^^^^ ^ ■^ » -— U" SPEECH OP / THE HON. JAMES EMOTT, HOiJSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THE UNITED STATES DELIVERED THE IWi JANUARY, 1813, Oy THE BILL IN ADDITION TO THE ACT ENTTTLEP, " AN ACT TO RAISE AN ADDITIONAL MILITARY FORCE," AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. NEW-YORK : PRINTED BY J. PKYMOUR, NO. 49, JOIIN-STREKT 1813 g* 4G0U ,^t^Y or ttid9 '^- ". »*'/^sHmc^3 SPEECH 9 S,^c. MR^ CHAIRMAN, I MEAN no common-place remark, when I declare to you, that I address you on the subjects which have been brought into this debate, ^and as I think pioperly so brouij;ht, with great reluc- tance. My general deportment since I have been honoured ■with a seat on this floor, is sufficient evidence to you and the committee, that I feel an unwillini^ness to mingle in the war of •words, which is carried on here. There are causes which add to this repugnance on the present occasion. The debate has been continued for such a length of time, and in part has been conducted with so much asperity, that the minds of all have become fatigued, and the passions of many inflamed. I know, and I duly appreciate the difficulties which, under such circum- stances, surround and face the speaker. But, sir, there are con- siderations of public duty, and individual propriety, which urge, nay, demand of me, to ask your putience, and the indulgence of the house, while I present to you and to them ray view of the great subjects involved in this discussion. I listened, sir, with great attention, and certainly with mucU pleasure, to the gentleman from Louisiana, (Mr. Robertson) who addressed the house for the first time yesterday. Against some of Ms positions, and some of his doctrines, I must how- ever enter my protest. The gentleman, in the silence uf the minority, finds cause for censure ;.they are not of equal utility with guide-posts; which, if they do not accompany the traveller in his journey, at least point to his way. And yet when it oc- curred to him, that the n\inoriiy did sometimes inierpose with their advice, their directions, and if you please, their censurcj they were held up by him, as fit objects of distrust. The ulti- mate object of the opposition being, as he supposes, power, he appears to think that when they do advise, it will be for the purpose of embarrassing their opponents, of procuring their assent to measures, which will end in their downfal. Thus, if we remain silent, wc do not peribrm our duty ; and if we object to majority plans and views, or propose measures which are not stamped with the mark of executive approbation, wc do worse ; wc are plotting the destruction of the men in place, not with a view to the pu\)lic welfare, but to individual in- terest. This is really placing tl.c mhiority in an awkward situa- tion ; and after all we shall, 1 believe, have to pursue the track of former minorities. With the good pleasure of the gentle- niAU, Vic xvill toniiiiue to mark the public course e»l' public men, and when we believe they lose siglit of, or disregard, the essential rights and vital interests of the ' people, lor whose welfare, and at whose expense, this government is maintained, we must be allowed to oppose them in a constitutional and or- derly manner. The gentleman from Louisiana, has gone into a course of I'casoning, to repel the charge and the suspicion of French in- fluence, in or out of the administration. With his facts, or his deductions, I have nothing to do. 1 hope it is true, that there is no understanding between our governuvent and that of France, with respect to the measures which have been formerly adopt- ed, or are now purs^iing, against Great-Britain. Nay, I am wil- ling to allow, that the persons in the majority, are as pure in their views, and as patriotic in their intentions, as men in the op- position can be. But after saying this, I hope I may be permit- tee! to ask the gentleman to re-consider the judgment he has been pleased to pass upon the Northern and Eastern parts of the union. He believes in the existence of a British party in that country, and intimates, that the charge of a French influ- ence elsewhere is a mere cover : it h a dust, raised to draw off the attention, or obscure the vision of the people. Sir, we fiometimes hear of this charge of British influence at the cast- ward. The charge is made there by the wicked, and not un* frequently believed by the weak ; the latter have our pity, the former our contempt. The influence of British feelings ! Yes, sir, the eastern peo- ple are sometimes actuated by British feelings, but thf y are the feelings which operated on their ancestors, when they left Eng- land, because they loved liberty, and hated oppression. They are the feelings, which opci-ated on some, even of the present generation, when they staked their homes, and their fire-sides, on a contest for their political rights ; when, at the hazard ot their lives and fortunes, they opposed British power and claims. The influence of British principles ! Yes, sir, ihey are actuat- ed by British principles, l)ut, they are the principles of a Mil- ton, a Locko, and a Sidney ; principles which teach them that government is intended for the bcnelit of the people, and not for advantage of their agents ; principles which teach them, that it is not only the right, btit the boundcn duty of the people, to mark the conduct of thcii rulers, and to reason on its fitness ; to bestow applause where it is due, and not to withhold censure where it is meritc Now, sir, with the details of this bill 1 have nothing to do. Nay, I will confess to you that I like the bill as it stands, providing for enlistments for one year only, better than I should, were it amended as has been proposed, by prolonging the term, precisely for the reason that the force will be less efficient and dangerous, and nore under legislative control. I meddle not with the fitness of the instrument. That is the business of odier men. But being opposed to the continuance of the war offen- sively, as 1 was to its commencement, I cannot consent to grant any further force to carry it on. The only check or control which the legislature can constitutionally have over a war after it is begun, is in withholding the means ; and in voting the means, either in men or money, every member of the legislature ought to t)e satisfied of the necessity of prosecuting the war. According to my best judgment, sir, this war was improperly commenced, and is unnecessarily continued ; and I shall now proceed to explain the grounds of that judgment by an exami- nation of the causes of the war, as they existed at its commence- ment, and as they now remain. As this is the first time that the subject has been brought into debate, and indeed the earliest opportunity which has been allowed, of an open discussion, I am sure I shall be pardoned for going into detail, if I even should be tedious, as I know 1 shall be uninteresting. It is a right which I think I may claim, to state distinctly my reasons and motives for the votes which 1 have given, and may give, in relation to the war, after what has been said in this house, and out of it, about the opposition to the views of the administration. In making this examination, I shall pass in review, in as brief a manner as possible, the three great subjects of complaint against Great-Britain : her orders of blockade, her orders in eouncil, and her practice of impressment. But for one or ali of these, the war certainly would not have been declared ; and I may assume that but for one or all of these, the war ought not to be continued. I cannot indeed but recollect, that the gcntle- ni:ui from Louisiana, has mentioned the conquest of Canada, and ot the Floridas, as causes for the continuance of the war. As respects the Canadas, 1 have heretofore understood that their reduciion might be a consequence of the war, but never till now did I know, tliat it was to be shifted into a cause for carryi.ig it on. And in regard to the Floridas, 1 will not consent that their conquest should, in the existing relations of t'lis corntrv, b*^ 6 fciiiici' a cause or a consequence of war. I will confess to 7011, tliai an invasion of the colonics of Spain at this time, under the stale excuses of convenience, or necessity, strikes me with ab- horrence. Ii is not only against tiie genius of our government, a»id as I hope the character of our people, but if persisted in, ■will be a foul blot in our national history. JS TO THE BRHISH HLGCKADES. In order that 1 may not be said to misrepresent liie views of the exicuiive government, or of this house, I will read to you tlie charge of the one and the other respecting blockades. The President, in his war message of June last, says, " Under pre- tended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force, and sometimes without the practicability of applying one, our com* mtrce has been plundered in every sea." What is thus gene- ralized by the executive, is made particular by the report of the committee of foreign relations, which it will be recollected, and I make the observation once for all, was made the act of this house by placing it, against all former usige, on the journals. The report, after a dissertation on the carrying trade, and its interruption by the British, proceeds to say, "in May, 18u6, the whole coast of the continent, from Elbe to Brest inclusive, was declared to be in a state of blockade. By this act, the well-es- tablished principles oi the law of nations, principles which have served for ages as guides, and fixed the boundary between the rights of belligerents and neutrals, were violated." This then being the charge, we may inquire, whether tJie order of block- ade, of May, 1806, was really a just cause of war in June, 1812^ and whether it yet continues to be so ? 1 understand, Mr. Chairman, that the British government, theoretically at le.ist, admits the ancient rule of national law re- specting blockades. Not to go further back than the corres- pondence of 1811 ; the British Minister in his letter of July 3, TO the Secritary of State, in reference to this very blockade, de- clared, " if tlie orders in council should be abrogated, the block- ade of May, lSt6, could not continue under our construction of the law of nations, unless that blockade should be maintained by a due application of an adequate naval force." Indeed, sir, the President in his message, and the committee of foreign relations IH their report, distinctly admit the ^correctness of the British, theory, and urge it by way of complaini against her practices. I have not discovered that we have chatiged our gromid on this suiiject. AV'e have not yet, to my knowledge, adopted the Na- poleon principle of maritime law, that a blockade requires a ht sieging f'lice, and can only be applied to strong or foriihed ports. It U:erefore follows, that the dispute with England, re- lali\<- to blockades, is not aijout any new principle advanced by her, but about her practice in opposition to her own principles and our avowed docirinv. Now, sir, with this view ot tho 7 subject, was the order of blockade of May, 1806, a cause of war in 1812? The order of blockade of the 16th of May, 1806, with an ex- ception which I will presently notice, declares " the coast, ri- vers, and ports, from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, both inclusive," to be in a state of blockade, but provides that such blockade was not to extend to neutral vessels, laden with goods not being enemy's property or contraband of war, provided that the vessel going in, iiad not been laden at a port belonging to an enemy, and the vessel going out was not flestined to an ene- my's port, and had not previously broken the blockade. In regard to so much of the order as relates to enemy's property and contraband of war, it affords no ground of com- plaint ; as by the law of nations we could not, even in the absence of a blockade, cover the former or trade in the latter. The ob- jectionable part of the order must therefore be that which pro- hibits the entry of a neutral vessel, which had loaded at an ene- my's port, and the departure of a ship destined for an enemy's port Now the obvious effect of these restrictions, was to pre- vent neutrals from carrying on the colonial, and engaging in the coasting, trade of France. The inward hound vessel was not to have a cargo which had been put en board in a French port, and thus the trade from a colony to the mother country, as well as the coasting trade in the latter, Avaa prevented. The outward bound vessel was not to be intended for a French port, and thus the trade from the mother country to the colony was prohibited. If the order had an operation beyond this, it must have been almost a thing of accident. Let it now be recollected, that the British have, from the year J756, contended that a neutral was