T] SI ;;!!;;■;■' D 511 .F75 Copy 1 \ ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY SINCE 1878. BY HENRY D. FUNK, Professor of History, Macalester College, Saint Paul, Minnesota. Copies of this pamphlet may be procured of the publisher at the following prices : Single copies ... $ 0.05 10 copies . . . 0.25 100 copies ... 1.50 1000 copies . 10.00 Any profits derived from the sale of this pamphlet will be used for the purposes of the Red Cross. THE FRANKLIN PRESS, 323 Cedar Street. Saint Paul, Minnesota. D. Of D. ilAY i^^ 19 S y When the Great War now raging in Europe began early last August the majority of Americans believed Germany had precipitated this conflict. The popular explanation was Germany had built up its giant war machine to satisfy the lust of conquest of its war-lord, as Emperor William is commonly called. Having derived most of his information on current historj^ up to that time from American and English sources the author naturally laid most of the blame for the war upon Germany's war party and the Kaiser. A little reflection on the bitter anti-German tone of the British press for many years past, and a consideration of European diplomacy since the overthrow of Napoleon, however, raised serious doubts concerning the correctness and justice of such an opinion. A closer investigation concerning the main facts of European diplomacy since 1878, and examination of the official documents of the several countries bearing on the present war, have convinced the speaker that his first conclusions were too hastily reached and not based on facts. The result of his search for the truth relative to the causes of this terrible war are hereby frankly submitted. In the main the conclusions are based on the course of European diplomacy since 1878, but in several instances reference will be made to events of an earlier date in so far as they have bearing on the sub- ject under discussion. Before examining the diplomacy of this period, it is proper to acquaint ourselves with the national aims of the coun- tries involved in the present conflict, since national aspirations deter- mine the policies they pursue. GERMANY. Two impulses have dominated the policy of the German Empire since its foundation in the Franco-German war : the Will to realize a strong national unity, and the Will to Live. When the imperial crown was placed on the brow of William I a- thrill of joy went through all the German peoples as they realized that the dream of their poets and seers had at last been fulfilled. Barbarossa had come forth out of his subterranean castle, the ravens of discord had vanished, and a united Germany had become a fact. No longer should it be their mission to be the fertilizers of foreign nations, strengthening other races by their blood and ideals and skill, but a great and an ever greater Fatherland would they establish. Their scientific method applied to business produced marvelous economic development. Germany became commercially one of the foremost nations of the earth. In scholarly activities she continued her honorable leadership in the civilized world. But her growth in industries, colonial possessions, and in population — gaining 25,000,000 since the war with France while her Gallic neighbor added only 2,000,- 000, and Great Britain's gain was about nine per cent.^ — these evidences of prosperity aroused the green-eyed yellow monster in her rivals. And when the Emperor announced that "Germany's future lies on the water" the so-called mistress of the sea saw in this a challenge to her supremacy and denied tlie lijrht of the Kaiser to sueli aspiration; Great Britain already eonunitted to an anti-(jerman propaganda now entered into a league with oilier nations to stop German ascendency. GREAT BRITAIN. The world gratefully acknowledges England's grand work in modeling constitutional government and owes her a debt for many benevolent influences. But England's foreign policy has been far from purely altruistic. Hir Robert Peel, 1788-1850, twice Prime Minister of Great Britain, best expressed the dominant policy of his country in these words: "The empire is the fruit of a long, deliberate, persistent and conscious effort on the part of our statesmen to avert the pre- dominance of any Euroj)ean power." In pursuance of this object Britannia successively brought about the overthrow of the political supremacy of Spain and France, and of the commercial supremacy of Holland. Her method was that of bringing about coalitions and alliances as the occasion required and to direct these against her rivals, seeing to it that in every instance when peace was made she gained the lion's share of the prey. In passing it should be noted that during the conflict with France in the Seven Years' War England relied on Prussia to do the fighting for her in Europe while she attacked France in her colonial possessions. William Pitt was accustomed to say that Prussia won England's war in Europe, and the British public generally hailed Frederick the Great as the Protestant hero. During the Napoleonic wars Great Britain subsidized many of the small Ger- man states, Baden, Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse, as also Prussia and Austria, and Holland and Russia. She broke the treaty of Amiens in 1803 because "peace appeared only to offer an opportunity to Napoleon to develop French commerce at their expense."* In 1854-55, in consequence of this policy to maintain her supremacy, Great Britain allied with France and Piedmont prevented Russia from fulfilling the prayer of Gladstone that the unspeakable Turk be kicked out of Europe with bag and baggage — because she could not permit Russia to gain a commercial advantage by obtaining control of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. Commercial self-interest prompted her to thwart Russia a second time in the attempt to oust the Sultan from Europe and to obtain control of the Porte in bringing together a coalition of jiowers which forced Russia to give up the treaty of San Stefano and submit to the terms dictated by Lord Beaconsfield at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. By that treaty Russia was obliged to surrender the control she had long sought over the Balkan states. Thessaly and the Epirus were handed over to Greece, Bulgaria was made autono- mous but tributary to Turkey, Rumania and Servia independent, Bosnia and Herzegovina Austria was invited to occupy and administer, England received Cyprus and guaranteed the integrity of the Sultan's possessions in Asia ]Minor. From 1878 to 1907 Great Britain consistently pursued an anti- Russian policy in order to preserve a balance of power in Europe favorable to herself. * Robinson & Beard— Outlines of Kiii-opcfiii History, Vol. TI. p. 200. FRANCE. France has never ceased to long for the glory it had in the days of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte. The wretched miscarriage of the attempt by Louis Napoleon to eclipse his great namesake Em- peror has only intensified its ambition and deepened French hatred for Germany. The demand for revenge for "the lost provinces" care- fully kept alive by the war party has been nursed with diligence and zeal by her allies. France acting as the banker for Russia has been guided by this motive : to use Russia to defeat (lermany. Colonel Arthur Boucher voiced the national hope in 1911 in his book : "France victorious in the next war," in Avhich he shows Germany can be de^ feated if attacked by Russia on one side and by France on the other. