IN RE THAT AGGRESSIVE SLAVOCRACY BY CHAUNCEY SAMUEL BOUCHER, Ph D PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AUSTIN 1921 Reprinted from the Mississippi Valley Historical Review Vol. VIII, Nos. 1-2, 1921 £4-4% H375" ^^d^^^ f &&3^^ Cole, The whig party in the south, 119; Pendleton, Alexander H. Stephens, 76-83, 89-92; John B. Lamar to Cobb, June 24, 1846, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 82; Joseph Pickens wrote to Calhoun from Eutaw, Alabama, on January 6, 1848, that he and his whig friends approved of Calhoun's speech on the war ; some of the ' ' old Hunkers ' ' did not. ' ' I have from the first thought that the War might have been avoided if proper prudence had been used by Mr. Polk. I think he lacks the bump of caution if nothing else. I have no hesitation in believing that the President violated the Constitution knowingly and willfully in rushing us into this uncalled for and unnatural War with Mexico, and if his acts are allowed to go unrebuked the Constitution is a perfect dead letter." Calhoun papers. 40 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v - H - R - for an aggressive purpose, the south was forced, during the course of the war, to become interested in a negative and de- fensive phase of the territorial question; it must prevent the war from being used to serve an aggressive purpose by the enemies of slavery. 41 Joseph W. Lesesne of Mobile wrote that although in the earlier period of the war there had been in the south, as in the north, a strong sentiment for acquisition of territory — because "an insane thirst after land" was "the great American disease" — there was now, in August of 1847, a growing dis- position in the south to come out boldly against further acqui- sition of territory as the only practicable mode of saving the south; for, if a result of the increase of territory should be the enactment of the Wilmot proviso into law, it would mean ruin for the south. 42 Thus the early enthusiasm of the south for new territory was of the character common to the people of the country as a whole. But when southerners appreciated fully the slavery complication and saw that the prospect of new territory was causing further attacks by the abolitionists, they rued the day when conquest was begun. 43 When the Wilmot proviso brought the sectional issue squarely 4i Calhoun, Works (Cralle, ed.), 4:340; Calhoun from J. Hamilton, February 7, 1847, from Samuel A. Wales, June 17, 1847, from J. W. A. Pettit, June 18, 1847, from F. W. Byrdsall, July 29, 1847, from Daniel E. Huger and others, August 2, 1847, from Joseph W. Lesesne, August 21, 1847, from Elwood Fisher, August 22, 1847, Calhoun papers; Calhoun from Edward Fisher, December 2, 1846, from Wilson Lumpkin, January 6, 1847, from Fitzwilliam Byrdsall, February 14, 1847, Calhoun to Mrs. T. G. Clemson, December 27, 1846, in Correspondence of John. C. Calhoun, 716, 1096, 1102, 1104; Charleston Mercury, January 14, February 17, June 24, 1847; Greenville Republican, January 22, February 12, 1847; Pendleton Messenger, January 22, 1847. 4 2 Joseph W. Lesesne to Calhoun, August 24, 1847, in Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, 1130. 4 3 Joseph W. Lesesne, writing to Calhoun from Mobile on August 21, 1847, commented at great length on the fact that the people of the south were not sufficiently aroused for their own defense against the attacks from the north, of which the Wilmot proviso was but one example. "Should the Whig party concur with us that for the sake of peace on this question we will take no more territory we may escape the dangers that threaten us." Elwood Fisher, writing to Calhoun from Cincinnati on August 22, 1847, said that political rumors had it that the Silas Wright men of New York insisted on acquisition of territory to augment the strength of the nonslaveholding states, and that both parties in that state were warmly in favor of the Wilmot proviso because they could make of it good political capital with the people. Calhoun papers. Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 41 before congress southern whigs joined southern democrats to block the measure, and were successful, thanks to some " north- ern men with southern principles." The northern whigs hav- ing shown fairly clearly their antislavery character, southern whigs tried to solve the problem of party harmony by proclaim- ing their hostility to the acquisition of territory as a result of the war. Indeed, they came to believe that not simply the preservation of the whig party was at stake, but quite as likely either the "peculiar institution" or the union. Patriotism therefore demanded that this dangerous slavery complication be avoided by blocking annexation of Mexican territory. 4 * Even General Taylor, who, it has been said, was later elected as a southern president, announced, after Mexico had been placed at the mercy of the American armies, that he was decidedly opposed to the acquisition of any territory south of 36° 30', which might endanger the permanence of the union by fomenting a sectional controversy. Furthermore, when reports began to be circulated that conditions of soil and climate would make slavery a physical or an economic impossibility in most of the new region proposed to be annexed, the Wilmot proviso became simply an insulting abstraction which, together with the danger of additional free states in the southwest, could be avoided by blocking annexation. 45 Thus opposition to the annexation of Mexican territory was accepted by many southern whigs, and many southern demo- crats as well, as the foundation for the defense of the southern institution and southern rights. The Wilmot proviso was but one aspect of the greater issue. A law passed by the general as- sembly of Pennsylvania in March, 1847, to impede and prevent the recovery of fugitive slaves, was regarded as a more definite proof that the north was preparing to weaken slavery bit by bit until its utter collapse was assured. Nothing less than this was the ultimate aim. "The Mexican war has been used by our northern and eastern enemies as a means by which they hope to rob us of all constitutional guaranties, subvert institutions most essential to our peace and prosperity, strip us of the insignia of sovereignty, pass a sentence of social degeneration 4* Cole, The whig party in the south, 119; Luther J. Glenn to Cobb, December 1, 1847, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 89. *s Cole, The whig party in the south, 121-123. 42 Chauncey S. Boucher m.v.h.k. upon us, and effect our complete and total ruin," wrote Percy Walker from Mobile on October 10, 1847. 46 Even when faced by this crisis, however, the south did not rally upon a defensive position as some of its truer citizens, less interested in party politics, would have had it do. Apathy was breeding future trouble, when decision and firmness were needed to avoid it. Southern unity would work wonders — would solve the problem once for all, some believed — but that essential was lacking. A few men saw clearly the course events were taking in the north : the abolitionists, though few in num- ber, were recruiting their ranks steadily, and by clinging stead- fastly to their basic principle they were holding the balance of power between the two main parties and were forcing con- cessions now from the whigs and now from the democrats. They had, as a result, come to be courted alternately and to- gether by both parties until in many places it had come about that no politician was considered "available" who could not enlist in his behalf this necessary abolitionist vote. The only chance for southerners to maintain for any length of time their rights under the constitution was to be found in united action ; yet little headway could be made in this direction. 47 -*e He added : ' ' The assault has been kept up for years, but under the false assurances that the great majority of the non-slaveholding people were not parties to it, we have remained idle and inactive, until our enemies have become powerful enough to control the Legislatures of Ten Sovereign States, which in the most solemn forms of Law, have declared against us. . . . Our action should be calm, determined, and above all united. We must endeavor to make the Southern States think and feel and act alike, upon this subject. How is this to be done?" Calhoun papers. Calhoun from C. J. Faulkner, July 15, 1847, from Joseph W. Lesesne, September 12, 1847, from H. W. Peronneau, September 25, 1847, from L. M. Keitt, October 1, 1847, from David Johnson, October 26, 1847, from Wilson Lumpkin, December 20, 1847, from Wyndham Eobertson, Jr., May 10, 1848, from F. W. Byrdsall, June 25, 1848, from L. H. Morgan, June 30, 1848, from Chesselden Ellis, July 5, 1848, from B. F. Porter, July 17, 1848, from G. B. Butler, July 29, 1848, ibid.; Calhoun, Works (Cralle, ed.), 4:527; Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, November 18, 1847, in Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, 1135; Isaac E. Holmes to Cobb, August 21, 1847, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 88. 47 Calhoun from Wilson Lumpkin, August 27, 1847, from Joseph W. Lesesne, September 12, 1847, from H. W. Connor, October 6, 1847, from Percy Walker, October 10, 1847, from David Johnson, October 26, 1847, from A. Bowie, January 19, 1848, from J. A. Campbell, March 1, 1848, from W. W. Harlee, June 8, 1848, from W. L. Yancey, June 14, 1848, from F. W. Byrdsall, June 25, 1848, from Joseph W. Lesesne, July 5, 1848, from Benjamin F. Porter, July 17, 1848, from Wilson Lumpkin, August 25, 1848, from Z. L. Nabers, November 29, 1848, Calhoun Vol viii, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 43 Once the treaty was concluded and the new territory ac- quired, the debate began in earnest concerning the powers of congress over the territories and the rights of citizens therein. Even on this question, however, the south could not agree on a defensive program. 48 papers; Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, January 6, 1847, in Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, 1102. A rather unique view of the acquisition of territory from Mexico was presented to Calhoun in January, 1848, by a northern Presbyterian clergyman who asked that his name not be used, but said that the subject matter he presented could be used. He gathered much of his information from abolition sourcea and the more numerous class of antislavery men who did not belong to abolition organizations. With these classes primarily, he said, the project of an extensive acquisition of Mexican territory was fast gaining ground; in their view, the more extensive the better. Whether slavery were extended over this territory or not, they thought that the annexation of it would ultimately overthrow the institution. Of course, if they could get the territory and keep it free, the forces of slavery would be so surrounded and outnumbered that the end of the institution would soon be compassed. But, even if slavery were not excluded, extensive acquisition of territory was favored for the same ultimate result, though it would be longer in attainment. They reasoned as follows: in proportion as slavery is extended over a greater area, in that proportion is it weakened; the slaves taken to the new territory must come from the old slave states; in those states fewer slaveholders and friends of slavery would be left to bear up against the onsets of their enemies; white laborers would flow in to take the places of the removed slaves ; as immigration and the laws of population gave preponderance to the nonslaveholding whites, antislavery presses could be set up right among the slaveholders without fear of molestation; then the battle would be more than half won, and the slaveholders could be defied; the south did not have slaves enough to take permanent possession of extensive territory and hold its own in either the old or the new states; with powers divided and energies distracted it could be cut to pieces in detail. Only temporarily, too, would the south have the preponderance in congress, for while gaining slave states at the south, it would soon lose them at the north; Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Tennessee, Kentucky, and North Carolina would soon become free. The writer concluded: "From what I can learn I think the signs of the times hereabouts indicate that the Abolitionists and their coadjutators will go for extensive annexation at all hazards. If they can enforce the Proviso they will. But if not they will favor secretly if not openly what they regard as the next best, i. e. a great extension of territory and a corresponding expansion of slavery. This will, perhaps, explain the reason why the National Era, the anti- slavery paper at Washington, goes for the acquisition of territory and yet strenuous- ly urges the Proviso. It betrays their secret intentions." He said that extensive acquisition was favored in the north not alone by the antislavery men, for the reasons stated, but by various other classes, each expecting it to serve a peculiar interest; among such classes were the ardent friends of the administration, specu- lators, capitalists, manufacturers, the military, et cetera. George H. Hatcher to Calhoun, January 5, 1848, Calhoun papers. 