x'^^U ,^>' " j<- /i^ <^. .xV 1' o ,i^' . 't^ v^ ■"if \^' ^' ^^^\ ,0o A • v.' ) o ■^' :r. .x^- O 0' y: h^:- '^ .A 3 O '^. ,<^^ .^- A ^A^ V- j , \ A^ V> ,^^ A""' ■^- ^ . A^ ,A -7*, v^^ ■^A Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/conversationsonsOOelye CONVERSATiaNS ON THE SCIENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. X y eONVERSATIONS ON THE SCIENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND, BY EZRA STILES ELY, D. D. Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the City of Philadelphia. PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR. SOLD Br A. FINLEY, CGBJfEIl OF CHESI^UT AKD JOURTH STREETS. William Fry, Printer, 1S\9. Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit: ******** 3J, YY REMEMBERED, that on the nineteenth day of I Seal. * April, in the forty -third year of the Independence of the ******** United States of 'America, A. D^,, 1819, Ezra Stiles Ely, D. D. of the said District, hath deposited in this office the title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as author, in the words following, to wit: " Conversations on the Science of the Human Mind. By Ezra Stiles Ely, D. D. Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the city of Philadelphia." In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, entitled, *' An Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprie- tors of such Copies, during the times therein mentioned." — And also to the Act, entitled, "an Act supplementary to an Act, entitled, " an Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies during the times therein mentioned," and extending the be- nefits thereof to the Arts of designing, engraving, and etching histo- I'ical and other, Prints." D. CALDWELL, Clerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. ^"^ ,^^^ Contents, ix Uses of the word Taste.— -Emotions. — Description of the principal Affections of Man. — A rule concerning inordinate Affection. — Re- gard. Page lOS CONVERSATION XI. Account of the Human Passions. — Lawful Passions. — Some general Ijaws of Feeling. — Sympathy, Commisei-ation, Compassion, defin- ed. — Relative Importance of the Intellectual and Sensitive parts of our Mental Nature. ' 125 CONVERSATION XII. The Faculty of Volition, or the Will. — Some contemplated action the object of every Volition. — Desire and Preference different from Volition. — The Will a dependent Faculty. — Perception and Con- ception the only independent Faculties of the Mind. — Definition of Volition and Motive. — Inducement and JSIolive distinguished. — Several general Rules concerning Volition. — An Inference concern- ing the importance of regulating oar Thoughts. 133 CONVERSATION XIII. The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. — An Operation of this Faculty distinguished. — Prnof of the Existence of this Faculty. — Objects of our Efficiency. — Some Operations of Man that are ordinarily per- formed without Volition, may be performed from Voluntary Exer- tion. — How the Mind exerts aQ Agency on the Body is unknown by us. — The Operations of our Efficiency on our different Mental Faculties considered. — On the Consciousness, Perception, Concep- tion, &c. 144 CONVERSATION XIV. Consideration of several Attributes of the Soul which are not inhe- rent. — Of Liberty, Capacity, Power and Necessity. — Of Physica\ Liberty and Necessity. — Of Moral Liberty, Moral Certainty, and Metaphysical Necessities. 161 Contents, CONVERSATION XV. Disposition of Mind. — Inclination. — Habit.— Imitation. — Consideration of several Principles of Human Actions. — Principles of Substances, Sciences, Actions, and Moral Actions. — Sentiments. — Instinct. — Instinctive, Animal, and Mechanical Operations. Page 173 CONVERSATION XVI. Several Complex Operations of Man considered.— Attention, Obser- vation, Reflection, Inquiry, Investigation, Consideration, Contem- I)lation, Meditation, Comparison, Association, and Abstraction.— Compounding not a Mental Operation, unless it be a name given to several successive Conceptions. 186 CONVERSATION XVII. Improvement and Injui'y of the Original Faculties of the Mind. — They have their Infantile state — Exercise and Discipline the chief means of their Improvement. — Insanity, a state of mind resulting from ' some Injury. — Dreaming. 200 CONVERSATION XVIII. Comparative Mental Science. 208 CONVERSATION XIX. Recapitulation of the Principal Doctrines, taught in the preceding Conversations. 218 '1%- '-> V rt. ^ ^^. ■^. ^ ./ ■ ^; ^1 ■ PREFACE, The writer of the following pages has endea- voured to exhibit, in a familiar manner, the Ele- ments OF THE Science of the Human Mind. The sources whence he has drawn his doctrines, are his own consciousness, memory, and reflection; and the writings of Locke, Hume, Price, Hart- ley, Lord Karnes, Reid, Stewart, Duncan, Pre- sident Edwards, Beattie, Watts, Condillac, and Cogan. What he deems true, and most important in all these celebrated authors, will be found in this compendium. He disclaims all metaphysics but those of commoJi sense. He flatters himself, that these Conversations will prove beneficial to Students in Law, Medicine, and Divinity,* and to the most^ intelligent young ladies of our country. No science is so intimately connected with all other systematic arrangements of knowledge as that of v/hich he has here treated; and he cannot but hope, therefore, that many who have neither time nor patience to peruse many volumes, will do him the honour of thoroughly examining one. Philadelphia, January 1st, 1819. A 2 CONTENTS. CONVERSATION I. Introduction. — The chief Obstruction to the Advancement of the Science of the Soul. — Its utility. Page IS CONVERSATION 11. The Human Soul defined. — Consciousness. — Judgment. — Axioms.— Substances.— Attributes. — Mind and Matter distinct things. 21 CONVERSATION III. Faculty defined.— Body. — Simple and Complex Operations.— Essen- tial and Incidental Attributes —Ten Faculties of the Human Mind enumerated. — All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for all his Actions. 32 CONVERSATION IV. Definitions.— Genus and Species. — The Faculty of Perception. — Five kinds of Perceptions. — Instrumentality of bodily Organs.— Conscious- ness. 39 CONVERSATION V. The Faculty of Understanding or Conception. — Different Operations of this Faculty. — Imagination. — Discernment. Comprehension. — Apprehension. — Intuition. — Some general laws of Conception. — The Importance of this Faculty. SI viii Contents. CONVERSATION VI. The Faculty of Judging. — Objects of Judgment. — A Truth. — A False- hood — Classification of Judgments. — They are Constitutional or Acquired. — The former are consequent on Consciousness, Percep- tion, (Conception, Memory or Conscience. — The latter result from Reflection, Reasoning, or Testimony. — Believing considered. Page 59 CONVERSATION VII. ) The Faculty of Memory. — Objects of Memory. — Local Memory.— Classification of the Operations of Memory. — Recollection. — Re membrance. — Memory essential to some Conceptions. — Time. — Duration. — Futurity. — Identity o — Knowledge of our own .continued Mental Identity. — Personal Identity. 76 CONVERSATION VIII. The Faculty of Reasoning. — Premises. — Conclusion.— A Syllogism.— Classification of Reasonings. — Demonstrative and Probable Reason- ings. — Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings. — Analogical, Analytic, and Synthetic Reasonings. — Reasonings a priori, a poste- riori, ad absurdurn, and ad homiuem. 89 CONVERSATION IX. The Faculty of Conscience. — Proof that all men have this FacuHy. — Other names fpr the same thing. — Some general Observations and LaM's concerning the Operations of Conscience. — Operations of Con- science always occasion certain Feelings. 101 CONVERSATION X. The Faculty of Feeling. — Feelings distinguished from other, Mental Operation's. — One general Law of Feelings. — Classification of all Human Feelings.—Sensations considered. — Three Appetites. — CONVERSATIONS. -- i CONVERSATIONS ON THE SCIENCE OF THE HUMAN MIND. CONVERSATION I. Introduction.^ — The chief obstruction to the advancement of the Science of the Soul.' — Its utility. Pupil. You have proposed, Sir, to conduct me through the thorny maze of Metaphysics; and I design to follow you, if not with equal steps, at least with equal ardour. Once, 1 confess, that I hated every thing that could be denominated metaphysics. Professor. You would make me promise too much. I have only proposed to teach you the ru- diments of the science of the human soitl^ which de- partment of knowledge is expressed, in a modern classification of universal science, by the term An- thropsychia; but which is rather indefinitely called " The Philosophy of the Human Mind," by all our ancient writers. This specific science is only one branch of metaphysics^ which treats of the nature, B 14 Principal Obstructions to relations, and operations of all substances and their attributes. But tell me, why do you speak of the thorny maze of metaphysics; and why did you hate the name of this extensive science? PupiL Because I thought all metaphysical reason- ings unintelligible and useless; especially if they re- lated to the human soul. Until you constrained me to study the works of Dr. Reid and his successor, Professor Stewart, I was ready to despair of obtain- ing any distinct and satisfactory conceptions on this subject. Professor, Whence arose your principal difficul- ties in attempting to acquire a thorough acquaint- ance with the human soul? Pupil. I had not learned, that in mental science a man must primarily regard his own consciousness of what passes within himself, and look to it for the facts from which he is to reason; just as the natural philosopher looks to his perception of external ob- jects for all the phenomena, whence he is to derive those general observations, which are called the laws of nature. In the next place, the writers with whom r was conversant, did not appear to be mas- ters of their subject. Professor, And what is your chief obstruction now? PupiL It is either the imperfection of language, or else the imperfect use which metaphysical writers have made of the terms which they possess;* and I am not able at present to determine which. * A specimen of the improper use of terms, and of metaphysical jargou, may be given from Hume's Treatise of Human J^ature^ vol. i. Mental Science. lo Professor, It will be my business to convince you, by actual experiment, I hope, that were the same precision of language to be adopted in teaching that which is known of the human soul, as has prevailed in natural philosophy and mathematics, there might be made as great advances, and enjoyed as much certainty in Anthrcpsychia^ as in the two last sciences. The same word has been used by the same writer in two or three different senses, inter- changeably; and two terms have been adopted to denote in some instances, the same, and in others different objects. Nothing has contributed so much p. 29. *' An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us perceive heat and cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may be properly called impressions of reflection, because derived from it. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which, perhaps, in their turn, give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflection are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral;- and therefore shall not at present be entered upon.**^ Any body who can disentangle this skein of terms will obtain more credit for his patience than for his intelligence; and were all meta- physics like those of Hume, we should advise mankind to waste no time upon them. In the language of common sense, an Impression can be made, strictly speaking, on nothing but material objects. Impres- sions are made on our bodily organs of sense; but in the mind there are no impressions, unless by a figure of speech we call our percep' tions or conceptions, by that name. In some places, Mr. Hume speaks oi perceptions when he writes the word " impr'essionsi" and of the conception of oxxf perceptions, when he talks of ** ideas or copies of impressions." 16 Precision in Terma to produce your thorny maze as the want of defini- tions for important terms, and a strict adherence to them when given.* Even President Edwards in his " Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will," uses the word necessity to denote a physical necessity, and sometimes nothing more than the certain futurition of an event; in such a manner as to produce no lit- tle obscurity. Locke uses the words understanding and ideas without much precision; for the first he * "The difference in the meaning affixed to words, by different wri- ters, is one of the greatest impediments to the discoveries of moral truths, and the most difficult to surmount. Complex terms being fre- quently composed of many parts, and each pai-t intermixing its own signification, they are frequently exposed to different constructions: and in controversial subjects, if two authors annex different ideas to the same term, they are taking different courses, and Avill soon steer out of sight of each others argument. Dr. Reid has justly expatiated apon the necessity of accurate definitions, without his having always made them; and his pupil. Dr. Beattie, has very seldom regarded them. Even that great master of reason, Mr. Locke, who has written Jn so satisfactory a manner on the errors occasioned by the abuse of words, has involved some of his ideas in great obscurity, through the want of due attention to their precise import. Perhaps no philosopher, ancient or modern, has taken greater liberties with language than Mr. Hume."— Co^aw'5 Ethical Questions. **I know that there are not words enough in any language, to an- swer all the variety of ideas that enter into man's discourses and rea- sonings. But this hinders not that when any one uses any term he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and" to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. When he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to dear and distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so. Therefore, there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, when terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination." — Locke. " There is no greater impediment to the advancemeut of knowledge than the arhbiguity of words. To this chiefly it is owing that we find sects and parties in most branches of science; and disputes, which are carried on from age to age, without being brought to an issue."—" Reid. absolutely Necessary* 17 calls a single faculty in some places, and in others it includes the whole human soiil^ with the exception of the ivilL By ideas he sometimes intends notions, conceptions, or opinions, and sometimes images of the objects of perception, which he supposes to be conveyed to the mind. Reid and Stewart also use several terms, such as faculty and power^ both as synonymous and not synonymous; while they employ many other words, about the meaning of which mankind do not agree, without accurately describing the meaning which they attach to those symbols of thought. I am senaible, that the preci- sion of language which I have prescribed to myself in our conversations, will render my style formal and dry; but I flatter myself, that what is lost in ease and sprightliness of diction, will be amply compensated for by the certainty of the knowledge acquired. Pupil, Before you proceed to propose your sys- tem, Sir, will you have the goodness to state wherein consists the usefulness of the science of the human soul? May we not think and reason, feel and act, while we remain in utter ignorance of it?^ * " 'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide anj' of them mar seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even JMathematics, J\atural Philosophy^ and JS^atural Religion^ are in some measure dependent on the science of Max; since they lie under the cognizance of man, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences, were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the na- ture of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in reasoning. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not B 2 1 8 Utility of the Science Professor, Can you seriously ask, of what use is this science? Surely it must be profitable to man to understand the nature of his own bodily organs; for otherwise he could not employ them aright. You would laugh at him who should persist in attempt- ing to walk on his hands, to see with his ears, to hear with his eyes, and to write with his lips. Of how much greater importance must it be for him to understand the nature, number, and operations of the faculties of the intelligent, sensitive, and ef- ficient part of his complex being? The inherent parts of the constitution of our souls are like mental comprised in the science of man; and there is none, ^vbich can be decided Mith any certainty, before we become acquainted -with that science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. And, as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and obser- vation." — Hume's Treatise on Human JVature. By quoting some admirable sayings from Mr. Hume, we shall not render ourselves I'esponsible for his numerous errors. Mental science is built upon consciousness; which Mr Hume calls experience; and the testimony of others concerning their consciousness. Our know- ledge of the operations of our own minds and of the minds of other people, he wouW say we have by experience and observation. His re- mark, that mental science lays a foundation for " a complete system of the sciences," has been verified in the review of Judge Woodward's splendid work on Universal Science, contained in the Anakctic Ma- gazine, vol. ix. p. 89, 105, 106. 1 have there evinced, that a systematic arrangement of all hu- man sciences may be founded on the operations of two fp.culties, perception and conception; for all our knowledge is of things per- ceived through the organs of sense, or of tliings conceived of by the of the Human Mind, 19 ©rgans, by which we perform our mental work and appropriate our own intellectual activity to the pro- motion of our happiness. To know ourselves, is to be prepared for profitable exertions, and a cheerful discharge of duty. If you are thoroughly versed in the science which you are now pursuing, you will be able to refer every duty enjoined to the ori- ginal constitution of your mind by which it is to be performed; you will be able to make accurate dis- criminations; will profitably classify the objects of your thoughts; will be prepared to investigate every other science, by knowing the foundation of human reasoning, and the talents which we have received for cultivating it; will be. able to detect error and defend the truth; and in short will experience all the advantages which knowledge can boast over ig-, norance. No man can reason well in any science, or employ his knowledge to advantage, any farther than he is a good, practical metaphysician. The utility of the science of the human soul will, how- ever, best appear from the developement of the sci- ence itself.* Pupil. I can say in its favour, that the pursuit of it has begun to afford me more permanent pleasure * '* We must, therefore, glean up our experiments in this science, from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they ap- pear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in com- pany, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish ©n them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension.*' — Hume. 2© A Desideratum* than all the works of taste; and I hope you will ex- hibit the elements of it so plainly as to banish from the world metaphysical jargon and nonsense, which usurping the names of philosophy, wisdom, and me- taphysics, have disgusted many, and induced the great body of the people to believe, that one who would become a metaphysician must renounce com- mon sense. Professor, A systematic treatise of the kind you describe, is greatly to be desired. Such an one does not exist; for Dr. Reid, who has excelled all other writers on this subject, employed himself rather in demolishing an old fabrick, than in building up a new one. Professor Stewart is but an elegant com- mentator upon Reid, without originality, and with- out any comprehensive arrangement of the topics of mental science. CONVERSATION II. The Human Soul defined. — Consciousness. — Judgment. — Axioms.-^- Substances. — Attributes. — Mind and Matter distinct things. Pupil. Since you last admitted me to your cham- ber, Sir, I have paid some attention to Watts on " the Improvement of the Mind;" and I beg leave to read a passage from him. " If we would improve our minds," he says, "by conversation, it is a great happiness to be acquainted with persons wiser than ourselves. It is a piece of useful advice therefore to get the favour of their conversation frequently, as far as circumstances will allow: and if they happen to be a little reserved, use all obliging methods to draw out of them what may increase your own know- ledge." Now Sir, I design to ask you questions, and shall plead the advice of Dr. Watts in justifi- cation of my conduct. Professor, I have known you, for some time past, to be an expert youth at interrogation; and so, with- out apology, proceed, to your full satisfaction. Pupil. Well, Sir, what is tlie human soul? Professor, It is that part of the complex being called man, which thinks, feels, wills, and acts.^ Pupil, Why do you call man a complex being? * " By the mind of a man," says Reid, "we understand that in liim which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills." It is true that mind would be distinguished from every other substance, should we merely affirm that it is that -which thinks,- but if the description is extended, it seems to be desirable to characterize it by such terms as include all its opera- 22 Of Body and Mind. Professor, Because he evidently consists in part of a substance which does not think, feel, will, and act; which we call body; and of another part that does; which is called the soul, or the mind. Pupil, How do you know that you have a body? Professor, I perceive the properties of a body, on which I am conscious that I act. PupiL How do you know you perceive proper- ties of a body? Professor, I am conscious that I perceive several of the properties of my body. PupiL How do you know that you think, feel, will and act? Professor, I am conscious of every one of my mental operations. Pupil, It seems, then, that we have ultimately the same proof of a mental operation which we have of the properties and existence of a body. Professor, The very same; and therefore I as- sert, that the basis of natural history, natural philo- sophy, and the mathematics, is no firmer than the basis of mental science.* tions. This, Reid has not done, for the mind is a sensitive as well as a cogitative being. Besides, to remember and to reason, are operations that come under the general description of thinking. The reader will soon conceive that eveiy thing which the mind does may be reduced to the four classes of operations enumerated in the text. * " It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by ray senses; but only extension, figure, colour, and certain othei qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something, which is ex- tended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with re- spect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought and volition; operations, which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every Of Body and Mind, 23 FupiL But you have not proved yet, that you have a soul: you have only shown, that you are conscious of your own mental operations. How do you know you have a soul? Professor, Dr. Reid would have answered, that he was conscious of his own existence; but my opi- nion is, that consciousness is the knowledge which one has of his own present mental operations^ and I shall use the word only in this sense. That I exist, is a proposition which 1 judge to be true, so soon as it is stated to me, or framed by my own mind, without any reasoning or reflection on the subject. The proposition is self-evident to every man, and the act of the mind in judging it to be true, is a constitutional judgment, I am conscious that I judge myself to exist; and such is the make of our minds, that we cannot use a personal pronoun, or an active or passive verb, in the first person singular, or plu- ral, without having this constitutional judgment. There is not a man living, who really doubts his own existence: and the reason is, that the Creator has so formed, and so governs, the human mind, that it ever thus judges, concerning its own being. Should man too is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all those sen- sations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being; to that being which he calls himself,' a being, which he is led, by the constit; tion of his naiure, to consider as something distinct from his hodv, and as not litble to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs. From these considerations it apjiears, that we have the same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the exist- ence of body; npy, if there be any difference between the two cases, that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is suggest- ed to us -by the subjects of our own consciousness, and the other merely by the objects of our own perceptions." — Stexvart. 24 Foundations of Science. any man wish to judge otherwise, he would find himself incapable of doing it, and, therefore, we as- sert, that this constitutional judgment is necessary. Pupil. You would have me understand, I appre- hend, that necessary, or constitutional judgments, lie at the foundation of the science of the human mind. Professor, They are the basis of every science: and the foundation on which all our systems of knowledge are erected. Do not the mathematicians begin their course by settling a few axioms^ And what are axioms but self-evident propositions, to which every mind, necessarily,- from its constitu- tion, gives assent, so soon as the meaning of them is apprehended? PupiL Some of these constitutional judgments I hope to hear you state ere long; but will you no\^^ have the goodness to tell me, what is the real essence of this thing which thinks, feels, wills, and acts? Professor. Here I must confess myself unable to answer you in any other way, than by acknowledg- ing my own ignorance, and expressing my persua- sion, that no man in the present life, will ever enjoy the ability of perceiving the essence of any substance. One thing I may venture to promise, that when you, or any one else, will teach me to comprehend the essence of matter, I will explain to you the essence of mind. We know no more of the one than of the other. PupiL How, then, do you know that mind and matter are distinct things; and that there is any es- sential difference between them? Professor, Your question requires something of Attributes, SJ5 a dissertation, for an answer. I must give you some preliminary statements too, that you may not mis- understand me. Observe then, that I use the words mind and soul as synonymous: that any thing to which you truly ascribe thought, feeling, volition^ or agency, or any or all of these, is what I call a soul or mind: and that any thing which is the sub- ject of inherent attributes is said to subsist, and is called a substance.* PupiL But let me know what you intend by in- herent attributes^ before you proceed. Professor. Any thing attributed to another, which appertains to its original constitution, and without w^hich it would not be the same thing, is an inherent attribute. Were all the inherent attributes of any substance to be taken away, v/e should have no knowledge of its existence. Thus, should the facul- ties of thought, feeling, volition, and agency be taken away from any thing which we call mind, we should no longer have any knowledge of the existence of that mind; nor can we even conceive of a substance which thinks, and yet has no faculty for thought; which feels, wills, and voluntarily acts, and yet has no faculties for performing these mental operations. * Substance I find a very convenient word, and having given the sense in which I shall use it, I see no objection to it, which will not equally militate against Reid and Stewart, when they speak of that ■which thinks, or of something extended. Mr. Hume tells us, that the idea of substance can be derived neither from *' impressions of sensa- tion," nor from "impressions of reflection." We assent, whpt then? can we not conceive of substance, as well as o^time, space, and a thou- sand other things? Mr. Locke and Mr. Hume were both erroneous in mantaining that all our ideas are derived either /rem sensation or reflection. c 26 Body and Mind Let me illustrate what I mean by inherent attri- butes^ in speaking of matter. Gravity, extension, in- activity, insensibility, and divisibility are attributes of every particle of matter ^ which we call inherent; because we conceive them to inhere in the very na- ture of the thing; and were these all taken away, we could form no notion of the meaning of the word. 7natter. Nothing extended, and inactive would then remain. Any number of particles of matter united, or organized, consiitute what we call a body. Now you ask proof of the accuracy of the prevailing opi- nion, that body and mind are two distinct substances. Of the essence of any substance, you have already learned, that I do not design to speak. Now! af- firm, that I am conscious of perceiving some of the inherent attributes of one thing which is called an egg; and of another, which is called an apple; and I judge, that the objects of my perception really exist. I cannot doubt their existence. This I find- then to be a law of my nature, that I should judge the thing which I perceive to have existence. The mental operation oi judging implies the existence of the faculty which is denominated the judgment. This faculty, I am conscious, uniformly operates in the same way, in relation to some propositions; so that I no sooner understand the meaning of the proposition, that the things perceived through the bodily organs, called the Jive senses, really exist, than I judge it to be true. Every other man of a sane mind has, under similar circumstances, a similar judgment, which results from the original constitution, and the established government of the human soul. Of this judgment every rational maa distinct Things. 27 is conscious; and testifies that he is conscious, to his companions. I judge, and I am conscious that I judge, therefore, that an eg^^ and an apple .are be- fore me. Bat I also jud^e^ with a like knowledge of my own judgment, that the egg is one substance, and the apple another substance; or that they are two distinct material substances. This judgment follows a previous judgment, that the inherent at- tributes of an egg are different from those of an apple; which last judgment immediately follows my perception of the attributes of one and of the other, and my discernment of the difference between those which appertain to the one, and those which inhere in the other. Thus, I perceive the shape and tex- ture, the colour, taste, and fragrance of the apple; and then I perceive the shape, texture, colour and taste of the egg'. I conceive of a difference between the things perceived in one, and those perceived ip. the other; and then follows my judgment, that they are differ- ent things; each of which is called a substance. Of this judgment I am conscious, and therefore I say, ^' I know that an egg and an apple are two different and distinct substances." An tgg is one thing that subsists^ to which we attribute a certain number of things, that being deprived of, it would no longer be recognized as an egg; and an apple is another thing that subsists; that is, an apple is another sub- stance. In this manner we actually, and philosophi- cally discriminate between different individuals, whether inanimate, or animate; and between differ- ent classes of things. So universal is the practical operation of this philosophy, that in every land, he would be called a fool, who should affirm, that be- 2S Mind and Matter tween the sun and moon, earth and water, birds and men, there is no substantial difference. But you wish me to prove, that mind is one substance, and matter another. Every man may arrive at personal satisfaction on this subject, precisely in the v/ay that I do. Thus, I judge involuntarily, and con- stitutionally, that somethings which I call by the pronoun /, exists. I am conscious that I think, feel, will, and act; and I judge that /have faculties for thinking, feeling, v/illing, and acting; because think- ing is an effect, and a faculty for thinking a cause; and because I judge moreover, that every effect must have some cause. These faculties are inherent attributes of that somethings which I call I; and were they all taken away there would remain no- thing of which I could have any conception, or de- nominate by any personal pronoun. This somethings which is the subject of these attributes, I call mind, or soiiL I may give it this name to distinguish it from every thing, which has not some of the same attributes. If I find any thing which has any of these attributes, I determine to call that a 77iind too; but if I have knowledge of any thing which has other attributes, but not one of these, I resolve to call it matter s to distinguish it; because I judge ihat those are different substances which are the subjects of different inherent attributes; and that all thinking, feeling, willing, and acting substances ahould be classed under the head of mental sub- stances; while all things not having in my judgment, any of the faculties that produce any of these men- ial operations, should be considered as forming an- other class, under the caption of material substances. distinct Substances, 29 Do I, then, know of any thing in existence, which is to be excUided from the first class, and assigned a place in the second? I am conscious, that I per- ceive many different objects, around me, in my chamber; and one of them, about two feet in length, I perceive to be in continual motion, while all the rest are stationary. The little moving thing looks me in the face, and (probably thinking that I am sulky, because I am studious^) cries out, with mean- ing forehead and eyes, " naughty papa!" I call the thing "my daughter." I am not conscious that she thinks, nor can I be conscious of any thing but of my own mental operations. But I am conscious, that I perceive her make such sounds, with her mouth, as I have made from volition, with my own; and I judge, that her speaking and my speaking are similar effects, that must have a similar cause. I know, that I speak from volition alone; and I judge, that no one thing could speak without volition: therefore I conclude, that my daughter speaks from volition. If she performs the mental operation of volition, I judge she must have the faculty of voli- tion; and if she has the faculty of volition, the thing in which that attribute inheres belongs to the class of mental substances, I have found, then, another mind besides my own, I judge that my soul exists^ and I judge., that another soul exists; and the judg- ment in one case is as satisfatory to myself as in the other. The external actions of my little daughter, I call effects, of a thinking cause; and sometimes signs of thought., because every effect may be de- nominated the sign of a cause. It is a judgment that results from my mental nature, that 7, xvho am C 2 30 Mind and Matter distinguished, conscious, exist; and that voluntary action proceeds^ from a xuilling agent. Pupil, I am not impatient, Sir, but it takes you a long time to come to the point. Professor, Well, I perceive on my paper a small thing, which I call a particle of sand; I know, or am conscious, that / perceive it; and such is the frame of my mind, that 1 judge the object of per- ception to have a real existence. I am conscious too, that I perceive it to be tangible, solid, extended, and divisible; to have gravity, and to be capable of mo- tio7i, but not of action; for if left to itself it is sta- tionary; but if I act upon it, motion is the result. These are some of the inherent attributes of all those things which I would classify under the gene- ral term matter. Having perceived these attributes of the grain of sand, and discerning them to be dif- ferent from the attributes of mind, I judge that it is a difftrent thing from that called mind; even a different substance. The perceptible difference be- tween that something which thinks, or feels, or willsj or acts, or does dl these things, and the grain of sand, is certainly greater than the difference between fire and water; and because I perceive in the sand attributes which I find not in mind, and do not per- ceive in it any of the attributes which I have found in the soul, therefore I conclude that matter and mind are two distinct substances. In confirmation of my own judgment, I have the testimony of all of my fellow men, that they have always found in cer- tain things the attributes of a material substance, and have never found in any of these same substances the slightest indications of thought, feeling, volition, Mind and Matter distinguished. 31 or efficiency. The same remarks, which I have made concerning the grain of sand, will apply to every other thing, whether in a simple, or organized state; which is solid, extended, insensible, and moveable, but inactive. Pupil, And so you have made it appear, that we perceive nothing but the attributes of matter, and the external indications of mind; and that we are as well, and as clearly acquainted with the attributes of the former as of the latter.* Frofessor. Yes, and that our judgment concerning the existence of mental substances, is as solid and satisfactory, as that the material substances around us exist. * ** The essence both of body and of mind is unknown to us. We know certain properties of the first, and certain operations of the lasts and by these only we can define or describe thera." — Reid. CONVERSATION III. Faculty defined. — Body. — Simple and Complex Operations. — Essen- tial and Incidental Attributes. — Ten Faculties of the Human Mind enumerated. — All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for all his actions. Pupil, You have frequently made use of the term faculty; will you have the kindness to make me fully acquainted with the meaning which you attach to it? Professor. By a faculty^ in general, I intend any inherent part of the original constitution of a sub- stance by which any distinct operation is performed. A body is any number of organized particles of matter;* and this may have many bodily faculties. Thus the body of a man consists of many members; each of which is a faculty for doing something: and were all these taken away, there would be no body subsisting; any more than if the particles of matter, out of which it was organized, were reduced to their native elements. A mental faculty is any inherent part of the ori- ginal constitution of a mind, by v/hich it performs any simple mental operation. *Dr. Reid says, "we define body to be that which is extended, solid, moveable, divisible;" which is the description of matter in gene- ral, but not oi body in particular. The definition which I have given, corresponds with the most general and approved use of the word. Mental Operations . 3 3 PupiL Bat I would know what you mean by a simple mental operation. » Professor, Any thing which the mind does, is a mental operation: any thing which it performs by one of its faculties is a simple mental operation. For example; if you see, hear, reason, feel, choose, and exert yourself, you perform so many simple mental operations. PupiL Your distinction would lead me to sup- pose, that some mental operations are complex. Professor. They certainly are: for it is the mind which reads a paragraph in the Freemai-Cs Journal; and this implies the perception of the words, to- . gether with the apprehension of their meaning. A little child m\^\, perceive the words before he could read at all. Should you read aloud^ an act of the will to make articulate sounds, and the exertion of the faculty of agency, together with those already mentioned, would be included in reading. PupiL It is evident then, because several facul- ties are concerned in the several acts, that declaim- ing, preaching, pleading, studying, running, fight- ing, and praying, are so many complex operations; but I wish to know if any of them but studying is a mental operation. Are running and fighting acts of the mind? Professor, Some actions are neither exclusively mental, nor exclusively corporal; for mind and body both are essential to their performance. We ascribe th^m, therefore, to the complex being, man; and say that man reads aloud, declaims, preaches, prays audibly, pleads, runs, and fights. These actions, therefore, which require the co-operation of two or 34 3Iental Operations. more faculties of man, whether they appertain t& the body or the mind, we call complex operations: but if two or more mental faculties perform the act, without the necessary intervention of any cor- poral faculty, we call the action performed a com- plex mental operation, PiipiL It would seem to me, that seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, reasoning, and choosing, are all of them complex operations. Professor, In the proper place, perhaps I may convince you, that they are all simple mental opera- tions; or that they are distinct acts, which may every one of them be referred to some one mental faculty. Pupil, It would be strange, indeed, if you can convince me that eating is a mental act. Professor, Eating and tastings young man, are two things, very easily distinguished; and the latter is consequent upon the former. Eating is a complex operation of an animal, who -wills to receive food into his mouth, and does what he wills, by his agency upon his corporal faculties, given him for the pur- pose. Tasting is a perception of the flavour, or of some quality, or qualities of the food eaten. You know that in a diseased state of the palate and fauces, a' man may eat^ and not taste his food. Hence he says, " I have no taste;" and sometimes, to express the same thing, " all things taste alike to me." Pupil- You have intimated, in a former conver- sation, that power and faculty are not convertible terms; because, I conclude, you have use for thera to signify different things: but if no expression is Faculty and Power. 