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"The Invasion of the 
 City of Washington" 
 
 A Disagreeable Study in and 
 of Military Unpreparedness 
 
 To be prepared for war is one of the most 
 effectual means of preserving peace.— George 
 Washington, President of the United States, 
 to the first Congress of the United States, 
 January 8, 1790. 
 
 By 
 
 JOHN M. STAHL, 
 
 Author of 
 
 The Real Farmer; Just Stories; The Story 
 
 of Ed; The Battle of Plattsburg, Etc. 
 
 THE VAN TRUMP COMPANY 
 Publishers 
 
\ 3$£g 
 
 
 Copyright, 1918. 
 By John M. Stahl 
 
 JUN 28 1318 
 .:.£. 01132 
 
To 
 
 The Daughters of 1812, 
 
 The Society of the War of 1812, 
 
 and 
 
 All that Love Liberty and Democracy, 
 
 Honor the Brave, 
 
 and 
 
 Glory in the Star Spangled Banner. 
 
1. 
 
 THIS BOOK HAS BEEN WRITTEN BECAUSE 
 
 very many indeed of the American people believe that 
 the soldiers of the United States opposed to the Brit- 
 ish forces that accomplished "the Invasion of the City 
 of Washington" (as the event was most often called 
 at the time) were cowardly, and fled without firing 
 scarcely a shot. This belief is founded on a vile libel 
 of the dead as well as of the living — some severely 
 wounded — that we cannot fasten on the British sol- 
 diers, for those that wrote of the fighting paid just 
 tribute to our forces ; but which had its origin in a 
 weak and "whitewashing" report of the subservient 
 congressional committee that, while it did not directly 
 accuse our soldiers, gave the cue and an excuse to the 
 group of American writers that persistently libelled 
 our soldiers of the War of 1812. This lie about our 
 brave soldiers has been allowed to live too long. 
 
 Why many of the Americans that wrote of our 
 "Second War of Independence" chose to belittle the 
 achievements of our soldiers in that war and actually 
 
to libel them, taking from both the living and the dead 
 that fair fame which it is most cruel to lose and most 
 despicable to take, has been explained in the author's 
 "The Battle of Plattsburg," and need not be repeated 
 here. 
 
 The truth about "The Invasion of the City of 
 Washington" is only justice to the brave, patriotic sol- 
 diers that fought well at Bladensburg to defend the 
 national capital. To recall the truth about those sol- 
 diers is never less nor more than a patriotic duty, and 
 one of compelling timeliness when war and peril 
 should make every heart burn and pulsate with pride 
 in and love of country and the insistent desire to do 
 the utmost to make secure for ourselves and others 
 that liberty and government for which our brave 
 countrymen before us twice fought a War of Inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 But the welfare of the living is beyond and above 
 even the good repute of the dead. The second reason, 
 and the better reason, for the writing of this book is 
 that "The Invasion of the City of Washington" fur- 
 nishes the best example in the history of the United 
 States of the inevitable results of the unmitigated 
 foolishness and positive national crime of military un- 
 preparedness. 
 
 Sad to say, it is only slightly the best among a 
 humiliating number of such examples. 
 
 All good and true Americans abhor war, while 
 
 8 
 
believing that there are times when not to fight, and 
 fight well, is dishonorable and criminal. We believe 
 in honorable peace; as did a certain Virginia gentle- 
 man, who had gained wisdom in both peace and war, 
 and who said in a speech to Congress, January 8, 1790 : 
 
 "To be prepared for war is one of the most effec- 
 tual means of preserving peace." 
 
 George Washington knew that the nation not 
 prepared effectually to defend itself will invite attack 
 as long as human nature is not fundamentally changed ; 
 until men are made into saints. He knew that un- 
 trained patriots, not lacking the least in bravery and 
 fighting remarkably well for men put to strange work 
 about which they know nothing and in which they 
 have not had any experience, cannot be depended on, 
 cannot reasonably be expected to be victorious over 
 trained, seasoned fighters. He knew that the un- 
 trained soldiers cannot protect their country from at- 
 tack by putting wholesome doubt or fear into the 
 trained soldiers of another country. Washington had 
 had experience with soldiers equipped with a full sup- 
 ply of patriotism, but, as soldiers, untrained and inex- 
 perienced ; and February 10, 1776, he wrote frankly 
 and confidentially to his friend, Joseph Reed : 
 
 "The party sent to Bunker Hill had some good 
 and some bad men engaged in it. One or two courts 
 have been held on the conduct of part of them. To be 
 plain, these people are not to be depended upon if 
 
exposed ; and any man will fight well if he thinks him- 
 self in no danger. I do not apply this only to these 
 people. I suppose it to be the case with all raw and 
 undisciplined troops." 
 
 This is somewhat, but far from altogether, unjust 
 to the troops. Three years later, even one year later, 
 Washington would have written differently. He would 
 have written differently in February, 1776, had he not 
 been discouraged, disheartened. In this same letter 
 to Reed he wrote : 
 
 "I know that much is expected of me; I know, 
 that without men, without arms, without ammunition, 
 without anything fit for the accommodation of a sol- 
 dier, little is to be done. * * * * So far from my 
 having an army of twenty thousand men well armed, 
 I have been here with less than one-half of that num- 
 ber, including sick, furloughed, and on command, and 
 those neither armed nor clothed, as they should be. 
 In short, my situation has been such, that I have been 
 obliged to use art to conceal it from my own officers/ 
 
 Truly Washington could speak as one having 
 knowledge when he spoke of military unpreparedness 
 and its consequences. His sad, disheartening experi- 
 ence of it did not end in Massachusetts. 
 
 But the American people soon forget the disas- 
 trous results of military unpreparedness as they also 
 forgot the words of Washington, who, in that most 
 remarkable — most intimate, solemn and wise — state 
 
 10 
 
paper, his "Farewell Address," said : 
 
 "Remembering that timely disbursements to pre- 
 pare for danger frequently prevent much greater dis- 
 bursements to repel it." 
 
 His countrymen, whom he so solemnly addressed, 
 had not remembered, and when war was declared 
 against Great Britain in June, 1812, although we had 
 been moving toward it surely for years, the United 
 States had neither a navy nor a standing army worthy 
 of the name. And during all the period of the War 
 adequate preparations and measures to conduct the 
 War successfully were hindered, and generally pre- 
 vented, by that same fear of liberal expenditure and 
 of vigorous execution that exists even in this hour of 
 war and peril and by its existence now, though feeble, 
 warns us that it will grow into dangerous strength as 
 soon as the war ends. During all the period of the 
 War of 1812 there were those that opposed — some 
 openly and many more subtly and covertly — the ut- 
 nost vigor of action to obtain the measures and means 
 o secure that military preparedness that is the best 
 imbassador to negotiate peace. For Stephen A. Doug- 
 as voiced a truth when he said in his great address 
 o the Illinois legislature, April 25, 1861 : 
 
 "When hostile armies are marching under rude 
 nd obvious banners against the government of our 
 ountry, the shortest way to peace is the most stupend- 
 ous and unanimous preparation for war. The great- 
 
 11 
 
er the unanimity the less blood will be shed. The 
 more prompt and energetic is the movement, and the 
 more important it is in numbers, the shorter will be 
 the struggle." 
 
 But the American people had paid little heed in- 
 deed to the words of Washington ; and some failed to 
 see the truth Douglas so well expressed half a century 
 later; while those that did perceive it were held fast 
 by their own timidity or the timidity and influence of 
 others; and as a result, when the enemy, after more 
 than two years of war, and after more than a year's 
 incursions into and occupancy of the nearby territory, 
 with ample warning approached our national capital, 
 there were yet no adequate means or measures to re- 
 pel the hostile army. 
 
 Major George Peter, one of the most intelligent, 
 efficient and fair minded soldiers this country has ever 
 produced, wrote of the battle of Bladensburg — the un- 
 fortunate result of which permitted "The Invasion of 
 the City of Washington :" 
 
 "A want of military experience was the ground 
 work of all the errors committed in the military oper- 
 ations of that day * * * The great defect was 
 the want of military experience." 
 
 Major Peter was in position to speak knowingly 
 of the battle of Bladensburg. He could say truthfully, 
 as he did in his illuminating account of the battle, "J 
 was the first to meet the enemy, and the last piece of 
 
 12 
 
artillery fired at the battle of Bladensburg was from 
 my battery, after I had received an order to retreat." 
 
 It is well to repeat here that the American troops 
 that participated in the battle of Bladensburg were 
 not lacking in bravery. When we consider all the con- 
 ditions we are surprised, not that they did not do bet- 
 ter, but that they did as well as they did. Not they, 
 but the failure of the national administration to take 
 adequate measures for national defense, and the fail- 
 ure of the state authorities as well to do their part, 
 were responsible for the result at Bladensburg, and 
 make it true that — 
 
 'The Invasion of the City of Washington" Aug- 
 ust 24, 1814, is as forcible and convincing an event as 
 could well occur to demonstrate the catastrophe and 
 humiliation that may come to any people as foolish 
 and blind about their defense as a nation as were the 
 American people in the years — and days — previous to 
 August 24, 1814; and as they have been in all too many 
 years since that day of shame and panic. 
 
 Even today — a day of dire national peril as well 
 as obtruding national duty — when it is our disgrace, 
 as it has been more than once before, to be unprepared 
 to defend our people, our rights, and the right; and 
 when it may easily be our peril and loss and humilia- 
 tion as it has been before, thus to be unprepared: 
 there are many that yet doubt the wisdom and down- 
 right necessity of military preparedness at all times, 
 
 13 
 
and there are some that actually oppose that universal 
 military training on which adequate national defense 
 must rest as its foundation. There are those that can- 
 not or will not see that which is made plain and al- 
 ways has been made plain as time unfolds events : 
 that to be defenseless invites attack ; that the military 
 training of citizens for defense is not an irrevocable 
 commitment of a nation to a large standing army or 
 to "militarism," or a commitment of any kind to any- 
 thing except the ability and readiness to do our part 
 as a nation to make right and the rights of a free peo- 
 ple secure, within our borders and beyond our bor- 
 ders ; and that this ability and readiness to wage war 
 successfully is the best guarantee of peace — and for 
 others as well as ourselves when less than war on our 
 part would be disgrace because less than war would 
 be shirking our duty as a nation. 
 
 Even now we need to be awakened and as with 
 a blow that stings and hurts, to the inevitable loss and 
 humiliation of a nation that cannot fight — efficiently 
 and fiercely; a loss and humiliation inevitable as long 
 as men are men. 
 
 14 
 
2. 
 
 A FOOL'S PARADISE 
 
 is a phrase disagreeably uncomplimentary and harsh 
 to apply to a state of mind of one's countrymen, but 
 it must be confessed that we people of this "greatest 
 and most glorious country on the globe" are prone to 
 give lightly and to receive seriously that which is flat- 
 tery ; and there are conditions, mental and material, 
 that not only warrant, but demand plain speaking. 
 
 Somewhat more than a century ago the American 
 people were foolish — that is the only word to use — 
 about the national defense. One would say that they 
 were incredibly foolish were it not that certain events, 
 notably "The Invasion of the City of Washington," 
 prove that foolishness ; and were it not that this fool- 
 ishness has persisted, to greater or less degree, to more 
 or less extent to this day ! While we are hurrying, 
 with all the confusion and waste of hurry, and all the 
 inefficiency of workmen at a strange task, to put our- 
 selves in position to fight — at this very hour — there 
 are those that boldly proclaim that this waste and con- 
 
 15 
 
fusion — and the infinitely worse results that must 
 come from it — loss of limb and sight and life — are bet- 
 ter than to have been prepared ! And there is abund- 
 ant evidence that as soon as the present war is over 
 there will be many indeed to lull and persuade and ca- 
 jole and push us into the old dangerous, disgraceful 
 condition of inability to defend ourselves or protect 
 others. 
 
 There is real need that we be told and reminded 
 of and be warned by the loss and disgrace of "The 
 Invasion of the City of Washington." Also, it is time 
 indeed that the truth about that event and the events 
 leading up to it, be told, fearlessly, that plain justice, 
 and justice only, be done to the brave soldiers and 
 sailors that fought, and fought well — for untrained 
 soldiers fought almost incredibly well — but with the 
 only result to be expected from military unprepared- 
 ness and inexperience. 
 
 As a people we have been indeed unwise in our 
 indisposition to be prepared for war in times of peace 
 because, for one thing, we have followed false proph- 
 ets and blind leaders, so sure that they were very wise 
 and so insistent that they were, that they have made 
 all too many of our people to believe in their wisdom ; 
 whereas events, which, without malice, but none the 
 less cruelly, strip fools and show them to be what they 
 are, have shown that these soi-disant wise people that 
 have been so sure that the world has grown too good /l 
 
 16 
 
to wage war and that the nation that does right is se- 
 cure from attack, are all of them foolish, and well- 
 nigh as hurtful to the people they mislead as if they 
 were selfish and traitorous. 
 
 The American people have been unwise about na- 
 tional defense because, for another thing, they have 
 not realized that all other peoples are not as happily 
 circumstanced and as happy as themselves. We have 
 thought — if we thought about it at all — that other peo- 
 ples were as fortunately situated, as well fed, as pros- 
 perous and as good, as ourselves. Having "a place in 
 the sun" and a much larger place than we have needed 
 or could utilize, we have not realized that many, many 
 millions have no adequate place in the sun. Having 
 no need of, and therefore no desire for, more room, we 
 have not realized that many millions have that most 
 urgent call of the stomach not well filled and of the 
 soul that feels hard circumstances bearing down on it 
 cruelly day after day, and therefore have a desire that 
 will not be forever denied for more room that both 
 the material and the spiritual may be fed and minis- 
 tered unto- -a desire so strong, so propulsive, so in- 
 sistent, that it leads even those weakened and fearful 
 in body and mind by years and years of cruel condi- 
 tions, to fight and kill; fight and kill with that wild 
 fury that, while it shames the beasts in its excesses, 
 almost glorifies those enslaved fighting for freedom of 
 the body, mind and soul. Being well provided with 
 
 17 
 
the good things of this world, and being safe and se- 
 cure, we have been too comfortable ourselves to think 
 as with conviction that to many millions there is no 
 meal time that comes at any certain hour ; that many 
 millions eat, not when the stomach, accustomed to a 
 schedule, calls for food — or unaccustomed to any sched- 
 ule, calls for food — but when a little food, say a handful 
 of rice or a piece of unpalatable bread, or a soup of 
 some vegetable of far greater bulk than nutrition, can 
 be had ; not thinking, also, that of these many millions 
 often hungry and who have no regular and sure meal 
 time, many indeed are to be found in those "civilized" 
 and "rich" nations of which the few have so very 
 much. Being generally well filled ourselves, we have 
 actually shut our eyes to that which history has hung 
 aloft in the sky to those that having eyes will to see — 
 when the head is well nigh empty and the stomach is 
 altogether empty, it is easy to fill the heart with hate. 
 Not having even those kings that should be put to 
 some useful employment because they are figureheads 
 and as kings are useless, we have not realized that 
 there are kings with kingly ambitions (for that which 
 is in truth kingly is always selfish and crafty) ; with 
 kingly lack of morality and pity ; with kingly contempt 
 of those not kings; with the fierce, fanatical, fearful 
 and selfish kingly belief in the divine right of kings 
 to have millions of common people suffer agony and 
 death, to have nations drink to the dregs the cup of 
 
 18 
 
poverty, suffering and hopelessness, to make these 
 kings more powerful and oppressive — at the least, to 
 keep a throne under them. Having the peace of the 
 full stomach and the head that lies secure on a soft 
 pillow, we have not realized that other peoples must 
 not only keep the door locked always, but must con- 
 tinually stand guard with weapon in hand, and that 
 while the man thus stands guard he often hears his 
 children cry for bread ; a condition that, because of 
 the unwisdom of one or the ill temper of another very 
 little fraction of the people, may lead to war, and very 
 often war that spreads to neighbors, relatives and 
 friends. Finally, we have had such a vast, vast, vast 
 new country to occupy and conquer; that by Us riches 
 continually called to us, tempted us, tantaU .<*d ue ; 
 i that enlarged always and pushed out farther and far 
 ther, as if they marked the horizon, its borders of hope 
 and aspiration and opportunity and achievement; so 
 that in the work of forest and mine and field and forge 
 and store we have been so very busy of head and hand 
 that we have not found time to think of war, and the 
 things that bring war. We have found it more agree- 
 able to think of an era of universal peace as if it had 
 really come. Having generally well filled and regular- 
 ly filled stomachs, sufficient apparel for comfort and 
 often for vanity, and an amplitude of good shelter, it 
 has been easy and comfortable for us to be friendly 
 in thought towards other nations, to exercise those 
 
 19 
 
Christian virtues of forbearance and tolerance and 
 even generosity that make one disposed to be peacea- 
 ble and therefore easily persuaded that war is sadly 
 out of date and that all that go to war are cruel and 
 criminal. 
 
 History repeats itself. The ideas, utterances, and 
 inaction in regard to military preparedness of the 
 American people during the first years of the twenti- 
 eth century have a disquieting similitude to their ideas, 
 utterances and inaction in regard to the same matter 
 during the first yeafs of the nineteenth century. Before 
 Aug. 24, 1814, we had been at war, actual war, and with 
 the great British Kingdom for our enemy, for more 
 than two years ; we had been making, through all of 
 that time, a great show of stupendous preparation for 
 a large and efficient and well equipped army and navy ; 
 our statesmen and highest officials had relieved them- 
 selves of many lofty utterances, and the lackeys and 
 claquers of the national administration regularly called 
 attention to its godlike diplomatic ability and almost 
 devilish diplomatic astuteness as shown in state pa- 
 pers and public addresses as well as conferences and 
 negotiations. The creation of armies on paper by 
 requisitions on those that had neither men nor muni- 
 tions, the defenses created in imagination by wordy 
 proclamations and pronouncements, were surpassed 
 only by the inefficiency, confusion and conflict of ef- 
 fort in the departments of the national government. 
 
 20 
 
The nation, somewhat disquieted by failure in the war, 
 was yet reassured by the complacent confidence of 
 the national administration and congress, and the 
 many newspapers that found it more convenient and 
 profitable, and may have believed it more patriotic, to 
 hide the truth than to expose incompetency and dan- 
 ger. One of the results was the burning of the na- 
 tional capitol. A week; yes, a day before the battle 
 of Bladensburg, which allowed the British to "violate 
 the metropolis" of Washington the day following, and 
 compelled the President and other public officials to 
 flee to escape capture, not one person in a hundred 
 among the people of the United States had the least 
 thought that such an event was possible ! The people 
 of this country now are no more certain in their belief 
 that no catastrophe and humiliation can come to us 
 now, and they have no less reason for such certainty 
 of belief, than the people of this country were certain 
 in their belief in 1812, or even 1813, or even later, that 
 there was not the least possibility of that which did 
 occur — "The Invasion of the City of Washington." 
 In 1814 our foe dwelt three thousand miles away. And 
 he had only sailing vessels. 
 
 21 
 
3. 
 
 MILITARY UNPREPAREDNESS 
 
 and it alone, for with it went military inexperience 
 and incompetency, was responsible for "The Invasion 
 of the City of Washington ;" and as well for the events 
 of the War of 1812 that lengthened that War and in- 
 creased its cost of property and lives; and for a con- 
 clusion of the War that did not secure the objects for 
 which it was begun, or results at all commensurate 
 with the loss and suffering. 
 
 As has been already said, history has a way of re- 
 peating itself — and at times this is a very disagreeable 
 performance. 
 
 Even after war had waged in Europe for five 
 months of 1914 and all of 1915, the people of the Unit- 
 ed States were content with their state of very com- 
 plete military unpreparedness. The nation was as ill 
 prepared, was as incapable of defending itself, of as- 
 serting its rights and protecting its citizens, of aiding 
 its friends or upholding right and liberty, as it was 
 in 1812. 
 
 22 
 
In January, 1916, Woodrow Wilson, President of 
 the United States, made a series of notable addresses, 
 to warn the people of this country about its military 
 unpreparedness, to arouse the people to the weakness 
 of the nation as a military force and to the danger in 
 which this placed them, and to point out our rights 
 and obligations. He said : 
 
 "There are certain obligations which every Amer- 
 ican knows that we have undertaken. The first and 
 primary obligation is the maintainance of the integ- 
 rity of our own sovereignty — which goes as of course. 
 There is also the maintainance of our liberty to devel- 
 op our political institutions without hindrance, and, 
 last of all, there is the obligation to stand as the strong 
 brother of all those in this hemisphere who will main- 
 tain the same principles and follow the same ideals of 
 liberty. 
 
 "We stand in the midst of a world which we did 
 not ourselves make and many of the forces of which 
 are only too jealous of those things which we cherish. 
 
 "We cannot alter that world overnight. We can- 
 not hold it at arm's length by merely holding up our 
 hands in disapproval and declaring our separation in 
 sympathy and purpose from it. We cannot make it 
 respect us by ignoring it. The hard, ugly fact is that 
 it will heed us only if it certainly knows that our ob- 
 ligation to ourselves and our ideals can and will be 
 met to the utmost and without delay should any one 
 seek to embarrass their fulfillment or to make it im- 
 possible * * * * 
 
 "But there is something that the American people 
 love better than they love peace. They love the prin- 
 ciples upon which their political life is founded. They 
 
 23 
 
are ready at any time to fight for the vindication of 
 their character and their honor. 
 
 "They will at no time seek a contest, but they will 
 at no time cravenly avoid it. Because if there is one 
 thing that the country ought to fight for, and that ev- 
 ery nation ought to fight for, it is the integrity of its 
 own convictions. 
 
 "We can not surrender our convictions. I would 
 rather surrender territory than surrender those ideals 
 which are the staff of life for the soul itself * * * 
 
 "There are two sides to the question of prepara- 
 tion. There is not merely the military side — there is 
 the industrial side. And the ideal which I have in 
 mind is this, gentlemen: We ought to have in this 
 country a great system of industrial and vocational 
 education, under Federal guidance and with Federal 
 aid, in which a very large percentage of the youth of 
 this country will be given training in the skillful use 
 and application of the principles of science in maneu- 
 ver and business. And it will be perfectly feasible 
 and highly desirable to add to that and combine with 
 it such a training in the mechanism and use and care 
 of arms, in the sanitation of camp, in the simpler forms 
 of maneuver and organization, as will make these 
 same men industrially efficient and individually ser- 
 viceable for national defense. 
 
 "The point about such a system will be that its 
 emphasis will lie on the industrial and civil side of life, 
 and that, like all the rest of America, the use of force 
 will only be in the background and as the last resort. 
 So that men will think first of their families and their 
 daily work, of their service in the economic fields of 
 the country, and only last of all of their serviceability 
 to the nation as soldiers and men-at-arms. That is the 
 
 24 
 
ideal of America. But, gentlemen, you cannot 
 create such a system overnight. You cannot create 
 such a system rapidly. It has got to be built up, and 
 I hope it will be built up, by slow and effective stages. 
 And there is something to be done in the meantime. 
 We must see to it that a sufficient body of citizens is 
 given the kind of training which will make them effi- 
 cient for call into the field in case of necessity." 
 
 Here we have the statement of some plain facts, 
 the proof of which is written on almost every page of 
 human history. By the events of the past we must 
 forecast the future. The slow change in the human 
 race makes it plain that it will, at the earliest, be cen- 
 turies before wars will cease — be centuries before 
 might exercised in some great way or other will not 
 be needed to protect and uphold and preserve the 
 right. Until human nature is so fundamentally and 
 wholly changed that the change cannot be expected 
 for centuries, physical force must be exerted; and at 
 times it will inevitably be on a national scale. Man 
 must be a fighting animal— to live— as long as he con- 
 tinues to exist; when he is no longer a fighting animal 
 he will become extinct; and as long as he is a fighting 
 animal he will fight— to live; for a place in the sun; 
 to protect his offspring; to secure and hold that op- 
 portunity and liberty that man above a certain plane 
 counts of more worth than mere life itself. 
 
 Here we have, also, in President Wilson's ad- 
 dress, an exceedingly gentle statement of a very mod- 
 
 25 
 
est plan and purpose of military preparedness. Not 
 all our citizens, but only "a sufficient body of citizens," 
 is to be given military training. This program is cer- 
 tainly little enough; for a "sufficient" body of citizens 
 to be trained is indefinite enough to be inoffensive. 
 Yet even this not only encountered much opposition, 
 but awakened much opposition. President Wilson 
 deserves no small credit for the less than enough that 
 he urged ; for considering the public opinion on mili- 
 tary preparedness in January, 1916, he was really bold 
 and radical in his utterances. And he deserves credit 
 for another reason : like Lincoln, he knows that he 
 that will be a true leader of the people, he that will 
 succeed in leading the people, must not put himself 
 so far ahead of them that they will not understand him 
 when he calls to them, and must not seek to lead them 
 too fast. Month after month Lincoln was scolded be- 
 cause he did not advocate more, did not insist on more, 
 and because he was so slow. We know now that in 
 his head and heart he was far in advance of his words ; 
 and that he was wise and patriotic enough to be mis- 
 understood because if his words had been as his 
 thoughts and wishes, he could not have led the people 
 at all. At this writing Russia shows only too well the 
 results of such radical attempts to lead, far in advance 
 of the people, that does not lead them except to disas- 
 ter. Abraham Lincoln is so exalted in the regard of 
 the writer of this that he hesitates even to suggest that 
 
 26 
 
any man has in any way the wisdom and far-sighted- 
 ness and patience of Lincoln. Yet in that most effec- 
 tive leadership that keeps, not far, but only a little, 
 and always, in the lead, Woodrow Wilson is strangely 
 not unlike Abraham Lincoln. They are strangely not 
 unlike in the contradictions in their public utterances ; 
 and doubtless the one is ready to confess, as the other 
 more than once confessed, that clearer vision and surer 
 knowledge have come with unfolding experience, and 
 that growth of mind and of spirit has not been denied 
 or repelled. 
 
 But it must be confessed that some might com- 
 pare James Madison and Woodrow Wilson and find 
 much in common, especially as regards the subject in 
 hand; for Madison's tongue was not dumb nor his pen 
 idle, and they put forth brave words for military pre- 
 paredness. 
 
 It will not be amiss to be vigilant against such 
 things as were done by members of the national ad- 
 ministration, and other friends of the President, dur- 
 ing the War of 1812, because of political expediency 
 — and which, for example, were clearly responsible for 
 "The Invasion of the City of Washington." There is 
 enough in the past to put wise citizens on the alert, on 
 guard; that these things of political expediency that 
 persisted through the administration of James Madi- 
 son may not be recorded by the historian of the admin- 
 istration of Woodrow Wilson as having persisted 
 
 27 
 
through his administration, with like results during 
 the war, and relapse into military unpreparedness 
 after the war.* 
 
 But whatever may be the characteristics, faults, 
 virtues, weakness or strength of this President or that, 
 and of his satellites, the fact remains that there is need 
 of the true friends of this nation being alert and active 
 to secure for this time and for future years that mili- 
 tary preparedness that is the most economical and 
 surest guarantee of peace and to avoid that military 
 unpreparedness that the War of 1812 showed to be 
 so extravagant, wasteful, and disastrous. 
 
 The greatest reason for the writing of history is 
 the benefit, as citizens, of those that read it. The er- 
 rors ot the dead are recorded that the living may read 
 and be warned. The wise deeds and the brave deeds 
 of the dead are put in the printed page that the living, 
 reading that page, may be stirred to emulation. That 
 
 *The writer is pleased to say that while Madison was a 
 truly great man, a statesman of the first rank, and a pure 
 patriot, as a vigorous believer in war for certain high ob- 
 jects, and as an administrator to secure the vigorous prose- 
 cution of war for those objects, Wilson now appears to be 
 head and shoulders above Madison. The progress made 
 by the United States in getting ready to fight during the 
 first year of the present war, though marked by mistakes, 
 confusion, waste and stubborn adhesion to inefficient men 
 and methods — much of which could not reasonably be oth- 
 erwise than expected — is nevertheless in striking and grat- 
 ifying contrast in some particulars to the events as well as 
 in disquieting resemblance to others of the like period of 
 the War of 1812. 
 
 28 
 
history which does not connect the events of which 
 it writes with the events of the present, to influence 
 the events of the future, misses no small part of its 
 usefulness. It is believed to be not only allowable, 
 but obligatory, that a history of the event of the War 
 of 1812 most humiliating to the American people — 
 an event due to military unpreparedness — should 
 make plain the probable, the inevitable, events that 
 will come from military unpreparedness at any time 
 in the future. 
 
 In his address quoted in this chapter, President 
 Wilson, in admirably terse language, has happily stat- 
 ed a military preparedness remarkable and indeed 
 commendable in its breadth and depth, but lacking in 
 length — it does not go far enough, for only universal 
 military training will give that complete military pre- 
 paredness that is safe and will escape the inequalities 
 and favoritism that are antagonistic to a democracy. 
 President Wilson's conception of military prepared- 
 ness is indeed admirable in that it recognizes that the 
 proper preparation includes far more than that which 
 is required on the battlefield itself — that to make war 
 in the best way is now an exceedingly complex under- 
 taking; and in that it recognizes that one of the cer- 
 tain, and chief, results of proper preparation for war 
 is the effect on the people entirely distinct from any- 
 thing connected with war. One fraction of this effect 
 is that the youth given the right military training is 
 
 29 
 
benefitted individually in several ways, and to such 
 extent that it is not exaggeration to say that in many 
 cases the character is transformed. 
 
 Doubtless war reacts for peace. A people tires of 
 war — but the next generation fights. The doors of the 
 temple of Jarrus are not often moved. It is pleasant 
 to dream of and it is noble to work for, a court of na- 
 tions or a league for peace that will not permit war; 
 but war can be prevented only by force, and the exer- 
 cise of force, if it is not war from the beginning, will 
 lead to war ! The only safety, and, as pointed out by 
 Washington, the true economy, is in being ready to 
 fight. We must not longer be misled by those that 
 see only evil in an army and a navy, no matter what 
 conditions may exist. We must not after the close of 
 the present war allow the American nation to be de- 
 fenseless, as it was a hundred years ago, as it was 
 scarce a year ago. We must not delude ourselves that 
 all other nations are kind and benevolent; that they 
 all have, not only all the room in the sun that they 
 need, but all that they want ; and that there is not 
 among them, nor will there be, men of ambition that 
 would gain power and make a name by even the hor- 
 rors of war. We know that human nature has not 
 much changed for the better in the last hundred years ; 
 that where in one nation men have gone up and for- 
 ward a little, in others they have slipped down and 
 back. If we are wise and honest with the events of 
 
 30 
 
history we will act as if men will not much change 
 for the better during the next hundred years. And 
 therefore we will, as patriots, and as good friends of 
 the weak or oppressed everywhere, avoid that military 
 unpreparedness that invited, and will always invite, 
 such humiliating events as "The Invasion of the City 
 of Washington." 
 
 31 
 
4. 
 
 MADISON AND FOUR OTHERS 
 
 The battle near Bladensburg, a few miles from 
 Washington, was the only battle of "The Invasion of 
 the City of Washington." On the American side it 
 was so notably a contest among public officials and a 
 conflict of officers, rather than a fight by soldiers, that 
 to understand it we must, first of all, know something 
 about certain of the officials and officers that had 
 much to do with that battle. 
 
 First of all is to be considered James Madison, 
 President of the United States and Commander-in- 
 Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States. 
 
 It was unfortunate for Madison and much more 
 unfortunate for his country, that his heart was never 
 in the War. He was a man of peace. He was 24 years 
 of age when the farmers assembled at Concord fired 
 the shot heard round the world, but the sound of it 
 did not reach his ears as a call to arms, and at no time 
 did he serve in the Continental army in any capacity. 
 
 32 
 
His choice of employment during the War of the Rev- 
 olution was doubtless a wise one, for he was fitted to 
 serve the colonies much better in civil than in military 
 employment ; and during the eight years of war he 
 was indeed able, industrious and helpful. Our quarrel 
 is not with him because during the Revolution he was 
 not a soldier, but with the fate that made him Presi- 
 dent during "The Second War of Independence." 
 
 In "The Battle of Plattsburg" the author has this 
 to say of Madison : 
 
 "Madison was a man of irreproachable character. 
 He was a patriot. He was a man of profound thought 
 and great scholarship. He had been a Federalist. He 
 wrote twenty-nine of the eighty-five numbers of "The 
 Federalist" — Jay contributed only five numbers, and 
 Hamilton the rest. When he graduated from Prince- 
 ton he remained a year longer to study Hebrew. He 
 was justly renowned as a thinker and writer on gov- 
 ernment ; but his liking for theology was fully as 
 strong as for the science of government, and had he 
 been born at a different time he would probably have 
 been a professor of theology and then president of 
 Princeton, or some other college, in which he would 
 have been also professor of Hebrew or theology or 
 government. He was a man of very great ability. 
 That the national constitution was accepted by the 
 states was probably due more to him than to any one 
 else. He broke with old friends and had bitter ene- 
 
 33 
 
mies, but his honesty or virtue was never questione 
 Naturally enough, the dominant element in his a 
 ministration was, in its own estimation, at least, sch 
 lastic and philosophical ; and it had the characte 
 istics of the soi-disant scholarly 'statesman' of the 
 time — and later dates — who was pleased not to be 
 'practical.' There was indeed one prominent excep- 
 tion — the commonsense, positive, bold Monroe. If, 
 before the destruction of the capitol he had been sec- 
 retary of war instead of secretary of state, the course 
 of the War would have been different. Madison ha 
 argued for universal military training and for a stand- 
 ing army and a navy sufficient for defense. He di< 
 this when eloquently endeavoring to secure the adop 
 tion of the national constitution. This required re; 
 moral courage, for the people of that time gr 
 feared, and were bitterly opposed to, a standing ; 
 'How could a readiness for war in time of peae 
 safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in 
 manner, the preparations and establishments of e T 
 hostile nation?' he asked in The Federalist. 'If,' 
 continued, 'one nation maintains constantly a d 
 plined army, ready for the service of ambition c 
 venge, it obliges the most pacific nations, who m; ; 
 within the reach of its enterprises, to take corresp 
 
 ing precautions The veteran legio* ^ 
 
 Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined 
 of all other nations, and rendered her mistres f 
 world.' 4- 
 
 34 
 
"That was written in 1788. Immediately follow- 
 ing what has just been quoted he wrote : 'Not the less 
 'rue is it that the liberties of Rome proved the final 
 victim of her military triumphs; and that the liberties 
 ' of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few 
 exceptions, been the price of her military establish- 
 ments. A standing force, therefore, is dangerous.' 
 
 "This view grew more and more in his mind, to 
 the exclusion of the need of military preparedness for 
 national defense. His genius was for scholarship and 
 vheology and literature and philosophy rather than 
 practical statesmanship and wise administration. He 
 was by nature antagonistic to war, to force. Jeffer- 
 S3n, his warmest admirer and friend, said of him that 
 \ nature and method were 'soothing always the feel- 
 is of his adversaries by civilities and softness of 
 ression.' He was, in early life, exceedingly diffi- 
 nt ; almost timid. Few have reached higher planes 
 thought or spiritual or patriotic expression; but, 
 ith Britain and France not only at war already in- 
 iving or threatening to involve all nations that could 
 1 ly fight, he was content with embargo and 'non- 
 ircourse' and beautifully worded remonstrances, 
 I no effective effort was made to get, equip and 
 in soldiers or to build up a navy. 'What has 
 "r. ght on other nations those immense debts,' he 
 l 'under the pressure of which many of them la- 
 . ot the expenses of their government, but war.' 
 
 35 
 
He was opposed to war. He entered into war reluct- 
 antly. Doubtless he never forgot that in allying him- 
 self with the war party he had parted from his early 
 political friends — the Federalists. Doubtless his heart 
 was not in the war ; but he was by birth of the section 
 that favored the war, and he went with his section. 
 And though his heart had been in the war, his admin- 
 istration would probably not have been more success- 
 ful in the prosecution of the war. He became stub- 
 bornly deaf to advice. 
 
 "Inevitably a President is pressed around by 
 subtly intrusive selfish or silly sycophants who know 
 the power of flattery. A President is continually told, 
 if he will listen to it, if he will not positively refuse to 
 listen to it — and unfortunately it is not characteristic 
 of human beings to dread 'praise, not blame' — that he 
 is the greatest statesman and ablest administrator that 
 ever occupied his exalted position ; and unless he is 
 quite exceptional, he comes to believe some or much 
 of this and to less or greater degree refuses to listen 
 to criticism, resents advice, constantly seeks greater 
 power, is more and more in sympathy with men and 
 measures that take from the liberties of the people, 
 and undertakes more and more the direction of that 
 for the proper direction of which he lacks ability or 
 energy, or both. He is content with inefficient officials 
 and aids, for, he having chosen them, they must be 
 the best that can be had! The War of 1812 was pro- 
 
 36 
 
longed and its conclusion was unsatisfactory, lives were 
 sacrificed, hardships were put upon the people, be- 
 cause the national administration attempted what was, 
 for it, impossible ; would not supplant the inefficient of 
 men and methods with the efficient ; and at times was 
 successful in accomplishing the astoundingly inoppor- 
 tune and inadvisable, if not actually criminal. 
 
 "Yet time has been kinder to Madison than it 
 has been to his critics, and for this we may all well 
 be content. It has preserved a remembrance of his 
 good qualities rather than of his shortcomings. Be- 
 fore he became President, even before he became Jeff- 
 erson's Secretary of State, he had given to his country 
 a vast service that required the highest and greatest 
 and most varied of talents coupled with true patriot- 
 ism and prodigious industry. If he had never been 
 President he would nevertheless merit very nearly 
 as much praise and gratitude from the American peo- 
 ple as any one in all our history. Possibly the Presi- 
 dency took from his high fame rather than added to 
 it. And it is certain that of those that criticised him 
 during the War, a good many would better have kept 
 silent. Some there were who criticised with wisdom 
 from patriotic motives ; and it would have been better 
 for Madison and the country he loved if he had list- 
 ened to these critics. He was not perfect. He was ill- 
 suited to be a war President. But he was patriotic. So 
 were some of his critics. But not all — not some of 
 the loudest, that sought most to hector and hinder." 
 
 37 
 
As already stated, Madison was a university grad- 
 uate, but never a soldier. James Monroe, born in 1758, 
 left William and Mary College in 1776 to enter the Rev- 
 olutionary Army as a cadet. He was descended from 
 Captain Monroe, an officer in the army of Charles I. 
 Monroe was in the army only a short time when he 
 was made a lieutenant. He was active and showed 
 real military ability during the campaign on the Hud- 
 son, and in the battle at Trenton he led a small de- 
 tachment that captured a British battery — receiving 
 as a result a ball in the shoulder and a captain's com- 
 mission. He was soon made a major and as aide-de- 
 camp to Lord Sterling he served brilliantly in the cam- 
 paigns of 1777 and 1778, showing undoubted bravery 
 and unusual energy and resource and military talent in 
 the battles of Brandywine, Germantown and 
 Monmouth. But by taking the position of aide- 
 de-camp to Lord Sterling he had lost his 
 rank in the regular line, and as he was nev- 
 er given to flattery or intrigue and would not 
 practice the ''diplomacy" of those days, he was de- 
 nied entrance into the army as a commissioned officer. 
 As a result, he began the study of law under the di- 
 rection of Jefferson, at that time governor of Virginia. 
 But in a short time he was organizing the militia of 
 the lower counties of his state and Jefferson sent him 
 as military commissioner to the army in South Caro- 
 lina. All his life he had a liking for the military and 
 when, during the War of 1812, he was addressed as 
 
 38 
 
"Colonel" Monroe, he was greatly pleased; and those 
 that write of that War, especially if military men, 
 most often speak of him as Colonel Monroe, although 
 the highest military rank he had ever had was that of 
 Major, while he had held very high civil positions and 
 at the time was Secretary of State. 
 
 In 1782 he was elected to the Virginia assembly, 
 and by that body he was appointed a member of the ex- 
 ecutive council although he was only 23 years of age. 
 In 1783 he was elected to Congress for three years. 
 He was ineligible for re-election for three years, else 
 he would undoubtedly have succeeded himself. In 
 1787 he was re-elected to the Virginia assembly, and 
 the next year he was chosen a delegate to the Vir- 
 ginia convention to act on the adoption of the federal 
 constitution. There was an especial appropriateness 
 in this, for — and this should never be forgotten by the 
 people of the United States — while a member of con- 
 gress he became convinced that the old articles of 
 confederation must always prove lame, ineffective and 
 incompetent, and in 1785 he advocated an extension 
 of the powers of congress and introduced a resolution 
 to give congress authority to regulate trade between 
 the States. This resolution was referred to a com- 
 mittee of which he was chairman. It was favorably 
 reported, and it was this which led to the convention 
 at Annapolis, and later to the federal constitution. 
 
