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GENERALS 
 
 J. E. Johnston and G. T. Beauregard 
 
 THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS, 
 
 CTTJTST^ 18S1. 
 
 ,vy 
 
 GUSTAVUS W. SiVLITH, 
 
 'I 
 
 Formerly Major-General Confederate States Army. 
 
 New York : 
 c. g. crawford, printer and stationer, 
 
 Nos. 49 AND 51 Park Place. 
 1892. 
 

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 ob^ 
 
 CoPTr.iGHT, 1892, BY GuPTAVUs W. Smith. 
 
 
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CONTENTS. 
 
 Preliminary 
 
 Part I. 
 \ 
 
 The Official Records. 
 
 Johnston's Army of the Shenandoah and Beauregard's 
 
 Army of the Potomac. 7 
 
 Correspondence between the two army commanders, June 
 
 and July, 1861 8 
 
 General Johnston arrives at Manassas Junction 9 
 
 Order for battle 10 
 
 President Davis defines " relative positions " of Generals 
 
 Johnston and Beauregard 11 
 
 Extracts from General Johnston's official report 11 
 
 Extracts from General Beauregard's official report 15 
 
 Comments on the tenor of these two official reports in re- 
 gard to the active command of General Beauregard. 21 
 Extracts from the official report of General D. E. Jones. . 22 
 Effect of the miscarriage of Beauregard's order to Ewell 
 
 to attack 23 
 
 President Davis promotes Beauregard to the rank of full 
 
 General 23 
 
 General H. E. Lee and the Secretary of War congratulate 
 
 Beauregard 24 
 
 Generals Johnston and Beauregard jointly is^ue a con- 
 gratulatory address to their combined forces 24 
 
 Each of these two ranking Confederate officers acquired 
 
 great distinction , . 25 
 
 General Johnston, in his "Narrative," 1874, and in the 
 Century 3Iagazine, May, 1885, claimed more credit 
 than was justly his due, and attacked the correctness 
 of General Beauregard's official report 26 
 
IV CONTENTS. 
 
 Part II. 
 
 General Johnstons Claims Considered. 
 
 PASE 
 
 1. He would now liave it believed he " played with Pat- 
 
 terson, reinforced Beauregard, and won a victory " . . 27 
 
 2. He now claims that he sketched a simple order of march 
 
 on the 20th, which he begged General Beauregard to 
 have prepared and submitted to him for inspection so 
 that the order could be distributed to the troops be- 
 fore night 28 
 
 3. He now claims that Beauregard's second plan was 
 
 "frustrated," "perhapsfortunately," by the appear- 
 ance of strong bodies of United States troops on the 
 wooded heights in front of Mitchell's, Blackburn's and 
 McLean's Fords 30 
 
 4. General Johnston says: "I had been waiting with 
 
 General Beauregard on Lookout Hill for evidence of 
 General McDowell's design 34 
 
 5. In his "After-thoughts," General Johnston would have 
 
 it believed that it "was a great fault," on his part, 
 that a large portion of Beauregard's troops were " not 
 engaged in the battle " 39 
 
 6. He now says : " While we were riding forward General 
 
 Beauregard suggested to me to assign him to the 
 immediate command of the troops engaged " 40 
 
 Y. General Johnston claims : " As fought, the battle was 
 made by me," and adds : " Beauregard commanded 
 those troops [on the Confederate left] under me ; as 
 elsewhere, Lieutenant- Generals commanded corps, 
 and Major-Generals divisions, under me " 42 
 
 8. General Johnston claims tliat : " There could have been 
 no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than mak- 
 ing the movement to Centreville " 44 
 
 Conclusion ^ - 
 
 4o 
 
 Appendix. Copy of the order for battle 4G 
 
 Map of the battlefield and vicinity End 
 
FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA. JULY 18TH-216T, 1861. 
 
\ -^ 
 
PRELIMINARY. 
 
 In the latter part of September, 1861, at the joint request 
 of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, I was appointed Major- 
 General by President Davis, and ordered to report to General 
 Johnston for duty as commander of the Second Corps of his 
 army, then at and in the vicinity of Fairfax Court-house, Ya. 
 The First Corps was commanded by General Beauregard. In- 
 timate personal and official relations existed between the three 
 of us.* 
 
 After it was decided by President Davis, in the first days of 
 October, that General Johnston's army could not be reinforced to 
 an extent sufficient to justify an immediate campaign of invasion, 
 the forces were withdrawn to the neighborhood of Centreville. 
 During the next few months we had abundant leisure, and, in 
 that time, I became thorouglily acquainted with the principal 
 events connected with the battle of Manassas and familiar with 
 the ground upon which the fighting occurred. The impressions 
 I then received were deep and lasting. They were derived from 
 all available sources, principally from Generals Johnston and 
 Beauregard. 
 
 * After the battle of Manassas, the combined forces of Generals Johnston 
 and Beauregard were called the " Arnay of the Potomac"; which had been 
 the designation of Beauregard's forces before the two bodies of troops were 
 united. Those of the latter were now designated the First Corps, and John- 
 ston's troops, from the Shenandoah, the Second Corps. Up to the time of my 
 arrival General John,ston had commanded this corps, which consisted of eight 
 brigades, not organized into divisions, and he, at the same time, commanded 
 the army. I relieved General Johnston from duty as a Corps Commander, and 
 he was thus enabled to give his undivided attention to the control of the army 
 as a whole. 
 
6 PRELIMINARY. 
 
 In 187i I read General Johnston's " Narrative," and was 
 surprised and shocked to find that, in reference to Manassas, his 
 accoftnt differed so greatly from the opinions I had formed 
 in 1861, which were derived in great part from himself, and 
 from reading liis official report. 
 
 In his " JSTarrative," he not only claimed more credit for his 
 services in that battle than I had been led to believe he was 
 justly entitled to receive, but, in my opinion, he now imfairly 
 called in question the accuracy of General Beauregard's official 
 report, and endeavored to detract from the well-earned distinc- 
 tion of that army commander. 
 
 In the Century Magazine^ May, 1885, General Johnston em- 
 phasized his attack on the correctness of General Beauregard's 
 official report, and enlarged his own claims. 
 
 Since that time the official records have become accessible. I 
 have made a synopsis of those records, and propose to contrast 
 some of General Johnston's more recent statements with his own 
 official report, and with facts which were well established in 
 1861. 
 
GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 
 
 Part I. 
 The OJicial Records. 
 
 Early in tlie summer of 1861, General J. E. Jolmston com- 
 manded the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah, which pro- 
 tected that valley against the Federal forces under General 
 Patterson ; whilst General G. T. Beaureguard commanded the 
 Confederate Army of the Potomac, near Manassas, confronting 
 the main Federal Army, which was in the vicinity of "Washing- 
 ton City. 
 
 These two Confederate leaders controlled separate armies ; 
 and, each independently of the other, reported to, and received 
 orders direct from the "War Department at Pichmond. 
 
 On the 11th of June, 1861, General Beaureguard, from 
 Manassas, wrote to President Davis : "I wish it distinctly under- 
 stood, however, that if the enemy should ofiFer battle on the line of 
 Bull Pun, I shall accept it for my command, against whatever 
 odds he may array in my front." Again, on the next day, he 
 wrote : " The enemy seem to be taking the o^ensive towards 
 Harper's Ferry, and a few days hence may find General J. E. 
 Johnston in such a critical condition as to render it impossible to 
 relieve him. If he were ordered to abandon forthwith his pres- 
 ent position and concentrate suddenly his forces with mine, 
 guarding with small detachments all the passes through which 
 the enem}' might follow him, we could, by a bold and rapid 
 movement forward, retake Arlington Heights and Alexandria, 
 
8 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 if not too strongly fortified and garrisoned, which would have 
 the effect of recalling all the enemy's forces from Northern Vir- 
 ginia for the protection of Washington. I beg and entreat that 
 a concerted plan of operations be adopted at once by the Gov- 
 ernment for its different columns. Otherwise we will be assailed 
 in detail by superior forces and will be cut off or destroyed 
 entirely." 
 
 From Winchester, on the 21st of that month, Major W. H. C. 
 Whiting, General Johnston's Chief of Staff, wrote to General 
 Beaureguard : "In the event of a move upon you, having now 
 cleared the enemy from this part of the valley, the General 
 xnight be able to throw from 5,000 to 6,000 men on his flank." 
 Later, on the same day. General Johnston wrote to General 
 Beauregard : " In the absence of a common superior, I am anx- 
 ious to correspond with you — to be informed of your needs — 
 that I may help you when the state of things in my front will 
 permit me to do so." 
 
 On the next day General Beaureguard wrote to General 
 -^Johnston : " I consider the chain of Bull Kun Mountain, Little 
 Hiver, and Goose Creek a strong secondary line of defense for 
 my left flank, but should they penetrate into Virginia, this side 
 of it, by moving rapidly a strong force of your command to 
 Aldie or Leesburg to take them in flank or rear, they would 
 have to fall back on the Potomac, or run the risk of being cut off 
 from their base of operations, particularly if I could attack them 
 from here at the same time." Two days later : "I do not believe 
 in the hostile advance of General Patterson, for I am informed, 
 on what I consider good authority, that they have quite a stampede 
 in Washington, thinking that we are going to unite our forces 
 for its attack, or that you are going to cross the Potomac at or 
 -about Edward's Ferry to attack it in rear, whilst I attack it in 
 iront." 
 
 On the 9th of July, General Johnston wrote to General 
 Beauregard : " I wrote you yesterday that intelligence I have just 
 received indicated that the enemy's intention is to advance upon 
 us here. Colonel Stuart, who is at the head of our scouting 
 service, has just written to me, that he suspects, for certain cir- 
 fiumstances, that he will move forward to-night. We are just 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 9 
 
 beorinnine: some little field works, , . . but have done too little 
 to make them available. . . . Militia, about 2,000, were called 
 out, but they have to prepare their own ammunition, which they 
 have not done. So the chances are against us. Less so, however, 
 than a retreat would make them." 
 
 The official records show that in the meantime General 
 Beauregard more than once warned the Confederate Government, 
 and General Johnston, that a forward movement of the main 
 Federal Army from the vicinity of Washington was imminent. 
 He urged the importance of transferring General Johnston's 
 army from Winchester to the vicinity of Manassas, and again 
 informed the Government that whether he received aid from 
 General Johnston's forces or not, he had determined to hold the 
 defensive line of Bull Kun ; and, when the Federals closely ap- 
 proached that position he would assume the offensive, cross that 
 stream, and attack them. 
 
 On the 17th of July he telegraphed to the Government, and 
 to General Johnston, that McDowell was advancing with his 
 whole army, and had driven the Confederate outposts from Fair- 
 fax Court-house. The War Department at Richmond ordered 
 General Johnston to move his army from Winchester to Manassas. 
 That order was received about 1 A. m. on the 18th, and General 
 Johnston telegraphed to the Government : "I have had the honor 
 to receive your telegram of yesterday. General Patterson seems 
 to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles to 
 the east of Winchester. Unless he prevents it, we shall move 
 towards General Beauregard to-day." 
 
