sT- ■■'•■.-;/.,•- En j^E We a Natiojn- ? i^Ijc (Driicstioii as it !5toatr Ocfore tijc IDar. ^/ J. M. BUNDY. WITH AX HISTORICAL LETTER By Senator Howe, of Wisconsin. ^ NEW YORK: (6. p. putnant vS: 60 its. 1870. ^.A^, Aee We a Nation ? Z\)c (Drucstion as it 6tooti i}cforc tijc iDar. J. M. BUNDY. WITH AIs" HISTOEICAL LETTEE By Senator Howe, of Wisconsin. ir,ilaces, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representa- tives, and for Electors for President and Yice President. And in these, as well as some other cases, Congress have a right to revise, amend, or supercede, the laws which may be passed by the State Legislatures. " AVlien, therefore, the States are stripped of some of the 48 AEE WE A NATIOIN- ? highest attributes of sovereignty, and the same are given to the United States ; wiien the legislatures of the States are, in some respects, under the control of Congress, and in every case are, under the Constitution, bound by the paramount au- thority of the United States; it is certainly diliicult to sup- port the argument, that the appellate power over the decisions of State Courts is contrary to the genius of our institutions. The Courts of the United States can, without question, revise the proceedings of the executive and legislative authorities of the States, and if they are found to be contrary to the Constitution, may declare them to be of no legal vitality. Surely, the exercise of the same right over judicial tribunals is not a higher, or more dangerous act of sovereign power, Nor can such a right be deemed to impair the independence of State Judges. It is assuming the very ground in controver- sy, to assert that they possess an absolute independence of the United States. In respect to the powers granted to the Unit- ed States, they are not independent ; they are expressly bound to obedience by the letter of the Constitution. And if they should, unintentionally, transcend their authority, or miscon- strue the Constitution, there is no more reason for giving their judgments an absolute and irresistible force, than for giving it to the acts of the other co-ordinate departments of State sov- ereignty. " The arguments used from the possibility of the abuse of the revising power, is equally unsatisfactory. It is always a doubtful course to argue against the existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse. It is still more difhcult, by such an argument, to ingraft upon a general power a restriction, which is not to be found in the terms in which it is given. From the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewhere. Wherever it may be ARE WE A ]NJ"ATION ? 49 vested, it is susceptible of abuse. In all questions of jurisdic- tion, the inferior or appellate Court must pronounce the final jndp;inent ; and common sense, as well as legal reasoning, lias conferred it upon the latter. It has been further argued against tlie existence of this appellate power, that it would form a novelty in our judicial institutions. This is certainly a mis- take." The Judge here instanced the right of appeal, in all cases of captures given in the Articles of Confederation, to Courts to be created by Congress. " It is further argued, that no great public mischief can result from a construction which shall limit the appellate pow^r of the United States, to cases in their own Courts : first, because State Judges are bound by an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and must be presumed to be men of learning and integrity ; and secondly, because Congress must have an unquestionable right to remove all cases within the judicial power, from the State Courts to tlie Courts of the United States, at any time before final judgment, though not afterward. As to the first reason, admitting that the judges of the State Courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, integrity and wisdom as those of the United States, which we very cheerfully admit, it does not aid the argument. " It is manifest that the Constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given, or withheld powers, according to the judgment of the American people, by whom it was adopt- ed. We can only construe its powers, and cannot inquire into the policy or principles which induced the grant of them. The Constitution has presumed, whether rightly or wrongly, we do not inquire, that State attachments. State prejudices, State jealouses, and State interests, might sometimes obstruct and control, or might be supposed to obstruct and control, the 50 ARE WE A NATION ? regular administration of justice. Hence, in controversies between States; between citizens of different States ; between a State and its citizens, or foreigners ; it enables the parties, under the authority of Congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and determined before the national tribunals. " This is not all. A motive of another kind, perfectly com- patible with the most sincere respect for State tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive is the importance, and even the necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States upon all sub- jects within the purview of the Constitution. Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different States, might differently interpret a statute or a treaty of the United States, or even the Constitution itself. If there were no revising authority to con- trol these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the Constitu- tion of the United States, would be different in different States, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construc- tion, obligation, or efficacy, in any t\vo States. The public mis- chiefs that would attend such a state of things would be truly de- plorable ; and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped the enlightened Convention which framed the Constitution. " What indeed miglit have been prophecy, has now become fact; and the appellate jurisdiction must continue to be the only adequate remedy for such evils, " There is an additional consideration, which is entitled to srreat weight. The Constitution of the United States was designed for the common and equal benefit of all the people of the United States. The judicial power was granted for the same benign and salutary purposes. It was not to be exercised exclusively for the benefit of parties wdio might be plaintiffs, and would elect the national forum ; but also for the protection ARE WE A NATIOIS" ? 51 of defendants, who might be entitled to defend tlieir rights, or assert their privileges before the same forum. Yet, if the con- struction contended for be correct, it will follow that, as the plaintifi may always elect the State Court, the defendant may be deprived of all the security which the Constitution intended in aid of his rights. Such a state of things can in no respect be considered as giving equal rights." The Judge, after show- ing the inadequacy of the supposed power of removal of suits from State to Federal Courts by Congress, to meet the ends of the Constitution, concludes: " On the whole, the Court are of opinion that the appellate power of the United States does extend to cases pending in the State Courts ; and that the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, which authorizes the exercise of the jurisdiction in the specified cases by a Writ of Error, is supported by the letter and spirit of the Constitution. We find no clause in that instrument which limits this power ; and we dare not oppose a limitation where the people have not been disposed to create one. Strong as this conclusion stands upon the general language of the Constitution, it may still derive support from other sources. It is an historical fact that this exposition of the Constitution extending its appellate power to State Courts was, previous to its adoption, uniformly and publicly avowed by its friends and admitted by its enemies, as the basis of their re- spective reasonings, both in and out of the State Conventions. " It is an historical fact that at the time when the Judiciary Act was submitted to the deliberations of the first Congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of great learning and ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in framing, supporting, or opposing that Constitution, the same exposition was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and the opponents of that system. 52 AEE WE A NATION ? " It is an liistorical fact that the Supreme Court of the United States have, from time to time, sustained this appellate juris- diction in a great variety of cases, brought from the tribunals of many of the most important States of the Union ; and that no State tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the subject, or declined to meet the mandate of the Supreme Court, nntil the present occasion. This weight of contemporaneous exposition, by all parties, this acquiescence of enlightened State Courts, and these judicial decisions of the Supreme Court, through so long a period, do, as we think, place the doctrine upon a foundation of authority which cannot be shaken without delivering over the subject to perplexing and irremediable doubts." So absolute and complete a demonstration as this is calcu- lated to compel the assent of every man's reason ; nor can its force be resisted by any one who reads it, unless he is under the thraldom of very strong prejudices ; and, indeed, the reasoning of the Court appears to have overcome even the violent prejudices of Virginia, since w^e do not find her ques- tioning the appellate jurisdiction after this ; for in 1821, when the case of Cohens vs. Yirginia came up, the Court of Appeals recognized it by making a return to the writ of Error, though the question was discussed, and Chief Justice Marshall decided it again, and as an original question ; bringing to bear upon it, all of his unrivalled powers of reasoning, his massive judicial englowments, and his intimate acquaintance with the events, the men, and the measures of our Revolutionary and Constitu- tional eras. I regret that I cannot give any extracts from this decision, since I have already made as extensive quotations as my limits will permit. During the interval between the case of Fairfax vs. Hunter in 1814, and the year of this case, in 1821, the appellate juris- ^ A EE WE A I^ATION ? 