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THE GREAT PEACE 
 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 HKW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
 ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 
 
 LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
 MELBOURNE 
 
 THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 
 
 TORONTO 
 
THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 H; H. POWERS 
 
 Author of* 'The Things Men Fight For," "America 
 
 Among the Nations," "America 
 
 and Britain," etc. 
 
 I15eto gotfe 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1918 
 
 AU rights reserved 
 
^ 
 
 ^5 
 
 COPTBIGHT, 1918 
 
 By H. H. powers 
 
 Set up and electrotyped. Published, December, 1918 
 
 DEC 18 1918 
 
 (S)CI.A5()6934 
 
PREFACE 
 
 When I was asked last August to prepare a book on the 
 terms of peace, I consented to have it ready by March, 1919. 
 My publishers thought that it should be ready by February 
 first if it was to anticipate the march of events. The writing 
 was completed in October, but even so, events have gotten 
 ahead. It is some consolation to know that the whole world 
 shares in this miscalculation. Neither the peoples nor their 
 governments, the knowing ones who had all the inside in- 
 formation, were prepared for this headlong precipitancy. A 
 letter from one of the staff of the Department of State at 
 Washington expresses the surprise, not to say the consterna- 
 tion, of the government at this sudden development for which 
 we were so eager and yet so utterly unprepared. It was in 
 anticipation of this unpreparedness that the book was written, 
 and yet I too am caught among the unprepared. 
 
 Naturally I have considered carefully whether any change 
 should be made in the text as the proofs pass through my 
 hands, but save for a few footnotes and minor changes, I have 
 left it as it was written. The difficulty in the phraseology, — 
 all of it appropriate to the situation of last September, — is 
 pervasive. Adaptation to the situation of today would mean 
 re-writing. But it is only the phraseology that the armistice 
 has rendered out of date. The problems remain, — not one 
 of them settled despite confident and contradictory news- 
 paper assertion. Even the signing of the treaty of peace, an 
 event for which we must perhaps long wait in patience, will 
 bring to most of them no immediate solution. If the great 
 truth be borne in mind that we are dealing with the slow 
 forces of race evolution rather than with political fiats of in- 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 stant effectiveness, we shall be little disturbed by these sudden 
 eddies in the slow current of events. Momentous as these 
 November days have been, they do not seem to me to have 
 greatly altered the problem. As I read in these days of 
 victory what I wrote in the days of struggle, it is only words 
 that I would change. 
 
 N^o doubt the reader will be impatient, — as I was, — to 
 get over the generalities of Part I and get to the concrete 
 problems of Part II. We have been surfeited with generali- 
 ties and abstract propositions. We are eager to know where 
 the new frontiers are to be drawn and how much Germany 
 is going to pay to Belgium, and what is going to become of 
 the Kaiser. But I have found, as I believe the reader will 
 find, that there is no getting away from these general prin- 
 ciples. We must either master them or they will master us. 
 If we do not hold them as reasoned propositions, we hold 
 them as prepossessions and unconscious assumptions. Thus, 
 there is a universal assumption that people of one speech 
 ought to live under one government, and from that we hastily 
 conclude that there should be an independent Poland. We 
 do not stop to consider that by the same token we ought to 
 be British, Alsace should be German, and Switzerland should 
 be divided among Germany, Italy, and France. Again we 
 assert the right of all peoples to decide their own allegiance. 
 That would have justified the Southern Confederacy and 
 would insure the crumbling of half Europe into helpless frag- 
 ments. Or again we assert the claim of the past and plead 
 for the restoration of historic arrangements. That would 
 make Xew England British and Florida Spanish while re- 
 uniting the Poles and freeing the Bohemians. In popular 
 discussion these and other principles are confidently assumed 
 as political axioms, — not conjointly of course, for this would 
 neutralize them, but singly and for the most part arbitrarily, 
 the particular assumption being requisitioned which proves 
 
PREFACE vii 
 
 momentarily convenient. The writer like the reader is sub 
 ject to this lawless tyranny of arbitrary assumption unless 
 he sternly guards himself against it. It is for this reason 
 that I have ventured to consider with some care the scope 
 and the limitations of these principles which are so confidently 
 and so carelessly assumed in current discussion. I hope the 
 reader will have the patience to do the same. 
 
 Those who have done me the honor to read my earlier 
 books on these subjects will see in the present book a larger 
 recognition of the psychological factor and something less of 
 insistence upon physical environment and cosmic forces than 
 in the earlier works. They will perhaps assume that I have 
 changed my views as to the relative importance of these 
 factors. I should not feel humiliated to plead guilty to the 
 honorable indictment. Strange indeed must be the individual 
 or the nation that has passed through these four years with- 
 out seeing things in somewhat different proportion. The 
 very hope of the world lies in such changes as the result of its 
 travail. 
 
 But the change is after all more in my theme than in my 
 attitude. Hitherto I have dealt with permanent relations 
 and with influences extending over centuries. Seen thus in 
 longer perspective, history seems primarily the product of 
 the cosmic forces. The fume and fret of men seems but 
 froth on the surface. Altogether different is the problem 
 here considered, the problem of effecting a working arrange- 
 ment for the years immediately before us. In this problem 
 of the hour and of the near tomorrow, human forces are 
 everything. The hate of Bulgar and Greek, the prejudice 
 of Moslem and Orthodox and Catholic among the Jugo-Slavs, 
 the resentment against German barbarities, — what are moun- 
 tains and seas against these fierce energies of the human soul ? 
 To treat these as at once almighty and ephemeral, this is the 
 difficult art of the statesman. 
 
viii PREFACE 
 
 I make no apology for my rather pitiless insistence upon 
 the difficulties of the problem and the necessarily imperfect, 
 even provisional, character of the adjustments which peace 
 will effect. The air is full of that irrepressible optimism 
 which is at once the hope and the despair of humanity. If I 
 have trudged along on the ground while others have aero- 
 planed in the clouds, unmindful of the obstacles that beset 
 the pathway of plodding men, I have none the less trudged 
 cheerfully, confident that the obstacles are being overcome 
 and that we shall sometime attain our goal. 
 
 H. H. POWEES. 
 
 Kewton, Mass., 
 
 ISTovember 19, 1918. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAOE 
 
 Author's Preface v 
 
 I Introduction 1 
 
 PAKT I. NATIONALITY 
 
 II Nationalism 15 
 
 III Nationality and Eace 31 
 
 IV Nationality and Territory 43 
 
 V Nationality and Natural Resource ... 55 
 
 "VI Nationality and Trusteeship 67 
 
 VII Nationality and Accountability .... 87 
 
 VIII Nationality and Internationalism . . . 103 
 
 IX Diplomacy and Treaties 127 
 
 PAET II. THE NATIONS 
 
 X Germany 143 
 
 XI Belgium 161 
 
 XII France 175 
 
 XIII Italy 191 
 
 XIV Austria 207 
 
 XV Turkey 242 
 
 XVI Constantinople and the Balkans . . . .270 
 
 XVII Russia and Poland 284 
 
 XVIII The Remoter Powers 297 
 
 XIX Britain 307 
 
 XX America 322 
 
LIST OF MAPS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Map of Belgium 163 
 
 Map of Alsace-Lorraine and the Rhine Province . . . 181 
 
 Map of Italy 195 
 
 Map of Austria-Hungary 209 
 
 Map of Hungary 213 
 
 Map of Czecho- Slovakia 217 
 
 Map of Eumania 221 
 
 Map of Jugo-Slavia 229 
 
 Map of The Turkish Empire 253 
 
 Map of Constantinople and the Dardanelles .... 271 
 
 Map of Poland 291 
 
 Map of South Africa 311 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Great War is passing and the Great Peace approaches. 
 The conflict, prolonged and widened beyond our utmost fears, 
 is entering upon its fifth year as these lines are written. 
 The end is not yet, but the indications are getting clearer 
 that the end is approaching and that the end is to be as we 
 wish. Beyond doubt an extremely stubborn conflict is still 
 before us, with losses that will stagger humanity and with 
 possible vicissitudes of fortune which may at times obscure 
 the issue, but a calm survey of the situation from a point 
 withdrawn from the smoke of battle permits but one conclu- 
 sion. The initial advantage of German preparedness has 
 disappeared, and the superior resources of the Allies in men 
 and materials are unmistakably apparent. The crude and 
 hesitant allied strategy of the early months of the war has 
 been succeeded by clear vision and fixed purpose. The al- 
 most insuperable difficulties in the way of unified command 
 have been overcome. Leadership, if not of N'apoleonic 
 genius, yet forged in the heat of the great conflict and of 
 demonstrated competency, has been assured. Above all the 
 incoherence of thought and confusion of purpose, always the 
 supreme danger in democratic governments, have been elimi- 
 nated. The onslaught of the highly organized Central Pow- 
 ers, which so nearly overwhelmed us at the outset, has trans- 
 formed our unbridled, wanton energy into disciplined power. 
 The more the struggle is prolonged, the more complete that 
 transformation will be and the more assured our triumph. 
 Such is the outlook at this hour. It may deceive us, for 
 nothing is sure before the event, but if the outcome is not 
 
 1 
 
2 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 assured, the obligation of preparedness for the next step is 
 clear. It may be presumptuous to assume victory at this 
 stage of the conflict, but it is simple prudence to prepare be- 
 times for an event which we have willed with all the power 
 of our being and which seems increasingly assured. 
 
 And for this event we are not prepared. As far as Berlin 
 our pathway lies straight before us, — diflficult beyond com- 
 pare, but unmistakable. But from there it is lost in a maze 
 of infinite intricacy. If Germany were beaten tomorrow, 
 we should be in sore perplexity to know what to do next. 
 Preparation for war has left us no time to prepare for 
 peace, — nay, more, it has been a bar to any such preparation. 
 One of the difficult lessons we have had to learn is that we 
 must cease discussing the issues of the war until victory was 
 assured. The paramount need was for agreement. To dis- 
 agree while we were fighting Germany meant ruin. Hence 
 Germany's oft repeated seductive invitation : " Come, now, 
 let us reason together." Germany knew that if she could 
 start a discussion of peace terms, she could start a dis- 
 agreement with all its disastrous consequences. Fortu- 
 nately we knew it too, and have had the self-control to 
 adjourn till the hour of victory those questions upon which 
 agreement will be sure to be difficult and attended with many 
 heart burnings. We were agreed with certainty upon only 
 one thing, the necessity of defeating Germany. For this 
 every nation, every class, every school of opinion, had its 
 own reasons. Latin and Saxon, capital and labor, imperialist 
 and anti-imperialist, all were in sharpest disagreement on 
 some of the issues involved. Fortunately they were agreed 
 that the defeat of Germany was more than the issues upon 
 which they disagreed. The Latin wished to defeat her be- 
 cause she held provinces rightfully his ; the Briton because she 
 menaced his necessary sea communications. The laborite rec- 
 ognized Germany as unfriendly to the political ascendancy of 
 
INTRODUCTIOK 3 
 
 labor, while the manufacturer feared the ruthless aggression 
 of German " big business." The imperialist saw in imperi- 
 alist Germany a redoubtable competitor ; the anti-imperialist 
 saw in her the chief protagonist of a hated principle. It 
 was thumbs down all round, but for the most varied and even 
 opposite reasons. The one condition of successful coopera- 
 tion under such circumstances is that individual aims shall 
 be subordinated. This has been perhaps our hardest lesson 
 as allies, but we have learned it. A few remain who will not 
 be silenced, who are so intent upon their particular purpose 
 that they are willing to risk defeat rather than that victory 
 should fail to realize their hopes. Thus a recent champion 
 of ultra democratic reforms declares that if these reforms are 
 not realized in the forthcoming peace, the war will have been 
 fought in vain. Our allies " must not be permitted to deter- 
 mine our purposes " in the war, but we must constrain them 
 to make these purposes their own, knowing that this will be 
 " for their ultimate good." To this end he urges that Presi- 
 dent Wilson should force their hand by the threat of with- 
 drawing from the alliance. Our aid being indispensable, 
 our terms would necessarily be accepted. This enthusiast 
 does not raise the question of what would happen if Britain 
 should threaten to withdraw unless we acquiesced in a pro- 
 gram of annexation. He sees no disturbing analogy between 
 his proposal and the action of Bulgaria who demanded her 
 price and sold out to the highest bidder, or that of Italy who 
 conditioned her support upon the doubtful acquisition of ter- 
 ritories across the Adriatic. To sanction these purposes is 
 farthest from his thoughts, for they are purposes which he 
 does not approve. But "our" (?) purposes are different, 
 and since they have as yet not commended themselves to our 
 allies, and these allies show no inclination voluntarily to adopt 
 them, it is obvious strategy to bargain with those who oppose 
 these purposes when they are in a tight place. 
 
4 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 It needs no very profound insight to see that this is intro- 
 ducing the principle of belligerency into the Allied camp. 
 Strategy is a principle of war, and its use against allies means 
 war against allies. If every people, class, or party should 
 choose this time to push its advantage under penalty of re- 
 fusing to cooperate, it is obvious that cooperation would at 
 once cease. For while the radical declares that if peace does 
 not assure radical democracy, the war will have been fought 
 in vain, a conservative is simultaneously declaring that if 
 ultra democracy prevails, " then we have lost the war." To 
 the insinuating demand that we should state our case against 
 Germany, there has been one consistent answer. We have no 
 single case against Germany. We have individual cases 
 against her, but as yet no common case. Each belligerent 
 has purposes peculiar to itself, purposes in which its allies 
 have little interest, purposes which are even mutually antago- 
 nistic. Italy wants the Trentino and Trieste, but has no 
 direct interest in the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. France 
 wants Alsace-Lorraine, but is little interested in, — perhaps 
 is secretly jealous of, — Britain's control of the sea. And so 
 on indefinitely. The discussion of these aims may produce, — 
 almost certainly will produce, — antagonisms and estrange- 
 ments, not only between allies, but also between classes and 
 special interests within each individual country. 'No suc- 
 cessful war of modern times has failed to have its aftermath 
 of disappointment and recrimination. England's clemency to 
 the Boers alienated large sections of British political opinion. 
 The Treaty of Frankfort left divided counsels in Germany, 
 and the Treaty of Portsmouth well nigh produced a revolution 
 in Japan. This war will be no exception to the rule. It will 
 rather be an exceptional case in point. Hence the just char- 
 acterization of all Germany's peace offensives as traps. If 
 these inherent conflicts of interest and opinion could be lifted 
 
INTKODUCTION 6 
 
 up into consciousness while Germany is still redoubtable, a 
 judicious concession to war-weary Italy or some other ap- 
 proachable unit might disclose another Caporetto and breach 
 the line. Failing this, it would at least lessen the cohesion 
 and weaken the morale upon which victory depends. It is all 
 but certain that if the belligerents were to agree to an armis- 
 tice and meet in council, conditions would develop, as the ^ 
 result of their discussions, which would make the resumption 
 of hostilities impossible, no matter how unsatisfactory the 
 results obtained. 
 
 All such proposals have fallen flat, save in the deplorable 
 case of Russia, whose fate has not been without its lessons for 
 the Allies. These proposals have found their supporters, but 
 they have everywhere been a dwindling minority. ISTot with- 
 out difficulty has a people habituated to free speech and politi- 
 cal discussion, seen the reasonableness of refusing to reason. 
 Yet in nothing have tbey so justified the claim of democracy 
 to be the arbiter of these difficult questions. It is democracy's 
 supreme achievement to have perceived that the will to victory 
 must exclude all else until victory makes it possible to dis- 
 agree and not perish. For disagree we shall and must. 
 
 It is thus that preparation for war has postponed prepara- 
 tion for peace, by excluding from negotiation, from public 
 discussion, even from individual thought, the grave questions 
 incident to peace. With all the pronouncements that have 
 appeared, there is as yet scarce a beginning of formulated 
 terms. These pronouncements have been, for the most part, 
 literary or rhetorical generalizations valuable for rallying 
 purposes but not of a nature to enter into a treaty of peace. 
 To destroy militarism, to make the world safe for democracy, 
 to secure the right of self-determination for all peoples, these 
 are legitimate formulas for ideals, but it is clear that if these 
 ends are to be furthered by treaty, these propositions must 
 
6 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 be translated into concrete terms, territorial, economic, and 
 commercial. This is the task of peace making, the task which 
 we have adjourned. 
 
 Yet in another sense the adjournment has furthered the 
 formulation of peace terms in a way which no discussion or 
 negotiation could have done. The concrete task has waited, 
 but the psychology of the peoples who are to perform the task, 
 has undergone constant and far-reaching change. We have 
 ceased to be citizens of a country or a state and have all un- 
 consciously become citizens of the world. Undreamed pos- 
 sibilities of cooperation among nations have been realized as 
 incidents to the great struggle. Equally, the marauder has 
 disclosed a power and a will to injure which nothing but the 
 experience could have made credible. In particular, our own 
 nation has forever discarded the myth of isolation. It long 
 ago ceased to be a fact, but the tradition lingered, and along 
 with it, not a little of the ignorance, the arrogance, and the 
 indifference of which it was the fertile source. If there are 
 those who still think we might have avoided this war, they 
 must at least recognize that we have not avoided it, and being 
 what we are, we should not be likely to avoid it under like 
 circumstances again. If the physical conditions permit iso- 
 lation, the psychic conditions do not. Whatever reluctance 
 we may have felt to accept this conclusion, the constant neces- 
 sities of international concert and the fellowship of prolonged 
 suffering and achievement have tended rapidly to dissipate it. 
 We are reconciled to being a part of the world, an indis- 
 pensable pre-requisite of intelligent participation in the great 
 world task. If, therefore, we still know little of the compli- 
 cated problems with which the peace conference must deal, we 
 have been getting ready to know. We have been developing 
 the " international mind." 
 
 This was peculiarly necessary for the Allies who repre- 
 sent, — partly by chance, to be sure, but not the less really, — 
 
INTRODUCTIO]^ 7 
 
 the cause of democracy. Democracy, despite its ancient line- 
 age, is a comparatively modern thing. Its ancient applica- 
 tions were to imits so small as to have no modern significance, 
 and its modern applications have been partial at best. 
 Broadly speaking, its success has been in inverse ratio to the 
 size of its domain. The town meeting has been a success ; the 
 state has been less successful. In the broadest field of inter- 
 national relations democracy has yet to demonstrate its ca- 
 pacity. The great democracy of Britain has had a wonderful 
 diplomacy, but not a very democratic one. Nowhere does 
 democracy defer so willingly to expert wisdom as in the 
 matter of foreign relations. Our own experience is also un- 
 convincing. Our diplomacy has been neither wholly demo- 
 cratic nor wholly successful, and withal its tasks have been 
 much simpler than those of other nations, largely because we 
 have deliberately minimized our relations with other states. 
 
 But throughout the domain of democracy there is a clear 
 announcement that democracy is to assume the responsibili- 
 ties of diplomacy. There is to be no more secret diplomacy. 
 International relations like domestic relations are to be deter- 
 mined by the popular will. Doubtless the change will be 
 less sweeping than these demands would suggest, but there 
 can be little doubt that there will be a change and that it will 
 be in the direction indicated. The people may not know how 
 to rule, but they are plainly determined to try. The forth- 
 coming settlement is sure to feel a democratic pressure never 
 known before. That settlement will not only involve concrete 
 problems affecting every nation on the planet, but it will prob- 
 ably establish new principles and lay the foundations of a 
 most radical reconstruction of the world order. It is not 
 simple tasks but supreme incentives that call democracy into 
 action. Such an incentive the present conflict has furnished. 
 The settlement will be a people's peace as has been no other. 
 No matter who the people's representative may be, he will 
 
8 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 listen to the people's voice for tlie constant renewal of his 
 mandate. Not once but a thousand times in the course of 
 the long negotiations, will be heard the words : '" Our people 
 demand this." " Our people will not accept that." If used 
 at times as a screen for personal insistence, it will owe its 
 serviceableness in this connection to its substantial truth. 
 The people will dictate, vaguely, fitfully, ambiguously, but 
 not the less imperiously. We have invoked democracy, and 
 democracy has come at our bidding, unskilled and unknowing, 
 but not the less unafraid. 
 
 Not to the diplomats, whose skill I respect but do not 
 emulate, but to the people, their masters, these pages are dedi- 
 cated. What shall be the terms of the people's peace, the 
 Great Peace ? What are the principles of that better state- 
 craft which has been slowly and half unconsciously taking 
 shape in the minds of those who through the will to victory 
 have slowly won the right to will the world's peace ? And 
 what do these principles require in the way of concrete ad- 
 justments and arrangements among the mountains and the 
 rivers and the seas where men have chanced to be born and 
 have snugly nested themselves in the traditions, the preju- 
 dices, the loves and the hates of a hundred generations i 
 
 On one point let there be no misunderstanding. Not until 
 victory crowns our arms do these questions become the order 
 of the day. With the enemy in arms there can be no parley, 
 none even among ourselves until we can be sure of our own 
 uncompromising and inflexible purpose. Our enemy will not 
 spare, and we must not spare. The most criminal of all wars 
 is the one begim for a righteous purpose and stopped short of 
 a possible triumph. Such a war exacts its toll of misery and 
 devastation, yet relinquishes the prize which alone can justify 
 the sacrifice. War is the negation of reason, the confession 
 that moral forces have failed to safeguard essential human 
 interests. A beaten enemy or one who knows that to go far- 
 
INTRODUCTION 9 
 
 ther is to fare worse, will grasp at the ruse of negotiation. 
 The nation that is fooled thereby has not learned the lesson 
 of war. Negotiation to the uttermost before war begins ; war 
 to the uttermost when negotiation has failed. There is no 
 half way ground in the law of war. This is not spite. These 
 lines are written in no vindictive or implacable spirit. It is 
 the plainest statement of inexorable law that they who draw 
 the sword must accept its arbitrament. These pages are not 
 written for the enemy, but for his conquerors against the day 
 of victory. If they are written somewhat in advance of that 
 day, it is in the firm conviction that the will to victory is 
 assured. If victory is still to tarry long in its coming, it is 
 not too early to prepare for its arrival. When it comes there 
 can be no waiting. The misery of the world will brook no 
 long and hesitant negotiations. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that the writer is not attempt- 
 ing to draft a treaty of peace. Such an instrument, of neces- 
 sity a task for experts, is but an incident in the larger problem 
 of settlement and reconstruction which will require many 
 minds and many agencies for its accomplishment. Our at- 
 tempt will be simply to answer the question : What should 
 the Allies demand? This question takes no account of the 
 detailed problem of ways and means, nor yet of the probable 
 ability of the Allies to impose their will. The question is 
 perhaps best discussed as an academic question. It is well 
 to be clear as to what we seek, whether or not the fate of arms 
 puts the prize within our reach. Not by way of prophecy, 
 however legitimate, but by way of working hypothesis, we 
 assume the defeat of Germany as the basis of our inquiry. 
 If Germany threw up her hands and cried " Kamerad," what 
 would we do with her ? What with her wretched partners ? 
 What of the powers now our allies, and of the great world in 
 general and possible better guaranties for its peace and order ? 
 We will be as concrete and practical as possible in our an- 
 
10 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 swers. It avails little to saj that frontiers should follow 
 ethnic lines. Where are those lines, and what sort of a Eu- 
 rope would we have if we followed them? A little map 
 drawing will throw much light upon a dilBcult principle 
 which, in the untested abstract, seems so attractively simple. 
 Similarly, such principles as self-determination and independ- 
 ence. Who or what is the " self " involved and what is the 
 scope of the desired " determination." Accepting without 
 question the principle of making the world safe for democ- 
 racy, what measures is it desirable or practicable for the 
 nations in council to adopt looking to that end ? In a word, 
 the purpose will be to concrete the problem, not to technical- 
 ize it. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that inquiries of this kind are 
 peculiarly necessary for the American people. We no doubt 
 have a very considerable aptitude for practical affairs, but in 
 the present struggle we are, by our very location, ignorant of 
 the practical issues involved, ^ot one in a thousand of us 
 knows that the fate of the world may be determined by the 
 possession of a great iron mine in Lorraine, or a pass across 
 the Taurus Mountains, or a harbor in the Adriatic. We are 
 tolerably good judges of iron mines and passes and harbors 
 when once we discover their existence, but we do not live in 
 Europe, and have not thought it worth our while as a nation 
 to take note of its outworn equipment. So our unencum- 
 bered minds find in this field, thus artificially denuded of all 
 its concrete realities, a rare opportunity for that aerial po- 
 litical philosophy which we as a people affect. It is appall- 
 ing with what confidence we generalize from our own highly 
 exceptional experience regarding situations in Europe which 
 we totally misconceive. We invoke democracy as the cure 
 for all the ills which the Central Powers are inflicting upon 
 the world, quite overlooking the fact that both the German 
 Eeichstag and the Austrian Eeichsrat are almost ideally 
 
mTRODUCTION" 11 
 
 democratic bodies. A man can vote for deputy in either 
 Austria or Germany who could not vote for Congressman in 
 Massachusetts. These bodies have no real power, we are 
 told. True, because they do not take it. They have all the 
 power that the British House of Commons ever had to curb 
 autocracy, if they and the people back of them had the will 
 to do so. But these peoples do not wish to curb autocracy 
 which they believe necessary to give them the unity which 
 popular government would destroy. The most superficial 
 knowledge of these countries, and especially of Austria, re- 
 veals conditions with which our democracy has never shown 
 itself able to cope. A knowledge of these facts of physical 
 environment and political condition should be valuable, if for 
 nothing else, to moderate the excessive confidence of our po- 
 litical generalizations. 
 
 Finally, let it be insisted with all possible emphasis, that 
 the terms of peace to be agreed upon should be based upon the 
 fullest recognition of the special problems and wishes of the 
 associated nations. There is a disposition in some quarters 
 to recall the fact that we entered the war as a free lance, not 
 bound by any pledge to make peace in common with those who 
 had so long borne the burden before us. This fancied liberty 
 gives us a freedom of action, so we are told, which enables us 
 to dictate terms. Conceivably, to those who see no obligation 
 that is not " so nominated in the bond." But no possible 
 course of action could be more unworthy or unreasonable. 
 The nearness of the Allies to the scene of conflict and their 
 immediate dependence upon the result gives them a right to 
 speak which we can scarcely claim. Were our detachment 
 entirely a matter of disinterestedness instead of being chiefly 
 a matter of ignorance, our ambition to act as arbiter might 
 have some justification. As it is, any such pretension on our 
 part is quite unwarranted and its enforcement by coercion, 
 direct or indirect, altogether intolerable. We are not more 
 
12 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 disinterested than the Allies. We are simply more ignorant 
 of our interests. Above all we are ignorant of their interests. 
 It is therefore earnestly to be hoped that our study of the 
 problem of peace will be conducted throughout in a spirit of 
 profoundest deference for the views and the wishes of those 
 who are associated with us in the struggle and who are so 
 immediately and vitally dependent upon the outcome. 
 
 It is needless to say that the technical task of treaty draft- 
 ing, frontier delimitation, and financial adjustment which 
 must complete the agreement reached, is a task for experts 
 and one quite beyond the scope of the present work. 
 
PAET 1 
 NATIONALITY 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 NATIONALISM 
 
 As we approach the problem of peace, the first question is, 
 who is at war ? This question may seem superfluous in view 
 of common knowledge on the subject, but a moment's reflec- 
 tion will convince us that here at the outset of our inquiry 
 there exists a serious confusion of thought. The surface 
 fact that we are at war with Germany is held by many to 
 conceal a deeper fact of very different purport. On the one 
 hand we are assured that our quarrel is not with the German 
 people but with the German government, the latter being con- 
 ceived primarily as a principle of rule represented by a lim- 
 ited clique of persons who are at present its exponents. 
 Making due allowance for the diplomacy associated with this 
 assertion and recognizing its apparent conflict with the logic 
 of events, it can not be doubted that this doctrine has a 
 strong hold upon the popular mind. The fact that the powers 
 allied against Germany have been from the first predomi- 
 nantly democratic and that the fortunes of war have elimi- 
 nated the most conspicuous exception, — autocratic, German- 
 modeled Japan being easily overlooked, — has tended to con- 
 firm this impression that this is a war, not between nations as 
 such, but between principles of political and social organiza- 
 tion. That it is so in fact admits of no reasonable doubt. 
 Popular government is a reality in the western peoples and 
 is not yet realized in the Central Powers. If the western 
 nations win, their ideas will win with them, while a German 
 victory would undoubtedly give a long lease of life and a pos- 
 sible extension of domain to autocracy. ISTo doubt autocracy 
 and democracy stand to win or lose with their present cham- 
 
 15 
 
16 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 pions, at least for long years to come. But whether these 
 nations have gone to war primarily as champions of democ- 
 racy or autocracy is not so clear. Had this been the issue in 
 1914, Japan and Russia would certainly have taken the other 
 side. On the outskirts of the two great camps are others 
 whose status is not clear. As regards democracy, there is at 
 present little to choose between China and Turkey, between 
 Bulgaria and Serbia, yet they are in opposite camps. It is 
 difficult to avoid the conclusion that other considerations have 
 influenced these nations, — all of them considerably, some of 
 them overwhelmingly. Democracy and autocracy will share 
 the fate of other characteristics, language, religion, etc. A 
 German victory would enormously extend the domain of the 
 German language, as an allied victory will extend or confirm 
 that of English and French. Yet no one claims that this is 
 a war of languages. Incidentally it is so, for the victor's 
 language will triumph with him, nor would it be safe to 
 assume that peoples are unconscious of this fact or uninflu- 
 enced by it. Consciously, and still more unconsciously, they 
 are committed in heart to their own familiar speech and will 
 sacrifice much for its sake. But this is but one of many 
 things to which they are committed and for which they will 
 suffer and die. 
 
 Quite comparable to the view that this is a war between 
 principles, is the widely held theory that it is a war of classes, 
 a capitalists' war, as popular phrase puts it. The argument 
 is that wars are brought on by financial interests in the hope 
 of gain. This gain may be in the shape of direct profits from 
 industries created or stimulated by the war, or the more subtle 
 gain of tactical advantage in the class struggle always in prog- 
 ress. The argument is often forced and obviously convinces 
 less by its cogency than by its congeniality. That there are 
 facts which lend themselves to this interpretation is clear. 
 War contracts of immense extent are let on easy terms and 
 
NATIONALISM 17 
 
 result in enormous profits. Currency inflation, always a con- 
 comitant of war, even when best financed, sends up prices, 
 scales down debts and creates fictitious values. Every war 
 has left its legacy of great fortunes, often persisting through 
 many generations. Sentiment, too, throws its weight into the 
 scale. Labor is adjured in the name of patriotism not to 
 press its advantage, and its response may at times enable capi- 
 tal to improve its tactical position. 
 
 It would be strange if these possibilities did not appeal to 
 certain individuals. That " high finance " or '' big busi- 
 ness " should avail itself in a measure of the opportunities 
 thus offered is to be expected. That it has at times done so 
 on a considerable scale and with far-reaching results is prob- 
 able. The action of the National Liberal party, — the party 
 of " big business " — in Germany in the present war appar- 
 ently furnishes an example. Nor is the influence exerted by 
 so mighty an organization as Krupps on minor nations 
 through well conducted propaganda a negligible factor in 
 determining their decisions for war or peace. 
 
 But when all is said, the facts are hopelessly against this 
 theory as an explanation of war. War is destruction, and 
 wealth prospers onlv bv production. The disturbance of 
 values brings wealth to a few but takes wealth from many. 
 The fortunes that war creates are as nothing to the fortunes 
 which it destroys. If individuals in hope of gain are moved 
 to favor war, even to promote it bv organized effort, im- 
 mensely greater numbers are moved by identical interests to 
 preserve peace, and there is no reason to suppose them less 
 alert or capable than their opponents. Similarly, if war 
 gives the employer an advantage over patriotic labor, it gives 
 labor a far greater advantage over capital when industry, 
 feverishly stimulated and penalized for failure, can suffer no 
 interruption. If the rise of wages does not always outstrip 
 the rise in prices, the thoughtful laborer will realize that he 
 
18 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 scores an enormous gain if he maintains his standard of living 
 at a time when society as a whole is put on short rations. 
 War comes to no class as a boon, but upon none does its hand 
 rest more lightly than upon labor. 
 
 All of these considerations are greatly enhanced as war 
 passes from the local to the general. It is possible to imag- 
 ine big business in America or England deriving advantage 
 from a war in the Balkans in which we were non-participants 
 and our profits as purveyors were undiminished by war taxes. 
 Even so, a close analysis would disclose offsets for these advan- 
 tages, though hardly sufficient to neutralize their temptations. 
 But when the conflagration becomes general, these advantages 
 disappear. The farmer whose crop is good in a season of 
 partial crop failure, may prosper and even come to associate 
 prosperity with crop failure. But let the blight extend to 
 his own crop and the truer relation reveals itself. Even with- 
 out this immediate loss, it must slowly become clear that pros- 
 perity is sadly limited under conditions of widespread indi- 
 gence. 
 
 Ko, the " interests " find their opportunity in a condition 
 of general prosperity and maximum production of wealth. 
 Nothing is more certain than that the great capital interests 
 in modern states are overwhelmingly committed to peace. 
 The destroyer of wealth is their enemy, no matter where he 
 operates, for he destroys the medium in which they operate, 
 the sole possible source of their gains. So clear is this fact 
 that sanguine experts before our present war were found to 
 declare that organized industry and finance had made war 
 impossible. The holders of the purse strings held the dogs 
 of war in leash. This was an exaggeration of the power of 
 organized finance, as others then contended and as the result 
 has shown, but there was never a question then, — there can 
 be no question now, — as to where the interests of capital and 
 
^NATIONALISM 19 
 
 finance really lie and on which side their representatives are 
 to be found. 
 
 But while this is not fundamentally a class war, it is so to 
 a degree incidentally. No one of the present belligerents 
 entered this war to emancipate labor or to subject it to the 
 tyranny of capital. Yet it will not escape any fair-minded 
 observer that the status of labor is far different on the one side 
 from what it is on the other. Despite their enormous accu- 
 mulations of capital, no countries have so restricted the power 
 of capital by legislative and social action as have Britain and 
 the United States. In none is the influence of labor so pow- 
 erful. Not only in the great Anglo-Saxon centers but still 
 more in the self-governing dominions of Australia and New 
 Zealand, labor sits in the seat of the mighty as nowhere else 
 in the world. Neither the equity nor the adequacy of these 
 conditions is here in question. We are concerned only to note 
 the fact that the Anglo-Saxon countries stand as the supreme 
 representatives of the principle of labor emancipation. Noth- 
 ing approximating these conditions can be found in Germany 
 and Austria. On the other hand, in Germany especially, 
 organizations of capital, instead of being checked by anti- 
 trust laws as with us, have been favored, even forced, in the 
 interest of national efficiency. Again we will waive the ques- 
 tion of desirability or undesirability of these policies. It is 
 sufficient to note the facts. 
 
 Once more, it behooves us to recognize that this antithesis 
 does not hold throughout. Industrial conditions in China, 
 Japan, Serbia, or Greece, bear little resemblance to those 
 above described. Least of all did Russia, at the time of her 
 entering the conflict, rank with the emancipated powers, nor 
 has her orgy of liberty contributed certainly to the emancipa- 
 tion of labor, however effectually it has destroyed capitalist 
 tyranny. It is perfectly certain that the line-up was not on 
 
20 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 this issue, yet it is equally certain that the line chances to be 
 drawn between the forces of industrial freedom and reaction. 
 A German victory will mean the perpetuation of the all- 
 powerful Cartels of German industrial organization and the 
 extension of their sway over new territories together with the 
 subjection of labor. A victory for the Allies must as cer- 
 tainly extend their industrial system with its attendant eman- 
 cipation of labor. 
 
 Other popular theories of war might be considered, but 
 always with the same result. The contestants in the great 
 struggle are not fighting in the first instance for an abstract 
 principle or for a virtue, or for a private or class interest, 
 but for a great concrete human thing which embodies 
 these principles and interests only incidentally and im- 
 perfectly, and that along with many others. For this is a 
 war between nations. And we find our place in the 
 ranks, not because we approve the principles or interests 
 there represented, but for the very much humbler reason that 
 we were born there and have, for the most part, no option but 
 to stay. This does not mean that we do not care for these 
 principles, virtues, or interests, but that we recognize the 
 impracticability of working for them otherwise than as em- 
 bodied in the nation. We try to make our nation represent 
 the principles and the special interests that we believe in, al- 
 ways with but partial success, but w^e accept the result and 
 make the best of it. For after all the nation is the only place 
 where these things have any real existence. The only virtue 
 there is in the world is the virtue that is in virtuous men, and 
 they are only partially virtuous at best. So with nations. 
 None of them have ideal class relations or perfect democracy, 
 but they have the only democracy and the only class relations 
 that there are in the world. Outside of them there is only 
 imagination, a valuable thing, but not at all to be mistaken 
 for the reality. It is only out of the democracy of the pres- 
 
]SrATIOJTALISM 21 
 
 ent and the imperfect class relations of the present that the 
 better democracy and the more perfect class relation can grow. 
 Thus the nation is the repository of all that the race has 
 achieved in the way of democracy and all related interests, a 
 very imperfect repository, no doubt, but the only one. The 
 treasure is in earthen vessels, but there are no other vessels, 
 and without them there would be no treasure. 
 
 It is therefore the deepest of all social instincts, an instinct 
 more imperious than that of our own self-protection, which 
 impels us to defend the nation. Within the home circle we 
 may criticise, attack, and modify to any extent, but we must 
 not sacrifice the nation or carry our criticism to the point of 
 weakening it in the great competition of the nations. When 
 the existence of the nation is ever so remotely at stake, criti- 
 cism and party struggle must cease. Thus the two great 
 parties in the British government are usually in sharpest 
 antagonism, but when a foreign crisis menaces the British na- 
 tion, it is the unfailing practice that the leader of the oppo- 
 sition in Parliament rises at the first opportunity and pledges 
 the support of his party to the government. There must be 
 no opposition within, no criticism, no discussion of principles, 
 while there is danger from without. These lines are written 
 not by way of advocacy, but simply in explanation of the 
 fundamental political principle of our age. Men have every- 
 where judged that the nations are essential as repositories of 
 the great social forces and that they must be defended from 
 all attacks, violent or insidious. There are a few who seem 
 to think this policy a mistake. They see in the nation not so 
 much a repository of social forces as an interference with 
 their larger play. They would quite disparage nationalism 
 or abolish it altogether. Perhaps the future may have such 
 things in store, but certainly not the present. To eliminate 
 the nation in the interest of humanity would be like tearing 
 down our house that we might see the sky. 
 
22 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that in this cult of the nation 
 we have usually very little choice as to which nation we shall 
 support. The nations are not all alike, and it is often pos- 
 sible for the intelligent citizen to see that some other meets 
 his ideas of justice and political wisdom far better than his 
 own. But he can not usually change his allegiance on that 
 account, nor would it be well if he could. The free lance may 
 espouse the cause of a nation with which he is in sympathy, 
 as Lord Byron espoused the cause of Greek independence, but 
 few are so situated that they can play this part, and it is a 
 very ineffectual part. Changes of allegiance are diflScult and 
 are seldom made for political reasons. The allegiance of 
 adoption is always an imperfect allegiance. But quite aside 
 from this question of feasibility is the deeper question of 
 right. The crude and imperfect nation may have quite as 
 good reason to exist as the more advanced nation. It is all 
 the nation that somebody has. It may hold little as yet in 
 the way of finished achievements, but it holds unknown pos- 
 sibilities, possibilities that no other nation may be able to 
 hold, and that are somebody's all. Hence the instinct of 
 national support is unquestioning. Stand for principle, vir- 
 tue, party, class, within the nation, but never as between na- 
 tions. Stand for your nation. Such is the instinct and law 
 of being in the twentieth century. Perhaps no people has 
 ever shown more devotion to abstract principles or contended 
 more earnestly for them than the French, and never were 
 they more engrossed in their several advocacies than in 1914. 
 But ask a French soldier what he is fighting for, and what 
 will he reply ? For liberty, equality, fraternity ? for democ- 
 racy? for socialism? Not one of these. The answer will 
 not vary among a thousand. " Pour la France." 
 
 Perhaps the most disturbing thought about this blind in- 
 stinct of nationalism is that it so often tenaciously maintains 
 barriers and divisions that are clearly superfluous. It has 
 
NATIONALISM 23 
 
 the vices as well as the virtues of conservatism. We could 
 all mention manifestations of nationalism today that are an 
 unqualified nuisance, though there might be disagreement as 
 to the examples chosen. Indeed there are no more serious 
 obstacles in the way of the settlement that we seek than cer- 
 tain perfectly gratuitous and obstructive assertions of nation- 
 alism. Virtues like individuals have the defects of their 
 qualities. It is friction that makes it so hard to move the 
 railway train, but it is friction that makes it possible to move 
 it at all, for without friction the wheels would not grip the 
 rails. Nationalism must therefore be dealt with in its dual 
 capacity of conserving and obstructing force. Few will ques- 
 tion the wisdom of the French soldier who fights for France, 
 but we did question, — and as the world judges, justly — the 
 wisdom of those who fought to make a separate nation out of 
 our southern states. There are other cases. The mere shout 
 of nationalism for any chance unit without consideration of 
 size, location, or suitability, is not a claim to our endorsement. 
 For in one important particular nations are not like men. 
 They are after all only devices for human convenience, with- 
 out assignable limit as to size or character. Hence it is that 
 they are able to devour and absorb one another, either wholly 
 or in part, becoming thereby proportionally larger. Men 
 have fixed frontiers, and though they may greatly interfere 
 with one another's privilege and convenience, this frontier 
 of personal identity is never passed. Not so with nations. 
 They may not only annex one another's territories, but may 
 quite assimilate one another's people, displacing the senti- 
 ments and habits which constituted their former nationality 
 by others suitable to the new allegiance. This latter process, 
 to be sure, is often slow and difficult, and seemingly becomes 
 more difficult as the national organization becomes more elab- 
 orate. But if we take a long glance backward over history 
 we shall not onlv discover cases in which it has been com- 
 
24 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 pletely successful, but we shall perceive that this process of 
 merger and assimilation, often violent and painful, has been 
 the regular method of national growth in its earlier stages. 
 Indeed, it is not clear how else great nations could have 
 come into being in a world which was all parceled out among 
 little ones. It is pretty clear that nations ultimately reach a 
 stage of development where such merger and assimilation is 
 no longer possible, — indeed it seems to be one of the mistakes 
 of our great adversary not to have fully appreciated this fact, 
 but up to a certain point, while nations are still plastic, such 
 mergers, even though temporarily unwelcome, are a normal 
 method of uniting men. The principle of self-determina- 
 tion, — a principle vital to nations as to individuals, — pre- 
 supposes in each case a certain maturity. Applied rashly it 
 means disintegration. 
 
 Since nations are but conveniences and, as it were, way- 
 stations on the road toward unity, why, it may be asked, 
 should we not at once effect the inevitable union, thus ending 
 once for all, these conflicts which threaten to engulf human- 
 ity ? Easier said than done. !N"ations serve the purpose of 
 social convenience, but it is not therefore to be assumed that 
 they are mechanical contrivances which can be used or junked 
 at pleasure. The nation is not contrived; it grows. Its 
 essence is not an agreement but a sentiment, or rather, a com- 
 plex maze of sentiments, associations and attachments, the 
 product of incredibly slow growth. Have we any idea of the 
 painful experiences through which man has come to his pres- 
 ent estate ? Slowly, with countless misgivings and misadven- 
 tures, he has stumbled out of the isolation of his early cave, 
 living down old suspicions, laying the ghosts of strange ter- 
 rors, accustoming himself to new restrictions, and learning 
 new arts, new wants, and new loves. For millenniums each 
 he has conned the lesson of the family, the clan, the tribe, the 
 petty state, the nation, learning their passwords, their sym- 
 
NATIONALISM 25 
 
 bols, and their mystic rites, ever revolting and as often 
 scourged back to his arduous task. With every widening of 
 his frontier he has faced new terrors and met new foes, ever 
 constrained to enter upon new pathways where his progress 
 has been marked by his blood. Ever and anon the frontier 
 has claimed him as its victim, yielding him a sullen obedience 
 only at the price of the amenities and the attachments which 
 were the glory of the narrower circle, and making him the 
 outlaw of progress. The structure of civilization is cemented 
 with the blood of humanity, and not with that of the soldier 
 alone. 
 
 And now comes our heedless enthusiast and asks : " To 
 what purpose all this clamor of the nations ? Why love the 
 one more than the other? How are you better off to live 
 under this government than under that ? " Eorsooth ! How 
 am I better off to live in my own skin ? 
 
 It is the A B C of our inquiry to recognize the fundamental 
 character of nationality. It is beside the mark to descant 
 upon the weakness of nationality and the advantages of inter- 
 nationalism. We have the one and we have not the other. 
 That the larger circle, the wider horizon, to the limit of a 
 unified humanity, is preferable to our present national units 
 we may readily admit. The unification of humanity is the 
 obvious goal of human progress, the unavoidable hypothesis 
 of all constructive thought. But the question is not as to the 
 merits of human unity. The question is how to get it. 
 We shall not get it by the disparagement of nationality or 
 by the reversal of the process by w^hich organization has thus 
 far been attained. Nations have their unlovely traits. 
 They are selfish, suspicious, and prone to resort to force in 
 the assertion of their claims. Scrupulosity, candor, and 
 deference have not been the rule in international relations. 
 That is unbeautiful, seemingly bad, though an exact appraisal 
 of results is difficult. But nations have their beautiful side. 
 
26 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 Sheltered behind their barriers of prejudice and suspicion are 
 discipline and forbearance, cooperation, protection, and love. 
 There the ritual of life works its marvel of harmony in feel- 
 ing, thought, and action. These things are good, just the 
 kind of things that the great human nation of the future will 
 require in larger measure. To decry nationality, to belittle 
 its services, to emphasize its limitations and picture it as the 
 antithesis of human unity instead of its partial realization, 
 this is not to advance the cause of unity but to retard it. 
 Nationality is human unity half grown. If we ever get full 
 unity, it will be by the further development of nationality. 
 Even now that further development is visibly taking place 
 before our eyes. It is seemingly to be the crovsming glory 
 of our own race to develop the super-nation, the unforced 
 merger of independent nations committed to pacific coopera- 
 tion in the field of the largest human interests. 
 
 It is not irrelevant to note in this connection that the critics 
 of nationality, though ever reprehending its divisive influence, 
 seem to have little real sympathy with unity as hitherto real- 
 ized in human experience. The emphasis is always upon 
 liberty, with a visible sense of the irksomeness of cogent or- 
 ganization. Their ideal seems rather to be that of an easy- 
 going fellowship in which friction is reduced by reducing the 
 points of contact, an organization that is less exacting, more 
 Bohemian in spirit, and free from the irksome constraints of 
 the more strenuous nationalism. It is significant that inter- 
 nationalism, rather than supernationalism or pan-nationalism, 
 is the term chosen to express this ideal. The assumption is 
 that present nations are to persist, but wnth their teeth 
 drawn, this concession to the rejected principle of nationality 
 being made as a matter of expediency. But nationality as 
 thus tolerated, is to lose its old time significance as the unifier 
 of humanity. 
 
 Concurrently with this emasculation of nationality, the 
 
NATIOI^ALISM 27 
 
 utmost emphasis is laid upon local independence or self-deter- 
 mination. It is easy to see what all this comes to. Divisive 
 tendencies now held in check by the demands of nationalism 
 would be released and half completed assimilations inter- 
 rupted. The painfully widening mental horizon would again 
 narrow. Localism, provincialism, with an imsubstantial fic- 
 tion of human unity, these are the inevitable, — perhaps the 
 desired, — result. The internationalist is conspicuously the 
 advocate of local and internal reforms. Fortunately for our 
 instruction, this philosophy is being applied by Hussia, with 
 what results, those most concerned may soon be expected to 
 judge. 
 
 These conclusions will evoke protest. The internationalist 
 disclaims any intention of disparaging nationality. A promi- 
 nent socialist has recently declared : " Internationalism is 
 not anti-nationalism. Internationalism presupposes nation- 
 alism. It is the inter-relation of nations. The maintenance 
 of national integrity and independence is one essential con- 
 dition of internationalism." No doubt these declarations are 
 sincere and represent the attitude of internationalists as a 
 class. They have no intention of destroying nationalism. 
 But we are less concerned with intentions than with tend- 
 encies. The internationalist recognizes in nationalism an 
 " essential condition of internationalism," but does he recog- 
 nize the essential conditions of nationalism ? International- 
 ism may not purpose the destruction of nationalism, but the 
 disparagement of nationalism has always been its concomi- 
 tant, its pervasive spirit. The animating spirit of interna- 
 tionalism has ever been, — not national solidarity, but class 
 solidarity, — and it is national solidarity which is the " essen- 
 tial condition " of nationalism. 
 
 It is to be noted finally that nationalism is the striking 
 characteristic of recent political development. This means 
 that the present age is preeminently the age of nations and 
 
28 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 that sentiment and doctrine have followed in the wake of fact. 
 The definiteness and coherence acquired by the modern na- 
 tions in the last two or three centuries and above all the 
 immense increase in the daily services rendered by the nation 
 in our time, all this has developed a corresponding group 
 consciousness out of all proportion to anything known in 
 earlier times. When the individual knew the nation only as 
 the tax gatherer or through the summons to the corvee or the 
 army, his enthusiasm for the nation was not very ardent. In- 
 deed, had the call to service not come through his local liege 
 lord to whom he sustained a closer and more human relation, 
 it is doubtful whether the state could have commanded his 
 allegiance. But when he meets the state daily in the post- 
 man, when the railway, the highway, and all the complex ma- 
 chinery of modern national life reveal the state as the great 
 doer of needful things, the national consciousness becomes an 
 abiding, all-overshadowing fact. Hence the tendency, — 
 seemingly somewhat counter to the spirit of the age, — toward 
 separation under the lead of nationalism. The languid na- 
 tionalism of an earlier day permitted the pseudo-union of 
 Xorway and Sweden, presaged a like union of Spain and 
 Portugal, and permitted the drastic germanizing policy of 
 Maria Theresa and her son with but feeble opposition. The 
 nationalism of today, tenfold intensified by the larger service- 
 ableness of the state and reinforced by the literary revival 
 which has restored the consciousness of past achievement, has 
 made short work of these unions based on indifference. Nor- 
 way and Sweden have separated, Portugal repudiates the 
 idea of merger with vehemence, and the strangely consorted 
 nationalities of the dual empire are obsessed with a spirit of 
 virulent nationalism. Beyond question this is but a cross 
 current. The dominant tendency of the age is toward the 
 formation of larger nations, a tendency which necessarily 
 implies merger and the disappearance of nationalism in some 
 
NATIONALISM 29 
 
 of its narrower and more obstructive manifestations. But 
 this tendency toward merger is offset by the tendency toward 
 the intensification of nationality. The units to be merged 
 become more resistant, less assimilable. If the American 
 colonies had not united when they did, they could not now be 
 made into a nation. 
 
 It is with this paramount fact of nationality, a fact legiti- 
 mate in its essence, however extravagant and troublesome in 
 its occasional manifestations, that we have to deal. The task 
 of the peace conference is essentially a task in nation making. 
 Prepossessions against this fundamental fact of nationalism 
 will make that task impossible. Equally, such prepossessions 
 will make it impossible for us to anticipate and contribute to 
 that task. 
 
 It is a corollary of nationalism that nations have rights 
 which are exclusive as regards one another. If nations have 
 a right to exist, they have a right to rule within their own 
 domain. That is the meaning of nationality, the meaning of 
 democracy, the basic principle of our western civilization. 
 Never is that principle likely to be so sorely tested as in the 
 moment of its triumph. What a temptation to our emanci- 
 pated labor to compel the emancipation of labor in the Cen- 
 tral Powers ! What more generous than to reach a helping 
 hand to an oppressed fellow worker! What more prudent 
 than thus to eliminate the danger of his underpaid competi- 
 tion ! How eagerly certain elements in Germany itself would 
 welcome such intervention ! The clamor of appeal is already 
 raised. Similarly the cause of temperance, of suffrage, of 
 democracy, see here their opportunity to follow in the wake 
 of the ponderous war tank into fastnesses otherwise so difiicult 
 of assault. It is no disparagement of any of these interests 
 to sternly resist their plea. Triumphs thus won would be 
 specious, premature, and in the long run, disastrous. " Lib- 
 erty is not a gift; liberty is an achievement." For liberty 
 
30 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 conferred but unachieved is not liberty but only indulgent 
 autocracy. 
 
 In particular should democracy be on its guard lest, in a 
 moment when its triumph necessitates the wholesale recon- 
 struction of alien systems, it forget its own nature in its eager- 
 ness to prevail. Make the world safe for democracy, — yes, 
 by all means, at any sacrifice of blood and treasure. But the 
 safety of democracy is infinitely more dependent upon for- 
 bearance than upon aggression. The people that wills, even 
 passively, to have an autocratic government, is more nearly 
 exercising a democratic prerogative than the people who 
 would force a democratic government upon them. The ut- 
 most that can be justified, — and this only with the extremest 
 circumspection, — is to demand for subject or component peo- 
 ples the right of self-expression. Even so we rob them of 
 the stimulating privilege of self-achievement. If it be 
 argued that the very existence of an autocratic Germany with 
 its militarist traditions and purposes, threatens the liberties 
 of neighboring peoples, the reply must be that Germany will 
 be autocratic until she elects to be otherwise. Have we not 
 learned the futility of baptizing the unregenerate ? To com- 
 pel Germany to desist from her attack on our liberties, — that 
 is our plain duty. To compel her to adopt free institutions is 
 to misjudge both our rights and our powers. Germany thus 
 veneered would not be less hostile, nor should we profit by 
 a deceptive reliance upon her democratic mask. It would 
 be a grave abuse of the happiest of rallying cries if we should 
 try to make the world safe for democracy by forcing an un- 
 sought freedom upon an unprepared people. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 NATIONALITY AND RACE 
 
 Since nationality holds tlius the supreme place in the 
 human scheme of things, the problem of peace becomes a 
 problem in constructive nationality. The war has put exist- 
 ing nations to a terrible test, and in addition to the damage it 
 has wrought, it has disclosed every sort of defect and patho- 
 logical condition. There seems to be no likelihood that this 
 peace conference, like that of a hundred years ago, will try 
 to restore the status quo ante. A radical reconstruction seems 
 inevitable. It therefore becomes highly important to under- 
 stand the essential conditions of national life. 
 
 In seeking the basis of nationality the first thought is that 
 it rests on the foundation of race. Words used in this con- 
 nection seem everywhere to imply such a dependence. But if 
 by race is meant blood relationship, no existing nation can 
 lay much claim to race unity. If we carry our inquiry back 
 to the earliest social group, the primitive family, we shall 
 find nothing that can be called race purity. The mixing 
 process is already at work. Marriage, especially in the days 
 of wife purchase, is the reverse of exclusive, and slavery is 
 even more indulgent. Even the Hebrews had their Gibeon- 
 ites. 
 
 But such race purity as the family represents quickly van- 
 ishes in the turmoil of early nation building. Migration, 
 conquest, and wholesale deportation with the ruthless disre- 
 gard of all prejudices and race barriers, mingles the most 
 alien elements. With the advent of more settled conditions, 
 these violent agencies are less active, but their place is taken 
 
 31 
 
32 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 by individual migration, that silent infiltration of alien ele- 
 ments which permeates the entire population, and that the 
 more as civilization advances and the facilities for movement 
 increase. What we see going on in America is what goes on 
 everywhere and always in the growing parts of the world. 
 The notion of a pure bred race is a fiction. 
 
 It is perhaps worth noting that within wide limits this 
 mingling of the races encounters no protest of reason or in- 
 stinct. The union of Caucasian and Mongolian, of black and 
 white, is repugnant to civilized instincts, but aside from 
 purely prudential considerations as affecting problems of 
 language, religion, life habit or social status, unions between 
 our closely related western races occasion no repugnance. It 
 seems to be, as indeed it is, the natural thing. Blood rela- 
 tionship is a negligible factor in our problem. 
 
 But though the fact of kinship is negligible, the name is 
 still a name to conjure with. The consciousness of race, — 
 the latter vaguely conceived as connoting kinship, — is one of 
 the most stubborn with which we have to deal. Though a 
 people may be mingled of every race and may know them- 
 selves to be so, yet there is no cry to which they will rally as 
 they will to that of kinship. The most mongrel of nations 
 will sacrifice its most substantial interests and risk its very 
 existence in the service of its assumed kin. This is the 
 animus of pan-slavism, irridentism, and the like. The ap- 
 peal, to be sure, has often had its ulterior motive. The Pan- 
 slavist Pussian, so much in evidence in earlier discussions, 
 was much more concerned about the Dardanelles than about 
 his Polish or Balkan relatives, while the Pan-German, with 
 characteristic effrontery, uses the race catchword in behalf 
 of the annexation of territories never inhabited by the Ger- 
 man people. But these very abuses are suggestive of the 
 strength of race sentiment. The German expansionist would 
 not call his program Pan-German if there were not something 
 
NATIONALITY AND EACE 33 
 
 in that covert suggestion of race unity, even in the most inap- 
 propriate connections. How much more when, as in the case 
 of Italy, the assumption has an outward semblance of justi- 
 fication ? If blood unity is gone forever, the consciousness of 
 it is not, and no factor in our problem requires to be handled 
 with more deference and tact. 
 
 The truth is that while kinship is a fiction, race is a fact. 
 We are united by blood only in the most casual way, but we 
 are united by other bonds which are far more tangible and 
 significant, and which are almost as closely associated with 
 birth as kinship itself. We may be born of the bondwoman 
 in the house, but we are none the less born in the house. 
 The brotherhood that really counts in the world as such 
 doesn't come from being born of the same parents, but from 
 growing up in the same family. Members of the same race 
 are therefore those that have grown up in the same race fam- 
 ily, that have joined in the same concert exercises and have 
 learned the same ritual of life. Included in this ritual are 
 all the most fruitful activities of our lives. Our much 
 vaunted individuality is and must be only a trifling interest 
 in an essentially ritualized existence. More than this be- 
 comes social weakness ; much more becomes insanity. Every 
 people is constantly busy in developing its ritual, in reducing 
 all the activities of life to uniformity, and correlating them 
 with one another, all in the interest of efficiency and economy. 
 The way chosen is often arbitrary. It matters little what 
 tune we sing, but we must sing together. Correlation is the 
 very essence of society. 
 
 The supreme example of this correlation is language. To 
 be able easily and with precision to communicate our ideas 
 and feelings to those with whom we must cooperate is an ob- 
 vious necessity, yet one hardly appreciated till once we are 
 deprived of it. A few hours' isolation among a people whose 
 language he did not speak has more than once made the 
 
34 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 writer appreciate the embarrassments of the builders of the 
 Tower of Babel. As language develops, it becomes the intel- 
 lectual counterpart of our entire life, establishing relations of 
 incredible finesse, and in turn, stimulating and enticing life 
 into activities of unlimited subtlety and complexity. Inas- 
 much as language is the counterpart of all else and the con- 
 dition of all else, it is often assimied to be the effective basis 
 of race. 
 
 But there is much else than language. Indeed pretty much 
 all else that there is falls under this same great law of cor- 
 relation. The food that we eat is determined originally by 
 the spontaneous resources of our habitat, but this option of 
 nature rapidly disappears. Time was when Peru grew pota- 
 toes and our own country maize, but now both are grown over 
 the world. We are learning to make nature very subservient. 
 If the choice of our food was once with her, it is now with us. 
 If France, Germany, and America, drink three different 
 kinds of coffee, it is not because they produce different kinds, 
 for none of them produce any, and all of them get the ingredi- 
 ents on essentially the same terms. The choice of articles of 
 food and still more of the methods of preparation and service, 
 are not nature's choices but social choices. This is still more 
 true as regards costume, household organization, business and 
 social procedure. Every department of life, every possible 
 human interest, comes under the sway of this same great law 
 of correlation and concert. The result is an all-embracing 
 social ritual, a ritual with antiphonal and responses, a ritual 
 with parts for the few and parts for the many and parts for 
 all, but a ritual without which we are nothing. The indi- 
 vidual voice, to be sure, is heard, but to no purpose unless it 
 in turn becomes ritual. Failing that, it is only discord. 
 
 All this is truism, but truism too often forgotten at the 
 moment when recognition is vital. More truisms must be 
 noted if we are to proceed with hope of profit. 
 
NATIONALITY AND RACE 35 
 
 The obvious function of all this correlation is convenience, 
 — convenience of so cogent a character as to be virtual neces- 
 sity. Suppose we decide to eat different food from that 
 usually eaten about us, food quite as vs^holesome and equally 
 congenial to climate and soil, but not the social choice. Sup- 
 pose even less, that we merely decide to have it prepared or 
 served by other than the usual method. The result is at 
 the least, a vast inconvenience and an expenditure of time and 
 effort out of all proportion to the advantage gained, which 
 last is almost invariably nil. The writer has had rather un- 
 usual opportunity to notice the application of this principle 
 to his fellow countrymen in travel, — laborious and time con- 
 suming effort repeated day after day and meal after meal, 
 to effect trivial changes in the ritual of foreign cookery or 
 service, when a tithe the effort devoted to self adaptation 
 would have removed the annoying friction by conformity of 
 the traveler to the ritual of the land of which he is the guest. 
 Equally and more true is this principle in other parts of 
 social procedure. Imagine, if it be possible, that no social 
 standards afford guidance in the matter of dress, — that each 
 must devise and in some way secure the necessary costume. 
 Conceive the labor involved in devising, in securing the neces- 
 sary materials, in making or guiding the making, to say noth- 
 ing of the weird and soul estranging result. Intelligent 
 women are sometimes criticised for subserviency to " sense- 
 less " fashion. The sufficient answer is that they can not 
 afford the time and effort to do anything else. The purpose 
 of social ritual is to lighten the burden of life, to bring pro- 
 ducer, purveyor, and user into frictionless correlation, and 
 to make the myriad perplexities of social choice forgettable 
 things. 
 
 But social ritual, though originating in convenience, is not 
 therefore a mere utilitarian calculus of advantage. It 
 quickly develops a coimterpart of unreasoning, passionate 
 
36 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 attachment which finds its only equal in maternal affection. 
 Customs the most arbitrary and the most irksome in the learn- 
 ing, ultimately intrench themselves behind this barrier of 
 feeling and resist all encroachment. We may recognize that 
 our way is no better than another, that in a given situation 
 it is a handicap and that we can come to the mountain far 
 easier than the mountain can come to us, — the suggestion of 
 change is none the less intensely repugnant to us. More often 
 we quite lose the power to recognize the true relation, and our 
 ritual becomes to us the very constitution of nature. The 
 Englishman who thought the French word for bread, pain, 
 very peculiar '' because it is bread, you know," is a classic 
 illustration. When the ritual of social procedure is thus 
 completely assimilated to the fundamentals of nature and the 
 normal attachments have been developed, innovation becomes 
 sacrilege. 
 
 This, then, is our definition of race, a body of men united 
 by a social ritual. Born into this ritual, no matter from what 
 stock, they grow up in almost abject dependence upon it. The 
 adaptation once effected, any second adaptation becomes im- 
 mensely difficult and is perhaps never complete. The mere 
 learning of a foreign language is but the most trifling begin- 
 ning. Said an American who lived for years in Germany 
 and had brought back with him a beautiful German wife: 
 " I thought I had become German in sympathy and in habit, 
 but if I had known how many trifling differences of instinc- 
 tive judgment and procedure existed between us, recurring 
 day by day and creating friction in the most unexpected rela- 
 tions, 1 would never have married her." 
 
 The essence of the social ritual is thus twofold. Objec- 
 tively it is convenience. Subjectively it is congeniality. 
 
 We now have to notice certain facts in this connection 
 which are vital to our problem. The first is the arbitrary 
 character of this ritual. All important as it is, the impor- 
 
^NATIONALITY AND RACE 37 
 
 tance is in the ritualization, not in the thing ritualized. 
 When an army receives the order, " march/' it might conceiv- 
 ably start with either foot, but it is imperative that all start 
 with the same foot. Judged by inherent fitness, many social 
 forms are absurd. What more arbitrary than that an obso- 
 lete riding coat with skirts split to go over the horse's back 
 and cut away in front to accommodate the rider's bended 
 legs, should have become the exacting model for full 
 dress of men who never mount a horse. It is the pitfall 
 of the inexperienced to judge these social prescriptions 
 by intrinsic fitness. But intrinsic fitness is as nothing to 
 social uniformity, especially in connections where forms are 
 primarily of symbolical value. Any one could devise a coat 
 more suitable, but probably no society in the world could 
 secure its adoption and emotional consecration, as inscrutable 
 influences have secured it for the coat in question. As society 
 progresses, this arbitrariness of social choice tends to increase. 
 As our mastery over nature increases, the range of theoretic 
 choice widens. But the range of actual choice does not widen 
 in proportion. Social considerations of propriety take the 
 place of nature's vanishing barriers and again, straight is the 
 gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life. For the 
 multiplication of options means confusion, and ritual and 
 convention are the only escape from chaos. Not that the new 
 options bring no advantage, but they are available only with 
 social sanction. They must be ritualized to be really avail- 
 able and legitimate. 
 