 On that day (the 18th) the Federals attacked Beauregard's 
 line at Blackburn's Ford. That attack was repulsed, but Beaure- 
 gard then refrained from making a counter-attack, by crossing 
 Bull Run, because he preferred to await the arrival of Johnston's 
 forces, which he knew had been, on the previous day, ordered to 
 move to Manassas. 
 
 On the 19th, a small portion of Johnston's army reached 
 Beauregard. About noon on the 20th, General Johnston him- 
 self arrived with another detachment, and he was then confident 
 the w'hole of his forces would unite with those of Beauregard 
 before daylight next morning. 
 
10 GENEBAL8 JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGAED 
 
 During the night, by authority of General Johnston, General 
 Beauregard drew np and signed an order for battle, directing the 
 movements of all of Johnston's forces as well as his own. 
 
 That order -was formally approved, in writing, by General 
 Johnston at 4.C0 a. m. on the 21st. It required that : 
 
 I. — Ewell's brigade, supported by Holmes' brigade, should 
 commence the offensive movement by crossing Bull Run at 
 Union Mills, and move on the Centreville road to attack the 
 enemy. 
 
 II. — Jones' brigade, supported by Early's brigade, was to 
 cross at McLean's Ford, and attack on Ewell's left. 
 
 III. — Longstreet's brigade, supported by Jackson's brigade, 
 was to cross at McLean's Ford and go into action on Jones' left. 
 
 lY. — Bonhara's Brigade, supported by Bartow's brigade, 
 was to cross at Mitchell's Ford, and go into action on Long- 
 street's left. 
 
 Y. — Cocke's brigade, supported by Elzey's brigade, was to 
 cross at the Stone Bridge, and the fords on the right thereof, to 
 the left of Bonham's brigade, and move to the attack in the 
 direction of Centreville. 
 
 YI. — Bee's brigade, Wilcox's brigade, Stuart's cavalry, and 
 Walton's battery, would constitute the reserve and was to cross 
 at Mitchell's Ford, to be used as circumstances might require.* 
 
 At 5.30 A. M. on the 21st, it was reported that the Federals, 
 in large force, were threatening close in front of Stone Bridge. 
 Beauregard's plan, as given above, was at once modified, with the 
 approval of General Johnston, so that the Confederate left would 
 stand on the defensive, and only the right and centre would cross 
 the stream — assume the active offensive — and immediately attack 
 the left flank and rear of the Federals between Bull Bun and 
 Ceutreville. This was Beauregard's second plan. 
 
 En route from Winchester to Manassas, General Johnston 
 made an inquiry in regard to the " relative positions " of himself 
 and General Beauregard. In reply President Davis telegraphed 
 him : 
 
 * For the full text of this order see Appendix A. 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 11 
 
 " You are a General in the Confederate Army, possessed of 
 tlie power attaching to that rank. You will know how to make 
 the exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard, as well of 
 the ground as of the troops and preparation, avail for tlie success 
 of the object in which you co-operate. The zeal of both assures 
 me of harmonious action." 
 
 Extracts from Gp:neral J. E. Johnston's Official Report.* 
 
 "... I reached Manassas about noon on the 20tli. 
 I found General Beauregard's position too exten- 
 sive, and the ground too densely wooded and intricate, to be 
 learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore deter- 
 mined to rely upon his knowledge of it and of the enemy's posi- 
 tions. This I did readily from full confidence in his capacity. 
 . . . I regarded the arrival of the remainder of the Army of 
 the Shenandoah during the night as certain, and Patterson's 
 junction witli the Grand [Union] x\rmy on the 22d as probable. 
 During the evening it was determined, instead of remaining in 
 the defensive positions then occupied, to assume the offensive and 
 attack the enemy before such a junction. General Beauregard 
 proposed a plan of battle, which I approved without hesitation. 
 He drew up the necessary order during the night, which was 
 approved formally by me at 4.30 o'clock on the morning of the 
 21st. The early movements of the enemy on that morning and 
 the non-arrival of the expected troops prevented its execution. 
 General Beauregard afterwards proposed a modification of the 
 abandoned plan, to attack with our right while the left stood on 
 the defensive. This, too, became impracticable, and a battle en- 
 sued different in place and circumstances from any previous plan 
 on our side. . . . About 8 o'clock General Beauregard and I 
 placed ourselves on a commanding hill in rear of General Bon- 
 liam's left. Near 9 o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, 
 reported that a large body of troops was crossing the valley of 
 Bull Run some two miles above the [stone] bridge. General 
 Bee, who had been placed near Colonel Cocke's position, Colonel 
 
 * " Official Records," Series I., Vol. II.. p. 470. 
 
12 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUKEGARD 
 
 Hampton, witli Lis legion, and Colonel Jackson, from a, point 
 near Genei-al Bonham's left, were ordered to hasten to tlie left 
 iianlv. . . . The enemy, nnder cover of a strong demonstra- 
 tion on our right, made a long detour through the woods on his 
 right, crossed Bull Run two miles above our left, and threw him- 
 self upon the flank and rear of our position. This movement 
 was fortunately discovered by us in time to check its progress, 
 and ultimately to form a new line of battle nearly at right angles 
 with the defensive line of Bull Run," 
 
 General Johnston then describes, in some detail, the move- 
 ment of Colonel Evans, supported by General Bee, and later by 
 Colonel Hampton, to cheek the enemy, advancing on the Sudley 
 road ; and the withdrawal of these forces — after a bloody contest 
 — to the plateau where the main fighting occurred later ; and on 
 which Colonel Jackson's brigade had just formed in line of 
 battle. 
 
 General Johnston adds : " In the meantime I waited with 
 General Beauregard near the centre the full development of the 
 enemy's designs. About 11 o'clock the violence of the firing on 
 the left indicated a battle, and the march of a large body of 
 troops from the enemy's centre towards the conflict was 
 shown by clouds of dust. I was thus convinced that his 
 great efiiort was to be made with his right. I stated that 
 conviction to General Beauregard, and the absolute 
 necessity of immediately strengthening our left as 
 much as possible. Orders were accordingly sent to General 
 Holmes and Colonel Early to move with all speed to the sound 
 of the firing, and to General Bonham to send up two of his regi- 
 ments and a battery. General Beauregard and I then hurried at 
 a rapid gallop to the scene of action, about four miles off. On 
 the way I directed my chief of artillery, Colonel Pendleton, to 
 follow with his own and Alburtis' batteries. We came not a mo- 
 ment too soon. The long contest against five-fold odds and heavy 
 losses, especially of field officers, had greatly discouraged the 
 troops of General Bee and Colonel Evans. Our presence with 
 them under fire, and some example, had the happiest effect on 
 the spirit of the troops. Order was soon restored and the battle 
 re-established, to which the firmness of Jackson's brigade greatly 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 13 
 
 contributed. Then, in a brief and rapid conference, General 
 Beauregard was assigned to the command of the left, which, 
 as the younger officer, he claimed, while I returned to that 
 of the whole field. . . . 
 
 " My headquarters were now established near the Lewis house. 
 From this commanding elevation my view embraced the position 
 of the enemy beyond the stream and the approaches to the Stone 
 Bridge, a point of special importance. I could also see the ad- 
 vance of our troops far down the valley in the direction of Ma- 
 nassas and observe the progress of the action and the manoeuvres 
 of the enemy." 
 
 Speaking of the main fighting on the plateau, General John, 
 ston says : "• For nearly three hours they [the Confederate forces] 
 maintained their position, repelling five successive assaults by 
 the heavy masses of the enemy, whose numbers enabled him con- 
 tinually to bring up fresh troops as their preceding columns were 
 driven back. Colonel Stuart contributed to one of these repulses 
 by a well-timed and vigorous charge on the enemy's right flank with 
 two companies of his cavalry. . . . The expected reinforce- 
 ments appeared soon after. Colonel Cocke was then desired to lead 
 his brigade into action to support the right of the troops engaged, 
 which he did with alacrity and effect. Within a half hour the 
 two regiments of General Bonham's brigade (Cash's and Ker- 
 shaw's) came up, and were directed against the enemy's right, 
 which he seemed to be strenghtening. Fisher's JSTorth Carolina 
 regiment was soon after sent in the same direction. About 3 
 o'clock, while the enemy seemed to be striving to outflank and 
 drive back our left, and thus separate us from Manassas, General 
 E. K. Smith arrived with three regiments of Elzey's brigade. He 
 was instructed to attack the right flank of the enemy, now ex- 
 posed to us. Before the movement was completed he fell, se- 
 verely wounded. Colonel Elzey, at once taking command, exe- 
 cuted it with great promptitude and vigor. General Beauregard 
 rapidly seized the opportunity thus afforded him, and threw for- 
 ward his whole line. The enemy was driven back from 
 the long-contested hill, and victory was no longer 
 doubtful. lie made yet another attempt to retrieve 
 the day. He again extended his right with a still 
 
14 GENEEALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 wider sweep to turn our left. Just as be reformed to renew the 
 battle Colonel Early's three regiments came upon the field. The 
 enemy's new formation exposed his right flank more even than 
 the previous one. Colonel Early was therefore ordered to throw 
 himself directly upon it, supported by Colonel Stuart's cavalry 
 and Beckham's battery. He executed this attack bravely and 
 well, while a simultaneous charge was made by General Beaure- 
 gard in front. The enemy was broken by this combined attack. 
 He lost all the artillery which he had advanced to the scene of 
 the conflict. He had no more fresh troops to rally on, and a 
 general rout ensued. Instructions were instantly sent to General 
 Bonham to march by the quickest route to the turnpike to inter- 
 cept the fugitives, and to General Longstreet to follow as closely 
 as possible upon the right. Their progress was checked by the 
 enemy's reserve and by night at Centreville. . . . Colonel 
 Stuart pressed the pursuit on the principal line of retreat, the 
 Sudley road. Eour companies of cavalry, under Colonel Radford 
 and Lieutenant-Colonel Munford, which I had held in reserve, 
 were ordered to cross the stream at Ball's Ford to reach the turn- 
 pike, the line of retreat of the enemy's left. ... A report 
 came to me from the right that a strong body of U. S. troops 
 was advancing upon Manassas. General Holmes, who had just 
 reached the field, and General Ewell, on his way to it, were 
 ordered to meet this unexpected attack. They found no foe, 
 however. . . . 
 
 " Our victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and 
 ai'tillery can be. An adequate force of calvary would have made it 
 decisive. . . . The loss of the Army of the Potomac [Beaure- 
 gard's] was 108 killed, 510 wounded, and 12 missing. That of 
 the Army of the Shenandoah [Johnston's] was 270 killed, 979 
 wounded, and 18 missing. Total killed, 378 ; wounded, 1,489 ; 
 missing, 30. ... It will be remarked that the three 
 brigadier-generals of the Army of the Shenandoah were all 
 wounded [General Bee, mortally]. . . . 
 