53 diction was assertedTwrchout denial on the part of the State Courts, over cases from Masg»chnsetts, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, in the historical case of Dart- mouth College vs. Woodward, from Xew Hampshire, so often quoted and recognized as the law of the land, and again ni a case from Pennsylvania, the decision of which has moulded the jurisprudence and legislation of that State ever since, upon the questions and principles involved in it. Soon alter this, the legislative and judicial policy of the State of New York, in reference to the steamboat monopoly of its waters, was reversed by the decree of the Supreme Court in the memorable case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, which not only involved millions, but M-as calculated to enlist State pride, and to stimu- late the feeling of State sovereignty in the " Empire State " of the Union ; and notwithstanding all of the Courts of that State had solemnly pronounced the legislation thus completely set aside to be Constitutional. In this case no question of jurisdic- tion was raised. After this, appeals were taken successively from the Supreme tribunals of Ohio, Vermont, New York, Tennessee, Louisiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Delaware, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Missouri; from some of them more than once ; all of them obeying the mandates of the Su- preme Court, and recognizing its appellate jurisdiction. Then there were two cases from the State of Georgia, Worcester vs. State of Georgia, and Butler vs. State of Georgia, 6 Peters 515 and 537, in which the Supreme Court of that State refused obedience to the mandates of the Federal Court. The plaintiffs in these cases were convicted of the crime of preach- ing the gospel to the Cherokees. But the moving cause of the popular excitement, and that which swayed the Court, was jealousy of suspected interference with the institution of 54 AEE WE A NATIOlSr ? slavery. Under the pressure of tliis outside excitement, the Georgia Court assumed for its decrees a finality, which they knew was necessary to avert the just judgment of the Supreme Court, as they may again, under the first Administration, which really tries to punish the slave traders of that State ; citing, perhaps, the decision of our own Judge Smith as au- thority. Since these " Georgia cases," the mandates of the Supreme Court have been obeyed by the Courts of nearly every State in the Union, including Wisconsin. ]S[o I'esistance has been made to the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction, except in the J3ooth case. From an able contribution upon this subject in the State Journal^ which has rendered my labor much easier in this particular, we learn that " upwards of Two Hun- dred cases have been removed from State Courts to the Su- preme Court of the United States, as follows : From Rhode Island 3 From Virginia 5 " Maryland 16 " Massachusetts 13 " Connecticut 2 " Pennsylvania 13 " New York 17 " New Hampshire 2 " South CaroHna 3 " Vermont 4 " Ohio 16 " Tennessee 5 " Louisiana. 28 " Georgia 2 " Mississippi 8 " Arkansas 11 " Delaware 3 " Maine 2 " Missouri 17 " Illinois 6 " Kentucky 8 " Alabama 19 " Michigan 3 " Iowa 4 " Indiana 4 " Wisconsin 4 " Texas 2 " Florida 2 " Of these, sixty-five have been dismissed as not coming within the act of Congress; sixty-eight have been reversed, and the judgments of reversal acquiesced in, in all, it is be- lieved, except the cases from Georgia and the Booth case from Wisconsin. In the remainder of these cases, the judg- ments of the State Courts were affirmed." AEE TTE A NATI02f ? 55 Tims, it has been shown that the constitutionality of the Judiciary Act of 1789, under the provisions of which the ap- pellate jurisdiction has been exercised for seventy years, has been recognized as unquestionable by the highest Courts of nearly all of the States of the Union, and has been denied in no case save in Virginia, whose Court has since twice recognized it, in Georgia, and in Wisconsin, in the Booth case,* and our own Court has recognized this jurisdiction in other cases. In the exercise of its controlling power as a Court of Appeals the Supreme Court has reversed the judicial policy of great States, again and again, in cases where State interests or State prejudices have distorted the principles of law. Every citizen of the Union has received his share of the benefits arising from the uniformity, the impartiality, and the beautiful synnnetry of our Jurisprudence ensured by this system of appeals : which was designed by the Fathers to pro- duce these happy results, and which has so uniformly met the approbation of the wisest Judges of the various State tribu- nals, that a Judge who dissents from this, their uniformity of ao-reement, is apt to become, perforce, an Ishmael among his * Note.