 It is therefore illegitimate to assume that race character, 
 resting as it does essentially upon arbitrary choices, is inher- 
 ently sacred. Some other word for bread would do quite as 
 well if once adopted. Language, custom, even religion and 
 government, are largely arbitrary as regards their inherent 
 character. Their only advantage, — a very great one, to be 
 sure, — is that they have acquired social and emotional sane- 
 
38 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 tion. There is much talk today of reuniting religious denom- 
 inations which are no longer separated by differences in the 
 " essentials." In fact they are separated by something far 
 more essential than articles of creed, — by unconsciously 
 developed rituals of form and expression in a multitude of 
 insignificant things which are an obstacle to that congeniality 
 which is the condition of helpful association. This is no 
 disparagement of the project of union, a policy often dictated 
 by the weightiest considerations of economy and efficiency. 
 It is merely a suggestion of where the true obstacle to union 
 is to be found. The tenacity of social ritual and the difficulty 
 of changing it can scarcely be exaggerated, but broadly speak- 
 ing, other forms would do as well. The practical man will 
 urge changes only with extreme circumspection, but he is not 
 dealing with the sacro-sanct. 
 
 One final and all important consideration remains. What 
 determines that a given people shall develop a ritual ? There 
 are numberless observations to be made in this connection, 
 but only one that is of vital importance. One fact over- 
 shadows and embraces all others. They develop a ritual be- 
 cause they live together. They can not develop it unless they 
 live together ; they must develop it if they do. This means 
 that race is a product of CLSsociation, a result of living to- 
 gether. 
 
 But this important truth is always at variance with the 
 facts of the moment. There are at all times people living in 
 a unit territory who are not of one race, and people of one 
 race who are not living in one territory. Thus, it would 
 seem that the Transylvanians and the Hungarians or the 
 Poles and the Germans, separated by no natural barriers, 
 ought to be united in race, but they are sharply opposed. 
 Conversely, the ancient Pha?nicians and Greeks and the mod- 
 ern Anglo-Saxons are conspicuous examples of race unity, 
 though occupying widely scattered territories. The obvious 
 
NATIONALITY AND KACE 39 
 
 explanation is that these races have changed their habitat. 
 They lived together long enough to develop their language and 
 race character, and then migrated to another territory where 
 the diverse race characters have as yet resisted the unifying 
 influence of habitat. Sometimes, however, a more subtle 
 change has taken place in the territory itself, barriers have 
 been virtually eliminated and habitats once distinct thus 
 merged into a unit. This little noticed tendency is peculiarly 
 characteristic of recent years. Time was when very moder- 
 ate barriers kept peoples pretty effectually apart. The Ap- 
 ennines almost prevented communication between Venice and 
 Florence, giving to the two peoples a markedly different char- 
 acter through the distinctive period of their history. Today 
 the barrier is scarcely noticeable, and Italy is a unit habitat. 
 The very considerable diversity which had grown up between 
 the different parts of Italy has perceptibly diminished since 
 railways and other modern facilities have lowered the divid- 
 ing barriers, the process of unification being aided, of course, 
 by the substantial unity bequeathed to all by Eome. In the 
 great plains of eastern Europe, mere extent and sparseness of 
 population long prevented unification. With extreme sim- 
 plicity of life and the feeblest incentive for intercourse and 
 exchange, mere expanse and other trivial obstacles sufficed to 
 keep peoples apart and slowly to diversify them. Witness the 
 separatism of the Ukraine unmotived by barriers of mountain 
 and sea. Against such separatism the quickened life of the 
 present with its freer communication and its more varied re- 
 gional demands operates as a powerful unifying influence. 
 The result, however, is to imify the habitat much more than 
 the people. Hence the irritating incongruity between race 
 and habitat, the seeming refutation of the truth that the one 
 is the product of the other. The tendency is in consequence 
 to attribute to race an absolute character and to accord to it 
 a deference to which it is not entitled. Race character is 
 
40 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 derivative in origin and arbitrary in essence. The forces 
 making for unification are undoubtedly gaining at the ex- 
 pense of the divisive forces. While recognizing the tenacity 
 with which races hold to their language and customs, political 
 prevision can not wholly ignore the fact that they are a 
 waning power. When a conflict presents itself between race 
 integrity and the most obvious requirements of territorial con- 
 venience, the former may not unreasonably be asked to make 
 concessions. Eace interests are not always paramount. 
 
 It will be noted that this conclusion is somewhat in con- 
 trast with that reached in tlje preceding chapter regarding 
 nationality. ^Nationality must not be confounded with race. 
 Eace is merely one of the bases of nationality, ordinarily the 
 most important one, but never the only one, and in exceptional 
 cases quite subordinate to other factors. It is a great ad- 
 vantage to a nation to be based on race unity, but it is not a 
 necessity. Switzerland is a nation, and withal a very suc- 
 cessful one, but the Swiss are not of one race. Physical 
 conditions of habitat are here so much more important than 
 race unity that they not only effect the union of diverse races, 
 but that without appreciable tendency toward assimilation. 
 Great Britain, again, is a nation, but the diverse races united 
 under its sway, English, Scotch, Welsh, and Cornish, being 
 less separated by physical barriers, are visibly undergoing 
 assimilation. The Cornish have lost their separate language, 
 the Scotch nearly so, and the Welsh in part, and complete 
 assimilation seems plainly foreshadowed, but as yet British 
 unity is a unity of nationality with but an incomplete unity 
 of race. 
 
 More striking and difficult examples are found in the great 
 imperial combinations of Britain and of Eome. Eoman 
 unity made no pretense to being a unity of race. Indeed, 
 for a long time nothing more was attempted than the barest 
 recognition of Eome's paramount authority. Eome had long 
 
NATIONALITY AND RACE 41 
 
 been mistress of the world before she even attempted unity of 
 administration. With the ultimate unification of adminis- 
 tration, however, there inevitably came a steadily increasing 
 measure of cultural and even of racial unity. Eoman archi- 
 tecture, with wide variation of forms, but always Roman, be- 
 came universal. Even the Roman language displaced the 
 less developed of the subject tongues, thus completing the 
 unity of what we now instinctively call the " Latin races," a 
 unity developed from the most pronounced diversity within 
 historic times. More significant still is the consciousness of 
 unity which persisted in Roman Europe for many centuries 
 after the decay of the Roman power, a feeling that the world 
 unity which that power represented must somewhere still 
 exist, however much in abeyance. This was neither a unity 
 of race, for none such existed, nor a unity of state, for politi- 
 cal authority had long since passed away, but a unity essen- 
 tially national, although on so vast a scale that usage hesi- 
 tates to apply the term. The more recent and less developed 
 case of the British Empire presents similar phenomena. 
 
 We waste our time here in attempts at exact classification. 
 The cases are few and so highly individual that classification 
 helps us little. But it is clear that the group solidarity which 
 has received such accentuation in our day, is something else 
 than race unity. Race consciousness should unite the Dutch 
 and Flemish, the Germans and Austrians, the Americans and 
 Canadians, and divide the Swiss. If given full sway, it 
 would recast very extensively the political map of the world. 
 But race is a waning rather than a growing power. The 
 awkward recrudescence of race separatism in our day at- 
 tests rather than disproves the assertion. It is the protest 
 of an alarmed race consciousness which foresees its doom. 
 
 Nationality is again to be distinguished from mere po- 
 litical authority resting upon no foundation but physical 
 coercion. The authority of the Austrian monarchy has not 
 
42 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 succeeded in uniting the diverse elements of that perplexing 
 population into a nation, though they unquestionably con- 
 stitute a state. It is difficult to speak of the United King- 
 dom of Great Britain and Ireland as a nation, though it is 
 undoubtedly a state. But while the state is not the nation, 
 it tends to become one. German Alsace became completely 
 merged in the French nation (though not in the French race). 
 Cornwall, Wales, and Scotland have become merged in the 
 British nation, and are apparently in process of a further 
 merger into the British race. There is a clear dependence 
 of state upon nation, and of nation upon race, but each de- 
 pends upon other things as well. Moreover the dependence 
 works the other way. The state requires national feeling as 
 the condition of its stability, but let the state be once estab- 
 lished and judiciously maintained, and national feeling will 
 result. Prussia was built upon the resentful incorporation 
 of Frankfort and Hanover, but both are now safely Prussian. 
 Bavaria and Saxony were hardly more favorable to the Em- 
 pire, but their loyalty in 1914 was unquestioned, xs'or can 
 the general desirability of these mergers be questioned, what- 
 ever their present embarrassments. 
 
 To summarize, race unity based on language and custom, 
 has lost ground in our day, and nationality, a unity based on 
 other considerations, chiefly economic, territorial, and poli- 
 tical, has acquired the ascendancy. Nationalism stands, on 
 the whole, for the larger, though not for the complete union 
 of mankind. 
 
CHAPTEE IV 
 
 NATIONALITY AND TERRITORY 
 
 We have seen that nationality is the key to our problem 
 and that nationality is closely connected with race. Indeed 
 some would have it that the two should be identical, that a 
 race should always be a nation and a nation always a race. 
 The trouble, it is contended, lies just here, that nations have 
 been formed which are not based on unity of race and so 
 are inharmonious, one race tyrannizing over the other as the 
 Austrians do over the Bohemians, the Magj-ars over the 
 Croats, and the like. Let each of these races be a 
 nation by itself and all will be well. This is an 
 enticing theory in the abstract, but when we begin to apply 
 it, we at once discover that something besides race is neces- 
 sary to make a satisfactory nation. It is absolutely neces- 
 sary that the race that is to form a nation should be satisfac- 
 torily situated. For instance, if a race is divided and scat- 
 tered, some here and some there, with alien populations in 
 between, it is usually recognized as impracticable to form 
 them into a single ethnic nation. Either they must form a 
 number of smaller nations alike in race but unable to unite 
 because they lack the necessary territorial unity, or they must 
 be formed into a single nation with incorporation of the alien 
 elements. In either case race unity is plainly not enough. 
 Territorial unity is also necessary to the forming of a satis- 
 factory nation. Even the sea, — which is quite as much a 
 bond as a barrier, — usually makes national union difficult. 
 It has made it impossible for the Anglo-Saxon race to form 
 a single nation, despite its pronounced unity and its control 
 
 of sea communications. 
 
 43 
 
44 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 But the territorial requirement is for something more than 
 unity. There are certain elemental conveniences which are 
 quite as necessary as unity itself to successful national life. 
 To start nations without these is to run so large a risk of 
 failure that no prudent people will attempt it. Eirst among 
 these requirements is defense. A nation's territory and the 
 wealth which it accmnulates upon it in the shape of houses, 
 roads, factories and the like, constitute its capital. The na- 
 tion that can not put its possessions under lock and key, as 
 it were, simply invites aggression. Undoubtedly we may 
 hope for greater respect for national rights and something 
 of collective enforcement of them as time goes on, but recent 
 events have not tended to reassure us as regards the present. 
 Nor can we hope that the time will ever come when the nation 
 like the householder will not need to take reasonable precau- 
 tions. In any case it is a present necessity of nations to pro- 
 tect themselves, and therefore a prime requisite that the 
 national domain should be reasonably capable of defense. 
 In particular it becomes important that nations should be 
 delimited on reasonably equitable terms. A national bound- 
 ary may be an arbitrary line throuoli a plain, — not an ideal 
 frontier, surely, nor easily capable of defense, but still an 
 equitable one, as the two neighbors face each other on essen- 
 tially equal terms. But when a natural barrier exists be- 
 tween two peoples with fastnesses of immense strength, and 
 the line is so drawn as to give these all to one party, making 
 his domain impregnable and leaving that of the neighbor 
 completely indefensible, the inequity is such as virtually to 
 destroy the latter's independence and create a relation of 
 vassalage. Very few are aware of the number of strategic 
 frontiers which are now of that character and the part they 
 have played in the present conflict. Thus, Italy has lived 
 all her national life under the sword of Damocles, her fron- 
 tier towards Austria running, not along the mountain crests, 
 
NATIONALITY AND TERRITORY 45 
 
 but far down the Italian slope. This has made Austria per- 
 fectly safe, while Italy was always exposed to Austrian ag- 
 gression. A nation so situated could not disagree with so 
 dangerous a neighbor. It was this helplessness which drove 
 Italy into the Triple Alliance, a most unnatural combination, 
 and this again that induced her to join the Allies, hoping 
 thus to remove the hated menace and secure an equitable and 
 defensible frontier. It so happens that the territory needed 
 to rectify this frontier is all Italian so that racial and terri- 
 torial considerations unite in demanding the change, but it is 
 easy to understand that if the population were alien, — as in 
 certain like situations it is, — the strategic consideration 
 might be of so great importance as to overbear the claims of 
 race. It would in any case be a factor that could not be 
 ignored. 
 
 But territorial demands do not stop here. War, though 
 a possibility which a prudent people can never leave out of 
 account, is after all the exception. Provision for peace is 
 even more necessary. There are territorial requirements 
 of peace as well as of war, and these have rapidly become 
 more exacting with the development of civilization. Here, 
 perhaps, more than anywhere else, popular notions are in- 
 adequate, particularly in countries whose perceptions have 
 not been sharpened by need. A country so completely 
 equipped as is our own, with all the facilities for modern 
 civilized existence, easily overlooks its debt to an exception- 
 ally favorable situation. That which it owes to accident or 
 good fortune, it easily assumes to be the common lot of na- 
 tions. It is safe to say that there is not a single nation in 
 existence that does not lack some important element of our 
 wonderful endowment. If we had more experience of their 
 needs, we should have more s^nnpathy with their strivings. 
 
 It is important to note in this connection that the develop- 
 ment of civilization in the last two or three centuries has 
 
46 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 materially modified what we may call the minimum terri- 
 torial requirements of nationality. The exceedingly simple 
 life of an earlier age was essentially local and self-sufficing. 
 Every community, almost every household, raised its own 
 food, built its own dwellings, made its own tools, and wove 
 its own garments. Things brought from distant localities, 
 — mostly articles of personal adornment and luxuries of 
 limited use, — demanded little in the way of transportation 
 facilities. The pack horse and mountain trail were suf- 
 ficient. Access to foreign lands was a convenience, but not 
 a necessity, the more so as life, thus compelled to be local 
 and self-sufficient, developed local possibilities that are now 
 undreamed of. For a woman of the Middle Ages to be de- 
 nied the privileges of the cloth mart was small privation. 
 She might still be decently, perhaps sumptuously clad. For 
 the woman of today the cloth mart is absolutely necessary. 
 
 This all-roundness of community life had its political con- 
 sequences. It made little nations possible and that in com- 
 paratively indifferent situations. Bohemia might be not 
 only happy and prosperous but highly civilized without hav- 
 ing harbors or extensive commercial facilities. Even in the 
 interior of Russia such independent political units could and 
 did flourish. 
 
 But something has changed all that. Perhaps the steam 
 engine was chiefly responsible. But whatever it was, the 
 result was that industry of every kind became specialized, 
 communities ceased to be self-sufficing and became dependent 
 upon one another, sending great distances and in many di- 
 rections, not for a few things of exceptional use, but for every- 
 thing. Probably the modern American brings his food an 
 average of a hundred miles and other things much farther. 
 Hardly a home is so humble that its equipment does not lay 
 under tribute every grand division of the globe. 
 
 It is a peculiarity of the new industrial order that it was 
 
NATIONALITY AND TEERITOKY 47 
 
 compelled from its very nature to be virulently competitive. 
 The new way of making goods, by great mechanisms driven 
 by nature energies, was cheaper, vastly cheaper, than the old 
 way, but on one condition, namely, that they should be made 
 in very great quantities. But if made in great quantities, 
 there would obviously be more than single communities or 
 small districts could use. It vras therefore necessary to get 
 the largest possible markets. Hence the belligerent imperial- 
 ism of the new industry. It could not remain contentedly 
 at home and allow other countries to go on in their old way. 
 It simply had to have world markets or it could not work at 
 all. It broke into these old countries with their hand artisan- 
 ship and local self-sufficiency, as a desolating revolutionary 
 force. Some of them like China tried to stem the tide but 
 to no avail. Had the new system been capable of local appli- 
 cation, the innovators might possibly have been more con- 
 siderate. As it was, they developed, as men always do, 
 a philosophy of society consonant with their needs and sword 
 in hand demanded its recognition. The intrinsic legitimacy 
 of honest trade had became an axiom of western thought and 
 was maintained by force of arms. 
 
 The all important characteristic of this new order was the 
 increase of transportation. For every one of us, every day, 
 four tons of goods are moved a mile by the railroads alone. 
 Other agencies probably move as much more. Transporta- 
 tion has probably increased a hundred-fold as compared with 
 the days of Elizabeth. Such an increase has been made 
 possible only by a complete change in transportation methods. 
 The development of transportation facilities has become a 
 prime concern with modern nations. They are in that re- 
 spect somewhat like private concerns. When one firm em- 
 ploys auto trucks, its competitor can not get along with pack 
 mules or carts. The securing of favorable sites for rail- 
 roads (one accession to the territory of the United States 
 
48 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 was made exclusively for that purpose), for industrial plants, 
 and above all for the great harbors which modern shipping 
 requires, is of capital importance and is indeed a chief pre- 
 occupation of modern statecraft. 
 
 It will readily be understood how completely such a revolu- 
 tion invalidates the territorial standards of earlier national 
 life. It is important to notice this because nationality is be- 
 ing continually advocated on the strength of former national 
 possession and achievement. Bohemia, Poland, Serbia, and 
 other nations of the past are applicants for readmission to 
 the family of nations on old territorial lines. The argu- 
 ment is simple and at first sight plausible. " We once were 
 independent, prosperous, and civilized. Why can we not, 
 with the same territories, be so again ? " The answer should 
 be easy in the light of the foregoing. " Prosperity and 
 civilization now rest on a different basis from what they did 
 in your day." The modern nation can no more get along 
 with the old outfit than the modern housewife can get along 
 with the spinning wheel and the distaff. This is not to 
 prejudice the case of these or other candidates for nation- 
 hood, but they must meet the new requirements if they are 
 to win the privilege anew. No greater folly could be com- 
 mitted than to set up new nations without the basic requisites 
 of present-day national life. 
 
 The consciousness that new things can not be as the old is 
 curiously betrayed in certain of the extreme nationalist pro- 
 posals recently offered for our consideration. Thus an ardent 
 protagonist of Bohemian independence urges the reconstruc- 
 tion of Bohemia as an independent nation, but can not for- 
 get the fact that Bohemian territory has no access to the sea. 
 This, he sees, will never do. He therefore proposes that 
 Bohemia be accorded a narrow strip of territory which should 
 serve as a runway to the sea. This pipestem appendage 
 would, of course, be alien in population and would work havoc 
 
NATIONALITY AND TERKITOEY 49 
 
 with other nationalities quite as much entitled to unity and 
 perhaps to independence as Bohemia herself. It would be 
 a standing provocation to hostilities and yet entirely indefen- 
 sible, a positive marvel of misadjustment. But what would 
 you? An independent Bohemia must have access to the 
 sea. Assuredly, but the historic Bohemia in whose name 
 the new Bohemia is invoked, had no harbors and needed 
 none. Thus she has bequeathed no raw material out of 
 which the necessities of a modern Bohemia can be constructed. 
 Similar difficulties present themselves in connection with the 
 reconstitution of Poland, and perhaps in other cases as well. 
 
 The meaning of it all is clear. The past has bequeathed 
 to us a lot of little nations with their little patrimonies, once 
 ample for nationhood. They ask to be continued under new 
 conditions which permit none* but nations more ample and 
 more liberally endowed. Professing themselves willing to 
 be little, they demand, — the conditions demand, — an equip- 
 ment which is possible only for the big. We will not attempt, 
 for the moment, to reconcile this conflict of interests. We 
 are concerned to note, first, that such a conflict exists, that 
 race unity is at war with the requirements of modern equip- 
 ment, and second, that race unity is an old fact, the product 
 of existence under conditions that have now passed away, 
 and the other is a new fact, the requirements which new con- 
 ditions have inexorably forced upon the modern world. It 
 requires little insight to predict the ultimate outcome of such 
 a struggle. The Bohemians will have a seaport, whether or 
 no, and they will pay for it by such concessions from race 
 unity as are necessary. 
 
 With all possible insistence let it be repeated that these 
 words are written in no unsympathetic spirit. It is not the 
 intention to disparage these products of the patient dis- 
 cipline of past ages. The legacy of race ideals, race sympa- 
 thies, and race inspiration which the past has left us must 
 
50 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 be accounted among our most precious possessions. To treat 
 them lightly as things to be brushed aside at convenience, to 
 note only the barriers which they interpose in the way of 
 progress, this is the opposite of wisdom and of statesman- 
 ship. But there is not one of these precious inheritances 
 that has not itself been purchased at the expense of lesser but 
 like sentiments which have died that it might live. With 
 what agonies of heartache the Scottish clans yielded to the 
 strong hand that welded them into the weapon of Eobert the 
 Bruce! How many memories of Bannockbum have had to 
 be forgotten or remembered with kindlier thoughts ere 
 the kilties could find their glory in Waterloo and the Marne ! 
 That the one must increase and the other decrease is the lesson 
 of all history. The process will not be hastened by con- 
 tumely and reproach. The existing horizon is the possible 
 horizon for the moment, and the enthusiasms of today are the 
 only possible parents of the larger enthusiasms of tomorrow. 
 We must reckon, — not grudgingly but s^Tnpathetically, — 
 with the products of historic nationality. But we must not 
 sacrifice to them, — we are powerless to sacrifice to them, — 
 the vital requirements of modern life. These new require- 
 ments, these larger physical conditions, have the same power 
 to create their spiritual counterpart of sentiment and con- 
 geniality, their new race unity, that foimer conditions have 
 had. Prudence requires respect for the nationality of the 
 past, but progress requires respect for the nationality of 
 the future. 
 
 It will long ago have occurred to the impatient reader that 
 an easy way of removing this conflict is to be found in co- 
 operation. An independent Bohemia must indeed have ac- 
 cess to the sea, but why a monopolized Bohemian access ? 
 Why can not some neighboring seaboard nation permit the 
 use of its facilities by arrangement ? It can. This is not 
 a matter of speculation but of fact. Such arrangements 
 
NATIONALITY AND TERRITORY 51 
 
 exist. Germany ships via Antwerp, Switzerland via Genoa, 
 and the like. But while experience attests the possibility 
 of such arrangements, it also witnesses beyond question that 
 they are never satisfactory. They are impeded, partial, and 
 precarious. They are better than nothing, better, it may 
 be, than any available alternative, but they remain irksome 
 at the best. It may seem very unreasonable of Germany to 
 want Antwerp for her very own, but what would we say to 
 an alien-owned New York which we were permitted to use 
 by arrangement? It is safe to say that such a New York 
 would never have attained a quarter of its present size and 
 that the diverted traffic would have followed more expensive 
 routes to less convenient harbors. 
 
 Here, quite naturally, the internationalist sees in his pro- 
 posal a cure for the evils of jarring national interests. Let 
 the precarious arrangements referred to be guaranteed by 
 the associated nations and the uncertainty is removed. Yes, 
 if something can guarantee the associated nations. The pro- 
 posal to neutralize or internationalize important ports or 
 traffic ways which are necessarily used by different nations, 
 is an elaboration of the same principle. Such an arrange- 
 ment, it is urged, would make it possible to have an inde- 
 pendent Bohemia, and in short, any number of little nations 
 without territorial distortions. 
 
 It may seem ungracious to suggest that this is one of the 
 very objections to internationalism. It summons men to the 
 larger brotherhood by promising them a larger freedom to 
 indulge their narrower prejudices. The world feels uncom- 
 fortable just now because of an unusual amount of readjust- 
 ment which it is called upon to make. The little unities 
 that stand for nothing but the past, that correspond to noth- 
 ing in the life conditions of the present, are feeling the piti- 
 less pressure of these new conditions. We are constrained 
 to enter into larger relationships, to adjust ourselves to larger 
 
52 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 groups and get acquainted with strange people. It is all so 
 uncongenial, so irksome. We are homesick for the little home 
 circle out of which we have been driven into this great cheer- 
 less, uncongenial world. 
 
 And just as we are feeling the irksomeness of this larger 
 relationship, and uneasiness is passing into resentment and 
 revolt, along comes the internationalist and launches his 
 anathema against this thing that irks us. He tells us that 
 polyglot empires and unions not based on congeniality ought 
 not to be. How welcome such doctrine! In exchange for 
 this odious reality which chafes us, he summons us to a su- 
 preme unity, to the world fellowship, a fellowship that seems 
 to demand no concrete sacrifices, to entail no immediate and 
 irksome relations. And withal and above all it permits and 
 even enjoins the return to the earlier congenial relation with 
 its local exclusiveness and prejudices. The appeal is en- 
 ticing. 
 
 It may be conceded that this response to the appeal of in- 
 ternationalism is quite illogical. If internationalism ever 
 becomes a fact among men, it will be no painless union. It 
 will require such a shedding of prejudices and such a read- 
 justment of mental habit as no nationalism ever yet imposed, 
 and the serious internationalist doubtless realizes this and is 
 willing to pay the price. IsTor need we question for a moment 
 the sincerity of its prophets or the elevation of their motives. 
 But all unconsciously the gospel of internationalism owes 
 its glamour in large part to its indulgent attitude toward 
 provincialism. Its immediate tendency is disintegrating, 
 whatever its promise. So pronounced is this relation that dis- 
 integration is usually the first plank in the internationalist 
 platform, the one upon which present effort is chiefly con- 
 centrated. Russia is not altogether a fair example, but her 
 case is none the less relevant. She has proclaimed the larger 
 human unity and denounced the irksome unity of the nation 
 
NATIONALITY AND TERKITOEY 53 
 
 under the name of self-determination. The resulting disin- 
 tegration is apparent, but hardly the resulting unity. 
 
 Conceding all that may be claimed for internationalism 
 as the goal of human endeavor, it is impossible to avoid the 
 query whether the disintegration of the present larger aggre- 
 gates is the way to get it. These have been painfully formed 
 by the slow removal of obstructive sentiments, the formation 
 of larger cohesions, and the successive widening of men's 
 horizons. The little has grov^Ti into the large. May not 
 the large grow into the universal ? 
 
 In summary, nationality is based upon race and upon 
 physical' conditions. But race is itself the product of earlier 
 and long standing physical conditions. Conflicts between 
 the two are due to changes in physical conditions, changes 
 due in part to migration, but in greater part to the develop- 
 ment of larger relations of co-operation and interdependence. 
 In its present high stage of development race sentiment is ex- 
 ceedingly tenacious and imperious, often arrogating to itself 
 an absolute and permanent character and yielding reluctantly 
 to changed physical conditions. Changes in physical condi- 
 tion have of late been rapid and far-reaching, the newer de- 
 mands for successful national life requiring larger areas and 
 better facilities than were formerly necessary. Present race 
 feeling, therefore, does not fit present national requirements, 
 which latter are too recent to have developed the larger race 
 sentiments except imperfectly in certain favored localities like 
 Great Britain. It is a transition age, an age of narrow senti- 
 ments and broad requirements. Working arrangements must 
 be based on compromise. Yet it is well to remember that race 
 sentiment is itself a product of physical conditions and that 
 new^ conditions inevitably produce new sentiments. Historic 
 nationalism is a stubborn but a waning force; specialized 
 industrial civilization a permanent and growing power. This 
 must increase and that must decrease. The working adjust- 
 
54 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 ments which we are called upon to effect will call for very 
 large concessions to these great spiritual inheritances from 
 the past, but these concessions should be made in full recog- 
 nition of this fundamental fact. The Great Peace must be 
 based on a larger justice, a deeper sympathy, and a fuller 
 deference than we have hitherto known, but it would indeed 
 be pitiful if that deference and sympathy were construed in 
 the interest of provincialism and the perpetuation of petty 
 prejudice among men. Not so would it become the Great 
 Peace. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 NATIONALITY AND NATURAL RESOURCE 
 
 At the basis of national life there is always an economic 
 problem. An essential condition of the nation as of the 
 family is an assured livelihood. Briefly and by exception, 
 a nation may live upon its endowment as a family may live 
 by consuming its patrimony, but such an existence is preca- 
 rious and demoralizing. Nations can not long escape the 
 wholesome necessity of providing for their own necessities. 
 Exemption from this requirement, even for a brief period, 
 results in a degeneration of tissue which is speedily followed 
 by national decay. Spain and Portugal are classic examples 
 of nations ruined by being privileged for a time to live on 
 the fruits of other men's labors. 
 
 It is therefore pertinent to inquire at the founding of the 
 nation as at the founding of the new household, — is economic 
 support assured? If not, then nationality will be handi- 
 capped and stunted. Such a result has its dangers, not only 
 for the nation in question, but for the general community 
 of nations. The indigent nation is apt to be the tool of the 
 unscrupulous, like the indigent individual. Relations of ex- 
 treme dependence involve responsibilities which may well 
 be the subject of the closest public scrutiny. 
 
 Eirst in importance in the inventory of a nation's economic 
 resources must be reckoned its soil. This, with its correlate 
 of climate, is the natural source of its food, clothing, and 
 much of its shelter and permanent equipment. It is true 
 that all these things may be, and commonly are, secured in 
 part from outside the national limits, but to the extent that 
 
 55 
 
56 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 this is necessary, the nation becomes obviously dependent 
 in its most fundamental interests. In war, importation is 
 difficult if not impossible, and dependence upon it quickly be- 
 comes onerous. But not alone in war is the relation irk- 
 some. The purveyor is always in some sense a master, and 
 national independence, under such conditions of dependence, 
 is to a degree a contradiction in terms. 
 
 The present war has served to emphasize what all the 
 world knew but had not previously appreciated. That some- 
 thing like universal famine was a possibility as a result of 
 interruption of world commerce, had hardly occurred to us. 
 Yet we have seen the food producing countries themselves 
 put on short rations, while millions of bushels of the coveted 
 wheat spoiled for lack of transport. Equally, we have seen 
 local production stimulated beyond precedent or supposed 
 possibility by distress. It may be doubted whether nations 
 will ev'er again accept complacently the extreme dependence 
 which has characterized England and Belgium in recent 
 years. Possibly the accumulation of a surplus may help to 
 insure against possible lean years ; but for the most part, these 
 nations must resort to the unwelcome expedient of costly 
 artificial stimulation, if their limited agriculture is to meet 
 the increasing demand. 
 
 Be this as it may, in our task of nation building, we can 
 hardly overlook the importance of these fundamental re- 
 quisites of successful nationality. Europe has not always re- 
 membered this need in her nation making. When Greece in 
 1830 was constituted an independent nation, by the European 
 powers, the very able prince who was called to guide the 
 destinies of the little state, declined the invitation on the 
 ground that Thessaly, the natural granary of Greece, was 
 not included. But the powers were timid and were guided 
 as usual by a great variety of considerations which made it 
 seemingly impracticable to provide adequately for the wants 
 
NATIONALITY AND NATUKAL EESOUKCE 57 
 
 of the fledgling nation. Their decision held, and an impru- 
 dent and incompetent prince rashly assumed the responsibili- 
 ties which the other had declined. The result was complete 
 failure. The powers were obliged to do their work over 
 again, to include the necessary grainland, and to secure a 
 more competent leader. 
 
 Capacity to produce food staples is of prime importance, 
 but by no means the only desideratum. Ability to provide 
 a " balanced ration " is most desirable. Agricultural variety 
 with its larger guaranty against the vicissitudes of nature, 
 stock and their products, fruit and the numberless delicacies 
 of the civilized table, these all count. Nor does the require- 
 ment stop with food. The impending shortage of wool and 
 the disappointing cotton crop of the present year are re- 
 minders of our dependence for other essentials upon the soil. 
 A narrow and highly specialized productivity, even though 
 ample in amount, again necessitates exchange and involves 
 dependence, and this again incites to effort to better the na- 
 tion's economic position, it may be by those violent efforts 
 which it is our problem to prevent. 
 
 The needs above noted are fundamental to all nations and 
 to all civilizations. The Indian who disputed the possession 
 of hunting grounds with a rival tribe was actuated by the 
 same motives that today impel Germany to annex the grain 
 fields of Courland. But there has slowly developed in the 
 western nations a need which in its magnitude has not char- 
 acterized earlier civilizations and is not now felt by certain 
 great peoples. The distinctive characteristic of our western 
 civilization is its dependence upon minerals. In this it dif- 
 fers from the great civilizations of the east. Their equip- 
 ment is essentially of vegetable origin. Nothing so impresses 
 the traveler in China as the number of things made of bam- 
 boo which with us are made of metal. If to vegetable prod- 
 ucts we add earthenware of one sort or another, the product 
 
58 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 of minerals whose supply is universal and unlimited, we have 
 the essential basis of these great civilizations. 
 
 In contrast, our civilization has learned to avail itself, — 
 and that at a rapidly increasing rate, — of minerals and more 
 particularly of metals the annual production of which already 
 mounts into the hundreds of millions of tons. Scarcely a 
 year passes that does not witness the transfer of some im- 
 portant article from the vegetable to the mineral category, 
 apparently never to return. The recent general adoption 
 of metal bedsteads and the introduction of metal office fix- 
 tures now in progress, are cases in point. 
 
 The advantage of this metal civilization is obvious. Noth- 
 ing else could make possible the mighty enginery of modern 
 industry or war. We perhaps do not often enough reflect that 
 it has the great defect of ultimate exhaustion. Great as is 
 the wealth of certain metals like iron still reposing in the 
 bowels of the earth, the supply is not unlimited, and local 
 scarcity is already acutely felt. Furthermore, continued 
 exploitation must be under less favorable conditions, with 
 the possibility that we may experience economic exhaustion 
 even if physical exhaustion is still remote. The time may 
 yet come when men will hunt iron as men hunted it in the 
 Middle Ages, reserving the costly stuff for necessary imple- 
 ments and invoking for vulgar uses again the unfailing timber 
 or bamboo. 
 
 Be the future what it will, wealth of iron and coal is to- 
 day the much sought dower of favored nations. A reasonable 
 supply of both is, if not indispensable, at least of such ex- 
 treme importance to modern nations that they will go to al- 
 most any lengths to secure them. Doubtless a people may 
 live happily without these resources, but they cannot form 
 a nation of great wealth and power without them. The na- 
 tions that have developed great population, great wealth, and 
 great political power, have all been industrial nations, at 
 
NATIONALITY AKD NATURAL RESOURCE 69 
 
 least in modem times. Agriculture creates no such accumu- 
 lations of capital, no such enginery of power, no such huge 
 masses of population, as does industry, which, in the western 
 nations, is directly or indirectly based on the exploitation of 
 mineral resources. Doubtless such a development brings 
 its grave problems and perplexities. The philosopher might 
 perhaps counsel a people to resist these dangerous advantages, 
 but peoples in their onward groping find little opportunity 
 to heed philosophic counsel. In our war with man or nature, 
 the all-compelling demand is power. That, the exploitation 
 of metal industries assures beyond the wildest imaginings 
 of a soil tilling people. 
 
 Again this war has emphasized the great lesson. The na- 
 tions that are winning are those that can forge the heavier 
 sword. Here, everywhere, the cry is for more, and ever more, 
 millions of tons of coal and steel. It takes steel to make 
 cannon, and steel to make shells, and steel to make ships. 
 And the while we are straining every nerve to provide these 
 things, we are reminded on every side of the myriad demands 
 of peace which passed unnoticed until denied. Contrast 
 the pitiful weakness of Italy that, without coal or iron of 
 her own, waits a suppliant for the supplies that are needed 
 to stem the tide of invasion. There is warrant for the belief 
 that with coal and iron mines of her own, Italy, even the 
 weaker Italy of today, might have been knocking at the gates 
 of Vienna. But Italy with coal and iron of her own. would 
 not have been the Italy of today. An immensely larger 
 population, a vastly larger accumulation of capital and in- 
 dustrial appliances capable of conversion to war's emergency 
 uses would have changed the problem in toto. Is it any 
 wonder that the nations want coal and iron ? 
 
 It will of course be urged that economic provision is not 
 necessarily dependent on political control. This is true, as 
 present conditions prove. Italy and other nations have se- 
 
60 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 cured their coal and iron, like many other commodities, by 
 importation, and must apparently continue to do so. It is 
 not to be supposed, however, that such provision is satisfac- 
 tory, even if assured. Districts having coal and iron, com- 
 modities that are difficult of transport, have an immense ad- 
 vantage in the development of the basic industries over dis- 
 tricts not thus provided. The mere mining of coal and ore 
 employs a large population, and this necessarily belongs to 
 the district in question. When it is remembered that it takes 
 four tons of coal and several tons of ore and stone to make a 
 single ton of steel, it will readily be seen that the basic in- 
 dustries tend strongly to gravitate likewise to the locality 
 where nature has located their heavy materials. Thus a 
 farther increment of industrial population tends to develop 
 in such centers. 
 
 To those to whom nationality is nothing but an inconse- 
 quential prejudice, it may seem of no moment whether such 
 a population own the allegiance of a particular nation or not. 
 But men do not so judge. These men pay taxes and their 
 wealth, — often very large, — is an asset of the state. They 
 are available to recruit the armies of their state. They are 
 in all respects of the stuff that states are made of. If the 
 members of a nation are of importance, by the same token, 
 these possible additions are important. 
 
 But we may perhaps add another reason for desiring the 
 incorporation of such districts into the territory of the na- 
 tion. It is important, not only to get population, but to as- 
 similate it to the race which is nationally paramount. The 
 assimilation of agricultural populations is very slow. In- 
 frequent contact with assimilative elements, and perhaps a 
 mental habit less susceptible to these influences, makes such 
 a population tenacious of alien speech or ways. But such 
 industrial centers as above described, especially if developed 
 by the alien annexing power, draw their population from 
 
NATIONALITY AND NATTTEAL RESOURCE 61 
 
 other sources and predominantly from the dominant nation- 
 ality, if it is suitable. It is comparatively easy to implant 
 the new language and race sentiments in such a mobile popula- 
 tion during the period of its fluidity. Such additions, there- 
 fore, not only strengthen the nation, but strengthen 
 the race, results obviously to be desired if race and 
 nationality are conceived to be important. Whatever 
 the reasons, — and it is safe to say that aggressive 
 nationalism is but secondarily concerned with the reasons, 
 — there is nothing that the nations want more than deposits 
 of coal and iron. Campaigns are conducted and treaties 
 framed with very large regard for these prime essentials 
 of national life. Some of the most sensitive frontier prob- 
 lems in Europe turn on these stores of mineral wealth. On 
 debatable ground, with a population already hybrid, they 
 are the most tempting of all opportunities to shift by slight 
 changes of boundary or effort, the whole political and racial 
 equilibrium of the family of nations. The enormous in- 
 dustrial development of central Europe in the last fifty years 
 has inured to the benefit of Germany because she acquired 
 the mineral basis of that development from Erance in 1871. 
 By that transaction Germany acquired more than the fields 
 of Alsace-Lorraine, more than their iron and coal, more than 
 their two million people. Quite beyond the limits of these 
 provinces, in the region of the belching furnaces and the busy 
 workshops, some millions of men today speak German and 
 loyally support the German cause who would never have ex- 
 isted had the trains carried their coal and their ore the other 
 way and fed them to the furnaces of Erance, to call into 
 being there the other millions that have not been. For the 
 mines bring forth men, and men after the nation's kind. 
 Small difference in the end, will some one be found to sug- 
 gest ? Perhaps so to those who view the whole with an out- 
 sider's indifference, but to France with her thinning line of 
 
62 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 defenders, and to Germany with her plans of world dominion, 
 these millions one way or the other may be the difference 
 between success and failure. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to add that other minerals enter 
 largely into the list of national requisites, especially copper 
 for which, in its rapidly widening uses, there is no kno\vn 
 substitute. Manganese, tungsten, and other metals, some of 
 them but yesterday unkno^vn, have speedily become indispen- 
 sable as ingredients in that ever changing marvel of products 
 which still goes by the old name of steel. Other minerals 
 of chemical importance extend the list. Many of these, 
 though of highest importance, are used in small quantities 
 and derived from limited and local sources, where they are 
 easily controlled by individuals, with possible exclusive ad- 
 vantage to single powers. In this field of obscure but vital 
 interests, unpracticed statesmanship and diplomatic tradi- 
 tion are easily misled and popular judgment is hopelessly in- 
 competent. It is neverthless in the realm of these subtle 
 forces that the destiny of nations may henceforth be decided. 
 
 Xo attempt is here made to enumerate the necessary in- 
 dustrial requirements of the nation. A complete inventory 
 is the work of the industrial expert, a functionary too little 
 employed in most national counsels. Kor has it been the at- 
 tempt to show that nations ought to insist upon these re- 
 sources as conditions of their existence. The purpose has 
 been rather to indicate that nations do seek these things, and 
 that their presence or absence reacts strongly upon the wealth, 
 population, and power of the states in question. And since 
 wealth, population, and power have much to do with the sur- 
 vival of nations, the builders of nations must have large re- 
 gard for these things. 
 
 So far we have dealt exclusively with natural resources. 
 There are, however, other and derivative factors which de- 
 termine the economic life of a nation quite as much, perhaps, 
 
NATIONALITY AND NATUKAL RESOURCE 63 
 
 as these gifts of nature. Tlie possession of mines determines 
 whether a nation shall have a mining industry or not. But 
 it does not determine quite absolutely whether the nation 
 shall have a smelting industry or not. If the materials are 
 all there, the tendency is strong to develop such an industry, 
 but still these materials may be shipped elsewhere and the 
 smelting done by another nation, as in fact happens. Con- 
 versely, as this case indicates, it is possible for a nation with- 
 out such resources to develop the industry appropriate to 
 them. The derivative industry is not quite controlled by the 
 primary industry. 
 
 As we go farther from the primary industry toward in- 
 dustries more and more elaborative, the dependence becomes 
 ever less. Watch springs need not be made near coal and 
 iron mines. They may be made anywhere where other con- 
 ditions are favorable. Thus a very large option is opened 
 in the broad field of industry. Not that the choice ever 
 becomes a matter of indifference. There are always potent 
 if not compelling economic reasons. It pays to make watch 
 springs in some places and not in others, but no longer be- 
 cause of the location of the mines. And since large scale 
 industry and the grouping of kindred industries is always 
 advantageous, it follows that there is everywhere a tendency 
 toward specialization and far reaching dependence. This 
 specialization is at bottom quite as natural as that which 
 rests on the presence or absence of natural resources, but it 
 is far more flexible. Left to themselves, industries will mass 
 themselves as stated, but it is quite possible for nations to 
 prevent this massing and to develop, by judicious stimulation, 
 industries of a varied character. Economically this does not 
 pay. Nations do not get rich by bribing themselves to main- 
 tain unprofitable industries. No matter how many complexi- 
 ties and side issues are brought into the argument, nothing 
 can change this fundamental economic relation. Nor do 
 
64 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 high wages and full dinner pails result from this mainte- 
 nance of non-paying industries, unless temporarily, by avert- 
 ing the collapse of an artificial order which the system itself 
 has created. 
 
 But while such a policy does not make us rich it may make 
 us independent. The reasons that impel nations to seek 
 varied natural resources may justly impel them to develop 
 varied national industries. Complete national self-suffi- 
 ciency, either in resources or in developed industries, is a 
 chimera, but relative self-sufficiency is an attainable and a 
 desirable goal. 
 
 But it will be objected that this is a national rather than 
 an international problem. It has already been urged in an 
 earlier chapter that the peace conference can not better show 
 its wisdom than by resolutely refraining from interference 
 in matters of purely national concern. It is much to be 
 wished that the rule might be observed in this connection. 
 Unfortunately it is all but certain that certain powers with 
 which we have to deal will recognize no such limitation. The 
 German industrial development, so much admired and in 
 some ways so admirable, has been as ruthless and as aggres- 
 sive as German militarism itself. For the widespread Ger- 
 man practice of selling goods below cost in invaded markets 
 and making up the loss in protected home markets, there is 
 probably no remedy, especially as against a nation that has 
 no respect for its promises. But certain industries so fos- 
 tered are of a character which perhaps entitles them to inter- 
 national consideration. A German manufacturer of dye- 
 stuffs is said to have declared, anent a proposal to develop 
 that industry in Italy, that he would do business there with- 
 out profit for ten years, — would if necessary sacrifice the 
 profits of ten years past, — to defeat that project. This seems 
 harmless until we learn that the reason for this German 
 specialty is that the dyestuff industry can be converted with- 
 
l^ATIONALITY A:N'D I^ATURAL RESOURCE 65 
 
 out change of materials or appliances, into the manufacture 
 of high explosives. Such specialization has a significance 
 in connection with the problem of national defense that makes 
 it a legitimate interest to alliances formed for that purpose. 
 Whether effective measures can be devised is not so clear. 
 
 More imperative and more practicable, however, is it to 
 see that nations disorganized by the war do not resume their 
 national life under conditions that destroy their economic 
 freedom. If we may not dictate the economic policy of other 
 nations, by the same token we must see that others do not do 
 so. We may be perfectly certain that every effort will be 
 made by certain powers to prevent the development of econo- 
 mic independence, with its concomitants of wealth and power, 
 by certain other nations whose subserviency and helplessness 
 are desired. The attempt will be to accomplish by an in- 
 dustrial offensive that which the military offensive has failed 
 to achieve. Prudence forbids us to interpose a veto, but it 
 requires us to insure the square deal. 
 
 No rule can be laid down as to the economic requisites of 
 national existence, but it is clear that such requisites exist 
 and that they are among the weightiest considerations in the 
 nation builders' problem. Ample and varied resources are 
 a condition of national strength and independence. Such 
 provision our own country enjoys in a high degree. Prob- 
 ably no other nation is so nearly self-sufficing as the United 
 States, nor is it probable that its like is possible without ex- 
 tensive mergers of states now separate. 
 
 For nations not blessed with this all-round provision, the 
 possession in abundance of some material or product which 
 is vitally necessary to other nations, is the nearest equivalent. 
 Germany's potash makes her a strong bargainer for our cot- 
 ton. If little Greece had been known to have iron in her 
 mountains, she might have gotten on without Thessaly. 
 Those who have iron can always buy wheat. 
 
66 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 But they cannot buy the capital which their industry is 
 not of a nature to create, or the thousands of their o^vn kind 
 which their industry is not competent to support. Above 
 all they can not buy the varied human types that the raising of 
 the wheat and the forging of the iron produce. Their build- 
 ing must be done with less differentiated human material. 
 The result must be a simpler organism and one perhaps less 
 fitted to survive under modern conditions. 
 
 In conclusion, a single fact calls for emphasis. Economic 
 resource, like territorial convenience or defensibility, is an 
 independent requisite of national existence. The economic 
 demands of today are totally unlike those of earlier times and 
 stand in no necessary relation to historic sentiments or his- 
 toric frontiers. Where race sentiment or historic boundaries 
 conflict with economic requirements, concession is inevitable. 
 In particular must purely local sentiment be subordinated 
 to the interests of the larger populations affected. How in- 
 adequate the proposal that the disposition of Alsace-Lorraine 
 should be determined by a plebiscite! The industrial, po- 
 litical, and cultural future of two great nations is dependent 
 upon the decision in a way of which the humble Alsatian 
 peasant is utterly unconscious. There could be no greater 
 travesty of justice than to settle these far-reaching questions 
 of human destiny by reference to the transient sentiment of 
 a single generation of distracted border peasantry. To in- 
 voke the principle of self-determination in connections where 
 its exercise would give to the unknowing few the power to de- 
 termine the fate and even the existence of millions who have 
 no voice in the settlement, can have no other result than to 
 bring discredit upon a vital principle. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 NATIONALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 
 
 The present peoples of the world are clearly very unequal 
 in their capacity for the duties of nationality. These in- 
 equalities, again, are of the most varied character. There are 
 differences of location, of climate, of education, and of his- 
 torical inheritance. The English have been peculiarly fav- 
 ored by their location, enjoying at once exceptional oppor- 
 tunity for contact with the world and at the same time a rare 
 immunity from attack. They have consequently developed 
 a remarkable aptitude for affairs and for political and social 
 organization. The Erench have profited greatly from their 
 Roman inheritance which laid the foundation of their ex- 
 traordinary political unity. The Germans, enjoying neither 
 of these advantages, have been but recently and imperfectly 
 unified and have been unable to develop the capacity for self 
 government which the inherent capabilities of the people 
 should lead us to expect. Here location and inheritance ac- 
 count for differences of the most far reaching character, but 
 differences which seemingly do not inhere in race character. 
 The Germans are socially akin to the English and were joint 
 originators of their political institutions. Very large Teu- 
 tonic elements have continually recruited the Anglo-Saxon 
 stock, and at an earlier date, the Erench stock as well, with 
 no sign of inferiority or misadaptation after a generation 
 or two of assimilation. Differences are here purely a mat- 
 ter of situation and circumstance, though not necessarily 
 slight or transient on that account. In more extreme cases, 
 like that of the Russians and the Poles, where access to the 
 
 world is still more limited and natural defenses almost wholly 
 
 67 
 
68 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 lacking, political development has been effectively checked, 
 though again, we have no reason to doubt the capacity of the 
 race. 
 
 But there are other cases where the difference is more 
 fundamental and significant. Where climatic conditions are 
 essentially a bar to energy, a type of character develops which 
 is undoubtedly less capable of political development. 
 Whether the inhabitants of the tropics, when transferred to 
 temperate climates, are capable of developing the qualities of 
 the northern races is a disputed question, but one of little 
 moment. There is little opportunity for such transfer, and 
 whatever the result to those thus circumstanced, those that are 
 left behind remain unmodified and determine the character 
 of the race. It is this character that concerns us. What 
 are the possibilities of political development in the less fav- 
 ored climates, more particularly in the broad zone between 
 thirty degrees north and south of the Equator, the tropics 
 as defined by the ethnologist ? 
 
 The writer has elsewhere ^ given at length his reasons for 
 believing that the political inferiority of the tropics is in- 
 herent and permanent. It was in the tropics that civiliza- 
 tion first developed, but that civilization was based on slavery, 
 sure sign of the irksomeness of exertion. Even this slave 
 organization seems to have been effected by members of more 
 energetic races. With the passing of slavery and the intro- 
 duction of a more efiicient principle of organization, civiliza- 
 tion transferred its headquarters to the energy zone and the 
 tropics ceased to progress, even retrograded, separated from 
 the developing northern peoples by an ever widening gulf, 
 until the northerner himself chose to bridge it. It has been 
 justly said that no tropical people has ever yet developed a 
 civilization that would pass muster according to the most 
 tolerant of modern standards. Such governments have ex- 
 
 1 " America Among the Nations," Chapter XII. 
 
IsTATIONALITY AKD TRUSTEESHIP 69 
 
 isted within the tropics, and in particular exist there today, 
 but they are established and maintained by peoples from the 
 temperate zones. Such participation in these governments 
 as the native peoples have acquired, has been under the tute- 
 lage of the suzerain peoples. The actual choice of human 
 agents, — always the test of self government, — has never 
 rested with the native. Possibly this too will come, but 
 even so it will not prove or constitute equality. It will mean 
 at most that they are capable of development, — not that they 
 are capable of se?/-development. 
 
 The question of ultimate capacity, however, concerns us 
 very little. It is at best a question whether these peoples 
 will never develop political capacity, or will develop it very, 
 very slowly. Any suggestion that tropical races as a whole 
 are the equals of the northern peoples in political capacity 
 is a palpable absurdity. Making allowance for certain fa- 
 vored localities in the tropics where elevation or dryness 
 counteract in a measure the enervating effects of climate, 
 the general condition of the tropics speaks for itself. They 
 are not young peoples, novices at their task. The tropical 
 peoples are among the oldest on the globe. They are not 
 few or scattered. The tropics in Africa, India and South 
 America bulk large among the world's inhabited areas, and 
 India alone has a population nearly equal to that of all Eu- 
 rope, with natural defenses unrivaled in the world. They are 
 not lacking in resources, for nowhere has nature been more 
 lavish. Yet India passed, almost without a struggle, under 
 the control of a power one tenth her size and ten thousand 
 miles away. Tropical Africa was partitioned with scarce 
 a protest, and tropical America appropriated as though it 
 were an empty land. We can explain these facts only on 
 the assumption of the inferior political capacity of tropical 
 peoples. 
 
 It is sometimes urged that this is not inferiority but only 
 
70 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 adaptation to tropical conditions. True, but not an adapta- 
 tion to world conditions, and it is with world conditions that 
 modern civilization and modern political conditions have to 
 deal. All the tendencies of modern life, — the harnessing 
 of nature forces, quantity production, world markets, uni- 
 versal transportation and communication, — tend to make 
 all parts of the world dependent upon one another. The 
 tropical peoples may themselves be quite satisfied to be in- 
 dolent, unorganized, and inefficient, but the organized and 
 energetic northern people need the products of the tropics 
 in a measure which only organization and industry can sup- 
 ply. Diseases due to carelessness and sloth may be a small 
 matter to the native,^ but when foreign ships carry the infec- 
 tion to distant ports, it requires intervention. Finally, and 
 most of all, tropical peoples require protection from the 
 cupidity and ruthless energy of the powerful peoples who 
 are tempted or compelled to seek their products. Thus, the 
 discovery of rich tin deposits in the Malay Peninsula at a 
 time when other known deposits of this indispensable metal 
 were beginning to be exhausted, put a pressure upon these 
 feebly organized folk which they were entirely unable to 
 bear. Imagine the conditions that would have followed such 
 a discovery if no strong government had intervened to pro- 
 tect native interests. A few vigorous and unscrupulous ad- 
 venturers such as are found among all strong peoples, — men 
 like Cortez or Pizarro or Drake, or Hawkins, — would seize 
 the territory, coerce the natives into working the mines, sub- 
 ject them to unspeakable cruelties, and virtually exterminate 
 the race in the pursuit of private gain, as was done in the 
 West Indies. It is useless to say, — wrong to say, — that the 
 
 1 The inhabitants of Guayaquil are said to have protested against the 
 eradication of yellow fever on the ground that they, being semi-immune, 
 survived its attacks, while the more susceptible foreigner succumbed. 
 It constituted thus a natural protection against dreaded commercial 
 competition. 
 
l^ATIOI^ALITY AND TKUSTEESHIP 71 
 
 foreigner should keep out. He "will not and he should not 
 keep out. It would be a breach of trust toward civilization 
 to leave unutilized a necessary instrument of progress be- 
 cause an inefficient people have accidentally located on the 
 spot. Anyway it will not be done. There is no power in 
 the world that can keep out the lawless adventurer under 
 such circumstances. The prize is too great, the place too re- 
 mote, and foreign prohibition too ineffectual. 
 
 The tin mines of Malaysia offer an easy illustration of 
 the problem of tropical exploitation, but it is only one case 
 among many. All natural products of the tropics, products 
 demanded by western civilization with ever increasing im- 
 portunity, present similar temptations and dangers. The 
 frightful cruelties of rubber gathering in the Putumayo il- 
 lustrate the danger of letting the strong race go as exploiter 
 without carrying his own strong restraints and protections 
 with him. Similar conditions obtained in the Congo while 
 under the control of an irresponsible commercial combination, 
 conditions which even the assumption of responsibility by 
 Belgium did not at once remove. 
 
 When the demand for tropical products exceeds nature's 
 spontaneous supply, new reasons for tutelage present them- 
 selves. The Malay can collect wild rubber, but when it be- 
 comes necessary to establish a rubber plantation, neither co- 
 ercion nor inducements will make him equal to the task. 
 Larger power of organization, more sustained purpose, and 
 fuller knowledge than tropical man possesses are required 
 for the purpose. Yet the purpose is perfectly legitimate. 
 It is as reasonable that the soil of the tropics should be tilled 
 as that the tin should be mined in the service of civilization. 
 Yet this mobilization of world resources which is at once 
 the necessity and the glory of our civilization, requires the 
 organizing abilities and the effective restraints which only 
 the most advanced nations can furnish. The strong races 
 
72 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 must help the weak and yet must protect them from the im- 
 pact of their own strength. 
 
 The tropics perhaps furnish the clearest case of obvious 
 dependence, but not bv any means the only one. Peoples of 
 undoubted capacity may be quite as dependent by reason of 
 limited area and peculiar situation. Denmark is an example. 
 oSTo expansion of Danish territory is practicable, and con- 
 sequently, no considerable expansion of the race. Denmark 
 is surrounded by powerful nations who would find her ter- 
 ritories a most convenient addition to their domain. Ob- 
 viously the integrity of Denmark must depend on something 
 else than her o^wti strength. Lack of coal, of access to the 
 sea, or of other vital needs of national life create further 
 conditions of helplessness, a helplessness very different from 
 that of the tropical peoples, but not the less real. What 
 they can not do for themselves, stronger nations must do for 
 them. 
 
 Hence the relation which we may call trusteeship, a re- 
 lation not to be confounded with mere control. There has 
 been plenty of control in the world, but little trusteeship. 
 The higher relation has slowly developed from the lower. 
 The early conquerors were merely marauders. They took 
 everything they could turn to account and destroyed the rest. 
 It was an advance when the great Pharaoh of the eighteenth 
 dynasty hit upon the idea of making annual raids, plunder- 
 ing with moderation, and leaving enough food and seed so 
 there might be something for him next year. Then came 
 the system of tribute in which the helpless bought immunity 
 from the annual raid by an advance payment. It is the 
 principle accepted by early empire builders and dominant 
 still in the days of more enlightened Rome, that helpless, ap- 
 propriated peoples are the property of their suzerain, to be 
 farmed for his benefit like a private estate, and with such 
 regard for native interests as a prudent farmer shows to- 
 
]SrATIOI^ALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 73 
 
 ward his horses or cattle, the source of his profits. Even 
 Cicero pleads for good government in the provinces, not at 
 all in the interest of the provincials, but on the ground that 
 it will increase the revenue that can be derived from them. 
 In justice to Eome it must be recognized that she became 
 better than her theories and that much of the spirit of trus- 
 teeship animated her best officials. But their higher temper 
 never had the support of a recognized social principle. 
 
 In the awful collapse of civilization which followed the 
 decay of Eome, the fugitive principle was quite lost sight of. 
 With the rise of modem nations and the world discoveries 
 which established dependencies of unprecedented extent, the 
 unschooled nations began again at the first lessons. The 
 plundering of Peru and the depopulation of the West Indian 
 Islands were eighteenth dynasty performances or worse. 
 Drake and Hawkins hardly represented a higher principle. 
 The policy of the British East India Company in the early 
 period of its unexpected imperial responsibilities, reflect but 
 little of the later British temper. The attempt to tax the 
 American Colonies, though moderate in amount and reason- 
 able in its alleged purpose, was suggestive of the earlier idea 
 of o^vnership. And so still is the terminology handed down 
 from an earlier time and an earlier set of political ideas. We 
 still hear of '' British Possessions," and the realities of the 
 modern relation are still concealed under the symbols of 
 ownership. 
 
 Slowly the principle of trusteeship has emerged from the 
 brutal relation of force. The incontinent marauder slowly 
 learns prudence and gives his victims the benefit of a closed 
 season, as did the great Pharaoh. Then he protects, multi- 
 plies, and organizes them, the better to harness them for his 
 purpose. Such was the policy of Eome in the great days, a 
 wise and humane exploiter, but still not a trustee. But at 
 last, in accordance with a principle of universal application, 
 
74 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 he becomes interested in the objects of his care. Like the 
 horse fancier, whose passion for horses leads him to spend his 
 money freely upon them, so the care-taker of the peoples be- 
 comes engrossed in his task, proud of his constructive achieve- 
 ment, eager to give rather than to get, and the ulterior pur- 
 pose of his effort at the beginning is slowly subordinated and 
 then forgotten. He is no longer an owner, an exploiter, but 
 a trustee. The relation here indicated is not at all one of 
 self-denying devotion or religious self-abnegation. It is one 
 that results naturally from honest and competent devotion to 
 a constructive task. We learn to enjoy the task. Once we 
 have learned the delight of building, we would rather build 
 than occupy. The typical trust administrator is a practical, 
 business man, largely competent, and capable of a large satis- 
 faction in his own competency. No self-denying altruism 
 need siTpplement, — still less can it ever replace, — his sturdy 
 respect for professional honor, his repugnance for the cheap 
 betrayal of the implicit trust placed in him, and his satisfac- 
 tion at seeing his city of brick become a city of marble. The 
 man who has once known these recompenses cares little for 
 any other. Especially if he continues a long line of those 
 who have so wrought and so judged, any other judgment or 
 attitude becomes impossible. 
 
 The same holds of nations, possibly in an even greater 
 degree. They are slower to move, slower to become imbued 
 with a principle, but correspondingly slow to abandon it, 
 especially if it is backed by a long tradition. It is cheap 
 tirade to denounce the great order-creating powers as land 
 grabbers, bandits, and brigands. There have been nations 
 that were selfish and short-sighted, without inspired vision or 
 constructive wisdom. And there have been others that have 
 built greatly and enduringly, asking little by way of recom- 
 pense save the privilege of building, because their pleasure 
 was in that. The world has nothing more valuable to show 
 
NATIO]^ALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 75 
 
 as the result of its age-long travail than such men and such 
 nations as these. 
 
 It is needless to say that the spirit of trusteeship has heen 
 very differently developed in modern nations. It is not al- 
 ways possible to account for these differences which seem to 
 stand in no uniform relation to experience or national tem- 
 perament. The beginners seem to have fared worst. Spain 
 and Portugal had the unfortunate privilege of plundering the 
 treasure houses of the newly discovered world. Possibly 
 other peoples would have plundered as ruthlessly at that time 
 and would have paid as heavy a penalty. That penalty came 
 in the form of a demoralizing tradition of unearned wealth 
 which no later experience or enlightenment could overcome. 
 Contrary to popular opinion, Spain's colonial legislation was 
 for the most part well conceived and unselfish. But nothing 
 could secure its administration in that spirit. The habit of 
 *' milking " the colonies dominated the official and the national 
 consciousness. This administrative plunder did not find its 
 worst effect in the constant drain upon colonial resources, but 
 in the destruction of the constructive tradition. The habit of 
 thinking of the colonies in terms of revenue made it impos- 
 sible to think of them in terms of constructive opportunity. 
 It isn't the collector of rents in slum tenements who dreams 
 dreams of architectural reconstruction. This depressing 
 temper was not that of individuals ; it was the temper of the 
 nation. With imperial decline and the growing need of earn- 
 ing her own living, the reluctant nation responded with 
 increasing shift and evasion. It was the loss of her last 
 colony that started Spain on the wholesome path of self- 
 support. To her had been committed one of the world's 
 greatest trusts, but she had never learned the secret of trustee- 
 ship. 
 
 Spain is a conspicuous example of failure in the trusteeship 
 of dependent peoples, but she is neither the only failure nor 
 
76 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 the worst one. The failure of Portugal has been more abject 
 and pitiful. Her mighty power in the East has dwindled to 
 the merest speck, a fossil reminder of things extinct, while 
 her African colonies, the only considerable remains of her vast 
 empire, are the blackest spots on the dark continent. Even 
 more than Spain, too, she has suffered the demoralizing home 
 reaction of unearned existence. Her chief monument is 
 African slavery, her invention. The world owes to her in- 
 famous trusteeship the most insoluble of all social and race 
 problems. 
 
 But distinctly worse than either is the case of Turkey. 
 She hardly surpasses them in cruelty or destructiveness, but 
 against her trusteeship lies this damning indictment, that it 
 has been the subjection of the higher to the lower. The Turk- 
 ish Empire has included the most civilized peoples of the 
 ancient world and of all the later times down to the Renais- 
 sance. It has scarcely included at any time a people, — 
 Arab, Jew, Greek, Armenian, or other, — which was not supe- 
 rior to the Turk himself. Upon these subject races the Turk 
 has never conferred any gift of organization. He has never 
 even learned their own higher secret. He has simply al- 
 lowed their organization to continue, using at times the con- 
 quered as agents of administration, and through them farming 
 his estate for his own benefit. Thus the Rumanian princi- 
 palities were always ruled by Christians. Before the con- 
 quest Christians ruled them in the interest of Christians; 
 afterward, Christians ruled them in the interest of Turks. 
 The governorship was sold in Constantinople to the highest 
 bidder, and the purchaser, always a Greek, recouped himself 
 from the revenues that should have gone to the development 
 of the provinces. Meanwhile the Turk sat at home, good- 
 natured, tolerant, unimaginative, amid the decaying splen- 
 dors of an empire that he did not create and could not pre- 
 serve. It is not an uncommon thing that a crude people has 
 
NATION^ALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 77 
 
 conquered a more highly developed one, but it would be dif- 
 ficult to find a ease in which the conqueror has learned so 
 little from the conquered. If there is any power among 
 men to rectify the demonstrated misfits of history, the Turk 
 may well be asked to give an account of his stewardship. 
 