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. The problem of this comglommerate empire has been to prevent dissolution on the one side and to keep Russia from establishing her- self in the Balkan states. No other European state has had such a vexing and perj)lexing task to settle as has tested the ingenuity of her statesmen. Russia has menaced the Dual-empire since its creation, and the struggle between these two countries is one of the importaiit factors bringing about the present war. RUSSIA. The arch-disturber in Europe has been "the bear that walks like a man." Despite all the crudity of its civilization this Slavic-Mongolian people has consistently pursued a grand policy expressed in the wi'l of Peter the Great, Czar in 1689-1725. The national objective set forth in that document, whether it be the will of Peter or not, Russia has striven to realize, as history plainly discloses. Of this remarkable document clauses 9, 10 and 11 deserve special attention and are her* reproduced : "9. Russia must incessantly extend herself toward tlie north, along the Baltic Sea, and toward the south along the Black Sea. Our kingdom must advance as far as possible toward Constantinople and the East Indies. Whoever shall reign there shall be true master of the world. Therefore we must excite continual wars, sometimes with Turkey, sometimes with Persia; create dockyards on the Black Sea; take possession, a little by little, of that sea, as well as of the Baltic, which is a point doubly necessary for the success of the project ; we must hasten the downfall of Persia ; penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf; re-establish, if possible, the ancient commerce of the Levant, through Syria, and advance as far as the Indies, which is the Emporium of the world. When once there we can do without the cold of Eng- laiul." "10. Russia must carefully seek and keep up the alliance with Austria ; apparently second her design for future dominance over Germany; and we must excite underhand her jealousy of the Princes. We must excite each and all of these who seek succor from Russia, and exercise .a sort of protection over the country, which may prepare our future domination. " "11. We must interest the House of Austria in the expulsion of tlie Turk from Europe, and neutralize her jealousy after the conquest of Constantinople, either by excitinu' a war between her and the old states of Europe, or by giving up to her part of the conquest, to retake it from her afterward." Ballard, in New York Sun. That big plan in part has been realized. Already Kussia has reached the Pacific, she is pressing into Afghanistan, Thibet, Persia, ]\roneolia and China. And in the Northwest she has annexed Finland. Russia refuses to be checked in her advance. In 1901 the St. Petersburg Bourse Gazette, an official organ, de- clared: "Russian diplomacy has put an end once for all to the idle talk about dividing Persia into a northern sphere of influence belong- ing to Russia and a southern sphere belonging to England. There can be no division of spheres of influence in Persia, which together with the waters which bathe its shores, must remain the object of Russian material and moral protection." In the spring of this year Professor Delbrueck of Berlin asked one of his former Russian students. noAV a teacher of history in Russia, why the Russian government and people were so bitterly anti-German. The answer frankly and honestly given was: that Russia had become convinced that the way from St. Petersburg to Constantinople must be via Berlin. "Recent revelations of how the war (in the Balkans) came about show that the plans that led up to it were formulated in 1908, when Russia entered into secret treaty with Servia. directed in the first instance against Austria. The exposure began through the publication of recriminations among the Bulgarian public men who Avere involved in the catastrophe to Bulgarian arms and Bulgarian diplomacy when the treaty of Bucharest was signed." R. of Rs. April, 1914, p. 487. The Russian Den for December, 1913. charged that Russian diplo- macy in admitting the insertion in the treaty of alliance of articles directed against Austria-IIuns:ary has assumed the responsibility for all the military armaments ]n'Ovoked in Europe by that alliance. The fact of the alliance of a million bayonets in the Balkans would not have caused the increase of the German military forces if the rumor had not got about in diplomatic circles that that alliance had an anti- Austrian tendency. The London Outlook, for January, 1914, declared : "The second Balkan war was the work of Russia. Russia has been planning to get a Slav on the Bulgarian throne. . . . The Czar is afraid of Bulgarian enlightenment." ". . . On ]\rarch 12th, in addition to the extremely large regu- lar appropriation of $250,000,000 for the army, extraordinary military estimates of $60,000,000. an increase of thirty per cent, over 191.3, were submitted to the Duma : in addition to this, a loan of $400,000,000 was secured from the French government "to build strategic railways designed to facilitate the concentration of troops on the European and Caucasus frontiers. According to the Paris Journal des Debats this money was lent by France on the express condition that Russia ' ' should render fuller service to the alliance and should take up a firmer atti- tude toward Germany." This same periodical tells us about the second Balkan war the following : "Austria was working hard to preserve peace in Rumania and keep King Charles quiet — who was forced into war by the Russian Czar. Emperor William failed to support Francis Joseph because he told the statesmen at Vienna he could not involve Germany in a war with Russia." EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY AFTER 1878. The check to Russian aspirations by the treaty of Berlin provoked grim anger of the Bear, tlis growls frightened Anstria-Hungary, who looked to Germany for protection and accepted the plan for an alliance proposed by Bismarck in 1879. This agreement guaranteed the peace of Europe which now entered into a scramble for colonial possessions in Africa. THE PARTITION OF AFRICA. The overthrow of Napoleon in 1815 placed Great Britain in a position of overwhelming supremacy as a commercial and colonial power. Her statesmen assumed it was their "manifest destiny" to control the seas and to determine who should occupy