PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT *:^1^....^ .^^t::^:^^ PERSONAL MEMOIRS .1)1 O^ Ui'S. GRANT YOLUME TWO NEW YORK THE CENTURY CO. 1917 Copyright, 1885, by Ulysses 8. Grant. Copyright, 1895, by JvLix D. Grant. i^^-- -^ t- ^ *■ ^ o y TABLE OF CONTENTS Vol. II FAOB Chapter I. Preparations for Battle — Thoivias CARRIES THE FiRST LiNE OP THE EnEMY — SHER- MAN CARRIES Missionary Ridge — Battle of Lookout Mountain — General Hooker's Fight 1 Chapter II, Battle of Chattanooga — A Gallant Charge — Coiviplete Rout of the Enemy — Pur- suit OF THE Confederates — General Bragg — Remarks on Chattanooga 12 Chapter III. The Relief of Knoxville — Head- quarters moved to Nashville — Visiting Knox- ville — Cipher Despatches — Withholding Or- ders 24 Chapter IV. Operations in Mississippi — Long- street in East Tennessee — Commissioned Lieu- tenant-General — Commanding the Armies of the United States — First Interview with Pres- ident Lincoln 39 Chapter V. The Military Situation — Plans for the Campaign — Sheridan assigned to Command OF the Cavalry — Flank Movements — Forrest at Fort Pillow — General Banks's Expedition — Colonel Mosby — An Incident of the Wil- derness Campaign 53 vii VIU TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Chapter VI. Commencement of the G-rand Cajvi- PAiGN — General Butler's Position — Sheridan's First Raid 71 Chapter VII. Sherman's Cajvipaign in Georgia — Siege op Atlanta — Death of General McPher- SON — Attempt to Capture Andersonville — Capture of Atlanta . • 81 Chapter VIII. Grand Movement of the Army of the Potomac — Crossing the Rapidan — Enter- ing THE Wilderness — Battle of the Wilder- ness 95 Chapter IX. After the Battle — Telegraph and Signal Service — Movement by the Left Flank 116 Chapter X. Battle of Spottsylvania — Hancock's Position — Assault of Warren's and Wright's Corps — Upton promoted on the Field — Good News from Butler and Sheridan . . . 126 Chapter XL Hancock's Assault — Losses of the Confederates — Promotions recommended — Discomfiture of the Eneimy — E well's Attack — Reducing the Artillery . . . .134 Chapter XII. Movement by the Left Flank — Battle of North Anna — An Incident of the March — Moving on Richmond — South of the Pamunkey — Position of the National Army . 146 Chapter XIII. Advance on Cold Harbor — An An- ecdote OF the War — Battle of Cold Harbor — Correspondence with Lee — Retrospective . 162 Chapter XIV. Left-flank Movement across the Chickahominy and James — General Lee — Visit TABLE OF CONTENTS IX PAGE TO Butler — The Movement on Petersburg — The Investiment of Petersburg .... 174 Chapter XV. Raid on the Virginia Central Rail- road — Raid on the Weldon Railroad — Early's MOVEJIENT upon WASHINGTON — MiNING THE Works before Petersburg — Explosion of the Mine before Petersburg — Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley — Capture of the Weldon Railroad 192 Chapter XVI. Sheridan's Advance — Visit to Sheridan — Sheridan's Victory in the Shenan- doah — Sheridan's Ride to Winchester — Close OF THE Campaign for the Winter . . . 213 Chapter XVII. The Cajmpaign in Georgia — Sher- man's March to the Sea — War Anecdotes — The March on Savannah — Investjient of Sa- vannah — Capture of Savannah . . . 227 Chapter XVIII. The Battle op Franklin — The Battle of Nashville 254 Chapter XIX, Expedition against Fort Fisher — Attack on the Fort — Failure op the Expedi- tion — Second Expedition against the Fort — Capture of Fort Fisher 261 Chapter XX. Sherman's March N6rth — Sheridan ordered to Lynchburg — Canby ordered to move against Mobile — Movements of Scho- field and ThomasI — Capture of Columbia, South Carolina — Sherman in the Carolinas ". .271 Chapter XXI. Arrival of the Peace CoivonssiON- ERS — Lincoln and the Peace Commissioners — An Anecdote of Lincoln — The Winter before X TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Petersburg — Sheridan destroys the Railroad — Gordon carries the Picket-line — Parke re- captures the Line — The Battle of White Oak Road 287 Chapter XXII. Interview with Sheridan — Grand Movement op the Army of the Potomac — Sher- idan's Advance on Five Forks — Battle of Five Forks — Parke and Wright storm the Enemy's Lines — Battles before Petersburg . . .300 Chapter XXIII. The Capture of Petersburg — Meeting President Lincoln in Petersburg — The Capture of Richiviond — Pursuing the Ene- my — Visit to Sheridan and Meade . . . 314 Chapter XXIV. Battle of Sailor's Creek — Engagement at Farmville — Correspondence with General Lee — Sheridan intercepts the Enemy . 328 Chapter XXV. Negotiations at Appoiviattox — Interview with Lee at McLean's House — The Terms op Surrender — Lee's Surrender — In- terview with Lee after the Surrender . . 337 Chapter XXVI. Morale of the Two Armies — Rel- ative Conditions of the North and South — President Lincoln visits Richmond — Arrival AT Washington — President Lincoln's Assassi- nation — President Johnson's Policy . . 350 Chapter XXVII. Sherman and Johnston — Johns- ton's Surrender to Sherman — Capture of Mo- bile — Wilson's Expedition — Capture of Jef- ferson Davis — General Thomas's Qualities — Estimate of General Canby .... 362 TABLE OF CONTENTS XL PAGE Chapter XXVIII. The End of the War — The March to Washington — One of Lincoln's Anec- dotes — Grand Review at Washington — Char- acteristics OF Lincoln and Stanton — Estimate OF THE Different Corps Coimimanders . . 373 Conclusion 386 Appendix 397 Index . . . « , . , . 461 i.^ ^ l^ LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS U. S. Gbant, General Retired Frontispiece Facing page Map op the Battle-field of Chattanooga 4 Map of Operations in Mississippi 42 Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant 56 Facsimile of Lincoln's "God-speed" to Grant 64 Map op Operations at Drewry's Bluff, Bermuda Hundred, AND Deep Bottom 72 Map of the Atlanta Campaign 84 Map illustrating the Siege of Atlanta, Georgia 92 From the Rapidan to Richmond 96 Map of the Wilderness 104 Map op the Country between the "Wilderness and Spott- SYLVANiA Court House 120 Map op Spottsylvania Court House 128 "^ Map op the Virginia Campaigns of 1864-65 136' Map of North Anna 150 Field of Operations between the Pamunkey and James Rivers 156 ' Map of the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren and Sheridan Raids .. 161'^ Map of Cold Harbor 164 ' General Grant and Staff at Bethesda Church 168 "-" General Grant at Headquarters during the Virginla. Cam- PAIGN 184 Map of Richmond 200 ^ Map of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign 216 ^ General Grant, Mrs. Grant, and Master Jesse at Head- quarters at City Point 224 -'- From Atlanta to Savannah 240 ■snii u^ XIV LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS Facing page . Map of Franklin and Nashville 258 Sketch op Vicinity of Fort Fisher 262 ^ Map of Sherman's Route through the Carolinas 276 Map op Petersburg and Five Forks 304'^ Map of the Petersburg and Appomattox Campaigns 316 '^ Map of Jetersville and Sailor's Creek 328 Map op High Bridge and Farmville 332 ^ McLean's House, Appomattox Court House 338 Map op Appomattox Court House 340 The Surrender at Appomattox 344 Facsimile of General Grant's Despatch announcing the Surrender of General Lee 348 Right Profile of General Grant, 1875 368 Left Profile of General Grant, 1875 384 Important Battles op the Civil War 396 ^ PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKANT CHAPTEE I PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE — THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY — SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE — BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUN- TAIN — GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT ON the 20th, when so much was occurring to dis- chap, i courage, — rains falHng so heavily as to delay Nov. ises the passage of troops over the river at Brown's ferry, and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge ; news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville, and ^-^jfo™ of Willcox being threatened by a force from the east, — a letter was received from Bragg which con- tained these words : " As there may still be some ^•^2)'|™ non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." Of course I understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Vol. II.— 1 1 2 PERSONAL MEMOrRS OF U. S. GEANT Chap. I Bragg was leaving our front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to fol- low, but was recalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until Knoxville could be captured and his troops there be returned to Chattanooga. Nov. 1863 During the night of the 21st the rest of the pon- toon-boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in the North Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress in Washington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for his relief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. The position occupied by the Army of the Cum- berland had been made very strong for defense during the months it had been besieged. The line was about a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek — a small stream running near the base of Missionary Eidge and emptying into the Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga — on the left to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. The important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so forti- Fortwood fied was one to the east of the town, named Fort THOMAS CAREIES THE FIKST LINE 3 Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact chap, i that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. Fort Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d, Thomas, ^"^aj^g^^^ according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood com- w.p.'mi-ii'; manding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed ^te-is- them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on vois^oct.ii, the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Ge11.jan.27, Citico Creek. Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. He supported Sheridan with one divi- sion (Baird's), while his other division, under John- B^ird^w^p son, remained in the trenches, under arms, ready BriS^n. to be moved to any point. Howard's corps was ^^seljfBvt^' moved in rear of the center. The picket-lines were sept."i,i86i within a few hundred yards of each other. At two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. The signal for advance was given by ]^lna"w'B a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other ^^^^ <2> ^^ points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These, too, were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to rein- force their advance guards. But it was not with- out loss on both sides. This movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. The fortifi- 4 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT CHAP. I cations were rapidly turned to face the other way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the pris- oners that were captured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary Eidge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have been assured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should have rested more easily. But we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. w.R.xxxi By the ni2:ht of the 23d Sherman's command was (2) 572 JO in a position to move, though one division (Oster- haus's) had not yet crossed the river at Brown's ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross ; but I was determined to move that night even without this Ibid. 598 division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus, accord- ingly, to report to Hooker if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him. General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of the Military Division. To him Ibid. 73 were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from the North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. During the night G-eneral Morgan MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF CHATTANOOGA. ^ ca7e orMt!< UNITED. STATES FORCES CONrEDERATE •"• J CROSSING THE TENNESSEE L. Smith's division was marched to the point where chap, i the pontoons were, and the brigade of Griles A. coihthMS: Smith was selected for the deUcate duty of manning ^Brls^-Gen! ,1 Vols.Julyie, the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the 1862 south bank of the river. During this night, also, General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, moved -Jia^w'T forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of Mexico, the Cumberland, and placed them on the north side Brig.-Geu. of the river so as to command the ground opposite, 28;i86i to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to use Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, ^-^2)^^^ Thomas having none. At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chicka- ibid. 73 mauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of the South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket-guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised and twenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the north side of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. The rest of Jof^s^th^iS: M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division "^BSGln.' ' , - - Vols. Nov. of John E. Smith. The troops as they landed were 29,1862 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP.i put to work intrencliing their position. By day- light the two entire divisions were over and well covered by the works they had built. The work of laying the bridge on which to cross the artillery and cavalry was now begun. The ■^2)^?'^^ ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the South Chickamauga, connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the Ten- nessee. Ibid. 573 Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Eidge. By one o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the Ibid. 643 course of Chickamauga Eiver; J. E. Smith next to the right and a little to the rear ; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish-line preceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, fol- lowed closely by their supports. By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. A brigade from each Ibid. 631 division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Mis- JUNCTION OF HOWARD AND SHERMAN 7 sionary Ridge were obscured from the view of per- chap, i sons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. Sherman's cavahy took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at Chickamauga station. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee. During the after- noon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded captft^Mo! and carried from the field. BriL'-S Thomas having done on the 23d what was ex- ^*'*'\^2^'*' pected of him on the 24tli, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek ^JmfS' and a junction with Sherman, and was directed to report to himo With two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the Teimessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west. iwd. au He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the Fif- 8 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. I Chas. Cruft, Col.31st Ind. July, 1861 ; Brig.-Gen. Vols.Jiilyie, 1862; Maj.- Gen. Mar. 5, 1865 C.L. Steven- son, Miij.- Geu. C. 8.A. Lookout Mountain Nov. 1863 W.R. XXXI (2) 3.15 Wm. Grose, Col.36tbIncl. Aug. 1861 ; Brig.-Gen. Vol8.July30, 1864 teenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac ; and Cruft's, Fourteenth Corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the cen- ter, and Osterhaus near Brown's ferry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. These brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L. Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillery with a small in- fantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top I do not see. A hundred men could have held the sum- mit — which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down — against the assault of any number of men from the position Hooker occupied. The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hook- er's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon- road zigzagging up it connects the town of Chatta- nooga with the summit. Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The re- mainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Grose's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN if This attracted the enemy, so that Geary's move- chap.i ment farther up was not observed. A heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost ^'■^2)f9?'^^ unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced as- cending the mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seen coming down from his camps on the mountain slope and filing into his rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. Oster- haus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured. While the operations at the bridge were progress- rad. 392 ing, Greary was pushing up the hill over great ob- stacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy, seeing his left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and was followed by Cruft and Oster- haus. Soon these were up abreast of G-eary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade ; but there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our fine a continu- ous one. It was in full view, extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of Missionary Ridge, 10 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT Chap. I over the top of the north end of the ridge to Chat- tanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the month of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day was hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise, but the sound of his artillery and mus- ketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark W.E.XXX1 where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At four o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a little after five direct com- munication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek, and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and w.p.cariin. bv nisfht tlic commaudcr, General Carlin, reported W.P.1846-50; J ^ ' 1 inL Mar*^2. ^^ Hookcr and was assigned to his left. I now tel- AugaMswi egraphed to Washington : " The fight to-day pro- voiInov; gressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tun- nel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops W.B.XXXI from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports two thousand pris- oners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge." The ■ Ibid. 26 next day the President replied: "Your despatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. DAVIS'S POSITION 11 Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burn- chap, i side." And Halleck also telegraphed : " I congrat- ulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that General Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know that you will do all in your power to relieve him." The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the ^'^aS^^ Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chicka- mauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. CHAPTER II BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA — A GALLANT CHARGE — COMPLETE EOUT OF THE ENEMY — PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES — GENERAL BRAGG — REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA CHAP. II AT twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, -^^ I began to give orders for the next day, and w.B. XXXI sent a despatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside. (3)240 ^ w.R. XXXI Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker ^^^*^ was ordered to move at the same hour, and en- deavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained ; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further orders from me. Nov., 1863 The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers — pre- sumably staff-officers — could be seen coming and going constantly. The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over 12 BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 13 whicli there is a wagon-road crossing the hill, and chap, it near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now was to get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point ; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light |^™%^ enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in ^ xi(2)574 motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, m*i8x^'oi.26th supported by two brigades of John E. Smith's divi- mi';iomd?. sion ; and Corse with his brigade was between the div. isfh a.- two, moving directly toward the hill to be captured. The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad-bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from Chickamauga station, where the main depot was located. The enemy |ep"w^°R. made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our ^^^i'^)^''^ troops from the position we had gained, but with- out success. The contest lasted for two hours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly corse! Maj. wounded in this assault. Sherman now threatened jfuynjsei; both Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it voif; Aug.' necessary for him to weaken other points of his Apr. 27,1893 line to strengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every Confeder- ate gun that could be brought to bear upon the 14: PEKSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. II Union forces was concentrated upon him. J. E. J^E. Smith's Smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side XXXI (2)644 ^£ ^j^g ridge to the support of Corse's command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily re- formed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments. Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from the position I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce w R^xlfi hi^- Baird's division was accordingly sent from ^^^'"^ the right of Orchard Knob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eyes of the enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once com- menced massing in the same direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also. Bragg'8 The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain Rep. W. E. '' xxxi(2)666 (iiii-ing the night, as I expected he would. In cross- ing the valley he burned the bridge over Chatta- nooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance rIp°w''r. and the destruction above named. He was detained xxxi(2)3i8 £^^^, hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected from A GALLANT CHARGE 15 his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extend- ing across it was to be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been Ijiiig under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at once.^ I watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. The center of the line which was to make the charge was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an incred- ibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them toward Missionary Ridge. The Confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and Chap. II Sheridan's aud Wood's Rep. W. R. XXXI (2) 189, 257.— Sheridan, Memoirs, I, 308 1 In this order authority was pits, preparatory to carrying the given for the troops to reform ridge. — U. S. G. after taking the first line of rifle- 16 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKANT Chap, ii followed tliem SO closely, that rebel caiid Union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on that occasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works ; over that and on for the crest — thus effectually carrying A«te,^i, 518 out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th^ for this charge. I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon- and musket-balls filled the air; but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. The pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along most of his line was 1 Chattanooga, Nov. 24, 1863. either carry the rifle-pits and ridge W.R. XXXI Maj.-Gen. Geo. H.Thomas, directly in front of them, or move ^^) ** Chattanooga : to the left, as the presence of the General Sherman carried Mis- enemy may require. If Hooker's sionary Ridge as far as the timnel position on the mountain [cannot with only slight skirmishing. His be maintained] with a small force, right now rests at the tunnel and and it is found impracticable to on top of the hill, his left at carry the top from where he is, it Chickamauga Creek. I have in- would be advisable for him to structed General Sherman to ad- move up the valley with all the vance as soon as it is light in the force he can spare, and ascend by morning, and your attack, which the first practicable road, will be simultaneous, will be in U. S. Grant, cooperation. Your command will Major-General XXXI (2) 191 COMPLETE EOUT OF THE ENEMY 17 precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and chap, n his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Jegw^R. Chickamauga River at a point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of Mission- ary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account, pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the atten- tion of the men placed to defend it, while he de- tached to the right and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon-trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit so much in this way would not have been accomplished. While the advance up Missionary Ridge was going forward. General Thomas with staff. General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the entire field could be observed, i'he moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defenses I ordered Granger to join his command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left about the same time. Sheridan, on the extreme right, was already in pur- voL. n.— 2 18 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT CHAP. II suit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in Baird's front, where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy Sherman's j^^d left his frout he directed his reserves, Davis's Rep. W. R. 1 T 1 XXXI (2)576 (division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chicka- mauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga station. He ordered Howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith was ordered to reconnoiter the tunnel to see if that was still held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. The rest of Sher- man's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad toward Graysville. Hooker'8 Hookcr, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga &uA Creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. PUKSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES 19 He got his troops over, with the exception of the chap, ir artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, Nov., isea extending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville. During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burn side if he could hold out ; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and ^"^2)^?'^^ informed him that forces would be sent up the val- ley to relieve Burn side. Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was ^•^•)f2'2'^^ directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to Knox- ville, accompanied by the boat. In addition to the supplies transported by boat the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haver- sacks. In the battle of Chattanooga troops from the 20 PEESONAl, MEMOIKS OF U. S. GEANT Chap. II Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Ten- nessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland participated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennes- MuigiiDg^of gg(3 River so mingled the troops that the organiza- chattenoo- ^j^jjg wcre uot kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac ; Osterhaus's division of the Fifteenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy — hardly rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this inter- mingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe sur- rounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge liim, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily BraJi'smis- ^^^'^^ ^^^ cxpcctcd, by rcasou of Bragg's making takes several grave mistakes : first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops ; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle ; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary Ridge a short time before my character GENEEAL BEAGG 21 reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and be- chap, ii lieved that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and find- ing this difficult to do, planned the campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before Bigg's the war, the latter very well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my gradu- ation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in the Mexican war. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally subse- quently. I could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-in- formed man, professionally and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in fre- quent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infring- ing his prerogatives ; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order. I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field-officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster — him- self — for something he wanted. As quartermaster 22 PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. II Gen. Long street he declined to fill the requisition, and indorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. As com- pany commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quarter- master to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs Bragg referred the whole matter to the command- ing officer of the post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed, " My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarreled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarreling with yourself ! " Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knox- ville for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of " killing two birds with one stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the Union army by means of his superior military genius. I speak advisedly when I say Mr. Davis prided himself on his military capacity. He says so him- F^irGso geif^ virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the Confederate Presidency. Some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy. My recollection is that my first orders for the Cf. Davis, Kise and PLAN OF THE BATTLE 23 battle of Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman chap, ii was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did ; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley, and get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to assault in the center. Before Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to" come to Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hook- er's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally. Note. — From this point on after his great illness in April, this volume was wTitten (with the and the present arrangement of exception of the campaign in the the subject-matter was made by Wilderness, which had been pre- him between the 10th and 18th of viously written) by General Grant July, 1885. — F. D. G. Knoxville CHAPTER III THE EELIEF OF KNOXVILLE — HEADQUAETEES MOVED TO NASHVILLE — VISITING KNOXVILLE — CIPHEE DESPATCHES — WITHHOLDING OEDEES CHAP. Ill /^HATTANOOG-A now being secure to the Na- V-^* tional troops beyond any doubt, I inimedi- to reiSvf <^iately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the situation of which the President, in par- ticular, was very anxious. Prior to the battles I had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. Greneral Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition, and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. General Granger, with the Fourth Corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. With the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the coun- try, it was supposed he could hold out until Long- street was driven away, after which event East 24 THE BELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 25 Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for chap, in Burnside's army and Ms own also. While following the enemy on the 26th, and again Nov., isea on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to Einggold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see the situation. I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached Dalton, In that case Bragg might think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thence toward Knox- ville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash upon Burn side. When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the ^'^^^lY' 27th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest. The ^ragg'srout enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons, and small arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division, which was p. R. cie- ^ ' burne, Maj.- acting as rear-guard to coVer the retreat. Dec' ml' i' When Hooker moved from Rossville toward n^?3o/^ Ringgold, Palmer's division took the road to Grays- ville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chicka- mauga station toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff-officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the con- dition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to ^•■^2m?'^^ start Granger at once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of Burn- side, I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated 26 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. Ill between East Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles southeast from Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got j^°°w^R up. His men were attacking Cleburne's division, XXXI (2) 320 ^i^icii had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills, so as to cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. This attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured, how- ever, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. MemoTr^t At this poiut Sliermau came up, having reached Graysville with his troops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back in the evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there overnight, and did not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. I then found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost a full day, which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the month Burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days, and during that time he could hold 365 THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 27 out against Longstreet, but if not relieved within chap, iii the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. He was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. Finding that Granger had not only not started, but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, I sent word to General Sherman of the situation, and ^'^anf •'^^ directed him to march to the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had to solve — that Burnside had now but four to six days' sup- plies left, and that he must be relieved within that time. Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his re- turn from Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleve- land and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men MemofrM, needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hard fighting at Chattanooga. But I had be- come satisfied tliat Burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's move- ments. Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents by that time, and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither over- coats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. 367 28 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap, hi The two days' rations had already lasted them five days ; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was but little probability of find- Rep^ w!°R. iiig much food. They did, however, succeed in xxxi(2)577 (^apturing some flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach Knox- ville. I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it be- came necessary, that I determined to send a mes- sage to him. I therefore sent a member of my Ibid. staff. Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if he could, report to Burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumed command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and did accompany him. I put the information of what was being done for the relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of ^wson's*^ General Longstreet. They made the trip safely; ^xxi'a^' General Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. Burnside had stretched a boom across the Hols- ton Eiver to catch scows and flats as they floated down. On these, by previous arrangements with 262, 430. THE BELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 29 the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed CHAP.ni flour and corn, with forage and provisions gener- r^p°w*?r! ally, and were thus secured for the use of the Union ^^^^(I'^Te troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy ; so that when relief arrived Burnside had more pro- visions on hand than when he had last reported. Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all xxxY(2f8o- these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4529 ^^ wounded, and 330 missing. We captured 6142 prisoners — al^out fifty per cent, more than the enemy reported for their total loss — 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and over 7000 stands of small arms. The enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here re- ported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about sixty thousand men. Bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be im- pregnable. It was his own fault that he did not wSers have more men present. He had sent Longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one third, and depriving him- self of the presence of the ablest general of his command. He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while Chat- tanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga, Knoxville with its garrison would 30 PEllSONAL MEMOmS OP U. S. GKANT CHAP, in have fallen into liis hands without a struggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was on the north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buekner's division to reinforce Longstreet. He also started another divi- sion a day later ; but our attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville, Bragg ordered it back. It had got so far, however, that it could not return to Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latter blunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to what was Ante, 1, 52i going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's ferry, in full view of Bragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack. They then disappeared behind foot- hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knew it was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the Tennessee River to the relief of Knox- ville, and that Longstreet was therefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had captured Chattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. It would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army ; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 31 The probabilities are that our loss in killed was chap, m the heavier, as we were the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361 ; but as he ^""osser*^ reported his missing at 4146, while we held over 6000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds, if not thousands, who deserted, l)ut little reliance can be placed on this report. There was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. Then, too, Chattanooga following in the same half- year with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was much the same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in the North the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowed the people and press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the Union. General William F. Smith's services in these bat- "^roinot'e'd^ ties had been such that I thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had previously been named by the President for pro- motion to the grade of major-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-gen eralcy. My recommendation was heeded and the appoint- ment made. Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville, I, of course, informed the authorities at Washington — the President and Secretary of War — of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had been 32 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. Ill relieved ^ without further bloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President for several monthr during which time he was doing all he could to elieve the situa- w.p.ml-fei ^^^^^ — sending a new commanded with a few tliou- ¥m^8; sand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and Y(Aioit^3, telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to " remem- Gen.jiiiyi8, ber Bumsidc," " do something for Burnside," and 1862 ' . ° ' other appeals of like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after our victory at Chatta- nooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condi- tion, or overpowered; and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been driven from tlie field. Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet would leave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on, and sub- sisted his army for the entire winter off East Ten- siierraan nessec. Fostcr uow relieved Burnside. Sherman Memoirs, I, ^^^ made disposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance with instructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee. W.R. XXXI 1 Washington, D. C, — my prof oundest gratitude — for (2)51 Decembers, 1863, 10: 2 a.m. the skill, courage, and persever- Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant: ance with which you and they. Understanding that your lodg- over so great difficulties, have ment at Knoxville and at Chat- effected that important object, tauooga is now secure, I wish to Grod bless you all. tender you, and all under your A. Lincoln, command, my more than thanks President U. S, HEADQUAETERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE 33 ville 1864 Nashville was the most central point from which chap, hi to communicate with my entire military division, tStatlS- and also with the authorities at Washington. While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and Washington. Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter;^ so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies, so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected to re- thSriifot tain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence southwest. I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small gar- rison, and it was my expectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in our possession ; if not, to Savannah ; and in this manner to get possession of the only east-and-west railroad that would then 1 During this winter the citizens of the battles in which General of Jo Daviess County, Illinois, Grant had participated, subscribed for and had a dia- Congress also gave him a vote mond-hilted sword made for Gen- of thanks for the victories at eral Grant, which was always Chattanooga, and voted him a known as the Chattanooga sword, gold medal for Vicksburg and Theseabbardwasof gold, and was Chattanooga. All such things ornamented with a scroll running are now in the possession of nearly its entire length, display- the government at Washington, ing in engraved letters the names — F. D. G. Vol. II.— 3 34 PEESONAL, MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. Ill be left to the enemy. But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made. The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap until their animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not, to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter part of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chatta- Ante, 1, 500 uooga I took ouc of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinch with the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired up to Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I went by rail, there- fore, to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General John G. Foster was then command- ing the Department of the Ohio. It was an in- tensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville. The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains to Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one and very disagreeable. I found a great many people at home along that Winter travel THE CIPHER CODE 35 route, both in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to an- other about their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel- worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th of January, 186-1. When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn des- patches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher despatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically inde- pendent of the commanders whom they were serv- ing immediately under, and had to report to the War Department through General Stager all the despatches which they received or forwarded. Chap. Ill Loyalty in TennesBee and Ken- tucky See Corresp. W. R. XXXII (2) 150, 159, 161, 172, 323, 361 Anson Stag- er, Col. A. A. D.C. Feb. 26, 1862 36 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. Ill I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville, because that was the point at which all despatches to me would come, to be for- warded from there. As I have said, it was neces- sary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher, to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the War Department without my despatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly I or- dered the cipher operator to turn over the key to l^t^tSff!' Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, of the Corps of En- "^"lI-coi!**' gineers, whom I had selected as a wise and discreet to Gen. in' mau wlio Certainly could be trusted with the cipher Ch Mar 29 '1864' ■' if the operator at my headquarters could. The operator refused point-blank to turn over the key to Captain Comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the War Department were not to give it to anybody — the commanding general or any one else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said that if he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the conse- quences of his disobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded. When I returned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator had been reprimanded very severely and ^ith^teif- ordered to be relieved. I informed the Secretary ton of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be re- lieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. It was THE SECEETARY OF WAR 37 absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it ; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect. This was about the only thing approaching a dis- agreeable difference between the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, wliile issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-gen- eral's office until he had approved it. This was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. I re- monstrated against this in writing, and the Secre- tary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of General-in-chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. After the relief of Knoxville, Sherman had pro- posed to Burnside that he should go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before Chap. TTI Stanton's character- istics Sherman's Rep. W. R. XXXI (2) 579 38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. Ill Stated, Sliei'man's command had left their camps Ante,n,27 north of tlie Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacri- fice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River. i ^ CHAPTER IV OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI — LONGSTREET IN EAST TEN- NESSEE — COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL — COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES — FIRST INTER\aE\V WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN SOON after his return from Kuoxville I ordered chap, iv Sherman to distribute his forces from Ste- venson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville. MemoTrM, Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back ^^^^ ^ to Mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on the east bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by our boats. He expected also to have the cooperation of Banks to do the same thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily. About the 10th of January Sherman was back in ibid. 389 Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, and got to- gether his Memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to where McPherson was in command, and ^ ^ „ „, ^ ' , L.Polk,W.P. had him organize his surplus troops so as to give BiSls-ei; him about twenty thousand men in all. ^^■'A!^f8^i? Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was octV.iMiJ; occupying Meridian with his headquarters, and had jiiue u, isoi 39 40 PEESONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GEANT Chap. IV two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, to move directly upon Meridian. mSS-m, I liad sent some twenty-five hundred cavahy ^^^ under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's depart- ment, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis. Hurll3ut had seven thousand cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce W.R1849-53;' Smith SO as to give the latter a force of about Ohio, June seven thousand with which to go against Forrest, Brig.-Gen. wlio was thcu kuowii to bc southcast from Mem- i862 ■ ""' 2)his. Smith was ordered to move about the 1st of February. ibjd. 390 While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command. ^c^S Forrest had about four thousand cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. Smith's command was nearly double that of For- rest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men had had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. This same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI 41 the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no op- position whatever until he crossed the Big Black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. Here, however, there were indications of the con- centration of Confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy, who destroyed a few of his wagons, about Decatur, Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman himself came near being picked up. He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who, he supposed, had met Forrest be- fore this time, and, he hoped, had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. Hear- ing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest's favor. Chap. IV Sherman's Rep. W. E. XXXII (1) 173 et seq. Sherman, Memoirs, I, 391 W. R. XX XII (1) 176 Smith's Rep. W. R. xxxn (1) 252, 253 42 PERSONAL MEMOrRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. IV Sherman had written a letter to Banks, propos- x^n(2) i^S ^ cooperative movement with him against "^ Shreveport, subject to my approval, I disapproved of Sherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have them for the spring campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement proved abortive. F. D. Grant My cldcst SOU, wlio had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of Janu- ary I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly ex- pecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I was permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to commu- nicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington, just as though I had remained at Nashville. When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of Tennessee cooperate with Sherman's movement in x:^n (2) Mississippi. I directed Thomas and Logan, who was 193, 198 ^^ Scottsborough, Alabama, to keep up a threaten- ing movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many trooj)s as possible there. Ibid. 198 I learned through Confederate sources that Johns- ton had already sent two divisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, CD -55- CO 9 ^ 90 to ^ ■^ CS ■ o r^= i-\i ,?;-•, Ul: ?J i ■'*,=■' 36 '\?^ ~ar- "iS" LONGSTEEET IN EAST TENNESSEE 43 W. R. XXXII (2) 337 Ibid. 367 and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Ten- chap, iv nessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send at least ten thou- sand men, besides Stanley's division, which was already to the east, into East Tennessee, and noti- fied Schofield, who was now in command in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department, and also of the reinforcements Long- street had received. My object was to drive Long- street out of East Tennessee as a part of the prep- arations for my spring campaign. About this time General Foster, who had been in command of the Department of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him,^ advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep Longstreet just where he was; that he was per- fectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the ibid. 374, sss orders for pursuit of Longstreet. On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, if possible ; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he had not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to cooperate with Sherman, Ibid. 373 Ibid. 414 1 Washington, D. C, December 29, 1863. Maj. -General U. S. Grant : General Foster has asked to be relieved from bis command on accoiint of disability from old wounds. Should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor? It is possible that Schofield will be sent to your command. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. lOfficiaQ 44 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. IV who was moving eastward and might be in danger. xxxn(2) Then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, **^ I asked him if he could not start the next day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the Ibid. 480,482 rear. Thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soon fell back. Ibid. 464. 472 Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carry supplies with him, and Long- street was between him and the supplies still left in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving toward his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's suc- cess, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington. iS'^^Lifetf ^^^ ^^^^^ restoring the grade of Lieutenant-Gen- ¥111,^334 et ®i"^l ^^ the Army had passed through Congress and ^®'^' became a law on the 26th of February. My nomi- nation had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmed the next day (the 2d). I was x:^n(3) ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive my ^^'^^ commission, and started the day following that. The commission was handed to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me, and a few other visitors. ^oinrvni!' The President in presenting my commission read 34oet8eQ. fpQjjj ^ paper — stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 45 that up ou paper, kuowing my disinclination to chap, iv speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. The President said : " General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what gSte^i^ you have done, and its reliance upon you for what ^®^^' ' *^^ remains to be done, in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constitut- ing you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." To this I replied : " Mr. President, I accept the ibid, commission, with gratitude for the high honor con- ferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me ; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men." On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Mar. i864 Army of the Potomac at Brandy station ; then re- turned to Washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the com- mands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign. It had been my intention before this to remain Pi^"^^"?^^^^" in the West, even if I was made lieutenant-general ; *'°° but when I got to Washington and saw the situa- 46 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. IV tion it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back, to have Sherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. These changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. My commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following G-G.Meade, ^j^y, as already stated, I visited General Meade, fste^!?.; ' commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his head- ESMlyi7, quarters at Brandy station, north of the Rapidan. Gen.voil:" I had kuowu General Meade slightly in the Mexi- Aug.31,1861; , _ , , , T . . ±•^ J.1 ' • •!. Maj.-Gen. can War, but had not met him smce until this visit. U.S.A. Aug. ■ n 1 -r» j_ NoY.Ti8?2 I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Poto- mac, I might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of impor- tant commands. Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who had served with me in the West, men- tioning Sherman specially, to take his place. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the Meadgs^a- change. He urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. GENEKAL MEADE 47 For himself, he would serve to the best of his abil- chai-. iv ity wherever placed. I assured him that I had no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he could not be spared from the West. This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than did his great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. Meade's position afterward proved embarrassing to me, if not to him. He was commanding an army, and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme com- mand of the Army of the Potomac — except from the authorities at "Washington. All other general officers occupying similar positions were indepen- dent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to make General Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. I therefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, and I had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the 11th I returned to Washington, and on the day after orders were published by the War Department xxxn(3)68 placing me in command of all the armies. I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command in the West and to meet Sherman, whom I had telegraphed to join me in Nashville, 48 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT CeAP. IV W. R. XXXII (3) 87 Sherman, Memoirs, I, 400-402; II, 6,7 W. R. XXXII (2) 40-42 Ibid. 99-101 Sherman assumed command of the Military Di- vision of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had Sherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that we could talk over the mat- ters about which I wanted to see him without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The first point which I wished to dis- cuss was particularly about the cooperation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. There were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sangui- nary war — the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely, McClellan, Burnside, and Fremont in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley, and Crittenden in the West. Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisable for the command under me — now Sherman's. Greneral J. E. Johnston was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largest part of which was sta- tioned at Dalton, about thirty-eight miles south of Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the rail- road from Cleveland with the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta. There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the Military Divi- sion of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad center, Atlanta, the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of the approaching cam- REORGANIZATION 49 paign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it chap, iv was expected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to cooperate with the armies east of the Mississippi, his part in the pro- gramme being to move upon Mobile by land while x:^iv' (i) the navy would close the harbor and assist to the " best of its ability.^ The plan, therefore, was for Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army Sherman's if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with ^^"^p^f^*^™' his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or at least to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east-and-west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had done before. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to hun, and circum- stances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterward made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. In regard to restoring officers who had been re- lieved from important commands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had been re- moved in the West while I looked out for the rest. I directed, however, that he should make no assign- M^emoSs.n, ment until I could speak to the Secretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to 1 See letter to Banks, iu Gen- and in the Official Records as cited eral Grant's report, Appendix, in the margin. — F. D. G. Vol. II.— 4 6,7 50 PERSONAL. MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. IV First meet- ing with Lincoln Lincoln's military policy the Secretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received the assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterward the Secretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered. I understood afterward that he refused to serve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both. Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. Sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the old army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at Cul- peper Court House, a few miles south of the head- quarters of the Army of the Potomac. Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, I never met Mr.' Lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. I knew him, however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West who had known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series of de- bates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years be- fore, when they were rival candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident of Missouri, and by no means a " Lincoln man " in that contest ; but I recognized then his great ability. In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be FIEST INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT 51 conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them ; chap, iv but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the North and Congress, ivliicli tvas always ivitli him, forced him into issuing his series of "Military Orders" — one, two, three, etc. He did not know but they were all wi*ong, and did know that some of them were. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging him- self to use all the power of the government in ren- dering such assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War Department, our first interview ended. The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knew him better. While 'Commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against giving the President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in our interview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposed to do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the Federal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on the map two streams which The Presi- empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the egy 52 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. IV army might be moved ou boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the tribu- taries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. I did not communicate my plans to the Presi- dent, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to Gen- eral Halleck. 1864 March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. March, 1864 CHAPTER V THE MELITAEY SITUATION — PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN — SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAV- ALRY — FLANK MOVEMENTS — FORREST AT FORT PIL- LOW — GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION — COLONEL MOSBY — AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAM- PAIGN WHEN I assumed command of all the armies chap, v the situation was about this : The Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth, '^tfon 17' The line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the Northwest north of that river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river were held by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held sub- stantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, tak- ing in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands ; and that part of old Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fort- ress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, Washington, and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal, and Fort Pulaski in South CaroUna and 53 54 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. V Greorgia ; Fernaudina, St. Augustine, Key West, and Pensacola in Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. In tbe West Sherman, who had succeeded me in the com- mand of the Military Division of the Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the AUeghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force about Chattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but the com- Thomas*^' ^^^^^^I's all reported to Sherman and were subject ^''steeir^' *^ ^i^ orders. This arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without await- ing the orders of the division commander. In the East lu the East the opposing forces stood in substan- tially the same relations toward each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina ; but, be- yond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James Eiver and Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army •, but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the South- ern press, if not by the Southern generals. The THE MILITARY SITUATION 55 Northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these chai«. v claims ; a portion of it always magnified rebel suc- cess and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preserva- tion of the Union and the overwhelming success of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally ex- press dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. That portion of the Army of the Potomac not in Virginia engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army of Northern Virginia, confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest gen- R.E.Lee,w. Jr. lo25~jy ^ eral in the Confederate army. The country back ia4^_*'4f.*'coi. to the James River is cut up with many streams, JeS'S generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except isei-^i.^ct! 12 1870 where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified i:)Osition he would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System and discipline were both essential to its accom- plishment. The Union armies were now divided into nineteen Reorganiz- lug the departments, though four of them in the West had armies been concentrated into a single military division. The Army of the Potomac was a separate com- mand and had no territorial limits. There were 56 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. V thus Seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of one another, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army of the Potomac as the center, and all west to Memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing ; ■^ifi^GeD!^' ^^^® Army of the James, under General Butler, as i86iti^Yan! ti^6 left wing; and all the troops south as a force 11,1893 ^^ j,g^^ ^£ ^^^ enemy. Some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade-runners; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to the Army of im>"rt.w!"p. ^^^® James from South Carolina alone, with General ciptEng. Gillmore in command. It was not contemplated ^rfgt'Gen.' that Gcucral Gillmore should leave his department ; 1862'; Mfij.-' but as most of his troops were taken, presumably 1863 tor active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concen- tration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. .Sy^joros ^^ ^ reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support of it, the Ninth Army-corps, over twenty thousand strong, under General Burn- side, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Mary- ^f»"T^^ir'7-^-»K-' -"W^J* M,. (engraved by T. JOHNSON FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1864, OWNED BY THE UNION LEAGUE CLUB, NEW YORK CITY.) PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN 57 land. This was an admirable position for such a chap, v reinforcement. The corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North Carolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In fact, Burnside and the War Department both thought the Ninth Corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. My general plan now was to concentrate all the pi^jf°,f ^J,e- force possible against the Confederate armies in the '■''*''*°^ field. There were but two such, as we have seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac ; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed to Sherman, who was still at Chat- tanooga. Besides these main armies the Confeder- ates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the West with a large force, making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy, because it would lay the Northern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. Better, indeed, 58 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Cum: V Geo. Crook, W.P.1848-52; Capt.4thlnf. May 14, Col. 36th Ohio, Sept. 12,1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Sept. 7, 1862; Maj.- Gen. July 18, 1864 W. R. XXXII (3) 245 for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with. a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I ar- ranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective points.^ Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was 1 [Private and Confidential.'] Headquarters, Armies of THE United States, Washington, D. C, April 4, 1864. Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi. General : It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat toward a common cen- ter. For your information I now write you my progi-amme, as at present determined upon. I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all despatch ; to turn over the defense of Red River to General Steele and the navy, and to return your troops to you and his own to New Orleans ; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men ; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest num- ber necessary to hold it ; and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. To tliis I will add five thousand men- from Missouri. With this force he is to commence opera- tions against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early. Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two oper- ate against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gill- more the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five tliousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army wherever it may be found. Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charles- ton on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennes- see railroad. Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN 59 to move from the mouth of the Gaiiley River with a cavahy force and some artillery, the Virejinia and Tennessee railroad to be his objective. Either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect his communications, or see them destroyed, and a large amount of forage and provision, which he so much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from an invasion through that channel as well while advanc- ing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective. fi'om ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, intiicting all the damage you can against their war resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but sim- ply lay down the work it is desira- ble to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concen- trating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. But all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as jjossible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it. From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great re- sults ; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict gi-eat damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins. I am, general, very respect- fully, your obedient servant, U. S. Grant, Lieu tena n t- General. Chap. V Grant to 8is«'l, \V. R. XXX1II,765 Franz Sisel, Col. 3d Mo. Inf. May i, Brig.-Gen. Vols.MavlT, 1861; Mty.- Gen.Mar.21, 1862 60 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. V Grant to Butler, W. R. XXXIII 794 W. R. XXXIII, 861, 916 W. R. XXXII (3) 268 Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This was the first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views. They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct,^ in writing, before leaving. General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were now re- luctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one of the corps under Greneral Butler. I was not long in finding out that the objections to Smith's promotion were well founded. In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplish- ing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. I said I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleck was present and spoke up, saying, " How would Sheridan do I " I replied, "The very man I want." The President said I could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. This relieved Gen- eral Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on 1 See instructions to Butler, in dix, and in the Official Records as General Grant's report, Appen- cited in the margin. — F. D. G. SCHEME OF BANKS'S CAMPAIGN 61 that of&cer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavahy com- mander. Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his objective. At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move the Army of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy or by his left. Each plan presented advantages.^ If by his right Chai'. V Nicolay & Hay, Life of Lincoln, Virr,353 W. R. XXXIV (1) 11 1 In Field, Culpeper C. H., Virginia, April 9, 1864. Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, Com'd'g Army of the Potomac : For information and as instruc- tion to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following ip communicated con- fidentially for youi- own perusal alone. So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and toward one common center. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can — not less than twenty-five thou- sand men — to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other movements. From the scattered condition of his com- mand, however, he cannot possi- bly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Joe Johns- ton's army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. If successfid he will secure the line from Chat- tanooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks. Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the gi-eat armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. Tliis he has been directed to do, and is now making prepara- tions for it. Two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move : one fi'om Beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord ; the other from Charleston, Virginia, prin- cipally cavalry, imder Brigadier- General Crook. The former of- these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia railroad, about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work east- ward to Lynchburg and retiu'n to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Virginia, and come eastward to join Ord. Tlie cavalry from Ord's command will try to force a passage south- ward, if they are successful in 62 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT CHAI-. V — my left — the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay, and tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following. A movement by his left — our right — would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter j)lan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry every- thing with us. reaching the Virginia and Ten- nessee railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Rich- mond with all the South and Southwest. Gillmore will join Butler with about ten thousand men from South Carolina. Butler can re- duce his garrison so as to take twenty-three thousand men into the field directly to his front. The force will be commanded by Major-General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours. Lee's army will be your objec- tive point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Rich- mond and going north on a raid. But if we take this route all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. We sep- arate from Butler, so that he can- not be directed how to cooperate. By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James rivers. These advantages and objec- tions I will talk over with you more fully than I can wi-ite them. Burnside, with a force of prob- ably twenty-five thousand men, will reinforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be FOKllEST AT FORT PILLOW G3 While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. In the West, Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hun- dred men at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city, he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put him- self into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protec- tion of the navigation of the Mississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored Chap. V Mar. 16 to Apr. 14, 1864 W. R. XXXlI(l) 501-62;!; (3) passim W. R. XXXII (3) 155 Apr. 12, 1864 W. R. XXXII (1), (3) passim shortly after the 20th inst., I will give him the defense of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front. There will be naval coopera- tion on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided, so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. What I would direct, then, is that you commence at once reducing bag- gage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regi- ment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed for all baggage, exclu- sive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division head- quarters is sufficient, and about two to corps headquarters. Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House on tlie Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contin- gency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere. If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stoi'es. I would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 64 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. V troops, infaiitiy, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his des- patches to tell what he did with them. yyxT^'o) " The river was dyed," he says, " with the blood ^^" of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. The ap- proximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twenty killed. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subse- quently Forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had xxxin'947 ^^i^ ^o Halleck that Plymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler's command. If success at- tended our arms, both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied by Federal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that the Ex- ecutive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my Apr. 20, 1864 views were carried out the rebels captured the gar- xxxiii I'ison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandon- 278-305 iiient of Washington, but directed the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essential be- cause New Berne was a port into which blockade- runners could enter. General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenu- ously, but acquiesced because it was the order of ^7-U-t^^^-<^«-t^, ^-^^aJ-^ ^^-e^ Ci-v-&-i^^*<-«_^ (i/ /i-'i^-tr^^ ;Z^^^^«-a^o A-c^^^-^ ,t^^^j /^>vi/>^v _ a^-7 fP^h.£y\jO A^ ^l/-i*.^,^^t^I<,-»^ /v-Ti-->^,c£*W' A/''A-<-^i-^ /-r A-^CSiC^i Lincoln's god-speed to grant, (fac-simile of the original, slightly reduced in scale.) [This remarkable letter was re- ceived by General Grant on the 1st of May, three days before the Wilderness campaign began. He was always care- less about his papers, and private or semi-official ones were often thrust into his pockets, where thej^ I'emained for months. In some such way Mr. Lincoln's beautiful God-speed was mislaid. General Grant had forgotten its existence, until in 1866 I came across it in my researches for my his- tory of his campaigns. He was so pleased at the discovery, or recovery, that he gave me the original letter at the time. It is my intention eventually to present it either to the government or to the family of General Grant. Adam Badeau. New York, November 10, 1885.] GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION 65 my superior at the time. By direction of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, and turn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Arkan- sas. Orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belonged and get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smith returned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun. The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from Washington, and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. He opposed the expedition. By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rap- • pahannock. Meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of May, and he was directed to Vol. II.— 5 Chap. V W. R. XXXIl (2) 41, 122 Sherman, Memoirs, II, 13 Fed. & Conf . Rep. W. R. XXXIV (1) 162-638 W. R. XXXIII, 955, 994 Ibid. 992 Ibid. 1009 66 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT Chap. V movG the night of the same day and get as far up the James Eiver as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified that reinforcements were be- ing collected in Washington City, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into M^emoSs,n, the trenches at Richmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance xxxni ^^^ ^^^® ^^^^- ^ig'sl w^s in Winchester and was noti- 964, 997 Q^Q^^ ^^ iiiovc lu coujunctiou with the others. The criticism has been made l)y writers on the campaign from the Rapidan to the James River that all the loss of life could have l^een obviated by moving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession of Lee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his army Richmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. If the Arm}^ of the Potomac had been moved bodily to the James River by water, Lee could have moved a part of his forces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Po- tomac, up the James River by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the 4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer with the Secretary of War and President. On the last oc- casion, a few days before moving, a circumstance COLONEL MOSBY 67 occiUTed which came near postponing my part in chap.v the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby S^Pl.^nli?- had for a long time been commanding a partizan ^^"ises"^' corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road, as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. I was on a special train, if I re- member correctly, without any guard. Since the close of the war I have come to know Mosby'sper- Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat inti- mately. He is a different man entirely from what I had supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command. On this same visit to Washington I had my last nirLife'^f interview with the President before reaching the vnS!348 James River. He had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. I explained to him that it was 68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT CHAP.v necessary to have a gi-eat number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was, " Oh yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak ; and to avoid a digression further on I will mention it here. A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B. Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some dis- tance south, through the battle in the Wilderness, and, I think, to Spottsylvania. He was accom- wiiiiam panied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. He assured me — and I have no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance — that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to have him (Swin- ton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, how- ever, in the character of the information he could give. We received Eichmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It was desirable, A MISPLACED HISTORIAN G9 therefore, that correspondents should not be privi- chap, v leged spies of the enemy within our lines. Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all events, he was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with some paper (I have now for- gotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given as to the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us, however, for a time at least. The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the i?oppIu|" night of the 5th of May), Colonel W. E. Rowley, of "°S"°" my staff, was acting as night-officer at my head- quarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbal instructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff-officers. Both his staff' and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversa- tion should be private. There was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and the camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bow- Tat LtS' ers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the "62^a;pt; ground and leaning against the stump, listening to i/isiai M°aj! the conversation between Meade and myself. He 'e.ises called the attention of Colonel Rowley to it. The lat- ter immediately took the man by the shoulder and 70 PERSONAIi MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. V asked him, in lauguage more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the " historian," and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eavesdropping. The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade came to my headquarters dSedTo be' saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton, who at some previous time had given great offense, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army, not to return again on pain of punishment. shot CHAPTER VI COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN — GENERAL butler's position — SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID , THE armies were now all ready to move for the chap, vi accomplisliment of a single object. They were acting as a unit, so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the ^ampign® Confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an impor- tant obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an in- dependent objective. It was of less importance only because the capture of Johnston and his army Note. — At this stage of the ferent circumstances ; and the work the final decline in General scheme of presenting the final Grant's strength became clearly scenesof the war as a panorama of manifest, and it was found neces- one vast campaign directed by the sary to bring his task to a close central power — the Lieutenant- as soon and as easily as possible. General of the Army of the United For this reason the notes and States — had to be abandoned, memoranda which he had col- Had this plan for the book been lected for the purpose of refresh- followed, the separate armies ing his memory, and of forming would have been treated as but the framework upon which the parts of one, of which the Army of narrative might be constructed the Potomac would have formed from recollection and from the the center, the troops west and manuscript field-records in his east of that army being regarded possession, were hastily put to- as wings, and those to the south gether with little of the careful of the enemy as an attacking force original work which the subject in the rear, would have received under dif- Frederick D. Grant. 71 72 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. VI would not produce so immediate and decisive a re- sult in closing tlie rebellion as would the possession of Richmond, Lee, and his army. All other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This was the plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can^ the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but cooperative columns. Ante, IT, 65 As stated before. Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected — ten thousand with Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile. Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley, I received instead the following x:^\i (2) announcement from Halleck : " Sigel is in full re- ^*" treat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run ; May 15, 1864 never did anything else." The enemy had inter- cepted him about New Market and handled him xxx"^i (1) I'oughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine ■^^'^^ hundred men out of his six thousand. The plan had Ijeen for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns. Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously, the other w.^w. A^ve- pi'oved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell AuS.iseV; liis western column advanced from the Gauley in voif:"S: West Virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. They reached the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at Dublin and destroyed a w. R. depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles 8-68 of road and burning the bridge over New River. ^ i^ Fold-out Placeholder rhis fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date. Y ^ o T- ^ ^ •v> o ^ V ^ ^ ir "?» S Fold-out Placeholder lis fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date. GENERAL BUTLER'S MOVEMENTS 73 Having accomplished this, they recrossed the Alle- chap, vi ghanies to Meadow Bkiffs and there awaited further orders. Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his com- ^^Jp.^^^^^f- mand, except the cavalry and some artillery which ^^^lel *^^ moved up the south bank of the James River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as if threatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, and Butler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss, and, no doubt, very much to the sur- prise of the enemy. This was the accomplishment of the first step con- templated in my instructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond as his objec- Butie°w/R. tive point. I had given him to understand that I "fg^.^ioog' should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but should Lee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, at as early a date as possible. Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had xxxvi (2) begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his "^*S' cavalry from Sufi'olk to cut the Weldon railroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the rail- road between Petersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenseless. About the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff, iwd. 74 PEESONAIi MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VI Butler's po- sition J. G. Bar- nard, W. P. 1829-33; Mexico, 1840-48; Maj. Eug. Dec.13, 1858; Brig.- Gen. Vols. Sept. 23, 1861 W. R. XXXVI (3) 88 about half-way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean time Beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further use- fulness of the Army of the James as a distinct fac- tor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained, and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital. The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, the James and Appomat- tox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected by the James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by their junction — the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while they increased the area which the line inclosed. Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer, Greneral Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James to in- spect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safely make an order for General Butler's movement in cooperation with mine, now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdi'awing some of his troops GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION 75 and having them brought round by water to White chap, vi House to join me and reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported the position BSfrd*to very strong for defensive purposes, and that I ?{!xxx^' could do the latter with great security; but that ^'"^*" General Butler could not move from where he was, in cooperation, to produce any effect. He said that the general occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move out from his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of Rich- mond. He replied that it was impracticable, be- cause the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle, and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck ; and it was there- fore as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly^ when I saw the hasty sketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report I used that expression without x^S'^^'d) adding quotation-marks, never thinking that any- "Appendix" thing had been said that would attract attention — vices 76 PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GKANT Chap. VI as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler, and, I know, very much to my own. I found afterward that this was mentioned in ^'^■?55*'"' *^® uotes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, I asked to have stricken out ; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. I make this statement here because, although I have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history ; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I may have done to individuals, particularly to offi- cers who were gallantly serving their country dur- ing the trying period of the war for the preservation ?er>?e^-' of the Uniou. General Butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war ; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion. The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated of in connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being so in- timately associated and connected as to be sub- stantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta camj)aign, which must conclude my description of the various cooperative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the opera- tions of the center, I will briefly mention Sheri- dan's first raid upon Lee's communications, which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAH) 77 By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when I shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan. On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness, and when we were moving on Spott- sylvania, I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army, and attack his cavalry; to cut the two roads — one running west through Gordons- ville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond — and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move took him past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given in writing through Meade. The object of this move was threefold. First, if successfully executed — and it was — he would an- noy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear, and trains than by remaining with the army.. Third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. It was sixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac. The course Sheridan took was directly to Rich- Chap. VI Sheridan, Memoirs, I, 365 et seq. W. R. XXXVI (2) 552 Sheridan, Memoirs, I, 327 et seq. 78 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VI J. E. B. Stu- art, W. P. 1850-54; Brig.-Gen. C.S.A. Sept. 24, 1861 ; M;)j.-Gen. July 25, 18G2 Slieridan's Rep. W. R. XXXVI (1) 776, 777 W. R. XXXVI (1) 777, 778 May, 1864 moiid. Before night Stuart, commanding the Con- federate cavah'y, came on to the rear of his com- mand. But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia Central raih'oad, recaptured four hundred Union prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road, and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores, Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing to- ward Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th, and, by a detour and an ex- hausting march, interjjosed between Sheridan and Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived in Stuart's front. A severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides ; but the rebels were beaten, their leader mor- tally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were cai3tured. Sheridan passed through the outer defenses of Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports near, he could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck for the James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to rest his men and horses, as well as to get food and forage for them. He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He then turned to cross to the north side of the Chicka- hominy by Meadow Bridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized. SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID 79 occupying the opposite side. The panic created by chap, vi his first entrance within the outer works of Rich- mond having subsided, troops were sent out to attack his rear. He was now in a perilous position, one from Avhich but few generals could have extricated them- selves. The defenses of Richmond, manned, were to the right; the Chickahominy was to the left, with no bridge remaining and the opposite baiik guarded; to the rear was a force from Richmond. This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's ^^3^,?v..> and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan turned to the ^^*' ^"'^ left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire, of the enemy, forced a crossing, and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge-building. On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed this ibid. 777, 778 stream, and on that day went into camp on the James River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself into communication with General Butler, who di- rected all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution, therefore, had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, ibid. 779, 7sc after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the way of White House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Mattaj^ony, 80 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VI where he learned the position of the two armies. May, 1864 On the 24th he joined us on the march from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chester- field. Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army ; encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all ; recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and cap- tured many of the enemy ; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war ; destroyed miles of railroad and telegrajili ; and freed us from annoy- ance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. CHAPTER VII SHEKMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEOEGIA — SIEGE OF ATLANTA — DEATH OF GENEEAL McPHEESON — ATTEMPT TO CAPTUEE ANDEESONVILLE — CAPTUEE OF ATLANTA AFTER separating from Sherman in Cincinnati -^^ I went on to Washington, as ah-eady stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties of his new command. His military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the Alleghany Mountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State of Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was the Department of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding ; the next was the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding ; the third the Department of the Ten- nessee, General McPherson commanding ; and Gen- eral Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas. The last-named de- partment was so far away that Sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was in command. The movements of the armies, as I have stated in Vol. IL— 6 8i Chap. VII Ante, II, 48 Sherman, Memoirs, 11,7 E. R. 8. Can- by, W. P. 1835-39 ; Mexico, 1847-48 ; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Mar. 31,1862; Maj.- Gen. May 7, 1864 82 PEKSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VII a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fixing Ante, II, 58 ^j^e day to start, when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay at Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding ; Thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga ; and Schofield, with about four- teen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With these three armies, numbering about one hundred thou- sand men in all, Sherman was to move on the day May 4, 1864 fixed for the general advance, with a view of de- stroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta, Mf!j^oh-8,n, He visited each of these commands to inform him- 7etseq. g^j^ ^^ ^^ their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to Chattanooga sufficiently large to warrant a move- ment. He found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops, without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef-cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He at once changed all this, and required beef-cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and SHEEMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 83 everything that could travel, even the troops, to be chap, vii marched, and used the road exclusively for trans- porting supplies. In this way he was able to ac- cumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4tli of May. As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, '^p'i^S'^ which was nearly one fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is moun- tainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in moun- tain streams, some of them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drains toward Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising northeast from there and flowing southwest — this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into tliem. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. The best positions for defense had been selected all the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched ; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any farther. With a less skilful general, and one dis- posed to take no risks, I have no doubt that he would have succeeded. Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from Knox- ville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton. Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention to cross McPherson over the Tennessee Eiver at Huntsville or Decatur, and Sberman's plau of cam- paign 84 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT Chap, vn move liim south from there so as to have him come into tlie road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that McPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veteran divisions had reenlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. -Sherman, Tlicu, agaiu, Slicrmau had lent Banks two divi- Meinoirs.ii, gj^j^g uudcr A. J. Suiith, the winter before, to coop- erate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. That department continued to ab- sorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of Thomas — the two coming together about Dalton. The three mS^s n armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on I4et8e4. * tij^^e^ Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault ; and even to carry it by regular Ibid. 32 approaches was impracticable. There was a nar- rowing up in the mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon-road, and a railroad ran. Besides, the ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. .5?:--' v-^,j ^,^ x^ •^^^^, V^ X. X ' A\ It l/elicy/jyj %/^' t -v 'V-s/ •i.r::; 'fsT .; J; f ('BroonODiy/i J^ ,' « ■ f 0^' . rS'"^--?!.,""' / /N/n!! I ■ ^n TCassviile c %mii>-'' / ,/; ■j-^" j\ ^J-raa^^ds/im ^^f^.m A .Boi'. ,.- ''15 SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 85 stream had been dammed so that the valley was chap, vii a lake. Through this gorge the troops would have to pass. McPhersoii was therefore sent around by xxkviii the right, to come out by the way of Snake Creek *^' ^*^"^^ Gap into the rear of the enemy. This was a sur- prise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at Daltoii. On the loth there was very hard fighting about ^^p.^w.^r!' Resaca ; but our cavalry, having been sent around a)^(|^^"- sim to the right, got near the road in the enemy's rear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, ex- cept that Newton's division overtook the rear of {^Jj"^^®^" Johnston's army and engaged it. Sherman was edI^^auS; now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up voif;'S'. 23 1861 ' his railroad-trains. He was depending upon the Maj.-Gen. railroad for all of his supplies, and as, of course, the railroad was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting — some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles — neither were single positions gained in a day. On the contrary, weeks were spent at some ; and about Atlanta more than a month was consumed. It was the 23d of May before the road was fin- i864 ^6 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap, vn Sherman, Memoirs, II, 42 et seq. Ibid. 44.— W. R. xxxvin {l)-{i)pas- tim 1864 W. R. xxxvni (3) 639 ished up to the rear of Sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. This was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. They kept work- ing still farther around to the left toward the rail- road. This was the case more particularly with the cavalry. By the 4tli of June Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off, and Allatoona was left in our possession. Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before ad- vancing farther, and made a secondary base of sup- plies. The railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of his new position. While Sherman's army lay here. General F. P. Blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kene- saw Mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 87 him. At this latter place our troops made an as- chap.vii sault upon the enemy's lines after having got their mwhoSh n own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining ^letseq. considerable loss. But during the progress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was found that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Sherman had made every prepa- ration to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. This time he fell back to the Chattahoochee. About the 5th of July he was besieged again, i864 Sherman getting easy possession of the Chattahoo- chee River both above and below him. The enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so fright- ened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river. Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston was now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded ^ pi^g^g^-. "l-iiw-, Capt.Cav.c! ^J^"^' 8. A. May, Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem g^cu.'mS; to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of jum'27,1862; the administration at Richmond, or of the people sept. 30,1863 of that section of the South in which he was com- manding. The very fact of a change of comman- ders being ordered under such circumstances was 88 PEESONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VII au indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors — the very thing our troops wanted. For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close would probably have exhausted the North to such an extent that they might then have aban- doned the contest and agreed to a separation. ^^'^lln'tL'^^ Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this, there were advanced ^ intrenchnients which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. van^^Horue, Suve ouough, as indicated by the change of com- iandrii!'ii2 zanders, the enemy was about to assume the offen- et seq. g^^g^ Q^^ ^Yie 20tli he came out and attacked the Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's R- w. John- corps and Newton's and Johnson's divisions were the sou, \V . p. ■•- captli't'h pi'iucipal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted ^Brigtafn.' niore than an hour ; but the Confederates were then \ois.oct.ii, fQj,gg(j ^^ f^Y[ back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on both sides. On this day ^?c?hl3d Ceneral Cresham, since our Postmaster-General, 1861*^; Mff.