.R5 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS nil I nil 011 896 686 7 HOLLINGER pH8J MILL RUN F3-1543 THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE- HIDALGO JESSE S. REEVES REPRINTED FROM THE g^mrncau ^i^toticat §mm VOL. X No. JANUARY, 1905 ^ [Keprinted from Tfik Amkrican IIisiorrai, Rknu'W, \'o1. X., Sit. 2, Jan., 1^05. J THE TREATY OF GUADALUPE-HIDALGO The treaty of peace with Mexico was signed February 2. 184S, at the town of Guadahipe-Hidalgo. It has appended to it the name of but one American, that of Nicholas P. Trist, who admitted that he had no authority at the time to represent the United States. The government at Washington had canceled his powers, denied his authority, and ordered him to leave the headquarters of the invading army and return home. Various views have been published regarding his actions. Trist has been called a far-sighted patriot, who by dis- obeying orders sacrificed his own reputation in order that he might put an end to the Mexican War and give to his country the legitimate fruits of victory. His motives have, on the other hand, been repre- sented as based upon inordinate vanity, which blinded him to the manifest obligations of his mission and gave his name a distinction which his character by no means justified. It is the purpose of this paper to trace the history of the negotiations of which the Guadalupe- Hidalgo treaty was the result in the light of the mass of correspond- ence to be found in the archives of the Department of State, a part of which has never been printed. The diary of James K. Polk, a manuscript copy of which is in the Lenox Library, New York, furnishes a running commentary upon the peace negotiations, and by it the President of fifty years ago takes us into his confidence as fully as he did his own cabinet.^ The history of the Mexican War, aside from the purely military part of it, has been written chiefly as a chapter in the history of the slavery question. The momentous national issues which pressed for attention even before Polk retired from office have given a twist to the many accounts of the period from 1845 to 1848. Books appearing soon after the event, animated not by a spirit of unbiased historical investigation, but written with the professed purpose of presenting a brief against the aggressions of slavery, have furnished in large measure the materials for the history of the period. The treatment of the subject of the Mexican War in the " reviews " of Jav' and ' Acknowledgment is here made to the authorities of tlie I.enox Library for permis- sion to use parts of Polly's diary. 2 William Jay, A Review of Ihe Causes and Coiiseijiiences of the Mexiian War (Boston, 1849). (309 ) 3IO J. S. Reeves Livermore\ well-constructed as they were and widely distributed, and fortified by an examination of published documents and news- papers, has grown into the narrative of Von Hoist. When Congress was told that by the act of Mexico there existed a state of war, and that Santa Anna was permitted to pass into Vera Cruz, Polk and his advisers were convinced that the war would be a :short one, perhaps not ninety days in length. The diary informs us ithat when Polk came into office he had already made up his mind to .•acquire California. A plan developed by which he believed the acquisition might be made by peaceful negotiation. Claims against Alexico, under discussion as far back as Jackson's time, furnished ■.the groundwork of the plan ; the joint resolution annexing Texas .gave the President something to build upon. By that act the de- termination of the boundaries of Texas rested with the United States. Mexico could not pay the claims in cash ; the Texan boundary was unsettled. The idea of territorial indemnity was an irresistible conclusion : let her pay in land. Two weeks after Polk was inaugurated, a secret agent, William S. Parrott, left Washington for Mexico to prepare a way for the reopening of diplomatic relations. By autumn the reports of the agent led Polk to believe that Mexico would receive a representative from the United States. John Black, the United States consul at the 'City of Mexico, wrote to Buchanan that he had positive and official assurance that the Mexican ministry was favorable to an adjustment of the questions in dispute between the two republics. The consul's letter was received November 9 ; on the tenth John Slidell, who had been selected by Polk two months previously,^ was sent upon " one of the most delicate and important [missions] which has ever been confided to a citizen of the United States ", one which, if successful, Buchanan told him, would establish for the envoy " an enviable repu- tation " and do an " immense service " for his country.-'' This was no sham mission. Parrott, the secret agent, had reported that Mexico would not fight. The notoriously peaceful proclivities of the R-Iexican president, Herrera, warranted the hope that some sort of a settlement might be quickly arranged. " An Envoy possessing suitable qualifica- tions for this Court ", wrote Parrott, " might with comparative ease. ' Abie! Abbot Liverraore, '1 he War with Mexico Kcrirtuetl {V>aiAov\, 1850). 'Buchanan to Slidell, .September 17 1S45 ; Slidell to Buchanan, September 25, 1845. See George TicUnor Curtis, Life oj James Biicliannn, I, 591. 'Buchanan to Slidell, November 10, 1845 ; called for by re.solution of the House, January 4, 1S48, ard refused by Polk, January 13, 1848 ; see H. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Con- gress, I Session, 770; also No. 25, p. i ; printed in S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, I Session, 71, with the correspondence concerning the treaty of peace with Mexico. The Treaty of Guadalupe- Hidalgo 311 settle, over a breakfast, the most important national question. "' The instructions to John Slidell covered more than Mexico anticipated. Xo sooner had the envoy appeared in Vera Cruz than broadsides scattered over the City of Mexico told of his plans : to negotiate with the JNIexican government for the sale of Texas, New Mexico, and the Californias.