— It is singular that there should exist so much misapprehension as to the positions taken by the different Justices of the Supreme Court in this case. Judge Smith's "State Rights" theories, developed m the various stages of this case, are strengthened in the minds of many by a supposed concur- rence, to a greater or less extent, of Chief Justice AMiiton, a Judge who never was famous for "theories," but rather for his clear, practical insight into the law as it is, and a studious avoidance of extraneous matters in his decisions. This supposed concurrence of Judge Whiton is well known to be a mis- take, by those who have read the Report of the case. For the benefit of such as have not the time to read this rather volumin- ous document. I will state briefly the various stages of this case, as far as is given in the 3d vol. of our Reports. The later proceedings are fresher and more familiar The first appUcation of Mr. Booth was made to Justice Smith alone. In his decision upon this application, the Judge criticises the course of Mr. 56 ARE WE A NATIOX ? judicial brethren, and to make use of the vague generalities of the politician, instead of tlie precise langnage of Jnrispru- dence. He is likely to insist on reiterating phrases applicable only to a state of things which the Constitution was made to remedy, as if reassertions could endow them with vitality or could clothe them with truth. He is compelled, in order to sustain his position, to assert that the Constitution is a " compact between the States,^' not- withstanding it contains no covenants between the States, that the States are not mentioned in it as parties, that, by its own terms it emanates from " the people " as directly as the Con- stitutions of the States, that its language throughout is not the language of compact or treaty, but the imperative dialect of command, to the States as well as to the citizen ; and in face Booth in allowing two opportunities of applying to the whole Court to pass unimproved. Says the Judge : "I am at a loss to conceive the motive which may have induced him or his advisers to forego such opportunities. " Whether by design or from neccessity, this application has been made to me." (Rep. vol. 3, p. 9.) ]\Ir. Booth had waived the technical defences which were sufficient to discharge him, and saw fit, in the words of the Judge ' ' to demand his discharge upon the invalidity of the law by vu-tue of which the warrant was issued, or not at all," and the Judge remarks most properly, " I can neither permit, nor accept an such issue. " It seems rather strange, after such an introduction, that the Judge shox^ld go on, and give a very lengthy opinion, not only as to the constitutionaUty of the Fugitive Slave Law, but also as to the nature of our Government, enunciating the State Rights theories which have been so much talked abou.t, and so little under- stood, in this State. One is led to fear that the Judge did, in this way (involuntarily) further the very designs which Mr. Booth entertained. This was the first proceeding. Afterwards a writ of " Certiorari " was allowed, and the case came before the whole Court, where it should have come in the first instance. The Justices delivered separate opinions, all of them agreeing as to the vital point in the case, viz., the discharge of ]VIr. Booth on account of the defective- ness of the process by which he was held, but each giving his own views as to other matters. Chief Justice WTiiton beheved the Fugitive Slave Law imconstitutional, but nowhere assents, any more than Justice Crawford, to the State Rights Theories of Justice Smith. In fact, he expressly admits the ARE WE A NATION ? 57 of the fiict that those who made the Constitution intended to supercede an inefficient "compact" by a Government endowed with the sovereig-n characteristics inherent in the very idea of a government. He is compelled to say that the State and general govern- ments are "co-ordinate and co-equal witliin the respective spheres of the departments of the system," while, in fact, these terms are no more applicable than they would be to the respec- tive orbital spheres of Saturn, and of this Earth, which groans under so manv fallacies. authority of the Federal Supreme Court, for in reply to the objection that the Supreme Coui-t of the XJ. S. had passed upon the Law in question, he says that there had been no adjudication by that Court upon the " Act of 1850," consequently (these are his very words), "we are not at liberty to consider the question of the right of a person claimed as a fugitive to a trial by jury before he can be surrendered, or delivered up to the claimant, as already settled by the Coiu-t which has the power finally to decide all questions gi'owing out of an alleged violation of the