unclaimed lands in the dark continent. When France undertook an expedition to Algiers iii 1830 Britain resorted to every possible means except war to prevent her rival from securing a foothold in Algiers, yielding at last because she believed France would fail in the colonizing venture. In the war between France and Morocco in 1844 this calm assurance was distui'bed, and Great Britain prevented France from obtaining fresh territory by conquest in Morocco, and when this state was plunged into war with Spain in 1860 British diplomacy secured the co-operation of France to avert any territory from falling into the Spanish hands. The unification of Italy begat in that Power the dream of a world empire. Looking across the Mediterranean she longed to assert her control over historic Carthage and planned the occupation of Tunis. But France blocked that move and sent her troops into this state in 1881. This disappointment of Italy was one of the chief reasons for her entrance into the Triple Alliance in 1883. This alliance has been renewed from time to time, in 1887, 1902, 1907 and again in January, 1914. From 1883 Italy turned her eyes toward Tripoli, the next best thing attainable.* France asserting her "protectorate" over Tunis in 1881, Britain announced her "occupation" of Egypt in 1882 and the same year crushed the revolt of the natives. Because the Khedive had plunged Egypt into enormous debt to France as well as to herself Great Britain consented to a sort of dual control with France from 1879-1883, but CooUdge, American Hist. Review, Vol. 17:23. after that she made herself the "compulsory adviser" of Egypt, ignoring- French claims. Although she has not yet annexed that country she is the ruler in fact, if not in law, there. The explorations of Livingston, 1840-1873, and of Stanley, 1873- 1884, enlarged the knowledge of the world about darkest Africa. Leopold II of Belgium bore most of the expenses for the explora- tions of Stanley from 1879-1884 in the Congo region and consequently claimed that territory for Belgium despite protests from Portugal and Great Britain. Europe recognized his rights there and the Congo Free State became a Belgian colony. England found it hard to forgive Leopold for his success, and when the Belgian capitalists abused the natives by exacting hard labor in building railroads and draining swamps and requiring a certain quantity of rubber each year "the British government took care to report the conduct of the Belgian officials to the world, and it aroused loud protests in, Europe and America ; but those Avho know most aliout African conditions suspect that the English had a selfish interest in exaggerating the horrors of the situation, with the hope of ultimately extending tlieir own con- trol over the Congo regions."* Germany also entered on colonial ventures in this era. In 1879 Bismarck adopted a vigorous industrial and colonial policy to stop German emigration and find a market for German manufacturing products. By making treaties with African chiefs in 1884 Germany acquired four considerable areas amounting to about one million square miles in East and West Africa: Togoland, Kamerun, German South- west Africa and German East Africa. Germany also obtained a part of New Guinea, the Samoan islands, and by purchase from Spain the Caroline and Ladrone islands. This policy brought Germany into conflict with Great Britain, Avhose monopoly in commercial and colonial enterprises were now challenged. Emperor William's telegram to Paul Krueger in 1895 con- gratulating the Boers upon frustrating Dr. Jameson's raid from Rhodesia into the Transvaal, with the purpose of overthrowing the Boer government and annexing the diamond fields to England, aroused the bitterest feelings in England against the Kaiser. Great Britain had leaned in a friendly Avay toward the Triple Alliance until Germany became a strenuous competitor. An article in the Review of Reviews for April, 1898, by Sidney Whitman, Fellow of the Royal Geographic Society, helps us to understand the reasons for the estrangement between these kindred peoples: "With regard to the English, the sooner they drop the contemptuous railing at 'things made in Germany,' the sooner they banish the fantastical proj- ect — more currently harbored than is generally believed or acknowl- edged — of sinking Germany's fleet, bombarding German towns, and ruining Germany's commerce, the better for all parties, themselves included. In competing with England Germany is only fulfilling her national destiny. . . . Germany in many practical matters is al- ready ahead, has already left England in the rear." . . . "There mav be war, there has ever been war — there will alwavs be war. In Robinson & Beard, Outlines of European History- 11, 49C.. this case it is also war — the subtlest if not the most cruel — economic war. And victory will be to the most disciplined, the most intelligent, the most thrifty — shall I add. the most virtuous — the fittest."* Soon after the keen observation just quoted was made the South African war broke out — October, 1899. The issues of that confliet it is not necessarj^ to discuss here. Suffice it to state that while the Boer delegates received a rousing welcome in Paris and at The Hague the Kaiser refused to grant them audience and opposed the attack of the German press against Great Britain by pursuing a pro-British policy. Indeed he even offered suggestions to his grandmother, Victoria, rela- tive to the kind of military campaign that would ensure victory for her armies. After this war Emperor William endeavored faithfully and sincerely to maintain cordial relations with Great Britain, but a certain element in that country persisted in a campaign of slander and misrepresentation. Says Robinson: "English manufacturers and merchants have begun to chafe under the competition of Germans, and belligerent English publicists insist that the German navy is not only a menace to British supremacy on the high seas, but is constructed with ulterior designs on Great Britain, "t Toward the close of the nineteenth century Great Britain's supremacy Avas threatened in several quarters. When France, which still had interests in Egypt, raised her flag at Fashoda she almost pre- cipitated a war in 1898 and averted it only by ordering Marchand to lower the colors in the region he had explored on the Nile. When Germany demanded compensation for the murder of two missionaries in China and then compelled the lease of Kiao Chau for ninety-nine years, thus obtaining the best harbor on the Asiatic coast of China. England saw her commercial interests threatened there, and then to even up matters established her "protectorate" over Wei-hei-wei in the same year, while Russia took Port Arthur. ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN. By this time the competition with Germany had become so serious that Great Britain in her isolation after the Boer war felt the need of an allv, and that she found in Japan. In 1891 Russia began her Trans- Siberian railroad. In 1894 war between China and Japan broke out about the question of suzerainty over Korea claimed by both coun- tries. "Japan had an interest in extending her claims, as she desired larger markets for her products. Friction was frequent between the two countries concerning their rights in Korea, as a consequence of which Japan began a war in which, with her modern army, she was easily victorious over her giant neighbor. The Japanese drove the Chinese out of Korea, defeated their navy in the battle of the Yalu. invaded IManchuria, where they seized the fortress of Port Arthur, the strongest position in eastern Asia, occupied the Liao-tung peninsula on which that fortress was located, and prepared to advance toward Peking. , , , But in the hour of her triumph Japan was thwarted ' Tlu» Anierifiin Review of Reviews, April, iSPS, p. 45;i. f- Outlines of European History, II, 531. 10 I)y a European intervention, and deprived of the fruits of her victory. i\ussia induced France and Germany to join her in forcing them (tiie Japanese) to give up the most important rewards of their vic- tory. . . . These powers were determined that Japan shoukl not have Port Arthur, should not have any foot-hold on the continent of Asia."* Nippon surrendered to the demands of the three powers. While she was nursing her grievances and preparing for a war with Russia by increasing her army and navy Great Britain approached her with the offer of an alliance. The common enemies of these two countries were Russia. France and Germany; they quickly under.stood each other and in lf)02 the alliance was formed. THE ALLIANX'E BETWEEN GRExVT BRITAIN AND FRANCE. Encouraged by Great Britain Japan assumed a firmer attitude toward Russia. The Czar had promised to withdraw from Manchuria when order was restored, but despite this he kept on increasing his military preparations long after quiet and order had been established. Japan demanded of Russia the date when her troops would be with- drawn from Manchuria, and negotiated about this question from August, 1903, to February, 1904. Then because Japan believed "Rus- sia Avas merely trying to gain time to tighten her grip on Manchuria by elaborate and intentional delay and evasion, and to prolong the discussion until she had sufficient troops in the province to be able to throw aside the mask, suddenly broke off diplomatic relations and com- menced hostilities, "t The miserable showing of Russia in the early stages of the war gave great concern to France, which had been in alliance with Russia since 1891. The balance of poAv.er in Europe Avas upset by this war. Great Britain's position and that of Germany was much stronger, but that of the Czar much weaker. In view of these facts Delcasse realized France could not support two strong hatreds, one against Germany, the other against Great Britain. His country believed it needed a strong ally against Germany and though that government made friend- ly approaches the sentiment of the French people was voiced by the Temps in these words: "We can with dignity live on correct terms with Germany, but the past forbids us from going further. England throughout her history always felt the necessity of a con- tinental alliance and continental support. The French army and the British navy will be mutually advantageous." Thereupon the alliance was formed on the understanding that France should have a free hand in ]\Iorocco in return for which she would yield to British supremacy in Egypt. This .agreement was signed April 8, 1904. As the Russo-Japanese war progressed the Anglo-French entente began to carry into operation the terms of the alliance. The process of dis- memberment in the Turkish empire had been going on since 1815, nevertheless both Egypt and iMorocco were nominally under the rule of the Sultan. In 1905 the Kaiser visited the Sultan at Tangiers and Hazen, Kurope Since 1815,695. Ibid, 7 1. 11 declared that he Avoiild enforce the sovereignity of the Snltan and the integrity of IMorocco. This intrusion of the Kaiser disturbed the equanimity of the two powers that had assumed the right to dispose of Morocco in accordance with their interests by a process they called "peaceful penetration." Forgetting how Great Britain had intervened for Turkey in 1833, 1854, and 1878, her political and religious journals poured forth a tirade of abuse against Germany for championing the cause of the wicked Mohammedans. But the Kaiser stood his ground and in the Algeciras conference, signed April 7, 1906, secured the open- door policy for ^Morocco. AVhile this diplomatic encounter was a triumph for Germany, its eft'ect was to draw France and Great Britain closer together and to intensify their hatred against their chief rival. (See Algeciras Conference in last issue of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.) THE TRIPLE ENTENTE. The problem of France and England now was how to check Ger- many. This young empire was everywhere in the way. It had prevented Great Britain from obtaining the Congo region and it had maintained the integrity of Morocco. German trade was increasing enormously from year to year, markets formerly altogether under British control fell into Germa}! hands, and the Kaiser's population increased at the rate of about 8,000,000 each decade. British and French statesmen conferred and produced a plan : EdAvard VII, on the throne since 1901, might undertake a visit to the Czar bearing the good wishes of the French cabinet, etc. Perhaps an understanding would be reached. The journey was successful; a "gentlemen's agreement" was made in 1907, and the Entente Cordiale proclaimed to the world. Its object, these nations declared, was: (1) to maintain the balance of power: (2) to strengthen treaty laws in the interest of peace and the status quo; and (3) disarmament. But in each of these particulars the Entente has belied its principles. It upset the balance of power, it did not work for peace or the status quo, and did not secure dis- armament. On the contrary it precipitated an increase of armaments at an amazing rate, the Balkan disturbances became more serious at once, and treaties became "scraps of paper." SOLEMN PLEDGES BROKEN BY ENGLAND AND RUSSIA. The first result of the "gentlemen's agreement" between/Great Britain and Russia, or Edward VII and the Czar, was the disp^i^r-A--^ they made of Persia. That country was divided into a northern sphere of influence for Russia and a southern sphere of influence for Great Britain. To this end the two powers signed a convention August 31, 1907, in which they pledged themselves mutually "to respect the integrity and independence of Persia." Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British minister in Teheran, writing to the IMinister of Foreign Aiifairs for Persia September 4 of the same year, assured him as follows : "The object of the two Powers in making this agreement 1° not in 'y2 any way to attack, but rather. to assure forever the independence of Persia." And Sir Edward Grey, reporting- this convention to the House of Commons February 17, 1908, said: "I have used the term 'British and Russian spheres.' I trust that it will be noted and understood that I have used it solely in the sense in Avhich it is used in this agreement, and not in the sense of the political partition of Persia. Under the Agreement we bind ourselves not to seek certain concessions of a cer- tain kind in certain spheres. But these are only British and Russian spheres in a sense which is in no way derogatory to the independence and sovereignity of Persia." One passage of this treaty is especially significant in the light of subsequent history. "This Agreement be- tween the two Powers which have the greatest interests in Persia, based as it is on a guarantee of her independence and integrity, can only serve to further and promote Persian interests, for henceforth Persia aided and- assisted by these tAVO poAverful neighboring states, can employ all her poAvers in internal reforms."* Believing in the sincerity of these repeated asserA^erations Persia began to set her house in order. She asked President Taft to recom- mend trustAvorthy Americans to assist in this matter, recognizing the good Avork American statesmanship had rendered in reforming China. The President complied Avith this request and forAvarded the names of several honorable Americans. Among these Avas Morgan Shuster to Avhom Avas assigned the difficult task of reorganizing the financial system of Persia. He secured as assistant a IMajor Stokes, a former officer of the British-Indian army. Then St. Petersburg began to bluster about his ai)pointment and Sir EdAvard Grey, AAdio had pre- viously given his consent, nOAv afraid of displeasing Britain's good friend, Russia, ordered Stokes to resign because the reorganization of Persia "Avas in conflict AAath the spirit of the convention of 1907." Having secured the removal of Stokes Russia next demanded the dis- missal of Shuster. When the Persians refused this a violent encounter ensued in Avhicli Persia Avas overcome. A number of executions fol- loAved, Shuster Avas sent out of the country, and an indemnity imposed on the sub.jected Persians. t The reform party under the paAvs of the groAA'ling bear has given up its aspirations for a modern strong and independent Persia. IMeanAvhile the "nortliAvestern province of Persia has become virtually a Russian annex and the Russian Consul. General Orloff, (in April, 1914) sent there from Bagdad, Avas received at Tabriz Avith as much ceremony as if he Avere a vaceroy. The princes, nobility, and 15,000 people assembled on the shore of the river Aji to give him .rv^^eo^ne and rugs Avere laid for Mr. Orlotf to Avalk upon from his carriage to the gala tents, an honor hitherto reserved to the Shah alone. t Informed and honest Englishmen have blushed and remonstrated Avith the Foreign Office for its bafflinu- conduct in Persia. The London • The Living Age, Vol. 275, page 111. + Hearst's Magazine, April, 1912, Sinister, Cossaclc Rule in Persi-a. 1 The Independent, May 11, 1914, p, 243, 13 Econoiiiist boldly charged that "Edward Grey's policy has for its end the destruction of Persia . . . and that by peaceful penetration Persia will soon be a geographical exi)ression." Concluding this jour- nal says: "A treaty is a treaty, to the East of Suez as well as to the West. Sir Edward Grey has landed the country into grave moral and political difficulties, from which he can only extricate us by ridding his office of an excessive fear of Russia and an excessive mistrust of Germany. ' '* What has puzzled Englishmen about the alliance of their country with Russia has seemed less mysterious to observers in other nations. The New York Outlook expressed this opinion with remark- able clearness, as subsequent events have proved, in its Foreign News editorial January 6, 1912, in these words: "If Great Britain is to rely for the maintenance of her position in Europe, not upon the potentiality of her armed strength, but upon her friendship among nations in Europe, the British i)eop]e must be ready to pay the price of those friendships, even if the price involves a loss of national self-respect. In plain words, if Great Britain is to reckon the friendship of Russia among the essential elements of her defense against Germany, she can not be too critical of her ally's activities in other directions. Only when her naval strength is sufficient so that she is indifferent to any threat from Germany will England be safe in running the risk of sacrificing the friendship of Russia in the cause of justice to a weak people." Great Britain has declared that she is in this European war to vindicate her honor as a signatory to the treaty of London of 1831 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. In announcing this as her motive she takes a high moral ground, and offers as a reason for going to war a principle that must appeal to her own citizens and to the whole world. Unfortunately the proclamations of statesmen can not always be taken at their face value. If we are to estimate this explana- tion at its true worth we must know how in the past the British govern- ment observed her treaties. To do this it is proper that the -searchlight of historj' be cast on her still further. We need not tarry to consider that she violated the treaty of 1783 with the United States, nor how she persisted in kiterfering with the fur trade in the Northwest territory and retained the forts she promised to evacuate by the Jay treaty of 1794. or how she impressed American seamen until the war of 1812. Nor is it necessary to give much space to an account of the Oregon dispute and the violation of American neutrality in the Civil war — suffice it to show how Great Britain has regarded her treaty obligations since 1907, under the direction of the present Foreign OfP^^e Secretary. The Persian affair we have disposed of. In the Baltic s!o-a, off the coast of Finland, are the Aland Islands. In 1856 a treaty was signed by Russia, France and Great Britain together with other Powers, providing that the Aland Islands shall not be fortified and no naval force be established there. But in 1908 the Russian Duma appropriated a large sum of money to fortify this island. Sweden at once protested to the government at St. Petersburg, and when Russia in her charac- * Living Age, Vol. '21^, p. Ml. 14 teiistlc way ignored Sweden tliis country made representations to Great Britain and France, the two allies of Russia. Both ignored Sweden's appeal. And yet how different had been the British attitude in 1829? Sweden ceded Finland and the Aland Islands to Russia in 1809. Twenty years later when Russia undertook to fortify the island. Great Britain at once objected, and a few years later the British tieet destroj^ed the fort. After Edward VII had come to an understanding- with the Czar England allows