'' **'\ •; .■^ . " o - "^ - ^o ./\^^:^.\ /.i^%A .^^\c:^'/^. - ^ov -^^^^r^. ^^u.^ oV^^^^^a"" ^^C^^ ^v v^ • • « » V ' -s. Ji u , » . V, -j.^ • • • s - *■ ♦^ O ^ * r ..^" -. ^ ■• ■or ^ti. . :- -e^o^ °, ^ A* ^Jl^^^^*' - «. '■ft 6^^ „ • *Pj. A* 0^ %, *777T^ A <> ■^^ >v " « ^ "^ :« "^^0^ : -^^^ ^•^^'H •\/°-^-o- -^^ *"^* ^^ .... <^ *»'"' V^ 0* .LVL'* -^j o. *.t:t*' A ^b V^ ^'/-^/-^ ^ - '=^-xxxNn^ ..A > *v' AT ^ .V - « n "^ ^^-n^. .-j^" ^o^y :^^'^ '^^0^ f^^S" -ov^^ '^0^ * V* ^^' Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data: Doyle-Coombs, D. M. (Diane M.) A seal breaching operation in Quinland Coal Mine. (Bureau of Mines information circular; 9207) Bibliography: p. 12. Supt. of Docs, no.: I 28.27:9207 1. Mine filling— West Virginia. 2. Abandoned coal mines— Environmental as- pects—West Virginia. I. Hansford, Randy. II. Title. III. Series: Information circular (United States. Bureau of Mines); 9207. ^TN2 95.U4 [TN292] 622 s [622'.8] 88-600214 CONTENTS Page Abstract 1 Introduction 2 Background 2 Detection of mine fire 5 Seal breaching 6 Using tracer gas to understand air migration patterns through abandoned area 8 Predicting gas concentrations 10 Discussion 11 Summary 12 References 12 Appendix A.-Mine fire sampling plan 13 Appendix B.-Completion plan 15 Appendix C.-MSHA approved plan for mine unsealing if continuous monitoring system failed 16 Appendix D.- Volume calculation behind sealed area 17 Appendix E.-Calculations of purge times 18 Appendix F— Calculations of purge time after increase in air volume 19 Appendix G.-Tracer gas released at 2 North and recovered at 1 North 20 Appendix H.-Velocity calculations inby seals 21 ILLUSTRATIONS 1. Quinland Mine map 3 2. Quinland Mine 1 and 2 North Main Seals 4 3. Borehole locations in 2 North 6 4. Projected mine development 7 5. Temporary ventilation controls in 2 East 7 6. SFg concentration in 1 North 9 7. 1 North CH4 decay curve 10 8. Concentration in 1 North-COj, O2, Nj, and CO 11 C-1. Location of checkpoints 16 TABLES 1. Average gas concentrations behind seals 5 2. Borehole descriptions 5 3. Gas concentrations in number 2 borehole of 2 North after injection of 98 st of CO2 5 4. Average gas concentrations behind seals and pressure differential across seals prior to breakthrough ... 7 UNIT OF MEASURE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS REPORT cfm cubic foot per minute L/mol hter per mole cfm/in, w.g. cubic foot per minute per inch, water gauge min minute fpm foot per minute mL milliliter ft foot mol mole ft^ square foot pet percent ft^ cubic foot ppm part per miUion g gram psi pound per square inch g/mol gram per mole St short ton h hoiu- Vdc volt, direct current in inch w.g. water gauge L liter yr year A SEAL BREACHING OPERATION IN QUINLAND COAL MINE: A CASE STUDY By Diane M. Doyle-Coombs^ and Randy Hansford^ ABSTRACT In late July 1985, ciir samples from a sealed portion of the Quinljmd coal mine in West Virginia showed the presence of carbon monoxide (CO). Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) personnel concluded that a fire was burning behind the seals. Since an imminent danger existed, the mine operator was given a closure order. The gases behind the seeds were monitored and almost 2 million ft^ of carbon dioxide (COj) gas was pumped into the sealed area to stabilize the environment. Sixteen days after the closure order was issued, MSHA allowed the mine to return to production. Approximately 1 yr later, mine management submitted a seal breaching request to MSHA in order to drive a set of entries to further develop the mine. The Bureau of Mines established a s£unpling strategy and monitored gases from behind the sealed area during the breaching operation imtil the atmosphere was safe. This report is an account of the seal breaching conducted by the mine, MSHA, and the Bureau. The logistics of this event, the sampling strategy, and the equations applied could be used by the mining industry in future breachings or mine recovery operations. Time to reenter the area was calculated by using the methane (CH4) concentrations sampled at the discharge of the seals. Tracer gas was used to verify the ventilation flows through the area. ^Mining engineer, Pittsburgh Research Center, Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA. ^Chief