- was very badly wounded. During the night Hood Aug^n/' abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were ad- vanced. The investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 22d. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates, our troops being some- 1863 THE SIEGE OF ATLANTA 89 what surprised. While our troops were advancing chap.vii they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. The field of battle continued to i.il^'*;""fVT expand until it embraced about seven miles of **^ ground. Finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city.^ It was during this battle that McPherson, while li^piJersM passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest, and best generals. Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to ^pfg^f^^f. get upon the railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it Feb*2^7j^67; in the direction of Angusta. He was successful in voit. jni^ this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had also come up from Tennessee with a '^^^^- '^^ small division of cavalry, having crossed the Ten- m-ig^^Gen! nessee Eiver about Decatur and made a raid into X86i';^aj.^-' Alabama. Finally, when hard pressed, he had come '1862 ' in, striking the railroad in rear of Sherman, and reported to him about this time. The battle of the 22d is usually known as the ^ General Johu A. Logau, iipou first upon and was broken by whom devolved the command of his depleted command, remarks : the Army of the Tennessee during "The disparity of forces can be this battle, in his report gave our seen from the fact that in the total loss in killed, wounded, and charge made by mj' two brigades missing at 3521, and estimated under Fuller and Mersy they took J. W. Fuller that of the enemy to be not less 351 prisoners, representing forty- Aug. Mersy than 10,000; and General G. M. nine different regiments, eight Dodge, graphically describing to brigades, and three divisions ; General Sherman the enemy's at- and brought back eight battle- tack, the full weight of which fell flags from the enemy." 90 PEESONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GKANT Chap. VII W. E. XXXVIII (3)94 Geo. Stone- man, W. P. 1842-46 ; Mexico, 1846-48 ; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 13, 1861 ; Ma j. -Gen. Nov. 29, 1862 Battle of Atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September. Prep- arations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city, — all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable, — in order to hold them with the smallest possible num- ber of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the raikoad down south of Atlanta. On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th the enemy struck our right flank. General Logan commanding, with great vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and in- flict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the after- noon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses in these unsuccessful as- saults were fearful. During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town. This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles ; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there. In the latter part erf July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east, and, if possible, release our GENEKAL STONEMAN'S EXPEDITION 91 prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful chap. vii stories current at the time about the great hard- ships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathy was felt for them ; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But the attempt proved a failure. McCook, who com- e. m. mo- ^ ^ ' Ci)ok, 2d Lt. manded a small brigade, was first reported to have g^^sef- ms^ been captured ; but he got back, having inflicted a llT^J.^'im good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners ; but encountering afterward a largely superior force of the enemy, he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as "best he could with what men he had left. He had lost several ^^^k. hundred men out of his small command. On the <^> ^^^"^^* 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little suasAd- ^ ' ° ams. Col. ist brigade of about a thousand men, returned report- ^y- <^''^^- ing Stoneman and all but himself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture of Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after Colonel Adams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small de- Horace ca- ^ ~ pron, Col. tachment and confirmed the report of the capture ^cmMg.^fd' of Stoneman with something less than a thousand ^"^^^^'^•^d men. It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all xxxviii his force was impossible, had made arrangements ^^^^^^ for the escape of two divisions. He covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundi*ed men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the 92 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. VII commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. Aug. 1864 On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where Schofield sherinan. ^^g j^ commaud, but these attempts failed utterly. Memoirs, II, ' ^ ggetseq. Qeneral Palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and General Schofield ; but I am not pre- pared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right to command him. If he did raise this ques- tion while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. Ibid. 103 About the same time Wheeler got upon our rail- road north of Resaca and destroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman off from communica- tion with the North for several days. Sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communi- cation by directing one upon theirs. H.j.Kiipat- Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of coK2d1^.'Y. August to reach the Macon road about Jonesboro'. ^'862'; Brifff- He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around juueilms the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and w^as back xxxviii again in his former position on our left by the 22d. (2) 858 Tj^gg^ ]^^^|g affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by a cavalry expedition is soon repaired. Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics ; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last !>S-- ^m ts<--. ^1^^ t'/^^^^^^rJ'v. -^ ,?«c .f-^. v*l F-J- / CAPTURE OF ATLANTA 93 movement on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of chap, vii September was well up toward the railroad twenty- miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardee in- trenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable to drive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up i^femoSs.n, his military works, such as he thought would be ^"^ valuable in our hands, and decamped. The next morning at daylight General H. W. cYiiuV ^p Slocum, who was commanding north of the city, ^27^1^ n. y!'" moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and noti- BrE^ien. fied Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately isei'; Maj.-' back, taking three days to reach the city, and occu- i^^^ pied a line extending from Decatur on the left to Atlanta in the center, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right. The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. There was but little, if anything, in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticize at all, and nothing to criticize severely. It was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade comman- ders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. The troops now went to work to make them- selves comfortable and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta was m^Sm'i, turned into a military base. The citizens were all i^^^t^*^*- compelled to leave. Sherman also very wisely pro- hibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army 94 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. VII in the field, if permitted to do so, for trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies. Sherman, The ucws of Sherman's success reached the North Memoirs, II, 109, 110 instantaneously and set the country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign for the Re- publicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later by Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the North. CHAPTER VIII GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE x\EMY OF THE POTOMAC — CEOSSING THE EAPIDAN — ENTEEING THE WILDEE- NESS — BATTLE OF THE WILDEENESS SOON after midnight, May 3d-4:tli, tlie Army chap.viii of the Potomac moved out from its position r^xxxvi north of the Rapidan, to start upon that memo- ^^Humph-~ rable campaign destined to result in the capture of j,^Sa cam- the Confederate capital and the army defending it. e! s'eq! This was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever wit- nessed ; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, or a single season. The losses inflicted and endured were destined to be severe ; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded ; and neither had made any real progress toward accomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. But previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture Philadelphia, New York, and the National capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good — too near for complacent 95 96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT W. R. XXXVI (2) 333 CHAP, vni contemplation l>y the loyal North. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this. The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whij). Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition, Avere taken in wagons. Beef-cattle were driven with the trains and butchered as wanted. Three days' rations in addition, in haver- sacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. The country over which the army had to oper- ate, from the Eapidan to the crossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The crossings of these streams l)y the army were gener- ally made not far above tide- water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in oppositi(^n. The country roads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for in- fantry except along the roads. All l)ridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came- to them. The Army of the Potomac was composed of three Topography feM^/«>/4:^|y^ >>a4; CROSSING THE RAPIDAN 97 infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respec- tively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, John Sedgwick, and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up, as it did, so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. The Fifth Corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for Germanna Ford, preceded by one division of Chap. VIII H. J. Hunt, \V.P.1835-a9; Mexico, 18-16-48; Mai. 5tll Alt. May 14,1861; Brlg.-Geii. Vols. Sept. 15, 1862 G. K. War- reu, W. P. 1846-50 ; Brig.-Gei). Vols. Sei>t. 26, ISr.'i; Maj.-Geii. May 3, 1863 Maj.-Gen. W. S. Hancock, commauding Second Army-corps. UNION AEMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864. [Compiled.] LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-iu-Chief. Major-General George G. Meade, commanding Army of the Potomac. First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles. Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth. Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank. Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke. First Brigade, Brig.- Gen.Alex.S.Wehb. Second Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Joshua T. Owen. Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll. f First Brigade, Brig.- I Gen.J. H.H.Ward. i Second Brigade, I Brig. -Gen. Alex. I Hays. ( First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister. Secf)nd Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster. Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball. Vol. n.— 7 First Division, Brig. -Gen. Francis C Barlow. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon. Third Division. Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney. | I Fourth Division. Brig.-Gen. Gershom -' Mott. 98 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP, vm cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedg- wick followed Warren with the Sixth Corps. Ger- manna Ford was nine or ten miles below the right of Lee's Une. Hancock, with the Second Corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germanna, preceded by Gregg's division of cavahy, and followed by the DtrtTw."p. artillery. Torbert's division of cavalry was left i8tN.j.'8ept: north of the Rapidan, for the time, to picket the Bri'g.-Gen. rivcr and prevent the enemy from crossing and Vole. Nov. -^. . / r^-, ^ . -. -, 29,1862 gettmg into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, di'ove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by 6 a.m. had the pon- toons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee. The fact that the movement was unopposed proves this. Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warken, commanding Fifth Army-corps. First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles - Griffln. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. . Robinson. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth. ( Fir.st Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. Third Brigade, Brig.- Gen. J. J. Bartlett. First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leon- ard. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter. Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Deni- son. r First Brigade, Col. I Wm. McCandless. ) Third Brigade, Col. l^ Joseph W. Fisher. f First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Lysander Cutler. Second ■ Brigade, Brig.-Gen, James C. Rice. Third Brigade, Col. [ Roy Stone. Artill'y Brigade, Col. C. S. Wainwright. CKOSSING THE KAPIDAN 99 Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was left back at chap, viii Warrenton, guarding the railroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case our cross- ing the Eapidan should be long delayed. He was in- structed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a despatch x:^vi(2) was sent to him a little after 1 p.m. giving the in- ^^° formation that our crossing had been successful. The country was heavily wooded at all the points Topograpiiy Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, commanding Sixth Army-corps. Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, commanding Cavalry Corps. First Division. Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James B. Ricketts. First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson. First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown. Second Brigade, Col. Emoiy Upton, -i Third Brigade, Brig.- Gen. D. A. Russell. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex- ander Shaler. ' First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Frank Whea- ton. Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant. Third Brigade, Brig.- Gen.Thos.H.Neill. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis. ' First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Wm. H. Mor- ris. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Sey- mour. Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tomp- kins. ' First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. G. A. Custer. Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin. Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt. First Brigade, Brig.- Gen. Henry E. Da- vies, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg. First Brigade. Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman. 100 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VIII of d'ossing, particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field from the crossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wil- derness toward Spottsylvania was of the same char- acter. There were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roads were narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. There are two roads, good for that part of Vir- ginia, running from Orange Court House to the battle-field. The most southerly of these roads is known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the Maj.-Gen. a. E. Burnside, commanding Ninth Army-corps. Brig. -Gen. Henry J. Hunt, commanding Artillery. First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson. Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter. Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willcox. Fourth Division. Brig.-Gen. Edward Perrero. Reserve Col. H. S. Burton. General Headquarters. First Brigade, Col. Sumner C!arruth. Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure. First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss. Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. GriflQn. First Brigade. Col. John F. Hartranft. Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ. First Brigade, Col. JoshuaK. Sigfried. Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas. Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Mar- shall. ( First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching. Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins. First Brigade Horse Art., Capt. J. M. Robertson. . Second Brigade Horse Art., Capt. D. R. Ransom. Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh. ' ProvostGuard, Brig.- Gen. M.R.Patrick. ■ Volunteer Engi- neers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham. ENTEEING THE WILDERNESS 101 northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There are chap.viii also roads from east of the battle-field running to Spottsylvania Court House — one from Chancellors- ville, branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop's, thence by the Brock road to Spottsylvania; the east branch CONFEDERATE ARMY. Organizatiou of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31, 1864. First Army-corps : Lieut.-Gen. R. H. Anderson, Commanding. {Brig. -Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade, (a) " M. D. Corse's " " Eppa Hunton's " " Wm. R. Terry's " TiT n r< Tir n , ^>„ r>- • f Brig. -Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade. Maj.-Gen C. W. Field's Divi- J «,, ^ ^^ Law's {<•) ?' s>0'^- ("^ I " John Bratton's ( Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade. Ma.i.-Gen. J. B. Kershaw's Di- J " B. G. Humphreys's " vision. Id) 1 " Goode Bryan's " (^ " Kershaw's (Old) " Second Army-corps : Maj.-Gen. Jubal A. Early, Commanding. r Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays's Brigade, (e) Ma.j.-Gen. John B. Gordon's J " John Pegram's " (/) Division. 1 Gordon's " (g) [ Brig.-Gen. R. F. Holce's ( Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A.Walker). Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson's I Brig.-Gen. J. M. Jones's Brigade, (k) Division. ] i-. Geo. H.Stewart's " \h) [ " L. A. Statiford's " (e) Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade, (t) Geo. Dole's " (k) " S. D. Ramseur's Brigade. C. A. Battle's " R. D. Johnston's " (/) Note. (n) Colonel W. R. Aylett was in command August 20th, and probably at above date. (6) Inspection report of this division shows that it also contained Ben- ning's and Gregg's Brigades, (c) Commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles. (a) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty ; names not indicated. (e) Constituting York's Brigade. ) Maj.-Gen. R. E. Rodes's Divi sion. (/) In Ramseur's Division. (jf) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson, commanding, and containing Twelfth Georgia Battalion. (A) The Virginia resiinents constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's Division. (0 Grimes's Brigade, (fc) Cook's Organization of the Army of the Valley District. 102 PERSONAL MEMOIES OP U. S. GRANT Chap. VIII goGs by Gates's, tlieuce to Spottsylvauia. The Brock road runs from Germanna Ford through the battle- field and on to the Court House. As Spottsylvauia is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there to Fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. These roads strike the road from Germanna Ford in the Wilderness. Third Army-corps : Lieut.-Gen. A. P. Hill, Commanding. C Brig.-Geu. J. C. C. Sanders's Brigade. IHaj.-Gen. Wm. Mahone's Divi- „ ^ Mahone's aioTi Ih i Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris s " Im] ' ^ ' I " A. R. Wright's t " Joseph Finegan's " {Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade, {n) " James H. Lane's " " Sam'l McGowan's " Alfred M. Scale's " ' Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade. " John R. Cooke's " " D. McRae's " " J. J. Archer's " H. H. Walker's " Unattached : Fifth Alabama BattaUon. Maj.-Gbn. H. Heth's Division (0) Cavalry Corps: Lieut.-Gen. Wade Hampton, Commanding, (p) Maj.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's Di- 5 Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade. vision. } " L. L. Lomax's " Maj.-Gen. M. C. Btftleb's Di- f Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade. vision. i " P- M. B. Young's " t " Thomas L. Rosser's " ]VIaj.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee's Di- 5 Brig.-Gen. Rnfus Barringer's Brigade, vision. ( " J. R. Chambliss's " Note. (I) Returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indi- cated. (m) Colouel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding. in) Colonel Thoujas J. Simmons, commanding. (0) Four brigadier-generals reported present for duty ; names not indicated. (p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's, Fitz-Lee'e, and W. H. F. Lee's Divisions, and Bearing's Brigade, ENTERING THE WILDERNESS 103 As soon as tlie crossing of the infantry was as- sured, the cavahy pushed forward, Wilson's divi- sion by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's Store, on the Orange plank road ; Gregg to the left toward Chan- cellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there, and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, by sundown. Hancock, with the Second Corps, moved parallel with Warren and Chap. VIII W. R. XXXVI (1) 871 Ibid. 853 Ibid. 539 Artillery Reserve: Bkig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton, Commanding. Bmg.-Gen. E. P. Alexandek's Division.' Brig. -Gen. A. L. Long's Divi- sion. Cabell's Battalion. Haskell's Battalion. Huger's Battalion. Gibb's Battalion. Braxton's Battalion. Cutshaw's Battalion. Carter's Battalion. Nelson's Battalion. Brown's Battalion. I Manly's Battery. First Co. Richmond Howitzers. Carleton's Battery. [ Calloway's " Branch's Battery. Nelson's '" Garden's " Rowau " ' Smith's Battery. Moody " Woolfolk " Parker's ' ' Taylor's " Fickling's " Martin's " f Davidson's Battery. < Dickenson's " I Otey's . " {Lee Battery. First Maryland Artillery. Stafford " AUeghany " f Charlotte\alle ArtiUery. -j Staunton " [ Courtney " I' Morris ArtiUery. Orange " Kins William Artillery. Jeff Davis f Amherst ArtiUery. \ MiUedge [ Fluvauna " ' Powhatan Artillery. Second Richmond Howitzers. Third j Rockbridge Artillery. (^ Salem Flying " 1 But one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original. 104 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKAif T CHAP.vm W. R. XXXVI (1) 318 The wa^on- trains R. Tngalls, W. P. 1839- 43; Mexico, 1846-47; Maj. Staff. Q. M. Jan. 12, 1862; Brig.-Gen. Vols. May 23, 1863 camped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's corps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that would have extended from the Eapidan to Rich- mond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome all difficulties the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. At a glance the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note the contents : if ammunition, whether for artil- lery or infantry ; if forage, whether grain or hay ; if rations, whether bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee, or whatever it might be. Empty wagons Col. R. 1 1. Walker's Division Cutt's Battalion. Ross's Battery. Patterson's Battery. Irwin Artillery. C Lewis Artillery. Richardson's Battalion. g^Sm UgM ^^"^^ Mcintosh's Battalion. Pegram's Battalion. P'^ague's Battalion, t Huger {Johnson's Battery. Hardaway Artillery. Danville " Second Rockbridge Artillery. ' Peedee Artillery. Fredericksburg Artillery. Letcher " Purcell Battery. ^ Crenshaw's Battery . {Madison Artillery. Albemarle " Brooke " Charlotte " BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 105 were never allowed to follow the army or stay in chap.viii camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it would re- turn to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army, they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this system the hauling of forage for the supply-trains was almost wholly dispensed with. They consumed theirs at the depots. I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rajiidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of Sedg- •'^fpfi'^g^ wick's corps, and established headquarters for the ^isiil^vfg.'- afternoon and night in a deserted house near the Aug^si.isei; Maj.-Gen. river. J^iy 4, 1862 ; k. Spottsyl- Orders had been given, long before this move- '^'^^'^•g^^y ment began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper to Germanna Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks — an improvidence I had never wit- nessed before. Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of May that the Army of the Potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judge from the fact that at 1:15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren had reached Old "Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were 106 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VIII Virg.Camp. p. 22 A.P.Hill, W. P. 1842-47 ; Mexico, 1847-48 ; Maii.-Gen.C. 8. A. May 5, 1862; Lt.- Gen.May20, 1863 ; k. Pe- tersburg, Apr. 1, 1865 W. R. XXXVI (2) 371 W. E. XXXVI (1) 539 ; (2) 413 G.W.Getty, W.P. 1836-40; Mexico, 1847-48; Capt. 5th A^rt. May 14, 1861 ; Brig.- Gen. Vols. Sept. 25, 1862 seeu to be an order to his troops to occupy their in- trenchments at Mine Run. Here at night despatches were received announc- ing that Sherman, Butler, and Crook had moved according to programme. On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell, and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to at- tack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on the same road. Longstreet was at this time — middle of the afternoon — at Grordonsville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by the Orange Pike. He was near by, and arrived some four miles east of Mine Run before bivouack- ing for the night. My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. War- ren was to move to Parker's Store, and Wilson's cavahy — then at Parker's Store — to move on to Craig's meeting-house. Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right. The Arm}^ of the Potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move southwestward to join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church. At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's Store, Warren discovered the eneniy„ He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren's right, and Getty, with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get BATTLE OF THE WILDEKNESS 107 on his left. This was the speediest way to reinforce chap, vui Warren, who was confronting the enemy on both the Orange plank and turnpike roads. Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on re- ceiving word that the Army of the Potomac had safely crossed the Eapidan. By making a night- march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilder- ness Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in posi- tion. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and was his senior in rank. Getting in- formation of the proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and, without waiting to see Burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where Meade was. It was my plan then, as it was on all other occa- sions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments, if we were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neither party had any advantage of position. Warren was there- fore ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered to come xxxvi (i) up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at ^^^ Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. Getty was directed to hold his posi- tion at all hazards until relieved. About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable ibid. 540 though not decisive results. Getty was somewhat 108 PEESONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VHI W. R. XXXVI (1) 319 Ibid. 677 Ibid. 320 J. T. Owen, Col. 24th Pa. May, 18C1; Brig.-Gen. Vol.'^. Nov. 2y, 1862 A. Hays, W. P. 1840-44; Mexico, 1846-48 ; Col. 63d Pa. Auir 2.5,1881; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Sept. 29, 1862 H. Baxter, Capt. 7th Mich. Aug. 1861; Brig.- Gen. Vols. Mar. 12, 1863 isolated from Warren and was in a precarious con- dition for a time, Wilson, with his division of cav- alry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. At two o'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from get- ting into position for attack as promj^tly as he gen- erally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders from Meade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not. He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards. Hancock immediately sent two divisions, com- manded by Birney and Mott, and later two bri- gades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty. This was timely and saved Getty. During the bat- tle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but remained on the field. One of Birney's most gallant brigade commanders — ^ Alexander Hays — was killed. I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served with him through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his com- mand wherever ordered. With him it was " Come, boys," not " Go." Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the second division were sent to reinforce Hancock and Getty, but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into j^osition. BATTLE OF THE WILDEKNESS 109 During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's divi- chap, viii sion of cavahy to Todd's Tavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilson engaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's xxxvi m Bridge. ^76 Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close to it. Neither side made any special progress. After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my ^■''|-.^3|™p- orders were given for the following morning. We knew Longstreet with twelve thousand men was on his way to join Hill's right, near the Brock road, and might arrive during the night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4 : 30 o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to his wishes W. R. as far as I was willing, the order was modified and xxxvi 415 (2) five was fixed as the hour to move. Hancock had now fully one half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworth, with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpen- dicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He was directed to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left. Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, ^""^.^^""P" was directed to get in between Warren and Han- cock, and attack as soon as he could get in posi- tion to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the 110 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. VIII Virg. Camp, p. 37 W. R. XXXVI (1) 320 F. C. Bar- low, Col. 61 8t N. Y. Apr. 1862 ; Brig.- Gen. Vols. Sept. 19, 1862 enemy as they could, atid to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burn- side was ordered, if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's center, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock was in- formed of all the movements ordered. Burnside had three divisions ; but one of them — a colored division — was sent to guard the wagon- train, and he did not see it again until July. Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. His purpose was evident, but he failed. Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Eoad, and Wads- worth by the right of it. The fighting was desper- ate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 111 that Lee would not have made another stand out- chap, vm side of his Richmond defenses. Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was or- ^^||%9i^- dered to attack, but w^as not able to accomplish if^S , 1847-48 ; much. . Brig-.-Gen. On the mornins; of the 6th Sheridan was sent to i862; Maj.-' ^ Gen. June 7, connect with Hancock's left and attack the enemy's i864 cavalry, who were trying to get on our left and rear. He met. them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brock roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later he was attacked, and xxxvid) again the enemy was repulsed. '^'^^ Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the Brock road. Another incident rad. 322 happened during the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column. Word reached him that troops were seen moving toward him from the direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's Siarla. brigade was detached to meet this new enemy ; but ^Biig^-oen.' the troops apj)roaching proved to be several hun- " ^i864 '^ dred convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6 : 50 a.m., Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. The difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the 6th. Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. He maintained this posi- 112 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. Vin W.R. XXXVI (1) 323 J. 8. Wads- worth, Brig-.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 9, 1861 Biig.-Gen. Micah Jenkins W. E. XXXVI (1) 323 tioii until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill, meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, be- came encouraged and returned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest, to ap- proach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly in- trenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wads- worth, while trying to rally his men, was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misajjprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his right in person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attack Hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the pur- pose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of Long- street's or Hill's commands. This brigade, having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 113 held by Hancock's command, swept down the whole chap, viii length of them from left to right. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move ; but it broke and disappeared without a contest. Firing was continued after this, but with less fury, Burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance ; but it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into posi- tion on Hancock's right. At 4:15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. ^J^,?v,,, His line moved uj) to within a hundred yards of ^^* ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was maintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's wiid^iN^x- di vision gave way and retired in disorder. The coL'mVN. enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of miYfi'ril;- this and pushed through our line, planting their ocT'4,i862 flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock their success was but temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, w pS^se^ moved at a double-quick with his brigade and drove DecaKse?;' back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting had ^iSiayii continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied in width, but aver- aged three quarters of a mile. The killed and many of the severely wounded of both armies lay within this belt, where it was impossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, xxx^' (d and the conflagration raged. The wounded who ^^* had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finally the fire com- municated with our breastworks in places. Being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. Vol. II.— 8 114 PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GKANT Chap, vni W. R. XXXVI (2) 445, 447 W. R. XXXVI (1) 540, 906 Virg. Camp, pp. 49, 50 J. A. Early, W. P. 1833-37; Mexico, 1847-48 ; Brig.-Gen. C. 8. A. 1863 ; Lt-Gen. 1864 ; d. Mar. 2, 1894 But the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. Lee was now in distress. His men were in confu- sion, and his personal efi:orts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now ; but I revoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, for Hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance. Biu'uside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept uj) an assault during all this time ; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from re- inforcing his right from the troops in their front. I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be taken up, except one at Grermanna Ford. The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to reinforce oui* left. This left our right in, danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all pres- ent base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against at- tack. But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confu- sion. Early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. The defense, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his " Memoirs " that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 115 we might have brought fresh troops to his great dis- chap, vm comfort. Many officers who had not been attacked by Early continued coming to my headquarters even after Sedgwick had rectified his Hues a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was push- ing on and would soon be upon me. During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within theu' intrenchments. On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry w.p.S^il from Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets juuc'^sel; and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to voif.june . . „ ^ o, j_ r? 29, 1863 ; find the position of the enemy, borne went as lar Maj.-Gen; ^ '' . Apr. 15, 1865 as a mile and a liaK before finding him. But Lee ■ showed no disposition to come out of his works. There was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in Warren's front, he being directed about noon to make a reconnaissance in force. This drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back. This ended the battle of the Wilderness. CHAPTER IX AFTER THE BATTLE — TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SER- VICE — MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK Chap. IX liyTORE desperate fighting has not been wit- -L'-"- nessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army to- gether as a unit. We gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained an advantage, but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. unlcmcasu- ^^^' l^^^scs in the Wildemess were very severe. x*xx'^(i^' Those of the Confederates must have been even more so ; but I have no means of speaking with ac- curacy upon this point. The Germanna Ford bridge was transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the trans- portation of the wounded to Washington. It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the Army of the Potomac. First, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy 116 119-136 THE FIELD TELEGKAPH 117 or not, the moment arms were stacked the men in- chap, ix trenched themselves. For this purpose they would intrenching build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. It was wonderful how quickly they could in this way con- struct defenses of considerable strength. When a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strength- ened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The second was the use made a^lSi of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could ''^^^ be more complete than the organization and disci- pline of this body of brave and intelligent men. In- sulated wires — insulated so that they would trans- mit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water — were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds' weight of wire to each reel. Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon supplied with a telegraph-operator, battery, and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a waU-tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. The mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command 118 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. IX they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders. The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to i^ut up their wires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the Avii-es would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. The men attached to brigades or divisions wouW all commence at once raising the wires with their telegi'aph-poles. This was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpen- dicular position. At intervals the wu'e would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. While this was being done the telegraph-wagons would take their posi- tions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minutes' longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, tele- graphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. THE SIGNAL SERVICE 119 The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands. When movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of inter- cepted despatches for us to receive any benefit from them ; but sometimes they gave useful information. On the afternoon of the 7tli I received news from Washington announcing that Sherman had prob- ably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler had reached City Point safely and taken it by sur- prise on the 5th. I had given orders for a move- ment by the left flank, fearing that Lee might move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there. My order for this movement was as follows : Chap. IX May, 1864 Capture of City Point Headquarters Arivhes of the United States, May 7, 1864, 6 : 30 a.m. Major-General Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac : Make all preparations during the day for a night-marcli to take position at Spottsylvania Court House with one army-corps, at Todd's Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny River. W. R. XXXVI (2) 481 120 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. IX I think it woiild be advisable in making the change to leave Hancock where he is nntil Warren passes him. He could then follow and become the right of the new line. Bnrnside will move to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancel lorsville and on to his destination. Bm-nside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination. All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellors- ville. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. w. R. XXXVI (1) 774, 775 During the 7tli Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd's Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay on the Brock road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The great- est enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to them that they had passed through the " beginning of the end " in the battle just fought. The cheer- ing was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night-attack. At aU events, it drew from him COUNTRY BETWEEN THE WILDERNESS^ AND SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. mm^mmmm Cbfi/^Cf era/6 2^<)rC^S.L MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 121 a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard, but not felt, by us. Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. We looked to see, if we could, which road Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be the right-hand one, and ac- cordingly we took it. We had not gone far, how- ever, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's column when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern, where we arrived after midnight. My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two- fold : first, I did not want Lee to get back to Rich- mond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond, if possible; and if not, to draw him into the open field. But Lee, by acci- dent, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon-trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement com- menced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government. Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps — now commanded by Anderson — to move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsyl- Chap. IX A narrow escape W. R. XXXVI (y 970,974 122 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. IX E. H.Andei- eon, W. P. 1838-42 ; Mexico, 1846-48 ; Brig.-Geu. C. 8. A. Mar. 1861; MaJ.- Gen. Aug. 1862; Lt.- Gen. May, 1864 Ante, II, 111 Slieridau, Memoirs, I, 363 et seq. Wesley Mer- rltt, W. P. 1855-60 ; Brig.-Geii. Vols. June 29, 1863 ; Miij.-Geii. Apr. 1, 1865 vania. But the woods being still ou fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been the result if Lee's orders had l^een obeyed as given ; but it is certain that we would have been in Spottsylvania and be- tween him and his capital. My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter line. Thus twice since crossing the Rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described ; the second, when fires caused by that battle di'ove Anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. But accident often decides the fate of battle. Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would have to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's orders to Merritt — who was holding the bridge — on his arrival at Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so with his division of cavalry ; but he could not hold it against MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 123 the Confederate corps, which had not been detained chap, ix at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted to execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had to cross, and must have de- tained him long enough to enable Wai'ren to rein- force Wilson and hold the town. Anderson soon intrenched himself — if, indeed, HM^Tifui the intrenchments were not already made — imme- diately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. He soon organized his men, as they were not pur- sued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's ^^ w^ ^aw- front, where he intrenched. His right and left Mayufisiii; divisions — the former Cra^^ord's, the latter Wads- \^is°A?r.25, worth's, now commanded by Cutler — drove the ^ ^^^^^^ enemy back some distance. julieSisfiii At this time my headquarters had been advanced voif; Nov." to Piney Branch Church. I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his sup- port. To this end Sedgwick, who was at Piney xxxvi(2) Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's support. ^*^ Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was notified ibid. 531 of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. Burnside, who was with the wagon-trains at Aldrich's on our extreme left, re- ceived the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason, — probably unavoid- 124 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. IX Warren's character- istics W. R. XXXVI (2) 974 able, because lie was never at fault when serious work was to be done, — so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of Sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. Warren's difficulty was twofold. When he received an order to do anything it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to cooperate with him. His ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick percep- tions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. Lee had ordered Hill's corps — now commanded by Early — to move by the very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg. Indeed, he informed the authorities at Eichmond that he had possession of Spottsylvania and was thus on my flank. Anderson was in possession of Spottsyl- vania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only found that he had been following us when he viewed MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 125 ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern. His coming chap, ix detained Hancock from the battle-field of Spottsyl- vaniafor that day ; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and forced him to move by another route. Had I ordered the movement for the night of the '^S^^**^.^' 7th by my left flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an hour or more earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confront- ing the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would no doubt have enabled him to crush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made was tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the Second Corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the Fifth and Sixth corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At that time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man ; and he was besides thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. Chap. X CHAPTER X BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA — HANCOCK'S POSITION — AS- SAULT OF warren's and Wright's corps — upton PROMOTED ON THE FIELD — GOOD NEWS FROM BUT- LER AND SHERIDAN THE Mattapony River is formed by the junction ofspottsyi- ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^' ^^^ "^^^ ^^® Poj ^^^ *^i® ^y rivers, vania ^^^^ jg^g^ beiiig the northernmost of the four. It takes its rise about a mile south and a httle east of the Wilderness Tavern. The Po rises southwest of the same place, but farther away. Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. The Brock road reaches Spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. Lee's army, coming up by the Catharpin road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hancock came by the Brock road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at CatharjDin Fur- R^>°w^K iiace. Burnside, coining by Aldrich's to Gates's House, had to cross the Ny near the enemy. He found pickets at the bridge ; but they were , soon diiven off by a brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream w^as crossed. This brigade was furiously attacked ; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. 126 XXXVI (1) 908 THE MATTAPONY 127 About the time I received the news of this attack, chap, x word came from Hancock that Early had left his xxxvi'(2) front. He had been forced over to the Catharpin ^^ road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge. These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. These movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or toward, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. I made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Eichmond* if he should try to exe- cute this design. If he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny. The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms, — at the time we were there, — and difficult to cross except where bridged. The country about was generally hea^dly timbered, but with occasional clearings. It was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. By noon of the 9tli the position of the two armies ^i}|*amie°s' was as follows : Lee occupied a semicircle facing north, northwest, and northeast, inclosing the town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell came next, then Early. Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock and other roads converging at Spottsylvania ; Sedgwick was to his left and Burn- side on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd's TaA^ern, but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front the latter was ordered up to Warren's right. He formed a line with three 128 PEBSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT ciiAr. X divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the Gershom. aftemoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get MOtt, MeXl- ' ■,.,, n TT u'-coLltii on the enemy's flank. The fourth division of Han- mu;1irfg*- cock's coi'ps, Mott Commanding, was left at Todd's seyl\\]'imi; when the corps first came up ; but in the afternoon May 26^1865 it was brought up and placed to the left of Sedg- ^ic]i's — now Wright's — Sixth Corps. In the morn- ing General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His ,.. ?//-w loss was a severe one to the Army of the Potomac A\ right, W. . K^Etg! and to the nation. General H. G. Wright succeeded Bfig^Gen. Mm iu thc command of his corps. "^'i^ifelf • Hancock was now, 9 p.m. of the 9th of May, across July iS!862 the left flank of Lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of Meade's army, by the Po Eiver. But for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at Wooden Bridge, thus bring- ing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. Just below his lower crossing — the troops crossed at three points — it turns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. During the night this corps built three bridges over the Po ; but these were in rear. The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his left during the night. Accord- xA'^'(i) ^^S^y ^^ *^® morning of the 10th, when Hancock 330,331 renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of Early's com- mand, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA 129 but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed. Hancock reconnoitered his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing if it were found that an advantage could be gained. The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery. Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore for Hancock to cross over — although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army — would still further isolate him from it. The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. The idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of Hancock's, and I determined to take advantage of it. Accordingly in the morn- ing orders were issued for an attack in the after- noon on the center by Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attacking force. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po. Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a reserve. Barlow's divi- sion was left south of the stream, and Mott, of the same corps, was still to the left of Wright's corps. Burnside was ordered to reconnoiter his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. The enemy, seeing Barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter and with considerable loss to himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. Birney was now moved to the high Vol. n.— 9 Chap. X W. R. XXXVI (1) 331 W. R. XXXVI (2) 604 W. R. XXXVI (1) 331 D.B.Biniey, Col. 23d Pa. Aug. 2, 1861; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Feb. 3, 1862; Maj.- Gen.May20, 1863 W. R. XXXVI (2) 610 130 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. X ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. The second as- ■vir^\^-n. sault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the A. A. A. V X (J.) ^^^ enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. General T. Gr. Stevenson was killed in this move. Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impene- trable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitered his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. He was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to re- port recommending the assault. Wright also reconnoitered his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. He .then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel w.^1856- Emory Upton, of the One Hundred and Twenty- MaTiZ'iii fi^st New York A^olunteers, to the command of it. About four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright's corps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultane- rY'^^w'r ously. The movement was prompt, and in a few ^fgf_^y^> minutes the fiercest of struggles began. The battle- field was so densely covered with forests that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. Meade and I occupied the best Lt-cof m'h position we could get, in rear of Warren. i^RiTMgl- Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General A^il^iSs; J. C. Rice being among the killed. He was not fol- ■ 1864 ^^' lowed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby en- BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA 131 abled to reorganize his command as soon as covered chap, x from the guns of the enemy. To the left our suc- cess was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of Mott. Upton with his assaulting xxx^d) party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's in- ^^^"^^^ trenchments. Turning to the right and left, he captured several guns and some hundreds of prison- ers. Mott was ordered to his assistance, but failed utterly. So much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which wei-e in the right position to re- inforce that I ordered Upton to withdraw ; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that I withdrew the order. To relieve them I ordered a renewal of the assault. By this time Hancock, who iwd. 333, 334 had gone with Birney's division to relieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. His corps was now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault. It was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy ; but they were not able to hold them. At night they were withdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. Be- fore leaving Washington I had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gal- ^^ tSffleid lantry. By this authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been badly wounded in this fight. Burnside on the left had got up to within a fe-^,^ hundred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, com- 132 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. X W. R. XXXVI (1) 909 Cf. W. R. XXXVI (2) 627 pletely turning Lee's right. He was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being with the troops where the heaxj fight- ing was, did not know of it at the time. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. Burnside's position now sep- arated him widely from Wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered to join on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do to myself for not having had a staif-officer with him to report to me his position. The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow. Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing ; none except by Mott, who made a reconnais- sance to ascertain if there were a weak point in the enemy's line. I wrote the following letter to General Halleck : Near Spottsylvania Court House, May 11, 1864, 8 : 30 a.m. Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C. : We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general ofdcers killed, wounded, and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater— we CUTTING SHEKIDAN LOOSE 133 having taken over f onr thousand prisoners in battle, whUst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encou- raging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply-trains. If it is more convenient to send them out by train, to march from the raUroad to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so. I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defense of Richmond. U. S. Grant, Ideutenant-General. Chap. X And, also, I received information, through the War Department, from General Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south of Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whipped Hill, killing, wounding, and cap- turing many ; also that he was intrenched and could maintain himself. On this same day came news from Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between Lee and Eichmond, one and a haK million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully exe- cuted in the manner I have already described. w. R. XXXVI (2) 10 Ibid. 615 Ante, II, 77-80 CHAPTER XI HANCOCK'S ASSAULT — LOSSES OF THE CONFEDEKATES — PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED — DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY — EWELL'S ATTACK — REDUCING THE ARTILLERY Chap. XI May, 1864 W. R. XXXVI (2) 635 Ibid. 629 IN the reconnaissance made by Mott on the 11th a sahent was discovered at the right center. I determined that an assault should be made at that point.^ Accordingly in the afternoon Han- cock was ordered to move his command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where 1 Headquarters Armies U. S., May 11, 1864, 3 p.m. Major-General Meade, Commanding Army of the Po- tomac : Move three divisions of the Second Corps by the rear of the Fifth and Sixth corps, under cover of night, so as to join the Ninth Corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. I will send one or two staff-officers over to-night to stay with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. War- ren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by Mott's division and the Ninth Corps. U. S. Grant, Lieu tenan t- General. 134 HANCOCK'S ASSAULT 135 W. R. XXXVI (2) 643 he was to halt. It took most of the night to get the chap, xi men in position for their advance in the morning. The men got but httle rest. Burnside was ordered to attack' on the left of the salient at the same hour. I sent two of my staff-officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigor- ously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren and ibid, es?, ess Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readi- ness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a central position most con- venient for receiving information from all points. Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, ai\d Birney to his right. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve. The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh to cross. But notwithstanding all these w. R. XXXVI (1) 334, 335 1 Headquarters Armies U. S., May 11, 1SG4, 4 p.m. Major-General A. E. Burnside, Oommandiiig Ninth Ariny-eorps : Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of iiight to join yon in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to- morrow. You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possi- ble vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A.M. to-morrow, the 12th inst. Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the ut- most secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. I send two of my staff-oflieers — Colonels Comstoek and Babcock, in whom I have great confidence, and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here — to remain with you and General Hancock, with in- structions to render you every assistance in their power. Gen- erals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. U. S. Grant, Lieutcnaut-General. 136 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XI Maj.-Gen. Edw. John- son and Brif^.-Oen. G. H. Stew- art W. R. XXXVI (1) 909, 910 R.B.Potter, Lt.-Col. 51st N. Y. Oct. 11, 1861 ; Brifj.-Gen. Vols. Mar. 13, 18G3 ; Maj.-Gen. Sept. 20, 1865 W. R. XXXVI (1) 336 difficulties the troops pushed on in quick time with- out firing a gun, and v^hen within four or five hun- dred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered almost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. The hand-conflict was soon over. Hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners,— among them a division and a brigade commanden', — twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock, as soon as the hand- to-hand conflict was over, tm*ned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About six o'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. Potter, command- ing one of his divisions, got over, but was not able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy, but not without loss in return. This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left and attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back ; but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to re- Fold-out Placeholder -lis fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date. Fold-out Placeholder is fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date. LOSSES OF THE CONFEDEEATES 137 Meade to Warren, W. R. XXXVI (2) 661-666 W. R. XXXVI (2) 664 inforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He chap.xi was wounded soon after coming up, but did not re- linquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. At eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to re- lieve Warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his center from that quarter. If the Fifth Corps, or rather if Wai- ren, had been as prompt as Wright was with the Sixth Corps, better results might have been ob- tained. Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket -balls. ' All the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morning be- Mayis.ise* fore the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. In this engage- ment we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade, and one regiment, with W. R. XXXVI (1) 337 138 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XI lieavj losses elsewhere.^ Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. May 13, 1864 At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it. Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up. Cutler's division sent to Wright, and Griffin's to 4.v^-^"™- Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, Gen- Ma/5rop.' ei'^1 Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the ^"et; Brfgf-' remaining division, and authorized him to give it Gen. Vols. -, . -, . Ai)r.28,i862; orders m his name. July 8, 1863 During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. About the center stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seen a Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. She said her husband and son, being Union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, if alive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out, if I could, where the husband and son were. May, 1864 There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little sldrmishing between Mott's division and the 1 Headquarters Armies U. S., enemy are obstinate, and seem May 12, 18G4. 6 : 30 p.m. to have found the last ditch. We Major-General Halleck, have lost no organizations, — not Washington, D. C. : even that of a company, — whilst The eightli day of the battle ^^e have destroyed and captured closes, leaving between three and "ne division (Johnson's), one bri- four thousand prisoners in our g'^tle (Doles's), and one regiment hands for the day's work, includ- '^"tire from the enemy, ing two general officers, and over U. S. Grant, thirty pieces of artillery. The Lieutenant-General. PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED 139 enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be moving out, chap, xi and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. The indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was re- duced to a brigade and assigned to Birney's division. During this day I wrote to Washington recom- mending Sherman and Meade ^ for promotion to the grade of major-general in the regular army; Hancock for brigadier-general; Wright, Gibbon, and Humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers ; and Upton and Carroll to be brigadiers. Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment A^ite, ii, m had to be confirmed by the Senate on the nomina- tion of the President. W. R. XXXVI (2) 695 iSpottsylvania Court House, May 13, 1804. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : I beg leave to recommend the following promotions to be made for gallant and distinguished ser- vices in the last eight days'battles, to wit : Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General John Gibbon to bo major-gener- als ; Colonel S. S. Carroll, Eighth Ohio Volnnteers ; Colonel E. Up- ton, One Hundred and Twenty- first New York Volnnteers ; Colo- nel William MeCandless, Second Pennsylvania Resei'ves, to be brigadier-generals. I would also recommend Major-General W. S. Hancock for brigadier-genei-al in the regular army. His services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion for- gotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I woidd also ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth Army-corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General Humphrej's to the rank of majoi'-general. General Meade has more than met my most sanguine exjiecta- tions. He and Shernum are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of major- generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily be- stowed, and I would feel person- ally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time withoiit seeing both. U, S, Grant, Lieutcnant-General. 140 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XI The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to the left of Burnside. The X A'^' (1) niglit was very dark and it rained heavily ; the i-oads ^*^ were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and cor- duroy the road a part of the way to get through. It was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. They gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in Wright's Ibid. 669 front. Here Upton had to contend for an eleva- tion which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drove the enemy, ^^p^S* ^^^^ ^^^ ^^®^ repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to ^^iMf-isT' ^^^^ support with his brigade (of Griffin's division, Capt. 5tli Art! May 14, Warrcu's corps), the position was secured and for 1861 ; Bris.- Gen. Vol.s. Nov. 29, 1862 Gen. vX." tified. There was no more battle during the 14th. This brought our line east of the Court House and running north and south and facing west. During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front. This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought to the rear of our new center, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. xxxvi (2) ^^ ^^^ 1''^^^ news came from Butler and Averell. 771, 803 rpj^g former I'eported the capture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond on the Danville road ; and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on Sherman the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. The next day to Hauec , j^g^g came from Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman xxxvni (4)172,173 had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia, and DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY 141 was following him south. The report from Sheri- dan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defenses of Richmond. The prospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraph were cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut in every direc- tion from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. This condition of affairs, how- ever, was of but short duration. I wi'ote Halleck : Chap. XI Sheridan to Meade, W. K. XXXVI (1) 778 Near Spottsylvania Court House, May 16, 1864, 8 a.m. Major-General Halleck, WashingtoD, D. C. : "We have had five days' abnost constant rain without any prospect yet of its clearing up. The roads have now be- come so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feels the greatest confidence of ultimate success. # You can assure the President and Secretary of War that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. W. R. XXXVI (2) 809 The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night-march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccess- W. R. XXXVI (1) 337, 338 142 PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XI W. R. XXXVI (2) 840 ^Y. R. xxxvn (1) 475 Ibid. 485, 492 W. R. XXXVI (2) 11,12 \V. R. XXXIV (3) 490, 543 W. R. XXXVI (2) 906 R. O. Tyler, W. P. 1849- 53 ; Col. 4t,li Conn. Art. Sept. 17, 1861 ; Brig.- Gen. Vols. Nov. 29, 1862 ful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as dis- couraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market l^adly, and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before I had sent the inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stop supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might be relieved and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name was suggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reported him diiven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburg road. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in his. place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All this news was very discourag- ing. All of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture. But this was no time for repining. I immediately gave orders for a move- ment by the left flank on toward Richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from Fredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rapj)ahannock. Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under Brigadier- General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They had not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on our right. This corps had been brought to EWELL'S ATTACK 143 the rear of the center, ready to move in any direc- tion. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about five o'clock in the after- noon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade of Warren's corps. Tjder received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans. Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown to Tyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve ; and Ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrench- ments. But his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army being engaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, I naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. The withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by Gen- eral Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Fer- rero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered Chap. XI J. H. Kitch- in.c, Capt. 2d N. Y. Art. Aug. 19, 1861; Col.ethN.Y. Art. Apr. 1863 W. R. XXXVI (1) 338 E. Ferrero, Ool. 5lst N.Y.Oct. 11, 1861 ; Brig.- Gen. Vols. 8ept.l9, 1862 Mai. -Gen C. 8. A. 144 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT CHAP. XI to throw his cavahy pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come ; if he had to retreat, to do so toward Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons, which, however, were soon retaken. In consequence of the disasters that had befallen lis in the past few days Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had Ho doubt he would be. Beaure- gard had come up from the south with troops to guard the Confederate capital when it was in dan- ger. Butler being driven back, most of the troops R F.Hoke, could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed in North Carolina ; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. .^®'^^?,V'^ The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles con- vinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. It occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Before leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defenses of Washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advan- tageously used. In fact, before reaching the James River I again reduced the artillery with the army largely. I beheved that if one corps of the army was ex- posed on the road to Richmond, and at a distance TEMPTING THE ENEMY 145 from the main army, Lee would endeavor to attack chap, xi the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up ; in which case the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. So I issued the following orders : Near Spottsylvania Court House, Virginia, May 18, 1864. Major-General Meade, Commaudiug Army of the Potomac : Before dayUght to-morrow morning I propose to di'aw w. r. Hancock and Bm-nside fi'om the position they now hold, 864 and put Burnside to the left of Wright. Wright and Burnside should then force theh way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy wiU come out of their works to fight and intrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved southeast with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far toward Richmond on the hne of the Fredericksburg raOroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. Suitable directions wiU at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. U. S. Grant. On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. Vol. II.— 1G CHAPTER XII MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK — BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA — AN INCIDENT OF THE MARCH — MOVING ON RICHMOND — SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY — POSI- TION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY CHAP. XII WT^E were now to operate in a different country ▼ ▼ from any we had before seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good and the country well cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were or where they led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitering they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army-corps. Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. v^^\^- n. Hancock, who had the lead, had marched easterly 3*°' 2*1 to Guiney's Station on the Fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met a detachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speed- 146 MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 147 ily driven away and several hundred captured, chap, xii Warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and x:^^'(i) reached Guiney's Station that night without moles- ^ tation. Burnside and Wright were retained at Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an in- tended assault, and to hold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enough to interpose between him and Richmond. Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the oV^ortuMty initiative either by attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph Eoad and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of either oppor- tunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs ; but moved by his interior line — the Tele- graph Road — to make sure of keeping between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. The evening of the 21st, Burnside, Ninth Corps, moved out, followed by Wright, Sixth Corps. Burn- ^^^ side was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by Hancock and Warren, without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the Sixth Corps, at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock. There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they moved out of their lines ; but it was easily repulsed. The object, probably, was only to make sure that we were not lea^dng a force to fol- low upon the rear of the Confederates. W. R. XXXVI (V 148 PERSONAL, MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XII W. R. XXXVI (3) 81 By the morning of tlie 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station. Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They were therefore permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren was pushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with it by a good road, and Biu'nside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright's corps was still back at Guiney's Station. I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day : New Bethel, VmomiA, May 22, 1864. Major-General Meade, Commauding Ai-my of the Potomac : Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readi- ness to march at 5 a.m. to-morrow. At that hour each command wiU send out cavahy and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the Fifth and Sixth corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins's Creek as they can be found. The Second Corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The Ninth Corps wiU be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only show^s two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps. The troops will foUow then- respective reconnoitering parties. The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station. Headquarters will foUow the Ninth Corps. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. BATTLE OF THE NORTH ANNA 149 Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright's following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharp- shooters. The men had to w^ade in water up to their waists. As soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artil- lery and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost perpendicular to the course Of the river — Crawford on the left, next to the river, Griffin in the center, and Cutler on the right. Lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill's corps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. A brigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy fol- lowing; but assistance coming up, the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hun- dred prisoners left in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforce Warren. On the 23d Hancock's corps was ipoved to the wooden bridge which spans the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg railroad crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the bridge guarded, with troops in- trenched, on the north side. Hancock sent two brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simulta- neously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundi-ed prisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did not cross until next morning. Chap. XII W. R. XXXVI (1) 6r(3 Ibid. 612 Ibid. 341 T. W. Egan, Lt.-Col. 40th N. Y. Jime 14, 1861 ; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Sept. 3. 1864 B. R. Pierce, Capt. 3d Mich. 1861 ; Brig.-Gen. Vols. June", 1864 150 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GEANT CHAP. XII Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road x:^vi' (1) I'unning between those described above, and which ^^^ strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. Ibid. 341 On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright's corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of Warren's corps, extending south of the Virginia Central rail- road. This road was torn up for a considerable dis- tance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the Ibid. 912 burning ties. It was found, however, that Burn- side's corps could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his center on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line mak- ing an acute angle where it overlooked the river. Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accurately known I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford by the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. A third ford was found between Ox Ford and Jericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by this newly discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with Crawford's left. Pot- ter joined Hancock by way of the Wooden Bridge. Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. When joined to Warren's corps he was AN INCIDENT OF THE MAKCH 151 no fui-ther molested. Burnside still guarded Ox chap, xii Ford from the north side. Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. To get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march, or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practically two armies besieging. Lee had been reinforced and was being rein- forced largely. About this time the very troops whose coming I had predicted had arrived or were coming in. Pickett with a full di^dsion from Rich- ^eu,'w!?' mond was up ; Hoke from North Carolina had come Mexl^o^ with a brie:ade : and Breckinridge was there — in all Brig.-Ge'n. „ „ ? ^ ^ J C. 8. A. Feb. probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But 1862; m^.- ^ "^ Gen. Oct. 10, he did not attempt to drive us from the field. ^862 On the 22d or 23d I received despatches from Washington sajdng that Sherman had taken Kings- mSSm^i, ton, crossed the Etowah River, and was advancing into Georgia. I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for Burnside's corps to pass. Meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and an elderly lady were present. Burnside, seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. He touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many " live Yankees " before in their lives. The elderly lady spoke up promptly, say- ing, " Oh yes, I have ; many more." " Where ? " said 41-*3 152 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XII Burnside. " lu Riclimond." Prisoners, of course, was understood. I read my despateli aloud, when it was received. This threw the younger lady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the South) was that Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized condition, and that in the Southwest our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her informa- tion was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no doubt about it. I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assui'ed her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But I ^iresume he was in the Con- federate army. v^vaIV /. . ^11 the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relieved Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Eidge to Charlottesville, and go as far as Lynchburg, if pos- sible, living upon the country and cutting the rail- roads and canal as he went. After doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me. On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Eichmond. This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing where we were unless Lee would assume the offensive. I deter- mined, therefore, to draw out of our present posi- tion and make one more effort to get between him and Eichmond. I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this ; but I did expect to hold him 183 POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES 153 far enougli west to enable me to reach the James River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of the Potomac. On the 26th I informed the government at Wash- ington of the position of the two armies ; of the re- inforcements the enemy had received ; of the move I proposed to make ;^ and directed that om- base of Chap. XII W. R. XXXVI (3) 206 1 QuARLEs's Mills, Virginia, May 26, 1864. Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : The relative position of the two armies is now as follows : Lee's right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg road and south of the North Anna, his center on the river at Ox Ford, and his left at Little River, with the crossings of Little River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps and one division of the Ninth Corps crossed at Chester- field Ford and covers the right wing of Lee's armj-. One division of the Ninth Corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. The Fifth and Sixth corps, with one di^asion of the Ninth Corps, run from the soutli bank of the Anna from a sliort distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and par- allel with and near to the enemy. To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaugh- ter of our men that even success would not justify. To tm-n the enemy by his right, between the two Annas, is impossible on ac- count of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by the left leaves Little River, New Found River, and South Anna River — all of them streams pre- senting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army — to be crossed. I have determined, therefore, to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves lis still where we can draw sup- plies. During the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing, were quietly with- drawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this division, with most of the cavalry, will commence a forced march for Hanover Town, to seize and hold the crossings. The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same liour, and follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the soiitli bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrench- ments cannot be had. Oui- men 154 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT Chap, xn supplies should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagou-train and guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Sup- plies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. xxxvi (3) Orders had previously been sent, through Halleck, 77,183 £^j^ Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. This order was repeated on the 25th, with direc- tions that they should be landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined the Army of the Potomac. It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy. Ibid. 183 To accomplish it I issued the following order: QuARLES's Mills, Virginia, May 25, 1864. Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. : Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artUlery not in position to the north side of the river to-morrow. Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road to Hanover Town as it feel that they have gained the track they will have to import morale over the enemy, and at- rail from elsewhere. tack him with confidence. I may Even if a crossing is not effected be mistaken, but I feel that at Hanover Town, it will proba- our success over Lee's army is bly be necessary for us to move already assured. The prompt- on down the Pamunkey until a ness and rapidity with which you crossing is effected. I think it have forwarded reinforcements advisable, therefore, to change has contributed largely to the our base of supplies from Port feeling of confidence inspired in Royal to the White House. I our men, and to break down that wish you would direct this change of the enemy. at once, and also direct Smith to We are destroying all the rails put the railroad-bridge there in we can on the Central and Fred- condition for crossing troops and ericksburg roads. I want to leave artillery, and leave men to hold it. a gap on the roads north of Rich- U. S. Grant, mond so big that to get a single Lieutenant-General. MOVING ON RICHMOND 155 can go, without attracting attention to the fact. Send with chap, xn it Wright's best division or division under his ablest com- mander. Have their places filled up in the line so, if pos- sible, the enemy will not notice then* withdi-awal. Send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch, and seize if they can, Little- page's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points rmtil the infantry and artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-mon-ow night start the di\-ision which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forced march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the Fifth and Sixth corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. The two divisions of the Ninth Corps not now with Hancock may be moved down the north bank of the river, where they wiU be handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the Fifth and Sixth corps. Hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the wa}^ is clear for him. To-morrow it will leave noth- ing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Han- over Town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think it would be well to make a heavy cavahy demonstration on the enemy's left to-morrow afternoon, also. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Wilson's di\dsion of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by om* right south to Little River. Here he manoeuvered to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army. Under cover of night our right wing was with- drawn to the north side of the river, Lee being com- 156 PEESONAI. MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap, xu pletely deceived by Wilson's feint. On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbei't's cavahy to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords xxk\i (1) toward Hanover. As soon as it was dark both divi- '^^ sions moved quietly to Hanover ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that cross- . ings were to be attempted in the morning. Sheri- dan was followed by a division of infantry under DA.Russeii, General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the W .r. 1841-40, <-' isitTbhr.- crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy j^Tw,i862; losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. Thus a posi- septJ'w "i864 tion was secui^ed south of the Pamunkey. Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry Ba?ringer P^^''^lied ou to Hauovcr Towu. Hcrc Barringer's, ■^c!^s] A^.°' formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away. Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's and Hancock's corps. Wlien out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pick- ets confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry fol- lowed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then, taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest to and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, fol- lowed by Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. The trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossed the Pamunkey on the morning of the May, 1864 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. FIELD OF OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE i^ V PAMUNKEY ^^D THE JAMES RIVERS. ^l^aiio?/al 2'orce3. ' / ^yitJ*»«57^ ki^castle^^y\ \ 7icM^ rP^' SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY 157 Lee had evidently been deceived by our move- chap, xii nient from North Anna ; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond : " Enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at xx':j^i% Hanover Town." The troops that had then crossed ^^^ left his front the night of the 25th. The comitry we were now in was a difificiilt one to move troops over. The streams were numerons, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. The banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to ap- proach except where there were roads and bridges. Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Rich- Topography mond. There are two roads leading there ; the most direct and shortest one crossing the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central rail- road, the second going by New and Old Cold Har- bor. A few miles out from Hanover Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Rich- mond. New Cold Harbor was important to us be- cause while there we both covered the roads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roads southeast over which we would have to pass to get to the James River below the Richmond defenses. On the morning of the 28th the army made an w.k. early start, and by noon all had crossed except 343,543,913 Burnside's corps. This was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon-train. A line was at once formed extending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's in the center, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. 158 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKANT CHAP.xn At the same time Sheridan was directed to recon- xA'vi'o) iioiter toward Mechanicsville to find Lee's position. ^''^ At Hawes's Shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered the Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially in- trenched. Gregg attacked with his division, but xxkYia) w^s unable to move the enemy. In the evening 821, 854 Quster came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charg- ing as infantry. This time the assault was success- ful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. But our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union soldiers had been killed. The position was easily held, because oui- infantry was near. Ibid. 343, 543, On the 29th a reconnaissance was made in force, •7X0 to find the position of Lee. Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corps pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek ; Warren's corps to the left on the Shady C-rove Church road ; while Burn- side was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fight- ing. There was now an appearance of a move- ment past our left flank, and Sheridan was sent to meet it. May, 1864 On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopoto- moy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps, and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of Hancock. Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady Grove Church road. There was some skirmishing along the center, and in the evening Early attacked War- ren with some vigor, dri^dng him back at fir^, and INSTRUCTIONS TO MEADE 159 threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means of reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front. He carried and held the rifle-pits. While this was going on Warren got his men up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile. On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washington to be sent to City Point. In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corps at White House. I notified Meade, in writing, as follows : Near Hawes's Shop, VmoiNiA, 6 : 40 P.M., May 30, 1864. Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. : General Smith will debark his force at the White House to-night and start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of Smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements weU out toward Cold Harbor, and also on the MechanicsviUe road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy if necessary. I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 o'clock in the morn- ing, to communicate with Smith and to return with him. I wiU send orders for Smith by the messenger you send to Sheridan with his orders. U. S. Grant. Chap. XII W. R. XXXVI (1) 343 W. R. XXXVI (3) 322 Ibid. 323 I also notified Smith of his danger and the pre- cautions that would be taken to protect him. Ibid. 371 Culpeper "/"^i^ /j 2teven.sbuV'g'".>. ,, >.x£^^ S 4^^ jforange C.H. ?d>^" ordonsville. IreviB an's v^~v^/'' -. \ '''■■? City CH. ^ -"'■'^Ji^'rkiurs^-^'-- George C.R / ^-V •'■I BATTLES© Sc*i.e~ =)15M1LC5 POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY 161 The night of the 30th Lee's position was substan- tially from Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central railroad south and east to the vicinity of Cold Har- bor. Ours was : The left of Warren's corps was on the Shady Grove road, extending to the Mechanics- ville road and about three miles south of the Toto- potomoy ; Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and Wright on the extreme right, extending toward Hanover Court House, six miles southeast of it. Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watch- ing our left front toward Cold Harbor. Wilson with his division on oiu- right was sent to get on the Vir- ginia Central railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. He got possession of Hanover Court House the next day after a skirmish with Young's cavalry brigade. The enemy attacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed, and the enemy fol- lowed some distance toward Cold Harbor. Chap. XII W. R. XXXVI (1) 872, 873 P. M. B. Young, Maj.-Gen. C. 8. A. Dec. 12, 1864 W. R. XXXVI (1) 782 Vol. II.— 11 CHAPTER XIII ADVANCE ON COLD HAEBOE — AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAE — BATTLE OF COLD HAEBOE — COEEESPOND- ENCE WITH LEE — EETEOSPECTIVE Chap. XIII W. R. XXXVI (1) 783 W. R. XXXVI (3) 404 W. R. XXXVI (1) 783 ON the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He fonnd it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensued, but the place was carried. The enemy well knew the importance of Cold Harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. He retm-ned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdi-awing without making any effort to hold it against such odds ; but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defense. Night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to Cold Harbor, passing by the rear of the army. It was expected to arrive by daylight or before ; but the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of June before it reached its destination. Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two as- 162 ADVANCE ON COLD HAEBOE 163 466 Ibid. 371 saults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed chap.xiii with heavy loss to the enemy. Wright's corps com- ing- up, there was no further assault on Cold Harbor. Smith, who was coming up from White House, xxxyio) was also directed to march directly to Cold Har- bor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of June ; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directed him to New Castle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the after- noon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He landed twelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a division was left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soon after light on the 1st of June, Anderson, who commanded the corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along War- ren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move out and get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy, but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by ; and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly in- trenched in his front, and, besides, his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. He seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of Ibid. 448 164 PERSONiVL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT W. R. XXXVI (1) 543 Chap, xm ail ai'iny hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitered some distance to his front ; but the enemy, finding Old Cold Harbor already taken, had halted and fortified some distance west. By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make an assault. In front of both the ground was clear for several hundred yards, and then became wooded. Both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. While this was going on the enemy charged Warren three separate times with vigor, but was repulsed each time with loss. There was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemy forced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's corps at the same time ; but it was feeble and prob- ably only intended to relieve Anderson, who was being pressed by Wright and Smith. During the night the enemy made frequent at- tacks with the view of dispossessing us of the impor- tant position we had gained, but without effecting his object. Hancock was moved from his place in line dur- ing the night and ordered to the left of Wright. I expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive, and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of the column only reached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7 : 30 A.M. Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but it did not take place until the Ibid. 344 A WAK ANECDOTE 165 next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the chap.xhi left to connect with Smith ; Hancock's corps was got into position to the left of Wright's ; and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While Warren and Burnside were making these changes xxxvi(i) the enemy came out several times and attacked 5«, 544, 913, them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. I was so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of om- manoeuvers being made for the very pm-pose of getting the enemy out of his cover. On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia Central raih'oad, ha\dng damaged it considerably. But, like om-selves, the rebels had be- come experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in his Memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign voi.ii.p.m to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The rebel cavalry, lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications, had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tun- nels. One of them said, " No use, boys ; old Sher- man carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will re- place them as fast as you can blow them up ; better save your powder." Sheridan was engaged reconnoitering the banks of the Chickahominy, to find crossings and the con- dition of the roads. He reported favorably. During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to oui^s. His lines extended 1G6 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT W.R. XXXVI (3) 626 CHAP. XIII now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor ; mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahomiuy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright, and Smith ; but Warren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness either if he should reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quar- ter, or if a favorable opportunity shoidd present itself.^ The corps commanders v/ere to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commence at half- past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow 369,432,433 ^^^ Glbbou forward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy tire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. Not- withstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line, where the road makes a deep cut through a bank, affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hun- dred prisoners. The guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. No W.R. XXXVI (1) 344, 345, W.R. XXXVI (3) 526 1 Near Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 7 a.m. Major-General Meade,' Commanding A. P. : The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive ; but when one does succeed, push it vigor- ously, and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. BATTLE OF COLD HAKBOR 167 assistance coming to liim, he (Barlow) intrenclied under fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. Wright's corps, moving in two lines, captui*ed the outer rifle-pits in its front, but accomplished noth- ing more. Smith's corps also gained the outer rifle- pits in its front. The ground over which this corps (Eighteenth) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine run- ning toward his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross-fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put Martindale's division in it, and, with Brooks supporting him on the left and Devens on the right, succeeded in gaining the outer — probably picket — rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also ad- vanced and gained ground — which brought the whole army on one line. This assault cost us heavily, and probably with- out benefit to compensate ; but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any disposi- tion to leave his defenses far behind him. Fighting was substantially over by half -past seven in the morning. At eleven o'clock I started to visit Chap. XIII W. R. XXXVI (1) 1002-1005 J.H.Martin- dale W. T. H. Broofes Chas. De- vens W.E. XXXVI (1) 544, 914 168 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XIII all the corps commanders to see for myseK the dif- ferent positions gained, and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. "Wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the co- operation of Hancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine. Burnside thought something could be done in his front, but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore, to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 12 : 30 p.m. Major-General Meade, Commanding A. P. : w. R. The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine 526 of success in case an assault is ordered, you may du-ect a suspension of further advance for the present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. Reconnaissances should be made in front of every corps, and advances made to advantageous posi- tions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there. Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's hues, and all should be ready to resist an assault. U. S. Grant, lAeutenant- General. h:i -r ri ^1 i r f^arfte^^::-^.^=.^ GENERAL GRANT AND STAFF AT BETHESDA CHrRCH. GENERAL GRANT IS SITTING WITH HIS BACK TO THE SMALLER TREE. (FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.) COKRESPONDENCE WITH LEE 169 The remainder of the day was spent in strength- ening the line we now held. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us. During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of his wounded, and with- out burying his dead. These we were able to care for. But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. So I wrote the following : Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 5, 1864. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate Ai-my : It is reported to me that there are wounded men, prob- ably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering be- tween the Unes occupied respectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish-lines unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired wiU be accepted by me. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. Chap. XIII W.R. XXXVI (3) 600 Lee replied that he feared such an arrange- ment would lead to misunderstanding, and pro- posed that in future, when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I answered this immediately by saying : Ibid. 170 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIII "VV. R. XXXVI (3) 638 Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 6, 1864. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia : Your communication of j^esterday's date is received. I will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and vn.]l also instruct that j-ou be allowed to do the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between the hom-s of 12 M. and 3 p.m. to-day. I will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. U. S. Grant, Lieu ten an t- Genera I. Ibid. Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce ; and he had directed that any parties I might have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, be turned back. I answered : Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 6, 1864. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army Northern Virginia : Ibid. The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, Ijetween the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in — say two hours. Permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General COKKESPONDENCE WITH LEE 171 Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting chap.xui the correspondence brought it to the 7th of June x^vi'o) — forty-eight hours after it commenced — before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. In the mean time all but two of the wounded had died. And I wi'ote to Lee: Cold Harbor, ViRGmiA, June 7, 1864, 10 : 30 a.m. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Army of Northern Virginia : I regret that yonr note of 7 p.m. yesterday shoidd have ibid. 666 been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the horn- which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired ; 10 : 45 P.M. was the hour at which it was received at corps head- quarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of coUecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officers and six men of the Eighth and Twenty-fifth North Carolina Regi- ments, who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captiu'ed and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learned the fact I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be re- turned to their commands. These officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear, I have determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they wiU be sent by some other route. Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the suffer- ings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain, etc., U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. I have always regretted that the last assault at -me last as- Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same Harbor 172 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT . Chap. XIII tiling of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksbui'g. At Cold Harbor no advantage what- ever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses were on the Confederate side. Before that the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to nave acquired a wholesome regard for the coui"age, endurance, and soldierly quahties gen- erally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antago- nist in the open field. They had come to much pre- fer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the re- verse. When we reached the James River, how- ever, aU. effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared, '''onvick^* There was more justification for the assault at burg^,May22, Yic]jg]3^i.g^ ^^q wbyg iR a Southcrii climatc, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of the Ten- nessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion of that army from Port Gribson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked another portion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the in- terior of the State, and driven them back into Jack- son with great loss in killed, wounded, captm'ed, and missing, besides loss of large and small arms. They had captm-ed the capital of the State of Mississippi, KETROSPECT 173 with a large amount of materials of war and manu- chap, xiii factures. Only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy, then penned up in the town, first at Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut oif from returning), besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circum- stances. There was no telling how long a regular siege might last. As I have stated, it was the be- ginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might be among Northern troops working and li\ing in trenches, drinking surface-water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If Yicksburg could have been carried in May it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we gained — and it was a slight one for so great a sac- rifice — was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had. the assault not been made I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health, and comfort. CHAPTER XIV LEFT- FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES — GENERAL LEE — VISIT TO BUTLER — THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG — THE INVEST- MENT OF PETERSBURG Chap. XIV W. R. XXXVI (3) 598 LEE'S position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left-flank move carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River.^ Preparations for this 1 Cold Harbor, June 5, 1864. Major-General, Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C. : A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be im- practicable to hold a line north- east of Richmond that would pro- tect the Fredericksburg railroad, to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of com- munication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond; then, after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or fol- low him south if he should re- treat. I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immedi- ately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can in- stjmtly retire beliind them. With- out a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. 174 ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES 175 were promptly commenced. The move was a haz- chap.xiv ardous one to make : the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed ; all the bridges over it east of Lee were destroyed ; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing ; more than fifty miles intervened between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. Then, too, he might spare troops enough to send I have therefore resolved upon Ouce on the south side of the the following plan : James River, I can cut off all I will continue to hold substan- soiu'ces of supply to the enemy tially the ground now occupied by except what is furnished by the the Army of the Potomac, taking canal. If Hunter succeeds in advantage of any favorable cir- reaching Lynchburg, that will be cumstance that may present it- lost to him also. Should Hunter self, until the cavalry can be not succeed, I will still make the sent west to destroy the Vir- effort to destroy the canal by giuia Central railroad from about sending cavalry up the south side Beaver Dam for some twenty-five of the river with a pontoon-train or thirty miles west. When this to cross wherever they can. is effected I will move the army The feeling of the two armies to the south side of the James now seems to be that the rebels River, either by crossing the can protect themselves only by Chickahominy and marching near strong intrenchraents, whilst our to City Point, or by going to the army is not only confident of pro- mouth of the Chickahominy on tecting itself without intrench- north side and crossing there, ments, but that it can beat and To pi'ovide for this last and drive the enemy wherever and most possible contingency, sev- whenever he can be found with- eral ferry-boats of the largest out this protection, class ought to be immediately U. S. Grant, provided. Lieutenant- General. 17G PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIV agaiiist Huiitei', who was approaching Lynchburg, Hving upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him. But the move had to be made, and I rehed upon Lee's not seeing my danger as I saw it. Besides, we had armies on both sides of the James River and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safety would be a matter of the first considera- tion with the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took all the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers. Grant to Shcridau was sent with two divisions to com- Meade.W.B. sS^Meade Hiunicate with Hunter and to break up the Virginia mKsIe^g Central railroad and the James Eiver Canal, on the 7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him.^ Hunter was also informed by way 1 Cold Harbor, Virginia, for a single day. But that point June 6, 1864. is of so much importance to the Major-General D. Hunter, enemy that in attempting to get Commanding Department of it such resistance may be met as West Virginia : to defeat your getting on to the W.R. General Sheridan leaves here road or canal at all. I see, in 598 to-morrow morning, with instruc- looking over the letter to General tions toproceed to Charlottesville, Halleek on the subject of your in- Virginia, and to commence there structions, that it rather indicates the destruction of the Virginia that your route should be from Central railroad, destroying this Staunton via Charlottesville. If way as much as possible. The you have so understood it, you complete destruction of this road will be doing just what I want, and of the canal on James River is The direction I would now give of great importance to us. Accord- is that if this letter reaches you ing to the instructions I sent to in the valley between Staunton General Halleek for your gui- and Lynchburg, you immediately dance, you were to proceed to turn east by the most practicable Lynchburg and commence there, road until you strike the Lynch- It would be of great value to us burg branch of the Virginia Cen- to get possession of Lynchburg tralroad. From thence moveeast- ACEOSS THE CHICI^HOMINY AND JAMES 177 of Wasliiugtou aud the Valley that Sheridan was on chap, xiv the way to meet hhn. The canal and Central road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent of all the supplies for the Ai-my of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan got off on the 7th news was re- xxxViiu) ceived from Hunter reporting his advance to Staun- ton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. E. Jones, was killed. On the 4th ^:|:i^^f|.' of June, the enemy having withdrawn his left cal'.6llt.2i corps, Burnside, on our right, was moved up be- Gen.'asS. tween Warren and Smith. On the 5tli Birney re- Maj.-den. ' 1863 turned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy, and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks to that stream to Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's Bridge. On the 7th Abercrombie — who was in command crombfe! w. at Wliite House, and who had been in command at ^Mellco!' our base of supplies in all the changes made from col nh m. • Feb ''5 the start — was ordered to take up the iron from BriK.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 31, 1861 ward along the line of the road, If on receipt of this you should destroying it completely and thor- be near to Lynchburg aud deem oughly, until you join General it practicable to reach that point, Sheridan. After the work laid you will exercise your judgment out for General Sheridan and about going there, yourself is thoroughly done, pro- If you should be on the rail- ceed to join the Army of the Po- road between Charlottes^^lle and tomae by the route laid out in Lynchburg, it may be practicable General Sheridan's instructions, to detach a cavalry force to de- If any portion of your force stroy the canal. Lose no oppor- — especially your cavalry — is tunity to destroy the canal, needed back in your department, U. S. Grant, you are authorized to send it back. Lieutenant-General. Vol. II.— 12 178 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIV the Yoi'k River railroad and put it on boats, x:^'^'(3) aiid to be in readiness to move by water to City '«" Point. Ibid. 695 On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. Ibid. 716 On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to report to But- ler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send all reinforcements to City Point. On the 11th I wrote : Cold Harbor, Virgentea, June 11, 1864. Major-Gteneral B. F. Butler, Commanding Department of Virginia and North Carolina : Ibid. 754 The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River will commence after dark to-morrow night. Colonel Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval, during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has not yet re- turned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I would wish ; but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes to make arrangements for gunboats and transportation to send up the Chickahominy to take to you the Eighteenth Corps. The corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening to- morrow as possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it should reach by 10 a.m. the following morning. This corps numbers now 15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artiUery, these latter marching with the balance of the army to the James ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES 179 River. The remainder of the army will cross the Chicka- chap, xiv hominy at Long- Bridge and at Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below City Point. I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond. The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough. I wish you would du-ect the proper staff-officers, your chief engineer and your chief quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If there is a point below City Point where a pontoon-bridge can be tlu-OTvn, have it laid. Expecting the arrival of the Eighteenth Corps by Mon- day night, if you deem it practicable, from the force you have, to seize and hold Petersburg, you may prepare to start on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. I do not want Petersbiu'g visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it unless you feel a reasona- ble degree of confidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secm-ed. If Colonel Dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transi)ortation for the Eighteenth Corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. p_ s. — On reflection I will send the Eighteenth Corps by way of White House. The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of naviga- tion on the Chickahominy will be avoided. U. S. Grant. 180 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIV W. R. XXXVI (3> 746 Cold Harbor, Virginia, June 11, 1864. Major-General G. G. Meade, Commanding Army of the Potomac : Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the army, has not yet re- turned. It is now getting so late, however, that all prep- arations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer. The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon ; that is, the Eighteenth Corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompany- ing the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. The Fifth Corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge road to its junction with Quaker road, or until stopped by the enemy. The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at Long Bridge and two at Jones's Bridge, After the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about Fort Powhat- tan. Of course this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. The Fifth Corps, after secur- ing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon-trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made, lower down than Jones's, they should take it. U. S, Grant, Lieutenant- General. P. S. — In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the Eighteenth Corps may be changed to White House. They should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waitmg for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. U. S. Grant. ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES 181 About this time word was received (through the chap, xiv Richmond papers of the 11th) that Crook and xxxVn (d Averell had united and were moving east. This, 120, ue with the news of Huntei-'s successful engagement iwd. 95,96 near Staunton, was no doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan's leaving with two divisions of cavalry looked indeed threatening, both xxx'^' (d to Lee's communications and to his supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after Sheridan, and Early, with Ewell's entire corps, was sent to the Valley. Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Con- sternation reigned there. On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night xx^'^O) to White House, not to stop until he reached there, ^*^' '"' '^^^ and to take Ijoats at once for City Point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing by wading and floun- dering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon-bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed, and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright. Ferrero's division, with the wagon-train, moved farther east, by Window Shades and Cole's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. 182 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT Chap. XIV It was kiiowii that the enemy had some gunboats at Eichmond. These might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone, ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in w. R. XL (2) an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them and prevent their removal by the enemy. As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chicka- hominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but Warren and Wil- son reported the enemy strongly fortified in their ^•\f^<^> front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City Court House, on the Ibid. 521 James River, Burnside's and Wright's corps were on the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the cavalry still cover- ing the army. The material for a pontoon-bridge was already at hand, and the work of lajdng it SaX'w.T ^^^ commenced immediately, under the superin- Me^co', tendence of Brigadier-General Benham, command- Maj.' En'ff. iug the Engineer Brigade. On the evening of the Gen. Vols. 14th the crossing commenced, Hancock m advance, Aug. 13, 1861 . using both the bridge and boats, xxxvi^i) When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's corps, — which was a separate command until the 24th of May, when it was incorporated with the main army, — numbered about 116,000 men. During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforce- ments were received. At the crossing of the James 106 et seq. ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES 183 River, June 14th-15th, the array numbered a}3orit chap, xw 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were dis- charged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.^ In estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is in- eluded, no matter how employed : in bands, sick in field-hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks, and all. Operating in an enemy's country, and be- ing supplied always from a distant base, large de- tachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides, or maps showing the roads accurately. The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account ; never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets or carbines. Generally the latter are far enough I FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE ADJUTANT- GENERAL'S OFFICE. FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE. KILLED. WOTJNDED. MISSING. AGGKEGATE. Wilderness, May 5th to 7th ... . Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21 st. North Auna, May 23d to 27th . . Totopotomoy, May 27th to 3l8t Cold Harbor, May 31st to June 12th 2,261 2,271 186 99 1,769 8,785 9,360 792 358 6,752 2,902 1,970 165 52 1,537 13,948 13,601 1,143 509 10,058 Tntal 6,586 26,047 6,626 39,259 184 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIV away to be excluded from the count in any one field. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In the Northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay. IxxYuh Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had io2iet8eq. j^q|; j^gg than eighty thousand men at the start. His reinforcements were about equal to ours dur- ing the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops, and every natural defense was familiar to him and his ai-my. The citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. Rear-guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon-trains were not required. All circumstances considered, we did not have any advantage in numbers. General Lee General Lcc, wlio had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all these contests, was a very highly es- timated man in the Confederate army and States, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the Northern States. His praise was sounded throughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in ; the number of his forces was always lowered, and that of the National forces exaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and, I judge, difficult of approach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of the South after every engagement, and by a por- tion of the press North with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his OtNEKAL IjUANl- Al II K AU'jL' AK ni US Dl-U1N<, l)ll': \Ik<,lMA CAMl'AIGN. (from a photograph bv bradv.) VISIT TO BUTLER 185 troops and to make him feared by his antagoiiists. chap.xiv It was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers, "Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet." There are good and true officers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was supeiior to the Army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believe the difference was the other way. The Army of Northern Virginia became de- spondent and saw the end. It was not pleased thereby. The National army saw the same thing, and was encouraged by it. The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th of June. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon-bridges and crossing the river. As already stated, I had Ante, n, 182 previously ordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler for the purpose of directing a movement against Peters- burg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing. I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Ante, ii,i8i 186 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIV Harbor by the way of White House, thence on steamers to City Point, for the purpose of giving General Butler more troops with which to accom- xxxvi'o) plisli tliis result. General Butler was ordered to "^ send Smith, with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army of the James. He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty- five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty- R^v\Hinks fi^'^' huudrcd colored infantry under Hinks. The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the Confederate advance-line of works was but two miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move, under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight. I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. It had only about twenty-five hundred men in the defenses, besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up ^■^7(55^^^^ arms in case of emergency. Smith started as pro- posed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between City Point and their lines out- side of Petersburg. This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really w.E.^xL(2) gQJ; off fi-om there. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps would cross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case the latter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from his position. I retm'ned down the river to where the troops of 72 MOVEMENT ON PETERSBUKG 187 the Army of the Potomac now were, communicated chap, xiv to General Meade, in writing, the directions I had given to General Butler, and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to Peters- burg, halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had ordered rations from Ber- '^^ \f^ <^^ muda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained ^"^gof^^^^ until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them, and on the road re- ceived a note from General W. F. Smith asking him ^- ^gf^'^^ to come on. This seems to have been the first infor- mation that General Hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early ibid. 705 in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. The enemj^'s line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox back, there were thirteen of these redans, extending a distance of several miles — probably three. If they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Eichmond, 188 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XIV Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with ^' ^7of ^ ^^^ success. By nine o'clock at night he was in posses- sion of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him ; and Smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. ^' ^3(5^ '^^ Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the com- mand of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at Gettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily. The works were nob strongly manned, but they all had guns in them, which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, had received no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury's Bluff,^ which 1 City Poikt, Virginia, tage of this and moved a force at June 17, 1864, 11 a.m. once upon the railroad and plank W. R. XL (2) Major-General Halleck, road between Richmond and Pe- Washington, D. C. : tersburg, which I hope to retain ***** possession of. Too much credit The enemy, in their endeavor cannot be given to the troops and to reinforce Petersburg, aban- their commanders for the energy doned their intrenchments in and fortitude displayed during front of Bermuda Hundred. They the last five days. Day and night no doubt expected troops from has been all the same, no delays north of the James River to take being allowed on any account, their place before we discovered U. S. Grant, it. General Butler took advan- Lientenant-General. 115 MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG 189 had arrived on the morning of the 16th ; though he chap, xiv had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. During the 17th the fighting was very severe and ^"3^,^^^^^ the losses heavy ; and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by Potter during the day. During the night, however, Beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying it. Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the Twentieth *^^^erfata™" Maine, was wounded on the 18th. He was gal- lantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. He had several times been recommended for a brigadier- generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On this occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, Yi6f2n,^236* and forwarded a copy of my order to the War De- partment, asking that my act might be confirmed and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without any delay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well. If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon 190 PEBSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XIV the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. The days were long, and it would have given him considera- ble time before night. I do not think there is any doubt that Petersburg itself could have been car- ried without much loss ; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then oc- cupied by the enemy. This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Side rail- roads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from June, 1864 the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet, except that there was more or less firing every day, until the w. E.xL(2) 22d, when General Meade ordered an advance to- 241 274 ' ward the Weldon railroad. We were very anxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side railroad, if possible. w.R.xL(i) Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. General Wright, with the Sixth Corps, was ordered, by a road farther south, to march directly for the Weldon road. The enemy passed in between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced position. The Army of the Potomac was given the invest- ment of Petersburg, while the Army of the James 325 INVESTMENT OF PETEESBURG 191 held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we pos- chap, xiv sessed north of the James River. The Ninth Corps, Burnside's, was placed upon the right at Peters- burg ; the Fifth, Warren's, next ; the Second, Bir- ney's, next; then the Sixth, Wright's, broken off to the left and south. Thus began the siege of Petersburg. CHAPTER XV RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD — RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD — EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON — MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG — EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG — CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY — CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD CHAP. XV r\^ the 7tli of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had, ^-^ as already indicated, sent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the Virginia Central railroad. General Hunter W. R. XXXVII (1) 94-96 had been operating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought a battle near Staunton, where he captured a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed a junction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from the Ka- nawha or Gauley River. It was supposed, there- fore, that Greiieral Hunter would be about Char- lottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he w^as sent to do. I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet him about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the Potomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the Valley, 192 KAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD 193 started Breckinridge out for its defense at once, chap.xv Learning later of Sheridan's going with two divi- sions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of hS^ou, cavalrv, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's. c.8.A".june, " -■ n n • T o ji AT J.1 1862; Maj.- Sheridan moved to the north side ot the Wortli oen. aus.3, 1863 ; Lt.- Anna to get out west, and learned of the movement ^en^ Aug. of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to Trevillian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On the night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of Tre- xxxvi' (d vilhan, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilhan Station, and Hampton but a few miles away. During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a countermove, sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to City Point. During that day, the llth, Sheridan moved into iwd, Trevilhan Station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. There was con- siderable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. In the mean time, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take Vol. II.— 13 194 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XV W. R. XXXVI (1) 784 to go noi'tli when lie left Trevilliaii. Sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here, that G eneral Hunter was about Lynch- burg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to Charlottesville with a view to meet him. Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House, and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had established near Trevillian, and these necessarily feU into the hands of the enemy. White House up to this time had been a depot ; but now that our troops were all on the James River it was no longer wanted as a store of sup- plies. Sheridan was therefore directed to break it up, which he did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon-train with him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month, and Sheridan ready to follow. In the mean time Meade had sent Wilson's divi- sion on a raid to destroy the Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton free to return to Richmond with his cav- alry, Wilson's position became precarious. Meade w.E.xL(2) therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads; but the damage done was soon repaired. After these events comparative quiet reigned Ibid. 786 W. R. XL (1) 620 HUNTER IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 195 about Petersburg until late iu July. The time, chap, xv however, was spent in strengthening the intrench- ments and making our position generally more se- cure against a sudden attack. In the mean time I had to look after other portions of my command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I could have wished. General Hunter, who had been appointed to sue- xxx\li (d ceed Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On the 8th he formed a junction with Crook and Ave- rell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Up to this time he was very successful ; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march through a hostile country, he would no doubt have captured Lynchburg. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and june, im 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammuni- tion to give battle, retired from before the place. xxxV?i(i) Unfortunately this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up the Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. A long time was con- sumed in making this movement. Meantime the Valley was left open to Early's troops and others in that quarter ; and Washington also was uncovered. 196 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT CHAP. XV Early took advantage of tliis condition of affairs and moved on Washington. In the absence of Hunter, General Lew. Wallace, with headquarters at Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. His surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in number. Most of these were raw, and consequently very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but the situation of Washington was pre- xxxVfid) carious, and Wallace moved with commendable ^^^ promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until Wash- ington could be put into a state of preparation for xxxvn(2) liis reception. I had previously ordered General ^^° Meade to send a division to Baltimore for the pur- pose of adding to the defenses of Washington, and ette.'w! r" lie had sent Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps Melfco, (Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th BriS^Gek of July. Finding that Wallace had gone to the ^2l!i86i^^ front with his command, Ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division. They met the enemy and, as xxxVn (1) niight have been expected, were defeated ; but they ^"* succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. The next morning Early Ibid. 348 started on his march to the capital of the nation, arriving before it on the 11th. Learning of the gravity of the situation, I had w. E- directed General Meade to also order Wright with 158 the rest of his corps directly to Washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that Early arrived before it. The Nine- EAKLY'S movement on WASHINGTON 197 teenth Corps, which had been stationed in Louisi- chap, xv ana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about Richmond, had about this time arrived at xxxVii(2) Fortress Monroe, on their way to join us. I di- ^*^ verted them from that point to Washington, which place they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The Nineteenth Corps was En^ix'w commanded by Major-General Emory. Lt-coLctii Early made his reconnaissance with a view of m^ii'm^g*' attacking on the following morning, the 12th ; but Man iv "1862 the next morning he found our intreuchments, xxxviio which were very strong, fully manned. He at once ^*^ commenced to retreat, Wright following. There is no telling how much this result was contributed to by General Lew. Wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, General Wallace con- tributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory. Farther west, also, the troubles were threatening. \?-|*^4f^ Some time before, Forrest had met Sturgis in com- **'i^{^ir' mand of some of our cavalry in Mississippi and vois;"Aug. handled him very roughly, gaining a very great Brice's victory over him. This left Forrest free to go Roa^s^june almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in ^^•'^^^*- ®^® W. R. rear of Sherman, who was then advancing. Slier- xxxix (d ' ^ passim man w^as abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his mili- tary division so long as he could communicate with W. R. XXXIX (2) 182 198 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XV it ; but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Two divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some months before. Sherman ordered these back, xxx'ix(i) "^^t^ directions to attack Forrest. Smith met and 250,320 defeated him very badly. I then directed that Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go, and to prevent by all means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville railroad. Sherman had anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance; but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it. ^' ^52?^ '^^ ^^ t^® 25th of June General Burnside had com- menced running a mine from about the center of his front under the Confederate works confronting him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Plea- Hcnrv Pleasants, sauts, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regi- ment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had sub- mitted the scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. The positions of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart, with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. In the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position was unfavor- able in this particular : that the enemy's line at that point was reentering, so that its front was com- manded by his own lines both to the right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy 48tli Pa. MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG 199 had, at least, a detached work on this highest point, chap, xv The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready for charging ; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. ^- ^^^-f ^ <^' On the 17th of July several deserters came in ibid. 305 and said that there was great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an attack upon us — the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to Georgia, where the army Sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the army commanders, Meade and Butler, on the look- iwd. 290, 307 out, but the attack was not made. I concluded, then, a few days later, to do some- thing in the way of offensive movement myself, having in \dew something of the same object that - Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, and with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defenses to send West. I had other ob- jects in view, however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry Petersburg if I coidd. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible. Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a move- ^g^iihi^^i.' ment with Hancock's corps and Sheridan's cavalry niofra,i!^u6 to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom, where Butler had a pontoon-bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose, and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the Virginia Central railroad, while, in 200 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XV the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. We were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James, as I expected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morn- ing of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minute orders ^ on the Battles & LciHlcrs.IV 545-5(17 W K. XL (3) 421 1 City Point, Virginia, Jiily 24, 1864. Major-General Meade, Commanding, etc. : The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Ber- muda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. The chances, they think, will be better on Burn- side's front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to concen- trate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we ex- pect to penetrate. All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's pres- ent line if tliey sliould succeed in penetrating it, and of gettingback to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in break- ing through. To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the sup- port of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders : if they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act l>romptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord can cooperate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce you, or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox and James rivers, as may be deemed best. This should be done by Tues- day morning, if done at all. If not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as Hicksford at least', and to Weldon if pos- sible. ***** Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at Peters- burg, Burnside's mine will be blown up. . . U. S. Grant, Lien tenan t- General. MINING THE WOEKS BEFORE PETERSBURG 201 24th, directing how I wanted the assanlt conducted, chap, xv which orders he amplified into general instructions ^-5^6,^97'^^ for the guidance of the troops that were to be en- gaged. Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, were all that I can see now was neces- sary. The only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them. The gallery to the mine was over five hundred ibid. 476, 477 feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross-gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed ; and on the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James River with their troops. Under cover of night they started to re- ibid. 602 cross the bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march di- rectly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments iwd. 596 with a sufficient number of men, and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burn side's cori3S, while Ord, now commanding the Eighteenth Corps, temporarily under Meade, was to form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. All were to clear off the parapets and the abatis in their front, so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at all, but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps. 202 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XV Warren and Ord fulfilled tlieir instructions per- fectly so far as making ready was concerned. Burn- side seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they coidd. The four divisions of his corps were commanded by Grenerals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie, and Ferrero. The last was a colored division ; and Burnside selected it to make the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took Ledlie's division — a worse selection than the first could have been. In fact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside had who were J^H. Ledlie, equal to the occasion. Ledlie, besides being other- isei^^Brig'- ^i^^ inefficient, proved also to possess a disqualifi- iSc°2Z*i862 cation less common among soldiers. There was some delay about the explosion of the mine, so that it did not go off until about five o'clock xL^(if527 "^ *^® morning. When it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length. Instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, Ibid. 536 commenced playing. Ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions, their commander hav- ing found some safe retreat to get into before they started. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and tm*n to the right and left, carrying the rifle- pits, as I expected they would do. EXPLOSION OF THE PETEESBURG MINE 203 There had been great consternation in Peters- chap, xv burg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though Beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. "We had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano, and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a reali- zation of the true situation. It was just as I ex- pected it would be. We coidd see the men run- ning without any apparent object except to get away. It was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater; it was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them ; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops. The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us c^^ofi^'qy, about four thousand men, mostly, however, cap- ^42^et'l^q.^' tured ; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander, and the incompetency of the divi- sion commander who was sent to lead the assault. 204 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT CHAP. XV After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the James w.R.xLO) River was still there, I gave Meade directions to 637, 638 send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon rail- road. But misfortunes never come singly. I learned during that same afternoon that Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from Wash- ington, while I was cut off from immediate com- munication by reason of our cable across Chesa- peake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not aware of the fact that Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg. Finding that he was not pursued, he turned back to Winchester, ^^^v?f M. where Crook was stationed with a small force, and ^^ drove him out. He then pushed north until lie Brig.-Gen. j^^d readied the Potomac : then he sent McCausland Jonn Mc- ' causiand ^cross to Chambersbui'g, Pennsylvania, to destroy that town. Chambersburg was a purely defense- less town, with no garrison whatever, and no forti- xxxvn(i) fixations; yet McCausland, under Early's orders, 333-335,355 "b^i-ned thc place and left about three hundred families houseless. This occurred on the 30th of July. I rescinded my orders for the troops to go ^•.?A^.!i^^> out to destroy the Weldon railroad, and directed 639, 641 •' them to embark for Washington city. After burn- ing Chambersburg, McCausland retreated, pursued B.F.Keuey, by our cavaliy, toward Cumberland. He was met vofs'MLy and defeated by General Kellev and driven into 17, 1861 '' w. R. Virginia. xxxviKi) ^j^^ Shenandoah Valley was very important to CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 205 the Confederates, because it was the principal chap.xv storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond. It was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from Washington. It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep any force sent there, in pm-suit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital ; and, generally speak- ing, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free to supply themselves vdth horses, beef- cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determined to put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field of opera- xxxH^i (2) tion, and on the following day sent another division ^^^ of his cavalry. I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, but Mr. Stanton objected, on the i|Sft. ground that he was too young for so important a command. On the 1st of August, when I sent re- inforcements for the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders: City Point, Virginia, August 1, 1864, 11 : 30 a.m. Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty xxxvn(2) whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the field m person, I want 558 206 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XV Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put liimself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let om* troops go also. Once started up the Valley, they ought to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia Central railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give Sheridan direct command of the Sixth Corps and cavalry division. All the cavahy, I presume, will reach Washing- ton in the course of to-morrow. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. The President in some way or other got to see this despatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field operat- ing against Early, and sent me the following very characteristic despatch : Office U. S. Military Telegraph, War Department, Washington, D. C, August 3, 1864. Cipher. 6 p.m. Lieutenant-General Grant, City Point, Virginia: xxxvn(2) ^ have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want 682 Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it. A. Lincoln. CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 207 I replied to this that " I would start in two hours chap, xv for Washington " ; and soon got off, going directly ^^- g, f^^^ to the Monocacy without stopping at Washington on my way. I found General Hunter's army en- camped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, which he had taken the precau- tion to bring back and collect at that point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He re- plied that he did not know. He said the fact was that he was so embarrassed with orders from Wash- ington moving him first to the right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy. I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in the Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon-trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. I knew that the Valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south. I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions, ^{j^gvf^"^ I told him that Sheridan was in Washington, and p^''^^^^^- still another division was on its way ; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the depart- ment at any point that would suit him best, — Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere, — and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The general replied to this that he thought he had better 208 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XV be relieved entirely. He said that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the posi- tion he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. He did not want in any way to em- ?o GrTnt? barrass the cause ; thus showing a patriotism that Dec. 6, 18C4, . • J.1 rrn w. R. was none too common m the army. There were 366,3(57 not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. I told him, "Very ^(1)^6% ^96^ well, then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to come to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there. Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until he arrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Union people, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at the Monocacy when Sheridan mSSi, arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been ^^ done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the wi'itten instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter and directed to that officer. ™ie*^^ «* Sheridan now had about thirty thousand men to move with, eight thousand of them being cavalry. Early had about the same number ; but the superior ability of the National commander over the Confed- erate commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted. Early was soon found in front of Sheri- dan in the Valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 209 were speedily freed from the invaders. The im- chap, xv portance of the Valley was so great to the Confed- erates that Lee reinforced Early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would. To prevent as much as possible these reinforce- ments from being sent out from Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces about his capital. I therefore gave orders for an- other move to the north side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps, part of "^^i^^flf^ the Tenth Corps under Birney, and Gregg's divi- sion of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the 13th-14th of August. ise* A threatening position was maintained for a num- ber of days, with more or less skirmishing and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure gi'eat success. Greneral Meade was left in command of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly in- trenched ; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to re- inforce the north side. There was no particular victory gained on either side ; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the Valley. I informed Sheridan of what had been done to '""•fj-^fg^™ prevent reinforcements being sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we sup- posed had gone to the Valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred Vol. II.— 14 210 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XV W. E. XXXVIII (5) 408 Ibid. 488 E. K. Smith, '\V.P.l841-45; Mexico, 1846-48 ; Brig.-Geii. C. S.A.June 17, Maj.- Gen. Oct. 11, 1861; Lt.- Geii. Oct. 9, 1862; Gen. Feb. 19, 1864 W. R. XLII (2) 111 prisoners from that division, each of its four bri- gades having contributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to prevent the going of any more. To add to my embarrassment at this time, Sher- man, who was now near Atlanta, wanted reinforce- ments. He was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the Northwest, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the North- west be sent to him. Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving out against him. I informed him of what I had done, and assured him that I would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his real danger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-Mississippi Department. If Smith should escape Steele and get across the Mississippi River, he might move against him. I had, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile in case Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to draw him to the defense of that place, instead of going against Sherman. Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the field to put it down. He also ad- vised taking in sail and not going too fast. CAPTUKE OF THE WELDON KAILROAD 211 The troops were withdrawn from the north side chap, xv of the James River on the night of the 20th. Be- fore they were withdrawn, however, and while most of Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent with most of the Fifth Corps to capture the Weldon railroad. He took up his ^-J'^s" line of march weU back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near the old Hue, it was about three miles to the Weldon railroad. A division was ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the James River to take its place. This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. War- md. 429 ren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodge Warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforce- ments reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon railroad ; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies he got thereafter from that source. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the Weldon railroad as having been lost to him ; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed 212 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XV attempts to recapture it. Again he failed, and with : very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. On the night of the 20th our troops on the north 5;.^?^" side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock (l)221et8eq., ' eoeetseq. ^^^^ Gregg Were sent south to destroy the Weldon railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. But the Weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of August to the close of the war. CHAPTER XVI SHEEIDAN'S advance — VISIT TO SHERIDAN — SHERI- DAN'S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH — SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER — CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE WINTER WE had our troops on the Weldon railroad chap, xvi contending against a large force that re- garded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it ; Sherman just getting through to Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges, and de- tachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him ; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early being strength- <> ened in the Valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. It kept me pretty active in looking after all these points. On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced ^.r XLIII (1)17 on .Early up the Shenandoah Valley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry, and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen Early. It was important that Sheridan should be informed of this ; so I sent the inf orma- ibid. 775, 783 tion to Washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to 213 214 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XVI Visit to Sheridan Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 9 Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy and reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way of Snicker's Grap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just making his preparations to attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive. On the 15th of Sejitember I started to \asit Gen- eral Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. My pur- pose was to have him attack Early, or drive him out of the Valley and destroy that source of sup- plies for Lee's army. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washington to Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stojDped there, and such orders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) would suggest would be given instead, and would no doubt be contra- dictory to mine. I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directly through to Charles- town, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waited there to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet me. When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side- pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the Confederates, and that he could " whip them." Before starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so VISIT TO SHERIDAN 215 positive in his views, and so confident of success, I chap, xvt said nothing about this, and did not take it out of my pocket. Sheridan's vragon-trains v^ere kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of his stores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not have to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions, and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester. Knowing that he, in making prepara- tions to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagon-trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday. " Oh yes," he said, he " could be off before daylight on Monday." I told him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan; and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond. After visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jer- sey, I arrived at City Point on the 19tli. On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, president of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. He seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for run- ning. It was a large piece of property to have standing idle. I told him I could not answer then positively, but would try and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett met me again with the same question, and I told him I thought that by the following Wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no further information, however, and he had no sue- 216 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XVI picioii of liow I expected to have the road cleared for his workmen. a^'S«^554 Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met Early at the crossing of Opequan Creek, and won a most decisive victory — one which elec- trified the country. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship, and made the vic- tory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's division east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and about the time I arrived there he M^emSrs n started with two other divisions (leaving but two ^" in their camps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose of destroying the Baltimore and Ohio railroad at that point. Early here learned that I had been with Sheridan, and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started back as soon as he got the information. But his forces were sepa- rated, and, as I have said, he was very badly de- feated. He fell back to Fisher's Hill, Sheridan following. The Valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there, behind works which WR.XLIII extended across. But Sheridan turned both his (1) Jo~Jot 46— 49,655-558 flanks and again sent him speeding up the Vallej^, following in hot pursuit. The pursuit was con- tinued up the Valley to Mount Jackson and New Market. Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. The houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with Early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally, on the 25th, Early turned from the Valley eastward, leaving Sheridan at Harrisonburg in undisputed possession. Ibid. 60 Now one of the main objects of the expedition SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN. SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH 217 began to be accomplished. Sheridan went to work ciiAr. xvi with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the Valley required by our troops ; and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. What he could not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a ^•^■)fi8"^ salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory. I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle fought at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the November elections. The dan® Me-" convention which had met and made its nomina- ™°^^^' ^' ''^*' tion of the Democratic candidate for the Presidency had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked as boldly in Chicago at that convention as ever it had been in Charleston. It was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrests and punish those who thus talked treason. But this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass. Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in Washington, and the Presi- dent became very much frightened about him. He was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of General Cass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was an officer of the army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in 218 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XVI their front and the Indians pursuing him. The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other side of Early and that Early was in behind him. He was afraid that Sheridan was getting so W.R.XLIII far away that reinforcements would be sent out (2) 208 "^ 1 1 • T from Richmond to enable Early to beat him. i replied to the President that I had taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, by attacking the former where he was. On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his w. R. xLii position, I sent Ord with the Eighteenth Corps and (1) 793 A 7 Birney with the Tenth Corps to make an advance on Richmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin's Bluff; Birney with the Tenth Corps took a road farther north ; while Kautz with the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north. They got across the river by the next Ibid. 798 morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. In that, however, they were unsuccessful. The enemy's lines were very strong and very in- tricate. Stannard's division of the Eighteenth Hiram Corps, with General Bumham's brigade leading, coi-6t^^Me- i^i-ied an assault against Fort Harrison, and cap- Apil^isS' tured it with sixteen guns and a good many prison- ers. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Aaron F. gtcveus, who succccded him, was badly wounded ; Stevens '-^7 ci and his successor also fell in the same way. Some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them — six in number — and a few more prisoners. Birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were un- successful in their efforts upon the main line. Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into the new line and extending it SHERIDAN'S VICTOEY IN THE SHENANDOAH 219 to the river. This brought us pretty close to the chap.xvi enemy ou the north side of the James, and the two opposing Hues maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon General Heckman, and later Greneral Weitzel ^^^^ "S' was assigned to the command of the Eighteenth ^^o.isetr' Corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troops n. j. Feb. lo, about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort '^^^''-^^gO/- Harrison, by transferring eight additional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. All their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallant officer, who was defending Fort ^a?dS" Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualties during these May? isl*;' operations amounted to 394 killed, 1554 wounded, voisiMar" ^ . . 11,1863 and 324 missing. While this was going on General Meade was in- structed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Parke and Warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move, leaving their inclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments. The object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. Meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if Lee ^-(J-ins"^ weakened his lines, to make an attack. On the 30th these troops moved out, under War- ren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main 220 PEESONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GKANT Chap. XVI line. Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line ; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. The number of killed and wounded was not large. The next day our troops advanced again and established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon railroad very considerably. Sheridan, having driven the enemy out of the Valley, and taken the productions of the Valley, so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his ^2)^4^250^ own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be ^^^ of more use. I approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River. I further directed him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley toward the ad- vanced position, which we would hold with a small force. The troops were to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. The Valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that, contrary to our expec- tations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it, if possible, before the supplies should be all destroyed. Reinforcements were sent, there- fore, to Early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan at Harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there. SHEKIDAN'S VICTOEY IN THE SHENANDOAH 221 On the 6tli of October Sheridan commenced re- chap, xvi thing down the Vahey, taking or destroying all the ^(i^^Jgo" food and forage, and driving the cattle before him, Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, was pm'suing closely, and routed it w.p.fs^e^i; most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large cav.^6ct!i6, number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about Gen'. Nov. 1864 sixty men. His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10th of October J^^i^^J^o^ the march down the Valley was again resumed, ^^ Early again following. I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity, if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central railroad. But this order had to go through Wash- '^•^jlg"^ ington, where it was intercepted ; and when Sheri- dan received what purported to be a statement of what I wanted him to do, it was something entirely different. Halleck informed Sheridan that it was ibid. 345 my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville ; that he should fortify this position and provision it. Sheridan objected to this most decidedly ; and I was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows : City Point, Virginia, October 14, 18C4, 12 : 30 p.m. Major-General Sheridan, Cedar Creek, Virginia : What I want is for yon to threaten the Virginia Central ibid. 363 railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance if the enemy 222 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XVI draw off tlieir forces. If you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thorough- fares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruc- tion. If jon cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a good cavahy force necessary for your offensive as well as defen- sive operations. You need not, therefore, send here more than one division of cavahy. U. S. Grant, lAeutenant- Genera I. W. R. XLIII (2) 363 Sheridan, having been summoned to Washington city, started on the 15th, leaving Wright in com- mand. His army was then at Cedar Creek, some twenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning, while at Front Royal, Sheridan received Ibid. 389 a despatch from Wright, saying that a despatch from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry up the Valley to join Wright. a)"5t5™- On the 18th of October Early was ready to ^^* move, and during the night succeeded in getting Ms troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the VaUey, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. The right, under Ibid. 193-196 General Getty, maintained a firm and steady front, falling back to Middletown, where it took a position and made a stand. The cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester, and held them for the use of our troops in falling back. General Wright having ordered a retreat back to Cf. Sbei'i- 4.1 J. 1 dan, Me- that plaCC. etseq.' Slicridau, having left Washington on the 18th, SHERIDAN'S KIDE TO WINCHESTER 223 reached Winchester that night. The following chap.xvi morning he started to join his command. He had scarcely got out of town when, he met his men re- turning in panic from the front, and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediately ordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the Valley to stop the stragglers. Leaving mem- bers of his staff to take care of Winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small es- cort directly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. His presence soon restored confidence. Finding them- selves worse frightened than hurt, the men did halt and turn back. Many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night. When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and ^'- ^i^^^" Custer still holding their ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops. Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position ; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. This was made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's iwd. 284 corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By one o'clock the attack was repulsed. Early w^as so badly damaged that he seemed disin- clined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. He thought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him un- molested; but in this he was mistaken. About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan ad- sherifc vanced. He sent his cavalry by both flanks, and Memoirs, II, 88 224 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XVI they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegi'ation along the whole line soon followed. Early tried to rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back to Richmond, with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Poto- mac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the Valley. Early had lost more men in killed, wounded, and captured in the Valley than Sheridan had commanded from first to last. Gen. Hayes Ou morc tliau ouc occasiou in these engagements General E. B. Hayes, who succeeded me as Presi- 1877-1880 dent of the United States, bore a very honorable part. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry, as well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere per- sonal daring. This might well have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said to have done so, "Any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a Ma-i. 23d , ^ Lt'^coi^oct' ^^^^ ^^ Congress, ought to be scalped." Ha\'ing Coif Oct 24 entered the army as a major of volunteers at the Gen.vSf." beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by Bvt. Maj.*' meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general Gen. Mar. 13, t p ., , 1865 before its close. GENERAL GKANT, MRS. GRANT, AND MASTER JESSE AT HEADcJl'ARTERS AT CITY POINT. (from photograph by E. and H. T. ANTHON"!'.) CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOE THE WINTER 225 On the north side of the James River the enemy chap.xvi attacked Kantz's cavahy on the 7th of October, "^'S-gfa"^ and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wonnded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artiUery. This was followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnaissance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was con- structing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt w- l/gn"^ to get possession of the South Side railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. The at- tempt proved a failure, however, the most ad- ibid. 35-37 vanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment, I ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day. Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstra- iMd.^331,390. tion on the north side of the James River in order to support this move, by detaining there the Con- federate troops who were on that side. He suc- ceeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before turning in on the Darby road, and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place. This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of course there was frequent skir- mishing between pickets, but no serious battle was fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around Petersburg and at other parts of my command, Vol. II.— 15 226 PEKSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XVI aiid it would iiot interest the general reader if given. All these details can be found by the mili- tary student in a series of books published by the Scribners ; Badeau's history of my campaigns ; and also in the publications of the War Department, including both the National and Confederate re- ports. w- K.^xLii jjj tj^e latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from the command of the Second Corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to Washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the First Corps. It was expected that this would give him a large command to cooperate with in the spring. It was my expectation, at the time, that in the final opera- tions Hancock should move either up the Valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg ; the idea being to make the spring campaign the close of the war. I expected, with Sherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee, with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that State, to move from the direction of Washington or the Valley toward Lynchburg. We would then have Lee so surrounded that his sup- plies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army. Ibid. 705,714 General Humphreys, chief of staff of the Army of the Potomac, was assigned to the command of the Second Corps, to succeed Hancock. CHAPTER XVII THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA — SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA — WAR ANECDOTES — THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH — INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH — CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH IET US now return to the operations in the chap.xvii ^ Military Division of the Mississippi, and ac- company Sherman in his march to the sea. The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very materially, and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east to west. A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto and Macon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th of ise* September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had reheved Johnston and appointed Hood, ^.^^^^y^ and Hood had immediately taken the initiative, it ^^^""'^ is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disap- pointed with General Johnston's policy. My own judgment is that Johnston acted very wisely : he husbanded his men and saved as much of his terri- tory as he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. As Sherman advanced, as I have shown, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been 227 228 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Jos. E. Brown, Gov. 1857-64 ; U. S. Sen. 1880-91 Chap. XVII easy to destroy it in detail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of the change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier, and not destitute of ability; but unfor- tunately his policy was to fight the enemy wher- ever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat. In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Greorgia, and General Johnston in un- measured terms, even insinuating that their loy- alty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnston is concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in this particular. I had known the general before the war, and strongly be- lieved it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. Then, as I have said, I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole South — protract the war, which was all that was necessary to en- able them to gain recognition in the end. The North was already growing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with this difference. In the North the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was a military camp, controlled abso- lutely by the government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief. He tried to assure his fright- ened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly digging Johnston's policy Davis on the war THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 229 Cf. Hood's Rep. W. R. XXXIX (1) 801 their own graves; that measures were ah^eady chap.xvii being taken to cut them off: from supplies from the North ; and that, with a force in front and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the Northern States, and they were republished. Of course that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communica- tion was kept up with Sherman. When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the southwest, and was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared upon the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying the road. At the same time, also, the work was begun in Tennessee and Kentucky which Mr. Da\T.s had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Macon would take place. He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry gen- eral in the South) north for this purpose ; and For- rest and Wlieeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. Forrest, indeed, performed the very remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to ac- count for. Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing the Georgia State Memoh-Mi, troops for the pui'pose of gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not. only depleted Hood's forces, but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself W. R. XXXIX (1) 868-871 138, 139 230 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XVII with portions of it Mther and thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any force what- ever with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary ; and Mr, Da^ds's pre- diction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which Mr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He took advantage of the in- formation they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected — attempts to break his communications. Something else had to be done ; and to Sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be. On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows : City Point, Virginia, September 10, 1864. Major-General Sherman, Atlanta, Georgia: ^ w.K. So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and prepara- 355 tions can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy con- stantly pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but it will be tlie best move to transfer Canby's THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 231 troops to act iipon Savannah, whilst you move on Augusta, chap xvii I should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. U. S. Grant, Ideiitenant- General. Sherman replied promptly : If I could be sm-e of finding provisions and ammuni- tion at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. ... If you can man- age to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State of Georgia. W.R. XXXIX (2) 356 On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign. City Point, Virginia, September 12, 1864. Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding MiUtary Division of the Mississippi : I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myseh strong enough for offensive opera- tions, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of the James across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and south of the Ap- pomattox to the Weldon road. This hue is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. I pro- pose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and Petersburg, road, then, if possible, to keep the Danville road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to Ibid. 364 Horace Por- ter, W. P. 1855-60; 2d Lt.Ord.Apr. 22, 1861 ; Lt.-Col. Staff, A.D.C. Apr. i, 1864 232 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XVII send a force of from six to ten thousand men against Wilmington. The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet Avill be assembled there, and the ironclads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forces at your command I do not see. The diffi- culties of supplying your army, except when you are con- stantly moving, beyond where you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements, Canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From yom- command on the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to Mobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supphes. My ob- ject now in sending a stafe-offtcer is not so much to suggest operations for you as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. It mil probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated wiU be executed. If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and I will approve them. . . . U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. This reached Sherman on September 20th. w.R. On the 25th of September Sherman reported to «* Washington that Hood's troops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending a division to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was in the rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same XXXIX (2) THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 233 time Sherman and Hood kept up a correspondence chap, xvii relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment M^emoirMi, of citizens, and other matters suitable to be ar- ^29, 143 ranged l^etween hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September I telegraphed Sherman as follows: City Point, Virginia, September 27, 1864, 10 : 30 a.m. Ma.jor-General Sherman : I have directed all recruits and new troops from the x:^'ix(2) Western States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their *^^ further orders from you. . . . U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chat- M^emota.n. tanooga, and afterward to Nashville, with another ^** division (Morgan's) of the advanced army. Sher- ga^Brig.' man then suggested that, when he was prepared, j^*^y iT, ^2 his movements should take place against Milledge- ville and then to Savannah. His expectation at that time was to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. Hood was moving in his own country, and vf as moving light, so that he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He de- pended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays. As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened. Mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should move against Mobile. I recommended this from " '^iss' ' 234 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XVII time to time until I came into command of the army, the last of March, 1864. Having the power cf. w. R. in mv own hands, I now ordered the concentration XXXIX (3) '' ' 25,63 of supplies, stores, and troops in the Department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field. Be- fore I came into command these troops had been scattered over the trans-Mississippi Department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration which had caused Mobile to be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army, to find his next base of sup- plies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer existed. M^emoi?rii Greneral G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient "^ officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the 1st of October. He was in command of two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, consolidated into one. Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings — the right com- manded by General O. 0. Howard and the left by General Slocmn. General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. How- ard's command embraced the Fifteenth and Seven- teenth corps, and Slocum's the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. A.8.wii- Davis and A. S. Williams. Generals Logan and liams, Brig.- ^ MaTirisei Blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. About this time they left to take part in the Presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus and Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the ear- THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 235 nest solicitation of the War Department. General chap, xvii Blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the grand review at Washington. General Logan did not return to his command until after it reached Savannah. Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer ^gf^°ed^' of General Howard from that portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the Western army, to the command of the Army of the Ten- nessee, with which army General Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall of Atlanta — having passed successively through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general com- manding a brigade, division, and army-corps, until, upon the death of McPherson, the command of the entire Army of the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested battle. He con- ceived that he had done his full duty as commander in that engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motive which actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army to supersede General Logan. I have no doubt whatever that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved ; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as Logan would have done. Differences of opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. The 236 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XVII of&cer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong. Sherman, Shcrmau's army, after all the depletions, num- Memoirs.II, -^ ' . ^*^ bered about sixty thousand elfective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth ; better than any European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine, but the machine thought. European armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops there were two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand men. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of Forrest, whose forces were operat- ing in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr. Davis had pres. promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's DaiVi8*8 mil- i^ *^ itary genius military plan was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have done, according to my judgment. I say this because I have crit- icized his military judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in the appointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between Davis and his sub- ordinate, whom I regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants. w.R. ^ On the 5th of October the railroad back from 581, 802 Atlanta was again very badly broken. Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. The defense of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 237 between their intrenched positions against Hood's chap, xvii whole army. In fact, they made no attempt to do so; bnt generally the intrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges, and stores located at them. Allatoona, for instance, was de- fended by a small force of men under the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the corse'sRep. National army, and was attacked with great vigor 760 et seq. by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and his sub- ordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the M^emoUMi, temporary siege, but the time that would be ne- i*^-^*^ cessarily consumed in reaching Corse would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. Corse was a man who would never surrender. From a high position some of Sherman's signal corps discovered a signal-flag waving from a hole in the block-house at Al- latoona. It was from Corse. He had been shot through the face, but he signaled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this point, probably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal the keeping open of his line of communications with the North would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back xxxix(3) to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave ^^' ^^*' ^"^^ the latter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair 238 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XVII W.R. XXXIX (3) 594 D. S. Stan- ley, w. p. 1848-52 ; Capt. Ist Cav. Mar.16, Brig.-Geu. Vols. Sept. 28, 1861; Maj.-Gen. Nov. 29, 1862 Thomas's strength damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores, and small rations as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery ; his object being to move light, and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter's moving the other way while he was moving south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I myself was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman, author- izing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed — that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga. To strengthen Thomas he sent Stan- ley (Fourth Corps) back, and also ordered Scho- field, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with two divisions of Sher- man's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in driving the enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas, and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before Hood could reach Nashville. In addition to this the new levies of troops that were being raised in the Northwest went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. Thomas, with- out any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at Chattanooga — which had been strengthened by one division — and garrisons at Bridgeport, Steven- son, Decatur, Murfreesboro', and Florence. There THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 239 were already with him in Nashville ten thousand chap, xvii soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other depart- ments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville, for its def en se. Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him al- together about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of. About this time Beauregard arrived upon the xxxixo) field, not to supersede Hood in command, but to '^^^'^^^-^^s take general charge over the entire district in which Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. He made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for ^- \f ^^^ assistance to be rendered in every way : by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape. Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, where he remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place. The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats from Muscle Shoals east, and also below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, with 240 PERSON.\L MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XVII the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impos- sible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it was navigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal XXXIX (1) which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore ^"^ moved down to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over, and remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage, and ammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had long since been exhausted. w.R. On the 1st of November I suggested to Sherman — ^''^ and also asked his views thereon — the propriety ot destroying Hood before he started on his campaign. Ante, II, 238 On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved def- initely his making his proposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender mercy of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sher- man fixed the 10th of November as the day of starting. ^ w.R. Sherman started on that day to get back to At- ^^*^^^J^ lanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea w. E. xLiv commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and the cavalry went to Jonesboro' ; Milledgeville, then the capital of Greorgia, being Sherman's objective or stopping-place on the way to Savannah. The Ibid. 157 left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened Augusta as the point to which he was moving ; but _^---^'^7\ :^35 "L. r~ /^s^\ -^\ ^?A ^^ ^ \/( »0 \ I V /)%L^ vX-fc (^^ ^^6 5C f :i r . ,6" ViPahS/k ^ Vrthrr ^lU M scmitr a^ /HtMyisi ^K/XiV^*^ JHE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE 259 W. K. XLV (2) 114 tions, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas chap.xviii that I should be obliged to remove him unless ho acted promptly. He replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant, and efficient officer, I gave him an order to proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, I became restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far as Washington city, when a despatch was received from General Thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and des- ignating the time of his movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and was successful from the start. This was on the 15tli of December. General Logan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself. The battle during the 15tli was severe, but favor- able to the Union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The next day the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's men in their intrenchments, the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them ; so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the Ibid. 230 Thomas's Rep. W. R. XLV (1) 38 et seq. ; Hood's Rep. Ibid. 654 et seq. 260 PEBSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GKANT CHAP.XVIII moment the enemy retreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to get to Frankhn ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White road ; but too much time was con- sumed in getting started. They had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the "enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which they .^•q?-.^^!^ were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and driven in great disorder. Our cavalry then w^ent into bivouac. Ibid. 552, 553 and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The enemy already had pos- session of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became a chase in which the Confederates had the lead. 553*^554,' 655 ^^^'^' ti'oops coutinued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad-bridge as well as all other bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. Unfortu- nately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon-bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to Franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone Ibid. 41, 42 toward Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. Of course Hood got such a start in this time that further pur- suit was useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming upon him again. CHAPTER XIX EXPEDITION AGAINST FOKT FISHER — ATTACK ON THE FORT — FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION — SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT — CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER UP to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort chap, xix Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear River and below the city of Wilmington. This port was of J^wiSg^ immense importance to the Confederates, because *"° it formed their principal inlet for blockade-runners, by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home. It was equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to ensure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the British gov- ernment, were constantly threatening that unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with the concurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an ex- pedition against Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it. To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I will mention a circumstance that 261 262 PERSONAL, MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XIX Surprised blockade- runners G. Weitzel. W.P.1861-65; ist Lt. Eng. July 1. 1860 ; Brig.-Gen. Vols. Aug. 29, 1862 : Maj.-Gen. Nov. 17, 1864 Gen. But- ler's scheme Porter, Nav. Hist. p. 692 et seq. took place at Fort Fisher after its fall. Two Eng- lish blockade-runners came in at night. Their com- manders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. They then signaled the fort, an- nouncing their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. He informed General Terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did as he advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the Union forces. Even after they were brought into the fort they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the Union troops were occupying the fort. They were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with the expedition, but gave instruc- tions through General Butler. He commanded the department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher was situated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by our troops; he was therefore entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against Fort Fisher. General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. Admiral Porter, who was to com- mand the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington ; the navy was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. I had no confidence surveyed under the direction of *\ Bvt. Brig.-Gen. C. B. Comstock, ^ Chief Engineer, ™ W J.t. Cd^LDrA IfrrfX. d EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER 263 in the success of the scheme, and so expressed my- ohap.xix self; but as no serious harm could come of the xm'M:i)TO9 experiment, and the authorities at Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I pernutted it. The steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of Fort Fisher.i General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of December. Very heavy storms prevailed, isu however, at that time along that part of the sea- coast, and prevented him from getting off until ^i')^6S the 13th or 14th. His advance arrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but was obliged to run into Beaufort for munitions, coal, etc. ; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th ; but Butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort to replenish. Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to cooperate. On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was ^^^^^^^^^,- towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then propelled by her own 1 The report of Major T. L. the mechanism for firing the ex- Casey, of the Corps of Engineers, plosives. Embraced also iu the published in the Official Records report are accounts of several pre- of the War of the Rebellion, vious military and accidental ex- Vol. XLII, part 1, pp. 988-993, plosions of large quantities of gives a full description of the powder, and their effects.— F. powder-boat, her stowage, and D. G. 264 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIX machinery to within about five hundred yards of w- Rxi.n ii^Q shore. There the clockwork, which was to ex- plode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At two o'clock in the morning the explosion tOok place — and produced no more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed, when the troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion, they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats. Fort Fisher Fort Fishcr was situated upon a low, flat penin- sula north of Cape Fear Eiver. The soil is sandy. Back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea-coast about thir- teen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of twenty-one guns and three mortars on the land side, and twenty-four guns on the sea-front. At that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery, and the gunners at the heavy guns, — less than seven hundred niei], — with a reserve of less than a thousand men five whitin-^w ^iiil'^s up the peninsula. G-eneral Whiting, of the BrS^otu. Confederate army, was in command, and General ^■f^.tset;'^' Bragg was in command of the force at Wilming- Feb!'28,i863 ton. Both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. The z. B. Vance Govcmor of Nortli Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun ■(3)'i284 to join them. In this way they got two or three ATTACK ON THE FORT 265 hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and chap.xix Hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond. A few of these troops arrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance. On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs H*iet pS; of concentric circles, their heavy ironclads going in ^^^ very close range, being nearest the shore, and leav- ing intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. The damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort. But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them, and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs. On the next day part of Butler's troops, under ^p^^-^g^^'g^- General Adelbert Ames, effected a landing out of iuSasel i range of the fort without difficulty. This was ac- v^Saylo, complished under the protection of gunboats sent ^ ^ ^^^^ for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed at- (D^sietseq. tack upon the fort by the fleet. They formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering them- selves as they did so. Curtis pushed forward and gaJft-SthN! came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small gar- i^ifBriJ- rison at what was called the Flag Pond Battery, jan^is.ises Weitzel accompanied him to within half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort had not been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault. Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured two hundred and twenty- eight of the reserves. These prisoners reported to 266 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIX Butlei" that sixteen hundred of Hoke's division of six thousand from Richmond had akeady arrived, and the rest would soon be in his rear. w- J-g^g"i Upon these reports Butler determined to with- draw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. Curtis had got within a few yards Ibid. 983 of the works. Some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. At night w- R-^xLii Butler informed Porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his pur- pose, as soon as his men could embark, to start for ^mat^^i^ioo Hampton Eoads. Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for more ammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort ; and he begged that Butler would leave some brave fel- lows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort. Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis's brigade, and started back. In doing this Butler made a fearful mistake. My instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the w- (g-gfg^^^ statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be relinquished. On the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced ; and to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. But General Butler FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION 267 seems to have lost sight of this part of his instruc- tions, and was back at Fort Monroe on the 28th. I telegraphed to the President as follows : City Point, Virginia, December 28, 1864, 8 : 30 p.m. The Wilmington expedition lias proven a gross and culpable failure. Many of the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of the expedition en- abled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it. After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant' General. Porter sent despatches to the Navy Department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a different commander. As soon as I heard this I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on. I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that I would send the same troops back with a different com- mander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops ; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. I selected A. H. Terry to command. It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. They Chap. XTX W. K. XLII (3) 1087 Nav. Hist, pp. 698-706 W. R. XLII (3) 1100 A. H. Terry, Col. 7tll Conu. Sept. 17, 1861 ; Brig.-Gen. Vols.Apr.25, 1862; Maj.- Gen. Vols. & Brig.-Geu. U. S. A. Jan. 15, 1865 268 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIX Sailed from Fort Monroe on that day. The ob- ject and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army to whom it was ^' a) 395^^^ necessary to impart the information. Greneral Terry had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. He simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him, which were to be opened when out at sea. Ibid. 43 He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of the service. They arrived off Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at Fort Fisher until ^mBL^ni the 13th. The navy prepared itself for attack about ^^^^^- as before, and at the same time assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. Only iron- clads fired at first, the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their posi- tions. This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and fast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured. waaeSoT Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort, with a respectable abatis in front of his line. His artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. Again Curtis's brigade of Ames's division had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished wftrk less than a half-mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way. Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an as- SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FOET 260 sault on the following day. The two commanders chap.xix arranged their signals so that they could commu- Jau.i5,i8C5 nicate with each other from time to time as they ^hLTpp.