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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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 THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO, 1S47-1848' 
 
 During the last eighteen months, few students of our histon- 
 can have failed to be struck with the points of similarity between 
 some of the aspects and incidents of our recent public policy and 
 some of the phases of the Mexican War. Not only in broad out- 
 lines is there a resemblance between the two situations, but it exists 
 even in details. What a curious coincidence that in the one case we 
 should ha\-e assisted the exiled Santa Anna to return to Mexico, 
 counting, on his friendh- aid in attaining our demands, and that in 
 the other the exiled Aguinaldo should have been brought iiome and 
 his followers equipped as our allies ! Indeed let any one who thinks 
 this comparison forced I'cad o\'er his r>ig/cni-> Papers. The famous 
 epistle of Birdofreedom Sawin from Mexico echoes with contem- 
 poraneous discussion, and one long passage, with two or three 
 changes in the names, might well serve the Anti-Imperialists as a 
 tract for the times. 
 
 But it is not my purpose on this occasion to follow out in detail 
 the comparison between the two wars and the issues arising from 
 them, but rather, in view of the present persistent asseveration that 
 the victory in Manila Bay imposed upon the United States at once 
 the duty and the necessity of securing and retaining the Philippines, 
 to inquire how we escaped annexing all of Mexico in 1S48. This 
 relic of New Spain, less populous than our antipodal islands, con- 
 tiguous to our territor)-, a political wreck from the incessant turmoil 
 of a generation, in the complete possession of our armies for months, 
 with the flag flying from the " Halls of the MontezAimas," was finally 
 relinquished, although the situation presented every argument urged 
 for the retention of the Philippines more cogently, and annexation 
 would have involved fewer social, political and constitutional diffi- 
 culties. In the light of present events and of current opinion it is 
 hardly credible that, if confronted to-day by that situation, our perple 
 would avoid their duty and leave the conquered to work out their 
 own salvation merely disburdened of some undeveloped territorj-. 
 
 That a policy so alien to our present ideas should have pre- 
 vailed only a half-century ago invites some explanation in addition 
 
 ■ Read at the meeting of the American Historical Association at Cambridge, Mass., 
 December 29, iSgg. 
 
 ( 491 ) 
 
49- E. G. Bourne 
 
 to tlie ob\'ious one that expansion and tlic extension of human 
 slavery were, in the minds of an increasing number, inextricably 
 bound together, and that therefore the deepening moral abhorrence 
 of slaxcr}-, which was taking fast hold of the idealists, re-enforced 
 the opposition of conservatism. As a consequence just that idealist 
 element which, to-day, leads the movement for expansion under 
 the banner of political altruism, shrank back fift}' years ago from 
 having anything to do with it. 
 
 It is to offer some further explanation beyond this obvious one 
 that I undertake a brief inquiry into the rise, diffusion and probable 
 strength of a desire to acquire all of Mexico. For such an in- 
 quiry will show that the movement for expansion, although as- 
 sociated in the minds of many people with the extension of 
 slavery, was by no means identical with it, being on the one hand 
 strongly opposed by some of the ablest champions of the institu- 
 tion and on the other hand ardently advocated by its enemies, 
 while the body of its support was in no inconsiderable degree made 
 up of men on the whole indifferent to the slavery question. The 
 emergence of this expansionist movement at this time in spite of 
 the obstacles to its success prepares us for its triumphant career at 
 the present day, when it has no substantial hindrance save the 
 conservative spirit, to whose objections our sanguine people are 
 wont to pay little attention. 
 
 It is well known that President Polk on assuming office an- 
 nounced to George Bancroft that he proposed during his term to 
 settle the Oregon question and to acquire California.' He is, I 
 think, with the possible exception of Grant, the only president who 
 has entered office with a positive and definite policy of expansion. 
 Polk was in fact an expansionist, not at the behest of slavery as 
 has been charged, but for the cause itself; yet a prudent expan- 
 sionist, for he hesitated at the incorporation of large masses of 
 alien people, refusing to countenance, as we shall see, the all-of- 
 Mexico movement and yielding only in the case of the proposed 
 purchase of Cuba. To accomplish his purpose in regard to Cali- 
 fornia, when negotiations failed. President Polk was ready to try 
 conquest and he welcomed, if he did not provoke, the war with 
 Mexico.^ The conquest of sparsely settled California and New 
 Mexico was easily accomplished. The resistance of Mexico, 
 although more desperate than was expected, was not effectual and 
 in April, 1847, Mr. Trist was despatched with the project of a 
 
 ' Schouler's ///j/ot7 s/" M^ L'nit^-c/ States, IV. 498. 
 