engineer, MA.E. Services Inc., Beckley, WV. INTRODUCTION A goal of the coal industry is to mjiximize the amount of coal removed without compromising miners' health zmd safety. As a mine develops, portions of the mine aie. aban- doned and mining moves to areas where coal production is feasible. To prevent explosive concentrations of gases in abandoned portions or gob areas, coal mine operators can (1) continue to ventilate them or (2) isolate them from the main mine ventilation system by sealing. To seal an aban- doned area, operators construct substantial and incombus- tible seals of sufficient strength to prevent their rupture in the event of an explosion. The conditions encountered in underground coal mines make it difficult to construct a seal that is completely airtight; recent studies indicate a near perfect seal will leak 150 cfm/in, w.g. Seals do, however, greatly restrict the passage of air in and out of abandoned areas. This report documents an investigation of an aban- doned sealed area in a West Virginia coal mine. The atmosphere behind the seals was sampled on a regular basis. During one of the sampling cycles, peak concen- trations of 2,800 ppm CO and 1,260 ppm hydrogen (Hj) were detected, leading MSHA to close the mine because of the impUed danger. The atmosphere behind the seals was judged sjife after COj gas was injected into the abandoned area. A yr later, the seals needed to be breached in order to continue with extraction of the seam. The Bureau of Mines assisted in estabhshing a gas sampling strategy and in collecting gas samples until the ail exiting the abandoned area had reached a CH4 concentration of 1.5 pet. A tracer gas, sulfur hexafluoride (SFg), was used to test the ventilation in the abandoned area after the seals were breached. The seals were safely breached, and within 95 h production at the mine was resumed. BACKGROUND Quinland Mine, an underground coal mine in southern West Virginia, was opened into the Cedar Grove coal seam in 1973. The coalbed locally averages 42 to 50 in thickness and the overburden ranges from 250 to 900 ft. The mine used room and pillar mining with six to seven entries (fig. 1). The parallel mains, submains, and panels were developed and interconnected at the termination point by bleeder entries. Barrier pillars ranging from 300 to 525 ft in width are maintained between mains, submains, and panels being developed. The mine is ven- tilated by two main fans operating parallel. One fan (339,000 cfm) ventilates the northern portion of the mine, while the other fan (212,000 cfm) ventilates the southern portion. CH4 liberation at this operation is approximately 226,000 cfm in 24 h. The mine developed from two mains (2 East Mains). Two parallel north mains were developed off the 2 east mains. Development of 1 North Mains began in May 1974; development of 2 North began in May 1977. The 1 and 2 North Mains are interconnected by bleeder entries. Last reported mining in 2 North Mains was on or about July 1982. A ventilation survey indicated that sealing off 1 and 2 North would result in more effective ventilation in the existing workings. In August 1984, two sets of seals were constructed in the 1 and 2 North entries (fig. 2). The 14 sejils were constructed of soUd concrete blocks, set on solid flooring and were not hitched into the ribs. The 16-in blocks were placed with the long axis of each block aligned parallel to the rib along the entry length, and laid skin to skin with mortared joints, producing an effective thickness of 16 in. Seals were faced with mortar, then the face and perimeter were coated with a fire-resistant rigid foam. A valved sampling pipe was placed in the center of the highest number 1 seal (left) of both panels to measure the pressure differentiail across the seals cuid to monitor the atmosphere in the sealed area. The sampling pipes terminated approximately 5 ft inby the seals. A water drainpipe and trap with a shutoff valve were installed in the lowest elevation, at the number 7 seal of each panel. Supplemental roof support, such as cribs £md timbers, were used where needed in the 2 North aiea, because roof falls in the 2 North panel had occurred prior to seaUng. The mine firebossed the seals during preshift and during the weekly ventilation inspection. During an inspection in April 1985, two of the seals in 1 North were outgassing around the perimeter and through the face of the seals. New seeds were constructed outby the original number 3 and 6 sesds in the same mjmner as the originjd seals. a. a E « e S ■o c a c 3 O I 3 o> Scale, ft Figure 2.