Class Book 5= ield, Fort and Fleet; ILLUSTRATED. BEING A SERIES OF BRILLIANT AND AUTHENTIC SKETCHES OF THE MOST NOTABLE BATTLES OF THE LATE CIVIL WAR, INCLUDING MANY INCIDENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEVER BEFORE PUBLISHED IN ANY FORM. h&AA nvn_ qtt^:d_ n ' TO WHICH IS APPENDED An Outline History of the Grand Army of the Republic, TOGETHER WITH .A. HISTORY OIF 1 George Washington Post No. 103, G. A. R., INCLUDING BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF MEMBERS. HENRY WHITTEMORE DETROIT FREE PRESS PUBLISHING COMPANY, DETROIT, MICH. 1885. 10 Copyright, 1885, by THE DETROIT FREE PRESS PUBLISHING COMPANY, Detroit, Mich. Electrotyped and Printed by The Detroit Free Press Company. M> The Volcano The First Gun of the War .... First Bull Run ""ilson's Creek ...... ulligan's Defense of Lexington . rail's Bluff ort Henry, the Man-Trap he Capture of Fort Donelson . ea Ridge .... . . Yorktown and Beyond .... v T illiamsburg ...... ■hiloh — The First Day .... Shiloh — The Second Day ieven Pines ...... Cross Keys and Port Republic Behind the Earth -Works .... Colonel Morgan's Defense First Confederate Gun-Boats Van Dorn's Blow at Grant . Army Panics ...... The Waste in War .... Stonewall Jackson in the Valley The Fall of New Orleans Over the Guns ...... The Turning Point in McClellan's Career Change of Base ...... Toward the James ..... The Spot Where McClellan Cried "Halt!" McClellan — Lee — Pope Pope's Fights Around Manassas Defeat — Invasion ..... The Crisis Page 1 3 9 12 16 20 25 30 37 43 47 51 60 66 72 70 82 85 86 89 91 93 99 106 109 116 120 123 130 132 139 141 IV CONTENTS. South Mountain ..... Surrender of Harper's Ferry Sharpsburg Murder in War ..... The Abandonment of Norfolk Navy Yard How the Dead Were Uncovered The Harbor Defenses of the Confederacy Eccentricities of Bullets The Merrimac and Monitor . The Evacuation of Corinth The Battle of Perryville The Evacuation of Pensacola The Fight at Island No. 10 . The Fate of British Blockade Runners The Famous Castle Thunder at Richmond How the Gun-boats Passed Island No. 10 The Career of the Ram Arkansas . Stuart's Great Raid Zagonyi's Charge .... The Federal Blockaders of the War The Alabama and the Hatteras Some Famous Confederate Cruisers How the Confederates lost Hilton Head The Panic at Nashville The Peril of an Army The Slaughter-Pen at Corinth The Blockade-Runners of the War The Fight Before Memphis The Last Fight of the Monitor How the Federals Retook Fort Pulaski The Siege and Capture of Vicksburg The Capture of Port Hudson Burnside's Crossing at Fredericksburg Stone River .... The Fight at Lavergne . Lincoln — Emancipation McGlellan— Burnside — Hooker Confederate Scouts and Spies Destruction of Nashville The First Test of the Iron-Clads Rams, Gun-Boats and Iron-Clads Page 143- 145 147 153 154 159 163 169 172 179 184 190 195 201 207 212 216 221 224 226 233 239 245 250 252 255 259 273 277 282 287 312 318 325 356 363 366 370 374 379 385 CONTENTS. Paoe The First Federal Attack on Sumter . 391 The First Cavalry Battle • • * . 398 Reminiscences of the Ilarr iet Lane . 401 The Fight at Grand Gulf • • • o . 406 Raising the Blockade at Charleston . 412 Morgan the Raider • • • • • . 417 Chancellorsville . • • • • . 423 Stonewall Jackson . • ••00 . 431 Brandy Station • O • • . 432 Capture of Raiders .000 . 436 Aldie and Middleburg . . 438 . 441 The Gettysburg Campaign . . 443 Gettysburg — First Day . . 451 Gettysburg — Second Day . . 454 Gettysburg — Third Day . . 461 . 467 Gettysburg Campaign and the Cavalry . 470 From July to December . . 477 The Fight in Stono River . . . . . 480 The Federal Attacks on Fort Wagner . 483 A Strange Breastwork Bragg's Siege of Chattanoo ga . . 491 How Forts Wagner and Gr egg were Abandoned . 496 501 Sheridan versus Early • . 502 Gilmore at Charleston . 513 . 518 Bombardment of Fort Sumter Fort Sumter in 1860 and in 1864 Malvern Hill ...... Combat Between the Monitor and Merrimac Island No. 10 and Pittsburg Landing Stuart's Raid Around McClellan . Gen. R E. Lee . . . . . . Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan . Death of Stonewall Jackson Custer's Charge at Aldie . Gettysburg Cavalry Fight at Gettysburg Frontispiece facing page 9 " 123 , " " 178 " 200 " 221 " " 318 . « " 370 " 431 " 467 , " u 476 Cavalry Fight ...... Infantry Charge ..... Cavalry Bugler ...... Cavalry Officer ..... A Hand Litter Military Accouterments .... Hauling Cannon Pickets . Ruins of Shiloh Meeting House . Road Between Yorktown and 'Williamsburg Burning Dead Horses ..... Sharp Shooters ..... Lady Davis ....... The Lily Battery to the Front ..... Page 2 Tail-Pieces : The Volcano Edmund Ruffin ........ 8 Squad Drill 15 19 24 29 36 42 46 50 59 65 71 78 81 85 88 90 ILLUSTRATIONS. vii Tail-Pieces — Continued : Page Whit worth Cannon ..... . 108 Broken Cannon and Flowers . 129 After the Battle Harper's Ferry ...... . 142 First Maryland Regiment . . 144 Palisades ....... . 158 Floating Battery at Charleston .... 168 Lighted Shell . 171 Rifle Pits A Cotton Plant .'.... . 194 A Blockade Runner ...... . 206 Grave on the Battle Field .... : . 211 Mechanicsville Bridge over the Chickahorainy . . 223 The Hartford . 232 Casemates ....... . 249 Broken Arms ....... . 258 Confederate Ship Sumter .... . 272 Interior of a Monitor's Turret .... . 281 Field Battery ....... . 286 Bomb and Splinter-Proof ..... . 311 Scene in Fredericksburg Dec. 12, 1862 . 324 One of the Grayson Dare-Devils . 369 The Palmetto Tree . 373 Ruins of the Steamer Nashville .... . 378 Ram Manassas Attacking the Brooklyn . . 390 John H. Morgan, the Raider .... . 422 Washington Artillery ...... . 430 Army Cabin ....... . 435 Gauntlet and Sword ...... . 440 A Confederate General .... . 453 Defenses on Culp's Hill . 460 View on Little Round Top . 466 A Parrott Projectile ...... . 482 The Swamp Angel ..... . 489 A Cannon in the Mountains . 495 Fort Wagner ...... . 500 Torpedo ........ 517 Knapsack and Canteen ..... . 520 ffjf* ©clraita. 'S a mole-hill men passed it by, but it irritated and annoyed and set bad blood in circulation. Men hoped that it would grow no larger, but even as they hoped they saw it rise higher and higher, and increase in circumference. The mole-hill became a mound. Its existence had a place in the speeches of statesmen, and its presence brought dreams of war and glory to warriors. A few — wise in their dread and anxiety — would have leveled the mound with hands of peace, but even as they stood around it there were mutterings and threats which fed its rapid growth. The mound became a hill. The hill hid sections from each others' sight, but the voices of men wrangling and cursing and uttering threats of vengeance rose above its crest and were heard from sea to sea. The hill became a mountain — grim, forbidding, and frowning down upon forty million anxious people. Flashes of fire darted from its dark ravines, and mysterious rumblings made men turn to each other with white faces. As a long day of apprehension drew to a close, the sun sunk slowly and sullenly into the unknown, leaving behind him signs which a child might read. Women gathered their children about them and prayed and wept, while husbands, and fathers, and sons, gathered in groups and crowds, and watched the frowning moun- tain and waited to see its fires of hate burst forth. The crest of that mountain could be seen from the shores of Maine and the valleys of California, and the rumblings were felt at every door-step in the Eepublic. Some were cool and possessed — others terrified and undone. Midnight came, but even the children had not slept. The rumblings were louder, and the fire-flashes were lighting up a great Vol. l.-l 2 THE VOLCANO. continent. Men who had sneered at the mole-hill and passed the mound in contempt, stood aghast in the shadow of the angry mountain. The slow-moving hours but increased the darkness of the night and the terror of the people ; but those who prayed for the dawn recked not what it would bring. It was such a night as never had fallen upon a continent. It was such darkness as a happy people had never walked in before. Slowly, grudgingly, grimly, the hours dragged themselves along, and as the east was broken with the first signs of dawn the mount- ain air seemed to concentrate all its fires into one flame, which suddenly burst through its crest and went roaring to Heaven, while rivulets and rivers of blood poured down upon the plains and wet the feet of tens of thousands. The volcano of Civil War was lighting the whole world ! CIj* first (Suit rf tfje Mar. AYLIGHT is breaking over Charleston. It is the morning of the twelfth of April, 1861 — the most momentous morning in the history of America. Fifteen thousand citizens of Charleston have crowded down to the esplanade, and every man has his face turned towards the sea. To the right, as they look down the harbor, is Morris Island ; to the left Sullivan's, and midway between is Fort Sumter, grim and silent, and not even showing its flag. The great crowd trembles with excitement and speaks in whis- pers. A bloody civil war is about to open. The young men are ready to hurrah over the prospect, but the older ones look grave, as they realize what war means. Now the gray mist creeps up from the waters of the harbor and floats away, and the eastern horizon becomes tinged with red. You can see more plainly now. At the head of Sullivan's Island is the floating iron battery, and it is to fire the first gun. Its echoes will awaken the huge iron monsters asleep in Forts Moultrie and Johnson — at Cummings' Point — at Point Pleasant and other localities* There is a flag over each Confederate fort and battery, and with a good glass you can see men on the ramparts. From December to April the Confederates have been busy trying to get possession of the grim and silent fort rising out of the waters of the harbor. All demands for surrender have been refused, and the only other way is now to be tried. Day by day batteries and forts have been erected, almost within rifle-shot of Sumter's walls, and Major Anderson has been powerless. His orders are to hold the fort, and he has no authority to fire a gun until it becomes an act of self-defense. He has seen the forts rise— the great guns landed and mounted — the volunteers march in — the ammunition brought down from Charleston, and yet Federal policy kept his guns silent. [31 4 THE FIRST GUN OF THE WAS. Silence now ! In the floating battery is an old, gray-haired man — Edmund Euffin. He has sought the privilege of firing the first gun of the war. The lanyard he holds in his hand is the rope which will ring the bell of destiny. When that bell strikes a mighty Republic will fall in fragments, and it will take the blood of a thousand battles to cement it. " Boom ! " The bell has struck. At the word the old man has pulled the lanyard, and a solid shot whirrs across the water and strikes the brick wall of Fort Sumter with a heavy thud. For a long minute no one speaks. The echoes of that gun are fraught with mighty issues — the whirr of that shot meaps death to a quarter of a million soldiers. As the thunder rolls up and down the harbor and dies away twenty thousand people cheer. The war has begun ! There can be no backward step now. Old and young cheer and shout and shake hands and feel a glad relief. The Confederates had been all ready for a week. Every one of the fifty guns and mortars in position had been trained with mathematical precision to reach certain points with their fire. The order was to fire from left to right, beginning with the floating battery, and the gun which Edmund Rufnn fired was soon answered by the next, and the fire swept clear around the circle until it came back to the same gun. The projectiles used were solid shot, shell, and bombs, and every gun had the fort within easy range. At the time the first gun was fired a reporter of the Charleston Mercury — now on the staff of the News — was standing directly behind Mr. Ruffin, and to him I am indebted for many particulars of that attack never before published. He was one of the first in the fort after the surrender, and what he saw and made a note of can be depended on even when it clashes with the traditions of the his- torian. Taking up the firing in the order named, each gun was soon busy at work, and the tremendous cannonade shook Charleston from center to circumference. One standing on the esplanade, three miles away, felt the ground tremble under his feet as if an earthquake was struggling to reach the surface. There was no excitement among the Confederates after the first five minutes. The guns were loaded and fired with coolness and regularity, and officers sought positions from "vhich they could note with their glasses the work of every shot. Major Anderson was not only expecting the attack, but was ready for it. With the echoes of the first gun, all the men turned THE FIRST GUN OF THE WAR. 5 out, and the morning roll was called and the nag run up, with the iron balls pounding away on the walls, each one jarring the masonry for several yards around and sending up a cloud of dust. It was just after roll-call that a gun fired from Sullivan's Island dis- mounted one of the monsters en barbette on the fort. The ball which struck and dismounted the gun broke in three pieces, two of which fell inside the fort. Anderson knew it would be an all-day fight, and his first move was to send his men to breakfast. There was no particular excite- ment within the walls, as each one had been looking for the climax. It was during the morning meal, over an hour after the first gun was fired, that the first bomb-shell fell inside the walls, Others had fallen short or passed over, but the exact range had finally been obtained. After breakfast the handful of men were divided into reliefs, and the first went to the guns and opened fire in reply. As soon as the fort answered, the Confederate guns were ordered to fire one- third faster, and the result was that within an hour not one of the barbette or upper tier of guns in the fort could be used. One was struck in the muzzle and split down four feet, and three or four were upset and hurled yards away. Those left intact could not be worked on account of the enemy's fire. When a shell struck the wall anywhere within thirty feet of a gun, a shower of mortar and pieces of brick were hurled clear over the fort, and solid shot were continuously passing over and around the guns. The dis- mounting of the guns was plainly noted by a hundred men with glasses, and the announcement called forth cheers all around the circle. Anderson could not have had the faintest hopes of saving Sumter, and he seems to have fought more to gain time or in the way of duty, than to silence any of the guns opposed. His firing for the first two hours was very wild, and even in the afternoon not one shot hit where four missed. With the ordnance of 1864 he might have damaged Moultrie and the floating battery, but he could not have silenced them nor inflicted any great loss of life. So little were his cannon balls feared that hundreds of Confederates stood outside the works to get a better view of the fight. With so few men in the fort only a few guns could be worked, and those but slowly. Before noon the Confederates began using hot shot, and the third one which entered the fort set a building on fire. This emergency t THE FIRST GUN OF THE WAR. had been provided for, and the flames were quickly extinguished, but to be kindled again and again during the day by the same means. After the men had orders to desert the upper tier of guns- and serve the next, they were well protected, and fired with more regularity. When Fort Sumter was ready for occupancy it was pro- nounced by engineers and artillerists to be impregnable. From twenty to thirty feet of brick, stone, sand, and earth stood between the balls of an enemy and the defenders within. Within an hour after the first gun was fired the fort was not only being knocked to pieces by old-fashioned ordnance, but was menaced by a danger never dreamed of by its builders — that of the mortar firing. While subsequent events proved that the stronghold could not be battered so badly but that it could be defended, it was a dozen times shown that bombs could be dropped into it from the sea as well as the land. As night fell, Anderson called his men from the guns, and preparations were made for what was likely to occur during the long night. The last gun fired from Sumter that day was at the floating battery. The ball struck the water a hundred feet short, jumped over the battery, and, missing a small boat by only two or three feet, sank out of sight. Some believed because the fort had ceased firing it had surrendered, and there was intense interest to learn the truth. No one could set off in a boat and approach the fort on account of the Confederate fire, which did not slacken in the least, as the target was lost sight of in the gloom of night. When a shell struck the walls and exploded, a bright flash dispelled the darkness for an instant, and twice before midnight, the bombs and hot shot renewed the conflagration inside. From the first gun in the morning until seven o'clock in the evening. Fort Sumter had been struck over twelve hundred times. Every barbette gun was dismounted, almost every foot of the walls scarred and pounded, and there were several spots where the walls were dug out to a distance of ten feet. At least once every five minutes during the day a bomb fell into the inclosure, and it seemed a miracle that half the garrison had not been wiped out. When day broke again, twenty thousand pairs of eyes were strained to catch sight of the fort. The flag was rippling in the- morning breeze. Twenty-four hours of the most terrific pounding had failed to bring down the stars and stripes or weaken the brave hearts of the defenders. The men went to breakfast, as before ; were again toled off into reliefs, and as day broke in all its glory THE FIRST GUN OF THE WAR. the guns began bellowing defiance. Long before noon hot shot rekindled the tires, and at noon the barracks were burning fiercely. From this hour the guns were fired only at long intervals, every man in the fort being wanted elsewhere. Much of the powder was thrown out of the embrasures into the sea, followed by all the loaded shells which could be got at, but the explosions in the shell- room were plainly heard in Charleston. The flames from the burning barracks could be seen from Moultrie and other elevated points, and the Confederate fire was redoubled to push the garrison to desperation. Utterly unmindful of the fight without, the garrison battled against the danger within. At one time during the afternoon the shell-room was on fire, the barracks burning, the main gate ablaze, and every wooden building inside the fort walls, ready to go. Every four or five minutes a great bomb dropped from the sky and exploded with terrific violence, and it seemed wonderful that the garrison did not give up in despair. The remainder of the powder was wet down or thrown out, and then the men could only stand by and let the flames have full sweep. " Have they surrendered ? " was the query in the Confederate forts and batteries as the clouds of smoke hid the flag ; but now and then the query was answered as the wind rolled the stifling curtain aside and the old flag was seen streaming out to the breeze. Anderson would have held Fort Sumter another night at least, had it rested with him to raise the white flag. But the flag came from the Confederates, borne by Wigfall. That the Senator was acting solely on his own account, and that he had not even conferred with Beauregard, was shown by the fact that he rowed to the fort under the fire of his friends, and that several balls fell around him as he waited at an embrasure for admittance. He had come to propose a surrender, and Anderson was ready to come to terms. Federal history finds the Major in full uniform, clanking sword, and stern dignity. He was begrimed with smoke, covered with cinders, and received Wigfall with courtesy. The terms agreed upon had to be sanctioned by Beauregard, and they were far better terms than were ever subsequently accorded on either side. It is not disputed that Anderson made a brave defense — for the opening of the war. Two years after he would have been cashiered for surrendering under like circumstances. In after days, when that island was no more than a brick-pile, men defended it against such bombardments as the world had never seen — defended it b THE FIRST GUN OF THE WAR. against attacks by small boats — held it in spite of not twenty-four hours' cannonade, but long weeks of bombardment. Anderson knew that the storm was coming, and he had ample time to purchase provisions for a siege of a week at least. He had time to tear down the barracks and make other preparations. Some commanders would have assumed the authority to act, even though the Washington government was handling the question with gloves. As to provisions, Headly says the men ate their last cracker before the surrender. Tradition has it thus, and the truth will be an unpleasant revelation. Later on in the war one hundred men would have lived for two weeks on the provisions left after the surrender, and no man would have been on half rations. While the fire was hot and long-continued, not a man was killed by it. While the fort was badly knocked about, it did not receive one half the damage inflicted by a Federal fleet in six hours one day in 1863. While Anderson received the fire of old-fashioned ordnance, the fort under a Confederate commander received such pounding from new and enormous projectiles that the bursting of a shell against the walls made the whole island tremble. Major Anderson's position was an embarrassing one in every sense, and his surrender was probably considered the only alterna- tive. Had he maintained the fight, he could not have been bom- barded out in a fortnight, but at the same time he could have inflicted no injury on the Confederates, and there was not a vessel in the Federal navy at that time which could have run the gauntlet and brought him succor. FORT SUMTER IN I860. FORT SUMTER IN 1864. Jfirst lull %xi\x. THE FIRST TEST IJST THE EAST. r OULD the American fight? His forefather fought at Lexington and Bunker Hill and Yorktown, and a hundred other places made forever historic by bloodshed. His father fought at Churubusco and Resaca de la Palma, and the city of Mexico. There was fighting blood in his veins, but it had been thinned down by years of continued peace. The test was coming ! Fort Sumter simply proved what no one would have denied. A fort of stone and brick can be battered, barbette guns dismounted, barracks burned by hot shot. Five thousand men, ensconced behind earth-works and provided with the best of artillery, deserve no particular credit for continuing a bombardment which finally results in the surrender of a fort defended by a hundred men. West Virginia had brought Federal and Confederate face to face in battle array, and blood had been shed and fields had been won, but the test had not come. Where one regiment had shown its fighting blood, another had been ready to run away. Bull Run was to be the test. Every Federal soldier knew this as the long blue columns tramped across the bridges spanning the Potomac. Every Confederate realized it as the order reached camp after camp on the front to fall back and mass. There was good fighting-ground at Germantown and Vienna, but there was better at Bull Run. As the columns in blue pressed forward over the highways lead- ing south, every soldier eager and jubilant, the columns in gray slowly fell back from picket and post, and earth-work and fort, every man hoping for a battle. One day at noon the head of the Federal column filed into the straggling hamlet of Centreville, and from its hills the men looked down upon the dark green fields and forests, through which meandered the insignificant stream whose name was to become world-wide within a week. [9] 10 FIRST BULL KUN. Beauregard had massed along the stream for a distance of seven miles, guarding his right in the strongest manner, but leaving his left to take care of itself. His center was impregnable. The head of the column turned to the left and took the road to Blackburn's Ford — Beauregard's right ; a second body pushed straight on ; a third turned to the right. Before night over 40,000 Federals were massed in front of the Confederates, whose number no one knew. The morrow would bring the test ! Bull Run was an experiment spattered with blood ; a farce which ended in tragedy ; a tire in which swords were tempered for long years of gallant work. McDowell's plan of battle was good. Under the same circum- stances it would be followed ninety-nine times out of a hundred. He knew the risk of throwing soldiers who had never seen an enemy against a position which veterans might hesitate over, and he determined on a flank movement to compel Beauregard to fall back from cover. The General plans — his subordinates execute. In the gray of that summer morning as three great columns in blue started out in as many directions to fall upon the enemy, the plan seemed excel- lent ; within three hours its execution was surrounded with diffi- culties. The flanking columns met unlooked for obstructions and were puzzled among the highways. The citizen-soldiery became sore-footed and lagged. Heintzelman found highways not marked on his maps, and others missing, and Hunter's men insisted on taking the pace which suited them best, despite the oft repeated orders to close up. At half past ten o'clock the Federals appeared on Beauregard's left flank, and within ten minutes McDowell's entire right and center moved down in battle line and the earth began to quiver under the terrible voice of artillery and the spiteful crackle of muskets. The test was at hand ! The query was being answered ! New' York and Virginia, Michigan and Georgia, Massachusetts and South Carolina, Wisconsin and Louisiana, were shedding each other's blood ! It was a battle in which regiments fought like tigers, while other regiments seemed to be on the ground as spectators. Some general officers exhibited the greatest coolness, others might better have remained in Washington or Richmond. A glorious charge saved a battery — a cowardly retreat lost it. It was not that the men on FIRST BULL RUN. 11 either side would not fight, but that they had not yet learned how. It was the Lexington of the civil war. At two o'clock Napoleon would have looked down upon that field to acknowledge a Federal victory and order the cavalry to be ready to pursue the routed Confederates. An hour later he would have been borne back towards Centreville by the wildest mob that ever left a battle field. Johnston and Patterson had been facing: each other miles away, each one under orders to prevent the other from moving down to reinforce. Patterson was duped and deceived by the thinnest strategy, and while in line and expecting an attack, his opponent stole away with the greater portion of his force and suddenly appeared to save the day at Bull Run. The Federal panic which followed the sight of this new army marching upon the field already considered won, started no one can say how, but could have been looked for. The soldier is a machine until victory is decided against him. Then he is no longer to be controlled by orders or arguments. The panic among raw soldiers at Bull Run was more than once imitated by veterans of a dozen battles. Had it been possible to retire the Federal forces to the heights of Centreville in good order, Patterson would have come up that afternoon and evening to balance numbers. The next day would have witnessed another grapple, with a result which no one can predict. It mattered not who won that first battle. Had Beauregard been routed the war would not have been cut short by a single week. North and South had entered upon a war which was to drag its length through long years and leave trails of blood and disaster over countless paths. The Confederate jubilee was short lived. After a day of rejoic- ing it was remembered that only Johnston's coming had turned defeat into victory. There were dead to bury and grieve over, and wounds to heal, and it was realized that the issue must now become one of shot and shell. Defeat at Bull Run cemented a hundred factions at the North into one solid body whose watchword was : " War to the end ! " "Victory would have been followed by appeals from a hundred factions for a compromise. Americans would fight ! They had been fairly tested at Bull Run. No matter what uniform he wore, or what his occupation or profession before donning the uniform, he had faced the murderous batteries and the deadly muskets with a nerve to be commended by the veterans of other wars. Sfftlaoit'a Creek. THE FIRST TEST IN THE WEST. HE men of New England and the Middle States had met those of Maryland, Virginia, Alabama and the Carolinas, and each had stood the test. How would it be in the West, when Illinois and Iowa and Kansas and Wisconsin came to grapple with Arkansas, Mississippi and Texas ? The East was reorganizing. The giants had met, drawn blood, recognized each other's strength, and then gone into training for a fight to the finish. Peace was no longer thought of ; a long and bloody war was at hand. On the first of August, 1861, the Federal General Lyon was at Springfield with a force of a little more than five thousand men. The state echoed to the tread of both armies. The Federal govern- ment was determined that Missouri should not go out of the Union, no matter what action had been taken by her Confederate legisla- ture. The Confederate government was equally determined to hold the prize, and in the case of Lyon, two separate armies were ordered to move forward and crush him. The force under either Price or McCulloch outnumbered him, but when it was left to Lyon's discretion to retreat or fight he began to serve out ammuni- tion. He would fight. If Lyon was wiped out then it was good- bye to Fremont at St. Louis. If he could check and detain the advancing armies, Fremont would have time to secure arms and artillery for the recruits who had flocked to his standard. Victories and defeats have their moral effect on nations. Defeat at Springfield meant ten thousand recruits for the Confederacy. Victory meant more than that to the Federal cause. The test in the West was coming ! Lyon would not wait to be attacked. The enemy was strong enough to invest his position. At sundown on the ninth instant, [12] Wilson's creek. 13 having been apprised by his scouts that the advance of the Confed- erates was only about ten miles away, he put his little army in motion, and with the exception of a few brief halts marched all night long. At daylight he was confronting the enemy. Had he seen a year's service in the Held he would have massed his army on the ridge which offered such advantages, thrown up intrenchments, and waited for the superior force to hurl itself against him. Believing that his advance was unknown, he detached Sigel with a column to make a flank movement and strike the Confeder- ate rear, while the impatient Lyon moved forward and drove in the enemy's pickets and warned him of what was coming. It was bravery, not strategy. From an hoar past midnight, the Confederates had been apprised of Lyon's march. Sigel's flank movement was promptly reported, and only waiting until he had fully cut loose, the battle-lines in gray moved forward to annihilate Lyon. The light at Bull Run was preceded by marching and counter- marching. That at Wilson's Creek opened with a crash of mus- ketry and artillery, followed by a rush which was not checked until men could see into each other's eyes. For twenty-five minutes Lyon's right and center fought to keep from being run over and trodden into the earth by the masses hurled against them. Time after time the Confederates, three ranks deep, rushed against the positions to be checked and driven grudgingly back. It was in their last advance, when the dead almost blocked the path of the living, that Lyon's horse was shot dead and he himself received two serious wounds. Eegiment met regiment at Bull Run. At Wilson's Creek, army rushed against army with a shock which cumbered the ground with dead and rent the heavens with the cries of the wounded. The West would fight ! While the Confederates failed to carry the center, they massed on the right and left and fell with renewed fury upon those positions. On the left they were checked with grape and cannister. On the right Lyon, wounded as he was, placed himself at the head of a regiment and advanced to meet the battle-lines of gray. It was in this advance that he received his third bullet and fell to the ground a corpse. Now came a lull, which was hailed with glad relief. In after battles men learned to dread these lulls in the roar and crash and carnage of battle, and to rightly look upon them as the precursors 14 wilson's creek. > of desperate advances. The command was assumed by Major Sturgis, and he employed the lull in bringing up ammunition, strengthening his position, and making all preparations for a last grapple. When the Confederates advanced again it was a living wall mov- ing up from the plains to crush all opposition. Sturgis was ready, and a sheet of fire flashed out to meet it. The wall staggered, but did not stop. Another blaze of fire halted it for a moment, but it came on again, slowly, steadily, vengefully. For ten minutes death reaped a grand harvest. Federal gunners were bayoneted as they loaded their pieces — Confederate infantrymen were blown to atoms at the muzzles of cannon. Then the wall shivered — toppled — fell, and the Confederates were forced back to the plain. Where was Sigel ! He should have been heard from an hour ago! Let him but open on the Confederate Hank or rear and the day was won. The echo of his guns would have been sw T eetest music to the ears of the weary, thirsting, anxious Federals, but they waited in vain. It was a blunder in detaching him, and his movements were a series of blunders. Without giving a thought to the idea that the breaking away of so large a force must have been noted, and that prepara- tions would be made to receive it, he pushed ahead in a lawless manner and at length found his progress barred by a strong column thrown across the highway in battle-line. It pleased Sigel's advance to believe that this force belonged to Lyon's command, but to believe it they had to argue that five thousand Federals had walked over fifteen thousand Confederates and were still in pursuit. In straggling order Sigel's troops closed up the gap, and were within pistol-shot of the Confederate lines when they received the first volley. Confusion followed. The efforts made to rally the men in the face of sharp musketry was unavailing, and with scarcely a show of resistance the various regiments broke into panic- stricken detachments and fled for their lives. Out of two full regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery and a detachment of cavalry, numbering about two thousand four hundred men, Sigel sustained a loss of about eight hundred in killed and wounded. When Sturgis received word of this disaster he was holding his own bravely, but lie lost not a moment in making preparations for retreat. So far as the battle was concerned neither had won a vic- tory, but as he was permitted to withdraw in the face of a superior WILSON S CREEK. 15 force without molestation, the North sang his praises without stint The entire loss of the Federals was upwards of a thousand ; the Confederate loss was two hundred greater. Had Sigel's troops remained with Lyon and fought as bravely as the others, the Federals would have held the battle field. Had his flank movement been the success Lyon hoped for, the Confederate forces would have been routed. The East had poured out its blood on the field of Bull Kun. The West had formed its lines of battle and held them like heroes. The query ; " Will Americans fight ? " had been answered. PulUjan'a §dmz of £mnjtmt. HERE are pages in the history of the great Civil War which, though spattered with the blood of friend and foe, and telling of terrible disaster, are yet so burnished with the lustre of heroism, that no matter on which side the reader fought, he must feel his pulse beat faster, and his heart swell w T ith pride. Col. Mulligan's defense of Lexington forms such a page. In September of the first year of the war, Mulligan, and his Irish brigade (Illinois troops), reached Lexington, with orders to hold it to the last, as it was looked upon as a strategic point of importance to the Federal government. The place was occupied by two or three different companies of Missouri home-guards, none of whom had seen a skirmish, and Mulligan's total force lacked but a hun- dred of four thousand men. The defeat of Lyon, at Wilson's Creek, gave the Confederate army, under Price, an opportunity to walk over various posts held by small Federal forces, and Mulligan had not yet reached Lexington when he received news that Price was marching for that point. About half a mile back from the river, on a high ground, and in the centre of the straggling village, the Federals enclosed several acres with a breastwork, and the large brick building used as a seminary was included in the enclosure and fortified as well as possible. While the position was the only one which could have been defended for an hour, Mulligan realized that anything like a siege must prove his destruction within a week The river was half a mile away, and he must depend upon it for water He had a large number of horses and mules with him, and subsequent events proved that it would have been better to have shot them down before the Confederates appeared. Barrels, casks, jugs, crocks, pails, and everything which would hold even a gallon of water was [16] MULLIGANS DEFENSE OF LEXINGTON. 17 called into service, and filled by the night of the eleventh. At daylight on the morning of the twelfth the advance of Price's army drove in Mulligan's pickets on every road, and Lexington was soon invested. It was generally believed among the Confederates, that Mulligan had less than two thousand men, and that he had a large amount of treasure in his care. These rumors increased the enthusiasm of the large force of raw troops under Price, and the entire army was not yet up when a heavy force was massed and hurled at the weak point in the breastwork. This was at its lowest spot, where it crossed a dry ravine. After a sharp cannonade lasting about an hour, a force of about six thousand infantry dashed forward with loud cheers, expecting to drive right over the earth-works. Mulligan had been watching operations until satisfied of the point to be attacked. Then he massed to.i'epel the assault, and when the Confederate battle-lines broke cover and advanced they were greeted with such a fierce and continuous fire as to disor- ganize and drive them back. It was wonderful that raw soldiers, hundreds of whom were not two weeks from home, could be thrown against breastworks as these were. It was just as strange that Mulligan, with his equally raw material, could hold them steadily to their places under the play of a heavy artillery and musketry fire. The repulse was so emphatic as to convey the idea that the Federal force numbered at least five thousand men. Price formed a crescent about the fortifications, lodging his sharpshooters in houses, barns, trees, and every other spot where the elevation would enable them to secure a plunging fire; but what troubled him most was the fact that he could not advance his artillery sufficient to make it more effective. Whenever one of his guns was hauled from cover Mulligan concentrated the fire from his six field-pieces and drove it back. In this emergency a private soldier stepped forward with a hint which eventually resulted in disaster to the Federals. Scores of wagons were at once dispatched over the country to bring in bales of hemp. As fast as they arrived they were rolled into the water until thoroughly soaked, and they were then as impervious to shot and shell and fire as Mulligan's earthworks. These bales were dropped in line all along the open ground, and the infantry and artillery advanced behind this strange shelter. Each bale furnished cover for three men, and while those at the ends heaved it along the one in the middle acted as a sharp-shooter against any Federal showing his head above the Vol. I.