 ' Compare the narrative in Schouler's Historical Briefs, 149-151, which is a faithful 
 iMesentation in brief of the material contained in Polk's diary. 
 
 P. 
 
 o 
 
The L 'nitcd States and Mexieo 493 
 
 treat)'. Our coinniissioiicr was autliorizcd to offer peace on the 
 cession of all tcrrit(M-\- cast of tile Rio (jrande from its mouth to 
 the southern biuuular)- of New Mexico. New Mexico, Upper ami 
 Lower California ami a right of way across the Isthmus of Tehuaii- 
 tepec. " The boundary of the Rio Grande, and the cession to the 
 United States of New Mexico .mil Upper California constituted an 
 ultimatum," and less than that was under no circumstances to be 
 accepted. The refusal of these terms was followed in Septembei- 
 by the capture of the City of Mexico. The news of this triumph 
 of the American arms which rcachetl Washington late in October 
 soon gave rise to an acti\'c agitation to incorporate all of Mexico 
 into the Union.' The opponents of the administration averred this 
 to be the design of the President, although it was not, and the sus- 
 picion was increased b_\- the known fact that the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, Robert J. W'.dker, was an advocate of this policy.'- 
 
 Inasmuch as President Polk initiatcLl his own polic\- and reso- 
 lutely and independent! V jjursued his o\\ n plans, no account of his 
 presidenc}' can be satisfactor\' to-day, which is not based on a care- 
 ful examination of the voluminoLis diar_\-' in whose pages are re- 
 corded not only his own views and intentions but also brief reports 
 of cabinet meetings and of conferences with party leaders. Turn- 
 ing to this record we find that Polk told his cabinet, September 4, 
 1847, that if the war was still further prolonged he would " be un- 
 willing to pay the sum which Mr. Trist had been authorized to 
 pay," in the settlement of a boundary, by which it was contemplated 
 that the United States would actiuire New Mexico and the Califor- 
 nias ; and that " if Mexico continued obstinately to refuse to treat, 
 I was decidedl}' in favor of insisting on more territory than the 
 provinces named." The question was discussed by the cabinet on 
 .September 7, and Secretary Walker and Attorney-General Clifford 
 are recorded as " in favour of acquiring in addition the department 
 or state of Tamaulipas, which mcludes the port of Tampico." 
 Secretarj- Buchanan, the Postmaster-General and Secretary John 
 Y. Mason opposed this proposition. The President declared him- 
 self " as being in favour of acquiring the cession of the Depart- 
 
 ' Cf. Von Hoist, III. 34I-344. It will be noticed lli.it Von Hoist, not having ac- 
 cess to PoUt's diary, worked in the dark in regard to the President's Mexican policy and 
 attributes designs to him which he did not entertain. The New York Sun asserted in 
 October that it had advocated the occupation of Mexico in May. Niles, l.WIII. llj. 
 
 ^ Bal/iiitore American intiWci, I.XXIII. IIJ. 
 
 'George Bancroft's typewritten copy of the MS. of the diary is among tl>e Bancroft 
 Papers in the Lenox Library. l''or an account of the diary see Schouler, Historital 
 Briifs, 121-124. I may take the occasion here to express my appreciation of the cour- 
 tesy of Mr. Eames and Mr. Paltsits in giving me every facility in the examination of the 
 diary and correspondence t)f Polk. 
 
494 E. G. BoiD-nc 
 
 merit of Tamaulipas, if it should be found practicable." Clifford 
 proposed the recall of Trist and the prosecution of the war with 
 the greatest \-igor until Mexico should sue for peace. This was 
 approved by Walker and b)- the President except as regards the 
 recall of Trist. A month later he changed his mind and Trist was 
 recalled, as he notes, October 5, " because his remaining longer with 
 the army could not probably accomplish the objects of his mission, 
 and because his remaining longer might and probably would im- 
 press the Mexican government with the belief that the United 
 States were so anxious for peace, that they would ultimate (wc) 
 conclude one on the Mexican terms. Mexico must now sue for 
 peace and when she does we will hear her propositions." 
 