 If we turn from these deplorable examples in almost any 
 direction, the contrast is striking. In trusteeship of the high- 
 handed imperial sort, the Russian has given us much to 
 admire. Doubtless Russian provincial development has been 
 for the sake of the empire rather than for the sake of the 
 provinces, but there has at least been provincial development, 
 and that of a sort that would have done honor to Trajan. To 
 one who compares the squalid quarters of old Tiflis with the 
 magnificently appointed city which Russia has built beside 
 it, or who looks out upon the superb avenues and quays of 
 Dalny which displace the Chinese fisher huts of a few years 
 before, it is plain that with all her faults, Russia was no 
 mere parasite, no wearer of the cast-ofiF purple of older em- 
 pires. Nor was her constructive power confined to the build- 
 ing of cities. Under a dynasty which despite its recent fiasco 
 has been characterized for a century and a half by a remark- 
 able degree of ability and public spirit, Russia was one of the 
 great constructive powers in the world. It was her misfor- 
 tune that the democratic preoccupations of the western pow- 
 ers should make us primarily conscious of Russia's unlearned 
 lessons, her rudimentary development of popular government 
 and safeguards for individual right. We neither realized the 
 impossibility of achieving these things first, nor yet the fact 
 that they were being rapidly achieved. The Duma and the 
 Zemstvos, despite their limited prerogatives, were rapidly 
 building popular government on the soundest of foundations 
 when the avalanche of fanaticism and treason swept their 
 work away. The writer holds no brief for Russia. Her 
 efforts will be needed at home for a long time to come. Even 
 
78 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 were she with us still in her coherent power, her trusteeship 
 for the wards of the nations was more to be dreaded than 
 sought. But now that she has left the stage we may freely 
 recognize her as one of the great players. 
 
 A mixed record, but on the whole an honorable one is that 
 of France. The problem presented by North America, a 
 problem of colonization more than of trusteeship of the native 
 races, was little suited to the France of the ancien regime. 
 Religious bigotry hindered settlement, and state aid proved a 
 demoralizing inducement. International conflicts prevented 
 any rational policy toward the natives, even had the insight 
 of the time made such a policy possible. It is rare that a 
 historic decision has been better justified than was that on the 
 Heights of Abraham in 1759. 
 
 But the free France of a later day has had a very different 
 history. No wars with European rivals have been fought 
 within the limits of her great modern dependencies. No at- 
 tempt has been made to displace their native populations. 
 From the first the policy has been one of development, and 
 so far from exploiting these possessions for tribute, they have 
 uniformly entailed a charge upon the home government for 
 their maintenance and development. It is just here that 
 France has been oftenest criticised. She has not been preda- 
 tory or parasitic, — despite a certain tendency to officialism 
 on the part of French residents, — but she has not always 
 seemed to be practical. Perhaps the difficulty lies with the 
 home people. They are less disposed to grasp colonial oppor- 
 tunities for business and less inclined to let foreigners do so. 
 Hence the development of the dependencies is slower and the 
 day of self-support is postponed. 
 
 Possibly it should be added that French devotion to the 
 principles of free government has at times hindered her work. 
 In her effort to do for her dependents she has gone so far as 
 
NATIONALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 79 
 
 to incorporate Algeria into the body of France, giving it rep- 
 resentation in the French Parliament and at one time extend- 
 ing the entire body of French law to this province. The 
 result only demonstrated the futility of arrangements not 
 based on nature. Algeria is not France, and her representa- 
 tives show a dangerous provincialism and detachment from 
 general interests. Above all, Mohammedans are not French- 
 men, and the well meant privileges of French law were for 
 them a hardship and an irritation. 
 
 But despite these excesses of zeal and other limitations of a 
 less excusable kind, French rule has shown in a high degree 
 the spirit of trusteeship, and an increasing mastery of its 
 problems. It is a matter of regret, to those who chiefly de- 
 sire the expansion of the French race, that the Frenchman is 
 so little disposed to emigrate and challenge the native posses- 
 sion of Algeria and Tunis, but as the trustee of dependent 
 peoples France is certainly not to be criticised for showing 
 so little disposition to displace them. That she is creating 
 in these lands the material conditions of civilization in a 
 degree that they have never known, and that she is sincerely 
 devoted to their development rather than to a policy of 
 exhausting exploitation is hardly to be questioned. France 
 is one of the great trustees. 
 
 The case of Britain is too well known and recognized as 
 a model to require lengthy discussion. The most striking 
 fact is the immensity of her trust. About one-fourth of the 
 population as of the area of the globe is in her keeping, and 
 of these more than three-fourths are essentially wards. In- 
 deed if we take account of the scanty population of the self- 
 governing dominions, a population quite unable to protect 
 itself unaided against possible aggressors, then all outside the 
 United Kingdom, or more than nine-tenths of the vast aggre- 
 gate, must be classed as dependent. Trusteeship, however, 
 
80 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 as regards the self-governing dominions can be nothing more 
 than protection from foreign aggression. Bejond this they 
 are self-sufficing. 
 
 Toward the dependent peoples the policy of Britain, though 
 persistently misrepresented, is not open to doubt. Its first 
 requisite is order, as is that of every true government. But 
 this assured, all effort is bent toward the care and develop- 
 ment of the people held in trust. Burke's declaration that 
 England was not powerful enough to oppress the humblest 
 dweller on the banks of the Ganges and protect the proudest 
 lord on the banks of the Thames, may fairly be taken as the 
 guiding principle of British trusteeship, a principle whose 
 strength lies not so much in its acceptance by the British 
 people as in the slowly developed tradition of the British 
 administrator. This tradition which is not the creation of 
 any single individual or the result of any legislative act, has 
 slowly come to envelop the whole service like an atmosphere. 
 It is not the sentimental devotion of the altruist, but the self- 
 respect of a superior race. From his first day in the service 
 the future administrator breathes this atmosphere of matter- 
 of-course recognition of native rights and suzerain obliga- 
 tions. The petty tricks, the lies, the nameless exasperations 
 of his wards must not exhaust his patience. That would be 
 to show weakness. His word must be inviolable, the more so 
 because theirs is not. To take advantage of them is con- 
 temptible, unsportsmanlike, l^ot saintliness but sportsman- 
 ship is the key to this finest service ever rendered by race to 
 race. 
 
 But the great thing about British trusteeship is not merely 
 its justice, competency, and professional honor. It is rather 
 to be found in its democracy. To the limit of the possible 
 it is Britain's policy to place responsibility in native hands. 
 This policy, so well exemplified and advocated by Lord 
 Cromer in his administration of Egypt, means in the first 
 
NATIONALITY AND TRUSTEESHIP 81 
 
 place the use of native agents so far as possible in adminis- 
 trative service, a general practice in all trusteeships, for only 
 the most bungling incompetent seeks posts for " deserving " 
 partisans in such a service. But British policy goes farther, 
 — and in this finds its distinctive characteristic, — placing 
 the actual direction of affairs little by little in native hands. 
 In this Britain never dogmatizes about the inalienable right 
 of men to govern themselves. She feels her way. She is 
 chiefly concerned with their ability to govern themselves, and 
 justly concludes that, failing the ability, the right has no 
 present application. Withal, she has shown herself inclined 
 to give them the benefit of the doubt. In recent years espe- 
 cially, she has taken long chances in her extension of the 
 principle of native control. Unlike France, she cares not a 
 whit for logical consistency. Her procedure is empirical. 
 But she is sincerely devoted to the principle that men should 
 be permitted the use of their powers and encouraged to develop 
 them. The discontent among her educated colonials is an 
 indication of success in the attainment of both these aims. 
 
 The striking outward fact is the material success of British 
 trusteeship. Her colonies prosper, prosper beyond the imagi- 
 nation of those unfamiliar with them. Not one of them 
 pays a penny of tribute or contributes perforce even to impe- 
 rial defense. Yet not one of them entails a charge upon the 
 imperial budget. Their increase in wealth has been enor- 
 mous, an increase which has accrued primarily, — especially 
 in Egypt, — to the poorest classes of the population. And 
 the English have prospered, — justly prospered, — in trade 
 with the people that England has made rich. That wealth 
 and intelligence have not brought submissiveness and content 
 is quite in accordance with their nature. It is a unique 
 record. Britain is the great trustee. 
 
 Our own experiments in this unwonted relationship call 
 for brief notice. Our experience has been but recent and 
 
82 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 has been complicated from the first by prepossessions and 
 divided counsels. We had no thought of assuming trust 
 obligations. We had little sympathy with them or apprecia- 
 tion of their necessity. In particular we felt that they were 
 inconsistent with our own political institutions. In conse- 
 quence our policy has been characterized by not a little of 
 half-heartedness and vacillation, the more so as our first great 
 acquisition, — that of the Philippines, — was of a peculiarly 
 unpremeditated and unnecessary character. Our hesitancy 
 has naturally reacted powerfully upon the Eilipino mind, 
 arousing aspirations of the vaguest and most troublesome 
 character. Said an American who had listened to a Fili- 
 pino's glowing words on independence : " What could you 
 do, if you were independent, that you cannot do now ? " "I 
 could build my house there in the middle of the street, if I 
 wanted to." " But suppose your neighbor objected and in- 
 terfered." " I would get him." " But suppose he got you." 
 A shrug of the shoulders was the only answer. 
 
 Yet despite these handicaps, American administration in 
 the Philippines is an undeniable success. Material prosper- 
 ity, enormous improvement in physical and sanitary condi- 
 tions, well nigh universal education, and the establishment of 
 order and safety such as the islands have never known, are its 
 indisputable results. Objections on the ground of imperial- 
 ism and the strategy of national defense simply lose all hold 
 upon the mind, when once we are in the actual presence of 
 this great undertaking. We are doing the white man's work 
 and doing it worthily. We have learned much from Britain, 
 but possibly have a thing or two that we might teach her. In 
 the extension of self-government to the people, we have vied 
 with Britain in the audacity of our faith. 
 
 One fact is worthy of especial notice. In the mountainous 
 interior of the islands have dwelt from time immemorial the 
 head hunters whose strange rites are so inimicable to civiliza- 
 
NATIOJ^ALITY AND TEUSTEESHIP 83 
 
 tion. They are also found in Formosa, Borneo, and other 
 localities where they are the wards of the Japanese and the 
 Dutch, expert trustees in their way. Both these powers have 
 been compelled to adopt a policy of extermination toward 
 these untamable savages. The Japanese have surrounded 
 their habitat with a barrier of barbed wire which is advanced 
 from time to time as parts of the area are cleared, and in this 
 narrowing circle the savages are trapped and destroyed. In 
 the Philippines, Americans have risked their lives to learn 
 the secret of these strange peoples and to reconcile them to 
 civilized ways, an effort that has been crowned with success. 
 They are today among the most promising of our Filipino 
 wards. 
 
 But American trusteeship has not stopped with the Philip- 
 pines. The building of the Panama Canal, and the slowly 
 dawning consciousness of its vital place in our developing 
 commerce and our national defense, have awakened us to the 
 necessity of order and business-like administration in the 
 Caribbean region. Faced with the possibility of foreign 
 complications of the most dangerous character, we have shed 
 our prepossessions and accepted our inevitable task. We 
 stand guard over Cuba, protecting her alike from foreign 
 aggressors and from herself. We have annexed Porto Rico 
 and the Virgin Isles. We have a protectorate over Hayti and 
 Panama. We are unofficially in control of the Dominican 
 Eepublic. Our marines occupy the Nicaraguan capital. 
 The Canal Zone is ours by a perpetually renewable lease. 
 Not one of these trusts was sought ; not one of them could be 
 avoided; and the end is not yet. The inexorable logic of 
 events has brushed aside our theories and our prepossessions. 
 Not with exultation but with a grave sense of responsibility 
 we may accept our place among the world's trustees. 
 
 The coming settlement is primarily a problem of trustee- 
 ship. What is to become of the German colonies, the Portu- 
 
84 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 guese colonies, the Turkish subject territories ? Who are to 
 be sponsors for Belgium, for Denmark, for Switzerland, for 
 Holland, for the Balkan and near-Balkan states ? Who will 
 maintain the free passage of the Bosphorus and the Darda- 
 nelles? The answer will depend largely on our conception 
 of the relation involved. 
 
 On the one hand is heard the claim of ownership. Give 
 us back "■ our colonies," our share of the plums. Colonies 
 are property to be farmed like an estate. Their people are 
 our servants to be used subject only to such limitations as self- 
 interest and public conscience with its feeble instruments for 
 the prevention of cruelty may dictate. This was the answer 
 of Spain to all charges of cruelty and incompetency in Cuba. 
 " Cuba is ours." It was the plea of ownership, pure and 
 simple. To this claim we instinctively opposed the principle 
 of trusteeship. The opposition was not one of argument or 
 theory. It was the instinct of a free people. Spain's his- 
 toric title was unquestioned. The great trust was indubitably 
 hers. But she had been guilty of breach of trust, and through 
 incompetency and maladministration her title was forfeit. 
 There was no other possible attitude for a free nation com- 
 mitted to the cause of human freedom. There is no other 
 possible attitude today. 
 
 But if trusteeship, then who is to be the trustee ? Again 
 the internationalist is heard. Eor the common interest there 
 should be a common trust. An international trusteeship is 
 proposed for the administration of the Dardanelles, the great 
 canals, the little nations, the tropical colonies and the like. 
 The proposal is logically plausible. But the opinion may 
 safely be hazarded that the trusteeship which is to give the 
 world a stable peace will depend much less on logic than on 
 competency. Beyond a doubt the spirit of trusteeship must 
 be maintained. Territories and interests which are incapa- 
 ble of self-administration, must be administered in the inter- 
 
]SrATIONALITY AISTD TRUSTEESHIP 85 
 
 est of their own people and the community of nations. But 
 whether such administration can better be secured by an un- 
 tried international agency than by experts in the work who, 
 all uncoerced, have developed compelling traditions of soimd 
 trusteeship, may well be doubted. Possibly an administra- 
 tion could be devised for Egypt which would better satisfy 
 the equities of international theory than that now established 
 there, but hardly one that would better conserve the inter- 
 ests of the Egyptians, or the legitimate interests of other 
 powers. The case is not unrepresentative. The possibilities 
 of internationalism will be considered in another chapter. 
 Meanwhile it behooves us to note to how great an extent the 
 greater nations of the world have acquired not only inter- 
 national functions but the international spirit. A recent 
 writer has aptly described the British Empire as " a great 
 and sacred international trust with responsibilities of vital 
 importance for all mankind." These words are no figure of 
 speech. The British Empire is not an empire but a group 
 of free nations holding numerous wards in trust. That trust 
 is administered with strictest impartiality not only as re- 
 gards the associated nations, but as regards nations in general. 
 The prudent will think twice before they relinquish such 
 tried instruments as this for untried theoretical creations. 
 
 But whatever the ultimate choice, the great national trusts 
 must long continue. We may propose internationalization 
 of the Dardanelles and the like, but no man in his senses ex- 
 pects Britain to surrender India or France Madagascar. 
 Whether these trusts are to be permanent or are ultimately 
 to give way to international agencies, the chief wards of hu- 
 manity are still to be long in their keeping. There can be 
 no more urgent duty in this terrible hour than to emphasize 
 their character as trusts. Discriminating tariffs, adminis- 
 trative partiality, parasitism, and ofiicial intimidation such 
 as have marred and still mar certain otherwise fair records, 
 
86 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 are one and all incompatible with the spirit of the trust. 
 Such excellent administrators as Holland and France may 
 hesitate to grant to all nations the advantages which they enjoy 
 in the farming of their rich, tropical possessions, but any 
 other policy is sure to jeopardize both their title and the 
 peace of the world. No more vital interest is involved in 
 the forthcoming settlement than to establish on the firmest 
 foundations the principle of trusteeship, the principle that the 
 control of helpless peoples is to be in their interest and in 
 the common interest of all nations. The trustee must find 
 his reward in the mere privilege of doing, not in any monop- 
 oly of trade or exploitation. We may with perfect legiti- 
 macy consider the removal of Germany from her trusteeship. 
 Whether we can justly or safely exclude her from traffic with 
 these colonies or with any colonies is a very different question. 
 To so exclude her would be to deny her a place in the family 
 of the nations. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 Wak is in part an effort to hold nations accountable for 
 their acts, an effort usually culminating in the imposition of a 
 penalty by the victor. We have here to consider the efficacy 
 and practicability of certain conventional penalties as a means 
 of holding offending nations to account. In particular the 
 popular penalty of indemnity calls for careful consideration. 
 
 There is nothing that a belligerent does to an enemy in 
 war that he may not do to the same enemy after surrender 
 if he chooses. The collapse of all resistance leaves the victor 
 sole arbiter. In earlier v^arfare the worst horrors were often 
 reserved for the hour of victory. The story of Samuel who 
 cursed Saul and deposed him from the kingship because he 
 had spared the king of the Amalekites and the best of the 
 flocks condemned by the implacable Samuel is familiar. 
 From that time down to Tilly's capture of Magdeburg in 
 the Thirty Years' War, the harsh old rule has been of inter- 
 mittent if not regular application. Even among the most 
 civilized ancient races the selling of prisoners of war into 
 slavery and the beheading of enemy generals on the battlefield 
 was the high watermark of leniency. Confiscation of estates 
 and looting of personal property was a matter of course. 
 
 Self-interest mitigated the rule in case of conquest. What 
 was the use of conquered provinces if nobody remained to 
 till them for the benefit of the conquerors ? The notion that 
 these lands were necessary for the expansion of the conquer- 
 or's people did not at first suggest itself. Race lines were 
 trivial in a day when language was rudimentary and slavery 
 obliterated all distinctions. With primitive sense of thrift, 
 
 87 
 
88 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 therefore, a conquered population might be conserved, the 
 while personal effects as before were ruthlessly confiscated. 
 This was the easier because of the fact that such effects were 
 almost exclusively articles of personal gratification rather 
 than productive capital. When the Egyptian Pharaoh 
 proudly records the thousands of pounds of gold that he 
 carried off as the result of a marauding campaign, we must 
 beware of attaching to the transaction a modern significance. 
 Ko doubt the feelings of the conquered suffered severely from 
 the loss of their earrings and bracelets, and the vanity of 
 the conqueror was correspondingly flattered, but the economic 
 functions of society were little disturbed. Gold was not a 
 circulating medium or a measure of values, and the transfer 
 of gold from one locality or owner to another was a matter 
 of no serious consequence. 
 
 To a very large degree these conditions continued down to 
 comparatively modern times. The precious metals, to be 
 sure, became money in Greek and Roman days, and the indus- 
 trial fabric became somewhat sensitive to disturbances from 
 this source. But even in the great days industry remained 
 simple, credit relations were few, productive instruments were 
 but tools of small value, and accumulations of industrial 
 capital were comparatively small. During the Middle Ages 
 again the world lapsed into a far more primitive condition, 
 and simplicity again brought the immunity which is charac- 
 teristic of all simple organisms. 
 
 But with the development of power industry came the enor- 
 mous accumulations of industrial capital and with them the 
 all-embracing credit relations and the sensitiveness to mone- 
 tary values which are the characteristic of our time. It is 
 not necessary or fitting that we here go into detail. It is 
 sufficient to remind ourselves of the perfectly recognized fact 
 that the industrial fabric of the world is now a unit, that its 
 parts are all interdependent, and that an extreme sensitive- 
 
NATI0:N^ALITY and accountability 89 
 
 ness pervades the whole. Violent transfers of the precious 
 metals or of industrial capital are attended with disastrous 
 results which are apt to outweigh their benefits. Without 
 attempting to go into this subject fully, we may give a few 
 illustrations. 
 
 Let us take the subject of indemnity in its crudest form as 
 popularly conceived, the payment of a large sum of gold by a 
 country whose currency is gold or on a gold basis. It is a 
 well known fact that prices are determined by the ratio be- 
 tween the amount of money in circulation and the amount of 
 business done. Suppose we could violently take from Ger- 
 many a billion dollars and add it, — as we should do in this 
 money age, — to our circulation. There would be a general 
 rise in prices everywhere, that is, a cheapening of money. 
 All creditors, including holders of insurance policies, owners 
 of liberty bonds, receivers of fixed salaries, and the like, 
 would lose in proportion to the cheapening of money. Other 
 classes would reap correspondingly unexpected profits. 
 Hardship and extravagance inevitably follow such changes. 
 But this is only the beginning. Every country depends some- 
 what, — usually a great deal, — on foreign commerce. When 
 prices rise, manufacturers are compelled to charge more for 
 their goods. If, for instance, they wished to sell goods in 
 South America, their prices would be very high. Mean- 
 while Germany, having reduced her money supply by a bil- 
 lion dollars, would have experienced a general fall in prices, 
 and her manufacturers would be able to offer their wares in 
 South America at a very low price. The first result of our 
 seizure of Germany's gold would be to shut ourselves com- 
 pletely out of the South American market. 
 
 But the matter would not stop here. There are always 
 some industries in which there is close competition even for 
 our home market. Let us take the cotton industry as an illus- 
 tration. We have a tariff on imported cotton goods to pro- 
 
90 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 tect our home producers. Even so there are usually some 
 kinds of cotton goods which can be bought so cheaply abroad 
 that even after payment of the duty they will undersell Amer- 
 ican goods. Now let us suppose that prices rise violently in 
 America and fall correspondingly in Germany. That, of 
 course, would include the price of manufactured cottons along 
 with the rest. Immediately the German manufacturer could 
 undersell the American manufacturer and we should all soon 
 be wearing goods " made in Germany." Sentiment, of course, 
 might prevent this for a time and to some extent, but no boy- 
 cott based on sentiment ever long restrains economic forces. 
 The second result of our billion dollar indemnity would there- 
 fore be to close our own factories, turn our people out of 
 employment, and boom the industries of Germany. So cer- 
 tain are these results that it is now recognized as economi- 
 cally impossible to transfer large quantities of the money 
 metals, — that which is the nation's normal quota, — from one 
 nation to another. So extreme is this sensitiveness that even 
 peace transactions on a large scale have to be managed with 
 the greatest care. When the United States acquired the 
 Panama Canal from Prance for the sum of forty millions, 
 special experts were called in to devise means of transferring 
 this sum, — now so seemingly insignificant, — without creat- 
 ing serious disturbances of the kind above mentioned. 
 
 It is characteristic of the ruthlessness of German militarism 
 that they planned on huge indemnities in case of victory. 
 At the close of the war of 1870-71 Germany exacted from 
 France an indemnity of a billion dollars, — a huge sum for 
 tiose days, — and took it in gold. She is said to have locked 
 up this sum as a war chest in preparation for " the next war " 
 for which she is always preparing. This prevented the flood- 
 ing of her own currency and the consequent rise in prices, 
 but it did not prevent the reverse effect in France. The 
 result, though mitigated, was distinctly unfavorable to Ger- 
 
NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 91 
 
 man industry which did not begin to forge ahead until the 
 effect of this was lived down. Conversely, France surprised 
 the world by the rapidity of her economic recovery. Ger- 
 many is now repeating this blunder. In her peace with Rus- 
 sia she has exacted an enormous indemnity which is now 
 being paid by installments and in gold. Her economists have 
 not failed to warn her of the danger of this course, but the 
 nation has not yet mastered its crude passion of cupidity. 
 Among the numerous extravagant peace demands heard in 
 Germany during the last four years, none is heard so often 
 as the demand for indemnities. 
 
 But there are subtler ways of securing indemnities than 
 this. One is to take over productive property in some form. 
 Thus the railways of Germany, now state owned, might con- 
 ceivably be made over to foreign governments to be run for 
 their benefit or sold to foreign or German syndicates. This 
 would in itself be an immense indemnity. The surrender of 
 German ships is also proposed, a proposal which has the more 
 pertinence because of the destruction of Allied shipping by 
 submarine warfare. Still another proposal, — this time from 
 German sources, — is that colonies be transferred as an in- 
 demnity. Finally, a transfer of national credits or obliga- 
 tions is proposed. Thus, Germany, when considering an in- 
 demnity from France, proposed that Russia's huge debt to 
 France should be paid to Germany. Again a would-be Ger- 
 man conciliator proposed that Belgium be indemnified for her 
 losses by England against the surrender to the latter of the 
 German colonies. A proposal closely akin to the above is that 
 the indemnity exacted should be paid in installments as is 
 now being done by Russia. This was urged by German chau- 
 vinists at a time when Germany, still suffering from the 
 effects of the French indemnity, was urged to again despoil 
 the too rapidly recovering France. Such an indemnity, 
 though expressed in terms of money, would not be really paid 
 
92 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 in money, but by transfers of goods in the ordinary course of 
 international trade. 
 
 These proposals all have the merit that they do not dis- 
 order the delicate credit system of the world in the way above 
 described. Each has its individual merits and objections 
 which deserve brief notice before we turn to the general prin- 
 ciple underlying them all. 
 
 The railroads are the largest industrial asset of the German 
 states. They have the merit of tangibility. But if oper- 
 ated in the interest of foreign states or their citizens, they 
 would inevitably become the target for unfriendly legislation 
 and regulation at which the Germans are past masters, and 
 for which there is no limit and no remedy. It may be naively 
 objected that Germany would be bound by treaty pledges on 
 these points. Doubtless, but conceding that these difficulties 
 could all be anticipated, — an extreme concession, — what is 
 to compel Germany to respect these pledges ? Foreign owned 
 railroads would be a most irritating constant reminder of Ger- 
 many's humiliation. Cheating the railroad would become a 
 point of honor, and German law, administered by utterly 
 unfriendly officials, would give no redress. If the foreign 
 powers protested, Germany would in effect reply: "What 
 are you going to do about it ? Will you make another world 
 war to redress your grievances ? " The net result would be 
 that Germany would submit to any hardship to ruin these 
 hated foreign properties. Bankruptcy would follow, and 
 with little or no payment the properties would pass into Ger- 
 man hands again. Hence, the only thing would be to dis- 
 pose of them at once to German owners. This would mean 
 merely an ordinary indemnity with the railroads as a cum- 
 brous intermediate term for determining the amount. 
 
 The transfer of ships is not open to these objections, and 
 is of all these proposals the most appropriate. It presents 
 only such objections as hold against all indemnities, objections 
 
NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 93 
 
 which we reserve for later consideration. Even more innocu- 
 ous, unless in this most general wav, is the proposed transfer 
 of international obligations. The principal question is as to 
 the value of the obligations available for transfer. If Ger- 
 many were victor, France might be compelled to surrender 
 her claims against Eussia as formerly proposed, but their 
 value is now doubtful. Our own country would be the chief 
 loser. We now hold obligations against governments for the 
 most part solvent, amounting to over seven billions of dollars. 
 To transfer these obligations to Germany would not only 
 largely offset her own vast debt, but what is even more im- 
 portant, it would give her absolute financial control of some 
 or all of these countries during the long period of indebted- 
 ness. Such a country as Italy, for instance, would become 
 absolutely a tributary state, unable to make a single impor- 
 tant decision without Germany's consent. The establishment 
 of this relation of financial control over countries not avail- 
 able for annexation, was indeed a prominent feature of Ger- 
 many's plan of world conquest which contemplated indem- 
 nities from France which, as one noted writer urged, " can 
 scarcely be made too heavy." 
 
 But with the Allies as victors, what can be gotten in thia 
 way ? Immense sums are due from Russia to Germany, but 
 one purpose of the Allies is to liberate Eussia from this Ger- 
 man tyranny. We can not collect further installments from 
 Russia. We must if possible compel Germany to return what 
 she has taken. We shall be fortunate if our financial rela- 
 tions with Russia do not involve much heavier burdens. 
 
 Turkey, Bulgaria, and presumably Austria owe vast sums 
 to Germany. But we have seemingly decided to dismember 
 at least two of these countries. The value of their obligations 
 under these circumstances is problematical. If the Turks 
 lose Constantinople, Armenia, Palestine, Syria, Arabia, and 
 Mesopotamia, two thirds of which is an accomplished fact 
 
94 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 and the rest an almost inevitable sequence of victory, how 
 will they pay the huge war debt they have contracted ? Bul- 
 garia, too, is likely to issue from the war with diminished 
 wealth and credit if not with diminished territories. The 
 case of Austria is more obscure but not more hopeful. 
 
 It will be plain from the foregoing that such transfers 
 promise small relief for the war burdened Allies. Neverthe- 
 less this is the one form of indemnity which it is most im- 
 perative to exact. These obligations carry with them of ne- 
 cessity a large measure of political dependence, and the Allies 
 will leave their work half done if they leave the component 
 parts of the menacing Mittel Europa in financial bondage to 
 Germany. Turkish bonds may be below par, but they at 
 least command Turkish allegiance and that must not be to 
 Germany. Such a transfer would come much more under the 
 head of guaranty than of indemnity, but it is not the less 
 important for that reason. 
 
 The possibility that Germany may hold pre-war obligations 
 against foreign states such as Brazil which may have good 
 value is worth considering, but these obligations are doubt- 
 less in private hands and are hardly to be distinguished from 
 the manifold assets of that character which make so large a 
 part of a nation's financial capital. There is little to be 
 gained by singling out these securities in indemnity calcula- 
 tions. 
 
 There remains to be considered the proposed transfer of 
 colonies. Aside from the fact that these colonies are already 
 in Allied possession and their assimilation into their several 
 colonial administrations already far advanced, it can not be 
 too emphatically asserted that colonies can not be considered 
 as indemnity. Nations want them, as men want wives, but 
 they should not be gotten by purchase in the one case or the 
 other. To count colonies as financial assets inevitably im- 
 plies the idea of exploitation for profit. This is the bane of 
 
NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 95 
 
 all colonial relations, the vicious principle that wrecked the 
 colonial empires of Spain and Portugal and made their names 
 a byword and a hissing. It is a vicious theory which only 
 the Anglo-Saxon seems completely to have outgrown. He 
 makes money, to be sure, from colonial trade, but only as he 
 makes money from trade with Germany, or as a German 
 makes money by trade with these same Anglo-Saxon colonies. 
 The sole meaning of possession in such cases should be, — and 
 very nearly is, — the artificial maintenance of conditions of 
 world commerce which more developed peoples can maintain 
 for themselves. No nation that assumes the burden of main- 
 taining these conditions with fair equity toward the civilized 
 world should be asked to pay for the privilege. The sale of 
 colonies is on a par with the Turkish system of selling gov- 
 ernorships. It is significant that Germany should think such 
 a sale quite a business proposition. It gives us the measure 
 of German trusteeship. 
 
 The difiiculty of finding available assets for the collection of 
 indemnities is plainly considerable. Nevertheless it may 
 safely be assumed that the collection of an indemnity in the 
 form of capital, if discreetly managed and especially if dis- 
 tributed over a long period, is not economically impossible. 
 Germany has vast powers of recuperation and if skillfully 
 farmed for indemnity purposes, would prove productive. 
 
 There remain, therefore, the general questions, what do 
 we wish to accomplish by means of indemnity and how far 
 are our ends attainable ? 
 
 The first idea is that of punishment, to hurt Germany be- 
 cause she has hurt us. This again may be simply from anger, 
 a desire to inflict injury without much thought of conse- 
 quences, or it may be a more reasoned attempt to make Ger- 
 many think twice before she tries it again. The first we will 
 not discuss, though sentiments of resentment will perhaps 
 bulk large at times during the long struggle. It is much to 
 
96 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 be hoped, however, that we shall keep a cool head and see 
 where we are going. If so, our desire to make Germany 
 smart as a deterrent to future aggression will probably re- 
 solve itself into the more tangible and reasonable demand of 
 recompense for injuries suffered. We will not for the mo- 
 ment dwell on the fact that the injury is incalculable and 
 utterly beyond Germany's power to recompense. It may well 
 be that certain particular injuries will be deemed to have 
 prior claim and that they will not be open to this objection. 
 Wherever the line is drawn, we may concede the possibility 
 of formulating a practicable demand and of enforcing it at 
 the peace settlement. 
 
 There is still another criterion for the determination of 
 an indemnity, namely, the weakening of the rival. This has 
 been the avowed purpose of Germany both in the historic case 
 of 18Y1 and in the proposals made later with regard to in- 
 demnities to be exacted from Britain, France, and America. 
 This is of course an entirely different thing from the recom- 
 pensing of injuries, but in practice it works out much the 
 same. The losses are always so colossal that no indemnity 
 can cover them, and whether the indemnity be demanded for 
 this purpose or for the weakening of the enemy, it may very 
 well be the limit of what the conquered can pay. Our prob- 
 lem, therefore, simplifies itself to this. W^hat will be the 
 result to us of exacting an indemnity from Germany ? 
 
 First of all, we must continue our military occupation of 
 the country until the indemnity is paid. This has been the 
 rule in such cases. If the indemnity is collected at once, the 
 occupation will be brief, but in that case the amount can not 
 be considerable. It can not be too strongly insisted that the 
 means for paying a large indemnity do not exist in Ger- 
 many at present. Possibly Germany could raise the amount 
 by foreign loans as France did in 1871, but the odds are much 
 against her, and if she succeeded, it would amount to our 
 
NATIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 97 
 
 lending her the money to pay our indemnity with all the risk 
 of later repudiation which would be involved in taking her 
 promise to start with. In all probability such an indemnity 
 would have to be paid in installments, and if we did not con- 
 tinue military occupation of the country, the installments 
 simply would not be paid. Germany would have no con- 
 science about repudiating a debt which she believed unright- 
 eous, and she would know perfectly that her enemies would 
 not undertake another world war to collect a debt that would 
 not cover a tenth their expenses. The cost of such a military 
 occupation would in itself be prohibitive, though it would be 
 the least of the objections to such a course. It would not be 
 peace but war. 
 
 It has been urged that the Allies possess an easy alternative 
 to this expensive and dangerous expedient of armed occu- 
 pation. They hold and presumably will retain the tropical 
 world and many of the raw materials necessary to German 
 industry. Any failure on Germany's part, it is argued, can 
 be met by a refusal to furnish the raw materials which Ger- 
 many needs. But a moment's reflection will make it clear 
 that the Allies possess no such power. It is not the nations 
 that buy and sell rubber and cotton, but individuals who act 
 quite independently and ask only protection in their opera- 
 tions. Doubtless the Allied nations will, in their national ca- 
 pacity, control the supply of necessary raw materials to pre- 
 vent cornering in a scarcity market, but to continue to do so 
 would mean the abandonment of the fundamental principle 
 of our economy. It is conceivable that that principle may be 
 abandoned, but certainly not suddenly, nor in the interest of 
 collecting an indemnity. So long as the regime of individ- 
 ual liberty continues, Germany will find purveyors for her 
 wants. If the Allies should abandon the policy of the open 
 door as regards the territories they hold in trust, and should 
 forbid the sale of their products to Germany, it would not 
 
98 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 only invalidate their title to trusteeship but would raise a 
 storm of protest from their own citizens. There may well 
 be opportunities for wise, concerted, economic action on the 
 part of the Allied governments, but they will hardly find it in 
 abrogating their long standing rule of industrial liberty. As 
 compared with the havoc which such a step would work, the 
 gain of an indemnity, even the largest, would be as dust in 
 the balance. Moreover the Allies do not altogether monopo- 
 lize these supplies, and any attempt so to do would stimulate 
 competitive production elsewhere with disastrous results. 
 
 But we will not allow even this diflBculty to keep us from 
 the deeper issue. Possibly ingenuity and statesmanship of 
 a high order could overcome these obstacles and could secure 
 from Germany the regular payments of a deferred indem- 
 nity of large amount. What would be the result? The 
 immediate result would of course be to enrich the Allies and 
 impoverish Germany. In the same way a gift to charity re- 
 lieves suffering. But it is the rarest thing in the world that 
 the forces set in motion stop with the first happy result. 
 Habits are formed and character adjustments effected which 
 are often the opposite of what is intended. As the world 
 emerges from the colossal contest, the supreme fact will be 
 the impoverishment of the world. Eor this there is but one 
 possible cure, the devotion anew of human energy to the con- 
 quest of nature, the practice of thrift and self-denial. The 
 nation that learns these habits soonest and best, will inherit 
 the future. Any trifling handicap in the way of initial allot- 
 ment will rapidly disappear in the face of this all potent fac- 
 tor. "We are awed by the immensity of the world's momen- 
 tary stock of wealth. That is as nothing to the great stream 
 which is ever emerging from the void and disappearing in the 
 channels of human service. Give to a favored nation any 
 advantage you please in the way of initial supply, and if its 
 rival has an advantage, say, of ten per cent, in habits of pro- 
 
NATI0:N^ALITY A^D accountability 99 
 
 ductivity and thrift, it will pass its favored competitor in a 
 single generation. Bismarck thought he had disabled France 
 for fifty years by his crushing indemnity. Within a decade 
 he confessed his miscalculation and showed undisgiiised alarm 
 at the recovery of his humbled enemy. Impoverishment only 
 stimulated thrift, such thrift as no other nation in Europe 
 knows, and reversed the great Chancellor's calculation. 
 
 Despite all her losses, Germany is going to emerge from 
 this war tremendously strong for the ensuing industrial 
 struggle. Her colossal debt is not a liability against the 
 German people, but against Germans in behalf of other Ger- 
 mans. Every cent paid by the taxpayer will be wrung from 
 him by enforced economy which will become a law of his 
 being. But every cent so paid will be paid to a person who 
 is for the most part an investor, an accumulator. It would 
 be impossible to devise a better method for coercive thrift. It 
 will mean enormous privation, the loss for whole generations 
 of much that makes life worth living, but it will mean the 
 rebuilding of the industrial machine of Germany in the 
 shortest possible time. 
 
 If we impose farther burdens we shall possibly postpone 
 that recovery (though even that is not sure, as the experience 
 of France would seem to show), but we should assure only the 
 more certainly the ultimate result. Meanwhile we should 
 just as surely experience a disastrous reaction ourselves. 
 I^othing so bodes ill to us in our future competition with 
 Germany as the certainty that we shall not be willing to pay 
 the price for success that she will offer. We shall demand 
 shorter hours, lighter tasks, more favorable and expensive con- 
 ditions of labor. Above all we. shall demand higher wages 
 which means that we shall refuse to set aside as large a part 
 of the national income as Germany will do, to restore and 
 enlarge the great industrial plant of society. This may be 
 the wise decision. Certainly the ampler living is one of the 
 
100 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 things, nay, the very thing, for which industry exists. But 
 the eternal obstacle to the attainment of these ends is the com- 
 petition of lower paid and less exacting labor. It is an eco- 
 nomic truism that slave labor makes free labor impossible. 
 In precisely the same way the prolonged enslavement of Ger- 
 man labor would be an insuperable obstacle to the emancipa- 
 tion of our ovm. 
 
 In the face of these considerations, it is scarcely worth our 
 while to urge or refute the so-called ethical arguments for 
 indemnity. Germany's guilt for the great war is incalcu- 
 lable, but it is a guilt for which the feeble means at the dis- 
 posal of the victor offer no atonement. Perhaps, too, in our 
 moments of calmer thought, we may realize that it is guilt of 
 a somewhat different order from that with which our puny tri- 
 bunals are accustomed to deal. In the surging torrents of 
 race assertion and the conflict of race ideals individuals count 
 for so little and their freedom of choice is so narrowed that 
 our human codes and tribunals seem to have no competent 
 jurisdiction. This is no attempt to minimize the guilt of 
 Germany. The writer can not see it otherwise than as a 
 monstrous, immeasurable thing. Not because it is so little 
 but because it is so great, he feels the hopelessness of any 
 attempt to assess a penalty. The great case takes us back 
 through a chain of causes which we shall not soon follow to 
 the end. We may as well wait for the judgment day. 
 
 Our conclusion is, therefore, that as a general measure of 
 reprisal, or restitution, or deterrent, or economic repression, 
 indemnities are not available. Above all in a war of such 
 magnitude as this, the defeated can not pay and the victors 
 can not collect an indemnity at all commensurate with either 
 injury or guilt. Could they do so, the indemnity would ulti- 
 mately defeat its own end by its reactions upon the habits of 
 the peoples involved. Indemnity is no remedy for war. 
 
 But it is possible that in a limited way indemnity may be 
 
iq-ATIOI^ALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 101 
 
 a remedy for the abuses of war. There is a distinction, pos- 
 sibly artificial, but not the less important, between things 
 sanctioned and things forbidden in war by the consensus of 
 civilized nations. The sinking of the Queen Mary is in a 
 different class from the sinking of the Lusitania. The inva- 
 sion of France, the recognized rival of Germany, unprovoked 
 as it was, is different from the invasion of Belgium, whose 
 neutrality Germany had promised to protect. The execution 
 of Captain Fryatt was not war, but plain official murder of a 
 civilian. These acts, appalling as is their aggregate, are 
 after all just the things which our governments and our tri- 
 bunals have been established to deal with. Indemnities for 
 the victims of the Lnsiianin and for at least certain of the 
 injuries suffered by Belgium,^ if kept within limits not too 
 disturbing to the economic order, may have a wholesome effect 
 in establishing the limits of warfare. Even here, however, 
 only the most conspicuous cases can be dealt with. Any at- 
 tempt to cover the field of Germany's violations of interna- 
 tional law would at once encounter the obstacles already noted. 
 
 The writer ventures, with much hesitation, to raise the ques- 
 tion of other possible penalties in certain cases. There were 
 things done in Belgium as elsewhere which have no relation 
 to war and which no nation condones. Many of these are on 
 record and their perpetrators perfectly known. The sugges- 
 tion is reasonable and perhaps practicable, that certain of 
 these monsters, men often high in authority, should be handed 
 over to civil tribunals and punished in accordance with civil 
 law. A few public trials and legal executions would have 
 results of possibly permanent value. Care should be taken to 
 choose such cases as even the German conscience would con- 
 demn. Yet here again the suggestion appalls by its vast 
 scope. Only the most limited application of the principle of 
 peace reprisals can have other than disastrous reactions. 
 
 1 This subject is considered at length in the chapter on Belgium. 
 
102 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 If the peace for which we are striving is to be worthy 
 of our struggles, it must be a peace that will bring prosperity 
 to the world, and ultimately reconciliation to men. The no- 
 tion that the crippling or impoverishment of a competing 
 nation can permanently enrich our own is a fallacy con- 
 demned by all human experience and unworthy of thoughtful 
 men. Let us not be guilty of following Germany in the 
 grossest of her blunders. Germany is at present a colossal 
 example of misdirected energy, but destruction is not her only 
 art. German proficiency is as marked in constructive as in 
 destructive lines. The problem of the world is not to destroy 
 this energy but to subdue it to its service. Let us not forget, 
 in the just indignation of the moment, the immense poten- 
 tial serviceableness of this misguided people. The Germans 
 are after all a people that the world can not spare. Even 
 from the low standpoint of commerce the repression of Ger- 
 many would have disastrous consequences. Germany is not 
 only England's redoubtable competitor. She is also Eng- 
 land's best customer. If, therefore, the suppression of Ger- 
 many brought profit to certain industries it would bring ruin 
 to other and greater industries. The full benefits of afflu- 
 ence are impossible except in an affluent world. It is indica- 
 tive of Germany's abuse and degradation of the function of 
 war that she should see in it an opportunity for wholesale 
 plunder. 
 
 Above all it is fitting that a nation which never exacted an 
 indemnity, but which has established the precedent of pay- 
 ment for the territories annexed, a nation that entered this 
 war in pursuit of no material interests and that rejects with 
 scorn the imputation of sordid aims, — it is fitting that such 
 a nation should refuse to compound its ideals for money pay- 
 ment. And may reparation, where necessary, be so made as 
 to carry with it no taint, no clouding of tha ideal which is 
 the glory of Belgium and France. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 
 
 Internationalism, in its necessity and its crude reality, 
 is the outstanding fact in the present world situation. Na- 
 tions can do nothing alone, — will never again do anything 
 alone. There are no more local problems, no exclusively 
 national interests. Alliances are the supreme problem of 
 war, as cooperation is the supreme fact in peace. With the 
 passing of the old local civilization and of the self-sufficient 
 community, independent nationality in any complete sense 
 of the word becomes a fiction. International dependence is 
 the ever increasing fact as civilization develops. The prob- 
 lem of the hour is to match this growing independence with 
 both the mood and the mechanism of effective cooperation. 
 The dependence is inevitable, and that in itself means weak- 
 ness. Effective cooperation is indispensable. Only that 
 means power. 
 
 A time like this tends to emphasize and at the same time 
 to pervert the problem of internationalism. Our thought 
 turns too exclusively to the prevention of war. The problem 
 seems to be a judicial one, and the supreme need a tribunal 
 for the settlement of disputes. The great international in- 
 terests, on the contrary, are peace interests, and the problem 
 is administrative far more than judicial. It is a question 
 of the official management of certain great business interests 
 of the nations much more than a problem of punishing or 
 preventing breaches of the peace. 
 
 Among these interests perhaps the most obvious is the use 
 of the sea, the inevitable international area and the highway 
 of the nations. The problem is to keep it open and safe, 
 
 103 
 
104 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 safe from the pirate or individual marauder, and safe from 
 the shock of contending nations who pursue their enemies 
 upon this world domain. This problem will be discussed 
 more fully in the chapter on Britain. For the present it is 
 sufficient to note its obviously international character. 
 
 Then there are certain strategic sites of special importance, 
 an importance so great as to overshadow the problems of their 
 own population. Gibraltar is an extreme example. Its in- 
 significant population is little more than an appendage of the 
 garrison. Its interests as compared with those of the na- 
 tions whose busiest trade route is controlled by the great rock, 
 are so insignificant that all question of democratic privilege 
 is completely forgotten. The double passageway of the Dar- 
 danelles and the Bosphorus presents a like problem, though it 
 is less easily detached from adjacent territories and the prob- 
 lem of its local population is not so readily subordinated. 
 But it is alike in this that the world interest is paramount. 
 The people who live there have rights which must be re- 
 spected, but they can not be permitted to control the water- 
 way, nor yet to block the highway, almost equally important, 
 which crosses it from north to south. 
 
 The great canals, Suez, Panama, and Kiel, are quite sim- 
 ilar, but with the important difference that they are artificial 
 and have been built at enormous expense. Those who have 
 made this outlay have acquired a title which can not be 
 ignored, yet one which can not be allowed to obscure their 
 obviously international function. 
 
 Certain small nations, Denmark, Belgium, Greece, Swit- 
 zerland, and others, have something of this paramount inter- 
 national character. They are nations with a considerable 
 population and a historic national consciousness for which we 
 instinctively claim the usual privileges of self-determination 
 and independent sovereignty. Yet they have something of 
 the Gibraltar character in that their occupation or use by a 
 
KATION^ALITY AND INTEEliATIONALISM 105 
 
 great power would give it an overwhelming advantage over 
 its rivals. Such states necessarily lose some of the ordinary 
 attributes of sovereignty and become in a sense wards of the 
 powers whose fate they can not but determine. They are 
 international interests. 
 
 Quite distinct are those peoples who are wards because of 
 inability to manage their own affairs in a manner to meet 
 modern requirements. There is an irreducible minimum of 
 decency, order, and safety which all parts of the world are 
 now required to provide. The doctrine of liberty is no 
 longer construed as giving to any people the right to breed 
 pestilence or rob and kill peaceable persons, or withhold from 
 the world the resources which civilization has requisitioned 
 for its higher uses. There is still much of all this in the 
 world, but it is recognized as an abuse, and it is a legitimate 
 international problem to remove it. The peoples that can not 
 eliminate pestilence and anarchy and make it safe for men 
 to go and come within their borders must be helped to do so 
 or made to do so. For such peoples a receivership must be 
 established. This does not mean that they have no rights, 
 but that they are incompetent to protect their rights, and still 
 more, to protect those larger rights to which all local rights 
 are necessarily subordinate. All backward peoples are thus 
 of necessity the wards of the nations. Under present condi- 
 tions the guardian is necessarily a nation, but the interest is 
 plainly international. The perception of this fact has led to a 
 proposal that international agencies be created for the admin- 
 istration of these trusts, more particularly for the adminis- 
 tration of the German colonies which this war is seemingly 
 going to throw upon the world for disposal. 
 
 Most important of all international interests, however, are 
 the great, civilized nations themselves in that range of their 
 interests which do not come witliin their recog-nized individ- 
 ual jurisdiction. The great civilized powers are after all the 
 
106 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 great disturbers of the peace, the great destroyers of civiliza- 
 tion. If the savage becomes a ward by reason of his inability 
 to keep the peace and protect life and property, then by the 
 same token the great powers call for guardianship. The 
 problem is to find a guardian. 
 
 Let us recognize at the outset, if possible, that the impor- 
 tant thing is to get the work properly done, rather than to get 
 it done in a particular way. There are always those who 
 wish procedure to be logical. There are others who demand 
 only that it should be effectual. Possibly if we perfectly 
 understood all factors in our problem, the logical and the 
 effectual would be seen to be very nearly identical, but with 
 our half knowledge the seemingly logical often diverges 
 widely from the effectual. It is characteristic of the very 
 successful Anglo-Saxon that he invariably prefers the effec- 
 tual, no matter what its seeming incongruity. It is in this 
 Anglo-Saxon spirit that we approach the study of this much 
 debated subject. We seek an effectual administration of 
 international interests in a manner consonant with their inter- 
 national character. The presumption is enormously in favor 
 of any existing administration which meets these require- 
 ments, as it is in favor of the further use of experienced and 
 efficient agencies. It is the logical thing to provide inter- 
 national agencies to administer international interests, just 
 as it is the logical thing to have the community own its 
 bakeries because all citizens eat the bread. But such logic 
 often reposes on mere verbal suggestion. The real ques- 
 tion is, which way gives us the most and the best bread. 
 It is a slow and difficult task to create effectual admin- 
 istrative agencies. It means knowledge which transcends 
 the individual's power to acquire and guiding traditions 
 which transcend his personal sense of obligation. Such 
 an administration can only rest back on a coherent and well 
 defined entity such as only national bodies have yet been able 
 
NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 107 
 
 to supply. The creation of such a great spiritual entity is a 
 matter of secular slowness. It can be done, it almost cer- 
 tainly will be done, but by what methods and whether for 
 immediate availability is not so clear. It is rather to be 
 anticipated that for a long time to come we shall find the 
 great, mature, disciplined nations the most effectual agencies 
 for purposes of international administration. The important 
 thing in the meantime is to recognize clearly the nature of 
 the trust and their accountability to the community of nations. 
 
 With this general observation we may reserve for discus- 
 sion in other chapters the various concrete interests which are 
 involved in the present war. The freedom of the sea is essen- 
 tially the problem of Britain, so long its guardian. The 
 problem of Belgium, nation and international bulwark, is 
 necessarily the subject of an entire chapter. Constantinople, 
 the problem of a thousand years, calls for treatment which 
 may require a break with all tradition. The German col- 
 onies, again, must be considered, not as cases under a general 
 rule, but in relation to adjacent territories and the problem 
 of their political development. If full account be taken of 
 local peculiarities, these problems raised by the war will be 
 found capable of individual solution. 
 
 There remains the great problem of establishing an inter- 
 national agency for the one task for which the nations are 
 individually incompetent. All the other tasks, the control of 
 the sea, the occupation of strategic sites, the protection of 
 little nations, the administration of backward territories, 
 may be, — and thus far have been, — distributed among the 
 great powers, but the control of these powers themselves obvi- 
 ously requires a higher authority. That authority can be no 
 other than the joint authority of these nations themselves or 
 a preponderant portion of them. Proposals to form such a 
 joint authority and to equip it with machinery suitable for 
 its function have acquired unusual importance from the ap- 
 
108 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 parent adhesion of the President of the United States who has 
 given prominence to this subject in all his addresses and pro- 
 nouncements relative to conditions of peace. Statesmen of 
 nearly all the Allied nations and even the chancellors of the 
 German Empire have also expressed their approval in more 
 or less guarded phrase. The subject therefore rises quite 
 above its usual status of theory and speculation, and becomes 
 one of the great practical issues of the day. As such it de- 
 serves our careful consideration, both in its present form and 
 in its origin. 
 
 The earlier proposals were purely permissive and moral. 
 Little more was attempted than to have a place and an agency 
 always ready to arbitrate the differences of those who were 
 unable to reach an agreement unaided. The verdict rendered 
 by this tribunal was to have no other sanction than its pre- 
 sumptive competency and impartiality and the force of inter- 
 national opinion. 'No doubt such an arrangement would meet 
 certain requirements. Its defect lay in its basic assumption 
 that nations were willing to live and let live and asked only 
 for equity under this principle. Now if never before, the 
 world should realize how far this is from the facts with which 
 we have to deal. 
 
 Slowly it became apparent that an element of force was 
 necessary in dealing with a problem whose essence was force. 
 Proposals to compel the submission of disputes to arbitration, 
 to enforce the acceptance of the award, and the like, were 
 made, — always with this result that they raised the ques- 
 tion of who or what was to do the compelling. To the popu- 
 lar mind this question has never come home with its true 
 force. The writer has been interested to note with what ease 
 \j proposals of internationalization of every sort find acceptance 
 with the public. If the Dardanelles proves a bone of conten- 
 tion over which the great powers exhaust their energies, the 
 popular remedy is always there. Internationalize the straits 
 
NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 109 
 
 and make them all stand back. It rarely occurs to any one to 
 ask, who is to make them stand back. Even after Germany 
 has snapped the bonds of international law like tow burned in 
 the fire, the assumption is still unthinkingly made that she 
 would stand in awe of an internationalized Constantinople. 
 There is an easy and very creditable explanation for this per- 
 sistent illusion. We live under conditions of social order so 
 secure that obedience to the judgments of tribunals is a matter 
 of course. We never think of trying conclusions with the 
 policeman's club or the armed power of the state. Eor us the 
 pronouncement of recognized authority is final. We nat- 
 urally assume that the pronouncement of recognized authority 
 will everywhere be final. Yet nothing is more certain than 
 that it is the policeman and the armed power of the nation, 
 no matter how unnoticed and forgotten, which give to con- 
 stituted authority its finality. 
 
 Thi? fact has not escaped the attention of practical men. 
 Attention has therefore been devoted of late, and especially 
 since the outbreak of the great war, to the question of sanc- 
 tion or enforcing power. This can be furnished, of course, 
 only by the nations themselves, and must be in essence, how- 
 ever disguised, a super-state. Proposals looking to this end 
 are best represented by the strongly urged League to Enforce 
 Peace which numbers among its promoters many distin- 
 guished names, and commends itself, as we have seen, to the 
 statesmen of most of the nations now at war. 
 
 The League proposes a union of nations pledged to submit 
 their differences to a tribunal, if " justiciable," or to a com- 
 mission of inquiry if the issues are adjudged vital to the 
 existence or honor of the nation. In the latter case, according 
 to plans which have been given the widest currency, it is not 
 proposed to make the commission's report binding upon the 
 parties to the dispute. They are pledged, as members of the 
 league, only to await the result of the inquiry. They are 
 
110 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 then free to go to war if they elect to do so. It is judged 
 that this very moderate demand will commend the plan to 
 those nations whose power and pride make them hesitate to 
 commit their existence and honor to the keeping of other 
 nations. Finally and chiefly, the members of the league are 
 to use their power, military and economic, to compel obedi- 
 ence and the observance of pledges to the league. It is plausi- 
 bly urged that a power so overwhelming would effectually awe 
 any rebellious power. 
 
 It is plain that such a league would involve a great en- 
 croachment upon the traditional authority of the nations. 
 It is not simply the right to make war which is withdrawn 
 or curtailed but the right to adjudicate or investigate all 
 those questions which give rise to war. In current plans, 
 this encroachment upon national prerogative is held within 
 the most moderate limits, but this moderation is confessedly 
 prudential and temporary. The concession of the right to 
 go to war after investigation is a reluctant one, not to say 
 a specious one, for the intention is plainly to make war vir- 
 tually impossible by the investigation. More would be de- 
 manded if more were judged possible, but in this transition 
 state it is thought best to leave the nations at least the outer 
 semblance of national prerogative. But the avowed purpose 
 of the proposed leairne is to prevent war, and this can be 
 accomplished only by developing an extensive and powerful 
 supernational authority. The assumption usually is that 
 with the establishment of such an authority, national differ- 
 ences would tend to disappear and that the supernational 
 authority would have little to do. Such an assumption seems 
 unwarranted. If the nations become submissive and indif- 
 ferent to national asfcrandizement, it can onlv be because 
 they have ceased to be the doers of the real things, as in the 
 case of the States of the American Union. But the lessen- 
 ing interest in the states has not meant a lessening activity 
 
NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 111 
 
 on the part of the Federal government. It is because the 
 Federal government has absorbed the substance of state au- 
 thority that we no longer care much about their individual 
 interests or aggrandizement. When we recall that all 
 equilibriums among nations, localities, families, and the like 
 are continually being upset by new discoveries and inventions, 
 above all by the unequal power of growth which so mysteri- 
 ously manifests itself in peoples, we may assume with cer- 
 tainty that the supernational authority thus established would 
 either break down or be progressively extended and strength- 
 ened. If the nations continue to be the real power, the old 
 ambitions, jealousies, and conflicts of interest will continue. 
 If international authority holds these turbulent elements in 
 permanent equilibrium, it can only be by increasingly ab- 
 sorbing such of their functions as have international re- 
 actions. This would mean the gradual establishment of a 
 vast administrative mechanism with numerous functions and 
 an extensive personnel, in short, the formation of a true super- 
 state. 
 
 Such a super-state once formed and experienced in its ad- 
 ministrative functions, would almost inevitably take over 
 in turn those international trusts which for the present are 
 administered by the nations. The policing of the seas would 
 ultimately be done by ships flying the flag of the league and 
 owning only its authority. Gibraltar and the Dardanelles 
 could hardly fail to accept like administration. Belgium 
 and Denmark and the great canals would continue under in- 
 ternational guaranties of a sort very different from those they 
 have hitherto known. Above all, the tropics and all the lands 
 of the backward peoples would be the charge of the super- 
 state. Or, not to make too violent an assumption, if these 
 various trusts were still administered by individual nations, 
 it would be by delegated authority and under the sanctions 
 of the super-state. 
 
112 THE GEE AT PEACE 
 
 The writer, for one, is not deterred by this prospect. Let 
 us hedge and hesitate as we will, the conclusion is unescap- 
 able that the world is moving toward Cosmos rather than to- 
 ward Chaos. If it is not, it is not worth bothering about or 
 staying in. Nor can the writer conceive of this Cosmos as 
 essentially other than a state with its organs for repressing 
 disorder and organizing for effective cooperation the multi- 
 farious energies of nature and man. This organization does 
 not take place spontaneously nor without coercion of reluc- 
 tant and suppression of malignant forces. The world unity 
 must be essentially a state. ISTor can the argument that in- 
 ternational authority is inconsistent with national sovereignty 
 be recognized as having any weight. Absolute sovereignty 
 / is and always has been a fiction. 'No state has more authority 
 / than it has power, and no state has unlimited power. The 
 very existence of other states limits the power of the state, 
 and there is no reason why that power should not be further 
 limited in the interest of the ends for which states exist. 
 
 But all this is ultimate and immeasurably remote. Be- 
 tween us and the attainment of ideal internationalism 
 stretches a long, long road of difficult progress, and it is 
 near its hither end that lies the problem with which we have 
 to deal. For the coming settlement will be after all only 
 a transition adjustment, one destined to give place, — peace- 
 ably, let us hope, — to another and to many another before 
 the end of the road is reached. And the way is not plain nor 
 is the distance measured, however clear the goal. Turning, 
 therefore, from ultimate or ideal internationalism to in- 
 ternationalism as a practical problem of the immediate pres- 
 ent, let us consider how far it is available as a solution of 
 present difficulties. 
 
 It is a precaution never to be omitted in such cases to in- 
 quire what light, if any, history has to throw upon our prob- 
 lem. Very few people seem to be aware to how large an 
 
ITATIONALITY AND INTEENATIONALISM 113 
 
 extent the experiment of international control has already 
 been tried. Despite the complicating circumstances that 
 are always present, certain of these cases are exactly in point 
 and their outcome is the most reliable guide we can have. 
 
 A significant case is that of Denmark. Controlling by 
 her situation the entrance- to the Baltic, she is yet too weak 
 to protect herself against her powerful neighbors. In the 
 interest of the European balance of power, the great powers 
 of that day, England, France, Prussia, Austria, and Eussia, 
 pledged themselves in 1853 to respect the integrity of Den- 
 mark and to join forces against any one of their number 
 who should violate it. But in 1864 Prussia and Austria, 
 having quite changed their views as to their needs, attacked 
 Denmark and despoiled her of Schleswig-Holstein. France 
 found herself too busy and too little interested to interfere. 
 England threatened to the last, but ultimately backed down, 
 and Russia, most concerned of them all, was powerless to pre- 
 vent the spoliation. 
 
 It will of course be urged that this was not a fair test, that 
 not all powers were represented, and that only a single object 
 was included. It will be clear on reflection, however, that 
 these were elements of strength rather than of weakness in 
 the scheme. If all the nations had been included, would 
 Argentina or Guatemala or Turkey or the United States have 
 been likely to oppose Germany and Austria if a country so 
 nearly interested as France refused to interfere? And if 
 they could not stand together on this vital question which 
 they had distinctly foreseen, is it likely that they would have 
 risked a war with such powers on other and more unexpected 
 issues? The case was a very favorable one and illustrates 
 another factor with which we have always to deal, namely, 
 national growth. Prussia had prospered and the vision of 
 sea power had come to her. The difficult Danish straits gave 
 but unsatisfactory access to her long Baltic sea coast and in 
 
114 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 war time were impassable. Her navy which must protect 
 her toward the east and toward the west, must be able to pass 
 the Danish peninsula at will, or but half of it wouH be avail- 
 able against either foe. In short the idea of the Kiel Canal 
 had come to her, and the Danish neck must be acquired. 
 Pretexts, the most barefaced imaginable, were found, the 
 situation of the hostile powers shrewdly estimated, Austria 
 won by false inducements, and the deed accomplished. 
 
 Belgium offers another case, almost identical with the 
 foregoing, save that there were fewer guarantors and no 
 acquiescence in the spoliation. But again the agreement was 
 violated because conditions had changed and one of the guar- 
 antors deemed it advantageous to violate its pledge. 
 
 Whether we invoke internationalism as the custodian of 
 some special and local interest or as the general arbiter of 
 all international disputes, we encounter the same difficulties 
 which wrecked these experiments. The larger applica- 
 tions of the principle do not essentially change the problem. 
 The argument of preponderant force takes no account of the 
 ease with which great combinations are formed in our day. 
 It is impressive to say that in a league of twenty nations, the 
 nineteen could always bring the one disturber to book. What 
 guaranty have we that it would be nineteen against one? 
 So it was argued about Denmark, that four could always 
 control the one. But it proved to be three against two, and 
 that at a moment when one of the three was embarrassed and 
 another weakly led. In a combination of twenty nations this 
 situation might easily repeat itself. Nothing is more de- 
 ceptive than general talk about '' nations " with counting 
 on the finger tips. As a matter of fact the nations are very 
 unequal in size and are so situated that they fall into natural 
 groups which have no choice but to act as units. If an in- 
 t ternational agreement were reached neutralizing the Dar- 
 danelles and signed by all the present powers of Europe, and 
 
 S' 
 
NATIOi^ALITY AISTD INTERNATIONALISM 115 
 
 Germany should violate the agreement and attempt to seize 
 the straits herself, the other powers could not line up against 
 her. Holland, Belgium, and Denmark would be compelled 
 to remain neutral or join with her, as she might choose, under 
 pain of annihilation. The same might be true of Norway 
 and Sweden, to say nothing of the Balkan states. Opposi- 
 tion could come only from a few great powers. But it is al- 
 most certain that Germany would choose a time for such an 
 adventure when one or more of these powers would be em- 
 barrassed, and that inducements would bring one or more 
 of them to her side. There has been hardly a decade in the 
 last hundred years when a statesman of the sagacity of Bis- 
 marck could not have found conditions favorable to such an 
 enterprise. And the Dardanelles once seized and Constanti- 
 nople occupied by Germany and her allies, they might very 
 possibly hold it against all comers and through it attain their 
 end of world domination. 
 
 Even greater than the danger of direct violence would be 
 the danger of intrigue, the manipulation or corruption of 
 international agents, the scheming to control their appoint- 
 ment, and the accusation, true or false, but deadly in either 
 case, of partiality. And if the administrator were not partial 
 when partiality was sought, the accusation of partiality would 
 be the certain device for removing the unpliable official. It 
 is a situation in which Potiphar's wife could play her role to 
 perfection. Nor would these dangers menace international- 
 ism less in its role of world arbiter than in its function as 
 local administrator. The losing nations would be dissatis- 
 fied nations, and their dissatisfaction, whatever its cause, 
 would be laid to the charge of the league, engendering schism 
 and faction within the group of the nations. 
 
 And there would always be losing and dissatisfied nations. 
 The great and eternal disturber of equilibrium among na- 
 tions is growth, unequal growth, which makes the equities of 
 
116 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 today seem the inequities of tomorrow. The losing will 
 falsely explain their loss. The growing will protest against 
 their straitened allotment of opportunity. They will not 
 willingly give of their growth and their strength to swell 
 the ranks of other peoples and assure the triumph of other 
 cultures than those they love. We may decry these impulses 
 but we can not escape them. These forces that menace the 
 nations are the forces that built the nations and the forces 
 that must maintain them. The fundamental weakness of 
 all schemes to stabilize international relations is that they 
 assume rigidity and finality where the norm is flux and 
 growth. They are like attempts to survey town lots on a 
 glacier or to prescribe once for all the size of a boy's shoes. 
 
