•^} 
 
 EV 
 
 fi' ■?' 
 
 ^^. 
 
 
 '0:.- 
 
 
 -1^ : 
 
 'v^:'. .^^.y-^^^^f^j.- 
 
 N^' 
 
 
 ,;-(»-• 
 
 '*-.?•: 
 
THE 
 
 NARRATIVE 
 
 OF 
 
 Lieut Gen. Sir William Howe, ^c. 
 
 [PRICE THREE SHILLINGS.] 
 
THE 
 
 NARRATIVE 
 
 OF 
 
 Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, 
 
 I N 
 
 A COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 ON THE 29™ OF APRIL, 1779, 
 
 RELATIVE TO 
 
 HIS CONDUCT, 
 
 DURING 
 
 HIS LATE COMMAND OF THE KING'S TROOPS 
 
 I N 
 
 NOR r H A M E RICA: 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED, 
 
 SOME OBSERVATIONS UPON A PAMPHLET, 
 
 ENTITLED, 
 
 LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN, 
 
 - ■! ' J I II i««— i— ■«— a— Bg—aaa— — — aa—B—t— » m i u i i 1 1 
 
 THE THIRD EDITION. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED BY H. BALDWIN, IN FLEET-STREET. 
 
 SOLD BY R, BALDWIN, IN PATERNOSTER-ROW J P. ELMSLEY, IN THE STRAND} 
 AND ALMON AND DEBRET, IN PICCADILLY, 
 
 MDCCLXXXI. 
 
.hi $3^ 
 
T PI E 
 
 NARRATIVE 
 
 OF 
 
 Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, ^c. 
 
 IF the peculiarities of my iituation be conlidered, I {hall not 
 be thought prelumptuous in defiring the indulgence of the 
 committee during the trefpafs I mufl: this day commit upon 
 their patience. The repugnance of his Majefty's minifters (in 
 this houfe at leaft) to declare any opinion concerning the tranf- 
 aftions of the American war during my command, although 
 poffeffed of all the necelTary, and only, documents, upon which 
 a judgement could have been formed, impelled me to move, that 
 my correfpondence with the Secretary of State for the American 
 department, might be laid before you. The moft material parts 
 of my condu6l, the reafons upon which I ad:ed, the plans which 
 I fuggefled and executed, appear in that correfpondence ; and 
 therefore to thofe who may have connected the whole in a re- 
 gular feries of dates and events, the detail into which I propofe 
 to enter may feem unneceflary. But I cannot flatter myfelf that 
 the papers have been confidered with fuch minute attention, nor 
 can I prefume to fuppofe, that all the circumftances of the 
 American war have been inverted with the partial view of 
 clearing the condud: of the man who commanded the army. 
 And, Sir,, it is with that partial view I now rife — for I mean 
 not to call in queftion the juftice, nor the policy of that war. 
 
 B I mean 
 
t 2 ] 
 
 I mean not to call in queftion the expediency of meafures which 
 have been framed, relaxed, or perfevered in, by the councils at 
 home. My objedt, at prefent, is confined to the explanation of 
 my own condudl:. 
 
 Many are the cenfures that have been paffed upon me. The 
 milreprefentations and falfe arguments of my enemies have made 
 a deep impreffion upon minds too prompt to decide ; whilft aa 
 ignorance of the true ftate of fa6ts has left the unprejudiced in 
 doubt. Thofe who alone could do me juflice, have been filent : 
 and therefore to the judgement of this committee, and to the 
 impartiality of my country at large, I at lafl: refort, flattering 
 myfelf with the hope of an ample juftification. 
 
 In the eourfe of the great variety of bulinefs which fell to my 
 lot, during fuch a wide and extenfive command, faults muft 
 undoubtedly be perceived, but none I hope which can be. 
 fufpeded to have arifen from want of zeal, or from inadivity. 
 In all military tranfadions, but more particularly in thofe of 
 America, where the nature of the war, in all its points, is with- 
 out example, the happieil commander will he be who efcapes 
 with the feweft blots. 
 
 The fads to which I principally wifh to turn the attention of 
 the committee, and which the papers upon your table bear 
 witnefs to, are 
 
 I/?. That I did not negled to furnifh the minifler of the 
 American department with every information, as well as with my 
 ideas, relative to the condud of the war from time to time. 
 
 id. That I did not fail to give my opinions refpeding what 
 appeared, pradicable to be done, with the fuccours required, or 
 expeded from Europe, and with the force at different times on. 
 the fpot. 
 
 3^. That my plans were carried into execution with as little 
 deviation, as, from the nature of military operations, could have 
 keen expeded, 
 
 ^tb. That 
 
.r 3 ] 
 
 ^th. That I never flattered the minifler with improper hopes 
 of feeing the war terminated in any one campaign, with the 
 force at any one time under my command. 
 
 I fliall now beg leave to trouble the committee v/ith a narra- 
 tive of thofe material operations of the war, which may lead to 
 an impartial judgement upon my general condudt, which may 
 obviate mifconceived opinions concerning particular events, and 
 which, with fome few remarks upon the feveral paiTages of the 
 correfpondence as they arife, may elucidate the truth of the 
 fadts p rem i fed. 
 
 The evacuation of Bofton was the firft material occurrence, 
 after my appointment to the command of his Majefly's forces in 
 North America. 
 
 On the 9th of November, 1775, I received the Secretary of 
 State's order, dated the 5 th of September, to abandon that town 
 before winter, and to move the army to New- York, or to fome 
 other place to the fouthward ^ my own reafons, indeed, againft 
 opening the campaign from Boflon, had been in the mean time 
 generally fet forth in a letter to his lordfliip of the 9th of October. 
 The late arrival of the order, and the deficiency of tranfporC 
 tonnage, rendered the removal of the troops impracticable till 
 the 17th of March following, when I embarked with about 6000 
 rank and file, fit for duty, and about 900 fick. 
 
 It has not been infinuated that any difgrace was brought upon 
 his Majefty's arms by the manner in which that town was eva- 
 cuated, faj 
 
 My let::er of the sift of March, 1776, accounts for my carry* 
 ing the army, with the incumbrances then belonging to it, to 
 
 B 2 Hallifax, 
 
 (a) In the examination of General Robertfon (one of the witncfies called by- 
 Lord George Germain) an attempt was made to prove that conilderable quanti- 
 ties of linen and woollen merchandizes, which might be of great ufc to the rebels, 
 Were left at Bofton, upon the evacuation of that town, although it was in my 
 power, to have carried the whole away. But though the General was of opinioa 
 that thofe goods might have been removed with the army, it was merely in the idea, 
 conceived from report, that they might have been carried away, if the holds of the 
 tranfports had been well (towed ; for he acknowledged that we were in great want 
 of (hipping, and that we took with us all the veflels ihat were fit to go to fea. 
 
[ 4 ]. 
 
 Hallifax, in preference to any other port. Concluding that the 
 reafons there given are fatisfadory, I do not trouble the com- 
 mittee with any farther explanation, except that I think the army 
 by going thither, received great benefit, not only from neceffary 
 refreflmients, but from the opportunity of being exercifed in 
 line, a very material part of difcipline, in which we were de- 
 fedive until that time. I might alfo add, that the troops per- 
 formed very eiTcntial fervice at Hallifax, by conftruding redoubts, 
 and other ftrong works, for the defence of the tov/n and dock, 
 whi^h could not have been executed by the garrifon. 
 
 My letters go on to fhow how the army was difpofed of 
 previous to the landing upon Long-Illand, while waiting for the 
 arrival of the troops from Europe, and from the expedition 
 againft South Carolina. That intermediate time, as I do not 
 recoiled, amongft the multiplicity of anonymous publications 
 againft me, any fault has been imputed, I pafs over, remarking 
 only, that from the violent heat of the weather, little adive fer- 
 vice could have been done, and that fuch fervice would probably 
 have been attended with much licknefs to the troops. 
 
 I beg leave here to fay, that although, to fave the time of the 
 committee, I may omit to mention many tranfadions of the war, 
 I fliall be v.dlling to folve all doubts which the members of this^ 
 committee may entertain, with refped to circumfiances not 
 touched upon, or not fufficiently explained. 
 
 I haften to the adion at Bedford on Long-Illand, the 27th of 
 Auguft, 1776, where a paragraph in my public letter of the 3d 
 of September has been quoted againft me as a violent charge^ 
 The paragraph is as follows. ** Had the troops been per- 
 ** mitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the 
 ** redoubts, but it was apparent the lines mufl: have been ours 
 ** at a cheap rate, by regular approaches, I would not riii^ the 
 ** lofs that might have been fuftained in the allliult, and ordered 
 " them back to a hollow way in the front of the works, out of 
 ** the reach of mufquetry." 
 
 This paragraph, I am free to own, I added to give here the 
 fame imprefiion that I felt of the ardour of the troops upon that 
 occafion. But I am at a lofs to know from whence it has been 
 
 fuppofed 
 
[ 5 1 
 
 fuppofed, that carrying the lines would have been followed by 
 the defeat of the rebel army. The fad:s are thcfe : — The rebels 
 had a body of men pofled in front of the lines, to guard againft 
 an attack from Flat-Bufli, and from the lower road upon their 
 right. Thefe troops were defeated with confiderable lofs. 
 The remainder of the corps was pofhed behind the lines, the 
 main army being then on York-Illand -, fo that admitting the 
 works to have been forced on the day of action, the only ad- 
 vantage we fhould have gained would have been the deflrudion 
 of a few more men, for the retreat of the greatefl part would 
 have been fecured by the works conftruded upon the heights 
 of Brooklyn, oppofite to New-York, and their embarkation 
 covered by a number of floating batteries. 
 
 On the other hand, the mofl eifential duty I had to obferve 
 was, not wantonly to commit his majeily's troops, where the 
 objed: was inadequate. I knev/ well that any confiderable lofs 
 fuftained by the army could not fpeedily, nor eafily, be repaired. 
 I alfo knew that one great point towards gaining the confidence 
 of an army (and a general without it is upon the moil dangerous 
 ground) is never to expofe the troops, where, as I faid before, 
 the ohjed is inadequate. In this inftance, from the certainty of 
 being in poflefiion of the lines in a very few days, by breaking 
 ground, to have permitted the attack in queflion, would have 
 been inconfiderate, and even criminal. The lofs of looo, or 
 perhaps i coo Britifli troops, in carrying thofe lines, would have 
 been but ill repaid by double that number of the enemy, could 
 it have been fuppofed they would have lufFered in that pro- 
 portion. 
 
 The neceiTary preparations, and ereding batteries, to facilitate 
 the landing upon the ifland of New-York and battering the 
 enemy's works at Horens-Hook, occupied us till the 15th of 
 September, when the poffefHon of New-York was effected, as 
 appears in my letter of the 21ft: of September, 1776. 
 
 From that time to the r2th of Odober we v/ere employed in 
 fortifying the heights from Macgowan's-Pafs to Noith River,, 
 about two miles from the ei^emy's moft advanced intrenchments, 
 and in getting polieiiion of Paulus-Hook. Some time was alio 
 neceffarily employed in enquiries refpeding the face of the 
 
 country 
 
[ 6 ] 
 
 country to be pofTeffeii, upon a fappofiiion that the enemy Tnould 
 remove from King's-Bridge. There was a ncceffity of entrench- 
 ing^ upon the height I have mentioned, in order to cover New- 
 York in the abfence of the main army. My publick letters of 
 the 23d, 24th, and 25th of September point out all thcfe par- 
 ticulars. 
 
 With regard to the knowledge of the country, fo neceflary to 
 be obtained previous to the movement from New-York, I beg 
 leave to mention the difficulties we laboured under in that refpe*it 
 throughout the war. 7 he country is fo covered with wood, 
 fwamps, and creeks, that it is not open in the leaft degree to 
 be known, but from poll to poft, or from accounts to be col- 
 lected from the inhabitants entirely ignorant of military defcrip- 
 tion. Thefe circumftances were therefore the caufe of fome un- 
 avoidable delay in our movements. 
 
 I muft here add, that I found the Americans not fo well dif- 
 pofed to join us, and to ferve us as I had been taught to exped; 
 that I thought our farther progrefs for the prefent, precarious, 
 and that I faw no profpcd; of finifhing the war that campaign. 
 Thefe fentimcnts I communicated to the Secretary of State in 
 the letters lall: mentioned. 
 
 From the 12th of Od:ober, the day the army landed on Frog's- 
 Neck, to the 21ft of the fame month, we were employed in 
 getting up {lores and provilions, in bringing over the dragoons, 
 the fecond divifion of FlefTians, the carriages and horfes for 
 tranfporting provifions, artillery, ammunition, and baggage. 
 Four or five days had been unavoidably taken up in landing at 
 Frog's-Neck, inftead of going at once to Pell's Point, which 
 would have been an imprudent meafure, as it could not have 
 been executed without much unnecelTary rifk. 
 
 On the 28th of October the engagement at the White-Plains 
 took place. But it has been afferted, that, by my not attacking 
 trie lines on the day of action, I loft an opportunity of deftroy- 
 ing the rebel army ; and it has been alfo faid, that I might have 
 cut off the enemy's retreat by the Croton-Bridge, Sir, an aflault 
 upon the enemy's right, which was oppofed to the Heffian troops 
 was intended. The committee mufl: give me credit when I alfure 
 J them, 
 
( 7 ] 
 them, that I have political reafons, and no other, for declining 
 fo explain why that ailault was not made. Upon a minute en- 
 quiry thole reafons might, if necellary, be brought out in evi- 
 dence at the bar. If, however, the aifault had been made, and 
 the lines carried, the enemy would have got off without much 
 lofs, and no way had we, that I could ever learn, of cutting off 
 their retreat by the Croton Bridge. I cannot conceive the. 
 foundation of fuch an idea. By forcing the lines we fliould un- 
 doubtedly have gained a more brilliant advantage, fome baggage, 
 and fome provifions; but we had no reafon to fuppofe that the 
 rebel army could have been deftroyed. The ground in their rear 
 was fuch as they could wifli, for fecuring their retreat, which 
 indeed feemed to be their principal objedt. And, Sir, I do not 
 hefitate to confefs, that if I could by any manoeuvre remove an 
 enemy from a very advantageous pofition, without hazarding the 
 confequences of an attack, where the point to be carried was not 
 adequate to the lofs of men to be expelled from the enterprife, 
 I fhould certainly adopt that cautionary condud:, in the hopes 
 of meeting my adverfary upon more equal terms. 
 
 But to proceed in my narrative. — My publick letter of the 
 30th of November relates the further proceedings of the army,. 
 until Lord Cornwallis arrived at Brunfwick in the Jerfeys, in 
 which is included the taking of Fort Wafliington, afterwards 
 called Fort Knyphaufen. I need not trouble the committee with 
 ether particulars in that period : But I muft fay I fhould have 
 been highly blameable, had I ordered the noble lord to have fol- 
 lowed the enemy beyond Brunfwick, when the whole of his. 
 corps had not joined him, 
 
 I refer to my publick letter of the 20th of December for arh 
 account of the progrefs of that corps until the 14th of that 
 month, when they went into cantonments, which I was hopeful 
 they might have maintained. My firff intentions wer^ to have 
 made Brunfwick the left,, and Elifabeth-Town, or Newark,, 
 the right of thofe cantonments ; and my reafon for extending to 
 Trenton was, that a confiderable number of the inhabitants came 
 in with their arms, in obedience to the proclamation of the com- 
 miffioners on the 30th of November. I took upon •, e to riik 
 that poli under the command of a brave ofricer^ with the fupport 
 
 of 
 
[ s ] 
 
 of Colonel Donop at Bordentown, five miles dldant, with a very 
 flronc' corps. The two polls were occupied by nine battalions, 
 the Heffian cavalry, and a party of the i6th regiment of light 
 dra?oons, amounting in the whole to upwards of 3000 men, 
 with lixteen field pieces. The light infantry of the army, a 
 brin-ade of infantry, and fome dragoons, were ported at Prince- 
 town, in the chain of cantonments, twelve miles from Trenton. 
 But it has been objeded to me that I ought not to have intrufted 
 
 the important poft of Trenton to the Heffian troops. Myanfwer 
 to this, if clearly underftood, will I think be fatisfadory, 
 Military men will certainly underfland it. The left. Sir, was 
 the poll of the Heffians in the line, and had I changed it upon 
 this occafion it muft have been confidered as a difgrace, fince the 
 lame fituation held in the cantonments as in the camp. And it 
 probably would have created jealoufies between the Heffian and 
 Britiffi troops, which it was my duty carefully to prevent. 
 
 Colonel Donop, who commanded the two pofts, was perfectly 
 fatislied with his fituation, and fo was Colonel Rhall. They 
 both had timely information of the intended attack : The num- 
 bers of the enemy, I was credibly informed, did not exceed 
 3000, and if Colonel Rhall had obeyed the orders I fent to him 
 for the erecting of redoubts, I am confident his pofl: would not 
 have been taken. 
 
 I would afk thofe who objedl to this part of the diftribution, 
 where could the Heffian troops have been better employed than 
 in the defence of a poft ? In the laft war they were efteemed not 
 unequal to any troops in Prince Ferdinand's army, and I fliould 
 do them much injuftice were I not to fay they were in very high 
 order in America. Tv/o of thefe very battalions had ferved in 
 Germany with great credit, and the whole brigade under Colonel 
 Rhall's command had given a recent proof of their bravery at 
 the attack of FortKnyphaufen. 
 
 The pofleffion of Trenton was extremely defireable; could we 
 have preferved it we fliould have covered the greateft part of the 
 country to the eaftward of Prince-town, including the whole 
 county of Monmouth, where I had reafon to think there were 
 many loyal inhabitants. We fliould alfo have been fo near Phi- 
 3 ladelphia 
 
[ 9 ] 
 
 ladelphia that we might poffibly have taken poffeffion of it in 
 the courfe of the winter ; though I confefs I had feveral reafons 
 for doubting the expediency of that meafure at that time. 
 
 My principal objedl in fo great an extenfion of the cantonments 
 was to afford protection to the inhabitants, that they might expe- 
 rience the difference between his majefly's government, and that 
 to which they were fubjed: from the rebel leaders. For, Sir, 
 although fome perfbns condemn me for having endeavoured to 
 conciliate his majefly's rebellious fubjeds, by taking every means 
 to prevent the deftrucftion of the country, inilead of irritating them 
 by a contrary mode of proceeding, yet am I, from many reafons, 
 fatisfied in my own mind that I aded in that particular for the 
 benefit of the king's fervice. Minifters themlelves, I am per- 
 fuaded, did at one time entertain a fimilar doctrine, and from a 
 circumftance not now nece/fary to dwell upon, it is certain that I 
 fhould have had little reafon to hope for fupport from them, if I 
 had been difpofed to ads of great feverity. Had it been afterwards 
 judged good policy to turn the plan of the war into an indifcri- 
 minate devaftation of that country, and had I been thought the 
 proper inflrument for executing fuch a p]an, miniiliers, I prefume, 
 would have openly (bood forth, and fent clear, explicit orders. 
 Ambiguous meffages, hints, whifpers acrofs the Atlantick, to 
 be avowed, or difavowed at pleafure, v/ould have been paltry 
 fafeguards for the honour and condud: of a commander in chief. 
 
 I now return to my narrative.- — Previous to the lofs of Trenton 
 I had detached General Clinton with 6000 men to take poffefiion 
 of Rhode-lfland, the fuccefs of which expedition is mentioned in 
 my publick letter of the 20th of December 1776. This was 
 one material point in the general plan of operations. And here 
 I mufl beg leave to call the attention- of the committee to my 
 feparate letter of the 30th of November, 1776, wherein is fet 
 forth my iirft plan for the next campaign, with the force requifite, 
 in order, if poffible, to finilh the war in one year. My propo- 
 fitions were, that we (hould have 10,000 men to a6l on the lide 
 of Rhode-Illand, and penetrate eaftward into the country towards 
 Bofton, leaving 2000 for the defence of Rhode-iiland, 10,000 in 
 the province of New- York, to move up the North River to 
 Albany, 5000 for the defence of York-Ifland and its De- 
 
 C _ pendencies 
 
f 'o ] 
 
 pendencies, 8000 to cover Jerfey, and to keep General Wafh- 
 ington's army in check, by giving a jealoufy to Philadelphia, 
 which as well as Virginia I propofcd to attack in autumn, 
 provided the fuccefs of other operations (liould have admitted of 
 fendino- thither an adequate force. South Carolina and Georgia 
 I propofed as objedts for winter. But to carry ^his plan into 
 execution I informed his Lordfliip, that ten fliips of the line, 
 and a re-inforcement of i 5,000 rank and file would be abfolutely 
 neceflary, befides an additional battalion of artillery. According 
 to this calculation the army under my command would probably 
 have confifted of 35,000 effedlive men, to oppofe 50,000 voted by 
 the congrefs for the next campaign, exclufive of the large bodies 
 of militia, who were to be collected on the fhorteft notice. I 
 mentioned at the fame time the fpirit infufed into the people by 
 their leaders from the ftrongeft alTurances of procuring the affift- 
 ance of foreign powers, and that it was faid Dr. Franklin was 
 gone to France to follicit the aid of that court. 
 
 This letter of the 30th of November was received by the Se- 
 cretary of State on the 30th of December. On the 9th of March, 
 1777, I received his lordfhip's anfwer, dated the 14th of January. 
 This anfwer it is to be obferved was by no means decifive. 
 The determination upon my plan was poftponed until the arrival 
 of my next letter, when Major Balfour (one of my aides du camp, 
 and then in England) was to be immediately defpatched. My 
 requifition, as has been juft flated, was for 15,000 rank and file 
 in order to complete the army to 35,000 effedtive men. The 
 noble lord, in the letter I am now quoting, hopes that he fliall 
 be able to augment the army under my command to near 35,000, 
 although he propofes fending me only 7,800. This mifconceived 
 calculation can no othervvile be accounted for, as I apprehend, 
 than by his lord/hip's computing the fick, and the prifoners with 
 the rebels, as a part of the real effedtive ftrength of the army ; 
 and yet I cannot fee how fuch amiftake could have arifen, as my 
 requifition was fpecifick, for 15,000 men, rank and file. His 
 lordlhip further declares, that it is beyond his power to 
 furnilh me with the additional battalion of artillery. If any 
 thing could be an alleviation of my difappointment in thele 
 refpedis, it was the affurance which accompanied it, that — 
 " whatever degree of fupport the rebels had been taught to 
 
 ** expert 
 
[ n ] 
 
 ** expe(5l from foreign powers, his lordihip had great reafon to 
 •* believe that Dr. Franklin would not be able to procure 
 *' them any open affiftance." 
 
 During the doubts I entertained, whether the large re-inforce- 
 ment I had requfted would arrive in time for the execution of 
 the extenfive plan mentioned in my letter of the 30th of No- 
 vember, 1776, I had information, which I thought might be 
 depended on, that the redudion of Pennfylvania was pra<5licable, 
 even upon the fuppoiition that the whole of my flrength, fit for 
 duty at the opening of the campaign, might not exceed 19,000 
 men. I therefore fuggefled, in my feparate letter of the 20th 
 of December, 1776, a fecond plan, which was for acTting next 
 campaign in Pennfylvania, and which, when I was told I mud 
 expert a re-inforcement of only 7,800 men, little more than half 
 my requilition, I concluded was to be adopted. 
 
 I remarked that by this plan the march towards Bofton, which 
 I had before propofed, muil be deferred until the required re- 
 inforcements fhould arrive from Europe ; but as thefe operations, 
 perhaps of the laft importance to the nation, might depend upon 
 the exigences of the moment, I follicited his lordfliip to point 
 out any general plans that might be thought mofl advifeable, as 
 well with refpe<5t to the prefent flrength of the army, as in the 
 event of re-inforcements, remarking to me the periods of time 
 in which I might expedt the arrival of troops. This letter 
 having been received in England on the 23d of February, 1777, 
 which was long before General Burgoyne's departure, the minifher 
 had full opportunity of communicating the contents to that 
 general, and of making fuch changes as he might judge expedient 
 to co-incide with the northern operations. 
 
 Prefuming that it was my duty to omit no opportunity of 
 communicating, though it might be deemed repeating, my ideas 
 to the Secretary of State, my private letter of the 20th of 
 January, 1777, was alfo full and explicit. I there afTure him, 
 that there mull be another campaign, for I found that upon the 
 good news from Quebec, in 1776, he had hoped, that a profpedl 
 was open for ending the war in one campaign. I preiTed for 
 more troops — I told him that a re-info rcemcnt of 20,000 men 
 was requisite, but that 15,000 would give us a fuperiority, 
 
 C 2 pointing 
 
[ 12 ] 
 
 pointing out Philadelphia, for the reafons before mentioned, as 
 the principal objedt j I obferved, that an augmentation of 20,000 
 men would admit of my detaching a corps thither by fea, whilfl 
 the main body might penetrate by the way of Jerfey. On the 
 other hand I obferved, that if the re-inforcements were fmall the 
 operations would be of courfe curtailed. This letter alfo arrived 
 in England prior to General Burgoyne's departure. Both letters 
 are anfwered the 3d of March, 1777, and brought by Major 
 Balfour, who arrived at New-York on the 8th of May. 
 
 I had now the Secretary of State's entire approbation of my 
 fecond plan, the expedition to Pennfylvania; my reafons for de- 
 viating from my former plan being, as his lordfhip is pleafed to 
 exprefs himfelf, folid and decifive. He laments, however, that 
 inllead of augmenting the army to 35,000, which I had requefted, 
 and which I had fome reafon to hope for, inftead of even re- 
 inforcing me with 7,800 he could only allow me to expeiSt 2,900 
 that is to fay not a fifth part of the number I had required. It is 
 to be obferved, that his lorddiip at the fame time, notwithftand- 
 ing fo great a reduction of the re-inforcemnts requifite for the 
 operations determined upon and approved of, recommends a warm 
 diverfion to be made on the coafts of MalTachufet's-Bay and New 
 Hampfhire, as fiir as the main plan will permit. The admiral 
 and I however, agreeably to his Lordihip's commands, con- 
 fulted upon the expediency of the diverfion, and in my letter 
 of the third of June, 1777, I informed the Secretary of State, 
 that we found it not to be pradiicable without interfering ma- 
 terially with thofe more important operations of the campaign 
 which had been approved of by himfelf, and which were al- 
 ready too much curtailed from a want of a land force. -r; 
 The army fit for actual duty at this time, exclufive of about 
 2000 provincials, was 14,000 fliort of the number I had ex- 
 pcifled. 
 
 But to refume the chain of my correfpondence. Finding by 
 the Secretary of State's, letter of the 14th of Jan. 1777, received 
 on the 9th of March following, that the re-inforcements were 
 not to be expedcd, I totally relinquiflied, in my fecret letter of 
 the 2d of April, the idea of any offenfive operation, except that 
 to the Southward, and a diverfion occafionally upon Hudfon's- 
 
 River^ 
 
[ 13 ] 
 
 River. I informed the Secretary of State that the principal part 
 of the plan formerly propofed could no longer be thought of; 
 that the Jerfeys muft be abandoned, and Pennfylvania be invaded 
 only by fea ; that in the former campaign my force was equal 
 to the operations, but that in the enfuing one, from the feveral 
 pofls neceffary to be preferved, the oifenfive army would be too' 
 weak for rapid fuccefs ; and that reflrid:ed as I was from entering 
 upon more extenlive operations, by the want of force, my hopes 
 of terminating the war that year were vanifhed ; that notwith- 
 ilanding the whole rebel army, 50,000 men, voted in autumn^^ 
 might not be raifed, the enemy would have a numerous militia 
 in the field, in addition to their ftanding force, and a good train 
 of artillery. I at the fame time tranfmitted my diftribution of 
 the army for the campaign, by which it is to be obferved, that 
 my real effecftive force exclufive of 3000 provincials amounted 
 only to 18,100 (bj. 
 