not authorized by the law of nations, to engage during war in an unaccustomed trade with the colonies, or on the coasts of their enemy. To capture ves- sels engaged in such trade, we know that they did not think it ne- cessary to i-esort to blockades. By this order, therefore, they claim- ed no new right, nor did they under it exercise any new power over neutrals. In fact, while it prohibited the direct, it left free, or rather threw open to neutrals, the indirect colonial tradCo The nature of the cargo, or its origin, was not a subject of inqui Ty ; it was sufficient that it was not put on board the vessel at a French port. And we have the authority of the adniinislralion, for saying that in this respect, it was not only calculated to bener fit our merchants, but tliat they actually were ber.cfjted by it. In the letter from Mr. Munroc to Mr. Foster, of the 1st of October, 18 11, it is expressly stated, — " That this order, by aJ- lowmg the trade of neutrals in colonial productions to all that portion of the coast which was not rigorously blockaded, af- jforded to the United States an accontmodatiun in a principal point then at issue between our governnjents, ;;ud of vhicl* their citizens extensively availed thcmselvci." When we look at the order of blockade m this point oi view, and without the exception, it is surely not necessary to ascer- tain the extent of coast embraced by it, nor to calculate the num- ber of ships it would take to blockade such coast. This may be pretty amusement for grown children, who need examples in the first rules in arithmetic, but it is unworthy of grave states- men, when decidinf^ on the momentous question of peace or war. It was in a special manner, as I shall more distinctly show hereafter, unworthy of the member of the administration vho has taken a lead in this war, and who, in the opinions of ma- ny, is now nursinJ^ it. Such a blockade was in itself harmless, T)ay> more, it was beneficial to us. It wanted no fleets to en- force it. Our merchants at the time would have seen with pleasure a iike blockade of all the coasts, riveis, and ports, from Korth Point to the Rock of Gibraltar. It remains then, Mr. Chainnan, to be seen, whether the ex- ception in the order of May, made it so objectionable as to call for war. The order, after stating the kind of trade which was not to be interrupted, has this expression, " save and except the coast, rivers, and ports, from Ostend to the river Seine, already in a state of strict and rigorous blockade, and which are to be considered as so continued." In truth, as the mere reading of the order will show, if there is any thing substantially hostile to our rights to be found in it, it is in this saving clause — With this, the order may be considered as a blockade of the coast from Ostend to the Seine, but surely not beyond that. Indeed, the ad- ministration so well understood this, that Mr. Monroe, in his let- ter to Mr. Foster, of the 1st of October, 1811, declares it alnjost in terms. " If, (says Mr. Monroe,) you will examine the order, yon will find that it is strictly little more than a blockade of the coast from tiie Seine to Ostend. There is an express reserva- tion in it in favour of neutrals to any part of the coast between Brest and the Seine, and between Ostend and the Elbe. Neu- tral powers are permitted by it to take from their own ports «very kind of produce, v/ithout distinction as to its origin, and to carry It to the continent, under that limitation, and with the exception cnly of contraband of v.'ar and enemy's property, and to bring thrnce to their own ports in return whatever articles ♦hey think fit." An attentive perusal of the exception will establish another fact, that the order of May, 1806, was not even a blockade of the coast from Ostend to the Seine. It merely excludes that country from the benefits which were to arise to neutrals un- der the order, by recognizing the existence of a prior blockade, and providhig lor its continuance. The blockade thus kept alive, is that of the 9ih of August, 1804 — " At the entrance qf the ports of Fecamp, St. Vallery au Caux, Deippe, Treport, the Somme, Naples, Boulogne, Calais, Gravelines, Dunkirk, New-port, ai:d Ostend." And of this blockade \ve hear of no romplaiut, either as to its extent, or the want of ability to en- force it. Will gentlemen now say, what has never yet been pretend- ed, that from the extent of coast, the British could not, or did not, enforce the blockade ? We may ask them to look at the order, and then say whether it contains a fuir cnu-nerution of the principal ports or points. If so, and I think I may venture to say it does, had not the British at the time a sufficient naval force to blockade eleven or twelve places in their own seas, and almost in sight of their own coasts ? If this is admitted, and I presume no one will undertake to question it, are we not certain, from our knowledge of the history of the limes, that such force was applied ? Do we not know that Bonaparte not only threatened an invasion of England at the time, but had a powerful army encamped for the purpose on this very coast ? And do we yet doubt whether, under such circumstances, the British had not a naval force on the French coast, and before these places, sufficiently strong to enforce the blockade ? There is still one other circumstance in relation to the or- der of May, 1806, which is worthy of notice, and that is, that it was an act of the Fox administration. To those who have attended to the' history of that great man, it is well known, that Charles James Fox was, at every period of his life, and in all circumstances, the open and the sincere friend of this coun- try. When we were colonies of Great-Britain, we had his ex- ertions, and after our independence, his wishes, in our favour. To the last moment of his life, he felt intei-ested in our prospe- rity. It was indeed, if we are to believe Monroe, his ruling passion strong in death. And yet we are now called on to say, that under the guise of friendship, he not only contemplated a vital blow at our neutral rights, but actually did the deed. We are now willing, in the face of the world, to declare that this great champion of neutral rights, and American interests, was the author and founder of a system, which not only made just and proper the French decrees, but which called for war on the part of this nation. — Sir, it is not doing justice to the me- mory of the man, or his intentions towards us, to say so. Thus far, Mr. Chairman, I have ventured on the face of the order itself; but to make assurance doubly sure, I will now place before you the opinions of the very persons who recommend- ed war on account of the blockade. These opinions, given at different times, will prove most satisfactorily, that as long as the order of blockade of May, 1806, had a practical effect and operation ; while it still had substance as well as form, it was not only not viewed by the administration as violating our neu- tral rights, but was received as a benefit to this comitry, and a relaxation on the part of Great-Britain. The order, it will be recollected, bears date the ICth of May, and it was communicated by Mr. Monroe, then our Minister at London, to Mr. Madisooj then Secretary of Slate, 2 10 uy a IfUer dalcil ihc 17ih. In this letter Mr. Monroe says, " early this morning I received from Mr. Fox a note, a co- py of which is enclosed, which you will perceive embraces explicitly a principal subject depending between our govcm- mcnts, though in rather a singular mode." The note is <:ouchcd in terms of restraint, and professes to extend the i blockade further than was heretofore done ; nevertheless, it takes it from many ports already blockaded ; indeed, from all east of Ostend and west of the Seme, except in articles con- traband of war and enemy's property, which are" seizable with- out a blockade. And in like form of exception, considering every enemy as one power, it admits the trade of neutrals with- in the same limit to be free in the productions of enemy's co- Ionics in every, but the direct, route between the colony and the parent country." — " it cannot be doubted that the note was drawn by the government in reference to the question, and if in- tended by the cabinet as a foundation on which Mr. Ifox is authorized to form a treaty, and obtained by him for that pur- pose, it must be viewed in a very favourable light." On the 20th of INIay, Mr. Monroe again writes to this go- vernment, and speaking of the order, he says, " from what I could collect, I have been strengthened in the opinion, which I communicated to you in my last, that Mr. Fox's note of the l5th was drawn with a view to a principal question with the United Sates, I mean that of the trade with enemies colonies." In a letter of llic 9th of June, after detailing a conversation with Mr. Fox in part relating to the order, Mr. Monroe de- clares, " I concluded however from this conversation, as I had done from what had occurred before, that this measure had been taken to prevent the further seizure ajid condemnation of ouv vessels on the principle in discussion between our govern- ments," — " several circumstances, independent of those alluded to, support this idea. It is not necessary to state them, because 1 trust the business will ere long be placed on a much more iiolid footing." Here then we have a full expression of tlie opinion of Mr. Monroe at the time, and formed, as it would seem, with all due caution. But it may l)C said, that he was too credulous on this occasion : that he was deceived by the British minis- try, and that he aflerwarda discovered and renounced his error. Hear what he says in his new capacity of Secretary of State, to Mr. Foster, in his letter already referred to, of the 1st of October, 1811. After remarking on the order of May, 180G, that it was strictly little more than a blockade of the coas', from the Seine to Ostend, he observes, " why then did the Bri- lisii government institute a blockade, which with respect to neu- trals was not rigorous as to the greater part of the coast com- prised in it ? If you will look to the state of tilings which then existed between the Unileil Slates and Great-Britain, you will Hhd the answer: a conlrovcisy had taken place between our go- n vcinments on a different topic, which was sUU depending. The British government had interfered Avith the trade between France and licr allies in the produce of their colonies. The just ciaim of the United States was then a subject of negociation, ai)d your government professing its willingness to make a satisfacto- ry arrangement of it, issued the order which allowed the trade, without making any concession as to the principle, reserving that for adjustment by treaty. It was in this light that I view- ed, and in this sense that 1 represented, that order to my go- vernment." , This gentleman has, in this case at least, the merit of con- sistency. His opinion of the order in 1806, as negociator, was not changed, when, in 1811, as Secretary of State, he was in possession of the views, the wishes, and the information of the executive government. It is possible, however, though cer- tainly not very probable, that he may be mistaken on this sub- ject, and if he is, we will surely find the mistake exposed and corrected by the committee of foreign relations. Permit me, sir, to read to you the part of their " report or manifesto," which contains their opinion of the order. " Your committee think k just to remark, that this act of the British government does not appear to have been adopted in the sense in which it has been since construed. On consideration of all the circumstances attending the measure, and particularly the character of the dis- tinguished statesman who announced it, we are persuaded that it was conceived in a spirit of conciliation, and intended to lead to an accommodation of all differences between the United States and Great-Britain." Notwithstanding this broad apology, if not justification, of the order, the committee deemed it a just cause of war; and why, Mr. Chairman ? Because " it has been made by his successors u pretext for that vast system of usurpation, which has so long oppressed and harassed our commerce." Indeed ! and are we to commence and carry on an offensive war, on account of the order of blockade, not for its own demerit, but because it was made a pretext for another system ? But where do gentle- men learn that the order of May, 1806, was made a pretext for the orders in coimcil ? Certainly they do not find it in the or- ders themselves, nor in the attempted justification of them by the British government. Heretofore I had understood, that^the pretext for the orders in council, were the French decrees, and the war on British commerce commenced by those decrees. But not to detain you longer on