^' might have occasion. At daylight the fleet com- "^'''" menced its firing. The time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames, ^- JJj f^^ who commanded the assaulting column, moved at 3 : 30. Porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea-front in cooperation with Ames's assault. They were under Commander Breese, of the navy. These sailors and marines u:s.n.''nov.' had worked their way up to within a couple of comdr.'jiliy hundred yards of the fort before the assault. The signal was given and the assault was made ; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very HK^lie' badly handled by the enemy, losing two hundred and eighty killed and wounded out of their number. Curtis's brigade charged successfully, though met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach the fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some killed ; but they soon reached the palisades. These they cut away, and pushed on through. The other troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Cur- '^•gj^^^^ tis, and Bell, who commanded the Third Brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker. But the fort was not yet captured, though the parapet was gained. The works were very extensive. The large para- pet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. Traverses had therefore been ibid. 399 run until really the work was a succession of small forts inclosed by a large one. The rebels made a 270 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XIX desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from these traverses one by one. The fight continued till long after night. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by ten o'clock at night the place was carried. During this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best ser- ^ ■ u) ^9^^^ ^^*^^ ^^®y could by reinforcing Terry's northern line — thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleet kept up a continu- ous fire upon that part of the fort which was still occupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. ^fsrp^^Tn" During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell, on the opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works on Smith's Island in the river. Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, be- sides small arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and 2083 prisoners. In addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. coL4th N.' In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the H. Mar. 1862 "j^i.^ga^^jg commaudcrs, was killed, and two, Curtis CJ- Penny- and Pennypacker, were badly wounded. ^111^1864^ Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back voit'Fib; from Savannah, arrived off Fort Fisher soon after it fell. Wlien he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been confirmed. This confirmed him ; and soon after I recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, Xcri'v uro- mited and it was given to him for this victory. CHAPTER XX SHEKMAN'S march north — SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG — CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE — MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS — CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA — SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS WHEN news of Sherman being in possession of chap, xx Savannah reached the North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. m^cSmi, Among others who went was the Secretary of War, ^*^ ''* '''"^' who seemed much pleased at the result of his cam- paign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New |j™^«? York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been aban- doned and captured. Savannah was then turned over to Greneral Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard) with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with the general, and when n^S|,n, he returned brought back letters, one of which con- tained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in cooperation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward. I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had 271 237-240 272 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XX no idea originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for any- thing except such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a move. I had therefore made preparations to collect transports to carry Sherman and his army around to the James Eiver by water, and so informed him. On receiv- ing this letter he went to work immediately to pre- w. E. xLiv pare for the move, but seeing that it would require 636. 727, 728, -■■ i '?*2, 743, 798, a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this ; for, if successful, it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transj^ortation in that State, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. If North and South Caro- lina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison at Richmond would be reduced in terri- tory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia ; and although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion, therefore, at once. I'repanng ^\^q work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had en- march SHEKMAN'S MARCH NORTH 273 countered on their previous march; and the ter- chap.xx ritory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very ex- istence of the Confederate army that the most des- perate efforts were to be expected in order to save it. Sherman, therefore, while collecting the neces- sary supplies to start with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part of ^r6t',v!s^^. the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, ^capt.'ji^iiy' 1 A "I ftfiO • and General Foster, commanding the troops^ to take ReaV-Adm. positions, and hold a few points on the sea-coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighbor- ^^S^^ii^ hood of Charleston. '" ' ' This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea-coast in case he should encoun- ter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. This letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of January. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to cooperate with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter. Headquarters Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C, January 21, 1865. Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi. General: Your letters brought by General Barnard n)id.257 were received at City Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommenda- VOL. II.— 18 274 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT Chap. XX tion. As I arrived here at 1 p.m. and must leave at 6 p.m., having in the mean time spent over three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland, with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as raili'oad transportation can be procui*ed from Cincinnati. The corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do this because I did not beUeve Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His pur- suit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would' never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subor- dinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is possessed of excellent judg- ment, great coolness, and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. This report and a determina- tion to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma under an energetic leader. He has been tele- graphed to to know whether he could go, and if so, which of the several routes he woidd select. No reply is yet re- ceived. Canby has been ordered to act offensive^ from the sea-coast to the interior, toward Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men. Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of eight thousand effective. At New Berne about half the number. It is rumored, through de- serters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy SHEEMAN'S MAKCH NORTH 275 were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that chap, xx on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington. If Wilmington is captured, Sehofield will go there. If not, he will be sent to New Berne. In either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in cooperation with your movements. From either point raili-oad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of roUing-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south. Of these you will have fourteen thou- sand against you, if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about two thousand. All these troops are subject to yom- orders, as you come in communication with them. They will be so instructed, Fi'om about Richmond I wiU watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the mean time, should you be brought to a halt any- where, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about Richmond. To resimie : Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will cooperate with you from New Berne or Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements. This wiU be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who wiU return with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. Yours truly, U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. I had written on the 18th of December to Greneral ^'-^^^^""^ Sherman, giving him the news of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result, al- 276 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XX though, Hke myself, he had been very much disap- pointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of Ten- nessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however, as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter. Sherman. Qu the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of Memoirs, II, *' ' ' i i /-t 229 thanks to Sherman and his army passed by Con- gress were approved. Ibid. 218, 219 Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris in Savannah cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all other obstructions. He had then intrenched the city, so that it coidd be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movements with. Ibid. 268 et He proposed to move in two columns — one from SCO Savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threat- ening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his right wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotahgo by water. This column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would not have a force visit Charleston. South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South for secession, and had been so active in pre- cipitating the decision of the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North, and also largely entertained by people of the. South, toshe^'an, that the State of South Carolina, and Charleston, w. R. xLiv ^^^ hotbed of secession, in particular, ought to have CANBY OEDEKED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE 277 a heavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing chap.xx but the decisive results that followed deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement because Charleston had been left out. To pass into the interior would, however, be to en- sure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garri- son could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. Sherman, therefore, passed it by. By the 1st of February all preparations were com- >femoSMi, pleted for the final march, Columbia, South Caro- ^esetseq.' lina, being the first objective ; Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second ; and Goldsboro', or neighbor- hood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon. The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left from about Hardeeville, on the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty direct route for Columbia. The cavalry, however, were to threaten Charleston on the right and Augusta on the left. On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, ises news of which Sherman had received before start- ing out on his march. We already had New Berne, and had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher ; as did other points on the sea-coast, where the National troops were now in readiness to cooperate with Sherman's advance when he had passed Fayetteville. On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in m^«J^^«°* command at New Orleans, to move against Mobile, Montgomery, and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine-shops, etc. On the Mobile 278 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XX 8tli of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit, and strike the canal west of Eiehmond at or about Lynchburg ; and on the 20tli I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying : ^" a')?8^^ As soou as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaehiug Lyuehburg with a eav- ah-y force alone. From there you could destro}^ the rail- road and canal in every direction, so as to be of no fur- ther use to the rebellion. . , . This additional raid, with one starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, num- bering about four or five thousand cavahy; one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavahy ; Canby, from Mobile Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops, — these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, — is aU that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I woidd advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last. by&S" C)n the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, that I had sent Grrierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity, whom it would be diffi- cult to get by. I still further informed him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter. This force did not get off, however. CANBT ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE 279 All these movements were designed to be in sup- chap.xx port of Sherman's march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time. I had some time before depleted ^ (Jeu^^ Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something. Canby seemed to 'be equally deliberate in all of his move- ments. I ordered him to go in person ; but he pre- pared to send a detachment under another officer. General Granger had got down to New Orleans in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put him in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps. Almost in despair of having adequate service ren- dered to the cause in that quarter, I wrote to Canby : I am in receipt of a despatch . . . informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have di- rected that none be sent. Thomas's army has been de- pleted to send a force to you, that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it coidd have been done much better from the North, where we already had the troops. I ex- pected your movements to he cooperative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine-shops, etc., not to build them. Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior— to Montgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling-stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such 280 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GEANT Chap. XX positions as can be supplied by water. By this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken. Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed. The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, con- sisted of Hardee's troops and Wheeler's cavalry — perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all ; but Se^Sltfon fi'autic efforts were being made in Eichmond, as I was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was being done to raise troops in the South. Lee despatched against Sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including those of the other defenses of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded, and captured, to fourteen thousand men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville, what remained of Hood's army were gathered together and for- warded as rapidly as possible to the East to cooper- ate with these forces ; and, finally. General Joseph ^'Si'^i^^ E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the South, though not in favor with the administration N^arelti've! (^^* ^^ ^^^^* ^i^^ -^1*- Davis), was put in command P- ^^^ of all the troops in North and South Carolina. Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January ; but before sending his troops to North ^'*S'4^I^ Carolina I went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions after being on the ground than I could very well have given without. We soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both New Berne and Wilmington are connected with MOVEMENTS OP SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS 281 Raleigh by railroads which unite at Goldsboro'. chap.xx Schofield was to land troops at Smith ville, near the mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure the Wilmington and Charlotte- ville railroad. This column took their pontoon- bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of Wilmington. A large body was sent by the north side to cooperate with them. They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of February. I took the precaution to isee provide for Sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea-coast before reach- ing North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. I also sent railroad rolling-stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in Virginia. The gauge of the North Caro- lina railroads, being the same as the Virginia rail- roads, had been altered too ; these cars and locomo- tives were ready for use there without any change. On the 31st of January I countermanded the ^^ut^oT^' orders given to Thomas to move south to Alabama ^^^^' and Greorgia. (I had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed, in lieu of this movement, that he should send Stone- man through East Tennessee, and push him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman. Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when I had supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman, I heard of his being in Louisville, Kentucky. I immedi- ately changed the order, and directed Thomas to ibid. 385, 386 send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on 279 282 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XX the 12tli of Marcli, lie did push down through the northwestern end of South CaroKna, creating some consternation. I also ordered Thomas to send the Fourth Corps (Stanley's) to Bull Glap, and to de- stroy no more roads east of that. I directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward Lynchburg. Groldsboro' is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman's march was without Mlmoiwi, i^auch incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17th of February. He was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads and re- build the bridges. There was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of Columbia ; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A formidable river had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under General Wade Hampton. There was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. Hamp- ton left as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire. There has since been a great deal of acrimony dis- played in discussions of the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of the Confederates. One thing is certain : as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability Ibid. 280 et seq. CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA 283 with the limited means at hand. In any case, the chap, xx example set by the Confederates in burning the vil- lage of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defense of the act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible for the conflict then raging not imperative. The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the National forces for the pur- pose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc. Sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but puslied forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens. He then, however, coop- erated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When he left there he even gave the mayor flve hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies. He remained in M^Srii, Columbia until the roads, public buildings, work- shops, and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed. While at Columbia Sher- man learned for the first time that what remained of Hood's army was confronting him, under the command of General Beauregard. Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of Febru- ary, and Foster garrisoned the place. Wilmington was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cheraw, farther north, were regarded as so secure from in- vasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuable property 287 284 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XX to these two points to be stored. Among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture. I am afraid lyfemoSs n i^uch of these goods fell into the hands of our ^^^ troops. There was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small arms, and fixed ammunition. These, of course, were among the articles destroyed. While here Sherman also learned of Johnston's restoration to command. The latter was given, as already stated, all troops in North and South Carolina. After the completion of the destruction of public property about Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his march, and reached Cheraw without any special opposition and with- out incident to relate. The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way. Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw, and finally, on Ibid. 292 et the 6th of March, crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced straight for Fayetteville,, Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped. Sher- man reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March. He had despatched scouts from Cheraw with letters to General Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, cloth- ing, and other articles which he enumerated. The scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had asked as were in store at Wilmington. Un- fortunately, however, those stores did not contain clothing. Ibid. 300 Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fay- etteville for Goldsboro'. The march now had to be made with great caution, for he was approaching Lee's army and nearing the country that still re- SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS 285 mained open to the enemy. Besides, lie was con- chap.xx fronting all that he had had to confront in his pre- vious march up to that i^oint, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army. Frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all over thirty-five or forty thousand men. The people had grown tired of the war, and ^^^aSss^ desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions. There was some fighting at Averysboro' on the M«noirM]» 16th between Johnston's troops and Sherman's, ^^^ with some loss ; and at Bentonville on the 19th and 21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the con- test before the morning of the 22d. Sherman's loss in these last engagements, in killed, wounded, ajid missing, was about sixteen hundred. Sherman's troops at last reached Goldsboro' on the 23d of the ibid. 306 month and went into bivouac ; and there his men were destined to have a long rest. Schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington. Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johns- ton confronting him, but with an army much in- Narratfve^ ferior to his own, both in numbers and in morale, pp-3'^2-374 He had Lee to the north of him with a force largely ' superior ; but I was holding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforce- MemoS-s n ments he now had from Schofield and Terry, would ^^ have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shore, with his back to it, and our navy occupied the har- 286 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XX boi's. He had a railroad to both Wilmington and New Berne, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the coun- try and deepen as they approach the sea. Then, too, Sherman knew that if Lee should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnston together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. With the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached North Caro- lina. Johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat, and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty. The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and dis- asters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. CHAPTER XXI ARKIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS — LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS — AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN — THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG — SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD — GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET-LINE — PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE — THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD ON the last of January, 1865, peace commission- chap, xxi ers from the so-called Confederate States pre- sented themselves on our hues around Petersburg, h^V^S of and were immediately conducted to my headquar- ^'m^.^u ' ters at City Point. They proved to be Alexander j ^ camp- H. Stephens, A^ice-President of the Confederacy, justAifs?" ^ ,,■,..,. f>i i P TTT T Sup.Ct.l853- Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary ot War, and ei R. M. T. Hunter, formerly United States Senator (^li.fisTei and then a member of the Confederate Senate. It was about dark when they reached my head- quarters, and I at once conducted them to the steamer Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of pas- sengers. I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington, and informed the Secretary of War and the President of the arrival of these commis- sioners, and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between the United States and, as they termed it, the Confederate government. I OCT 288 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXI was instructed to retain them at City Point until ^'state^ the President, or some one whom he would desig- papers. II, ^^^q^ should come to meet them. They remained several days as guests on board the boat. I saw them quite frequently, though I have no recoUec- ibid. 646 tion of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission. It was some- thing I had nothing to do with, and I therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. For my own part, I never had admitted, and never was c^-^^ranuo j-eady to admit, that they were the representatives pou?'*^ii,48 of a government. There had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. As long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant, and I found them all very agreeable gentlemen. I directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to minister to their comfort in every way possible. No guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements ; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privi- leges extended to them. They were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters. I had never met any of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and I had been a g^A. H^ u P^i'ticular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had always ^■?84^i59^'''^ sup'posed that he was a very small man, but when ^T^c^il:' I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very mII'T,\s83 much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. When he got down on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woolen overcoat, LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS 289 a manufacture that had been introduced into the chap.xxi South during the rebellion. The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I had ever seen, even in Canada. The overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. He took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it. After a few days, about the 2d of February, I re- ceived a despatch from Washington, directing me l-^e^Pa^ to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to ^^^^' "' ^" meet the President and a member of the Cabinet. Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview Hay°me*f of short duration. It was not a great while after ^'uT-m^' they met that the President visited me at City Point. He spoke of his having met the commis- sioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first, that the Union as a d^^-Sig whole must be forever preserved ; and, second, that °' ^^^""^ slavery must be abolished. If they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations, and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached, for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the Union and be one people. He always showed a generous and o^iSraSw kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I never heard him abuse an enemy. Some of the cruel things said about President Lincoln, particu- larly in the North, used to pierce him to the heart ; but never in my presence did he evince a revenge- ful disposition — and I saw a great deal of him at Vol. II.— 19 290 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GKANT CHAP. XXI City Point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital. chSacteri Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Liu- H*8t?phen8 coln. It was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at Hampton Roads. After a little conversation he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens's. I replied that I had. " Well," said he, " did you see him take it ofe ! " I said yes. " Well," said he, " didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did seel" Long afterward I j.B.Gor- told this story to the Confederate Greneral J. B. don, Lt.- "^ ^v^^ie'n." Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate. He 19^,'im-^'; repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heaVd afterward. Gov. 1887-90 g^gpijgjjg laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln. The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and un- eventfully, except for two or three little incidents. On one occasion during this period, while I was visiting Washington City for the purpose of confer- ring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. Aconfeder- Beforc their presence was known they had driven ate reprisal ^ x •' off a large number of beef-cattle that were grazing in that section. It was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the Confederates. It was only retaliating for what we had done, some- times for many weeks at a time, when out of sup- plies — taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten. As appears in this book, on Ante, 1, 485, one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River THE WINTER BEFOEE PETEESBUEG 291 near Port Hudson on tlieir way from Texas to sup- chaf. xxi ply the Confederate army In the East. One of the most anxious periods of my experi- f^^p^tert ence during the rebeUion was the last few weeks ^"^^ before Petersburg. I felt that the situation of the Confederate armj^ was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket-line. He had his railroad by the way of Danville south, and I was afraid that he was running oft' his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate de- fense. I knew he could move much more lightlj^ and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind, so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south — and the war miglit be prolonged another year. I was led to this fear by the faot that I could not see how it was possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they w^ere. There is no doubt that Eichmond would have been evacuated ^^?R*eh-''*' much sooner than it was if it had not been that it '"*'°'^ was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Con- federate army. When it was evacuated (as we shall see further on) the Confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away. Then, too, desertions were taking place not only among those wdio were with General Lee in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the w^hole Confederacy. I remember that, in a conversation with me on one 292 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXI occasioD. long prioi" to this, General Butler remarked that the Confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army ; possibly adding, though I am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave." Confederate ^1^^ South, as we all kuew, wcrc conscripting **°° every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five ; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty, to be called the senior re- serves. The latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear. General Butler, in alluding to this conscrip- tion, remarked that they were thus " robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I afterward used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn. ^deSion? ^^ ^^^ ™y belief that, while the enemy could get no more recruits, they were losing at least a regi- ment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone. Then, by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. It was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. Of course, long be- fore their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs. Then, too, I knew from the great number of desertions that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly, and so long for the cause which they believed in — and as earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting — had lost hope and become de- spondent. Many of them were making application THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG 293 to be sent North, where they might get employment chap, xxi until the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes. For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time to come when I could com- mence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly be- lieved would close the war. There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and which detained me. One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. It was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon- trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country. The other consideration was that General Sheridan, with the ^g^herffan^ cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, was operat- ing on the north side of the James River, having come down from the Shenandoah. It was neces- sary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the James River. Let us now take account of what he was doing. On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. He had met Early between Staunton and Charlottes- (Y^^e^sS ville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire MeuJofrsji; command. Early and some of his officers escaped ^ ^^^' by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods. On the 12th I heard from him again. He had turned east, to come to Wliite House. He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. He had a pontoon-train with him, 294 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXI but it would iiot reacli half-way across some of the streams, at their thee stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered. I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. We had intended to abandon it, because the James River had now become our base of supplies. Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respec- coLothN^Y: tively by Ouster and Devin. General Merritt was ^i86i?im!'' acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved very voif: Aug.' light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt, and other small rations, and very little else besides ammunition. w-g.xLvi They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg. He also sent a division along the James River Canal to destroy locks, culverts, etc. All mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also. Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to White House was now somewhat hazardous. He determined, there- fore, to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to Richmond as it was possible Ibid. 478 et to get, or until attacked. He did this, destroying mS:iMi9 *^i® canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to ®*^*'*^" a point as near Richmond as he could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of de- stroying the railroads and the canal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, be- cause he had been able to find plenty of forage. He SHEEMAN'S MARCH TO WHITE HOUSE 295 Cf. Sher- ujau, Me- moirs, II, 325, 3t;i, 333 et seq. had captured most of Early's horses and picked up chap.xxi a good many others on the road. When he reached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. He resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the South and North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th. The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from Goldsboro', where he then was. Supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass. I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he w^as, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro', on the 18th of April, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready. Sherman was anxious that I should w^ait where I was until he could come up and make a sure thing of it ; but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fix- ing any time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who w^as on his way from the Shenan- doah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However, having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans. Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I was aware of it, and, having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to join with Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the 1st of the month 296 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXI of March, given instructions to the troops around Petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready to strike at once if it was undertaken. It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and Greneral Lee had a consulta- tion about the situation of affairs in and about Richmond and Petersburg, and they both agreed that these places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condi- tion of the roads which would make it possible to move. General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the Danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, de- termined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg. The night of the 24th of 1865 March was fixed upon for this assault, and GTeneral Gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. The point between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack. The attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear, where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines. Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape. The plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line. GORDON CAREIES THE PICKET-LINE 297 Gordon assembled his troops, under the cover of chap, xxi night, at the point at which they were to make ^-Sis^^ their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments ; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. For some time before, the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them ; and this the Confederate general knew. Taking advantage of this knowledge, he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours, as if to desert. When they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. This plan was to have been exe- cuted and much damage done before daylight ; but the troops that were to reinforce Grordon had to be brought from the north side of the James River, and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time ; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge. The charge, however, was successful and almost ^i^-wn, without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. Then, turning to the right and left, they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. Continuing the charge, they also carried Batteries 11 and 12 to our left, which they turned toward City Point. Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all com- munication with his headquarters. Parke, however, 298 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap, XXI Commanding the Ninth Corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and, learning that the general was away, assumed command himself, and with commendable promp- titude made all preparations to drive the enemy captlijd Art! hack. General Tidball gathered a large number of ^BvtS-' pieces of artillery, and planted them in rear of the Gen. Vols. j. i i - i i n Apr. 2, 1865 captured works so as to sweep the narrow space ot J- F- Hart- ground between the lines very thoroughly. Hart- jiuv^27^86i- I'^iift was soon out with his division, as also was Yoiiuini Willcox. Hartranft to the right of the breach (Pa.V 1872-78 headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into Fort Stedman. On the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments \)%^3Z^ which they had captured, and Batteries 11 and 12 were retaken by Willcox early in the morning. Ibid. 318 Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. The artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. They all, there- fore, fell captives into our hands. This effort of Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and re- sulted in their killing, wounding, and capturing about two thousand of ours. After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket-line, which they strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later. Appx.%S The day that Gordon was making dispositions for Ma/24, 1865 this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD 299 the movement to commence on the 29th. Ord, with chap, xxi three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavahy, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the James River, and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda Hundred and the north of the James River. The Engineer Brigade was to he left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about Petersburg. Ord was at his jjlace promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on our extreme left with the Second and Fifth corps. They were directed, on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side railroad and ultimately the Danville railroad. There was considerable fighting in tak- ^i")^02f67T,^ ing up these new positions for the Second and ^^^ Fifth corps, in which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. This was what was known as the battle of White Oak road. CHAPTER XXII INTEKVIEW WITH SHERIDAN — GEAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC — SHERIDAN'S AD- VANCE ON FIVE FORKS — BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS — PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINES — BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG CHAP. XXII QHERIDAN reached City Point on the 26th of 1865 ^ March. His horses, of course, were jaded, and many of them had lost their shoes. A few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving. Immediately on General Sheridan's ar- w. R. xLvi rival at City Point I prepared his instructions for (1) 52. But *' x- jr MemoSJii; the move which I had decided upon. The move- 127,134 jjient was to commence on the 29th of the month. After reading the instructions I had given him Sheridan walked out of my tent, and I foUowed to have some conversation with him by himself — not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. In preparing his instructions I con- templated just what took place ; that is to say, cap- turing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Peters- burg and Richmond, and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. But the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that 300 INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN 301 it would never terminate except by compromise. CHAP.xxn Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire suc- cess it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and, living upon the country, proceed south by the way of the Dan- ville railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johns- ton ; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already had re- ceived, to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburg and Richmond. I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions M^emoSrii, he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, pos- sibly, of having to cut loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy. I said to him, " Gen- eral, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely as a blind ; " and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended to close the war right here with this movement, and that he should go no farther. His face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said, " I am glad to hear it, and we can do it." Sheridan was not, however, to make his move- ment against Five Forks until he got further in- structions from me. One day, after the movement I am about to de- cf.ibid.i42- scribe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were 302 PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXII then established, at Dabuey's Mills. He met some of my staff-officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and success- ful effort. Although my chief of staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked ; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered impor- tant news, and suggested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. Knowing, as I did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement at once, although, on account of the rains which had fallen after I had started out, the roads were still very heavy. Orders were given accordingly. Five FOTk? Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately, there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. On that date I moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again, however, ^rofdi* and in a very short time the roads became practi- cally impassable for teams, and almost so for cav- alry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be stand- ing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself, all his feet would sink, and he SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS 303 would have to be drawn by hand out of the quick- chap, xxii sands so common in that part of Virginia and other Southern States. It became necessary, therefore, to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. Tlie next day (March 30th) we had made sufficient progress to the southwest to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Din- widdle, with instructions to then come up by the road leading northwest to Five Forks, thus menac- ing the right of Lee's line. This movement was made for the purpose of ex- i'lveFo^rk" tending our lines to the west as far as practicable toward the enemy's extreme right, or Five Forks. The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches were themselves extend- ing to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and Five Forks. My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their center to protect their right, so that an assault in the center might be successfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan's success. He was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get. It is natural to suppose that Lee would under- stand my design to be to get up to the South Side 304 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP. XXII and ultimately to the Danville railroad, as soon as lie had heard of the movement commenced on the March, 1865 29th. These roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in Eichmond and Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. He ^•,?;£^^^ did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks. He also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readi- ness on the north side of the James Eiver to come over on call. He came over himself to superintend in person the defense of his right flank. Ibid. no2 Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddle Court House on the night of the 30th, and then took a road lead- ing northwest to Five Forks. He had only his cav- alry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry, he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually drove them back, however, until in the neighbor- hood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. Sheridan, Jn this couditiou of affairs he notified me of Memoirs, II, 146, m ^Y^^^ ^^^ taken place, and stated that he was tail- ing back toward Dinwiddle gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assis- tance. I replied to him that it was impossible to send Wright's corps, because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was, besides, a long distance from him; but the Second (Humphreys's) and Fifth (Warren's) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of SHEEIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FOKKS 305 it, in a position to threaten the left flank of the CHAP.xxn enemy at Five Fork's, and that I would send Warren. Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move ^{m^sl^. at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddle Court House and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after five o'clock next morning. When he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains, so that he regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan, of course, knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. MMnoix8,n, He was also hastened, or at least ordered to move up rapidly, by General Meade. He now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear ; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move forward without him. However, Ayres's division of Warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the Fifth Corps and fighting directly under Sheridan. Warren reported to Sheridan about eleven o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up ^'lvi S so as to be much engaged until late in the after- ^^°^ noon. Griffin's division, in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross-fire of the enemy, was found marching away from the fighting. This did not continue long, however; the division was brought back, and with Ayres's division did most excellent ibid. 838,869 service during the day. Crawford's division of the Vol. II.— 20 30G PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXII Same coi'ps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. Once there it did very excel- lent service. Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the after- noon, or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five impaSce Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. Unless the assault was made and was successful he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddle Court House, or even farther than that, for the night. It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staft'-of&cer after staff-officer in search of Warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all events, Sheridan was unable to M^emoira n S^t that officer to him. Finally he went himself. ^^" He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the Fifth Corps. The troops were then brought up and the assault suc- cessfully made, warren^s J ^as SO mucli dissatlsficd with Warren's dilatory movements in the battle of White Oak road, and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail Sheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS 307 before discovered a defect whicli was beyond his chap.xxii control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. He would not only make prepara- tions to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move. I had sent a staff-officer to General Sheridan to ]vfemSr8,n, call his attention to these defects, and to say that, ^^" as much as I liked General Warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success ; and if his re- moval was necessary to success, not to hesitate. It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed ibid, les Warren. I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty. It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went ^"Snos^^ over the parapets of the enemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction, some six thousand prisoners, besides artil- lery and small arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops were pursued in dif- ferent directions, the cavalry and Filth Corps under Sheridan pursuing the larger body, which moved northwest. This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when Sheridan halted his troops, and, knowing the importance to him of the part of the 308 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT CHAP.xxn enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the Fifth Corps across Hatcher's Run to just southwest of Petersburg, and facing them toward it. Merritt, with the cavahy, stopped and bivouacked west of Five Forks. This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of April. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered the Second Corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advan- tage that could be taken from weakening in their front. KmS I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the suc- cess of the day ; in fact, I had reported to him dur- ing the day and evening as I got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as I could. I notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the with- drawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of Richmond. I was afraid that Lee would regard the posses- sion of Five Forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die. It was for this reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as I had received the news of the capture of Five Forks. The corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. ASSAULT BY PAEKE AND WRIGHT 309 But we kept up a coutinuous artillery fire upon the chap.xxii enemy around the whole line, including that north of the James River, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the Apr. 2,i865 morning. At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved "^^^^o^i^i^ out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw them- selves inside of the enemy's line. Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction ; but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg that he could make no advance forward, and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defense of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. Wright swung around to his left and moved to ibid, go* Hatcher's Run, sweeping everything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on ; but the latter met no serious obstacle. As you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradu- ally much farther from the inner one, and along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly two miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prison- ers — Wright about three thousand of them. In the mean time Ord and Humphreys, in obedi- rbid.679,n6i ence to the instructions they had received, had suc- ceeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, 310 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXII in capturing the intrenclied picket-lines in their front ; and before Wright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's intrenchments. The Second Corps soon followed ; and the outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops, never to be wrenched from them again. When Wright reached Hatcher's Eun, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side railroad just outside of the city. My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills. As soon as I received the news of Wright's success I sent despatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred and those on the north side of the James, and to the President at City Point. Further des- patches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the Badeau^Mii. additional news to these points. Finding at length "^ that they were all in, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. When I ar- rived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon joined inside by General Meade and his staff. Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part ^'S)^i8^^ of the lost ground. Parke on our right was repeat- edly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the James River, thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel G. L Hart- ^^^ directed him to keep up close to the enemy, and ^"K2f' to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda Hun- vo'iI:"ap?: dred front, to do the same thing, and if they Nov.'^i), 1862 found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG .'511 should do SO, for this would separate Richmond chap.xxii and Petersburg. Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to Petersburg, coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous line from the Appomat- tox River below the city to the same river above. At eleven o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with two brigades from C;ty ^-(f/j^i^^^ Point. With this additional force he completed his captured works for better defense, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank. He also carried in and made an abatis between himself and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artillery against Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses. The enemy had, in addition to their intrenched line close up to Petersburg, two inclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by Foster's division of the ibid. 1179 Twenty-fourth Corps (Gibbon's), supported by two brigades from Ord's command. The battle was des- perate, and the National troops were repulsed several times ; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. The guns of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemv, and the commanding officer, N. A. Miles with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth, I'stLt. 22d' *' ' Mass. Sept. surrendered. ^^i^ey coi. I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to igelffirig.- Sheridan. In moving to execute this order he came MaTiaTise^i; upon the enemy at the intersection of the White octVi.lses 312 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP.xxn Oak road and the Claiborne road. The enemy fell back to Sutherland's station on the South Side road and were followed by Miles. This position, natu- rally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly ^iMi^!'-^ intrenched. Sheridan now came up, and Miles asked Mimoirsji, permisslou from him to make the assault, which Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over Miles, who com- manded a division in his corps. I had sent an order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move toward Petersburg. This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards. Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreys to send a division back to his relief. He went himself. Sheridan, before starting to sweep down toPeters- MemoS'i, ^1^1*^5 ^^cl seut Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that had assem- bled there. Merritt drove them north to the Appo- mattox River. Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland's station on the reverse side from where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was w-R-xvLi stopped. Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he, with Sheridan, had carried so hand- somely by assault. I cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my despatch to City Point that evening : EVACUATION OF PETERSBURG 313 BoYDTON Road, near Petersburg, chap.xxh April 2, 1865,4:40 p.m. Colonel T. S. Bowers, City Point: Henry Heth, We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, MaT'-Gen^c and in a few hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox s- Ag^'^y' below Petersburg to the river above. Heth's and Wilcox's ^ „ „,., p , , CM. Wil- divisions — such part of them as were not captured — were cox, w. p. . 1842-46 ; cut off from town, either designedly on theii* part or be- Mjn.-Gen.'c. cause they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry ' isea^' ' and Fifth Corps is above them. Miles's division, Second Corps, was sent from the White Oak road to Sutherland's station on the South Side railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not know- ing whether Sheridan would get up in time. General Humphreys was sent with another division from here. The whole captnres since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men and probably fifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the num- ber of men and guns accui'ately, however, ... I think the President might come out and pay us a visit to-morrow. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. During the night of April 2d onr line was in- trenched from the river above to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at 5 a.m., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock ; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning. CHAPTER XXIII THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBUEG — MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG — THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND — PURSUING THE ENEMY — VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE CHAP.xxiii /^ ENERAL MEADE and I entered Petersburg peterablifg ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ moming of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry, which was flying thick and fast there. As we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the Appomat- tox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the Confederate army. I did not have artil- lery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immedi- ately in pursuit. At all events, I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon. Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated A military Petersburg, a man came in who represented him- self to be an engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia. He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong inclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there ; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops 314 ruse PLAN OF OPEEATIONS AGAINST LEE 315 from Richmond, and falling back into this prepared chap.xxiii work. This statement was made to General Meade and myself when we were together. I had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move against Lee in his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the Potomac and the James. Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. It would only have been a question of days, — and not many of them, — if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antago- nist. My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville road. Accordingly my object was to se- cure a point on that road south of Lee, and I told Meade this. He suggested that if Lee was going that way we should follow him. My reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ^'^^^°^"' ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better ; that when we got in possession of the Danville railroad, at its 316 PEKSONAI. MEMOIBS OF U. S. GRANT chap.xxiii crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up ; that we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the Dan- ville road early in the morning, supposing that Lee would be gone during the night. During the night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps. i)i^^,"^ii, L^®? ^^ ^® ^^^ know, had advised the author- ^^ ities at Richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. Davis was at church when he re- ceived Lee's despatch. The congregation was dis- missed with the notice that there would be no evening service. The rebel government left Rich- mond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. ^rlte plln^ At uight Leo ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, his object being to get away, join Johnston, if possible, and try to crush Sher- man before I could get there. As soon as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan, and directed him to move out on the Danville railroad to the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible. He replied that he already had some of his com- mand nine miles out. I then ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the same road in the morning. Parke's corps followed by the same road, and the Army of the James was ALTEKING THE RAILROilD GAUGE 317 directed to follow the road which ran alongside of chap.xxiii the South Side railroad to Burke's Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. That road was a 5-feet gauge, while our rolling- NORTH C. MAP OF THE PETERSBURG AKD APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGNS. stock was all of the 4 feet 8^ inches gauge ; conse- quently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and loco- motives. Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some days. I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only, while I felt 318 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT The Presi- dent's visit to Peters- burg chap.xxiii a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I would have only added another to the many disap- pointments he had been suffering for the past three years. But when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us God- speed, remained there to hear the result. The next morning after the capture of Petersburg I telegraphed Mr. Lincoln, asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await his arrival. I had started all the troops out early in the morn- ing, so that after the National army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. There was absolutely no one there except my staff-officers and, possibly, a small es- cort of cavalry. We had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the President arrived. About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was, " Do you know, general, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this ? " Our movements having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President all my movements, and the objects I had in view. He remained for some days near City Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph. Possible ri- Mr. Liucolu kucw that it had been arranged for valry be- ~ E^ttndthe Sherman to join me at a fixed time, to cooperate in ^®®* the destruction of Lee's army. I told him that I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies MEETING THE PRESIDENT IN PETERSBURG 319 vanquish their old enemy, who had so long resisted cuAr.xxiii all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. The West- ern armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the Mis- sissippi Elver to the State of North Carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking admittance. I said to him that if the Western armies should be even upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. It might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East and those of the West in some of their debates. Western members might be throwing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the Western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with. Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done. The Army of the Potomac has every reason to ?ii^eP^tomaJ be proud of its four years' record in the suppres- sion of the rebellion. The army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United States. Its loss would be the loss of the 320 PEESONAI. MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP.xxm cause. Every energy, therefore, was put forth by the Confederacy to protect and maintain their cap- ital. Everything else would go if it went. Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to main- tain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the South in another quarter. I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated between the soldiers of the two sections ; and fortunately there has been none between the politicians. Possibly I am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance. When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lin- coln mounted his horse and started on his return to City Point, while I and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance. Up to this time I had not received the report of the cap- ture of Richmond. FauofRich- Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a despatch from General Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond at about April, 1865 8 : 15 o'clock in the morning of that day (the 3d), and that he had found the city on fire in two places. The city was in the most utter confusion. The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. The city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave. In fact, up to the very hour of the evac- uation the people had been led to believe that Lee had gained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg. Weitzel's command found evidence of great de- THE FALL OF RICHMOND 321 moralization in Lee's army, there being still a great CHAP.xxm many men and even officers in the town. The city %KiS^ was on fire. Our troops were directed to extin- guish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. The fire had been started by some one con- nected with the retreating army. All authorities deny that it was authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital, and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. Be that as it may, the National troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them. The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great LeKw many of them, were cut off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the Ap- pomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over. I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join the command, which halted at Suther- land's station, about nine miles out. We had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object ; but the roads were bad, and the trains be- longing to the advance corps had blocked up the ^oad so that it was impossible to get on. Then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them ; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry when- ever they appeared. This caused further delay. General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain Vol. II.— 21 322 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP.xxm time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. Humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of rations. They did not succeed in getting them up through the night ; but the Army St trTopJ of the Potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end that they preferred marching withr out rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. So the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning. w. R. xLvi Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven them north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced to cross. On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations up from Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at Farmville. This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of sheridau, Famiville. I notified Sheridan of this and directed Memoirs, II, ^■'^ him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee. He responded that he had already sent Crook's division to get upon the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place ; and he thought Crook must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly for Jetersville by two roads. After I had received the despatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was on the Danville road, I im- mediately ordered Meade to make a forced march with the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke's PURSUING THE ENEMY 323 corps across from the road they were on to the chap.xxiii South Side raih'oad, to fall in the rear of the Army of the James and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along. Our troops took possession of Jetersville, and in the telegraph-office they found a despatch from Lee, ^ate pug^t ordering two hundred thousand rations from Dan- ville. The despatch had not been sent, but Sheri- dan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville and had it forwarded from there. In the mean time, however, despatches from other sources had reached Danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road ; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cav- ^- f^^^^J^ airy, were off between the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and the Appomat- tox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank. They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his advance north of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. The country was very poor and afforded but very little. His foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the Army of Northern Virginia. Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation. I again ordered Meade up with all iMd. 604 despatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of in- fantry, with a little cavalry, confronting Lee's entire army. Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he 324 PEKSONAI. MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP.xxiii was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. w^K-gXLvi Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have said, the wagons being far in the rear. I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side railroad. On the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of the progTess Meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack Lee. We had now no other objective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close the thing up at once. sLeridan Q^ the 5th I marchcd again with Ord's command Memoirs, II, ^ "^ until within about ten miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I then received from Sheridan the following despatch : The whole of Lee's army is at or near AmeHa Coui't H. E. House, and on this side of it. General Davies, whom I capt. 5th N. sent out to PainesviUe on their right flank, has just cap- ^Bril.^Gen.' tured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. We can "^wMelf ■ capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough May'Ss can be thrown to tliis point, and then advance upon it. My cavalry was at Burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville road, last night. General Lee is at AmeUa Court House in person. They are out of rations, or nearly so. They were advancing up the railroad toward Burkes- ville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point. It now became a life-and-death struggle with Lee to get south to his provisions. w.R. xLvi Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off im- mediately toward Farmville, moved Davies's bri- md. 1145 gade of cavalry out to watch him. Davies found the movement had already commenced. He attacked and drove away their cavalry, which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning one PUKSUING THE ENEMY 325 hundred and eighty wagons. He also captured CHAP.xxni five pieces of artillery. The Confederate infantry then moved against him, and probably would have handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow Davies, and they came to his relief in time. A sharp engage- ment took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. Meade himself reached Jetersville about two ^"^J^^^ o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. The head of Humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterward. Sheridan stationed ibid. 1107 the troops as they came up, at Meade's request, the latter still being very sick. He extended two divi- sions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right. The cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack, feeling that, if time was given, the enemy would get away ; but Meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up. At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which Memoes, n, had been handed to him by a colored man, with a "''' ^^^ note from himself saying that he wished I was there myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court House, April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor. It was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me the information, as here related, of the movements of that day. I received a second message from Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more em- 326 TEPtSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT chap.xxtii pliatieally the importance of my presence. This was In'ought to me by a scout in gray nniform. It re^autiou ^^'^^ Written on tissue-paper and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing-tobacco is folded in. This was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and, putting it into his mouth, chew it. It would cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewing tobacco. It was nearly night when ^•/^•tS'^^ this letter was received. I gave Ord directions to continue his march to Burkesville and there in- trench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and Farmville. I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's army. The distance was about sixteen miles ; but the night being dark, our progress was slow through the woods in the absences of direct roads. However, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our iden- tity and were conducted in to where Sheridan was M^emSji. l>ivouacked. We talked over the situation for some little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was trying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escap- ing us and putting us in rear of him. We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight. I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow the enemy — we wanted to get ahead of him ; and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape ; and besides that, 178 VISIT TO SHEKIDAN AND MEADE 327 T had no doubt that Lee was moving right then, chap.xxiii Meade changed his orders at once. They were ^-^j^^^'^ now given for an advance on Amelia Court House, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay ; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left. Creek CHAPTER XXIV BATTLE OF SAILOE'S CREEK — ENGAGEMENT AT FAEM- VILLE — CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE — SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY CHAP.xxiv rilHE Appomattox, going westward, takes a long Jl. sweep to the southwest from the neighbor- of siuSs liood of the Richmond and Danville railroad bridge, and then trends northwesterly. Sailor's Creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the Appomattox between the High Bridge and Jetersville. Near the High Bridge the stage-road from Petersburg to Lynchburg crosses the Appo- mattox River, also on a bridge. The railroad runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. The roads coming up from the southeast to Farmville cross the Appomattox River there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg railroad well to the left. Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of all the roads between the Dan- ville road and Appomattox River to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. In this way he came very near suc- 328 BATTLE OF SAILOE'S CREEK 329 ceeding in getting to his provision-trains and elud- chap.xxiv ing us with at least part of his army. As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the M^emolrMi, night before, and our army in moving upon Amelia ^^^ Court House soon encountered them. There was a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was reached. Our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon-train in order to get it past our left. A severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confeder- ates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a Lfader^/A. heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery, and cavalry were all brought into action. Our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. Our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward, and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. The enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures. Some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. This engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them. 720-722 330 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT CHAP. XXIV W. R. XLVI (1) 906 Ibid. 1161 Francis Washbum, Col. 5tb Mass. Cav. Theo. Read, Capt. A. A. G. Oct. 24, 1861; Maj. July 25, 1864 W. E. XLVI (1) 1162 Wheu the move toward Amelia Court House had commenced that morning, I ordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of Griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right. The object of this movement was to get the Sixth Corps (Wright's) next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the Valley of Virginia. The Sixth Corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between Burkesville and the High Bridge. On the morning of the 6th he sent Colonel Washburn, with two infantry regiments, with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Burkesville Station ; and he pre- pared himself to resist the enemy there. Soon after Washburn had started Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety, and sent Colonel Read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee's column had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the rein- forcements could not get through. Read, however, had got throngh ahead of the enemy. He rode on to Farmville, and was on his way back again when he found his return cut off, and Washburn con- fronting apparently the advance of Lee's army. Read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, in- DEATH OF KEAD AND WASHBURN 331 fantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, chap.xxiv making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then gave the order to charge. This little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. Colonel Read fell mor- tally wounded, and then Washburn; and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the com- mand and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. The remainder then surren- dered. The Confederates took this to be only the ^•^^•^62^^ advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench ; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the Confederate army. This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon-road bridge near the High Bridge, and attempted to destroy it. He did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little head- way when Humphreys came up with his corps and iwd. 682, 683 drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. Humphreys forced his way aci'oss with some loss, and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farm- ville with the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held a position which was very strong naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys was alone, confront- ing him all through the day, and in a very hazard- ous position. He put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return. Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of 332 PERSONAL MEMOIBS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP.xxiv Prince Edward's Court House, along with the Fifth Corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in between Griffin and w. K. XL VI the Appomattox. Crook's division of cavalry and Wright's corps pushed on west of Farmville. When the cavalry reached Farmville they found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point ; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they suc- ceeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time. These troops re- treated to the north side of the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after Ibid, m them. Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away. Wright built a foot- bridge for his men to march over on, and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve Humphreys, arri\dng there that night. I had stopped the night before at Burkesville Junction. Our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field-hospital there, and Ord's command was extended from that point toward Farmville. Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conver- sation with General Ewell, one of the prisoners Eweirs and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we views ' . had got across the James River he knew then* cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. The authorities thought differently, however. Now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything. He COEEESPONDENCE WITH GENEEAL LEE 333 said, further, that for every man that was killed chap.xxiv after this in the war somebody was responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the President, but he hoped he would. I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south. Meade was back to- ward the High Bridge, and Humphreys confront- ing Lee as before stated. After having gone into bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House, Sheridan \fii^^I^ learned that seven trains of provisions and forage M^emSs.n, were at Appomattox, and determined to start at ^^^'^^^ once and capture them ; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army could secure them. He wrote me a note telling me this. This fact, together with the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. I therefore wrote to him on this day as follows : Headquarters Armies of the U. S., 5 P.M., April 7, 1865. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate States Armies : The result of the last week must convince you of the w. r. xlvi '' (1) 56 hopelessness of f lu'ther resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia In this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the respon- sibihty of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. 334 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GEANT chap.xxiv Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows : April 7, 1865. ^y. R. xLvi General : I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you wdl offer on condition of its surrender. R. E. Lee, General. Lieutknant-General, U. S. Grant, Commandins' Armies of the U. S. ^& This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving another letter, and wrote him as follows : April 8, 1865. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate States Armies : Ibid Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my gi-eat desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for tak- ing up arms again against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. COTif^ederate Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the State SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY 335 where they now were, and were continually drop- chap.xxiv ping out of the ranks and going to their homes. I know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which had probably been used as a Confederate hospital. The next morn- ing when I came out I found a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neigh- borhood. He said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. I told him to stay there and he would not be mo- lested. That was one regiment which had been elim- inated from Lee's force by this crumbling process. Although Sheridan had been marching all day, ^^etevins^ his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. They began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for. Nothing seemed to fatigue them. They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move ^Jyno^^^ south of Appomattox Station, which is about five miles southwest of the Court House, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. They got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the trainmen had just dis- covered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. The other four were held by Custer. 336 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP.xxiv The head of Lee's column came marching up w.R- xLvi there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near. The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry- had possession of the trains. However, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. In the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting any- thing from it. Custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road toward Farmville, and the fight continued. So far only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were engaged. Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. But our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found Griffin's corps Ibid. 841 and the Army of the James confronting them. A sharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up a white flag. CHAPTER XXV NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX — INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT Mclean's house — the teems of surrender — LEE'S SURRENDER — INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THE SURRENDER N the 8th I had followed ae Army of the chap, xxv Potomac iu rear of Lee. I was suffering LfadeSiv, 731, 732 very severely with a sick-headache, and stopped at a farm-house on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the arnjy. I spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard-plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morn- ing. During the night I received Lee's answer to ^{i^^f^^^ my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between ^''*'' ^^^^- the lines on the following morning. But it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows: Headquarters Armies of the U. S., April 9, 1865. General R, E. Lee, Commanding Confederate States Armies : Your note of yesterday is received. I have no an- w. e.xlvi •^ _ (1) 57 thority to treat on the subject of peace ; the meetmg pro- posed for 10 A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for Vol. II.— 22 337 338 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXV peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down then- arms they will hasten that most desu'able event, save thousands of human lives, and hundi-eds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping tliat all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc., U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- Gen eral. Lfadersjv, ^ procGeded at an early hour in the morning, still 732-734 suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. I was not more than two or three miles from Appomattox Court House at the time, but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee's army, or a portion of it. I had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction. When the white flag was put out by Lee, as al- ready described, I was in this way moving toward Appomattox Court House, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be in- formed of what Lee had done. Lee, therefore, sent ^- ^) f^^^ a flag to the rear to advise Meade, and one to the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a mes- itfemoS'i, ^^S^ to me for the purpose of haAdng a meeting to 193 et seq. consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be com- municated with. As they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commanders hesi- tated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. They were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the Army of Northern Virginia where it NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX 339 could not escape except by some deception. They, chap, xxv however, finally consented to a suspension of hos- tilities for two hours, to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible. It was found that, from the route I had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines. Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me: April 9, 1865. General : I received yom- note of tins morning on the w. R- xlv picket-line, whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer con- tained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. R. E. Lee, General. Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, Commanding U. S. Armies. When the officer reached me I was still suffering Lf^-Ssj^ with the sick-headache; but the instant I saw the "^ contents of the note I was cured. I wrote the fol- lowing note in reply and hastened on : April 9, 1865. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate States Armies : Your note of this date is but this moment (11 : 50 a.m.) ibid. 733 received, in consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at this writing about four miles west of Walker's Church, and will push forward to the 340 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXV front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- Gen era I. Sheridan, Memoirs, II, 200 Wilmer Mc- Lean Clias. Mar- shall, A. A. G. & iDSp. Gen. Facts about the apple- tree I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located, with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army near by. They were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confed- erates to get away. They said they believed that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now, and Lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if I would only let them go in. But I had no doubt about the good faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. I found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox Court House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff-officers, awaiting my arrival. The head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of which was an apple-orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south. Before stating what took place between Greneral Lee and myself I will give all there is of the story of the famous apple-tree. Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until the}'' are believed to be true. The war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple-tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. As I bave said, there was an apple-orchard on the side APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE. From Surveys i/wzfo ff/^JUH^. under the direction of Bvt Brig. Gen. N. Michler, f> ^- ■f^ -f* -f f Maj. of Engineers, By Command of Bvt. Maj. Gen'l A. A Humphreys, Brig. Gen'l & Chief of Engineers. \\r-:»] ti^ijr- t? S\ V^n' /hUe)Wn ■iipA Xi&^v ''Jcirj :'Pl>l'A 7 v>'»rekny TTUXC ^ hp-c^uf ■gi ^^ \ ^^.f^f'.-*-^^'^'''''''^ nSr'fo iikaP? i' &Z/ay^ ^^"■■iJ: ■5J9^'' .^s^^ kSS' INTEEVIEW WITH GENERAL LEE 341 of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces, chap.xxv Eunning diagonally up the hill was a wagon-road, which at one point ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had on that side cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embank- ment. Greneral Babcock, of my staff, reported to c^ck.'w^p. me that when he first met General Lee he was sit- coLltaff!'!! ting upon this embankment with his feet in the " ml ' road below and his back resting against the tree. The story had no other foundation than that. Like many other stories, it would be very good if it were only true. I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him in the Mexican war ; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me ; while I would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of General Scott in the Mexican war. When I had left camp that morning I had not LeadeSiv, expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. I was without a sword, as I usually was when on horse- back in the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder-straps of my rank to indi- cate to the army who I was. When I went into the house I found General Lee. We greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats. I had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview. What General Lee's feelings were I do not know. As he was a man of much dignity, with an impass- ible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt 737 342 PEESONAIi MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXV sad ovei' the result and was too manly to show it. Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation ; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us. jS&devlvi, Greneral Lee was dressed in a full uniform which '^^^ was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of con- siderable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the State of Virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. In my rough traveling-suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very strangely with a man so hand- somely dressed, six feet high, and of faultless form. But this was not a matter that I thought of until afterward. We soon fell into a conversation about old army times. He remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army ; and I told him that as a mat- ter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages) I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our THE TEEMS OF SUKEENDEK 343 meeting. After the conversation had run on in this chap, xxv style for some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army. I said that I meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and prop- erly exchanged. He said that he had so understood my letter. Then we gradually fell off again into conversa- j^^aerlr^, tion about matters foreign to the subject which "^ had brought us together. This continued for some little time, when General Lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be written out. I called to General Parker, secretary ^rkfr, of my staff, for writing-materials, and commenced a^May'25,' writing out the following terms : 1863 Appomattox C. H., Virginia, April 9, 1865. General R. E. Lee, Commanding Confederate States Armies : General : In accordance with the substance of my let- ^- ^jfj^"^ ter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the sui*- render of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit : Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental com- mander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and tm*ned over to the officer appointed by 344 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXV me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor theii* private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States author- ity so long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside. Very respectfully, IT, S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. I'^rajnngup WliGii I put my peii to tliG paper I did not know the first word that I should make use of in writing the terms. I only knew what was in my mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought occurred, to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us ; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side-arms. No conversation — not one word — passed between General Lee and myself, either about private prop- erty, side-arms, or kindred subjects. He appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed ; or, if he had a point to make against them, he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. When he read over that part of the terms about side-arms, horses, and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army. Battles & Then, after a little further conversation, General Leaders, IV, ' _ ' Lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the United States (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries) ; that in their army the cav- 739 3 ¥" 3 5 O 2.0 iL 1 — ■ "^ I— 2 SI 2 rj y .-•. C--T; M *^ 5 ^ ^ ?r = 3 2 • S " !^ ^ .^ "^ - "< i» C 3- 05° '„ g_ tj ^, ^ ^ p 2 ~ ^ ."^ ai■^ g_ — (!)■* n "" 5 ° o ?:s -^ 3 — --. O ~3 o'2 It;/' 7 Si. O w "^ ^ o ■ 5>=^ f^ H^ ^ OO on ^ 3 o^S S — 3- 3-n. ►t- 3 TO 3 g.pS-.3 ^3 rt v: r^|2S r& vo « £.>3 V 2 " 3 2 S't» S-sj ^ ST n ' i3. >" n2 0-'Tl3-^ a. c/jSL 3 3'-r' m 2 HH ■ 2 TO t-' '^' I M LEE'S SIJERENDEK 345 alrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; chap, xxv and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. I told him that as the terms were written they would not ; that bnly the officers were permitted to take their private property. He then, after reading over the terms a second time, re- marked that that was clear. I then said to him that I thought this would be L?adeSn^, about the last battle of the war — I sincerely hoped so ; and I said, further, I took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. The United States did not want them, and I would therefore instruct the officers I left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home. Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect.^ He then sat down and wrote out the following letter : Headquarters Army of Northern Virge^ia, April 9, 1865. General : I have received your letter of this date con- w, r. xlvi taining the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern 1 There is a popular error to parlor of McLean's house, while the effect that Generals Grant Genei-al Lee was sitting in the and Lee each signed the articles room ; and General Lee immedi- of surrender. The document in ately wrote a letter accepting the the form of a letter was signed terms, and handed it to General only by General Grant, in the Grant. — F. D. G. 346. PERSONAIi MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXV Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as tliose expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. R. E. Lee, General. Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union generals present were severally presented to General Lee. The fable of The mucli- talked- of surrendering; of Lee's sword the sword '^ and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. The word "sword" or "side-arms" was not mentioned by either of us until I wrote it in the terms. There was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment I wrote it down. If I had happened to omit it, and G-eneral Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it in the terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers retain- ing their horses. BattiesA General Lee, after all was completed and before ''^^ taking his leave, remarked that his army was m a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage ; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. I told him " Certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. His answer was " About twenty- five thousand;" and I authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox Station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the pro- visions wanted. As for forage, we had ourselves LEE'S SUERENDEK 347 depended almost entirely upon the country for chap.xxv that. Generals Gibbon, Griffin, and Merritt were des- ignated by me to carry into effect the paroling of Lee's troops before they should start for their homes — General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon, and Pendleton for them to confer with in dTLvSi.w.p. order to facilitate, this work. Lee and I then sep- Artrc/s^A! arated as cordially as we had met, he returning to oen. m1?:' his own lines ; and all went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox. Soon ^f ter Lee's departure I telegraphed to Wash- ington as follows : Headquarters, Appomattox Court House, Virginia, April 9, 1865, 4 : 30 p.m. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington : General Lee surrendered the Ai-my of Northern Vu-ginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The ac- companying additional correspondence wiU show the con- ditions fully. U. S. Grant, Lieutenan t- General. When news of the surrender first reached our LfadeSiv. lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hun- ''^^ dred guns in honor of the victory. I at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. The Confeder- ates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall. I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now deemed other useless out- lay of money. Before leaving, however, I thought 348 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CHAP, XXV I would like to see General Lee again ; so next morn- LeaSSiv i^S I i'0i^r\,<\/\-^^ eP%^ By Ckimmand o£ FAC-SIMILE OF GENERAL GRANT'S DESPATCH ANNOUNCING THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE. At the request of the Editor, General Badeau has given the history of the despatch in the following letter : "On Sunday afternoon, the 9th of April, 1865, as General Grant was riding to his headquarters from the farm-house in which he had received the surrender of Lee, it occurred to him that he had made no report of the event to the government. He halted at once and dismounted, with his staff, in a rough field, within the National lines. Sitting on a stone, he asked for paper. I happened to be near, and offered him my memorandum-book, such as staff-officers often carrj' for orders or reports in the field. He laid the book on his knee and wrote the above despatch in pencil; he handed it to me and told me to send it to the telegraph operator. I asked him if I might copy the despatch for the oper- ator and retain the original. He assented and I rewrote the paper, the original of which is in the keeping of The Centurv magazine. " Adam Badeau. " Tannersville, N. Y., July 10, 1885." FRATERNIZING OF OPPOSING OFFICERS 349 Here the officers of both armies came in great num- chap, xxv hers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. After an hour pleasantly passed in this way I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired. CHAPTER XXVI MORALE OF THE TWO AEMIES — RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH — PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND — ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON — PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION — PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY Chap. XXVI AFTER the fall of Petersburg, and when the the^Soar- -^^ Armles of the Potomac and the James were ^^^^ in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the National troops had greatly improved. There was no more straggling, no more rear-guards. The men who in former times had been falling back were now, as I have already stated, striving to get to the front. For the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their coun- try saved. On the other hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. Their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of Sailor's Creek. They threw away their arms in constantly increas- ing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betak- ing themselves to the woods in the hope of reach- ing, n, 335 ing their homes. I have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I met at Farmville. As a result of these 350 EELATIVE CONDITIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH 351 and other influences, when Lee finally surrendered chap.xxvi at Appomattox there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. It was probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, North and South, that Lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. As a matter of official record, and in addition to Lee's losses the number paroled as given above, we captured be- tween March 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 Confederates, to say nothing of Lee's other losses, killed, wounded, and missing, during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. The same record shows the number of cannon, including those at Appomat- tox, to have been 689 between the dates named. There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every bat- tle, or all important battles, fought between the sec- tions, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engaged and belittling their own. Northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. I have often heard gentlemen who were thoroughly loyal to the Union speak of what a splendid fight the South had made and success- fully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non- combatants. I will add to their argument. We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the South. But the South had rebelled against the National government. It was not bound by any constitu- 352 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Chap. XXVI tional restrictions. The whole South was a mili- tary camp. The occupation of the colored people eSt^amies ^^^ ^^ fumish supplics for the army. Conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of State and intended National government. The old and phys- ically disabled furnished a good portion of these. The slaves, the non-combatants, one third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. Children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe ; they were not much older when they began to hold the plow. The four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. Women did not work in the fields in the North, and children attended school. £a c^o'S ^^® ^^'^^ ^^ peace were carried on in the North, trasted Towus and cities grew during the war. Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop and in the field. In the South no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up, and which would have become real and respected if the rebel- lion had been successful. No rear had to be pro- tected. All the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threat- ened with invasion. The press of the South, like the people who remained at home, was loyal to the Southern cause. In the North, the country, the towns, and the EELATTVE CONDITIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH 353 cities presented about the same appearance they chap.xxvi do in time of peace. The furnaces were in bhist, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the North and the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. In the North the press was free up to the point of open treason. The citizen could entertain his views and express them. Troops were neces- sary in the Northern States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being released by outside force, armed, and set at large to destroy by fire our Northern cities. Plans were formed by Northern agaTisuhe and Southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison ^"^"*^ the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers — regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. The copperhead dis- 'iJ'ead press' reputable portion of the press magnified rebel suc- cesses and belittled those of the Union army. It was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the Con- federate army. The North would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment was in the South, than we were as the battle was fought. As I have said, the whole South was a military ^''^'Q^^^' camp. The colored people, four million in num- ber, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. The cause was popular, and was enthu- siastically supported by the young men. The con- scription took all of them. Before the war was Vol. II.