— 2 18 MULLIGAN'S DEFENSE OF LEXINGTON. breastwork. Years after, when Forrest was repulsed from the block-houses left by Sherman to cover his line between Chatta- nooga and Atlanta, he used bales of hay instead of hemp, and rolled his breastwork forward foot by foot until the block-houses had to surrender or receive the torch. From the twelfth to the eighteenth Price gave Mulligan no rest day or night. His artillery thundered all day and far into night, and rifle and musket were kept busy in reducing his beleaguered force. As the water grew scarce the horses and mules were forced to do without, and one by one they succumbed to thirst or bullet. In expecting reinforcements he hoped against hope. Fremont was at St. Louis with a large force, but he received no orders to succor Mulligan. Had he sent troops forward the Confederates would have been prepared to receive and drive them back. As the days went by the brave Colonel realized that the fate of Lexington was sealed. It was then a question of how long he could hold out. In eight days he had lost several hundred men, and now the Missouri- ans with him began to weaken. They had all along been held in the background while the Irish brigade took the posts of danger, but the conduct of men and officers proved that they could no longer be relied on in any situation. Twice on the nineteenth Mulligan led sorties in person, which resulted in driving back portions of the Confederate line, but the loss was heavy and the gain only temporary. On the night of the nineteenth, after midnight, Mulligan pro- posed to mass and cut his way out. He did not hope to get clear of Price, then numbering five to one, and reach some point from which he could receive reinforcements, but he would push clear of the investing line and fight Price a stand-up battle — twenty-six hundred men to more than fifteen thousand ! The Missourians refused to go out, and the project was abandoned.. On the twentieth the enclosure was a hell on earth. Men killed thirty hours before had not been buried, while their numbers were being constantly added to. Wounded men filled the air with their cries and groans ; an overpowering stench arose from the dead ani- mals ; men stood at the breastworks with clenched teeth and flashing eyes, and knowing that the end was near, but determined to fight to the death. Price had determined that this day should witness the capture of Lexington. His artillery had been reinforced, while two of Mulligan's six field-pieces had been rendered useless. More than a thousand bales of hemp had been rolled into line on ground MULLIGAN 8 DEFENSE OF LEXINGTON. 19 which gradually sloped towards the earth-works, and three thousand Confederates were behind this wall. At an early hour in the morning it began to move. Shot, nor shell, nor bullet could penetrate or stop it. Foot by foot, yard by yard, it moved down the slope, crowned by a sheet of flame which every moment brought death to some Federal. As this wall of Fate moved onward, Mulligan saw that a large force was massing on the opposite side. The home-guards realized that there was to be a simultaneous assault, and to a man they flatly refused to fire another shot. Threats and appeals were alike in vain. They flung down their muskets and sought cover, and the twice-wounded Mulligan was forced to raise the white flag in token of surrender. Of the twenty-six hundred and forty men he sur- rendered to Price, upwards of four hundred had been wounded but would not leave the breastworks. Price was an enemy and conqueror, but he had a heart which reverenced gallantry in friend or foe. In returning Mulligan's sword to him he said : " The war may last for a decade, but no sword will be more bravely defended." As the Confederates swarmed over the breastworks and found the water-barrels dry, the dead unburied, the wounded uncared for, but every musket-barrel hot from the desperate defense, they extended their hands, and the bitterness of years was forgotten in the admiration of the moment. Sail's Slttff. HE crossing at Fredericksburg — the march of Hooker into the thickets of Chancellorsville — the rush into the crater at Petersburg, and other fatal mistakes of the war committed by Federal generals, had a bloody pre- cedent before the close of 1861. In October of that year, while McClellan and Lee confronted each other along the Potomac, there were grounds for believing that Lee meditated a swift massing of troops at Leesburg and a rush across the river. This belief was not shared by McClellan, and perhaps not by the administration, but the fact that such a rumor was in circulation among the rank and file laid the ground- work for the terrible disaster at Ball's Bluff. Colonel Devens, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts, held a post of observation opposite Ball's Bluff. He had orders to keep scouts out along his front, and on the nineteenth one of them reported a new camp of Confederates opposite Devens' position and half a mile back from the Bluffs. One of the excuses afterwards put forth was that the scout, skulking about in the darkness, had mistaken shocks of newly-cut corn for Confederate tents. There were no shocks of corn there. In his desire to bring in a report of interest the scout had manufactured his story, having no idea of what would result from it. Devens reported the matter to his superiors, and at his own solici- tation received permission to cross the river and rout the force. While it was generally believed, as before stated, that Lee was massing on his left, Devens took only three hundred men with him to oppose the unknown force supposed to be in his front. This force was ferried over the wide and rapid stream in leaky old scows, and only after more than three hours' hard work. Not until his command had finally been placed on the Virginia shore did it seem to occur to Devens that in case of disaster he would be in an awk ward, not to say dangerous, situation. [20] ball's bluff. 21 The Confederate force was reported to be encamped back of the Bluffs. Instead of crossing above or below, to take the supposed encampment enjlank, Devens landed under the Bluffs and was com- pelled to ascend them by a winding cattle-trail in single file. Ten Confederate infantrymen could have held his whole force in check right there. When the command finally gained the crest of the Bluffs they had a long wait for daylight, but during this interval Devens sent a report to General Stone, and soon after daylight Colonel Lee of the Twentieth Massachusetts crossed with a full company. As daylight came, scouts were sent out in different directions, but not a Confederate was to be found. The encampment was a hum- bug, and not even a picket guarded the neighborhood. Devens' orders extended no farther, but he pushed on in the direction of Leesbnrg to see what force he could uncover. It was only when he saw Confederate troops riding and marching along his front that he ordered a halt. His presence on the Bluffs had been discovered soon after daylight by farmers, and messengers were dispatched to the nearest Confederate force. Lee was not massing there. In point of fact the neighborhood was guarded by local companies who had seen no service. It took from daylight until after eight o'clock to bring up and concentrate a sufficient Confederate force to oppose the four hundred Federals. The way for retreat across the river was open all this time, but Devens had carried the war across the Potomac and was deter- mined to stick. General Stone encouraged him by sending over the remainder of the Fifteenth, thus raising his force to nearly seven hundred men. He knew the Confederates were gathering to attack him, and that it was only a question of hours when they could bring up twenty to his one. He had no hopes of further reinforcement, nor did he expect to advance. What, then, could have influenced Devens to take up position for battle and wait until noon to be attacked ! Confederate troops massed on him from points ten to fifteen miles distant, and by noon the force in his front was large enough to crush him and intended to do it. The Federal center and left were vigorously attacked, and a column had almost succeeded in passing Devens' right flank when he checkmated it by falling back to the Bluffs. Here, while forming his lines anew, he surrendered his command to Colonel Baker, the ranking officer, who had been crossing with reinforce- ments since the first rattle of musketry proved that a fight was on. 22 ball's bluff. Four scows furnished the sole means of transportation, and these were such wretched hulks that the men dared not take a six-pound field-piece and its horses over together. Three pieces of artillery were finally crossed and landed right under the Bluffs, up which they had to be hauled by ropes. The horses were pulled after them, roads cut through the thickets, and the pieces finally brought into action. Baker brought with him his California batallion and a New York regiment. It would have been far better had Devens surrendered his whole command to the Confederates. Reinforcements were simply to add to the victims of the blunder and the slaughter. Baker had the bravery of a hero and the coolness of a general. As soon as he could get his forces into line he began pushing the Con- federates back until he had room to maneuver. The three pieces of artillery were got in position, and when the fight again opened the Federals for a time had the best of it. But for the knowledge that retreat was cut off by the river his men would have gone into the battle in better spirits, but though the officers sought to offset this feeling by spreading rumors of reinforcements, the certainty that disaster meant surrender or slaughter acted like a chill. The Federal lines were so firmly planted that they could not be forced at any point, though repeated attempts were made during the afternoon. But if they could not be driven they could not be advanced. Unless reinforcements in sufficient numbers to rout the Confederates reached Baker he must hold his position and see his ranks being gradually thinned out by the steady fire. As the afternoon wore on the Confederates received reinforce- ments and began to be more aggressive. The Federal artillery, after all the trouble of crossing, was rendered useless at various intervals by the concentrated fire which swept away the crews at each gun, and every piece was finally disabled or abandoned. There were no signs of giving way until Baker fell. He had recklessly exposed himself all the afternoon, and received the fatal bullet while ming- ling with the men at the front and encouraging them to repel a sudden assault. He was shot by a Virginia soldier who was armed only with a self-cocking revolver, and he fired at Baker from a dis- tance of about six feet. Nearly all the fighting on the Confederate side up to noon was done by the Eighth Virginia, assisted by local militia and farmers, a large number of whom brought rifles and shot-guns and fought on their own hook. About noon three Mississippi regiments BALL 8 BLUFF. 23 arrived and went into line, and from this hour on, the day was lost to the Federals. The news of Baker's fall produced something of a panic for a time, the more so as it was followed by a change of commanders and loss of valuable time in settling the seniority of rank. Colonel Lee, who first assumed command, directed the troops to fall back in order to shorten the lines, but being outranked by Cogswell, the movement was stopped and the men massed to break through the Confederates and attempt to reach Edward's Ferry It was too late I Every Federal soldier on that field knew the day was lost, and the knowledge brought confusion and more blunders. It is asserted in at least two Federal histories that at this critical moment a Confederate officer on a white horse left the cover of the woods held by the Thirteenth Mississippi, advanced close to the front of the Tammany regiment, and pointing back to the woods, ordered a charge. No man could have lived two minutes on that front, which was being swept with a continuous fire of musketry. Any person coming from the woods would have been known as an enemy and fired on at once. No member of the Thirteenth Missis- sippi knew of such an occurrence. The story was doubtless invented to excuse the blunder made when Cogswell assumed com- mand. " We are going to cut our way out ! " was passed from man to man along the lines, and the Tammany regiment was ordered by its own officers to advance. It dashed forward in fine style, carrying with it nearly the entire Federal front, thus breaking and throwing the lines into confusion. The Mississippians met the assault with such a murderous fire that it was almost instantly checked. Then, as the Federals fell back, order and discipline could no longer be maintained. There was a wild rush for the foot of the Bluffs and the scows. A year later any sergeant in the army would have known what step to take to prevent the slaughter that followed. Enough men could have been rallied to hold the Bluffs. The ground there was covered with trees, thickets, logs and rocks, and a single line of infantry could have repulsed five times its numbers. No such effort was made. A few officers and men, knowing that they would be drowned in the crossing, tarried for awhile on the Bluffs and kept up a feeble fire, but they were soon routed out by the Confederate advance. Then the slaughter began. The old scows were pushed out into 24 ball's bluff. the river, with their loads of men, each one offering a fair target, and from the crest of the Bluffs the Confederates had a plunging fire on the panic-stricken mass huddled at the river's edge. They have been severely criticised for continuing this fire when no resist- ance was offered, but it must be remembered that no white flag appeared among the Federals in token of surrender. The force was making every effort to escape, instead. Cogswell and Lee, together with a portion of their commands, surrendered and received kind treatment, while a considerable number escaped up and down the river, and finally succeeded in crossing. The Union loss, in killed and captured, was about one thousand. The Confederates lost about two hundred killed, and three hundred wounded, and captured the three pieces of artillery and several hundred muskets. It was a battle brought on by a blunder, fought amidst other blunders, and a victory for the Confederates that was unexpected and unhoped for. General Stone was held responsible, but this did not wash the blood-stains from the bluffs nor restore to life the corpses floating heavily down the current of the merciless river. From Ball's Bluff, in the first year of the war, to Appomattox, in the last, the Federal government had too many men. It could spare a thousand lives at any time as victims to a military blunder. gttti Swa, % IN-CrajK fcF the Confederates had been allowed more time, Forts if Henry and Donelson would have formed part of a quad- rilateral. As it was, one event crowded another so closely that the forts were not finished as intended, not armed as they should have been, and not garrisoned for such attacks as Grant and Foote made. * . . On Z fourth of February, 1862, Grant begau landing his mfaii- trvthee miles below Fort Henry, and Foote was on band w.th seve gnn-boats. On the same night the Federa s had po-ss.on of both tanks of the Tennessee below the fort. The move was made ^en, but had it been proelaimed a week in advance tie gar = of the fort could not have been mcreased * V* "*? £"■ Grant's move was a part of a grand movement which gave the Con- trjants move w r „,„„J? „f an xietv and no threatened point federates at each point plenty ot anxiety, auu had reinforcements to spare. , Could the original plans of the engineers have been earned out, Fort Hen 7wonfd have been a strong work, mounting from fifty to £*lnon, instead of eleven, and calling for a garrison of ^ s thousand men, instead of two thousand seven hundred. Not only h fort itself was open to attacks from both land and water .. the same moment, but it was actually commanded fro,, . three or fop different land points, which an enemy would be certain to ocenpy^ To have had a fair show against Grant and Foote, with *«* seve "mi-boats eighteen thousand infantry and nearly one blind, ed gin , f Sghm S an, commanding, should have bad five thousand infam try and four or five additional batteries of field ar illery Hod not even think of holding the opposite shore, although Gral had *„t to post his batteries there to rake every acr< ^o f gronnd in the fort, and maintain a cross-fire over most of it. A rise ol l % ^ater would give a gun-boat a direct fire into he inched camps, and yet this matter did not seem to have t;°» bl " Lineers who laid out the works. There was not in Fort Henry, 26 FORT HENRY. when Grant and Foote were fairly ready for attack, a spot or place to shelter half a dozen men from the fire of one or the other. One who doubts has but to go over the ground. He can see the position of every gun, and the river is still there. The roads which the Federals cleared along the banks are plain enough, and the enfilad- ing fire can be traced as easily as the blaze of an ax through the forest. Gen. Smith's forces, which moved up the west bank, walked into a position hardly a thousand feet from the magazine of the fort, and from this position had three cross-fires on the garrison. When the Confederate commander realized the strength of the force closing in upon him he saw that the fort must fall. While Fort Donelson, twelve miles across the country, on the Cumberland, was a part of the same system of defense, it was better located for a vigorous defense, and the fall of one did not necessarily include the fall of the other. If he could save Donelson by letting go of Henry, it would still be a point gained. On the morning of the sixth, while the gun-boats were moving up and the infantry swinging into position, Tilghman sent away four-fifths of his garrison, by the highway, to Fort Donelson. Indeed, it was either this, or to see them cut to pieces by the enfil- ading fire, or captured as they stood in line. They had already been driven clear of the works before the fort had fired a gun. The command marched swiftly away, to be added to the garrison of the other fort, and that they might not be too closely pursued, and because he had fight in him and would not surrender without strik- ing a blow, Tilghman went to his heavy guns and made ready for what was coming. There were exactly eleven of them in battery on the river side, and were not enough artillerists to work more than eight of them at once. These facts may read strangely to one who has perused the enthusiastic versions of certain historians regarding the Confederate strength, but they are facts, nevertheless. The Federal infantry held back to let Foote open the ball and silence the water batteries. Right gallantly the fleet moved up, opening fire while yet a long way off, and steadily maintaining it until coming as close as was deemed prudent. The first dozen shells from the fleet were altogether too high, and crashed among the trees. The second one fired struck a tree about twenty-five feet from the roots, just below where three great limbs branched out, and took the entire top off and flung it upon other tree tops to the rear. The trunk was split into quarters clear down to the roots. Under cover of their own rapid fire, the iron-clads advanced to within FORT HENRY. 27 rifle-shot of the water battery, while those not protected remained at a safer distance. All were near enough to make their fire effec- tive, and when once the range had been obtained, it was not ten minutes before those in Fort Henry realized that the fleet alone was more than its match. Only eighty seven men had been left behind to work the guns, and not five out of the number had ever witnessed a skirmish. They could not even be called trained artillerists, for their practice at the guns had amounted to nothing. Not a gun was fired from the fort until Foote's whole fleet was in position. Then the men opened fire with six or seven of the eleven guns. The first shot was fired from a twenty-four pounder. It flew over the gun-boat Essex, missing her by only three or four feet, struck the water half a mile below, bounded like a ball over another gun-boat, and sank a mile away. The next shot, from a columbiad, missed the Essex by a shave, and plumped into the river so close to the next in line as to throw water over her decks. After these two shots the guns were fired as fast as possible, and in a brief time the range on both sides was excellent. While three out of every five Federal shot cleared the defenses, the two which struck inflicted such damages as the engineers could not have thought possible. Banks of solid earth eight feet thick were blown away and dug out by the great shells, until they scarcely offered any defense, and the shells which ex- ploded in the rear furnished proof that there would have been no safety within the works for a garrison. The Essex and the Cincinnati were hit at about the same time, and that within five minutes after the fort opened fire. Then the guns were toled off and each selected its target. The fort used solid shot altogether, and after the first excitement the men fired coolly and deliberately and cheered whenever their shots made a hit. When the fight had been going on for an hour the Essex steamed in a little closer and delivered a shot which struck the muzzle of a twenty-four-pounder and tore away an iron splinter three feet long and crushed one of the gunners to pulp. The big gun was being fired at the instant, and it burst wide open and killed or wounded every man of the crew. At the same moment a solid shot from the fort crashed into the side of the Essex, penetrated one of her boilers, scalded a number of men, killed Captain Porter's aid, and so disabled the craft that she floated out of the fight. She received two more shot while drifting out of range, making over twenty received in all. 28 FORT HENRY. The flag-ship Cincinnati at one time approached to within pistol shot of the parapets, but it was a position she could not maintain live minutes. Two of the big guns were devoted entirely to her, and she was struck about thirty times during the fight. While not so seriously injured as to compel her to abandon the fight, she was so badly knocked to pieces as to necessitate sending her off for repairs at an early date after the capture of the fort. Others of the iron-clads were repeatedly struck, and more or less damaged, and it was plain to see that had they taken broadside posi- tions, as at Fort McAllister and other points later on, they would have been sent to the bottom by the fire of the fort. The armor was in a measure experimental ; at least, these were pioneer iron- clads, and it needed a fight like this to settle the question of how thick the armor should be. Fighting bow on, all shots were received at an angle, and the boat was a small target to fire at. The fight lasted about two hours, and in this brief time the casu- alties in the fort were singularly numerous. The big twenty-four pounder was useless after a round or two, and five men were dis- abled. Then came a Federal shell, which struck another cannon fair in the mouth and tore it open and disabled its crew. Then the most valuable gun left was rendered useless by being accidently spiked with the priming wire. This disaster was followed by the dismounting of another gun, and before the fight was over, General Tilghman himself was acting as the captain of a gun. During the last ten minutes of the fight he had only men enough to work two guns. There were two or three guns not fired at all during the entire fight for want of crews to work them. As the great major- ity of the artillerists were for the first time under fire they naturally threw away a great deal of ammunition before getting settled down to cool fighting. The numerous disasters behind the parapets also served to unnerve them, but the history of war in this country does not furnish another instance like the defense of that fort. Less than one hundred men, surrounded by land, opposed by iron- clads and mortar boats, receiving ten shots where they could only fire one — this little band held out for two long hours under a fire which Foote called terrible, and surrendered only when the crew of the last gun fell down exhausted, and were lying on the ground as the flag came fluttering down and the surrender was made. At the time Grant appeared the river was rising, the country full of backwater, and the roads in a horrible condition. But for this latter fact everything in Fort Henry worth taking away could and FORT HENKY. 29 would have been removed to Donelson. The Federals captured stores of all kinds and a number of valuable guns, and the number of prisoners surrendered, outside of the sick on the hospital boat, was seventy-eight. The killed, wounded and missing in the fleet was seventy-three. The surrender was made to Foote, and Grant came in for no share of the praise, although had he walked in on the fort instead of giving the fleet a chance, his skirmish line would have captured it in ten minutes, and perhaps without the loss of a man. The results were of direct benefit to both sides. The Confeder- ates saw that rifled twenty-four-pounders were a match for any Federal gun-boat then afloat, and the Federals at once set about securing stronger armor and strengthening the weak spots. The attack by the fleet was terrific for that epoch, and the men were enthusiastic and encouraged. The defense was heroic, and from that date Confederates who had the shelter of parapets would fight a gun-boat as soon as anything else. The fort, as it then stood, without the other contemplated posts, which would have made it a part of a grand combination of defense, was simply a man-trap. The engineer did not take a rise of the river into account, and yet four feet more than the stage at which work was begun would drive the men from the lower guns, and seven or eight feet would overflow a good portion of the fort. It was convenient of approach for an enemy, commanded on both sides of the river, and the wisest thing ever done by a Confederate commander was in Tilghman J s getting his command out of the trap before the jaws came together. Had he been reinforced he would have lost every man. Cije Cajrtan of Jfart §mkm. ORT DONELSON, to which the majority of the garrison of Fort Henry retreated before the surrender, was distant but twelve miles across the country, on the Cumber- land. The earth-works on the Bluffs required a garrison of at least ten thousand men to fully man them, and were laid out to cover strategic points, thus giving the fort an irregular shape. Below, near the water's edge, the heavy guns were put in battery to command the river, and the infantry supports had the cover of earth-works at fair musket range. Had Foote brought a score of gun-boats to the attack they would have been beaten off, but when Foote was assisted by a land attack, all the weak points of the fort were at once exposed. The defenders of Fort Donelson were a miscellaneous crowd. Floyd was there with his command ; Buckner had a command ; Pillow had a command, and Forrest had a command. While Floyd was in supreme command, he neither had a reputation as a fighter nor the entire confidence of the various commands. There was not that harmony among the officers that should have been dis- played, and it seems that some of them, from the hour the invest- ment became complete, were more occupied in planning to break through and get away than in perfecting details for defense. The fort covered too much ground for the strength of any garri- son likely to be intrusted with its defense. One soldier in a fort should count for four attacking it, but the earth-works on the Bluffs were so strung out that one defender could count for no more than an assailant. The force defending the fort is not placed at above fifteen thousand men by any Confederate military report, and Forrest's cavalry were of little use as cavalry. Outside of Foote's fleet Grant had an investing force estimated at twenty-seven thousand or twenty-eight thousand men, and by the thirteenth of February he was in position. Whatever the shape of the Confederate line, he conformed to it, and if the Confederates [301 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 31 had the cover of an earth-work, the Federals were protected by logs and trees and ditches and ravines. The same plan was pursued as at Fort Henry. Had Grant been less generous Foote would have had no fighting to do. A Federal infantry force, by a land investment, or by breaking through at any point, could have won a victory and taken the river batteries in reverse. The Confederates would have been forced to surrender them" without firing a shot. But Grant completed his investment and then waited to give Foote a chance. The Confederates had not to exceed fifteen guns in the water batteries. Foote moved up with gun-boats carrying a total of more than sixty, and of superior caliber at that. On the afternoon of the fourteenth, six gun-boats moved out into the great bend of the river and slowly advanced upon the batteries, opening fire at long range and keeping it up with a steadiness that soon set the earth trembling for miles around. If Foote could lay his fleet broadside on at close range, thirty minutes' time would either silence the batteries or send his gun-boats to the bottom. But he could not reach the position. He advanced to within five hundred yards, and there the Confederate fire became so accurate and so hot that further advance was impossible. There was not a gun in the batteries equal to the ten-inch guns on the fleet, and they were scarcely one-fourth in number, and yet the fleet went out of the fight in a crippled condition. In one hour's time the Louisville, after being struck over thirty times, drifted out of the fight with the pilot having no control over her. Her armor was bulged and cracked and dented in a way to prove that a gun of heavier metal would have let daylight into her hold. The St. Louis was at the mercy of the current as she left the fight, the Pittsburgh was leaking, and the best gun on the Carondolet was useless. The four iron-clads, Avhich advanced closest and took the brunt of the fight, were compelled to drift out of it in less than two hours, all more or less damaged, and having inflicted no real injury on the battery. The accuracy of the Con- federate fire is shown by the report that the iron-clads were hit over thirty times each on an average, and this while fighting in positions offering the least target for a shot. As in the case at Fort Henry, the guns were manned mostly by men who had never been under fire before, but they were in sufficient numbers to work the guns to their best. Not a man was killed in the battery, and only one wounded, and that by a pebble 32 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. hurled in his direction by the bursting of a shell. Dozens of the Federal missiles buried themselves in the Bluffs above the batteries, and dozens more in the earth-works, but they were harmless. The men complained more of the annoyance of the showers of mud and dirt than of the pieces of shell and flying bullets. One of the guns was struck on the muzzle but not disabled, and another, partly dis- mounted at the opening of the fight, was repaired during the hottest of the fire. Had Foote alone attacked he could not have put enough gun- boats into the bend to capture the water batteries, though his iron- clads were fought with the utmost gallantry and were steadily held under a fire such as those crafts had never before encountered. Grant had given him a chance, and he had been beaten off. The Federal infantry were now to move up and settle the fate of Fort Donelson. After General Floyd had ascertained Grant's strength he enter- tained no further idea of resistance. The idea was to break through the investing lines and carry out as many men as possible. The fort was too large to be successfully defended by his command. In beating off the fleet the batteries had not scored a single point in favor of the general situation. It was the infantry who were to be feared, and it was the plateau and not the river bank which consti- tuted the key-stone of the arch. Up to night of the- day of the fight between fleet and batteries there had been no real fighting between the infantry. Not more than one third of the Confederates had caught sight of a Federal. Floyd could defend the fort for a time, but the inevitable result would be surrender. He has been sharply criticised for not holding out instead of fighting his way out with a portion of the garrison, and he lost his official head for the manner in which he turned over the command of the post to a subordinate that he might not himself be made a prisoner. The plan was to mass the Confederate garrison, or the bulk of it, and fall upon the Federal right with such vigor at early dawn as to crush it back and clear the highway running at Charlotte. Grant would be taken by surprise, and before he could reinforce the point attacked, the Confederates would be clear of his lines. It was a simple plan, and as night came the Confederate commander began carrying out the details. The weather was cold and stormy, the troops were in movement a good share of the night, and when the gray of the winter's morning began to light up the woods, hundreds THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 33 of the men in the ranks had frost-bitten ears and fingers and were benumbed with cold. The want of harmony among commanders had resulted in blunders among other officers and these blunders delayed the attack, which was to have been made at early dawn, to nearly an hour later. During this delay the Federal scouts dis- covered that a move of some sort was on foot, and the attack was by no means the surprise that had been planned. An hour after daylight the Confederates moved to the attack. On most portions of their front the men had not marched five hun- dred feet before they encountered the Federal line of battle, and a fierce and steady conflict at once opened. The Federal right wing was matched, if not considerably out-numbered, but it was admira- bly positioned for defending such an attack. The ground was broken by ridges and ravines, mostly sheltered by heavy timber, and battle-lines were within stone's throw of each other as the men settled down to their deadly work. Grant could not have known the Confederate plan, and could not therefore have prepared his right for the blow suddenly given it. Knowing that the only way out lay in that direction, the Confeder- ates attacked with desperation. In the advance through the timber nearly every Confederate regiment had to march by the flank, and thus when the heads of columns were fired on, battle-lines had to be formed under a close fire. The number of troops in this movement against Grant's right was not quite eight thousand. Federal writers who have given it at twelve thousand have counted up the regiments and fallen into the error of estimating the strength of each at one thousand men. There was not a regiment there numbering seven hundred men, and some had less than four hundred. It was a rare thing after the summer campaign of 1861 to find a Confederate company, regi- ment, brigade or division up to its full strength. McClernand held the Federal right with a division, General Wallace was in the center, and Smith on the left, the latter having nothing to do with the fight during the forenoon. The road to Charlotte lay between McCiernand and Wallace, and both these commands were included in the attack, although for the first two hours McClernand received the brunt of it. Such of his division as came into the fight was opposed only by a single brigade, com- posed of the Seventh Texas, Eighth Kentucky, and First and Third Mississippi, and this brigade did not number two thousand men when it went into action. It formed under a fire so hot that some Vol. 1.