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 Copy 1 
 
 THE 
 
 RIGHTS OF THE OWNERS 
 
 OF 
 
 Private Property Taken in War, 
 
 TO 
 
 •Jli: 
 
 Where there has been no Adjudication of Confiscation. 
 
 BY T. y^. BARTLEY, 
 
 pF Washington, p p. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. : 
 
 OHRONICLK PUBLISHING COMPANY, iill NINTH STREKi'. 
 1S73. 
 

 61605 ' 
 
 '05 ' 
 
^ 
 
 :^ 
 
 
 OP 
 
 PRIVATE PROPERTY TAKEN IN WAR, 
 
 AS 
 
 SETTLED BY THE HIGHEST JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 The people of the iSoutherri States have been told that " they must 
 accept the situation.'^ They say that they have accepted it on the 
 basis of the Constitution and the law of the land. But what is- 
 that ^^ situation,^'' and wh'at di^e'the terms of it? Is this matter to 
 be determined by the Oonst-itution and the law of the land, as ex- 
 pounded by the highest judicial tribunal, or is it to be determined 
 3y sectional and political feeling? Let this be seriously considered, 
 md, in a financial point of view, especially, fully understood ; and 
 IS a preliminary to the inquiry what the people of the South inay and 
 lo ask, let it be distinctly understood what they can not and do not ask : 
 
 First. 1^0 man of ordinary intelligence and common sense in the \ 
 )0uth even dreams of such a thing as asking, either for compensation 
 or the loss of his slaves, or for the assumption of the debt of the 
 louthern Confederacy. These losses were the inevitable results of 
 he rebellion, and the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution 
 as forever settled all questions about them by taking away from 
 ae Government the power of compensation in regard to these two 
 latters. 
 
 Second. The inevitable destruction of private property from the "^ 
 Derations of large armies in the field, on both sides, and the inci- 
 sntal losses from plundering and robbery and marauding are among 
 e unavoidable calamities of war, and no compensation can be re- 
 ared to be made therefor by the laws of war, and iione is asked. As 
 the instances where the property of private persons was taken and 
 propriated for destruction, and was destroyed, under the orders of AZ^ 
 mmanding officers, to prevent its capture and use in aid of the 
 emy, a different question arises. But as yet no law regulating 
 ptures on land has required compensation therefor; and, from the 
 
vindictive feeling of the ruling politicians of the l^orth, it is plain 
 to be seen, that none ever will be enacted. 
 
 Third. Losses, by property confiscated by adjudication, by planta- 5 
 tions seized as abandoned and sold for taxes due the United States^ 
 for a nominal amount, and by the general and permanent deprecia. 
 tion of real estate necessarily resulting from the abolition of slavery, 
 and the measures of Congress which have eventuated in placing the 
 taxing power of the Southern States into the hands of the non-prop- 
 erty-holders, are wholly beyond the reach of remedy by compensation, 
 and no com[)ensation is asked or expected therefor. 
 
 Thus stands " the situation" as to the losses of the South, for 
 which no compensation is asked, and for which none is, from the 
 nature of things, required by law to be made. 
 
 Tlie aggregate losses by tlie abolition of slavciy cannot, bo estimated 
 at less than $2,000,000,000 
 
 Tiie aggregate of the losses by tlie destruction of private propei-ty, 
 togetiier witli the losses of private property in th(! vai-ions forms 
 of contribntions and subscriptions in aid of tlic. Confederacy, can- 
 not be l.'sstlian 2,500,000,000 
 
 The losses, by judgments of confiscation, and by tlie seizure of plan- 
 tations as abandoned, and the sale thereof at a mere nominal 
 amount for the taxes, and by tlie general and permanent deprecia- 
 tion of real estate necessarily resulting from the abolition of 
 slavery, together with the total breaking up of the established 
 channels of pro hictive industry, and the measures of Congress, 
 which have eventuated in placing the taxing power of the Southern 
 States into the hands of the non-property-hulders, in the aggregate, 
 cannot be less than 2,500,000,000 
 
 Total loss for which no compensation is, or can be, asked $7,000,000,000 
 
 Besides all this, the people of the Southern States are required to 
 pay their proportion of the entire expenditure of the United States 
 in the war to suppress the rebellion, which entire expenditure may 
 be fairly estimated at !p3,000,000,000. 
 