— 23 354 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT chap.xxvi over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior re- serves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. It would have been an offense directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the South, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the Confederate army. He would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. Under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. I know they did not. JaS'Mex- During 1862 and 1863, John H. Morgan, a parti- M^'.-G^en-^c. zau officcr, of uo military education, but possessed i862''^"' of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee. He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. The army operating against the South, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the North, from which all supplies had to come to the front. Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. These guards could not render assistance beyond the points where sta- ^rS^ tioned. Morgan was foot-loose, and could operate where his information — always correct — led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. Dur- ing the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded, and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. He destroyed many millions of property in addi- tion. Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. Forrest, an abler soldier, PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND 355 operated farther west, and held from the National chap.xxvi front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. It is safe to say that more than half the National army were engaged in guard- ing lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hos- pital, or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. Then, again, large forces were employed where no Confederate army confronted them. I deem it safe to say that there were no large en- gagements where the National numbers compen- sated for the advantage of position and intrench- ment occupied by the enemy. While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the Presi- dent went to Richmond in company with Admiral Porter, and on board his flag-ship. He found the £ Hay^lffe people of that city in great consternation. The "xfSis' leading citizens among the people who had re- mained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. General Weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighbor- ing villages after his troops had succeeded in sub- duing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the Confederate capital. The President sent for him, and on his arrival a short '^'et^s^q.^^^ interview was had on board the vessel. Admiral Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also present. After this interview the President wrote an order in about these words, which I quote from memory: " General Weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia • troops from the Confederate armies." Immediately some of the gentlemen composing cf^ « \A\^^ 356 PEKSONAJL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKANT Pec Stan- ton's char- acteristics Chap. XXVI that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. This call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had con- templated, as he did not say the " Legislature of Virginia," but " the body calling itself the Legisla- ture of A^irginia." Mr. Stanton saw the call as pub- lished in the Northern papers the very next issue, and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was nearer W\^ spot than he was. This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was a man who never questioned his own authority, and who always did in war-time what he wanted to do. He was an able constitutional lawyer and ju- rist; but the Constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. In this latter particu- lar I entirely agree with the view he evidently held. Theconsti- rpj^g Constitution was not framed with a view to ^^'li'o'f'^' any such rebellion as that of 1861-65. While it did not authorize rebellion, it made no provision against it. Yet the right to resist or suppress re- bellion is as inherent as the right of self-defense, and as natural as the right of an individual to pre- serve his life when in jeopardy. The Constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termina- tion of the war. Those in rebellion against the government of the United States were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the South was then fighting. It would be a hard case, when one third of a nation, united in AKRIVAL AT WASHINGTON 357 rebellion against the national authority, is entirely chap.xxvi untrammeled, that the other two thirds, in their efforts to maintain the Union intact, should be re- strained by a Constitution prepared by our ances- tors for the express purpose of ensuring the per- manency of the confederation of the States. After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my staff and a few others directly to Burkes ville Station on my way to Washington. The road from Burkesville back having been newly repaired, and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when I reached City Point. As soon as possible I took a despatch- boat thence to Washington city. While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs ; communicating with my different com- , manders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. But by the 14th I was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in Burlington, New Jersey, attend- ing school. Mrs. Grant was with me in Washing- i^^^i^etf ton at the time, and we were invited by President ^""^29°' ^' and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theater on the evening of that day. I replied to the Presi- dent's verbal invitation to the effect that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accom- panying them ; but that I was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if I could get through my work during the day I should do so. I did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theater. 358 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT chap.xxvi At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on Broad Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware Eiver, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they took the cars again. When I reached the ferry, on the east side of the city of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival there; and also des- Newsofthe patchcs informing me of the assassination of the tion President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination of the Vice-President, Mr. Johnson, and requesting my immediate return. It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these as- sassinations, more especially the assassination of the President. I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and, above all, his desire to see all the people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with recoJTstruc- equality among all. I knew, also, the feeling that Hon ^ly Johnson had expressed in speeches and conver- sation against the Southern people, and I feared that his course toward them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. I felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to Washington City ; but Mrs. Grant was with me, it was after midnight, and Burling- ton was but an hour away. Finding that I could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I went up with her and re- PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION 359 turned immediately by the same special train. The chap.xxvi joy that I had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in Washington when I left there had been turned to grief ; the city was in reality a city of mourning. I have stated what I believed then the e-ffect of this would be, and my judgment now is that I was right. I believe the South would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson's course toward them during the first few months of his administration. Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination was particularly unfor- tunate for the entire nation. Mr. Johnson's course toward the South did en- fl^^*'^^"* Jormson s gender bitterness of feeling. His denunciations of harshness treason, and his ever-ready remark, " Treason is a crime and must be made odious," were repeated to all those men of the South who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. He uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feel- ing, wishes, and judgment of those over whom he presides ; and the Southerners who read the denun- ciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the senti- ments of the Northern people ; whereas, as a mat- ter of fact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, foiiy of the I believe the great majority of the Northern peo assassina- tion 360 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Reconstnic tion chap.xxvi pie, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. They be- lieved, I have no doubt, as I did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. The people who had been in rebellion must neces- sarily come back into the Union, and be incorpo- rated as an integral part of the nation. Naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more recon- ciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens they would, be from the be- ginning. They surely would not make good citi- zens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks. I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. They supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred ; but Mr. Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the South not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to considera- tion of any of our citizens. This was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. The Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. John- son having gone to their side ; and with a compact South, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the North, they felt that they would fri age Pres. John- son'srevolu tion of sen- timent son PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY 361 be able to control the nation at once, and already chap.xxvi many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so. Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one tSn*con- hand, and receiving the supj^ort of the South on the ^eXim- other, drove Congress, which was overwhelmingly Republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. There being a solid South on one side that was in accord with the political party in the North which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Con- gress and of the majority of the legislatures of the States, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. In this work I shall not dis- cuss the question of how far the policy of Congress in this particular proved a wise one. It became an absolute necessity, however, because of the fool- hardiness of the President and the blindness of the Southern people to their own interest. As to my- self, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, I had gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, I favored immediate enfranchisement. CHAPTER XXVI SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON — JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN — CAPTURE OF MOBILE — WTLSON'S EXPE- DITION — CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS — GENERAL, THOMAS'S QUALITIES — ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY ch. XXVII TTTHEN I left Appomattox I ordered General ▼ ▼ Meade to proceed leisurely back to Burkes- ville Station with' the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. Gleneral Johnston, Ante,u,28o, as has been stated before, was in North Carolina 284, 295, 316 ' confronting General Sherman. It could not be known positively, of course, whether Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, though I supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkes ville Station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. The army which I could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which Sherman confronted him was also superior ; and between the two he would neces- sarily have been crushed or driven away. With the loss of their capital and the Army of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether Johnston's men would have had the spirit to stand. My belief was that he would make no such attempt ; but I adopted 362 SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON 363 Sherman's terms to Johnston this course as a precaution against what might ch. xxvii happen, however improbable. Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a messenger to North Carolina by boat with despatches to General Sherman, informing him of the surrender of Lee and his army; also of the terms which I had given him; and I authorized Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston if the latter chose to accept them. The country is famil- iar with the terms that Sherman agreed to condi- tionally^ because they embraced a political question as well as a military one, and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agree- ing to them definitely. Greneral Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting tliere to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincoln Ante, ii, 289 had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at Hampton Roads, viz., that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points — one being that the Union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together. He had also seen notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Eich- mond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the Legis- lature of Virginia. Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had made with Greneral Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the President of 364 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT ch. XXVII the United States. But seeing that he was going ]vSok8,n. beyond his authority, he made it a point that the ^hnstou^ terms were only conditional. They signed them p.foiet^seq. with this Understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final ; if not approved, then he would give due notice before resuming hostilities. As the world knows, Sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (Congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was jfemoSs n denounced by the President and Secretary of War 358 et seq., jj^ very bitter terms. Some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor — a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to Johns- ton and his army. If Sherman had taken author- ity to send Johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own States, without submitting the question to the authorities at Washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation. But the feeling against Sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest confidence of the American people. When, some days after my return to Washing- ton, President Johnson and the Secretary of War received the terms which Gleneral Sherman had for- warded for approval, a Cabinet meeting was imme- diately called and I was sent for. There seemed to be the greatest consternation lest Sherman would SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON 365 commit the government to terms which they were ch.xxtii not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant. A message went out directing the troops in the South not to obey General Sherman. I was ordered to proceed at once to North Carolina and take charge of matters there myself. Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible. I repaired to Ealeigh, where Sher- man was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence. When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, M^emoSMi. and we were at once closeted together. I showed ^^^ him the instructions and orders under which I visited him. I told him that I wanted him to no- tify General Johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in Washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms I had given General Lee. I sent Sherman to do this himself. I did not wish the knowledge Of my presence to be known to the army generally ; so I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and with- out the enemy knowing that I was anywhere near the field. As soon as possible I started to get away, to leave Sherman quite free and untrammeled. At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement in the North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston ; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the President and Secretary of War. I knew that Sherman must see these papers, and I fully real- ized what great indignation they would cause him, though I do not think his feelings could have been 366 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Belated ex pedltlous ch. XX VII more excited than were my own. But like the true Sherman's ^j^^\ loval soldier that he was, he carried out the in- loyalty •' ' structions I had given him, obtained the surrender of Jolmston's army, and settled down in his camp about Raleigh, to await final orders. There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. With these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of Lee and Johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do. The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off : one under Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March ; that under Stoneman, from East Tennessee, on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They were all eminently successful, but without any good result. Indeed, much valu- able property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. The war was practically over before their victories were gained. They were so late in commencing operations that they did not hold any troops away, that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the Con- federate armies to a surrender. The only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by Stoneman's getting near Lynchburg about the time the Armies of the Potomac and the James Btoneman's WQYQ closiug in ou Lce at Appouiattox. ^^pii^^""" stoneman entered North Carolina and then CAPTURE OF MOBILE 367 pushed north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee ch. xxvii railroad. He got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places, and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomat- tox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. He then pushed south, and was operat- ing in the rear of Johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter's surrender. In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thou- sand prisoners were the trophies of his success. Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of lSSiv, March. The city of Mobile was protected by two "^ forts, besides other intrenchments — Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city. These forts were invested. On the night of the 8th of April, the National troops hav- ing carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated ; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th the city was evacuated. I had tried for more than two years to have an ^1%]^.^^^ expedition sent against Mobile when its possession 58.61,232-234 by us would have been of great advantage. It finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands with- out any bloodshed whatever. Wilson moved out with full twelve thousand men, l^^ISiv, well equipped and well armed. He was an energetic '^^^^^ 368 PEESONAX, MEMOmS OF U. S. GEANT ch. XXVII officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. He now had principally conscripts. His conscripts were generally old men and boys. He had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even i-etard materially the progress of Wilson's cavalry. Selma fell on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war-material, machine-shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors. Tuscaloosa, Mont- gomery, and West Point fell in quick succession. These were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war- material. They were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured. Macon surrendered on the 21st of April. Here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. This stopped all fighting. General Eichard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he surren- dered everything within the limits of this extensive command. Greneral E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war. Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugi- tive President of the defunct Confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred at Irwins- ville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For myself — Surrender of Taylor and Kirby Smith RIGHT I'ROFILE OF GENERAL GRANT. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY WALKER IN 1875, AND LENT BY MAJOR C. C. SNIFFIN.) CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS 369 and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling — I ch.xxvii would have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis mL^ Me- succeed in escaping, but for one reason: 1 feared ™326?327' that if not captured he might get into the trans-Mis- sissippi region and there set up a more contracted Confederacy. The young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year. The Northern people were tired of the war ; they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes. Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. He knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confeder- ate President, for high treason. He thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation. At all events, he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. But his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-President of the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy. All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned. This reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as Abraham Lincoln. He would have proven the best friend the South ^'jo^^^o^n "^ could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by recon- struction under a President who at first wished to revenge himself upon Southern men of better social Vol. n.— 24 coutrastecl 370 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CH. XXVII standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties. Reconstoic- rj^\^Q story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. Much of it, no doubt, was uncon- stitutional ; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judici- ary and a decision obtained. These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain " a dead letter " upon the statute-books of the United States, no one tak- ing interest enough in them to give them a passing thought, cf. Davis, Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. 'Rise and " F&iir^y'joi, Davis was wearing when he was captured. I can- not settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts ; but I have been under the belief from information given to me by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing-gown. Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished pro- vided it might be done successfully. If captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. He represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war — and the most costly in other respects — of which history makes any record. Every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. Had he succeeded in making GENERAL THOMAS 371 his escape in any disguise it would have been ad- ch.xxvu judged a good thing afterward by his admirers. As my official letters on file in the War Depart- ThomS ment, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier. The same remark will apply also in the case of General Canby. I had been at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action ; sensible, honest, and brave. He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent * degree. He gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. This implies a very valuable quality. It is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serviug under the commander possessing it. Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. He was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. I do not believe that he could ever have conducted Sher- man's army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the defenses and the commander guarding that line in 1864. On the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer, could have done it better. Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly de- served, as he has received, the plaudits of his coun- trymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-65. 372 PERSONAX, MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CH. XXVII G-eneral Caiiby was an officer of great merit. lie was naturally studious and inclined to the law. Gen. canby There have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of Congress and every regula- tion for the government of the army as he. His knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff-officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the Military Division of the Gulf. He was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning. I presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city were somewhat like ^"""201 ^°"' ^y ^^^ when marching a regiment against General Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861. Neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding. Had Canby been in other engagements afterward, he would, I have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. He was afterward killed in the lava-beds of south- ern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile Modoc Indians. His character was as pure as his talent and learning were great. His services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. I have no idea that it was from choice that his ser- vices were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there. CHAPTER XXVIII THE END OF THE WAE — THE MAEGH TO WASHINGTON — ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANCEDOTES — GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON — ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS THINGS began to quiet down, and as the cer- CH.xxvm tainty that there would be no more armed re- sistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina ^J troops and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. Suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the South to ensure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several States, and to ensure security to the lives and property of all classes. I do not know how far this was necessary, but I deemed it neces- sary, at that time, that such a course should be pur- sued. I think now that these garrisons were con- tinued after they ceased to be absolutely required ; but it is not to be expected that such a rebeUion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious ap- prehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done. Sherman, Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro' up ^Tes^' 373 374 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CH.xxvni to Manchester, on the south side of the James River, opposite Eichmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation was there. Sherman. It was duiing; this trip that the last outrage was Memoirs, II, ox ^-^ 371-374 committed upon him. Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his, Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of Hal- leck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest. This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for Halleck not to show him- self, because he (Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indig- nation for the treatment he had received. Very soon after that Sherman received orders from me Ibid. 375 to proceed to Washington city, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the muster- ing out of the troops. There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from Groldsboro' to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington city. The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through the South- ern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro', and thence to Washington city, had passed over THE END OF THE WAR 375 many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Po- ch.xxvim tomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theater of the four years' war for the preservation of the Union. The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to ^eaSS the sea and north to Goldsboro', while it was not p^^^^ accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally mag- nificent in the way it was conducted. It had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia had felt the hardships of the war. Georgia and South Carolina, and almost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the Northern armies, except upon ' their immediate sea-coasts. Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success that the people who remained at home had been con- vinced that the Yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves. Even during this march of Sherman's the news- papers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southern people. As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused, and they saw the true state of affairs. In turn they 376 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT CH.xxvin became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise. Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies. As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and the southern part of North Carolina further cut off their resources, and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much ex- hausted of food and forage. In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the other from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into camp near the capital, as directed. The troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they ap- peared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. I doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a gi"eat battle. American The armics of Europe are machines : the men are and Euro- -^ t i ji • -j. £ pf^a^n armies "brave and the officers capable; but the majority ot the soldiers in most of the nations of Europe are taken from a class of people who are not very in- telligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. Our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the ANECDOTE OF PKESIDENT LINCOLN 377 nation was involved, and so necessarily must have ch. xxviii been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. Nothing of particular importance occurred dur- ing the time these troops were in camp before start- ing North. I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It occurred a day after I reached Washington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville with the army. Grovernor Smith of Virginia had J^Ext™ left Richmond with the Confederate States govern- sm^thfaU. n T -1 , -r^ -11 n • T 1846-48,1863- ment, and had gone to Danville, bupposmg 1 was 65 necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he ad- dressed a letter to me there, informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State of Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond to Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal authorities. I give this letter only in substance. He also inquired of me whether, in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference. Gen- eral Meade, being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without inform- ing the officer who brought it that I was not pres- ent. He read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiv- ing this despatch, I repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was asking for instruc- 378 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT CH. XXVIII tions, said, in reply to that part of Governor Smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the coun- try unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain Irishman (gi\ang the name) he knew in Springfield, who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked. Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. These friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. They asked Pat to join them in sigDing the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a bever- age that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. After a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. So holding the glass behind him, he said, " Doctor, could n't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself?" I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, but I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. He would have been equally wiUing to permit the return of the same expatri- ated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice. The srand Qu the 18th of May orders were issued by the ad- jutant-general for a grand review by the President and his Cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's armies. The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two ^ 1^ i^ Missing Pages These missing pages will be inserted at a future date. ^ ^ i^ Missing Pages These missing pages will be inserted at a future d ESTIMATE OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS 383 it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those ch.xxviii around him to approach him even with informa- tion. In spite of this defect he was a most valu- able officer, and deserves a high place in the annals of his country. General Burnside was an officer who was gener- ^*^°'ide"™" ally liked and respected. He was not, however, fitted to command an army. No one knew this bet- ter than himself. He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. It was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command. Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I aen.Hooker had known him very well before, however. Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of Look- out Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was brilliant. I nevertheless regarded him as a danger- ous man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. He was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. His disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate com- mand, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors. Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of ^ck.w.^p all the general officers who did not exercise a sepa- mfxim, rate command. He commanded a corps longer than Brig!^^eu. any other one, and his name was never mentioned 23,1861; ' as having committed in battle a blunder for which NnyigAses; ^ _ Bng.-Geu. he was responsible. He was a man of very con- ^•fa.^'st"^" spicuous personal appearance. Tall, well formed, and, at the time of which I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that 384 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT Gen. Sedg- wick ch. XXVIII would attract the attention of an army as he passed. His genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. No matter how hard the fight, the Second Corps always felt that their commander was looking after them. Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observa- tion. I had known him in Mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade.' He stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave and conscientious. His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. He was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. He declined the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not oftener. General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education. His way was won without political influence up to an im- portant separate command — the expedition against Fort Fisher, in January, 1865. His success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major- general of volunteers. He is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues. As a commander he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situa- tion under which he was placed at any given time. Gen. Terry LEFT PROFILE OF GENERAL GRANT. (FROM A 1-HOIoGKAI'H TAKEN BY WALKER IN 1875, AND LENT BY MAJOR C. C. SNIFFIN.) ESTIMATE OF THE COKPR COMMANDEES 385 Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good CH.xxvrn corps commanders, but came into that position so ^^,®w^^" near to the close of the war as not to attract pub- Me^Jo, he attention. Ah three served as such in the last capt.2dArt. campaign of the Armies of the Potomac and the S^^'^®°' James, which culminated at Appomattox Court ^en^^lJJ.^2] House, on the 9th of April, 1865. The sudden col- "^^ lapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in temie^w'. the army. Graduating at West Point, as he did, 2d'Lt Eng. during the second year of the war, he had won i862rBrig.- his way up to the command of a corps before its oct. 19, isu close. This he did upon his own merit and without influence. Vol. II.— 25 CONCLUSION ^^thc'lvrir"* rriHE cause of the great war of the rebellion J- against the United States will have to be at- tributed to slavery. For some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that " a state half slave and half free cannot exist." All must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. I took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true. Slavery Slavery was an institution that required unusual guaranties for its security wherever it existed ; and in a country like ours, where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. Hence the people of the South were dependent upon keeping control of the gen- eral government to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. They were enabled to main- tain this control long after the States where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the Northern States. They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence 386 CONCLUSION 387 of the Northern States by enacting such laws as the Fugitive Slave Law. By this law every North- Jive sikve ern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a Southern man. Northern marshals became slave- catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution. This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute-books. Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the North had no par- ticular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves. But they were not willing to play the role of police for the South in the protection of this particular institution. In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs, and steamboats, — in a word, rapid transit of any sort, — the States were each al- most a separate nationality. At that time the sub- ject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. But the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the National government became more felt and recognized, and therefore had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution. It is probably well that we had the war when we '^^I'm^r did. We are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid pro- gress than we otherwise should have made. The civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people 388 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT of different nationalities have become common; whereas before it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country, or who knew anything about other people. Then, too, our republican institu- tions were regarded as experiments up to the break- ing out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future. "^Sf^e"* "^^^ conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual. Seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth, and intelligence, the European nations thought it would be well to give us a check. We might possibly, after a while, threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions. Hence England was constantly finding fault with the administration at Washing- ton because we were not able to keep up an effec- tive blockade. She also joined, at first, with France and Spain in setting up an Austrian prince upon tempted the throuc in Mexico, totally disregarding any empire rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated CONCLUSION OQ 89 as an independent power. It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pre- texts which can always be found when wanted. Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been un- able to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them. Under pretense of protecting their citi- zens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a foot- hold for establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. I myself regarded this as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged, and sup- posed as a matter of course that the United States would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike. I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lin- coln and the Secretary of War, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought Or felt about it. I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands. All of the powers except France very soon with- drew from the armed intervention for the estab- lishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne of Mexico ; but the governing people of these coun- tries contin^^ed to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to tlie Rio Grande to Jntjo the have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off be- fore they could be stopped, and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed them up and Rio Grande 390 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to a request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande, and to negotiations for the withdrawal of Kps theirs. Finally Bazaine was withdrawn from Mex- TroSfMel^ ico by ordcr of the French government. From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us. France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States. I did not blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the Mexican republic. That was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. He had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people. He tried to play the part of the first Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. He sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory ; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow. Like our own war between the States, the Franco- Prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people. It was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III. The beginning was when he landed troops on this con- tinent. Failing here, the prestige of his name — all the prestige he ever had — was gone. He must ^N^iS^n"^ achieve a success or fall. He tried to strike down "■^ his neighbor, Prussia — and fell. I never admired the character of the first Napo- leon ; but I recognize his great genius. His work, CONCLUSION 39\ too, has left its impress for good on the face of Europe. The third Napoleon could have no claii^ to having done a good or just act. To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again ; but, grow- ing as we are in population, wealth, and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago ; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an in- vasion by the fleets of fourth -rate European powers for a time until we could prepare for them. We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defenses should be put in the finest possible condi- tion. Neither of these cost much when it is con- sidered where the money goes, and what we get in return. Money expended in a fine navy not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the mean time. Money spent upon sea-coast defenses is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security. England's course toward the United States dur- ing the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother-country. I regretted it. England and the United States are The art of raaiHtain- iug peace Naval and coast de- fenses Attitude of England 392 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT The cotton famine The negro question natural allies, and should be the best of friends. They speak one language and are related by blood and other ties. We together, or even either sepa- rately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world. England governs her own colonies, and particu- larly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation. She is just to the conquered, but rigid. She makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. She does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at lib- erty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government. The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. It was the hostility of the leaders of one political party. I am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North. Even in Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the North at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing. It is possible tha,t the question of a conflict be- tween races may come up in the futui'e, as did that between freedom and slavery before. The condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least. But he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now CONCLUSION 393 should be considered as having as good a right ,to remain here as any other class of our citizens. It was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo diir- anuexS> ing the time I was President of tlie United States. ''^'^liisij'"" Santo Domingo was freely offered to us not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people. The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so com- pensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage. I took ]^ that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent States governed by their own race. They would still be States of the Union, and under the protection of the gen eral government ; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored. By the war with Mexico we had acquired, as we ^l^ewfs"^ have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen that the vol- unteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast countr3\ Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war. After our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the workshop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterward they found that rich valleys and productive gi'azing and farming lands were there. 394 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT This territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country. Rail- roads traverse it in every direction — north, south, east, and west. The mines are worked. The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agri- cultural lands are found in many of the valleys. This is the work of the volunteer. It is probable that the Indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war. We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good. Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the peo- ple were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. In fact, an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers. So much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hear- ing him speak. Before, new territories were set- tled by a "class" — people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. Their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil their bread and vegetables. All the streams abounded with fisli. Trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raise — powder, lead, whisky, tobacco, and some store goods. Occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases — a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more CONCLUSION 395 of sugar, some playing-cards, and, if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whisky. Little was known of the topography of the couu- na^.f.l ot?[,e try beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. *^^^^^'^y This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. The feeling now is that a youth must cut loose from his old surround- ings to enable him to get up in the world. There is now such a commingling of the people that par- ticular idioms and pronunciation are no longer local- ized to any great extent ; the country has filled up " from the center all around to the sea " ; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior ; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography. The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness, and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first ; our power secures the latter. I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when The new era there is to be great harmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot stay to be a living wit- ness to the correctness of this prophecy ; but I feel it within me that it is to be so. The universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last seemed to me the beginning of the answer to " Let us have peace." The expressions of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country nor to a division of the people. They came from individual citizens of all nationalities ; from all denominations 96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT — the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies of the land — scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. Politics did not enter into the matter at all. I am not egotist enough to suppose all this sig- nificance should be given because I was the object of it. But the war between the States was a very bloody and a very costly war. One side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end. I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratify- ing fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. ^ ^ 1^ "^ s Fold-out Placeholder This fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date. 1^ i^ Fold-out Placeholder This fold-out is being digitized, and will be inserted at a future date. APPENDIX REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES (1864-65) Headquarters, Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C, July 22, 1865. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Sir : I have the honor to submit the foHowing report of the opera- tions of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appoint- ment to command tlie same. From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of aU the troops that could be brought into the field, reg-ardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours ; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the oper- ating armies. The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transpoi-ting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of pro- ducing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the peo- ple, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops ])racticable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting 397 398 APPENDIX and procliieiiii? necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hainnier continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land. These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and Avho have to jjay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is that what I have done has been done conscien- tiously, to the best of my abihty, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country. At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contend- ing forces was about as follows : The Mississippi River was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Ai-kansas was also held, thus giving us armed posses- sion of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points in southern Louisiana, not remote fi-om the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisi- ana, and Texas was in the abnost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been suffi- cient opposition to have brought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probabl}^ but little more than one half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. But the one half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerrillas scattered through Missouri, Ai'kansas, and along the Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Miss- issippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Hol- ston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga a small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substan- tially within oui' lines. Virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area about the mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along the Rapi- dan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast foot- holds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Berne, in North Carolina ; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina ; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. APPENDIX 399 The accompanyine^ map,^ a copy of which was sent to General Sher- man and other commanders in March, 18G4, shows by red Unes the territory occnpied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 18G4, while those in blue are i\w lines wliich it was proposed to occupy. Behind the Union lines there were many bands of gueri'illas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in sn}»plying our armies. In the South a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of beaiing arms a soldier, and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting de- serters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field. The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westwai'd, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Rich- mond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strougly intrenched position at Daltou, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, — a place of great importance as a railroad center, — against the armies under Major- Geueral W. T. Shei-man. In addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force, under Forrest, in northeast Mississippi ; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah Vall(^y and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee ; and also con- fronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon laud. These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign. Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies, and the Dej>artment of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against Johnston. Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies. Genei-al Sherinan was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's eountry as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the fuU extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the 1 This allusion is to a map wliich is fully described in the "Official Records of the War of the Rebellion," vol. xxxii, part 3, p. 261.— F. D. G. 400 APPENDIX Army of the Potomac to do so. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River against Shreveport, Louisiana (wliieh had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sher- man had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the Red River expedi- tion, for this force was necessary to movements east of the Missis- sippi; that should his expedition prove successful he would hold Shreveport and the Red River with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held ; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile ; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements ; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition ; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable. On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows : 1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defense of the Eed River to General Steele and the navy. 2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying- then- positions. At least one half of the force required for this service might be taken from the col- ored troops. 3d. By properly fortif jing on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would tlien hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with wliich to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If,, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as neces- sary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon ]\Iobile. Two or more ironclads wiU be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. APPENDIX 401 This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to cooperate. You can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his cooperation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base ; but, from your long service in the Oulf Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be cooperative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. AH I would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General N. p. Banks. Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his objective point ; that wiierever Lee went he would go also. For his movement two plans presented themselves : one to cross the Rapid an below Lee, moving by his right flank ; the other above, moving l>y his left. Each presented advantages over the other, with correspond- ing objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooi)erate. If we took the other route. Brandy Station could be used as a base of supplies until an- other was secured on the York or James rivers. Of these, how^ever, it was decided to take the lower route. The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F. Butler : Fort Monroe, Virginia, April 2, 1864. General : In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory ah-eady taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concen- tration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement they interpose themselves between the enemy and the comitry to be guiirded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater objects toward which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your depart- ment with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the be- ginning of any move. I pi'opose, therefore, what comes nearest this of any- thing that seems practicable : The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from vour command that can be spared from garrison dutv — I should Vol. IL— 26 402 APPENDIX say not less than twenty thousand effective men — to operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you aheady have will be added about ten thousand men from South Caro- lina, under Major-Greneral Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department. General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all yom- troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for yoiu- fui-ther movements. The fact that has already been stated — that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between your force and the Army of the Potomac — must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intvenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would foUow, and by means of trans- ports the two armies would become a unit. All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your eavah-y south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General B. ¥. Butler. On the 16th these instnictions were substantially reiterated. On the 19th, in order to secure full cooperation between his army and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of April ; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler's) army on the James River ; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the junction there ; that circum- stances might make this course advisable anyhow ; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move ; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible. , ArPENDix 403 In cooperation with the main movements aj^ainst Lee and Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops neeessarily kept in depart- ments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines be- tween the loyal States and the armies operating against them. A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so held for the protectiou of West Virginia and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these trof)ps coidd not be with- drawn to distant fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act dire(;tly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detacli largely for the protection of his supplies and Hues of comnmnicatiou, or he would lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to or- ganize all bis available force into two expeditions, to nu>ve from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request. General Sigel was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shen- andoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumlierland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Sheuandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the Tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the New River Bridge and the salt- works at Saltville, Vh-ginia. Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything beiug in readi- ness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general move- ment of all the ai-mies not later than the 4tli of May. My first object, being to break the mihtary power of the rebellion and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Rich- mond, as that would tend more than anything else, imless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to com- pel Lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defense of Richmond. It was well understood l)y both Generals Butler and Meade before starting on the campaign that it was my intention to put both their ai-mies south of the James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it. 404 APPENDIX Before giving General Butler his instructions I visited him at Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying raih-oad communi- cation as far south as possible. Believing, however, iu tlie practica- bility of capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee coukl not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troo})s elsewhere to bring to the defense of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River. I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried as far as possible to leave General Meade in independent command of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their natui'e, leaving all the de- tails and the execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received. The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across the Rapidan (the Fifth and Sixth corps crossing at Germanna Ford, and the Second Corjjs at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance), with the greater part of its trains, numbering aboiit four thousand wagons, meeting with but shght opposition. The average distance traveled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained — that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and protected. Early on the 5th the advance corps (the Fifth, Major- General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy out- side his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiouslv all day, the whole army l^eing brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was, at the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria railroad, holding the road back to BuU Run, with instructions not to move until he re- ceived notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of APPENDIX 405 the morning of the Gth he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of Lis troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion — probahly two thirds — of his command was composed of new troops nnac(nistomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a re- markable march. The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by ns at five o'clock on the morning of the 6tli, and continued with unabated fury until dark- ness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several huncb'ed prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the 7th reconnaissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inal:)ility to fiu'ther main- tain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack "behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between liim and Richmond, and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the night of tlie 7th the march was commenced toward Spottsylvania Coin-t House, the Fifth Corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy, having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. On the 8th General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main force within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the 9th General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvering and fighting, witliout decisive results. Among the killed on the 9tli was that able and distinguished soldier, Major- General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Ai-my- corps. Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. The Second Corps, Major-General Hancock com- manding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the re- sistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th w^ere consumed in manoeuvering and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack 406 APPENDIX upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Com-t House, orders were issued on the 18th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the afternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank ; but the attack was promptly repulsed with heavy loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The Fifth Corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the Sixth Corps. The Second and Ninth corps got up about the same time, the Second holding the railroad-bridge, and the Ninth lying between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the 25th General Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large sup- plies of rations, and many miles of railroad track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war ; met and defeated the enemy's cavahy at Yellow Tavern ; carried the first line of works around Richmond, but (finding the second line too strong to be carried ])y assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire ; and moved by a detom- to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he com- municated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard oiu* trains. General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pur- suance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with the Tenth Corps. At the same time he sent a force of eighteen hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junc- tion with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavahy, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the 6th he was in posi- tion with his main ni'vay, and commenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnaissance against the Petersburg and Richmond rail- road, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows : Headquarters near Bermuda Landing, May 9, 1864. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With seventeen himdred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chicka- Al^PENDIX 407 hominy, and have safely brought them to then- present position. These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets toward Richmond. General Kautz, with three thousand cavahy from Suffolk, on the same day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the railroad-bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into Beaure- gard's force at that point. We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies. Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cut- ting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well -contested fight. General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard's force. Benj. F. Butler, Major- General. On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at Drnry's Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Peters- burg, enabhng, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and South Carohna, and bring them to the defense of those places. On the IGth the enemy attacked General Butler in his posi- tion in front of Drnry's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrench ments between the forks of the James and Appo- mattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus cov- ering his raih-oads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as com- pletely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It reqnu-ed but a com- paratively small force of the enemy to hold it there. On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavahy, was started on a raid against the Danville railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula stations, destroying them, the railroad track, two freight- trains, and one locomotive^ together with large quantities of commis- sary and other stores ; thence, crossing to the South Side road, struck it at Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and Wliite's stations, destroy- ing the road and station-houses ; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he reached on the 18th. On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General But- ler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron- clad ram, attacked Plymouth, North Carolina, commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and om- gunboats there ; and after severe fightmg the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and arma- ment captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk and the Miami disabled. 408 • APPENDIX The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself \i\) at Bermuda Hundred, tlie enemy was enabled to l)ring- the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south l)y Beauregarti against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement a very considerable one — probably not less than fifteen thousand men — was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia. The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to oi)erate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained ; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they be sent forward under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac. On the 2-lth of May the Ninth Army-corps, commanded by Major- General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command. Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26Ui to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy's position by his right. Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavahy, under Sheri- dan, and the Sixth Corps, led the advance, crossed the Paniunkey River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we ad- vanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chiekahominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish-line. On the 31st General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad-lu-idges over the South Anna River, after defeating the ene- my's cavalry. General Sheridan on the same dayreached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the Sixth Corps and General Smith's command, which had just arrived, via White House, from General Butler's arnl3^ On the first day of June an attack was made at 5 r.M. by the Sixth Corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the Sixth Corps, and in front of General Smith. During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy APPENDIX 409 loss in every instance. That niglit he made several assaults to re- gain what he had lost in the day, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting" troops into position for an attaclv on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted tlie enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his })Osition. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was eoniparatively light. It was the only general attaek made from the Kapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for oui" own losses. I would not be understood as saying thtit all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped f ro2n them ; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended in the end to the complete overthrow of the re- bellion. From the proximity of the enemy to his defenses around Richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the cit3^ I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would l)e impracti- cable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg raih-(jad — a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if possible ; then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of re- pulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not he accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to con- tiniie to hold substaiitially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present them- selves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Clor- donsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River^ by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. On the 7th two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the Vu-ginia Central raih-oad, with in- 410 APPENDIX structions to Hunter — wliom I hoped he would meet near Charlottes- ville — to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Ai-my of the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions. On the 10th of June General Butler sent a force of infantrj^ under General Gillmore, and of cavahy under General Kautz, to capture Petersbvu'g, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavahy carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in toward the town, but were forced to re- tire. General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundi'ed without attempting one. Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersljurg, I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point General Smith's command by water via the White House, to reach there in advance of the Ai-my of the Potomac. This was for the express' purpose of secui'ing Peters- burg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could rein- force the place. The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the Fifth Corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps reached James River, at Wilcox's Land- ing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th. During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the van- tage-ground of either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and Southern territory. Hence Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set do^\m as failures on our part, and victories for them. Their ai-my believed this. It produced a morale which could only be overcome by des- perate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offen- sive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attack- ing party ; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The de- tails of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery have rarely })een surpassed, are given in the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. APPENDIX 411 During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James River, the army had to be snppHed from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, tlirough a densely wooded eountiy, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, Ix^ awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the z(!al ;ind tiffi- ciency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base,' and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia raih-oad, near Wytheville, on the lOth, and proceeding to New River and Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union oh the 15th. Gen- eral Sigel moved up the Shenandoah VaUey, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and Major-General Hunter was appointed to supersede him. His instructions were embraced in the followhig despatches to Major-General H. W. Halleek, chief of staflP of the army : Near Spottsylvania Court House, Virginia, May 20, 18G4. ********* The enemy are evidently relying for supphes greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton, On the whole, therefore, I thmk it would be better for General Hunter to move m that direction ; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charh>ttesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. ... ^r r. ^ ' U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-Genekal H. W. Halleck. Jericho Ford, Virginm, May 25, 1864. If Himter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so living on the country. The raih-oads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his wav back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army. "^ U. S. Grant, lAeutenant- General. Major-General H. W. Halleck. 412 APPENDIX General Hiintev immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the iShenaudoali A^alley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle fifteen hundi'ed men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with Crook and AvereU at Staun- ton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg via Lexington, which place he reached and invested on the sixteenth day of June. Up to this time he was very successful, and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march thi'ough a hostile country, he would no doubt have captured that, to the enemy important, point. The destruction of the enemy's sup- plies and manufactories w^as very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which readied Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on tlie 17th and IStli, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from tlie defense of the North. Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville instead of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force lie met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not he would have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its defense. I have never taken exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the com- mendation of his country. To return to the Army of the Potomac. The Second Corps com- menced crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry. Aiter the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of Petersburg. The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions s APPENDIX 413 as rapidly as it could be done ; that we conld reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring- troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before dnylight next morning, but, for some reason that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assaidt, and carried the lines north- east of Petersburg from the Appomattox Kivc^r for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fiftecm pieces of artillery and three hundi-ed prisoners. This was about 7 p.m. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced Petersl)urg with a single bi-igade from any source. The night was cleai- — the moon shining brightly — and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the Second Corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But instead of taking these troops and pusldngat once into Petersburg, he recjuested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith and the Second and Ninth corps. It required until that time for the Ninth Corp^ to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over fom* hundred prisoners. The Fifth Corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and per- sisted in with great vigor on the ITtli and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemj^ into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The advantages of position gained by us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop Petersljurg toward the South Side railroad, as far as possible without attacking fortifications. On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersl)urg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn before we coidd discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised of the advan- tage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the Sixth Corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was notified, and the 414 APPENDIX importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him. About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with liis two divisions, joined General Butler on the fore- noon of the ITtli, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his owai line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re- occupied his old line. On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by General Butler, with one bi-igade of infantiy, on the iioi'th bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda Hundred. On the 19th General Sheridan, on his retiu'n from his expedition against the Virginia Central raih-oad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy's cavahy was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The result of this expedition was that General Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian Station, on tlie morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundi'ed prisoners and several hundred horses. On the 12tli he destroyed the railroad from Trevil- lian Station to Louisa Court House. This occupied until 3 p. m., when he advanced in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the ene- my's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition to con- tinue the engagement, and his annuals being wdthout forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdi-ew his command to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25tli, near Fort Powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac. On the 22d General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon railroad at Reams's Station, de- stroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg to near Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He APPENDIX 415 reached Burkesville Station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville raih-oad to Roanoke Bridge, — a distance of twenty-five miles, — where he found tlie enemy in force and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his retm-n march, and on the 28tli met th(; enemy's cavahy in force at the Weldon railroad crossing- of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station (supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artil- lery and trains. In this last encounter General Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in cross- ing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition moi-e than compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several weeks. With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the Shenandoah ; and, in the event of faihire in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the Ninth Corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the Second Corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the James River, and joined the force General Butler had there. On the 27th the ene- my was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th our hues were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market road, but in getting this position were at- tacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaidting Petersburg before he could get his force back there. One division of the Second Corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the Eighteenth Corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the Second Corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blow- ing up a battery and most of a regiment ; and the advance of the as- saulting column, formed of the Ninth Corps, immediately took pos- session of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. 41G APPENDIX Had they done this I have everj^ reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete) and get forces to this point foi' its defense. The captured line thus held being unten- able and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign. Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he retm-ned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and raili-oad, to Harper's Ferry ; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was exi)erienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this move- ment of the enemy. For this purpose the Sixth Corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added the Nineteenth Corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hamp- ton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued immedi- ately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red Ri^^er expedi- tion. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days' men, and de- tachments from the invalid corps. One di\dsiou, under command of General Ricketts, of the Sixth Corps was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the Sixth Corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of July the ene- mj^ approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdstown, and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river and occuj)ied Maryland Heights. On the 6th the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong colunui toward Frederick City. Gen- eral Wallace, with Ricketts's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad-bridge. His force was not sufficient to ensure success ; but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and the advance of the Nineteenth Corps before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washing- ton, his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th a reconnaissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skir- APPENDIX 417 iiiish ensued, in wliicli we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was prol)al»ly greater. lie com- menced retreating dm-ing the night. Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by telegraj)h, at forty-five min- utes past 11 P.M., on the 12th, the assignment of Major-General H. (1. Wright to the command of all the troops that could be nuide avail- able to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright connnenced the pursuit on the 13th ; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snick- er's ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred ; and on the 20tli General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several huntli'ed prisoners. Learning that Early was retreating south toward Lynchburg or Richmond, I directed that the Sixth and Nineteenth corps be got back to the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the Valley ; and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of i-eturning, the fact would be developed before the Sixth and Nineteenth corps could leave Wash- ington. Subsequently the Nineteenth Corps was excepted from the order to return to the James. About the 25 th it became evident that the enemy was again ad- vancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Corps, then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved down the Valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania, which on the 30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavahy, toward Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph-wires were frequently down between Wash- ington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by lioat. It took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches through and return answers back ; so that often orders would be given, and then information would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have heen. To remedy tins evil it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of aU the forces in the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, Susque- hanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended. Vol. IL— 27 418 APPENDIX On the 2d of August I ordered General Sheridan to report in per- son to Major-General HaUeck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time the enemj' was concentrated in the neighbor- hood of Winchester, while ovu- forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania. From where I was I hesitated to give posi- tive orders for the movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore on the 4th I left City Point to visit Hunter's command and determine for myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after consultation with Gen- eral Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions : Monocacy Bridge, Maryland, August 5, 1864, 8 p.m. GeneraIi : Concentrate all your available force without delay ia the vicin- ity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this coucentratiug, the rail- road, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, it it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac m large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found ; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander a suf- ficient force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavali'y now en route from Washing- ton via Rockville may be taken into account. There are now on "their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of fiirther orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing shoidd be left to innate the enemy to return. Take all pro^dsions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your comniand ; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed — they should rather be protected ; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at aU hazards. Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south ; and to do tliis, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the coirrse he takes. Make your own arrangements for supplies of aU kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the coimtry through which you march. U. S. Grant, Major-General D. Hunter. Lieutenant- General, The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached Halltown that night. APPENDIX 419 General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willing- ness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry, by the morn- ing train, with orders to take general command of all the trooi)s in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th ; and after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I retm-ned to City Point by way of Washington. On the 7th of August the Middle Department and the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna were constituted into the "Middle Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Ai-niy of the Potomac. The first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August. His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, residt- ing in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successfid ; but no general engagement took place. The two armies lay in such a position — the enemy on the west bank of the Opequan Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berry viUe — that either could bring on a battle at any time. De- .feat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be inter- posed to check him. Under these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally the use of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessaiy to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the ])rol)able result, I left City Point on the IGth of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after con- ference with him, what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay, what he coidd do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instruction neces- sary — Go in ! For the convenience of forage the teams for sup- plying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was that he could before daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add that the result was such that I have never since deemed it neces- sary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders. 420 APPENDIX Early on the moruiug of the 19th General Sheridan attacked Gen- eral Early at the crossing on the Opequan Creek, and after a most sangiiiuary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the even- ing, defeated liiui with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Oi)equaii Creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The euemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, vi^here he was attacked and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through Harrisonbu]'g, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping the upper valley of most of the sup- phes and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of Cedar Creek. Having received considerable reinforcements. General Early again returned to the Valley, and on the 9th of October his cavalry encoun- tered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces t)f artillery and three hundred and fifty prison- ers. On the night of the 18th the enemy crossed the mountains which sej^arate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the dark- ness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied be- tween Middletown and Newtown. At this juncture General Sheri- dan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captm-ed in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped dur- ing the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this the enemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley. I was now enabled to return the Sixth Corps to the Army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him 'to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the Second Corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of Gen- eral Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and as- APPENDIX 421 certained that but one division (Kershaw's) of the three reputed de- tached had gone. The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this movement, the Fifth C'orps, General Warren conmianding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon raili'oad. During the day he had considerable fighting. To regain possession of the road the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repidsed with great loss. On th(^ night of the 20th the troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at Petersburg. On the 25th the Second Corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Reams's Sta- tion destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fight- ing a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. By the 12th of September a branch railroad was completed from the City Point and Petei'sljurg raih-oad to the Weldon railroad, en- abling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of Petersburg. The extension of our lines across the Weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his that it seemed he coidd have but few troops north of the James for the defense of Richmond. On the night of the 28th the Tenth Corps, Major-General Birney, and the Eighteenth Corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General But- ler's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, captm-ing fifteen pieces of artillery and the New Market road and intrenchments. This success was foUowed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of the Cliaffin Farm fortifi- cations, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by in- fantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unaljle to get farther. The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond that I determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th General Meade sent out a reconnaissance, with a view to attacking the ene- my's line if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. In this reconnaissance we captured and held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the after- noon troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were at- tacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. On the 7th of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north 422 APPENDIX of the James, and di'ove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery — eight or nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnais- sance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the ene- my from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heav}^ loss to us. On the 27th the Ai-my of the Potomac, leaving onlj- sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The Second Corps, followed by two divisions of the Fifth Corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Eun, and moved uj) the south side of it toward the South Side raih'oad, until the Second Corps and part of the cavalry reached the Bo^-dton plank road where it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distant from the South Side railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to reach aiul bold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within oiu' fortified line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left, the enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap l)etween Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desjDerate at- tack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock imme- diately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old po- sition. In support of this movement General Butler made a demonstra- tion on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsbui'g road, and also on the York River raih-oad. In the former he was unsuccessful ; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work, which was afterward abandoned and his forces withdrawn to their former positions. From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defense and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his de- taching an}' considerable force to send south. By the 7th of Febru- ary our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon rail- road had been destroyed to Hicksford. General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the Gth of May, with the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded re- spectively by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, upon John- ston's army at Dalton ; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPher- APPENDIX 423 son was sent throngb Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofleld threatened it in front and on the north. This move- ment was successfnl. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at Kesaca, where \w was atta(;ked on the afternoon of May 15th. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south. Late on the 17th his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again disappeared, lie was vig- orously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on tlie 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it, with its forts and artillery and its valual)le niills and foundries. General Slierman, having given his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters oceiu-red at this point. The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted General McPlierson at Dallas, but received a terrible and liloody repulse. On the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places and concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Gen- erals Thomas and McPlierson made a determined but unsuccessful assaidt. On the night of the 2d of July Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned Kene- saw and retreated across the Chattahoochee. General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee, to give his men rest and get up stores, until the 17tli of July, when he resumed his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the raih-oad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston in command of the reliel army, and assundng the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of July. About 1 P.M. of this day the brave, accomplished, and nobleJiearted Mi^Pherson was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and com- manded the Army of the Tennessee, through this desperate battle and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division. In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Find- ing it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after 424 APPENDIX securing his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to di-aw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his cam- paign. About the time of this move the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, at- tempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repiilsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinn\dlle, Murfreesboro', and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days. During the partial investment of Atlanta General Rousseau joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavah-y raids were also made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining raikoad com- munication with Atlanta. The fii-st two were successful, the latter disastrous. General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles dm*ing that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders accom- panying it, give the details of that most successfid campaign. He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track raih'oad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. To guard against this dangei', Sher- man left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in com- mand of this force to attack him. On the morning of the 10th of June General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to Mem- phis, — a distance of about one hundred miles, — hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with which he followed up this success exliausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the mean time Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been APPENDIX 425 sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their retm-n from Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take the ofeensive against Forrest. This he did with the promptness and eiTect which has characterized his whole military career. On the l-tth of Jidy he met the enemy at Tnpelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis. Dm-ing the months of March and April this same force under Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois Volun- teers. Colonel Hicks, having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place. On the 13th of April part of this force, under the rebel General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to sm-render, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, Thirty-fourth New Jersey Volunteers, that, being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, sur- render was out of the question. On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavah-y and the First Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the after- noon, when the enemy carried the works by assault, and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison. On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before Paducah, but was again driven o&. Guerrillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's opera- tions, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand cavahy he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June thev attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the i2th he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completelv routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the State. Tliis notorious guerrilla was afterward surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General Gillem. In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under General Smith comprising two divisions of the Sixteenth and a detachment 426 APPENDIX of the Seventeenth Army-corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field ; bnt, wliile occnpying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort de Russy, Avliich had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison — about three hundred and fift}^ men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's HiU, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and fom- pieces of artillery. On the 28tli he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th General Banks had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th he advanced and met the ene- my near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach HiU, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, captm'ing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemjr repulsed with great loss. During the night General Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious difficulty arose in getting Admii-al Porter's fleet, which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his supeiinten- dence, wing-dams were constructed, by ^^'llich the channel was con- tracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14tli of May, after consid- erable skii'mishing wdth the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and Point Coupee near the end of the month. The disastrous termi- nation of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to ensure the capture of Mobile. On the 23d of March Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the Seventh Army-corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedi- tion on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined near Elkin's ferry, in Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes^ in which APPENDIX 427 tlie enemy was defeated, Genei-al Steele reaelied Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April. On learuing- the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red River, and the loss of one of his own traius at Mark's Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele dcMermiiied to fall back to the Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 2()th oi' April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the oUth of April tlie enemy at- tacked him while crossing Saline Rivei- at Jenkins's fei'ry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Oiu' loss was about six huudr(Hl in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to send the Nineteenth Army-corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his commaiul to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of comnniui(;ations he then occu])ied. Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, Gen- eral Canby sent a part of it to disperse a foi'ce of the enemy that was collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and de- feated this force near Lake C'liieot on the 5th of June. Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded. In the latter part of July General Canby sent Major-General Gor- don Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to cooperate with Admiral Farragut against the defenses of Mobile Bay. On the 8th of August Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned. On the 9th Fort Morgan was invested, and after a severe bombard- ment surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to four- teen hundred and sixty-four prisoners and one hundi*ed and four pieces of artillery. About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with a force of alK)ut ten thousand men, had reached Jack- sonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's com- mand, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive him back, while the forces under General Steele, at Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the twenty-sixth day of September Price attacked Pilot Knob, and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the Missoiu'i River, and continued up that river toward Kansas. General Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while Gen- eral Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. The enemy was broiight to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, 428 APPENDIX with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to northern Ai'kansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concen- trated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob. September 20th the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of six liuudi-ed men, which capitulated on the 24th. Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforce- ments arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville and summoned the sm-render of the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and re- ceived the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without success. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed. Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he moved toward Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every exertion was made by Ceneral Thomas to de- stroy the forces under Forrest before he could recross the Tennes- see, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, Mississippi, In September an expedition, under General Burbridge, was sent to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt- works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command and returned to Kentucky. General Sherman, inmiediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus APPENDIX 429 enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fear- fully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it. In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon i-eported to the southwest of Atlanta. Bloving far to Sherman's right, he suc- ceeded in reaching the raili-oad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it. General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the re- mainder of his army fell upon him and di-ove hiju to Gadsden, Ala- bama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman pro- posed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows : Centreville, Georgia, October 10, noon. Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, boimd west. If he passes over the Mobile and Ohio road, liad I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee, to de- fend the State ? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements or- dered reach NashviUe. W. T. Sherman, Major- General. Lieutenant-Genkral Grant. For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter : " I will therefore give my opinion : that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river ; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to com- merce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a des- patch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Vii'ginia, etc. City Point, Virginia, October 11, 1864, 11 a.m. Your despatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to 430 APPENDIX be met and prevented from getting' north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be busliwhaeked l)y all the old meu and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would prolmbly sti'ike for Nashville, think- ing that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to seud a foi'ce from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine— at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going- north. "With Wilson turned loose with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General W. T. Sherman. Kingston, Georgia, October 11, 11 a.m. Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedar- town, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rtjme. He threw one corps on my road at Aeworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachuients along my line. This re- duces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men and the bold cavahy he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely pre- fer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city ; send back all my wounded and worth- less, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I woidd be on the offensive ; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long. W. T. "Sherman, Major- General. LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT. City Point, Virginia, October 11, 1864, 11:30 p.m. Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the hue of the Tennessee River fii-mly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General W. T. Sherman. It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting tbroiigh to the coast, witb a p-nrrison left on the sonthern railroads, leading east and west, throngli (leorgin, to effectually sever the East from the West ; in other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, APPENDIX 431 as it had been eiit once by our gainino^ possession of tlie Mississippi River. General Shernian^'s ])lan virtually cifccted tliis object. _ General Sherman connneneed at once his preparations for his pro- posed movement, keeping his army in position in the mean time to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, (Jeueral Shernum sent the Fourth Corps, Major-General Stanley comnuinding, and the Twenty- third Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, l)ack to Chatta- nooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, ^yhom he had'placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army-corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Ten- nessee, or, in the event Hood should fVn-ce it, would ])e able to con- centrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast. Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of Novem- ber, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not im- possible that a force inferior to his o^vn might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army — the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi River— northward on an of- fensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice. How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort McAlhster oii the Savannah River, and the occu- pation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are aU clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report. Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions — one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi— were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the raih-oad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel Third United States Colored CWalry), captured on the 27th of No- vember, and destroyed, the Mississippi Central railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The ex- pedition from Baton Rouo-e was without favoral)le results. The ex- pedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate 432 APPENDIX command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about live tlionsand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved to sti'ike the railroad at Grahams- ville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from GrahamsvUle, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah railroad between the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny rivers. Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move north- ward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I slioidd not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garri- son at Decatur, Alabama, but, failing to carry the place, withdrew toward Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in efi'ect- ing a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Flor- ence. On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three trausjiorts. On the 2d of Novem- ber he planted batteries above and below Johnson ville, on the oppo- site side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats, be- coming disabled, were set on fire, as also were the transports, to pre- vent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and jjroperty on the levee and in store- houses was consumed by fii"e. On the 5tli the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnson- ville, moving toward Clifton, and sulisequently joined Hood. On the night of the 5th General Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty- third Corps, reached Johnson ville ; but, finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of Genei'al A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson could' get his cavalry remounted. On the 19th General Hood continued his advance. General Thom- as, retarding him as much as possible, fell back toward Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy, coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, as- saulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but was in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed^ seven hundred and two APPENDIX 433 prisoners, and three tliousaiid eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and, I am satisfied, was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the niglit General Scho- field fell back toward Nashville. This left the field to the enemy,— not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned, — so that General Thom- as's whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nash- ville on the 2d of December. As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennes- see River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, Genertd Rose- crans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November. On the morning of the loth December General Thomas attacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was in- creased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavahy across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urghig upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the ofeensive, I started West to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington city, I received General Thomas's despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the residt as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dis- pelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immedi- ate! v upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had^^time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracti- cable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that dis- tinguished officer's judgment. After Hood's defeat at Nash\ille he retreated, closely pursued by cavahy and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to aban- don many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th of Deeend^er our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river. About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North Alaliama, making it difficult to move army transportation and Vol. II.— 28 434 APPENDIX . artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee River. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Voluuteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing" considerable transportation and the ene- my's pontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas's report. A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississijipi, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, destroyed the raih-oad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's army, fom- thousand new English carbines, and large amounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked and cnptured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars. Thence turning to the southwest, he struck the Mississippi Central railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicks- burg January 5th. During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals Bm-bridge and Gillem near Bean's Station, to operate against Breckinridge and destroy or drive him into Virginia ; destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the raih-oad into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of Decem- ber he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the ene- my's forces wherever he met them. On the Ifith he struck the enemy, under Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, capturing aU his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners ; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning ; but morn- ing found Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captui-ed eight pieces of artillery. Having thus suc- cessfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville. Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad and APPENDIX 435 send cotton and other products out l)y blockadc-riiiniers, besides being a place of great strategic; value. Tlie navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature of the outlc^t of Cnpe Fear Kiver was such that it rec|uired watching for so great a distauce that, witliout posses- sion of the land north of New Inlet, oi" Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entii'ely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. To secure the possession of this land required the (jooperatiou of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the juost formidal)le armada ever collected for concentration upon oue given point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the em;my, as well as that of the loyal North ; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common dis- cussion in the newspapers both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the ex- pedition until the latter part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with Major-Gen eral Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a con- ference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men v.as regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was tlKJuglit all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about V/ibnington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General But- ler to make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who had been designated to command the .land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment. On the 6th of December the following instructions were given : City Point, Virginia, December 6, 1864. General: The first object of the expedition under General "Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington, If successful in this, the sec- ond will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, il: advantaj^e can be taken of the absence of the gTeatcr part of the enemy's forces, now looking after Sherman in Geoi-gia. The dii'ections you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedi- tion are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching--tools to bo taken. Tlie object of tfte expe- dition wiU be gained by effecting a landing- on the mainland between Cax)e Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. 436 APPENDIX Shoiild sueli landing be effected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by cooperating with the navy, effect the reduction and captm-e of those places. These in our hands, the navy coiild enter the harbor, and the port of Wdming-ton woidd be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of laud on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops imniediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wil- mington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second wUl become a matter of after- consideration. The details for execution are intrusted to you and the of&cer immediately in command of the troops. Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they wUl be retui-ned to the armies operating against Richmond without delay. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General B. F. Butler. General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory witliin which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should g'o through him. The_y were so sent ; but General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing in- structions, nor was he aware of their existence until he read General Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda Hundi-ed, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel had received all the instructions and would be in command. I rather formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a de- sire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat. The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or ^vithout the powder-boat, had been urged upon General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter. The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to replenish ; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder«boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the enemy APPENDIX 437 were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion nntil they were informed by the Northern press. On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnaissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up toward the fort. But before receiving a fidl report of the result of this reconnaissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instruc- tions given, ordered the reembarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. The reembarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. On the return of the expedition, officers and men — among them Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. W. Ross, One Hundred and Seventeenth Regi- ment New York Volunteers, First Lieutenant William H. Walhng and Second Lieutenant George Simpson, One Hundred and Forty-second New York Volunteers — voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their oj)inion, it could have been taken without much loss. Soon after the return of the expedition I received a despatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, inform- ing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was that when the troops abandoned the expedition the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, how- ever, I answered on the oOtli of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about fifteen hundred, and a small siege-train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions : City Point, Virginia, January 3, 1865. General : The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and Wil- mington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yoru-seU! and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be imity of action. It would be weU to have the whole programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would 438 APPENDIX therefore defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibiU- ties. The first object to be attained is to get a hrm position on tlie spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accom- plished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of then* fleet into Cape Fear River, whUe the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or ciit it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy. _ A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them. Keep the fleet of vessels with you until yoiu- position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders. In ease of failure to effect a landing, hving your command back to Beau- fort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed. General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Balti- more and place them on sea-going tessels. These troops will be broiight to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Brevet Major-General A. H. Terry. Lieutenaut-Colonel C. B. Comstoek, aide-de-camp (now brevet briga- dier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief engineer to this. It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous off Beaufort on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops com- menced on the morning of the 13th, and by 3 p.m. was completed without loss. On the 14th a reconnaissance was pushed to witbin five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance- work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. This reconnaissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of the ir)th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison APPENDIX 439 and armament. Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss was : killed, one hundred and ten ; wounded, five hundred and tliirty-six. On the IGth and 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's Island, which were immedi- ately occupied l)y us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River. At my request, Major-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and Major- (leneral E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and North Carolina. The defense of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly desti-oyed the only army now threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for (Gen- eral Thomas's surplus troops — fields from which they would coiiper- ate with other movements. General T]i<>mas was therefore directed to collect all troops not essential to hold his communications at East- nort in readiness for orders. On the 7th of January General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. This direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Berne. On the 26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canity. By the 7th of Febru- ary the whole force was en route for its destination. The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military de- partment, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman. The following instruc- tions were given him : City Point, Virginia, January 31, 18G5. GeneraIi : , . . Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sher- man's tliroucfh the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objec- tive point, moving" either from Wilming'ton or New Berne, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast — as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The entei-prise under you has two objects : the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north ; the second, to open a base of suppUes for him on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can detei-mine which of the two points, Wilmington or New Berne, you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. I be- lieve General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of seciiring supplies for his army. You will learn 440 APPENDIX what steps he has taken, and be governed in your reqmsitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. Make aU requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by eveiy opportu- nity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress IMonroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. The supphes referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those re- quired for your own command. The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your impera- tive duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that yoii are ah'eady fullj' alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of February ; this hmits youi- time very materially. If rolling-stock is not seciu'ed in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supphed from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Foi^t Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph. U. S. Grant, lAeutenan t- Genera I. Major-General J. M. Schofield. Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for my- self the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done. Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah, — his army entu'cly foot-loose. Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the Southern raih"oads destroyed, so that it would take several months to reestablish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important operation toward clos- ing the rebellion, — I sent orders to General Sherman, on the 6tli of December, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with neces- sary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with the lialance of his command. On the 18th of December, having received information of the de- feat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procming ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much toward the de- sired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a communication from General Sher- man, of date 16th December, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informiug me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also that he had ex- APPENDIX 441 pected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me ; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of Savan- nah, whereas by sea he could probal)ly reach me by the middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of bemg able to march up and join me pleased me, and without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make preparations to start, as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carohna, and join the armies operatino- against Richmond as soon as he could. On the 2ist of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the Twenty-third Corps, Major- General Schofield command- ing, east ; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men ; that we had at Fort Fisher al)out eight thousand men; at New Berne about four thousand; that if Wilmington was captm-ed General Schofield would go there ; if not, he would be sent to New Berne ; that in either event all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior toward Goldsboro', in cooperation mth his movement ; that from either point railroad communication could be run out ; ' and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them. In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce Wilmington, North Carohna, in cooperation with the navy under AdmirarPorter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's' main defense on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the ene- my having evacuated it after our appearance before it. After fi'ghting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated toward Golds- boro' during the night. Preparations were at once made for a move- ment on Goldslioro' in two columns,— one from Wilmington, and the other from New Berne, — and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape Fear River, toward Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from New Berne was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the 22d. By the 1st of February General Sherman's whole army was in mo- tion" from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th ; thence moved on Goldslwro', Nortli Carohna, via Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communi- 442 APPENDIX cation with General Scliofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro', He met a force of the eueniy at xVverysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and com- pelled it to retreat. Our loss in this engagement was about six huu- di'ed. The enemy's loss was much greater. On the 18th the com- bined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and diiving it back upon the main body. General Slocum, vv^ho was in the advance, ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself, and awaited reinforce- ments, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to Smitlrfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsljoro', which place had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon -bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from New Berne and Wil- mington. Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of Februarv, and occupied by our forces on the 18th. On the morning of the 31st of January General Thomas was di- rected to send a cavalry expedition, under Genex'al Stoneman, from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down toward Co- lumbia, to destroj^ the railroads and military resoiu'ces of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners tliere, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter, however. General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman ha,ving passed out of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General Thomas to change his course and ordered liim to repeat his raid of last fall, de- stroying the railroad toward Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not impossil)le that in the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of Feb- ruary the following communication was sent to General Thomas : City Point, Virginia, February 14, 1865. General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Moliilc^ and the interior "of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty thou- APPENDIX 443 sand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavab-y ah-eady in that section, will move from tlu-re eastward, ui cooperation. Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeiit, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has' been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days since, in a speech, that one half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object "would be threefold : Jirst, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insui-e success to Canby ; second, to destroy the enemy's hue of communications and military resom-ces ; thkd, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selraa would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Dis- cretion shoidd be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best seciu-e the objects named above. Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that' you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksbui;g has been 'three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegi'aph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the in- formation received. To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-tram as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. , « .i,- i Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what torce you thmk vou will be able to se'nd under these directions. ^ U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General G. H. Thomas. On the 15th he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off. I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city north of Janies River should be cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valh-y and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desir- ing to reinforce Sherman, if practical)le, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish 444 APPENDIX the first at least, and possibly the latter of these objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as follows : City Point, Virginia, February 20, 1865, 1 p.m. General : As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reachino- Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every du'ection, so as to be of no further use to tlie rebelhon. Suflicient cavalry slioidd be left be- hind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there wotdd justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand eavahy, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these thi-ee latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the \dtals of South Carolina, is all that Avill be wanted to leave nothing for the rebeUion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great ob- stacles to aceomphsh this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General p. H. Sheridan. On the 25th I received a despatch from General Sheridan, inqnir- ing where Sherman was aiming for, and if I conld give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer the following telegram was sent him : City Point, Virginia, February 25, 1865. General : Sherman's movements wiU depend on the amount of opposi- tion he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, South Carolina, and tit out for a new start. I think, however, ah danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided m youi" after-movements by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from Goldsboro' toward Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or New Berne. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General p. H. Sheridan. General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. APPENDIX 445 On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of tlie Shenandoah, at Moimt Craw- ford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated on Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make a reconnaissance, an immediate attack was made, tlie position was carried, and sLxteen hundred pris- oners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seven- teen battle-flags were captiu-ed. The prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Win(*hester. Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here he remained two days, destroying the railroad toward Richmond and Lyncldjurg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanua River, and awaited the arrival of his trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of cap- turing Lynchburg. On the morning of the Gth, cUviding his force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched np the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the l)ank of the canal. From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duguidsville, to ol)tain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place, but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other cohmin moved down the railroad toward Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Andierst Court House, sixteen miles from L.ynchburg ; thence across the coun- try, uniting w^ith the column at New Market. The river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it ; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the South Side railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House, the only thing left f(n- him was to return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market he took up his hue of march, following the canal toward Richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the l)anks wherever practical)le, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts informa- tion of his whereabouts and 'purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th. 446 APPENDIX Previous to this tlie following communication was sent to General Thomas : City Point, Virginia, March 7, 1865, 9:30 a.m. General : I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in East Tennessee and thi'ow a good force up to Bidl's Gap and fortify there. Supphes at Knoxville coidd always be got forward as required. With BuU's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about aU of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be requiied of you La the spi'ing, to make a cam- paign toward Lynchburg- or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman shoidd break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut oft' rolling-stock that may be caught west of that. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-Gteneral G. H. Thomas. Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Caiiby M^as mov- ing an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General Dick Taylor ; Thomas was pushing out two large aud well-appointed cavalry expeditions — one from Miudle Tennessee, under Brevet Major-General Wilson, against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, toward Lynchburg — and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to connneiiee offensive operations from East Tennessee ; General Sheridan's cavalry was at White House ; the Armies of the Potomac and James were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defenses of Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro' ; General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi ; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against inva- sion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, liefore he was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24tli of March General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at Jones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy. On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued : APPENDIX 447 City Point, Virginia, March 24, 1865. General: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond wiU be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turnmg the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success ot the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same tirae, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville raih-oads. two corps of the Anny of the Potomac will be moved at first m two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the present line lield by us strikes that stream, both moving toward Dmwiddie Court House. . , 1 T • • 1 The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the di\asion now luicler General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldou road and the Jerusalem plank road, turnmg west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reachmg Stony Creek. General Sheridan wUl then move independently, imder other instructions which wall be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavah-y from the Middle Military Divi- sion not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the defenses ot City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the Imes about Petersburg and City Point, subject, of eoui-se, to orders from the commander of the Ai-my of the Potomac. The Ninth Army-corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied bv us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the Ninth Corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the captui'e of the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the Ninth Corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be desiguiited when the order is given. General Ord Avill detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the pres- ent left of the Anny of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the Army of the Polomac, and the colored division the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army of the James. The movement of troops from the Ai-my of the James will commence on the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalrv necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the mam army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of Aprd, under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad aljout Hicksford. This, if accompUshed, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed m reaching the Weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad- bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of caiTiages, it might be 448 APPENDIX practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much haid- ing as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days' suppUes with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of aminunition per man wiU be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amomit of other supphes. The densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army wiU be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders. All necessary preparations for can-ying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. The reserves of the Ninth Corps should be massed as much as possible. While I would not now order an uncondi- tional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their fi'ont, without wait- ing for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the Ninth Corps could follow up so as to Join or cooperate with the balance of the army. To prepare for this, the Ninth Corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. A success north of the James should be followed up with great promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defense of Eichmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James, except inclosed works — only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Rich- mond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and re- turn. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occm' without taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of theii- action. I would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-Genekals Meade, Ord, and Sheridan. Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assanlted onr lines in front of the Ninth Corps (which held from the Appomattox River toward oiu" left), and carried Fort Stedman and a part of the line to APPENDIX 449 the right and left of it, established themselves, and tnrned the guns of the fort against us ; but oiu- troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded and nine- teen hundred prisoners. Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six miss- ing. General Meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the Second and Sixth corps, and eight hundred and thirty- four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundi-ed and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. General Sherman, having got his troops all quietly in camp about Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them per- fected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated that he woidd be ready to move, as he had previously wi-itten me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, in cooperation with oui- forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg. General Shennan proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roan- oke at Gaston or thereabouts, whence lie coidd move on to the Rich- mond and Danville raih-oad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he was directed to carry into execution if he received no further directions in the mean time. I explained to him the move- ment I had ordered to commence on the 29th of March ; that if it should not prove as entirely successfid as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the Danville and South Side raih-oads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supphes, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies. I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night beiore. I was thiidy convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might be- come necessary. By moving out I woidd put the army in better con- dition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the Dan- ville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered. On the night of the 27th Major-General Ord, with two divisions Vol. II.— 29 450 APPENDIX of the Twenty-fonrtli Corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division"^of the Twenty-Mth Corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding-, and Mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position as- signed liim near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions were given to General Sheridan : City Point, Vieginia, Marcli 28, 1865. General : The Fifth Army-corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 a.m. to-moiTOW morning. The Second moves at about 9 a.m., having but about three lailes to march to reach the point desigTiated for it to take ou the right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddle Court House, Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you cau, and without being confined to any particidar road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of 'the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, aud passing near to or through Dm- widdie, reach the right aud rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Shoukl he come out and attack us, or get him- self where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in yom- own way, and with the full reliance that the army wiU engage or follow, as cir- cumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose aud push for the DanviUe road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, untd you reach the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomat- tox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possi- ble. You can then pass on to the South Side road, west of Burkesville, and desti'oy that in like manner. , After having accomphshed the destruction of the two radroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road farther south, or you may go on into North Caro- lina" and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet vou at Goldsboro'. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. Major-General P. H. SHERn)AN. On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night tlie cavah-y was at Dimviddie Court House, and the left of our hi- fantry line extended to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the Boydton plank road. The position of the troops from left to right was as follows : Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke. Everything looked favoralde to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of Petersburg and Eiclimond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore addressed the following communication to General Sheri- APPENDIX 451 clan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so : Gravelly Creek, March 29, 1865. General : Qui* line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddle. We are all ready, however, to crive up all, from the Jerusalem plank road to Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. General GriflS.n was attacked near where the Quaker road inter- sects the Boydton road, but repidsed it easily, capturing about one hunch'ed men, Humphi'eys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing on when last heard from. I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. We will act altogether as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal-of&eer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past 11 a.m., that a cavahy column had passed that point from Richmond toward Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. U. S. Grant, Ideutenant- General. Major-General p. H. Sheridan. From the night of the 29tli to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddle C-ourt House toward Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force. General War- ren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton plank road to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the latter ; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us, as he did, at every point from Kichmond to our extreme left, I conceived his Hues must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I de- termined, therefore, to extend oiir line no farther, but to reinforce General Sheridan with a corps of infantrj*, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's riglit flank, and with the other corps as- sault the enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the ene- my the week before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The enemy's intrenched picketdine cai)tured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. 452 APPENDIX Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General Sheridan ; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the olst Gen- eral Warren reported favorably to getting possession of tlie White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and it in turn forced back upon the third division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the Second Corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavahy got possession of the Five Forks ; but the enemy, after the affair with tlie Fifth Corps, reinforced the rebel cavahy, defending that point with infan- try, and forced him back toward Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of su- perior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. This com- pelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture he despatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavahy and one division of the Fifth Corps were immediately ordered to his assis- tance. Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Hum- phreys could hold our position on the Boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the Fifth Corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once. Thus tlie operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren, because of his accessibihty, instead of Hum- phrej^s, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April General Sheridan, reinforced by Gen- eral Warren, drove the enemy back on Five Forks, where late in the evening he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, cap- turing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners. About the close of this battle Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the Fifth Corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan before assistance could reacli him, (h'ive him from his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this. General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until fom* o'clock in the morning (April 2d), when an assault v/as ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to APPENDIX 453 his left toward Hatcher's Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division of General Ord's, that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on tliat side of them in Peterslmrg, while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions, and joined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main-line, capturing guns and prisoners, bxit was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan, being advised of the con- dition of affairs, retui-ned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, cap- tm*ed two strong inclosed works, — the most salient, and cominand- ing south of Petersburg, — thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement en- sued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station toward Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force re- treated by the main road along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated Peterslmrg and Richmond, and retreated toward Danville. On the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville road, keep- ing near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the Sec- ond and Sixth corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along the South Side road ; the Ninth Corps stretched along that road be- hind him. On the 4th General Sheridan struck the Danville road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th. On the morning of the 5th I addressed Major-General Sherman the following communication : Wilson's Station, April 5, 1865. General : All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Dan- ville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left — horse, foot, and dragoons — at twenty thou- sand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push ou from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. 454 APPENDIX Whether it wdll be better for you to strike for Greensboro' or nearer to Dan- ville, you will be better able to judge Avhen you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at. U. S. Grakt, Lieutenant- General. Major-General W. T. Sherman. On the morning of the 6th it was found that General Lee was mov- ing west of Jetersville, toward Danville. General Sheridan moved with his cavalry (the Fifth Corps having- been returned to General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the Sixth Corps, while the Second and Fifth corps pressed hard after, forcing liim to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from Buikesville toward Farm- ville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavahy, under Brevet Brigadier-General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the head of Lee's column near Farm- ville, which it heroically attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which the enemy immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon General Sheridan struck the enemy south of Sailor's Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four liundi-ed wagons, and detained him until the Sixth Corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavahy was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand pris- oners, among whom were many general officers. The movements of the Second Corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success. On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the Fifth Corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House ; the Sixth Corps, General Ord's command, and one divi- sion of cavaliy, on Farmville ; and the Second Corps by the High Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox ; but so close was the pursuit that the Second Corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. The Sixth Corps and a division of cavahy crossed at Farmville to its support. Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hope- less, I addressed him the following communication from Farmville : April 7, 1865. General : The result of the last week must convince you of the hopeless- ness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from my- APPENDIX 455 self the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia. U. S. Grant, General E. E. Lee. Lieutenant- General. Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville the following: April 7, 1865. Generai.: I have received your note of this date. Though not enter- taining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the^part of tlie Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion "of blood, and therefore, before considering yom- proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General. To this I immediately replied : April 8, 1865. General : Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, ask- ing the condition on which I will accept the sm-render of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I wovdd say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disquahfied for taking up arms again against the government of the United States until properly ex- changed. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the^ same pui-pose, at any point agi-eeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received, U. S. Grant, General R. E. Lee. Lieutenant-General. Early on the morning of the 8th the pnrsnit was resumed. Gen- eral Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight for Appomattox Station, fol- lowed by General ()rd's command and the Fifth Corps. During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engage- ment. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital-train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During this day I accom- panied General Meade's column, and al)out midnight received the following communication from General Lee: ^ April 8, 1865. General: I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Ncv tli- ern Virginia, but to ask the terms of yom- proposition. To be frar,k, .i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army ; 456 APPENDIX but, as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals Vv'ould lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia ; but as far as yoiu- proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of j^eace, I should be pleased to meet you at 10 A.M. to-mon-ow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General. Early on the moruing of the 9tli I returned Lim an answer as fol- lows, and immediately started to join the column south of the Appo- mattox : April 9, 1865. Genbral : Youl* note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace ; the meeting proposed for 10 a.m. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down tlieir arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of propertj- not yet destroyed. Sei'iously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, 1 subscribe myself, etc., U. S. Grant, General E. E. Lee. Lieutenant-General. On the morning of the 9th General Ord's command and the Fifth Corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry wjis at once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters I received the following from General Lee : April 9, 1865. GeneraIi : I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with refei'ence to the surrender of this arm}'. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in vour letter of yesterdav, for that purpose. R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General. The interview was held at Appomattox Court House, the result of which is set forth in the followdng correspondence : Appomattox Court House, Virginia, April 9, 1865. General : In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit : Rolls of aU the officers and men APPENDIX 457 to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may desig- nate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take \\p arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged ; and each company or regimental cominander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and pul)lic pi'operty to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by rae to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their pri- vate horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to liis liome, not to he disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General. General R. E. Lee. Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, April 9, 1865. General : I have received your letter of this date containing the terms of sui-render of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are suljstantially the same as those esi)ressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. R. E. Lee, General. Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. The eommaud of Major-General Gibbon, the Fifth ^Vi-my-corps under Griffin, and Mackenzie's cavaliy were designated to remain at Appomattox Court House until the paroling of the surrendered army was comx)leted, and to take charge of the public property. The re- mainder of the army immediately retui-ned to the vicinity of Biu-kes- ville. General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. On the receipt of my letter of the 5th General Sherman moved drrectly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh, wdiich place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. The day preceding news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at Smithiield. On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sher- man and General Johnston, which resulted on the ]8th in an agree- ment for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the President on the 21st, wdiich disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Caro- 458 APPENDIX Una, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 2Gth, which terminated in the sur- render and disbandment of Johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee. The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North CaroUna, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersbui"g, and Big Lick. The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro', on the North Carolina railroad ; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges toward Charlotte. Thence he moved to Slatersville. General Canby, who had been directed in January to make prepa- rations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the in- terior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The Sixteenth Corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the Thu'teenth Corps, under Major-Geueral Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and joined the Sixteenth Cor23s on Fish River, both moving tlience on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th ; while Major -General Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and par- tially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Span- ish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. Dui-ing the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured ; our loss was considerable. These successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was de- layed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Ala- bama. On the 1 st of April General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove liim in confu- sion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed APPENDIX 459 the central bridge over the C^ahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captnred the fortified city of JSelnia, defended by Forrest, with seven thonsaud men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, ar- mory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4tli he captured and de- stroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the Ala})ama River, and after sending information of his operations to General Canby , marched on Montgomery, which place he occuj)ied on the 14tli, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five steam- boats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched du-ect on Colum- bus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got fifteen hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy-yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the 20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, twelve hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jefi". Davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in i:>m-suit, and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th. On the fourth day of May General Dick Taylor siu'rendered to General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi. A force sufficient to ensure an easy triumph over the enemj^ under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command ; but on the twenty-sixth day of May, and before they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered his en- tire command to Major-General Can1>y. This surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel President and Vice-President ; and the liad faith was exhibited of fii'st disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public pi'operty. Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully l^elonging to the United States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement, — among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person, — and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed. There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and move- ments to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith sub- mitted; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announcing 460 APPENDIX them, and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially re- ported. For information touching our Indian difficulties I would respect- fully refer to the reports of the conmianders of departments in which they have occurred. It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi VaUey, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in North Caro- lina. The armies of the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The splendid achievements of each have national- ized our victories, removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunatel}^ experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its dut}/'. All have a proud record, and aU sections can well con- gratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belong- ing to the United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and har- mony with that enemy whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such lierculean deeds of valor. I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U, S. Grant, Lieutenant- Oeneral. INDEX INDEX The asterisks indicate the location of tfie iiograpMcal notes. Abercrombie, J. J., II, *m, 178 Abolitionists, I, 170, 171 Acworth, Ga., II, 130 Adairsville, Ga., tislitius near, II, 423 Adams, Silas, iu Stoueman's raid, II, 91 Adamsville, Tenn., I, 289 Adjutant-General, U. S. A. See THOMAS, L. Agriculture. See Farming Aiken's Landing, Va., 1,469 Alabama, secessiou. See Arkansas I, 83; KoHSseau's raid iuto, II, 89 ; Sherman asks to have Thomas campaisn in, 274; Tlio- maa's orders countermanded, 281 ; For- rest'sraidsin, 428; piirsuitof Hoodstopped by rains in, 433, 434 ; Oanby's movements in, 442, 443, 458; Wilson's expedition into, 446 Alabama River, the, Canby to move on, II, 429 ; opened to Union troops, 458 ; Wilson crosses, 459 Alameda, the, I, 125 Alamo, massacre at the, I, 34, 49 Albertis, William, killed at Vera Cruz, I, 96 Aldrich's, Va., II, 101, 123, 126 Alexander, E. P., II, 103 Alexandria, La., Banlis assembles his army at, II, 426 ; retreat of Banlis to, and evacu- ation of, 426 Alexandria railroad, Va., Bnmside on the, II, 404 AUatoona, Ga., Johnston abandons, II, 86; capture and fortilication of, 86 ; defense of, 237 ; Sherman moves against, 423 Alleghany Mountains, railroad over the, I, 19 ; boimdarv of the Military DiAasion of the Mississippi, 191, II, 54, 81, 399 ; Crook and Averell cross, 73 " Alps," steamer, at Fort Donelson, I, 246 Alsop's, Va., II. 101, 119. 120 Ameca Ameca, Mex., I, 144, 145 Amelia Court House, Va., Lee at, II, 316, 323-325, 453 ; Meade orders an advance on, 327 ; Lee's movement from, 328, 329 American citizens, rights of native-bom, I, 169 American Party, rise of the, I, 169 Ames, Adelbert, at Fort Fisher, II, *265, 269 ; reinforced by Terry, 270 Amherst Court House, Va., destruction of railroad at, II, 445 Ammen, Jacob, drives Breckinridge from Knoxville, II, 434 Ammunition-train, a motley, I, 407, 408 Amozoque, Mex.. occupation of, I, 104 Ampudia, Gen., strength of his army at Monterey, I, 80 ; surrenders the city, 88 Anderson, G. T., II. 101, 216 Anderson, J. B., military manager of rail- roads, 1,515 Anderson, Richard H., at Spottsylvania, I, 142, II, 122, 123, 127 ; visit to Popocatepetl, I, 142-145 ; liis command, II, 101, *121 ; in battle of the Wilderness, 113 ; beats Grant to Spottsylvania, 122 ; reasons for his cap- ture of Spottsylvania, 122, 123 ; intrenches, 123 ; assaulted by Warren, 123 ; Grant's anxiety to crush, 123 ; on the Po, 128, 129 ; commanding Lee's left at Cold Harbor, 163 ; movement along Warren's front, 163 ; pressed by Wright and Smith, 164 Andersonviile, Ga., attempt to release pris- oners at, II, 91 Annapolis, Md., Burnside's corps at, II, 56, 57: Burnside's advance from, 65; Scho- field ordered to, 274, 280 Antietam, Md., Southern view of the battle of, II, 410 Anton Lizardo, the harbor of, I, 95 Appalachicola River, Canby to move on, II, 429 Appomattox Court House, Va., Grant's ride to, II, 338 ; the surrender at, 340-349, 4.56, 457, 460 ; number of ti'oops surrendered av,, 351 Appomattox River, the, Butler's position between the James and, II, 74, 407 ; de- fenses of Petersburg on, 187 ; thi-eatened assault on Petersburg between the James and, 200; Union lines on, 231, 311, 313, 448, 451 ; Merritt drives the enemy to, 312, 322; proposed movements on, 315, 316; Lee's fugitives cross, 321, 453, 454; its course, 328 ; raid against bridges on, 410 ; W. F. Smith's assault on Petersburg lines on , 413 , . J Appomattox Station, Va., Sheridan pushes to to capture Lee's trains, II, 333, 335, 455; Custer ordered to, 335; engagement at, 336, 456 Archer, J. J., II, 102 Arkadelphia, Ark., Steele reaches, II, 426 Arkansas, secession of, 1, 183 ; Confederate movement in, 219 ; Halleck commanding iu 231; Steele commanding in, 488, II, 65; embraced in Sherman's military division, 81 • in the enemy's hands, 398 ; guerrilla warfare in, 398: Steele ordered to move from, 400 : Price's retreat to, 428 Arkansas Post. Ark., capture of, I, 366 Arkansas River, operations on the, 1, 366, II 427 ; Union holdings on the, 53, 398 Army of Northern Virginia, defeats Pope and invades Maryland, 1, 336 : driven from Pennsylvania, 478; on the Rapidan, II, 55, 57 ; organization, 101-104 ; respect for Army of the Potomac, 172 ; preference for breastwork fighting, 172, 174, 409 ; a chan- 463 464 INDEX nel of supply for, 177; compared with Army of the Potomac, 185; Sheridan avers the possibUlty of its capture, 3-2i; demoralizatiou, 325, 350 ; in desperate plight, 339 ; long struggle with the Army of the Potomac, -tlO ; surrender of, see Lee Army of the Cumberland, depletion and peril of, I, 493 ; peril at Chattanooga, 495 ; Thomas assigned to command, 497 ; be- sieged in Chattanooga, 503 ; expedition to Brown's Fei-ry, 504 ; imi)roving its condi- tion, 511 ; troops from, in Lookout Valley, 519 ; plan of assault at Chattanooga. 520 ; strength of position at Chattanooga, II, 2 ; captures at Missionary Ridge, 17 ; parti- cipation iu battle of Chattanooga, 20 ; its work at Chattanooga planned beforehand, 23 ; at Chattanooga, 82 ; engagement be- fore Atlanta, 88; in Sherman's march against Johnston, 422 Army of the Gulf, united with. Army of the Tennessee, I. 478. Army of the James, the left wing of the united armies, II, 56; commanded by Gen. Butler. 56; reinforcements for, 56; protection to Washington, 57 ; proposed junction between Army of the Potomac and, 73, 402 ; crippled at Drm-y's BluflF, 74 ; united with Army of the Potomac, 74-76, 447 ; holds Bermuda Hundred, 190, 191, 299 ; in battle of White Oak Road, 299 ; in action of AprLl2, 1865, 308; ordered to Burke's Station, 316, 317 ; Parke ordered to protect its rear, 322, 323 ; in engagement at Appomattox Station, 336 ; ordered into camp at Burkesville Station, 362; moves simultaneously with the Army of the Po- tomac, 404 ; Sheridan reinforces the, 420 Army of the Mississippi, left wing of Ilal- leck's army at Pittsburg Landing. I, 307 ; proposed movement, 314; reinforcements sent to Buell from, 333 ; Sheridan's com- mand in, 334; dispositiou, Sept. 4, 1862, 335, 336 ; depletion of, 336 ; i)ut on the de- fensive, 344 ; strength after Corinth, 349 Army of the Ohio, ordered to reinforce Grant, I, 273 ; arrangements for, at Ham- bvu-g Landing, 273 ; in battle of Shiloh, 301, 302 ; center of Halleok's army at Pittsburg Landing, 307 ; reports of Shiloh .sent to Halleok from, 308 ; to repair Memphis and Charleston railroad, 317,318,326; pos- sibilities of early capture of Chattanooga by, 333 ; plight of animals belonging to tlie, II, 34 ; strength, 238 ; ordered to reinforce Thomas, 238 ; Morgan's raids in rear of, 354 ; commanded by Burnside, 382 ; in Sherman's movement against Johnston, 422 Army of the Potomac, the " regular brig- ade " in the, I, 231 ; Grant's interest in its movements, 382, 383 ; in battle of Chatta- nooga, II, 20; visit to, at Brandy Station, 45-47 ; changes in, 46 ; Meade in command, 47, 399, 404 ; an independent command, 55 ; position on the Rapidan, 55 ; difflcultv of provisioning, 55 ; center of the united" ar- mies, 56, 71 ; supported by the Ninth Corps, 56 ; principal protection of Wash- ington, 57, 401 ; confronted by Lee on the Rapidan, 57 ; reinforced by Burnside, 58. 62, 408 ; Grant to stay with, 58 ; Sheridan to command the cavalry, 60; question of moving by right or left flank, 61 ; reduc- ing transportation, 63 ; question of mov- ing by water to the James, 66 ; Mosby's operations in rear of, 67; junction with Army of tlie James, 73-76,402; Sheridan rejoins, 79, 80, 406 ; grand movement, 95 et seq., 404; organization, 96-100; rations, forage, and supplies, 96; surplus of artil- lery, 97 ; quartermaster's corps, 104, 105, 411 ; ordered to march light, 105 ; position. May 5, 1864, 106 ; skill in intrencMng, 116, 117 ; movement by the left flank, 119, 120; orders for night marches, 119, 120; Lee assumes its retreat, 121, 124 ; possible race to Richmond, 122; Sheridan ordered to cut loose from, 133 ; reducing the artillery, 144, 183 ; Sheridan again with, 153 ; moving right wing from position south of the North Anna, 154 et seq.; respect of Army of Northern Virginia for, 172; disheartened at Cold Harbor, 172 ; attempt to get south of the James, 174 et seq.; sti-ength at opening of Wilderness campaign, 182 ; reinforcements for, 182; strength at crossing of the James, 182, 183 ; advance reaches the James, 185 ; compared with Army of Northern Virginia, 185; Grant rejoiiis, 186, 187 ; invests Petersburg, 190, 191, 412 : Hunter ordered to return to, 192 ; Wright ordered back to, 224, 420 ; loses its chief of stafl', 226 ; length of lines, 231 ; cavalry operating norfli of the James, 293; provision for Sheridan's cutting loose from the, 301, 419 ; ordered to move on Danville road, 316 ; its record, 319, 320 ; forced march ordered, 322 ; ordered into camp at Burkesville Station, 362; com- manded by Burnside, 382 ; commanded by Hooker, 382; territory covered by, 398; Lee's army its obiective, 401; to move simultaneously with the Army of the James, 404 ; Beauregard brings reinforce- ments against, 408 ; W. F. Smith ordered to reinforce, 408 ; long struggle with Army of Northern Virginia, 410, 460 ; moves by the enemy's right flank, 422 ; Sheridan re- joins, Mar. 27, 1865,446; dismounted cav- alry ordered to City Point, 447; move- ments, Mar. 29, 447 Army of the Tennessee, Sherman's com- mand in the, I, 273 ; reinforcements for, 274; commanders of, 274; losses on first day at Shiloh, 286 ; share in the battle, 301 ; right wing of Halleck's army at Pittsburg Landing, 307; reports of the battle of Sliiloh, 308 ; dissatisfaction at capture of Corinth, 316; confi'outed by Van Dorn, 327 ; weakness at Corinth, 328 ; unites with Army of the Gulf, 478 ; Shennan assigned to command, 500; in battle of Chattanoo- ga, II, 20 ; losses at Atlanta, 89 ; enthusi- asm at Vicksburg, 172, 173; Logan's ser- vice with, 235, 423 ; Howard appointed to command, 235; in Sherman's movement against Johnston, 422 ; part returned by Banks to Sherman, 424, 425 Army of the Valley District, organization, II, 101 Artillery, surplus of, in Army of the Poto- mac, II, 97, 144, 183 Ashland, Va., Sheridan destroys railroad and supplies at, 11, 78, 406, 445; Sheridan attacked at. 295 Aspinwall, Colombia, I, 154 Athens, Ala., captured by Forrest, 11, 428 ; Buford's unsuccessful attack on, 428 Athens, Tenn., Gen. Dodge halted at, I, 513 INDEX 465 Atkinson, E. N., IT, 101 Atlanta, Ga., possibilities of a bloodless ad- vance to, I, 318 ; prcparatious for cam- paign against, II, 3a; defended by Joliiis- tou, 48, 399 ; importance of captiiring, 48, 49, 71, 227, 399; Sherman's cami)aign against, 49, 58, 210, 213; country between Dalton and, 83; time occupied in cap- ture, 85 ; commencement of final move- ment toward, 87; Hood abandons his outer lines at, 88; strength, 88; battles before and at, 88-93, 423; railroad cut between Augusta and, 89 ; operations between De- catiir and, 90: movement by right flank, 90; close investment, 90; Sherman's final movement, 92, 423, 424; Kilpatrick's raid around, 92 ; Gen. Slocum takes possession, 93; expulsion of citizens from, 93; tiu-ned into a military base, 93: Hood's retreat from, 229, 429 ; weakness of Sherman's communications with, 230; Hood breaks railroad back from, 236 ; Sherman autiio- rized to give up, 238 ; Sherman starts back to, 240; destruction of, 2-11 ; Sherman sug- gests destruction of railroad to Chatta- nooga from, 252, 430; Sherman drives the enemy to, 423; Sherman puts troops into camp at, 428 ; guarding road to the Cum- berland from, '428; Sherman proposes to abandon, 429, 431 ; original design to hold, 430 ; Sherman holds, with the Twentieth Corps, 430 ; Sherman concentrates troops at, 431 Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, Rous- seau's raid on the, II, 424 Atlanta campaign, Sheraian's preparations for the, II, 82, 83 ; skill in its management, 85, 424 ; rebuilding railroads in, 85 ; its im- portance, 93; news of its success in the 2s"orth, 94 Atlee's Station, Va., Lee's position near, II, IGl Auburn, Miss., Sherman at, I, 413 Augur, C. C, excursion with, I,*50, 51 Augusta, Ga.,the railroad cut between At- lanta and. II, 89, 423 ; proposed movement against, 231, 232, 429 ; threatened by Slo- cum, 240; Sherman's apparent objective, 248, 247 ; importance of capturing, 250 ; threatening, 277, 431 Austin, Tex., paying off troops at, I, 47 Austria, a prince of, on the Mexican throne, II, 388 "Autocrat," transport steamer at Nash- ville, I, 264 Averell, W. W., operations against the Vir- ginia and Tennessee railroad, II. 58, *72, 411 ; reports operations in West Virginia, 140, 411; junction with Crook, 181, 411; Hunter's junction with, 192,195,412; vic- tory at Winchester, 417 Averysboro, N. C, fighting between John- ston and Sherman at, II, '285, 442 Axioms of war, I, 353 Aylett, W. R., II, 101 Aylett's, Va., Sheridan at, II, 79 Ayotla, M2X., Gen. Scott's position at, 1, 109 Ayres, Romeyn B., his command, II, 98; in action. May 14, 1864, 140 ; in b.attle of Five Forks, 305 Aztec town, an old, I, 146, 147 Babcock, O. E., report of meeting with Lee at Appoinattox, II, *341 Badeau, Adam, discovers Grant's offer of Vol. II.— 30 services to the government, I, "192, 193; sheds new light on history, 270; report of capture of Prentiss's division, 280; injus- tice to McCook, 292; accuracy of liis ac- count of Sliiloh, 305; jireserves story of Sherman's opposition to the Vickshurg cauipaign, 454; mentions Butler and his " bottle," Tl, 76 Bailey, Bartlett, I, 14, 15, 18 Bailey, Dr., I, 14, 15 Bailey, Joseph, constructs dams on Red River, I r, 426 Baird, Absalom, in Chattanooga campaign, IL *3, 14, 18 Baker's Creek, Miss., I, 427, 429, 431, 432 Baldwin's Ferry, Miss., I, 442, 457 Ballot, its exercise in tlie South, 1, 178, 179 Baltimore, Md., troops ordered to, II, 196, 416, 438 ; Hunter advised to establish head- quarters at, 207; Grant visits, 215; Wal- lace moves on the enemy from, 416 Baltimore and Ohio railroad, operations on the, II, 195, 207, 215, 216, 418; import- ance, 419 Banks, Nathaniel P., on the Red River. I, * 410, 419; correspondence with, concerning Port Hud.son. 410, 419, 439, 440, 455 ; plan to bring his forces against Vicksburg, 440; Grant ordered to cooperate with, 440, 4H6; informed of the fall of Vicksburg, 475 ; re- lief to be sent to, 475; Grant resolves to unite with, 481 ; fails to unite with Grant, 481 ; reinforcements for, 485, 486, II, 42, 58, 65, 84, 198, 400, 426 ; visit to, at New Orleans, I, 486; Grant reviews his army, 487 ; his command coterminous with the Military Division of the Mississivipi, 491; expectation of his clearing the west shore of the Mississippi, II, 39 ; proposed coop- eration with Sherman, 42, 49 ; letter from Grant to, 49 ; expected to move upon Mo- bile, 49 ; orders to, for spring of 1864, 58, 59, 61; ordered to turn over defense of Red River to Steele, 58, 61, 65, 400 ; ordered to return trooiis to Sherman, 58, 400; or- dered to abandon Texas, 58, 400 ; to assem- ble troops at New Orleans, 61; to move against Mobile, 61; to cooperate with Sherman in securing raili'oad between Mobile and Chattanooga, 61 ; operations on the Red River, 64, 65, 72, 400, 426, 427 ; opposes the Red River expedition, 65 ; to take and hold Shreveport, 65, 400; suc- ceeded by Canby, 81, 142; operations in Louisiana, 142, 426; suggests that Steele move from Arkansas, 400 ; to return troops to New Orleans, 400 ; Farragut to cooper- ate with, 400, 401 ; returns troops to Sher- man, 425; Steele's cooperation with, 426, 427 Bankston, Miss., Grierson's raid at, II, 434 Barlow, Francis C, his command, II, 97 ; in battle of the Wilderness, *110 ; in battle of Spottsylvauia, 129-132, 135, 136 ; assault at Cold Harbor, 166, 167 Barnard, J. G., sent to investigate Butler's position, II. *74 ; his report, 75 ; communi- cates with Sherman as to northward campaign, 271, 273 Barnett's, Miss., Rosecrans at, I, 342 Barrett, Major, attempts to capture Grant, I, 217 Barringer, Rufus, his command, II, 102 ; en- counters Russell's command, 156 Bartlett, J. J., II, 98 466 INDEX Barton. Seth M., II, 101 Base of supplies, question of operating with or without a, I, 353, 359, 360, 411, 417, 427, 454 Baton Rouge, La., fall of, I, 317 ; Grierson's raid at, 408; Cauby's expedition from, II, 431 Battery No. lo, Gordon's assault at, II, 296- 298 Battery No. ii, capture and recapture of, II, 297, 298 Battery No. i2, capture and recapture of, II, 297, 293 Battle, C. A., II, 101 Baxter, A. S., sent to order Wallace to Pitta- burg Landing, I, 277 ; Wallace's interpre- tation of bis orders, 278 Baxter, Henry, his command, II, 98 ; in battle of the Wilderness, *108 Bayou Baxter, I, 373, 374 Bayou Macon, I, 373,374 Bayou Pierre, I, 401, 402, 405, 406, 408 Bayou Vidal, I, 388 Bean's Station, Tenn., concentration of troops aa;ainst Breckinridge at, II, 434 Bear Creek, I, 340, 352 Beaufort, N. C, the Fort Fisher expeditions at. II, 263, 268. 436, 438 Beaufort, S. C, Union possession of, II, 53, 398; Sherman moves his right wing to, 276 Beauregard, P. G. T., atCerro Gordo, 1, 100; at Shiloh, 298, *299, 302, 303; at Corinth, 310, 312 ; evacuates Corinth, 315 ; supersed- ed by Bragg, 332 ; danger of his coming to Lee's assistance, II, 66; attacks Butler, 74 ; separated from Richmond, 133 ; sent to guard Richmond, 144; commanding south of Richmond, 188; reinforced by Hoke, 188 ; fortifies Petersburg, 189, 203 ; in general command, 239 ; appeals to citizens of Georgia, 239 ; confronting Sherman, 283 ; attacked by Kautz, 407 ; brings rein- forcements against the Army of the Poto- mac, 408 Beaver Dam, Va., recapture of Federal prisoners by Sheridan at, II, 78 ; plan to destroy the Virginia Central railroad west of, 175 ; Sheridan desti-oys depot at, 406 Belen garita, the, I, IIT, 120 Belfry, the gun in the, I, 123, 124 Belknap, W. G., member of court of in- quiry in Gen. Scott's case, I, *135 Bell, Louis, in assault on Fort Fisher, II, 269 * killed *270 Belle' Plain, 'Va., getting supplies from, II, 133 Belleville, 111., mustering in troops at, I, 187 Belmont, Mo., contemplated attack on, I, 211 ; the battle of, 219-229 Beniiam, H. W., his command, II, 100; su- perintends bridge-work at the crossing of tbe Chickahominy, *182 ; dismounted cav- alry to report to, at City Point, 447 Benicia Barracks, Cal., tlie Fourth Infantry at, I, 161 Benjamin, Calvin, I, *50-53 Benning, Henry L., II, 101 Benton, Thomas H., attempt to supersede Scott by, I, 92, 93, 135 " Benton," the. Porter's flagship, running the batteries at Vicksbvirg, I. 386 Bentonvills, N. C, lighting between John- ston and Sherman at, II, 285, 442 Bermuda Hundred, Va., seizure of, by But- ler, II, 73, 406; question of marching the army toward, 180; visit to Butler at, 185, 186, 412; supplies ordered lor Hancock from, 187 ; held by the Army of the James, 190, 191, 299; report of engineers at, 200; reinforcements for Meade fi'om, 200, 408 ; troops at, informed of capture of outer works of Petersburg, 310; Butler's posi- tion at, 406-408; the enemy partially re- tii-es fi'om, 413 ; Wright to send troops to, 413 Berry ville, Va., Sheridan near, II, 419 Bethel, O.. Jesse R. Grant removes from Georgetown to, I, 21 ; a humiliating inci- cident in. 24 ; visit to parents at, 27 Bethel, Tenn., Lew Wallace's march to- ward, I, 278 ; Ord's command at, 335 Bethesda Church, Va., II, 165, 166 Beverly, Va., proposed expedi tion against Virginia and Tennessee railroad from, II, 58, 61, 403 Big Black River, the dangers of attack on, I, 400; reconnaissances ordered toward, 412 ; McPherson crosses, 413 ; McCler- nand's position on, 414, 415 ; guarding the crossing of, 419; the enemy's design to cross, 425 ; piu'sitit of the enemy to, after Champion's Hill, 433; Pemberton falls back to, 435 ; possibilities of Pemberton's crossing, 437 ; Sherman ordered to, 437 ; hopes of crossing, at Bridgeport, 438; bat- tle of, 438-440 ; destruction of tlie bridge over. 440; rebridging, 440, 441; demoral- ization of the cneiiiy at, 443 ; Federal losses and Confederate strength at, 447; need of cavalry on, 448; Blair's work on, 455 ; troops on, 457 ; Sherman assigned to command at, 458; .Johnston crosses, 4'58; Johnston between Brownsville and, 464 ; Sherman crosses, 482. II. 41; Sherman's troops on, 1, 482, 484; Osband's operations on, II, 431 Big Black River Bridge, successof the Army of the Tennessee at, II, 173 Big Blue, battle of the, II, 427, 428 Big Lick, N. C, Stoneman destroys the rail- road at, II, 458 Big Sandy, McClernand at, 1, 413 ; Sherman moves to, 413 Big Shanty, Ga., Hood reaches, II, 429 Big South Fork, Cumberland River, I, 511 Big Sunflower River, water communications of, I, 377 Bird's Point, Mo., orders to troops at, I, 211 ; Col. Oglesby appointed to command at. 214 Birney, D. B., in battle of the Wilderness, II, 108; in battle of Spottsylvania, *129, 131, 135, 136; Mott's brigade assigned to, 139 ; sent to Tyler's assistance, 143 ; in battle of Cold Harbor, 166; returns to Hancock, 177 ; commanding Hancock's corps, 190 ; in investment of Petersburg, 191 ; threatening movements against Rich- mond, 209, 218 ; captures Fort Harrison, 421 ; moves to Hatcher's Run, 450 Black Bayou, water communications of, I, 377 ; Sherman's expedition on. 378, 379 Black Fort, Monterey, the, I, 80, 82 Black River. See Big Black River. Black's Station, Va., Kautz's raid at, II, 407 Blackwater River, the, II, 407, 447 Blair, Austin, governor of Michigan, I, INDEX 467 *334 ; appoints Sheridan colonel of 2d Mi- cliigau Cavalry, 334 Blair, Frank P., leader of the Free-Soil Democracy in St. Louis, I, *169, 188 ; raises a regiment, 188; ordered to Grand Gulf, 412 ; arrival before Jackson, *42() ; .joins McClernand, 423 ; reaches Now Auburn, 423 ; ordered to Bolton,425 ; near Kay moiid, 426 ; near Auburn, 420 ; his command turned over to McClernand, 428 ; ordered to Edward's Station, 428 ; at Champion's Hill, 428, 431, 432, 435, 447 ; ordered to Bridge- port, 437, 438, 441 ; raid up the Yazoo, 454, 455; troops sent to MechanicsViurg, 455; character and military ability, 480 ; crosses the Tennessee at Eastport, 512 ; reinforces Sherman, II, 86 ; commanding the Seven- teenth Corps, 234 ; quits the field for po- litical purposes, 234; returns to his com- mand, 235 Bliss, AV. W. S., adjutant-general to Gen. Taylor, I, 58 ; death of, 164 Bliss, Zenas R., II, 100 Blockade, Great Britain insists on effective, II, 261 ; the naval, 398 Blockade-runners, capture of one at Savan- nah, II, 252; principal inlet for, 261, 435; capture of, at Fort Fisher, 262 Blue Ridge, boundary of Union holdings, II, 53 ; operations in the, 152, 216, 220, 226, 420 Boggs, Harry, in business with, I, 168 Boggs & Grant, the firm of, I, 168 Bolivar, Tenn., threatened by the enemy, I, 327, 332, 344; guarding the Mississippi Central raUroad at, 327, 352; skirmishing near, 329; repulse of the enemy at, 332; Ord's command at, 335 ; reinforcing Coi-- inth from, 336, 338; reinforced, 330, 344; repairing the railroad at, 352 ; movement on Grand Junction from, 352 Bolton, Miss., troops ordered to, I, 425, 428; Hovey at, 426 ; capture of, 426 ; Steele en route to, 428 ; Sherman's march fi'om Jack- son to, 437 ; Sherman concentrates at, 482 Boone, N. C, Stoneman's movement via, II, 458 Boonville, Mo., Grantorderedto secure cash from l)anks in, I, 209 ; Sheridan's victory at, II, 334 Booth, L. F., colonel Ist Alabama colored regiment, II, 425 Bottom's Bridge, Va., Sheridan at, II, 79; Wright ordered to send troops to, 177 Bourbon County, Ky., early visit to, I, 16 Bowen,John S., commanding at Port Gib- son, I, *402, 403 ; bearer of Pemberton's proposals at Vicksburg, 465; Grant re- fuses to meet, 466 ; conference with A. J. Smith, 467 ; anxiety for complete surren- der, 467 Bowers, T. S., on Grant's staff, II, *69; de- tects William Swinton eavesdropping, 69, 70 ; letter to, April 2, 1865, 313 Bowles, P. D., II, 101 Bowling Green, Ky., the Confederate line at, I, 232 : Buell confronting Buckner at, 233 ; fortifications of, 265 ; Johnston's re- treat from, 266; capture of, 304 Bowling Green, Va., Hancock's march to, II. 146 Boyd's Neck, S. C, Hatch's expedition at, II, 432 Boydton plank road, movements on the, II, 422 ; Union line at, 450-452 ; Grittin at- tacked near, 451 Bragg, Braxton, possibilities of Ipjuring, alter Corinth, 1,318; at Rome, Ga., *329; supcrsecb's Beauregard, 332; despaUdics troops from Tupelo to Chattanooga, 332; march to the Ohio Kiver, 336 ; aiming to pre- vent reinforcement of, in Middles Tennes- see, 336, 337 ; reinforces Johnston, 448, 492; proposetl movement against, from Mobile as a base, 484, 485 ; Rosecrans ordered to move against, 492; confronting Rosecrans at Mui'froesboro, 492 Roseiirans's tactical skill aga inst, 493; moves against Rosecrans, 494; takes possession of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, 494 ; jjosscssion of roads into Chattanooga, 495; report of condition of the Union gairison at Chat- tanooga, 507; Pres. Davis's visit to, 507, II, 20,' 21 ; preparations for attacking, I, 520,524; reported withdrawal fiom Chat- tanooga, II, 1 ; advises withdrawal of non- combatants from Chattanooga, 1 ; designs concerning Knoxvillc, 2; in battle of Chat- tanooga, 12 ; operations against Sherman, 13; threatens Baird's advances 14; loses control of his men at Missionary Ridge, 17; mistakes at Chattanooga, 20, 29, 30; difference between Louj^street and, 21; personal acquaintance with, 21 ; personal characteristics, 21, 22 ; danger of his at- taclung Burnside, 25 ; retreat toward Dal- ton, 25; completeness of his rout, 25; strength at Chattanooga, 29 ; disliked by his soldiers, 31 ; superseded by J. E. John- ston, 42 ; leaves Wilmington, 249, 435 ; com- manding at Wilmington, 264 ; caUs for re- inforcements, 264 Branchville, Ga., importance of capturing ports to the east of, II, 250 Brandon, Miss., Steele ordered to, I, 483; Sherman reaches, II, 41 Brandy Station, Va., visit to Army of the Potomac at, II, 45-47 ; as base of supplies; 62, 401 ; Meade to collect strength at, 63 Brannan, J. M., operations on the Chicka- mauga, II, *5 Bratton, John, II, 101 Brazos Santiago, I, 59, 64, 93. See also POINT Isabel. Breckinridge, John C, the contest between Lincoln and, I, *172; reinforces Lee, II, 151 ; ordered to the defense of the Shen- andoah Valley, 193 ; reinforcements called for, from, 408 ; operations in East Tennes- see. 434 Breese, K. R., commands naval brigade at Fort Fisher, II, *269 Brevet rank, ditflculty between Twiggs and Worth concerning, I, 73, 74 Brewster, W. R., II, 97 Brice's Cross Roads, Miss., battle of, 11, 197 Bridge Creek, I, 309 Bridgeport, Ala., troops ordered to, I, 437, 438 ; arrival of Sherman and Blair at, 441 ; Rosecrans loses the river road to, 494; terminus of Union possession of railroad between NashviUe and Chattanooga, 495 ; Grant at, en route for Chattanooga, 498 ; opening the "cracker line" to, 501; con- centration of reinforcements at, 504; the Tennessee opened from Lookout VaUey to, 505; transportation and supplies at, 506, 513 ; navigation of the Tennessee between Kelly's Ferry and, 506 ; Sherman arrives at, 516-518; Sherman's trip from Chatta- nooga to, 523 ; communication with Chat- 468 INDEX tauooga, II, 29 ; garrisoned by Thomas, 238, 2,16 Bridgeport, Miss., Federal losses at, I, 447 Bridges, crossing the bayous by, I, 389, 394, 405 Broad River, Foster's expedition on, II, 431 Brock road, Va., operations ou the, II, 101, 102, 109, 111, 120, 126, 127 Brooke, John R., his command, II, 97; in biitllo of the Wilderness, *111 Brooks, Horace, at capture of San Cosme iiarita, I. '"122 Brooks, VV. T. H., in battle of Cold Harbor, II, 1G7 Brough, John, governor of Ohio, meeting ^sntb, I, *490 Brown, B. Gratz, commanding at Ironton, I, *207 Brown, George, commanding the " Indian- ola," I, 387 Brown, Henry W., II, 99 Brown, Jacob, occupies Fort Brown, I, 64 ; killed, 72 Brown, John, character, I, 4 Brown, Joseph E., governor of Georgia, II, *228 ; denounced by Pres. Davis, 228 ; flight from Milledgeville, 244 Brown, Owen, .lesse R. Grant works for, 1, 4 Brown County, O., the Grants in, I, 7 Brown's Ferry, Tenn., operations, naviga- tion, roads, etc., at, I, 501, 504-506, 508, 509, 520, 522, 523, II, 1, 4, 8, 29, 30 Brownsville, Tenn., I, 335, 336, 464 Brownsville, Tex., first settlement of, I. 63, 72 ; probable effect of garrisoning. 484 Bruinsburg, Miss., operations at, I, 398,400- 402, 411, 446, 4f.4, 483 Bryan, Goode, II, 101 Bryan, T. M.,Jr., II, 99 Buchanan, James, Grant votes for, I, *171 ; helplessness of his administration, 180, 181 ; secessionists leave his Cabinet, 181 ; Floyd's actions in the Cabinet of, 253 Buckland, Ralph C, I, *275 Buckner, Simon B., trip to Popocatepetl, I, 142-145; confronting Buell, *233; com- mand at Fort Douelson turned over to, 254 ; correspondence with, touching sur- render of Fort Donelson, 255, 256 ; sent to reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, II, 2, 30 Buell, Don Carlos, commandingDepartment of the Ohio, I, *233; confronting Buckner atBowliug Green, 233 ; reinforcesGrautat Fort Donelson, 243; notified by Halleck of movement against Fort Donelson, 244; ad- vance on Nashville, 262, 263 ; letter to C. F. Smith from, 263 ; letter from Grant to, 264 ; meeting witb Grant, 264 ; calls upon Smith for assistance, 264; delayedmarohouNash- ville, 266 ; ordered to reinforce Grant, 273 ; at Columbia, Tenn., 274 ; en route to rein- force the Army of the Tennessee, 274; awaiting his arrival, 275-277 ; arrival of, 277 ; meeting with, at Pittsburg Landing, 283 ; berates stragglers at Shiloh, 283 ; con- dition of affairs at Shiloh before arrival of, 285, 286 ; loss on the first day, 286 ; rein- forcements for, at Pittsburg Landing, 287 ; position on the morning of April 7, 288; cliaracter, 295, 296 ; charges of disloyalty against, 295, 296 ; Grant's reply to, 296 ; re- torts on Grant in the New York " World," 296 ; subsequent attempt to restore him to command, 296, II, 48, 50; A. 8. Johnston's plan to crush, I, 298 ; strength at Shiloh, 302 ; his report of Shiloh concealed from Grant, 306; commanding center of Hal- leck's army at Pittsburg Landing, 307; transmits reports of Shiloh direct to Hal- leck, 308 ; sent in pursuit from Corinth, 316 ; ordered to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad, 317, 318, 326, 333 ; dith- culties of his march through a hostile country, 329 ; reinforcing, 329, 330, 332, 336, 344 ; march to Chattanooga, 332, 333 ; pos- sibilities of his early capture of Chatta- nooga, 333 ; march to Louisville, 336 ; suc- ceeded in command by Rosecrans, 349 ; declines to serve under Sherman or Can- by, II, 50 Buena Vista, Mex., T, 92, 93, 102 Buffalo, the southern herd of, I, 62 Buford, Abram, raids in Kentucky, II, 425; in Alabama, 428 Bull-fights, Mexican, I, 137-140 Bull Gap, II, 282, 446 Bull Run, Va., II, 63, 65, 99, 404 Bulwer, Grant's fondness for works of, 1,20 " Bummers," Sherman's, II, 242-244 Bunker Hill, Mass., Capt. Noah Grant in battle of, I, 2 Burbridge, S. G., drives Morgan out of Ken- tucky, II, 425; expedition against Salt- ville, 428; operationsagainst Breckinridge, 434 Burgess's Mills, Va., Humphreys's success at, II, 451 Burke's Station, Va., the Army of the James ordered to, 316, 317 Burkesville, Va., Crook sent toward, II, 322; Sheridan's operations at and near, 323, 324, 449, 450 ; Lee's army intercepted at, 324 ; Ord's operations near, 330, 332, 453, 454 ; Grant at, 332, 349, 357 ; the Armies of the James and of the Potomac ordered into camp at, 362 ; Wilson destroys the railroad at, 415 ; Grant determines to push to, 453 ; the army retui-ns to, 457 Burlington, N. J., visits to, II, 215, 357-359 Burnham, Hiram, killed in assault on Fort Harrison, II, *218 Burnside, A. E., possibilities of avoiding his imprisonment at Knoxville, I, 318; rein- forcements from, at Vicksburg, 456; the Ninth Corps to be returned to, 475; at Knox- ville, *497 ; instructions to, 437, 498 ; draws supplies from East Tennessee, 511, II, 28, 29 ; desperate condition of, I, 511, 515; question of getting siipplies to, 513 ; fears for his safety, 515, 516, 523, n, 2, 11, 24, 32 ; Wheeler and Longstreet move against, I, 515-518 ; advice to, 516, 517 ; encouragement for, 516, II, 12, 19 ; confidence of, 1, 516, 523 ; despatch from, 517 ; cut off from tele- graphic communication. 523 ; message to, concemins: attack on Bragg, 524 ; mea- sures for relief of, II, 2, 4, 19, 24, 25, 27 ; lack of supplies at Knoxville, 26, 27 ; peril of, 27; J. H. Wilson and C. A. Dana work through to, 28; pursuit of Longstreet by, 32 ; superseded by Foster, 32, 43 ; de- clines Sherman's oft'er of assistance, 37 ; question of his restoration to dutv, 48; commanding the Nintli Corps. 56, 100 ; at Annapolis, 56, 57 ; reinforces the Army of the Potomac, 58, 62, 408; assigned to defense of road south from Bull Run, 63 ; advances fi'om Annapolis, 65 : orders Swinton to be shot, 70 ; guarding the railroad at Warren- INDEX 469 ton, 99; notified of the successftil crossing of the Rapidan, 99, 404 ; crosses the Rapi- dan. 107 ; m battle of the Wilderness, 109- 111, 113, lU, 405; loses a colored division, 110; orders for movement, May 7, 1H64, 120; ordered to support Warren, 123; crosses the Ny, 12G, 127 ; in battle of Spottsylvania, 126, 127, 129, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137 ; orders to, for cooperation with Hancock, 134, 135 ; movement of Warren and Wright to left of, 140; ordered to draw Lee from his intrenchments, 145 ; attacks on, 147; held at Spottsylvania, 147; Lee'8 policy to attack Wright and, 147 ; at Guiney's Station, 148 ; ordered to Jericho Bridge, 148 ; sent to New Bethel Church, 148; moves to the North Anna. 150, 151; movement. May 27, 1864, 156; on the Pamunkey, 157, 158 ; position. May 30, 1864, 158, 161 ; attack on, June 1, 1864, 164 ; movement to Bethesda Church, 165; at- tack on, June 2, 1864, 165 ; failure to follow up advantaare, 165 ; orders for Juno 3, 1864, 166 ; in battle of Cold Harbor, 167 ; opin- ion of the situation at Cold Harbor, 168 ; movement, June 4, 1864, 177 ; crosses the Chickahominv, 181, 182 ; in investment of Petersburff, 191, 198-203; his division commanders at Petersburg, 202 ; his commands, 382; military and personal characteristics, 383; at crossing of the Rappahannock and the Alexandria rail- road, 404 ; remarkable march of his troops, 405 Burnsville, Miss., operations at, I, 273, 338, 340, 341, 342 Burton, H. S., 11, 100 Butler, B. F., commanding the Army of the James, II, *56 ; reinforced by GiUiuore, 58, 62, 406; Strength on the James, 58, 62; to operate on the south side of the James, 58, 62, 402, 403; to move on Richmond via the James River, 59, 62 ; movements against Petersburg, 59, 142, 410; visits to, 60, 185, 186, 404 ; to seize City Point, 62, 402 ; coop- eration with Meade, 63, 401, 402, 408 ; moves up the James, 65, 66, 73, 406 ; embarks at Fort Monroe, 73 ; seizes City Point and Bermuda Hundred, 73, 119, 406 ; his objec- tive point, 73, 402 ; neglects to attack Pe- tersburg, 73; sends cavalry against the Woldon railroad, 73, 133, 406; operations at Dniry's Bluff, 73, 74, 140, 142. 144, 407 ; reduction of his force, 74 ; his position likened to a " bottle," 74-76, 407, 408 ; his services in the war, 76; Sheridan ordered to draw supplies fi-om, 77 ; Sheridan com- municates with. 78, 79, 406 ; moves accor- ding to programme of spring campaign, 106; fears that Lee would crush, 119, 121, 175; cooperation of W. F. Smith's (18th) corps with, 154, 178. 179. 185. 186, 402 ; rem- forcements fi-om, at Cold HarV)or, 163; m- quiries about his position, 178; Abercrom- bie ordered to send troops to, 178 ; letter to, Jvme 11, 1864, 178 ; reinforcements for, 179, 402, 413-415; instructions to. concern- ins: movement on Petersburg, 179; di- rected to provide for crossing of the army at City Point, 179, 185 ; sinks stone boats in the James. 182, 185 ; movement agamst Petersburg, 186, 413 ; informed as to Han- cock's movements, 186 ; bridges the James at Deep Bottom, 199, 414 ; warned to expect attack from Lee, 199 ; failure of movement on north side of the James, 225, 422 ; defeat of, Oct. 13, 1864, 225, 422 ; operations against Fort Fisher, 249, 262-267, 435-437 ; returns to FortMonroe,267; Adm. Porter's bitter com- plaints of, 267 ; on the Confederate army, 292 ; instructions to, for spring campaign, 1864, 401 ; proposed investment of Rich- mond by, 402; importance of his suc- ceeding in movement against Richmond, 403; sends cavalry to West Point, 406; reconnoiti'rs toward the Petersburg and Richmond railroad, 406 ; sums up his oper- ations, 406, 407 ; forces the Chickahominy, 406, 407 ; telegram to Stanton, May 9, 1864, 406, 407 ; engagement with Hill, 407 ; forced back, 414 ; threatens Richmond, 420; letter to, Dec. 6, 1864, 435, 436; superseded by Ord, 439 Butler, M. C, II, 102 Butler, W. O., at Monterey, I, *80, 82,85 ; suc- ceeds Geu. Scott, 135 Buzzard's Roost, Ga., operations against Johnston at, II, 422, 423 Cahawba River, Wilson destroys bridge over, II, 459 Cairo, 111., Grant's headquai-ters at, I, 211, 213; expedition to Paducali from, 214; ex- chaua;ing prisoners at, 216, 217; movement against Belmont from, 219 ; return to, 227 ; meetings with rebel officers at, 230 ; for- mation of the District of, 233; securing flotilla at, 235, 236 ; pro\n8ioniug Fort Don- elson prisoners at, 258; Nelson sends troops to, 262 ; Gen. CuUum at, 267 ; tel- egraphic coramvtnication with Paducah and Smithland, 268 ; holding: the Missis- sippi at, 352 ; Grant ordered to, 489, 490 ; Adm. Porter at, 498 California, nea;otiations for cession of, I, 115 ; purchase 134 ; flush times in, 159-161 ; the journey to, in 1852, 160 ; gambling in, 161, 165, 166 Camargo, Max., arrival of troops at, I, 76, 77 79 93 Carnden, Ark., Steele at, II, 427 Campbell, J. A., Confederate Assistant Sec- retary of War, II, *287; Peace Commis- sionei-, 287 Camp Jackson, Mo., seizure of, 1,187-190; exchange of prisoners fi'om, 216, 217 Camp Salubrity, I, 31, 32, 34-36 Canby, E. R. S., Buell declines to serve under, II, 50; succeeds Banks in com- mand, *81, 142 ; commanding Department of the Gulf, 81 ; proposed movement on Savannah, 230, 231 ; hampered by Price's movements, 232 ; strength, 274; reinforced by Thomas, 274, 279, 443; ordered to move against Mol)ile. Montgomery, and Selma, 274, 277, 279, 444 ; to campaign in the interior from the Gulf, 275; com- manding at New Orleans, 277 ; movement from Mobile Bay, II, 278, 367, 442, 444, 446, 448; dilatoriness of, 278-280, 366; letter fi-ora Grant to, 279, 280 ; asks the War De- partment to assign Granger to command, 279 ; advised not to put Granger in com- mand, 279; lu-ged to destroy railroads, 280 ; military character, 372 ; killed in the Lava Beds, 372 ; commanding MiUtary Division of the West Mississippi, 427; orders A. J. Smith to dis]>erse rebels on the Mississippi, 427 ; sends Granger to cooperate with Farragut at Mobile, 427 ; 470 INDEX ordered to reinforce the armies before liiclimoud, 4'27 ; proposal to reinforce, 429 ; proposal that lie hold the Mississippi River, 429 ; proposal that he get Coliun- Ijiis Ga., 429; expeditions from Baton Koujre and Vicksburg, 431; A. J. Smith ordered to report to, 439; informed of Wilson's operations, 459 ; Taylor and Kir- h\ Smith surrender to, 459 Caiie River, battle of, II, 426 Canton, Miss., the enemy's strength at, I, 4i',i; Osbaud's operations near, II, 481 Cape Fear River, defenses of the, II, 2G1, 2(;4; operations on, 280, 281, 435, 437, 441, 442 ; dirticulty of blockading, 435 ; in Union control, 439 Cape Girardeau, Mo., headquarters at, I, 211 ; meeting (ien. Prentiss at, 212 Capron, Horace, reports Stoneman lost, II, *91 Carlin, W. P., reports to Hooker at Lookout Mountain, II, *10 " Carondelet," the, at Fort Donelson, 1, 24G ; riuiiiing the batteries at Vicksburg, 386 Carr, E. A., at battle of Port Gibson, I, *403; advances to Bolton, 426; at Cham- pion's Hill, 428, 433; at Edward's Station, 435 ; in battle of Black River Bridge, 438, 439 Carroll, Samuel S., Ms command, II, 97; wounded in the Wilderness, 108 : in battle of the Wilderness, 108,*113; recommended for brigadier-generalship, U. S. Vols., 139 Carrollton, La., Grant reviews Banks's army at, I, 487 Carruth, Sumner, II, 100 Casey, Silas, at Chapultepec, I, ^120 Casey, T. L,., report on the powder-boat at Fort Fisher, II, 263 Cassville, Qa., pursuit of Johnston to, II, 423 Catharpin Furnace, Va., operations at, II, 115, 126 Catharpin road, movements on the, II, 110, 126, 127 Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, or- ganization of, II, 99 Cedar Creek, movements, engagements, etc., at, II, 144, 222, 223, 403, 411, 420 Cedartown, Ga., Hood's movement by, II, 430 Cerralvo, Mex., Taylor's troops at, T, 79 Cerro Gordo, Mex., battle of, I. 99-102 Chaffin's Bluff (Farm),Va., Ord's action at, II, 218, 421 Chagres River, tl-avel on the. I, 154, 155 Chalco, Lake, I, 108, 109 Chamberlain, J. L., wounded before Peters- burg, and commissioned brigadier-gen- erar, II, 189 Chambersburg, Pa., battle of, 11,54; Mc- Causland destroys, 204, 283, 417 Chambersburg, Va., Stoneman at, II, 458 Chambliss, J. R., II, 102 Champion's Hill, Miss., topography, I, 426, 429, 431 ; battle of, 428-436, 443, 447, II, 173 Chancellorsville, Va., movements and inci- dents at, II, 101, 103, 111, 120 Chandler, Zachariah, I, 153 Chapman, George H., II, 90 Chapultepec, capture of, I, 116, 118, 120; Mexican celebration of its capture, 131 Charles City Court House, Va., movements at, II, 182, 410 Charleston, S.C, firing on FortSumter from, I, 183 ; Sherman plans seizure of points near, II, 273 ; Sherman proposes to threat- en, 276, 429, 430; the hotbed of secession, 276 ; threatening, 277 ; its defensive posi- tion, 277; Sherman passes by, 277 ; evacua- tion of, 278, 283, 442, 444; Foster's expedi- tion to destroy railroad between Savannah and, 431 Charlestown, W. Va., expedition against Virginia and Tennessee railroad from, II. 58, 61, 403; meeting of Sheridan and Grant at, 214, 215, 419 Charlotte, N. C, movements near, II, 444, •458 Charlottesville, Va., Sheridan's operations at, II, 77, 176, 221, 293, 294, 445 ; Hunter's operations at, 152, 176, 411, 412 ; proposed iuuctiou of Sheridan and Hunter at, 192, 194, 410 ; necessity of breaking railroad communications at, 409 Chattahoochee River, the, Johnston retreats across, II, 87, 423 , Sherman gains posses- sion of, 87, 423, 424; Sherman proposes tak- ing, 231, 430 Chattanooga, Tenn., possibilities of early capture of, I, 261, 318, 333 ; abandoned by Johnston, 267 ; Confederate lines at, 304, 502, .503 ; possibilities of avoiding the battle of, 318; boundary of HaUeck's district, 326; Bragg's movement toward, 329, 332; Buell's march to, 332, 333 ; orders for the relief of, 487 ; Rosecrans driven into, 487, 488, 494; C. A. Dana at, 491, II, 28; scheme to capture, T, 492; Bragg's possession of roads into, 495; strategic importance, 495 ; lack of supplies at, 495, 496, 503 ; to be held at all hazards, 497; desperate condition, 497; Grant at, 499, II, 26, 42; building steamboats at, I, 499, II, 19, 34; personal inspection of the situation at, I, 501 ; the enemy's view of the garrison at, 501, 507 ; topography, 502 ; the Army of the Cumber- land besieged in, 503 ; securing the bridge at, 505 ; opening a line of supplies for, 505- 509 ; the picket-line at, 509, 510 ; importance of expelling the enemy from the neigh- borhood of, 515 ; lack of draught animals at, 515, 516; meeting between Grant and Sherman at, 518 ; Grant's orders for bat- tle, 518, 519 ; plan of Thomas's assault at, 520 ; Hooker's route to, 521 ; plans of the battle, 522 ; Sherman's trip to Bridgeport from, 523 ; Bragg advises withdrawal of non-combatants from, II, 1 ; battle of, 12 et seq. ; the tunnel at, 13; Sheridan's and Wood's charge at, 15, 16 ; troops participa- ting in battle, 19 ; consideration of the vic- tory at, 20 ; Bragj?'s mistakes at, 20, 29, 30 ; the battle fought as planned, 23 ; secured to the National troops, 24, 53; Sherman's arduous services at, 27 ; numbers engaged at, 29 ; Union and Confederate losses, 29, 31 ; communication between Bridgeport and, 29; importance of the victory, 30; perilous situation of the Union army, 30 ; Thomas in command at, 32, 82, 238, 256; trip from NashviUe to, 34; Sherman at, 54, 57 ; plans for Sherman's advance from, 58, 61 ; the Army of the Cumberland at, 82 ; Sherman accumulates supplies at, 82, 83; Sherman sends troops to, 232, 431; Thomas ordered back to Nashville and, 233; Sherman proposes to garrison, 237; reinforced, 238; Sherman authorized to give up the railroad from Atlanta to, 238, INDEX 471 430; Sherman sn^gCRta destrnction of rail- road from Atlauta to, 252, 430; giianliug the road from Nashville to, sso ; Thomas warned against losing the road to, 257 ; pontoon bridge wrongly sent to, 2{)(»; Hooker's aehievemeuts at, 382; Union holdings near, 398; Sherman moves against Johnston from, 422 ChattanoogaCreek.theNatioual position on, I, 4y4, II, 10 ; topography, 502, 603, 50S) ; the picket-line at, I, 509, 510; Confederate hon- ors for the opposing General at, 509, 510 ; plans for crossing, 519, 522 ; position of Army of the Cumberland on, II, 2 ; opera- tions on, 9, 10 ; Hooker's detention at, 14, 18; destruction of bridge over, 14, 18; Hooker crosses, 19 Chattanooga Valley, the National troops in- trenched at, I, 494 ; Confederate lines in, 503; orders to concentrate troops iu, 519 ; plan for Hooker to get into, 519, 520 ; plan to get Hooker past, 521, 522; the Federal lines in, II, 10; Hooker's work in, planned beforehand, 23; Hooker's achievements at, 383 Cheatham, B. F., with Hood at Franklin, II, 254; pursues Stanley, *255 Cheraw, S. C, valuable property stored in, II, 283, 284; Sherman marches from Co- lumbia to, 284 Chesapeake and Ohio canal, necessity of securing the, II, 419 Chesapeake Bay, as source of supplies, II, 62; Batler's movements on, 73; country of the tributaries of, 96 ; breaking of tele- graph cable across, 204 Chesterfield, Va., Sheridan rejoins the Army of the Potomac at, II, 80 Chesterfield Ford, the Second Corps at, 148, 153 Chewalla, Tenn., movements at, I, 344, 348 Chicago, 111., collecting boats fi-om, I, 386; treason in the Democratic Convention at, II, '217 Chickahominy River, actions, movements, etc., on the, II, 54, 78, 79, 96, 157, 165, 160, 174, 175, 177-179, 181, 182, 406-408, 410, 446 Chickamauga, Ga., possibilities of avoid- ing the battle of, I, 318; battle of, 488; 494; plan lor cavalry operations above, 518 Chickamauga Creek, 1, 502; operation^;, po- sitions, etc., on, 517, 519, II, 9, 10, 17, 18. Bee also NoiiTU Chickamauga; South Chickamauga. Chickamauga Station, Sherman's cavalry moves against, II, 7 „ „ , , Chickamauga Valley, plan of Hookers movements toward, 520 Chickasaw, Ala., Wilson's expedition moves from, 458 ^ x i,o Chickasaw Bayou, road-making at, 1, 443, 448 Childs, Thomas, in battle of Palo Alto, I, Chillicothe, Mo., threatened by Price, 1, 208 ; Orant ordered to secure cash from banks ill- 209 . .. . ^ „ Chillicothe, O., early visit to, I, 9 Cholera, outbreak on the Isthmus, I, 156, 157 Christ, Benjamin C, IT, 100 Christian Association, at Vicksburg, I, 452 Christiansburg, W. Va., Averell's oper- ations at, II, 411 Chula, Va., Kautz's raid at, IT, 407 Church, slavery supported in the, I, 17; treason in the, I, 17; "defilement" of a, in Menipliis, 324 Church, Prof., favors Grant's seeking a ma1h('matic:il professorship, I, 30 Churubusco, Mex., b.attle of, I, 109, 112 Cigarettes, use of, in Mexico, I, 42 Cincinnati, O., visits to, 1,9,24; failure to meet McClellan at, 193; trip fi-om Nasli- ville to, II, 48; Grant heaves Sheriium in, 81; trail SI )orting Scliolicld's command to Annapolis from, 274 Cipher despatches, trouble concerning, II, 35-37 Citico Creek, II, 2, 3, 7 City Point, Va., Butler to seize, II, 62, 402; Butler captures, 73, 119, 406; iiontoons or- dered to, 159; Abercrombie to move to, 177, 178; Halleck ordered to send rein- forcements to, 178 ; arrangements for the army to get below, 179, 180; W. F. Smith (18th Corps) sent to, via White House, 180, 181, 185, 186, 410 ; Smith's action between Petei'sburg and, 186 ; Sheridan sends i)ris- ouers to, 193 ; Grant at, 215, 357, 419 ; Logan visits Grant at, 259; arrival of the Peace Commissioners at, 287 ; Meade at, cut oflf from communication with his headquar- ters, 297 ; the Engineer Brigade to remain at, 299; Sheridan reaches,300; the President at, 289, 290, 308, 310, 317, 320; meeting of Sherman and Lincoln at, 363; Kautz reaches, 407 ; the Sixth Corps ordered to, 413; interruption of commuDication be- tween Washington and, 417; Grant leaves for Monocacy, 418; Grant leaves, on visit to Sheridan at Charlestown, 419 ; Scholield to draw upon, for supplies, 440 ; Shei-man ordered to go by water to, 440 ; dismounted cavalry sent to, 447; Parke commanding at, 447 ; Sherniau visits (jrant at, 449 City Point and Petersburg railroad, con- struction of l)rauch between tiie Weldon railrood and, II, 421 Claiborne Road, Va., Miles meets the en- emy at, II, 312 Clarke, Newman S., at San Antonio, I, *111; at Churul)ueco, 112 Clarksville, Tenn., proposal to take, I, 262; Confederate evacuation of, 262; visit to C. F. Smith at, 263, 264; capture of, 304 ; garrisoned liy Union troops, 317, 327 ; sur- render of, 330, 331 Clay, Henry, Jesse R. Grant's admiration for, I, 5 Cleburne, P. R., rear-guard for Bragg's re- treat, n, 25, 26 ; attack on, at Ringgold, 26 Clermont County, O.. Jesse R. Grant set- tles in Point Pleasant, 1,4; the Simpson family in, 7 ; birth or U. S. Grant iu, 7 ; Jesse R. Grant removes to Bethel, 21 Cleveland, Tenn. .movements near, 1, 512, 515, .517, 518, II, 25 Clifton, Tenn., Fori'est moves toward, II, 432 Clinch, the river, II, 34 Clinton, Miss., movements at, 1,419, 420,427 ; Grant goes to, 427 Coalfield, Va., Kautz's raid at, II, 407 Cobb, Howell, Vice President, C. S. A., sur- renders at Macon, II, 459 Cobb's Hill, Va., II, 451 Coehorns, use of wooden, at Vicksburg, 1, 452 472 INDEX Cold Harbor, Va., Swinton sentenced to be shot at. II, 70 ; march from the North Anna to, 80; Sheriilan's movements at, 159, 161, 408 ; Lee's position near, 161 ; pursuit of the enemy toward, 161 ; importance of, 162; advance on, 162-166; close proximitj' of the lines at, 163, 166; assault ordered for the 3d of June, 166; battle of, 166-172, 408, 409; caring for the dead and wounded at, 169-171; regrets for the last assault at, 171, 172; Warren withdraws to, 177; Union losses at battle of, 183 ; W. F. Smith sent to City Point from, 185, 186; dispropor- tion of Union and Confederate losses at, 409; effect of the battle on the enemy, 410; movement from, 410 Coldwater River, I, 375 Cole's Ferrj^, Va., Ferrero crosses the Chickahomiuy at, II, 181 Cole's Landing, Va., movement of troops to, II, 178, 180 Colonies, the confederation of the, 1, 174 Colorado River, Tex., early settlements on the, I, 48, 49 Colored troops, behavior at Milllken's Bend, I, 456 ; massacre of, at Fort Pillow, II, 63, 64, 425 ; Foi-rest's opinion of, 64 ; Biu-uside loses a division of, 110; at the Petersburg mine, 202 ; suggested for holding the Rio Grande, 400; cavalry expedition on the Peninsula, 407 ; First Regiment, Alabama, 425 ; 3d U. S. Colored Cavalry, 431 Columbia, S. C, Sherman's march on, II, 277, 429, 441 ; Stoneman ordered toward, 281, 442; Hampton abandons, 282 ; Sherman enters, 282. 