35 equivalent to that of mental faculty^ we shall be sadly circumscribed in language. Professor* Our predicament will not be worse than that of the mathematicians, who always call a triangle a triangle. You may, however, call a men- tal faculty a mental organ^ if you choose; and then, you will have two names for one thing. Pup'iL Your philosophy would restrict the mean- ing of the word faculty as Reid has done, when he says, " I apprehend that the word faculty is most properly applied to those powers of the mind which are original and natural, and which make a part of the constitution of the mind." Professor, I mean by faculty what Reid under- stood by " an original and natural power;" but I never call a faculty a power; because power is often and most properly used as synonymous with ability; and includes every thing essential to the production of an effect. You can distinguish, between the exist- ence of something in our mental constitution, where- by we reason, when we reason, and which exists when not in operation; which is the faculty of rea- soning; and that which .puts the faculty into opera- tion, so that we actually reason, which together con- stitute the poruer of reasonings can you not? Pupil* I remember, at least, that you have else- where said, that any thing called a power ^ which is not adequate to the production of an effect, is a powerless power* What do you think, Sir, of Lord Kames's use of the word faculty? He says, " man is provided by nature with a sense or faculty that lays open to him every passion by means of its ex- ternal expressions." 36 Bifferent Attributes. Professor. I think he undoubtedly intended, that every man is so constituted, that he has the faculty of judgment, by v/hich he involuntarily judges cer- tain external expressions to be signs of internal pas- sions. This faculty he considered to be as natural to the mind as the faculty for smelling; and there- fore he calls it a seiise^ or faculty; and would it not lead to confusion, I would sometimes call a mental faculty a mental sense too. Pupil. In our last conversation, you taught me, that some attributes of mind and matter are inhe- rent: pray do you class all other attributes under some general ternci? Professor. All attributes are inherent^ or such as may be called incidental and extraneous. Any thing, which you ascribe to another, which is not essential to its subsistence, and which therefore may be considered as being without its essence, I call an incidental^ or an extraneous attribute. For in- stance, a man may have the faculty of reason, with- out actually reasoning: the faculti/ I call an inherent attribute; but the act of reasoning is i?icidental or extraneous. Solidity, gravity, extension, and divisi- bility are inherent^ or essential attributes of a body; but the colour, the particular figure, the location, and the motion of the same body, are .incidental; for an ivory ball will have the former attributes, whether it is in one place or another; whether it be stained red, or is white, and whether it move, or is stationary. From this example you will not find it difficult to class most of the attributes of subjects with which you are intimately acquainted. If you please, I shall now claim the privilege of Ten Mental Faculties* 37 interrogating you, on subjects which have been fre- quently presented to your attention; and if you have doubts about the truth and propriety of any part of the system which I have inculcated, you are at perfect liberty to express them. What are the principal inherent attributes of the human mind? PupiL They are ten mental faculties; which, for the want of some new scientific terms, frequently bear the names of the operations which they per- form. They are denominated, I. The Faculty of Perception. II. The Faculty of Consciousness. III. The Faculty of Understanding. IV. The Faculty of Judging. V. The Faculty of Memory. VI. The Faculty of Reasoning. VII. The Faculty of Conscience, VIII. The Faculty of Feeling. IX. The Faculty of Volition. X. The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. To one, or other of these, may be attributed all ©ur simple mental operations; and to some two or more of them, all the complex 'mental operations, with which we are acquainted.* * " Upon a slight attention to the operations of our own minds," says Professor Stewart, *'they appear- to he so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to he impossihle to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which ap- peared, at first, to be too various for our comprehension, are foimd to be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and un- eompounded faculties." (3ondiii.ac remarks, that " Centuries must D 38 Mental Operations, Professor. What is wanting to account for all the operations of a man? PupiL Would we analize, and reduce to their proper faculties, all the operations of man, we must consider his bodily as well as mental faculties; for many things are performed by the co-operation of corporal and mental organs. We must also consider his powers^ as well 2is faculties. You could not walk, for instance, without legs, a volition to use them, and the exertion of the faculty of agency over them. Neither could you eat without a mouth, and the activity of those mental faculties which are requi- site to put it in motion. Professor, Well, let us defer the consideration of the mental faculties till after dinner. have passed away before men could have suspected that thought can be subjected to laws; and even at this time the greatest number of mankind think, without conceiving how it is done." CONVERSATION IV. Definitions.— Genus and Species.— The Faculty of Perception.—Five kinds of Perceptions.— Instrumentality of bodily Organs. — Conscious- Professor, We resume the consideration of the Ten Faculties of the Human Soulj and I shall ex- pect my pupil in giving definitions, to remember the opinion of Dr. Reid, " that there are many v»^ords, which, though they need explication, cannot be logically deftned;" and that " a logical definition, that is, a strict and proper definition, must express the kind of thing defined, and the specific difference, by which the species defined, is distinguished from every other species belonging to that kind." Hence, '' no word can be logically defined, which does not denote a species; because such things only can have a specific difference; and a specific difference is es- sential to a logical definition-. On this account there can be no definition of individual things, such as London and Paris.'* They may, however, be de- scribed in such a way as to distinguish them from all other cities. Pup'iL I have found some difficulty result from the use of the words gemis^ species^ and individual: I should like, therefore, to have them explained before we proceed. 40 Genusy Species, and Individual. Professor, The explanation is easy. We have perceived many objects, whose essential attributes are alike; but whose incidental attributes are un- like; and we wish to class them, for our own con- venience. If the essential attributes of any number of things are alike, we class them together, and say, they are of one genus^ or race. Thus we perceive fifteen persons, v/ho indicate by their actions, the existence of the same mental faculties within; and they have evidently the same essential corporal members. We say that they are of one genus. For this genus we wish a name that shall denote any one of the fifteen; and which shall distinguish any one, and each one, from any thing which belongs to another genus; to the one, for instance, consist- ing of animals with four legs; and we call the name man; by which any one of the fifteen persons is distinguished from a quadruped; and indeed, from every thing else, but one of his own genus, or gene- ral class of things. When I call a being a man, there- fore, every one, who understands the language, knows what kind of a thing I mean; but he knows not whether I intend a white man, a black man, or a red man; that is, he knows not what species of the genus I would designate. We find it /convenient, therefore, to make subordinate classes; and the common rule is, to put those things together which are alike in some of their principal incidental attri- butes. The colour of a man is an attribute of this description; and we say, therefore, that five of these fifteen men, being of a white colour, shall constitute the species of -white men; the five that are black, the species of black men; and the five which are red, Genus ^ Species^ and Individuals. 41 the species of red me?i. Thus, in the genus, which contains, by the supposition, fifteen, we have three species. Suppose that each species contains a person by the name of John. Now I wish to designate one of these, so that the person to whom I speak, may fix his thoughts on one; that is, on an individual. If I call him a man, I point out only his genus, so that my auditor knows I do not mean a quadruped, or reptile; but he knows not which of fifteen indivi- duals I n>ean. If I call him a xvhite man, he knows the genus and the species of the thing of which I speak, but he knows not which of five white men, that constitute the species of the genus, I mean. Let me speak, then, of John, the white man^ and he understands me to designate an individual, who is neither John the black man, nor John the red man, nor any one else but the identical one person, of whom I designed to have him think. In like manner, you may class any number of things, in which you can perceive, or apprehend to be, some similar and some dissimilar attributes; especially if some of them are essential, and others only inci- dental. Pupil, Might we not have more classes of things? Professor. Undoubtedly: you might h^ve the provinces, classes, and orders of Judge Woodward; and to them add, if you please, a genus and species. Thus, a person might be your provincial tt rm; 2L human person, your classical ii2iVLi^; ^ferncde hu' man person^ vour ordinal distifiction; a xvhite female human person, \QK-\r generic ■pp-i)ntiorx; a tall white fewxde human person, ^- -fic clnsrnption; and then Jane, a tall xvhi.- , v; ruun an person, would D 2 10' 42 Cksslfications. i ;,; |! point out the individual, and distinguish her from every thing not a personi from all persons superior or inferior to human persons; from all males, who might make another order, of the same class and province; from all females, that are not white; from all females that are short; and^ from all tall females of any other name than Jane. Pupil Were these classifications to be generally made, would Dr. Reid's description of a logical definition b^ correct? Professor. You dejine a word when you clearly describe the thing of which that word is a symbol. Of course, you may invent a term, and then define it; that is, point out the limits of its use, by clearly stating what you mean by it. You may dejine an object of which any word is the sign, by clearly de- scribing that object, so as to distinguish it from every other object. If you will do this I shall be satisfied with your answers to my questions. What is the faculty of Perception?* PupiU The faculty of Perception in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has knowledge, through the instru- mentality of his bodily organs. * " The perception of external objects hy our senses, is an opera- tion of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name ap- propriated to it. It has so in al! languages. And in the English, I know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than per- ception. Seeing, h(^aring, smelling, tasting, and touching, are words that expre?;s il>e operations proper to each sense; perceiving expresses that which is common to them all."— Da. Reij). Perceptioris, 43 Professor, Give some example of the mental operations called perceptions^ or, show what this faculty does. PupiL I perceive the sun, through the instru- mentality of my eyes; I perceive a sound, through my ears; I perceive the hardness of a ball, through my hand, which touches it; I perceive the fragrance of a rose, through my olfactory organs; and I per- ceive the acidity of vinegar, through my organs of tasting; so that seeing^ hearings touching^ smelling^ and tasting are so many mental operations, per- formed through the instrumentality of different parts of the body. Professor* Can you classify all the perceptions of man? Pupil. All our perceptions are reducible to five classes, which take their names from the orga7is of senses through which we have them. Professor. I presume that you use the expression organs of sense^ in this case, as synonymous with organs of perception. Be careful always to use it in this manner, and then I have no objection to your asserting, that man has five senses^ or ^ve kinds of perceptions; and of course that he becomes acquaint- ed with the attributes of matter only by the men- tal faculty of perception. Sense always means either perception or conception. But why do you speak of perceiving through the instrumentality of the bodily faculties?* * " That nothing external is perceived till first it make an impres» sion upon the organ of sense, is an observation that holds equally in 44 Perceptions. Pupil. Because the bodily organs do not them- selves perceivej and because we find, by experience, that the soul of a wakeful and sane man does not perceive without them. Sometimes, in figurative language, the operation of the agent is ascribed to the instrument; and hence our eyes are said to see; but every one knows, that the eye does not in reality perceive even the inverted image of the object, which is formed on its retina. Every one knows, too, that were the faculty of perception wanting, were the soul absent from the material part of the complex being, man, the eyes could not see, nor the nose smell, nor the hands handle, nor the palate taste, nor the ears hear. Hence it is common, and strictly philosophical, to say, I see^ I hear ^ I taste^ I smelly 1 touch; while by the pronoun used we in- tend something evidently different from our bodily organs. Here I wish, however, to question my teacher. Pray, Sir, if the soul has the faculty of perception, which is an essential part of itself, are any bodily organs indispensable to the mental ope- rations of that faculty? Might we not see, hear, touch, taste, and smell, without the instrumentality of eyes, ears, and the other members of the body? every one of the external senses. But there is a difference as to oup knowledge of that impression: in touching, tasting, and smelling, we are sensible of the impression; that, for example, which is made upon the hand by a stone, upon the palate by an apricot, and upon the nostrils by a rose: it is otherwise in seeing and hearing; for 1 am not sensible of the impression made upon ray eye, when 1 behold a tree; nor of the impression made upon my ear, when 1 listen to a song."*— Lord Karnes, Perceptions, 45 Might not the soul, if separated from the body, see material objects? Professor. You are running furiously into the re- gions of speculation. Stop a little, and I will tell you all philosophy knows on this subject. When man is awake, and in a sane state of mind, he constitu- tionally judges, that he perceives only through his bodily organs: but when sleeping, a man often has mental operations, which he at the time judges to be perceptions; which are so much like the percep- tions he has had when awake, that he cannot dis- tinguish them, either by any difference in their own nature, or in his feelings, which are consequent on them; but when he awakes, he knows that his eyes were closed, and that light did not shine on them, when he was conscious of seeing; that no material lips uttered sounds, when he heard; and that no real object was present, when he embraced and kissed a friend. The consciousness which accom- panied these nocturnal perceptions, was like the con- sciousness of his wakeful hours; and gives proof of the actual performance of mental acts of seeing and hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting, or of nocturnal actions resembling them, without the in- tervention of material organs. "A man who is insane, in like manner has perceptions, which are purely mental, and without the instrumentality of the ex^ ternai organs; for he sees angels and devils in the air, and hears them address him; or he performs such mental operations as a sane man would, were visible forms of celestial beings presented to his vision; were they to utter real, but seraphic sounds in his ears. 46 Perceptions, Pupil, Is not this wholly the work of imagina- tion? Professor, The imagination of sleeping and in- sane persons is frequently very active; but when they see a house with their eyes closed, or the face of a friend; and are conscious of the act, it would be unjust to say, that they are not conscious of a perception^ when they readily distinguish between perceptions and the work of the imagination. If bodily organs v;ere absolutely essential to perceiving, we should undoubtedly see objects in the position of their images on the retina; so that we should see all the heads of our friends occupying the place of their feet.* * " There is no phenomenon in nature more unaccountable, than the intei'course that is carried on between the mind and the external world: there is no phenomenon which philosophical spirits have shown greater avidity to pry into and resolve. It is agreed by all, that this intercourse is carried on by means of the senses; and this satisfies the Yulgar curiosity, but not the philosophic. Philosophers must have some system, some hypothesis, that shews the manner in which our senses make us acquainted -with external things. All the fertility of human invention seems to have produced only one hy[)othesis for this pur- pose, which, therefore, Ijath been universally received: and that is, that the mind, like a mirror, receives the images of things from with- out, by means of the senses: so that their use must be to convey these images into the mind" — "There are laws of nature by which the opera clous of the mind are regulated; there are also laws of nature that govern the material system; and as the latter are the ultimate conclusions which the human faculties can reach in the philosophy of bodies, so the former are the ultimate conclusions we can reach ia the philosophy of minds." — "It is evident, therefore, that the pic- tures upon the retina are, by the laws of nature, a mean of vision; but in what way they accomplish their end, we are totally ignorant." ---Pb. Eeis. Gonsciousness, 47. FupU. It would be a very natural inference from your doctrine, that a disembodied spirit could per- ceive visible and material objects, as truly as any man who has bodily organs at his command. Professor, I shall not object to such an inference. At any rate, we know that God is a Spirit, without bodily organs, and that he beholds the works of his hands. He has mental perceptions of material ob- jects; and has formed men in his own image; but while they continue in the world, his good provi- dence has connected their ordinary intercourse with matter, with material organization. Pupil. Have you not, dear Sir, • restricted too much the use of the words perceive and perception? It is customary for a person to say, '^ I perceive your meaning: I perceive the truth." In short, men talk about perceiving every object of thought, whe- ther visible or invisible. Professor. It is true: and they use the words very indefinitely, or else figuratively. It is not improper to use the word perceive as we do the verb see^ figu- ratively, for mtnx.2\ seeing. Thus we see or perceive a truth, when we conceive of the meaning of a propo- sition, and judge it to be true. But in philosophical discussions, we should avoid" indefinite and figura- tive expressions as much as possible, if we would arrive at certainty in mental science. I never use, therefore, perception^ for any act of conception^ or mental seeing of immaterial things. What is the faculty of Consciousness? The faculty of Consciousness in man, is that in- herent part of the original constitution of his soul 48 (Consciousness. by which he has immediate knowledge of all his own mental operations.* Professor. We are conscious in every instance, by an act of consciousness, or a mental operation, bearing that name. Now I would ask, have we as many acts of consciousness as we have other men- tal operations? Pupil, Undoubtedly we have an act of conscious- ness, for every other mental operation, of which we are conscious. Professor, Is every act of consciousness subse- quent to, or co-existent with, the mental operation, of which it is the object? Pupil, You have taught me, that consciousness is the only ultimate source of knowledge upon the subject of mental science; and I cannot say, that I ' am ever conscious of performing two mental ope- rations at once. I must conclude, therefore, that an act of consciousness is immediately consequent upon every other mental operation. Thus, I perceive and am conscious that I perceive; I conceive, and am conscious that I conceive; I remember, and am con- scious that I remember. The act of consciousness, however, is performed so immediately after each * ** Conscious7iess is a word used by philosophers, to signify that immediate knowl,edge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds. Whence we may observe, that consciousness is only of things present. To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in popular discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory; and all such confusion of words ought to be avoided in popular discourse. It is likewise to be observed, that consciousness is only of things in the mind, and not of external thin s/' — Dn. Reid. Consciousness* 4$ other operation, that lam insensible of any lapse of time; and should not wonder if some should deem consciousness and the object of it, in any par- ticular case, simultaneous. Professor, Of what use is the faculty of con- sciousnessP Pupil. Without it, we could not know that we think, feel, will, and have efficiency. Consequently we could never have knowledge of our own existence, or of our mental identity. We could never predicate any thing of ourselves, nor act as, responsible, moral agents. Besides, consciousness is as essential to men- tal science, as perception to our knowledge of per- ceptible objects, and of the phenomena of natural philosophy. We could not testify concerning any^ thing done by the mind, without consciousness, any more, than concerning things extraneous to the mind, without the faculty of perception. Professor. Which source of knowledge is the most "satisfactory, perception or consciousness? Pupil. At first thought, people would generally say, '•^perception; for we are more certain of no- thing, than of what we see, hear, smell, touch and taste." Yet, upon reflection, every one will judge, that there is no higher certainty in our perceptions than in our consciousness; for we may with pro- priety ask a man, how he knows, that he sees the sun, hears the sound of a cannon, smells the fra- grance of a rose, tastes the flavour of an orange, and touches a marble surface; and he must answer, " I am conscious that I do these things;" so that the certain knowledge of owv perceptions the Dselves consists in our consciousness. We know that we 50 Consciousness, see, hear, smell, taste and touch, only by our fa- culty of consciousness. Could we doubt concerning the operations of this faculty, v/e might doubt whe- ther we perceive at all; and consequently whether any external objects of perception exist. Professor. And thus we should be driven to Bishop Berkeley's theory, that there is no material substance in existence: and thence to Hume's, that impressions and ideas are the only things that exist. Pupil. Pray, Sir, is our consciousness the result of volition, or not? Professor. If I will to perform an act, and to be conscious of it; I find an act of consciousness fol- lows the determined act; but I cannot suspend my consciousness by a volition; and generally I am conscious without any volition on the subject. Could we cease to be conscious at pleasure, it would be equivalent to the power of destroying our own men- tal existence, by a volition. Should such a power be given to man, he could escape from the world, and the government of his Maker. CONVERSATION Y. The Faculty of Understanding or Conception.—Different Operations of this Faculty. — Imagination. — Discernment.- Comprehension.— Apprehension. — Intuition. — Some general lav/s of Conception.— The importance of this Faculty. Professor, What is the Faculty of Understand- ing: Pupil, The faculty of understanding in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has knowledge of things which are not perceived through the instrumenta- lity of the senses.* Professor, Do you distinguish The Understanding from a faculty of understanding? Pupil, By a faculty of understanding we intend that particular faculty which has just been described; but the expressions, The Understandings and The Intellect^ are often used to comprehend all the fa- culties of the human mind, except those of feeling, volition, and agency. To the understandings or the intellect^ belong the faculties of Consciousness, Per- * *' It is plain that one sense cannot judge of the objects of another; the eye, for instance, of harmony, or the ear of colours. The faculty therefore, which views and compares the objects of all the senses, cannot be sense." Price's Beviexv, y. IS. In other words, he might hvLve said, conception is &n act of mind disXinetArom perceptio?^. o2 The Understanding. ception. Understanding, Judgment, Reasoning, Me^ mory, and Conscience. Professor, The understanding' or the intellect^ then, comprehends seven faculties, called intellectual^ of which that of understanding' any thing' is one. Has this faculty any other name? PupiL It is called Conception by Dr. Reid and others; for by it we take in a subject,ybrw a notion of a thing, or have an idea of it. We conceive of the meaning of a term, a clause, a proposition, and a sentence. Mathematical points and lines, are ob- jects of conception^ which cannot be perceived. All abstract terms^ such as virtue, vice, goodness, state, faculty, power, liberty, and man, denote objects of , which we have knowledge only by this faculty. The science of numbers, or arithmetic, and all the sciences commonly included under the terms mathematics and metaphysics^ morals and theology^ have their origin in the operations of Conception. We c^xiTiOt perceive^ but we can conceive of number, space, quantity, time, spirit, substance, relation, moral obligation, guilt, and the Deity. Professor, The operations of the faculty of un- derstanding are numerous: can you classify them? Pupil. I have never attempted itj and think it would be very difficult to do it, in any other manner than by referring them to the objects upon which they terminate. Thus, for instance, all conceptions of images formed by the mind, of things which do not really exist, I would put together in one ^lass, and term them imaginations.^ * " I may conceive or imagine a mountain of gold, or a winged MovBt\ but no man says that he perceives such a creature of ima|;ina^ Acts of Conception, 53 Professor, So that The Imagination is nothing but the faculty of conception employed in forming images, I frankly confess, that The Imagination is not, in my opinion, a faculty distinct from that which con- ceives, or forms notions of things. Can you name some other principal operations of this faculty of understanding? Pupil. Discernment is an operation of the mind, in which it conceives of some difference between two or more objects. Comprehension is a firm conception of some extensive or complex object. We discern differ- ences; we comprehend difficult and complicated things. Apprehension is any act of the mind in under- standing the meaning of a statement. Thus, a per- son speaks to me; I will to attend to him, that I may understand him; and when I do it, I say, " / apprehend your meaning.'^ It is a figurative expres- sion, and literally signifies to take hold oi any thing. I may apprehend the meaning of a proposition with- out passing any judgment upon it. Intuition is any such conception of the meaning of a proposition, as is immediately followed by a judgment that it is true. This is also a figurative expression, taken from the act of looking into any thing. tion. Thus perception is distinguished from conception or imagina- tion." *' Let it be observed therefore, that to conceive, to imagitie^ to ap- prehend, when taken in the proper sense, signify an act of the mind which implies no belief or judgment at all."— i?e/(/. E 2 54} Complex IdeaSc Professor, When the mind, therefore, imagineSj discerns^ comprehends^ apprehends^ or performs an act of intuition^ it is the subject of different species of conceptions* Pupil, Pray, Sir, has man any complex ideas? Professor, Every idea is a conception; and every act of conception is a simple operation, Man has, therefore, no complex ideas. He conceives, however, of complex objects; even as he may see a complex object; and yet the act of seeing is simple. Pupil, Has man any abstract ideas^ Professor, Man conceives of the meaning of ab- stract terms, or has ideas of certain things, which he resolves to consider as abstracted from certain other things that he knows to be connected with the former. For instance, I conceive of t\it figure of an ivory ball, abstractad from the colour, and other attributes of the ball. Here the idea is one simple thing, that may be conceived of as abstract- ed from all other mental operations, and even from the efficient of it; and the object of the idea is a figure, which is a terra that denotes something that .may be considtred abstractedly from all other attri- butes of any substance. Abstract terms, or names of things that may be considered abstractedly from other things with which they are always connected, there certamly are; but of complex, and abstract ideas, I know nothing by my own consciousness, besides what I have here disclosed.^ * "A great philosopher," Dr. Berkeley, " has disputed the received opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are Laws of Conception* 35 From your own consciousness of what passes in your mind, can you give any general laws of con- ception? Pupil. A few, I think; for I find, that I conceive of every mental operation which I remember to have performed: and I can renewedly conceive of any remembered past conception, by a voluntary exertion to do it. Professor, And hence, you naturally conclude, that other persons whose minds are similarly con- stituted, can do the same, and lay it down as a ge- neral observation, or law of mental operation. Pupil. An example may be given, thus: I per- ceive a fair female form; I close my eyes, and per- ceive it no longer; but I remember that I did per- ceive it; I will to conceive of it; and immedistely I do conceive of it; so that the feeling consequent upon the conception^ is hardly distinguishable from that v^^^hich followed tht perception. Professor. Can you conceive of all objects of per- ception? Pupil. Every object of perception is an object of conception. This is another general rule; but all ob- jects of conception are not objects of perception. Thus, I conceive of seeing, liearing, smelling, tast- nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recal upon oc- casion, other individuals, which are similar to them." ** 'Tis a princi- ple generally received in philosophy, that every thing in nature is individual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really existent, \vhich has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this, therefore, be absurd m. fact and reality j it must also be absurd ia idea" — Hume, 36 Laws of Conception. ing, and touching, but I cannet perceive a thought, a circle around the earth, or the distance between the sun and our planet. Moreover, I find, that one man in his present state, often has different conceptions of the same object; and that similar conceptions of the same ob- ject differ in the degree of their vigour and vivacity. The state of my body and of my mind, I find by experience also affects the conceptions of the human mind, both in their nature and degree. Professor. Can you give any general laws con- cerning the origin of our conceptions?^^ Pupil. I can account for them generally, in no other manner than by saying, that man has a facul- ty of conception, and therefore it is as natural to him to form conceptions as to breathe. From what * " Wpon a slight attention to the operations of our own mindsj they appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence, however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which appeared, at first, to be too various for out* comprehension, are found to be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and uncompounded faculties, or of simple and un- compounded principles of action. These faculties and principles are the general laws of our constitution^ and hold the same place in the philosophy of mind, that the general laws we investigate in physics, hold in that branch of science. In both cases, the laws, which nature has established, are to be investigated only by an examination of facts; and in both ^ases, a knowledge of these laws leads to an explanation of an infinite number of phenomena:." — Sieivart. " Now, as the act of moving large masses, has its laws in the facul- ties of the body, and in Ihe levers which our arms acquire the power of using; so the act of thinking has its laws in the faculties of the mind, and in the levers [ poxvers] which our understanding has like- wise learned to use." — Condillac. Origin of Conceptions, St has been already said, it will be evident, that many of our conceptions are occasioned by our percep- tionsj as those perceptions are occasioned by the existence of external objects. Our social relations give rise to other conceptions; and we never attend to the use of our own language by any one, without having some apprehension of the meaning of the speaker, or some conceptions concerning him, and the subject of his discourse. Hence, the notions of men very much depend upon education, taken in its most extensive sense; upon the times in which they live; the events which occur; the temperament of their constitution; and the circumstances of their existence. Professor, Are our operations of understanding the result of our volitions or not? PupiL Many of them result from volition, and many of them do not. The same is true of percep- tions. Now when I perceive something without willing it; or even when I will not to perceive it; I find that an act of conception involuntarHy succeeds it. Thus, I will not to see an obscene picture; some one unexpectedly presents it before my eyes; I see it: I close my eyes, and conceive of it, even in op- position to my volition never to think of it again* So far, therefore, as our perceptions are involun- tary, our conceptions may be originated without,_or even against our will. Were it otherwise with us, a man could not be placed in a state of trial by his Maker, unless the man should previously will to be put into a state of trial for probation. Professor* Your remarks are just. This faculty 58 Conceptions* of conception, and its operations, are peculiarly im- portant to man; for without it he would have no science, or systematic arrangement of knowledge, concerning any subject. He might, indeed, wtre his other faculties to continue in operation, perceive external objects, feel, will, and act, but he could have no language superior to that of brutes. Be- sides, it will soon appear, that our judgments, rea-^ sonings, emotions, conscience, and most important volitions, are dependent on our conceptions. CONVERSATION VI, The Faculty of Judging. — Objects of Judgment. — A Truth. — AFalse= hood. — Classification of Judgments. — They are . Cfdnstitutional or Acquired. — The former are consequent on Consciousness, Fercep= tion, Conception, Memory or Conscience. — The latter result from Reflection, Reasoning or Testimony. — Believing considered. Professor. What is the Faculty of Judging?* Pupil The faculty of judging, or The Judgment in man, is that inherent part of the original consti- tution of his soul, by which he decides that any proposition is true or not true. Professor, You intentionally make a proposition^ in every case, the object of an operation of the judj^ment, I presume. PupiL I do; because every operation of the mind, except it be a feelings terminates on some object, distinct from the operation itself; and because I am conscious, that when I judge, some proposi- tion, some statement, expressed or understood, is the object of it. Not to judge some proposition to * Of the act oi judging. Dr. Reid remarks, that it **is an operation of the mind, so familiar to evei^ man who has understanding, and its nante is so common am' so well understoo'', that it needs no defini- tion " We are all conscious of judging, and we can have no stronger evidence of the fact Still, -^ ^ think a correct definition, would prevent or silence objections. Jtidging is a mental decision that a proposition 's true or false. 66 Acts of the Judgment, be true or false, would in our apprehension be, not to judge at all."^ Professor, Can we perform any operation of judg- ing, without some previous mental act? Pupil* We must conceive of a proposition, before we can judge that the proposition is true or not true; so that there can be no act oi judgment with- out some previous conception. This is one general law of mental operation. Professor. Is there not some reason to suppose^ then, that judging is rather a complex^ than a simple operation of the human mind? Pupil, No more than there is reason to think, be- cause a horse goes before the cart, and the cart comes after him, that they are not distinct things. f * The proposition which is the object of judgment, need not be expressed by sounds or letters. It is sufficient that it is conceived of fey the mind, " There may be judgment which is not expressed. It is a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or denial, is not at all essential to it. It may be tacit and not expressed. Nay, it is well known that men may judge contrary to what they af- firm or deny; the definition," (that judging "is an act of the mind, whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another,") " therefore must be understood of mental affirmation or denial, which indeed is •nly another name for judgment." — Reid. ■J- « Aulthough there can be no judgment without a conception of the things about which we judgej yet conception may be without any judgment. Judgment can be expressed by a proposition only, and a proposition is a complete sentence; but simple apprehension may be expressed by a word or words, which maice no complete sentence. When simple apprehension is employed about a proposition, every man knows that it is one thing to apprehend, a proposition, that is, to conceive what it means; but it is quite another thing to judge it to be true or false. It is self-evident, that every judgment must be either true or false; but simple apprehension or conception can neither be trwe nor false, as was shown before. One judgment may be contradio- Acts of the Judgment. 