 " The apparent firmness of the U. S. troops at Centreville, 
 who had not been engaged, which checked our pursuit ; the 
 strong forces occupying the works near Georgetown, Arlington, 
 and Alexandria ; the certainty, too, that General Patterson, if 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 15 
 
 needed, would reach "Washington with his army of thirty thou- 
 sand men sooner than we could, and the condition and inadequate 
 means of the army in ammunition, provisions, and transporta- 
 tion prevented any serious thoughts of advancing against the 
 capitaL It is certain that the fresh troops within the works were 
 in number quite sufficient for their defense. If not. General 
 Patterson's Army would certainly reinforce them soon enough." 
 From General Johnson's report it might be inferred that Gen- 
 eral Beauregard ivaited until 11 a. m., " the full development of 
 the enemy's designs " ; and that, at the end of that time, General 
 Johnston gave specific instructions, telling General Beauregard 
 what to do ; and when, and how, to do it. But General John- 
 ston does not exactly say this. What he does say will be better 
 understood in view of the specific statements contained in the 
 following : 
 
 EXTBACTS FROM GeNEEAL BeAUREGARd's OFFICIAL RePORT. 
 
 " . . . . The "War Department having been informed 
 by me, by telegraph, on the 17th of July, of the movement of 
 General McDowell, General Johnston was immediately ordered 
 to form a junction of his army corps with mine. . . . Gen- 
 eral Holmes was also directed to push forward. . . . General 
 Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th of July, and being 
 my senior in rank, he necessarily assumed command of all the 
 forces of the Confederate States then concentrating at this point. 
 Made acquainted with my plan of operation and dispositions to 
 meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval, and generously 
 directed their execution under my command. . . . 
 
 " It became necessary, on the morning of the 21st, before 
 daylight, to modify the plan accepted, to suit the contingency of 
 an immediate attack on our lines by the main force of the enemy, 
 then plainly at hand. ... By half-past four a. m., on the 
 21st of July, I had prepared and dispatched orders* directing 
 the whole of the Confederate forces within the lines of Bull Run, 
 including the brigades and regiments of General Johnston which 
 had arrived at that time, to be held in readiness to march at a 
 
 * See Appendix A. 
 
16 GENEEALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 moment's notice. . . . Informed at 5.30 a. m., by Colonel 
 Evans, that the enemy had deployed some twelve hundred men 
 with several pieces of artillery in his immediate front [at and 
 above the Stone Bridge, the left of the Confederate line], I at 
 once ordered him, as also General Cocke, if attacked, to maintain 
 tlieir position to the last extremity. In my opinion, the most 
 effective method of relieving that Hank was by a rapid, determined 
 attack, with my right wing and centre, on the enemy's flank and 
 rear at Centerville. ... By such a movement I confidently 
 expected to achieve a complete victory for my country by 12 
 meridian. These new dispositions were submitted to General 
 Johnston, who fully approved them, and the orders for their im- 
 mediate execution were at once issued. Brigadier-General Ewell 
 was directed to begin the movement, to be followed and supported 
 successively by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, 
 respectively supported by their several appointed reserves. . . 
 About 8.30 A. M. General Johnston and myself transferred our 
 headquarters to a central position, about half a mile in rear of 
 Mitchell's Ford, whence we might watch the course of events. 
 ... In the meantime, about 7 o'clock a. m., Jackson's brigade, 
 with Imboden's and five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sent 
 to take up a position along Bull Hun, to guard the interval be- 
 tween Cocke's right and Bouham's left, with orders tO' support 
 either in case of need. ... So much of Bee's and Bartow's 
 brigades, now united, as had arrived, some twenty-eight hundred 
 muskets, had also been sent forward to support the position of 
 the Stone Bridge." 
 
 In his report, General Beauregard proceeds to describe the 
 Federal movement, by Sudley's Ford, against the Confederate 
 left, and the resistance offered by Evans, Bee and Hampton, 
 before these three commands were forced back to the plateau 
 upon which the main fighting occurred ; and he adds : 
 
 " From the point previously indicated, where General John- 
 ston and myself had established our headquarters, we heard the 
 continuous roll of musketry and the sustained din of the artillery, 
 which announced the serious outburst of the battle on our left 
 flank ; and we anxiously, but confidently awaited similar sounds 
 of conflict from our front at Centreville, resulting from the pre- 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 17 
 
 scribed attack in that quarter by our riglit wing. At Iialf-past 
 ten A. M., however, this expectation was dissipated by a dispatch 
 from Brigadier-General Ewell, informing me, to my profound 
 disappointment, that my orders for his advance had miscarried ; 
 but that in consequence of a communication from General D. R. 
 Jones, he had just thrown his brigade across the stream at Union 
 Mills. But, in my judgment, it was now too late for the effect- 
 ive execution of the contemplated movement, which must have 
 required quite three hours for the troops to get into position for 
 the attack. Therefore, it became immediately necessary to de- 
 pend on new combinations and other dispositions suited to the 
 now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and centre,, 
 already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once counter- 
 manded, with the sanction of General Johnston, and we arranged 
 to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had chosen to give 
 us battle. . . . These orders having been dul}^ dispatched by 
 staff oflBcers, at 11.30 a. m.. General Johnston and myself set out 
 for the immediate field of action. ... As soon as General 
 Johnston and myself reached the field we were occupied with the 
 organization of the heroic troops whose previous stand, with 
 scarce a parallel, has nothing more valiant in all the pages of his- 
 tory. ... It was now that General Johnston impressively 
 and gallantly charged to the front, with the colors of the 4rth 
 Alabama regiment by his side, all the field officers of the regiment 
 having been previously disabled. ... As soon as we had 
 thus rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General Johnston to 
 leave the immediate conduct of the Held to me, while he, repair- 
 ing to Portici (the Lewis house), should urge reinforcements for- 
 ward. At first he was unwilling, but, reminded that one of us 
 must do so, and that properly it was his place, he reluctantly, but 
 fortunately complied ; fortunately, because from thstt position, by 
 his energy and sagacity, his keen perception and anticipations of 
 my needs, he so directed the reserves as to insure the success of 
 the day." 
 
 In his report, General Beauregard describes, in detail, several 
 phases of the main fightiijg, and adds : 
 
 "Now, full 2 o'clock p. M., I gave the order for the riglit of 
 my line, except my reserves, to advance to recover the plateau. 
 
18 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 . . . The Federal lines were broken and swept back at all 
 points from tbe open ground of the plateau. Rallying soon, 
 however, as they were strongly reinforced by fresh regiments, 
 the Federalists returned, and, by weight of numbers, pressed our 
 lines back, recovered their ground and guns, and renewed the 
 offensive. By this time, between half-past 2 and 3 o'clock p. m., 
 our reinforcements pushed forward, and, directed by General 
 Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand just as I had 
 ordered forward, to a second effort for the recovery of the plateau, 
 the whole line, including my reserve, which, at this crisis of the 
 battle, I felt called u])on to lead in person. . . . Tlie whole 
 open ground was again swept clear of the enemy, and the plateau 
 around the Henry and Robinson houses remained fully in our 
 possession. ... While the enemy had thus been driven 
 back on our right, entirely across the turnpike, and beyond 
 Young's Branch on our left, the woods yet swarmed with them, 
 when our reinforcements opportunely arrived in quick succession 
 and took position in that part of the field." 
 
 After describing the operations that immediately followed on 
 the left. General Beauregard continues his report : " Another 
 important accession to our forces had also occurred about the 
 same time — 3 o'clock p. m. Brigadier-General E. K. Smith, with 
 some seventeen hundred infantry of Elzey's brigade of the Army 
 of the Shenandoah, and Beckham's battery, came upon the field, 
 from Camp Pickens, Manassas, where they had arrived, by rail- 
 road, at noon. [They were] directed by a staff officer, sent in 
 person by General Johnston to the left, then so much endan- 
 gered. . . . 
 
 " Colonel Early, who by some mischance did not receive orders 
 until 2 o'clock, which had been sent him at noon, came on the 
 ground immdiately after Elzey. . . . [Early's] brigade, by the 
 personal direction of General Johnston, was marched by the Holk- 
 ham house across the fields to the left entirely around the woods 
 through which Elzey had passed, and, under a severe fire, into a 
 position in line of battle, near Chinn's house, outflanking the 
 enemy's right. . . . Under this combined attack the enemy 
 was soon forced . . . back over Young's Branch and the 
 turnpike into the fields of the Dogan farm, and rearward, in 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF M.A.NASSAS. 19 
 
 extreme disorder, across the country iu all available directions, 
 towards Bull Run. The rout had now become general and com- 
 plete. . . . Elzey's brigade . . . pursued the now panic- 
 stricken, fugitive enemy. Stuart, with liis cavahy, and Beckham 
 had also taken up the pursuit along the road by which the enemy 
 had come upon the iield that morning. . . . 
 
 " The centre brigades, Bonham's and Longstreet's, of the line 
 of Bull Run, if not closely engaged, were, nevertheless, exposed 
 for much of the day to annoying, almost incessant, fire of 
 artillery of long range. . . . They held, virtually paralyzed, 
 all day, two strong brigades of the enemy, with their batteries. 
 . . . Longstreet's brigade, pursuant to orders prescribing his part 
 of the operations of the centre and right wing, was thrown across 
 Bull Run early in the morning, and, under a severe fire of artil- 
 lery, was skillfully disposed for the assault of the enemy's bat- 
 teries in that quarter, but was withdrawn subsequently in con- 
 sequence of the change of plan already mentioned and ex- 
 plained. . . . After the rout, having been ordered by Gen- 
 eral Johnston in pursuit, in the direction of Centre ville, these 
 [two] brigades advanced nearly to that place, when, night and 
 darkness intervening. General Bonham thought it proper to di- 
 rect his own brigade, and that of General Longstreet, back to 
 Bull Run. 
 
 " General D. R. Jones, early in the day, crossing Bull Run 
 with his brigade, pursuant to orders indicating his part in the 
 projected attack by our right wing and centre on the enemy at 
 Centreville, took up a position on the Union Mills and Centre- 
 ville road, more than a mile in advance of the Run. Ordered 
 back in consequence of the miscarriage of the orders to General 
 Ewell, the retrograde movement was necessarily made under a 
 sharp fire of artillery. At noon this brigade, in obedience to 
 new instructions, was again thrown across Bull Run to make a dem- 
 onstration. Unsupported by other troops, the advance was 
 gallantly made until within musket-range of the enemy's force, 
 Colonel Davies' brigade, in position near Rocky Run. . . 
 Not only did the return-fire of the brigade [Jorics'] drive to 
 cover the enemy's infantry, but the [knowledge of that] move- 
 ment unquestionably spread through the enemy's ranks a sense of 
 
20 • GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 insecurity and danger from an attack by that route on their rear 
 at Centreville, which served to augment the extraordinary panic 
 which we know disbanded the entire Federal array for the 
 
 time. . . • 
 
 " General Ewell, occupying for the time the right of the lines 
 of Bull Kun at Union Mills Ford — after the miscarriage of my 
 orders for his advance upon Centreville — in the afternoon, was 
 ordered by General Johnston to bringjip his brigade into battle, 
 then raging on the left flank. Promptly executed as this move- 
 ment was the brigade, after a severe march, reached the field too 
 late to share the glories, as they had the labors, of the day. As 
 the important position at the Union Mills had been left with but 
 a slender guard, General Ewell was at once ordered to retrace his 
 steps and resume his position, to prevent the possibility of its 
 seizure by any force of the enemy in that quarter. Brigadier- 
 General Holmes, left with his brigade as a support to the same 
 position, in the original plan of battle, had also been called to 
 the left, whither he marched with the utmost speed, but not in 
 time to join actively in the battle. . . . 
 