441 ; burning of, 282, 283 ; Sher- man provides for the inhabitants of, 283; valuable property stored in, 283, 284; evac- uation of, 283 ; Sherman marches to Che- raw from, 284 Columbia, Tenn., Buell's advance at, I, 274; Scholield falls back to, II, 254 ; skirmish at, 254; pursuit of Hood to, 260; Forrest ap- pears before. 428 Columbia, Va., Sheridan at, II, 294, 445 Columbia River, ordered to the, 1, 161 ; Hud- son Bay Company's posts on, 162; over- flow of the, 162 ; mortality among Indians on the, 1C3, 164 Columbus, Ala., capture of, II, 459 Columbus, Ga., proposed movements against, II, 231, 429 Columbus, Ky., troops sent from, to capture Paducah, I, 214; in Confederate posses- sion, 216; fortifications, 218, 265; Grant's desire to capture, 218 ; reported movement of enemy from, 219; C. F. Smith ordered against, 219; strength, 220; meetings with rebel officers at, 230 ; the Confederate line at, 232, 265 ; hindering reinforcements to Buckner from. 233; capture of, 304; re- pairing, holding, etc., railroads fi-om, 317, 326-328, 352; meeting with Sherman at, 355; Forrest's raid near, 3G0; abandoned as a base, 361 ; garrison at, 368 ; Grant re- ports to Stanton from. 489; Buford makes unsuccessful attempt to capture, II, 425 Columbus, Miss., Hatch destroys the rail- road between Macon and, 1, 408 Comstock, C. B., engineering work at Vick.s- burg, I, *450; entrusted with the cipher code II, -36 ; saves Grant and Meade from capture, 121 ; mission to Bermuda Hun- dred, 178, 180 ; chief engineer in Fort Fish- er expedition, 438 Confederate Army, mode of estimating ita strength, I, 302, II, 183, 184 ; organization of, 101-104 ; desertions from, and demoral- ization in, 285, 286, 291-293, 297, 320, 321, 325, 334, 335, 350, 351; Butler on the, 292. See also AkMY OrNOItTHERN VIRGINIA ; LEE, R. E. " Conestoga," the, action on the Tennessee, I, 240 ; at Fort Douelson, 247 Confederate States of America, preliminary Congress of , 1, 180 ; organization of govern- ment, 181 ; the capital at Montgomery, 181 ; disclaim the Constitution of the United States, 183; military advantages compared with the North, 230, 479, II, 397,399; de- pression in, over fall of Fort Donelson, I, 260; lack of enthusiasm in the South- west, 261 ; examples of patriotism in, 320, 321, 323-325; confiscation of debts due to Northern creditors, 325 ; northern advance of the armies of, 336; foreign powers and the, 484 ; the press in, II, 31. 54; claim vic- tories from the North, 54 ; importance of the Shenandoah Valley to, 204, 205, 207, 209, 214, 220; importance of Vv'ilmington to, 261 ; mission of the Peace Commis- sioners from, 2S7-2SO; Grant refuses to recognize the government of, 288 ; impor- tance of the capital to, 291, 319, 320 ; hope- lessness of the cause after the Union army crossed the James, 332; morale of the armies of , 410 ; cutting the Confederacy in two, 430, 431. See also South. Congress. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS. Connecticut, the Grants in, I, 1, 5, 6 Conner, David, visit to General Taylor, I, 74, 75 Conquest, a policy of, I, .304 Conscription, resort to, in the North, I, 454 ; in the South, TI, 292, 352-354, 368, 399 Constitution. See UNITED States Consti- tution. Consumption, in the Gr.ant familv, I, 23; Grant free from fears of, 36 ; death of S. S. Grant from, 172 Contraband of war, what considered, 304 Contreras, Max., battle of, I, 109-111; Gen. Pierce ininred at, 113, 114 Cooke, John R., II, 102 Cooper, J. F., Grant's fondness for works of, I, 20 Coosa River, Hood on the, II, 429, 430 Coosawhatchie River, Foster on the, II, 432 Corbin's Bridge, Va., Gregg and Wilson's action at, II, 109 ; Sheridan orders cavalry to occupy, 127 ; Early crosses, 127 Cordova, Mex., I, 98 Corinth, Miss., possibility of capture after the fall of Donelson, I, 261 ; importance of, 272, 309, 315 ; railroad communication with Jackson, 272; Confederate position at, 272,273, 312,314; contemplated advance on, 274; A. S. Johnston advances from, 275,298; Johnston fortifies at, 298; Union advance on, 308, 312; topography, 309; delays in capturiug, 310; strengthening the troops at, 310; investment of, 313, 314 ; Confederate evacuation of, 314, 315 ; Beauregard's device of cheering at, 315; Union occupation of, 315 ; the trophies of war at, 315; needless precautiem in ad- vancing on, 316 ; fortified by Halleck, 316 ; depletion of Halleek's army at, 317, 327 ; lost opportunities after its capture, 317, 318 ; repairing railroad from Columbus to, INDEX 473 317; Grant's anomalous position at, 319 ; de- serted by its inhabitants, ;V2.i; Grant nt- called from Mempliis to, 325, 326 , retort i- fyinj?, 327 ; tlireati-ned li>y Van IJoru, 32'i ; minor battles in vicinity of, 328; coni- niuiiieation willi Columbus, 328; nieetinj^ Slieridan at, ;)o3 ; troops at, 335; advance of Van Dorii and Price on, 330 ; provisions for reinforcini^, 330-338; tlio enemy's de- termination to attaeli, 345 ; battle of, 315- 3-19; value of tlie fortifications of, 31G; dani^er of rebel cajjlui-e of, :iiij; heavy losses at, 3iG, 318; resiUts of the battle, 349; Grant's strength at, 349; movement on Grand Juuetiou from, 352; hoUlin.ii' Memphis and Charleston railroad a't, 352; Sherman starts from Memphis for, 511; Forrest escapes to, II, 428 Corporal punishment in Ohio schools, 1, 13 Corpus Christi, the Fourth Infantry arrives at, I. 39 ; a bath in the bay, 40, 41 ; the Mexican town of, 41, 42 ; assembling of thi^ armv of occupation, 44; military life at, 47; trip to San Antonio from, 47-53; pre- parations for an advance from, 54 ; break- ing mules at, 54-57; advance of the army of invasion from, 59 ; review at, 73 Corse, John M., in battle of Chattanooga, II, 13, 14 ; defense of AUatoona, 237 Corse, M. D., II, 101 Cortez, Hernan, road built by, at Cerro Gordo, I, 100 Corwin, Thomas, attititdo toward the Mex- ican war, I, 45 Cottage Hill, Miss., Sherman at, I, 350 Cotton, demoralization of the troops by the trade in, I, 331, 332 ; working plantations for the N.ational benefit, 354 ; export of, from Wilmington, II, 435 Cotton-gin, its intluence on slavery, I, 179 Courtland, Ala., Hood relTeats toward, II, 432 Covington, Ky., visit to parents at, I, 193; plan of t )rd's operations near, II, 01 Cox's Bridge, N. C, Sherman at, II, 442 " Cracker line," establishing the, I, 505-509, II, 29 Craig's Meeting-Kouse, Va., II, lOG Crawford, Samuel V/.,his command, II, 98; attacks Anderson at Spottsylvania, *123; sent to Tyler's assistance, 143 ; at .Tericho Ford, 149; iiinction with Crittenden, 150; in battle of Five Forks, 305, 306 Criminal classes, dangers of the. North and South, II, 245 Critics, a word about, 1, 128 Crittenden, George, f)U excursion In Mcxi CO, 1, 142 et seq. Crittenden, T. L., at Shiloh, I, *287, 288; re- treats to Chattanooga, 494; question of his restoration to duty, II, 48; junction with Crawford and Warren, 150; crosses the North Anna, 150; engagement with Hill, 150 Crocker, Marcellus M., promoted, brigadier- general, 1, 350 ; at Bruinsburg, 401 ; at Port Gibson, 400; at battle of Eajnnond, 415; as a commander, *416, 480; death of, 416; at battle of .Jackson, 421-423; near Bolton, 426 ; in battle of Champion's Hill, 432, 433 Crook, George, commanding in West Vir- ginia, II, *58, 403, 411 ; operations against the Virginia and Tennessee i-ailroad, 58, 59, 61, 72, 403; moves according to pro- gramme of spring campaign, 106 ; junction with Avcrell, 181, 411; Hunter's junction Willi, 192, 195, 412 ; di'is en from Winchester by Early, 204; sent out between Jiurkes- viUe anil .relersville, 322; moves west of Farmville, 332; to tak<-. I,e\visbiiig, 403 Cross, Trucman, killed b,\- Mexicans, I, '64 Cruces, awaiting transportation at, [,155,156 Cruft, Charles, supports Geary on Lo(djout (Ireek, II, '8; in battle of Lookout Moun- tain, 8, 9 ; serving under Hooker at Chat- tanooga, 20 Crump's Landing, Tenn., operations at, I, 272, 275, 277, 2S5, 290 Cuautla, Mcx., visit to, 1, 145; arrested in, in; Cuernavaca, Mex., occupation of , 1, 133 ; visit to. 140, 147 Cullum, G. "W., congratulates Grant on canture of Fort Donelson, I, 201 ; chief of stait'at Cairo, *267; Grant reports to, 267 Culpeper Court House, Va., Grant's head- ((uaiters at, il, 50, 52, 60; Grant leaves for the front, 105; troops ordered to Wasiiington via, 220; Grant's intention to tight Lee between Kiclimoiid and, 402 Cumberland, Md., II, 204, 207, 417 Cumberland Gap, I, 511, II, 32, 34 Cumberland River, the, I. 215, 232-234, 242- 244, 240, 254, 262, 265, 304, 317, 320, 511, II, 2.56, 258, 428. 433 Curtis, N. M., in expedition again.st Fort Fisher. II, "265, 200, 208 270, 437 Curtis, S. R., put under Sherman's com- mand, I, *357 ; connnanding department of Kansas, II, 427 Cashing, Caleb, member of court of inquiry in Gen. Scott's case, I, 135 Custer, G. A., his command, 11,99: drives the enemy from Oatharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern, '115 ; action at Hawes's Shop, 158; movement against Hampton, 193; in battle of Ce;lar Creek, 223 ; com- mandin'j; cavalry division with Sheridan, 294; ordered south of Appomattox Sta- tion, 335; engagement at Appomattox Station, 330 Cutler, Lysander, his command, IT, 98; at- tacks Anderson at Spott^-ylvania, "123; fucceeds to command of Wadsworth'8 corps, 123 ; his division transferred to Wright's corps, 138; at Jericho Ford, 149; driven back by Hill, 149 Cynthiana, Ky., Morgan captures, II. 425 Dabney's Mills, Va.. interview with Sheri- dan at, II, 301,302; Grant's headquartera at, 310 ; Humiihreys at, 451 Dahlgren. J. A., connnanding on the South Carolina and Georgia coasts, II, '273; to seize points near Charleston, 273 Dallas, Ga., operalions at and near, 11,86, 423, 430 Dalton, Ga., ])lan for operations between Cleveland and, 1, 517, 518 ; Bragg's retreat toward, II, 25 ; operations against rail- roads at, 27, 92,430; Thomas ordered to capture, 43; Johnston confronting Sher- man at, 48, 57,422; .lohnston's position at, 83, 399 ; Schofleld's movenaent from Knox- ville to, S3; McPaerson's movement from Huntsville to, 83, 84; strength of, 84; abandimed by.Tohnston,85 ; Wneelercuts railroad between Kesaca .and, 92 ; Sherman drives Johnston out of, 140; repulse of Wheeler at, 424 474 INDEX Dana, Charles A., In the Vicksburff cam- paign, I, *40(i; sent to Rosecraus's head- quarters, 488 ; in Chattanooga, 491 ; com- nniuicatiou 1(> ^(tanton, 491, 492 ; despatch ti-om, 517 ; at Chattanooga during the bat- tle, II, 28 ; atvDUipauii's Wilsonfrom Chat- tanooga to Kuoxvllle, 28 Daniel, j., II, 101 Danville, Miss., troops at, I, 335 Danville, Va., movements at and near, II, 322, 32:5, 377, 444, 453, 454, 458 Danville road, movements on and against the. If, 140, 231, 299, 301, 310,322,324,407, 447,449,450,453; Lee's avenue of escape, 291, 296, 303, 304, 315, 316 Darby road, the, Kautz's movement on, II, 218; Butler's mistalio on, 225 Davies, H. E., Jr., his command, II, 99 ; cap- tures at PainesviUe, *324, 325, 447 Davies, T. A., I, 335 Davis, Jefferson, on the threatened war, I, *178 ; head of the Southern rebellion, 181 ; visit to Bragg, 507, II, 20, 21 ; letter to A. 8. Johnston, I, 297 ; exalted opinion of his own military talents, II, 22 ; disappointed at Johnston's policy, 227 ; appoints Hood to succeed Joiiustou, 227; denounces Gov. Brown and Uen. Johnston, 228; speeches at Palmetto and Macon, 227-230, 428, 429 ; appeals to the people of Georgia, 228, 229 ; views of Sherman's position, 228-230, 429 ; plan of operations in Kentucky and Ten- nessee, 229,236; feeling between Johnston and, 236, 280 ; agrees with Lee to abandon Richmond and Petersburg, 296 ; abandons Richmond, 316 ; capture of, 368, 370, 371, 459; feelings of Grant and Lincoln to- ward, 368. 369 ; question of his capture in female attire, 370, 371 Davis, Jefferson C, relieves Grant at Jeffer- son City, I, *210; position, Nov. 24, 18G3, 11,11; ordered to Chickamauga Station, 18; serving under Sherman at Chatta- nooga, 20; commanding the Foui-teeuth Corps, 234 ; captures Rome, 423 Davis, Joseph R., II, 102 Davis's Mills, Miss., pursuing the enemy to, 1, 345 Decatur, Ala., troops sent to Buell via, I, 330; rebuilding railroad from Nashville to, 513-515; Sherman ordered to send troops to, II, 39; plan for McPherson to cross the Tennessee at, 83 ; operations be- tween Atlanta and, 90; Sherman's line at, 93; garrisoned by Thomas, 238; Hood camps near, 239 ; Thomas aljandons, 250, 250 ; Rousseau reinforces Sherman at, 424 ; Hood's base at, 429 ; Hood fails to captui'e, 432 Decatur, Miss., Sherman's narrow escape at, II, 41 Dechard, Tenn., Forrest cuts the railroad at, II, 428 Deep Bottom, Va., Butler bridges the James at, II, 199, 414; movements of troops at, 199, 201 ; extent of the Union lines from, 231, 415 ; Merritt sti'ikes the enemy at, 322 ; action, July 28, 1804, 415 Deer Creek, Adm. Porter's explorations on, 1,377 Deerfield, O., the Grants in, I, 3 Delano, Susannah, I, 2 Delaware, represented in Confederate Con- gress, I, 180; fails to pass ordinance of secession, 180 De Loche, , hospitality of, I, 321-323 Democratic Convention of 1864, declares the war a failure, II, 217 Democratic Party, the Simpsons and the, I, 6 Demopolis, Ala., Polk retreats toward, II, 41 Denison, Andrew 'W., II, 98 Dennis, Elias S., defeats a force near Me- don, I, 332 Dent, Ellen, I, 26 Dent, Emma, I, 26 Dent, Frederick T., early friendship with, I, 26 ; sent to make transportation ar- rangements for the Eigliteeuth Corps, II, 178, 179 Dent, Julia, early friendship and affection for, 1, 20, 29, 30 ; engaged to, 29, 30 ; mar- ried to, 153 Department of Arkansas, embraced in Sher- man's command, II, 399. See also De- PART.-VIENT OF THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. Department of Kansas, 8. R. Ctirtis com- manding iu, II, 427 Department of North Carolina, Schofleld as- signed to command the, II, 439 Department of the Cumberland, merged in the Military Division of the Mississippi, I, 491, II, 81 ; Thomas commanding, 81 Department of the Gulf, Banks command- ing, II, 01, 401 ; Banks succeeded by Can- by, 81 ; Department of the Trans-Missis- sippi transferred to, 81 ; constant demand for troops by, 84 ; concentration of stores in the, at New Orleans, 234 ; troops with- drawn from, 416 Department of the James, II, 401 Department of the Mississippi, Halleck commanding the, I, 320 Department of the Missouri, Halleck com- manding the, 1, 231 ; sends reinforcements to Vicksburg, 456 Department of the Ohio, Buell in command, I, 233; merged in the Military Division of the Mississippi, 491, II, 81 ; Foster com- manding, 34, 43; Schofleld commanding, 81 Department of the South, Foster conamand- ing, II, 431 Department of the Susquehanna, necessity of a supreme commander in the, II, 417 ; merged in the Middle Military Division, 419 Department of the Tennessee, Grant in command of the, I, 350; Special Orders No. 110, 390-392; merged in the Military Division of the Mississippi, 491, II, 81; McPhei'Son commanding, 81 Department of the Trans-Mississippi, Steele commanding, II, 81 ; transferred to the Department of the Gulf, 81 Department of Virginia and North Carolina, Ord assigned to command, II, 439 Department of 'Washington, necessity of a sujireme commander in, II, 417; merged in the Middle Military Division, 419 Department of West Virginia, expedition from the, II, 59 ; necessity of a supreme commander in, 417 ; merged In the Middle Military Division, 419 De Shroon's, La., I, 400 " De Soto," the, Ellet loses ihe, I, 387 Destiny, man's inability to control, I, 76 Destruction of rebel property, policy of, I, 304, 305 INDEX 475 Detroit, Mich., in parriRon at, 1, 153; Zacha- riali Chaudler elected mayor, 153 Devens, Charles, In battle of Cold Harbor, II, 107 Devin, T. C, bis command, II, 09, *29l "Diana," steamer, at Nashville, I, 204 Dinwiddie Court House, Va., movements at and near, II, i!03-305, 447, 45(», 451 Discipline, lacli of, among troops, I, 202 Dismounted Rifles, the, I, 27 District of Cairo, I, 233 District of West Tennessee, Grant in com- mand of, I, 320 Divine institution, a, I, 173 Dix, Roger S., I, *.'.0 Dodge, G. M., ordered to rebuild the rail- road between Nashville and Decatur, I, *513; skill in railroad building, 513-515; providing food and forage for his army, 514; report of battle of Atlanta, II, 89; re- commended for promotion, 139 ; wounded, leaves the army, 234 Doles, George, his command, II, 101 ; cap- ture of his division, 138 Donaldson, J. L., commanding organization at Nashville, II, 256 Dorchester, Eng., Matthew Grant emigi-ates from, I, 2 Dorchester, Mass., settlement of Matthew Grant at, I, 1 Douglas, Stephen A., Grant's party aflilia- tious with, I, *172; acquaintance with, 191; debates with Lincoln, II, 50 Dover, Tenn., operations and incidents at, I, 212, 245, 247, 253, 250, 257, 323 Draft, the, recourse to, 1, 369, 481 ; resistance to, II, 210 Draper, Simeon, in charge of abandoned and captured i in iperty at Savannah, II, 271 Drury's Bluff, Va., operations at, II, 73, 74, 140, 14:, 144, 188, 407 Dublin, W. Va., destruction of the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at. II, 72, 140 Duckport, La., canal project, I, 380, 381; Sherman's troops at, 392 Duck River, Hood destroys bridges over, II, 200 Duelling, views on, I, 37 Duguidsville, Va., Sheridan's operations at, 11,445 Duncan, James, placed under arrest, I, n34 ; hostility to Gen. Scott, 134, 135 ; re- leased from arrest, 135 Dunn, William M., sent to Caii-o with des- patches, I, 474 ; sent with letters to Sher- man at Savannah, II, 249 Dunovant, J., II, 102 Dutch Gap, Va., depot for exchange of pris- oners at, I, 469 Eagle Bend, I, 377. 378 Early, Jubal A. his command, 11, 101 ; in the V/ilderaess, *114; admission concerning the battle. 114, 115 ; succeeds to command of Hill's corps, 124; follows Army of the Potomac, 124; crosses the Po, 127; con- fronts Hancock. 128 ; attacks Union right, 143 ; attacks Warren at Huntley Corners, 158; repulsed, 159; sent to the Valley, 181; moves against Hunter, 195; movement against Washington, 195-197, 417 ; retreat to Strasburg, 204; drives Crook from Win- chester, 204^ Wright's pursuit of, 204, 417 ; instructions to commanders operating against, 206 ; strength, 208 ; confiouts Sher- idan in the Valley, 208; compared with SlKU'idan, 208; reinforccmentH lor, 209, 213, 220, 420, 421; fears of aiiotlier attempt to capturt! Washington by, 2i:t; i>laii to have Sheridan attack, 214; attempts to destroy tlie railroatlat Martinsburg, 21f;; defeated at Opcciuan Creek, 216, 420; ))ad f^eneral- ship, 210; retreats to Fisher's Hill, 2](;; fears of reinforcements for, 218; prepares to stiike Sheridan at Harrisonburg, 220 ; pursues Sheridan, 221 ; defeated at Fish- er's Hill, 221, 420 ; intention to crush Sheri- dan, 222; intrenches, 223; in battle of Cedar Creek, 222, 223, 420; defeated by Sheridan, 224, 420 ; losses in the Valley, 224 ; defeated bv Sheridan between Staunton and Char- lottesville, 293 ; movement on Washington, 381 ; defeated at Strasburg, 420 ; defeated by Sheridan at Waynesboro, 445 East and West, possibility of bickerings between, IT, 319, 320; lack of concert be- tween Union armies of the, 397 ; the armies of the, compared, 460 East Chickamauga Creek, II, 26 Eastport, Miss., situation of affairs, opera- tions, (;tc., at, I, 233, 244, 268, 317, 498, 512, II, 274, 278, aOC, 439, 444 East Tennessee and Virginia railroad, ex- peditions against the, II, 403, 411 Eaton, John, organizes negro labor, I, *354 Ebenezer Church, Ala., Wilson defeats For- rest near, II, 458 Edgefield, Tenn., Buell at, I, 263 Education, lack of facilities for, in the West, I, 4, 7 ; U. S. Grant's early, 8, 11, 13 Edward's Station, Miss., operations at and near, I, 415, 420, 424, 427, 428, 431, 477 Egan, T. W., carries bridge over the North .\una, II, 149 Egypt, Miss., Grierson's raid at, II, 434 Eighteenth Army-corps, in battle of Cold Harbor, II, 167 ; strength, 178; sent to But- ler, 178-180; in Meade's command, 201 : in Petersburg mine affair, 201 ; threatening movement against Richmond, 218, 219; Weitzel assigned to command, 219 ; re- lieved by the Second Corps, 415 ; captures Fort Harrison, 421 Eighth U. S. Infantry, at Corpus Christi, I, 44 Electricity, changes -wrought by the appli- cation of, I, 176 Elections, of 18.56, I, 170, 171 ; of 1860, 171-173; of 1862. 4S1 ; of 1804, II, 94, 234 Eleventh Army-corps, I, !503 Elkins's Ferry, Ark., junction of Steele and Thaver at, II, 426 Elk River, Sherman detained at, I, 517 EUet, Charles R., commanding the Marine Brigade, I, 387 ; runs batteries at Grand Guif, 387 ; action on Bed River, 387 Ely's Ford, Va., II, 98, 116, 404 Emorv, W. H., commanding Nineteenth Corps, II, *197; in Washington, 199; in battle of Cedar Creek, 223 Engineer Brigade, the, II, 182, 299 Engineer Corps, at Cerro Gordo, I. 100. 101 ; at San Antonio, 110, 111 ; at Chumbusco, 113 England, attitude on the blockade, 11,388; share in the Mexican imperial scheme, 388 ; attitude toward the United States in the war, 391, 392; the true relations between the United States and, 391, 392 ; treatment of her colonies, 392 476 INDEX " Essex," the gunboat, in capture of Fort Heury, I, 236, 237, 23'.) ; narrow escape of Porter and (iraut on board of, 236, 237 ; explosion of boiler on the, 239 Etowah River, movements on the, 11,151, 423 Europe, the soldiers of, compared with those of the United States, II, 376 ; how the war was regarded in, 388 European troops, compared with Sherman's army after Atlanta, II, 236 Eustis, Henry L., II, 99 Ewell, Richard S., commanding at Jeffer- son Barracks, I, *28; character, 28; ar- rives near Mine Run, II, 106 ; ordered to attack via the Orange Turnpike, 106 ; posi- tion, noon. May 9, 1864, 127; attacks the Union right, 143, 406 ; defeat of, 143 ; sent to the VaUey, 181 ; taken prisoner, April 6, 1865, 332 ; views on the hopelessness of the war, 332 ; losses. May 12, 1864, 405 Ewing, H. B., at Trenton, I, *523 ; in assault on Missionary Ridge, II, 6 Executive Mansion, Grant receives his commission as lieutenant-general at the, 11. 44, 45 Explosive musket-balls, use of, at Vicks- burg, I, 451 Farming, Grant's early training in, I, 8, 9, 12, 13; experiment at Fort Vancouver, 161, 162 ; near St. Louis, 167, 168. Farmington, Miss., Pope's engagement at, I, 313 Farmville, Va., Lee orders rations fi-om Danville to. II, 322, 323 ; the Richmond and Danville railroad at, 328; Read at, 330; movement of Wright and Crook west of, 332; Ord's position between Burkesville Junction and, 332, 454; the Confederates run their trains olf at, 332 ; Grant at, 333, 335, 454, 4.55 ; an incident of the war at, 335, 350; Sheridan's plan to destroy the South Side railroad at, 445 ; the Sixth Corps at, 454 ; Read's action at, 454 Farragut, David G., passes the batteries at Port Hutlson, I, *387 ; visit from, 387 ; op- erations at Mobile, 11,400, 401, 427 Fayetteville, N. C, movements at and near, II, 277, 284, 285, 441, 444 Fernandina, Fla., in Federal possession, II, 54, 398 Ferrero, Edward, his command, II, 100, *143 ; guarding road from Spottsylvanla to Fredericksburg, 143, 144; crosses the Chickahominy, 181; in the Petersburg mine atfair, 202 Fever and ague. Grant incapacitated by, I, 168 Fevers, outbreak of, before Vicksburg, I, ;J82 Field, C. W^., II, 101 Field telegraph, the, II, 117, 118 Fifteenth Army-corps, at the Yazoo River, I, 366; left wing of the Army of the Ten- nessee, 390; at Bruinsburg, 401 ; at Cham- pion's Hill, 428; in operations west of Chattanooga, 11,7; commanded by Gen. Logan, 234 ; in right wing of Sherman's army, 234 Fifth Army-corps, crosses Germanna Ford, II. 97, 98, 404 ; ordered to the South Anna, 148, 406 ; position. May 26, 1864, 153 ; or- dered toward Hanover, 155 ; instructions to Meade for movement of the, 180; to seize Long Bridge, 180 ; in investment of Petersbm-g, 191, 413 ; captures the Weldon railroad, 211 ; in battle of White Oak Road, 299; in advance on Five Forks, 304,452; Warren superseded by Grittin in command, 306, 452 ; in pursuit at Five Forks, 307 ; sent across Hatcher's Run, 307, 422 ; intrenched near JetersvLlle, 323,454; movement via Prince Edward's Court House, 332,454; meets the enemy at Mine Run, 404 ; march toward Spottsylvanla Court House, 405; takes possession of the Weldon railroad, 421; to move on the Vaughn road, 450; to reinforce Sheridan, 452 ; in pursuit to Appomattox, 454-456 ; designated to re- ceive paroles of Lee's anny, 457. See also Griffin; Warren Fifth U. S. Infantry, at Corpus Christi, I, 44 Finegan, Joseph, II, 102 First Army-corps, Army of Northern Vir- ginia, organization of, II. 101 First Army-corps (Union), Hancock ordered to organize the, II, 226 First U. S. Dragoons, in Mexican war, I, 105 Fisher, Joseph W., II, 98 Fisher's Hill, Va., Early's retreat to, II, 216 ; Sheridan routs Early's cavalry at, 221, 420 Fish River, movement of the Sixteenth Corps to, II, 458 Fitzhugh, R. H., II, 100 Five Forks, Va., movements of Humphreys and Warren toward, 299 ; plan to capture, 300, 301, 303 ; Sheridan's advance on, 303- 300, 451 ; Pickett sent to reinforce, 304 ; battle of, 304, 306, 307, 451, 452 ; Merritt at, 307 ; fears that Lee would attempt to re- capture, 308 Five-Mile Creek, McClernand at, I, 413 Flag Pond Battery, captiu-ed by Curtis's brigade, II, 265 Flamingo Island, cholera hospitals on, I, 156, 157 Flat Rock, Ky., visit to, I, 10 Florence, Ala., Sherman arrives at, I, 512; aarrisoned by Thomas, II, 238; Hood crosses the Tennessee at, 240, 432 ; Hood's base at, 240, 429 Florence, Tenn., gunboats at, I, 244 Florida, no claim to the right of secession, 1,174; secession of , 183 ; Federal holdings in, II, 54, 398 Florida, Mo., moving against Harris at, I, 200, 201 Floyd. John B., Secretary of War, I, *181; scatters the army and war material, I, 181,253; commanding at Fort Donelson, *241 ; flight from Fort Donelson, 254, 257, 258 ; character, 253, 254, 267 Folly Island, S. C, Federal possession of, II, 53, 398 Foote, Andrew H., commanding gimboats on the Tennessee River, I, *235; coin- cides with Grant's plan of campaign, 235 ; in expedition against Fort Henry, 236; operations at Fort Donelson, 244, 247-250 ; wounded, 248; visit to, on the flagship, 249, 250 ; congratulated by Halleck, 260 Forage, policy regarding, 1, 304, 305 ; collect- in;;, 353 Ford's Station, Va., Sheridan's movement toward Petersburg from, II, 453 Ford's Theatre, Gen. and Mrs. Grant in- vited to accompany the President to, II, 357 INDEX 477 " Forest Queen," the, running the batteries at Vicksburn', I, 386 Forrest, Nathan B., escape of, from Port Donelson, I, "255, is?; raid on (irjiut's cominunicatious, ;i(iO ; \V. Hooy Sir.itli sent against, II, 40; streuRth ami (iiiality of his cavalry, 40, 41 ; military ability, 41, 57, 229, 278; defeats NV. Sooy Smith, 41 ; force in the West, 57 ; rai->'i. 223 Gettysburg, Pa., battle of, 1,475, 478, II, 47, 54; effect of the liattle ou the couutry, I, 475, 478; Haucoek wounded at, II, "l88; Southern view of the battle, 410 Gibbon, John, his eouiniand, II, 97 ; in battle of the Wilderness, *111, 113; in battle of Spottsylvania, 129, 135, 143 ; recoiiinjended for niajor-freueralship, U. S. Vols., 13'.i; assaults at Cold Harbor, 166, 167 ; assaults Fort Gregg, 311, 453 ; designated to receive paroles of Lee's army, 347, 457 Gillem, A. C. captures and disijerses Mor- gan's men, II, 425 ; operations in Tennes- see, 434 Gillmore, Q. A., reinforces the Army of the James, II, *56, 58, 59, 62, 402, 40G ; sent to attack Petersburg, 410; returns to Ber- muda Himdred, 410 Girard College, visit to, I, 19 Goliad, Tex., niassaere at, I, 34, 48, 49 ; car- ing for Lieut. Augur at, 50,51; adventure with wolves near, 52, 53 Gold, use of, in payment for cotton, 1, 331 Gold-digging, in California, I, 159, 160 Goldsboro, N. C, Sherman's movements to- ward, at, and near, II, 275, 277, 284, 285, 295, 441, 442, 444, 446, 449 ; commuuications with points in Union possession, 2SO-282, 286; troops sent to, to cooperate with Sherman, II, 285, 439, 440; Sherman's march to Wash- ington from, 373,37,4; retreat of the enemy toward. 441 Goochland, Va., Sheridan destroys the James Kiver canal near, II, 294, 445 Gordon, James B., his command, II, 101 Gordon, John B., his command, II, 101 ; re- liites anecdote of Lincoln to A. H. Ste- phens, *290; carries the picket-line at Petersbiu'g, 296 ; appointed to oversee the paroling of Lee's nrmy, 347 Gordonsville, Va., operations at, II, 77, 106, 221, 409, 411, 414 Gore, John H., at captiU'e of the City of Mexico, I, 121 Gorgona, crossing the Isthmus via, I, 154, 155 Governor's Island, N. V., the Fourth In- fantry at, I, 153 Grahamsville, S. C, Hatch's movement toward, II, 432 Grand Qampaign, opening of the, II, 71 Grand Ecore, La., in camp near, I, 31, 35; Banks at, II, 420 Grand Gulf, Miss., running the batteries at, 1,387, 397, 398; land operations at. 388. 394- 397, 401, 402, 409-413, 433, 440. 447, 481, II, 172 Grand Junction, Tenn., operations at, 1,326, 327, 329, 344, 352-355, 361, 362 Granger, Gordon, ordered to Louisville, I, *332-334; in action at Fort Wood, II, 3; with Grant ou Orchard Kuo'o, 17 ; ordered to pursue at Missionary Kidge, 17, 18 ; or- dered to the relief of Burnside, 19, 24, 25 ; orders withholding, 25 ; dilatoriness of, 26, 27 ; reinforces Burnside, 37 ; dilticnlty with Canby about assigning him to com- mand, 279; sent to coiiperate with Far- ragut at Mobile, 427 ; commands the Thirteenth Corps, 458; invests Simuish line Fort, 458 Granger, R. S., reinforces Thomas, II, ''256 Granny White road, Tenn., movements on the. IL 260 Grant, Clara B., dies of consuniptiou, I, 23 Grant, Frederick Dent, birth of, I, 167 ; tlrst t!.\pei-iences m the wai-, 199; at battle of I'ort Gibson, 406; at siege of Vicksburg, 407 ; .sickness of, II, 42 ; at the White House, 44 Grant, Hannah, I, 6 Grant, Jesse R., l)irth of, I, 3; in family of Judge Tod, 3; learns trade in Mavsville, 3; returns to Deertlchl, 4; thirst for edu- cation, 1. 5, 8; interest in (irant (estate iu Connecticut, 5 ; political views, 5; mayor of Georgetown, 5 ; marries Hannah Simp- sou, 7; social position. 8; parental control, 14 ; difl'erence with Hamer, 15, 16 ; removes fi-om (^tain, 164; resigns fi-om the ariuy, 167 ; birth of children to, 167 ; farming near St. Louis, 167, 168; fever and ague, 168; in real-estate business in St. Louis, 168; candidate for oflice of county engineer, 168 ; removes to Galena, 168 ; joins the American Party, 169 ; opin- ions on sects and secret societies, 169, 170; votes for Buchanan, 171 ; position in Ga- lena, 171, 172 ; interest in election of 1860, 172 et seq. ; on the rights of revolution and secession, 173 et seq. ; presides at meeting at Galena, 184; drills troops at Galena, 185 ; assists in office of the ad- jutant-general of Illinois, 186; musters troops into Illinois State service, 187; witnesses stirring scenes in St. Louis, 187- 190; offers services to the government, 192 ; fails to secure apiiointnient from McClellan, 193 ; appointed c(donel 21st Il- linois, 194; in camp at Springfield, 194; meets McCIernand and Logan, 195-197 ; disciplines his troops, 195, 200, 202 ; or- dered to Missouri, 198; at Palmyra, 199; sensations at leading a regiment into battle, 199; brushes up tactics, 203, 204; appointed brigadier-general, 205; selects aides, 205, 203; commanding District of Ironton, 207 ; moves against Price, 208 ; at Jefferson City, 209, 210; difference witl» Prentiss, 211-213; assumes command at Cairo, 213, 214; seizes Paducah, 214-216; attempt to capture, 217 ; movement against Belmont, 218-222 ; battle of Belmont, 222- 229 ; narrow escapes at Belmont, 223-227 ; capture of Forts Heury and Heiman, 231- 240; commanding Disti'ict of Caii'o, 233; sieffe of Port Donelson, 241-259; created major-general of volunteers, 260; goes to Nashville, 263 ; difQculties with Hajleck, 267-270 ; threats of arrest, 269 ; relieved of conmiand, 269; restored to command, 270; at Pittsburg Lauding and ShiloU, 272-306; injured by fall with horse at Pifrsburg Lauding, 276 ; leads the final charge at Shiloh, 288; struck by a bullet, 291 ; nomi- nally commanding rightwiug of Halleck's aiTuy at Pittsburg Landing, 307; in ad- vance on Corinth, 307-314 : refuses to send iu report of battle or Shiloh, 308; anoma- lous position on march to, and at, Corintb. 312-314; asks to be relieved from duty under Halleck, 313, 319; headquarters at Memphis, 319-326; difficulty with cotton- traders, 321, 322 ; iu danger of capture, 322, 323; recalled to Corinth, 325, 326; com- manding District of West Tennessee, 326; ordered to Uvo upon the country, 329; operations against Van Dom and Price, 335 et seq. ; battle of Iidia, 338-343 ; battle of Corinth, 315-349 ; commanding Depart- ment of the Tenuessee, 350; the campaign against Vicksburg, 351-482; strength at opening of Vicksburg campaign, 352 ; em- ploying freedmen, 353, 354; troubles with McCIernand, 355, 358-360, 367, 368, 404, 429, 434, 435, 444, 457; at Holly Springs, 355, 365 ; ordered to divide his command into four army-corps, 3G0; assumes command at Youug's Point, 368; newspaper comments on his position before Vicksburg, 382; fancy for a cavalry commission, 383 ; sup- ported by the Presideut and Halleck, 383, 384; visit to New Carthage, 389; issues Special Orders No. 10, 330-392 ; attack on Grand Gulf, 394-400; operations below Vicksburg, 400 et seq.; capture of Port Gibson, 405-407 ; lack of comforts, 406, 407, 410; occupation of Grand Crulf, 409,410; cuts loose from base at Grand Gulf, 411; move- ment up the Big Black, 413^15; battle of Raymond, 414, 415; capture of Jackson, 417^24 ; battle of Champion's HUl, 428-436; battle of Black River Bridge, 437-440; crossing the Big Black, 440, 441; invest- ment of Vicksburg, 441 et seq. ; assaulting the works, 4-11-445'; siege of Vicksburg, 446 et seq. ; credited by Shennan with the Vicksburg camjiaign, 453, 454; surrender of Vickslmrg, 464-473; enters Vicksburg, 473 ; reti-ospect of the Vicksbtu'g cam- paign, 478-482 ; proposes campaign against Mobile, 484; visits Banks, 4S6,' 487 ; acci- dent in New Orleans, 487 ; ordered to re- liort at Cairo, 489 ; meeting with Stanton, 490, 491, 496, 497 ; commanding Military Di- vision of Mississippi, 491, 497; meeting with Andrew Johnson, 497 ; arrives at Chattanooga, 499; assumes command at Chattanooga, 501; opens the "cracker line," 501 et seq.; saluted bv the pickets of the enemy at Chattanooga Creek, 509, 510; plans of the battle of Chatt.anooga, 518 et seq. ; battle of Lookout Mountaiin, II, 1 et seq. ; battle of Chattanooga, 12 et seq.; note concerning his autobiographi- cal work, 23; congratulations from Pres. Lincoln on the raising of the sieue of Knoxville, 32 ; headquarters at Nashville, 32-36; Congress votes a gold medal to, lor Vicksburg and Chattanooga, 33 ; present- ed with the " Chattanooga sword," 33 ; final depository of medals, swords, etc., presented to, 33 ; visit to Knoxville, 34, 35 ; difference with Stanton, 35-37 ; operations INDEX 481 m Mississippi, 39-41 ; commissioned licn- tenaut-seueral, 44, 45,97; lirst iutcrviow witli President Lineolii, 44, 50-5?; disin- cliuatiou to pulilic speiikiiiK, 45 ; visits tlie Army of the Potomac at Brandy .Station, 45-5o"; relations witli Meade, 4(5, 47 ; plaeed in conimand ot all the armies, 47, !)7, aon ; headquarters at Ciilpeiier Court House, 50,66; plans for the eampaisn, 5:{ et seq., 397, 398 ; visits Butler at Fortress INlonroe, 60; uarrow escape from capture by Mos- hy, 66, 67 ; interview with Lincoln, 67, 68; impleasant exiierienees with William Swiuton, 68-70; conuueucement of the Grand Campaign, 71 ct seq.; declining health, and hasty completion of his Me- moirs, 71 ; conimeudation of Butler by, 76 ; goes from Cincinnati to Washington, 81; approves Johnston's tactics in Atlanta campaign, 88; grand movement of the Array of the Potomac, 95 et seq.; leaves Culpeper Court House for the front, 105 ; battle of the Wilderness, 105 et seq.; plan of initiating attack, 107 ; uarrow escape from capture, 121 ; battle of Spottsylvauia, 126 et seq.; aids a Uuion woman in Vir- ginia, 138 ; reduces the artillery, 144 ; battle of the North Anna, 149 ; an incident of the march, 152, 153 ; battle of Cold Harbor, 162 etseq.; correspondence with Lee regard- ing dead and wounded at Cold Harbor, 169-171; movement across the Chickahom- iny and James, 174-182; visits Butler at Bermuda Hundred, 185, 186, 412; move- ment on Petersburg, 186-191; defense of Washington, 196, 197; the Petersburg mine, 198-203; proposes to follow the en- emy to the death, 206; visits Hunter ou the Monocacy, 207, 208, 418, 419; revision of his orders by HaUeck and Stanton, 214; visit to Bheridan, 214, 215 : close of the campaign for the winter, 1864-65, 22.5 ; ap- proves J. E. Johnston's military policy, 227, 228; criticism of Pres. Davis's military policy, 228, 236 ; invites Sherman's views, 231, 232 ; authorizes Sherman to cut loose from his base, 238; definitely approves Sherman's campaign through Georgia. 240, 430 ; credits Sherman with plans and execution of the march to the sea, 252, 253; proposes to go to Nashville to over- see Thomas's movements, 258, 2.59, 433; threatens Thomas with removal, 259 ; ex- pedition against Fort Fisher, 261-270, 435, 439,440; requests that Butler be relieved, 439; approves Sherman's plan of march through the Caroliuas, 272, 441 ; goes to Washington, Jan. 21, 1865, 273 ; provisions for coJiperation with Sherman, 273-275; orders campaign against Mobile, 274. 275, 277,279 ; consrralulatesThonias.276 ; makes tour of in.spection with Schotield, 280; holds Lee down at Richmond, 285 ; re- ceives the Peace Commissioners, 287, 288; refrains from discussing peace with the Commissioners, 288 ; refuses to ackuow- led"-e the Confederate government, 288; visited by Lincoln at City Point, 289, 290 ; fears a prolongation of the war, 291 ; anx- iety before Petersburg, 291, 295 ; impa- tience for the spring campaign of 1865, 293; battle of White Oak Eoad, 29C; inter- view with Sheridan at Dabney's Mills, 300-302 ; authorizes the removal of War- ren, 306; enters Petersburg, 314; state- VoL. II.— 31 mcnt of a so-called engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia to, ;n4, 315; congrat- ulated by the I'resident at Petersburg, 31k; plan lor Sherman to unite with, 318; fall of Kichmond, 320; pursuit of Lee, 321- 336; a night ride to join Meade, 326; Ijattle of Sailor's Creek, 328 ; goes to Farm- ville, 333; correspondence i nd communi- calious wilh Lee, concerning surrender, 333, 3:14,337-349; sickness belort' Leci's sur- render, 337, 338; dischnnis authority to treat for peace, 3:53; contrasted with Lee, 341,342; acquaintance with Lee, 341,342; goes to Wasiiiiigton, 347, 357 : declines the President's invitation to attend Ford's Theater, 357; inl'ornied of the assa.ssiiia- tion of Ihe President, 358; views on re- construction and negro suli'rage, 359-361; goes to Norlli Carolina to adjust Sher- man's dillicuUies, 305; anxiety for cap- ture of Mobile, 307; feeling in regard to Jcll'erson Davis, 368, 369; the end ol the war, 373 et seq. ; grand review at Wash- ington, 378-380; estimates of his corps commanders, 382-385; opinion on slor verv, 386; conclusion of the Memoirs, 386-396; his illness, 395; Con federate sym- pathy l'or,3'. 6 ; interview with Sheridan at Monocacy, 419 ; eorrespondence : wilh But- ler, 178, 435, 436 ; with Canl)y, 279, 280; with Halleck, 132, 133, 138, 141, 1.53. 174. 188, 205, 206,411; with Hunter, 176, 418; with Lee, 169-171, 333, 334, 337-339, :?.13-346, 454-457; with Lincoln. 206, 267; with Meade, 148, 154, 159, 166. 168, 180, 200; with Sclioaeld, 440; with Sheridan, 221, 222, 278, 324, 444, 450, 451; with Sherman, 230-233, 249, 250, 273-275. 429. 430, 453, 454; with Stautou, 139 ; with Terry, 437, 438 ; with Thomas, 257, 258. 442, 443, 446 „.,,,- ^.i. Grant, Ulysses Simpson, Jr. (" Buck ) , birth of, I, 107 . J , ^ -TT .,«- Gravelly Run, Va., Warren s delay at, 11, iOo Gravois Creek, Mo., Grant's mischance in the. 1, 28, 29 , ^ . TT Graysvilie, Ga., movements at and near, li, 18 19 25 26 Great Britain, insists on effective blockade, 11,261 . ^ , Greensboro, N. C, operations at and near, 11,4.54,458 ^ ^^r ■, r. Greensburg, Pa., settlement of Noah Grant near, I, 2 Greenville, Miss., Steele's expedition to, I, 392 Greenville, Mo., movement against Hardee at, I, 207, 208 Greenville, Tenn., Morgan killea near, 11, 425 Greenwood, Miss., fortifications at, I, 376 Gref^i^ John, tights McPhersou at Raymond, I, '^415; in Army of Northern Virginia, 11, Gregp- D McM., engasementonthe Chicka- hominy, II, 79; crosses Ely's Ford 98 ; his conimand, 99 ; advances toward Chan- cellorsville, 103 ; in battle of the W ilder- ness, 109; movement toward Hanover, 156; action at Hawes's Shop, 158; threat- ening movements against Richmond, 209, 420; unsuccessful attempt to desti-oy the AVeldon railroad, 212 ; returns to the front of Petersburg, 421 ; defeated at Reams s Station, 421 ; attacked near Poplar Spring Church, 421 482 INDEX Gregg, J. I., II, 99 Grenada, Miss., movements at and near, I, 352, aSi", 365, 454, II, 434 •' Grengos, Los," Mexican opinion of, I, 79 Gresham, W. Q., wounded before Atlanta, TT ^'HH Grie'rson, B. H., raids in Mississippi, I, *408, II, 434 ; sent to command Canby's cavalry, 27K Griffin, Charles, liis command, II, 98; traus- tcried to Hancock's corps, 138; at Jericlio Ford, 149 ; in battle of Five Forks, 305, 306 ; succeeds Warren in command of the Fifth Corps, 306, 452 ; Intrenched across the rail- road south of Jeters-ville, 323 ; movement, April 6, 18G5, 330 : movement via Pi-ince Edwai-d's Court House, 332 ; in ensase- ment at Appomattox Station, 336 ; desis- nated to receive the paroles of Lee's army, 317. 457; military character, *385 ; action near the Quaker road, 451 Griffin, Simon G., II, 100 Griffith, James, I, 6 Griffith, Louis, I, 6 Griffith, Mary, I, 6 Grimes's Brigade, II, 101 Grindstone crossing, the, I, 409 Groierty, Gen., I, 18 Grose, 'William, operations at Lookout Creek, II, *8 Guadalupe, the road to the City of Mexico thi'ouj^h, I, 128 Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of, 1, 134, 137, 152 Guadalupe River, I, 48, 209 Guerrillas, raids by, I, 200, 318, 331, 332, 486, 512, II, 308, oO'J, 425 Guiney's Station, Va., movements at, II, 146-148 Gulf of Mexico, Cauby to operate in the in- terior from the, II, 275 Gunboats, at Belmont, I, 210, 227 ; at Fort Henry, 236, 238-240; their value, 241; at Fort Donelsou, 244^250, 267 ; at Nashville, 262; at Pittsburg Landing, 285, 288, .303; at Memphis, 317, 328; at Vicksburg, 357, 386, 474; at Arkansas Post, 366; at Yazoo Pass, 376; at Fort Pemberton, 376; on the bayous, 377-379; at Grand Gulf, 396; at Haines's Bluff, 400; capture of, by For- rest's cavalrv, II, 229, 432 ; at Fort Fisher, 265; at Plymouth, 407 ; in Red River, 426 Guntown, Miss., defeat of Stui-gis by For- rest at, II, 424 Gwin, William, at Pittsburg Landing, I, *285 Hackleman, P. A., killed at Corinth, I, *348 Hagerstown, Md., occupied by the enemy, II, 416 Haines's Bluff, Miss., operations at, I, 371, 398, 400, 401, 414, 448, 455, 456, 458. 482, 484 Hains, Peter C, bridge-building by, I, 389, 441 Halleck, Henry W., supersedes Gen. Fre- mont, I, *231; visit to. at St. Louis, 234, 235; orders movement against Fort Henry, 235; sends reinforcements to Grant at Fort Donelson, 243 ; attitude on subject of capturing Donelson, 244; con- gratulates Hunter, 260; credits C. F. Smith with captme, 260; Grant's diffi- culties with, 260, 261, 267-270, 305, 306, 319 ; caUs for more troops, 269; congratula- tory letter to Grant, 270; opinion of C. F. Smith, 270; Grant's letter to, after Shiloh, 305; assumes command in the field, 305, 307, 334 ; establishes headquar- ters at Pittsburg Landing, 305, 307 ; Grant's reasons for not reporting the battle of Shiloh to, 305, 306; his army at Pittsburg Landing, 307 ; orders Grant to send in report of Shiloh, 308; headquarters on road to Corinth, 313; frowns on a sug- gestion by Grant, 314 ; anticipates attack- at Corinth, 315; fortilies Corinth, 316; de- pletes his army, 317, 327 ; Grant asks per- mission to remove headquarters to Mem- phis, 319; appointed to command of all the annies, 325 ; boundaries of his district, 326; orders the repair of the Mobile and Ohio railroad, 326 ; leaves Corinth for Washington, 326; advice from, as to the scattering of troops, 329; advises the re- inforcing of Buell, .329; relations with Sheridan, 333, 334 ; anxiety about Tennes- see, 337, 523, II, 11 ; correspondence with, concerning Roseci'ans's insubordination, I, 348; proposal to, to move against Vicksburg, 349 ; despatch to, announcing opening of the Vicksburg campaign', 352 ; gives fiill command to Grant, 355; orders reinforcements from Helena, 356 ; constd- tation with, as to movements against Vicksburg, 358 ; informed of the Duckport canal project, 381; supports Grant, 383; informed of successes at Grand Gidf, 410 ; character and peculiarities, 411, 485; ad- vices to, concerning reinforcements for J. E. Johnston, 419; notified of pending attack on Jackson, 421 ; orders Grant to return to Grand GitU and cooperate with Banks, 440; forwards reinforcements to Vicksburg, 449, 456 ; news of the surreuder of Vicksburg annoiuiccd to, 474; misun- derstanding about prisoners, 478, 479; trans-Mississippi campaign views of, 484; disapproves the MobUe project, 484, 485 : orders troops to Memphis and Tuscumbia, 487; suggests that Sherman be sent to Memphis, 488; alarmed at residts of Chickamauga, 488; suggests that Grant go to Nash\'ille, 488, 491 ; Grant's sugges- tions to, concerning Rosecrans, 492; or- ders Rosecrans to inove against Bragg, 492 ; informs Grant of results of Chicka- mauga, 494; notified of Grant's arrival at Chattanooga, 500; orders reinforcements for Rosecrans, 503 ; congratiUations from, on operations of Nov. 24, 1863, 11, 11 ; in- formed of the battle of Chattanooga, 19 ; letter from, concerning Foster and Scho- fleld, 43 ; invites views of campaign for the armies of the Military Division of the Mis- sissippi, 48; Grant writes to, concerning the spring campaign, 48; cautions Grant against contlding plans to the Presi- dent, 51; Grant's reticence with, 52; sug- gests Sheridan for command of cavalry, 60; warned against holding Plymouth and Washington, N. C, 64; orders Banks to operate on the Red Ri\er, 64, 65; an- nounces Sigel's defeat and retreat, 72; letters and despatches from Grant to : (May 11, 1864) 132, (May 12) l.S8. (May 16) 141, (May 20) 411, (May 25) 411, (May 26) 153, (June 5) 174, (June 17) 188, (Aug. 1) 205, 206; inquiry addressed to, concerning Sigel, 142; asked to secure naval cooper- ation in changing base from Fredericks- burg to Port Royal, 142; orders sent to INDEX 483 Hirnter througli. 152; orders for Butler seut through, ioi ; orders to, Miiy 30, 1804, 159; iinfoldiug of plau to, for loft-llank movement across tlie Cliickahoiuiuy uiid James, 174; ordered to send reinforce- ments to City Point, 178; uotitlcd of oper- ations'before Petersburg, 188; bad policy concerning the Shenandoah Valley, 205; distrust of Hunter, 208 ; informs Grant of resistance to the draft, 210; advises tak- ing in sail, 210 ; revision of Grant's or- ders by, 214 ; garbles an order to Sherid.m, 221; Grant suggests movement against Mobile to, 233 ; bitter opposition to Sher- man's movements in Georgia, 253; inter- view with, 274; views as to movements about Petersburg and City I'oint, 302 ; seut to Richmond to command Virginia, 374 ; forbids Sherman's troops to obey him, 374; Shei-man resents his indignities, 374; Sheridan ordered to report to, 418 Halls of the Montezumas, the, I, 125, 127 Halltown, Va., movement of troops to, II, 207. 418 Hamburg Landing^Tenn., operations at, I, 273, 307 Hamer,T. L., difference with.Tesse K. Grant, I, *15, It; ; procures (jraut's appointment to West Point, 15, 16; personal relations with, 75; major of Ohio volimteers in Mexico, 75 ; character, 75; death, 75 Hamilton, C. S., promoted major-general, I, *350; commanding center of the Army of the Tennessee, 352 Hampton, Wade, his command, II, 102 ; or- dered to the defense of the Valley, *193 ; defeated by Sheridan, 193 ; returns to Richmond, 194; ojiposes Sherman near Columbia, 282; abandons Columbia, 282; denies the firing of Colimibia, 282 ; escapes from Sherman at FayetteviUe, 284 ; cap- ture of cattle by, 290 Hampton Roads,Va., interview between the President and the Peace Commissioners at, 289, 290, 363 ; arrival of the Nineteenth Corps at, 416 ; conference between Porter, Butler, and Grant at, 435; fonnation of the Fort Fisher expedition at, 435 Hancock, W. S., commanding Second Army- corps, II, 97 ; crosses the Rapidan, 98, 103, 104; orders for movements. May 5, 1864, 106: in battle of the Wilderness, 107-114; ordered to take the right of line, 120 ; en- thusiasm of his corps, 120; expected at- tack on, 120; orders for. May 7, 120; at Todd's Tavern, 123-125. 127; ordered to support Warren, 123 ; relative positions of Warren and, 125 ; detained from battle of Spottsylvania, 125 ; on the Brock road, 126; in battle of Spottsylvania, 127-131, 134-137, 405 ; Griffin's division transferred to, 138; recommended for brigadier-gen- eralship, U. 8. A., 139; movement, May 14-15, 1864, 140; assaults, May 18, 141 ; rein- forcements for, 142 ; comes to Tyler's as- sistance, 143 ; military and personal char- acteristics, 143, 148, 189, *383, 384; orders for his advance toward Richmond, 145 ; march to Milford, 146 ; attempts to get be- tween Lee and Richmond, 147 ; ordered to Chesterfield Ford, 148 ; crosses the North Anna, 149, 150 ; ordered to send troops to Ox Ford, 150; Burnside ordered to send troops to, 150; Potter joins, 150; crosses the North Anna at Chesterfield Ford, 153 ; supports for, 155 ; ordered to move toward Hanover Town, 155; movement, May 27, 18(!4, 156; jtosition (ui lh(! Pamunkey,157; position. May 30, 158; advances toward To- topotomoy Creek, 158; to throw trooi)S across the Totopotomoy, 159; action. May 30, 159, 161 ; attack on, June 1, 164 ; move- ment, .Iun(! 1-2, 104, 105; ordered to as- sault, June 3, 160, 108; opinion of situation at Col(i;Harl)or, 108; his left extended to the Chickahominy, 177; crosses tlK^Chick- ahominy at Long Bridge, 181 ; crosses the James, 182 ; at Charles City Court House, 182; operations before I'l^tersburg, 186- 190,413,421; wounded at (Gettysburg, 188; temporarily relic^vcd by Meade, 188; Bir- ney in command of his corps, 190; movo- nuijit via Deep Bottom, 199, 201 ; threaten- ing movements against Richmond. 2(i9; unsuccessful attempt to destroy the Weldon railroad, 212; relieved of com- mand of the Second Corps, 226; succeeded by Himiphreys, 220 ; ordered to organize the Fii'st Corps, 226 ; proposed plans for, for the spring campaign. 1865, 226; junc- tion of Warren and, 422 ; in action at Hat- cher's Run, 422; coiu'cntrates at Win- chester, 440 Hankinson's Ferry, Miss., operations at, I, 409-411, 413 Hannibal & St. Joseph railroad, Grant or- dered to duty on the, I, 198 Hanover Court House, Va., operations at, II, 158,161, 408 Hanover Town, Va., movements at, II, 153- 157, 408 Hardee, ^V. J., his "Tactics," I, 64, 203; captured by Mexicans, 04; in camj) at Greenville, '*207 ; last battle before Atlan- ta, II, 93; abandons Atlanta, 93; raises troops to confront Shennan, 247 ; blows up the navy-yard and evacuates SavauTiah, 251, 252; opposes Sherman's advance through the Cai-olinas, 280 ; escapes from Shennan at FayetteviUe, 284 Hardeeville, S. C, movement of Sherman's left from, II, 277 " Hard tack ! hard tack ! " I, 443 Hard Times, Miss., assembling at, I, 394, 395; MoPherson at, 4C0; ditliculty of bring- ing up the train to, 407 ; F. P. Blair at, 412 Hardwicksville, Va., destruction of bridge at, II, 445 Harney, W. S., in Mexican war, I, -105 Harper's Ferry, Va., John Brown's inviir siou of, 1.4 ; movements of troops at, II, 59, 195, 207, 215, 416-419 Harris, N. H., II, 102 Harris, Thomas, Grant moves against, I, 200, 201; reciprocity of feeling between Grant and. 201, II, 372 Harrisburg, Pa., I, 18 Harrisonburg, Va., Sheridan and Early at, II, 216, 220, 420 Harris's Store, Va., movements at, II, 148, 149 Harrodsburg, Ky.,the Soldiers' Home in, I, 133 " Hartford," the, passes the batteries at Port Hudson, I. 387 Hartranft, John F., his command, 11.100; in action before Petersburg, March 24, 1865, *298 Hartsuff, G. L., II, *310, 311 484 INDEX Haslett, Lieut., 1, 31 . „. . . . _ ... Hatch, Edward, raid m Mississippi, I, '408 Hatch, John P., to destroy Hardee's com- muiiii'atioiis at Savauiiab, II, 251 ; com- mandiug expt-dition on Broad River, 4^2; defeated at Honey Hill, 4^2 Hatcher's Run. Va., movements, ena;a£re- nieilts. etc., OU, II, 293, 307, 309, 422, 447, 450, Hftc'hie River, operations on the, I. 329 ^^^5 Hawes's Shop, Va., action at, II, 1;.8, 408 Hawkins, John P., chief commissary, at fehi- lOh, I, 291 TT 1,Q Hawkins's Creek, troops ordered to, II, 148 Haxall's L-anding, Va., camps at, II, 79, 40G Hayes, R. B., military career and charac- ter il *224 Hays, Alexander, his command, II, 97 ; killed in the Wilderness, *108 Hays, H.T., II, 101 Hazen W. B., in expedition to Brown s Ferry. I. ^:J04,505 ; captures Fort McAllis- ter, il, 218 Hebert, PaulO.,I, *151 Heckman, C. A., succeeds Ord m command, II. *219 Helena, Ark., movements, operations, etc., at, I, 345, 350, 358, 365, 375, 376, 473 Henderson's Hill, La., battle of, II, 426 " Henry Clay," the, riiiming the batteries at Vicksbur.a:, I, 386 Herron, F. J., in siege of Vickshurg, I, 456, *458 Heth. Henry, his comiiumd, II, 102; in the Wilderness, 108 ; cut ott' from Petersburg, *313 Hickman, Ky., Confederate occupation of, I, 216; Union capture of, 304 Hickman's Creek, Tenn., I, 242, 243, 245 Hicks, S. G., repulses Forrest at Paducah, II. 425 ^ ., ^ ^ Hicksford, Va., destruction of railroad at, II, 200, 402, 422, 427 High Bridge, Va., movements and opera- tions at, II, 328, 330, 333, 454 Hill, A. P., ordered to attack via Orange plank road, II, *106; Longstreet to rein- force, 109 ; failure to pursue, after battle of the Wilderuess, 122 ; succeeded in com- mand by Early, 124 ; defeated b7 Kautz, 133, 407 , attacks and is defeated by War- ren, 149; engages Crittenden at crossing of the North Anna, 150 Hillyer, W. S., appointed aide-de-camp, I, *205 ; brings bad news at Fort Donelson, 250; suggests that Grant exchange into Army of "the Potomac, 383 Hilton Head, S. C, Union possession of, 11,-53,248,398 , ,. Hinks, E. W^., commanding colored troops in movement- against Pctersbtu'g, II, 186 History, the need of truthful, 1, 132 Hoffman, V/illiam, at Churubusco, I. *112 Hoke, R. F., his command, II, 101; in North Carolina, *144; reinforces Lee, 151 ; rein- forces Beauregard, 188; sent to Fort Fisher, 2i';5, 266; captures Plymouth, 407 Holly Springs, Miss., Price at, I, 329; Pcni- berton at, 349, 352 ; Union capture of, 355 ; captuj-ed liy Van Dorn, 360, 361 ; reprehen- sible conduct of Col. Murphy at, 362 ; les- son of its capture, 362 ; Grant's return to, 365 Holmes, T. H., early acquaintance with, I, *54, 151 ; repulsed at Helena, 473 Holston River, movements on, for relief of Burnside, H, 19, 24, 28, 29; Union holdings 53 Honey Hill, S. C, defeat of Hatch at, II, 432 Hood, J. B., supersedes Johnston, II, *87, 227, 236, 423; l)attles before Atlanta, 88-90; blows up works and evacuates Atlanta, 93 ; assumes the otfensive, 227 ; military policy, 228 ; weakened by loss of Georgia State troops, 229; operations between Sherman and, in his retreat from Atlanta, 229, 231-233, 236, 429-431; correspondence with Sherman, 233; strength after At- lanta, 236; Sherman's anticipation of his movements, 238; moves north, 238, 239, 429-432; under Beaui-egard's supervising command, 239; crosses the Teunessee at Florence, 240, 254, 432 ; advances on Nash- ville, 250. 132; strength, 250, 254; turns Schotield's position, 254; defeated at Franklin, 255,432, 433; invests Nashville, 256, 433, 410; Thomas prepares to receive, 256; fears of his eluding Thomas, 256-258; fears of his getting north, 257, 258; de- feated at NashA-ille, 259, 200, 433, 440 ; gets possession of Franklin, 260; makes good his escape, 260; destroys bridges over Duck River, 260 ; recrosses the Tennessee, 274, 276, 433 ; sluggish pursuit of, 274, 434 : remains of his army sent against Sher- man, 280, 283, 285, 443; fails to capture De- catur, 432; junction with Forrest, 432; demoralization of his army, 443 Hooker, Joseph, commanding reinforce- ments at CUiattanooga, I, "503; expedi- tion to Brown's Ferry, 504, 505 ; supplies the troops at Chattanooga with full ra- tions. 506; strength, 508; in battle of Wauhatchie, 508, 509; plan of operations at Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga, and Missionary Ridge, 517, 519, 520; position iuLookout Valley, 521; change tu orders to, .521, 522, II, 4, 23 ; Osterhaus ordered to report to, 4; operations west of Chatta- nooga, 7 ; sends Geary up Lookout Creek, 8; in battle of Lookout Mountain, 9, 10, 3S3 ; orders to attaclt, Nov. 25, 1863, 12 ; In battle of Chattanooga, 14, 18, 383 ; crosses Chattanooga Creek, 19; operations at Rossville, 19; mingling of forces imder, at Chattanooga, 20; his work at Chatta- nooga planned beforehand, 23; move- ment from RossviUe toward Ringgold, 25; operations at Ringgold, 26 ; battle be- fore Atlanta, 88; commanding Army of the Potomac, 382; military and personal characteristics, 383 ; drives the enemy to New Hoi>e Church, 423 Horses, Grant's fondness for, I, 9, 10; inci- dents and accidents with, 10-12, 57, 58, 87, 226 276, 291, 292,487 ; Mexican trade in, 47 ; wild, in Texas, 46, 47, 61; price of, in Cor- pus Christi, 57, .=^8, 61 ,, ^ ^ Hoskins, Charles, adjutant. Fourth Infan- try, I, *83 ; killed at Monterey, 84 Hospitals, before Vicksburg, I, 382 ; service between Duckport and Milliken's Bend, 391 Hovey, A. P., cuts the road in Pemberton's rear, I, *35fi; at battle of Port Gibson, 403 ; at Bolton, 426 ; in battle of Champi- on's Hill, 428, 429, 431-435 Howard, B. B., speaks at meeting at Ga- lena, I, 184 . T T Howard, O. O., headquarters at Jasper, I, INDEX 485 *498 ; coramandinp: Eleventli Coinis, 503 ; ordered to reinforce Kosecraiis, rMi ; eiii)- tmes Browii'H Ferrv, SOf); ordered to Geary's relief at Waidiatchie, 508 ; plan of operations at Cbattanooj?a. 519 ; niarcli of, deceives the en(>my, 521, 525 ; in action at Fort Wood, II, 3 ; crosses Citico Creek, 7 ; junction with Slieriuau, 7; ordered to cross the Cliickamanga, 18; serviuK un- der Slierniau at Cliattanoosa. 20; eom- mauding right wing of Sherman's army, 234; succeeds Logan in command, 235, 423 ; marches to Jonesboro, 240 ; military ability, 423 Hudson, Capt., mission to Sherman, II, 275 Hudson Bay Co., Indian trade iu the North- west, I, 162, 1(54 Humboldt, Tenn., Ord's command at, 1,335 Humboldt Bay, Cal., the Fourth Infantry ordered to, 1, 164, 165 Humphreys, A. A., put in special charge of ■Warren's corps, II, *138; recommended for maior-geueralship, U. S. Vols., 139 ; chief of stall". Army of the Potomac, 226; assigned to command the Second Corps, 226; in battle of White Oak Road, 299 ; at Five Forks, 303, 304. 452 ; in action of April 2, 1865, 308, 309, 312, 313 ; at yutherlaud's Station, 312; goes to Miles's relief, 312, 313; reinforces Sheridan, 316; out or ra- tions, 322, 324; reaches Jetersville, 325; confronts Lee, 331, 333; reinforced by Wright, 332 ; military character, 385 ; at Hatcher's Run, 450, 451. 453 Humphreys, B. G., II, 101 . ^ tt ak- Hundred-days men. garrison duty for, 11,416 Hunt, H. J., commanding artillery, Army of the Rotomac, II, *97, 100 Hunter, David, sends reinforcements to Grant, I, *243 ; congratulated by Halleck on the fall of Donelson, 260 ; nominated by the press as Grant's successor, 382; suc- ceeds Sigel iu command. II, 142, 152, 195, 411 ; to move up the Valley of Virginia, 152 ; movements in aid of, 168 ; movements toward, at, and from Lynchburg. 175, 176, 194, 195, 411. 412, 416; Lee's opportunity to attack, 175, 176 ; ordered to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, 176, 177, 192; letter to, June 6, 1864, 170: ordered to destroy the Virginia Central railroad, 176, 177; Sheridan sent to commuuicate with, 176, 177; success at Staunton, 177, 181, 192; Lee sends troops against, 192, 193, 195,412; proposed iunction with Sheridan at Char- lottesville, 192, 194, 410; junction ^ylth Averell and Crook, 192, 195, 412 ; operations in the Shenandoah VaUey, 192, 194, 195, 412. 417 ; takes the offensive, 195, 412 ; in- vests Lexington, 195; defeats the enemy at Piedmont, 195, 412 ; retreats to Harper s Ferry, 195, 416 ; difficulties of his march, 195 412 ; commanding in the Valley, 206 ; instructions to, 207, 418 ; perplexed by con- tradictory orders, 207 ; Grant visits, on the Monocacy, 207, 418. 419 ; superseded by Sheridan, 207. 419 ; Halleck's distrust of, 208; patriotism and military character, 208 412 419; at meeting between Sheridan and Grant, 208 ; to live on the country, 411- to move toward Gordonsville.Chai- lottesville, and Staunton, 411 ; criticism of his movements, 412 Hunter, R. M. T., Confederate Peace Com- missioner. II, *287 Huntley Corners, Va., Warren at, II, 158 Hunton, Eppa, II, 101 Huntsville, Ala., McPherson commanduig at, II, 82; McPherson's movement to Dalton from, 83, 84 ; Buford denmnds sur- render of, 428 ^ . . Hurlbut, S. A., coiiiuianding division of Army of the Telluess(^<^ I, *274 ; at Shl- loh, 279, 284, 288, 302; commanding at La Grange, Miss., 320; reinforces Koseerans at Corinth, 346; skirmish with Van Dom, 346; .at Hatchie Bridge, 347; junction with Ord, 347; at Young's Point, 367; ordered to relievo Blair, 413; at Memplns, 413, 488, II, 39 ; expulsion of alleged rebel from Memphis by, I, 425 ; sends reinforcements to Vicksburu-, 448, 455, 4.50 ; Halleck's or- ders to, 488;' cavalry strength, II, 40; to reinforce Sooy Smith, 40 Illinois, mustering in volunteers, 1, 18.5-187, 193-198; secession spirit in, 196; Grant ap- pointed brigatlier-gcneral from, 205; Grant's command iu southern, 211; Grant's strength in, 349 Illinois River, transportation on the, 1, 198 Indianapolis, Ind., meeting with Stanton at, I, 490 " Indianola," the, capture of, I, 387, 388 Indians, Mexican pi ecautious against raids by, I, 48 ; treatment by the Hudson Bay Company, 162; trade with, 162, 163; mor- tality among, 163, 164 ; Sheridan's services against, 333; kill Canby in Oregon, II, 377 " Inevitable conflict," the, I, 170 Ingalls, Rufus, administration of the quar- termaster's de])artiiicnt. Army of the Po- tomac, II, *'.: 4, 105, 411 Interstate co.-.merce, efl'ect of the spread of, II, 387, 388 Invalid Corps, on garrison duty, II, 416 Iowa, traveling in, I, 177 , ^ ^ ^ Ironton, Mo., the 21st Illinois ordered to, I, 193; Grant commanding the district of, 207 Irving, Washington, fondness for works of, I 20 Irwinsville, Ga., capture of Jefferson Davis at, II. 368, 370 Island No. lo, capture of, I, 307 luka. Miss., Col. Murphy evacuates, I, 337, 361 : entered bv Price, .337 ; Rosecrans 8 headquarters at, 338 ; Price's predicament in, 340 ; Rosecrans's promise to reach, 341 ; capture of, 342, 343 ; orders sent to Sher- man at, 512 Jacinto, Miss., troops and movements at, I, 335, 340, 341 ^ - Jacinto road, Rosecrans s movements ana defeat on the, I, 340-342 Tackson. Andrew, Jesse R. Grant supports, I, 5 : cause of dissension between Jesse R. Grant and Hamer, 15 Tac'Kson, Claiborne F., governor of Missouri, ioius the rebels, I, *180, 187 ; death ot, 180 Jackson, W. H., Grant's nan'ow escape fi-om capture by, I, *322, 323 Jackson, Miss., strategic importance of, I, 369 ; connection with Vicksburg, 401 ; the enemy's strength at, 401, 414. 417, 447, 449; advance on, 413, 414, 417. 420, 421 ; arrival of J. E. Johnston at, 419 ; flr.st capture of, 401-423. 481, II, 172 ; destruction of stores at, I, 423, 424, 427, 446 ; Sherman's march to 486 INDEX Bolton from, 437 ; Federal losses at, 447 ; Johnstou falls back on, 482 ; Bhermau be- sieges, 482, 483 ; Joliuston evacuates, 483 ; casualties at second capture, 483 ; feeding the destitute at, 483; Sliemian enters, 11,41 Jackson, Tenn., movements, commimica- tious. etc., at, I, 211, 212, 272, 326, 327, 332, 335, 338, 344, 540 ; Grant leaves, to com- mand tlie Vicksburg campaign, 352 ; For- rest's raid near, 300 Jackson and Vicksburg railroad. Grant's line ou the, I, 415 Jacksonport, Ark., Price at, II, 427 Jacksonville, Mo., troops ordered to, I, 211 Jalapa, Mex., I, 98, 99, 102, 134, 132 James River, the depot for exchange of prisoners on, I, 469, 477 ; country between the Rapidan aud the, II, 55, 96 ; Butler's operations on, 38, 59, 62, 65, 66, 73, 140, 185, 225, 402, 403, 406, 407, 414, 422 ; Gillmore and Smith's operations ou, 58 ; base of supplies on, 62, 294, 401 ; plan of naval operations on, 63 ; the campaisu from the Rapidan to the, 66, 411 ; Butler's position between the Appomattox aud the, 74, 407 ; Sheridan's operations ou, 77-79, 293, 40G, 414, 445, 446 ; movements of the Army of the Potomac on, 153, 157, 174, 175, 178, 180, 182, 183, 185, 194, 199, 200, 204,209,211, 212, 219, 220, 231, 299, 308, 310, 403. 409, 410, 41 2, 415, 420, 421, 443, 448 ; Col. Comstook'smission to the, 180 ; preventiug Confederate gunboats from leaviug the, 182, 185; coimtiy north of, held by the Army of the James, 191, 299 ; the whole army on, 194 ; Lee'.s troops drawn to thenorth of, 199, 204 ; the Union lines on, 219, 231 ; Confed- erate attacks on the north side, 225 ; proposition to transport Sherman's army from Savannah to the, 272 ; reinforce- ments for Gordon from the north side of the, 297 ; Lee's Troops on the iiorth side, 304, 421 ; Lee orders Longstreet from the north side, 310 ; Union crossing of the, the deathlJlow to the Confederacy, 332 ; Sher- man's troops in camp at, 374; Union hold- ings ou, 398 ; defeat of Kautz on, 421, 422 James River canal, destruction of, II, 175- 117, 221, 222 278, 294 Jasper, Tenn., Howard's headquarters at, I, 498 Jefferson Barracks, Mo., Grant reports for duty at, I, 2r. Jefferson City, Mo., Grant commanding at, I, 203; resttirins order, 209; employiug refugees, 209, 210 ; relieved by Jefferson C. Davis, 210 Jenkins, Micah, killed in the Wilderness, II, 112 Jenkins's Ferry, Ark., battle of, II, 427 jaricho Bridge, Va., troops ordered to, II, 148-150, 406. Jerusalem plank road, Va., movements on the, II, 447, 451 Jetersville, Va., movements, enaragemeuts, etc., at and near, II, 322, 323, 325, 453, 454 Jo Daviess County, 111., citizens of, present :i swi>rd to Gen. Grant. II, 33 " lohn Rain," the, transport steamer at xMasliville, I, 264 Johnson, Andrew, first meeting with, I, *497; attitude toward the South,: H, 358-361, 369, 370; supposed assassination of, 358; con- flict with Congress, 361 ; denounces Sher- man, 3G4, 365, 457 ; at the grand review in Washington, 378, 379 Johnson, Edward, his command, II, 101; captured, 136, 138, 405 Johnson, R. W., in action at Fort Wood, II, 3 ; battle before Atlanta, *88 Johnsonville, Tenn., Forrest's captures at, II, 432 ; Schotield readies, 432 Johnston, A. S., early acquaintance with, I, 151; Pillow's telegram from Fort Donel- 80U to, 254 ; commanding in the West, *265; sti-ength of his command, 265, 266 ; de- f<'ated at Mill Springs, 266; awaiting the result of the siege of Fort Donelson, 266 ; fatal mistake of," 266, 267 ; opinion concern- ing Fort Donelson, 267 ; abandons Nash- ville and Chattanooga, 267 ; killed at Shi- loh, 267, 296, 297; fortifying at Corinth, 273, 298; marches to Shiloh from Coriuth, 275, 298; his cavah-y at Pitt8l>urg Land- ing, 275 ; letter from Pres. Davis to, 297 ; his personality, 297-299 ; plnn of campaign at Shiloh, 298; method of raising rein- forcements, 310 Johnston, Joseph E., early acquaintance with, 1,151; arrives at Jackson, *419; di- rects Pemberton to attack Grant, 421 ; rein- forcements for, 421, 444, 448, 452, 492; evacu- ates Jackson, 423; plan to defeat Sher- man, 424 ; oommuuication between Pem- berton and, 424-427, 437, 456, 458, 462-464; fails to Join forces with Pen iberton, 437; expected to remforce Pemberton, 444 ; cav- alry watchiug. 448 ; crosses the Big Black, 458; despairs of holding Vicksburg, 458; refrains from attack, 460 ; threatened at- tack from, 463; between Brownsville and the Big Black, 464; Pemberton proposes negotiations between Grant and, 465; Slieruian ordered to drive him from Mis- sissippi, 473, 475, 482; falls back on Jack- son, 482; evacuates Jackson, 483; super- sedes Bragg, II, 42; Thomas and Logan ordered to threaten, 42 ; moves toward Mobile, 42; ou the defensive in Georgia, 48, 399 ; importance of attacking, 48, 49, 71, 72; Sherman's campaign against, 49, 58, 59, 61, 82, 83, 399, 422, 423 ; at Dalton, 57, 83, 85. 140, 399; surprised by McPherson, 85; Newton engages his rear, 85 ; abandons Dalton, 85, 140; at Resaca, 85, 423; falls back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, 86, 423 ; abandons Allatoona, 86 ; abandons Kenesaw Mountain, 87 ; retreats across the Chattahoochee, 87 ; superseded by Hood, 87, 227, 236, 423; military policy, ability, and character, 87, 88, 227, 228, 236, 280, 399; feeling between Pres. Davis and, 228, 236, 280 ; put in command of all troops in North and South Carolina, 280, 284 ; con- fronts Sherman in North Carolina, 285, 301, 362,442, 453, 457 ; at AverysboroaudBenton- ville, 285; demoralization of his army, 286; fears of Lee's junction with, 295, 316, 340, 446, 449; hopeless position of, 362; Sher- man's difBcultv with the authorities about the terms granted to, 363-366, 374, 379, 457 ; surrender of, 306, 458 Johnston, R. D., II, 101 Johnston, W. P., estimate of Confederates at Fort Donelson, 1, 258 ; biographer of A. S. Johnston, 298 Joliet, 111., imprisonment of rebels at, and their release, I, 330 Jones, T. M., 11,101 Jones, 'W. E., defeated and klUed at Staun- ton, II, *177 INDEX 487 Jonesborc, Ga., Kilpatriclf's raid at, II, 92; Howard moA'cs to, 240; Sliermau defeats Hood near, II, 424 Jonesboro, Miss., Kosecraus's pursuit through, I, US Jones's Bridge, Va., moveinents at, 11, 177, 179-181 Jones's Landing, Va., Sheridan crosses the Jamos near, II, 446 Juarez, Benito, President of Mexico, 1,42; assistance ofi'ered to, II, 389 Judah, Henry M., at capture of City of Mexico, 1, 121 Kanawlia River, Peter Grant drowned in the, I, 3; niovenients on, in the rcliellion, II, 58, 192, 195, 403, 411, 412, 416 Kansas, re:nl'oreenioutsfi-oua, 1,243; Price's raid toward, II, 427 Kautz, A. v., enters West Point from Georgetown, O., I, *18; defeats Hill, II, 133; operations against Virginia rail- roads, 133, 199, 405,' 407, 414; operations against Peterslnirg and Eiclimond, 133, 186, 218, 410; defeated, Oct. 7, 1864,225, 421, 422 ; forces the Black Water, 407 ; actions atStony Creek, 407, 415; crosses the James, 415; action, Sept. 29, 1864, 421 Kearny, Philip, wounded at Ohurubusco, I, *113 ; early acquaintance with, 152 Kearny, Stephen, at Jefferson Barracks, I, *25 Kelley, B. F., defeats McCausland, II, *204, 417 Kelly, Rachel, I, 2 Kelly's Ferry, Tenn., operations, etc., at, I, .505, 506, 517, 523, II, 29 Kenesav/ Mountain, Ga., operations on, II, 86, 87, 423 Kentucky, the Grants in, I, 3; Ulysses' schoollife in, 8; visit to, 16; represented in Confederate Congress, 180; fails to pass ordinance of secession, 180 ; at- tempted neutrality of, 216; Grant's cor- respondence with the legislature of, 216 ; Halleck commanding in, 231; the Con- federate line in, 232 ; the fate of, depend- ing on Fort Donelson, 266; Confederate disasters in, 297 ; possibilities of avoiding fighting for, 318; boundaries of Grant's district in, 326 ; fears of the invading line going beyond, 337 ; Grant's strength in, 349 ; army of defense of, 359 ; the Ninth Corps returned to, 485; Forrest's and WTieeler's operations in, II, 229, 236; Thomas to hold, 238; Morgan's raids in, 354, 425 ; activity of guerrillas in, 425 ; the enemy crosses the Cunilierland into, 433 Kershaw, J. B., his command, II, 101 ; sent to reinforce Early. 421 Key West, Fla., Federal possession of, II, 54, 398 Kilpatrick, H. J., raid on the Macon railroad, II, 92 Kimball, Nathan, ordered to Mechanics- bur^, I. *455 King, Maj., I, 18 Kingston, Tenn., possibility of enemy breaking through at, I, 517 Kingston, Ga., Sherman captures, II, 85, 151 Kinston, N. C, occupation of, II, 441 Kitching, J. H., II, 100, *143 Know-nothing Party, Grant joins the, I, 169 Knoxville, Tenn., the Confederate line at, I, ;J04 ; possibilities of avoiding Burnside'H imprisonmeut in, 318; i)roposal t(tabanrlou terri tory soul baud west of, 516; Longstrcet threatens, 518 ; battle of, 623, II, 1 ; Bragg's designs concerning, 2; projected expedi- tions to, 19 ; reasons for the Confederate campaign against, 21 ; measures for le- lief of, 24 ; fears of Bragg's attacking, 25 ; relief expedilions to, 25-28, 38; destruc- tion of railroad between Dalton and, 27; Wilson and Dana's journey from Chatta- nooga to, 28; Buruside obtains supplies in, 28, 29; its value to Bragg, 29, 30; rais- ing of the siege, 31; (iraiit visits, 34; severe winter at, 34 ; Scholield command- ing at, 82 ; Sehotleld's movement from, 83 ; Thomas ordered to concentrate stoi'es at, 282.446; Breckinridge defeats Gilleni at, 434 " Lafayette," the, running the batteries at Vieksburg, I, 386 Lagow, C. B.,- appointed aide-de-camp, I, *205; solo statl-oflicer at Jefferson City, 210 La Grange, Miss., speech of .Tefferson Davis at, 1, 178; journey from Corinth to Mem- phis through, 320, 321; ahandoimient of, 327; occupation of, 352; stoi'Cs at, 355; re- turn to, 361 ; Hatch arrives in, 408 ; Grier- son's raid from, 408 Lake Chicot, , A. J. Smith's engagement near, II, 427 Lake Pontchartrain, proposed movement against Mobile from, I, 484 Lake Providence, La., operations at, I, 370, 373-375, 380, 392, 464 Lake St. Joseph, I, 394 Lane, James H., II, 102 Lauman, J. G., in siege of Vieksburg, I, 413, *448, 456 Lava Beds, Ore., Gen. Canby killed in the, II, 372 Law, E. M., II, 101 Lawler, M. K., in battle of Black River Bridge, I, *439, 440 Lawrence, Col., commanding at Columbus, Ky., II, 425 ; refuses to surrender the gar- rison, 425 Leasure, Daniel, II, 100 Ledlie, J. H., in the Petersburg mine affair, II, *202 ; incompetency of, 202, 203 Lee,,-Fitz-Hugh, his command, II, 102; or- dered to defense of the Valley, 193 ; at Trevillian Station, 193 Lee, Robert E.,atCerroGordo,I,100; Grant's acquaintance with, 151, 11,341, 342; per- sonal and military characteristics, 1, 152, II, 184, 185, 341, 342, 348, 399 ; plans of cam- paign against, 33, 61-63, 73, 121, 127, 145, 168, 174, 199, 209, 218, 226, 275, 326, 327, 399, 401- 403, 409, 440, 442, 449, 453; anticipations and fears of his movements, 62, 63, 66, 1I9, 121, 127, 145, 218, 275, 291, 295, 308, 313-316, 326, 327, 338-340, 442, 446, 449 ; commanding the Army of Northern Viri;inia, *55, 101, 184, 399 ; situation on the Kapidan, 57, 399 ; capture of his army the great olijcct of the (;rand Campaign, 66, 71, 401, 440; Sher- idan's operations against, 76-80, 133, 181, 333, 405, 450 ; surprised at the crossing of the Rapidan, 98 ; organization of bis army, 101-104; headquarters at Oranae Court House, 102; ignorance of true import of 488 INDEX the Federal advance, 105, 124; orders Hill, Ewell, aud LoiiKstreet to attack, 106 ; or- ders his troops to intrenchments at Mlue Run, 106 ; endeavors to avoid battle on the right, 110 ; in the battle of the Wil- derness, 110-115, 184, 405; loss of Lons- street a severe blow to, 112 ; assumes command in pei'son, 112 ; withdi-aws with- in his intrenchments, 115; oi-ders for movement by the left flank, 119, 120, 405 ; informs his government of the assumed retreat of the Array of the Potomac, 121 ; beats Grant to Spottsylvania, 121, 122 ; or- ders to Early, 124; informs his govern- ment that he is on Grant's flank, 124; crosses the Po at Wooden Bridge, 126 ; on the Catharpin road, 126; in battle of Spottsylvania, 127-132, 134-145; Wright's operations against, 129, 141, 142, 147, 149; Warren's operations against, 129, 14T, 149, 405; Burnside's operations against, 131, 132, 147 ; Hancock's operations against, 136, 137, 141, 147, 405 ; roads and telegraphs cut between Richmond and, 141 ; defeats Hancock and Wright, 141, 142 ; Staunton a source of supplies for, 142; Pickett at- tempts to reinforce, 146; his lost oppor- tunity, 147; attempts to get between Richmond and, 147, 152 et seq., 405; con- fronts Warren and Wright at Jericho Ford, 149; position on the North Anna, 150, 151 ; reinforcements for, 151 ; inactiv- ity of, 151, 152 ; reported falling back on Richmond, 152; popular impression in the South concerning his operations, 152 ; po- sition. May 26, 1864, 153 ; virtually whipped, 153, 154; feint of attack on left flank of, 155 ; telegraphs belated news to Richmond, 157 ; deceived by the movement from the North Anna, 157 ; endeavoring to find his position, 158 ; position. May 30, 161 ; extent of his lines at Cold Harbor, 165, 166 ; effect of the battle of the Wilderness on, 167, 409, 410; correspondence with, regarding dead and wounded at Cold Harbor, 169- 171 ; position near Richmond, 174 ; oppor- tunity to crush Butler, 175; facilities for anticipating news, 181 ; favorable condi- tions tor, 184; sends troops to Early aud the Valley, 192, 193, 195, 209, 213, 412, 417 ; threatened attack by, 199 ; delay in bring- ing up troops at Petersburg mine, 203; di-awing his troops to the north of the James, 204; importance of the Weldon railroad to, 211, 213 ; unsuccessful efforts to recapture the Weldon railroad, 211, 212; importance of the Shenandoah Valley to, 214; measures to prevent his reinforcing Early, 218; strength of his lines, 218; rein- forces troops about Fort Gilmer, 219; Grant to watch him closely at Richmond, 275; sends troops against Sherman, 275, 280; held down by Grant at Richmond, 285 ; impossibility of his strildng at Sher- man, 285, 286; desertions fTom, and de- moralization of, his army, 286, 291, 297, 320, 321, 325, 334, 335, 350, 351 ; attempt to unite with Johnston and crush Sherman, 316, 340; determines to assault the Union lines at Petersburg. 296'; agrees with Pros. Davis to abandon Richmond and Peters- burg, 296 ; plan of escape, 296 ; his avenue of escape, 315; loss in Gordon's attack. March 24, 1865, 298 ; menacing his right, 303; importance of the South Side and Dan^nlle railroads to, 303, 304 ; personally superintends defense of his right flank, 304 ; frantic efforts to recover lost ground, 310, 311; attacks I'arke, 311 ; hopes of cap- turing his flying army, 314-316, 328, 327; plan to get ahead of, 315, 316, 32G, 327; abandons Richmond, 316; orders his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, 316 ; importance of koejiing up his army, 320 ; orders rations from DauATlle to Farm- ville, 322, 323 ; intrenches at Amelia Com-t House, 323, 324, 453; in a Ufe-and-death struggle, 324,454; movement from Amelia Court House to Farmville, 328, 329; cuts oft" Washburn, 330; attempts to destroy bridge near High Bridge, 331 ; stopped by Washburn and Read, 331, 454; pui-sued by Humphreys, 331, 333; Ewell expresses hopes of his surrender, 333; correspon- dence and communications with, concern- ing surrender, 333, 334, 3S6, 337-349, 454-457 ; engagement at Appomattox Station, 336; chief of staft" to Gen. Scott in Blexico, 341 ; contrasted with Grant, 341, 342 ; sword presented to, by the State of Virginia, 342 ; Grant's personal feelings toward, 342 ; preserves the fiction of two separate countries, 344; the fable of his sword at Appomattox, 346 ; paroling liis army, 346 ; starving condition of his troops, 346 ; in- terview with, April 10, 1865, 348; influence of, 348, 457; number of troops surren- dered by, 351 Lee, S. D., with Hood at Franklin, II, *254 Lee, W. H. P., 11,104 Leggett, M. D., repulses the enemy at Bo- livar, I, *332; promoted brigadier-general, 350 ; mining at Vicksburg, 460-462 Leonard, Samuel H., II, 98 " Let-alone policy," the; II, 398 Lever, Charles, Grant's fondness for works of, I, 20 Lewisburg, W. Va., Crook to take, II, 403 Lexington, Ky., horseback journey from KnoxviUe to, II, 34; Burbridge returns to, 434 Lexington, Mo., threatened by Price, I, 208 ; Grant ordered to secure cash from banks in, 209 Lexington, Va., Hunter's movements near, II, 195, 412 " Lexington," the, action on the Tennessee River, I, 240 ; at Pittsburg Landing, 285 Lick Creek, its coui'se, and movements on, I, 279-281 Lieutenant-General, the office restored by Congi-ess, II, 44 ; (xrant commissioned, 44, 45; the military situation at time of Grant's commission, 53 et seq. Lincoln, Abraham, election of, I, 171- * 173; secret journey to Washington, 182; inau- guration, 183; calls for 75^000 troops, 183; anecdotes of, 186, II, 68, 246. 290, 377, 378 ; second call for troops, I, 194 ; constant hope for the Union, 337; congi'atiilates Grant on success at Corinth, 349 ; author- izes McClernand to command expedition against Vicksburg, 358 ; Mississippi River experience, 372 ; supports Grant, 383, 384; effect of Gettysburg and Vicksburg on, 475; desires to gain foothold in Texas, 484 ; alarmed at results of Chickamauga, 488 ; concern for the loyalists of East Ten- nessee, 515; anxiety for Burnside and Knoxville, 515, 516, 523, U„ 11, 224, 32; con- INDEX 489 gi-atulations from, on operations of No- vember 24, 18G;i, 10, 11; uomiuates \V. F. Smith for promotion, 31; iut'ormert of the raising of tlie sioRc of Knoxville, 31 ; letter of tbanks from, 32 ; presents Grant with comuiissiou as liouteuant- geueral, 44, 45; debatoH with Uonghis, 50; Grant's lirst meeting with, 50 52; his military ability, 50-52; supports Sheridan for command of cavalry, GO; conferences with, 6G-U8; quaint phrase- ology of, 68; despatch to (irant, Aug. 3, 1864, 206 ; anxiety for Sheridan's safety. 217, 218; reassured by Grant, 218; asks for comfort from Grant, regarding Sher- man, 245, 246; sums np Sherman's i)0- sition, 246; anxiety as to propriety of Sherman's cutting loose from his base, 253; Grant telegraphs failure of Fort Fisher expedition to, 267 ; notified of the aiTival of the Peace Commissioners, 28T ; interview with the Peace Commissioners, 289, 290, 363 ; his terms of peace, 289, 363 ; personal characteristics, 289, 319, 358, 380, 381; characterization of A. H. Stephens, 290 ; at City Point, 289, 290, 308, 310, 317, 320, 363 ; notified of success at Five Forks, 308 ; informed of capture of outer works of Petersburg, 310; invited to visit Peters- burg, 313, 318; congratulates Grant, 318; visits Petersburg, 318-320; visits Kich- mond, 355, 356, 363 ; interview with Weit- zel at Richmond. 355; diflfereuce with Stanton concerning the calling of the Vir- ginia legislatiu-e, 355, 356; invites Gen. and Mrs. Grant to attend Ford's Theater, 357 ; the invitation declined, 357 ; assassi- nation of, 358, 369; efi'ects of his assassi- nation, 359; meeting with Sherman, 363; feeling in regard to Jefferson Davis, 369, 378; his death a national loss, 369; con- trasted with Stanton, 380, 381 Little Colorado River, crossing the, I, 62, 63 Littlepage's Bridge and Ford, Va., II, 155, 156 Little River, movements at, II, 153, 155 Little Rock, Ark., Steele at, II, 426, 427 Logan, John A., Grant's first meeting with, I, 195-*197 ; personal characteristics, mil- itary ability, etc., *196, 416, 480, II, 235, 259; his loyalty suspected, I, 196; pa- triotic speech by. 196; his district in Illi- nois, 196-198; addresses the 21.st Illinois, 197; raises troops, 197; proposes to enter Corinth, 314; personnel of his command, 393 ; at Briiinsburg, 401 ; in battle of Port Gibson, 403 ; to repairbridge atNorth Fork of Bayou Pierre, 406 ; reinforces McPher- son, 409 ; ordered toward Grand Gidf , 409 ; in battle of Raymond, 415; in battle of Jackson, 422; at Bolton, 426; in battle of Champion's Hill, 432, 433, 435; enlists a colored man in his service at Vicksbiirg, 461 ; at meeting between Pemberton and Grant, 467; lus di^^sion first to enter Vicksburg, 472 ; ordered to threaten J. E. Johnston, II. 42 ; assigned to command the Fifteenth Corps, 46 ; succeeds McPherson in command of Army of the Tennessee, 89, 235, 423; report of losses at Atlanta, 89 ; assaults on. at Atlanta, 90 ; command- ing the Fifteenth Corps. 234; quits the field for political purposes. 234 ; dUatori- ness in returning to his command, 235 ; su- perseded by Howard, 235, 423; aggrieved at Howard's transfer, 235 ; visits Grant at City Point, 259 ; ordered conditionally to relieve Tliomiis, 2.')9 Lomax, L. L., 11,102 Long, A. L., 1[, 103 Long Bridge, Va., movements at, II, 179- 181, 410 Longstreet, James, attack^ Geary at Wau- hatchie, I, *508; position on Chattanooga Creek, 510; moves ngiiinst Burnside. 515- 518, II, 25,29, 30; at Loudon, I, 51H ; threat- ens Knoxville, 518; plan to cut him ort' fi"om the soutli, 518; ])erils environing, 524, II, 30; reinforcements sent to, 2, 30, 42, 43; Graut's personal accpiaintance with, 21 ; ditl'erenco between Bragg and, 21; personal characteristics, 22; to b(^ driven from Knoxville, 24; information for, 28; puisuit of, by Burnside, 32: win- ters in J<^ast Tennessee, 32; ])roposal to drive him out of Tennessee, 37, 43; pur- suit of, abandoned, 43 ; checks Sehofleld's movements, 44; ordered to attack via the Orange plank road, 106; at Gordonsville, 106; en route to reinforce Hill. 109; in the battle of the Wilderness, 110, 112; wounded, 112; his loss a severe blow to Lee, 112; his corps (U'dered to Spottsylvania. 121 ; intention to join Early in crushing Sheri- dan, 222; supports Lee's riglit, 310; ap- pointed to oversee the paroling of Lee's army, 347 Long Wharf, San Francisco, I, 159, 165 Lookout Creek, I, 502, II, 8 Lookout Mountain, Tenn., Rosecrans aban- dons, I, 494; Bragg's position on, 494, 495, 502, 503, 508, II, 30; reconnoitering near, I, 501 ; junction of the Tennessee with Chat- tanooga Creek at, 509; Hooker's op(!r- ations on, 517, 521, .522, II, 8-10, 23, 383; Sherman's crossing of the Tennessee in view of, 1, 524 ; deception of the enemy on, 525 ; the clouds on, II, 6 ; physical features of, 8; battle of, S-lO; evacuated by the enemy, 14 Lookout Valley, Confederate lines at, 1, 503 ; gaining a footing in, 505; the Tennessee opened from Bridgeijort to, 505 ; c(nni)ar- ative advantages of the Union and Con- federate forces ill. .508; losses in securing posses-sion of, 509; deceiving the enemy with regard to movements m, 517; to be defended by Geary, 519 ; plan of Hooker's movement to Chattanooga Valley from, 520; key to the line of supplies, 521 ; com- manded by Missionary Ridge, 521 ; Hook- er's position in, 521 Loomis, , excellence as an accountant, I, 187 Loomis, John M., in battle of Chattanooga, II, *13 Loring, W. V/., delayed at Port Gibson, I, * 402; effect of battle of Champion's Hill on, 435 " Lost cause," the, 1, 132 Lost Mountain, Ga., J. E. Johnston at, II, 423 Loudon, Colonel, I, 18 Loudon, Tenn., Longstreet at, I. 516, 518 Louisa Court House. Va., Sheridan destroys the railroad at, II, 414 Louisiana, with the Armj' of Observation in, I. 30; secession of. 183 ; Union holdings in. II, 53, 398; Banks defeated m, 142; Grant proposes that troops in, move 490 INDEX against Mobile, 233 ; in the hands of the enemy, 398 , . . ^i. • v ^ Louisiana Purchase, no claim to the right of secession, I, 174 . Louisville, Ga., Sherman's movement via, Louisville, Ky., early visits to, I. 9, 16; Bii- ell's headiiuarters at, 233; National troops at, 265 ; Granger at, 332-334 ; Sheridan at, 334 ; Buell's march to, 336 ; meeting with Stanton at, 490, 491, 496 ; Grant leaves, for the front, 497 ; Thomas advised to caU for a force to go to, II, 258 ; Stoneman in, 281 " Louisville," the. at Fort Donelson, I, 247; running the batteries at Vicksburg, 386 Lovejoy's, Ga., Sherman defeats Hood near, II, 424 Lovell, Mansfield, commanding at New Or- leans, I, 142 ; excursion in Mexico, 142 et seq. ; joins Van Dorn in attacli on Corinth, 345 Luther, Roland A., wounded at Palo Alto, I, *69 Lynchburg, plans for Ord's operations to- ward, 11, 61; Sheridan's operations to- ward, at, and near, 77, 278, 293, 294, 444, 445 ; Hunter's operations toward, at, and near, 152, 168, 175, 176, 191, 195, 411, 412, 416 ; im- portance of, 176. 409 ; Early's movements at, 195, 420; proposed plan of campaign toward, for spring of 1865, 226 ; Tlioinas ordered to move toward, 281, 282, 446 ; road between Petersburg and, 328 ; Stoneman's movements against, 366, 367, 442, 446, 458 ; evacuation of, 367 ; Lee's troops beat Hun- ter to, 412 ; possibilities of Lee's falling back to, 442 ; destruction of raUroad near, 445 Lynchburg and Petersburg road, proposal to capture the, II, 231, 238. See also South Side Railroad Lyon, Nathaniel, energetic work by, at Bt. Louis and Camp Jackson, I, *188 McAllister, Robert, II, 97 Mc Arthur, John, at Corinth, I, 335; in battle of Champion's Hill, 433 ; in siege of Vicks- burg, *448 McBirney, David B., II, 97 McCall, George A., Grant's service in the company of. Fourth Infantry, I, *54 ; char- acter, 54; liindness rendered by, 60, 61 ; at Resaca de la Palma, 70 ; early acquain- tance with, 151 McCandless, William, his command. II, 98; recommended for brigadier-generalship, U. S. Vols., 139 McCausland, John, burns Chambersburg, II. 204 ; defeated by Gen. Kelley, 204 McClellan, George B., at Cerro Gordo, I, 100; Grant's acquaintance witli, *193; ap- pointed majjor-general, 193; orders from, 233; delay in communication with, 268; correspondence with Halleck concerning operations in the West, 269 ; orders arrest of Grant, 269 ; nominated by the press as Grant's successor, 382 ; question of his res- toration to duty, II, 48 McClellan, Moody, & Hillyer, I, 205 McClernand, J. A., first meeting with, I, *195- 197 ; addresses the 2l8t Illinois, 197 ; loy- alty of, 197 ; ordered into west Kentucky, 234; commanding expedition on the Ten- nessee, 236 ; at Fort Donelson. 244-246, 250, 251,258; promoted major-general of vol- unteers, 260; commanding division of Army of the Tennessee, 274 ; quality of his troops, 279; at Pittsburg Landing, 279; praises Sherman, 282 ; at Shiloh, 284, 288, 302, 307 ; recruiting expedition at the Nortli, 349, 350; rumored separate com- mand for, 355; fears of his assuming com- mand of expedition against Vicksburg, 358, 359; a command provided for, 360; faUm-e of Grant's despatch to reach, 364; assumes command of Sherman's troops, 365, 366 ; reaches the mouth of the Yazoo, 365; approves the attack on Arkansas Post, 366 ; returns to Napoleon, 366 ; diffi- culty about, 367; visit to, at Napoleon, 367 ; ordered to Yoimg's Point, 367 ; insub- ordination of, 368; character and politi- cal affiliations, 368; excavation work at Young's Point, 372; nominated by the press as Grant's successor, 382; at New Carthage, 388, 389; discovers route from Smith's plantation to Perkins's planta- tion, 389; bridge-biulding by, 389; com- manding right wing of the Army of the Tennessee, 390; at Hard Times, 394; at Port Gibson, 402-404 ; to hold Hanklnson's Ferry, 409 ; plan to send him to Port Hud- son, 410 ; awaiting supplies, 412 ; orders to, for attack on Grand Gulf, 395, 396 ; lands at Bruiusburg, 400 ; commanding the Thii-- teeuth Corps. 401 ; on the Big Black, 412, 414, 415 ; at Edward's Station, 420, 427, 428; at Big Sandy, Five MUe Creek, and Rocky Springs, 413; at Fourteen-Mile Creek, 413-415; ordered to Clinton. Mississippi Springs, and Raymond, 420; joined by Blair. 423 ; moves on Bolton, 425, 426 ; Blair's command turned over to, 428 ; or- ders to. regariling movements of troops, 428; in battle of Champion's Hill, 429, 431, 432, 434, 435; in battle of Black River Bridge, 438 ; in siege of Vicksburg, 442-445, 448, 456 ; complaints concerning his con- gi-atulatory order, 457 ; relieved from duty and ordered to Springfield, 457 McCook, A. McD., at Shiloh, I, *287, 288, 292 ; comment on article in " Century Magazine" regarding, 292; retreats to Chattanooga, 494 ; question of his restora- tion to duty, II, 48 McCook, E. M., raid toward Macon, II, *9l, 424 McCook family, the, I, 292 Macfeely, R., excused from engineer duty at Vicksburg, I, 450 McGowan, Samuel, II. 102 Mcintosh, J. S., wounded at Resaca de la Palma, I, *71 Mackenzie, R. S., in battle of White Oak Road, II, 299 ; attacks the enemy near the Appomattox, 323; military career, *385; movement to Hatcher's Run. 450; at Din- widdle Court House. 452 ; designated to receive paroles of Lee's army, 457 McKenzie, Samuel, commanding assault- ing column at Chapultepec, I, n20 McLean, 'Wilmer, owner of house at Appo- mattox where Lee surrendered, II, 340, 34,5, 348 McMinnville, Tenn., 'UTieeler at, II, 424 Macon, Tenn., Hatch destroys the railroad between Columbus and, I, 408 Macon, Ga., Stoneman's raid toward, II. 90- 92: Kilpatrick's raid toward. 92; Pres. Davis's speech at, 227-230, 428, 429 ; Sher- INDEX 491 man tbreatens, 231, 232, 424, 431 ; captured by Wilsou, 3(18, 459 McPherson, J. B., report on question of m- trenchiufj, i\t I'ittslmrg Landing, I, *274, 295 ; at Sllilob, 276, 278, 2)1. Dennis defeats the enemy near, 332 Memphis, Tenn., possibility of capture of, after the fall of FortDonelson, I, 261 ; rail- road communications with the South and East, 272 ; the Confederate line at, 304 ; na- val battle at, 317 ; Grant removes head- quarters to, 319-326, 365, 367 ; the journey from Corinth to, 319-323 ; Southern hospi- tality near, 321-323 ; Southern patriotism in, 323-325 ; a church in," defiled " by Union troops, 324 ; complaints and requests in, 324, 325 ; troops at, 326 ; threatened by Van Dorn, 327 ; Van Dorn endeavors to strike the Mississippi above, 345 ; difficulties of reinforcing, 328; Shennan commanding at, 328, 335, 352, 357, II, 39 ; reinforcing Bo- livar from, I, 336; Grant's strength in, 349 ; holding the Mississippi River at, 352 ; reinforcements for, 356; transportation for Sherman's army from, 357 ; proposed movements fi-om, 358 ; strategic value of, 369 ; expulsion of alleged rebel from, 425 ; Sherman's proposed retreat to, 454 ; troops sent to, 487, 488 ; Sherman starts for Cor- inth from, 511; diihcultj' of procuring supplies at, 512; Hurlbut commanding in, II, 39 ; the limit of the right wing of the united armies, 56 ; Sturgis driven back to, by Forrest, 424 ; A. J. Smith at, 424, 425 ; troops sent against Price from, 427 ; Grier- son's expedition from, 434 Memphis and Charleston railroad, at East- port, I, 233; positions, movements and operations on, I, 309. 314, 317, 318, 326, 337, 338, 344, 345, 352, 367, 502, 512-514, II, 53, 429 Memphis and Nashville railroad, A. J. Smith ordered to prevent Forrest from setting on the, II, 198. Memphis and Ohio railroad, destruction Of bridge over the Tennessee, I, 240; Sher- man's i)osition on the, 335 Meridian, Miss., occupied by Polk, 11, 39, 40; Sherman's movement against, 39-41 Merritt, Wesley, his command, II, 99; or- dered away from the Po bridge by Meade, *122; chief of cavalry with Sheridan, 294 ; at Five Forks, 307 ; drives Confederate cavalry to the Appomattox, 312; strikes the enemy at Deep Bottom. 322 ; attacks the enemy in flank, 323; appointed to oversee the paroling of Lee's army, 347; crosses the Pamunkey. 408 Mersy, Augustus, in battle of Atlanta, II, 89 Mexican laws, origin of, I, 43 Mexican war, its origiu, iniquity, conduct, and rcsidts, I, 32-34, 90, 115, 127, 130, 133, 136, 170 ; personnel of the U. S. army in the, 44, 72, 130 ; equipment, transportation, etc., in. 46, 68, 09; outbreak of, 62, 64. 66, 72; didiculty of obtaining troops for, 105 ; gen- eralship of, 128, 129; victories in, 130; per- sonnel of the Mexican army, 131 ; treaty of peace, 134, 137, 152 ; value of experience in, 151, 152; Pillow's pride in his service in, 254; old acquaintances in, II, 46; ac- quaintance with Lee iu, 341, 342; Sedg- wick in, 384 Mexico, menacing, 1, 32 ; grants permission for colonization of Texas, 32, 33 ; slavery forbidden by constitution of, 33 ; war with Texas, 33, 49; non-recognition of Texan independence by, 33; smuggling In, 42; use of cigarettes in. 42 ; tobacco trade, 42 ; 44; Spanish restrictions on trade of, 43; provoking the war with, 45; night- marches in, 76, 77 ; the array of, in 1848, 131 ; patriotism in, 131; the modern army of, 131 ; celebration of national defeats in, 131; Scott's preparations for prolonged occupation. 132, 133; temporary govern- ment at Queretaro, 134 ; treaty of peace with, 134, 137, 152 ; national amusements INDEX 493 137-140; gambling, 140, 148; trip to the great caves of, 14;)-150; tlu^ peoim of, 14H; evacuation of, by U. y. troops, ir>'2 ; service* witli Bragg and Longatreet in tlie, 11, '21 ; the Imperial scheme in, 388-3'.i0; tall ofthe Empii'e in, 3110; the territory ac(inire(l from, 393-395; ( 'out'ederate refugees in, 459 Mexico, City of, Mex., its situation and approaches, I, 70, 98, 108, no, in, r27, 128; Philip Kearny at the gates of, 113; viola- tions of truce in, 115; aqueducts of, 110, 117, 121, 122; defenses, 117; Santa Anna evacuates, 124; ceded to Gen. Scott, 125; liberation of convicts in, 124, 120 ; entry into, 125-127 ; Gen. Scott's government of, 127 ; prohibition of buU-tights near, 139 ; evacuation of, by U. S. troops, 152 Mexico, Mo., Grant ordered to, I, 201 ; restor- ing order in, 202; Pope's headquarters at, 202; studying tactics in, 203, 204 "Miami," the, disabled at PlymoutL, II, 407 Michigan, ratification of the Constitution of, 1, 153; question of Grant's citizenship in, 153 Middle Department, necessity of a supreme commander in the, II, 417 ; merged in the Middle Military Division, 419 Middle Military Division, formation of, II, 419 ; Sheridan assigned to temporary com- mand of the, 419; dismounted cavalry from, to report to Benham, II, 447 Middletown, Va., rallying of Sheridan's troops near, II, 420 Miles, Nelson A., his command, II, 97 ; in battle of Sutherland's Station, *311-313, 453; reinforces Sheridan at Five Forks, 452 ; returned to Humphreys's command, 453 Milford, Va., operations at. II, 140-148 Military Division of the Mississippi, crea- tion of the Department of the, 1, 491 ; G rant assumes command of, 497 ; W. F. Smith appointed chief engineer, II, 4; Sherman assumes command of the, 48, 54, 399 ; the proper plans for the, 48, 49; operations in, 227; limits, 399; Cauby in command, 427 "Military Orders," Lincoln's, II, 51 Military tactics, change in, since the Mexi- can war, 1, 130 Milledgeville, Ga., Sherman's operations against, II, 231, 233, 240, 241, 244 ; flight of the governor and legislature fi-om,244; mocii legislature sits at, 240; Sherman's march to Milieu from, 240, 247 Millen, Ga., Shennan's march to, II, 246, 247 Milliken's Bend, La., McClernand ordered to, I, 307 ; new waterway project started at, 380, 381; concentration at, 384; Grant's return to, 389 ; issuance of Special Orders No. 110, from, 390-392 ; F. P. Blair at, 412 ; troops sent to, 413; Taylor's attack on, 455 ; behavior of colored troops at, 456 Mill Springs, Ky., battle of, I, 232, 234, 265, 266 Mine Run,Va., Lee's position at, II, 100, 399; Fifth Corps meets the enemy near, 404 Mining, in the United States, II, 393, 394 Minnesota, traveling in, 1, 177 Missionary Ridge, Tenn., positions, move- ments, engagements, etc., on, I, 494, 502, 603, 508, 515, 517, 518, 520-522, 525, II, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 15-17, 23, 30 Mississippi, secession of, T, 183 ; end of .Tolm ston's cai'cer in, 207; possibilities of IpIimkI- less c;ii)lurcs of points in, 318; jiroposals to si'ciiro, 35.S ; al>iinilan('(^ of jiriiiy siiji- plics in, 302; loiK>gi;iphy of, 402, 4(i3, 414; Gricrson's raid tliiougli, 408; .1. JO. .lolin- stoii art.siinies command in, 419; dcstruc- tioii ofthe cai>ital,440 (seealso.I acksoN) ; character of the country for military op- erations, 447; Sherman ordered to drive .loluiston from, 473, 475. 482; imporliiiico of expelling the enemy from, 48'2; a. p(,-aco feeling in, 480; Forrest in, IL 197, 278, 399, 424; Thomas ordered to send a cavalry force into, 278 Missis^ppi Central railroad, operations on the, I, 327, 335, 344, 345, 362, 356, 367, 11,431, 434 Mississippi River, its character, courses, vagaries, etc., I, 67, 368-375, 380, 382, 384, 401 ; Union movements, positions, etc., on, 211, 219, 317, 349, 350, 352, 357, 390, 447, 403, 404, 475, 476, 478, 486, IT, 39, .53, 68, 232, 319, 398, 400, 427, 429; Confederate raovenients, positions, etc., on, I, 216, 219, 231, 232, 345, 374, 449, 463, 464, II, 398, 399; closed to Jiav- igation below Cairo, I, 235 ; capture of Is- land No, 10, 307 ; its importance, 317, 361, II, 49; Vicksburg the only obstacle to free navigation ot', I, 351 ; employing ne- groes as woodcutters on, 354; ruiiioi'(>d mov(Mnent by McClernand against Vicks- burg via, 355; McClernand assigned to command expedition on, 360; terrors of the lowlands, 382 ; the winter of 1802-03 on, 370 ; fortiflcations and situation of Vicks- bm-g on, 371, 449; cutting the dam on the Moon Lake route, 375 ; illumination of, at passage of the gunboats. 386, 387; the de- struction of the " Indianola," on, 388; Johnston raises the question of Grant's supplies via, 426; gi'cat Union capture of cattle on, 485, 486, II, 290, 291; boundary of the Military Division of the Mississippi, 1,491, II, 81, 399; guerrilla warfare on, 398; difficulty of keeping navigation open on, 398 ; the" Confederate forces east of, 399 ; the Confederacy cut in two by Union vic- tories on, 430, 431; Pope's campai.im west of, 440; tliial surrender of Confederates east and west of, 459 Mississippi Springs, Miss., movements at, I, 420, 426 Mississippi Valley, railroad system of the, I, 272 ; operations of western armies in, II, 460 Missouri, represented in Confederate Con- gress, I, 180; fails to pass ordinance of se- cession, 180; the rebellion spirit in, 180; dubious character of tlui State govern- ment, 188; Pope commanding in, 201, 202; Price's raids in, 208, 485, II, 427, 428; dan- gers to Union men in, I, 209; Grant as- signed to (-ommand district of Southeast, 211; Jeff. Thompson's operations in, 211, 213, 214 ; Grant assumes command of hia district, 213, 214 ; Fremont moves against Price, 218; Sheridan's service in, 333, 334 ; sending troops to Scholield in, 485 ; troops .sent to Banks from, II, 58, 400; A. J. Smith's operations in, 238; A. J. Smith re- inforces Thomas from, 250 ; guerrilla war- fare in, 398 Missouri River, Price's operations on the, n, 427 494 INDEX Mitchell, Ortnsby M., arrives at Nasbville, I, *26:{ Mobile, Ala., Grant's favorite scheme of a canipai>!U aj^'aiust, I, 484, 485, 492, 493, II, 33, 34, 4<», 210, 232-23t, 367, 426; Bra^g's nioveiiu'ut to C'liatt:uioo.t;a, via, I, 329; J. E. Johnston moves troojis toward, II, 42; Banks's iiiovenients agaiust,.'58, 61, 40(), 40i; Shorman to secure the railroad between Chattaiiooiia and, 61; Union control of harbor of, 230, 232; Cauby's movements against, 232. 234, 277, 279, 366, 367, 431, 442, 443, 446, 458 ; proposed movement on, by Sherman, 233, 234 ; evacuation of, 367, 458 Mobile and Ohio railroad, movements, po- sitions, etc., on the, I, 275, 289, 308, 309, 314, 326, 327, 335, 345, 3.32, II, 429, 434 Mobile Bay, Union possession of part of, II, 230; Farragut's operations in, 427; CiHi- by'e movements against Mobile from, 442-444, 458 Modoc Indians, Gen. Canby killed by, II, 372 Molino delRey, Mex., situation, I, 116; bat- tle of, 117-120; Mexican celebration of the battle, 131 Monocacy River, the, Wallace's defeat at II, 196, 197, 416 ; Grant visits Hunter at, 207, 418, 419; meeting of Grant and Sheri- dan at, 208, 419 Monopolies, in Mexico, I, 42-44 Monte, a national game in Mexico, I, 140, 148 Monterey, Mex., its situation, approaches, and defenses, I, 76, 78, 80; advance on, 76, 79; battle of, 82-88; after the siu-reuder, 88, 89; relieving the post fund at, 141, 142 Monterey, Tenn., movements at, 1.308, 313 Montgomery, L. M., bearer of Pemberton's proposals at Vicksburg, I, 465 Montgomery, Ala., the Confederate capital, I, 181; Canity's movements against, II, 274, 277-279, 444 ; captured by Wilson, 368, 459; Steele's raid toward, 458 Montgomery Co., Pa., the Simpson family in, I, 5, 6 Moon Lake, Miss., proposed route through, I, 375 Morales, Gen., surrenders Vera Cruz, I, 97 Morgan, J. D., ordered to Chattanooga and Nashville, II, *233 Morgan. John H., raids of, I, 17, II. *354, 425 ; killed, 425 Morganzia, La., Banks reaches, II, 426 Morris, Thoma:;, iuilnences apjtointment to West Point. I, *14-16 Morris, W. H., II, 99 Morris Island, S. C, Federal possession of, II, 53, 398 Morrison, William, wounded at Fort Don- el-ion, I, *246 Morristown, Tenn., Breckinridge defeats Gillem near, II, 434 Morton, Miss., Sherman reaches, II, 41 Mosby, John S., narrowly misses capturing Grant, II, *67 ; perscm.il characteristics, 67; operations in rear of the Army of Potomac, 67; Sheridiin io look alter, 414 Moscow, Pres. Davis likens Sherman's po- sition to Napoleon's retreat from, II, 230 Mott, Gershom, his command, IT, P7 ; in bat- tle of the Wilderness, 108, 112, 113; at Todd's Tavern, *128 ; in battle of Spott- sylvania, 129-132, 134, 135; skirmishing, May 13, 1864, 138 ; reduction of his divi- sion to a brigade, 139 ; his brigade assigned to Birney's command, 139 Mound City, 111., proposal to send the gun- boats to, I, 250; Grant's strength south of, :;19 "Mound City," the, running the batteries at Vickwiiiii'g, I, 386 Mount Albans, Miss., I, 442 Mount Crawford, Va., Sheridan secures bridge at. 11, -445 Mount Jackson, Sheridan pursues Early to, II, 216. 420 Mount Pleasant, Tenn., Forrest moves to- ward, II, 428 Mower, J. A., promoted brigadier-general, I, 3.50 ; repulses Taylor's attack on Tensas Bavou, 456 Mule's, Mexican, 1, 42, 46, 54-57, 77, 78 ; dearth of, on the Isthmus, 155, 156 Mulligan, James A., commanding at Jeflfer- son City, 1, *208 Murfreesboro, Tenn., Rosecrans confronts Bragg at, I, 412 ; garrisoned by Thomas, II, 238, 256 ; Wheeler at. 424 Murphy, R. C, evacuates Inka, I, 337, 361; disgraceful surrender of Holl v Springs by, 360, 361; dismissed fi-om the army, 360; treacherous conduct of, 361, 362 Muscle Shoals, Ala., movements at, I, 233, 512 ; II, 239, 2.54 Muskets, superiority of Confederate, I, 479 Mutiny, on board the "Suviah," I, 40 Napoleon I., Pi^es. Davis likens Sherman to, II, 230 ; (irant's opinion of, 3S0, 391 Napoleon III., his vanity and overthrow, II, 390, 391 Napoleon, Ark., McClernand at, I, 366; visit to BlcClei-naud at, 367 Nashville, Tenn., situation, approaches, etc., I, 233, 263; strategic importance, 233, 262, 264, 495; A. S. Johnston at, 254, 266; escape of Floyd and Pillow to, 254; pro- posal to take, 262; Nelson's and Buell's advance on, 232; destruction of railroiid bridge at, 262, 266 ; arrival of Mitchell at, 203; (Jrant at, 263, 'JGU II, 32-36; Buell's alarm concerning, 264, 265 ; abandoned by Johnston, 267; comidaints about Grant's visit to, 259; reasons for occui)ying, 269; Buell's advance to Pittsburg Lnnding from, 274; capture of, 304; garrisoned by Union troops, 317, 327 ; fears for, 336 ; Hal- leek sug.itests that Grant go to, 488, 491 ; meeting with Andrew Johnson at, 497; a trying time at, 407; fears of Confeder- ate movement toward, 512, 515 ; rebuilding the railroad from Decatur to, 513-515 ; rnil- road supplies sent to, 514, 515; trip to Chattanooi;a fi-om, II, 34 ; troubles of the ■ telegraph operator at, 36, 37 ; Sherman or- dered to send troops to, 30 ; meetint!; with Sherman at, 47, 48; trip to Cincinnati from, 48; Shermnn assumes duties at, 81 ; recruits sent to Slierman at, 233; Thomiis at, 233, 239, 250, 2.56, 429. 431-433 ; Schofield at, 254-256. 433 ; guarding the road to Chat- tanooga from, 256; Hood's movement against, and .siege of, 256, 257, 430, 432, 433, 440 ; freezing weather at, 256 ; Thomas ad- vised not to let Hood remnin about, 257; Grant proposes to go to, 258, 259 ; Logan ordered to, 259; b.nttle of, 259, 260, 433; Sherman advised of the battle of, 275 ; INDEX 495 Sherman anrl Grant disapprove Thomas's aetiou at, ■270; Bhcruuiu'sdepeudeiiocou, for supplies, 421; arrival o( A. J. Smitli at, 433 Nashville and Chattanooga railroad,, juiic- tiou with till', M»'iiii)h!s and Cli;nli'sti>ii railroad, 1, 513 ; i'orrcst cuts the, 11, 4'28 Natchez, Miss., UaiisDUi ordered to, 1, 485; houudary of aberuiau's ooiuiiumd, II, r>4 Natchitoches, La., iu canip near, 1, 31, 3") Navy Department, eoucurs iu expedition aiiainst Fort Fisher, 11, 2G1 Negley, J. S., question ot liis restoration to duty, II, 48 Negroes, friemlly, I, 344; employuieut of, by Union armies, 353-355, 452; join Slieri- dan's eolumn, II, 294; their work in the Southdiu'ing the war, 352, 353 ; in tlie Kraud review at Washington, 380; the Sjinto Do- mingo question and the, 393 ; emploj niont as troops, see Colored Troops. See also Slavery. Negro question, the, in the United States, II, 392, 393 Negro suffrage, the question of, II, 360, 3G1 Neill, Thomas H., II, 99 Nelson, William, reinforces Grant at Fort Donelson, I, *243; ordered to NashviUe, 202; takes Nashville, 263; arrives at Sa- vannah, 276; at Shiloh, 286-288, 301 Neuse River, crossed by Union troops, II, 441, 442 New Auburn, Miss., Blair reaches, I, 423 New Berne, N. C, Union possession of, and forces at. II, 53, 274, 275, 277, 398, 439, 441, 442 ; importance of, 04 ; Schofield sent to, 275, 439, 441 ; cooperation with Sherman from, 275, 286, 444; communication vnth Raleigh, 280, 281; communications with Goldsboro, 280, 281, 286; expedition to- ward Goldsboro from, 441 ; disaster to ex- pedition from, 441 New Bethel Church, Va., Burnside sent to, II, 148 New Braunfels, Tex., I, 48 New Carthage, La., the " Henry Clay " at, I, 386 ; McClemand at, 388, 389 ; Grant's visit to, 389 ; order of march fi-om MiUi- keu's Bend to, 390 New Castle, Va., W. F. Smith hlunderingly ordered to, II, 163 New Cold Harbor, II, 157, 166 " New Era," the, Ellet's escape on, I, 387 New Found River, II, 153 New Hope Church, Ga., II, 86, 423 New Inlet, N. C, II, 435. 436 New Market, Va., Sigel's defeat at. II, 72, 142. 144, 411 ; Sheridan's operations at and ni-ar, 216, 445 New Market road, Va., operations on, II, 415, 421 New Mexico, boundary of Texas, I, 32; ne- gotiations for cession of, 115 ; purchase of, 134 New Orleans, La., the Fourth Infantry or- dered to, I, 37 ; an early-morning duel in. 37 ; departure of Fourth Infantry from, 39; Gen. Lo veil at, 142; fall of, 317; Banks at, 440, II, 58, 61, 400; proposal to make a base at, I, 481 ; leave of absence asked for visit to, 485 ; visit to Banks at, 486 ; se- rious accident at, 487; proposed expedi- tion from, against Mobile, II, 210, 400; concentration of stores about, 234 ; Canby commanding at, 277; Granger m, 279; Banks to return troops to, 400; guarding the Mississippi from Tort Hudson to. Kio New Orleans and Jackson railroad, broken l)\' (Irierson . 