 The noble Lord's anfwer to this letter, dated the i8th of May, 
 1777, contains a repeated approbation of the expedition to 
 Pennfylvania; but it is remarkable in other refpedts — He ftates 
 his inability to furnifh me with the fupplies requefted, and is 
 concerned to find tha^t I do not imagine my force to be as fui table 
 to the operations of the enfuing campaign as I had confcfied it 
 was to thofe of the lad. Thefe expreffions. Sir, require obfer- 
 vation — They feem eager to catch me in the confeffion that my 
 force was fuitable to the operations of the laft cumpaign, and 
 would from thence imply, that 'my force was equally fuitable^ 
 to the operations of any oi'her campaign. Now, Sir, even if I 
 had not explained my idea'upon -the point (which however I - 
 clearly did) I think it might have been obvious to any man lefs 
 acquainted than his lordfhip with military reafpning, that the 
 force which had been fufficient ta take poflefFion of New-York,^ 
 and other ftrong holds of the enemy, could not, after the neceffary 
 divifions for preferving the variety of pofts we had gained, be 
 equally fuitable to the making of n'eW conquefts. For is it not 
 felf-evident, that the power of ail army mlift diminifli in pro- 
 portion to the decreafe of their numbers ? And muft not their 
 numbers for the field necefiarily decreafe, in proportion' to the 
 
 town-s^ 
 
 {l>) In Hating numbers prefent, rank and file fit for duty is always meanUv 
 
[ '4 } 
 
 towns, pofls, or forts, which we take, and are obliged to pre* 
 ferve ? But his Lordfliip proceeds to fay, that his concern (on 
 account of this imagination of mine) is in a great degree alle- 
 viated by the intelligence which he daily receives, of the 
 rebels finding the utmoll: difficulty in rnifing an army to face 
 his majefty's troops — From the fuppofed wcaknefs of the enemy, 
 and the good inclination of the inhabitants, he has every reafon 
 to exped: that my fuccefs in Pennfylvania will enable me to raife 
 amongft them fuch a force, as may be fufficient for the interior 
 defence of the province — He declines a particular confideration 
 of the advantages which may be expeded from a fuccefsful exe- 
 cution of my prefcnt plan, but is pleafed to inform me (in con- 
 tradidion to my repeated reprefentations and affertions) that he 
 is infpired with no fmall degree of hope, that this campaign will 
 put an end to the unhappy conteft. Thus, Sir, all my pofitive 
 alfurances, ariiing from a declared want of force, and from a 
 plain ftate of fads, are here anfwered with a fingle argument 
 of his own dclufive hopes, built upon a fuppofition of the 
 enemy's weaknefs •. To what a dilemma is a commander reduced, 
 when, after having repeatedly cpmplained of his deficiency of 
 ftrength, the minifler, from information colleded here at home, 
 or frbm hopes fuggefled by fears, oppofes his own conjecture 
 (I cannot call it judgement) and tells him, that decifive fuccefs 
 is ftill expedled from him ? If the powers of this country, or 
 the extent of his Lordfliip's influence, could not have raifed the 
 force required, that anfwer would have been fatisfadiory to me 
 and no reflection upon himfelf. That anfwer would have re- 
 lieved my mind from an apprehenfion I began to entertain, that 
 my opinions were no longer of weight; and that of courfe the 
 confidence fo necefl^ary to the fupport, fatisfadion, and indeed, 
 fecurity, of every man in a refponfible fituation, was with- 
 drawn. If the noble Lord had thought that my requifition for 
 more troops was unnecefl^ary, and that the force he had already 
 furnifhed was adequate, why did he not take the manly part of 
 appointing fome other perfon to fulfil thofe fanguine expeda- 
 tions, which from duty and convidion I had laboured to dif- 
 countenance ! 
 
 In order to preferve, as well as I can, the hiflorical chro- 
 nology, amidfl: fuch numerous events and quotations, I mufl: in 
 I this 
 
[ '5 ] 
 
 this place remind the committee, that in my letter to the Secre- 
 tary of State of the 2d of April 1777, I enclofed a copy of a 
 confidential letter which I wrote on the 5th of the fame month 
 fpontaneoufly to Sir Guy Carleton ; I fay fpontaneoufly, becaufe 
 I had not at that time received any official information, concern- 
 ing the plan of the northern expedition which I conceived v/as 
 to take place that year. It may be recolleded, that the fubftancc 
 of this letter was, that I fhould probably be in Pennfylvania 
 at the time when the northern army would be ready to enter 
 the province of New-York ; that little affiftance was to be 
 expected from me to facilitate their approach, as a want of 
 fufficient fhrength in my own army would probably not admit 
 of my detaching a corps to a(5l up Hudfon's River in the be- 
 ginning of the campaign. 
 
 On the 5th of June I received a copy of the Secretary of 
 State's letter to Sir Guy Carleton, dated the 26th of March 1777, 
 wherein he communicates to him the plan of the northern expe- 
 dition, and adds, " that he will write to Sir William Howe by 
 ** the firft packet." 
 
 I muft obferve, that this copy of a letter to Sir Guy Carleton, 
 though tranfmitted to me, was not accompanied with any in- 
 ftrucftions whatfoever -, and that the letter intended to have been 
 written to me by the firfl: packet, and which was probably to 
 have contained fome infl:rud:ions, was never fent. 
 
 I now come to the fummer of 1777, paffing over the expedi- 
 tions in March and April to Peeks-Kili and Danbury. 
 
 The progrefs of our army in Jerfey being alfo fully mentioned 
 in my letters upon the table, I likewife pafs over the various oc-^ 
 currences there, previous to the embarkation at Staten-Illand. 
 But as I have been blamed for not marching, before I left 
 Jerfey, to attack General Walhington, ported at Middlebrook, 
 I muft beg leave to trouble the committee with a few words upon 
 that point. 
 
 To have attacked General Wafhington in that Itrong pofl I 
 muft necelTarily have made a confiderable circuit of the country ; 
 and having no profped: of forcing him, I did not think it 
 
 advifeable 
 
[ i6 ] 
 
 advifeable to lofe fo much time as mu ft have been employed upon 
 that march, during the intenle heat of the feafon. 
 
 Exclulive of this confideration, our return muil have been 
 through a very difficult and exhaufted country, where there was 
 no pollibility of keeping up the communication with Brunfwick, 
 from whence alone we could draw our provifions ; and the force 
 with me at that time amounting only to about j looo men, 
 it would not admit of fufficient detachments to preferve the 
 communication. The movement v/hich I did make in two co- 
 lumns was with a view of drawing on an aftion, if the enemy 
 fliould have defcended from his poii, and been tempted towards 
 the Delav/are, in order to defend the paifage of the river, on a 
 fuppofition that I intended to crofs it. But as the pofition of 
 my lirfi: column at Hilllborough mull have induced that idea, 
 and yet had not the deiired effecfl, I determined to return to 
 Brunfwick, and to follow the plan which had been approved by 
 the minifter. Thefe reafons, together with thofe athgned in 
 my letter of the 5th of July, 1777, will I hope fufficiently ac- 
 count for my not attacking General Walhington upon that occa- 
 fion. I muft alfo obferve, that even fo long before as in my 
 letter of the 2d of April, I declared it was not my intention to 
 undertake any oifenfive operation in the Jerfeys, unlefs fome very 
 advantageous opportunity fhould offer. 
 
 But it has been afked, why I did not crofs the Delaware, 
 and proceed by land to Philadelphia ? To this I anfwer, that, 
 from a want of fufficient means to pafs fo large a river, I judged 
 the difficulties and the rilk too great, more efpecially as the 
 enemy had a corps ready for the defence of it, exclufive of their 
 main army in my rear. 
 
 I have already fhown, that finding the promifed re-inforce- 
 ments were not to be expected, I informed the Secretary of State 
 that the plan firfl: propofed could no longer be thought of; that 
 the Jerleys muft be abandoned, and Pennfylvania be invaded 
 only by iea. The communication for proviiions through luch 
 an extent of country could not poffibly be maintained with the 
 force then at my command. This, Sir, is furely a fatisfadlory 
 anfwer to the charge of my not having proceeded to Philadelphia 
 at that time by land. 
 
 In 
 
 > 
 
i 17 1 
 
 In my next letter of the 7th of July, 1777, I obferved 
 ** that the war was now upon a far different fcale with refpe»5t 
 *' to the increafed powers and llrength of the enemy, than it 
 *' was laft campaign, their officers being much better, with an 
 " addition of feveral from the French fervice, and a refpedtable 
 ** train of field artillery: That 50 pieces of brafs cannon had been 
 ** landed at Boflon, and that the rebel army in Jerfey had al- 
 *' ready with it a field train of 40 pieces — That unlefs the 
 ** Britilli regiments were completed with drafts and good re- 
 " cruits, v/e fli^ould foon lofe our confequence by the current 
 *' cafualties of a campaign, even without a general adion : 
 ** That a corps of 10,000 Ruffians, effective fighting men, might 
 ** infure the fuccefs of the war to Great-Britain in another cam- 
 " paign: But that if they were not to be had, and if we 
 ** lliould fucceed this campaign in the pofi^effiion of Pennfyl- 
 *' vania, the Jerfeys, and the province of New York (which 
 ** I had before faid mud in a great meafure depend upon the 
 ** fuccefs of the northern army) the drafts of troops in that 
 ** cafe for the prefervation of them in the next campaign, would 
 ** be great, at the fame time that a confiderable force would be 
 ** requifite for the reduction of the northern provinces, wherein 
 ** three armies fhould be employed to make it effed:ual : And 
 ** that even in our prefent ftate, twenty regular battalions were 
 *-* employed for the fecurity of York-Illand with its Dependencies, 
 ** and Rhode-Illand." 
 
 It may be obferved, that I made various alterations from time 
 to time in the plans of operations, but I flatter myfelf they will 
 be found folid, fo far as they relate to the diftribution of the 
 troops to Rhode-Illand, New- York, and the main army. 
 
 With regard to the main army, the quefcion is, " Whether it 
 ** could have been difpofed to better advantage than upon 
 ** the expedition which took place to Pennfylvania ?" — an expe- 
 dition faid by fome gentlemen to have been the caufe of the 
 fubfequent misfortunes : Thofe gentlemen will, I prefume, 
 endeavour to fupport this flrong affertion by evidence of the 
 officers, the General officers, upon whofe opinions they profefs 
 to have founded their judgement. If there are any in this Com- 
 mittee who have formed a fimilar conclufion from their own 
 
 D reafoning. 
 
[ i8 ] 
 
 reafoning, I truft they will this day favour me with their ground' 
 for luch opinion, unlels they rtiould be faiisfied with what I 
 am going to ftate in my j unification. And in making this re- 
 quell I know I addrefs myfclf to men of honour, who cannot 
 mean a wanton accufation, but who may wifli to be fatisfied in 
 points not fufficiently explained. 
 
 And here. Sir, although I might fhelter myfelf from this- 
 violent charge, by referring to the complete approbation, as 
 well as the acquiefcence of the Secretary of State ; and might 
 anfwer every obje(Stion by the fhort obfervation, that the reafons 
 for adopting this expedition are adjudged by his Lordiliip to be 
 folid and decifive; yet am I content to wave that juftification, and 
 to fland entirely upon the merits and policy of the meafure itfelf. 
 
 Perfons of fome authority, I am told, have faid, *' that the 
 ** army ought to have gone into New-England, others that it 
 ** ought to have gone up Hudfon's River." Permit me to examine 
 the propriety of both thefe opinions, by coniidering wliat would 
 have been the confequences, if either of them had been adopted. 
 
 Suppofe, in the firll place, it had gone to New-England, 
 would that meafure have led to a conclufionof the war ? I think 
 not. For, Sir, wherever, the main body of our army had gone, 
 there mofl affuredly would General Wafhington have gone alfo, 
 but that he would have avoided a general adion, I am authorifed 
 to fay, not only from his conflant uniform condudl in that 
 refpeil: (and in which, no doubt, he ad:ed judicioufly) but alfo 
 from this very obvious reafon : He knew we could not have kept 
 any part of Connedicut in the winter, except oae or two places 
 upon the coail of the Sound ; lituations which could not have 
 forwarded the recovery of that province. — In Connediicut, there- 
 fore, there was no objedl for which he could have been tempted 
 to riilc a general adion. 
 
 Befides, the provinces of New England are not only the mod 
 populous, but their militia, when brought to adion, the mofl 
 perfevering of any in all North America; and it is not to be 
 doubted that General Wafliington, with his main army, would 
 have followed me into a country where the ilrcngth of the Con- 
 tinent, encouraged by his prefence, would have been mofl fpee- 
 dily colleded. 
 
 3 ii^ 
 
[ J9 3 
 
 In Pennfylvanla the profpe(5l was very difTerent. The increare 
 of force which that country could afford to Wafliington v/as 
 fmall in comparifon to the other, and the defence of Philadel- 
 phia was an objedt, which I juftly concluded would engage the 
 whole of his attention. It was incumbent upon him to rifk a 
 battle, to preferve that Capital And as my opinion has always 
 been, that the defeat of the rebel regular army is the furefl road 
 to peace, I invariably purfued the moH: probable means of forcing 
 its Commander to adlion, under circumftances the leafl: hazardous 
 to the royal army ; for even a victory, attended by a heavy lofs of 
 men on our part, would have given a fatal check to the progrefs 
 of the war, and might have proved irreparable. 
 
 Thefe, Sir, were my inducements at the time, for carrying his 
 Majefty's arms into the province of Pennfylvania in preference to 
 thofe of New-England. ^^y 
 
 Had the re-inforcements I required been granted. New Eng- 
 land would have had a lliare in the general operations of the 
 campaign while the main body ad:ed to the fouthward. But 
 with an army upon the fmaller fcale, that plan was impradlicable, 
 and I have already given my reafons why I could not carry the 
 main army into thofe provinces, unlefs I had been really defirous 
 of protracting the war for my private advantage, a motive which 
 has been bafely imputed to me by thofe who wifh to perpetrate 
 the ruin both of my profeffional and my private character. 
 
 The fecond fuggeflion is, that I ought to have gone up Hud- 
 fon's-River, in order to facilitate the approach of the northern 
 army to Albany. What would have been the confequences of 
 fuch an expedition ? Before the objedt of it could have been 
 attained, the forts in the Highlands muil: have been carried, 
 which would probably have coil a confiderable number of men, 
 defended, as they would have been, by General Wafliington'3 / 
 whole force. But thefe forts being carried, how would the 
 enemy have aCted ? In one of thefe two ways : He would either 
 have put himfelf between me and New-York, or between me 
 and the northern army. In either cafe I am of opinion, that 
 
 D 2 the 
 
 (a) I have omitted a computation of the ftrength of the New-England pro- 
 vinces, .becaufe it is impoffible to fpeak of it with a I'ufiicient degree of accuracy. 
 
[ 20 1 ^ 
 
 the fuccefs of our efforts upon Hudfon's-River, could not from 
 the many difficulties in penetrating through fo Very ftrong a 
 country, have been accompliflied in time to have taken poffeffion 
 of Philadelphia that campaign. But admitting I had at length 
 reached Albany, what fhould I have gained, after having ex- 
 pended the campaign upon that obje6l alone, that I had not a 
 right to exped by drawing off General Wafhington, with the 
 principal American army, from any operations on that fide ? 
 
 When it is confidered hov/ invidious and how minute a fcru- 
 tiny has been made into my condu6l, and into the motives of 
 my condudt, I fhall not be thought to fpeak abfurdly if I fay, 
 that had I adopted the plan of going up Hudfon's-River, it 
 would have been alledged, that I had wafted the campaign 
 with a confiderable army under my command, merely to enfure 
 the progrefs of the northern army, which could have taken care 
 of itfelf, provided I had made a diverfion in its favour, by drav/- 
 ing off to thefouthward the main army under General Wailiing- 
 ton. Would not my enemies have gone farther, and infmuated, 
 that, alarmed at the rapid fuccefs which the honourable General 
 had a right to exped: when Ticonderoga fell, I had envioufly 
 grafped a (hare of that merit which would otherwife have been 
 all his own ? and let me add, would not Minifters have told you, 
 as they truly might, that I had afted without any orders or in- 
 ffrudlions from them ; that General Burgoyne was diredted to 
 force his own way to Albany, and that they had put under his 
 command troops fufficient to effed: the march ? Would they 
 not have referred you to the original and fettled plan of that ex- 
 pedition (which is amongfl the papers on your table) to prove 
 that no affi fiance from me was fuggefted ? and would they not 
 readily have impreffed this houfc with the conclufion, that if 
 any doubt could have arifen in their minds of the fuccefs of fuch 
 a well digefted plan, they fliould, from the beginning, have made 
 me a party in it, and have given me explicit inflrudtions to ad: 
 accordingly ?- 
 
 And now, Sir, Having fufficiently, and I hope fatisfadorily 
 fpoken to the two plans, which fome perfons have judged ought 
 to have taken place j I return to the only one which, in my 
 opinion, could with propriety have been adopted. — After the 
 
 4 moff 
 
[ 21 ] 
 
 mofl: mature deliberation, and frequent confultation with the 
 Admiral, Lord Cornwallis, and other General officers j after 
 weighing all the circumilances of every poiTible operation ; after 
 the molt probable conclulion, founded upon the bed intelli- 
 gence, that General VVafliington would follow me, I determined 
 on purfuing that plan which would make the moll efFedual di- 
 verfion in favour of the northern army, which promifed in its 
 confequences the moft important fuccefs, and which the Secre- 
 tary of State at home, and my own judgement upon the fpot, 
 had deliberately approved. 
 
 It was not one province, but three, that I conceived we had 
 reafon to take polleffion of at the end of the year 1777. The 
 firll: objedl was Philadelphia, a city from whence, by means of 
 the River Delaware, the rebels drew the greateft part of their 
 fupplies — -the capital of Pennfylviana — the capital, as it were, 
 and relidence of the Congrefs in North-America, fituated in one 
 of the mofl fertile provinces of that Continent, and in v/hich I 
 include the three lower counties on Delaware. Added to Penn- 
 fylvania, I concluded that the arrival of the northern army at 
 Albany, v/ould have given us the province of New-York and the 
 Jerfeys ; all v/hich events I was confident would lead to a profpe- 
 rous conclulion of the war. 
 
 Early in July, 1777, I began the embarkation — I willied how- 
 ever to remain until the arrival of Sir Henry Clinton from 
 Europe, who was to command at New- York in my abfence ; and 
 until I (liould learn fomething of the progrefs of the northern 
 army. On the 5th of July Sir Henry Clinton arrived, and on 
 the 15th I received an exprefs from General Burgoyne, informing 
 me of his fuccefs at Ticonderoga, ** that his army was in good 
 *' health, and that Ticonderoga would be garrifoned from Canada, 
 ** which would leave his force complete for further operations." 
 In my anfwer I faid, that I expected General Wafhington would 
 follow me to Pennfylvania, but that if, contrary to my exped:a- 
 tion, he fliould go northward, I fliould foon be after him. It 
 may alfo be proper in this place to advert to the inftrudions I left 
 with Sir Henry Clinton, and to feveral of my fubfequent letters 
 to that General. As I omitted to fend copies of them to the 
 Secretary of State, they are not upon the table -, but I have them 
 
 in 
 
[ 22 ] 
 
 in my hand, and with leave of the Committee will read a fhort 
 extrad: of them. 
 
 EiXtraB of InJlruSlions from Sir William Howe to Sir Henry 
 Clinton, dated gth Jufyy lyjj' 
 
 " UPON my departure from hence with the army, 
 *' you will be pleafed to take the command of the troops men- 
 ** tioned in the enclofed return, and of all other troops now here, 
 " or that may arrive in my ab fence. You will make fuch 
 " changes in the pofition of them as you may judge moft con- 
 ** ducive to his Majefty's fervice for the defence of this im- 
 " portant pofl, and its dependencies, whereby I would be under- 
 *' Hood to include King's-Bridge, Long-Illand, Staten-Ifland, 
 " Paulus-Hook, and Sandy-Hook ; at the fame time it is by 
 ** no means my intention to prevent your adling offenfively, in 
 ** cafe an opportunity lliould offer, confident with the fecurity 
 ** of this place, as above-mentioned, which is always to be 
 '* regarded as a primary objed." 
 
 Extrad of a Letter from Sir William Howe to Sir Henry 
 Clinton, dated i^tb fuly, 1777. 
 
 ** I Have dire(fted the 7th and 26th regiments of foot, 
 *' and Colonel D'Eib's regiment of Anfpach to remain here under 
 ** your orders, in addition to the troops of which you have re- 
 " ceived a return, and am hopeful, if you fee occalion to ad: 
 '*' offenfively, thofe corps may prove of effential ufe. 
 
 **■ Upon the arrival of Major-General Sir Thomas Wilfon, 
 you will be pleafed to order him to join me, unlefs from any 
 offenfive operations you may have in view at the time, you 
 fhdU find his prefence neceffary for that fervice, in which cafe 
 you will keep him under your command," 
 
 ExtraB of a Letter from Sir William Howe to Sir Henry 
 Clinton, dated of Delaware, 2>^tb of July, ijyj. 
 
 '* IT is not poffible for me to fay at this time when I 
 «' iliall be able to fend re-inforcements to you, but I beg you 
 
 ** may 
 
 (( 
 
 it 
 it 
 
[ 23 ] 
 
 " may be afTured I {hall not fail to do it, as foon as expedient: 
 *' In the mean while, if you can make any diverfion in favour 
 •* of General Burgoyne's approaching Albany, with fecurity to 
 *' King's-Bridge, I need not point out the utility of fuch a 
 *' meafure." 
 
 From thefe extradls it is to be obferved, that I gave full power 
 to Sir Henry Clinton to adt offenfively, if opportunity fhould 
 offer, confident v/ith the defence of New- York and its Depen- 
 dencies, and that the facilitating the approach of the northern 
 army, by a diverfion in its favour, if pracfticable, was not out of 
 my thoughts, although I had received no inftr nations whatfoever 
 upon that head. 
 
 The Committee wVA now permit me to ftate the diftribution 
 of the whole army under my command, at the time of my de- 
 parture to the fouthward. For the defence of Rhode-Illand there 
 were about 3000 men ; at New- York about 8500, exclufive of 
 the fick and convalefcents of thofe corps, and of the fouthern 
 army, and a fmall body of militia upon Long-Ifland. Thefe 
 two corps I judged to be not more than fufficlent for their 
 fituatlons at that time, efpecially in the view of Sir Henry 
 Clinton's adlng upon occafion, to a certain degree offenfively^ 
 in favour of the northern army — My own corps, to be oppofed 
 to the enemy's principal army, was nearly 14000, and knowino- 
 General Wa£liington to have about 15,000, exclufive of alm^oit 
 any number he pleafed of militia, I could not think It advifeable 
 to weaken any of thofe corps, by detaching from them for an ex- 
 pedition to the northward by fea. 
 
 The embarkation being finifhed, we failed from New-York the 
 23d of July, and arrived off the Delaware on the 30th. Several 
 days muffc have been employed to furmount the difficulties of 
 getting up the river, and I inferred from thence, that I ihould 
 not be able to land the troops before General Wafhington 
 would be in force at Wilmington, where there was alfo a corps : 
 There was befides no profpedt of landing above the confluence 
 of the Delaware and Chriftiana-Creek, at leafl the preparations 
 the enemy had made for the defence of the river, by gallles, 
 ioating batteries, firefliips, and dee rafts, would have made fuch 
 
[ 24 ] 
 an attempt extremely hazardous. I had alfo to confidcr that the 
 country below, where the troops muft have landed, and where 
 only the tranfports could have laid in fecurity (I mean about 
 Reedy-Ifland) was very marfliy, and the roads upon narrow 
 caufeways interfecfled by creeks : I therefore agreed with the 
 Admiral to go up Chefapeak-Bay, a plan which had been precon- 
 certed, in the event of a landing in the Delaware proving, upon 
 our arrival there, ineligible. It is to be obferved, that if we 
 could not have landed above Wilmington we fliould have been 
 under the neceffity of going the fame route we took from the 
 head of Elk, by way of Aikens's Tavern, otherwife called Pen- 
 cadder. 
 
 Our going up Chefapeak-Bay alarmed the provinces of Vir- 
 ginia and Maryland, and diverted a body of their troops, 
 which did not join General Walliington until after the battle of 
 Brandy Vvdne. Another circumftance much in our favour attended 
 this change : Our troops by being on board lliip in the hot 
 month of July and part of Auguft, efcaped an almofl cer- 
 tain fatality by ficknefs, in which the enemy fuffered much 
 at that time. But, for this I do not take credit, as I was 
 anxious to get forward, and no delay arofe from that coniidera- 
 tion. I will, however, declare it as my opinion, that in thofe 
 two months the troops fhould be expofed as little as poffible in 
 the field in America, 
 
 On the 1 6th of Augufl: we entered Chefapeak-Bay, and 
 there I received the Minill:er's letter of the i8th of May, 1777, 
 wherein I am again told, that my laft plan is approved, and in 
 the fame period, that he trufts ** whatever I may meditate, it 
 ** will be executed in time for me to co-operate with the 
 •* northern army." Were I to be permitted to account for this 
 expedation, I would fay, it muft have been founded upon an 
 idea, that the pofTeffion of that mofl important objedl, Phila- 
 delphia, was to be obtained without any great efforts of the 
 enemy for its defence — At leaft I mufl; conclude the noble Lord 
 apprehended none. The fad however is, that Mr. Wafliington 
 oppofed our progrefs with his whole force. It is alfo to be re- 
 marked, that, although the idea of going up Hudfon's River had 
 Jiot entered into any of the reduced plans which I fcnt home, 
 
 and 
 
r 25 ] 
 
 and which met with approbation, yet, 111 this letter it is fuggeded 
 at a time when there could be no poiiibility of carrying it into 
 execution, confiftently with the approved expedition I was then 
 upon — I was now under the necefhty of proceeding fa) , 
 
 I pafs over the time between the landing of the army near the 
 head of Elk, and the battle of Brandywine. But underftanding 
 fome fault has been attributed to me for making a divifion of 
 my forc^tb bring on that ad:ion, I flatter myfelf it v/iil not be 
 thought impertinent to fay a few words on that fubje(5l. 
 
 To bring the enemy to an adion was my object, and being 
 confident that General Wafliington was iludious to avoid it, un- 
 lefs under mod favourable circumflances, fome art and fome 
 hazard was neceilary to accomplilh my purpofe. 
 
 The movements made on this occafion, which may be found 
 in my letter of the loth of Odlober, 1777, Vv'ere not repugnant 
 to found principles, and it is no fmall confolation to me to know 
 independent of the event, that I have the opinions of the mofl 
 judicious officers in the army on the fpot, to fupport a meafurc 
 which fome gentlemen, from what authority I know not, have 
 
 E been 
 
 (a) Lord George Germain, in his anfwerto this part of my fpeech, complained 
 of my negle£l of duty in point of correfpondence, by declaring that after I had 
 embarked for Pennfylvania, two months elapfed without his hearing from me. I 
 took the earlieft opportunity of replying to this charge ; the fadl Hands thus :-— 
 On the 16^/:? of July I wrote to his lordfliip, informing him, that I propofed 
 going up the Delaware, in order to be nearer New- York than if I went up 
 the Chefapeak, as I once intended^ and which route I preferred to that of the 
 Delaware, provided the enemy difcovered a difpofition to defend Pennfylvania. 
 This letter was received by the noble lord on the 22d of Auguft. My next letter 
 was dated the 'ipth of AuguJ}^ from the head of Elk ; but it happened that the 
 Swallow-packet, carrying that letter, had a very uncommon length of voyage, 
 and did not reach England till the 282"/^ of OSiober, which accounts for his 
 lordfhip's having been two months without hearing from me, my letter of the 
 16th of July having reached England on the 22d oY Auguft. The noble Lord, 
 when he was fo unufually long without receiving a letter from me, might have 
 conjectured the poffifiility of a packet's having a tedious voyage ; of its having 
 been loft ; or of its having been taken by the enemy. Indeed he might alfo have 
 conjectured from the words I have quoted in my letter of the i6th of July, that I 
 was gone up the Chefapeak, which would neceffarily lengthen my voyage from 
 New-York ; and finally he ought to have compared the dates of the letters them- 
 ielves, and aot the dates of their arrival, 
 
[ 26 ] 
 
 been pleafed to cenfure. But at the fame time that I am refleded 
 upon on one hand, for hazarding too much, lam blamed on the 
 other, for not making the ad:ion more decifive, and for not fol- 
 lowing up the vidtory more clofely. 
 
