LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
 
 SiLelf....K-5.; 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
THE POWER AND AUTHORITY ] 
 
 1 
 OF j 
 
 SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS 1 
 
 IN THE MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNMENT OF 
 PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND OVER PUPILS OUT OF SCHOOL 
 
 AS DETERMINED BY THE 
 
 COURTS OF THE SEVERAL STATES 
 
 A MEMBER OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAR ] 
 
 NEW YORK 
 HARPER & BROTHERS, FRANKLIN SQUARE 
 
 1885 
 
i%. V. 
 
 
 Copyright, 1885, by Harper & Brothers. 
 
 All righU reserved. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 This collection of decisions, bearing upon the 
 powers and authority of school officers and teach- 
 ers in the management and government of public 
 schools, is the result of a careful examination of re- 
 ported cases in the several states. The work was 
 first undertaken to enable me, as a school officer, 
 to answer, with some show of authority, the ques- 
 tions constantly presented. Its publication has 
 been advised and urged by many directly interested 
 in school work, and by a large number of teachers 
 eminent in their profession. The need of such a 
 book has been long felt and acknowledged. With- 
 out commenting upon the form or substance of 
 other publications relating to the law of schools, it 
 is sufficient to say that this book, in plan and scope, 
 is unlike all others, and certainly embodies more 
 recent law than any other. 
 
 My plan has been to fully state the facts upon 
 which each case arose and was determined, and the 
 opinion of the court, not the substance of the deci- 
 sion. The cases relating to the same subject matter 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 have been grouped, and reported An tlie order of 
 date, with cross references and annotations. 
 
 In a number of states the decision of all ques- 
 tions arising in the administration of schools is left 
 to the school oflScers, with provisions for appeal 
 from town or subordinate officials to those of the 
 county, and thence to the highest school officials of 
 the state. In some states the final decisions are 
 published. In making up this collection of cases I 
 have not resorted to the decisions thus made, but 
 have taken those rendered by courts. In the re- 
 ports of cases decided by school officials the state- 
 ment of facts and the decision are usually very mea- 
 gre and unsatisfactory, while the opinion of a court 
 defines the principles governing the case. Again, 
 the tribunals thus created within the school system 
 follow and depend, in a large measure, upon the 
 law as announced by courts. 
 
 I have added at the close of the book, in appendi- 
 ces, abstracts of the laws of the states relating to the 
 supervision of schools, and the suspension, expulsion, 
 and punishment of pupils, and other matters. 
 
 The Compiler. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 General Powers of School Officers Page 2 
 
 What is a Eeasonable Rule ? 2 
 
 Rule as to Tardiness and Absence 3 
 
 Bendick Y. Bahcock^ I ^1 T ■ 'SC^ 3 
 Chandler v. Bahcock^ ) ' 
 
 Thompson v. Beaver, 63 111. 356.... , 8 
 
 Russell V. Lynnfield, 116 Mass. 366. 9 
 
 Ferriter v. Tyler, 48 Vt. 444 , 10 
 
 King V. Jefferson City School Board, 11 Mo. 628 .. . 20 
 
 Churchill v. Fewkes, 13 Brad. Rep. 520 22 
 
 Rules Concerning Studies 24 
 
 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 24 
 
 Guernsey v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 226 33 
 
 Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 34 
 
 Rulison V. Post, 79 111. 567 41 
 
 Sewell V. Board of Fducation, 29 0. St. 89 44 
 
 Trustees v. People, 87 111. 303 46 
 
 State V. Mizner, 50 Iowa, 152 * 50 
 
 Kidder v. Chellis, 59 K H. 473 52 
 
 Note 56 
 
 Rules in Other Cases 68 
 
 Spiller V. Woburn, 12 All. 127 68 
 
 Perkins v. Board of Directors, 56 Iowa, 479 72 
 
 Suspension and Expulsion 74 
 
 Hodgkins v. Rockport, 105 Mass. 475 76 
 
VI CONTENTS. 
 
 Suspension and Expulsion — Continued: 
 
 Scott V. School 'District, 46 Vt. 452 .Page 11 
 
 State V. Burtoyi, 45 Wis. 150 78 
 
 Parker v. School District, 5 Lea, 525 80 
 
 Davis V. City of Boston, 133 Mass. 103 83 
 
 Hughes v. Goodell, 3 Pitts. R. 264 86 
 
 Peck V. Smith, 41 Conn. 442 88 
 
 Rights and Powers oyer Pupils for Acts Committed 
 
 Out op School. , . , 91 
 
 Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. 160 91 
 
 Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 96 
 
 Murphy v. Board of Directors, 30 Iowa, 429 99 
 
 Dritt V. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286 102 
 
 Corporal Punishment 105 
 
 State V. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. & Batt. 365 105 
 
 Hathaioay v. Rice, 19 Vt. 102 109 
 
 Stevens v. Fassett, 21 Me. 266 110 
 
 Cooper V. McJunMn, 4 Ind. 291 113 
 
 Gardner v. State, 4 lud. 633 115 
 
 Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray, 36 116 
 
 Anderson v. State, 3 Head, 455 119 
 
 Lander v. Seaver, 82 Vt. 114 121 
 
 State V. Mizner, 50 Iowa, 152 122 
 
 Dannenhoffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295 124 
 
 Commonwealth v. Seed, 5 Pa. L. J. R. 78 126 
 
 Note 129 
 
 Rules Need not be Recorded, and Rules Made by 
 
 Teachers and Ratified by Board are Binding 130 
 
 Pupils Over Age Subject to Rules 133 
 
 Teachers Acting in Good Faith not Personally Liable 1 34 
 
 Authority op Teacher in Charge op School, without 
 
 Holding Certificate op Appointment 138 
 
 State V. Williams, 21 Yt 156 140 
 
CONTENTS. Vll 
 
 APPENDIX A. Page 
 
 Statk Laws in Relation to Powers of School Officers,. 143 
 
 APPENDIX B. 
 
 State Laws in Relation to Suspension and Expulsion.. 159 
 
 APPENDIX C. 
 
 State Laws in Relation to Powers of Teachers 167 
 
 APPENDIX D. 
 
 State Laws in Relation to Insults to Teachers 169 
 
 INDEX Ill 
 
POWER AND AUTHORITY 
 
 OF 
 
 SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 
 
 In defining herein the rights and powers of teach- 
 ers and school ofiicers in the management of schools, 
 as determined by the courts of last resort of the 
 several states of the Union, we assume, at the out- 
 set, that the school officers — committee, visitors, 
 trustees, directors, or however designated by statute 
 — have been legally chosen ; that the teachers have 
 been found worthy and well qualified, and have re- 
 ceived certificates of approval and election from the 
 proper source;* that the school taxes have been 
 legally assessed ; that the person having such duty 
 has employed a boy to open and sweep the school- 
 room and build the fire ; that the scholars have 
 arrived, and the teacher is ready to call them to 
 order. 
 
 * For authority of teacher having no certificate, see p. 138. 
 
2 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 By starting from tliis point we /know better where 
 we are, and escape a great number of conflicting de- 
 cisions which arose in the judicial interpretation of 
 statutes enacted in the early days of school legisla- 
 tion. 
 
 GENERAL POWERS OF SCHOOL OFFICERS. 
 
 A general power of charge and supervision of 
 schools includes the power to make- all reasona- 
 ble rules and regulations for the discipline, govern- 
 ment, and management of the schools. (5 Gush. 
 [Mass.] 198; 8 Gush. [Mass.] 160; 12 All. [Mass.] 
 127; 105 Mass. 476; 63 111. 353.) 
 
 (For power as given by law in different states, 
 see Appendix A.) 
 
 WHAT IS -A REASONABLE RULE 
 
 is a question of law to be determined by the courts, 
 or by officers designated by law to pass upon ques- 
 tions arising in the administration of the school 
 laws. (63 111. 353 ; 48 Yt. 476, 477.) The Iowa 
 Supreme Gourt makes a general definition as fol- 
 lows; "Any rule of the school, not subversive of 
 the rights of the children or parents, or in conflict 
 with humanity and the precepts of divine law, which 
 tends to advance the object of the law in establish- 
 ing public schools, must be considered reasonable 
 and proper." (31 Iowa, 565.) 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 
 
 RULE AS TO TARDINESS AND ABSENCE. 
 
 Iowa, ISVl. — Bendick v. Bahcock^ ) 
 
 Chandler v. Babcock, \ ^^ ^^^''^' ^^2- 
 
 The board of directors and teachers in a district 
 in Iowa adopted the following rules, among others: 
 " Any pupil who is absent six half days in any con- 
 secutive four weeks, and two times tardy, shall be 
 counted as one absence, unless detained by sickness 
 or other unavoidable cause, and shall be suspended 
 from the schools until the end of the terra, or until 
 reinstated by the superintendent or board." " Teach- 
 ers may require absence and tardiness to be certified 
 to by parent or guardian in writing, or personally, 
 or by special messenger. All lessons lost on account 
 of absence may be made up at the discretion of the 
 teacher." 
 
 Two cases arising under this rule were passed 
 upon by the Supreme Court in 1871. In the first, 
 a boy was absent and tardy, and was suspended. 
 The teacher notified the boy's father, and informed 
 him that his boy could return if proper excuse were 
 rendered, and assurance given that the acts would 
 not be repeated. The father replied that he kept 
 the boy at home to work, and for that reason he 
 was absent and tardy ; that he could give no assur- 
 ance as to the future, and claimed the right to keep 
 his boy at home at any time for the above purpose, 
 and, notwithstanding the above rule, to send him to 
 school. 
 
4 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 In the second case a girl was siispended for being 
 absent. Her parents represented that she was kept 
 from school to be taken upon a visit with them ; 
 that they were poor, and unable to leave their chil- 
 dren at home when they went visiting, and had to 
 take her with them. 
 
 The suspended pupils brought suit against the di- 
 rectors and superintendent for damages, and asked 
 the court to restrain the directors from enforcing 
 the rule. It was claimed that the rule first quoted 
 was unreasonable, oppressive, and unjust. The court 
 held otherwise, and decided it to be reasonable and 
 proper, and in the course of the opinion say : 
 
 "The object of public schools, as established by 
 our laws, is to secure education to the children of 
 the state. The intention of the law is, not that the 
 children shall, at certain times or on certain days, 
 be simply gathered together, but that, when assem- 
 bled, they shall be instructed. Their progress in 
 learning is the grand object of the law. ... It re-^ 
 quires but little experience in the instruction of 
 children and youth to convince any one that the 
 only means which will assure progress in their stud- 
 ies is to secure their attendance ; the application of 
 the powers of their minds to the studies in which 
 they are instructed. . . . But this cannot be done 
 if they are at school one day and at home the next; 
 if a recitation is omitted or a lesson left unlearned 
 at the whim or convenience of parents. . . . The 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 5 
 
 rule requiring prompt and constant attendance is 
 for the good of the pupil, and to secure the very 
 objects the law had in view in establishing public 
 schools. It is, therefore, reasonable and proper. . . . 
 
 " Tardiness-^that is, arriving late — is a direct in- 
 jury to the whole school. The confusion of hurry- 
 ing to seats, gathering together of books, etc., by 
 tardy ones, at a time when all should be at study, 
 cannot fail. to greatly impede the progress of those 
 who are regular and prompt in attendance. The 
 rule requiring prompt and regular attendance is de- 
 manded for the good of the whole school. While 
 it may be admitted that absence and tardiness are 
 acts committed out of school hours, yet, as their 
 effects and consequences operate upon the school— 
 the pupils when assembled for instruction— they 
 are therefore subject to control by rules for the gov- 
 ernment of the schools. . . . The rule in question, as 
 we have shown, operates directly upon the order of 
 the school ; upon the pupils when assembled for in- 
 struction. It promotes efficiency to the school, and 
 secures the progress of the pupils in their studies. 
 It is therefore a rule for the government of the school, 
 and must be regarded as proper and reasonable, and 
 wuthin the authority of the school officers to pre- 
 scribe and enforce. 
 