 In a financial point of view simply, therefore, beside all the 
 other troubles and disastrous results, whicli no language can ex- 
 press, the people of the South have sutt'ered losses on account of the 
 rebellion to the amount of $4^,000,000,000, at least, over and above the 
 aggregate cost of war to the United States, /or ivhich no compensation 
 is, or can be, asked. 
 
 And it may be added, that while the war of the rebellion devas- 
 tated and impoverished the South, and brought incalculable ruin 
 
and suffering upon the jteople, it enriched the people of the ISTorthern 
 States. The prosperity of the iSTortheri; cities was immensely in- 
 flated, and more large private fortunes were accumulated by people » 
 in the JTorthern States during the war, than in doul)le that length 
 oi time at any other period in the history of this country. 
 
 In view, then, of what is not and can not he asked, let the inquiry 
 be made, what rights of private property, in the loay of restitution^ do ^^J 
 and ca7i the people of the South injustice and right ask, on the terms'^ 
 and under the requirements of the Constitidion and law of the land ? 
 
 In the wars which have occurred for the last three hundred j^ears at 
 least, among civilized and Christian nations of people, the rights of / 
 private property have been respected, and the owner entitled to com- | 
 pensation in case of seizure and appropriation, without regard to 
 h.\8 poliiiml status, unless his rights should be divested by an adjudi- 
 cation of confiscation or forfeiture in court. The people of the 
 South do ask and have a right to ask — ■ 
 
 First. That the citizens of the South shall be compensated for .^ 
 their cotton seized and taken from them during the war by the 
 agents and officers of the United States ; 
 
 Second. That they shall be compensated for their property taken ^ 
 and used as army stores and supplies, and for forts, hospitals, &c., 
 during the war. 
 
 The aggregate amount of the proceeds of the cotton received in 
 money, by the oflicers and agents of the United States, can not be 
 fairly estimated at less than from thirty-five to forty millions of ^v 
 dollars. Of this, at least one-sixth part has been paid upon the 
 charges of the agents and officers of the Government, as expenses. 
 And of the remaining part, not over one-half has been demanded on 
 claims preferred. And with a fair opportunity afforded for recovery 
 by judicial proceeding, there is no probability that private jjersons 
 will be able to establish claims, which in the aggregate, including all 
 which has been already allowed, could amount to three-fourths of 
 the total amount received by the agents and officers of the Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 And as to the army stores, supplies, &c., for which compensation 
 is asked, the aggregate amount taken may have reached the amount 
 of two hundred millions of dollars. But, even with a fair opportunity 
 for adjudication^ there is no rational probability that private claims 
 can be established to the one-half of that amount, on account of the 
 manner in which it was taken by the army, and the refusal to ap- 
 praise its value and give receipts at the time. 
 
The Southern people, therefore, do not ask that the United States 
 shall compensate them for, their losses by means of the war, but that 
 they shall be fairh/ paid for the private property taken from indi- 
 vidual citizens and appropriated and used by the United States, It 
 is simply a demand of compensation for property taken and used, 
 the rights of property in the owners of which were never divested 
 by any judgment of forfeiture or confiscation. 
 
 The cotton was seized and shipped North to supply the Northern I 
 cotton factories, to aid in sustaining the prosperity of the jSTorthern \ 
 States. It was not intended at the time as booty or plunder, and I 
 the owners were assured that when the war was over they would be 
 paid for their cotton. And the Court of Claims and Supreme Court j 
 have repeatedly declared that the proceeds of this cotton created a/ 
 trusty and were held as a trust fund for the benefit of the owners. / 
 