 To demonftrate the impradlicability of a vigorous purfuit in a 
 hoftile country (but more particularly in America than in any 
 other country I have (een) or the inutility of attempting it farther 
 than was done, in the peculiar ftate of the army at that time, would 
 be trefpaffing too much upon the indulgence of the Committee. 
 I flatter myfelf it will fuffice to fay, that from a due regard to 
 the wounded, the importance of poifeffing the poft at Wilming- 
 ton for their accommodation, and for the fecurity of the pri- 
 foners, no movement could have been made fooner, or more ef- 
 fedual, under fuch circumftances, than the advance of the two 
 corps with Major-General Grant and Lord Cornwallis towards 
 Chefter 5 and I mufl be allowed to infifl there was no avoidable 
 delay in the approach to Philadelphia by Valley Forge, the 
 Schuylkill, by the nearer route through Derby, being impaifa- 
 ble : nor any opportunity lofl: of bringing the enemy to farther 
 action between Dilworth and German-Town. This I nearly 
 effedted on the 17th of September when he was upon his march 
 on the Lancailer road, but the extreme violence of the weather 
 rendered every effort to get forward impracticable. They had 
 therefore an opportunity of evading the approach of the King's 
 army, by a forced march into a very rough mountainous country, 
 where it was certain they could not be followed. But my en- 
 deavours to get at the enemy, whatever was thought by thofe 
 a(ftually engaged in them, have been treated here as ill-judged, 
 feebly profecuted, and void of enterprife, which lafl cenfure has 
 been even extended to the general condud: during my command. 
 
 I fhali not defccnd to minute refutations, but I beg leave to 
 f^y, and I affert it with firmncfs, that almoll every movement 
 of the war in North- America was an a6t of enterprife, clogged 
 with innumerable diflicultics. A knowledge of the country, 
 interfe6ted, as it every where is, by woods, mountains, waters, 
 or moraffes, cannot be obtained with any degree of precifion ne- 
 ceffary toforefee, and guard againfl, theobitrudtions that may occur. 
 4 In 
 
[ 27 ] 
 
 In a word, Sir, whatever may be tiie aim or willi of my encmi'es 
 in propagating thefe afperlions, it is from my confcience I ^illnn 
 to this Committee, and to my country at large, that I never 
 negleded an opportunity of bringing the enemy to a6tion, 
 where it could have been done upon a comparative viev/ of ail 
 circumftances at the time, and coniiftent with the caution indif- 
 penfably requifite in actuation always fo critical, that a material 
 check to his Majefty's arms might have been productive of fatal 
 confequences to the interefls of this country in America. 
 
 The next point is the attack made upon the King's army at 
 German-Town on the 4th of Odober, whi^ch has l)een mali- 
 cioully reprefented as a furprife, thereby throwing a ftigma upon 
 the vigilance of the troops, but more particularly upon that of 
 the General. 
 
 The circumftances which encouraged the enemy to make this 
 attack are fet forth in my letter of the 10th of Odober, 1777, 
 us well as the reafons for making the detachments which caufed 
 that encouragement. In addition to the account there given, 1 
 beg leave to inform the Committee, that my firil pofition at 
 German-Town was taken to cover Philadelphia, during the opera- 
 tions carrying on againfl: Mud-Ifland, and was therefore more 
 extended than it otherwife would have been. It is true, however, 
 that I did not exped: the enemy would have dared to approach 
 after fo recent a defeat as that at Brandywine. 
 
 In this Idea I did not dired: any redoubts to be raifed for thft 
 fecurity of the camp or out-pofts, nor did I ever encourage the 
 conftru(5tion of them at the head of the line when in force, 
 becaufe works of that kind are apt to induce an opinion of infe- 
 riority, and my wifli was, to fupport by every means the acknow- 
 ledged fuperiority of the King's troops over the enemy, which I 
 conlidered more peculiarly effential, where ftrength was not to 
 be eftimated by numbers, fmce the enemy in that refped:, by 
 calling in the force of the country upon any emergence, mufl 
 have been fuperior. 
 
 I confefs alfo it was for the above reafons I did not change 
 my pofition, after making the detachments beforementioned, 
 choofing rather totruilto the well-tried vigilance of the troops, 
 
 E a and 
 
[ 28 ] 
 
 and the adivity of the patroles (though I had intimation that an 
 .attack might be made) than to give the army unneceffary fatigue, 
 by making more cautionary preparations. 
 
 In my confidence in the troops I was not difappointed ; the 
 enemy's approach was difcovered by our patroles, and I had early 
 notice of it. The line was prefently under arms, and although it 
 mull be admitted that the out-pofts and light-infantry in one 
 quarter, were driven back, it muft be equally admitted, that 
 they were foon efFedually fupported, and the enemy repulfed 
 from the only place where the fmalleft impreflion was made. 
 
 I cannot mention this tranfadion without paying a due acknow- 
 ledgement to an excellent officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Mufgrave, 
 whofe gallant and judicious condud:, upon this occafion, will, I 
 hope, fome day meet with its reward. 
 
 I have ftated thefe fa(3:s, in addition to the account in my letter 
 upon the table, principally to fliew, that how much foever I may 
 be fuppofed to have erred in my own conjedture, the imputa- 
 tion of the army being unguarded or furprifed is not founded 
 in truth. 
 
 On the 19th of Odober I found it advifeable to remove to 
 Philadelphia, to expedite the reduction of Mud-Ifland, which 
 proved to be more difficult than was at firfl fuppofed. To this 
 end the polTefTion of Red-Bank on the Eaft lide of the Dela- 
 ware engaged my attention. The event of that enterprife is con- 
 tained in my letter of the 25th of Ocftober, 1777, but as I under- 
 jftand that a pointed reference was made to it in this Houfe, laft 
 year, by the noble Lord in the American department, Lfliall 
 briefly Hate, to the beft of my recolledion, the circumflianccs 
 under which Colonel Donop, a brave and gallant officer, was 
 detached on this fervice. He earneftly intreated Lord Corn- 
 wallis, in whofe corps he ferved, to exprefs his wifhes for an 
 opportunity to fignalize himfelf, and the Heffian troops under 
 his command. My defign on Red-Bank affording the. earlieft 
 opportunity, I defired Lord Cornwallis to explain the natui"e of 
 the fervice, and if it.fhould meet with his approbation, to offer 
 him the command, which he very readily accepted. On tli^ 
 cycning of his departure Colonel Donop defired to know from 
 
 Lord . 
 
[ 29 1 
 
 Lord Cornwallis, if it was expected he fliould make the attack 
 at all hazards, when Lord Cornwallis afTured him from me, that 
 he was to be guided by his own judgement on the fpot, but that 
 the attack was to be made, unlefs he f iw good reafon to the con- 
 trary. If I may conclude from the manner in which I parted 
 with Colonel Donop, or from the approbation the dired:ions 
 given to him received from his immediate and moft valuable com- 
 mander. General Knyphaufen, I have every reafon to believe he 
 went upon the fervice perfedtly fatisfied. 
 
 The committee will do me the juftice to believe I have no 
 other motive for this explanation than to make known what 
 really paifed with refpecft to the orders given to Colonel Donop 
 upon this enterprife. The intrepidity and vigour with which it 
 was attempted, refled: the higheft honour on the commander 
 and his troops, and the lofs fuilained upon the occafion cannot be 
 too much regretted. 
 
 It has been afferted, that an early poileffion of Red-Bank mufl 
 have been immediately followed by the reduction of Mud-Illand, 
 to which I in fome m.eafure agree, that is to fay, after the enemy 
 had put it in a flate of defence : Before that time fuch corps as 
 could have been fpared from the army, muft have been eflablidied 
 and- fupplied with ftores and provifions, with great difficulty, 
 while expofed to the annoyance of the armed gallies and floating 
 batteries ; and before the army was drawn nearer to Philadelphia 
 the fupport of a pofl, fo detached, would liave been very pre- 
 carious. 
 
 I muff: neverthelefs acknowledge my great difappointment in 
 the time that proved neceffary for the reduction of Mud-Iffand ; 
 but if the violent rains, by filling the trenches, and fipping the 
 foundations of the batteries, had not caufed a conffderable delay 
 in the deffrudtion of the enemy's defences, which prevented an 
 earlier co-operation of the ffiips of war, I probably ffiould have 
 been much lefs deceived in my expe(£lations. 
 
 My difpatch of the 13th of December, 1777, refpedling. the 
 movement to White-Marffi, and my condud: on that occafion, 
 is fo explicit as to make farther obfervations unneceff^ary.— The- 
 motives from which I aded at that time were, I think, juff:;, and 
 
 
[ 3° ] 
 
 if they appear hiconclurive to any here, I can only eileem myfelf 
 unfortunate in the want of their concurrence. 
 
 The activity of the army during the winter is undeniably 
 proved by my fubfequent letters : But as many of the tranfadliona 
 were in their effec^ts lefs important to the grand object than to the 
 credit of the troops, the mofl material only were fpecified in my 
 difpatches. 
 
 The entrenched fituation of the enemy at Valley-Forge, twen- 
 ty-two miles from Philadelphia, did not occafion any diffi- 
 culties fo prefling as to juftify an attack upon that ftrong poft 
 during the fevere weather, and though every thing was prepared 
 with that intention, I judged it imprudent, until the feafon 
 fliould afford a profpe(ft of reaping the advantages, that ought to 
 have refulted from fuccefs in that meafure; but having good in- 
 formation in thefpring that the enemy had flrengthened the camp 
 by additional works, and being certain of moving him from 
 thence when the campaign fliould open, I dropped all thoughts 
 of an attack. My letter of the 19th of April, 1778, gives fur- 
 ther reafons for this part of my condu(5t. 
 
 From the remainder of my correfpondence, gentlemen mufl 
 have feen, that I continued my remonftrance for more troops* 
 Perhaps it was impoffible for the minifter to fend more. — Such 
 an acknowledgement would have been no reflection upon himfelf, 
 and would have relieved my mind from the unealinefs it laboured 
 under, in conceiving, that my opinions of the neceffity of re- 
 inforcements were deemed nugatory : and that, of courfe, I had 
 loft the confidence of thofe, who were in the firft inftance to 
 judge of my condu(5t. It cannot be furprifing, that finding my- 
 felf in this fituation, I defired his Majelty's permiflion to with- 
 draw from the command.— ^I gave the true reafon for that re- 
 queft — the lofs of confidence. — The reafon was tacitly acknow- 
 ledged to be well founded, for it was acquiefced in -, and his Ma- 
 jefty was pleafed to appoint a fuccefiTor to the command of the 
 army. 
 
 With regard to the complaint I made of the lofs of confi-^ 
 dence, the noble Lord in the American department muft have 
 done ^reat injuftice to my fenfibility, when he cxprelTed an 
 
 opinion 
 
[ 31 ] 
 
 Opinion, upon a former occafion, that I alluded merely to the 
 flight put upon my recommendations ; not but that I confefs 
 I was mortified to find, that brave officers, whofe eminent fervices 
 I had flrongly and faithfully reprefented, were not rewarded at 
 home with the diftindion expeded for them by the army in 
 general, as well as by me. It were a matter of final I m.oment 
 if the evil went no farther than to my perfonal mortification : 
 but if it be true that the fpirit of military men is raifed or de- 
 prefi^ed by the conferring or with-holding of their fovereign's 
 fubfiiantial approbation, fuch (lights may prove of very dangerous 
 tendency. 
 
 The noble Lord, on a former day, thought proper to treat 
 my recommendation of Captain Emmerrick with a certain air of 
 contempt and ridicule. He had forgot, it Ihould feem, that he 
 himfelf fent Captain Emmerrick to America, and, in the very 
 extraordinary terms contained in his Lordfhip's letter of the 25th 
 of April, 1776, originally recommended him to my attention. 
 His Lordfhip befi: knows the purpofe for which he fent him out, 
 and whether he was a proper perfon to raife a body of men, or 
 to be trufi:ed with money for fuch a fervice. 
 
 When I received my orders to return home, as foon as Sir 
 Henry Clinton fhould arrive at Philadelphia, I confefs I became 
 cautious of hazarding exploits which might have reduced the 
 army of my fucceflbr, though a fair opportunity happening to 
 prefent itfelf, I did make one attempt, which, had it fucceeded, 
 would have proved a fevere flroke upon the enemy. Upon the 
 whole, I flatter myfelf it will be found, that I made no difad- 
 vantageous ufe of the army under my command, and that I never 
 made deceitful reprefentations of the fituation of affairs, but freely 
 communicated my fentiments upon the force necefiary to fup- 
 prefs the rebellion : and I am to this hour confident that if fuffi- 
 cient re-inforcements had been fent from hence, and the plan of 
 operations which I took upon me to propofe, had been adopted in 
 its proper extent, the war in North America would now hav# 
 wore a very different afped:. 
 
 I have heard it has been faid, that my civil commiflion was 
 inconfi*fl:ent with my military command — and that my mind was 
 more intent upon bringing about a peace by Jiegociation, than by" 
 
 force 
 
[ 32 ] 
 force of arms. Sir, thinking it my firft duty, I certainly {liould 
 have preferred the former mode of conciliation, and my brother 
 and I for that purpofe did go to the utmoft verge of our very 
 limited ccmmiffion and inftrudiions. But our proceeding in the 
 character of Commiffioners never for one moment fufpended our 
 military operations. We foon faw that the leaders of the rebel- 
 lion were determined, from intereft, if not from principle, to 
 prevent a reconciliation with Great-Britain, and therefore our 
 joint endeavours were invariably exerted in the profecution of 
 the war, to as great an extent as the force in our hands would 
 permit. 
 
 The refledion, that the civil and the military commiiTion were 
 incompatible, has, I know, been applied particularly to my con- 
 duct. I boldly alTert it to be ill-founded, as I am certain I never 
 delayed to feize an opportunity of attacking the enemy, confift- 
 ently with my duty of weighing the rifk of ruining the caufe I 
 was engaged in by a confiderable lofs of troops : and indeed thofe 
 who are acquainted with my commiffion and inflrudions, as a 
 CommilTioner of peace, muft know, that from the rcftridiions 
 they contained, it was next to an impofTibility, that my military 
 could materially interfere with my civil duty. 
 
 I have trefpaffed, I fear, too long upon the patience of the 
 
 Committee — The great importance of the fubjed:, and the detail 
 
 offadts, I have been neceffarily led into, will, I hope, plead my 
 
 apology. I fliall trouble you with but a word more ; in fup- 
 
 port of the meafure of proceeding to Philadelphia. Before I 
 
 came from thence, I had every reafon to be perfectly fatisfied 
 
 of the advantages that would have enfued from that operation, 
 
 if the councils at home had thought the Pofl proper to be pre- 
 
 ferved. The inhabitants in general of the province of Pennfyl- 
 
 vania, thofe of the lower counties on Delaware, and thofe of 
 
 the lower part of Jerfey, v/ere forward to return to their allegiance, 
 
 and even to affifl offenfively in compelling his IVlajeily's revolted 
 
 ifubjeCts to their duty. This favourable difpofition, however did 
 
 not appear immediately — An equivocal neutrality was all I at 
 
 firfl experienced ; our fucceffes and apparent ability to retain 
 
 our advantages, induced the inhabitants at laft to be lefs referved. 
 
 Secret intelligence, which, until that period, had been extremely 
 
 difficult 
 
t 33 ] 
 difficult to procure, was then fo good, and fo readily oba ined, 
 that I could not but attribute it to the pofleffion of Philadel- 
 phia, which convinced the country of the fuperiority, and per- 
 fuaded them of the eftablifhed power, of his Majefty's arms. 
 The difficulties of the Congrefs, in railing fupplies, and in re- 
 cruiting Mr. Waihington's army, then indeed became real, and 
 had the appearance of being unfurmountahle. But the French 
 treaty, and our orders to evacuate Philadelphia, by v/hich 
 meafure the protediion of his Majefty's forces was to be with- 
 drawn from the province, made a fudden and melancholy change 
 in our affairs. The rebels were infpired with frefh hopes; the 
 friends of government were difmayed. — But it is not my inten- 
 tion to animadvert upon orders fent from hence after my recall, 
 nor upon the future profped;s of the v/ar. — My view is merely 
 tojuftify my owncondud; during the time I was honoured with 
 the command (a) . 
 
 This Narrative has, I fear, been too prolix j but the fubje<fl 
 was fo complicated v/ith matter, and the circumflances necellary 
 to be brought into a clear point of view, were fo numerous, 
 that brevity v/ould not have been conliilent with perfpicuity. 
 Had I laboured to make my Narrative fliort, it v/ould have been 
 obfcure. Senfible as I am of the great attention and indulgence 
 with which the Committee has honoured me, I now haften to 
 the concluiion. 
 
 The Secretary of State, as appears in his letters, has fignified 
 in the moil flattering expreffions, his Majefty's approbation of 
 every material part of my conduct, during the whole of my 
 command. His Lordfliip's own perfonal appiaufe is alfo very 
 warmly conveyed throughout his correfpondence ; all his letters 
 
 F however, 
 
 • 
 
 (a) Mr. Jofeph Galloway, in his evidence to the Committee of the Houfe of 
 Commons, pofitively afferts, that I ridvifed him, and the other magiftrates, to go 
 over to Wafiiington and make their peace. The truth is, as foon as it was known 
 that orders were arrived for the evacuation of Philadelphia. Mr. Galloway came 
 to me on behalf of himfelf and the other magiftrates, and requelled my advice and 
 aifiilance concerning the meafures to be adopted for their welfare. I affured him, 
 that if they chofe to go with the King's army, they fhould be taken all poffible 
 eare of; but if they rather chofe to flay behind with their property and families, . 
 I could have no objection to their enquiring previoufly whether Wafliington and - 
 the Congrefs would grant them protection and fecurity. 
 
[ 34 1 
 
 'however, may with piopriety be faid to have been private Ict-^ 
 ters, until they were laid before this Houfe. The knowledge of 
 the approbation they contained was confined within his Lord- 
 Ihip's breaft and mine. When calumny firil became bufy with 
 my reputation, I could have wiflied his Lordfliip's fentiments 
 more generally known : — though it would not perhaps have 
 become me to have obtruded upon the world thofe official de- 
 clarations in my own favour. But I muft ever think it would 
 have been an ingenuous, an honourable, and a liberal part in 
 the noble Lord to have avow^ed, openly in parliament, the appro- 
 bation, which it is to be prefumed he was convinced I deferved, 
 becaufe he had advifed the King to beftow it. Such a condudt 
 ■would have flopped the current of ill-founded accufation againft 
 me. Such a condudl would have fecured to himfelf the confi- 
 dence, and to his country the chearful fervices, of future Ge- 
 nerals. 
 
 And now, Sir, having endeavoured to bring before you, by 
 the mod impartial quotations, all the evidence that I thought 
 neceffary to colled from the papers on your table, I iliall only 
 remind you, that the Houfe has ordered the attendance of feveral 
 of the moll refpeftable officers who ferved in America during 
 my command. Their teftimony may confirm the truth of the 
 fads I have advanced, and will undoubtedly explain and prove 
 any other material circumftances, which you may think neceflary 
 for your inveftigation. 
 
 And, Sir, if the Houfe of Commons, or any other individual 
 member, ffiall have any charge or accufation to make againfl: me, 
 I declare myfelf ready and willing to meet it. The Committee 
 is open for the reception of any other papers, and for the exami- 
 nation of any other witnefles. My only wi(h is, that every pof- 
 fible light may be thrown upon every part of my conduct, 
 
 I move that Earl Cornwallis be called in. 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
 
 U P O N 
 
 A PAMPHLET 
 
 ENTITLED 
 
 LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN. 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
 
 UPON 
 
 A P A M P H L E T, e'r. 
 
 THE Author of Letters to a Nobleman, upon 
 whofe invidious afTertions I mean to make fome obfer- 
 vations, opens his pamphlet againfl me with a com- 
 parifon between the prefent and the lafl war in America. 
 
 Without meaning to depreciate the great fervices of former 
 Commanders, I muft take leave to fay, that the two wars, with 
 refped: to the ftate of the country of America, are in no degree 
 iimilar. In the lafl war, the difficulties arifmg from the ftrength 
 of the country were, for the moft part removed by the friendly 
 difpolition of the inhabitants, who always exerted themfelves to 
 facilitate the operations of the King's army, and to fupply them 
 with every neceffary and accommodation. 
 
 In the prefent war, thefe circumflances are reverfed -, and yet 
 the author attempts to purfuade his reader, that " the ftrength 
 *' or impradlicability of America is loft in idea, when we com- 
 ** pare it with the fcene of adion in the laft American war." 
 
 Becaufe the Britifh troops were always fuperior to the rebels 
 in difcipline, and frequently in numbers, he is unwilling to 
 ajlow them any merit in the vidories they obtained; for he 
 
 denies 
 
[ 38 ] 
 
 denies that they had ftrength of country to contend agalnfl. 
 *' That part of the middle colonies (fays he page 2d) which has 
 ** been the fcene of the late military operations, cannot, with . 
 ** the lead propriety, in the military fenfe of the words, 
 " be called uncommonly ftrong ; and much lefs impradi- 
 '* cable." 
 
 This affertion is in dired: oppofition to the opinions of Earl 
 Cornwallis, M.ijor General Grey, and every military ^ man I 
 ever converfed with on the fubjedt, who hav« been eye-witneifes, 
 and ferving in this war. 
 
 Major-General Grey's evidence upon this point to the Houfe 
 of Commons, is a follows: 
 
 ^ *' Is not the country in general fo covered with wood, 
 ** and fo fiivourable to ambufcades, that but an imperfedt know- 
 ** ledge of it can be obtained by reconnoitering ?" 
 
 A. ** That part of America where I had been, is the 
 ** ftrongell: country I ever was in ; it is every where hilly, and 
 ** covered with wood — interfered by ravines, creeks, and marfhy 
 ** grounds, and in every quarter of a mile is a poft fitted for 
 ** ambufcades. Little or no knowledge could be obtained by 
 '* reconnoitering." 
 
 ^ ** Do you know any country, conlidering the circum- 
 ** fiances of the American war, fo well calculated for the de- 
 ** fen five ?" 
 
 A, '* My anfwer to the former queflion certainly fliews, that 
 ** America is, of all countries, the befl calculated for the de- 
 '* fenfivc. Every one hundred yards might be difputed -, at 
 " leafl that part of which I have feen." 
 
 I fhall now proceed with my remarks upon the pamphlet, page 
 by page. 
 
 Page 3d.] In this country, we have lately feen two armies, one 
 meditating its conqueji, the other its defence. We have feen the 
 Brttifi army penetrating into its heart, in a circuit of near twcy 
 hundred miles, from Long-Ifland, by the White Phiins, to Trenton, 
 and from the Elk Firry to Philadelphia, in dcfance of the iitmofl 
 
 efforts 
 
t 39 ] 
 
 efforts of an enemy perfeBIy acquainted with every advantageous 
 Jpot of ground ; and we have feen that army takings with eaf\ 
 and little lofs, every jirong pojl pojfeffed by the enemy ^ who have 
 always fed at its approach. 
 
 This defcriptlon is introduced to fliew that the country is not 
 very ftrong and impradiicable. But it only proves, that the Gene- 
 rals, and officers commanding the feveral corps, were indefati- 
 gable in their duty, and furmounted all the difficulties of coun- 
 try which they met with in thofe marches. The author certainly 
 did not mean to pay me any compliment. The commander in 
 Chief, however, will be fuppofed to have had fome fliare in the 
 merit of thefe fucceffies — But it is not true, that the enemy always 
 fled at our approach , nor that we took all their flrong pofls with 
 eafe and little lofs. They fought the King's army on Long- 
 liland ; they fuftained the attack at Fort Waffiington ; they ftood 
 the battle of Brandy wine ; and our lofs upon thofe oceafions, 
 though by no means equal to their's, was not inconfiderable. 
 
 Page 7, 8, &€."] Thefe pages contain a differ ta-tio/i upon the 
 loyalty of the people of America. 
 
 Much might be faid upon the ftate of loyalty, and the prin- 
 ciples of loyalty, in America. Some are loyal from principle; 
 many from intereft ; many from refentment j many wiih for 
 peace, but are indifferent which fide prevails; and there are 
 others who wiffi fuccefs to Great-Britain, from a recolled:ion of 
 the happinefs they enjoyed under her government. In the courfe 
 of thefe remarks I fhal'l have occafion to treat this fubjed more 
 at large. 
 
 Page 8.] NegleB and inhuman treatment which his Majefiys 
 faithful fubjeBs received. 
 
 I am at a lofs to know what fpecles of negleft, or inhuman 
 treatment, is here meant. Plundering is particularly flated in 
 another part of the pamphlet, and Ihall be there anfwered. Upon 
 this general accufation, however, I cannot help making fome 
 remarks. — I am contented that ftridures (liould be made upon my 
 
 5 P''°" 
 
r 40 1 
 
 profefTional condud ; but I feel myfelf hurt as' a man, when I 
 am accufcd of inhumanity. 
 
 The firll diftreffes to the Americans, in confcquence of the 
 rebellion, commenced in Boflon ; and I believe it in^poflible to 
 give one inftance of inhumanity towards any individual in that 
 place. The utmoft attention was, on the contrary, extended, 
 not only to thofe whofe condu6l gave them a claim to public 
 protection, but to all who made even the ilightefl profeliions, 
 oralmmed the appearance, of loyalty. It is upon record (Procla- 
 mation of 28th October, 1775) that their fervices were courted, 
 by recommending a defeniive alTociation, and that arms were 
 offered to all, who would declare themfelves willing to contri- 
 bute their affiftance in the prefervation of good order and go- 
 vernment within the town of Boflon : thofe, who enrolled them- 
 felves upon this occaiion, were fupplied with fuel and provifions 
 equal to the allowance iffued to his majefty's troops. A limilar 
 regard was continued to the refugees upon the evacuation of 
 Boflon (when the army was in the mofl perilous circumftances, 
 as well from a fcarcity of proviiions as of tranfport tonnage) by 
 carrying to Hallifax above 11 00 men, women, and children^ 
 with as much of their merchandife and effed:s as could be re- 
 moved. Does this treatment come under the defcrintion of in- 
 humanity ? — The circumftances I have mentioned are upon record 
 in my letters to Lord George Germain of the 21 fl of March, 
 and 25th of April, J 776. 
 
 At every other period of my command at New- York, at Phi- 
 ladelphia, was there a man, having a jufl: claim to notice, and 
 offering his adtive fervices, who was not employed ? Many were 
 provided for in civil departments; many received pecuniary 
 reliefs; nor do I recollect a refugee (properly recommended to 
 me) who was not offered military fervice, civil employment, 
 money, provifions, accommodations, or fome mark of public 
 attention. It is true that I particularly diftinguilhed (as I had 
 a right to do) thofe from whom I had reafon to exped more 
 effential fervices; and I confefs that I fometimes found myfelf 
 the dupe of fuch diflindions. 
 