48 Chauncey S. Boucher, ' ' The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," and "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession," in Wash- 44 Chauncey 8. Boucher M - v - H - R - The Wilmot proviso, which precipitated one of the most bit- terly contested phases of the slavery controversy, was certainly not loftily conceived. It had its origin among democrats who were discontented over the veto of internal improvement bills and the distribution of the patronage. Another factor was impatience in regard to Oregon; the northwestern expansion- ists did not get as much territory as they coveted, and they claimed that half of Oregon had been given away. 49 Though the "Wilmot proviso was introduced in 1846, and many in the south at once saw that a crisis was at hand which demanded concerted action, and many suggestions were offered as to the best method of procedure, no agreement on policy or plan of action could be reached in the next four years — in- deed, such agreement within a single state was rare, and when reached at all was agreement only upon a first step which com- mitted the state to nothing and might lead or be turned in almost any direction. Even in the state which was supposed to be most radical and most free from internal party strife — South Carolina — no agreement could be reached on a platform state- ment of policy and action which meant anything more than vague hints or threats. The proviso did little to unite the south be- yond evoking an agreement in opinion that the placing of such a principle upon the statute books should be defeated if pos- sible. Southerners concurred in a general way in the belief that they might have some rights in the territories, but as to what the extent of those rights was, upon what legal or constitu- tional basis to rest them, they could not agree ; in other words, while they were united in believing that the Wilmot proviso must be resisted, they could not agree upon the necessary positive po- sition or statement with which to parry. Many suggestions of principle or policy were made, but from the presentation of the proviso until the election of 1860 the south was not united upon a thoroughly satisfactory answer to the troublesome and com- plicated territorial question. ington university studies, Humanistic series, 5:97-101; 6:83-144; Charleston Courier, November 27, December 2, 8, 16, 1847; South Carolina, House journal, 1847, pp. 204, 206; Joseph W. Lesesne to Calhoun, August 24, 1847, in Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, 11, 30. 49 William E. Dodd, Expansion and conflict {Riverside history of the United States — Boston and New York, 1915), 170. Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 45 The divergence of opinion in the south in regard to future policy or action, after the acquisition of territory had become a certainty, is shown by the division among southern whigs: some advocated disunion if the proviso were passed ; some would have accepted the extension of the Missouri compromise line as a fair settlement involving mutual concession; a significant minority were ready to acquiesce, if the proviso should pass both houses and receive the president's signature. 50 Calhoun answered the Wilmot proviso with a denial of a constitutional power in congress to discriminate between the states by passing a law which would " directly, or by its effects, deprive the citizens of any of the states of this union from emi- grating with their property, into any of the territories of the United States." The section could not be thoroughly united on this pronouncement, however, for there were prominent law- yers of both parties in the south who believed that congress did have jurisdiction over, and power to deal with, slavery in the territories. 51 The proposal to extend the Missouri compromise line of 36° 30' to the Pacific coast was not without its embarrassments on points of principle, for it would "yield up forever the con- stitutional question"; it would be a complete admission of the power of congress over slavery in the territories. Nevertheless, the position of many was clearly stated by a man who said: 1 ' Although ... the north has no right to claim our ex- clusion from one foot of the territory, yet as they do claim it most earnestly and there is no practical benefit in our setting up a counter claim to any above 36° 30' I am for settling the con- troversy by adopting that line." Others, who were interested mainly in the success of the democrats in the coming election, had little patience with constitutional quibbles, asserting that "this idea that constitutional questions may not be compromised is all fallacious." They preferred the "Missouri basis" be- cause that would satisfy the northern democrats best and would bring party harmony, since both the northern democrats and the southern democrats could, without sacrifice, still retain their so Cole, The whig party in the south, 124; Calhoun from J. T. Trezevant, June 7, 1849, Calhoun papers. si Calhoun from J. A. Campbell, March 1, 1848, ibid.; Cole, The whig party in the south, 137. 46 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v - H - R particular views in regard to the extent of congressional con- trol over the territories. 52 Squatter sovereignty, put before the senate in the Dickinson resolutions in December, 1847, and approved by Cass in the Nicholson letter later in the same month, was not satisfactory to all. Objection was frequently registered that it was but a temporary evasion of the points of constitutional principle and not a permanent and satisfactory solution of them; and there was too much certainty of embarrassing complications which would develop from an attempt to apply the theory in actual practice. Many, however, were interested mainly in the elec- tion of Cass, were willing to accept his Nicholson letter as satis- factory, resented attempts to force a definition of squatter sovereignty any more clear than Cass had made, and opposed " pressing nice, hair-splitting distinctions on the subject upon our northern democratic friends, whose liberality should be appreciated but not abused." Such men, however, might state very clearly, privately, their reasons for believing that a ter- ritorial legislature had no right to prohibit slavery and that such action could be taken only when the constitution for state- hood was framed. However, when a southerner contended "that our people should have permission to go" to the terri- tories "with their peculiar property and risk the decision of a majority when the territory forms a constitution and demands admission as a State, and that Congress should guarantee this privilege," he was met with the argument presented by his neighbor, "If you yield that settlement to Congress, will it not be surrendering our rights to the Wilmot proviso men?" 53 An added complication was introduced by the question wheth- er by Mexican law slavery was legally prohibited in the new territory. How to deal with the Mexican law without abandon- ing the principle that slavery rested upon state or local law only, 62 Calhoun from B. K. Cralle, July 23, 1848, from Laurel Summers, October 21, 1848, Calhoun papers; Cobb from Hopkins Holsey, December 31, 1847, from William Eutherford, Jr., April 16, 1850, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 91, 189; Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," in Washington university studies, Humanistic series, 5:97-101. 63 Calhoun from Louis T. Wigfall, June 10, 1848, from M. Torrance, June 19, 1848, from B. F. Porter, July 17, 1848, Calhoun papers; Cobb from Luther J. Glenn, February 12, 1848, from Henry L. Benning, February 23, 1848, from James C. Dobbin, June 15, 1848, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 95, 97, 107. Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 47 and without invoking national legislation for its protection, became a difficult question. 54 The plan of the so-called Clayton compromise, providing ter- ritorial organization for Oregon, New Mexico, and California, and leaving the question of slavery to the operation of the constitution of the United States as interpreted by the supreme court also met with objections. It was recommended in July, 1848, by a senate committee composed of northern and southern men of both parties ; it passed the senate with the aid of most of the southern whig members — though they disagreed in ex- pectations as to its operation; but it was shelved in the house, partly because of the efforts of southern whigs who believed that the court could only recognize the continuance of the Mexi- can law which prohibited slavery there. 55 At least one Alabama man, a member of the state legislature, thought that the only policy which promised "any good practical results" was for each southern state to arm and equip a regi- ment of volunteer emigrants and send them into the new terri- tory to protect all southerners who might go there, "in the full enjoyment of their property of whatever description, should any effort be made, either by savages, Mexicans, or others to wrest it from them." 56 As one reads the opinions of southern men on the territorial question, expressed both publicly and privately from 1846 to 1850, one can only conclude that the situation was well stated by Joseph W. Lesesne of Mobile, when he wrote: "You must be aware how very various and conflicting the opinions of even good and able men at the south are with regard to the question of Slavery in the territories. All profess to be agreed that the Southern people are entitled to occupy them with their slaves as much as the Northern people with their goods and chattels. But how is this right to be enjoyed? how is it to be s* Cobb from Henry L. Benning, February 23, 1848, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 97;Calhoun from J. A. Campbell, March 1, 1848, Calhoun papers. 55 Cole, The whig party in the south, 125; Calhoun from E. K. Cralle, July 23, 1848, from H. V. Johnson, August 25, 1848, Calhoun papers; Stephens to the editor of the Federal Union (Milledgeville, Georgia), August 30, 1848, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 117. See also Boucher, "The secession and co- operation movements in South Carolina," in Washington university studies, Human- istic series, 5:70. 56 Calhoun from Benjamin Gardner, September 5, 1849, Calhoun papers. 48 Chauncey 8. Boucher M - v - H - E - endangered? and if assailed, how is it to be protected? whether the question is not a purely legal or political one? These are points upon which no two persons are entirely agreed, and are full of intrinsic difficulty." 