 " It must be permitted me here to record my profound sense 
 of my obligation to General Johnston, for his generous permis- 
 sion to carry out my plans, with such modifications as circum- 
 stances had required. From his services on the field — as we 
 entered it together, as already mentioned — and his subsequent 
 watchful management of the reinforcements as they reached the 
 vicinity of the field, our countrymen may draw the most aus- 
 picious auguries. . . . 
 
 "In the conclusion of this report it is proper, and, doubtless, 
 expected, that I should acquaint my countrymen with some of 
 the sufficient causes that prevented the advance of our forces and 
 prolonged vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the 
 Potomac. The War Department has been fully advised, long 
 since, of all those causes, some of which only are proper to be here 
 communicated. An army which had fought as ours that day, 
 against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time 
 without water and without food, except a hastily snatched meal 
 at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective 
 pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle. On the fol- 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 21 
 
 lowing day an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain 
 intervened to obstruct our advance, with reasonable prospects of 
 fruitful results. Added to this, the want cf a cavalry force of 
 sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossi- 
 bility." 
 
 The whole tenor of General Beauregard's official report 
 shows conclusively that he considered himself in active com- 
 mand, by authority of General Johnston, subject, of course, to 
 the orders of the senior in rank on the field whenever the latter 
 chose to exercise the power which that rank gave him. 
 
 In addition, the records show that, in an official letter, dated 
 August 16th, 1861, addressed to General T. J. Jackson, General 
 Beauregard said : " I commanded in person on the field on that 
 occasion, being responsible for the success or failure of that 
 battle." 
 
 In view of the " record-facts," it is not at all probable that 
 General Johnston is correct, when he says : General Beauregard, 
 "as the younger officer," "claimed " to be " assigned to the com- 
 mand of the left." There is no shade of ambiguity in any por- 
 tion of General Beauregard's official report ; and it is especially 
 clear iu contemporaneously asserting that he was in command of 
 the combined Confederate forces. 
 
 If Beauregard's statements on this subject were not true, it 
 was General Johnston's duty, at the time, to stamp out such pre- 
 sumption on the part of a junior in rank. General Johnston 
 restricted himself to the terms of his own official report, which 
 — but for Beauregard's official report — would seem to show that 
 Johnston had not intrusted the active command to Beauregard. 
 
 Whilst a difference of color, in that respect, is plainly discern- 
 ible in the reports of these two army commanders, nothing is 
 found, in the somewhat guarded expressions used by General 
 Johnston, which, when fairly construed, could well be placed in 
 direct conflict with the specific statements, made by General 
 Beauregard in his official report, in regard to the active command 
 of the combined Confederate forces. 
 
 It was, therefore, not to be expected that the latter — a junior 
 in rank — would feel it to be incumbent on him, at the time, to 
 
22 GENEBALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUEEGAED 
 
 make special objection to the tone of the report of the former in 
 reference to that question. 
 
 Farther quotations from the official records will now be given 
 in illustration of the partial movements made by the Confederate 
 right and centre, under the " second plan " ordered by Beaure- 
 gard. 
 
 In the official report of General D. K. Jones it is stated : 
 
 "At Y.IO A. M. [July 21], the following order was received : 
 
 " ' General Ewell has been ordered to take the offensive upon 
 Centreville. You will f oIIom^ the movement at once by attacking 
 him [the enemy] in your front,' signed ' G. T. Beauregard.' 
 
 " I immediately placed my brigade in readiness to advance, 
 and dispatched a messenger to communicate with General Ewell, 
 whose movement I was to follow. Not receiving a prompt re- 
 ply, I crossed JVIcLean's Ford, and took position with my artillery 
 in battery on the Union Mills road, . . . which the enemy 
 held with a strong force of artillery, infantry, and cavalry. I 
 here awaited the advance of General Ewell for about two hours 
 and a half. . . . The following positive order [was received] 
 through Colonel Chisholm : 
 
 " ' 10.30 A. M. — General Jones : On account of the diffi- 
 culties^ in our front it is thought preferable to countermand the 
 advance of the right wing. Kesume your former position. G. 
 T. Beauregard.' 
 
 " Upon reaching the entrenchments General Ewell sent me an 
 order he had received from General Beauregard, upon which 
 was the following indorsement, viz. : 
 
 " ' The General [Ewell] says this is the only order he has 
 received. It implies he is to receive another. Send this to 
 General Beauregard if you think proper.' Signed, ' Fitz Lee, 
 Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.' 
 
 " Shortly after this I was requested by General Longstreet to 
 make a demonstration in his favor on my front, followed by an 
 order from General Beauregard, borne by Mr. Terry, 11.30 
 
 * The " difficulties " liere referred to were caused by the miscarriage of the 
 order to Ewell. The Federals, then pressing on the Confederate left, made it 
 seem injudicious, at that time, for the Confederate right and centre to con- 
 tinue the long-delayed movement against the left and rear of the Federals. 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 23 
 
 A. M., to advance upon tlie enemy up Hocky Run, co-operating 
 with General Ewell on my right and General Longstreet on my 
 left. I recrossed the ford, . . . and retraced my route to 
 the position I had occupied in the morning and thence en- 
 deavored to communicate with General Ewell. Failing in this, 
 I notified General Longstreet that I was advancing to the 
 assault." 
 
 General Jones describes the spirited conflict in which his bri- 
 gade became hotly engaged for several hours, but with varying 
 success, and adds : 
 
 " Althougli the main object of our attack — the possession of 
 the battery — was not attained, the effect of our operations, I am 
 glad to believe, was none the less important in working out the 
 grand issues of the day. The enemy left, in panic, the strong posi- 
 tion from which he completely commanded several fords of Bull 
 Hun and the adjacent country for miles around." 
 
 There can hardly be a well founded difference of opinion as to 
 what would have been the probable result, if the order to Ewell to 
 attack had been received by the latter, about T a. m., and the Con- 
 federate right and centre had fallen upon the left flank and the 
 rear of the Federals whilst one-half of McDowell's army was mak- 
 ing a wide, detached movement to the north, on a narrow country 
 road, through dense woods, to cross Bull Eun at Sudley's Ford, 
 two miles beyond the extreme Confederate left. 
 
 Resuming an examination of the official records it is found 
 that a few hours after the battle ended. President Davis addressed 
 the following letter to General Beauregard : 
 
 " Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas and on 
 several other occasions during the existing war, as affording the 
 highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your gallantry as 
 a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are appointed to be 
 general in the army of the Confederate States of America, and, 
 with the consent of Congress, will be duly commissioned accord- 
 ingly." 
 
 On the 24th of that month, the Confederate States Secretary 
 of War wrote to General Beauregard : 
 
 " Accept my congratulations for the glorious and most brilliant 
 victory achieved by you.'' 
 
24 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 On the same day, General R. E. Lee, in a letter to General 
 Beauregard said : 
 
 " I cannot express the joy I feel at the brilliant victory of the 
 21st. The skill, courage, and endurance displayed by yourself 
 excite my highest admiration. You and your troops have the 
 gratitude of the whole country, and I offer to all ray heartfelt 
 congratulations at their success." 
 
 On the next day a congratulatory address was jointly issued 
 to the combined Confederate forces, by Generals Johnston and 
 Beauregard : 
 
 " Soldiers of the Confederate States : 
 
 " One week ago a countless host of men, organized into an 
 army, with all the appointments which modern art and practical 
 skill could devise, invaded the soil of Virginia. . . . 
 
 "... We, your generals commanding, are enabled, in 
 the name of our whole country, to thank you for that patriotic 
 courage, that heroic gallantry, that devoted daring, exhibited by 
 you in the actions of the 18th and 21st, by which the hosts of 
 the enemy were scattered, and a signal and glorious victory ob- 
 tained. 
 
 " The two affairs of the 18th and 21st were but the sustained 
 and continued effort of your patriotism against the constantly 
 recurring columns of an enemy fully treble your numbers. . . . 
 
 " Comrades, our brothers who have fallen have earned un- 
 dying renown upon earth. . . . 
 
 " Soldiers, we congratulate you on a glorious, triumphant 
 and complete victory, and we thank you for doing your whole 
 duty in the service of your country. 
 
 "J. E. Johnston, 
 
 General, C. S. Army. 
 " G. T. Beaueegaed, 
 
 General, C. S. Army." 
 
 On the 12th of September, 1861, General Johnston wrote to 
 President Davis : 
 
 " My rank was expressly recognized by Congress also in the 
 resolutions adopted by that body returning the thanks of Con- 
 gress to General Johnston, to General Beauregard, and to the 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 25 
 
 officers and soldiers of the army for the victory at Manassas. 
 . . . My noble associate with me in the battle has his pre- 
 ferment connected witli the victory won by our common trials 
 and dangers. His commission bears the date of July 21, 1861, 
 but care seems to have been taken to exclude the idea that I had 
 any part in winning our triumph." * 
 
 General Beauregard's official report, as well as that of Gen- 
 eral Johnston, was made to the Adjutant and Inspector-General 
 of the Confederate States Army at Richmond. These two reports, 
 taken together, must be accepted as the true Confederate history 
 of what occurred at the battle of Manassas, unless they are modi- 
 iied by other official records of the time, or by facts, proved by 
 incontestible testimony, developed later. There are some dis- 
 crepancies, as already noted, between the respective reports of 
 these two army commanders. But there seems to be no direct 
 and positive conflict in their statements when a fair attempt is 
 made to adjust their combined meaning. 
 
 The official records in regard to this first great battle of the 
 Secession War, show conclusively that each of the two ranking 
 Confederate officers acquired great and deserved distinction for 
 services in connection with that action. These two commanders 
 were personal friends — they were both gallant and able soldiers 
 — on that field they were close allies — and, in spite of some ad- 
 verse circumstances, their combined forces gained a signal victory. 
 
 But not content with the official records. General Johnston, 
 in 1874, published a " Narrative," in which — without proofs — 
 lie claimed more credit than was justly his due — attacked the 
 correctness of General Beauregard's official report, and attempted 
 to depreciate the character of the services rendered by the com- 
 mander next in rank to himself. He seems to have assumed 
 that his neio version of these operations must be bow accepted as 
 correct, because he was the senior general present. He thus 
 became an aggressor, and forced a close discussion of his later 
 claims. 
 
 * Compare the limitations of that letter with the recent wholesale claims 
 and attempt to jostle General Beauregard out of all share, even, except as an 
 executive subordinate. 
 
26 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 In an article published in the Century 3Iagazine, May, 1885, 
 he repeated, emphasized and enlarged the statements made in 
 his "Narrative." 
 
 If his new claims in his own behalf are well founded, the 
 Confederate official records of this battle are wof nilj misleading, 
 and the concurrent opinion of the Confederate Army, the Gover- 
 ment and the people, in attributing to General Beauregard a 
 very large share of credit for the victory gained at Manassas, was 
 based upon a misapprehension of the facts. 
 
