I E 469 
 .8 
 .fl2 
 Copy 1 
 
 Compliments of 
 
 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, 
 
 84 State Street, Boston, Mass. 
 
 THE CRISIS OF FOREIGN 
 INTERVENTION 
 
 IN THE 
 
 WAR OF SECESSION 
 
 ./ 
 1862 
 
 i 
 
 'id* 
 
\ 
 
THE 
 CRISIS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION 
 
 IN THE 
 
 WAR OF SECESSION 
 
 SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER, 1862 
 
 BY 
 
 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS 
 
 B OSTON 
 1914 
 

 [The following paper, prepared for the Massachusetts Historical 
 Society, and submitted at its April Meeting, 1914, appears in the 
 printed Proceedings of that Society, vol. xlvii, pp. 372-424.] 
 
 
THE CRISIS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION 
 IN THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1862 
 
 At the November meeting, 191 1 — thirty months since — 
 it may by some be remembered I submitted a paper — "The 
 Trent Affair; An Historical Retrospect" — which now appears 
 in its proper place in our Proceedings. The episode then dis- 
 cussed was one of indisputable historical interest, and I was 
 able to speak of it to a certain extent from personal recol- 
 lection. What I now submit amounts to a sequel. I then had 
 occasion to refer in some detail to the Confederate Commis- 
 sioners arrested in transit by Capt. Wilkes — James M. Mason 
 of Virginia, and John SlideU of Louisiana. I described their 
 seizure, their subsequent detention at Fort Warren, their re- 
 lease, and, finally, their arrival at their original destinations 
 in the two European capitals — London and Paris — there to 
 represent the Confederacy. 
 
 The present narrative has in it not a few of the elements 
 which enter into works of fiction; and, on behalf of the Confed- 
 eracy, it was John Slidell who at that juncture arranged the 
 diplomatic program about to be described. Such being the 
 case, it is historically interesting, in view of what subse- 
 quently occurred, to recall the impression once made on his 
 contemporaries by Mr. Slidell; for, so highly developed was 
 his faculty of political management supposed to be, he was 
 popularly regarded as Httle short of a magician. This impres- 
 sion was shared also by those exceptionally competent to form 
 opinions on that head. For instance, in his publication, 
 My Diary, North and South, W. H. Russell thus describes a 
 social call at New Orleans, May 24, 1861, immediately after 
 the fall of Fort Sumter. He says: 
 
 In the evening I visited Mr. Slidell, whom I found at home with 
 his family. ... I rarely met a man whose features have a greater 
 finesse and firmness of purpose than Mr. Slidell's; his keen grey 
 
eye is full of life, his thin, firmly-set lips indicate resolution and 
 passion. Mr. Slidell, though born in a Northern state, is perhaps 
 one of the most determined disunionists in the Southern Confeder- 
 acy; he is not a speaker of note, nor a ready stump orator, nor an 
 able writer; but he is an excellent judge of mankind, adroit, perse- 
 vering, and subtle, full of device, and fond of intrigue; one of those 
 men, who, unknown almost to the outer w^orld, organizes and sus- 
 tains a faction, and exalts it into the position of a party — what is 
 called here a "wire-puller." Mr. Slidell is to the South something 
 greater than Mr. Thurlow Weed has been to his party in the North. 
 . . . Mr. Slidell and the members of his family possess naivete, good 
 sense, and agreeable manners; and the regrets I heard expressed 
 in Washington society, at their absence, had every justification. 
 
 This was written in May. Six months later Mr. Slidell 
 emerged into world-wide notoriety, and Russell, then still 
 sending his ''Special Correspondent" letters to the Times, 
 thus referred to him immediately after the Trent affair, the 
 letter, written in Washington, appearing in the Times issue 
 for December loth: 
 
 Mr. Slidell, whom I had the pleasure of meetiDjgr in New Orleans, 
 is a man of more tact and he is not inferior to his colleague, Mr. 
 Mason, in other respects. He far excels him in subtlety and depth, 
 and is one of the most consummate masters of political manoeuvre 
 in the States. He is what is here called a ''wire-puller," — a man 
 who unseen moves the puppets on the public stage as he lists — a 
 man of iron will and strong passions, who loves the excitement of 
 combinations, . . . and who in his dungeon [at Fort Warren], or 
 whatever else it may be, would conspire with the mice against the 
 cat sooner than not conspire at all. . . . Originally a northern man, 
 he has thrown himself into the southern cause and staked his great 
 fortune on the issue without hesitation, and with all the force of his 
 intellect and character. 
 
 Commenting on the above, I thus expressed myself in the 
 paper on the Trent affair: 
 
 Slidell, on the other hand, was considered one of the most astute 
 and dangerous of all Confederate public characters. An intriguer 
 by nature, unscrupulous in his political methods, he . . . was 
 generally looked upon as the most dangerous person to the Union 
 the Confederacy could select for diplomatic work in Europe. The 
 first object of the envoys was to secure the recognition of the Con- 
 federacy.^ ^ 
 * Proceedings, xlv. 40. 
 
In the present study my purpose is to describe, in the light 
 of material to which access has since been obtained, the work 
 done by this master of poHtical management, this diplomatic 
 magician, during the eight months immediately succeeding 
 his arrival in Europe. The narrative, an extraordinary one, 
 involves, as I shall show, the crisis of our Civil War. Well- 
 designed, the scheme — plot, it cannot properly be termed — at 
 one time seemed almost certain to prove a triumph of dip- 
 lomatic art. In the event it failed, and failed utterly; but its 
 failure was due to a combination of circumstances highly 
 iihprobable of occurrence, and quite beyond the control of 
 Mr. Slidell. Not long surviving the cause he had furthered, 
 Mr. Slidell died in exile. No biography of him has since 
 been published, and his papers, like those of his colleague in 
 the Senate and Chief in the Confederate State Department 
 during the Civil War, Judah P. Benjamin, have been de- 
 stroyed. In his share in what then occurred, however, so far 
 as the record survives, I find nothing provocative of censure, 
 nothing which an opponent would be justified in stigmatiz- 
 ing as otherwis*e than in accordance with the accepted rules 
 of the game. On this point my judgment is also worth 
 something; as, first so to do, I have been privileged to read 
 the confidential correspondence between him and Mr. Mason. 
 
 July, 1863, witnessed the Gettysburg struggle and the fall 
 of Vicksburg. That month, consequently, is by general his- 
 torical consent looked upon as marking the climax and turning- 
 point of the War of Secession. Perhaps it did; but it may none 
 the less fairly be questioned whether for sympathisers in the 
 cause of the Union, the previous September did not furnish 
 occasion for a deeper soHcitude. In it the crisis became acute; 
 and, until the ensuing July, it continued to be so. 
 
 To summarize briefly the course of events, it will be re- 
 membered that in August, 1862, the great Union advance 
 inaugurated, East and West, in the preceding February, had 
 spent its force*; and, in Virginia, ceasing to be aggressive, it 
 was thrown back to such an extent that Washington, and not 
 Richmond, stood jn danger of hostile occupation. At the same 
 time, the European situation was far from satisfactory. 
 Not only was the Confederate cotton campaign in progress, 
 but every indication favored for it "an early and successful 
 
issue; and that issue involved nothing less than the out- 
 come of the struggle. Was Cotton not indeed King? This 
 had, in the summer of 1862, become a world question; and 
 the machinery and life incident to and dependent upon the 
 cotton production and the cotton textile industries, whether 
 in Great Britain, on the continent, or in Asia, were disor- 
 ganized. The social unrest and economical suffering, neces- 
 sarily incirient to a commercial confusion literally world-wide, 
 were at their height. This condition of affairs was, moreover, 
 by common consent, attributed to the American War. The 
 blockade of the Southern cotton-shipping ports by the National 
 Government of the United States was accepted as the obvious 
 cause of ills and disturbances in Hindustan and China no less 
 than in Lancashire. 
 
 The question of foreign action in some form, bearing on 
 this situation — whether an offer of mediation, or through the 
 formal recognition of the Confederacy as a member of the 
 family of nations, or through a refusal farther to recognize 
 the blockade — now presented itself. It had been in the air 
 since the commencement of the struggle. Indeed, weeks be- 
 fore the attack on Fort Sumter, M. Mercier, the French 
 Minister in Washington, had become so convinced that a 
 permanent separation, South from North, was impending and 
 inevitable, that he had even gone so far as to suggest to Lord 
 Lyons that it was desirable that he, the British Minister at 
 Washington, acting in connection with the representative of 
 France, should be clothed with discretionary power to recog- 
 nize the Confederacy. This was in March. ^ The conviction 
 further on assumed in Mercier 's mind the shape almost of an 
 obsession;^ and, naturally, it colored his official dispatches, 
 operating immediately on the minds of the Emperor and his 
 advisers in potent furtherance of the program which had 
 early outhned itself in Mr. Slidell's busily scheming brain. 
 Indeed, that program may be said to have originated with the 
 French representative; for, in April, 1862, Mercier obtained a 
 permit to visit the Confederate capital. Judah P. Benjamin 
 was then acting as the Confederate Secretary of State, and with 
 him, Creole Senator from Louisiana up to the previous Feb- 
 ruary, the French Minister had, during their common resi- 
 
 1 Newton, Life of Lord Lyons, i. 34. 2 /^^ g^ 
 
dence in Washington, held social relations of a peculiarly 
 friendly character. Lord Newton, in his Life of Lord Lyons, 
 says of Mercier in this connection, ''after the manner of French 
 diplomatists of the period, he could not resist the temptation 
 of trying to effect a striking coupr ^ Whether such was or 
 was not his moving impulse, Mercier had concealed from Lord 
 Lyons his project until it was too late to endeavor to dis- 
 suade him from it. Indeed, he was bent upon it. More 
 cautious in his disposition than his colleague, Lord Lyons ap- 
 prehended that in going to the Confederate capital at that 
 time he was "as likely to get himself into a scrape as to do 
 anything else." And it so turned out. It was an officious 
 act, characteristic of the man and of the imperial diplomatic 
 service. 
 
 Mercier got back on the 24th of April.^ He returned 
 more than ever persuaded that a restoration of the Union 
 was impossible; ^ that unless the Powers of Europe intervened 
 the war would last for years; that in the end the independence 
 of the South would have to be recognized; that the evils inci- 
 dent to a cotton shortage would meanwhile be intensified; 
 and that, in view of these conditions, the Governments of 
 Europe should be on the watch for any favorable opportunity 
 of exerting themselves in such a way as to end the war. His 
 dispatches would in this connection be of great historic value; 
 and, at some future time, will probably be accessible. At 
 present, however, they are buried in the archives of the French 
 Foreign Office; but the Minister of course freely communicated 
 his views whether to the Emperor personally or to his official 
 superior in the department of the French Foreign Affairs. 
 Those views also, it so chanced, chimed in most opportunely 
 with the plans of the Emperor in connection with the Mexican 
 enterprise on which he was at the time fully embarked. Na- 
 poleon III, therefore, was under every inducement to exert 
 himself actively and openly to bring the proposed intervention 
 about.4 A Httle later, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 M. Thouvenel, was in England, and the Emperor then sent 
 
 1 Newton, Life of Lord Lyons, i. 82; Lyons to Russell, April 14, 1862. 
 
 2 Lyons to Russell, April 25, 1862. 
 
 3 See Butler, Judah P. Benjamin, 288. 
 ^ Rhodes, iv. 94. 
 
8 
 
 him a telegram desiring him unofficially to ascertain whether 
 the British Government did not think the time had com.e for 
 recognizing the South. This was in July. Thouvenel replied 
 that from conversations which had already taken place be- 
 tween him and Lord Palmerston, and from the language 
 which the Premier had just used in Parhament, it did not 
 seem to him expedient to press the matter further at that 
 time.^ 
 
 The course of ensuing events must next be noted in close 
 connection with military operations then going on both in 
 the United States and in Mexico. The reverses to the Union 
 arms which marked the months of July, August and early 
 September, 1862, were already foreshadowed. On the i8th 
 of July, it was reported in London and Liverpool that 
 McClellan 's army either had surrendered or was on the point 
 of capitulation.^ Under pressure of disaster, a military reor- 
 ganization in face of a victorious opponent had become a 
 necessity. So General Halleck, called from the West to Wash- 
 ington, superseded at the seat of government McClellan, his 
 senior in commission. General Pope had already been put 
 at the head of a newly organized force, intended to act in co- 
 operation with the Army of the Potomac, but wholly indepen- 
 dent of it. The succession of military disasters was thus 
 provoked, which, a few weeks later, resulted in the Union 
 forces being driven or withdrawn from Virginia soil. On the 
 29th of July, moreover, to the unconcealed satisfaction of 
 Parliament as well as a large preponderance of the EngKsh press, 
 the Alabama, eluding the customs officials, got to sea. It was 
 in position to begin its work, the character of which was well 
 and generally understood. A British-built, British-armed and 
 British-manned Confederate commerce-destroyer had been let 
 loose on the American merchant marine. 
 
 The second French expeditionary force to Mexico was in 
 course of active preparation. The Emperor had been advised 
 by the commander of the first force, sent out a year before, that 
 in point of discipline, organization and morale, the French were 
 so superior to the Mexicans that he (Gen. Lorencez) felt able 
 to "assure the Emperor that at the head of six thousand men 
 
 1 Walpole, Twenty-five Years, 11. 55. 
 
 2 Adams, Ms. Diary; Mason to Slidell, July 18, 1862. 
 
[he] would undertake to become complete master of Mexico." 
 Thus officially informed, Louis Napoleon, constitutionally a 
 dreamer, was imbued with a belief that it was his mission to 
 establish in West Indian waters a firm government, which 
 "shall give to that Latin race beyond the ocean its ancient 
 strength and power. " ^ 
 
 From Gibraltar to Kronstadt, all Europe was intently fol- 
 lowing the above course of events. Thus, through a wholly 
 fortuitous concurrence of circumstances, Mr. Slidell found 
 himself in that situation for which Nature had especially de- 
 signed him. The atmosphere was one of intrigue, and every 
 condition of the environment, whether in France, in England, 
 in Mexico, or in the Confederacy, invited manipulation. 
 He was also in fairly close personal touch with the Emperor, 
 at that time looked upon as the European Sphinx, and him- 
 self the busiest schemer of the day. About the middle of 
 April the Confederate Commissioner had with him a personal 
 interview, of which Slidell sent to Mason the following 
 account: 
 
 My interview lasted seventy minutes (one hour, ten minutes) ; he 
 was particularly gracious, I may even say cordial. I had expected 
 him to be reserved, taking little part in conversation, making or 
 suggesting questions and replying briefly. Far from this he talked 
 freely, frankly, and unreservedly, spoke in the most decided terms 
 of his sympathy and his regret that England had not shared his 
 views. He said that he had made a great mistake in respecting a 
 blockade which had for six months at least not been effective, that we 
 ought to have been recognized last summer while our ports were still 
 in our own possession. He spoke freely of the Mexican question and 
 the probability of its soon bringing him into collision with the United 
 States, that the treaty with Mexico if ratified by the Senate, would 
 place them inevitably in a hostile position towards him. He asked 
 if he offered mediation how the question of boundaries could be 
 settled? What we would insist on? I said that we would insist on 
 all the States where a majority of the people had already deter- 
 mined by their votes to join our Confederacy, leaving the people 
 of Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland to decide further — such as 
 whether they could or would associate their fortunes with ours. 
 He expressed his regret that he had not been able sooner to see me 
 and on parting said that he hoped for the future I should have less 
 difficulty in seeing him. 
 
 * Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, 107, 108. 
 
lO 
 
 On the whole he left on my mind the impression that if England 
 long persists in her inaction he would be disposed to act without 
 her, although of course he did not commit himself to do so. He 
 said that he had reason not to be wholly satisfied with England, 
 she had not appreciated as she should have done his support in the 
 Trent affair. There is an important part of our conversation that 
 I will give you through Mr. Mann. On the whole my interview was 
 highly satisfactory.^ 
 
 At this time a sharp personal stimulus was administered to 
 Mr. Slidell's activities. The surrender of New Orleans to the 
 Union fleet under command of Admiral Farragut took place 
 April 26. Immediately on receipt of the news of this event 
 in Paris, Slidell wrote to Mason that in an interview with 
 M. Thouvenel, the Foreign Secretary, he had frankly admitted 
 that this occurrence ''would be most disastrous, as it would 
 give the enemy the control of the Mississippi and its tribu- 
 taries, that it would not in any way modify the fixed purpose 
 of our people to carry on the war even to an extermination. 
 He [Thouvenel] said that was the opinion of everyone here. " ^ 
 Referring to the effect of the capture on his personal circum- 
 stances, Slidell added in the same letter: " The taking of 
 New Orleans cuts me off from all resources while the war 
 lasts, and that will probably be very many months. Under 
 other circumstances, I should not care about receiving any- 
 thing from Richmond. This, is now to me a matter of 
 consequence."^ 
 
 Slidell's line of diplomatic activity was now clearly defined. 
 Aware that concurrent action with Great Britain was funda- 
 mental in the policy of the Second Empire, Slidell's pur- 
 pose was to make the most effective use possible of France 
 • to influence Great Britain in favor of a joint European 
 recognition of the Confederacy, and, if possible, of inter- 
 vention in the blockade. This failing, he further hoped so 
 to commit Napoleon through his Mexican enterprise that, 
 in case of a failure to bring about concurrent action, the 
 independent recognition of the Confederacy by France would 
 become for the Emperor a logical necessity, implying the 
 
 1 Slidell to Mason, April 20, 1862. 
 
 2 Slidell to Masojt, May 19, 1862. 
 2 Slidell to Masoti, May 14, 1862. 
 
II 
 
 presence of a formidable fleet in the waters of the Gulf, 
 *' strong enough to keep [that coast] clear of every Federal 
 cruiser." Such a naval armament had in fact already been 
 provided as a necessary adjunct to the Mexican outfit. As 
 Slidell now expressed it to Mason, ^'I shall be very much sur- 
 prised and disappointed if the Emperor do not take the 
 matter in hand on his own hook." This was written Au- 
 gust 3. Three days later, on the 6th, Slidell further wrote 
 to the same effect. Referring to a discussion which occurred 
 in the House of Lords two days previous, in the course of which 
 Earl Russell, being questioned, had made certain statements, 
 Slidell thus expressed himself: 
 
 I think that it may now be assumed that England will not move, 
 and I can only account for the inaction of the English Ministry on 
 the hypothesis that they desire to see the North entirely exhausted 
 and broken down, that they are wiUing in order to attain this 
 object to suffer their own people to starve, and [themselves to] play 
 the poltroon in the face of Europe. [Russell's] answer must have 
 been given without any consultation with this Government. If I 
 am right in this opinion, the Emperor has been treated with a 
 rudeness approaching to indignity, which will make him the better 
 disposed to pursue his own pohcy without consulting England. 
 If he do, Russell's prompt reply ought not to be regretted. France 
 will for us be a safer ally than England. 
 
 With this program rapidly assuming shape in his mind, on 
 July 1 7 Slidell had submitted to the Emperor a direct and defi- 
 nite proposition, which was also a little later communicated in 
 writing to Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This 
 proposition was based on formal instructions drawn up by Ben- 
 jamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, at the time of 
 Mercier's visit to Richmond. Benjamin's instructions ran 
 in part as follows: 
 
 It is well understood that there exists at present a temporary 
 embarrassment in the finances of France, which might have the 
 effect of deterring that government from initiating a policy likely 
 to superinduce the necessity for naval expeditions. If, under these 
 circumstances, you should after cautious inquiry be able to satisfy 
 yourself that the grant of a subsidy for defraying the expenses of 
 such expeditions would sufl&ce for removing any obstacle to an ar- 
 
12 
 
 rangement or understanding with the Emperor, you are at liberty 
 to enter into engagements to that effect.^ 
 
 Slidell, accordingly, construing his instructions broadly, 
 now proposed to Louis Napoleon that, in return for Confederate 
 recognition, France was to receive in bales of cotton w^hat 
 amounted to the equivalent in cash of a hundred million francs, 
 together with most favorable tariff arrangements; and, so far 
 as Mexico was concerned, an immediate alliance offensive and 
 defensive was to be arranged. ^ Tliis was in every way an op- 
 portune as well as tempting inducement; and the Emperor 
 encouraged the Confederate representative by assuring him 
 that he, the Emperor, had moved in the matter, and was ex- 
 erting himself to bring about combined action by European 
 powers. A diplomatic intimation meanwhile shortly after 
 reached Mr. Slidell to the effect that it was undesirable the 
 special inducements held forth should come to the knowledge 
 of the English Government;^ and, accordingly, when Slidell 
 confidentially communicated with his London colleague on 
 this topic, he did not fail to intimate to him that the ex- 
 istence of an understanding so markedly advantageous to 
 the French Government had best not reach those the Em- 
 peror proposed to have associated with him in the con- 
 templated movement. It was presumably at this stage of 
 proceedings that the telegraphic message from the Emperor 
 personally to Thouvenel, already referred to, was sent. 
 
 Thus Slidell was putting in most effective diplomatic work, 
 and the tide not only seemed to be setting, but, from all di- 
 rections, actually was setting in favor of the Confederacy, and 
 that strongly. On the 7th of August ParHament was pro- 
 rogued, and the Government, relieved of its presence for some 
 months to come, felt comparatively free. The situation in 
 Lancashire was, however, most disturbing. It even threat- 
 ened to get beyond all available means of relief, and not im- 
 possibly of control. The market was in a condition of unpre- 
 cedented excitement, for American cotton was quoted at thirty 
 pence per pound, while great uneasiness was felt because of a 
 belief that the next steamer from America might not improb- 
 
 ^ April 12, 1862. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, 11. 229. 
 2 Slidell to Benjamin, July 25, 1862. 
 ' Slidell to Mason, July 30, 1862. 
 
13 
 
 ably bring news of the Confederates being in Washington. 
 In such case, as the result of some European offer of mediation, 
 a speedy recognition of the Confederacy was anticipated, and 
 Liverpool might find itself flooded with cotton arrivals. The 
 most prudent and the most daring were equally at a loss. The 
 suffering in the Lancashire districts was at the same time 
 rapidly intensifying. The number of those either actually 
 paupers or dependent upon others for relief was mounting up 
 at the rate of approximately a thousand each day; and it was 
 reported that as compared with the previous year there had 
 been an increase of over 113,000 persons in receipt of parochial 
 relief, or some 263 per cent. In five manufacturing centres, 
 32,718 operatives were reported as working short time, while 
 33,651 were wholly unemployed; 14,530 only were working 
 full time. The weekly loss of wages in those five unions alone 
 amounted to £27,430.^ 
 
 In view of these facts and the situation thus set forth, the 
 minds of both Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell naturally a 
 little later on turned to the question of policy as respects the 
 American conflict. Was not the time actually come, or at 
 least probably at hand, when a new attitude should be assumed? 
 If so, what form should it take? Should the cooperation of 
 other European powers be invited? And, so far as France was 
 concerned, the intimations, direct and indirect, semi-official 
 and unofficial, received first through Mr. Lindsay and later 
 through M. Thouvenel, bore fruit. ^ As Palmerston expressed 
 it, '^France, we know, is quite ready, and only waiting for our 
 concurrence." ^ So far as the cause of Confederacy was con- 
 cerned, all the indications were favorable. 
 
 Lord Palmerston accordingly now broached the subject in 
 characteristic fashion to Earl Russell; and the two, as the 
 result of an interchange of views, agreed on both the expedi- 
 ency and nature of ministerial action looking, as respects the 
 American conflict, to a radical change of policy. This sub- 
 ject, however, elsewhere discussed,^ is familiar history, and I 
 
 1 Index, I. 354. 
 
 2 Slidell to Mason, August 6, 1862; Butler's Benjamin, 299. 
 
 3 Walpole's Russell, 11. 362, 
 
 * Life of C. F. Adams (Am. Statesmen Series), chap, xv; Studies, Military 
 and Diplomatic, 400-412; Trans- Atlantic Historical Solidarity, 97-106. See, also, 
 Rhodes, iv, and, generally, the researches of Callahan, Latan6 and others. 
 
14 
 
 have no new facts now to present in connection therewith. 
 I shall not, therefore, encumber our Proceedings with what 
 would at best be only a useless repetition. At this juncture 
 Lord Palmerston was at Broadlands, his home in the South 
 of England. Earl Russell was at Gotha, Germany, in attend- 
 ance on the Queen, who had left England in the closing 
 days of August. She, recently widowed, was in a state of 
 great mental depression. When not absorbed in a sense of 
 bereavement, her mind was occupied with family and strictly 
 domestic affairs; for the marriage of the Prince of Wales, now 
 arranged, took place some months later. 
 
 The proposed change of policy, based on a tender of 
 friendly mediation to the parties to the American conflict, 
 decided on by the two ministers had been officially com- 
 municated to the Queen, and she had assented thereto. In do- 
 ing so she had merely expressed a wish that Austria, Prussia 
 and Russia should be consulted before action was taken. 
 It was, however, well understood that the counsels of no one 
 carried greater weight in the mind of the Queen than those of 
 King Leopold of Belgium; and King Leopold was at this time 
 writing personal letters to the Emperor urging him to use 
 every exertion to cause England to join in a recognition of the 
 Confederacy, or take any other course likely to put an end to 
 the American struggle. The Confederate agents naturally set 
 much store on the influence thus brought to bear in their 
 favor. ^ As Mason expressed it to Slidell, "You know, I sup- 
 pose, the great and affectionate respect of Queen Victoria for 
 her uncle." So it only remained to bring the matter before 
 the Cabinet for its approval; and that approval seems to have 
 been assumed as of course. The importance of the action 
 proposed was fully realized, and, in order to give proper at- 
 tention to it, the Foreign Secretary now left Gotha, return- 
 ing to England and his Downing Street office. Getting there 
 about the 2 2d of September, the next two weeks were utilized 
 by him in the preparation of an elaborate Cabinet circular, 
 in furtherance of the program agreed upon between himself 
 and the Premier. He was reUeved as respects attendance on 
 the Queen by Lord Granville, then President of the Council. 
 In the confidential circular he now drew up the Foreign Secre- 
 
 * Slidell to Mason, October 29; Mason to Slidell, October 31, 1862. 
 
IS 
 
 .tary submitted to his colleagues the question whether, in the 
 light of what had taken place in America and the conditions 
 of distress prevailing throughout the manufacturing districts 
 of England and France, it was not the duty of Europe ''to 
 ask both parties, in the most friendly and conciHatory terms, 
 to agree to a suspension of arms for the purpose of weighing 
 calmly the advantages of peace" — and so forth and so on. 
 
 Harmless, and even philanthropic and benevolent, in aspect 
 and tone, this was in fact a most insidious, not to say hypo- 
 critical, proposition; for it was an initial step — the entering 
 wedge. The national government, it was perfectly well known, 
 would reject the offer. If, then, the Confederacy signified its 
 acceptance — what was the next step to be? Of course, rec- 
 ognition; to be speedily followed by a joint intervention, Eng- 
 lish and French, at least to the extent of a refusal to recognize 
 further the blockade. Europe was to the last degree benev- 
 olent; but it wanted cotton, and proposed to get it. Lord 
 Palmerston and Earl Russell knew just as well what the game 
 they were playing meant, as did James M. Mason and John 
 Slidell, when they put the Emperor up to playing it. Mean- 
 while, this attitude and style of utterance were in no way char- 
 acteristic of either Palmerston or Russell — the somewhat 
 cynical bonhommie of the one or the curt downrightness of 
 the other. But it is always to be remembered that John Bull 
 was then, in contemplation of our most unfraternal strife, 
 indulging in one of his most unctuous, Pharisaic moods. Hap- 
 pily forgetful of Burgos incidents, in his Peninsular Wars, and 
 of more recent Hindoo, Sepoy-suppression methods, he could 
 not find words adequate to the expression of the horror felt 
 over the unchristian, not to say ungentlemanly, way in which 
 we were conducting ourselves and hostihties in America. 
 ''History afforded no example," etc., etc., etc. Snivelling and 
 with upturned eyes, Russell and Westbury now recorded their 
 sense of the "horrible atrocities" which marked the course of 
 a war which "may become worse than any we have yet heard 
 of in barbarism and atrocity." The Chadband, I am-better- 
 than-thou, element in the British make-up was unmistakably 
 and, to Americans, most unpleasantly in evidence. On the 
 other hand, the calm and self-contained Lyons was at this time 
 absent from his post and temporarily in England, having left 
 
i6 
 
 in charge of the legation at Washington a Mr. Stuart, "a 
 strong partizan of the South." And Mr. Stuart, as the record 
 shows, vied with Mercier in his obsessions as respects media- 
 tion and recognition. A most unhappy substitute for Lyons, 
 this gentleman was now advising the Foreign Secretary and 
 Cabinet that the general aspect of things in America was, as 
 the result of the mihtary reverses then sustained by the Union 
 Army in Virginia, fast ripening for mediation and peace. There 
 were, in short, more hopeful indications of returning sense; 
 and he was almost convinced that any proposals which Great 
 Britain might now make in concert with France, if moderately 
 and courteously worded, would, after a certain amount of 
 threats and howling by the violent portion of the press, be favor- 
 ably received by a majority of the public. And so, expressing 
 himself in harmony with such suggestions direct from the scene 
 of conflict, the Foreign Secretary oiled his entering wedge with 
 language most moderate and courteous. Altogether, it was, 
 for John Russell, quite a model of Pharisaic unctuosity. 
 