Russia to keep a fort on the same island despite the fact that she had signed a treaty forbidding the erection of fortifications there. Again let us note that the Algecira Conference recognized only "spheres of influence and economic interests" in IMorocco. But by means of "peaceful penetration" France extended her control over districts in Morocco until she finally secured a military occupation of Fez. When German economic interests suffered in consequence of the revolt that followed the Kaiser announced that if Great Britain and France persisted in ignoring the provisions of their agreement of 1906 Germany would be obliged to do so too and seize territory in ^Morocco. This threat brought the members of the Anglo-French entente to time. After many diplomatic encounters these two Powers succeeded in persuading Germany to give up this demand by yielding to her a vast amount of territory of doubtful value on the Congo. THE ATTITUDE OF GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE MOROCCO APFAIR. British opinion was not altogether satisfied with this arrangement with Germany. The Contemporary Review complained: "France is dangerously peace-smitten. She is eager for peace at almost any price. She looks at the alternative through the eyes of the late M. Rouvie'r or of M. Clemenceau, which magnify the risks of war a hundredfold and the evils of Avar a thousand fold. "When the Bosnian crisis was nearing its turning point and France had to consider her position earnestly, M. Clemenceau summed it all up in a few epigrammatic sentences, which dealt with both possible issues of war, and found a bottomless abyss at the end of each. . . . Come what may France must avert war." This ultra-pacific attitude the editor of the Contemporary Review deplored because it was "certain to embolden Germany to make greater demands from France," and he concludes by insisting, there should be no conversations between France and Germany from which Great Britain will be excluded. "Germany's present scheme -: — . is to discuss the matter thoroughly with France, not merely frankly or amicably, but quite fraternally, and form an alliance with France. ... In virtue of this alliance Germany would guarantee to France her present possessions, hold out a promise of others, and then authoritatively cry halt to the advance of Anglo-Saxondora. Germany's aim to fraternize with England and France is in the hope of stepping into their colonial shoes. . . . The friendlier we are with Germany the greater will be her demands on our altruism.''* Contem. Rcvit-w, Vol. 100, p 2,5(5 ff. 15 Another writer admits the anti-German policy of the Foreign Office thus: "We kept Germany out of Asia Minor and out of Morocco. Indirectly through the rise of Japan, we checked her ambition in China. ... On the whole then we have succeeded in our game, . . . But we hav-e not succeeded in maintaining the integrity of Persia by our resistance to the Bagdad railway. "We have had to give the game into Russia's hands to secure her doubtful assistance against Germany. . . . The action of France in Morocco was a clear breach of the Algecira Agreement, and Great Britain had recently treated with almost pedantic rigor the setting aside by Austria of that far more obsolete document the Treaty of Berlin. Surely the more natural and dignified part would have been to come forward as an intermediary — to have told Germany that we desired nothing but justice and the maintenance of agreements, and that we would as a friend plead with France for a prompt recognition of compensation claims. Simultaneously the Foreign Office Secretary should have informed the French government that we would support her against any attempt to take advantage of her military action in Morocco, but that we thought Germany had a case which merited prompt attention and a just settlement. The settlement came, but it was no thanks to Sir Edward Grey that war did not come first. "^ Another article from the pen of E. D. Morel throws additional light on the Morocco diplomacy. France again and again denied with the most solemn asseverations that it entertained any notion of infringing the integrity of Morocco. Yet France had violated this agreement. "It was surely infantile to imagine that Germany was any more likely in 1911 than she was in 1904-05 to agree to France securing ]\Iorocco without positive guarantee as to the open door, and without paying her bill of compensation even as France had found it necessary to pay the British', Spanish and Italian bills. . . . France had occupied Fez contrary to the articles of the Algecira conference. . . . And in the face of this, British diplomacy has persistently accused the German government of having re-opened the Morocco ques- tion in sending a gunboat to Agadir. An astounding story, in truth ! When will the bandages fall from the eyes of the British public, one wonders ! What millions already spent in war preparations, what mil- lions yet to be expended would not have been saved the peoples of Britain, France and Germany if British diplomacy had been conscious of its power and its responsibilities, and above all its opportunities I"^ "The indiscretions of 1905 in regard to plans for seizing the Kiel Canal and the landing of 100,000 British troops in Schleswig-Holstein were followed by the cry for more ships. So the indiscretions of 1911 as to the mobilization of the British fleet and the landing of 150,000 British troops in Belgium have had the same results. The Germans feel themselves menaced." In defence of the Foreign Office Philippe Millet ventured this assertion: "By expressing, at the most critical moment England's will, not only to stand by France, but before all to defend British 1 Nineteenth Century, Vol. 71, 227-8. 2Ibid, Vol. 71,233-251. 16 interests in Morocco, Sir Edward Grey has certainly done more to streno'then the peace of Europe than if he had listened to the peace- crank-open-air preachers Avho are trying to ruin England for the bene- fit of humanity ... in the name of democratic principles.""' The instances cited show that twice the British Foreign Office consented to the violation of treaties by Russia and once by France. In view of these facts what value shall we attach to the statement Great Britain had entered this war to preserve the sanctity of inter- national treaties? That the Balkan war was precipitated through the intrigues of Russia is so generally accepted by all writers whether British, German. French or American that it is not necessary to devote time to it here. The outcome of the second Balkan war, however, was such that Servia 's territory was almost doubled. In consequence of this Europe was pre- pared to see an end to the old order of things at almost any moment. Since Octol)er, 1908, the Balkan region had been in a ferment. On October 3rd of that year Francis Joseph announced his decision to incorporate Bosnia and Herzegovina within his empire. Two days later Bulgaria proclaimed