 Of 
 
, t 41 1 
 
 Of this I ihall Hate one particular inflance. — Jofeph Galloway 
 Efq. (a lawyer by profelTion) had been formerly Speaker of the 
 Aflembly of Pennfylvania. This gentleman, in the beginning of 
 the rebellion, was eleded a member of Congrefs. V/hen my 
 Brother and I, in the Character of his Majeiliy's Commiffioners for 
 reftoring Peace, publilhed a Proclamation of indemnity for all 
 thofe who had taken part in the rebellion, provided they iliould 
 furrender themfelves, and fubfcribe a declaration of allegiance, 
 within a limited time, Mr. Galloway was amongfl: the firll: who 
 came over to us from Philadelphia. This was in the month of 
 December, 1776, when our great fuccefles had intimidated the 
 leaders of the rebellion, and nearly induced a general fubmiffion. 
 Notwithstanding fo favourable a profped of affairs, I confidered 
 the acquifition of ilfr. Gallo%vay as a matter of fome imocrtance, 
 becaufe in all events I expeded. much afliflance from a gentleman 
 of his abilities and reputed influence in the province of Penn- 
 fylvania. This expedation will, I hope, in fome degree jufiify 
 my liberality towards him. I allov/ed him at the rate of 2ooL' 
 fterling per annum from the time of his joining the army until l^e 
 could be otherwife provided for. When we had taken poffeffion of 
 Philadelphia, I appointed him a Magiflrate of the police of that 
 city, with a falary made up 300I. fterling per annum, and fix 
 Shillings a day more, for a clerk. I alfo appointed him Superin- 
 tendent of the Port, with a falary of twenty Ihiliings a day, 
 making in the whole upwards of 770I, fterling per annum. Had 
 his popularity, or perfonal influence in Pennfylvania, been as 
 great as he pretended it was, I fliould not have thought this 
 money ill beftowed. I at firfl: paid attention to his opinions, and 
 relied upon him for procuring me fecret intelligence; but I 
 afterwards found that my confidence was mifplaced. His 
 ideas, I difcovered, to be vifionary, and his intelligence was 
 too frequently either ill-founded, or fo much exaggerated, that 
 it would have been unfafe to a6l upon it. Having once detected 
 him in fending me a piece of intelligence from a perfon, who 
 afterwards, upon examination, gave a very difl^erent account of 
 the matter, I immediately changed the channel of fecret commu- 
 nication, and in future confidered Mr. Galloway as a nugatory 
 informer. I continued him, however, m his lucrative offices of 
 
 G Magiflrate 
 
[ 42 ] 
 
 M;i2;iftrate of the police, and Superintendent of the port, in the 
 duties of which I believe he wiis not deficient. 
 
 Pages 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.] T^e author in thefe pages fays, 
 that the Britlfr ar'my, wherever they marched, were received with 
 every mark ofgladncfs, and particularly in Philadelphia — that during 
 our poll ejj ion of Philadelphia the people of the country, at the r if que 
 cf their lives, fupplicd the army, navy, and the inhabitants of 
 the city, con/ijling of not lefs than ^0,000 fouls, with every kind of 
 provi/ion — that they refufed thofefupp lies to the rebel general, rather 
 than be the injiruments of aiding the enemies of their J over eign — that 
 they came in from all quarters to give intelligence of the fate of the 
 enemy, and of the good difpofition of the people towards goverJiment — 
 that many thoufands came over to the Britijlo troops for prote^ion, 
 or concealed themfelves in dijiant provinces, where they were unknown -, 
 or took refuge among the favages, to avoid entering into the war 
 againjl their fellow fuhjeBs in this country, aud at the fame time 
 ihoufands of them in arms as woluntQcvs ferved in their behalf with- 
 out receiving pay or clothing, 
 
 I know not, nor ever heard, that the Britidi troops.^ wherever 
 they marched, and particularly in Philadelphia, were received 
 with gladnefs, except by the Quakers, and a very lew other 
 pcrlons. Upon the arrival of the army at Philadelphia, there 
 were not quite 4,500 male inhabitants between eighteen and 
 iixty years of age remaining in that city. By degrees they came 
 in, fomc to get poileiiion of their houfes and effects — -fom.e to do 
 us all the mifchief they could, by fending out intelligence to the 
 enemy, inveigling th>e troops to defert, and fmvggling fuch fup- 
 plies for Wafliington's army as could not be purchafed in the 
 country. That the people of the country brought in freih pro- 
 vifions to us, and refufed fuch fuppiies, as much as they dared, 
 to the rebel General, is certain j but I do not admit that this 
 condu(5t proceeded from the motives afcribedto it by the author. 
 The people of the country had no opinion of the value of Con- 
 grefs paper money, and the rebel General compelled them to take 
 that in payment for the fuppiies he colleded. But they knew 
 they fhould receive inflantly hard money for every thing they 
 iliould bring to us j and they had alfo the opportunity of carrying 
 
 back 
 
Loan Division 3 
 
 n 
 
 ^36 
 
 Ic. 0157 -No. 10 
 
 )3 
 

r 43 ] 
 
 back with them, for the mc of their families, a variety of 
 necefTary articles, that could only be had in thofe places which 
 were poirelled by the Britifli army and navy. Thefe, I apprehend, 
 were the real motives of all that fort of afliftance which we pro- 
 cured from the country people. The author fays they did. this 
 2X l\\Q rij que of their lives. There was in fadt that appearaiice, 
 and I regularly fent out coniiderable detachments to protect thts 
 ingrefs and regrefs of the people on market days ; but I always 
 fufped:ed that General Walhington, through policy, connived at 
 this kind of commerce. He knew that neither our army nor our 
 navy were ever in diftrefs for provifions : he knew that diftrefs, 
 if any, would fall upon the inhabitants, who were in general 
 his friends; he knew that an influx of gold and filver was 
 ftrengtening his country in a mod important point ; and he 
 knew that the people, whether he fhould connive at the practice 
 or not, would carry their produce wherever they could get gold 
 and iilver in payment. 
 
 Many thoufands (the author fays) concealed themfehes in dipant 
 provinces where they were unknown ^ or took refuge a?nongft the fa^ 
 vages, to avoid entering into the war. 
 
 If by this he means (as I prefume he mud) the infurgents of 
 North Carolina, the reader will find the circumftances refpe(5ting 
 them related in a fubfequent remark. 
 
 Many thoufands (he fays) came over to the Britifi troope for 
 protect ion. 
 
 I aver, that at no time did men in numbers come over to the 
 Britilh troops, although there was a profpedt of that happening 
 in thcfpringof 1778, which I attributed toourfuccefs in taking, 
 and retaining pofTeiTion of, Philadelphia. 
 
 What the author means by thoufands of volunteers in arms, 
 without receiving pay or clothing, I know not. I know that of 
 the whole number of the men in our provincial corps, only a 
 fmall proportion were Americans. 
 
 Soon after the arrival of the army in Philadelphia, Mr, 
 Galloway applied to me for permiffion to raife a troop of dragoons, 
 
 G 2 which 
 
t 44 ] 
 
 which he aflurcd me fliould be compofed of natives of America, 
 and chiefly from the county of Bucks in Pennfylvania, where he 
 pretended to have (for he certainly had not) great influence. His 
 requeit was granted ; and afterwards, upon examination, it turned 
 out that very few of the men he did raife were Americans. 
 
 To prove my opinion of the loyalty of the people, the author, 
 in a note (page 24) quotes a pallage in my letter of the 3d of 
 September, 1776, to the fecretary of flate, wherein I fay, that 
 ** the inhabitants of Long-Iiland, many of whom ^^^ been forced 
 ** into the rebellion^ have all fubmitted, and are ready to take the 
 ** oaths of allegiance." 
 
 My information, that many of the inhabitants of Long-Ifland 
 had been forced into the rebellion, came from the Governor of 
 the province ; and it is true, that after our fuccefs there the 
 inhabitants did fubmit ; but it appeared in the fequel, that their 
 fubmiffion proceeded from no other motive, than that of our 
 fuccefs, a few of them entered into our battalions then railing 
 upon Long-Illand. The v^ordi fubmitted, in my letter, implies a 
 degree of compullion. 
 
 The author (in the fame note) endeavouring to fliew, that I 
 thought the people not inclined to the rebellion, quotes the 
 following words in my public letter of the 12th of February, 
 1777. ** They (the Rebel States) confcious that their whole 
 *• ftake depends upon the fuccefs of the next campaign, ufe 
 '• every compufory means to thofe who do not enter 'uolnntarily 
 ** iuto. their fervicc." He alfo quotes my letter of the 5th of 
 March, 1778, to the like effecft. 
 
 The compufory means, to which I faid the Rebel States were 
 reduced, was in fa6l the confequence of the fuccefs of the Britifli 
 arms. The Americans would not voluntarily enter into that 
 army, which, whenever it met our's, was almoil certain of being 
 defeated. If the aver^on which the Americans fhewed to enter 
 into the rebel 'army proceeded from loyalty to their Sovereign, 
 why did not that body of 500 men, which the author alferts (but 
 which I do not believe) were, in September 1777, difmiiTed by 
 General Wafliington, b.ecaufe they were, too much attached to 
 
 I the 
 
[ 45 ] 
 
 the BrltliTi government, why did not that body, when fo dif- 
 milTed, at the diftance of a very few miles from our army, take 
 an opportunity of offering their fervices to us ? 
 
 P''^g^ 32-] T^ he foot and cavalry fent over to America amounted 
 to 52,815 — of that numi?er ^0,'^j^ were under the command of Sir 
 William Howe, 
 
 The author would here imprefs the reader with an opinion, 
 that at the time of my arrival at Staten-Illand, my army 
 amounted to 40,874, and the rebel army to 18,000, militia in- 
 cluded. Nothing can be more fallacious than this account. 
 
 When I landed upon Staten-Ifland I had under my immediate 
 command, including fick, only 'jy^^(:i rank and file. I landed 
 upon Long-Ifland with between 15 and 16,000 rank and iile, 
 having left the remainder of the army for the defence of Staten- 
 Ifland ; my whole force at that time confifled of 20,121 rank and 
 file, of which i^(^jj were fick. 
 
 Page 34.] When Sir Williafn Howe arrived at Staten-Iflandy 
 the refolution of Congrefs^ recommending independence to the colonies y 
 had j lift pajfedy &c, 
 
 'The Rebel force which had been feduced info arms, under a pre- 
 tence of obtaining a redrefs of grievances, did not amount to 1 8,00a 
 men, militia included. 
 
 Having thus before us the number of troops of both parties, it is 
 necefary, to a further elucidation of the truth, to take a comparative- 
 view of the real force of each in the milita?y balance. 
 
 The rebels, from the befl information I could obtain, had then, 
 in that part of the country, upwards of 20,000 — they were called 
 24,000 — I mean upon Long-Ifland and York-Illand only, ex- 
 clufive of what they called their flying camp in the neighbour- 
 hood (in the Jerfeys) faid to confifl of 8,000. If I were ta 
 follow the author's mode of computation when he flates the 
 number of men under my command, I fhould fay, and from 
 better authority, that General Wafhington had under his com- 
 
 jnand 
 
[ 46 ] ^ 
 mand, in May 1776, In the feveral provinces, an army of 80,000 
 Men faj 
 
 Page 35.] The rebel army ivere negleoled in their healthy a?id 
 undifciplined. 
 
 The truth is, that inftead of being neglcded in their heahh, 
 they had the moll: e:ninent of the faculty in America to attend 
 them, and had regular eftabliihed hofpitals. With regard to 
 their difcipline, they had as good ufe of fire-arms, in general, as 
 the King's troops, great pains having been taken to train their 
 men ever fince the year 1774. 
 
 Page 35.] Another matter, which has long been a qtiejiion with 
 the publicky ought to be cleared up— I mean, whether the General 
 commanding the Britip troops has been cojijined by peremptory in- 
 JlruBionsy which weakened his operations, and objlrudied the great 
 dejign of the war. — The letters of the American Secretaries of State 
 prove, that he was left to his own judgement in forming and exe- 
 cuting his plans in every injiance, except one (d), which he uf for- 
 tunately negleSledy and by that negledl facrificed a Britijh army, and 
 involved his country in a degree of difgrace it never before had 
 experienced. 
 
 (d) Thcfe inJlniSiiotis, (the author fays) were, to fupport the northern army, andta 
 make a diver/ion in its favour on the New-England coa/ls.—-Lord George Germain's 
 letter, 3^ March, 1J]J. 
 
 I never complained of being confined by peremptory in- 
 Aru<ftions. My operations were weakened, and the great defign 
 
 of 
 
 {a) A Return of the Rebel Strength in May, 1 776, printed at New-Tork, was thus : 
 In Canada, on the lakes, and at Albany - 9,000 Continental. 
 
 {12,000 Ditto. 
 11,000 Militia. 
 3,300 Jerfey brigade. 
 In Jerfey and Pennfylvania - - 10,000 Flying Camp, 
 
 In Virginia - - - 8,000 Continental. 
 
 North -Carolina - - -, 1,000 Ditto. 
 
 South-Carolina - . - 4,000 Ditto. 
 
 At Bofton - - - 2,000 Ditto. 
 
 >iot then flationed. - - - 20,000 Militia. 
 
 Total. 80,300 
 
[ 47 ] 
 
 of the war was obflruded, by a want of fufficient force, as I have 
 explained at large in my Narrative. The author here quotes 
 Lord George Germain's letter of the 3d of March, 1777, ^^ con- 
 taining inftru6lions to fiipport the northern army, although in fadt 
 it makes no mention whatfoever of that army. The only in- 
 ilruilions (if they can be fo called) which I ever received con- 
 cerning the northern army, are contained in his Lordfhip's letter 
 to me of the i8th of May 1777, which I did not receive till the 
 i6th of Auguft, when I was up Chefapeak-Bay — the words are 
 thefe ; '* trufting however that whatever you may meditate, it 
 ** will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the armv 
 ** ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itfclf under your 
 ** command." — I have fpoken to this in my Narrative (page 24). 
 
 In the letter of the 3d of March (referred to by the author) 
 I am informed that it is his Majeily's opinio j, that *' a warm 
 " diverlion upon the coafls of MafTachufett's-Bay and New- 
 ** Hampfhire would not only impede the levies for the conti- 
 ** nental army, but tend much to the fecurity of our trade," — 
 and Lord Howe and I are ordered to ** take this matter into oui* 
 ** ferious confideration, fo far as my intended plan (the expe- 
 ** dition to Pennfylvanla) will admit." — In my anfwer to Lord 
 George Germain of the 3d of June following, I gave my reafons 
 why that diverlion could not be made — This fubjed; is difcuffed 
 in my Narrative (page 12). And here I will only farther obfcrve, 
 that the diverlion propoled, in Lord George's letter, does not 
 profefs to have any reference to the northern army. 
 
 Page 36.] '7 he Commander in Chief never begaii his operations 
 till the month of June. A part of that month, and the whole of 
 April and May, when the feafon is moderate, mojl proper for a5lion, 
 and the roads are good, were wafitonly wafted ^ while a variety of 
 the moft cogent motives pointed to an early and vigorous campaign. 
 
 I have the opening of two campaigns to account for. 
 
 On the 2d of July 1776 I landed at Staten-Illand, from Halli- 
 fax. Our operations were not expelled to commence btforc the 
 arrival of the troops from Engiiind, or of General Clinton's army 
 from Charles-Town. General Clinton arrived the ill of Auguft. 
 
 The 
 
[ 43 J 
 
 The Guards and HeiTians, with the camp equipage, arrived tlie 
 1 2th of Auo-uft. Nine days only were allotted to the refrefli- 
 ment of the troops after the great length of time they had been 
 on board their tranfports, and for making all neceffary arrange- 
 ments. We landed on Long-Illand the 22d of Auguil: This 
 was the opening of the firft campaign, 1776, nor could it pof- 
 fibly have been opened fooner. 
 
 The fecond campaign in ^^j^j is next to be accounted for.— The 
 expedition toPeek's-Kill took place fo nearly as the 22d of March. 
 The expedition to Danbury on the 23d of April. The camp 
 equipage for the army did not arrive till the 24th of May. Our 
 operations in the Jerfeys began the 12th of June. My letters to 
 the Secretary of State contain fufficient reafons why thefe opera- 
 tions could not take place fooner. 
 
 Page 37.] In thefe montJos (April and May) the rebel army 
 was always reduced to its weakeji Jlate. 
 
 It was in the months of April and May that recruits for the 
 rebel army were chiefly procured, who never could join it before ths 
 month of June. 
 
 They recruited, as all other armies do, in the winter -, and 
 their levies joined them early in fpring. In fummer their re- 
 cruiting parties were in the tield. 
 
 Page 38.] He knew that dry forage was much more hearty food 
 for his horfes than green -, that he might have carried the fame 
 forage with him for a time, which fuftained him in their quarters -, 
 that the country was full of dry forage of every kind ; and that he 
 had ever obtained it when he flood in need of it, whether in the field 
 or in his quarters ffj. 
 
 (f) Sir JV. H — '^ letter of the ijth of Jan. 1778. Lord Cornwall! s procures 
 * fro?n the country , forage fu£icient for the winter confujnption.' 
 
 We had not forage in quarters, nor could we have carried any 
 quantity for effential fervice. 
 
 His reference to my letter of 17th of January, 1778, is of a 
 piece with the reft of his performance. The forage therein 
 
 fpoken 
 
■( -49 T 
 
 fpokcn of was procured in the neigh|>onrhood of Philadelphia, 
 at the beginning of the winter. But though every means was 
 exerted, we could not procure a fufficient quantity of forage 5 
 and we Should have been'much diftreifed in that article, if Lord 
 Howe had not conveyed to us a confiderable fuppiy from Rhode- 
 Illand. 
 
 But what €onne(Sl:iqn is there between the ilate of forage at 
 Philadelphia in the year 1778, and the opening of the campaign 
 in Jerfey in 1777 ? The author is peculiarly expert in anachro- 
 nifm, and has, in feme inflances, not only tranfpofed dates, but 
 combined the circumftances of different periods, for the fake of 
 ilrengthening, or applying them to, a particular point of time. 
 
 Of the opening of the campaign 1777, I have already fpoken. 
 It is not necelTary forme to fay much of 1778. — Very early in 
 April I received my orders to return home — The conduct, there- 
 fore, of the campaign of 1778 was to reft upon my fuccelTor. 
 The army, however, was not indolent or dijjipated in that interval. 
 — In the month of March I detached Colonel Mawhood to make 
 a defcent on the coaft of Jerfey. He defeated the force collected 
 againft him, and brought off a large and feafonable fupply of 
 forage, — Colonel Abercrombie was no lefs fuccefsful in furprifing, 
 -and entirely defeating, a corps of near a thoufand of the rebels, 
 who had taken poft about feventeen miles from Philadelphia. 
 This fervice was performed on the 4th of May -, and on the 7th 
 of May Major Maitland, with Capt. Henry of the navy, pro- 
 ceeded up the Delaware, to deftroy the rebel ihips and veffels 
 between Philadelphia and Trenton, an enterprize very ably con- 
 ducted, and effediually executed. — Sir Henry Clinton arrived at 
 Philadelphia on the 8th, and on the 24th of the fame month I 
 refigned to him the command of the army. 
 
 Page 38.] He faw repeated attempts made by bodies of men to 
 form themfelves in arms, and to ajfijl him in fupprejjing the Rebellion, 
 
 The only attempt of this kind worth mentioning happened in 
 North-Carolina, in the fpring of 1776, when it was abfolutely 
 impoflible for me to give affiftance to the infurredtion. The plan 
 was concerted between a fettlement of Highland emigrants, and 
 
 H a bodv 
 
[ 50 1 
 
 a body of Americans in that province, diftinguifhed by the name 
 of Loyalifts. They engaged to obey the orders of Governor 
 Martin, who propofed they fhould operate in favour of the 
 troops from Europe under Earl Cornwallis. The Loyalifls 
 promifed 5000, the Highlanders 700, men. The former in- 
 fixed upon their alTembling immediately; the latter urged the 
 expediency of uraiting the arrival of the Britifh troops, but 
 yielded to the importunity of the Loyalifts, and repaired in arms 
 to the rendezvous, ftronger than the ftipulated complement. The 
 Loyalifts, inftead of 5000, did not aflemble a tw^entieth part 
 of that number, and two companies of thefe deferted, upon the 
 near approach of the rebels. The Highlanders ftood their ground, 
 and fought bravely, but being overpowered, were defeated with 
 confiderable lofs, and forced to difperfe. 
 
 Page 38.] He faw many of the inhabitants fined y imprifofied, 
 dndjuffer death itfelf on account of their loyalty (g). 
 
 (i) ^'^ JVilliam Howe's letters prove the truths I have endeavowecl to Jupport. — In 
 that dated the ^th of fnne^ ^ll^-) he fays ^ he landed his troops to the great joy of a moji 
 faithful and loyal people. — That he has great rcafcn to expert a numerous body of the 
 inhabitants to join the army from the provinces of Aeiv-Tor^, the ferfeys^ and Con- 
 ne^icut ; ivho^ in this time of univerfal opprcjfton^ only wait for opportunities to give 
 proofs of their loyalty and zeal for government. 
 
 The letter, which the author here quotes as dated the 8th of 
 June, is dated the 7th of July, 1776, from Staten-Ifland. The 
 few inhabitants of this place had been averfe from the violent 
 meafures adopted by their neighbours, and in confequence ill- 
 treated by the people of Jerfey. The arrival of the King's troops 
 relieved them from future apprehenlions; and they teftitied their 
 loyalty by all the means in their power. They furnifhed us with 
 frefh provifions, carriages, horles, &c. at that time, therefore 
 they merited the delcription I gave them in my letter. But it 
 fhould be remembered, that it was only the people of Staten- 
 Ifland I fpoke of. The campaign not having begun, I could 
 have no perfonal knowlege of the loyalty of the people of New- 
 York, the Jerfeys, or Connedicut. At Sandy Hook I had met 
 Governor Tryon, and fome other gentlemen, who had taken 
 refuge on board lii ip, and from them only could I receive infor- 
 mation 
 
[ II ] 
 
 matlon of the difpofition of the people of thofe provinces. — 
 The event proved, that they were too fanguine in their ex- 
 pe(5tations. 
 
 Page 39.] As another proof of my opinion of the great loyalty of 
 the Americans y he adds hi a note the following quotation from ?ny 
 letter to the Secretary of St ate ^ dated 20th Dec. ijj(). 
 
 * The chain of cantonments is rather too extenfivCy but I was in- 
 ' duced to occupy Burlington, to cover the county of Monmouth, in 
 * which there are many loyal inhabitants.* 
 
 This letter was written before the affair of Trenton, and I 
 could have no reafon to fufped: the fidelity of thofe who came 
 in to us from Monmouth ; but I was foon undeceived. Many, 
 very many, of thefe Loyalifts, were a iliort time afterwards 
 taken in arms againft us, and others killed with my protections 
 in their pockets. In the pockets of the killed, and prifoners, 
 were alfo found certificates of thofe very men having lubfcribed 
 a declaration of allegiance, in confequence of the Proclamation 
 of the King's CommifTioners for a general indemnity. — Thefe 
 are notorious fad:s. 
 
 Page 39.] And yet, contrary to thefe proofs, he, with many of 
 his General ojicers, affeSled to believe the?n, and have f nee declared, 
 that the people of that country were almojl unajiimoufy difaffeBed to 
 the Crown, under this pretence we have feen him decline to entruji 
 the faithful and loyal fubjeBs with arms, or to make ife of the 
 well-afeBed force in the colonies, to aj/ifi him in reducing, or in 
 defending, after reduced, either cities or provinces. 
 
 Various offers of raifing men were made to me, nor did I de- 
 cline any of thofe offers that brought with them the leaft profped: 
 of fuccefs ', but I muff add, that very few of them were fulfilled 
 in the extent propofed. 
 
 Mr. Oliver Delancey, who was reputed to be the mofi; likely 
 man in New- York, to induce the Loyalifts of that province 
 
 H 2 to 
 
f 5^ ] 
 
 to join the King's troops, was appointed a Brigadier- General, 
 and authorifed to raife three Battalions, to conlift of 1500 pri- 
 vates, placing at the head of each the moft refpecSable charaders, 
 recommended as fuch by himfelf, and by Governor Tryon. Every 
 poffible effort was ufed by thofe gentlemen, not only in the 
 diftrids poffefled by the King's troops, but by employing per- 
 fons to go through the country, and invite the well-affected to 
 come in. Several of the officers (as I have fmce been informed) 
 anxious to complete their corps, fought for recruits, even amongff 
 the prifoners, who were then very numerous, and ventured to 
 hold out to them the temptations of pay, liberty, and pardon. 
 Notwithftanding all thefe efforts and encouragements : notwith- 
 ftanding the loyalty of the people, and the 7nany thoufand 
 fiying over to the BritiJJo troops for protection (as afferted by the 
 author) Brigadier-General Delancey, at the opening of the cam- 
 paign 1777, inftead of 1,500, had only raifed 597. 
 
 Mr. Courtland Skinner, who was acknowledged to poffefs con- 
 fiderable influence in the Jerfeys, where he had ferved the office 
 of Attorney-General with great integrity and reputation, was 
 alfo appointed a Brigadier- General, and authorifed to raife five 
 Battalions, to confiff of 2,500 privates, under the command 
 of gentlemen of the country, nominated by himfelf. The 
 fame efforts were made as for the railing of Delancey's corps -, 
 but at the opening of the campaign 1777, Brigadier General 
 Skinner's numbers amounted only to 517, towards his expedled 
 five Battalions of 2,500. 
 
 In November, 1777, Brigadier-General Delancey's corps en- 
 creafcd to 693, and Brigadier-General Skinner's to, 859. — In 
 May, 1778 their progrefs was fo flow, that the flrll: had only 
 advanced to 707, the latter to. i iqt. 
 
 Several other corps were offered to be raifed, and were 
 accepted, in the winter of 1776, making in the whole 
 thirteen, to confifl: of 6,500 men, including the Brigades 
 of Delancey and Skinner. But in May 1778, the whole 
 number in all thefe thirteen corps amounted only to 
 3,609, little more than half the promifed complement, and of 
 
 ' X thefe 
 
[53 3 
 
 thefe (as I have before obferved) only a fmall proportion were 
 Americans. 
 
 Upon our taking pofTeilion of Philadelphia, the fame, and 
 indeed greater encouragements were held out to the people of 
 Pennfylvania. — Mr. William Allen, a gentleman who was fup- 
 pofed to have great family influence in that province-^Mr. 
 Chalmers, much refpedted in the three Lower Counties on Dela- 
 ware, and in Maryland — and Mr. Cliftoji, the chief of the Ro- 
 man Catholic perfuafion, of whom there were fiid to be many in 
 Philadelphia, as well as in the rebel army, ferving againfl: their 
 inclinations : Thefe gentlemen were appointed Commandants of 
 corps, to receive, and form for fervice, all the well-aiFed:ed 
 that could be obtained — And what was the fuccefs of thefe ef- 
 forts ? In May, 1778, when I left America, Colonel Allen had 
 raifed only 152 rank and file — Colonel Chalmers 336 — and 
 Colonel Clifton 180; which, together with three Troops of 
 light dragoons, confining of 132 troopers, and 174 real volun- 
 teers from Jerfey, under Colonel Vandyke, amounting in the 
 whole to 974 men, conflituted all the force that could be col- 
 leded in Pennfylvania, after the moil indefatigable exertions, 
 during eight months. 
 
 P^g^ 39'] V/hen he faffed through New Jerfey, and drove the- 
 pnnic Jiruck rebels out of that country, no fiep was taken to embody 
 a7id arm the friends of government, who were reudy and anxious to 
 be employed, in difarming the difqff'eSied, in refioring the province 
 to his Majeflys peace, and in defending it when the ar?ny Jhould 
 proceed in its other ?iecejfary operations, 
 
 I never heard before of the readinefs and anxiety here expref- 
 fed — nor could I — for that part of New Jerfey through which 
 Earl Cornwallis marched, from Fort Lee to Trenton, was almoft 
 deftitute of male inhabitants, a few excepted, who remained to 
 £re, from behind bufhes, upon the King's troops as they pafTed. 
 The idea of employing people of this defcription, in difarming, 
 the difafJ'eBed, in rejhring the province to peace, and in defending 
 it when the army (liould proceed in its other operations, is too 
 glaringly abfurd to deferve farther comment. 
 
 Page- 
 
t 54 ] 
 
 Page 40.] In Philadelphia where a militia might have been 
 framed fiifficient, with the ajjijlance of 1 000 regulars ^ and a few 
 vefels of wary to have defended it againjl any force that could have 
 been brought againfi it, while the Britifi army was operating againjl 
 the main body of the rebel army, there was the fame unpardonable 
 omifjlony although he remained in that city near nine months. 
 