 Next to Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell, Mr. Gladstone 
 was the most influential member of the ministry then in office. 
 Consulted as to the change of policy proposed, he gave to it 
 his emphatic approval. It wholly coincided with the views he 
 at that -time entertained. The cry of distress coming up from 
 the cotton-spinning districts appealed to his strong humani- 
 tarian sympathies. He, moreover, like Lord Palmerston, and 
 indeed the great mass of European observers and supposed 
 authorities, was fully convinced that a re-estabhshment of the 
 American Union was impossible, as well as from every point 
 of view undesirable. Finally, by a subtle process of reasoning 
 always characteristic of him and them, Mr. Gladstone, in 
 common with a large number of his countrymen, had most 
 conveniently persuaded himself that the immediate victory 
 of the slave-owner would surely result in the ultimate downfall 
 of slavery. He had also conceived an idea that the Northern 
 States could be reconciled to the severance of the South by 
 the friendly acquisition of the Canadas and the other British 
 North American continental possessions; to which arrange- 
 ment, as Mr. Gladstone was then inchned to think, no sound 
 objection existed. More than thirty years later, reverting in a 
 spirit of unsparing self-examination to what now occurred, he 
 
17 
 
 wrote: "I really, though most strangely, believed that it was 
 an act of friendliness to all America [to cause the North] to 
 recognize that the struggle was virtually at an end." ^ 
 
 The concurrence of Mr. Gladston\3 in the proposed program 
 apparently made the assurance of its adoption doubly sure; 
 for, as Lord Granville had a few months before, and in another 
 connection, written to Lord Canning, *'He [Gladstone], Johnny 
 [Russell], and Pam [Palmers ton] are a formidable phalanx when 
 they are united in opposition to the whole Cabinet in foreign 
 matters." Not only was this so, but in the present case, so far 
 as sympathy with the struggling and now apparently victori- 
 ous Confederacy was concerned, a large majority of the Cab- 
 inet were with ^^the formidable phalanx." So Granville, an 
 experienced judge of Cabinet situations, looking upon the 
 conclusion as foregone, wrote to a colleague, *'I suspect you 
 will settle" in the way proposed; "it appears to me a great 
 mistake." ^ 
 
 For weeks the tension had been on the steady increase. 
 Something of a decisive character must, it would seem, soon 
 occur; and, on each side, the representatives of the contending 
 parties were preparing for an immediately impending crisis. 
 Mr. W. S. Lindsay, member of Parliament representing Sun- 
 derland, was throughout the conflict a warm English' sup- 
 porter of the Confederate cause. His personal relations with 
 the Confederate commissioners were so close as to be al- 
 most intimate. He in June brought forward a motion that 
 in the opinion of the House of Commons the time had come 
 when '^the propriety of offering mediation with a view to 
 terminating hostilities between the contending parties [in 
 America] is worthy of the serious and immediate attention of 
 Her Majesty's Government." After consulting with Disraeli, 
 Roebuck, and other leading Conservatives and Liberals, as 
 well as with Mason and SHdell, Mr. Lindsay had in July 
 concluded that conditions were ripe for pressing his motion.^ 
 Thouvenel, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was then 
 in London.'* Why was he there? Slidell, writing at this junc- 
 ture from Paris, assured Mason, as the result of a "long, 
 interesting and satisfactory interview with the Emperor" 
 
 1 Morley, Gladstone, ii. 8i. ^ Fitzmaurice, GrawwV/e, i. 442. 
 
 * Masonio Slidell, July 11, 1862. < Ih., July 13, 1862. 
 
i8 
 
 that '^ things are right in France." He further told Mason 
 that he had received the Emperor's approval of a formal 
 demand for immediate recognition, to be simultaneously made 
 by himself in France and by Mason in England.^ Mason 
 in reply wrote: "I am happy to say that the rout before Rich- 
 mond has had the happiest effect here in all quarters, and things 
 look well for Lindsay's motion tonight." He added: ''We have 
 rumors today coming through the bankers that McClellan's 
 army had capitulated, he escaping in a gun-boat." ^ 
 
 The debate on the motion took place on the evening of the 
 1 8th. Concerning it Mr. Lindsay had a month before written 
 as follows to Mr. Mason: ''Lord Russell sent to me last night 
 to get the words of my motion. I have sent them to him 
 tonight, and I have embraced the opportunity of opening my 
 mind to his Lordship. I have told him that I have postponed 
 my motion in courtesy to him — that the sympathy of nine- 
 tenths of the members of the House was in favor of immediate 
 recognition, and that even if the Government was not pre- 
 pared to accept my motion, a majority of votes would be 
 obtained within the next fortnight." He added: "I further 
 told his Lordship that recognition was a right which no one 
 would deny us the form of exercising. That the fear of war 
 if we exercised it was a delusion. That the majority of the 
 leading men in the Northern States would thank us for exer- 
 cising it, and that even Seward himself might be glad to see 
 it exercised so as to give him an excuse for getting out of the 
 terrible war into which he had dragged his people." ^ The 
 debate ^ closed with a speech from the Premier, after which, 
 at his suggestion the motion was withdrawn. Of what Palm- 
 erston said on this occasion Mr. Adams the next day wrote: 
 "It was cautious and wise, but enough could be gathered from 
 it to show that mischief to us in some shape will only be averted 
 by the favor of Divine Providence on our own efforts. The 
 anxiety attending my responsibiHty is only postponed." A 
 few days later Mr. Adams further wrote: "The suspense is 
 becoming more and more painful. I do not think since the 
 beginning of the war I have felt so profoundly anxious for the 
 
 1 Slidell to Mason, July i6, 1S62. 2 Mason to Slidell, July 18, 1862. 
 
 ^ Lindsay to Mason, June 18, 1862. 
 
 ^ Index, I. 214; 3 Hansard, clxviii. 549. 
 
19 
 
 safety of the country." Then, on the 29th of September: 
 ^'For a fortnight my mind has been running so strongly on 
 this, night and day, that it seems almost to threaten my 
 life/' 
 
 In view of the emergency possibly impending, Mr. Adams 
 had weeks before written home asking from Secretary Seward 
 specific instructions for his guidance if what he apprehended 
 should occur. Those instructions he had in due time re- 
 ceived; they were expKcit. They were also characteristic. 
 The despatch in which they were imbedded, prolix and Seward- 
 esque, is also otherwise curiously suggestive. Suffice it to say 
 that, in its essential passages, carrying the standard entrusted 
 to him high and with a firm hand, the American Secretary 
 in that hour of darkness, defeat and discouragement bore 
 himself in a way in which his country may take pride. Fifty 
 years later the concentrated excerpts read well. The despatch 
 was in part^as follows: 
 
 If the British government shall in any way approach you directly 
 or indirectly with propositions which assume or contemplate an ap- 
 peal to the President on the subject of our internal affairs, whether 
 it seem to imply a purpose to dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, 
 or even to solicit or persuade, you will answer that you are forbid- 
 den to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit 
 any communication of the kind. You will make the same answer 
 whether the proposition comes from the British government alone 
 or from that government in combination with any other Power. 
 
 If you are asked an opinion what reception the President would 
 give to such a proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are 
 not instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it would 
 be entertained. 
 
 If contrary to our expectations the British government, either 
 alone or in combination with any other government, should acknowl- 
 edge the insurgents, while you are remaining without instructions 
 from this Government concerning that event, you will immedi- 
 ately suspend the exercise of your functions. ... I have now in 
 behalf of the United States, and by the authority of their chief 
 executive magistrate, performed an important duty. Its possible 
 consequences have been weighed, and its solemnity is therefore felt 
 and freely acknowledged. This duty has brought us to meet and 
 confront the danger of a war with Great Britain and other states 
 allied with the insurgents who are in arms for the overthrow of 
 
20 
 
 the American Union. You will perceive that we have approached 
 the contemplation of that crisis with the caution which great reluc- 
 tance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have perceived 
 that the crisis has not appalled us.^ 
 
 With these ringing instructions before him, Mr. Adams now 
 awaited the outcome he was powerless in any material way 
 to affect. Meanwhile, acting under a proper sense of diplo- 
 matic restraint, he did what was in his power to do. He 
 communicated the tenor of his instructions to W. E. Forster, 
 a member of Parliament and stanch friend of the Union, who 
 held confidential relations with Mr. Milner-Gibson, a member 
 of the Cabinet. Mr. Forster expressed the opinion that the 
 Government should be made aware of the nature of these in- 
 structions before it further committed itself; but what action, 
 if any, he took to that end does not appear. It is, however, in 
 no way an unreasonable historical assumption to suppose that 
 the intimation thus given reached its intended Cabinet destina- 
 tion. If so, it could not have failed to convey to the minds 
 of those responsible for the pohcy about to be pursued its 
 ultimate possible consequence in the matter of American 
 Alabamas. Both Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell also 
 retained vivid personal recollections of 1812. 
 
 The special Cabinet meeting was called for the 23d of Oc- 
 tober; to all outward appearance and in all human probabiHty 
 that was the fateful day; the ordeal must then be faced. The 
 course of events was arranged. As it rested in the mind of the 
 Foreign Secretary, it began with an innocent-looking proposal 
 of a cessation of hostihties; friendly offices in the way of media- 
 tion were next to be extended; with a recognition of the 
 Confederacy in reserve, should this offer be decHned. So far 
 as the American minister was concerned and the course by 
 him to be pursued in the contingency now arising, the in- 
 structions of the Secretary were exphcit. They covered the 
 ground. 
 
 The momentous 23d of October came and passed. Upon it, 
 
 ^ So far as is ascertainable never made public in full, the body of this despatch 
 of August 2, 1862, is to be found in Messages and Documents, 1862-1863, Part 
 I, 165-168. The passages quoted were there omitted, and were first printed as 
 from Ms. by Rhodes (IV. 342-343) in 1899, and by Frederic Bancroft in his Seward 
 (II. 294-296) in 1900. 
 
21 
 
 SO far as the outer world was advised, nothing happened. 
 The unexpected had again occurred. 
 
 What had taken place? Why was the carefully prepared 
 program, so far-reaching, so world-momentous, suddenly, 
 quietly, postponed — ostensibly abandoned? It is a curious 
 story — that which I am now about to tell. But I must 
 preface it with an acknowledgment — an acknowledgment 
 amounting almost to a recantation. Not pleasant to make, 
 it none the less illustrates somewhat strikingly, I think, the 
 force, in historical narrative as v/ell as in political and re- 
 ligious discussion, of Cromwell's famous remark to the Presby- 
 terian ministers in Edinburgh Castle: "I beseech you, brethren, 
 to think it possible that you may be wrong." I in this case 
 confess to having heretofore been wrong — to having reached 
 erroneous conclusions. Not only did I misinterpret the course 
 of events, but I attributed motives to individuals which I have 
 since seen cause to believe did not influence them, or, in any 
 event did not influence them to the extent I assumed. 
 
 Following such authorities as were then accessible, and draw- 
 ing from them inferences inherently probable, if not mani- 
 festly logical deductions, I attributed what now occurred to an 
 indiscretion on the part of one member of the EngHsh Cabi- 
 net. Through that indiscretion he put himself in the pov/er, 
 so to speak, of a chief who felt no good- will towards him. The 
 offending Cabinet member was Mr. Gladstone; the chief was 
 the Premier, Lord Palmerston. It was, as I saw it, a Cabinet 
 collision between tv/o very eminent pubKc characters, in which 
 one availed himself of an opportunity to assert his authority 
 and to secure an advantage over the other. In what now en- 
 sued I stated that ''the hand of the Premier was on the poKti- 
 cal lever," and that he had in the outcome caused a somewhat 
 forthputting subordinate to realize that he was not yet master. 
 To this Cabinet controversy I attributed a fortunate delay of 
 action on an issue of international policy which, occurring at 
 a most critical period, led to far-reaching results. 
 
 In arriving at this conclusion, moreover, as I have said, I 
 merely made use of the material at my disposal, relying upon 
 the evidence of those who, it might naturally be assumed, were 
 best and most correctly informed. 
 
 In the Hght of new material contained in recent publications, 
 
22 
 
 and more especially from information derived from unpublished 
 English sources, access to which has recently been given me, I 
 now find myself compelled to the conclusion that I was mis- 
 taken in both my statements and my inferences; that, in short, 
 the causes to which I attributed important poHtical action in 
 no way, or only in very slight degree, affected it or the course 
 of events. 
 
 There was, I am now satisfied, no collision at this time be- 
 tween the Premier, Lord Palmer ston, and the Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone. The utterances of Mr. Glad- 
 stone were, it is true, most indiscreet and politically ''incon- 
 venient;" but I am satisfied the Premier took no offence at 
 them, and that the relations between the two throughout the 
 time in question were, if not actually friendly, yet courteous 
 and thoroughly considerate. Thus the historical situation I 
 at Oxford somewhat dramatically pictured has since, so to 
 speak, gone to pieces on my hands. So to-day and here, I 
 propose to set forth the facts as I now find they really were, 
 substituting for what I have heretofore said explanatory of the 
 mystery a more commonplace, but certainly, I must admit, 
 a more natural as well as satisfactory solution. It has the 
 advantage, too, of being historically correct. 
 