57 It seemed to many in the south that the abolitionists were but showing their hand when they forced the territorial issue in the face of the fact, which many men seem to have realized, that there was but little territory in the recent acquisitions where slavery could be maintained profitably. The country was by nature dedicated to freedom. The valleys of the Sac- ramento and the San Joaquin were said to be almost the only districts in the territory acquired from Mexico where slavery could exist, and the question was soon settled there by the inrush of opponents of slavery following the discovery of gold. The territorial question was an abstraction. Many northerners and many southerners knew this. The northerners, or at least the abolitionists, insisted on the technical exclusion of slavery by law simply for the sake of principle, determined to check slavery at every point, hoping ultimately for a checkmate. By the same token the southerners who admitted that it was an ab- straction were interested in it even as such, because they saw that if the abolitionists were allowed to gain point after point without opposition, they would ultimately strike at slavery in the states. The election of 1848 shows again that at this time there was no such thing as a united, aggressive slavocracy. In spite of, the truckling of Van Buren and others of the abolitionists, in spite of the evidence of the effective political use to which the abolitionists could be put, and in spite of the signs of the times found in the operations of the free-soil party, the south, could not agree. The campaign of 1848 showed, perhaps, that for the first time the south was united on the view that southern interests must be protected. This, however, did not result in unity of action; for, having been brought to this realization of the necessity of a defensive (not aggressive) policy, southerners could agree no further. The southern electoral vote was al- most evenly divided between Cass and Taylor, in spite of the fact that Taylor was run as a southerner, who could at least 57 Calhoun from Joseph W. Lesesne, July 5, 1848, Calhoun papers. vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 49 be relied upon to check the progress of the antislavery move- ment, if necessary, by the exercise of the veto power. Fillmore, true, was then regarded as a bitter pill for the south to swallow in order to get Taylor — for a president had been known to die and give the vice-president an opportunity for mischief — but serious doubts were registered in many quarters as to whether Taylor could be the regular whig candidate and at the same time a true southerner. Furthermore, his Allison letter left many in doubt as to whether he would veto the Wilmot proviso if passed by a majority of congress. Party ties continued binding. There was as much interest in the spoils of office as ever. How could the south be united on an aggressive campaign to get con- trol of the presidency, when the leaders of the section were so far from agreement on the question supposed to be of greatest interest to the people? The word ''supposed" is used deliber- ately, for many men were interested quite as much in Taylor's views on the tariff as in any other point involved in the election. While one southerner had only praise for Cass and denunci- ation for Taylor, in view of the interests of the section, his neighbor used words equally strong, but with the names in re- verse order. Even though some regarded a choice between Cass and Taylor as a choice between evils for the south, a third party, devoted to southern interests only, was out of the question at this time, for it would rally but few recruits. 58 Following the election of 1848 — which settled nothing — events soon brought on a crisis. With the discovery of gold in California, settlers rushed to the west in such numbers that the territorial question obviously could be delayed no longer. The abolitionists were registering the vow again and again that not another slave state should enter the union ; they were making persistent demands for action against slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia; interference with the rendition of fugitive slaves was becoming more frequent. In view of this situation the south became aroused, as never 58 Letters by Elmore, Rhett, Brydsall, Fisher, Lumpkin, Peronneau, J ohnson, Prescott, Calhoun, Paulding, Harlee, Wigfall, Yancey, Ellis, Seabrook, Wilson, Webb, DeBow, 1847 and 1848, Calhoun papers; letters by Toombs, Cobb, Thomas W. Thomas, James C. Dobbin, Henry E. Jackson, Thomas Smith, W. C. Daniell, John Forsyth, James F. Cooper, 1848, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb. 50 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v - H - R - before. Some defensive action seemed to be imperative, but no agreement could be reached. During the course of the year 1849 literally scores of suggestions for a policy and more or less definite action were made in as many different quarters. The writer actually has catalogued more than forty plans offered for the people of a county, congressional district, or state, individ- ually, and for the south as a whole. 59 Through this maze of suggestions it is clear that though a majority realized that the south was in a desperate position, there was no agreement as to the best method of procedure ; and, further, even when a more or less definite proposal for action was made, there is little evidence that the proposition had been carefully thought out to a logical conclusion; more often than not the suggestion came from a befogged mind. Early in 1849 one of the suggested measures was attempted. On January 15 the southern members of congress met in caucus to consider an address prepared by Calhoun. The reports of the debates in the caucus seem to show that the hopes of those who expected southern politicians, whigs and democrats, to unite in defense of southern rights, were groundless ; instead, the southerners persistently divided on the old party lines, and even the democrats could not agree among themselves. The whigs displayed their conservatism and loyalty to the union. Their opposition was not sufficient to prevent the pub- lication of the address, but they did succeed in relegating it to the status of a party affair and thereby robbed it of much of the effect anticipated for it by its promoters. Toombs wrote to Crittenden that he had told Calhoun very bluntly "that the union of the south was neither possible nor desirable until we are ready to dissolve the Union . . . and that we intended to stand by the government until it committed an overt act of aggression upon our rights, which neither we nor the country ever expected." 60 The southern whigs, in the main, simply would have none of "Mr. Calhoun's desperate remedies," and in several state legislatures successfully exerted a moderating influence as reflected in state resolutions. They still placed 59 To give the exact source citation for each one of these suggestions would take too much space. They are found in newspaper files and correspondence collec- tions covering the year 1849. 60 Quoted in Cole, The whig party in the south, 140. Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slav ocracy 51 hope in Taylor's administration to protect their rights, and would not believe that consideration of the disunion alterna- tive would really ever become necessary. The southern address reviewed the development of the abo- litionist crusade, the offenses of the north, such as breaking the provisions of the constitution for the rendition of fugitive slaves, and the aggressions already launched in congress, and concluded that, unless vigorously resisted, the abolitionists would accomplish their design in the near future. Following emanci- pation, the blacks would be raised to political power by the north, and southern whites would sink into oblivion and degra- dation. Only unity of action would prevent such a calamity. However, in spite of the most earnest endeavors by those who pleaded that a united south could preserve southern constitu- tional rights and thus the union, the southern address, bearing the names of only forty-eight signers — a few more than half the southerners in congress — succeeded only in precipitating a three-cornered political fight in the south in the fall elections of 1849 among the whigs, the Calhoun-" chivalry "-southern- rights-democrats, and the regular or anti-Calhoun democrats. The regular democrats still believed that the northern demo- crats and the national party were true to the south and worthy of confidence and support. Neither democratic group had any confidence in the southern whigs, who, they believed, would support Taylor even if he signed a Wilmot proviso law. The resistance democrats had no confidence in the regular demo- crats, who, they believed, would cling to the party and the union until southern rights were beyond redemption. The regular demo- crats argued that all southerners, including the whigs, should support the northern democrats in their fight for southern rights, or these northern democrats, failing to receive the southern sup- port they deserved, would have to abandon the southern cause and appeal for abolitionist votes as the whigs were doing. In- deed, the southern address, it seemed, had been worse than useless: it had divided the south and thus had encouraged the antislavery forces in the north. 61 61 Letters by Lumpkin, Wigfall, Byrdsall, Weems, Sims, Wiekliffe, Starke, 1849, Calhoun papers; letters by Cobb, Hopkins Holsey, John H. Lumpkin, George S. Houston, John W. Burke, James B. Bowlin, James Buchanan, Lewis Cass, Thomas D. Harris, Henry L. Benning, 1849, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb. 52 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v - H - & While the status of California remained unsettled, in 1849, southern whig leaders, hoping to save embarrassment for the Taylor administration, rallied about a plan to try to get the new territory admitted as a single state before the inauguration. This would remove the troublesome subject, would add but a single state to the strength of the north, and would evade the issue of the Wilmot proviso without sacrificing the honor of the south. 62 The resistance or radical wing of the southern democrats had no patience with the temporizing of the southern whigs, saw only the prospect of further aggressions in the immediate future, and began to talk of resistance and disunion. The movement took definite form in Mississippi and resulted in the call of a southern convention to meet at Nashville on June 3, 1850. The whigs tried at first to block the movement, and then, when this could not be accomplished, to force the radicals to moderate their position. Of course by this time a number of whigs had become infected with the contagion of ultrasectionalism and had become radicals, while conservative democrats tended to draw away from the radical leaders of their party. Taylor's message in December, 1849, disclosed his plan in regard to the territories. California should be admitted as a state at once with its free constitution, framed while congress had delayed giving it even territorial organization; and New Mexico was soon to follow the same course; thus the problem would be solved without the intervention of congress. Of course southern democrats at once denounced the heresy of ' ' approving the Wilmot proviso in the constitution of California, ' ' and Cal- houn dubbed it the ''Executive proviso." Southern whigs, ex- cept a few insurgents, approved the president 's plan. Meanwhile the time approached for selecting delegates to the Nashville convention. The policy of the southern whigs, in state after state, was either to block the sending of delegates at all, or, if delegates were to be sent, to try to select moderate men. They were partially successful in both directions. Before the convention met, however, the Clay compromise measures had been introduced into congress and were being debated. In spite of the efforts of whig congressmen, Taylor refused to sponsor the compromise plan, and prepared to come out even 62 Cole, The whig party in the south, 143. vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 t^ Aggressive Slavocracy 53 more strongly for immediate admission of California and New Mexico, determined to back the latter 's boundary claims against Texas with troops if necessary. Before he could succeed in bringing the issue between his plan and that of congress, he died after a brief illness. Taylor's death smoothed the way for the passage of the compromise. The Nashville convention meantime proved virtually a fiasco for two reasons : final action had to be delayed until after the adjournment of congress, and in view of the strong pronounce- ments against disunion or radical action which had been regis- tered in many southern states, the presentation of 36° 30' as an ultimatum and the pronouncing of disunion tenets seemed worse than fruitless. When the time came for the second ses- sion, there had been a union victory in Georgia and the whigs again were unrepresented. Fire-eating speeches and discussion of radical resolutions condemnatory of the entire compromise adjustment became the order of the day — with but very little perceptible effect in either section. The convention denounced all president-making conventions and recommended a southern congress to secure concerted action of the whole south. Distrust of the Nashville convention was felt from the time of the launching of the movement not alone among southern whigs; some conservative democrats also distrusted it because they feared that either the radicals would deliberately make demands which the nonslaveholding states could not sanction and secession would be forced, or the convention would be far from unanimous as to the proper course to be pursued and a divided front would weaken the south. The ultimatum of the Nashville convention — the extension of the Missouri compro- mise line to the Pacific — was indeed regarded by the whigs and the conservative democrats as an effort on the part of the radical democrats to force secession, because they wanted no compromise accepted. During the debate in congress on the com- promise measures in the summer and fall of 1850, the whigs and the conservative democrats argued for acceptance, if the meas- ures should be passed by congress, and endeavored to show that the measures really would put the south in as good a position as the extension of the Missouri compromise line to the coast. 