 However, when the federal constitution was sub- 
 mitted to the Virginia convention, Monroe was one 
 
 39 
 
of the minority that felt compelled to oppose it, be- 
 lieving that it gave too much power to the federal 
 government. The majority of the people of Virginia 
 supported the minority and Monroe was elected Unit- 
 ed States Senator in 1790. In 1794 he was appointed 
 minister to France. He was exceedingly popular in 
 that country, but his attitude towards Great Britain 
 led to his recall in 1796. From 1799 to 1802 he was 
 governor of Virginia. At the close of his term he was 
 appointed envoy extraordinary to the French govern- 
 ment to negotiate for the purchase of Louisiana, and 
 in this undertaking he was able and successful. As 
 soon as this purchase was accomplished he was sent 
 as minister plenipotentiary to England, but soon was 
 sent to Madrid as minister extraordinary and pleni- 
 potentiary. In 1806 he was returned to England as 
 minister extraordinary. He was not successful at 
 either Madrid or London. Possibly no one could have 
 been. But Monroe had little patience with the ways 
 of diplomacy of that period. He was the first one to 
 practice "shirt sleeve diplomacy." His blunt an- 
 nouncement of what is known as the "Monroe Doc- 
 trine" is a good example of his methods and language. 
 That doctrine may have suited the purposes of Great 
 Britain, but to say, as is frequently done nowadays, 
 that Monroe announced this doctrine at the sugges- 
 tion of Great Britain, is as silly as it is untruthful, and 
 it is the limit of both. Monroe had no love or respect 
 for Great Britain and while the men in the government 
 
 40 
 
of the British Kingdom in those years were dense and 
 often stupid and foolish, they were not so stupid as to 
 think that if they suggested anything to Monroe it 
 would, on that account, be regarded favorably by him, 
 or by the people of the United States. They knew 
 that the effect would be the contrary. 
 
 In 1808, Monroe was the choice of many, possibly 
 a majority, of the Republican party for President, but 
 President Jefferson favored Madison, and this made 
 Madison President. In 1810 Monroe was elected for 
 the third time to the Virginia assembly and the next 
 year he was again elected governor of the state. In 
 the same year he became Madison's Secretary of State, 
 and he was holding that office at the time of "The 
 Invasion of the City of Washington." From the be- 
 ginning of Madison's administration he was an 
 avowed candidate for the Presidency as Madison's 
 successor, as was, for some time before "The Inva- 
 sion of the City of Washington," John Armstrong, the 
 Secretary of War ; and to the political maneuvering of 
 Monroe and Armstrong and their friends, having in 
 view the Presidential election of 1816, were due many 
 of the military moves during that fateful year of 1814. 
 We can not have an intelligent understanding of the 
 events of the War of 1812, we can not understand 
 aright, or pass a correct judgment on, the event of 
 "The Invasion of the City of Washington," if we do 
 not know of and consider the partisan political forces, 
 the ambition for office, and the fierce feeling and bitter 
 
 41 
 
rivalry between the two political parties of that per- 
 iod, and especially the maneuvers and plottings of and 
 for the two principal candidates for the next nomina- 
 tion for the Presidency by the Republican party. 
 
 This rivalry for the nomination for the Presidency 
 led to certain events just preceding and after the 
 battle near Bladensburg that would be amusing were 
 they not so tragic. An example is Armstrong's leav- 
 ing his office in Washington, where he was needed, 
 to "go into the field" and from there sending others to 
 report to him on the enemy's movements ; and Mon- 
 roe, not to be outdone by the Secretary of War, "going 
 him one better" and actually heading a scouting 
 party! More of this in subsequent pages. 
 
 We may be sure, however, that Monroe never 
 did anything that he had the least thought would be 
 injurious to his country. He was ambitious — nobly 
 ambitious ; he wished to be President— and surely that 
 was neither a weakness nor a crime; but he was al- 
 ways a patriot, whose honesty and sincerity could not 
 be doubted. If ever the history of our country is 
 studied in our schools and homes as it should be, the 
 fame of Monroe will be greater and brighter than it 
 is now, and few indeed among our public men will 
 have more of the respect and gratitude of the Ameri- 
 can people. It was no accident that his administration 
 was such that it soon ushered in "The Era of Good 
 Feeling," in which party lines were almost effaced 
 and in which party feeling almost died out. It was no 
 
 42 
 
accident that when he traveled extensively among the 
 people while he was President, he was received every- 
 where, by all the people, with profound respect and 
 real affection. 
 
 John Armstrong, the Secretary of War, had par- 
 ticipated actively in the War of the Revolution. Born 
 in 1758, he entered the Revolutionary army as a vol- 
 unteer when 18 years of age. He was one of General 
 Mercer's aids at the battle of Princeton and when that 
 general was mortally wounded, it was Armstrong that 
 bore him from the field. Later Armstrong joined the 
 army of General Gates and became a great favorite of 
 that general, and served under him, with the rank of 
 major, until the end of the war. He was a brave and 
 capable soldier. The reputation he gained as a soldier 
 in the war of the Revolution was very creditable — al- 
 though this reputation was dimmed for a time by 
 "the Newburg correspondence," it was soon seen that 
 his part in this affair was dictated by good motives 
 and it added to, rather than detracted from, the high 
 esteem in which he was held in military circles. 
 
 While the Revolutionary Army was encamped at 
 Newburg, N. Y., in the winter of 1782-3, the arrear- 
 ages of pay, which had become really serious, occas- 
 ioned, and reasonably enough, great anxiety among 
 both the private soldiers and the officers. Application 
 for relief was made to congress, but without success. 
 As a result, a meeting of officers for March 11, 1783, 
 to discuss their grievances, was anonymously called 
 
 43 
 
In an anonymous address, the writer of it called on his 
 comrades in arms, in strong language, to refuse to per- 
 form further military duty during the war, and at the 
 conclusion of the war to refuse to lay down their arms 
 until their just demands were satisfied. At once 
 Washington issued a call for a like meeting, for the 
 15th of the same month. Washington, in his call, 
 promised a free discussion of all claims and demands. 
 Immediately another anonymous address was issued, 
 from the same source as the first, in which it was made 
 to appear, to the satisfaction of the author of the ad- 
 dress, that the action of Washington was an approval 
 of the first address. At the meeting on the 15th 
 Washington addressed the officers, with unusual 
 warmth for him and showing great feeling. He as- 
 sured the officers that he wished to aid them in every 
 proper way to secure satisfaction of all their just de- 
 mands, that he would do all that he could to secure 
 that satisfaction, and he begged them not to take the 
 dangerous and extreme action advocated in the anony- 
 mous addresses. His plea to the officers was acknowl- 
 edged by all to be very earnest and well framed, and 
 very eloquent — and so true was this that he gained all 
 that he asked of the officers; and shortly afterwards 
 he obtained from congress action that redressed the 
 grievances of the soldiers, both privates and officers. 
 It was soon known that it was Armstrong that 
 had written these anonymous addresses. While it 
 was equally well known that he had written the ad- 
 
 44 
 
dresses on the request of a large number of his fellow 
 officers, all the blame was put on him. He was very 
 severely blamed. Some did not hesitate to say that 
 what he had done, and what he had advocated, were 
 highly treasonable. Even the mildest and friendliest 
 of his critics pointed out that what he had done and 
 what he had advocated were dangerous insubordination 
 in an army, doubly culpable during a time of actual 
 war. Among his severest critics for a time was Wash- 
 ington himself. One can readily understand that 
 Washington would regard these addresses with ex- 
 treme disfavor. But that illustrious man was first of 
 all just, and in time, when he fully understood all the 
 conditions and circumstances, and had time for care- 
 ful consideration, he changed altogether in his attitude 
 towards Armstrong and was his friend. 
 
 It was not on account of his military achieve- 
 ments or experience, however, that Armstrong was 
 appointed Secretary of War. It would have been too 
 much to expect of the Madison administration that, 
 for this very responsible place when the nation was 
 in the midst of war with the powerful British King- 
 dom, it would select the man best fitted for the place. 
 The Madison administration — and in this it is not 
 singular among the national administrations of the 
 early decades of our national existence or far removed 
 from certain national administrations of our later his- 
 tory — always had in view partisan political conditions, 
 considerations and results. Back of the selection of 
 
 45 
 
Armstrong were political conditions, and Armstrong 
 was made Secretary of War, not because of any espe- 
 cial qualifications for that place, but because his ap- 
 pointment might win political support to the national 
 administration, and also give it aid in naming its favor- 
 ite for President in 1816; especially in two states of 
 much influence in which it needed friends and a friend- 
 ly sentiment — Pennsylvania and New York. Arm- 
 strong was a native of one and a prominent citizen of 
 the other. 
 
 There was a further reason for the selection of 
 Armstrong, political in its nature — as already re- 
 marked, a reason of this nature was reasonably to be 
 expected of the Madison administration ; the War was 
 unpopular in Pennsylvania and New York and the 
 national administration was equally unpopular in 
 those states, and Madison and his advisers believed 
 that by appointing Armstrong the War could be and 
 would be made more popular in both of these import- 
 ant states. Unfortunately, the Madison administra- 
 tion had not learned that the way to make a war — 
 and a national administration conducting the 
 war — popular with the people of the United 
 States, is to put in all positions of direction 
 or command the men best fitted for these positions 
 and that will most ably, energetically and successfully 
 prosecute the war, regardless of all political consider- 
 ations. For the conduct of the nation's affairs during 
 
 46 
 
a war or time of great events, the politicians are too 
 knowing to be wise, too shrewd and cunning to have 
 that foresight which is essential to the greatest suc- 
 cess. 
 
 To understand fully the political reasons for Arm- 
 strong's appointment, we must know a little of his per- 
 sonal history. He was born at Carlisle, Pa. He was 
 a citizen of that state during the war of the Revolu- 
 tion, and subsequently was elected Secretary of State 
 of Pennsylvania and later was a member of the old 
 congress from that state. In November, 1800, he was 
 chosen U. S. Senator from New York. In 1804 he was 
 sent as minister to France and he also acted as minis- 
 ter to Spain. His position in Paris was difficult, and 
 he filled it with real ability. At the outbreak of the 
 War of 1812 he was made a brigadier-general and giv- 
 en command of the important military district which 
 included the city of New York. In 1813 he was ap- 
 pointed Secretary of War. Of his work in that de- 
 partment we are interested in only that which is di- 
 rectly connected with ''The Invasion of the City of 
 Washington," and that properly belongs to subse- 
 quent chapters. As a result of the burning of the na- 
 tional capitol, Armstrong was severely censured ; and 
 because he believed that censure unjust, and because 
 Madison, whom he believed should have acted to re- 
 move that censure, did rather the contrary, he re- 
 signed as Secretary of War not long after "The In- 
 vasion of the City of Washington." During his after 
 
 47 
 
years he made diligent use of his pen. He was much 
 and directly interested in rural pursuits and he wrote 
 two treatises, and excellent ones, on farming and 
 gardening. He wrote a history of the War of 1812, of 
 real value but inevitably showing no small bias. He 
 wrote a very animated criticism of Wilkinson's Me- 
 moirs, a number of biographical sketches, and also 
 partly prepared a history of the War of the Revolu- 
 tion. He died at Red Hook, New York, in 1843. 
 
 It will be seen that his selection, by an adminis- 
 tration that always regarded political conditions, was 
 logical. Wishing never to do any injustice to the hon- 
 est and patriotic, and also able and justly renowned 
 Madison, I wish to say again that because he and his 
 advisers put partisan political advantage so often at 
 the head of the things to be considered, we must not 
 judge him or them as harshly as we properly would 
 had they lived and acted at a later date. Partisan 
 feeling and prejudice and maneuvering were far more 
 highly regarded then than now. Further, the greatest 
 consideration for partisan success might be, at that 
 time, compatible with the purest patriotism— that in- 
 tense desire for political success that led to acts which 
 would now be condemned was then often, and un- 
 doubtedly in the case of Madison was, the result of 
 pure and ardent patriotism. Different modes and de- 
 grees of self government were yet experimental and 
 therefore subjects of academic discussion; and aca- 
 demic discussion always becomes heated and engen- 
 
 48 
 
ders intense feeling rather than the calm considera- 
 tion of facts. The members of the two political par- 
 ties, and which parties were founded on honest, but 
 diverse, beliefs in the capacity of the people to govern 
 themselves, firmly, and often fiercely, believed that the 
 future of the government and of the welfare of the 
 people, depended on the triumph of their party. With 
 the most patriotic impulses and ardor the opposing 
 party was feared and fought. At the distance of more 
 than a hundred years it is easy to see that Madison 
 was too much of a politician and partisan to be a great 
 President; and it is equally clear that he and most of 
 his friends and advisers were partisans because they 
 were patriots — they believed beyond doubt that the 
 success of their party and that for which it stood, was 
 essential to the security, prosperity and happiness of 
 the people ; and to the firm continuance, and wise dis- 
 tribution of powers, of the national and state govern- 
 ments. 
 
 Armstrong was ill-adapted to any executive office. 
 While he was not at all inclined to protracted work, he 
 was yet less disposed to leave details to others. But 
 as an executive officer he failed most because of his ill 
 temper and excessive egotism. He resented sugges- 
 tions from anyone. In most cases the fact that a cer- 
 tain measure was recommended by some one else was 
 to him sufficient reason to oppose it. Apparently he 
 found very little pleasure in life, and of that very little 
 much the greater part came from being churlish and 
 
 49 
 
exceedingly discourteous to those that had business to 
 transact with him. His only argument was that the 
 other party was more than mistaken — what he said he 
 knew to be untrue. The few that saw, during July and 
 August, 1814, what was about to occur and, urged on 
 by patriotic concern, sought to warn Armstrong and, 
 in some cases, to suggest measures of adequate de- 
 fense, had for sole reward contemptuous or abusive 
 words. Because of these unfortunate traits of charac- 
 ter and faults of conduct, it was easy to create public 
 opinion against Armstrong and to have accepted as 
 true the pronouncements of committees and individual 
 members of congress, of newspapers, and of the horde 
 of small public officials, that took the blame for "The 
 Invasion of the City of Washington" away from Mad- 
 ison and Monroe and their lackeys and satellites — 
 where some of it belonged — and put some of it on 
 Armstrong — where some did belong — and on Win- 
 der — where a very little of it may have belonged — and 
 most of it on the common soldiers — where none of it 
 belonged. 
 
 I have consulted several dictionaries and as a re- 
 sult have been forced to the conclusion that the Amer- 
 icans did not have an army at Bladensburg. If the 
 lexicographers are men competent for their work, four 
 things are required to make an army: 
 
 First, a considerable number of men. 
 
 Second, these men armed for war. 
 
 50 
 
Third, these men organized into several classes of 
 divisions. 
 
 Fourth, these men under proper officers. 
 
 At Bladensburg the Americans had assembled a 
 considerable number of men, but it is not altogether 
 true that they were armed for war and they certainly 
 were not organized as an army must be to be an army, 
 and there is no doubt that they were not under proper 
 officers. 
 
 But if the Americans lacked an army, they had 
 four commanders on the field! And all of these four 
 commanders acted independently, each gave orders 
 without consulting the others, and they gave orders 
 direct to the troops, and not through another of the 
 four or the one of the four that had been designated as 
 having the immediate command. If anything has been 
 well settled in matters military, it is that more than one 
 commander is a superfluity plus. Four commanders 
 has yet to be given a name or class in the chapter of 
 "Military Afflictions that are Inevitably Fatal." 
 
 The four commanders at Bladensburg were : 
 
 James Madison, Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
 and Navy of the United States. 
 
 "Colonel" Monroe, Secretary of State, and on oc- 
 casion head of a scouting party. 
 
 John Armstrong, who stated himself to be "late a 
 major-general in the Army of the United States, and 
 Secretary of War." 
 
 51 
 
W. H. Winder, brigadier-general, supposed to be 
 the general in command of the army. 
 
 As has been previously remarked, it would be ex- 
 pecting too much of the Madison administration to ex- 
 pect it to appoint to the command of the soldiers as- 
 sembled for the defense of Washington, the man best 
 fitted for the place because of his military training, 
 ability and achievement. That administration regard- 
 ed everything, even military affairs, from the politi- 
 cian's point of view ; and even in the critical days when 
 the national capital was threatened, political expedi- 
 ency was put above military merit in selecting the 
 commander of the American forces ; and, as in the ap- 
 pointment of Armstrong as Secretary of War, the ap- 
 pointment of Winder was made because it was be- 
 lieved that the first consideration was to make the 
 W T ar (and the national administration) popular, and 
 that the best way to do this was, not to fight the war 
 to a successful conclusion with all the speed that effi- 
 ciency and energy would secure, but to appoint to im- 
 portant commands men closely associated with power- 
 ful politicians or popular in certain states. 
 
 Up to the time Winder was appointed to the com- 
 mand of the newly created military district that in- 
 cluded the City of Washington — a district so created 
 that the plain task of its commander was to assemble, 
 organize, equip and command, with the co-operation 
 of the national administration, an army for the defense 
 of the national capitol — his military experience had 
 
 52 
 
been limited, his military achievements had been hard- 
 ly creditable, and he had given no evidence of any ex- 
 traordinary ability as a commander. He had recently 
 returned from "a long imprisonment in Canada, the 
 consequence of his capture by the enemy during a 
 night attack on our troops under General Chandler at 
 Stony Creek on the 3rd of June, 1813." There were 
 some peculiar features about this capture, and of them 
 some were never explained. Apparently all the facts 
 about this capture were never revealed. Winder's 
 senior in command, General Chandler, was captured at 
 the same time. In the official letter to the command- 
 ing general that reports this occurrence, it is spoken of 
 as "the unfortunate capture of Brigadier-generals 
 Chandler and Winder, who were taken in the action, 
 unknown to any part of the army, and hurried into the 
 enemy's lines." Just how these two generals could be 
 captured "unknown to any part of the army" was nev- 
 er explained. In his report to the Secretary of War, 
 General Dearborn called the capture "a strange fatal- 
 ity." Major-general Morgan Lewis, who succeeded 
 Dearborn, made it appear in a later communication to 
 the War Department that no censure properly rested 
 on General Winder. 
 
 Previous to his appointment as commander of the 
 forces to oppose the British near Washington, Gener- 
 al Winder had never had any important command or 
 an independent command. Not his military experi- 
 
 53 
 
ence or ability, but, as already stated, the expediency 
 of politicians, was responsible for his selection. 
 
 As shown in "The Battle of Plattsburg," the War 
 was unpopular in Maryland — very unpopular among 
 the most intelligent and able people of that state. This 
 included those prominent in political affairs; and we 
 may be sure that this would give deep concern to the 
 Madison administration. The chief, but, of course, not 
 the only reason for the opposition to the War in Mary- 
 land were the efforts, sometimes brutal and nearly al- 
 ways unnecessary, to suppress free speech and a free 
 press. The first blood shed in the War of 1812, as in 
 the Civil War, was American blood shed by Ameri- 
 cans in the city of Baltimore. In the case of the War 
 of 1812, this blood was shed in the effort, by mob 
 methods, to destroy a free press. This occurrence 
 aroused a sentiment that was made bitter by the un- 
 necessary and silly, and at times offensive and treas- 
 onable, measures of officers of the national govern- 
 ment to prohibit free speech and destroy a free press- 
 treasonable because such measures struck directly at 
 those rights and liberties that the people and their an- 
 cestors had fought to obtain and preserve, and on 
 which the government so lately achieved rested as on 
 a foundation. Prosecuting attorneys, full of the fanat- 
 ical zeal of small minds and petty tyrants, and a zeal 
 assumed by spies and traitors, took upon themselves 
 the powers of judges. Judges of like character abused 
 and ridiculed those brought to trial and, reversing the 
 
 54 
 
maxim that the accused is to be considered innocent 
 until proved to be guilty, heaped opprobrium upon the 
 accused as if already convicted and at times acted as 
 judge, jury and prosecuting attorney. Sheriffs and 
 constables arrested citizens without warrants, on sus- 
 picion, and put themselves with the judges and prose- 
 cutors among lawbreakers by treating with contempt 
 the articles of legal procedure that are among the 
 things essential to make the citizen secure in "life, lib- 
 erty and the pursuit of happiness." The result was 
 that bitter feeling — all the more bitter because its ex- 
 pression was so ruthlessly suppressed — that such pro- 
 cedure must inevitably produce among a vigorous, lib- 
 erty loving people descended from those that had 
 formulated the Magna Charta and had promulgated 
 the Declaration of Independence. 
 
 It is only justice to the Madison administration to 
 say that it had often good reason to curb the ut- 
 terances of public speakers and writers. Violently se- 
 ditious and actually treasonable utterances were not 
 rare. Further, when the nation is at war because of 
 the action, according to the national constitution, of 
 the designated officials, war must be taken as the de- 
 liberate act of the nation, and whatever may be the 
 opinion of the individual, his duty as a citizen is plain 
 and it is to refrain from criticism of the decision made 
 to go to war, and to do his share to bring the victory 
 to his nation. The Madison administration may be 
 justly criticised because it confounded the conduct of 
 
 55 
 
the War by the national government with the War it- 
 self and at times prosecuted, and persecuted by illegal 
 methods, those that did not oppose the War or meas- 
 ures to advance it, but criticised the inefficiency and 
 incapacity of the administration in the conduct of the 
 War. What made this all the more effective in arous- 
 ing resentment was the strange leniency of the admin- 
 istration at times which took no notice of really sedi- 
 tious utterances or actions. The Madison administra- 
 tion often permitted greater freedom of speech and of 
 the press than is permitted now. It did not imprison 
 any one for any criticism of the physical appearance of 
 any public official. Among the faults of its attitude 
 toward free speech and a free press were vacillation 
 and inconsistency; and because of this the public re- 
 sentment was all the greater. Also, in those days the 
 people were more jealous of free speech and a free 
 press than they are today. 
 
 The generally unnecessary and sometimes gross- 
 ly illegal measures to suppress free speech and a free 
 press, were more resented in Maryland than in any 
 other part of the country. The feeling that existed in 
 Maryland was shown by the preamble and resolutions 
 adopted by the Maryland legislature, and quoted in 
 The Battle of Plattsburg. 
 
 In the opinion of the national administration, the 
 first step — and the shrewd step of the politician — to 
 protect Washington was to placate the Marylanders 
 by appointing to the command of the army that was 
 
 56 
 
to defend Washington, a Marylander and a relative of 
 the governor of Maryland and bearing the same name ! 
 Hence Winder. 
 
 As regards the appointment of Winder, General 
 Armstrong was undoubtedly right* when he wrote in 
 his "Notices" (in two volumes) : 
 
 "The error of first occurrence in this campaign be- 
 longs exclusively to the administration, and will be 
 found in the selection made of a commanding general, 
 not on the ground of distinguished professional ser- 
 vice or knowledge, but simply on a presumption that, 
 'being a native of Maryland, and a relative of the-gov- 
 ernor, Brigadier-general Winder would be useful in 
 mitigating the opposition to the War, and in giving in- 
 creased efficiency to the national measures within the 
 limits of the state ;' an opinion which, though some- 
 what plausible, was wholly unsustained by the event." 
 More will be said of General Winder in subse- 
 quent chapters. It may properly, and justly, be ob- 
 served here that the task put on him was very diffi- 
 cult; and, with James Madison for President and Mon- 
 roe and Armstrong occupying the offices they did, it 
 was impossible. Winder was not without military 
 ability ; he was energetic, earnest and exceedingly in- 
 dustrious ; and he was patriotic. If he had been a Ma- 
 comb or a Jackson, and — even more important — could 
 have done something similar to Dewey's cutting the 
 
 *See Annals of Congress, 1st and 2nd sessions of the 
 14th Congress. 
 
 57 
 
cable, and thus have rid himself of the interference and 
 contrary purposes of Madison, Monroe and Arm- 
 strong, he would not only have defeated the British 
 army that fought at Bladensburg, but would have an- 
 nihilated or captured it. 
 
 Possibly the reader will be surprised that space 
 be given here to General James Wilkinson. He was 
 not in command of any part of the forces assembled 
 for the defense of Washington. In fact, during July 
 and August, 1814, he was under arrest and awaiting 
 trial by court-martial. Before this he had been ac- 
 cused of treason, had been tried, and acquitted, and 
 then given command of all the armies of the United 
 States. The expedition he had commanded on the 
 northern frontier during the War had been a failure ; 
 but if every one in command of forces on the northern 
 frontier that had not been victorious, had been court- 
 martialed, there would have been real need of the War 
 Department doing what it did without need when 
 Wilkinson was court-martialed ; go beyond the law 
 and appoint an assistant prosecutor — rather, an acting 
 principal prosecutor — whose appointment was illegal. 
 But Madison's administration has probably not been 
 the only one some of the officials of which have come 
 to believe themselves so wise and exalted that they 
 were far above the laws of their country. Notwith- 
 standing that he had been accused of drunkenness, of 
 obscenity, of insubordination, and of inefficiency, when 
 in a highly important position of command, and was 
 
 58 
 
under arrest, it is certain that both Madison and Arm- 
 strong consulted Wilkinson when the capital was 
 threatened — and gave no heed to his advice ; yet on 
 account of his aggressive character as well as his high 
 reputation as a military man, his recommendations in- 
 fluenced others, including officers in the army assem- 
 bled to defend Washington, and both before and after 
 "The Invasion of the City of Washington," he had, in 
 shaping events and moulding public opinion, as much 
 real influence as Armstrong and much more than Win- 
 der. Doubtless one reason why in the summer of 1814 
 he was not, at the least, ignored by Madison and the 
 administration, was that he was a Marylander, and 
 had influential family and political connections. He 
 was born in Calvert county, Maryland. He declared 
 his great satisfaction, gratitude and pride in "the acci- 
 dental circumstance of birth" having been, in his case, 
 in "the urbane, loyal, generous, gallant state of Mary- 
 land!" His birthplace was about three miles from 
 "the decayed village" of Benedict, made prominent in 
 connection with the destruction of Washington by the 
 debarkation of the British detachment under com- 
 mand of Major-general Ross which fought at Bladens- 
 burg and burned the national capitol. He was justi- 
 fied in claiming that his family was "ancient and re- 
 spectable." His ancestors were all English and the 
 earliest of them to come to America reached Maryland 
 in the sixteenth century. His mother was a noble- 
 minded woman that he fervently loved and deeply re- 
 
 59 
 
vered. When twelve years of age he made his first 
 notable journey "to the town of Baltimore, for the pur- 
 pose of being inoculated for the smallpox. This dis- 
 ease in the natural way, was as frightful in those days 
 as the plague in London in the year 1665, and inocula- 
 tion was considered an occult art, professed at that 
 period in the Southern states by a Doctor Stevenson 
 only, who by his success acquired great celebrity." He 
 "read the Latin classics, and studied the inferior 
 branches of mathematics" under a private tutor. He 
 was "put to the study of medicine" under an eminent 
 physician who had served during the war of 1756, and 
 delighted to recount the defeat of Braddock at Pitts- 
 burg and Wolfe's victory on the Plains of Abraham. 
 In his seventeenth year he was sent to the medical 
 school in Philadelphia. He had begun the practice of 
 medicine in Maryland when "the abortive enterprise 
 of General Gage against the town of Concord in Mass- 
 achusetts, on the 19th of April," caused him to shoul- 
 der "a firelock in Georgetown, Potomack" — now the 
 District of Columbia. He was a member of "an inde- 
 pendent company, commanded by Captain Thomas 
 Richardson, a Quaker, from Rhode Island." He re- 
 sided "thirty miles from the place of parade, but was 
 punctual to the rendezvous" — the company was drilled 
 once a week. 
 
 The foregoing is given space, because at the time 
 of the Chesapeake expedition General Wilkinson was, 
 as already indicated, a man of such consequence, had 
 
 60 
 
such a place in the public eye, and his criticisms had 
 such consideration, that we may well know this much 
 of his family, education and early attainments. But at 
 least as strong a reason for giving space to these facts 
 about him, are the glimpses they give of the conditions 
 of life and popular thought and feeling at that period. 
 For example, consider that the independent company 
 to which the young Doctor Wilkinson attached him- 
 self was commanded and drilled by a Quaker, and 
 from Rhode Island! What was it that put into the 
 hearts of all real men the fierce desire to fight that 
 would not be denied? At that time liberty meant 
 much less and also much more to the plain people than 
 it means today. It meant enough to overcome the most 
 intense and fanatical religious beliefs, the beliefs of 
 martyrs. The Mennonite ancestors of the author were 
 hunted like wild beasts, were murdered and tortured 
 and starved and driven into the mountain refuges of 
 Switzerland, because they would not bear arms. In 
 war they could see only wholesale murder — a violation 
 of the command, "Thou shalt not kill." They preferred 
 torture, starvation and death to that eternal hell fire 
 that was the inevitable reward of the murderer. Yet 
 when they had come to America and the news came of 
 Lexington and Concord, they changed their opinion 
 about war and hell fire. Did something tell them that 
 to fight and die for liberty for their children and neigh- 
 bors on earth might be an exceedingly good argument 
 with St. Peter for admission to heaven? At any rate, 
 
 61 
 
everyone of them, some boys and some old men, 
 fought for the Revolution ; and the younger ones of 
 them, if yet alive, fought again in the War of 1812. 
 What was true of them was true of thousands ; and 
 this must be considered — not a few in the forces of 
 the War of 1812 were veterans of the War of the Rev- 
 olution. They were not cowards. They fought with 
 their sons and the sons of brave soldiers of the Rev- 
 olution. These sons were not cowards. That ardor 
 for Opportunity and Liberty that made the Quaker 
 and the Mennonite into soldiers, and soldiers that im- 
 printed their unconquerable devotion with the blood 
 of their bare feet, on the snow and frozen ground of 
 winter, had not cooled, nor was it lacking in the hearts 
 of their sons, in the days of "Our Second War of In- 
 dependence." 
 
 When news of the attack "at Breed's hill, the 17th 
 of June," reached Doctor Wilkinson, he determined 
 "not to await the tardy proceedings of committees and 
 conventions, then engaged in organizing a regiment; 
 but, unrestrained by the admonitions of friends and re- 
 lations," he abandoned his "profession forever," and, 
 at his own expense, "repaired to the camp before Bos- 
 ton, and as a volunteer, joined the rifle corps under the 
 gallant Colonel William Thompson of Pennsylvania." 
 
 For further biography of Wilkinson the reader is 
 referred to the encyclopedias. It will be found that he 
 was accused of meanness and high crimes, that he was 
 
 62 
 
tried for treason and acquitted; that many believed 
 him to be a traitor, and some, at least, were sure that 
 he was a patriot. The truth doubtless is that he was 
 unduly ambitious, that by some his attainments were 
 over-rated, and that his crimes and misdemeanors 
 were, at the least, greatly exaggerated. He lacked di- 
 plomacy and cunning, and he lived during a period of 
 intrigue, cabal, and practices of public officials that 
 now would not be tolerated; when those that ex- 
 pressed the loftiest ideas of patriotism, in beautiful 
 language, were constantly guilty of treachery to the 
 public interests as well as to friends, in order to fur- 
 ther personal ambitions. To understand those times 
 and the public men and the masses of those times, we 
 must remember that there were no public schools in 
 half of the states, and where they did exist they had 
 deteriorated for more than fifty years ; there were no 
 railroads or telegraphs ; there were few newspapers, 
 with few readers ; the people were easily led and mis- 
 led by violent language, and were narrow-minded and 
 fanatical ; the people travelled little ; very few of the 
 masses wrote or received letters ; ministers occasion- 
 ally got drunk without much or any scandal ; some 
 people were yet in doubt about women having souls ; 
 there was much preaching, praying, fasting and im- 
 morality ; and the degree of honesty and the regard for 
 the public welfare expected of public officials were not 
 r-.uch higher than prevailed to a considerable extent 
 
 63 
 
for some years lately terminated, and to some limited 
 extent may yet prevail, among the officials of railways 
 and other big corporations. 
 
 If only justly accused, and judged by the stand- 
 ards of his time, Wilkinson would probably be pro- 
 nounced a good citizen. What concerns us is that he 
 was a student of strategy and tactics, his military 
 ability was by many very highly regarded, and, in 
 truth, his criticisms of military affairs and actions 
 were, when stripped of his violent prejudices, often in- 
 telligent and valuable. It would only weary the reader 
 to transfer to these pages his minute and technical criti- 
 cism of the American military operations against the 
 Chesapeake expedition. We are not now intei ?sted 
 in the exact location in which he would have posted 
 this company or that detachment. Any unprejudiced 
 student of the military operations in the vicinity of 
 Washington will reach the conclusion, however, that 
 Wilkinson's strategy and tactics were the strategy and 
 tactics that should have been used. Further, he was 
 able to show that he had advocated this strategy and 
 these tactics some weeks in advance of the destruction 
 of the capitol, and had not waited to announce them 
 until after that event. 
 
 This chapter cannot be better or more fittingly 
 closed than with the following extract from Wilkin- 
 son's "Memoirs" — published in three bulky, but inter- 
 esting, volumes: 
 
 "Cicero says that 'it is the first law of history that 
 64 
 
the writer shall neither dare to advance what is false, 
 nor to suppress what is true ; that he shall relate the 
 facts with strict impartiality, free from ill will or fa- 
 vor; that his narrative should distinguish the order of 
 time, and, when necessary, give the description of 
 places ; that he should unfold the statesman's motives, 
 and in his accounts of the transactions and events, in- 
 terpose his own judgment ; and should not only relate 
 what was done, but how it was done, and what share 
 chance, or rashness, or prudence had in the issue : that 
 he should give the characters of the leading men, their 
 weight and influence, their passions, their principles, 
 and conduct through life.' " 
 
 65 
 
5. 
 
 HAVING EYES, SEE NOT. 
 
 The national authorities had ample warning of an 
 attack on the national capital. In the early spring of 
 1813 Admiral Cockburn entered the Chesapeake with 
 a considerable naval force, including marines. On 
 April 24th of that year he destroyed the military equip- 
 ments and munitions stored at Frenchtown, near the 
 head of the bay. This was followed by the pillage and 
 destruction of private property for some weeks, when 
 Cockburn descended the bay to join Admiral Warren, 
 who had arrived with naval reinforcements, more ma- 
 rines, and the "Chasseurs Brittanniques" — a corps 
 composed very largely of foreign renegades and ruf- 
 fians, all the officers, however, being British. On the 
 22nd of June the attempt was made on Craney Island 
 and on the 25th and the following night occurred the 
 horrors of Hampton. About the middle of July Admi- 
 ral Warren entered the Potomac with a considerable 
 force, took possession of Blackstone's Island, and took 
 soundings as high up as Kettle Bottoms. This indi- 
 
 66 
 
cated an attack on the national capital. At that time 
 there was no defense'of the national capital, by land 
 or water, that could have withstood five hundred mod- 
 erately good troops fairly well equipped; yet the 
 House Committee on Military Affairs, to which had 
 been referred a motion of Mr. Stuart, a veteran of the 
 Revolution, to distribute arms and embody the mili- 
 tia of the district, reported : "That they have examined 
 into the state of preparation, naval and military, made 
 to receive the enemy, and are satisfied that the prepa- 
 ration is, in every respect, adequate to the emergency, 
 and that no measures are necessary on the part of the 
 House to make it more complete." 
 
 As a matter of fact, no preparations whatever had 
 been made to receive the enemy. That a committee of 
 the House should make such a report when the condi- 
 tions were such as they were, would be unbelieveable 
 were it not that at a more recent date in our history 
 a committee of congress has actually accomplished as 
 fine a whitewashing report to shield and please as in- 
 competent a cabinet officer as the Secretary of War 
 July 15, 1813. 
 
 Mr. Stuart made his motion one day and the Com- 
 mittee on Military Affairs made its report early the 
 next day. It could not have made any investigation 
 beyond Washington. Probably its report was written 
 in the office of the Secretary of War, if not by him. 
 
 There is much in the official management of the 
 
 67 
 
War of 1812 to be studied with profit — not to reveal 
 that which is to be followed, but that which is to be 
 avoided. 
 
 Fortunately for us, that the national capital was 
 as defenseless as it was ; that the national administra- 
 tion was as feeble and innocuous, while wise in its own 
 conceit, as it was ; and that congress was as subservi- 
 ent and lazy as it was; were so altogether incredible 
 that the British commanders had no suspicion of the 
 real conditions. 
 
 In the autumn the British forces left the Chesa- 
 peake. There was rather free intercourse between the 
 British forces and the inhabitants of the country near 
 the Chesapeake and as a result those inhabitants were 
 certain that the British intended to return the next 
 Spring. The national administration was equally cer- 
 tain that the British would not return. It refused to 
 do anything to defend the Potomac or to provide a 
 land force to defend Washington, Baltimore and An- 
 napolis. The President, the Secretary of State, and the 
 Secretary of War, were very busy with political strat- 
 egy and tactics. The nomination for the Presidency 
 and the financial, political and military fortunes of 
 friends, were of more concern than the successful pros- 
 ecution of the war and the safety of the country ; and 
 to silence the people and troublesome critics it was 
 easier and more agreeable to accuse them of sedition 
 and to abuse and scare, and possibly arrest and impris- 
 
 68 
 
on them without trial, than to gather, equip and train 
 troops and give the thought and energy necessary to 
 co-ordinate in the management of the war. 
 
 The danger to the capital was imminent. But in 
 the language of Wilkinson, used in his Memoirs and 
 quoted by Williams (the most intelligent and judi- 
 cious of all that wrote books on the War of 1812), the 
 administration acted, or, more correctly stated, refused 
 to act, and continued to speculate, as if the war were, 
 as the then Secretary of War went on record, "at a 
 thousand miles distance." If any one knew of the state 
 of defense of the capital at that time, it was Williams, 
 and he says: 
 
 "Throughout the whole boundary-line of the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia there was not a single point forti- 
 fied ; not a redoubt, dike or ditch ; not a solitary piece 
 of artillery ; not a single battalion of regular soldiers ; 
 not one company of militia or volunteers properly 
 armed, equipped, and disciplined." 
 
 Early in March, 1814, the British, as anticipated, 
 returned to the Chesapeake in some force and renewed 
 their depredations. The British had five vessels of 
 war, which were reinforced from time to time. Their 
 force was so superior to the American flotilla, com- 
 manded by the able and brave Commodore Barney, 
 and bottled up in St. Leonard's Creek, that the nation- 
 al administration ordered its destruction ; but just in 
 time to save it, a plan of Colonel Wadsworth, head of 
 the ordnance department, was put into successful exe- 
 
 69 
 
cution, and with the aid of two 18-pounders on land, 
 the flotilla forced the British to fall down the river and 
 this permitted Barney to proceed up to Benedict. And 
 Wadsworth, instead of gaining merited credit, was ac- 
 tually discredited ! Partisan politics were weightier 
 than military merit. 
 
 However, nothing was done to provide defenses 
 for the national capital, or Baltimore, or Annapolis. 
 Apparently to every intelligent person except the 
 President, his Cabinet, and satellites, it was plain that 
 the British would attack points in the Chesapeake ter- 
 ritory with strong forces. As early as April 6, 1814, 
 it was known in this country that events in Europe 
 would permit Great Britain to send to our shores her 
 veteran armies from Spain and France. The entrance 
 of the allied armies into Paris March 30th and the ac- 
 cession of Louis XVIII, were published in the Wash- 
 ington papers May 18th. Yet the national administra- 
 tion continued to slumber ; and with stubborn refusal 
 to see what was obvious to many, actually repelled the 
 aid that the patriotic people of the District were anx- 
 ious to give. The truth of the foregoing is nicely 
 shown by the treatment of Alexandria, which will be 
 recounted in a future volume on "The Birth of the 
 Star Spangled Banner." 
 
 General Armstrong and others sought, after the 
 War, to excuse the national administration by saying 
 that it had no official information of the pacification 
 of Europe until the 26th of June. Such an excuse is, 
 
 70 
 
of course, worse than silence, for it is only evidence of 
 culpability. Of course if General Armstrong had 
 found robbers breaking into his house he would not 
 have done anything whatever until the robbers had 
 sent him in writing, properly sealed, official informa- 
 tion that they had robbed his neighbor. 
 