 I will now proceed to state what actually did occur; though, 
 in so doing, I upset not only the inferences to be drawn from 
 my predecessors in the line of narrative, but also the conclu- 
 sions and statements of other members of my own family di- 
 rectly at the time concerned, who naturally would be assumed 
 to have been pecuharly well informed. 
 
 This acknowledgment of error duly made, I return to the 
 narrative — my revised explanation of the British Cabinet 
 mystery of October, 1862. It was, it will be remembered — 
 for dates in this connection are all-important — the 23d of 
 October that had been assigned for the special Cabinet meet- 
 ing to consider the change of policy proposed. Now it so 
 chanced that sixteen days before, on the 7th of that month, 
 Mr. Gladstone delivered himself of that famous Newcastle 
 speech, still remembered, in which he declared that Jefferson 
 Davis had ''made a nation," and that the independence of the 
 Confederacy and dissolution of the American Union were as cer- 
 tain "as any event yet future and contingent could be." That 
 
23 
 
 speech, a marvel of indiscretion — or, as Mr. Gladstone him- 
 self subsequently expressed it, "a mistake of incredible gross- 
 ness" — though at the moment it caused in the mind of 
 Mr. Adams a feeling akin to dismay, in reahty went far 
 towards working a favorable solution of the problem which 
 so deeply concerned him. At a very critical moment com- 
 pKcating a delicate Cabinet situation, it prematurely preci- 
 pitated action. 
 
 Speaking for himself — ^'playing off his own bat," as Lord 
 Palmerston would have expressed it — Mr. Gladstone had 
 foreshadowed a ministerial policy. The utterance was in- 
 spired; in venturing on it Mr. Gladstone unquestionably sup- 
 posed, as he had good cause to know, he spoke the minds of 
 both Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell. In fact, writing to 
 him in his familiar way two weeks before the Newcastle occa- 
 sion, Lord Palmerston had thus outlined the proposed change 
 of policy: 
 
 It seems to Russell and me that the time is fast approaching when 
 some joint offer of mediation by England, France, and Russia if 
 they would be a party to it, might be made with some prospect 
 of success to the combatants in North America, and Russell is going 
 to instruct Cowley by a private letter to sound the French Govern- 
 ment as to their willingness to agree to such a measure if formally 
 proposed to them. Of course, no actual step to such effect could 
 be taken without the sanction of the Cabinet. But if I am not mis- 
 taken, you would be inclined to approve such a course. 
 
 The Proposal would naturally be made to both North and South, 
 and if both accepted we should recommend an armistice and cessa- 
 tion of Blockades with a view to negotiations on the basis of separa- 
 tion. If both declined we must of course leave them to go on; 
 if the South accepted and the North declined we should then, I 
 conceive, acknowledge the Independence of the South. But we 
 ought, Russell and I imagine, to declare the maintenance of our 
 neutrality even in the case of our acknowledging the Independence 
 of the South. Ld. Lyons would be going back towards the middle 
 of October, and his Return would be the fitting opportunity for 
 such a step if determined upon. It looks as if matters were rapidly 
 coming to a Crisis and perhaps we may have to make the move 
 earlier than the middle of October. A great battle appeared by the 
 last accounts to be coming on. If Maclellan is badly defeated the 
 Federal Cause will be manifestly hopeless, if Jackson should sustain 
 a serious reverse he will be in a dangerous Position so far North 
 
24 
 
 and cut off from his supplies. But a few days will bring us impor- 
 tant accounts. 
 
 Palmerston then added the following significant intimation, 
 bearing more particularly upon the topics on which the Chan- 
 cellor of the Exchequer would presumably dwell: 
 
 I saw the other day that you are going to have some great dinner 
 given you in the early part of next month. I hope the Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer will not be too sympathizing with the Tax Payer, 
 nor tell the Country that they are paying too much taxation, have 
 too large Establishments, and ought to agitate to bring the House 
 of Commons and the Government to more economical ways and 
 habits. These topics suit best Cobden and Bright and their fol- 
 lowers. 
 
 The principle of the so-called "collectivity" of the British 
 Cabinet has been often discussed, and the rule is well estab- 
 lished that ministers are in no wise free to put forward each 
 "his own views at large public meetings and elsewhere." As 
 Lord Palmerston a few days later wrote to Clarendon, refer- 
 ring to Gladstone's Newcastle speech: "A minister, whether 
 speaking in or out of Parhament, ought to confine his remarks 
 to the past and the present, and to steer clear of the future, 
 unless he is authorized to announce the result of some Cabi- 
 net decision." ^ Now, in this case, no Cabinet decision had 
 been reached; nor, if it had been reached, would the pubKc 
 announcement of it have been committed to the Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer. It would have fallen within the province 
 of either the Foreign Secretary or the Premier. As it was, a 
 premature announcement from an unauthorized source pre- 
 cipitated something bearing a close resemblance to a Cabi- 
 net crisis, and, so far as the schemes of the Confederate 
 Commissioners and the French Emperor were concerned, fur- 
 nished a fresh illustration of the truth of Robert Burns's 
 familiar aphorism as respects the fate not seldom befalling 
 even the best-laid plans. 
 
 Tphe ministerial situation then existing needs here to be 
 understood, and has constantly to be borne in mind. The 
 Pabnerston-Russell Cabinet, so called, had been formed in 
 
 * Maxwell, Clarendon, ii. 267. 
 
25 
 
 June, 1859. The Premier, born in October, 1784, was then 
 in his seventy-fifth year. Earl Russell, his colleague in the 
 ministry and associate in its formation, was sixty-six. The 
 House of Commons was very evenly divided. The previous 
 government — that headed by Lord Derby, with Mr. Disraeli 
 as its leader in the Commons — had, as the result of an appeal 
 to the constituencies, been turned out of office by a majority 
 of thirteen only on a division numbering 638 members. Under 
 these circumstances the two leaders jointly responsible for 
 the new government had sought to combine in the Cabinet 
 representatives of all shades of Liberal principles. The result 
 was a body of exceptional abihty, but composed of men by 
 no means always concurrent in their opinions, or harmonious in 
 action. Mr. Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer; and 
 that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 were not in general harmony was well known in ministerial 
 circles. On the contrary. Lord Palmerston disHked and ha- 
 bitually thwarted Mr. Gladstone; and Mr. Gladstone instinc- 
 tively distrusted Lord Palmerston. So far did this go that the 
 two had, a year before the time in question, been ''in violent 
 antagonism" on financial propositions. Lord Granville, him- 
 self a member of the Cabinet, had informed a correspondent: 
 *'For two months Gladstone had been on half-cock of resigna- 
 tion. . . . Palmerston has tried him hard once or twice by 
 speeches and Cabinet minutes, and says that the only way to 
 deal with him is to bully him a little; and Palmerston appears 
 to be in the right." To the same effect Bright had then written 
 to Cobden: ''Gladstone has been in a painful and critical posi- 
 tion ; from day to day it has been doubtful if he could remain 
 under a leader who has used him so treacherously." This 
 referred to the Premier's characteristic action in procuring the 
 defeat in the Lords of Gladstone's bill repealing the Paper 
 Duties. Then, the next year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 had countered on the Premier by incorporating this measure of 
 repeal in the Budget, and so compelling its passage by the Lords. 
 A species of Cabinet modus vivendi was then arrived at, and 
 had since been more or less observed; but the two men were 
 by nature antagonistic. Built on wholly different models, 
 they were, to use the Italian expression, constitutionally an- 
 tipatica. Palmerston was indisputably old; Gladstone, a man 
 
26 
 
 of fifty-four, was in the full maturity of his great powers. 
 His star was looming large in the Parliamentary heavens — 
 distinctly in the ascendant. One competitor only, Sir George 
 Cornewall Lewis, could challenge prospective leadership with 
 him. 
 
 Of Lewis something must here be said, for at a most critical 
 juncture for us — that now under consideration — he was a 
 vital political factor. A man of marked individuality and 
 great force, Lewis temperamentally appealed to Palmerston. 
 Though very differently constituted, the two men got on to- 
 gether. Lewis had himself been Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 in Palmerston's previous ministry (1856-1857), and had then 
 won the confidence of the House of Commons. In the debate 
 on the Budget he had introduced, he successfully withstood 
 the combined attacks of both Gladstone and Disraeli. In fact, 
 the rise of Lewis in parliamentary estimate had been as marked 
 as it was rapid. Later, on the formation of the Palmers ton- 
 Russell government, he had yielded precedence to Gladstone, 
 who became Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lewis accepting the 
 less considered positions, first of Home Secretary, and then 
 (1861) of Secretary for War. He is described by Sir Spencer 
 Walpole, who spoke with personal knowledge, as being without 
 the imagination which attracts attention or the eloquence which 
 commands it, but as having knowledge, ability and judgment. 
 Thus his temperament, Walpole further adds, made him a 
 power in the Cabinet; and, though it procured him Kttle or 
 no notice in the country at large, won for him the respect of 
 the Commons. In the House he was regarded as one of the 
 few men who might possibly in the not remote future preside 
 over the fortunes of the country.^ Palmerston, though still 
 vigorous, must, it was obvious, soon pass from the stage. With 
 him also were to go both a generation and a political system — 
 the generation of Castlereagh, Wellington, Melbourne and 
 Peel, and the system of ministerial government which had 
 grown into acceptance through the working of the Reform Act 
 of 1832 — a transition system based on a species of equilib- 
 rium attempted between a reformed House of Commons on 
 the one side and an hereditary Chamber of Peers on the other. 
 This system had, with more or less success, served its pur- 
 
 i Twenty-five Years, i. 74. 
 
27 
 
 pose through the Ufe-time of a generation; but, in 1862, mani- 
 festly antiquated, it no longer worked in reasonable harmony 
 with existing conditions, social and industrial. It was, there- 
 fore generally accepted that, with Palmerston gone, a drastic 
 constitutional revision would be in order, and mevitable. 
 The leadership would then go to younger men, and either to 
 Gladstone or to Lewis; and Palmerston, it was well under- 
 stood, favored the latter. So far as was in his power he 
 designated Lewis as his residuary ministerial legatee. But 
 this arrangement, if in any degree practicable, was made im- 
 possible by the premature and altogether unexpected death 
 of Lewis on April 13, 1863 - only six months after the occur- 
 rence of the events now under consideration. It was prooa- 
 bly then that Pahnerston, reading the future not mcorrectly, 
 had been heard to say: "Gladstone will soon have it all his 
 own way; and whenever he gets my place we shall have 
 strange doings." ' Meanwhile in the closing months 01 862 
 Lewis was still alive; and Palmerston, so to speak, held the 
 fort. As between him and Gladstone, it was a case of armed 
 Cabinet observation. _ , , -r, , 
 
 Under these circumstances the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 had in the autumn gone on what proved to be a sort_ of 
 triumphal political progress through the northern counties. 
 Surprising even him by its manifestations, it amounted to a 
 popular ovation; and, not unnaturally, his colleagues, espe- 
 cially his chief, took cognizance of it. Suddenly in course 
 of it, came the highly sensational and quite uncalled for utter- 
 ance on the American situation, then the foremost topic m 
 the pubUc mind. From his long-subsequent pubUshed diary 
 entries, it appears that what Mr. Gladstone there said was no 
 hasty, impromptu, dinner-table utterance; it had, on the con- 
 trary, been, as he thought, carefully considered. The mference 
 appears to be unavoidable. In taking such a course, and 
 committing his colleagues as well as himself by his utterances 
 Mr. Gladstone, as a member of the Government, spoke with 
 a purpose; but that purpose was not distinctly apparent at the 
 time, nor has the mystery since been satisfactorily explained 
 A momentous utterance, Mr. Gladstone himself afterward 
 referred to it as "an error the most singular and palpable. 
 
 'Trevelyan, BrisM, 344. 
 
28 
 
 Lord Morley in his Life (ii. 79), plainly puzzled, says that it 
 was ''a great mistake ... of which [Gladstone] was destined 
 never to hear the last." Thirty years later Gladstone him- 
 self wrote — ^'This declaration [was] most unwarrantable 
 to be made by a minister of the crown with no authority other 
 than his own. . . . The fortunes of the South were at their 
 zenith. Many who wished well to the Northern cause despaired 
 of its success. The friends of the North in England were begin- 
 ning to advise that it should give way, for the avoidance of 
 further bloodshed and greater calamity. I weakly supposed 
 that the time had come when respectful suggestions of this 
 kind, founded on the necessity of the case, were required by a 
 spirit of that friendship which, in so many contingencies of 
 life, has to offer sound recommendations with a knowledge that 
 they will not be popular." (11. 81.) 
 
 I have heretofore, and recently at Oxford, thought to account 
 for this Newcastle utterance upon an hypothesis which I 
 am now satisfied is untenable. I reasoned as follows: Mr. 
 Gladstone was famihar with the mental processes and pol- 
 itical methods of his official chief. He was also deeply inter- 
 ested after his own fashion in the proposed change of poHcy 
 as respects the United States; hence it is not unfair to surmise 
 that the Chancellor of the Exchequer suspected that, for reasons 
 presently to be considered, the Premier's mind and purpose as 
 respects the proposed change of poHcy were less clearly as- 
 sured than had at first been the case, or than his colleague 
 thought desirable. As matter of fact, considering the thing 
 from a ministerial and parHamentary point of view, Palmer- 
 ston had really begun to entertain grave doubts as to the tac- 
 tical wisdom of the proposed move. Subsequently as. the result 
 of much self-communing, Gladstone came to the conclusion 
 that it would be well, if possible, to force the hand of his Chief, 
 thus assuring the action which seemed under the circumstances, 
 highly desirable. This ^'forcing-the-hand" historical hy- 
 pothesis I now find myself compelled to abandon. While, so 
 far as Palmerston and his subsequent action are concerned, 
 inconsistent with the record since come to light, it does in- 
 justice to Mr. Gladstone. My reasons for coming to this con- 
 clusion I shall presently set forth; meanwhile, on the other 
 hand, I was not without both plausible evidence and apparent 
 
29 
 
 authority for reaching and stating the earlier conclusions just 
 referred to. As an illustration of erroneous historical infer- 
 ence the story will bear telling. 
 