- Such in fact were Slidell's instructions. He was authorized to assume the claims, fix the boundary of the United States at the Rio Grande, and obtain the cession of New Mexico and Upper California for a sum not to exceed twenty-five millions of dollars.^ The administration of Herrera, weaker even than most revolutionary governments in Mexico, was accused of a traitorous attempt at the disintegration of the country. To save itself from revolution it refused to receive Slidell because his powers were too great, since he was named as minister instead of as commis- sioner ad hoc to settle the Texas question, and by so doing Herrera countered Polk's policy. The refusal, however, did not improve the situation. The peaceful Herrera gave way to the warlike Par- edes. Polk, in anticipation of Slidell's ultimate failure, ordered Taylor to the Rio Grande. Instead of calling Slidell home, he was directed to make further efforts to obtain recognition. Buchanan wrote to Slidell, March 12, 1846' : The Oregon question is rapidly approaching a crisis. By the Steam Packet which will leave Liverpool on the 4th April, if not by that which left on the 4th instant, the President expects information which will be decisive on the subject. The prospect is that our differences with Great Britain may be peacefully adjusted, though this is by no means certain. Your return to the United States before the result is known, would pro- duce considerable alarm in the public mind and might possibly exercise an injurious influence on our relations with Great Britain. By the time this letter was read by Slidell he had exhausted all pretexts for remaining in Mexico and was on his way home. The plan of acquiring California by peaceful means was a failure. ' Parrott to Buchanan, August 26, 1845, received September 16, 1845. MS., De- partment of State Archives, Despatches, Mexico, vol. 12. It will be noticed that this letter from Parrott was received the day before Buchanan wrote to Slidell, offering him the Mexican mission. ^A copy of this broadside, called La Voz del Pueblo, was sent to Buchanan by Slidell. It bears date of December 3, 1845, ^"d is headed: " La traicion se ha de- scubierto ! . . . Mr. Slidell, ministro nombrado por los Estados-Unidos, para arreglar con el gobierno actual la venta de Tejas, Nuevo-Mexico y las Californias.'' Slidell's first letter from the City of Mexico, dated December 17, 1845, was received by Buchanan January 12, 1846. 'Taylor was ordered to the Rio Grande the following day. •Buchanan to Slidell, November lo, 1845, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, i Ses- sion, 71. * Buchanan to Slidell, March 12, 1846, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of State, Instructions, Mexico, vol. 16, p. 43. 312 J. S. /beeves " War . . . exists by the act of Mexico ", Polk informed Congress May II, 1846. Immediately orders were issued to permit Santa Anna, then in exile and under sentence of death, to pass into Vera Cruz^. A great war was not contemplated, but a war just big enough to realize the plan of territorial indemnity. Santa Anna, it had been reported to the President, would make certain concessions rather than see Mexico ruled by a foreign prince ; he preferred a friendly arrangement to the ravages of war. Santa Anna passed the American blockade ; Vera Cruz received him as a hero, and he pro- ceeded to the capital as the savior of the nation. By the middle of August he was in command of the Mexican forces and president ad interim of the Mexican Republic. Hardly had he arrived at the City of Mexico when Buchanan's note was submitted to him, sug- gesting that peace negotiations be forthwith begun.- The offer was declined.^ Santa Anna as a military chieftain was not Santa Anna in exile. Buchanan's answer to the refusal was that henceforth the war would be prosecuted with vigor vintil Mexico offered to make terms.^ From now on the war was waged in earnest. It appeared no longer to be a little war. Scott took command of the army, and the storm-center shifted from the northern provinces to Vera Cruz. And yet Mexico gave no sign of a desire for peace. Polk therefore was again compelled to make overtures for settlement, and this time by offering a specific proposition. In January Buchanan wrote to the Mexican minister of foreign affairs that although making " a renewed overture for peace " might " be regarded by the world as too great a concession to Mexico, yet he " was " willing to subject himself to this reproach ". If Mexico so agreed he would send commissioners either to Havana or to Jalapa clothed with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace and given authority to suspend hos- tilities and raise blockades as soon as the Mexican commissioners met them.^ The Mexican answer was in spirit like its predecessors : Mexico would appoint commissioners aS suggested, but not until the blockades were raised and all the territory of the Mexican Re- public evacuated by the invading army." Such an answer was tanta- mount to a refusal, and so Polk considered it. When, in the middle of April, news of the fall of Vera Cruz reached Washington, it ' George Bancroft to Commodore David Conner, May 13, 1846, H. Ex. Doc. 25, 30 Congress, I Session, 5. 2 Buchanan to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, July 27, 1S46, Congressional Globe, 29 Congress, 2 Session, Appendix, 24. 