 The liability to pay for the private property taken and used in the 
 service of the army is no less obligatory. To subsist and supply an 
 invading army on the country, by seizing the property of private 
 citizens, is always a harsh and severe measure. By means of it 
 whole families, including women, children and servants, are turned 
 out from their homes and left in a state of starvation. When the 
 pressing emergencies of the war require this, it is always with the 
 understanding and assurance that when the war is over the owner 
 will be compensated. The legislation of Congress has recognized the 
 obligation to pay for this property, but has made a distinction 
 between loyal and disloyal owners, refusing to pay the latter. This 
 distinction in cases where there has been no judgment of confiscation 
 is not justified by either the Constitution or the laws of war among 
 modern civilized nations. The surface politician is heard to say, 
 that he will never agree to pay anything to a rebel. The trite maxim, 
 " give the devil his due," is the simple dictate of common honesty. 
 Why were not proceedings for confiscation instituted? Congress 
 had provided in the confiscation act of 1862 for the proper pro- ^ 
 ceeding in court for confiscation. There was no difficulty about 
 this proceeding. The district attorney in each district, on being 
 furnished, by the quartermaster with a list of the property and the 
 name of the owner, in each instance, could have obtained the judg- 
 ment of confiscation, either during the war or after its close; but 
 such proceeding was, for wise and just purposes, waived, and the 
 owner left undivestcd of his rights of property, and a full pardon was 
 granted, with restoration of all rights, &c. 
 
On the 25th day of December, 1868, the President of the United 
 States, in order '■'■to secure permanent peace, order, and prosperity 
 throughout the hxnd, and to renew and fully restore confidence and 
 fraternal feeling among the whole people, and their respect for and 
 attachment to the JSTational Grovernment," issued his proclamation 
 '' of universal amnesty and pardon for participation in the rebellion;" 
 granting " unconditionally, and without reservation, to all and to 
 every person who directly or indirectly participated in the late 
 rebellion, a full ■pardon and amnesty for the offense of treason against 
 the United States, or of adhering to their enemies during the late 
 civil war, z^i7A tJu restoratio7i of all rights, privileges, and immunities 
 under the Constitution, and the laws ivhich have been made in p>ufsuance 
 thereof — (See United States Stat, at Large, vol. 15, p. 712.) 
 
 The power of granting amnesty and pardon is an executive power, 
 vested by the Constitution exclusively in the President. And Con- 
 gress has no power to control it, nor to curtail or limit the legal 
 operation of pardon granted. The effect and operation of pardon and 
 amnesty presented a legal inquiry for the determination of the 
 Supreme Court. That tribunal has, on great consideration, determ- 
 ined and declared in numerous cases that the legal efiect and opera- 
 tion of this pardon and amnesty was to wipe out wholly the offense 
 of disloyalty, and restore those who had offended to all their rights 
 of person and property under the Constitution and the laws, and 
 place all the people of the Southern States, in this regard, on an equal 
 footing.— (Padelford case, 9 Wall. R., 537 ; Klein case, 13 Wall. E,., 
 136; Armstrong case, same vol., p. 155.) 
 
 This effect of amnesty and pardon is the law of the land. But Con- 
 gress has taken the extraordinary position of refusing to submit to 
 the law as interpreted and declared by the Supreme Court ; as to the 
 property taken for the subsistence of the army, and for hospitals, 
 forts, &c., especially, that body wholly disregards the law of the land 
 as declared by the court. If this course be persisted in, it leads ine- 
 vitably to repudiation and violations of the public faith in matters 
 involving the integrity of the nation and the honor of our people. 
 
 The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is not a 
 matter of fancy or a freak of political feeling. The grave and 
 learned judges of the court, upon full investigation and great delib- 
 eration, ascertained, from the judicial determinations and reports of 
 the enlightened courts of England and this country, the legal effect 
 of pardon and amnesty at the time the Constitution was adopted ; 
 