 Two writers, both men of judgment and enjoying access to 
 the most reliable sources of information, had expressed them- 
 selves on this head. Sir Spencer Walpole, the biographer of 
 Earl Russell, says that Mr. Gladstone's Newcastle decla- 
 ration "was so inconvenient" that ''Lord Palmerston sent 
 for Sir George Cornewall Lewis, and told him that if he [Sir 
 George] did not reply to Mr. Gladstone, it would be necessary 
 for him [the Premier] to do so himself." ^ To the same effect 
 but in language far stronger, Mr. Henry Adams wrote: ''Glad- 
 stone, October 7, tried to force Palmerston's hand by treating 
 the intervention as a fait accompli. Russell assented, but 
 Palmerston put up Sir George Cornewall Lewis to contradict 
 Gladstone and treated him sharply in the press. . . . Never 
 in the history of pohtical turpitude had any brigand of modern 
 civilisation offered a worse example [than that offered by 
 Gladstone on this occasion]. The proof of it was that it out^^ y 
 raged even Palmerston, who immediately put up Sir George^ 
 Cornewall Lewis to repudiate the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
 against whom he turned his press at the same time. Palm- 
 erston had no notion of letting his hand be forced by 
 Gladstone." ^ 
 
 Relying on these authorities and drawing natural mferences 
 and obvious conclusions from certain undisputed data, in my 
 Oxford Lectures and elsewhere I attributed to the Cabinet 
 situation just described a greater influence on the turn of 
 events than correctly belonged to it. I said: "The hesitation 
 and postponement brought about by Lord Pahnerston m 
 consequence of Mr. Gladstone's Newcastle speech thus saved 
 the [American] situation." Undoubtedly the Newcastle ut- 
 terance, and its reception by other members of the ministry 
 as well as by the Premier, did exercise an influence, and a 
 not inconsiderable influence, on the policy subsequently de- 
 cided upon and pursued; but more recent investigation in 
 unpublished material, combined with new light from printed 
 sources, clearly shows that this influence was not so altogether 
 
 1 Twenty-five Years, 11. 57- 
 
 2 Education of Henry Adatns, 136, 140. 
 
30 
 
 controlling as I had inferred. It certainly did not operate in 
 the way, nor altogether through the channels, my authorities 
 had indicated. The Premier did at the time express himself 
 decidedly, though with no indications of a rufHed temper, as 
 to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's indiscreet and highly 
 ''inconvenient" utterances; but, on the other hand, it is not 
 clear that he sent for Lewis, or imposed on him the function 
 of a reply. In fact, it would appear he had no occasion so 
 to do. Lewis was apparently quite ready to take action on 
 his own part. It is to be borne in mind that it was now 
 Autumn — the British vacation period. Parliament was not 
 in session; the Queen was in Germany; the members of the 
 Cabinet were scattered. Most of them were in the country, 
 for the shooting season was on; some few of them only were at 
 their offices. Lord Pahnerston was in the South of England, 
 at Broadlands; Lewis was in Wales, at his country home. 
 
 Our knowledge of what took place is thus derived chiefly 
 from newspaper columns and such of the private letters then 
 exchanged as have since chanced to appear in the numerous 
 memoirs of the public characters concerned. It thence ap- 
 pears that the proposed change of policy outlined in the me- 
 morial of the Foreign Secretary of October 13 had been matter 
 of serious consideration with certain members of the Cabinet; 
 and this almost from the moment it had been agreed upon by 
 the ''two ancient masters," as in famiHar correspondence Palm- 
 erston and Russell were not over-respectfully designated 
 by their associates. Palmerston, moreover, had especially re- 
 quested Earl Russell to inform the Duke of Newcastle. The 
 head of the Colonial Office, Newcastle, as such, was interested 
 in a change of policy which obviously and deeply concerned 
 Canada. Inasmuch as Lord Granville was now in attendance 
 upon the Queen at Gotha, and her mental condition, though 
 not openly discussed, was well understood, he also had to be 
 advised; for, as Mason, the Confederate commissioner in 
 London, about this time wrote to Mr. Hunter, the Confederate 
 Secretary of State, "It is said that [the Queen] is under great 
 constitutional depression and nervously sensitive to anything 
 that looks like war." Much apprehension was in fact then 
 felt lest she "lapse into insania." ^ There is at this stage of 
 
 * Mason, Life of Mason, 264, 315. 
 
31 
 
 developments no indication whatever, in the letters of Granville 
 or in the other correspondence come to Hght, of any further 
 exercise of influence by the Queen or of consideration paid her. 
 Directly or indirectly, she nowhere appears as a factor in the 
 situation. Granville, however, in reply to the intimation con- 
 veyed him, wrote, under date of September 27, 1862, a detailed 
 letter to the Foreign Secretary, in which he set forth the reasons 
 why he considered it ^'premature to depart from the policy 
 which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord Palmerston, 
 and which notwithstanding the strong antipathy to the North, 
 the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish 
 to have cotton, has met with such general approval from Parlia- 
 ment, the press and the public."^ Russell also now received a 
 letter from Lewis, in which strong ground was taken against 
 the change of policy proposed. These letters Russell, im- 
 mediately on their receipt, forwarded to Palmerston, who wrote 
 back, October 2, admitting that he had found in them much 
 matter for serious consideration. It was at this date, there- 
 fore, and in consequence of these letters, that doubts as to the 
 expediency of the course agreed upon seem first to have entered 
 into the mind of the Premier. 
 
 It was still five days before Mr. Gladstone dehvered him- 
 self at Newcastle. In view of the proposed demonstration 
 there. Lord Palmerston had written (September 24) to Glad- 
 stone, the letter already referred to, and from which extracts 
 have been given. The next day, Thursday, September 25th, 
 Gladstone replied by a missive marked ''Private," written 
 from Hawarden Castle. In it he expressed himself as glad 
 to hear what the Premier had told him, and further went on to 
 say that he, for two reasons, desired prompt action on the 
 Knes indicated. First, the rapid progress of the Confederate 
 arms threatened, in his apprehension, to raise other very seri- 
 ous difficulties. His chief reason, however, for desiring that 
 there should be as little delay as possible in deciding upon the 
 proposed change of policy was next given as follows: ''The 
 population of Lancashire have borne their sufferings with a 
 fortitude and patience exceeding all example, and almost all 
 belief. But if in any one of the great towns, resignation should, 
 even for a single day, give place to excitement, and an outbreak 
 
 1 Fitzmaurice, Granville, i. 442. 
 
32 
 
 should occur, our position in the face of America, and our in- 
 fluence for good might be seriously affected; we might then 
 seem to be interfering with less of dignity on the ground of our 
 immediate interests, and rather in the attitude of parties 
 than as representing the general interests of humanity and 
 peace." ^ 
 
 Up to this point, therefore (Thursday, September 25), 
 the two men were in complete accord on the question under 
 consideration. It was seven days later (October 2), and 
 five days before the Newcastle speech (Tuesday, October 7) 
 that the Premier, in consequence of the letters forwarded 
 to him by Russell, began to waver in his conclusions. News 
 oi the battle of Antietam had reached England on the 26th 
 
 - of September, the day following Gladstone's acknowledg- 
 ment of Palmerston's letter, in which acknowledgment allusion 
 had also been made to the *' rapid progress of the Southern 
 arms and the extension of the [American] area of Southern 
 feeling." There is no indication of any further exchange of 
 letters at this juncture, or that any intimation reached Glad- 
 stone of the change of heart which Palmerston was expe- 
 riencing. The methods and language of the Premier towards 
 him both then and later were altogether courteous and con- 
 ciHatory; and, so far from evincing any hard feeling because 
 of the Newcastle indiscretion, as late as October 12 — five 
 days after Gladstone had compromised himself and the Minis- 
 try — Palmerston wrote from Broadlands to Russell in Lon- 
 don as follows: "It is clear that Gladstone was not far wrong 
 in pronouncing by anticipation the national independence of 
 the South." 
 
 The sensation following the Newcastle utterance was im- 
 mediate and profound. Jefferson Davis, the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer had declared, had made a nation; the independence 
 of the Confederacy was as assured as was possible for a thing 
 to be which was in a degree still future and contingent. All 
 the world took it to mean that the government was about to 
 recognize the Confederacy ; the market for cotton and for cotton 
 . textiles was thrown into doubt, and uncertainty still further 
 
 j disturbed a trade already in a condition of direst confusion. 
 Orders were countermanded; the price of the raw material 
 * Gladstone Papers, Ms. i. 73. 
 
33 
 
 was seriously depressed. Moreover, large interests did not now 
 want to have the war brought to a close, and made known 
 their objection to any change of poHcy. Mr. McHenry in his 
 ^'Statement of Facts" says that he was ^'an eye-witness to this 
 procedure," taking it upon himself-'to assure the Enghsh pubHc 
 that, whatever change of poKcy might be agreed upon, the 
 South was in no position to ''deluge" the European market 
 with cotton. To the same effect, Mr. Mason, a local manu- 
 facturing magnate, assured the Lancashire men that they 
 had been needlessly terrified ''by that bugbear" of "American 
 cotton at this moment shut up, while any mail might bring 
 news in consequence of which four milKon bales would be let 
 loose upon Manchester like a deluge." The speaker, however, 
 at the same time took occasion pointedly to deprecate "the lan- 
 guage which had been used by men in high position in this country 
 with respect to the prospect of the duration of this war." 
 
 Under such circumstances, Gladstone, realizing the false- 
 ness of the position into which he had got himself, framed a 
 form of reply, disclaiming responsibility for the various infer- 
 ences drawn from his language; and this disclaimer, which, as 
 Morley says, was couched "in phrases that justly provoked 
 plain men to wrath," Gladstone sent to the Foreign Secretary, 
 with a request that he would transmit it to his (Gladstone's) 
 private secretary, to be made public use of by him as one 
 acting under instructions. This Russell did, at the same time 
 advising Gladstone that in the Foreign Secretary's opinion the 
 Chancellor of the Exchequer had, in what he said at Newcastle, 
 "gone beyond the latitude which all speakers must be allowed. 
 Recognition," Russell added, "would seem to follow, and for 
 that step I think the Cabinet is not prepared." ^ A similar 
 disclaimer was sent by Gladstone to the Premier. This was 
 prior to October 20. If anything further now passed between 
 Palmerston and Gladstone, it has not come to light. But on 
 the 20th Lord Palmerston did write to Lord Clarendon, who 
 at this time acted as a sort of mutual friend or convenient 
 pohtical intermediary, commenting adversely on Gladstone's 
 utterances.^ This, however, he did without any indication of 
 temper or of a serious taking of offence. 
 The utterances of the press have next to be taken into con- 
 * Morley, Life of Gladstone, n. 80. ^ Maxwell, Clarendon, 11. 267. 
 
34 
 
 sideration, for two metropolitan papers at least — the Times 
 and the Post — were looked upon as inspired.^ The Times, in 
 its issue of October 9, referred editorially to the Newcastle 
 speech, but commented upon it in no unfriendly tone. An 
 explanation of Gladstone's language was found in ''the warmth 
 of his feeling" and ''his readiness of speech." The following 
 day it again referred to the speech, treating it as equivalent to 
 a governmental decision. A strange silence then ensued, 
 Delane, the editor, apparently sharing in the indecision of the 
 Premier. This continued until November 13, when the paper 
 came out with strong editorial approval of the Cabinet's re- 
 jection of the mediation proposed. Meanwhile, the Post, 
 currently supposed in well-informed London circles to be the 
 more direct organ of the Premier, at the time of its delivery 
 reported Gladstone's speech in full, but made no editorial 
 comment upon it until October 13. It was then most comph- 
 mentary to the Chancellor oT the Exchequer, speaking with 
 laudation of the general results of his triumphal northern 
 tour, but refraining from reference to American affairs. In 
 pursuing this course, it seems to have reflected what was pass- 
 ing in the Premier's mind; but at last, on the 21st, there ap- 
 peared an editorial sharply criticising Gladstone as a minister 
 altogether too ready to speak about Cabinet matters.^ The 
 letter of the same date from Palmerston to Lord Clarendon 
 would seem to indicate that this editorial was very directly 
 inspired. The mind of the Premier was becoming clear as to 
 the course now proper to be pursued; but, so far as Gladstone 
 is concerned, there are no indications of resentment. 
 
 Sir George Cornewall Lewis enters at this point upon the 
 
 1 "It became tolerably clear to me [by October 13] that Mr. Gladstone had 
 been expressing his individual opinions, and giving loose to his personal sym- 
 pathy with the chief of the rebels, whilst his course was regarded by several of 
 his colleagues as transcending the line of policy formerly agreed upon at the time 
 of their dispersion for the summer. The first public indication of this took the 
 shape of an informal notice in the Globe, an evening newspaper professing neu- 
 trality in our struggle, and occasionally used for that reason to express ofi&cial 
 opinions, which, not without a Uttle sharpness towards Mr. Gladstone, drew a 
 clear line between him and the ministry in regard to the sentiments in his speech." 
 Adams to Seward, October 17, 1862. Messages and Documents, 1862-63, Part I, 
 221. 
 
 2 The editorial reflected also on Lewis for his speech of October 4, though 
 not in so severe terms. 
 
35 
 
 stage, as the controlling Cabinet factor. What actuated 
 Lewis does not clearly appear. Tn the language already 
 quoted, Sir Spencer Walpole asserts that Palmerston sent 
 for Sir George Cornewall Lewis, and told him that "if he [Sir 
 George] did not reply to Mr. Gladstone, it would be necessary 
 for him [the Premier] to do so himself." Lord Morley in his 
 Life of Gladstone says that "a week after the dehverance at 
 Newcastle, Lewis at Lord Palmerston's request, as I have 
 heard, put things right in a speech at Hereford." The issue 
 of the London Daily Telegraph of more than forty years after- 
 wards — as late, in fact, as October 24, 1908 — contained a com- 
 munication relating to what now occurred. Referring to 
 Gladstone's Newcastle utterance, the writer, evidently well 
 informed in a general way, speaks of it as 
 
 a striking attempt by an individual minister to force the hand of 
 the Cabinet by a public declaration. Four members — Sir George 
 Lewis, Mr. Milner-Gibson, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Villiers — 
 were vehemently opposed to any change in the policy of strict neu- 
 trality. Lord Palmerston kept his own counsel, with a view of 
 holding the Cabinet together, but was generally supposed to sym- 
 pathise with the Southern States. The ill-considered language and 
 conduct of Mr. Gladstone caused great indignation. ... A few 
 days afterwards the four ministers to whom we have alluded [Sir 
 George Lewis, Mr. Milner-Gibson, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Vil- 
 liers] each received a note from Lord Palmerston, asking them to 
 call and see him half an hour before the Cabinet Council, which had 
 been specially convened. Two of these have described the interview 
 to the writer of this letter. When they met. Lord Palmerston told 
 them, to their astonishment, that he entirely agreed with them, and 
 charged Sir George Cornewall Lewis then and there to go down to 
 his constituents in the Radnor Boroughs and in the name of the 
 Government practically repudiate the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
 Lord Palmerston added that, if this were not done, he would an- 
 nounce at the meeting of the Cabinet the resignation of the Govern- 
 ment. Lewis consented. His measured and sober repudiation of 
 Mr. Gladstone produced a great sensation. 
 