 What I have before faid, concerning the fuccefs of our en- 
 deavours to raife troops at Philadelphia, might be deemed a luf- 
 iicient anfwer to this paragraph. But it may be more fatisfadory, 
 to give the reader an exad: return of the number of inhabitants 
 rjmaining within the city of Philadelphia, the Northern Liber- 
 ties, and Diftrid: of Southwark, in Odober, 1777, taken from 
 an exad lift made out in the feparate wards, under the diredion 
 of Mr. Galloway. 
 
 Males under 18 years of age - - 494 ^ 
 
 Ditto above 18, and under 60 - - 4482 
 
 Total males 9423 
 Females of all ages - - - 12,344 
 
 Total 21,767 
 
 Whether a militia, formed from the above, could contribute 
 to the defence of the city, is fubmitted j and to make the con- 
 clufion as eafy as pofTible, I (liall ftate a very ftrong faft, to Ihew 
 how far the inhabitants were anxious to promote the King's fer- 
 vice, even without carrying arms* 
 
 As foon as we were in poffeffion of Philadelphia, my intention 
 was to fortify it in fuch manner, as that it might be tenable 
 by a fmall number of men, whilft the main army fhould keep 
 the field, and adl againft General Wafhington. To effectuate 
 this purpofe, I fent orders from German Town to the chief 
 Engineer, to conftrudl redoubts, and to form the neceifary lines 
 of communication. That the work might be expedited, and 
 the labour of the foldiers fpared, I, at the fame time, directed 
 him to employ the inhabitants, and pay them 8d. per diem, 
 
 befides 
 
r 55 ] 
 
 befides a ration of fait proviilons each, without which, I was 
 convinced they could not have been perfuaded to have worked 
 at all. 
 
 Mr. Galloway^ whom I had prevloufly talked with upon the 
 fubjed:, had allured me there would be no difficulty in finding 
 500 men for this bufinefs; and I prefumed he exerted himfelf to 
 fulfil the exped:ations he had given me. But with all the af- 
 fiduity of that gentleman, and all the means made ufe of by the 
 chief Engineer, the whole number that could be prevailed upon 
 to handle the pick-axe and fpade, for the conftrudlion of the 
 redoubts and abbatis, amounted, each day, upon an average, 
 to no more than between feventy and eighty. 
 
 Page 41.] Did he take one Jiep which tended to reconcile the 
 people to his Majefiy s inter ejis and government ; or to bring the^n 
 back to their former allegiance y although he had a cojnmijjion and in- 
 JlruB ions for that purpofe f 
 
 Every flep was taken for thefe purpofes, and the meafures 
 purfued by my Brother and me, in the execution of our civil 
 commiffion, were approved by the King's Minifter. Our inftruc- 
 tions have not yet been made public, and therefore it would be 
 improper to difcufs them in this place. 
 
 Page 41.] jilt hough he faw the people in different parts of the 
 country, making every effort in their power to affji him ; yet we 
 find in all his proclamations , an injundlion on them to remain peace- 
 ably in their habitations, without the leaf invitation to take up 
 arms in behalf of the Crown, or the fmallefl intimation, that their 
 affftance would accord with his wijhes. An injunBio?i which 
 amounted, in effeSl, to a prohibition, and rendered it dangerous, if 
 720 1 unlawful, for them to a5l other wife, becaife a flri£l obedience to 
 it was the only condition upon which he prom fed them his Majejiy's 
 protection, 
 
 J have already defcribed the efforts and afjifiance of the people 
 in different parts of the country. 
 
 Many 
 
r 56 ] 
 
 Many of my Proclamations contained invitations' to a^iis; m^ 
 i|-)romires of large encouragements. The autlxor her<2 perhaps 
 "meant to allude to one particular Declaration, which 1 i0u$d 
 when the army landed at the head of Elk. I fhall fubjoin a copy 
 of that declaration, which will prove how invidiou% he has 
 mif-quoted it. . 
 
 As to his fuggeftion, that the injandion, for the people to 
 remain peaceably in their habitations, amounted to a prohibition 
 againit their taking up arms in behalf of the Crov/n, and ren- 
 dered it dangerousy if not unlawful for them to do fo, becaufe 
 aJiriB obedience to the declaration was the only condition upon which 
 J. promifed them his Majejiy s protection ^ this I think, is a quib- 
 ble, which would never have entered the head of an E?iglifi 
 Lawyer. 
 
 As this Declaration was calculated for the meridian of Pennfyl- 
 vania, of the people of which province Mr. Galloway profeffed 
 an intimate knowledge, I confulted him previoudy upon it; 
 I framed it agreeably to his ideas; when written, it had his full 
 approbation. 
 
 Mr. Galloway afTured me, that the inhabitants of rhat part of 
 the country would come in to us. Soon after our landing, 
 I complained to him of my difappointment in that particular. — 
 He returned for anfwer, that the people were not fo v/ell afFed:ed 
 in that part of the country as they were farther on ; and that 
 I iliould find them more and more loyal, as I advanced towards 
 the Capital of Pennfylvania. This information, however, proved 
 equally falfe. Through the whole march of the army, from the 
 Head of lilk to Philadelphia, the male inhabitants, fit to bear 
 arms (a very few excepted) had deferted their dwellings, and 
 I had great reafon to believe, were in arms againfi: us. The 
 Quakers were the only people againft whom I entertained no 
 fufpicion. 
 
 D E C L A- 
 
[ S7 ] 
 
 DECLARATION. 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HOWE, regretting the calamities, to 
 which many of his Majeily's faithful fubjedts are flili expofed, 
 by the continuance of the rebellion, and no lefs defirous of pro- 
 ted:ing the innocent, than determined to purfue with the rigours 
 of war all thofe j whom his Majefty's forces, in the courfe of their 
 progrefs, may find in arms again it the King, doth hereby affurs 
 the peaceable inhabitants of the Province of Pennfylvania, the 
 Lower Counties on Delaware, and the Counties of Maryland on 
 the eaflern fliore of Chefapeak Bay, that, in order to remove any 
 groundlefs apprehenfions, which may have been raifed, of their 
 fuffering by depredations of the army under his command, he 
 hath iffued the flridefl orders to his troops, for the prefervation 
 of regularity and good difcipline ; and has fignified, that the mofl 
 exemplary punifliment fliall be inflidled upon thofe, who Ihall 
 dare to plunder the property, or molefl the perfons, of any of his 
 Majefty's welKdifpofed fubjed:s. 
 
 Security and protedion are likewife extended to all perfons, 
 inhabitants of this Province, who, not guilty of having alTumed 
 legiilative or judicial authority, may have adled illegally in fub- 
 ordinate ftations, and, confcious of their mifcondud:, been in- 
 duced to leave their dwellings, provided fuch perfons do forth^ 
 with return, and remain peaceably at their ufual places of 
 abode. 
 
 Confidering moreover, that many officers and private men now 
 a(5tually in arms againft his Majefty, may be willing to relinquifli 
 the part they have taken in this rebellion, and return to their 
 due allegiance : Sir William Howe doth, therefore, promife a free 
 and general pardon to all fuch officers and private men, as fhall 
 voluntarily come and furrender themfelves, to any detachment of 
 his Majefty's Forces, before the day on which it fliall be notified, 
 that the faid indulgence is to be discontinued. 
 
 Given under my Hand, at Head-Quarters of the Arrny, 
 the 27th Day of Auguft, 1777. 
 
 W. HOWE. 
 
 I Page 42.] 
 
[ 58 1 
 
 Pao-e 42.] Thoufands came in wherever the army marched, and 
 took the oath, but the Royal Faith, pledged for their fifity, was 
 fiame fully violated. The unhappy people, injiead of receiving the 
 prote5lion promifed, were plundered hy the foldiery. Their wives 
 and daughters were violently polluted by the luftful brutality of the 
 low eft of mankind; and friends and foes indifcriminately ?)iet with 
 the fame barbarian treatment. 
 
 If the Prritijlj (General was iiidolent and negleBful in putting a flop 
 to thefe cruelties, the rebel commander and the new fates were not 
 fo in converting them to their own be?ieft. Every pofible advantage 
 was take. I of thefe enormities (h). A ff davits were taken of the 
 plunder, and of' every rape. They were publified in all their newf- 
 papers, to irritate and enrage the people againft his Mojefy and the: 
 Britiflo jiation. Tlot Britip foldiers werereprefented as a race of 
 men more inhuman than favages. By thefe means, the minds of 
 many were turned againft the Britiflo government, and many in 
 defperation joined the rebel army. The force of the rebels was in- 
 creafed, the Britijh weakened, a?id the humanity and glory of Britons 
 received a difgraceful tarnifo, which time can never efface. 
 
 This is a rhapfody calculated, alternately to freeze and fire the 
 blood of the indignant reader, and my humanity, as well as my 
 honour, is concerned in the refutation of its falfehood. 
 
 It may be remembered that, when this country began to grow 
 impatient under the long continuation of the American war, 
 (with a fpeedy termination of which the people had been re- 
 peatedly flattered, notwithitanding the contrary alTurances the 
 Secretary of State was poiTefTed of from me) the moft illiberal 
 and unceafmg attempts were made, to divert the publick odiuni 
 from the Minifter to the General. One of the principal allega- 
 tions againft him, and againft his Brother alfo, was, that they 
 were too lenient, too difcriminate towards the inhabitants of 
 America. Severity, in its moft lavage extent, was held to be 
 the only means of quelling the rebellion. The fufterings, even 
 of the innocent, were to operate in our favour, by rendering 
 them weary of the conteft, and by exciting the multitude to fub- 
 miflion. Such was the language of thofe times. But Major 
 
 General 
 
[ 59 ] 
 
 "General Grey, in his evidence before the HouTe of Commons, 
 depofed, *' that he never fav/ any degree of lenity (liewn to the 
 ** Americans, but what was highly proper, and much to the 
 '* honour of the General and the Britilh army." — The imputa- 
 tion of improper lenity having thus loft its weight, the charge 
 is fuddenly reverfed. — Major Gener-al Robert/on and Mr. G^/- 
 /jw^^j/ are brought to fay, that the inhabitants were plundered by 
 the King's army, and (the enquiry in the Houfe of Commons 
 being haftily clofed, fo as to exclude the farther examination of 
 witnefTes on my part, who could have counterbalanced the weight 
 ofthefe and other allegations) the author of letters to a nobleman 
 is inftigated to alledge, that no lenity at all was fliewn towards 
 the people of America j but that on the contrary, every fpecies 
 of cruelty, at which the human minds revolts, was countenanced 
 and encouraged. 
 
 General Robert/on fays, that the troops, as they paiTed through 
 the Jerieys, plundered the inhabitants ; but he alfo confelTes, 
 that the commander in chief gave orders cigainjl it repeatedly j 
 and he might have added, that Earl Cornw-allis, who com- 
 manded the army when they pafled through the Jerfeys, ex- 
 erted himfelf to prevent that, and every other irregularity. 
 Even Mr. Galloway, who in his evidence aflerts that plunder 
 was committed, acknowledges at the fame time, that upon a me- 
 morial being prefented, relative to the plunder of a large quan- 
 tity of Madeira wine (which was one of the mofl flagrant in- 
 ftances) the matter was duly enquired into, and fettled. 
 
 The author of letters to a nobleman well knows, that my 
 general Orders, and my Proclamations, againft plundering, were 
 inceflant ; and in my confcicnce I believe, there never was lefs 
 plundering, nor fewer enormities committed by any army, in the 
 field, and where the inhabitants were in arms againft the troops, 
 than by that army Vv^hich I had the honour to command. With 
 regard to the pollution of wives and daughters by the liiftful 
 brutality of the loweft of mankind, I declare, that I do not 
 recolledt to have ever heard of more than one rape imputed to 
 the foldiery, and that was find to have been committed in Chelter 
 county, in the province of New-York. The criminal was 
 
 I 2 fecured, 
 
i [ 6° I 
 
 fecurcd i an enquiry immediately took place; but theacculer 
 rcfufcd to profecute. 
 
 It may be true (as the author alTerts) that the Leaders of the 
 rebellion circulated accounts of Britifh barbarity in their newf- 
 papers. To irritate the Inhabitants againfl the King's authority 
 and government was an invariable part of their fyftem. The 
 ncwfpapers of America, like thofc of other countries, are the 
 vehicles of invention and calumny, in fupport of party. But if 
 fuch accounts had been founded in truth, complaints from the 
 perfons, or families injured, w^ould probably have reached me; 
 as they did not, I am perfuaded the accounts were falfe. 
 
 That irregularities will fometimes be committed by a numerous 
 army cannot be denied. All I contend for is, that, circum- 
 ilances confidered, they were few, and not of an enormous nature ; 
 tliat every means was ufed to prevent them ^ and the delinquents, 
 when convidted, alv/ays puniflied in proportion to the offence. 
 
 Page 43.] The fuffering of the foldiers to plunder, and commit 
 ether outrages, was a dangerous relaxation of difcipiine. It ren- 
 dered them avaritious, negleBful of their duty, and difobedient to 
 command. 
 
 That the King's troops in America were relaxed in difcipiine, 
 negligent of their duty, and fyftematically difobedient to com- 
 mand, are allegations perfeftly new, and, I will add, fcandaloufly 
 falfe, refleding, without fliadow of proof, upon the honour and 
 condud: of all the officers who ferved with me in that army. 
 
 Page 45.] If near 20,000 men, afjifted by the Britifo feet were 
 necefjary to carry on the operations in Pennfylvania, a country which 
 he acknowledges to be in general well affected to govcrmnent, he muf 
 certainly know, that one third of that number were not fujfcient to 
 oppofe the united force of the five mofi difaffct'tcd of all the revolted- 
 colonies. 
 
 He mifreprefents the numbers of the fouthej-n army. They 
 amounted to 13,799 rank and file, including the Britifli, foreign, 
 and provincial force. I have acluiowledged, that I was i?iformed 
 
 the 
 
[ 6i ] 
 
 the country of Pennfylvania was in general well afFeded. I 
 received fuch information principally from Mr. Galloway ^ who 
 was a ftrong advocate for the expedition into that province. 
 
 Page 45.] He could not have taken a more effeSiual Jiep to fa- 
 crifice the northern army, than that of carrying his whole force to 
 the pjuthward, imthout leaving a corps ftifflctent to make a diverfion 
 in its favour. 
 
 This is a very grofs mifreprefentation. So far from carrying 
 my whole force to the fouthward, I left at New-York about 
 8,500 rank and file, fit for duty. I do not include the fick and 
 convalefcents of thofe corps, nor of the fouthern army, which 
 together amounted to more than 3,000 men. With that force 
 Sir Henry Clinton did make a diverfion in favour of the northern 
 army. But I fhali ever infift, and I am fupported by evidence 
 in infifling, that the foutliern expedit'.on, by drawing oif General 
 Wafliino:ton and his whole force, was the flronc(efl diverfion that 
 could have been made. This fubjed: is fully difcufifed in my 
 Narrative to the Houfe of Commons (page 20) and Major 
 General Grey's evidence is as follows : 
 
 ^ " Did not the expedition to Philadelphia prove a powei:- 
 ** ful diverfion in favour of the northern army ? 
 
 A. *' I think a ftronger, or more folid diverfion could not 
 ** have been made, than that of drawing General WaHiing- 
 '* ton, and the whole continental army, near three hundred 
 ** miles off. 
 
 ^ *^ Whether the moft pi-obable motive, to Rave obliged 
 '* General Wafliington to come to a general engagement, waS- 
 *' not the prefervation of Philadelphia; I mean, was there any 
 ** other probable objed that would have drawn General Wafh- 
 ** ington to an engagement ? 
 
 A. " I do not think there was any one objed, which would 
 ** have tempted General Walhington to rifk a general adion, fa 
 '^ much as the fear of lofing the Capital of Pennfylvania," 
 
 ^ " WaSL 
 
' i 62 ] 
 
 ' * ^ ** Was there any probability of bringing the war in 
 ^' America to a termination that campaign, without forcing 
 '' General Wafliington to an engagement ?" 
 
 J'. " Certainly not." 
 
 ^. *' Whether, if Mr. Wafliington had had his choice, with 
 '' refpecSt to the dir^<5lion of Sir William Howe's army, he would 
 " have wiflied him to have gone up the Hudfon's river, or to 
 ** Philadelphia?" 
 
 j4. " With the force that Sir William Howe had under his 
 " command I think, if- General Wafliington had a wifli, it was 
 ** for him to have gone up the North river." 
 
 Page 46.] Why ivas fo high-fpirited an army taken from the 
 fight of an enemy of not ha f its force, put on board a feet, and 
 £ypofed to all the accidents and dangers of the ocean, &c. 
 
 My reafons for going by fea are fully fct *forth in my Narrative 
 (page 16). 
 
 Page 46.] And why, when Philadelphia was his objeB, after he 
 had experienced the oppoftion of the trade wind, did he ohflinately 
 perfift in his circuitous route, &c. 
 
 My reafons forgoing the circuitous route by Chefapeak-Bay 
 are alfo given in my Narrative, and they are fully confirmed and 
 juflified by the depofition of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond to 
 the Houfe of Commons, which I have given in a fubfequent 
 remark. 
 
 Page 47.] In the midji of viSlory the ardour of his troops was 
 fiipprejjed. 
 
 I fuppofe the author here alludes to my condud near the Lines 
 ^of Brooklyn, on the 27th of Augufl:, 1776. As this was much 
 fcrutinized in the Houfe of Commons, I fliall fairly infert tho 
 evidence upon the fubjed. ,1 
 
 Examination 
 
[ 63 ] 
 
 Examination of Earl Cornwallis. 
 
 ^ ** Did your Lordflilp fee the enemy's Lines at Brooklyn, 
 ** during the a6tion of the 27th of Auguft, 1776 V* 
 
 A. *' I did not fee them on that day with any accuracy ; I 
 " was on the left with the fecond Battalion of grenadiers, and 
 ** could form no judgement." 
 
 ^ '* From the knowledge you had of -thofe Lines after the 
 ** ad:ion, would it have been a prudent meafure to have alTaulted 
 ** thofe w^orks, on that day ?" 
 
 A. " I apprehend the latter part of that quefiion is matter 
 *' of opinion ; I never did hear it fuggefted by any one, that 
 ** thofe Lines could have been carried by alfault." 
 
 ^hird Days Examination (p/'Major General Robertson. 
 
 ^ *' From the circumftances of the purfuit of the 27th of 
 ** Augufl, and the manner in which the rebels retreated, do you 
 ** apprehend the Lines of Brooklyn might have been ftormed ?" 
 
 A. " There was a ridge of heights feparated us from the 
 *' rebels 3 the rebels had poffeffion of them, audit would have- 
 *' been very difficult to "have forced them. ; General Howe, by 
 *' making a march in the night, got the better of the difficulty; 
 *' we got near the rebel camp without their perceiving us. 
 ** General Howe put hitnfelf at the head of the troops, and 
 *' pufhed in between the heights and the rebel Lines; by this 
 •* move we got 2000 prifoners. Some of the troops were going 
 ** to ftorm the Lines; General Howe thought proper to order 
 " them back.'' 
 
 ^ ** Do you apprehend, in the manner in which the rebels 
 ** fled to the Lines, and in which that part of our army purfued 
 ** them, that, if our troops had not been called back, they. 
 ** would have llormed the Lines, and carried them ?" 
 
 A, ** I did not m.yfelf know the ilrength of the Lines,-, nor do 
 *' I believe General Howe did at that time. I have heard fince, 
 ** that the Lines v/ere weakly manned ; and that Putnam, who 
 
 " had 
 
[ 64 ] 
 
 ** had the command there of 7000 men, had detached all to the 
 ** heights but 300 ; but this was a circumflance known, to 
 *' nobody at the time, it was a circumftance General Howe 
 ** could not polTibly know, and I did not myfelf, at that time, 
 " think, that ftorming them would have been a proper meafure." 
 
 ^ *' Do you know whether Sir William Howe took immc- 
 " diate care to follow the enemy, as foon as he was informed of 
 ** their evacuating the Lines ?" 
 
 A. ** Sir William Howe was always alert. I fent my Aide- 
 ** du-camp to head-quarters, to give notice that my Brigade was 
 *' ready to march; when he returned Sir William Howe was 
 ** gone out, I apprehend, to head fome part of the army." 
 
 ^ " On what do you found your opinion, that Sir William 
 ** Howe could not be a judge of the force of the enemy's lines 
 " on the 27th of Auguft ?" 
 
 A. " I marched at the head of my brigade to a place near 
 
 '^ the enemy's Lines ; I went to the lituation where I thought I 
 
 ** could fee them bell from, without leaving my Brigade far ; and 
 
 ** I could not make any judgement of the ftrength of the enemy's 
 
 *' Lines, from any place I could fee them: This made me wiih 
 
 ** that the grenadiers would not goon; and pleafed to think 
 
 ** that my ideas correfponded witli Sir William Howe's. I 
 
 *' imagined that the General called back the troops, becaufe he 
 
 " was unable to form ajuft eflimate of the force of the Lines." 
 
 Page 48.] At Brmifwicky in December^ 1776, Lo7^dCornwallis 
 ivas upon the heels of the eiiemy. — The deJlru5lion of a bridge over 
 ■theRarito?! fived them — only for a few hours. — Their further fecurity 
 ijvas owing to the orders received by that 7ioblejna?i to halt at 
 Brunfwick. 
 
 TheRariton is fordable in that place, at every recefs of the tide 'y—^ 
 and had the noble General been free to act at his own difcretiony 
 he ?nighty and fio doubt would, have purfued hii enfeebled anct 
 panic-firuck enemy to the Delaware, over which they never could 
 have pajjl'd, without falling into his hands, 
 
 I 
 
t 65 ] 
 
 In anfwer to thefe aflertions, I believe, it will be Aifficlent «5 
 oppofe the evidence of Earl Cornwallis. 
 
 \^ "Would it have been prudent, to have purfued the 
 ** enemy from Brunfwic, with the part of your Lordihip's corps, 
 ** which firfl reached that place ?" 
 
 A, ** As my condudt in America forms no part of the prc- 
 ** fent enquiry I certainly do not think myfeff, at prefent, ac- 
 ** countable to this Houfe for any action of m'y own. I am 
 *' however, on the prefent occafion, free to fay, that I could not 
 ** have purfued the enemy from Brunfwic, with any profped of 
 " material advantage, or, without greatly diftreffing the troops 
 *' under my command." 
 
 ^ ** In what refpedl, would the purfuit of the enemy froni 
 ** Brunfwic, have diftrefled the troops under your command ?" 
 
 A. *' We arrived at Brunfwic the night of the firft of De- 
 '* cember. We had marched that day twenty miles, through 
 ** exceeding bad roads. We fubfifted only on the flour we found 
 ** in the country; and as the troops had been conflantly march- 
 •' ing, ever lince their firfl entrance into the Jerfeys, they had no 
 " time to bake their flour ; the artillery horfes, and baggage horfes 
 ** of the army were quite tired ; that fufliciently proves, that we 
 *' were not in a good condition to undertake a long march. The 
 ^ bridge over the Rariton was broken, which caufed a necefl^ary 
 <' delay of one day. If the enemy could not have pafled at Tren- 
 ** ton, they might have marched down the eaft fide of the Dela- 
 «' ware. What I have faid, I believe, is fufiicient to prove, that 
 <' we could not reap any confiderable advantage from fuch purfuit." 
 
 6^ « Were the troops, under the command of your Lordfhip, 
 ** in a condition to have marched before the 6th ?" 
 
 A, *' The troops would have been fo undoubtedly." 
 
 ^ *' What was the impediment to purfuing the march from 
 *' Brunfwic, as your Lordlhip fays the troops were undoubtedly 
 .*v able before the 6th ?" 
 
 A. ** As the enemy had fo much the ftart of us, I do not fee 
 **, there was any great objed: for the march. We wanted re- 
 
 K ** inforcement. 
 
/I 
 
 !' [ 66. } 
 
 ♦♦ infos€€mcnt, in order to leave troops for the communication 
 *^ between Brunfvvic and Amboy. It was Hkewife neceflary ta 
 *' pay fome attention to a conflderable body of troops, then, 
 ** pafTmg the north river, under Geiaeral Lee." 
 
 ^ Did you ftop at Bhinfwie, from the ifk to the 6th, in^ 
 ** confcquence of orders ?" 
 
 A. ** I underftood it tasy be tlie Gfincral's direcflion, that I 
 ** fhould halt at Brtrnfwic, but had i feen, that I could have 
 ** ftruck a material ftroke, by moving forward, I certainly ihould 
 ** have taJien it upon aie to- have done it." 
 
 Page 48.] yf/ Brunfiiilc the Britijb. army.' baked near a weckK. 
 Washington Sy conjijiing of 0,^00 men, lay at Pritice-TowTt, feventeen:: 
 miles — and at Trenton on the Delaware, twenty-nine mil£;s. difianti . 
 ivith all his heavy cannon and baggage. 
 
 The reafons for halting at Brunfwic are ilated abqve hy Earl 
 Cornwallis- 
 
 Washington's force, at this time, , coniiflied of 600.Q men, ex~ 
 clufive of Lee's corps of 4000, General Wafliington loii no 
 time, in croffing his artillery and baggage over the Delaware at 
 Trenton, before we could move from Brunfwic. He alfo c rolled 
 part of his troops,, keeping a Gor£s on the eaftiide to obferveour 
 motions. 
 
 Page 49.] O^ the yth of December ,^ the army marched from 
 Brunfwic at four o'clock in the morning y^and arriv£d at Prince-' 
 Town in the afternoon about the fame hour. 
 
 The troops of the left column were not in their cantonments,. 
 in the evening of the march to Prince-Town, until after dark, 
 and thofe of the right column, not until fome hours after dark. 
 Earl Cornwallis (that his march might be. impeded as little as 
 polTible) left his tents behind him. 
 
 Page 49.] He waited at Prince-Town feventeen hours, marched.- 
 at 7iine clock on the morning of the eighth, and. arrived at Trenton 
 at four Q clock in the afternoon* 
 
 ^ The;. 
 
I 67 3 
 
 The caufe of n©t marching earlier the fGllowiag day was, that 
 the enemy had broken down abridge, which could not.be iconcr 
 repaired, and rendered fit for the paiTage of artillery,' 6cc. 
 
 Page 50.] TLvery one expert ed, that he ivould pafs that r'rcer 
 (the Delaware) as it is fo eafily praSli cable, and as It mujl have 
 ie en followed by the great eji advantages. 
 
 To this alfo I (hall ojjpofc the evidence of Earl Cornwall is, 
 
 ViZ. 
 
 ^. ^ Was there any movement made in the purfuit of the 
 ** enemy to Trenton, with a defign to crofs the Delaware at that 
 ^* time?" 
 
 A, " The nigkt that the General arrived at Trenton, he dc- 
 ^* tached me, with a confiderable corps of -troops, from Maiden- 
 ** head to Coriel's- Ferry, where we had fome hopes, frora 
 ** previous meaAires taken by the General, that we (liould have 
 ** found boats to crofs the river. Our expe<3:ations were difap- 
 ** pointed, and we found no boats.." 
 
 -^ *' Whether the execution ©f that meafure (crofling the 
 ^* Delaware) was pra<3:icable at that time?" 
 
 A, ** As the Delaware was not fordable, and we could ^ot 
 ** no boats, it was certainly impracticable, as I have faid." 
 
 Page 51.] The General having refolved not to crofs the Dela^ 
 ^vsare, began to form his winter cantonments. hi this irifiance, he 
 difcovered no more military judgement than he had JJjewn vigour in 
 purfuing his enemy. He fcattered and extended them from Bur^ 
 Mngton to New-Tork, a fpace ahnoji ninety miles j dividing his 
 force into fmall dijlant parties y liable to be cut off by the enemy y one 
 after another y with eafe. But this was not the mofi cenfurable part 
 of his conduct : the frontier .po/isy or thofe near eft to the enemy 
 were committed to the command of foreigners y who could not under- 
 ft and the language of the country . 
 
