America's Foreign Policy A CATECHISM By Charles P. Howland of the New York Bar Published by the American Rights Committee, 45, Cedar Street, Neio York City. America's Foreign Policy A CATECHISM By Charles P. Howland of the New York Bar n 3V $1* By Transfer MAY 6 I I9V9 AMERICAS FOREIGN POLICY A CATECHISM BY Charles P. Howland, of the New York Bar 1. What has been the basis of traditional American school-teaching" about the Revolution ? Military story — tales of Continental heroism and English oppression — which (like the hatchet-ancl-cherry-tree myth invented by good old fiddling parson Weems) have passed into current legend. In the old school-books the Americans of the Revolutionary War were always noble and usually victorious ; the British always mercenary and usually defeated. 2. What truth lies in this school-book tradition ? American historians have laughed at it for a generation, but politicians continue to use it for their own purposes. 3. What were the political facts distinguished from this legendary military tradition ? (a) That the Colonies were peopled by England's middle and lower classes — people who earned their own living. (b) That England and also her colonies were at that time still controlled by an oligarchy of powerful nobles. (c) That the colonists fought for representation and democracy ; independence and nationality were the outcome. 4. How did Englishmen view the struggle ? The best men and the best minds, like Burke and Fox, were making the same struggle for political liberty in England, and were therefore open advocates of the Colonies in their political aspirations. 5. What was the outcome in England of this struggle for political liberty ? Entirely successful. But while the struggle on American soil was short and sharp by force of arms, it proved in the old country to be long and difficult, and was won by political and parliamentary weapons. Yet the results were the same ; England becnme a land of virtually manhood suffrage and of free political institutions. Public opinion controls its course, (7797) 4 America's Foreign Policy. 6. What has been the consequence to the world ? England has everywhere for a hundred years been regarded as a land of freemen. Her political institutions have been imitated to some extent by every civilized nation of the world. 7. But does she not still own the South African colonies, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia, and treat them as she treated the American colonies ? She does not " own " Canada and these other " Colonies " any more than the United States owns the State of Penn- sylvania. England learned her lesson in the American Revolution and the following years. She voluntarily gave Canada her freedom, and all citizens of these so-called " colonies " have as much political and economic freedom as the citizens of California or Massachusetts. 8. What has been the course of England's re- lations with the United States ? As the power of England's public opinion strengthened, her attitude towards the United States became more and more friendly. Our close commercial relations have sometimes created minor points of friction ; but a policy of give-and- take has always prevailed. To-day the two great English- speaking nations have more in common than any two nations of the earth. 9. 'Wherein has England been of help to us in this sympathy of outlook and community of institutions ? In the protection of the " Monroe Doctrine." Germany is opposed to our policy for this hemisphere ; but the English fleet has always been in the path of German con- quest on this side of the world. The " Monroe Doctrine " is an American policy ; but it has not had the latent force necessary for its recognition by less friendly powers. The English have always viewed it with approval, and their fleet has given the backing necessary. 10. But is not the English fleet a menace to us ? No. The English have no ambitions for aggrandizement in this hemisphere ; and besides, they want our help in the long future. The English fleet protects rather than threatens our com- merce ; for the English maintain free ports and free trade everywhere. America's Foreign Policy. 5 11. Where do English and German policies differ, so far as they affect America ? Germany's policy has for fifty years been one of aggran- dizement by conquest, Many of her citizens have settled in Brazil and the Argentine. A free hand is all she needs for an attack upon one or more of the South American republics. 12. Why has Germany formed this policy ? Because she thinks it pays. Three times she deliberately attacked a neighbor — Denmark, Austria, and France — and each time she added to herself territory and power. 13. But is not the friendship of Germany and America so strong- that Germany would not disturb it ? Germany has no friendships. She has policies. Her apparent friendships are broken like her treaties. 14. Has the United States any experience with this German characteristic ? In the Spanish war Germany and her allies tried to secure a general agreement in Europe for interference in Spain's behalf. England, however, decisively vetoed the suggestion of interference, and her control of the sea made action with- out her co-operation impossible. 