 I do not vouch for the authenticity of this statement. Evi- 
 dently written from recollection of occurrences and conversa- 
 tions long passed, it is certainly inaccurate in many essential 
 respects. None the less, it has significance as confirmatory 
 of what is asserted or impHed by both Walpole and Morley. 
 
36 
 
 It at least shows the general prevalence of a tradition and an 
 historic understanding in quarters otherwise well informed. 
 The intimate correspondence of Sir George Lewis with Lord 
 Clarendon does not reveal any allusion to such a conference, 
 or to any such mission imposed upon Lewis. On the contrary, 
 judging by the letters in Maxwell's Life of Clarendon, and by 
 those in other collections which I have been privileged to con- 
 sult, it would be distinctly inferred that, so far as Sir George 
 Lev/is was concerned, nothing of the sort described had ever 
 taken place. Apparently, Lewis acted upon his own judgment 
 and motion; and at a later day Lord Palmers ton unquestion- 
 ably intimated in a letter to Clarendon that the Hereford 
 speech was open in some degree to the criticism which had 
 been expressed on Gladstone's utterance at Newcastle.^ 
 
 Assuming, therefore, that Lewis now acted in the way he did 
 upon his own initiative, the question next naturally arises — 
 What led him so to do? Was he, as the expression then went, 
 a ''friend of the North"? Did he sympathize with the anti- 
 slavery feeling, and take action accordingly? Nothing ap- 
 pears which would lead to an assumption that such was the 
 case. On the contrary, as Morley -points out, Lewis in 1861 
 used language of characteristic coolness about our Civil War. 
 ''It is," he wrote, "the most singular action for the restitution 
 of conjugal rights that the world ever heard of." And again, 
 "The Northern States have been drifted, or rather plunged, 
 into v/ar without having any intelligible aim or policy. The 
 South fight for independence; but what do the North fight for 
 except to gratify passion or pride?" ^ Was he then actuated 
 by an unworthy jealousy of a colleague, who had replaced him 
 as Chancellor of the Exchequer? and did this feehng lead him 
 to an outspoken hostile expression? This, however, was dis- 
 tinctly not characteristic of the man. Lewis had Character. 
 But he and Gladstone, though the latter also had Character, 
 were not sympathetic. Lewis was an uncommonly level- 
 headed man; of a judicial turn of mind; calm, clear and cou- 
 rageous, he seems never to have hesitated to express himself, 
 always, however, soberly and in a way indicative of thought. 
 There could not consequently have been much close sympathy 
 between him and Gladstone, a man influenced by fervor, and 
 
 1 Clarendon, n. 267. 2 Morley, 11. 84 n. 
 
37 
 
 subject to what can best be described as moments and even 
 periods of cerebral exaltation. Gladstone's Newcastle utter- 
 ances, though at the time, as he thought, well considered, 
 were, there can be little question, largely attributable to im- 
 pulse. He sympathized deeply and acutely with the Lanca- 
 shire suffering. It appealed to him. He was also fully 
 persuaded that the North was carrying on a hopeless struggle. 
 He so expressed himself. Lewis, on the other hand, was 
 otherwise-minded; but both his attitude and utterances at 
 this juncture bear marks of conviction. They are those of a 
 pubhc-spirited minister, weighing considerations calmly, with 
 a view to action on grounds which would bear examination. It 
 would seem as if he did not propose to have the government of 
 which he was a member swayed by authority or unduly in- 
 fluenced by a "phalanx" of colleagues, no matter how '^ formi- 
 dable," or to what degree reinforced. Accordingly, whether 
 induced so to do by the Premier or acting on his own initiative, 
 he thus, on October 14, a week after Gladstone's speech at 
 Newcastle, expressed himself at Hereford: 
 
 Everybody who read the accounts in the newspapers of what was 
 doing in America could see that although there was a war between 
 these two contending Powers, it was a war which was as yet un- 
 decided — a war which was waged on the part of the Northern 
 States for the purpose of restoring the States to the condition of 
 union they were in before the war began; and on the part of the 
 Southern States a war to establish their independence. But the 
 war must be admitted to be undecided. Under such circumstances, 
 the time had not yet arrived when it could be asserted in accord- 
 ance with the established doctrines of international law that the 
 independence of the Southern States had been established.^ 
 
 The matter did not end here. Only the day before Sir 
 George Lewis expressed himself at Hereford, Earl Russell 
 had circulated his "confidential memorandum." Three days> 
 later, October 17, Sir George sent out a counter-memorandum 
 in reply to that of Earl Russell. The memorandum, Kkewise 
 confidentially addressed to his colleagues of the Cabinet, was 
 elaborate. In it he expressed himself even more explicitly 
 than at Hereford. This paper has as yet never seen the light. 
 Though important in itself, especially to American writers, 
 
 1 The London Post, October 16, 1862. 
 
38 
 
 and illuminative as to conditions then prevailing in Great 
 Britain, it is too long to be given here in full. It ends, how- 
 ever, with the following expression: 
 
 Every friend of humanity must wish that this disastrous and san- 
 guinary war should be brought to a speedy termination. Every 
 person who believes that it must terminate, sooner or later, in the 
 independence of the Southern States, must desire to see that in- 
 dependence recognized at an early period. Every person who 
 sympathizes with the distress of the Lancashire operatives must 
 wish that the ordinary trade in cotton with the Gulf States should 
 be re-estabUshed. But, looking to the probable consequences of 
 this philanthropic proposition, we may doubt whether the chances 
 of evil do not preponderate over the chances of good, and whether 
 it is not 
 
 Better to endure the ills we have, 
 Than fly to others that we know not of. 
 
 Copies of both memoranda were sent to Lord Palmers ton, 
 also to Lord Clarendon. From the former nothing, so far as 
 is known, was eHcited. The comments of the latter were, 
 however, truly edifying. He characterized the position of Earl 
 Russell as "idiotic" — one in which he presented 
 
 our face gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive. We 
 have not yet recognized the Southern States (whose independ- 
 ence is 2i fait accompli, whatever may be said to the contrary), be- 
 cause it is not our interest to quarrel with the North; and we sub- 
 mit to great privations, because it is our policy to remain neutral, 
 and not because we doubt the utter inability of the North to impose 
 its yoke again upon the South. The French, who have no such fears 
 about a quarrel with the North, have long since thought that the 
 time was come for recognizing the South, and they would have done 
 so if they had not been restrained by deference to our wishes and 
 interests. ^ 
 
 In thus expressing himself. Clarendon did but echo the con- 
 clusion then generally accepted by those recognized as leaders 
 of both pohtical parties — those looking to Lord Derby for 
 guidance and those led by Palmerston, The Saturday Review 
 w^as a free journaHstic lance, with pronounced ''governing 
 class" views. Referring to the Newcastle utterance, the Satur- 
 
 ^ Clarendon, n. 266. 
 
39 
 
 day Review now voiced the prevailing belief of Court, Aris- 
 tocracy, Army and Navy, no less than that of the Street as 
 well as ParHament. *'We did not," it contemptuously and 
 characteristically said, ''need a Cabinet Minister to tell us, 
 what all who possess even the most elementary acquaintance 
 with passing events in America have known for more than 
 half a year, that the independence of the Southern States is 
 an accompHshed fact, nor does it become one whit more an 
 accompHshed fact by the circumstance of Mr. Gladstone's 
 announcement. ' ' 
 
 The English situation as it then existed not only as respects 
 Sir George Lewis but also as respects Lord Palmer ston, the 
 members of the Ministry and the members of the press, cannot, 
 however, be fully understood without taking into account the 
 letters signed ''Historicus," at this time appearing in the 
 columns of the Times. "Historicus," as was already well 
 known, was merely the newspaper nom de plume of Mr. 
 WilHam Vernon Harcourt, subsequently distinguished in 
 public life, but then a rising young man of thirty-five. Har- 
 court's relations with Sir George Lewis were of the closest 
 character, for in November, 1859, he had married Lewis's 
 step-daughter, who was also Lord Clarendon's niece. A 
 man of great ability, incisive style, and masterful disposition, 
 young Harcourt was applying himself to problems of inter- 
 national law. In common with every one else, deeply inter- 
 ested in the international aspects of the American struggle he 
 now contributed a series of letters to the London Times. 
 These at the moment attracted much public attention, and 
 upon them his subsequent reputation was based. He unques- 
 tionably set forth in those letters the conclusions reached as 
 a result of frequent and famiHar discussion with both Sir 
 George Lewis and Lord Clarendon. Subsequently (1863) pub- 
 lished in pamphlet form, in the preface to the publication 
 Harcourt makes a reference to the "great events which are 
 rending to pieces the entrails of America, and agitating to its 
 inmost core the mind of Europe." In the first of these com- 
 munications, referring to the Hereford speech, ''Historicus," 
 speaking manifestly by authority, says: *'The position in- 
 sisted upon by Sir G. C. Lewis seems to have been much 
 misunderstood by those who have criticised his doctrine. He 
 
40 . 
 
 is supposed to have maintained that England would not be 
 entitled to recognize the Southern Confederacy until the 
 Federalists had previously done so. But the Secretary of War 
 is far too accurate a thinker and speaker to have laid down 
 any such doctrine. The rule he propounded was precisely 
 that acted upon by Mr. Canning in the case of the South 
 American Republics, viz., that where a doubtful and bona 
 fide struggle for supremacy is still maintained by the Sover- 
 eign power, the insurgents jam flagrante hello cannot be said 
 to have estabhshed a de facto independence." He then goes 
 on as follows; setting forth in clear and forcible language the 
 correct rule of international law: 
 
 As far, then, as any practical rule can be deduced from historical 
 examples it seems to be this — When a sovereign State, from ex- 
 haustion or any other cause, has virtually and substantially aban- 
 doned the struggle for supremacy it has no right to complain if a for- 
 eign State treat the independence of its former subjects as de facto 
 established; nor can it prolong its sovereignty by a mere paper 
 assertion of right. When, on the other hand, the contest is not 
 absolutely or permanently decided, a recognition of the inchoate 
 independence of the insurgents by a foreign State is a hostile act 
 towards the sovereign State which the latter is entitled to resent 
 as a breach of neutrality and friendship. The true rule is that 
 laid down in the old distich. Rebellion, until it has succeeded, is 
 Treason; when it is successful, it becomes Independence. And thus 
 the only real test of independence is final success. 
 
 He concludes as follows : 
 
 Yet if we are to mediate, it can only be by urging some plan 
 which we approve. What is that solution of the negro question 
 to which an English Government is prepared to aflSx the seal of 
 English approbation? If the combatants settle the question for 
 themselves, we can accept the result, whatever it may be, and 
 however little we may approve it, without responsibility. If the 
 matter is to be negotiated through our mediation, we must lend 
 our moral sanction to the settlement at which we assist. There 
 are many things which we cannot help, but there are some things 
 with which it were wise to have nothing to do. And to this latter 
 category I venture to think most eminently belongs the definition 
 of that permanent line of demarcation which must, no doubt, one 
 day separate the Slave from the Free States of America. 
 
41 
 
 So far as sympathy was concerned, the feeling then enter- 
 tained by Sir George Lewis and Lord Clarendon is probably 
 not incorrectly mirrored in the following extract from a sub- 
 sequent communication of ^'Historicus" to the Times: 
 
 Is there any man so sanguine as to hope that the end of this busi- 
 ness is to be the extinction of slavery? But, if not, are we. to be- 
 come the virtual guarantors for its security? To my mind, in the 
 one word "slavery" is comprehended a perpetual bar to the notion 
 of English mediation as between the North and the South; a bar 
 to amicable mediation, because it would be futile; to forcible inter- 
 vention, because it would be immoral. Shallow and inexperienced 
 observers may suppose that English opinion has undergone a revolu- 
 tion on the subject of slavery. It is true that the English public 
 has been revolted by the insincerity and hypocrisy of Northern 
 politicians on this question. We have seen through the cant by 
 which political capital has been manufactured out of a great cause; 
 but, on the true merits of the question itself, I believe the con- 
 victions of the English people to be wholly unchanged. It is my 
 firm persuasion that there is no sentiment more deeply rooted in 
 the conscience of the nation than the abhorrence of the principles 
 and practice of that which is called in the South "the peculiar 
 institution," but which in England we know by the more straight- 
 forward name of "negro slavery." If we refuse to become the 
 dupes of Northern insincerity, we are equally determined not to 
 make ourselves the abettors of Southern iniquity. A joint media- 
 tion, involving the settlement of this question, would practically 
 place our honour in the hands of our copartners in the intervention. 
 We might find ourselves placed in a position in which it would be 
 equally difficult to advance with credit or retire with safety. Yet 
 any administration, which should compromise the character of 
 England in a cause for which she has encountered so many sacrifices, 
 would make a fatal and inexcusable mistake. 
 
 The foregoing extracts from the letters of ^'Historicus"^ 
 probably set forth clearly and correctly the considerations which 
 
 1 The letters of "Historicus" afford excellent reading even now, fifty years 
 after their appearance in the columns of the Times. They foreshadow the sub- 
 sequent parliamentary eminence of the writer. Throughout he evinces a mastery 
 of his subject, an incisiveness of utterance, and a freedom in the expression of 
 opinion distinctly refreshing. His comments, for instance, on what are known as 
 the "standard authorities" on principles of international law, in no way lacking 
 in clearness, will bear reproduction. 
 