this subject, let me say, that as it appears the order of May, 1806, was adopted to benefit and not to injure our commerce ; as it was so understood by this go- vernment at the time and up to the moment when war was de- clared ; as it was really without any possible operation, good or 'bad, when war was resolved on, it follows that it Vi'as not a just cause of war. If, however, the blockade of ?.lay, 1 806, was a just cause of war J 2 ill June, 1812, is it so now ? On the 29lh of June Lord Castlereagi-i informed our agent in England, what wc indeed already knew, that in point of fact this blockade had been discontinued for a considerable lenj^th of time, and that there was no intention of recurring to it without a new notice to neutrals in the usual forms ; and wc have the authority of the administration for say- ing, tiial they arc satisfied on this point. The order has there- fore fairly sunk beneath the horizon. It is emphatically no lon- ger a cause of controversy or of war. One M'ord more on the subject of blockades^ and I have done with them. The President, on the 6th of July last, sent to this house a report of the Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, of the captures made by the belligerents during the present European •war, and of the edicts bearing upon neutral commerce. In the enumeration of edicts, we have the British blockade of the canal of Corfu, of the 18th of August, 18 10, v.hich he says " in effect >vas an attempt to blockade the wJiole Adriatic sea." An at- tempt thus to close a sea upon neutrals, was certainly a novel, and most injurious, application of the right of blockade. The case was cited to us, as explanatory of the hostile views and practices of Great-Britain, as a practical commentary on the ex- ecutive text, relative to British blockades. But what will you say, sir, when you lind from papers on your table, which have been sent from tlie (jflice of state, that the Secretary has either mistaken or mistatcd the extent of this blockade ? Such in truth is the fact. ]\Ir. Pinkney, 'u\ his latter of the 24th of August, 18 lu, transmitting the notification of the blockade, intimates that it is a blockade of the Adiialic; but in that of the 7th of Sep- tember lollowing, he declares to the goverment, that this con- struction appears to be erroneous, and that " the canal to whicli the notification is now understood to apply, is the narrow pas- sage to the eastward of Corfu." This blockade therefore of an entire sea, dwindles down to that of the strait, between the island of Corfu and the Grecian shore. Reflections will urge themselves on the mind, on a statement so manifestly untrue ; but 1 pass them over. 77/ /i BRITISH ORDERS IJ\r CO UAVIL. After mentioning blockades, the President, in his v.'ar mes- t-agc of June last, brijigs to view the next great subject of com- jilaint, tlie Orders in Council. — " Not content with these occa- sional expedients for laying waste our neutral trade, the cabinet ijf Great-Britain resorted at length to tlie swee-ping system of blockades, under the name of Orders in Council; which has been nxjulded and managed as might best suit its political views, )ts commercial jealousies, or the avidity of British cruizers." Thecommitteccf foreign relations, in this, as in the caseofblock- i des, make particular what was left general by the executive'; ;'nd lliey have so far at least the merit of making out to the na- tion, and to the world, the actual causes of the war. The Order in Council of January, 1807, the first of the series, is mentioned as a matter of histoi y ; hut us this dud passed away, the commit- tee piucc the grievance ot" the naiion ou the order of November, 1807 — ''We proceed to brint^- into view the British Order in Council of November i 1, 1807, which superseded every other order, and consummated that sysit^m of hostility on the com- merce of the United States, which has been since so steadily- pursued. By this order, all France, and her allies, and every country at war Avith (ireat-britain, or with which she was not at »"war, from which the Briiis!. flus; was excluded, and all the colo- nies of her enemies, were subjected to the same restrictions as if they were actually biockaded. in the most strict and rigorous manner ; and all trade, in articles, the produce and manufacture of" the said countries and colonics, and the vessels engaged in it, were subjected to capture und condemnation as lawful prize." " It -would be superfluous in your committee to state, that by this order the British government declared direet and positive war against the United States." This order is certainly extensive in its terms and operation, and gave strong grounds of complaint to neu'ral nations. But there was one objection to making it a substantive cause of war in 1812, and ihat is, that it really had not then a legal existence. Yes, sir, strange as it may seem, we were called upon to de- clare war, and did declare war, for a thing which rested only in history. The British Order in Council of the 26th of April, 18u9, after reciting the order of 1807, exjire6-sly revokes it, and then declares, " that all the ports and places as far north as tiie river Ems, inclusively, under the government of France, to- gether with the colonies, plantations, and settlements in the possession of those governments respectively, and all ports and places in the northern parts of Italy, to be reckoned from the ports of Orbetello and t'esaro, inclusively," shall continue sub- ject to the restrictions of blockade, " and every vessel trading- irom and to the said countries or colonies, plantations or settle- ments, together with all goods and mcrchuntiise on board, shall be condemned as prize to the captors." It may be said, and to a certain extent it is certainly true, that the orders of November, 1807, and of April, 1809, are sin.ilar in principle : but it cannot be pretended that they are equally obnoxious in their effects. It is truly stated in the report, tha( the order of November, 1807, interdicted the trade of neutrals to France, to the allies of France, to countries at war w ith England, and to countries fi'om which the British flaj^- was exclu- ded. The order of April, 1809, applies only to the trade with France, with Holland as far as the Ems, and with a small part of the north of Italy. Again, the order of November, 1807, prohibits all trade in articles the produce or manufacture of the interdicted countries. Nothing of this is found in the order of April, 1809. In truth, the British order existing when we de- <:lared >yar, though a great let and hinderance to us, did not jus- 14 isiy the conclusion diuwn by the commklcc, that the liritiiih go- vernnient liad coiDplciely usurped the dominion of the ocean, and forbid all trade. A wide spread of commerce was left un- touched by British regulations or orders; and if we credit the administration, that which was interdicted, was neither inviting to our merchants, nor desirable for the country. Thus standing the charge against Great-Britain, I will now, as in the case of blockades, examine whether the order in council of April, 1809, was a reasonable cause of war, and if it remains so ? War, being one of the severest calamities that ever scourged liuman kind ; carrying in its train every vice, and laying a foundation for the commission of every crime ; it follows, that the nation which commences it, should act but from necessity. If just to itself, it should not only be certain, that its opponent is clearly wrong, but also that it is itself clearly right. Again, the agents in the government having the power to make war, are not true to their trust, if in addition to the causes of war, they do not look to the consequences and effects of it. If an (Evil exists, it ought to be certain that war will be a remedy for it, and that the good to be acquired, will more than balance the injuries to result from the war. In examining therefore this, and the other avowed causes of the war, whether they were, or are just and reasonable, I wish to be distinctly understood, as settling the case with this peo- ple and nation. If there is a wrong done to them by the or- ders in council, before, as their agent, I will consent to carry on a •^var for this cause, I must be satisfied that the wrong in practice is of sufficient magnitude to justify war ; that the war is to afford a remedy for the evil ; and that the remedy is not •^vorsc than the disease. A paper blockade of the Island of Tristan d'Acunha, or an order in council, prohibiting a commer- cial intercourse with that august sovereign, Jonathan Lambert, CTid his four subjects, however much in principle it may inter- fere with our right's, will i>ever gain my consent, to a war cither with Great-Britain or France. In considering this cause of war, we are necessarily led to view the orders in council, in connexion with the Frcnqh de- crees. Taken separately, and without regard to the causes •which led to them, oi- the reasons alleged by each nation for their continuance, the French decrees and the British orders <»rc undoubted causes of war. Both nations, however, sought for a jurftificalion, in tlic conduct of their adversary, and the submission of neutrals. It is not perhaps material to ascertain which was the first aggressor, in this novel system of warfare ; -Ijut if it was, and I have justly explained, the blockading order cf May, 1806, or if that order was fairly understood by Mr. Monroe, and by the committee of foreign relations, it would item to follov., that France took the first step, in this war on our rights and interests. <. 16 Be that as it may, this government has by its embartvo and*" non-iniercourse laws, and the offers made to the bcUiijcrents. imdev them, considered botii so much in the wrong, as lo ro- iuse to select either for an enemy in exclusion of the other, while the obnoxious acts of both remained. This, sir, ncces- r.arily leads to an examination, whether the French decrees were revoked, when we were called upon to declare war against Great-Britain. I speak the settled and firm conviction of my own mind, when I say they were not. I have on a former occasion attempted to show, that the Pre- sident was not authorised to issue his proclamation of tlie 2d of. November, 1810, and that Congress ought not to have passed the non-importation l^w, of the 2d of March, 1811, the two acts which were the precursors of this war, because the note of the Duke of Cadore of the 5th of August, 1810, war, not, and was not intended to be, a repeal of the French decrees. Without metm- ing to repeat what was then urged, 1 will briefly examine the practices of the French cruizers, the decisions of the French courts, and the declarations of the French government, in rel^r tion to the decrees, since the pretended revocation. Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention to bring into this dis- cussion the decrees of Bayonne and Rambouillet, which more than volumes speak the disposition of the French ruler to- wards us ; and which at one time appeared to have made a deep and lasting impression on the administration. I cannot but i-e- collect the declaration of Secretary Smith, in his address to the people, that " on the 20th of February, 1811, the French go-- vernment did officially, and formally, through their minister, INIr. Serrurier, communicate to this government their fixed determination, not to restore the property that had been so seiz- ed." And when I do recollect this, and bring to mind also that the information Avas not given to the national legislature, before the passage of the non-intercourse law, and has never yet been laid before us by the executive, I dare not trust myself to speah of it. Neither, sir, is it my intention, in any manner, to bring into question the motives of the President, in issuing his proclama- tion, or of the members of this and the other branch of the legislature, who voted for the non-intercourse law. 1 am will- ing to believe, that the executive, when he issued the proclama- tion, and congress, when it passed that law, which was in effect to validate the proclamation, acted under the impression that the French decrees were revoked: but I must believe also, that in this instance they were deceived, by the arts and cun- ning of the French government. Having been an actor in the scenes which preceded the non-importation law, I cannot, how- ever, when I view them, with the light since aflbrdcd by the- gentleman who was at the head of the department of State, ac- quit the President of all blame. Mr. Smith, in his address, states some thin?Ti whicli v.c all knov.' to be tme. Wc know 113 that mucii doubl cxUtcd in this house and nation, with respect to the etTect ot the Trench note, and tlic intention of the French j^ovcrnineut : and we know also, that the non-importation hiw was delayed on account of the arrival of the new French minis- ter, who it was confidently expected would be able to dispel our doubts. Sir, the minister came, and we received no infor- mation. How this happened, has been explained by Mr. Smith, lie had a conference with Mr. Serrurier, and prepared a note, in order to obtain his formal answer, among other thini^s, to the question, whether the decrees had been revoked, and wliat ex- planation he was aulhoi'ized to give on the subject. Let Mr. Smith inform you how this was received by the President.