1, 40s New River, W. Va., Averell's o])eralionH at, II, 111 ; Stonenian's raid on, 45K New River Bridge, W. Va., breaking of the, II. 72, 140, 403, 411 Newspapers, lighting battles iu the, I, 72. See a.lso PUKSS. Newton, John, battles before Atlanta, 11, *85, 88 Newtown, Va., rallying of Sin lidan's troops between Middletown and. II. 420 New York, early visit to, I. 10. 19; end)arka- tion of the Fourth Infantry from, 153, 1.54 ; Confederate attempts to captme, II, 95, 410 Nineteenth Army-corps, arrives at Hamp- ton Roads, II. 416; ordered from Fortress Monroe to defense of Washington, 197, 410; ordered to reinforce the anuies be- fore Kiclimond, 197, 417, 427. See also Em- ory. W. II. Nineteenth Illinois Infantry, difticulty with its colonel, I, 194 ; relieves the 21st regi- ment at Palmyra, 199 Ninth Army-corps, returned to Burnside, I, 475,485; supports the Army of the Poto- mac, II, 56: mol)ility of, 57; organization, 100: moves from Spottsylvania, 147; or- dered to .lericho Bridge, 148; (! rant's headquarters with, 148; position. May 26, 1864, 153; ordered toward Hanover Town, 155; incorporated with the main army, 182, 408 ; in investment of Petersburg, 191, 413,415: at crossing of the Rappahannock and the Alexandria railroad, 404 ; reaches the North Amia, 406; instructions for, March 24, 1805. 447, 448; attacked. 448, 449; moveiiients on the South Side road, 453. See also Burnside. Norfolk, Va., in Union hands, II, 53, 398 ; Suniuer to be reinforced from, 447 North, the. sympathy with secession in. I, 181 ; disadvantage in the personnel of its army. 230; exultation over the fall of Fort Donelson. 200: eftect of (Gettysburg and Vicksburg at, 475, 478 ; contrasted with the South as regards lii^ense of speech and press, II. 31,' 55 ; the copperhead press of, 353; weary of the war, 228, 300, 369; re- sistance to the draft in, 210 ; its resources and strength contrasted with those of the South, 228, 351-355, 397 ; anxiety about Shennan in, 245, 246 : exaggerations of re- ports of battles in, 351 ; Confederate plots in, 353; excitement in, over Sherman's terms to Johnston, 3G5 ; how slavery re- garded in, 386, 387 North Anna, the, Sheridan's movements on, II, 78. 193, 295.414; march to C(dd Har- bor from 80: Hancock's operations on, 149, 150, 406; Burnside moves to. 150. 153, 406; Lee's position and strengtli on, 150. 151,153,406, 408; impossibility of turning the enemy between the South Anna and, 153 ; withdrawingto the i;orthside, 154, 155, 408; movements on. May 27, 1S64, 156; Lee deceived by themovemeutH on, 157 ; battle of the, 183, 410 ; the Fifth and Sixth Corps at. 406 North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, the, II, 437 North Carolina, secession of, 1, 183 ; Union 4:9G INDEX holdings in, n, 53, 54, 398; Hoke free to leave, 144; Hoke's reinforcements for Lee from, 151 ; the governor's call for defend- ers of Fort Fisher, 264 ; Shei-man proposes to march through, 272, 441; importance to the enemy, 273; J. E. Johnston put in command of all troops in, 280, 284 ; chang- ing the railroad gauge in, 281 ; Johnston's strength in, 285 ; fears of Lee getting into, 295; conquest of the Confederacy fi-om the Mississippi to, 319: apprehended ap- proach of Jolmston to Appomattox fi'om, 340; Johnston confi'ontiug Sherman in, 362; Grant goes to, to ad,iu8t Sherman's difflculties, 365; withdrawal of troops from, 373; Sherman's march through, 376; exhaustion of the country. 376 ; constitu- ted a separate military departn)ent, 439 : Schotield to aid Sherman in, 439, 440; pi-o- posal that Thomas campaign in, 446 ; pro- posal that Sheridan invade, 450 North Carolina railroad, Stoneman's raid on, II, 458 North Chickamauga, the, course and junc- tion with the Tennessee,!, 520; flotiUaon, 521, II, 2, 5 ; operations on, 4 ; Jefferson C. Davis at, 11 Nottoway River, Wilson crosses the, II, 415 Nottoway Station, Va., Wilson destroys the railroad at, II, 414 Northwest, the feeling in, in 1860, I, 173, 177 Nueces River, dispvited boundary of Texas, I, 33, 34; at Corpus Cliristi, 41; Indian massacres on the, 48 ; wild horses on the, 61 Ny River, movements on the, II, 119, 126 ; its course and character, 126, 127 Oath-bound societies, I, 169 Obstructionist, the fate of an, I, 45 O'Fallon, John, I, 26 Officers, the value of effective, II, 40, 41 Oglesby, Richard, commanding at Cairo, I, *21& ; to command at Bird's Point, 214 ; to move on the St. Francis River, 219; or- dered to New Madrid, 219 ; predicament of, 229; wounded at Corinth, 348, 349 Ohio, Noah Grant settles in, I, 2, 3 ; the Simpson family in, 6 ; birth of U. S. Grant in, 7 ; Grant's school life in, 8 ; Morgan's raid through, 17; visiting relations in, 153 " Ohio," the, a crowded passage on, 1, 154 Ohio River, the, early steamboats on, 1, 18 ; threatened by the rebels, 261, II, 257, 258 ; National troops on, 1, 265 ; A. S. Johnston's plan to cross, 298 ; fears of being driven back to, 330 ; Bragg's march toward, 336 ; Sooy Smith's troops ice-bound in the, II, 41 ; Forrest's raid on, 63 ; Hunter's re- treat via, 195; gunboats on the Tennessee near, 239 Okalona, Miss., Hatch destroys the railroad at, I, 408 Old Cold Harbor, Va., operjitions at, II, 157, 162, 164, 166 Old Court House, Va., orders for night march toward, II, 119, 120 Old Wilderness Tavern, Va., intercepting Lee's sif-nals at, II, 105, 106 ; headquarters at, 107 Oliver, W. S., master of transportation on the Mississippi, I, *393 Opelika, Ala., Rousseau's raid near, II, 424 Opequan Creek, Va., battle of, II, 216, 419, 420 ; political effect of the victory at, 217 Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, Burnside ordered to the, II, 120 Orange Court House, Va., road to the Wil- derness from, 100, II, 100, 102 Orange plank road, Va., movements on the, II, 100, 103, 107, 110 Orange turnpike, Va., the, movements on the, 100, 107 Orchard Knob, Tenn., viewing the battle of Lookout Mountain from, II, 9, 10; Grant and Thomas on, 12, 17 Ord, E. O. C, commanding center of the Army of the Mississippi, I, *335; com- manding reinforcements for Corinth, 338 ; plan of his operations, 338, 340, 341; en- gagement near Bumsville, 341; attacks luka, 341-343; attacks Van Dorn at Hat- chie Bridge, 347 ; wounded, 347 ; assumes command at Corinth, 347 ; at meeting between Pemberton and Grant, 467; to reinforce Sherman, 473, 482; to reinforce Banks, 486 ; to move against the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, II, 58, 61, 403; strenglh, 59, 01; in operations at Peters- burg, 200-202 ; commanding the Eighteenth Corps, 201 ; movement against Richmond, 218, 219 ; wounded, 219 ; in battle of White Oak Road, 299, 450 ; in action of April 2, 1865, 308-311; troops at Fort Gregg, 311; marches toward Burkesville, 324, 453; Grant marches with his command, 324; ordered to seize roads between Burkes- ville and High Bridge, 330; becomes alarmed for Washburn, 330; movement via Prince Edward's Court House, 332; southerly movement of, 333 ; relieved at own request, 403; captures Fort Harri- son, 421; supersedes Butler, 439; com- manding Department of Virginia and North Carolina, 439 ; covers the crossing of the Chickahominy, 446; instructions to. Mar. 24, 1865, 447, 448; question of supplies for, 448; movement. Mar. 27, 449, 450 ; proposed assault at Five Forks, 451; in action at Hatcher's Run, 453; in battle of Sailor's Creek, 454 ; at Farm- ville, 454; reaches Appomattox Station, 456 Oregon, Lieut. Slaughter killed in, I, 158; the Fourth Infantry ordered to, 161 ; Washington Territory set off from, 161; Gen. Canby kiUed in, II, 372 Orizaba, Mex., road to the City of Mexico throus;h, I, 98 ; occupation of," 134 Osband, E. D., colonel 3d U. S. Colored Cavalry, II, 431 ; operations on Big Black River, 431 Osterhaus, P. J., at battle of Port Gibson, I, *403; advance to Bolton, 426; at Cham- pion's Hill, 428, 429, 433^35 ; at Edward's Station, 435; in battle of Black River Bridge, 439 ; in siege of Vicksburg, 457 ; to report to Hooker, II, 4; at Brown's Ferry, 4, 8 ; in operations west of Chatta- nooga, 7; at Lookout Creek, 8; in battle of Lookout Mountain, 8, 9 ; serving under Hooker at Chattanooga, 20 ; commanding Logan's Fifteenth Corps, 234 Owen, J. T., his command, II, 97 ; in battle of the Wilderness, *108 Owl Creek, Tenn., Lew Wallace's march to- ward, I, 278 ; condition of, at time of Shi- loh, 280 ; bridged, 308 INDEX 497 Oxen, uso of, in Moxican war, I, 08 Oxford, Miss., opexations at aud near, I, 351), 300, 3(U Ox Ford, Va., movements at, II, 150, 151, 153 Ozumba, Mex., ascent of Popocatepetl fi-om, 1, 142 ; a niglit at, 144 Pachuca, Mex., occupation of, I, 133; an unappreciated honor at, 1-10 Pacific Coast, cost of living on, in 1849-1853, I, 161; Grant's fondness for the, 107; the opening up of the, II, 393-3i)5 Paducah, Ky., seizure of, I, 214, 215; ad- di'ess to citizens of, 215 ; Tilshnian evac- uates, 216 ; bringing troops to Fort Henry from, 237; tekjgraphi(! communicaticm with Cairo, 268; Forrest's raid to, II, 03, 425; Buford's unsuccessful attempt to capture, 425 Page, John, mortally wounded at Palo Alto, I, *69 Painesville, Va., Davles's captures at, II, 324 Palo Alto, Mex., battle of, I, 67-70, 72; Taj- lor's army at, 130 Palmer, John M., commanding 14th Illinois, I, *19'J ; in expedition to Brov.ii's Ferry, 504; plan of operations at Chattanooga, 521 ; in action at Fort Wood, II, 3 ; at and near (jraysville, 19, 25, 26 ; question of re- sponsibility for failure of attack on rail- road at Atlanta, 92 ; disputed seniority between Scholield and, 92 ; instructed by Sherman as to supplies, 439, 410 Palmer, W. J., pursuit of Hood by, II, 434 Palmetto, Ga., Pres. Davis's speech at, II, 227-230; Hood moves from, 430 Palmyra, Mo., Grant ordered to, 1, 198; ser- vice at, 199 Pamunkey River, movenicnts, etc., on the, II, 63, 79, 154, 156-159, 408, 445 Panama, outbreak of cholera at, I, 150, 157 Panama, Isthmus of, the rainy season on the, I, 154 Panama Railroad, extent in 1852, I, 154 Paris, Tenn., proposed exi)edition against, I, 208 Parke, J. G., brings reinforcements to Haines's BlulT, I, *456; feinting move- ments by, II, 219 ; commanding the Ninth Corps, 297, 298; defeats Gordon's attack at Petersburg, 297, 298; to hold lines about Petersburg, 299; carries the enemy's main line at Petersburg, 308, 309, 453 ; desperate fighting by, 310 ; attacked by Lee, 311 ; fits the captured works for defense, 311 ; moves out on the Danville road, 316 ; ordered to the South Side railroad, 322, 323 : in com- niaud around Petersbui-g and City Point, 447; position. Mar. 29, 18G5, 450; at Hatch- er's Run, 451 Parker, Ely S., secretary of Grant's staff, at Lee's surrender, II, *343 Parker's Store, Va., movements at, 11,103,106 Pascagoula, Miss., the Fourth Infantry or- dered to, 1, 152 ; suggested as Banks's base in operations against Mobile, II, iOl Patterson, Robert, commands division in Scott's army, I, *99; advance toward Ja- lapa 99 Patrick^M. R., II, 100 Payne, , horse-trade with, T, 10 Peace, the art of maintaining. II, 391 Peace Commissioners, mission of the, II, 287-290; meeting with Lincoln at Ilamp ton Roads, 363 Peach Hill, La., defeat of Banks at, II, 426 Pearl River, I, 422 Pedee River, Sliernian crosses the, II, 284 Pedregal, tlie, I, 109-111 Peeble's Farm, Va., Warren captures camp at, II, 219 Pegram. John, II, 101 Pemberton, John, messenger from Gen. Worth to Lieut, (iraut, I, *124; comman- plies liefore, 421 ; operations before, during winter of 1864-65, 422 ; the enemy witii- draws troops from, to protect Richmond, 421; armies of the Potomac and of the James confronting, 446; fears that Lee would abandon, 446 ; purpose of turning the enemy at, 447 ; its capture imminent, 450; Gibbon's assault on the south side of, 453 Phelps, S. L., destroys bridge of the Mem- phis and Ohio railroad, over the Tennes- see, I, 240 Philadelphia, Pa., early visit to, I, 16, 19 ; Confederate attempts to capture, II, 95; Grant informed of the President's assas- sination at, 358 ; transportation facilities in, in 1865, 358 Phister, E. C, at school of Richeson and Rand, I, 8 Phrases : " Hard tack ! hard tack ! " I, 443 " If a man can't skin, he must hold a leg while somebody else does," II, 59, 68 "I purpose to light it out on this line if it takes all summer," II, 133 " If they cannot get out where they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at," II, 246 Pickett, George E., his command, II, 101 ; attempts to reinforce Lee, 146 ; encounters Hancock at Milford, 146, 147 ; reinforces Lee, *151 ; sent to Five Forks, 304 Piedmont, Va., Hunter's success at, II, 195, 412 Pierce, B. R., carries bridge over the North Anna, II, *149 Pierce, Franklin, a possible rival of, for the Presidency, I, 75; injured before Con- treras, 113, *1U; candidacy for the Presi- dency, 114, 136; his personal character, 114 Pillaging, opposed by Gen. Taylor in the Mexican war, I, 60; Grant's views as to, and punishment of, 304 Pillow, Gideon J., at Cerro Gordo, I, *101; commands division in Scott's army, 105; advances from Puebla, 105 ; capt"m-e of Chapultepec assigned to, 120; hostility to Gen. Scott, 134, 135 ; placed under arrest, 134 ; released from arrest, 135 ; personal character, 241, 254, 267 ; telegram sent to Johnston by, 254 ; flight from Fort Donel- soii, 254, 257, 258; report of killed and wounded at Donelson, 258 Pilot Knob, Mo., Price drives the garrison from, II, 427 Pine Mountain, Ga., Joseph E. Johnston at, II, 423 Piney Branch Church, Va., II, 101, 119, 120; Grant's headquarters at, 123 Pioneers, employment of, at Vlcksburg, I, 452 Pittsburg, Pa., I, 18 " Pittsburg," the gunboat, at Fort Donel- son, 1, 247 ; running the batteries at Vlcks- burg, 386 Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., position of troops at. I, 272 ; advance on, 273 ; question of intrenching at, 274; intention to remove headquarters to, 275 ; Grant's attendance at, 275; skirmishes at, 275, 276; battle of, 277 et seq. (see also Shiloh) ; V/ebster's artillery at, 284, 285 ; bridge connecting Crump's Lauding and, 285; arrival of Halleck at, 305, 307 Plains, crossing the, I, 160 Plan del Rio, Mex., Twiggs and Patterson camp at. I, 99 Pleasant Hill, La., battles at, II, 426 Pleasanton, Alfred, superseded by Sheridan, II, 60 Pleasants, Henry, suggests the mine at Petersburg, II, *198 Plymouth, N. C, in Union hands, II, 53, 398 ; capture of the Federal garrison at, 64, 407 Po River, Va., movements at, II, 122, 123, 126-129, 132, 147 ; course and character, 126-128 Pocotaligo, S. C, Sherman at, II, 276, 277 Point Coupee, La., Banks's army reaches, II, 426 Point Isabel, Taylor's expedition to, I, 64- 67; Scott arrives at, 93 Point Pleasant, O., Jesse R. Grant settles at, I, 4 ; birth of U. S. Grant at, 7 Political influence, eflect on personal re- sponsibility, I, 383 Politics, effect of, on the Administration's conduct of the war, II, 217 Polk, James K., President of the United States, attitude in Mexican war, I, 45, 90- 92, 135 Polk, Leonidas, at the battle of Belmont, I, 228; occupies Meridian, II, *39, 40; re- treats toward Demopolis, 41 " Poor ■whites," in the South, I, 178, 507 Pope, John, U. S. mustering-otficer at Springfield, 111., 1, 191 ; acquaintance with, at West Point and in Mexico, 191 ; an un- accepted offer fi-om, 191 ; commanding in Missom'i, 201, 202 ; captures Island No. 10. 307; at Hamburg Landing, 307; com- manding left wing of Halleck's army at Pittsburg Landing, 307 ; " gets loose " on the march to Corinth, 313'; sent in pur- suit from Corinth, 316 ; defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, 336; to cam- paign west of the Mississippi, II, 446 INDEX 499 Poplar Spring Church, Va., capture of the enomy's works ut, II, 421 Popocatepetl, Mex., visit to, I, 142-145 Portage County, O., Jesse K. Grant settles in, I, 4 Porter, Andrew, excursion with, iu Mex- ico, I, 142 Porter, D. D., to cooperate with Sherman against Vicksbiu'K, I,*357 ; withdraws irom the Yazoo, 36(J: distrusts McCIcrunncrs ability, 367 ; explorations on the bayous, 377-379 ; cooperation of, 384; prepara'tions for running the batteries at Viclcsburg, 385; sends the "Indianola" down the river, 387 ; cooperation in attack on (iiaud Gulf, 396-398, 409, 410; runs the batteries at Grand Gulf, 397, 398; goes to liaiiks's assistance, 419; supplies navy guns for the siege of Vicksburg, 450 ; expedition to Haines's Bluff, 455 ; notified of Peuiber- ton's plan of escape by the river, 463 ; no- tified of cessation of hostilities, 468 ; ser- vice at Vicksburg, 480, 481 ; at Cairo, 498 ; asked to assist Sherman, 498 ; operations against Fort Fisher, II, 249, 262, 265-270, 435-437; complains bitterly of Butler's abandonment, 267; escorts Lincoln to Richniond, 355; present at interview be- tween Lincoln and Weitzel, 355 ; in Red River expedition, 426 ; confers with Grant and Butler at Hampton Roads, 435 ; com- manding North Atlantic blockading squadron, 437 ; personal and military qualities, 437; confers with Grant and Terry, at Fort Fisher, 440 ; cooperates in capture of Wilmington, 441 Porter, Horace, mission to Sherman, II, *231, 429 Porter, Mary, I, 1 Porter, Theodore, kUled by Mexicans, I, 64 Porter, V/. D., commanding the ''Essex" at Fort Henry. I, 236 Port Gibson. Miss., movements toward, battle at, and capture of, I, 398, 401-405, 447 : II, 172 Port Hudson, La., situation, importance, etc., I, 351, 374, 419, 464; Farragut rims the battei'ies at, 387 ; operations against, 410, 440, 455, 481; surrender of, 475, 478; great Union capture of cattle near, 485, 486, II, 290, 291 ; guarding the Mississippi between New Orleans and, 400 Portland, Ore., Indians neai', 1, 162 Port Royal, S. C, Federal possession of, II, 53, 398 Port Royal, Va., changing base from Fred- ericksburg to, II, 142 ; change of base to White House from, 154 Portsmouth, Va., Sumner to be reinforced from, II, 447 Potatoes, an experiment in raising, 1, 162 Potomac River, as a source of supplies, II, 62 ; movements on, 204, 416, 418 ; in Union possession, 398 Potter. Robert B., his command, II, 100: in assault at Spottsylvania, *ia6; jimction with Hancock. 150: cajitures i-edan at Pe- tersburg, 189; in the Petersburg mine af- - fair. 202 Pound Gap, Ky., Morgan's movements at, II, 425 Powder-boat. See FORT Fishke. Powhatan, Va., Kautz's raid at, II, 407 Prentiss, B. M., relieves Grant at Ironton, I, * 208 ; march from Ironton to Jackson, 211, 212; question of seniority vrith, 212; character, 213; at sliiloh, 274, 279-281, 285, 302; capture of his division, 280, 281, 302; ordered to send reinforcements to Vicks- burg, 448 ; defeats Holmes at Helena, 473 Presentiment, a, I, 22 Presidency of the United States, an exalted position, I, 93 ; etlects of hostility to candi- dates for the, i;i5, VM President of the United States, his respon- sibility in selecting commanders, I, .ms Press, the, the wonderful influence of, 1,72; in the South, :j70, II, 31, 54 ; in the North, 55 ; Sherman as dejiicted by the Southern, 245 ; the copperhead, 353 ; reveals secrets of Fort Fisher expedition, 435 Price, Sterling, raids in Missouri, I, *2as, 485,11,427,428; movements against, I, 218, II, 427, 428, 446: reinforcements for, I, 219; troops available to leiniorce Van Horn, 327; at Holly Springs. :i29 ; advances upon Corinth, 3;i6 ; inii)ossibilit v of attacking, 337; enters luka, 337 ; advancing to rein- force Van Dorn, 338; dangerous situation of, 340; joins Van Horn in attack on Cor- inth, 345; movements (if, II, 2:j2; at Jack- sonport, 427; attacks Pilot Knob, 427; moves toward Kansas, 427 ; defeated at the Big Blue, 428 " Price," the, running the batteries at Vicks- burg, I, 386 Prime, F. E., engineer work at Vicksburg, I, *450 Prince Edward's Court House, Va., move- ments at, II, 331-3:33, 454 Prisoners, matter of paroling, exchanging, etc., at Vicksburg, I, 469, 476, 477 Profanity, justified, I, 78 Professorship, Grant prepares for a, I, 30, 31 ; the idea destroyed, 35 Property, protection of, I, aOl Provost-Guard, Army of the Potomac, II. 100 Prussia, conquest of France by, II, 390 Public office, the most efficient servants in. II, 47 Puebla, Mex., Worth's advance to and oc- cupation of, I, 103, 104; route to the City of Mexico from, 108, 127, 128; Gen. Pierce joins the army at, 113; occupation of, 134; an unappreciated honor at, 140 Pulaski, Tenn., movements at, II, 254, 432; Forrest's skii-mish at, 428 Purdy, Tenn., Lew Wallace's march toward, I, 278 Purdy Road, the, I, 289 Quaker guns, at Corinth, 1,315 Quaker road, Va., movements and fighting on, II, 180, 450, 451 Quarles's Mills, Va.. headquarters at, II, 154 '' Queen of fne V/est," the, attacks the " In- dianola," 1, 388 ; sunk in the Red River, 388 Queretaro, Mex., temporal}- government at, I, 134 Quinby, I. P., reconnoiteis Fort Pemberton, I, *376; reinforces MeClernand at Vicks- burg, 445 Quincy, 111., Grant ordered to, 1, 198 Quitman, John A., commands brigade at Monterey, I, 84; commands division in Scott's army, 105; advances from Puebla, 105 ; in action against gaiita Belen, *120, 121 ; appointed to take possession of the City of Mexico, 125 500 INDEX Raccoon Mountain, Ga., toposrapby, Con- federate positions, etc., on, I, 495, 502, 503, Railroad, Grant's tirst sight of a, 1, 19 Railroad men, acuteuess of, I, 315 Railroads, effect of the introduction of, II, 387, 388 . ^. .^, ^^ Raleigh, N. C, coinniuuications with New Berne, AViluainston. and Goldsboro, II, "80 281; Sherman's movements toward and at, 441, 449, 457 ; meeting with Sher- man at, 365, 457, 458 .^, ^ ,, ,, Ralston, , horse-trade with, I, 11, 12 Ramseur, S. D., II, 101 Rand, , schoolmaster, I, 8 Ransom, D.R., II, 100 _ Ransom, T. E. G., at Champion's Hill, I, *432, 447 ; bridges the Big Black, 441 ; mili- tary ability, 480 ; ordered to Natchez, 485 ; conimandiug Blair's Seventeenth Corps, II, 234 Rapidan River, Union holdings on the, II, 53,398; the country between the James and the, 55, 96, 102 ; positions, movements, etc., on, 55, 57, 62, 73, 95-98, 399 ; crossing the, 62. 103-103, 107, 114, 116, 401, 404; the campaign to the James River from, 66, 411 ; narrow' escape of closing the campaign soon after crossing the, 122 Rapid transit, ideas in 1839, 1, 19; effect of, on the incUvidual States, II, 387, 388 Rappahannock River, movements on the, II, 05, 142, 404 Ravenna, O., Jesse R. Grant in business at, 1,4 Rawlins, John A., speaks at meeting at Ga- lena, 1, 184; appointed assistant adjutant- general, *206; Sherman writes to, concern- ing the Vicksburg campaign, 454 Raymond, Miss., McPherson at, I, 413, 414; battle of, 415, 447; Sherman and McCler- nand ordered to, 419, 420; Osterhaus at, 426; roads from, 431; feeding the destitute at, 483 ; success of the Army of the Tennes- see at, II, 172 Read, Theodore, sent to TccaW Washburn, II, *330; attacks Lee near Farmville, 330, 331, 451; kUled, 331, 454 Reading, Grant's fondness for, I, 20, 31, 35 Real-estate business, Grant in the, I, 168 Reams's Station, Va., Hancock and Gregg defeated at, II, 212, 421; desti'uction of the Weldon railroad at, 414, 421 ; Wilson defeated at, 415 . Rebellion, the Mexican war the forerunner of the, I, 130, 170; "patriotic" writers on the, 132; political effects of, on partici- pants in, 136; the right to suppress, II, 356, 357 ; necessity of breaking the military Ijower of the, 397, 403 Rebel property, policy of destruction of, I, 304, 305 Reconstruction, a blow to, II, 358, 360; the period of, 370 Recreations, boyish, I, 9 Red River, the, the Fourth Infantry ordered up, I, 28; in camp betweeu the Sabine and, 31, 35, 36 ; possible route to Vicksburg via, 373; waterway for the enemy, 374; the enemy's holdings below, 374; Ellet's action on, 3S7 ; the ram " Webb" in, 388; Banks's operations on, 410, 419, II, .58, 61, 64, 65, 72, 400, 426, 427 ; getting the gunboats over the rapids, 426 Redwood, trade in, at Humboldt, 1, 165 Refugees, employing, at Jefferson City, I, 210. See also Nkgroes Regimental bands, maintenance of, I, 141 Regimental funds, I, 141 Reorganization of the armies, plans for, II, 45 et seq. Republican Party, x-ise of the, I, 169; how viewed in the South, 170, 171 ; in Galena, 173 ; disasters in the elections of 1862, 369 ; effect of Sherman's and Sheridan's suc- cesses on the campaign of 1864, 94 Resaca, Ga., battle of, II, 85, 423; Wheeler cuts railroad between Dalton and, 92 Resaca de la Palma, topography of, I, 67 ; l)attle or, 70-72 ; Taylor's army at, 130 Revolution, the right of, I, 175 Reynolds, Thomas C, lieutenant-governor of Missouri, joins the rebels, 1, 180 Rice, James C, his command, II, 98; killed at Spottsylvaniai, *130 Richardson, Anna, I, 2 Richeson and Rand, school of, I, 8 Richmond, La., projected waterway via, I, 380 ; McClernand sent to New Carthage via, 388 Richmond, Va., report of great Confederate victory at Fort Donelson sent to, I, 249, 254 ; depression in, over fall of Fort Don- elson. 260; Johnston's despatch to, con- cerning Fort Douelsou, 267; one line of communication between the West and, 317; battles near, II, 54; defenses of, and positions of the Confederate army around, 55, 66, 174, 399; Butler's oper- , ations against, 58, 62, 73, 75, 402-404 ; Gill- more and Smith to operate against, 58, 62 ; possibilities and fears of Lee's falling back to, 63, 66, 119, 121, 152, 168, 402 ; de- pendence on Lee, 66 ; exchange of news- papers with, 68, 181; leakage of news from the Union armies to, 08, 69; the ob- ject of the Grand Campaign, 71, 73, 401; operations against railroads and tele- graphs communicating with, 73, 77, 133, 140, 141, 154, 177, 405, 406, 409, 414, 415, 443; Grant plans to light Lee between the Rapi- dan and, 73, 174, 402 ; Sheridan's operations against, 77-79, 133, 141, 294, 405, 406, 445? the grand movement of the Ai-my of the Potomac against, 95 et seq. ; hopes of get- ting between Lee and, 121, 122, 127, 147, 152 et seq., 405; Beauregard's defensive oper- ations, 133, 144, 188; Hancock's operations against, 145, 147 ; movement by the left flank on, 142, 145 et seq. ; Lee reinforced from, 146, 151; Warren's movements against. 147; " Live Yankees" in, 151, 152; Lee telegraphs belated news to, 157; roads froiii Hanover to, 157; proposedsiege of, 174, 109; importance to the Confed- eracy, 176, 291,319, 320; consternation in, and desperate condition of, 181, 199, 280, 291, 355 : Confederate gunboats at, 182, 185 ; importance of the Shenandoah Valley to, 204, 205; movements to prevent Early's reinforcement fi-oin, 209; threatening, fi-om the north side of the James, 209, 218, 219 , 409, 420 ; the President fears the reinforcement of Early from, 218; Con- federate troops from the Valley sent to, 224 ; close of active operations around, for the winter, 225 ; plan of campaign against, for spring of 1865, 226, 446-448 ; length of lines before, 231; reinforcements for Fort Fisher from, 265, 266 ; proposed move- INDEX 501 ment by Sherman against, 272, 301, 441, 449 ; Lee to be watched closely at, 275 ; frantic eflforts in, to retard Sherman's ad- vance, 280 ; Davis and Lee agree to aban- don, 296 ; plan for capturing, 300 ; Weitzel notified to be ready to enter, 308 , the Con- federate government abandons, 316 ; de- ceptions practised on the people of, 320 ; Weitzel enters, 320 ; found to be on fire, 320, 321 ; Lincoln's visit to, 353, 356, 363 ; pro- posed meeting of the Virginia legislature after the fall of, 355, 356, 363 ; Halleck sent to, 374 ; Halleck invites Sherman to, 374; Gov. Smith's flight from, 377 ; junction of the Armies of the Potomac and of the James before, 402, 446 ; possibility of cap- turing, in 1864, 404; Kautz's expedition against the road south of, 406; recall of troops from Washington to, 417 ; Early's retreat toward, 417 ; weakness of the ene- my's lines before, 421, 451 ; operations be- fore, during winter 1864-65, 422; Canby ordered to send troops before, 427; fears that Lee would abandon, 446; possible plans of the enemy for the defense of, 448; its capture imminent, 450; cavalry sent to Petersburg from, 451 Richmond and Danville railroad, Va., II, 328 Richmond and Fredericksburg road, Lee's position on the, II, 153 Richmond and Petersburg railroad, why Butler could not cross the, II, 75 Ricketts, J. B., his command, II, 99 ; at bat^ tie of the Monocacy, 196, 416 ; sent to Bal- timore, 416 Rienzi, Miss., troops at, I, 327, 335, 340 Riley, Bennett, at Contreras, I, ^111 Ringgold, Samuel, killed at Palo Alto, I, *69 Ringgold, Ga., njovements, engagements, etc., at, II, 25, 26, 83 Rio Frio Mountain, the, I, 108, 128 Rio Grande, the, boundary of Texas, I, 32, 33, 134; preparing to advance toward, 45, 54 ; wild horses on, 61 ; arrival of the U. 8. army at, 63 ; outlireak of the war on, 66 ; course and characteristics, 67 ; move- ment of troops on, 76 ; Scott advises fall- ing back, to, 92 ; in camp on, 94 ; to Vera Cruz from, 95, 96 ; advantage of placing a garrison on, 484 ; in Union hands, II, 53, 398; orders to Banks to hold the, 58,61, 400; proposed use of colored troops on, 400 ; Sherman sent to, 389, 459 Ripley, O., school life in, I, 8, 14; Grant starts for West Point from, 18 Ripley, Miss., Rosecrans's pursuit to, I, 318 Rivanna River, Sheridan destroys bridges over, II, 445 Roanoke River, the, proposed movements on, II, 301, 449 ; Wilson destroys the Dan- ville railroad at, 415 ; Sumner to destroy supplies south of. 448 Robertson, J. M., II, 100 Robinson, John C, II, 98 Rockville, Md., Early at, II, 416 Rockwell, William, I, 2 Rockwell, the widow, I, 2 Rocky Springs, Miss., McPherson and Mc- Clernaud at, I, 413 Rodes, R. E., II, 101 Rodney, Miss., contemplated landing at, I, 396 Rolling Fork, water communications of, I, 377 Rome, Ga., Bragg at, 1, 329; Sherman sends troops to, II, 232 ; captured by Jefferson C, Davis, 423 Rosecrans, W. S., commanding left wing, Army of the Mississippi, I, 335 ; troops of, ordered into Corinth, 337 ; commanding District of Corinth, *338 ; plan of opera- tions for, 340 ; delay at Jacinto, 341 ; de- feated on the Jacinto road, 342; enters luka, 342 ; Grant's opinion of, 343 ; his in- subordination, dilatoriness, etc., 843, 349, 492, 493; faint-hearted pursuit by, 343; Van Dorn's attempt to captm-e, 346; fail- m-e to pursue after victory at Corinth, 347, 348 ; ordered back, 348 ; losses at Corinth, 348 ; relieved from duty with Army of the Mississippi, .349; succeeds Buell hi com- mand, 349; denounces Murphy for sur- rendering luka, 361 ; confronted by Bragg in Tennessee, 448; di'iven Into Chattar nooga, 487, 488, 494 ; Grant ordered to co- operate with, 487, 494 ; C. A. Dana sent to, 488 ; Halleck suggests that Grant relieve, 491 ; superseded by Thomas, 491 ; ordered to move against Bragg, 492; confronted by Bragg at Murfreesboro, 492; Dana fears his retreat from Chattanooga, 492, 493; assistance needed for, 493; his mis- take iu operations against Bragg, 493, 494 ; defeated at Chickamauga, 494; abandons Lookout Mountain, 494; difficulty of bringing supplies to, 495 ; advised of his supersession, 497 ; meeting with, at Ste- venson, 498; contemplated retrograde movement of, 499 ; reinforcements for, 503 ; operations in Missouri, II, 238, 427, 428; ordered to send A. J. Smith to Thomas, 433 Ross, G. W., reports probability of captiu'- ing Fort Fisher, II, 4.37 Ross, L. F., commanding at Bolivar, I, *328 ; reinforcements for, 329 ; enters the Yazoo Pass, *375, 376; retreat of, 376; anxiety for, 377 Rosser, Thomas L., his command, II, 102 ; in battle of the Wilderness, 109 ; defeated by Sheridan at Fisher's Hill, * 221 Rossville, Ga., Hooker's operations at, I, 520, i52l, II, 12, 14, 19, 23, 25 Rough-and-Ready, Ga., Sherman defeats Hood near, II, 424 " Rough and Ready, Old," I, 73-75, 105-107. See also Taylor, Zacuart. Rousseau, Lovell H., makes raid into Ala- bama, II, *89; reinforces Sherman, 89, 424 Rowley, W. R., sent to bring up Lew Wal- lace's division at Shiloh, I, 278 ; on Grant's staff, II, 69 ; instructions to, betrayed to Richmond, 69 Russell, D. A., his command, II, 99; encoun- ters Barringer's brigade, *156 Rust, Albert, joins Van Dorn in attack on Corinth, I, 345 Sabine Cross Roads, La., defeat of Banks at, II, 426 Sabine River, in camp between the Red River and, I, 31 ; boundary of Texas, 32 Sackett's Harbor, N. Y., in garrison at, I, 153 Sacrificios, Mex., debarkation at, I, 96 Sailor's Creek, Va., location and coarse, II, 328 ; battle of, 329, 454 ; depressing effect of the battle on the Confederates, 350 St. Augustine, Fla., in Union hands, II, 54, 398 502 INDEX St. Francis River, niOTCraont against the eucmy on tlio, 219 St. Louis, Mo., Grant reports for duty at, I, 25; vLsits to, 30, 36, 152, 153, 187-190, 234,23.';, II, 42; farming near, I, 167, 168; in tho rcal-e.state business in, 168 ; a can- didate for office in, 168; danger to the U. S. arsenal at, 187; secession spirit in, 189 ; hauling down the rebel flag in, 189, 190; ollice in, 205; ordered to report at, 210; (ien. Prentiss reports at, 212 ; visit to Halleck at, 234, 235 ; transportation for Sherman's army from, 357 ; collecting boats from, 386 ; sending supplies to Sher- man from, 512 ; visit to F. !>. Grant at, II, 42 ; the Mississippi in Union hands from its mouth to, 398 ; " St. Louis," gunboat, at Fort Donelson, 247 Saline River, Steele's battle on the, II, 427 Salisbury, N. C, Stoneman's expedition against, II, 442, 458 Salt River, service on the, 1, 199-201 Saltillo, Mex., I, 80, 82 Saltville, Va., Crook's operations at, II, 58, 61, 403; Biu'bridge's expedition against, 428; Stoneman's expedition against, 434 San Augustin Tlalpan, Mex., occupation of , 1, 109; feasts at, 140 San Antonio, Tex., i>aying off troops at, I, 47 ; trip f ro]u Coi-piis Christi to, 47-53 ; Mexican massacre at, 49; situation, 109; Garland's brigade at, 109, 110; battle of, 111, 112 San Antonio River, I, 48, 51, 52 San Cosme garita, the, I, 116, 117 ; assault on, 120-123; the gun in the belfry at, 123, 124 Sanders, J. C. C, IT, 102 Sanders, John, at battle of Monterey, I, *82 Sand Mountain, Hood crosses, II, 431 San Francisco, Cal., arrival of the Fourth Infantry at, I, 158; the city in 1852, 159- 161 ; in 18.53, 165, 160; gambling in city lots in, 166 ; tlie city in 1854, 166 Sanitary Association, the, atVicksburg, 1,452 San Juan de UUoa, Mex., I, 96, 97 San Patricio, Indian massacres at, I, 48; settlement at, 52 Santa Anna, A. L. de, capture of, by Tex- ans, I, 33; ti-eaty with Texas, 33, 34; massacres by, 34; commanding Mexican forces at Cerro Gordo, 99; wonderful march by, 102 ; negotiations with, 114, 115 ; evacuates the City of Mexico, 124, 134 Santo Domingo, the question of annexa- tion of, II, 393 Savannah, Ga., preparations for campaign against, 11,33; movements to and from, proposed and executed, 230-233, 272, 276, 429, 430, 441; Sherman's march to, 240, 247 ; torjiedoed roads near, 247, 248 ; investment of, 217-251; opening commimication with the Union fleet at, 248; strength, 250; im- portance of capture of, 250 ; topography, 250, 251 ; evacuation of, 251 ; destruction of the navy-yard, and capture of stores at, 251, 252 ; captT\re of a blockade-rvmner at, 252 ; turned ov^er to (Jen. Foster, 271 ; news of the capture of, in the North, 271 ; Sim- eon Draper put in charge of abandoned and captured property at, 271 ; Sherman clears up in, 276; intrenching at, 276; distance of Goldsboro from, 282;" Sherman goes to, 374; troops sent to, 420; occupa- tion of, 431 ; Foster's expedition against the railroad between Charleston and, 43l anticipating Sherman's arrival at, 440 Savannah, Tenn., Grant reassumescomma^d at, I, 271; C. F. Smith sick at, 271, 279, troops at, 272 ; advance on Pittsburg Land- ing ft-om, 273; headquarters at, 275; Nel- son arrives at, 276 ; Buell expected at, 277 , McCook's march to, 292 Savannah River, Sherman's operations on the, II, 231, 276, 431 Scale, Alfred M., II, 102 Schenck, Capt., commanding the "Ohio," I, 154 Schofield, John M., troops sent to, I, 485: commanding in East Tennessee, II, 43 ; relieves Foster, 43; unable to move for lack of supplies, 44 ; commanding depart- ment under Shei-man, 54 ; comnjanding the Department of the Ohio, 81, 422; com- manding at Knoxville, 82; strength, 82; Shernum's plan for his advance, 83 ; move- ment from Knoxville, 83; successes at Kenesaw, 87; blames Palmer for failure of operations, 92 ; disputed seniority be- tween Palmer and, 92; ordered to rein- force Thomas, 238 ; Thomas's orders to, before Franlilin, 254; Hood turns liis po- sition, 254; falls back to Columbia, 254; strength before Franklin, 254; retreats to Franklin, 255 ; defeats Hood at Frank- lin, 255, 432 ; retreats to Nashville, 255, 256, 433; strength, 274 ; ordered to Annapolis, 274; sent to Wilmington or New Berne, 275, 441; arrives at Annapolis, 280; Grant makes tour of inspection with, 280, 440; sent to Cape Fear River, 280 ; to seize the Wilmington tind Charlotteville railroad, 281; to land troops at Smithville, 281; at Cioldsboro, 285, 441, 442, 446 ; moves with Sherman against Johnston, 422 ; opera- tions against Buzzard's Roost, 423 ; or- dered to Chattanooga, 431 ; reaches John- sonville, 432; commanding at Pulaski, 432 ; ordered East, 439; reaches Washington, 439; placed under Sherman's orders, 439; to command the Department of North Carolina, 439; sent to Fort Fisher and New Berne, 439; instructions as to coiiiv erationwith Sherman, 439, 440; to secure rolling-stock from Washingt(m, 440 ; cap- tures Wilmington, 441 ; to reinforce Sher- man, 441 ; commanding the Twenty-third Corps, 441; Sherman opens communica- tions with, 442 Scott, Sir Walter, Grant's fondness for works of, I, 20 Scott, 'Winfield, visits West Point, I, 22; poUtioal aspirations of, * 90, 91 ; difficulties concerning his appointment to command in Mexico, 90-93 ; sent to Mexico, 91-93 ; opposes Taylor's plan of the war, 02; deceived by the Administration, 92 ; with- draws regular troops from Taylor, 92-91; arrives at Camargo, 93; size of his army, 98, 99; plans the capture of Cerro Gordo, 100, 101; reduction of his army at Ja- lapa, 103; at Puebla, 104; handicapped by want of trooiis, 105; strength at Puebla, 105; contrasted with Taylor, 105-107 ; per- sonal characteristics aiid jnilitary char- acter, 105-107, 135; position at Ayotla, 109; reconnoiters Contreras, 110: strategy and tactics at Churubusco, 112, 113 ; reasons for not entering City of Mexico, 114 ; declares armistice at an end, 115 ; occupies Tacuba- INDEX 503 ya,115; estrangement between Gen. Worth and, 117 ; iissiguw capture of Cliapiiltepoe to Pillow, 120; captures City of Mexico, 125, 126; enters the city, 121;, 327; his suc- cesses an answer to criticisui, 12'J; his tactics couipared with Gen. Taykir's, 129 ; personnel of his army, 130; prepares for prolonsert oceiipation of Mexico, i:!2, 13:5 ; originator of the Soldiers' Hoiue, 133; attempts to remove him, 134; hostility of PiUow, Worth, and Duncan to, 134; hostility of the Administration to, 134, 135; relieved of command, 135 ; laLer years of, 135; defeated for Presidency, 136; diHiculty of providing clothing for the army, 140; system of tactics taught at West Point, 203 ; Lee his chief of staff in Mexico, II, 341 Scottsborough, Ala., Logan at, II, 42 Scottsville, Va., Sheridan destroys the James River canal at, II, 445 Scout, device of a, II, 326 Sea-coast defenses, importance of, II, 391 Seasickness, a bad case of, I, 157, 158 Secession, the approach of, I, 171, 173; the right of, 174-177 ; the clamor for, in the South, 177-181 ; Ix'giiining of, 179, 180 ; Northern sympathy with, 181 ; of eleven States, 183; repealing the ordinance of, in the mock legislature of Georgia, II, 246 ; the hotbed of, 276 Second Army-corps, Army of Northern Va., organization of, II, 101 Second Army-corps, Army of the Potomac, organization of, II, 97 ; crosses Ely's Ford, 98, 404 ; indefatigable work by, 148 ; under command of Birney, ISO ; "move- ment against the Weldon railroad, 190; in investment of Petersburg, 191, 413 ; Hancock relieved of commainC 226 : Hum- phreys assigned to command, 226 ; in battle of White Oak Eoad, 299, 452 ; in advance on Five Forks, 304 ; in action of April 2, 1865, 308. 310 ; confidence in Hancock, 384 ; in battle of Spotteylvania, 405 ; holds bridge at the North Anna, 406 ; crosses the James, 412, 415 ; threatens Riclinioud, 420 ; de- feated at Eeams's Station , 421 ; in action at Hatcher's Run, 422 ; in action, March 25, 1865, 449 ; movement toward Dinwiddie Court House, 450 ; piu'sucs Ia'c toward Danville, 453, 454; operations at High Bridge, 454 ; in battle of Sailor's C!rcek, 454. See also Hancock; Hdmphrkys. Second Dragoons, at Fort .Tessup, T, 27; at Corpus Christi, 44 ; capture of companies of, by Mexicans, 64 ; in Mexican w;ir, 1, 105 Second Michigan Cavalry, Sheridan ap- pointed colouel of the, I, 334 Secret societies, I, 169 Sects versus the state, I, 170 Sedgwick, John, commanding Sixth Army- corps, II, 97, 99 ; crosses the Rapidau, 98, 103, *105 ; closes on Warren's right, 106 ; in battle of the Wilderness, 109, 114, 115, 405; orders for. May 7, 1864, 120; with- drawal of, 120 ; at Piuey Branch Church, 123 ; ordered to support Warren at Spott- sylvania, 123 ; fails to support Warren, 123, 124 ; military and personal character- istics, 124, 384 ; in reserve nt Spottsylvania, 125 ; crosses the Ny at Catharpin Furnace, 126 ; position, noon, Mav 9, 1864, 127 ; killed before Spottsylvania, 128, 384, 405 Selma, Ala., movements against, II, 274,277- 279, 443 ; captured by Wilson, 368, 459 Semmes, Raphael, at capture of City of Mexico, I, ^121 Seven-Mile Creek, Pope nt, I, 313 Seventeenth Corps, position at Lake Provi- dence, I, 370; center of the Army of ilio Tennessee, 390: at Bruinslmrg, 4oi, 402; in assault on Vieksburg, 445 ; in right wing of Sherman's army, II, 234; comiiiiindcd by (Jen. Jilaii', 234; part of, sent from Vieksburg to Red River, 426 Seventh Army-corps, in cooperation with Banks, II, 427 Seventh U. S. Infantry, at Corpus Christi, I, 44; Grant promoted to full second lieutenant in the, .53; Grant transferred back to the Fourth Infantry from, 53, 54 ; Mil,). Bi'owu killed, 72 Seward, W. H., views as to the duration of the war, I, -177 ; Grant informed of the attack on, II, 358 Seymour, T., IT, 99 Shady Grove Church, Va., movements near, II, 106, 158, 161 Shaler, Alexander, II, 99 Shelllsland, Tex., debark.'ition of the Fourth Infantry at, T, 39-41 Shenandoah Valley, the, importance of, to the Confederates, II, 57, 204, 205, 207, 209, 214, 220; plan for Ord's operations in, 61 ; Sheridan's oiierations in, 94, 206, 213- 217, 220-223, 278, 293, 445; possibility of reinforcing Lee from, 144 ; Ewell sent to, 181 ; Early's operations in, 181, 213, 216, 420 ; left open to Early, 195, 416 ; Hunter's op- erations in, 192, 194, 195, 412, 417, 418 ; bad policy of Stanton and HaUeck concerning, 205; moving troops toward, 207 ; visit to Sheridan in, 214, 215 ; Wright left in com- mand in, 222; Union troops withdrawn from, 224 ; virtual closing of the campiiign in, 224 ; Confederate troops sent to Rich- mond from. 224 ; proposed niovenieiits for Hancock in, for spring of 1865, 220 ; pro- posed plan of cami)iugn from, in spring of 1865, 226; Sheridan moves on the James from, 2;!3 ; Confederate force in, 399 ; Sigel's operations in, 403, 411 ; necessity of breaking railroad comnnmicatiou be- tween Richmond and, 409 ; engagement at Snicker's Ferry, 417; to be depleted, 418, 420 ; the enemy's last attempt to invade the North via, 420; withdrawal of the enemy from, 443; Sheridan to move to- ward Sherman from, 443, 444 Shepherdstown, Va., Sigel retreats across the Potomac at, II, 416 Sheridan, P. H., brings news of Bragg to Corinth, I, 329 ; meeting with, at Corinth, *333 ; his early career, 333, 334 ; relations with Halleck, 333, 334; victory at Boon- ville, 334 ; promoted brigadier-general, 334; reaches and fortifies Louisville, 334; in action at Fort Wood, II, 3: in battle of Chattanooga, 15-18; supersedes Gen. Pleasanton, 60; commanding Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, 60. 97, 99 ; first raid on Lee's communications, 76-80, 127, 133, 141, 153, 405, 406 ; crosses the North Anna, 78, 414; destroys railroad at Ash- laud, 78, 406 ; passes the outer defenses of Richmond, 78, 406 ; defeats Stiuut at Yel- low Tavern, 78, 406; crosses the Chicka- hominy, 78, 79, 406 ; at Ha xall's Landing, 79, 406; crosses the Pamunkey, 79, 408; at White House, 79, 4U; campaign in the 504 INDEX Shenandoah Valley, U ; political eflfect of Ms victory, 94, 217 ; in battle of the Wilder- ness, 109, 111 ; at Todd's Tavern, 120, 122 ; his plans for capture of Spottsylvania balk'ed by Meade, 122, 123 ; movement to- ward Hanover, 156, 408 ; crosses the Pa- munkey, 156,408; action at Hawes's Shop, 158; reconnaissance toward Mechauics- ville. 158, 159 ; to reconnoiter toward Cold Harbor, 159 ; to commtmicate with Smith, 159; position near Cold Harbor, May 30, 1864, 161, 408 ; repulses attack, 161 ; in bat- tle of Cold Harbor, 162, 163; reconnoiters on the Chiokahominy, 165; expedition asainst the Viri^luia Central railroad, 176, 177, 181. 192-194, 409, 414 ; defeats Hampton, 193 ; operations at Tre^-illian Station, 193, 414 ; breaks up the depot at White Bouse, 194 ; returns to the Army of the Potomac, 194, 414 ; movement via Deep Bottom, 199, 201, 415; Stanton's objection to giving command to, 205 ; sent to the Valley, 205, 206, 418, 419; supersedes Hunter, 207, 419; inWashingtou, 207 ; strength, 208 ; meets Grant at the Monocacy, 208, 419 ; instruc- tions given to, 208 ; confronted by Early in the Valley, 208; Informed concerning reinforcements sent against him, 209; follows Early to Strasburg, 213 ; sending Information of Early's reinforcements to, 213, 214; difficulty of getting orders to, through Washington, 214, 221 ; thrown on the defensive, 214, 419; visit to, at Charlestown, 214, 215, 419; completeness of his plans, 214, 215, 419; at Harrison- biu-g, 216 ; defeats Early at the Opequan, 216, 420; pursues Early to Fisher's Hill, 216 ; despoils the Valley, 217. 221, 420 ; con- gratulations for, 217 ; the President's anxi- ety for, 217, 218 ; recommends a reduction of his force, 220 ; precautious to prevent the enemy getting in the rear of, 220 ; or- dered to cut the James Kiver canal and the Virginia Central railroad, 221, 278 ; com- mences retreatdowu the Valley,221, 420; de- feats Early's cavalry at Fisher's Hill, 221, 420; Grant's telegraphed orders to, Oct. 14, 1864, 221, 222 ; summoned to Washing- ton, 222 ; orders cavalry up the Valley, 222 ; return to Winchester from Washington, 222, 223 ; at Front Royal hears of Early's movement to crush him, 222; the famous "ride," 223, 420; intrenches, 223; defeats Early, 224, 420 ; letter to, Feb. 20, 1865, 278, 444 ; ordered to raid fi'oin Lynchburg, 278, 444 ; defeats Early between Staunton and Charlottesville, 293, 445 ; hazardous march to White House, 293, 294, 445 ; moves toward Richmond, 294, 445; flne condition of his cavalrv, 294 ; crosses the Anna rivers, 295, 445 ; reaches White House, 295, 445, 446 ; at- tacked at Ashland, 295; reaches City Point, 300; instructions for his movements, March 29, 1865, 300-302, 447, 448; proposed cooperation with Sherman, 301. 443, 444, 450 ; advance on Five Forks, 303-306, 451 ; moves back to Dinwiddle Court House, 304, 452 ; driven back near Five Forks, 304 ; Warren ordered to his assistance, 305, 452 ; relieves Wan-en, 306; in battle of Five Forks, 306, 307, 452 ; comes in on the left, 311 ; in battle of Sutherland's Station, 312, 453; pursues from Sutherland's Station, 312 ; ordered to move out on the Danville road, 316, 453 ; reinforced by Humphreys, 316 ; plan to imite with Grant, 318 ; notified of Lee's route to Farmvllle, 322 ; hazard- ous position, 323; intercepts Lee's mes- sage for rations, 323 ; advised to attack, 324 ; despatch to Grant, April 5, 1865, 324 ; reports Lee at Amelia Court House, 324 ; at Burkesville, 324; assists Meade, 325; prevented from attacking by Meade, 325 ; asks Grant to go to JetersvlUe, 325 ; con- sultation with, 326 ; takes the Sixth Corps under his command, 330; bivouacs at Prince Edward's Court House, 333 ; south- erly movement of, 333 ; pushes forward to capture Lee's trains at Appomattox, 333, 335, 455, 456 ; vim Of his troops, 335 ; orders Custer south of Appomattox Station, 335; Lee asks him for suspension of hostilities, 338; excitement among his troops, 340; sent to the Rio Grande, 389, 390, 459; crosses the Rapidan, 404; crosses the James near Fort Powhatan, 414 ; advances toward Gordonsville, 414; sent to Har- per's Ferry, 419; cavalry sent to, 419; promptness, 419 ; pursues Early through the Blue Ridge, 420 ; returns to Strasburg, 420; takes position on north side of Ce- dar Creek, 420; defeats Early at Stras- burg, 420 ; reinforces the Anuy of the James, 420 ; ordered to send troops to Bal- timore, 438 ; moves from Winchester, Feb. 27, 1865, 444 ; to look after Mosby, 444 ; se- cures bridge at Mt. Crawford, 445 ; enters Staunton, 445 ; defeats Early at Waynes- boro, 445; march to Charlottesville, 445; de- stroys bridges over the Rivanna,445; aban- dons idea of capturing Lynchburg, 445; destroys James River canal, 445; failure of expeditions to Duguidsville and Hard- wicksvllle, 445 ; concentrates at Columbia, Va., 445; threatens Richmond, 445; move- ments on the Pamunke.v, 445 ; moves from White House, 446; crosses James River, 446 ; rejoins Army of Potomac in front of Peters'bm-g, 446; Instraotions to, March 28, 1865, 450 ; position, March 29, 1865, 450 ; in battle of Sailor's Creek, 450 ; letter to, March 29, 1865, 451; reinforced by Miles, 452 ; returns IMiles to his proper command, 453; intrenches near Jetersville, 453; re- ports Lee's army demoralized, 453; pur- sues Lee toward Danville, 454 Sherman, W. T., sent to Smithland, I, 258, *259; generous offer by, 259; expedition to Burusville, 273 ; commanding division In Army of the Tennessee, 273, 274 ; pm-- sues Johnston's cavalry, 275 ; quality of his troops and their commander, 279, 282 ; at Slliloh, 279, 280, 282, 284-286, 288, 302; wounded, 282; records gallantry of Mc- Cook's command at Shiloh, 292 ; accuracy of his reports of Shiloh, 305; action before Corinth,314 ; dissuades Grantfi-om leaving the Department of the Tennessee, 319; commanding at Memi)his, 328, 335, 357, 488, 11,39; commanding right wing of the Army of the Mississippi, 1,335, 352 : meeting with, at Columbus, 355 ; personal and military abilitv and characteristics, 355,356,512,11, 139, 230 ; instructions to, I, 357, 358 ; corre- spondence with Grant. I, 357, 358, 483, 488, II, 58, 230-233, 249, 250, 273-275, 429, 430, 453, 454; sent to Memphis in charge of move- ment against Vicksburg, I. 358 ; coopera- tion between Grant and, 359 ; first attack on Vicksburg, 364; strength, 365; with- INDEX 505 draws from the Yazoo, ncO; distrusts Mc- Cleriiaud's ability, 3G7 ; cxiicditioii up Steele's Bayou, 378; ou KUuk Havoii, ;i7.s, 379 ; commandiufT left wiug- ol Aiu'iy ol tlio Tennessee, o",)0; advauce"ui)(>u New Car- thage, 3i)'2; ordered to threaten Haines's Blult, 398; withdraws from Haines's Bluft", 400; atr!ruinsl)ur.i;-, 401; disiijiproves lilau of eattini; loose from base of sup- plies, 411; arrives at Grand Culf, 4V2; marehes froiu Grand Gulf to llankiuson's Perry, 413; at Bis Sandy and Anbuin, 413; at Fourleen-Milo Creek, 413-415; at Raymond, 419, 420; to march on Jackson, 420; at battle of Jackson, 421-423; John- ston's plan to defeat. 424 ; destroys Jack- son, 424, 427 ; march from Jackson to Bol- ton, 428, 437; goes to Bridgeport,437, 441.516- 518; conversation with, on Walnut Hills, 441, 442, 453 ; prophetic view of the Vlcks- burg campaign, 442, 453; in investment of Vicksburg, 443, 448 ; sacrtflces in favor of McClernaiid, 445 ; Northern visitors to, be- fore Vickshm-g, 453 ; credit due to, for the Vicksburg campaign, 453; disclaims tb.e credit, 453; loyal support from. 453, 454; re- monstrates against the plan of campaign, 453, 454: complains of McClernand's con- gratulatory order, 457; assigned to com- mand of forces from Haines's Bluff to the Big Black, 458 ; ordered to drive Johnston from Mississiiipi, 473, 475, 482; command- ing at Haines's Blufi',482; on the Big Black, 482 ; besieges Jackson, 482, 483 ; liiie from Haines's Bluff to tiie Big Black, 484 ; or- dered back to Vicksburg, 484; renders assistance during Grant's disablement, 487; sent to reinforce Rosecrans, 494; passes Eastport, 498; assigned to com- mand the Army of the Tennessee, 500; leaves Memphis for Corinth, 511 ; repairs roads, 511, 512 ; ordeied to Stevenson, 512 ; at Florence, 512 ; notitJed of Confederate movement toward Nashville, 512; move- ments and positions on the Tennessee, 512, 519-521, 524, II, 5, 30, 32, 38 ; to halt Gen. Dodge at Athens, I, 513; lu'ged forward, 51G ; plan of movement for relief of Burn- side, 517 ; detaiued at Elk River, 517 ; meet- ing with Gr.!nt at Chattanooga, 518 ; to co- operate with Thomas, 519; plan of battle for, 520, 522; trip from Chattanooga to Briilgeport, 523 ; with the advance at Brown's Perry, 523; reaches his position imdiscovei-ed, 525 ; ready for action at Brown's Ferry, II, 4 ; in battles of Mission-., ary Ridge and Chattanooga, 6, 7, 10, 12, A 13, 15, 10, 18, 20, 23, 30; at Graysville, 25, 26 ; at Ringgold, 26 ; destroys railroad be- tween Daiton and KuoxviUe, 27 ; march to Knoxville, 27, 28, 38 ; jn-oposes to assist Birrnside in driving Longstreet out of Tennessee, 37 ; proceeds to clear the east bank of the IVIississippi, 39 ; sends scout- ing expeditions from Vicksburg, 40; moves against Polk at Meridian, 41; nar- rowly escapes capture at Decatur, 41; proposes to move against Shreveport, 42; Thomas to coijperate with, 42, 43; cooperation with Banks, 42, 49, 58, 61, 65, 84, 400, 425; recommended by Meade as Ms successor, 40 ; commandlnj^ the Mili- tary Division of the Mississippi, 46, 48, 54, 399 ; meeting with, at Nashville, 47, 48 ; dis- cussion of the spring campaign, 48, 49; Buell declines (o serve under, 50; con fronted liy Johnston in (icorgia, 57, 59,61, 399 ; movement against and eaiiture of At- lanta, 58, 82, 83, 89, 90, 92, 93, 210, 213, 423, 424 ; semis troops iigainst Forrest, 63, 424, 425 ; or|ili(>s at Chattanooga, 82, 83; moves on IJalton, 84, 422; halts to bring up his sup plies, 85; ri'inforced by Blair, 86; gains possession of tiie Chattahoochee, 'J7 423; sends Stonemaii on raid, 90; nnsuceeseful attempt to capture railroad on tnc fight, 92 ; blames Palmer for failure ot opera- tions, 92 ; Wlieeler cuts his comneimcur lions with the North, 92 ; value of his .lab- ordiniites, 93 ; regulates the sutlers, Jb, .t4 ; news of his success in tlu^ North, 94; mo738 according to program of spring cam- paign, 106 ; encounter with Johnston. 119 ; ret'onnuended for major-generalship, U. S. A., 139; drives Johnston out of Daiton, 140 ; ca])tures Kingston and crosses the Etowali, 151 ; anecdoteof the Atlanta cam- paign told by, 165; Forrest hamsses his rear, 197; hnrasses the enemy in Georgia, 199; asks for raw reci'uits, 210 ; i)roposed plan of canipaignjfor. in spring of 1805, 226 ; a source of weakness in liia army, 227- 230; Ms march to the sea, 227 et seq., 237, 240. 429-431; Pres. Davis's views of his position, 228-2.30; opposed by Hood, 229, •232, 233, 238, 429, 443; takes advantage of Davis's speeches. 230, 429 ; proposes to sweep the whole JState of Georgin, 231. 430 ; asked for views, 231, 232 ; sends troops to Thomas, 232, 431 ; eorresiiondeuce with Hood, 233 ; proposers movement agsiinst Milledgeville and Savannah, 233; Mobih; considered his objective point, 233 ; orders Thomas to Chattanooga and Nashville, 233 ; movement on Mobile no longer neces- sary, 234; organization of his army, 234- 236; sui>ersedes Logan by Howard, 235; views the battle of Allatoona, 237; au- thorized to cut loose from his base, 238; proposal that he destroy Hood before starting to the sea, 240; his campaign through Georgia delinitelv approved, 240, 430 ; concentrates at Atlanta, 240, 428, 431 ; destroys Atlanta, 241; his "bummers," 242-244; reaches Milledgeville, 244 : as de- picted ))y Southern nev.spapers, 245; anx- iety about, in the North, 245, 246; move- ment via Waynesboro and Louisville, 246; resumes march from Milledgeville, 246; advances j)risoners over torpedoed roads, 248; communicates with Foster, 248, 249; Grant's confidence in, 249,250; invests and captures Savannah, 251, 431, 440; suggests destruction of raili-oad back to Chatta- nooga. 252; question of the credit due for his march to the'sea, 252, 253 ; the Presi- dent's anxiety concerning his cutting loose from his base, 253 ; proposed north- ward campaign, 271-273, 276, 429, 430, 440, 441 ; news of Ills capture of Savannah in the North, 271; visitors to, at Savannah, 271 ; results of his march through Georgia, 272; commencement of the tiuid march, 277, 441; arranges with ,\(lm. Dahlgren and Gen. Foster to seize points near Charleston, 273; provisions for coopera- 506 INDEX tion -witll, 273-275, 277, 279, 281, 441, 443, 444, 450 ; Lee sends ti'oops asainst, 273, 280; ad- vised of the battle ol" Nashville, 275 ; clears up in Savauuub, 276; thanked by C'on- Krt!ss, 270; congratulates Thomas, 276; disapproves Thomas's action at Nash- ville, 276; his objective points, 277; iu- foriiuid of the fall of Fort Fisher, 277; to eat the vitals out of South Carolina, 278, 444; march ti) and capture of Columbia, 282, 283, 441 ; karus that Beauregard con- fronts him, 283 ; marches from Columbia to Cheraw, 234; crosses the Pedee, 284; learns of Johnston's restoration to com- mand, 284; ri'ceives supplies from Terry at Payetteville, 284 ; march from Fayette- Ville to GoLi:;boro, 284, 285. 440, 442, 444, 446 ; confronted by Johnston, 285, 362, 442 ; impossibility of Lee's striMng at, 285, 286 ; arranging for Lis movement, 295; pro- posed cooperation of Sheridan with, 301 ; to cooperate iu movements on Petersburg and Richmond, 301, 449; Lee's attempt to unite with Johnston and crush, 316 ; in- formed of Lee's surrender, 363; meets the President at ( 'ity Point, 363; difficulty about his conditional terms to Johnston, 363- 360, 374, 379, 457, 458 ; his populnrity, 364 ; his troops ordered not to obey Mm, a65, 374 ; meeting wit'.i Grant at Raleigh, 365, 457, 458; his loyaltj', 366; secures Johnston's surrender, 366, 458: march to Washington, 373, 374, 379; resents Halleck's indignities, 374; ordered to Washin.gton, 374; achieve- ments and quality of his army, 374-376, 379, 380; his operations in Georgia, 375, 376; operations in South and North Caro- lina, 376; in t!ie grand review at Washing- ton, 378-380; resents Secretary Stanton's insults, 379; x'lan to i)revent Lee concen- trating against, 399; thorough under- standing of his instructions, 400; con- quests on the coast, 420; moves against AUatoona, 42:i; destroys the railroad to Augusta, 423; moves upon Dallas, 423 ; ac- tions at Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, 424; reinforced by Rous- seau, 424; proposes to abandon Atlanta, 429, 431; proposal that he turn Wilson loose, 430; to act independently of Grant, 430; threatens Augusta and Macon, 431; Schotield placed under orders of, 439; weakness in the cavalry arm, 443; move- ment toward Raleigh, 444, 449, 457 ; vi^sits Grant at City Point, 449 Sherman, Mrs. W. T., II, 250 Shields, James, at Cliurubusco, I, *112 Shiloh, Tenn., death of Johnston at, I, 267; the church at, 279; the Union lino, 279- 281; capture of the Federal camp, 280; Confederate losses, 280; repulse of the National line on the night of the 6th of April, 280; contour of the battle-fleld, 280; personnel of the Union army, 281, 294; panic-stricken troops, 281, 282; consti- tutional cowardice, 282; stragglers, 283, 284; the panic in the Confederate rear, 284; use of cavalry, 282, 283; situation on the night of the 6th of April, 284-288; losses of the Army of the Tennessee on the lirst day, 286 ; a temporary hospital, 287; the advance on the morning of the 7th, 287; retreat of the Confederates, 288; positions of Union troops on the morning of the 7th, 288 ; the battle of the second day, 288 et seq. ; modiflcation of stric- tiu'eson Lew. Wallace's dilatoriness, 289; Grant's personal actions on the second day, 291; condition of roads, 292; gallan- tly of McCook's command, 292 ; reviewed in the " Century Magazine," 292 ; reasons for non-pursuit, 292, 293; severity of the battle, 293; the enemy's retreat, 293; burial of the dead, 294 ; question of in- trenching, 294, 295; Johnston's plan of camiiaign, 298; the Coniederate council of war before, 298 ; opening of the battle, 298 ; question of surprise at, 299 ; the word "if," 299; W. P. Johnston's description of the battle, 299, 300; condition of the ar- mies at the end of the tirst day, 300; the aims of the two armies, 301; Confederate claims, 301; Union forces at, 302; losses of Union artillery, 302; Union ca])ture8, 302; the Confederate forces, 302, 303; Union and Confederate losses, 302, 303 ; the gunboats at, 303 ; a much misundei'- slood battle, 305 ; how the reports were sent in, 308 ; the advance on Coiiutli fi'om, 312; Col. Mason's supposed cowardice at, 330. See also Pittsedi!g Landing. Shirk, James W., at Pittsburg Landing, I, *285 Shreveport, La., railroad from Vicksburg to, 1, 351 ; operations against, II, 42, 58, 65, 400 Sibley, H. H., excursion in Mexico with, I, 142 et seq. ; in the Egyptian service, 142 Sierra Madre Mountains, entrance to Mex- ico through the, I, 76 Sigel, Franz, plans for the spring cam- paign. 1864, II, 58, *59, 61, 403; com- manding in the VaUey of Virginia, 59, 403 ; ordered to advance fi'om Winchester, 66; defeated at New Market, 72, 142, 144, 411; retreat on Str.isburg, 72; superseded in command by Hunter, 142, 152, 195, 411 ; re- treats to Cedar Creek, 144; operations in the Kaiuiwha and Shenandoah Valleys, 411; retires behind Cedar Creek, 411; at Martinsburg, 410 ; retreats across the Po- tomac at Shepherdstown, 416 Sigfried, Joshua K., II, 100 Signal corps, work in the Held, II, 119 "Silver Wave," the, running the batteries at Vicksburg, I, 386 Simpson, George, reports probability of capturing Fort Fisher, II, 437 Simpson, Hannah, I, 6; marries Jesse R. Grant, 7 Simpson, John, 1,5; settles in Clermont County, O., 6 Simpson, Mary, I, 6 Simpson, Samuel, I, 0, 7 Simpson, Sarah, I, 6 Simpson family, the, in Pennsylvania, 1, 6; in Ohio, 6, 7 Sixteenth Army-corps, changes in the, II, 234 ; ))ait of, sent from "Vicksburg to Red River, 425,426; moves against Mo- bile, 458; invests Spanish Fort, 458 Sixth Army-corps, organization of, 11,99; crosses Germanna Ford, 98, 404; moves from Spottsylvania, 147 ; ordered to the South Anna, 148; position, May 26, 1864, 153 ; ordered toward Hanover Town, 155, 408; moves against the Wcldon railroad, 190 ; in investment of Petersburg, 191 ; re- quest for Sheridan to command the, 206; movement April 6, 1865, 330 ; loses its INDEX 507 commander (Sertj^wick), 405; reaches the North Auua, 40(; ; in battle of Cold Harbor, 408; ordered lo City I'oint, 4i;!; ected to rein- force Schofleld, 432; arrives at Nashville, 433; ordered to report to Canby, 439; moves against Mobile, 442, 443, 458 Smith, C. F., commandant at West Point, I, 22 ; at Resaca de la Palma, 70 ; assigned to command at Paducah, *215 ; ordered to move against Columbus, 219 ; his district merged in the District of Cairo, 233; to threaten Forts Heiman and Henry, 234; in expedition against Fort Henry, 230, 238, 239; ordered to guard Forts Henry and Heiman, 244, 245 ; in investment of Fort Donelson, 245, 251-253; receives proposal of surrender from Buckner, 255 ; promoted major-general of volunteers, 260 ; credited by Haileck with capture of Fort Donel- son, 260; Grant approves his promotion, 261 ; finds Clarksville evacuated, 262 ; com- manding at Clarksville, 263; letter from Buell to, 203 ; criticism of Buell's order, 264; goes to Buell's assistance, 205; per sonal characteristics, 270, 271; death of, 271 ; ctinniianding divisiou of Army of the Tennessee, 274; sickness of, 274, 279; po- sition at Pittsburg Landing, 279 Smith, Dr., a dangerous introduction to, I, 322 Smith, Dr., rejjorts conversation with Gen. Kwell, 11, 332, 333 Smith, E. Kirby, comniaiuling Trans-Mis- si8sii)pi Department. II, '210; confronted by Steele, 210 ; surrend(!r of, 308, 459 ; Pope sent aiiainst, 446 Smith, Giles A., mans boats on the North ('hickamauga, 11, 5; wounded at Mission- ary Ridge, 7 Smith, G. W., at Cerro Gordo, I, 100; com- maniliug Georgia- militia, II, *244 Smith, John E., lu'omoled brigailier-gen- eral, I, 350; at battle of J'ort (Jibson, '403; (crosses the Tennessee, II, *5; in assault on Missionary Ridge, 6; in battle of Chat- tanooga, 13, 14 Smith, Morgan L., sent to the North Chick- amauga, IT, *5; crosses the Tennessee, 5 ; in assaidt on Missionary Ridge, 6; in bat- tie of Chattanooga, 13, 18; ordered to re- coimoiter the tunnel, 18 Smith, Sidney, humorous remark by, I, 95; mortally wounded, 95, 126 Smith, Watson, commanding gunboats at Yazoo Pass, I, *376 Smith, William, governor of Virginia, II, *377; flight froiii Richmond to Danville, 377 ; anecdote of, 377, 378 ; not permitted to act as governor after the surrender, 378 Smith, W. P., chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, I, *499 ; his genius and Lugenuity, 499, 504 ; joins in inspection of situation at Chattanooga, .501; in expedi- tion to Brown's Ferry, 504, 505; losses at Lookout Valley, 509; reconnoitei'ing the line of Sherman's nmrch,522; apponited chief engineer of the Military Division of the Mississippi, II, 4; valuable services in Chattanooga campaign, 31 ; promoted majior-general, 31, GO; commanding But- ler's right wing, 58, 60, 402; opposition to his promotion, 60; at White House, 154, 1.59, 408; Sheridan ordered to connauni- cate with, 159; strength, 103; in battle of Cold Harbor, 103, 164, 166-168, 408 : sent to reinforce Butler, 179, 181, 185, 186, 410; operations before Petersburg, 185-188, 412, 413 ; brought from Bermuda Himdi-ed to join the Army of the Potomac, 408 Smith, 'W. Sooy, brings reinforcements to Vicksbiu'g, I. 4.56; ordered to Haines's Blufl", 456 ; ordered to move against For- rest, n, 40; unsuccessful encounter with Forrest. 41 Smithfield, N. C, J.E. Johnston retreats to, II, 442 "Smithfield," the, sunk at Plymouth, II, 407 Smithland, Ky., occupation of, I, 215; Sher- man commauiling at, 259 ; commimication with Cairo, 268 Smith's Island, N. C, capture of, II, 270, 439 Smith's Plantation, La., route to Perkins's l)lantatiou from, I, 389 Smithville, N. C, Schofield to land troops at, II, 281 508 INDEX Smuggling, on Mexican frontier, I, 42 Smyth, Thomas A., II, 97 Snake Creek, its course, condition. Union positions on, etc., I, 278-281, 284, 285 Snake Creek Gap, Ga., MePlierson's opera- tions at, IT, 8"), 423 Snicker's Ferry, Va., engagement at, II, 417 Snicker's Gap, Va., getting information to Slieridan through, II, 214 Snow-blindness, I, 144 Soldiers, value of seasoned, II, 40 Soldiers' Homes, oriirin of, 1, 133 South, the, its real position, 1, 175 ; clamor for secession in, 177-181 ; slavery in, 179, n, 386, 387 ; the class of " divine right " in, I, 179; inconsistency in, 180; perils of Union sentiment in, 181; its military re- sources contrasted with those of the North, 230, II, 351-355 ; admiration for, I, 370; heneflted by the war, 507, 508; con- trasted with the North as regards lieense of speech and press, II, 31; a military camp, 228, 523, 353 ; weary of the war, 22S ; Lincoln's generosity toward, 289; conscrip- tion in, 292, 352-354, 368, 399 ; exaggerations in reports of battles in the, 351 ; the press in, 352, 410 ; the negroes in, during the war, 352, 353 ; Pres. Johnson's attitude toward, 358-361, 370 ; the solid, 360, 361 ; the assas- sination of Lincoln a loss to, 369; garri- soning the, 373; the press of, on Sher- man's operations, 375 ; military despotism in, 399. See also Confedekate States. South Anna, movements on the, II, 148, 153, 295, 408 South Carolina, secession of, I, 179, 183; Union holdings in, II, 53, 398 ; Sherman's march through, 272, 278, 376, 439-441, 444 ; Admiral Dahlgren commanding off the coast of, 273 ; importance to the enemy, 273 ; reasons for laying a heavy hand on, 276, 277 ; Sherman to " eat the vitals out of," 278, 444; J. E. Johnston put in com- mand of all troops in, 280, 284 ; Stonenian's operations in, 281, 282, 442 ; the hotbed of secession, 283 ; destruction of railroads in, 284; reinforcements for Butler fi-om, 402 ; Schofleld to aid Sherman in, 439, 440; Thomas ordered to raid, 442 South Chickamauga River, its course, etc., I, 502, 520 ; operations on, 520, 521, II, 5, 6 Southeast Missouri, Grant assigned to com- mand District of, I, 211, 213,' 214; chang- ing the name of the District of, 233 South Side railroad, Va., its importance, II, 190. 303, 304 ; operations against, and movements on, 194, 225, 231, 299, 310, 312, 313, 316, 317, 322-324, 407, 413, 414, 422, 449, 450, 453 Spain, imposes restrictions on Mexican trade, I, 43 ; share in the Mexican Impe- rial scheme, II, 388 Spanish Fort, Ala., investment, evacuation, and capture of, II, 367, 458 Sparta, Tenn., Thomas orders cavalry to, I, 518 Special Orders No. no, II, 390-392 Spottsylvania, Va., General Anderson at, I, 142,11,123,124; E.B.Washburneat,68; roads to, 101, 102; march to, 119, 121,405; Lee beats Grant to, 121, 122, 405 ; Meade balks Sheridan's plans to capture, 122, 123 ; War- ren's attack at, 123 ; Lee's mistaken notion concerning the captm-e of, 124 ; situation, 126 ; battle of, 126-132 ; Sheridan's plan of occupation, 127; Upton's charge at, 130, 131 ; Hancock detained from the battle, 125; uncovering the road to Fredericks- burg from, 143 ; a lesson of the battle, 144 ; artillery sent to Washington from, 144; movement of troops from, 147 ; Bui'nside and Wright held at, 147 ; Union losses at. 183 ; Sedgwick killed at, 384 ; effect of the battle on the enemy, 410 Springfield, 111., Grant accompanies troops to, 1, 185 ; Gen. Pope musteriug-offlcer at, 191; Grant ordered to Quincy fi-om, 198; McClemand at, 360 ; McClernand ordered back to, 457 Spring Hill, Tenn., Cheatham camps at, II, 255 Stafford, L. A., II, 101 Stager, Anson, head of the telegraphic de- partment of the War Office, II, *35, 36 Stanard's Ford, Va., in Confederate hands, II, 147 Stanley, D. S., in East Teuiit-ssee. II, 43 ; strength, *238; sent to reinf(;ne Thomas, 238,431; falls back with Schotleld's train, 255 ; Cheatham pursues, 255 ; wounded at Franklin, 255; ordered to BuU Gap, 282 Stannard, G.J., captures Fort Harrison, II, 218 ; wounded, -219 Stanton, Edwin M., authorizes McClernand to command expedition against Vicks- burg, I, 358 ; orders Grant to Cairo, 489 ; meeting at Indianapolis with, *490; pre- monition of his death, 491 ; communica- tion from C. A. Dana to, 491, 492; anxiety concerning Eosecraus, 496, 497; anxiety for Burnside, 523; informed of the raising of the siege of Knoxville, II, 31 ; controls the telegraph lines, 35 ; difference with, concerning use of the cipher code, 36, 37 ; personal characteristics, 37, 356. 380, 381; promises to restore BuetTto dutyT^; acquaintance with, 51 ; cautions Grant against confiding plans to the President, 51 ; Grant's reticence with, 52 ; conferences with, 66 ; letter to, recommending promo- tions, May 13, 1864, 139 ; objects to giving command to Sheridan, 205; bad policy concerning the Shenandoah Valley, 205; revision of Grant's orders by, 214; pro- / motes officers at Fort Fisher, 270 ; visits \/ Sherman at Savannah, 271 ; interview with, 274 ; notified of the arrival of the Peace Commissioners, 287 ; informed of Lee's surrender, 347 ; countermands the order calling the Virginia legislature, 356; denounces Sherman, 364, 365; Sher- man resents his insults, 379; contrasted with Lincoln 3Sfl,.221: Grant's report to, July 22, 1865, 35^-460 State, sects versus the, I, 170 / State sovereignty, inconsistency in the South's doctrine of, I, 180 Staunton, Va., a source of supplies for Lee, II, 142, 411; proposition to send Sigel to, 142 ; Hunter's operations at and near, 176, 177, 181, 192, 195, 411, 412; Sheridan defeats Early between Charlottesville and, 293, 445 ; pursuit of Early through, 420 Steam, changes wrought by the introduc- tion of, I, 176, II, 387 Steam-bath, the Indians', I, 163, 164 Steamboats, early Ohio River, I, 18; effect of the introduction of, II, 387, 388 Steam-propeller, an early, I, 95 INDEX 509 Steedman, J. B., reinforces Thomas, IT, *256 Steele, F., ordered to march on New Car- thage, 1, *392; moves to Bolton, 428; or- dered to reinforce Sherman, 473, 482; or- dered to Brandon, Miss., 483 ; in Arkansas, 488, II, 65, 400; commanding department under Sherman, 54 ; Banks ordered to turn over defense of Ked River to, 58, 61, 65; commanding the Trans-Mississippi Department, 81 ; confronting Kirliy Smitli, 210; movement to cooperate with Banks, 426; junction with Thayer at Elkius's Ferry, 426 ; occupies Camden, 427 ; loss at Mark's Mill, 427 ; falls back to the Arkan- sas, 427 ; engagement on the Saline River, 427 ; to cut oflf Price's reti'eat, 427 ; moves from Pensacola against Mobile, 458; in- vests Fort Blakely, 458 Steele's Bayou, Miss., water communica^ tions of, I, 377 ; Shei-man's expedition up, 378; attempt to tind a passage through, 377-379 Stephens, Alexander H., Vice-President of the Confederate States, II, 287 ; Confeder- ate Peace Commissioner, 287, *288, 289; physical peeiiliarities, 288-290; Lincobi's characterization of, 290; capture of, 459 Stevens, Aaron F., succeeds Burnham in command, II, 218; wounded in assault on Fort Harrison, 218 Stevens, Isaac 1., at Cerro Gordo, I, *100 Stevenson, Carter L., commanding Confed- erate forces on Lookout Creek, II, "8 Stevenson, J. D., promoted brigadier-gen- eral, I, 350 ; at capture of Jackson, *423 Stevenson, T. G., his command, II, 100; killed at Spottsylvania, 130 Stevenson, Ala., meeting with Rosecraus at, I, 498; Sherman ordered to, 512, II, 39; railroad destruction at, I, 513 ; garrisoned by Thomas, II, 238, 2,56 Stewart, A. P., with Hood at Franklm, II, *254 Stewart, George H., Ms command, II, 101 ; captured, 136 Stone, Charles P. ("Stone Pacha"), trip to Popocatepetl, 1, 142-145 Stone, Roy, II, 98 Stoneman. George, raid toward Macon, II, *90-92, 424 ; suiTender of, 91, 92, 424; raids in and from Tennessee, 278, 281, 434, 446; to support Sherman, 281; raids toward Lynchburg. 281, 366, 367, 442, 444, 446 ; raul in South Caioliua, 281, 282, 442; tardy movements of, 366 ; movements in North Carolina, 366, 442, 458 ; movement against the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, 366, 367 ; moves against Breckinridge, 434 ; de- feats Vaughn, 434; destroys WytheviUe, 434 ; destroys Saltville, 434 ; to release pris- oners at Salisbury, 442; captures Salis- bury, 450; at Slatersville, 458 Stone Mountain, Ga., Slocum moves to, II, 240 ...,.,. Stone River, Tenn., possibilities of avoiding the battle of, I. 318 Stony Creek, Va., Kautz burns railroad bridge at, II, 407; Wilson's engagement at, 415 ; Sheridan's movements near, 447 Strasburg, Va., movements, engagements, etc., at, II, 72, 204, 420 Strawberry Plains, ride to Lexington, Ky., from, II, 34 ^ , Stuart, David, position at Pittsburg Land- ing, I, 279; expedition up Steele's Bayou, ■378 Stuart, J. E. B., defeated by Sheridan at Yi'llow ravcrii, and mortally womidcd, II, "78; in battle of the WilderncKs, 111 Sturgis, S. D., defeated by Forrest, II, "197, 424 Suffolk, Va., Kautz's cavalry cxpoditifm from, against the Weldon railroad, II, 73, 4()(;, 407 ' Sullivan, J. C, assignment to duty under Special Orders No. 110, I, *392 Sulphur Branch Trestle, Forrest captures garrison at, II, 428 Sumner, Colonel, operations against Hicks- ford and the Weldon road, II, 447 Superstitions, firaiit's, I, 2'.», 382, 383 Sutherland's Station, Va., battle of, II, 312, 313,453; ti-oops halted :it, 321 Sutlers, Sherman regulates the ti'ade of, II, 93, 94 "Suviah," the, mutiny on board of, I, 40 Sweat-bath, the TndiaiiK', I, 163, 164 Sweitzer, Jacob B., II. '.'8 Swinton, William, unpleasant incident con- cerning, II, 68-70; sentenced to be shot, 70; expelled from the lines, 70 Ta River, the, II, 126 Tactics, Grant's standing in, at West Point, I, 20, 203 ; brushing up, 21)3 Tacubaya, Mex., the U. S. army at, I, 114, 115, 119, 140 Tallahatchie River, movements, etc., on the, I, 352, 355, 356, 358, 362. 375 Tanning, Grant's detestation of the trade, 1,9 Taylor, Richard, attack on Milliken's Bend by, I, 455 ; expected to aid Pemberton in escape across the Mississippi, 4fi4 ; surren- der of, II, 368, 459 ; defeated at Cane River, 42(> ; defends Mobile, 446 Taylor, Gen. Zachary, in command of the Army of Occupation in Texas, I, 34, *44; personnel, size, eiiuipment, etc., of his army, 44, 59, 64, 67-69, 80, 130 ; provides duty for officers, 47 ; methods of moving troops piu'sued by, 59, 79; his tactics compared with General Scott's, 129 ; yn-obable views of the war, 60, 127 ; personal characteris- tics, 60,72-75, 10.5-107; expedition to Point Isabel, 64-67 ; speculations regartling his feelings at Palo Alto, 68 ; volunteers for, 72; snters Mexico, 72; reviews his army at Corpus Chi'isti, 73 : actual rank in Mex- ican war, 73, 74; visit of Comiu. Connor to, 74, 75; encamped at Walnut Springs, 79; establishes battery at Monterey, 82; a Presidential candidate, *9l; regular troops withdrawn from, 92-94; battle of Bueua Vista, I, 92, 93, 102 ; failure to meet Gen. Scott at Camargo, 93 ; elected Presi- dent, 93, 130 ; contrasted with Scott, 105- 107; deserters from his army at Churu- busco, 112 Taylor, Colonel, intercepted letter from, II, 325 Taylor's Ford, Va., II, 155, 156 Telegraph, diiHculties with, in the Fort Douclson campaign, I, 268; effect of the introduction of the, II, 387, 388 Telegraph corps, the, work in the field, II, 117, 118 Telegraph operator, a rebel, I, 268 Telegraph road, II, 147, 150 510 INDEX Tennessee, secession of, T, 183 ; the fate of, deiiendiug ou Fort Douelson, 26G ; Cou- ferterate disasters in, 297 ; the enemy di'iven from West, 317; possibilities of avoidiuj^ lighting for, 318; boundaries of Grant's district in, 326; dangers in West, 336; Confederate attempts to reinforce Bragg in, 33fi, 337 ; anxiety of the authori- ties about, 337, 515, II, 32; Eosecrans ac- quires a separate command in, I, 349; army of defense of, 359 ; Eragg confront- ing Eosecrans in, 448; Burnside draws supplies from East, 511, II, 29 ; movement of troops in West, I, 514 ; measures to re- lieve East, 524; the fate of East, II, 30; Confederate possession of, 32, 43, 399; loyal people in, 35; proposal to di-ive Longstreet out of, 37, 43 ; Schotield com- manding in East, 43 ; Thomas's operations in, 43, 238, 429, 443, 446; Union holdings in, 53, 398 ; Forrest's raids in, 57, 63, 229, 236, 424; McPherson guarding, 82; proposed plan of campaign from, for spring of 1865, 226; Wheeler's operations in, 229, 424; Stoneman's raids in and from, 278, 281, 366, 446, 458 ; Morgan's raids in, 354 ; protecting East, 398; fears of Hood's in- vasion of, 429; pursuit of Hood stoiiped by rains in, 433, 434 ; Breckiuridge's oper- ations in East, 434 Tennessee and Virginia railroad, raids on the, II, 403, 411 Tennessee River, the, occupying positions on, I, 215; Confederate posts on, 232; its mouth included in the District of Cairo, 233 ; C. F. Smith ordered up, 234 ; opera- tions on, planned or executed, 231-236, 240, 268, 272 et seq., 304, 340, 501, 517-521, II, 83 ; fortifications on, I, 265 ; the strategic center of, 272 ; the Natioual left on, 281 ; the gunboats ou, at Pittsbm-g Lauding, 285, 303 ; A. S. Johnston's plan of crossing, 298; in Union control from its mouth to East port, 317 ; Eosecrans puts Bragg south of, 493 ; position of National troops on, 494 ; situation of Cliattanooga on, 502 ; expedi- tion to Bro\vn's Ferry, 504,505; secui'ing the bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry, 505; opened from Bridgeport to Lookout Valley, 505; navigation of, 505, 506; junction of Chattanooga Creek with, 509; junction of the North and Pouth Chickamauga with, 520; getting orders to Sherman via, 512 ; the' Memphis and Chai'leston railroad at, 512; Sliermau crosses, 512, 524, II, 5 ; high %ater in, I, 522, 524, II, 4, 20; completion of bridge over, 6; Howard and Sherman meet in the middle of, 7 ; the Federal line ou, 9 ; movements ou, for relief of Burnside, 19, 24; Sheriiian's camp and movements on, 27, 30, 32, 38; a trip up, 34; Union holdings on, 53, 398; guuboiits on, 239; Hood's movements on, 239, 240, 254, 274, 430, 432, 433 ; fears of Thomas's having to abandon the line of, 257 ; \V'heeler driven south of, 424; Forrest's movements on, 428, 432; the line of, to be firmly lield, 431, 432; Thomas stops pursuit of Hood at, 434 Tensas, Ala., Steele cuts raUi-oad to Mont- gomery from, II, 458 Tensas Bayou, repidse of Taylor across the, I, 456; outlet of Lake Providence, 373 ; a waterway for the enemy, 374 Tenth Army-Corps, threatening movement against Eichmond, II, 209, 218 ; reinforces Butler, 406 ; at capture of Fort Harrison, 421 Terrett, John C, mortally wounded at Mon- terey, I, 87 Terry,' A. H., captures blockade-runners at Fort Fisher, II, 262 ; selected to command second Fort Fisher expedition, *267, 437; cooperation of Porter and, 268. 269, 437 ; attacks and captures the fort, 268-270; reinforces Ames, 270; promoted major- general of volunteers, and brigadier- general U. S. A., 270; moves on Wilming- ton, 275 ; reinforced fi-om Thomas's com- mand, 281 ; sends supplies to Sherman at Fayetteville, 284 ; i-oinforces Sherman, 285 ; services at Fort Fisher, 384 ; military and personal characteristics, 384; GJrant's instructions to, for second expedition, 437,438; Grant confers with, 440 j bridges the Neuse River, 442 Terry, William R., II, 101 Texas, Jolm WaUcer's opinion of, I, 16 ; an- nexation of, 27, 30, 32-34, 36, 134 ; bound- aries of, 32-34, 134 ; early lustor\ of, 32-34 ; slavery in, 33 ; the Army of Occupation in, 34 ; the country between Matamoras and Corpus Christi, 46 ; wild horses in, 46, 47, 62 ; hostilities between Mexico and, 49 ; negotiations tor cession of, 115 ; no claim to the right of secession, 174 ; secession of, 183 ; Pemberton's conscripts from, 349 ; the President's desire to gain a foothold in, 484 ; Banlis ordered to abandon, II, 58, 61, 400; in the hands of the enemy, 398 ; Sheridan goes to, 459 Texcoco, Lake, I, 108, 128 Thayer, John M., at Fort Donelson, T, *244, 247, 251 ; junction of Steele and, at Elkins's Ferry, II, 426 Third U. S. Dragoons, in Mexican war, I, 105 Third U. S. Infantry, in garrison at St. Louis, I, 25; ordered to Fort Jessup, 27, 31 ; at Corpus Christi, 44 ; losses at Mon- terey, 86 Thirteenth Army-corps, at the Yazoo River, I, 366 ; right wing of the Army of the Ten- nessee, 390; orders for attack ou Grand Gulf, 395, 396 ; at Bruinsburg, 401, 402 ; Mc- Clernand's congratiUatory order to, 457 ; MeClernand relieved of command of, 457 ; sent to Banks, 486 ; invests Spanish Fort, II, 458 Thomas, E. L., II, 102 Thomas, George H., wins battle of Mill Springs, I, 234, 266 ; absent fi'om Slilloh, 302 ; commands right wing of the Army of the Tennessee, 307; positiou in front of Corinth, 314; ordered to reinforce Buell, 344 ; Eosecrans superseded by, 491 ; his stand at Cbickamauga, 494; retreats to Chattanooga, 494; assigned to command of the Army of the Cumberland, 497 ; or- dered to hold Chattanooga at all hazards, 497 ; advised to put wagon-road to Bridge- port in repair, 498 ; Grant's headquarters with, at Chattanooga, 499 ; joins in inspec- tion of situation at Chattanooga, 601 ; or- ders concentration of reinforcements at Bridsreport, 504; his military character, 516, II, 43, 44, 256, 257, 274, 279, 281, 366, 371, 433; ordered to attack, Nov. 7, 1863, 1, 516; plan for attack ou Missionary Ridge, 517, INDEX 511 618 ; orders cavalry to Sparta, 518 ; to co- operate with Sliermaii, r,i',); i)laii ol' oper- ations at Chattauoosa, 5'2(), 521; rccoum ti- ters the line of Slieniiuu's march, 522 ; or- dered to move on Nov. 23, 1863, 523, 524 ; in battle of Chattanooga, 11, 3, 5, 7, ',), i2, 14, 15, 17 ; ordered to the relief of Burusidc, 19, 24; ordered to start (irauser toward Knoxville, 25; ordered to hold back Gran- ger, 25 ; delays starting (irangt^, 2(i ; lt^lt in command at Chattanooga, 32, 82; or- dered to threaten J. E. Johnston, 42; co- operation with Sherman, 42, 422 ; ordered to send troops into East Tennessee, 43; ordered to capture Dalton, 43 ; coinphiins of his teams, 44 ; commanding department under Sherman, 54, 81, 422; commanding Department of the Cumberland, 81, 422; strength, 82 ; movement to Ringgold, 83 ; proposed plan of campaign for, iii spring of 1865, 226; ordered back to Chattanooga and Nashville, 233, 431 ; levies from the Northwest sent to, 238, 429; to hold Ten- nessee and Kentucky, 238. 429, 431 ; Sher- man reinforces, 238, 431, 433; strength and garrisons, 238, 239 ; Hood left to his care, 240; strength compared with Hood, 250; retreats to Nashville, 250, 432 ; orders to Schofield before Franklin, 254 ; fails to re- inforce Schofleld at Franklin, 255, 432, 433 ; reinforcements for, 250; prepares to re- ceive Hood, 256; abandons Decatur, 256; strength of his position at Nashville, 256 ; fears of the enemy's eluding, 256-258; let- ters from Grant to, 257, 258 ; advis(>d to aiTU citizen employees, 257; lost oppor- tunity after Hood's repulse at Franklin, 257; urged to attack Hood, 257-259; an- nounces his preparations to move, 258, 259; threatened with removal, 259, 433; defeats Hood at Nashville, 259, 433, 434; proposed movement of, from the north, 274; Shei-man asks to have him campaign in Alabama, 274 ; reinforcement of Canby from, 274, 279, 439 ; congratulated by Sher- man and Grant, 276; his action at Nash- ville disapproved by Sherman and Grant. 276 ; ordered to send a cavalry force into Mississippi, 278; orders to, for soutliern movement, countermanded, 281 ; ordered to send Stoneman toward Lynchburg, 281, 442; reinforcements sent to Terry from, 281 ; contemplated movement of, toward Lynchburg, 282; ordered to send the Fourth Corps to Bull Gap, 282 ; operatiojis against Buzzard's Roost, 423 ; xmsuccess- ful assault on Kenesaw Mountain, 423; endeavors to destroy Forrest, 428 ; fears that he cannot prevent Hood's going north, 430; routs Hood's army, 430; de- lays at Nashville, 433; orders concen- tration of troops against Breckinridge, 434; to coUect troops at Eastport, 439; to send Schofield east, 439; to raid South Carolina. 442 ; letters to, 442, 443, 446; in- formed of Canby 's expedition, 442, 443; defeats Hood in Tennessee, 443; advised to send a cavalry expedition south, 443; to repair railroads in Tennessee, 446 ; base of supplies at Knoxville, 446 ; to occupy East Tennessee, 446; proposal that he campaign in North Carolina, 446 Thomas, Henry G., II, 100 Thomas, Lorenzo, adjutant-general, U. ». A., letter to, 1, 191, * 192 Thompson, Jacob, voyage of espionage, T, 385 Thompson, M.Jeff., (irant ordei'cd against, I, '211; ope la lions ill iMissouri, 211, 213, 214 Thompson's Hill. See I'our (iinsoN. Thompson's plantation, Miss., action at, I, 402 Thornton, Seth B., captured by Mexicans, I, *(;4 Tidball, John C, his command, II, 97 ; in ac- tion at Petersburg, .Mareli 24, 1805, -298 Tilghman, Lloyd, evacuates I'aducah, I, *216 ; defcuse of Fort Henry, 239 ; capture of, 239 Tobacco, ac(iuiring the habit, I, 42 ; rcNtric- tions on use of, at West Point, 42 ; Mexi- can trade in, 42-44 Tod, George, I, 3, i Tod, Gov., I, 3 Tod, Mrs., I, 3 Todd's Tavern, Va., Gregg ordered to, IF, 109; Hancock's movements towai'd and at, 111, 123-125, 127; Sheridan's actions at, 111, 120, 122 ; Custer drives the enemy from Catharpin Furnace to, 115; orders for night march to, 119, 120; a night ride to, 120, 121 ; Early at, 124, 125; MoU at, 128 Toluca, Me.x., occupation of, 1, 133 Tompkins, C. H., II, 99 Tompkins, J. A., II, 100 Torbert, A. T.. commanding rear-giiard, nortli of the Rapidan, II, *98; his com- mand, 99; movement toward Hanover, 156; crosses the Pamunkey, 408; sent to Sheridan at Harper's Ferry, 419 Torpedoes, Confederate use of, on roads, II, 247,248 Totopotomoy River, the. movements and engagements on, II, 158, 161, 106, 183 Toucey, Isaac, Secretary of the Navy, scat- ters the navy, I, *181 Townsend, E. D., discovers a missing letter, I, n92 Tower, Z. B., at Cerro Gordo, 1, 100; excur- sion in Mexico, 142 ct seq.; .supervises for- tifications of Nashville, If, 256 Towson, Nathan, on court of inquiry in Gen. Scott's case, 1, 135 Traders, the nuisance of, within the lines, I, 331 Trans-Mississippi Department, surrender of the, II, 368 Treason, open, in the South, 1, 171 ; question of punishment for, II, 217 ; in the Chicago Convention, 217 ; Pres. Johnson's denun- ciations of, 359 Trenton. Ga., plan for Sherman's march from \Vhitesides to, I, 517 Trevillian Station, Va., Sheridan's opera- tions at, II, 193, 194, 414, 415 • . Trist, Nicholas P., commissioner to negoti- ate with Mexico, I, *1U; negotiations with Mexico, 114, 115, 134; recalled to Washington, 134 Tulifinny River, Foster's position on the, II, 432 Tullahoma, Miss., reinforcements for J. E. Johnston fi'om, I, 419; Forrest cuts the railroad at, II, 428 Tupelo, Miss., troops ordered to Chatta- nooga from, I, 332 ; Hatch destroys the railroad at, 408 Turkey-hunt, a, I. 51, 52 " Tuscaloosa, Ala., proposed raids toward, II, 278, 443, 444 ; captured by Wilson, 3C8, 459 512 INDEX Tuscumbia, Ala., Halleck orders troops to, I, -187 " Tuscumbia," the, ruuulng the hatteries iit Vicksbur^, I, 386 Tuscumbia River, I, o09 Tuttle, J. M., lit battle of Jackson, I, *i22, 42;i Twelfth Army-corps, ordered to reiuforce Rosecrans, I, 503; in operations wet-;t of Cliattauoo.ua, II, 8 Twentieth Army-corps, in left "wing of Sher- man's army, II, 234 ; commanded by A. S. Williams, 234; Sherman holds Atlanta with the, 430 Twenty-first Illinois Infantry, mustered in at Mattoon, I, 190 ; Grant appointed col- onel, 194; personnel of the res?imeut, 194, 195; addressed by McClcrnand and Lo- gan, 197: ordered to Quincy, 111., 198; or- dered to Irontou, Mo., 198, 207 ; relieved by the 19th Illinois at Palmyra, 199; drilling in battalion, 203, 204 ; appointment of aide-de-camp from, 205 Twenty-fifth Army-corps, movement to- ward Hatcher's Kim, II, 450 Twenty-fourth Army-corps, assaults Fort Gregg, II, 311, 450 Twenty-third Army-corps, sent to Pulaski to watch Hood, II, 254; sent to Chatta- nooga, 431 ; fichotield commanding, 441 ; ordered to reinforce Sherman, 441 Twiggs, David E., his command, I, * 59 ; dif- ficulty with Worth concerning litevet rank, 73, 74 ; " Memorial to Congress," 74; commands division at Monterey, 80; operations at Monterey, 82, 85-87; ad- vances toward Jalapa, 99 ; encounters the enemy at Cerro Gordo, 99; commands di- vision in vScott's army, 99, 105 ; advances from Puebla, 105 Tyler, Pres. John, seeks annexation of Texas, I, 27 ; approves annexation-bill, 36 Tyler, Robert O., brings up reinforcements, II, *142; steady behavior of his raw troops, 143 Tyler, Mrs., anecdote of, II, 151, 152 "Tyler," the, action on the Tennessee Pkiver, I, 240; at Fort Donelson, 247; at Pittsburg Landing, 285 " Tyler's grip," I, 23, 36 Uniform, Grant's first, I, 23, 24 ; Grant's dis- like of, 24 ; Gen. Taylor's dislike of, 73, 74, 105 ; Gen. Scott's fondness for, 100 ; provid- ing, for Illinois' volunteers, 185 ; Grant's lack of , at Cairo, 213; Grant's simplicity of, at Appomattox, II, 341, 342 Union, the, the President's constant hope for, I, 337 ; despair of saving. 837, 369 ; Lin- coln's love for, II, 289 Union, W.Va., Junction of Crook andAver- ell at, II, 411 Union army, mode of estimating strength of, II, 183, 184 Union City, Tenn., captured by Forrest, II, 63, 425 United States, the, the foundation of, 1, 174, 176 ; the right to suppress rebellion in, II, 356, 357 ; position of the President, 359 ; the soldiers of Europe compared v\'ith tbose of, 37G, 377 ; canse of the civil war, 386, 387 ; condition of the separate States before the era of rapid transit. 387; the experi- ment of republican institutions in, 388 ; relation of the Mexican imperial scheme to, 389 ; feeling in, toward England, 391 ; forgetting the lessons of the svai-, 391; the true feeling between England and, 391, 392 ; the negTO ipiestion, 392, 393 ; develop- ment of, 393-395 ; a new era in, 395 U. S. Army, scheme for disbanding the, I, 231 U. S. Commissioner of Education, the, I, 334 U. S. Congress, dilatoriusss in providing for the Mexican War, 1, 105 ; convened in ex- tra session, 183 ; passes vote of thanks to Grant for Chattanooga, II, 33 ; votes a gold medal to Grant for Vicksburg and Chat- tanooga, 33 ; restores the gi-ade of lieuten- ant-general, 44 ; thanks Sherman and his army, 276 : loyalty of, 356 ; Pres. Johnson's conflict with. 361 U. S. Constitution, the, effect of the amend- ments. I, 174 ; the nation bound to uphfild it, 175, 176 ; the world's chan'^es since the framing of, 176 ; Confederatesdcbar them- selves of rights under, 183 ; Mr. Stanton's elastic views of, II, 356; question of its autlioiity in time of war, 336, 357 U. S. Military Academy. See West POINT. U. S. Navy, atSluloh, I, 303 ; battle at Mem- phis. 317; at Arkansas Post, 366; with- dr;iwH from the Yazoo, 366 ; cooperation at Vicksburg, 384-388, 392-394, 446. 474, 479- 481 ; cooperation at Grand Gulf. 395-397 ; proposed expedition against Mobile, 485, 11,49; convoying supplies on the Missis- sippi, I, 512 ; Banks ordered to turn over defense of Red River to Steele and the, II, 58, 61, 400 ; plan of operations on the James River, 63 ; cooperation asked, in changing base from Fredericksburg to Port Royal, 142 ; guards change of base from Port Royal to White House, 154; operations against Fort Fisher, 232. 265-270. 436, 437 ; Sherman opens communication with, at Savannah, 248; need of maintaining the, 391 ; blockades the coast, 398 ; operations on Broad River, 432 ; unsuccessful efforts to close Wilminston. 435; cooperates in capture of Wilmington, 441 U. S. Senate, confirms Grant's appointment as brigadier-general I, 203 ; rejects W. F. Smith's nomiiiation for promotion, II, 31 ; conllrms Grant's nomination as lieuten- ant-general. 44 Uniten.Va., Sumner's movements at. II. 447 Upton, Emory, his command, II, 99; in bat- tle of SpotLs^ ivania, *130, 131, 140 ; wound- ed. 131; promoted on the field, 131. 139; recommended for brigadier-generalship, U. S. Vols., 139 Utica, Miss., McPherson moves to, I, 413 Valley of Virginia, the, Sigel commanding in, II, 59; Hunter ordered to move up, 152 Van Buren, Martin, visits West Point, I, 22 Vance. Z. B., governor of North Carolina, calls for defenders of Fort Fisher, II, 264 Van Dorn, Earl, operations.at and near Cor- inth. I, *310, 336, 338, 345, 346, 348 ; confront- iug the Army of the Tennessee, 327 ; Price's reinforcements for, 327 ; Grant prepares for, 341 ; endeavors to strike the Mi ssissippi above Memphis, 345 ; skirmish with Hurl- but, 346; dashing attack by, 346; defeat of, at Hatchie Bridge, 347 ; captures Holly Springs, 360, 361 : sending cavalry against, 361, 362 INDEX 513 Vaqueria, tbo, at ropocatepetl, 1, 142, Hn Varioloid, aclvautascs of an attack of, 1, 18G Vaughn, J. C, defeated at Marion, H, 4^4 Vaughn Road, Va., niovenionts ou the, II, 450 Vera Cruz, Mex., sieRe and capture of, I, 91, 94-97; size of Scott's army at, 98; roada to the City of Mexico from, 98 ; the vomito in, 98, 152 ; occupation of, 134 Verona, Miss., surprise of Fori-cst by Gricr- son at, II, 434 Vicksburg, Miss., possibility of capture of, after the fall of Fort JJouelHou, I, 2(il; communications of, 317, 351, 402, 457 ; pos- sibilities of a bloodless advance to, 318 ; plans of campaign against, their execu- tion, ordej-s in relation thereto, etc., 349, 351, 357-359, 308, 370, 379, 384, 390, 410, 413, 414, 417, 440; its importance, 351, 419, 448; rumored movement by McClernand against, 355 ; naval operations at, 357, 384- 388, 392-394, 446, 474, 479-481; Peiubertou commanding at, 359, 3CA ; vagaries of the Mississippi at, 371 ; hardships of the win- ter before, 381, 382 ; coufusion in, concern- ing threatened attack on Haines's Bluff, 398; retreat of the enemy fi-om Grand Gulf to, 409 ; estimate of Pemberton's movable force at, 414 ; plan to bring Banks against, 440 ; advance from Bridgeport ou, 441 ; investment of, 442, 443, 446 ; skimiish- ing around, 443 ; the cry for bread at. 443 ; assaults ou the M^orks, 443-445 ; enthusiasm of the troops, 444 ; McClernand's reported successes in assault on, 444, 445 ; regiHar siege of, 446, 448; successes of the early part of the campaign against, 446, 447; Confederate strength at, 447 ; the Union and Confederate lines at, 4-48, 451, 452, 456, 460,462,464; natural defenses of . 449 ; lack of siege-artillery and use of navy guns at, 450 ; need of miUtary engineers at, 450 ; sharpshooters at, 451 ; use of explosive musket-balls at, 451 ; a superfluity of poul- try at, 452; wooden coehorns at, 452; Northern visitors at, 452, 453 ; strength of the besieging army, 456; Johnston de-' spairs of holding, 458 ; twofold aspect of the besieging force, 460; pleasantries ))e- tween the opposing troops, 460, 471 ; min- ing at, 460-462 ; use of hand-gi-enades at, 460, 462 ; a colored man's aerial trip, 461 ; plan for the garrison's escape across the river, 463 ; preparations for assault on July 6, 464; negotiations for surrender, capitulation, and evacuation, 404-472, 476, 477, 479 ; the historic oak-tree at, 467 ; ex- pected assault on the 4th of July, 471 ; the last Confederate newspaper published in, 471; fraternization of opposing troops, 472, 477 ; last effort of the Confederacy to raise the siege of, 473; Grant's entrance into, 473 ; bomb-proofs in the hills, 474 ; ef- fect of the surrender throughout the coim- try, 475, 478 ; paroling prisoners of war at, 476, 477 ; captures at, 479 ; personnel of the Union army after caiiture of, 479, 480; suggestion and development of the cam- paign, 481 ; cleaning up around, 484; Sher- man at, 484, II, 39-41 ; minor expeditions around, I, 486, II, 40; Grant's removal from New Orleans to, I, 487 ; effect of the siege of, on Bragg's army, 492; troops sent to reinforce Rosecrans from, 494 ; lo- comotives sent to Gen. Dodge from, 514 ; Vol. II.— 33 McPherson conimimdingin,lT,39; assault on, May 22, 1803, ortauce of obtaining possession of, 200 Volunteering, effectiveness of, after the fall of Fort Donelson, I, 201 ; falling off in, 309, 481 Volunteers, value of, in wat, I, 44 ; in the Mexican war, 130; call for 75,000, 183; rais- ing troops at Jefferson City, 208, 209; scheme for treating the regular army as, 231; superahiuidance of, in Illinois, 185; drilling the Galena company, 185; early enlistments in Illinois, 195 ; efficiency of, for special work, 393 Vomito, the, in Vera Cruz, I, 98, 152 Vose, Col., death of, I, *S8 Wadsworth, J., his command, II, 98 ; in bat- tle of the Wilderness, 108-110 ; Idlled, * 112 ; succeeded in command by Cutler, 123 Wadsworth, W. H., I, 8 Wainwright, C. S., II, 98 Waldron's Ridge, I, 498; II, 34 Walke, Henry, operations at Fort Donel- son, I, *246 Walker, H. H., IL 102 Walker, J. A., II, 101 Walker, John, opinion of Texas, I, 16 Walker. R. L., II. 104 W^alker's Church, Va., tyrant at, II, 339 Wallace, Lew.,commandingat Forts Henry and Heiman, I, *245; in siege of Fort Donelson, 247, 251, 256 ; promoted major- general of vohinteers, 260 ; commanding division of Army of the Tennessee, 274; position at Crump's Landing, 275 ; posi- tion on morning of April 0, 1862, 290; Grant's meeting with, at Cnmip's Land- 514 INDEX ing, 277; ordorod to Pittsburg Landing, 277 ; delay on tlie tiist day of 81iiloli, 278 ; arrival at the battle-fleld, 285, 286 ; posi- tion on the morning of tlie 7th, 288 ; modi- fication of stri(!tiires concerning his dila^ toriuess at Shiloh. 289 ; letter to \V. H. L. Wallace from, bearing on the former's dilatorincss, 289; strength at Shiloh, 302 ; commanding at Baltimore, II, 196; pro- tects tlie capital by his defeat at the Mo- uocacy. 196, 197, 416 Wallace, W. H. L., ordered to New Madrid, I, *219 ; commanding Smith's division, 274, 279 ; reports from the front at Pittsburg Landing, 27G ; mortally woimded, 279; characteristics and military service, 279 ; condition of his di\asion on the night of April G, 1862, 284 ; letter from Lew. Wallace to, bearing on the latter's dilatoriness, 28!) Wallace, Mrs. W. H. L., forwards letter to (ioneral Grant, bearing on the dila- toriness of Lew. Wallace, I, 289 \A^allen, H. D., woimded at Palo Alto, I, *69 Walling, W. H., rejiorte probability of cap- turing Fort Fisher, II, 437 Walnut Hills, Miss., Sherman's repulse at, I, 441 ; conversation with Sherman on, 441, 442, 453 AA^alnut Springs, Mex., troops at, I, 79, 80, 85 W^ar, a pitiful side to, I, 88, 436 ; a funda- mental principle in, 370; not an unmixed evil, II, 394 Ward, J. H. H., his command, II, 97 ; in bat- tle of the Wilderness, * 113 War Department, orders reinforcements for Grant at Fort Donelsou, 1, 243 ; telegraph- ic communication with the, 490; regula- tions concerning telegi-aph lines, II, 35, 36; places Grant in command of all the armies, 47 ; ignorance of Burnside's desti- nation, 57 ; electioneering actions of the, 234, 235 War of the rebellion, its cost and benefit, I, 508 Warren, G. K., commanding Fifth Army- corps, II, *97, 98; crosses Gernianna Ford, 97, 98; reaches Wilderness Tavern, 103; in battle of the Wilderness, 106-109, 114, 115 ; withdrawal of, 120; orders for May 7, 1864, 120 ; assaults Anderson's position at Spottsylvania, 123 ; Sedgwick ordered to his support, 123 ; possibilities of his rein- forcing Wilson at Spottsylvania, 123; per- sonal characteristics and military quali- ties, 124, 125, 137, 163-165, 305-307; failure of attack on Anderson, 124 ; in battle of Spottsylvania, 125-127, 129-131, 134, 135, 137, 405; threatened with relief from com- mand, 137 ; temporary breaking up of his corps, 138 ; movemeiit to Buraside's left, 140; allows Ewell to escape, 143; Lee's policy to attack Hancock and, 147; marches to Guiney's Station, 147; at- tempts to get between Lee and Ri(!hmond, 14T ; pushed to Harris's Store, 148 ; ordered to the South Anna, 148; reinforced by Wright, 149; defeats Hill on the Korth Anna, 149, 406 ; ordered to send troops to Ox Ford, 150; position. May 24, 1861, 150; jimction with Crittenden, 150 ; ordered to cross the North Anna, 154; movement. May 27, 156; position onthe Pamunkey,157; at Himtley Corners, 158; defeats Early, 158, 150 ; on Shady Grove road, 161 ; posi- tion, May, 30, 161; ordered to attack Ander- son, 163 ; repulses the enemy three times successively, 164 ; attack on, June 2,165 ; or- ders for June 3, 166 ; in battle of Cold Har- bor, 167 ; opinion of the situation, 108 ; withdraws to Cold Harbor, 177; crosses the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, 181; covers the crossing of the Chickahominy, 182 ; in investment of Petersburg, 191 ; in the Petersburg mine affair, 201, 202 ; cap- tures the Weldon railroad, 211 ; captures camp at Peeble's farm, 219 ; advances on the Weldon railroad, 220; in battle of White Oak Road, 299, 450, 452 ; in battle of Five Forks, 303-306, 451 ; reports to Sher- idan, 305, 452; dissatisfaction with, at White Oak Road, 306 ; succeeded in com- mand by Ciriffln, 306. 452 ; engagement at Mine Run, 404 ; at Hatcher's Run, 422. See also Fifth Coups. W^arrenton, Miss., McClernand's position near, I, 443, 448; the highlands at, 371; batteries at, bombard the fleet, 386; Grant's line at, 448 Warrenton Junction, Va., Grant's narrow escape ft-om Mosby at, II, 67 ; Burnside guards the railroad at, 99 Warriors, two classes of, I, 66, 67 Washburn, C. C, cuts the road in Pem- bertou's rear, I, *356; commanding at Haines's Bluff, 456 ; commandins; in West Tennessee, II, 424 ; sends Sturgls against Forrest, 424 Washburn, Francis, ordered to destroy High Bridge, II, *330; confronts Lee's ad- vance, 330 ; killed, 331 Washburne, E. B., speaks at meeting at Ga- lena, I, *184; Grant's first meeting with, 191 ; visits Grant at Culpeper Court House, II, 68; campaigning experiences of, 68 W^ashington, D. C, origin of the Soldiers' Home at, I, 133 ; Lincoln's secret journey to, 182 ; Halleck ordered to, 325 ; Grant's visits to, II, 44, 45, 47, 50. 66, 81, 207, 259, 273, 290; the place for headquarters, 45, 46; collecting reinforcements in, 66; dan- ger of Lee's moving on, 66 ; Confederate attflmpts to capture, 95, 195-197, 410,416; transportation of wounded from the Wil- derness to, 116; sending artillery to, 144, 183 ; jiontoons ordered to City Point fi-om, 159 ; troops ordered to, 204, 206, 220, 416 ; policy of Halleck and Stanton concerning the defense of, 205; Sheridan in, 207, 222; fears of another attempt by Early to capture, 213; difficulty of getting orders to Sheridan through, 214, 221 ; Sheridan's return to Winchester from, 222, 223 ; proposed plan of campaign from, for sprinii- of 1885, 226; Hancock ordered to organize the First Corps in, 226; a city of mourning, 359; Sherman ordered to, 374; arrival of the troops at, 376; Sher- man's march to, 373, 374, 379; the grand review at, 378-380; covered by the Ai-my of the Potomac, 401, 409 ; awaiting rein- forcements from, 405; interruption of communication between City Point and, 417; fears of exposina:, 418; Schofield reaches, 439 ; Schofield to secure rolling- stock from, 440 ^A^ashington, N. C, in Union hands, II, 53, 398 ; abandoned by the Federals, 64 INDEX 515 ■Washington Territory, set off from Oregon, I, 101; ludiiins in, UV> Washita River, oiitlot of Ijiiko I'rovidouco, I, :!7y; waterway lor the enoiiiy, :!7t Waterloo, Ala., Forrest crosses theTeuues- see near, II, 4'28 "Watts, N. G., Confederate comniissiouer for excliau^e of i)risoiiers, I, -179 Wauhatchie, Tenn., llooUer's movements via, I, 504 ; battle of, 50S, 501); (4ear.v at, 11, K Wayne, Henry C, eonimaiidiufr Geoi-f;i:i mi- litia, II, 244; harasses 81iirman, *247 Waynesboro, Ga., Sherman's luovomeut via, II, 24(; Waynesboro, Va., Karly's retreat to, II, 44.'j \A^ebb, Alexander S., II, 97 " Webb," the, iu action against the " In- dianola," I, 388 W^eber, Max. at Harper's Ferry, TT, 416 Webster, J. D., iu action at Foit Donelson, I, *252 ; places artillery at Pittsburs Land- ins, '^Sl. 285 W^eir, Rebecca, I, 5 ■Weitzel, G., assigned to ('(nnmand the 18tli Corps, II, 219 ; selected to command the Fort Fislier expedition, *2G2, 435, 436; ad- vises Bntler against an assault, 265; to hold Bermuda Hnndved, 209 ; notified to be ready to enter Richmond, 308 ; ordered to close up, 310; takes possession of Ilicli- mond, 320; interview with the President at Richmond, 355 ; difticulty about the- meeting of the Virginia legislature, 355, 356 ; commanding the Arm.y of the .lames, 447 ; proposed movements tor, 448 Weldon railroad, the, raids on, II, 73, 190, 194, 200, 204, 211, 212, 220, 414, 421, 422, 447 ; importance of capturing, 190, 211, 213 ; ex- tent of tlie Union lines on, 231, 421 ■Welles, Gideon, suggests a second attempt to capture Kort Fislier, II. 437 ■Wellsville, 'Va., Kantz's raid at, II, 407 Wessells, Henry, defeated at Plymouth, II, 407 ■West and East, possibility of bickerings between, II, 319, 320; lack of concerted action between tlie armies of, 397 ; the ar- mies of, compared, 460 ■Western armies, successful campaig-uing by the, II, 319 ■Western Reserve, the, lack of educational facilities in, I, i : early visit to, 16 West Indies, Solomon Grant settles in the, 1,2 Westmoreland County, Pa., the Grants m, I, 2 ■West Point, Ga., captured by Wilson, II, 368, 459 ■West Point, N. Y., Grant at, I, 7, 14-16, 18- 23 ; proposal to abolish the Military Acad- emy at, 20; Capt. Smith's regime at, 22; Gen. Scott and Pres. Van Buren at. 22; use of tobacco at, 42 : important classes at, 151; onus on graduates of, 192; pre- sumption of a graduate of, 202; tactics taught at, 203; graduates iu the war, 230, 231 ; Grant's comrades at, 2.56, II, 21, 371 West Point, Va., Butler sends cavalry to, II, 406 West Virginia, in Federal possession, II, 53, 398; Crook and Averell's operations in, 72 ; Sisel protecting, 403 ■Wheaton, Frank, II, 99 Wheeler, Joseph, moves against Burnsiae_, I, 515 ; cuts railroad between Dalton and Resaca, II, 92; o])eratioiis in 'reniiessoe and Kentucky. 229, 121; <-onfi oil' the enemy at the Xy, 126 ; in the Petersburg mine affair, 202 ; in action be- fore Petersbnrg, March 24, 1865. 298 Williams, A. S., commanding the Twen- tieth Corps. II 231 Williams, Thomas, cuts a canal across Yonu'JT's Point, I, *372 ^ , "Williams, William G., mortally wounded at Monterey, I, 87 'Williamsburg road, Va., Butler attacks on the, II, 422 ^ . Willow Springs, Miss., McPherson orderea to hold road to, I, 409 516 INDEX 'Wilmington, N. C, contemplated raove- meut aj^aiuHt, II, 232, i.ir, ; Brafrj,' leaves, 249, 435 ; attempts to captTire, 2i9, 2G7, 275, 437-439; defensi's of, 2Ul; iiuportauce of, 261, 434,435; Bra^rs coiiiniumliug at, 264; proposal to scud Hcboticlil to, 275, 439, 441 ; proposed cooperation with Sbeniian from, 275, 429, 444; Jail of, 277, 281, 2S3, 441 ; com- munication with (ioldsboro and Kaleisjh, 280, 281, 286; operations in the vicimty of, 281 ; Sherman's ccnniiiunications with, 286; blockade-running at, 435; expedition toward GoldsOoro Irom, 441; junction of column from, with that from New Berne, 442 Wilmington and Charlotteville railroad, Schofiild to seize the, II, 281 Wilson, James H., sent to examine Moon Lake and Ya7/>o Pass Route. I * 375 ; con- structs bridf:;e over Nortli Fork of Bayou Pierre, 405, 40ii ; takes message from Chatr tanooga to Burnside, U, 28 ; on the Chicka- hominy, 79, 410; crosses Geruianna Ford, 98; his command, 99; advances to Parker's Store, 103 : ordered from Parker's 8tore to Craig's Meeting-house, 106; in battle of the Wilderuess, 109 ; seizes Spottsylviinia, 122; fails to hold it, 123; nu)venient to Little River, 155; movement. May 27, 1864,156; captures Hanover Court House, 161; raids on railroads, 161, li;5. 194, 414, 415; reports the enemy's position, 182; Sheridan sent to his aid, 194; at Nashville, 239 ; sent to Pulaski to watch Hood, 254 ; raid from Kastport, 366-308; luilitary character, 367, :t)stniitii)U of, 375; iriinboats at, 376 Yazoo River, the, prnposed movements atainst VIekstiurK' with forces south of, I, :i6^, 3.'>9 ; rebel posit ions on, 364 ; McCler- nand reaches the mouth of, 365 ; providing for the navigation of, 3i;^; Sherman ana Porter withdraw from, 366; tlie country north of, 371 ; water communications of, 377; Shenuan ordered to move up, 398; anxiety to secure a base of supplies on, 441 ; road-making on, 443, 448 ; Blair's raid up, 454, 455 ; troops on, 456 Yellow fever, at New Orleans, I, 37. See also VOMITO. Yellow Tavern, Va., battle of, II, 78, 406 York River, the, question of securing base of supi)lies on, II, 62, 401 ; Butler's move- ments on, 73 York River railroad, the, Abercrombie di- rected to strip, U, 177, 178 ; Butler attacks on, 422 Yorktown, Va.. Capt. Noah Grant at. I, 2 Young, P. M. B., his command, II, 102; de- feated at Hanover Court House, 161 Young's Point, Miss., McClemand ordered to, I, 367; Grant assumes command at, 368 ; the Mississippi at, 371 ; canal schemes at, 372, 373, 380, 381 ; the tliought upper- nu)8t in Grant's mind on assuming com- nuind at, 370 ■i....,.i:ri.uiICTir