 In the preface to his 1874 "ISTarrative," General Johnston 
 says : " I offer these pages as my contribution of materials for 
 the use of the future historian of the War between the States." 
 It is proposed to group some of his more important claims 
 under headings numbered from 1 to 8. Then, at the risk of 
 tedious repetitions of testimony, the statements contained in each 
 of those groups will be compared with the official records made 
 in 1861, including his own official report, and such comments 
 will be added as may seem to be required in order to fairly 
 illustrate his "contributions" and elucidate tlie truth. 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 27 
 
 Part II. 
 General Johnstons (1874-85) Claims Considered. 
 
 1. He would now have it believed that "Johnston knew 
 the value of concentration for a fight. He played with Patterson, 
 reinforced Beauregard, and won a victory.''* 
 
 The official records show that the strategic elements in these 
 Confederate operations — the transfer of forces from the Yalley 
 of Virginia to Manassas — emanated from General Beauregard. 
 He notified the Government at Richmond that the advance upon 
 his position by the main Federal Army from Washington was 
 imminent— that he had decided to concentrate his army on the 
 line of Bull Run, and that he would attack the Federals east of 
 that stream when they closely approached his position. At the 
 same time he suggested that the line of Bull Run was the place 
 at which the forces under General Johnston could best be used. 
 But Lis decision to fight near Bull Run was formed irrespective 
 of any aid he might, or might not, receive from General 
 Johnston. 
 
 On the 17th of July he informed the Government and General 
 Johnston that his outposts at Fairfax Court-house had been 
 driven in and McDowell's army was advancing. On the same 
 day the Government ordered General Johnston to move his forces 
 from Winchester to Manassas. That order was received by 
 General Johnston at 1 a. m. on the 18th. He replied : " General 
 Patterson seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty- 
 three miles to the east of Winchester. Unless he prevents it,f we 
 shall move towards General Beauregard to-day." • 
 
 * Quoted from a notice of " Johnston's Narrative " in the Neto York Even- 
 ing Mail, April, 1874. See " Battle of Manassas," Beauregard, p. 129. 
 
 I In his " Narrative," General Johnston says: "The only question was, 
 whether to attempt to defeat or to elude General Patterson." Whilst Johnston 
 hesitated. General Beauregard's Adjutant-General telegraphed him: "For 
 God's sake come at once." If he had then attempted to defeat Patterson, there 
 would have been no possibility of Johnston's reinforcing Beauregard before the 
 latter had either won or lost the battle of Manassas. 
 
28 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGAED 
 
 Twelve hours later one brigade started. It arrived at Manassas 
 on the 19th. General Johnston in person, with an additional 
 detachment, reached that place about noon on the 20th. En 
 ro?<^e he received a telegram from President Davis: " You will 
 know how to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-General 
 Beauregard, as well of the ground as of the troops and prepara- 
 tion, avail for the success of the object in which you co-operate." 
 
 On the 18th the Federals had moved against Beauregard's 
 line on BuU Run and were checked. Beauregard refrained from 
 then making a counter-attack, because he had reason to suppose 
 he would soon receive aid from Johnston. 
 
 In the face of the "record-facts," it is worse than idle to 
 claim, at this late day, that General Johnston is entitled to full 
 credit for the strategy, on the Confederate side, which resulted 
 in the first great battle of tlie Secession War. There was cer- 
 tainly, on his part, nothing " J^apoleonic" in the conception, or 
 in the execution, of the movement he was ordered to make from 
 Winchester to Manassas. 
 
 2. He now says that, immediately after his arrival at Ma- 
 nassas, he told General Beauregard the enemy must be attacked 
 as soon as possible next morning ; that he (Johnston) sketched 
 a simple order of march which he begged General Beauregard to 
 have prepared and submitted to him for inspection so that the 
 order of march could be distributed to the troops before night ; 
 that the papers were not presented to him until after dajdight on 
 the 21st ; that they differed in great degree from the order 
 sketched the afternoon of the previous day, but as they would 
 " put the troops in motion if distributed, it would be easy then 
 to direct the course of each division." lie adds : " The papers " 
 " were not written in the form usual in the United States Army, 
 being written by General Beauregard's Adjutant-General in his 
 name, my sanction to be written on each copy. This was too 
 immaterial to be worth correction, for the troops should then 
 have been in motion." 
 
 In contrast with these "After-thoughts" of General Johnston 
 it is well to place here the following extracts from his own official 
 report. In that report he says : " I found General Beauregard's 
 position too extensive, and the ground too densely wooded and 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 29 
 
 intricate, to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and 
 therefore determined to rely npon his knowledge of it and 
 of the enemy's position. . . . During the evening it was 
 determined, instead of remaining in the defensive positions then 
 occupied, to assume the offensive and attack the enemy. . . . 
 General Beauregard proposed a plan of battle, which I approved 
 without hesitation. He drew up the necessary order during the 
 night, which was approved formally by me at 4.30 o'clock, on 
 the morning of the 21st.'' 
 
 General Eeauregard, in his official report, says : " General 
 Johnston arrived here about noon on the 20th of July, and being 
 my senior in rank, he necessarily assumed command of all the 
 forces of the Confederate States then concentrating at this point. 
 Made acquainted with my plan of operations and dispositions to 
 meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval, and gener- 
 ously directed their execution under my command." 
 
 In view of the two foregoing quotations, there is no justifica- 
 tion for General Johnston's asserting — that : 
 
 He told General Beauregard the enemy must be attacked. 
 
 He sketched a simple order of march, which he begged Gen- 
 eral Beauregard to have prepared before night. 
 
 He signed a simple order of march about daylight on the 21st, 
 merely that the troops might be put in motion ; because it would 
 then be easy for him to direct the movements of perfectly raw 
 troops over very extended, wooded and difficult country — and fight 
 a battle upon ground with Avhich he was not even acquainted. 
 
 " The papers," now in question, were the orders for battle ; 
 see Appendix A. They were not written by General Beaure- 
 gard's Adjutant-General, and they did not differ from the order 
 of battle "determined" upon "during the evening" of the 
 20th.* 
 
 * " The order " " was written by Major [W. H. C] Whiting, General John- 
 ston's own confidential staff officer, under General Beauregard's dictation, for 
 the reason that Colonel Jordan, the latter's Adjutant General, was asleep at the 
 time under [the influence of ] a narcotic, which had been administered by Dr. 
 Nott, of Mobile, on account of nervous exhaustion from his almost sleepless 
 labors of nearly two weeks previous. 
 
 " When those orders, thus issued, because of the express understanding ihat 
 General Beauregard should be in command of the field for execution of opera- 
 
30 GENEEALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 3. In reference to the " second plan " General Johnston as- 
 serts that : " Three of the four brigades of the first line, at Mitch- 
 ell's, Blackburn's, and McLean's Fords, reported strong bodies 
 of United States troops on the wooded heights before them. This 
 frustrated the second plan." " Perhaps fortunately." 
 
 Beauregard's _^rs^ plan — see Appendix A — required that the 
 combined Confederate forces should cross Bull Kun early on the 
 morning of the 21st, and attack the Federals. All the accounts, 
 then and later, agree in stating that, at 5.30 a. m. on the 21st, it 
 was reported that large bodies of Federal troops had advanced, on 
 and near the Warrenton turnpike, to the vicinity of Stone Bridge 
 — the Confederate left. On receipt of that information, Beaure- 
 gard, with the approval of General Johnston, ordered the left to 
 stand on the defensive ; and the right and centre to cross Bull 
 Run and attack the left flank and rear of the Federals between 
 that stream and Centreville. This is what is referred to as the 
 *' second plan.'' 
 
 On its face. General Johnston's assertion that the attack, which 
 the Confederate right and centre were ordered to make, was 
 "frustrated" by the "reported'' appearance of the Federals in 
 their front, is worse than absurd. In reference to that attack it 
 has already been stated he simply says, in his official report : 
 
 " This, too, became impracticable ! " But General Beaure- 
 gard's official report states that : 
 
 " Informed at 5.30 a. m., by Colonel Evans, that the enemy 
 had deployed ... in his immediate front, I at once ordered 
 
 tions, were taken to Colonel Jordan in the morning of the 21st of July, for his 
 official signature, he, a staff officer of long experience, inasmuch as the troops 
 of the Army of the Shenandoah were embraced as well as those of the Ai'my 
 of the Potomac, appended of his own jn'ompting, the paragraph of approval 
 for General Johnston, and in person took to him for his signature only such 
 copies as were to be sent to the Army of the Shenandoah, in order, as he stated to 
 him at the moment, to secure beyond the possibility of accident their complete 
 recognition by the Shenandoah troops. 
 
 " Not a word or indication of objection as to the form or tenor of the docu- 
 ment was made by General Johnston, though the fact that General Beaure- 
 gard was to exercise the command of all the Confederate forces in that day's 
 operations was thus made a matter of record." See "Battle of Manassas, 
 Beauregard," p. 60. 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 31 
 
 him, as also General Cocke, if attacked, to maintain their position 
 to the last extremity. In my opinion, the most effective method 
 of relieving that flank was by a rapid, determined attack with 
 my riglit wing and centre, on the enemy's flank and rear at 
 Centreville. . . . By such a movement I confidently ex- 
 pected to achieve a complete victory " " by 12 meridian." " These 
 new dispositions were submitted to General Johnston, who fully 
 approved them, and the orders for their immediate execution 
 were at once issued. Brigadier- General Ewell was directed to 
 begin the movement, to be followe,d and supported successively 
 by Generals D. R. Jones, Longstreet and Bonham, respectively sup- 
 ported by their several appointed reserves. . . From the point 
 previously indicated, where General Johnston and myself had 
 established our headquarters, we heard the continuous roll of 
 musketry and the sustained din of artillery, which announced the 
 serious outburst of the battle on our left flank ; and we anxiously, 
 but confidently, awaited similar sounds of conflict from our front 
 at Centreville, resulting from the prescribed attack in that 
 (juarter by our right wing. At half-past ten, however, this 
 expectation was dissipated by a despatch from Brigadier-General 
 Ewell, informing me, to my profound disappointment, that my 
 orders for his advance had miscarried." 
 
 In a letter addressed to General Ewell, Vv'ithin a month after 
 the battle. General Beauregard expressed regret that his order 
 for attack " could not be carried into effect, as it would have been 
 a more complete victory with only half the trouble and fighting." 
 
 General Johnston approved the " second plan " at the time, 
 and would now have it believed — in face of the ofiicial state- 
 ments made then by General Beauregard — that it was " perhaps," 
 fortunate tliat this plan was " frustrated ! " 
 
 In this connection the following extracts from " Battle of 
 Manassas, Beauregard," will not be found irrelevapt : * 
 
 " Upon our part, a determined resistance, nerved by the 
 excellent conduct of our troops in the repulse of the Federals on 
 the 18th, was trusted by General Beauregard to defend the 
 crossing [in front of the Confederate left] sufficiently to allow 
 
 * See pages 66 to 70 of that work. 
 