its complete independence of Turkey and declared itself a kingdom. On the 7th Crete repudiated all connection with Turkey and declared for union with Greece. The events of 1908 to 1913 upset the balance of power in Europe, but not in favor of the Triple Alliance. In March, 1909, Servia had pledged herself to the PoAve'rs "to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria- Hungary and to live in the future on good neighborly terms with the latter " But she did not keep her promise. Anti-Austrian agitations among her subjects culminated in the assassination of Franz Ferdi- nand. June 28th, 1914. After that fatal date Servia did nothing what- ever to express regret for, or undertake an investigation of. the con- spiracy which had caused the murder. Then on the 23rd of July the Austro-Hungarian government addressed a formidable note to Servia and in ten days Europe w^as plunged into a big war. Now as to that note. Sir M. Bunsen charges that Germany knew its contents before it was issued, but he furnishes no proof for this con- tention, W'hile Germany denies that it had previous knowledge thereof. The most that can be said is that Austria informed Germany it could look no "longer at the operations on the other side of the border with- out taking action" and that Germany assured Austria she would sup- port her in "any action she might consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in Servia against the existence of the Austra-Hungarian monarchy." Diplomatic negotiations among the Powers began at once with the avoAved purpose of averting a general European war. Sir Edward Grey was very active in this work, but his record during the twenty-seven years he had been con- nected with the Foreign Office now proved a great handicap to him. He had been so consistently and so bitterly anti-German the represen- tatives of Germany and Austria had no confidence in his honesty. How could they when they remembered his policies with regard to Persia, the Aland Islands, Morocco, etc. 3 Ibid, Vol.71, 1058. 17 He declared the time-limit of the Austrian ultimatum too short, and yet he admitted that a time limit had to l)e fixed to prevent the affair irom being- dragged out indefinitely. Again, from the very first he assured Russia and France, by impli- cation at least, so that these two countries understood. Great Britain could be' counted on to help them in case war would come, and on the other hand he made it clear to Germany that it need not depend on Great Britain remaining neutral. But striking, indeed, is the confession he makes in document No. 101 of the British White Papei^: "And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France. Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and. Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly im- proved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject for definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochment between the Powers than has been possible hitherto." What the paragraph shows is this : When he had made a friendly advance Germany had recip- rocated and the thing to do was to discontinue his anti-German policy. In document No. 90 he says: "There must, of course, be some humiliation of Servia, but Austria might press things so far as to involve the humiliation of Russia." And in No. 17 he declared: "If they (Austria) could make war on Servia and at the same time pacify Russia, well and good, but if not, the consequences would be incal- culable." Now here is the key to the situation. Sir Edward Grey in this case as in much of his diplomacy since 1907 is too considerate of Russia. As he did not restrain Russia in Persia and on the Aland Islands, so he failed here, he yielded to St. Petersburg. This is especially apparent from the negotiations concerning Russian mobilization. As early as July 25 Sir Edward Grey knew that if Russia were assured of the support of France she would face all the risks of war. That help was promised at once and on the same day Russia decided to mobilize, according to documents 17 and Annex 23A in the Official Documents published by the International Conciliation. And this was three days before Austria declared war against Servia! Sir Edward Grey must have known that the mobilization of Russia would precipi- tate the war, especially if it mobilized against Germany. In docu-. ment 43 he was informed that if Russia mobilized against Germany, i. e. in the north, Germany would mobilize, too. The same day the British Ambassador informed the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs he "trusted that the Russian Government would defer the mobilization ukase for as long as possible and that troops would not be alloAved to cross tbe frontier even when it was issued." No. 44. 18 Sir Edward Grey knew, too, that Russia under no consideration would agree to localize the war, Xo. 56, July 27. On the 28th and 29th Russian mobilization was in full swing. Nos. 71 and 78. The Powers, except Russia, believed Servia should be chastised. Austria insisted that this be done by a "punitive occupation of Servian terri- tory." Austria guaranteed she would not destroy the "sovereignty," the "independence," and the "integrity" of Servia. On the 30th of July Sazanof submitted the following formula as a basis of mediation : "If Austria, recognizing that her conflict Avith Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate principle of sover- eigntv of Servia, Russia engages to stop all militarv preparations." No. 97. On July 31 Grey wired Gosclien favorably about Austria getting full satisfaction of her demands on Servia "provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her will- ingness to respect them. - Russia might be informed by the four Powers that the,y would undertake to prevent Austrian demands going the length of impairing Servian sovereigntj^ and integrity." No. 111. Then Sir Edward Grey declared: "If Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France Avould be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his ^lajesty's Government would have nothing to do with the consequences ; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." ^Meanwhile the whole Russian army and fleet were being mobilized, and the British began to express fear "that Germany would mobilize," July 31, No. 118. At the same time the White Papers admit Germany did influence Austria to work for peace. No. 121. and Austria was ready to co-operate. The way to preserve peace was to stop mobilizing. But Avhen Buchanan pressed this matter on Sazanof, he ansAvered : "It Avas, however, of course impossible, for reasons explained, to stop a mobili- zation Avhieh Avas already in progress. No. 120. Russia's game Avas to temporize still more. On August 1 she offered a ncAv formula as a basis for discussion betAveen Austria and herself, in accordance Avith the English proposal: "If Austria con- sents to stay the march of her troops on Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great