 "It is argued that the rule interferes with pa- 
 rental authority, inasmuch as it deprives the parent 
 of his right to the services and society of the child 
 
6 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 at times "when Ije may require 'them. ... If he 
 would have him make proper advances in school, he 
 must not distract his attention and slacken his in- 
 terest by interruptions for a day or two in a week, 
 or an hour or so in a day, for the little advantage 
 that he may derive from his labor during such 
 times. Neither has the parent the right to interfere 
 with the order of the school, or the progress of the 
 pupils, by sending his own child at times and in a 
 condition that will, as we have seen, prove an an- 
 noyance and hinderance to others. ... 
 
 "Again, it is said that the rule visits upon the 
 child punishment for the parent's offence. That is, 
 the child is kept from school through the fault of 
 the parent, and is punished for the act of the par- 
 ent in detaining him. If the good of the children 
 were to be considered only, there would be force in 
 this argument ; but it is completely answered by the 
 consideration that the parent's act is an injury to 
 the whole school. He makes the child, in the ex- 
 ercise of his authority, a source of annoyance and 
 absolute injury to all the other pupils of the school. 
 This he cannot do. The child, through no fault of 
 his own or of his parents, may be afflicted with a 
 contagious disease ; yet, as the good of other pupils 
 demanded it, he may be for that reason forbidden 
 attendance at the school (Spear v. Cummings, 23 
 Pick. 225). So, if, by the exercise of parental au- 
 thority, the child is made to act in such a manner 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 7 
 
 as to interfere with the progress of his fellow-pu- 
 pils, it is the duty of those having charge of the 
 school to remove the evil by dismissing the pupil 
 causing it. The good of the whole school cannot 
 be sacrificed for the advantage of one pupil who has 
 an unreasonable father. 
 
 " It is urged as an objection to the rules in ques- 
 tion that poor parents who require at certain times 
 of the day, as the morning hours, or during the 
 whole of school-days, the services of their children 
 to aid in earning their support, will be prohibited 
 sending them to the public schools. But this appli- 
 cation of the rules is foreign to their spirit, and it 
 cannot be presumed that they will be unjustly and 
 wantonly enforced in cases not in their spirit. The 
 tenth rule provides that absence and tardiness, un- 
 less from sickness or other unavoidable causes, shall 
 be punished by suspension ; and the eleventh rule 
 provides that the parents may be required to certify 
 the cause of absence and tardiness. Now we cannot 
 believe that a school board or school teacher within 
 our state will not accept as an unavoidable cause of 
 absence or delay in reaching school the fact that the 
 child's services, at such times, were demanded for 
 its own support or that of its parent. In such cases 
 the school boards and teachers will be bound to per- 
 mit inconveniences and annoyances to other pupils, 
 which we have above pointed out, for the sake of 
 such unfortunate ones, upon whom want has en- 
 
8 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 forced the necessity of labor daring school hours* 
 No such case as this is made by the records before us. 
 
 "In the first case the son was detained from 
 school to do some work in preparing * shrubbery for 
 winter,' and his tardiness resulted from the fact that 
 he had ' two cows to take care of/ and was required 
 * to do the marketing for the family.' These facts 
 do not indicate a condition in life that requires the 
 labor of a lad either for his own support or for that 
 of his parents. 
 
 "In the other case the daughter was kept from 
 school to visit with her parents. A family that can 
 afford to visit may well keep their children at 
 school, and if this can only be done by the parents 
 depriving themselves of the pleasures of visiting, it 
 is not too great a sacrifice to secure the great bene- 
 fits of education to their offspring." 
 
 The foregoing views, it is believed, are sus- 
 tained by the following cases: Sherman v. Charles- 
 towrij 8 Cush. 160; Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 
 379; Landers v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114; Guernsey v. 
 Pitkin, 32 Vt. 224; Spiller v. Wohurn, 12 All. 
 127.* 
 
 Illinois, \%l2.— niompson\. Beaver, 63 111. 356. 
 
 Directors of a district in Illinois made a rule that 
 the school -house doors should be barred against 
 tardy children. In an action to determine certain 
 * See p. 10. (48 Vt. 444.) 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 9 
 
 powers of township trustees, the power of school 
 directors was considered, as bearing upon this rule. 
 
 The Supreme Court said: 
 
 "The directors undoubtedly have the power to 
 make and cause to be enforced all reasonable rules 
 and regulations for the government of schools in 
 their respective districts. What are reasonable rules 
 is a question of law, and we do not hesitate to de- 
 clare that a rule that would bar the doors of the 
 school-house against little children who had come 
 from so great a distance (a mile and a half) in the 
 cold winter, for no other reason than that they were 
 a few minutes tardy, is unreasonable, and therefore 
 unlawful. In its practical operation it amounts to 
 little less than wanton cruelty." 
 
 Massachusetts, 1874. — Rixssell v. Lynnjield, 116 Mass. 366. 
 
 One member of the school committee of Lynn- 
 field, Mass., made a rule that if a pupil was tardy 
 twice the teacher should send the pupil to him. 
 This rule was subsequently assented to by the other 
 members of the board. A girl was tardy the sec- 
 ond time, and the teacher told her to go to the 
 above member of the committee. She left the 
 schoolroom, but, instead of obeying the command 
 of the teacher, went directly home. For this diso- 
 bedience the teacher suspended her from school un- 
 til she should conform to the rule. 
 
 The girl brought suit, but the Supreme Court de- 
 
10 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 cided in favor of the rule. Th6 justice delivering 
 the opinion of the court says : " For the disobedi- 
 ence of a regulation established to prevent tardiness, 
 the plaintiff was suspended from a public school un- 
 til she should conform to the rule. . . . Upon the 
 case here presented we cannot see that there was 
 not a reasonable exercise on the part of the teacher 
 of the power necessary to punish disobedience and 
 promote the proper government and discipline of 
 the school." 
 
 Yermont, 1876. — Ferriter v. Tyler^ 48 Yt. 444. 
 
 An important case was decided by the Supreme 
 Court of Vermont in 1876. The decision was to 
 the effect that the committee of a school district 
 had authority to exclude children from school for 
 absence contrary to the rules thereof, although such 
 absence was in obedience to the command of Cath- 
 olic parents and their priest, and for the purpose of 
 atttending religious services. 
 
 The priest of a Catholic church in Brattleboro, on 
 the morning of June 4th, 1874, sent to the commit- 
 tee of Brattleboro this note : 
 
 " You will confer a favor on us Catholics by ex- 
 empting the Catholic children from attending school 
 on all holy days. I should have called and explained 
 our reasons, but have not had opportunity as yet." 
 
 The committee replied as follows : 
 
 " Your note is just received. To comply with 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 11 
 
 your request involves closing two of our schools, 
 and greatly interrupting several others. This we 
 never have done, and cannot do. "We have great 
 pride in our schools, in which the Catholic children 
 are as well treated as any." 
 
 The 4th day of June, 1874, was called " holy 
 Corpus Christi day ;" and considered and set apart 
 by the Catholic Church as a holy day. Catholic 
 parents were directed by their spiritual adviser, their 
 priest, to attend services on that day, and have their 
 children do so. On the day before, the Catholic 
 children informed their teachers that they should 
 not attend school on the next day, that it was a 
 holy day, and they had been directed by their priest 
 to attend services at church on that day. The 
 teachers replied that they could not be excused for 
 that purpose. On the morning of the 4th of June 
 five or six of such scholars called on the committee 
 and said they had heard that the committee would 
 not excuse them, if they were absent to attend 
 church on that day ; to whom the committee replied 
 that they had not been requested to excuse them, 
 and that they could not have done so, if they had 
 been requested. The children then went to their 
 priest, and soon returned with the note from him 
 above recited. 
 
 Some sixty Catholic children, by direction and 
 command of their parents, were kept from school 
 to attend religious services. When they applied for 
 
12 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 admission to the schools they were' told by the com- 
 mittee thatj as they had absented themselves without 
 permission, and in violation of the rules of the 
 school, which they well understood, they could not 
 return without an assurance from their parents or 
 their priest that in future they would comply with 
 the rules of the schools. The committee assured the 
 children, their parents, and also the priest, that if 
 the schools would not again be interrupted in like 
 manner they would gladly admit the children to 
 them. The priest and parents refused to comply 
 with this proposal, and claimed that on all days 
 which they regard as holy, they could, as matter of 
 right, take their children from the schools, without 
 any regard to the rules thereof. 
 
 For more than ten years there had been a rule, 
 required by the committee, that those registered as 
 scholars for a given term should be constant and 
 regular in their attendance, and not be absent, ex- 
 cept by permission of the teachers or the committee, 
 on reasonable cause shown. The committee claimed 
 the right, which they had exercised, to suspend from 
 school during the remainder of the current term, 
 scholars who violated the rule. 
 
 The parents asked the Supreme Court to restrain 
 the committee from excluding their children from 
 school, and based their claims upon two grounds : 
 
 First. " Their constitutional right to worship God 
 accordino- to the dictates of their own consciences, 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 13 
 
 without being abridged in the enjoyment of their 
 civil rights." Second. Their " right to exercise par- 
 ental authority and government over their children 
 as regards their moral training and culture." 
 
 The court held, at the outset, that the parents 
 were not the proper parties to the suit, but, in view 
 of the importance of the subject, they considered it 
 on a broader ground, by supposing the children to 
 have been substituted for the parents. 
 
 The " rights of conscience " article in the Consti- 
 tution of Vermont is : " That all men have a natu- 
 ral and inalienable right to worship Almighty God 
 according to the dictates of their own consciences 
 and understandings, as in their opinion shall be reg- 
 ulated by the word of God ; and that no man ought 
 to, or of right can, be compelled to attend any re- 
 ligious worship, etc., contrary to the dictates of his 
 conscience;, nor can any man be justly deprived or 
 abridged of any civil right as a citizen on account 
 of his religious sentiments or peculiar mode of re- 
 ligious worship ; and no authority can or ought to 
 be vested in or assumed by any power whatever that 
 shall in any case interfere with, or in any manner 
 control, the rights of conscience in the free exercise 
 of religious worship: nevertheless, every sect Or 
 denomination of Christians ought to observe the 
 Sabbath or Lord's day, and keep up some sort of 
 religious worship, which to them shall seem most 
 agreeable to the revealed will of God." 
 
14 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 The following ^^re extracts from the opinion ren- 
 dered by the court : 
 
 "... Art. III. (above recited) was not designed 
 to subjugate the residue of the Constitution, and the 
 important institutions and appliances of the gov- 
 ernment provided by the enacted laws for serving 
 the highest interests of the public as involved in 
 personal condition and social relations,' to the pe- 
 culiar faith, personal judgment, individual will or 
 wish of any one in respect to religion, however his 
 conscience might demand or protest. In that re- 
 spect it is implied that while the individual may 
 hold the utmost of his religious faith, and all his 
 ideas, notions, and preferences as to religious worship 
 and practice, he holds them in reasonable subservi- 
 ency to the equal rights of others, and to the para- 
 mount interests of the public as depending on, and 
 to be served by, general laws and uniform adminis- 
 tration. . . . 
 
 " Let it be granted that parents and others may, 
 npon their own respective reasons, control the at- 
 tendance of the scholars, as against the oflScial right 
 of the committee in that behalf, and practically the 
 ground of system and order and improvement has 
 no existence. ... If a Catholic citizen should be 
 serving on a jury in the midst of a trial when divine 
 service in his church on holy Corpus Christi should 
 be in progress, would it be a violation of his rights 
 under said Art. III. to compel him to keep his seat 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 15 
 
 and serve tlirougli the trial? The same may be 
 asked of the Jew or the seventh-day Baptist, who 
 should be required to do like service on Saturday. 
 The same may be asked of a devout Methodist, when 
 a camp-meeting or a love-feast should be in progress 
 in his vicinage. If either, or all, should refuse to 
 serve, would their rights of conscience under Art. 
 III. be a valid defence in a prosecution for the pen- 
 alty in suck case provided. . . . 
 