 One may get a good idea of the strange notions 
 entertained in the year 1814 in Washington — and not 
 dissimilar from the notions entertained there at more 
 recent dates — by considering the following from the 
 Memoirs of General Wilkinson, who had been a sol- 
 dier all his adult life, had been given the highest posi- 
 tion in the army, had been governor of Louisiana, and, 
 while he cordially hated Madison, yet held such pa- 
 cific notions as these : 
 
 "If such doctrines" — which Wilkinson had just 
 quoted with approval — "apply to the local and politi- 
 cal circumstances of Great Britain, how much more 
 applicable are they to those of this country; the for- 
 mer within arm's length of a great, powerful, and rival 
 nation, called her natural enemy, the latter three thou- 
 sand miles removed* from every rival power; but be- 
 cause the neighboring despots of Europe, whose es- 
 tates join, and are ever engaged in controversies, find 
 it political in time of peace to prepare for war, by 
 building up today what was knocked down yesterday, 
 or in this year to supply the place of mercenaries 
 
 *In Wilkinson's mind war was sure to be "three thou- 
 sand miles away." 
 
 71 
 
whose throats have been cut the last, we, blindly and 
 falsely, apply the same reason to our situation 
 
 No ! although a soldier from early 
 
 youth, and holding every honorable military man as a 
 brother, I contend it were better the United States 
 should run the hazard of suffering a year or two, in 
 the commencement of every war, if wars they must 
 have, until they can give form, consistency, and ex- 
 perience to their levies, than that they should permit 
 institutions, which ever have been, and will ever con- 
 tinue to be, dangerous to civil liberty." 
 
 And that was written after the War of 1812! 
 
 The baleful, dangerous "institutions" referred to 
 were "an invalid corps, ostensibly to provide for mili- 
 tary unfortunates;" "three military academies;" "to 
 increase the standing army ;" and "to saddle the people 
 with a national university, on a site so insalubrious, 
 that the great public functionaries find it necessary an- 
 nually to abandon their public duties three months out 
 of twelve. A national university at the city of Wash- 
 ington within the purlieus of the court!" The quota- 
 tions are from Wilkinson's Memoirs. 
 
 At last, but not until 1814! the President became 
 suspicious that Great Britain was not maintaining 
 such a military force in the Chesapeake simply to steal 
 tobacco, poultry and hogs, and to terrorize the people 
 — to make, as was freely said, by terrorizing methods 
 the war as unpopular as possible among the outraged 
 people. The British did not yet know the Americans : 
 
 72 
 
Havre de Grace, Frenchtown, Georgetown, Frederick- 
 town, Hampton — all this, instead of making the people 
 disposed to yield to the British, made them only the 
 more disposed to fight. Only the national administra- 
 tion had remained undisturbed. There is good evi- 
 dence that after the British outrages of 1813 on the 
 Chesapeake, a thousand citizens of Washington and 
 Georgetown formed a legion of volunteers, and in due 
 form "petitioned" the President to organize them. He 
 graciously authorized the choice of officers; "but when 
 the names were sent in he refused to commission them, 
 for what reason remains a secret; and thus President 
 Madison prevented the establishment of a corps, which 
 had actually been enrolled, officered, equipped, and, 
 except the rifle companies, completely armed." It was, 
 therefore, quite a reversal of previous position when 
 on June 30th, 1814, President Madison sent to the 
 members of his cabinet a note requesting them to meet 
 him at the White House at noon the next day "to con- 
 sult them on the measures which it would be proper 
 to adopt for the safety of this city and district." 
 
 But note the date, June 30th, 1814! Fifteen 
 months after the British had begun to occupy the wa- 
 ters and the land of the immediate vicinity! Just three 
 months after the allied armies had entered Paris! Six 
 weeks after it was known in Washington that Great 
 Britain had a free hand in her war with the United 
 States ! 
 
 73 
 
6. 
 
 A CABINET MEETING. 
 
 As for what occurred at the consultation of the 
 President with his Cabinet July 1, 1814, we must go 
 to the reports made of that meeting by the members 
 of the Cabinet that attended it, in their letters to the 
 committee of congress appointed to inquire into the 
 causes of the capture of Washington. 
 
 In his letter to the committee named, Mr. Monroe, 
 Secretary of State, said that "the President convened 
 the heads of department and the attorney-general to 
 consult them on the measures which it would be prop- 
 er to adopt for the safety of this city (Washington) 
 and district. He appeared to have digested a plan of 
 the force to be called immediately into the field ; the 
 additional force to be kept under orders to march at a 
 moment's notice ; its composition, and necessary equip- 
 ment. It seemed to be his object that some position 
 should be taken between the Eastern Branch and the 
 Patuxent with two or three thousand men, and that 
 an additional force of ten or twelve thousand, includ- 
 
 74 
 
ing the militia of the District, should be in readiness 
 in the neighboring states to march when called on; 
 the whole force to be put under the command of an 
 officer of the regular army. The measures suggested 
 by the President were approved by all the members of 
 the administration." 
 
 The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Jones, wrote that 
 "the President stated the object of the meeting to be 
 consideration of the menacing aspect of things, in con- 
 sequence of the augmented power of the enemy by the 
 great political changes which had taken place in Eu- 
 rope, and the disposition manifested by the govern- 
 ment and people of Great Britain to prosecute the war 
 with the most vindictive and devastating spirit; rep- 
 resented the motives and inducements which he con- 
 ceived the enemy had to prefer the invasion of the cap- 
 ital rather than any other immediate enterprise; and 
 urged the necessity of speedy and efficient preparation 
 for the defense of the District and capital ; inquired in- 
 to the existing state of its military and naval defenses, 
 and the extent of the disposable force which it would 
 be practicable to concentrate in the District. The Sec- 
 retary of War estimated the disposable regular force 
 applicable to the intended purpose, to the best of my 
 recollection, at about twelve hundred, including about 
 two hundred cavalry at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, who, I 
 think he said, were not all mounted, but would prob- 
 ably be so in a short time. The Secretary of the Navy 
 enumerated the naval force within immediate reach as 
 
 75 
 
follows: The marines at headquarters, about 120; the 
 force attached to the flotilla under the command of 
 Commodore Barney, on the Patuxent, 500; total 620. 
 To the regular force, the President proposed to add 
 ten thousand militia, to be designated and held in read- 
 iness in such neighboring districts as should be found 
 most convenient. He also suggested the propriety of 
 depositing at a suitable place, contiguous to the me- 
 tropolis, a supply of arms, ammunition and camp 
 equipage. These propositions produced very little dis- 
 cussion. The propriety and expediency of the meas- 
 ures appeared to be admitted, though no formal ques- 
 tion was taken, nor was any dissent expressed." 
 
 Here we may well stop to note certain facts. First, 
 there was "very little discussion." The probability 
 that the enemy would attack the capital and the cer- 
 tainty that the force to defend it was altogether inade- 
 quate, seem to have caused only a languid interest on 
 the part of the gentlemen assembled, and who might 
 be thought to have something to do with the defense 
 of the capital and the conduct of the War. 
 
 Second, "no formal question was taken." No defi- 
 nite, positive conclusion to act was reached. Mr. 
 Jones continues that "the meeting separated with the 
 understanding that the measures proposed were to be 
 carried into effect." It was only an understanding — 
 not definite, not positive. Apparently the matter was 
 not of sufficient importance to stir the lethargic gen- 
 tlemen even so far as to think with considerable vigor, 
 
 76 
 
not to speak of something so laborious as reaching a 
 definite conclusion or positive action. By the first of 
 July the weather is hot and oppressive in Washington, 
 and in 1814 the most important employment of cabinet 
 and congress was maneuvering for political advantage. 
 
 Third, the force at hand for the defense of the cap- 
 ital — or Baltimore or Annapolis — was only a rather 
 small fraction of what any real knowledge of condi- 
 tions would have shown to be the least that could 
 prove adequate. 
 
 Fourth, the President led the way, not only in 
 stating the danger, but in submitting plans. More of 
 this hereafter. 
 
 The Attorney-General, Mr. Rush, wrote: "On the 
 30th of June, the heads of departments were desired to 
 meet at the President's house on the following day 
 Our public affairs were brought into discussion * * * 
 The President mentioned what I had heard him indi- 
 vidually express before relative to Washington, stat- 
 ing his impressions unequivocally to be, that if it fell 
 within the plans of the enemy to send troops for opera- 
 tion upon the Atlantic frontiers this season, he thought 
 the capital would be marked as the most inviting ob- 
 ject of a speedy attack; that it would be right forth- 
 with to put in train measures of precaution and de- 
 fense. He then declared that to him it appeared that 
 a force of ten thousand men should be got in readiness 
 for the city and District ; that it would be desirable to 
 have as large a portion of it as practicable regular 
 
 77 
 
troops, but that, at the least, there should be a thou- 
 sand of this description, and more if more could be ob- 
 tained. That the residue should be made up of the 
 volunteers arid militia of the District of Columbia, 
 combined with that from the parts nearest adjacent of 
 Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. That conven- 
 ient depots of arms and military equipage should be 
 established. No dissent was expressed to these opin- 
 ions of the President." 
 
 I have reserved the Secretary of War to the last. 
 General Armstrong — the rival of Monroe for the nom- 
 ination for the Presidency in 1816 — wrote: "The ques- 
 tions proposed for discussion were two: 1st. By what 
 means can the seat of government and Baltimore be 
 defended, in case the enemy should make these cities 
 objects of attack? 2nd. Should he select the former, 
 will his approach be made by way of the Potomac or 
 by that of the Patuxent? On these questions I took 
 the liberty of offering the following statements and 
 opinions: 1st. That the principal defense to be relied 
 upon for either place was militia ; that, besides 
 artillerists comprising the garrisons of Fort M'Henry 
 and Washington, about one thousand regular troops 
 only could be collected ***** fa^t the number of 
 militia called into service should be proportioned to 
 the known or probable strength of the enemy, and be 
 taken from the states of Virginia, Maryland and Penn- 
 sylvania; that it is not believed the enemy will hazard 
 a blow at either place with a force less than five thou- 
 
 78 
 
sand men ; that, to repel one of this extent, we should 
 at least require double that number of militia." Gen- 
 eral Armstrong writes at length of the proper naval 
 defense of the Potomac, etc. 
 
 It will be observed that General Armstrong's let- 
 ter, as quoted, indicates that the views expressed and 
 the plans proposed were his, and not the President's. 
 In this he differs from the others. 
 
 This would lack the importance to be mentioned 
 were it not that it shows the rivalry and division 
 among the members of the national administration. 
 This rivalry and jealousy was largely responsible for 
 the failure to take proper and effective measures of de- 
 fense of Washington; it was largely responsible for 
 the failures of the War and the feebleness of its prose- 
 cution ; it was largely responsible for a good many 
 wounds and a good many deaths among our brave 
 soldiers. 
 
 There are three against Armstrong alone: the 
 chances are three to one that the plans were those of 
 the President. The probabilities are yet greater, for, 
 as Williams said, "Mr. Madison made no pretensions 
 to military science." Major Williams thought that be- 
 cause of this the President had consulted some mili- 
 tary friend and had derived the plans from him. Major 
 Williams conjectured that this friend was Colonel 
 Monroe. A conclusion opposite to that reached by 
 Williams is the more reasonable. History shows that 
 it is the public man who knows the least about mili- 
 
 79 
 
tary science or strategy that is often the most ready to 
 formulate military plans and advocate military cam- 
 paigns. There is, however, more than a possibility 
 that the plans proposed by President Madison were 
 derived from his Secretary of War. The Secretary of 
 War and the Secretary of State being rivals for the 
 next nomination for the Presidency, they were natur- 
 ally antagonistic to each other in more ways than one, 
 they were envious and jealous of each other, and both 
 were continually trying to become more popular, to 
 advocate those things and to do those things that 
 would please the populace. The opinions expressed 
 by their contemporaries are so conflicting that one can 
 only conjecture the feeling the President had for Mon- 
 roe and Armstrong. It is the most probable that 
 President Madison sincerely admired and liked his 
 Secretary of State while fearing, yet not having the 
 highest respect for, his Secretary of War. It is cer- 
 tain, however, that he frequently consulted his Secre- 
 tary of War — but rarely heeded his recommendations. 
 If the President had obtained the plans for the defense 
 of Washington from Armstrong or if the plans were 
 advanced by Armstrong, Monroe and the Secretary 
 of the Navy and the Attorney-General would have 
 preferred to give the credit to Madison, and it is cer- 
 tain that for these plans and everything else they 
 would give as little credit as they well could to the 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 It is to be considered further that the letters to 
 
 80 
 
the committee of congress were written after the de- 
 struction of the capital, when every one was trying to 
 put the blame and humiliation on some one else, and 
 when nearly every one else of the national administra- 
 tion was trying to put the blame on the Secretary of 
 War. Monroe, Jones and Rush would be exceedingly 
 loath to write that July 1st the Secretary of War had 
 proposed plans for the defense of Washington. 
 
 The sympathies of the writer are almost sure to 
 be with the loser. He has not been able to escape the 
 conclusion that some injustice was done Armstrong 
 when the destruction of Washington was used to dis- 
 credit and almost disgrace him and certainly to put the 
 Presidency forever far from him. Yet it was said that 
 if it was easy to make the people believe that he had 
 not advanced plans for the defense of Washington 
 July 1st, or even later, or that it was easy to make him 
 unpopular, his conduct, and especially his man- 
 ners, were to blame. He was "cold and re- 
 pulsive." ''His peculiar temper and turn of 
 mind were supposed to be entirely uncongen- 
 ial with the official and confidential relations 
 in which he must necessarily stand with the Presi- 
 dent." His appointment to the War Department oc- 
 casioned much surprise. For various reasons, after 
 the resignation of Mr. Eustis as Secretary of War, the 
 President found it really difficult to get any one accept- 
 able to him to take the place. Several prominent and 
 able men, offered the place, declined it. At this junc- 
 
 81 
 
ure General Armstrong was recommended to the 
 President by friends in whose judgment Mr. Madison 
 had confidence. The President had good reason to be- 
 lieve that General Armstrong had the ability and the 
 military knowledge and experience to fill the place sat- 
 isfactorily. Unfortunately he did not know of the pe- 
 culiar temper and disagreeable manners of General 
 Armstrong or else he chose to ignore them. The sen- 
 ate did not ignore them and General Armstrong was 
 confirmed by a bare majority. It was almost, or quite, 
 a tragedy that time developed that the freakish temper 
 and natural stubborness of General Armstrong made 
 him disposed to oppose what others advocated, to de- 
 ride what others advanced, and to adhere to his opin- 
 ions when it was all too plain to others that those opin- 
 ions were wrong. 
 
 It is not strange, therefore, that it was possible to 
 make General Armstrong as well as the militia — who 
 were only common people — the scapegoats after the 
 destruction of the capital ; as it was only to be expect- 
 ed that General Armstrong would maintain longer 
 than any one else that the British did not intend to at- 
 tack Washington, and delayed until too late any effec- 
 tive measures for the defense of the capital. 
 
 The attitude of the Secretary of War is doubtless 
 correctly set forth in what follows from General Wil- 
 kinson's "Memoirs": 
 
 "It appears from the best information I have been 
 82 
 
able to obtain, that towards the end of June, 1814, 
 President Madison had conceived the idea that the en- 
 emy might make the capital an object of attack, and 
 that advices received from Messrs. Bayard and Galla- 
 tin the 26th of the month, confirmed his suspicions ; in 
 consequence of which, he on the 1st of July, submitted 
 to his Cabinet a plan for immediately calling 2,000 or 
 3,000 men into the field, and holding ten or twelve 
 thousand militia and volunteers, of the neighboring 
 states, in readiness to reinforce that corps. It seems 
 also that he suggested the plan of taking a position, 
 somewhere between the Eastern Branch and the Pa- 
 tuxent, and that this proposition was not objected to 
 * * * * * there are abundant existing evidences, of 
 applications made to the executive by individuals and 
 by corporate bodies, as well posterior as anterior to 
 this convention of the Cabinet, on the subject, of the 
 defense of the city, to which no satisfactory answer 
 could be obtained. I understand that to the earnest in- 
 quiries of two gentlemen, of the first intelligence, re- 
 spectability, and fortune in the District, after listening 
 to the expression of their apprehensions, the Secretary 
 of War laconically replied, 'I don't believe there is any 
 danger.' " 
 
 Before we dismiss the meeting of the President's 
 cabinet July 1, 1814, we should consider that with the 
 exception of Monroe, the members of that Cabinet 
 were not men of the first rank in ability or force 
 
 83 
 
of character. Naturally Monroe would not favor the 
 prominence of a cabinet position to any one that might 
 gain troublesome popularity. But doubtless he found 
 no need of argument with Madison to have maintained 
 a cabinet that could not, in any place, become danger- 
 ous. Madison, though one of the very greatest men in 
 the history of this nation, was not great throughout 
 his character. He lacked that greatness, the breadth 
 and perfection of greatness, seen in Washington and 
 Lincoln, that chose, for the furtherance and security 
 of a great cause, the intimate service of the ablest, 
 most forceful contemporaries, though they might have 
 been — and yet were — rivals and critics. Madison pre- 
 ferred for cabinet ministers those that would seek in- 
 structions and heed suggestions, rather than men that 
 would think and act with ability and force for them- 
 selves. The members of his cabinet present at the not- 
 able meeting July 1, 1814, should not be harshly criti- 
 cised because they did not discuss the plan submitted 
 for the defense of Washington or because they accept- 
 ed that plan by implication: that the plan was sug- 
 gested by the President or was approved by him, was 
 all that they cared to know — and that was just the at- 
 titude the President desired. It was unfortunate for 
 his country that Madison did not feel the need of the 
 counsel and activities of the very ablest and most 
 forceful of his fellow citizens, regardless of political 
 party or personal feeling, for the United States was at 
 
 84 
 
war with its overmatch. Only the very greatest feel 
 the need, and are ready to acknowledge the need, of the 
 very best help they can get when great issues are put 
 to the decision of war — as when a Lincoln joins with 
 him such men as Seward, Chase and Stanton. 
 
 85 
 
7. 
 
 CERTAIN CONDITIONS CONSIDERED. 
 
 We wil 1 all certainly agree with Cicero and others 
 that the historian must write down much more than 
 the events. Justice to the dead that participated in 
 the events written about and especially justice to the 
 readers of what is written, demand that the writer 
 give such information beyond the mere recital of facts 
 as will enable the reader to judge people and events 
 correctly. Hence the reader must know of the public 
 opinions and morals, of the material and spiritual con- 
 dition of the people, and of the inherited and inevita- 
 bly acquired characteristics of the persons of promi- 
 nence. 
 
 On the shoulders of President Madison must be 
 laid so very much of the responsibility for the course 
 of the War — he had a subservient congress as well as 
 cabinet — that, while it may be tiresome to the reader, 
 it is nevertheless well to call attention again to his 
 peaceful disposition, for it was his repugnance to war 
 that was responsible for his all but fatal procrastina- 
 
 86 
 
tion in the conduct of the War. "President Madison 
 would neither act himself nor allow others to act," 
 wrote Wilkinson. 
 
 Wilkinson was frankly unfriendly to President 
 Madison, and this must be considered; nevertheless, 
 his assertion just quoted contained a good deal of 
 truth. 
 
 In an effort to shield and excuse Madison and 
 Monroe — and Armstrong — it has been said that the 
 first information they had of the fall of Bonaparte and 
 as a result the release of Wellington's Peninsular vet- 
 erans for service in America, was June 26, 1814. As 
 already pointed out, this is not true. It was on June 
 26 that the President received certain official infor- 
 mation from our ministers, Gallatin and Bayard. But 
 the President and the country knew in April that the 
 allies fighting against Bonaparte were everywhere 
 gaining ground and that the end was not far off. On 
 the 3rd of April, Mr. Calhoun, Chairman of the Com- 
 mittee of Foreign Relations of the House, introduced 
 a bill to repeal the Embargo Act and made a notable 
 and eloquent address in support of this bill, in which 
 his principal argument was founded on the complete 
 change that had just occurred in the circumstances of 
 the European belligerents. On April 6th Bonaparte 
 abdicated. It will be seen that the astute Calhoun had 
 correctly interpreted the news he had received — and 
 in those days six weeks might be required for news 
 to get from France to Washington. On the 12th of 
 
 87 
 
May the brig Ida, from Rochelle, arrived at Boston, 
 and brought information of the entrance of the allied 
 armies into Paris March 31st, and also of proclama- 
 tions issued in the name of Louis XVIII. Three days 
 later the cartel Fair American, from Liverpool, 
 reached Sandy Hook, and its passengers had read in 
 the London papers the official account of the abdica- 
 tion of Bonaparte and the virtual end of the war with 
 France in which Britain had participated. The infor- 
 mation brought by both the Ida and the Fair Ameri- 
 can appeared in the Washington papers on May 18th. 
 
 Yet ninety days later no effective measures had 
 been taken to defend Washington ! 
 
 Bonaparte had set the fashion of capturing the 
 capital city of an enemy. Britain was now free to send 
 her seasoned soldiers, natives and mercenaries, to 
 America. British forces had been active on the Chesa- 
 peake for more than a year and their conduct at sev- 
 eral places, contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, 
 gave ample earnest of what might be their conduct if 
 they reached the national capital. Yet Madison, Mon- 
 roe — and Armstrong — perceived no danger, found no 
 time for military activity, but remained exceedingly 
 busy about the Presidential nomination to be made in 
 1816 and about public and political offices. Well might 
 Williams, brigade-major of the Columbian Brigade in 
 the War, write after mature reflection : 
 
 "The moral which we are disposed to draw from 
 the history of the battle of Bladensburg is, not that 
 
Americans were too 'pusillanimous' to defend their 
 seat of government, and that, therefore, it would be 
 safer to hire an army of foreign mercenaries to defend 
 it for us ; nor that militia troops are not to be depend- 
 ed upon, and therefore a large standing army of regu- 
 lar troops is necessary ; but that politicians of fairest 
 fame require watching, and will not hesitate to sacri- 
 fice or jeopardize the interests and honor of their coun- 
 try in order to advance themselves or ruin a rival." 
 Yet if one were to apply that without qualifica- 
 tion to Madison or Monroe or Armstrong he would 
 do every one of them a great injustice. We must be 
 careful to understand the conditions, opinions and 
 standards of 1814 in the United States. For fifty years, 
 and especially during the years following the Revolu- 
 tion, there had been much profound, fine and eloquent 
 speech-making and writing about the science and 
 practice of government, in which the loftiest senti- 
 ments were expressed and the strictest standards of 
 conduct of public officials were set forth. The spoken 
 and printed word were of the purest patriotism, the 
 strictest honesty, the most virtuous conduct. The 
 thought and expression about government and the du- 
 ties and conduct of public officials reached commonly 
 a plane that had rarely been attained before and has 
 as rarely been attained since. But between preach- 
 ment and practice there was a wide and deep chasm. 
 To steal money directly and boldly from the national 
 treasury was an unthinkable crime ; but to rob the peo- 
 
pie obliquely or to sacrifice the public interests was 
 more than excusable when the motive was partisan 
 political advantage. There were two schools that 
 taught very differently about the safe and proper func- 
 tions of government; nearly all connected with these 
 schools thought that the success of the other school 
 would be the destruction of the nation; each school 
 was organized as a political party ; hence to defeat the 
 other party and secure the success of one's own was 
 the purest and most practical patriotism. Partisan 
 feeling ran high, partisan contests were bitter, and 
 from this grew personal animosities that made invin- 
 cibly strong the conviction that when the triumph of 
 a party and its candidates was the end, it justified any 
 means. 
 
 It is doubtful if truer patriots ever lived than 
 Madison and Monroe. It is not easy, and it would 
 probably be unjust, to question the patriotism of Arm- 
 strong. All served their country well at times, though 
 some, at least, did not serve their country well at all 
 times. But it is only right and fair, if one presumes to sit 
 in judgment on any man, to consider all the conditions 
 — material, intellectual and moral — of his time. When 
 we consider these conditions as they existed during 
 the lives of Armstrong, Monroe and Madison, we will 
 not have much censure for the first, and the faults of 
 character and conduct of the others will be hid in the 
 dazzling brilliancy and steady light of their great and 
 patriotic services to the weak and struggling Republic. 
 
 90 
 
As the greatest responsibility rested on the Pres- 
 ident, on him might fall the greatest blame. There- 
 fore we should keep in mind that which the author will 
 risk repeating once more — Madison was a man reluct- 
 ant to engage in war and preferred the pen far above 
 the sword. This would have been commendable 
 if the outrages of our enemies on our commerce and 
 seamen had been confined to the work of the pen only. 
 Madison's preference for the pen and his belief in his 
 diplomatic ability were responsible for his giving cre- 
 dence to the reports that were brought to America in 
 the early summer of 1814 that Britain would seek 
 peace during the summer. While making prepara- 
 tions to send Wellington's Peninsular veterans to 
 Canada — to be so unkindly treated at Plattsburg! — 
 and to the Chesapeake and later to Louisiana, Great 
 Britain, knowing Madison well, was careful to lull him 
 yet more securely into the certainty of safety by giv- 
 ing grounds for rumors of negotiations for peace. 
 Madison was easily deceived. He even regarded the 
 mediation of Russia as promising. Madison evidently 
 believed that with the pen he could make the English 
 people ashamed of the way the English forces were 
 making war, and thus make them so opposed to the 
 War as to influence their government. Doubtless 
 Monroe did not approve of this, for he knew the class 
 that ruled in Great Britain ; but he was unable to get 
 Madison to act, if he really attempted to do so. There 
 is little evidence that Monroe was more alarmed than 
 
 91 
 
Madison about the safety of the national capital. True, 
 it was very often said that the War was "Monroe's 
 war." If he had been President the War would have 
 been differently conducted — he would have sought 
 victory on the field of battle; his weapons would not 
 have been made of paper. But the man that was Pres- 
 ident delayed and procrastinated in the making of war 
 because he believed that he could do the impossible 
 with the diplomatic pen. 
 
 The conditions responsible for, and made by, the 
 military methods of the British must be considered if 
 we would have a correct or proper understanding of the 
 events leading up to "The Invasion of the City of 
 Washington." Undoubtedly some of the British 
 forces at times ignored the laws of civilized warfare-- 
 even for that time. But what war of any magnitude 
 has been so conducted that the same charge could net 
 justly be brought against some of the contending 
 forces? And plainly while they are at peace men are 
 not always just and moral. While engaged in peace- 
 ful pursuits all men do not always live the Golden 
 Rule. Those that have so much to say about the evils 
 and abuses of war have nothing to say about the evils 
 and abuses of peace. The evils and abuses of war are 
 much the more obtrusive for we are accustomed to 
 peace. The evils of peace are real and great, and yet 
 more insidious, and not infrequently clothed as bene- 
 fits. However, we will grant, what is true, that war 
 is — no one knew better what it is than Napoleon Bo- 
 
 92 
 
naparte, and he said, "What is war? A trade of bar- 
 barians."* War can not be made a pink tea affair. 
 And pink teas do not develop strong characters or 
 peoples or produce good moral fibre. While the ex- 
 cesses of the British troops along the Chesapeake just- 
 ly merited the execrations of the American people, to 
 condemn all because of the acts of a few is illogical 
 and unjust. We must consider the general practices 
 of the British troops along the Chesapeake. Of those 
 practices, the one most complained of was the taking 
 or destruction of private property. But if that is to 
 condemn an army, the British have not been the only 
 troops within the borders of the United States that 
 must suffer condemnation. Further, the appropria- 
 tion and destruction of private property by the British 
 were doubtless much exaggerated. The victims rare- 
 ly start these things too small and the recitals rarely 
 shrink during their travels. 
 
 The most charming writer about the Chesapeake 
 expedition — and a very fair and just one — is the Brit- 
 ish "Subaltern in America." His narrative is direct 
 and frank, his style simple and lucid. As a matter of 
 course, without any attempt to justify or excuse, he 
 narrates that from the time the British troops landed 
 they foraged and pillaged. What they could not con- 
 sume they frequently destroyed. They took every- 
 thing they wanted that they could find, and they espe- 
 cially wanted everything to drink and eat. True, there 
 
 ♦Count de Segur's Campaign in Russia, Book VII, Chap. 8. 
 
 93 
 
were "orders already issued against plunder and ra- 
 pine." But, observes this subaltern, "it would have 
 been unreasonable to expect that hungry soldiers, in 
 an enemy's country, would sit down to digest their 
 hunger, whilst flocks of poultry and herds of swine 
 were within their reach." Consider that the voyage 
 from England had begun in an exceedingly severe 
 storm lasting for days, yet later the ships were be- 
 calmed — the voyage was of weeks ; some of the casks 
 of water became poisonous, some of the sea biscuit 
 spoiled ; some of the poultry the officers had provided 
 for their use was washed overboard, and the pigs died : 
 how toothsome indeed must have been the fat fowls 
 and swine of the enemy ! Fowls and swine have often 
 been the undoing of a hungry trooper. 
 
 But the indignation because of the taking of fowls 
 and swine was not near so great as the indignation be- 
 cause of the taking of slaves. The negroes were more 
 valuable. The Norfolk Herald was of opinion that 
 "To take negroes, who were human beings ; to tear 
 them forever from their kindred and connections is 
 what we should never expect from a Christian nation, 
 especially one that has done so much toward abolish- 
 ing the slave trade. There are negroes in Virginia 
 and, we believe, in all the Southern states, who have 
 their interests and affections as strongly engrafted in 
 their hearts, as the whites, and who feel the sacred ties 
 of filial, parental, and conjugal affection, equally 
 
 94 
 
strong, and who are warmly attached to their owners 
 and the scenes of their nativity." 
 
 Commenting on this, that most interesting Cana- 
 dian historian of the War of 1812, Auchinleck*, says : 
 
 "James very correctly notices this. as one of the 
 most inadvertent but happiest pieces of satire extant ; 
 and so it must appear to all. Even at the present time, 
 no later than two days back, a New Orleans journal, 
 the 'Creole,' contained an advertisement offering to 
 purchase slaves from any quarter, and it is impossible 
 to take up a southern paper without the eye being 
 offended and the senses disgusted with the accounts 
 of slave sales — the attractions of a young quadroon 
 being dwelt on and puffed with as much minuteness 
 as the points of a horse. The revelations of the hor- 
 rors of American slavery are so patent, and have ex- 
 cited such universal horror, that it is almost unneces- 
 sary to dwell on the unparallelled impudence which 
 could assert that the slaves were warmly attached to 
 their masters — slave owners selling their children, and 
 the mothers of their children ; but the bare thought of 
 these things is sickening, yet the very journals con- 
 taining those advertisements were the foremost to ac- 
 cuse the British of having violated 'the dictates of 
 Christianity and civilization' * * * * During the 
 whole period that the English fleet were on the wa- 
 ters of the Chesapeake, the officers, who were sent on 
 
 *See The Battle of Plattsburg. 
 
 95 
 
shore to procure provisions and water, were constant- 
 ly beset by crowds of fugitive slaves, who implored 
 to be rescued from a state of bondage. These appeals 
 were too piteous, always to be disregarded, and the 
 consequence was that hundreds of them were taken 
 on board the British vessels, from whence they were 
 mostly transported to Halifax, a few being landed at 
 Jamaica. This circumstance it was that afforded an 
 excuse for the assertion of the American Government, 
 that 'the British, after receiving the negroes, shipped 
 the wretches to the West Indies, where they were sold 
 as slaves, for the benefit of British officers' * * * * 
 The assertion that slaves were dragged away by force 
 with the greatest cruelty is simply absurd ; it was with 
 the greatest difficulty that the British commander 
 could victual his fleet, lying as it did on an enemy's 
 shore, and it was not very probable that he would suf- 
 fer his difficulties in that respect to be increased by 
 the addition of loads of negroes, whom, to make profit 
 on it, it would be necessary to feed and keep in good 
 condition. The only marvel is that the British com- 
 mander should have allowed his feelings of humanity 
 to overstep the strict line of duty, inasmuch as by res- 
 cuing these unhappy victims from slavery he was seri- 
 ously inconveniencing the crews of the vessels under 
 his command, and so crowding his ships as to render 
 them almost unfit for going into action." 
 
 It is to be hoped that the amiable reader has read 
 carefully what has just been said about the depreda- 
 
 96 
 
tions of the British on the shores of the Chesapeake, 
 and that as he has read carefully he has also consid- 
 ered carefully, and honestly and justly. It might not 
 be amiss for him to re-read what is said on the subject 
 just named, especially the extract from the edifying 
 history of that consistent lover of "the glorious Brit- 
 ish constitution" — Auchinleck. 
 
 For with this careful reading, and careful, and 
 especially honest and just, consideration, there will 
 surely come a conviction that most questions are pos- 
 sessed of two sides, if not three ; and there will surely 
 arise also a tolerant feeling that is needed by every 
 one that reads history, a fortiori the history of war. 
 We may have, and should have, some little feeling of 
 kindness toward even our enemies in war — unless, as 
 has rather rarely happened, they have so outraged the 
 laws of humanity and raped the decencies of mortal 
 combat, that they have put themselves beyond the 
 pale of those to be regarded as human beings; and 
 even then we should be very careful to outlaw only 
 those directly guilty and those that have approved the 
 guilty. Most assuredly we may have, and we should 
 have, no small measure of charity for our own, for 
 their sins of delay or omission, whether they be civil- 
 ians or soldiers. We may be sure that we know of 
 only the very small part of the obstacles in their way. 
 It is easy to blame a commander for a defeat — and the 
 chances are many to one that no man could have 
 avoided the defeat. It is easy to scold at troops be- 
 
 97 
 
cause they retreated when they saw some of their 
 number being killed or wounded — but would we have 
 stood in the ranks as long? Our two greatest men — 
 so great that they stand aloof, like two giant trees on 
 the top of a high hill — Washington and Lincoln, were 
 objects of more criticism, of more impatience, of more 
 abuse, of more scheming enmity, than any other two 
 of our Presidents ; and how petty and immaterial are 
 now all their faults and errors that at the time seemed 
 so big and criminal to some honest people! It is the 
 duty of the historian to point out the faults of Madi- 
 son and the others responsible for "The Invasion of 
 the City of Washington ;" but considering all the con- 
 ditions, of which not the least important was the char- 
 acter of the American people themselves — their ideas, 
 their jealousies, their lack of cohesion, their little loy- 
 alty to the national government — who could have done 
 much better? And if we are disposed to be impatient 
 with a later President, if we see that his administra- 
 tion has a good many of the faults of the Madison ad- 
 ministration, let us be careful indeed that we are im- 
 patient and that we point out faults, only so far as is 
 justified, and with the one clear purpose, to aid the 
 administration to greater efficiency. When war was 
 declared June 18, 1812, there was but one thing for 
 every American citizen to do, regardless of his opin- 
 ions of war in general or of the war with Great Brit- 
 ain in particular — do his utmost for victory. How 
 plainly do we see that now ! May not a like clear vision 
 
 98 
 
be his that, in 2018, looks back a century? And he will 
 see clearly also that it was the part of true patriotism 
 to expose faults and corruption — for that, is essential 
 to victory ; and also to give credit generously for the 
 many things done — for that is equally essential to 
 victory. 
 
 At the time, the people of the United States were 
 indeed indignant that their national capital had been 
 wantonly devastated; and this act of the British was 
 almost universally condemned. Even among the Brit- 
 ish people, and especially among the British common 
 people, there were many indeed that felt that the Brit- 
 ish, not the Americans, had been disgraced. Yet one 
 must marvel, not that the British burned the national 
 capitol and other buildings, but that the Americans 
 permitted it. Notwithstanding the opinion of Bona- 
 parte*, Jomini could speak as an authority on some 
 phases of war; and he said — 
 
 "The English performed an enterprise which may 
 be ranged amongst the most extraordinary: — that 
 against the capital of the United States of America. 
 To the great astonishment of the world, a handful of 
 seven or eight thousand English were seen to descend 
 
 *The Count de Segur, in his History of the Expedition 
 to Russia, book IV, Chap. 5, says that in the course of a con- 
 versation with an envoy from the Czar, Bonaparte said: 
 "You all believe yourselves to understand the art of war be- 
 cause you have read Jomini; but if his book could have 
 taught you anything, do you think that I would have al- 
 lowed it to be published?" This was at the beginning of the 
 invasion of Russia. 
 
 99 
 
in the midst of a state of ten millions of souls, pene- 
 trate a considerable distance, besiege the capital, and 
 destroy the public establishments there; results which 
 history may be searched in vain for another example 
 of."* 
 
 Here the American citizen may well stop to do 
 some hard thinking; starting with the quotation from 
 Jomini, and assisted by much that has preceded. 
 
 
 ♦Summary of the Art of War. 
 100 
 
8 
 
 A PAPER ARMY. 
 
 It is not the task of the author of this little book 
 to make any defense of General Wilkinson ; and with- 
 out a defense many will consider Wilkinson exceed- 
 ingly untrustworthy about anything. I can only say 
 that Wilkinson was one of those on whom was visited 
 grave injustice in a time of bitter feeling and partisan 
 rancor hard to understand at this time. He was guilty 
 of a good many things he should not have done. He 
 may have been guilty of treason. Grant even that, 
 and it remains true that in his statements about con- 
 ditions before the burning of the capitol, the measures 
 that were taken and those that were not taken for 
 defense, and the disposition and handling of the forces, 
 he is intelligent and enlightening and nearly always 
 correct and accurate. His prejudice is so open that it 
 is easily perceived, and I have paid no attention to it. 
 The reader will not be wearied with his minute and 
 laborious explanations of how he would have success- 
 fully defended the capital, although some space must 
 
 101 
 
be given to this later on — more than one general with- 
 out a command has had better hindsight than fore- 
 sight. However, it must be said that he has proved 
 by witnesses of the highest character that as early as 
 July 1st, 1814, he foresaw that the British would at- 
 tack Washington and had elaborated plans for its de- 
 fense. Further, although he was under arrest when 
 he went to Washington in late June, he asked to be 
 allowed to serve in the military forces when danger 
 threatened. Yet, further, as will appear later, in Aug- 
 ust even Monroe did not scorn to seek his advice. His 
 military attainments, experience and knowledge were 
 such that few, indeed, could be more capable of stat- 
 ing a military situation and therefore the following is 
 quoted from his Memoirs: 
 
 "It appears, that the day after the cabinet coun- 
 cil, the 2nd of July, the President judged it expedient 
 to create a 10th military district ***** A district 
 was accordingly created to comprehend the whole 
 state of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and that 
 part of Virginia north of the Rappahannock river, em- 
 bracing an exposed coast of 800 to 1,000 miles, vulner- 
 able at every point, and intersected by many large 
 rivers, and by Chesapeake Bay ****** General 
 Winder accepted the command without means and 
 without time to create them ; he found the district 
 without magazines of provisions or forage, without 
 transport tools or implements, without a commissa- 
 
 102 
 
riat or efficient quartermaster's department, without 
 i general staff, and finally without troops." 
 
 Why was this 10th military district created? 
 There is little doubt that its creation was the result of 
 bringing partisan political maneuvering and wire-pull- 
 ing into military operations. Until the creation of 
 this new military district, Washington was in the 5th 
 military district, and this 5th district "was then com- 
 manded by one of the bravest and most experienced 
 generals in the service, Moses Porter, who had en- 
 tered the Revolutionary army as a common soldier, and 
 had gradually raised himself, by his own signal merits, 
 from a private in the ranks to the high and distin- 
 guished post of brigadier general and commander of 
 a military district* * * * * The Secretary of War, it 
 appears, was desirous of calling this veteran to the 
 seat of government, for the purpose of defense, but 
 his wishes were over-ruled * * * * Another general 
 could not be appointed to an independent command 
 within District No. 5 without a gross insult to General 
 Porter; and as the President had already determined 
 to have another, and had, indeed, 'specially assigned' 
 him to the service, a commendable respect for his old 
 fellow-soldier of the Revolution may have induced the 
 Secretary of War to save his feelings by suggesting 
 the establishment of a new district * * * * *After 
 having created military district No. 10 * * * * * the 
 next subject of discussion, we may suppose, was the 
 selection of a military^ commander for the new district 
 
 103 
 
— though it might be inferred from the language of 
 General Armstrong that this had been pre-determined 
 by the President himself: so, at least, if we are to 
 credit the statement of the other members of the cabi- 
 net * * * * * It was a point of even more importance 
 than the selection of troops, whether regard be had to 
 the quality or number of the latter. A commander of 
 well known and acknowledged experience and good 
 fortune — for sometimes success is as much the result 
 of the latter, in the eyes of the soldiers, as of skill or 
 courage — would have brought with him to the execu- 
 tion of his duties what the French call a prestige, 
 a prepossession in his favor, which would have in- 
 spired the troops with a confidence perhaps sufficient 
 to counterbalance all the deficiencies in their organiza- 
 tion. They would have obeyed the orders of such a 
 leader with a trustful conviction that whatever he 
 commanded was right and necessary. They would 
 have fought under him with the animating presenti- 
 ment of victory ; and all who are acquainted with hu- 
 man nature are aware that the stimulus of such an an- 
 ticipation rarely fails to bring about its own realiza- 
 tion * * * * If there had been no mutual jealousies 
 between the two Revolutionary secretaries,* it is not 
 probable that any objection would have been made to 
 the selection by the head of the War Department of 
 General Porter to command the force destined for the 
 
 ♦Monroe and Armstrong. 
 