— " But waiting on the President witii it (the note, and on the 30th of February,) and afler having refiorled to him verbally the result of the conference, I was to my astonishment told by liim,that it would not be expedient to send to Mr. Serrurier any siich note. His deportment throughout tliis interview evinced a high degree of disquietude, which occasionally betrayed him into fretful exprcssitjns." As to the practices of the French cruizcrs, we have it in thi*. history of the times. From accounts not contradicted, and which cannot with truth be contradicted, we know that the French armed vessels, public as well as private, and in every HCa, cojitinued their aggressions on our commerce, under tile principles of the decrees, notwithstanding the pretended revoca- tion. When told of the revocation, tlieir answer was a smile of contempt for our credulity. Bui without resorting to report and general history, we have a document from the state depart- ment, which establishes these depredations ; 1 mean the re- port of captures laid on our table on the 6th of July last. In this we have given to us a list of forty-five captures, inadc by the French, since the 2d of November, 1810; of the vessels thus taken, eight are expressly said to have been burnt or sunk at sea by a French squadron. The papers relative to the French burnings, went to the department through this house, and we know, that in some instances, the certificate of the French commander accompanied the representations, proving that he acted under orders issued afler tlie 2d of Novcntjcr. This report of captures 1 am sorry, sir, to have it to remark, does not comprelicnd all the cases of French depi-edations on our commerce, after the date of the proclamation of Novem- ber. As it was made up from cornnmnicalions by individuals, this was in some measure to have been expected ; but it was not to be expected that any cases known in the office of slate would have been oiniltcd ; and yet so is ihe fact. Among the papers which accomp.mied the President's message of the last session, is a list from our agent in France, of American ves- stls taken by French pvivateers since the 1st of November, 18 lu, and rarriod into Jic ports of France. In it wc h-ive with o!hc»,thc Kobinson O.a, the Neptune, the Two Brothers, and 17 ■^e Zaiivz, not one of which is mentioned in the rejJort. Add- ed to this, we know the protests and papers which went from this house, proved that the French squadron destroyed nearly thirty American vessels, Instead of eight, as represented by the teport. As to the decisions of the French prize courts ; it will be re- collected that Mr. Kussell, in his letter to the Secretary of .btate, of the 8th of May, 1811, says, " it may not be improper to re- mark, that no American vessel, captured since the 1st of No- vember, has yet been released, of had a trial." It is not neces- sary, therefore, to go further back. In the message of April 23d, 1812, relative to captures of vessels in the Baltic sea, wc have from our agent, Mr. Warden, three cases of condemna- tion by the council of prizes at Paris, on the lOtli September, 1811 ; the captures having been made in 1811. The ship Julian, •with her cargo. Was declared good prize, because, among othei- reasons, " that she was visited by several English war vessels ;" and the ship Hercules, becatise " that it was impossible she was not visited by the enemy's ships of war, in approaching the Isle of Anholt." In all the determinations of tlie French Courts, as far as we have any knowledge of them, the princi- ples of the Berlin and Milan decrees have been recognized and enforced. As to the acts and declarations of the French governnicnt ? It has been more than once urged, that the admission of some- of our vessels into France was a proof of the revocation of the decrees ; and yet. Sir, Mr. Russel, in his letter of May, which I have just mentioned, declares that the vessels v.hose entry had been allowed, had come direct from the United States, ■without having done or submitted to any known act which ■would have subjected them to the Operation of the decrees.. How then. Sir, can such admission lie evidence of the revoca- tion ? And how does it happen that the admiission, if there was a revocation, was to proceed from the Emperor ? In the answer of the French Emperor to the deputies from Hamburg and Bremen, we find him, on the 2©th of March, 1811, saying that "the decrees of Berlin and Milan are the fundamental laws of my empire ; they cease only to have effect as to those nations which defend their sovereignty and main- tain the religion of their flag." And what, I pray you, Sir, does his majesty mean by this religion of the flag ? It is, thai; the flag, if it does not give character to, shall protect the pro- perty under it. It is, that the passengers on board the vessel shall be considered as on neutral territory, and not be subject to capture. Have we really consented to maintain this religion of our flag ? 1 hope this is not yet to be numbered among ouiv fpllies. And if we have not, is it not certain that the dccree;> remained in operation against us ? Again, his imperial majesty addressed his council of commerce on the 31st March, i8l I, "«vhcn he told tliem, and told us, th?/. " thn decrees of Bdr^iji 3 i8 a'i)d Ionian aic the fundamental laws of my empire. I^or the neutral navifration, I consider the flag as an extension of terri- tory. The power which suffers its flag to be violated, cannot be considered as neutral. The fate of American commerce will soon be decided. 1 will favour it, if the United States con- form themselves to these decrees. In a contrary case, their vessels will be driven from my empire." His majesty, then, had not come to a determination about our commerce in March, 1811. Its fate siill depended on his good pleasure. He was willing not to a})ply Llic decrees to us, in cuse we adopted them ourselves, and joiii'.d him in the war he was waging for the freedom of the seas. If, sir, any doubt on this subject remained, it must now be at an tnd. The French decree, with the date of the 28th of April, 1811, but actually made in I8I2, and communicated by our agent to the English government on the 20th of last May, will for ever settle this question. By this paper the decrees of Berlin and Milan arc " definitively" declared as not existing in regard to our vessels. And why ? Because they were repeal- ed in August, 1810? Not so, but because our law of March, 1811, was a formal refusal to adhere to a system, invacing the tndepcndtncc of neutral powers, and of their Hag. To the friends of the liberty, the prosperity, and the reputation, of the country, it cannot lut be a source of melancholy reflection, to ^iiid our executive governmen, insisting oi^ the revocation of the French decrees, and recommending for such revocation a non-intercourse and a war with lingland ; when in every act of the French government, its courts, and its fleets, a direct nega- tive is to be found to such revocation. When, however, Mr. Chairman, the dsclarations of the French Tuler, and the seizure, and condemnation, and destruction of our property, have been cited in proof of the existence of the French decrees, a distinction by way of apology has been made, between the internal and external application of them ; we have been told that they existed against us merely as municipal regula- lions. What, municipal regulations to authorize and to justify the captures and the burnings on the Atlantic, and the captures and the condenmations on the Baltic I \Vc shall look in vain for such a distinction, as coming from our good friend, Xapolcon 'he just. He makes none such. lie has not yet descended thus to trifle on this subject. But what arc tlie nuniicipal regulations to which we are so villing to submit ? 'i iicy arc, accouling to the IMilan decret, thai every vessel which sliall submit to be searched by an Eng- 'ish ship, or that sails from or to an English port, or from or to their colonies, or countries occupied by their troops : and ac* ■ ;ording to the Berlin decree, all ujcrchandisc coming tronx El glish manufactories and colonics, is lawful prize. These : '-gulatiunb arc to remain as long as England continu'ji: to deny 19 the inviolability of the flag"; or in other woads, shall deny tiiut the flag of a neutral shall protect the prppcriy of an enemy. Do we wish to know in what country these municipal rej^ula- tions are to operate ? Tiie French note on the breaking out of the war with Russia, will give us some information on tliis head. The Duke of Bassano, ihc French minister of foreign relations, on the 25th of April, 1812, addressed a paper to Count Romanzow, chancellor of Russia, from which I will give you one or two extracts. — " Count — ills majesty the emperor of Rus- sia, had acknowledged at Tilsit the principle, that the present generation should not have looked to the enjoyment of iiappi- ness, but on the ground that the nations in the full enjoyment of their rights, might give themselves up freely to the exercise of their industry : that the independence of their flag should be inviolable ; that the independenceof their flag was a right be- longing to them, and its protection a reciprocal duty of the one towards the other ; that they were not less bound to protect the inviolability of their flag, than that of their territory ; that if a power cannot, without ceasing to be neuter, allow its ter- ritory to be taken away by one 6f the ;belligcrent powers, so neither can it remain neuter in pernntting to be taken from un- der the protection of its flag, by one of the belligerent powers, the property which the other has placed there : that all powers consequently have the right of exacting, that nations pretend- ing neutrality, should cause their flag to be respected in the same manner as they enforce respect to their territory ; that so long as England, persisting in this system of war, should dis- avow the independence of any flag upon the seas, no power which is possessed of coast, can be neuter v. ith respect to Eng- land." — " Tiie emperor Alexander offered his mediation to the English government, and engaged, if this government would not consent to conclude peace upon the principle of acknow- ledging that the flags of all powers should enjoy an equal and perfect independence upon the seas, to make common cause ■with France, to summon in concert with her, the three courts of Copenhagen, Stockholnj, and Lisbon, to close their ports against the English, to declai^e war against England, and to in- clared war against her." The great complaint against Russia, and the principal cause of the present war, as collected from this paper, is the permission to bring into Russia tlic produce of English colonies under foreign or neutral flags. These municipal decrees, so called by our administration, therefore, are, or are to be, as extensive as the continent. All nations arc to protect the religion of their flags. Any nation relusing or omitting to do this, loses its».ieutral character, and k-ar IS to be made upon it. Arc these indeed mere municipal egulations i Have we no iiitcrcsts in these questions ; no 20 ;.ights to claim or protect ? — The events of the last twenty years have been suc'i, as, if not lo stupify, to astonish and paralyze the human mind. We lose the enormity of the conduct of the great despot ol" Europe, in tlic splendour of his achievements, and suc- cess of his enterprises. How else are we to account for the in- difi'ercnce with which we hear of his depredations on our pro- perty anA his violations of our rights ? How else dfces it hap- pen, that we so carelessly receive, or make apologies for, his outrages on our people and nation ? To sum up all in a few words. Tiie President was mistakeu when he issued his fatal proclamation, and we were equally mis- taken when Ave passed the non-intercourse law. The French decrees were not revoked. And we were called upon, by no duly to France or ourselves, to declare war against Great-Bri- tain, on account of the orders in council. In this point of view, it is not necessary to have reference to the diplomatic warfare of last year, between our secretary of state and the British mi- nister, then in this country ; nor to inquire what kind of revo- cation wa3 demanded by