'The Mexican Minister of Foreign Aflairs to Hiiclianan, August 31, 1846, i/iiJ. •Buchanan to same, September 25, 1846, i/iiil. 5 Buchanan to same, January 18, 1847, S. F.x. Doc. i, 30 Congress, i Session, 36. "i Monasterio to Buchanan, February 22, 1S47, iliiil., 37. The Treaty of Giiadaliipe-Hidalgo 3 1 3 was thought that Santa Anna could no longer refuse to negotiate, for the American arms were everywhere victorious, and Scott's army was on the march toward the capital. Now was the time, in Polk's strange phrase, to " conquer a peace ". Buchanan informed Mexico that the ofifer to negotiate would not be renewed (strong language until the context is heard) until the President had reason to believe that it would be accepted by the Mexican government. " The President . . . devoted ... to honor- able peace ", so wrote Buchanan to the Mexican minister of foreign affairs,' " is determined that the evils of the war shall not be pro- tracted one day longer than shall be rendered absolutely necessary by the Mexican republic. For the purpose of carrying this determi- nation into eflfect with the least possible delay, he will forthwith send to the head-quarters of the army in Mexico, Nicholas P. Trist, esq., the officer next in rank to the undersigned in our department of foreign aiifairs, as a commissioner, invested with full powers to conclude a definite treaty of peace with the United Mexican States." Thus did Polk act upon a plan for negotiation by an agent not con- firmed by the Senate, a method quite without precedent or parallel. The appointment of public commissioners might only subject the United States to the indignity of another refusal and give the Mexi- cans encouragement in their opinion concerning the President's motives for desiring the termination of the war. Influenced by these considerations, he hit upon the plan of sending " to the head-quarters of the army a confidential agent, fully acquainted with the views of this government, and clothed with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace with the Mexican government, should it be so in- clined ". He would be enabled in that case " to take advantage, at the propitious moment, of any favorable circumstances which might dispose that government to peace".^ In the selection of this agent the President again proceeded upon altogether unusual lines. Gen- eral Scott is authority for the statement that Polk wanted Silas Wright to undertake the mission, intimating that Scott would be Wright's associate.^ This was surely a strange selection, for Wright was a well-known advocate of the Wilmot Proviso, and Scott was personally obnoxious to the President. " Scott", said Polk, " is utterly unqualified for such a business."' No man of national prominence could be expected to assume the role of a confidential •Buchanan to Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 15, 1847, ibid., 3S-39. Also in Raphael Semmes, Service Afloat and Ashore, during the Mexican War, 303-306. 2 Buchanan to Trist, April 15, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, i Session, 81. ' Scolt's Aiiiotiocrap/iy, 11, 576. * Polk's diary, July 15, 1847. AM. HIST. REV VOL. X.— 21 314 J- S. Reeves agent to accompany the army and jump at a propitious moment to conclude a treaty. The chief clerk of Buchanan's department, per- sonally little known to the President, was selected for the mission, a man with but meager training in diplomatic affairs, anything but robust in health, irritable, suspicious, timid, and, moreover, given to great verbosity of statement. Nicholas Philip Trist was a Virginian by birth and was for a time a cadet at West Point. He did not graduate, however, but began the study of law under Jefferson, whose granddaughter he had married. At twenty-eight he was a clerk in the Treasury Depart- ment when Jackson selected him as his private secretary. After a short service in that capacity he was consul at Havana for eight years, whence he was recalled on the ground that he had aided the slave-trade.' Soon after the beginning of Polk's administration, he was made chief clerk of the State Department, and during his ser- vice there he appeared as a hard-working administrative officer in the department presided over by the somewhat timid Buchanan and really directed by the energetic Polk. The chief clerk gave evidence of uncompromising loyalty to the President and thorough sympathy with his plans. His selection for this delicate mission was probably due not so much to Polk's overestimation of Trist's diplomatic abili- ties as to an underestimate of the difficulties of the undertaking. It had appeared a simple thing to send Slidell to Mexico as the repre- sentative of a strong power to strike a bargain, through claims and a bonus, for the cession of New Mexico and California — how could so " feeble and distracted a nation as Mexico " refuse a liberal cash offer? The answer to that question had been war. Now that Con- gress had placed three millions of dollars in Polk's hands for the " speedy and honorable conclusion of the war", the President seemed to think that to negotiate- a peace treaty upon terms dictated bv himself was a mere clerical act for an agent accompanying a vic- torious army. Whatever may have been the oral instructions which Trist re- ceived from the President, the official letter from Buchanan gave him small discretionary powers. Trist was handed a projet of a treaty, and with it the statement that the extension of the boundaries of the United States over New Mexico and Upper California was to be considered a sine qua non of any treaty. What Buchanan had authorized Slidell to do before the war began was now, thanks to 'Trist was commissioned consul at Hav.nna .April 24, 1833. 'lyler ordered his recall June 22, 1841. There is a mass of correspondence connecting Trist with aiding the slave-trade attached to a complaint from fox to Forsyth, Kebru.Tiy 12, 1S40; MS. Notes from Hritish Legation to the Department of State. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo 3 1 5 the victorious advance of the army, made an ultimatum. Trist was- authorized to pay in addition to the claims not more than twenty millions for the cession of New Mexico and Upper California ; not more than five millions additional for Lower California; while the right of transit and passage over Tehuantepec was held to be worth another five millions, the consideration to be paid in annual instal- ments of three millions each. In any event the southwestern bound- ary was, of course, to be the Rio Grande. What Slidell had been au- thorized to offer twenty-five millions for, Trist was instructed to secure for twenty. The provisions as to Lower California and the right of transit over Tehuantepec were new, no mention of them hav- ing been made when Slidell was sent upon his mission. The projct accompanying Trist's instructions contained eleven articles covering- the points just referred to. The third article provided that as soon as the treaty was ratified by Mexico, the military and naval com- manders of both sides should be informed of the action as quickly as possible, after which an immediate suspension of hostilities should take place. Such was the expression of Polk's idea of " conquering^ a peace". Pending the negotiations of peace the L^nited States was not to bind itself to discontinue offensive operations against Mexico ; hostilities were not to cease until Mexico had actually ratified the peace treaty upon our own terms. ^ The confidential agent and commissioner left the capital for Mexico, and soon Buchanan began to receive Trist's long and tedi- ously circumstantial communications. From New Orleans he wrote a dozen pages minutely describing his trip and the dangers of the journey from Mobile thither. Arrived at Vera Cruz, May 6. he quickly despatched two more reports, filled with his views upon the officers of the army and things in general. Illness seems to have held him for a -.iiile, as his next letter is from Jalapa, dated two weeks later. By this time he was involved in a high-tempered and wordy epistolary quarrel with the commanding general. Trist had been directed by Buchanan to communicate his instructions in confidence to Scott and to deliver to him Buchanan's letter for transmission to the Mexican minister of foreign affairs. Instead of waiving formali- ties and putting himself on friendly and confidential terms with Scott, Trist immediately on his arrival at Vera Cruz sent the Ameri- can commander a note inclosing the letter from Buchanan sealed and with it orders from Marcy. Scott was ever suspicious of the administration at Washington, and now he opened the vials of his wrath upon the commissioner. He was ordered by the secretary ' Buchanan's projet, S. Ex. I loc. 52. 30 Congress, I Session, 85-Sg. 3i6 y- S. Reeves of war to yield to Trist the right to decide upon the suspension of military operations. It is doubtful if a more astounding order was €ver sent to a commanding officer in the field, and Scott replied to Trist that the secretary of war proposed to degrade him by requiring that he, as commander of the army, should defer to the chief clerk of the Department of State the question of continuing or discon- tinuing hostilities.' Consequently Scott returned the sealed letter from the Department of State and, as a purely military question, declined to obey the order of the secretary of war, unless Trist was clothed with military rank over him. The next month was spent by the commissioner in writing voluminous letters to Scott, which the latter answered in kind. Trist lectured the general upon his lack of respect for the commissioner sent by the President. Scott replied that Trist's letter was such a farrago of insolence, conceit, and arrogance as to be a choice specimen of diplomatic literature and manners. " The Jacobin convention of France never sent to one of its armies in the field a more amiable and accomplished instru- ment. If you were armed with an ambulatory guillotine, 3-ou would be the personification of Danton. Marat, and St. Just, all in one." ^ On June 4 Scott wrote to Marcy, asking to be recalled, owing to the many " cruel disappointments and mortifications " he had " been made to feel since " leaving " Washington, and the total want of support and sympathy on the part of the War Department "''. The administration responded with orders to each to cease the disgracefid quarrel and to join in carrying out the plans of the government. Much of this quarrel doubtless had its origin in politics. The military history of the Mexican War is largely made up of jealousy and its consequent wrangles, which, ending in arrests and courts- martial, were transferred from the field of operations to Washing- ton. " The truth is ", Polk wrote in his diary, June 12, " I have been compelled from the beginning to conduct the war against Mexico through the agency of two generals, highest in rank, who have not only no sympathies with the government, but are hostile to my administration. Both of them have assumed to control the government. To this I will not submit and will as certainly remove General Scott from the chief command as he shall refuse or delay to obey the order borne him by Mr. Trist."'^ For some time, -however, '.Scott to Trist, May 7, 1847, ibitl., 157-159. 2 Scott to Trist, May 29, 1847, ibid., 172. 'Scott to Marcy, June 4, 1S47, ibid., 129-131. * Marcy to Scott, July 12, 1847, ibid., 131 ; Uuchanan to Trist, July 13, 1847, ibia., "3- 5 Pollc's diary, June 12, 1847. 