 " Let it be repeated then, that that article in the 
 Constitution was not designed to exempt any person 
 or persons of any sect, on the score of conscience as 
 to matters of religion, from the operation and obli- 
 gatory force of the general laws of the state, author- 
 ized by other portions of the same instrument, and 
 designed to serve the purposes contemplated by such 
 other portions ; it was not designed to exempt any 
 persons from the same subjection that others are 
 under to the laws and their administration, on the 
 score that such subjection at times would interfere 
 with the performance of religious rites, and the ob- 
 servance of religious ordinances, which they would 
 deem it their duty to perform and observe but for 
 such subjection. ... 
 
 " It remains now to be considered whether the bill 
 can be maintained on the other ground, namely, the 
 prerogative of parents to control their children as 
 scholars, as against the prerogative of the commit- 
 tee to make and enforce the rule in question. This 
 
16 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 does not involve ^ny right or question of conscience 
 under the Constitution, but only the matter of legal 
 right under the statutes as to public schools. . . . 
 By our statutes the committee are charged with the 
 duty of * adopting all requisite measures,' etc., as 
 before recited.* The graded school in Brattleboro 
 is organized and acts in pursuance of the statutes 
 in that behalf. The committee are chosen and 
 charged with their duties under the same statutes. 
 They adopted rules for the regulation of the schools, 
 and for the improvement of the scholars in learn- 
 ing. The rule in question is for the purpose of 
 inducing and enforcing constancy in attendance. 
 That such constancy is essential to such improve- 
 ment is not debatable. That such attendance is 
 requisite as matter of regulation in order to the 
 necessary classification of the scholars in reference 
 to age, capacity, studies, and proficiency is not de- 
 batable. Those who attend constantly cannot be 
 required to linger, in order that the inconstant may 
 keep along with them ; nor can such inconstant 
 scholars keep equal pace with those who attend 
 constantly. The rule, then, is such as is contem- 
 plated by the statute, so far as the purpose of it is 
 concerned. That purpose is indispensable to the 
 attainment of the object and end proposed by the 
 
 * " Adopting all requisite measures for the inspection, ex- 
 amination, and regulation of the schools, and the improve- 
 ment of the scholars in learning." (Gen. Sts, c. 22, § 39.) 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 17 
 
 statutes, both as to the individual scholar and as to 
 all others who may be affected by his attendance 
 and absence. The answer states, as before recited, 
 that the rule had been in operation for more than 
 ten years. The children of the orators were sub- 
 jected to its operation in the present instance. Was 
 that unlawful ? 
 
 " If the. orators had the right to control the at- 
 tendance of their children as against that rule, then 
 the committee had not the right to maintain and 
 enforce such rule. We are not prepared to sanc- 
 tion a view of the subject that would subordinate 
 the authority of the committee, in the matter of the 
 attendance of the registered scholars, to the will of 
 parents. On the other hand, we do not hesitate to 
 hold and declare as matter of law that, in this re- 
 spect, the citizen is in subordination to the lawful 
 rules for the regulation of schools, and the improve- 
 ment of scholars in learning ; and this is for the 
 same fundamental reason that he is in subordina- 
 tion to the statutes themselves, on that or any other 
 subject ; and it is no more his right to defy or dis- 
 regard those rules than it is to defy and disregard 
 any statute that affects him as a citizen in respect 
 to schools, or any other subject involving the com- 
 mon weal, as it is to be provided for under the Con- 
 stitution by the legislation of the state. . . . 
 
 " Recurring now to what is stated in the answer as 
 to the manner in which the rule has been administered, 
 2 
 
18 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 it is proper to remark, that the lawfulness and pro- 
 priety of the rule are not to be tested or adjudged 
 upon the presumption that the penal part of it will 
 be unjustly or unwarrantably enforced. The pre- 
 sumption is the other way, to wit, that it will be 
 administered justly, and upon, and with reference 
 to, warrantable occasion. If a case should arise in 
 which it should appear that the penalty had been 
 inflicted outside of or beyond the fair scope and 
 reason of the rule, it would be both the province 
 and the duty of the courts to accord proper reme- 
 dy. But, as before demonstrated, this is not such a 
 case. And this leads to the further remark, that the 
 remedy is not sought in this case as against the re- 
 fusal of leave to be absent on the 4th of June ; but 
 as against the imposing, as the condition of remit- 
 ting the penalty, a promise that absence for a simi- 
 lar cause should not be repeated that term. Such 
 promise being refused, the penalty of exclusion was 
 not remitted, and the children did not return to the 
 schools; and hence the position assumed by the 
 orators — the same as already stated — that the com- 
 mittee had not the lawful right to exclude scholars 
 who should be absent by the direction of their 
 parents, contrary to the established rule of the 
 school. 
 
 " As before intimated, this position takes no ac- 
 count of any diJfference of occasion or reason for 
 such direction of parents, whether it be religious 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 19 
 
 service or secular employment or amusement, but is 
 on the ground only of the right of the parent as 
 ao-ainst the rule of the school. In reference to that 
 position, in explicit statement, as the result of the 
 discussion, it is held that the scholars of a school 
 are amenable to the school authorities as to their 
 conduct as scholars affectijig the school, notwith- 
 standing the prerogative of their parents in respect 
 to them.* . . . The rule in question in this case, and 
 the enforcement of it, are subject to the judgment 
 of the courts as between the parties to the suit. It 
 is easy to suppose cases in which such enforcement 
 would be beyond the lawful right of the committee. 
 The rule itself, in terms and intent, contemplates 
 exclusions as a penalty only where permission to be 
 absent is withheld for want of reasonable cause 
 shown. In case of casual sickness of the scholar ; 
 of sickness or death in the family of the scholar ; 
 of some impediment, like fire or flood ; in case of 
 various incidents of current life, giving occasion for 
 temporary absence, the enforcement of the penalty 
 of exclusion would, under such circumstances, be 
 adjuTlged to be unauthorized under the statutes and 
 law by which the subject is governed." 
 
 * See as to this point, p. 3. (31 Iowa, 562.) 
 
20 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 Missouri, 1880. — King v. Jefferson City School Board, '71 Mo. 
 628. 
 
 The following is from an opinion rendered by the 
 Supreme Court of Missouri in 1880, in an action 
 against the School Board of Jefferson City for the 
 suspension of a boy under the rule stated. 
 
 "The rule is as follows: *Any pupil absent six 
 half days in four consecutive weeks, without satis- 
 factory excuse, shall be suspended from school.' The 
 statute provides (R. S. 1879, § 7045) that *the 
 board shall have the power to make all needful rules 
 and regulations for the organization, grading, and 
 government of the schools in their district.' It is 
 clear that the legislature have intrusted to this school 
 board the duty of making regulations, touching the 
 government of the school, of the necessity and pro- 
 priety of which they are primarily the judges. They 
 are elected by the people of the district, and must 
 be presumed to be conversant with the subject, and 
 have no motive to make any rules except such as, 
 in their best judgment, are necessary and proper 
 to promote the objects of our common-school sys- 
 tem. ... 
 
 " It is said that occasional absences from school 
 on the part of the pupil, or truancy as it is familiar- 
 ly termed, is of no importance to any one except 
 the pupil or his parents, and its indulgence is, there- 
 fore, not to be attended with such punishment as 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 21 
 
 suspension or expulsion from the school entirely ; 
 that every child has a right to go to the public 
 school, and that right cannot be taken away by a 
 rule of the board ; that such rule is subversive of 
 the object of our system of common schools, which 
 was designed to throw open and leave open the 
 doors of the school to all children of the proper 
 age, and give them an opportunity of acquiring such 
 education as will fit them for the after-duties of life. 
 This is true, but this right of attending school nec- 
 essarily requires, when the school is joined, and 
 while such attendance continues, a submission to 
 the regulations of the school. 
 
 " Suppose Rule 11 to be inverted, and instead of 
 reading as it now stands, should read thus ; ' Any 
 pupil is at liberty to go a-fishing during school 
 hours and be absent a half day or a whole day, and 
 as many days as he pleases, provided he conducts 
 himself decently when in attendance on school.' 
 And this is the point to which the argument of the 
 plaintiff tends. The pupil, it is urged, is at liberty 
 to be absent when he pleases, and such absence is a 
 matter solely between him and his parents. But 
 the studies in our public schools are, I presume, 
 classified according to the ages and advancement of 
 the scholars ; and the continued or repeated ab- 
 sences of one of a class not only is injurious to the 
 absentee, but if allowed beyond a certain point is 
 calculated to demoralize those who attend, and de- 
 
22 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 range the orderly, instructions of the teacher. Taxes 
 are not collected to pay teachers to sit in front of 
 empty benches, or to hunt up truant boys. Such 
 absences, when without excuse, are the fault of the 
 parents, whose business it is to see that the attend- 
 ance of their child is regular, unless prevented by 
 causes which will, of course, be an excuse under the 
 rule now in question. My opinion is, that the rule 
 in question was clearly within the power of the 
 board of directors, and that it is not our business to 
 supervise its expediency, even if we might differ 
 with the board on that point, but all the judges are 
 of opinion that the rule was a reasonable and proper 
 
 Illinois, ISSZ.—ChurcJdll v. Fewkes, 18 Brad. Kep. 520. 
 
 This action was by pupil against school directors 
 and teachers for expulsion from school. The direc- 
 tors had made the following rules: 
 
 " Any pupil who shall be absent six one half days, 
 without a valid excuse, shall be liable to suspension 
 from study, and no pupil thus suspended shall be 
 restored without permission from the board." 
 
 " All pupils will be required to bring written ex- 
 cuses from their parents to teachers for absence, 
 and such excuses must be satisfactory and reason- 
 able, otherwise it will not be granted." 
 
 The pupil suspended was absent from school 
 about two weeks, in violation of these rules. When 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 23 
 
 she returned she declined to give any reason what- 
 ever for her absence. The teacher called her atten- 
 tion to the rules, and informed her that it would be 
 necessary for her to bring a written excuse from her 
 mother. The parents refused to give a written ex- 
 cuse showing why she had been absent, although 
 she was absent with their knowledge and consent. 
 After several days the principal of the school and 
 assistant teacher each wrote a letter, couched in polite 
 terms, to the mother (believing her to be the only 
 parent), calling her attention to the rules of the 
 school as prepared and adopted by the board of di- 
 rectors, and their duty in the premises, and respect- 
 fully asking that she would furnish her daughter 
 with a reasonable excuse for her absence from school. 
 No reply was made to these letters, and after the 
 lapse of some four or five days, no excuse having 
 been received from the parents, the child was sus- 
 pended from further recitations. 
 
 The suit was then brought. 
 
 The court decided that an action would not lie 
 against a public officer acting in good faith, af- 
 firming the law as laid down in McCormick v. Burt 
 (p. 134), and thus commented upon the rule : 
 
 '' The rule in question is not a hard or harsh one. 
 It does not of itself indicate any sinister or malevo- 
 lent purpose, or wicked force, on the part of the 
 directors. It does not trench upon the rights or 
 dignity of any one. We instantly and properly re- 
 
24 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 pel any encroachment upon our rights as citizens. 
 We have a proper pride and ambition in maintaining 
 those rights under any and all circumstances. But 
 I am utterly unable to understand how this simple 
 rule or regulation, requiring the pupil in certain 
 cases to bring a written excuse from its parents 
 to the teacher, is an attack upon, or an abridgment 
 of, our inalienable rights as citizens of this free 
 country." 
 
 RULES CONCERNING STUDIES. 
 Maine, 1854.— DonaJioe v. BlcJiards, 38 Me. 379. 
 