63 63 Cobb from Hiram Warner, March 17, 1850, from John B. Lamar, July 3, 1850, from William H. Morton, July 10, 1850, from John H. Lumpkin, July 21, 54 Chauncey S. Boucher m. v. h. r. Of course the abolitionists claimed at the time, and many historians since have maintained, that the compromise meas- ures of 1850 constituted a one-sided bargain, a victory for the aggressive slavocracy. But it is only fair to state that many southerners also regarded it as a one-sided arrangement, in v/hich the south gained nothing. Another free state was added — California. In the provision for the organization of Utah and New Mexico without the Wilmot proviso, the south gained nothing save a point of principle which should never have been raised — an unreasonably aggressive abolitionist move was tem- porarily blocked. The Texas boundary settlement, although per- haps equitable as far as Texas was concerned, was considered as a loss to the south as a whole ; a large district which was slave territory under Texas was now put in a status where it might be lost by the slave interests. The abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia was a clear concession to the abo- litionists. The new fugitive- slave law was regarded simply as a long-delayed recognition of southern rights under the consti- tution. Putting it still more forcefully, some southerners said that to admit California as a state with its free constitution, with- out giving the south a chance to share in the common heritage of California soil, during a territorial stage, was to enforce the Wilmot proviso in an insulting form. Furthermore, the policy of the administration officials in regard to nonintervention was pronounced a fraudulent pretense ; for, it was said, they had dis- patched agents who engineered the whole process of forming the state government and giving it a free-state hue. A more flagrant violation of the constitution and the principles of the federative compact had never disgraced the senate. What guar- antee was there that the south would not also, in due season, be robbed of the rest of the new territory, by some trick or theory conjured up for the purpose? The proposition to pur- chase nearly one-third of Texas, with the south 's own money, to become ultimately subject to some newfangled nonintervention or proviso of free-soilism, was another outrage. The abolition 29, 1850, Cobb to William Hope Hull, July 17, a public letter (published August 20, and 21, 1850), in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 186, 191, 194, 206, 208, 196; Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," in Washington university studies, Humanistic series, 5:84-107. Vol viii, Nos. 1-2 rphat Aggressive Slavocracy 55 of the slave trade in the District of Columbia was not contested unanimously as a provision undesirable in itself, but as an entering wedge put there by the abolitionists to prepare for total abolition in the district in the near future. Such were the views of many southerners, summarized by one writer as follows: "A more wretched abortion, a more mis- erable apology for a compromise, a more wanton insult to the understanding and the firmness of the southern people, never before was offered by professing friends or open enemies." Another said its title should have been "The ignominious sur- render of the South." Such views did not prevail, however. The voices of the con- servatives were soon raised to show that the compromise set- tlement was fair, just, and honorable, or at least as good as could have been expected under the circumstances, and that certainly, if carried out faithfully, it left the south no grievance serious enough to cause talk about secession. 6 * To say, as a recent writer has said, that southern leaders pro- jected a scheme to enlarge the boundaries of Texas so as to extend slavery over a large part of New Mexico, and to accept the statement of the abolitionists at the time that the payment of ten millions of dollars to Texas for the alleged surrender of claims to a part of New Mexico was a bribe to secure votes necessary to pass the other measures, and that even the bound- aries conceded to Texas involved the surrender of free terri- tory, not only misrepresents the situation, but presents what has been proved untrue. Furthermore, if the compromise was such a victory for the south, why was it necessary to buy south- ern votes for it? 65 64 See many letters of 1850 and 1851, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb; Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," in Washington university studies, Humanistic series, 5:67-138. 65 William C. Binkley, "The question of Texan jurisdiction in New Mexico under the United States, 1848-1850," in Southwestern historical quarterly, 24:1-38. Much light on the truth about Texan boundary lines and claims is found in Binkley, "The expansionist movement in Texas, 1836-1850," an unpublished thesis submitted for the Ph.D. degree at the University of California. The administration at Washington sustained the general claim of Texas to the Bio Grande boundary in 1845-1846; and in February, 1847, the United States secretary of state, in response to a protest from Governor J. P. Henderson, said that the military government set up by General Kearney over Santa Fe was only temporary and acknowledged the claims of Texas to that region. (Manuscript in file box 184, 56 Chauncey 8. Boucher M - Y - H - R- To the south, the passage of the compromise of 1850 by con- gress served not as a pacifier, but as an apple of discord for at least a twelvemonth thereafter. Throughout most of the section forces rallied on one side for submission or union, and on the other for resistance or disunion ; and in Georgia, Missis- sippi, and South Carolina there came a contest as bitterly waged as any the south had ever seen. The compromise meas- ures were thoroughly dissected, with the result that one group pronounced the settlement, as a whole, fair, while the other group found little to praise in any single item and pronounced it as a whole most unfair and worthy only of decisive rejection. From the time of the passage of the measure until the elec- tion of 1852, about as many and almost the same variety of suggestions were offered for state or sectional policy as had been brought forward in the period just before the passage of the compromise. Most of these hinged upon the policy of re- jection of the compromise terms, or acceptance of them with the necessary accompaniment of proper guarantees for their pres- ervation. It became a period of confusion in the south, with readjustment of party lines and personnel in regard to national policy. A few whigs still clung to the idea of a continuance of their allegiance to the national party, but the majority, believ- ing that the northern wing of the party had become almost if not entirely an abolitionist party, looked toward the formation of a new national union party, which should eliminate the abo- litionists and stand for the guaranty of southern rights on the basis of the compromise settlement. Some democrats were willing to join such a party; others still regarded the national democratic party as such a party and hence wished to maintain affiliation with it ; while the ultra wing of the democratic party, joined perhaps by a few whigs, could see hope only in resistance — disunion. After a most bitter contest waged during elections, in legis- latures, and in state conventions, the conservatives won the day and an aggressive policy — secession — was defeated. A for- department of state, Austin, Texas. The writer is indebted to Professor C. W. Rams- dell for calling his attention to this document.) Of course this does not validate historically the claims of Texas asserted consistently from 1836, but it does validate the Texas claim as contested between Texas, New Mexico, and the United States after the Mexican war. Vol. vin, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 57 midable majority seemed to agree that secession at the time was not the proper step, and in the debates it became clear that a very considerable number refused to accept the meta- physics of the secession doctrine and held that a state or section possessed only the inherent right of revolution, and when such a policy was adopted all its consequences must be considered. Without reading some of the newspapers and correspondence of the time it is impossible to gain a full impression of the bitterness of the contest in the south. It is by no means preposterous to wonder whether the ultra leaders were not hated and distrusted by many of their more conservative south- ern brethren quite as much as were the abolitionists. Indeed, in many an instance, the abolitionists and the southern radicals were put in the same category as undesirable and dangerous citizens. 66 "Confusion" is the only word which will describe the political situation in the south from 1848 to 1860, and especially in 1851 and 1852. Indeed it was confusion confounded in the two years following the passage of the compromise of 1850, for the char- acter of the confusion in South Carolina was different from that in Georgia, while that in Mississippi was different from that in either Georgia or South Carolina. In South Carolina after a year of intense excitement and campaigning, with a great variety of complications introduced to becloud the situation and confuse the voter, things gradually settled down to an issue of immediate secession by that state alone versus cooperation with some one or more of the other southern states. When the question was finally settled at the polls in October, 1851, the cooperationists polled sixty per cent of the votes cast. This meant nothing except acceptance of the compromise settlement. In Georgia it was evident fairly early that the secessionists were in a minority, and the struggle growing out of the neces- sary readjustment of party lines came to be one to determine control of the political policy of the state for ensuing years. The internecine party warfare continued most bitterly in Geor- 66 Calhoun papers; Correspondence of John C. Calhoun; Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb; Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," in Washington university studies, Humanistic series, 5:67-138. 58 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v - H - R gia, with considerable shifting of personnel, for more than three years. 67 In the south as a whole, during this period of party readjust- ment, the union democrats and the southern rights democrats prepared to restore harmony and cooperation. The tendency of the union whigs and of a smaller group of state-rights whigs was to give up the idea of longer affiliation with the national whig party and to join the democratic party; the campaign of 1852, especially with the nomination of Scott, fostered this ten- dency. The northern wing of the whig party was regarded in the south as lost to abolition, while there was still some hope in the democratic party. Party ties, however, were strong, and many were very reluctant to see them severed; indeed, to- ward the middle of the campaign a strong effort was made, with some promises of success, to start a tremendous reaction in favor of Scott. Every effort was made to prove him sound on the compromise of 1850. When the returns came in, however, the extent of the southern whig disaffection was shown — Scott carried only two states, Kentucky and Tennessee. It was a vote of lack of confidence, on the part of the southern whigs, in Scott and the northern wing of the party. Several sporadic efforts were made to rehabilitate the whig party in the south after 1852, but the result was only confusion. All that was clear was that though the whig party in the south was dead, the section was not united under the single democratic banner with a single policy or program in case action were needed. 1 ' The Whig party in the south had degenerated into a mere op- position party, ready to act under one name or another in the cause 'against the democrats.' " 68 The south as a whole, at the time of the election of 1852, may be said to have reached something of an agreement on policy. The Georgia platform seemed to have become the south- ern platform: the compromise of 1850 was to be accepted as a 67 Letters by Toombs, Stephens, Cobb, Thomas D. Harris, John H. Lumpkin, James Jackson, John B. Lamar, Orion Stroud, Henry L. Benning, George D. Phillips, Francis J. Grund, William H. Hull, Thomas C. Howard, John C. Johnson, James A. Meriwether, Henry S. Foote, Andrew J. Donelson, George W. Jones, John Slidell, Hopkins Holsey, John E. Ward, John Milledge, 1851-1852, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb. es Cole, The whig party in the south, 281; Toombs to John J. Crittenden, Decem- ber 15, 1852, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 322. Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 Tj ia t Aggressive Slavocracy 59 final settlement, but if it were violated by the north, or if further aggressions came from that section, the south was determined to resist. But this was more the appearance of unity than a reality, for there was sure to come disagreement over such points as these : what was a violation of the compromise % what was a further aggression worthy of resistance? and, if resist- ance were demanded, what form of action should be taken? These questions were certain to revive the old differences and prevent unity of action. The Kansas-Nebraska bill was the next development to dis- turb the apparent equilibrium between the sections and to in- troduce further confusion among southerners. We do not as yet know all the forces back of the introduction of this meas- ure, but it seems to have been a political job, in which many northern politicians and groups were interested, with various and sundry motives and interests to serve. To represent it as the product of a united and aggressive slavocracy is to ob- scure the truth. Among the various factors produced by con- ditions in the nation at large and in several localities in partic- ular — factors compounded in just what proportion we do not as yet definitely know — which led to the bill to organize the Nebraska territory and to repeal the Missouri compromise, may be enumerated the following : the agitation for one or more transcontinental railways; the local demand in Missouri and Iowa for the organization of the territory ; the demands of the prospective settlers and speculators ; the activities of the Wyan- dot Indians ; the necessity for adequate protection for emigrants, travelers, traders, and mail-carriers in and through the terri- tory; the dissensions in the democratic party in Missouri and in New York; the Benton- Atchison feud in Missouri; Douglas' political position and aspirations; the question of slavery in the territories; and the appearance and growth, in some quar- ters, both north and south, of the idea that the principle of the compromise of 1850 had superseded that of the compromise of 1820. 69 6 9 P. Orman Ray, The repeal of the Missouri compromise; its origin and author- ship (Cleveland, 1909); Frank H. Hodder, "Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska act," in Wisconsin historical society, Proceedings, 1912, pp. 69-86; Ray, "The genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska act," in American historical association, Annual report, 1914 (Washington, 1916), 1: 259-280. 60 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v - H - R - Though the logic of Calhoun's pronouncements upon slavery in the territories seems now to have demanded the repeal of the Missouri compromise, it is highly doubtful whether more than a very few southern leaders, if any, other than a few in Mis- souri, had ever seriously considered striving for such action. Southerners had more or less generally accepted the Calhoun theory for future policy, at the time of its pronouncement, but had little thought, if any, of making it retroactive. Though a few of the leaders of what was called the Calhoun wing of the democratic party in Missouri, as opposed to the free-soil wing led by Benton, may have cherished the hope in 1853 that the Missouri compromise might be repealed — and one of them, Judge William C. Price, later boasted that he had originated and sponsored the idea as early as 1844 — there seems to be only such evidence as may be drawn from inference that south- ern leaders like Calhoun, Davis, Breckinridge, Toombs, Benja- min, and others of "the leaders of the aggressive slavery exten- sion party," with whom Price and the Calhoun democrats of Missouri are said to have been in close touch, were responsible for prompting and pressing for the repeal. In other words, the evidence is lacking to show that the repeal feature was the product of a proslavery extension plot among southern leaders at large. Even in so far as it was the product of the local polit- ical feud in Missouri — and this is its most intimate connection with the southern cause — it seems to have been precipitated by the aggressiveness of Benton against Atchison, and Atchi- son sponsored the repeal in the latter part of 1853 when forced to it, to save his very political life, in spite of the fact that he had said in the preceding March that there was no remedy for the law of 1820, since it could not be repealed. 70 With all the pressing interests enumerated above, the ter- ritorial organization of Nebraska, whether with or without the repeal of the Missouri compromise, could not have been long- er delayed, it seems. In the face of circumstances, Douglas per- haps became convinced that he could best serve the interests of northern Illinois, his party, and himself by accepting the repeal amendment, when it was urged by Atchison and actu- ally presented by Dixon of Kentucky; and other interested 70 Kay, ' ' The genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska act, ' ' in American historical associa- tion, Annual report, 1914, volume 1, pp. 259-280. Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 61 parties who were desirous only of the immediate organization of the territory were willing to accept the repeal because they believed that territorial organization might be delayed without it and that their immediate interests would not be adversely af- fected by it. Once the bill embodying the repeal of the Missouri compro- mise was before congress, a majority of the southern whigs in congress joined the southern democrats in support of it. The position of many was aptly put by Senator Clayton of Del- aware when he said: "I did not ask for it, I would not have proposed it ; and I may regret that it was offered, because I do not believe that it will repay us for the agitation and irritation it has cost. But can a Senator, whose constituents hold slaves, be expected to resist and refuse what the North thus freely of- fers us as a measure due to us ? ' ' 71 The first impulse of south- erners in general seemed to be to welcome the bill because its great underlying principles were nonintervention and popular sovereignty, making it the logical development of the compro- mise of 1850. They were inclined to view it simply as a long- delayed act of justice to the south, and felt that it would cer- tainly be unbecoming of a southern congressman to refuse it when offered. Even though it might not result in the actual extension of slavery, the point at issue was one of principle, and a wholesome moral victory might be gained. The passage of the bill is generally represented as a victory for the slaveholding interests. But there' were other interpre- tations of it in the south. Though all rejoiced because of the point of principle involved in this partial removal of the stigma of federal legislation directed avowedly against southern insti- tutions, many cautioned against building false hopes upon it, for the following reasons: the act would not put an end to antislavery agitation or congressional interference, for the op- eration of the act would inevitably bring the question back to the floors of congress ; the south would really gain nothing be- cause of its unequal capacity for immediate expansion, as compared with that of the north; and, furthermore, slavery would not be profitable in this territory. Many objected to the bill because they believed that it established the principle of 71 Quoted in Cole, The whig party in the south, 293. 62 Chauncey 8. Boucher m.v.h.e. squatter sovereignty in such a way as to preclude congressional protection against hostile territorial legislation. Many saw the ambiguities of the bill, and realized that it was likely to bring the issue between squatter sovereignty and popular sovereignty — meaning by the former the right of a people during the ter- ritorial stage to exclude slavery, and meaning by the latter the right to exercise such power only after reaching the condition of statehood, though not often was such a nice distinction drawn in denning these two terms even if the difference in principle was recognized. This ambiguity was glossed over, in some quarters, by talk of establishment of congressional nonintervention, or by a profession of belief that the bill said to slaveholders that they could go into the territory with their property and be safe until as a sovereign state the people decided for or against the institution. Others pointed out that northern democrats were defending the act, not as a measure of justice to the south, but as an antislavery measure — that instead of opening up north- ern territory to southern colonization, it really opened up southern territory to northern conquest. There were southerners, it must be added, who spoke their minds in and out of congress against the repeal of the Missouri compromise as an unjustifiable breach of plighted faith which could serve no practical end for the south and would ultimately cause only discomfort and loss. The whigs especially were in- different to the fate of the bill and could not share enthusiasm for an abstract principle which promised no practical advan- tages for the south. Apprehensions of a renewed agitation of the slavery question were frequently registered. The Kansas-Nebraska bill was a surprise quite as much to the south as to the north ; but, once it was introduced, it was natural that the south should easily convince itself that the measure was simply a measure of delayed justice involving no breach of faith in the repeal of the Missouri compromise. The south had accepted the compromise of 1820 in good faith, and had never thought of repudiating it. When new territory was ac- quired to the west of the Louisiana territory, the south had said again and again that it was willing to accept the principle of the Missouri compromise and extend the line to the Pacific. But the north would have none of it, had put the Wilmot pro- viso, instead of the Missouri principle, into the bill to organize Vol. vin, Nos. 1-2 t^ Aggressive Slavocracy 63 Oregon, and had further repudiated the principle in the long struggle over California and New Mexico. Thus the north had abandoned the principle underlying the settlement of 1820 and stood for a new one — absolute exclusion of the south from all territories. A new compromise agreement was reached in 1850, which in principle rejected both that of the compromise of 1820 and the new principle sponsored by the north. Thus, after the north had abandoned the principle of 1820 and had accepted the new one of 1850, with what grace could it now object to the application of the new principle to the present and all future cases? The Kansas-Nebraska bill would settle the question in conformity with the declared will of the whole people, bring ''peace, equality and fraternity." This was the line of reasoning pursued by many northern democrats as well as southerners. 72 It is not easy to discover the warrant for the statement made in a recent book that for ten years the leaders of the Calhoun section of the democratic party had been laboring to get rid of the Missouri compromise. Though many southerners after 1846 repudiated the basic principle underlying the passage of the Missouri compromise — that congress had power over slav- ery in the territories — very few, if any, of these seriously con- templated asking for a repeal of the Missouri compromise as applied definitely to the Louisiana purchase territory. Indeed they would not have been led to deny the power of congress over slavery in the territories if the Wilmot proviso had not been introduced; and, when they did deny the power, they did it with future settlements in the new territory in mind. It is evident that during the development of the situation in Kansas which Sumner called the " crime against Kansas" and to which many historians refer as "bleeding Kansas," the south had little accurate information as to what was actually going on, either in Kansas or in administrative circles in Wash- ington. All sorts of conflicting reports and rumors were current in the south concerning what was happening in Kansas, how much the agents of the administration were responsible for inter- na Boucher, "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession, 1852 to 1860," in Washington university studies, Humanistic series, 6:79-144; Toombs to W. W. Burrell, February 3, 1854, Stephen A. Douglas to Cobb, April 2, 1854, Stephens to J. W. Duncan, May 26, 1854, Cobb to , April 21, 1856, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb, 342, 343, 345, 363. 