7 he Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo 3 1 7 as their despatches show, Trist and Scott continued their unseemly altercation. " Between them ", the diary says, " the orders of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State have been disregarded and tlie danger has become imminent that the golden moment for conchiding a peace with Mexico may have passed." ' The President was for recaUing both Scott and Trist, but the cabinet was unanimous in the opinion that it would be bad policy to do so. Realizing Trist's inefficiency, Polk then suggested that Soule or Jefferson Davis be associated with him, but nothing came of the suggestion." Writing from Puebla, June 13, Trist stated that he had had no intercourse with Scott for a month, although he had been near him for more than that time. His next letter, dated July 7, in which he is supposed to have given his reasons for making peace with the general, was never received at Washington. Scott made no report to the secretary of war from June 4 to July 25. At that time each asked that the correspondence relating to the quarrel be suppressed.* What caused the reconciliation, so far as their letters show, must remain a mystery. During the time in which Trist and Scott were quarreling, Trist asked the British minister, Bankhead. and Thorn- ton, the British secretary of legation, to transmit to the Mexican authorities Buchanan's letter, which Scott had refused to receive. Bankhead and Thornton readily acquiesced in his request and for- warded the letter to Ibarra, the acting minister of foreign affairs. In a few days the commissioner received through the same channel of communication the answer of the Mexican government. It was that the determination of the question of peace must rest with the Mexican congress." So far there was no reason to believe the way open for negotia- tions. Santa Anna sent a message to congress in which he per- emptorily ordered it to state whether or not any propositions for peace should be listened to.'' When the Mexican congress scattered and made no answer to the message, Santa Anna informed Mackin- tosh, the British consul at the City of Mexico, that as he was aban- doned by congress, he must, as military chief, endeavor to make 1 Ibid. •^ Ibid., July 9, 1847. 'Trist to Buchanan, June 13, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, I Session, 178-181. 'Scott to Marcy, July 25, 1847 : " Since about the 26th ultimo, our intercourse has been frequent and cordial ; and I have found him [Trist] able, discreet, courteous, and amiable.'' Ibid., \T,^. Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1S47 : Scott's "character I now be- lieve that I had entirely misconceived." Ibid., 302. ^Ibarra to Trist, June 22, 1847. ^ Santa Anna to the Mexican Congress, July 16, 1S47. S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Con- gress, I Session, 302-305. 3i8 J- -S- Reeves peace.^ His secret agents then intimated to Trist that while nothing could be done without the use of money, yet if a million dollars were placed in his hands at the conclusion of the peace and ten thousand immediately, commissioners would be sent to meet the American commissioner and negotiations begun." It was at this juncture that Scott and Trist began to be upon the most friendly terms, and Trist was a welcome guest at Scott's headquarters. Trist reported to Buchanan, upon the authority of Thornton, that Santa Anna would let Scott advance close to the City of Mexico and then nego- tiate.^ What was not reported was that Scott paid the ten thousand dollars of earnest-money after consultation with his officers.* The matter did not come to Polk's attention until December, when 'Gen- eral Pillow, enraged at what Polk called Scott's persecution of that officer, wrote of it to the President."* Scott reported the expendi- tures as those for secret service and asserted that he had never tempted the honor or patriotism of any man, but held it as lawful in morals as in war to purchase valuable information or services vol- untarily tendered him.* " General Scott's answer is evasive ", is the entry in the diary, " and leaves the irresistible inference that such a transaction took place and that it will not bear the light." " Writing to Buchanan, July 23, Trist copied a letter received by him from an unnamed source. Trist's correspondent, in whom undoubtedly the commissioner placed great confidence, wrote : " Santa Anna is afraid to make peace now and cannot. M " can do nothing with him, even with the aid he possesses from you. S. A. now says se- ' Thornton to Trist, July 29, 1847, MS. copy, Bureau of Indexes and ."Xrchives, Department of State. ^Ripley's Warwilh Mexico, II, 148-170; Polk's diary, December iS, 1847. ■^Trist to Buchanan, July 23, 1S47, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of State. * Ripley's War unth Mexico, II, 14S-170. General .Shields, however, told I'olk that Trist was not present at the conference. Polk's diary, December 28, 1S47. 5 Polk's diary, February 16, 1848: "The chief clerk of the War Department brought to me today a letter received from Majr. Genl. Pillow, dated at the City of Mexico on the iSth. of January in answer to a letter of the Secretary of War addressed to him in relation to certain proceedings of General Scott and Mr. Trist at Puebla in July last concerning an attempt to use money without any authority or sanction of the government, to bribe the authorities in Mexico, to secure peace. This letter discloses some astounding facts in relation to that infamous transaction and must lead to a further investigation." In the letters-received book of the War Department is the following entry under date of March 31, 1848 : "Pillow, Maj. Genl. G. J., Mexico, Jany. iS, 1848. In answer to letter of Sec. War Dec. 24, 1847 and relates to negotiations carried on at Puebla in July and Aug. 47." The letter referred to ca»not be found in the War Department. ' Scott to Marcy, February 6, 1848. II. Ex. Doc. 60, 30 Congress, I Session, 10S5. There is some discrepancy in the date. 