PoAvers may examine the satisfaction Avhich Servia can accord to the Austro- Hungarian GoA^ernment Avithout injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes her Avaiting attitude, No. 132. Austria accepted the formula, and Sir EdAvard Grey on this same daj^ telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg: "The understanding of this acceptance Avould naturally be that the Austrian military action against Servia Avould continue for the present, 19 and \ that the British Government would urge upon Russian Govern- ment] to stop the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in whicli case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military counf\pr-measures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria by Russifin mobilization. You should inform Minister for Foreign Afifairs and siiy that if, in consideration of the acceptance of mediation by Austri^, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears still to be possible to preserve peace," No. 135. Now that is exactly the position Germany took. On July 30 she had ask^d Russia to stop mobilizing, but then the Czar answered the Kaiser, the plan for mobilizing had been made on the 25th, and when the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar a second time and demanded Russian demobilization, Russia answered "it was technically impossible to do so." And then comes the astounding apology for Russia by Sazanof, "it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt. . The action of the Austro-Iiungarian Government and the Ger- man preparations" had forced the Russian Government to order mobili- zation, and the mobilization of Germany had created a desperate situation . . . (but) In no case would Russia begin hostilities first." Nevertheless on that same day Russian troops crossed the German frontier. Germany has been criticised for not pushing the intervention of the Powers at the beginning of the negotiations. It is true she was slow but her answer is not unreasonable. It was a ques- tion of propriety. Let Austria and Servia settle their affairs. But when Russia threatened to make war, Germany brought pressure on Austria to avert war. Germany insisted the trouble could be settled between Austria and Servia. It did not believe Russia would actually begin war. Nos. 47, 48, and 80, although the possibility existed. Nos. 80, 86, and 106. In view of these facts, that Germany urged Austria to accept the Anglo-Russian proposal for mediation and that thi^ formula was accepted by Austria, that Grey himself had said: "If Russia can stop mobilization it appears still to be possible .to preserve peace," can it be said that Grey was true to his own promise that he would not support Russia and France if they would not be reasonable in their attitude toward mediation? Certainly Russia's action in this affair was unjustifiable. On August 1 Grey had the opportunity to avert the war if he had demanded of Russia to do what he urged upon her, but as in all dealings with Russia known to us since 1907 the British Foreign Office was submissive to St. Petersburg. And the war came with Great Britain supporting Russia. France answered the German inquiry ;as to what she proposed to .do if Russia and Germany became involved in a war, by saying France would act as she thought her interests required; it was clear that she was ready for war. The question then was how to secure the neutrality of Great Britain. The endeavor to obtain this the Brit- ish government has characterized as an "infamous proposal" and her LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 20 021 546 309 6 statesmen have appealed to tlie men of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales to enlist in the British army to defend the honor of the govern- ment. Now what was it Germany proposed? 1. To comply witli the British demand that the German navy should not attack the northern coast of France. 2. That Germany would observe the strict neutrality of Belgium. 3. That Germany would neither take French continental nor French colonial territory ; and, 4. That Germany asked the Brit- ish Foreign Office to formulate conditions on which Britain would remain neutral. Document No. 123. Now, if we bear in mind that Russia precipitated the war by refusing to demobilize and that France had pledged her support of Russia, was it an "infamous proposal" for Germany to ask Great Britain to remain neutral? The German government believed it had sufficient evidence that Belgium had violated her neutrality, and "hacked" her way through that country. When peace will be made Germany will have to submit the evidence for this explanation to the judgment of the world. Meantime the enemies of the Kaiser and his people charged them with being deliberate disturbers of the world-peace. To substantiate this accusation the British publicists and writers have wiped the dust from Nietzsche's philosophy and make that the ethics of the German people. They cite from Heinrich von Treitschke's History of Germany and find there the inspiration for Germany's lust for world conquest: and they quote from Bernhardi's "Germany and the Next War," and adduce that as proof that Germany wanted the war, had long prepared for it and is now following the plans mapped out by that military critic. These are very serious charges, and it must be admitted that these three authors have caused great embarrassment to Germany and her friends. Delbriick said only last winter, Germany's greatest ene- mies were the Pan-Germanists. But to prove that Nietzsche, Treit- schke and Bernhardi had become the leaders of German thought and ambition requires more than a few pages of quotations from the most radical statements of these authors. While Germany and her friends deny the validity of these imputations, they can do nothing more at present than wait and let time pronounce the verdict of "guiltj'" or "not guilty." The people of Germany believe they are innocent of the grave charges preferred against them and maintain that they desired peace. Never before in the history of Europe were all the German states and parties so united as today, and at no time was the Kaiser so beloved as in this crisis. Even from Alsace and Lorraine the num- ber of volunteers to fight for the Fatherland was more than called for. The British public, on the other hand, is not so united in the support of its government, of many voices raised in protest against the policy of the Foreign Office tw^o will be cited here in concluding this paper. The Rev. John Clifford, D. D., of London, said: "I can not doubt that we ourselves have to a large extent created the circum- stances which have made our intervention inevitable," and Bernard Shaw declared : "History will not excuse us because after making the war inevitable, we run around at the last moment begging everybody not to make a disturbance." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 021 546 309 6 1 1 11- /^