 Viewed in what is perhaps its most significant aspect, the 
 present conflict is a struggle between these two principles of 
 rigidity and plasticity. The western nations, mature in 
 their development, have attained to relative permanence of 
 frontier and the idea of finality has become fundamental in 
 their thought. The nations of Central Europe and still 
 more of Eastern Europe have established their boundaries 
 more recently and with less conformity to nature, conveni- 
 ence, and race. To a large extent these boundaries are ob- 
 viously artificial and perhaps provisional. It is impossible 
 for these nations to attribute thus instinctively to their ar- 
 rangements this character of finality. It seems to them a 
 monstrous thing to conceive of the present European hodge- 
 podge with which they are but too familiar, as a finality, a 
 thing to be petrified and held fast forever. With this con- 
 sciousness of plasticity comes inevitably the dream of con- 
 solidation, of leadership, of world dominion. This is with 
 them, not an argument or a conviction, but an instinct. In 
 this struggle, therefore, two great race instincts are in con- 
 flict, and each race tries to interpret the other in terms of its 
 
NATI0:N^ALITY and internationalism 117 
 
 own instinct. Each utterly fails to take account of the in- 
 stincts which it attempts to harmonize. 
 
 This conflict of instincts is pathetically and amusingly il- 
 lustrated by the reception of the peace league proposal in 
 Germany. This reception has taken two opposite but per- 
 fectly consistent forms. On the one hand the proposal has 
 been scornfully rejected as a scheme to put Germany at the 
 mercy of a combination dominated by her present enemies. 
 The assumption was that the league would be under Anglo- 
 Saxon leadership and that it would mean Anglo-Saxon world 
 empire. On the other hand, the German chancellor early 
 in the war announced that Germany not only approved such 
 a league but that she would he willing to assume the leader- 
 ship of it. This proposal has recently been repeated with 
 the suggestion that Germany should take the initiative in 
 preparing plans for such a league and the farther naive sug- 
 gestion that the natural capital for such a league would be 
 Berlin. We laugh at such proposals, but they are perfectly 
 serious, and the German can not understand why we laugh. 
 It will be noted that whether he accepts or rejects the pro- 
 posal, the one thing he sees in it is the possibility of a dom- 
 inating leadership ending in world empire for a single race. 
 This is fundamental to all his thinking, an axiom of his 
 political philosophy. A league of nations, to his mind, could 
 not be other than an instrument for world domination by a 
 single race. He would accept it with perfect sincerity and 
 set to work all his powers of organization and intrigue to 
 secure that domination for his own race. It is not incon- 
 ceivable that he should succeed. 
 
 There are other minor difficulties in the way of the pro- 
 gram of inclusive internationalism as it was originally pro- 
 posed, difficulties in themselves sufficient to insure its failure 
 under present conditions. One is the group dependence of 
 
118 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 nations which deprives them of the liberty of action which 
 the plan of the league presupposes. How can we ask Hol- 
 land to promise in certain eventualities to attack Germany 
 or even to withhold supplies when we know that she will 
 he annihilated if she does so ? The same of Denmark, of 
 Rumania, of Bulgaria. What possible freedom of choice 
 have Portugal and Finland and the Poland that is to be ? 
 They have no option but neutrality or cooperation with the 
 nation that can destroy them. The world is made up, not 
 of many independent nations, large and small, but of a few 
 great groups, vague in outline but predetermined in their 
 essence, which necessarily act as units. 
 
 Again, it is provided that in those matters concerning 
 which nations refuse to surrender the right of war, they shall 
 hold that right in abeyance. They may not fight until after 
 their quarrel has been investigated, but then they may. But 
 then they can not, or if they do, they must do so under vitally 
 changed conditions. How can we expect Japan to give 
 Russia a year's notice of her intention to defend a cause which 
 she dares not arbitrate, when we know that her only hope lies 
 in promptness and surprise ? Such a proposal simply dis- 
 arms the quick nations in favor of the slow, the little nations 
 in favor of the big. Whether this would be in favor of ul- 
 timate equity is doubtful, but the nations unfavorably af- 
 fected will hardly consent thus to give away their case. 
 
 Most of all are to be feared in such a league the possibilities 
 of racial propaganda, the inevitable formation of parties, 
 the coalition of nations having common interests or instincts, 
 the deepening schism between groups, as the forces of growth, 
 energy, or accident slowly tipped the scale toward the one or 
 the other, the reappearance within the league of the hostilities 
 which it was meant to suppress. How certain the charge 
 that the winning group was the favored group ! How in- 
 evitable the suspicion of partiality, a suspicion as fatal as 
 
NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 119 
 
 the fact! How irresistible the temptation of the losers to 
 secede, to redress the balance with the sword! When Flor- 
 ence, hampered in her growing industry by the feuds of her 
 country barons, suppressed them and destroyed their castle 
 tollgates, she thought to insure peace by forcing them to live 
 within her walls where she could watch and control them. 
 The result was that they brought their feuds with them and 
 rallied the Florentines to the one or the other side. Flor- 
 ence was rent with strife for a hundred years until in despair 
 she banished them in a body to fight it out away from her 
 presence and carry their mischief where they would. Until 
 men are peaceable, such a league to enforce peace will be a 
 trap and a pretext for war. 
 
 But under peace conditions, it may be urged, men will be 
 peaceable. Germany would not care to seize the Dardanelles 
 if she were certain of being free to use it. She would not 
 seek colonies with all their burdens of administration if she 
 were certain to have the freedom of their markets and her 
 fair share of their raw materials. Assure her this by in- 
 ternationalization and she will be content. So in her dis- 
 tress she would fain assure us. Would that it were so. But 
 if this war has taught us anything, it is that Germany wants, 
 — not the freedom of this our world, — but its lordship. We 
 utterly mistake the temper of nationalism in these its more 
 virulent forms if we do not perceive that it desires to pre- 
 vail, to dominate and subordinate other nations and other 
 civilizations. Germany does not believe in a fellowship of 
 equal nations. She believes in a triumphant Germanism. 
 Freedom of the seas, freedom to use the Dardanelles, free- 
 dom to trade with the tropics, all these she has had and these 
 nowise meet her demands. She seeks the control of the 
 world's vantage points and the world's resources, that she may 
 make them serve the ends of Germanism. There is nothing 
 unique about this except the virulence and ruthlessness which 
 
120 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 it acquires from German character, but it is in square contra- 
 diction with the purpose of the proposed league, and if Ger- 
 many joins such a league it will be to use it for her purpose. 
 
 The objections to the proposed league have been urged at 
 some length because of the great and influential support 
 which the project has received and because of the writer's 
 conviction that it involves very great peril. In particular 
 we should be on our guard against the thoughtless argument 
 that " it will do no harm to try it." It may do infinite harm 
 to try it. The natural and necessary concomitant of any such 
 scheme is disarmament, partial or complete. There is no 
 known way of effectually enforcing such a measure. If 
 actual armament is reduced, there are still ways of accumu- 
 lating military advantage by the cornering of necessary ma- 
 terials, the equipment of mimition plants, the specialization 
 of national industries in directions favorable to military pre- 
 paredness, the manipulation of national education and the 
 like. The nation that wishes to evade the purpose of the 
 peace league can do so. Germany, by a misdirected military 
 move has roused the peaceably disposed nations and armed 
 them against her. She can not hope to prevail against a 
 world in arms. Her next move must of necessity be to again 
 disarm the world. Eor that purpose a peace league with its 
 program of universal disarmament is admirably suited. 
 
 Once more we grasp at straws. Will not the war change 
 the German temper ? Yes and no. It is reasonable to hope 
 that Germany will ultimately learn the lesson of these ex- 
 periences. The German people can not suffer as they have 
 suffered without at last reflecting to some purpose on the 
 blindness of conceit, the abysmal ignorance, the world alienat- 
 ing arrogance, and the maddening brutalities that have neu- 
 tralized all their science, their industry, and their organiza- 
 tion and dragged them down to defeat. These things will 
 sometime be written so that Germans will read them and will 
 
NATIONALITY AND INTERNATIONALISM 121 
 
 understand. No people can be wholly immune to the cor- 
 rective influences of experience. But this change will not 
 come soon. One of the most extraordinary phenomena of his- 
 tory is the persistence of Prussian character. Such as they 
 have been in this war, they have been ever since they were 
 known in history. Yet they have again and again passed 
 through these chastening experiences. While conceding 
 therefore, that the Germans will be influenced by this ex- 
 perience, we must not expect that the change will be so im- 
 mediate or so far reaching as to constitute in itself a safe- 
 guard for the peace of the world. 
 
 Yet it may easily seem to be so. Over and above all the 
 bitterness and resentment which will follow defeat, will ap- 
 pear a war-weariness approaching utter exhaustion. This 
 weariness will conceal from us, perhaps even from the Ger- 
 man himself, his deeper and more permanent sentiments. 
 He may easily seem broken, humble, perhaps contrite. Even 
 without the dissembling of which he is a master, he may 
 easily disarm those who are incapable, — as they always have 
 been incapable, — of understanding his intractable nature. 
 Under such circumstances the enthusiast with whom the wish 
 is so easily the father of the thought, may think the candi- 
 date ripe for baptism into the circle of the changed in heart. 
 Alas for the peace of the circle when old passions return 
 with the new currents of life.-*^ 
 
 But the foregoing objections which the writer has felt 
 compelled to urge with so much earnestness, hold only against 
 plans of immediate, universal internationalism. Interna- 
 tionalism is immediately practicable and necessary, but it 
 is practicable only among a limited number of nations. Uni- 
 versal internationalism will sometime be practicable, but not 
 
 1 The same point of view is expressed by Mr. Roosevelt in his vigor- 
 ous assertion that to include Germany and Turkey in a league to enforce 
 peace would be like attempting to eliminate burglary by including all 
 the burglars in the police force. 
 
122 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 now. Successful internationalism must rest on a spiritual 
 basis of common aims, common instincts, and common sym- 
 pathies. No nation is ready for internationalism until it 
 has outgrown even the wish to dominate other nations that 
 have learned how to provide the common decencies of na- 
 tionhood. The nation that even feels the inclination to im- 
 pose its will upon the civilized Belgians, is not ready for 
 internationalism. It must come to feel an instinctive aver- 
 sion for that sort of thing. Above all, it is necessary that 
 this sentiment should exist toward the members of the group 
 itself. The true league of nations finds its analogue rather in 
 good society than in the mechanically organized state. As 
 we exclude the ill bred person from the society of the well 
 bred, setting thus the highest possible price upon good breed- 
 ing, so the ill bred nation that has not learned the decencies 
 of live-and-let-live, can not be more effectually corrected than 
 by exclusion from the society of those who have learned the 
 lesson of civilization. 
 
 The league we seek is in existence, guaranteeing to an ex- 
 tent that few appreciate, the peace of the world. Its nu- 
 cleus is the great fellowship of independent British nations 
 (misnamed the British Empire) in whose circle our own 
 country has long unconsciously held its place on almost ex- 
 actly the same terms as the rest. These nations with their 
 wards control one third the surface of the earth and one third 
 of its population. Within this vast area there is peace. Xo 
 one makes or dreams of making war upon another. All are 
 moved by a common impulse. — so much more effectual than 
 a common agreement, — to enforce peace upon other less pa- 
 cific peoples. This league was not made ; it grew, as all liv- 
 ing things do. It needs but the privilege of larger growth. 
 
 The present war with its fellowship in arms has been an 
 immense stimulus to this vital league. It has lifted it from 
 the unconscious into the conscious realm" and defined and 
 
NATIONALITY AND INTEENATIONALISM 123 
 
 intensified its purpose. Does any one imagine that if the 
 existence of Anglo-Saxon civilization were again imperiled, 
 our country would wait two years and a half before it lifted 
 a finger in protest or preparation ? The spiritual reunion of 
 the Anglo-Saxon peoples, the only reunion that they desire 
 or need, is Germany's unintentional contribution to world 
 unity thus far. 
 
 But there is other growth and more significant. France, 
 with her wards, twenty times the homeland in area and vitally 
 related to territories in Anglo-Saxon trust, has been added 
 to the league of the changed in heart. It is not implied that 
 France has ceased to be imperialistic. No nation has. The 
 desire for colonies, the desire to control the untamed peoples 
 and subdue the uncouth to the uses of ordered life is the corol- 
 lary of virility and manhood. But France no longer desires 
 to rule Italy or Spain as Napoleon made her do. She has en- 
 tered the circle of the well bred. The same for Belgium with 
 her vast trust of the Congo. Do we realize what a guaranty 
 of peace is contained in these handclasps across the Channel ? 
 If we assume that by the exercise of vigilance, forbearance, 
 and tact, our ov^ti country can answer for the peace of that 
 Latin America for which it unwittingly made itself sponsor 
 nearly a century ago, then two thirds of the world's surface 
 and two thirds of its people are already within the fold. 
 
 It is by no means certain that this is the limit of our ef- 
 fective achievement. The bulk of the remaining world is 
 the Mongolian East. Of this, China is at present inert. 
 The controlling element is Japan, her control having been 
 assured during the present war, both by her aggressive policy 
 toward China and by her astute diplomacy regarding our- 
 selves. By the one she obtained a virtual suzerainty over 
 China and by the other she obtained our recognition of it.^ 
 
 1 The " notes " exchanged between Viscount Ishii and Secretary Lan- 
 sing amount to a treaty recognition of Japan's " paramount interests " 
 in the East. 
 
124 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 What will be Japan's part in the struggle between Cosmos 
 and Chaos? It would be idle to assume that she is bound 
 to her present allies by any such bonds of sympathy as those 
 that unite the Anglo-Saxon peoples or even the British and 
 Erencli. There is no kinship of race or culture. Nor has 
 the Orient had reason to look upon the western nations as 
 natural protectors of the weak. But considerations of ad- 
 vantage of which the Japanese have shown themselves singu- 
 larly appreciative, constitute a very effectual pledge of co- 
 operation with the group above indicated. All discussion 
 of the ease with which Japan could seize the Philippines or 
 the possibility of the capture of Hawaii or of a successful 
 descent upon the California coast are beside the mark. Japan 
 is a naval power and must remain so. She will not and can 
 not risk collision with the power that controls the sea. That 
 power is and must continue to be the league above mentioned. 
 During three and a half years of the great struggle Japan 
 watched to see which way the scale would incline. When 
 the decision became plain, Viscount Ishii voiced the sincere 
 and inevitable decision of the Japanese people when he said : 
 " Japan has decided to cast in her lot with the English 
 speaking peoples of the world." This decision rests on the 
 larger opportunism rather than on affection, but it is not 
 therefore untrustworthy. It is certainly preferable to the 
 sullen acquiescence of a beaten and revengeful Germany. 
 
 Our league as thus enlarged is so nearly all embracing 
 that it has but to take note of its power and extent to assure 
 peace in the world. It must expect to maintain that peace 
 with a very large element of mobilized force as long as there 
 are peoples in the world that are willing to use their force, 
 not to maintain order, but secure domination. That price 
 must cheerfully be paid for the boon which it can assure and 
 which as yet can not be assured without it. But if the price 
 be paid and the boon assured, the outsiders will not long re- 
 
NATIONALITY AND INTEKNATIONALISM 125 
 
 main unreconciled. Let it be established beyond reasonable 
 doubt that the Anglo-Saxon solidarity has come to stay and 
 that cooperation with France and Japan is a settled fact in 
 international relations, and the present century will witness 
 such a transformation of German policy and of German 
 sentiment as no coercion or artificial fellowship could ever 
 effect. 
 
 Such a conclusion will be unwelcome to those who hope, 
 as the sanguine have always hoped, that this struggle would 
 be the last. The air is full of cries that if this war be not 
 the end of war, if it end not in the full recognition of inter- 
 nationalism, then we shall have fought in vain and our peace 
 will be but a truce. But victories are never final in this 
 struggle between right and might, and if all is vain that is 
 not final, how vain our human struggle has been. 
 
 It is a relief to note that the manifest impossibility of in- 
 ternational confidence between the chief contestants in the 
 present struggle has made itself felt even in the circle of the 
 sanguine. The American society of the League to Enforce 
 Peace whose earlier plans we have had under consideration, 
 now announces a revised plan, with much of complicated 
 definition and machinery, which makes provision for cer- 
 tain of the special cases which we have considered. Mem- 
 bership is to be restricted and based on fitness as determined 
 by a vote of the existing membership. It may also be com- 
 plete or partial, the members being pledged in the one case 
 to use both military and economic pressure to enforce the 
 mandates of the league, and in the other case economic pres- 
 sure alone. This is evidently a recognition of the delicate 
 position in which certain of the smaller or more exposed na- 
 tions find themselves. Simultaneously there comes from Eng- 
 lish sources a cautious and limited proposal of a " League 
 of Free Nations " whose constituency could not be other than 
 that already noted. The questions of procedure and ma- 
 
126 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 chinery which so greatly interest the advocates of these pro- 
 posals, need not here detain us. What concerns us is to note 
 that the limitations thus admitted imply the complete aban- 
 donment of the original principle. The plan, if adopted in 
 this form, would mean essentially the perpetuation of the 
 present Allied group, with the addition of certain machinery 
 whose usefulness has yet to be tested. The prospect is less 
 dazzling but far more hopeful. For in fact such a plan as 
 this corresponds to the great reality. 
 
 Internationalism is a thing, not of the flesh, but of the 
 spirit. It is a growth, not a contrivance. What we need is 
 to recognize it, not invoke it. The league that we have 
 dreamed of is here, less symmetrical and mechanical than 
 that of which we had dreamed, but infinitely more vital and 
 effective. Its widening circle passes from the English to 
 the British, from the British to the Anglo-Saxon, from the 
 Anglo-Saxon to the democratic. It has but one more step, 
 — from the democratic to the human. That is a long step, 
 but a step to be hastened rather than forced, and not to be 
 hastened by force. 
 
 Note. It is interesting to note that our present administration that 
 has insisted not only upon a league of nations, but upon disarmament 
 as its corollary, now urges a tremendous increase of our navy, an in- 
 crease apparently intended to make it the largest in the world. This 
 may seem inconsistent with the idea of international guaranty. On the 
 contrary it marks the first sane appreciation of what such a guaranty 
 implies. It is a popular fallacy that internationalism would make na- 
 tional defense unnecessary, the assumption being that social action in 
 like manner relieves the individual of the necessity of protecting him- 
 self. But does it? Let anyone who so imagines, visit a bank vault and 
 observe the intricate and ponderous mechanism installed to protect the 
 bank's funds. Could the bank count on police protection if it left the 
 front door unlocked and the money heaped upon the counter? When 
 that becomes possible, it will be legitimate to cite the analogy of social 
 protection of the individual as an argument for internationalism and 
 disarmament. Even the most successful internationalism could only 
 protect those nations that do their utmost to protect themselves. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 
 
 It is the bad luck of the dike keeper that when the flood 
 breaks through he is always busy working at the breach. 
 The suspicion is inevitable that he did not do all that might 
 have been done to stop the breach, that he was negligent or 
 incompetent, — possibly even that he opened the breach him- 
 self. So with breaks in the dikes between nations. The 
 menace has been there for months or years. By a vigilance 
 and a resourcefulness almost superhuman, the diplomats in 
 charge, — possibly on both sides, — have been endeavoring 
 to prevent the break. At the moment when the break comes 
 they are at their busiest, contriving check and brace and 
 counterweight, but all in vain. Their work goes down to 
 ruin and almost invariably drags them dovm with it. Then 
 the comfortable burghers whom nothing but disaster arouses 
 to consciousness, overwhelm in their turn the wretched 
 keeper and all his work. Why all this intricacy and con- 
 trivance, these subterranean works carried out without our 
 knowledge? Why were we not called to the dike? We 
 could have averted the disaster. 
 
 The metaphor is doubtless imperfect as all metaphors are. 
 
 The storms that beat upon the dikes of the nations are largely 
 
 human storms, with a measure of consciousness and volition 
 
 which it is not meant to deny. But when all allowance is 
 
 made for this element of knowledge and choice, these storms 
 
 so far transcend common knowledge and individual volition 
 
 that they closely resemble the great nature forces of wave 
 
 and flood that breach our dikes against the sea. Nor does 
 
 the analogy end here. There can be no reasonable doubt 
 
 127 
 
128 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 that diplomats have been as a class devoted, patriotic, and 
 skillful, honest keepers of the dikes. There is scarcely a 
 recorded case of betraval of trust, rarely even one of negli- 
 gence. Incompetence has been frequent enough, but not more 
 frequent than in other responsible positions, not so frequent 
 even as we think, for failure is always construed as incom- 
 petence by a public never cognizant of the deeper facts in 
 the case. 
 
 Yet now that the dikes have broken, the demand is again 
 heard for drastic remedies. We challenge, not the individual 
 diplomat nor yet the individual negotiation, but the whole 
 principle and practice of diplomacy. There must be an end 
 of secret diplomacy, an end of secret treaties. Even more 
 drastically it is demanded that the very privilege of treaty 
 and of negotiation itself be withdrawn as between individual 
 nations, all relations being subject to supernational regu- 
 lation. These demands, like certain others noted in the pre- 
 ceding chapter, derive an added interest from the endorse- 
 ment of the President of the United States who has not hesi- 
 tated to give to these principles a foremost place among the 
 conditions of peace. They therefore call for our careful 
 consideration. 
 
 The proposed curtailment of diplomatic and treaty privi- 
 lege as between individual nations is in a class by itself. It 
 is in fact a feature of the plan for a league of nations al- 
 ready discussed. If this plan is to be adopted in its com- 
 prehensive and unqualified form, a certain limitation of in- 
 dependent diplomatic relations is inevitable. Little leagues 
 and private understanding might easily render nugatory 
 the provisions of the larger agreement. The privilege of such 
 private understandings is therefore quite logically withheld. 
 
 Quite logically, but not so certainly effectually. This is 
 one of a multitude of popular remedies which look to ends 
 without sufficient regard to means. What means has the 
 
DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 129 
 
 family of nations at its disposal for preventing such private 
 understandings? It is specitically in connection with the 
 plan for a complete league of nations that this restriction is 
 proposed. Such a league would include Germany, Austria, 
 and Turkey. It is needless to say that for a very long time 
 to come sentiments of bitterness toward the western powers 
 and of common interest as among themselves are likely to 
 characterize these peoples. Suppose Germany and Austria 
 see an opportunity to advance their own interests by a policy 
 of solidarity. What is going to hinder them? Even the 
 most flagrant violation of the league provision would be dif- 
 ficult to detect and still more difficult to punish, but the 
 really dangerous cases would not be the flagrant ones. The 
 trouble is, there is the usual insensible gradation from the 
 admissible to the inadmissible, and that in two ways. 
 
 In the first place, no one can contemplate an absolute pro- 
 hibition of agreements between nations. Such a prohibi- 
 tion would have no counterpart or analogy in either indi- 
 vidual or federal relations. The states of the American 
 Union are not prohibited from making agreements with one 
 another, and such agreements are frequent. Their rights 
 in this connection are of course limited and can not legally 
 be used against the defined federal interest, but it is plain 
 that they could be and would be so used if any group of 
 states were unfriendly to the union. The one flagrant case 
 of such use is familiar, but the really significant cases are of 
 constant occurrence, cases of sectional solidarity unfavorable 
 to federal interests which nothing but the overwhelming pre- 
 ponderance of federal loyalty holds within the limits of safety. 
 Reduce the privilege of local international agreement to a 
 minimum, and it will still be possible to find in it a medium 
 for the expression of disloyal sympathies and local cohesions 
 having all the dangers of present alliances. 
 
 The second difficulty is that international cooperation and 
 
130 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 solidarity depends but little on overt official agreements. Let 
 the law forbid marriage between undesirable parties, and the 
 usual result is that they cohabit without marrying. We 
 have dissolved trusts, but seldom prevented the concerted 
 action at which we aimed. So we may prohibit treaties and 
 alliances within the league of nations, but we can not pre- 
 vent concerted action or gentlemen's agreements where senti- 
 ment and interest favor such action. The chief result of any 
 such prohibition would be to substitute the informal for the 
 formal, the clandestine for the open. A closer view of actual 
 conditions in our day will disclose the fact that even now, 
 without the desired prohibition, treaties and alliances play 
 a minor part in the concerted action of nations. Most of 
 the actual correlation is informal and unofficial. It is the 
 ententes (the understandings) that hold and the alliances 
 that break down in the present war. 
 
 We thus see two serious obstacles in the way of eliminating 
 the clique in the community of nations, first, the impossibility 
 of detecting and punishing the agreements in question, and 
 second the possibility of maintaining the clique without such 
 agreements, by means of perfectly informal and intangible 
 understandings. It is not meant to imply that legal action 
 can do nothing to limit practices of this kind, but that the 
 clique spirit is peculiarly difficult to control, quite as diffi- 
 cult in the community of nations as in the community of men. 
 1^0 repressive action of this sort will contribute much to the 
 solution of our problem. 
 
 The abolition of secret diplomacy is the reform most 
 prominently urged in this connection. This demand comes 
 from the most varied quarters. The representatives of that 
 school of democracy who essentially reject the principle of 
 representation in democratic government and who would re- 
 fer all issues directly to popular vote, quite consistently ap- 
 ply the same principle to the regulation of foreign relations. 
 
DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 131 
 
 The demand for open diplomacy is essentially a demand for 
 referendum diplomacy. It is chiefly from these more radical 
 elements that come the caustic references to " traditional and 
 musty diplomacy " and the often expressed fear lest the 
 forthcoming settlement should be another diplomats' peace, 
 another plot around the table, a new deal at the old game. 
 There is in such criticisms a certain assumption that diplo- 
 matic negotiations are essentially machinations, deals made 
 by persons who are irresponsible and unrepresentative, and 
 on a low moral plane. The moral straightforwardness of 
 the people is thus invoked to save the world from diplomatic 
 chicane. 
 
 But the criticism of traditional diplomacy comes from other 
 quarters which represent very different political assumptions. 
 Thus, ex-President Eliot of Harvard University has ex- 
 pressed regret at the secret conduct of the negotiations of 
 1914 by Sir Edward Grey, while paying a high tribute to his 
 ability and disinterestedness. He objects, not to the deci- 
 sions or the outcome of the negotiations, but to the principle 
 on which they were conducted. In view of the very consid- 
 erable openness which has always characterized Sir Edward 
 Grey's diplomacy, and his insistence upon the publication of 
 treaties, such an objection is a serious one. 
 
 There can be no doubt that a considerable ground exists 
 for these criticisms. The history of diplomacy offers num- 
 erous examples of chicanery which were made possible only 
 by secrecy. The well known case in which Bismarck en- 
 tered into a secret agreement with Russia in a sense dia- 
 metrically opposed to the known agreement with Austria is 
 a characteristic case. In this case Austria was depending 
 on her understanding with Germany, all unconscious that 
 she was being betrayed by her ally. If the agreement with 
 Russia had been open and known, the agreement with Austria 
 would have lapsed automatically. Such cases of extreme dis- 
 
132 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 ingenuousness are uncommon, but secret agreements against 
 some third power that was an object of legitimate fear or 
 illegitimate aggression, have been exceedingly frequent. 
 There can be no question that secrecy has enabled nations to 
 combine against other nations, for purposes either of war 
 or peace, as they otherwise could not have done. At a time 
 when we are seeking to prevent hostilities, the prohibition of 
 secrecy is a form of disarmament. 
 
 Another and quite different objection which is urged with 
 a certain justice is that secrecy lessens the accountability of 
 the diplomat and enables him to adopt a policy not sanc- 
 tioned by the people. It is undemocratic. As regards 
 formal ratification, this is undoubtedly true. The people 
 can not be directly consulted as to agreements reached and 
 may even continue for years unconscious of the obligations 
 which have been entered into on their behalf. This is ab- 
 horrent to the theory of direct democracy, that is, democracy 
 in which the people do not delegate their powers but decide 
 questions directly by popular vote. It is this school of de- 
 mocracy which most loudly voices its protest. 
 
 But if we concede the necessity of delegating the people's 
 powers, — a necessity nowhere so obvious as in the field of 
 foreign relations which lies farthest from the familiar facts 
 of daily life, — the objection loses much of its force. The 
 transactions of diplomacy may be secret, but its policy is un- 
 mistakably determined by popular will, so far as that will 
 finds expression in government, and the people are by no 
 means without the power of holding the diplomat to account. 
 The mandate of the people to its agent would then be some- 
 thing like this : " We do not know what steps are necessary 
 to accomplish our ends, but we wish cooperation with this 
 power, protection against that power, etc." Such a mandate 
 is not more diflScult to enforce or more liable to abuse than 
 any other, save in so far as international interests are farther 
 
DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 133 
 
 beyond the people's ken than matters of domestic concern. 
 For this difficulty no form of procedure offers an adequate 
 remedy. 
 
 It may as well be stated at the outset that the writer has 
 but limited faith in plebiscite democracy. There is a place 
 for the plebiscite, and the possibility of a referendum as an 
 emergency measure, to break a deadlock or to punish mal- 
 feasance may be freely granted. But the wholesale adoption 
 of plebiscite methods means the rejection of the expert in 
 the whole business of government. For centuries the ex- 
 pert has been the ever increasing dependence of modem so- 
 ciety. The field of knowledge so immeasurably transcends 
 the capacity of the individual mind, that the individual can 
 appropriate its advantages only through the intermediary 
 of specialists of many kinds. Government is no exception. 
 If self-government is held to mean popular mastery of the 
 expert problems of which modern government consists, then 
 self-government is an iridescent dream. The theory that 
 we must have direct personal expression of opinion on prob- 
 lems of governmental detail as a means of making the people 
 intelligent is an absurd misconception. We do not study 
 medicine in order that we may intelligently employ a phy- 
 sician, still less in order that we may dispense with his serv- 
 ices. Our intelligence, — the only intelligence that is fea- 
 sible or relevant, — consists in the ability shrewdly to esti- 
 mate the results of his ministrations. 
 
 !N"owhere is the difference between this intelligence which 
 shrewdly estimates results and the specialized intelligence 
 of the expert more marked or more important than in govern- 
 ment. The enactment of wise corrective legislation is as 
 delicate a task as a piece of corrective surgery. It is for the 
 people to note their malaise, to choose their surgeon, and to 
 order the operation. For all of that they may be competent. 
 It is not for them to perform the operation. The referen- 
 
134 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 dum movement, whatever local correction of abuses it may 
 have effected, has everywhere developed its inevitable weak- 
 nesses. It has gathered its whole force, not from the superior- 
 ity of popular decisions, but from the incompetency of former 
 intermediaries. The only advantage of the intermediary 
 is the advantage of expert knowledge. Our intermediaries 
 have not been specialized experts. The fact that they knew 
 no more than we did, has not unnaturally suggested the pos- 
 sibility of dispensing with their services. Some of the 
 democracies that are being born in these days of travail bid 
 fair to revolutionize both the theory and practice of self-gov- 
 ernment as we know it. The evolution now observable in 
 certain states toward a parliament whose lower house repre- 
 sents individuals and the upper house the specialized organs, 
 industrial, commercial, and cultural, which make the modern 
 state, is distinctly a truer application of the representative 
 principle and a higher type of democracy. Society is not 
 made of individuals alone, but of individuals and specialized 
 organs of which the non-participant individual knows almost 
 nothing. To represent the former only is not democracy 
 as regards our great, modern, specialized societies, whatever 
 it may have been in the days of simpler things. It is this 
 radically unrepresentative character of our representative in- 
 stitutions which has discredited them and made them the 
 prey of the lobby, that illegitimate and extra-constitutional 
 third house through which alone the organs of society find 
 expression. This explains the revolt against representative 
 government, but it does not justify it. This is the age of 
 the specialist, and despite all its dangers, the specialist must 
 be our hope and must have our confidence. 
 
 This may seem something of a digression, but it is in fact 
 an indispensable preliminary to our main conclusion. No 
 plea for referendum diplomacy is to be admitted under the 
 disguise of open negotiation. We need the expert in every 
 
DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 135 
 
 department of government, and nowhere so much as in the 
 management of foreign relations, the matters which lie 
 farthest from our ordinary knowledge. Especially do these 
 considerations need to be brought home to the American peo- 
 ple. It is from them that this demand for plebiscite diplo- 
 macy chiefly comes. It is not our superior democracy but 
 our superior ignorance, that motives this demand. It is 
 hardly an exaggeration to say that we, as a people, do not 
 even know the existence of those great material interests the 
 careful adjustment of which is vital to the problem of peace. 
 Hence we soar in the untrammeled ether of pure generaliza- 
 tion and caustically refer to those who sit around the table and 
 make " new deals at the old game." The peoples of Europe 
 that live in physical contact with those material factors that 
 make or mar their destiny, have this immense advantage over 
 us that they know their incompetency. The basic assumption 
 of our further discussion must be the frank acceptance of the 
 expert in this, the most specialized of all functions of gov- 
 ernment. The recent assertion of an American scholar that 
 there were not more than four Americans living who had the 
 knowledge and skill necessary to represent America at the 
 peace table may be an exaggeration, but it emphasizes an 
 important truth. 
 
 Accepting, therefore, the expert, what are the conditions 
 under which he can work successfully to accomplish the just 
 ends of negotiation? There can not be a moment's hesita- 
 tion in answering this question. The preliminary stages of 
 negotiation must have the benefit of privacy. There are 
 delicate stages in almost every diplomatic transaction, sharp 
 disagreements and unreasonable arguments which if published 
 would rouse resentments and jealousies that would make 
 further negotiation impossible. The notion that the people 
 are calm, and judicial, and peace loving, and that it is diplo- 
 matic scheming which engenders strife is utterly erroneous. 
 
136 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 It is a part of the art of the diplomat to keep his temper, to 
 marshal many and unfamiliar forces, to win by nice align- 
 ment and organization, as the great general wins by strategy. 
 Of all this recondite science the people know nothing. But 
 they seek their objectives none the less relentlessly, and when 
 balked, tend necessarily to grasp at the weapon of violence 
 which passion is prompt to put in their hands. It is some- 
 times assumed that the expert moves of diplomacy have 
 something sinister about them, which tends ever to embroil 
 peoples in war. The fact is that diplomacy is averse to war 
 in its inmost nature. When diplomacy proves unequal to 
 the task and war comes in to cut the Gordian knot, it is a con- 
 fession that diplomacy has failed. The diplomat himself is 
 almost invariably sacrificed and finds in the rupture the end 
 of a hard earned career. 
 
 It is true that diplomacy sometimes deliberately precipi- 
 tates war, but only when war is judged to be inevitable and 
 the choice of time and circumstance seems of advantage. 
 For every war thus precipitated there are a dozen that diplo- 
 macy labors hard to avert and which could not be averted 
 without its aid. Merely as an abstract proposition, the peo- 
 ple do not want war, but their passions and jealousies render 
 them exceedingly prone to violence. It is these passions 
 and jealousies which are the great problem of diplomacy and 
 the sufficient occasion for diplomatic secrecy. 
 
 This secrecy can be and often has been abused. The con- 
 fidence reposed in the expert may always be abused. But in 
 the last resort we remain judges of the expert's work. Even 
 when no suflficient measures are adopted for the public discus- 
 sion and ratification of treaties, — measures certainly not 
 lacking in our own country, — successful diplomacy must and 
 does keep in touch with the will of the people. The concep- 
 tion of the diplomat as one whose machinations flout the 
 popular will is ludicrously false. He is normally in an at- 
 
DIPLOMACY AND TREATIES 137 
 
 titude of studied subserviency, even while reserving at times 
 the right to " appeal from Philip drunk to Philip sober." 
 
 Our conclusion is that secret diplomacy, in the sense of 
 confidential negotiations, is not an abuse but a necessity, a 
 permanent condition of the successful performance of the 
 diplomat's necessary functions. For such abuses as occa- 
 sionally occur the remedy is to be found in the choice of bet- 
 ter diplomats and the development of a higher standard of 
 professional honor. There is no short cut or royal road.^ 
 
 Passing from negotiations to agreements, there can be no 
 question as to the desirability of publicity as a general prin- 
 ciple. This is not a new conclusion. It has been the steadily 
 increasing practice of the more enlightened nations in recent 
 years. That remarkable document, the memorandum of 
 Prince Lichnowski, late German ambassador to England, at- 
 tests the stand of Britain on this point in an unusual manner. 
 The much desired treaty concerning the Bagdad railway 
 which Germany at last succeeded in obtaining, was held up 
 for many months and finally lost because Britain insisted 
 upon its publication when signed, a step to which Germany 
 refused to consent. In our own case the publication of 
 treaties is practically inevitable owing to the requirement 
 of ratification by the Senate, a procedure which insures 
 publicity, intentional or otherwise. There can be little doubt 
 that this practice will become more general. 
 
 But it must not be overlooked that there are certain treaties 
 of a perfectly legitimate character which would be vitiated 
 by publicity. Such are treaties of military alliance which 
 contain specifications as to military procedure in the event 
 
 1 It is interesting to note that when Mr. Wilson's unqualified endorse- 
 ment of open diplomacy seemed about to become embodied in a binding 
 enactment, he hastened to explain that he approved of publicity only 
 for the treaties as finally negotiated, secrecy being indispensable for 
 the negotiations themselves. He has, in practice, quite frankly availed 
 himself of at least this much of the privilege of secrecy. 
 
138 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 of war. A mere pledge of alliance may be published, — in- 
 deed its publication may be just the means of accomplishing 
 its purpose. But treaties specifying the extent and manner 
 of military cooperation and the objectives aimed at have 
 the same occasion for secrecy as a general's plan of campaign. 
 Such treaties have been frequent and necessary in Europe. 
 If we have not resorted to them, it is because our isolation 
 has hitherto made military alliances unnecessary. The re- 
 sult is that in one more important particular we are dis- 
 qualified for judging Europe. Meanwhile our isolation 
 seems gone forever and it may well be our procedure rather 
 than that of Europe that will require revision. 
 
 Once more we shall be adjured to form a league of nations 
 and abolish forever the danger of war and the odious safe- 
 guards which it seems to necessitate. So be it, — if so it may 
 be. In the preceding chapter we have given reasons for 
 moderating our expectations as to the immediate immunities 
 to be hoped from such a league, — more exactly, perhaps, as 
 to the possibility of forming such a league to include the na- 
 tions with which we are now at war. And until they are in- 
 cluded, be it noted, the league must be in a measure a league 
 of offense and defense having something of the character 
 above noted. Not till the leagiTC becomes both inclusive and 
 stable beyond the possibility of collapse or even serious dis- 
 turbance can the conditions of ideal publicity in treaty agree- 
 ments be attained. Such a condition is to be sought by every 
 means in our power, but not assumed as a fact while it is as 
 yet but an aspiration. 
 
 Meanwhile it is reassuring to note that the element of 
 secrecy in treaties is much less than is supposed. Secret 
 treaties are after all not very secret. Details are withheld, 
 but the general tenor of such agreements is always discovered 
 and usually frankly avowed. The Bolshevik publication of 
 the secret treaties of the Allies brought no surprising revela- 
 
DIPLOMACY A^D TREATIES 139 
 
 tions. If the reasoning of the foregoing pages is correct, it 
 is only this general purport of treaty agreements of which 
 the public can take profitable account. As regards this gen- 
 eral purport, the diplomat is now held to a very real account 
 by peoples capable of so doing, and it is doubtful whether 
 publicity in matters of detail would make public control more 
 effectual. The treaties of the last hundred years have pretty 
 effectually reflected the will of the peoples who permitted 
 themselves to be bound by them. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to allude again in this connection 
 to the unenforceability of a provision against secret treaties. 
 Let us forbid all we like, and yet if Germany and Austria 
 make such a treaty, what are we going to do about it ? We 
 might never find it out. If we did, we could only declare 
 it invalid, and if they still chose to be bound by it, what 
 then ? Would we use war or boycott to force them to desist ? 
 
 Openness and straightforwardness are qualities greatly to 
 be desired in all human relations, great and small, but they 
 are the spontaneous product of confidence and goodwill, not 
 matters of contract and treaty stipulation. Publicity in pub- 
 lic affairs, never useful in matters of technical detail, is to 
 be desired and expected as rapidly as the conditions of fel- 
 lowship are realized. To most if not all of the nations the 
 great war has brought as its chief compensation an enlarged 
 sense of fellowship and a greater appreciation of the interests 
 and needs of other peoples. May frankness and candour ap- 
 pear as a pervasive spirit rather than as a futile stipulation 
 in the Great Peace. 
 
PAET n 
 THE NATIONS 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 GERMANY 
 
 In- peace as in war, Germany is everything. No doubt 
 her allies have been very important factors in prolonging the 
 war, contributing both by their military power and still 
 more by their strategic position to the diflBculties of the 
 Allies. Correspondingly they will present their full share of 
 difficulty to the peace conference. But in the one case as 
 in the other Germany is the key to the situation. As it is 
 useless to defeat her allies unless we can defeat her, so it 
 is useless to settle their problems until we have settled hers. 
 Every question, territorial, racial, commercial, connected 
 with the various countries now at war, turns sooner or 
 later on the supreme question, what about Germany? We 
 must try at the outset, therefore, to get a clear idea of 
 what we wish to accomplish with regard to our arch antago- 
 nist. As regards the war we have answered the question 
 with fortunate positiveness. " Unconditional surrender " 
 is the plain demand of the American people. " War to the 
 end, to the very end of the end," is the stem declaration 
 with which the powerful Clemenceau voices the undoubted 
 determination of all the Allies. If there have been mo- 
 ments when this determination seemed to be called in ques- 
 tion, they have but given opportunity for its reaffirmation 
 by statesmen and peoples. We are determined to see it 
 through, to make the power that sought the decision of force, 
 accept the decision of force, " force without stint or limit." 
 But what then ? For as regards our present inquiry, this 
 " end of the end " is but a beginning, and our war formula 
 
 carries us no farther. It is true that we hear suggestions 
 
 143 
 
144 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 about wiping Germany off the map, and Germany is doing 
 much, and ever more and more, to reconcile us to some such 
 procedure. But what does this wiping off the map mean? 
 Does it mean the annihilation of the German race, or their 
 expulsion from their land, or even the carving up of their 
 country and its distribution among neighboring nations ? 
 It is plain that we have neither the temper nor the oppor- 
 tunity for any of these things. Nobody wants German 
 exiles or German territory. All such proposals are there- 
 fore mere expressions of war passion which contribute noth- 
 ing to the solution of our problem. Whatever our senti- 
 ment toward Germany, we can not get away from the fact 
 that there is to be a Germany after the war, a Germany 
 that we must live with and that can make us an infinity of 
 trouble, no matter how badly she is beaten now. The problem 
 of adjustment will be almost inconceivably difficult at best. 
 It will help us little to get Germany where we can dictate 
 terms to her if we do not know what terms we wish to dic- 
 tate. What then should be the position of the German peo- 
 ple in the future community of nations ? 
 
 The writer, for one, is utterly opposed to any policy of 
 soft heartedness or leniency toward the German nation. 
 The world can not for a moment tolerate its pretensions or 
 its temper, and any harshness that may be required to com- 
 pel their abandonment is a harshness which we must be 
 prepared to exercise. Despite our wartime fulminations, 
 it is a matter for grave concern whether at the critical mo- 
 ment we can be hard enough for the hard task. The Allied 
 nations are not brutal, not even under German provocation. 
 If they prove equal to the difficult task before them, it will 
 be because that task presents itself as reasonable and neces- 
 sary to their minds. What must that task be ? 
 
 There are two ways of answering this question. The 
 first we may call retrospective. It recalls Germany's deeds 
 
GERMAItTT 145 
 
 in recent years and attempts to estimate her moral guilt 
 with, a view to retributive action. The account is appalling 
 and any attempt to calculate her debt overwhelms the mind 
 and swamps all kindlier feelings in a tempest of moral indig- 
 nation. It is hardly to be doubted that the sober verdict of 
 history and ultimately of the German people itself, will be 
 that this war, in its unprovoked aggression and its unpar- 
 alleled brutality, is the most criminal in history. With these 
 facts in mind it is easy to conclude that no penalty is too 
 severe for Germany's guilt, and no status too low for her in 
 the future family of nations. But unfortunately such a con- 
 clusion brings us to no practical solution of our problem. 
 Eetributive justice calls for a payment that would condemn 
 the German people to perpetual bondage, a relation impossible 
 for us, even if thinkable for them. The debt as thus assessed 
 leaves her hopelessly bankrupt. As in the case of other bank- 
 rupts, some fraction of the debt must be accepted in lieu 
 of full payment. What shall that fraction be ? 
 
 There is but one practicable way of settling bankrupt 
 accounts, the way adopted by all rational societies. That 
 is to let the past be past, to cancel the hopeless debt, and 
 let the bankrupt whom we can not get rid of, start again 
 in life under such restrictions as may be required for the 
 safety of his fellows. In a word, protection of the com- 
 munity of nations rather than retribution must be the guid- 
 ing principle in our settlement. We are fighting to make 
 the world a decent place to live in, and it is much to be de- 
 sired that we direct our efforts solely to that end. 
 
 Why are we in this war ? ]N'ot because Germany sank the 
 Lusitania, or butchered babies, or attacked neutral com- 
 merce, or otherwise violated international law. '^oi that 
 there is the least doubt about her having done these things, 
 or about our judgment of them. But whatever justification 
 these facts give to the war, they are not the issue, — the 
 
146 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 great issue, — in the struggle. That issue is between two 
 principles of organization, the principles of freedom and 
 coercion. Both sides look forward to a united humanity. 
 The one side believes that that union must be effected under 
 the leadership, the direction, and the authority of a single 
 superior people, a people that has more energy', more mental 
 power, and more organizing ability than any other and that 
 is therefore privileged, — nay, divinely commanded, — to im- 
 pose its will and its wisdom upon the world's less favored 
 peoples. 
 
 It is perfectly consonant with this doctrine that this people 
 recognizes the superior right, the divine authority, of a 
 single individual or a limited class among themselves, but 
 that of itself does not concern us who are outsiders to this 
 relation. We have paid altogether too much attention to 
 this figure in shining armor who rather symbolizes than em- 
 bodies the principle at issue. It will be the gravest of mis- 
 takes if we challenge the right of the German people to 
 have such leadership and such organization as they choose, 
 or question the actuality of their choice, even though we be- 
 lieve their choice has a certain bearing upon our problem. 
 The result of such a choice can hardly be other than to 
 rally German patriotism to the support of the system thus 
 attacked, and to fix upon the free institutions whose tri- 
 umph we desire, the stigma of foreign intervention. Nor can 
 we regard lightly the possibility that the destruction of so- 
 cial institutions by outside agencies before the people has 
 become matured to the change carries with it the menace 
 of bloody revolution and social disintegration. The ex- 
 ample of Russia is before us, and the responsibility for 
 German plotting in this desolating terror is not the least of 
 the counts in Germany's terrible indictment. Our pres- 
 sure would doubtless be less clandestine, but if really exer- 
 cised against the defacto institutions of a neighbor state, we 
 
GEEMANY 147 
 
 can hardly fail to incur like odium and with greater jus- 
 tice, for it would be for us a violation of our most cher- 
 ished principle. 
 
 No, ours is no feud with domestic autocracy. It is a 
 larger issue. It is what we may call the race autocracy of 
 the German people, their belief in the superiority of a 
 single race, and in the right of that race by reason of its 
 superiority, not merely to lead, but to dominate all other 
 races. When the leaders of German industry, the great 
 men who do things in Germany, some time ago memorialized 
 their government regarding the necessary objectives of the 
 war, they specified numerous territories which must be 
 annexed, — Poland, Courland, Belgium, a part of France, 
 etc., — and then added that these territories must never, on 
 any account, be allowed a voice in determining the destiny 
 of the German Empire. In other words Germany must 
 subject to her authority large populations of advanced civi- 
 lization, but must not allow them, either now or at any 
 future time, to share the privileges that belonged exclusively 
 to the superior German people. 
 
 It matters very little how much Germany intended to 
 take as the result of the present war. It has suited her 
 purpose, at various stages of the conflict, to disclaim in larger 
 or lesser measure, the vast objectives attributed to her by 
 her critics and by her authoritative spokesmen. This is 
 small matter. In these great schemes of world conquest, as 
 in the offensive of a single campaign, the prudent commander 
 sternly limits the objectives which are then and there to be 
 attained. Germany did not mean to conquer the world now. 
 She could not have organized such enormous gains without 
 a vast development of resources and personnel. It is even 
 possible as the Eaiser has stoutly affirmed, that he had never 
 planned world dominion. Sufficient unto the day is the evil 
 thereof. General Foch is 'probably not yet planning his 
 
148 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 entry into Berlin.^ But it is perfectly plain that if Germany 
 had realized her limited objectives in the present war, she 
 would not have stopped permanently with them, but new 
 designs would have followed to be attained at her convenience. 
 All discussion of the extent of her proposed present aggres- 
 sion is beside the mark. The question is as to the principle 
 on which she was proceeding. And when we learn that she 
 was already parceling out Australia among her supporters, 
 we may assume that even her immediate objectives were not 
 over modest. 
 
 It is but fair to recognize that there is an enormous 
 amount of historic precedent for Germany's plan. Most 
 of the organization of mankind has hitherto been of this 
 kind. She can cite the awe inspiring example of Rome 
 in her favor. Nor can it be doubted that there is some 
 ground for her assumption of superiority. Without con- 
 ceding for a moment her claim to a unique position among 
 the races of the world, we must recognize her wonderful 
 power of organization, her integrity of administration, her 
 energy in the development of natural resources, her genius 
 for applied science, all as entitling her to a very high place 
 among civilized peoples. She is no doubt in a position to 
 confer very great blessings, as regards these important mat- 
 ters, upon some of the less developed peoples to the east and 
 south over which she has sought to extend her authority. All 
 this and more we may admit, but the one great issue re- 
 mains. She believes in the right of a superior race to dom- 
 inate the rest of the world by force and to make other peoples 
 its servants in perpetuity.^ 
 
 1 Written about October first. 
 
 2 The writer has quoted elsewhere the allusion by Professor Rudolph 
 Huch to the British and French as races which are '* incapable of attain 
 ing a high humanity, incapable of influencing the world. Such nations 
 are destined to hew wood and draw water for the dominant nations. 
 If they can not fill this inferior office they must perish." "America 
 Among the Nations," p. 357. 
 
GEKMANY 149 
 
 And what do we, the Allies, stand for ? Or, to make our 
 inquiry a little more concrete, since the Anglo-Saxons are 
 the most numerous and prominent of Germany's antagonists, 
 and since both writer and readers of these pages are Anglo- 
 Saxons, let us ask what the Anglo-Saxons stand for. We 
 have little reason to fear that our French or other Allies will 
 seriously dissent from our conclusion. 
 
 The slogan, as we know, is liberty. It is liberty bonds 
 that we are buying and liberty bread that we are eating. 
 The French motto consecrated by the Eevolution and now in- 
 scribed on every public building in France, is Liberty, 
 Equality, Fraternity. This may seem more comprehensive, 
 but it is in fact only a more elaborate statement of the great 
 Anglo-Saxon principle which in practice works out into the 
 same trinity. Not that the Anglo-Saxon believes at all in 
 the mere removal of restraint. He has found by sad ex- 
 perience that this does not result in liberty but in disorder 
 and in all manner of interference with the legitimate func- 
 tions of life. If there is anything that the Anglo-Saxon 
 hates, it is disorder, and he knows that order does not result 
 spontaneously from the removal of restraints, but from a 
 carefully adjusted balance between restraint and privilege. 
 The Anglo-Saxons are a strong governing race. They have 
 never hesitated to lay a heavy hand on disturbers of the peace, 
 whether individuals or nations. 
 
 Nor do the Anglo-Saxons cherish the foolish notion that 
 the races of men are equal. They have lived too much in 
 contact with all sorts and conditions of men not to know 
 that races like individuals, whatever they were meant to be 
 or may sometime become, are at present in their capacity 
 for government or anything else, very far from equal. And 
 they believe quite as much as the Germans in their own su- 
 periority as a race. It would be the sheerest affectation not 
 to do so. They have measured themselves with every race 
 
150 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 in the world in almost every capacity, and without settling 
 the question of absolute rank, they have the evidence of 
 their senses that many of the races of men are immensely 
 their inferiors. There is no mawkish self disparagement in 
 their bearing toward these peoples. Such of them as are 
 unable to maintain the decencies of national life, they do 
 not hesitate to constrain, as need may require, in the inter- 
 est of that order which they believe to be necessary to the 
 peace of the world, even compelling them in appropriate 
 connections to recognize the superiority which is the war- 
 rant of their authority. The Indian sentinel that stands 
 guard at so many of Britain's doorways, must present arms 
 whenever the white man passes. That is not a gratuitous 
 obeisance, but the very means best suited to the accomplish- 
 ment of the white man's necessary task. All of this is but a 
 way of saying that the Anglo-Saxons are a practical people. 
 They do not believe in liberty or anything else beyond the 
 point where experience proves it to be serviceable to human 
 interests. 
 
 But in this very practical way and within these proven 
 limits the Anglo-Saxons do believe in liberty and equality 
 as the Germans do not. Though both would assert their be- 
 lief in liberty within practical limits, their judgment of what 
 those practical limits are is so different that it works out in 
 a diametrically opposed political policy and an opposite view 
 of how the unity of mankind is to be brought about. 
 
 This belief in liberty and equality appears in two ways. 
 Eirst, the Anglo-Saxons recognize the civilized nations as 
 equals. This does not mean that they think Italians, Span- 
 iards, French, and English are equal in all respects, but they 
 are alike in this that they have all learned to maintain or- 
 der and live decently with other nations. That is the test 
 of competent nationhood. Possibly some one of these peo- 
 ples is more competent to manage national interests than 
 
GERMANY 151 
 
 the others, but that does not seem to the Anglo-Saxon a 
 reason why that people should seize their territories and as- 
 sume the management of their affairs.^ Such a notion has 
 become distasteful to them, just as it becomes distasteful to 
 well bred men, even if hungry, to grab food from one an- 
 other's plates or raid one another's larders. It is the live- 
 and-let-live temper, the sportsmanship and good breeding 
 of the civilized nations. 
 
 But there is a second development of this temper, this 
 instinct of liberty and equality which is more remarkable. 
 Britain has gotten together an extraordinary and heterogene- 
 ous aggregate of peoples all of whom have at one time 
 recognized her authority. Some were originally colonies 
 peopled by emigrants from her own. race. Others were 
 colonies acquired by conquest from other strong races which 
 became involved in conflict with Britain. Still others were 
 backward peoples that were unable of themselves to provide 
 the peace and order required for nationhood and so passed 
 into trusteeship. This great aggregate was formed in defer- 
 ence to no special theory and was at first subjected to author- 
 ity of quite the traditional kind. 
 
 But as the strenuous period of consolidation passed, the 
 Anglo-Saxon instinct showed itself. Little by little Britain 
 has relaxed her hold upon the more capable parts of this 
 vast domain, trusting only to the spirit of friendliness and 
 fair play to maintain the necessary accord. Canada, Aus- 
 tralia, and New Zealand, being obviously competent to man- 
 
 iln the early days of the war when Germany was carrying on a 
 propaganda in neutral countries, her emissary to Sweden, in a public 
 address in Stockholm, developed the familiar German thesis that the 
 superior organizing ability of the German people gave them a right to 
 organize the world. An auditor interrupted him with the question 
 whether that gave Germany the right to organize Sweden. With per- 
 fect candour and characteristic German tact, he is said to have replied 
 that he thought it did. Can we imagine an Anglo-Saxon saying, or 
 even thinking, such a thing? 
 
152 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 age their own affairs and maintain peace and order within 
 their borders, and under the bonds of good breeding to live 
 at peace with one another, it became repugnant to Anglo- 
 Saxon instincts to exercise authority over them. With the 
 Boers whose unwilling pledge to keep the peace was less 
 reassuring, the case was not so clear, but the aversion of the 
 Anglo-Saxons to holding competent peoples in tutelage made 
 the subjection of South Africa impossible. India and Egypt 
 are not able as yet to guarantee the essentials of peace and 
 order, but they are being hurried on toward self management. 
 Hence comes the paradox of British development, that while 
 Britain has been consolidating a quarter of the world under 
 her control, she has at the same time been relaxing her con- 
 trol and leaving these peoples free again, so that now they 
 take their place, to the full measure of their capacity, along- 
 side of France, Italy, and the rest, nations that have never 
 known Britain's control, as free peoples, managing their 
 own affairs and at liberty to do anything they choose except 
 injure one another. 
 
 This is race democracy, the recognition of liberty and 
 equality as the working basis of nations in their relations to 
 one another and the ultimate principle of human unity. It 
 is a thing that can not exist until nations learn good breed- 
 ing, that is, until they learn to dislike lording it over other 
 nations that are able to manage their own affairs and keep 
 the public peace. 
 
 The Germans have noticed this relaxing of British con- 
 trol and have quite misunderstood it. They can not under- 
 stand how a strong race should willingly relinquish control 
 over other races. They have often extolled the excellence of 
 British colonial administration, but have noted this relaxa- 
 tion of authority as a weakness. This and the consequent 
 slight development of British military power, are the grounds 
 for the oft repeated charge that the British are a decadent 
 
GERMAI^Y 153 
 
 race. This aversion to the exercise of authority has seemed 
 to them nothing less than a degeneration of their moral 
 fiber. Heinrich von Treitschke, the most representative of 
 German writers on these subjects, declared that the British 
 Empire was a sham which would fall to pieces at a touch, 
 all because it lacked that overlordship which seems to the 
 German the only possible way of uniting men. 
 
 The other nations now associated with Britain have less 
 extensive but similar records. Our own history is a con- 
 spicuous example of the Anglo-Saxon principle. Our sev- 
 eral states, though more dependent upon the Federal Gov- 
 ernment since the great nation-wide interests of railroads 
 and the like have developed such proportions, are none the 
 less free, and there is little disposition to curtail their free- 
 dom. We put an end to Spanish rule in Cuba, but we 
 refused to establish our own in its stead, as the Germans 
 were sure we would do. In our trusteeship of the Philip- 
 pines we have rivaled Britain's liberality to the Boers and 
 with even less guaranty. The record of France is hardly 
 less liberal, though perhaps less judicious and successful in 
 certain cases. 
 
 It may be noted in passing that the nations that have at- 
 tained to this race democracy have, with practical unanimity, 
 adopted the democratic principle in the management of their 
 home affairs. They do not recognize any authority as di- 
 vinely established over them, but establish their own author- 
 ity and the rules for its exercise. This, of course, is quite 
 natural, for the spirit that recognizes liberty and equality 
 among competent nations, would naturally recognize liberty 
 and equality among the men of their own nation. But we 
 must not confound the one democracy with the other. Above 
 all we must not assume that the mere adoption of demo- 
 cratic forms of government by the German people, especially 
 if done under pressure or in times of great national distress. 
 
154 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 would insure the spirit of live-and-let-live in the larger rela- 
 tion between the nations.^ The matter goes very much 
 deeper. We are dealing with the character of a race, or 
 more exactly, with a certain stage in the development of a 
 race that has not yet become sensitive to the higher forces 
 that regulate the relations between men and nations. 
 
 One more fact must be noted before we are ready to 
 draw our conclusion. Eace autocracy and race democracy 
 can not permanently get along in the world together. It 
 is hard for those who are democratically minded to realize 
 this. Why, it may be asked, should we not keep our way 
 and let Germany keep hers until she is tired of it ? Why 
 must we fight her because she lacks good breeding? The 
 answer is that she insists upon fighting us, and that quite 
 consistently. She believes that the superior race, — which 
 is of course her own, — not only may but must establish 
 its authority over all the rest. As it is her duty to confer 
 this higher organization upon a stubborn and misguided 
 world, she can not consistently rest from her labors until 
 her task is accomplished. There is no live-and-let-live in 
 the creed of autocracy. 
 
 This, then, is that hated thing that we must put out of 
 the world, race autocracy, the arrogant assertion of race 
 superiority and the assumption that race superiority carries 
 with it the right and the duty to subjugate and control 
 all other races. This is what we have called militarism, a 
 name which suggests rather one of its outer manifestations 
 than its inner spirit. That spirit has been just as manifest 
 in German industrial aggression as in recent military cam- 
 paigns. It is this that we have declared niust be destroyed. 
 
 1 This seems to be exactly what is now happening. The morning 
 paper announces: "The Germans are hastening their constitutional 
 and electoral reforms in the hope of presenting a government with 
 which the United States and the Allies will deal in restoring permanent 
 peace." Such a structure would be built upon sand. 
 
GERMANY 155 
 
 It is an exceedingly diflBcult thing to accomplish, for this 
 militarism or race autocracy is not so much a thing as the 
 absence of a thing, the absence of good breeding, of the sen- 
 sitiveness to others' feelings and the s\Tnpathy for others' 
 ideals which makes us averse to coercing those who have 
 learned the art of decent living. We must trust to the slow 
 influences of peace to develop this restraining instinct. 
 Meanwhile we must repress this pious hoodliunism as best 
 we may, and in our settlement take stem measures to " stop 
 this swashbuckling through the streets of Europe," as Lloyd 
 George has so admirably called it. We must not hesitate at 
 any measure necessary to that end. 
 
 Just what practical measures does this require of us? 
 This above all else. German auihority over every race or 
 people other than their own, must cease} If the Germans 
 wish to be governed in the German way, we shall make a great 
 mistake to interfere, but knowing as we do that Germany 
 believes in dominating other peoples, and that without limit, 
 with no intention ever to make them free or self sufficient, it 
 is the plainest of duties to ourselves, to the principle that we 
 stand for, and to the peoples that are helplessly concerned, 
 to see that our settlement does not sanction at any point or in 
 any degree the triumph of this German principle. 
 
 Do we realize what this means ? It means that when we 
 release Germany from the grip of our armies, there must be 
 no German dependencies, no alien provinces, no overshadow- 
 ing alliances, no strangling agreements. Germany must be 
 nothing but Germany, and that limited to those peoples that 
 unmistakably choose to cast in their lot with her. For the 
 
 1 Recent reports of German barbarities in the administration of the 
 African colonies, — barbarities for which even the present war had not 
 prepared us, — have added emphasis to this conclusion, if emphasis 
 were needed. It can not be too strongly insisted, however, that this is 
 not the issue. If Germany's treatment of her wards had been free from 
 cruelty, it would still be open to the graver condemnation here noted 
 of condemning them to perpetual servitude. 
 
156 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 trusteeship of backward peoples, the guidance of weaker 
 allies, and the exploitation of others' territories her avowed 
 principle of political organization as yet disqualifies her. 
 
 There is another aspect of the case which is more imme- 
 diately our o\vn. Germany is situated between the two 
 greatest peoples in the world. On the one side is the Slav 
 with territories forty times the size of Germany, and on 
 the other side the Anglo-Saxon with territories seventy times 
 that of Germany. Wedged in between these two mighty 
 races, Germany fears extinction, politically from the one, 
 culturally from the other. Hence the frantic effort to be- 
 come also a great empire by the annexation of territories at 
 hand and overseas, the seizure of capital, the acquisition of 
 natural resources, and the conquest of world markets and 
 commercial privileges. Aside, therefore, from her divinely 
 appointed mission of world organizer, Germany has a very 
 concrete and local reason for counterbalancing her huge riv- 
 als by a prompt and strenuous expansion. Whatever the 
 legitimacy of such an expansion in the abstract, a study of 
 the concrete situation shows it to be impossible. There are 
 no more colonies to annex and no suitable neighbor lands to 
 assimilate. The only alternative, and one which Germany 
 clearly sees and frankly accepts, is to destroy the British 
 Empire to get materials to build her own. Germany doubt- 
 less argues that turn about is fair play in the highly gratify- 
 ing occupation of empire building, but the British Empire 
 and the Anglo-Saxon race w^hose future is thus menaced, can 
 hardly so regard it. More cogently, the world whose peo- 
 ples are concerned primarily for the maintenance of peace 
 and the privilege of undisturbed development, may take ex- 
 ception to this theory of rotation. For Germany makes no 
 charge that these trusts are mismanaged. Her plea is solely 
 that of privileged exploitation. 
 
 Both the empires that Germany menaces and the world at 
 
GERMAISTY 157 
 
 large whose interests quite transcend her claim to rotation of 
 privilege, must unite in telling Germany that her dream of 
 empire is gone forever. Present trusts are too firmly estab- 
 lished, present overseas colonies too far developed, and pres- 
 ent order too nearly assured to permit of violent readjust- 
 ment in her supposed interest. This is no wrong or in- 
 justice. Not every people can have imperial opportunity. 
 It is the exceptional privilege of the few whom coincidence 
 and the world's need requisition for the work. Austria has 
 no dependencies and expects none. Japan must shape her 
 plans with reference to other forms of national achievement. 
 Germany came too late and went at it wrong. She must 
 frankly recognize and we must recognize that her opportunity 
 has passed by. Our settlement must be based above all on 
 the recognition of this principle that there can he no im- 
 perial future for Germany. That is the stake for which she 
 threw the dice in this war, and she has thrown and lost. 
 Any lingering notion that some measure of imperial privi- 
 lege, some portion of imperial domain, are hers by right 
 on the score of nationhood, a right to be conceded now or 
 on the occasion of some future rehabilitation, is fatal to the 
 cause for which we have fought. 
 