 The school committee of Ellsworth, Me., required 
 the use of the Bible in their schools ; and that all 
 of sufficient capacity should read therein, and di- 
 rected the use of the common, or Protestant, version. 
 A Catholic girl was expelled for not complying with 
 this rule, and she began suit for this expulsion. 
 Both the girl and her father considered the reading 
 of this version to be sinful, and had been so in- 
 structed by the Church. The case was decided by 
 the Supreme Court in 1854, and in favor of the 
 committee. 
 
 The following extracts are made from the opinion 
 of the court : 
 
 " The present suit is by the minor, for her alleged 
 wrongful exclusion from school in consequence of 
 her refusal to read in one of the books directed by 
 the defendants, who are the superintending school 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 25 
 
 committee of the town of Ellsworth, to be used in 
 the school of which she was a member. . . . 
 
 "By the act of 1850, c. 193, art. 5, § 1, the pow- 
 ers and duties of superintending school committees 
 are defined and established, and the authority is 
 given them ' to expel from any school any obsti- 
 nately disobedient and disorderly scholar, after a 
 proper investigation of his behavior, if found neces- 
 sary for the peace and usefulness of the school ; also, 
 to restore him to the school on satisfactory evidence 
 of his repentance and amendment.' . . . 
 
 "By the act before referred to, under art. 5, § 1, 
 among various powers and duties conferred upon the 
 superintending school committee, they are empow- 
 ered, 'fourthly, to direct the general course of in- 
 struction, and what books shall be used in the re- 
 spective schools.' 
 
 " The right to prescribe the general course of in- 
 struction and to direct what books shall be used 
 must exist somewhere. The legislature have seen 
 fit to repose the authority to determine this in the 
 several superintending school committees. They 
 may therefore rightfully exercise it. 
 
 " The power thus conferred is in the most literal 
 and explicit terms. The power of establishing by- 
 laws is given to the several city governments of the 
 state. This court is authorized to establish rules 
 for the regulation of business in court. The only 
 restriction in either case is that the by-laws and rules, 
 
26 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 thus established, shall not conflict' with the statutes 
 and Constitution of the state. Within these limits 
 they have all the force and vigor of legislative en- 
 actments. So, in this case, the same general and 
 extensive power over the subject-matter is granted ; 
 and the course of studies, and the books prescribed 
 by the superintending school committee are to be 
 regarded as if established and prescribed by the act 
 of the legislature. 
 
 " The power of selection is general and unlimited. 
 It is vested in the committee of each town. . . . 
 The manner of its exercise must depend upon the 
 judgment, discretion, and intelligence of the different 
 committees. The actual selection at any given time 
 and place depends upon the views and opinions of 
 those upon whom the law devolves this duty. The 
 power of ultimate decision must rest somewhere. 
 No right of appeal is granted. No power of revis- 
 ion is conferred upon any other tribunal. Because 
 the right of selection may be injudiciously or un- 
 wisely exercised, it by no means follows that it does 
 not exist. This court cannot make an aflarmative 
 rule as to what books shall be selected, nor a nega- 
 tive rule prescribing what shall not be used, if the 
 right to selection be exercised in conformity with ex- 
 isting statutes and the Constitution. The power of 
 selection includes that of making injudicious and ill- 
 advised selections, but, there being no right of ap- 
 peal, the selection is binding and conclusive. . . . 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 27 
 
 " If the right to direct the course of instruction and 
 the books to be used is given, the right to enforce 
 obedience to the determining power must manifest- 
 ly exist or the determination will be ineffectual. It 
 would be worse than idle to grant this power to 
 direct, if any one can set at naught the action of the 
 committee. 
 
 " The committee may enforce obedience to all reg- 
 ulations within the scope of their authority. If they 
 may select a book, they may require the use of the 
 book selected. If the plaintiff may refuse reading 
 in one book, she may in another, unless, for some 
 cause, she is exempted from the duty of obedience. 
 If she may decline to obey one requirement, right- 
 fully made, then she may another, and the disci- 
 pline of the school is at an end. It is for the 
 committee to determine what misconduct requires 
 expulsion. That is expressly left to their determina- 
 tion. . . . 
 
 " The plaintiff seeks to avoid these conclusions by 
 denying that the book selected was one in which she 
 could be constitutionally compelled to read upon 
 pain of expulsion, in case of her refusal to obey. 
 She claims exemption from the general duty of obe- 
 dience from the particular character of the book in 
 whicb she was required to read. The question, there- 
 fore, is whether, if the legislature should by statute 
 direct any version of the Bible to be read in schools, 
 and should impose the penalty of expulsion, in the 
 
28 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 case of refusal, such statute would be a violation of 
 the Constitution. The use of the Bible as a reading- 
 book is not prohibited by any express language of 
 the Constitution. 
 
 " Is its use for that purpose in opposition to the 
 spirit and intention of that instrument ? If it be 
 not, if it be a book which may be directed, within 
 the spirit and meaning of the Constitution, to be 
 used in schools, it is obvious that its use may be re- 
 quired by all ; for a regulation which any scholar 
 may violate with impunity would cease to have the 
 force and effect of a rule. . . . 
 
 " But the instruction here given is not in fact, and 
 is not alleged to have been, in articles of faith. No 
 theological doctrines were taught. The creed of no 
 sect was affirmed or denied. The truth or falsehood 
 of the book in which the scholars were required to 
 read was not asserted. No interference by way of 
 instruction, with the views of the scholars, whether 
 derived from parental or sacerdotal authority, is 
 shown. . . . 
 
 "... The plaintiff, indeed, makes no objection to 
 the Bible as a book which she may not rightfully be 
 required to read in schools, but only to a particular 
 translation. Indeed, the report finds that she was 
 willing to read from the Douay version. It is ap- 
 parent that it is highly desirable that in the same 
 class there should be a uniformity of books to be 
 used. But if the book is proper, if consonant to the 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 29 
 
 soundest principles of morality, then is there any 
 translation which can be justly deemed adverse to 
 those principles? Does the version in which the 
 plaintiff was willing to read contravene sound moral- 
 ity, even in the judgment of the defendants ? Does 
 the version which the defendants required to be read 
 conflict, even in the opinion of the plaintiff, with 
 pure morality? If not, then the book itself, alike 
 in the judgment of the plaintiff and defendants, is 
 one whicb may be read without reasonable grounds 
 of objection in schools. ... 
 
 " Such being the case, all that is shown by the se- 
 lection of one version is simply a preference of one 
 over another when there must, from necessity, be a 
 difference of opinion. But in case of numerous 
 translations of a work, in itself unobjectionable, a 
 preference may be expressed and acted upon with- 
 out infringing upon the just rights of others. 
 
 " All that is done is, that a committee for the time 
 being prefer one to another. Both, undoubtedly, 
 may be used in schools, or both may be excluded 
 therefrom. ... 
 
 But the claim of the plaintiff is much more liable 
 to the exception that it is creating the subordination 
 or preference of one sect or denomination over an- 
 other. Her claim to be exempted from a general 
 regulation of the school rests entirely on her relig- 
 ious belief, and is to the extent that the choice of 
 reading-books shall be in entire subordination to her 
 
30 POWER AND AUTHORITY OP 
 
 faith^ and because it is her faith. The preference 
 is manifestly given, if, in the selection to be noade, 
 the defendants were bound to defer to the doctrines 
 and authority and teachings of the sect of which 
 she is a member. The right of negation is, in its 
 operation, equivalent to that of proposing and es- 
 tablishing. The right of one sect to interdict or 
 expurgate would place all schools in subordination 
 to the sect interdicting or expurgating. 
 
 " If the claim is that the sect of which the child 
 is a member has the right of interdiction, and that 
 any book is to be banished because under the ban 
 of her Church, then the preference is practically giv- 
 en to such Church, and the very mischief complained 
 of is inflicted on others. ... 
 
 " The case finds that the authorities of the sect of 
 which the plaintiff is a member regard it sinful to 
 read in the version directed by the defendants ; but 
 if a book is to be excluded for that cause in one 
 instance, it must be in all, and the use of books 
 would be made to depend, not upon the judgment 
 of those to whom the law intrusts their selection, 
 but upon that of the authorities of a Church, so that 
 each sect would have precedence as a sect and for 
 that cause. 
 
 "From the report, it appears that the plaintiff, from 
 conscientious religious scruples, refused to read in 
 the version designated by the defendants as the one 
 to be used, and that she and her father both re- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 31 
 
 garded it as sinful so to do, both having been so 
 taught by the authorities of the Church of which 
 they are members. 
 
 "As the suit is by the child, as her rights only 
 are alleged to be violated, the conscientious religious 
 views of the father are not involved in the deter- 
 mination of this suit. He is no party to it, for the 
 purpose of obtaining compensation, nor is it brought 
 on account of any infraction of his rights. The 
 real inquiry is, whether any book opposed to the 
 real or asserted conscientious views of a scholar can 
 be legally directed to be used as a school-book, in 
 which such scholar can be required to read. The 
 claim, on the part of the plaintiff, is that each and 
 every scholar may set up its own conscience as over 
 and above the law. It is a claim of an exemption 
 from a general law because it may conflict with the 
 particular conscience. 
 
 *' The action being by the scholar, the invasion be- 
 ing of its rights, it is apparent that if the fact of 
 opposition to conscience on the part of a child af- 
 fords a well-grounded reason for its exemption from 
 the general rules of the school — that it may operate 
 to the exclusion of books to an indefinite extent. 
 As the existence of conscientious scruples as to the 
 reading of a book can only he known from the as- 
 sertion of the child, its mere assertion must suffice 
 for the exclusion of any hook in the reading or in 
 the hearing of Avhich it may allege 2^ wrong to be 
 
32 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 done to its religious conscience. The claim, so far 
 as it may rest on conscience, is a claim to annul any 
 regulation of the state made by its constituted au- 
 thorities. As a right existing on the part of one 
 child it is equally a right belonging to all. As it 
 relates to one book, so it may apply to another — 
 whether relating to conscience or to morals. Error 
 may reach the understanding by the hearing equally 
 as by the vision, by the ear as by the eye. As the 
 child may object to reading any book, so it may 
 equally object to hearing it read, for the same cause ; 
 and thus the power of selection of books is with- 
 drawn from those to whom the law intrusts it, and 
 by the right of negation is transferred to the schol- 
 ars. 
 
 " The right, as claimed, undermines the power of 
 the state. It is that the will of the majority shall 
 bow to the conscience of the minority, or of one. 
 If the several consciences of the scholars are per- 
 mitted to contravene, obstruct, or annul the action 
 of the state, then power ceases to reside in majori- 
 ties, and is transferred to minorities. Nor is this 
 all. While the laws are made and established by 
 those of full age, the right of obstruction, of inter- 
 diction, is given to any and all children, of how- 
 ever so immature an age or judgment." 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 33 
 
 Vermont, 1869.— 'Guernsey/ v. Pitkin, 32 Vt. 226. 
 
 A teacher of a district school in Vermont required 
 that all scholars in grammar should write English 
 composition, although not mentioned in the list of 
 studies required by law to be taught. A boy named 
 Guernsey declined to yield to this rule, and the 
 teacher informed the committee. The committee 
 visited the school, talked with the boy, and told the 
 teacher he would see the boy's father, and if the fa- 
 ther sent word that he did not wish his boy to write 
 compositions, she could excuse him. The boy came 
 to school the next day, but without an excuse. The 
 teacher sent him to his father to see if he had not 
 some word to send her on the subject. The parent 
 returned answer that if she had any business with 
 him she must call upon him. The committee then 
 told the boy he must not attend the school unless 
 he would obey the regulations, and instructed the 
 teacher not to treat him as a scholar unless he 
 obeyed her rule as above, or she received a request 
 from his father to excuse him. The boy continued 
 to attend the school for about three weeks, but the 
 teacher would not hear him in recitation, or assist 
 him in his lessons. He then left the school and 
 sued the committee. 
 