 104 
 
defense of the seat of government; for that the objec- 
 tion originated, either directly or indirectly, with the 
 Secretary of State, was never doubted by any intelli- 
 gent citizen of Washington at the period referred to ; 
 and it is as little to be doubted that the principal 
 ground of the objection was that the Secretary of War 
 recommended the appointment." 
 
 This last quotation is from Williams' volume on 
 the "Capture of Washington." He certainly was in as 
 good position to know about the topics just discussed 
 as any one except Monroe and Armstrong, and he 
 never hesitated to write the truth as he saw it. He 
 hints that another reason for the creation of the 10th 
 district and thus putting Washington and the sur- 
 rounding territory outside the command of General 
 Porter, was the wish of the Secretary of State, "re- 
 garded as a prominent candidate for the presidential 
 succession," to execute a brilliant military achievement 
 which would "render his future elevation sure," but 
 which "could not well be attempted under the bluff old 
 soldier, Moses Porter, or any other experienced gen- 
 eral not indebted to him for appointment." 
 
 This much space has been given to this matter, 
 and yet more will be again, because it is a matter of 
 much importance — of vital importance. Political am- 
 bition is all too prone to intrude itself into military 
 operations. Far too often in our history there have 
 been "political generals" who may have been patriotic, 
 but certainly were so incompetent that treason could 
 
 105 
 
have been but little more disastrous. It may be safely 
 said that the fewer politicians and methods of the poli- 
 tician in the conduct of war, the better for the soldiers 
 and the country. Whenever military promotion is 
 used in any way to build up a political following to 
 secure public office, a crime of no light hue is commit- 
 ted against the people. Even the indirect methods of 
 the politicians in the War and Navy departments are \o 
 be heartily condemned. The creation of District 
 No. 10, as just recounted, indirectly, by the favorite 
 hidden methods of the politicians, to displace one com- 
 mander and place another, may not have been respon- 
 sible for the disgrace and humiliation of the destruc- 
 tion of the national capital, but the ideas and methods 
 responsible for this shifting of commanders were re- 
 sponsible for that disgrace and humiliation. The read- 
 er knows only too well that the War of 1812 is not 
 the only war in which the United States has engaged 
 in which lives have been sacrificed, defeats suffered 
 instead of victories won, and the burden of war laid 
 heavier on all the people, because the politician was 
 allowed to have his way in places— where he should 
 not have been allowed to intrude. 
 
 As set forth in a previous chapter, there was, for 
 the selection of the commander of the new district, a 
 politician's reason, other than to have a commanding 
 general under direct obligation to the Secretary of 
 State and willing to stand aside that all the rays of 
 glory might shine on that Secretary. 
 
 106 
 
General W. H. Winder was, as Ingersoll* states 
 in his historical sketch of the War of 1812, a relative 
 of Levin Winder, the governor of Maryland, federal 
 governor of a federal state; "and Mr. Madison and 
 Mr. Monroe deemed it politic to conciliate opposition 
 by appointing him to that responsible and arduous 
 command." 
 
 The view of the soldier, as expressed by Wil- 
 liams, was that "the most effectual mode of mitigating 
 the opposition to the War would have been to render 
 the War successful and glorious ; and that would have 
 been accomplished by selecting able men for the 
 conduct of military operations, without reference to 
 their personal relations or party opinions, by encour- 
 aging capacity, no matter from what rank or class of 
 life it sprung, and giving it the means of displaying 
 itself in a way which should advance the public in- 
 terests." 
 
 The author must confess that he agrees with Ma- 
 jor Williams on this point, at least. 
 
 General Armstrong states further that "the per- 
 son recommended by the Secretary of War for this 
 appointment was Brigadier-General Moses Porter, 
 then at Norfolk, whose whole life may be said to have 
 been military. Entering the army of the Revolution 
 a boy, he had, by uniform good conduct, risen 
 through every rank, from that of a private to the com- 
 
 *See The Battle of Plattsburg. 
 
 107 
 
mand of a brigade. No objection to General Winder, 
 except a want of military experience, either was or 
 could be made ; his patriotism and courage had already 
 been tested, and were generally acknowledged." 
 
 General Winder was not without military train- 
 ing or experience, but in neither was he near to Porter, 
 or other available generals. 
 
 Such was the new commander of the new military 
 district. Not his military experience or attainments, 
 but the expediency of politicians, was responsible for 
 his selection. He did not lack ability ; he did not alto- 
 gether lack military training; he certainly did not lack 
 energy or patriotism ; but he was unknown to the 
 troops that were to serve under him ; even had they 
 known him they would have lacked that confidence 
 in their commander that is so important to victory; 
 and considering what was needed for his success and 
 what was lacking, he was given what to him — or to 
 any man living — was an impossible task. The fault 
 was not in Winder or in the soldiers he commanded. 
 It was in the national administration. 
 
 To repeat the sententious statement of General 
 Wilkinson, "General Winder accepted the command 
 without means and without time to create them ; he 
 found the district without magazines or provisions or 
 forage, without transport tools or implements, with- 
 out a commissariat or efficient quartermaster's depart- 
 ment, without a general staff, and finally without 
 troops." But truly magnificent preparations were 
 
 108 
 
made — on paper — to furnish him with everything 
 needed. That was always the way with the national 
 administration. There never was a regime that could 
 more easily call armies from the farm and forge by 
 requisition — and get no troops. There never was an 
 administration more valiant with proclamation. One 
 shrinks from considering what would have happened 
 if there had been typewriters ! The writer knows well 
 of a small city that at least once a month has a public 
 meeting addressed by its most prominent citizens — 
 tight-fisted old fogies; at which meeting certain com- 
 mittees are appointed, numerously enough to put the 
 name of nearly every one present in the next morn- 
 ing's paper; which committees report copiously of 
 whereases and resolutions which, after every one 
 present who thinks he is an orator has painfully dem- 
 onstrated that he is not, are adopted — and then all go 
 home to read, the next morning, the usual congratula- 
 tions of the Press on having done something — some- 
 thing important. And always when I read of the con- 
 duct of the War by the Madison administration I am 
 reminded of that little city on the river bank each year 
 growing less in business and educational importance, 
 but more fruitful in meetings, speeches and wordy res- 
 olutions. 
 
 On the Fourth of July, 1814, the President made a 
 requisition on the various states for 93,500 militia ! It 
 was just as easy to make a requisition for 93,500 as for 
 9,350. Inevitably Madison called for the 93,500. Cer- 
 
 109 
 
tain soi-disant historians have taken account of the 
 different "calls" and "requisitions" of the national ad- 
 ministration for troops, and being contemptuous of 
 the truth and exceedingly brave and broad liars when 
 the truth would not serve their purposes, have allowed 
 their readers to understand, or seme have positively 
 asserted, that the numbers called for were the numbers 
 obtained. As a matter of fact, all in arms during the 
 War were but a rather small fraction of the number 
 these lying writers of popular or unpopular histories 
 lead their readers, unfortunately mostly school chil- 
 dren, to believe were actually in service. 
 
 Not all of the 93,500 troops — on paper — were, 
 however, to be for the defense of Washington. The 
 quota to be furnished by each state was designated. 
 Virginia was to furnish 2,000; Pennsylvania 5,000; 
 Maryland 6,000; and the District of Columbia 2,000; 
 a total of 15,000 for the defense of the capital. 
 
 But even this diminished number was not to be 
 immediately available — was not to be immediately 
 available even on paper. The President's requisition 
 specified that these militia were "to be organized and 
 equipped, and held in readiness for future service, 
 within their respective states, until the 10th district 
 shall be actually invaded, or menaced with invasion." 
 Then General Winder might "call for a part or for 
 the whole of the quota assigned to the state of Mary- 
 
 110 
 
land,* which shall have been organized and equipped 
 under the aforesaid requisition." 
 
 And then General Winder was cautioned not to 
 call for troops until they were clearly needed, being 
 careful "to proportion the call to the exigency." Fur- 
 ther, it will be noted that he could call for only, at the 
 most, the Maryland quota of 6,000. Yet further, he 
 could not call for even these until the invasion of his 
 military district was imminent or an accomplished 
 fact. And yet further, he could have only those Mary- 
 land militia "which shall have been organized and 
 equipped under this requisition." This meant as many 
 as the governor of Maryland chose to organize and 
 equip, for, as General Wilkinson points out, Winder 
 had no power or authority to organize or equip the 
 militia — nor had the states ! Wilkinson is right in say- 
 ing that "the requisition was a mere matter of form, 
 and incapable of producing the end it affected to em- 
 brace ; in each state the militia was first to be organ- 
 ized and equipped in the manner prescribed by the 
 requisition, and yet in those states there existed no 
 power so to organize and equip in such form, and un- 
 til such special organization and equipment had taken 
 place, the call was not to be made." All of this is true. 
 General Winder was not to have militia collected or 
 trained or equipped before he needed them. He was 
 
 ♦Apparently Pennsylvania, Virginia and the District of 
 Columbia had been named in the requisition only that they 
 might not feel slighted. 
 
 Ill 
 
not to have any militia "trained to military duties in 
 a camp of observation and exercise, to await the ex- 
 pected exigency, around which the remainder might 
 rally; he is, when danger stares him in the face, to the 
 utter neglect of the many important duties pressing 
 on him, obliged to devote his time to the collection 
 and formation of a body of raw yeomanry ; and is him- 
 self trammelled with restrictions." 
 
 But the national administration, busy with parti- 
 san political concerns and timorous, weak and vacil- 
 lating in its prosecution of the War, actually feared 
 that it had gone too far! One can not refrain from 
 quoting again from General Wilkinson : 
 
 "President Madison appears to have been 
 alarmed, lest he should have done too much, and in 
 recommending depots of arms and equipments, he 
 seems to have forgotten that subsistence was an in- 
 dispensable article of the munitions of war; that trans- 
 port was necessary to convey his baggage ; and that 
 entrenching tools and axes might be useful, in break- 
 ing up and obstructing roads, or to fortify his camps ; 
 and to put it out of General Winder's power to 
 burthen the public with the expense of a competent 
 force for the defense of the capital, he informs him, 
 through his Secretary of War, on the 17th of July, two 
 days after he had received advice of the arrival of 
 Commodore Cochrane's van at Lynnhaven bay with 
 heavy reinforcements, that 'the militia of the District 
 of Columbia, amounting to about 2,000 is kept in a 
 
 112 
 
disposable state, and subject to your orders; I have 
 also to express the wishes of the President, that not 
 less than two, nor more than three thousand of the 
 new drafts, under the requisition of the 4th of July, 
 be organized, embodied and encamped at some middle 
 point between Baltimore and this city.' How incon- 
 sistent was the conduct of President Madison ! The 
 enemy had been reconnoitering the Potowmack and 
 the Patuxent since the beginning of May ; no doubt 
 remained of their designs against the capital, which 
 were admitted by himself, and under the impression, 
 he calls on the respective states for the immediate or- 
 ganization and equipment of their respective quota of 
 93,500 militia, 15,000 of whom he designated for the 
 defense of the metropolis, but directs them to be held 
 'in readiness for future service.' This was doing with 
 one hand and undoing with the other ; it was blowing 
 hot and cold in the same breath ; it followed that Gen- 
 eral Winder must, necessarily, have been perplexed 
 and embarrassed." 
 
 It must be taken into account that General Wil- 
 kinson was prejudiced against President Madison ; 
 that his feeling toward the President, who had had 
 him arrested, and, when the Memoirs were written, 
 had had him courtmartialed, was bitter. Yet it is true 
 that in the main the criticisms of the President were 
 justified. What Wilkinson criticises is only one of the 
 several highly successful attempts of Madison to cre- 
 ate a large paper army — but pitiably small when actu- 
 
 113 
 
ally ready for service. On one point, however, Wil- 
 kinson is incorrect — when he states that the President 
 admitted that there was no doubt of the designs of the 
 British on the capital. The President was not sure 
 that the British thought of attacking the capital — ap- 
 parently he was rarely sure of anything about the 
 War. Incredible as it is, not he or the members of his 
 cabinet were sure that the British intended to attack 
 Washington, as late as the morning of August 24th. 
 This will be shown hereafter. The President found 
 it impossible to decide in his own mind where the Brit- 
 ish forces would strike ; until the very eve of the battle 
 of Bladensburg he was not sure that they intended to 
 strike at all; day after day and week after week he 
 persisted in the happy dream that the British had no 
 greater object than to continue to "live off the coun- 
 try" — a procedure in war not altogether sanctioned by 
 the rules of the game, but made respectable by cus- 
 tom — to "appropriate" tobacco, flour, hogs and poul- 
 try, and occasionally to relieve this routine by burning 
 a farm house. It was indeed unfortunate that nothing 
 could disturb the belief of the national administration 
 that the British forces were amiable gentlemen bent 
 on a little prankish and thievish, but friendly, diver- 
 sion. 
 
 That the conditions and circumstances must 
 prove perplexing and embarrassing to General Win 
 der, was beyond doubt. In his Historical Sketch of 
 the Second War of Independence, Ingersoll says: 
 
 114 
 
"Winder's was an arduous perplexity : to arm and 
 fortify a military district without magazines or troops, 
 composed by a cabinet of older soldiers than himself, 
 whom it would be disrespectful in him to contradict, 
 and almost insubordinate to overrule; to lead undis- 
 ciplined neighbors to battle, in whose material prow- 
 ess he could not confide, of whose blood he was hu- 
 manely sparing, overlooked by several superiors, and 
 distracted by a host of advisers." 
 
 Another says of the conditions and task that con- 
 fronted General Winder : 
 
 "The appointment of a general, unless a proper 
 military staff is furnished him, and efficient troops 
 given him, is a very unnecessary ceremony. There 
 were few regular troops within the power of the gov- 
 ernment ; the most numerous body which had recently 
 been near or within the district, 500 men of the 10th 
 infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Clinch, a body of 
 stout, active young men enlisted in North Carolina, 
 which had been encamped near Washington for sev- 
 eral weeks, were marched away to the northern fron- 
 tiers on the 13th of June, in the midst of the alarm of 
 an expected attack. In strictness, two detachments of 
 the 36th and 38th infantry, and a small detachment of 
 artillery, amounting in the whole to 330 men, were all 
 that could be said to be at disposal at the time that the 
 10th military district was created, nor was this great 
 deficiency remedied in any degree before the troops 
 were called into action. No orders were issued by the 
 
 115 
 
War Department appointing an assistant adjutant- 
 general, assistant inspector-general, or assigning to du- 
 ty in the district any topographical engineers; and it 
 is well known that General Winder's greatest com- 
 plaint was, that he had not the aid of this staff, with- 
 out which the proper organization, equipment, and 
 efficiency of troops is impossible and that his time was 
 occupied by an oppressive mass of detail, when he 
 should have been at liberty to devote it to duties of a 
 very different character." 
 
 The recital, later on, of the many activities, the 
 travel, the hurry, of General Winder, will emphasize 
 the closing sentence of the paragraph just quoted. 
 
 General Winder received his commission as com- 
 mander of the new 10th district on the 6th of July. 
 Three days later he addressed a letter to "Hon. John 
 Armstrong, Secretary of War," in which he said : 
 
 "The utmost regular force which it is probable 
 can, in the present state of affairs, be placed at my 
 command, including the force necessary for garrison- 
 ing the several forts, will not exceed 1,000 men, and 
 some weeks will necessarily elapse before the detach- 
 ments from Virginia and Carlisle will reach my dis- 
 trict. The detachments of the 36th and 38th are, there- 
 fore, the only troops that I can expect to have in the 
 meantime, and when those other detachments join, 
 the utmost force will be from 700 to 800 * * * * The 
 enemy's fleet has now spent more than a twelvemonth 
 in the waters of the Chesapeake, and during that time 
 
 116 
 
has visited almost every river falling into the Bay, 
 and must be presumed to have such accurate informa- 
 tion that whatever expedition may be destined to these 
 waters will have a definite object, to the execution of 
 which, on its arrival, it will proceed with the utmost 
 promptitude and dispatch. Should Washington, Bal- 
 timore or Annapolis be their object, what possible 
 chance will there be of collecting a force, after the ar- 
 rival of the enemy, to interpose between them and 
 either of these places? They can proceed, without 
 dropping anchor, to within three hours' rowing and 
 marching of Baltimore, within less of Annapolis, and 
 upon arriving off South River, can debark and be in 
 Washington in a day and a half. This celerity of move- 
 ment, on their part, is not probable, owing to adverse 
 weather and other causes; but if the enemy has been 
 active, while in our waters, to acquire a knowledge of 
 our country, of which there can be no doubt, and 
 should be favored with weather on the arrival of re- 
 inforcements, he can be in Washington, Baltimore, or 
 Annapolis in four days from entering the Capes. But, 
 allowing liberally for all causes of detention, he can be 
 in either of those places in ten days from his arrival. 
 What time will this allow us to hear of his arrival, to 
 disseminate through the intricate and winding chan- 
 nels of the various orders to the militia for them to as- 
 semble, have their officers designated, their arms, ac- 
 coutrements, and ammunition delivered, the necessary 
 supplies provided, or for the commanding officers to 
 
 117 
 
learn the different corps and detachments, so as to 
 issue orders with the promptitude and certainty so 
 necessary to active operations? If the enemy's force 
 should be strong, which, if it comes at all, it will be, 
 sufficient numbers of militia could not be warned and 
 run together, even as a disorderly crowd, without 
 arms, ammunition, or organization, before the enemy 
 would already have given his blow. 
 
 "Would it not, then, be expedient to increase the 
 force of my command by immediately calling out a 
 portion of the militia, so that, by previously selecting 
 the best positions for defense, and increasing as far as 
 possible the natural advantages of these positions, the 
 advance of the enemy might be retarded, his force 
 crippled, and time and opportunity thus gained for 
 drawing together whatever other resources of defense 
 might be competent to resist the enemy? The small 
 force of regulars will be incompetent to accomplish 
 any material works at favorable positions for strength- 
 ening the defences,, and to supply the various vedette 
 parties which it will be necessary to station on the 
 prominent points of the Bay to watch the enemy, and 
 communicate his movements with the greatest possi- 
 ble dispatch." 
 
 To this letter the Secretary of War vouchsafed no 
 reply. 
 
 This is a very important letter — important be- 
 cause of several things in and about it, as we shall see. 
 
 118 
 
Yet no one of the national administration gave it any 
 attention. 
 
 But General Winder need not have given himself 
 any concern about organizing and equipping a rather 
 large assemblage of militia, for he would not have any 
 large number even to assemble. As already stated, 
 the President's call for militia named conditions that 
 made a compliance impossible, unless the states exer- 
 cised powers that they did not have ! 
 
 A copy of the proclamation calling for 93,500 mili- 
 tia — 6,000 from Maryland — was not served on the gov- 
 ernor of Maryland until July 10th ; and not until July 
 12th was General Winder authorized to call for the 
 Maryland quota in case of "menaced or actual invas- 
 ion." Certainly the administration believed in leis- 
 urely methods ! When one considers all the circum- 
 stances he would be greatly surprised if Maryland had 
 even assembled any considerable body of militia. Of 
 the Maryland response hereafter. 
 
 Pennsylvania, nearby, was to furnish 5,000 mili- 
 tia. In The Battle of Plattsburg, the contempt for the 
 national government, and especially the national ad- 
 ministration, shown by the states, is made plain, and 
 will be only mentioned here. The requisition on Penn- 
 sylvania did not reach the office of the governor of 
 that state until July 14th — ten days in getting from 
 Washington! The following correspondence is so 
 typical of communications from state authorities to 
 
 119 
 
the national administration that it may well be read 
 with interest. It explains itself: 
 
 Letters from the Secretary of the Governor of Penn- 
 sylvania to the Secretary of War. 
 
 Secretary's office. 
 
 July 14, 1814. 
 SIR, 
 
 In the absence of the Governor, I deem it my duty 
 to inform you that your communication containing a 
 requisition for a detachment of 14,000* Pennsylvania 
 militia, came to the office this morning and was imme- 
 diately forwarded by express to the Governor, at Sel- 
 in's Grove. Be assured the requisition will be met 
 with all the promptness the circumstances possibly 
 will permit. 
 
 With high considerations of respect, 
 I am, sir, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 M. B. Boileau, 
 
 Secretary. 
 John Armstrong, esq. Secretary of War. 
 
 Secretary's office, 
 
 July 25, 1814. 
 SIR, 
 
 The governor has directed me to inclose to you 
 
 *Nine thousand — on paper — to go elsewhere than the 
 Tenth Military District. 
 
 120 
 
copies of general orders issued by him in compliance 
 with a late requisition for a military force from Penn- 
 sylvania, by the president, communicated by yours un- 
 der date of the 4th inst. He has not, as you will per- 
 ceive, designated places of rendezvous: he thinks it 
 will be in time to do so in subsequent orders, which 
 must issue before the troops can march : the threaten- 
 ed point of attack by the enemy will, it is probable, 
 then be better ascertained, and a more prudent selec- 
 tion of place can be made. The repeal of our militia 
 law of 1807, and its several supplements, on 
 the 1st of August next; the disannulling of all 
 commissions by the last session, granted un- 
 der the old law, except the commissions of 
 such officers as may then be in actual service; the or- 
 dering by the new law ; the holding of elections of offi- 
 cers by the militia, after the said 1st of August; the 
 notice of election; returns to be made; and the pro- 
 tracting to the 4th Monday of October next the classi- 
 fication of the militia ; cause an almost total disorgan- 
 ization of our militia system, between the 1st of Aug- 
 ust and the 4th of October, and present difficulties, in 
 yielding perfect compliance with the requisition of the 
 president, insurmountable. It is hoped, however, that 
 the patriotism of the people will obviate the difficulty, 
 by a voluntary tender of services, which the governor 
 has invited, growing out of the unaccountable over- 
 sight of the legislature. It is strongly doubted wheth- 
 
 121 
 
er any orders can be enforced under the present state 
 of things.* 
 
 The requisition refers to the act of Congress 
 passed 28th of February, 1795; under which militia 
 can be held in service three months only; and to the 
 law of 1814, which authorized the president to keep 
 them six months in service. The law of Pennsylvania, 
 passed at the last session of the legislature, required 
 the governor to mention in general orders the period 
 for which any militia ordered into service is to remain 
 on duty. It is desirable, therefore, to know whether 
 the requisition is intended for three or six months ser- 
 vice. The offices of deputy quarter master general and 
 assistants and assistant adjutant generals, are not rec- 
 ognized by our state laws. 
 
 I have taken the liberty of inclosing to you a copy 
 of the militia law of this state, passed at the last ses- 
 sion of the legislature ; from a persual of which you 
 will perceive the difficulties under which the executive 
 at present labors, in attempting to comply with the 
 requisition. 
 
 With high consideration of respect, 
 
 Sir, 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 N. B. Boileau, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 John Armstrong, esq. Secretary of War. 
 
 *Please consider that the conditions existing in Pennsyl- 
 vania — a very important state — were existing while the coun- 
 try was at war with Great Britain. 
 
 122 
 
Secretary's office, August 27, 1814. 
 SIR, 
 
 I am directed by the governor to inclose to you a copy 
 of general orders issued yesterday. The letter of gen- 
 eral Winder containing the requisition, under date of 
 the 18th instant, was not received until the evening of 
 the twenty-third. The deranged state of our militia 
 system prevented a more prompt compliance with the 
 demand. To obviate as far as possible the inconven- 
 ience of delay, the governor has directed the flank and 
 volunteer companies to push on as rapidly as possible, 
 without any regard to the time fixed on for the gen- 
 eral rendezvous of the ordinary drafts. The command- 
 ing officers of the companies or detachments are in- 
 structed to report themselves and the number of their 
 men to General Winder, as the officer who may have 
 command of the troops in the service of the United 
 States, in the 10th military district. 
 
 The tents, camp-equipage, as well as arms and ac- 
 coutrements belonging to the state being insufficient 
 to accommodate the troops called into service, the 
 governor relies on the deficiency being supplied by the 
 United States as promptly as practicable, to render 
 the men comfortable and efficient. 
 
 With highest respect and esteem, 
 
 Your obedient servant, Sir, 
 N. B. Boileau, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 John Armstrong, esquire, Secretary of War. 
 
 123 
 
It will be observed that this letter is dated three 
 days after the burning of the capitol ! 
 
 Also, that it is dated 54 days after the proclama- 
 tion of July 4, calling for the militia! 
 
 On that same date — August 27 — General Winder 
 wrote to the Secretary of War a long letter — his offi- 
 cial report — about the battle of Bladensburg and the 
 burning of the national capital. This letter begins as 
 follows : 
 
 "When the enemy arrived at the mouth of the Po- 
 tomac, of all the militia which I had been authorized 
 to assemble, there were but about 1,700 in the field." 
 
 124 
 
9. 
 
 RUNNING AROUND IN CIRCLES. 
 
 On the morning of August 16, 1814, "twenty-two 
 sail of enemy's vessels came in from sea, and proceed- 
 ed up the Chesapeake to join the force previously sta- 
 tioned at the mouth of the Patuxent. The whole force 
 then ascended that river, and on the 19th commenced 
 landing troops at the old village of Benedict, situated 
 about forty miles southeast of Washington. The in- 
 telligence was promptly received in Washington, and 
 the questions at once arose, what is the object of the 
 enemy? What is the contemplated point of attack?"* 
 
 Monroe wrote to the committee of congress 
 formed to investigate the destruction of the capitol : 
 
 "Calling on the President on the morning of the 
 18th of August, he informed me that the enemy had 
 entered the Patuxent in considerable force, and were 
 landing at Benedict. I remarked that this city (Wash- 
 ington) was their object. He concurred in the opin- 
 ion." 
 
 *Williams' Capture of Washington. 
 
 125 
 
Knowing the mental characteristics of Armstrong 
 and his feeling towards Monroe, we are not surprised 
 to be told that on the 18th and later the Secretary of 
 War "derided the notion that the British intended a 
 visit to Washington." 
 
 Of those that testified before the committee of 
 congress that investigated the invasion of Washing- 
 ton, was General Van Ness, a prominent man of the 
 highest character. He testified that when the "in- 
 creased and reinforced" British fleet entered the Pa- 
 tuxent, he called on Secretary Armstrong and ex- 
 pressed his "apprehensions, arising from want of 
 means and preparations, adding that, from the known 
 naval and reputed land force of the enemy, he proba- 
 bly meant to strike a serious blow. His reply was, 
 'Oh, yes; by G — d, they would not come with such a 
 fleet without meaning to strike somewhere, but they 
 certainly will not come here. What the d — 1 will they 
 do here? * * * * No, no; Baltimore is the place, sir; 
 this is of so much more consequence.' " However, in 
 his Notices of the War of 1812, Armstrong yet main- 
 tains that the "first and great object" of the British 
 was to destroy Barney's flotilla, and that the attack 
 on Washington was a casual enterprise — an after- 
 thought of General Ross. 
 
 General Winder believed from the first that the 
 enemy intended to attack Annapolis — and the best 
 reasons favored that conjecture. But, also, he thought 
 that the squadron might be "intended to unite with 
 
 126 
 
the land force, and co-operate in a joint attack on 
 Washington." Williams, who was not unfriendly to 
 Winder, says : 
 
 "General Winder's doubts as to the objects and 
 destination of the enemy continued from the time of 
 the debarkation at Benedict on the 18th of August, 
 until within three hours of the commencement of the 
 battle of Bladensburg on the 24th." 
 
 Winder says himself, in his account of the battle, 
 and referring to his own position at the Eastern 
 Branch Bridge, near the Navy Yard, after nine o'clock 
 of the morning of the battle : 
 
 "My patrols and vedettes not having yet brought 
 me any intelligence of a movement of the enemy (from 
 his bivouac twelve miles from Washington) and be- 
 ing still doubtful whether he might not move on An- 
 napolis, Fort Washington, or towards the bridge rath- 
 er than Bladensburg, I held the position near the 
 bridge as that which, under all circumstances, would 
 enable me best to act against the enemy in any alter- 
 native." 
 
 Thus up to less than three hours before the begin- 
 ning of the battle of Bladensburg, there was no cer- 
 tainty among the four active American commanders — 
 already mentioned, and of which later — as to the move- 
 ment of the enemy. 
 
 From the landing at Benedict, the objective of 
 the enemy was believed by 
 
 127 
 
Madison and Monroe to be Washington. 
 
 Armstrong to be Baltimore. 
 
 Winder to be Annapolis. 
 
 But no one was sure. 
 
 As the result of this uncertainty, it was attempted 
 to protect three points, and also to guard three avenues 
 of approach — by Bladensburg; by the Eastern Branch 
 Bridge ; and from Fort Washington. And all knew — 
 when too late — that the available force was not suffi- 
 cient for one point. 
 
 It is now our hard and unpleasant task to follow, 
 for some days before the battle at Bladensburg, the 
 two parts of that available force ; for we must do this 
 to understand the physical and mental condition of the 
 American forces that participated in the battle at 
 Bladensburg. 
 
 To begin our task, with the most competent guide 
 — John S. Williams, "Brigade Major and Inspector, 
 Columbian Brigade, in the War of 1812:" 
 
 "The brigade of District militia under General 
 Smith left the Capital in the afternoon of the 20th of 
 August, taking the road for Nottingham, and halted 
 for the night about four miles from the Eastern 
 Branch." General Smith reported that they "were 
 here overtaken by their baggage, when it was ascer- 
 tained there was great deficiency of necessary camp 
 equipage, the public stores being exhausted ; many 
 of the troops were compelled to lie out in the open 
 field ; and of the essential article of flints, upon a requi- 
 
 128 
 
sition of one thousand, only two hundred could be 
 had." The next day, which was Sunday, those troops, 
 "after a hot and fatiguing march," as expressed by 
 General Smith, arrived at "the Wood Yard, about fif- 
 teen miles from Washington and twelve from Notting- 
 ham." Here other troops were assembled ; and on 
 this day, the 21st, Sunday, General Winder joined the 
 force at the Wood Yard. 
 
 At sunrise on Monday General Winder ordered 
 a body of his best troops, about 800, "to proceed im- 
 mediately to Nottingham, to meet the enemy," the rest 
 of the force to follow and support. General Winder 
 and his staff, "accompanied by Colonel Monroe," pro- 
 ceeded in advance of the first body, "and upon arriv- 
 ing within half a mile of the place where the road from 
 Nottingham forks, they received intelligence that the 
 enemy was moving in force towards the junction." At 
 this time the advance body of American troops was 
 about two miles from the junction and the rest about 
 two miles in the rear. The American troops were or- 
 dered to stop and select the best defensive positions. 
 But Ross, who, on reaching the junction, had proceed- 
 ed some distance on the road to the Wood Yard, after 
 halting for an hour or more, took "the road to Marl- 
 borough, thus renewing General Winder's uncertainty 
 as to his purposes. In consequence, an order was giv- 
 en for the whole force to retire, on the same road on 
 which they had advanced, to a place called the Long 
 or Battalion Old Fields, about eight miles from Wash- 
 
 129 
 
ington. This movement in advance, therefore, result- 
 ed in nothing but the fatigue and discouragement of 
 the troops. It was judicious in General Winder to 
 avoid an engagement, because his force was wholly 
 insufficient. But that was known before the move- 
 ment began; and if it was wise to retire, it certainly 
 was unwise to have advanced."* 
 
 When these troops had rejoined the others, left at 
 the Wood Yard, the entire force "retired to encamp at 
 the Long Old Fields," and, says Wilkinson, "like all 
 retrograde movements in the face of an enemy, this 
 disheartened the men and officers." 
 
 As our object is to determine the condition of the 
 forces in the battle at Bladensburg, it is proper for us 
 to know that "Ross arrived at Marlborough about two 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the 22d, and remained there 
 until the same hour the next day, having abundant 
 time to rest and refresh his troops, and being perfectly 
 unmolested. They employed themselves in securing 
 and sending off tobacco and other plunder." 
 
 To rejoin our troops at Long Old Fields — very 
 tired, very hot, ill equipped. 
 
 Soon after the troops reached Long Old Fields, 
 General Winder was informed that the President and 
 
 cabinet had arrived at a house about a mile in the rear 
 
 __^_ • 
 
 *Wilkinson is not disposed to excuse any one, but he 
 says, "if a fault was then committed, he (Winder) should not 
 be held responsible, for he was attended by a minister of the 
 cabinet (Monroe), an old soldier, by whose advice he was 
 doubtless influenced." 
 
 130 
 
of the camp. There is no record that this gave him 
 any great joy and he certainly did not use any undue 
 haste in calling on the distinguished meddlers. "He 
 detached a captain's guard to their quarters, but was 
 himself too much overwhelmed with business to wait 
 upon the President until next morning." 
 
 It will be recalled that General Winder had not 
 been provided with any of the usual assistants, to han- 
 dle details. He says: 
 
 "After having waded through the infinite appli- 
 cations, consultations, and calls necessarily arising 
 from a body of 2,500 men, not three days from their 
 homes, without organization, or any practical knowl- 
 edge of service on the part of their officers, and being 
 obliged to listen to the officious but well-intended in- 
 formation and advice of the crowd, who, at such a 
 time, would be full of both, I lay down to snatch a mo- 
 ment of rest." 
 
 But it could have been only "a moment of rest," 
 for, "to add to the fatigue and discouragement" of the 
 troops, they "were roused about 2 o'clock in the morn- 
 ing of the 23rd by a false alarm from a sentinel, were 
 formed in order of battle, and when dismissed, were 
 ordered to hold themselves ready for their posts at a 
 moment's warning. This was the second successive 
 night they had been needlessly deprived of their rest. 
 Shortly after daybreak orders were given to strike 
 their tents, load the baggage-wagons, and have all in 
 readiness to move in the course of an hour. The troops 
 
 131 
 
were then got under arms, and were reviewed by the 
 President and suite." 
 
 The worn-out troops that we have been accompa- 
 nying were "ordered to move in the direction of Marl- 
 borough, reconnoitre the enemy, approach him as near 
 as possible without running too much risk, and annoy 
 him whether he should be stationary or in motion." 
 
 General Winder led a troop towards Bladensburg, 
 to confer with General Stansbury — of whom later — 
 but after the troop had marched ten miles, in the hot 
 August sun, it was called back by the intelligence con- 
 veyed to Winder that the troops sent towards Marl- 
 borough had skirmished with the enemy and been 
 driven back, and were then halted within three miles 
 of the Old Fields; and that all the troops at Old Fields 
 were "drawn up ready to receive the enemy, should he 
 make an attack." 
 
 Marching in the vicinity of Washington, in Aug- 
 ust, and standing in line, is not refreshing. Ross was 
 at this time resting and refreshing his troops. 
 
 The American troops were kept in line "until near 
 sun-down !" It was then determined to retire across 
 the Eastern Branch Bridge. Winder gives good reas- 
 ons for this move — if the enemy had done certain 
 things. There is good evidence that apprehension — 
 and without cause — was the first reason, and there are 
 grounds to believe this apprehension started in the 
 farm house around which Winder had kept a captain's 
 guard ! 
 
 132 
 
One of the prominent citizens of Washington, a 
 soldier in the American army, Mr. John Law, testified 
 before the committee of congress : 
 
 "Although our march in the retreat was extreme- 
 ly rapid, yet orders were occasionally given to captains 
 of companies to hurry on their men. The march, there- 
 fore, literally became a run of eight miles ; and the 
 propriety of this rapid movement, which unnecessarily 
 fatigued and dispirited the men, may be tested by the 
 fact that the main body of the enemy bivouacked that 
 night on the Melwood estate, more than three miles 
 distant from the ground we had left." 
 
 These troops, retreating from a force about which 
 they knew nothing definitely, moved hither and thith- 
 er without regard to plan or reason so far as they 
 could see, finally reached Washington at the close of 
 the 23rd, worn out, poorly equipped, dispirited. Gen- 
 eral Smith, the brigade commander, says that they, 
 "much wearied and exhausted, encamped late at night" 
 within the capital. He says — and being in command 
 of the brigade, and an able soldier and trustworthy 
 man, what he says may be considered as a correct and 
 also conservative statement : 
 
 "Thus terminated the four days of service of the 
 troops of this district preceding the affair at Bladens- 
 burg. They had been under arms, with but little in- 
 termission, the whole of the time, both day and night ; 
 had travelled, during their different marches in ad- 
 vance and retreat, a considerable tract of country, ex- 
 
 133 
 
posed to the burning heat of a sultry summer day, and 
 many of them to the cold dews of the night, uncov- 
 ered. They had, in this period, drawn but two ra- 
 tions, the requisition therefor, in the first instance, be- 
 ing but partially complied with, and it being after- 
 wards almost impossible to procure the means of 
 transportation, the wagons employed by our quarter- 
 master for that purpose being constantly impressed by 
 the government agents for the purpose of removing 
 the public records, when the enemy's approach was 
 known, and some of them thus seized while proceed- 
 ing to take in provisions for the army. These hard- 
 ships and privations could not but be severely distress- 
 ing to men, the greater part of whom possessed and 
 enjoyed at home the means of comfortable living, and 
 from their usual habits and pursuits of life but ill qual- 
 ified to endure them. They, however, submitted with- 
 out murmuring, evincing by their patience, their zeal, 
 and the promptitude with which they obeyed every or- 
 der, a magnanimity highly honorable to their charac- 
 ter. Great as was their merit in this respect, it was 
 no less so in the spirit manifested whenever an order 
 was given to march to meet the foe ; and at the Long 
 Old Fields, where his attack was momentarily ex- 
 pected in overwhelming force they displayed, in pres- 
 ence of many spectators, although scarce any of them 
 had ever been in action, a firmness, a resolution, and 
 an intrepidity which, whatever might have been the 
 result, did honor to their country." 
 
 134 
 
These men were ready to fight. They wanted to 
 fight. And whenever any of them had competent com- 
 manders, they fought extremely well indeed, and in 
 almost every case victoriously, although at times 
 against great odds. The troops under General Smith 
 did not complain when they were marched back and 
 forth, beneath the broiling August sun of the vicinity 
 of Washington, many of them without any shelter at 
 night, and with, during the four days, only two ra- 
 tions, one of them only a partial one! 
 
 The memory of these men may well inspire our 
 soldiers at any time. And we may be sure that at all 
 times our troops will exhibit the same patience, forti- 
 tude and courage — will be worthy of those that before 
 them have fought under The Star Spangled Banner. 
 
 The troops that encamped in Washington the 
 night of the 23rd, were kept in uncertainty until eleven 
 the next morning, when they were very hurriedly 
 marched to the battlefield near Bladensburg — situated 
 about six miles northeast of Washington. They reach- 
 ed the battle-ground just as the action began and had 
 scarcely time "to make a hasty selection of position." 
 
 Doubtless the reader thinks that he has been read- 
 ing of the troops that were most unfortunately treated. 
 By no means! The Maryland militia, under General 
 Tobias E. Stansbury, and which formed nearly all the 
 first line at Bladensburg, were even worse treated. As 
 to this, I can not do better than quote from General 
 Stansbury's letter to the committee of congress that 
 
 135 
 
investigated the destruction of the capitol : 
 
 "On Saturday, August 20th, about one o'clock P. 
 M., I received by express letter No. 1, directing me to 
 move down with my whole force for Washington.* 
 
 "I immediately issued orders for wagons to be 
 procured, provisions served out, tents struck, and ev- 
 erything prepared to march that evening. But the 
 difficulty of obtaining wagons to transport tentsand 
 camp equipage prevented my moving more than a part 
 of the brigade this evening. The residue followed on 
 the morning of the 21st. The advanced party camped 
 at the Stag tavern ; the rear three miles short of it, on 
 the evening of the 21st. 
 