 Another month passes and Secretary Buchanan has shifted his 
 position, presumably in response to some indications of a changing 
 public sentiment, such as the recent Democratic \'ictory in Pennsyl- 
 vania, and we are not surprised to learn that he " spoke in an un- 
 settled tone " and " would express no opinion between these two 
 plans," /. c, for the President in his message " to designate the part 
 of Mexican territory, which we intended to hold as an indemnity, 
 or to occupy all Mexico, by a largely increased force, and subdue 
 the country and promise protection to the inhabitants." Buchanan 
 would, so Polk gathered from his utterances, favor the acquisition 
 of Tamaulipas and the country east of the Sierra Madre Mountains 
 and withdraw the troops to that line. This in fact Buchanan an- 
 nounced to the President nearly two months later, January 2. 
 " My views," records the President, November 9, " were in sub- 
 stance that we would continue the prosecution of the war with an 
 increased force, hold all the country we had conquered, or might 
 conquer, and levy contributions upon the enemy to support the war, 
 until a just peace was obtained, that we must have indemnity in 
 territory, and that as a part indemnity, the Californias and New 
 Mexico should under no circumstances be restored to Mexico, but 
 that they should henceforward be considered a part of the United 
 States and permanent territorial governments be established over 
 them ; and that if Mexico protracted the war additional territory 
 must be acquired as further indemnit}-." 
 
 He adds in regard to Buchanan : " His change of opinion will 
 not alter my views ; I am fixed in my course, and I think all in the 
 Cabinet except Mr. Buchanan still concur with me, and he may yet 
 do so." 
 
 On November 18, Polk requested Buchanan to prepare a para- 
 graph for the message to the effect : " That failing to obtain a 
 peace, we should continue to occupy Me.xico with our troops and 
 
TItc I'lu'fcif Sititcs and Hfcxico 495 
 
 encourage and protect tiic friends of peace in Mexico to establish 
 and maintain a Republican Government, able and willing to make 
 peace." By this time Buchanan had come into an agreement with 
 the President, and on the 20th, the cabinet all agreed that such a 
 declaration should be inserted in the message. But if peace could 
 not be obtained by this means the question was as to the next step. 
 " In Mr. Buchanan's draft, he stated in that event that ' \vc must 
 fulfill that destiny which Providence ma)' ha\e in store for both 
 countries.' " 
 
 E.xperience warns us, when a statesman proposes humble sub- 
 mission to the leadings of Providence, that he is listening an.xiously 
 and intently to the voice of the people. President Polk was too 
 independent a man to get his divine guidance by those channels and 
 announced to his cabinet : " I thought this would be too indefinite 
 and that it would be avoiding my constitutional responsibilit\-. I 
 preferred to state in substance, that we should in that event, take 
 the measure of our indemnity into our own hands, and dictate our 
 own terms to Mexico." 
 
 Yet all the cabinet except Clifford preferred with Buchanan to 
 follow whither destiny should lead.^ The paragraph was still 
 troublesome, and Polk presented a third draft to the cabinet, No- 
 vember 23. " Mr. Buchanan," records the diary, " still preferred 
 his own draft, and so did Mr. Walker, the latter avowing as a 
 reason, that he was for taking the whole of Mexico, if necessary, 
 and he thought the construction placed upon Mr. Buchanan's draft 
 by a large majority of the people, would be that it looked to that 
 object." 
 
 Polk's answer does him honor : " I replied that I was not pre- 
 pared to go to that extent ; and furthermore, that I did not desire that 
 anything I said in the message should be so obscure as to give rise 
 to doubt or discussion as to what my true meaning was ; that I 
 had in my last message declared that I did not contemplate the con- 
 quest of Mexico. And that in another part of this paper I had said 
 the same thing." 
 
 It will be noticed that on this occasion Robert J. Walker comes 
 out squarely for all of Mexico. He seems to have improved the 
 occasion again in his Treasury report to express his views, but the 
 President required that to be in harmony with the message. Per- 
 haps it will not be superfluous to remark that the most advanced 
 expansionist in Polk's cabinet always had been an expansionist, was 
 opposed to slavery, although a Southerner by adoption, and was 
 during the Civil War a strong Union man. 
 
 1 It is interesting to note that Buchanan used tliis rejected [jaragr.Tph in a letter to a 
 democratic meeting in Philadelphia. Von Hoist, III. 341 n. 
 