— 3 34 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. of the regiments had to change front twice, and then advanced straight upon the rising ground held by McClernand. "With a wild yell and a rush together they swept up the hill, cleared it, held it for five minutes, and were then swept back into the ravine below by a counter-charge. This was the first ground gained and lost by the Confederates. As soon as the brigade could reform, it began a steady advance in line, and at the end of forty minutes once more held the hill. Up to this time Wallace had scarcely fired a shot. Believing from the fighting already done that the Federal right could be turned, a Confederate brigade was now pushed forward to skirmish with Wallace and prevent his sending away reinforce- ments, and the attack upon McClernand was renewed. He had a naturally strong position, being a succession of sharp ridges and the cover of ravines and timber, and his left hung to every foot of ground with the tenacity of old veterans. When the Confederates first moved out in the morning, McCler- nand's right, where it touched the river and thus completed the line of investment, was composed of a Kentucky regiment, the Third Union. This regiment held as strong a position as any battle field ever furnished, and up to the moment of attack the men seemed full of determination. They were advanced upon by about thirty skirmishers from a Mississippi regiment, and within five minutes were thrown into a panic and so completely routed that the regi- ment was not reorganized until after noon. The flight of this regiment left a gap through which the Confederates began to pour for an advance down the flank. As McClernand found himself hard pressed he sent to Wallace for reinforcements and was given Cruft's brigade. The men made a run of over two miles through woods and fields and up hill and down to reach the threatened point. Had they come into position just where they were needed, behind the hard pressed regiments, the tide of battle might have turned then and there. But, in the confusion of battle, unfamiliar with the ground, and simply anxious to secure position and open fire, the brigade formed its battle-line on untenable ground and was at once attacked with the utmost fury. For a time the conflict seemed to whirl round and round this single brigade, and though three-fifths of its members were in battle for the first time, not a company broke nor a man skulked. They held their first ground until flanked, and then they fell back to take a second position and fight as grimly as before. An officer in the Seventh Texas said of the way they fought : THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 35 "They were the hardest men to drive I ever saw. We had been having it pretty much our own way before they came, but when they swung into line and opened fire our advance was checked. Three different times we advanced so close upon them that the powder almost burned men's faces, but they would not move until the line had been flanked." The gallant fight of Craft's brigade enabled McClernand to reform and bring Swartz' battery into position to cover the threat- ened point. When next the Confederate wave rolled forward it met a line of fire which shriveled it. Those who lived to fall back were reformed to advance again, and this time the lines ran into each other and men were brained with clubbed muskets, and bayonets were everywhere in use. The Federal battery was worked with such vigor that the Confederate advance was checked. Six thou- sand men were advancing, retreating, circling and changing posi- tions in the smoke-cloud— now gaining a little ground — now being repulsed — now in solid front — now riven and scattered, when a move by a single regiment on the flank captured the battery and drove McClernand out of his camps. Soon after noon the Confed- erates had gained nearly two miles of ground on the front attacked. McClernand's whole division had been pushed back, one wing of Wallace's command bent back, and the road to Charlotte was open. At two o'clock on that afternoon the entire Confederate army could have passed out of Fort Donelson by the Wynn's Ferry road, thus opened by gallant fighting and at such cost of blood. Had the entire strength of the garrison been ready to attack Wallace as McClernand gave way, the Federal center and right must have lost the line of investment, if not suffering defeat. Up to the hour when the way out was clear several thousand Confederates had not yet fired a shot. Now came the blunder. Through some misunderstanding of orders, or because Pillow took it upon himself to change the pro- gramme of his superior, the plan to march out was countermanded and a feeble attack made on the Federal left to cover the move of withdrawing into the trenches. Pillow claimed that Smith, holding the Federal flank, was ready to follow up the evacuation and make it a rout. Buckner proved that he was prepared to cover the retreat with fresh regiments and prevent any serious attack. Floyd could prove nothing, except that he was not the general to take advantage of a favorable crisis. Thus, after capturing six guns, three hundred prisoners, five thousand three hundred stand 36 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. of arms, and a quantity of ammunition and camp equipage, and losing in killed and wounded about twelve hundred men to open the way out, the Confederates returned to the trap and the Federals returned to their lines of investment. That night Floyd, and Pillow, and Forrest skulked out with portions of their command, leaving Buckner, who was the real fighter, to surrender the remainder. No page of Confederate war record shows grander opportunities or greater blunders. The general who could have led his garrison safely out, after a fight in which every regiment engaged had proved its gallantry, blundered, hesitated, counter- manded, and finally disgraced his uniform by skulking out at midnight in the company of men who could have looked upon him only with feelings of contempt. $ m llttrge. is N the sixth of March, 1862, General Curtis, with a Federal force not exceeding fifteen thousand men, had taken position at Pea Ridge, Arkansas. He had been following and driving the Confederate General Price out of Missouri, and had been drawn into a trap. Price had marched to a point where a junction could be effected with the forces under McCullough and Van Dorn, and a force of at least twenty thousand fighting men now made ready to give Curtis battle. Acting with the Confederate force was a body of about three thousand Indians, half civilized, but lawless and blood-thirsty. They had no reverence for the Confederate flag, but had been gathered into the army through the influence of gold and promises of plun- der. Only such as had no guns of their own were armed with Confederate muskets. Eight out of ten had their own rifles and equipments, and they went into battle with tomahawks and scalp- ing-knives in their belts. Previous to this battle the Confederates had placed considerable dependence on the Indian force, estimating that at least eight thousand could be recruited and brought into active service, but after Pea Ridge the red man was counted on no longer. It was found he was a coward in the face of artillery, a skulk under musketry, and that his disobedience of orders brought about dan- gerous confusion. All the roads by which Van Dorn could approach Curtis' posi- tion were swiftly and strongly fortified with rifle-pits, breastworks, and abattis, and at points the highways were blocked by falling trees across tnsm. The strong manner in which Curtis protected his front came near proving his ruin. Confederate scouts reported his front impregnable to assault, and Yan Dorn determined on a flank movement. This was being carried out all night long on the night of the sixth, but it was almost daylight before scouts dis- [371 38 PEA KIDGE. covered the maneuver and brought word to Curtis. lie then found himself compelled to change front almost completely, leaving his defenses on the flank and rear, and his army obliged to face three different points of the compass. As daylight came Van Dorn had not yet finished massing, owing to the difficult nature of the ground, and Curtis at once prepared to move forward and strike the first blow. It was a cold, bleak morning, and nine o'clock came before any important movement was made. Then, as Curtis moved out a force to strike Van Dorn, his own right flank three miles away was hotly attacked, and the battle soon opened on a front three miles long. Colonel Osterhaus moved from Curtis' left flank on a highway running to the northeast and meetino; two others at Elkhorn tav- ern. His troops were scarcely in line before they encountered the Confederate skirmishers, who were pressed back foot by foot for a mile before any stand was made. A sharp engagement ensued, lasting about a quarter of an hour, when the Confederates seemed to have been routed. Here Osterhaus committed one of those unaccountable blunders of which so many were charged up to Federal generals during the war. He had been fighting over ground difficult even for the infantry to traverse, and his guns were got to the front only by the help of dozens of men at the wheels ; but in his excitement he brought up the Third Iowa Cavalry and ordered them to charge the thickets in his front. The brave fellows must have been amazed at the order, but with- out hesitation they obeyed, the lines all awry from the very start, owing to the natural obstacles encountered. Some at a gallop, and some at a trot, the Third moved forward with cheers, and the result was what might have been expected. The Confederates, who had simply sought shelter from the artillery fire, rose up and opened a murderous fire on the cavalry, and had its commander not been possessed of more sense than his superior, his command would have been annihilated. He got out as soon as possible, but left dozens of his dead in the thickets behind. As the cavalry fell back the Confederates advanced, and in ten minutes had two of Osterhaus' guns and were pressing him back at every point. He would have been routed entirely had not Davis and Sigel appeared at the critical moment, both having fought their way to him under fire. Reinforcements also arrived for the Confederates, and what had been a sharp skirmish now grew into a fierce battle between ten thousand men. PEA RIDGE. 39 On this front were open fields, bushy ravines, thickets and patches of woods, and every rod of it was fought over again and again. Curtis could spare no more reinforcements, and the men on the ground realized that they must hold it at any cost. The Indians were distributed along the front, sheltering themselves behind trees and in the ravines and thickets, and their yells could all the time be heard above the roar of battle. Not once in that fight did any body of them appear in the open, and at several points where the Federals recovered lost ground they found dead men who had been scalped and otherwise mutilated by these blood-thirsty allies. A member of Davidson's Federal battery was shot in the leg in the charge on the guns, and was unable to leave the field. A Confed- erate soldier helped him to a seat with his back to a tree, and left him a full canteen of water, and two or three others addressed him kindly, but on their heels came a lot of skulking Indians. One of them tomahawked a wounded man belono-ino- to the Third Iowa Cavalry and lying only ten feet from the artillerist, and another came running up with a knife in his hand to dispatch him, when he drew his pistol and shot the savage dead. The act was witnessed and applauded by a Confederate lieutenant, who then drove other Indians away from the spot with his drawn sword. When the Federals came to bury their dead they found at least fifty corpses which had been scalped, and wherever an Indian had found opportunity to approach the wounded he had used knife and tomahawk to murder them. Many of the bodies showed three or four knife thrusts, and others were hacked and mutilated in the most dreadful manner. For two long hours the fight on the Confederate right resulted in no advantage to either, when the Federal commander decided on a flank movement. Two Indiana regiments made a wide detour and passed the Confederate flank and swung around to the rear. There was not a suspicion of their presence until they poured in their first volley and followed it by a charge. In this charge they uncovered a large gang of Indians in a ravine, and such as did not get away were shot down as fast as reached, their shouts of " me give up ! " failing to arouse any mercy in the hearts of men who had seen their dead comrades hacked and scalped. That flank movement by an insignificant force doubtless won the battle of Pea Ridge. The Indians, at least, were entirely demoral- ized and of no further use, while McCulloch and Mcintosh and a large number of lesser officers were killed or disabled. It resulted 40 PEA RIDGE. in routing the Confederate right and driving it, and in securing strong positions for the Federals. On the Federal right the morning did not pass without disaster. Colonel Carr, who had the command, resented the Confederate attack with such energy, that he advanced one of his batteries too far and had some of the guns captured by a sudden rush. Almost immediately following, his entire front was attacked so vigorously that it was pressed back at every point. Contracting his lines and throwing up breastworks of logs and earth and rails, and half-fac- ing some of the troops to protect his flanks, he settled down to stay. Charge after charge was made upon his position — now on the right — now on the left — now at his centre, but his lines could not be penetrated. Nevertheless, fighting one to five, as he was doing all along his front, his loss soon became serious. Curtis had no troops to spare, and it became a fight simply to hold his own until annihilated or a victory on the left should afford a chance to spare him a few regi- ments. This chance came only after the field was strewn with his dead and wounded — one out of every four he had in line. His artillery was out of ammunition, his infantry short of cartridges, and another quarter of an hour must have seen him broken and routed. Carr had fought like an old hero, but at every point he had been driven back. Just in the nick of time a Federal division arrived and flung itself into the fight, and at the same time a movement by Sigel alarmed the Confederates and caused them to shorten their lines. With numbers now more equal the fight along Carr's front was renewed with intense bitterness until night-fall shut each other out of view. The Confederate right had been broken and driven ; the center had sought to advance, but had been checked, the left had gained a mile of ground, but the loss had been heavy. The sum- ming upas darkness put an end to the conflict showed no advantage to either. Under the leaden sky, through which the moon burst now and then as it raced across the heavens, the dogs of war snarled and growled for a while, and then lay down to lick their bloody wounds. It was an anxious night for Curtis. He knew that he was out- numbered, and the reports from brigade commanders showed his losses to have been heavy. To retreat in the face of an enemy needs but some unlooked for accident to bring about a panic and annihilation. Had he preferred retreat, he had no point of safety PEA RIDGE. 41 within reach. It would simply mean a march across a state, with the Confederate infantry pressing his rear and their cavalry harass- ing his flanks. That meant destruction. But Curtis had no thought of retreat. His scouts kept him posted as to Van Dorn's movements, and lie changed front to meet them. The new positions he took up in again changing fronts, and adding Sigel's command to the force likely to receive the first attack on the morrow, were stronger than the old ones, and as the morning of the eighth was ushered in every regiment was ready for what was to come. As the Confederates let the sun come up and time fly past with- out attacking, Curtis advanced his center to feel them. This opened the battle at once, and the Federals had to fall back under a fire of artillery such as none of the troops had ever faced before. There was now an interval or lull of half an hour, during which both commanders were bringing up every man and gun. Curtis was ready first. With every piece of artillery in his army massed along his front and supported by lines of battle lying on the ground in front, he suddenly opened such a fire that there was no holding men in front of it. Whole regiments were moved by the flank or ordered into ravines for shelter, and for nearly two hours the fight was almost wholly confined to the artillery. The Indians had been pretty thoroughly broken up the day before, and this finished them. They could not be held anywhere within the Federal range, and the Texans, who were relied on for hot work, had not counted on facing such a fire as this. Said one of the officers who became a prisoner to the Federals : " The thicket which covered the front of my regiment was right in play of a Federal battery of six guns, and within grape-shot range. In a quarter of an hour it was entirely cut away, and in spite of all we could do to prevent, the men broke and sought shelter in a ravine. It was a splendid rifle-pit, but so hot was that rain of grape and canister that we could not get a sharp-shooter to put his head above the bank. Up to the time this fire opened on us our men were full of fight, but it had not continued half an hour when I caught dozens of them stealing away to the rear." Curtis had still another card to play. During the fire his lines were closed up and made ready, and at the word the guns ceased their roar and the whole army moved forward. A feeble resistance was offered here and there, but in half an hour Yan Dorn was in full retreat. He had probably intended this movement since the 42 PEA RIDGE. evening before, as his wagons were sent off and most of tbe plunder of tbe battle Held secured. His retreat was by no means a rout, as a strong rear-guard prevented any tiling like aggressive pursuit. Ten miles away be baited and sent back a flag of truce and received permission to bury bis dead, after wbich be marched away to leave Curtis in full possession of that section of country. Counting numbers and the average chances of war, Van Dorn should have won that battle before night of the first day. Leaving out his force of Indian allies, Confederates never fought with more determination than on that field, and it was from no want of cour- age that they met defeat where victory seemed waiting. Van Dorn's subordinates were out-maneuvered, and he himself made a mistake in attacking the Federals in that position. It was a place offering a small army a chance to escape destruction, and it was held with such bravery as to stamp every man a hero. The losses were about equal — fourteen hundred killed and wounded, but the entire Federal force in the west felt the enthusiasm of the hour and were anxious to go to the front. forlitoton attir ilnioruL AD McClellan been permitted to carry out his original plan of moving on Kichmond and the Confederate army defending it, there would have been no siege of Yorktown to chronicle. He was to land at Fortress Monroe, Banks to move down on Hanover Junction, via Fredericksburg, and McDowell to be landed at a convenient point for placing himself between the Confederate army and Richmond. The three separate Federal armies were to be timed to act in con- cert, and, in all human judgment, the movement must at least have resulted in the retreat of the Confederates from the Peninsula. The weeks of delay, the waste of treasure and the loss of life in front of Yorktown would have been avoided by this policy, and had one of the three armies suffered a defeat the situation would have been no worse. McClellan's plan was thoroughly known to the administration in every detail, and it must have been approved or he could never have carried out the portion he did. It was a plan not for his army alone, but for the entire armed force of the Federal government to move upon the enemy simultaneously, giving battle to any force found in their front. Such a proceeding would have given every Confederate army plenty of business to look out for itself, but there was a Congress behind Abraham Lincoln and a nation behind that Congress. Washington must not be left defenseless. That was one of the bugbears of the war. Half a dozen times in the four years Rich- mond was left to the defense of government clerks, cripples and , boys, and there was no time that twenty thousand militia could not have been collected at a day's notice to occupy the defenses — stronger than those of Richmond — around the capital. McClellan had moved, Banks was concentrating for his march, and McDowell was actuall} T embarking, when a cowardly trepidation caused Lincoln to modify the plan by a stroke of the pen and retain [431 44 YOKKTOWN AND BEYOND. McDowell's corps to defend "Washington. That pen was dipped in the blood of twenty-five thousand Federal dead. The order resulted in the siege of Yorktown and the bloody battles of the Peninsula. In the wet and weeping clays of April, 1862, McClellan landed his array within twenty miles of Yorktown and slowly advanced upon the place. Lincoln's order retaining McDowell was known in Richmond within twelve hours after it was known in Washing- ton, and the Confederates made their preparations accordingly. There were forty thousand men less to look out for — there was another corps of Confederates for McClellan to fight. At Yorktown McClellan found a lion in his path. Time had been given to throw up extensive earth-works and add to the number of guns mounted months before, and behind Yorktown was a Con- federate army which meant fight. McClellan must withdraw or lay siege to the place. He felt, of the entire line of defenses like one knocking on a wall to find a tender spot, but every movement was stained with blood.' There were no weak spots. Infantry could not carry those defenses — field artillery might as well have been loaded with peas. Yorktown must be battered down, and to do it required such preparatory labor as Federal soldiers had not encountered before. The heaviest cannon which the arsenals or navy yards could furnish were forwarded to McClellan, and the monsters had to be dragged those twenty long miles over roads on which empty army wagons stuck fast. One would have said that not a single gun could have been hauled to Yorktown, but every one landed was pulled across the country and placed in position. When ten or twelve pairs of mules were stuck fast with a gun, five hundred soldiers tailed on to the drag-ropes and brought it through. For a month McClellan was bringing up his siege guns, con- structing earth-works and forts in which to mount them, and in the early days of May he reported one hundred cannon and mortars in position. It has been asked why the Confederate army, numbering at least one hundred thousand men, and all within striking distance, was not hurled upon McClellan before his lines closed around York- town. No answer has even been made. Had Lee then been in command he would have been waiting for that army, and as the three columns, demoralized and dispirited by the weather, straggled across the country towards Yorktown, there would have been a spring and a blow, with the chances in favor of a great Confederate YORKTOWN AND BEYOND. 45 victory. At any hour during the first two weeks of April a Con- federate attack by the whole army would have had seven chances out of ten of success. McClellan had opened with a part of his guns, and by the fourth of May would have had every one of them lending its ponderous missile towards the destruction of the defenses, when, on the second instant, it was decided by a Confederate military council that the place must be evacuated. Why ? Not because it could not be held ten days longer, but because the opportunity to attack the Federal army with hopes of success had long passed, and because the evacuation freed that great army in gray from trench and fort and earth-work and left it free to select its battle ground. On the morning of the third, before day had fairly broken, the Confederates opened against the Federal works with every gun which could speak, and McClellan replied with almost an equal number. For the first time in the history of the war the earth was quivering under the concussions of the largest cannon cast at any foundry in the Republic. The uproar was tremendous, shaking buildings miles away and making the whole Peninsula seem agitated by an earthquake. The Confederate shot and shell plunged into the Federal earth-works to tear up showers of sod and earth, or fell in the trenches to maim and destroy; and the Federal missiles dropped into Yorktown in a way to hasten the preparations for evacuation. From dawn until midnight the uproar continued, and when it finally ceased the silence was almost as painful as the cannonade. Confederate troops began moving away from Yorktown on the first, and were followed by other commands as fast as the roads were clear. It would have required a month's time to remove the heavy guns, and the orders were to spike them. This work was entered upon soon after midnight, and while the guns were yet hot from the long-continued fire. Of the eighty-five or ninety left to fall into Federal hands the greater number were rendered useless for a long time, and some were entirely disabled. A large quantity of ammunition was removed to Richmond, together with the most valuable supplies, and on the morning of the fourth, when the strange silence in the Confederate works aroused suspicion, an investigation resulted in uncovering the fact that Yorktown had been evacuated. It was a victory for McClellan, but not such a victory as he had hoped for. Evacuation is not surrender. The enemy simply leaves 4G YORKTOWN AND BEYOND. an untenable position to occupy a strong one. He could march into Yorktown, but the Confederate army had marched away from it. He had come into possession of their abandoned works and spiked cannon, and the York River was now opened, but that great Confederate army was still intact and anxious for fight. McClellan did not lose an hour in beginning the pursuit. The Confederates had withdrawn by the York and the James River highways — McClellan followed by both. When the Confederates determined on the defense of Yorktown it was likewise determined to secure the line of retreat across tne Chickahominy. Ten miles north of Yorktown, and a mile and a half from the quaint old town of Williamsburg, the two highways mentioned meet each other and are absorbed into one. Here strong earth-works had been erected for heavy guns, breastworks thrown up for infantry, and it only remained to dig a line of rifle-pits to be prepared for the pursuing Federals. The right of the Confederate position was open ground, — corn fields, meadows and orchards, — and the flank defended by earth-works and troops massed under natural cover. The center commanded the two highways, and was considered impregnable. The left was covered by a dense forest, and here, in rifle-pits and behind log breastworks, a thousand men in gray could hold in check five thousand men in blue. While the great bulk of the Confederate army passed on over the Chickahominy to baffle any Federal attempt from West Point to get in its rear, a strong rear- guard was left at Williamsburg to check and delay McClellan's pursuit. There was no idea of fighting a great battle there, but that policy which kept McDowell idle on the plains of Warrenton called for blood elsewhere. Forest and thicket and meadow and corn field were soaked with the spring rains, but earth is ever thirsty for blood. C^ SStlliamslmrjj, HE abandoned guns and other property left in York- town led McClellan to believe that the Confederate array was retreating in a panic, and he ordered swift pursuit. Federal scouts and spies had claimed to have passed around the entire Confederate army, and yet they had not discovered the earth-works in front of Williamsburg. The pursuit was taken up without thought of a battle nearer than the crossing of the Chickahominy. When Stoneman arrived at the junction of the Yorktown and Lee's Mill highways, he suddenly uncovered a Confederate force which drove him back in confusion. He skirmished until he un- covered the defenses and found them manned by heavy guns, and then drew off and waited for the infantry to come up. The com- mands of Smith and Hooker were first up, but the afternoon was so far gone that operations were confined to skirmishing and further uncovering the Confederate position. It was found to be a strong one, and the Federal soldiers who rested in woods and fields through that night of steady rain felt that hot work awaited them on the morrow. Hooker was ready to move as the darkness of night gave place to the gray of morning. Impatient and impetuous, he had determined to bring on a great battle or walk over the defenses in his front. As soon as the lines could be formed, and with scarcely time for the men to make their coffee, Hooker pushed them forward. Fort Magruder, the strongest work on the line, was in his front, and he opened on it with a battery and sent forward a brigade to skirmish up to the front. Two of these regiments found a slashing in their path, and they were opened upon so fiercely that they could make no headway, while the casualties were very numerous. The battery placed in position had scarcely sent its first shell into the Confederate lines when the fire was returned with such vigor that* the Federal artillerists were driven from the guns and two of [47] 48 WILLIAMSBURG. the pieces dismounted, and it was a quarter of an hour before the battery opened again. No sooner had it done so than a large force of Confederates advanced upon it, and almost in a moment there was terrific fighting. The brigade supporting the battery did not hold their front half an hour before a message was sent off for rein- forcements, and within an hour from the firing of the first gun twelve thousand men were fighting back and forth over a field of less than one hundred acres. By eleven o'clock Hooker's whole force had been sent in, and every gun he had was belching shot and shell into the Confederate lines. The first note of battle had recalled Longstreet's whole corps from its march, and as the different brigades came up, they swung into battle-line and pressed forward to rout Hooker. He could not advance, but he was determined to hold his own. Between eleven and one o'clock three desperate charges were made at intervals on his center. His lines were breasted back by the rush, but each time they rallied and recovered their ground. Then there was a sudden rush from the lines in front of Magruder, and it was not checked until Hooker's center had lost five guns and several hundred pris- oners. This was his hour of peril. The gray lines broke cover with a yell, and as they swarmed across the fields and along the highway and burst out of the thickets, there was no checking them. The right and left centers turned their fire on the advancing foe, and the artillery changed to grape and canister. It did not seem as if human beings could face that fire and live, but the cheers drowned the roar of battle as the Confederates swept up to the guns and surrounded them. They were not given up until encircled by the dead and dying, and every spoke in every wheel carried its mark of bullet or plash of blood. Hooker had been too impetuous. The highways were not only crowded with vehicles and troops, but the rains had made them perfect rivers of mud. It was impossible to hurry up troops or am- munition. At half-past four, when General Kearney finally reached the front, Hooker gave him the front and fell back to cover with his shattered regiments. He had held his position, but over seventeen hundred of his men had been left there to mark his front. Kearney went in with a rush, and in a quarter of an hour he had swept his front clear and the music of a score of guns long silenced was heard again. By flanking the slashing he seized some rifle-pits and detached works, and although he could not further advance his WILLIAMSBUKG. 49 lines, he had strengthened them until he felt they could not be carried. Hancock had come up on the Confederate left, and greatly to his surprise he found the redoubts defending that flank unoccupied. He at once took possession, and Fort Magruder was flanked and the Confederate route to Richmond menaced. Had Hancock had five thousand men, instead of half that number, he could have executed a movement which must have relieved the pressure on Hooker, if not resulting in the speedy capture of the fort. But he had no more men than needed to hold his ground, and all his advantages were finally annulled by an order to fall back and form a new line of battle. He had scarcely made his dispositions when General Earl}', lead- ing the Twenty -fourth Virginia infantry, charged him. The charge was made across the open fields of a farm, with many of the fences and walls still standing, and Hancock's battery was supported by two full regiments. Every gun and musket opened fire as the Vir- ginians broke cover, but with muskets at the trail and every right hand swinging a cap, they rushed forward at the guns and would have taken them had they not been retired. A whole brigade had been ordered to participate in this movement, but only the Vir- ginians and the Fifteenth North Carolina left cover. When the latter regiment came up, the supporting Federal force was driven away, and the two regiments formed a line of battle to fight a whole division, and did fight it until orders came to retire. It was in the retreat from this position that both regiments were nearly wiped out, having over two hundred captured and twice as many killed and wounded. Night was now falling. There had been ten or eleven hours of hard fighting, and the troops on both sides were worn out and short of ammunition. From five o'clock to twilight both sides had been robbing their dead and wounded of cartridges to continue the fight. The same causes which prevented the Federals from hurrying up reinforcements and ammunition had likewise operated against the Confederates, and as darkness began to settle down the fighting ceased as if by mutual consent. McClellan firmly expected a renewal on the morrow, and all night long his columns were coining up through the terrible mud and taking positions. Under the trees — in the terrible abattis — in meadow and cornfield and orchard, the wounded groaned in their agony or uttered prayers for succor, Vol. I. -4 50 WJLLlAMSUL'liU. while the dead grew cold Sad stiii' and the ground licked up their blood. When daylight came again the Confederates were miles away on the road to Richmond, having abandoned their works early in the night. They left behind them their dead and wounded, but noth- ing more. While there was time to remove the majority of the wounded, there was no transportation. Longstreet had returned to help hold the Federal advance only until the Confederate trains were well out of the way, and he had returned in light marching order. There was no order from Johnston to bring on a battle at Williamsburgh. The sole idea was to hold the Federal advance for half a day, or possibly until night. This was successful. When it was discovered that Hooker was fighting without support, the Con- federates assumed the aggressive in hopes to deal him a fatal blow. At sunrise McClellan had possession of Williamsburg, and Johnston was pursuing his march unmolested. More than two thousand Federals were lying dead or wounded, while the Confed- erate loss, above prisoners, was only a few hundreds. It was called a Federal victory at the North, and a drawn battle at the South. McClellan's path to the Chickahominy was now clear, but he had paid a heavy price for the open highways. >ffito|— C|* Jfirat fatK JTUPIDITY — Luck— Fate! McClellan permitted the insignificant Chickahominy to divide his army, and lie paid for it with five thousand lives. Bull Run Creek, over which a boy could jump at any point, was a barrier before which hundreds fell. Peach Tree Creek, a stream just as insignificant saved one of Sherman's corps from destruction. It was General Grant who dared place his army with its front to an unknown foe and its back to an impassable river; and there, without digging a rifle-pit or throwing up a breast-work, wait for reinforcements. Johnston's center was at Corinth, and he was working like a giant to get his army in order for the spring campaign. Through the month of March many of his troops drilled with borrowed guns, the muskets of one regiment being made use of by three or four. A few regiments were completely armed and uniformed on the first of March, but whole regiments which took part in the battle when it finally occurred, were without arms up to three days previous. There was a deficiency of artillery and ammunition and clothing^ and the chances of battle depended on Fate. Blockade-runners were on their way from England with the desired equipments. If spared by storm, would they escape the Federal blockaders \ Fate decided. Two ships loaded with arms entered Charleston by the closest shave, and with feverish haste and by special trains the arms were conveyed to Johnston's men. Grant seemed to hold Johnston in profound contempt. His army at Pittsburg Landing had its right guarded by Snake Creek and its left by Lick Creek, with no particular cover for the center. As the troops were landed from the transports they took up their positions as follows : Sherman, McClernand and Prentiss making the front from creek to creek, with Smith's division (commanded on the day of the battle by Wallace) supporting the right wing, and Hurlburt supporting the left. Wallace's own command was [51] 52 SHILOH — THE FIRST DAY. strung along the river to Savannah, to cover the line of communi- cation. The extreme left was held by one of Sherman's brigades, and though it had the creek on its flank, the ground across the stream commanded the position. Not only did the Federal army rest in that position from the seventeenth of March to the sixth of April without making the least preparation for defense in case of attack, but the various divisions were not even closed up. There were two long gaps between com- mands in Sherman's division, and between Sherman and McCler- nand, and between McClernand and Prentiss were gaps through which whole Confederate brigades afterwards charged. The posi- tion of that Federal army was criticised even by citizens who knew nothing of the tactics of war, but Grant was sullen and determined, and he would not rectify it. His position was weak in a dozen dif- ferent ways and his presence was a challenge for a superior force to move up and crush him. Lincoln would have been justified in taking measures for the safety of that army, but was reassured by dispatches from Grant that Johnston was so strung out that con- centration was impossible before Buell's arrival. Johnston's wings were widely scattered, and arms were being issued the day that Grant crossed the river. It was a grand oppor- tunity to strike a telling blow, and Johnston was the man for the emergency. With a celerity seldom exhibited in the war, he called in and concentrated, some of his troops tramping for twenty-six hours without a halt, and thousands of men marching across fields and through forests to save distance and avoid the mud. Every Confederate soldier who could trace a map or read a newspaper saw the situation and the opportunity, and they moved forward feeling that victory was absolutely certain. The safe arrival of two block- ade-runners and the blunder of a Federal general had placed the West in peril. Fate sat around the camp-fires of the Federals on the banks of the muddy river — in the dark forests on the Purdy and Hamburg highways, and she flitted along the front of John- ston's legions as they tramped steadily and sturdily forward toward victory or defeat. Between the twentieth of March and the first of April, the Con- federate cavalry were continually hovering along the Federal front, coming within a mile of the lines of battle, and it was known that Grant had neglected even the most common-sense precautions. Confederate farmers were permitted to enter the lines with their "truck," and there was not a day for the last two weeks that spies SHILOII THE FIRST DAY. 53 were not taking notes. Johnston knew the situation exactly. Could he have waited one week longer he might have increased his force by thirty thousand men, but to wait was to permit Buell to come up and join forces with Grant and outnumber him. Johnston's entire force moved to within four miles of the Federal front without having met scout or picket or created the least sus- picion of a grand movement. On the fifth of April every man and gun was up. Reinforcements were coming on, and were only two days away, and Johnston at first decided to wait for them. Two reasons decided against the delay: Buell was hurrying up faster than the expected reinforcements, and the position of the army, only four miles from the Federal camps, might be discov- ered any hour. On the evening of the fifth it was decided that the attack should be made at daylight next morning. It was a damp, cheerless night, but while the Federals slept peacefully in their camps, the Confed- erates were held in line without camp-fires, and with but little chance for sleep. Thus far the movement had been a complete success. Daylight had not yet broken on the morning of the sixth when preparations were begun for the advance, and as the lines moved forward the first notes of the birds were heard in the branches overhead. Hardee had the advance ; behind him followed Bragg ; behind Bragg came Polk ; behind Polk were the reserves under Breckenridge, making a fourth line of battle. Cavalry and artillery moved with each line, and the army of forty thousand, three hun- dred and thirty-five men pushed forward in the early morning like a great tidal wave which was to sweep an island clear of human life. About half a mile in front of the Federal lines the pickets were encountered. They heard the tramp! tramp! tramp! of ten thousand men ; they felt the ground trembling as the gray wave rolled over it ; they saw a battle-line bursting out of wood and thicket and field upon them, and they turned and fled in terror. The step of the advancing Confederates was quickened, and along Sherman's front the alarm had no sooner been sounded than Har- dee's line of battle was bursting upon the camps. Not a man on that whole front but was dumbfounded with astonishment, and in hundreds of cases this feeling gave way to terror and flight. Soldiers were half dressed or still asleep, guns unloaded, artillery useless, and officers lost their wits with the rank and file. Troops from Bragg's corps struck Hildebrand's brigade 54 SHILOII — THE FIRST DAY. of Ohio troops and scattered it like chaff in a tempest, hundreds of the men leaving camp without coats and hats, and scores of them without shoes. Ten minutes' time was given Buckland and McDowell to rally their men, and for half an hour they made a gallant fight, assisted by artillery and troops sent forward by McClernand. Then the lines were slowly pushed back, each flank rolled up, and Sherman was pushed into a position which he could for a time hold against any advance. It is more than a score of years since that momentous sixth of April, and } T et he who rides over the ground will still find a thousand signs of that sudden rush upon Sherman. Hundreds of trees bear the scars of ball and bullet, and one can tell just where the Federals rallied for a moment in a vain attempt to stem the bloody wave. There is not a rock, or tree, or stump on Sherman's front, and for two miles over the route of his dogged retreat, which does not tell of the fight. In the open ground one may find bullets and pieces of shell, and in the dark woods one is startled by the gleam of bones, which time has whitened and the teeth of the wildcat have polished. Sherman and McClernand had been terribly smitten, but were fighting for every inch of ground, when the hammer fell upon Prentiss. He had received warning, and was prepared as well as circumstances would permit. The three regiments first hit returned blow for blow for a few minutes, but were then walked right over by the advancing lines, and such as would not retreat were taken prisoner. One after another four brigades were brought up and flung into the gap, but the advance was only temporarily checked. A whole division stretched across the front, and pouring in a murderous and bravely-continued fire, held the gray wave less than twenty minutes, when it had to fall back to prevent being flanked. The gaps between corps and divisions were being sought for and found, and wedges of living men were being driven into them. While giving ground slowly along his whole front, Prentiss made a determined stand on a new line, a part of which was open ground, then a portion of a plantation and bare of the least shelter. A part of this field is now in cotton, and a portion overgrown with briers and thicket. Bones and blood are a great fertilizer. Trees have shot up twenty-five feet high, and brier and bramble thrive here until a horse can hardly break through. The Federals formed in the open field and there met the attack. 