61 The fact, that our Maker has so constituted our minds, that we perform our mental operations in a certain order, no more destroys the distinctness of them, than the order observed in the production of flowers and fruits evinces that they are the same. Professor* What is the object of every true judg- ment? Pup'iU A truth. Professor. And what is a truth? Pupil, 1 shall quote my teacher's language. " Any proposition in which is predicated any thing which was, is, or will be, in relation to an object, is a truth. On the other hand, that proposition in which any thing is predicated of an object which neither was, nor is, nor will be, is a falsehood." Of course, every untrue judgment has for its object a falsehood. *'The adjective true denotes something pertaining to truth. A true proposition is a truth^"* Professor. Can you classify all human judgments? Pupil. They are either true or false^ and thus may be divided into two classes. Professor. These two classes would include all; but such a classification would be of little service tory to another; and [but] it is impossible for a man to have two judg- ments at the same time, which he perceives [conceives] to be contra- dictory. But contradictory propositions may be conceived at the same time without any difficulty. That the sun is greater than the earth, and that the sun is not greater than the earth, are contradictory pro- positions. He that apprehends the meaning of one, apprehends the meaning of both. But it is impossible for him to judge both to be true at the same time. He knows that if the one is true, the other must be false. For these reasons, I hold it to be certain, that judgment and simple apprehension are acts of the mind, specifically different."— Reid, F 62 Classification of Judgments, to the cause of science, unless you would give \xb a list of truths and falsehoods. Do you think of no classification more important to the science of mind? Pupil. All judgments of the human mind are either constitutional or acquired. Professor, Distinguish these two classes. Pupil. Constitutional judgments are such as im- mediately follow some previous mental operation, without requiring any induction, or experience. They result from the constitution of our minds, and are common to all men of sound mind. Acquired judgments result from some voluntary, inductive process, from testimony, or from experience. Professor. Can you reduce constitutional judg- ments to specific classes? You know they are nume- rous. Pupil. We may refer them to the different men- tal operations upon which they are consequent, and from which they seem spontaneously to arise. 1. The co7isciousness of the mind is followed in every man, by the constitutional judgments, that he exists; that he performs the mental acts of which he is conscious; that another did not perform them; and that his mental operations are not all alike in species and degree* No man ever doubted these proposi- tions, if we may judge from the universal language of mankind; and all men decide that they are true, so soon as they form any just notions of conscious- ness. 2. Perception is immediately followed by many constitutional judgments. We are so constituted, that we no sooner perceive external objects, than we judge, that they exist; that they exist without Classification of Judgments* 63 us; that they have such qualities as we perceive in them; and that they are perceived through the or- gan, which is the instrument of their perception. For instance, when I see a horse running full speed towards me, I judge that there is a horse, that he is running towards me; that he is of a bay colour; and that he is not something else than I perceive him to be. In like manner, when we know the names of things, and perceive them, we judge that whatever we perceive really exists, and that our senses do not deceive us. These judgments are com- mon to all; and hence Berkeley and Hume, while they adopted a theory which excluded the actual being of all material objects, as firmly judged, in spite of their efforts to the contrary, as any men, that the ground was under them, and the sky over them; that the bodies of their fellow men were around them; and that all the objects of their per- ception existed, and were such as they perceived them to be. Were these constitutional judgments not to result from our perceptions, these perceptions would be of no practical use in life; for should we see a precipice in our path, and not judge, that a precipice was there, we should never will to avoid it; nor could we conceive of danger from any mate- rial substance. 3. Memory gives rise to other constitutional judg- ments; for without any effort, learning, or experi- ence, we judge, that our own mental actions, which we remember, actually had existence: and that rve^ who remember^ did exist. If we remember to have heard any one speak, we judge that he did speak; and hence in giving testimony, we are said to affirm 6^ ConstitutioJial Judgments* or deny. In testifying, we publish our constitutional judgments, that result from memory; for, when we affirm, that an arraigned person murdered his bro- ther in our presence, we declare that we remember to have seen the murderous act performed, and that we judge the fact to correspond with our remem- bered perception. If we should not judge things to have been as we remember to have perceived them, our memory would be of no practical utility. All 4nen, however, are constitutionally constrained to judge, that they actually have perceived, conceived, judged, inferred, felt, willed, approved, remember- ed, been conscious, and acted, as they remember they have acted, been conscious, remembered, ap- proved, willed, felt, inferred, judged, conceived, and perceived. 4. Many of our conceptions are followed hy judg- ments^ for which we can account in no other manner, than by saying, that we are so constituted that we thus judge, v/ithout reasoning, or any voluntary effort. All those conceptions which are properly call- ed acts of intuitioji^ are of this description; while other conceptions may, or may not be followed by judgments, according to the circumstances of those conceptions. Thus, I conceive of the meaning of the proposition, '-^ I read yesterday ^ and from the cir- cumstance that / reynemher to have done it, or am told by a credible witness that I did it, I judge it to be a truth. But intuition^ without any thing else connected with it, is the occasion of all those judg-t ments, which being expressed in words, are called axioms^ or. self-evident propositions. For example; by barely looking into the thing, by intuition^ I discover Constitutional Judgments, 65 and judge, that there can be no effect without an adequate cause. We no sooner conceive of the meaning of this proposition, by looking into it^ that is, by intuition^ than we judge that it is a truth. Professor. Let us call these acts of the judg- ment, then, that immediately result from intuition, intuitive judgments. In most sciences these are the most important of our judgments, because all sys- tematic arrangements of knowledge are founded on axioms. The constitutional judgments, however, that are consequent upon perceptions^ are most im- portant to the common transactions of life. Proceed in your account of constitutional judg- ments. Pupil, I can think of only one other source of them; and therefore I remark, 5. That an act of conscience is not only preced- ed by some judgment, but is also followed imme- diately by some constitutional judgment. The action of which we disapprove^ we judge ought not to have been done. Now conscience approves or disapproves of actions, when compared with some moral law. If we approve of any contemplated action, we judge that it ought to be done. We find too, by consult- ing our own consciousness, that we judge a moral agent to be praiseworthy or blameworthy, commend- able or censurable, according as we approve or dis- approve of his moral conduct. Professor, Are you satisfied, that these are con- s:itutional judgments? Pupil, I am; for while a man's conscience per- forms diflferent operations at different times, rela- tive to the same object; and while different men F2 66 €o72stttiitional Judgments^ mutually oppose each other, in their acts of appro- bation, and disapprobation; still, every man judges, at the time in which he really disapproves of any moral action, that it ought not to be done. It is common to all men, to judge immediately after the operation of conscience on the subject, that men are to be justified or condemned, according to their ap- probation or disapprobation of their moral conduct. Professor* Hence if the conscience is erroneous, our judgment, concerning the obligation to perform certain moral actions, will be erroneous also. Are not some constitutional judgments immedi- ately consequent upon reasoning, feeling, willing, agency, and even judging? Pupil, V^ tx^ feeling used for that species of per- ception which you have called touching^ as it some- times is, but not by yourself, I should say, that every feeling through the instrumentality of a bo- dily organ, is followed by ^ judgment^ that we feel^ through that particular organ. It is probably, how- ever, more correct to say, that the consciousness and conception of a feeling are followed by a judg- ment, that something has occasioned it. Professor. It is true, we judge, that there can be no feeling without some cause of feeling; but this is an intuitive judgment^ tantamount to our intui- tive knowledge of the truth, that there can be no effect without a cause. You have already stated, that our consciousness of judging, reasoning, feeling, willing, and agency, is followed by constitutional judgments, that we, who are conscious, exist; and that we perform the mental operations of which we are conscious. Constitutional Judgments, . 67 You have before stated too, that immediately after perception, we judge concerning the bodily organ of perception, that we have perceived through it. Hence, if you prick a man in the thumb or great toe, he instantly perceives it by the sense of touch, and has both a judgment that he was pricked in the toe, or thumb, according as the fact may have been, and a feeling consequent upon the perception. This instantaneous judgment concerning the place and the mode of our being touched; and indeed, concerning the organ, or part of an organ employed as an instrumental cause of any perception, is de- signed, by our Maker, to regulate our voluntary exertions, for the preservation of the body. Without it, we should not know to what part of the body we should apply preventives or remedies. The painful sensations that immediately follow some percep- tions, are designed to make us immediately xvill to apply some remedy or defence to the part, which we judge to be the organ of that perception which occasions the sensation. Thus I perceive that I touch some sharp instrument. This act of perceiv- ing is in my mind. Instantly I have a painful sen- sation; and I judge that I touch it with the hollow of my right foot. The painful sensation induces me to will the removal of the sharp instrument; and my judgment directs my hand to the place affected. Were I destitute of a painful sensation in this case, I might not choose to remove the offending object; were I destitute of judgment concerning the organ touching the instrument, I should as readily move my hand for relief to my left elbow as to the hollow of my right foot. @8 Judgment, Pupil, Is not every sensation immediately fol- lowed by a constitutional judgment, concerning the cause of that sensation? Professor, From intuition we judge, that there is no effect without a cause; and consequently so soon as we conceive of sensation as an effect, we judge that it must have a cause; and hence we learn to look for the cause. These constitutional judg- ments, I have before said, are the result of concep- tions and not of sensation. If any constitutional judgment were immediately consequent upon sen- sation, we should naturally expect it would relate to the perception which occasioned it. Thus I per- ceive the drawing of a blister plaster on my wrist, and I feel a painful sensation* If any judgment should constitutionally follow the sensation^ it would naturally be this; that my perception, through the wrist, is the occasion of my painful sensation. Now I find, by my own consciousness, that I no sooner have a perception through the wrist, which is a part of my organ of touch, than I judge from perception that my wrist is the part affected; but I find I must have some reflection, and must conceive of some connexion between my perceptions and sensations, or between the application to my wrist, and the painful sensation, before I judge that my pain is produced by the blister plaster. I should think, therefore, that this judgment concerning the cause of sensation is acquired^ and is dependent upon ex- perience, and some previous intuitive judgment. Pupil. But why should not sensation be followed by a judgment concerning the instrumental cause of it, as well as perception? Acquired yudgments. 69 Professor, Our business is to ascertain, in mental science, what mental operations actually are per- formed, and not tp conjecture what might be. It will appear, however, in its proper place, that our sensations themselves are all consequent upon perceptions; so that if a judgment concerning the organ of perception immediately 'follows the per- ception, there is no need of another judgment, to the same effect, consequent upon sensation. Pupil, I wish to know, if we could ever have any correct judgments concerning , the nature of Reasoning, Feeling, Willing, Agency and Judg- ment, without having first performed these mental operations? Professor, I think not; but then you will please to remember, that our judgment concerning the na- ture of these operations is consequent upon our conception of them; immediately after the perform- ance of the acts themselves. Wq jud^e; then are con- scious of judging; then judge that we actually have judged; then conceive of the nature of the act of judging; and then judge that the act is such as we conceive it to be. The same is true of the other operations just mentioned; apd vf ithoMt conceiving of the nature of them, we never form any judg- ment concerning their nature. Let us now hear what you have to offer concern- ing acquired judgments. Pupil, Acquired judgments include all operations of the judgment which do not result immediately from our constitution. We denominate them ac- quired^ because we learn to form them. We arrive TO Refiective Judgments, at them by reflection^ reasonings and attention t» testimony. Professor, Judgments resulting from reflection, may be called reflective judgments. Of this descrip- tion are the judgments formed on the bench, and m the common acts and intercourse of life, from the consideration of a variety of circumstances. Our experience is a common subject of reflection; and from the two, we judge, that fire will burn us; that water will flow down an inclined plane in future; that the wringing of the nose will bring forth blood; that the sun will rise to morrow; and thousands of of similar judgments. The result of every course of reasoning is an in- ductive judgment; and of all our judgments, these, even while they are most applauded among men, are most liable to impeachment, and subsequent condemnation. Constitutional judgments are never reversed by us; reflective judgments sometimes are; inductive judgments frequently are. Have you any distinct appellation for those judg- ments which have some testimoriy for their object? Pupil, Believing is an operation of the faculty of judging, which has some proposition which is a matter of testimony for its object. The proposition, ~" I think," I judge to be true, because I am con- scious of thinking. It is constitutional with every man, who thinks and is conscious, thus to judge, so soon as he conceives of the proposition. But if you assert, that you are now thinking of faith ^ I believe the assertion to be a truth. I cannot know that it is true, by any other faculty which I possess than that of judgment. The ground of my judgment Believing^ 71 13 your testimony; and my previous judgment con- cerning your veracity. Professor. Is an act of believing- or of faith, an acquired judgment? Do we not constitutionally ac- credit testimony? Pupil, The utterance of truth or falsehood, is a voluntary act. Indeed, if men speak at all, it is from volition. If they speak what they judge to be truth, or falsehood, it is from volition to do so. Now we find it to be a fact, that all men choose to speak the truth, until they think that some benefit will result from speaking falsehood, or from con- cealing the truth. This is a general law of human nature. Professor. But why do men naturally choose to speak the truth, under the circumstances which you have stated? Pupil. I am conscious, that the utterance of what I think to be truth, and the recollection that I have spoken the truth, are followed by pleasing emotions; while the utterance of known falsehood is attended with painful ones. I c/zoc?5f, therefore, to speak the truth, and not to speak falsehood, because of the pleasure consequent upon the former, and the pain that I know by experience "attends the latter.' I judge, moreover, that the experience of other per- sons corresponds with my own. Hence all men blush and feel shame, at the consciousness of lying, unless they have become in some measure hardened by habit. Hence, men naturally feel anger at the person who accuses them of intentional falsehood. Professor, It is the constitution of our minds which has connected painful emotions with con- j^2 Believing. sciousness of lying, and agreeable ones with the consciousness of personal veracity; and it is our ex- perience of this constitution, which induces us to form the habit of uttering truth at all times, unless when we conceive that some advantage, which we prefer to these agreeable emotions, or on account of which we are willing to endure the painful ones, will result from telling an untruth. Pupil, This constitutional connexion, I remem- ber to have heard you say, constitutes a predisposi- tion in all men to utter truth. There is also in men, a constitutional predispo- sition to believe the testimony which they hear. It is constituted by the natural connexion which sub- sists between the painful feelings consequent upon the discovery that we have been deceived, and the agreeable feelings which we find consequent upon the discovery, and even the accrediting of truth. To believe our neighbour, when he speaks, is natu- rally agreeable; to disbelieve him, unpleasant. Hence children believe the testimony of their parents, and of all who speak to them until they learn to doubt, in consequence of having experienced deception. Professor, If then, mankind have a natural pre- disposition in their mental constitution to speak truth, and to accredit testimony, I ask again, if be- lieving is not a constitutional^ rather than an ac- quired judgment? Pupil, Had no obliquity of the human mind oc- curred, perhaps it might have been constitutional with us to give our assent to every statement made; and credulity would never have been knov/n: but the facts now are these; that we find in mankind a Believing. 73 constitutional predisposition to veracity and cortfi- dence; and that, nevertheless, no article of testimony, when proposed to us, is at once, from the consti- tution of our minds, judged to be true. I affirm, therefore, since every act of believing terminates on some proposition which is a matter of testimony, and since we do not constitutionally judge the tes- timony to be true, that believing is not a constitu- tional judgment. It is acquired^ and commonly in the following manner. We consider the character of the testifier; and if we judge that he neither can, nor will utter false- hoods, then we subsequently judge that which we know he has testified to be true. Hence, the act of believing any one's testimony, is commonly subse- quent to some prior judgment concerning the author of the testimony. It is owing to this, that a judge considers the character of a witness, when he wishes to form a just estimate of the testimony which he gives; for we well know, that the solemnities of an oath v/ill not induce some men to tell the truth to their own real, or conceived disadvantage. When a person is previously judged by us to be a competent witness; to be a man of integrity, des- titute of an unwise credulity, and well acquainted with the subject of which he speaks, we very readily judge that his testimony is true. On the other hand, if a notorious liar, a foolishly credulous person, and one manifestly ignorant of the subject concerning which he testifies, should utter the truth in our presence, his testimony would not be accredited, unless in our judgment some other circumstances, G 74 Believing- and Asseiit. with which we are acquainted, should corroborate it. If we judge a proposition to be true from our own reflection on it, or from intuition, we ought not to call this judgment an act of believing. Professor. Yet men frequently say, that they be-* lieve any proposition, which they judge to be true; whether it be a matter of testimony or not. Is this correct language? Pupil, Certainly not, if they would desire to dis- tinguish things by a difference in words, which are, or should be, the signs of conceptions^ or ideas, or of some other mental operations. I think the word belief has be^n very generally used for other acts of judgment than those of which it is properly de- scriptive, in consequence of our figuratively as- cribing acts of testimony to objects that cannot lite- rally testify. Thus we say, that our senses testify; when really they speak nothing; and hence we talk of believing them. This will do well enough in figu- rative, poetical, rhetorical discourse; but not in scientific discussions, or didactic theology. Professor. What we personally know to be true, we should say we judge or knoxv to be true; and when we judge that some statement is true, which another declares is true, not because we have per- sonal knowledge on the subject, but for some other reasons, we should use the language of belief. Pupil. What is assent? Professor. Ir is a judgment, resulting from re- flection, that some proposition which anotiier states to us is true. Pupil. What is dissent? Conviction and Persuasion, 75 Professor, It is a judgment that some proposition which another declares to be true, is not true. Pupil, Is consent a judgment? Professor, It is generally used to denote a voli- tion to comply with some proposed agreement, or to acceed to some proffered terms. It is not a judg- ment. It may not be superfluous to remark, that an act of beliefs and an act of faith are synonymous ex- pressions; that 2LUY judgment of the truth of a pro- position, which results from meditation or the exer^ tions which others make to produce the judgment in our minds, is called A conviction; and that any judgment^ which moves us to a volition to act in conformity with that judgment, is called A persua- sion. CONVERSATION VII. The Faculty of Memory. — Objects of Memory. — Local Memory. — Classification of the Operations of Memory. — Recollection. — Re- membrance. — Memory essential to some Conceptions. — Time. — Duration. — Futurity. — Identity. — Knowledge of our own continued Mental Identity. — Personal Identity. Professor, What is the Faculty of Memory? Pupil. The Faculty of Memory in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he has present knowledge of his past mental operations. Professor. You make mental operations the ob- jects of memory: are there no other objects upon which the acts of this faculty terminate? Pupil. I judge, that there are not; because I am conscious of remembering nothing but mental ope- rations. Professor. Do you not retnember your absent fa- ther's face? Pupil. It is very commonly said, that we remem- ber material objects; but when I carefully examine my own mind, I find, that I am conscious of re- membering my perceptions^ and even my conceptions of my father's face. I remember too, the feelings which were consequent upon the sight of his face. I remember^ moreover, that I have formerly remem- bered these things. In short, I remember, at differ- ent times, the simple operations of each faculty; and Memory* 77 those complex ones which result from two or more faculties; but I remember nothing but what has passed in my own mind. Professor. I cannot say that I am conscious of remembering any thing else: for had I never seen West's celebrated painting of Christ healing in the temple, I should not say that I remember it; and when I use such language, my meaning is, that I remember my seeing it» In the same manner, when we commit words to memory, so as to repeat them, memoriter, we remember our perception of them, either by the eye or the ear. Hence, a memoriter preacher, when delivering his discourse, remembers the perceptions which he has had of the words, pa- ragraphs, and pages of his manuscript; so that he " turns over leaves in his mind;" as I have heard one say he did, when reciting it to the people. Be it remembered, however, that it is a much more profitable employment to remember concep- tions, judgments and reasonings, than perceptions of words, or other things. A man who remembers his perceptions through his eyes, more readily than any other mental opera- tions, is said to have a local memory; or a memory that is particularly exercised about positions and places. A man who can more easily remember concep- tions, judgments, and reasonings, than his percep- tions of words, has acquired one of the most im- portant habits of memory. Pupil, I know a person who can remember the date of the birth of every relative which she has, and they are numerous; but hardly any thing else. G2 78 Different Operations Professor. She will serve as an example of local memorij, I knew a man too, who, from the inspec- tion of maps, could accurately describe the position of every known country, river, sea, lake, ocean, and mountain under the sun; and he hardly remembered any thing else. The origin of this local memory will be explained when we treat of hahit. Can you classify the operations of human me- mory? PupiL They might be arranged into ten classes, corresponding with the ten faculties of the human mind, whose operations are remembered. Professor, That would be a very natural classifi- i:ation. Do you think of any other? Pupil. All our operations of memory are per- formed either without, or with, voluntary effort to produce them: and thus may be divided into two classes. Any act of memory which is consequent upon some volition, is called an act of reminiscence or RECOLLECTION. Any act of memory not resulting from some vo- lition to recollect, is called remembrance. Recollection, therefore, is consequent upon some volition to recollect; but I may rememher without willing to do it; and even when I desire and xvill not to do it. An act of memory may be either recol- lection or remembrance. Professor. Do you conceive of any resemblances between the faculties of Consciousness and Memory^ and their respective operations? PupiL Consciousness has for its objects nothing ^ but our own mental operations. The same is' true of Memory* f% of memory.. Could we cease to be conscious^ or to rernejnher^ at pleasure, in consequence of simply willing not to be conscious, and not to remember, we might escape from all punishment; and even from the moral government of parents, civil rulers, and our Maker himself. These are resemblances. Professor, State the most prominent difference between Consciousness and Memory. PupiL We are conscious of present mental ope- rations; we remember the past. Thus consciousness makes us know what we are now doing; and me- mory, what we have done. Memory gives per- petuity, or at least continuance to our knowledge. Professor. Could we have any knowledge of time^ or duration^ without memory? Pupil. We conceive of time and duration: we do not remember them: but as we should probably have no conceptions of perception without having actually seen, heard, smelt, touched, and tasted; so it is most likely we should never have conceived of time and duration^ had we never remembered past men- tal operations. At any rate, should we conceive of perceptions, of time, of duration, and of futurity, without having exercised oi^r senses and memory, our conceptions would be of that class which we have termed imaginations. Professor, We find it to be a law of our consti» tution, that some conceptions of some things, shall be subsequent to some acts of perception or of me- mory. I have particularly observed in children in- dications, that they had no conceptions of the mean- ing of the terms, to-day^ yesterday and to-morrow; no conceptions of time past, duration, and futurity; until they had exercised the faculty of memory. 80 Of Memory. Often I told my little daughter, when two years of age, that " to-morrow I would do something if we should live;" and she has answered, " yes. Papa, we live;" and for a considerable time could not conceive of the difference between living now^ and at some future time. Memory, therefore, is actually exercised by children, before they learn to conceive of time. PupiL Dots personalidentzttf consist m conscious- ness^ as Mr. Locke affirms that it does; or in Me- moryP Professor. In neither. Identity is an object oicon* ception; not of consciousness^ nor of memory. In forming an idea of identity^ we cojiceive of some being as having existed in past time, and as existing at present, or at some subsequent time; so that with- out having some notion of past and of present time, we could not conceive of identity. Memory, there fore, is as necessary to our conceiving of identity, as it is to our conceiving of past and present time. We next conceive^ that this being which now exists, is the same which did exist; and this is our conception of the identity of a being. If we conceive, that any thing now is., and from any past time has continued to be essentially what it was^ we coJiceive of iden- tity; and if we judge that this conception is a con- ception of a truth or of a falsehood, we judge con- cerning the identity of the thing; that it is the same thing that it was, or that it is not the same thing that it was. I perceive a watch hanging over the mantle-piece. I conceive of the meaning of the proposition, that watch is the same which hung there yesterday. This Of Identity. 81 is a conception concerning identity. \ judge the pro- position to be a truth; and this is a judgment con- cerning the identity of the watch. Now let me arise and examine the watch. It has the same appearance externally, which I remember I perceived it had yesterday. I still judge it to be the same. Let us open it. The wheels that I ex- pected to find within are not to be seen. I reverse my judgment concerning identity^ and say, this is not the same watch which hung here yesterday. The identity of the case I recognize; but it is not the watch that it was; for some of the essential parts of the watch are gone. Now let me take it to a watch-maker; and let him supply all the internal parts of a watch. I still recognize the identity of the case; but I jadge that the internal parts are nexv^ It is no longer the same watch; unless by watch I mean merely the case of a watch. Again, let us suppose that on opening the watch, instead of finding any wheels gone, every thing appears within and without, as I remember the watch I took down from the same nail did yester- day. I now judge this to be the very same watch I took down yesterday; because it looks like the same and I know there is no other silver watch in my house. Under present circumstances I cannot doubt its identity. But I may have a wrong judgment in this case, for here come ten audible witnesses, who all testify, that one of them took down my silver watch from that nail last night; that they took it to an artist; that he melted the silver case, in their presence; and that he melted every internal part se- parately; but having done all this, he refashioned 82 Of Identity* the whole again, in the very mould in which it Was made, so that every part now appears just as it did before it was i educed to a fluid; and that they re- stored it to the nail. I believe the witnesses: can I predicate identity of this watch, and of the watch that hung there yesterday? I cannot. Had I seen each part in the crucible, in a fluid state, I might have said, these are the identical particles of silver which composed my case; and these the identical particles of brass that composed the wheels; and co of the rest: but this is a new^ another watch; formed out of the materials of the old one. Want of con- tinued existence as a watch has destroyed its iden- tity as a watch. Let us now change the subject, and instead of a watch, speak of a particular human soul, or mind. This mind now exists: and has the ten constituent faculties of every human mind. If we judge this same mind existed at some time before the present, and has now the same faculties which it then had, without having ceased to be, between the two given points of time, we predicate of it identity. Should this mind, however, be annihilated, or cease to be; and should another be erected like it, it would be another^ and not the same mind. Pupil, I remember you have said in your Quar- terly Theological Reviexv^ " that mental identity con- sists in the continued existence of all the constituent mental faculties of that mind of which we predicate identity. Take away any one of the ten faculties from any human mind, and the identity of that mind would cease." The identity of the other faculties might be continued, but the mind constituted by Mental Identity. 83 ten faculties would cease to exist; and the being that should retain the nine would be a different mental being from any now called human. Professor, Can you discriminate between mental identity^ and the knowledge which the mind has of its identity? PupiL Very easily! for a man may be in a swoon; he may be destitute of all mental operations; and yet his mental faculties may all continue in exist- ence, and be the very same that had being before the swoon* " Our knowledge of our own mental identity we have by the operations of consciousness and memory; which has led many erroneously to suppose, that personal identity consists in consciousness, or in memory, or in both. We might as well say that the identity of a table consists in consciousness^ as that the identity of a moral agent consists in knowings that he is the same being to-day, that he was yes- terday!" garter ly Theological Review, Professor, Tell me, then, since you have ex- plained what you mean by mental identity^ how a man comes by his knowledge that he is the same mental being that existed and acted yesterday? Pupil, I perform a mental action; I am conscious of it; and upon being conscious, constitutionally judge, that I now exist. Again, I remember t\i2it I was conscious in some past moment; and I consti- tutionally judge, that I did then exist. Now should the question be started, whether this thijig denoted by /, that I call myself bt- a mind or not, I should answer, that by /, or myself I mean one individual mind. Should it be demanded, Is your mind that 84 Mental Identity. did exist, and now exists, one and the same mindf I answer, that I judge it, upon reflection, to be the same, in all its constituent faculties; for I am con- scious of now performing all the different mental operations which I remember that I did perform; whence I infer^ that the mind is possessed of the same faculties, and is essentially the same. Professor. But how do you know, that you have not ceased to exist between the time of your present consciousness, and that past time in which you re- member that you did perform certain actions? Pupil. I now remember, that when I was two years of age, I saw my paternal grandfather incline his chair backwards, until he tumbled over; and from my constitution I judge, without being able to doubt the truth of my judgment, that /, who now remember, now exist; and that /, who now exist, did then exists when I remember to have seen what occurred. That I, who now exist, am the same in- dividual that did then exist, is implied in the con- stitutional judgment, that /, who now remember^ did then exist. Now, if I state the proposition, I have continued to exist from the time of the most remote mental iteration which I remember^ until the present time, in which I remember it, without any cessation of being; I conceive the meaning of it, and judge that it is a truth. Professor. You do indeed thus judge, and so does every other rational man. All, who remember, judge, that they have continued to exist, uninter- ruptedly, from the time in which they remember any thing; but the question is, how come they by Mental Identity. 85 this judgment? Is it a constitutional or an acquired judgment? Answer this question, and you will then show, hoxv a man obtains knowledge of his continued mental identity. If the judgment is constitutional^ it will be in- stantly formed in your mind, without any reasoning or deliberation on the subject. If it is constitutional, no circumstances can make you seriously doubt it. To assist you in forming a correct opinion on this subject, let me state a fact. Some years ago, a man in Northampton in Mas- sachusetts, took his axe, his beetle and wedges, and went into the woods to cut, and split, some fencing stuff. He went alone, and soon after returned in a state of delirium. He continued an active, ingenious, crazy person, for seven years. Near the expiration of that time, he began to indicate approaching sanity of mind; when one day, standing by his fire, and instantly turning round, he asked, " Boys, have you brought in that axe, the beetle and wedges?" " What axe, father?" asked his sons. " Why, the one I just left in the woods," said he: I had a pain in my head, and came home, and left it, with the beetle and wedges." His sons and fa- mily told him, that seven years ago, he went into the woods; that he had been disordered in mind ever since; and that they never had been able to find the implements which he then carried with him. He went with his sons to the spot, on which he had left his farming utensils. The helve of the axe, and the whole of the beetle, except the iron rings, had mouldered under the leaves, and returned to H 86 Mental Identity, dust. The axe, and the wedges, and the rings were brought home; but the restored naan never was able to remember any thing that occurred during seven years; and could judge, only from testimony^ and reflection^ that he had continued to exist during that portion of his life. His judgment of his con- tinued identity was certainly acquired. The truth of the anecdote may be relied on: I had the account from the late President Dwight, a native of North- ampton. Pupil, This man constitutionally judged, that he existed, at each, and every time, in which he re- membered any one of his mental operations. Professor. All men do the same. Pupil. Could we then remember something for every moment of our existence, we should consti- tutionally judge, that we had existed in every mo- »ient, from the present, to the most remote, time, in which we remember any thing done. Professor, True; but then no man does remem- ber something done by himself, in every moment of time, during which he judges that he has continued to exist; and hence no man constitutionally judges himself to be the subject of a continued mental identity. Pupil, Then the judgment that a man has con- terning his own continued mental identity, must be acquired; and I am confident that all men have it; for no man judges, that he has at any one time ceased to exist, since his existence began; and all, from time to time, remember certain things, which induce the judgment, that they existed at each par- ticular time referred to by memory. All remember Mental Identitij. 87 too, some of their mental operations which were performed during sleep; and hence judge that they exist in time of sleep. In this way they seem to ar- rive at the judgment, that they have never ceased to exist, since they can remember any thing. Professor, One thing, then, is certain, that if a man has ever, for a moment, ceased to exist, since his mental existence began, he does not knov/ it: for he judges that he existed at every time of per- forming any remembered actj nor can he believe it, for no one has ever testified to his temporary ex- tinction of mental being. PupiL I should like to hear your account oi per- sonal identity. Do you distinguish it from mental identity? Professor. When we speak of a human person^ we mean an individual man, consisting of body and soul. Neither the one nor the other alone consti- jtutes a person. Now the question may be asked, can personal identity be predicated of any one who passes from infancy through all the usual changes to old age? The most important part of the human being, the mind, continues essentially the same, from the cra- dle to the grave. The body-undergoes numerous changes; but there are portions of it, which continue from the birth to the dissolution of the frame, by a process of corruption. Perfect personal identity, therefore, cannot with truth be predicated of any man, at two different periods of his life; and yet the identity of the mental being, the moral agent, may be predicated of one from his birth, to any fu- tore period of his existence. 38 Personal Identity » Pupil, What, then, does an old man mean, when he says, " I am the very s2iVf\Q person that you knew, when I was a little boy?" Professor, He intends to assert his mental iden- tity, and the fact, that he who now thinks and speaks, was once the inhabitant of the little frame of the boy mentioned; which frame has grown and changed, from time to time, until it presents its present appearance of an old man. CONVERSATION VIII. The Faculty of Reasoning. — Premises. — Conclusion. — A Syllogism.