32 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 time for our corps of attack [the Confederate right and 
 centre] to make their own offensive movement felt npon the 
 enemy's line, the left of which, wherever found between Bull 
 Run and Centreville, would have been taken in flank and rear. 
 The resistance afterwards maintained by Evans, Bee and Bartow 
 to the entire flanking column fully approved this opinion. But 
 instead of an attempt by the Federal army to cross at and near 
 Stone Bridge, it was divided into two forces, one of which, a 
 column 14,000 strong, was detached in the early morning from 
 the right of the Warrenton turnpike through a narrow, deep-cut 
 road, hedged on both sides by a dense second-growth forest, over 
 a distance of six miles up to Sudley Ford, where it was to cross, 
 and thence march down on our left flank, while the remainder 
 were distributed as follows : Sehenck's brigade, in front of the 
 Stone Bridge, and extending about half a mile below it ; Sher- 
 man's brigade, to the rear and right of Schenck, its left resting 
 on the Warrenton turnpike ; Keyes' brigade, still further to the 
 rear on the turnpike ; that is, Sherman and Keyes were disposed 
 on the Warrenton turnpike between Stone Bridge and Cub Run ; 
 Davies' brigade and Richardson's, united with the command of 
 Davies, were thrown forward in front of Blackburn's Ford, and 
 extending to the vicinity of McLean's Ford, thus isolated at a 
 distance of about three miles from Sehenck's, Sherman's and 
 Keyes' brigades, and from Blencker's brigade at Centreville. 
 
 " By directing that detached column of 14,000 men through 
 a defile of thick woods to Sudley Ford, the Federal commander 
 had done what nothing but the happiest manoeuvres on our part 
 could have accomplished ; for he had thus cut his army in two 
 and sent nearly the select half of it for several hours away from 
 the field. . . . 
 
 " During the time of this circuitous march of the Federals^ 
 our line of battle from Mitchell's Ford to the extreme right *at 
 Union Mills Ford, should have been executing the offensive inove- 
 ment General Beauregard had ordered ; and the employment of 
 so large a mass of the enemy's forces in the divergent operation 
 by Sudley's Ford had so shortened the Federal line in our front 
 that their left (Richardson's brigade) only covered our line as far 
 as the left of Jones' position at McLean's Ford, so that the 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 33 
 
 enemy would have been decisively outflanked by Jones, sup- 
 ported by Early, who were on Longstreet's right, not to speak of 
 Ewell, supported by Holmes, who were on the right of Jones 
 and Early. The report of the Federal brigade commander, 
 Richardson, shows his dread of being out-flanked by Jones' 
 force, while the latter held his advanced position and stood await- 
 ing the arrival of Ewell on his right, upon which the general f or- 
 w ard movement in full line of battle was to begin. 
 
 " In the face of such a movement, which should have begun 
 at 7.30 o'clock at latest (the orders to attack having been sent 
 at 5.30) the Federal left, Richardson, pressed in front by Long- 
 street and out-flanked by Jones, Early, Ewell and Holmes, must 
 have been instantly routed, exposing still more fatally the flank 
 of Davies' brigade, which must have dissolved in turn ; and 
 Blencke)-'s, under the full stress of the flight of these forces and 
 the advance of superior numbers, would have been quickly 
 stampeded. The continuing result would speedily have been 
 that Schenck's, Sherman's and Keyes' forces, demoralized by the 
 unexpected sound of conflict on their rear, and enveloped, 
 must have been overcome and scattered or captured. It is but 
 necessary to read fully the immediate Federal reports and chron- 
 icles of the day, or look to the actual rout that occurred under no 
 such pressure either of numbers or position, to see at a glance 
 what must have happened from such a formidable and happily 
 related offensive movement, which even veteran troops could 
 hardly have successfully withstood. . . . 
 
 " Yet, when McDowell cuts his own army in two, isolates one 
 part from the other by a defile, it is [by General Johnston] con- 
 sidered ' fortunate ' that General Beam-egard's plan of attack — by 
 which our forces must have struck in flank the exposed fraction — 
 failed to go into effect ; and that the enemy was meanwhile per- 
 mitted to execute unmolested his own movement, which General 
 Johnston extols as good strategy — the undiverted accomplishment 
 of which was fraught with such danger to us." 
 
 It is not deemed necessary, at present, to say anything more in 
 regard to General Johnston's recently expressed opinion that 
 it was, "perhaps," fortunate that Beauregard's order, for Ewell to 
 attack, miscarried. 
 
34 GENEEALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUEEGARD 
 
 4. General Johnston says : " I liad been waiting with General 
 Beauregard on Lookout Hill for evidence of General McDowell's 
 design. The violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, 
 but the large bodies of troops reported by chosen scouts to be 
 facing our right kept me in doubt. But near eleven o'clock 
 reports that those troops were felling trees showed that they were 
 standing on the defensive ; and new clouds of dust on the left 
 proved that a large body of Federal troops was arriving on the 
 field. It thus appeared that the enemy's great effort was to be 
 against our left. I expressed this to General Beauregard, and the 
 necessity of reinforcing the brigades engaged, and desired him to 
 send immediate orders to Early and Holmes, of the second line, 
 to hasten to the conflict with their brigades. General Bonham, 
 who was near me, was desired to send up two regiments and a 
 battery. I then set off at a rapid gallop to the scene of action ; 
 General Beauregard joined me without a word."' 
 
 From General Beauregard's official report, it has already been 
 very clearly shown what he was waiting for, whilst General 
 Johnston, as above stated by himself, was waiting " for evidence 
 of General McDowell's design." It will presently be seen that 
 if did not require the " felling of trees " by the Federals, in front 
 of the Confederate right and centre, to convince General Beaure- 
 gard that "the great effort of the enemy was to be against our 
 left." 
 
 But General Johnston wonld have it believed that — he told 
 General Beauregard "the necessity for reinforcing the brigades 
 engaged '' ; he told General Beauregard to order certain specified 
 troops to the left ; he, himself, ordered other troops to the same 
 point ; he then set off at a rapid gallop to the scene of action, and 
 General Beauregard joined him " without a word." 
 
 In short, General Johnston now claims that when it was re- 
 ported the Federals were felling trees in front of the Confederate 
 right and centre, he (Johnston) suddenly became the sole active 
 director on the Confederate side, and Beauregard became a mere 
 automaton. 
 
 The latter, in his official report, states that at 10.30 a. m. he 
 was informed the order for Ewell to attack had miscarried ; and 
 adds: 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 35 
 
 " In my ju'lgment it was no.v too late for the effective exe- 
 cution of the contemplated movement [of the Confederate riglit 
 and centre against the left flank and rear of the Federals] which 
 must have required quite three hours for the troops to get into 
 position for the attack. Therefore, it became immediately neces- 
 sary to depend on new combinations and other dispositions suited 
 to the now pressing exigency. The movement of the right and 
 centre, already begun by Jones and Longstreet, was at once 
 countermanded, with the sanction of General Johnston, and we 
 arranged to meet the enemy on the field upon which he had 
 chosen to give us battle. . . . These orders having been 
 duly dispatched by staff officers at 11.30 a. m., General Johnston 
 and myself set out for the immediate field of action." 
 
 In farther illustration of actual occurrences, on the Confed- 
 erate right and centre, previous to the time at which these two 
 commanders left Lookout Hill, the following quotations are 
 made from General Beauregard's recently published book, " The 
 Battle of Manassas," pages 79 to 88. 
 
 He says : " Here it may be mentioned as an incident signi- 
 ficant in view of General Johnston's present architecture of nar- 
 rative, that General Beauregard, in order to avoid the open road 
 as they came within reach of the enemy's artillery fire, took the 
 wood paths, and for a moment misled by their intricacy lost his 
 way and rode into a pocket path, followed by General Johnston ; 
 but, being familiar with the direction, he struck a straight line 
 through the woods to the point he intended on the Mitchell's 
 Ford road. Halting there for a few moments to send some 
 directions to General Longstreet (he did not go near his position). 
 General Beauregard pointed out to General Johnston the position 
 he intended to occupy a short distance to the left of the road, to 
 which General Johnston thereupon went. And it was thus that 
 he found himself at ' Lookout Hill,' in the rear of Mitchell's 
 Ford, where General Beauregard immediately joined him after 
 dispatching a message. 
 
 " General Beauregard took that position, however, for no 
 such sedentary purpose as ' waiting for evidence of General 
 McDowell's design,' but because it was best adapted for the obser- 
 vation and following up of the attack he had ordered, while af- 
 
36 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 fording convenient report of the progress of the enemy's appa- 
 rent offensive against his left. 
 
 " Here from about 8.30 till 10.30, while hearing the firing in 
 the direction of the left near the Stone Bridge, the sound of 
 attack from our own line of battle towards the right was 
 awaited. ... 
 
 " Neither General Johnston nor General Beauregard knew 
 wliat force of the enemy was in rear of Bull Kun, nor what par- 
 ticular forces of our own were in fact immediately opposed to 
 them. They only knew that an attack was in progress against 
 our left flank, which General Beauregard had ordered to hold out 
 to the last extremity, while the forces on our right and centre 
 should be executing the movement for the counter-attack and 
 seizing the enemy's line of communications ; and they were wait- 
 ing in expectation of the sound of this attack, which would have 
 turned the tables on the Federals, giving the Confederates their 
 ammunition and subsistence trains, and efiectually cutting 
 ofE their retreat. 
 
 " But General Johnston's account is constructed so as to 
 assert that our plan of attack, having been frustrated before 
 eight o'clock by the report from chosen scouts of strong bodies 
 of troops in front of our right, the forces were standing with- 
 out active orders from that hour up to eleven, while he was wait- 
 ing for evidence of the enemy's design, etc. 
 
 "Now, the actual course of events at headquarters, after 
 Generals Johnston and Beauregard took position in reir of Mitch- 
 ell's Ford, was as follows : General Beauregard had sent the 
 signal oflScer (Captain, afterwards Brigadier-General E. P. Alex- 
 ander, an accomplished officer of his army) to Wilcoxen's Hill 
 with couriers to observe and report to him. Captain Alexander 
 sent General Beauregard two dispatches [ivritten, as were all his 
 dispatches to headquarters in the field, not signaled), importing 
 that forces of the enemy were crossing the Run at different 
 points. Later he came to General Beauregard in person, and 
 pointed out a column of dust, which by this time had risen so 
 high as to be visible above the trees from our position. Gen- 
 eral Beauregard thereupon dispatched Captain W. H. Stevens, of 
 the Engineers, to the extreme left, provided with couriers and 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 37 
 
 with orders to sei)d liini a report of the condition of affairs 
 every ten minutes. 
 
 " Meanwhile, and before any such report came from the left 
 (General Johnston being immediately present and a witness of 
 ear and sight), General Beauregard received from General Jones, 
 by Captain Terry, of Texas, a dispatch stating that he had been 
 in position all along waiting for General Ewell's force to come 
 up on his right and begin the offensive movement, as ordered, 
 upon Centreville, but that Ewell had not come into position. 
 General Beauregard immediately despatched Captain Terry to 
 Ewell with an order to hasten forward. Soon, however, the 
 firing on the left increased sensibly, and General Johnston said 
 that, as matters seemed to be growing serious in that quarter, 
 he thought he had better go there. He proposed nothing more 
 than this, the usefulness of his immediate personal presence with 
 the troops engaged, while General Beauregard remained in rear 
 of Mitchell's Ford directing our own offensive movement which 
 he had just reurged upon Ewell. General Beauregard thought 
 it a very useful thing for General Johnston to do, but in a few 
 moments, and before the latter started, a dispatch came to General 
 Beauregard from General Ewell himself, showing that he was not 
 merely delayed on the way, but that, not having received the 
 final order to move to the attack, he had been at a stand in his 
 original position awaiting it. 
 