England. To all inquiries of this kind, t lie obvious answer is, that there was no revocation of any kind by France. But it seems, to sTime gentlemen, that all this investigation, and indeed any investigation, on the subject, is useless. The honour and interest of the country called for this war. Sir, a well regulated sense of honour is a proud trait in the character of a nation, as well as in that of an individual ; but let us not Take tinsel for gold. Muclx.has been said about submission, and Mie disgrace, individual and national, attending it. Is it not said, c^nd io'there not some foundation for the remark, that war with Greai-Britian, in the state of our relations with P' ranee, was sub- mission to the arts, or at least the duplicity, of Bonaparte ? If to maintain the chastity of our character, was indeed our only object, we ought to have had all doubts rerooved as to the acts •nd intentions of the French emperor. Was the pretended revocation by France an act of justice to us, •'V at all calculated for our benefit ; or was it not a mere lure to kad us on to a war with England I The depredations on the high seao were continued to the extent of French power, and our commercial intercourse with France was fettered with new duties and oppressive regulations. In the letter of instructions iVom the secretary of state, Mr. Monroe, of the 26th of July, '811, to our present minister in France, this subject is present- ed in a fair point of view. After remarking that it had been ex- pected that our trade with France would have been placed on a 'liir looting, he says, it appears from documents m his office, ' that our comuierce has been subjected to the greatest dis- ouragemtui, or ravlier, to the most oppressive restraints." ' In short, that the ordinary usages of conmiercc between friend- ly nations were abandoned." — '' If tlie puils of France and her rfllies iue noi opened to t!ic commerce oj the United Stales oo 21 H liberal scale, and on fair conditions, of what avail to them, it may be asked, will be the revocations of the British orders in council?" Sir, I have nothing to add to these observations; they are strong in character, and not more strong than just. Would to heaven I could see a correspondent spirit in the scraps and morsels, which have been cast upon us, of the mea- gre communications of the man who was thus instructed. Nearly eighteen months have now passed, since this man, who " had the most flattering things said to him from the Emperor, relative to his appointment," reached France, and yet to this day we are ignorant of the great valiie of his labours. But if Avhat he has done remains unknown, what he has not done is not so. The discouragements and restraints on our commerce re- main as he found them. If the British orders in council were a cause for declaring the war, are they a cause at this time for continuing it ? Sir, the or- ders were revoked about the time we made the war, and though much has been said about conditions annexed to the repeal, ren- dering it unacceptable to this country, yet the administration understand it differently. The President, in his message at the commencement of this session, admits that the repeal was " sus- ceptible of explanations meeting the views of this government.'* This cause of war has therefore vanished. IMPRESSMMM-T OF SEJM£J\r. The injury done to our seamcnjunder the British practice of impressment, was also made a cause of the war, and to the eye, at least, it is the only one which now remains. Mr. Chairman, the discussion of this subject is attended with adventitious difficulties, growing out of the times and the state of the country. The public mind, in some sections of the union. Is in such a feverish state on this account, from tales oft told of bondage, worse than negro slavery, and of condemnation with- out trial, that the person who is willing to " hear the other par- ty," is at once branded with foreign partialities, and threatened with the trial by mob. Besides, Sir, it is intimated that a nego- ciation is to be had, or may possibly be attempted, which may be affected by an open discussion of the topic. In point of duty, I feel myself called upon to take some notice of the subject, but my view of it will be less perfect than in a different situation I should think desirable. The President, in the war message, thus introduces the sub- ject' — " British cruizers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it ; not in the ex- ercise of a belligerent right, founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects," As this does not present the case in its true light, I shall, for the purpose of fairly bringing to view the conflicting claims of the iwo nations, give you iin extract from the letter of Mr. Madison 22 io Mr. Monroe, ol ihc 5th of January, 1804, containing instruc- tions for a treaty with Great-Britain. *' With this exception, (persons in tl>c military service of an enemy) we consider c neutral Jlai^ on the /jrrfk 6cas, as a saftn^uard to thoae sailing un- der it. (ireat-lirilain,on the contrary, asserts a rifjlit to search for and seize her onvn subjects ; and under tliat cover, as cannot but happen, aic oFien seized and taken oiV, citizens ot the Uni- ted States, and citizens or subjects of other neutral countries, navip;atinjj the high seas, under the protection of the American flag." * The claim then on the part of the Biitisli is, that in time of war they have a right to enter neutral merchant vessels on the high seas, to search for and seize their subjects, being seamen. On our part it is, that on the high seas the flag shall cover and protect all sailing under it, whether British subjects or American citizens. These are distinctly the claims of right on the part ©f the two nations, and I shall so consider them, without regard to practice apart from right. One or two remarks. Sir, before 1 enter upon the subject. The first is, that 1 do not mean to moot the point, relative to the rights of our naturalized citizens, or the extent of our duties towards them. But this I will say, that 1 am willing to give them all the protection which the situation of the country ajid its true in- terests will justify. I know that the unruly passions and the meddling dispositions, of some foreigners, have raised prejudices in the minds of many persons against all foreigners. But 1 know also, and I speak without reference to political opinions or pre- judices, that among our naturalized citizens, are to he found men, and many men too, of great worth and respectability, and who are extensively useful to the country. Tlicse men have iny good will, and it is certainly my wish, that they should be fostered and protected, as far as it can be done, without putting at hazard the great interests and the permanent welf:irc of the country. But, Sir, to this class of our citizens, the claim that they arc to be protected on the hii^h seas by our flag, is really of little importance. Our claim never was, and 1 am sure never will be, that they are to be protected, if they put theniselves within the power of their former sovereign, by going to his ports, or plac- ing themsjclves on his territories. And yet such is the state of the commerce of the world, that it can scarcely happen in a mercantile voyage, in this or the other hcmis{)hcre, that the ves- ael will not at some time be in a British port, and the crew on British ground : our riglu of flag will not then save our adopted citizens from impressment. lor the slight benefit, therefore, to our naturalized citizens, which can arise under our claim, if es- tablished, I am sure the wcll-njeaning and reasonable part of them will not ask tlie counliy to ( onlinuc the war on their account. Another remark which 1 wish to make is, that 1 am most decidedly the friend, n;iy, Sir, if you please, the partisan, of the 23 seamen ef the country. I have no doubt that this nation is des- tined to be a great maritime power; and that, in times not very far distant, we are to owe our prosperity, as a commercial peo- ple, and possibly, under providence, our security, to our seamen. I am therefore a friend to '* seamen's rights," properly under- stood and fairly enforced ; but this shall not blind me to the rights of others. Besides, in a war to be carried on for seamen alone, and that too on the abstract question of the right of flag, I can see great danger to the seamen in their just claims to pro- tection ; and I must beg their friends, in and out of this house, to reflect before they act. As surely as the war is continued on this ground alone, so surely will seamen become unpopular, and their rights be neglected. When the evils of the war press upon the country, and press they will ; when the many lives sacrific- ed, and the countless millions expended, shall be brought to view, is it not to be apprehended that seamen and their claims will be remembered, only as the causes of the scenes of expense and blood through which we are to pass ? It is not dealing fairly with our seamen, to make them the scape- goats of this war. The British then claim the right, in time of war, to take their seamen out of neutral merchant vessels on the high seas. Is this claim a novel one ? That the claim is novel, is certainly Intimated by the committee of foreign relations, when they say that the impressment of which we complain, is " a practice which has been unceasingly maintained by Great-Britain in the wars to which she has beeh a party since our revolution." In- deed it has been most roundly asserted, and by many it is be- lieved, that the British claim was made for the first time after our war ; that it originated in views hostile to our commerce- and maritime rights ; and that in practice it is only brought to bear upon us. In truth, however, whatever may be the justice of the claim, it is not a recent one. It has, in a greater or less degree, been practised on in all the wars in which England has Keen engaged for the two last centuries. The instructions to armed ships is not frequently made public ; but it so happens, that we have in print an instruction on this very point, given in 1 646, by the Earl of Northumberland, Lord High Admiral of England, to Sir John Pennington, which goes beyond the present claim. " As you meet with any men of war, merchants, or other ships, belonging to any foreign prince or state, or in any road where you, or any of his majesty's fleetj may happen to come, you are to send to see whether there be any of his majesty's subjects on board ; and if any seamen, gun- ners, pilots, or marines, (whether English, Scotch, or Irish,) be found on board, you are to cause such of his majesty's subjects to be taken forth, and so disposed of as they shall be forthcom- ing, to answer their contempt of his majesty's proclamation in that kind." These instructions were modified in the reign of Charles the second, so as to exclude public armed vessels, and vnth tliis modification they have come d«v/n to the presen*- 24 umes. If it were ai all necessary t« the purposes of my aig<. ment, I might show that this right has bv'cn exercised both to? wards France and Holland, long before we had existence as a nation. Their vessels have been searched, and British seamen taken from them. But enough has been said to prove that the Claim, if unjust, is not novel. Is the cletini Jicculiar to the British ? I am justified in saying, that this claim, in time of war, to search for and seize seamen irt neutral merchant vessels, on the high seas, has been made and exercised by every maritime nation in Europe. To be more particular — I assert, and stand ready to prove, that it has been jnade and enforced by France as well as England, and is so now. It would be a waste of time to go very much at large into the French usages on this subject I propose to do little more than to refer to one or two French ordinances, and then show from our slate papers their practical application to us. By the French laws, and they are aiicient laws, the seamen of the country are all classed, and enrolled, and licensed. In 1784, an edict was made, which is still in force, declaring, that any classed seaman, who shall, in time of peace, be found serving in foreign ships, shall be sentenced to 15 days' confinement, and re- duced to the lowest wages, and serve two years extraordinary at the lowest rate ; but those who, in time of war, shall be arrested in foreign ships, or passing into foreign countries, shall be sen- tenced to three years* service in the gallies." Under the autho- rity of this, and similar ordmancee, the French have taken their seamen out of our vessels, and in some instances our seamen with them. Mr. Chairman, the first proof relative to the French practice ■which I shall lay before the committee, is the impressment do- cument of January last, known to the American people as the 6 5 7 document. The Secretary of State, Mr. Monroe, at the close of the introductory report, says, " it is equally impossible, from the want of precise returns, to make an accurate report of the names or number of citizens of the United States, who have been comfielled to enter into the French service, or are held i/t ca/itivity under the authority of that gov er nine nt^wViCihcr taken from vessels captured on the high seas, or seized in rivers, ports, or harbours; the names of a few only, greatly below the number believed to be so detained, being within tlie knowledge of this department. A detail therefore is not attempted, with respect to this pajt of the call of the House of Representatives." Yes, sir, it is known to the administration, that some of our citi- zens have been compelled to enter into the service of the French Emperor, while others ure held in captivity by him. Ask, how ever, for t!