— Classification of Reasonings. — Demonstrative and Probable Reason- ings. — Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings. — Analogical, Analytic, and Synthetic Reasonings. — Reasonings a priori, h. poste- riori, ad absurdum, and ad hominem. Professor. What is the Faculty of Reasoning? Pupil. The faculty of Reasoning in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he infers conclusions from premises. Professor. What is the result of every operation of reasoning? Pupil. An inferred judgment.* In reasoning we always deduce something before unknown from something previously known. Professor* What is logic? Pupil. The science of Reasoning: or a systematic arrangement of all we know about the operations of the Faculty of Reasoning. * " Reasoning is the process by which we pass from one judgment to another, which is the consequence of it. In all reasoning, therefore, there must be a proposition inferred, and one or more from which it is inferred. And this power of inferring, or draAving a conclusion, is only another name for reasoning; the proposition inferred, being call- ed the conclusion, and the proposition or propositions, from which it is inferred, the premises "-^Reid. H2 90 Reasoning. Professor. Could any man reason without having some previous operations of judgment? Pupih He could not, for reasoning implies some previous judgments and an inference from them. Without admitted axioms, or self-evident proposi- tions, or acquired judgments, reasoning could never commence; but when by reasoning we have estab- lished any judgment, it may be used as one of the premises, from which we derive another conclusion. Professor. Your account would make every act of reasoning imply a syllogism, expressed or under- stood. Pupil. A syllogism is nothing more than the ex- hibition of a process of reasoning. It consists of three propositions, the two first of which are called premises^ and the last the conclusion. It very frequently happens, however, that we state one truth, and infer another from it, without naming one of our premises, because it is so obvious as to be understood by every one. An argument of this kind is called an Enthymeme. Thus we might say, " because God is a just being, the just man will be justified by him." The last clause of this sen- tence is an inference; the first clause is one of the premises, from which it is derived; and the other is understood. The whole chain would be express- ed thus: By a just being a just man will be justified: God is a just being: Therefore, a just man will be justified by him. The i&rst of these three propositions is a truth, 30 generally known and admitted, that in reasoning from it, few would take the trouble to state it: and Reasonings, 91 in like manner, we omit thousands of axioms, and generally admitted principles of reasoning. Professor, Can you classify human reasonings? PupiL They are either true or false. The rea- soning of any one, in any particular instance, is false, when the inference from the premises is not a le- gitimate one, or when either of the premises is false. An inference may be legitimate, and yet false, when either of the premises is false; and the reasoning may be false, when an illegitimate conclusion is drawn from true premises. Professor, What is the usual difference between the reasonings of a/oo/and 2i madman? Pupil. Tht fool states true premises^ and infers from them an illegitimate conclusion. His infe- rences do not naturally, and in the view of rational men, flow from his premises. The madman^ on the other hand, states false premises and argues conclu- sively from them. Should we admit his premises we could not avoid admitting his inferences. Professor* You may give another classification of human reasonings. Pupil. Dr. Reid has said, " The most remarkable distinction of reasonings is, that some are probable, others demonstrative." Hence, I should say, that in probable reasonings, the" conclusion is probably true; but in demonstrative reasonings, the conclu- sion is demonstrably true. Demonstrative reason- ing is called demonstration. Professor. What is the prominent distinction be- tween probable and demonstrative reasonings? Pupil. In demonstrative reasoning, each of the premises is judged to be certainly true, and the con- 92 Logic* Definition, elusion is judged necessarily to result from them: but in probable reasonings one at least of the pre- mises admits of some doubt. Professor. Give an instance of demonstration. Pupil. Things which are equal to the same, are equal to one another: The sum of seven and three, and the sum o(Jive and jfive are equal to the same number, ten: Therefore the sum of seven and three, and the sum of Jive and five are equal to one another. The first proposition in this syllogism is a ma- thematical axiom; the second is an intuitive judg- ment, and neither the one nor the other of these premises can be doubted by any offe, who under- stands the meaning of the terms used. The conclu- sion necessarily follows; and a different conclusion cannot be judged even possible. Professor. In DuncarCs Elements of Logic, we have a similar example. " Every number that may be divided into two equal parts, is an even number: The number eight may be clivided into two equal parts: Therefore the number eight is an even number." Here the first proposition is a definition of a word; and if you judge it to be correct, from a conception of the meaning of the terms, the conclusion will inevitably follow; for every man will, from intuition, judge, that the second proposition is true. Pupil. But I judge, that the definition is not cor- rect; for it would prove every number to be an even number. Thus^i;^ as w^ell as eight may be divided into two equal parts • Two and a half are ^ part of Reasonings. 93 iive, equal to two and a half^ the other part of five. Thus every number may be divided into two equal parts. He would have been correct had he said, "Every number, the units of which may be di- vided into two equal parts, is an even number:" for we could not divide the units composing the number five into two equal parts. One unit would remain after we had made two equal parts, each of which should contain twoj and by the definition we are to make two even parts by the units, without di- viding a single unit into halves. Hence txvo^ fi^^''-) six, eighty and ten are called even numbers; for they can be equally divided without leaving a unit for the remainder; and Q?ie, three, fi'^^t seven, and nine^ are called uneven or odd numbers; because the units that compose them cannot be divided into two equal numbers of units. Professor, You are correct. Duncati^s Logic might, without any detriment to the cause of science, be dismissed from our colleges. Can you give as good a criticism on Dr. Reid's division of demonstrative reasonings into metaphysical and ma- thematical reasonings. You know he says, " The reasonings I have met with that can be called strict- ly demonstrative, may, I think, be reduced to two classes. They are either metaphysical, or they are mathematical." Pupil, Mathematics, strictly speaking, are things learned; and metaphysics include all things known concerning the nature, relations, operations and at- tributes of all beings which exist. Mathematical rea- sonings, therefore, ought to include all reasonings concerning things" learned; and metaphysical rea- 94 Reasonings, sonings, all reasonings concerning all beings, oi every description. Some have restricted the mean- ing of mathematics and metaphysics; so as to denote by the former, the sciences of arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, spherical trigonometry, astronomy, and the mensuration of solids,* and by the latter, the science of all immaterial substances. But such a restriction would not suit Dr. Reid's classification of reasonings; for the axioms of ma- thematical science, (using mathematical in the re- stricted sense.) are such propositions as the mind of man, from intuition^ judges to be true; and so partake of a metaphysical nature. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to class our reasonings of a de- monstrative kind, under the two heads of metaphy- sical and mathematical^ whether these words be used in a restricted, or in their most extensive sense. The fact is, deinonstrative reasoning may be em- ployed in any, and every science, which contains axioms^ or is founded on constitutional judgments. Professor, Well: give me an example of Proba* ble Reasoning, Pupil, What the sun has done uninterruptedly for a thousand years past it will do to-morrow: The sun for a thousand years past has uninter- ruptedly illuminated the portion of earth on which we live: Therefore the sun will to-morrow illuminate it. Of the truth of the first proposition in this conca* tenation, we cannot be certain, unless the Creator of the sun and earth should assert it. It is possible the sun may not illuminate Philadelphia, and the ad- jacent country. It is possible j in the nature of things, Reasonings, 95 that it should be annihilated. Were this first propo- sition infaUibly certain, as a self-evident truth is to our minds, the inference could not be doubted; the first could not be otherwise than as it is stated. The reasoning, therefore, is not demonstrative: and it cannot be demonstrated that the sun will shine here to-morrow. He may be completely shorn of his beams, for a day, or a month, or for ever. Probably^ therefore, might with propriety be inserted in the first of these premises, and in the conclusion; as it may in every instance of probable reasoning. What the sun has done uninterruptedly for a thousand years past, it will probably do to-morrow. There- fore, it \Y\\\ probably shine on us to-morrow. Professor. Were it deducible from any self-evi- dent truth, that day and night, seed time and harvest, summer and winter, should never cease while the world exists, that they should not cease would probably never have been made a matter of direct revelation. Probable reasonings admit of many degrees of probability; and \x^on judgments which are probably true, we are obliged to act in the greater part of our affairs.* * *' Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption for it, because, as there may be ])robabilities on both sides of a ques- tion, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet a sligl.'t presumption does not beget that degree of conviction which is implied in saying a thip;; is probably true. But that the slightest pos- sible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence, 96 Analogical Reasoning '6-. Analogical reasonings are nothing more than a species of probable reasonings, in which one or both of the premises is a matter of analogy. The syl- logism you have just given is an instance; for the proposition, that what the sun has done it will con^ tinue to do^ is a judgment which we learn to form from analogy. A few other distinctions I will name. They re- spect modes of reasoning. When we form judgments by observation and experience, or in any other way, concerning indivi- dual things, and make them the premises whence we infer general or universal truths, we are said to pursue the analytic mode of reasoning. Thus, we judge from observation, that one gravid substance gravitates to the centre of the earth; as Sir Isaac Newton judged, that the apple did. Again, we judge from what we perceive, that another, and another, and another, similar substance does the same; until we have formed this judgment concern- ing every gravid body, with which we are acquaint- ed. Then we reason thus. Wood, stone, lead, water, earths, &c. gravitate towards the centre of the earth: Wood, stone, lead, water, earths, &c. are all the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted^ that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to a moral certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumijtion, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow; but the observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will." Bntler's .Analogy. Modes of Reasoning, 97 Therefore, all the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted gravitate towards the centre of the earth. The first of these propositions should enumerate in the place of the £ffc. which we have introduced for the sake of brevity, every gravid substance, with which we are acquainted, and then the inference would be as certain as those constitutional judg- ments which follow our perceptions. Should we choose to adopt the synthetic mode of reasonings we might now make some general truth one of our premises, and from it infer some parti- cular truth; thus: All the gravid bodies with which we are ac- quainted gravitate towards the centre of the earth: Stone is one of the gravid bodies with which we are acquainted: Therefore, stone gravitates towards the centre of the earth. You will readily apprehend, that many sciences are reared by analytical reasonings; but that being already established they may be taught in the syn- thetic method, I do not affirm that every systematic arrangement of knowledge, on any subject, called a science, is made by analytical deductions j for many constitutional judgments are themselves general principles. Those sciences which are generally in- cluded under the title of natural philosophy and na- tural history, are all formed originally by analy- tical reasonings: but arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, spherical trigonometry, astronomy, and mensuration of solids, have grown out of the synthesis of axioms and definitions* I 98 Modes of Reasoning, Pupil, Do not the sciences of natural philosophy and history depend very much upon analogical, probable reasonings? Professor. Undoubtedly they do; and therefore I wonder, that men of sense should deem natural philosophy any more capable of certainty than men- tal science. The conclusion, that all gravid bodies will gravitate to the centre of the earth to-morrow^ is derived from nothing more certain than analogy; and from analogy alone can the natural historian judge, that all human bodies which he has not dis- sected, have viscera essentially similar to those which he has dissected; and that the same medi- cines in similar circumstances, will produce similar effects, on the living subject to-morrow, which they have done to-day. Pupil. I have heard old logicians talk much about reasonings a posteriori^ a priori^ ad absurdum^ and ad hominem. Will you explain them? Professor, Reasonings a priori^ are inductions concerning effects from their causes. The premises^ of course, in a priori reasonings, must predicate something concerning the cause of a thing; and the conclusion from the premises, some inference con- cerning an effect of that cause. I give an example, from Dr. S. Clark, on the being and attributes of God. A Being in his own nature infinite, omnipresent, and inielligent, must be infinitely wise: The Supreme Being is in his own nature, infi- nite, omnipresent, and intelligent: Therefore the Supreme Being must be infinitely wise. Modes of Reasoning, 99 Here the nature of the Supreme Being is consi- dered as the cause of his infinite wisdom; which is an infinite, unchangeable effect, of this Infinite, Unchangeable Cause. Reasonings a posteriori^ are inductions concern- ing causes from their effects. The premises, in reasonings of this kind, must predicate something concerning effects. One example will suffice. Every intelligent creature must have had an in- telligent Creator; Man is an intelligent creature: Therefore man must have had an intelligent Creator. Here man is the effect^ concerning which it is predicated, that he must have had an intelligent Creator: and the Creator is the cause of man's ex- istence; concerning which cause we infer, that he is intelligent. Reasoning ad absurdum^ is an act of reason in which you infer some absurd proposition^ with a design to establish the converse of that conclusion. This mode of reasoning is adopted, because it is an undisputed principle of reasoning, that if a proposi- tion be false^ the converse of it must be true: and if a proposition be true^ the converse of it must be false. Thus we may assert. That God is a good beings or That God is not a good being. Each of these propositions is the converse of the other; and every one will readily judge, upon the slightest examination, that if either is true, the other must be false. Reasoning ad homznem^ is a reasoning at a man; 100 Reason* or an act of reasoning in which you take a man's own propositions, whether true or false, for your premises, with a design to refute some of his asser- tions, or to convince him of some truth. PupiL Do you make any distinction between Reason^ and iho. faculty of reasoning f Professor, The faculty of reasoning" is sometimes called the Reason of a man; but reason more com- monly denotes the result of our intellectual opera- rations. Hence we say, that our reason teaches us, such and such a truth. A reason for an action, is a motive; and the reason of an event, means the occa- sion or instrumental cause of that event. CONVERSATION IX. The Faculty of Conscience. — Proof that all men have this Faculty.— Other names for the same thing. — Some general Obseryations and Laws concerning the Operations of Conscience.— Operations of Con- science always occasion certain Feelings. Professor, What is the faculty of Conscience? Pup'iU The faculty of conscience in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his souly by which he performs mental operations of a re- ligious character. Professor, You would have it understood, I pre= sume, that the religion of which you speak in this case may be either true or false ^ rational or absurds Scrittural^ Deisttcal^ or Atheistical, Pupil, I would; because all men have a religion of some sorty as we judge every rational being, who has a conscience, must have; but I should be far from deciding, that all religions are equally good, or that one may be contradictory to another, and both be true. Professor, How do you know that all men have a conscience? Pupil, All men with whom we are acquainted, or of whom we have ever read, approve of some moral actions, and disapprove of others; according to the moral law which they have either formed or 12 102 Conscience. adopted. The law may, in the judgment of others, be reasonable or unreasonable; but so long as a man approves of the law, in his own mind, he will ap- prove of conformity to it, and disapprove of the transgression of it. Now every act of mental approbation, or disap- probation, is a mental operation of which a man is conscious; and which, every man may readily be convinced, is distinct from any operation of any othtr faculty. It is because men are conscious of these acts of conscience, and judge them to be dif- ferent from other simple operations of the soul, that they have given them distinct names. From the general principle, that there can be no effect without an adequate cause, we infer, that all men who approve or disapprove of any moral action, must have a faculty of mind by which they perform these operations: and this faculty we call Conscience. Some denominate it the Moral Faculty^ and others the Moral Sense, Professor., How do men commonly express their approbation or disapprobation of moral actions? Pupil. They affirm or deny, that they are right or xvrong. They say, that such particular actions ought^ or ought not to be done: and that they are either morally good^ or morally evil. In short, their modes of expressing the dictates of their consciences are very numerous. Had' they no consciences, they would never speak of a sense of moral obligation^ rectitude^ virtue^ piety^ and religion; unless they were to imagine things, of which, from experience, they could form no conceptions. Professor. The fact that men either mentally ac-- Conscience, 103 cuse or excuse themselves, for their own conduct, is another proof that they have consciences: and their attempts to make other men approve or disapprove of certain courses of conduct, are evidence that they think other men have consciences as well as them- selves. PupiL May not every operation of conscience be resolved into judgment and feeling'^ and so be ac- counted a complex, instead of a simple operation? Professor, After mature reflection upon what passes within me, I feel constrained to express my judgment, that the approbation or disapprobation of a moral law or action, is neither a judgment^ nor a feelings but a single act, that seems to partake of both. I am conscious that I judge the proposition, men ought not to steals to be true: I am conscious of certain feelings too, consequent upon this judg- ment; and I am conscious, moreover, of approving of the proposition as a rule. The acts of ^w^a^mj^ this moral rule to be true, and of feeling content- ment with it, or love for it; appear to my mind to be as distinct from a conscientious approbation of it, as any acts of memory from those of reasoning. As a particle is a word distinct from every other part of speech, and yet partakes of the nature of a verb and of a noun, so it appears to me, that an act of conscience partakes of the nature of a judgment and of a feeling, and yet is distinct from each, and every other kind of mental operation. It is by this faculty that I experience what is called a sense of obligation^ and a sense of account- ability. Perhaps you are able to enumerate some general i©4 ' Conscience* laws concerning the operations of conscience, which will serve to distinguish them from other mental acts. Pupil. I am conscious of approving' or disapprov- ing actions only when I remember that I have com- pared them with some rule of moral conduct, and judged them to be conformable or not conformable to it. Professor, Every operation of conscience, then, relative to moral actions, presupposes an act of the judgment. Pupil, Certainly; for I never approve of any ac- tion without previously judging that it is right; that is, conformable to some rule of action, which I have laid down. Again; I never judge any law to be reasonable, equitable, and obligatory, without some previous conception concerning it: the same is true of my judgmenr concerning actions; it is consequent upon some conception of them, and of their relation to a law: so that my moral approbation is consequent upon my judgment, and my judgment upon my con- ceptions. Professor, Ultimately, then, our dictates of con- science are dependent on our conceptions; and hence we learn the importance of having right concep- tions, or a right understanding of things; for if a man verily thinks, (conceives and judges,) that he ought to do many things against Jesus of Nazareth, his conscience will approve of the action. Hence we hear of the blinding and perversion of conscience. It is by having a darkened understanding, that men approve of what is wrong in the judgment of more Conscience. 105 enlightened and exalted minds. If you would pro- duce in a man a good conscience, rectify his con- ceptions and judgments. PupiL It must be owing to this connexion be- tween the operations of Conception and Judgment, and those of Conscience, that the most ignorant people, generally speaking, are the most vicious. Professor. Undoubtedly; their consciences in many cases are not exercised at all; and in other instances, from wrong notions concerning law, duty, and the nature of moral actions, they approve of moral evil. PupiL It is another peculiar law of Conscience, that if a man acts contrary to his own moral appro- bation, he immediately disapproves of his own trans- gression. In figurative language. Conscience alv/ays makes a man condemn himself, for not doing what she approves, and for doing what she condemns. A similar law exists in relation to no other mental ope- ration. We may act contrary to any other mental operation, and she will not infallibly condemn us. Indeed she often approves of our yielding our own judgment, for the sake of peace; and requires oppo- sition to some of our most ardent emotions; but if any man dare to act contrary to his Conscience, however uninformed, or misinformed, she may be, Conscience will surely scourge him. It is for this reason she has been called the Vicegerent of God in the soul; and is often compared to an impartial Judge. Professor, Dr. Reid has very well remarked; " Conscience prescribes measures to every appetite, affection, and passion, and says to every other prin- 106 Conscience* ciple of action, so far thou mayest go, but no fur- ther. We may indeed transgress its dictates, but we cannot transgress them with innocence, nor even with impunity. We condemn ourselves, or, in the language of Scripture, our heart condemns usy when- ever we go beyond the rules of right and wrong, which Conscience prescribes. Other principles of action may have more strength, but this only has authority. Its sentence makes us guilty to ourselves, and guilty in the eyes of our Maker, whatever other principle may be set in opposition to it. It is evi- dent, therefore, that this principle has, from its na- ture, an authority to direct and determine, with re- gard to our conduct; to judge, to acquit, or to con- demn, and even to punish; an authority which be- longs to no other principle of the human mind." Pupil. It is another law of Conscience, that every act of disapproving of our own past conduct, should be immediately followed by some emotion of shame^ self- contempt^ or disgust with ourselves: and ano- ther, that disapprobation of the past conduct of others should occasion in us the emotions oi disgust, aversion^ discontentment ^ contempt or indignation in relation to them. On the other hand, approbation of our own or our neighbour's past moral actions, is immediately fol- lowed by some agreeable affection in our own minds. Professor, Operations of Conscience, then, are always productive of pleasure or pain. Pupil. And in this way Conscience rewards or punishes men in the present life. Professor, Is there any distinction between those Conscience, 107 operations of conscience, which respect the conduct of other men; and those which regard ourselves? Pupth When we approve or disapprove of our own conduct, our consequent emotions are more ardent, than those which ordinarily follow our ap- probation or disapprobation of the conduct of our fellow men. This has led Dr. Wylie to divide the operations of conscience into those of seoscience and heteroscience; or into acts of conscience that respect ourselveSy and acts of conscience that respect others* These may be considered as two classes of opera- tions performed by one faculty. Our general rulcj therefore, may be expressed thus: acts of seoscience are commonly followed by emotions more pleasing or more painful than those which are consequent upon heteroscience^ CONVERSATION X. The Faculty of Feeling.— Feelings distinguished from other Mental Operations. — One general Law of Feelings. — Classification of all Human Feelings.— Sensations considered. — Three Appetites. — Uses of the Avord Taste.~Emotions.-~Description of the principal Affections of Man .-—A rule concerning inordinate Affection. — Re- gard. Professor, What is the faculty of Feeling? Pupil, The faculty of feeling in man, is that inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he experiences feelings. This is the sen- sitive faculty.* Professor, Can you define those mental opera- tions that you c \\ feelings? Pupil. If I cannot define them, I am conscious of them, and therefore I know that I am the sub- ject of them. I can distinguish them from all other mental operations, by stating this fact, that they have no object distinct from themselves; whereas every other mental operation has some object upon which it terminates. If I perceive it is some object without the mind, which is presented through our * " It is the mind that feels; it is to the mind alone that the sensa- tions belong," says CondiUac, very truly; but feeling he unhappily uses for perceiving, and sensations for perceptions. Hence he says, *' we hbve nve sorts of sensations. The iToind feels through sight, hearing, smell, taste, and chiefly through touch." , Pleasure and Pain, 109 bodily senses; if I conceive^ it is of some substance, or attribute, or image, or meaning of a word, clause, or sentence; if we judge or reason^ some proposition is the object; if we are conscious or have memory^ it is of some mental operation; if we approve or dis- approve^ it is something of a moral nature; if we wi//, it is to do, or not do, some action; and if we exert our efficiency^ it is upon some mental faculty or bodily organ; but if we feel^ it must be some feelings and nothing else. Professor, In what consists all human happiness or unhappiness? Pupil, In human feelings. Were we destitute of these, we should feel neither pleasure nor pain. All the happiness or unhappiness, which we derive from our thoughts^ is inherent in the feelings which they produce; for, if we have any degree of the one or the other, we feel it. Professor, It seems necessary for you to define the word thought; that no misconception may arise from the manner of your using it. Pupil, Any operation of any one of the seven fa- culties of The Understanding, I call a thought. Agency, volition, and feeling are mental operations, which we exclude from the^ catalogue of thoughts; and they are excluded in all languages. Professor, You would assert then, I suppose, as a general rule, that men never have any feeling ex- cept in consequence of some thought, volition, or efficiency,^ * " It is a fact universally admitted, that no emotion or passion ever starts up in the mind without a cause: if 1 love a person, it is for good K 110 Classification oj Human Feelings, Pupil. Upon self-examination, I judge, that every feeling I ever had, was preceded by some thought, volition, or efficiency, which was the occasion of it. If our feelings were not dependent on some previ- ous mental operation, or upon some antecedent, it would be very absurd to inquire, what is the occa- sion of our having one feeling and not another; or why we feel as we do. If we give the reason for QMY feeling in any particular instance, it will uni- formly prove to be some thought^ volition^ or men- tal agency* Professor* Human feelings are very numerous: can you classify them? Pupil, I can recite your classification, which seems to me to be correct. " All human feelings may be divided into sen- sations and emotions. " Our Sensations* are those feelings which are immediately consequent upon omx perceptions of ob- jects without the mind, through the five bodily organs of sense. " Our Emotions are ihost feelings which are con- sequent upon other mental operations than our per- ceptions^ by the organs of sense. qualities, or good offices: if I have resentment, against a man, it must be for some injury done me: and I cannot pity any one who is under no distress of body nor of mind." — Lord Karnes. We must conceive, we shouid say, of some good quality, or office; of some injury, or of some distress, before we can feel love, resentment, or pitz/; for we may feel if all these are imaginary things; but we cannot feel without some conception of them as real. • " Sensations," says Price, " is only a mode of feeling in the mind."— JBmew of Morals, p. 19. Classification of Human Feelings, 111 ^' Emotions are subdivided into Affections and Passions. " Affections are those emotions of the mind which are naturally pleasurable to us. '•^Passions are those emotions of the mind which are naturally painful to us. " This brief classification includes every feeling of which we are conscious."* Professor, According to this account of sensa- tions^ they are always consequent upon perceptions. How do you know that men do not feel through their bodily organs when they have no perceptions? Is it not common for men to say, " I feel that this is smooth, this rough, this soft, and this hard?" Do they not tell you, that they feel pain in their eyes, when oppressed with too much light; and in their fingers when they are cold? Pupil* It is customary, indeed, for people to say, that they feel., whenever they perceitie any thing; and they speak of feeling"^ as if it were equivalant to perception,, because every perception is followed instantly by a feeling of some kind. Feeling too is often used for touching; but because a feelings dis- tinct from the perception of a thing by the touchy is consequent upon every act of touching, we should distinguish in our language between touching and feeling. Professor. Now, for the proof that the particular kind of feeling which we call sensation is always consequent upon perception. * Quarterly Theological Review, voil. i. p. 454. 112 Sensations, Pupil. Well, then, when I put my finger upon a polished surface, I am conscious that I touch or perceive something smooth; and I am conscious that I have an agreeable sensation immediately following the perception. When I touch a rough, and espe- cially a prickly substance, I am conscious that a very difFerent/^^/i/z^, or sensation^ immediately fol- lows the act of touchin^^ from what I experienced when I touched something smooth and polished. I find the same to be true, when I attend to any ope- ration of seeing, hearing, smelling, or tasting: so that my consciousness teaches me, that every per- ception to which I attend, is followed by some sen- sation: and no man can say that his perceptions to which he does not attend, are not thus followed, unless he can testify to that of which he knows no^ thing. That I never h2iv^ 2i sens alio n^^ but in consequence of some perception, I deduce from the fact, that I * Dr. Hartley has well said, ** Sensations are those internal feel- ings of the mind, which arise from the impressions made by external objects upon the several parts of our bodies.*' Another sentence that deserves, from its obvious truth, to be cited, can scarcely be found in Lis " Observations on J^Ian.^* That work is a fanciful attempt to ex- ^>Iain ho-w all mental operations may be imputed to the instrumental agency oi vibratio7is in the injiiiitesimalivhite me diiUary particles in the substance of the brain, spinal marroio^ andnerves. That there are an}' such vibrations he has not pi'oved; and no one can affirm, from his own observation, feeling, reason, consciousness, or experience of any sort. Dr. Hartley, however, admits, that these vibrations are merely the instrumental, and not the efficient causes, of sensations, and other mental operations^ so that he no more accounts for the intercourse between the soul and body than those >vho confess it to be inoompre_ Lensible. Sensations. 113 am able to trace my sensations to some antecedent perceptions. Again, I know that objects of perception have been sometimes presented to my bodily senses, and that I had no sensations in consequence of their physical action on my body, until I perceived them. For example, I have been walking the streets in such a state of mental occupation, that I have not perceived a friend whose image, I subsequently learned, must have been formed on the retina of my eyes; and not perceiving him, I had no such a sen- sation of a pleasurable nature as always follows the perception of his animating face. Had my sensation been immediately dependent on physical impression^ I should have had a pleasing sensation from the image of my friend in my eye, without perceiving him. I give another instance. I have been so en- gaged in study for some time, as not to perceive the pricking of a pin; and I felt no painful sensation until I had perceived it. Professor, All who have attentively examined their own mental operations, must have found, that the faculty of Conception, and several other facul- ties, are often so busily engaged as not to afford the faculty of Perception leisure, or opportunity, to operate. Hence a very thoughtful man may ride through a fine country, and perceive very few of its beauties. Such a person is frequently called an absent man; for indeed he seems to be like one ab- sent from the objects of perception that surround him. When engaged in writing, I do not hear the conversation, which passes in the usual tone, in my chamber; and very frequently mental science so K2 ^14» Sensations* engages my Reason, Judgment, Memory, and Con- eeption, that the shrill voices of my children, pulling at my knee, to ascend into my lap, are scarcely per- ceived, while the same action of the modulated at- mosphere on my ears, at other times, would be the occasion of my hearing every syllable. So long as I do not hear the noise of my children, it gives me no painful sensation. Pupil. Your remarks have brought to my re- membrance this fact, that men who feel acute sen- sations of pain, from the gout, rheumatism, or other disease, may for a time, by close attention to some important, interesting study or business, avoid feel- ing the pain. Professor, By their energetic attention to some intellectual subject, they preclude, for the time, all perception of objects through their senses; especially the operation of inflammation, or other disease, upon the organs of touch; and so have no sensations^ be- cause they have no perceptions. Not long since, I was wounded on the knee; and the pain was intense so long as I perceived any thing through my knee; but for a little time, when I could deeply engage my mind in the study of mental science, or theolo- gical inquiry, or devotional exercises, I had no sen- sations of pain from my knee, because I ceased to perceive through the wounded part. I lay it down, therefore, as a fundamental law, that man has no sensation except in consequence of some antecedent perception. Can you reduce our sensations to classes? PupiL They may be divided into as many classes Sis we have species of perceptions, or bodily organs Sensations, 115 of sense. They are sensations consequent on seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, or tasting.* In each of these classes we may find as many sensations as we have ever performed acts of perception. Every distinct colour, when seen, is the occasion of a dis- tinct sensation; and so is every modification of figure, v/ith every other visible object. Professor, What do you mean by The Appetites of man? Pupil, Any sexual sensation, any sensation from hunger, and any sensation from thirst, is an appe- tite. The appetites of course include three species of sensations, which are the most powerful and influ- ential. The word appetite is derived from appeto, to catch at, or earnestly seek any thing. The appe- tites, figuratively speaking, may be said, to catch at^ or earnestly seek^ that which will gratify them. " Our other sensations generally derive their names, when they have any, from the qualities of external things, which, being perceived, occasion those sensations. Usually we couple an adjective, descriptive of the quality, with the verb feel. Thus we say, I feel hot, I feel cold, I feel warm, &c."f The philosophical explanation of these expressions * ** Every feeling, pleasant or painful, must be in the mind; and yet, because in tasting, touching, and smelling, we are sensible of the im- pression made upon the organ, we are led to place there also the plea- sant or painful feeling caused by that impression; but, with respect to seeing and hearing, being insensible of the organic impression, we are not misled to assign a wrong place to the pleasant or painful feelings caused by that impression; and therefore we naturally place them ia the mind, where they really are." — Lord Kames. t Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 457. 116 Sensations, is this. I perceive hot air^ or some other hot sub- stance; I have a sensation of a peculiar kind, conse- quent upon the perception of heat: I perceive cold air, water, ice, or some other cold substance, and have a sensation from the perception of coldness; I perceive warm air, or something else of a warm quality, and I have a sensation of warmth, Cold^ hot^ and warm are adjectives, that must agree with some noun, or name of a thing, of which they denote some quality. *» If we touch a rough object, the feeling conse- quent upon the perception of the roughness by the touch, we call a sensation of roughness* In like manner, we speak of feelings, or sensations, of smoothness, hardness, softness, and the like. A great multitude of sensations are consequent upon our perceptions through the eye, for which we have no distinguishing terms. Every different effect pro- duced in or upon the body, being perceived, occa- sions a distinct feeling. Thus from the pricking of a pin we have one sensation; from the act of pinch- ing, another; from the gout in the system, another; from tasting twenty different liquors, twenty more; and instead of naming each distinct and different sensation, we merely say, that we feel pleasure or pain, in the part of the body, which we judge to be the organ affected, or the bodily instrument of the particular perception, that occasions the feeling."* Professor. What do you mean by pleasure and pain? * Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 458. Taste, Emotions* 117 Pupil. '•'• Pleasure and pain are attributes of feel- ing; and the feeling really is in the mind. We say the pain is in one of our bodily organs of percep- tion, merely because we have the painful sensation through the instrumentality of that organ. For the same reason we say the pleasant taste is in our mouth."