 Of Hautefeuille's treatise he says: "For contempt of the existing code of 
 
42 
 
 actuated Sir George Lewis and others in regard to the struggle 
 then going on in America. They looked upon it as useless and 
 bloody, and considered the independence of the Confederacy 
 an accomplished fact. Only a question of time, they saw no 
 good reason for involving Great Britain in a conflict the out- 
 come of which was apparent and any participation in which 
 could result only in an indefinite war-expenditure, and inci- 
 dental injury to British commerce and mercantile marine 
 impossible of forecast or estimate. 
 
 Returning now to the course of events in October and 
 November, 1862, while, so far as is known, the Premier pre- 
 served the discreet silence incident to a strict neutrahty in 
 
 international law, for intrepidity in the misrepresentation of history, for audacity 
 of paradox, this ingenious speculator is without his equal, even in the modern 
 license of coxcombical jurisprudence. I can concede to M. Hautefeuille every- 
 thing except the title to originality. ... I have no hesitation in saying that, of 
 all treatises on this subject which have ever come under my notice, it is the most 
 inaccurate and the most unreliable that is anywhere extant. I think I am not 
 putting the case too high when I say that on any given point the presumption is 
 that the propositions which will be found to be laid down by M. Hautefeuille are 
 not only not the law, but are the exact reverse of the established law of nations." 
 
 Of Philhmore he next writes: "The recent work of Dr. Phillimore is a useful 
 compilation, in which, however, amidst the heterogeneous pile of indiscriminate 
 and undigested material, in which the good, bad, and indifferent is garnered 
 up with laborious impartiality, an inexperienced reader is not unlikely to lose 
 his way. It is a digest of opinions and authorities, rather than a scientific 
 disquisition, on the topics to which they refer. When I turned over the pages 
 of Dr. Phillimore's book, I confess it was with the confident expectation of 
 finding the unauthorized crotchet of M. Hautefeuille either scouted with the 
 brief contempt of which Wheaton thought it worthy, or, at least, disposed of 
 upon the clear authorities to some of which I have referred you. But what was 
 my astonishment — I will add my regret — to find that, so far from condemning 
 this monstrosity, Dr. Phillimore actually approves and adopts it!" 
 
 Where a contributor to a newspaper deals with English and French authorities 
 in this masterful manner, it is safe to assume that he would hardly evince much 
 respect for the law enunciated by Secretary Seward. Such is the case. In another 
 letter contributed to the Times "On the Affair of the Treftt," Mr. Vernon 
 Harcourt, as he then was, expressed himself as follows: "Mr. Seward 'trusts 
 that he has shown that the four persons who were taken from the Trent by 
 Captain Wilkes and their despatches were contraband of war.' This confidence 
 expressed by the American Secretary of State can only be founded on the as- 
 sumption that all the persons to whom his argument is addressed enjoy the same 
 ignorance of the elements of international law with which he himself rests so 
 abundantly satisfied. . . . The great maritime nations of England and France 
 cannot afford to have the leading principles of international law confounded 
 by the loose inaccuracies of Mr. Seward. They cannot suffer their trade to be em- 
 barrassed and their interests compromised by the American navy acting upon 
 instructions of which every line is a blunder." 
 
43 
 
 this conflict of Cabinet memoranda and Newcastle-Hereford 
 clash of policies, his next step was characteristic — almost 
 delightfully characteristic of the man and of the English 
 political methods of the period. 
 
 The Palmerston-Russell ministry held office by a somewhat 
 uncertain tenure through the silent acquiescence of a large 
 element in the ranks of the Conservatives, who recognized 
 in the Prime Minister one of themselves. The head of the 
 firm was accepted as a species of compromise; and it was 
 tacitly understood that, exceptional conditions and issues be- 
 ing allowed for, Palmerston would now remain in office as 
 long as he Hved; Russell was a different proposition. The 
 Premier appreciated the situation, and, holding further Par- 
 liamentary reform in abeyance on the one hand, on the other 
 he did not advocate a really aggressive foreign policy. As 
 respects America, his sympathies were with the South; but, as 
 to slavery, he was committed to the other side. The United 
 States he looked upon as a species of present international 
 nuisance and prospective danger; Democracy was an alto- 
 gether evil thing. The nuisance, he wished to see abated; 
 the evil thing was working out its natural results, so bringing 
 itself into world-wide disrepute. And this it was doing, now! 
 Lancashire was manifestly a temporary ill; the question of 
 cotton supply would, if let alone, settle itself. So, wily in his 
 ways, the Premier had recourse to the '' mutual friend"; he 
 wrote to Clarendon to sound Derby. 
 
 This Clarendon did, and the response was satisfactory.* 
 Derby told Clarendon that he had been constantly urged *'to 
 go in," as he expressed it, for mediation and recognition; but 
 had refused so to do on the ground that any action would 
 merely irritate the North without advancing the cause of the 
 South, or procuring a single bale of cotton. Clarendon then 
 added that Derby, without professing an opinion, said that 
 *'the recognition of the South would be of no benefit to Eng- 
 land unless we meant to sweep away the blockade, which 
 would be an act of hostility towards the North." This 
 "mutual-friend" illumination reached Palmerston some ten 
 days after Gladstone had delivered himself of his Newcastle 
 utterance, and nearly a week before the date assigned for the 
 * Clarendon, ii. 267. 
 
44 
 
 Cabinet meeting. Meanwhile, the news from America was of 
 an uncertain nature, and, probably, for that reason disappoint- 
 ing so far as Palmerston was concerned. He had hoped for a 
 decisive Confederate success; but the reports indicated Lee's 
 withdrawal again into Virginia. The Confederate aggressive 
 movement had come to an end; its clutch at Washington had 
 failed. Altogether, it was a highly mixed situation; and the 
 Premier was more and more besieged by doubt. 
 
 The members of the Cabinet were meanwhile reaching vari- 
 ous individual conclusions. Indications were not lacking that 
 the Foreign Secretary was annoyed both by Gladstone's pre- 
 mature utterance on the one side, and by Lewis's attitude of 
 aggressive opposition on the other. Yet the Hereford speech 
 and the subsequent confidential ''memorandum" would, if any- 
 thing, have seemed to confirm the Foreign Secretary in his 
 advocacy of mediation. He was irritated at this pronounced 
 inroad on his province.^ But all idea of recognition had been 
 dismissed. What he seems now to have aimed at was simply 
 an altogether non-committal tender of good offices — quite a 
 different thing ! To this the original more aggressive program 
 had been reduced. 
 
 The remaining members of the Cabinet were influenced by 
 various considerations. As representing Canada, the Duke 
 of Newcastle, Colonial Secretary, advocated delay. With 
 winter impending, he evidently felt no inchnation to renew 
 the activities of the Trent excitement period of the previous 
 year, including its movement of troops, suppKes, etc., to 
 Canada. There was also an element in the Cabinet, consisting, 
 as already mentioned, of the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Milner- 
 Gibson, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Villiers, pronouncedly in 
 sympathy with the national government, or ''the North," as 
 the National and Union side to the struggle was always des- 
 ignated. As already pointed out, Mr. Milner- Gibson, in close 
 sympathy with the Bright-Cobden pohtical element, and, in 
 fact, its representative in the Cabinet, not improbably consti- 
 tuted a convenient medium of communication for Mr. Adams' 
 friend, Mr. W. E. Forster, Thus, as time passed, the Premier 
 became satisfied that the majority of those composing the 
 Cabinet, on general principles inclined strongly to sympa- 
 * Clarendon, n. 266. 
 
45 
 
 thize with the South, were distinctly averse to any imme- 
 diate change of poKcy. The perturbation of the cotton mar- 
 ket, as respects both textiles and raw material has already 
 been referred to; and now not without reason, the City was 
 nervous. At just that time, the Alabama was playing havoc 
 with the American commercial marine,^ incidentally illustrating 
 for the benefit of Lloyd's the inconveniences in possible wars 
 of modern commerce-destroyers. In the event of hostilities 
 the boot might not impossibly be found transferred to the 
 other leg; for, on the high seas, the Americans were apt 
 pupils. So, while as a result of a changed policy, the blockade 
 would assuredly be broken and cotton released, this might 
 well be brought about at the risk of losses in comparison 
 with which that resulting from a cotton shortage was not 
 to be considered. Rather than incur it, would it not be 
 better, because less costly, to board indefinitely all the unem- 
 ployed of Lancashire in the most expensive hotels of Man- 
 chester and Liverpool? And this view of the case Richard 
 Cobden thus put with characteristic bluntness: "I will ven- 
 ture to say, that it would be cheaper to keep all the popula- 
 tion engaged in the cotton manufacture — ay, to keep them 
 upon turtle, champagne, and venison — than to send to 
 America to obtain cotton by force of arms. That would in- 
 volve you in a war, and six months of that war would cost 
 more money than would be required to maintain this popula- 
 tion comfortably for ten years." ^ Nothing in any way ade-v 
 quately compensating for the risks run by a change of policy 
 was thus in sight. Moreover, so far as the ultimate issue of 
 the American struggle was concerned, the concurrence of opin- 
 ion was distinct that Gladstone had not overstated the case. 
 The Premier, and both Clarendon and the French Emperor 
 used respecting it the same expression — the independence of 
 the Confederacy was '^un fait accompli.^^ It was merely a 
 question of time, involving the effusion of a certain amount 
 of blood, chiefly Irish and German, in addition to that of the 
 same strains which had already been so profusely and, as most 
 thought, so needlessly, and even wantonly spilled. After all, 
 Gladstone had voiced it not incorrectly: "We know quite 
 
 * Message and Documents, 1862-63, Part I. 206. 
 2 Cobden, Speeches, n. 469. 
 
46 
 
 well that the people of the Northern States have not yet 
 drunk of the cup — they are still trying to hold it far from 
 their lips — which all the rest of the world see they neverthe- 
 less must drink of." ^ 
 
 As it reached him day by day, this general do-nothing re- 
 sponse on the part of the members of the Cabinet undoubtedly 
 affected the mind and purpose of the Premier. Though quite 
 ready to yield to the pressure in favor of mediation, and, later 
 on, even of recognition, Palmerston no longer felt the confidence 
 and buoyancy of his earHer years. Old, and conscious perhaps 
 of being a bit weary, he in those October days of 1862 had 
 cause to appreciate a ministerial situation concerning which he 
 thus at a subsequent date and on another occasion wrote to 
 Earl Russell: ''As to Cabinets, if we had colleagues Hke those 
 who sat in Pitt's Cabinet, or such men as those who were with 
 Peel, you and I might have our own way on most things; but 
 when, as is now the case, able men fill every department, such 
 men will have opinions and hold to them." ^ Lewis certainly 
 now held such opinions, nor was evidence lacking that he 
 proposed to ^' hold to them." Palmerston thus saw no sufficient 
 reason for action. If it involved a ministerial break, the 
 government was not strong enough to stand a break. And 
 later Clarendon wrote Lewis: "Your speech at Hereford was 
 nearly as effective in checking the alarm and speculation 
 caused by Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in 
 smashing the Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention."^ 
 
 Though the Foreign Secretary must by this time have real- 
 ized that in the Cabinet there was much opposition to his 
 
 1 "The commissioners and the principal agents of the Confederate States in 
 England had opportunities for learning the feelings of different members of the 
 Government, and of prominent men in both of the great parties, with a very near 
 approach to certainty. I shall not be guilty of the indiscretion of classifying the 
 Cabinet by name, but I may say that it was a common belief among the repre- 
 sentatives of the Confederate States that two members [Russell and Gladstone] 
 of the Ministry, at least, were very favorable to the South, and that still another 
 [Palmerston] would have been disposed to give some support to certain members 
 of the House of Commons who wished to bring in a motion for the recognition 
 of the Government at Richmond, if he had not been impressed with the belief 
 that the separation of the States was final, and that it would be both unnecessary 
 and impolitic for the Government to give undue offence or encouragement to 
 either of the combatants." Bulloch, Secret Service, 11. 4. 
 
 2 Ashley, n. 438. 
 
 ^ October 26. Maxwell, Clarendon, 11. 266. 
 
47 
 
 proposed change of policy, however chastened, and that the 
 Premier was wavering even as to that irreducible minimum, 
 Russell went ahead on the path outKned in his memorandum. 
 The call had gone out for the Cabinet to meet on the 23d. 
 The proposition that it was the "duty of Europe to ask both 
 parties, in the most friendly and conciKatory terms, to agree 
 to a suspension of arms'* was to be considered. Lord Lyons 
 was then in London, and had postponed his departure for 
 Washington until after the proposed meeting. In constant 
 communication both with Russell and with Palmerston, he 
 no doubt freely expressed his views, always conservative, as 
 to the course to be pursued; but, so far as he was concerned, 
 no record of what then took place has been preserved, or, at 
 least, as yet made pubUc. 
 
 Mr. Adams, meanwhile, purposely delayed seeking an ex- 
 planation. When at last, however, he did request an inter- 
 view, Russell named for it the afternoon of October 23, the 
 very day the morning of which was assigned for the momentous 
 Cabinet meeting. The interview was interesting; to Mr. 
 Adams intensely so. He referred to the Newcastle speech, and 
 made no secret of the uneasiness it had caused him. In reply, 
 Earl Russell vaguely stated that Mr. Gladstone's utterances 
 had been much misunderstood; and he referred to subsequently 
 written explanatory letters of his colleague, which, however, 
 had in every way failed to explain. He added, in true diplo- 
 matic parlance, that while it was not for him to disavow any- 
 thing on the part of Mr. Gladstone, he had no idea that, in 
 saying what Mr. Gladstone had said, there was a serious in- 
 tention to justify any of the inferences, drawn therefrom 
 as to a disposition in the government to adopt a new policy. 
 This was in itself going very far; but Russell added, the in- 
 tention of the Cabinet still was to adhere to the rule of 
 perfect neutrahty, and to let the American struggle come 
 to its natural end without the smallest attempt at inter- 
 ference, direct or otherwise. He could not, however, say 
 what circumstances might occur from month to month in 
 the future. Mr. Adams then inquired,, somewhat categorically, \ 
 whether he was to understand the Foreign Secretary as say- \ 
 ing that no change of policy was now proposed. To this Earl 
 Russell gave his assent. 
 