 "About 10 o'clock P. M. I received from General 
 Winder by express letter No. 2, dated the 21st, direct- 
 ing me to halt until further orders. August 22nd, at 
 10 o'clock A. M., received from General Winder letter 
 No. 3, dated at the Wood Yard the 21st, 10 o'clock P. 
 M., directing me to advance with all speed to Bladens- 
 burg. In consequence thereof, the line of march was 
 taken up immediately, and at 7 o'clock P. M. we ar- 
 rived at Bladensburg * * * * About 10 o'clock A. M. 
 (the 23rd) received from General Winder letter No. 4, 
 dated at Headquarters, Battalion Old Fields, August 
 22nd, containing orders to march my brigade slowly 
 toward Marlborough, and take a position on the road 
 not far from that place. The brigade was instantly 
 
 *At this time his brigade was encamped one and a half 
 miles north of Baltimore. 
 
 136 
 
put in motion, and the march commenced towards 
 Marlborough. ***-** After proceeding about one 
 mile on the road to Marlborough, I met Captain Moses 
 Tabbs riding express to inform me that the enemy, 
 with their whole force, had left Marlborough, and 
 were on their march toward me, distant about six 
 miles. This information made me determine to avail 
 myself of the high grounds I occupied in the morning, 
 to which I immediately returned, and made the neces- 
 sary preparations to receive the enemy.* I directed 
 Captain Tabbs to return and reconnoitre the enemy, 
 and give me every information. About 4 o'clock P. M. 
 he returned, and informed me that the enemy, on leav- 
 ing Marlborough, had taken a different route. Soon 
 after, my aid-de-camp, Major Woodyear, returned 
 from General Winder, and informed me that the intel- 
 ligence I had received of the movements of the enemy 
 was in part incorrect, and that General Winder wished 
 me to encamp on the direct road from Bladensburg 
 to Marlborough, at about seven miles distant from the 
 latter place. ***** By letter No. 4 I was first in- 
 formed that Lieutenant-Colonel Sterett's detachment, 
 were attached to my command. * * * * About sunset 
 on the 23rd he (Sterett) arrived with his command. 
 The fatigued condition of his troops induced me to 
 halt for the night on the hill near Bladensburg, with 
 
 *At this time he had a force of only 1,353, officers and 
 men. The British force was reported at this time to be from 
 7,000 to 10,000 men. 
 
 137 
 
the intention of moving toward Marlborough at re- 
 veille on the 24th. At about 8 o'clock P. M. a militia 
 captain * * * came into camp, and informed me he 
 was from General Winder's camp at Battalion Old 
 Fields * * * * that a detachment from the army had 
 skirmished that day with the British. * * * * About 
 11 o'clock P. M. the Secretary of State, Colonel Mon- 
 roe, with several gentlemen, came to my tent * * * * 
 and advised vigilance to prevent surprise. Soon after 
 the departure of Colonel Monroe, the advance pick- 
 ets, on the road by which we expected the enemy, and 
 which was the direct one from Marlborough, fired, and 
 in a few moments my whole command was under arms 
 and prepared for action. * * * * The troops were un- 
 der arms until after 2 A. M. of the 24th, when, being 
 advised by the cavalry that the enemy were not near, 
 I ordered them to retire to their tents, but to be ready 
 to turn out at a moment's notice. * * * * About half 
 after 2 o'clock A. M., Major Bates came to me from 
 Washington, with a message from General Winder in- 
 forming me that General Winder had retreated from 
 Battalion Old Fields into the city of Washington. 
 * * * ** Thus was my expectation of security from 
 the Battalion and river roads cut off, my right flank 
 and rear uncovered, and liable to be attacked and 
 turned. * * * * Orders were instantly given to strike 
 tents and prepare to march, and in about thirty min- 
 utes, without noise or confusion, the whole were in 
 motion, and about half past 3 o'clock in the morn- 
 
 138 
 
ing passed the bridge at Bladensburg leading to the 
 city of Washington. Securing our rear from surprise, 
 we halted in the road until the approach of day, with 
 a view of rinding some place where water could be had, 
 in order that the men might cook their provisions. 
 The provisions consisted of salt beef in inferior quali- 
 ty, the flour old and musty. At daylight I moved on to 
 the foot of a hill near a brick-yard, and there ordered 
 the troops to refresh themselves. This was about one 
 and one-half miles from Bladensburg. Early in the 
 morning, I had dispatched Major Goodyear to Wash- 
 ington to inform General Winder of my movements 
 and situation, of the exhausted state of the troops, and 
 the impracticability of their meeting the enemy, in 
 their present fatigued state. * * * A note was pre- 
 sented to me by an express from General Winder 
 * * * * directing me to oppose the enemy as long as 
 I could. * * * * I called a council of war ***** 
 Colonel Sterett observed that he marched from Balti- 
 more with a determination to defend the city; that his 
 men, the day before, by a forced march, reached Blad- 
 ensburg without halting to cook ; that they had been 
 under arms nearly the whole of the night, without 
 sleep or food ; that Major Pinkney's riflemen, and the 
 twj companies of artillery, were in the same situation; 
 that they were so completely worn down and exhaust- 
 ed that he would consider it a sacrifice of both men 
 and officers to seek the enemy. ***** At this mo- 
 ment Major Woody ear returned from Washington, 
 
 139 
 
with positive orders from General Winder to give the 
 enemy battle at Bladensburg. * * * * I immediately 
 ordered the troops to retrace their steps to Bladens- 
 burg, determined to maintain, if possible, the ground 
 at all hazards." 
 
 It was these troops, marched and counter- 
 marched, forward and back, all the day and through 
 the night, not an hour for rest, much less sleep, "their 
 only provision salt beef of an inferior quality, and old 
 and musty flour, and no time to cook that," marched 
 and marched back again in the morning, ready to drop 
 from hunger and fatigue, that two or three hours later 
 had to meet the British I* 
 
 What was the physical condition, and resultant 
 morale, of the opposing forces? 
 
 During the three days after the British army land- 
 ed at Benedict they advanced only fifteen miles and 
 
 *Possibly Laval's cavalry suffered most of all. It was 
 on constant duty, reconnoitering, patrolling and escorting 
 "from the afternoon of the 21st until 11 at night of the 23rd, 
 when it reached the Eastern Branch Bridge, 'both men 
 and horses hungry and harassed with fatigue,' and remained 
 in that condition until the next morning. They then suc- 
 ceeded in procuring a stack of hay, and the men were in the 
 act of fetching it on their heads to feed their famished horses, 
 when the trumpet sounded, and they were compelled to drop 
 it and mount, a number of the horses being unable to pro- 
 ceed." Yet the cavalry managed to reach the battle ground 
 before the battle of Bladensburg, and they "seem to have 
 been considered as a part of the first line." Laval, a French- 
 man and an officer of experience, stated, in his account to the 
 congressional committee, that his men were unable to make 
 a charge: "the men, from fatigue and hunger, hardly able to 
 sit their horses, or the horses to move." 
 
 140 
 
rested quietly each night. Williams says that they 
 took time "to amuse themselves during the day by 
 plundering the country bordering on their line of march, 
 and to regale themselves on the summer fruits and 
 melons." A Subaltern in America says of the troops 
 landed at Benedict that some were "lying at full length 
 upon the grass, basking in the beams of a sultry sun, 
 and apparently made happy by the very feeling of the 
 green sod under them. Others were running and leap- 
 ing about." Speaking of them later, after the night 
 spent at Marlborough, he says : "Fresh, and in excel- 
 lent spirits, we rose next morning, and, having stood 
 the usual time with our men, began to consider how 
 we should most profitably and agreeably spend the 
 day. * * *The attacks which they from time to time 
 made upon farm-yards and pig-styes were, to a certain 
 degree at least, allowable enough. It would have been 
 unreasonable to expect that hungry soldiers, in an en- 
 emy's country, would sit down to digest their hunger, 
 while flocks of poultry and herds of swine were within 
 their reach. And then with respect to tobacco, that 
 principal delicacy of soldiers upon active service, 
 there was no reasonable cause for scarcity or com- 
 plaint." The Subaltern in more than one page of his 
 interesting history, details the moves made by officers 
 and men to keep their stomachs well filled with the 
 delicacies of the countryside. The stores of preserves 
 were especially relished and more than one respectable 
 wine cellar was discovered. Sustenance was so abund- 
 
 141 
 
ant that "the quarter-master arriving soon after the 
 halt with stores of bread and rum, an additional al- 
 lowance of both was served out, as well to the men as 
 to the officers. " 
 
 The British army felt itself secure. It had, during 
 one night, at least, no pickets, though Winder and his 
 army were only a few miles away. Of its nights be- 
 tween landing and the battle at Bladensburg, all but 
 the last afforded a full night's comfortable rest (for 
 this army was well equipped) "with nothing to dis- 
 turb their repose and self-complacency." The night 
 of the 23rd was the only one that did not give them 
 long repose — Ross put them in motion the morning of 
 the-24th some time before four o'clock. But that was to 
 avoid marching in the heat of the day. Always they 
 marched slowly — while our troops were hurried back 
 and forth ; always they were complacent and con- 
 temptuously indifferent — while our troops were kept 
 in uncertainty and apprehension; always they rested 
 during the day and reposed comfortably at night — 
 while our troops lay in the open, and were not allowed 
 one full night's undisturbed rest ; always they had full 
 rations and even more — while our troops got less than 
 two rations in four days. 
 
 142 
 
J 
 
 10. 
 
 THREE COMMANDERS TOO MANY. 
 
 We have seen that the American troops were 
 marched and counter-marched, day after day and also 
 night after night, and when not marching were often 
 kept standing in the ranks; and during all this had 
 only partial rations, of poor quality — at times none at 
 all ; in fact, were handled, not as any good strategy or 
 commonsense would have dictated, but clearly with- 
 out settled plan or purpose, and certainly in a way 
 that outraged all military rules and all intelligence and 
 commonsense. If the British commander of the in- 
 vading forces had been allowed to specify what should 
 be done with and to the American troops, he could 
 hardly have conceived — for he was an intelligent mili- 
 tary man — of anything that would have been so favor- 
 able to him as the very things that were done. If 
 those responsible for the movements and treatment of 
 the American troops assembling and assembled to 
 meet the British Chesapeake expedition had endeavor- 
 ed to do that which would be the most helpful to the 
 
 143 
 
British, they could hardly have succeeded better. But 
 the British commanders can not be blamed for the out- 
 rage perpetrated on our troops, for what was done 
 was so incredibly stupid and vicious that it never oc- 
 curred to the British that anything of the sort was be- 
 ing done! 
 
 On whom, then, must the blame rest? There is a 
 great and somewhat stinking mess of conflicting state- 
 ments and so-called evidence. This mess leaves some 
 things in doubt, but it makes it plain that the blame 
 must rest on these four: 
 
 Armstrong, Secretary of War — the most. 
 - Monroe, Secretary of State — next. 
 
 Madison, President and Commander-in-Chief. 
 
 Winder, Commander under the preceding — the 
 least. 
 
 We have been advised in the preceding chapter 
 of the arrival of the President and members of his 
 cabinet at Long Old Fields the evening of August 
 22nd. Unfortunately this was not the beginning and 
 by no means the end of the meddling, and most unin- 
 telligent meddling, of Madison, Monroe and Arm- 
 strong. They were "in the field" during the two days 
 before the battle, and, what was yet far more unfortu- 
 nate, they were on the field the day of the battle ! 
 
 Williams says in his most enlightening volume : 
 
 "The President of the United States is, by the 
 highest law of the land, commander-in-chief of the 
 army and navy; and President Madison was actually 
 
 144 
 
in the field and exercising command. The Secretary 
 of War is the channel of communication from the 
 President to all officers of the army, high and low, and 
 any suggestion or request from him is equivalent to 
 an order. Secretary Armstrpng was also in the field, 
 and in addition to the authority of his official position, 
 he was considered by many, and certainly considered 
 h'.mself, to possess profound military science, as well 
 as some military experience. Colonel Monroe, the 
 Secretary of State, from the outset took an active in- 
 terest and share in the practical operation of the cam- 
 paign. General Winder was under the immediate 
 personal supervision of these high functionaries, all 
 much older than himself, and he, instead of having the 
 prestige of a high military reputation to support him 
 in case of difference of opinion, had yet a reputation 
 to achieve." 
 
 The National Intelligencer, the Washington pa- 
 per that existed almost altogether to advance the po- 
 litical interests of the administration, said in its issue 
 of August 30th : 
 
 "The President of the United States was not only 
 active during the engagement which took place with 
 the enemy, but had been exerting himself two or three 
 days previous, and has been personally active ever 
 since. Everyone joins in attributing to him the great- 
 est merit." 
 
 That is interesting as showing the very low depth 
 145 
 
to which journalistic and political flunkeyism could 
 reach at that time. 
 
 The miscalled exertions of the President, very 
 nearly altogether verbal, during the two or three days 
 before the battle will have brief, and adequate, treat- 
 ment later. As for his activities on the day of the 
 battle, they also will have mention in a later chapter. 
 
 With Madison — Monroe — Armstrong — Winder all 
 active in the field, any result except victory was pos- 
 sible and no result that was discreditable could be sur- 
 prising. 
 
 The first and most essential requisite of all milita- 
 ry movements is the authority and direction of one 
 mind and will. In his instructions to his generals, 
 Frederick the Great quotes and endorses the saying of 
 Prince Eugene that "a general who wishes to avoid a 
 battle need only call a council of war." 
 
 The most blame is put upon General Armstrong 
 because, as Secretary of War, his duty was plain, was 
 defined, and it was urgent — to do what he could to 
 make the military forces of the United States more 
 than a match for those of the enemy. Instead of doing 
 what he could he did more nearly as little as he could. 
 His stubbornness has been referred to : he would not 
 believe that Washington was in any danger. He 
 treated with discourtesy those that, intelligently and 
 rightly apprehensive, sought to have him take proper 
 measures for defense. Instead of acting promptly and 
 
 146 
 
with vigor, he was both feeble and dilatory in the lit- 
 tle that he did. His stubbornness was not the only 
 reason for his attitude, and in justice to him this other 
 reason, referred to in a previous chapter, should be 
 mentioned. He had recommended for the post given 
 General Winder (and, as we have seen, if not for po- 
 litical reasons, at least the reasons of the politician) 
 Brigadier-General Moses Porter, an experienced, tried, 
 and rather able commander. General Armstrong was 
 very much chagrined that General Porter was not put 
 in command of the American forces in the vicinity of 
 Washington, and he had a right to be. In the summer 
 of 1814, the 5th Military District, which included the 
 District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia, was 
 commanded by General Porter. It would have aroused 
 too much public criticism to have removed him or to 
 have put General Winder over him; hence out of his 
 district was carved the new 10th Military District. It 
 was freely said and written, especially during the con- 
 troversy over the burning of the capitol, and appar- 
 ently no real effort was ever made to disprove it, that 
 Colonel Monroe was responsible for the 10th Military 
 District and Winder, and for this reason: It would 
 not do to allow a commanding general to get such 
 glory from a victory over the British that he could 
 aspire to the nomination for the Presidency; hence a 
 really able commander, especially if his record were 
 such that the troops would have in him that confidence 
 that is such an important influence for victory, would 
 
 147 
 
be too dangerous. Further, Colonel Monroe intended 
 to be active on the field of battle — and apparently both 
 he and Madison thought at the time that when it oc- 
 curred the battle would be a victory for our forces — 
 and he hoped and expected to get no small glory from 
 his part in the battle ;* but that would be impossible 
 if General Porter were in command, for such was his 
 repute as a commander that Colonel Monroe could not 
 hope possibly to shine very brilliantly with him on the 
 field ; especially as Porter was an exceedingly blurT 
 old soldier that probably would not stand for any in- 
 terference or other nonsense. It is certain that Gen- 
 eral Armstrong urgently recommended that General 
 Porter be called from his headquarters at Norfolk, 
 which he "had made impregnable to any force which 
 the enemy could bring against it," and be given the 
 immediate task of organizing and equipping an army 
 that, under his command, would meet and defeat the 
 invaders. It is equally certain that when General 
 Armstrong found that his recommendation would not 
 be heeded he, on one occasion, at least, did the grace- 
 ful thing, and signed the order for the creation of the 
 10th Military District ; and he did this although it did 
 not correctly state the reasons for the creation of the 
 
 *The eyes of the whole people would be upon the defend- 
 ers of Washington; a brilliant volunteer achievement, accom- 
 plished without the orders acknowledged of the commanding 
 general, would win for him the hearts of his countrymen, and 
 render his future elevation sure. — Capture of Washington by 
 Williams. 
 
 148 
 
district. It has been suggested that the reason for this 
 was General Armstrong's desire to obtain the nomina- 
 tion for the Presidency and therefore his disposi- 
 tion to do what would please the President; but this 
 surely does him an injustice. He could, and, at times, 
 he did, show a broad, generous spirit. Thus, in his 
 Memoirs, written after the War of 1812, and "when cer- 
 tainly he had reason to think bitterly of the events of 
 that War, and of the blame unjustly put on him for 
 "the Invasion of the City of Washington," he writes 
 dispassionately and fairly of the appointment of Gen- 
 eral Winder and of his (Armstrong's) desire to have 
 General Porter appointed, and adds: "No objection to 
 General Winder, except a want of military experience, 
 either was or could be made ; his patriotism and cour- 
 age had already been tested, and were generally ac- 
 knowledged." 
 
 Armstrong might have been more receptive, alert, 
 prompt and energetic in doing his part to provide a 
 force adequate to meet the British army if General 
 Porter had been in immediate command of that force. 
 But the fact can not be gainsaid that as Secretary of 
 War in his office in Washington he fell far short of his 
 full duty. He was stubbornly blind and inactive. 
 
 Yet even greater blame may properly be put on 
 him because he left his office in Washington and, like 
 Madison and Monroe, journeyed to Long Old Fields 
 August 22nd. His object, as was the object of Mon- 
 roe, was to get more in the public eye, to be more 
 
 149 
 
prominent in the military operations, to get a greater 
 portion of the glory — it actually appears that victory, 
 rather than defeat, was expected ! Monroe was much 
 less culpable than Armstrong, for the duties of the 
 Secretary of State at that time did not confine him 
 closely to Washington. It was very different as re- 
 gards the Secretary of War. With an army to be as- 
 sembled, organized, equipped and properly officered, 
 the proper place for the Secretary of War could be 
 only in his office in the city of Washington, for only 
 there could he transact the heavy and important busi- 
 ness that it was imperative he should transact to do 
 his work as Secretary of War. In his office at Wash- 
 ington he would be sought by those that had business 
 to transact with him ; there were the records, assist- 
 ants, aids and means essential to the transaction of his 
 urgent business. 
 
 Armstrong was much to blame for neglecting the 
 business of the Secretary of War while he was in 
 Washington; he was more to blame for deserting his 
 office and his business altogether. The proper place 
 for the Secretary of War, who is an executive, not a 
 commander, is in his office, and not in the field. In the 
 field he can do only one of two things — interfere or, 
 more happily, nothing. And in the field he can not 
 possibly escape the neglect of his proper work. For 
 whatever reason he leaves his office he condemns him- 
 self as not a good Secretary of War. Armstrong must 
 bear most of the blame for the failure at Bladensburg 
 
 150 
 
because of his inefficiency while in Washington and 
 even more because he left Washington. 
 
 Monroe is blamed more than Madison because he 
 was useless while he hindered as much and meddled 
 even more — especially on the field, at Bladensburg — 
 and he had even less excuse for meddling. As for use- 
 fulness, General Wilkinson gives the following ac- 
 count, which he says he had from "an officer of charac- 
 ter, rank, and intelligence," and there is abundant oth- 
 er evidence to corroborate : 
 
 "During the morning of the 24th I was repeatedly 
 in the tent of General Winder, where I found the Pres- 
 ident, the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and the 
 Attorney-general assembled, to deliberate on the state 
 of things and aid the general (Winder) with their coun- 
 sel. Observing no privacy in their deliberations, the in- 
 terest I took in the public welfare prompted me to in- 
 trude some of my own ideas, more especially as a pal- 
 pably erroneous opinion appeared to prevail that the 
 enemy would approach by that bridge, and that the 
 troops ought therefore to be detained where they were 
 to defend it. I felt anxious they should move to Blad- 
 ensburg early, and unite with the militia which had 
 arrived from Baltimore, because it would require a 
 great deal of time to post the men advantageously, and 
 to communicate the orders and instructions how to 
 act, according to the various chances and events of 
 battle. It seemed mere folly to expect the enemy by 
 way of the bridge, where a dozen men, with half an 
 
 151 
 
hour's notice, by destroying it, might arrest their pro- 
 gress. General Armstrong suggested they might lay 
 a bridge of pontoons; I answered, it was impossible; 
 to which he replied, with a sneer, that the word impos- 
 sible was not to be found in the military vocabulary. 
 The mere belief that an army, certainly short of 7 
 or 8,000 men, destitute, as we knew them to be, of 
 horses to transport their artillery and baggage could, 
 notwithstanding, contrive to carry an equipage of pon- 
 toons sufficient for laying a bridge across a river near- 
 ly half a mile wide, demonstrated that General Arm- 
 strong's knowledge of pontoon bridges extended not 
 much beyond the name. 
 
 "The conversation at General Winder's quarters 
 during the morning was rather desultory ; first one 
 suggestion was made and commented on, and then an- 
 other ; no idea seemed to be entertained that it was 
 necessary to come instantly to a decision how we 
 should act, and to set immediately about it. When I 
 mentioned the certainty of the enemy approaching by 
 the route of Bladensburg in preference to the bridge, 
 and the expediency of taking post there without fur- 
 ther delay, I observed my opinion to produce some 
 effect on the mind of the President ; by the others it 
 was not much regarded." 
 
 The reader is advised to read the quotation again, 
 considering carefully all the points therein, being care- 
 ful to keep in mind that the British forces had landed 
 a few miles away the 18th, that they had been in that 
 
 152 
 
neighborhood for six days, and that at the headquar- 
 ters of the commanding general the morning of the 
 day of the battle of Bladensburg there was no definite 
 knowledge of the numbers of the British force ; of its 
 movements, although it had been on the march since 
 three o'clock that morning: only the sheerest conjec- 
 tures of its destination — and they wrong; no plan of 
 action decided on, or even being seriously considered, 
 and no disposition to prompt, energetic action ; all was 
 "desultory!" 
 
 Mr. Rush, the Attorney-General, in his letter to 
 the committee of congress to investigate "the Invasion 
 of the City of Washington," said of this morning of 
 August 24th at General Winder's headquarters : 
 
 "I there found the President, General Winder 
 and two or three military officers. The Secretary of 
 State, I understood, had previously been there, 
 but had gone on to Bladensburg. The Secretary of the 
 Navy came into the room not long afterwards. The 
 conversation turned upon the route by which it was 
 thought most likely the enemy would make his ap- 
 proach. It was interrupted by dragoons, who had 
 been on scouts, coming in every few minutes with 
 their reports. The preponderance of opinion, at this 
 period, I took it to be, that he would be most likely to 
 move in a direction toward the Potomac, with a view 
 to possess himself of Fort Warburton (Fort Washing- 
 ton) in the first instance. This way of thinking in- 
 duced, as I supposed, General Winder to retain a large 
 
 153 
 
portion of his force in the neighborhood of the East- 
 ern Branch Bridge, in preference to moving it on to- 
 wards Bladensburg. * * * * After the lapse of prob- 
 ably an hour from the time I reached headquarters, an 
 express arrived from General Stansbury, commanding 
 the Baltimore troops at Bladensburg, rendering it at 
 length certain that the British army was advancing in 
 that direction. General Winder immediately put his 
 troops in motion, and marched off with them for Blad- 
 ensburg. 
 
 "When he had left the house, the Secretary of 
 War, in company with the Secretary of the Treasury, 
 arrived there. The President mentioned to the for- 
 mer the information which had just been received, at 
 the same time asking him whether, as it was probable 
 a battle would soon be brought on, he had any advice 
 or plan to offer upon the occasion. He replied, that 
 he had not. He added that, as it was to be between 
 regulars and militia, the latter would be beaten. All 
 who were in the house then came out, the Secretary 
 of War getting on his horse to go to Bladensburg." 
 
 Major Williams observes that "it appears, there- 
 fore, that General Armstrong went, or rather was or- 
 dered, to Bladensburg for the purpose of making exer- 
 tions to falsify his own prediction as to the result. 
 He had to choose between endeavoring to save his rep- 
 utation as a military man and his credit as a prophet, 
 and the latter was certainly the easier task of the two." 
 
 It was, when the destruction of the capital was a 
 154 
 
live topic, rather freely insinuated that Armstrong 
 found his vindication as a prophet not only the easier 
 task, but the more agreeable task. The manuscript 
 papers of President Madison showed that on the 23rd 
 and 24th of August the President and the Secretary of 
 War had very little direct communication with each 
 other, that there was great reserve between them, and 
 that Armstrong told the truth when he wrote of the 
 moment of departure from Winder's headquarters for 
 Bladensburg: "I again met the President, who told 
 me that he had come to a new determination, and that 
 the military functionaries should be left to the dis- 
 charge of their duties, on their own responsibility. I 
 now became, of course, a mere spectator of the com- 
 bat." 
 
 To sum up : The Secretary of War offered no plan 
 of campaign; doubtless he had none ; and if he had had 
 one, the probabilities are that he would not have di- 
 vulged it, as he did not desire to do anything to aid 
 General Winder, who had been appointed contrary to 
 his wishes. Further, no one else — President, Secre- 
 tary of State, Winder or any one else in authority — 
 had any plan. All were most excellent Micawbers, 
 waiting for something to turn up. Even as late as 
 after nine o'clock of the morning of the 24th there was 
 the same indifference, the same lassitude, the same 
 lack of information, the same lack of plan and of ac- 
 tion, the same hesitancy, vacillation, inefficiency, as 
 
 155 
 
well as of common sense and military intelligence, that 
 there had been since the War began.* 
 
 Was a successful plan of campaign against the 
 British force possible? Yes — easy and certain. Of that 
 in another chapter. Was Armstrong right — must mili- 
 tia always be defeated by regulars? Let Plattsburg and 
 New Orleans answer. If Macomb or Jackson or Har- 
 rison had been in command of the 10th Military Dis- 
 trict ; if the Secretary of War had been competent for 
 his place and had stayed where he could do his work and 
 had done it, instead of seeking publicity by being with 
 the army ; and if Madison and Monroe had kept away, 
 the British under Ross would have been grievously 
 defeated. But ifs, even an array of them, do not win 
 battles. 
 
 The least blame is placed on General Winder be- 
 cause all the evidence is that he did his very best, and 
 had from no one in position to give him real aid near 
 the help that he had a right to expect. There is abund- 
 ant evidence, some of which appears in this book, that 
 he labored hard during the day and late into the night, 
 that he travelled from place to place, that he made the 
 greatest exertions, to assemble, equip and put into 
 shape an efficient force ; and everywhere he met with 
 indifference and procrastination, if not actual opposi- 
 tion — none the less actual because often covert. Yet 
 
 *Only Winder and Monroe displayed physical energy 
 and activity. Monroe was active because, most of all, he 
 wished to be President. 
 
 156 
 
further, as is made plain from what has preceded in 
 this chapter, for days before the battle and even on the 
 day of battle, he was under the eye and direction of 
 the President and Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary 
 of War, and Colonel Monroe — all three his superiors, 
 and two of them regarding themselves as men of much 
 greater military ability. As Brigade-Major Williams 
 observes, "General Winder was the commanding gen- 
 eral in little more than name, and that his movements 
 were influenced, if not actually dictated, by his super- 
 visors, who were neither in harmony among them- 
 selves, nor consistent any one with himself, and one of 
 whom, General Armstrong, was not likely, from his 
 self-willed and resentful disposition, to be over-zealous 
 in his efforts to produce a result which would justify 
 Mr. Madison's selection of General Winder instead 
 of General Porter as the commanding-general." 
 
 157 
 
11. 
 
 STRATEGY AND TACTICS. 
 
 In the preceding chapter it was asserted that a 
 successful plan of campaign against the British force 
 that burned the capitol could have been devised and 
 executed. 
 
 The total American force at the battle of Bladens- 
 burg was 5,435 — 4410 militia, 380 regulars, 125 dra- 
 goons, 400 sailors and 120 marines. The British force 
 was 3,540, all regulars. 
 
 In addition to the troops actually at or near Blad- 
 ensburg, as enumerated in the preceding paragraph, 
 there were other troops that should have been em- 
 ployed. There was a brigade of 500 militia and vol 
 unteers, which included a company of cavalry. They 
 cwere unusually efficient for militia and volunteers. 
 They reported to General Winder August 18th. The 
 only use made of them was to defend the approach to 
 Fort Washington — no real use at all. Also, a regiment 
 of Virginia militia, 600 infantry and 100 cavalry, but 
 they could not get arms until August 24th, after the 
 
 158 
 
battle of Bladensburg! And about 500 additional 
 troops, including about 200 cavalry, in several small 
 bodies. 
 
 The battles of Plattsburg and New Orleans show 
 that, rightly used, the American troops would have 
 defeated the British. 
 
 Not in a pitched battle; not in any one battle un- 
 less the militia had some protection or cover — and 
 which they easily could have had when the time ar- 
 rived. 
 
 What, then, should have been the strategy, the 
 plan of campaign, of the Americans? 
 
 For a time, at least, the very opposite of that 
 which is generally the best strategy. 
 
 It is a military axiom that "He who divides his 
 force will be beaten in detail." The corollary was ex- 
 pressed by that master of strategy, Bonaparte, who 
 said that "the whole art of war consists in being the 
 strongest on a given point."* Another authority has 
 said that the object of strategy should be always "to 
 operate a combined effort with the greatest possible 
 mass of force upon the decisive point." Another mili- 
 tary maxim is, Divide et impera — Divide and conquer. 
 It is axiomatic, and applies to many things other than 
 war, and it is older and more fundamental than any 
 scientific warfare. Another authority, Frederick, said 
 that "the talent of a great captain consists in inducing 
 theTenemy to divide his forces." It might be added that 
 
 *Count de Segur's Campaign in Russia, book VII, chap. 8. 
 159 
 
generally the efforts of the great strategist will be to 
 compel the enemy to divide his forces — will be to di- 
 vide the forces of the enemy. This was one-half of the 
 favorite strategy of Bonaparte. The other half was to 
 strike with all his force. It was the secret of his suc- 
 cess from Montenotte to Ligny. Two days after Lig- 
 ny he ignored his favorite strategy while Wellington 
 succeeded late in the day in completing this strategy 
 and the result was Waterloo. One of the very great- 
 est commanders the United States has ever produced, 
 General "Stonewall" Jackson, said that right strategy 
 was "getting there fust with the mostest men."* As 
 pointed out in The Battle of Plattsburg, the Platts- 
 burg expedition and also the New Orleans expedition 
 was founded on the strategy to divide the forces of the 
 enemy. It was this same strategy which resulted in 
 "the Father of Waters" flowing "unvexed to the sea." 
 Sherman's March to the Sea was dictated by it. It has 
 been the rule of all great commanders to strike with 
 superior force — superior in number, or equipment, or 
 training and experience, or morale — at the vital point ; 
 and nearly all successful campaigns have been the re- 
 sult of this. 
 
 But there are properly exceptions to every rule, 
 
 *Some have actually concluded that because Jackson 
 used this language he was uneducated and used only such 
 language! Like most very serious and religious men, Jack- 
 son had a keen, subtle sense of humor; and he also knew that 
 a great truth may often be made more effective by pictur- 
 esque or peculiar expression. 
 
 160 
 
and some of the most successful campaigns have been 
 because a commander had the daring and resource to 
 go contrary to the rule just discussed. Perhaps the 
 best example of such a campaign is found in Bona- 
 parte's invasion of Russia in 1812. The Russian gen- 
 erals avoided a decisive battle ; they divided and re- 
 treated, but harassed and nagged, while detachments 
 bit at the French-and-allies army like stinging insects 
 — Bonaparte ravaged Lithunia, but all the time swarms 
 of Cossacks hung on his flanks and in Lithunia alone 
 he lost more than 100,000 soldiers — dead of disease 
 and hardship, but many killed or captured by the 
 harassing parties of Russians. It was this that laid 
 the foundation of Leipzig little more than a year later. 
 It was this strategy — avoidance of a pitched battle and 
 the constant harassment of mobile parties taking all 
 advantage of every natural feature of the theatre of 
 operations — that should have opposed the British that 
 landed at Benedict and which doubtless would have 
 been successful. 
 
 This strategy was urged, but it was ignored. It 
 was freely charged that it was ignored, and a pitched 
 battle was insisted on, because not the proper strategy 
 but a pitched battle would allow of the spectacular per- 
 formance on the field of battle of a certain aspirant for 
 the Presidency — a performance that would not only 
 advance him toward the coveted nomination, but 
 would also add to the prestige and popularity of the 
 national administration. 
 
 161 
 
Doubtless there was some good reason for this 
 charge. But it is nearer the truth to say that no one 
 connected with the movements of the American forces 
 — from Madison to Winder* and beyond, had any plan 
 of campaign or any strategy whatever. (Armstrong 
 would be excepted, but he really had no voice in deter- 
 mining those movements). Williams says, referring 
 to the conferences in which the President took the lead 
 and his expressed notions about certain military mat- 
 ters, that it appeared that the Secretary of War and 
 others were to "leave strategic operations to be deter- 
 mined by the President in cabinet, aided by lights de- 
 rived from Grotius and Puffendorff, instead of Lloyd, 
 Tempelhoff, and Jomini." 
 
 In another place Williams, a soldier of ability and 
 experience, with a record always creditable, and in 
 1814 "Brigade Major and Inspector, Columbian Brig- 
 ade" (District of Columbia troops) says: 
 
 "There is no treatise on strategy which can provide 
 for all the circumstances of a general's position, and 
 no one has acknowledged this more fully and frankly 
 than Jomini himself. * * * * Nevertheless, the art of 
 war has been reduced to certain fixed rules, and there 
 is such a science as strategy, the principles of which 
 are not to be despised because they are not infallible. 
 
 *A letter that Winder wrote to Armstrong a few days 
 after he was appointed to the command of the 10th District, 
 rather feebly points out the right strategy; but apparently 
 Winder dropped it at once and during August had neither 
 strategy nor plan. 
 
 162 
 
 
And the plan of harassing the enemy recommended by- 
 General Armstrong and General Wilkinson, though it 
 made detachments necessary, so far from being 
 against the principles of the art of war, was in perfect 
 conformity with them. Writers on the art of war rec- 
 ommend, and common sense dictates, that the weaker 
 of two belligerents should, as a rule, resort to harass- 
 ing guerilla warfare rather than to pitched battles, 
 more particularly against an invading enemy." 
 
 Williams says that "this is the plan emphatically 
 dictated by Lloyd, whom Jomini seems disposed to 
 regard as the father of modern strategy." He quotes 
 also General Rognat, as saying in his Considerations 
 sur 1'Art de la Guerre, "Les bons principes de la guerre 
 defensive veulent qu' au lieu de s'opposer de front a 
 une armee envahissante qui cherche a penetrer dans 
 Tinterieur d'un pays, on se place sur ses flancs, etc." 
 But Williams goes on to say that Winder had not the 
 means of pursuing the course recommended by Rog- 
 nat — hanging on the enemy's flanks — and rear — and 
 harassing him by multiplied attacks, because "such a 
 plan of war requires experienced troops, or, at the 
 least, men accustomed to the use of arms, to danger, 
 and fatigue;" and he quotes Jomini, "il n'y a que de 
 troupes legeres qui puissent remplir cet objet" — only 
 light troops can accomplish this object.* And Wil- 
 
 *The author's translation. And as an American by birth 
 and long inheritance he would be indeed content to know 
 only the language of the United States if he could always 
 use it correctly — and forcibly in advocacy of military pre- 
 paredness. 
 
 163 
 
Hams quotes Jomini further that the light troops must 
 be well trained, and not those that "manquaient en- 
 tierement d'activite, et n'avaient rein de leger que le 
 nonV' — lack training altogether and are light troops 
 only in name.* Williams says that Jomini "probably 
 would not have considered either raw militia or sailors 
 with 18-pounders as fulfilling the necessary condi- 
 tions." Yet he immediately goes on to say that "the 
 petite guerre, therefore, recommended by General 
 Armstrong and General Wilkinson, appears to be in 
 perfect conformity with theory." 
 
 Let us look, therefore, a little into the petite 
 guerre, the flank attacks, the harassing guerilla war- 
 fare, recommended by Armstrong and Wilkinson, and 
 rejected by Madison and Monroe. 
 
 Then we will briefly consider if the force that 
 could have been put at the disposal of Winder — more, 
 the force that was put at his disposal — was inadequate 
 and unfitted for such warfare. 
 
 Armstrong quoted "a high authority" that "mul- 
 tiplying small attacks, made by day and by night, on 
 the camp-guards, detachments, and communications 
 of an enemy, will greatly retard his progress, dimin- 
 ish his strength, and, not improbably exhaust his pa- 
 tience." That General Armstrong and especially 
 General Wilkinson** advocated this strategy was well 
 
 *The author's translation. 
 
 **Wilkinson was always much more successful than 
 Armstrong in making himself heard. 
 
 164 
 
known, especially in Washington, and naturally 
 enough some supposed that this strategy would be 
 employed. Thus Mr. Campbell, in his letter to the 
 committee oi' congress, wrote: 
 
 "It appears to have been expected that, in case our 
 force was not considered sufficient to meet and repulse 
 the enemy on his landing, his advance would be op- 
 posed, and his progress, at least, retarded, as far as 
 practicable, by harassing him on his march, erecting 
 defensive works at suitable positions, and throwing 
 such other obstructions in his way as was best calcu- 
 lated to check his movements ; for all which operations 
 the nature of the country through which he must pass 
 was said to be favorable. * * * * Falling in conver- 
 sation with the Secretary of War on this subject, I ex- 
 pressed my apprehensions that suffering the enemy to 
 approach so near as to make the fate of the city de- 
 pend on a single battle ***** was hazarding too 
 much. He appeared to concur in this opinion * * * * 
 he gave me to understand that the movements which 
 had taken place were not in pursuance of any plan or 
 advice given by him." This was the evening of August 
 23rd. 
 
 That "the nature of the country through which" 
 the enemy "must pass was said to be favorable" for the 
 operations advised by Armstrong and Wilkinson was 
 an over-cautious statement — they were favorable. This 
 was considered very important by both Armstrong 
 and Wilkinson. They recommended the guerilla war- 
 
 165 
 
fare, not only because sound strategy indicated it, but 
 because the nature of the country favored it. The 
 country was cut up by numerous deep ravines separat- 
 ed by ridges and hills and covered with timber, in 
 many places exceedingly dense, as so vividly shown 
 by A Subaltern in America. These ravines ran in many 
 directions — often at right angles to the line of march 
 of the British and at times parallel. This, of course, 
 was true of the ridges also. The reader knows that 
 such a terrain is especially well adapted to guerilla 
 warfare. It was doubly suitable to warfare conducted 
 by such troops as Winder had. They were accustomed 
 to the woods, though they may have lived in Balti- 
 more or Washington. They were "woods wise." The 
 British were not. Then the greater part of the troops 
 Winder had were militia and it had been well demon- 
 strated that they would fight well when they had some 
 protection, some cover. It will be recalled that Wash- 
 ington noted this in his letter to Reed. Macomb knew 
 this, and after the first day his absolutely raw militia 
 and volunteers fought well because they had the cover 
 of the woods or of stone walls. They fought well 
 September 12th, because they had not only the cover 
 of the woods, but the planks from the bridges across 
 the Saranac had been made into barricades, and while 
 the militia and volunteers had been harassing Prevost 
 on the flanks, the regulars and others had been com- 
 pleting redoubts and other protective works.* Jackson 
 
 *See The Battle of Plattsburg. 
 166 
 
knew militia thoroughly and won at New Orleans be- 
 cause he gave his troops cover, protection. The forces 
 under Winder, posted on the ridges and hills to attack 
 the flanks of the British, would have had excellent 
 cover, a protection they were familiar with and would 
 have appreciated ; and when it became advisable or 
 necessary for them to retire they could have done so 
 safely along a ravine, under cover of the woods. Wil- 
 kinson has told with great detail just where each de- 
 tachment would have been stationed and by what 
 route it would have retired ; he names or locates each 
 hill, ridge, ravine or road, and gives the number of 
 troops, and the name aPnd character of the detachment 
 that should have been placed at each point. We are 
 not interested in these details ; and to understand them 
 fully one would need not only maps, but probably also 
 a personal knowledge of the localities. What is im- 
 portant is that although Wilkinson had many enemies 
 and they never wearied of attacking him, they were 
 never able to show that his strategy was not much 
 better than that which was employed — rather, than 
 the hit or miss lack of strategy. And this makes it 
 proper to take three extracts from his Memoirs — 
 enough to give a correct idea of the strategy he advo- 
 cated. It is proper to say that Wilkinson produced 
 witnesses that could not be impeached to prove that 
 he had advocated this strategy and had formulated 
 plans of defense days and weeks before August 2-1 — 
 very early in July, if not in June. But to quote Wil- 
 
 kmson: ,,- 
 
 16/ 
 
"Here it may be proper to remark, that the max- 
 im, 'he who divides his forces will be beaten in detail,' 
 must be received with qualification, as the art of war 
 depends on an infinity of contingencies, and therefore 
 is not reducible to specific rules: it will apply to 
 armies nearly on an equality, which are maneuvering 
 for advantages-, but never to an inferior force, which, 
 though competent to harass its adversary, dare not 
 hazard a general engagement." 
 