 " This news altered the whole aspect of the question to Gen- 
 eral Beauregard, who, from his knowledge of the country to be 
 covered, thought it now unlikely that the troops would be able to 
 get into position in time to make their attack felt on the right so 
 as to CO operate decisively with the defensive action by such troops 
 as were then on the left, and, expressing this consideration to 
 General Johnston, said that the attack which had just then been 
 reurged by order to General Ewell (to move into position with 
 the advanced line that was waiting for him), should be abandoned 
 altogether, and that all available reinforcements should be 
 hastened to the left so as to fight the battle in that quarter. Gen- 
 eral Johnston, stating that he could give no positive advice on 
 the subject on account of his not understanding the country and 
 knowing but little of the location of the troops, expressed his 
 
38 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 agreement with General Beauregard's opinion, though giving his 
 for what it Avas worth. . . . 
 
 " General Beauregard thereupon ordered General Bonham, 
 who was at hand, to send to the left two regiments and a battery 
 (Kershaw's and Cash's regiments with Kemper's battery were sent), 
 and dispatched orders to Holmes and Early to move to the same 
 quarter, and to Jones and Ewell to resume their former position. 
 But, considering it also necessary to maintain a strong demonstra- 
 tion along our position in front of the Run, so as to detain the 
 enemy there, he gave, before setting out for the left, directions 
 to this eifect to Bonham, Longstreet, Jones and Ewell. After he 
 had dispatched these orders. General Johnston and he set out 
 together for the scene of the engagement. 
 
 " In his official report of the battle, General Beauregard re- 
 lates this change of tactics as made with General Johnston's 
 ' sanction,' studiouslj^ maintaining here, as elsewhere, that reserve 
 and deference which military men will understand as due from 
 the junior to the senior ofiicer present, and toning statements down 
 to the least self-expi*ession consistent with the facts. . . . 
 
 " General Johnston in his official report had here said : 
 
 " 'About 11 o'clock the violence of the firing on the left in- 
 dicated a battle, and the march of a large body of troops from 
 the enemy's centre towards the conflict was shown by clouds of 
 dust. I was thus convinced that his great effort was to be made 
 with his riffht. I stated that conviction to General Beauregard 
 and the absolute necessity of immediately strengthening our 
 left as much as possible.' 
 
 " The language of this passage was noticed by General 
 Beauregard at the time as, though being literally true so far as 
 it gave General Johnston's opinion as expressed in concurrence 
 with that of General Beauregard as above related, yet bearing 
 an incorrect suggestion. But he [Beauregard] was very grateful 
 for the coming of the Shenandoah force to his assistance, and his 
 feelings were averse to the least thing that might raise a coldness 
 between him and General Johnston. The facts had been so 
 clearly stated in his report, which, though he was the junior, was 
 not questioned by his senior, whose duty it was to do so immedi- 
 ately after reading it [if it needed correction], and, moreover, the 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 39 
 
 substantial facts themselves were so notorious that it might have 
 seemed a pruriency to have raised under such conditions any con- 
 tentious question." 
 
 The " incorrect suggestion," contained in the quotation just 
 given from General Johnston's official report, is the germ from 
 which has now been developed his claim that he told General 
 Beauregard to order certain troops to reinforce those engaged — 
 himself at once ordered additional forces to the same point — then 
 set off for the scene of action, and was joined by Beauregard 
 " without a word ! " 
 
 Further comment on this branch of the subject is not needed 
 here, 
 
 5. In his " After-thoughts" General Johnston states, very truly, 
 that, " A large proportion of " General Beauregard's own army 
 " was not engaged in the battle," and adds : 
 
 " This was a great fault on my part. When Bee's and Jack- 
 son's brigades were ordered to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, 
 those of Holmes and Early should have been moved to the left 
 also, and placed in the interval on Bonham's left — if not then, 
 certainly at nine o'clock, when a Federal column was seen turn- 
 ing our left ; and, when it seemed certain that General McDow- 
 ell's great effort was to be made there, Bonham's, Longstreet's, 
 Jones's and Ewell's brigades, leaving a few regiments and their 
 cavalry to impose on Miles' division, should have been hurried 
 to the left to join in the battle.'' 
 
 In General Beauregard's first order for battle — see Appendix 
 A — Jackson's brigade was assigned to the support of Longstreet's 
 brigade. Bee's brigade was assigned to the reserve ; Elzey's bri- 
 gade was to support Cocke, in the vicinity of Stone Bridge, and 
 Bartow's brigade was to support Bonham at Mitchell's Ford. 
 But, when it was reported, on the morning of the 21st, that the 
 Federals were threatening in front of Stone Bridge, Elzey's bri- 
 gade and a large portion of Bartow's had not arrived at Manassas 
 Junction. Thus, the Confederate left was deprived of its reg- 
 ularly assigned supports, and the Federals were unexpectedly 
 moving in force against that part of the line. The non-arrival of 
 Elzey's and Bartow's troops made it necessary to transfer Bee's 
 and Jackson's brigades to the left, before 7 a. m. 
 
40 GENEEALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUEEGAKD 
 
 At that time General Beauregard, with the approval of Gen- 
 eral Johnston, had just ordered an important forward movement 
 to be made by the right and centre of the Confederate forces. 
 It is, therefore, worse than absurd for General Johnston to assert 
 that it was " a great fault " on his part, that he did not order 
 Holmes and Early to the left when Bee's and Jackson's brigades 
 were ordered to the vicinity of Stone Bridge. 
 
 General Johnston further says : " We could distinctly hear 
 [about 10 A. M.] the sounds and see the smoke of the fight. But 
 they indicated no hostile force that Evan's troops and those of 
 Bee, Hampton and Jackson, which we could see hurrying towards 
 the conflict in that order were not adequate to resist." 
 
 There was a ridge of high ground and much woods between 
 the hill on which General Johnston was then stationed and the 
 low ground upon which the fighting was going on, four or five 
 miles from him. It was physically impossible for him to have 
 seen " Evan's troops and those of Bee, Hampton and Jackson " 
 " hurrying to the conflict in that order." 
 
 But, if he had then seen what he says he did ; and those troops 
 were " adequate to resist " the " hostile force " in their front ; it 
 would seem that General Johnston had no good reason to censure 
 himself for not having ordered " Holmes and Early " to move to 
 the left, before 7 a. m., when they were needed on the right to 
 carry into effect the order for the Confederate right and centre 
 to attack the left flank and rear of the Federals. 
 
 It is difficult to perceive why he censures himself in this 
 matter except for the double purpose of having it now believed 
 that he was in active executive command during all these opera- 
 tions, and of throwing discredit on Beauregard's order for the 
 Confederate right and centre to attack the left flank and rear of 
 the Federals. 
 
 6. After stating that General Beauregard "joined" him 
 *' without a word " ! General Johnston adds : " While we were 
 riding forward General Beauregard suggested to me to assign 
 him to the immediate command of the troops engaged, so that 
 my super\iRion of the whole field might not be interrupted, to 
 which I assented." 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 41 
 
 General Beauregard, in his official report, says : " As soon as 
 we had thus rallied and disposed our forces, I urged General 
 Johnston to leave the immediate conduct of the field to me, 
 while he, repairing to " " the Lewis house, sliould urge reinforce- 
 ments forward. At first he was unwilling, but, reminded that 
 one of us must do so, and that properly it was his place, he re- 
 luctantly, but fortunately complied ; fortunately, because from 
 that position, by his energy and sagacity, his keen perception and 
 anticipation of my needs, he so directed the reserves as to insure 
 the success of the day." 
 
 General Johnston, in his official report, says : " Order was 
 soon restored and the battle re-established. . . . Then, in a 
 brief and rapid conference, Genei-al Beauregard was assigned to 
 the command of the left, which, as the younger officer, he 
 claimed, while I returned to that of the whole field." 
 
 Whatever discrepancies there may be in the above extracts 
 from the official reports, there is none in regard to the time 
 and place at which the incident in question occurred. Each 
 of those reports shows that General Johnston is certainly in 
 error when he says : " While we were riding forward General 
 Beauregard 'suggested to me to assign him." The suggestions 
 were made after the Confederates had been rallied on the 
 plateau, and '•' the battle re-established." 
 
 There was no occasion, at any time, during these operations, 
 for General Beauregard to urge — suggest — or request — that he 
 be assigned to the command of " those troops " — because he 
 was already, by authority of General Johnston, in actual com- 
 mand of all the forces of both of the Confederate armies on that 
 field. But he did insist that General Johnston should leave the 
 fighting line, and repair to the Lewis house for the purpose 
 of urging reinforcements forward. In this, General Beaure- 
 gard, in good faith, was taking the best measures to achieve 
 success, under the authority generously conferred upon him by 
 General Johnston, when he approved Beauregard's plans and 
 directed their execution under Beauregard's "command." It 
 is true that Johnston was reluctant to leave the plateau, but 
 there was no longer a pressing necessity for the personal presence 
 of both of these commanders in the fighting line, and General 
 
42 GENEBALS JOHNSTON AND BEATJKEGARD 
 
 Johnston acted wisely in accepting Beauregard's urgent advice 
 in this matter. 
 
 7. In his " After-thoughts," General Johnston says : " Learn- 
 ing that Bee's and Jackson's brigades were still on the right, I 
 again desired General Beauregard to transfer them to the left, 
 which he did.'' " As fought, the battle was made by me ; 
 Bee's and Jackson's brigades were transferred to the left by me, I 
 decided that the battle was to be there, and directed the meas- 
 ures necessary to maintain it ; a most important one being the 
 assignment of General Beauregard to the immediate command 
 of this left, which he held. In like manner the senior officer on 
 the riffht would have commanded there if the Federal left had 
 attacked." ** He [Beauregard] commanded those troops under 
 me ; as elsewhere Lieutenant-Generals commanded corps and 
 Major-Generals divisions, under me." " We were compelled to 
 fight on the defensive ... on a new and unsurveyed field " 
 " selected by General Bee." 
 
 In General Johnston's ofiicial report there is no intimation 
 of the implied censure contained in his statement that he had to, 
 again, desire General Beauregard to transfer Bee's and Jackson's 
 brigades to the left. The necessity for that transfer of these 
 two brigades was caused by General Johnston's mistake in regard 
 to the time of arrival of a large portion of his own army. 
 