48 
 
 It was all very curious ; for, only an hour or so had passed 
 since Earl Russell had asked those composing a part of the Cab- 
 inet to authorize a change of policy, and his colleagues, or those 
 of them then present, had, under the lead of Sir George Corne- 
 wall Lewis, evinced a distinct disinclination to accede to the 
 suggestion. Lord Granville was absent; but the Duke of 
 Newcastle and Sir George Grey had joined in support of the 
 position taken by Lewis. No formal action was taken at this 
 gathering/ Palmerston was at Broadlands, and his staying 
 there was significant. The Premier absenting himself, no 
 action could be taken. In the aimless, informal discussion 
 Russell and Gladstone stood alone. No Cabinet was held,^ 
 and consideration of the business for which those present had 
 been specially summoned was postponed sine die! 
 
 Morley afterwards, in his Gladstone, called attention to the 
 fact that the Foreign Secretary did not, in his conversation 
 with Mr. Adanis, after those at the meeting had dispersed, 
 construe strict neutrality or continuance of the existing policy 
 as excluding what diplomatists call "good offices." It was 
 a nice distinction, and widely at variance with the program 
 originally arranged by the two "ancient masters"; but it 
 served to meet present exigencies. So Mr. Adams contented 
 himself with an expression of great rehef that Lord Lyons 
 was to return to America, to which was added a hope that 
 he would long continue there. To this the Foreign Secretary 
 seems to have yielded a silent assent. Meanwhile, as Russell 
 perfectly well knew, the question of abstention from in- 
 terference of any character was not settled on that October 
 23. And, only the day following, Gladstone circulated a re- 
 joinder to Lewis, insisting again on the duty of England, 
 France and Russia to intervene by representing "with moral 
 authority and force the opinion of the civilized world upon 
 the conditions of the case." ^ At the same time Russell trans- 
 mitted to the Premier at Broadlands a communication marked 
 "Confidential" in which, referring to the memorandum of 
 Sir George Lewis, of the 17th, he said: "The basis of any 
 negotiation for peace is a matter to be seriously considered 
 by the European governments. Whenever the question is 
 
 1 Maxwell, Clarendon, n. 265. ^ Maxwell, 11, 265. 
 
 ^ Gladstone Papers, i. 113. 
 
49 
 
 considered by the Cabinet I shall be prepared to state my views 
 upon that head." ^ Nothing, therefore, was as yet concluded. 
 A few days later, indeed, on the 7th of November, Sir George 
 Lewis submitted a final and most elaborate paper, which, 
 marked ''Confidential," was printed for the use of the Cabinet. 
 In it both the principles and the precedents involved were 
 discussed in detail. A combination of brief and treatise, it 
 is suggestive as to authorship. My own impression is that, 
 prepared by Harcourt, it was presented as a Cabinet memo- 
 randum by Lewis — of course in his own name!^ 
 
 Though the attitude of the Emperor was well understood, 
 the situation was complicated by his Mexican enterprise. 
 From this the Enghsh had withdrawn. The bearing upon 
 it of the American conflict was, however, obvious; and, natu- 
 rally, the British government felt no disposition to be made 
 use of in furtherance of Napoleon's Latin-American projects. 
 Up to this time, therefore, the Slidell program was in abey- 
 ance; his inducements to action had not materiahsed, and, 
 moreover, the Emperor had evinced a distinct reluctance 
 when further action had been suggested. He did not care 
 to subject himself to a chance of further rebuff.^ Accordingly 
 the English ministry had received no official offer or comrauni- 
 cation from France upon this question; but the attitude of 
 the Emperor was understood. Now, October 28, the Emperor 
 gladdened Mr. SHdell's heart by advising him of the desire 
 he felt to bring about, with England's aid, an American ar-. 
 mistice, and of the active steps he was about to take to that 
 end. He proposed to communicate on the subject with vari- 
 ous European powers, including Great Britain. In view of 
 advices from America, the hour seemed at last to have surely 
 come.^ His message looking to such action was, however, not 
 officially presented to Russell until November 10, though he 
 had known the general character of the proposed measure 
 from Cowley's letter of October 31. The following day, No- 
 
 1 Morley, Gladstone, 11. 84. ^ Gladstone Papers, 11. 2-69. 
 
 3 Walpole, n. 55. 
 
 4 Slidell to Mason, October 29, 1862. For Slidell's report to Benjamin of 
 his interview with Napoleon on October 28, see Richardson, 11. 345. Rhodes 
 (iv. 346) gives the date incorrectly as October 22, deriving it from Bigelow, 
 France and the Confederate Navy, 126. The error has been a source of con- 
 fusion to historical writers. 
 
50 
 
 vember ii, the question of mediation was again submitted by 
 the Foreign Secretary to the Cabinet, formally convened. 
 
 This meeting the Premier attended. It so chanced that 
 both Gladstone and Lewis have left reports of what occurred. 
 Gladstone wrote: "I am afraid we shall do httle or nothing in 
 the business of America. Both Lord Palmerston and Russell 
 are right. ^^ Of what occurred at an adjourned meeting held 
 the next day, he reported: "The United States affair is ended, 
 and not well. Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way 
 without resolutely fighting out his battle. Palmerston gave 
 to Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support. . . . 
 However, though we decline for the moment, the answer [to 
 the French Emperor] is put upon grounds and in terms which 
 leave the matter very open for the future." ^ Lewis's report is 
 more specific. Addressed to Clarendon, it was given in a letter 
 of the same date as the adjourned Cabinet meeting. He told 
 how the Foreign Secretary had opened the meeting by stat- 
 ing that the French Ambassador had called on him the pre- 
 vious day and had read him a despatch from his government, 
 proposing that Russia and England should join with France 
 in a request to the two American belKgerents to suspend hos- 
 tilities for six months, both by sea and land. No terms of 
 pacification were suggested, and no offer of mediation made. 
 Russia, it appeared, had dechned to be a party to this proposed 
 joint representation, but was prepared to support it through 
 her Minister at Washington, provided so doing would not 
 cause irritation. For reasons which he then proceeded to 
 give, the Foreign Secretary advised that the proposal of France 
 should be accepted. Lewis thus goes on: 
 
 Palmerston followed Lord John, and supported him, but did not 
 say a great deal. His principal argument was the necessity for 
 showing sympathy with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any 
 chance of mitigating [the condition of affairs there existing.] 
 
 The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who proceeded 
 to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a stone at it of greater 
 or less size, except Gladstone, who supported it, and the Chancellor 
 [Westbury] and Cardwell, who expressed no opinion. The principal 
 objection was that the proposed armistice of six months by sea and 
 land, involving a suspension of the commercial blockade, was so 
 
 1 Morley, Gladstone , ii. 85. 
 
51 
 
 grossly unequal — so decidedly in favour of the South, that there 
 was no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time, Palmer- 
 ston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was against being 
 a party to the representation, and he capitulated. I do not think 
 his support was very sincere: it certainly was not hearty. . . . 
 After the Cabinet had come to a decision, and the outline of a draft 
 had been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular sentences 
 on the danger of refusing the French invitation, and gave a strong 
 support to Lord John.^ 
 
 ^'I think," Lewis significantly added in closing his letter, the 
 Foreign Secretary's ''principal motive was a fear of displeasing 
 France, and that Palmerston's principal motive was a wish to 
 seem to support him. There is a useful article in to-day's Times 
 throwing cold water on the invitation. I take for granted that 
 Delane was informed of the result of the Cabinet." Unques- 
 tionably, Delane had been informed; but, not without reason, 
 did Slidell, on hearing of what had taken place, write to Mason: 
 ''Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have 
 been the only mem'ber of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in 
 favor of accepting the Emperor's proposition? " ^ 
 
 Thus as respects the Slidell program '' the game was up," 
 temporarily at least, and it was necessary " to take another 
 tack." Acting as a government, the British Ministry had 
 evinced a decided indisposition towards any change of policy 
 involving a possible concurrence in the promotion and for- 
 warding of the Emperor's Mexican venture. This also in 
 direct disregard of the expressed recommendation of Premier, 
 Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer. Of these 
 three the veteran and altogether wily Premier at the moment 
 probably looked upon the Cabinet action thus taken with 
 entire complacency; in fact, had, to a large extent, engineered 
 it. The officious and agressive Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 had been forced to submit to a distinct rebuff. His position 
 was in truth humiliating. Generally recognized as being so, 
 it was so recognized by no one so much as himself. This was 
 to Palmerston undoubtedly an outcome of the comphcation 
 not otherwise than gratifying. Meanwhile, he, in all probabil- 
 ity, Hke Gladstone, regarded the proposed action as merely 
 
 1 Maxwell, Clarendon, n. 268. 
 
 2 Slidell to Mason, November 28, 1862. 
 
52 
 
 deferred — probably for a fortnight, perhaps for a month. 
 But whether the postponement was for a greater or less period, 
 the end he regarded as inevitable. The independence of the 
 Confederacy was assured; the American Union was severed; 
 or, as Lord Derby put it a Httle later on, "The restoration 
 of the Union, as it formerly existed, is the one conclusion which 
 is absolutely impossible." Thus, hugging themselves in this 
 conviction of the sure occurrence of what they all most mshed 
 to see, they awaited the speedy arrival of the inevitable. Palm- 
 ers ton was outspoken in his belief. "As to the American 
 War,'' he now characteristically wrote to Clarendon, "it has 
 manifestly ceased to have any attainable object as far as the 
 Northerns are concerned, except to get rid of some more thou- 
 sand troublesome Irish and Germans. ... It must be owned, 
 however, that the Anglo-Saxon race on both sides have shown 
 courage and endurance highly honorable to their stock." 
 
 The same belief obtained in France. The Emperor did not 
 hesitate to express his firm conviction that the independence 
 of the South was "ww fait accompli.''^ He would have liked 
 to shape his course accordingly. Up to this time, however, 
 his action had been hampered by compKcations in Italy. 
 Since the Summer of 1 861-1862, Napoleon III had been anx- 
 ious to withdraw the French garrison from Rome. He hesi- 
 tated, however, in so doing because of his fear of losing the 
 support of the clerical party in France. Count Cavour had 
 died June 6, 1861. As a consequence thereof, a year later the 
 Italian compKcations had become serious. The integrity of 
 the Papal States was threatened. Rome, and Rome only, 
 was to be the capital of a United Italy. Napoleon sought to 
 arbitrate between the Pope and Victor Emmanuel. Suddenly, 
 in July, Garibaldi had left Sicily with a body of revolutionary 
 volunteers and openly marched on Rome. The Italian Gov- 
 ernment interfered to stop him, and the affair of Aspromonte 
 occurred, August 27. In it Garibaldi was wounded and cap- 
 tured. So far as the Confederacy was concerned, to such a 
 degree did these events complicate the situation that Slidell 
 wrote to Mason, August 6: "Garibaldi's recent movements 
 in Italy are exciting a good deal of alarm here and may I 
 fear do us harm. I wish that he may be taken at sea and 
 sent to New York." On the 20th of the samie month he again 
 
53 
 
 wrote, "The affairs of Italy are giving great uneasiness and 
 with all the Emperor's desire to get rid of his English com- 
 mitments he can do nothing until Garibaldi is disposed of." 
 Finally, October 17, Slidell wrote, referring to the change 
 of Ministry which had arisen out of these complications. 
 "There has been the devil to pay here about the Roman ques- 
 tion and for the time our question has been lost sight of." 
 On this issue a change of French Ministry now took place, 
 Drouyn de Lhuys succeeding M. Thouvenel in the Foreign 
 Office. SHdell presently undertook to resume the negotiations 
 initiated wit^ M. Thouvenel, but found his successor wholly 
 uninformed as to what had taken place. 
 
 Meanwhile, the second Mexican expedition ha\dng now 
 started to its destination, and the Italian compHcations being 
 temporarily, at least, adjusted, the Emperor, in view of what 
 had occurred in London at the meeting in Downing Street 
 on the 23d of October, submitted the proposition for joint 
 action simultaneously to the Foreign Offices of St. Petersburg 
 and London. Into its reception by the Russian Foreign Office, 
 and the attitude there assumed in regard to it there is no occa- 
 sion here to enter. The comment of the English Minister at 
 St. Petersburg will suffice. He wrote: "I think that the 
 proposal of M. Drouyn de Lhuys is very repugnant to the 
 Prince [Gortchakoff] and that he would be happy to elude and 
 defeat it in any way which would put the Russian Government 
 in a favorable light before the Northern Federation." Such 
 being the case, and the suggestion of a joint offer of mediation 
 being declined by Russia, the only question now in any doubt 
 was whether the Emperor, in view of his expanded Mexican 
 enterprise, could be induced to proceed independently. As 
 respects Great Britain Mr. Slidell felt no confidence. He had 
 diagnosed the situation there not incorrectly. Nevertheless, 
 he had to await the action of the Ministry on Napoleon's 
 formal suggestion. This was presented with the result which 
 has been described. 
 
 Such on November 11, 1862, was the situation of affairs 
 in Europe as respects some form of interference in the Ameri- 
 can conffict, whether through intervention, recognition, 
 an offer of mediation, or simply a proffer of friendly offices 
 looking to a temporary cessation of hostilities. No action 
 
54 
 
 could be agreed upon. Meanwhile at that very time (Novem- 
 ber 5), exactly seven weeks after the battle of Antietam, Mc- 
 Clellan had been removed from the command of the Army of the 
 Potomac. No one of recognized capacity or who commanded 
 confidence whether at home or abroad had been found to re- 
 place him. Under these circumstances, not unjustifiably 
 pinning their faith on the vigorous lead of Lee and " Stonewall'' 
 Jackson, Palmerston and Louis Napoleon, as well as Messrs. 
 Mason and Slidell waited for something speedily to happen; 
 and within the period commonly assigned therefor, something 
 did happen ! — but not what either Palmerston or the French 
 Emperor had anticipated. At that critical juncture, and by the 
 merest chance as to time, one of the great events of the nine- 
 teenth century took place in America. On September 22, 
 while the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were 
 corresponding with a view to the early recognition of the slave- 
 holding Confederacy, the coming Emancipation Proclamation 
 of President Lincoln had been announced. That African ser- 
 vitude was an issue in the American struggle was no longer 
 possible of denial; and it presently became apparent that the 
 newly assumed attitude of the national administration could 
 not be ignored. The success of the Union cause from that 
 time meant the freedom of the slave. 
 
lUM mi.JI -^A 
 
w " A