— Quinland Mine 1 and 2 North Main Seals. DETECTION OF MINE FIRE In addition to the regular inspections, MSHA inspectors examined the seals, assessed ventilation, and collected air samples from behind the 1 and 2 North seals. During one sampling cycle, MSHA reported the presence of CO and H2 in 2 North. Table 1 shows the average concentrations of COj, oxygen (Oj), CH4, CO, and Hj reported in 1 and 2 North (i)/ The MSHA subdistrict manager requested that additional samples be collected at the 2 North location. Inspectors went imdergroimd to obtain bottle samples, visually inspect the seals, conduct smoke leakage tests, obtain hand-held sample readings at the seal face and outby the mmiber 1 seal, take stain measurements, obtain pressure differentials across the seals, and take airflow readings. During the inspection of the 2 North seals, air was foxmd to be leaking around the perimeter of the number 1 seal and at the water trap in number 7 seal. MSHA required mine management to remove miners from imderground, and then issued an imminent danger order because of the elevated levels of CO (evidence of a fire) and the presence of Hj in 2 North. The Jones-Trickett ratio (JTR) (2) was apphed to the data to provide insight into what was on fire. The 2 North gas samples gave a JTR value of 0.53,which indicates CH^ was the primary fuel for the fire. Four boreholes (table 2) were drilled from the surface to the 2 North panel for atmospheric sampling (fig. 3). Each borehole was equipped with a three-tube bundle of sample tubing that extended through the borehole to near the top, middle, and bottom of the coalbed. This arrange- ment was initially used because air within a sealed area tends to stratify. After several hr of sampling, it was obvious that it was uimecessary to obtain gas readings at the three height locations; gas concentrations were the same at each height. The number 4 borehole was sampled and gas concen- trations, in pet, averaged: CO2-O.8, Oj-lS.?, CH4-3.4, and CO-0.1. Underground, work crews collected bottle samples from the 2 North number 1 seal; gas concentra- tions, in pet, averaged: CO2-O.9, O2-I7.8, CH4-6.I, nitrogen (N2)-76.41, CO-0.257, and H2-O.O76. These individual samples prompted mine management to submit a formed mine fire and seunpling plan as an aid in dealing with the fire (appendix A). Decisions on the state of a fire are based on the changing composition of the mine air and not single samples (3). Because the samples collected indicated the presence of am explosive mixture of gases behind the 2 North seals, MSHA prohibited regular visits to the underground sampling ports. To gain information on the environment behind the seals, a crew of workers was given permission to go underground zmd install a sampUng tube from the number 1 seal of 2 North, Mine management proposed to MSHA that CO2 gas be injected down a borehole. Thirty st (525,000 ft^) of CO2 gas, pumped down borehole 3, resulted in a nonexplosive atmosphere behind the 2 North seals. Miners were then permitted to go imderground to assess the ventilation and to apply a cementitous (gunite) sealant to the surfaces. When the crew arrived at 2 North, mem- bers observed COj leaking out of the seals. To reduce the leakage, they coated the seal face and ribs with gunite. Forty-two st (735,000 ft^) of CO2 was then pumped through the number 3 borehole into the area behind the 2 North sejils. Gas analyses indicated a steady improve- ment of the atmosphere behind the seals. The crew of miners returned imderground to continue rehabiUtating the seals. As a safety precaution, an additional 28 st of COj was pumped down the number 3 borehole. A total of 98 st CO2 (approximately 1,710,000 ft') was pumped into the area behind the 2 North seals to make the atmosphere nonexplosive. Five days after the initial injection of COj in the number 3 borehole, bottle samples collected at the number 2 borehole had gas concentrations below the explosive range (table 3). The continuous gas monitoring station TABLE 1. - Average gas concentrations behind seals, percent 1 North 2 North C02 CH." '.