 The action of the committee was upheld by the 
 courts. The lower court ruled that the requirement 
 of the teacher in regard to compositions was reasou- 
 3 
 
84 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 able and proper, and that by judicious means she 
 endeavored to induce tlie pupil to comply therewith, 
 and that there was no sufficient reason for his not 
 complying with it. This ruling was sustained by 
 the Supreme Court, from the opinion of which the 
 following extracts are made : 
 
 " But in regard to those branches which are re- 
 quired to be taught in the public schools, the pru- 
 dential committee and the teacher must, of necessity, 
 have some discretion as to the order of teaching 
 them, the pupils who shall be allowed to pursue 
 them, and the mode in which they shall be taught. 
 If this were not so it would be impossible to classi- 
 fy the pupils, or for one teacher to attend to more 
 than ten or twelve pupils. 
 
 " With this concession to the teacher of fixing 
 the mode of teaching these branches, it seems very 
 obvious that English composition may fairly be re- 
 garded as an allowable mode of teaching many of 
 these branches." 
 
 Wisconsin, 1874. — Morroio v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59. 
 
 In 187-4 a case arose in Wisconsin the decision 
 in which has been widely discussed and variously 
 commented upon. A man named Wood sent his 
 son, a boy about twelve years of age, to school. He 
 wished him to study orthography, reading, and writ- 
 ing, and also wished him to give particular attention 
 to the study of arithmetic. In addition to these 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 35 
 
 studies, the teacher, named Morrow, at once required 
 the child to study geography. The father, on be- 
 ing informed of this, told his boy not to study geog- 
 raphy, but to attend to his other studies; and the 
 teacher was promptly and fully advised of this wish 
 of the parent, and also knew that the boy had been 
 forbidden by his parent from taking that study at 
 that time. But, claiming and insisting that she had 
 the right to direct and control the boy in respect to 
 his studies, even as against his father's orders, she 
 commanded him to take his geography and get his 
 lesson. And when the boy refused to obey her, 
 and did as he was directed by his father, she resort- 
 ed to force to compel obedience. The father insti- 
 tuted a criminal action against her for the assault 
 on his boy. She afterwards sued the father, com- 
 plaining that the suit against her for the assault was 
 malicious prosecution. The jury in the lower court 
 was instructed that the order given by the father to 
 his son not to study geography " did not annul or 
 abridge the right of the teacher to control that mat- 
 ter ;" " that under the circumstances, as proved, she, 
 the plaintiff, had a right to require the scholar's 
 obedience;" and that the infliction of the punish- 
 ment was justifiable if " reasonable and commensu- 
 rate with the boy's contumacy." The judgment in 
 the lower court was in favor of the teacher, but in 
 the Supreme Court this judgment was reversed, and 
 the following decision made: 
 
36 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 " . . . And whether she had or had not the power 
 to correct him is the question in the case ; for it is 
 not pretended that the boy was otherwise disobe- 
 dient, or was guilty of any misconduct, or violated 
 any rule or regulation adopted for the government 
 of the school. The circuit court, in considering 
 the relative rights and duties of parent and teacher, 
 among other things, told the jury that when a par- 
 ent sent his child to a district school he surren- 
 dered to the teacher such authority over his child 
 as is necessary to the proper government of the 
 school, the classification and instruction of the pu- 
 pils, including what studies each scholar shall pur- 
 sue, these studies being such as are required by law, 
 or are allowed to be taught in public schools. And 
 the court added, in this connection, that a prudent 
 teacher will always pay proper respect to the wish- 
 es of the parent in regard to what studies the child 
 should take, but, where the difference of view was 
 irreconcilable on the subject, the views of the par- 
 ent in that particular must yield to those of the 
 teacher, and that the parent, by the very act of send- 
 ing his child to school, impliedly undertakes to sub- 
 mit all questions in regard to study to the judgment 
 of the teacher. In our opinion there is a great and 
 fatal error in this part of the charge, particularly 
 when applied to the facts in this case, in asserting 
 or assuming the law to be that, upon an irreconcila- 
 ble difference of views between the parent and teach- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 37 
 
 er as to what studies the child shall pursue, the au- 
 thority of the teacher is paramount and controlling, 
 and that she had the right to enforce obedience to 
 her commands by corporal punishment. We do not 
 think she had any such right or authority, and we 
 can see no necessity for clothing the teacher with 
 any such arbitrary power. We do not really un- 
 derstand that there is any recognized principle of 
 law, nor do we think there is any rule of morals or 
 social usage, which gives the teacher an absolute 
 right to prescribe and dictate what studies a child 
 shall pursue, regardless of the wishes or views of 
 the parent, and, as incident to this, gives the right 
 to enforce obedience even as against the orders of 
 the parent. From what source does the teacher de- 
 rive this authority? From what maxim or rule of 
 the law of the land? Ordinarily, it will be con- 
 ceded, the law gives the parent the exclusive right 
 to govern and control the conduct of his minor chil- 
 dren, and he has the right to enforce obedience to 
 his commands by moderate and reasonable chastise- 
 ment. And, furthermore, it is one of the earliest 
 and most sacred duties taught the child to honor 
 and obey its parents. The situation Of the child is 
 truly lamentable if the condition of the law is that 
 he is liable to be punished by the parent for diso- 
 beying his orders in regard to his studies, and the 
 teacher may lawfully chastise him for not disobeying 
 his parent in that particular. And yet this was the 
 
38 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 precise dilemma in which the defendant's boy was 
 placed by the asserted authority on the part of the 
 parent and the teacher. 
 
 " Now we can see no reason whatever for denying 
 to the father the right to direct what studies, in- 
 cluded in the prescribed course, his child shall take. 
 He is as likely to know the health, temperament, 
 aptitude, and deficiencies of his child as the teacher, 
 and how long he can send him to school. All these 
 matters ought to be considered in determining the 
 question what particular studies the child should 
 pursue at a given term. And where the parent's 
 wishes were reasonable, as they seem to have been 
 in the present case, and the teacher, by regarding 
 them, could in no way have been embarrassed, her 
 conduct in not respecting the order given the boy 
 was unjustifiable. If she had allowed the child to 
 obey the commands of his father it could not pos- 
 sibly have conflicted with the efiSciency or good or- 
 der or well-being of the school. The parent did not 
 propose to interfere with the gradation or classifica- 
 tion of the school, or with any of its rules and reg- 
 ulations, further than to assert his right to direct 
 what studies his boy should pursue that winter. 
 And it seems to us a most unreasonable claim on 
 the part of the teacher to say that the parent has 
 not that right, and, further, to insist that she was 
 justified in punishing the child for obeying the or- 
 der of his father rather than her own. Whence, 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 39 
 
 we again inquire, did the teacher derive this exclu- 
 sive and paramoutat authority over the child, and 
 the right to direct his studies contrary to the wish 
 of the father ? It seems to us it is idle to say the 
 parent, by sending his child to school, impliedly 
 clothes the teacher with that power in a case where 
 the parent expressly reserves the right to himself, 
 and refuses to submit to the judgment of the teach- 
 er the question as to what studies his boy should 
 pursue. We do not intend to lay down any rule 
 which will interfere with any reasonable regulation 
 adopted for the management and government of the 
 public schools, or which will operate against their 
 efficiency and usefulness. Certain studies are re- 
 quired to be taught in the public schools by statute. 
 The rights of one pupil must be so exercised, un- 
 doubtedly, as not to prejudice the equal rights of 
 others. But the parent has the right to make a 
 reasonable selection from the prescribed studies for 
 his child to pursue, and this cannot possibly conflict 
 with the equal rights of other pupils. In the pres- 
 ent case the defendant did not insist that his child 
 should take any study outside of the prescribed 
 course. But, considering that the study of geogra- 
 phy was less necessary for his boy at that time than 
 some other branches, he desired him to devote all 
 his time to orthography, reading, writing, and arith- 
 metic. The father stated that he thought these 
 studies were enough for the child to take; and he 
 
40 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 said he was anxious the boy should obtain a good 
 knowledge of arithmetic in order' that he might as- 
 sist in keeping accounts. 
 
 "He wished to exercise some control over the 
 education of his son, and it is impossible to say 
 that the choice of studies which he made was un- 
 reasonable or inconsistent with the welfare and best 
 interest of his offspring. And how it will result 
 disastrously to the proper discipline,' efficiency, 
 and well-being of the common schools to concede 
 this paramount right to tbe parent to make a rea- 
 sonable choice from the studies in the prescribed 
 course which his child shall pursue is a proposition 
 we cannot understand. The counsel for the plain- 
 tiff so insist in their argument, but, as we think, 
 without warrant for the position. It is unreason- 
 able to suppose any scholar who attends school 
 can or will study all the branches taught in them. 
 From the nature of the case some choice must be 
 made, and some discretion be exercised as to the 
 studies which the different pupils shall pursue. The 
 parent is quite as likely to make a wise and judi- 
 cious selection as the teacher. At all events, in case 
 of a difference of opinion between the parent and 
 the teacher upon the subject, we see no reason for 
 holding that the views of the teacher must prevail, 
 and that she has the right to compel obedience to 
 her orders b}!' inflicting corporal punishment upon 
 the pupil. The statute gives the school board pow- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 41 
 
 er to make all needful rules and regulations for 
 the organization, gradation, and government of the 
 school, and power to suspend any pupil from the 
 privileges of the school for noncompliance with the 
 rules established by them, or by the teacher with 
 their consent ; and it is not proposed to throw any 
 obstacle in the way of the performance of these du- 
 ties. But these powers and duties can be well ful- 
 filled without denying to the parent all right to con- 
 trol the education of his children. 
 
 " These views are decisive of this case. Under 
 the circumstances the plaintiff had no right to pun- 
 ish the boy for obedience to the commands of his 
 father in respect to the study of geography. She 
 entirely exceeded any authority which the law gave 
 her, and the assault upon the child was unjustifia- 
 ble." 
 
 Illinois, I8l6.—Iiulis07i v. Fost, 19 111. 56Y. 
 
 One Frances S. Post attended a district school in 
 Illinois, and was in a class which, by the course of 
 study prescribed by the directors, was required to 
 study book-keeping. She was requested by the 
 principal of the school to procure books for the 
 purpose, but declined, saying her father objected to 
 her studying it. She was notified, as were also her 
 parents, that unless she complied with the rule she 
 would be expelled from the school. On going to 
 the school without the book she was told her rights 
 as a scholar had ceased, and she was requested to 
 
42 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 leave, but, declining, the teacher took hold of her 
 and led or pushed her out of the building. She 
 returned to the room and was again ejected. She 
 instituted an action against the teacher and direc- 
 tors for trespass, and the jury gave her a verdict, 
 and assessed damages at $130. 
 
 Book-keeping was not one of the studies enumer- 
 ated in the law to be taught, but was prescribed un- 
 der a provision of the law which allowed' the teach- 
 ing of other branches than those enumerated. The 
 Supreme Court sustained the above verdict. The 
 reasons given therefor are contained in the follow- 
 ing extracts from the opinion : 
 
 " The school law [reciting it] under which these 
 directors derived their powers and were then acting 
 provides that the school directors ' may direct what 
 branches of study shall be taught, and what text- 
 books shall be. used in their respective schools, and 
 may suspend or expel pupils for disobedient, refrac- 
 tory, or incorrigibly bad conduct.' * The next sec- 
 tion provides that no teacher shall be authorized to 
 teach a school under that act who is not qualified 
 to teach orthography, reading in English, penman- 
 ship, arithmetic, English grammar, modern geogra- 
 phy, and the history of the United States ; and the 
 same section requires that such teacher shall be ex- 
 amined by the county superintendent of schools, and 
 
 * For the law at present see Appendices B and C. 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 43 
 
 if found to be qualified shall be given a certificate 
 of that fact. The same section contains this pro- 
 viso, * that nothing herein contained shall prevent 
 the teaching in the common schools of other and 
 higher branches than those enumerated in this sec- 
 tion.' From these enactments it is manifest that it 
 was the design of the lawmakers that all of the 
 children of the state should be afforded an oppor- 
 tunity to acquire, free of charge, a knowledge of 
 the enumerated branches required to be taught. . . . 
 