8HIL0H — THE FIRST DAY. 55 The gray lines swept up to the edge of the field, and there, shel- tered and protected, poured in such volleys as soon tore regiments to pieces. Every Confederate had shelter ; every Federal was a fair target. While whole companies were wiped out in the open field, there was hardly a casualty in regiments posted in the woods. The Federals held gallantly, fighting like heroes doomed to die, but of a sudden the gray lines pushed out, the Federal flanks were folded back like the wings of a bird, and over three thousand pris- oners were caught as in a trap, while the remainder of the division was practically routed. Prentiss himself, surrounded by fragments of regiments who disdained to fly, rallied in a strong position, where they drove back assault after assault, and surrendered only when entirely surrounded and about to be exterminated. As Prentiss gave way, Johnston, reinforced along the fronts of Sherman and McClernand, and the additional weight thrown against them pressed the two Federal commanders back, but they gave up the ground only as it was stained witli blood. Every piece of Fed- eral artillery which could be brought up was opened in an effort to check the advance, and the uproar along McClernand's whole front was pandemonium itself. Had the flanks been secure the artillery might have been effective, but a front could not hold its line when enfiladed. A sudden rush upon the massed artillery bent back the Federal lines and captured gun after gun. An hour before noon there came a lull in the battle. Prentiss had been scattered, Sherman had been driven, McClernand had fought like a tiger, but had lost ground, and everywhere along its front the Confederate army had won a victory. Five thousand panic-stricken and unarmed men were crowding back to the river with white faces and tales of disaster, and apprehension was written on the face of every Federal officer. If the advance of that victo- rious wave could not be checked the entire Federal army would be driven to the banks of the Tennessee by high noon. Now, as Johnston paused to reform his lines and bring up his artillery, Sherman fell back to join hands with McClernand and make a fight to save the army. It was a battle without a commander to direct. Each division was fighting as best it could, and there was no head to appeal to for support. "When pressed too hard it must fall back to a new position. Grant had come up from Savannah, but in that confusion no one could secure an intelligent idea of the whole situation. The position taken by Sherman and McClernand was a strong 56 SHILOH THE FIKST DAY. one. The forest was a cover for a part of the front, and in the open advantage was taken of the ditches and dips. Along some regi- mental fronts the men had time to bnild slight breast-works of logs, and rails, and rocks. One can to-day see where trees were rent and riven, and fields reaped of the terrible harvest of death. Down on what was McClernand's right I found a negro plowing in a field which had been cleared since the fight. Asking, what relics he had discovered, he pointed without a word to the heaps he had made along the edge of the field. There were bullets, frag- ments, solid shot, unexploded shell, old bayonets, musket barrels, belt-buckles and what not, and as he started the plow it turned up a grinning skull and a rust-eaten sword. From the field of a few acres had been taken five thousand pounds of lead and iron and steel. After Johnston had drawn a long breath, he advanced upon Sherman and McClernand. If he could roll them away the battle of Shiloh would be decided before noon. If they could hold him in check for an hour help might come to turn defeat into victory. Now all along a front of two miles there was a conflict in which exultation w T as met by desperation. The Confederates swept right up in solid battle-lines, determined to ride over and break through, but they were repulsed. The wave receded to come again and again, and it seemed as if every man in gray had become a devil. Here and there the heads of charging columns broke through the Federal lines, but only to be cut off and made prisoners. The Federal artillery mowed down the attacking lines by scores and hundreds, and yet, as at Stone River, the wave receded but to gather greater power and come again. There was not a Federal battery on that front w T hich was not taken and re-taken from one to three times. In thirty minutes from the advance not a field-piece could be moved for the want of horses. There were hand-to-hand grapples all along that front, and the bayonet was used as often as the bullet. It was such a resistance as Thomas made at Chickamauga — as Rousseau made at Stone River — as rallied divisions made at Fair Oaks. But it was only a check. At noon the Federal army had been rolled back at every point, and the shore of the Tennessee was lined with enough skulkers and cowards to form two brigades. The Federals had lost two to one, and many thousand stands of arms and large quantities of ammunition had fallen into the hands of the Confederates, while several thousand prisoners had been marched to their rear. SHILOII THE FIRST DAY. 57 At early dawn the Federal army was a crescent with a front of six miles. At noon it is a thin semi-circle, and the distance from flank to flank is not three miles. Not by Grant's orders, but by a sort of mutual understanding, as they are crowded back, the shat- tered lines of Sherman and McClernand reform with those of Hurlburt, and form a new line. Nine out of every ten pieces of artillery had been drawn back by hand, and men too grievously wounded to walk to the rear are left among the dead. The Feder- als have changed their tactics now. The have posted themselves in the thick woods and behind natural cover, and to reach them the Confederates must cross the open cotton and cornfields and the plains covered with pines too small to afford protection. Johnston's plan was to crush the left and center back on the right, and he was succeeding. There was scarcely a breathing spell before his battle-lines burst from the woods and surged across the fields at the Federal position. He had but to break through here, and his work w T as done. Nightfall would witness the utter annihilation of Grant's army. Every general in that Confederate army, including Johnston himself, rode at the head of his command, and the lines broke cover with cheers and shouts. There is a hell-spot on every field of battle — some spot which becomes a maelstrom of cold, cruel slaughter. This was the hell- spot of that first day's fight. As the gray lines advanced across the open ground they met such a flame of death as left one or two men standing to represent companies. Lines wavered, broke, van- ished, and when the smoke lifted the fields were clear of all but the dead and wounded. And now the gray brigades of Chalmers and Jackson are brought up and massed as a wedge to drive forward and split the centre of Federal resistance. Among the seven thousand men in the two brigades are one thousand recruits who are smelling powder for the first time. Two thousand of the men are armed with rifles and shot-guns, and are without bayonets. The wedge settles itself into a compact mass, catches a long breath, and then there is a forward movement such as Napoleon never saw. The wedge of seven thousand men drives at the Federal center with yells and cheers, reaches it, penetrates it for a short distance, and then the whirlwind picks it up and drives it back to the woods, limp, torn, bleeding, and with more than a thousand dead left behind to prove its valor. And now the whole line moves forward like a mighty wall, and men look straight into the eyes of death without flinching. The 58 SHILOH THE FIRST DAY. same billow of flame rolls along the Federal front, the same terri- ble roar and crash, and the gray lines melt away, and the dead lie so thickly that the living can hardly pick a way through them. Again there is a breathing spell. Johnston is hurrying up fresh brigades, and posting them to overlap the Federal position. Dur- ing the brief respite the Federals make ready for what they know will be the last assault. When it conies it is like a tornado sweep- ing out of the woods. The same terrible fire is directed upon the advance — lines break and reform, hundreds go down to rise no more, but the tornado sweeps on and drives the Federals from their position. They fall back grudgingly. They turn and fight at every step. The cowards departed long ago, and only brave men are left. The left and center are crowded back until the river is behind them, and though the right has made a gallant fight, the news of the disaster is beginning to tell in the ranks. From flank to flank of the Federal army the distance has been reduced from six miles to one. Johnston can concentrate twenty-five thousand exultant men against what is hardly better than a mob. He is moving to do so when death claims him and the command devolves upon Beauregard. From the hour when Johnston fell until the sun was gilding the tree tops the Confederates continued to gain ground, but it was only foot by foot. There were cowards and cravens lining the bank of the Tennessee, but there were heroes between them and the exultant wearers of the gray. Prentiss had been captured, Wallace was down, and a score of field officers "were out of the fight, but the Federal lines broke back only to reform again. Wallace's division, which as before stated, was stationed along the river, had been ordered into the fight before noon, but owing to a confusion of orders this entire division was kept marching around the country all day and did not get into the fight. There were times when it seemed as if, had this body of troops been where it could have been hurried to imperilled points, the Federal lines could have been held, but yet, the successes of the morning had made the Confederate army determined on victory at any cost. At sunset there came another lull — a long breath before closing in for the final struggle. What was left of the Federal army under arms was huddled together on the plateau above the river in no more space than a brigade would need for a drill. As a last hope all the artillery had been collected on the three fronts, and the two gunboats in the stream would add their fire. The lull was broken SHILOH ■THE FIRST DAY. 59 by the sadden roar of artillery and the rush of the gray lines. On came brigade after brigade — Cheatham, Anderson, Pond and ten thousand others, and for half an hour it was a fight for life on one side and a tight to annihilate on the other. Did Beauregard issue orders to stop the fight? Did the lines of gray reach a point beyond which men could not advance and live'< Johnston knew there were no earth-works there. Was Beauregard deceived by Prentiss into believing that works of great strength had been erected % The tight ceased in a sullen, grudging manner, and the Confederate troops drew back out of the range of the artillery on the plateau. Grant had lost all but the plateau, Beau- regard had won all but that. Both are living to tell the readers of magazines why and how it happened, and to smooth away their blunders. The Confederates had the Federal camps, immense supplies of commissary and ordnance stores, many captured battle-flags, thous- ands of muskets, and had won the battle. Grant had not been driven into the river, but he had been sorely defeated. Beauregard must have gained information that Buell's advance had reached the river at sunset, and military critics could not have shadowed his record had he gathered up the spoils of battle during the night and withdrawn to a position of his own, or even into Corinth. But he had determined to complete his victory. O*^/^ /&£* "$*&>. >ljiloIj — tlje decani fan. 'S the night drew on the fire along the plateau slackened, and by and by it fell away to an occasional growl from a cannon and the fitful crackle of musketry. The Federal gun-boats took position, and all night long their great guns roared at intervals and their monster •shells went shrieking through the woods towards the Confederate lines. Who were in front of the Federals massed on the plateau? Not an army — not a corps — not even a division. Simply the brigades of Chalmers and Jackson. Both had been fighting since daylight, and the two did not number over six thousand men. Of this number at least one half had never been in a skirmish. Bragg, commanding the division in which these brigades were numbered, was acting under Johnston's orders to push the Federal army to the river bank, and to carry out his plan of attack he had changed front with some of his forces. The two brigades had gone forward before Beauregard's order to cease fighting. Two regiments in Jackson's brigade had less than seven rounds of ammunition per man, and one regiment in Chalmer's brigade had less than three. Even as the battle-lines moved forward men were heard begging -cartridges of each other. These two brigades advanced for three hundred yards in the face of the fire of Webster's artillery, and were halted only when within pistol-shot. Here they held their position and waited for reinforcements, but in place of additional troops came the order to fall back. General Beauregard may not have been as well posted on the situation as some of his officers at the front, or the order he issued would not have been given. He saw before him troops which had been fighting since daylight without food or rest — he had captured many prisoners and great quantities of stores — -he had the wounded of both armies to see to, and he had Grant penned up and demoral- ized. He may have reasoned that he could finish him in the [601 SHILOH THE SECOND DAY. 61 morning and that Buell was still far away, and the order to rest on their arms was issued. Such an assault as was made upon Sherman, Prentiss or McClernand would have taken the Confederate army to the banks of the river before the sun was out of sight. The fire of the gunboats can still be distinctly traced. Great limbs and entire tops of trees were cut off and dashed about, but the statements that this fire either demoralized or drove back the Confederate army are without foundation. It is doubtful if half a dozen men were killed by the fire, and those were far in the rear. I saw one unexploded shell in a field at least a mile and a half from the landing, and it is agreed by all Confederates that nearly every shot whistled through the tree tops. The Confederate victory was rich in spoils, Grant's army having been supplied with everything an organized body could make use of. Johnston had sadly needed artillery. Here his forces captured gun after gun and turned them upon the Federals. More than ten thousand muskets and half a million rounds of ammunition were picked up during the night. Having captured all the camps but one, the Confederates captured with them great stores of provisions, considerable clothing, and supplies of forage. It was not a night for rest and sleep, but for hard work in gathering up the wounded and taking care of the spoils of victory. While engaging in this work the Confederate front became disorganized. Gaps were opened between divisions, regiments were detailed from brigades,. and entire brigades were moved back to new positions. Thus it happened that much of the advantageous ground won the day before by terrific fighting was given up during the night l o preserve a front. Buell in person reached the battle-field during the afternoon, but the advance of his army did not appear until the battle was dying out. While the Confederates were busy gathering up the spoils the Federals were straining every nerve to wrest victory from defeat. Entire divisions in Bnell's army advanced for miles at the double- quick, and as fast as they came up they were ferried across the river and ordered into position. Wherever the Confederates retired the Federals advanced and occupied the ground, and thus before morn- ing came the Federal front had almost the length it measured at noon the day before. In the long hours of night broken brigades- and scattered regiments were collected, the stragglers sent back to their commands, and field batteries reorganized and sent to advanced positions. 62 SHILOH THE SECOND DAY. When daylight sent its gleam down into the forests both armies were ready for the mighty struggle which was to decide the fate of Shiloh. Grant's defeated forces were panting for revenge, Buell's veterans were cool and assured, and the Confederate army, knowing that reinforcements had arrived, were grimly determined to win a still greater victory. On a front less than two miles long the battle lines were ready and the dogs of war were waiting the sound of the first gun to rush at each other and drink their fill of blood. Most of the wounded had been removed, but the dead lay thickly over the whole ground, and where Sherman and McClernand had made their halts and fought to gain time and save the army the dead had to be lifted out of the way before the batteries could take positions. All night long the gun-boats had maintained a steady fire, directed upon the heavy woods sheltering the Confederate wedge, and day- break revealed such a spectacle as is seen after a cyclone has come and gone — only worse. The first two hours of morning were spent in massing the troops and batteries as they reached the front, and those already in line boiled their coffee and opened their haversacks. It was the same in the Confederate army. There was no thought but that of pre- paring for the terrific fighting which all could see was at hand. The three divisions of Nelson, McCook and Crittenden, with their splendid batteries, were there; Wallace had at last found his place, and the battered commands of Sherman and McClernand had solid fronts as they waited for the signal. Nelson moved first. Hardly were his rear lines in motion before his front lines were driving in the Confederate skirmishers. Then, sweeping through thickets and over fields, they struck the gray lines and pressed them back with a force which nothing could resist. In Crittenden's front it was the same — the same in front of McCook. As the blue lines advanced the gray fell back — grudg- ingly — slowly — fighting all the time, but giving ground. The Federals were exultant — the Confederates sullen and desperate. For an hour or more Grant had it all his own way. If there was a check it was only momentary, and the over-sanguine were believing that the day was won, when the Confederates reached a chosen position and would give way no longer. Here their lines rested, and here they received reinforcements. You have seen a sturdy oak in the arms of the gale? It sti-ains and tugs and braces — it gives way — it recovers — it bends to the blast with sullen growl of anger — it recovers its poise with a roar of defiance. So with those SHLLOH THE SECOND DAY. 63 battle-lines, only the gale was a whirlwind of death, and the oak was represented by fifty thousand desperate men. Almost in an instant the Confederate retreat was checked, and along the lines there blazed forth such a flame of fury that Nelson was stopped in his tracks — Crittenden held at bay — McCookmade to believe that his flank was overlapped. Then, with shouts of defiance, and moving like a great gray cloud before a mighty wind, the entire Confederate army advanced. Nelson was rolled back — Crittenden lost his lines — McCook had his center driven back as if struck with a mighty hammer. Here is the field : Two miles of forest, thicket, swamp and plan- tation — ravines cutting across — fences here and there — three highways leading out at angles — three or four houses from which the people had fled. It is all there to-day, and the changes are so few that every feature of the fierce battle can be distinctly traced. It was over this field that hell let loose its furies when Beauregard turned at bay. He saw victory slipping from his grasp — he saw honor and glory replaced by retreat and disaster, and his desperation seemed to infect every wearer of the gray. The meeting of two great storm-waves makes the whirlwind. The waves rush at each other and grapple and surge and struggle — retreat to breathe — advance with increased fury — whirl round and round, and Death reaps such a harvest that men who live to count the dead are appalled. Batteries were taken and retaken — guns were left alone amidst the carnage — regiments were shriveled and companies almost wiped out. In the woods you will find strange-looking trees — trees without limbs, without tops — trees split and riven and growing in curious shape. Along the ravines you will find the moss and wild flowers and vines growing thickly and the odor of the violets will be lost in the scent of blood. In the fields the stones will reveal their scars — every shade tree will be a witness, every furrow turned by the plow will speak of the carnage that day in the long ago when the whirlwind of death leveled its thousands of brave men. When that death-struggle had lasted for an hour there came a moment of weakness. Fresh batteries advanced to the aid of the Federals, and Federal brigades and divisions suddenly reformed and advanced with great ardor. For a moment the gray lines held firm. Then they wavered, gave ground, and fell back a few hundred feet to close up again and renew the struggle. It was thus in front of every Federal commander. The advance 64 SHILOH THE. SECOND DAY. would be checked — rolled back — grappled with — and then the gray lines would melt away under the steady fire, or fall back. McCook gained ground and lost it, and sprung back again to give a dozen lives for every inch. Wallace was rolled through the woods and across fields, but when the fury of the movement had spent itself, he recovered his ground and gained something. It was here that Rousseau won glory — here that a score of regimental commanders won the swords made for heroes. Slowly, but steadily, hour by hour, and foot by foot, the Confed- erate army was pressed back, until Grant had regained all the ground taken from him the day before. Then the fighting died away. The gray lines would give back, but there was neither sur- render nor panic. While Beauregard was defeated, he was not crushed. With his solid ranks facing the Federals, he slowly retired toward Corinth, his cannon roaring grim defiance and his bayonets gleaming spitefully through the trees. Did Grant direct the battle of Shiloh ? If so, where are his orders to Sherman, or Prentiss, or McClernand, as they desperately strove to save the army on the first day ? The historian who weaves a crown of glory for Grant must forget that it was Buell's orders, delivered amidst the awful carnage, which advanced the Federal army at the proper moment. That advance won Shiloh. When Sherman's division was halted and breasted back in the great open field, now in corn and cotton and rich with the blood of three thousand men, it was Buell's order to Wallace which sent the latter sweeping down on the gray flank and disorganizing it. It was Buell's orders which massed the batteries — which brought up reinforcements — which looked for and found a weak spot in the Confederate lines and drove Marsh into it as a wedge. There has been much dispute over the number of men Johnston carried into the first day's fight. Headly puts it at seventy thou- sand, Lossing at over forty thousand ; Grant's first report gave the number at "over one hundred thousand/'* Not more than two Federal historians place the number as low as forty thousand, and yet the real strength, as returned by the Adjutant-General of the army, was forty thousand, three hundred and thirty-five. It lias been admitted and denied by Federal officers that there was any surprise. If it was not a surprise, Sherman's men must have been inventing a way to fight a battle in their sleep or half- dressed. Hundreds of them were driven out of camp in a half- nude state, and hundreds went without a thought of taking their SHILOH THE SECOND DAY. 65 muskets along Could the whole front have been struck simul- taneously, the camps would have been abandoned with hardly a return shot. Sherman was hit first, and his front line scattered like sheep, but his second stood firm long enough for the alarm to run along the whole line and prepare other troops for the desperate work to come. In killed, wounded, and prisoners, the Federal loss exceeded thir- teen thousand. The Confederate loss was about ten thousand. On that field of six miles front were five thousand dead and ten thou- sand wounded men. Almost every foot of ground had its stain of blood ; every yard had its burden of dead or wounded. Dismounted cannon — dead and' dying horses — exploded caissons — broken musk- ets and wreck of fury — it was a picture to make the living turn away with a shudder. Grant had blundered — he had suffered defeat — he had regained his ground at terrible cost. The Confederates had grasped at an opportunity — seized it — held it — fought for it, and been forced to let go and fall back. §r Vol. I.— 5 rlifii filter HE Chickahominy is the same to-day as when its waters were first tinged with the blood of assailant and defender — a deceptive river, running through dark woods and reptile-haunted marshes— through barren fields and cultivated acres — here stopping to foam and fret over a riffle — again gliding along with smooth current which hides a bottom of blackest mire or treacherous quicksand. To-day a lad may ford it without wetting his knees ; to-morrow it may be a stream deep enough to float a ship, and violent enough to sweep an army to destruction. In falling back from Williamsburg, Johnston had massed for the defense of Richmond. As soon as McClellan had buried the dead and the roads had become passable he had followed on to the Chick- ahominy and beyond, and detached commands had been sent out in various directions to cut railroad lines and keep Johnston on the defensive before the Confederate capital. In the last days of May, Keyes had advanced Casey and Couch's divisions of his corps to Seven Pines, within six or seven miles of Richmond. Kearney was resting near Couch, and Hooker's full corps was behind them to the north. Fair Oaks is a railway station on the Richmond & York River Railroad, and at that time the country about was but little cleared. Seven Pines was a hamlet a few miles to the northeast, on the Williamsburg Road. It was one and the same battle, but is called by both names. When Johnston became certain that the Chickahominy divided McClellan's forces he planned to strike a swift and telling blow. McClellan has been harshly criticized for his movement, but his answers are arguments which cannot be controverted. His desire was to attack Johnston. To reach him he must advance the army. An army cannot move except in portions. The forces advanced beyond the Chickahominy had occupied the highways for three days and nights, and as fast as they reached the points designated they [66] SEVEN PINES. 67 had set about making their fronts secure by abattis and breast- works. The advance could be made in no other way. Johnston held the winning card if he desired to use it. He was in position to move out of the defenses of Richmond by three great highways ; and if he did not move while the Federal army was broken up and strung out he had less activity than both sides credited him with. McClellan must take his chances. Could a commander do more than to order each division to fortify itself as it reached its position to wait for the remainder of the army to come up % On the morning of the thirty-first, General Longstreet moved out by one road, General Huger by a second, and General G. W. Smith by another. Longstreet would strike the Federals square in the face at Seven Pines ; Huger would skirt the White Oak Swamp on its western side, and Smith would come from the northwest by way of the Old Tavern highway, and strike Fair Oaks station first. But for the storm which had rendered the roads almost impassable the Confederates would have been up and ready to attack at day- light or soon after. As it was, they drove in Casey's pickets between ten and eleven o'clock. It was Longstreet who was going to batter at this Federal front. Was Casey prepared ? In 1884, twenty-two years after that terrific struggle, I found the remains of his earth-works and breast- works to answer in the affirmative. Prisoners brought in from his front gave information of an intended attack, and scouts reported a heavy Confederate force at hand. Casey's men should have been in line to meet the threatened storm, but they were not. Even when the heavy picket firing in his front should have created appre- hension, men in his camps were cleaning their guns, mending their clothes and preparing dinner. For an hour Longstreet had been forming battle-lines across his front, unmolested and undetected. Just before noon all was ready, and three lines of battle moved down on Casey, the wings over- lapping him by a quarter of a mile. The Federal earth-works and breastworks were strongly manned by artillery, while Longstreet could advance nothing but light pieces, and those only over the highway. Federal history, which says that Casey was ready and expecting the attack, is strangely silent as to what occurred within twenty minutes after the fight opened. His first line of battle, formed in front of his works on good defensive ground, might have checked the Confederate advance but for the panic which suddenly 68 SEVEN PINES. took several regiments out of the fight. Hundreds of men threw down their muskets and ran to the rear in affright, and this left a gap which caused the whole line to be retired behind the defenses. If Casey was prepared, this line could have been held until flanked. The attack was directly on the front, and every Confederate was a fair target, but again a panic set in and a mob of cowards went rushing to the rear to disorganize other troops. There was no checking this rush. Men who had fought at Yorktown and Wil- liamsburg now submitted to be called cowards and poltroons and to be beaten with the officers' swords, but they could not be induced to return to the front. A little after one o'clock Longstreet's men were sweeping through Casey's camps victorious and jubilant, and the other Federal commands were changing fronts or taking new positions to prepare for the fast-coming storm. As Casey fell back, Keyes advanced five regiments to stem the tide, but they were rolled to the left by Longstreet's battle -lines,, and fortunately drew off towards Fair Oaks Station to do good work as the Confederates came up on the Old Tavern Road. Seven Pines now became the right-center and Fair Oaks the extreme right. The Federal right-center clung tenaciously to its ground, every man who could be spared being brought up, but it was slowly pressed back, giving ground foot by foot and wiping out the dis- grace that had fallen on Casey by surrendering hundreds of precious lives. At four o'clock in the afternoon Smith was ready to strike the Federal right at Fair Oaks, and it was a swift and stunning blow. In one brief hour he scattered Couch, breasted Heintzelman back half a mile, and flung Kearney into the swamps. The day seemed lost, but Sumner was coming up. As soon as across the Chicka- hominy the order to advance on the double quick was passed along the whole command, and his men pushed through mud and mire and water faster than his field batteries could follow. Regiments were sent in as fast as they arrived, and Smith had only gotten rid of one force in his front when he found a second disputing the path. From five o'clock until sunset the fighting around Fair Oaks was terrific, no matter whether the lines encountered each other in the semi-darkness of the woods or the sunlight of the open fields. Smith had won a victory, and he was determined that it should not be changed to a defeat. Sumner felt that the safety of the Federal army depended on his fighting, and he would not give ground. SKVKN PINES. 69 Again and again his lines were charged with such desperation as had not before been witnessed in the war, but every shock was resisted. In the meantime the right-center at Seven Pines was fighting for life. As Berry's Michigan brigade was brought into the fight, it was advanced as a battle-line to hold the ground until a second line could be formed. It held out for twenty minutes against double its number, but it left four hundred dead and wounded as it fell back. Kearney had bought up his last man, and now he fought without hope except to see the sun go down and night come on. He was pressed back, and back, and back, leaving blood-stains on every foot of ground, and though giving up the ground, he could not be broken or disorganized. When the sun went down he had his front to the foe. Sumner had saved the day at Fair Oaks. Regiments and brig- ades went into the struggle with cheers and hurrahs, and his guns were massed where every shot must tell. Every gun on his line was charged again and again, and over the pieces in Brady's battery men clubbed their muskets and used the bayonet. Smith was checked, but as he massed for a fresh effort, Johnston, who had been the controlling mind on this wing, was wounded and sent to the rear. His men cried out for revenge, and two brigades were hurled upon Sumner's flank with such fury that the fire of musketry betokened a ♦conflict among fifteen thousand men instead of half that number. As night fell the Confederate assault was hurled back, and the crackle of musketry and roar of cannon soon died out. Sumner's rapid march and quick fighting had not won a victory, but had saved that portion of the Federal army south of the Chickahominy. Nightfall found him holding his ground, but the Confederates had full possession of the camps of Casey and Couch, and the spoils of battle belonged to them. During the long night the pickets along Sumner's front crouched down within fair pistol-shot of each other, while nearly all the dead and wounded were within Smith's lines, and but little effort was made to alleviate the sufferings of the latter. All night, too, the Federals were being reinforced, and a large body of Confederates which had been delayed on the Old Tavern road reached the front. In the gray of morning there was a sudden and powerful rush at Sumner's center, but it was checked by grape and canister from the guns massed there. Then, for nearly three hours, Smith struck 70 SEVEN PINES. terrible blows at the Federal shield — now to the right — now to the left — now full in the center, but he could not break it. He piled his dead and wounded in windrows but the sacrifice came too late. Was it wise in Johnston to attack as he did ? The opportunity to strike a crushing blow was a grand one, and he would have been no soldier had he let it pass. His plans could not have been better laid, but the impassable roads brought difficulties and delays. The commands under Rodes and Huger were at least six hours behind time, having to construct bridges over streams and march for miles through swamp and water. Longstreet was to have attacked at daybreak, but he was not only not in position at that hour, but he delayed five or six hours longer for other commands to come up. Two events would have brought about the annihilation of the Fed- eral army. Had the entire Confederate force been up to begin the battle at daybreak, they must have swept the field. Had they been massed within an hour's march and then waited one day more, the same result must have been accomplished. The Chickahominy was rising fast, and Sumner's troops crossed with the bridges afloat. By noon of next day not a company nor a field-piece could have crossed to the rescue. The Confederates held their lines on the battle field all day of the first, but under cover of darkness returned to the defenses of Rich- mond, taking with them nine pieces of captured artillery, four battle-flags, eleven hundred and fifty prisoners, and enough camp equipage and ammunition to load sixty wagons. Johnston's army numbered a few hundred over forty thousand men, but at least six thousand did not participate in the fight. The Federal strength was about the same, but every man was brought into action. Sumner's coming up sent the scales down in favor of the Federals, and they recovered considerable of the ground lost between one and five o'clock. The Confederate loss was reported at six thousand and eighty-four, but of the "missing" included in this report nearly six hundred afterwards returned to their com- mands. The Federal loss was five thousand seven hundred and thirty-nine. The command of the Confederate armies was now to fall upon General Lee — a pure citizen — a gallant soldier — a general who believed in the aggressive instead of defensive. He did not over- estimate Confederate valor, nor underestimate that of the men in his SEVEN PINES. 71 front. The Confederates had scarcely left the woods and fields and swamps of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks when General Lee began planning the destruction of McClellan. The dead at Williams- burg and Seven Pines were to be forgotten in the holocaust pre- paring. Cross Jieus anD |}ort Ijkjmbltt, "0fc 'S I saw Port Republic nestling against the shaggy mountains one September clay in 1884, so it looked in the mellow days of June, 1862. It is a strange, wild spot, and the country for miles around is full of wildness and romance. Here is the same Shenan- doah across which Federal and Confederate shells screamed and shrieked — here the eternal hills which trembled as artillery boomed and musketry crashed. These sooty-faced children playing on the door steps know nothing of war, but the gray-haired women behind them remember the day when the fury of battle startled them as never earthquake or tornado could. Fremont had followed Jackson out of the Shenandoah Valley — Shields was coming up the Luray to close in. Jackson had sent off his plunder and prisoners through Brown's Gap, and there was time for him to follow. Either Federal army outnumbered his, but when the great Confederate fighter reached Port Renublic he turned at bay. They had pressed him close and drawn blood, and they meant to do more. They would close in and make an end of him. He must retreat or fight. He would not retreat, and when Jackson meant fight he meant to be the attacking party. In ten minutes after he understood the situation his men were moving. Shields was hastening up, but Fremont was nearer. Ewell moved out to Cross Keys to check and hold him, while Jackson could prepare for Shields. What five thousand Federals could have done at Strasburg three or four days before, five thousand Confederates now accomplished at Cross Keys. Two hours more would have taken Fremont to the Shenandoah, when he suddenly discovered Ewell in his front. Fremont waited — Ewell attacked. It is one of the prettiest battle-fields nature ever made, and for three hours it was one of the fiercest of the war. If Ewell could not hold Fremont, Jackson must retreat. If Fremont could not break through, Shields might be beaten. Artillery was never [72] CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 73 better used than at Cross Keys, and from an hour before noon until three o'clock the crash of musketry was territic. Fremont could maneuver only five or six thousand men — Ewell had no more to maneuver. Without a man in reserve, with every man closed up and every musket speaking, he slowly drove Fremont's left wing foot by foot, crushed his center back on his right wing, and with another full brigade he would have won a complete vic- tory in half an hour more. But he had no more men, and he had to be satisfied with holding his ground. This he did until dark, when he was ordered back to Port Republic with his main com- mand. Fremont had been cheeked — now for Shields ! And yet the road to Port Republic was not to be left open to Fremont. A single regiment was left in his front, and it was to stay there. If driven back it was to take another position. If driven from that it was to take another, and if driven to the river it was to tire the bridge. You smile at the idea of a thousand men checking the impetus of an army corps. Ride from Strasburg to Cross Keys and you will pass fifty places where a hundred men could check ten thousand. If the advance of an army is a regi- ment, the army must halt until that regiment breaks through or rides over an opposing force. At the turn of a narrow mountain road, shut in by walls of granite which a fox could not climb, ten men may hold an army until the ten are corpses. Jackson's advance had scarcely entered Port Republic before Shield's cavalry appeared, closely followed by a regiment of infan- try, Brigadier-General Carrol being in command. He charged into the town and captured and held the bridge. He has been freely abused for not burning it, and thus preventing Jackson's crossing. He was making preparations to do so, and had piled up wood and saturated it with oil when a charge by the Confederates whirled him into the suburbs of the town. Here he waited until Tyler came up and assumed the command, and the Federal troops then began preparations for the battle which must come. Tyler must have known that Fremont had been checked on the other side of the river, and that he was face to face with Jackson. Banks, Milroy or Fremont would have retreated — Tyler remained. He had less than four thousand men, but Shields was hastening up to join him. Over there is Cole Mountain where his left rested, and where his park of artillery was so admirably posted. Down here is the Shenandoah, where his right rested, and between is a corn field and a potato patch. No general could have massed his 74 CROSS KEYS ANl) PORT REPUBLIC. army to more advantage, and Shields was to prove that his men could fight better than they could march. All night long he was getting into position and strengthening the weak points', and scarcely had his men snatched a hasty breakfast when they caught the ripple of Jackson's banners moving down upon them. Jackson smiled grimly as he surveyed the Federal position. He was again face to face with the men who had beaten him at Kerns- town. He saw that Tyler meant tight, and he must have honored him for it. He who had boxed Federal armies about from end to end of the Shenandoah, now found in his front a general who would not give an inch. Over the river a single regiment was holding Fremont. Here, under the shadow of the mountain, Tyler was waiting the onslaught of Jackson's whole army. The preponderance of numbers was with the Confederates, but Jack- son must attack. He coolly and carefully surveyed every foot of the Federal line from mountain to river, and he could not discover a weak point. It was a short, strong line, and to attack any point was to meet a cross-fire. Tyler would not leave such a position to attack Jackson — Jackson could not delay for fear that Fremont would come up behind him. Already the morning breeze brought to his ears sounds which told him that the sino-le regiment left to fight and fall back over the mountain road was being pressed. Tyler was waiting the onslaught. Jackson hoped that a grand dash at the Federal center would break it. The ground from mountain to river was then a wheat field, with nothing to obstruct a charge. The great Confederate fighter picked out five regiments of his best troops and hurled them against that wheat field with a shock which made the earth tremble. As sudden as a thunder peal, artillery boomed, musketry crashed, and ten thousand men shouted and cheered. Over the rolling ground — over a barren strip — into the waving wheat marched the five thousand men in gray with ranks unbroken. A double line of battle waited their coming with never a tremor. Then sheets of flame leaped over the wheat — down , from the mountain side — up from the river, and a cloud of smoke covered all. For twenty-five minutes there was fighting to kill. That center would not give an inch. Again and again the lines in gray hurled themselves forward until bayonets drank blood, and blue and gray died together, but each time they were forced back, and every moment the cross-fire grew hotter. The Federal artillery used nothing but grape and canister, and every gun had a fair range. CEOSS KEYS AND POKT REPUBLIC. 