8 
 
 and the Snpreme Court has simply exponnded and declared tbe im- 
 port and effect of these terms, according to their legal signification. 
 And ^yhether the President's policy in issuing this general pardon 
 and amnesty was right and expedient ; whether it was right and ex- 
 pedient to take the essential steps to restore harmony and fraternity, 
 and secure the confidence and respect of the whole people of the 
 United States, is not now the question. The pardon and amnesty 
 were by the authority of the Constitution in due form issued and 
 promulgated, and became the law of the land; and Congrsss had no 
 more power to revoke, rescind, or curtail the pardon, than that body 
 has to revoke or change the grant of the title to Mnd conveyed and 
 patented under the Constitution and laws by the deed of the Presi- 
 dent to any private person. The power of pardon and amnesty is 
 one of the highest exclusive prerogatives with which the Constitution 
 has clothed the President. And when once issued, he cannot him- 
 self revoke it. Had the pardon here granted been partial or condi- 
 tional, had it made any reservation as to rights of property liable to 
 forfeiture or confiscation, a different question might have been made. 
 But it was not only a '•'■full pardon^''' but it expressly granted "a res- 
 toration of all rights," &c. After this all civil disabilities were 
 removed, and no forfeiture or confiscation of property could be ad- 
 judged. By the operation of pardon and amnesty, the offense was 
 wiped out, and the offender renewed and restored to the same con- 
 dition he would have been in had the offense never been committed. 
 In a legal point of view, therefore, pardon and amnesty became con- 
 clusive evidence to repel the charge of disloyalty. And any attempt by 
 Congress to defeat this effect and operation of pardon and amnesty, 
 by a change in the law of evidence, would be a manifest violation of 
 the Constitution. This is the law and the Constitution, as expounded 
 and settled by the Supreme Court. After full amnesty and pardon, 
 an attempt, by any means, direct or indirect, to forfeit or confiscate 
 private property for participation in the rebellion would be uncon- 
 stitutional, and would be equivalent to an attempt to punish after 
 full pardon. An attempt by Congress to effectuate such a thing 
 would be not only a manifest breach of the high obligations enjoined 
 by the Constitution, but also of a high duty required of the United 
 States as a civilized nation, touchijig the rights of private property. Not 
 only is this the law as settled and declared by the Supreme Court, 
 but it is the law of war as recognized and established among civi- 
 lized and Christian nations of people. In the struggles for dominion 
 

 
 and civil authority which occur in modern times, the rights of pri- 
 vate property are required to be respected. If no pardon or amnesty 
 had been granted, the obligation of the Government to compensate 
 for private property would have still existed. 
 
 The following extract from an argument of the author of this 
 article, before the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case 
 of Klein, administrator of Wilson, presents the law touching this 
 point more fully: 
 
 "By captui-e, the ii2:ht to the poissession, and in the ca*se of perishable property, 
 and in some other iiistaiice?, tlie right to convert the property into money by sale, 
 passes to the captor. But t' e contingent right to the beneticial interest hi it, which 
 is in fad the right of property^ still remains in the original owner until divosted by 
 some kind of ail adjudication. The right in the personal property of a deceased 
 person, which passes to tlie administrator, is notiiing but the right of possession, and 
 the right to convert the p operty into money for dista-ibution according to law. It 
 is nothing but a trust, while the contingent right oi" property, or beneticial interest 
 in its proceeds, is Tested in the heir or distributee. So in the case of captured prop- 
 erty turned over by the military to the civil authorities, tlie latter can not be invested 
 with the absolute )ight of property therein, until the right of property of the owner 
 has been divested by an adjudic.ition, or something equivalent thereto. The personal 
 
 guai'antee in Magna Charta, which was incorporated into our Constitution, that 'no 
 
 person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law,' or "without just 
 compensation,' secures tiiis right. And this is in accordance with the international 
 laws and usages of war among modem civilized nations^ as well as the confiscation 
 laws of Congres-s, passed during the late rebellion. 
 
 "Property captured in war is not ipso facto transferred absolutely from the owner 
 to the captor or the government of the captor. The capture does not |?er se effect- 
 uate tiie confiscation, but simply confers the right of confiscation on the proper 
 proceedings being taken for condemnation in court. Such is the doctrine of Brown 
 vs. The United States. (8 Cranch R.. 112.) This applies to captures on land as ^ 
 well as on the high seas. In tiie case cited Chief Jnstice Marshall said (p. 139): 
 
 " 'Even Bynkershock, wiio maintains the broad principle that in war everything 
 done against an enemy is lawful ; that he may be destroyed, though unarmed and 
 defenseless; that fraud^ or even poison, may be emploj^ed against him ; that a most 
 unlimited right is acquired to his person and jyroperfi/; admits that war does not trans- 
 fer to the sovereign a debt due to his enemy, because, he says, ' the occupation 
 which is had b}' war consists more in fact than in law.' * * * + 
 
 "And on page 140 he adds: 'This rule appears to be totally incompatible with 
 the idea that tear does of itself vest the property in the belligerent government. 
 It niaj' be considennl as the opinion of all who have written on the_;'Ms belli that war 
 gives the right to confiscate., but does not itself eonf scale, the property of the enemj", and 
 their rules go to the exercise of this right.' 
 