 I have fpoken fully upon this fubje^flin my Narrative; hu«^as 
 a farther juftification, I Ihall here add the teflimony c^ Earl 
 jCornwalli^, viz. 
 
 K 2 %, *' For 
 
f 6S ] 
 
 ^. " For ihe reaions then known to your Lordflyip, was 
 •* Sir \tilliam Howe juflifiable, in having taken Trenton into 
 ** the cllain of cantonments, and- for pofting the Hellian troopsy 
 ** with ithe 42d regiment, there, and at Bordentown, under the. 
 ** comniand of Colonel Donop ?•" 
 
 yif. ** This again is a queftion of opinion, and does coma 
 *' under the defcription of thofe, which I think myfelf not, 
 ** bound to anfwer : but, as I. believe I was the perfon,. who ii-rft 
 '* fuggefted the idea to the General, of taking Trenton and Bor- 
 '* dentown in the chain of his cantonments,.! think myfelf inj 
 '* honour bound to anfwer it.. 
 
 **' The advantage that mufl naturally arife, from holding fo 
 ** large a part of the Jerfeys ; the great encouragement we met. 
 ** with from the inhabitants, three or four hundred of whom. 
 ** came in and took the oath every day, fbr, at leaft ten days;, 
 ** the great advantage we fhould derive, from obtaining forage 
 ** and provinons, made me think itadvifeable to rifk that extended. 
 '* cantonment. Human prudence could not forefee the fatal 
 ** event of the furrender of Colonel Rhall's brigade. I appre- 
 ** hended no danger, but the chance of having our quarters beat 
 ** up in the winter ; and the objedl,. in my apinion, towards* 
 ** finiihing the war, was of greater confequence, than two or 
 *' three victories. In regard to what the General . mentions, of 
 ** pofting the Heftians on the left of the cantonments, I muft:. 
 " fay, I ever had, and ftill have, the higheft opinion of thofe 
 '* brave troops. The misfortune at Trenton was owing entirely 
 ** to the imprudence and negligence, of the-comrnanding Officer, 
 ** On all other occaiions, the troops ever have behaved, and, I 
 ** dare fay, ever will behave, with the greataft courage and intre- 
 ** pidity. The behaviour, on the attack of Fort Wafhington, 
 *' of this very brigade of Coloaei Rhall's, was the admiration 
 ** of the whole army." 
 
 To this I will add the teftimony of Sir George Ofbbrne, who. 
 being allced ** if he ever heard Colonel Donop exprefs his fenti- 
 '* ments, relative to the port at Trenton, either before oraft.er 
 ** his defeat ?" anfwered. 
 
 '* III: 
 
u 
 
 it 
 
 [ 69 ] 
 
 ** In the fituationl had the honour to be with theHeflian 
 troops, I lived in a degree of friendship with Colonel Donop, 
 and very frequently, after the misfortune at Trenton, he ac- 
 quainted me, that if Colonel Rhall had executed the orders ho- 
 ** had delivered to him from Sir William Howe, which were to 
 *' ered: redoubts at the pofl at Trenton, that his opinion was, it. 
 ** would have been impoflible to have forced Colonel Rhall's 
 " brigade, before he could have come to his affiftance from 
 ** Bordentown,*' 
 
 . Page. 9 5. J Which f viz. Wapjingtons whole force) being at thiti 
 time lefs than 4,000.. 
 
 Washington, after Lee's corps joined him, had. never lefs than 
 about 8,000. 
 
 , Page. 6 1.] He did not open the campaign fill the 12th of June.. 
 I have fpoken to this point above. . 
 
 Page 61 .] On that day filth of JuneJ the Eritijh General af 
 fcmhled his troops at Brunfwick. Wafiington was enqatnped on a 
 hill above ^ibble-'Town, about nine miles fro?n that place, on the 
 north fide of the Rariton, with fewer than 6000 undifcip lined and ' 
 badly appointed troops -, which, with a corps under Sullivan of 2000 
 men at Rrince-Town, compo fed his .whole force. 
 
 From intelligence I then had, and which I have not fmce hadl 
 any.reafon to doubt, Wafhington had ..not lefs than io>ooo in his 
 camp, on the hill above Quibble Town i. 
 
 Page 6ie] His camp fat ^ibble^l'ownj was far from- being 
 inaccejjible or fortifed. It was Jirong and defeiifible in front, be^ 
 caufe it was guarded by the Rariton, and the hill was Jieep and 
 difficult of accefs : but in his rear, towards the mountains, or on his 
 right, towards, the Delaware, it was by no means impradlicable of 
 • qfault. 
 
' His camp was to the full as inaccefTiblc in the rear, as in th€ 
 * front; and an attack upon his right flank (from every account I 
 could get) would have been flill more hazardous. 
 
 Page 62.] Thefe ctrcumjlances plaifily informed WaJhmgto72y 
 that Sir William Howe did not mean to crojs the Delaware, and that 
 he was not anxious to bring on an a5lion» 
 
 General Wafhington was certainly induced to believe, that my 
 intention was to attack him j and had he not been perfectly fa- 
 tisfied with the ftrength of his poft, he would not have remained 
 fo long in it. 
 
 Page (^i?^ Sir William Howe, with 17,000 men, was in the 
 Jieldy in Jight of his coiitcmptible enemy. 
 
 I marched from Brunfwic with about 11,000 fighting men. 
 It being neceflary to leave the pofts of Amboy and Brunfwic in 
 a proper ftate of defence, between 3 and 4,000 men were left for 
 that purpofe. This circumftance is more particularly explained 
 in my Narrative (page 15). 
 
 Page 66.] T^ he note (c). 
 
 This note is a critlcifm on the variation of my plans. My 
 plans undoubtedly did vary, according to circumftances. The 
 variation of circumftances, and the variation of my plans, ar« 
 flated in my Narrative £b fully, as to require no farther dif- 
 
 cullion. 
 
 [Page 68 and 69.] 
 
 The author here adopts the common place arguments againft 
 the expedition up the Chefapeak. If what I have faid in my Nar- 
 rative upon that fubjedt is not fatisfaftory, the evidence of Sir 
 Andrew Snape Hammond, is fo full, fo clear, and fo uncontro- 
 vertible, that I Should imagine the expediency of that route can 
 no longer admit of a doubt, in the mind of any impartial man. 
 
 Martjs 
 
C 7» 3 
 
 Mortis 1 1 die Maii, 1 779 , 
 
 CJOMMITTEE to confidcr of the feveral papers, which were 
 prefented to the Houfe, by Mr. De Grey, upon the 19th da^ 
 of March lafl:, purfuant to their Addrefs to his Majefly. 
 
 Mr. FREDERICK MONTAGUE IN THE CHAIR. 
 
 Sir Atidrew Snap,^ Hammsnd calkd in, and examined by Sir 
 William and Lord Howe. 
 
 Q^ ** Did you ferve in the fquadron, under the command of 
 ** Lord Howe, in North- America, in 1777?^' 
 
 A., " I did ; I commanded a detached fquadron on the coaft 
 **' of Delaware and. Virginia, for a year and a half, except at 
 '* fome intei*vals prior to that period/' 
 
 Q^ ** Had you been employed in the command of ,a detach- 
 ** ment of frigates,, to watch the motion of the rebels on the 
 '* Delaware, for feveral months antecedent to the arrival of the _ 
 ** Britifh fleet, off pf the entrance of that river, on the 30th of , 
 " July 1777?" 
 
 A. ** I was employed on that fervice for feveral months before/' 
 
 Q^ ** Of what number of Ships and veiTels do you reckon 
 **^ that fleet conflfted; I mean the Britifh fleet which arrived off 
 ** the Delaware ?" 
 
 A. *' Of two hundred and fifty fail.": 
 
 Q^ " Was the navigation of the Delaware very intricate and i 
 ** hazardous, efpecially from the Ihoals and rapidity of the tides ?" ' 
 
 A. ** It certainly is; I do, not know any river fo difficult of- : 
 *' navigation." 
 
 Qjj *;* Was it more particularly ..fo,. for the expeditious paf- 
 ** fage of large fliips of war ?'* 
 
 A. ** Large fhips of war can only pafs certain places- at par* 
 ^* ticular times of tides," 
 
 ** Q^ ** What was your report to Lord Howe, on the 30th of July,,, 
 ** ©f the pofrtion of the enemy on the banks of the Delaware ?'•' 
 
 A. *' Theu 
 
[ 7^ ] 
 A. ** The report v/hich I recolledled I made to Lord Howe on 
 ** that day was, That I had received intelligence the day before 
 ** that General Wafliington had croiTed the Delaware, and was 
 •* marching down to \yilmington from Philadelphia." 
 
 Q^ " What did you underfland to be the nature of the Penn- 
 *' fylvania fliore, with refped to an eafy communication with the 
 <* interior parts of the country, up to Reedy Ifland?" 
 
 A. *' The coafl: of the Delaware from Cape Hinlopen all the 
 " way up to Reedy Illand is marfliy low land, very full ®f creeks, 
 ** and communicates to the Upland only by caufeways." 
 
 (T «* What was the nature of the fliore on the fame fide 
 " from Reedy Illand to Newcaftle ?" 
 
 A. " 111 fome places marfhy, in others fbme tolerable landing 
 ** places." 
 
 Q^ ** What extent of anchorage do you fuppofe the fleet 
 *' would occupy in any part of the navigable channel of the De- 
 ** 1 aware from Rtedy Ifland up to Chefter ?" 
 
 A. " The main channel of the river is fo narrow till you pafs 
 «* Wilmington, or rather till you pafs Newcaftle, that I conclude 
 " it would require at leafl: four miles, if not more. 
 
 Q^ *' At what difliance mufl: the fliips and veflTels lie from the 
 ** fliore in fuch anchorage ?" 
 
 A. ** Within gun fhot on both fldes — within cannon fliot in 
 '*' all places, and within mufquet fliot in fome." 
 
 Q^ " H'ow many miles an hour do the tides run in the Dela- 
 «' Ware ?" 
 
 A. ** Between three and four.'* 
 
 Q^ " What did you underfl:and to be the water-guard, which 
 •* the rebels had provided, to obftrud the free navigation of the 
 ** river -, I mean the whole force on the river ?" 
 
 A. '* There were two frigates at Philadelphia, not complete as 
 •* to men — at Mud-Ifland, where the fort was, there was a fliip 
 '* called the Province Ihip, which mounted eighteen 1 8 pounders 
 
 *f — the 
 
[ 73 ] _ 
 
 et — the Delaware frigate of twenty-eight 12 pounders — tw@ 
 *' xebecks, mounting each two 24 pounders in their bow, two 
 '* 18 pounders in their ftern, and four 9 pounders each in their 
 *• waill — a brig mounting fixteen 6 pounders — two floating bat- 
 ** teries, the one twelve 18 pounders, the other of lo; thefc 
 ** guns were moveable on either fide — thirteen row gallies, each 
 ** carrying one gun, from 32 pounds to 18 — thirty-fix row boats, 
 ** or half gallies, carrying a 6 pounder, or a 4 pounder — I believe 
 ** that was all, except fire rafts, of which there were twenty- 
 '' five, or thirty — each compofed of five flages chained together. '* 
 
 Q^ ** Did it appear afterwards, that your report of that water 
 ** guard was well founded ?" 
 
 A. ** It did ; I faw them all myfelf." 
 
 Q^ ** Whether the proper boats of thefhipsof war were of 
 " a conflru(5lion and force, well adapted to oppofe their water 
 ** guard on night fervice?" 
 
 A. " Certainly not." 
 
 Q^ ** Whether the fmall armed vefTels of the fleet were ade-. 
 ** quateto that purpofe, the Cornwallis galley excepted?" 
 
 A. ** By no means." 
 
 [Exammeci by the other Members of the Committee >'\ 
 
 Q^ " What is the nature of the fhore above Reedy Ifland, 
 *• and below Wilmington, with refped: to the flatnefs of the 
 ** country, and the eafe of covering a landing by the fhips ?" 
 
 A. ** I have before faid, that the fliore before Reedy Ifland 
 •* and Newcaftle is m.arfliy in fome places, and that there are 
 " landing places in parts of it — Above Newcaflle, as far as Wil- 
 ** mington Creek, it is an entire marfh." 
 
 Q^ *' Could the army have landed either at Newcaflle, or 
 " upon any parts of the weflern (hore of the Delaware, between 
 ** Newcaflle and Reedy Ifland ?" 
 
 L A. ** Aa 
 
[ 74 ] 
 
 A. ** All army can land any where, where there Is no oppo- 
 " fition." 
 
 Ci^ *' Do you believe that the fituation of the rebels wag 
 ** fuch, that they could have made fuch an oppofition as to pre- 
 '* vent our trOops landing, affifted, as the troops could have 
 ** been by the fleet, at the time of your report ?" 
 
 A. " That is a queftion impofTible for me to anfwer, unlefs 
 " I knew the force that was likely to oppofe them/' 
 
 Q^ ** What do you believe that force to have been ?" 
 
 A. " The intelligence I received was, that General Wafliing- 
 '* ton was in that country with his whole army.." 
 
 Q. ** In what part of the country ?'* 
 
 A. ** My intelligence mentioned Wilmington."' 
 
 Q^ ** Whether in the fituation of Wilmington, with refpecfl 
 ** to Newcaftle, troops, pofted at Wilmington, could have been 
 ** ufed to prevent a landing at Newcaftle, or below Newcaftle ?" 
 
 A. " I conceive the rebel army would have marched to the 
 *' fpot where the Britifh troops meant to land; I do not fuppofe 
 ** the rebel army were meant to remain pofted at Wilmington/' 
 
 Q^ " Whether you believe the rebel troops could have kept 
 ** poiTeffion of Newcaftle, if they had marched there ?" 
 
 A. " That queftion can only be anfwered by aland officer." 
 
 Q^ ** Do you now believe that the rebel troops were at, or 
 ** near, Wilmington ?" 
 
 A. *' By the works I faw at Wilmington, I have reafon to 
 ** think, that the rebel army were there at that time — the 30th 
 «« of July." 
 
 Qi ** Do you know that a great weftern road leads fronx 
 " Newcaftle to the Head of the Elk ?" 
 
 A. ** I have heard £0" 
 
 Q^ " Do 
 
I 7S ] 
 
 Q^ *' Do you fee any reafon to have prevented the rebel 
 '* troops from marching to the Head of the Elk, in the fame 
 ** manner as you fuppofe they might have marched to Newcaftle, 
 ** from Wilmington ?" 
 
 A. ** I have very little knowledge of the marching of armies.* 
 
 Q^ '* How far is it from Newcaftle to the head of the Elk ?'' 
 
 A. " It is called by the map feventeen miles." 
 
 Q^ " How far is it by fea from Cape Hinlopen to the Head 
 *' of the Elk?" 
 
 A. ** About 350 miles." 
 
 Q. ** Are there not manv difficulties in the navigation to 
 " theHeadoftheElk?" 
 
 A. *' There are fome difficulties, but the navigation of the 
 *' Chefapeak is exceedingly eafy in general." 
 
 Q^ " What is the diftance between Reedy-Ifland and 
 " Newcaftle?" 
 
 A. *' Five or fix miles." 
 
 Q^ <« Might not the fleet have lain below Reedy-Ifland in 
 ** fafety, within a fmall diftance of Reedy-Ifland ?" 
 
 A. *' There is no part of the Delaware, between the ihoals, 
 '* where they could have lain, without being expofed to the 
 ** fire rafts ." 
 
 Q^ ** Whether the fleet, on returning to the Delaware, were 
 ** not neceflTarily expofed to the fire rafts ?" 
 
 A. " When the fleet returned from the Chefapeak, they came 
 <* in detachments, and we were in pofieffion of the lower 
 *< Chevaux de Prize of the enemy." 
 
 Q^ *' How far was the lower Chevaux de Prize from Reedy- 
 ** Ifland?" 
 
 A . *' About eighteen or twenty miles." 
 
 Q^ *' Might not the fleet have gone up in detachments on 
 " the 30th of July and the beginning of Auguft ?" 
 
 L 2 A. '* That 
 
[ 76 ] 
 
 A. ** That depends on the mode the Commanding Officer 
 «* chufes to condu<Sl; them in." 
 
 Q^ *' V/hen you made the report on board the Eagle, on the 
 ** 30th of July, whether you mentioned the intelligence refpecft- 
 ** ing Wilmington, as a reafon, to induce the Commander in 
 •* Chief to proceed up the Delaware ?" 
 
 A. ** I had no other inducement than to do my duty, and to 
 ** relate particularly to the Commanding officer every intelli- 
 «* gence I had received." 
 
 Q^ " Was there any other intelligence given at the fame 
 «* time?" 
 
 A. ** I do not recoiled: any." 
 
 Q^. '* What do you conceive to be the reafon, that the Com- 
 ** manderin Chief went to Chefapeak, infteadof the Delaware?" 
 
 A. ** As no publick reafons were given to me, I hope the 
 ** Houfewill not think me wanting in refpedl to them, if I de- 
 *' cline faying what the fubftance of the private communication 
 ** was." 
 
 Q^ ** What is the width of the river, oppofite to Newcaftle?" 
 
 A. ** The width of the river, immediately oppo£te Newcaflle> 
 ** is about three miles." 
 
 Q^ ** What is the breadth of the navigable channel in that 
 *' place ?" 
 
 A. *' About two miles there, and below confiderably 
 •* narrower." 
 
 Q^ " What width in the narrowefl parts below, between 
 '* the Pickpat fhoals and Fort Penn ?" 
 
 A. " Not above half a mile from one fhoal to another in the 
 *' narroweft part." 
 
 Q^ *' How many days, from the 30th of July, does he 
 ** fuppofe itwould have taken the fleet, to have come to anchor 
 ** off of Reedy -Ifland, in a difpofition fit for landing the troops?" 
 
 A. " M 
 
[ 77 ] 
 
 A. *' As it would depend entirely on the wind, itisimpoffiblc 
 ** to anfwer that diredtly, but I fhould fuppofe, not lefs than 
 ** four or five days." 
 
 Q^ *' Suppofe the wind fair?" 
 
 A. *' With a fair wind, in three or four days." 
 
 Q^ *' With the whole fleet, fhips of war and tranfports ?" 
 
 A. '* I have before faid, the fhips of war can pafs particular 
 *^ flioals only, at particular times of the tide." 
 
 Q^ ** Do you apprehend that the enemy's water force would 
 <* have been the greateft impediment to our landing troops above 
 '* Reedy-Ifland?" 
 
 A. '* Yes, I do ; the row gallies, in particular, are con- 
 ** flruded to go in very fhoal water — they would lay on the 
 *' flats of the river, where the fhips guns could not be brought 
 ** to bear on them." 
 
 Q^ *' Whether the fliips guns could not be brought to bear 
 ** on the bite of Newcaftle?" 
 
 A. ** Certainly they could," 
 
 Q^ *' Does he know the river St. Lawrence, and how many 
 ** knots it runs on the ebb tide?" 
 
 A. *' I never was there." 
 
 Q^ ** Have you not been informed by good accounts how 
 ** many knots it runs ?" 
 
 A. *' I have heard the tide is rapid there, but I never knew 
 ** with certainty at what rate," 
 
 Q^ ** Do you underfl:and the river St. Lawrence runs as rapid 
 ** as the Delaware?" 
 
 A. ** I can fpeak with no certainty." 
 
 Q^ ** Do you know at what rate the Humber runs on ebb 
 « tide?" 
 
 A. ** I do not." 
 
 3 Q^ '* Dp 
 
[ 78 ] 
 
 (X *' Do you know the Severn ?'* 
 A. " I do not?" 
 
 Q^ " Will you fay that a tide, running three knots and an 
 *' half in an hour, is a rapid tide." 
 
 A. ** I think it is a very rapid tide." 
 
 Q^ *' Have you not heard that the St. Lawrence runs ten 
 ** knots an hour ?" 
 
 A. ** I never did." 
 
 Q^ " Whether the rapidity of the tide, and the breadth of 
 *^ the river, do not both of them make a great difference, in the 
 ** danger from the effedts of the fire rafts?'* 
 
 A, ** I conceive the ftronger the ti'de runs, the danger from 
 ** fire rafts is greater, if the channel is the fame." 
 
 Q^ ** Whether the fire rafts would not have floated, over any 
 " part of that breadth of three miles, at high water, or at three 
 *' quarters tide ?" 
 
 A. ** They certainly would float on every part of the river 
 " oppofite to Newcaftle; but as they were directed by the gal- 
 " lies, it is to be conceived, that they would only be ufed in 
 '* the channel," 
 
 Q^ " Having iaid that the frigates could not come near enough 
 " to fire at Newcaftle-Bite ; if the landing of the troops had been 
 *' attempted within-fide of the frigates, and the frigates ranged 
 " round to proted; them, whether the enemies gallies would have 
 ** ventured within fire of the frigates ?" 
 
 A. " The enemy's water force was conftrucfled to fire In the 
 *' flream of the tide^ the tide ran too rapid for the fliips of war 
 ** to ride with fprings upon their cables. I had before found the 
 ** gallies very troublefome, and very little in my power to annoy 
 *' them; and therefore do conceive, as they had increafed their 
 ** force from the time I had been lafl: up the river, they certainly 
 ** would not have been idle on fo important an occafion to 
 ** themfelves." 
 
 Q^ " Did 
 
[ 79 ] 
 
 Q^ <* Did the gallies ever venture within fair reach of your 
 ** guns, fo as to engage ?" 
 
 A ** Yes, v^ithin point blank fhot." 
 
 Q^ ** Did they hold any engagement v^^ith you ?" 
 
 A. ** They had two engagements with me, the one five 
 *' hours, and the other fix, on two different days." 
 
 Q^ ** When was that ?" 
 
 A. " The 7th and 8th of May, 1776?" 
 
 Q^ « Were they only gallies, or were there frigates with 
 " them?" 
 
 A. ** Only thirteen gallies, attended by fire-fliips." 
 
 Q^ " What execution did they do on board yourfhip ?" 
 
 A. '* They killed two men, wounded fix, damaged the 
 ** mail very materially, and rendered all the fails ufelefs." 
 
 Q^ ** Was that in the two days engagements of eleven hours ?** 
 
 A. ** Yes, I have fpoken to that time." 
 
 Q^ ** What force had you then ?"^ 
 
 A. *' The Roebuck of 44 guns, Liverpool of 28 guns, and 
 ** two armed tenders." 
 
 Q^ ** Was that the damage done on board all the veifels, or 
 ** to your own only ?" 
 
 A. ** What I mentioned before, was only in the Roebuck." 
 
 Q^ *' What was the damage with regard to the other fhips ?" 
 
 A. ** The Liverpool fuffered in her mafts and fails, feveral 
 ** men were wounded, but I do not recoiled any were killed." 
 
 Q^ " How many frigates had Lord Howe on the 3ath of 
 •« July ?" 
 
 A. " To the befl of my recollection, three. In the De!a^ 
 *♦ ware with the Roebuck, there were three more." 
 
 Q^ ♦' How 
 
[ 8o ] 
 
 Q. ** How many fifty gun fliips?" 
 
 A. ** I think two." 
 
 Q^ " Do you know what damage you did to the gal lies ?" 
 
 A. ** I never heard diflindlly, but I believe not a great deal 5 
 '* they were fuch fmall objeds, it was very difficult to ilrike 
 ** them with cannon fhot." 
 
 Q^ ** Could the gallies have effeded their purpofe of em- 
 *' ploying the fire rafts with effedt, without coming within fair 
 *' gun fliot of the frigates ?" 
 
 A. " When the rebels burnt any fire rafts, the rebel gallies 
 ** never quitted them, till they were within half gun Ihot." 
 
 Q^ ** What fliips to your knowledge, did the rebels ever 
 " attack with fire rafts, and with what efFed: ?" 
 
 A. " They attacked the fquadron under my command feveral 
 ** times with fire rafts — the firft time off of Chefler, where 
 ** the channel is about one third of a mile wide^ the 
 ** lliips were employed in taking men on board, when the 
 " enemy came down with the fire rafts — they came within half 
 ** gun fliot before they lighted the fire rafts j at the fame time 
 ** they difcharged their guns from the gallies — the tide run very 
 ** flrong — the fhips were obliged to flip their cables, to prevent 
 " the fire rafts being on board them, and to give the boats an 
 ** opportunity to tow the fire rafts off. When the ifliips cafi:, 
 ** their guns reached the gallies, which drove the gallies off, and 
 ** permitted the boats to tow the fire rafts on fliore ; the Ihips 
 ** at this time run a great rifque of running a-ground, but for- 
 ** tunately efcaped." 
 
 Q^ *' Did you not fay, that this happened where the river 
 ** was only one third of a mile wide; and that at Newcaftle there 
 ** is a two mile wide navigable channel ?" 
 
 A. *' Yes, I did, what I mentioned happened off of Chefter, 
 ** where there is an ifland that lies diredtly off, from which a 
 ** flioal extends, fo as to reduce the channel within one third 
 •* of a mile." 
 
 Q^ " Do 
 
C 8r J 
 
 Q^ " Do you know of an inftance of any fire raft laying hold 
 /* of one of our fhips, and fetting it on fire ?'* 
 
 A. ** I do not ; the precautions that were taken prevented it.** 
 
 Qi ** Might not the noble Admiral's ikill and precaution 
 ** have equally prevented it at Newcaftle, if the fleet had pro- 
 ** ceeded there, after the 30th of July ?'* 
 
 A. ** If the fleet had all arrived ofFof Wilmington, I do con- 
 •* ceive it would then have been fo capital an object to the 
 ** enemy, that they would have employed all their force in the 
 *' night to have effedted fuch a purpofe; and if they had done 
 ** fo, and conducted their expedition v/ith any fpirit, they mull: 
 ** certainly have put the fleet into very great confuHon, as we 
 '* had no boats whatfoever, of a nature futiicient to have with-^ 
 ** fl:ood their thirty-fix row-boats, and thirteen gallies.'* 
 
 Q^ ** If the frigates had been placed on the outfide, round 
 ** the veflels landing the troops, how would the galiies and row- 
 ** boats have pafled the frigates, or how would they have ven- 
 *' turedto pafs them, in your opinion ?" 
 
 A. ** As the enemy poffefTed both fliore?, I think it exceed- 
 *< ingly poflible for the gallies to have pafled within the frigates, 
 ** and towed their fire rafts down to the fleet." 
 
 Q. " The river being fl:ated to be three miles broad, wh.^t 
 ** amfl:ance could the rebels, from being in poflefllon of the eait 
 ** fhore, be able to give to the gallies and row-boats, coming 
 ** down clofe along the wefl: fliore, at three miles difiance, as 
 ** they mufl; necefllirily have done to molefl; our troops on tlieir 
 *' landing ?" 
 
 A. ** The gallies would require no afliflance from the fhore ; 
 they could come to any point, and lay in fhoal water, until 
 they had effedled their purpofe ; and then have ran into aaiy 
 creek above or below, as it would fuit their purpofe*" 
 
 Q^ " Whether the flioal water does not lie to the eafl:ward 
 of the channel, in which our Ihips would have lain, to cover 
 the landing of the troops ?'* 
 
 M A. " There 
 
 <( 
 
f 82 ] 
 
 A. " There is flioal water on each fide in every part, except 
 ** at tlie town of Newcadle." 
 
 Q^ " Tliere being then no flioal water at the town of New- 
 ** caiHe, whether the gallies coming down, and getting into 
 ** flioal water, to the ealtward of the channel, could have pre- 
 " vented our troops landing, by dire(fting the fire rafts againfl 
 ** them, or otherwife ?" 
 
 A. ** I do not apprehend the gallies would have lain on the 
 ** eaii fide, in cafe of any landing at Newcaftle 5 they would 
 ** have employed themfelves to have oppofed the landing on the 
 
 *' weft ihore." 
 
 Q^ " Would the gallies then have had any advantage from 
 ** fhoal water ?" 
 