75 All at once the fire of musketry slackened and wild cheers were heard above the sullen boom of cannon. Jackson's five thousand were falling back ! They had struck the Federal center, but they could not break it. More than four hundred dead men were left lying on the trampled and bloody wheat field as the Confederates fell back. When the gray lines retreated the blue advanced. They met three fresh regiments, and yet they were not checked. Like a great wall of fire those lines swept on through the wheat, driving the foe and capturing such artillery as was not hurried off. Jackson was being driven ! The Federal infantry fire was terribly hot — that of the Federal cannon a hurricane of death. Unless that park of artillery on the Federal left could be taken Jackson was defeated. It was a brigade of Louisiana troops which dashed away for this purpose, closely followed by two regiments of Virginians. It is a run of half a mile with the guns at a trail — a dash up the mountain side — a rush through the undergrowth, and the Federal gunners turn their pieces upon the new foe. It was not war on that spot. It was a pandemonium of cheers, shouts, shrieks and groans, lighted by the flames from cannon and musket — blotched by fragrants of men thrown high into the trees by bursting shells. To lose the guns was to lose the battle. To capture them was to win it. In every great battle of the war there was a maelstrom. At Port Republic it was on the mountain side. For an hour men ceased to be men. They cheered and screamed like lunatics — they fought like demons — they died like fanatics. Long enough before they reached the guns each one of those six Confederates regiments has lost over a hundred men. Once — twice — thrice their battle-lines have pushed forward, to be literally wiped out. The Seventh Louisiana finds itself opposite the Seventh Indiana, and there is a duel — a rush — a grapple. In fifteen minutes the Louisianians have lost more than one-third of their number — the Hoosiers scarcely less. In the little valley across which the Confederates rush for the guns, there are four hundred corpses left behind the living. The Federals do not retreat their guns. They stand by them, and many are shot, thrust with their bayonet, and hacked to pieces with sword and sabre. There is a whirlwind of blood and death sweeping round and round the guns for five minutes, and then Jackson's men have won. They raise a cheer, but it dies away in a scream. The Federals gave way only to rally and return. They advance with a rush that sends the enemy whirling over the corpses 76 CROSS KEYS xlND PORT REPUBLIC. — across the valley — back into the thick undergrowth, and a minute has hardly passed before the guns are again throwing grape and canister at Jackson's left, now being slowly pushed by the Federal right. If Tyler dallied on the march, he is making up for it now. If he failed to reach Strasburg on time, he is showing his mettle here. Across the river a single regiment is holding Fremont in check. Here on this field of blood Jackson's best troops are being pushed back and his Louisiana Tigers find their match. And now they come again ! The cheers from the Federal left have nerved those six regiments until they would charge hell itself. They reform under a terrific fire, and rush with an impetus which even the hand of death cannot stop. They reach the guns again, and again men shoot, stab, cut, hack — aye ! they grapple and roll under the wheels of cannon so hot that they would almost blister. There are no wounded. It is a grapple to the death. For the second time the Federals are pressed back, and for the second time the guns speak under Confederate hands. Will it end here? No! Panting like dogs — faces begrimed — nine-tenths of them bare- headed — the Federal wave rolls back on the guns, and now there is a grapple such as no other battle ever furnished. Men beat each other's brains out with muskets which they have no time to load. Those who go down to die think only of revenge, and they clutch the nearest foe with a grasp which death* renders stronger. Down where the Federal right is pushing Jackson they hear this pande- monium of shrieks and screams on the mountain-side, and they halt. It is a sound ten times more horrible than the whistle of grape or the hiss of canister. Men cease firing to look up. They can see nothing for the smoke, but what they hear is a sound like that of hungry tigers turned loose to tear each other to the death. If Tyler had had two more regiments in reserve behind his guns they could not have been taken. When the Federals were driven for the third time they were not disheartened, but wiped out. To recover his artillery the Federal commander detached a brigade from his right. Weakened only by that much Jackson could drive it. He divined where other generals had to grope. In the same breath he ordered reinforcements to the men holding the guns and a charge on the Federals center and left. From that moment the battle of Port Republic was decided. Tyler must have realized it, but he would die game. With his own artillery pouring death into his ranks, he shortened his lines and for half an hour held Jackson with a fire of musketrv so hot CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 77 that men advancing against it were struck by five or six bullets at once. It was his last effort. Foot by foot he lost ground — foot by foot Jackson advanced — and when there was no longer any hooe, the Federal array faced about for the Luray and acknowledged its defeat. It was not a panic, but Tyler was routed. He was pushed for a couple of miles and then left to pursue his way toward the Potomac with only cavalry, to sting his rear-guard and keep him going. "When Tyler was out of sight of the battle field Fremont came up. He had at last brushed the Confederate fly from his path and reached the river. Fremont was on one side — Jackson on the other, and the long bridge spanning the stream was on fire. If Fremont had fight in him he had come too late. Next morning he began his retreat on that Mecca of Federal pilgrimage, to be heard of in the valleys no more. Port Republic was one of the squarest fights of the war. Tyler had the advantage in acting on the defensive, and he had every reason to hope that Fremont would come up in time to participate. Jackson had less artillery, but his troops were nerved by the knowl- edge that Fremont would be held, and that a victory at Port Republic would clear the valleys. After Jackson had passed Strasburg and was on his way to Port Republic, Fremont fell in behind him. It was known for a fact that Shields was hastening up the Luray to reach Port Republic first. There was a plan to get him between the two armies. How could he say that he would defeat it ? How could he know that he was to check one army, whip the other and clear the valleys of both ? And yet Jackson so calculated. On the sixth of June, with Fremont at his heels, Shields hurrying up, Ashby dead and the Confederates pushing at the top of their speed, he sent a courier to Johnston at Richmond with the message : "Should my command be required at Richmond, I can be at Mechanic's Run depot, on the Central Road, the second day's march." He did not mean that he would leave the valley in possession of the Federals and hurry on to the spot named, but he meant that he would have finished the both armies by the time Johnston wanted his command. Two days before Cross Keys — three days before Port Republic — that strange man had planned what would happen and what did happen. He had a strange power of intuition, shown in a dozen 78 CROSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. instances. He never halted nor hesitated nor groped — he divined. Was it a gift ? His men say yes ; his enemies cannot say no. Once more, when we find him hurrying through Thoroughfare Gap to strike Pope's army in the rear, we shall see .evidences of an intuition which startled those who shared his dangers and knew him best. yjwwo® iel]in& tlje (tartlj-toorks. >H ! it was one of the prettiest June days even Virginia ever saw. There was such a mellow sunshine that every flower and blossom turned its face to be kissed, and there was such a happy, peaceful look down across the fields towards the James River that men forgot for a moment that war existed. In the trees overhead the robins called to each other, and once a blue-bird alighted on the wheel of a field- piece which had its shining brass muzzle thrust through the embra- sure, ready to send its shrieking shell whenever hand pulled the lock-string. There were a thousand of us down behind the earth-works, and we were so quiet that the voice of the colonel reached the last men on the flanks as he cautioned us : '' My lads, we are going to hold this position against a whole army ! " See! A thin line of men — skirmishers to the number of fifty — suddenly break cover from the woods half a mile away, and advance upon us. They skulk — they dodge — they drop down and suddenly rise again and advance as stealthily as Indians intent upon surpris- ing a hamlet. Bah ! Fifty men against one thousand ! No, it is not that. The Octopus is in the woods — these skirmishers are the long arms he is reaching out to feel for us — to uncover our position — to ascertain our strength. "Puff! puff!" It is the fire of the skirmishers. You know where the watch-dog is by his growl. They are trying to provoke the beast to betray his retreat. Zip! zip! How the bullets sing as they fly over our heads ! There is dead silence behind the works. We breathe faster and harder — we clutch our guns with tighter grip, but we are silent. To kill an Octopus you must strike at the body. Sever his arms and they will grow again. " Pop ! pop ! pop ! Zip ! zip ! zip ! " " Steady, lads, and wait for the word ! " says the colonel. [79] 80 BEHIND THE EARTH-WORKS. There is no excitement among us. I bear the man on my right shut his teeth with a gritting sound, and the one on my left is breathing like a weary man in profound slumber. If I should look up and down the line I might see pale faces, but I am looking down across the fields and over the heads of the skirmishers. The grandest sight of the world is to see the Octopus of War leave his lair and come forth thirsting for human blood. Ah! here he comes! His feelers have failed to uncover us, but he can judge for himself that such a short line of works cannot conceal more than a full regiment. He does not know that our right flank rests on a swamp, and our left on an impassable ravine, while our front offers no shelter even for a rabbit. Look ! the sight is worth ten years of your life ! A full brigade pours out of the woods and forms for the charge. Regiments and companies swing into position as if on parade. The skirmishers redouble their fire, and a general gallops along the front of the brigade, as if to see that every foot is on line with its neighbor. Now they get the word to advance, and at the same instant our field-pieces open fire. The cruel shell are striking plump into the front rank and tearing men to pieces by the half-dozen, but as the smoke lifts we find the Octopus marching on with steady movement. He wants blood. He will demand drop for drop — and more ! Ha ! The shriek of shell has changed to the whistle of grape and can- ister, and the men at the guns are working as if the fate of nations depended upon them. The smoke drops down in a great cloud, and one cannot see beyond his bayonet. Now it is rent and shattered, and it lifts and floats away in great pieces and fragments. "Now lads — and fire low ! " The Octopus has been staggered — wounded — halted — but here he comes again. Right in front of me I see a face and form which I select as a target. I could kill him now, but I grimly wait for him to come nearer. He is pale with excitement, and as the man at his left is struck down my target loses the steady step of the line. But only for an instant. Now he is not over forty feet away,, and the fire of musketry has checked the advance. My weapon points straight at him. I am looking right into his eyes. I note his brown curls, his high forehead — the white teeth shut tight together in his excitement. He is not over twenty years old. He has a mother whose poor old heart will almost break to-morrow. He has sisters who will refuse to be comforted for long months. And BEHIND THE EARTH-WORKS. 81 such a fair-faced boy must have a sweetheart whose very soul will cry out in anguish at the news of his death. I am going to kill him ! The excitement of the check has con- fused him. He looks to the right and the left, and then into my eyes. He is standing almost alone. As our eyes meet, he sees murder in mine, and I read an appeal for mercy in his. The result of a battle does not hinge upon the life of a corporal. The war will not be over the sooner for his death. But I take deliberate aim at his breast and press the trigger, and even before I feel the shock of discharge I see the red blood spray out from the horrible wound, and he falls back with a shriek upon his lips. The Octopus is beaten back. I go over the works and find my target. Those brown curls are damp with death — the fair face as white as snow — the ground soaked with blood so precious that every drop will call for a hundred tears from women's eyes. The blue eyes are wide open, the lips are parted, and as I bend over him it seems as if his voice came back for an instant to whisper the exclamation : Jfttrdererf And that was war ! That was one of the acts which helped to make a victory for thousands to shout over — for flags to ripple — for rockets to ascend — for children to cheer and women to bless high heaven ! Vol. I.-G Colonri HJargait'* §dt\\$t HE Federal Colonel William H. Morgan's conflict with Confederate troops belonging to Van Dorn's command and his spirited defense of Davis' Mills, Mississippi, in 1862, was an incident of war which none of the his- torians have given more than a line, although it was one of the most plucky affairs witnessed during the whole war. Colonel Morgan, with about two hundred Indiana infantry and half that number of Ohio cavalry, was stationed at Davis' Mills, Mississippi, to defend a saw-mill, three or four storehouses, and a trestle bridge on the Central Railroad. The saw-mill was not in running order, but strongly built and situated so as to fairly com- mand both the railroad and a country bridge over the creek. This saw-mill was converted into a fortress in a novel manner. Railroad ties were placed on end all around it and firmly lashed, and then a second course of ties laid horizontal was constructed. Bales of cotton were then rolled into position and piled up until nothing of the mill could be seen. Port-holes were left for the muskets of the defenders, and a supply of water in barrels was at hand to be used to drown out fire. When the block-house had been completed the Colonel proceeded to throw up an earthwork which not only commanded the approach to the block-house, but was a second key to the bridges. This earthwork was still in fair condition in the spring of 1884. All this work was begun only after news had been received that Van Dorn had dispatched a strong force up the railroad to sweep it clear of Federal occupation, and it was finished as scouts brought in word that Confederate cavalry was close at hand. Morgan placed one hundred and fifty men in the block-house with plenty of food and ammunition, fifty of his dismounted cavalry in a ravine from which they had a fair range of the bridges, and the remainder were gathered in the earthwork. This was to be the first fight with most of the men, but with the exception of [82] COLONEL MORGAN'S DEFENSE. 83 two of the force all went to their positions in good spirits. These two, one belonging to the cavalry and the other to the infantry, deserted to the woods half an hour before the Confederates appeared, and during the fight were discovered by the Confederates and dragged out of their hiding places and shot as spies. Soon after noon Van Dorn's troops formed for a charge over the country bridge and moved forward with cheers and yells. The fire of the entire Federal force was concentrated on a front of about fifteen rods, and the assault was checked within ten minutes. The Confederates supposed they were charging a camp, and anticipated only a slight resistance. When driven back their front was extended, reinforcements brought up, and preparations made for hot work. From a front of half a mile long they opened a hot fire of musketry lasting twenty minutes, and then a second rush was made for the bridge. The Federal fire was again concentrated, and again the column of assault was checked, broken and driven back. After the second repulse at the bridge, troops were massed at different points on the front and attempts made to force the passage of the creek, but the result in each instance was the same. Said a member of Company M, Fifth Ohio Cavalry : " Men never exhibited such reckless bravery as those dare-devil Confederates. It must have been plain enough to every one of them on that front that any attempt to cross the creek was offering up their lives, but they kept trying it as if anxious to be slaughtered. It was only pistol-shot from my position to the stream, and I had a dead rest and a sure bead as fast as I could load and fire. It seemed to me like murder to drop a man with every bullet." When the entire Confederate force had been brought up and massed a third attempt was made on the bridge, the lines of assault being five deep. The head of the column gained perhaps fifty feet on the one preceding it, but the concentrated fire had the same result. The approach to the bridge was now covered with dead and wounded, and many of the latter, crazed with pain and maddened by thirst, «drew themselves up the railing and dropped into the water below. It was murder to order the Confederates to a fourth charge, but the commanding officer seemed to have lives to throw away. When he massed again he had a solid column in the middle of the highway, and on each side of it a line of men who were ordered to carry their guns at a trail and speed across the bridge without firing 84: COLONEL MORGAN'S DEFENSE. a shot. As this column was ready to break cover a hot fire was opened from right to left to distract attention, and at the same time balls of cotton soaked with turpentine were lighted and flung upon the railroad bridge with the hope of burning it. "When the assaulting column uncovered itself it was to meet that concentrated fire again, and although about twenty men succeeded in crossing, the remainder were struck down or driven back after a fight of ten minutes. This ended the serious fighting, although a scattering fire was maintained for an hour after, during which time the Confederate commander sent in a flag of truce and demanded an unconditional surrender! His messenger took back the request for a few more assaults to be ordered. When the Confederates retreated they left in Morgan's hands upwards of one hundred killed and wounded, ninety-six muskets, two dozen sabres, two wagons, a lot of ammunition and about twenty prisoners, and drew off under the belief that the post was garrisoned by at least two thousand men. The loss to the Federals was only three wounded. One of the causes contributing to such a victory was the fact that the dismounted cavalry had just been armed with seven-shooters, thus enabling them to maintain a fire without a lull in which the assaulting columns could recover from their confusion. Yan Dorn's force was at first estimated at six thousand men, but was subsequently known to have comprised only half that number, although this gave him at least ten to one. Jftot Qlonfekrate (Sutibcate ARLY in the summer of 1862, Miss Sue Gelzer, a young lady residing in Charleston, donated an amount of money to a fund to be called " The Ladies' Gunboat Fund " — the idea being to raise a sufficient cash fund among the ladies of South Carolina to build and equip a Confederate gunboat. The scheme became popular in a day, and in a few weeks the sum of thirty thousand dollars in cash was in the hands of the treasury. Many of the contributors to this fund had to sell jewelry and other articles to obtain the money forwarded. As soon as it was seen that a large fund was certain to be raised, the work of building the first boat was begun, and she was not yet half completed when money enough had been raised to warrant the building of another. The second week in October both boats were launched at Charleston, in the presence of a great crowd, the first being named the " Palmetto State," and the second the " Chicora." The crafts were constructed entirely for the defense of Charleston harbor, and both took part in repelling the several attempts to enter the harbor. In the attempt to raise the blockade, as described else- where, in a separate article, these two gunboats took the lead in attacking the Federal blockaders. The action of the ladies of South Carolina was followed in other States, and the money contributed or collected by the women of the South from 1862 to 1865 amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars. L85] ©ait font's floto at (Srattt j NE of the severest blows Grant received in any of liis campaigns was the capture of Holly Springs, just as he was prepared to make it the base for a grand move- ment against the western Confederate army. For weeks and weeks he had been collecting forage, provi- sions, and munitions of war at the Springs, and the garrison consisted of eighteen hundred men under Colonel Murphy. This force was considered all-powerful, as reinforcements could be hurried in at a moment's notice, and the only fear was from small bodies of Con- federate cavalry. Van Dorn went quietly to work about the middle of December — it was in 1862 — to consolidate all detached commands, and on the twentieth he had a force of cavalry numbering at least two thou- sand. His movements were closely watched by Federal spies, and when Grant became satisfied that Holly Springs was the point aimed at, he notified Murphy to be on his guard against an attack. It is not clear whether this Federal colonel was a coward or an idiot. He had at least sixteen hours in which to prepare for the attack, but he made no movement beyond telegraphing Grant to hurry up reinforcements. Not a street was barricaded, not a defense thrown up, no official order transmitted to the men. Soon after daylight on the morning of the twenty-second the Confederate advance dashed into the town and brought up at the railroad depot. Here was a guard of one hundred and eight Fed- erals, and although seeing that they were overpowered ten to one, they made a hot little fight to save the depot, and had twenty men killed before they surrendered. Had all the Federal infantry been stationed here, the depot and its trains, at least, would have been saved. There was one long train, loaded with bales of cotton, and these would have made an excellent breastwork for at least five hundred men. As soon as the Confederates had possession of the depot, their [86] VAN DORN's BLOW AT GRANT." 87 regiments came charging in by every highway. The remainder of the Federal infantry was of no use, because broken up into detach- ments. Most of the cavalry in the town were Illinois troops. The men were anxious to barricade the streets and fight, but had orders from Murphy not to do so. When Van Dorn's men swarmed in these Illinoisans stood holding their horses until entirely sur- rounded. Then, when called upon to surrender, and with no regi- mental officers to lead them, seven or eight companies drew sabre and cut their way out and got safely away. As soon as the captured Federals were paroled, Van Dorn began to look for greenbacks. There were scores of cotton buyers in the town, together with many sutlers and speculators. These men were " gobbled up," one after another, and taken to headquarters, where each one was ordered to "shell out." About fifty gold watches, a dozen diamond pins, and nearly one hundred and twenty- five thousand dollars in greenbacks were gathered in from private individuals. Over forty cars at the depot were loaded with cotton belonging to Federal speculators, and every bale was consumed, along with the trains and depots. In addition, two thousand bales were piled up in the town, and it made a grand bonfire. The idea was to cripple Grant's intended movement by destroying his stores, and the work was done in a thorough manner. What the Confed- erates did not wish to carry away they gave to the flames, and at no other time during the war did the torch find such a rich harvest. Every locomotive and car — every bale of cotton — every store- house — every forage pile — every public building, made a bonfire. Grant had taken possession of scores of buildings and filled them with medical and quartermaster stores. On the vacant lots he had piled up sugar, meat, coffee, rice, molasses, beans, and bales of hay and sacks of oats. Not a hundredth part could be taken away, and the rest must be destroyed. Buildings filled with ordnance stores were set on fire, and there were several explosions which wrecked houses two squares distant. One hundred and twenty-two barrels of powder were stored in one building, and when this explosion took place men half a mile away were knocked down by the concussion. The destruction included two million cartridges, six thousand muskets, three thousand sabers, two thousand five hundred revolvers, ninety -five thousand uniforms, eleven thousand barrels of flour, one million dollars' worth of medi- cal stores, five hundred thousand dollars' worth of sutler's stores, eight hundred thousand dollars' worth of ordnance stores, twelve OO VAN DORN S BLOW AT GRANT. hundred dollars' worth of quartermaster and commissary stores not included in the above, four hundred horses, eighty-four army wag- ons, twenty-two ambulances, a battery of field pieces, and enough to bring the total loss of the Federal government up to over seven million dollars. Grant knew that Tan Dorn would attack, but he felt confident that Murphy could beat him off. He, however, forwarded rein- forcements, but the troops reached Holly Springs to find the place in ashes and the Confederates gone. In his official report, Grant gave Murphy and his officers a rebuke, which followed them until the last one resigned his commission, and the rank and file, willing to fight had they been permitted, were told that their conduct in accepting paroles could not be justified. %r\n f antes. HE panic which seized upon a portion of the Federal army at First Bull Run and resulted in demoralizing the whole, was repeated many times afterwards in both armies. Place a regiment in ever so favorable a fight- ing position, and give it the best officers in the service, and one thing more is needed. Unless men are driven to despera- tion they will not fight their best until possible disaster is provided for by an avenue of escape in the rear. Troops can be quickly and steadily half-faced to meet a flank attack, but if it continues long a panic is almost certain to be the result. The soldier fears that his retreat will be cut off. Even if he has no thoughts of retreat, this feeling forces itself upon him and demoralizes the bravest troops. The slightest cause has led to gravest results in battles. Let a battery change position with a rush, running through a brigade, and those men must be handled firmly to prevent a falling back. Caissons in search of ammunition have stampeded regiments time and again. Let one regiment fall back hastily to secure a new position, and it is a cool line of veterans indeed which will open to let the men pass, and then close up firmly after them. It is not the fear of being killed that unnerves a man fighting in the ranks. Men who have fired seventy five rounds at close range have been afterwards stampeded by the fear of being surrounded and cap- tured. With veteran fighters the fear of being made a prisoner is perhaps stronger than that of death itself. A man falling dead as a line advances produces no consternation. The gap is closed as quick as the men on either side can move up. But, let a man be wounded and call out at the top of his voice, as was sometimes the case, and a sort of quiver runs up and down his whole company. Let a second and third be hit, and it requires the stern: "Steady, men !" of the captain to prevent disorder in the ranks. The teamsters were the direct cause of more than one panic. Being non-combatants and unarmed, they were, of course, helpless, [89] 90 ARMY PANICS. and for this same reason easily frightened. Let one single shell fall among the wagon-train, and nine out of ten wagons were bound to move. If one teamster abandoned his wagon, others were certain to follow his example, no matter how slight the danger. When Gen. Sturgis had his fight at Guntown, Miss., the wagon train was by some blunder brought too near the front and parked in an open field. As the fighting grew hot the Confederates brought forward a single section of artillery and got the range of this train. Four or five shells did the work. A panic seized the teamsters, and the few who brought their wagons out of the field abandoned them along the only highway. This action blocked the road, preventing any movement of artillery along the thoroughfare, and in half an hour there was a panic among the men who had all along been fighting with the greatest bravery. The panic resulted in a rout entirely uncalled for, and the Confederates gathered in from nine hundred to twelve hundred prisoners, eighteen pieces of artillery, two hundred and thirty wagons and ambulances, six hun- dred horses and mules, and rations and ammunition in immense quantities. The bursting of five or six shells half a mile in rear of the lines of battle lost Sturgis that fight, and came near being the destruction of his whole command. An incipient panic was often crushed out by the coolness of a few officers, who, recklessly exposing themselves to the fire of the enemy, would reanimate a regiment, but a brigade once started for the rear in disorder paid not the slightest heed to demands, entreat- ies or curses. As a rule, a command disorganized early in a fight was of but little use during the rest of the day, the men seeming to be thoroughly unnerved and beaten. r' ( '< ~y— C|* State in ®kr. 'HE wars of 1776 and 1S12, together with the Mexican War, must have been conducted with an eye to economy, for the country had little to spare during the first two named, and the Mexican War was fought at such a distance from home as to demand the utmost care in preserving the supplies which reached the armies. But with the American Civil War it seemed to be the rule to waste and destroy. Not a single department of government attempted to check the wholesale waste, and not a branch of the service made the least effort to take care of military property. Beginning with the horse and the mule, without which no army could move, this terrible waste was apparent in the ordnance, quarter- master and commissary departments everywhere, and ran down the scale to the outfit of the poorest private. Uncle Sam paid any price asked for anything he wanted. There were better mules in Cheat- ham's Confederate wagon train the day he surrendered than Grant had at any time during the war. Farmers who had a poor horse or mule to sell, sold it to the government for double its worth. Too many teamsters had no care whether an animal lived or died. Nine out of ten teams would begin to fall away in flesh as soon as any work was demanded of them. In and around Harper's Ferry the government buried fifteen thousand animals which were used up by gross carelessness, stupid brutality, and the trickery of teamsters in selling forage. At Pleasant Valley, below the Ferry, which was for two years a remount camp for cavalry, it came to be the rule to shoot a horse which had the slightest ailment. An animal with a sore back, which two weeks' rest would cure, or one with a cough which needed a dose or two of medicine, would be led out and shot down without an attempt to save him. Cavalry horses were never better provided for by a government, and yet horses never died faster in any war. [911 92 THE WASTE IN WAR. The waste around a camp was a matter of astonishment, but it could not be fully realized until the troops moved. Then one could pick up muskets, bayonets, wagon loads of sabres, belts, tents, uni- forms, cartridges and provisions. While some of these articles were picked up and turned into the ordnance department, not five per cent of the value of the whole was saved. Official mismanage- ment placed millions of rations in depots, which had to be given to the torch. The want of nerve and strategy on the part of various commanders lost the government not only campaigns, but miles of wagon trains, and arms and ammunition enough to supply whole divisions. Beginning with the First Bull Run, the loss to the Fed- eral government in arms, munitions, provisions and medical stores by reckless waste must have counted up tens of millions. What was captured by Jackson and others amounted to millions more. From July, 1861, to April, 1865, the Confederate government had the benefit of at least three hundred million dollars 1 worth of Uncle Sam's money. What Jackson took from Banks in one single cam- paign cost many millions, and for evory dollar it cost the Union it was worth ten to the Confederacy. Indeed, from the very first battle, Uncle Sam was paying for the entire cost of the war for one side, and a very large share of the cost for the other. The destruction of public and private property in various Southern States, falling upon counties, cities and individuals, must be estimated at hundreds of millions. Sherman alone, in his march from Atlanta to Savannah, caused the State ot Georgia a loss of seventy million of dollars. A Federal cavalry raid which did not destroy at least two or three million dollars worth of pub- lic and private property was looked upon as a failure. The war begot a reckless waste and extravagance on the part of the North which was carried from the field to the store and fac- tory and shop and family, and which after all these long years may still be held responsible for many commercial disasters. >taefaall fitcksoit in t|e JfaHej, NE cannot look over the history of war for the last century and find another just such general as Stonewall Jackson. He was a strangely peculiar man in all respects. He fought in a strange way — his plans were peculiarly original — he had such faith as few men ever possessed. Lee was deep and strategetic — Jackson was a surprise. He never fought a battle after war's tactics. He never moved as other generals moved. He never attacked where he was expected. He never understood his opponent's plans as was hoped he would. As a man he had no vices. As a Christian he had faith and rever- ence. As a general his strange career gave him fame in every land where brave deeds find admirers. When Jackson moved there was no halting by the wayside. If he started with ten thousand men to reach a certain point by day- light and attack the enemy, he was there at the hour. If his troops were not all up he attacked with those he had in hand, even if there was but a single regiment. When, in March, 1862, he swept down the Shenandoah from Mt. Jackson to Kernstown, he reached the latter place at the head of a regiment. His foot-sore troops were strung out on the pike for a distance of twelve miles, and yet that one regiment formed a line of battle and moved to the attack. Shields had upwards of ten thousand men and was in position. Jackson had less than four thousand men when all had arrived, and yet for three hours it was one of the sharpest fights of the year. For nearly an hour Jackson fought two brigades with a regiment. His boldness in attacking the moment he arrived on the ground so astonished Shields that he acted on the defensive. It was only after he found that Jackson's troops were all up, and that they numbered less than four regiments, that he moved out and took the offensive. When night fell Jackson was beaten — his first and only defeat of the war. So continuous was the fire of musketry on the [93] 94 STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. Confederate side in that fight that scores of the men had to cool their musket barrels in the creek. A Confederate lieutenant who was captured three days after the Kernstown fight was asked if the defeat had not greatly demoral- ized Jackson's men, and his reply was ; " Bless you, no ! Why, his men never have time to be demoral- ized ! " And such was the fact. He fell back beyond Strasburg and in three days made such a demonstration that Shields called for rein- forcements. Twenty days after he was being pushed into the Blue Ridge by Banks, and Banks telegraphed the North that the Valley had seen the last of Jackson. That boast had scarcely been printed when Jackson was moving. On the fourth day he struck Milroy beyond Staunton, drove him out of his path and picked up his army train, and was back in his lair before Banks had moved a man. Milroy was defeated, Banks humiliated, and the government was determined to punish the swift-moving raider. While it was plan- ning Jackson was moving again. By a rapid march over fields, through forests, across mountains and rivers and along almost impassable highways, he suddenly appeared in the Luray Valley. The Federal force at Front Royal could not have been more sur- prised had the ancient burying-ground there given up its dead. There was a quick attack, a sharp fight, and then the road leading into the Shenandoah Valley behind Banks was open to Jackson. Even while the fighting was in progress at Front Royal his columns were hurrying down the pike with the bullets singing over their heads. If Jackson could strike the Valley anywhere between Winchester and Strasburg he would be between Banks and the Potomac, and for hours his men moved at such a pace that the horses of the officers had to trot to keep up with them. It was Ewell's corps which was moving on the direct road to Winchester. Jackson took the road to Strasburg. Both would strike Banks on the flank. But swiftly as moved the Confederates, the news went faster. It reached Banks, and he turned pale. He had over fifteen thousand men — Jackson had less than ten thousand. Why not stay and fight him? He had four hours' warning. He could pick his own battle field — he could even protect his men with earth- works. But Banks had no fight in him then. He who had " driven Jackson out of the valley forever " now ordered a retreat. He had good STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. 