15. Has Germany ever betrayed her unfriendli- ness towards us by any overt act ? In the Spanish war, after Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila, the German Admiral Diederichs made a threatening demonstration with his five ships ; but it ceased as soon as Commodore Chichester's action showed the position which would be taken by the English navy. 16. What was Germany after ? Her desire for aggrandizement by conquest is so strong that she could not bear to see any islands lying around " loose " which she could occupy. The affair was just important enough to disclose the German state of mind. It would have become of the utmost seriousness, if England had not backed us. 1 7 . What bearing* have these historical con- siderations upon the issues of the present war ? German — or Prussian — militarism is due to the desire for conquest of the territory or the wealth of others by force 6 America's Foreign Policy. This causes large military establishments which make a terrible burden to wage-earners in peace, and in the long run are certain to bring on war. Military autocracy also destroys political freedom by control of the press and by the suppression or manipulation of public opinion. The leading newspapers of Germany are practically government organs ; any independence even in times of peace leads to their suppression. 18. Has militarism any effect upon the national character ? Yes. Part of it is " spying " in friendly countries, in- triguing against them among their own citizens, preparing the way for German armies or German violence. The two countries which ought best to understand this are Belgium and the United States. " FRIGHTFULNESS " (Schrecklichkeit) in war is another product of German militarism. It consists in disregarding the laws of God and man to such an extent that other nations, seeing that Germany stops at nothing, will succumb through fear. 19. Why do Germans justify such doctrines ? Because they have come to believe. that they pay. 20. How can they reconcile such doctrines with the dictates of Christian morals ? They do not try to do so. They avoid the inconsistency by saying that there is one set of morals for the individual and another set — or rather none at all — for the State. 21. Can we accept such a doctrine ? God forbid ! The two great branches of the English- speaking race act through public opinion, which bases its judgment upon the dictates of personal morality, and in the long run they oblige their respective governments to conform to the moral standards of their citizens. 22. Does this war then directly concern us ? The Prussians desire to reorganize the world on the basis of military autocracy. They insist that it is "right" for any country strong enough, and which thinks its interests enough involved, to overrun and absorb any other country ; the only reason for hesitation with them in any case is that of self-interest. The war, therefore, involves not only the liberties of Europe and of the world, but also the future of democracy. If international force is to be the test of survival, America's Foreign Policy. 7 democracy cannot persist on the ground that it affords the best social programme and the highest individual develop- ment of its citizens ; the Prussian attitude makes a nation's ability to defend itself in a struggle imposed by others the sole standard of survival. Should European democracy fail in this crisis, America would be the last bulwark of popular government. For this fundamental reason there is a literal truth in the statement that the Allies are fighting oar battles. 23. Shall we not satisfy morality if we remain strictly " neutral " ? Neutrality is essentially passive and in itself has no moral value. Obviously a great Power which, in a world-war that is determining the future course of civilization and con- sequently its own destiny as well, deliberately remains passive and abstains from aiding what it considers to be the cause of civilization is by this very fact placed upon the moral defensive. Its neutrality, instead of being meritorious, cannot escape condemnation. 24. Have we an interest beyond the moral one or the indefinite political one ? Yes. If America is to have a voice in the world of the future and is to have power to protect her own interests, she must join her sympathies to that nation and that cause which most resembles her own. Isolated, she will be defenseless in the future. The democracy of England, of Australia and of Canada, and the protection their common fleet affords to our policies, are the best bulwarks of America's future. 25. What relation have these thing's to America's duty in the way of military prepared- ness ? It is impossible to set any proper standard for military preparedness until we know definitely what are our foreign policies, our formal alliances (it we have any), and our informal diplomatic arrangements. If we have no policies or arrangements, and decide for " preparedness " against all the world, we shall need a fleet bigger than Japan's and England's combined and an army strong enough to meet Germany and Russia. All that sort of " preparedness " is absurd. The prepared- ness of policy must precede the preparedness of a navy and an army. 26. What then should we do ? Throw our sympathies on the side of England and her allies. Pursue this line as the logic of events requires. 8 America's Foreign Polio y . After the war, put ourselves into the closest and most sympathetic relations with Great Britain and France. 27. But would not such an attitude be a break with the traditional policy of the United States in foreign affairs ? Quite the contrary. After a diplomatic understanding with Canning, England's foreign minister, Monroe promulgated his famous " Doctrine " as an obstacle to the plans of the " Holy Alliance " in this hemisphere. As soon as Thomas Jefferson heard of it he wrote jubilantly to Monroe : " WE BRING ENGLAND'S MIGHTY WEIGHT INTO THE SCALE OF FREE GOVERNMENT AND EMANCIPATE A CONTINENT AT ONE STROKE WHICH MIGHT OTHERWISE LINGER LONG IN DOUBT AND DIFFICULTY. GREAT BRITAIN IS THE NATION WHICH CAN DO US THE MOST HARM OF ANY ONE, OR ALL, ON EARTH; AND WITH HER ON OUR SIDE WE NEED NOT FEAR THE WHOLE WORLD. WITH HER THEN WE SHOULD MOST SEDU. LOUSLY CHERISH A CORDIAL FRIENDSHIP AND NOTHING WOULD TEND MORE TO KNIT AFFECTIONS THAN TO BE FIGHTING ONCE MORE SIDE BY SIDE IN THE SAME CAUSE." Printed in Great Britain. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 020 914 064