496 E. G. Bourne 
 
 Twice later this crucial paragraph was revised. In its final form 
 it read : " If we shall ultimately fail [/. c, to secure peace], then we 
 shall have exhausted all honorable means in pursuit of peace, and 
 must continue to occup)^ her country with our troops, taking the 
 full measure of indemnity into our own hands, and must enforce the 
 terms which our honor demands."' An earlier passage, however, 
 in explicit terms renounced the " all-of-Mexico " policy in these 
 words : "It has never been contemplated b)- me, as an object of 
 the war, to make a permanent conquest of the Republic of Mexico, 
 or to annihilate her separate existence as an independent nation. "- 
 
 The opening of Congress gave an opportunity for the rising feel- 
 ing for all of Mexico to show its strength. Yet it must not be for- 
 gotten that the new House had been elected over a year earlier, 
 when the opposition to the war was perhaps at its height and not 
 yet counterbalanced by the excitement of the victories of 1847. 
 During the first weeks of the session many series of resolutions in 
 favor of and against the policy of all-of-Mexico were presented. Sev- 
 eral of the latter were offered by Southern Whigs like Botts of V^ir- 
 ginia and Toombs of Georgia, and illustrate the point that the slaver\- 
 and expansion interests were not identical. Similarly, as Calhoun 
 made the ablest speech against the absorption of Me.xico, so the 
 most outspoken advocates of it were .Senator Dickinson of New 
 York, a Hunker Democrat, and Senator Hannegan of Indiana. 
 Hannegan offered the following resolution January 10: "That it 
 may become necessary and proper, as it is within the constitutional 
 capacity of this government, for the United States to hold Mexico 
 as a territorial appendage."' Senator Dickinson, who at the Jack- 
 son dinner on the 8th had offered the toast " A More Perfect Union 
 embracing the entire North American Continent," 'on the 12th made 
 a speech in the Senate advocating expansion, in which he declared for 
 all of Mexico and asserted that it was our destiny to embrace all of 
 North America. " Neither national justice," said he, " nor national 
 morality requires us tamely to surrender our Mexican conquests, 
 nor should such be the policy of the government if it would ad- 
 vance the cause of national freedom or secure its enjo\-ment to the 
 people of Mexico." 
 
 Calhoun at the earliest opportunity, December 15, had offered 
 these trenchant resolutions: "that to conquer Mexico or to hold 
 it either as a province or to incorporate it in the Union would be 
 
 iNiles Resist ei; LXXIII. 230. 
 
 2 JOiti. 
 
 ^ Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st .Session, p. 136. 
 
 *NiIes, Kegish-r, LXXIII. 336. 
 
The i 'in ted States and Mexieo 497 
 
 inconsistent witli the avowed object for which the war lias been 
 prosecuted ; a departure from the settled policy of the government ; 
 in conflict with its character and genius, and in the end subversive 
 of our free and popular institutions."' 
 
 These resolutions drew from Cass a few days later the wonderful 
 assertion that " there is no man in this nation in favor of the extinction 
 of the Nationality of Mexico." Whereupon Calhoun rejoined : 
 " Why, you can hardly read a newspaper without finding it filled 
 with speculation upon this subject. The proceedings that took 
 place in Ohio at a dinner given to one of the \'oluntcer officers of 
 tile army returned from Mexico show conclusively that the impres- 
 sion entertained by the persons present was, that our troops would 
 never leave Mexico until tlic\- had conquered the whole country. 
 This was the sentiment advanced by the officer and it was applauded 
 by the assembly, and endorsed by the official paper of that State."" 
 
 Calhoun put the case even more strongly in his speech in the 
 Senate, January 4 : " There was at that time [/. c, at the beginning 
 of the session] a party scattered all over every portion of the country 
 in favor of conquering the whole of Mexico. To prove that such 
 was the case, it is only necessary to refer to the proceedings of nu- 
 merous large public meetings, to declarations repeatedly made in 
 the public journals, and to the opinions expressed by the officers of 
 the arm}- and individuals of standing and influence, to say nothing 
 of declarations made here and in the other House of Congress." '■ 
 Some of these expressions may be briefly noticed. General John 
 A. Quitman, one of the most energetic of the army officers, subse- 
 quently a persistent advocate of the acquisition of Cuba, arrived in 
 Washington in December and presented a plan to the President for 
 a permanent occupation of Mexico.* Commodore Stockton, the 
 Dewey of the conquest of California, at a great dinner given in his 
 honor the 30th of December, advocated not the annexation but the 
 occupation of Mexico until that people should be completely regen- 
 erated, and would accept civil and religious liberty and maintain a 
 genuine republic.'' Among the newspapers advocating the reten- 
 tion of all of Mexico we find, strange as it seems, the Nciv York 
 Evening Post, with such language as this : " Now we ask whether 
 any man can coolh' contemplate the idea of recalling our troops 
 
 ' Cong, Globe, p. 26. 
 