* Professor, What do you mean by taste? Pupil. An act of tasting is a mental perception through the mouth, palate, and tongue. An act of tasting is sometimes called a taste; and the sensa- tion consequent upon this act of tasting is also fre- quently called a taste. The term moreover is figu- ratively used to denote nice discernment^ especially in works of imagination, and the lively emotions consequent upon that nice discernment. Accurate discrimination upon moral subjects^ ac- companied by lively emotions^ is frequently called moral taste. To apply taste to the operations of Conception, Judgment, Emotions, and the works of Imagina- tion, such as painting, music, and sculpture, will answer in figurative, but not in philosophical dis- course. Professor, Under the general term feelings you have included sensations and emotwns; and under the term emotions you include affections and pas- sions. Let us have your account of the affections. Pupil. Every one is conscious of having those mental operations which we call affections,^ and is Quarterly Theological Review, tol. i. p. 458. 118 Various Affections able to conceive of them. It is only requisite to de- scribe, and distinguish them as clearly as possible. All of them we cannot be expected to enumerate; for not all of our emotions have distinct names. Many of them require a circumlocution to express them. The account which I give is but a recitation, with a few interpolations, from the ^arterly Theological Review. Among the AFFECTIONS we enume- rate, I. Love, which is a pleasing emotion, consequent upon the conception and judgment, that some ob- ject is lovely, either on account of some of its in- herent attributes, or because it is calculated, to pro- mote some agreeable feeling in ourselves. The emotion of love ^ is a generic expression, which includes several species; which are designated, gene- rally, according to the object upon which the men- tal operation terminates, or else according to the relation of the person who loves. Hence we have, 1. Paternal love, which is the love a father exer- cises. 2. Maternal love, which is the love a mother feels. 3. Conjugal love, which is the love married persons exercise towards each other as partners. 4. Filial lovey which a sister exercises. 5. Fraternal love, which a brother feels. 6. Social love, which is the love of society. 7. Personal, or Self-love; which is the love of ourselves. 8. Selfishness, which is the inordinate love of one's self. 9. Benevolence, which is love of the happiness of others. 10. Complacencyy which is the love of an object for its inherent attri- butes, or for its own sake. 11. The love of fame ^ of the Human Mind, 119 the love of knowledge^ the love of power ^ and the love of happiness^ which need no explanation. II. Joy is another strong affection, consequent on some thought of an event or object, past, pre- sent, or expected, which we deem very desirable for ourselves, or in relation to others.* When we think again of any source of joy, and feel a new, similar emotion, we are said to rejoice, " Gladness is an inferior degree of joy; it may be excited by Incidents, agreeable or disagreeable in themselves, which are not of sufficient moment to raise the ec- stasies of joy."f III. Contentment is an affection consequent up- on our judgment, that the thing with which we are contented, is not to be dispraised, blamed, or high- ly commended. It is a feeling which often results from contemplating conduct, circumstances, cha- racters, or events that neither displease, nor afford much, if any, positive gratification. IV. Satisfaction is an emotion which we ex- perience, when we judge, that any object is fit, suitable, reasonable, or what might have been ex- pected; or in consequence of thinking of the accom- plishment of some desire. Hence we say, " we are satisfied with your conduct,^' when any one has conducted as we should have desired him; and hence the Christian says, in relation to the Supreme * "In no situation doth joy rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of any violent distress of mind or body; and in no situation doth sorrow rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of what makes us happy." — Lord Karnes. t Cogan's Philosophical Treatise, p. 64 , 120 Afcctiom, object of this affection, " I shall he satisfied, xvhen I axvake in thy likeness J'^ V. Cheerfulness is a moderate affection which we experience, in consequence of some thought about objects with which we are contented. It has for its object generally our present state, and future pros- pects. It is a feeling which occupies a place between gladness and contentment; being inferior to the first, and superior to the last. It is generally of longer continuance than any more ardent emotion. VI. Desire is an affection which we feel in con- templating an object, which we love, and do not possess; or an action, that we judge would promote our happiness by being accomplished. A Wish is the verbal expression of a desire. VII. Hope is an affection consequent upon the desire of some object, which we judge to be both good and probably attainable. We may desire that which we think we shall never be able to obtain;* but we hope only for that, which we have some expectation that we, or others, shall obtain, or re- ceive. VIII. Delight is an ardent emotion which we experience on obtaining an object desired or hoped for; or in consequence of juf^ging something to be what we highly approve of, and ardently love. IX. Confidence is an emotion consequent upon some act of faith, in relation to the word of the * Full conviction of the impossibility of gratifying any desire, will, however, commonly prevent the recun-ence of desire, after the thing; of which we despair. Affections. 121 person in whom we confide. We never confide in any person, without previously judging that he is true, and competent to promote the happiness we expect. X. Gratitude is an emotion consequent on a judgment, that some one has intended to confer, or has actually conferred, a favour on us. Thankfulness is the name we give any grate- ful emotion, when it moves us to a verbal expres- sion of our gratitude^ and the actual expression of gratitude is thanksgiving, XI. Resignation is an emotion which we feel in consequence of some judgment, that it is wise, proper, best, or necessary, upon the whole, to yield our will to the will of another. It is an affection which often moves us to resolve, that we will make no resistance. XII. Patience is an emotion consequent upon a judgment that it is reasonable and best to wait and endure. It is a feeling which moves in us the de« termination to suffer without complaining. XIII. Humility is an emotion that results from some thought of comparative unworthiness. Of course, it implies some previous judgment, that the person or law, with which we compare ourselves, is worthy and excellent. XIV. Meekness is an emotion which we expe- rience, subsequently to some thought of insult or injury, and to a persuasion that it is not right, or suitable for us to avenge the insult or injury. It is that feeling which prevents our choosing to retaliate, Christ felt meekness^ when he was sensible of the injury done him, and yet opened not his mouth, L 122 Affections^ XV. Pity is an emotion consequent upon oui*' judgment that another suffers pain, or is exposed to suffering, and a desire to afford relief. Some may question whether this should not be called a passion instead of an affection; but appeal being made to consciousness, the last umpire in matters of this sort, we are compelled to say, that we have never felt pity without having some degree of satisfaction in the emotion. XVI. Esteem is an emotion consequent upon our appiobation of a person's moral character, or a judgment that the object esteemed possesses worth, XVII. Respect is a feeling consequent upon a judgment, that a person possesses some degree, at least, of both wisdom and goodness. Veneration is a name given to a high degree of respect, for persons eminent in wisdom and good- ness. XVIII. Reverence is an emotion consequent upon some thought of a being, whom we judge to be great and powerful, as well as wise and good; or of something appertaining to such a being. Holy reverence regards aj^erson, or the attributes of a person, divinely great, powerful, wise, and good: and hence we are said to feel holy reverence for God and his house; for his word and ordinances. XIX. Admiration is a sudden emotion, con- sequent upon the thought of something sublime, or more than commonly excellent in some respect. XX. Surprise is an emotion that results from the apprehension of something novel and unex- pected. XXI. Wonder is an emotion consequent upon Affections. 12S the apprehension of something deemed strange, or unaccountable. Astonishment is a name given to a very great degree of wonder. XXII. Amazement is a feeling consequent upon some thought of something novel, unexpected, great, and intricate. XXIII. Curiosity is an emotion consequent upon the judgment that something new to us, may be perceived, understood, or felt, to the promotion of our happiness. Professor » How do you know that Surprise, Wonder, Astonishment, Amazement and Curio- sity, should not be classed with our passions? Pupil. I know from my own experience, that they afford me pleasure; and I judge that they are felicitous to others, for those who have felt these emotions desire to feel them again; and take pains to excite them. The chief pleasure experienced in attention to a play, a novel, and a volume of travels or history, consists in the mental operations of this kind, which are excited by such attention. The pleasure found in these mental affections, induces men to travel far from home; or sit for hours in the odious atmosphere of a theatre. It is the pleasure found in these emotions that induces the ignorant to listen to every tale of horror, superstition, ima- gination, and wild romance. Professor. Since all our affections are, in their own nature, felicitous, will it not follow, that every affection is lawful an«l proper? PupiL It is to be remarked, that we may feel an affection for an improper object; or for a proper 124 Affections, object in an unreasonable degree; and every such emotion is called an inordinate affection. When an inordinate affection induces an evil volition^ it is said to be a malevolent affection. It should be re- membered, moreover, as a general law of feeling, That every inordinate affection produces some passion^ which is in some degree painful. Selfish' ness^for instance^ is an inordinate love of one's self, which invariably occasions in the person who exer- cises it, some emotion of pride, grief, anger, resent- ment, shame, or the like. Professor, Is not Regard an affection? Pupil. Regard is a general term, used to denote any emotion exercised in relation to any object. Hence we have aff'ectionate and passionate regards. I regard a man, if I feel any emotion relative to him, whether it be good or bad, pleasing or pain- ful. If I have no regard to a man, he excites in me no emotions, whether favourable or unfavour^- able to himself. CONVERSATION XI. Account of the Human Passions. — Lawful Passions. — Some general Laws of Feeling. — Sympathy, Commiseration, Compassion, defin- ed. — Relative Importance of the Intellectual and Sensitive parts of our Mental Nature. Professor, Let us now have your description of the Passions of man. Pupil, I shall proceed with my recitation from your Review; and intersperse a few of my own re- marks. Professor, Proceed; and make such alterations and remarks as you deem meet. Pupil, Among the PASSIONS we enumerate, I. Hatred, which is an unhappy feeling, con- sequent upon some painful sensation, or some thought of an object which we judge to be hateful in itself, or unfavourable to ourselves, or to some one whom we love. It is an emotion directly oppo- site to love, II. Sorrow is' a strong passion consequent upon some thought of an event past, present, or ex- pected, which we judge to be very undesirable for ourselves, or in relation to others. III. Grief is an emotion, consequent upon the disapprobation of some conduct in ourselves, or in some one whom we love or esteem. We haU the L 2 126 Human Passions. bad conduct of our enemies; but we grieve only for ourselves, or some beloved object. IV. Sadness is a passion of some continuation, consequent upon some thought of the loss of, the want of, or the despair of, something good, but not in an exalted degree. It is a feeling inferior to sorrow and grief, but superior to discontent. V. Discontent is a passion that we experience in consequence of some judgment, that the thing with which we are discontented deserves to be dis- praised or censured, but not in a great degree. It generally refers to some state, or substance. VI. Dissatisfaction is a passion which we find consequent on some judgment, that the object of our dissatisfaction is unfit, unsuitable, unreasona- ble, or different from what we might have expected or desired. VII. Disappointment is the passion which we feel in consequence of not obtaining some expected good. VIII. Despair is a deep and settled passion, con- sequent on a full conviction, that there is no longer any reason to hope for some object which we desire. IX. Aversion is a passion, dependent for its existence on the thought of something so offensive in its own nature, that we wish to think of it no more. Figuratively speaking, we wish to turn away our mind from an object of aversion. X. Disgust is a strong emotion, consequent upon some strong disapprobation of some person or conduct, on account of something in him or his conduct, obscene, base, mean, or vulgar. XI. Ingratitude is a feeling consequent upon Human Passions, 127 the remembrance of a favour done or intended, and some hatred of, or disgust at, the benefactor. XII. Pride is a feeling, which one experiences in consequence of some judgment of his own com- parative worthiness. It is 3n emotion which we always experience, in a greater or less degree, when we think of ourselves more highly, and of others less highly, than we ought to think. XIII. Vanity is a passion, consequent upon a judgment, that we excel others in something, for which we desire them to admire and esteem us. It moves a man to display his mental, or other endow- ments, of which he is vain. XiV. Suspicion is an emotion, consequent on some sentiment, that persons or things probably are not, or will not be, what they appear, or promise to be. A Doubt is the expression of some suspicion concerning the truth of a proposition. XV. Jealousy is a passion, consequent on some fear th another has obtained, or will obtain, some good, which we had hoped to enjoy ourselves. XVI. Anger is a passion, consequent upon some , thought of an insult, or injury, intended or expe- rienced. It is a feeling, which often moves the will to purposes of resentment, or of revenge. Wrath is a strong, but Rage the strongest spe- cies of anger. XVII. Fretfulness is a feeling, which we ex- perience in consequence of some unpleasant sensa- tions, or disappointments, or vexations, which we 128 Human Passions. judge to be of no great magnitude; and yet, of which we will to complain. XVIII. Vexation is a painful emotion, conse- quent upon a rapid succession of little occurrences, contrary to our desires, and calculated to interrupt the train of our thoughts, or to impede the course of our business. XIX. Fear is a passion consequent upon the judgment, that we, or the objects for which we fear, are in danger of experiencing some kind of evil. Terror is a high degree of fear, in consequence of some great evil apprehended. Dread is long continued fear, especially of evil, the nature of which we do not fully comprehend. XX. Horror is a passion, that results from the thought of sometliing peculiarly, or unexpectedly, evil, in one's character, conduct, or situation. XXI. Indignation is a strong emotion, result- ing from our thoughts concerning some action or conduct, which we judge peculiarly meritorious of feelings of resentment, and the manifestation of dis- pleasure. XXII. Resentment is an emotion consequent on some thought of an insult or injury, and a judg- ment that it is fit, best, or right, to evince our dis- pleasure against the offending party. XXIII. Contempt is an emotion, that immedi- ately follows our judgment that a person is desti- tute of wisdom, power, and goodness, and deserves to be treated accordingly. XXIV. Disdain is a feeling, that results from the judgment, that a person, or an action is not only destitute of wisdom, power, and goodness, but is The Passions. 129 calculated to dishonour all who have intercourse with the one, or do not feel indignation at the other. XXV. Envy is an emotion, consequent on a con- ception of something desirable that is the property of others, and the feeling of selfishness. It is that passion which would induce the volition to appro- priate the envied object to ourselves, could we do it with impunity. XXVI. Malignity is a feeling, exercised in re- lation to sentient beings, in consequence of some emotion of hatred, anger, envy, suspicion, jealousy, or other passions of which they have been the oc- casion. It induces us to wish them injury. Malice is an inferior degree of malignity; and is excited by, and employed about little things. XXVII. Cruelty is a passion consequent upon the conception of suffering, hatred to the sufferer, and a desire to inflict pain unnecessarily. XXVIII. Lust is a passion consequent on some volition to indulge some appetite, or other feeling, in an unlawful manner. XXIX. Shame is a passion, that results from a conviction of the disgrace of some one in whom we feel interested; or from the ktiowledge of our own weakness, folly, inferiority, wickedness, or expo- posure to disapprobation and punishment. Professor. Your list is sufficiently extended. What do you mean by malevolent passion? Pupil. Any passion which ordinarily induces m the mind which feels it, an evil volition. Professor. Since all oar passions are in their own 130 The Passions, nature infelicitous, I would ask, whether any ot' them may be lawfully indulged? Pupil. In an evil world, or in a state in which there are any evils, there must be objects to which some passions are suitable. Hence any passion ex- ercised in relation to a suitable object, and in a reasonable degree, is called a suitable^ reasonably lawful^ or sacred passion. It is also to be had in remembrance, as a general law of feeling, That suitable^ reasonable^ lawful or sacred passions are always followed by some agreea- ble affection. Ultimately, therefore, it is for our hap- piness to exercise right passions, notwithstanding they are in their own nature, in some degree painful. Professor. If I hate base, mean, and unworthy conduct, I am conscious that I subsequently find satisfaction^ from thinking that I have felt as I ought to have done. " We may be said to find hap- piness in hating evil, feeling aversion from sin, fear- ing God, having holy resentment^ being disgusted with obscene conduct; and in grief sadness^ sorrow^ and even shame, for such things as we know ought to excite these emotions in us; not because the pas- sions themselves are agreeable, but because they are instantly followed by some affection that is. We love^ esteem^ or respect ourselves for these passions; or we feel some degree of gladness, contentment, or satisfaction because we have felt as our consciences tell us we ought to have done; or the hope of ap- probation, or of other rewards, springs up in the soul."* * Quarterly Theological Review, rol i. p. 465. Laws of Feeling. 131 Having tak,e« a general survey of human feelings, perhaps yoU can state some other laws, than those which we have already contemplated. Pupil I think I can a few. Rule I. The nature and degree of every feeling, whether it be a sensation, passion, or affection, are dependent on, and according to, the nature and de- gree of the antecedent bodily or mental operation which is the occasion of it. Professor, Give a brief illustration of this rule. Pupil, If I attend to objects of perception, my acts of perception will be weak or vigorous, in pro- portion to the impression on my bodily organs; and my sensations will in kind, and in vivacity, ardour, strength, or weakness and dulness, be in proportion to the perceptions which occasion them. My affec- tions and passions, in like manner, will be propor- tionate to the vigour or debility of those conceptions, judgments, or other operations of mind, that give rise to them. Professor. Very good. Give another general rule concerning feelings. Pupil. Rule II. The contemplation of a feeling in others, when we do not judge it to be an evil feeling, is commonly followed>by a similar feeling in our ownjninds; which is called a fellow-feeling. Rule III. The contemplation of any feeling in another, which we disapprove, at the time, com- monly excites in us disgust. Professor, What do you understand by Sympa- thy? Pupil. When our thought of any passion^ felt by another, is the occasion of our experiencing a simi- i 32 Laxvs^ of Feeling\ lar passion, it is called an act of Sympathy, or a sympathetic emotioju^ Professor. What do you mean by Commisera- tion? Pupil. Commiseration is sorrow experienced by us, in consequence of some conception of the misery of another. Professor, What is Compassion? Pupil. *' Any sympathetic emotion occasioned by the despair^ sorrow^ g^ief sadness., or fear of ano- ther, we call Compassion." Professor, It seems to be a general conclusion from your whole account of the operations of the heart .^ and the intellectual faculties., " that our Crea- tor has made the intellectual paramount to the sen- sitive part of our mental nature." He designed that our understanding should regulate our passions and affections; and that our perceptions through the bodily organs, should limit our sensations. In this, our heart has the pre-eminence over our intellect^ that all our happiness consists in the ope- tions of the former. Pupil. It may be added, that all our unhappiness too, cbnsists in our feelings; but it is the province of intellect to promote such feelings as are agree- able, and to prevent such as are painful. * *' Emotions are raised in us, not only by the qualities and actions of ot.heis, but also by theii- feelings: I cannot behold a man in distress, withovit pai'taking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his pleasure."— Zorrf Karnes, CONVERSATION XII. The Faculty of Volition, or the Will.— Some contemplated actioa the object of every Volition.— Desire and Preference different froni Volition.— The Will a dependent Faculty.— Perception and Con- ception the only independent Faculties of the Mind.— Definition of Volition and VIotive. — Inducement and Motive distinguished.— Several general Rules concerning Volition. — An Inference concern- ing the importance of regulating our Thoughts. Professor. What is the faculty of Volition? PupiL The faculty of volition in man, is that in- herent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he chooses, determines, resolves, purpo- ses, or wills, to perform, or not perform, any con- templated action, of which he judges himself ca- pable. Professor, You make some mental or bodily, some simple or complex, operation, the object of every volition: and by your definition would have it understood, that no man ever has a volition to per- form, or not perform, any action of which he judges himself absolutely incapable. Pupil. Such seems to me, to be a correct defini- tion of an operation of the faculty of volition, which we use as synonymous with The Will. Professor. How do you know, that all men have this faculty of volition? Pupil, All men declare their coasciousness of M 134 Objects of Volition, willing in certain cases; and there could be no act of volition without the requisite faculty, unless there could be an effect without an adequate cause. Professor* Do we not choose external objects? If a pear and a peach are before me, may I not say, that I choose the peach, and that my volition ter- minates upon a peach, rather than upon any con- templated action? Pupil, Desire is a feeling which may have a peach for its object; and many have confounded an operation of the will, w^ith this emotion of the heart. If two things are presented to my contemplation, I am said to prefer that which I most love^ desire^ or esteem: but if I choose that which I prefer^ the meaning of this elliptical expression is, that I choose^ or will to take, or to receive, or to possess, that object which I prefer to something else. When apples, pears, and peaches, are all presented to your view, and you choose peaches^ the meaning of the expression is, that you choose to take^ or receive^ or eat peaches. The question in the mind is, " which shall I take?" and the volition is, " I will take peaches." If men accurately distinguish between their feel- ijjgs and volitions^ they will find in every instance, that a volition respects nothing but a contemplated action. Professor, Does the faculty of volition in man ever act independently of all his other mental facul- ties? Pupil. Never; if I may judge from my own con- sciousness. I find, that I perceive without any pre- vious operation of any other faculty than that of The Will dependent. 135 Perception: I conceive too, independently of any- other mental operation, in many instances; so that Perception and Conception are independent facul- ties, that originate thought, or that may be said to have a sort of creative mental ability. It is not so with any other faculty, for if we are conscious or remember^ we must be conscious of, or remember, some mental act: if we judge or reason^ or approve^ we are dependent on conception or some other act, for the object about which we judge, or reason, or exercise our conscience in approbation, li wt feel^ it is in consequence of, and in dependence on, some antecedent mental operation; and if we exert our faculty of agency^ it is in obedience to volition. In like manner, if we will, it is to do, or not do, some- thing of which we have conceived; so that some no- tion of an action to be done, or not done, is essential to the existence of a volition. Besides, if I will, it is in consequence of some other mental act, than the mere conception of the action which is the ob- ject of volition; it is from some motive; so that the Willis more dependent on previous mental opera- tions than any other faculty of the mind. It re- quires at least a conception of its object and a mo- tive. . Professor. The dependence of which you now speak, is not any thing extraneous to the mind; but a dependence of one faculty upon one or more fa- culties of the same mind. PupiL Yes, it is a constitutional dependence; that has its origin in the mental nature which the Creator has given, and the laws by which he governs human minds, as certainlv as the material universe.. 136 Volitions, Motmes^ Professor, In what sense do you use the term volition? Pupil. It is a general term, that includes every operation of the faculty of the will; whether that operation be called a determination, a choice, a reso- lution^ a purpose, an intention, an act of xvilling, a will, or any thing else. Professor* What is a motive to volition? Pupil. Any simple or complex mental operation, or operations, which figuratively speaking, move, induce, excite, or occasion any volition, are the motive to that volition. Professor. Of course, every volition presupposes a motive, and there are as many motives as voli= tions in existence, and no more. Do you distinguish between a motive and an t72ducementP Pupil. Any simple mental operation, which of itself does not constitute a motive, but which in connexion with one or more other mental opera- tions, often does constitute a motive, we call an inducement. Hence an inducement may be consider- ed as any constituent part of a motive. I will give an example. I judge that a vexatious servant de- serves to be flogged; but this judgment alone does not make me will to flog him. Immediately after, I judge that the servant will be ruined if I do not correct him. 1 judge also, that I am bound in duty to flog him; and from these three judgments taken together, I am induced to will that I will flog the boy. Neither of these judgments alone moved me to this volition; but each in conjunction with the other, conspired to induce me to determine that I wo«ld flog him. Here the oction of fogging a boy, and Inducements,, lo7 IS the object of my volition;- the motive for this vo- lition consists of three distinct judgments; and each of the jjLidgments is ati inducement, A sufficient inducement^ and a motive to volition are equivalent expressions; but by motive we always mean, that which actually is the true reason of our xvilling in any particular instance. Ask a man why he chose, willed, or determined, as he actually did, in any case; and if he candidly and intelligently answers the question, he will present his motive for the volition. But if he states several things, no one of which singly moved him to volition; but all of which together did; each single thing is an induce- 7nent. Professor, Why do you define motives to be those mental operations that move us to volition f May not some external object, some creature of sense, some written arguments, or some speech ut- tered, be a motive? Pupil, An external object must be perceived, or conceived of, by the mind, before It can have any influence on the will: we say, therefore, that the perception of external objects, and not the objects themselves, or some conception of them, is the mo- tive^ or inducement to volition," presented by external objects. A speech never moves us to any volition unless it be heard, or understood, or conceived of, or in some way thought of, by the mind: and argu^ menu are nothing to any man, before he forms some notion of them: so that, strictly speaking, nothing but mental operations can be motives to volition in any human mind. When a writer or speaker talks of presenting ^uq^ M2 5 38 Laws of Volition. fives to his readers or hearers, he intends to make such statements as being heard, read, or thought of in some way, will by these mental operations move ihcm to some desired volition. It is the thought of the mind concerning a proposition, or its feelings consequent upon the thought, and not the proposi- tion itself, that constitutes a motive. . Professor, It is unquestionably one of the inva- riable laws of the human mind, that the Will never operates except in consequence of some motive* Can you now state any other laws of volition? PupiU Any human feeling may be an immediate motive to volition. Any operation of conscience may be an immediate motive to volition. A simple operation of consciousness never proves a motive to volition. The same is true of a simple operation of Perception, Conception, Volition and Agency. Any operation of the judgment concerning our duty, interest, convenience, happiness, or unhappi- iiess, or concerning the fitness or unfitness, the pro- priety or impropriety of any action, may be a motive to volition. Any inferred judgment concerning the things just mentioned, may be a motive to volition. The memory of any past volition to choose in any particular way, may be a motive to a future vo- lition. The meraorij of any operation which we Judge we can perform if we will, and of any agreeable feeling that followed it, may be a motive for a volition to periorm a similar action. Laws of Volition. 139 The memory of any past motive may constitute a future motive to volition. The memory of any promise may be a motive for •willing to perform the promised action. Professor. In laying down these rules, I presume you judge, that what commonly has taken place 7nay take place again: for we all remember that we have repeatedly chosen from such motives as you have described, and it is reasonable to conclude, that v/e, and other beings like us, may do it again. Pupil I can no more doubt, that men may in future do, what they have commonly done in ages past, than I can doubt whether the sun will arise to-morrow; or whether fluids will continue to roll down an inclined plane. Professor, A motive consisting of a single men- tal operation may be called a simple motive; and a motive consisting of two or more mental operations may be called a complex 7?iotive. Can you name any simple motives? Pupil. I sometimes have a volition immediately consequent upon some feelings and a conception of the action which is the object of volition. Professor, The conception of the action willed is essential to every volition; and it is also essential, that we should not judge ourselves absolutely inca- pable of the action. These are pre-requisites to every volition. But these pre-requisites existing, a simple feeling may be a motive for willing immedi- ately to perform any contemplated action, that we have not judged ourselves incapable of performing. This simple feeling is consequent upon some intel- lectual operation; but it is the feelings when it ex- ists, that constitutes the motive. 140 Laws of Folitioii, Professor. In the same manner, any single feel- ing, operation of conscience, act of the judgment, result of reasoning, or act of memory, that moves us to a volition, is a simple motive; but when we will in consequence of two or more inducements, the motive is complex. Professor. The greater part of our volitions, I think, are the result of complex motives. Ixvill to eat, we will suppose. If I thus will, because I now have a pleasant sensation from tasting food, and for this reason alone, my motive for willing to eat is simple: but if I not only feel present pleasure in tasting, but judge that eating is necessary for my sustenance; and from both these considerations, will to eat another mouthful, the motive is complex. Again, if I would not eat another mouthful merely because I now feel an agreeable sensation from the last, but if I will to eat it, from the present sensa- tion in conjunction with remembrance or recollection of past pleasure derived from eating, and a judg- ment that I shall feel the better for eating it, my motive is again complex, and is constituted of three distinct inducements; viz: a sensation, an act of me- mory, and a judgment. Have you any other rules of volition to give? Pupil. That which has been a motive to a particu- lar volition in a man, at one time, and in one state of body and mind, may not prove a motive to a similar volition, at another time, and zvhen he is in a diffe- rent state of body and of mind. Similar feelings^ however, in the sa7ne man, ge- nerally occasion similar volitions, unless they are counteracted by some dictate of the Judgment err Laws of Volition. 141 Consciences or by some memory of painful feelings^, that formerly resulted from an action similar to the contemplated one. For instance, a man who has for- merly chosen to eat, from the sensations of hunger, will, when hungry, generally determine to eat again, unless his judgment informs him, that his health requires a temporary abstinence, or his Conscience approves of his deferring the act of eating, until he has discharged some more immediately urgent duty. Let a physician seat himself at table, and he will eat, if he is hungry, and does not judge that it is best for him to abstain; or if his Conscience does not require him to visit a patient, before he gratifies his appetite. The same is true of other men, with a change in the objects of duty, to which Conscience may call them. It is our knowledge of this rule, that enables us to anticipate very accurately how men will act, when certain appetites crave indulgence, or when any given emotion is excited in the heart. Every body knows, that men -will choose to act as their sensations induce them^ unless Judgment^ Reason^ Conscience^ or Memory^ or all of these^ pre- sent stronger inducements^ and so furnish a motive for resisting^ denying^ and subduing their sensations. Hence, if men will to act at all from their sensations, without giving the Judgment, Conscience, Reason, and Memory time to be exercised about the action, they invariably will act according to their sensa- tions. The same rule holds good in relation to our em.otions. If men will and act hastily, they com- monly act out their feelings; or they will to act f 42 Laws of Volition. from the emotions of the moment. These are rasli men. Hence, every man knows, that anger will move that man, who feels the passion, and acts suddenly, without consulting any other faculty than that of feeling, to purposes of retaliation and revenge. Professor. A little attention to human character and conduct, will convince men of the truth of this rule, that any man who has many ardent feelings consequent upon his perceptions; and comparatively few consequent upon his operations of Conscience, Reason, Judgment, and Memory, will generally be governed in his volitions, by objects of sense. Pupil, Might you not have given another rule, prior to this; that a man who more generally exer- cises his perception^ than his Conscience, Reason, Judgment and Memory, will have more sensations- than feelings of any other kind; and so will in his Volitions be mainly a sensual man? Professor, The truth of your position cannot be denied. You might have added, that a man who employs his faculty of Conception in the work of imagination, more than all his other intellectual fa- culties, will have more feelings consequent on ima- ginations, than on the operations of Judgment, Reason, Conscience, Memory, and Perception; and if he wills from his feelings mainly, as men gene- rally do, his Imagination will control his Will. This man is styled a visionary^ or ro7nantic being. Pupil. A person such as you have now described, would be justly deemed insane^ I think. Professor. The most general rule, with which I am acquainted concerning volitions is this, that a LaTVS of Volition. 143 marCs habitual volitions are as his habitual feelings: for there is scarcely any motive of which some feel- ings or a design to promote some feeling, is not a constituent part. Pupil, Of course, since a man's feelings are as his thoughts, and his volitions are as his feelings, his volitions must ultimately be as his thoughts. " As a man thinketh so is he." Professor. And hence v^e infer, that it is a mat- ter of unspeakable importance, by education, reve- lation, and every other practicable way, to regulate a man's thoughts. Could we secure the right operation of the seven faculties of the understandings and employ them ex- clusively about desirable objects, we should then infallibly secure the exercise of right feelings^ and Qf right volitions. CONVERSATION XIll The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. — An Operation of this Faculty distinguished. — Proof of the Existence of this Faculty. — Objects of our Efficiency. — Some Opet;ations of Man that are ordinarily per- formed without Volition, ma^ be performed from Voluntary Exer- tion. — How the Mind exerts an Agency on the Botly is unknown by us. — The Operations of our Efficiency on our different Mental Faculties considered. — On the Consciousness, Perception, Concep- tiftp, See. Professor. What is the faculty of Agency? PupiL The faculty of agency in man, is that in- herent part of the original constitution of his soul, by which he performs from volition, or instinct, any action. Professor* Agency and efficiency you will use as synonymous expressions. Any operation of the hu- man mind, you will bear in mind, moreover, is called an action; but a mental agency^ exertion^ ef- fort^ or efficiency^ is only such an actio7i as we per- form in consequence of a volition to do it, or of some Instinct. PupiL I think I have understood your distinc- tion, ever since I read your NOTES to the first American Edition of Dr, Reid^s Works, You have there said, '' We think^ zve ruill^ we act. Here are three mental operations, which belong to three different faculties. The first belongs to the under- Faculty of Efficiency, 145 standing, the second to the will, and the third to a fa- culty not the least important, which metaphysical wri- ters have not honoured with a distinct name and place in their systems. It is the faculty of agency^ which has generally been confounded with The WilL There could be no agency without the Will, or some In- stinct, any more than will without thought; but these things ought not to be confounded. The fa- culty by which we will, is not the faculty by which we DO what we will. They are as distinct as the volition to walk, and the act of walking, which is consequent upon the volition; or as the perception of an external object, and the judgment that it ex- ists. It is true, that where the power of doing any thing exists, the performance of it immediately fol- lows the will to do it immediately; because the Author of our constitution has thus connected voli- tion and agency; but the faculty of the will may ex- ist, and operate, after the power of agency is gone. I judge that I can speak; I will to speak; but the power of doing the thing which I will, was, without my knowledge, previously taken away. In this case my Creator has separated the power of agency from the power of volition. Should I continue, from any derangement of intellect, to think that I coald speak, I might continue to will, without producing the ac- tion of speaking."