'Polk's diary, February 19, 184S. 8 Mackintosh ? The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo 319 cretly that he shall allow )'Our army to approach this city [Mexico], even as far as the Penon, and then endeavour to make peace. "^ The advance of the army, however, was by no means unobstructed. The decisive victory at Contreras, followed by that at Churubusco, opened the way to the capital. Instead of pushing on to clinch the former victories, as the rules of military science would seem to have dictated, Scott halted his army and proposed an armistice. Was this done, as Scott said, lest the elements of peace might be scattered, or was it with the expectation that Santa Anna, with a part of the con- sideration cash in hand, would carry out the balance of the bargain? Through the good offices of Thornton, who with Bankhead and ^lackintosh played a large part in all these negotiations, the armistice became effective August 24. Santa Anna appointed as commis- sioners four well-known peace men to meet the American commis- sioner. The opportunity for which Trist had been waiting since May was now presented. Santa Annas commissioners met him as agreed. No further evidence of Trist's utter incapacity is needed than his own account of the conferences. Two days before the first meeting he made known to Santa Anna that in order to secure the boundary defined in his projet, with the right of transit over the isthmus, he was authorized and willing to go as high as the highest sum named in his instructions. This amount, he said, might be paid in such a way as to enable Santa Anna to convert all of it into cash as soon as the treaty was ratified.^ Such an unfortunate admission had the result he might have expected. Santa Anna's commissioners sub- mitted a counter-projet conceding nothing but Upper California north of the thirty-seventh parallel, for which the United States was expected to assume the claims and pay a bonus''. The Mexican commissioners insisted on the Nueces as a boundary, declaring that if peace were established it must be at that river. Trist hesitated and then oiifered to refer the question to Washington, thereby pro- posing to extend the armistice for at least forty-five days. ■" No more flagrant disobedience of orders was ever committed. The war had been begun and waged upon the theory that the Rio Grande was the ancient boundary of Texas. What persuaded Trist to submit tli"" matter for further instructions is incomprehensible. He himself ''I'rist to Buchanan, July 23, 1847, ^- S-, Ju'y 25. M.S., Kureau of Indexes and Archives, Despatches, Mexico, Vol. 14. ^Trist to Buchanan, September 4, 1847, MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Department of State. 'S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, i Session, 339. *The Mexican Commissioners to the Minister of Relations, September 7, 1S47, Ibid., 344-346. 320 J- S. Reeves explained it by saying that the Mexican commissioners led him to believe that a part of New Mexico would be ceded if the Nueces were accepted as a boundary. There was no reasonable foundation in fact, however, for any such belief, for Mexico demanded Trist's decision within three days upon the-counter-projet, by the terms of which New Mexico was to remain a Mexican province. Before that short time had elapsed Santa Anna's violations of the armistice be- came so notorious that Scott gave notice of its termination. The American army moved toward the capital and entered it only after two of the bloodiest battles of the war. Santa Anna's army was scattered and without a leader. Notwithstanding all this, Trist was blind to Santa Anna's duplicity. As late as September 27 he wrote that he was perfectly convinced of Santa Anna's sincere desire for peace, but that peace was an impossibility upon the terms of Buch- anan's instructions.'^ The armistice was a strategic blunder, giving Santa Anna opportunity to mass his forces for the defense of the capital, and the heavy losses suffered by Scott's army at ]\Iolino del Rey were the price paid for it. The overtures for peace displayed the gullibility of Trist, whose persistent belief that Santa Anna once bought would stay bought led him to ignore his instructions and to disobey Polk's most positive orders. Before Trist's reports of his inglorious conferences reached Washington, Polk had read the Mexican accounts of the affair sent from Vera Cruz. The President at once ordered Trist's recall. " Mr. Trist is recalled ", says the diary, " because his remaining longer with the army could not probably accomplish the objects of his mission, and because his remaining longer might and probably would impress the Mexican government with the belief that the United States are so anxious for peace, that they would ultimate [ly] conclude one upon Mexican terms. Mexico must now sue for peace and when she does, we will hear her proposition." ^ Trist's actions had surely merited his recall, but Polk's policy of continually making overtures, first by a series of notes suggesting peace and finally by sending a commissioner, gave Mexico exactly the belief which Polk attributed to Trist's blundering efforts alone. The policy was ill- advised and its instrument incompetent. The occupation of the City of Mexico, September 14, completely changed the complexion of affairs. Two days later Santa Anna resigned the presidency, and by so doing removed the one great obstacle to peace. Within a week after Santa Anna's abdication 'Trist to Buchanan, September 27, 1847, ibid., 201. ^Polk's diary, October 5, 1S47. Trist's despatcli of September 4 was received October 21. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 321 plans were well under way for the reorganization of the government under the auspices of well-known modcrados. Before it had been accomplished Trist again asked the Mexican commissioners to meet him. A month elapsed before he had an answer, and he asked Buchanan for permission to return home, as the weakness of the new government might keep him " hanging here for an indefinite period " without accomplishing anything.^ Buchanan's letter of recall reached Trist November 16. Trist acknowledged it. waived for the moment any defense of his actions, and stated that he would start home at once. Following hard upon the receipt of his recall Trist received word, again through Thornton, that the new Mexican administra- tion had appointed commissioners.^ He replied, November 24, that, as he was about to return to the United States, whatever over- tures Mexico desired to make would be forwarded through Scott to Washington.^ Despite this statement and notwithstanding his orders to return, he began immediately to negotiate with the Mexican commissioners upon the basis of his original instructions. The reasons for this change in plans are set forth in a letter of sixty pages written December 6.* This letter was certainly of a character to arouse the President's indignation. The diary describes it as " im- pudent, arrogant, very insulting to the government and personally offensive to the President ". The writer of it was " destitute of honor or principle and contemptibly base ". " It is manifest to me ", wrote Polk, " that he has become the tool of General Scott and his menial instrument and that the paper was written at Scott's instance and direction. I directed the Secretary of War to write to Major General Butler [who had superseded Scott], directing him, if Mr. Trist was still with the headquarters of the army, to order him oiT and to inform the authorities of Mexico that he had no authority to treat." ^ Scott, writing at the same time, said : " No proposition has been made to mc, looking to a peace, by the federal government of this republic, or its commissioners ; the latter understood to be still in this city. I have not seen them." '' This long despatch of Trist's doubtless justified Polk's suspicion that Scott instigated it. While Trist said that the government would be left at liberty to disavow his act, he set forth his reasons for ' Trist to Buchanan, October 31, 1847, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, I Session, 213. 2 Thornton to Trist, November 22, 1847, and to Pena y Pena, November 24, 1847, ibid., 231. 3 Trist to Fena y Pena, November 24, 1847, ibid. •Trist to Buchanan, December 6, 1847, received January 15, 1848, ibid., 231-266 ^ Polk's diary, January 15, 1848. S.Scott to Marcy, December 4, 1817, H. E"x. Doc. 60. 30 Congress, i Session, '033-1035- 322 J. S. Reeves reopening negotiations as: i, that peace was still the desire of the President ; 2, that unless he seized the opportunity offered, no other chance for peace would remain : 3, that the boundaries stipulated in his instructions were as much as Mexico would ever yield ; and 4, that his recall was based upon a supposed state of facts the reverse of the truth. Underlying all of his arguments in support of these reasons is the thinly-disguised innuendo that the President had changed his plans and now favored the annexation of all Mexico. In other words, Trist proceeded to make a treaty embodying Polk's original idea of territorial indemnity with the express- intention of throwing upon the President the unpleasant alternative of either accepting the treaty or rejecting it. If Polk rejected it, he must bear the odium of seeking to annihilate Mexico as a nation and of renew- ing a war which was now unpopular. If he accepted it, he would then, according to Trist's belief, sacrifice his cherished wish, the con- quest of the whole of Mexico. Such is the import of this unique despatch. Trist's assumption that Polk desired the absorption of all Mexico has been proved to be baseless.^ Reasonably enough, the President felt that the amount of money to be paid Mexico for the cession should be less than would have been the case had the war ceased seven months before. Pillow was in favor of greater terri- torial indemnity and claimed while in Mexico to be the President's mouthpiece. Trist shared Scott's hatred of that officer, and the parts of the despatch not directly or by inference attacking Polk are filled with venom against Pillow. Before Butler had an opportunity to carry out Polk's order, Trist had signed the treaty and sent it on its way to Washington. There are no detailed accounts of the conferences of which the treaty was the result. We know that for two months Trist met the commis- sioners daily, that the original projet was taken as a basis for the negotiation, and that there was apparently little difficulty in agreeing upon boundaries. The question of claims and of the condition of the inhabitants of the ceded territory occupied most of the meetings. The result was in hand February 2, 1848, when Trist met the Mex- ican commissioners to sign the treaty at Guadalupe-Hidalgo. " a spot ", said Trist, " which, agreeably to the creed of this country, is the most sacred on earth, as being the scene of the miraculous ap- pearance of the Virgin, for the purpose of declaring that Mexico was taken under her special protection ".- Seventeen days later Polk had in his hands the grant of territory '"The United States and Mexico, 1847-1848", by Professor E. G. Bourne, in American Historical Review, V, 491-502, April, 1900. 