64 Chauncey 8. Boucher M - v - H - E - fering with the working out of the principle of popular sover- eignty, and what was really the policy of the president, first Pierce, and then Buchanan. Even when a few southerners agreed on what they believed to be facts, they disagreed as to the significance of the facts and as to what the attitude and policy of the south should be. The one fact of which they were earliest certain was that the abolitionists had refused to accept the principle in good faith and to let the status of Kansas be settled through natural emigration and settlement. Many southerners from the very first feared and expected treachery, and believed that every available trick would be resorted to by their opponents to make Kansas a free state. As reports both true and false came to the south concerning the evidence of trickery and bad faith, many men were inclined to regard the outcome and the manner of its accomplishment as the final test whether the south could ever hope for justice in the union. Many became interested in the developments in Kansas and the whole territorial question, not merely for the sake of obtaining enough slave states and votes in congress to control the government, but as a question of principle. They believed that a greater question of principle was involved, the loss of which would mean that the abolitionists would then have a clear road on which to march to the abolition of slavery in the states. The rights of the southern states as equals in the union must be protected at some point at once, or they were completely lost. This was the stand at the bridge which must be taken to stop the onrush and complete victory of the abolitionists. During the period of uncertainty as to what was happening or going to happen in Kansas, many southerners, fearing trick- ery from the start and receiving reports confirming their fears, could only fall back upon the view that the proof of the pudding would be found in the eating. If the south were not given a fair chance in colonizing Kansas, if artificial emigration were stimulated in the north, if the president, whether Pierce or Buchanan, should instruct or permit his agents in Kansas to discriminate in any way against southern interests, if the south, after seeing California hurried into the union "against all law and all precedent because she was a free state," should see Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 t^ Aggressive Slavocracy 65 " Kansas subjected to the rigors of the inquisition because she had a chance of being a slave state," if Kansas were refused admission either directly or through some ingenious circumlo- cution, simply because it was to be a slave state — then it was likely that the southern people would forsake the leadership of the conservatives and those who had urged acceptance of the bill, and that the radicals — the secessionists — would come into power. Though historians generally agree to-day that the proslavery men in Kansas resorted to more unfair methods than did their opponents, there were several points on which a fair-minded southerner, not knowing all the facts, could base an interpreta- tion similar to one or another of those just given. However, when confronted with the same report as to what had taken place, southerners disagreed radically in forming a judgment. While some men saw only evidences of betrayal and unjustifiable action on the part of President Buchanan and Governor Walker, others saw nothing to criticize. While some insisted that Kan- sas must become a slave state by whatever means were neces- sary, fair or foul, and resorted to most specious reasoning to prove a point, others were convinced that a large majority of the people in Kansas were against slavery, that the opposition to the submission of the question, in the constitution, to a free vote and fair count was simply the result of a fear that a major- ity would condemn slavery, and that "an effort to get a free state into the Union over the will of a majority of its citizens would never be submitted to at the south." 73 Of course at the time of the Kansas-Nebraska bill the south would have welcomed the addition of another slave state, for defensive purposes in the national councils. The "border ruf- fians" of Missouri, however, and the slaveholders of the state generally, were interested in an immediate problem of defense which concerned them alone, primarily. The Missouri slave- holders were already surrounded by free territory on the north and east, and saw that if a free state were added on the west, 73 Boucher, "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession," in Wash- ington university studies, Humanistic series, 6 : 79-144 ; letters by Toombs, Stephens, Cobb, Thomas W. Thomas, William H. Hull, Lucius Q. C. Lamar, Joseph E. Brown, and many others, 1856-1858, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb. 66 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v - H - R - and the underground railroad operated on three sides of this slaveholding peninsula "jutting up into a sea of free-soil," slave property in Missouri would be almost worthless. Slave- holding Missourians frequently asserted at the time of their interest in the Kansas struggle that theirs was a defensive movement to conserve existing slave property and an existing slave society. Their first thought was to defend what they al- ready possessed. To them the settlers of the Emigrant aid society appeared to be "bands of Hessian Mercenaries," an "army of hirelings," "military colonies of reckless and des- perate fanatics" — to use their own appellations. On July 29, 1854, the citizens of Platte county, Missouri, held a meeting at Weston, at which they resolved that all settlers sent to Kansas by free state aid societies must be turned back ; and they formed the Platte county self-defensive association, with the object of settling Kansas with proslavery men. So it was in the rest of Missouri: organized effort to win Kansas for slavery came only after the action of the Emigrant aid so- ciety was known. From the testimony of Missourians before the congressional investigating committee it seems that the invasion of Kansas for the purpose of voting had not been thought of until the leaders were convinced that the eastern emigrant aid societies had determined to colonize Kansas with antislavery men to make it a free state. In the south popular sentiment justified the action of the Missourians as being an act of self-defense against the unfair encroachments of the north. 74 When in the autumn of 1855 the word came from Missouri to the rest of the south that unless recruits were sent at once to counterbalance the emigrants sent in by the northern socie- ties all would be lost, some sporadic efforts were made in several southern states to enlist volunteer companies to go to Kansas; fire must be fought with fire. The most famous expedition was that led by Major Buford of Alabama — some three hun- dred men recruited from several states. Though northern min- isters were raising funds to buy Sharpe's rifles for northern emi- grants, Buford 's men, out of respect for a proclamation by the president, were armed with bibles instead of rifles. In some 7* Mary J. Klem, ' ' Missouri in the Kansas struggle, ' ' in Mississippi valley his- torical association, Proceedings, 9:393-413. Vol. vin, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 67 localities, where a company of ten or twelve volunteers was raised, composed largely of mechanics, artisans, and a few younger sons or nephews of planters, the men were given din- ners, balls, and other appropriate demonstrations and were treated as military volunteers ; and no doubt many of the men must have gone in the spirit of military volunteers. The cause for which they were no doubt prepared to fight, if occasion de- manded it, was not simply that of the rights of slaveholders in the territories, nor two more votes in the United States senate, but it was aptly stated on the banner which the Buf ord battalion carried when it left Montgomery: on one side was inscribed "The Supremacy of the "White Eace," and on the other "Kan- sas — The Outpost." This, in the minds of many southerners, was the real issue ; Kansas was really the outpost of the struggle for the supremacy of the white race, because if one point of principle after another were lost, the abolitionists would ac- complish their design to emancipate the slaves throughout the union ; and, with no real solution as yet suggested for the negro problem which would follow emancipation, southerners believed that the supremacy of the white race, with all its civilization, was truly at stake. During the struggle over Kansas the members of the strong southern opposition were at one with the southern democrats in desiring to see Kansas won as a slave state, since the Kansas- Nebraska bill had been passed, but the opposition condemned the use of violence to that end, opposed the adoption of the Lecompton constitution, and used the developments in Kansas to justify their saying "I told you so." It was the result many had predicted would follow the repeal of the Missouri com- promise and the establishment of squatter sovereignty. 75 Again it seems a pity that the abolitionists were so aggres- sive. Kansas was destined to be a free state even in spite of the repeal of the Missouri compromise. It seemed now to be demonstrated that organized efforts to stimulate a great rush of people to Kansas, to become permanent settlers, almost com- pletely failed both in the north and in the south. These efforts have long been overemphasized. They simply stirred up a greater amount of antagonism and strife than would otherwise have been produced. The intensity of the fight for Kansas 75 Cole, The whig party in the south, 331. 68 Chauncey S. Boucher m. v. h. r. drew strong spirits to the territory, among them many who were attracted by the opportunities to participate in exciting adventures and dangerous exploits. On the other hand, the turmoil kept out of the territory numerous settlers who wanted homes instead of trouble. In the end the natural forces of the westward movement, normal migration and settlement, and not the artificial forces produced by the slavery controversy, de- termined the character of the majority of the settlers; and these forces, balanced as they were at the time, determined that Kansas was to be a free state. 76 The Kansas-Nebraska bill put an end to all possibilities of further cooperation between northern and southern whigs. Now was the time of all times for the formation of a southern party per se, and the working out of a grand sectional agreement as to platform policies and program of action. But this could not be. There were some democrats and some whigs who fa- vored such a course, but the radicalism of many of the former repelled those democrats who still had faith in the national democratic party, and also repelled those whigs who were still strong union men as well as those whigs who could not be reconciled to cooperation with democrats under any circum- stances. The result was that the know-nothing or American party was in large part the beneficiary and attracted to its ranks a great variety of elements who had few common interests and could not be brought to accept any very definite program. Many there were who joined the ranks of the know-nothings because they believed that here lay the best possibilities of serving sectional interests. The best arguments which they could present to this end were simply that the policy of the party would help to stifle the accretion of strength gained by the abolitionists from the foreign-born, and that the party was really a national one which would aid in putting down the slavery agitation by ignoring it. The growth of the party in the south, however, was simply proof that confusion was to continue in that section and perhaps become more confounded. 77 76 William O. Lynch, ' ' Popular sovereignty and the colonization of Kansas from 1854 to 1860," in Mississippi valley historical association, Proceedings, 9:380-392. 