95 blood under him, and men cursed his lack of resolution as they obeyed his orders. A retreat without a fight is a run. The cowardice of the action makes cowards of the bravest men. In one hour after Banks heard that Jackson was on his flank, he was sending off troops towards the Potomac. If it was not a panic it was a helter-skelter march, and the confusion increased as the hours passed and as it became evident that the Confederates were hurry- ing up. Jackson and Ewell struck the marching column miles apart, but almost at the same moment. Jackson cut it in two, driving two regiments back on Strasburg, from which place they broke up into detachments and escaped over the roads and hills to the nearest Federal forces. Ewell drove the remainder of the column down the valley upon Winchester. Here Banks made a stand. He had still enough men to whip Jackson had he been the general to manage them. One quick rush, a crash of musketry and the roar of a few pieces of artilleiw, and Banks was again flying for his life, nor did he stop until safe across the Potomac. Is it disloyalty for a Federal who fought Jackson to write of his brave deeds ? If so, Banks could be nothing short of a traitor. He ran from him — skulked away in the darkness like a thief, when he had an army large enough to crush him. When Sheridan and Early fought at Winchester, Early, at one point in the battle, fought a whole division with a brigade for nearly an hour, retreating only by inches. When Jackson struck Banks on the same field the Federal general hardly waited for the Confederates to reach him. The northern ultra-partisan, if there is such, who hates truth when it tells of Confederate successes, had better post himself on what led to those successes so often. Incompetency, mismanagement, cowardice and jealousy whipped the Federal armies often and again, and men who write in the years to come will tell more ugly truths than one dares to at this day. Jackson again had the valley. When he drove Banks from Win- chester he pushed on to Charlestown. The Federal post there went flying. At Halltown there was a crash of musketry lasting five minutes, and Jackson's men pressed on towards Harper's Ferry. Lines of battle had been formed for the attack when the retreat was sounded. What did it mean ? The North was wild with excitement, and the government at Washington never acted with more promptness. Federal armies were then lying in such positions that it was easy to set a trap for 96 STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. Jackson. McDowell detached a column from his position near Fredericksburg and pushed it for Front Royal with all speed, and from thence it was to push on to Strasburg, there to unite with another heavy column under Fremont, coming from the West. Both columns were in rear of Jackson, though on the other side of the mountains, before he knew of the trap. If either Federal column reached Strasburg first, Jackson must fight superior odds. If both reached it in advance of him, he was lost. Forty thousand men could not fail to crush fifteen thousand. The column from McDowell's army under Shields had orders to move rapidly. Fremont could not dally if he would reach Stras- burg first. Jackson had three thousand Federal prisoners and a wagon-train thirteen miles long, but he had the shorter road. Not an hour nor a minute was spent in sleep — no time was lost in pre- paring meals. " Close up ! close up ! " was the oft-repeated order, and footmen made their three miles — sometimes four — an hour for hours on a stretch. It was a close race. When Jackson's cav- alry reached Strasburg, Fremont's cavalry were almost within gun- shot. Both Fremont and Shields had imperative orders to make all haste to reach Strasburg in advance of Jackson. Shields knew of the orders to Fremont. Fremont knew of the orders to Shields. And Jackson knew of the orders to both. He did not let go his grip on a single prisoner who could march — on a musket — aye ! he did not even leave a cartridge on the road, and yet he need not have hurried. Fremont did not wish to reach Strasburg first, for then he must fight Jackson alone. He had five thousand more men than Jackson, but ! Shields did not wish to reach Strasburg first. Why ? He had fifteen thousand men, while Jackson, out- side of his train-guards and the escort for prisoners, could not have mustered over ten thousand fighting men. Was Shields afraid ? If not, why did his army creep at snail's pace for the last twenty- four hours ? They marched one mile to Jackson's two. Fremont hardly marched faster. If the two columns united, one Federal general must outrank the other. If Jackson was defeated, only one would receive credit. Shields and Fremont were the two jaws of the Federal trap set to catch the wily Confederate. The road into Strasburg was the bait. When the game took the bait the jaws refused to spring. When two Federal generals let cowardice and jealousy lose a chance to bag a whole Confederate army, what shall be said of it 1 STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. 97 I have been over the routes taken by both Shields and Fremont as they marched to bag Jackson. I can walk farther in two hours than either army marched in the last eighteen. Jackson said of that affair : " Either one had men enough to whip my army. Ten thousand men ought to have held me in check until the forty thousand had come up. Both armies ought to have reached Strasburg hours ahead of me." Fremont had come up, willing or unwilling. Jackson had come up, also ; and the Federal commander must make a show of attack. But Jackson waited for that attack until its failure to come off made hi in suspect a trick. Then he sent Ewell forward and opened the fight himself. Shields was not far away, and Fremont must be held back until all that long train was safe, and until the last Confederate had come up. A single brigade of Ewell's men drove Fremont's advance back in confusion, and two brigades held his whole army in check for hours. Snch is the lay of the ground in that locality that a single Federal brigade might have halted Jack- son. But that brigade was not there in time. When the last wagon and the last soldier had passed, Ewell was recalled, Ashby took the rear and Fremont entered the town to find it occupied only by women and children. Any one can be brave when chasing a flying enemy. When Fre- mont found that Jackson was trying to get away, he pushed after him with all speed, fighting the rear guard every mile of the way to Harrisonburg. In one of these attacks Ashby was killed — Jack- son's right arm. The war had developed no braver fighter, and one of the finest eulogies pronounced over his dead body fell from the lips of a Pennsylvania Colonel captured at the same moment. The failure to catch Jackson at Strasburg brought Shields and Fremont such new orders as made them think their heads would fall if his did not, and while the first hurried up the Luray, the latter followed in Jackson's footsteps. If Shields could reach Port Republic first, Jackson would be between two armies. It was a neck-and-neck race, and the Confederate won. He not only walked out of the jaws of the trap, but he carried the trap off with him ; that is, by destroying the bridges he made it impossible for Shields and Fremont to unite. Then Ewell was sent to amuse and check Fremont, and Jackson girded himself for one of the quickest cam- paigns war has ever known. He meant to crush Shields with one hand and Fremont with the other, and he did not mean to be ten Vol. I.— 7 98 STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. hours about it. Men fought there as they could not be made to fight at Gettysburg. Call him a rebel fighting for a bad cause, but that will not hide his generalship from the eyes of the world. In ninety days this singular leader, who had neither an army wagon nor an ambulance when he began his campaign, captured over four thousand wagons, one hundred ambulances, thirty-six sutler's outfits, two hundred thousand dollars' w^rth of medical stores, four thousand prisoners, twelve thousand stands of arms, more than a battery of artillery, and such quantities of ammunition, forage, clothing and provisions that they were estimated by the ton and carload. In that ninety days his men marched over six hundred miles. There was more or less fighting during sixty of the ninety clays. He inflicted square defeat in four battles and a dozen heavy skirmishes. When he struck Front Royal he caused such an alarm for thirty miles around that thousands and tens of thousands of dollars worth of Federal stores were burned. He captured in the valley over eight hundred horses and a large drove of beeves, and even when encumbered with a wagon train thirteen miles long, in addition, he marched twenty miles while the Federals marched twelve. In a campaign begun only after a Federal general had "driven him out of the valley," he whipped four Federal armies in succession and secured for the Confederacy such spoils as could not have been purchased for six million dollars in gold. Stonewall Jackson's memory is such that the world has given his character as a citizen, and his success as a general, a leaf in history which can never be torn out. He hated no one. He fought for principle, and not for glory. He fought to win — to defeat Federal armies ; and yet almost his last words related to a captured Federal colonel — spoken with all the kindness of an old friend, instead of an enemy fighting to destroy: " Take Colonel Wilkins to the rear and see that he is well used." Thirty seconds after the last word had left his lips, Jackson was mortally wounded. Cip Jail of |jUto ®rleans + NE night in the spring of 1881 five Confederate officers, each one of whom had assisted in the defense and witnessed the fall of New Orleans, were assem- bled in Richmond, and to the question : u Was New Orleans ably defended ? " each one answered with an emphatic " No ! " That New Orleans would have fallen into Federal hands within the year is quite probable, but that it might have held out for months longer will be admitted by unbiased readers when the situ- ation is stated. Neither the Confederate Secretary of "War nor the Secretary of the Navy seemed to understand the danger which threatened, and a more unfortunate combination of circumstances working against the defenders cannot be found in the history of war. In the last days of March, 1862, the advance of the Federal fleet destined to capture New Orleans entered the Mississippi river. About twenty-three miles above the bar were Forts Jackson and St. Phillip, being the only defenses of any moment between the city and the gulf. While these forts were well located to command the river, and, armed and garrisoned as they should have been, could have sunk any vessel afloat, they were not, in the first place, armed with anything above second-class guns. When the test came, it was discovered that the best gun in either fort fell short of the poorest gun in the fleet. If it was anticipated by the Confederate authorities that New Orleans would be attacked by way of the river, no special prepara- tions were made to ward off the blow. Neither of the forts had its complement of cannon, and neither was able to secure them, though the government was repeatedly appealed to. While the city itself was garrisoned by ninety-day men, hundreds of whom had no other accoutrements than the pistols and shotguns brought from home, the garrisons of the forts were weak in num- [99] 100 THE FALL OF NEW OKLEANS. bers, poorly provided for, and had powerful enemies to combat out- side of the Federal fleet. The powder in the magazines was of poor quality, the fixed ammunition could not be relied on, and there was such a lack of co-operation between the forts and Confederate river fleet as to prevent any concert of action until too late to avail. Porter reaped a glorious harvest at New. Orleans, but let us see how it came about. It will not detract one iota from any Federal's patriotism to state facts as they appeared to Confederates, and as they can be verified in. military reports. About the middle of March the Mississippi began rising, and by the last of the month there was a flood which covered thousands of acres between the city and the bar. The two forts were not only isolated, but inundated, and could only be reached by boats. For days the water stood knee-deep on the parade ground, and the first guns fired at Porter were worked by men standing in ten inches of water. All the powder and much of the fixed ammunition, together with quartermaster and commissary stores, had to be handled two or three times over by the garrison, and scarcely a man escaped chills and fever. For six days previous to Farragut's appearance every soldier in both forts had been worked like a slave, with scarcely time to eat or sleep, and when they beheld the overwhelming force making ready for the attack, one must wonder that they had the pluck to go to their guns. Early in the war the Confederates had the prudence to anchor a raft in the channel between the forts to obstruct the passage and hold an enemy under fire. It was easy enough to construct and anchor a raft, but one would not remain there. Wind, wave, flood and drift-wood all fought against it. When a raft could not be made to remain on the surface a differ- ent plan was tried. A number of old sailing vessels were loaded with stone, towed to the right positions and sunk so as to completely blockade the channel, except a narrow opening. Heavy chains extended from one vessel to the other, and it seemed as if the great problem had been solved. As if in league with Porter, he had scarcely sighted the forts before a terrible gale came on one night and disarranged the raft so as to open several channels through it,, and it was then too late to make any repairs. The river fleet and naval force at hand consisted of eight or nine vessels, including the famous iron-clad Louisiana, then about com- pleted, and the ram Manassas. The other vessels were passenger steamerc and tugs, armed almost any way, and protected by bales of THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. 101 cotton. The fleet was expected to aid the forts in driving back any advance by the river, but there was a series of blunders, mishaps, and misinterpretations, which rendered the fleet almost a cipher in the stirring events. During the two weeks consumed by Farragut in feeling his way up the river to within gunshot of the forts, the Confederate fleet had time to prepare fire-barges and rafts, mount additional guns on steamers, and make ready for what was to come. By the ninth of April, Farragut had closed up his entire fleet to within six miles of the forts, and on this day a Federal gun-boat ran within range of the Confederate guns to draw their fire and locate their number and calibre. The entire fleet, including the mortar schooners, had a safe anchorage in the elbow of the river below the forts, and here again the flood was an enemy to the Confederates. But for the overflow five hundred sharp-shooters could have been sent into the woods to harass and annoy, and no vessel could have remained within rifle-shot of the banks. When scouts reported the entire Federal fleet in the bend, it was realized that the time had come to prove the worth of the fire- barges and rafts. The first one sent down was the only one out of the dozen sent at different times which kept the current and appeared among the fleet, and this one occasioned no damage and but little annoyance. In sending down the others the steamers towing them out exercised such poor judgment that the floating bonfires grounded on the banks long enough before reaching the bend. Much labor and trouble had been expended in constructing these barges, and it was time thrown away. Porter had been a long time getting ready, but on the morning of the eighteenth of April he was heard from in the most emphatic manner. He had a fleet of upwards of twenty mortars, and the steady fire of these was backed by the heavy ordnance of the gun- boats. At least thirty-five Federal guns and mortars opened on the forts at fair range, and from half-past eight o'clock in the morning until night had fully set in, there was a steady pounding away with serious results. It was wonderful how exactly Porter secured the range. Most of the mortar fleet lay behind the' woods, entirely shut out from view and miles away, and yet the very first shell fired from a mortar fell fair within Fort Jackson. During the day four shells hit where one missed, and the firing, taken together, was more accurate than ;any fleet ever scored afterwards. 102 THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. Within half an honr after the bombardment opened Fort Jackson was on fire, and men had to leave the guns to help subdue the flames. A conflagration was hardly extinguished in one locality before the incendiary shells started another, and three different fires were raging at one and the same time. Before noon the garrison had lost its quarters, together with nearly all cooking utensils, bedding, blankets, and three or four days' cooked rations. Not a man or officer had a change of cloth- ing left, and the suits they stood in were in some cases nearly burned off their backs. Had the men not been called from the work of extinguishing the flames, thus giving them full play, to that of still further protecting the magazines, the fort would have been blown up. There was not in either fort a single gun to match the rifled ord- nance of the gun -boats. This was before the Federal iron-clads and. gun-boats had brought out the terrible eleven and thirteen-inch guns. Forts and vessels were armed alike from the ordnance on hand when the war broke out. Fort Sumter and other eastern forts had the heaviest and best ordnance. Forts Jackson and St. Phillip, guarding the path to a great city and a strategic point, had only a gun apiece which would even carry a shot to the nearest gun-boat. The Confederate Secretary of War knew how the forts were armed and equipped, and yet he ordered one of the best guns away, instead of adding to the number. Even after Farragut had reached the bend the garrisons had to go to work and mount short-range guns to play on the channel. Indifference, jealousies, want of enter- prise, and a great flood, were enemies working day and* night to assist the Federal fleet. When the fleet finally opened fire, the gun-boats took position in plain view and maintained it. The guns in the forts could scarcely reach them with the heaviest charges the metal would bear, while with ordinary charges the shot fell into the water long before reaching the first of the vessels. The powder had become damp and heavy and burned slowly, and within an hour after the bombardment opened, the Confederates realized that they were helpless until the fleet should come nearer. Four guns were dis- mounted in Fort Jackson by the first day's fire, and fifteen hundred mortar shells fell within the area of the works. Nearly everything- that would burn had been reduced to ashes when the first day closed. During the night of the eighteenth, Farragut's scout-boats as- THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. 1()3 cended the river to the raft and even beyond, and the nature and position of each obstruction was known. Federal scouts also pene- trated far enough into Fort Jackson to ascertain that the bombard- ment had inflicted great damage. Not a Confederate picket-boat was below the raft that night. On the second morning the fire opened hot and was continued with fury all day and nearly all night, and three out of every five mortar shells plumped down within Fort Jackson. . An officer told me that within two hours over one hundred shells fell upon the parade ground, plowing and digging it up in fearful shape. On this day seven or eight guns in the fort were dismounted and many of the gunners torn to pieces, and, as night came down, the over- worked and dispirited garrison had but one consolation : during the afternoon three or four gun-boats had advanced within range of the fort, and in each instance had been driven back. If Fort Jackson could hold out until Farragut was ready to make his rush, its guns would give a good account of themselves. But could it stand the terrific pounding ? At the close of the second day five thousand shot and shell had been flung at its walls or dropped down behind them. The wet earth was bed and bedding for the men, and their rations were raw meat and damaged bread. Federal historians have written of the glories of that movement. If there was glory for the one side there were hardship, suffering, self-sacrifice and heroism for the other. The third day of the bombardment was a counterpart of the others. Heavy weather sent the water up until it was knee-deep on the gun platforms in the lower battery at Fort Jackson, and the shoes of the gunners, soaked for days and days, fell off their feet. More guns were dismounted, more men killed, and the return fire of the fort went for nothing. Had New Orleans been properly prepared for what had come, the garrison at Jackson would have been increased or relieved. Had the naval force been under brave management, it would have attempted to create a diversion and run some risk of hearing the whistle of a shot. There were no troops to send down, and no vessels with the pluck to steam down and try the range of their guns. The success of the Federal scout boats emboldened Farragut, and on this third night a gun-boat left his fleet, steamed up to the raft, and when discovered and chased away she had been at work for hours picking up the trailing ropes, cutting the chains and dragging 104 THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. the hulks out of the channels. Three of the old schooners were actually dragged a distance of fifty feet and a broad channel opened, and this within talking distance of two forts and a fleet which was to blow Porter sky-high ! The fourth day it was the same terrible story told again — dis- abled guns, suffering men, a rain of shells, a score of the garrison torn to fragments by the bursting of the dreaded missiles. Fort St. Phillip was escaping with an occasional shell, but Porter, with his bomb fleet, seemed determined to wipe out the very spot on which Fort Jackson rested. It would have taken three hundred men a week to repair damages already inflicted, and yet the Federal fire held steady and continued its destruction. On this day the iron-clad Louisiana, mounting sixteen guns and being complete except as to her steam power, dropped down to the raft to act as a battery. Had she taken position lower down, among the obstructions, she could have brought such a broadside on any ves- sel attempting to pass as would have sent a ship like the Hartford to the bottom at one discharge. But she selected a different post, and one apparently much safer. Not one of her guns but would have easily carried to the bombarding fleet, but every one was silent. The Confederate navy was taking care of itself, and ex- pected the forts to do the same. For six days and nights there was a steady, galling, damaging fire, directed mainly at Fort Jackson. The fort was torn and rent and scorched and battered, but it was there yet and full of pluck. Movements in the Federal fleet showed that Farragut was pre- paring for a rush past the forts, and the Confederates were ready for the event — that is, orders were issued to make ready, but they were not carried out. The rams were acting independently of the river boats, and the Louisiana was acting independently of the rams, and all were seemingly indifferent to suggestions from the forts. General Duncan planned for the Louisiana to anchor in mid- channel at the raft. She had not only plenty of men aboard to work her guns, but at least one hundred and fifty riflemen. The rams and other vessels were to take positions to cover the channel on either side, using their stern guns to get a raking fire, and each having a supply of riflemen. Had this programme been carried out, is there a naval officer alive who will believe that Farragut could have worked a single vessel past the fort % Such a fire could have been brought to bear as would have shattered wood and iron and sent whole crews to graves at the bottom of the mighty river. THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. 105 But the Confederate navy had its own plans; and when, just before daybreak on the morning of April 24, Farragut's fleet advanced, there was nothing but the fire of the forts to be feared. Fire barges had been collected by the score to be sent among the Federal fleet as it advanced, but not one of them was cut loose. Not even a bonfire was lighted to show the vessels to the gunners at the forts. It was grand in Farragut to make the movement he did. He expected to meet the programme suggested by General Duncan, and a man not born for war would not have dared push his fleet up. When he was fairly within range both forts opened upon him with every gun which would bear, and the Confederate vessels at least added to the din and excitement. Cold shot, hot shot, shell, grape and canister were hurled down upon the moving vessels, and in return they poured ont such broadsides as would have made Nelson rub his hands with delight. In the darkness neither forts nor ships could be made out, and and the firing was all done by the flash of guns. The fleet steamed steadily and slowly along, each ship sounding as well as fighting, and before daylight broke thirteen of them had passed up the river clear of everything, and the fate of New Orleans was decided. Not a vessel could stand that fire after daylight gave the Confederates a chance to see what to fire at. Had the fire barges been sent down, Farragut might have been forced to try again. The forts were passed and cut off, and yet they had not surren- dered. Indeed, it was not the intention to surrender while the guns could be worked. The many bitter pages of Confederate war history, made up of meager rations, ragged uniforms, long marches, and fighting at terrible odds, were rarely blotted by mutiny on land or sea. On the night of the twenty-seventh the garrisons in both forts revolted. They were cut off, isolated, discouraged, and felt that further resist- ance was a useless sacrifice. They gathered on the parade-ground in their wet and ragged clothes, scores of them shoeless, hundreds of them hatless — all of them suffering from exposure and want of food, and respectfully but firmly declared that the time had come to surrender the forts. The officers tried to drive them back to their stations, but without avail. They had fought gallantly and well, but, with a powerful enemy on either hand and New Orleans in possession of the Federals, of what hope was further resistance? direr % (grow* ERE is the position. Three guns of a divided battery are stationed on the crest of a 1 1 111 to the left of an old orchard which surrounds an ancient farm house. The other three are on the right of the orchard, and the six pieces point at the meadows below — meadows broken by fences and hay stacks and lone trees, until they are lost in the edge of the woods a mile away. • The eye ranges over the fields in front and sees nothing to fear. The ear listens to sounds in rear of the battery and hears the ominous preparations for a bloody struggle. Cavalry are swinging away to the right to get position, infantry are marching here and there, guns rushing along at a gallop, and aids fly from point to point with orders. In ten min- utes a deep stillness begins to settle down over the left wing. The doves fly down from their cotes, the hens walk about in search of food, and the gray-headed farmer stands at the door and shades his eyes with his hand and looks curiously about him. Twenty minutes ago he sat rocking on the porch, and the bees flew lazily in the June sunshine, the birds sang in the orchard, and afar down the meadows he heard the voices of his sons as they swung their scythes. Ah ! what's that ? Down there, where meadow and forest blend, we can see quick puffs of smoke, and here comes the sound of muskets. A blue cloud just begins to gather and rise down there when we catch sight of men. They are retreating back- — coming towards the orchard. They fall back slowly, halting at every fence to tear it down, and to deliver a fire from behind the scattered rails. Now we see a long, thin line of skirmishers emerge from the woods and occupy the ground as the other line loses it. Back ! back ! Forward ! forward ! and you might think it pantomime if men did not fall out of' the lines here and there and drop heavily to the earth. [106] OVER THE GUNS. 10 < There is a stir around us. The silence has been so deep that the jingle of a sabre or the rattle of a spur has made men nervous. Out from the edge of the woods, by the broad highway and across the peaceful fields, pours a host of armed men. Regiment after regiment, and line after line, sweeping forwards like mighty waves — now undulating, like the course of a serpent — now marching as steadily as the stride of Time. One — three — five — ten — you can- not count the nags. Silk and frirtge, and gold and bunting stream over the heads of the men whose eyes are fixed on the orchard and the hillside. The stir deepens. There is a tramping of feet ; orders are given in quick, sharp tones, and three companies of infantry come up at a double-quick as a support and fling themselves down under the trees. Just a moment now to listen to the notes of the blue-birds and robins — to see the blue smoke creeping lazily from the farm house chimney — to note that the marching lines are almost within musket shot, and down over men, and guns and sabres and shot and shells, falls a shower of pink and white apple blossoms — emblems of purity and peace ! Aye ! a rough hand brushes them off — a cannon which a moment later is carrying a horrible death to a score of men. " Boom ! boom ! boom ! " Now the fight has begun. Men raise their voices from whispers to mad shouts. The smoke leaps up and stains the pure blossoms. The flame springs forward and scorches the green grass to yellow, and then burns it to the roots. Are the lines yet advancing ? You cannot see ten feet beyond the guns, but you can hear. Heavens ! but how they shout and scream, and shriek and curse ! The guns are using grape and canister, and the murderous missiles cut men into shreds and scatter flesh and blood over the living far behind. We are driving them back ! hip! hip! hur ! No ! Here they are ! Through the cloud of flame and smoke they rush at the guns — spectres of death bursting through and over the vapory barrier which has reared itself between the living and the dead. They shout in fury ! They shriek in despair ! They fight the very flame which dissolves them, and they pass the muzzles of grim monsters. Here on this acre of ground — here beneath the apple blossoms — is a hell on earth — a hell in which smoke and flame, and curse and wail, and blood and wounds and death are so mingled that those outside of it only hear one terrible 108 OVER THE GUJ^S. and appalling roar, as if some fierce beast had received its death- wound. Shoot to the right or left — over the guns or under them. Strike where you will, but strike to destroy ! Now the hell surges down even to the windows of the old farm-house — now back under the apple trees and beyond it. Dead men are under the ponderous wheels of the guns — mad devils are slashing and shooting across the barrels. No one seems to know friend from foe. Shoot ! Slash! Kill! And ! But the hell is dissolved. The smoke is lifting, shrieks and screams growing fainter, and twenty or thirty living men pull the bodies of the dead away from the guns and renew the slaughter against the lines marching across the meadow. Three hundred dead and wounded on the single acre ! Blood on the grass, blood on tire and spoke and gun. -Arms hacked off — brains spattered against the trees — skulls cleft in twain, and bloody fingers clenched fast into blood-red grass ! They tell of war and glory. Look over this hell's-acre and find the latter ! Cjp Citnting f oiitt in HtCMknt's Caror* ^ SPENT the whole day riding over the fields of New and Old Cold Harbors. McClellan's first great battle with Johnston brought on his second with Lee. He fought Johnston at Fair Oaks in the last days of May — he confronted Lee at the Harbors in the last days of June. It is a country of farms and forests, and hills and plains. Autumn was dropping its ripe apples on the half-leveled breast- works erected twenty years ago, and the wild grapevines covered many a scar left on the trees by ball and bullet. Here are the swamps in which the dead and wounded were sucked slowly down by the treacherous ooze as shot and shell flew above them — here the slopes and fields across which death rushed with bloody hands to claim his victims by the thousand. At the top of this hill, where Federal cannon thundered destruction, a flock of sheep crop at the short, dry herbage. Down there where the little creek steals softly under the green banks and noisily rushes over the pebbles, the dead lay in heaps" and the wounded crept to the stream in such numbers that the waters were dammed back and eddies of blood went circling round. Here, behind Powhite Creek, where Porter was massed, a school-boy would tell you that infantry would have a terrible advan- tage. All along this ridge is a grand sweep for cannon, and in the ravines below a whole division can find safe cover. ■ Here are scars to make you wonder. Great limbs lopped off — trees cut in two — rocks broken and shattered — scars of bullets on every trunk and limb which was growing here on that June day. It is the only other spot in the world resembling the place at Port Republic where the Federal guns were massed, and over which men fought and died like demons. There were thickets and jungles in the path as battle- lines moved that day. They are here yet. As I sit on the old earth-works along the Gaines' Mill road to smoke a cigar at noonday, down in those dark swamps the ow t 1s scold each other and the frogs call out as if evening had come. You would wonder that a farmer's [109] 1 10 THE TURNING POINT IN McCLELLAN's CAREER. horse could draw a cart over these fields, and yet it was here that batteries came into position at a gallop — whole divisions charged — thousands of men marched, fought and died. War may seek the green meadow or the dark jungle — the hill-top or the dense forest. McClellan had been warned of the approaching hurricane. His cavalry pickets had been driven in from the left bank of the Chick- ahominy ; Meadow Bridge had been seized by the enemy ; the green grass at Beaver Dam had been wet with blood ; Jackson was reach- ing out beyond the Federal flank. The bell had tolled its warning — a warning which rose on the air above the shrieks of the wounded and the roar of musketry and cannon. The warning was: " Fall back — shorten your lines — mass your artillery on the ridges — hide your infantry in the ravines." McClellan had obeyed. Jackson had struck him like a thunder- bolt, but he was not paralyzed. With a grim coolness he issued the orders which massed men and cannon where they could not be flanked. Down this winding road leading past the Mill the Federal picket boiled their coffee and munched their hard-tack at noon of the twenty-seventh of June, with the birds singing in the trees and the air filled with the lazy hum of perfect peace. Jackson's cannon sounded in the distance, but here all was quietness and peace. The noonday meal is scarcely finished when strange figures appear in the road — in the fields — in the woods. It is the advance of A. P. Hill. In thirty seconds the peace is broken by the pop of musketry and the cheers of men. The Federal picket gives way, fighting at every step, and sounding the alarm — the Confederates push on with a confidence which proves that battle-lines are following. From the McGhee house to Powhite swamp the alarm runs up and down the Federal lines — Lee is attacking ! Here on this ridge was the artillery. The Federal line ran to the right to that farm-house half -hidden among the cherry trees — to the left to that bluff covered with trees and under-growth, while cavalry were massed on either flank. Along the base of the ridge is a ravine — the bed of a crack now dry. A division of infantry occu- pied the ravine. Half-way up the ridge I can still trace an old breastwork of logs. Behind this defense was a second line of infantry. On the crest of the ridge I can find the old rifle-pits and the breastworks thrown up for artillery. On that June day the ground in front of this ridge was mostly clear. Here and there was a thicket — here a glade — there a swamp — here a few acres of THE TURNING POINT IN McCLELLAN's CAREER. Ill forest — there five acres of open ground. To reach the ridge every Confederate must make a fair target of himself. He must meet the terrible fire of three lines of infantry rising one above the other, and the cannon beyond will use nothing but grape and canister. It is a stronger position than Lee had at Fredericksburg — than Meade had at Gettysburg — than McClellan had elsewhere in his campaigns. Civil engineers have said it was the strongest position of the whole war. A. P. Hill had the dash of Jackson in striking a swift blow. Hardly waiting to form a line of battle, he pushed his troops to the front in assault. There was no spirit of recklessness in that move. He knew the Federal position and its terrible strength. It could not be flanked. Could it be carried by direct assault ? The way to answer that query was to advance. There was no halting to parry and thrust and look for a weak link in the chain. Gathering his division in hand Hill flung it square at the ridge. Twelve thousand Con- federates, two thousand of whom had never seen a Federal soldier, moved as one man — moved as the tornado which levels forests and blots out landmarks. The moment that gray mass swings into view twenty thousand muskets open fire — fifty pieces of cannon shake the earth and send their echoes into Richmond and beyond. Can flesh and blood stand such a fire % The air screams with its burdens of death, and the awful roar sways the tree-tops as in an autumn gale. There is a rush of feet — a cheer — and out from under the smoke-cloud that gray division dashes into the ravine — dashes up the ridge and over the logs — springs to the very crest and is among the guns. Neither storms of bullets nor walls of bayonets had checked it. It was only when the living wave had reached the crest and actually captured some of the guns that the surprised Federals rallied. The recklessness — the cold blooded abandon of that rush had so amazed the defense that many men stood without firing a shot. Cheers of victory and shouts of defiance rose above the trees and floated down to Longstreet's men in reserve, but the sound died away in a wail. The Federal arm was uplifted — it swept through the air, and almost in a moment that gray division was hurled back to its starting point — shattered — limping — blood-stained — and a fifth of its number lying dead behind it. It was one of the most gallant dashes of any war — it was a repulse so bloody that men shuddered at the sight. It was the men under Gregg who led that 112 THE TURNING POINT IN McCLELLAN 8 CAREER. assault — it was the men under Morell and Sykes who hurled them back. The repulse was not enough. As the Confederates retired they were followed by the Federals with a rush which nothing could check for nearly half a mile. Back, back, back, and for a time it looked as if Hill would be annihilated. It seemed beyond human power to reorganize those shattered regiments, but it was accom- plished, and Hill stood up and took his pounding like the brave man and stubborn tighter. At Groveton Pope hurled Kearney at Jackson to pierce his army. Kearney could fall back and endanger nothing. Hill had hurled himself at the center of the Federal position and been repulsed. If driven too far Longstreet would be taken in flank — Jackson's advance checked. Thus it was that when the great wave of blue had rolled over swamps and thickets and woods and fields until its impetus was weakened, it suddenly found Hill again in battle-line, with feet firmly planted. For an hour the firing was terrific and murderous, but Hill would not budge a foot. By twos — by fives — by dozens, his men went down where they stood, but those unhurt held their lines against every assault. The Confederate army was waiting for the arrival of Jackson, who had been recalled from a move on the Federal flank. He was coming, but his advance found a foe at every step. Hill would be wiped out in another hour unless relieved. Longstreet was ready to relieve him, not with fresh troops, but b} r making an attack on the Federal position higher up — squarely against Morell's division. He swept forward like a mighty wind, coming so suddenly against the Federal position that the scene of Hill's assault was re-enacted. At the first rush Anderson's and Pickett's brigades were carried over the lines of blue and right among the smoking cannon. For ten minutes that rocky crest was a scene of dreadful carnage. Men used the bayonet — they clinched with bare hands — gunners wielded their rammers — cannon were discharged with the foe touching the muzzles. The mighty wind had struck a stone wall. The wall stood firm. Ten minutes of that awful fighting was enough for the Confederates, and a strong volley lifted them off their feet and hurled them back. Warren's troops faced to the northwest, its left flank near the road running down across Powhite Creek to Gaines' Mill and com necting with Griffin's right. A part of Longstreet's men advanced on this highway as the fight opened, but never a man lived to reach THE TURNING POINT IN McCLELLAn's CAREER. 