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'. CO H, 1.30 12.35 19.07 Trace 0.91 18.62 2.13 .268 .12 Higher hydrocarbons . . Trace TABLE 2 - Borehole descriptions Diameter, Borehole in Depth, ft Entry location in 2 North seals Distance from 2 North seal, ft 1 6 2 6 3 6 4 2 261 269 176 685 6 3 1 4 2,900 3.050 3,075 310 TABLE 3. - Gas concentrations in number 2 borehole of 2 North after Injection of 98 st of CO2, percent Location Borehole 2 CO2 9.38 O2 11.08 N2' 62.32 CH4 18.19 CO .0298 H2 NA NA Not analyzed. 'The percentage of N2 was determined by subtracting the sum of the reported values from 100.00. This valve is nitrogen plus argon. Italic numbers in parentheses refer to items in the list of references preceding the appendixes at the end of this report. 660- LEGEND Borehole ^Seal — Bottom of COG elevation lines Figure 3— Borehole locations In 2 North. samples collected immediately behind the 2 North seals were considered stable. The data indicated the original fire behind the seals was not burning, and CH4 concen- tration in the atmosphere at the boreholes was due to the holes being at a higher elevation than the seals, therefore the CH4 was displaced by COj. The closure order was terminated because a nonexplo- sive atmosphere now existed behind the seals. After mine management submitted a completion plan to MSHA (appendix B), the mine was reopened. SEAL BREACHING Approximately 1 yr after the start of the fire, mine mamagement submitted a plan to MSHA to open the seals in 1 and 2 North Mciins for the purpose of driving a set of mains off the number 7 entry in 2 North (3). The mine had attempted to develop a set of mains off of 2 North, but was unable to continue advancing because of geologic conditions that created roof control problems (fig. 4). For future development of the mine, it was necessary to brecik into the sealed area, establish ventilation, and begin driving a set of entries from the number 7 entry in 2 North. The Bureau was requested to estabhsh a gas samipling strategy to be used during the seal-breaching operation, and to conduct a tracer gas test to evaluate the ventilation in the abandoned area. Two 3/8-in-ID tube bundles were extended from the seals at 1 cmd 2 North to an outside monitoring station. One tube bimdle was for 1 North and the other was for 2 North. The outside monitoring station was equipped with a portable gas chromatograph, sampling pumps used to draw samiples from behind the seals to the surface, cadi- bration gcis, evacuated seunple tubes, detector stain tubes, and hand-held gas detecting instruments. This continuous monitoring station made it unnecessary for individuals to go underground to obtain air samples. If the continuous monitoring station fedled, an alternative plam would have been followed (appendix C). A known concentration of calibration gas was inserted at the tube end to test for leakage and accuracy. Before taking a sample, it wjis necessary to draw the atmosphere through the tubing for a period not less than three times that required for one air exchange {4). Once started, sam- pling pumps operated continuously, ensuring an uninter- rupted air exchange. Some site preparation was done prior to the seal breaching. Mine phone communications were estabhshed between both seal locations and the surface. An air com- pressor was located in 2 North with the air Unes extending to the 1 and 2 North seal areas. Gunite on the number 1 seals of both 1 and 2 North was removed from a 48- by 48-in area using jackhammers with stimdard hardened steel bits. Wing curtains were installed within 10 ft of each of the seals to provide ventilation to sweep away any noxious or toxic gases emitted from behind the seals when they were opened. Temporary ventilation controls were installed in 2 East to facihtate a 0.5-in, w.g. drop between 1 and 2 North, so that air would enter 2 North and exit Water drain- pipe and trap- Sccle, ft '~^C?o/ = Seal Figure 4.