 "The antiquated doctrine that by capture an unlimited right was acquired over 
 the peisoii or property of the enemy, prevailed only in barbarous times, and among 
 barbarous nations. It was the doctrine which authorized the victor to make slaves 
 of captives in war, and which has long since been discarded among Christian and 
 civilized nations. 
 
10 
 
 "In, England it has not been claimed since the adoption of the Magna Charta at 
 Riinnymede, over six hundred years ago, that tlie absolute interest in property 
 captured in war, and given over to the civil autliorities, could pass' to the captor 
 witiiout a judgment of condemnation. It appears that wliere the property was 
 claimed, and tlie mattei- was so clear as not to admit of controversy, tlie Lords 
 Commissioners of tlie Treasury in England asi^umed the responsibility of a restora- 
 tion of the property. (3 Phillimore, 102.) But where tliere was any question or 
 supposed ground for confiscation, tiie matter was adjudicated, in very earlj' times, 
 in wiiat was ti-rmed tlie Court of Chivalry^ held by the constable and marshal; 
 afterward in the court of the King's Privy Comicil, until Parliament finally 
 made provision by statute that all matters of capture on land should be reft-rred 
 for adjudication to the Court of Ailmiralty, where matters of prize and captures on 
 the higii seas were adjudicated. (See Elsebe. .'ith liob., 173; Phillimore, vol. iii, pp. 
 190, 192, 193 and 196.) 
 
 "It was in accordance with this doctrine of modern warfare that the Con.'^titution 
 of the United States expressly authorized r;ongress *• to make rules concerniny captures 
 on land and tcater.''' Accordingly, in the case of Brown vs. The United States, 
 8 Cranch R., 110. it was held by this court that legislation by Congress was essential 
 to authorize proceedings to condemn property captured in war, and that without 
 this the property could not be confiscated, and the intei-est therein passed or tran.?- 
 ferred by the capture. 
 
 "The fii-st couliscation act passed by Congress as to captures on land was that of 
 August 6, 18G1, which in .sections two and three provided for the proceedings for ^ 
 condenniation in either the District or Circuit Courts of the United States. (Statutes 
 at Large, vol. 12, p. .119.) The act of March 25, 1S(J2, (Statutes at Large, vol. 12, p. 
 374,) provided specificallj^ for proceedings in adjudication upon captmrd property 
 on land under the administration of the law of prize ; but the more general confis- 
 cation act under which most of the seizures in the late rebellion were made was that 
 of July 17, 1S62, in the .seventh and eighth sections of which proceedings in the 
 United States District Courts were prescribed and recpiired for condemnation and 
 confiscation. (12 Statutes at Large, p. .■)9l.) In view of this legislation of Congress 
 it will not be claimed, I presume, that the interest in captured property could be 
 transferred from the original owner to the United States without a judgment of 
 condemnation. 
 
 "These are the acts prescribing rules concerning captures on land. Then comes 
 in the act of the 12th of March, 18G3, in relation to the collection of abandoned or 
 captured property in the insurrectionary States, authorizing th"- petition iu the Court 
 of Claims by the owner of the property. The provisions of the confiscatir»n acts 
 prescribing the proceedings for condemnation are still uin-epcaled. Put as to the 
 captured and abandoned property act of March 12, l!S63, the remedy was limited to 
 loyal persons. 
 
 "The beneficial interest in the captured property could not pas.s to the United 
 States under these statutes without a judgment of condemnation, oi- what was made 
 equivalent thereto, a dismissal of the petition of the Court of Claims. An appro- 
 priation of the proceeds of thifi propi^rty by tiie Treasury Department without some 
 such proceedings, or a judgment of condemnation, or some judgment eqinvalent 
 thereto, would be the act of the freebooter. It could not be justified by any law, 
 either of war or of peace. Modern civilized nations have long since repudiated the 
 practices of the freebo()ter in war. The doctrine of the right to plunder and rob an 
 enemy in war, much less a non-bellujerent or pacific private citizen, prevailed only 
 