 "In the performance of their duty in carrying 
 the law into effect the directors may prescribe prop- 
 er rules and regulations for the government of the 
 schools of their district, and enforce them. They 
 may, no doubt, classify the scholars, regulate their 
 studies and their deportment, the hours to be taught, 
 besides the performance of other duties necessary to 
 promote the success and secure the well-being of 
 such schools. But all such rules and regulations 
 must be reasonable and calculated to promote the 
 objects of the law — the conferring of such an edu- 
 cation upon all, free of charge, ... 
 
 " The law, for the purpose of preserving the school 
 and promoting its usefulness, has empowered the 
 directors to suspend or expel scholars, but only for 
 disobedient, refractory, or incorrigibly bad conduct. 
 It is by the commission of one of these acts alone 
 that the pupil can forfeit his right to the privileges 
 of the school ; and this forfeiture can only be en- 
 
44 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 forced, and the right lost, after all other reasonable 
 means have failed; ... 
 
 " As to the means the directors may employ for the 
 purpose of imparting knowledge in the enumerated 
 branches, and the extent of their power to compel 
 the pupils to study all of them, or whether that is 
 optional with the parent or guardian, we do not 
 pretend to decide in this case. That question is 
 not presented by this record, nor has it been dis- 
 cussed by counsel ; we therefore pass it over until it 
 is properly presented. The question here presented 
 is whether the power has been granted the direc- 
 tors to compel scholars to study other and higher 
 branches than those enumerated in the law. . . . 
 
 " They may undeniably require the teacher to im- 
 part instruction in other and higher branches than 
 those enumerated, but that is discretionary, and, be- 
 ing discretionary, they cannot be compelled to mate 
 the requirement ; it is only permissive to the direc- 
 tors, and is optional with parents, guardians, or pu- 
 pils whether the scholars shall study such branches, 
 and, being optional, pupils cannot be compelled to 
 pursue such studies without the assent of the parent 
 or guardian, or their own consent." 
 
 Ohio, ISIG.—Sewell v. Board of Ed., 29 0. St. Kep. 89. 
 
 The School Board of Defiance, Ohio, prescribed 
 the study of rhetoric, and one of the rules adopted 
 by the board for the government of the schools 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 45 
 
 provided tliat if any pupil should fail to be pre- 
 pared in this study he or she should, unless ex- 
 cused on account of sickness or other good cause, 
 be suspended. A boy named Andrew Sewell re- 
 fused to comply with the rule or offer an excuse, 
 and the teacher, with the consent of the board, sus- 
 pended him until he should comply with the rule or 
 offer excuse. The boy's father brought suit against 
 the board. The Supreme Court decided that the 
 rule was a reasonable one. 
 
 From opinion : " The act under which the com- 
 mon schools of Defiance were organized gives to 
 the board of education of the town the entire con- 
 trol and management thereof; authorizes the board 
 to make and enforce all necessary rules and regula- 
 tions for the government of teachers and pupils 
 therein, and to determine 'the various studies and 
 parts of study' in which instruction shall be given in 
 the several departments thereof. 
 
 "The act does not direct how, or in what man- 
 ner, the rules and regulations which the board may 
 adopt for the government of the schools under its 
 care and management shall be enforced, but leaves 
 the whole subject of the making of such rules and 
 their enforcement to the judgment and sound dis- 
 cretion of the board. The rule in question, for the 
 enforcement of which, in the manner stated, dam- 
 ages are claimed by the plaintiff in this action, was, 
 in our opinion, reasonable. 
 
46 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 " The pupil having failed to comply with the rule, 
 the teacher, in excluding him from the school until 
 he should comply with it, or offer a reasonable ex- 
 cuse to the board for his non-compliance, acted un- 
 der the authority of and with the consent of the 
 board, and the action of the defendants in the prem- 
 ises having been, as they aver in their answer, in 
 their judgment, for the best interests and welfare of 
 the school, they are not liable in damages to the 
 plaintiff therefor." 
 
 Illinois, 1811.— Trustees v. 77ie People, 87 111. 303. 
 
 Frank Van Allen was examined for admission to 
 the free high -school of Lake View, Illinois. He 
 passed examination, and was sufficiently proficient 
 in all branches of study except that of grammar to 
 entitle him, under the regulations, to admission. 
 He was denied admission solely because of his ina- 
 bility to pass satisfactory examination in grammar. 
 His father had forbidden him to study grammar, 
 and desired that he should pursue no study which 
 necessitated a previous knowledge of grammar, and 
 asked that he be admitted to pursue only those stud- 
 ies in which he was sufficiently proficient to entitle 
 him to admission. The school trustees refused his 
 request. He then resorted to the courts, which de- 
 cided the rule unreasonable, and ordered the trus- 
 tees to admit the boy. 
 
 From opinion : " The powers and duties of the 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 47 
 
 trustees being, with respect to the high-school, the 
 same as those of directors with respect to the dis- 
 trict school, it becomes necessary to ascertain what 
 are the powers and duties of directors with respect 
 to district schools. So far as they affect the ques- 
 tion before us, they are, to adopt and enforce all 
 necessary rules and regulations for the management 
 and government of the schools; to direct what 
 branches of study shall be taught, and what text- 
 books and apparatus shall be used, and to enforce 
 uniformity of text -books." (Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 
 962-3, §48.) 
 
 " Here, then, is power to decide what branches of 
 study shall be taught in the high-school, what text- 
 books shall be used, and to prescribe necessary rules 
 and regulations for the management and govern- 
 ment of the school ; but not to decide what particu- 
 lar branches of study, of those decided to be taught, 
 shall be pursued by each pupil. Under the power 
 to prescribe necessary rules and regulations for the 
 management and government of the school, they 
 may, undoubtedly, require classification of the pupils 
 with respect to the branches of study they are respec- 
 tively pursuing, and with respect to proficiency or de- 
 gree of advancement in the same branches; that there 
 shall be prompt attendance, diligence in study, and 
 proper deportment. All regulations or rules to these 
 ends are for the benefit of all, and presumptively pro- 
 motive of the interests of all. No parent has the right 
 
48 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 to demand that the interests of the children of others 
 shall be sacriticed for the interestsr of his child, and 
 he cannot, consequently, insist that his child shall be 
 placed or kept in particular classes, when by so do- 
 ing others will be retarded in the advancement they 
 would otherwise make; or that his child shall be 
 taught studies not in the prescribed course of the 
 school, or be allowed to use a text-book different 
 from that decided to be used in the school, or that 
 he shall be allowed to adopt methods of study that 
 interfere with others in their studies. The rights 
 of each are to be enjoyed and exercised only with 
 reference to the equal rights of all others. 
 
 " But no attempt has hitherto been made in this 
 state to deny, by law, all control by the parent over 
 the education of his child. Upon the contrary, the 
 policy of our law has ever been to recognize the 
 right of the parent to determine to what extent his 
 child shall be educated, during minority, presuming 
 that his natural affections and superior opportunities 
 of knowing the physical and mental capabilities and 
 future prospects of his child will insure the adop- 
 tion of that course which will most effectually pro- 
 mote the child's welfare. The policy of the school 
 law is only to withdraw from the parent the right 
 to select the branches to be studied by the child, to 
 the extent that the exercise of that right would in- 
 terfere with the system of instruction prescribed for 
 the school, and its efficiency in imparting education 
 to all entitled to share in its benefits. . . . 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 49 
 
 " If the relator's son had possessed the required 
 knowledge of grammar, but would not have been 
 compelled to further pursue that branch of study 
 or to pursue any other branch of study to which a 
 knowledge of grammar was essential, it is impossi- 
 ble to perceive how his position in the high-school, 
 so far as it might affect teacher and pupils, would 
 be different from that he now occupies. He is 
 qualified to pursue, as a pupil, every branch of study 
 that the relator desires that he shall pursue in the 
 high-school. If he is qualified to go on with the 
 studies selected by the relator, of what consequence 
 is it that he is ignorant of some branch of study 
 in no manner connected with those branches ? This 
 may, possibly, be a misfortune to Frank Yan Allen 
 — it surely cannot affect the government .of the 
 school or incommode the other students or the 
 teachers. Whether fortunate or unfortunate to 
 him, however, it is for the parent, not the trustees, 
 to direct the branches of education he shall pursue, 
 so far as they are taught, and he is, by necessary 
 preliminary education, qualified to pursue them in 
 the high-school. 
 
 " It is possible that a father may have very satis- 
 factory reasons for having his son perfected in cer- 
 tain branches of education to the entire exclusion 
 of others ; and so long as, in exercising his parental 
 authority in making the selection of the branches ho 
 shall pursue, none others are affected, it can be of 
 4 
 
60 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 no practical concern to those having the public 
 schools in charge. ' 
 
 " We think the exclusion of the relator's son 
 from the high-school, upon the ground alleged, by 
 the respondents, unauthorized by the statute. The 
 regulation requiring it is arbitrary and unreason- 
 able, and cannot be enforced, but must be disre- 
 garded. 
 
 " In Bulison et al v. Post, 79 111. 56Y,* views were 
 expressed in harmony with what has been here said, 
 although the question there decided was materially 
 different from that presented here. 
 
 *' Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59,f presents the ques- 
 tion of the right of a teacher to punish a pupil for 
 refusing, under parental objection, to pursue the 
 study of geography, and the ruling was against the 
 right. The opinion is able and instructive, and 
 demonstrates to our satisfaction the correctness of 
 the conclusion." 
 
 Iowa, 1878. — Stater. Mizner, 50 Iowa, 152. 
 
 Ada Buemer, a pupil in a public school in Iowa, 
 carried the following notes from her father to the 
 teacher : " Please excuse Ada afternoons, as her 
 health will not permit her to attend all the time," 
 and " Please excuse Ada from the algebra class, she 
 having more lessons than she can well attend to." 
 
 ♦Ante, p. 41. f Ante, p. 34. 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 51 
 
 The teacher did not excuse her, and, from her re- 
 fusal to recite, a very spirited conversation was 
 carried on between her and the teacher; and ho 
 called in a hickory stick to determine the argument. 
 He was tried and convicted of an assault and bat- 
 tery. There was a conflict of testimony and opin- 
 ion as to whether the punishment was for tho fail- 
 ure to recite or for her " insolent and contemptuous 
 conduct." All views of the case were evidently passed 
 upon. The value of the case for this collection of 
 decisions is found in the following extract from the 
 opinion of the Supreme Court : 
 
 " If, therefore, the rules adopted by the teacher 
 •required that the prosecutrix should study algebra, 
 and be in attendance during afternoons, and that 
 proper discipline and the good of the school, as 
 a whole, required an enforcement of the rules, we 
 are constrained to think the mode adopted was 
 not the proper one. Compulsory education is not 
 yet the rule in this state, and instead of whipping 
 the prosecutrix for failure to attend or study alge- 
 bra, when both she and her father desired she 
 should be excused, we think the defendant should 
 have plainly said to both the prosecutrix and her 
 father that she could not attend the school unless 
 she was prepared to obey the rules in this respect. 
 If a pupil attends school it must be presumed he 
 submits himself to the rules ; but that is not this 
 case. Until compulsory education is established 
 
62 POWER AND AUTHORITY OP 
 
 we are unwilling to sanction the rule that a teacher 
 may punish a pupil, as ill this case, for not doing 
 something the parent has requested the pupil to be 
 excused from doing. The remedy in such case is 
 not corporal punishment, but expulsion." 
 
 New Hampshire, 1819.— Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N. H. 473. 
 