^ Prof&ssor. How do you know that you have any faculty of efficiency? * Upon the principle, that I may do what I will with my own prg- perty, I have altered a few words in the foregoing extract. N 146 Faculty of Efficiency, Pupil, I am conscious of exerting an agency in consequence of a volition. I am conscious of a vo- luntary efficiency; and this efficiency I judge to be an effect, which must have some cause. I judge too, that the mind which is conscious of a voluntary ef- ficiency must be the cause of this efficiency. But it could not be the cause of this efficiency, without being adequate to it, for it is self-evident, that every effect must have an adequate cause* Now this in the human mind, which renders it adequate, under certain circumstances, to voluntary efficiency, I call the faculty of efficiency in the human mind. That other men have a similar faculty, I believe from their testimony, and mfer from the analogy between their actions and my own. Professor. Have the operations of the facult)' of Efficiency any objects? If they have, what are they? Pupil, An operation of the faculty of efficiency in man, has for its immediate object, either his body, or some of the faculties of his own mind. Any bodily action which we judge we can per- form, we exert ourselves to perform, whenever we will to do it : and we find that most of our bodily organs are excited by our mental efficiency. If I will to open my mouth, my faculty of efficiency so operates upon the muscles of my mouth, through the nerves connected with those muscles, that I ac- tually open ^my^outh. If I will to speak, my fa- culty of doing what I will, so operates upon my mouth, lungs, tongue, larynx, and other organs of speech, that they inhale, expire, and modulate the air expired, in such a naanner as to produce all the Faculty of Efficiency, 147 variety and combinations of articulate sounds, of which vocal language is composed. If I will to walk, my faculty of agency operates upon the nerves connected with the muscles of my legs, in such a manner that the action of walking is produced. In short, any voluntary animal operation which a man performs, is the result immediately of his faculty of agency, and only mediately of his faculty of volition; for the will has the government of the body only through the faculty of agency. Professor, Many of our bodily operations are performed ordinarily without any volition to pro« duce them. The muscular distending and contract- ing of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the winking of our eyelids, the peristaltic motion of the intestines, and breathing, are of this description; hence they are called involuntary animal operations: but although they are generally involuntary, yet we find that the faculty of agency has some ability to reach some of them; and that some of them may be voluntarily performed for a little time. Hence, if I will to cease from breathing for a short time; or to inhale more air than is natural, by breathing oftener than is usual; or ta inhale a greater quan- tity at a time, by a longer inspiration than is com- mon; or to wink at a certain time; I find that my fa- culty of Agency executes my volition. By inhaling more air than is natural too, in any given time, I may voluntarily, if I know this will be the effect, increase the muscular action of the animal heart. By knowing the effect of certain medicines on my system, by experience, or judging of them from 148 Mental Agency on the Body, analogy, I may also, voluntarily, produce changes in the state of my fluids, and even of the solid parts of my body; and thus exert a physical agency upon my own animal frame. The principal concern of our faculties of volition and agency, however, with our body, is to produce such bodily operations as are never performed with- out the exertion of either a voluntary, or an in- stinctive efficiency upon the human frame. We never eat, drink, speak, read, walk, sit, ride, stand, nor labour, in any of the mechanical or fine arts, without the voluntary employment of our faculty of efficiency, upon the requisite bodily organs. Pupil, Can you tell me, Sir, how the mind exerts its efficiency upon the body? Professor, I frankly confess, that I cannot: and moreover I affirm, that no one has ever yet done it. I do not proceed so far as to assert, that no one will ever be able to do it; for it becomes not me to say, to what extent the faculties of the human mind, and the boundaries of human knowledge, may be enlarged. The fact that mind operates on matter we know, but of the mode of operation we cannot conceive. This is no more mysterious or incredible than another fact, that matter operates on matter, in most instances in an inconceivable way. The modus operandi in every chemical process is a mystery. In the animal frame, we have learned, by various experiments, that muscular motion is dependent on the action of the nerves upon the muscles; for if the nerves that lead to any limb are divided, or tied, the muscular motion, that used to result from the Mental Agency on the Body* 149 operation of voluntary efEciency, will no longer take place. The spinal marrow is the great trunk of the inverted tree of nerves, in the human body, of which the brains are the root; and if the spinal mar- row be broken, the limbs of the body supplied with branches of nerves issuing beyond the broken place, will be as incapable of voluntary and instinctive motion, as the limbs of an oak of growth beyond the point of truncation. A dog with a broken back, that drags his hind legs after him, is an illustration of this truth. Cut off the communication between the brains and any part of the nerves growing out of them, and the muscles upon which the truncated nerves are laid, will no longer obey the will, and of course, the bones into which the muscles are inserted, will cease to be moved at volition. Hence it is inferred, that the mind must first act upon the brain, and de- pendent nerves, before the muscles and bones can move according to the exertion of voluntary or in- stinctive mental efficiency. These are facts; but how the nerves act upon the muscles, that is, how one material organ acts upon another; and how the fa- culty of mental efficiency operates on the brain and other nerves, no one has ever shown; nor are we, at present, able to show. It remains one of the se- crets of nature. It is as difficult for us to conceive how the mind acts upon the brain and nerves, as to conceive how it might operate directly on the mus- cles, bones, and blood. It is as impossible for us, at present, to conceive at all of the mode of mental agency upon any part of the body, or of the mind, as to conceive of the essence of the substance of N2 150 Mental Efficiency. matter, of the operation of a chemical solvent, of the nature of the action of the gastric juice, or of the nature of the causation of attraction, cbhesion, and gravitation. Let us not, however, reject the knowledge which we do possess, because we do not know every thing, which we conceive it would be desirable to understand. Let us now inquire concerning the operations of the faculty of Efficiency upon some of the other faculties of the human mind. What can you do in and with your own mind, when you will it? PupiL I find, when I will to be conscious^ and endeavour to do what I will, that an act of con- sciousness immediately follows both the volition and the exertion: but I find also, that if I exert myself to refrain from being conscious, I cannot ej^ect my purpose; so that my faculty of agency cannot stop the operations of consciousness. It has been -pre- viously shown, that for a wise reason, this faculty has not been subjected to Volition, and its executor, Efficiency. Professor, Well, proceed to review our faculties in the order in which we have treated of them. Per- ception is the next. Pupih I often perceive, through my eyes, ears, nose, and organs of tasting and touching, without any voluntary exertion to produce my perceptions: I even perceive frequently in direct opposition to my voluntary exertions, I am conscious, however, that I frequently make exertions to perceive, and that perceptions of such objects as are to be perceived, are immediately 3Iental Efficiency. 151 consequent upon the voluntary employment of my bodily organs. If I will to see my wife, that is in the room, and exert myself to do it, my eyes are turned towards her, and I see her. If I will not to see her, my mental agency closes my eyelids, or turns away my face, and I do not perceive her. I have a similar control over my other sensesj for I can feel, what is to h^felt^ and so on, by a voluntary exertion to do it; and, to a certain extent, I can re- frain from hearing, by stopping my ears; from smell- ing, by holding my nose; from future tasting, by keeping my mouth shut, and free from the thing to be tasted; and from touching many things, by keeping my body free from any contact with them. We are, therefore, in the present world, perci- pients, partly from voluntary exertion, partly with- out it, and partly contrary to it: so that in percep- tion we are subjected only in part to our own self- government. The most effectual way to prevent the perception of any object, which we cannot remove from our senses, is to remove from it; and if we can do neither of these, we may sometimes prevent per- ception by vigorously employing some of our other mental faculties, about some interesting subject. If I sit still, and make no exertion, I smell the offen- sive effluvia of boiling cabbage from the kitchen^ but if I closely apply myself to" any object of con- ception, judgment, conscience, affection, or passion, I do not perceive any thing fetid in the air which I breathe. The faculty of Conception^ or of Understanding, is often acted upon by the faculty of Efficiency. If 152 Voluntary Efficiency, I remember any conception, and will to have a similar mental operation, I find that voluntary ex- ertion will put the faculty of conception in opera- tion, so that I again conceive of the same thing. When I will to employ this faculty in forming imaginations^ without previously conceiving of the mental images which I shall form, I find that vo- luntary exertion vfiW^Mt the imagination to work. In this way all works of imagination are produced. If the faculty of agency did not affect the imagination in this way, no voluntary work of the imagination, such as a novel, or a face which a painter never saw, or a figure such as a statuary never perceived, could ever be the result of design, and intelligent exertion. Again, when I will to employ my faculty of un- derstanding upon any particular subject, and to render my faculty of perception and other faculties subservient to it, my faculty of agency will produce reading, or some other kind of mental employment, in which conception will be principally engaged. Hence, if I will to study a particular subject, my exertion will produce repeated conceptions upon the subject, many of which will, and many will not, assume the form of mental propositions: and thus conception furnishes, as it were, raw materials to the Judgment, Reason, Conscience, and Feeling. Professor. You have spoken oi reading and of study: we must have a definition of these terms be- fore we proceed. PupiU Reading is a complex operation of the mind: and consists of a voluntary perception of cha- racters and words, printed, written, or painted, to- Studying and Revery, 153 gether with an effort to conceive of the meaning of them. Professor. This is a very good description of reading to one's self, without any enunciation of the words; but reading aloud is a still more complex operation; for it implies an agency which is partly voluntary, and partly instinctive, upon the organs of speech, as well as of seeing, and conceiving; so as to produce the actual seeing of characters, that denote things; the conception of the things denoted; and the utterance of the sounds, for which, as well as other things, the characters stand. Pupil. Well, study, I think is the employment of any intellectual faculty upon any subject, in con- sequence of some voluntary exertion to understand that subject. Professor. But what am I doing, if my mind is busily employed in thinking upon various subjects, without any voluntary exertion to limit it to any particular subject? Pupil. You are engaged in a revery; you are thinking, to be sure, but you are not studying. Professor. I fear there is much revery and little studying in the minds of most men. But not to in- dulge ourselves in a revery, proceed in your dis- course upon Efficiency, Pupil. The faculty of fudging, will not imme- diately yield to any mental agency upon it, so as to form a particular judgment correspondent to our will and desires; but if I will to employ my judg- ment about any particular proposition, I can do it^ by a voluntary exertion, until I come to some de« cision upon that subject; or else will to suspend 1 S4f M en tal Efficiency • my judgment upon it; or resolve on some other mental pursuit. I may take a circuitous course of operation on my faculty of judgment, so as to ren- der its decisions conformable to my predominant feelings, by voluntarily considering such concep- tions, arguments, and other judgments, and such only, as are most likely to produce any desired judgment: and in this way, do men commonly per- vert their judgment. Professor, We may exert an efficiency ijidirectly and mediately on our judgment, you mean to say; but not immediately. This is true, especially of our. acquired judgments; but our constitutional judg- ments generally, will not yield to any mental oppug- nation. Hence, it is truly said, we cannot always judge ^s we feel; we cannot always believe as we desire; but that men find no great difficulty in work- ing themselves into a ^^/z^ correspondent with their feelings, on many subjects. In relation to the Memory we may remark, that if we will not to remember^ we cannot cease to re- member at will. Every act of recollection is depen- dent on the operation of the faculty of Efficiency on the Memory. In many instances, however, we exert ourselves to recollect some past mental acts, which we judge we must have had; and are unable to effect the thing which we have willed. Memory, therefore is only partially under the control of our voluntary agency. PupiL The faculty of Reasoning never operates except in consequence of some voluntary efficiency upon it, but the nature of the inference depends on pur conception of the premises, and not at all upon Mental Efficiencij, 15 5 volition or efficiency. In paralogisms^ or instances of false reasonings, a non sequitur as it is called, or a conclusion -which does not result from the pre- mises, may be attached to them, that shall be any thing, which we have previously determined to make it; but since this is not reasoning, but a pre- tence of reasoning, our remark, that an inductive judgment does not depend on any voluntary agency on the reasoning faculty, remains unimpeachable. The subjects of reasoning are determined on by the will, so that we always reason from voluntary exertion, and on voluntarily selected subjects. In preparing and presenting these subjects, by its agency over other faculties, the efficiency has great influence. Our conscience can be acted on by our efficiency, only mediately^ through our Conceptions, Reason- ing, and Judgment. We must change our mental views of a law, of obligation, and of conduct, be- fore we can alter our approbation or disapprobation; and should we desire, and will, most earnestly to approve immediately of what we disapprove, or the reverse, our conscience would not obey our volun- tary exertion. Hence conscience often reproves and condemns us, in spite of our desires and volitions to the contrary. Could we change the dictates of conscience at pleasure, conscience would not be a better guide than feeling, to the path of duty. Con- science may be moulded by the hand of education, and must always operate according to the know- ledge tvhich we have; so that we must exert our agi-r,cy upon something anterior in operation to conscience, before we can reach that moral faculty; 156 Me7ital Efficiency* It is happy for man, that his conscience is thus en- trenched against the will, armed with efficiency, which is very generally subservient to Sensation, Affection, and Passion. We may conceive of any particular Feelings and should we think ourselves capable of producing it, by a voluntary exertion, might will to produce it; but we should find that no act of efficiency upon the heart could immediately produce it. The facul- ty of Feeling is operated upon by the Efficiency of man, only mediately^ -through those mental opera- tions which occasion feeling. Thus, should a man exert himself to produce in himself a particular sen- sation, he could effect his purpose only by his agen- cy on the faculty of perception, to produce such a perception as ordinarily is followed by that sensa- tion. Would he make himself love, hate, hope, fear^ or experience any other emotion, he must, by his agency on his intellectual faculties, excite those thoughts which alone occasion those emotions. We cannot cease to feel, in consequence of any voluntary exertion to cease from feeling; so that the heart of a man is but partially, and that indi- rectly, under the goverment of his will and agency. Professor. Now then, for The Will: what can a man do with his will, if he will? Has he any power of agency over his own volitions? This is the very pith of the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy; but you must treat the subject without the least re- ference to any theological disputation. Pupil, You have taught me to treat this subject philosophically; that is, to exhibit a fair, simple ^ picture of my own consciousness and memory. Mental Efficiency, 157 Well then, I am not conscious that I will, neither do I remember that I ever did will, except in con- sequence of some motive; and hence I conclude, that if my faculty of agency ever operates on my will, it must be indirectly and mediately, by opera- ting on those faculties which furnish and present motives for volition. A volition which I remember that I once had, to determine at a certain future time, in a particular case, in a particular manner, I find may be a motive to that determination, so that a volition remembered, may become a motive to a future volition: but I do not find, from any thing in my own memory, consciousness, or experience, that the recollection of any past, voluntary agency, produces immediately any volition; or that I have any direct efficiency upon my own will. Professor, You may read, if you please, the fol- lowing extracts from the notes on Dr. Reid. I have altered a few words for my own satisfaction, and made some additions. Pupil, " It remains for us to inquire if the power of agency extends to the faculty of the will, so as to regulate its volitions. We think; and when we will to think, the object of our power of agency is an act of thinking. We perform the external uction of writing, and then, the act of writing is the object of agency. We think and write, when we Vv^ ill, be- cause the Supreme Being has connected the power of performing these operations, with the voluntary exertion to perform them. But is volition ever the object of agency? Willing is a mental operation all must allow; and we ask, Is volition the object of voluntary exertionP"^ Do I always, or at any time, O 158 Of Mental Agemij -will to have a certain volition^ and then voluntarily exert myself to produce that volition, so as actually to produce that certain volition? A certain volition always respects some action to be done. If I ivill^ that Inoxv -will resolve to, perform it; I need exert no agency upon my faculty of volition, for / now will to perform it; and I could not will to will its present performance, without actually having alrea- dy the certain volitition to perform the action in question. If I will in future to resolve on the per* formance of some action, when that future time ar- rives, if I remember my previous determination, I shall then will to perform it, from the memory of my former purpose; unless I then have some motive for refusing to determine, as I previously intended to do. In regard to a future, intended volition, therefore, no voluntary exertion will produce it in any other way, than by producing the recollection of a past purpose, as an inducement; and even then the inducement will not prove a motive, if any change in our thoughts or feelings, moves us to the choice of not performing the action, the perform- ance of which we formerly intended to will.* " An apple and an q^% lie before me. I have the opportunity of making my election between them. I have not yet determined which I will take, but I will to determine. Will a determination immediate- ly follow my will to determine, even as the motion of my fingers follows my volition to write? Is choice so connected with an antecedent will to choose, as the voluntary motions of the body with the operations of the will, which relate to them? We apprehend that it is not; for every one, wh^ upon the WilL i58 will examine his own mental operations will find, that after his will to make a choice between the egg and the apple, he must have some motive for his choice of taking one of them. If then he chooses to take one, say the apple, from some motive, and that motive is not the mere volition to deter- mine which he will take, his determ/mation to take the apple is not immediately consequent on anj power of agency exerted on the will, but the im- mediate consequence of that simple or complex mental operation, which constituted the motive. Now that a mere volition to determine which of two things I will take* never was to my mind a motive for the subsequent choice to take one of them in preference to the other, I am certain; for I never was conscious, so far as I remember, of ever choosing from such a motive; nor have I ever known a man who did choose from such a motive. We are conscious of no operation of our efficiency upon the will, which according to a mental constitution produces volitions. We feel pei-suaded, therefore, that no act of the will, follows a determination to pro- duce an act of the will, in the same manner, and for the same reason that bodily motions, or various in- tellectual operations, follow volitions. We will to speak, and speak, because the faculties for doing so, are rendered obedient to the faculties of volition and agency: we will to think upon a particular sub- ject, and thought follows our voluntary effort to think; but if we will to have a choice, a determina- tion, a purpose, or any kind of volition, the future volition which a man should imagine himself able to produccj will not follow, without the intervention 160 Power of Agetiey, of some other mental operation, which shall consti- tute a motive for that particular volition." Professor, Well, to conclude, you have only to decide whether the faculty of Efficiency ever ope* rates on itself Pupil, It never does directly: but indirectly it may,* for one volition may occasion an operation of agency; a pleasant feeling may result from that exf** ertion; the feeling may be a motive for willing to repeat the exertion; and again, the operation of agency may be consequent upon the new volition. In this way any exertion, consequent upon volition, may give rise to a great variety of feelings, and conceptions, each of which, or any combination of them, may serve as a motive for willing some other similar, or different, operation of agency. Professor, It appears, then, that this faculty of agency, under the direction of the will, can operate directly on every part of the body to which there is an uninterrupted communication of nerves,* and either directly or indirectly, upon every faculty of the human mind; even upon itself. How wonder- ful, how simple, and yet how complicated a being is man! To a very great extent he can do what he wills; even in the regulation of his own thoughts, feelings, volitions, and other mental actions. Let him know himself, and if he perseveringly deter- mines it, he may govern himself. CONVERSATION XIV. Consideration of several Attributes of the Soul -which ai-* not inhe- rent.— Of Liberty, Capacity, Power and Necessity.— Of Physical Liberty and Necessity.— Of Moral Liberty, Moral Certainty, and Metaphysical Necessities. Professor, Having taken a survey of the faculties of the human mind, and spoken of its simple opera- tions, it seems necessary that we should converse a little about the attributes of Liberty, Capacity, Power, Necessity, Disposition, Inclination, Habit, Principles of Action, several Complex Operations, and the Improvement and Injury of the original faculties of the soul. PupiU If you please, Sir, I should like to turn interrogator. Professor* It will, perhaps, conduce quite as much to your edification in knowledge to ask ques- tions as to answer them. You may proceed, without being reproached as a Tankee, Pupil, What then is Liberty? Professor, Liberty and freedom are terms that denote the same thing. They express the relative state of the thing concerning which they are pr^^di- cated. They express the state of any thing in rela- tion to some contemplated effectual resistance^ ob- struction^ compulsion^ or necessity^ from some ex- 02 162 Liberty and Necessity. traneous cause. Had we never formed an idea of one of these things, we should never have conceived of liberty^ or freedom; by which we mean a state of exemption from resistance, obstruction, compulsion or necessity. Liberty can with propriety be predi- cated only of beings that are capable of some ope- ration; and of beings destitute of effectual compul- sion, or restraint, from without themselves. A mere animal, for instance, is capable of animal operations, such as walking, running, flying, swim- ming, eatmg, drinking, and sleeping. Now an animal, that is capable of walking, has liberty to walk, when he is not physically obstructed in walking, so as to be absolutely prevented, by some other being. A fish, that has fins, and is alive in the water, has liberty to sxvim^ when it is not physically and effec- tually restrained. A bird has liberty to fty^ so long as it has wings capable of wafting it, and is not physically compelled to desist from using them. Cut off the fins and tail of a fish, and the wings of a fowl; and then the fish has no liberty to swim, the bird no liberty to fly. Leave the fins on a fish, but take it out of the water, and it has no liberty to swim. Leave the wings of a bird on his back, but hold it under the water, in your hand, or thoroughly drench its plumage, and it will have, for the time, no liberty of flying. An animal that is capable of slumbering, and that is not prevetrted from sleeping, by something that disturbs him, has the liberty of sleeping. Man is at liberty to perform any action of which he is capable, when he is not physically and eifectuaily restrained from doing it, by some being Power and Capacity* 163 more powerful than himself. This is a physical liberty of action. To ascertain, therefore, the extent of man's li- berty of action, I must ascertain what actions he is capable of, and how far he is physically prevented from doing them, by some extraneous cause. The idea of restraint, implies some restraining cause or agent. Man is capable of performing those actions which he has power to do, when he has the liberty of doing them. For instance, when a man has all his limbs in a healthful state, wills to walk, and finds the faculty of agency on his muscles obedient to his will, he has the power of walking, if he is not phy- sically prevented from walking, by some cause with- out him '.t If. We say, therefore, that he is capable of walking, or has a capacity for walking, under such circumstances, when nothing but liberty is wanting to constitute the perfect /?0Tt;er of walking. Pupil, So that a man may have a capacity for v/alking, when he has no power of walking, because he wants liberty to complete his power of walking. Professor, I hold my little son by the legs: my arms are more powerful than his legs: he wills to walk, but he has not the power of walking, because I hold him fast. He has not the liberty of walking; but he has a capacity for walking. Had he liberty he would have the power, for nothing but liberty is, by the supposition, wanting to constitute his power of walking. Now a man has liberty to perform all those ac- tions, of which he is capable, when no physical re- straint is exerted upon him by some extraneous 164 Power and Liberty, cause. If any physical restraint is exerted upon him by any extraneous cause, to force him not to do, any action for which he has a capacity, he is not at li- berty to perform the contemplated action. Pupil, It seems to be requisite, I think, to as- certain wh'dt poTJuei's a man has, in order to a correcft understanding of the liberty with which he is en- dowed. Pray, Sir, what constitutes the power and the liberty of perception? Professor. Each kind of perception requires dis- tinct things to constitute the power of that parti- cular perception. The general description, which I give of Power to perform any operation, is this, that it includes every thing essential to the actual production of that operation. Of course, the exist- ence of a faculty or of faculties for doing any thing, is always included in any particular power of action. Liberty of action is another thing included, for where there is no physical liberty to perform the action, there is no power of performing it. Pupil, You speak, I perceive, exclusively of the liberty of action. Would you distinguish it from the liberty of not acting? Professor. Liberty not to perform any particular action is the exemption of any agent from compulsion to do, or the physical necessity of doing, an action. Liberty to perform an action may be called, for the sake of distinction, positive liberty; and liberty not to perform an action, negative liberty. Exemption of an agent from compulsion to do, or not to do an action, is the prominent idea included under the term of liberty^ whtther it be positive or negative. Pupil, That a n^an may have liberty to perform Liberty and Power, 165 an action, is it necessary that he should have, at the same time, liberty not to perform it? Professor. Negative liberty is essential to positive liberty. A man cannot be compelled not to do an action, and yet have liberty at the same time to perform it; nor can he be compelled to do it, and yet have liberty not to perform it. He cannot, there- fore, have physical liberty to do an action, and yet be under the physical necessity of not doing it: nor can he have the liberty of not doing it, and yet, be under the necessity of doing it; so that if he has positive liberty to do an action, he must not be under the necessity of not doing it, which is the same thing as to say he must have the negative li- berty of not doing it. Pupil. Well, Sir, is it essential to the power of performing an action^ that we should have the power of not performing it? Professor. It is not; for this would imply the ne- cessity of the co-existence of two directly contrary powers, to constitute a single power. In many in- stances the power to perform a mental operation implies something which would render the exist- ence of a power of not performing the same opera- tion, an impossibility. This" will appear from the description of different powers. Pupil. I am constrained to interrupt you again, for I wish to know whether the power and the liberty respectively, of doing any action, implies the power, and the liberty of performing a directly contrary action. Professor, Certainly not, for every distinct action must hjvye its proper power and liberty. To walk 166 Fower of Perception, one way, and to walk in a directly contrary way, are two opposite actions. Now a power to walk one Way, since it is a voluntary action, may imply, among other things, a volition to walk in that par- ticular way; and the motive for willing to walk in that particular way, may be the very motive for willing not to walk in the opposite way; so that the fower to walk in one way may exist, when I have no power to walk in the opposite way. Again, one way may be open to me, and the other may be ef- fectually obstructed; so that I have liberty to walk in one way, and not in the opposite. It is to be re- marked, that walking in one w^aj^, and not walking in that one v/ay, are not opposite actions* Not doing is the mere negation of action. The converse of a proposition in which an action is predicated, is not a proposition in which a directly opposite action is predicated, but one in which the non-entity of the action is affirmed. For instance, I walk southxvard is not the converse of I walk northward; but I walk not southward^ is the converse of the first statement; and 1 walk not northward^ of the second. A nega- tive particle introduced in any proposition, in the right place, will make it the converse of what it was. I may have power and liberty to walk, when I have not to sit; or to stand still, when I have not to walk; or to will one action, when I have not the power and liberty to luill a contrary action. Pupil. You was going to describe the power of perception, before I interrupted you. What, Sir, is the power of seeing? Professor, The power of seeing includes the fa- culty of perception, the existence of a sound eye in Power of Perception, 167 its proper place, and of light; the transmission of rays of light from an object of vision to the eye, and the exemption of the other faculties of the mind from such intense employment, as prevents perception, together with the liberty of seeing. If all thtse things, but the last, should conspire to pro- duce the power of seeing, and some one more pow- erful than ourselves should exert a physical agency on our faculty of perception, so as to prevent our seeing, we should not have the power of seeing. The liberty of seeing, however, when all the other things named conspire to produce the power of vision, cannot be taken away, so far as we know, by any other being than our Maker. By the eye in its proper place I intend, in its due connexion with the optic nerve and brain. If light be absent, or if no eye exist in its proper place, or if there be no faculty of perception, or no object of vision; or if the mind be wholly occupied with the mental ope- rations, there is no power of seeing, in a sound man, when awake, and under the ordinary opera- tion of the laws of our mental nature. To constitute the poxvcr of hearings the faculty of perception, a sound ear in its proper place, the vibrations of air upon the tympanum of the ear, a state of mind in which other things do not intensely occupy it, and the liberty of hearing, are essential. The power of tasting mcludes the existence of liberty to taste, a faculty for tasting, the organs of tasting in a proper state; and the contact of some- thing vo be tasted with those organs. Thvi power of smelling is constituted by the ex- istence of the faculty of perception, the nasal organs 168 Different Powers* in a proper state, the liberty of smelling, and th& contact of some effluvia of the object to be smelt with those organs. The power of touching includes the liberty, the faculty, and the organs of touching in a proper state; together with the contact of something with those organs, to be touched. The nerves spread over the whole body, in a proper state, may be considered as the essential part of the bodily organs by which we perceive in these five different ways. Pup'iU I am impatient to hear your account of the power of performing the other simple mental operations. Professor* The existence of the faculty of Con- sciousness, and of some previous mental operation, of which to be conscious, together with the liberty of being conscious, constitute the power of con* sciousness. The existence of the faculty of Understanding or Conception, together with liberty of operation, con- stitute the power of understanding, PupiL Is not the previous existence of an opera- tion of consciousness, perception, memory, judgment, reasoning, conscience, volition, feeling, and agency, requisite to constitute the power of conceiving of each of these things? Professor, Why did you not add, " and of con- ception?" Pupil, Because I clearly understood, that it would be absurd to suppose, that an operation of conception was essential to constitute the power of conception, for that would be supposing an opera- Different Powers, 169 tion of conception must have existed before there was any power to perform it. Professor. You are correct. It seems, then, that we may have power to conceive of an operation be- fore we actually perform that operation. Conception is an instance of this kind. Now then I ask, what should prevent me from conceiving of an act of me- mory, had I the faculty of conception, without the faculty of memory? Pupil, I know not that you would be prevented from doing it; and so you might do it, if you had poxver. That you would not have the power, I can- not affirm; for I conceive of an angel, of Satan, of a mountain of salt, and of a man as tall as a steeple, without ever having perceived, or ever before, per- haps, conceived of such things. Professor, It is true, that we more readily con- ceive of such mental operations as we have had, than of any which we have not performed; vet I cannot ascertain, that the actual experiencing of anv operation is essential to the power of conceiving of them. Conception, as we have already shown, is a sort of creative, inventive, originating faculty of the human mind. Pupil. V^ hat is the power of judging? Professor, A conception of the meaning of a pro- position, together with the faculty and the liberty of judging, constitute the power of judging consti- tutionally. Volition and attention are requisite in addition, to constitute the power of forming ac- quired judgm en ts. The power of reasoning comprehends the pre- vious conception of at least two propositions, two P 170 Dtffereyit Powers, judgments, together with the liberty and faculty of inferring from them a third, of which he conceives. The power of memory includes the faculty and liberty of memory, together with the previous ex- istence of some other mental act to be remembered. The power of recollection consists of the faculty and liberty of memory, the previous existence of some act to be recollected, a volition to recollect, and voluntary agency on the memory to produce recollection. The power of conscience includes the faculty of conscience, liberty to exercise it, and some previous judgment concerning a law, obligation, and the con- formity or non-conformity of some action to that law and obligation. Of the seven powers appertaining to the ^even faculties of The Understandings it may be well here to remark, that God alone has the power of absolutely depriving us of the liherty of thinking. We may partially impair our own liberty of think- ing; and men may in some instances deprive others of the liberty of employing some of their intellectual faculties for a little while; but him whom God has made free to think, not all the tyrants in the world ean compel not to think. The power of feeling includes the liberty and faculty of feelmg, together with some previous thought which is the occasion of feeling. I'he power of volition includes the faculty and li- berty of volition, together with the conception of some action deemed practicable to be resolved on, and the apprehension of some motive for willing the performance of it. Liberty and Necessity, 171 The power of agency includes a volition to per- form some action, together with the faculty and li- berty of exertion in obedience to the will. These are the POWERS of man to perform simple operations of the mind. To describe the dif- ferent powers of complex operations, would re- quire too much time. Only keep in mind, that poxver always includes every thing essential to the performance of an operation, and you will generally satisfy yourself, so far as you have knowledge of causes and effects, what constitutes the power of performing any action. Fupil. Are there not many kinds of liberty and necessity of which you have said nothing? Professor. A law which does not forbid any ac- tion is said to give liberty to perform it; because the law presents no legal obstruction to it. A person too, is said to give liberty to do any action which he determines not to use any exertions to prevent from being done. If a law authorizes any action, it may be said to give moral or legal liberty for its performance. Oi physical necessity nothing more need be said. There is a metaphysical necessity^ that two and two should amount to neither more nor less than four; that a square should not be a circle; that the same thing should not exist and yet exist at the same time; that a proposition should be either true or false, and not both in the same sense; and that a being of in- finite knowledge and perfect truth should not lie. Many similar things are metaphysically necessary; ajjd to a metaphysical necessity, or a necessity re- 1 7% €ertainty. suiting from the nature of the things which exist, there is no opposing liberty. Moral certainty^ or any thing which is absolutely certain in moral operations^ has been called, some- times moral and sometimes metaphysical necessity^ but v/e think very improperly. When people mean moral certainty they should say so; and not con- found the certain futurition of a moral action with necessity. Some things, moreover, which have been called moral necessities^ are absolutely physical necessities. It is said, for instance, to be morally necessary^ that every volition should be consequent upon some mo- tive; whereas this is a physical necessity^ resulting from the very nature of volition, and the natural constitution of the human mind. It is not only mo- rally certain that there will be no volition without some motive; but it \s physically impossible^ during the continuance of the present mental 7iature of man, that there would be any act of the will with- out some motive, in a sane mind. CONVERSATION XV. Disposition of Mind. — Inclination. — Habit. — Imitation. — Consideration of sereral Principles of Human Actions. — Principles of Substances, Sciences, Actions, and Moral Actions. — Sentiments, Instinct. — In- stinctive, Animal, and Mechanical Operations. Pupil, What do you mean by Disposition of mind? Professor. It is the name of any relative state of the mental faculties, I have a mental disposition to learn, if my mind is in such a state as is conducive to the acquisition of knowledge. For instance if my faculties are in such a state relative to learning, that I conceive of the importance of learning, desire to learn, judge it best to learn, and will to pay the re- quisite attention, that I may learn, I have a dispo- sition to learn. Pupil, You derive the word, I presume, from iispono^ or dispositum^ a placing in order ^ and use it always in the strict sense. Professor, I do: and I assure you, I never found a man who could tell me what he did mean by dis*- position^ that attempted to give any other definition of the term. It surely is not the name of any one feeling, or of any other single operation of mind. We hear much of a disposition to believe. It is a very important one, if we mean by it such a state V 2 ' 174) Disposition* Inclination* of the mental faculties relative to testimony, as is likely to ensure assent to the truth of credible and valuable testimony. If a man judges that a speaker is a person of veracity, and has interesting truth to communicate, and at the same time desires to hear his testimony, he has a disposition to believe. On the other hand, if a man doubts the veracity of a testifier, or hates his person, or judges that he has nothing of importance to communicate, he is dis- posed not to believe, A right mental disposition in relation to any m.ental operation to be performed, is as essential a& the right disposition of the eye and of light in rela- tion to the seeing of any object; or the right dis- position of a cannon, to carry a point blank shot through a target. PupzL What do you mean by a mental Inclina- iioni^ Professor, Mental inclination is such a disposi- tion of mind as presents many inducements to any specified voluntary action. It is figurative language, derived from the inclination or bending forward of the body towards any object. If a man says he has an inclination to go to the theatre to-night, his meaning is, that he has several inducements to will the operation of going, but has not quite determined to go. If he has willed to go; he says, I have deter- mined, resolved, purposed, intended or willed to go to the theatre to-night; but if he has not actually v/illed, yet thinks himself almost ready to do it, from the inducements which he at present has, he asserts that he is inclined, or has an iiiclitiation to go. A man is always inclined to do that, for willing Mental Habits. 