 "Apathy, indifference, and a blind confidence 
 marked President Madison's conduct, until the enemy 
 was at the threshold; yet from the singular nature of 
 the country, the capital might have been saved by the 
 instrumentality of axes and spades, supported by two 
 hundred mounted riflemen, an hundred dragoons, and 
 four pieces of artillery only ; but such was the distrac- 
 tion, the irresolution, and imbecility which ensued the 
 landing of the enemy, and such had been the unpar- 
 donable improvidence before, that not a single bridge 
 was broken, not a causeway destroyed, not an inunda- 
 tion attempted, not a tree fallen, not a rood of the road 
 obstructed, not a gun fired at the enemy, in a march 
 of nearly forty miles, from Benedict to Upper Marl- 
 borough, by a route on which there are ten or a dozen 
 difficult defiles; which, with a few hours labor, six 
 pieces of light artillery, 300 infantry, 200 riflemen, and 
 60 dragoons, might have been defended against any 
 force that could have approached them; such is the 
 
 168 
 
 
narrowness of the road, the profundity of the ravines, 
 and the sharpness of the ridges." 
 
 "I did believe, that by covering the roads in front 
 of the enemy with working-parties, to obstruct them 
 by all practicable means, and at the same time by fall- 
 ing on their rear by the new road to Zakiah swamp, 
 or that by St. Paul's church, with Peter's artillery, 
 Stull's, Davidson's, and Dougherty's riflemen and in- 
 fantry, and fifty dragoons; whilst simultaneous at- 
 tacks were made on his front and left flank, at every 
 exposed point or difficult defile, by flying parties of 
 four or five hundred infantry, so stationed as to relieve 
 each other as the enemy advanced ***** that by 
 such attacks, judiciously conducted and vigorously 
 pushed, if the enemy had not retraced their steps, 
 they would have crossed the Patuxent at Nottingham 
 or Pig Point, and returned to their shipping; or if 
 they had persevered in their march against the capital, 
 their boats might have been destroyed, and their re- 
 treat cut off, or rendered a scene of carnage." 
 
 It will not be amiss to remark that the British 
 were especially weak in such warfare as Armstrong 
 and Wilkinson advocated. The British fought by 
 rule. They always lacked adaptability. Generally 
 they had an ill-founded contempt for their adversary — 
 a contempt that on rather numerous occasions cost 
 them dearly. On uneven ground — ridges and ravines, 
 cut by streams — and covered with the forest, they em- 
 ployed the same tactics that they used on the open 
 
 169 
 
plain on which they were trained and to which they 
 were accustomed. "These savages may indeed be," 
 said General Braddock to Benjamin Franklin, "a for- 
 midable enemy to your raw American militia, but up- 
 on the King's regular and disciplined troops, sir, it is 
 impossible they should make any impression." But 
 400 Indians and French killed or wounded 63 of the 86 
 officers of the Braddock expedition, and killed 714 men 
 out of 1,100 — and would have done even better had it 
 not been for a young American officer, named George 
 Washington, whose training, such as that which many 
 of the militia had received, fitted him for Indian war- 
 fare. Indian warfare was essentially guerilla warfare. 
 Guerilla warfare was legitimate and according to the 
 rules, for it did not include cruelty nor did it make 
 women and children its victims, as did Indian warfare. 
 The British would have fared better in the War of the 
 Revolution if they had not stubbornly held fast to cer- 
 tain methods of warfare. Their tactics were inflexi- 
 ble. This was generally true in The Second War of In- 
 dependence. Wellington's Peninsular veterans fought 
 at Plattsburg and New Orleans in exactly the 
 same way, employing the same tactics and means, 
 that they had used in Spain ; and they did the same 
 on their leisurely march to Bladensburg, although 
 they used better tactics in the battle near there. 
 Stubbornly maintaining their close ranks, sticking in 
 column to the road, disdaining to deploy or skirmish, 
 they were pre-eminently the troops that would have 
 
 170 
 
suffered most from the warfare advocated by Arm- 
 strong and Wilkinson, and they were just the troops 
 that would have been of the least embarrassment and 
 danger to light troops, mobile, agile, having initiative, 
 at home in the woods, and readily adapting themselves 
 to cover. All the more would they have been helpless 
 against such troops because they did not have any cav- 
 alry whatever — not one horse. Yet further, they had 
 practically no artillery of any kind. Both Armstrong 
 and Wilkinson attached much importance to the lack 
 of cavalry and artillery, as it certainly lessened great- 
 ly their ability to prevent guerilla warfare or to strike 
 back at light troops infesting flanks and rear. 
 
 Apparently Armstrong stuck to his strategy to 
 the last, and it is not evidence to the contrary that on 
 one occasion, when it had become impossible to em- 
 ploy his strategy at that time, he advocated something 
 else. On the morning of August 24th General Wind- 
 er, from his headquarters "near the Eastern Branch 
 Bridge," sent a note to Secretary Armstrong, in which 
 he said: 
 
 "The news up the river is very threatening. Bar- 
 ney's or some other force should occupy the batteries 
 at Greenleaf's Point and the Navy-Yard. I should be 
 glad of the assistance of counsel from yourself and the 
 government." 
 
 The committee of congress reported that on the 
 back of this note was the following memorandum in 
 the handwriting of Secretary Armstrong : 
 
 171 
 
"Went to General Winder ; found there the Presi- 
 dent ; Mr. Monroe had also been there, but had set out 
 for Bladensburg to arrange the troops and give them 
 an order of battle, as I understood ; saw no necessity 
 for ordering Barney to Greenleaf's Point or the Navy 
 Yard. Advised the Commodore to join the army at 
 Bladensburg, and ordered Minor's regiment to that 
 place. Advised General Winder to leave Barney and 
 the Baltimore brigade* upon the enemy's rear and 
 right flank, while he put himself in front with all the 
 rest of his force. Repeated this idea in my letter to 
 him of the 22nd." 
 
 Commenting on this, Williams says, "he (Arm- 
 strong) still harps upon the enemy's rear, and flanks, 
 and front." 
 
 • Williams had no friendship for Armstrong. His 
 position as Brigade Major and Inspector of the Co- 
 lumbian Brigade brought him into contact with the 
 Secretary of War and he says, with evident feeling, 
 that General Armstrong was "not a very agreeable 
 person to hold a discussion with, his arsenal of argu- 
 ments consisting in too great part of oaths, sneers and 
 sardonic smiles." He was, also, "opinionated, rude 
 and disdainful." 
 
 Williams was an able and nearly always fair writ- 
 er on military topics, but his personal feeling must 
 
 *This was Stansbury's brigade, which, as we know, was 
 inarched back and forth, or kept standing in ranks, night as 
 well as day, with rations of infamous quality or no rations, 
 until worn out; yet was in the front line of the battle at 
 Bladensburg. 
 
 172 
 
have led him to condemn the strategy of Armstrong 
 and Wilkinson, on the ground that Winder's troops 
 were not suitable to the warfare advocated. If their 
 18-pounders that he mentions were not suited to the 
 work to be done, they could have been ignored — if the 
 Americans had no artillery, they would be on an equal- 
 ity with the British. But the Americans had suitable 
 artillery. For example, they had two companies of 
 light artillery among the District troops — commanded 
 by Major George Peter, whom Williams himself says 
 "had obtained a high reputation as an officer of experi- 
 ence and ability in the regular service," and by Cap- 
 tain Benjamin Burch, a Revolutionary soldier. Wil- 
 liams himself says that each company had six six- 
 pounders. Also, according to Williams, there was an- 
 other District "company of artillery, with two brass 
 six-pounders and one brass four-pounder, command- 
 ed by Captain Marstetler." Among the Maryland 
 troops were "two companies of volunteer artillery, un- 
 der Captains Myer and Magruder, with six six-pound- 
 ers." These quotations are from Williams' own enu- 
 meration of forces; and this light artillery was avail- 
 able from the 18th and all was capable of effective 
 work. Williams would lead one to believe that Wind- 
 er had no troops that could shoot. At Bladensburg 
 they demonstrated that they could shoot. A Subal- 
 tern in America says the fire from the militia was the 
 hottest he had ever encountered, and he was an old, 
 seasoned soldier. He pays a high compliment indeed 
 
 173 
 
to the marksmanship of the militia. The American 
 militia were good marksmen. Many of them were ac- 
 customed to fire-arms. It should be remembered, also, 
 that there were some well trained regular troops. 
 Finally there were, according to Williams himself, 
 "more than 400 cavalry," generally efficient, "a part of 
 it very efficient." Rightly employed, this cavalry 
 would have given the Americans a great advantage, 
 for the British had no cavalry ; especially as the Amer- 
 icans could have been well supplied with guides that 
 knew not only every road but every acre of the forest, 
 and the men and the horses of the cavalry did not need 
 to have good roads to move along — they were accus- 
 tomed to find their way through the woods. 
 
 No ; it would not have been impossible for Gen- 
 eral Winder to have employed the strategy advocated 
 by the Secretary of War and Wilkinson, notwith- 
 standing that Williams allows his personal feeling to 
 sway him so far at times that he argues that Winder 
 lacked the essential means. Wilkinson had said, to 
 illustrate how his strategy might have been employed 
 and might have worked out :* 
 
 "General Winder should, in my judgment, have 
 ordered his main body, commanded by General Smith, 
 which was under arms near the Wood Yard ready for 
 combat, to have gained the heights on the left of 
 Charle's Creek, and, as soon as the enemy had resumed 
 their march and passed Oden's, he should have fol- 
 
 *Memoirs. 
 
 174 
 
lowed them, and fallen on their rear at the time Gen- 
 eral Smith engaged their front, or when their center 
 had passed the creek ; but the enemy gave him a more 
 favorable opportunity by turning to their right soon 
 after they had passed Bishop Claggett's, on a road so 
 flanked by hills and ravines that, by a vigorous attack, 
 their rear might have been broken and cut up before 
 they could have made front to support it. Pent up in 
 such narrow, difficult grounds, and pressed in front 
 and rear, the effect of General Ross' discipline and 
 numbers would have been impaired, and he must have 
 been crippled before he could have extricated himself, 
 while the American corps, with the country open be- 
 hind them, could have withdrawn at discretion, and, 
 although the enemy might have gained Upper Marl- 
 borough, it would have terminated their advance. 
 This is speculation, but, whatever may have been its 
 merits, I know the corps of Scott and Peters panted for 
 action, and they should have been indulged; in such 
 circumstances, blood judiciously expended excites em- 
 ulation and inspires courage." 
 
 His critics could not successfully attack General 
 Wilkinson's strategy. They could only assert that 
 Winder lacked the necessary means. Thus, comment- 
 ing on the quotation just made from Wilkinson's Me- 
 moirs, Williams says : 
 
 "In indulging in these speculations, General Wil- 
 kinson does not seem to have recollected the anecdote 
 with which, in another part of his book, he satirizes a 
 
 175 
 
speculation of Secretary Armstrong 'in his cabinet at 
 a thousand miles distance.' 'I think,' said the minister 
 to Eugene, 'you might have crossed the river at this 
 point,' tracing the route on a map with his finger. 
 'Yes, my lord, if your finger had been a bridge.' " Yet 
 even Williams at times admits that Winder's availa- 
 ble force might have been effective for the harassing 
 warfare. He quotes Armstrong, without disapproval, 
 for the fact could not be gainsaid, as saying August 
 23rd, (according to Colonel M'Clane) : "mul- 
 tiplied attacks, made simultaneously or in succession, 
 on the front, flank and rear of an enemy's march. 
 Such was the well-known affair of Lexington, in the 
 War of the Revolution, in which 1,800 of the British 
 elite were so beaten, disheartened and exhausted, that, 
 had they not, at sunset, found armed vessels to pro- 
 tect, and an intrenched camp to receive them, not a 
 man would have escaped capture or death." 
 
 Williams says that this "plan advised by General 
 Armstrong on the 19th* was similar to the course Gen- 
 
 *This was reported by Colonel Allen M'Clane, who was 
 a volunteer aid to General Winder and kept a journal during 
 the campaign. On date of August 19th in his journal, M'Clane 
 reported a conversation with General Armstrong, in which 
 Armstrong said: 
 
 "Our course is a plain one: assemble as large force as 
 we can; place it speedily at Nottingham or other point on the 
 Patuxent; clear the road between that and Benedict of horses 
 and cattle; break down bridges; abattis the route, when lead- 
 ing through woods; select strong points for defense; and, as 
 soon as his movements begin, harrass his front and flanks 
 by small attacks made by night and by day, while Stuart op- 
 erates in the same way on his rear." 
 
 176 
 
eral Wilkinson says he would have adopted;" and 
 which course has already been made plain. 
 
 As Wilkinson said, with rather rare modesty for 
 him, his plan was "speculation"; but certainly it was 
 more promising, more in accord with # the strategy in- 
 dicated by the conditions and more in accord with the 
 warfare of successful commanders under like condi- 
 tions, and it was far more nearly common sense, than 
 the strategy, if such it could be called, that was adopt- 
 ed. 
 
 But the Fabyan strategy and tactics advocated by 
 Armstrong and Wilkinson is not often popular among 
 the masses, and certainly did not give the promise of 
 glory to an aspirant to the Presidential nomination 
 and of popularity for a national administration, that 
 was offered by one important pitched battle. Further, 
 Madison was, as pointed out in an early chapter, in- 
 clined to urbanity and had a nice sense of the proprie- 
 ties. Wilkinson, at times inclined to satire, may have 
 happily expressed the fact when he wrote : 
 
 "President Madison preferred to signalize himself 
 in a pitched battle, and, as he scorned the idea of tak- 
 ing any advantage of his antagonist, he permitted him 
 an undisturbed march to the theatre of combat." 
 
 177 
 
12. 
 
 THE BATTLE LINES. 
 
 It will not be amiss to review the location and 
 condition of the American forces assembled to defend 
 Washington, on the morning of August 24, 1814. 
 
 Bladensburg, already frequently mentioned, a vil- 
 lage, in 1814, of about 1,200 people, is about six miles 
 northeast of Washington. ''But," wrote A Subaltern 
 in America, "the houses are, for the most part, com- 
 posed of brick." There was, connecting it and Wash- 
 ington, a good turnpike, "formerly the mail road to 
 Baltimore. North of this road is another old road, 
 which before the City of Washington was founded, 
 was the route from Georgetown to Bladensburg. 
 These roads meet, at an angle of about forty-five de- 
 grees, some sixty or eighty yards from the river at 
 Bladensburg. From the junction the turnpike-road 
 continues on to the river, not abutting, however, im- 
 mediately at the bridge, but curving for a short dis- 
 tance to the south and east along the margin of the 
 stream, and following a sort of causeway, which, at 
 
 178 
 
the time we speak of, was bordered on the west side 
 by thickets of small trees and bushes, and which led 
 to the bridge. The bridge is somewhat less than thirty 
 yards in length, and about four in breadth, and the 
 stream, a few rods above or north of the bridge, is 
 everywhere fordable."* 
 
 A Subaltern in America said, as just quoted, that 
 "the houses are, for the most part, composed of 
 brick;" and he continues: "There is a mound on the 
 right of the entrance very well adapted to hold a light 
 field piece or two for the purpose of sweeping the 
 road. Under these circumstances, we naturally con- 
 cluded that an American force must be here. Though 
 out of the regular line, it was not so far advanced but 
 that it might have been maintained, if not to the last, 
 at all events for many hours, while the means of re- 
 treat, so soon as the garrison should be fairly over- 
 powered, were direct and easy. Our surprise, there- 
 fore, was not less palpable than our satisfaction, 
 when, on reaching the town, we found that it was 
 empty." 
 
 The other British soldiers of this expedition as 
 well express their surprise that Bladensburg, 
 which would have so well lent itself to defense, 
 was not occupied by a considerable body of American 
 troops; especially as the houses would have afforded 
 cover and protection that the American troops so 
 well liked ; would have favored the style of fighting 
 
 *Major John S. Williams. 
 
 179 
 
that the American forces should have adopted; and 
 made conditions that plainly indicated the use of not 
 only light artillery, but of riflemen. But the only 
 riflemen Stansbury had with him had been refused 
 rifles! And, besides, it could hardly have been ex- 
 pected that Stansbury would risk the occupation of a 
 position so far advanced when his force, sadly limited 
 in numbers, was made far less effective because of fa- 
 tigue and hunger. Further, Stansbury was not an ex- 
 perienced and perhaps not an able commander — cer- 
 tainly he never claimed to be. Armstrong quotes 
 this description of his army from Winder's letter to 
 "the Committee of Inquiry:" "A mass of men sud- 
 denly assembled without organization or discipline, 
 or officers of any the least knowledge of service, 
 excepting Major Peter; or if any, unknown to me." 
 And Armstrong proceeds to comment as follows: 
 "Yet to officers thus described — to Stansbury and 
 Smith — he assigns the duty of choosing his position, 
 and to Mr. Monroe, that of forming his order of bat- 
 tle !" It must be remembered that Armstrong had 
 wished Porter, not Winder, in command of the Amer- 
 ican forces; also, that Armstrong was a man of vio- 
 lent prejudices; but it appears that there were good 
 grounds for his criticism, especially as what he said 
 about Stansbury was never disputed. 
 
 At any rate, Stansbury's force, after its counter- 
 march to Bladensburg, recounted in a previous chap- 
 ter, "occupied the triangular field" formed by the 
 
 180 
 
roads named on the first page of this chapter, near 
 their junction. "In this field, on the Georgetown 
 road, and about a hundred and fifty yards from the 
 junction of the roads, there stood a large barn or to- 
 bacco house, and between the barn and the Washing- 
 ton turnpike there was an orchard, which commenced 
 at the barn and extended more than half way across 
 the field, or about a hundred and twenty or thirty 
 yards toward the turnpike. In front of the barn, 
 looking toward the river, the ground has a gentle 
 descent, and upon the brow of the declivity, near the 
 Georgetown road, and some thirty or forty yards in ad- 
 vance of the barn, had been hastily constructed a bar- 
 bette battery of earthwork, intended for heavy ord- 
 nance. This battery was distant about three hundred 
 and fifty yards from the bridge at Bladensburg, nearly 
 west of it, and commanded it by an oblique and not 
 enfilading fire."* 
 
 We should remember that Stansbury had posi- 
 tive orders to give battle at Bladensburg; and if a 
 pitched battle for the defense of Washington was to 
 be fought, the route of the British troops made the 
 crossing of the two highways the place for the battle. 
 The battle ground presented natural features that, 
 properly used, recommended it to the American forces. 
 Stansbury's choice of battle ground was not altogeth- 
 er faulty by any means ; nor was his disposition of his 
 forces subject to severe criticism, if any. Even Wil- 
 *Major Williams' account. 
 
 181 
 
liams says that his intended order of battle was "not 
 the worst that could have been adopted." 
 
 In his account of the battle, General Stansbury 
 said: 
 
 "On arriving in the orchard near the mill, I di- 
 rected the artillery to post themselves behind a small 
 breastwork of dirt that lately had been thrown up by 
 Colonel Wadsworth.* This battery commanded the 
 pass into Bladensburg and the bridge southwesterly 
 of the town. Our artillery consisted of six six-pound- 
 ers ; Major Pinkney's battalion of riflemen on their 
 right, under cover of the town and bushes, also com- 
 manding the pass by the bridge; two companies from 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Shutz's regiment, under the com- 
 mand of Captains Ducker and Gorsuch, acting as rifle- 
 men, although principally armed with muskets, on the 
 left of the artillery, near, and protected by, the barn, 
 intended to defend the road leading by the mill, on 
 the left of the battery, into the field ; Colonel Sterett's 
 regiment was halted in the orchard, on the right and 
 in the rear, and the regiments of Colonels Ragan and 
 Shutz were also halted in the orchard, in the rear and 
 on the left flank, near the creek. My intentions were 
 that they should remain here to refresh themselves 
 as long as possible, and, as soon as the enemy ap- 
 peared, to form Colonel Sterett's regiment (in whom 
 
 *The same Colonel Wadsworth that, as already narrat- 
 ed, arranged and executed the plan that once saved Barney's 
 flotilla. He was a most capable, efficient and active officer, 
 and was almost disgraced because of his good work. 
 
 182 
 
I placed great confidence) on the right, their left rest- 
 ing on and supporting the right of Major Pinkney's 
 riflemen, in view of the bridge, and fronting the road, 
 along which ran a fence, and act as occasion should 
 require. Colonels Ragan and Shutz's men were to be 
 drawn up in echelon, their right resting on the left of 
 Captains Ducker and Gorsuch's rifle companies, in or- 
 der to prevent the enemy from pressing and turning 
 our left, hoping that General Winder would join me 
 before the battle would commence, and occupy the 
 ground in my rear as a second line." 
 
 It must be said, in justice to General Stansbury, 
 that he displayed no small ability in disposing of his 
 force. Major Williams made further comment on his 
 battle formation as follows: 
 
 "By this prepared disposition of Sterett's regi- 
 ment, the troops from the city of Baltimore would 
 have been stationed so as to support and give confi- 
 dence to each other; and as they were well disciplined 
 and reliable troops, and some of them were necessarily 
 to encounter the first shock of the contest, Stansbury's 
 intended order (of battle) * * * * had the merit of 
 placing all parts of his line within supporting distance 
 of each other." 
 
 What was the condition of the forces thus dis- 
 posed the morning of August 24th? We already 
 know how they were marched and countermarched 
 or kept standing in line, without opportunity to cook 
 their unfit and well nigh poisonous rations, without 
 
 183 
 
even opportunity at times to have water to drink. 
 Stansbury says of their condition this morning of 
 August 24th: 
 
 "The men under my command were worn down and 
 nearly exhausted from long and forced marches, want 
 of food, and watching. They had been, with very lit- 
 tle intermission, under arms and marching from the 
 time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little 
 sleep, bad provisions, and but little opportunity 
 to cook. They certainly were not in a condition to go 
 into battle; but my orders were positive, and I was 
 determined to obey them." 
 
 But General Stansbury's line of battle was not al- 
 lowed to remain as above described. The change that 
 was made in it was, all competent critics agreed, large- 
 ly responsible for the conduct of his forces and was 
 certainly a serious error. Whoever was responsible 
 for the change was careful not to take the blame ; and 
 who that person might be led to a lively controversy. 
 This change in his line, and its tactical effect, are 
 well stated by General Stansbury: 
 
 "While I was giving some directions to the artil- 
 lery, I found Lieutenant-Colonels Ragan's and Shutz's 
 regiments had been moved from the place where I 
 had stationed them, and marched out of the orchard 
 up the hill, and formed in order of battle about two 
 hundred and fifty yards above the orchard, and up- 
 wards of five hundred yards in the rear of the artillery 
 and riflemen. Thus uncovered by the trees of the or- 
 
 184 
 
chard, their situation and numbers were clearly seen 
 by the enemy from Lowndes' Hill, and the flanks of 
 the artillery and riflemen unprotected, and laid liable 
 to be turned, our main body being placed too far off 
 to render them any aid. On riding up the hill to 
 know who had ordered this movement, I was informed 
 that General Winder was on the ground. I immedi- 
 ately rode to the mill, where I understood General 
 Winder was, and found him reconnoitering the posi- 
 tion of the enemy. While in conversation with him, 
 the 5th regiment was taken out of the orchard, 
 marched up the hill, and stationed on the left of Col- 
 onel Shutz's regiment, that of Colonel Ragan being 
 on the right, its right resting on the main road ; but, 
 as I before observed, the whole at so great a distance 
 from the artillery and riflemen that they (the artillery 
 and riflemen) had to contend with the whole British 
 force, and so much exposed that it has been a cause 
 of astonishment they preserved their ground so long, 
 and ultimately succeeded in retreating. Whose plan 
 this was I know not ; it was not mine, nor did it meet 
 with my approbation ; but, finding a superior officer 
 on the ground, I concluded he had ordered it, conse- 
 quently did not interfere." 
 
 General Stansbury's conclusion that General 
 Winder had ordered the remarkable break-up of his 
 battle line, was incorrect, and did Winder a great in- 
 justice. In his account of the battle Winder states 
 that almost immediately after he reached the field of 
 
 185 
 
battle, and which was about noon, he found General 
 Stansbury "and Colonel Monroe together. The latter 
 gentleman informed me that he had been aiding Gen- 
 eral Stansbury to post his command, and wished me 
 to proceed to examine it with him, to see how far I 
 approved of it." But this was prevented by the ap- 
 pearance of the British and the beginning of the bat- 
 tle. 
 
 Undoubtedly it was Monroe that changed the bat- 
 tle line, and General Armstrong has this to say* of 
 the activities of Colonel Monroe on the field of battle : 
 
 "It is only in the following report, that we are 
 made acquainted with this busy and blundering tac- 
 tician that Stansbury does not know, and whom 
 Pinckney will not name. 'The 5th regiment,' 
 says Sterett, 'was formed under the direction of Col- 
 onel Monroe, on the left and in line with General 
 Stansbury's brigade. * * * * I ought also to notice, 
 that the first line formed on the battle ground, was 
 changed under the direction of Colonel Monroe.' In 
 addition to this information, Colonel Sterett adds : 
 'The action commenced about one o'clock, by an at- 
 tack on the redoubt, where the riflemen and artillery 
 were placed. These soon retired, and the 5th covered 
 their retreat, and kept up a lively fire, and supported 
 their place in line with firmness, until the enemy had 
 gained both flanks, when the order to retreat was giv- 
 en, by General Winder himself. The opposing front 
 
 ♦Notices of the War of 1812, Vol. II, Chap. 5. 
 186 
 
of the enemy was never disconcerted by the fire of the 
 artillery or the riflemen, and the brigade of General 
 Stansbury was seen to fly, as soon as the action be- 
 came serious. No second line or reserve appeared to 
 advance or support us, and we were out-flanked and 
 defeated, in as short a time as such an operation could 
 well be performed.' " 
 
 The statements of Colonel Sterett were not ac- 
 curate or correct, though doubtless made honestly 
 enough. As A Subaltern in America and other Brit- 
 ish soldiers testified, General Stansbury's brigade 
 fought much better and longer than Colonel Sterett 
 states. It is certain, also, that this brigade would have 
 fought yet longer and better if the battle line had not 
 been changed. 
 
 The tactics of the day of battle were almost, or 
 quite, as stupid and bad as the alleged strategy of the 
 days preceding the battle. It is certain that the front 
 line, broken up and misplaced by Monroe, was of such 
 extent, was so formed, and so placed, that the tactics 
 of the British were obvious, and the flanking of the 
 line inevitable. Its forced retirement was also inevi- 
 table unless it had reinforcements, but the reinforce- 
 ments it might have had were so placed — rather mis- 
 placed — that they were never brought forward — were 
 really not intended to reinforce the first line. Just 
 what they could reasonably be supposed to do has 
 never been determined. Even the master tactician of 
 
 187 
 
the day, Monroe, never found time to give this infor- 
 mation. 
 
 But we are anticipating the battle itself. For a 
 moment we will here digress to observe that those 
 responsible for the strategy and tactics of the battle 
 at Bladensburg certainly believed in keeping soldiers 
 on the go. Apparently they thought that the two 
 things a soldier should not be allowed to do were to 
 eat and sleep. The American troops were kept march- 
 ing most of the day and night ; and when not marching 
 they were kept standing in line, without rations, or 
 were reviewed by the President. Apparently their 
 commanders thought that it was a crime to let an 
 American soldier rest. Though worn out, and ready 
 to drop from exhaustion, due to hunger and exposure 
 as well as to much marching and little rest, the troops 
 were marched and again marched as the battle was 
 about to begin. Major Pinkney had this to say of the 
 effect of the change of position of the 5th regiment: 
 
 "The 5th regiment, which had been removed from 
 a position where it might have contrived to repulse 
 the enemy, in his attempts to leave the bridge, had 
 now, to the great discouragement of my companies, 
 and of the artillery, been made to retire to a hill, sev- 
 eral hundred yards in the rear. The two companies of 
 General Stansbury's brigade, acting as riflemen, had 
 changed their position, so that I no longer perceived 
 them. The residue of the brigade had been removed 
 from the left, and made to take ground (invisible to 
 
 188 
 
us by reason of the intervening orchard) on the right 
 of the 5th regiment, with its own right resting on the 
 main road, and disclosed to the enemy." 
 
 In his statement to the committee of congress, 
 Major Pinkney complained rather bitterly of what he 
 termed this "new order of battle." "The 5th regi- 
 ment,',' he said, "had been made to retire to a hill sev- 
 eral hundred yards in our rear, but visible, neverthe- 
 less, to the enemy, where it could do little more than 
 display its gallantry." 
 
 In his statement Lieutenant-Colonel Sterett said, 
 "I ought to notice that the first line formed on the bat- 
 tle ground was changed under the direction of Colonel 
 Monroe. On this occasion he observed to me, 'Al- 
 though you see I am active, will you please bear in 
 mind that this is not my plan?' or words to that ef- 
 fect." 
 
 But if not Monroe's plan, whose? It hardly was 
 Madison's or Armstrong's or Winder's or Stansbury's. 
 The only explanation is that Sterett must have misun- 
 derstood Monroe. Williams quotes Monroe as say- 
 ing that the removal of the 5th regiment "at a late 
 period, was a measure taken in reluctance and in 
 haste." And what follows in his statement leaves it 
 to be inferred that this movement was ordered by 
 Stansbury. 
 
 Moving the 5th regiment, etc., was such a tactical 
 blunder that after the battle no one wished to own it. 
 
 We can not better dismiss this matter than by 
 189 
 
making a rather lengthy quotation from Williams' 
 Capture of Washington : 
 
 "We have dwelt particularly upon this matter, 
 not only to illustrate the confusion existing at the 
 time of forming the order of battle, owing to the near 
 vicinity of the enemy, and the number of persons ex- 
 ercising independent authority, but in justice to the 
 troops of Stansbury's line, the only troops who can 
 be said to have fled. * * * * It was hardly reasonable 
 to expect that raw militiamen would remain firm in 
 the position in which Stansbury's troops were placed, 
 considering the force which they believed were ad 
 vancing against them, and the alarm created by the 
 rockets, a species of weapon wholly unknown to them, 
 and apparently of the most formidable description. 
 The orchard would have served as a cover for them, 
 and, if permitted to remain in it, they might have been 
 encouraged by the shelter which it afforded, by the 
 steadiness which the troops in their front displayed 
 under the advance of the enemy, and even by the ex- 
 citement attending an opportunity of immediate ac- 
 tion." 
 
 What about the rest of the American forces? 
 
 About eleven A. M. General Stansbury was 
 reached by a dragoon from Lieutenant-Colonel Beall, 
 who brought the information that Beall "was on the 
 road from Annapolis to Bladensburg, with about 
 eight hundred men, distant from me about five miles," 
 says Stansbury in his account of the battle, "and 
 
 190 
 
 
wished to know the distance and situation of the en- 
 emy. * * * I advised the colonel * * * to take a po- 
 sition on the high grounds north and northwest of 
 Bladensburg, which would completely protect my left 
 by preventing the enemy from outflanking us that 
 way, and force their main body across the bridge, in 
 the face of my artillery and riflemen, and expose them 
 to the fire of the 5th regiment under Colonel Sterett,* 
 who would be protected by the fence. This advice it 
 appeared Colonel Beall only took in part. * * * * He 
 took his station on the hill, as I was informed * * * * 
 about one and one-half miles in my rear." General 
 Winder says that when the British reached the vicin- 
 ity of Beall's position, his (Beall's) "detachment gave 
 one or two ineffective fires and fled." Before we dis- 
 miss these troops it is only just to observe that as they 
 were not moved forward to support and aid the first 
 line, but were held in their position, the battle did not 
 reach them until the American forces were in such 
 condition and situation that Beall's troops could not 
 have been much blamed for their conduct, even if the 
 preceding correctly reported it. 
 
 Also, it is but justice to these soldiers to state 
 further, that "the veteran Colonel Beall, in his brief 
 and modest letter to the committee (of Congress) 
 makes no other excuse for his men than to state that 
 they were fatigued and exhausted from their march 
 
 *This was before the 5th had been moved by Colonel 
 Monroe. 
 
 191 
 
of sixteen miles that morning before the battle, and 
 that, according to his own impression, they did not 
 give way 'as early as represented by some.' ,: While 
 it is anticipating the actual battle, it will be said now 
 that Colonel Beall's troops did not flee, and they did 
 not retire until ordered to do so by General 
 Winder. Of this later. Unfortunately they were so 
 misplaced that they could be of little use. 
 
 As for the cavalry, they were placed near the first 
 line. Just who assigned them to their place is not 
 clear. Probably it was Colonel Monroe. Stansbury 
 does not mention their place in the line. Colonel Mon- 
 roe stated that they "were placed to the left, some- 
 what in the rear of the line." There was no attempt 
 made to use them during the battle, and they were 
 not in condition to be of use. The reader will recall 
 that we left them, the morning of the 24th, men and 
 horses exhausted with hard service and by hunger, 
 just as the bugle called the men from giving then- 
 starving horses some hay. It will be recalled that 
 their commander said that they were unable to make 
 a charge — from fatigue and hunger hardly able to sit on 
 their horses, or the horses to move. As a matter cf 
 fact, quite a number of the horses were unable to pro- 
 ceed on the hurried march to Bladensburg the morn- 
 ing of the 24th, and several died on the march. 
 
 The second line was composed of the troops 
 which General Winder had held at the Battalion Old 
 Fields. We have, in a previous chapter, seen what 
 
 192 
 
was their condition the morning of the 24th. That 
 condition was made all the worse by the hurried march 
 through the broiling sun from the Eastern Branch 
 Bridge to the battle field. This march was begun at 
 11 A. M. and these troops reached the field at such 
 time that "they had barely time, on arriving on the 
 ground, to make a hasty selection of position." This 
 position was some distance to the rear of the first line. 
 Just what this distance was can not be determined. 
 General Smith, who commanded these troops, said in 
 his report of the battle : 
 
 "On Wednesday morning, the 24th of August, 
 at 11 A. M., I received orders from General Winder 
 to detach one piece of artillery and one company of 
 infantry to repair to the Eastern Branch Bridge, and 
 to proceed with the residue of the troops to Biadens- 
 burg and take a position to support General Stans- 
 bury. This order was put in immediate execution, and 
 the troops for Bladensburg moved off with all the <*/- 
 pedition of which they were capable. Having put 
 them in motion, I passed on ahead, in order that I 
 might select my position against their arrival. I found 
 General Stansbury * * * * I left him to hasten the 
 arrival of my troops. They moved rapidly on, not- 
 withstanding the excessive heat of the day, covered 
 with clouds of dust and were promptly disposed ot as 
 follows * * * * This position (of the 36th U. S. regi- 
 ment) was about one hundred and fifty yards in the 
 rear of the front line, but extending to the right." 
 
 193 
 
Other of his troops— Peter's artillery, Davidson's light 
 infantry, Stull's riflemen armed with muskets, and 
 part of a District regiment of infantry — were posted a 
 hundred yards further in the rear. Then, "after a 
 short space of time," objection was raised to these po- 
 sitions—Smith did not say by whom— but he "yielded 
 with reluctance to the abandonment of the position: 
 time did not admit of hesitation." Then, when Major 
 Peter's battery had taken its new position, "it was 
 found that the range of his guns was principally 
 through that part of the field occupied by the 36th reg- 
 iment." ( !) "To remove one or the other became nec- 
 essary, and the difficulty of the ground for moving 
 artillery, and the exigency of the movement, left no 
 alternative. The 36th fell back about one hundred 
 yards, losing, in some measure, the advantage of its 
 elevated ground. The position of the 1st regiment 
 District militia, from this circumstance, was also nec- 
 essarily changed. It fell back about one hundred 
 yards. Of the 2nd regiment District militia, two 
 pieces of artillery and one company of riflemen, armed 
 with muskets, were, by directions of General Winder, 
 sent on to the front; with those he flanked the ex- 
 treme left of the front line ; two pieces more of artil- 
 lery were posted in the road near the bridge at Blad- 
 ensburg; the residue of that regiment was formed as 
 a reserve a short distance in rear of Major Peter's bat- 
 tery." General Smith goes on to state that the battle 
 began while his "troops were yet taking their different 
 positions." 
 
 194 
 
 
It will be seen that to the very last possible mo- 
 ment these exhausted troops were marched and 
 marched ; kept uncertain and apprehensive ; and regi- 
 ments were broken up. 
 
 The accounts of others would place this second 
 line a good deal farther to the rear of the first line. 
 Williams says that "the second line of the American 
 army was nearly a mile in the rear of the first." It is 
 certain that it was not in supporting distance of the 
 first line. General Winder was frank in confessing 
 the faults of the disposition of the troops, and his con- 
 fession was to the effect that "the main defect in the 
 arrangement of the troops was their being out of sup- 
 porting distance of each other." General Wilkinson's 
 criticism of the battle simmered down to two definite 
 points — "the bridge at Bladensburg should have been 
 better defended, and the troops were not within sup- 
 porting distance of each other." Williams says that "the 
 disadvantages of the order of battle and of the distance 
 of the two lines from each other, were made worse by 
 the fact that the troops of the first line were generally 
 ignorant that there was a second line, or any troops 
 in the rear to support them, or on which they could 
 fall back. They were under the impression that they 
 were to fight the battle unassisted, against a force four 
 or five times as numerous as their own." Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Sterett said that he "knew nothing of any 
 second line or reserve being formed to support" him. 
 Major Pinkney stated that he "did not know 
 
 195 
 
that Brigadier-general Smith's brigade was in or near 
 the field until the action had ceased," nor that Bar- 
 ney's artillery was on the field. General Stansbury 
 stated that "before and during the action, he "did not 
 see any of the force" he "was led to expect would sup- 
 port" him. 
 
 When one regards the disposition of the Ameri- 
 can forces one must agree with Wilkinson that it 
 was "void of plan or proportion ; and the naked truth 
 is the best apology for it, that is, it was formed on the 
 spur of the occasion, by pieces, and under the direction 
 of many different chiefs, without preconcert, principle 
 or design!" One must grant the justice of the criti- 
 cism of Williams, who said, "in orders of battle formed 
 with such precipitation as those were, under direction 
 of a variety of inexperienced heads, it would be 
 strange if errors did not exist which the merest tyro 
 might point out." 
 
 "Inexperienced heads." "Military inexperience." 
 Therein lay all the trouble; from that came the 
 grievous errors, the defeat, the humiliation! 
 