 But if Germany may not wear the purple, she must still 
 be clothed and fed. We may as well recognize that it is a 
 sheer impossibility for the civilized world to keep the Ger- 
 man people permanently in repressive custody. We have 
 the strength to do it, but we have not the stomach to do it. 
 It is repugnant to the whole principle on which our lives 
 are ordered, to the whole philosophy on which our claim is 
 based. Germany must have opportunity, if not the oppor- 
 tunity that she seeks. The change of temper in the German 
 people on which the permanent solution of the problem must 
 depend, will not be brought about solely by repressive meas- 
 ures. No doubt a crushing defeat will have a powerful 
 
158 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 effect in diminishing their arrogance and dampening their 
 world conquering ardor, but if we leave them nothing worth 
 doing except world conquest, that ardor will revive. Let us 
 stop and ask ourselves, what do we wish Germany to do? 
 Would we not have her devote herself to honest industry, 
 to the development of her natural resources and to the gen- 
 tle arts of civilization? If so, then we must see to it that 
 she has every opportunity, every inducement, to expend her 
 great energies along these lines. !No churlish policy of hit- 
 ting Germany wherever she shows herself will accomplish our 
 purpose. If we want her to be decent, we must give her 
 the privilege of being so. 
 
 It must be recognized, however, that Germany has her- 
 self made this liberal policy exceedingly difficult. Quite 
 aside from the passions engendered by the war and the con- 
 sciousness of the monstrous wrongs that Germany has com- 
 mitted against civilization, her industrial and commercial 
 policy for many years preceding the war has had a predatory 
 character and an imperialist purpose which have stamped it 
 with illegitimacy. If we must suppress German imperial- 
 ism and encourage German industrialism, then we must be 
 quite sure that German industrialism is not German im- 
 perialism in disguise, as it has been in the past. We can 
 not open the world's markets to German industry and Ger- 
 man commerce if they continue to take orders from the Gen- 
 eral Staff. 
 
 It is difficult to see what guaranties the Allies can ask or 
 Germany can give as security against this danger. It is 
 probable that for a time precautions must be taken of an 
 onerous character, especially as regards the apportioning of 
 certain raw materials which are to be much in demand fol- 
 lowing the war. Difficult as these adjustments must be, 
 they are not beyond the wisdom of modern statesmanship if 
 the principle governing the settlement is kept clearly in mind. 
 
GERMANY 159 
 
 "We want Germany to be transformed from a bullying mili- 
 tary power into a constructive industrial nation. We must 
 not block the road to that transformation. Any notion that 
 the world can prosper by the suppression of Germany's indus- 
 trial competition and by the manacling of Germany's great 
 power of world service is a profound mistake. Our busi- 
 ness men know, if the rest of us do not, that the German 
 market is one that they can not afford to lose. It is the glory 
 of the Anglo-Saxon to have learned, as he has pushed his 
 trade among the remotest peoples, that these peoples can be 
 profitable to him only as he makes them rich. That is the 
 lesson of British trade in India and in Eg}^pt. Can we 
 have the steadiness of vision to perceive, in these passionate 
 times, that the principle is of universal application ? 
 
 Undoubtedly the suggestion that Germany desist from her 
 dreams of empire and become an honest industrial nation 
 like " the nation of shopkeepers " that she has so often 
 mocked, will be rejected with scorn by certain elements which 
 have been dominant in German higher circles in recent years. 
 There is none the less reason to believe that Germany may 
 reconcile herself to the now imwelcome alternative. The 
 case of Holland is closely analogous, though on a smaller 
 scale. Holland once was among the foremost of the great 
 imperial powers. She lost her primacy in conflict with a 
 rival that was at that time far less considerate than those with 
 which Germany now has to deal. It is doubtful, however, 
 if Holland now regrets her loss of empire and its burden- 
 some responsibilities. Doubtless she feels keenly her help- 
 lessness in the presence of the great swashbuckler, but she 
 probably does not envy him his role. It is not beyond hope 
 that Germany should some day come to think and to feel 
 in the same way. When that time comes she will find her- 
 self quite automatically one of the group of free, world serv- 
 ing nations, sharing to the full the privileges which they 
 
160 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 are at present forced to deny her. For in the end, it is the 
 free, world serving nations who will guard the backward 
 peoples and fill the empty places and share the earth's in- 
 crease. Whoever performs these tasks of empire will per- 
 form them at the bidding of the free nations and to them 
 will render account. 
 
 In the following chapters we shall have occasion to take 
 up the case of the several territories, adjacent and overseas, 
 and the problems of international interests and relations 
 which call for special consideration under the principles 
 herein set forth. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 BELGIUM 
 
 Among the victims of German aggression, Belgium unques- 
 tionably claims first attention. Uer complete innocence of 
 any part in provoking the war, her helplessness, her claim 
 to German protection by virtue of treaty guaranty, her heroic 
 resistance, and finally, her fearful sufferings, have made her 
 the sacrificial offering for the world and won for her the 
 world's compassion. It is hardly necessary to recall the 
 treaty agreement of 1838 by which Prussia, France, and 
 Britain pledged themselves to guarantee the independence 
 of the little nation, pledging her, meanwhile, to form no 
 alliances and to refrain from other usual precautions against 
 aggression. Nor need we recall the momentary candour 
 with which the German Chancellor recognized the wrong 
 of the invasion and pledged reparation, or the later disgrace- 
 ful attempt to prove the helpless little state the aggressor. 
 The main issue as regards Belgium has fortunately never been 
 doubtful. Whatever else may have been in doubt, the res- 
 toration of Belgium is a point regarding which the Allies 
 have never faltered. 
 
 For this restoration there are two reasons. The first and 
 sufficient reason is the mere fact that Belgium existed and 
 was minded to continue as she was. Failing some flagrant 
 wrong against the peace of Europe, of which she has never 
 been guilty, it is fundamental to the principle of liberty and 
 equality which is the common faith of the Allies, that that 
 existence should continue. It is easy to see that Germany 
 wanted Belgium and that in a thoroughly peaceable Europe, 
 the closest possible relation between the two countries is to 
 
 161 
 
162 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 be expected and desired. But in view of the conclusion al- 
 ready reached that no extension of German territories is ad- 
 missible under present conditions, the re-establishment of 
 Belgian nationality follows as a matter of course. 
 
 But this argument is quite overshadowed in the present 
 instance by the fact that Belgium is strategic ground, the 
 one natural gateway between France and Germany as be- 
 tween Germany and Britain. Through this gateway have 
 poured the conquering or marauding hosts that from time im- 
 memorial have passed eastward or westward in the struggle 
 between the two great peoples that are separated by the 
 Bhine. Here too have landed the British armies like that 
 which conquered Napoleon at Waterloo, and from here as 
 from no other point an invasion of England might be un- 
 dertaken with hope of success. The strategic character of 
 Belgium was never so well illustrated as in the present war. 
 Everyone knows how the unexpected resistance of Belgium 
 held up the German advance for days and thus gave to Erance 
 the time to mobilize the troops that stopped the German ad- 
 vance at the Mame. Suppose Germany had held Belgium 
 and that her advance on that fateful first of August had 
 started from the western Belgian frontier ? It is as certain 
 as things human can be that the Germans would have occu- 
 pied Paris and Calais and that the whole result of the war 
 would have been different. So far as we can now foresee, 
 that must always be true. The possession of Belgium by 
 Germany would put both France and England in her power. 
 
 Conversely, though to a far less degree, the possession of 
 Belgium by England or France would give them a strong 
 position as regards Germany. It would advance their front 
 line and bring them that much nearer to the heart of Ger- 
 many, wherever that may be. But the advantage would be 
 inherently defensive rather than offensive. The Belgo-Ger- 
 man frontier is short and correspondingly easy for Germany 
 
BELGIUM 
 
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 N O Ji T H 
 
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 ^ 
 
 T 
 
 ,Zwclle , 
 
 Amsterdam^ 
 
 The Hague> 
 
 KOTKrdam 
 
 ^- 
 
 <V 
 
 SEA 
 
 ^ 
 
 Ss^.r^-''x/^^ 
 
 
 
 > Bouloene 
 
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 3 Antwerp /^^■>.<^k'{ ^> 
 
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 russels > ci 1/ 
 
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BELGIUM 165 
 
 to defend. Moreover there lies close behind it the immense 
 natural barrier of the Ehine which can be strengthened in- 
 definitely. The chief industrial centers of Germany, to 
 say nothing of her remotely located capital, all lie to the 
 east of this barrier. Germany's affectation of terror lest her 
 enemies should get possession of Belgimn need not be taken 
 very seriously. She did, indeed, greatly fear such a move on 
 their part, but only because it would checkmate her in her 
 long cherished plans of aggression. 
 
 The reasons, therefore, which led the three nations, in a 
 loyal endeavor to preserve the balance of power, to neutral- 
 ize Belgium and to pledge their support of her neutrality, 
 were very serious reasons and have lost none of their validity. 
 Belgium is a natural neutral ground, important to all and 
 a matter of life and death to England and France. Her 
 maintenance as a neutral nation is indispensable so long as 
 these three nations remain enemies, really or potentially, and 
 this they plainly must remain so long as Germany believes 
 herself divinely commissioned to control the destinies of 
 civilized men. 
 
 But what is involved in the restoration of Belgium ? First 
 of all the restoration of Belgian territory to the sovereignty 
 of its own people. As regards internal affairs this covers 
 the requirements, for the Belgian people are amply capable 
 of providing for the needs of civilized government. But as 
 regards their place in the family of nations, Belgium will be 
 as helpless as before. Her people are too few and her fron- 
 tiers too open to enable her to defend herself against her 
 powerful neighbors who can never be indifferent to her politi- 
 cal status. Will the restoration of Belgium automatically 
 restore the guaranties which have hitherto determined her 
 status ? Obviously not. For three powers, emerging from a 
 prolonged and bitter war as conquerors and conquered, to 
 assume a joint trusteeship would certainly be a dubious pro- 
 
166 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 ceeding, but when the very cause of conflict was the viola- 
 tion of this same trusteeship, to resume it would be absolutely 
 farcical. An orphan ward, in the care of three trustees, is 
 kidnapped by one of them, her person outraged and her 
 property squandered. When apprehended the miscreant 
 gives as his excuse that he but anticipated what he believed 
 to be the intended action of his co-trustees. He is com- 
 pelled to give up his victim and to make such restitution as 
 is possible. So far, so good. But how about the guardian- 
 ship ? Shall the kidnapper retain his position ? 
 
 The mere mention of restorin the joint guaranty of Bel- 
 gium reveals the incongruity, th\ impossibility of such a 
 proceeding. There is reason to believe that the original 
 tripartite agreement was made in good faith. Prussia had 
 at that time and for many years after, no imperialist aims 
 which menaced the independence of Belgium. If threat- 
 ened at all in the earlier years, it was by the jingoistic policy 
 of France under the second Empire. But following the Ger- 
 man victory of '70-'71 and more particularly following the 
 accession of William II, the temper and policy of Germany 
 gradually underwent a radical change. The policy of a 
 balauce of power gave way to that of German supremacy 
 which has been characterized in the preceding chapter. With 
 this new policy Germany inevitably became disloyal to the 
 spirit of her earlier guaranty, and its violation was only a 
 question of opportunity. That violation did not begin with 
 the crossing of the frontier on August first. Long before 
 that Germany had built her network of double tracked 
 strategic railways up to the Belgian frontier with their huge 
 terminals that no possible peace requirements could justify, 
 thus completely altering the physical situation. Meanwhile 
 she had long made it plain to France that the building of 
 strong defenses on the Franco-Belgian frontier would be re- 
 
BELGIUM 167 
 
 garded as a hostile act. It is plain that she had long marked 
 Belgium for her own. 
 
 With this plainly declared change of policy on Germany's 
 part, the compulsory renewal of her guaranty could not be 
 sincere, and an effort to secure it would be but an incite- 
 ment to hypocrisy. If the world entrusts the vital interests 
 involved in Belgian neutrality ever so little to German 
 guaranty, it will do so to its grave peril. 
 
 What then ? There is but one practical alternative. Ger- 
 many's railways have destroyed the neutrality of Belgium 
 and made it a spearhead on the German shaft pointed al- 
 ways toward the west. We can not destroy these railways. 
 The destruction of railways is a familiar incident of war, 
 but an impossible condition of peace. Any such crippling 
 of Germany in her legitimate peace interests would be justly 
 criticised as vandalistic and would rankle long in the hearts 
 of the German people. The German breach of neutrality is 
 permanent. The menace must be met in kind. Belgium is 
 to be reconstituted by the Allies. She must remain their 
 ally. They must be her permanent guaranty against Ger- 
 many, the only power from which she fears or has occa- 
 sion to fear aggression. And since in any future war she 
 is certain again to be the first to feel the blow, she must be 
 prepared to parry it. The narrow frontier between Belgium 
 and Germany must be the first line defense of Western 
 Europe against the German. Moreover Belgium must be 
 prepared to man these defenses. Whether the armament of 
 the future be much or little, Belgium must henceforth bear 
 her share. She must never again be disarmed and exposed 
 with naked breast to the enemy under the fiction of neu- 
 trality. It is a great change from a shielded neutral to a 
 frontier guard, but one imperiously dictated by the logic of 
 events. More exactly it is not a new situation, but a new 
 
168 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 recognition of a situation long existing and revealed by the 
 tragedy of the invasion. There is no occasion, as there cer- 
 tainly is no disposition, on the part of England and France 
 to interfere in the domestic affairs of the well managed little 
 kingdom, but in their one great international concern the 
 three powers are necessarily a unit, and to affect independence 
 or separate action would be merely disingenuous. Whether 
 the short frontier in question is the strategic one, the one 
 most capable of defense, is a question for experts to deter- 
 mine. If it is not it should be made so. No marked dif- 
 ference of race hinders the rectification. If Germany should 
 protest and seek the reason for the possible encroachment, she 
 should not have far to go to find it.^ 
 
 It will doubtless be urged here that Belgium should have 
 the benefit of international guaranty. Beyond a doubt, 
 but once more we must remind ourselves of what is meant 
 by guaranty. It is merely a pledge of all the nations in- 
 volved to use their force as needed to secure the end guar- 
 anteed. International guaranties are too often conceived as 
 substitutes for force. On the contrary they are always force, 
 actual or potential. And international force like national 
 force, has need of strong positions and efficient instruments. 
 If Germany sees that the frontier is open and that by a quick 
 move she can seize a dominating position, the mere pro- 
 nouncement of any number of nations will not deter her. By 
 all means let the nations of the civilized world guarantee 
 Belgian neutrality, but it will be a guarded frontier that 
 will enforce their guaranty. 
 
 But the worst of our problem is yet to come. The Allied 
 demand for " restoration, restitution, and guaranty " has be- 
 come associated in the public mind especially with Belgium. 
 We have considered briefly the question of restoration and 
 
 1 For the possibility of extending Belgian territory on the east eee 
 note at the end of Chapter XII. 
 
BELGIUM 169 
 
 guaranties. It remains for us to consider the question of 
 restitution. 
 
 The material losses sustained by Belgium in the destruc- 
 tion of property, the interruption of industry, and war con- 
 tributions are probably the heaviest in proportion to her re- 
 sources, of any of the belligerents. Even such occupied 
 countries as Serbia have suffered less in material wealth 
 since they possessed little except their soil. Belgium on the 
 contrary, being primarily an industrial state and the most 
 densely peopled in Europe, had accumulated vast wealth and 
 that in a form peculiarly subject to injury. Being almost 
 wholly in enemy possession and stiff necked in her opposition 
 to his purposes, she has felt the full force of his fury. By 
 common consent all the Allies, even those that, like France, 
 have suffered immense injury, concede that Belgium has a 
 preferred claim. Before examining the question how far 
 Germany may be expected to discharge this obligation it may 
 be well to call attention to one aspect of restitution that has 
 been too little discussed, namely restitution in kind. 
 
 The immense destruction which the war has wrought has 
 created a dearth in many lines, notably in many kinds of 
 mechanical and industrial appliances, which will be felt long 
 after the war is over. Thus, the writer inquired recently the 
 price of an automobile. The dealer mentioned a certain 
 sum, — the price fixed by the manufacturer, — but could not 
 fill an order. Pointing to a car that was passing he re- 
 m,arked : " If I had that car I could sell it for twenty per 
 cent, more than that. The price of the new car is fixed at 
 the factory, but on a used car I can set my own price, and 
 the demand is so great that I can get more than the price 
 of new." Obviously under such circumstances the owner of 
 a car would not feel indemnified for its loss by getting back 
 its cost. He wants his car because he needs it and can not 
 replace it. Ships furnish a well known example. Holland 
 
170 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 has refused to put ber ships at the disposal of the Allies, even 
 if fullj insured. She does not want the insurance. She 
 wants the ships ready to earn the enormous profits which will 
 come with peace. If the ships are lost, it will be years be- 
 fore she can replace them. 
 
 This is the situation of Belgium as regards much of the loot 
 that has been carried off by the invaders. Aside from works 
 of art and like objects which have been removed with Ger- 
 man thoroughness, a process in which certain persons of 
 exalted rank have distinguished themselves, and the return of 
 which should be enforced with pitiless rigor, Belgium has 
 been subject to another form of pillage for which there is 
 hardly a precedent. As has already been said, Belgium is 
 primarily an industrial state, and as such, one of Germany's 
 great competitors. When first occupied by Germany, there 
 was an obvious attempt to preserve the industrial plant, 
 and every inducement was offered to employers to resume 
 operations and continue to give the population employment. 
 Belgium was at that time regarded as a German province 
 and was protected in its industrial interests like any other 
 section of the Empire. But when later it became apparent 
 that Belgium could not be retained, the policy of the invader 
 changed. A systematic removal of all valuable machinery, 
 raw materials, and industrial movables of every sort was 
 imdertaken and Belgium was stripped bare. Doubtless the 
 intention is to destroy buildings and other immovables if 
 the evacuation actually takes place, the complete destruction 
 of Antwerp and Brussels being contemplated, it is said, in 
 that event. The object is, of course, to destroy Belgian com- 
 petition after the war. If Belgium will not work for Ger- 
 many, she shall not be allowed to work against her. 
 
 We are too apt to confine our thought to the money loss 
 involved in such a program. The time loss is here even 
 more important. We are so accustomed to having access to 
 
BELGIUM 171 
 
 a plethoric market where you can buy anything and in 
 any quantity if you have money enough, that a compounding 
 of injuries in terms of money is too readily accepted as 
 satisfactory. But after the war no such market will exist 
 for years to come. There will be no end of things, and 
 among them chiefly these great requisites of industrial recon- 
 struction, which will not be purchasable for love or money. 
 Germany is perfectly aware of this and is taking every pre- 
 caution that her factories shall be equipped and stocked ready 
 to start the moment peace is declared, while her victorious 
 rivals are confronted with the painful task of rebuilding. 
 Even if Belgium received an adequate money indemnity, 
 she would have to stand as a petitioner, — in part at least be- 
 fore German purveyors, — and wait their pleasure for the 
 necessary equipment. 
 
 The remedy in this case is obviously restitution in kind. 
 Not necessarily the identical machines, for their present 
 availability is doubtful, but equivalent articles from Ger- 
 man factories or German stocks sufficient to reinstate Belgian 
 industry in the shortest possible time. Both in purchasable 
 equipment and in raw materials, Belgium should be supplied 
 before Germany receives her allotment. Failing these pre- 
 cautions, Germany whose factories are essentially intact, will 
 make a rush for world markets from which Belgium will 
 long remain excluded, and into which she will later have to 
 force her way against an intrenched and determined enemy. 
 
 No doubt Germany will protest against this on all manner 
 of grounds, equity, humanity, and the like. Consistency is 
 not a German characteristic. But however inconsistent, such 
 pleas are likely to have their weight with the Allies, With 
 an unsubdued Germany we can deal sternly, but with a 
 beaten Germany there is danger that we shall be soft hearted. 
 It will perhaps be well for us at that time to recall that Ger- 
 many has pursued this policy of weakening her enemies in- 
 
172 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 dustrially with a view to their ultimate subjection, all with 
 a thoroughness that we hardly yet appreciate. Thus in the 
 famous Hindenburg retreat in the spring of 1917, not only 
 were buildings, railways, roads, and bridges utterly destroyed, 
 but fruit trees were sawed down or girdled and even the 
 soil, in some cases, treated with chemicals so as to destroy 
 its fertility. This was not spite but war, war projected far 
 beyond the present struggle into the days of peace, to prevent 
 the little savings of the French peasant, destroy the produc- 
 tivity of the soil, and lessen to as great an extent as possible, 
 the number of Frenchmen who should be born into the world. 
 The forces thus launched will, to a large extent, continue 
 after peace, — a war after the war. If it was our right and 
 our duty to combat German aggression in its military form, 
 it is equally our right and our duty to combat it in this half 
 military form whose consequences are equally to be feared. 
 The writer makes no plea for mere destructive retaliation. 
 It is to be hoped that no German factory will be destroyed 
 except as an incident to legitimate military operations. But 
 it is equally to be hoped that Germany will not be allowed to 
 profit by this deliberate spoliation of an industrial rival. 
 
 But no restitution in kind that is within Germany's power 
 can liquidate her debt to Belgium. For every article recov- 
 erable a score have been destroyed, not to speak of the markets 
 lost, the years of labor wasted, the lives sacrificed, the famil- 
 ies disrupted, the shame endured, injuries for which money 
 indemnification is a mockery. Even the direct property 
 losses which can be measurably expressed in terms of money, 
 attain a figure which, without our recent experiences, would 
 have seemed fabulous. The loss to industry during the 
 first year of the war, in buildings destroyed and machinery 
 destroyed or removed, is estimated at a billion dollars, while 
 agriculture lost in buildings, implements, and crops, seven 
 hundred and eighty millions more. Meanwhile war con- 
 
BELGIUM 173 
 
 tributions, systematically exacted throughout the period of 
 occupation, from cities, provinces, individuals, corporations, 
 from anything, in short, from which money might be ex- 
 torted, attain a staggering total for v^hich as yet no reliable 
 estimates are available. Meanwhile Belgium has borrowed 
 from the United States alone in the short space of eighteen 
 months, the sum of one hundred and fifty seven million 
 dollars to feed her starving people, while similar obligations 
 have been incurred toward other governments, — all this in 
 addition to some three hundred millions spent for like pur- 
 pose in charity. The direct property loss alone amounts to 
 several billions. 
 
 This, of course is but the beginning of injuries suffered. 
 German authorities state that in a single year there were a 
 hundred thousand convictions in Belgium by military 
 tribunal. We may safely assume that most of these were 
 incident to the invasion and that they constituted in the 
 aggregate merely a colossal injury to the Belgian people. 
 The nameless injuries unoflBcially inflicted and above all the 
 ruin of Belgian industry with its resulting demoralization 
 of the people swell the account beyond the limits of the im- 
 agination. 
 
 Any proposal that Germany should fully indemnify Bel- 
 gium for these losses breaks down from sheer, demonstrable 
 impossibility. To exact the full toll would be to sell her 
 land under the hammer and her people into bondage. There 
 is a limit to what Germany can do, and a much narrower 
 limit to what it is expedient to compel her to do. We must 
 beware of settling such a question in a spasm of moral in- 
 dignation. Not only would such a payment ruin Germany 
 utterly, but it would ruin Belgium. We have considered 
 elsewhere the difficulties in the way of such adjustments. 
 
 But impossible as it is thus to square the account, this is a 
 connection in which the conscience of the world simply will 
 
174 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 not be placated without a measure of reparation. Not only 
 have the Allies been a unit in demanding it from the first, 
 but German voices have been heard from time to time de- 
 manding reparation to Belgium in the interest of the na- 
 tional honor. Doubtless such voices are rare, but the fact 
 that they are heard at all from a people which could com- 
 placently hear from its prophet of world dominion the in- 
 junction to " leave to the conquered nothing but their eyes 
 to weep with " is an indication of the enormity of Germany's 
 crime in the eyes of all men. 
 
 Aside, therefore, from the restitution in kind which has 
 been urged, a reasonable, — that is to say, a practicable, — 
 indemnity may be — must be, — exacted. It would be well 
 that this should cover certain specific losses the nature of 
 which leaves least reason to fear a demoralizing reaction 
 upon the people. Such would be the payment of loans made 
 by the Allies which must otherwise become a burden upon 
 the Belgian taxpayer, the return of war contributions which 
 have been largely taken from the active industrial capital 
 of the country and again are largely represented at pres- 
 ent by loans for which tax payers are responsible, and the 
 restoration of buildings required for industrial purposes. 
 From Germany, too, might be secured the equipment or the 
 funds, one or both, for fortifying the eastern frontier against 
 her future aggression. Possibly the object lesson would 
 have its value. How much this indemnity can or should 
 be made, having regard always to the danger of general de- 
 moralization, it is impossible for the writer to form any idea. 
 There are other claimants to be heard, — none quite so de- 
 serving as Belgium, but still entitled to a hearing before 
 Belgiimi is fully recompensed. When the utmost has been 
 exacted that it is safe or even possible to demand, Belgium 
 will still be compelled to begin life anew under conditions 
 closely approximating to economic ruin, 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 FRANCE 
 
 The reasons which induced France to enter the war, or 
 more exactly, the reasons which induced Germany to at- 
 tack her, were many and varied. To the popular mind the 
 issue was, for France, the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and 
 for Germany its defense and retention. There can be no 
 question that this is a completely erroneous conception of 
 the situation. France had long since decided never to go 
 to war to recover Alsace-Lorraine and Germany knew that 
 the issue was dead unless she revived it. On the other hand, 
 France had prospered greatly in the field of colonial enter- 
 prise, and in company with Britain, by the simple fact of 
 anticipating Germany's tardy ambition, effectually blocked 
 the way to the realization of Germany's vast designs. More- 
 over France had accumulated, — thanks in part to Germany's 
 earlier indemnity exactions, — a huge capital, the power of 
 which Germany had more than once been taught to fear. 
 Germany, balked in her expansionist designs by French oc- 
 cupancy and by French finance, boldly determined to ap- 
 propriate both her colonies and her capital. The funda- 
 mental fact which we must not lose sight of is that it was 
 Germany that had the grievance and Germany that was the 
 aggressor. For France more than for any other of the great 
 powers, this is a war of defense. We need not rest this 
 conclusion on French assertions or on any estimate of French 
 character. It inhered in the situation. The claim of Ger- 
 many that Britain and France were the aggressors is pal- 
 pably absurd. They were the possessors and Germany the 
 dispossessed. They were creditor nations and Germany a 
 
 175 
 
176 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 debtor nation. A successful war would have given them 
 little thr.t they did not already possess, unless it be immun- 
 ity from the menace of German attack, while a successful 
 war for Germany would have won her an imperial domain 
 and an enormous loot. The nations that have much to lose 
 and little to gain by war, have given hostages to keep the 
 peace. Those who are familiar with recent European his- 
 tory will not forget that the French general election, held 
 but a few weeks before the outbreak of the present war, 
 returned a distinctly pacifist majority to Parliament and 
 virtually assured a policy of semi-disarmament, the peril of 
 which was averted only by the heroic extra-constitutional in- 
 sistence of President Poincare. The forcible recovery of 
 Alsace-Lorraine was certainly farthest from the thought of 
 this prosperous and pacific people. 
 
 But the war came and not only revived the old passion 
 but furnished new and compelling reasons for the recovery 
 of the lost provinces. If France could live at peace with 
 Germany, she could spare them, though not without loss. 
 If she must fight Germany, they were indispensable. What 
 then is the problem of Alsace-Lorraine ? 
 
 The population comes first to mind. To the novice, in- 
 deed, it is the only consideration. What is their race, their 
 nationality, their affiliation, their history? The answer to 
 these questions will illustrate the diflSculty of these easily 
 proposed ethnic solutions. 
 
 In race, these provinces have the normal border character 
 of a no-man's land. The predominant racial stock is neither 
 French nor German, but belongs to an earlier race. This, 
 however, counts for little, as we have seen. In language there 
 is much mixture. Alsace is and always has been predomi- 
 nantly German in speech, though French is spoken in certain 
 frontier districts. But this German is a most extraordinary 
 dialect, entirely unintelligible to one who understands only 
 
FEANCE 177 
 
 high German. In Lorraine a little less than half the terri- 
 tory is French. Taking the two provinces together, a little 
 less than one-tenth of the population are accounted as French 
 speaking and the area in which French predominates is not 
 much greater. 
 
 But these figures are most deceptive. In the first place 
 Germany easily manipulates these figures by recording as 
 German all who speak German, regardless of whether they 
 speak French also, a procedure of immense importance in a 
 border province where a knowledge of both languages is com- 
 mon. When we remember that throughout the period of 
 German occupation, the German language has been employed 
 in the schools to the exclusion of French, and that by the 
 above procedure Germany has succeeded in reducing her 
 Polish population to negligible proportions,^ we may assume 
 that these statistics hardly correspond to fact, or if they 
 do, the fact loses its usual racial significance. It is doubt- 
 less true, however, that the population is predominantly Ger- 
 man, and in Alsace almost wholly so, the more so as France 
 during her control of these territories, made no effort to 
 force the French language upon them. 
 
 But whatever the proportion, the dividing line loses most 
 of its significance from the fact that it is not a line at all. 
 Throughout practically the entire area the two languages 
 are intermingled, especially in Lorraine. There is very lit- 
 tle advantage in assigning an area of mixed speech to one 
 side or the other. 
 
 A farther fact which greatly modifies the significance of 
 these data is the enormous displacement of population which 
 followed German occupation and which would undoubtedly 
 attend another transfer. When Germany took possession 
 she substituted for the tolerant policy of France, a program 
 of strenuous Germanization. This and other features of 
 
 1 Her stock assertion now is that " there is no German Poland." 
 
178 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 German rule were displeasing to the population, Germanic 
 though it was, and all who could feasibly leave the country, 
 did so. The nearby French city of Nancy promptly received 
 an addition of a third to its population. It was one of the 
 suggestive results of the war that the German dialect of 
 Alsace dominated whole quarters of this French city be- 
 cause the Alsatians objected to being Germanized. Alto- 
 gether it is claimed that a full quarter of the population 
 left the provinces, despite the great industrial development 
 which offered them such inducements to remain. Their 
 places were of course taken by German immigrants. During 
 the present war, as the possibility of reference of the ques- 
 tion to popular vote has forced itself upon German atten- 
 tion, this displacement of population is said to have been 
 systematically continued, unsympathetic proprietors being 
 expropriated and their holdings disposed of to loyal Ger- 
 mans. Germany probably has little reason to fear the re- 
 sults of a plebiscite. All this raises the question, however, as 
 to the validity of such a plebiscite, even if the principle were 
 conceded. If we are to consult the wishes of the Alsatians, 
 it is pertinent to inquire, who are the Alsatians ? Have the 
 exiles no rights? Have the immigrants full rights, espe- 
 cially those so lately rushed in to stuff the ballot box ? It is 
 impossible to give a sweeping answer either way. The ex- 
 iles are hopelessly lost; the immigrants for the most part 
 there to stay. There is nothing to do but accept the situa- 
 tion. Yet Germany would ask nothing better in the case of 
 Belgium or the Baltic Provinces than to refer their case to 
 a vote if she is given the privilege of preliminary seizure and 
 forty years of forcible preparation.^ 
 
 1 It is well to recall that the dominant Pan-German party demand not 
 only the annexation of Belgium, but the expropriation and German 
 ownership of its essential industries. The very monstrousness of Ger- 
 man demands serves in no small degree to camouflage them from their 
 victims. The decent world has simply lost the power to believe things 
 
FKANCE 179 
 
 To the claim that Alsace-Lorraine is historically a part 
 of France, Germany replies that it is also historically a part 
 of Germany, and that that connection is older and of longer 
 standing. This is true, especially as regards Alsace, which 
 belonged to Germany from 925 to 1681, or between seven and 
 eight centuries, while the connection with France was only 
 from 1681 to 1871 or less than two hundred years. But the 
 German is careful not to recall what we are all too prone to 
 forget, namely, that there was no Germany at that time. 
 There was a German people existing in the shape of numer- 
 ous petty states of which Alsace was one, but there was no 
 German nation and consequently no conscious German na- 
 tionality. Alsace during these early centuries developed 
 a nationality of her own, but no other. Not till she became 
 a part of France in 1681 did she have any chance to develop 
 the sentiment of allegiance to a great modern nation. She 
 came to France, therefore, racially but not politically, Ger- 
 man. It is a surprising attestation of the liberality of 
 French character, that though her government was at that 
 time wholly autocratic, the policy adopted toward the new 
 province was one of extreme tolerance and moderation. It 
 was completely successful, with the curious result that Alsace 
 became as loyal as any French province, while retaining its 
 essentially German character, thus hopelessly complicating 
 the ethnic-political problem. We have seen that race at the 
 best is not a sufficient determinant of nationality. In such 
 
 that Germany coolly professes. Yet Germany has been doing these 
 things for decades. One reason why " there is no German Poland " is 
 that Germany has long been expropriating the intractable Poles Many 
 years ago when the writer was a student in the University of Berlin, a 
 distinguished professor created a sensation there bj' denouncing this 
 policy of forcible displacement as too drastic. He urged that Germany 
 had only to leave the Pole without education, save of a rudimentary 
 character, and the better-educated German would soon displace him by 
 natural means. This amazinja: proposition in governmental circles 
 was regarded as almost treasonably lenient, and the professor was for 
 a time in marked disfavor. 
 
180 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 a confused and contradictory form as this it becomes well- 
 nigh negligible. 
 
 Turning to the physical or strategic problem, the data are 
 still conflicting. Lorraine is physically a part of France, 
 though the dividing line is not sharp. There is no serrated 
 ridge or commanding stream plainly destined by nature as a 
 boundary, — unless we regard the Rhine as such, which has 
 its difficulties. The whole district is rather the barrier, 
 which of course makes it debatable ground. Turning far- 
 ther south, there are two natural and rather pronounced par- 
 allel barriers, the Rhine and the Vosges M,ountains with a 
 broad valley between them. This valley is Alsace and the 
 mountains or the river became the international boundary 
 according as the one people or the other proved the stronger. 
 On the whole the mountains have had the advantage, as ia 
 indicated by the fact that during the period of linguistic de- 
 termination, German was established in the valley. But 
 during the period of political determination, France had 
 the advantage, and established, as we have seen, her na- 
 tionality in the valley. It is still something of a draw 
 game, but with this reflection that the whole territory is a 
 region of tremendous strength, giving its possessor a power 
 of offense or defense which the other can not match. Those 
 concerned for the world's peace may well be interested in 
 the character and designs of the holder. 
 
 We come finally to the most important consideration of all, 
 the natural resources of the district. These consist chiefly 
 of that great determinant of national destiny, iron, together 
 with a large deposit of potash of which Germany has otherwise 
 a practical monopoly. We here approach what is beyond 
 question the most important problem of the entire peace set- 
 tlement. It is a sad fact that the supreme factor in the deter- 
 mination of national destinies is one of which the American 
 people in its discussion of this question, has seemed as yet 
 
,— C- ...■■JIT. - ■ 
 
 Longitude Suti* 
 
 netherLand^K'^ 
 
 ANfWERP/^ 
 
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 '^aiserslautern I j 
 
 ^P PALATIN|ATr 
 
 (To Bavaria.) f 
 irbruckeii 
 
 Heidelberg < 
 
 -ALSACE-LORRAINE 
 
 AND THE ^-\ ^Mfi^ 
 
 RHINE PROVINCE /*" X. 
 
 , SCALE OF MILES fRANCHE 
 
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FRANCE 183 
 
 almost wholly unconscious. It is a familiar truth that in war 
 the victory always inclines to the side that has the most men 
 and the amplest equipment. Leadership of course counts for 
 much and may, in a given war, decide the issue. But leader- 
 ship is a short-lived thing. If a Xapoleon gives the victory to 
 France, it is only for a short time. Napoleon passes, and a 
 Moltke appears on the other side and turns the scale. The 
 personal factor is but a ripple on the surface. It is the great 
 undercurrent of men and resources that determines the 
 result. 
 
 But even here we have not reached the final term. We 
 have seen that resources develop population. In 1750 it was 
 generally assumed that England had reached her limit of 
 population at the long stationary figure of eight millions. 
 Then came the discovery of coal and the development of her 
 great industries, and her population rose to thirty-eight mil- 
 lions. Jt was coal and iron that made the extra thirty mil- 
 lions. ) 
 
 Exactly the same thing is happening in Germany today. 
 Her population has gained about thirty millions in forty 
 years, and it is iron and coal that have produced the extra 
 thirty millions. Meanwhile France has not increased, and 
 it is at bottom primarily for this reason, that she lacks the 
 iron and coal. It is iron and coal that produce the men and 
 it is iron and coal that arm and equip the men. Hence we 
 come to the farther truth, — the almost appalling truth. It, 
 
 is natural resources that determine the strength and the 
 ultimate destiny of nations. 
 
 The question naturally arises, whether there is any limit 
 to this principle. If a country like Germany or France were 
 one vast coal and iron mine with absolutely limitless sup- 
 plies, would it have limitless power? "Would it not have, 
 after all, other limitations of space or food which would 
 affect the result? Yes, undoubtedly, if it remained in its 
 
184 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 original boundaries. But that is exactly what it would not 
 do. Such a country would develop and equip a very large 
 population, all that it could raise or buy food for, and with 
 this population it would conquer additional territories in 
 which it could raise more food and develop more population, 
 and so on to the end. If its supplies of iron and coal were 
 far superior to those of other powers and if they were not 
 early taken, before the nation had time to grow to them, there 
 could be but one result. That nation would dominate the 
 rest. 
 
 This is almost the exact situation in Europe today. It is 
 of course impossible to tell with exactness how much of these 
 minerals lies buried in the earth, but estimates have been 
 made in Europe with great care, especially in the matter of 
 coal. According to these estimates Belgium has a coal re- 
 serve of 11 billion tons, France 17 billion tons, England 189 
 billion tons, Russia 233 billion tons, and Germany 409 bil- 
 lion tons. A billion is a very large number and even the 
 smallest of these reserves may give us a reassuring sense of 
 sufficiency. But in a matter in which annual consumption 
 rises into the hundreds of millions and in an age when a 
 single steamship bums a thousand tons a day, these figures 
 become distinctly finite. The important thing to note is that 
 Germany has today substantially half the coal reserves of 
 Europe, while France has next to none. These two countries 
 are nearly equal in size, but one has about twenty-five times 
 as much coal as the other. That difference is already ex- 
 pressing itseK in the normal way. The two countries had 
 fifty years ago about the same population. Today Germany 
 has thirty millions more than France because they entered 
 the industrial era, the one with coal and the other without. 
 That difference in coal supply has only begun to express 
 itself in population. France can not hope to redress the 
 balance unless she can get larger supplies of coal. In that 
 
FRANCE 185 
 
 industrial development which is preeminently the measure 
 of modem national power, France is a case of arrested de- 
 velopment.^ 
 
 In the matter of iron the balance is less unequal and Ger- 
 many is certainly in a less fortunate position. By far the 
 largest of her ore beds is in the extreme west, a huge deposit 
 lying right astride the present Franco-German frontier. 
 This ore bed was carefully examined by German experts at 
 the time the frontier was drawn, but with imperfect results. 
 They reported that only the eastern portion of the field was 
 valuable and so the western part was graciously left to 
 France. Improved methods, however, quickly invalidated 
 their decision and left Germany to mourn the loss of a splen- 
 did prize which had been within her grasp. It is significant 
 that one of the first objectives of the German army was this 
 iron mine, the seizure of which robbed France at the very 
 outset of practically all her material for war and compelled 
 her to depend on imports from America. The seizure of her 
 slight remaining coal fields completed her helplessness. It 
 is for that reason that the French people were doomed to pass 
 the past winter in unwai^med houses. 
 
 Viewed in the light of these facts, the disposal of Alsace- 
 Lorraine acquires an entirely new significance. Germany 
 will cling with the utmost desperation, to this great ore bed, 
 not only to the eastern portion which has been the source of 
 three quarters of her supply in the last few decades, but 
 to the French portion as well which it was her first care to 
 acquire and which has been exploited with feverish activity 
 throughout the war. It is this iron mine of Briey that the 
 
 1 " Let us not deceive ourselves. It is not common language, litera- 
 ture, or traditions alone, nor yet clearly defined or strategic frontiers, 
 that will in the future give stability to the boundary lines of Europe, 
 hut rather such distribution of its supplies of coal and iron as will 
 prevent any one of the great nations of Europe from becoming strong 
 enough to dominate or absorb all the others." Macfarlane, " The Eco- 
 nomic Basis of an Enduring Peace." 
 
186 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 Germans have m mind when they talk about a " slight rectifi- 
 cation of the western frontier." To possess this ore bed 
 would not only disarm France completely and make her de- 
 pendent upon distant allies, but it would limit her popula- 
 tion, prevent her industrial development, and in the long 
 run make her a ward of Germany. Germany will not 
 relinquish without the most desperate of struggles what is 
 virtually a guaranty of her eventual domination. She now 
 has the coal ; with a " slightly rectified " Alsace-Lorraine, 
 she would have the coal and iron both necessary for the task. 
 ISTot willingly will Germany let such a prize slip from her 
 grasp. There is reason to fear as Maximillian Harden has 
 declared, that " if necessity compels us to sign such a peace 
 (surrendering Alsace-Lorraine), seventy million Germans 
 will tear it vip." And for all these reasons the French peo- 
 ple, to whom the experiences of the war have brought home 
 these truths with new force, will cling with the tenacity of 
 despair to this condition of their safety and their independent 
 existence. 
 
 It is one of the curious caprices of nature that these vital 
 conditions of power and growth to modem nations should 
 be located in spots that were predestined to be the frontiers 
 between great peoples. If the German coal and iron de- 
 posits were in Hanover and the French in Touraine with 
 only innocent farming land between the two nations, the 
 problem would be immensely simplified. As it is, forty per 
 cent, of Germany's coal reserves are in Silesia, an eastern and 
 essentially Polish province which would be lost to Germany 
 if the more radical plans for the reconstitution of Poland 
 should be carried out, — which helps to explain Germany's 
 insistence that there is no German Poland. The rest of her 
 coal is on the western frontier, most of it west of the Rhine. 
 All that France possesses lies in the same uncertain region. 
 The iron is held in even more dangerous equipoise. Nature 
 
FEANCE 187 
 
 could hardly have better contrived to keep these races at 
 odds, or shall we say, — to force their ultimate union ? 
 
 Returning now to Alsace-Lorraine, we have to note the 
 important fact that their restitution to France would give 
 her the iron, but it would give her no coal. Only one of the 
 great western coal fields, that of Saarbrueck, extends slightly 
 into the territory of Lorraine. All the rest that lies to the 
 west of the Ehine is located in the Ehine Province, as the 
 territory is called which lies between Lorraine, Luxembourg, 
 and Belgium on the one hand and the Ehine on the other. 
 The restoration of these provinces would therefore have this 
 extraordinary and highly unsatisfactory result, that it would 
 give about all the iron of central Europe to France and all 
 the coal to Germany, a most doubtful guaranty of peace. It 
 would be like making peace between two blood feudists by 
 giving to each hostages out of the family of the other. 
 
 The fate of Alsace-Lorraine is as nearly determined as 
 anything can be by the present war. Elsewhere everything 
 is still in a state of nebulous generality, but here the frontiers 
 of our purpose are definite and concrete. France is to have 
 Alsace-Lorraine. It would indeed be a neglect of the most 
 elemental precautions if the decision had been otherwise. 
 But in the light of the facts here set forth, it may well be 
 asked whether this promises peace or a renewal of the con- 
 flict. Against that frontier, — which is henceforth our 
 frontier, — the Teutonic storm will beat with redoubled fury. 
 Germany will not purr peacefully with such an appeal to her 
 predatory instincts constantly before her eyes. She will not 
 be deterred by any international warnings to " keep off the 
 grass." It will be force, not mere international agreement, 
 that maintains that frontier, force not potential merely, but 
 in large part actual, equipped and ready for its strenuous 
 task. All the awful mandates of the powers will avail noth- 
 ing if Germany finds the frontier unguarded and rushes the 
 
188 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 iron and coal mines and a few strategic points from the too 
 trustful powers. 
 
 Why has the world decided on just this territory of Alsace- 
 Lorraine ? Is it so clear that this is the measure of nature's 
 equity, the sufficient guaranty of the world's peace ? Noth- 
 ing of these. Alsace-Lorraine is to be returned because 
 Alsace-Lorraine was taken away. The Europe of yesterday 
 was a hodge-podge of accident, but in this world of new 
 forces and changed conditions, it is still yesterday that gives 
 the law to today. ^ With all our talk of destroying Prussian 
 militarism, we can not bring ourselves to disarm the mon- 
 ster, because, forsooth, the arms were his of old. The writer 
 has small hope that his suggestion will commend itself to a 
 world obsessed with the idea that the surface facts of local 
 prejudice and habit are the legitimate determinants of na- 
 tionality. Yet human progress has been a continual struggle 
 against these surface accidents, a continual yielding on their 
 part to the inexorable forces of environment. But however 
 hopeless the suggestion, there is but one suggestion possible 
 as the result of this reasoning. The Rhine Province and the 
 Palatinate should go with Alsace-Lorraine. That territory 
 cuts a huge notch out of the natural unity of the west Rhine 
 territory, with no other result than to take from the western 
 peoples practically all their coal and make their frontier in- 
 defensible. Its cession to Erance would restore the boundary 
 of Caesar, the boundary of nature. It would still leave Ger- 
 many twice as much coal as it would give to Belgium and 
 France. It would be, under modern conditions, a bourdary 
 virtually immune from aggression as between peoples measur- 
 ably equal in equipment for defense. Finally, it would give 
 to France the possibility of that industrial development that is 
 now so unrighteously denied her, a development without 
 
 1 " Das ewig Gestrige das immer war und immer wiederkehrt, 
 Und heute gilt weil's gestern hat gegolten." 
 
 — ScHiixEB, " Wallenstein." 
 
FKANCE 189 
 
 which she has no future and German domination of the con- 
 tinent with all its illimitable possibilities becomes assured. 
 It is the irreducible minimum of concession if we are to have 
 peace on this border which is the Armageddon of the nations. 
 
 It will of course be objected that this leaves Germany 
 insufficiently supplied with iron. There is truth in this. 
 Importations from Sweden and from the recently discovered 
 deposits of Lapland, a pretty safe supply even in war, 
 and possibly from imperfectly explored southern sources, 
 must less conveniently eke out her supply from other home 
 sources. Possibly we might reconcile ourselves just now to 
 seeing a nation that is equally predatory with steel billets 
 and steel cannon, a little straitened for the present in her 
 supply. But after all this question is irrelevant. There 
 is no iron in the Khine Province. If Germany is to get 
 her iron in the west, she must have Alsace-Lorraine and 
 perhaps some "rectifications." That we do not propose to 
 give her. But the Rhine Province has coal, our coal, and it 
 is on our side the river. 
 
 But here comes the stubborn fact. It was not so from 
 the olden time. These people are Germans. Yes, and so 
 are the Alsatians. France won them by fairness and toler- 
 ance. She can win the others by the same. Doubtless a 
 transfer would mean an exodus of the irreconcilable among 
 this German population. But it is an open question whether 
 there would not be as many who would welcome the transfer. 
 The people of the Rhine Province do not love the Prussian. 
 In any case, the people that has solemnly proposed that all 
 non-Germanic population in America and Australia should 
 be transported to Africa can hardly complain of a transfer 
 that exiles and oppresses no one, even if it should result in 
 something of voluntary exodus to congenial lands across the 
 
 river. 
 
 France, like Belgium, has a vast claim against Germany 
 
190 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 on the score of property destroyed and injuries of every sort 
 inflicted. As already indicated, however, these claims rest 
 on a technically difterent basis. France is a great power, a 
 long standing and recognized rival of Germany, and not 
 under German guaranty. It is not claimed that this differ- 
 ence is more than technical. France was peaceable and her 
 warfare against Germany was of that legitimate sort which 
 can not be held to justify military reprisals. Still, techni- 
 cal though it be, the difference is such as to give Belgium 
 a prior claim. If it be practicable to indemnify both with- 
 out injurious reactions upon themselves and upon the world, 
 by all means let it be done, but on this point the writer 
 has already expressed his doubts. 
 
 The great question of colonial possessions, a question in 
 which France is deeply interested, may be reserved for sep- 
 arate consideration. 
 
 Note. A glance at the map on page 181 will disclose the fact that 
 the Rhine Province lies in part between Belgium and the Rhine The 
 annexation of this part to France would be highly unnatural. It would 
 therefore be the natural thing to make Belgium rather than France the 
 beneficiary in this region. Tliis would have the farther advantage that 
 adjacent Belgium is Flemish, that is, low German, in speech, essentially 
 the same as the Rhine Province. The writer has made no effort to decide 
 this question of local convenience. The Allies in this region are 
 considered as a unit and the transfer here proposed is urged on behalf 
 of the group rather than of any particular member. An extension of 
 Belgium and possibly a modification of the Dutch frontier might well be 
 necessary in case of this transfer. 
 
CHAPTEK XIII 
 
 ITALY 
 
 The entry of Italy into the war was in a sense unlike that 
 of the other Allies. It had no immediate connection with 
 the crisis which seemed to determine the action of the others. 
 Indeed, Italy had seemed to share the apprehensions of 
 Austria at the rising power of Serbia. This previous atti- 
 tude together with her alliance with the Central Powers 
 and her long hesitation before taking the decisive step, made 
 her action seem peculiarly deliberate and calculating. Prob- 
 ably the difference was mostly seeming, for the action of 
 those powers that made most of the Serbian and Belgian 
 episodes was really determined by very serious considerations 
 of self-preservation. It was no burst of moral indignation 
 at violated pledges or impudent demands that swept Prance 
 and Britain off their feet, though that indignation was tre- 
 mendous and sincere. This wave of emotion greatly aided 
 those governments in quickly marshalling their people to pro- 
 tect their vital interests, but it was those interests which the 
 statesmen of those powers believed to be jeopardized, that 
 were the real ground of their action. The emotional out- 
 burst in those countries served, therefore, to somewhat screen 
 the deeper movement of the nation. 
 
 In Italy this screen was lacking. The psychological mo- 
 ment for moral protest had passed when Italy, after pro- 
 longed parley with both camps, finally took the decisive 
 step. It is true that ardent protagonists of the Italian cause 
 have attempted to claim for Italy a share in this moral 
 spontaneity so honored in popular judgment. We are told 
 that the Italian people forced a cautious and reluctant gov- 
 
 191 
 
192 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 eminent to enter the war in vindication of its honor and 
 on behalf of the sacred rights of humanity. There was un- 
 doubtedly pressure from a certain section of the Italian pub- 
 lic, and no doubt these sentiments were urged and sincerely 
 entertained, but they have impressed the world less than 
 similar sentiments in other countries. This seemingly calcu- 
 lated pursuit of self interest is noted, not by way of criticism 
 of the Italian people, with whom the writer claims a personal 
 relation of friendship of more than thirty years standing, 
 but rather in their defense. Their case is quite as strong 
 as that of the others, but it does not look so and has in fact 
 made less appeal. 
 
 Italy entered the war chiefly for two reasons, antagonism 
 to Austria, — one of the deepest antagonisms in Europe, — 
 and desire to better her very unsatisfactory strategic position. 
 The first reason, antagonism, was the popular motive because 
 it rested on facts that were within popular memory. It 
 had, of course, its generous counterpart or aspect in irredent- 
 ism, the desire to redeem their kinsmen from the hated 
 Austrian rule. The second or strategic argument was the 
 one that actuated the Italian statesmen and military leaders. 
 It was abundantly justified by the situation. To a consider- 
 able extent the strategic and ethnic demands coincided. To 
 a much greater extent they were made to seem to do so. 
 
 The antagonism to Austria is based on very substantial 
 grounds. Her rule over the once highly civilized independ- 
 ent states of northern Italy, was both unnatural and unen- 
 lightened. The friction engendered by it increased steadily 
 to its close in 1866. To this was added another source of 
 friction when in 1870 Italy broke with the Vatican, a rup- 
 ture seemingly unavoidable if Italy was to be consolidated. 
 During this long period of struggle, Austria remained the 
 one uncompromisingly Catholic power, upholding not merely 
 the Catholic faith, but the Catholic claims to temporal rule. 
 
ITALY 193 
 
 Indeed, throughout the earlier struggle for independence and 
 nationality, Austria appears, not only as claimant for Italian 
 territories on her own behalf, but always as the staunch up- 
 holder of Papal claims. As the feud between the Quirinal 
 and the Vatican has never been settled, so the feud between 
 Italy and Austria has necessarily continued. It is difficult 
 for one not familiar with internal conditions in the two coun- 
 tries to appreciate the inevitableness of all this. Austria 
 is a group of alien and even antagonistic nationalities united 
 almost solely by fealty to their personal sovereign and their 
 loyalty to the Catholic faith. For these states, if their union 
 is to be preserved, the Catholic faith is an indispensable 
 political factor. In Italy, on the other hand, we are dealing 
 with a single race whose natural political union was long 
 blocked by the Catholic church as ruler of the centrally sit- 
 uated Papal States. For Italy, therefore, it was absolutely 
 essential that the Catholic church should disappear as a 
 political factor. These two nations were therefore squarely 
 opposed in a matter that was vital to each. The result was 
 antagonism, deep and long standing, which has become an 
 instinct of their people. Nor can we escape the conclusion 
 that this antagonism is a living one, not merely a memory. 
 The forces that produced it are in part still active and con- 
 tributing to its maintenance. Austrian rule over northern 
 Italy has greatly diminished, but it has not wholly disap- 
 peared, while the fundamental conflict regarding Catholic 
 claims, though perhaps less keenly felt than formerly, is 
 still present. This antagonism is therefore one of the great 
 factors to be reckoned with in the approaching settlement. 
 Resting as it does upon Italian unity, Austrian diversity, 
 and Catholic claims, it must apparently continue as long as 
 these continue. The dissolution of Austria might remove 
 it, for it apparently does not hold against the component 
 parts of the Austrian state, but only against the government 
 
194 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 which represents their union. The renunciation of the claim 
 of the church to territorial sovereignty might also remove it, 
 would certainly reduce it. The disappearance of Italian 
 unity is a contingency which we seemingly need not consider. 
 Turning to the problem of Italy's strategic frontier, her 
 grievance is plain. The Austro-Italian boundary was deter- 
 mined in 1866 under peculiar conditions. France and Italy 
 had just fought an indecisive war against Austria. Success- 
 ful on land, they had met decisive defeat in the Adriatic, 
 and it is doubtful what the result would have been had 
 Austria not been overwhelmingly defeated at the same mo- 
 ment by Prussia. This defeat of Austria by a power which 
 was an}i;hing but an ally of France, alarmed the latter and 
 made her come to terms with Austria on her own account 
 and with little reference to the interests or wishes of Italy, 
 thus relinquishing what seemingly was within their grasp 
 as the result of Austria's embarrassment. Most of Austria's 
 Italian territories were ceded, — not to Italy, but to France, 
 who thereupon exchanged them for Savoy, an Italian ter- 
 ritory on her own frontier. This peculiar transaction 
 definitely foreseen by France, is perhaps responsible for the 
 establishment of a frontier which France would hardly have 
 accepted had she been the one to guard it. Its most glaring 
 defect was the retention by Austria of the Trentino, a purely 
 Italian district of immense strategic strength. The Trentino 
 is doubly Italian, for not only do the people speak Italian, 
 but the district is on the southern slope of the Tyrolese Alps, 
 whose summits are the natural boundary between the Italian 
 and German peoples. The retention of the Trentino de- 
 prived Italy of her natural defenses against her age long 
 rival and enemy, while it gave to the latter the best possible 
 opportunity to attack her neighbor for the recovery of the 
 territories that she had unwillingly parted with. To these 
 natural advantages have been added some of the most power- 
 
ITALY 197 
 
 ful fortifications in the world, the building of thirty-five 
 powerful forts having converted the whole region into one 
 vast fortress. 
 
 Even this is not the whole story. The Trentino thrusts it- 
 self like a blunt wedge into the great plain of northern Italy. 
 It is from the northeastern corner of this plain, far beyond 
 the Trentino, that Italy must operate if she is to fight Austria. 
 The Trentino in Austrian hands thus becomes a frowning 
 bastion threatening the flank of any army that passes and 
 the communications of any army that has passed. It would 
 be difficult to find a parallel for this extraordinary defense. 
 It is plain that Austria established this frontier in expecta- 
 tion of trouble and with the intention of holding the whip 
 hand. 
 
 A somewhat similar though less striking situation holds 
 in the east. Here the Isonzo River is the natural boundary 
 though not quite the linguistic boundary between the two 
 peoples, the Italian speech extending somewhat beyond it. 
 But once again Austria established the border somewhat to 
 the west of the river in order that her own front might be 
 impregnable and the Italian front exposed. 
 
 We need not waste any anathemas on Austria. All the 
 powers involved were manoeuvering for position, and neither 
 Cavour nor Napoleon III would have scrupled to take advan- 
 tage of such a situation if they had been able to do so. But 
 looking at it from the standpoint of European or world 
 peace, it is clear that the arrangement is a vicious one. 
 No war sentiment should pervert our judgment and induce 
 us to reverse the situation giving to Italy the chance to over- 
 awe her antagonist. But a boundary based so far as possible 
 on natural features and separating the antagonists on fairly 
 even terms is desirable in the interest of general peace, 
 especially since ethnic boundaries so nearly coincide. The 
 cession of the Trentino to Italy and the rectification of the 
 
198 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 Isonzo frontier in conformity with natural boundaries and 
 so far as may be with race limits, are the most indisputable 
 of Italy's claims. It will be noted that precedence is here 
 given to natural over ethnic frontiers. This is the sound 
 principle in all cases where the two are fairly identical. An 
 ethnic frontier is never sharp edged. Language boundaries 
 are both vague and shifting, while natural boundaries in 
 a region like this are often inexorable. To make the crest 
 of a mountain range or the summit of a pass a national boun- 
 dary is reasonable, even if a few persons have carried their 
 language over the divide. The proper drawing of the polit- 
 ical boundary usually effects the rectification of the ethnic 
 frontier speedily and without hardship, whereas the ethnic 
 factor has no such power over nature. The two rectifications 
 noted would each require slight ethnic adjustments. A 
 proper mountain frontier in the north would require the in- 
 clusion of a portion of the Tyrol with a few German speaking 
 inhabitants, while a strategic boundary in the east would 
 leave a few Italians under Austrian rule. 
 
 But unfortunately neither Italy's demands nor Italy's prob- 
 lems end here. The great Austro-Italian frontier is the 
 Adriatic. It may seem extravagant to characterize a body 
 of water a hundred miles wide as a boundary, but all the 
 problems of a frontier exist here in their most acute form. 
 Unfortunately here too we find Austria holding the same whip 
 hand over Italy, this time through a caprice of nature. The 
 Italian side of the Adriatic is featureless and indefensible, 
 a low unbroken coast line without a single harbor suitable 
 for modern commerce or for a naval base, except possibly 
 at the extreme south where Brindisi has been constrained 
 into the service of the Orient mail and Taranto does duty as 
 an indifferent naval station. Briefly, Italy, of necessity a 
 maritime and naval power, has on her east coast no facilities 
 for either commerce or defense. The east coast of the 
 
ITALY 199 
 
 Adriatic, on the contrary, is a perfect maze of rocky islets, 
 deep fjords, and ample harbors, while at the northern end 
 lies Trieste, one of the finest harbors in Europe, and at the 
 other an embarrassment of riches in the way of natural 
 refuges for a navy. Such is Cattaro, a fjord whose narrow 
 but perfectly practicable entrance between towering cliffs is 
 scarcely visible from the sea, but this once passed, it opens 
 into a great inner lake resembling in size, shape, and environ- 
 ment the famous Lake of Lucerne. The conquest of Mon- 
 tenegro by Austria was effected primarily to give her posses- 
 sion of the mountain dominating this naval stronghold. 
 Another is Avlona, a deep bay, its entrance protected by an 
 island, in the inner recesses of which ships of war could lie in 
 perfect security. Still another is the channel of Corfu, a 
 body of water between the island and the mainland almost 
 entirely surrounded by towering mountains. Here are har- 
 bors and islands and naval bases in plenty for both coasts, but 
 all piled up on one, a most inequitable caprice of nature. 
 Here again, precisely as in the mountains to the north, the 
 power holding the east coast is perfectly secure from attack 
 and the power holding the west coast absolutely defenseless. 
 This disparity of position results in a further disparity, in 
 that Austria finds it unnecessary to maintain a great navy 
 and is thus free to devote her resources to her army, while 
 Italy is compelled to maintain both, and that of course to 
 the disadvantage of both. 
 
 Italy covets this coast. It is clearly a strained and un- 
 natural territorial program but one to which she is forced 
 by the exigencies of her position. These exigencies are her 
 real and comprehensible motive, but they are not her chief 
 argument, for the simple reason that Austria can advance 
 even more compelling ones. To give the eastern coast of the 
 Adriatic to Italy would obviously be an advantage to Italy, 
 but it would even more obviously be ruin for Austria. It 
 
200 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 would take all of her sea coast and leave her an interned 
 nation like Serbia. Worst of all, it would not find a natural 
 frontier, no matter where the line might be drawn. The 
 interned Balkan states would never be reconciled and would 
 make endless wars of protest. If Italy held her ground, she 
 w^ould find in these protests and the constant menace from the 
 rear a continual incentive to extend her borders. We should 
 have introduced one more formidable factor into the trouble- 
 making Balkan situation. 
 
 Considerations like these would hardly deter Italy, con- 
 tinually menaced by her position and confronted with a power 
 so hated as is Austria, but Italy is not unconscious that to 
 the world and to those allied powers whose cooperation can 
 alone realize her ambition, these are very serious objections. 
 To her own people, too, as to every other, strategic considera- 
 tions make but a feeble appeal. She has therefore turned to 
 another argiimeut which everywhere in our day enjoys pos- 
 sibly exaggerated popularity and an argument which in this 
 case she has certainly abused, — the argument of race. Italia 
 irredenta, unredeemed Italy, is the slogan by which Italy 
 has roused the enthusiasm of her people and appealed to the 
 sympathy of mankind. 
 
 We have seen that as regards the mountain frontier this 
 argument coincides fairly if not exactly with the argument 
 of natural defense. It there reinforces an argument already 
 conclusive. It may also be urged fairly for the city of 
 Trieste and part of the Istrian Peninsula at the tip of which 
 lies the city of Pola of ancient Roman importance and now 
 the chief naval base of Austria, Beyond this, all the way 
 down the eastern coast, Italian is more or less in use on 
 account of the constant intercourse with Italy, but it is clearly 
 an exotic. The traveler along this coast, familiar in a 
 degree as he is sure to be with the sound of Italian and 
 wholly unacquainted with Serb, is apt to get an exaggerated 
 
ITALY 201 
 
 impression of the Italian character of the region. Statistics, 
 even if imperfect, are a much safer guide. According to the 
 census, Dalmatia, the narrow coast state including the islands, 
 which is most under debate, contains more than 600,000 
 Serbs and but 18,000 Italians. The latter form but three per 
 cent, of the population as against ninety-six per cent, of 
 Serbs. Italian irredentists will say that the census is unfair, 
 all the bi-linguists being counted as Serbs. It is safe to 
 assume that Austria has not erred in favor of Italy. Still, 
 it would be a very extravagant irredentist who would claim 
 ten per cent, of Italians for Dalmatia. If it be argued, 
 as it justly may, that under Italian rule in this bi-lingual 
 country, assimilation would be rapid, it must not be over- 
 looked that this quite gives away the irredentist case. Italy 
 can not claim these people as her unredeemed brothers, and 
 then shift her ground and say that though they are not 
 Italians, she could speedily make them so. The claim of 
 race has absolutely no validity as regards Dalmatia, and 
 not a wholly satisfactory one as regards Trieste and Istria, 
 for even here there are far more Slavs than there are Italians 
 in Dalmatia. Yet the secret treaties published by the Bol- 
 sheviki show that an agreement existed between Italy and 
 her Allies to the effect that she was to receive the Trentino, 
 the Isonzo district, Trieste, Dalmatia and Avlona. We have 
 briefly to consider the wisdom of this arrangement. As 
 regards the Trentino and the Isonzo district, the case is 
 and always has been clear. The Allies have always and 
 openly stood for this accession, and even Austria offered the 
 most of the disputed territory in a vain effort to secure Italian 
 neutrality. That is one of the settled things in a program 
 of Allied victory. 
 