 ^ Co)ig. Globe, 30tliCong. , 1st Sess. , ;'/(/(/., p. 54. 
 
 3 Quoted by Von Hoist, III. 343. Cf. Niles, Register, LXXIII. 334. A writer 
 in the Charleston Courier affirmed : " Most of the leading Democratic papers openly ad- 
 vocate that policy." Niles, LXXIII. 351. 
 
 'Claiborne's Quitman, II. 79. 
 
 ■'Niles, Register, LX.MII., 335. 
 
49 S E. G. Bonnie 
 
 from the territory we at present occupy, from Mexico — from San 
 Iiian de Ulloa — from Monterej^ — from Puebla — and thus b}' one 
 stroke of a secretary's pen, resign this beautiful country to the cus- 
 tody of the ignorant cowards and profligate ruffians who have ruled 
 it the last twenty-five years. Why, humanity cries out against it. 
 Civilization and Christianity protest against this reflux of the tide o 
 barbarism and anarch}'."' 
 
 The National Era, the organ of anti-slavery, advocated the ab- 
 sorption of Mexico by the admission to the Union of individual 
 Mexican states as fast as they should apply. The disrupted condi- 
 tion of Mexico favored this solution.' 
 
 In New York the Hunker Democrats came out strongly. The 
 " Address to the Democracy of New York " unanimously adopted 
 by the Syracuse Convention explains that as the purpose of the 
 occupation of Mexico is to advance human rights such occupation 
 is miscalled a conquest. " It is no more than the restoration of moral 
 rights by legal means." The field for such a work is " opened to us 
 by the conduct of Mexico, and such moral and legal means are of- 
 fered for our use. Shall we occupy it ? .Shall we now run with manly 
 vigor the race that is set before us ? Or shall we yield to the sug- 
 gestions of a sickly fanaticism, or sink into an enervating slumber ? 
 . . . W'e feel no emotion but pity for those whose philanthropy, or 
 patriotism, or religion, has led them to believe that they can prescribe 
 a better course of dut)- tlian that of the God who made us all."' 
 
 January 12, Senator Rusk of Texas called on the President to 
 request him not to commit himself further against the annexation of 
 all of Mexico. Polk told him that his views had been distinctly 
 stated in his message and that his mind had not changed. 
 
 As in our own da\' foreign pressure in this direction was not 
 lacking. More than a year earlier Bancroft wrote Buchanan from 
 London : " People are beginning to say that it would be a blessing 
 to the world if the United States would assume the tutelage of 
 Mexico."' Rumors, too, were current of a rising annexationist 
 party in Mexico.' 
 
 1 Quoted in Niles, Rf^^isler, LXXIII. t,t,\, in aiticle on '• Manifest Destiny." 
 
 ^The National Era, August 19, 1847, Tlie article fills three and one-half columns. 
 Tlie plan was presented again February 3, 1S48. .\s these Mexican accessions would 
 probably have preserved their non-slaveholding character, the number of free states would 
 have been immensely reinforced by any such proceeding. 
 
 3 Niles, Register, LXXIll. 39I. 
 
 *G. T. Curtis's Buchanan, I. 576. In this connection it is interesting to compare 
 the forecast, at a somewhat later date, of Alexander von Humboldt : "Die Vereinigten 
 .Staaten werden ganz Mexico an sich reissen und dann selbst zerfallen." Roscher, 
 Kolonien, Koloaialpolitik und Atisiuatidertoig, p. 177* 
 
 '" Cf. the citation by Von Hoist, HI. 342, from Hodgson's Cradle of the Confederacy, 
 251-252, in regard to the annexation party in Mexico. Hodgson's estimate, however, 
 must be greatly exaggerated. 
 