11 
 
 anion^ barbarians in ancient times, wlien captives iu war were made slaves. I'he re- 
 spect paid to tlie right of private property by General Scott and General Taylor in our 
 late war with ilexico, and by the Prussian army under King William iu the recent war 
 between Prussia and France, put the blush upon the cla m asserted here to take and 
 appropriate the property of pacific citizens in private life and non-belligerents with- 
 out compensation, and vvitliout a«iy pretense of proceedings for confiscation or con- 
 demnation. The proceeds of captured and abandoned property in the hands, or under 
 tlie control, of the Secretary of the Ti-easury cannot be converted and appropriat-ed to 
 the use of th(^ Government without some kind of proceedings for condemnation, or 
 something equivalent thereto, except on the principle which authorized the con- 
 queror to mate slaves of captives in the time of war. Wiiile, in our l*te war to sup- 
 press rebellion, slaves were freed instead of men being consigned to slavery, the 
 character of our Government should be saved from the stain and infamy which the 
 i-apacity, the cupidity, and the aggressions of the freebooter would impose upon it. 
 Dishonesty and pilfering depredations on the rights of private property in the con- 
 duct of individuals are infamous, but in a public officer, or the conduct of the Gov- 
 ernment, it is perfidy an^l disgrace, which brings the country into contempt, and 
 makes it au object of reproach and det^estation among the nations of the earth. 
 "Kent, in his C'on)mentaries, (vol. 1, p. 102,) says, in reference to this subject: 
 " 'By the modern usage of nations, neither the twentj'-four hours' possession nor 
 the bringing the prize infra pnesidia, is sufficient to change the property in the case 
 of maiitime capture. A judicial inquiry must pass upon the case, and the present 
 enlightened practice of commercial nations has subjected all such captures to the 
 scrutiny of judicial tribunals as the only sure way to furnish due proof that the 
 seizure was lawful. + + * + * + *** 
 
 " 'There is a marked dilference in the right of war carried on by land and at sea. 
 The object of a maritime war is the destruction of the enemy's commerce and navi- 
 gation, in order to weaken and destroy the foundations of his naval power. The 
 capture or destruction of private property is essential to that end, and is allowed in 
 maritime wars by the law and practice of nations; but there are gr^at limitations 
 imposed upon the opei'ations of war by land, though depredations upon private 
 property, and despoiling and plundering the enemy's territory, are still too preva- 
 lent, especially when the war is assisted by irregulai-s. Such conduct has been con- 
 demned in all acjes by the ivijie and viiiiious, and it is usually sec erely punished by those 
 commanders of disciplined troops who have studied war as a science, and are 
 animated by a sense of duty or the love of fame.' " 
 
 In this case of Klein, the humane maxims of the modern law of 
 nations are fully recognized by the court, and in reference to the 
 seizure and confiscation of the private property of those who partici- 
 pated in the rebellion, the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of 
 the court, said, (p. 13, Wal. R. :) 
 
 '•But it is to be observed that tribunals; and proceedings were provided by whicli 
 alone such property could be condemned, and without which it (tliat is, tlie right of 
 property) remained unattected in the possession of the proi)rietors. It is thus to be 
 seen that, except as to property used in actual hostilities, as mentioned in the first 
 section of the act of March 12, 1863, no titles were divested in tlie insurgent States, 
 unless iu pursuance of a judgment rendered after due legal pi-oceedings," &c. 
 
12 
 
 It is, therefore, undeniable that the distinction made bj Congress 
 between loyal and disloyal citizens in the South, as to private property ^ 
 is untenable, and^pro tanto. repudiation: 
 
 First, because in violation of the constitutioual operation and effect 
 of pardon and aranest}' ; 
 
 Second, because in violation of the laws of war among civilized 
 nations as recognized by the Supreme Court; 
 
 Third, because in violation of the established riil<3S and regulations 
 governing captures on land, in full force at the time; and 
 
 Fourth, because in violation of the constitutional provision, that 
 "private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
 compensation." 
 