175 to do which he apprehends many powerful induce- mentsj but he always wills to do that, for doing which his inducements constitute a motive. Pupil. Hence I am inclined to do many things, which I have not, upon the whole, motives for re- solving to do. I have been inclined to visit the theatre, but never willed to do it; and so was never there. Professor.' Yes; and it is owing to your mental disposition that you apprehend any inducements^ and that you are not actually moved^ to mental deter- mination^ and activity^ in relation to those actions. Pupil. What should I mean when I speak of mental Habits? Professor. Mental habit is any such disposition of mind in relation to any kind of action, which we have often rtrpeated, as renders the repetition of it easy, and common. Habit is something acquired, and when confirmed, more strongly resembles a mental faculty than any other attribute of the soul. Hence it is frequently called a second nature. The habit of imitation is one of the earliest which we form. PupiL Are there any general laws concerning habit? Professor, It is a law of our nature, that the frequent repetition of any action, shall render the performance ©f that action easy; and commonly present a motive for future repetitions of it. Pupil, Of course, it is a law of our nature, that the frequent performance of a particular kind of ac- tion, shall produce a habit of action. Professor* It is another law of our nature, that 176 Principles of Action. not very ardent, but moderately agreeable feelings shall result from habitual actions: and another, that a habit, once formed, shall be difficult to resist and eradicate; but may be destroyed by the formation of a contrary habit. Pupil. Can you classify the habits of man? Professor, Not easily; for any action of which he is capable, by being often repeated, may become the germ of a habit, lasting as life. Man forms habits of thinking, feeling, choice, and efficiency. He has habits of speaking, writing, dressing, eat- ing, drinking, sleeping, amusement, idleness, study, and labour. But one thing I would have you re- member, that it is of unspeakable importance to form amiable and healthful habits of body, and vir- tuous, studious, systematic habits of soul: for so powerful is habit, that it may enable the animal frame to resist that poison which would have occa- sioned death before the habit of using it was form- ed; and the mind, to take unceasing satisfaction in unremitting, intellectual, and benevolent pursuits. PupiL We have heard much about principles y and principles of action. I would thank you to re- peat to me, what you have formerly said on this subject, that your views may be more thoroughly impressed on my mind. Professor. A principle^ is the beginning, the ori- gin, the foundation of any thing. It is derived from the Latin wprd principium. When you trace a science to the axioms on which it is founded, you trace it to its first principles. The first principles of any complex substance, are those simple substances of which it is compounded or constituted. Hence, Principles of Action. 177 flour, yeast, water, and salt may be called the com- ponent principles of bread; and the ten mental fa- culties which have been named, the component principles of the human mind. If we inquire into the origin of human operation, and ascertain what it is that occasions or produces any operation, we ascertain the principle of that operation. Hence the soul itself may be denomi- nated 2L principle of thought, of feeling', of volition, and of agency. It is very frequently called an ac- tive principle^ because it has the power of beginning and continuing various kinds of operations. The principle of any particular action is that which, figuratively speaking, lies at the foundation of it, and supports it. Hence every faculty may be called the first principle of its own operations. Be- sides these first principles of action, those antece- dent operations upon which any subsequent action depends, are called the principles of that action. Hence a motive is the principle of a volition. If you ask, upon what principle a man willed a certain action, you inquire what motive induced him to will it. , Any thing that is very generally among mankind, a motive for willing any particular kind of opera- tion, is called a general^ or common principle of action. Hence huyiger^ because it moves all men to seek and receive food, is called a common principle of action. Each of the natural appetites has the same distinction. Habit is an acquired principle of action, because it furnishes a standing motive to every one who forms it, for choosing to act in a particular way. 1 78 Sentiments, Mankind are so universally influenced in their volitions, and voluntary exertions, by the desire of wealth, power, society, health, life, happiness, and the approbation of those whom they esteem, that the desire and love of each of these things is styled si e^mmon principle of action. These desires are na- tural to all men in their present state. Hence we say, that a man is governed in his conduct by one, or the other, or all of these principles of action, in all the common concerns of life; unless he is ha- bitually moved by a superior, acquired principle of action, called the sense of duty • Feeling and Conscience, as we have already seen, frequently furnish motives for our conduct, and therefore may be called principles of action; and even common principles. The common principle of voluntary efficiency^ is volition; for a man exerts himself upon this princi- ple, that he xvill to do it. Pupil. Is not sentiment a very general principle of action? Professor, By sentiment I design to denote any such judgment as ordinarily operates as a motive to volition. I answer, therefore, that sentiment is a very common principle of human action. Pupil. Many of our constitutional judgments I should think, then, might be called sentiments; for t\it judgments^ that the things which we perceive, really exist, and that they are such as we perceive them, are principles of action to all men. Professor. You are undoubtedly correct. It is another comnum principle of action with men, that every operation of mind of which they are conscious^ Moral Principles. 179 #r which they remember, has really been performed by themselves. Our judgments, concerning our own mental identity, the intelligence of the persons with whom we converse, the credibility of testimony; and in short, all other permanent judgments, whether constitutional or acquired, which commonly move men to will a course of conduct conformable to those judgments, are principles of action. One of our most commonly operative sentiments in relation to our voluntary agency upon material objects is this, " That in the phenomena of nature, what is to be, vv'ill probably be like to what has been in similar circumstances."* PupiL What is a moral principlef Professor, Any thing which lies at the foundation of a moral law, obligation, or action. Pupil. I designed to inquire, particularly, about the principles of moral actions* Professor, When you have ascertained what is a moral action., you will then find no difficulty in ascertaming what is the principle of any particular moral action. For instance, if every volition is a moral operation, then every motive is a moral prin- ciple; and the faculty of volition is an inherent mO' ral principle. If every operation of conscience is a moral action, then the faculty of conscience is a moral principle of action; and Q^ch. judgment in de- pendence on which conscience operates, is a moral prmciple of conscience. If no operation of man is a moral action, but some operation of voluntary ef- * Dr. Reid, 1 80 3Ioral Agency. fidency^ then the faculty of agency is a moral prin- ciple, the volitions on which our operations of agen- cy depend, are moral principles of agency; and the motives on which these volitions depend, are ulte- rior moral principles of agency. Pupil. You speak hypothetically. I should be obliged to you for a definition of a moral action. Professor, I will offer a few general remarks on this subject; but must refer you for full satisfaction to the science of theology. Any law given for the regulation of the actions of an intellectual^ sensitive^ voluntary efficient^ or agenty is a moral lazu. All other laws are called physical. Any action -ivhtch is required or forbidden by a moral law, is a moral action., in contradistinction to a physical action, or operation. Pupil. Moral laws and moral actions, of course, may be either good or bad, right or wrong. Professor, Yes; for every law which a ruler gives his subjects; a master, his servant; a parent, his child; a teacher, his pupil; or the Creator, his intel- lectual, voluntary, efficient creature, is a moral law; and every act of disobedience, as well as of obe- dience, is a moral action. Pupil, In some sense, it appe irs to me, that a moral action may be a very immoral one; and a mora/ law, an im7noralUw, Am I right? Professor, Perfectly: for one mor d law of one being, may be contrary to the moral law of another being. A parent, for example, may require his child to steal; and God requires the same child not to steal. Now conformity to any moral law is Moral Agency, 181 3®metimes cdled moral, in contradistinction to non- conformity, which is popularly denoted humoral, or vicious. Moral, therefore, has two senses; one of which is opposed to physical, and the other to im- moral. That moral lazu of any being which is con- trary to the moral, law of th6 Creator, is an immo- ral or vicious law: and that moral conduct which is required by a moral law of man, but which is contrary to the moral law of God, is immoral con- duct. When we enquire, what is a moral action? we use the word moral in opposition to physical. It is in this sense, that I have said, that any action required or forbidden by a moral law, is a moral action. Pupil, From what you have already said, I should infer, that a 7noral sentiment^ is any such judgment on any moral subject, as is commonly a motive to a particular kind of moral actions. Professor, We accord in judgment; and let me add, it is happy for mankind that all of their 'diZ- quired Judgme7its are not senti?nents; for then, every man's moral actions would be as unreasonable as his opinions are erroneous. Pupil. What do you call Instinct?^ Professor. An a7ii?nal principle of action; and so called, because it appertains to all animals; and ex- cites them to many actions. * "Instinctive actions," says Lord Karnes, " cannot be said to have a motive, because they are not (?one with any view to consequeuces."— Elem&nts of Criticism j vol. i. p. 46. Q 182 Human Instinct, Pupil, What is this Instinct? Is it a faculty, or a disposition? Professor, Instinct in man is such a disposition of the faculties of perception and agency in relation to each other^ as produces instantly certain actions, without any conception of them, or volition concern- ing them. Pupil. Will you h^ve the kindness to illustrate your definition? Professor. In a child, the perception which it has through the stomach and organs of tasting, in consequence of the operation of the gastric juice on the coats of the stomach, in the absence of food, is immediately followed by an operation of the fa- culty of agency on the lips, tongue, and throat, which produces the act ot sucking. The child has no conception of the action, nor of the utility of it; nor of its ability to perform it; neither does it will to perform it, from any motive whatever. It sucks, instinctively. The author of our nature has disposed the faculties of perception and agency in such a manner, that the child exerts its power of agency in sucking, immediately in consequence of certam perceptions, so that if the child had no other faculties of mind than these two, it would be able to suck. The perception which is followed by suck- ing, is commonly called the sense of hunger. Pupil, Sucking then is an operation performed by instinct. What other operations, do mankind perform from this disposition? Professor. It is to be remarked, that men fre- quently perform those actions from volition, which are ordinarily performed from instinct. With this Instinctive Operations, 183 understanding, I denominate sw.allowtng^ wiriking^ sucking^ shrinking^ laughing^ crying^ weepings sigh- ing^ starting^ and all those actions performed by our bodily members for self defence^ or self-preser- vation^ when they are performed without volition to perform them, instinctive operations. None of these are performed, except in consequence of some perception; and they are frequently performed with- out any intention. Hence instinct is the principle of these operations. PupiL I think Dr. Reid represents breathings and the contraction and relaxation of the muscles^ in all VOLUNTARY, bodHy actions^ to be instinctive ac- tions. Professor* I think him incorrect in this; for breathings when involuntary, as it generally is, re- sults not from perception of any kind; but from the mechanical construction of the chest, lungs, and windpipe of the human frame; and the chemical affinity of the blood in the living animal, for a por- tion of the atmospheric air, called oxygen gas, to- gether with its want of affinity for the other portion, called azotic gas. Hence I have known the dead body of a man to breathe, from pulling down the diaphragm, so as to produce a vacuum favourable to the distension of the lungs. This case of unnatu- ral breathing was purely a mechanical operation, without any chemical influence. The action of the muscles in voluntary opera- tions is the effect of our mental efficiency upon them; and although we know not the mode in which our mental effi Jen<:y affects our nerves and muscles, yet we know the fact, that upon volition, the mind 184 Muscular Motion. does exert an agency upon every moveable part of the body. This is something widely different from instinct. The muscles are so connected with the mechanical structure of our bones, and with one another, arranged like loops and puUies, that the contraction or distention of certain muscles being effected, through the agency of the mind, by the medium of the nerves, the bones are moved me- chanically. Muscular 7notion, therefore, when the result of volition, is no more instinctive, than ner- vous influence, whatever that may be; and breathing is no more instinctive than the circulation of the blood, or the muscular distention and contraction of the material heart. Some of our involuntart/ mus- cular 7notions^ however, are instinctive; as in the case of sucking. Breathing is partly a mechanical operation, and partly the result of what is usually called the vi- tality of the blood. The principles of breathing are the mechanical structure of the organs employed , in it, and animal life: and the principles of muscular motions are the mechanical structure of the mus- cles, the influence of the nerves, and the action of our mental efficiency upon them. Sleeping, involuntary natural breathing, the cir- culation of the blood, and the motions of the heart, are all dependent on animal life. The motions of the bones, are dependent on mechanical structures and muscular operation: and the growth of the bones, nails, hair, and indeed of every nerve, mus- cle, sinew, and portion of the human frame, upon vegetable life. As the plants of the earth grow from food supplied to them by the earth, air, light. Growth of the Body, 185 and heatj so the parts of the human body are fed by the blood; and the blood by the aliments suited to the nature of the vital fluid. We thrive and grow, not from volition, not from instinct, not from mechanical principles, but from the principles of vegetation. As so many capillary tubes in plants convey the sap to every vegetating portion, so the lacteal vessels take up the chyle prepared for them, and convey it to the thoracic duct, which pours the new stream of life into the aorta and heart. From this great reservoir, the arteries take it to every in- creasing particle of the human frame. Q CONVERSATION XVI. Several Complex Operations of Man considered. — Attention, Obser- vation, Reflection, Inquiry, Investigation, Consideration, Contem- plation, Meditation, Comparison, Association, and Abstraction.— Compounding not a Mental Operation, unless it be a name givea to several successive Conceptions. Pupil. Will you describe some of the principal complex operations of man? Professor, Of several actions which are partly mechanical, partly animal, and partly mental, such as voluntary walking, eating, drinking, writing, reading aloud, speaking and the like, we have al- ready said enough. Dancing, playing on instruments of music, riding, fighting, and the practice of every domestic, ornamental, mechanical, or other art, is a complex operation, Pupih I desire particularly a knowledge of com- plex mental operations. Professor. Some of the most important complex mental operations, which are described by a single term in our language, are the following, viz: I. Attention. This is a voluntary effort to con- fine some one or more of our intellectual faculties to some particular object, or objects, for the pur- pose of knowing or perceiving something, which we judge may be known or perceived. Attention Complex Mental Operations. I8i^ always implies a judgment tiiat by attention some- thing may be perceived or known; together with a volition^ and a consequent exertion of the faculty of agency upon some other faculty; to keep it in a state favourable to its appropriate operation; so that at least three simple operations are always denoted by the term attention* Let perception be the object of attention^ for an example. Attention will then include a judgment, that something may be either seen, touched, heard, smelt, or tasted; a volition to exert our faculties to perceive what may present itself to our perception; and an actual agency upon that faculty, so as to hear any sound that may reach the ear, or to see any object exhibited to the eye, or to smell, taste, or touch such things as may come in contact with the organs of these senses. Let me speak to a man who appears not to hear what I say; or if he hears, not to be employing his Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, Conscience, or Memory, about my statements; and I will say, at- tend to me. If he then judges, that I have some- thing to utter, and voluntarily exerts himself to hear me, and apprehend my meaning, he performs the complex mental operation of attention, IL Observation. Attention to any object of perception, is the complex mental operation called observation. Of course it includes as many simple operations as attention. Hence, a statement of any thing which we have attentively perceived, is an observation, III. Reflection, is another complex mental act, which consists in a man's attention to his own 188 Complex Operations, mental operations. If he judges that he may know what is transacted in his own mind, and voluntarily exerts himself to remember, be conscious or con- ceive of; or judge, reason, or exercise his conscience about any of his own thoughts, feelings, volitions, or exertions, he is the subject of oriental reflection. It most commonly denotes the turning again of the attention of the mind to itself, and its own conscious operations. IV. Inquirt, is a voluntary exertion of the mind upon its faculties of conception and judgment, for the purpose of framing propositions in the form of questions. You exemplify this complex operation whenever your mind creates any interrogation which you put to me. V. Investigation, is the institution of an in- quiry into any subjeci, from the desire or the de- termination to form some judgment concerning it. VI. Consideration, is a voluntary, and for some time continued thinking of some operation, or con- duct, in regard to its consequences, or other rela- tions. Of course, consideration implies attention to at least two things; namely, some operation and its consequences, or other relations. VII. Contemplation, is a voluntary, general, and serious consideration, of a number of objects in their various relations to one another. VIII. Meditation, is the consideration of any object with a design to form some plan of future conduct, or to be prepared for some future event. IX. Comparison, implies the conception of at least two things, and of some relative judgment concerning them. Hence if I compare one apple Complex Operations* 189 with another, I conceive of each, and of the mean- ing of the thing which I predicate, at least in my €>wn mind, in relation to them. I say, for instance, this apple, of which I conceive, is like or unlzke that, or is larger, or smaller, or better, or worse, than that, of which I also conceive. Something of this nature enters into every mental operation of comparing; so that there is no comparison without a conception of each of the things compared, a con- ception of the thing mentally predicated in relation to them, and a relative judgment. X. Association or Classification, is a com- plex mental operation, which includes the compa- rison of a plurality of objects, and a determination to arrange, and label them, according to our judg- ment of their resemblance, or dissimilitude.^ Cast into my lap twenty things, and bid me asso- ciate, or classify them. I will perform the operation thus. First, I perceive each one of them, in one or more ways, for I see them all; I handle them all. * " To form a class of certain objects, is nothing else but to give the same name to all those which we judge to be similar; and "when out of this class we form two or more, we still do nothing else but choose new names . to distinguish objects which we judge to be different. It is by this artifice alone we reduce our ideas to order, and this artifice accomplishes nothing more; we must add, that it can do nothing but this. Indeed we should be grossly mistaken, if we imagined that there are in nature species and genera, because there are species and ge- nera in our manner of conceiving. General names are properly the names of no existing [[external] thing; they only express the views of the mind, when we consider things under relations of resemblance or difference. There is no tree in general, no apple-tree in general, no pear-tree in general; there are only individuals; therefore there are neither species nor genera in nature." — Condillac. 190 Association, Then I compare each one of the twenty with every other one of the remaining number. I perceive that five of them have one colour, which I call red; and, in the operation of comparing, judge that they are like each other, and unlike the other fifteen in this respect. I call them, therefore, red things; because thing denotes any object of knowledge, and is the noDst general term in our language. On comparison^ in like manner, Ijudge^ that five others out of these twenty are blacky five white, and five green, I have of course, by comparing these twenty things to- gether, in relation to their colour, and forming judgments concerning them, in consequence of per- ceptions through the eye, divided them into four companies, or classes, which I distinguish as classes of red, black, white, and green things. Now I have performed one work of association: but I attend to the things still, and make another classification. I grasp each thing of the twenty in the palm of my hand; and from the perception of touch, compare each, in order, with every other thing, and judge, that ten of them are in shape like each other, and the other ten like each other, but unlike the first ten. I give a particular name to each shape, for the sake of distinction, and so call the one round, and the other cubic. Hence I have two classes of things; namely, cubic and round things. On further com- parison, I judge them all alike in several of their attributes, of a different nature from their colour and shape. They are all elastic, of similar consistency, and I saw them all cut out of the tusk of an ele- phant. I give a name, therefore, to denote this si- milarity of the things in several attributes, and call Association. 191 tliem all ivory. Hence, should I compare them with other objects around me, that want elasticity, and other attributes which belong to these twenty things, I should say, these are ivory things^ ten of which are round^ and the other ten^ cubic in shape,* and five of them are in colour red^ five blacky five zdhite^ and ^ve g-reen. In this way we classify or associate all objects of our conception. By this complex operation men have divided all things into uncreated and created things; into substances and attributes; and all sub- stances into mind and matter, PupiL And is this that association of ideas of which we hear and read much that is unintelligible?* Professor* An idea you know is nothing but a conception; and all the things of which we conceive we class in various ways, in consequence of compar- mg them. An association of ideas^ is nothing more than an association or classification of conceptions. Now our conceptions will admit of as many classes as there are kinds of things of which we conceive. We have of course conceptions of substances, attri- * " The object which we name a tree, a child will call a tree after Bs, the very first tree which we shall show it; and this name will be for it the name of an individual. However, if it be shown another tree it will not wait to ask its name: it will call it a tree, and render this name common to two individuals. It will in the same way render it common to three, to four, and at last to all the plants which will ap- pear to it 4.0 bear some resemblance of the first trees it had seen. It is naturally induced to generalize, because it is more convenieut t» use a name which it knows, that to learn a new one. It generalizes, therefore, without having formed a design of generalizing; nay, without remarking that it generalizes."— . Co7ic/?Ytoc. 192 A Train of Thought. butes, mind, matter, operations, faculties, relations^ dispositions, and the like. PvpiL Are all our classifications acquired? Professor. Every one of them. Classification is a voluntary operation. Pup'iL Of what great use is association of things? Professor* Should men never classify objects of thought, they could speak of individual things only. Besides, association greatly assists our memory. It is a law of mental operation, that the memory of any thought of a single object should greatly facilitate our recollection of other things, which we have at any former time classed with it. It is even a law of our mental nature, that mental operations which have been classified merely by a conception of, and judgment concerning, the time of their existence, should be easily remembered. Hence, if we can only recollect one mental operation, per- formed at a certain time, we can often readily recol- lect many operations, that very speedily followed it. This is recalling what is called a train of thought. Pupil But why should the thought of one object in a class, or of one idea in a train, bring up a multi- tude of other objects, in the same class, or ideas that were in the mind at, or near, the same. time? Professor. I can assign no other reason, why these things should be, than this, that God has so con- stituted our minds that these things are actually ex- perienced by mankind in general. We find these to be laws of our mental nature; that a train of thought, which has once passed through our minds, if volun- tarily or involuntarily commenced again, is easily re- traced; that we perform any mental operation, and Abstraction, 193 train of operations, more and more easily, and rapidly, in proportion to the number of times, in which we have repeated them; and that the memory of one thing shall frequently occasion the memory of a number of other things, with which it was as- sociated by some work of our own minds, or to which it was related by some apprehended circum- stances. These are laws of memory as well as of as- sociation. Pupil. There is another very important complex mental operation of man which you have not named. Professor* Abstraction, is the Xlth complex mental operation, of which I designed to speak. It is intimately connected with classification; and without it we should never have any abstract terms, or general zvords^ so that language would consist of nouns, exclusively; and of such nouns only as de- note individual things. Pupil, Well, Sir, what is abstraction?^ Professor, It is a mental process, which includes the comparison and classification of individual things, together with a judgment, that all the things of each class are alike, at least in some respect; and a de- termination to employ one name to denote any one, and every one, of the individuals of that class, so far as we judge it to be like the rest, without re- * "There is no man in general. — Abstract ideas are therefore no- thing bal-<1enominatiofiS. if we really imaginff! any thitigel.se in ihf^m, we should reseoable a painter who should obstinately be beiit ou \^■^\<^t• ing man in general, and who, it is obvious, can never paint but indivi- duals."— CondUlac. R 194 Abstracti07u garding the things in which it may differ from them.* I will refer to an example just given. Hav- ing classified the twenty things cast into my lap, by comparing them, and judging them, I will to use a name that shall designate any one of the ten, that is judged to be of a similar shape, without any present regard to colour, elasticity, or any thing else but shape; and I invent, or adopt, the word ball. Of each and every one of the round things thus classi- fied, I say, this is a ball. Subsequently, if I com- pare any other object with any one of these ten balls, and resolve not to attend for the present to any thing appertaining to them but their shape, I shall judge, that the other object is like, or unlike, each of the balls in shape. If I judge it, upon com- parison, to be like them, in this one respect of shape, I shall say, " this is a ball too." The ten things that from similarity of shape among themselves, but dissimilarity to the balls, have been put into a distinct class, I wish to speak * An abstract ferm is such a name of an individual thing of which we conceive, as we judge equally applicable to any one of many similar indi- viduals. Such a term we could neither form, nor use, did we not volun- tarilj take away, that is, abstract, from our conceptions concerning an individual, several things which are peculiar to it as an individual. J}£an is an abstract term. In forming it, we abstract from our conceptions of an individual man those which are peculiar to any one, and not com- mon to every other individual being, that we designate by this name. We abstract, for instance, the colour of the complexion, the size of the limbs, and th*? expression of the features, as well as the distinction of sex, when we say, " God made man upright." Of the meaning of this tertrif man, we conceive, or have an idea. We conceive that it denotes any one individual, in whom certain attributes meet, without regarding certain other attributes that may be peculiar to some one, and not com- mon to other individuals called meit. Abstractmi, 195 of in relation to their shape, to the exclusion of every thing else perceived in them, and so I invent, or adopt, the name of cube. By subsequent compari- sons, I am induced to call every other object, which in shape resembles one of these things, a cube; whatever may be its other attributes. Hence any thing that is judged to be like another thing in shape which we have previously called a ball, we denominate, when considered in relation to shape alone, a ball. Now put, for the first time, five balls of wood, five of ivory, five of marble and five of lead into a child's hat, v/ho by comparing and judging has learned to call them balls in distinction from all ob- jects of a different figure. Let him now be taught to compare these balls in some other respect than that of figure. Let them be all of the same size, and he will soon judge, that while alike in shape and size, they are not all alike in weight. By handling them, he will have such perceptions as will induce the judgment, that five may be put into one class, from being like each other, and un- like the other fifteen in weight. In this way, con- templating them for somcvtime, he will make four classes, each of which will consist of five indivi- duals. Now he will want a name to designate each, and every one of the five, as belonging to one of these four classes. There is, however, no name in our language to designate each of a class of objects, merely from regard to their specific gravity. We must therefore turn the attention of the child to other things in which each ball of the five in each class is like all in its own class, and unlike all in 1 96 Abstraction, the other classes. The five in one class look alike, and differ m appearance from those of each other class. The five in one class are alike elastic, and the five in each of two other classes are also elastic; but the five in one class are less elastic than the five in the other class. The five in the last class are not elastic. Besides, one class o£ the balls were cut out of a tree, another out of an elephant's tusk, another out of a gritty block of a certain kind of stone, and the fourth were run out of a substance rendered liquid by- heat. The child still wants a name for each thing of each class, that shall serve for every one of five in its own peculiar class. He is taught therefore, to call the five balls, that have a peculiar appearance, texture, and degree of elasticity, that were cut out of a tree, wooden balls; and any one of the five is a wooden ball. In proceeding thus far, there has been no attention paid to the kind of a tree from which each wooden ball was cut, nor to its colour, nor to many other of its attributes. When, therefore, the child sees any other object, that is a ball, and that has the attributes of wood, he calls it a wooden balU abstracting, or taking away voluntarily, from his contemplation of the thing, its size, colour, and all other things, which are not common to every thing in the class of things called wooden balls. The five balls that have the highest degree of elasticity, with a peculiar texture, appearance, and origin, the child calls ivory balls; and each and every one of them an ivory ball. In like manner he ob- tains a notion oi a marble^ and of a leaden ball. Pupil, In abstracting, it appears to roe, that we Abstraction, 197 voluntarily conceive of a part of a complex object, of uhich as a whole we have previously conceived, with a design to classify that complex object, ac- cording to the part of which we voluntarily con- ceive, to the exclusion of its other parts, with ob- jects that resemble it in this selected feature, while they differ from it in others.* Professor, Every class of things is a complex whole, constituted by constituent parts which have more or less resemblance to each other. Mankind for example, is an abstract term, designed to de- note all beings collectively which would indivi- dually be called a man^ without any regard had to those attributes in which one man may differ from * ** We must here beware of the ambiguity of the word conception^ which sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, some- times the thing conceived, which is the object of that act. If the word be taken in the first sense, [as it always should be,] I acknowledge that every act of the mind is an individual act; the universality there- fore is not in the mind, but in the object, or thing conceived.'* Dfi. Reid. What Dr. Reid calls a general conception, is nothing but a complex object, of whose distinct attributes we have so many distinct concep- tions. We adduce a passage from this author which perfectly expresses our opinion. **I apprehend that we cannot, with propriety, be said to have abstract and general ideas, either in the popidar or in the philo- sophical sense of that word. In the popular sense an idea is a thought; it is the act of the mind in thinking, or in conceiving any object This act of the mind is always an individual act, and therefore there can be no general idea in this sense. In the philosophical sense, an idea is an image in the mind, or in the brain, which, in Mr. Locke's system is the immediate object of thought; in the system of Berkeley and Hume the only object of thought. I believe there are no ideas of this kind, and therefore no abstract general ideas. Indeed, if there were really- such images m the mind, or in the brain, they could not be general, because every thing that really exists is an individual." — ReiiTs Works, vol. iii. p. 57. R2 198 Abstraction. another. Ma?i also is an abstract term, formed by voluntarily conceiving of some things which we have found in every individual included under the term, while we voluntarily exclude from our conception all those minor differences which we discern. One man has a white skin; another, a black skin; one man is tall and another short; one man crooked and another straight; but voluntarily declining to think of these things, I conceive of a part of each of these individuals, of the intellectual and bodily fa- culties of each, for instance, and then judging, that the colour of the skin, the length, crookedness, shortness and straightness of each individual being disregarded, these are essentially alike in their fa- culties, I resolve to give each of them the name of ?nan^ that I may thereby class and distinguish them, from beings that do not possess similar attributes. FupiL Is abstraction necessary to classificationf Professor, Conceive of five objects as perfectly alike in all respects as possible. You still find, that they are numerically different. If, then, you put these five things together into one class, and call each apea^ you conceive of each without regard to its numerical difference and individuality. You cannot therefore classify any two things without abstract- ing from the consideration of each its numerical difference, if you class them from regard to their similarity. PupiL Is classif cation essential to abstraction^ so that we could not abstract without it? Professor, We might abstract had we never be- fore classified; but the first abstraction would lay a foundation for a classification. Should we consi- ^ Compounding, 199 der, for instance, the attribute of a thing without regard to the substance of which it is an attribute, we should prepare the way for a division of a thing into its substance and its attributes. Pupil. Mr. Locke speaks of compounding' or composing as a mental operation. Do you call this a simple or a complex operation? Professor, The apothecary compounds^ when he conceives of, and selects different substances, and amalgamates them, or grinds or mixes them together; but of any mental operation of compounding I know nothing, by my own consciousness or memory, or by the intelligible testimony of others; unless it consists in conceiving of one external thing, and then of another external thing, and then of the two as being so connected or physically compounded, as to constitute one complex thing; which is nothing different from a simple act of conception, for the object of an act of conception may be either simple or complex. If it is the union of two things of which we conceive, this union is a simple object; but if the thing made by union or composition be the thing conceived of, it is a complex object of conception. For example, I conceive of the word thought^ then of the word /w//, then of the U7iiting of the two, and then of the compound word thoughtful. Here is no mental operation of compounding distinct from four successive, simple acts of conception. CONVERSATION XVII. Improvement and Injury of the Original Faculties of the Mind.