>eir names, und you iiavc for answer, that all the per sons detained arc not known to the government, and tbcreforc il cannot l\c material that you should have the names of any. Say to gentlemen, here is a case of American rights violated, and ^ou will be toW, that the injury, in practice, is not of sullicienl 25 importance to justify strong measures against the French go- vernment. Be it so. But attempt to prove to the same gentle- men, that the practical operation of British blockades and ordera in council, is not such as to require war, you will then hear, that it is necessary to fight about the principle. I have one other paper to lay before the committee, on this subject. For some years back, the information about French impressments, has been general and vague, or altogether with- held. Formerly this was otherwise. In a report respecting the impressment of seamen in 1797, made by the Secretary ot State to this house, on the 27th of February, 1798, we have the names of upwards of twenty American citizens, taken out of American vessels, on the high seas, by French privateers. We have more, Sir. This same report states, that two French sea- men named Lewis, had been impressed from on board the American ship Bryseis, by a French Commodore's ship ; that Francis Gibbons, a native of France, but married and resident at New-London, in Connecticut, was impressed from the Ameri- can ship Edward, at Rochefort, by authority of the French re- public, and put on board a French ship of war ; and that Henry Doughty, an American, was impressed at sea, from the Ameri- can brig Elsa, by the French frigates Lapancey and Thetis. I could instance other cases, but these are sufficient to show, th it neither the claim nor the exercise of it is peculiar to the British. It is a claim altogether unsupfiorted by reason. As I under- stand the nations who contend for this right to seize their sea- men, it is founded on the principle of national law, which jjives to every government a right to the service of its subjects in time of war. I meddle not, Sir, with the question, who is, or who is not, a subject ; but as long as a person is a subject, and owes allegiance, and may demand protection, so long has the community a claim on him, when the country is in distress or danger. And this, not by any municipal regulation, properly so called, but by general law. It is a right necessarily growing out of a state of society. If this is a right, then there must be a remedy also. To al- low that a sovereign has a claim to the services of his subject, is necessarily to admit, that he has the power in some way to enforce such claim. As to sailors, the right is a dead letter, unless search and seizure on board neutral merchantmen is al- lowed. In every war, if the principle is established, that the flag shall protect all sailing under it, seamen would be drawn from the country and its service into neutral employ. High -wages, ith security against the hazards and dangers of war, >vould overbalance considerations of general duly. Let it be known to the seamen of England or of France, that they may safely sail under the American flag during the existing v/ar, and aiy word for it, they will come to you, to the extent of your ability to employ them. 4 26 Id the case of a national ship, the seaman enters under the go* v'ernmcm , and ii is therefore fair to presum<;, aiul ou^ht to be prcrsumed, thai there is no violation ol right, on breach of duty. If a seaman of a belligerent, or a deserter, is employed, the comi- ty of nations, and the respect due to governments, make a re- quest for a discharge or delivery necessary. But in this case, if tlie demand is refused, a ni'lionrtl right is violated, and it be- comes a kgiiimate cause of war. Not so with a merchant ves- sel. I'hc sovereign is not concerned with the crew or the voy- age. No duty exists not to employ foreigners. If the com- mander refuses to surrender any one of his crew, although he^ is the subject of the demanding nation, and even a deserter, the government is not concerned The refusal is no cause of war. Seizure is therefore the only remedy. It is, Sir, unnecessary to view the subject in all its hearings ; what has been said was in- tended merely to show that there are some grounds for the claim. Is it our real intercut to ofipose thin claim ; in other words, would it be a substantial and permanent benefit to this country, to tstabiish the principle, that the flag should in all cases, cover and protect the person ? To question this, may seem strange to gentlemen ; and yet, Sir, after much reflection, I have almost brought myself to believe, thac it would neither comport with the interest of our own seamen, nor with that of the nation, to have the right of flag, as we are made to contend for it, insert- ed in the law of nations. The recent French doctrine, that the flag shall cover the pro perty to whomsoever it may belong, like this, that the flag shall protect the person, had at one time many advocates in this country, and there are not wanting some, even at this day, wh« think it altogether favoyi-able to us. Yet, Sir, our experience is sufticient to satisfy any practical man, that it is our interest 10 adhere to the old rule on this subject In peace it has beer. Ihe horn of plenty, which has poured riches into the coun- try. When the French colonists could no longer cover theii- property by neutral flags, they were driven in consequence te 5ell to our merchants All the profits on the European sale- and it was certainly great, became ours, and the ship-owners had tiie advantages of a double freight, as liie merchant was en- abled to fill the vessel in, as well as out. If the colonists couli have sent their property home without danger ol capture, thc\ would have done it. The profit to the merchant would have been lost, and the ship-owner would have had an outuard fi cigli" only. Jn war, Sir, we find the old doctrine equally ncccss.iry to U' If Grtat-Uriiaiu is vulnerable to ui, it is esscniial in her con> meicc wilh her ctji'onies and allies in this hcmisfihere, Avb.ic! pas.uig by our di.or, .s !hro\\n in our way. But if the flag is l* gi-.. .1 r.!.ar:'ct> I- m y\.c piojunv. !• ,he lias to do, is to borro^v :\ Spanish or Portuc^ucsc vessel, and her commerce is placed bt •27 yond our grasp or poWcr. We are too apt to form general con- clusions from individual cases, and lo suffer o'lr jud^n. cm to be misled by fine speculations, which favour our wishes. Tliis religion of the flag, has many charms for tliose vi^lio will not suf- fer themselves to think of consequences ; when, however, it is viewed with the lights of experience, the charm vanishes. We then see the advantage and necessity of old rules, and arc willing to be regulated by them. 1 have said, Sir, the right of flag docs ot appear calculated to promote the real interests uf our own ,camen. The interest of the sailor is to have good wages, and constant employment ; and he is sure with us to have both the one and the other, if foreign seamen do not interfere with him. If foreigners are admitted to be covered and protected by our flag, it must follow, from the low wages in Great-Britain, and the liability to impressment, that English sailors will come in bhoals to this country. They will by this compeiition lessen the wages of our native sailors, if they do not absolutely drive them from the ocean, for want of employment Mr. Chairman, it may seem absurd to say, that the security of the great body of our seamen has been found in the British practice of impressment, with all its evils": and yet there is some foundation for such an opinion. Our own regulations place all seamen, native and foreign, on the same footing^, and allow them equal privileges : is it not then fair to infer, that but for the danger of being impressed by their own nation, we should have been overrun by British sailors, to the great injury of our own sailors ? In truth. Sir, in principle, the operation of the British claim is favourable to American seamen. All they require, is a regulation of the, practice, so as to furnish them ■with a reasonable security against impressment. In a national point of view, the right claimed by the Europe- an maritime nations, appears all important to this co\iiitry ; unci I venture to predict, that those who witness the close of the next half century, will see us practising on this very claim, and if necessary, fighting for it. There can be no doubt, Sir, that we are to be a great maritime power, as we are already a great < ommercial nation. Indeed, to continue the latter, >ve must be- come the former. Our future wars will be maritime -wars. — The business of the Canadas and the Floridas, according lo the common course of events, Avill settle itself, and if we. meet a foe, it must be on the ocean. To carry on a maritime war, we must have ships ; but ships, ■without seamen to navigate and fight them, will be useless. It •will therefore be absolutely necessary to settle on some princi- ple, which will give us a» much command over our seamen, on their element, as we have over our landsmen on shore. With- out meaning to intimate tliat wc will or ought to resort to tho European practice of impressment, yet, when we seriously de- termine on having a navy, we shall iind it necessary to look to some regulation, wJiich will bririg our sailors within the country 28 in every war, so as to make it their interest to go into our ser- vice. We sluill have no means to prevent their accepting the bribes of neutrals, high wages, and safe employment, but by seizing them, when found sailing under neutral flags, after they shall be recalled. If, Sir, there is any thing in this course of reflection, and I do think there is, then s.o far from being bound in duty to the nation or to our seamen, to continue the war with Great-Britain on the abstract question of right, we are ourselves interested in preserving the very right claimed by that nation. What we have to contend for, is in reality, that the practice by tiic Bri- tish, and all other nations, should be so regulated, as to afford to our seamen a reasonable degree of security. For as to perfect and absolute security, their habits, and the nature and scene of their employment, renders that impossible. Their service will of course bring them, and that frequently, within the British territories, where our doctrine of the religion of the flag will not protect them In point of fact, -a considerable number of the impressments reported to us, took place on British ground, and not on the high seas. If this right, or claim of right, however, is made a mere pre- text by any nation, to seize and detain our seamen, I am willing to allow that it would be a cause of war. But even in this case, •war ought not be waged, until we had done our duty to cur sea- men and the offending nation, by making suitable regulations, to prevent the employment of the seamen of such nation. Have we done this, as respects Great-Britain ? Perhaps some such regulation is to be found, in the law which defines what vessel is an American vessel, and which, as such, is entitled to hoist our flag. Look at it. Sir, According to the act of December, 1792, an American ship, is one wholly owned by an American citizen, and commanded by a person also a citizen. The crew may be all foreigners, all Englishmen, and if you please, all English deserters. In this, therefore, wc find no security to the British government. But we have also the law of May, 15'96, which provides, that the collectors may register seamen, calling them.selvcs Ameri- can, an^'^ grant certificates of citizenship. Out of this law, it is presumed, has grown the practire of granting protections, as they ar<5 called ; papers procured from notaries und magis^irates, 'oft-times on the most barefaced perjuries, and always consider- ed as a species of negotiable property for value received. Sir, these protections, in their abuse, arc a scandal to the nation. — It has made false swearing an employment, and the granting of filse I apersa business. The price of Quch a paper, is as well known in the gre;it sea-port towns, as is that of your stocks.