 Chellis, the defendant, a teacher, was engaged by 
 the prudential committee to teach a certain school, 
 and presented himself to the school committee for 
 examination. The committee-man asked him a few 
 questions; told him he did not have time to ex- 
 amine him then but told him to commence the 
 school and he would send him a certificate in a few 
 days. The defendant commenced school Jan. 22d, 
 1879. He divided the largest scholars into two 
 divisions for declaiming and writing, and fixed Jan. 
 31st as the time for the first division to declaim. 
 The plaintiff, sixteen or eighteen years of age, was 
 to be ready to speak on the 31st. At the appointed 
 time he was not prepared to speak, and declined to 
 do so then, or at any future time. The teacher 
 gave him until Feb. 3d to consider the matter, and if 
 he then complied with the requirement, very well. 
 But if he did not he must leave school until he could. 
 On Feb. 3d he came to school in the morning, but 
 refused to speak, and the teacher sent him home to 
 stay until he would. In the afternoon he returned, 
 but persisted in his refusal to conform with the reg- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 53 
 
 ulation. The teaclier then told him he must leave, 
 took hold of him and put him out of the school- 
 house. The effort was sharp and vigorous, but was 
 no more than reasonably necessary to overcome the 
 resistance of the plaintiff. 
 
 The school committee, on the evening of Feb. 3d, 
 after the affray, examined the defendant, and gave 
 him a certificate, and he kept the school through ac- 
 cording to his engagement. 
 
 The scholar on the morning and in the evening 
 of Feb. 3d notified the teaclier that, in his refusal 
 to speak, he was acting according to the directions 
 of his parents. 
 
 The regulation as to speaking was made by the 
 teacher, and was oral, and no regulations were pre- 
 scribed by the committee for the school. 
 
 Opinion of the court : " The statute is peremptory 
 that no person shall be employed or paid for services 
 as teacher until he shall produce and deliver to the 
 prudential committee a certificate of the school com- 
 mittee of the town that he is qualified to instruct in 
 the branches to be taught in the school which he is 
 employed to teach. (G. L. c. 89, § 6.) This require- 
 ment of the statute neither the district nor the pru- 
 dential committee can waive. {Barr v. Deniston, 19 
 N. H. 170.) It does not necessarily follow, however, 
 that the plaintiff can recover by reason of what tran- 
 spired at the time of the affray. The defendant was , 
 keeping a school in the school-house of the district. 
 
54 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 He sustained to the other occupants of the house the 
 relation of teacher,' and they to him that of scholars. 
 The daily assemblage in the school-house for nearly 
 two weeks prior to the alleged assault was not an 
 unlawful meeting. The defendant was occupied in 
 the useful and highly honorable employment of giv- 
 ing instruction to the youth of the district. If the 
 instruction must be held to have been given gratui- 
 tously because the school committee of the town neg- 
 lected to examine him as to his qualifications and 
 give him the proper certificate when he presented 
 himself for examination, the business in which he 
 was engaged was none the less useful and honorable, 
 nor was it made thereby illegal. He was in the oc- 
 cupation of the school-house for the purpose of giv- 
 ing instruction to the scholars of the district, with 
 the unrevoked license of the district, and of its in- 
 habitants. Although not a public teacher by legal ' 
 appointment he was a teacher in fact, and his au- 
 thority to govern the school could not be contested 
 by those who sought to avail themselves of its ad- 
 vantages. By placing their children under his in- 
 struction, parents, for the time being, invested him 
 with the prerogatives of school government, and con- 
 ferred upon him the power to do what was reason- 
 ably necessary to maintain order and render effective 
 his instruction to the school, and the plaintiff's par- 
 ents authorized him to require of the plaintiff obedi- 
 ence to such reasonable rules as were necessary for- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 55 
 
 the government and instruction of the whole school. 
 Their directions that they did not desire him in- 
 structed in public declamation did not limit the 
 defendant's authority as his teacher, because the ref- 
 eree has found that the regulation was a reasonable 
 and useful one to the school. (The case had been 
 referred to a referee to .find the facts.) They could 
 not require the defendant to receive their child un- 
 der his instruction without conforming to his rea- 
 sonable rules. The plaintiff was informed that he 
 must submit to the rule in question by declaiming 
 on Feb. 3d, or leave the school. By remaining, he 
 tacitly consented to submit, and gave the defendant 
 authority to compel obedience ; or he was a tres- 
 passer, and the defendant had the right to expel 
 him. If Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (see p. 84), 
 sustains this action, we are unable to follow the de- 
 cision in that case. 
 
 " Although the defendant was not, for all purposes, 
 the teacher of a public school, he was a teacher of a 
 public or private school for the purpose of govern- 
 ing the school as against persons who chose to be 
 members of the school ; and for any misgovern- 
 raent, or maladministration in prescribing studies 
 or requiring educational exercises the law provided 
 ample remedies ; and a refusal to obey his reason- 
 able regulations was not a legal remedy for any wrong 
 of which the plaintiff complains. The defendant 
 did not expel the plaintiff, but merely suspended 
 
66 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 him until he should comply with the regulations. 
 Whether the educational assembly^ over which the 
 defendant presided' was a school in fact, whatever 
 legal qualities it might lack — whether it was a pub- 
 lic or a private school — the power of each parent to 
 decide the question what studies the scholars should 
 pursue, or what exercises they should perform, 
 would be a power of disorganizing the school, and 
 practically rendering it substantially useless. How- 
 ever judicious it may be to consult the wishes of 
 parents, the disintegrating principle of parental au- 
 thority to prevent all classification and destroy all 
 system in any school, public or private, is unknown 
 to the law. 
 
 *' As no unnecessary force was used to remove the 
 plaintiff from the house for non-compliance with a 
 reasonable and useful regulation of the school, the 
 plaintiff cannot recover, and the defendant is en- 
 titled to judgment on the report." 
 
 Note. — It seems plain from a careful study of the 
 Wisconsin case {Morroic v. Wood, ante, p. 34) that the 
 Supreme Court of that state, in the consideration of 
 rights of parents in the matter of studies in the 
 schools, have removed the bound which had seemed 
 fixed, by common consent, if not by the courts, to de- 
 termine the relative rights of parents, pupils, and 
 school oflacers. 
 
 It is a matter of some moment in the administra- 
 tion of common-school systems, and has merited and 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 57 
 
 received much discussion. It may be claimed from 
 one standpoint that while the above proposition is 
 admitted — that the decision makes a change of limits 
 — yet the decision is not based upon law or sound 
 reason. From another standpoint the effect or result 
 of the decision is not only admitted, but assented to ; 
 and the decision supported as sound in both law and 
 reason. There is a third view which admits the law 
 and reasoning of the court, but claims that noth- 
 ing new is decided — that the decision does not af- 
 fect the rights and powers of school officers in gen- 
 eral to prescribe studies as against the wishes of 
 parents. 
 
 In support of the last view it is claimed that 
 the decision turned upon the power of the teacher^ 
 rather than the right of school officers or authorities; 
 and upon the method of punishment employed by the 
 teacher in that particular case. The Supreme Court 
 of Vermont, in the case of Ferriter v. Tyler ^ ante, p. 
 10, seems to take this position, and thus reviews the 
 case : " We have carefully studied the Iowa " (should bo 
 Wisconsin) " case of Morrow v. Wood^ before cited, and 
 not only find nothing in conflict with the other cases 
 decided, but that the ideas expressed by Judge Cole 
 are in harmony with the other cases. In that case 
 the teacher required a boy to study geography. His 
 father, for good reasons, wanted him to devote him- 
 self to other studies, requiring all his time and strength, 
 without geography. The boy, in obedience to his 
 father's direction, refused to study geography, and 
 the teacher whipped him. Hence the suit. It ap- 
 pears that geography was one of the studies required 
 
68 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 by law to be taught, but there was no law requiring 
 any scholar, or any particular description of scholars, 
 to study it. There was no rule of the school, beside 
 the arbitrary requirement of the teacher, which would 
 make it the duty of the boy to pursue that study. 
 Judge Cole says, ' The statute gives the school board 
 power to make all needfal rules and regulations for 
 the organization, gradation, and government of the 
 school, and power to suspend any pupil from the 
 privileges of the school for non-compliance "with the 
 rules established by them, or by the teacher with their 
 consent.' It does not appear, nor is it inferrible, that 
 the school board had made a rule requiring the boy 
 to study geograpliy, or had given their consent to the 
 requirement of the teacher. The question then was, 
 whether the teacher had justifiable cause for whip- 
 ping the boy. The court held that she had not, and, 
 in the discussion, held, that on the facts in the case 
 the father had the right to direct as to the study of 
 geography by his son. We see no occasion for dififer- 
 ing with the court in that case. In the course of the 
 opinion it is said : ' It is not proposed to throw any ob- 
 stacle in the way of the performance of their duties ' 
 by the school board. Again, ' We do not propose to 
 lay down any rule whicli will interfere with any rea- 
 sonable regulation adopted for the management and 
 government of the public schools, or Mdiich will oj)- 
 erate against their efficiency and usefulness. Certain 
 studies are required to be taught in the public schools 
 by statute. The rights of one pupil must be so ex- 
 ercised, undoubtedly, as not to prejudice the equal 
 riglits of others. But the parent has the right to 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 59 
 
 make a reasonable selection from the prescribed 
 studies for his child to pursue, and this cannot possi- 
 bly conflict with the equal rights of other pupils. In 
 the present case the parent did not insist that his 
 child should take any study outside of the prescribed 
 course.' 'And how it can result disastrously to the 
 proper discipline, efficiency, and well-being of tlie 
 common schools, to concede the paramount right to 
 make a reasonable choice from the studies in the pre- 
 scribed course which his child shall pursue is a prop- 
 osition we cannot understand.' And this, as well as 
 all that was said by the judge, is to be taken as in a 
 case where there was no rule as to the study of geog- 
 raphy by the boy, except the personal arbitrary com- 
 mand upon him of the teacher. How this court 
 would decide in a case involving the question of su- 
 periority between the parent and the school board, as 
 to the pursuit of a study required by the established 
 rule of that board, w^e have now no occasion to an- 
 nounce or intimate. Nor had that court any such 
 question before it." 
 
 It seems here assumed that had the school board 
 made a rule covering the point in issue, and the 
 pupil, under the direction of his father, refused 
 to obey the rule, and was punished by the teacher, 
 the court of Wisconsin would have decided other- 
 wise. 
 
 Again, it is claimed that the decision only deter- 
 mines that the teacher had no power to punish the 
 boy by inflicting bodily pain for refusing to obey her 
 command rather than the command of his father. 
 That, instead of whipping, she should have suspended 
 
CO rOWEli AND AUTnORlTV OF 
 
 him iVom the privilogos of the schooh This daim is 
 supported by the reasoning of the court ^ the case of 
 State V. MUner, ante, p. 50. 
 
 But, turning to the whole opinion of Judge Cole in 
 the AViseonsiu ease, the deeision is plainly based upon 
 a broader ground than the making of a rule, or the 
 method of punishment, namely: "The paramount 
 right of the parent to make a reasonable choice from 
 the studies in the prescribed course." True, the right 
 of the parent is determined as against the teacher, but 
 the argument goes beyond, making no distinction be- 
 tNveen the teacher and the school authorities. Sup- 
 pose the school board had made, recorded, and duly 
 announced to teachers and pupils a rule requiring 
 the study of geography; would the parent;:^ riglit 
 to make a choice of studies be in any ^Yay atlected ? 
 Would the rule operate against the parent with any 
 more force or reason than the act of the legislature 
 prescribing certain studies? Recurring to the opin- 
 ion (ante, p. 30), after the matter last quoted by the 
 Vermont court occurs this language : "' But, consider- 
 ing that the study of geography was less necessary for 
 his boy at that time than some other branches, he de- 
 sired him to devote all his time to orthography, read- 
 ing, writing, and arithmetic. The father stated that 
 he thought these studies were enough for the child to 
 take ; and he said he was anxious the boy should ob- 
 tain a good knowledge of arithmetic, in order that he 
 might assist in keeping accounts. He wished to ex- 
 ercise some control over the education of his son, and 
 it is impossible to say that the choice of studies which 
 he made was unreasonable or inconsistent with the 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 61 
 
 welfare and best interest of his offspring. And how 
 it will result disastrously to the proper discipline, ef- 
 ficiency, and well-being of the common schools to 
 concede this paramount right to the parent to make a 
 reasonable choice from the studies in the prescribed 
 course which his child shall pursue is a proposition 
 we cannot understand." 
 