113 it. A Federal battery, with infantry supports lying in the dry roadside ditches, checked every dash. It might well have been said of the regiments pushed at this battery that every man had lost all consciousness of fear. As they swung out of a belt of forest they dressed their lines in the face of grape, canister and bullets, which cumbered the ground with dead before a man had advanced. When the order came they rushed forward with heads down, as if the shower of death was a snow storm. Over the open ground — across the bit of marsh — but no farther. Death met them there. It tore off legs and arms — it left headless bodies — it mangled human beings beyond recognition — it blotted bodies off the face of the earth, leaving only a horrible smirch of bloody atoms to tell that they had been there. Again and again these charges were made, but they only added to the awful sights in the open field over which the Federal torrent of death swept unchecked. For an hour Longstreet thundered at Morell and Hill at Sykes, and then all of a sudden there came a dread silence. As if the voice of some man rising above the crash of fifty thousand muskets and the roar of fifty cannon had commanded it, there was almost absolute silence. It was a time for the bravest to tremble. Nothing is so grim in war as a sudden silence falling upon a field of battle. Death is gathering its bloody robes clear of the ground to strike a new blow. Men refill their cartridge boxes — lines are moved — the artillery wheeled about — bloodshot eyes peer into the woods and over the fields. What meant that silence there ? " Jackson is here ! " A shout rose on Hill's left and ran along the lines to Longstreet's right. Jackson had come up from Old Cold Harbor, D. H. Hill on his left, Ewell on his right. Each line was now almost a half-circle, but Jackson had scarcely come into position on the left before Slocum came up to strengthen the Fed- eral right. Mid-afternoon had passed. The thick spots of forest began to cast dark shadows. The whole Confederate army was up — McClellan could not give Porter another man. If he could not hold his ground with what he had, it was destruction to the entire Federal position before Richmond which had been reached at such a cost of blood and treasure. The cheers for Jackson subsided, and then the woods were so still that men looked at each other in wonder. From the Gaines 1 Mill Road clear around to Old Cold Harbor a wave suddenly rises up and sweeps forward. The Federals hear it as it starts. It is a roar in which the voices of men — the tramp of feet — the rumble of wheels and the gallop of horses are com- Vol. I. -8 114 THE TURNING POINT IN McCLELLAN's CAREER. bined. Jackson's whole corps, with the exception of the Stonewall Brigade, is advancing. The roar increases — the tramp comes nearer, and almost ;it the same instant thirty thousand streams of fire leap forward and thirty thousand muskets crash into the same echo. Hood's Texans rush forward like a thunderbolt, but they are checked by a fire so rapid and destructive that men fall fiat to escape it. Hill seeks to overlap Buchanan's right flank, but a swamp blocks his path, and in ten minutes he is not even able to hold his ground. Hood, too, is being pressed slowly back, when up thunders a score of Confederate guns to his relief, and now it is a death grapple all along the line. The roar of a dozen Niagaras would have been drowned in that crash of battle. Men do not hear; if they see the line moving to the right or left, they move with it. They advance — fall back — load and fire. The Confederate shot and shell cut off whole tree-tops — sever trunks of trees — send great rocks whirling through the air. Logs and limbs are torn out of the breastworks and become agents of destruction. A shell bursts where a score of men are crowded together, and when the smoke lifts the spot is bare of life. Hill's rush when first attacking was to be outdone. After the terrible cannonade had lasted half an hour, the Stonewall Brigade was advanced to reinforce D. H. Hill on the left. In half an hour more the sun would be down. If the Federals could hold the line an hour more they could hold it forever. The roar of cannon died away all at once, and the whole Confederate army advanced. Hood's brigade of Texans formed behind a thicket, through which shot and shell from the Federal guns were mowing great, wide swaths. As they moved out they rushed. Grape and canister were exchanged for shot and shell, but still the lines advanced, over ground into which men sank to the knees — over a deep ravine — over rocks and through thickets — death mowing them down at every step, and then they rushed. It was not a rush of men, but of devils. Their screams rose above the crash of musketry, and even as they rushed they fixed bayonets. Not a Federal moved out of the path of that advance. It struck: the blue lines and melted them as liquid iron w r ould melt snow. It cut a swath into the Federal position just its width, reaching from ravine to the Parrott guns on the crest. It was just at sundown. Already the sombre shadows of approaching night were settling down upon hill and valley. The flash of every musket could now be seen — the red flames from the cannon made the whole field blaze. Slocum had been put in across THE TURNING POINT IN McCLELLAN's CAKEEK. 115 the highway which led to Gaines' Mill in one direction and towards Old Cold Harbor in the other. It was between Warren and Lovell that the Texans rushed. It seemed as if no body of men could live through such a hurricane of death. The fire of at least eight thousand muskets and twenty pieces of artillery was concentrated on that one brigade leading the rush, but it came on, and on, and on, and it wedged itself in the Union lines and remained there. For ten minutes a mob of ten thousand men whirled round and round in that eddy of death, and tnen the Federals gave way — slowly, foot by foot, and fighting so desperately and dying so gallantly that every Confederate historian has lifted his hat to the dead and spoken in praise of the living. When the Union lines began to fall back the Second New Jersey and Eleventh Pennsylvania refused to move. They were fighting desperately on flanks and front with McLaw's Texans, and though exposed to a merciless fire their lines could not be broken. Unable to break their front, the Confederates flanked them, and yet they fonght on. Aye ! and it is Confederates who tell it, too, those gallant men continued the fight after they were entirely sur- rounded; and their arms were only laid down when the Confed- erates, awed at such bravery, ceased firing. When it was seen that the Federal lines were breaking some one ordered a charge of cavalry on D. H. Hill's flank. Five hundred of the regular cavalry massed and charged into the jaws of death. They were swallowed up as a drop of water sinks into the dry earth — a useless sacrifice, and yet a forlorn hope. Night came down to still the boom of cannon and the crash of musketry — to hide the blood-stained trees and stones and grass — to give brief rest to men with blood-shot eyes and hoarse voices and exhausted bodies. Then, from hillside and ravine — from field and swamp — from thicket and open came the wails and groans of the wounded. Men crawled here and there — men struggled up to fall and scream out with new agony — they dragged themselves over the bloody ground to lap the red waters of the creek and gain strength for another shout for succor. And there were thousands who neither cried out nor moved. As they fell and died so they lay, the soft dew of a summer's night falling upon white faces which war's glory would lighten no more. McClellan's right was beaten. He must fall back — he must have more than the sagacity of a Napoleon to bring that army to the James as a body. Ctjiuige of $aae. resnlt at Gaines' Mill made the Federal situation extremely critical. Lee not only had Johnston's old army splendidly in hand, but Jackson's forces had been added to swell the number. Lee was not only moving on the short line, but had assumed the offensive. McClellan has been vilified and maligned without stint because he did not pursue Johnston with more speed after the fight at Williamsburg. A general may order his army to move, but Provi- dence must be consulted. Three hours' rain on the Peninsula meant highwaj's without bottoms, and a condition of affairs which, neither orders nor proclamations could better. He has been grossly insulted by various Federal historians because he threw a portion of his army across the Chickahominy to be attacked at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks. Does an army move in a body or by portions % He has been fiercely attacked because he did not follow up the Confederates as they sullenly retreated from those battle fields towards Richmond. After a battle there is work to be done. Commands which have even been held in reserve all day are more or less disorganized. At the front the cartridge boxes and caissons arc empty, and the men who have fought for eight or ten hours must have food, if not rest. And it must not be argued that the columns of Longstreet, Huger and Smith left the ground in a panic. When they drew off it was after having had the whole day in which to reorganize. They fell back slowly and in good order, and a pursuit over country roads knee-deep in mud would have been senseless and dangerous. He has been placed in a false light because his movements between Fair Oaks and Richmond were not more rapid. Lee had the inner line; he was intrenched; he was watching for a chance to strike a blow. He had his army in hand, and provisions and ammunition at his back. McClellan's army was strung out ; he [116] CHANGE OF BAGE. 117 had the long line ; as a corps moved it had to prepare itself against a sudden onslaught by the vigilant Confederates. He had every- thing in the way of provisions and forage to bring up, and he had a thousand unforeseen difficulties to contend with and overcome. And the historian who has asserted that Richmond was in a tremble and ready to be evacuated at the first sign of a vigorous movement en masse by the Federal army had not one grain of truth for the assertion. Johnston realized that McClellan should have two men to his one to make anything like a successful strug- gle for the prize. Lee was not troubled for a moment as to the result if he was attacked. After Jackson left the Shenandoah Valley to join forces, McClellan's fate, unless heavily reinforced, was as good as decided. The battle of Gaines' Mill was the climax to McClellan's anxie- ties. Before that three courses were open to him. Jackson was already on his flank, and his base of supplies was threatened. He could concentrate either north or south of the Chickahominy and give battle to Lee — that is if Lee wonld attack him on the ground he selected. He could mass and push for Richmond, hoping to find it almost defenseless, or he could call in his right wing and retreat to the James. The slanderers would not have been satisfied had he accepted either of the first two courses instead of the last. Richmond was not left defenseless. McClellan's advance would have been promptly resisted from the first movement, and the heads of his columns could not have forced their way two miles before Lee and Jackson would have been heard from on his flanks. Had he concentrated to fight Lee, would the latter have felt obliged to attack him in the position thus selected % A retreat to the James was decided on. The beginning of this movement brought on the battle of Gaines' Mill, although Lee did not yet suspect that the Federal army was intending to slip away. To get his stores away McClellan had to throw a strong force along the west side of White Oak Swamp, to hold every highway by which Lee might advance on Savage's Station, and these were all in position by the night of June twenty-eight. As soon as the two or three narrow and bottomless highways were clear of marching troops the stores began to move. These included heavy guns, forage, provisions, and a large drove of cattle, and the roads were packed and confusion reigned supreme. Do the best he could, McClellan had to leave more or less behind, and that it might be 118 CHANGE OF BASE. of no benelit to the Confederates, what would burn was given to the flames and the rest destroyed. Having cut loose from the White House, his base of supplies, the Federal commander ordered everything at that point destroyed, and the sacrifice amounted to tens of thousands of dollars. His movements puzzled Lee to a certain extent. But for this he might have been broken at any point. While McClellan showed a bold, front everywhere, it was but strategy to secure a few hours more time. It was only on the night of the twenty-eighth that Lee dis- covered he had been deceived. McClellan was neither prepared to give battle nor to retreat down the Peninsula, but was making for the James and a new base. He had formed his lines at Savage Station to hold the ground until his trains could reach a point of safety. They were coming up and swinging into position all day and all night of the twenty-eighth, and on the morning of the twenty-ninth were ready. Trains and stores were being pushed rapidly towards the James, but they must be covered. There was no transportation for the sick and wounded in hospi- tal around Savage Station. An army on the retreat is sullen — anxious — selfish. An army in pursuit is exultant — vindictive — vengeful. The helpless must be left behind, as the Russian throws away his children to appease the appetites of the pursuing wolves. McClellan, smarting and indignant over defeat which he firmly believed had been brought about through the meddling of the administration with his original plans, and the half-hearted manner in which his subsequent movements had been assisted, saw his rear- guard ready for battle and then dispatched to the Secretary of War: Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand fresh troops to use to maneu- ver, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. I have lost this battle (Gaines' Mill), because my force was too small. I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed. I have seen too many rlead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost. If I save this army now I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other person in Washington ! You have done your best to sacrifice this army ! Such a dispatch could only have come from a soldier who had every confidence that he was in the right, and that the verdict of the country would be in his favor. CHANGE OF BASE. 119 And as the June sun lifted itself into the Heavens and poured his warm rays down into the tangled thickets and dark woods and miasmatic swamps around Savage's Station, the Federal lines watched and waited. Lee was on the trail now. He had called in his commands and was sweeping down on his prey. ffffhi :*jJ"WWtfV>»- Cffhrcrir ttje fames. EE was advancing in three columns — Jackson striking the Federal rear-guard, Longstreet and Hill pushing along the Williamsburg road, Magruder and Huger closing in by the Newmarket highway. Ten days previously the Federal army was an Octo- pus, reaching out long arms which drew blood in every direction. On that morning of the twenty-ninth it was a Fugitive — a Fugi- tive but not a coward. Let it alone and it would grant everything; press it too closely and it would turn and draw blood. When the commands of Sumner, Franklin, and Heintzelman were in position at Savage's Station to give Jackson a check, McOlellan pushed ahead to prepare for other contingencies. Two other armies were preparing to strike him terrific blows before he reached the James, and he must provide for the peril. An hour after sunrise Magruder's advance encountered Sumner's front and was whirled back, and the fighting from that time until afternoon, when the whole Confederate command was up, was confined to the picket lines. About mid-afternoon the storm broke. Massed in solid lines of battle, and cheering as they stepped out, the Confederates broke cover and rolled up against the Federal position. Blow after blow was rained down upon the shield held up by that rear-guard of a retreating army, but it was like a rock. Now the hammer falls upon Hancock, holding the woods on the extreme right — now upon Sumner's center, held by Richardson — now on Sedgewick, way down on the left, and riding about as if bullets could not kill ; but each and every blow was returned with mighty strength. Blood flowed under the green trees — blood stained the velvet grass in the open fields — blood mingled with the dark and poisonous waters of the swamps, but the blue lines would not be driven. They were there as the sun came up ; they were still there, but terribly thinned, as the sun went down. As night [120] TOWAKD THE JAMES. 121 came on and the Tiger drew back from the flame and smoke to lick his wounds, the Fugitive began his further retreat towards the James. Seven thousand dead and wounded men in blue and gray held the field of battle. Magruder had been temporarily checked, but the two other Con- federate armies were thirsting for blood. On the morning of the thirtieth McClellan realized that he could not advance beyond the Charles City Cross Roads without stopping to give battle. He must here wrestle with Longstreet and A. P. Hill. Seeing the storm gathering to sweep him away, McClellan turned at bay to draw blood. He had failed to reach Richmond— he had been obliged to plan a retreat— but he was not broken. In his retreat he would prove to the world that he had the skill of a great general and the courage of a hero. His disposition to meet this second attack on his army placed McCall's division on the right, Slocum on the left, and Kearney in the center, each well supplied with artillery, and a reserve of several brigades of infantry held in hand to be thrown at any imperilled point. The ground was field and forest and undergrowth, and the line of battle as finally formed, had a front like the windings of a serpent. The forenoon passed with heavy skirmishing, and it was not until two o'clock in the afternoon that Longstreet was ready. Then he hurled ten thousand men down upon McCall's weak division, and for two hours he was enveloped in flame and smoke and harried by a terrible shower of shot and shell. But he could not be driven. He was there to hold the right, and there he would die. Just before sundown he was breasted back for a quarter of a mile, but he gave up the ground foot by foot and finally secured a new line. It was in this movement that he lost a battery by a charge, and two more from being abandoned outright by their cowardly companies. ^ After striking McCall the attack rolled down the line upon Kearney. He had open ground on most of his front, and his bat- teries were ready with their deadliest missiles. As the gray lines appeared within range they were opened on with a fire which seemed to sweep the front clear of every blade of grass, but with their faces towards the guns the Confederates kept "closing up the terrible gaps and sweeping forward. Shell was changed for grape and canister, and now the front was a wall of flame which rose far above the heads of the artillerists. Through this wall burst the lines of gray— right up to the muzzles of the death-dealing guns— 122 TOWARD THE JAMES. but then to encounter the close and destructive fire of the supports and be forced to retreat. Three different times during the afternoon a fresh force massed on Kearney — each time to advance across the open ground to the muzzles of his batteries — each time to be sent back broken, rent, and bleeding. It was the same along the front of every Federal command — a desperate attempt to find a gap through which to pour — a desperate resolve to prevent. When night came Longstreet and Hill were baffled. Magruder was following the Fugitive, but not too closely, and Franklin had struck Jackson in the face at White Oak Bridge. Under cover of darkness the Fugitive continued his retreat towards the James, and again the dead and wounded were counted by thousands. The hour of peril to McCall came when his two German batter- ies — Knierim's and Diedrich's — failed him. As the Confederates broke cover for a charge every gun in these batteries was rushed to the rear in a panic and without excuse. Returned to the front again, and receiving the sneers and hisses of the infantry as they came up, it was not a quarter of an hour before every piece was abandoned as it stood, and such as were saved were hauled away by the infantry. As the artillerists broke for the rear they cut their horses loose and mounted them, and in dashing through the infantry they caused an excitement which for a moment threatened a panic. Randol'S battery had been particularly aggressive, and was so continuously well served that the Confederates determined to cap- ture it at any cost. Instead of a line of battle advancing upon it, two Virginia regiments were massed in the shape of a "V," the point being toward the battery. The men were ordered to advance on a run and with arms at a trail and not to halt to fire a single shot. With a wild yell the "Y" left cover and dashed forward, and the fire of the entire battery was at once concentrated. Grape and canister tore through the wedge-shaped command, and its point was shattered again and again, but nothing could check its momentum. It came straight at the battery — it pushed between the guns — it swept the field clear and cheered as it dragged away the blood- spattered cannon. Night had come, and the Fugitive- — anxious — wounded — bleed- ing, but undefeated, pressed on. Malvern Hill was the beacon light held out to him as the black clouds gathered overhead and the darkness increased the difficulties of the march. The Tiger was following — grim — thirsting — confident. €\t %ot m\\m PcCldlait Crieir "fait." HANDING in the front door of the old brick Malvern House you see Turkey Bend in the James River to the south. It is two miles away, over ravine, hill and thicket, and yet it seems almost at your feet. In that bend lay the gun-boats which helped save Mc- Clellan's army. Thirty steps in rear of the house is a natural sink, the beginning of a deep ravine which runs into Deep Bottom. The bottom of this sink is a solid bed of marl. In taking out marl they have taken out fifty cannon-balls and unexploded shells, and there are more to be discovered. The trees are broken and splintered, and a thousand bullets have been picked up along the steep sides. To the southeast, on a clear day, the eye can discern Harrison's Landing, which was McClellan's haven of safety. To the northwest is the Crews farm, across which the Confederates surged as they came to the attack, and on which blood poured out until the quiver- ing earth would drink no more. To the south and west is forest — below me is the road leading to Richmond by way of Varuna Grove. Between the hill and the road, where Porter was posted in reserve that day, is a field of ripened corn. To the right of this was a meadow. To-day it is a tangled wilderness of shrubs and vines. The old brick house has a story of its own. Four hundred and thirty-nine grape-shot and bullets hit the bricks that day, and thirteen cannon-balls left marks which only the trowel can efface. Here in the yard, under the shade trees, the surgeons worked, and as they plied saw and knife great branches fell upon them from the tree tops. Shell and ball and bullet are lying in the tangled grass, and the rank weeds hide rusting swords and broken bayonets. Malvern Hill is a singular spot. It is an almost level plateau of ground nearly two miles long and about a mile wide. On the river side the banks are too steep for soldiers to climb. In front, or [123] 124 THE SPOT WHERE McCLELLAN CRIED " HALT." towards Richmond, the ground slopes away like a lawn, and a creek winds in and out and furnishes with its banks natural cover for ten thousand men. McClellan had fought the battles of Fair Oaks, Williamsburg, Gaines' Mill, Peach Orchard and Savage Station, and here was his last stand. And so the retreating Federal army at last reached Malvern Hill. Every day had witnessed a bloody battle, and every night a long march. -McClellan had been sacrificed, but he was doing what scarce another general in the world had ever done — winning victories in a retreat. Each battle was begun by the Confederates with the feeling that the Federal army would be cut to pieces and captured. Each battle ended in a victory for the men in blue. If McClellan reached City Point his army was saved. Therefore, as he reached Malvern Hill on his retreat, the Confederates made one last, des- perate effort to crush him. And, therefore, too, as McClellan reached that grand battle ground, he determined that the foe which had so exultantly pursued his trail should 'receive a bloodier check than had yet been given his legions. There were four roads by which the Confederates could pour their troops against McClellan's left. Sixty cannon were massed to strengthen this flank. On the crest on which forty of those guns bellowed thunder that day, a farmer's boy is dragging in fall wheat. Further to the left where the other twenty added their flame and smoke, there is a tangle of weed and briar and brush. As McClellan sat on his horse that day on this crest his eye could take in his whole semi-circle of battle and count three hundred cannon with their black muzzles to the foe. Down under the crest of this hill, behind knolls and ridges and the banks of the creek, were four brigades of Federals. Before them were the fields and meadows of the Crews farm. Behind these fields were the dark pine woods in which the Confederates were massing. Above these men lying in ambush were the sixty cannon, each gun having a plunging fire on the plain. All night long Sykes, and Morell, and Couch, and Hooker, and Kearney and a dozen other heroes had been busy, and as morning came little further was needed. A few guns were shifted, lines dressed, gaps filled, and in the full glory of the glorious summer morning the men waited for the fury of the storm to burst. A death-like silence fell upon the army as it waited. Here for the first time since the sudden and overwhelming attack in the swamps of the Chickahominy there was exultation in the hearts of THE SPOT WHERE McCLELLAN CRIED " HALT." 125 the men as they stood in battle line. The humblest soldier could see that attack meant defeat, no matter what the force. Couch's division was hiding at the foot of the plateau, eager for the fight to open. Further up were the grim cannon. Beyond these the blue lines and the drooping flags. Hunted and hounded, the Fugitive had turned at bay. Betrayed and abandoned, he was going to prove himself more than a match for the hosts of Lee, Jackson and Magruder. To the right of the Crews farm, on the fields hidden by rows of shrubbery, the Confederate infantry marched and massed until the earth trembled. To the left, under the dark pines, legions of men in gray stood waiting. From the pine-bordered Varuna Grove road other legions debouched into the forest and marched by the flank until they formed in battle line across the green fields which were drinking in the summer sunshine. All the morning lines of gray marched to the right or left, batteries wheeled slowly into position, and that ominous silence which means more than murder held the air and the earth in its grasp. A sudden tremor quickly ran along the lines of blue. The Con- federate skirmishers came out of the pines in a long, thin line, and boldly advanced into the fields. They can count two hundred of the Federal cannon on the plateau, and they can see the blue lines massed for battle, but they are coming to feel the way across the fields — to see what that fringe of bushes conceals — to discover what is hidden behind the ridges. They skulk — they dodge about — they creep and crawl over the grass like snakes. It is a mere handful — routed and sent flying by one volley from Couch's advance line. The Confed- erates now understand what is before them, and they wait for other brigades and divisions to come up and swing into line. Every fifth man yi those gray lines will be a corpse before this July sun goes down. An hour after noon the storm bursts. Out from those dark pine woods sweeps a double line of battle, banners rippling, muskets gleaming, and lines dressed as if on parade. In ten' seconds more than two hundred cannon, each piece having a clear range, open on the moving lines with shot, shell, and canister. "Where the shells burst a gap fifty feet wide is opened in the lines. Where grape and Bhot and canister tear through, men are piled three deep. Malvern Hill quivered from center to circumference under that terrible roar of artillery, and yet those gray lines came on. Behind them the fields were strewn with corpses, but the living wall rolled on and on 126 THE SPOT WHERE McCLELLAN CKIED " HALT." as if no power on earth could stop it. The same steady tramp, tramp — no faster, no slower, and men who looked at them under the smoke-cloud wondered if they were soldiers of flesh and blood. Now, when the lines are only a stone's throw from the men lying behind the creek, a whole division springs up at the word, muskets are brought to an " aim," and a sheet of fire a mile long leaps across the narrow space and withers and scorches and shrivels whole brig- ades. It is one grand terrible crash — one leaping, hissing billow of flame — one furious shriek and scream of ten thousand bullets seek- ing for prey, and the ambushed tigers along the creek and the grim guns on the hill have no further work to do. Of all that grand line of battle a few poor hundreds hobble back beneath the shelter of the woods. From creek to the forest the grass is no longer green. It is gray with the dead — it is red with the blood of men torn to fragments. Men never made a more gallant advance — lines never met with a bloodier repulse. Slowly the blue cloud lifted and floated away over the thick forest towards Harrison's Landing, and the guns were still. The Federal signal-men on Malvern Hill now gave the gun-boats in Turkey Bend the range and location of the Confederate right, and a dozen monster guns suddenly opened fire. Great shells rose with terrible whirr, sailed over the heads of Porter's men, and fell among the pines and exploded with a crash which was heard miles away. Branches as thick as a man's body and fifty feet long crashed down on the massing Confederates or were whirled about like straws; and pines which had braved the hurricane and the light- ning flash for half a century were splintered and riven and dashed to earth at a blow. Under the cover of the woods — amidst the awful explosions and the fearful crashes, the Confederates reformed and moved out again. The instant those gray lines were clear of the forest, Malvern Hill shook and trembled again with the roar of cannon, and the gun- boats redoubled their fire. Shot and shell, and grape-shot and can- ister whistled and screamed until there was one awful and continu- ous shriek. Every man in gray looked into the eyes of a horrible death, and yet the columns moved forward without an instant's halt. Regiments were decimated before they had traversed a third of the distance, and yet the survivors moved forward. One shell from the gun-boats struck down a score of men, but the gap was closed and eleven men were left to represent the company. Think of the three hundred cannon — the shrieking, screaming tons of iron hurled into THE SPOT WHEKE McCLELLAN CRIED " HALT." 127 that crowded mass, and then wonder how men faced it ! With heads bent forward as if breasting a snow-storm — with teeth hard clinched and muskets tightly grasped, the Confederates again dashed at the hill, to be again confronted and withered by the fire of Couch's men. A single volley and the gra} T lines were no more. In place of them were heaps of dead, writhing, wounded, and a few battalions rushing back to cover. Then silence fell upon hill and forest, broken for the next two hours only by the sullen boom of the Parrotts on the gun -boats as their fire was still trained on the woods. McClellan's left was his weakest point, and that weakest point had beaten back two desperate charges by twenty thousand men, and had not lost above a hundred in killed and wounded. If the left could not be routed the center and right must be impregnable. Did the silence mean that the enemy had abandoned his purpose? Men looked down upon those fields sucking the blood of six thousand corpses, and answered yes. Silence is never more ominous than during a battle. Then it means that batteries are taking new positions, battle lines .being changed, and new plans being brought into play. Let the roar of battle suddenly die away on the right or left and grim silence take its place, and those who were fighting like heroes a moment before will turn pale and tremble. At four o'clock the birds sang in the old trees around the Malvern House, and commanders of brigades and divisions asked each other what that silence meant. Not a living Confederate could be seen, and what was passing under the pines no man knew. Beaten back in those two desperate charges, the Confederates were the more determined. They had attacked by regiments and failed. Now they would attack by brigades and divisions, and suc- ceed. At six o'clock, as the sun hung like a great ball of fire above the trees, fury was let loose. Scarcely a gun was fired as a warn- ing. All of a sudden two hundred Confederate field-pieces were galloped to positions along the far edges of the fields and at once opened a terrible fire on Malvern Hill. Three hundred guns instantly replied, and the roar of that terrible artillery duel was plainly heard thirty miles away. For half an hour hill and plain was enveloped in semi-darkness, through which flames darted and missiles shrieked. Then the Con- federate batteries suddenly ceased and the gray infantry moved out of the woods. Over the bloody grass — over the dead — a mighty torrent of war swept forward to do or die. Death swooped down 128 THE SPOT WHERE McCLELLAN CRIED " HALT." from the plateau and claimed scores and hundreds. The gun-boats hurled death to hundreds more, but those lines never stopped till within thirty yards of the creek. Then Couch's men rose up and swept them off their feet with one terrible volley. The Federal cheers had not yet died away when the gray masses came again. Brigades reduced to seven hundred men by that lire rallied and reformed where the corpses lay three deep and dashed at the hill on the double-quick, but not to reach it. Three — five — seven successive times those gray lines rallied and rushed, and field batteries crept forward over the corpses until the color of the gun- ners' eyes could be told by the men under the hill. When the sun went down the fight was ended. McCle Han's position was impreg- nable. His left wing alone had beaten back five times its strength, and the army which had so exultantly pursued, and which was so persistently determined to destroy, was shattered to the core. Those who looked down from Round Top at Gettysburg after Longstreet's charge did not see such a sight as the men who looked across the meadows of the Crews farm. The horrors of war left foot-prints there which fifty years of time will not efface. Not a hundred trees are missing from that dark silent forest. There they stand, just as when that July sun went down on those scenes of horror. It was not a tornado which rent and twisted and shivered, and left scars and traces to astound. It was not the sud- den sweep of a whirlwind which brought down tree-tops and splin- tered trunks. In the sandy bed of a dry ravine in those woods which hid Ma- gruder's men that day, I found a startling reminder of that fierce grapple. There lay an unexploded hundred-pound shell, just as it crashed through the trees. Relic hunters have carried away thou- sands of bullets and hundreds of pieces of shell, and the battle field has sent to the Richmond junk dealers tons upon tons of lead and iron, but no man has been bold enough to disturb this sleeping monster. All day long, as cannon roared and muskets crashed, McClellan was hurrying his trains through Deep Bottom to the river, whose glimmer his soldiers could see when the smoke lifted. Night brought him victory, but it also brought retreat. Only when the river was reached could the army be fed and reorganized. The afternoon is waning as I turn for a last look at the old brick house with its scars of cannon-ball and bullet. The rent and shivered THE SPOT WHERE McCLELLAN CRIED " HALT. 129 trees cast their shadows on the bricks. No hand has traced a word or letter there, but still I read': " Twenty thousand Federals lie dead between this hill and the Chickahominy. Who sacrificed them?" Aye ! who did ? Who baffled McClellan's plans ? Who left that army exposed ? Who refused him support to make victory of defeat? Who was it who muttered and sulked When that army was rescued and crowned with victory ? There is no tablet in the wall, but across the bullet-chipped bricks I read the words dispatched to Secretary Stanton from the Savage Station, and never to be forgotten while history lives : I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded com- rades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army ! History need only preserve the words. Every house and hill and forest and meadow from Malvern to the dark waters of the Chicka- homiiry will furnish accusing witnesses for half a century to come. Vou I— 9 cCkUcm — %ti — fey*. >FTER Malvern Hill— what? Lee had thrown his army at the plateau, and it had been flung back, broken — bruised — disorganized to a certain extent. When McClellan issued his order for the army to fall back to the James, there was indignation among many of his officers, and Porter, Kearney, and others were loud in their protes- tations. Because the Octopus, reaching out his cruel arms in a last effort to clutch and destroy his victim, had been beaten off, certain officers leaped to the conclusion that Lee was sorely defeated and could be pursued back over the same route to the gates of Rich- mond. Was Lee broken? Emphatically no! As night fell upon the battle field of Malvern Hill, thousands of his men had not yet fired a shot. A few brigades were disorganized, as might have been anticipated, but the greater part of the army was well in hand. Had McClellan moved to the attack next day he must have left a defensible position to attack one of Lee's own choosing, with the odds of battle against him. And the hot-headed subordinates and carping critics seem to have lost sight of the important fact that, even had Lee retreated towards Richmond, McClellan was in no condition to follow. He had burned his stores at the White House — at Savage's Station — at every spot where he halted to make a fight for his life. He had lost scores of wagons and thousands of horses and mules, and as his troops swung into line at Malvern Hill it was with empty haver- sacks. To pursue Lee he must have time to reorganize his shat- tered divisions, replace his trains and find a way to feed his army. Could Lee have been beaten back over those roads by the Federal army, even if fully prepared for the aggressive? ~No, again! As he left Richmond to fall upon McClellan it was by three different roads, with three different commands, to strike the Federal army at [130] McCLELLAN LEE POPE. 131 three different points. In no one battle could he claim a vic- tory. Had Lee retreated, McClellan's pursuit must have been by the same highways, held by strong rear-guards. Had Lee halted and McClellan been forced to attack, what were the chances for a Fed- eral victory? McClellan drew back to the river, his campaign ended. He had left behind him nearly sixty pieces of artillery, half a dozen battle- flags, thirty thousand stands of arms, fifteen thousand dead, wounded and missing, and had reduced millions of dollars' worth of stores to ashes. He was a fallen chief. "Defeat" was written on every wall, and the country called for his head. His proud spirit must have burned over his position — at the insults heaped upon him — at the knowledge that a hearty co-operation on the part of the government would have brought different results. As the army fell back to the James it made itself secure from successful attack and began to reorganize. Lee remained before it for a few days, and realizing that it could not be moved for some time, he withdrew towards Richmond to assume the aggressive. On the twenty-third of July General Halleck was appointed commander-in-chief of all the Federal forces, and during the same month General Pope was paraded before the public as the coming successful general. '•...... '■ l^szh'- IJGjw'a if ijjta ^rouitft Utatrassaa, f>ACKSON is moving! So said tlie Federal signal flags on the morning of the twenty-fifth of August, 1862. Pope had fallen back from his line on the Itapidan and retreated behind the Rappahannock. Lee had fol- lowed him and meant to attack. A part of the Confederates had forced the crossing of the river, and the two great commanders were moving their chess men here and there as they made ready for the great battle which could not long be delayed. Jackson was at Jefferson, on Lee's left. On the morning of the twenty-fifth he took the road to Amissville, and after crossing the river there, he turned to the northeast, in the direction of Water- loo. It was then that the Federal signal flags waved the news. With his right wing and center Lee meant to face Pope and hold him where he was until Jackson had carried out a plan. What was it, and where was he going? Pope did not know. From the direction of the march Jackson could strike into the Shenandoah, or he could swing into the rear of the Federal army. Which course he would take no one in that Federal army knew or seemed to care. At least no energetic movement was made to find out, and by and by Pope made up his mind that Jackson had started for the Shenan- doah and would bother him no more. All day long of the twenty-fifth Jackson pushed ahead at cavalry pace, and by the next evening he was at Bristol Station, squarely in the rear of the Federal army. Instead of turning to the west at Salem and making for the valley he had turned east and marched for Manassas. Five thousand Federals posted in Thoroughfare Gap could have held him until the arrival of an army corps, but there were no Federals in the Gap. Pope had seen Lee cut twenty-five thousand men off from his army and swing them beyond the Federal right, and yet he took no steps to guard the approaches in his rear until too late. As the hours passed by Jackson hurried on, and on, [132] POPE'S FIGHTS AROUND MANASSAS. 