 12,'227 wounded and un wounded Confederates captured by the Union forces 
 at and about Gettysburg from July 1st to oth, inclusive. 
 
314 
 
 ADDENDA. 
 
 
 a 
 
 C3 
 
 ire to t-H -< 
 
 •I^^OX 
 
 •saazntj 
 
 •U8IU p8^Sl[U3 
 
 SJ8D®0 
 
 •[uiox 
 
 W M »-l 
 
 O OS CO 
 
 ic CO ^ , ire 
 
 •snazijij I 
 
 •U3ni pajstjujj 
 
 sjaoiffo ! 
 
 -* -^ 
 
 ■a r 
 
 3^ n 
 
 
 i^ CO ire 
 
 lO 00 oo I ra 
 
 •saaziuj 
 
 •aaiu pa-jsnaa 
 
 ire 00 « I M 
 
 ■sjaoso 
 
 •IE?ox 
 
 I r^ 
 
 1-. ^ lo 
 
 •saazjiij 
 
 ; 
 
 
 ^1 
 
 
 w 
 
 
 :i ^' 
 
 •nara pa|si[n3 
 
 (M 
 
 00 
 
 ic 
 
 i 
 
 - 
 
 r^ 
 
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 •sjaogjo 
 
 ^ 
 
 3§ 
 
 ^S'-C-s -'.? 
 
 
 
 " 
 
 
 t-^ 
 
 ire 
 
 CO 
 
 c^ 
 
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 •saaznio 1 : : : | • ; :| I 
 
 •uara pajsjing 
 
 o 
 
 
 DC 
 
 
 c^ 
 
 o 
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 ire o 
 
 •sjaotgo 
 
 •I«;ox 
 
 ^ 00 
 
 •snazpij 
 
 l|« 
 
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 •sjao^O 
 
 lO ^ 
 
 CO eo '73 
 
 CO o CC -' 
 
 1-1 00 1-1 
 
 C-l CO ^ oo 
 
 
 ^ 5 
 
ADDENDA. 315 
 
 Instructions from Meade to French. 
 
 June 29, 1863. 
 Majok-Gen. French, Comdg. Harper's Feiry : 
 
 The major-general commanding directs that you remove the property of 
 the government at Maryland Heights, etc. by canal to Washington — that 
 you march with your command to join this army without delay. For the 
 purpose of removing and escorting the property to Washington, you will detach 
 such portion of your command as may be necessary, and order them to rejjort 
 to Maj.-Gen. Heintzelman. Tliis force should not exceed three thousand men, 
 and of course, in your discretion, may be less tlian that. 
 
 TJie head-quarlers of this army will be at Middieburg to-night, and the army 
 are all in march for the line between Emmettsburg and Westminster. Where 
 the head-qnarters will be after to-night will depend upon the information 
 derived from the front of the enemy and his movements. Your maix-h must 
 be as rapid as possible in view of the efficiency of your troops to join. 
 
 You will require to carry tlie amount of ammunition and su[)plies ordered 
 for the Army of the Potomac. If vour supplies do not hold out, you must 
 purcliase from the people through youi- quartermaster and commissary. Some 
 supplies may possibly be found at Frederick as you march through ; upon this 
 you cannot count with any certainty. 
 
 The commanding general expects to engage the enemy within -a few days, and 
 looks anxiously for your command to join. 
 
 Please acknowledge receipt of tliis order by bearer. 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 Daniel Butterfield, 
 
 Major-Oen. and Chief of Staff. 
 
 [Confidential.'] July 1, 1863, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. French: 
 
 The major-general commanding encloses for yonr information the orders as to 
 his disposition for an attack from the enemy, which will be understood by con- 
 sulting the map of Frederick county. He directs that you will hold Frederick, 
 camping your troops in its immediate vicinity ; also the Monocacy bridges, both 
 rail and turnpike. You will also guard the Baltimore and Ohio R. K. from 
 Frederick to a junction with Gen. Schenck, to whom you will communicate 
 your instructions. 
 
 In the event of our being compelled to withdraw and retire before the enemy, 
 you will be in readiness to throw your command by rail or march, as may be 
 most practicable and speedy, into the defences of Washington. 
 
 He desires that for the present you will hold the line of communication to 
 Frederick. Keep it open, and send up from Frederick all stragglers, keeping 
 the town clear and in good order. 
 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 S. Williams, 
 
 A sst. A djuian t- Oenei al. 
 
OP.T 2 5 1950 
 
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