 The other claims fall into three groups ; — the Italian 
 speaking district of Trieste and Istria, the coast strip and 
 islands of Dalmatia, and the naval base of Avlona. Of these 
 
202 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 Dalmatia is the weakest. Foreign in population and indis- 
 putably foreign in location and strategic and economic de- 
 pendence, its transfer to Italy could be contemplated only as 
 a part of the program of complete Austrian dismemberment, 
 and even so would be hazardous and unnatural in the extreme. 
 The defeat of Italy in the north is not too dearly paid if it 
 has saved Europe, — as it seems to have done, — from this 
 unnatural bargain, a bargain to which the Allies undoubtedly 
 gave their consent purely and simply because of their desper- 
 ate need and because Italy would not take the risks of war 
 for a less price. No friend of Italy can fail to share her 
 extreme solicitude for the danger that ever menaces her 
 from this sinister coast, but equally, no thoughtful friend 
 can fail to recognize the risk attending this too ambitious solu- 
 tion of the age long problem. 
 -^.The case of Avlona is wholly different. That, as has been 
 explained, is purely an isolated naval base, used only by the 
 fleet, and approached only from the sea. There is as little 
 temptation to expand such a possession as there is to expand 
 Gibraltar. The position is of all those available for the pur- 
 pose, the one nearest to Italy and the one best adapted to her 
 purpose. It completely commands the entrance to the Adri- 
 atic, subject only to the check of other like bases, — Cattaro, 
 Corfu, or Durazzo, — which may be held by other powers. 
 There is but one excuse for Italy's possession of such a post, 
 namely her lack of a suitable base on her own coast. That 
 excuse is apparently suflficient. It is further to be noted that 
 Avlona is not a part of Slavic territory, but of Albania, a 
 district almost certainly incapable of nationality, its popula- 
 tion being divided in language, religion and sympathies and 
 predatory in the extreme. With the inevitable division of 
 Albania, Italy may occupy Avlona without injury or risk to 
 Serbia. 
 
 There remains the district of Trieste-Istria, more or less. 
 
ITALY 203 
 
 Here, as we have seen, tlie fact of Italian race, that is, Italian 
 speech, — for the basic blood is probably Slavic, — makes its 
 strong appeal. The Italian people, little moved by consid- 
 erations of national function, see in this fact of language a 
 sufficient reason for the union of this district to the Italian 
 kingdom. Whether the inhabitants of the district share this 
 desire is not easy to determine. There can be no doubt that 
 they are strongly attached to their language and desire to 
 retain their Italian character, and it is quite possible that 
 they see in such a union the natural if not the only means of 
 doing so. So much may undoubtedly be conceded for that 
 portion of both populations which lives its life compara- 
 tively unthinkingly as regards the larger problems of the 
 national destiny. 
 
 But it can hardly be doubted that the few who are more 
 immediately concerned with these larger interests are aware 
 of other factors which seriously complicate the problem. 
 Trieste is a splendid harbor, just such a one as Italy would 
 wish to possess, but it could not under any possible arrange- 
 ment, be made to serve Italian purposes. Even if Italy's 
 maximum purpose should be realized and Trieste, Istria, and 
 Dalmatia should be annexed, scarcely a square mile of Italian 
 territory would be served by Trieste. On the other hand, 
 Trieste is the only harbor which serves the great Austrian 
 hinterland, and as such, Austria's sole communication with 
 the sea. It is true that Dalmatia is Austrian territory and 
 that it has numerous minor harbors, but Dalmatia is a de- 
 tached coastal strip completely separated from Austria proper. 
 Moreover, the mountainous character of this coast gives these 
 harbors no satisfactory access to the regions farther inland. 
 Dalmatia is essentially a detached interest, enormously val- 
 uable to Austria as a defensive outpost, but commercially 
 capable only of serving itself. For serious access to the sea 
 both Austria and Hungary are limited to a single port. 
 
204 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 Trieste is the terminus of the great railroad line leading to 
 Vienna, while Fiume, just across the narrow neck of the 
 Istrian Peninsula, serves as the unique outlet for the great 
 plain of Hungary. If Trieste were annexed to Italy, there- 
 fore, Italy could not use it and Austria would have to use 
 it. In its actual function, Trieste will remain Austrian, 
 no matter what flag may fly over her harbor. It is most 
 unfortunate to have political arrangements thus squarely at 
 odds with economic function. It is true that Austrian rule 
 over people of Italian speech has produced friction, but that 
 is due primarily to a suspicious and repressive policy on the 
 part of Austria, motived, no doubt, by fear of this same 
 annexationist movement. Indeed this fear and this policy 
 have gone far to create the danger which Austrians dread. 
 There are Italian writers who claim that irredentism is an 
 Austrian invention. The policy of Austria in 1866 was 
 conspicuously unfair to Italy, and the consciousness that 
 Italians so regarded it, has made Austria fearful of the 
 Italian attitude everywhere. A repressive policy on her 
 part toward Italian speech and national aspirations generally 
 was the natural but unfortunate result. If instead of this, 
 Austria had adopted a policy like that of France in Alsace, 
 it seems not improbable that the Italians in this small and 
 practically detached district would have contentedly accepted 
 her rule, as the Alsatians accepted that of France, the reason 
 for race separation being much more obvious in the former 
 case than in the latter. There is reason to believe that the 
 changes which this war will effect in Austria, undoubtedly 
 the most considerable which will be anywhere effected, will 
 quite change the conditions of Austrian rule. In any case, 
 this is one of the clearest cases in which other than race con- 
 siderations are the paramount interest. The proposal that 
 Trieste be given to Italy to be held as a toll gate on Austria's 
 main route to the sea merely because three quarters of her 
 
ITALY 205 
 
 people speak the Italian language, is not one to be seriously 
 entertained. 
 
 Italy, too, has her colonial problems. She is deeply in- 
 terested in the possible dismemberment of Turkey and is an 
 eager claimant for a share in the spoils. In 1911, as a result 
 of her seizure of Tripoli, she found herself in an inconclusive 
 war with that power whom she could not force to make a peace 
 recognizing her occupation of Tripoli. Debarred by the 
 powers from attacking Turkish possessions on the Adriatic 
 coast, she finally seized a group of islands, — the so-called 
 Dodecanese, — to bring Turkey to terms. Still Turkey re- 
 fused, and the occupation was continued until the inevitable 
 popular sentiment made withdrawal difficult. The peace 
 which ultimately followed provided for a farther, — though 
 still provisional, — occupation of the islands, but the ensuing 
 Balkan wars prevented Turkey from complying with the con- 
 ditions stipulated for their restitution. Thus temporary 
 occupancy hardened into permanency, a typical case of the 
 way such things go. Now Italy wishes to be confirmed in 
 the possession of the islands, a very strategic group, and also 
 to be assigned a territory on the mainland adjacent. The 
 feasibility of such an assignment naturally depends on the 
 settlement of the Turkish problem to be discussed elsewhere. 
 It involves the most vital questions of European policy and 
 the policing of the world's trade routes in the interest of 
 peace. But the question of Italy's interests is a different 
 matter. It is impossible for a disinterested outsider to avoid 
 misgivings as to the results of such ventures on the part of a 
 country inherently poor, — for no country without iron and 
 coal can ever be largely populous or rich, — and a country 
 already burdened with heavy responsibilities of this kind. 
 Italy already has Tripoli and Eritrea. The proper adminis- 
 tration of dependencies is not a money making thing. Their 
 development implies large investments of capital. Italy had 
 
206 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 little disposable capital before the war, and she will have 
 less after it. There is grave danger that her colonies will 
 become starveling affairs, or that the necessities of the admin- 
 istrator will draw her into a policy of predatory exploitation 
 such as has clouded the memory of Spain and blighted the 
 lands committed to her keeping. Trusteeship is something 
 that Italy can not afford, and predatory exploitation is some- 
 thing that the world can not afford. Italy may well be 
 cautious. 
 
 These considerations apply with even greater force to the 
 project, also endorsed by the Allies in their hour of need, 
 that in the event that the German colonies were acquired 
 by the Allies, Italy should also receive additional African 
 territory. It is to be hoped, in the interest of Italy herself, 
 that this promise, like that regarding Trieste and Dalmatia, 
 will lapse with changed conditions. The trusteeship of back- 
 ward races is a stern necessity, — not a privilege to be grasped 
 at. Eagerness to acquire under such circumstances implies a 
 false conception of the relation involved. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 This term, — here briefly used for the Austro-Hungarian 
 Empire, — undoubtedly covers the most serious problems of 
 the war and of the modern political world. It was in the 
 necessities of this strangely assorted group that the war origi- 
 nated, and it is here that are to be encountered the most 
 stubborn difficulties in the way of settlement. The Austrian 
 Empire sets every precept of political experience at defiance. 
 It is not based on unity of race, or on the supremacy of a 
 dominant race. It was formed by outside pressure, con- 
 tinued by fraud, and is maintained by balanced antipathies. 
 It has been described as " a political abortion, the petrified 
 residuimi of a confusion of Babylonian languages." Yet it 
 is one of the most dangerous of all governments to meddle 
 with, because the antagonisms which characterize it inhere, 
 not in the government, but in the elements of which the 
 nation is composed. Few suggestions are more popular for 
 the forthcoming political reconstruction of Europe than that 
 of abolishing this incongruous combination. It is not al- 
 ways remembered that to abolish the combination might not 
 remove the incongruity. 
 
 The main features of this combination are familiar. The 
 
 Empire consists of two essentially independent states which 
 
 are united only in their sovereign and in what amounts to a 
 
 defensive league against other powers. They have their 
 
 army and their representatives with foreign powers together, 
 
 but are otherwise as independent as any other nations. Each 
 
 of these partner nations consists of a number of distinct 
 
 races, most of them having historic or racial affinities with 
 
 207 
 
208 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 outside peoples. These racial units in some cases lie partly 
 in Austria and partly in Hungary. Finally, some of these 
 races, notably the Germans and the Magyars, have thro\Mi 
 out colonies which lie like scattered islands in the territory 
 of the other races. There is of course the usual number 
 of foot-loose individuals who have scattered themselves 
 throughout the whole empire. 
 
 Of these various races, the Germans, Bohemians, Mora- 
 vians, Italians, Galicians, Slovenes and Dalmatians are under 
 the sway of Austria. They lie, in the most awkward imag- 
 inable arrangement, like a wide open lobster's claw, the big 
 and little fingers enclosing the more compact Hungary which 
 includes in its turn the Magyars, Slovaks, Rumanians, Slavo- 
 nians, and Croats. Attached to both these countries but not 
 belonging to either are Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are 
 administered by a special bureau under the war department. 
 Certain peculiarities of the various units must be noted in 
 connection with their aspirations and the proposals made with 
 regard to them. For we are confronted with the momentous 
 proposal, a proposal already far advanced toward accom- 
 plishment, that this historic empire, so long one of the pillars 
 of the political structure of Europe and ruled by the oldest 
 European dynasty, is to be dissolved. Such a dissolution 
 would of course only liberate forces long held in uneasy 
 equilibrium, forces which must necessarily react in new and 
 unknov^n ways upon the equilibrium of nations and perhaps 
 in turn form new combinations. It is of the utmost import- 
 ance that we understand the nature of the forces thus liberated 
 and that we forecast, so far as possible, their several reactions. 
 
 The two chief elements in the dual empire and the nuclei 
 of their respective groups, are the Germans and the Mag^'ars. 
 There are about ten millions of each and both are situated 
 in the valley of the Danube. The Germans are located in 
 
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
 
 (POLITICAL) Durazzo/ 
 
 SC»LE or «.LE^_' 7 V X^^GREECI 
 
 1.5- LoD ganJt Bart from OreeD^^oh2p^ ySalonil^y 
 
 3 Prague 
 
 ((Je, 
 
 /Municji 
 
 i al/7 lo. 
 
 ^'i- 
 
 
 Rumanian) o <pa '^A^i 
 
 ^ Tatar 
 
 . and . 
 ^ \gu/0^') SEA 
 Sofia 
 
 0-\ 
 1^1 r Consta>i\toople 
 
 (Bulgar) 
 
 lj6° LoDsHttde East from GreeDwiob^gQ'' 
 
 >^S 
 
 Salonikiq 
 
AUSTRIA 211 
 
 a compact mass in the western or upper Danube valley, 
 with a comparatively narrow southwestward extension in the 
 Alps, — the Tyrol. It is important to note, however, that 
 they are solidly united along their whole western and north- 
 western front to the Germans of Germany from whom they 
 are but accidentally and artificially separated. This terri- 
 torial unity with the larger German body is the all important 
 fact. The founders of the German Empire did not wish to 
 include the Austrians, both because of their ancient pre- 
 tensions to leadership which militated against the supremacy 
 of Prussia, and because Germany hoped, through their 
 ascendency in the Austrian combination, to bring the whole 
 motley group under her control, a very shrewd and success- 
 ful calculation. But if the dual empire is dismembered and 
 the Austrian Germans are thrown on their own resources, they 
 could not do otherwise than join their kinsmen. This union 
 is everjn'here recognized as inevitable and one to which the 
 Allies could not consistently take exception. While consist- 
 ency is not quite inevitable in international action there can 
 be no doubt that in this case the union would take place 
 without protest. This would extend German territory from 
 the Baltic to the Adriatic and give to Germany her much 
 coveted base on the southern sea, for no thin screen of Italian 
 littoral would hold back such a power from so necessary 
 and natural a consummation. The possible consequences of 
 such an extension of German territory will be reserved for 
 later consideration. It is sufiicient now to note the fact. 
 
 It is farther to be noted that the Germans have their islands 
 of settlement more widely scattered through the Empire than 
 those of any other race, — some of them extending even 
 beyond the eastern border to the vicinity of Odessa. The 
 significance of these settlements should not be overlooked 
 when they become centers, not of Austrian, but of imperial 
 
212 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 German influence. Einallj it should be added that the 
 German unattached man of business is more ubiquitous and 
 correspondingly more influential than any other. 
 
 The Magyars are located compactly almost in the center 
 of the empire, though a very large island of Magyar popula- 
 tion is situated right in the elbow of Rumania where it is 
 entirely surrounded by Rumanians, and other smaller settle- 
 ments are scattered throughout Transylvania. Unlike the 
 Germans, the Magyars have no racial kin in Europe except 
 the Turks from whom they have become widely differentiated 
 and who can give them no backing. The proposed dismem- 
 berment would leave the Magyars an inland nation of about 
 ten million inhabitants. Despite the utmost deference to eth- 
 nic considerations, the population would still be sadly mixed. 
 Numerous German communities are scattered through 
 the territory, while a large Magyar population would be 
 excluded from it, a constant incitement to eastward expan- 
 sion across a wholly arbitrary frontier and at the expense of 
 a woefully mixed population. The only natural frontier 
 would be the Carpathians on the north, and even to attain 
 this inevitable barrier, it would be necessary to include a 
 considerable area of Russian population ^ with consequent 
 temptation to Russian irridentism. The Magj'ars could 
 hardly feel that the lines had fallen unto them in pleasant 
 places. 
 
 To the north of the German Austrians and the Magyars 
 are three bodies of Slavs, the Czechs or Bohemians, the 
 Moravians, and the Slovaks. The first two are under Aus- 
 trian and the third under Hungarian rule. Altogether they 
 number slightly more than eight millions. The distinction 
 between these groups is historical rather than racial, but not 
 the less considerable for purposes of practical cooperation. 
 Nevertheless they seem able to act together at least for pur- 
 
 1 The so-called Euthenians, a name adopted by Austria to conceal the 
 fact that these people really belonged in the Empire of the Czar. 
 
'AUSTRIA 215 
 
 poses of opposition, and the recent extraordinary achieve- 
 ments of their troops in Russia has given the combination 
 an unexpected interest in the eyes of the world. For mili- 
 tary purposes they have already been recognized as an inde- 
 pendent national unit, a recognition which seems to pre- 
 figure their later recognition as a nation. This has long been 
 the aspiration of the Bohemians who constitute about one 
 half their number. The union of the three elements for 
 political purposes seems to be recent, and the program of the 
 others, especially of the Slovaks, is probably less matured. 
 Of all the subject nationalities of the dual empire none are 
 so likely to insist upon independence and none so likely to 
 attain it as this group. It is therefore most important to 
 consider the difficulties and the possibilities of the proposed 
 arrangement. 
 
 First, the territory, no matter how carefully delimited, 
 would still have a mixed population. A large part of his- 
 toric Bohemia, for instance, the part devastated during the 
 Thirty Years' War, was resettled by Germans and is now Ger- 
 man in population. It is all but certain, however, that the 
 Bohemians would insist upon having this territory on his- 
 toric grounds,^ and since the alternative would be to give 
 it to Germany, we may assume that the Allies at the present 
 juncture would acquiesce in their demand, the more so as the 
 whole territory has long been accustomed under Austrian 
 rule to a unit administration. This is merely one of the 
 numerous limitations which are forced upon the ethnic prin- 
 ciple the moment we begin to make a practical application 
 of it. Yet it is a very serious limitation, for it insures the 
 perpetuation of the race struggle between Czechs and Ger- 
 mans, a struggle which has been characterized by a bitterness 
 
 1 As this goes to press it is reported that the Bohemians ( doubtless 
 German Bohemians) have asked Germany to take over this German 
 territory. Another report says that the new Bohemian government 
 offers food to Austria on condition that this territory is guaranteed to 
 Boliemia. 
 
216 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 and a purely provocative obstructiveness unparalleled in 
 parliamentary annals. The only difference would be that 
 the Germans would now be the under dog and the Czechs 
 would now avenge themselves for centuries of real or fancied 
 oppression. It is easy to understand how the cry of these 
 Germans would go across the border, and how willingly, in 
 certain eventualities, the big brother would lend a listening 
 ear. It is to be noted further that large German settlements 
 nearly cut the Slovak territory in two, and other settlements 
 are sandwiched in between Bohemia and Moravia. In addi- 
 tion there is a large percentage of German population in 
 the districts accounted Bohemian and Moravian. The pros- 
 pect is not bright for a happy family in the new Czecho- 
 slovak state. 
 
 Turning now to the internal character of the country, 
 we again face troublesome conditions. Bohemia is largely 
 industrial, more than half the industries of the Empire 
 being located within this territory. The Slovaks, on the 
 other hand, are an agricultural people. There is in every 
 country, — as notably in our own, — a tendency to jealousy 
 between industrial and agricultural districts. When it is 
 remembered that the connection between the Czechs and 
 the Slovaks is recent and untried and that most of the 
 industries of Bohemia are owned by Germans, it is safe to 
 predict that the course of true love will not nm smooth 
 between these newlyweds. 
 
 If we turn to the territorial arrangement, it will be at 
 once apparent that it is very little suited to purposes of 
 defense or administrative convenience. It is long, straggling, 
 and irregular. Its frontier, enormous in extent and for 
 the most part based on no commanding natural features, 
 would be the despair of a strategist. Bohemia and Moravia 
 constitute a sort of peninsula thrust into German territory, 
 one of the most isolated racial habitats in the world. Once 
 
AUSTRIA 219 
 
 the Germans are united and in possession of their entire 
 racial habitat, this peninsula could be pinched off by an easy 
 drive across the narrow neck. International guaranties will 
 be invoked to prevent this and to guarantee the integrity 
 of the exposed nation. Conceding the efficacy of this guar- 
 anty, it may still be doubted whether territorial integrity 
 would secure independence. To control a state so situated, 
 Germany would not need to occupy the border fortresses. 
 Her railroads with their constant economic argument, would 
 give her every facility. It is precisely in this way that 
 Prussia controls certain minor German states in imperial 
 questions, they being unable to vote against her on account 
 of their situation and economic dependence. The necessity 
 for access to the sea which could only be secured on Ger- 
 many's terms, would assure that domination in the present 
 case, no matter what the agreements or the guaranties of the 
 nations. 
 
 Still to the north and stretching farther east lies Galicia 
 or Austrian Poland. Most of the southern boundary is 
 marked by the mighty range of the Carpathians, though 
 annoyingly enough, this happens not to be the true ethnic 
 boundary. The dominant race of eastern Galicia has crossed 
 the Carpathians and occupied a considerable territory on 
 the southern slope. This territory, under the present 
 partnership arrangement, is very properly assigned to Hun- 
 gary, while Galicia historically limited by the Carpathians, 
 belongs to Austria. There can be no question that, if we are 
 to dismember the Empire, the Carpathians must continue 
 to be the line of division, the overflow of the northern race be- 
 ing left to take the consequences of its venturesome trespass. 
 
 Since Galicia once belonged to Poland, the easy popular 
 disposition of it is to restore it to a reconstituted Poland. 
 But this is a superficial proposal and one quite inconsistent 
 with the ethnic principle. About two thirds of Galicia is 
 
220 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 Russian in race and in certain of its historic antecedents. 
 If race is to be the criterion, this part of Galicia should be re- 
 stored to Russia, a proceeding which may have its embarrass- 
 ments at the present juncture. This problem need not detain 
 us, however, at present. It is sufficient to recognize that the 
 natural disposition of this fragment would be to restore it to 
 its northern kinsmen, whoever they may be. That, the 
 Galicians may perhaps be left to determine, though this is 
 a case where even their choice may not insure harmony. 
 Curiously enough, the Galicians are reputed to be compara- 
 tively content with their present allegiance. The Austrians, 
 themselves in minority in Austria, have needed the support 
 of some other race element to insure their control, and it 
 has usually been their policy to win the Galicians by special 
 concessions. Hence the almost unique phenomenon in this 
 part of the world of a comparatively contented people. This 
 content is of course only relative. 
 
 To the east of the Magyars lies the much more extended 
 domain of the Rumanians. The Rumanian problem is 
 ethnically the simplest of all the problems of the Balkans, 
 yet even so it presents almost insoluble difficulties. The 
 key to its solution is found in the fact that an independent 
 Rumanian kingdom already exists. This, however, includes 
 less than half the Rumanian area. To the east of independ- 
 ent Rumania lies Bessarabia, a well defined area between 
 the Pruth and Dniester rivers. This is solidly Rumanian 
 in population except in the coastal region where a patchwork 
 of German, Bulgarian, Turkish, Russian, and Rumanian 
 settlements are an effectual bar to any ethnic claim. The 
 claim of Rumania to this coastal strip, however, is as good as 
 any other, and since it necessarily goes with the hinterland 
 of Bessarabia to which her ethnic claim is indisputable, 
 there can be no ground for hesitation. The only excuse for 
 Russian occupation has been the great plan of Russian ad- 
 

AUSTRIA 223 
 
 vance to Constantinople, a plan which if realized along this 
 route would wipe out Rumania altogether. It was perhaps 
 to Russia's interest to keep Rumania small and weak, but 
 such interests will hardly prevail under present conditions. 
 The annexation of Bessarabia to Rumania, though effected 
 in the first instance by Germany and for her own ends, is 
 perhaps the most obvious and feasible act of ethnic justice 
 which this region permits. It is a recognition of race unity 
 and at the same time it is opposed by no other consideration. 
 Rivers are not ideal boundaries, but the Dniester is as good 
 as the Pruth. Bessarabia is not vital to Russia in any sense. 
 It includes no great city, no necessary seaport, no important 
 trade route. Its transfer would break no fond ties, inter- 
 rupt no long standing tradition. It is one of the few one- 
 sided questions. 
 
 To the west of Rumania and in the angle of its bent contour 
 lies Transylvania, now a part of the Magyar kingdom. A 
 very large area is here predominantly Rumanian, an area 
 nearly as large as that occupied by the Magyars themselves. 
 It is upon this that the Rumanians have especially set their 
 heart, and this that would undoubtedly fall to their lot in 
 the event of the dismemberment of the Dual Empire. The 
 addition of this large tract would not only greatly extend the 
 Rumanian domain and unite the Rumanian race, but it would 
 round out the country very handsomely, giving it a compact 
 form, a splendid river waterway, and a very satisfactory sea 
 coast. 
 
 But closer examination discloses serious obstacles in the 
 way of this attractive plan. The first of these obstacles is 
 political. Transylvania is united to Rumania by race, but 
 not by political tradition. This is a superficial fact, but one 
 often more potent at a given moment than the more per- 
 manent facts of nature. It is difficult to know what the 
 aspirations of the Transylvanians are, but it is safe to 
 
224 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 assume that in case of internal strain, there would be a 
 tendency to cleavage along this line. 
 
 This tendency would be accentuated by the physical fea- 
 tures which here assume such immense importance as seriously 
 to offset if not altogether to outweigh the claims of race. 
 Sweeping around the deeply indented curve which marks 
 the present western boundary of Rumania runs the great 
 chain of the Carpathian Mountains, one of the most consid- 
 erable as well as one of the best defined natural boundaries 
 in Europe. This divides Transylvania from Rumania 
 proper in a way that no political union can ever efface. Not 
 that this is a bar to political union, but it is an obstacle, and 
 one which, in a complex of conflicting forces, may assume 
 large importance. 
 
 On the other hand, Rumania by this extension would 
 acquire a perfectly arbitrary western border with no natural 
 defenses whatever. So lacking is this ethnic frontier in 
 natural feature and so vague in its own nature, — for language 
 areas fade into each other unless separated by very pro- 
 nounced barriers, — that when the recent Rumanian cam- 
 paign was decided upon with the avowed purpose of annexing 
 Transylvania, it was announced that the River Theiss was 
 the Rumanian objective, this being the first natural feature 
 which it was feasible to recognize as a national boundary. 
 But such a boundary would give nearly a third of the Magyar 
 territory to Rumania and would repeat within her borders 
 the race feuds which have made the dismemberment of Austria 
 seem necessary. The only difference would be that while the 
 Magyars have hitherto oppressed the Rumanians, the Ru- 
 manians could now oppress the Mag^^ars. It is of course 
 possible that the controlling powers would not sanction these 
 extreme ambitions of Rumania and would restrict her to the 
 true ethnic limits, but in that case the limitation of a com- 
 pletely artificial frontier would be inevitable. 
 
AUSTEIA 225 
 
 Restricted within these narrower but still unnatural limits, 
 the ethnic problem becomes simpler, but it is still embarrass- 
 ing. Unlike the hinterland of Bessarabia, Transylvania is 
 not solidly Eumanian in population. There are numerous 
 islands of Magyar and German dotted all over it. Worst 
 of all, there is in the angle of the Carpathians and thus in 
 the very center of the Rumanian oval, a very large district 
 which is decisively Magyar. The completed Rumania, there- 
 fore, is shaped much like a doughnut with the hole full of 
 Magyars. It would be difficult to imagine a worse situation. 
 The small scattered settlements of Germans or Magyars might 
 be gradually assimilated in a country otherwise Rumanian, 
 but so large a district as this will almost of necessity persist, 
 compelling recognition of its language in schools, courts, and 
 administration, and bringing its inevitable feuds. The fact, 
 too, that the kingdom of the Magyars on the west is but a 
 hundred and fifty miles away, and that traditions of Magyar 
 supremacy many centuries old would make the Rumanian 
 yoke doubly onerous, would provide almost ideal conditions 
 for political restiveness and instability. Only the most 
 extraordinary race tolerance, a tolerance to which not one of 
 these races has approximated as yet, could prevent the re- 
 emergence of all the traditional Balkan troubles. 
 
 The Dobrudja is a coastal strip lying between the lower 
 Danube and the sea. Its population is extremely mixed, — 
 Russians, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Turks, — but with 
 Rumanians fairly in the ascendant, especially in the north. 
 But even were the Rumanian ascendency less assured, it would 
 be preposterous to assign it to any other power. It gives 
 Rumania her only sea coast, while it would give to Bulgaria, 
 — the other possible claimant, — nothing, except the power 
 to injure Rumania. Nothing more absurd has emanated 
 from war passions than the suggestion emanating from Ger- 
 man sources, that the whole of the Dobrudja be given to Bui- 
 
226 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 garia. But while the allegiance of the Dobrudja is not open 
 to question, its southern limit which is necessarily arbitrary, 
 is not so easily settled. As the result of Rumania's bloodless 
 intervention in the second Balkan war, the boundary was 
 moved some distance to the south. The district thus annexed 
 has virtually no Rumanian population, while the Bulgarian 
 population is considerable. So far as the writer is aware, 
 no important strategic advantage was secured. At this dis- 
 tance it looks very much like one of those impulsive and 
 unthinking assertions of race cupidity which it is the function 
 of race breeding to restrain. If Rumania loses this ill gotten 
 gain in the redrawing of the map of Europe, she need not 
 be an object of commiseration. To the north of Rumania, 
 wedged in between her notched northern border and Galicia 
 is the little crown land of Bukowina. The southern portion, 
 — about enough to fill the notch, — is Rumanian in popula- 
 tion, the remainder Russian. A reapportionment would cer- 
 tainly give the Rumanian portion to Rumania. It is possible 
 that political tradition, natural features, or other considera- 
 tion would dictate the transfer entire. It can not be too 
 strongly insisted that mere race, — that is, speech, — in this 
 Babel of the world, is not a sufficient criterion for our pur- 
 pose. These people care often more for their church than 
 for their language, and then again, more for their political 
 tradition than for either. It is of interest to indicate ethnic 
 arguments, but altogether inadmissible to dogmatically assert 
 their complete validity. It is equally preposterous to assume 
 that the people themselves can solve these world problems by 
 an expression of preference based on provincial prejudice 
 and local faction. The settlement should be based on the 
 fullest deference to their interests and on a very considerable 
 deference to their present preferences, but there are times 
 when their preferences may well be sacrificed to their in- 
 terests, and their interests to the interests of humanity. 
 
AUSTRIA 227 
 
 It should perhaps be added that the Eumanian habitat ex- 
 tends across the Danube into the northeastern comer of 
 Serbia, and small Rumanian settlements are also found south 
 of the Danube in Bulgarian territory. It would be the height 
 of unwisdom to include any of these in a Rumanian king- 
 dom. There is even a considerable Rumanian district in 
 northern Greece, hundreds of miles from the home of the 
 race. These people plainly have no alternative but to accept 
 the consequences of their adventurous migration. 
 
 In conclusion, the Rumanian kingdom should undoubtedly 
 be extended by the inclusion of Bessarabia. If the Austro- 
 Hungarian Empire is to be dissolved, it must plainly be ex- 
 tended to include Transylvania also, not, however, as far 
 as the river Theiss. Bad as this arbitrary boundary of the 
 larger Rumania would be, it would certainly be preferable, 
 in a readjustment based ostensibly on race, to an arrange- 
 ment which outraged Magyar unity and guaranteed the per- 
 petuation of race conflicts. But at the best the greater 
 Rumania would be an uneasy state and a sorry compromise. 
 It would have nothing of the homogeneity of the mature na- 
 tions of western Europe, not even the homogeneity which the 
 smaller Rumania possesses, nor would it have a territory in 
 which that homogeneity could be easily achieved. 
 
 To the southwest of the countries we have considered and 
 with a long frontage on the Adriatic, lies the territory of the 
 group of peoples known as Jugo ^ Slavs. This is again a 
 territory lying partly within and partly without the Empire. 
 Outside are Serbia and Montenegro ; inside are Slavonia and 
 Croatia which belong to Hungary, Dalmatia which belongs 
 to Austria, and Bosnia-Herzegovina which belong to both. 
 Adjoining this territory on the northwest is the small moun- 
 tainous country of the Slovenes occupying a very strategic 
 
 1 Jugo is a Slavic word meanins: aoiTthern. It is pronounced Yvgo and 
 is aometimea so written for the benefit of those who are accustomed 
 only to the English sound of J. 
 
228 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 site at the head of the Adriatic, for it is in the country of the 
 Slovenes that the important little Italian district of Trieste 
 is located. It is also the Slovenes who confront the Italians 
 on the Isonzo border. It is very doubtful whether the 
 Slovenes will be grouped with the Jugo Slavs in the forth- 
 coming settlement, not so much because of their racial dis- 
 tinctness, which is considerable, but because of their location 
 which will almost necessitate a separate destination. We 
 will therefore omit them from the group for the present. 
 
 As thus limited, the territory of the Jugo Slavs presents 
 the most compact, unified, and workable unity in all this 
 region. It has a remarkably unified population except 
 along the edges where, of course, something of the inevitable 
 racial mixture is found. It has few of the islands of foreign 
 population scattered about, such as are so perplexingly com- 
 mon in Magyar and Rumanian territory. It has an exten- 
 sive sea coast suitable for both commerce and defense. The 
 proposal to combine this territory into a single independent 
 kingdom, considerable enough in territory, population, and 
 resources to be self-respecting and self-supporting, is an ex- 
 ceedingly attractive proposition. 
 
 But again, closer inspection somewhat dampens our en- 
 thusiasm. Down in this part of the world race takes on a 
 new character. It is no longer primarily a question of lan- 
 guage. Religion is the all important consideration. And 
 religion is not a matter of spiritual experience nor yet of the- 
 ological belief, but of allegiance to an ecclesiastical organiza- 
 tion. These organizations are not merely state churches in 
 our western sense of the word, but as the result of peculiari- 
 ties in the former Turkish administration they acquired and 
 in a measure still retain an altogether extraordinary political 
 importance. So important is this factor that when Bulgaria 
 found herself in competition with Serbia and Greece in the 
 attempt to win the Macedonians, she found it impossible to 
 
AUSTKIA 231 
 
 do 80 while she recognized the same church authority. The 
 Macedonians could not understand what it meant to join the 
 Bulgarian cause unless there was a Bulgarian church. So 
 Bulgaria renounced the authority of the venerable Patriarch 
 of Constantinople and appointed an Exarch as the head of her 
 own church. It was now possible to win Macedonians to her 
 cause because there was something tangible to lay hold of. 
 Serbia and Greece were not bold enough to take so daring a 
 step, and so they lost out in the propaganda which eventually 
 made Macedonia predominantly Bulgarian. One curious 
 result, however, was often manifest, where two brothers would 
 announce themselves to the census taker, the one as Bulgarian 
 and the other as Serbian or Greek, the fact being that one 
 had recognized the authority of the Bulgarian Exarch, and 
 the other retained the old allegiance. 
 
 We have gone somewhat afield for our illustration, but the 
 conditions are essentially those with which we have to deal. 
 Eeligion is everywhere in the Balkans, and for that matter, 
 throughout the whole Austro-Hungarian domain, the essen- 
 tial basis of nationality. The Macedonian peasant hardly 
 feels it more than the Austrian or Hungarian nobility. The 
 question of Jugo Slav unity therefore resolves itself very 
 largely into a question of religious unity. This unity is un- 
 fortunately conspicuously lacking. The Croats, Slavonians, 
 and Dalmatians are Catholics, the Serbians and Montenegrins 
 Orthodox (Greek church), and the Bosnians, strange to relate, 
 are largely Mohammedan and reactionary Mohammedans at 
 that. It was they who fought the sincere attempts of Turkey 
 at political reform in the early part of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury. It would be difficult to get more irreconcilable groups. 
 Of course our American suggestion is at once that we found 
 the new state on a basis of religious tolerance, and such a law 
 would undoubtedly be passed. But there is not the least 
 likelihood that real tolerance would result. Such laws exist 
 
232 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 in both Austria and Hungary, but they are notoriously and 
 ostentatiously violated, even officially. Yet the Catholic ele- 
 ment which rules in Austro-Hungary is undoubtedly the most 
 liberal and tolerant of the three. To propose tolerance to 
 these people is like proposing free love to us. It was this 
 difference of religion quite as much as anything that made 
 Serbia absolutely deaf to all the wooings of Austria. It was 
 this that compelled Austria to employ two hundred thou- 
 sand men for three years to bring Bosnia under her admin- 
 istrative control when it was assigned to her by the powers. 
 It was religion which led to the murder of Archduke Ferdi- 
 nand by one of his Bosnian subjects. Curiously enough, 
 this prospective emperor was strongly Slavophile. He was 
 committed to the policy, — detested by Germans and Mag- 
 yars alike, — of reconstituting the Empire on the basis of a 
 triple partnership instead of a dual partnership as at pres- 
 ent, the Slavs being the third partner. Yet it was a Slav 
 who shot him. The reason was that with all his liberality 
 toward the Slavs, Ferdinand was a staunch Catholic, uncom- 
 promisingly committed to the maintenance of the Catholic 
 unity of the Empire. His murderer was an Orthodox Slav, 
 to whom Slavic influence in the Empire was as nothing to the 
 maintenance of the Orthodox church. The Mohammedans 
 will hardly prove more concessive. When it is recalled that 
 this local tenacity will be backed up by all the millions of their 
 fellow believers, the prospects for assimilation or tolerance 
 are not flattering. One can imagine how the Eoman Propa- 
 ganda Fide would bestir itself if there were any chance of 
 the Croats and Dalmatians going over to the Orthodox faith. 
 Would the millions of Orthodox Russia do less if they saw 
 a like menace to the faith of the Serbians and Montenegrins ? 
 It is possible that all these difficulties may be overcome, but 
 the problem is not one of language or blood. 
 
 A seemingly trivial incident of this religious difference 
 
AUSTRIA 233 
 
 has after all serious consequences. The Catholic countries 
 use the Eoman alphabet while the Orthodox countries use the 
 much superior Cyrillic alphabet which is in use by the Rus- 
 sians. While it is a comparatively easy task to learn both 
 alphabets, practically very few do so, and religious prejudice 
 increases the difficulty. We are therefore confronted with 
 the curious fact that peoples that speak the same language 
 cannot read each other's books and newspapers. A more per- 
 fect device for perpetuating provincialism could scarcely be 
 devised.^ 
 
 Leaving the Slovenes for the time being alone, — though 
 they cannot possibly remain alone, — let us now take a wider 
 look over the group of nations thus reconstituted. We have 
 at the north an almost impossible Czecho-Slovakia (we will 
 call it Bohemia for short), a small Hungary wholly inland, a 
 large but imeasy Rumania, and a well situated but poorly 
 united Jugo-Slavia. In addition we have extended Ger- 
 many and brought her down to the Adriatic, and have given 
 to Poland or Russia, one or both, territories which bring them 
 to the Carpathians. What are the prospects for harmony 
 within this group ? 
 
 The one power that has most conspicuously gained is Ger- 
 many, for the extension of her territory through to the south- 
 em sea is of immense significance. But in reality Germany 
 would have lost, for she would be getting the small territory 
 of German Austria in exchange for the whole Austrian Em- 
 pire which she had brought into close alliance and which, by 
 the recently concluded agreement between the two emperors 
 she had virtually annexed. Doubtless German Austria would 
 be more dependable than the larger and less s^Tupathetic 
 
 1 It is but fair to note that these peoples, meeting in representative 
 convention in Corfu, have frankly recognized the difficulties here noted 
 and have notwithstanding reached the conclusion that a working union 
 is possible. This augurs well for the success of the attempt, though it 
 can hardly be said to guarantee it. 
 
234 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 combination, — though such an addition to the South Ger- 
 mans would justly give Prussia some cause for anxiety, — but 
 most if not all the new states formed would at present be 
 anti-German and would oppose stout resistance to a German 
 advance in this direction. This, indeed, is the very pur- 
 pose of the proposed dismemberment, the only purpose that 
 can justify Allied intervention in the affairs of the Empire. 
 Germany will not willingly accept such a situation. Yet it 
 is by no means clear that she would lose or that we would gain 
 by it. Germany could count on her Austrians absolutely, 
 but could we count on these raw new states to resist her 
 blandishments and ward off her intrigues ? With the example 
 of Bulgaria before us, it is hard to feel confident in their 
 unchanging loyalty to this or any other cause. And when 
 we recall the German settlements scattered through these 
 states all the way from Vienna to Odessa, and the farther fact 
 of race dissensions which afford so admirable an opportunity 
 for Germany to breach the phalanx, we have still occasion for 
 misgivings about the reconstituted Balkans. 
 
 Two of the states thus formed would have no access to 
 the sea. This is simply indispensable for a modem nation. 
 Hungary could, and probably would, be accommodated 
 through the country of the Slovenes, though Croatia would 
 have to give up a little of her territory if Hungary is to re- 
 tain her present port of Fiume, the only one available for her 
 purpose. The bulk of the Slovenes, however, would go to 
 Germany as a condition of her having access to the Adriatic, 
 an irreducible minimum. If this is not given her, she will 
 take it, or will keep the world on the anxious seat by her 
 obvious intention to do so. 
 
 But Bohemia could not be accommodated in this essential 
 matter by any accession of territory. Her path to the sea 
 must always be across German territory, the dismemberment 
 of which by a Bohemian strip is too outrageous a violation of 
 
AUSTEIA 235 
 
 ethnic proprieties to be discussed. For this indispensable 
 condition of modern life an independent Bohemia would al- 
 ways be dependent upon Germany, the relation which now 
 irks her. 
 
 Rumania would be a large and well situated, but physically 
 divided, ill-guarded, and heterogeneous state. Of the lesser 
 states thus formed, Rumania would be the largest, the best 
 equipped, and the most workable. She would have no irk- 
 some dependence and no extraordinary needs. Her difficul- 
 ties would be internal, but these considerable. 
 
 The same would be true in ever greater degree of Jugo- 
 slavia or greater Serbia. Her position would be excellent 
 and her access to the sea ample, — much better than that of 
 Rumania. Her troubles would come from within. Nature 
 speaks strongly for this combination, — more than for that 
 of greater Rumania, but man demurs. Not much can be 
 done till man consents, but in such a case we need not hesi- 
 tate to pay our respects to nature rather than to man. 
 
 A liberated Austria would not make a happy family. In- 
 dependent governments do not make independent peoples. 
 Bohemia mistakes the nature of the bonds which gall her. 
 The antagonisms, the conflicts of interest, and the relations 
 of dependence that are so conspicuous within the Austrian 
 Empire, would mostly be there if there were no empire, — 
 would mostly be there and some beside. There must be some- 
 thing to coordinate these jarring elements, at least to the 
 point of livableness. To the Hapsburgs falls the unlovely 
 task. When the din becomes intolerable and the public ser- 
 vice waits, and the Parliament becomes a babel, and the 
 Czechs refuse to speak or to hear the German that all know, 
 and insist on speaking the Bohemian that nobody else under- 
 stands, and chaos ends in deadlock, then Hapsburg speaks, 
 the ruler of a thousand years, and people in all the troubled 
 realm draw a sigh of relief and say : " Thank God, we have 
 
236 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 an Emperor to save us from ourselves." Nowhere is mon- 
 archy so unlovely, because nowhere has it so unlovely a task. 
 The monarchy may be abolished, but not the task. 
 
 The writer doubts the feasibility of a complete dismember- 
 ment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Autonomy based 
 on national, that is, approximately racial, units is obviously 
 desirable, though even that will prove difficult in almost every 
 unit for the various reasons above detailed. But complete 
 independence, followed as it inevitably would be, by tariff 
 barriers and all manner of commercial and industrial handi- 
 cap, with oppressive treatment of minority elements and 
 echoes across the border, would cripple the development of all 
 these peoples and ruin some of those most eager for the experi- 
 ment. The crude and unsatisfactory union of these peoples 
 which history has bequeathed to us is better, far better, than 
 disunion. Its bonds, which are so largely nature's bonds, 
 are less galling than would be those same bonds under mere 
 imputed freedom. 
 
 A much more reasonable alternative is federation, but even 
 this as Americans conceive it, is of doubtful applicability. 
 Such a federation would necessarily imply federal functions, 
 federal organs, and federal authority. It is much to be 
 feared that the states to be included in such a scheme have not 
 yet learned the deference and the concessive spirit necessary 
 to the success of federal action. We have seen something of 
 obstruction in our own Congress, but it is as nothing to what 
 is habitual in the Austrian Parliament. This Parliament 
 (Austrian, not Austro-Hungarian) was reconstituted in 1907 
 on an absolutely democratic basis, election being by manhood 
 suffrage. A man can vote for representative in Austria who 
 could not vote in Massachusetts. The membership elected at 
 that time was thoroughly representative of those classes and 
 interests that are characteristic of our time. There was in- 
 exhaustible work for them to do, reforms long agitated and to 
 
AUSTRIA 237 
 
 which they stood pledged. Yet when, after four years of ses- 
 sion, they were prorogued, they had earned no gratitude and 
 accomplished nothing. Race antagonisms dominated every- 
 thing from the first. The Czechs would vote for nothing that 
 the Germans wanted, and the Germans reciprocated. They 
 would not even speak the hated language of their opponents. 
 Each manoeuvred for the support of other race elements. 
 When the present war began, Parliament was dismissed, not 
 as a tyrannical muzzling of democracy, as we have too hastily 
 assumed, but to suppress the interminable race struggle in the 
 interest of public safety. It may be urged, and with much 
 justice, that present race relations in Austria are unjust and 
 that a juster arrangement would lessen these antipathies. 
 Undoubtedly, and too much insistence can not be placed on 
 the necessity for these juster arrangements. But it is a far 
 cry from present conditions to successful federation. For 
 after all no government can work that can not govern, — that 
 can not break deadlocks and bring about decisions and secure 
 acquiescence and get necessary things done. There are few 
 groups of men that have reached the point where federation 
 can be sure of accomplishing these necessary ends. Most 
 democracies, so-called, have their autocrat in reserve to break 
 the deadlock which they can create but can not undo, — an au- 
 tocrat known, of course, by less opprobrious names. No place 
 could be found among civilized men where federation would 
 oftener require such a service than in Austria. Perhaps a 
 better could be found than the Hapsburg, but scarcely an- 
 other whose decisions would be so restrained and whose 
 authority would be so enforced by the tradition of the cen- 
 turies. 
 
 And here some one will suggest the Hague tribunal as the 
 proper successor of the Hapsburg. It is difficult for the 
 writer to suppress, or yet to express, the emotions with which 
 he hears such a proposal. It betrays such an utter lack of 
 
238 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 feeling for reality, such an unconsciousness of the forces that 
 really sway the minds of men, such a disregard of the need 
 of that daily, sympathetic, living touch with the conditions 
 to be dealt with, that the very suggestion makes argument 
 hopeless. The Hapsburg may be an autocrat, but his au- 
 tocracy is beneficence itself compared with the autocracy of 
 an alien absentee tribunal. The Hapsburg seems to us 
 only an autocrat. He is in fact, — he must be, — and for 
 many a long year has been, little else than a conciliator. To 
 a knowledge which no be-lawyered tribunal could ever ac- 
 quire, a knowledge which is less an acquisition than an inher- 
 itance, is joined a reverence and a love on the part of his 
 people which no personal faults ever suffice to destroy or to 
 make inoperative for the performance of his indispensable 
 function. 
 
 The vTriter holds no brief for the Hapsburgs, but he 
 has too much respect for the democracy 'i^'hich such pro- 
 cedure would violate, too much regard for the Hague Tribunal 
 which such functions would imperil, and too much faith in 
 liberty to which even Austria is entitled, to see hope in this 
 destructive and reactionary proposal. The Hapsburg has a 
 task for which he is responsible to his own people. There is 
 another task for which he and they are responsible to the 
 world, the maintenance of the world's peace and of justice 
 toward other nations. For that he and they must be held, — 
 are being held — to a stern accountability. Let us not con- 
 found the two tasks. We shall not help Bohemia as we shall 
 not help Ireland, by recognizing a jurisdiction over their 
 case which we can not helpfully exercise. 
 
 This brings us to the great transgression, the world's griev- 
 ance against Austria. She made herself a bridge over which 
 the great marauder crossed to Armageddon. The offense 
 was grievous and grievous must be the expiation. That thing 
 must stop forever. Hence all these proposals. If there were 
 
AUSTRIA 239 
 
 no Austria, there could be no bridge. Nay, more. An inde- 
 pendent Bohemia, an independent Rumania, an independent 
 Serbia, all of them anti-German, would automatically block 
 the way. But would they? Might not a helplessly depen- 
 dent Bohemia barter her aid, wittingly or unwittingly, for 
 the indispensable that only Germany could furnish ? Is it 
 so certain that a Serbia, rent with religious feuds, might not 
 offer through faction the door through which so many a con- 
 queror has marched to victory ? Is it certain that Rumania 
 with her Hohenzollem dynasty and her opportunist policy 
 might not play the role of Bulgaria? It is a short-sighted 
 statesmanship that sees hope in dissension and helplessness, 
 rather than in union and slowly evolved adjustment. Much 
 more surely the anti-German forces of the Austrian Empire 
 will block German aggression if united than if separated and 
 weak. 
 
 What then do we wish as Austria's pledge to keep the 
 peace ? First of all, we should demand liberty within the 
 Empire. There is no sufficient reason why Austria, — vast 
 complex that she is, — should be ruled by a German-Magj'ar 
 partnership. Granting that these races are better qualified 
 for the task than the others, — as they almost certainly are, — 
 their rule is oppressive, repressive, and obsolete. In refusing 
 autonomy to the other race elements, they have made that 
 autonomy inevitable. That autonomy for the Rumanians 
 and the Jugo-Slavs unfortunately can not be effected within 
 the Empire. The war has made that impossible. It will 
 be difficult in the extreme to effect it outside the Empire, yet 
 in the measure of the possible the attempt must be made. 
 Rumania must remain independent and must be extended to 
 the Dniester. Whether the safe bulwark of the Carpathians 
 should be abandoned for an arbitrary line and the Transyl- 
 vanians and imprisoned Magyars included in free Rumania 
 is not so clear. A satisfactory status for the Transylvanians 
 
240 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 within the Empire would seem more practicable. But if 
 they are still to be the serfs of the Magj'ars, then their union 
 with Eumania is inevitable. 
 
 The Greater Serbia is again difficult but seemingly inev- 
 itable. Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia are not vital 
 to Austria unless as potential factors in national defense. 
 They are vital to Serbia, and if a union can be effected with 
 full consciousness of the delicacy of the religious problem 
 and adequate provision for it, the combination is a natural 
 and hopeful one. Since Austria has made their union within 
 the Empire impossible, she may justly be asked to consent to 
 their union outside it. But this union would not be an inclu- 
 sive one. Slavonia and Croatia would still be within the 
 Empire and in part at least must there remain. They give 
 Hungary her only access to the sea, an access of which it 
 would be folly to deprive her if we hope for enduring peace. 
 Their religious union with the Empire and their doubtful 
 friendship for the Orthodox Serbians would facilitate if it 
 did not in itself necessitate this seemingly unnatural arrange- 
 ment. 
 
 On the south, too, the union would be incomplete. The 
 Montenegrins, always independent and holding a vitally 
 strategic position, are said to be irreconcilable, l^o Greater 
 Serbia for them, but the unrestricted freedom of their moun- 
 tains. Their aloofness is certainly not in the interest of the 
 larger human order, but it may prove unalterable.^ 
 
 The preposterous kingdom of Albania, based on no unity 
 either of religion or speech or history, and created at the be- 
 hest of the Central Powers for no other purpose than to give 
 a pretext for intervention, should be abolished. The south- 
 ern portion speaks Greek and should be annexed to Greece, as 
 in effect it has been. Austria's former objection to this on 
 
 1 Later reports are to the effect that their king consents to enter the 
 union. His consent practically insures the consent of his people. 
 
AUSTEIA 241 
 
 the grouiid that it would give Greece control of the Corfu 
 channel and so of the Adriatic, may now be ignored. Italy's 
 objection on similar grounds is now offset by her own occupa- 
 tion of Avlona. The northern portion can go nowhere else 
 than to Greater Serbia. 
 
 Galicia, too, may perhaps reasonably go to her own if there 
 is any own for her to go to, — and if she really wishes to go, — 
 but there would be little objection to her willing continuance 
 in the Empire. For Bohemia and her kindred there can be 
 no better wish than partnership in the Empire. Nor need 
 the Allies greatly trouble themselves to urge a reformation 
 which at best would have come in the not distant future, and 
 which the war must hasten unless our indiscretion interferes 
 with the course of nature. 
 
 The Ilapsburg autocracy will disappear as soon as Austria 
 can dispense with autocracy. Meanwhile the accumulated 
 prestige of a thousand years of service is a thing not lightly 
 to be squandered. Much to be envied are they who, like the 
 English people, know how gradually to emancipate them- 
 selves from autocracy, and yet preserve its prestige, its dig- 
 nity, and its personal organ for the useful purposes of de- 
 mocracy. In Austria that transformation is exceptionally 
 difficult, but it is possible and it has long been under way. 
 
 Note, As these pages go to press, the destruction of the Empire 
 seems complete. The Czech Republic has acquired sufficient being to 
 call a president from America, with what degree of popular warrant 
 remains to be seen. Jugo-Slovia, too, has found a spokesman if not a 
 popular voice, and begins its national life by showing its teeth to the 
 Italians in Fiume, thus necessitating American intervention. German 
 Austria looks toward Germany and Hungary is abandoned to solitude 
 and uncongenial republican thoughts. There is nothing yet to prove 
 that the Empire can be dispensed with, — nothing to prove, for that 
 matter, that it has been dispensed with. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 TURKEY 
 
 The problem of the Turkish Empire has been for a cen- 
 tury the clearest and the most obscure in Europe, — the clear- 
 est in that there has long ceased to be any doubt as to the 
 necessity of some sort of receivership for the helpless realm, 
 and the most obscure in that it has seemed impossible to de- 
 cide what that receivership should be. Turkey has borne a 
 charmed life, protected by her very incompetency from the 
 consequences which that incompetency entails. Time and 
 again she has seemed about to pay the penalty of her inef- 
 ficiency and her crimes, but each time she has escaped with 
 trifling penalty, escaped to continue and even to exceed her 
 former blunders and misdoings. Will she escape this time ? 
 The great settlement hardly involves a more important ques- 
 tion. So long as Turkey is allowed to do that which is every- 
 where else forbidden and to omit that which is everywhere 
 else required, there will be small chance of establishing in 
 the world that better order and health for which we are sac- 
 rificing so much. Turkey festers in the world's flesh. Is 
 the newer surgery able and ready to effect a cure ? 
 
 It is no part of the writer's purpose to inveigh against the 
 Turkish people as criminal and depraved. Still less does 
 this charge lie against the individual Turk. All evidence 
 points to the conclusion that he is a man of many virtues, 
 patient, peaceable, hocpitable, industrious, and kind, virtues 
 invaluable in individual relations, but quite incapable of 
 forming a state. Even in his organic capacity in which he 
 is guilty of such incredible crimes as the Macedonian atroci- 
 ties and the Armenian massacres, it is rather his helpless 
 
 242 
 
TTJEKEY 243 
 
 incompetency than his criminal instincts with which we have 
 to deal. The Armenian massacres have no such moral sig- 
 nificance on the part of the Turk as they would have on the 
 part of a competent western nation, — as they do have on the 
 part of the nation that incited them. It is easy to extenuate 
 the crimes of the Turk. But that does not in the least lessen 
 the misery resulting from his deeds or the responsibility of 
 the civilized world for their continuance. In a sense it in- 
 creases it. If the Turk is irresponsible, the world becomes 
 by so much more responsible for allowing him to exercise 
 privileges with which he can not be trusted. Refraining, 
 therefore, from moral denunciation, we have to note what 
 it is in the Turkish Empire that is incompatible with modern 
 civilization. 
 
 The Empire is based on religion. That religion asserts not 
 only its own superiority but its own exclusive right. The 
 unbeliever has no right to live. If allowed to do so, it is by 
 the grace of the conqueror and on any terms that may seem 
 good to him. Of rights there can be no question to a non- 
 Moslem population. This is fundamentally at variance with 
 the whole concept of the western world. The fact that the 
 Turk has been, from the standpoint of this fundamental prin- 
 ciple, an easy master, does not in the least change the prin- 
 ciple. He has in fact pretty generally spared the conquered. 
 He has first offered them the privilege of embracing Islam, 
 in which case they at once become entitled to all the rights and 
 privileges of the conquering race. This was a corollary of 
 his principle, but it is not the less worthy of note that it made 
 the Turk the most liberal of conquerors. As this privilege 
 has remained open to the conquered, it has attracted certain 
 subject peoples, not always from the highest motives, to the 
 standard of Islam. The Albanians and the Bosnians are 
 examples. But religions allegiance, nowhere more tenacious 
 than in the Turkish east, has generally led to the rejection 
 
244 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 of the conqueror's offer. In that case the conquered was 
 allowed to live on condition that he paid an annual poll tax. 
 He was not allowed to serve in the army, could have no arms, 
 and was deprived of all civil rights. This was slavery in 
 principle, though carelessly enforced for the most part. All 
 such subjects were deprived of the benefits of Moslem law, 
 but were assumed to have a religious law and a religious head 
 of their own whom the Turkish government held responsible 
 for their behaviour. The person not registered as belonging 
 to one of these religions simply had no law, no political or 
 civil status whatever, for the idea of a civil state and of 
 statute law independent of religion, the Turk simply can not 
 conceive. 
 
 This characteristic of Turkish rule is in a double sense 
 a bar to progress. In the first place it denies in principle 
 the argument of human rights as regards all non-Moslems. 
 The plea that they should be elevated and developed falls 
 flat in the face of this fundamental assumption. They are 
 in essence disloyal. Their very lives are forfeit. What they 
 possess is just so much more than they deserve. If they 
 want more, let them join the faithful. The door is always 
 open. Such reasoning seems very satisfactory to a Moslem. 
 
 In the second place, religious law is wholly unmodifiable 
 in theory and largely unmodifiable in fact. Men did not 
 make it, and how should men change it ? Such is the argu- 
 ment. Slow change is always going on, to be sure, but this 
 is smuggled in under the plea of returning to an earlier purity 
 from which men have unconsciously dropped away, or it is 
 itself challenged as a departure from the true standards. A 
 religious state is therefore necessarily a conservative state. 
 This is suitable for an early stage of political development 
 in which stability rather than progress is the desideratum, 
 but it is utterly out of harmony with modern requirements. 
 
 The second great characteristic of Turkish political organ- 
 
TURKEY 245 
 
 ization is autocracy. This exists in its most unapologized 
 form. The sultan is held amenable to the sacred law of the 
 Koran, but to no other law whatever. The liberty claimed 
 for him is somewhat startling to western ears. Thus, it is 
 regarded as wholly inadmissible that he should be bound by 
 his own plighted word, for this would destroy his freedom of 
 action. Such autocracy is always limited, of course, by many 
 prudential considerations, but the theory is none the less po- 
 tent and incompatible with modern ideas. 
 
 The Moslem religion is military as is well known. In 
 practice Christianity has been hardly less so, but the western 
 civilization has unmistakably come to look upon war as an 
 abnormal condition, a means of maintaining order. The 
 Moslem assigns it a very different function, and his different 
 conception beyond a doubt retards the realization of western 
 peace ideals. The Turkish Empire was built by military 
 organization, the most efficient in the world in its day. For 
 three centuries it held the first place, yielding it only when 
 the art of war was transformed by an alliance with a science 
 and an industry of which the Turk was incapable. With the 
 extermination of the terrible Janissaries in 1826 by a Sultan 
 who had come to fear their power, Turkey lapsed into rela- 
 tive impotence as a military power until revived in modern 
 days by German organizing genius. During this period of 
 relative impotence Turkey has no doubt lost much of her 
 maitial spirit without thereby modifying in the least her 
 fundamental militarist principles. 
 
 But it can not be too strongly insisted that abstract prin- 
 ciples offer no sufficient basis of judgment in such cases. It 
 is the soundest of Anglo-Saxon principles that we are to take 
 no account of men's theories, little account even of men's 
 words, and that we are to judge men simply by what they 
 do or fail to do. It is here that the Turk fails most miserably 
 to meet the test. In every part of his vast empire he found an 
 
246 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 advanced civilization. In no part has he preserved that civi- 
 lization, much less made advance upon it. The writer has 
 traveled some thousands of miles in territories now or recently 
 under the rule of the Turk. In every square mile of the 
 territory thus visited there prevails a squalor inconceivable 
 to a dweller in the western world. Evidences of the earlier 
 civilization are pathetically abundant, but everything is ruin- 
 ous and decaying. Great regions, some of them among the 
 richest in the world, have lapsed into absolute wilderness 
 through the neglect of irrigation, a necessity in a very large 
 part of the Empire. Roman highways, bridges, and reser- 
 voirs are traceable only by scanty remains. Hillsides where 
 the cut-stone wine presses attest the former presence of vine- 
 yards and intensive culture, are now overgrown with weeds, 
 and goats browse where once was careful tillage. If the 
 Turk did not do all the destroying, he at least has been un- 
 able to rebuild. The reason is perfectly simple. He came 
 into this civilized land a conquering barbarian and made the 
 land and its civilized peoples his servants. He could not and 
 he would not do their work or learn their arts. Yet as slaves 
 and servants to a selfish and unenlightened master, they 
 could not maintain their arts and their appliances. The 
 Turk has been good natured, tolerant, even indulgent, but 
 these are not the qualities that develop a civilization. 
 
 The revolution of 1908 attempted to change the funda- 
 mental structure of the Empire and eliminate its vices. The 
 power of the Sultan was limited by a constitution. Provi- 
 sion was made for the development of statute law. Paces 
 were made equal before the law and liable alike to military 
 service. In short, Turkey was to become a modern state. 
 But such things do not go thus easily. The impulse had 
 come from without, and the old conditions remained within. 
 Above all the new Turkey was officially Mohammedan, and 
 Mohammedanism retained necessarily its old connotations. 
 
TUEKEY 247 
 
 It was with astonishment and intense indignation that Mo- 
 hammedans were told in those first days of hectic modernism 
 that they must surrender loot taken, in accordance with im- 
 memorial custom, from the patient unbelievers. What the 
 outcome might have been under ideal conditions we can only 
 guess. The conditions were not ideal. The war with Italy, 
 the Balkan wars, and now the world war have swept away 
 the feeble exotic and established the more normal military 
 despotism with which we now have to deal. ]!^ever since the 
 days of Othman has the government been more oppressive, its 
 procedure more arbitrary, its autocracy more absolute. And 
 to all this is now added the most appalling massacre in Turk- 
 ish history. 
 
 The Armenian massacre reveals better than anything can 
 well do the fundamental weakness of the Turkish government. 
 We are shocked by its incredible brutality, but in fact it is 
 incompetency rather than brutality which is its chief lesson. 
 The Armenians occupied strategic ground. Their country 
 is an elevated mountainous region sloping downward from 
 the Caucasus to the plain of Asia Minor. Part of the Ar- 
 menians had already passed under Eussian rule. A Eussian 
 attack from this quarter was inevitable, and the presence of 
 a disaffected people in this highland outpost on the route 
 which the Eussian must take was a very obvious danger. 
 The German-trained dictators of Turkev, aided, no doubt, by 
 the General Staff at Berlin, realized the necessity of taking 
 precautions. A strong and efficient administrative organiza- 
 tion could have taken precautions of a humane character. 
 Turkey possessed no such organization. Hence it was 
 agreed that the Armenians must be deported, a natural con- 
 clusion, however barbarous. But for this deportation Turkey 
 was as incompetent as for anything else. She had no rail- 
 roads, no commissariat, no shelters along the way. She had 
 no place to deport these Armenians where they would not fall 
 
248 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 into the hands of the enemy, except the desert region to the 
 south and east. Without roads, without shelter, without sup- 
 plies, and without time or means or skill to create any of these 
 things, she yet had to accomplish the task which was imposed 
 upon her by the conditions and by a merciless ally. Is it so 
 surprising that she made short work of an impossible task by 
 massacre ? 
 
 This is not said to excuse Turkey but rather to condemn 
 her. If there were no roads, shelters, or supplies, there 
 should have been these things. If there was no administra- 
 tion in Armenia that could make deportation unnecessary, 
 there should have been such an administration. Nay, more, 
 there should have been such a rule that the Armenians, who 
 have known no independence for two thousand years and have 
 ceased to feel the need of it, would have guarded the fron- 
 tier themselves. The condemning fact may not be Turkish 
 malevolence, but the condemnation is not therefore the less 
 complete. 
 
 If there is any moral animus to the Allied cause, there can 
 be but one attitude toward Turkey. The rule of Mohamme- 
 dans over non-Mohammedan peoples must cease. That rule 
 is vicious in principle, for Mohammedanism is the negation of 
 all rights on the part of non-Mohammedans. It is far more 
 vicious in fact, for the Turk is mentally and culturally the 
 inferior of the peoples he rules. Mohammedan rule in the 
 Caliphate of Bagdad or Cordova was better than its creed. 
 In Turkey it has no such amelioration. Nor does the mon- 
 strous character of Turkish rule end with the subject Chris- 
 tian. The Turk is the conqueror not only of Christian races, 
 but of earlier and better Mohammedan powers. The Arab 
 race, with which Mohammedanism began, has long been sub- 
 ject to a race which is a Mohammedan parvenu, a race alien 
 in spirit to that with which Mohammedanism began and a 
 ruthless marauder upon its domain. By the law of the Koran 
 
TURKEY 249 
 
 only an Arab and a descendant of Mohammed can hold the 
 position of Caliph. The Sultan, who is neither a descendant 
 nor an Arab, has long held it by sheer right of conquest. 
 The Arab is neither unmindful of these facts nor reconciled 
 to them. Absolutely loyal to his religion, he is not loyal to 
 his upstart barbarian master. 
 