133 and on, expecting each hour that his great movement would be exposed, but never meeting with the slightest opposition. Had he found a division holding Thoroughfare Gap he must have turned back. On the night of the twenty-sixth, when he struck the rail- road, Pope sent a single regiment down on the cars to drive away the " intruders," supposing that Mosby had dashed in. Instead of Mosby with a hundred guerillas, it was Jackson with twenty-five thousand fighters. It was only on the morning of the twenty-seventh that Pope realized that any considerable body of Confederates was in his rear. Manassas was the great Federal storehouse. It was a part of Jack- son's plan to destroy everything, and he lost not an hour in begin- ning his work. Ewell was sent in the direction of the Federal army, and the weak Federal guard over the depot was speedily over- come. Then, for an hour or two, Jackson's men were let loose on the stores. There was everything there to tempt a soldier's appetite, and the Confederates had not eaten full rations for three days. Men ate their fill, and then loaded themselves down with sugar, bacon, canned fruits and choice hospital stores. Jackson's march towards Centreville could be traced by empty cans and bottles and the stores which the men were tired of carrying. What could not be eaten or carried away was to be burned, and it was only when that great cloud of smoke rolled heavenwards that Pope knew any part of Jackson's plans. Official Confederate reports show that they removed or destroyed supplies which had cost the Federal govern- ment millions of dollars. One of the captures was a field battery of eight guns, complete even to horses, and this battery was send- ing death into the Union ranks two days later. On the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, in pushing forward toward Manassas to develop the enemy, Hooker ran upon Ewell, and a battle opened which did not close till the dusk of evening, Jackson depended on Ewell to stay there until the stores were destroyed, and at sundown sent him word to fall back. Hooker plumed himself on having driven the enemy across Broad Run and put him to flight, but Ewell was retiring in obedience to orders. It was a fight between divisions only, but so hotly contested and so bravely maintained, that neither line had been driven a hundred feet when Jackson's order came. Pope reached Hooker after the fight and then made up his mind that Jackson was at Manassas and could be bagged. Orders were instantly dispatched to different corps commanders to concentrate 134 popk's FIGHTS AROUND MANASSAS. oh Manassas, but before any brigade outside of Hooker's division had advanced a rod, Jackson was moving. Pope expected him to remain at Manassas until the Federal army found it convenient to bag him, and great was his surprise when he dashed out of the woods on the morning of the twenty-eighth to find Jackson gone. The Federal bag was ready, but the victim was nowhere to be seen. In what direction had he gone ? Pope killed himself as a leader when he issued his bombastic proclamation to the army, but he was a fighter for all that. He fell hack from the Rapidan to shorten his lines and secure a better fighting position. The best military writers have praised his sagacity in this. He meant to fight Lee on the Rappahannock, but Lee, Jackson, and one or two other things prevented. Lee mys- tified him by certain movements. Eain swelled the river and prevented Pope from crossing part of his forces to assail Lee's rear and flank. A corps commander retired from a position he should have held. Jackson cut loose, and no Federal knew his objective point. Pope did not believe Jackson would dare swing into his rear. He did not suspect that it was Lee's plan to march after Jackson and pour through the same Thoroughfare Gap to join him. Hooker lost his wits at Chancellorsville. Burnside lost his at Fredericksburg. Pope did not lose his around Manassas, but he failed to discover what the enemy were doing, and all his moves were made in the dark. He sent orders by one courier and counter- manded them by another. He marched divisions and corps all day and counter-marched them at night. After Jackson had been gone from Manassas ten hours, Pope ordered up a corps to cut his march- ing line in two ! He expected to find Jackson on the twenty-eighth where he was on the twenty-seventh. He expected him to retreat through Thoroughfare Gap, when Jackson knew that Lee was coming to join him through the same Gap. He expected Jackson was after the wagon trains in one direction, while he was really marching in another direction to pick his position to wait for Lee's arrival. Pope was no coward ; neither was he incompetent. But he was mystified and dumb-founded and groping his way from hour to hour. As soon as it was discovered that Jackson had gone towards Centreville, Pope acted with energy, but he made a mistake. He could not get rid of the idea that Jackson wanted to retreat through Thoroughfare Gap, and march back to rejoin Lee on the POPES FIGHTS AROUND MANASSAS. 135 Rappahannock, and he hastened to throw a force between Jackson and the Gap. Jackson was simply looking for a position to aWait the arrival of Lee, and the force thrust between him and the Gap would presently find itself between two Confederate armies. Pope had his plan to bag Jackson — Jackson had his plan to hold Pope until Lee came up. In this determined attempt to capture Jackson, Pope ordered McDowell to close in. To obey he must leave Thoroughfare Gap undefended. He took the responsibility of detaching the divisions of King and Ricketts and leaving them behind, but as soon as Lee made his appearance these divisions retired and permitted him to pour through and join Jackson. What is known as the battle of Gainesville was brought about through a mistake of Jackson. A Federal column on the march to a new position, was supposed by him to be in retreat, and he gave orders for an attack. The blue column wheeled into battle- line at the sound of the first gun, and for about three hours the conflict was close and bloody. On the Federal side King's division alone was engaged, and though opposed by superior numbers they could not be driven a single foot. When Jackson discovered his mistake he would have drawn off, but this the Federals would not let him do. As Gainesville was the mistake of Jackson, so was Groveton the mistake of Pope. Still following up his theory that he could bag Jackson, he made the attack at Groveton on what he supposed was Jackson's army, but which was in reality the entire Confederate force, Lee having come up and been in line for many hours. Por- v ter was to come up on Jackson's flank at Groveton, and was court- martialed and cashiered for his failure to do so. And yet, when Porter was ready to move, he found Longstreet in his front. Por- ter knew what Pope had to learn hours after — that the Confed- erate army was all up. Porter held fifteen thousand Confederates from pushing on to Groveton. When the order was sent him to move against Jackson, Lee was supposed to be still on the other side of the Gap. McDowell interpreted the same order to suit his own ideas, and no charge was brought against him. King and Ricketts fell back from Thoroughfare Gap against all orders, let- ting Lee in, and yet they sat in judgment on Porter. Sigel misin- terpreted a plain order by which a part of the troops had a march of nine miles for nothing, but his blunder was excused. Pope attacked like a man who meant to win a victory, and when night 136 pope's FIGHTS AROUND MANASSAS. fell the fields of Groveton were heaped with dead and wounded. That was all. Jackson was still there. Late in the afternoon, after several hours of terrific fighting, and after Milroy, Schenck, Reynolds and Schurz had taken their com- mands in and fought them until exhausted and obliged to fall back, Pope saw that Jackson could not be driven by any such fighting. The Confederate center was protected by a railroad embankment. Pope determined to mass a crack brigade and hurl it upon the cen- ter, and to follow it with a division. Hooker was to lead, and he selected Grover's brigade of five regiments. It was composed of regiments from Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, and every man knew that desperate fighting was in store for him. With muskets loaded and bayonets fixed the blue regiments ad- vanced at a steady pace. Confederate shells tore through the ranks, and grape and canister cut wide gaps in the lines, but nothing stopped the onward march. Now they halt to deliver their fire, and then they rush for Jackson's center with cheers which are heard two miles away. After that one volley they must depend on the bayonet alone. They dashed into the smoke, over the dead and wounded, through the woods and thickets, and Jackson's first line of battle was driven from the embankment with cold steel at their backs. There was a shock — a grapple — and that Federal wedge had entered Jackson's center. Pausing only a moment to reform, the blue brigade rushed at the second line, bent it back upon the third, and for a few minutes men jabbed with the bayonet, struck with clubbed muskets, and fired at such close range that the flame of the powder seemed to follow the bullets through the victims. Two lines had been carried — the third was fighting as regiments fight when the) 7 realize that retreat means disaster to a whole army. Confederates who helped to bury the dead at that point say that scores of blue and gray clutched each other as they went down in the agonies of death. Dozens of men lay dead with bayonets pin- ning the corpse to the earth. Grover's t brigade was to have been supported by a division, but that division did not come. The wedge had penetrated — Jackson's third line could not stand another blow, and yet not another Fed- eral advanced. Why? No need to ask Pope — he had no explan- ations. Longstreet was there at noon, and yet when that charge was made, hours later, Pope was seeking to bag Jackson and igno- rant that he had been reinforced. Slowly the blue lines yielded, retreating foot by foot, and when that brigade had reached the POPE'S FIGHTS ABOUND MANASSAS. 137 Federal lines again it had left five hundred dead behind it. It had penetrated Jackson's center — it had left five hundred corpses in its path — nothing more. Pope could have advanced his whole line as well as a single brigade. History is silent as to why he did not. He was trying to bag Jackson. Did he expect to do it by throwing him men to shoot at? When Grover was driven back, bloodstained and defeated, Kearney was ordered to try the same dash at another point. He put himself at the head of Stevens' division and he rushed upon A. P. Hill. Had Phil Kearney been ordered to lead a single company against all the artillery in the Confederate service he would not have flinched. Gallant as any cavalier of old — brave as any knight of history, if the whisper had reached his ears that death would clasp his hand a few hours later at another point on the same field, he betrayed no sign. He had seen Grover driven back — he knew what desperate fighting awaited him, but no man saw his face grow paler as he took the place of honor and dashed straight at Hill, who was on Jackson's left. Every Federal history which is written in truth will admit that Hill was outnumbered on the start. Some of his men had only three or four rounds of ammunition left, when Kearney swept down upon them. They were rolled back, and Jackson's left was actually turned and taken in flank. Then again men fought with clubbed muskets — with the bayonet — even with branches twisted off the trees, and with rocks pulled from the soil. Gregg's brigade received the first shock. What it cost him is told in Confederate reports. In five minutes he was out of ammunition and fighting with the bayo- net alone. In a brief quarter of an hour that one brigade had lost over six hundred men. It was pushed back, but it could not be routed. Regiments wdiich had not a cartridge fell back in order, with bayonets pointed towards the Federals. Where was the Federal support ? Did Pope expect that one division to bag Jack- son ? It had almost cut him in two in the center, but when it had done all that desperate men could do, Hill threw forward two fresh brigades, and Kearney was driven back, leaving a thousand dead and wounded to prove his valor. And still Pope labored under the delusion that he had only Jack- son's army in front of him. Longstreet had been there ever since noon — Stephen D. Lee was there with all his artillery — Porter was being held by a Confederate force, and yet Pope would not believe it. Even when the Confederates shortened their line for an 138 pope's FIGHTS AROUND MANASSAS. expected advance by the whole Federal army at sunset, Pope was pleased to construe it into a retreat, and he pushed three brigades into a position where they were decimated and driven out. Six thousand Federal dead were lying on the Held of Groveton — every assault of Pope's had been repulsed, and yet he sat down and tele- graphed, after being forced to believe Longstreet had come up: " We fought a terrific battle here yesterday. . . . The enemy were driven from the field. . . . The enemy lost two to one. . . . He is retiring towards the mountain. . . . We have made great captures." The enemy had not been driven a single rod. He had simply shortened his lines. He was not retiring. He had not lost two to one. Pope had captured nothing ; the enemy had captured many prisoners and several thousand stands of arms, and yet Pope thought he had won a great victory, and he spent the night in pre- paring plans to crush the whole Confederate army on the morrow! That morrow was to see the number of dead quadrupled — to see Pope driven at every point — to see the blue lines falling back upon Washington. Pope was to be defeated and driven, and his head was to fall, but some one else was to suffer with him. Fitz John Porter, held at bay by Longstreet, and likewise saving Pope by holding Longstreet from moving on, was to be degraded and dis- graced, and his judges were to be the men who left fords open to Jackson — who left bridges for his artillery — who skulked away from Thoroughfare Gap at Lee's thunder and let him through to Jack- son's aid! Pope groped his way over those fields like a man blind- folded ! He ordered and countermanded in the same moment. He remembered dozens of orders which he never wrote. He filled every road with wagon trains and then expected whole army corps to march at the rate of three miles an hour. The best Federal military authority, writing for the years to come, and writing in a spirit of peace, with all the facts before them, have pointed out such grave errors and serious mistakes in his campaign that readers must wonder that any part of his army reached a haven of safety. §d?S Pope rode to the front, McClellan's arm} 7 was being recalled from the James. As Pope reached the climax of his military glory, McClellan was ordered to report at Alexandria — deposed — degraded — disgraced. As the roar of the guns at Chantilly reached his ears he for- gave the blow struck by Halleck and telegraphed him : '• I cannot express to yon the pain and mortification 1 have experienced to-day in listening to the distant firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed on the morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff — merely to be with my own men, if nothing more. They will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to trust me with the command of my own army, I simply ask to be per- mitted to share its fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this to-night." The records gf war do not show another such appeal from a deposed commander. Fremont would not serve under Pope because the latter had been his inferior in rank in the west. McClellan was willing to serve as a volunteer under the man who had done his best to cover him with insult. Halleck made no reply to the appeal, but in his arrogance he was preparing for a terrible fall. Scarcely twenty-four hours had passed when, after an interview with the humbled and broken Pope, he telegraphed : " I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience." This was followed by a request from Lincoln for McClellan to hasten to Washington, and he was at once placed in command. He understood the danger, and he planned to meet it. Lee was throw- ing his whole force across the Potomac, and the Federal army must march fast and fight as it never had before. In five days the troops which had sought the defenses of Wash- [141] 142 THE CRISIS. ington after Chantilly, broken, dispirited, and their pluck gone, were marching over the highways of Maryland to meet Lee and defeat him. Accident placed in McClellan's hands Lee's plans, and it was discovered that Stonewall Jackson had Harper's Ferry as his objective point. McClellan needed the men and material there. So long as it held out Jackson would be unable to combine with Lee, and McClellan had the fewer to encounter in the struggle which must take place. Joutjr Utountaitu •T South Mountain Lee waited for McClellan to come up. He must hold him until Jackson had solved the problem at Harper's Ferry. Passing out from Frederick, the Federal array moved in two great columns — one towards Turner's Gap in the Mountain — the other towards Crarapton's. D. H. Hill, with a weak division, was left to defend Turner's Gap, and on the morning of the fourteenth the advance of one Federal column appeared before him. South of the Gap, to prevent a flank movement, he had posted Garland's division. Reno, who had the Federal advance, lost no time in calculating the chances. Driving ahead with a division, he planted his batter- ies at the base of the mountain and ordered his infantry up its steep and wooded sides. If he could gain the crest he conld take the Gap in reverse. The Confederate defenders were posted behind rocks and trees, having the strongest natural cover, and as the Federals advanced both sides resorted to Indian tactics. Men sprang from tree to tree and rock to rock, each one fighting on his own hook, but at noon the Federal force had pressed the Confeder- ates to the crest. Reno could hold his ground, but he could advance no further. Longstreet was reinforcing Hill as rapidly as possible, and the Confederates on the south crest were able to hold their own from noon until night. By two o'clock in the afternoon all the Federal troops which could be handled on the ground were in battle line, and McClellan was hammering away at every point. The Confederates who were defending the Gap itself had the advantage of twenty to one. It was simply a country highway — narrow — winding and full of natural defensive positions — from plain to crest. Only two Federal brigades advanced into the Gap, and they gained ground only by the inch. A dead man was left at every foot, and the Confederate lines fell where they were [143] 144 SOUTH MOUNTAIN. posted. It was long after dark before the Gap was won to the crest, and of the men lying on the rocky road nineteen ont of twenty were dead. The Federal right, as in case of the left, could advance only as men afterwards stormed Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Lines of battle could not be preserved as the men pulled them- selves up by the rocks and trees, but the light never slackened for a moment. Two hours after dark the Federal army had gained the crest of South Mountain, and now had an equal footing as to position. During the same hours of daylight the other Federal column was hammering at Crampton's Gap. On this column depended the sal- vation of Harper's Ferry from the clutch of Jackson. It was the same as at Turner's — the Gap desperately defended — the flanking mountain sides witnessing the same tactics of advance — the fall of night bringing a victory to the Federal arms. If Miles still held Harper's Ferry, Lee was in a position of peril. If Jackson had seized it he could form a junction with Lee to face McClellan. Lee had fought at South Mountain to gain time — McClellan to save Miles. Fifteen hundred Federal dead and wounded, and over two thousand Confederate, told of the bitter fighting, but Lee's object had been won. mwxfax of Jlarjtr's Jf otjk ROP an apple into a bushel basket and you have the situation of Harper's Ferry. It is not a village at the base of a mountain, but a village surrounded by moun- tains, and a field-piece on Maryland or Louden Heights can hurl its missile into any part of the antiquated town. As McClellan's army left Washington in pursuit of Lee, Harper's Ferry became a burden of anxiety to the Federal commander. To capture it, Lee must detach from ten to fifteen thousand men from his force. If bravely defended every one of its defenders would count as a man in the field confronting Lee. As Jackson swept down from Williamsport the small Federal force at Marti nsburg retreated to the Ferry, and as the Confed- erates appeared before it they found the place garrisoned by about twelve thousand men. Garrisoned is not the word, considering that the place was at the mercy of any five hundred men who might secure the Heights spoken of. It was a pen in which twelve thou- sand Federals cooped themselves up and waited for capture. It is on record that Miles was positively ordered to fortify the Heights at least a month before Lee crossed the Potomac, and he had the men, tools and cannon to do so, but he made not the slightest move to carry out the order. There was time even after Lee had crossed the river to place Harper's Ferry in such a defen- sive condition as would have made a hot fight necessary for its capture, but not a step was taken. Miles was neither a traitor nor a coward. He was simply one of that class of incompetents so often met with holding responsible positions in the Federal service. He had less common sense in the face of danger than any one of those twelve thousand men penned up with him. By the morning of the fourteenth Jackson had the Heights, and Vol. I- 10 [145] 146 SURRENDER OF HARPER' S FERRY. the garrison was very nearly cut off. When it was realized that this state of affairs had been brought about through Miles' incom- petency there was mutiny and rebellion in the garrison. Officers went about cursing the fate which had placed such a man in power, and soldiers destroyed their arms and could scarcely be restrained from burning the town. Colonel Davis, who had about two thousand cavalry under his command, saw that a surrender was coming, and he gathered his men together at dark, and broke through the line of investment with slight loss and made good his escape. During the night a number of Federal scouts and rangers made their escape on foot, and there was an abundance of time to spike every cannon and destroy most of the stores. But Miles was like one dazed, issuing no orders and having no control. At daylight next morning, when the Confederates opened on his battery on Bolivar Heights, the colonel seemed for a moment to feel something of the spirit of a soldier. He went among the guns and encouraged the men, but soon realized that his position was untenable and ordered the white flag run up. It was after this flag had been raised that Miles was killed by a cannon-shot. Harper's Ferry was surrendered with its twelve thousand men when five thousand could have held it if Miles had obeyed his orders. Lying there unmounted were seventy-three large can- non, and Jackson likewise came into possession of thirteen thou- sand five hundred muskets, two hundred and thirty army wagons, six hundred horses and mules, eight hundred tents, two thousand blankets, six hundred sabres, half a million cartridges, and hospital stores almost worth their weight in gold to the Confederacy. Not an hour was lost in preparing to convey all this property across the Potomac into the Confederacy. When these arrangements had been made he left A. P. Hill to carry them out, and started with his com- mand to join Lee. Franklin was coming up to + he aid of Harper's Ferry, and Lee had to move every command swiftly and concentrate at Sharpsburg to prevent the Federals from getting some of his detached corps into a trap. jJiarjrclmrj. .EE has fallen back from South Mountain to the Antie- tam River, and is posting his forces on the ridge above the town of Sharpsburg. Word has been sent to Jackson, and his infantry are marching at the rate of five miles an hour. Word has been sent to McLaws, and his detached command will make no halt until it faces the Federal lines at Sharpsburg. It is the morning of the seventeenth of September, 1862. Here is going to be a struggle which shall be remembered as long as there is an American nation. Who can record the feelings of McClellan ? Ten days ago he was in disgrace. Lee had driven him from the Peninsula, Halleck had insulted him, and the country had lost confidence in his general- ship. He is here this morning in supreme command. He is facing that same general and that same army once more. He can stand in front of his headquarters and look down upon an army of eighty- seven thousand Federals. On the hills of Sharpsburg are forty thousand Confederates — less than half McClellan's strength. It is a grand opportunity to strike a blow which will demoralize the whole Confederacy. Stand here with me, in Lee's center, and we will look down upon a struggle which will not be equalled in fierceness again during the war, except at Gettysburg and Chickamauga. From this center we can look down upon sixty thousand Federal troops and witness every movement. Here is the Federal position : Hooker, with three divisions, is in the woods and fields on the extreme right, with Mansfield's corps behind him, and Sumner's just ready to cross the stream. Burnside has the left wing, and the center is formed by the troops of his right and Sumner's left. Stonewall Jackson has the Confederate left, opposite Hooker ; [1471 148 SHARPSBURG. Longstreet the center, and there is really no right, nor will there be until the arrival of the Confederates who are hastening over the dusty highways. Boom I boom ! crash ! The battle has begun ! Hooker has picked up his eighteen thousand men and is hurling them at Jack- son's less than six thousand. Jackson has one Hank on the Hagers- town highway — the other on the river,-while his center is near the Dunker Church. He has the cover of woods and walls and depres- sions, and when those three Federal divisions bear down upon him he opens a fire so hot and so continuous that eighteen thousand men are halted — broken — repulsed. The Federals reform and advance again, and for an hour the crash of musketry is terrific. The Federal sword thrusts at the left — at the center — at the right, but there is no opening. Every thrust is parried — every blow returned. If Jackson is forced down on the center, as Hooker has planned, it is ruin to Lee. Every Confederate realizes this, and every man is desperate. For more than an hour Hooker uses his eighteen thousand men as a sledge-hammer to batter away at one third of their number, but he does not drive the Confederate line a single yard. It is only when thirty pieces of Federal artillery on the other side of the An- tietam are massed to enfilade Jackson that he falls back, but he retreats step by step through the woods and across the fields. He falls back almost to the Dunker Church, but will go no further. To let go of the Hagerstown road means defeat. To let go of the river means destruction. To give up another rod of his line may mean the annihilation of the whole Confederate army. Jackson has lost a thousand men since the fight opened, and the remainder of his command are out of ammunition. He sends to Lee for aid, and Hood and Early bring up five thousand men to help him hold his lines. Hooker is baffled — enraged — determined. He brings up Mans- field's corps, and now twenty-five thousand Federals bear down upon ten thousand Confederates like a mighty wave. The wave rolls up to the line of flame, but no further. It recedes and rolls forward again, but only to be broken. Here on this contracted line death holds carnival and shouts in exultation. In the forest the freshly fallen yellow leaves are being stained with blood. In the meadows the parched earth is enjoying a feast. In the cornfields the yellow stalks are plashed and splattered, and SHAKPSBURG. 149 the dead of Jackson and Hooker lie side by side. Here, after the armies have left, farmers will collect shot and shell by the wagon load and haul them down to a sink or morass near the church and dump them in to have them out of the way. Not two or three wagon loads, but fifteen or twenty; and every year the plow will turn up grape and canister by the bushel. Jackson is again reinforced, though the two skeleton brigades scarcely make good his loss, and now Hooker orders up Sumner and is wounded as the latter reaches the front. Sumner assumes com- mand, but hardly has he issued his first order when Jackson pre- pares for a desperate move. The Confederate left does not number over twelve thousand men, and yet Jackson is going to advance in the face of the three corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner — numbering over thirty thousand men ! The Confederate ammunition wagons arc driven right up to battle-line, and the soldiers refill their cartridge boxes as Federal bullets fall around them. Now, at the signal, Jackson changes from the defender to the assailant, and from river to highway his lines advance. Shell and grape and canister beat at them, but they do not halt. The crash of musketry is appalling, and the hail of bullets has no interval. Forward ! forward ! Gaps are torn in the advancing lines, but the living will not halt. Flags go down to be soaked in blood, but there is no stop. From the troubled waters of the Potomac to the Dunker Church and beyond, the gray lines are breasting the storm of death and gaining ground. One after another, Federal brigades and divisions are pressed back — flung aside — walked over — annihilated. Back — back— back — and Jackson has finally regained his lost ground, and McClellan must order Franklin's corps to that flank to even hold the Confederates where they stop for a time to reform and replenish their ammunition. Three Federal corps shattered by less than fifteen thousand Con- federates! In after months General Sumner will testify before the committee on the conduct of the war: " General Hooker's corps was dispersed ; there is no question about that ; I sent one of my staff officers to find where they were, .and General Ricketts, the only officer he could find, said he could 150 SHARPSBURG. not raise three hundred men of the corps. In the meantime Mans- field had been killed and a portion of his corps thrown into confusion." Jackson holds the Confederate left secure — Franklin can hold the Federal right. Look down upon the center, into what the citizens of Sharpsburg will ever refer to as Bloody Lane — into what history will call the Sunken Koad. It is a highway cut through hills for a distance of a mile or so, and troops passing over it do not even show their heads to an enemy forty rods away. In this sunken road two brig- ades of Confederates are massed to protect Lee's center. They are there when Burnside, who had been ordered to cross the Antietam at eight o'clock and attack Lee's right, finally moves at noon. His advance compels the withdrawal of several batteries on Lee's center, and a half -right-about-face of a portion of the troops there, and McClellan now pushes forward some of his batteries until they have the range of this sunken road. Grape and canister go screaming and shrieking through the massed Confederates, and not one-half of them escape from the trap. Citizens here who will look down into that sunken road to-morrow, before a corpse of all these thousands on this bloody field has been buried, will tell you that it is the most awful sight men have ever looked upon. It is a slaughter-pen and worse yet. Heads, arms, legs, feet, hands, and bloody trunks of mangled humanity fill the road from bank to bank, and old soldiers look down from the banks and turn away sick at heart. Now turn to the Federal left — to Burnside's bridge. It is a stone bridge over the Antietam, and in crossing it from McClellan's battle line to Lee's position there is a deep cut in the hills as the road rises to surmount the range. McClellan's right and center has moved forward and fought. At noon Hooker has pushed Jackson a mile and a half, and the center has advanced a mile, forcing Lee to change his headquarters to a brick house half a mile back of the town. Had Burnside advanced at eight o'clock in the morning, Lee would have been driven at every point. His right was terribly weak, as Longstreet's men were strung out all the way from the bridge to Harper's Ferry. The order was to carry the bridge, but there is no point for a quarter of a mile up or down that a soldier could not ford and keep his cartridge-box dry. A skirmish line is sent forward, a few shots are fired, and that SHAEPSBURG. 151 is Burnside's effort to carry out orders. At nine Hooker has lost two thousand men, and Burnside has hardly fired a gun. At ten the center has lost two thousand men, and Burnside has not killed a Confederate. At eleven he is where daylight found him. At noon six thousand Federals lay dead, and Burnside has not lost a man. He is dead now, but he lived to have historians ask him if he was not cowardly seeking a new downfall for McClellan by thus cowardly refusing to obey orders. At one o'clock Colonel Key is ordered by McClellan to force: the bridge with Burnside's troops, leading them himself if Burn- side will not — and then the latter moves. What is in front? The answer is that two single Federal regi- ments carry the bridge in ten minutes, as soon as let loose. Lee has been sending troops to aid Jackson, and his contempt for •Burnside is shown in placing less than eight hundred men to guard this approach to his right. Burnside has the bridge, but Lee holds the heights above. One determined rush will capture his guns massed there or drive them back through the town, but Burnside advances — halts — advances — hesitates — and finally sends back for reinforcements, although he already has five to one. Some of the guns on Lee's, right are positively without infantry supports. A dash by a single brigade may decide the great battle, but it is not made. Franklin can hold Jackson, but nothing more. Lee has made his center secure in its position, and any direct assault means the destruction of assailants. Burnside can break through Lee's right without losing a thousand men, and he has force enough to crush that wing back on the center, but he is not the man for the emergency. We can see the right of Porter's fifteen thousand reserves lying hidden along the Red Hills across the valley. Let Burnside move with vigor and strike a worthy blow, and he can have aid to follow up success. Those reserves are a menace to Lee. They prevent his right and center from any advance when opportunities offer. But for them he would, in the early morning, have flung the few skeleton brigades composing his right across the bridge and boldly sought to drive Burnside's whole corps down on the Federal center. Night comes and the battle dies away, each army clinging fast to its position. It is a drawn fight. Burnside could have made it a defeat for Lee. 152 SHARP3BURG. What a storm the North raised because McClellan did not bag Lee's army! Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner driven back to their battle line of the morning — Burnside plotting, hesitating, and fail- ing — the center having enough to hold its own, and it was McClellan who would have been bagged but for the menace of the reserves lying along the Red Hill. There was a great flaunt made of Lee's army being demoralized. Demoralized armies do not go into camp as he did that night within cannon-shot of his battle line and coolly wait for a river to fall and uncover a ford. He waited and showed his teeth. When he retreated he fastened his teeth into the flesh of those who followed. When the advance- guard pushed on after that "demoralized" army the Potomac ran red with the blood of Porter's men. The sun goes down as on that day. To-night there is the low- ing of kine, the far-away voices of men, the soft rustle of the wind over fields of corn and wheat and clover. On that night more than fifteen thousand corpses lay on those fields before me, with white faces and bloody hands uplifted in pitiful appeal to the young harvest moon. Meadow and corn field and thicket shivered under the stains of blood, and the swift-moving waters of the creek ceased their flow as they found the channel filled with dams made of human corpses. All this here, and yet it was not enough. In the dark woods beyond the shot-riven church, in which each Sabbath day was raised a prayer to God for peace, were limb and trunk and corpse until wounded horses turned back and sought another way. It is dark as I ride slowly over the hill wet with blood that day, and now and then I look back and almost believe that I am followed by a troop of spectres, who wave their skeleton arms in the faint moonlight, as if driving me from that direful field. ess urkr in