 One unit of the American forces is yet to be 
 placed. While it is mentioned last, it was of the first 
 importance. It was the sailors of Commodore Bar- 
 ney's flotilla, 400 in number, and the marines from 
 Washington, 120 in number, with two eighteen-pound- 
 ers and three twelve-pounders, and who had joined 
 General Winder at the Wood Yard the morning of the 
 22nd. Barney had continued with General Winder until 
 
 196 
 
 
the morning of the 24th, and in his account of the bat- 
 tle be speaks feelingly of the heat, the crippled con- 
 dition of his men from the severe marches they had 
 experienced the day before, many of them being with- 
 out shoes, and the hurried manner in which he was 
 compelled to take a position.* This position was 
 "about a mile from the stream at Bladensburg." The 
 two eighteen-pounders were planted in the highway, 
 and the three twelve-pounders immediately on 
 the right of them, a portion of his seamen acting as 
 artillerists, and the rest, with the marines, supporting 
 them as infantry. Immediately on his left was the 
 1st regiment of General Smith's brigade commanded 
 by Colonel Magruder, and on his right, on an eminence 
 about 250 yards from the highway, was the command 
 of Colonel Beall. 
 
 This places the American troops on the field of the 
 battle of Bladensburg, although, of course, it does not 
 mention every small division. But we would miss a 
 most juicy bit of evidence of the inefficiency of the 
 conduct of the War if we failed to have some account 
 of the regiment of Virginia militia under Colonel Mi- 
 nor. General Winder said that on the evening of 
 August 23rd "Colonel Minor had arrived in the city 
 (Washington) with five or six hundred militia from 
 Virginia, but they were without arms, accoutrements, 
 
 *He reported: "I preceded the men, and when I arrived 
 at the line which separates the District from Maryland, the 
 battle began. I sent an officer back to hurry up the men, 
 who came on at a trot." 
 
 197 
 
or ammunition. I urged him to hasten his equip- 
 ment." 
 
 Colonel Minor diligently endeavored to do this. 
 It will be recalled that the Secretary of War had de- 
 serted his office to seek glory in the field. From 
 Colonel Minor's letter to the committee of congress 
 we make the following extracts : 
 
 "We concluded it would be proper," to march 
 "with my whole force to the City (Washington), 
 which consisted of six hundred infantry and about one 
 hundred cavalry ***** On receipt of which 
 (General Winder's orders) I took up my line of march 
 immediately, and arrived at the capital between sunset 
 and dark (August 23rd) and immediately made my 
 way to the President and reported my arrival, when he 
 referred me to General Armstrong, to whom I re- 
 paired, and informed him as to the strength of the 
 troops, as well as to the want of arms, ammunition, 
 etc., which made it as late as early candle-light, when 
 I was informed by that gentleman the arms, etc., could 
 not be had that night, and directed me to report my- 
 self the next morning to Colonel Carberry, who would 
 furnish me with arms, etc., which gentleman, from 
 early next morning, I diligently sought for, until a late 
 hour of the forenoon, without being able to find him, 
 and then went in search of General Winder, whom I 
 found near the Eastern Branch, when he gave an or- 
 der to the armorer for the munitions wanting. On 
 my arrival at the armory, found that department in the 
 
 198 
 
care of a very young man, who dealt out the stores 
 cautiously, which went greatly to consume time; as, 
 for instance, when flints were once counted by my 
 officers, who showed every disposition to expedite 
 furnishing the men, the young man had to count them 
 over again before they could be obtained ; and at 
 which place I met with Colonel Carberry, who intro- 
 duced himself to me and apologized for not being 
 found when I was in search of him, stating he had left 
 town the evening before, and had gone to his seat in the 
 country. After getting the men equipped, I ordered 
 them on to the capitol, and waited myself to sign the 
 receipts for the munitions furnished; and, on my ar- 
 rival, was informed * * * * orders had been given to 
 march to Bladensburg, when we took up our march 
 for that place and met the retreating army." 
 
 Alas, since then there have been, more than once, 
 a General Armstrong* and a Colonel Carberry and 
 "a very young man/' in the wrong place! 
 
 *Wilkinson wrote in his Memoirs: "When Colonel 
 Minor applied the evening of the 23rd of August, for arms 
 for 600 Virginia volunteers, the Secretary (of War) observed 
 it would be time enough in the morning; but being pressed 
 for the delivery by the Mayor, who introduced the Colonel, 
 he, with a horrible smile, replied: 'Doctor, you are more 
 
 frightened than hurt. 
 
 199 
 
13. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG. 
 
 Ross put his army in motion early the morning 
 of August 24th. This was no hardship to his troops, 
 for they had been eating well, sleeping well, and rest- 
 ing well. About noon the British approached Blad- 
 ensburg. For half an hour the progress of their col- 
 umn had been made plain to the Americans by a cloud 
 of dust. Hon. William Pinkney, described as an ora- 
 tor and prominent citizen,* was, as we have seen in 
 the preceding chapter, in command of the most ad- 
 vanced American troops, and he says of the opening 
 of the battle : 
 
 "The enemy, having reached Bladensburg, de- 
 scended the hill, about 12 o'clock, in a very fine style, 
 and soon showed his intention to force his way by the 
 bridge. Assisted by some discharges of rockets (which 
 were afterwards industriously continued), he made 
 an effort to throw across the bridge a strong body of 
 infantry, but he was driven back at the very com- 
 mencement of it, with evident loss, by the artillery in 
 
 *But not as a man of military education and experience. 
 200 
 
the battery, which principally acted upon the street or 
 road near the bridge, and he literally disappeared be- 
 hind the houses. * * * * After a long pause * * * a 
 second attempt was made to cross the bridge, with in- 
 creased numbers and greater celerity of movement. 
 This, too, was encountered by the artillery in the bat- 
 tery, but not with its former success, although it was 
 served with great spirit. In consequence a large col- 
 umn of the enemy, which was every moment rein- 
 forced, either by way of the bridge or by the ford im- 
 mediately above it, was able to form on the Washing- 
 ton side, and to menace the battery and the inadequate 
 force by which it was to be supported." 
 
 A Subaltern in America says of the opening of the 
 battle : "The very first shot* cost us three men — one 
 killed, and the other two dreadfully wounded — and the 
 second would have been, in all probability, not less 
 fatal, had we not very wisely avoided it. We inclined 
 at once to the right and left of the road, and, winding 
 round the houses, made our way without any further 
 loss as far as the last range, when we were command- 
 ed to lie down and wait for the column. In the mean- 
 while, the main body, being informed how matters 
 stood (i. e., that Bladensburg was not occupied by the 
 American troops) resumed its march and approached 
 the town. It was saluted, as we had been saluted, by 
 a heavy and well directed cannonade; but, being 
 warned by some of our people where the danger lay, 
 
 *From the battery. 
 
 201 
 
it so far avoided it as to close up its ranks, and effect 
 all the arrangements necessary for the assault under 
 cover of the green mound." 
 
 The u green mound" was known as Lowndes' Hill 
 — "on the right of Bladensburg in approaching the vil- 
 lage by the turnpike from Washington." 
 
 General Winder's narrative is taken up from this 
 point. He said : 
 
 "Their light troops soon began to press across 
 the creek, which was everywhere fordable, and in most 
 cases lined with bushes or trees, which were sufficient 
 to conceal the movements of light troops who act in 
 the manner of theirs, singly. The advanced riflemen 
 now began to fire, and continued it for half a dozen 
 rounds, when I observed them to run back to the skirts 
 of the orchard on the left, where they became visible, 
 the boughs of the orchard trees concealing their origi- 
 nal position, as also that of the artillery, from view. 
 A retreat of twenty or thirty yards from their original 
 position toward the left brought them in view on the 
 edge of the orchard. They halted there, and seemed 
 for a moment returning to their position, but in a few 
 minutes entirely broke and retired to the left of Stans- 
 bury's line. I immediately ordered ihe fifth Balti- 
 more regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Sterett, being the 
 left of Stansbury's line, to advance and sustain the ar- 
 tillery. They promptly commenced this movement; 
 but the rockets, which had, for the first three or four, 
 passed very high above the heads of the line, now re- 
 
 202 
 
ceived a more horizontal direction, and passed very- 
 close above the heads of Shutz's and Ragan's regi- 
 ments, composing the centre and right of Stansbury's 
 line. A universal flight of these two regiments was 
 the consequence. This leaving the right of the fifth 
 wholly unsupported, I ordered it to halt, rode swiftly 
 across the field toward those who had so shamefully 
 fled, and exerted my voice to the utmost to arrest 
 them. They halted, began to collect, and seemed to be 
 returning to their places. An ill founded reliance that 
 their officers would succeed in rallying them when I 
 had thus succeeded in stopping the greatest part of 
 them induced me immediately to return to the fifth, 
 the situation of which was likely to become very crit- 
 ical, and that position gave me the best command of 
 view. To my astonishment and mortification, howev- 
 er, when I had regained my position, I found the whole 
 of these regiments (except a few of Ragan's, not more 
 than forty, rallied by himself, and as many, perhaps, 
 of Shutz's) were flying in the utmost precipitation and 
 disorder. 
 
 "The advanced artillery had immediately followed 
 the riflemen, and retired by the left of the fifth. I di- 
 rected them to take post on a rising ground which I 
 pointed out in the rear. The fifth, and the artillery on 
 its left, still remained, and I hoped that their fire, not- 
 withstanding the obstruction of the boughs of the or- 
 chard, which, being low, concealed the enemy, would 
 have been enabled to scour this approach and prevent 
 
 203 
 
his advance. The enemy's light troops, by single men, 
 showed themselves on the lower edge of the left of the 
 orchard, and received the fire of this artillery and the 
 fifth, which made them draw back. The cover to them 
 was, however, so complete, that they were enabled to 
 advance singly and take positions from which their 
 fire annoyed the fifth considerably, without either that 
 regiment or the artillery being able to return the fire 
 with any probability of effect. In this situation, I had 
 actually given an order to the fifth and the artillery to 
 retire up the hill toward a wood more to the left and 
 a little to the rear, for the purpose of drawing them 
 farther from the orchard and out of the reach of the en- 
 emy's fire while he was sheltered by the orchard. An 
 aversion, however, to retire before the necessity be- 
 came stronger, and the hope that the enemy would is- 
 sue in a body from the left of the orchard and enable 
 us to act upon him on terms of equality, and the fear 
 that a movement of retreat might, in raw troops, pro- 
 duce some confusion and lose us the chance, induced 
 me to countermand the order, and direct the artillery 
 to fire into a wooden barn on the lower end of the or- 
 chard, behind which I supposed the enemy might be 
 sheltered in considerable numbers. The fire of the en- 
 emy now* began, however, to annoy the fifth still more 
 in wounding several of them, and a strong column of 
 the enemy having passed up the road as high as the 
 right of the fifth, and beginning to deploy in the field 
 to take them in flank, I directed the artillery to retire 
 
 204 
 
to the hill to which I had directed the Baltimore artil- 
 lery to proceed, and halt, and ordered the fifth regi- 
 ment also to retire. This corps, which had heretofore 
 acted so firmly, evinced the usual incapacity of raw 
 troops to make orderly movements in the face of the 
 enemy, and their retreat in a very few moments be- 
 came a flight of absolute and total disorder." 
 
 Of this part of the battle General Stansbury said : 
 "The artillery, under the command of Captains 
 Myer and Magruder, and the riflemen, the whole un- 
 der the command of Major Pinkney, behaved in the 
 most gallant manner (this gallant officer, in the course 
 of the action, was severely wounded) ; but the superior 
 force of the enemy, and the rapidity with which he 
 moved, compelled them to retire. But one of the 
 pieces was lost, and that was rendered harmless before 
 it was abandoned. 
 
 The enemy took every advantage of the cover af- 
 forded them by the trees of the orchard, and their light 
 troops from thence kept up a galling fire on our line. 
 On this party, when advanced nearer, the 5th regi- 
 ment, under Colonel Sterett, opened a steady and well 
 directed fire, which was followed by the fire from the 
 right, and ultimately from our center, when the firing 
 on both sides became general. After a few rounds the 
 troops on the right began to break. I rode along the 
 lines, and gave orders to the officers to cut down those 
 who attempted to fly, and suffer no man to leave the 
 lines. On arriving at the left of the center regiment, 
 
 205 
 
I found Lieutenant-Colonel Shutz's men giving way, 
 and that brave officer, with Major Kemp, aided by my 
 aide-de-camp, Major Woodyear, exerting themselves 
 in rallying and forming them again. Captain Gallo- 
 way's company, and part of Captain Ransdall's and 
 Shower's companies, were rallied and formed again, 
 and behaved gallantly. The rest of Colonel Shutz's 
 and Ragan's regiments fled in disorder, notwithstand- 
 ing the extraordinary efforts of their officers to pre- 
 vent it. On the left, I soon after discovered a part of 
 the 5th regiment giving way, and that excellent offi- 
 cer, Lieutenant-Colonel Sterett, with those under 
 him, most actively engaged forming them again. Soon 
 after, the retreat became general, and all attempts to 
 rally them and make a second stand were fruitless. 
 With a body of United States cavalry, I endeavored 
 to protect the rear and right of the retreating men, so 
 as to prevent their falling into the enemy's possession. 
 "The men under my command were worn down 
 and nearly exhausted from long and forced marches, 
 want of food, and watching. They had been, with very 
 little intermission, under arms and marching from the 
 time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little 
 sleep, bad provisions, and but little opportunity to 
 cook. They certainly were not in a situation to go 
 into a battle."* 
 
 *This closing paragraph from General Stansbury's re- 
 port has already been quoted, but it will certainly bear repe- 
 tition. We know how true was his report of the condition 
 of his troops. 
 
 206 
 
It will now be proper to stop and consider certain 
 circumstances and conditions revealed by the preced- 
 ing. 
 
 First, the British had the initiative ; they out-ma- 
 neuvered and out-guessed the American commanders, 
 and excelled them very much indeed in strategy. 
 
 Ross was a shrewd and able commander. On the 
 night of the 23rd, as we have been informed in a pre- 
 vious chapter, he was encamped about three miles 
 from the Old Fields and some ten or twelve 
 miles from Washington. As already stated, he had 
 his army in motion early on the morning of the 24th — 
 he passed Old Fields at four o'clock. Two miles be- 
 yond Old Fields he came to the fork in the road — one 
 fork going to Bladensburg, ten miles to the north, and 
 the other to the Eastern Branch Bridge, west about 
 eight miles. Here he did what he had previously done 
 at the fork of the road from Nottingham to Upper 
 Marlborough — he took the road leading to the East- 
 ern Branch Bridge, and when his last column had got 
 into it, he suddenly reversed his front and marched 
 rapidly to Bladensburg. Thus he kept Winder and 
 the others uncertain as to his route until the last pos- 
 sible moment. 
 
 Second, the British used tactics that they almost 
 never employed — they took cover wherever possible 
 and favored flank movements. One of those tl.at had 
 reason to know well the usual tactics of the British 
 noted that they generally made frontal attacks, and, to 
 
 207 
 
use his phrase, "took the bull by the horns." The Brit- 
 ish did what the Americans should have done — used 
 the brick houses of Bladensburg for cover. They used 
 Lowndes' Hill also for cover and did not disdain to 
 use also the bushes along the creek for the same pur- 
 pose. And, finally, they so maneuvered and fought 
 that the orchard, which had sheltered the Americans, 
 soon sheltered them. Ross did not hesitate to use tac- 
 tics that might not have been sanctioned by British 
 tradition, but which observation had shown him were 
 good. It will be observed, further, that he at once saw 
 the opportunity for successful flank attacks made by 
 the withdrawal of Shutz's and Sterett's troops, on or- 
 ders of Monroe or someone else, from the support of 
 the artillery and Pinkney's riflemen, and so placed that 
 their flanks, also, were exposed. 
 
 Third, this breaking up of the front line, as orig- 
 inally arranged, by Monroe or whoever was the "blun- 
 dering tactician," was fatal, not only because of the 
 opportunity it gave the British to flank not only Pink- 
 ney, but Sterett, but for the further reason that tak- 
 ing from one part of Stansbury's force the other part, 
 both parts known to each other, greatly reduced the 
 confidence and morale of both parts. There are many 
 examples of certain forces that have fought well in- 
 deed together in several engagements that have not 
 fought well when broken up and thus each unit lacked 
 the support of all the others, and knew it; and in all 
 the history of warfare there is not one example of such 
 
 208 
 
a force fighting as well after being dismembered. 
 
 Fourth, the militia fought better than the reports 
 above given would indicate — much better. It must be 
 confessed that the shame, and deserved shame, of the 
 Americans put the officers of the American forces at 
 Bladensburg in such frame of mind that in their re- 
 ports of the battle they fell quite a little short of doing 
 justice to the "common soldiers." After the burning 
 of the capitol all the officials and officers directly or 
 indirectly interested, from Madison down, joined in an 
 effort to put all the blame on the "common soldiers" — 
 an effort so vigorous, able and persistent that if an 
 equal effort had been made to defend the capital Ross 
 and his forces would have been kept close to Benedict. 
 
 If we would find justice done to the troops that 
 fought on the American side at Bladensburg we must 
 go to the accounts of their British antagonists. It is 
 a shameful fact that so many of our own writers have 
 robbed the dead of that good name which is the great- 
 est riches — a ghoulish crime that the fair accounts of 
 British soldiers have made all the more shameful. 
 
 Williams observes that the "statement of General 
 Winder shows very clearly the value of the orchard 
 and barn as a military position, the advantage which 
 its possession gave to the enemy, and the difficulty 
 which they probably would have experienced in driv- 
 ing back our troops if they had been suffered to re- 
 main near and in it, as General Stansbury intended." 
 
 209 
 
That "blundering tactician" was an excellent aid 
 of the British. 
 
 Major Pinkney's command — the artillery and the 
 riflemen — certainly fought well. Stansbury says that 
 they "behaved in the most gallant manner." But they 
 numbered only 600 and the "blundering tactician" had 
 removed their supports and exposed their flanks. 
 
 Even Williams says that the statements of Ster- 
 ett and the others do not do justice to the troops. He 
 says : "Comparing all accounts, American and British, 
 it is evident that even Stansbury's brigade stood its 
 ground long enough to show that, under different 
 auspices, it would have performed its part well. * * * 
 Among the circumstances which induced" Stanbury's 
 troops to retreat were "the galling fire from the or- 
 chard ; the continued advance of fresh troops of the en- 
 emy, amounting, as they had been informed, to eight 
 or ten thousand veterans ; no knowledge that any re- 
 serve troops were in their rear; and the conviction 
 which every man of commonsense among them must 
 have felt, that, under these circumstances, to continue 
 longer on the field would expose them to the danger 
 of being cut to pieces." 
 
 As already stated, the "advanced troops, under 
 Major Pinkney and others, who encountered the first 
 shock of the British army," amounted to only 600 men. 
 "The regiments under Sterett, Shutz and Ragan, too 
 far in the rear to support the advanced troops, mus- 
 tered about 1800 men," said Williams. These figures 
 
 210 
 
are too high by about 200, unless one includes the 
 dragoons — about 125 — under Laval. 
 
 No one else made as careful and judicial a study 
 of the battle of Bladensburg as Major Williams ; and 
 his official position gave him the very best opportuni- 
 ties to arrive at the exact facts. He did not write his 
 volume on the "Invasion and Capture of Washington" 
 until 1856 — he took more than forty years to gather 
 and verify his data and to reach a ripe judgment of the 
 events of the Chesapeake expedition. The following 
 extracts are from his volume just named: 
 
 "The British accounts describe but one battle. 
 There were, in fact, two, as distinct as if they had tak- 
 en place on different days and with different armies. 
 The second line of the American army was nearly a 
 mile in the rear of the first, and there had been no 
 communication between them, no re-enforcement from 
 one to the other * * * * none of the troops of the first 
 line retreated to or rallied upon the second, which was 
 left, therefore, to encounter the full force of an enemy 
 inspirited by its victory over the first line and out- 
 numbering the second nearly two to one. * * * The 
 rest of the army (the second line), amounting to about 
 2,700 men, was more than a mile from Bladensburg, 
 and did not change its position until ordered to re- 
 treat." 
 
 The American force present at the battle of Blad- 
 ensburg, though some of it really did not participate 
 
 211 
 
in the battle, was, as stated in a preceding chapter, as 
 follows : 
 
 t Stansbury's Maryland militia and volunteers, 2,200 ; 
 Smith's District brigade of militia and volunteers, 
 1,070; Beall's militia and volunteers, 750; militia un- 
 der Warring and Maynard, 390; total militia and in- 
 fantry, 4,410; regulars — infantry — 380; Barney — sail- 
 ors, 400, marines, 120; and dragoons, 125. Grand to- 
 tal, 5,435. 
 
 Ross, in his official dispatch, put Winder's force 
 at "8 to 9000" ! 
 
 Auchinleck makes much of a statement by a Dr. 
 Smith, who put Winder's forces at the following fig- 
 ures, and given here because they were much ex- 
 ploited : 
 
 United States dragoons 140 
 
 Maryland ditto 240 
 
 District of Columbia ditto 50 
 
 Virginia ditto 100 5o0 
 
 Regular infantry 500 
 
 Seamen and marines 600 1,100 
 
 Stansbury's brigade of militia 1,353 
 
 Sterett's regiment, ditto :>00 
 
 Baltimore artillery, ditto 150 
 
 Pinkney's battalion, ditto 150 2,153 
 
 212 
 
Smith's brigade, ditto 1,070 
 
 Cramer's battalion 240 
 
 Warring's detachment, ditto 150 
 
 Maynard'r ditto ditto 150 1,610 
 
 Beall's and Hood's regiment of ditto .... 800 
 Volunteer corps 350 1,150 
 
 Total 7,503 
 
 It will be seen that his addition was faulty. Also, 
 so were his figures. In his official report of the battle, 
 Winder puts his total force at five thousand, which 
 was substantially correct. 
 
 As for the British force, it was exaggerated as 
 much by some Americans as the American force was 
 exaggerated by some British. Before the battle the 
 British force under Ross was most frequently reported 
 to the American troops to be 9,000. Some estimated 
 it at 12,000. Auchinleck says that "Mr. Thomson 
 states the British force at six thousand men, just one 
 thousand more than Mr. O'Conner, and two thousand 
 more than Dr. Smith." Dr. Smith's figure would be 
 liberal if only the force present at Bladensburg was 
 meant. Niles Register, Vol. VII, p. 14, gave the fol- 
 lowing statement of the British force landed at Bene- 
 dict: 
 
 Infantry, 3,183; artillerists, 90; marines and sea- 
 men, 1,850; total, 5,123. About 500 of these were left 
 at Marlborough. Gleig, the British soldier and au- 
 
 213 
 
thor, put the number that landed at 4,500. Probably 
 the seamen were not landed — at any rate, they were 
 not considered a part of the land forces. A Subaltern 
 in America says the force under Ross numbered only 
 4,000. Colonel Beall reached the same figure. De- 
 ducting the 500 left at Marlborough leaves only 3,500, 
 and this agrees closely with the estimate of Dr. Cat- 
 lett — 3,540. Dr. Hanson Catlett was an eminent sur- 
 geon of the regular army and staff surgeon to General 
 Winder. He was permitted by the British to proceed 
 to Bladensburg the day after the battle to attend to 
 some of the American wounded. He was a man of the 
 highest character. He said to the congressional com- 
 mittee : 
 
 ''With better means of judging than any other 
 American officer after the battle, my estimate was — at 
 Capital Square 700 men; at Turnpike Hill, 2,000; at 
 Bladensburg, wounded, 300, attendants and guards, 
 300; in the city, wounded and attendants, sixty; and 
 killed at Bladensburg, 180; total, 3,540. These esti- 
 mates, though somewhat incorrect in the detail, are 
 corroborated in the aggregate by the best information 
 I could get from the British surgeons, sergeants, and 
 others left in the hospital at Bladensburg." 
 
 Commenting on Dr. Catlett's statement, General 
 Armstrong said : "The Doctor's statement is fully 
 sustained by the writer of British Campaigns in Amer- 
 ica, who states Ross' army to have been composed of 
 four regiments of infantry, one battalion of marines, 
 
 214 
 
and a few rocket men and artillerists — the whole 
 amounting to 4,020 men. Deduct from this number 
 the 500 left at Marlborough to guard the boats and 
 plunder and the result will bring the assailing army 
 to 3,500, as stated by Dr. Catlett." 
 
 It is safe to say that if this figure is not correct it 
 is because it is too small. It is certain that Dr. Catlett 
 would not see more than there were and might not see 
 all that there were. It is certain that the British sur- 
 geons and officers would not exaggerate the number 
 of the British troops, and might conveniently forget 
 some. However, 3,540 is probably very nearly the ex- 
 act number of British that fought at Bladensburg — 
 first against Pinkney's 600, then against the 1,600 to 
 1,700 constituting what was somewhat in the nature 
 of a second line ; and then the troops under Smith, the 
 marines under Barney, and the others, that arrived 
 just in time to get on the field — it could hardly be said 
 to take positions. It is not strange that Winder's al- 
 leged army, thus taken in detail, was forced to retreat. 
 As for the resistance offered by the Americans in what 
 Williams well calls the second battle, and by 2,210 
 militia and volunteers, 520 marines and sailors, and 
 380 regulars — total, 3,110 — we will take the account of 
 A Subaltern in America, who will also be permitted 
 to say something of the first battle : 
 
 "The American army became visible. The corps 
 which occupied the heights above Bladensburg, was 
 composed chiefly of militia ; and as the American mili- 
 
 215 
 
tia are not dressed in uniform, it exhibited to our eyes 
 a very singular and a very awkward appearance * * * 
 seemed country people, who would have been much 
 more appropriately employed in attending to their ag- 
 ricultural occupations, than in standing, with muskets 
 in their hands, on the brow of a bare green hill. I 
 have seldom been more forcibly struck with anything 
 than with the contrast, which a glance to the rear af- 
 forded at the moment, with the spectacle which was 
 before me. A column of four thousand British sol- 
 diers, moving in sections of six abreast * * * * met 
 my gaze in that quarter. * * * The whole of the light 
 brigade, forming into one extended line, advanced to 
 the attack. In the rear of a high paling the enemy's 
 first line presented itself. I have stood under many 
 heavy fires of musketry in my day ; but I really do not 
 recollect to have witnessed any more heavy than that 
 which they instantly opened upon us. Had we been 
 a numerous body, and in compact array, our loss must 
 have been terrible * * * * our order was that of skir- 
 mishers. * * * The American line began to waver as 
 soon as we arrived within twenty or thirty paces of 
 their front, and the shouting preliminary to a charge 
 had hardly been uttered, when they broke, and fled. 
 Our men were too much fatigued to follow with any 
 celerity, but we pursued as quickly as we could, and 
 bayonetting some seamen, who pertinaciously clung to 
 their guns, took possession of two, out of the five 
 pieces of cannon, which had so severely galled us. 
 
 216 
 
Our work was, however, but beginning. In five min- 
 utes we found ourselves in front of a second line, more 
 numerous and more steady than that which we had 
 defeated. It was composed wholly of regular troops,* 
 who received us, as we came on, with a murderous 
 fire, and instantly advanced to the charge. * * * The 
 battle became now little else than an uninterrupted 
 exchange of tremendous volleys. Neither party gained 
 or lost ground, but, for a full half hour, stood still, 
 loading and firing as quickly as these operations could 
 be performed. Whilst this was proceeding, Colonel 
 Thornton received a ball in the thigh, and fell. The 
 Americans raised a shout at the event, pressed on, and 
 our people, a little disheartened, retired. General Ross 
 himself coming up at this instant, with the better 
 part of the 4th regiment, the fortune of the day was 
 speedily decided. * * * To do them justice, however, 
 their regulars** were not unmindful of the lessons 
 wdiich they had learned upon the parade. They cov- 
 ered their rear with a cloud of riflemen * * * and the 
 riflemen very deliberately, and very judiciously took 
 up positions from time to time. Nor was their fire 
 harmless. * * * 1 found the brigade gathering togeth- 
 er the shattered remains, upon the summit of the high 
 ground, which the enemy's reserve had occupied in 
 the morning. I say shattered remains, for out of the 
 
 *A mistake, of course. There were only 380 f-egulars on 
 the field. This was certainly a real compliment to the militia. 
 
 **Nearly all militia. 
 
 217 
 
twelve hundred men who bore the brunt of the battle, 
 nearly one-half had fallen." 
 
 Little more need be said of the battle. But espe- 
 cial mention should be made of Commodore Barney 
 and his force of marines and sailors. No better fight- 
 ing has ever been done than was done by this force. 
 Barney always claimed that none of his force was bay- 
 onetted. In his account of the battle he spoke first of 
 "the crippled condition of his men from the severe 
 marches they had experienced the days before, many 
 of them being without shoes, and the hurried manner 
 in which he had been compelled to take a position," 
 and continued : 
 
 "A second and a third attempt was made by the 
 enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed. They 
 then crossed over into an open field, and attempted to 
 flank our right; he was * * * * again totally cut up. 
 * * * * The enemy from this period never appeared 
 in force in front of us. * * * * The enemy, who had 
 been kept in check by our fire for nearly half an hour, 
 now began to outflank us on the right. Our guns were 
 turned that way. * * * * In this situation we had the 
 whole army to contend with. Our ammunition was 
 expended." In another statement he said: "So far 
 from using the bayonet, they fled before our men, who 
 pursued them, the sailors crying out to 'board' them. 
 Nor did the enemy rally until they got into a ravine 
 covered with woods, leaving their officers in our pow- 
 
 218 
 
er.* Then our men returned to their station. General 
 Ross, in person, was obliged to take command, but 
 dared not lead them on in front, but pushed out on our 
 flank. Our ammunition being expended, we were nec- 
 essitated to retire." 
 
 The persistent and shameful disposition of many 
 of our own writers to belittle the achievements of the 
 land forces ; in fact, to rob them, living and dead, of 
 the honors they had won by gallant conduct in deadly 
 struggle — a disposition given the treatment it merits 
 in The Battle of Plattsburg — was exceedingly appar- 
 ent in what was written about the battle of Bladens- 
 burg. Coupled with that disposition was the other 
 one to glorify the deeds of the navy — a disposition to 
 be commended, for the navy, as well as the army, 
 fought well indeed ; and being generally better offi- 
 cered, was oftener victorious, although this difference 
 in favor of the navy was not near so great as our 
 ! writers, especially those of New England, made it to 
 : appear. Because of the disposition just referred to, 
 it yet actually appears in a good many of our histories 
 : and encyclopedias that the only good fighting done at 
 I Bladensburg was done by the men of the navy under 
 i Commodore Barney! And that shameful lie and libel 
 is taught in our schools and is supposed to be truth by 
 many of our people to this day! 
 
 ♦Colonel Thornton, dangerously wounded; Lieutenant 
 Stevely, of the "King's Own;" and others. Captain Hamil- 
 ton and Lieutenant Codd were killed in front of Barney's 
 position. 
 
 219 
 
As a matter of fact, all of the so-called second 
 line ; or, as Williams would have it, the second arm} 
 in the second battle, fought well. Peter's batter) 
 fought as well as Barney's ; and the infantry, especialH 
 Magruder's regiment, fought as well as the batteries' 
 Williams states the facts, and conservatively, when hr 
 says: 
 
 "The light brigade of the enemy, in advancing 
 through the defile near the bridge over the ravine, 
 came within range of Peter's battery, which opened } 
 cross fire upon them with considerable effect. After 
 the first discharge from Barney's battery, the British 
 eighty-fifth regiment was thrown out on its right witl 
 a view to carry the left flank of that battery; and hav ; 
 ing advanced within range of Magruder's regiment 
 met a reception which caused it to retrograde; an<, 
 crossing the road in open order,* it united with tlV 
 fourth, which had deployed on the left on the margil 
 of the ravine, coming in conflict there with Kramer' 
 command, which, after a spirited resistance, fell bad, 
 to the right of the line. The Subaltern in Americ. 
 speaks particularly of the severity of the tire fron 
 every part of the American line commanding the denT 
 until the right of the line was flanked. The loss sus 
 tained here by the British, as well from the murderou 
 discharge of grape from Barney's battery, as from th 
 
 *One must admire the tactics of the British in this ba 
 tie — open order, flank attacks, taking cover, etc. On tb 
 British side it was the best fought battle of the War. Rot; 
 was a great general. 
 
 220 
 
cross fire of Peter's battery and the discharge of mus- 
 ketry, exceeded, according to the accounts of the Brit- 
 ish officers who were present, that of any battle in 
 which they had ever been engaged, considering the 
 numbers of the contending forces." 
 
 Yet more than one history of the United States, 
 used in our schools, slates that the soldiers in this 
 battle fled without firing a shot! By questioning a 
 rather large number of people, the author has found 
 that ninety per cent of our citizens believe that those 
 brave soldiers were arrant cowards ; that instead of 
 standing their ground, though outnumbered, they 
 turnedand ran on the approach of the British without 
 firing a shot ! This ignorance and misinformation, 
 this injustice to our brave soldiers of a century ago, is 
 our shame and disgrace. 
 
 Further, this second line, or, according to Wil- 
 liams, this second army, did not retire until ordered to 
 do so by General Winder. To quote again from the 
 careful, just, accurate Williams, writing dispassionate- 
 ly forty years after the event, and, having been all his 
 life a regular army man, certainly not biased in favor 
 of the militia: 
 
 "At this crisis, General Winder * * * *arrived 
 upon the ground, and perceiving his right flank in the 
 act of being turned, and his left nearly in the same 
 predicament, gave orders for the line to retreat. The 
 manner in which the order was executed by General 
 Smith we shall state in his own words : 
 
 221 
 
' 'The order to retreat was executed by regiments 
 and corps as they had been formed, and with as much 
 order as the nature of the case would permit. The 
 first and second regiments halted and formed, after 
 retreating five or six hundred paces, but were again 
 ordered by General Winder to retire.' * * * * 
 
 "The retreat of the troops was in consequence of 
 orders from the commanding general, which it was 
 sometimes found necessary to reiterate, from the re- 
 luctance of the troops to obey them * * * * 
 
 "The repeated orders to retire given to the ad- 
 vanced troops between the Wood Yard and Notting- 
 ham were, according to Major Peter's statement and 
 our own personal knowledge, very unwillingly obeyed. 
 At the Old Fields, the 23rd of August, the troops 
 showed no signs of unwillingness for the encounter, 
 great as they supposed the numerical superiority of 
 the enemy to be. At Bladensburg, it was with the 
 utmost reluctance that General Smith's troops obeyed 
 the order to retreat. 
 
 "With respect to the regular troops * * * while 
 the troops were in the act of returning the fire, General 
 Winder rode up to them and gave the order to retreat 
 to Washington. On being asked if the troops might 
 not be allowed to return the fire of the enemy, General 
 Winder demanded to know who commanded the 
 regiment. The adjutant pointed to Lieutenant-Col- 
 onel Scott, who was then on foot, his horse having 
 
 222 
 
 
been killed, when General Winder repeated the order, 
 directing him to retire immediately."* 
 
 As for the militia under Colonel Beall, whose con- 
 duct has already been noted — the troops of the second 
 army on whom was put the most discredit — it is very 
 certain that Commodore Barney — doubtless honestly 
 enough — did them a grave injustice. After the battle 
 it was proved by the bearer of the orders himself and 
 by others, that the troops under Colonel Beall did not 
 retreat until they had the orders of General Winder 
 to retreat, and when the order to retreat was received 
 Colonel Beall and his men protested. Further, Colonel 
 Beall formed his men in regular order before they be- 
 gan the march toward Washington — the retreat. 
 
 Commenting on this, and the conduct of the other 
 militia, Williams says : 
 
 "The most that can be expected of raw troops, or 
 
 indeed of any troops, is, that they will obey orders, 
 
 and not retreat until ordered to do so. If they satisfy 
 
 these requirements, all the blame attending their 
 
 movements must fall elsewhere. It is preposterous to 
 
 expect that any troops, in their anxiety to fight, would 
 
 mutinously disobey an order to retreat, and yet not a 
 
 few of the Bladensburg troops were on the point of 
 
 doing this." 
 
 *The orders to retire were more than warranted — the 
 Americans were outnumbered and outflanked. If they had 
 not retired a considerable number would have been captured. 
 General Winder gave the orders to retire, not because he 
 was a coward, but because here, at least, he "was a capable 
 commander, as he was at all times a brave man. 
 
 223 
 
When one considers carefully all the conditions 
 and circumstances of the battle of Bladensburg he 
 marvels, not that the Americans fought well — which 
 they did— but that they fought at all. It would not be 
 easy to speak in words of too great praise of the forti- 
 tude, patience, bravery and patriotism of the men and 
 officers — except the three superfluous commanding 
 officers. 
 
 That they fought well is proved, also, by the loss- 
 es they inflicted. A Subaltern in America, who cer- 
 tainly would not exaggerate the British losses, wrote, 
 as quoted in this chapter, that of the 1,200 British 
 troops that were in the hottest fighting, nearly one- ■ 
 half fell. In his official dispatch, General Ross put his 
 loss at 56 killed and 185 wounded. It is well known, 
 however, that his loss was fully twice this. Dr. Catlett 
 testified that the British surgeons left with the wound- 
 ed at Bladensburg, told him that they had buried about 
 one hundred of their men on the field. Nearly as many 
 more were buried by our own people after the retreat 
 of the British. Dr. Catlett estimated the wounded left 
 at Bladensburg at "three or four hundred," and "forty 
 or fifty" taken to Washington. Something of the Brit- 
 ish loss was given in a previous chapter. 
 
 The American loss was reported to be 26 killed 
 and 51 wounded— almost certainly too low, but differ- 
 ent figures were never produced. 
 
 For the loss and disgrace to the people of the 
 United States because of the events at Bladensburg 
 
 224 
 
and in Washington, a very heavy load of blame must 
 be laid on some one, but certainly not on the soldiers 
 and sailors or their rightful commanders — not the 
 least on them. The full weight of that blame must 
 rest on a national administration so narrowly partisan 
 that it would rather have loss and disaster come to the 
 American people than to avail itself of the services of 
 able men of the opposing political party — so narrowly 
 and pitiably partisan that at times it thought appar- 
 ently that its first duty was to make places for hungry 
 hordes of party followers — so unwisely partisan 
 and political that in the selection of a commanding 
 general political affiliation and the fortunes of candi- 
 dates for office were put above the fitness of the gen- 
 eral for the place. Even worse and more to be con- 
 demned, if that be possible, a national administration 
 so complacently, so smugly wise in its own conceit, so 
 ignorant, that it would not and could not be taught by 
 failure ; so incapable that it could not and would not 
 see how inefficient and hurtful it was ; so puffed up by 
 its natural characteristics supplemented by the flattery 
 of lackeys and claquers that it had in superabundance 
 the stubborn egotism that regards wise and honest 
 criticism as an impertinence to be coarsely character- 
 ized as untruthful ; that finds easier than reform the 
 suppression, by lawless procedures, of that same wise 
 and honest criticism ; that actually comes to believe 
 that it and the government are one and that wise and 
 honest criticism of ignorance, laziness, untruthfulness 
 
 225 
 
and dishonesty in the administration is "sedition" and 
 "treason!" Such an administration is the most dan- 
 gerous as it is the most offensive form of that kingly, 
 tyrannical egotism, "The state : it is I."* The national 
 administration in 1814 was guilty, also, of that which 
 some might consider not altogether removed from in- 
 famy — by methods with which the American peoph 
 have been kept only too familiar, high public officials 
 kept the blame for disaster and disgrace from theii 
 heads, where it all belonged, and put it on the heads oi 
 the "common soldiers" — a feat as cowardly as it was 
 disreputable. For all this such men as Madison ard 
 Monroe are to be leniently judged because of not only 
 their great public services, their patriotic work for the 
 new republic, and their many very high and excellent 
 qualities, but even more because of the inevitable par- 
 tisan prejudices coupled with academic discussions 
 and real doubts about the new form of government, 
 and also the accepted standards of public service of 
 that period — conditions that make the course of the 
 Madison administration much less blameworthy than 
 would be the similar course of a national administra- 
 tion at this time. 
 
 *The author, though not altogether ignorant of French, 
 prefers, when in the United States, the language of this 
 countrv, 
 
 226 
 
14. 
 
 THE BURNING OF THE CAPITOL. 
 
 A few moments after General Winder gave the 
 order to retreat at the battle of Bladensburg, he di- 
 rected General Smith to "collect the troops and pre- 
 pare to make a stand on the heights westward of the 
 turnpike gate. This was done as fast as the troops 
 came up. A front was again presented toward the 
 enemy. * * * While the line was yet forming," said 
 General Smith, "I received orders from General Win- 
 der to fall back to the Capital, and there form for bat- 
 tle. * * * * Approaching the capital, I halted the 
 troops, and requested his orders as to the formation 
 of the line. We found no auxiliaries there. He (Gen- 
 eral Winder) then conferred for a few moments with 
 General Armstrong, who was a short distance from 
 us, and then gave orders that the whole should retreat 
 through Washington and Georgetown." 
 