— - They have their Infantile state. — Exercise and Discipline the chief means of their Improvement. — Insanity, a state of mind resulting from some Injury. — Dreaming. Pupil, Are the original faculties of the mind in man capable of any improvement? Professor. Every one of them is capable of im- provement by exercise and discipline. We may vo- luntarily employ one faculty, so as to render many of its important operations easy from habit; or we may so neglect to employ it, that its operations will be comparatively feeble and difficult^ In infancy and youth the mental faculties are commonly in a feeble, infantile state; and they acquire strength with years. Pupil. We have a striking example in the facul- ty of memory, of the possibility of the improvement of our original faculties. I have observed, that per- sons who exercise the memory a good deal, commit any thing to memory, so as to be able to recollect it at pleasure, much more easily and rapidly than others who have exercised it less, and than they themselves did at first. A child who has learned to recite one stanza, will subsequently commit two Mental Improvement, 201 staiizas with more ease, and in less time than it did one. Professor. Many persons complain of the weak- ness and treachery of their memory. They are for- getful, and often cannot recollect, because they have suffered the faculty to become feeble for the want of exercise. Pupil Do we not find that some men whose other faculties are very energetic, have bad me- mories? Professor, We do; and we attribute it to the fact, that they have exercised their other faculties greatly to the neglect of this. These very men, however, will generally remember those operations of mind which delight them. Hence a philosophical and argumentative man, will remember a chain of reasoning, when he cannot recollect the precise words in which he heard it delivered. He is ac- customed to remember reasonings; while others who have employed themselves in remembering and reciting fine speeches, will be able to reiterate an elegant paragraph which they have heard but once, without the variation of a word. Pupil, Dr. Johnson, I think," remarked, concern- ing those who complain of the want of memory, that no man forgets the person xvho kicked his shins^ Professor, It is no less true of the other faculties than of memory, that they are improved by exer- cise. In this respect, there is a strong analo: be- tween the members of the body, and ihe constitu- enics of the mind. If any one limb is kept in a state of inactivity, it becomes feeble and rigid; but those 202 Mental Improvement, parts of the human frame that are exercised most regularly, become most powerful. If men would reason more, they would be more capable of reason- ing: if they would exercise their judgment more, they would be better judges. Even the faculty of perception, and the bodily organs of it, are render- ed more accurate and capable, by being judiciously exercised. PupiL Is it the part of wisdom to improve one or two faculties exclusively, or even pre-eminently? Professor* No better general rule can be given, than to employ and improve all mental faculties, habits, and dispositions, with due regard to their relative importance. A mere man of memory is a contemptible being; but the man who has all his faculties improved by use, is more likely to obtain that happiness which may result from all the con- stituent parts of his nature. We are in danger of exercising none of our fa- culties, except those of conception and feelings too much; unless it be from a wrong educatione From education some almost exclusively employ the me- mory; but if destitute of any injurious, extraneous influence, men will commonly indulge themselves inordinately in that work of the conception, which we call imagination, and in feeling alone. Con- science and judgment are most commonly exercised too unfrequently. PupiL Are our feelings capable of much im- provement? Professor, It is the business of a physician, par- ticularly, to prescribe for the regulation and im- provement of our SENSATIONS, becausc they depend Mental ImprovemefiU 203 ©n the state of our bodily health and organs, our food, our drink, the state of the weather, the quali- ty and temperature of the atmosphere, the stimulus which we take, and all the various things which are used as medicines. The deaf, dumb, and blind frequently evince how delicate our perceptions and consequent sensations may be rendered by use and constant attention. T^e senses which any of these persons retain, are generally more acute than the same are in those who enjoy the five. Our emotions are dependent on previous mental operations; and by improving the quality and the energy of them, our emotions may be improved. We find by experience, that certain thoughts are fol- lowed by certain affections; and if we would cherish the affections, and frequently enjoy them, we must voluntarily exert ourselves to reiterate the thoughts. If we find that certain thoughts are productive of certain inordinate passions, which are not ultimate- ly productive of happiness to us, we should exert ourselves to avoid the reiteration of the thoughts which occasioned them: and the best way to expel one class of thoughts, is voluntarily to attend to some other subject. We may acquire such self-command over our own thoughts, as to attend to any one particular subject, to the exclusion of all others, for a consi- derable time. Our feelings frequently need suppression; and the habitual indulgence of them renders us habitu- ally sensitive in an unreasonable degree. We may avoid the force of many feelings, and the existence 204 Mental Injuries. of others, by immediately recurring to subjects which ordinarily excite a different class of feelings. Those mental operations which require the most exertion, lazy people are the least inclined to per- form, and those who would attain to eminence should determine by all means to render the per- formance of them habitual. Men are naturally averse to close attention to any subject, and extremely reluctant to study, but habits may be formed, that will render idleness, or fre- quent revery, burthensome, and regular application to business, a source of moderate, but continued gratification. Pupil May not the mental faculties be injured or improved by physical means? Professor. Every faculty of the mind, while re- sident in the body, is in a greater or less degree affected by the state of the body. Excessive eating and drinking will for a time benumb all the facul- ties; and any one of them, by excessive application' may be impaired. Insane persons exhibit numerous instances of injury done to the mental facul6es, by the imprudent and excessive use of one or more of them. Pup'iU What is insanity? Professor. It is a state of mind in which the ment'ril faculties do not operate in a natural manner. PupiL What are the most common mental causes of insanity? Professor. An excessive indulgence of some af- fection or passion, is the most common cause of permanent madness. Inebriation is a very common cause of temporary madness, that not unfrequently Breaming, ' 2©5 terminates in idiocy; which when superinduced may be called the paralysis of all the faculties but that of perception. Pupil. But what do you say of a perfect natural idiot? Professor, In my opinion, for I have no certainty on the subject, a natural fool never had a human immortal soul, any more than the brutes have. Pupil What sort of a soul has a brute? Professor, I will endeavour to answer that ques- tion, in a future conversation on comparative men- tal science. Pupil. Well, Sir, is not dreaming' a species of insanity? Professor, Any mental operation performed while one is asleep, is called dreaming. There is some resemblance between the state of an insane person and that of a sleeping person who dreams: still dreaming is not raving. When one dreams, he does not generally think himself asleep; and w^hen one is insane, he is very prone to think all other men are more mad than himself. In a state of insanity, some of the faculties seem to be dormant, while others perform strange operations: and in sleep the faculties of the dreamer are not all equally active, nor equally consistent in their activity. Pupil. Do we always dream, when asleep? Professor. We do not always remember what our minds have been doing, when we were asleep; nor can we recollect any considerable portions of our mental actions done while we are awake. That we do not remember to have been at all times con- scious of thinking, feeling, willing, and mentally S 206 Dreaming. exerting ourselves, when asleep, is therefore no proof that we have not been. That our minds are always active, when we are asleep, or in a swoon, I cannot affirm; and must therefore leave you to form your own opinion, from such facts as may occur to you. Pupil. In what respects, particularly, do the mental operations of a man sleeping, differ from those performed by him when awake? Professor. A sleeper generally perceives nothing through his eyes, ears, nose, or organs of taste,* while he has various. perceptions through the organs of touching, and many sensations in consequence of them. A sleeper is more prone to exercise his fa- culty of conception in matters of imagination, than when he is awake, and often experiences very lively emotions in consequence of them. A dreamer per- forms many operations, which he judges, at the time, to be acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, tast- ing, and touching; but when he awakes, he is in- duced to judge, that the objects which he perceived had no real existence, or else were perceived with- out the intervention of bodily organs. Sometimes a sleeper judges his conceptions to be perceptions; and this mistake no wakeful person makes, unless he is insane. The insane often make it. Memory, Judgment, Reasoning, Consciousness, Conscience, Feeling, the Will, and the faculty of Agencv are also frequently operative during sleep; but this peculiarly distinguishes dreaming from our waking operations; that our voluntary agency upon our bodies is in a great measure interrupted. Dreamers commonly cannot speak, and perform Dr earning. 2€)7 other corporal actions which they will, and exert themselves, to perform. There are some exceptions to this general rule concerning the inefficiency of our agency upon our bodily members while asleep; for one who walks in his sleep, called a somnambulist^ has power over his ambulatory members, and sometimes over his arms and hands, while his eyes and ears are locked up in sleep. Pupil, In sound sleep, then, the agency of man over his bodily organs and members is in a great measure suspended; so that his thinking and wil- ling and efficiency do not produce their ordinary external effects. The judgment, moreover, is given to error, in supposing that we perceive, and by our bodily members perform, what we neither actually per- ceive, nor do, through our bodily members. These seem to be the principal differences between a dreamer, and a wakeful moral agent. CONVERSATION XVIlf. Comparative Mental Science. Professor, The professor of anatomy frequently instructs his pupils in the structure of the human frame by comparing it with the frames of different animals. I have pursued something of a similar course with you, in teaching the science of the hu- man mind. I have exhibited to you something of the peculiarities of minds not human, that you might better understand the operations of the hu- man soul. Now let me ascertain what you remem- ber of comparative mental science. Pupil, Any systematic arrangement of what we know concerning different kinds of minds, when com- pared with each other, is comparative mental science. Of the minds, or souls, of any other beings than men we know but little, because we have very few means of becoming acquainted with them. Of our own mental acts we are conscious, and have me- mory, but these faculties afford us no aid in the investigation upon M'hich we are entering. Professor, What then are our sources <.f know- ledge concerning souls superior or inferior to that of man? Pupil, Reasoning from external indications of mental operations, and Kevelation, are our only Comparative Mental Science* 209 sources of knowledge, concerning the souls of brutes and angels; and concerning the Uncreated Mind. Professor. What is a spirit? Pupil, Any thinking, sensitive, voluntary agent, that is destitute of a material body, is a spirit. The name however is sometimes used as synonymous with mind and soul Besides, tnind and spirit are used by some writers to denote Consciousness, Con- sience, Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, and Me- mory collectively, to the exclusion of Perception by the senses. Feeling, Volition and Agency, which they denote by the word 50m/. Hence some would say, that men have both souls and spirits^ but that brutes have only souls. We use, however, mind and soul as synonymous, according to the general custom of mankind, and as comprehensive of the whole substance in any indi° vidual that thinks, feels, wills, and voluntarily or instinctively acts; while we use spirit to denote this same substance in a state of separation from a ma- terial body. God is a spirit^ without any bodily form. Professor. What faculties has the Divine Mind? Pupil, All the faculties of the human mind, with the addition of a faculty of Prescience. His faculty of Perception, however, does not operate through any bodily organs; nor have we any reason to judge that his faculty of Feeling ever is the subject of any sensations. Professor. Man, it seems then was formed after the divine mental image; and although he wants prescience^ yet he is able to acquire such judgment and prudence as supply its place^ so far as it is de- S2 210 The Divme Mind. sirable for creatures, to possess any attribute of character resembling it. What are some of the principal differences be- tween the Divine, and a human, Mind? Pupil, The first is uncreated, and self-existent; the last is created, and dependent on the first, for the commencement and continuance of its exist- ence. The Divine Mind is infinite and immutable; but the human is finite and mutable. God is eternal^ or without beginning and without end; but man is only everlastings or without a termination to his mental duration. The Agency of God can produce substances where nothing before existed; but the agency of man has only a very limited power over a few things which already exist. The Divine Mind is perfectly and immutably good in all its operations; but the human is sus- ceptible of both good and evil. Professor, You cannot proceed much further, in this direction, without entering upon the science of theology; which would be contrary to our present design. Let us leave the doctrine of spirits, and attend to souls inferior to those denominated human. What do you know concerning the souls of brutes? PupiL Divine Revelation says little of them. It incidentally remarks, however, that the soul of a brute goeth downward, at death; by which it is ge- nerally understood, that at death the soul of a brute is annihilated. Our knowledge concerning the souls of animals inferior to man is derived from induction and ana- logy. We observe the external motions of animals, Of the Souls of Brutes. 211 and attribute them to such mental faculties in them, as we know are in ourselves the efficient causes of similar external motions. Professor, Do all animals possess the ten mental faculties which are common to men? Pupil. No animal inferior to man possesses them all. Professor. Is any one of our faculties possessed by every animal? PupiL The faculty of Feeling is; and every creature destitute of this, is denominated a vegeta- ble, a mineral, or something besides an animal^ and is destitute of a soul. Professor. You will find also, I think, that one other faculty is common to all. What do you understand by a brute? PupiL Any animal inferior to the human animal. Professor. Have brutes all the various y^^/j/z^* of mankind? PupiL In general, brutes have no other feelings than those denominated sensations. That many of them have emotions I am not confident. Professor, Have all hr nits- perception? PupiL The greater part of them have; and their sensations seem to be consequent upon them as in men. It is however, very questionable whether some brutes have not sensations immediately in conse- quence of some impression on their bodies. The snail, the oyster, the clam, and several similar ani- mals, appear to feel^ but give only faint indications oi perception. Professor. Let me state to you a fact. Oysters, if placed with the concave part of their shells 212 Of the Souls of Brutes. downwards, on your cellar floor, and sprinkled with salt water, will, at the time of tide when they usually feed, open their pearly lips and drink in their accustomed beverage. If you enter the cellar when they are feeding and make a noise, or if you enter with a lighted candle, they will close their mouths in a moment. Do they not hear, then; or perhaps hear and see both? Pupil, It would be, perhaps, rash to affirm that they do not hear; but to me it seems most probable, that light and sound acting upon them, produce cer- tain sensations, whereupon they instinctively exert their faculty of agency in closing their wide mouths. Hence we attribute to instinct all their operations. Theyy^^/, and act from sensation without any con- ception or volition. Instinct in some few animals inferior to man, I would say therefore, consists in such a relative disposition of the faculties of sensa- tion and agency that certain actions immediately follow certain sensations. Professor. Well, I shall not oppose your theory, until 1 have some positive proof to offer in favour of the notion that they see and hear. That they do something like it, I have already shown. As for conception or volition, none ever saw any indica- tions of either in them. We may remark, that the soul of an oyster, which is destitute of the power of leaving its native place, 'is the most diminutive soul of which we have any knowledge. The snail^ the clam, and other similar creatures, besides the power of sensation are capable of IochI motion. The clam, upon a perception or as you think a sensation from the noise of a foot approaching it on the sand Of the Souh of Brutes. 213 beach, will settle iisclf to the bottom of its hole. Sensation and agency if not perception and agency- are so connected in its soul, that certain actions in- stinctively follow certain sensations. Pupil Sensation and instinctive agency^ to a cer- tain extent, it seems then, that all animals, even clams and oysters, have in common xvith man. Professor. Which of our five senses are enjoyed by most animalsf PupiL All animals I believe are capable of taste and touch; so that even oysters have some per- ceptions. Many animals are able to smell in addition to the two former. The greater number of animals have all the five modes of perceiving which men have. Professor. Have brutes any faculty of under- standing? Pupil. Some brutes appear to conceive of objects of sense, and of these things alone. A horse which has been accustomed to company and then is se- parated, will, for a day or two, whinny after his companion. If he did not conceive of him, when he does not perceive him, it seems incredible that he should manifest uneasiness at his absence. A horse, a dog, an elephant, and most of the larger tribes of animals, discover frequently design. There can be no design without some degree of understanding. The objects of conception to brutes are, however, few, when compared with those presented to the human mmd. We have no evidence that they ever conceive of any of the things denoted by abstract terms. Professor. Have brutes judgment? 214 Of the Souls of Brutes, Pupil, I think they never conceive of a proposi- tion, and consequently never have any operations that may be properly denominated judgments. None of them I believe reason. None of them have con- science. Professor. Are any of them conscious of their own mental operations? . Pupil. If they are, I have no proof of it. Professor. Do brutes possess a faculty of me- mory? Pupil. Some of them appear to, in an inferior degree. They have what may be called recognitioUy or an act of memory resulting from the repetition of any particular perception or conception, but not recollection. Recognition is a species of remem- brance, that probably is never exercised but in con- sequence of perceiving again what has been before perceived; or conceiving again that of which the brute has before conceived. If the horse does not remember any former per- ceptions of a companion, why should he whinny for him: if a cow does not remember some of her notions of an absent calf, why should she bellow after it, as she will for two or three days after it has been concealed from her? The memory of brutes may be co-extensive with their perceptions, and their conceptions of perceptible objects. Professor. Have any of the brutes a faculty of volition? Pupil. Some of them appear to conceive of a few external actions, and to will the performance of them. My horse when weary of confinement in the stable, would unhook the door and get out, so that Of the Souls of Brutes. ^15 I was obliged to substitute a padlock instead of a hook. He then gnawed the padlock until he found it useless. Now unless he conceived of getting out, and willed to get out, I cannot assign any reason for his ingenious exertions to do it. A fox, one should think, must conceive and will the performance of his actions, when he takes wool into his mouth, and gradually immerses his body, beginning with the hinder part, until he has driven the vermin on him to the wool, when he abandons the wool to the stream. If dogs and elephants have conception, and they certainly indicate design, then they may conceive of something to be done, and will to perform it. Most animals, however, appear to act exclusively from instinct, instead of conceptions, motives, and volitions. Professor, You have already said, that brutes possess the faculty of feeling, which is the subject of sensa«^ions. They have in many instances sym- pathetic sensations^ which very nearly resemble the affection of pity. A few animals discover feel- ings, which if they do not deserve the name of emo- tions, are sensations of the highest order. The dog and horse, frequently manifest something like love and gratitude. An elephant discovers long cherished resentment; and most animals in some circumstances evince /ear. Pupil, To what extent have brutes the power of agency? Professor, Their faculty of agency operates, I believe, exclusively upon their bodily organs, so as to produce their accustomed instinctive or voluntary 216 Of the Souls of Brutes, actions. If they have conception, I have no proof that they exert any instinctive or voluntary agency in conceiving of any thing. They give no evidence of voluntary exertions of memory. They have no conscience, judgment, or reason, upon which their efficiency could be exerted. Have they many m- stinctive operations? Pupil, I know of no brute that laughs. Several of them cry, and moan; two species of them hiss; and the greater part of them have all the other in- stinctive operations which are common to the hu- man family, besides many that are peculiar to them- selves. Professor, Do brutes form habits of acting? Pupil, They are generally as expert in this bu- siness as the human species of animals. They seem naturally disposed to imitation; and some of them very soon learn to imitate every thing which they perceive, so far as they have faculties for perform- ing similar actions. The horse forms habits of tra- velling, and the parrot of imitating the human voice; while every tribe of brutes form other habits adapted to their nature and state. A disposition to imitate is a natural attribute of all animals that have perception. A disposition to consort with its own species, is also common to most animals; and most animals are gregarious, or have a disposition not only for a companion, but for considerable company. Professor, No aninal, however, finds society so essential to its happiness as man; and none is capa- ble of deriving such benefit or injury from it. Have brutes any complex mental operations? Of the Souls of Brutes. 2ir Pupih None. Professor. Are the mental faculties of brutes ca- pable of improvement or deterioration? Pupil. Their mental faculties may be injured by- abuse received from man; but their original facul- ties are capable of little improvement; and that chief- ly by physical agency on their bodies. Their habits may be strengthened or eradicated in some in- stances; and their dispositions may be somewhat affected by the manner of their treatment. Professor. Man appears to hold a middle rank between superior and inferior souls. When we con- sider the faculties, instincts, habits, and powers of brutes, in all their variety, we must exclaim, Horn manifold are thy works ^ Lord^ God^ Ahnig-htyJ but when we turn to man, A single human mind ex- cels them all! CONVERSATION XIX. lt£capitulation of the Principal Doctrines taught in the preceding Conversations. Professor. Anyone who would have his pupil master of any science, must repeatedly question "him, and require a summary of the knowledge which he has acquired. I wish you thoroughly to imderstand the science of which we have treated; I therefore will patiently hear from you a recapitu- lation. Begin, if you please. Pupil. Science signifies any such mental opera- tion as is denominated knowledge. The word is de- rived from scio^ to know. Any act of consciousness^ or of memory^ and any act of constitutional^ intuitive^ or inductive judgment^ is called knowledge. A particular science is any systematic arrangement of knowledge about any particular subject. Mental Science is our knowledge of mind sys- tematically arranged. The Science of the Human Mind is our know- ledge of the mind of man systematically arranged. The consciousness which mankind have of their own mental operations, is the foundation upon which this science is erected. Recapitulation^ 219 Any thing which subsists as the subject of inhe- rent attributes, is a substance. A substance is an object not of perception^ but of conception. The nature of a substance is known only by its inherent attributes. All the substances with which we are acquainted, may be divided into two classes; the first of which includes all material^ and the second, all immaterial or mental substances. Any portion of a material substance is called matter; and any immaterial substance, A mind. Any number of organized particles of matter is called A BODY. A mind connected with a body is called a soul. A mi72^ subsisting without a body, or considered as separated from it, is called a spirit. '^ Some of the inherent attributes of matter, by which it is distinguished from mind, are solidity, extension, inertness, .mobility, divisibility, and in* sensibility. The inherent attributes of a mind are its faculties of thinking, feeling, volition and efficiency. Man, in- his present stkte, is a complex being, constituted by two kinds of substances, matter and mind. The material part of man is so organized as to constitute the human body. The human mind, and the human body of the complex being man, are, to a certain extent, mu- tually dependent; and in other respects, severally independent, on each other. Any thing done by the miri '- is called a mental 220 Recapitulatioiu operation; any thing done by the body, a bodily ope- ration; and any operation performed by the co-ope- ration of a man's mind and body, is ascribed to the complex being, or person, having two constituent substances in his nature. Professor* Give an example. PupiL Reasoning is a purely mental operation; involuntary breathings a purely bodily operation: and reading aloud^ an operation neither of the mind nor of the body, but of the man, performed through the co-operation of his two constituent substances. Professor* Well: proceed in your didactic man- ner. PupiL Any operation performed by any single faculty of man, is called a simple operation: and any work of man, however it may be designated, by a single term^ that requires the co-operation of two or more faculties, is denominated a complex operation. Simple and complex mental operations, are such as are performed by one, or more of the mental fa- culties. Any thing done by the mind, or body, or both, is an action; and any action performed in conse- quence of a volition to do it, is called an exertion^ or an exercise^ or an act of efficiency ^ indiscrimi- nately. An attribute is any thing attributed tOy or predi- cated of, an other. All attributes of substances may be divided into such as are inker ent^ or such as are extraneous and mcidentaU Inherent attributes are those which we conceive Recapitulation* 221 of as inhering in the substance to which they belong, and which are essential to its existence. All other attributes are extraneous and incidental^ for the substance to which they appertain may be conceived of as existing without them. Mankind are conscious of performing ten distinct kinds of mental operations. We constitutionally judge, that every effect must have an adequate cause. Man is the efficient cause of all his own mental operations. That in the original constitution of the human mind, whereby it performs any simple operation, is a mental faculty, for performing that operation. Without the requisite faculty for performing each of its own mental operations, the human mind would not be an adequate cause of the effects which it actually produces. An inherent faculty^ is that, in the original con- stitution of any substance, whereby it is capable of any operation. The human mind has ten inherent faculties^ which are called The Perception; The Consciousness; The Conception^ or Faculty of Understanding; The Judgment; The Memory; The Faculty of Reason- ings or Induction; The Conscience; The Hearty or The Faculty of Feeling; The Will, or the Faculty of Volition; and The Efficiency^ or The Faculty of Agency, Men when awake and sane, perceive external objects through the instrumentality of their bodily organs of sense. Om perceptions may be divided mKofve classes; T2 2^ Recapitulation. viz. those of seeing, those of hearing, those of smelling, those of tasting, and those of touching. Men are conscious of nothing but their own pre- sent mental operations. Men conceive of everv object of knowledge. Our perceptions and the things perceived, our concep- tions and the objects of which we conceive, are all of them objects of conception. Any ideay or notion of a thing, is a conception of it. All ideas, or conceptions, are simple operations of the mind, so that there are neither complex nor ab- stract ideas in any mind. Abstract terms are names invented to designate any one thing in a genus, species, order, province, or class of any description, which contains many things similar to it, in its distinguishing characteris- tics, but dissimilar in some other attributes. These terms are called abstract, because we con- ceive of each and every thing denoted by them, as if they were abstracted from some of the attributes which belong to them as individuals, but not to all of the same class, that are respectively designated by the same general name. Professor, Give an example. Pupil. I conceive of the meaning of the term quadruped. I take away from each and every indi- vidual, when I consider it as a quadruped, every other attribute than this, that it has four legs* Qua- druped is an abstract term. When I call a horse, a cow, an ox, a hare, a tiger, a leopard, severally, a quadruped, I abstract voluntarily, from my concep- tion of each of these animals, their colour, size, Recapitulation, 223 sex, covering, propensities, and all other things in which they differ from each other; while I conceive of each as an animal having four legs, in which they all agree. Instead of having an abstract idea, I con- ceive of a name, that is capable of being applied to many individual animals, and of describing each in respect to one of its most distinguishing charac- teristics. Professor* I shall divide your discourse into several lessons by asking you a question now and then. Proceed in your summary of mental science. Pupil, The conception of images of things, es- pecially of things that we judge to have no real existence, is called imagination; and the faculty of conception when thus employed, is called the ima- gination. Discernment^ Comprehension^ Apprehension^ and Intuition are other principal acts oi conception. The object of every act of Judgment^ is some proposition expressed or understood. All acts of judgment are such as result either from our constitution, or from reflection and expe- rience. The former are called constitutional^ the lat- ter ttc^wfr^^ judgments. For our constitutional judgments we can give no other reason than this, that God has so formed the minds of men that they naturally form such judg- ments. Some constitutional judgments are called intuitive^ because they immediately result from intuition. If we judge a proposition to be true so soon as we understand the meaning of it, it is an intuitive judgment. 224 Recapitulation, Every proposition, which from bare intuition is judged to be true, is called a self-evident propo- sition. Any proposition which men constitutionally judge to be true, is denominated an axiom. Our acquired judgments are those which we learn to form from reflection, experience, reasoning, and attention to testimony. Believing^ or an act offaith^ is an acquired judg- ment; which has some proposition, which is the subject of testimony, for its object. Memory h2is ioY its object in every mind, some of the past mental operations of that mind. An act of memory consequent on a volition to employ the memory upon the subject, is called re- collection or reminiscence. Any act of memory not immediately resulting from voluntary exertion, is called remembrance. Logic is the science of reasoning. Reasoning is the act of inferring a conclusion from some con- templated premises. Axioms, or self-evident propositions, lie at the foundation of every system of reasoning. We must argue from things known to things un- known. Every act of perfect reasoning includes three propositions; the two first of which are called pre- mises^ and the last the conclusion^ or inference. These three propositions, so connected as to frame an argument, are called a syllogism. When one of the premises is generally admitted, and so well known, that it is not stated, the argu- Recapitulation. 225 merit, consisting of two propositions, is called an enthymeme. Any act of reasoning in which the premises are unquestionably true, and the conclusion necessarily follows from them, is called a demonstration. In probable reasonings^ the premises are proba- bly^ but not certainly true. All our reasonings may be considered as either analogical or synthetical^ according as we reason from effects to causes, or from causes to effects. Our inferred judgments we often reverse, from discovering some defect in the premises whence they were deduced; but our constitutional judg- ments are never changed. Professor. Your next lesson is concerning Con- science, which is often called the Moral Sense, Pupil. Conscience always has for its object some moral laxv^ moral agent^ or moral action. A moral law is any rule of conduct laid down for the governnjent of an intelligent, sensitive, volun- tary agent, or efficient. A physical law is any general observation con- cerning any uniform physical operations, descriptive of those operations. A physical action is any operation of an involun- tary agent upon mind or matter. A m.oral action^ as distinguished from a physical action, is any action of an intelligent, sensitive, vo- luntary agent, that is either required or forbidden, and so to he judged of, by some moral law. In the judgment of the moral law, which God has given man, those actions of man, and those 226 Recapitulation. alone, which God has either required or forbidden, arc moral actions. Breathing, and the circulation of the blood, for instance, are neither required nor forbidden by the law of our Maker, because they are natural opera- tions; and they are neither morally good nor mo- rally evil. Nevertheless, they are operations predi- cable of man; and of man too, consisting of body and mind, for so soon as the mind is separated from the body, breathing and the circulatioii of the blood cease. Conscience either approves or -disapproves of some- thing of a moral character. No operation of conscience can be opposed to a man's present judgment: but many are the instances in which the dictates of conscience are hostile to our present feelings. We have now treated of seven kinds of mental operations, any one of which is called a thought. We have spoken of seven mental faculties, that perform these seven kinds of thinkings which are denominated together The Understanding, The Understanding therefore, besides a faculty of understandings includes six other intellectual ia-- culties. Professor* Very good: now pass to the Faculty of Feeling, Pupil, The operations of The Heart are always consequent upon some previous thought. Our feelings may be divided into two great classes; the first of which contains all our sensa- tions; and the second, all our emotio7is. Recapttulatio7u 227 Our three most powerful sensations are called appetites. Every sensation is consequent upon some opera- tion of the faculty oi perception* Our emotions are either affections or passions; and are consequent upon some other kind of thinking than that called perception* The Will is that mental faculty by which a man chooses, resolves, or determines. Any act of the will is called a volition* Every volition has for its object some contem- plated action^ which a man conceives himself to be capable of performing. Any thought or feelings or complication of thoughts or feelings, or of both, that is the true reason why any volition is performed, is the motive to that volition. No rational man ever had a volition without some motive to that volition. Any one who has a volition without some motive of which he himself conceives, is either a fool or a madman* The immediate consequcQce of volition is the exertion of our faculty of agency, so far as we have the power of doing what we will. The mental faculty of effciency operates directly upon some of the mental faculties, and indirectly upon others. It is the province of man's effciency to perform what he wills. So far as any one can do this, he has the power of voluntary agency. Man's power of voluntary efficiency is finite, and 228 Conclusioti* circumscribed by such laws as his Creator has been pleased to establish. Thus we have briefly surveyed the operations of man's ten mental faculties, which are the inherent, and essential attributes of his mind. Professor. The incidental attributes of the human mind have been treated of in such a concise manner in the preceding conversations, that a recapitulation is needless. Permit me to express a hope, that you will frequently re-consider the doctrines you have learned, and grow in knowledge through eternity. THE ENB. ^v. 'O. if . (^ ^ s * ^ / "'t- '^ i<^ --1 e^'^ /• \ ^V 'f>. 0' o5 •^i' % ^ .0 K ' \^-^^ .0' ,\' .A ■^c. -•^ ^^' >K%-' %, 0( ": %.^^'' .'./^^^.^ ;« Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: Oct. 2004 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township. PA 16066 (724)779-2111 :^^>^, m ""■c i /^:-, .A^ -^ ^^^/T^^ ..-% •^>. '^ J •ft I %. .^^' j^>^A?. A \ 1 « ^ ''^; .-^^ ^^>^; ^. oo r^. \g rr ^ / xx^ -. :.^ ^. cP^.^!r^.% /^#^^?^ ^'^ r^X = iV., a'^ •' , s ^0 R ^^^ v^^ Oo. o c // C'