77 Boucher, ' ' South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession, ' ' in Washing- ton university studies, Humanistic series, 6:79-144; Cole, The whig party in the south. Vol vin, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 69 Even though every southern state save Maryland cast its electoral votes for Buchanan in 1856, the half million votes in the south for Fillmore showed that the opposition to the demo- cratic party was not eliminated. Following the inauguration of Buchanan the logic of the situation again called for unity in the south — "an undivided South as the base of a great constitu- tional party, embracing the conservative men of all sections," as Hillard of Alabama put it. 78 But again unity was not to be attained. The national democratic party ties were still too strong for many, and as many others placed no faith in this party. By this time there had grown up in the south what may best be called simply the " opposition" — a conglomeration of old-line whigs, know-nothings, dissatisfied democrats, and conservatives in general; their only common aims were opposition to the democrats in both local and national politics, and a cessation of the "eternal wrangling and spouting at abolitionism." The Dred Scott decision, published two days after Buchanan was inaugurated, was an attempt on the part of a majority of the supreme court to allay the bitter and dangerous sectional controversy by an endeavor to settle the then most troublesome phase of that controversy, the territorial question. But it came ten years too late. Had the decision been rendered in 1847 the course of events in the next decade might have been con- siderably different — and perhaps fortunately so for all con- cerned. However, coming as it did in 1857, it involved too many complications. It accepted the doctrine of Calhoun, de- nying the power of congress to prohibit slavery in the territo- ries ; it declared unconstitutional the basic principle on which the republican party was organized, namely, the prevention of the extension of slavery into any more territories; it nullified the doctrine of popular sovereignty as expounded by Douglas and northern and many southern democrats, that slavery could be excluded by the people of a territory during the territorial stage ; it accepted the doctrine of a part of the southern demo- crats who maintained that slavery could be excluded only at the time of statehood ; it was an attempt to interpret the declaration of independence and the constitution of the United States in 78 Quoted in Cole, Tlie whig party in the south, 327. 70 Chauncey S.Boucher m.v.h.e. the light of the existing conditions, claiming for this interpre- tation that it must be the one intended by the men of the rev- olutionary period. Although there were grave misstatements of historical facts in the process by which the chief justice reached his conclusion in regard to the territories, it must be admitted that to the mind of a southerner, in view of the existing circumstances, the de- cision as to existing and future territorial policy could but seem eminently equitable. Perhaps a majority of northerners be- lieved that the chief justice, in describing the sentiments of the fathers respecting slavery, was doing what Horace Greeley de- scribed as ''saying a thing and being conscious while saying it that the thing is not true." This suggests a pertinent question regarding what is represented as the prevailing and accepted social philosophy of the south. 79 Were not many southerners, Avhen they talked and wrote about the morality and justice of slavery and about its being a divinely ordained institution, in a position like that described by Greeley — but a position forced upon them by necessity of circumstances for immediate pro- tection ? Though the charge was made at the time by republicans that the decision was the result of collusion between members of the supreme court and democratic politicians, including Bu- chanan and especially southerners, and that there had been a most elaborate and comprehensive program sponsored by the slavocracy to control the federal judiciary, nothing of the sort has ever been proved. No doubt it was suggested to the members of the court, after the case of Dred Scott was on their docket, that a general and all-embracing pronouncement from that au- gust body might do much to calm troubled waters. But the decision did not allay the controversy ; the court succeeded only in lowering its own standing in the eyes of thousands in the north and indeed intensified the bitterness of the conflict. The south gained nothing, except a moral victory in its own eyes, for statements soon came from many quarters in the north that the main part of the court's opinion as obiter dictum was mere verbiage for them and would not be accepted. In his debates with Douglas, Lincoln said that the Dred Scott 79 To be considered more at length by the writer in a subsequent publication. Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 71 decision had raised the alarming question whether the next step would not be a decision to legalize slavery in all the states of the union. There seems to be no evidence, however, that any such design was entertained by southerners. They realized full well that such a step would be extremely hazardous, for it would rob them of their last stronghold for defense of slavery within their own states — the argument that slavery in the states was entirely a state affair. In the light of the time, however, per- haps it was almost as natural and reasonable for Lincoln to make this charge as it was for the southerner to charge that virtually all the antislavery men of the north were definitely planning to have governmental action put an end to slavery in the slave states. In the eyes of each contestant the logic of the situation and the policies of the other seemed to lead to the step charged against the other, each taking for granted that the other had a perverted sense of justice and no sense of, or res- pect for, constitutional law. The Freeport doctrine, as set forth by Douglas in his debates with Lincoln in 1858 — that a territory might by "unfriendly legislation" keep slavery out in spite of the Dred Scott deci- sion — was not original with Douglas. In a speech in the house on December 11, 1856, James L. Orr of South Carolina had said: " There are some democrats who think the territorial legislatures have power to prohibit or introduce slavery. I do not. But, it matters not, either way, for in every slaveholding community we have local legislation and local police regulation appertaining to that institution, without which the institution would not only be valueless, but a curse to the community. The legislature of a territory can vote for or against laws. If the majority of the people are opposed to slavery, all they have to do is simply to decline to pass laws in the territorial legislature to protect it. So the question whether squatter sovereignty does or does not exist by virtue of the Kansas-Nebraska bill is of no importance. It does by virtue of their power to pass police regulations. ' ' The shrewder thinkers in the south were not surprised by the Freeport doctrine, for by this time they saw the hopelessness of the south's position, practically, in regard to the territories. Although the constitution and the Dred Scott decision might 72 Chauncey 8. Boucher M - v - H - R - prevent the passage of certain laws to the injury of the slave- holder in the territories, they could not compel for his benefit the passage of laws without which slavery simply could not be maintained. Some southerners therefore suggested demanding the enactment of a slave code by congress for the protection of slavery in the territories. Although a congressional slave code for the territories seemed a logical step following the Dred Scott decision, thinking southerners met embarrassments when they considered demanding a code. What more could the abo- litionists ask than thus to be given the legal right to legislate for the negro? Without affecting his legal status as a slave, they could contrive a code which would do more mischief than anything they had yet been able to do. They could give him the power to testify; they could require certain forms prelimi- nary to his sale before a magistrate; they could invest him with certain privileges as to time, goods, dress, all perfectly consistent with his condition as a slave, which would utterly subvert the master's authority and give the negro the power of perpetual and, as far as profit was concerned, destructive annoyance. Did the advocates of the code forget that since 1847 most statesmen of the south of any reputation, "from Mr. Calhoun down," had been struggling to establish the doc- trine of nonintervention by congress in the territories'? Was the south in 1859 to take the position which was held in 1847 by the abolitionists and free-soilers, and from which they had been driven? Suppose a slave code were attainable; would it be worth a pinch of snuff when it had to be executed by the courts and juries of a territory whose refusal to pass a code had rendered congressional action necessary? Yet if the south did not adopt this theory of congressional legislation, it was thrown back upon Douglas' popular sover- eignty. Some men could accept neither theory, and were inclined to sigh for the good old days of the Missouri compromise. Un- constitutional in a strict legal sense, as it was to them, the Mis- souri compromise principle seemed the only possible solution of the difficulty. Such speculations led to the query whether it was possible to find any constitutional ground upon which the south could stand firmly, whether there were not great equities in the constitution — broad, strong, natural rights — Vol. viii, Nos. 1-2 TJiat Aggressive Slavocracy 73 which southern statesmen could maintain, whether a policy could be found which would be free from that idle and mischievous spirit of legal metaphysics which had so long passed for pro- found political thought. 80 Others were not so despondent and denied the necessity of a congressional code because, they said, the general laws were already sufficient to protect southern property in the territories and to make impossible "unfriendly legislation." Still others declared that a just construction of nonintervention meant no more than that congress should neither establish nor abolish slavery in the territories, but did not preclude congressional interference to counteract unfriendly territorial legislation. This interference might not be necessary, but it should be exer- cised whenever the territorial legislature attempted to discrimi- nate against slave property by an omission to pass laws for its protection, or by hostile legislation. Nonintervention, it was maintained, was to be denounced as a fallacy if it denied the power of congress to protect property. There was a vast dif- ference between the power to create or destroy by law and the power to protect rights legally existing under a fundamental law. In fact, these men declared that it was the solemn duty of congress to see that nothing was done, either by its own acts or by the acts of its agent — the territorial legislature, to which it might grant local legislative powers — that would destroy any right to which any citizen was entitled under the consti- tution. 81 During 1858 there was again a movement in the south among the opposition elements to form a conservative, national, union party. They belittled the strength of the aggressive antislavery men in the north, and hoped to rally the conservatives in both sections in a conspiracy of silence, content to let slavery rest in status quo. The John Brown affair at Harper's Ferry, how- ever, in October of 1859, did much to prove such a movement fruitless and to revive the sectional feeling in a more intensified form. The whole story of the ante-bellum period is filled with most so Hammond from J. J. Seibels, July 30, 1859, from W. H. Trescott, August 9, 1859, from J. L. Orr, September 17, 1859, Hammond papers. 8i Boucher, ' ' South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession, ' ' in Washing- ton university studies, Humanistic series, 6:126-127. 74 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v - H - R - unfortunate developments. Just when the conservatives in the south were devoting their utmost endeavors to guard against rash action and the rule of passion, and to insure calm judgment, the Harper's Ferry insurrection gave another forceful argu- ment to the radical hotspurs. Many southerners who had not been inclined to pay much attention to the fire-eaters were now soon ready to believe that the people of the north would re- joice to see the whole south wrapped in the flames of servile insurrection. One report of the affair brought it straight home : among the maps found in the conspirator's possession were some of southern states marked with circles and crosses, which seemed to show that the lives and property of these communities had been doomed by the plotters. Henceforth a more careful watch must be maintained to detect agents tampering with the slaves. 