 General Smith speaks of the indignation and 
 anguish of his troops when this order for further re- 
 treat was communicated to them, Williams says : 
 
 227 
 
"We can add our own testimony, as an eye witness, to 
 General Smith's statement of the effect which the 
 final order of retreat had upon the troops under his 
 command. Some shed tears, others uttered impreca- 
 tions, and all evinced the utmost astonishment and 
 indignation ; for it was impossible for them to compre- 
 hend why troops who were willing to risk an encoun- 
 ter with the enemy should be denied the opportunity." 
 
 If there was any cowardice in the American force 
 to defend Washington, it certainly was not in the 
 ranks. Nor was Winder a coward — even those not 
 friendly to him testified to his "personal gallantry, 
 zeal and energy which he displayed on the field of 
 battle." 
 
 Why, then, these various retreats? General Arm- 
 strong was responsible, by his order, for the last. Was 
 he, or some other official above Winder, really respon- 
 sible for the others? We have seen that the national 
 administration was indirectly responsible for them by 
 being directly responsible for the shameful condition 
 of military unpreparedness. In addition, there is much 
 evidence that General Armstrong was not the only 
 high official directly responsible for an order to retreat. 
 Certain high officials were not cowards, but they had 
 been panicky for several days. Williams unequivocally 
 accuses "the principal officers of the government" of 
 being "the first to set the example" of the panic "which 
 they almost created, and did nothing to allay." 
 
 It seems proper that we here learn something of 
 
 228 
 
the military activities of Monroe and Madison before 
 we go with the British soldiers into the city of Wash- 
 ington. We will begin with a long quotation from 
 Wilkinson. His statements are corroborated by reli- 
 able persons : 
 
 "About the 12th or 14th of July, Admiral Warren 
 entered the Potowmack with a considerable armament 
 * * * * and this being interpreted into a meditated at- 
 tack on the metropolis, strong excitements were pro- 
 duced at Washington, at a time when Congress hap- 
 pened to be in session. The idea of a Lieutenant- 
 general had just been started, and the rival candidates 
 for appointment entered into competition for public 
 distinction, in which the advantages were greatly on 
 the side of the war minister, who had the President in 
 subordination, and of consequence possessed the ex- 
 clusive authority to dispose of the military force, and 
 the implements and engines of war were subject to his 
 discretion also. He accordingly repaired to a narrow 
 pass of the river, about fourteen miles below the city, 
 defended by a wretched work called Fort Washing- 
 ton, and ordered the diminutive force assembled for 
 the defense of the capital to the vicinity of the same 
 place. The Secretary of State, also a soldier of the 
 Revolution, although his office did not give him mili- 
 tary command, determined not to be outdone in dem- 
 onstrations of zeal ; he therefore assembled a select 
 suite, and resolved to take the lead of his competitor, 
 by throwing himself immediately on the right flank 
 
 229 
 
of the enemy; and whilst his rival awaited the «'.;* 
 proach of danger, within the walls of Fort Washing- 
 ton, he determined to seek it on the left bank of the 
 Potowmack ; and having drawn around him a party ot 
 yeomanry, I have understood, a skirmish ensued, 
 blood was spilt, and a meditated attack of Blackstone's 
 Island, for the purpose of capturing Admiral Warren, 
 was marred by the jealousy or invidious spirit of the 
 war minister, who refused to the Secretary of State 
 a small detachment requested for the purpose." 
 
 But at a later date Monroe was more fortunate in 
 getting the desired military force. When, on another 
 occasion, the same war minister took the field, leaving 
 his office in Washington, which was his proper place, 
 Monroe again surpassed him by obtaining "twenty- 
 five or thirty dragoons" and engaging in a much her- 
 alded reconnoitering expedition to Benedict, when the 
 British had just landed there. This expedition result- 
 ed in only an exaggerated estimate of the numbers of 
 the British, although we have Mr. Monroe's own 
 statement that he arrived at ten A. M. on the 20th of 
 August "in sight of the enemy's squadron lying before 
 Benedict." It appears to have occurred to Mr. Mon- 
 roe about this time that it would be a tall feather in 
 the British cap to take the Secretary of State prisoner, 
 and he discreetly retired. 
 
 However, he informs us that from this hour of 10 
 A. M. the 20th of August he "continued to be a spec- 
 tator of their (the British) movements until after the 
 
 230 
 
action at Bladensburg on the 24th." The most irru 
 portant result of this up to the time that he broke up 
 Stansbury's line of battle at Bladensburg is apparent- 
 ly a hurried dispatch to the President. The exact date 
 of this dateless dispatch can not be determined, but 
 General Armstrong said that it was transmitted to him 
 by the President during the night of the 23rd. It read 
 as follows : 
 
 "The enemy are advanced six miles on the road 
 to the Wood Yard, and our troops are retiring. Our 
 troops were on the march to meet them, but in too 
 small a body to engage. General Winder proposes to 
 retire until he can collect them in a body. The enemy 
 are in full march for Washington. Have the materials 
 prepared to destroy the bridges. J. MONROE. 
 
 '.'You had better remove the records." 
 
 It has been well observed that "the tone of this 
 dispatch was certainly well calculated to create a pan- 
 ic." It had that effect, aided by other circumstances. 
 The panic was, as we have already seen, confined to 
 the high officials, but was none the less effective. 
 
 It will be recalled that Colonel Monroe came on 
 horseback to General Stansbury late at night the 23rd 
 and urged him to be vigilant, and then rode away in 
 the darkness ; and he was at General Winder's head- 
 quarters the morning of the 24th when the intelligence 
 was received that the British were on their way to 
 Bladensburg. Both the President and General Win- 
 der expressed a wish that he should join General 
 
 231 
 
Stansbury and he "lost not a moment in complying 
 with their desire." He reached General Stansbury be- 
 tween 11 and 12 o'clock — and the result we know. He 
 was soon followed by General Winder, and he by the 
 Secretary of War, and he by the President and the 
 Attorney-General. The last named stated that before 
 he and the President "could reach the town, the forces 
 of the enemy had possession of it." 
 
 Wilkinson says, and in italics, that at the battle 
 of Bladensburg President Madison "run away at the 
 very first shot." Doubtless he would not have risked 
 such an assertion unless there were good grounds for 
 it. And certainly Madison, who, it appears, was on 
 horseback near the advanced line when the battle be- 
 gan, would have been unwise to remain where he 
 might easily have been killed. The only valid criti- 
 cism is that he should not have put himself where he 
 was in such danger that it was advisable for him to 
 retire, for his doing this — and the evidence is that he 
 did it rather precipitately — may have had a bad effect 
 on the troops. General Wilkinson said that "when 
 General Winder saw the first line so easily routed, 
 without adverting to the primary cause, the example 
 of the President," etc. Wilkinson was unfriendly to 
 the President, was much prejudiced; yet what has just 
 been quoted appears to have been approved by Wil- 
 liams. One thing is certain — -the President and the 
 Attorney-General left the field as soon as the battle 
 began, or almost immediately thereafter, and took no 
 
 232 
 
further part in the battle ; and that Monroe and Arm- 
 strong remained until near the close of the battle, and 
 then retired in advance of the troops. It does not ap- 
 pear that the President gave any commands the 24th. 
 The activities of Monroe have already been set forth, 
 and it will be recalled that Armstrong advised the re- 
 tirement of the second line, or second army. 
 
 The British first entered the City of Washington, 
 the evening of August 24th, with only about 200 men. 
 This party withdrew for the night and encamped 
 about two miles distant ; and during the night the cen- 
 tral part of the city was held by a lone British senti- 
 nel, who had been stationed near the office of the lead- 
 ing newspaper and was forgotten when the others 
 withdrew ! 
 
 The Americans saved the British the trouble of de- 
 stroying the Navy Yard at Washington. We will let 
 Ross give his own account of the British work done 
 iu the capital : 
 
 "1 determined to march upon Washington, and 
 reached that city at eight o'clock. Judging it of con- 
 sequence to complete the destruction of the public 
 buildings with the least possible delay, so that the 
 army might retire without loss of time, the following- 
 buildings -were set fire to and consumed: the Capitol, 
 including the Senate-House and House of Representa- 
 tives, the arsenal, the dock-yard (navy-yard), treas- 
 ury, war office, President's palace, rope-walk, and the 
 great bridge across the Potomac. In the dock-yard, a 
 
 233 
 
frigate nearly ready to be launched, and a sloop of war, 
 were consumed. The two bridges leading to Wash- 
 ington over the Eastern Branch had been destroyed 
 by the enemy, who apprehended an attack from that 
 quarter. The object of the expedition being accom- 
 plished, I determined, before any great force of the 
 enemy could be assembled, to withdraw the troops, 
 and accordingly commenced retiring on the night of 
 the 25th." 
 
 Ross claims to have burned more than he did. T< 
 take from him any of this glory ( ?) claimed by him 
 is doubly unpleasant, for doing it adds that much more 
 to the disgrace of the national administration. A guard 
 of American troops posted on the Virginia end of "the 
 great bridge across the Potomac" saw some British 
 soldiers at the other end, and the British soldiers saw 
 them ; each burned their end of the bridge to protect 
 themselves from the others ! The Americans accom- 
 plished the most damage, for they not only burned 
 one-half of the bridge, but also a quantity of military 
 stores at their end of the structure. Ross states th it 
 he burned the navy-yard : it was burned by our own 
 men, on the order of the Secretary of the Navy, given 
 under the direction of the President! The order v/as 
 the result of the panic that had possessed the Presi- 
 dent and his cabinet for some time. Both Commodore 
 Tingly, the commandant of the yard, and Captain 
 Creighton, his principal officer, believed that it was 
 unnecessary to burn the yard and so far disobeyed the 
 
 234 
 
order as not to fire "the new schooner Lynx/' and it 
 was saved. 
 
 The "rope-walk" which Ross burned was not 
 public property, but the private property of two firms. 
 If Ross claimed credit (?) for burning what he 
 did not burn, he also neglected to take credit for all 
 that he did burn. He failed to mention the "Congress 
 Library." Williams says that "it was not a very valu- 
 able collection; but Ross and Cockburn wanted only 
 the opportunity to render themselves even more infa- 
 mously renowned than the barbarian calif who burned 
 the Alexandrian library, for he had at least the excuse 
 of not knowing the value of what he destroyed. Their 
 hostility to literature was shown also in another way, 
 by the destruction of the types and furniture of the 
 office of the National Intelligencer." 
 
 The committee of congress appointed to investi- 
 gate the invasion of Washington reported, after very 
 careful investigation, that the value of the public prop- 
 erty destroyed was as follows : 
 "The capitol, from its foundation to its 
 
 destruction, including original cost, 
 
 alterations, repairs, etc $ 787,163.28 
 
 "The President's house, including all 
 
 costs 334,334.00 
 
 "Public offices, treasury, state, war and 
 
 navy • 93,613.82 
 
 $1,215,111.10 
 
 235 
 
"The buildings have been examined by 
 order of a committee of the senate. 
 The walls of the capitol and presi- 
 dent's house are good, and require 
 repairs only. The walls of the public 
 offices are not sufficient. It is sup- 
 posed that the sum of $460,000 will be 
 sufficient to place the buildings in the 
 situation they were in previous to 
 
 their destruction $ 460,000.00 
 
 "Loss sustained at the navy yard — 
 
 In movable property 417,745.51 
 
 In buildings and fixtures 91,425.53 
 
 $ 969,171.04 
 "To this sum must be added the public 
 
 library, estimated at 
 
 "An estimate of the expense of rebuilding, 
 in a plain and substantial manner, 
 the navy yard, so as to carry on all 
 the public works with as much ad- 
 vantage and convenience as previous 
 
 to its destruction $ 62,370.00" 
 
 As for the loss of the navy-yard, Williams ob- 
 serves that it was one-half of the total loss, and con- 
 tinues : 
 
 "The sloop-of-war Argus, if manned by Barney's 
 seamen, might have been saved, or even used as a bat- 
 tery to protect the yard; but the panic which prevailed 
 
 236 
 
appeared to have destroyed all powers of reasoning 
 or forethought." 
 
 It is well to remember that the panic was not 
 among the "common soldiers," but among the highest 
 officials. 
 
 The British government did what was to be ex- 
 pected of it — when the news of the capture of Wash- 
 ington was received in London "the park and Tower 
 guns were fired three days successively." But, as has 
 been previously pointed out (and especially in The 
 Battle of Plattsburg) there was a difference between 
 the governing class and the British masses at that 
 time. The London Statesman said, "Willingly would 
 we throw a veil of oblivion over our transactions a1 
 Washington. The Cossacks spared Paris, but we 
 spared not the capital of America." The Liverpool 
 Mercury said: "We shall add nothing at present to 
 the sentiments which we have frequently and recently 
 expressed on the justice and policy of such warfare. 
 We will content ourselves with asking the most earn- 
 est friends of the conflagratory system what purpose 
 will be served by the flames of the Senate House at 
 Washington? If the people of the United States re- 
 tain any portion of that spirit with which they suc- 
 cessfully contended for their independence, the effect 
 of those flames will not easily be extinguished." The 
 British Annual Register for 1814 termed the warfare 
 of Ross and Cockburn as a return to "the times of bar- 
 barism" and said, "It can not be concealed that the 
 
 237 
 
extent of devastation practiced by the victors brought 
 a heavy censure upon the British character, not only 
 in America, but on the Continent of Europe." 
 
 The British, in addition to their other achieve- 
 ments, captured considerable quantities, for that time, 
 of the munitions of war. This gave them a double sat- 
 isfaction — the munitions were valuable to and needed 
 by themselves ; and the munitions were valuable to and 
 needed by the Americans. The loss of the munitions 
 was a severe blow to the righting capacity of the Unit- 
 ed States. Williams and Michell, artillery command- 
 ers of the British army, made the following official re- 
 port of the munitions captured, "between the 19th and 
 25th of August, 1814:" 
 
 "August 19 — 1 24-pound carronade. 
 
 "August 22 — 1 6-pound field gun, with carriage 
 complete; 156 stand of arms, with cartouches, etc., etc. 
 
 "August 24, at Bladensburg — 2 18-pounders, 5 12- 
 pounders, 3 6-pounders, with field carriages; a quan- 
 tity of ammunition for the above ; 220 stands of arms. 
 
 "Aug. 25, at Washington— Brass : 6 18-pounders, 
 mounted on traversing platforms; 5 12-pounders, 4 4- 
 pounders, 1 5^-inch howitzer, 1 5^-inch mortar. Iron: 
 26 32-pounders, 36 24-pounders, 34 18-pounders, 27 12- 
 pounders, 2 18-pounders, mounted on traversing plat- 
 forms ; 19 12-pounders, on ship-carriages; 3 13-inch 
 mortars, 2 8-inch howitzers, 1 24-pound gun, 5 32- 
 pound carronades, 5 18-pound carronades, 13 12- 
 pound guns, 2 9-pound guns, 2 6-pound guns. 
 
 238 
 
"Total amount of cannon taken — 206; 500 barrels 
 of powder; 100,000 rounds of musket-ball cartridges; 
 40 barrels of line grained powder; a large quantity o f . 
 ammunition of different natures made up. 
 
 "The navy-yard and arsenal having been set on 
 nre by the enemy before they retired, an immense 
 quantity of stores of every description was destroyed ; 
 of which no account could be taken. Seven or eight 
 very heavy explosions during the night denoted that 
 there had been large magazines of powder. 
 
 "N. B. The remains of near 2,000 stands of arms 
 were discovered which had been dstroyed by the en- 
 emy/"' 
 
 The public buildings burned were not the greatest 
 material loss of the Americans, and their material loss- 
 es were not their most serious losses. 
 
 The munitions of war lost, not at Bladensburg, 
 but by the invasion of the City of Washington, show 
 what a very serious blow that invasion was to the 
 Americans. 
 
 That invasion may have been an afterthought of 
 the Irishman — and a true Irishman — Ross, and the 
 humiliation of the American people may have been 
 foremost in his thought ; but it is certain that General 
 Ross showed real military talent and generalship, and 
 kept strictly within the rules of war, when he de- 
 stroyed or caused the destruction of so many cannon, 
 so much powder, etc., by his "violation of the metrop- 
 olis." 
 
 239 
 
But while Ross was justified in destroying the 
 munitions of war, the destruction of the capitol of a 
 hostile nation has never been a part of the warfare 
 of what have been known as civilized nations. In his 
 letter of September 6, 1814, to Commodore Cochrane, I 
 Secretary Monroe said : 
 
 "The late destruction of the houses of government 
 in this city, is another act which comes necessarily 
 into view. In the wars of modern Europe, no exam- 
 ples of the kind, even among nations the most hostile 
 to each other, can be traced. In the course of ten 
 years past, the capitals of the principal powers of the 
 continent of Europe have been conquered, and occu- 
 pied alternately by the victorious armies of each other, 
 and no instance of such wanton and unjustifiable de- 
 struction has been seen. We must go back to distant 
 and barbarous ages to find a parallel for the acts of 
 which I complain." 
 
 As was frequently pointed out at the time, the 
 Russians were not considered to be highly civilized. 
 Yet when their victorious army had, with its allies, en- 
 tered Paris a few years before, no public or private 
 property was wantonly destroyed. 
 
 There was never any claim by the British govern- 
 ment that the burning of the buildings in Washington 
 was a military necessity, or that they were being used 
 for military purposes. President Madison could not 
 be successfully contradicted when he said, in his pub- 
 lic proclamation of September 1, 1814, that the British 
 
 240 
 
"wantonly destroyed the public edifices, having no re- 
 lation in their structure to the operations of war, nor 
 used at the time for military annoyance." In his not- 
 able letter of September 6, 1814, to Admiral Cochrane, 
 Mr. Monroe, yet Secretary of State, speaks of the 
 "system of devastation which has been practiced by the 
 British forces, so manifestly contrary to the usages of 
 civilized warfare." This system had then been prac- 
 ticed for two years. Mr. Monroe continues in the let- 
 ter named : 
 
 "No sooner were the United States compelled to 
 'resort to war against Great Britain, than they resolved 
 to wage it in a manner most consonant to the prim i- 
 ples of humanity. * * * * They perceived, however, 
 with the deepest regret, that a spirit alike just and 
 humane was neither cherished nor acted on by your 
 government. Such an assertion would not be hazard- 
 ed, if it were not supported by facts, the proof of which 
 has perhaps already carried the same conviction to 
 other nations that it has to these States. Without 
 dwelling upon the deplorable cruelties committed by 
 the savages in the British ranks, and in British pay, 
 on American prisoners, at the river Raisin, which to 
 this day have never been disavowed, or atoned, I refer, 
 as ., more immediately connected with the subject of 
 [your letter, to the wanton desolation that was com- 
 mitted at Havre-de-Grace, and at Georgetown, early 
 in the spring of 1813. These villages were burnt and 
 ravished by the naval forces of Great Britain, to the 
 
 241 
 
ruin ot their unarmed inhabitants, who saw with as- 
 tonishment that they derived no protection to their 
 property from the laws of war. During the same 
 season, scenes of invasion and pillage, carried on un- 
 der the same authority, were witnessed all along the 
 waters of the Chesapeake, to an extent inflicting the 
 most serious private distress, and under circumstances 
 that justified the suspicion that revenge and cupidity, 
 rather than the manly motives that should dictate the 
 hostility of a high-minded foe, led to their perpetra- 
 tion." 
 
 The national administration was well informed of 
 all the events of this warfare of 1813 and 1814 along 
 the waters of the Chesapeake, and that both violated 
 not only the laws of war, but the sentiments of civ- 
 ilized nations, and gave ample warning of the charac- 
 ter of the events that would make up the continuance 
 of that warfare. It had no excuse for its failure to pro- 
 tect the capital. 
 
 The action of President Madison when he had re- 
 covered from his bewilderment and panic because of 
 the destruction of the capitol, was strikingly charac- 
 teristic. As soon as he could terminate his wander- 
 ings and return to the city, he — did not make vigorous 
 efforts to assemble as soon as possible a sufficient 
 force of well equipped and munitioned soldiers to cap- 
 ture the British army, if it again attempted invasion 
 and depredations, but — issued a proclamation! and of 
 
 242 
 
course it employed faultless rhetoric in expressing 
 lofty sentiments. In it he said : 
 
 "Whereas, these proceedings and declared pur- 
 poses, which exhibit a deliberate disregard of the prin- 
 ciples of humanity, and the rules of civilized warfare, 
 and which must give to the existing war a character 
 of extended devastation and barbarism, at the very 
 moment of negotiation for peace, invited by the enemy 
 himself, leave no prospect of safety to anything with- 
 in the reach of his predatory and incendiary opera- 
 tions, but in a manly and universal determination to 
 chastise and expel the invader. 
 
 "Now, therefore, I, James Madison, President of 
 the United States, do issue this my proclamation, ex- 
 horting all the good people, therefore, to unite their 
 hearts and hands in giving effect to the ample means 
 possessed for that purpose. I enjoin it on all, officers, 
 civil and military, to exert themselves in executing the 
 duties with which they are respectively charged. And, 
 more especially, I require the officers, commanding the 
 respective military districts, to be vigilant and alert 
 in providing for the defense thereof; for the more ef- 
 fectual accomplishment of which they are authorized 
 to call to the defense of exposed and threatened places, 
 proportions of the militia, most convenient thereto, 
 whether they be, or be not, parts of the quotas de- 
 tached for the service of the United States, under 
 requisitions of the general government. 
 
 "On an occasion which appeals so forcibly to the 
 243 
 
proud feelings and patriotic devotion of the American 
 people, none will forget what they owe to themselves; 
 what they owe to their country; and the high desti- 
 nies which await it; what to the glory acquired now, 
 and to be maintained by their sons, with the augment- 
 ed strength and resources with which time and 
 Heaven have blessed them." 
 
 Beautiful! Beautiful! But nothing that would 
 certainly produce a company of good soldiers or equip 
 them with even one cannon. One thinks of Don 
 Quixote. Not even The Invasion of the City of Wash- 
 ington could change the ideas and methods of the na- 
 tional administration. 
 
 244 
 
15. 
 
 AFTER THE INVASION. 
 
 As quoted in the preceding chapter, Ross was of 
 opinion that he should "complete the destruction of 
 the buildings with the least possible delay, so that the 
 army might retire without loss of time." Williams 
 surmised that it would not have required much to com- 
 municate something like panic to Ross. As a matter 
 of fact, Ross undoubtedly was apprehensive — not be- 
 cause of any cowardly feeling on his part, but because 
 it was reasonable for him to expect an attack by the 
 Americans. Undoubtedly there would have been such 
 an attack, and a successful one, if the three superfluous 
 commanders had been as good soldiers as the "com- 
 mon soldiers" and their rightful commanders. At any 
 rate, Ross retreated the night of the 25th in this fash- 
 ion, as told by one of his officers, A Subaltern in Amer- 
 ica — a retreat that must be considered good evidence 
 that the British were more beaten than the Americans : 
 
 "The destruction of Washington, or rather of the 
 stores or public buildings of Washington, had already 
 
 245 
 
begun. * * * * At the arsenal, public rope-walks, ar- 
 mory, bridge and palace, we accordingly saw nothing 
 except the smoke and flame which marked their de- 
 struction. Neither was the opportunity offered of 
 making ourselves very intimately acquainted with the 
 general appearance of the ruin. Having procured a 
 horse, I rode indeed through a few of what were called 
 streets ; that is to say, along extensive lanes, paved 
 only in part, and boasting, in numerous instances, of 
 no more than five or six houses on each side of the 
 way, planted at the distance of some eighth part of a 
 mile from one another." 
 
 Noon of the day after the battle at Bladensburg 
 and the burning of the public buildings had passed, 
 when, to continue the narrative of this fair-minded and 
 entertaining British historian and soldier, an Ameri- 
 can army appeared "and pushed forward a patrol of 
 cavalry as far as the suburbs of Georgetown. * * * * 
 But the elements interfered to frustrate the design of 
 the enemy * * * * for just at this moment the heav- 
 ens became black with clouds and a hurricane, such 
 as I never witnessed before, and shall probably never 
 witness again, began. * * * * Its force was such as to 
 throw down houses, tear up trees, and carry stones, 
 beams of timber, and whole masses of brickwork, like 
 feathers into the air. Both armies were scattered by 
 it, as if a great battle had been fought and won ; and as 
 it lasted without any intermission for upwards of three 
 hours, neither party, at its close, was in a fit condition 
 
 246 
 
to offer the slightest annoyance to its adversary. For 
 our part, it was not without some difficulty that we 
 succeeded in bringing our stragglers together, whilst 
 daylight lasted. * * * * In the meanwhile the officers 
 of the different corps had directed in a whisper to 
 make ready for falling back as soon as darkness should 
 set in. From the men, however, the thing was kept 
 profoundly secret. They were given, indeed, to under- 
 stand that an important maneuvre would be effected 
 before tomorrow morning; but the hints thrown out 
 tended to induce the expectation of a further advance 
 rather than of retreat. A similar rumor was permitted 
 quietly to circulate among the inhabitants, with the 
 view, doubtless, of its making its own way into the 
 American camp ; while all persons were required, on 
 pain of death, to keep within doors from sunset to sun- 
 rise. This done, as many horses as could be got to- 
 gether were put in requisition for the transport of the 
 artillery. Even the few wounded officers who had ac- 
 companied the column were required to resign theirs, 
 and mine, among the number, was taken away. But 
 the precaution was a very just and proper one. Not 
 only were the guns, by this means, rendered more 
 portable, but the danger of a betrayal from a neigh, 
 or the trampling of horses along the paved street, was 
 provided against. * * * * 
 
 "It was about eight o'clock at night when a staff 
 officer, arriving upon the ground, gave direction for 
 the corps to form in marching order. Preparatory to 
 
 247 
 
this step, large quantities of fresh fuel were heaped 
 upon the fires, while from every company a few men 
 were selected who should remain beside them till the 
 pickets withdrew, and from time to time to move 
 about, so as that their figures might be seen by the 
 light of the blaze. After this, the troops stole to the 
 rear of the fires by twos and threes ; when far enough 
 removed to avoid observation, they took their places, 
 and, in profound silence began their march. The night 
 was very dark. Stars there were, indeed, in the sky, 
 but, for sometime after quitting the light of the 
 bivouac, their influence was wholly unfelt. W e moved 
 on, however, in good order. No man spoke above his 
 breath, our very steps were planted lightly, and we 
 cleared the town without exciting observation. * * * 
 "I stepped to the hospital and paid a hasty visit 
 to the poor fellows who occupied it. It was a morti- 
 fying reflection, that, in spite of our success, the to- 
 tal absence of all adequate means of conveyance laid 
 us under the necessity of leaving very many of them 
 behind ; nor could the noncommissioned officers and 
 private soldiers conceal their chagrin on the occasion. 
 One of these, a sergeant of my own company, actually 
 shed tears as he wished me farewell. It was in vain 
 that I reminded him that he was not singular; that 
 Colonel Thornton, Colonel Wood, and Major Brown, 
 besides others of less note, were doomed to be his 
 companions in captivity * * * * *yet no apprehen- 
 sions could be more unfounded than those of that 
 
 248 
 
man; for however unlike civilized nations they may be 
 in other respects, in the humanity of their conduct to- 
 wards such English soldiers as fell into their hands the 
 Americans can be surpassed by no people whatever. 
 ** * * * To this the wounded whom we were com- 
 pelled to abandon bore, after their release, ample tes- 
 timony; and they told a tale which hundreds besides 
 have corroborated." 
 
 Dr. Catlett said of the British retreat ; 
 
 "They appeared to be preparing to move ; had 
 about forty miserable-looking horses haltered up, ten 
 or twelve carts and wagons, one ox-cart, one coachee, 
 and several gigs, which the officers were industriously 
 assisting to tackle up, and which were immediate!) 
 sent on to Bladensburg to move their wounded. A 
 drove of sixty or seventy cattle preceded this caval- 
 cade. On our arrival at Bladensburg, the surgeons 
 were ordered to select all the wounded who could 
 walk (those with broken arms and the like), and send 
 them off immediately. The forty horses were mount- 
 ed with such as could ride, the carts and wagons load- 
 ed, and ninety odd wounded left behind." 
 
 The National Intelligencer stated that "the ene- 
 my did not bury their dead, except those in the imme- 
 diate vicinity of the camp. The rest, in number near 
 two hundred, were buried by a committee of our own 
 citizens sent out for the purpose. * * * * The loss of 
 the enemy, before he regained his ships, probably ex- 
 ceeded a thousand men. lie lost at least two hundred 
 
 249 
 
killed in the battle and by explosion, and three or four 
 hundred wounded. Many died of fatigue, numbers 
 were taken prisoners by the cavalry hanging on his 
 rear, and not a few deserted." 
 
 Interesting testimony was given in a letter in 
 1855, by Mr. Rush, at that time the only surviving 
 member of President Madison's cabinet. He wrote: 
 
 "I have, indeed, to this hour, the vivid impression 
 upon my eyes of columns of flame and smoke ascend- 
 ing through the night of the 24th of August from the 
 Capitol, President's house, and other public edifices, 
 as the whole were on fire, some burning slowly, others 
 with bursts of flame and sparks mounting high up in 
 the dark horizon. This never can be forgotten by me, 
 as I accompanied out of the city on that memorable 
 night in 1814, President Madison, Mr. Jones, then 
 Secretary of the Navy * * * * 
 
 "If at intervals the dismal sight was lost to our 
 view, we got it again from some hill-top or eminence, 
 where we paused to look at it. We were on horse- 
 back, attended by servants,* proceeding on the Virgi- 
 nia side of the Potomac, which we crossed at the Little 
 Falls, intending to recross at the Great Falls that night 
 or the next morning, so as to be again on the Maryland 
 side, and return to Washington as the movements of 
 
 *It is a significant fact that in those days the President 
 and other high public officials were careful always to be at- 
 tended by servants, but never by secret service men or de- 
 tectives or anyone of that character — "common" labor, but 
 not the assassin, was feared. 
 
 250 
 
the enemy and our own strength might prompt. 
 
 "Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State, was active in 
 his steps that night and next day, in rousing, by suit- 
 able appeals, the people of the surrounding country 
 * * * * * cut orr - hjg re treat. This, it was believed, 
 could be done. * * * * Its execution was prevented 
 by the whole invading force hurrying off on the night 
 of the 25th of August, leaving a good portion of their 
 slain for us to bury, and of their wounded to our care. 
 
 "Those duties were performed as humanity dic- 
 tated, notwithstanding our fresh memory of the whole- 
 sale burning of our public edifices of costly and noble 
 structure, containing the national archives, libraries, 
 historical memorials — some not to be replaced — mod- 
 els of ingenuity and art — for even the Patent Office 
 was not spared — and when not a single article of a 
 warlike nature was to be seen or found in any of these 
 edifices. 
 
 "Our infant metropolis at that time had the as- 
 pect of merely a straggling village but for the size and 
 beauty of its public buildings. Its scattered popula- 
 tion numbered scarcely eight thousand; it had no 
 fortresses or sign of any ; not a cannon was mounted." 
 
 In 1814, Pennsylvania Avenue "was the only reg- 
 ular or used street or road from one part of the city to 
 the other." The other streets were frequently impas- 
 sable to vehicles or even horsemen, because of the 
 mud in them. 
 
 Let it be said to the great credit of Ross that he 
 
 251 
 
never claimed that his retreat was a "strategic retreat" 
 or "retirement to previously prepared positions." He 
 took four days for his retreat to Benedict. He was not 
 molested. The British "army remained the whole day 
 of the 28th at Nottingham, while the crews of their 
 boats were engaged in removing the plunder." On 
 August 30th the army re-embarked. 
 
 For rather a long period after August 24th, 1814, 
 gossipy, interesting tales, some weird, the greater 
 number clearly much exaggerated, were told about the 
 hurried flights of President Madison from the battle- 
 field at Bladensburg to Washington and from Wash- 
 ington. Making due allowance for the popular feel- 
 ing and for the personal prejudice of some narrators, 
 it yet appears certain that the Presidential household 
 and nearly all of the most prominent public officials 
 certainly believed firmly in "Safety First" and, if they 
 acted vigorously on nothing else, they acted with ex- 
 treme vigor and promptness on that belief. But this 
 was clearly an instance of discretion being the better 
 part of valor and certainly the President would have 
 been only foolish to take any chances of being cap- 
 tured. 
 
 Among the very most discreditable and contempt- 
 ible features of "The Invasion of the City of Washing- 
 ton" was the concerted, adroit and able, and all too 
 successful, effort of the public characters concerned to 
 put all the blame on the "common soldiers." If the 
 executive and the legislative branches of the national 
 
 252 
 
government had shown one-fourth as much earnest- 
 ness, ability and energy in repelling the British as 
 they showed in shifting the blame for the burning of 
 the capitol, there would not have been that blame to 
 be avoided by public officials, who should have borne 
 it, and to be put on the ''common soldiers," who mer- 
 ited none of it. 
 
 In his narrative, A Subaltern in America says: 
 
 "On the morning of the 7th (of October) the 
 anchors were raised and w r e stood in magnificent array 
 towards the Chesapeake. * * * * A beautiful schoon- 
 er, carrying a white flag at her main-topmast head, 
 shot after us from the Patuxent; she overtook us just 
 as we were preparing to bring up for the night, and 
 great was the joy of every man on board when it ap- 
 peared that she was the bearer of the majority of the 
 men and officers who had been left behind wounded 
 at Bladensburg. Among the individuals thus restored 
 to the army were Colonels Thornton and Wood. (Ma- 
 jor Brown's hurts were too serious to admit of his re- 
 moval.)" 
 
 Those that have read The Battle of Plattsburg 
 will recall the care that Macomb and MacDonough 
 gave the British wounded that fell into their hands and 
 the honors they paid to the British dead. 
 
 The feelings and sentiments of our brave soldiers 
 and sailors in 1812-14 toward their British foes of 
 those years of war would certainly shame us beyond 
 words if any citizen of the United States should, more 
 
 253 
 
than a hundred years later, remember any occurrence 
 of our Second War of Independence with any ill will 
 or ill feeling towards the British of a hundred years 
 ago; and certainly we would be shamed yet more if 
 because of any event of that War, we had any ill will 
 or any ill feeling toward any of the British people of 
 today. 
 
 To give a complete, just and accurate account of 
 "The Invasion of the City of Washington" and to con- 
 vey a just and accurate understanding of the events 
 of that invasion, it has been necessary to recite some 
 unpleasant facts; it has been necessary to reveal the 
 ignoble, discreditable and regrettable. The facts must 
 be known and considered. But it would be equally 
 ignoble and discreditable to remember those facts now 
 to harbor any ill will. The British people of today are 
 to be judged by what they themselves do. They are 
 now, not our enemies, but our allies. They are fight- 
 ing, and valiantly, now, not against our old friend, but 
 with her. A thousand events are now a thousand 
 compelling reasons for the bonds of friendship and 
 respect between the American people and the British 
 people being a thousand times stronger than any feel- 
 ings that have ever separated them. If we read aright 
 the history of the War of 1812 we will admire none 
 the less the people of our Mother Country that speak 
 the language every person in the United States should 
 speak, while our admiration for our soldiers and sail- 
 ors in that War will be deepened into reverence and 
 
 254 
 
our love of our country will be sanctified into a deeper 
 devotion — a devotion that our soldiers and sailors of 
 today will show forth in deeds worthy of those that 
 before them have fought to make our country The 
 Land of the Free and The Home of the Brave. 
 
 The one concern of the author has been always to 
 state the truth, all the truth, and nothing but the 
 truth, fearlessly, without prejudice, shielding no one, 
 but, above all, doing injustice to no one. He hopes 
 that his readers will remember, as he has remembered, 
 that certain things were done when passions had been 
 aroused by war and when ideas and standards were 
 different from what they are today. 
 
 Let it be said, also, in justice to Madison and 
 Monroe that they were always honest with the Amer- 
 ican people. Always they desired the prosperity and 
 perpetuity of the new Republic. 
 
 Nor were they deaf to criticism, though nearly al- 
 ways they ignored it. They — and especially Madison 
 — were always fair and gentlemanly, and, if it must 
 be said that too often they paid no attention to their 
 honest and intelligent critics, also they did not reply 
 by saying the critic was untruthful — when future reve- 
 lations would have shown that it was not he that had 
 — doubtless honestly enough — misstated the facts. 
 The little respect shown at that time for the national 
 government, especially by state officials, should al- 
 ways be remembered for that made the war task of the 
 national administration at least twice as difficult as it 
 
 255 
 
would have been had the national government been re- 
 garded as it is today. 
 
 Let it be said in justice to Armstrong that he, too, 
 never deceived the American people by stating that 
 our forces had cannon when they had not, or by exag- 
 gerating the forces actually in service. Let it be said 
 also that the executive branch of the government was 
 above, in ability and purpose, the subservient, medi- 
 ocre congress — their representatives that the people 
 had elected. After all, the greater part of the blame 
 for the misfortunes and humiliations of the War of 1812 
 must rest on a congress too weak, too lazy, too cow- 
 ardly to assert its share in the conduct of public 
 affairs. 
 
 One very beautiful, very creditable element of the 
 War of 1812 was our friendship for the French. It was 
 freely asserted and as freely acknowledged that one 
 reason for that War was that Great Britain was at war 
 with France and by fighting Great Britain we would 
 indirectly aid France. Monroe was accused, because 
 he favored the War, of being "the tool of France," of 
 being "subservient to France." That he was the ac- 
 tive, loyal friend of France was true ; he never denied 
 it; and he was doubtless proud-of it, as he should have 
 been. It was clear that if France had not aided us we 
 would have been beaten in our first War of Independ- 
 ence. If it had not been for France we would have 
 been the colonies of the Kingdom of Great Britain 
 and not an independent people having a republican 
 
 256 
 
form of government. It was not to our credit that at 
 an earlier date we had not shown in the most substan- 
 tial way our appreciation of the friendship and aid of 
 France. It is none to our credit now that we did not 
 earlier begin our preparations to fight with France in 
 this present war. If there is one people on the globe 
 that we should admire and love, if there is one nation 
 that we should stand beside as we would stand beside 
 our best friend, with all our strength and to the ut- 
 most, it is France. Our hearts should be full of proud 
 emotion that now the people of this Republic that 
 France made possible, are not so cowardly as to refuse 
 to show their friendship, gratitude and love for their 
 ally of old. God grant that on the fields of France 
 the two tri-color flags may go together to glorious 
 victory for Opportunity and Freedom. 
 (The End.) 
 
 2S7 
 
FRANCE. 
 
 To France one must ever say, "All glory to you !" 
 Whatever may happen, whatever the result of this war 
 may be — and I have no doubt as to what the result will 
 be — France and Belgium will be enshrined in the 
 hearts of all liberty loving people. France's deeds will 
 be sung, and laurel wreaths will ever be placed upon 
 the brows of that great republic. — Lord Reading, 
 April 11, 1918. 
 
 258 
 
A LITTLE GIRL'S VISION. 
 
 (Odette Gastinel, a 13 year old child in France, a pupil in 
 the Lysee Victor Duray, was asked by her teacher to 
 write a theme on the subject of the coming of the Amer- 
 icans to assist in driving out the German invaders. Here 
 is a translation of what she wrote.) 
 It was only a little river, almost a brook; it was 
 
 called the Yser. One could talk from one side to the 
 other without raising one's voice, and the birds could 
 fly over it with one sweep of their wings. And on the 
 two banks there were millions of men, the one turned 
 toward the other, eye to eye. But the distance which 
 separated them was greater than the stars in the sky; 
 it was the distance which separated right from in- 
 justice. 
 
 The ocean is so great that the seagulls do not dare 
 to cross it. During seven days and seven nights the 
 great steamships of America, going at full speed, drive 
 through the deep waters, before the lighthouses of 
 France come into view ; but from one side to another 
 the hearts are touching. 
 
 ODETTE GASTINEL. 
 
 259 
 
FRANCE. 
 
 Finish'd the days, the clouds dispell'd, 
 The travail o'er, the long-sought extrication, 
 When lo ! reborn, high o'er the European world, 
 (In gladness, answering thence, as face afar to 
 
 face, reflecting ours, Columbia,) 
 Again thy star, O France — fair, lustrous star, 
 In heavenly peace, clearer, more bright than 
 
 ever, 
 Shall beam immortal. — Walt Whitman. 
 
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