— All ages, and complexions., and tongues, may have this badge of citizenship, by paying the charges in such cases provided, if this, however, was not so; if protections were only granted to real Americans, it is difticult to sec, how ijiis is to prcyenf the 29 employment of British sailors. It is not necessary that the persons nuvii^alinii^ an American vessel should have them. This act ot ours wus presented to the British government, by Mr. King, in January, 1797, and Lord Grenville, on the 27th of March following, in a maimer highly conciliatory, and cer- tainly with much force, staiecl specific objections to the law — The executive, when, in July last, he answered the call of the benate, for papers relative to impressments, omitted this letter of Lord Grenville, but he gives a letter from the then secreta-' tary of state, to our minister at' the British Court, of the third of October, 1797, in which the force of the objections seems to be admitted. " Lord Grenville's observations on the act of Congress for the relief and protection of American seamen, present difficulties which demand consideration at the ensuing session." Nothing was, however, done at that or any future ses- sion. In truth, we have done nothing, to prevent the employ- ment of British seamen in our public or private ships ; and they are to be found in both, ^nd yet, with this fact staring us in the face, we are called upon to say that the war is altogether just on our part ! It will probably be urged, that the British practice under their claim, in its application to us, was sufficient to prove, that the reclamation of their seamen was not so much the ob- ject of the British government, as the seizure of our seafaring citizens ; that it had become so outrageous, as not only to justi- fy, but to require war. — Without, Sir, meaning to excuse or to palliate the taking even a cabin boy, if done knowingly and witting- ly ; and being willing to admit, that about the period of the attack on the Chesapeake, we had much and serious cause to com° plain on the subject, I must be permitted to say, that I have not evidence to satisfy mc, that when we declared war, the practice of the British was such as to prove, that the claim on their part was a mere pretext to take our sailors. In truth, I believe, if the administration have not deceived themselves on this subject, that they have attempted a gross deception on the public. The instructions given at this day, by the British admiralty to a naval commander, on this subject, directs him, " when he meets with any foreign ship or vessel, to send a lieuienane, to inquire whether there may be on board of her, any seamen "who are the subjects of his majesty; and it there, be, to rfe- mand them^ provided it does not difstrcss the ship : lie is to de- mand their \vages up to the day ; but he is to do this without detaining the vessel longer than shajl be necessary, or offering any violence to, or in any way ill-treating the master or his crew." Mr. Monroe may perhaps recognize in this, the in- structions shown to him after his arrangement, and of which he declared himself satisfied ; but whether he does or not, it must be conceded, that it provides for a moderate exercise of the right. The person who is to make the search, i« an officer 30 of some standing ; be is only lo take seamen \vho arc British subjects, excluiling thereby, not merely our citizens, but alj iorcigners ; and he is not to take even British scanitn, il by ii he destroys the crew, or endangers the vessel. Allowing the light to exist, it is diflicult more ikirly to regulate its exercise. But it may be urged, that the praciice ol the British com- manders does not correspond with these instructions ; that they search and seize at large according to their will and pleasure. I know, Sir, that the habits and education ot a miiiiaiy n)an, not untVequently make him act as it power and right meant the same thing : and 1 therefore have no doubt that tlicrc have been abuses. But i do most conscienliousiy believe, that these abuses have been greaily magnihed, and are, even by the well meaning, vastly overrated. 1 am aware, that 1 shall be refer- red to the impressment document of last session. This docu- ment, Sir, is so illy understood, and has been the source of so much misrepresentation, that 1 must be allowed slightly to re- view it. The Secretary in the report says, that the list transmitted, had been rcx;eived from our agent at London, and " contains the names of American seamen and citizens w/io have been im- pressed and held in bondage in his BriCannic majesty's shijis of •war ^ for the several cjuarters of 18oy a7id 18iO." — The list is headed, " A return or list of American seamen and citizei w, vho have been impressed and held on board of his Britannic majesty's ships of war, from 1st of April to the 3wth of June, inclusively," and so of the other quarters. >.'ow the pmin meaning of this is, it any meaning it has, that the persons ■whose names were tlms sent to us, were impressed and made to serve on board British armed ships, al some period in t;ic years i8oy and 1810. Indccts of citizenship, or made his claim on the British admiralty. Sir, there is not a man who, in practice or by inquiry, has made himself acquainted with the manner in which this business is transacted, but knows, that ma- ny foreigners, who never saw this country, or sailed under its flag, have attempted, by application to our agents abroad, to shield themsslves against British impressment. The secreta;ry of state, Mr. Monroe, needs no information on this subject, hav- ing himself resided in London as our minister. It was the duty of our agent to send home some account of his proceedings, and I have no objection to his making such a list as we have before us. But I do object to its being palmed on the American na- tion, as a true history of British impressments affecting our people and nation. I pray you look at this list. In the year commencing in April, 18W9, and ending in March, l8lo, we have about 940 names, and of these about 700 are given with blanks in the columns for the — " towns and states of whicli they represent themselves to be citizens" — " when impressed" — *' where impressed" — ships from whenc-e taken" — " nations" — " masters." — The time and the result of the application are only given. And from these entries in Mr. Lyman's book, you arc called upon to admit, that the applicant was an American, and that he was impressed in the year 1809, by the British, on the high seas, out of an American vessel. Really this is asking too much. Mr. Chairman, 1 have examined the list from April, 1809, to April, iSlu, with great attention, for the purpose of asccrtaini.nj;' the number of impressments, which took place in that year, \nd I will now make to you one or two statements, which may cast: 32 sonre light on the subject of the British practice. The nambei ■which by the list appears to have been imprcssecl in that year is one hundred. It will be understood, that in this number 1 do not include those whose names are carried out in blank as has been staled. It is uncertain whether such persons ever were im- pressed, and at all events, it is fair to presume, that their ser- Tice on board British ships had commenced before 1809, or otherwise there could be no difficulty in giving dates. Of the 100, seventy-six were dischart^ed, and six had deserted, leaving less than twenty to be accounted for Another result. Of the persons thus taken, 57 were impressed on shore and 43 at sea. Again— 3u of these seamen, when impressed, made part of the crews of British vessels, and 34, American vessels, and of the 34, twelve were taken on land, leaving but about 22 persons ta- ken from American vessels on the high seas. It is possible. Sir, that in these statements I may not be perfectly accurate ; 1 am certain, however, that I am substantially so. I do not mean to represent that this is a full account of all the impressments which took place in 1809 ; on the contrary, I ad- mit that it is not. Many impressments were certainly made, ol" persons undeniably British subjects, who would scarcely think of applying to Mr. Lyman, and will not therefore be found in his book. Many persons also having a right to his interference, were not then known to him My ol)ject in making these ex- planations, was to show that the 6, 0, 5, 7 document docs not fur- nish such strong evidence of British aggression as has been sup- posed. The number of our seamen impressed by the British, has been so variously represented, that I have, from motives of cu- riosity as well as duty, been desirous to arrive at somethinr- like a reasonable certainty on the subject. We hear of ten twenty, nay, forty thousand of our citizens, confined in the float- ing dungeons of Great-Britain, fighting her battles against their will The evidence of this, however, is only to be found in the imagination of gentlemen. It is the old story over again of tlu six men in Buckram. In part representing the greatest com- mercial Slate in the union, it may be expected that I have some personal knowledge on this subject, but indeed 1 have none such to give. Is there not in this some proof tliat the evil has been magnified ? I have sought for information, in quarterns where only it is to be found, among the shipping merchants and ship owners of the country, f will now furnish you with the opinion of ai^ intelligent gentleman from Marblehc-ad, whose means of information is ample, and whose veracity will not be doubled. I mean my friend from Massachusetts, who sits be- fore me, (Mr. Reed.) He has favoured mc with this state- ment. " In answer to your iniquiry, cclativc to the seamen of Mar- blehead, 1 have to remark, that the average sl/ipping of that port for the last twenty years, may bo estimated at about 19006, 33 tons, of which it is fair to calculate 10,000 tons were enipioyeil in foreign commerce, and the residue in the fisheries and in the coasting-trade. Allowing six men to every lOO tons, which is the usual estimate, it gives an average of 1 i76 seamen in all, and 600 in our foreign trade each year ; the number of seamen therefore employed from Marblehead for the last twenty years, must have been considerable, say 5000 I have resided at that place nearly twenty years, and during the greater part of the time, have been actively engaged in commerce. According to my own recollection, aided by that of others who have the best means of information, I do not believe that twenty of the sea- men of Marblehead, native or naturalized, have been impressed by the British within the twenty years, and it is not known that one has been demanded without being released." As there is no reason to suppose, that Marblehead has been more fortunate with respect to impressments than other places, we have here something, whereby to form an estimate of the number of our seamen taken by the British. My own convic- tion is, that the American seamen impressed and held by the British, at the commencement of this war, did not much ex- ceed 500 in all, and certainly did not amount to iOOO Permit me. Sir, to mention one circumstance which speaks loudly on this subject. If the practice of impressment had been as out- rageous as has been represented, it must have fallen with great force on the eastern states, as it is there the mass of our seamen are found. We are then to expect much feeling and passion on this account. The war must be popular when the cause of it is brought home to every man's door. No such thing, bir. The war is confessedly odious there. It is in states where seamen never grew, that the war has its strongest advocates ; it is there that you principally find the dark pictures of sailors' sufferingSj and hear the loud and long appeals to the sympathies and pas- sions of the people about seamen's rights, and seamen's injuries. One inquiry more, Mr. Chairman, on the subject of impress- ment, and I have done with it. The President, in his war mes- sage, says, that no pretext should be left for a continuance of the practice, " the British government was formally assured of the readiness of the United States to enter into arrangements, such as could not be rejected, if the recovery of Bruish subjects were the real and sole object. The communication passed with- out effect." The committee of foreign relations are more direct still : " Its continuance (the practice of impressment) is the more unjustifiable, because the United States have repeatedly pro- posed to the British government an arrangement which would secure to it the control of its own people. An exemption of the citizens of the