The United States and Mexico 499 
 
 The foregoing all show that the agitation for "all of Mexico " 
 was well started and needed only time to become really formidable. 
 It was deprived of that requisite element of time b\- the astonishing 
 course of Trist, who despite his recall still lingered with Scott's 
 army and finally negotiated a treaty on the lines of Folk's ultima- 
 tum. How this conduct struck the President can best be told in his 
 own words. When he hears, January 4, that Trist has renewed 
 negotiations he says : " This information is most surprising. Mr. 
 T. has acknowledged the receipt of his letter of recall, and he 
 possesses no diplomatic powers. He is acting no doubt upon 
 General Scott's advice. He has become the perfect tool of Scott. 
 He is in this measure defying the authorit}- of his govern- 
 ment. . . . He may, I fear, greatly embarrass the government." 
 On the 1 5th came a long despatch from Trist, which Polk de- 
 clares " the most extraordinary document I have ever heard from 
 a Diplomatic Representative. His dispatch is arrogant, impudent, 
 and very insulting to his government and was personally offensive to 
 the President. He admits he is acting without authority and in 
 violation of the positive order recalling him. It is manifest to me 
 that he has become the tool of General Scott and his menial instru- 
 ment, and that the paper was written at Scott's instance and dicta- 
 tion. I have never in my life felt so indignant, and the whole Cabi- 
 net expressed themselves as I felt." 
 
 Buchanan was directed to prepare a stern rebuke to Trist and 
 Marcy to write Scott to order him to leave the headquarters of the 
 Army. 
 
 January 23, Senators Cass and Sevier advised the President to 
 inform the Mexican government that Trist had been recalled. The 
 next day Buchanan thought such a letter proper if Polk had made 
 up his mind to reject the treaty. This Buchanan thought should 
 be done. Polk said he could not decide till he saw the treaty. On 
 the 25th the question was put before the cabinet. Walker agreed 
 with Buchanan. In regard to the treaty Polk said that if " unem- 
 barrassed " he " would not now approve such a treaty," but was now 
 in doubt about his duty. Buchanan still favored rejection, while 
 Marcy was in favor of approval if the treaty were on the lines of 
 the ultimatum, and John Y. Mason took sides with Marcy. It was 
 finally decided on the 28th to despatch the letter to the Mexican 
 government. The next entry of importance records the arrival of 
 the treaty after nightfall, February 19. Folk found it within Trist's 
 original instructions as regards boundary limits and thought that it 
 should be judged on its merits and not prejudiced by Trist's bad 
 conduct. The next evening, Sunday, the cabinet discussed the 
 
500 E. G. Bourne 
 
 treat}-. Buchanan and Walker advised its rejection. Mason, 
 Marcy, Johnson and Clifford favored its acceptance. Buchanan an- 
 nounced that he "wanted more territory and would not be con- 
 tent with less than the lines of Sierra Madre in addition to the 
 Provinces secured in this treat\^" Polk reminded Buchanan of his 
 entire change of position during the war and adds in his diary that 
 he believed the true reason of Buchanan's course to be that he was 
 a candidate for the presidency. If the treaty were well received he 
 would not be injured, if opposed he could say that he opposed it. 
 
 Februar)^ 21, the President made known his decision to the 
 cabinet : " That under all the circumstances of the case, I would 
 submit it to the Senate for ratification, with a recommendation to 
 strike out the loth Art. I assigned my reasons for this decision. 
 They were briefly, that the Treaty conformed on the main question 
 of limits and boundary to the instructions given Mr. Trist in April last 
 —and that though if the Treaty was now to be made, I should demand 
 more, perhaps to make the Sierra Madre the line, yet it was doubt- 
 ful whether this could be ever obtained by the consent of Mexico. 
 I looked to the consequences of its rejection. A majority of one 
 branch of Congress is opposed to my administration ; they have 
 falsely charged that the war was brought on and is continued by 
 me, with a view to the conquest of Mexico, and if I were now to 
 reject a Treaty made upon my own terms as authorized in April 
 last, with the unanimous approbation of the Cabinet, the probability 
 is, that Congress would not grant either men or money to prose- 
 cute the war. Should this be the result, the army now in Mexico 
 would be constantly wasting and diminishing in numbers, and I 
 might at last be compelled to withdraw them, and then lose the two 
 provinces of New Mexico and Upper California which were ceded 
 to us by this Treaty. Should the opponents of my administration 
 succeed in carrying the next Presidential election, the great proba- 
 bility is that the country would lose all the advantages secured by 
 this Treaty. I adverted to the immense value of Upper California, 
 and concluded by saying that if I were now to reject my own terms 
 as offered in April last, I did not see how it was possible for my ad- 
 ministration to be sustained." 
 