Constitution of the United States by an Act of Congress. We must consider the question an open one." Wis. Rep., vol. '^. p. 63. Let this be always remembered, when it is sought to fortify the individual views of Judge Smith, by the supposed concuiTence, in some degree, of the venerable Chief Justice. This was the second proceeding. Then, on the 21st of July, 1854, Mr. Booth made another application for a " Habeas Corinis," to deliver him from imprisonment on a warrant from the District Court of the U. S. This the Court refused to grant, on the ground that the District Court had obtained jurisdiction. This was the third proceeding. Then, the two applications of Booth and Rj'ecraft, which were the same in all respects, were presented to the Court, Jan. 2G, 1855. These applica- tions prayed for relief from imprisonment by virtue of a verdict rendered in the District Court. The Justices deHvered their opinions seriatim. Chief Justice ^^^liton declaring the petitioners entitled to their discharge, on the ground that the District Court had, in these cases, " no jurisdiction to pro- nounce a judg-ment," referring to the opinion of Justice Crawford for a fuller exposition of that question. Justice Smith comes to the same result, but theo- rizes quite at large upon the Constitution. Judges unanimous as to the dis- charge of the petitioners, Judge Smith, as in the previous instances, alone and unsupported in his State Rights theories, by his Associates. The subsequent proceedings are familiar to every body. 58 AEE WE A NATION ? He is compelled to assert that " the Fathers provided no iinal umpire to decide, in the last resort, between the States and the General Government,"' in face of the recorded declara- tions of these "Fathers " to the contrary, expressed so plainly, and with so ranch precision, that one would suppose that even the Calhoun metaphysics could not refine away their meaning. He is compelled to reply to the objection of an endless diversity of interpretations, were the State Courts the Una] arbiters of Constitutional construction, by the trifling query, " what of it'^ " But it must have been difficult to have forgot- ten, that it was the avowed object of the Fathers who made the Constitution, to terminate the discordant wranglings of Thirteen Independent States, each construing, finally and differently, the Articles of the Confederation. He is compelled to argue the equal propriety of an appeal from the Federal to a State Court, with that of a State to the Federal Court, by putting the irrelevant inquiry, " Is his Honor, Mr. Justice Nelson, any more competent to determine the law or the Constitution in Wasliington than in Albany? as a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, than of the Court of Appeals of his own State ?" while it would have been just as apposite to ask " why his Honor Judge Paine, sitting at Madison, on the Supreme Bench, should be more competent to construe the law finally, rather than when sitting as County Judge at Milwaukee?" It is difficult to ignore the plain meaning of the Constitu- tion, the circumstances of its origin, and the objects which were sought by its framers, which were presented by its friends and advocates to the people who adopted it as their supreme law, and which indicate plainly the extent of the powers thus granted by them. It would seem difficult to im- AEE WE A NATION ? 59 pngn the wisdom of the greatest judicial minds of the country, who have, for seventy years, in the various State tribunals, acknowledged the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as the "key-stone of our Constitutional Fabric." But there are, unfortunately, no limits to assumptions or to their acceptance. The wildest legal chimeras that ever sprung, "like Minerva, full-grown from the head of Jove," if clad with some tattered rags of legal and political phraseology, however motley or ill-adjusted, and tricked out with a few "grand, swelling phrases" of liberty, will find disciples, de- fenders, and friends enough to drown the "still, small voice" of dissenting reason. The people are always sound in their fundamental convic- tions of right and wrong, but are apt to associate the errors and iniquities of the ofhcer with any question involving the powers belonging to his office, and to desire the curtailment of powers which have been abused. If our own State Court were to decree palpable and gross injustice, or to pervert our laws to any dangerous extent, it M^ould soon find that the powers entrusted to it were given for good, and not for evil purposes, and that these powers would be treated as nullities by an indignant people. There is a " Higher Law," of earlier and more authoritative origin than any human enactments ; a law which is the ideal standard of wise law-givers, and which, as human laws approach, in that pro])ortion are they excel- lent — whose mandates can never be disobeyed without danger of penalties which are awful and infinite. But men of education and