2 Trist to Buchanan, February 2, 184S, S. Ex. Doc. 52, 30 Congress, i Session, I02. The Treaty of Guadalupe- Hidalgo 323 which he had hoped to obtain through the peaceful negotiations of Slidell. The Rio Grande was acknowledged as the boundary of Texas ; New Mexico and Upper California were ours ; and the sum to be paid was that named in Trist's instructions : the treaty included all of Polk's sine qua non. That the right of transit over Tehuan- tepec was not included was a small matter, for the recent treaty with New Granada afiforded a better route to the Pacific. Benton's com- ment upon the treaty was that it was a fortunate event for the United States and especially for Polk's administration. " The Congress elections were going against the administration, and the aspirants for the presidency in the cabinet were struck with terror at the view of the great military reputations which were growing up." ' Haste in acting upon the treaty was of the utmost importance for two reasons : first, that the treaty might be returned to Mexico for ratification before the Mexican government should be overthrown ; and second, that the growing sentiment for " all of Mexico ", both in the cabinet and out of it, a sentiment to which the President was opposed, might be effectually stifled.- Polk made up his mind at once not to reject the treaty because of Trist's conduct. His desire for peace was so great that he did not permit himself to be influenced by his indignation at Trist's insulting letters. He decided, after stating his views to the cabinet, to send the document to the Senate, suggesting certain amendments and by so doing show a " magnani- mous forbearance toward Mexico ". Every member of the Senate committee on foreign relations, with the exception of the chairman, Sevier, was at first opposed to ratification. The reason for dieir attitude, as reported by the chairman to Polk, was not the terms of the treaty, but Trist's lack of authority to negotiate. " I told Sevier", the diary records, " that the treaty was the subject for consideration, not Trist's conduct and that if the provisions of the treaty were such as would be accepted, it would be worse than an idle ceremony to send out a grand commission to re-negotiate the same treaty." '' The Senate committee reported the treaty without amendment on the same day, and after two weeks' discussion the Senate first amended and then ratified it by a vote of thirty-eight to fourteen. The most important of the amendments was made at the suggestion of the 'Benton's Thirty Years' View, II, 710. ^Professor Bourne's article as cited. The treaty arrived in Washington February 19; Polk decided to send it to the Senate for ratification t'ebruary 21. Polk's diary, February 21, 1848. Calhoun wrote to Clenison, March 7, 1848 : " The greatest danger is, that the [Mexican] Government may not hold together until the treaty is exchanged. Nothing but the countenance of our Government, and the support of capitalists interested in preserving it, can continue it in existence. It is, indeed, but the shadow of a Gov- ernment." Report of American Hist^^ricnl Aisocinlion, iSgg, II, 746. 'Polk's diary, February 28, 1848. US,!."'' CONGRESS / S. /beeves \\ President, and by it the tenth article, relating to the disposition of the public lands in Texas, was stricken out. An additional secret article, delaying for eight months the time of Mexico's ratification, was for obvious reasons omitted by a unanimous vote. Sevier and Clififord, the latter Polk's attorney-general, were appointed commis- sioners in accordance with the provision of the treaty permitting the exchange of ratifications at the City of Mexico. As their duties were merely the gaining of Mexico's consent to the Senate's amendments. and the hastening of final ratification, their task was light. As soon as it was known that the Senate was modifying the terms of the agreement as signed, the Mexican government ceased all efforts for ratification until the nature of the amendments was known. .A. few days after the arrival of Sevier and Clifford at Mexico with the amended treaty, the ?ilexican congress agreed to ratification by prac- tically a unanimous vote. There was no glory in all this for Trist. Polk characterized him as an " impudent and unqualified scoundrel ". Upon his arrival at Washington the former chief clerk of the State Department found the doors closed to him. He could get the ear of no one, and after vainly trying for some time to collect his salary after the date of his recall, he left Washington. Insisting on having a hearing, he ad- dressed a long communication to the speaker of the House August 7, 1848, accusing the President of high crimes and misdemeanors, including subornation of perjury, and suggesting that Polk be im- peached.^ But there was no need for stirring up the matter in the hope of finding political capital against Polk. The time had gone by for that. The letter was received during the last days of the session and referred to the committee on foreign affairs, and there it slept. The war was over ; Polk's term was drawing to a close : and the country was in the midst of a presidential campaign. Trist was soon forgotten. The result of the election of 1848 was the choice of Taylor for President, one of the two great Whig generals who had reaped the political popularity which Polk had coveted. Scott was for the time passed by, and nobody had any consideration for the assertive and talkative commissioner who had made the treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo. But the persistent Trist did not despair, and twenty-two years later he secured from Congress the reward for his successful presumption.- The feeble old man, who had been one of Jefferson's family and afterward the friend of Jackson, was at last secure in the belief that he had been vindicated by his government. Jesse S. Reeves. ' Congresiioiial Globe, 30 Congress, I Session, 1057-1058. ^Senate Report 261, 41 Congress, 2 Session.