 The rumor soon spread in Washington that Buchanan and 
 Walker were exerting their influence to have the treaty rejected. 
 On the 28th Senator Sevier, the chairman of the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations, informs the President that the committee will 
 recommend the rejection of the Treaty and advise sending a com- 
 mission. The other members of the committee were Webster, Ben- 
 ton, Mangum and Hannegan. Polk declared his opinion unchanged 
 
•13.; 
 
 The ( 'iiitcd States and Mexico ■ 50 1 
 
 and expressed his belief that Webster's object was to defeat tlie 
 treaty. Sevier said Webster wanted no territory beyond the Rio 
 Grande, and Polk comments in his diaiy : " Extremes meet. Mr. 
 Webster is for no territory and Mr. Hannegan is for all Mexico. 
 Benton's position cannot be calculated." Polk concludes his entry 
 with : " If the treaty in its present form is ratified, there will be ad- 
 ded to the United States an immense Empire, the value of which 
 twenty years hence it would be difficult to calculate." It was 
 surely the irony of fate that the eyes of this resolute Augustus, 
 enlarger of empire, were so soon closed in death and that he was not 
 suffered to see in the consequences of his policy the fulfillment at 
 once of the most dismal prognostications of its opponents and of 
 his own confident prophecy. 
 
 For several da\'s the treat)* hung in the balance. On Febru- 
 ary 29, Polk records : " P^rom what I learn, about a dozen Demo- 
 crats will oppose it, most of them because they wish to acquire 
 more territor)- than the line of the Rio Grande and the Provinces 
 of New Mexico and Upper California will secure." On March 2, the 
 outlook appeared more hopeful ; on the third Benton and Webster 
 are recorded as the leading opponents. The suspense came to an 
 end, March 10, when the treat)- was ratified at 10 P. M., 38 to 14, 
 four senators not voting. 
 
 The reception of the treat)' and its recommendation to the Sen- 
 ate clearly defined the position of the administration and tended to 
 discourage the advocates of "all of Mexico." If Trist had re- 
 turned as ordered and the war had been prolonged, we should prob- 
 abl)' have acquired more territory, but how much more is of course 
 uncertain. Calhoun in his opposition realized that every delay 
 in bringing the war to a close would strengthen the expansion party 
 and complicate the situation in ways that would contribute to ad- 
 vance their cause. We can best realize the importance of the ele- 
 ment of time in this matter and so appreciate the significance of 
 Trist's unexpected action in securing a treaty if we remember how 
 long it took after the battle of Manila Bay for the final policy of 
 acquiring all the Philippines to be developed. Trist's treaty arrived 
 about four months after the news of the capture of Mexico City 
 and it was at least four months and a half after the battle of Ma- 
 nila Bay before the present administration decided to demand all of 
 the Philippines. Nor must we forget in this comparison that the 
 formation and expression of public opinion through the agency of 
 the press proceeds to-day at a much more rapid pace than fift\' 
 years ago. 
 
 In conckision, then, in answer to the question how we escaped 
 
 k 
 
502 E. G. Bourne 
 
 the annexation of all of Mexico in 1847—48 the following reasons 
 may be assigned. The growing realization that territorial expan- 
 sion and the extension of slavery were so inextricably involved 
 with each other that every accession of territory would precipitate a 
 slavery crisis powerfully counteracted the natural inclinations of the 
 people toward expansion which are so clearly revealed to-day. The 
 fact that the elections for the Congress that met in December, 
 1847, took place over a year earlier, before the great military victo- 
 ries of 1S47 had begun to undermine the first revulsion from a war 
 of conquest, gave the control of the House to the Whigs, who as 
 a party were committed against the war and consequent annexa- 
 tions. Thirdly, there was the opposition of President Polk, who 
 effectually controlled the policy of the government ; and finally, 
 the lack of time for the movement to gather sufficient headway to 
 overcome these obstacles. 
 
 Edward G. Bourne. 
 
 /'lOe) 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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