 The obligations of the Government to discharge these liabilities to 
 the people of the Southern States are as clear and unquestionable as 
 the obligations to pay the bonded debt of the United States. The 
 bondholders can claim no higher authoritj- to affirm the liability of 
 the Government to pay their bonds, according to their legal tenor 
 and efiect, than the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
 States. Besides this, the proceeds of the captured and abandoned 
 cotton is a trust fund in the custody of the Government, and so 
 declared by the court. A tortious conversion of the fund, and refusal 
 to pay it over to the owner on proof of his right, would be equivalent 
 to an embezzlement, and would make tlie original seizure of the cot- 
 ton a robbery ah initio. And the liability of the Government to pay 
 for the private property taken from individuals for the subsistence 
 and use of the army, rests ujdou the constitutional guarantee that 
 ^'■private property shall not be taken for public use without Just compensa- 
 tion." The force and operation of this constitutional injunction could 
 have been avoided only by an adjudication of confiscation. Tlie 
 obligations to pay for the private property taken and used by the army 
 constitute., in fact and reality., a part of the war debt of the country. The 
 bonded debt was contracted for nionej^ obtained to subsist the army 
 and carry on the war. And this private property taken from the 
 people of the South for the subsistence and use of the army saved the 
 Government from a jwo tarUo addition to the bonded debt of the 
 United States. And it should be as honorably met and discharged 
 as any other part of the war debt. Let the honor and character of the 
 country be saved from the stain of repudiation as to any part of this 
 war debt. 
 
 The immense income of the Government — exceeding at this time 
 
13 
 
 an average of one million and a quarter of dollars per day — with the 
 great and growing resources for taxation in this vast country, extend- 
 ing from the Atlantic to the Pacific, forbid the idea of the slightest 
 embarrassment to the Government in meeting all just and legal de- 
 mands. A fair and honorable discharge of these demands of the 
 people of the Southern States will never be felt in the public burdens 
 of the country. 
 
 While, in the adjudication and adjustment of these claims the 
 most thorough and effective precautions should be used to guard 
 against fraudulent and unjust demands, the remedy and mode of 
 procedure should not be crippled bj' unreasonable limitations and 
 conditions calculated to defeat the end, and make the proceeding a 
 mere sham. 
 
 Attempts have been made by politicians in Congress to circumvent 
 and defeat the operation and effect of the decisions of the Supreme 
 Court by changes in the law of evidence, and directions to the courts 
 what judgments should be entered and what should not be rendered, 
 &c. These having proved abortive, the position is now taken that 
 the judicial determinations of the Supreme Court can be avoided by 
 withholding appropriations, &c. It is true that Congress may refuse 
 to make appropriations to meet the liabilities of the Government, 
 but such refusal is repudiation^ and brings upon the country all the 
 stain and disgrace of repudiation. A factious majority in Congress 
 might refuse to make appropriations to pay the salary of the Presi- 
 dent, and the salaries of all the executive officers. But this would 
 be a manifest violation of constitutional duty, and revolutionary in 
 its tendency. Suppose that a majority in Congress should refuse to 
 make appropriations to pay the interest on the bonded debt of the 
 United States upon the alleged ground that the bond-holders were 
 not good citizens. That would be manifest repudiation, but in prin- 
 ciple would not be distinguishable from the position now taken in 
 Congress. The obligations of Congress to provide by appropriation 
 for the discharge of the established and ascertained legal liabilities 
 of the Government are enjoined by the Constitution and a proper 
 sense of duty. The fact that Congress may, by contumacy, repudiate 
 the national liabilities, cannot justify repudiation. 
 
 It is now eight years since the close of the war of the rebellion, and 
 it is time, if that time shall ever come, that the animosities and hos- 
 tile feeling engendered by the war should be laid aside. Harmony 
 in our political system, and the respect and confidence of the whole 
 
14' 
 
 people of the United States are a hundred-fold more important to 
 the Government and the country than the amount of the compen- 
 sation claimed. It is believed that President Grant desires to do 
 what is just and right in the premises. But the misfortune has been 
 that the South heretofore has been only partially represented in Con- 
 gress, and, in fact, not at all represented in the Cabinet councils of 
 the President. 
 
 The people of the South have, under all their losses and troubles 
 and sufferings, accepted " the situation" in good faith, and they ask 
 most respectfully to be protected in their just and lawful rights. 
 And they ask this by virtue of the Constitution and the law of the 
 land, and also upon the terms of the laws of war which prevail 
 among the civilized nations of the earth. 
 
 T. W. BARTLEY.