 In liis official report he says that on the afternoon of the 20th 
 he " regarded the arrival of the remainder of the army of the 
 Shenandoah during the night as certain." On this assurance 
 from General Johnston, General Beaui*egard, as already stated, 
 assigned Bee's brigade to the reserve, Jackson's brigade to sup- 
 port Longstreet, Elzey's brigade to support Cocke, and Bartow's 
 brigade to support Bonham. It has already been shown too, 
 that, when it was reported at 5. 30 A. m., on the 21st, that the 
 Federals, in strong force, were threatening the Confederate left, 
 Elzey's brigade, and a large portion of Bartow's had not arrived 
 at Manassas Junction ; and the brigades of Cocke and Bonham 
 were thus deprived of the supports which had been assigned to 
 them. In this state of affairs it became necessary to transfer 
 Bee's and Jackson's brigades to the left. 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 43 
 
 General Beauregard, in bis official report, says: 
 
 " About 7 o'clock a. m., Jackson's brigade, witb Imboden's 
 and five pieces of Walton's battery, had been sent to take up 
 position along Bull Run, to guard the interval between Cocke's 
 right and Bonham's left, with orders to support either in case of 
 need. ... So much of Bee's and Bartow^'s brigades, now 
 united, as had arrived, some twenty-eight hundred muskets, had 
 also been sent forward to support the position of the Stone 
 Bridge." 
 
 But, even if it were true that, very early on the morning of 
 the 21st, General Johnston had, again, to desire General Beaure- 
 gard to transfer Bee's and Jackson's brigades to the left, this 
 would not prove that the battle, " as fought," was made by Gen- 
 eral Johnston. At the time of the transfer of these two brigades, 
 Beauregard had just ordered the Confederate right and centre to 
 attack the Federal left flank and rear, and ordered the Confed- 
 erate left "to maintain their position to the last extremity"; and 
 General Johnston approved those orders. 
 
 In asserting that he " decided that the battle was to be " " on 
 the Confederate left," General Johnston ignores his own state- 
 ment that, " We were compelled to fight on the defensive, . . . 
 on a new and unsurveyed field " " selected by General Bee." 
 
 " The field " loas " unsurveyed," and unknown, to General 
 Johnston ; but General Beauregard was thoroughly acquainted 
 with all the ground upon which these operations were conducted. 
 He certainly had something to say in regard to " the measures 
 necessary to maintain it " ; and it must be admitted that General 
 McDowell decided the question as to where the battle was to be 
 fought. 
 
 It is not necessary to repeat here the circumstances connected 
 with the so-called "assignment of General Baauregard to the 
 immediate command of this left, which he held." But, in refer- 
 ence to General Johnston's assertion that General Beauregard 
 " commanded those troops under me, as elsewhere, Lieutenant- 
 Generals commanded corps, and Major-Generals divisions under 
 me " ; it may well be said that this is not in accord with the ofticial 
 records of these events — including the letter of the President of 
 the Confederate States, written at Manassas a few lionrs after the 
 
4A GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGAKD 
 
 battle ended — the letters of the Secretary of War and General R. 
 E. Lee, dated a few days later — the joint congratulatory address 
 issued by Generals Johnston and Beauregard four days after the 
 fight — and the resolutions adopted by the Confederate Congress, 
 returning the thanks of that body to Generals Johnston and 
 Beauregard for the victory. 
 
 8. It will be borne in mind that, in General Johnston's official 
 report, the only reference he makes to the failure of the Confed- 
 erate right and centre to attack the left flank and rear of the Fed- 
 erals is contained in the words : '* This, too, became impracticable." 
 In that report he makes no mention of the miscarriage of the 
 order for General E well to move into action very early on the 
 morning of the 21st. 
 
 General Johnston now asserts : 
 
 " There could have been no greater mistake on General 
 Ewell's part than making the movement to Centreville," " But 
 he had no reason to suppose that his commander [Beauregard] 
 desired him to move to Centreville where there was then no 
 enemy." " General Ewell was not ' instructed in the plan of 
 attack,' for he says in his official report : ' I first received orders 
 to hold myself in readiness to advance at a moment's notice. I 
 next received a copy of an order sent to me by General Jones, in 
 which it was stated that I had been ordered to his support.' Three 
 other contradictory orders, he says, followed." 
 
 " General Ewell does not say that ' three other contradictory 
 orders, were received by him, as General Johnston ventures to 
 assert, manifestly with the object of fathering upon that 
 worthy oflicer an official criticism of General Beauregard's orders, 
 of which he was incapable."* 
 
 " General Beauregard's were successive orders, and no more 
 contradictory than are any two or more successive orders to suit 
 the changing circumstances of a battle. They were issued by him 
 with General Johnston present — they controlled the actions of 
 the divisions of the army in the crisis of the day.''t 
 
 It has already been shown that General E well received the 
 first order issued by General Beauregard early on the morning of 
 
 * "Battle of Manassas."— Beauregard, p. 107. t Page 108. 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 45 
 
 the 2l8t, which required all the Confederate forces to be prepared 
 to make an immediate " offensive movement" in the direction of 
 Centreville. General Ewell's Adjutant-General, in a note written 
 on the field that morning, stated that the above order was re- 
 ceived by General Ewell, and adds : " It implies he is to receive 
 another.'' 
 
 There is no justification for General Johnston's late assertion 
 that General Ewell "had no reason to suppose that" General 
 Beauregard " desired him to move to Centreville where there was 
 no enemy." In point of fact, Blencker's brigade, over 3,000 
 strong, w^as at Centreville, and Davies and Richardson, 6,000 
 strong, were in advance of that place not far from the Union 
 Mills road, on which Ewell was to have moved, and initiated the 
 attack against the left flank and rear of the Federals. 
 
 It is not necessary to repeat here what has already been said 
 in regard to the effect that would probably have been produced 
 upon the brigades of Richardson, Davies and Blencker, then 
 upon those of Keyes, Sherman and Schenck, and finally upon 
 the remainder of McDowell's army, if the Confederate right and 
 centre had advanced, about T a. m., and promptly attacked the 
 Federal left and rear, as they surely would have done but for the 
 miscarriage of the order sent to General Ewell, about 5.30 a. m. 
 
 In conclusion it may be stated that distinct traces of General 
 Johnston's method of conveying wrong impressions — by omis- 
 sions and special wording — are found in his official report. These 
 peculiarities — and worse — are far more pronounced in his " Nar- 
 rative," and they reach their full development in his Century 
 Magazine article. 
 
 It has not been considered necessary to point out, in detail, 
 all the instances in which he has resorted to such devices for the 
 purpose of conveying " incorrect suggestions 'i in regard to his 
 own and General Beauregard's connection with these opera- 
 tions ; neither has it been deemed essential to dwell upon all 
 the wrong conclusions that might be drawn from the state- 
 ments he has thus " contributed " to history. It is believed 
 that enouo-h has been said to srive a clear idea of the character of 
 his attempts to unduly exalt his own credit, and unfairly detract 
 from the well-earned distinction of General Beauregard. 
 
46 GENERALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUREGARD 
 
 APPENDIX A. 
 
 " Hdqks. Aemy of the Potomac, ) 
 "July 20, 1861. j . 
 
 " Special Orders, } 
 
 «' No. . j 
 
 "The following order is published for the information of 
 division and brigade commanders : 
 
 " I. Brigadier-General Swell's brigade, supported by General 
 Holmes' brigade, will march via Union Mills Ford and place 
 itself in position of attack upon the enemy. It will be held in 
 readiness either to support the attack upon Centre ville or to 
 move in the direction of Sangster's Cross-roads, according to 
 circumstances. 
 
 " The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in- 
 Chief. 
 
 " II. Brigadier-General Jones' brigade, supported by Colonel 
 Early's brigade, will march via McLean's Ford to place itself in 
 position of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills 
 and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to sup- 
 port the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of 
 Fairfax Court-house, according to circumstances, with its right 
 flank towards the left of Ewell's command, more or less distant, 
 according to the nature of the country. 
 
 " The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in- 
 Chief. 
 
 "III. Brigadier-General Longstreet's brigade, supported by 
 Brigadier-General Jackson's brigade, will march via McLean's 
 Ford to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or 
 about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in 
 readiness either to support the attack on Centreville or to move 
 in the direction of Fairfax Court-house, according to circum- 
 stances, with its right flank towards the left of Jones' command, 
 more or less distant, according to the nature of the country. 
 
AT THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 47 
 
 "IV. Brigadier-General Bonham's brigade, supported by 
 Colonel Bartow's brigade, will march via Mitchell's Ford to the 
 attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the Third Divi- 
 sion, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country 
 and of the attack. 
 
 " The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in- 
 Chief. 
 
 *' V. Colonel Cocke's brigade, supported by Colonel Elzey's 
 brigade, will march via Stone Bridge and the fords on the right 
 thereof to the attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of 
 the Fourth Division, more or less distant, according to the nature 
 of the country and of the attack. 
 
 " The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in- 
 Chief. 
 
 " YI. Brigadier-General Bee's brigade, supported by Colonel 
 Wilcox's brigade, Colonel Stewart's regiment of cavalry and the 
 whole of Walton's battery, will form the reserve, and will march 
 via Mitchell's Ford, to be used according to circumstances. 
 
 " YII. The light batteries will be distributed as follows : 
 
 " 1. To Brigadier-General Ewell's command. Captain Walker's 
 six pieces. 
 
 " 2. To Brigadier-General Jones', Captain Alburtis' and Stan- 
 ard's batteries, eight pieces. 
 
 " 3. To Brigadier-General Longstreet's, Colonel Pendleton's 
 and Captain Imboden's batteries, eight pieces. 
 
 "4. To Brigadier-General Bonham's, Captain Kemper's and 
 Shield's batteries, eight pieces. 
 
 " 5. To Colonel Cocke's, Colonel Huuton's and Captains La- 
 tham's and Beckham's batteries, twelve pieces. 
 
 "VIII. Colonel Kadford, commanding cavalry, wiU detail, 
 to report immediately, as follows : 
 
 " To Brigadier-General-Ewell, two companies of cavalry. 
 
 " To Brigadier-General Jones, two companies of cavalry. 
 
 " To Brigadier-General Longstreet, two companies of cavalry. 
 
 " To Brigadier-General Bonham, three companies of cavalry. 
 
 " To Colonel Cocke, the remaining companies of cavalry, ex- 
 cept those in special service. 
 
48 GENEBALS JOHNSTON AND BEAUEEGARD. 
 
 "IX. The rourth and Fifth Divnsions, after the fall of 
 Centreville, will advance to the attack of Fairfax Conrt-house, 
 via the Braddock and turnpike roads, to the north of the latter. 
 
 "The First, Second and Third Divisions will, if necessary, 
 support the Fourth and Fifth Divisions. 
 
 " X. In this movement the First, Second and Third Divisions 
 will form the command of Brigadier-General Holmes ; the Fourth 
 and Fifth Divisions, that of the second in command. The re- 
 serves will move upon the plains between Mitchell's Ford and 
 Stone Bridge, and, together with the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, 
 will be under the immediate direction of General Beauregard. 
 
 " By command of General Beauregard. 
 
 " ThcJmas Jordan, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant General." 
 
 '* Hdqrs. Army of the Potomac, ) 
 July 21, 1861, 4.30 a. m. f 
 
 " Special Orders, ) 
 No. . \ 
 
 " The plan of attack given by Brigadier-General Beauregard 
 in the above order is approved and will be executed accordingly. 
 
 "J. E. Johnston, 
 
 General, C. S. Army." 
 
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