 A. ** They would ; I have only faid there is no fhoal at 
 ** the town of Newcaflle; above and below there is fhoal water.'* 
 
 Q. ** Could the gallies have lain any where on the wefl fhorc 
 ** within our frigates, to have done any fervice, without being 
 ** fully expofed to the fire of our frigates ?" 
 
 A. ** Yes, I think they could. There are fo many little 
 " inlets and creeks, both above and below Newcaftle, that the 
 *' gallies could place themfelves in, and, from the lownefs of 
 '* the marfh, do execution with their guns, when the frigates 
 ** could fee nothing but their mafts." 
 
 Q^ ** Could not the fire of the frigates fairly reach the 
 *' fhore?" 
 
 A. *' I have declared that it is only a gun fhot from fhore 
 ** to fhore, except jufl above Newcaftle.'* 
 
 Q^ ** How near could a 36 gun frigate lie to the fhore op- 
 
 '* pofite Newcaftle ?" 
 
 A. ** Along-fide of the wharf." 
 
 Q^ ** How near could a 50 gun fhip lie ?'* 
 
 A. '* Within a very little near." 
 
 Q^ *« Whether 
 
[ 83 ] 
 
 Q^ '* Whether he knew, previous to the 30th of July, any 
 ** one battery of the enemy mounted along the river below 
 <* Billingfport?" 
 
 A. " No. I did not." 
 
 Q^ ** Did he know of any body of troops Rationed at any 
 ** place along the weflern fide of the river ?" 
 
 A. *' I have faid, that I received information, that General 
 ** Washington was there with his army." , 
 
 Q;_ ** Whether your intelligence went fo far as to fay, that 
 ** General Wafhington, or any part of his army, were arrived 
 ** fo far as Wilmington ?" 
 
 A. *' The intelligence I received was. from perfons who had 
 " never deceived m.e^ therefore I had every reafon to fuppofe 
 " that it was true. The intelligence I gave the Admiral was, that 
 " General Wafhington had crofTed the Delaware with his army, 
 *' and was gone totakepoflat Wilmington." 
 
 Q^ *« Had the enemy any water guard, or any defences afloat, 
 " or defences on fhore, in Chefapeak-Bay, when the fleet 
 " went up ?" 
 
 A. " None." 
 
 Q;^ " Had the rebels any troops pofled on the fliore ?'* 
 
 A. " None that I heard of." 
 
 Q^ « What is the breadth of the navigable channel of the 
 ** Delaware at Newcafl:le?" 
 
 A, " Nearly two miles." 
 
 Qj^ ** Suppofe a landing attempted at Newcaflle, when part 
 " of the troops were landed, fome in boats, and fome on board, 
 '* and that the row gallies had obliged the fhips to flip their 
 " cables to avoid the fire rafts, or had otherwife by thofe fire 
 ** rafts difarranged the fleet, what might have been the confe- 
 ** quencein that fituation ?" 
 
 A. *' I conceive it would have been attended with the woril 
 *' of confequences j in fo narrow a channel as that, it would 
 
 M 2 '* not 
 
[ 84 ] . 
 
 *' not have been poflible for the fleet to have got under fail in 
 ** the night-thne." 
 
 Q^ ** Would it not have expofed that part of the troops, 
 ** which were landed to be cut off ?" 
 
 A. " That would depend on the force to oppofe them." 
 
 Q^ ** Whether, though batteries are not eredled, it is not in 
 " the power of an enemy in force, and provided with cannon, ta 
 " bring them to bear fo, as greatly to annoy fhips in a river ?'* 
 
 A. *' It certainly is.'* 
 
 Q^ " Whether you would take on yourfelf, confidering all 
 ** the circumftances that came within your obfervation, to advife 
 ** the Delaware, as an eligible place for landing an army, conii- 
 ** dering the force on fhore, and the quantity and kind of force 
 ** that was on the river ?" 
 
 A. ** I have always been of opinion, that the landing an army 
 ■** in the face of an enemy was always to be avoided, if thefervice 
 ** can be effeded by any other means." 
 
 Q^ ** Was there any thing particular in the circumflances of 
 ** things, in the Delaware at that time, which could make an 
 ** exception from that general rule, in favour of a landing ?" 
 
 A. '' None that I faw." 
 
 Q^ *' Whether, independent of the intelligence you had re- 
 *' ceived concerning General Wafliington's army, you had heard 
 ** of any other troops being on the weflern fide of the Delaware, 
 
 *' at that time ?" 
 
 A. ** I knew of the militia belonging to each county being 
 ** flationed there, and there was no part, from Cedar Creek to- 
 i* Reedy Ifland, that a boat could land at, without a body of 
 «* armed men coming down to oppofe it." 
 
 Q^ ** Had you any intelligence of the number of which the 
 '' militia confifled, on the weflern fide of the Delaware, at that 
 " time ?" 
 
 A» *' The 
 
, [ 85 ] 
 
 A. *' The regiments of militia in each county were generally 
 *' reckoned at 4 or 500 men.^;- There was a Brigadier- vjeneral 
 « of the name of Rodney, who had the command of them." 
 
 ■ Q^ « Whether by the militia, you mean the militia of the 
 ** Lower counties on the Delaware ?" 
 
 A.. *' Yes, I do." 
 
 Q^ *' What is the diftance from Cape Hinlopen to Cape 
 *« Charles at the mouth of Chefapeak Bay ?" 
 
 A. " Between 140 and 150 miles." 
 
 Q. " Did you give your advice and opinion to Lord Howe, 
 *' on the 30th of July, to leave the Delaware, and go by 
 *' Chefapeak Bay ?" 
 
 A. " As I never was publickly confulted, I never gave any 
 <* publick advice." 
 
 (X ** Whether the various obftrudtions you have flated, to 
 *« prevent the army from landing in the Delaware, and the fleet 
 « proceeding up the river, were not known before Lord Howe 
 *« arrived off of the mouth of the Delaware, all except General 
 *' Wafhington's army being on the march towards Wilmington ?" 
 
 A. ** I never informed the Admiral of the nature of thofe 
 <* obftrudions— whether he knew them from any other quarter, 
 *« I cannot fay." 
 
 Q. " Might not the Admiral have been fully informed on 
 •' that fubjea, before he failed from New- York?" 
 
 A. ** He certainly might ; and I fhould rather fuppofe he was." 
 
 Q^ ** How long did the fleet delay their courfe oflf the Dela- 
 <« ware ?" 
 
 A. ** Not two hours." 
 
 Q. , *' How was the wind then ?" 
 
 A. ** Northerly— the wind was foutherly feme time before 
 «* —the north wind juft then fprang up." ^^ ^^ 
 
[ 86 ] 
 
 Q. " How long did the wind continue at north ?" 
 A. ** Till that evening, and no longer." 
 
 Q. *« Which are the winds that generally prevail on the 
 ** coafl towards the latter end of July ?'* 
 
 A. " The fouth wind prevails ; but frequently the weft and 
 ** north-weft, particularly in the night-time." 
 
 CX ** When you fpoke of the damage likely to be done by 
 *' the fire rafts, did you not mean to confine yourfelf to their 
 *« operation in the night ?" 
 
 A. " Yes, I did — but as the enemy was alfo provided with 
 ** fire Ihips, I conceive thofe might have been ufed alfo in the 
 *' day-time, with as much effedl againft a fleet at anchor, as the 
 " fire rafts might have been in the night ?" 
 
 Q. Do you think, with the wind foutherly, the enemy 
 *' could have given any obftrudiion to the fleet, fufficient to 
 " impede its courfe, before it came to Reedy-Ifland ?" 
 
 A. *' I conceive not, if we had been certain that the foutherly 
 ** winds would have lafted — I ihould obferve, that the foutherly 
 ** winds blow only in the day-time, and the northerly winds 
 ** prevail in the night-time." 
 
 Q^ ** How many hours fail is it from Reedy-Ifland to New- 
 ♦• caftle, with a fair wind and flowing tide ?" 
 
 A. ** With a fingle fliip not above an hour — but with a 
 ** fleet it is a very different thing." 
 
 Q^ ** Suppofing the ftiips had run up to Newcaftle with a 
 ** foutherly wind, and a flowing tide, in the day-time, was it 
 *' poflible for either fire Ihips, fire rafts, or gallies, to have 
 ** difturbed them, or prevented their landing troops, if there had 
 •* been no refiftance by an enemy on the ftiore ?" 
 
 A. " I conceive if the fleet had gone up the Delaware, the 
 ** rebels would naturally have brought their water force down to 
 ** the fleet ; that if the fleet had got under way, with the oppor- 
 ** tunity that the honourable gentleman has ftated, they would 
 
 ** naturally 
 
[ 87 ] 
 
 *< naturally have gone before the fleet; and when they flopped, 
 «* in order to land the troops, the gallies would naturally have 
 ** taken their pofition." 
 
 Q. ** Then all the obflrudions, which you conceive might 
 *' have been made, would have been from the gallies, and not 
 «' from the fire fhips, or fire rafts— Is that your meaning ? 
 
 A. *' The fire fhips and fire rafts could not have aded, under 
 ** the circumftances of a fair wind and flowing tide." 
 
 Q^ '* Is it your opinion, that any number of gallies ofi^New- 
 *« caftle, which you admit to be fo fteep to the fliore, that a 
 ** frigate could come to the wharf, and a fifty guia fhip almoftas 
 ** near, could have given any ferious obflrudion to the landing 
 ** of an army at that place ?" 
 
 A. ** I never pretended to deny the pradlicabillty of landing 
 " an army in the Delaware — I have only fpoke to the expediency 
 « of it." 
 
 Q^ ** Do you know what depth of water there is in the 
 ** Narrows in the Delaware ?" 
 
 A. ** The Narrows is a ftrait between two dioals, in which 
 ** there is deep water, not lefs than fix or feven fathom, but it is 
 ** extremely narrow." 
 
 Q^ *' What depth of water is there in the Flats above ?" 
 
 A. ** On the Flats of Morris Lifton's, which are the worfl 
 <« flats on the river, at high water there is only twenty-five feet, 
 <* or twenty-fix — that is, quite at high water." 
 
 Q^ ** Do you know the North or Hudfon's River. 
 
 A. *' No farther than Haver fl; raw- Bay." 
 
 Q^ '* Do you know the King's Ferry. ?" 
 
 A. *' No." 
 
 Q. " What depth of water is there at Morris Lifion's at low 
 <« water?" 
 
 A. ** The tide rifes and falls about eight feet." 
 
 Q;^ ** Did 
 
I 88 1 
 
 Q^ ** Did you underftand, that, on the 30th of July, the 
 '* enemy had a corps of ti'oops at Wilmington r" 
 
 A. " I was fo informed." 
 
 Q^ ** Was you informed what was the communication from 
 " Newcaftle to the interior part of the country, to the head of 
 •* Elk?" 
 
 A. " It has the Chriftien River on its right, which runs up 
 ** at leafl: ten or twelve miles before it is fordable." 
 Q^ ** Is Newcaftle fituated on a peninfula ?" 
 
 A. ** I am not very well acquainted with the lower parts of 
 " its fituation^ it has George River on its left, but at fome 
 ** diftance." 
 
 Q^ *« Whether, from the fuperiority of metal of the rebel 
 " veftels in the Delaware, they could not have ftationed them- 
 " felves in fuch a manner, as to have annoyed any frigates, even 
 •* with the affiftanceof a fifty-gun fhip, that might have been 
 •* deftined to cover the landing of any body of troops, without 
 ** being hurt by thofe ihips with any probable elte<ft ?" 
 
 A. ** I think, if they had had time and opportunity to have 
 •* placed them, they would have made the landing very difficult." 
 
 C^ " Do you know how far it is from Newcaftle to Cecil- 
 '* Court Houfe ?" 
 
 A. ** About feventeen miles." 
 
 (X ** Whether, in the march from Newcaftle to Cecil- 
 <* Court Houfe, it would have been necefiary to ford the 
 •* Chriftien, or any other river whatfoever ?" 
 
 A. ** I have no knowledge of the interior part of that 
 •* country, but from the map." 
 
 Q^ ** In what part of the Delaware was the water force cf 
 <* the rebels, on the 30th of July ?" 
 
 A. ** Part at Reedy-Ifland, and part at Mud-Illand." 
 
 ** What 
 
t 89 ] 
 Q^ *' What part was at Reedy-Ifland ?" 
 
 A. " The bri^ galley, the fchooner galley, and feveral of 
 <* the latteen gallies — and feveral of their row-boats." 
 
 Q^ •* What part was at Mud-Ifland ?'* 
 
 A. " All the remaining part of the force.'* 
 
 Q^ *' What is the diflance from Mud-Ifland to Reedy- 
 '* Ifland ?'' 
 
 A. " Twenty-five, or twenty-fix miles in the courfe of the 
 " river. 
 
 Q^ ■" How high in the Delaware can a fixty-four gun fhip go?" 
 
 A. ** if there had been no obfi:ru(5lion in the river, a fixty- 
 ** four gun fhip might be carried to Philadelphia at high 
 ** water." 
 
 Qi '* Where does the firfl obftrudtion begin in the river ?" 
 
 A. *' At Billingfport." 
 
 Q^ " How far is Billingfport above Newcaflle ?" 
 
 A. '* Above twenty miles." 
 
 Q^ *« Whether a fixty-four gun fhip can fafely lie a good 
 ** way above Newcaflle, at all times of tide ?" 
 
 A. ** A fixty-four gun fhip can at all times lie as high as 
 " Chefler." 
 
 Q^ ** Mufl not the fleet have anchored every night in their 
 ** way up the Delaware ?" 
 
 A. " Certainly ; it would not have been pradlicable to have 
 ** kept under fail." 
 
 Q^ ** How many feamen were neceffary for manning the 
 ** flat boats, for landing the army ?" 
 
 A. '* I do not recoiled how many — but I know, when the 
 •' flat boats were manned, we had but very few men left on 
 «* board the fhips/' 
 
 N Q^ '* Whether 
 
[ 90 ] 
 
 Q^ <« Whether the feamen, for manning the flat boats, muft 
 
 * not be taken from the line of battle fhips ?" 
 
 A. '* That was the ufual method pradtifed, in order to make 
 
 * the frigates ufeful." 
 
 Q^ ** What number of boats were prepared for the landing ?'* 
 A. *' To the befl of my recolledlion, feventy-nine." 
 
 Q^ *' Would not that have taken upwards of 800 feamen to 
 
 * have manned them properly ?" 
 
 A. " They were ufually manned with twelve men, a cock- 
 
 * fwain, and officer, each." 
 
 Q^ ** Whether when you flated, that the firfl; obftrudion iri 
 
 * the Delaware was at Billingfport, you intended to have it un- 
 
 * derftood, that no obflru6tion might be given to the courfe of 
 
 * the fleet, or the landing of the army, at any place of the fliore 
 
 * below Billingfport ?" 
 
 A. ** Wlien I mentioned the firlt obflrudlion being at 
 ' Billingfport, I meant only as to the Chevaux de frize, which 
 
 * the enemy had ftopped the channel with under water." 
 
 Q^ *' Did you mean to fay that an army at land, having no 
 
 * batteries eredted on the land below that Chevaux de frize, 
 
 * would have been an obftrudion to a fleet coming up the Dela- 
 
 * ware ?" 
 
 A. *' If the fleet had proceeded up the river, they would 
 have gone for many miles through a channel, where it was 
 only a fhort gun fliot, in many places, from flde to flde — it is 
 therefore not to be prefumed, that the enemy would have loft 
 the opportunity of annoying the fleet, from every advantageous 
 point." 
 
 Q^ ** Does this anfwer relate to the river above, or at and 
 below Newcaflile ?" 
 
 A. ** It relates principally to the parts above Newcaflrle, but 
 alfo to fome parts below." 
 
 Q^ ** Whether 
 
[ 9= ] 
 Q^ " Whether the fleet, in going up the Chefapeak-Bay, 
 ** were not obliged to caft anchor every night, even though there 
 ** v/as no obilrudiion frora the enemy ?" 
 
 A. *' They were — it is not poffible in fo narrow a navigation 
 ** for the fleet to continue under fail during the night. 
 
 Q. ** Whether, in confequence of thofe difliculties in 
 ** Chefapeak-Bay, the troops were not landed a month later, 
 " than they would have been at Newcaftle, if a landing could 
 '* have been effeded there ?" 
 
 A. ** I do not conceive, that a fleet, being obliged to anchor 
 *' in the night, can be conlidered a difficulty — the army v/as 
 ** certainly landed later about three weeks, than they might 
 *' have been by going up the Delaware, but it happened to be 
 ** a very uncommon and very unufual pafTage. When the fleet 
 ** left the mouth of the Delaware, the wind was northerly, and 
 ** there was great reafon to expert, that the fleet would have got 
 «« to the head of Chefapeak Bay in lefs than a week. It hap- 
 «« pened otherwife, on account of the fouth winds fetting in, 
 «* which was attended with fuch uncommon hot weather, that, 
 «* if the troops had been on fliore at that time, they mufl; have 
 «' fufl?ered exceedingly." 
 
 Q^ *' How far was the fleet advanced from the mouth of the 
 ** Delaware when they met the foutheriy winds ?" 
 
 A. ** About ten leagues." 
 
 Q^ " What number of foldiers did each boat take for land- 
 ** ing, befides the feamen to condudt it ?" 
 
 A. *' That depends on the difl:ance they have to go, and the 
 <* opportunity they have for landing — in fmooth water, and to go 
 *« a fhortway, they might carry about forty-five men." 
 
 Q^ " At how many turns, could the feventy-nine boats have 
 ** landed the whole army ?" 
 
 A. ** That depends totally on the difl:ance they have to go ; 
 '* it is a matter of calculation. I do not know how many troops 
 *' they had to land." 
 
 N 2 CL *' What 
 
[ 92 ] 
 
 Q^ " What way do you conceive a fleet of men of war and 
 
 * tranfports could make againft a tide of three and an half 
 
 * knots, with an unfavourable wind ^ but fuch as would permit 
 ' them to lie in their courfe, fuppoflng moderate weather ?" 
 
 A. " The channel in the Delaware is fo extremely narrow 
 ** amongfl: the (lioals, that unlefs the wind had been fair, the 
 ** progrefs of the fleet muft have been very flow indeed." 
 
 Q^ *' You will anfwer the fame quefliion ; but fuppofing the 
 ** wind to be a-head, or fo near a-head, that they would be 
 ** obliged to make way by turning or tacking ; flill fuppoflng 
 ** moderate weather, and this too in the Delaware ?" 
 
 A. " With the wind and tide contrary, the fleet could make 
 *' no way at all, but mufl; lie at anchor." 
 
 Q^ *' Have you not had much experience in the Delaware?" 
 
 A. " I was a long time there." 
 
 Q^ *' How long did you ever know a Angle jfhip detained, from 
 ** going up the river, in the months of July or Augufl:, after flie 
 *' got within the Capes ?" 
 
 A. ** About three days, between the Capes and Reedy-Ifland. 
 *< I am fpeaking of a Angle Ihip, and not of a fleet." 
 
 Q^ ** Did not the tranfports furnifli feamen to man the boats 
 ** for landing the troops ?" 
 
 A. ** When the tranfports were in a fl:ate of fecurity, they 
 ** frequently did, but not when they were to move ^ they were 
 '* not then able from their complement of men." 
 
 Q:_ " How many days did the wind fl:and to the fouthward, 
 ** after you left the Delaware ?" 
 
 A. ** The v/ind was variable : there were frequent calms 
 ** which delayed the fleet." 
 
 Qj_ ** W^as the wind in general, a north or fouth wind ?" 
 
 A. ** In general foutherly." 
 
 Q^ *' Was 
 
[ 93 I 
 
 Q, «« Was not that a fair wind to carry the fleet to Nev/* 
 <' caftle?" 
 
 A. " If they had been in the Delaware, it certainly would." 
 
 Q^ " In how many tides would the fleet have gone to New- 
 «« caftle from the Capes, with that wind ?" 
 
 A. " It is impoflible to anfwer that quefl:ion — it depends on 
 *« circumfl:ances — the fleet were very ill provided with pilots — 
 '* there were only eight or nine pilots to 250 fail." 
 
 Q. *' As the winds and tides then were, all circumftances 
 " confidered, how foon do you think the fleet might have 
 ** reached Newcaftle ?" 
 
 A. " If I could beafllired the fleet would keep in the right 
 '* channel, and no accident at all would happen, I could then 
 «* be able to anfwer the quefl:ion." 
 
 Q. '* Was not your fhip flationed the foremofl: towards 
 ** Brooklyn Ferry, the 27th and 28th of Augufl:, 1776 ?" 
 
 A. " My (hip was employed with the others on that fervice." 
 
 CK " Was net your fliip, ot any other, fo fliationed, as to 
 «* have the view of Brooklyn Ferry, fo open, as neceflarily to 
 «' fee the boats pafs backwards and forwards, betv/een Brooklyn 
 ** and New-York ?" 
 
 A. " My fhip was not, nor any other." 
 
 Q^ ** Whether, in paflingup the Chefapeak or Delaware, the 
 " fhips and tranfports were not neceflfarily obliged to keep very 
 ** much together, in failing through narrow channels ?" 
 
 A. ** The tranfports were neceflfarily obliged to keep clofe to 
 " the men of war, and alfo clofe to each other, in order to pre- 
 ** vent getting a-ground, and the few pilots could only be difl:ri- 
 *' buted to the men of war." 
 
 Q^ " If, when the tranfports were in that confined fltuation, 
 •' by change of wind (the tide ceaflng) they fliould be obliged 
 " to anchor, would it not be neceffary they fhould feparate con- 
 
 *' fldcrabjy 
 
[ 94 ] 
 " fiderably from each other, to prevent their falling on board 
 ** each other." 
 
 A. ** The fhips would certainly do fo, as much as they 
 ** could." 
 
 Q. " How long would it have taken the rebels, to have 
 '* brought their water force at Mud-Ifland down to Reedy- 
 ** IQand?" 
 
 A. ** In one ebb tide." 
 
 Q. '* How long does the flood and ebb tide run in the 
 ** Delaware ?" . . , 
 
 A. " Ebb runs about feven hours, and flood about five." 
 
 Q. *' Suppofing the wind, which was northerly when the 
 ** fleet quitted the mouth of the Delaware, had continued in 
 " that quarter, how long would it have taken that fleet to have 
 ** got up to Newcafl:le ?" 
 
 A. ** The fleet would not have got to Newcaftle in ten days 
 ** with a north wind." 
 
 CX ** How long could a great fhip get up from Reedy-Ifland 
 ** to Newcallle, before it is high water ?" 
 
 A. ** Suppofing the Ihips to have been at anchor at Reedy- 
 •< Ifland, I conceive, if the weather had been moderate, and 
 " they had met with no accident, they might have reached 
 <« Newcafl:le an hour before high water." 
 
 (X " How many fhips could have anchored at Newcaftle 
 ** where you have faid the water was fo deep clofe to thefhore ?" 
 
 A. ** I do not exadly know, but feveral might have anchored 
 «' there." 
 
 Q^ " What proportion of the fleet of 250 fail ?" 
 
 A. ** A very fmall part." 
 
 Q^ ** Mufl: not the refl: have anchored fome miles both above 
 ** and below it ?" 
 
 A. *' Certainly 
 
f 9S I 
 
 A. " Certainly they muft — I do not conceive that fleet could 
 ** have been anchored in lefs than four or five miles of ground." 
 
 Q^ *' Would they not then, as foon as the ebb tide made, 
 ** have been open to the attack of the enemy's gallies, fire fhips, 
 ** and fire rafts, notwithftanding the frigates that were fuppofed 
 " to be placed oppofite the town of Newcaftle ?" 
 
 A. '* They certainly would, and I do not believe the enemy 
 '* would have lofi: the opportunity." 
 
 Q. ** Could any fhip have been fo Rationed to open Brooklyn 
 " Ferry, fo as to obferve the boats pafs and repafs to and from 
 " New- York?" 
 
 A. ** I think not, without being expofed to the batteries of 
 '* the enemy." 
 
 Q^ " Whether, informed, as you was, of the navigation of 
 '* the Chefapeak Bay, and the navigation of the Delaware, with 
 " the water defence that you underftood to have been prepared 
 ** for that route, had you commaqded the fleet of 250 fail 
 *' would you have preferred going up the Delaware, to going up 
 *' Chefapeak Bay ?" 
 
 A. *' Informed, as I was, of every circumfl:ance refpeding 
 " the Chefapeak Bay and the Delaware, I was of opinion then, 
 ** and am of the fame opinion flill, that the going up Chefapeak, 
 ** Bay was a very wife and proper meafure." 
 
 Page 73, 74, and ys] 
 
 Thefe pages contain a criticifm upon the battle of Brandywine, 
 and upon my fubfequent condud:. In anfwer to which I fhall 
 refer to the more refpedable profeflional opinions of Earl Corn- 
 wallis and Major-General Grey. 
 
 £'u/^c';Z^^(9/'EaRL CoRNWALLIS. 
 
 Q. *' Did your Lordfhip concur with Sir Vv^illiam Howe in 
 ** the propriety of dividing the army, to bring the enemy to 
 ** adion at Brandywine ?" 
 
 A. " The 
 
[ 9^ ] 
 
 A. " The manceuvre that brought on the adllon of Brandy- 
 *' wine certainly refledis the higheft honour on the General. As 
 *' I have already refufed to inform this Houfe whether I concurred 
 ** in other operations, I have no right to take any merit from 
 *' concurring in this.'* 
 
 Q. ** Did your Lordihip obferve, that any advantage was loft 
 ** which rnight have been taken, in confequence of that battle ?" 
 
 A. " I did not fee that any advantage was loft.'* 
 Evidence ij/'Major General Grey. 
 
 Q^ *' Was you of opinion, that the divifion of the army, to 
 ** bring the enemy to ad;ion at Brandy wine, was judicious and 
 ** expedient ?'* 
 
 A. " I think the divifion of the army before the battle of 
 ** Brandywine was a mafterly movement, deceived the enemy, 
 ** and brought on the adion with almoft a certainty of fuccefs." 
 
 Q^ ** Did you obferve, that any advantage was loft, that might 
 ** have been taken, in confequence of that battle ?" 
 
 A. ** I know of none." 
 
 I here beg leave to infert an extract of my letter of the ibth of* 
 Odlober, 1777, to the Secretary of State, which contains a 
 journal of my operations immediately previous, and fubfequent 
 to, the battle of Brandywine. 
 
 Exfra^ of a letter. from Sir William Howe to Lord George 
 Germain, N*^. 68, dated Head garters, German-Town, 
 October lotb, ijyj* 
 
 " ON the 3d of September (Major General Grant, with fix 
 " battalions, remaining at the head of Elk, to preferve the 
 ** communication with the fleet) the two columns f under Eart 
 ** Cornwallis and General Knyphaiifen) joined at Pencadder, 
 " four miles to the eaftward of Elk on the road to Chriftien- 
 ** Bridge. In this day's march the Hefiian and Anfpach chaf- 
 " feurs, and the fecond battalion of light infantry, who were at 
 
 A. ** the 
 
[ 97 ] 
 
 *' the head of Lord Corn wallis's column, fell in v/ith a chofea 
 '** corps of looo men from the enemy's army advantageouily 
 ** ported in the woods, which they defeated with the lofs only 
 " of two officers wounded, — three men killed, and nineteen 
 ** wounded, — when that of the enemy was not lefs than fiftv^ 
 *' killed, and many more wounded. 
 
 " On the 6th, Major-General Grant, after Captain Duncan, 
 *• who fuperintended the naval department, had deflroyed fuch 
 " vefTels and ftores as could not be removed from the Head'of 
 *' Elk, joined the army. The whole marched on the 8th by 
 " Newark, and encamped that evening on the Townfhip of Ho- 
 ** keffen, upon the road leading from Newport to Lancafter, at 
 *' which firll place General Wafliington had taken poft, having 
 ** his left to Chriftien-Creek, and his front covered by Red 
 <- Clay-Creek. 
 