 All this is familiar and has long made the dissolution of the 
 Turkish Empire inevitable. Yet at every crisis when that 
 dissolution seemed inevitable, insuperable obstacles have pre- 
 sented themselves. These have been, first, the immense im- 
 portance of the several territories of the Empire, especially of 
 Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and the jealousy of the 
 great powers regarding them ; second, the fear of the great 
 Mohammedan powers, England and Erance, as to the conse- 
 quences to their populations of an attack on the one great 
 Mohammedan state ; and, third, the reluctance of the western 
 nations to extinguish a fellow nation that did not directly 
 threaten their own existence. This last was especially mani- 
 fest when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Czar 
 of Russia deliberately proposed to England and France that 
 the three powers unite to dismember Turkey, " the sick man 
 of the East," and appropriate his territories. 'No doubt Eng- 
 land and Erance had misgivings as to the possibility of a 
 satisfactory division and were actuated in part by prudential 
 considerations in that refusal which brought on the Crimean 
 War. But it is equally certain that quite aside from these 
 considerations, the Czar's proposal would have encountered 
 unconquerable repugnance on the part of these peoples. 
 
 It is important to note that all of these obstacles have now 
 disappeared. Russia no longer claims the Dardanelles and 
 is not likely for many a decade to be in a position to claim it 
 effectively. Even if she did, England and Erance, now in 
 league and in possession of Egypt, would no longer fear her 
 control of the straits. Germany is the new claimant and 
 
250 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 Germany must be denied. But Germany seeks to control by 
 controlling Turkey. The maintenance of Turkey is there- 
 fore in the interest of Germany's designs, as it was formerly 
 in the interest of her present enemies. 
 
 The fear of molesting the political and religious head of 
 the Mohammedan world has passed. The Sultan no longer 
 occupies that important position. Arabia is again independ- 
 ent of Turkey and her king, this time an Arab and a descend- 
 ant of the Prophet, now rules as Caliph in the sacred capital 
 of Mecca, while his soldiers are fighting the Turk on the 
 plains of Moab. The Turk is thus branded as an usurper by 
 the authority of the Prophet's legitimate representative.-^ 
 
 Finally, it must be said that our reluctance to extinguish 
 the Turkish nation has disappeared. The knowledge of what 
 Turkish rule is like, the utter failure of all attempts at re- 
 form, both those of internal and those of foreign initiative, 
 and the repeated massacres of tens of thousands of peaceable 
 subjects for no other reason than suspected dissatisfaction 
 with intolerable political and economic conditions, these have 
 deepened the conviction that that government has no right to 
 exist. Meanwhile the active alliance of Turkey with the arch 
 enemy has given the necessary occasion for the long needed 
 action. If this war does not end with a radical solution of 
 this perennial problem, it will convict the Allies in their turn 
 of incompetency and will render futile all other attempts to 
 establish permanent peace. 
 
 But our problem, like all such problems, is a concrete one 
 and one bristling with practical difficulties. What are the 
 component parts of the Turkish Empire with which we have 
 to deal, and what is the problem presented by each ? The list 
 has noticeably diminished since the Crimean War. The war 
 
 1 The complete failure of Mohammedans the world over to respond to 
 the Sultan's summons to a Jihad or holy war when Turkey joined the 
 Central Powers in the present conflict is another indication of his loss of 
 prestige as Caliph. 
 
TTJEKEY 251 
 
 of 1877-8 saw the loss of Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, 
 and Herzegovina in the Balkans, the fastnesses of upper 
 Armenia in the Caucasus, and the Island of Cyprus. Egypt 
 and Tunis slipped away soon after. The war with Italy took 
 Tripoli, Ehodes and eleven other islands. The Balkan War 
 resulted in the loss of Albania, Macedonia, part of Thrace, 
 Crete, Samos, Chios, Thasos, and other islands. Turkey in 
 Europe is reduced to Constantinople and the few square miles 
 necessary for its incomparable defenses, a mere defensive 
 outpost to the real Turkey lying beyond the narrow straits. 
 
 It is to this Turkey in Asia, the real Turkey, that we now 
 turn. It is here that the task of the present war lies and 
 here that the work of dismemberment and rearrangement is 
 already far advanced. Looking at the map of Turkey in 
 Asia, we notice certain well defined areas which are more 
 separable and definitely set off by nature than is usual in such 
 cases. At the top and running horizontally on the map is a 
 band of territory about a thousand miles long and four hun- 
 dred miles wide. Some six hundred miles of this zone on the 
 left is unsupported on the south, a huge projection running 
 westward from the mainland, commonly known as Asia 
 Minor, or in discussions of Turkish affairs, Anatolia. But 
 this zone continues with little change right on to the Persian 
 border, four hundred miles farther, or perhaps we should say, 
 to the Caspian Sea, two hundred miles farther still, though 
 this last is not under Turkish but under Eussian and Persian 
 rule. This twelve hundred mile zone is unusually well de- 
 fined, having the Black Sea and its straits and the Caucasus 
 on the north, a sea at either end, and a sea half the way ou 
 the south. And as if this last were not enough, there is a 
 mighty mountain range running along this southern coast and 
 on past the Syrian corner into the mainland itself. But 
 shortly after passing this corner the mountains seem to lose 
 their bearings. The chain swerves to the northeast and then, 
 
252 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 after a while, turns southeast again, thus cutting a broad, 
 shallow notch out of the eastern part of our broad zone. And 
 since the mountains are thus crowded to the north in this 
 region, they pile up and fill the whole narrowed eastern part 
 of the zone, which thus becomes a wild, rugged plateau which 
 culminates in the great Ararat of Bible story, a mountain 
 17,000 feet high. In this eastern mountainous part of the 
 zone is situated, — though very vaguely defined and not all 
 in Turkish territory, — the sore tried Armenia. 
 
 Turning now to the notch on the southern side of our zone, 
 we find two rivers rising at its very point and almost together, 
 the Tigris and the Euphrates. The former flows southeast- 
 ward following the right hand side of the notch, and heads 
 straight for the Persian Gulf, which it reaches in due time 
 by a tolerably direct course. The latter flows southwest, fol- 
 lowing the left hand side of the notch and makes directly for 
 the Mediterranean at the corner above referred to. But 
 some time before reaching the coast it seems to encounter im- 
 passable barriers. It therefore changes its direction, heading 
 also for the Persian Gulf, which it reaches soon after joining 
 with the Tigris. The two rivers thus enclose an immense 
 tract of comparatively level country, Mesopotamia, — between 
 the rivers, — which with adjacent river lands on the east and 
 west, stretches from the summit of the notch to the Persian 
 Gulf. 
 
 The mountains which run along the southern coast of Asia 
 Minor and which seem to become confused as they strike the 
 solid mass of the mainland, send a branch due south the whole 
 length of the coast. It was these mountains, of course, that 
 prevented the Euphrates getting through to the corner of the 
 Mediterranean. To the east of these mountains all is barren 
 and desert till we get to the territory of the great rivers which 
 retreats rapidly to the southeast. But on the western or sea- 
 ward slope is a narrow strip of habitable country beautiful 
 
TTJEKEY 255 
 
 and rich toward the north, then leaner to the south, until it 
 vanishes in yellow sand just where the great continent links 
 up with Africa. This narrow strip is perhaps the most fa- 
 mous in the world, partly because it is the home of the religion 
 of the western world, but partly also because it has always 
 been the narrow causeway by which alone the great peoples 
 of Egypt and Mesopotamia could get access to each other. 
 It is thus the bridge between Asia and Africa. Looking 
 again at the map, the broad horizontal zone which is the heart 
 of Turkey seems to be perched on two legs, the one a very 
 slender one and quite perpendicular, the other a very broad 
 and long one thrown far to the rear. Between these two is 
 thrust the vast bulk of the Arabian desert, one of the most 
 impassable barriers in the world. This desert extends far to 
 the south in the mighty Arabian Peninsula, an enormous ter- 
 ritory green about the edges but desert or semi-desert within. 
 These green edges form still another area, or rather, a series 
 of areas, which must be considered. Economically they are 
 of little importance, though famous as the breeding ground 
 of the finest horses and the hardiest of men. This narrow 
 border is too long, too narrow, and too broken to form a 
 political unity. It has in fact recognized the sway of the 
 Turk only fitfully and in part. But it has a political im- 
 portance quite without parallel from possessing the holy 
 cities of the Mohammedans, Mecca and Medina, situated on 
 the western borders of the peninsula. 
 
 The point to be emphasized in connection with these sev- 
 eral areas is their almost complete distinctness, the one from 
 the other. The great horizontal zone, to be sure, is essen- 
 tially a unit in spite of its more mountainous character and 
 greater general elevation in the east. There is no sharp 
 dividing line physically, ethnically, or historically, and the 
 much mooted project of dividing this area has its warrant 
 rather in recent political events than in nature or history. 
 
256 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 But all other demarcations are sharp. The Mesopotamian 
 plain is as definitely distinguished from the Armenian high- 
 lands into which its head is thrust as plains usually are from 
 the mountains they adjoin. Historically the two regions have 
 been largely distinct. The western coast strip communicates 
 with the broader land to the north only by a narrow pass 
 across the Taurus Mountains, the Cilician Gates, while it is 
 separated both from Mesopotamia and the Arabian coastland 
 by broad stretches of desert. Habitable Arabia is completely 
 isolated and is indeed broken into several portions, all more 
 or less distinct physically and politically. 
 
 Ethnically the problem is even more confusing. Arabia, 
 Mesopotamia, and the coast strip of Palestine and Syria speak 
 Arabic, but in this part of the world language is not the bond 
 of race but religion. Arabia and Mesopotamia are Moham- 
 medan, but the coast strip is hopelessly divided between Mo- 
 hammedans, Christians, and Jews, these last being histori- 
 cally rather than numerically predominant in Palestine and 
 the Christians, perhaps, in Syria, though in all this coastal 
 strip, the meeting place of the world's religions, we find a 
 bewildering complexity of sects and hybrid faiths. 
 
 In the great Anatolian-Armenian zone the Turkish lan- 
 guage and the Turkish religion predominate in all but a few 
 coast cities and isolated country districts. This and this 
 only is religiously, linguistically, and in some approximate 
 sense ethnically, Turkey. Toward the east, however, the Ar- 
 menian element becomes more pronounced, while in the ex- 
 treme west the Greek is much in evidence, being occasionally 
 in the majority, notably in Smyrna, the metropolis of the 
 entire territory. But Greeks and, even more, Armenians are 
 scattered through the entire territory. To further complicate 
 the situation certain bodies of Greeks speak only Turkish, but 
 write it with Greek characters. There are various other 
 anomalies. 
 
TURKEY 257 
 
 We have now to consider the problem of these several units. 
 
 The Hedjaz, the Arabia of the holy places, a region of un- 
 certain extent, has become independent under British suzer- 
 ainty during the war, a result that no peace conference is 
 likely to challenge and that Britain is still less likely to sur- 
 render in view of the fact that three quarters of the Moslems 
 of the world are under her rule and that the control of the 
 holy places by a power working in harmony with her policy is 
 essential to the very existence of her empire. Moreover there 
 is every reason to believe that British suzerainty is the choice 
 of the Arabians. In spite of the much fomented and exag- 
 gerated Turkish discontent in Egypt, it has long been a well 
 known fact that Moslem interests as such, long convinced of 
 the necessity of suzerainty, have sho^vn an unmistakable pref- 
 erence for that of Britain. The writer has been personally 
 cognizant of two pretty thorough canvasses of Palestine and 
 Syria, both by non-British parties, in which these two ques- 
 tions were put to all sorts of men : " Do you think there will 
 be a change of rule here? If so, what government would 
 you prefer ? " The answer to the first question was every- 
 where in the affirmative. The Turk was doomed. As to his 
 successor all the Moslems and most of the others hoped for 
 British rule. British impartiality in the administration of 
 justice and in protecting Moslems in the exercise of their re- 
 ligion had deeply impressed the Moslem mind. There is 
 every reason to believe that these sentiments, so common in 
 liberal Mohammedan centers everywhere, are shared by the 
 Arabians. If so, British suzerainty in the Hedjaz and the 
 holy places may be regarded as firmly established on the prin- 
 ciple of self-determination so dear to the western mind. 
 Other parts of the Arabian littoral like Oman have long been 
 independent under the watchful eye if not the official suzer- 
 ainty of Britain. She respects their independence and does 
 not interfere with their prejudices or their doings. Mean- 
 
258 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 while she renders them the great service of seeing that ro one 
 else shall interfere with them. This is suzerainty reduced to 
 its lowest terms, but a suzerainty that is invaluable. In this 
 most limited sense Arabia is British, — a necessary condition 
 of its being Arabian. 
 
 The case of Mesopotamia is very different. Arabia is free 
 to be as exclusive as it chooses, for none but the devotee has 
 occasion to set foot on its soil. Mesopotamia is a highway, 
 the one practicable short cut between Europe and India. 
 From time immemorial it has been a busy trade route be- 
 tween the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Nothing 
 can long prevent its becoming so again in the infinitely larger 
 sense that modern facilities make possible. The Bagdad 
 Eailway is one of the world transforming projects comparable 
 to the Suez and Panama Canals. It would not only become 
 one of the great through traffic routes between the two busiest 
 human centers on the globe, but it would develop in Meso- 
 potamia itself one of the richest regions in the world, a region 
 now utterly dormant, but capable of responding in an almost 
 unparalleled degree to the science, industry, and capital of 
 the west. What Mesopotamia needs, therefore, is not merely 
 the negative guaranties of Arabia, but the most intensive de- 
 velopment and scientific administration. There must be im- 
 mense investments of capital in railroads and above all in 
 scientific irrigation on which the prosperity of the country 
 depends, now as in the days of Xebuchadnezzar. There must 
 be protection and guaranties that the highway thus opened 
 shall not be used for armed forays destructive alike to the 
 country itself and to the great countries to which it offers 
 access. Finally there must be deference to the religious insti- 
 tutions of the country whose people, though not Turkish or 
 pro-Turkish, are devoutly Mohammedan. 
 
 There are the most obvious reasons why this task should de- 
 volve upon Britain. Her proven deference for native insti- 
 
TUKKEY 259 
 
 tutions which has become almost an instinct of British char- 
 acter, her immense aptitude for development of the kind here 
 required ^ and her experience in handling the very similar 
 problem of Egypt, all put her at the head of the list of eligible 
 candidates. But the overvt'helming consideration is the prox- 
 imity of India, which is exposed to attack through Mesopo- 
 tamia alone. If we recognize her responsibility for the three 
 hundred millions of India, we can not but recognize her right 
 to control the only gateway by which their safety is menaced. 
 The British Mesopotamia campaign has practically assured 
 British occupation of the country. The capture of Bagdad, 
 glorious with the memories of the Moslem's saturnian days 
 and the great caliphate of Ilaroun-al-Easchid, was the sign 
 to the Moslems of the new and not unwelcome order. Thence 
 the advance was continued in two directions, one to the north- 
 ward toward Armenia, where a junction was contemplated 
 with the Russian forces operating from the Caucasus, and 
 one to the northwest toward Aleppo, where a junction was 
 apparently contemplated with British forces operating north- 
 ward from Egypt along the coast strip. With the collapse 
 of Russia the former movement lost its chief significance, and 
 save for a recent abortive dash for the oil wells of Baku it 
 has long been lost to view. The advance toward Aleppo has 
 also been long unreported, but in view of the splendid suc- 
 cess of the advance from Egypt, there is every reason to expect 
 the junction in the near future. Assuming this to be accom- 
 plished, it is important to note just what such a completion 
 of this plan implies. It is nothing less than the severance 
 of the Arab speaking areas from the Turkish zone to the 
 north.^ The Arabic domain, the true home of Mohamme- 
 
 1 Her engineers are said to have planned irrigation works for Meso- 
 potamia before the outbreak of the war. 
 
 2 It must be remembered that the Arabic and Turkish languages have 
 nothing in common save their written characters. They do not even 
 belong to the same linguistic family. 
 
260 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 danism, the real cherisher of its traditions and the possessor 
 of its holy places, is thus lost to the Turk, to whom it has 
 never owned willing allegiance. As these lines are written, 
 all this is no longer prospect, but essentially accomplished 
 fact, a fact which no tribunal can or should reverse. Meso- 
 potamia will become another and a greater Egypt under the 
 same patiently creative and considerate administration as 
 that which, in a single generation lifted Egypt from her low- 
 est abasement to a prosperity such as the Pharaohs never 
 knew. 
 
 The coast strip on the eastern Mediterranean offers us 
 essentially a problem of sentiment. It is mountainous 
 throughout, but with the usual broad valleys and fertile slopes 
 which this implies. Toward the south it becomes arid and 
 merges into desert. The southern half of the strip is Pales- 
 tine, whose interest to the western world requires no com- 
 ment. It is the only region in the world which is sacred to 
 three great religions, Jewish, Christian, and Mohanunedan, 
 for it must not be forgotten that the Mohammedan finds a 
 place in his system for the worthies of Jew and Christian 
 precisely as the Christian does for those of the Jew. The sup- 
 posed tomb of Abraham is guarded by the Moslem with a zeal 
 almost as fanatical as that which he displays at the tomb of 
 Mohammed. But both Moslem and Christian recognize in a 
 sense the prior claim of the Jew. For him Palestine is not 
 merely a shrine but a fatherland. It is therefore with some- 
 thing like general consent that the liberated land becomes 
 again the home of a Jewish nation. 
 
 But those who know the modern Jew will not fail to note 
 the utterly artificial character of the nation thus established. 
 The Jews as a whole have immense wealth and power, but no 
 one expects that wealth and power to be transferred to Pales- 
 tine. That country, trifling in extent, meager in its agricul- 
 tural possibilities, and devoid of minerals, can never have 
 
TURKEY 261 
 
 army, navy, industries, or extensive population. In itself, 
 therefore, it must be utterly helpless, nor can any amount of 
 Jewish wealth in foreign lands lend it effective support in an 
 emergency. Yet it remains much as of old, immensely stra- 
 tegic as an approach to Eg^^pt and as sharing with that coun- 
 try the control of the Suez Canal. What, then, are to be its 
 political affiliations ? Who is to be its sponsor ? The an- 
 swer can hardly be doubtful, in view of the interests above 
 suggested. No doubt the new Palestine will be nominally 
 independent, and the fact that the modern Jew can provide 
 administrative talent of the highest competency should make 
 that independence a reality, if, as may be expected, the Jews 
 of the world and not those of Palestine alone, are charged 
 with the administration of the little state. This too will in- 
 sure the broadest tolerance toward the multifarious devotees 
 who swarm to this shrine of the nations, for the great Jew 
 who rules in Wall Street and in the council halls of modern 
 empires is no narrow fanatic. So far all should go well. 
 But for protection against great states, a great state is neces- 
 sary. That state must be Britain. Britain would tolerate 
 no other. The Jew would accept no other. No doubt all 
 outward appearance of such protection will be avoided. Ab- 
 solute independence will be the fiction, or if avowed protec- 
 tion be deemed necessary, then perhaps a form of internation- 
 alism, but in that Britain must needs be the animating spirit, 
 the really operating agent. 
 
 Let us not imagine for a moment that Britain covets these 
 responsibilities. She is already seriously burdened. But 
 this is the fatality of empire. To safeguard lands held in 
 trust, approaches which control these lands must be con- 
 trolled, and then other approaches, and so on indefinitely. 
 Britain would welcome partners and sharers in the task, if 
 partners of assured trustworthiness could be found. But 
 imagine her sentiments if a Jewish Palestine should throw 
 
262 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 itself into the arms of a Germany like the Germany of today. 
 Fortunately that is little to be feared. The Anglo-Saxon, 
 alone among great peoples, has given the Jew a fair chance, 
 and the Jew knows his friends. 
 
 The northern part of the coast strip is Syria, richer and 
 more beautiful than Palestine, but lacking its unique historic 
 attractions. It is broader and more productive than Pales- 
 tine, and in particular it has numerous and excellent harbors, 
 especially Beyrout in the south and Alexandretta in the ex- 
 treme north at the corner of the sea, an advantage which 
 Palestine lacks. The prosperity of Tyre and Sidon in an- 
 cient times and the incomparable ruins of Roman Baalbek 
 attest the larger possibilities of this region, which is in process 
 of occupation by the Allies as this is written. It has long 
 been recognized that Syria was to become a French protec- 
 torate in the event of the partition of Turkey. This was pre- 
 figured by the building of French railways, this being recog- 
 nized as a French sphere of influence and investment. It is 
 suggested by the French capture of Beyrout in recent days, 
 though the conquest of the country is being effected by a Brit- 
 ish force. All considerations of propriety and prudence 
 speak for it in the present juncture. Not only is France 
 the traditional protector of all Christians in the Levant by 
 an ancient agreement whose value consists in its long standing 
 recognition, — a fact of importance in this strongly Christian 
 district, — but the present complete imderstanding between 
 France and Britain makes the presence of these two nations 
 on this causeway of the nations a double guaranty against its 
 use by a marauder. It can not be too strongly insisted that 
 no part of this Arab world is able to protect itself, and the 
 only alternative to occupation by the powers we now fear, is 
 its occupation by powers we can trust. The ever ready sug- 
 gestion of internationalization can be in practice nothing but 
 this same occupation in disguise. 
 
TURKEY 263 
 
 Turkey south of the Taurus Mountains, the whole domain 
 of the Arab tongue and the Arab culture, is thus disposed of, 
 not prospectively but actually. We have but to record, as the 
 peace conference will have but to ratify, the inevitable and 
 only reasonable decision. There remains for consideration 
 the broad zone stretching from the ^gean to the Caspian, 
 the true home of the Turkish language and the Turkish cul- 
 ture. This has not been occupied by the Allies, nor are their 
 intentions clear regarding it. Omitting for the time being 
 Constantinople and such territory as may be necessary to 
 control the straits, we have first to consider whether this ter- 
 ritory can be advantageously divided, and second, what dis- 
 position can be made of it, whole or in parts. 
 
 The outrages committed upon the Armenians have not 
 unnaturally elicited the sjTupathy of the civilized world and 
 led to the conviction that the Armenians must be rescued from 
 Turkish rule. Quite naturally we have jumped to the con- 
 clusion that the way to do this is to sever Armenia from 
 Anatolia and put it under the government of its own people. 
 The Allied peoples seem to have settled clo\vn rather content- 
 edly to the idea of an independent Armenia. But inquiry 
 reveals the amazing fact that there is no such thing as a 
 modern Armenia. There is a district in which Armenians 
 once predominated and in which existed some two thousand 
 years ago a somewhat fluctuating Armenian kingdom. But 
 today there is neither kingdom nor predominant Armenian 
 population. Eeliable statistics, of course, do not exist, but 
 careful estimates have been repeatedly made and there is 
 sufficient agreement among independent estimates to give them 
 a fair reliability. Taking the best accredited of these esti- 
 mates, we reach the amazing conclusion that Armenia as 
 usually defined has but fifteen per cent, of Armenians in its 
 population, while Turks, that is, Moslems who speak the 
 Turkish language, number seventy-four per cent. There are, 
 
264 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 therefore, even in Armenia itself, five Turks to one Armenian. 
 Nor is there any appreciable part of the country in vt^hich 
 these figures are reversed. Only in nine out of the hundred 
 and fifty-nine subdistricts into which the country is divided, 
 are the Armenians in the majority, and then the majority no- 
 where exceeds sixty-five per cent. These nine subdistricts 
 are trivial in area and are not all contiguous. All told, the 
 Armenians living in Armenia have been estimated at slightly 
 less than a million. And all these figures, it must be remem- 
 bered, were for the period before the war. According to the 
 most conservative estimates of the deportations and massa- 
 cres, these numbers and percentages must now be reduced to 
 a half or a third. Such a population becomes almost negli- 
 gible in deciding the political destiny of a people. Conceding 
 that Armenia may be separated from Turkey without com- 
 punction, what are we going to do with it ? If we merely 
 make it independent and leave it to the management of its 
 inhabitants, the Armenians would still be at the mercy of a 
 Turkish population five or ten times their number. It is true 
 that the outrages from which they have suffered so much have 
 not originated with this local Turkish population, and com- 
 plete separation from the baneful control of Constantinople 
 with its big schemes of world politics and its strategic re- 
 quirements would promise decided amelioration of their lot. 
 But it would still leave the root evil, the rule of non-Moslems 
 by Moslems, with their denial of all rights to the subject 
 population. This must cease. If the victorious civilized 
 powers do not realize this, then nothing like final results are 
 to be expected from their present victory. 
 
 But recognizing this necessity, it may well be asked whether 
 anything is to be gained by separating Armenia from Ana- 
 tolia. There are Armenians in both and in both they are a 
 small minority, totally unable to control or even to furnish 
 valuable initiative. They have no such outside backing as 
 
TURKEY 265 
 
 the Jews. They are a subject people of two thousand years' 
 standing, timid and non-political in their instincts. Until 
 recent political exigencies made them the target for Turkish 
 outrage, they were docile and passively loyal. Aside from 
 the feeble and obsolete fact of historic tradition, Armenia does 
 not differ appreciably from Anatolia in its Armenian or gov- 
 ernmental problem. 
 
 The Greeks form a numerous and influential element on the 
 extreme western coast and noticeably in Smyrna, the com- 
 mercial metropolis of Anatolia, where they are in the major- 
 ity. The existence of an independent Hellenic kingdom west 
 of the ^gean naturally suggests annexation of these districts 
 to Greece. This has been made the more plausible by the 
 recent annexation of Chios and Samos to Greece. These 
 large islands lie on the Asiatic side of the ^gean and are 
 essentially a part of the mainland from which they are sepa- 
 rated by only the narrowest expanse of water. To step from 
 these annexations to the mainland is the easiest of steps. 
 
 But nothing could be less suited to annexation than these 
 Greek settlements. The Greeks do not form a normal terri- 
 torial population performing the various functions of com- 
 munity life, but are like the Jews in our American cities, a 
 specialized commercial class. To annex Smyrna to Greece 
 because of the Greek commercial element there, would be a 
 little like annexing l^ew York to the new Palestine because 
 of its Jewish merchants and financiers, — an extreme compari- 
 son, no doubt, but one not the less illustrative. There is no 
 evidence that these Greeks desire such annexation, — indeed 
 they almost certainly do not. They have seldom been mo- 
 lested by the Turks and have assumed a political status in the 
 Empire similar to that held by the Jews in the great western 
 nations. Their ambitions are not political. If there is any 
 demand for such annexation, it comes from Greece, whose 
 people have acquired imperial aspirations. Even this de- 
 
266 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 maud is doubtful. Under her present wise leadership, Greece 
 is notably sane, and will hesitate to assume the impossible re- 
 sponsibilities of isolated littoral possessions in Asia without 
 the possibility of an effective hinterland. The suggestion is 
 rather the impracticable dream of western enthusiasts. 
 
 The Anatolian-Armenian zone therefore remains a unity, 
 or if not a unity, its division contributes little to the solu- 
 tion of our problem. That problem is simply the problem 
 of Turkish government. The problem is embarrassing. The 
 population is overwhelmingly Turkish, and by our much her- 
 alded right of self-determination it should govern itself. The 
 small minority of alien elements should take their chances or 
 seek a better condition elsewhere. But we can not but be 
 appalled by the consequences of our own reasoning. Turkish 
 misgovernment is so abysmal that only ignorance can make 
 it seem tolerable. To one who has seen the squalor of these 
 lands that nature has made rich and that earlier civilization 
 has made glorious, talk about self-determination becomes sac- 
 rilege. Even the reading of such a book as Brailsford's Mace- 
 donia, so compelling in its dispassionateness and in the calm 
 statement of the facts that the writer knew so well, simply 
 leaves no alternative to the conclusion that Turkish rule must 
 cease or must be made amenable to the higher requirements 
 of that civilization for which we stand. It is not true that 
 we believe in the unqualified right of self-determination. 
 High above mundane realities and in the pure ether of ab- 
 straction in which some spirits so exasperatingly love to soar 
 while practical decisions wait, we may formulate our gener- 
 alizations about self-determination and government by con- 
 sent, but with our feet on the earth and in the midst of 
 annoying realities we have never hesitated to apply the needed 
 corrective. There is a certain minimum of decency and order 
 that the civilized world will not forego. If a people can 
 supply that minimum, it is the fixed principle of free peo 
 
TUEKEY 267 
 
 pies to let them do it. If they can not or do not do it, it is 
 equally our principle to help them or make them do it. 
 Doubtless we must be patient and give a people time to learn 
 the difficult art. We have done so with Turkey and the time 
 is up. 
 
 The writer sees little to hope in the division of this zone 
 unless for purposes of administrative convenience. There is 
 no reason for intei-vention in Armenia which does not hold in 
 nearly equal degree of Anatolia. Both have a Turkish ma- 
 jority and an oppressed non-Turkish minority. Both have 
 crying need of capital, organization, and development along 
 lines which presuppose such a government as the Turk can 
 not give. In fact, this latter need is greater in Anatolia 
 than in Armenia. Both must be made to supply or helped 
 to supply that minimum requirement of decency and order 
 which the world can not and will not forego. 
 
 Yet the Turks are neither so few nor so weak that they can 
 be taken in hand like savages and made wards of a civilized 
 state. The Turk must be made the instrument of his own 
 regeneration. An administration actually in Turkish hands 
 but under the supervision and control of civilized powers, able 
 and disposed to exact compliance with modern standards, is 
 perhaps the feasible compromise. It is extremely doubtful 
 whether any single state could assume this responsibility, con- 
 sidering the size and strategic location of the country and the 
 military training and capacity of its inhabitants. It is also 
 much to be feared that no international combination formed 
 for this or similar purposes could withstand the disintegrat- 
 ing influences of intrigue and conflicting interests which 
 would be used so assiduously for their undoing. But in 
 some way the required supen' ision must be forthcoming. If 
 the Allies are unable to provide this essential in their mo- 
 ment of victory, then indeed is our boasted internationalism a 
 fiction. The international commission which for a time con- 
 
268 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 trolled the finances of Egypt and again of Greece may perhaps 
 furnish the precedent and the model, perhaps also it will sug- 
 gest to some the ultimate failure and the inevitable next step. 
 If a single nation can be found willing to undertake so 
 heavy a responsibility under the mandate and guaranty of a 
 group of friendly powers, the writer for one would look more 
 hopefully upon the experiment. Britain, France, Italy, or 
 America would do honest work there and make a garden 
 where the Turk has made a desert, — yes, and make the Turk 
 the gardener at that, — but the first three ought not to increase 
 their responsibilities and the last would certainly be reluctant 
 to do so. It is not without a shudder that the writer makes 
 the suggestion. 
 
 In this connection reference should be made to Italy's 
 ambitions, already mentioned in an earlier chapter. Italy 
 aspires to retain the Dodecanese, the twelve islands off the 
 southwest corner of Asia Minor, and to acquire a foothold on 
 the mainland on the southern coast. Doubt has already been 
 expressed as to the wisdom of expensive colonial ventures for 
 Italy under present conditions. We have here to consider the 
 wisdom of such a move from the standpoint of the country 
 itself. It will be noted that the proposed district is in Ana- 
 tolia, not in the Arabian district. Such an annexation would 
 therefore impair the unity of the Turkish domain. If the 
 whole region is to be parceled out among the western powers, 
 this is a legitimate beginning. If not, it is an annoying 
 enclave thrust into a unit territory. The writer has a strong 
 aversion against needless dismemberment of unit territories. 
 All such divisions hinder the common object of our civiliza- 
 tion. The unity of Anatolia-Armenia is based broadly on 
 unity of geography, language, and religion. The proposed 
 division would sin against all three of these unities. It is 
 argued that such an arrangement would give Italy a stake 
 in the Levant and insure her cooperation in maintaining the 
 
TURKEY 269 
 
 status quo. It might just as easily work the other way. If 
 it left Italy with no other thought than to protect what she 
 had, such might be the result. But suppose it incited her 
 to extend her holdings. Might she not conspire with an ag- 
 gressor, — say with Germany, — to attain her ends, and with 
 what advantage to the marauder who would thus find his 
 base of operations prepared for him. Doubtless it will be 
 hard to refuse Italy's request. It were much to be desired 
 that she should avoid the necessity of a refusal. 
 
 Note. Since these lines were written it is reported that a definite 
 movement is on foot, sponsored by no less influential a personality 
 than Viscount Bryce, to place America in charge of the rehabilitation 
 of Turkey. Conversely, the plea comes from Turkish sources that the 
 great powers should furnish Turkey with trained administrators. 
 Neither of these proposals follows the lines above suggested. Both 
 presuppose the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey and her restora- 
 tion to independence. The writer believes that the present Turkish 
 Empire is unnatural and doomed to failure. The Arabs and the Turks 
 differ utterly in their race, character, their language, their civilization 
 and their habitat. There is no likelihood of their forming a helpful 
 imion. Meanwhile nothing but the most trustworthy of states can 
 safely be trusted with the guardianship of these crossroads of the na- 
 tions. With the divisions above suggested, divisions largely dictated 
 by nature, an American receivership for Anatolia is perhaps a reason- 
 able suggestion, — the more reasonable because unsought and unwel- 
 come. 
 
CHAPTEK XVI 
 
 CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 
 
 The well known assertion of Napoleon that " Constanti- 
 nople means the rule of the world " hardly exaggerates its 
 importance.^ It is not only the most important strategic site 
 in the world, but in certain respects it is quite unlike any 
 other. Constantinople, or more exactly the waterway which 
 it is convenient to call by that name, serves a larger territory 
 than any other port. It is also more defensible, being per- 
 haps the only impregnable passage in the world. In these 
 respects it merely surpasses others in its class. But in other 
 respects it is altogether unique, having no similar. It is 
 completely inaccessible to attack from without, being situ- 
 ated between two inland seas, yet is the most accessible of all 
 harbors, being untrammeled by reef or bar. No other har- 
 bor is so situated. It is unique above all in that it has no 
 substitute. All other great harbors have competitors which 
 could assume their task, were they closed or disabled. Con- 
 stantinople has none. 
 
 The value of Constantinople of course is very different to 
 different powers, even to those in its vicinity. To Turkey it 
 is merely a secure capital and a possession coveted by greater 
 powers. It does not guarantee the Empire from attack, how- 
 ever secure in itself. Especially as the Empire has now 
 shrunken, it loses all large functional importance, having na 
 considerable tributary in Turkish territory in Europe, while 
 Asiatic Turkey necessarily makes use for the most part of 
 other ports. The city itself has long ceased to be of any 
 
 1 For a more complete statement of the -Bignificance of Constantinople 
 see " The Things Men Fight For," by the author. 
 
 270 
 
CONSTA]^TINOPLE A^D THE BALKANS 273 
 
 importance, now that there is no occasion for transshipment 
 en route and customs barriers and backsheesh have made the 
 passers of the straits shun its quays. Its value to the Turk is 
 primarily one of sentiment and prestige. 
 
 But to a great power occupying the vast Black Sea basin 
 it is not only a necessary ingress and egress, an indispensable 
 condition of economic and commercial existence, but it is a 
 weapon of tremendous power. Such a power, perfectly se- 
 cure in the possession of the straits, could develop its vast 
 resources quite at its ease and forge its thunderbolts undis- 
 turbed, only to launch them from its secure retreat when 
 they were ready. It is almost certain that Russia, such as 
 she was and seems certain again to be, if once in secure pos- 
 session of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, could ulti- 
 mately dictate her will to other nations. In a very real sense, 
 therefore, N^apoleon's assertion, addressed as it was to the 
 Czar and with reference to Russian aspirations, represents the 
 literal truth. The world has ever been unwilling to see the 
 Dardanelles in Russian possession, for that would make the 
 Black Sea a Russian lake and would extend her control to all 
 its borders. If the Allies consented to this, as seems to 
 have been the case, it was under duress and with misgivings. 
 It is no small compensation for the disaster which the defec- 
 tion of Russia entailed, that this unfortunate pledge was 
 thereby abrogated. 
 
 To Germany in her Mitteleuropa extension Constantinople 
 would be hardly less valuable, though chiefly in a negative 
 sense as enabling her to put Russia under lock and key and to 
 menace British communications in the Mediterranean. It is 
 diflScult to see what the outcome of this war would have been 
 if Germany had been solidly established in Constanti- 
 nople with the resources of the tributary territories thoroughly 
 developed. The Mediterranean would have been sealed to the 
 Allies with consequences that it is difficult to imagine. Con- 
 
274 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 versely, if the Allies had early acquired possession of Con- 
 stantinople and been free to operate from that center in all 
 ways, it can hardly be doubted that the war would long ago 
 have been terminated in their favor. In short, though Con- 
 stantinople is of less significance to other powers than to Rus- 
 sia, it is hardly too much to say that any power that could 
 retain it would thereby become the foremost if not the master 
 of all. More definitely, if Constantinople falls into the hands 
 of Germany or Russia, — the only two great powers that are 
 seriously trying to get it, — that possession will assure the 
 ascendancy of that power. 
 
 This ascendancy is not to be admitted for a moment. 
 Therefore neither of these nations must control Constanti- 
 nople. No other power can reasonably aspire to such control. 
 Some other disposition than that of ordinary national annexa- 
 tion must therefore he made of this unique territory. 
 
 Before suggesting what this disposition shall be, it is well 
 to consider what we wish to accomplish by it. First, the pass- 
 age should be kept open. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus 
 must be public rather than private property. The Crimean 
 War was fought to establish the principle that they were the 
 private property of Turkey. It is now commonly asserted 
 that the Crimean War was a mistake. That is not so clear. 
 Situations change, and the necessities of the nations change 
 with them. It is not clear that it would have been better for 
 the world to have made the Dardanelles public property at 
 that time. But be that as it may, that is the need now. It 
 is customary to recognize the jurisdiction of a country over 
 three miles of sea off from its coast. This principle would 
 give Turkey jurisdiction over the Dardanelles and the Bos- 
 phorus. But this is no ordinary case. Such jurisdiction 
 would give her in effect a very considerable jurisdiction over 
 the entire Black Sea to which these straits are the only access. 
 But Turkey should have no such jurisdiction, and if possea- 
 
CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 275 
 
 sion of the coast gives jurisdiction over the straits, then she 
 must not have possession of the coasts. This indeed, as we 
 shall see, is the inevitable conclusion. So much of the shores 
 as command the straits must share the fate of the straits. 
 
 It follows from the foregoing that Constantinople should 
 be a free port. There should be no customs barriers, but 
 ships should unload and reload freely, making it once more 
 the busiest mart in Mediterranean Europe. Trifling dues of 
 some sort would of course be necessary to defray the expenses 
 of administration of the district, but the writer ventures to 
 suggest that the charge should be for the use of the straits 
 rather than for the use of the port as such, thus facilitating 
 to the utmost the performance of its great function as the 
 gathering and distributing point for the traflac that branches 
 inimitably on either side. 
 
 Finally, it is chiefly important to prevent the possibility 
 of seizure and monopoly by any power. This is the most 
 delicate matter of all. It implies on the one hand perfect 
 competency and impartiality of administration, and on the 
 other, the possession and exercise of a considerable force. It 
 is needless to say that Constantinople itself, even with the 
 limited territories that may be assigned to it, can not main- 
 tain itself against the attack of a modern empire. That 
 maintenance must be guaranteed by larger resources. But 
 those larger resources can never be more than potential. 
 They can not be ever mobilized and on the ground ready for 
 action. If the district is entirely unprotected save by these 
 unmobilized reserves, an unscrupulous power, even a little 
 one, could seize the city and the straits by a surprise attack. 
 It can not be too strongly urged that a serious power strongly 
 intrenched in Constantinople and the Dardanelles could not 
 easily be ousted. Does anyone doubt that if the Dardanelles 
 had been no man's land and undefended at the beginning of 
 this war, the Goehen and the Breslau would have rushed the 
 
276 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 city and that with the aid of Bulgaria or some other venal 
 ally, it could have been closed as it has been. Public prop- 
 erty does not mean unguarded property, especially when it is 
 property that all passers covet. Whatever the disposition of 
 the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, they must be powerfully 
 fortified and strongly held so long as men use force and craft 
 to accomplish their ends. 
 
 There are several possible ways of attempting this settle- 
 ment. It is conceivable that a great power might possess 
 Constantinople in its own right, and yet voluntarily accept 
 the limitations here proposed. This seems a hazardous guar- 
 anty of so distinctive a world interest, yet it is one with which 
 the world is well and favorably familiar. It is thus that 
 Gibraltar is held, open for all to pass, yet completely under 
 the control of a single power. Hong Kong in like manner, 
 is a free port to all the world, a perfect treasure trove to the 
 tariff harassed commerce of the east. It is not contended 
 that such a custodianship is without its potential evils, but 
 if we ask what in the actuality we would have different, it is 
 difficult to suggest a change. In other words, Britain man- 
 ages these vast trusts in exactly the way that we would wish 
 some other custodian to manage them. It is difficult to be- 
 lieve that the peaceably disposed nations of the world are 
 very restive under her management. Probably Prance would 
 manage such a trust in much the same way if its character 
 were definitely recognized. Some will claim as much for 
 America. Any of these nations would have the great advan- 
 tage that they could supply the large potential backing of 
 force which the situation requires as well as the police force 
 constantly needed. Any of them would make of this neg- 
 lected and bedraggled relic of a great past the very queen 
 among the cities of the world. But such a custodianship 
 would be in a sense irresponsible, however impartial and pub- 
 
COI^STANTIXOPLE AND THE BALKANS 277 
 
 lie spirited. These powers would have only this advantage 
 over Germany and Russia that they are not directely inter- 
 ested in Constantinople, a very great advantage, but hardJy 
 enough to silence the objections of those powers. 
 
 Another way would be to give the trust to an insignificant 
 power. Several such could be named who would administer 
 the trust with ability, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, 
 Norway, perhaps Greece. The advantage of such an arrange- 
 ment would be that the world would have little to fear from 
 so small a power and one whose situation did not tempt her 
 to turn the trust to her own advantage. Possibly, too, the 
 police force could be provided. But such a nation could not 
 furnish the larger backing of force required and must there- 
 fore have a sponsor. That sponsor would inevitably be a 
 great power, and perhaps a changing and even a clandestine 
 one. The possibilities are disquieting. Better a known 
 great power than an unknown one. Thus, Greece was before 
 the war supposed to be a cat's-paw of Russia, Sweden of Ger- 
 many, etc. It would be the most slippery of all guaranties. 
 Incidentally, it may be noted that it is the arrangement that 
 we have had for some centuries with the ascendancy of Ger- 
 many as the result. 
 
 Internationalization in some form would seem to be the 
 only alternative. But internationalization, it must not be 
 forgotten, is a concrete thing, not a mere talismanic ban. It 
 implies agents, laws, force, and all that we know in the ordi- 
 nary exercise of power. From whence is to come this force, 
 this agent, these regulations? We will not embarrass our 
 argument with questions of detail. But in principle these 
 questions require an answer before the proposal can claim 
 validity. It may be assumed that some concert of the nations, 
 some form of international organization, perhaps the peace 
 conference itself, will appoint some reliable person to act as 
 
278 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 its agent. ^ Some measure of citizen government could doubt- 
 less be instituted, though it is clear that pure democracy and 
 local self interest could not be relied upon to secure inter- 
 national interests. Then a police force amounting to a large 
 garrison would have to be provided. The suggestion of an 
 international force, — equal numbers, let us say, from Brit- 
 ain, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, America, and other 
 parties to the compact, — would be logical. But a cautious 
 inquirer will by this time begin to have misgivings. What 
 about the harmony of such a force ? Suppose the parties to 
 the compact went to war with one another, would their sev- 
 eral contingents be at peace in Constantinople ? Would they 
 not manoeuvre to control it and deliver it to their nation? 
 What a time their commander would have ! And even he 
 would not be a man without a country. Where would his 
 sympathies be ? And who would be the governor ? Would 
 he hold for life or for a term of years ? And if the latter, — 
 or even the former, — would not something like rotation be 
 inevitable ? And when it came Germany's turn to take the 
 lead, what of the possibilities with a German governor, a 
 German consul, a German merchant community, and a body 
 of German troops subject to his orders ? What would guar- 
 antee us against German intrigue and the recrudescence of 
 the Mitteleuropa dream under conditions so tempting? All 
 this is imagined, it is true. Other arrangements might be 
 made and unknown safeguards might develop. But mere 
 possibilities are not enough. And then too it is equally pos- 
 sible that unforeseen dangers might develop. We can not 
 escape the conclusion that, in any such form as this, inter- 
 nationalism would not he a safeguard against intrigue and 
 aggression, hut an opportunity and an occasion for it. 
 
 1 King Albert of Belgium has been suggested. He would at least have 
 the advantage of experience in the management of internationalized 
 territories. 
 
CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 279 
 
 But that the solution of the problem rests with the associ- 
 ated nations and not with any single nation is a foregone 
 conclusion. No single nation as yet commands sufficiently 
 the confidence of its fellow nations to be allowed to own Con- 
 stantinople. Conceding that its administration would be per- 
 fect and in the interest of all alike, the mere possession of 
 such a site by one of the great powers of Europe would give 
 that power an influence which, in wholly different connec- 
 tions, might be overwhelming. The power that possessed 
 Constantinople unchallenged, would speak with authority no 
 matter upon what subject. 
 
 Yet so far as efficiency and even impartiality of manage- 
 ment is concerned, the chances are immeasurably in favor of 
 administration by a single experienced and trustworthy 
 power. Administration by an international committee or by 
 any arrangement involving the actual cooperation of persons 
 representing different systems and different national habits 
 would be a guaranty of weakness and confusion. Let us 
 take the most favorable supposition, that of the cooperation 
 of English and Americans. Here no language barrier hin- 
 ders cooperation. National systems have evolved largely in 
 common, and national sympathies are for the present at least 
 wholly favorable. Yet the writer prophesies for such a 
 cooperation, certain confusion, friction, and inefficiency if 
 not failure, A certain acquaintance with American admin- 
 istration in the Philippines and with British administration 
 in India and Egypt leaves him at a loss to know which to 
 admire most. Yet the two are utterly diverse in method and 
 even in their fundamental conception of the race problem. 
 Either would be successful in Constantinople, but certainly 
 not both at once, nor yet any composite or compromise of the 
 two. They would simply emasculate and destroy each other. 
 There would be clash in the methods as such, but there would 
 be still more clash between the personnels of the two differ- 
 
280 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 ently evolved systems. Only the very biggest men at the top 
 would be able to bridge the chasm with their broader sym- 
 pathies. 
 
 All this would be still more true as between other races 
 where the barrier of language and a still greater divergence 
 of methods would add to the complications. The net result 
 of any scheme of internationalism which involved actual co- 
 operation of dissimilar peoples and methods, would he to 
 sacrifice efficiency to a purely fanciful equity. 
 
 There is another and perhaps graver objection. We have 
 been considering international interests. We are not wholly 
 at liberty to ignore the interests of the local population. 
 That population would be considerable. It has approached 
 the million mark in Constantinople and in the district which 
 would necessarily be included, it would be much more. There 
 can be no doubt that making Constantinople a free port would 
 largely increase this population. The interests of such a 
 population, necessarily largely withdrawn from their own con- 
 trol, must be a matter of grave concern to the international 
 body. There can be no possible question that the influence 
 of a single culture, consistent in itself and positive in charac- 
 ter, would be far more salutary than that of a confused dis- 
 cord in which each national element tacitly challenged the 
 most cherished principles or habits of the rest. The cosmo- 
 politan tendencies in such a place would be dangerously 
 strong at best. They could have no better corrective than the 
 presence of a positive, resolute race culture which would 
 command respect as illustrating the value of consistent race 
 ideals. 
 
 We conclude that such an administration should be inter- 
 national in its authority and ultimate sanctions but national 
 in its actual exercise, a difficult combination, but not impos- 
 sible, — perhaps, too, the least difficult of the permissible 
 alternatives. This is not the place to suggest by exactly what 
 
CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE BALKANS 281 
 
 means this may be accomplished. It is for practical states- 
 men and experienced administrators to devise the necessary 
 machinery. The essence of the suggestion is that a single 
 trustworthy nation should administer Constantinople under 
 the mandate of the associated powers. The chosen nation 
 must needs be one of the great powers, one experienced in ad- 
 ministration, and one not tempted by contiguity to make the 
 trust a stepping stone to annexation and monopoly. These 
 conditions would exclude Russia, Germany, and Austria, even 
 were they not excluded by other considerations. There 
 should be no hesitation whatever at such a juncture as this 
 in declaring these nations disqualified. We have learned 
 nothing from the war if we have not learned this. The list 
 thus reduces to Britain, America, France, and Italy. The 
 last could not wisely accept the trust. There is no serious 
 reason to doubt the trustworthiness or the competency of the 
 other three. 
 
 The question naturally arises whether such an adminis- 
 tration should be combined with the administration of Ana- 
 tolia-Armenia suggested in the preceding chapter. The bal- 
 ance of advantage would seem to be very much the other way. 
 To combine them would come dangerously close to continuing 
 the Turkish Empire under foreign administration. It would 
 pretty effectually prevent the isolation of Constantinople and 
 the Dardanelles and their administration purely as an inter- 
 national trust, a facility of world commerce. The fiscal de- 
 mands of impoverished Anatolia- Armenia would continually 
 covet the possible revenues of the great waterway and impede 
 its traffic with toll exactions. Political and religious inter- 
 ests and prejudices, easily managed in cosmopolitan Constan- 
 tinople, would acquire irresistible and dictatorial power with 
 the backing of Turkish Anatolia. The two problems are not 
 only diverse but wholly incompatible, if the plan of a truly 
 open waterway and free port is to be adopted. 
 
282 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 Such a plan naturally raises the question how much is to 
 be included in the internationalized area. Only military 
 and administrative experts can answer this question. It is 
 clear, however, that the inclusion should be based on mini- 
 mum requirements for defense and administrative conven- 
 ience. We do not wish to create another empire here. The 
 Gallipoli Peninsula, marvellously set off by nature for its 
 purpose, must obviously be included. Also the territory back 
 of Constantinople at least as far as the Chatalja lines. 
 Whether more than this is required, — possibly even territory 
 linking Constantinople with Gallipoli, — the novice can not 
 judge. It is even possible that the present slight territory 
 of European Turkey may prove to be the workable unit, 
 though it is to be hoped that a much more limited defensive 
 program may prove practicable. Probably a certain inclu- 
 sion on the Asiatic side will also prove to be necessary, though 
 here again it would seem to simplify the problem if the Euro- 
 pean shore proved sufficient. 
 
 Little remains to be said regarding the Balkan Peninsula. 
 The case of Serbia has been considered in connection with the 
 problem of Austria, save possibly the problem of its southern 
 and southeastern boundary as fixed by the treaty of 1912. 
 There seems little doubt that this treaty gave to Serbia a 
 certain amount of territory in which the population is pre- 
 dominantly Bulgarian. This, however, must be understood 
 in the light of the well known definition of nationality in 
 this region. Language has little to do with it, and kinship 
 still less. Church allegiance is the determining fact, and 
 this allegiance, throughout all this Macedonian region, is a 
 matter of comparatively recent propaganda. Under such cir- 
 cumstances national boundaries need not take too careful note 
 of present pseudo race alignments. ]\Ioreover these race ele- 
 ments are relatively mobile and migrations following changes 
 of frontier easily effect the necessary adjustments. The 
 
CONSTANTIN^OPLE AND THE BALKAN^S 283 
 
 writer was a witness of these swarming migrations from re- 
 gion to region following the second Balkan war. It may 
 safely be assumed, therefore, that population has largely ad- 
 justed itself to the lines as drawn in 1912, whether they were 
 then drawn rightly or not. To correct a mistake made at that 
 time, if such there were, would therefore necessitate renewed 
 migrations and further readjustments. Under these circum- 
 stances the thing to note is rather the topographical, commer- 
 cial, and strategic factors than the elusive and artificial fac- 
 tor of race. Whether these factors require rectification of 
 the frontier is a question for the expert. It must be remem- 
 bered that the Serbian and Bulgarian languages differ but 
 slightly. 
 
 The question of Bulgaria has been touched upon in speak- 
 ing of Rumania. Considerations of race require the restora- 
 tion of the earlier frontier between Bulgaria and Rumania in 
 the region of the Dobrudja. The writer is unaware of any 
 counter considerations. In case Constantinople is interna- 
 tionalized and the present Thracian territories in the rear are 
 regarded as unnecessary, their relinquishment to Bulgaria is 
 seemingly inevitable. The aggrandizement of Bulgaria is 
 about the last thing that the Allies are just now in a mood 
 for, but it is to be hoped that present moods will not be al- 
 lowed to stand in the way of plainly reasonable arrangements. 
 The odium which Bulgaria has incurred in the second Balkan 
 war and in the present struggle is largely to be charged to her 
 unworthy monarch, and while her standards are not high, her 
 shame and her disabilities may be allowed to disappear with 
 him. Greece, of course, desires these territories, but to ex- 
 tend the little kingdom to the gates of Constantinople would 
 do her no good unless she is to have the city itself, while it 
 would be both an affront and an injury to Bulgaria and a 
 new source of trouble in this troubled region. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 RUSSIA AND POLAND 
 
 It is significant of the change that the war has already 
 wrought that Eussia and Poland must now be mentioned sepa- 
 rately. The greater no longer includes the less. Whether 
 this prefigures a separate historical destiny from this time 
 forth is not so clear, but it is the possibility and the pros- 
 pect of the moment. The problem is distinctly the most com- 
 plex with which we are confronted. The problems already 
 discussed present grave difficulties, but for the most part we 
 can see what we would like to accomplish. In the great 
 Slavic East, it is difficult even to meet this preliminary re- 
 quirement. 
 
 The problem must be approached from two standpoints, the 
 needs of these peoples themselves and the safety of the family 
 of nations. These two interests may ultimately coincide, but 
 it would be hazardous to assimae an immediate and complete 
 coincidence. If all energies are devoted to the upbuilding of 
 the Slavic peoples, the world should be the richer for their 
 prosperity, but the world may be the sufferer from their 
 aggression. Their ultimate power is almost limitless. On 
 the other hand, the German policy of holding back the devel- 
 opment of these peoples and keeping them divided and weak 
 in the interest of outside nations is one so monstrous, when we 
 consider the magnitude of the interests thus sacrificed, that 
 we must regard it as both futile and perilous. It is ques- 
 tionable whether a repressive policy toward any people is 
 legitimate or safe, but certainly toward the largest and most 
 virile of all peoples it is perilous in the extreme. Nothing 
 could better assure the ultimate deluge than to keep the largest 
 
 284 
 
EUSSIA ANB POLAND 285 
 
 of the energetic races in perpetual barbarism. Underneath 
 all policies that we consider must run this steady current of 
 purpose, to promote the civilization of the Slavic peoples and 
 to develop in them as rapidly as possible those inhibiting in- 
 stincts which alone can protect civilization from their over- 
 whelming power. 
 
 The Slavs are by no means a homogeneous race, yet they are 
 all obviously related and are conscious of and influenced by 
 that kinship. Panslavism is the only one of the pan-isms 
 which has a very substantial foundation. It seems to por- 
 tend the ultimate union of all the Slavs whose habitats are 
 territorially united into a natural unity. This means all of 
 the former Russian Empire with the approximate addition of 
 Austrian Galicia and Prussian Posen, a combination not quite 
 equivalent to former Russia and historic Poland. The 
 Czecho-Slovak area, though conterminous with the great 
 Slavic domain, is not a natural part of that domain, and both 
 history and nature interpose seemingly insuperable obstacles 
 in the way of its inclusion. If it is ever to become a part of 
 a larger whole, that whole must be the Teutonic rather than 
 the Slavic unit, a result which is suggested by the steady 
 German encroachment, industrial and cultural, upon this 
 too far advanced outpost of the Slavic race. Present tenden- 
 cies, to be sure, are checking this encroachment, and until 
 the German learns better manners and better morals, we can 
 but welcome the divisive influences. But it is perhaps le- 
 gitimate to look forward to a very far future when the needs 
 of commerce, industry, and defense, the chief things for which 
 government legitimately stands, may be provided for a unit 
 area rather than for fragments based on linguistic and historic 
 accident. If the German people ever get over feeling that 
 the other peoples are destined to be " hewers of wood and 
 drawers of water for a dominant nation," they will have a 
 very large field of opportunity open to them. 
 
286 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 Eeturning now to the normal Slavic domain, we have to 
 note that it is both racially and naturally ill defined. In the 
 extreme southwest it is separated from the plain of Hungary 
 by the Carpathian Mountains, a very good natural boundary, 
 but on most of the western frontier no such natural barrier 
 exists. Vast marshes and lake systems make population 
 sparse and intermittent, but tend rather to confuse than to 
 delimit the racial frontiers. Such frontiers are seldom sharp 
 but are rather of the nature of gradual transitions. Here 
 they are even worse. In the early days of race mobility, the 
 rivalry between Teuton and Slav took the form of establish- 
 ing colonies or centers of population of each race against the 
 other. These colonies slipped past each other far into each 
 other's domain. Commercial organizations further compli- 
 cated the situation, and the location of the Teutonic Knights 
 as a patrician caste far to the east of the Teutonic domain, 
 as the result of vicissitudes in the Mediterranean area, added 
 another troublesome factor. There are Slavic settlements, — 
 strong and self conscious, — within forty miles of Berlin. 
 There are similar German communities not so very far from 
 Petrograd. For many hundreds of miles the country is one, 
 — not of mingled population, — but of mingled settlements, 
 a far more tenacious and difficult problem. ISTor must we 
 forget that there are other peoples like the Letts, mere racial 
 fragments left in this great lateral moraine of the westward 
 migrations, which own neither Slavic nor Teutonic allegiance 
 and which yet can have no profitable future as distinct na- 
 tionalities. We are therefore compelled to recognize at the 
 outset of our inquiry that any line drawn between these two 
 great areas will be arbitrary, — very arbitrary, — as compared 
 with other race frontiers. A region of interlacing settle- 
 ments can not be divided so as to throw all settlements of one 
 race to one side and all those of the other race to the other. 
 
 It must be plain, also, that such an area is peculiarly un- 
 
KUSSIA A:N^D POLAND 287 
 
 suited to the principle of self determination. If race lines 
 are followed, the result must necessarily be inconclusive. 
 It is equally impossible for the people of such a district, un- 
 less they are exceptionally developed, which these people cer- 
 tainly are not, to forecast the result of the greater trans- 
 formations which such a situation invites. Self determina- 
 tion is a delusion and a snare where fair coherence and finality 
 of national character has not been attained. 
 
 In the absence of fairly clear racial or natural boundaries, 
 the tendency is strong to follow historic boundaries. It is 
 noteworthy that here as in the case of Alsace-Lorraine, there 
 is an instinctive groping after historic boundaries which it 
 is assumed have some presumptive justification. When the 
 appeal to history is made to correct the wrongs of history, 
 we are again in confusion. Thus, the restoration of Alsace- 
 Lorraine is demanded on historic grounds, in oversight of 
 the fact that history can be cited just as legitimately in favor 
 of Germany's claim. Why is the history of the last fifty 
 years less valid than the history of the preceding period? 
 On general principles it should be rather more valid as 
 representing present adjustments. In fact, history alone 
 can not validate either claim. The indisputable claim of 
 France rests on other grounds. 
 
 Similarly, in our effort to escape from the confusion of 
 the eastern situation, there is a noticeable groping after his- 
 toric boundaries, a cry for the restoration of Poland. There 
 is no apparent consciousness of what that historic Poland 
 was, whether it was a constant or a variable, a fit or a mis- 
 fit, a success or a failure. The assumption is that it better 
 expressed the equities of the situation than the present (or 
 recent) arrangement. The yoke galls now, — that is clear. 
 It must be that the old one fitted better. So reasons the 
 present victim, so reasons the sympathetic onlooker, each 
 comparatively ignorant of that past which he invokes. 
 
288 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 It is to be noted, first of all, that the historic past which 
 is thus invoked is a much more remote past than that of 
 Alsace-Lorraine. It more nearly corresponds to that remoter 
 German past for the Rhine region which we have rejected as 
 having been invalidated by later history. And to a large 
 extent it has been thus invalidated by the happenings of the 
 relatively long period since the partition of Poland. The 
 tendency of political arrangements to validate themselves by 
 effecting the necessary adjustments, has been quite as marked 
 in this case as in any others. Unity of language and race 
 has not been effected but it had not been effected in the his- 
 toric Poland of pre-partition days which was largely Eussian 
 and quite as unnatural a combination as any which has fol- 
 lowed it. But adjustments of a very vital character have 
 none the less been effected which the proposed reunion would 
 disturb. Galicia, which is two thirds Eussian, is probably 
 the most contented of all the subject races in the Austro- 
 Hungarian Empire. Though racially Slavic and outside the 
 natural boundary of the Carpathians, it is united with Austria 
 in religion which, — we find it hard to remember, — is the 
 most important of political determinants in this part of the 
 world. German Poland has been forcibly and harshly as- 
 similated by Prussia, but not without effect. The German 
 assertion that there is no German Poland is false, but it is 
 not without a basis of truth. Germany is not Catholic like 
 Austria, but its large Catholic population has successfully 
 established its claim to complete liberty. The Poles have 
 been an irreconcilable element in German government circles, 
 but it is more than doubtful whether any considerable Polish 
 territory in the German Empire would vote to enter a re- 
 constituted Poland. 
 
 Eussian Poland alone has remained distinctively Polish. 
 Despite the official Eussification which has been so brutally 
 enforced, the Poles have remained stubbornly unreconciled, 
 
EUSSIA AND POLAKD 289 
 
 though it is noteworthy that no such wholesale betrayal of 
 allegiance took place in Russian Poland as that which Austria 
 suffered at the hands of the Czecho-Slovaks, and the efforts of 
 Germany to rally to her cause an army of Poles after her 
 conquest of Russian Poland seems to have met with failure. 
 But while a century of Russian rule with its unmistakable 
 harshness and tyranny, has not won the sympathy of the 
 Poles, it has developed bonds that are none the less vital 
 to Polish prosperity. A very large part of the industrial 
 development within the Russian Empire is in Poland. Safe- 
 guarded by the tariff barriers of the Empire, the immense 
 Russian market has been theirs. But without this advantage 
 these Polish industries could not compete for a moment with 
 the much more developed industries of Germany and Eng- 
 land. An independent Poland would not have this advan- 
 tage but would be outside the Russian tariff barrier, com- 
 pelled to find entrance on the same terms as these more ef- 
 ficient nations. This she could not do. An independent 
 Poland would be a ruined Poland, as far as manufacturing 
 industries go. This Germany perfectly understands. The 
 suggestion has been made that the independent Poland be in- 
 cluded within a Russian customs union, but this, if it did 
 not wholly imply Russian control, would almost inevitably 
 lead to a reunion of the two countries, as Germany again is 
 fully aware. By every means in her power, — not direct ap- 
 peal, but clandestine propaganda, appeals to the theoretical 
 democracy of the Poles and their sponsors, Germany will en- 
 deavor to keep the Poles theoretically independent, trusting 
 to the prejudices of the rural population and to the misdi- 
 rected economics of modern nationalism to isolate Poland 
 by tariff barriers which she will help to build and then in 
 turn to make her, as a helpless purveyor of raw materials, 
 dependent upon herself. There are more than military rea- 
 sons for Germany's desire to erect Poland into an inde- 
 
290 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 pendent buffer state, — of course with a trustworthy German 
 sovereign. With her industries ruined she would become 
 a great producer of food for industrial Germany, who in 
 turn would monopolize the privilege of providing her with 
 the necessary manufactured articles. If this relation of 
 dependent independence could be properly assured and sta- 
 bilized, it is not clear that Germany would object to the re- 
 union of Posen and perhaps of other parts of Prussian Po- 
 land. It would rid the Eeichstag of a pestiferous and in- 
 tractable element and would better delimit the hewers of 
 wood and drawers of water froip the dominant nation. This 
 economic dependence of which our western theoretic de- 
 mocracy is utterly unconscious, is in fact the supreme factor 
 in the problem of the Slavo-Teuton border. 
 
 There are other embarrassments. Poland must have ac- 
 cess to the sea if she is to have anything approaching real 
 independence. This can come only through the historic 
 harbor of Danzig. Unfortunately this harbor does not lie, 
 as it properly should, between German and Russian terri- 
 tories, but between two definitely German areas. To give 
 Danzig to Poland with the neck of Polish territory which 
 connects it with the Polish hinterland would cut Prussia in 
 two. Such an arrangement is not inconceivable or without 
 historic precedent, but it is pretty thoroughly discredited by 
 history. Nor could East Prussia, thus severed from the 
 main German body, be practicably given to Poland or any 
 other power, containing, as it does, Konigsberg, the earlier 
 Prussian capital and the center of Prussian tradition. 
 
 Finally, we can not overlook the fact that the historic 
 Poland to which we appeal was a signal failure. No gov- 
 ernment in Europe during the last thousand years, has a 
 record for more marked incompetency. Under the leader- 
 ship of truly great sovereigns, the provincialism and local 
 selfishness of the people proved obdurate to every appeal, 
 
KUSSIA AN^D POLAND 293 
 
 even in the face of the most unmistakable national dangers. 
 If ever a nation perished because it was unfit to live, that na- 
 tion was Poland. This is not saying that the same would 
 be true today, though the experiences of the last century or 
 two have not been of a nature, seemingly, to develop the 
 needed characteristics. Still less is this meant as an asper- 
 sion upon individual Polish character, which has often 
 enough given evidence of capacity and public spirit. But 
 it means that Polish history offers an inadequate basis for 
 faith in Polish future. 
 