ability should never attempt to deceive the people, to trifle with the high behests of con- science, or make it the interpreter of a written and definite Constitution ; they should not pervert historical facts ; con- temn the authoritv of men who are entitled to our reverence ; 60 ARE WE A I^ATION ? nor substitute fanciful speculations as to what our government should be, for the real government established by the people, and endowed by them with substantial powers ; which has been efiectual for good, yet is liable in bad hands to produce evil ; which has accomplished, and is yet to accomplish, the work of a substantial government, supreme within its clearly defined sphere, and which is no more than adequate to the growing exigencies of a vigorous and homogenous people. We have embarked, as a people, upon a new and untried experiment in self-government, in the success or failure of which we all feel a common interest. The fibres of our na- tional life are all knitted closely together in a solidarity of happiness or woe, and are all affected when one is unstrung or diseased. We are all in one boat, are exposed to common dangers, and all suffer from the evils or the misfortunes of the remotest districts. Maine and California, Wisconsin and Georgia, are as far apart as England and Turkey, as France and Egypt, but the ties of interest and the pulsations of feeling are as strong and tremulous as between any neighboring counties of England. When our fellow-citizens in Kentucky or Virginia are wan- tonly stripped of their constitutional rights, we in Wisconsin instinctively feel that the Aegis of our common government ought to shelter them from the fierce storms of State fanati- cism. When the jurisprudence of great States has become perverted into an instrument of oppression and cruelty, we all, from Maine to California, naturally look to the Tri- bunal which was instituted by our fathers "to establish justice," and we feel assured that they gave to it powers adequate for the attainment of this benign object. Nor will we, if we are wise, abridge or refine away the plainly given and necessary |;)Owers of the government to suit ARE WE A NATION ? 61 the requirements of a finely-gpun theory, which was devised thirty years ago by the subtlest and most dangerous brain ever influential in our politics, in anticipation of events which are yet fully to develop themselves, and to provide for an unfortunate section of our country in advance, a Constitutional doctrine, by virtue of which the rights of citizens of the United States, the Constitutional safeguards to life, liberty and property, and the authority and laws of the General Gov- ernment, might all be subject to the "discretion" of State despotism. If dangers thicken around the pathway of our national pro- gress ; if the " whole head " of our nation is sick, and the " whole heart faint," by reason of Executive corruption, and of judicial partizanship which poisons the very fountains of justice and paralyzes the influence which has belonged, and will yet belong, to the tribunal of final resort ; it becomes, more than ever, the duty and necessity of the people to fill these high places with true men, and such as are equal to the stern requirements of the times. The work will be arduous, protracted, and beset with trials of our faith, but it must be done ; it will be done. Even now all the omens are en- couraging. It is not, however, by evasive or forced constructions, which would palsy the energy and powers of the General Govern- ment, and would lead us back to chaos again, that we can restore the glorious era of our first Presidents, when the Executive arm was efficient for the good of the whole country, when the National Legislature cared for all of the national interests, and when the Supreme Tribunal of the Union was the uni- versally venerated fountain of our jurisprudence, the recog- nized arbiter of every Constitutional question which assumed the form of a case for its decision, and the refuge of the 62 ARE WE A NATION? wronged aud oppressed, from the erroneous or prejudiced judgments of State Courts. The whole government, through the dominant influence of an immense monied interest, corrupt and corrupting, through the criminal political apathy of good men and the demoral- izing strifes of parties, has been drifting away from the noble purposes and aims of its founders, until it seems to be already upon the fatal rocks and breakers ; but, now that we are thus brought face to face with near perils involving all Americans in common disasters, shall we take to the boats, because our pilots have betrayed their trust ? Should we not, rather, speedily fill their places with loyal men, and strain every sail and spar, until we have regained our lost track, and are again steering by the old charts, over the old course, cheered by the auspicious constellations which beamed upon our fathers ? V' ; I' -'1 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 011 839 163 9 § -^-/ <^'