 ** The two armies in this iituation being only four miles apart, 
 '* the enemy moved early in the night of the 8th, by the Lan- 
 ** cafter-Road, from Wilmington, and about ten o'clock next 
 *' morning crofTed Brandy wine-Creek at Chads-Ford, taking pod 
 ** on the heights on the eaftern fide of it. 
 
 *' On the 9th in the afternoon, Lieut. General Knyphaufen 
 *' marched with the left of the army to New-Garden and 
 *' Kennets-Square, while Lord Cornwallis, with the right moved 
 ** to Hokeflen meeting-houfe, and both joined the next morning 
 ** at Kennets-Square. 
 
 ** On the 1 1 th at day-break, the army advanced in two 
 "columns, the right commanded by Lieut. General Knyphaufen 
 *' confifting of four Hcffian battalions under Major-General Stirn j 
 ** the firft and fecond brigades of Britifli, three battalions of the 
 ** feventy-firfl: regiment, the Queen's American Rangers, and 
 ** one fquadron of dragoons, under Major-General Grant, having 
 ** with them fix medium twelve-pounders, four howitzers, and 
 ** the light artillery belonging to the brigades : this column took 
 *' the direct road to Chads-Ford, {^wcn miles diftant from 
 ** Kennets-Square, and arrived in front of the enemy about ten 
 ** o'clock, fkirmiihing moft part of the march with their ad- 
 ** vanced troops, in which the Queen's American Rangers, com- 
 
 O ** manded 
 
[ 98 ] 
 
 manded by Capt. Wemys of the fortieth regiment, diflin- 
 guiflied themfelves in a particular manner. 
 
 '* The other column under the command of Lord Cornwallis, 
 Major General Grey, Brigadier Generals Mathewand Agnew, 
 confifting of the mounted, and difmounted chalTeurs, two 
 fquadrons of the i6th dragoons, two battalions of light 
 infantry, two battalions of Britifli, and three of HelTian gre- 
 nadiers, two battalions of guards, the third and fourth 
 brigades, with four light twelve-pounders, and the artillery 
 of the brigades, marched about twelve miles to the forks of 
 Brandywine, crofled the firft branch at Trimble's-Ford, and. 
 the fecond at JeiFry's-Ford, about two o'clock in the after- 
 noon, taking from thence the road to Dilworth, in order to 
 turn the enemy's right at Chad's-Ford. 
 
 ** General Wafliington, having intelligence of this movement 
 about noon, detached General Sullivan to his right, with near 
 10,000 men, who took a ftrong polition on the commanding 
 ground above Birmingham-Church, with his left near to the 
 Brandywine, both flanks being covered by very thick woods> 
 and his artillery advantageoufly difpofed. 
 
 <5, , As fp'on as this was obferved, which was about fouro'cjock, 
 the King's troops advanced in , three, eo.lui;nns, and, upon, ap- 
 proaching the enemy formed the line, with the right towards 
 Brandywine. The guards were upon the, right, and the 
 Britifli grenadiers upon their left, fupported by the Heffian 
 grenadiers in a fecond line : to the left of the centre were the 
 two battalions of light inflintry with the HelTian and Anfpach 
 , chaffeurs, fupported by the- fourth brigade. The third bri- 
 gade formed the refer ve. 5"'''' 1«> .vif)/;?; 
 
 ** Lord Cornwallis having formed the line, the light infantry 
 ,and chafTeurs began the attack -, the guards and grenadiers in- 
 fiantly advanpe^ frorn the right, the Vv^holq under a heavy -fite 
 of artillery and mufquetry ; but they puflipd on with an im- 
 petuofity not to be fuflainecj by the enemy, v/ho falling back 
 into the woods in their rear^ the King's troops entered, with 
 tkem, and purfued clofely for npar two milqs." 
 
 '* After 
 
6( 
 
 t( 
 
 [ 99 i 
 
 «* After this fuccefs, a part of the enemy's right took a fecond 
 pofition in a wood about half a mile from Drlworth, from 
 whence the fecond light infmtry and chaffeurs foon diQodged 
 them, and from this time they did not rally agam in force. 
 ** The firft Britifli grenadiers, the Heffian grenadiers, and 
 ^'guards, having in the purfuit got entangled in very thick 
 f* woods, were no further engaged during the day. 
 
 « The fecond light infantry, and fecond grenadiers, and fourth 
 " brio-ade, moved forward a mile beyond Dilworth, where they 
 « atta'^cked a corps of the enemy, that had not been before en-^ 
 «* gaged, and were ftrongly polled to cover the retreat of their 
 « army, by the roads from Chads-Ford to Chefter and Wil- 
 « min^ton, which corps not being forced until after it was dark, 
 *« when the troops had undergone much fatigue in a march ot 
 «' feventeen miles, befides what they fupported iince the com- 
 <' mencementof the attack, the enemy's army efcaped a total 
 « overthrow, that muft have been the confequence of an hour s 
 " more day-light. 
 
 «« The third brigade was not brought into a^ion, but kept in. 
 '* referve, in the rear of the fourth brigade, it not being known 
 f ' before it was dark, how far Lieutenant-General Knyphaufen s 
 ** attack had fucceeded 5 nor was there an opportunity ot em- 
 ** ploying the cavalry. 
 
 - Lieutenant-General Knyphaufen, as had been prevloufly 
 concerted, kept the enemy amufed in the courfe of the day 
 with cannoii, and the appearance of forcing the ford, without 
 intending to pafs it, until the attack upon the enemy s right 
 aiould take place, Accordingly, when it began, Major^ 
 •' General Grant crolTed the foi'd with the 4th and 5th regiments ^ 
 ^' and the 4th preffing firft, forced the enemy from an intrench- 
 
 - ment and battery, where three brafs i^eld-pieces and a 5-inch 
 *' and a half howitzer were taken, that ha'd been placed there to 
 <« command the, ford. 
 
 <* Theeneiny made little ftaiid on that fide after the work 
 
 - was carried, when the guards appearing on their right flank, 
 «* the retreat became general 3 but darknels commg on, betoie 
 
 Q ^ ** Lieutenant^ 
 
 XI 
 
 <t 
 
 Xt 
 
[ 100 ] 
 
 Lieutenant- General Knyphau fen's corps could reach the 
 heights, there was no further adion on that fide. 
 
 ** From the moftcorredt accounts, I conclude the ftrength of 
 the enemy's army, oppofed to Lieu tenant-General Knyphaufen 
 and Lord Cornwallis, was not lefs than 15,000 men, a part of 
 which retired to Chefter, and remained there that night ; but 
 the greater body did not ftop until they reached Philadelphia. 
 Their lofs vv^as confiderable in officers killed and wounded; 
 and they had about 300 men killed, 600 wounded, and near 
 400 made prifoners. 
 
 ** The lofs on the fide of his Majefty's troops, and the ord- 
 nance, ammunition, and flores taken from the enemy, will 
 appear in the enclofed returns. 
 
 ** The army lay this night on the field of battle; and on the 
 1 2th, Major- General Grant, with the ift and 2d brigades, 
 marched to Concord. Lord Cornwallis, with the light iii- 
 fantry and Britirti grenadiers, joined him next day, and pro- 
 ceeded to Afhtown, within five miles of Chefter. 
 
 ** On the fame day (the 13th) the 71 ft regiment was detached 
 to Wilmington, where the enemy had thrown up works, both 
 to the land and to the river, with feven pieces of cannon ih 
 the latter; but thefe works being evacuated. Major Mac Donell 
 took pofTeffion of the place without oppofition, and made Mr. 
 M'Kinley, the new-appointed Prelident of the Lower Counties 
 on Delaware, his prifoner. 
 
 " On the 14th, Lieutenant-Colonel Loos, with the combined 
 battalion of Rhall's brigade, efcorted the wounded and fick to 
 Wilmington, whither the battalion of Mirbach was fent two 
 days afterwards to join him. 
 
 " The army moved in two columns towards Gofhen on the 
 16th; and intelligence being received upon the march, that 
 the enemy was advancing upon the Lancafter road and were 
 within five miles of Gofhen, it was immediately determined to 
 pufh forward the two columns, and attack them; Lord Corn- 
 5 ** wallie 
 
r loi ] 
 
 ** wallis to take his route by Goihen meeting-houfe, and Lieu- 
 *' tenant-General Knyphaufen by the road to Dovvnington. 
 
 ** The two divifions proceeded on their march, but a mofb 
 '* violent fall of rain fetting in, and continuing the whole day 
 " and night without intermiffion, made the intended attack im- 
 ** pradticable. 
 
 *' The firfl light infantry, at the head of Lord Cornwallis's 
 '* column, meeting with a part of the enemy's advanced guard 
 ** about a mile beyond Gofhen, defeated them, killing twelve, 
 *' and wounding more without the lofs of a man^ 
 
 ** Nearly at the fame time the chaffeurs, in front of Lieute- 
 " nant-General Knyphaufen's column, fell in with another 
 ** party, of which they killed an officer and five men, and took 
 ** four officers prifoners, with the lofs of three men wounded. 
 
 *^ The enemy, being thus apprifed of the approach of the 
 ** army, marched with the utmoft precipitation the whole night 
 ** of the 1 6th, and got in the morning to the Yellow Springs, 
 *' having, as it is fince known, all their fmall ammunition da- 
 *' maged by the exceffive rain. 
 
 ** In the morning of the 17th, Lord Cornwallis advanced to 
 ** the Lancafter Road, and took pofl about two miles diftant 
 ** from Lieutenant-General Knyphaufen. 
 
 ** The army joined in the Lancafler Road at the White 
 ** Horfeon the i8th, and marched toTruduffrin, from whence a 
 " detachment of light infantry was immediately fent to the Valley 
 ** Forge upon Schuylkill, where the enemy had a variety of 
 ** flores, and a confiderable magazine of flour. The ifl battalion 
 " of light infantry, and the Britiih grenadiers, took poll there 
 ** next day and were joined on the 20th by the guards. 
 
 ** The enemy croiTed the Schuylkill on the i8th above French 
 ** Creek, and encamped upon the river, on each lide of Per- 
 *' kyomy Creek, having detached troops to all the forts of Schuyl- 
 ** kill with cannon at Swedes Fort, and the Forts below it. 
 
 '* Upon intelligence that General Wayne was lying in the 
 " woods, with a corps of 1500 men and four pieces of cannon, 
 
 •' about 
 
[ 102 ] 
 
 -** about three miles diftant, and in the rear of the left wing of 
 *' the army. Major General Grey was detached on the 2oth, late 
 '* at night, with the 2d Light Infantry, the 42d and 44th regi* 
 ** ments, to furprife this corps. The mofl effedtual precautions 
 ** being taken by the General to prevent his detachment from 
 " firing, he gained the enemy's left about one o'clock ; and 
 " having, by the bayonet only forced their out-fentries and 
 ** pickets, he ruflied in upon the encampment, dire<5ted by 
 ** the light of the fires, killed and wounded not lefs than 300 
 ** on the fpot, taking between 70 and 80 prifoners, the greater 
 *' part of their arms> and eight waggons loaded with baggage 
 ** and fiores. Upon the firft alarm the cannon were carried 
 " ofi^, and the darknefs of the night, only, faved the reft of the 
 " corps. One captain of light infantry, and three men, were 
 " killed in the attack, and four men wounded. Gallantry in 
 " the troops, and good condud: in the General, were fully 
 .** manifeft upon this critical fervice. 
 
 ** On the 2 1 ft, the army moved by Valley Forge, and encamp- 
 *' ed upon the banks of the Schuylkill, extending from Fat- 
 *' Land Ford to French Creek. . The enemy upon this move- 
 *' ment quitted their pofition, and marched towards Pots^ 
 ** Grove in the evening of this day. 
 
 *' On the 2:ld, the grenadiers and light infantry of the guards 
 ^* crofied over to take poll ; and the chafieurs croffing foon 
 ** after at Gordon's Ford, oppofite to the left of the line, took 
 ** pod there alfo* The army was put in motion at midnight^ 
 *' the van-guard being led by Lord Cornwaliis, and the whole 
 ** crofitd the river at Fat-Land Ford without oppofition. 
 -"** Major-General Grant who commanded the rear guard with 
 '<■' the baggage, p:ilTcd the river before two o'clock in the after- 
 <* noon 3- and the army encamped oh the 23d with its left to the 
 «* Schuylkill, and the right upon the Monatony road, having 
 «* Stojiy Run in front. The two battalions of light infantry 
 " were detached to Sv/edes Ford, which a fmall party of the 
 '*• enemy immediately quitted, leaving fix pieces of iron cannon 
 ** behind them. 
 
 ** On the 2:;th., the army marched in two columns to German 
 
 4 . ** Town, 
 
E 103 ] 
 
 *'^ Town, and Lord Cornwallis,. with the Britlfli grenadiers, 
 ** and two battalions of Heffian grenadiers, took pofleflion of 
 ** Philadelphia the next morning." 
 
 Page. 76] ** A fall of rain prevented the intended attack.'* 
 
 This affertion is meant by the author as a farcafm. Major- 
 General Grey's evidence proves, that this attack " was prevented 
 *' by the weather which rendered it impojjible ;" that is, it pre- 
 vented the troops and. artillery from getting forward. The 
 
 latter did not come to the ground until it was dark. But as 
 
 the author thinks it ridiculous that a fall of rain (hould prevent 
 the operations of an army, I will fubjoin the evidence of Earl 
 Cornwallis, who was examined to that point. — 
 
 Q^ ** Was there not a time, at the White Plains, when our 
 ** army ky on their arms, intending to attack the enemy, but 
 ** were prevented by rain?'* 
 
 A. ^' After the enemy fell back to the heights near North 
 " Caftle, they left an advanced corps on the heights of the White 
 ** Plains. There were orders given for an. attack of that corps, 
 *' which was prevented by a violent rain. We did not lie upon 
 *' our arms." 
 
 Q^. ** From the fituation of the rebel army and of our -s^, was- 
 *' that ilorm of rain in their or our faces ?" 
 
 A. *' I do not apprehend that the attack was prevented by 
 ** the florm of rain in either of our faces. There are other ef-- 
 ** fedts of a.ftorm of rain ; fuch as fpoiling the roads, and pre-- 
 ** venting the drawing artillery up fteep hills." 
 
 Pagers.] ** Capt. Montr efor, the chief engineer, had, before 
 ** the rebellion^ furveyed Mud IJland, and taken the bearings and. 
 ** dijiances of the Jhores on each fide the river. He faw the ab- 
 *^ fbliite necefiity of repairing thofe dykes, and Jlopping out the wa^ 
 ** ters, before any effe6iual progrefs could be made in ereSling the 
 *' batteries. A gentleman of confiderable infiuence in the city, who' 
 " was of the fame opinion^ offered to have thefe repairs effeBed iri: 
 ** afe^v days. I'his' was. all pointed out to the Commander in. Chief , 
 ** but, from what motive is unknown to this day, they were not per- 
 
 ** mi tied 
 
[ 104 ] 
 
 ' mi t fed to be made. The workmetty obliged to work in water and 
 ' fift ^^^dy l<-ibonred in vain. The work they perforfned in the 
 ' reflux of the tide, the injiux wajhed aivay. Thus a month was 
 ' Jhamefully wajiedy and no progrefs made towards taking the fort. 
 
 * At length i Lord Cor nwallis fent for the gentlefnan who had of- 
 
 * fered to repair the dykes, injorined him that it mufl be done pre- 
 ' njioujly to the ereBing of the batteries, and requefied he would 
 ' undertake it. This he did with chearfulnefs ; aud although the 
 
 * breaches were as large again as when hefirji propofed the repairs 
 ' the work wasfnifiedinfix days — The batteries were immediately 
 
 * ereBed without difficulty, and opened on the loth" 
 
 It has been before obferved, that orders were given to the Chief 
 Engineer, upon the King's troops entering Philadelphia, to con- 
 fhrud: redoubts, and to form the necefTary lines of communica- 
 tion, for the better fecurity of that city ; that on this work he 
 was directed to employ the inhabitants, to be furnifhed, at my 
 particular requeft, by Mr. Galloway, for the relief of the fol- 
 diery 5 and that this afliftance fell far fhort of that gentleman's 
 aflurances. 
 
 The neceflity of repairing the dykes on Province and Blackeley's 
 iflands, before an effectual progrefs could be made in erecfting 
 batteries againft Mud Ifland, was an objedl of ftill more confe- 
 quence; and any offers to eifedl it, inftead of being rejeded, 
 would have been gladly accepted. I am confident that none were 
 n^ade to me, and have the moft explicit authority for faying, that 
 fuch offers having been made never arrived to the knowledge of 
 thofe immediately intrufled with the execution of the work. The 
 conduct of it was under the diredion of Earl Cornwallis, until I 
 moved to Philadelphia with the main army on the 19th of Od:o- 
 ber; and thofe, who have a jufl opinion of his lordfhip's zeal to 
 promote his Majefty's fervice by every poflible means, will hardly 
 fuppofe him to have been inattentive in this effential point. 
 
 Eleven dyke-men were, I find, fent to the engineer on the 
 2 2d of 0(5tober, and, I am very ready to grant, were of confi- 
 derable fervice for the few days they aflifled. But it cannot be 
 conceived that thefe men effected infix days, by their own labour, 
 the flopping of breaches that had encreafed to be as large again 
 
 under 
 
f 105 J 
 
 tinder the ei^orts made to flop them by all the carpenters in the 
 engineer's department, affifted by thofe in the bridge-mafter's 
 and the military working parties for the day : neverthelefs, the 
 author roundly afTerts, that in confequence of their affiftance, the 
 batteries were immediately erected tvithout dijicidtyy and opened 011 
 the loth of November. 
 
 The fadt is, that the military carpenters, and working parties 
 before-mentioned, laboured mofh ince/Tantly, from the 7th of Oc- 
 tober, under a continued fire from Mud Ifland and batteries afloat, 
 to repair the dykes ; that notwithflanding the great interruptions 
 from heavy rains, and high freflies in the Delaware, 19,800 yards 
 of banking, excluiive of roads and bridges, v/ere repaired, fo as 
 to open four batteries on the 15th of Od:ober : but thefe not 
 proving effe(5lual, for want of heavier cannon, there was a ne- 
 ceflity of procuring them from the King's fhips. 
 
 The interval from the time the firfl batteries opened, on the 
 15th of Od:ober, to the arrival of the battering guns from the 
 Eagle and Somerfet, was not Jhamefully wajied, but indefatigably 
 employed in continuing the extenfive lines (two miles and a half) 
 "-tranfporting materials for throwing two bridges acrofs the 
 Schuylkill, and in the conftrudtion of two Tetes des ponts. 
 
 Page 80.] Pojfejfed of thefe ideas y Colonel Stirling def red to fake 
 poffejjion of Red- Bank -, but it was not granted him* 
 
 « 
 
 This is entirely a mifreprefentation. The affair of Red-Bank 
 is difculTed in my Narrative ; and the evidences of Earl Corn- 
 wallis andMajor-General Grey form a complete anfwer to every 
 thing that can be faid upon the fubjedt. 
 
 Page 85.] Men who are perfectly acquainted with the ground 
 of Wajhington s camp (at JVhite-MarfjJ the eafy approach to it in 
 its rear, the variety of good roads leading to it, either on the right 
 or left, and the great advantages which the Britijh troops would 
 have com?nanded by a movement round the camp, were ajlonifoed at 
 his return, without effecting any good purpofe, efpe daily as tt was 
 mo ell known, that Wajhington s troops were in the great ejl pamc and 
 confufion, and prepared night and day for fight, during the time the 
 Britijh army lay in the neighbourhood, 
 
 P I had 
 
[ io6 I 
 
 I had the beft intelligence that the enemy's poll Was not 
 available in the rear ; and the truth of that intelligence was cor- 
 roborated by feveral of our own officers, who went over the 
 ground in the fpring following. The intention of my march 
 was to attack Washington, had I found it advifeable when I 
 came to the fpot, and not to remain in the field in that incle- 
 ment feafon. — Merely to move him from that poft was no 
 obje(5t. 
 
 What does Major- General Grey fay in his evidence upon this 
 
 fubjea ? . 
 
 Q^ '* Do you think an attack on the enemy's army at Whlte- 
 ** Marfh would have been advifeable ? 
 
 A. ** I think an attack of the enemy, fo very ftrongly fituated 
 " as they were at White-Marfh, would have been highly im- 
 ** prudent." 
 
 Pages 86, 87, 88, and 89, contain a defcription of Wafloington s 
 Jituatlon at Valley -Forge in the winter of 1777, and fpring of 
 1778 — and an accufation againjl 77iefor ?20t having attacked him in 
 that ftuation. 
 
 The author's plan of befieging the enemy at Valley-Forge is 
 in the higheft degree abfurd. Had I made a divifion of the 
 troops in the manner he propofes, I fliouldhave expofed them to 
 be beaten in detail. I have in my Narrative given a reafon why 
 I ought not to have rifked an attack with fo fmall a profped; of 
 fuccefs. Major-General Grey's evidence, however, may perhaps 
 l)e deemed more deciiive. 
 
 Q^ " Do you think it would have been advifeable to have 
 ** attacked the enemy at Valley-Forge in the winter, when the 
 *' army lay at Philadelphia ?" 
 
 A. ** As affiiirs were then fituated in America, I think an 
 <* attack on the enemy at Valley-Forge, fo flrongly pofted as 
 ** they were, both by nature and art, would have been very un- 
 ** juftifiable." 
 
 I Q^ *' Do 
 
[ 107 1 
 
 Q. *' Do you recoiled: any inftance of Sir WHliam Howe's 
 *' omitting any opportunity of attacking the enemy, when it 
 «* could have been done with a reafonable profpe6t of advantage, 
 ** confiderino- all refpedive fituations and circumftances at the 
 " time ?" 
 
 A. " All circumftances confidered, the choice of difficulties 
 " in carrying on a war in the ftrongeft country in the world, 
 *« with almoft an unanimous people to defend it, and the number 
 <« of troops the Commander in Chief had to overcome thofe 
 ** difficulties, I know of no inftance wherein Sir William Howe 
 «« ever omitted attacking the enemy, or of his not doing every 
 <' thing that was poffible to be done, to promote his. Majefty's 
 <* fervice, and the honour of the Britifli arms." 
 
 Page 90.] He omitted tofupport General BurgoynSy or even to 
 make a diverfion on the coaft of Majjachufett' s-Bay in his favour, 
 though he knew fuch was his Majefty's pkafure. 
 
 For an anfwer to this, fee my Narrative (pages 12 and 17), 
 
 Page 90.] And he took care not to fiiffer Sir Henry Clinton to 
 perform thofe important fervices, by not leaving himfufficient force^ 
 though the rebel army, at that time, confifted of lefs than one third 
 of his own effeSiive force. — Brit^fto force 17,000 veteran troops. — 
 Rebel force 8,000 new raifed undifciplined men. 
 
 In my Narrative (page 23) I have ftated, that I left at New- 
 York under the command of Sir Henry Clinton '' about 8,500 
 *« men, exclufive of lick and convalefcents, and exclufive ot a 
 '« fmall body of militia upon Long-Iiland." In a return now 
 before me, dated at New- York, ift of Odober, 1777, I find he 
 had at that time under his immediate command, exclufive of the 
 corps of artillery and light horfe — 
 
 Infantry, rank and file, fit for duty - 8,340 
 
 Ditto on publick employ - - 5^ 
 
 Ditto on command - ~ - 419 
 
 Ditto fick * . - - 1,356 
 
 fm^ • 
 
 10,167 
 
 P 2 My 
 
[ io8 ] 
 
 My inftrudions to Sir Henry Clinton (page 22) prove that I 
 did not lofe fight of offenfive operations up Hudfon's river in the 
 event of Walhington's following me into Pennfylvania. 
 
 The propriety of the expedition to Pennfylvania (although 
 approved of by his Majefly's Secretary of State for the American 
 department) v^^as a long time the principal point of difcuffion in 
 Parliament, and in the publick prints, I therefore ftated the 
 fubjed fully and fairly in my Narrative : And for a further eluci- 
 dation, I refer the reader to the evidence fince given by Major- 
 General Grey to the Houfe of Commons refped:ing that expe- 
 dition. 
 
 Page 92.] He fiiptnely fiiffered himfelf to be furprifed at 
 German-^ own: 
 
 I have given a candid account of the circumflances relative 
 to the attack made upon the Kmg's troops at German-Town, 
 in my Narrative (page 27) the accuracy of which I fhall fup- 
 port by an extract from Sir George Ofborne's evidence in the 
 Houfe of Commons. 
 
 Q^ ** Do you recolle(fl any orders you received the day before 
 ** the adion at German-Town ?" 
 
 A. " On that day I was to the right of the infantry, with 
 ** the grenadiers of his Majefty's guards. Sir William Howe 
 " came to the quarters I was in with his Aids du-camp, a 
 ** little before fun-fet, and gave rne orders to move on in front, 
 ** with the grenadiers, and light-infantry of the guards, to 
 ** Major Simcoe's poft, about half a mile in front of the line of 
 " infantry; acquainting me at the fame time, that I might 
 •* exped the enemy at day-break next morning. I can therefore 
 *' add, that the firing of the enemy, on the morning of the at- 
 ** tack of German-Town, began exadtly, or near the time, that 
 •* Sir William Howe acquainted me, the night before, it 
 ** would do." 
 
 Q^ ** From the evidence you have given, do you apprehend,, 
 ** that Sir William Howe had certain intelligence, on the even- 
 
*^ ing preceding the attack at German-Town, thvtt the enemy 
 *' would march towards him ?" 
 
 A. *' I believe I have been pretty accurate in my anfwer to 
 " the firft queftion, in which I faid, that Sir William Howe 
 " came to the houfe in which I was ported, and informed me, 
 *' that the enemy wOuld begin the attack in the morning exadly 
 ** at the hour at which they did." 
 
 Q^ " Notwithflanding the declaration from the Commander 
 ** in Chief of the army, do you conceive, that our army was 
 ** furprifed at German-Town, or otherwife ?" 
 
 A. '* What I fpeak in evidence can be merely in my own 
 " fituation, and I hope, it is not arrogance if I fay, that after 
 ** the information I received from the Commander in Chief, I 
 ** was not in any danger of being furprifed.'* 
 
 Q^ ** Do you conceive that any other part of the army was 
 *' furprifed ?" 
 
 A. *' I cannot anfwer to that from my own knowledge, and 
 *' therefore, from the fituation in which I am, I beg to decline 
 ** that Queftion.'* 
 
 Q^ ** Was it the general opinion of the officers with whorn^ 
 *' you converfed after the ad:ion, that fome other part of the 
 *^ army was furprifed, or not ?" 
 
 A. *' That queftion being exadtly the fame as the laft, only 
 " in other words, I can merely add, that the officers, with 
 *' v/hom I converfed, while I had the honour of ferving under 
 ** Sir William Howe, were always well fatisfied with the care 
 ** he had of his army." 
 
 I have now gone through- the whole Pamphlet, except the 
 Appendix, which requires no particular obfervation, as it con- 
 tains merely a falfe comparifon of the Britiih and rebel forces. 
 
 Several other anonymous writers have made free with my repu- 
 tation : but of their productions I take no notice, becaufe their 
 alTertions, their reafoning, and their fcutrility, appear to have 
 
 h&Qn 
 
f no 3 
 
 been all colleded and methodifed, in the Letters to a Noblman. 
 My remarks upon that produdion, have been confined princi- 
 pally to fadls : the falfe reafoning I have fometimes endeavoured 
 to dete(5t; the fcurrility, I have always pafled over in filence. 
 Contempt is the only fpecies of refentment v^^hich the venal 
 inftruments of calumny deferve ; though fomething further may 
 be due to their more infamous employers. 
 
 WILLIAM HOWE. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
X' 
 
f H/ 
 

 
 
 '1^ 
 
 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 011 463 384 7 
 
 
 
 >■ V ■■' *■ ' ■ ^ . . V ■ *,. ^ . ; -*■■' y .* A- '. ■ 'V^^