 The writer is predisposed, as he has already confessed, to 
 the maintenance of unions among men, even when those 
 unions are unideal and but imperfectly established. Such 
 examination as he has been able to make of the irksome unions 
 among peoples convinces him that the irksomeness usually 
 inheres in something else than the formal union and remains 
 after the union is dissolved. This predisposition should be 
 discounted by the reader in the measure that he deems neces- 
 sary. With this confession, he ventures to express his strong 
 feeling that the ends sought by Poland can be better secured 
 by autonomy and federation with Russia than by a nominal 
 and unreal independence. N'or is he able to convince him- 
 self that any form of international guaranty for a Polish 
 state would be able to give that state real independence. Con- 
 ceding that it might save the state from invasion and mili- 
 tary subjugation (a very doubtful concession) this is not the 
 danger that is most to be feared. With the present distribu- 
 tion of mineral resources, Germany is predestined to become 
 an industrial state, densely peopled and wealthy, while Po- 
 land is as certain to become an agricultural state, with the 
 moderate population and the moderate wealth which such 
 occupation implies. With the geographical situation as it 
 is, that means vassalage for Poland. To a large degree the 
 same fate threatens all Slavdom, but the danger is infinitely 
 
294 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 greater to isolated fragments and most of all to fragments 
 that lie next to Germany herself. Only the most strenuous 
 effort, not alone on the part of the Slavs, but on the part 
 of their friends as well, can avert this vassalage of the Slav 
 to the Teuton, a vassalage which was distinctly prefigured by 
 the commercial treaty of 1905 which was one of the prominent 
 reasons for the war and which the treaty of JBrest-Litovsk 
 re-imposes. Such a vassalage easily leads to military co- 
 operation if not to political merger, as witness Bulgaria's 
 statement on entering the war. It behooves the powers that 
 are interested in restraining the military aggressions of 
 Germany to resist by every means in their power that policy 
 of disintegration by which Germany, invoking our cherished 
 principle of self-determination, is pursuing her ends of Slav 
 subjugation. 
 
 It need hardly be said that the objections here urged against 
 an independent Poland hold in even gTeater degree against 
 the other fragments of Russia which it pleases Germany to 
 erect into puppet kingdoms and decorate with her surplus 
 princelings. They are smaller, weaker, and less historic than 
 Poland. They have shown no evidence of national spirit or 
 capacity. Their dependence upon Germany is not remote 
 and potential but immediate and avowed. Their detachment 
 and alleged independence would be tantamount to annexa- 
 tion. 
 
 This brings us to the all important conclusion. Russia 
 must be reconstituted, reunited, and constructively devel- 
 oped. Long dreaded by the western powers as the moving 
 glacier whose irresistible advance threatened to overwhelm 
 them, she now reveals herself as a necessary counterweight 
 to a nearer and a deadlier enemy. If Russia could remain 
 out of the game, perhaps all would draw a sigh of relief, 
 but this is impossible. United and powerful, she is the 
 inevitable check upon Germany whose leadership she resents 
 
RUSSIA AND POLAND 295 
 
 as much as we do. Divided and weak, she inevitahly he- 
 oomes a vast arsenal of resource for Germany's use. Ger- 
 many entered this war to get Belgium and the Channel ports 
 from which she could overpower Britain at her convenience, 
 to overpower France and take her money and her navy, to 
 get Constantinople and open the way from Berlin to Bag- 
 dad. The day after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk she would 
 have yielded Belgium and her hope of the Channel ports, 
 she would have withdrawn from France, she would have 
 retired from the Balkans and Constantinople, she would 
 have restored Alsace-Lorraine, and would have renounced 
 her dreams of Berlin to Bagdad, — all, if she could be 
 left free in her new and undreamed-of prospect of Berlin 
 to Vladivostok. That is what she is saying through her 
 new prince-chancellor as these lines are written. Autonomy, 
 justice, self-determination, leagues to enforce peace, with all 
 these she is agreed. She will not let paper principles stand 
 in the way of an agreement which says nothing about iron 
 and coal and interposes nothing but verbal barriers between 
 her and the richest prize that ever fell to the lot of a con- 
 queror. 
 
 The reconstitution of Eussia will encounter almost in- 
 superable obstacles. The underlying unity of race is ob- 
 scured by provincialism and negatived, — especially as re- 
 gards Poland, — by the intensest religious prejudice. The 
 country is inconceivably poor and wretched, and too ignorant 
 to know the occasion of its misery. The wildest economic 
 and political theories here find acceptance and work their 
 terrible havoc. Schooled in the democracy of petty, local in- 
 terests, no people is so utterly without knowledge of national 
 interests or so unskilled in international problems. It is the 
 land of the chimera and the will-o'-the-wisp. Yet if we are 
 to escape the menace of a Germany that would extend from 
 the Rhine to the Pacific, we must make a nation out of Russia. 
 
296 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 It will be the supreme test of our power to survive. !N'o 
 paper guaranties and permessos will do the work. Close 
 knit alliances, huge capital investments, constructive states- 
 manship, and above all tolerance for political necessities un- 
 like our own and for methods and mechanisms which would 
 not serve our ends, will be needed in a measure surpassing 
 our utmost imagination. If we don't do this, Germany will, 
 — in her different way and for her different ends, — and will 
 reap the benefit, all to Russia's hurt and ours. 
 
 One exception to this general conclusion should perhaps 
 be noted. Finland is not Russian, nor is there any reason 
 for her becoming so except as a stepping stone to the absorp- 
 tion of the Scandinavian countries by the great Slav power. 
 This is obviously no longer contemplated, and is farthest from 
 that ideal which now animates the Allied cause. Finland 
 is essentially Scandinavian in her culture and in all her af- 
 finities. She may well indulge in the novel pleasure of 
 independence until the Scandinavian powers see the futility 
 of their unnatural separation and find a way to reconcile 
 their individuality with the necessities of modern larger 
 organization. A customs union of Denmark, ISTorway, 
 Sweden, and Finland with some form of federal union for 
 the handling of their common interests, would seem a de- 
 sirable thing to one who knows nothing of the petty jeal- 
 ousies, the arbitrary differences of custom and dialect which 
 have motived their recent centrifugal policy. Whether the 
 war which has written its great lessons so large before their 
 eyes, has prepared them for the desirable, the seemingly 
 inevitable, step, remains to be seen. The issue is theirs, 
 not ours, and should in no way influence the deliberations 
 of the peace table except to dictate the expulsion of the Ger- 
 man kinglet and leave Finland free to effect the desirable 
 combination. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 THE REMOTER POWERS 
 
 The war has gradually drawn into its vortex a number 
 powers that are remote from the conflict both geographically 
 and in their interests. With a single exception these are 
 minor powers as measured by wealth, population, or military 
 establishment. Their interests are unfamiliar and are easily 
 forgotten. It may be assumed, however, that they are keenly 
 alive to these interests and that they look forward to the 
 peace conference as an opportunity for securing national ad- 
 vantage. The world is familiar with the case of Italy in the 
 Crimean War. The struggling little kingdom was but half 
 formed as yet, and the issue of the war concerned her but 
 remotely. Above all she was unprepared for war. But the 
 far-seeing Cavour perceived that participation in the war 
 meant participation in the peace conference and so recogni- 
 tion by the powers. It meant farther an opportuuity to bring 
 the cause of Italy before the powers of Europe in council as- 
 sembled, an opportunity which he used with telling effect. 
 ]t is safe to say that these remoter countries have been much 
 influenced by similar ulterior considerations, and that one 
 of the most delicate tasks of the conference will be to de- 
 termine what matters are relevant to the discussion. There 
 will be the strongest pressure to make the peace conference 
 a general committee pro bono publico, with the result that 
 an impossible program will develop and a multitude of 
 smouldering animosities will break into flame. Whether 
 the world will find in Venizelos or some unknown Brazilian 
 or Mongolian its new Cavour, we can only speculate. The 
 situation has possibilities. 
 
 297 
 
298 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 The scope of the present work does not admit a study of 
 these remoter national problems which may find in the great 
 war an occasion for demanding our attention. Small though 
 they may seem compared with the great issues that we have 
 considered, they are numerous and involved, and require for 
 their intelligent settlement a vast amount of patient research. 
 To lay this burden upon the peace conference, to postpone its 
 decisions and jeopardize its agreements by the animosities 
 and heart burnings which these minor issues involve, would 
 be fatal to its main purpose. It must not be forgotten that 
 after five years of literal world war one of the imperative de- 
 mands upon such a conference will be that it reach its de- 
 cisions promptly and relieve the nations at the earliest pos- 
 sible moment of their intolerable burdens. To reach a 
 settlement that is just in its main lines but leave all details 
 for more leisurely consideration under conditions of peace 
 is the plain duty of the conference. Many a minor issue 
 might better wait for justice than to have a suffering world 
 wait for peace. 
 
 The conclusion is that the irrelevant or feebly relevant is- 
 sues affecting remoter nations, — and even the main con- 
 testants, — should be rigorously excluded from the confer- 
 ence. At the same time the war furnishes an occasion not 
 to be missed for the settlement of these matters. The Hague 
 Tribunal, less ambitious than the league of nations, and 
 therefore more hopeful, has machinery ready and admirably 
 suited for the work. The peace conference may, without 
 undue delay, find time to refer such issues, properly defined, 
 to the Hague Tribunal. The advantage of the occasion con- 
 sists in this that the presentation of these issues to the council 
 of the nations gives them an opportunity to recommend, and 
 virtually to compel, the submission of issues to rational ad- 
 judication, which otherwise would wait indefinitely for a 
 suitable initiative. Kor will it be easy for one of these 
 
THE KEMOTER POWERS 299 
 
 claimants to refuse the reference of its claim to such a 
 tribunal when it has acquiesced in the reference of similar 
 claims for some other nation. The peace conference may, 
 therefore, become the occasion for an extensive world house- 
 cleaning without itself delaying for the completion of the 
 work. The question of the enforcement of these judgments 
 may seem to offer difficulties, but it is doubtful if enforce- 
 ment will be necessary. The mere reference of the matter 
 to the tribunal by the council of the powers is in itself a pow- 
 erful enforcement, and a quiet assumption of this fact with- 
 out allusion to possible coercion would facilitate the refer- 
 ence without seriously impairing the sanction. 
 
 One of these remoter nations, however, stands in a class 
 quite by itself. Japan is one of the great powers and this 
 fact, together with her early entry into the war, quite pre- 
 cludes the possibility of referring her claims to after settle- 
 ment. Possibly some will demur that Japan has played but 
 a secondary part in the war and that she is entitled to cor- 
 respondingly less consideration. This criticism is without 
 just foundation. Japan's part in the present war was de- 
 termined in advance by treaty and by nature. That part 
 was very considerable and has been admirably performed. 
 It was primarily the policing of the Pacific and Indian 
 Oceans against sea raiders, the protection of allied commerce 
 in this vast area, and the expulsion of Germany from all her 
 colonies and posts in the east. This last was done at the 
 very outset and with the utmost thoroughness. The police 
 duty has been performed throughout the war with perfect 
 success. When we consider the extent of Allied commerce, 
 let us say between Hong Kong and Aden and the heavy de- 
 mand upon Britain's navy in the west, it is no small service 
 to have made this largest commercial area in the world as 
 safe in these four years of storm as in time of peace. But 
 Japan has exceeded her pledge in this respect. When the 
 
300 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 submarine menace was at its height and the Mediterranean 
 became almost impassable, Japan joined the Allies in the 
 protection of this area, contributing materially to the practical 
 reclamation of this vital line of communications from which 
 the submarine menace long ago disappeared. This service 
 has been both costly and valuable, but it has not been dra- 
 matic. It easily permits the conclusion that no effort is be- 
 ing made. The writer has repeatedly been asked the im- 
 patient question during the last four years : " Why doesn't 
 the British navy do something ? " The questioner seemed 
 wholly unconscious of the fact that that navy was performing 
 incessantly and with complete success the most titanic and 
 exhausting task ever performed by any fighting force. The 
 task of Japan, though less strenuous, is of the same exacting 
 but unobtrusive character. 
 
 It has been widely urged that Japan should have con- 
 tributed to the struggle on land. This was physically im- 
 possible. The eastern front was barred both by the long 
 distance and poor communications, and by the feeling of 
 the Russian people who would not have tolerated the pres- 
 ence of their recent enemy in strength in their midst. The 
 western front was twelve thousand miles away, accessible 
 only by sea. At a time when no ships could be spared to 
 bring wheat from Australia and too few were available to 
 transport our own troops three thousand miles, the trans- 
 portation of Japanese troops four times as far was obviously 
 not to be considered. Japan has done what she could, and 
 so far as can be seen, has done it cheerfully and whole- 
 heartedly. The question has continually been raised whether 
 Japan might not betray her allies and suddenly cast in her 
 lot with Germany. There is nothing in the way of kinship 
 or accumulated obligation to prevent it. Yet Japan has 
 given no sign of defection. The writer is of the opinion that 
 no government is more constrained by its plighted word than 
 
THE KEMOTEK POWEES 301 
 
 this government,, so recently the inheritor of the incomparable 
 Samurai tradition. In any case the promise has been kept, 
 and Japan presents herself before the world in council as 
 an extremely strong claimant for whatever she sees fit to 
 
 claim. 
 
 What will she claim? Formally she will perhaps ask 
 nothing,— preferably so if she can avoid it. She will be 
 happy if her claims are not mentioned in the conference, 
 for to mention them will be to challenge them. Japan is 
 the one great power that has realized substantial gains during 
 the war and has succeeded in confirming herself in possession 
 during the struggle. These gains are not primarily terri- 
 torial, though the expulsion of Germany from her holdings 
 in the east has left certain territories in her possession. 
 Certain of these whose situation made their ownership a mat- 
 ter of concern to Australia and Xew Zealand, have been re- 
 linquished to their control. Others, and notably the famous 
 Tsingtao, Germany's Gibraltar on the Shantung Peninsula, 
 remain in Japanese possession. But these territorial prob- 
 lems, even so strategic a one as the last mentioned, are of 
 small moment compared with other advantages which Japan 
 has been able to secure while Europe was too occupied to in- 
 terfere. 
 
 The capture of Tsingtao was the starting point for this 
 very important advance of Japanese interests as also for a 
 very significant and rapid evolution of policy on the part of 
 the Japanese government and people. The announcement 
 first made on the fall of Tsingtao was vaguely to the effect 
 that Tsingtao had been recovered with a view to its restora- 
 tion to the Chinese people, and lively expectations were at 
 once aroused among the latter. These, however, were soon 
 disappointed. A more explicit announcement soon followed 
 to the effect that Tsingtao would be held by Japan during 
 the continuance of the war after which the question of its 
 
302 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 restitution -would be taken up. This seemed to promise the 
 consideration of the problem at the peace table, a recognition 
 of the fact that questions of international relation between 
 China and Japan were subject to its jurisdiction, or at least 
 a proper subject for its advice. 
 
 But it could not fail to occur to the Japanese that this 
 was a peculiarly favorable moment to escape from the tute- 
 lage of the western powers who had seldom shown themselves 
 disinterested arbiters of Oriental interests. For once the 
 long enforced deference to their opinion and wish might 
 safely be laid aside. Hence China was informed that Japan 
 thought it desirable to reach a settlement of all the questions 
 at issue between the two nations. These questions, — some 
 of them hardly living issues until this time, — amounted to 
 a remarkable series of demands made by Japan upon China, 
 embracing, among other things, the extension and prolonga- 
 tion of her hold upon Manchuria, the exclusion of foreign 
 powers from specified parts of the Chinese coast, the transfer 
 of control of the Chinese steel industry to Japanese hands, 
 freedom of Japanese religious propaganda in China, and 
 emplo}Tnent of Japanese experts in preference to those of 
 other nations in all the constructive enterprises of the develop- 
 ing Chinese government. The purpose of these remarkable 
 demands was to check the economic and above all the military 
 power of the western nations in the Orient and to secure that 
 of Japan in their stead. Despite the passionate opposition of 
 the Chinese, the effort was almost completely successful. 
 China was helpless, and her friends, — more exactly Japan's 
 rivals, — were powerless to interfere. All of the demands 
 except the last were finally conceded.^ 
 
 This diplomatic victory was not won without much com- 
 motion in the world. Germany of course protested but in 
 
 1 For a fuller statement of these demands and the reasons partly justi- 
 fying them, see " The Things Men Fight For," pp. 312-319. 
 
THE REMOTER POWERS 303 
 
 vain. Russia can hardly have been reconciled, but it was 
 not the moment to protest. Britain found her own strong 
 position rather strengthened than menaced by the aggressive 
 policy of Japan, though the unspoken animus of the move- 
 ment, the Orient for the Orientals, had its disquieting sug- 
 gestions. But Britain was plainly debarred from opposing 
 an ally upon whose assistance she was so vitally dependent. 
 Japan probably consulted her ally and acted with her ap- 
 proval, but that does not mean that the approval was will- 
 ingly given. Decidedly Japan was in a strong position and 
 she made the most of it. 
 
 But Japanese sagacity was never better shown than in her 
 prompt adoption of a conservative and conciliatory policy 
 following her victory. Political conditions at home for- 
 tunately enabled her to do this the more effectually. The 
 retirement of the aged premier. Okuma, permitted the saga- 
 cious elder statesmen to dictate the appointment of a con- 
 ciliatory successor. The ambassador to China whose strong 
 handed action had made him hated by the Chinese was con- 
 veniently retired and Japan for three years has practiced to 
 the full her incomparable art of ingratiation. The Chinese 
 have short memories in matters that are remote from their 
 daily thought, and there is little reason to doubt that the 
 nation has learned to accommodate itself to the virtual su- 
 zerainty of Japan. 
 
 Most astonishing of all is the triumph of Japan in securing 
 the recognition of outside powers and notably of ourselves.^ 
 In the fullest sense, Japan has fortified herself for the later 
 action of the powers. 
 
 This, then, is Japan's stake in the settlement, the main- 
 tenance of her position of paramountcy in the Far East and 
 particularly in China. During the war she has converted 
 that position from a theory into a fact and has confirmed 
 
 iSee page 123. 
 
304 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 it by her arts. The peace conference will he the first and 
 presumably the last ordeal which that paramountcy will be 
 called upon to pass. Best of all for her purpose would it be 
 to have the matter unmentioned, thus tacitly accepting it as an 
 accomplished fact like the other historic facts upon which 
 the governments represented depend. This is the probable 
 attitude which the conference will take. There will be living 
 issues enough without resurrecting any dead ones. Japan 
 is an ally and has done her part. China is not yet a going 
 concern and rights wrested from Japan on her behalf are 
 a doubtful service to the cause of civilization and peace. 
 And after all there are excellent reasons for each of the con- 
 cessions obtained, reasons which would have seemed com- 
 pelling had we been in the place of Japan. Above all it is 
 to be noted that the paramount position which China has 
 been compelled and we have been persu aded to recognize, has 
 long been a concrete fact. A highly organized military and 
 industrial nation situated at the very door of China, inert, 
 mediaeval, and effete, necessarily occupies a position to which 
 neither her helpless neighbor nor her efficient rivals ten thou- 
 sand miles away can lay any claim. There is not much use 
 in blinking facts like that or legislating against them. 
 
 But w^hile there can be, — and probably should be, — no re- 
 view of these transactions by the peace conference, despite 
 the cherished hope of China to the contrary, there are in- 
 terests that are menaced by the arrangement between the two 
 powers which may well be made the subject of consideration. 
 The policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for all na- 
 tions in the trade of China and the development of her 
 enormous resources, is a policy nominally in force since 
 1900. To this policy Japan, along with other powers, has 
 given her assent, and this assent is said to have been renewed 
 on the occasion of our recent approval of her policy. In the 
 interest of China, in the interest of their own commerce, and 
 
THE EEMOTER POWEES 305 
 
 in the interest of the peace of the world, that policy should 
 receive affirmation and, if possible, definition by the com- 
 munity of nations at this time. It is not nearly so self- 
 explanatory a policy as it might seem. It implies, of course, 
 equal tariffs, equal privileges, etc., for all nations. But the 
 easiest thing in the world is to evade the spirit of such an 
 agreement. Thus, at a time when Russia had guaranteed 
 to Japan equal commercial privileges in Manchuria, she is 
 said to have evaded her agreement by making it impossible 
 for Japanese consuls to find office or domicile. As there 
 could be no consuls without domicile and no commerce with- 
 out consuls, the guaranteed equality was thus effectually 
 withheld, but in a way difficult to make the ground of diplo- 
 matic protest. There is little likelihood that Japan will re- 
 sort to such contemptible devices as this, but there are others. 
 Particularly in the matter of concessions for railways, min- 
 ing operations and the like, matters dependent upon special 
 negotiations in each case, impartiality is not easy, nor is it 
 guaranteed by a formula. The duty of the peace confer- 
 ence, either directly or through some delegated procedure, 
 is to set definite limits to Japanese suzerainty in China. 
 Properly limited, that suzerainty is a safeguard, not a men- 
 ace. It assures first of all the integrity of China against 
 the rivalries and the possible domination of the powers whose 
 peace might find there its menace. It insures also the de- 
 velopment of China as a Japanese asset. On the other hand 
 the permanent domination of China by Japan in a sense which 
 might make China a military menace to the western nations 
 is most improbable. The Chinese are neither few nor weak. 
 Japan will be cautious about putting the sword into their 
 hands. With the development of modern intelligence and 
 modern methods in China, a certain sense of opposition is 
 likely to be felt between the two powers sufficient to protect 
 the world from them and to give Japan very good reason 
 
306 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 for checking militarism on China's part. In other words, 
 the much heralded yellow peril is one against which Japan 
 must be on her guard, for if she ever armed China to fight 
 her battles, China would inevitably get out of hand. The 
 world has reason to be complacent over the Japanese hege- 
 mony of the Orient. 
 
 On the other hand, we have little to fear from the hostility 
 of Japan. Japan is and must be a naval power. No re- 
 sources in her possession or within her natural sphere of in- 
 fluence can ever give her world mastery of the seas. Her 
 present allies hold that mastery and have every opportunity 
 to retain it. If we can conceive of our own country ever 
 having the folly to part company with its allied kin, a com- 
 bination of Japan and Germany would be possible and per- 
 haps fatal to either half and ultimately to both. But Japan 
 will '' cast in her lot with the English speaking peoples '' if 
 these peoples make common cause. If not, she will not and 
 can not. 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 BEITAIN 
 
 In the summer of 1915 the writer had opportunity for pro- 
 longed conversations with an Englishman who was officially 
 in touch with inner British circles. The relation became in- 
 timate and confidential. There could be no doubt of the 
 sincerity of the views thus expressed. In the course of one 
 of the conversations on the war, after a discussion of the 
 aims and prospects of the various powers, the question finally 
 came up: "And what do you want?" "Not a thing. 
 We are not going to annex a single square mile." " But you 
 will have to. You siriplj can't let Mesopotamia and Pales- 
 tine with their strategic situation go back to Turkey or to 
 anybody else who is in line for them. You must link up 
 India and Egypt." "Well, — yes, I see your point, but 
 (after hesitation), no, we must avoid it. We didn't go 
 into this war to get territory, and our moral position as fight- 
 ing a purely defensive war will be so much stronger if we 
 stick to that program, that I think we shall find some way 
 to avoid it." 
 
 Though speaking for himself, this man certainly reflected 
 the opinion of high British circles at that time. There is 
 no reason to assume that the preferences or judgments of 
 these circles or of the British people have changed since that 
 time. Yet we may take it as certain that this war will 
 largely increase the responsibilities of the British Empire. 
 The cynic will scoff and will find in this new discrepancy be- 
 tween British profession and British deeds one more occa- 
 sion for the oft alleged British hj^pocrisy. We can antici- 
 pate the new diatribes of German critics about " perfidious 
 Albion " and her conspiracy for the ruin of Germany and the 
 
 307 
 
308 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 filching of her possessions. The Englishman was not in- 
 sensible to the opportunity thus afforded. 
 
 A people in the stage of development in which the German 
 people now find themselves simply can not understand or 
 credit the attitude of reluctance to assume the responsibilities 
 of empire. With a crude acquisitiveness untempered by 
 scruple or experience, and conceiving of subject peoples not 
 as weaklings claiming their toilsome guidance and protec- 
 tion, but as lower beings created for their service, empire 
 for them means not burden but privilege. They do not ap- 
 preciate that with the full acceptance of the principle of 
 trusteeship the possibility of direct profit vanishes. Colonies 
 to them mean prestige and profits, not burden and obligation. 
 How can the people that conceives of the French and British 
 as destined to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for 
 themselves and that makes war upon a peaceable neighbor 
 with the express purpose of appropriating the accumulated 
 fruits of its industry and toil, — how can such a people regard 
 the rule of negroes or Mongolians as entailing burdensome 
 obligations? Colonies to them are assets and subject peo- 
 ples are loot. Their colonies may be models of administra- 
 tion and their peoples cared for like stock on a dairy farm 
 (neither of which has thus far been true) but it will be from 
 motives of sagacious exploitation, not of human obligation. 
 They can not conceive of true reluctance to accept such per- 
 quisites. 
 
 Yet nothing is more certain than that this reluctance char- 
 acterizes those who have truly mastered the secret of empire 
 as a great human trust. There may be no hesitation, no lack 
 of resoluteness in undertaking the necessary task, but the 
 attitude in which new obligations are accepted by a people 
 that has given hostages to humanity is as different from the 
 crass selfishness of the eager novice as white is from black. 
 Empire for such a people loses its glamour and presents itself 
 
BRITAIN 309 
 
 in the sober gray of duty and poorly requited toil, a guise 
 not without its attractions, but attractions incomprehensible 
 to the uninitiated. 
 
 There are still all kinds of people in the British Empire 
 and all kinds of attitudes toward imperial obligations. There 
 are those who feel the primitive impulse to acquire with little 
 care for anything beyond. There are those who are com- 
 placent with present gratifying achievments, too indolent to 
 think beyond. There are those who shudder at the respon- 
 sibilities that impend, and still others that would throw all 
 over in disgust. But the British people have lost their crude 
 eagerness to acquire. Their care is now to develop, to make 
 self-sufficient, to lessen responsibilities, to emancipate, to com- 
 plete rather than to extend the task of empire. 
 
 Meanwhile this task remains an ever enlarging fact. The 
 work of empire, the correlation of separated but kindred peo- 
 ples, the guidance of backward peoples, the protection of the 
 weak, this work remains to be done and calls aloud for those 
 who can do it. This is no fiction. Not long since certain 
 petty states in the Malay Peninsula petitioned King George 
 that they might be allowed to become a part of the Federated 
 Malay States whose prosperity and superb administration 
 they envied. The unanimous preference of the Syrian 
 Moslems for English administration in the event of a change 
 in Turkey, has already been noted (page 257). Nothing 
 succeeds like success, and British administration is a success, 
 its enemies themselves being witnesses. 
 
 But the immediate choice of the people is not the only nor 
 the most compelling reason for the extension of these no longer 
 alluring responsibilities. Little by little in all empires the 
 fact reveals itself that the world refuses to divide satisfac- 
 torily. Wherever the lines are drawn, there are weak points 
 that can only be strengthened by extension of control. No 
 responsible empire makes these extensions wantonly, but at- 
 
310 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 tack or menace compels the unwelcome step. The imperial 
 power is thus ever goaded on to further expansion. Such 
 is the history of every healthy empire. Its growth is un- 
 willed, reluctant, and at last coerced. The imperialism that 
 is deliberate and avid is a disease. 
 
 The present is one of those epochs of coerced advance of 
 which the British Empire has recorded so many. This neces- 
 sity rests on several facts. First, upon the clear necessity 
 of liquidating the imperial operations of Germany. As an 
 imperial trust she must go out of business. We have learned 
 nothing from the war if we have not learned that. Mean- 
 while her trust transactions call for a new trustee. Their 
 location, if nothing else, prescribes Britain as the successor. 
 The Caroline Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, and other 
 scattered holdings in Oceanica are in the great British area. 
 To assign them to any other power would be a forced and 
 artificial arrangement which could have nothing but jeal- 
 ousies or irrelevant interests to recommend it. These will 
 not go to England, be it noted, but to Australia, the nearby 
 civilized commonwealth that is vitally interested in their 
 occupancy by a possible enemy. There is abundant guar- 
 anty, however, that Australian administration will be guided 
 by the invaluable British tradition. 
 
 The great question, however, is the disposal of the exten- 
 sive German colonies of Togo, Cameroon, Southwest Africa, 
 and German East Africa. The first two are tropical colonies 
 and so situated that they link up with French possessions 
 more naturally than with those of any other nation. While 
 Britain has not surrendered her colonies of earlier foundation 
 in this part of Africa, there is an obvious assumption under- 
 lying all Anglo-French relations since 1904 that this part of 
 Africa is preeminently a French field of development. More- 
 over a large part of the German colony of Cameroon was 
 French until recently, having been ceded to Germany in 
 
OCEAN 
 
 Capet] 
 
 Cap* of Good Hope 
 
BKITAIN 313 
 
 1911 under compulsion in lieu of the much coveted Morocco. 
 It is fitting and probable, therefore, that these colonies should 
 be assigned to France and united with the adjacent French 
 territories in a unit development. 
 
 German East Africa, also a tropical colony, adjoins Brit- 
 ish, Belgian, and Portuguese territories. Of these three there 
 can be no thought of its union with any but the British. 
 Belgium already has in the Belgian Congo a territory visibly 
 in excess of her ability to manage. It owes its existence to 
 a misguided attempt at internationalization which resulted 
 in bankruptcy, fearful exploitation of the natives, and finally 
 in assumption by Belgium by the logic of accident. No 
 national exploitation of Africa can begin to show the incom- 
 petency and abuse which has characterized this great experi- 
 ment in internationalism. The Portuguese colonies, on the 
 other hand, have been conspicuous failures and their partition 
 among other European powers was openly discussed and 
 practically agreed upon before the war without protest from 
 Portugal herself. She has long ago been weighed in the 
 balances and found wanting. 
 
 Turning to the remaining colony of Southwest Africa we 
 have a wholly different problem, and one which is strangely 
 misunderstood. Southwest Africa was for Germany a de- 
 pendency, a possession, a source of materials for her in- 
 dustries and of men for the armies which, as she boasted, 
 were to keep British South Africa from aiding their associate 
 dominions. It was. in short, the estate of an absentee land- 
 lord. But Southwest Africa is by nature a part of the great 
 South African Commonwealth, the white man's Africa, a 
 white man's nation, free to determine its own destinies as is 
 Australia or Canada or England herself. The question there- 
 fore is not one of passing over a chattel from one power to 
 another, but of emancipating white man's land and uniting it 
 to its own. It is a question of Africa irredenta, of freedom 
 
314 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 and independence as contrasted with perpetual subjection, 
 for Germany never contemplated the freeing of her colonies. 
 
 But there is a larger question than this and one that has 
 been surprisingly ignored. Despite all our striving and all 
 our protestations we still continue to consider these questions 
 rather from the standpoint of suzerain privilege than from 
 that of colonial welfare. The plea is continually in our 
 ears or in our thoughts as to whether Germany should not 
 have *' her share " of colonies and the like, the good things 
 of earth. Maddened by her inhuman acts we nerve our- 
 selves to outlaw the great offender and to confiscate her col- 
 onies, but we are still conscious of having deprived her of 
 something normally hers, something which if decent she 
 might rightfully claim. We divide up Africa as Jacob and 
 Esau divided the herds. 
 
 As regards tropical races and peoples destined to permanent 
 or prolonged incapacity for self management, the right of 
 the civilized world to impose the conditions of order can not 
 reasonably be doubted, though it is a question whether even 
 upon such races the civilized world has the right to impose its 
 barriers and its feuds. But in a country like South Africa 
 which is certain to be the home of white men and the seat of 
 a great civilized independent state, this question becomes 
 far more important. Europe is hopelessly divided in lan- 
 guage and from this difference derive others which taken 
 in the aggregate make political union impossible and even 
 peace precarious. The present awful calamity which is said 
 already to have cost the lives of eight million men is wholly 
 due to diversities of race which in last analysis are matters 
 of speech and custom. 
 
 But awful as is this situation, in Europe it has its explana- 
 tion, its reason. Europe itself is divided into sharply dif- 
 ferentiated areas fit to engender race peculiarities but offer- 
 ing advantages which compensate for them. The seas and 
 
BRITAm 315 
 
 straits and gulfs that divide Europe are the most facile of 
 highways, the channels through which move the stimulating 
 and vivifying currents of life. Europe is the most quarrel- 
 some but also the most dynamic, the most civilized, part of 
 the world. Mature is responsible for both. 
 
 But South Africa is not made that way. To transfer to 
 that unit area the diversities and antipathies of Europe would 
 give it perfectly gratuitous disadvantages with no possible 
 compensation. These colonies are young yet. The German 
 colony has virtually no German population and the schism 
 is not yet born. But let it be German for a hundred years, 
 and we would have there a German area permanently in- 
 capable of union with the neighboring English speaking dis- 
 trict which is, and forever must be, the dominant white ele- 
 ment in South Africa. We should have gratuitously created 
 a barrier for future generations to balk at, perhaps to drench 
 with their blood. It requires a profound belief in the merits 
 of German culture (a culture which the writer by no means 
 despises) to make such a course as that seem worth while. 
 
 It will of course be said in reply that a similar divergence 
 exists between French and English. Yes, and regrettably so, 
 but the cases are not even approximately parallel. The 
 French and British colonies are sandwiched in together in 
 some parts of Africa in a way that seems at this distance 
 unfortunate, a thing perhaps to be remedied by exchanges. 
 But these are tropical colonies, and tropical colonies will never 
 become white man's land. The population will always be 
 native and will for an indefinite period retain its native 
 language. Whether these natives in addition acquire a smat- 
 tering of French or English is irrelevant as regards their 
 political or cultural future. But a land that is destined to 
 fill up with white men should avoid the white men's dissen- 
 sions, especially when the country itself speaks unreservedly 
 for union. The problem of Southwest Africa is not a prob- 
 
316 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 lem of the rights of Germany or of Britain. It is a problem 
 of developing a united people in a united land. If German 
 had the same dominating position in South Africa that Eng- 
 lish now holds, the writer for one would unhesitatingly vote 
 for a German unity. 
 
 It is perhaps worth while to note that the dissensions thus 
 forecast are by no means speculative. They have long ex- 
 isted and Southwest Africa has long been a thorn in the flesh 
 of the neighboring Commonwealth. It was no doubt in part 
 due to this that the Commonwealth espoused the cause of 
 Britain so wholeheartedly and devoted a hundred million 
 dollars and a considerable army to the expulsion of " neigh- 
 bor Hans " from his objectionable point of vantage. This 
 hostility was not merely racial, but in this case had the arti- 
 ficial virulence which William Hohenzollern has everywhere 
 known how to give it. But artificial or not, its effect was 
 not the less real. In German Southwest Africa had been 
 planted the seeds of one of the world's great antagonisms 
 which it is the good fortune of the present generation to pluck 
 up ere it was grown. 
 
 The case of the Portuguese colonies is not relevant to our 
 discussion, yet intimately associated with our problem. 
 Their fate has long been determined. Portugal does nothing, 
 can do nothing, to develop them. It is due to them and 
 to the world that some arrangement should be made to bring 
 them under more favorable conditions. Britain's control 
 of Portugal should make that possible. Indeed an arrange- 
 ment was announced before the war dividing them between 
 Britain and Gemaany. The eastern colony holds the same 
 relation to the South African Commonwealth on the east that 
 the German colony holds on the west, only the contact is 
 much closer and more vital. It should be united to that 
 great state now, before alien institutions and alien culture 
 
BRITAIN 317 
 
 make the -union unnecessarily slow and difficult. The great 
 western colony requires different treatment. 
 
 The cases of Arabia, Palestine, and Mesopotamia have been 
 sufficiently considered in the chapter on Turkey. These 
 districts for many reasons will doubtless pose as independent 
 states, but in varying degrees they must inevitably be British 
 dependencies. Arabia will be an isolated shrine in which 
 Britain will have no other function than to protect its isola- 
 tion, — and insure its sanitation. Palestine will be a com- 
 petently administered up-to-date artificial state, which will 
 require nothing of Britain save protection from foreign ag- 
 gression, and will repay that protection with perfect loyalty. 
 Mesopotamia will require British capital and British ad- 
 ministration and can hardly escape becoming an avowed 
 British protectorate. As such it will again become the 
 Garden of Eden. Perhaps Anatolia and Constantinople 
 will claim the healing touch, but the claim may well be 
 denied. 
 
 The problem of problems in connection with the coming 
 settlement is the control of the sea. That control Britain has 
 maintained against all comers for two reasons that are pe- 
 culiar to herself. The first is the insular position and dense 
 industrial population of England. That population normally 
 raises but thirty per cent, of its food. The rest is imported 
 by sea. If the sea routes are closed, England starves. IS""© 
 other country is so situated. If any other country loses the 
 use of the sea, it suffers but it does not starve. England 
 alone must have the freedom of the sea or her present popu- 
 lation can not continue to live there, but must migrate and 
 ruin her industries, her everything. 
 
 To this unique necessity is added another, equally impera- 
 tive and equally unique. England is but the European head- 
 quarters of a vast aggregate a hundred times her area and 
 
318 THE GKEAT PEACE 
 
 with ten times her population. This group of nations, falsely 
 called an empire, constitutes the greatest power in the world, 
 solely by virtue of its voluntary cooperation. But this co- 
 operation is rendered possible only by the use of the sea. If 
 this use were denied them, no amount of sympathy or desire 
 to help one another would be of any avail. The great power 
 would automatically crumble into a lot of scattered little 
 powers helpless to achieve any worthy work for the world, 
 helpless even to maintain their own existence- 
 No more pertinent demand can therefore be made of a 
 defeated Germany than the surrender of her navy. That 
 navy was built solely to destroy the navy of Britain, that is, 
 to destroy the British Empire. Even when Germany had 
 colonies, her navy stood in no relation to their number or 
 needs. With the loss of her colonies, she loses even the pre- 
 text for the maintenance of a vast navy. That navy neces- 
 sitated the expansion of every other naval program in the 
 world. No other form of German militarism was so odious, 
 so burdensome upon the entire world, so utterly gratuitous. 
 No other form is so capable of suppression by international 
 action. To propose the destruction of German militarism 
 and yet leave Germany in possession of a monster navy which 
 exists, not as the condition of her national union, nor yet for 
 the protection of her commerce, but purely for the purpose 
 of challenging the safety and the existence of other powers, 
 is a proposal which would invalidate every argument by which 
 the Allies have justified their action. 
 
 A logical corollary of the surrender of the German navy 
 would be the surrender of the Kiel Canal. It is true that 
 this Canal serves commercial as well as naval purposes, though 
 the latter were the real cause of its construction. Commer- 
 cial purposes it would of course continue to serve in any case. 
 But the Canal must in any case continue to exist, and so long 
 as it exists it must potentially serve Germany's purpose. The 
 
BEITAIN 319 
 
 idea of withholding it from her by internationalization in- 
 volves the usual fallacy of assuming that such arrangements 
 are self-enforcing. If the Canal would serve Germany's pur- 
 pose in any future war, she would take it, and no interna- 
 tional precautions would prevent it. 
 
 Britain controls the sea that she may use the sea, for she 
 must use the sea or perish. Her need and her right are such 
 as no other nation knows. And now she is asked to surrender 
 that control and to trust the freedom of the seas and with it 
 her own existence and the lives of her people to an interna- 
 tional league, a league having as yet only a theoretical exist- 
 ence, a league of whose competence, of whose justice, of whose 
 sympathy, even of whose existence, she has as yet had no 
 experience. She will not do it. The ivorld can not afford 
 to have her do it. The experiment must be tried with some 
 lesser stake than the existence of the " great and sacred inter- 
 national trust " which, more than any other power, holds the 
 safety of the world in its keeping. British statesmen and the 
 British people have too much feeling for reality to trifle thus 
 with the heritage of a thousand years. 
 
 And all for what ? What do we wish to accomplish by this 
 new international agency that we summon from the limbo of 
 the imagination to take over the task of this veteran of the 
 seas ? To open the waterways to all honest folk ? To light 
 the beacon on the savage's inhospitable shores? To rid the 
 sea of the marauder? To remove the barriers and the toll- 
 gates? To rescue the shipwrecked? To maintain by piti- 
 less discipline the law of " women and children first " ? In 
 which of these has Britain failed ? What sea has she closed ? 
 What waterway has she barred? What harbor does she 
 monopolize? Is there a reef that she has not charted, a 
 coast that she has left unlighted, a pirate that she has not 
 hunted? Is there a harbor under the control of her Parlia- 
 ment that she does not open to the ships of her rivals on the 
 
320 THE GEEAT PEACE 
 
 same terms as to her own ? Is there an abuse that she will- 
 ingly tolerates, a possible forbearance that she does not 
 show ? What is the world's grievance that impels it to dis- 
 miss this most competent of unpaid servitors ? 
 
 But Britain smites her enemies upon the sea, drives them 
 to cover and shuts them in, all to the sore discomfort of those 
 who were trafficking profitably with them. Precisely, just as 
 land powers pursue their enemies upon the land with vastly 
 greater disturbance and devastation. But what is there in 
 recent British history to warrant the fear that her power will 
 be used wantonly or tyrannously? It is fatuous to expect 
 peace by the disarmament of the conservative and forbear- 
 ing. The weapon in such hands is rather a guaranty of 
 peace than its menace. We have read the story of the wars 
 that the British navy has fought, but who knows the story of 
 the wars it has prevented ? 
 
 There has been just one intelligible protest against Brit- 
 ain's control of the sea, that of the power that wishes to de- 
 stroy her. That control is the condition of the existence of 
 that fellowship of free nations which Germany abhors, and 
 the very substance of its power. Withdraw the British navy 
 from the seas and nothing will effectually hinder Germany's 
 ruthless purpose. Eliminate that purpose, and Britain will 
 withdraw her navy without a mandate. 
 
 This protest against Britain's control of the sea is made in 
 the name of internationalism, but in the interest (con- 
 sciously or unconsciously) of the crudest and most illiberal 
 nationalism. The seer of visions as usual plays into the 
 hands of the seeker of gains. Meanwhile if the fondest of 
 visions were realized, we should at the utmost be where we 
 are now as regards the permanent interests of the safety and 
 freedom of the seas. The thing we crave is as like the thing 
 we have as tweedledum like tweedledee. And yet it is not the 
 same, for the thing we have embodies the instincts and the 
 
BRITAIN 321 
 
 traditions which the greatest of seafaring peoples has slowly 
 developed during fifteen centuries. 
 
 Note. For a more complete study of the problem of sea control see 
 the author's earlier work, " The Things Men Fight For," Chapters VI 
 and XIII. 
 
 One of Germany's fiercest protagonists, Count Reventlow, has stated 
 that as regards the use of the seas in time of peace Germany has no 
 grievance. Only schemes of conquest are interfered with. 
 
 It is perhaps a mistake to take seriously the newspaper speculation 
 which rims riot at a time like this, but it is not always easy to ignore it. 
 Our Secretary of the Navy recommends an enormous increase in our 
 navy. So be it. We are a naval power with extensive coasts to pro- 
 tect and interests exposed to the covetousness of all nations. But now 
 comes the report that we are to go to the peace conference armed with 
 the greatest navy in the world, — larger than that of Britain, — to de- 
 mand the freedom of the seas. What does that mean ? From whom 
 are we to demand it? From defeated Germany? From allied France? 
 There can be but one answer. From Britain. It is diiSicult to say 
 whether such a demand would be characterized most by foolhardiness or 
 by criminality. Were it not that certain official pronouncements, in- 
 cluding the famous fourteen points, have been disquietingly suggestive 
 of an effort to coerce Britain to adopt measures which she regards as 
 incompatible with her safety and her duty to the world, the suggestion 
 might be dismissed as too preposterous for consideration. 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 
 AMERICA 
 
 Among the great powers that are actively engaged in the 
 world struggle, the position of America seems to be unique. 
 The interests involved did not at first seem to be our interests. 
 In the territorial sense we were not attacked, nor was any 
 attack contemplated, at least during the present conflict. In 
 her tactless way, too, Germany made the most earnest eiforts 
 to win our friendship, sacrificing what seemed to her substan- 
 tial interests in order to do so. We accordingly essayed to 
 be neutral, even in our inmost thoughts. When we finally 
 entered the contest, it was still with no sense of serious danger. 
 Even the submarine warfare which amply justified our course, 
 did not seem to threaten our existence. There can be no 
 doubt that so far as the popular consciousness is concerned, 
 we entered the war for other than the compelling reasons of 
 national safety which actuated our Allies. We quite natu- 
 rally conclude that our action was on a higher plane and our 
 motives more disinterested than those of other nations. Quite 
 possibly this was the case. Our motives were naturally deter- 
 mined by our appreciation of the situation, and the danger 
 that we did not perceive did not influence our action. 
 
 It is perhaps due to this fact that we have shown so marked 
 a disposition to emphasize the theoretical and abstract aims 
 of the war. The recognition of general principles merely as 
 such, of forms of political organization and doctrines of popu- 
 lar rights, have seemed the appropriate ends for a nation seek- 
 ing no tangible interests to demand as the fruits of victory. 
 It has not always occurred to us that the recognition thus de- 
 manded might be a mere lip service, and that a nation so 
 
 322 
 
AMEEICA 323 
 
 skilled in dissembling as is our antagonist might purchase a 
 dangerous immunity by conformity to these shibboleths. In 
 short there has been an element of serious danger in this con- 
 fident assumption that we were free from danger and at lib- 
 erty to espouse ideals while others were compelled to think of 
 groveling material interests. It has made us quixotic and 
 unsympathetic toward the material interests of our Allies, 
 careless even of our own. 
 
 For the danger was there, quite as real and quite as seri- 
 ous for us as for the others. The perception of this fact has 
 become clearer as the war has progressed. The present war 
 was not aimed at America, it is true. Its objectives were 
 prudently limited to the defeat of Eussia, the appropriation 
 of the colonies and capital of France, the incorporation of 
 Belgium, and the dismemberment and plunder of the British 
 Empire. But with Britain destroyed, France plundered and 
 forced into alliance, and Eussia crippled and subject to Ger- 
 man exploitation, the Kaiser's purpose to " stand no nonsense 
 from America " was ready to reveal its true significance. 
 Just what was to happen to us is not clear, nor is it certain 
 that war was contemplated. It was probably assumed that 
 our nonsense could be dealt with by less expensive means, not 
 an unreasonable assumption. It matters little. The impor- 
 tant thing is that the Kaiser was to be in a position to say 
 what he would stand and what he would not stand. We were 
 to recognize his authority. If the lesson of this war were not 
 sufiicient, there would be other lessons as needed. 
 
 There is still a tendency in certain quarters to refer to these 
 designs with a certain levity. Such an attitude is not war- 
 ranted either by the seriousness of German designs or by the 
 American capacity for defense. If the Allies had been de- 
 feated, — if even now they could be persuaded to accept an 
 inconclusive peace, — these German designs would be realized 
 with terrible literalness. When we see by how narrow a mar- 
 
324 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 gin that disaster has been averted, we can but shudder at the 
 danger that we have escaped. 
 
 Whatever our purposes, therefore, in entering the war, our 
 purposes in closing it should be shaped by this fuller revela- 
 tion. We know now why we ought to have entered the war, 
 and that must determine our terms of peace. Kot merely as 
 a knight errant generously espousing the cause of weaker 
 nations, but as one that stands as our kinsmen stood " with 
 our backs to the wall," fighting for the right to live, must we 
 make peace with our enemy. 
 
 First of all we must insist upon the exclusion from the 
 Western Hemisphere of any power which might endanger our 
 peace and our independence. More specifically, we must bar 
 Germany from these shores. It has been suggested that this 
 0,^ take the form of the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine as a 
 principle of international law. It would perhaps be better to 
 avoid associating such a declaration with this historic doc- 
 trine which is too intimately associated with our own country 
 and too much motived by our national interests to command 
 : the sympathy of the Latin American republics. It is these 
 republics that are sure to be the first sufferers from German 
 aggression. Brazil was hopelessly in the toils of German 
 finance and marked for German appropriation before this war 
 began. Erom such a country, — better still, from a group of 
 such countries, — the plea for protection may appropriately 
 come. It is for diplomacy to arrange these important mat- 
 ters of detail, but for American vigilance to see that the neces- 
 sary purpose is accomplished.-^ 
 
 Kot that we are to imagine for a moment that such an 
 
 international guaranty will make us safe against aggression. 
 
 It can not be too strongly insisted that no international 
 
 1 For the author's fuller discussion of the Latin American problem 
 as related to the United States, and, particularly, to the problem of the 
 Caribbean and the Canal, see " America Among the Nations," Chapters 
 
 v-xn. 
 
AMERICA 325 
 
 power exists or is likely to exist which can of itself and with- 
 out national aid secure such ends. A coherent international- 
 ism will be a partial internationalism with powerful enemies 
 outside that do not own its law. An inclusive and all em- 
 bracing internationalism would include the dissensions and 
 the dangers against which it exists to defend the world. 
 Our right arm must be our defense for a long, long time to 
 come. But recognition is not without its value. It puts a 
 quietus upon minor protests and at least insures local acquies- 
 cence. And if the worst comes, it is easier to fight for a 
 recognized right than for an unsupported claim. 
 
 But more material interests may well claim our attention. 
 There are disturbing ownerships in the Caribbean which 
 menace our control of the Canal, the most vital of all our 
 possessions. Holland owns her Dutch Guiana on the Carib- 
 bean coast. We could have no more innocent or well disposed 
 neighbor if Holland were independent. But Holland is not 
 independent. During this war she has done all in her power 
 to remain neutral, but Germany has compelled her to grant 
 concessions which were a breach of neutrality. This rela- 
 tion is always potentially present, a relation of dependence. 
 The relation may slowly become one of virtual incorporation 
 into the Germanic unity of which Holland is so natural a 
 part. Had the Germans succeeded in retaining Belgium as 
 they intended, the incorporation of Holland would virtually 
 be an accomplished fact. With this incorporation would go 
 the power to use Holland's colonies, including Guiana. It 
 was precisely this danger which induced us to acquire the 
 Virgin Isles from Denmark lest later forcible annexation of 
 the little kingdom to Germany might give the latter control 
 of a territory dangerous to our safety. The danger is hardly 
 less in the case of Holland. 
 
 France is similarly situated, her islands at the eastern end 
 of the Caribbean being a close counterpart for the Virgin Isles 
 
326 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 and her Guiana similar to that of Holland. But France is 
 stronger and seems to be little in danger of incorporation into 
 a German Empire. The loss of such colonies as the result of 
 an unsuccessful war, however, is not impossible. It would 
 have resulted, as we have seen, from a French defeat in the 
 present war. To this we may add the fact that these trifling 
 possessions are isolated from the great French colonial terri- 
 tories and are doubtless unprofitable, the maintenance of com- 
 munications being expensive. France is at present heavily 
 indebted to the United States for money loaned. In another 
 sense the United States is more deeply indebted to France. 
 Only with a blush could we accept payment of her debt to 
 us, while unable to pay our debt to her. If the cancellation 
 of our claim or some very generous portion of it against the 
 cession of these scattered fragments of earlier empire could 
 simplify the relation involved and lessen the burdens of 
 France without a hurt to her sensibilities, it would perhaps 
 be of general advantage. But France is not a menace, and if 
 she prefers to continue to share with us the responsibilities of 
 the Caribbean, we need not regret it. In this sense the case 
 is not parallel to that of Denmark and Holland. 
 
 More important than any adjustment of territory is the 
 question of the control of the sea. Like Britain, we are a 
 naval power. Economically we are less dependent upon sea 
 communications than Britain. Isolation would not mean 
 starvation, nor would it sever us from any vital part of our- 
 selves. 'No nation is so well situated as we are for self- 
 suflScient existence. Yet the blockade of our coasts would 
 cause us almost inconceivable distress. We should be aston- 
 ished to find how long is the list of the necessities for which 
 we depend upon foreign lands. Many an industry would be 
 brought to a standstill and widespread depression would re- 
 sult. 
 
 But the more vital fact is our problem of national defense. 
 
AMERICA 327 
 
 1^0 great power can ever attack us otherwise than by sea, and 
 if we fail to defend ourselves by sea, we shall not defend our- 
 selves. Not that land defense is impossible, but it is certain 
 to be the one for which we are least prepared, and if the 
 stronger arm fails us, the weaker will not prevail. We are 
 therefore interested hardly less than Britain in the problem 
 of control of the sea. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to repeat here what was said in the 
 last chapter on this subject. Far from the noise of battle we 
 have been free to indulge in idealistic speculations as our 
 Allies have not. Remote realities become unrealities and 
 are easily exchanged for the unrealities of speculation on even 
 terms. Let us develop internationalism into a reality as 
 rapidly as we may, but let there be no interregnum while 
 nationalism is relaxed and internationalism is not yet effec- 
 tive. We must still keep the seas. 
 
 In framing the treaty of peace there are ends to be kept in 
 view which are more vital than those nominated in the bond. 
 Of these, none is so important to us or to the world as the 
 unity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and this for two reasons. 
 In the first place, they have essentially identical interests, 
 material and ideal. All are industrial and commercial na- 
 tions, dependent for their cooperation and for their contact 
 with the world upon the freedom of the sea. That freedom 
 is in their keeping, and with it the peace and prosperity of 
 the world. United they can easily meet the requirements of 
 their responsible position. Divided, they will exhaust them- 
 selves with the superhuman task and eventually fail. The 
 lessons of these days which have seen the two navies merged 
 into a single force and the Union Jack, proudest of national 
 emblems, floating from an American flagship, while the 
 Stars and Stripes floated from the Parliament House in 
 Westminster above the flag of Britain, should not be for- 
 gotten. It is the symbol of what must henceforth be if we 
 are not to squander our force and risk our existence. 
 
328 THE GREAT PEACE 
 
 But far more vital is the union of our ideal interests. We 
 are all free nations, and intent that the world shall be free. 
 The power we hold is held subject to this, our common pur- 
 pose. In no selfish particularism of race but as the begin- 
 ning of human unity, we strengthen the bonds of common 
 ideals and common purpose which make us one. The world 
 J will not be united as a motley assemblage of discordant wills, 
 ^ divergent cultures, and differing developments, all by the 
 V^, magic of an agreement and a mechanized procedure. The 
 union will come by gradual crystallization around a congenial 
 center. Ours is the privilege and ours the responsibility as 
 a race, of furnishing that nucleus of crystallization. At the 
 center is England, mother of free peoples and free institu- 
 tions. Around this center is the larger circle born from her 
 or drawn to her, the circle that we call Britain. All Britain 
 is British in some very real sense, though only the center is 
 English. 
 
 Earther reaching is the larger circle in which we find our 
 place. It is not English; it is not British. It is Anglo- 
 Saxon. Nearer by far to England than much that is British, 
 this outer circle after all owns a different allegiance, uses a 
 different symbol, and enjoys a more obvious independence. 
 Less clear is the bond of unity, but not less vital. 
 
 Again the circle enlarges and peoples feel the mystic bond 
 who are neither English nor British nor Anglo-Saxon, 
 France speaks another language, owns a different origin, and 
 boasts a different culture. But France is free, and this is 
 our talisman. With her accession the widening circle be- 
 comes the circle of the free peoples. 
 
 Build about this center the league of the nations. Enlarge 
 the circle of the free peoples. Strengthen their hand for the 
 defense of the world's liberties. Exchange not the substance 
 of things realized for the shadow of things imagined. Wel- 
 come the humblest accession of the free in spirit, but bar the 
 
AMERICA 329 
 
 proudest of the unregenerate. Compel no lip service. Trust 
 no deathbed repentances. For neither by clever contrivance 
 nor by outward profession of faith, but by unobtrusive growth 
 and transformation of spirit will mankind attain the goal 
 of unity and peace without the sacrifice of liberty. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Adriatic, 198 
 
 Africa, 69; German oolonies, 310; 
 
 South Africa, 152, 255, 312 flf. 
 Albania, 202, 240, 243, 251 
 Aleppo, 259 
 Alexandretta, 262 
 Algeria, 79 
 Alsace-Lorraine, 42, 61, 66, 175 flf., 
 
 287 
 America, 82-84, 153, 268, 279, 281, 
 
 302, (Ch. XX) 322 flf. 
 Anatolia, 251 ff., 265, 281 
 Anglo-Saxons, 149 ff., 262 
 Arab, Arabia, 76, 250, 255 ff., 317 
 Ararat, 252 
 
 control, 319-321 ; trusteeship, 
 79-81; unity, 40 ff. 
 Bulgaria, 3, 251, 283 
 
 Cartels, 20 
 
 Catholic; see Vatican 
 Cattaro, 199 
 Cavour, 297 
 Central Powers, 1 
 China, 123 ff., 301 ff. 
 Chios, 251, 265 
 Cilician gates, 256 
 Class struggle, 16-19 
 Clemenceau, 143 
 Coal, 58 ff., 180 ff. 
 
 Armenia, Armenians, 76, 242, 247, Colonies, 94, 105; German, 155, 
 
 251-252, 255 ff., 263 ff., 281 310; Italian, 205; Portuguese, 
 
 Australia, 19, 251 316 
 
 Austria, 113, 131, 192 ff., 207 ff., Constantinople, 107, 249, 251, 
 
 301 (Ch. XVI) 270, 295 
 
 Autocracy, 15, 147, 154, 245 Cordova, 248 
 
 Avlona, 199, 202 Corfu, 199; pact of, 233 
 
 Courland, 147 
 
 Baalbek, 262, 295 Crete, 251 
 
 Bagdad, 248, 259 ;— Railway, 137 Crimean War, 250, 274, 297 
 
 Belgium, 56, 111, 147, (Ch. XI) Croats, 208, 227, 240 
 
 161 ff., 173, 277 
 Bessarabia, 220, 227 
 Beyrout, 262 
 Bismarck, 131 
 Bohemia, Bohemian, 46, 48-50, 
 
 208, 215, 234, 241 
 Bolshevik, 138, 201 
 Bosnia, Bosnian, 208, 227, 232, 
 
 243, 251 
 Bosphorus, 104 
 Brailsford, 266 
 Brazil, 94 
 Brest-Litovsk, 295 
 Britain, British Empire, 56, 85, 
 
 113, 122, 151, 161, 257-258, 268, 
 
 Cromer, 80 
 
 Cyprus, 251 
 
 Cyrillic alphabet, 233 
 
 Czech, Czechoslovak, see Bohemia 
 
 Dalmatia, Dalmatian, 201-202, 
 
 208, 227 
 Danzig, 290 
 Dardanelles, 32, 84, 104, 111, 114- 
 
 115, 249, 273 
 Democracy, 7 ff., 126, 152, 236 
 Denmark, 111, 113-115. 277, 325 
 Diplomacy, 7, 127 ff., 137, 302 
 Dobrudja, 225 
 Duma, 77 
 
 281, 303, (Ch. XIX) 307 ff., 327- 
 328; population, 183, 279; sea Egypt, 81, 85, 152, 251, 255, 259 
 
 331 
 
332 
 
 INDEX 
 
 England, English; see Britain, etc. 
 Euphrates, 252 
 
 Finland, 296 
 
 Flume, 204 
 
 France, 78-79, 86, 113, 123, 147, 
 
 161, (Ch. XII) 175 ff., 262, 268, 
 
 276, 281, 312, 325-326 
 Fryatt, Captain, 101 
 
 Galicia, 208, 241, 285, 288 
 
 Gallipoli, 282 
 
 German, Germany, 19, 51, 57, 61, 
 67, 86, 131, (Ch. X) 143 fiF., 
 208 ff., 233, 273, 277, 285 ff., 318, 
 323; barbarities, 155, 161 ff.; 
 colonies, 155, 301, 310; indem- 
 nity from France, 89 ff., 102, 
 115; industries, 64, 168; league 
 of nations, 117; population, 183; 
 potash, 65 
 
 Gibraltar, 104, 111 
 
 Greece, Greek, 56, 65, 76, 256, 265, 
 277 
 
 Grey, 131 
 
 Guaranties, 219 
 
 Hague Tribunal, 237, 298 
 Hapsburgs, 235 ff., 241 
 Hedjaz, 256 
 
 Herzegovina, 208, 227, 251 
 Holland, 86, 159, 277, 325 
 Hong Kong, 276, 298 
 Himgary, 207 ff. 
 
 Imperialism, 47 ; British, 307 ff. 
 Indemnities, 87 ff., 96, 171 ff., 175 
 India, 69, 152, 259 
 International guaranties; see 
 
 guaranties 
 Internationalism, 27 ff., 51-53, 84, 
 
 103 ff. 
 Iron, 58 ff., 180 ff. 
 Isonzo, 197 
 Istria, 203-204 
 Italy, 39, 44-45, 59, 64, (Ch. 
 
 XIII) 191 ff., 205, 251, 268, 281, 
 
 297 
 
 Japan, 15, 83, 123 ff., 299 ff. 
 
 Jehad, 250 
 Jews, 256, 260 flf. 
 Jugo-Slavs, 227, 235, 240 
 
 Kiel Canal, 104, 111, 114, 318 
 Konigsberg, 290 
 
 Language, 16, 33, 197 ff. 
 
 League of Nations, 109 ff., 328- 
 
 329 
 Lichnowsky, 137 
 Lloyd George, 155 
 Lusitania, 101, 145 
 
 Macedonia, 242, 251, 266 
 Magyars, 208, 212, 225 
 Malay Peninsula, 70-71 
 Manchuria, 305 
 Mecca, 250, 255 
 Medina, 255 
 
 Mesopotamia, 252, 255, 258 
 Militarism, 245 
 
 Mohammedans, 79, 231, 243 ff. 
 Monroe Doctrine, 324 
 Montenegro, 199, 227 
 Moravia, 20 
 
 Nationalism, 15 ff. 
 Natural resources, 55 ff. 
 New Zealand, 19, 151, 301 
 Norway, 277 
 
 Oman, 257 
 
 Palestine, 256 ff. 
 
 Panama Canal, 104, 111, 325 
 
 Panslavism, 285 
 
 Peace, preparation for, 2; pur- 
 poses, 3 
 
 Persian Gulf, 252 
 
 Philippines, 82, 153, 279 
 
 Poland, 48, 147, 177, 179, 219 (Ch. 
 XVII) 284 ff. 
 
 Population, 183-184, 201 
 
 Portugal, 55, 75-76; colonies, 316 
 
 Posen. 2.S5, 290 
 
 President of the United States, 
 108, 128. 137 
 
 Prussia, 42, 113, 161, 290 
 
INDEX 
 
 333 
 
 Race, 31 ff. 
 
 Religion, 228 ff., 243 ff. 
 
 Restitution, 168 ff.; in kind, 171- 
 
 174; see also Indemnities 
 Rhine Province, 187 ff. 
 Rhodes, 251 
 Roman Empire, 40 ff. 
 Roosevelt, 121 
 Rumania, Rumanian, 76, 208, 
 
 220 ff., 235, 251 
 Russia, Russian, 52, 77, 93, 113, 
 
 131, 212, 215, 223, 273, 277, (Ch. 
 
 XVII) 284 ff., 303, 305 
 Ruthenians, 212 
 
 Samas, 251, 265 
 
 Schleswig-Holstein, 113 
 
 Sea, access to, 234; freedom of, 
 
 103-104, 107, 317-319, 326-327 
 Self determination, 10 
 Serbia, Serbian, 48, 200 ff., 227, 
 
 240, 251, 282 
 Sidon, 262 
 
 Slavonia, 208, 227, 240 
 Slavs, 203, 212, 232, 285 ff. 
 Slovaks, see Bohemians 
 Slovenes, 208, 227 
 Smyrna, 256 
 Spain, 55, 75-76, 84 
 Suez Canal, 104, HI, 261 
 Sweden, 151, 277 
 Switzerland, 405 
 Syria, 256 ff. 
 
 Taurus Mountains, 256, 263 
 
 Territory, (Ch. IV) 44 ff. 
 
 Thasos, 251 
 
 Thirty Years' War, 215 
 
 Thrace, 251 
 
 Tigris, 252 
 
 Transportation, 47 
 
 Transylvania, 212, 223, 225 
 
 Treaties, 127 ff.; secret, 201 
 
 Trentino, 194 ff. 
 
 Trieste, 4, 199, 202 ff. 
 
 Triple Alliance, 45 
 
 Tripoli, 205, 251 
 
 Tropics, 68 
 
 Trusteeship, (Ch. VI), 67 ff., 206 
 
 Tsingtao, 301 
 
 Tunis, 79, 251 
 
 Turkey, 76, 94, 205, (Ch. XV) 
 
 242 ff. 
 Tyre, 262 
 
 United States of America, see 
 
 America 
 Ukraine, 39 
 
 Vatican, 192 ff., 232 
 Vladivostok, 295 
 
 War between nations, 20 
 Wilson, see President of the 
 United States 
 
 Zemstvos, 77 
 
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H. H. POWERS' NEW WORK 
 
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