— Projected mine development 1 North (fig. 5). An air volume of 35,000 cfm was mea- sured at the junction of 1 North and 2 East. It was calcu- lated that a 10-ft^ opening would be needed to ensure a flow of 20,000 cfm through the sealed area. For a period of 24 h prior to the seed breaching, gas concentrations behind 1 and 2 North seals were collected via the sampling tube for background information. As a caUbration check, bottle samples were also collected. The pressure differential across the seals prior to breakthrough cuid the average gas concentrations behind the seals collected for this 24 h period are shown in table 4. On the first day of miners annual vacation, Saturday, July 26, 1986, at 11:00 a.m. the number 1 seals in both 1 and 2 North Mains were breached. Only personnel required for the seal breaking were permitted under- ground. Seals were breached by a certified mine fore- man/fireboss who performed all tests prescribed by law. Two persons trained in mine rescue procedures were pres- ent at the seals with mine rescue apparatus. All electrical power inby the intersection of 2 North and 2 East was shut off. Phone communication to the siuface was estabUshed. Ventilation measurements were taken at the 1 North-2 East intersection to ensure that an air quantity of 35,000 cfm of air was available. Hand-held gas readings, evac- uated tube samples, emd bottle samples were collected as a cahbration check for the outside monitoring station. The work sequence was to breach the number 1 seal of 1 North, then advance to 2 North and breach the number 1 seal of 2 North. If during the seal breaching, either mine fan failed, all persons underground would return to the surface and all electrical power would be deenergized. 'O/ Sampling u pipe- K ^^^, ^0/ ^0/ o '^mm Water drain- pipe and trap 'a /so --^ — I- M^^Po^Op^^/?^ %M. -Sampling pipe ^^ LEGEND (i^ — c~ Check curtain c\y ^= Seal X Overcast =^ Stopping — ► Return ->♦ Intake ^ 400 ^ ^ ^ Scale, ft ^, Figure 5.— Temporary ventilation controls in 2 East. Table 4. - Average gas concentrations behind seals, percent, and pressure differential across seals prior to breakthrough 1 North 2 North CO2 3.22 1.37 O2 6.15 13.5 N/ 56.29 63.45 CH4 31.11 19.89 Other gases 3.23 1.79 CO CjHg .0008 .0006 Pressure differential . . . . in, w.g. . . +0.8 -0.37 'Nitrogen plus argon. To eliminate sparking, brass tools were used to break the seals. The number 1 seal of 1 North was breached with a 4- by 2.5-ft opening. After the crew zarived at the 2 North seals and communication was established to the outside, the number 1 seal of 2 North was also breached with a 4- by 2.5-ft opening. The air reading was taken to ensure that a minimum of 20,000 cfm was entering the 2 North seal opening. One individual, using breathing apparatus, then went back to the 1 North opening to obtain measurements of pressure drop across the opening (0.1 in, w.g.), air volume (22,500 cfm), and concentrations of O2, (3.7 pet), CO, (0 ppm), and CH4 (>5 pet). After 30 min, SF^ was released at the opening of the 2 North seal. All persons then exited the mine. Power was restored inby 2 East-2 North intersection. Gas concentrations were continuously recorded. The air volume contained in the abandoned area was calculated by mine engineers in an attempt to determine how long it would take for the return air out of the 1 North seal to reach a CH4 concentration of 1.5 pet. CH4 was the gas that was used to assess the ventilation inby the seals. No one was certain of the entry and roof conditions that existed inby the seals. Mine maps showed conditions prior to sealing, but how the abandoned area had been affected by the fire was unknown. The open volume behind the 1 and 2 North seals was estimated as 26,676,000 ft^ (appen- dix D) with a ventilating airflow of 22,500 cfm entering the 2 North seal and exiting 1 North. It was assumed that the air in 1 and 2 North had a known CH4 concentration of 31 pet and that generation of CH4 had ceased. Depending on the equation applied, purge times were calculated as 20 h, 60 h (4), 120 h (5), and 138 h ( X 00 o ■vl o tj r- — * 33 L Ol W i2. o > s CO 5. 3^ H C/) 5" ^ "I^z == 5; ESS JSE- CD o' CO m D c > o -0 "0 O 3J m O -< m 30 C 12 1 89 J H<. /.i^>>o ./yi.:,^/\. .o«^.^;:.% ./\c:^/"'e. /.^j^%A ^ r.^ v" ■&• <^^ . t . . K* "V N* O B » ' - 1 Vv ^^0^ 'bv" - -^^0^ f "-^^ '" ^^ , . . . "^^ "''" .\^ . . . "'•^, ^^ .oxa^ -^O n,-^"* , " o ,- '-^^ ""Key vP 'j>^ *bv^ • '^^ A^ *'^ .\ '-^^0^ o^ K* '^ ^^ - P % "• ^'^i^ ^""^^^ . »I»XW*- "> .