82 Although John Brown went his solitary way in Kansas, and did not have the support or countenance of the majority of the free-state men there, how could the south know or believe this? The same may be said of his operations in Virginia. Probably less than a hundred people knew beforehand anything about the enterprise at Harper's Ferry, and less than a dozen of these rendered aid and encouragement. But the affair, because it came on the eve of the final election before the war, sharpened the issue and had considerable influence. It played into the hands of extremists in both sections. On one side, Brown was soon made a martyr and a hero; on the other, his acts were accepted as a demonstration of northern malignity and hatred, the fitting expression of which was seen in the incitement of slaves to massacre their masters. John Brown became to south- erners the personification of northern opposition. We know to- day that he was an extremist, perhaps, as some have said, unbal- anced mentally, certainly not possessed of robust common sense. But by the time of his rise to notoriety, many in the south could no longer distinguish between John Brown and Abraham Lincoln, even though we know that they were as far apart as the poles. Certain it is that a man who is said to have admired Nat Turner, the leader of the servile insurrection in Virginia, as much as he did George Washington, was a most dangerous citizen at 82 Boucher, ' ' South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession, ' ' in Washington university studies, Humanistic series, 6: 130. Vol. vin, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 75 such a time. Abolitionists of every class had said much about war and about servile insurrection. By the later eighteen-fifties the south realized what was in the mind of John Brown; he believed that so high was the tension on the slavery question throughout the country that revolution, if inaugurated at any point, would sweep the land and liberate the slaves ; he believed that he was himself the divinely chosen agent to let loose the forces of freedom. How could the south help but conclude that if war was to be forced, with the preliminary and accompanying horrors of servile insurrection and race war, the south had better try to prevent it by seceding, or at least have war come without these preliminary and accompanying horrors? It requires but little imagination to picture the reaction in the south when the news came that when Emerson referred to John Brown as "that new saint . . . who . . . will make the gallows glorious like the cross," he was cheered with enthusiasm by an immense audience in Boston; and there were many other testimonials of the temper of the north. During 1859 and 1860 the coming presidential election pre- sented to the south grave questions of policy : what part should the section take in that election? just what statement of prin- ciple and what candidate should it sponsor? in case of certain election results what course should be pursued? Down to the very eve of the election there was no general agreement on an answer to any of these questions. The nearest there was to a general consensus of opinion seemed to be simply that a black republican victory would mean an end of all probability of safe- ty for the south in the union, unless the section could really be aroused to positive united action as never before and could present as an ultimatum a demand for constitutional amend- ments which would without question guarantee to the southern states safety within their own boundaries. When the South Carolina legislature in December, 1859, could not agree on a policy for the state in the immediate future, the members, in the face of this embarrassment, agreed on a com- promise declaration that the southern states should appoint delegates at once to arrange a plan of united action. In a short time, however, it was seen that the attempt to promote a south- ern congress was a failure, for it was soon demonstrated by 76 Chauncey S. Boucher M - v. h. e. action in other states that there was no likelihood that more than one or two states could be interested in the congress, so absorbed were they all in the game of president-making. Even in the case of Virginia, where a special messenger was sent to express sympathy with the state in the John Brown affair and to invite it to lead in securing a southern conference, the attempt failed. 83 Clearly there was only one political party — the democratic party — with which the south could possibly cooperate, but there was serious disagreement as to whether the south should be represented even in that party's nominating convention. After a spirited contest — especially so in South Carolina — it was agreed in all the states to send representatives. Here, however, agreement ended. As to the platform statement to be demanded on the territorial question there was serious disagreement : some were for dropping the whole question, or for accepting any statement upon it, because it was a mere abstraction; others were willing to accept popular sovereignty, because that prin- ciple would give the south the opportunity to carry slavery wherever climate, soil, methods of production, and population would permit; others, including a majority of the southern dele- gates at the Charleston convention, insisted upon noninterven- tion so interpreted as to preclude hostile legislation by a terri- torial legislature and to allow for prospective legislation by con- gress if necessary. As to a safe candidate, worthy of southern support, there was again serious disagreement. To many, Doug- las was entirely satisfactory, because they regarded him as a noble and gallant man, offering to the south all that the section could in reason expect. Others, however, regarded him as a black-hearted villain of the deepest dye, whose theories were based not on sound principles but on insidious and dangerous sophistries. When disagreement over the platform was brought to a head in the national democratic convention at Charleston, and the delegations of eight southern states seceded, there seemed to be the prospect of united southern action. Once more, however, the agreement was only on the negative policy of withdrawing ; what positive policy should follow was not easily determined. The 83 Boucher, ' ' South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession, ' ' in Wash- ington university studies, Humanistic series, 6:134. Vol vin, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slav ocracy 77 immediate prospect for the south did not seem to be unity of action, for evidence was painfully clear in nearly every state that there was to be a scramble for the spoils of office available either in the Richmond or the Baltimore convention — the con- vention of the seceders and the adjourned session of what was left of the regular convention. By no means was it clear that the disruption of the Charleston convention would bring about a dissolution of the union. Many prominent southerners, including nineteen members of congress, thought that a grave mistake had been made by the seceders, and were for going back into the regular convention at Baltimore. Others were for sending delegates to the con- vention called by the seceders to meet at Richmond, hoping that this convention would be able to force the Baltimore con- vention to adopt the territorial principle demanded by the seceders, and thus unite the democratic party again, north and south. Still others, a minority in the south, led by the fire- eating and ' ' chivalry ' ' radicals, wanted the Richmond convention to take independent action and the southern democrats to re- main separate and independent from any alliances whatsoever with the north, hoping that secession would be the ultimate result of such action, following the election. This group ultimately had their way in regard to splitting the democratic party, and two democratic candidates, representing two distinct parties, were placed in nomination. As August came, and it was seen that the democratic party was irreparably split, the inevitable result of the election became evident — Lincoln, the black repub- lican candidate, would be the next president. When election time came the conservative vote in the south was surprisingly large. Even though a vote for Bell, the candi- date of still another party, the constitutional union party, indi- cated a willingness to play the role of the ostrich, his popular vote was surprisingly near that for Breckinridge. In the fifteen slave states the electoral vote was 9 for Douglas, 72 for Breck- inridge, 39 for Bell. But this does not at all reflect the charac- ter of the popular vote. Lincoln polled 26,430, Douglas 163,525, Bell 515,973, and Breckinridge 571,051. If we accept the vote for Breckinridge as indicating the strength of those who were united on an aggressive policy, even to the point of secession, they are found to have constituted only about 45 per cent of the 78 Chauncey S. Boucher m.v.h.r. people of the south. In the eleven states which ultimately con- stituted the confederacy, the popular vote was : Lincoln, 1,929 ; Douglas, 72,084 — 8.4 per cent; Breckinridge, 436,772 — 51 per cent ; Bell, 345,919 — 40 per cent. Secession was not a clear-cut issue in the election in the south. Indeed, in the remaining weeks of the year following the elec- tion, it was not at all clear that there would be a concerted move for secession in a majority of even the states of the lower south. There was abundant evidence of a strong union feeling, which some said was stronger than at any time in a decade, and it was apparently not at all unlikely that resistance would be delayed and offers of concession or compromise be seriously considered. In South Carolina alone there was a clear-cut determination to act — to secede; but whether its action would strengthen and rally support for, or completely unnerve and deplete the ranks of, the resistance elements in the rest of the south, few in South Carolina pretended to know. Nevertheless, the people of that state went wild with excitement ; liberty poles were erect- ed, volunteer companies drilled, and the palmetto flag was greeted with cheers for the new republic. Men who, when the legislature was convened at election time, had urged caution, unless indications were clear that the other southern states were ready to go out and only wanted a leader, now said that South Carolina must secede at once. The state convention, on Decem- ber 20, when it passed the ordinance of secession, merely gave official expression to what had been determined by the people a month before. Thoroughly wearied by the long period of threatening and blustering, with nerves kept a-tingle for years by the continual wrangling with the north and among themselves, the people of this state at last had reached the point where something, anything, to relieve the tension was welcome. Though by no means unanimously convinced that they were pursuing the course which was certain to bring a decided change for the better, from all standpoints, the people rejoiced in definite ac- tion. Few pretended to see clearly what the results would be. As some people had predicted, the action of South Carolina proved all that was needed to give the advantage to the resist- ance men in six of the other states which soon followed the example set by the palmetto state. In each of these states, vol. vin, Nos. 1-2 That Aggressive Slavocracy 79 once the decision was made, the union men declared that they would abide by it and act accordingly. For a few weeks, while "the confederate states of America" were being organized at Montgomery, while the constitution was being framed and officers were being selected, there was really for the first time unity of purpose and action. But this period proved all too brief for the sake of the cause which was destined in a few years to become "the lost cause." Within a short time after the new government was launched there came disagreements, both per- sonal and on policy; these ripened into bitter personal and factional feuds, and all too soon the body politic which should have been a perfect unit, in order to have any hope of success, was torn and distracted by bickerings and jealousies and honest disagreements on fundamental issues of policy. 84 Chauncey S. Boucher University of Texas Austin s* Letters by Toombs, Stephens, Cobb, Joseph E. Brown, and others, 1859-1860, in Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb; Alexander H. Stephens to Robert Collins and others, May 9, 1860, in Stephens, Constitutional view of the war between the states (Philadelphia, 1870), 2:677-684. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 011 898 972 \ LIBRARY OF CONGRES! 011 898 972 7 A LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 011 898 972 7 % P H8.5