United States from this degrading oppressior.s and their flag from violation, is all they have sought." In these passages we have two distinct propositions, th:it reasonable of- fers for an adjustment of this difficult and delicate subject have been proffered by tlic jjovcvnmrntj meaning s\^vcK' t):<" adniinis- 84 iraiion which coiiimcnced, and arc willing to carry on, the war on this account ; iind tliatUic British government would listen to no terms, hav.cver well calculnled to secure to it the service of its own seamen : Is all this true ? Is it true that the present executive has attempted to nego- ciate with Great-Britian on this subject; that he has communi- cated to the British government his willingiicss tuul his wish to come to an arrangement, which, while it afTordcd satciy to ouv seamen, would secure to that country the services of its seamen i What has been done by him is soon told, and ought to be known. The only measure whicli has come before the public, looking to- wards an accommodation, by him, is to be found in the letter from Secretary Smith to Mr. Pinckney, of the 2oth January, 1810, in which the latter is directed to resume the negociation with ihe British government, under the power which had been given to Mr. Monroe and himself. In his discussions, he was to be regulated by the instructions which had been given to them. It is added, " it is hoivever not intended, that xjoii should com- mcncc this ncg'ociaiion, until the requisite satisfaction shall have been made in the affair nf the. Chesajnake." The affair of the Chesapeake, we all know, was not settled until within a short time before the war was declared, and long after the return of Mr. Pinckney to this country. It follows that Mr. Pinckney could not, as most certainly he did not, commence, a negociation. No terms have been offered, no arrangement has been attempted to be effected, by the present executive. He cannot say his •' com- munications passed without e fleet," as in fact he made none. And yet by him we are carried into a war on this account. The President may, however, deem his administration so iar identitied with that of his in)mediaie predecessor, as to en- title him to the benefit of the offers formerly made. Be it so. We will then examine the sum and value of the propositions ot Mr. Jefferson. The instructions to Messrs. Monroe and Pinck- ney, are to be found in a letter to them from IVlr. Madison, then Secretary of State, of the 17tb of May, 18o6, in which they are leferrtd to the instructions to Mr. Monroe, of the 5lh of Janua- ry, 1804, as applicable to a great proportion of the matters com- mitted to, their joint negociation, and as their guide. In the in- structions therefore of 1804, we are to find the arrangement " repeatedly proposed to the 15ritish government," — " which would secure to it the control of its own people." Tiie iiisuuctions of January 3, 1804, were also drawn by Mr. Madi^.on,in his capacity of Secretary of State, and contain tin: plan of a convention on the subject of seamen, with some other matters, giving the proposal and the uUimaium. The first arti- cle provides, thai no p»;r.son shall be demanded or taken at sea, out of a ship of one nation, by the armed ships of the other, un- less he is liable to be so taken according to the laws of nations ; and not then; if he makes part of the crew. In the observations on the plan, Mr. Madison asserts, and reasons on, the right o^ Hag, and the article is drawn with a view to our claim, and to pre 35 vent search and seizure at sea. The cightii article provides, that no rcfutjc shall be given to persons tlcscrting from a vessel, making part of the crew of sucii vessel : and the elcrenth article provides, that " each party will prohiint its citizen* or subject* from clandestinely carrying away, from the territories or do' minions of the other, any seamen or soldiers belonging to such other party." These articles embrace every part of the con- vention which relate to seamen. In them therefore arc to be found, if any where, the arrangement said to have been repeat- edly proposed to il»c British governmejit. I shall not examine how far such an arrangement was desirable to this country j but did it secure to England the control of its own people, the re- covery of its own subjects? In this plan we find no provision ab>ainst the employment of British seamen, even deserters. Those already in the country- might plainly go into our service, and those who might subse- quently reach our shores, were safe when our flag should be waving over their heads. Deserters, it is true, were to be given up ; but how could this be done, when they were on the high seas, or had embarked in foreign voyages ? The convention, as proposed, will be found, when examined, not to secure toGreat- Britian the service of her seamen, or the return of her subjects. • Is it truv. that the British government would listen to no terms, that they have refused to negociate on this subject ? bir, it is not true. Lord Grenville, in his letter to Mr. King, of ihe 27th of March, 1797, which I have already mentioned, uses these ex- pressions — " If it were possible at once to find an obvious and indisputable mode of ascertaining whether a seaman is really a subject of his majesty's dominions, or a citizen of the United States, certainly the King's government would not hesitate to accede to any regulations for applying that rule, in the easiest, most expeditious, and most effectual manner." After stating his objections to our act for the relief and protection of American seamen, he goes on to say, " for the reasons which I have here stated, the force of which I am confident no candid mind can dis- pute, I am under the necessity of declining, on the part of his majesty's government, to accede to the propositions contained in your letter. If any other proposals jcan be made, less liable to objection, they will be considered witli candour and liberality. It is 'iiot exjiected, that on so difficult a7id delicate a busiTitss., ar- rangements can at cnce be broziif Jit forward, ivAolly free from all olijections, or such as to supersede the necessity of frequent revisal, improvement, and addition, in order to meet the differ- ent means of evasion that may be resorted to : but it is certainly not too much to ask, that the rules adopted in the first instance, shall at least afford some security against the most extensive and the most dangerous consequences to the maritime power and safety of Great-Britain." Sir, I cannot but admire the force and dignity of the letter of '.vhich I have read part. Tlie importance of the subject to both nations is fairly admitted, and a soli'^itude is evinred for the 36 auoption of some regulation which tvoukl afford security to each. A distinct avowal is made, that the British government do not vant our seamen, if they can be left in possession of their own. And a suggestion is added, that a perfect arrangement is not to be expected on the first attempt. Difiicuilies will arise in practice in any settlement of this business. All that is wanted is a point to start from, and a disposition in both gov- ernments to deal fairly and justly I am not afraid to assert, that if the arrangementof Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, in 1806, had been adopted with this spirit, we should wow have thoughts of impressments merely as an evil which once existed. But, Mr. Chairman, to come nearer to the present times. In the letter from Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney to Mr. Madison, of the 1 llh of September, i806, it is stated that the British com- missioners firessed ivitli much zeal " a provision, that the persons, composing the crews of such ships, should be furnish- ed with authentic documents of citizenship, the nature and form of which should be settled by treaty ; tliat these docu- ments, should completely, protect those to whom they related ; but that, subject to such protections, the ships of war of Great- Britain should continue to visit and impress on the main ocean as heretofore." This provision w'as rejected by our ministers. 1 will not say tliat such a regulation ought to have been adopt-' cd ; but 1 will say, that the proposition proves, that the English government was anxious to adjust this difference ; and it proves i'unher, that the great object of the British was the recovery' of their own citizens. The letter of the 1 1th November, 1806, from Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney to Mr. Madison, gives the history of the negocia- tion which led to the celebrated arrangement. Permit me to furnish you with one or two extracts from the letter, explana- tory of the views and feelings of the British government. " At our meeting the next day, tl^e Biitish commissioners slated ex- plicitly, but in a very conciliatory manner, that it -was not in T/itir fioivtr to adofit an article in the sfiirit of our firoject ; that the board of admiralty had been consulted on the subject, as had also been the crowj* oflicers in Doctors' Commons, who united all, without exception, in the opinion, that the right of their government in the case in question was well founded, and ought not to be relinquished. They added., that., tinder such circuiimtan- r( V, the reliiu/iashment cf it ivas a measure which the ffovern- inrnt could not adofit^ without takin:^ ufion itself a rcsfio?isibility ^vhich no mivifitry would be willintf to meet ^liowexf the govcrnmcjit, which was higldy favourable to their interest.'' !:•. .1 .•.•i!'.i ftMCMi. i<:>r Mpth'- ^-yw 'cttf 1". Mr. Mouroc, speak- ,.g of the note, and the omission in it of the terms " high seas," remarks, " it is impossible that those terms could have been omitted intentionally wiih our knowledge, ior any purpose other than to admit a construction, that it was intended that im- pressments should be confined to the land. 1 do not mean to imply that it Avas understood, between the British commission- ers and us, that Great-Britain should abandon the practice of impressment on the high seas altogcthei'. i mtan., /loiujver^ dis- iinclbj to siate^ that it was understood, that the practice hereto- fore pursued by her should be abandoned^ and that noiinprcsmneJiC should be made on the hisfh seas, under the obligation of that pa- per, except in cases of an extraordinary nature, to which no gene- ral prohibition against it could be construed fairly to extend." Again, and it is the last reference 1 shall make to these do- cuments, not because much and material matter does not re- main, but because I am really tired of the subject. Mr. Mon- roe, in his Richmond letter, declares, " We were, therefore, de- cidedly of opinion, that the paper of the British commissioners placed the interest of impressment on ground which it was both safe arid-honotirablc for the United States to admit ; that, in short* it gave their government the command of tbe subject for every necessary and tisejul fnirjiose. Attached to the treaty, it was the basis or condition on which the treaty rested. Strong in its char- acter in their favour on the great question of right, and admit- ting a favourabre construction on others, it placed them on more elevated ground, in those respects, than they had held before." The statements thus made by Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney, establish a few facts of great importance, which cannot be too generally known or too frequently repeated. Kept constantly iu recollection, and applied as touchstones to offers which have been, or may be made, to the British government, they will show the sincerity of the administration, or their insincerity. They prove that the British will negociate on the subject ot seamen, inasmuch as they have done it. They prove that the British will come to an arrangement with us : for this they have offered. And they prove that the British will accede to proposi- tions relating to impressments, which are safe and honotirable. and therefore satisfactory to this country ; for this we are toltl they did. But they prove also, that no ministry in England dare openly and avowedly relinquish the right of search, or recop-- nise, to the extent demanded by us, the right of flag. Tht practice may be so regulated, and was ofTered to be so regulat- ed, as to bring the claim into disuse. And what to us is a right claimed but not enforced ? When I find the administra- tion dealing less in abstract propositions about seamen's right!: and national honour, and attending to what is really to be desir- ed and is known to be attainable, 1 shall believe in their pacific dispositions, and not till then. From the time I first saw the arrangement made by Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, with their account of the negociation, • J^>c _ _ _,, ^,_, _ ^K' ,ot}rantvine.P A , J .^'^ i*:,^% '^^ ^'""-o'* ^