 Here the argument rests entirely upon the right of 
 the parent to choose, and the reasonableness of his 
 choice. And again, " It is unreasonable to suppose 
 any scholar who attends school can or will study all 
 the branches taught in them. From the nature of the 
 case some choice must be made, and some discretion 
 be exercised as to the studies which the different pu- 
 pils shall pursue. The parent is quite as likely to 
 make a wise and judicious selection as the teacher." 
 What force has the word "teacher" here? Why is 
 not the father, from his knowledge of "the health, 
 temperament, aptitude, and deficiencies of his child " 
 (ante, p. 38) as likely to make a wise and judicious 
 selection as the school board ? The words of Judge 
 Cole first quoted by the Vermont court, and the sen- 
 tence next quoted, " It is not proposed to throw any 
 obstacle in the way of the performance of these du- 
 ties," are to be read in connection with the qualifying 
 proposition immediately following, commencing with 
 a very large and expressive " But.'''' " But these powers 
 and duties can be well fulfilled without denying to 
 the parent all right to control the education of his 
 children " (ante, p. 41). And it must be noticed, further, 
 that in the remarks cited by the Vermont court as 
 demonstrating the wish of the Wisconsin court to 
 
62 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 avoid all conflict with the rules of the lyoard^ occurs a 
 qualifying statement equally broad and distinct as the 
 above, and introduced with the equally expressive 
 '•^Buty ''But the parent has the right to make a 
 reasonable selection from the prescribed studies for 
 his child to pursue, and this cannot possibly conflict 
 with the rights of other pupils." And in this connec- 
 tion it must be observed that it is only the "reason- 
 able " regulation of the board with which the court 
 will not interfere ; and this expression, couj^led with 
 the assertion of the parent's right, is a broad intima- 
 tion that any regulation afiecting that right would 
 not be " reasonable." 
 
 True, again, the case decides that the teacher had 
 no right to whip the boy ; but if the act was in con- 
 travention of a parental right, which right the de- 
 cision aims to establish, what matters it whether the 
 parental right is trespassed upon with a rattan or a 
 note of suspension. 
 
 That the Wisconsin court has made a decision 
 which announces the right of a parent to select the 
 studies the child shall pursue is fully recognized and 
 approved by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case 
 of Trustees v. The People, ante, p. 46. There the reg- 
 ulation was made by the school officers, and they 
 were the defendants in the suit; furthermore, the 
 method adopted with the pupil was not castigation, 
 but exclusion from school. The school officers were 
 authorized by law, "to adopt and enforce all neces- 
 sary rules and regulations for tlie management and 
 government of the schools ; to direct what branches 
 of study shall be taught." The court declares, with- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 63 
 
 out any equivocation, that the school board has no 
 power "to decide what particular branches of study, 
 of those decided to be taught, shall be pursued by 
 each pupil," that "no particular branch of study is 
 compulsory upon those who attend school, but schools 
 are simply provided by the public in which prescribed 
 branches are taught, which are free to all within the 
 district between certain ages," and "it is for the 
 parent, not the trustees, to direct the branches of edu- 
 cation" the child shall pursue. This seems to be 
 just the case supposed by the Vermont court, involv- 
 ing the questions which it said were not raised in the 
 Wisconsin case. It was decided three years after the 
 review of the subject by the Vermont justices, though 
 a year before the case of State v. Mizner. 
 
 It remains to take ground in support of, or against, 
 the decisions of Wisconsin and Illinois which an- 
 nounce the right of the parent to make a selection 
 from the list of studies prescribed by law, as against 
 school officers and teachers. The language of the 
 statutes of the above states is no more plain and 
 direct, and the powers and rights granted the school 
 officers any less than in most of the states. The argu- 
 ment against the assertion of the parental light, as 
 made by the courts above named, rests upon the cen- 
 tral, pivotal idea of public education — a system of 
 common instruction, announced and cared for by the 
 state, for the benefit of all the people, and therefore 
 the state. The state recognizes the fact that its sta- 
 bility and perpetuity are dependent upon the virtue 
 and intelligence of its citizens ; that individual, and 
 hence general, virtue is increased by tlic increase of 
 
64 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 individual and general intelligence. To this end the 
 state desires to secure for each child the rudiments 
 of education. It does not take from the parent the 
 right, or release him from the duty, to educate his 
 child ; but it warrants a measure of education to the 
 child as against the neglect or inability of the parent, 
 and defines the duty of the parent. The state, jealous 
 of its own interests, will not allow parents to permit 
 their children to grow up in ignorance. Hence, by 
 public statute, a course of jDublic education is pre- 
 scribed supported by public taxation. It is to be 
 presumed that the course of education defined, when 
 one is defined, by the organic law or the legislature, 
 is the best result of the wise deliberation of the rep- 
 resentatives of the public having in view the best in- 
 terests of the state and its citizens; and when a 
 course is not defined, as is the case in a number of the 
 states, but the choice is confided to certain officers or 
 boards created by the law, the presumption is equally 
 strong that the legislature has given to them its own 
 powers of prescription, and that the interests of citi- 
 zens and the welfare of the state will be best sub- 
 served by such exercise of the powers as they deem 
 best. Now if a father who, by force of circumstances 
 or simple choice, has intrusted the education of his 
 child to the state or its lawfully appointed agents, 
 can dictate to the state or its agents what amount, 
 how little and how much, of the course of public in- 
 struction is necessary for the welfare of the child, and 
 can refuse to have him take more than he desires and 
 commands, and the school authorities are powerless, 
 then the object of the law is frustrated ; the expressed 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 65 
 
 voice of the majority is without effect against the will 
 of one man. 
 
 It is urged, it is not intended to subvert the law 
 or intent of the law providing for general education, 
 but simply to allow the parent a reasonable choice of 
 studies for his child. The word "reasonableness," 
 then, is the bound ; the reasonableness of the demand 
 of the parent, the limit. If there is reason in the 
 claim of the parent, the lines laid by the law must be 
 swerved more or less according to the amount of rea- 
 son. Then there is no certainty ; the course of in- 
 struction in school may be dependent upon such plans 
 as respective parents may have. The discretionary 
 power of school officers given by law exists only in 
 name, and the simple duty remaining is to make such 
 course of instruction as is best and possible of the 
 studies chosen by parents in the exercise of parental 
 prerogative. 
 
 For where is the line of " reasonableness " to be 
 drawn? What is a reasonable choice to-day is not 
 to-morrow ; and the choice of one man, reasonable in 
 his case, may be unreasonable when presented by an- 
 other. There was a measure of reason in the demand 
 of the "Wisconsin parent that his boy should devote 
 extra time to aritlimetic, that he might be more valu- 
 able to him, and the school boards are few that would 
 not accede to the father's wish ; and yet it seems the 
 board, having in view the value of education to the 
 child, might demand that he receive some knowledge 
 of the world and its peoples through the study of 
 geography, as well as to keep in view the assistance 
 he was to render his parent. Suppose the father 
 5 
 
66 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 believed his own knowledge of arithmetic was suffi- 
 cient for his whole fjimily, and desired his boy to 
 devote his whole time to the study and practice of 
 penmanship ; or, thinking his son's head not strong 
 enough to wrestle with common fractions, should de> 
 sire him to confine his attention to grammar and 
 spelling, which would enable him to speak and write 
 correctly and appear well among his fellows. A man 
 who never went to school and runs the same sawmill 
 that his father before him did, who keeps his ac- 
 counts with a piece of chalk on a slab, and cannot 
 see the necessity or gain of his children knowing 
 more than he does, may make a choice of studies for 
 them based upon his own ignorance; a choice with 
 some sprinkle of reasonableness perhaps, and yet a 
 choice which will not enable them to take a level 
 much above his, or that will contribute greatly to 
 their improvement or pleasure. And the cases miglu 
 be multiplied in which a father, having in mind his 
 own interest, the health of his child, and his future 
 work in life, would make a choice of study which 
 M' ould appear reasonable, and yet, in the judgment of 
 men appointed to secure the best results of education 
 for one and all, would not be best either for the child, 
 the parent, or the state. To allow the wish of one 
 man might not interfere witli the welfiire of the 
 school or the course of instruction therein, but if sev- 
 eral or all the parents should make the same demand, 
 and they might with equal reason, and of course with 
 equal right, it might be impossible to do any efiectual 
 or valuable work in the school. 
 The advocate of the father's right may say such 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 67 
 
 cases are not likely to arise. Why not as likely to 
 arise as that a fair and prudent school board will re- 
 fuse to listen to the reasonable wish of parents ? The 
 demand in each case is reasonable, and the parent 
 makes it as of right. It is as fair to argue that sev- 
 eral instances of reasonableness become an aggregate 
 of unreasonableness, as to argue that a school board, 
 chosen for their good judgment in the matter, in the 
 exercise of lawful powers will refuse to grant the rea- 
 sonable request of a father, and thereby make a woe- 
 ful mistake and do a woeful wrong. 
 
 The claim of parental right, as against a right as- 
 sumed by government or unfairly exercised, is one 
 that the citizens of this country would not be slow to 
 assert. The fact that among the great population of 
 the states, in all the years the systems of public in- 
 struction have been in operation, but a very few cases 
 of this character have arisen, goes to show that there 
 has not been any serious conflict between the school 
 officers and parents ; and that such officers and their 
 teachers have heeded the reasonable requests of par- 
 ents and pupils. Is it not safer to let the matter of 
 defining a course of study rest in the judgment and 
 discretion of the school authorities than to submit 
 it to the individual whims and opinions of parents, 
 trusting rather to the good sense of the authorities to 
 make a wise disposal of individual cases, than to 
 announce the right of every man to set up his own 
 wish and desire ? Is it not more in accord with rea- 
 son, and in support of the end and aim of public in- 
 struction ? The reasoning of the court in the Maine 
 case of Dondhoe v. RicJiards, ante, p. 24, seems to meet 
 
68 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 and overturn that of the court in the- Wisconsin case 
 as to the principles governing the power and .author- 
 ity given by statute to school boards and teachers as 
 against the right of parents. Certainly no larger or 
 more explicit grant of power was given by the Maine 
 statute than by the Wisconsin. 
 
 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the case 
 of Kidder v. Chellis, ante, p. 53, directly denies the 
 rule of law as laid down in Morro-w v. Wood^ and evi- 
 dently deems it unnecessary to argue for the power 
 of public - school oflolcers and teachers to regulate 
 studies as against the parental right. And that court 
 further decides that the exercise of the authority to 
 prescribe and enforce studies is not dependent upon 
 the technical observance of the law in regard to the 
 appointment of teachers and the publication of rules 
 and regulations by the school board. 
 
 RULES IN OTHER CASES. 
 Massachusetts, 1%&^.—Spiller\. Wohiirn, 12 All. 127. 
 
 The school committee of Woburn, Mass., ordered 
 that the schools should be opened in the morning 
 with reading from the Bible and prayer, and that 
 the scholars should bow their heads during the 
 prayer. Because of some objection made to the 
 latter portion of the order, the committee modified 
 it, and directed that any scholar, whose parent re- 
 quested it, should be excused from bowing the head. 
 The father of a girl named Ella R. Spiller refused to 
 request that she be excused, and ordered her not to 
 obey that part of the order. She refused to bow 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 69 
 
 her head during prayer, and was excluded from the 
 school until she should comply with the rule, or her 
 parent should request her exemption. She then in- 
 stituted a suit against the town. The Supreme Court 
 decided that the rule was reasonable and proper. 
 
 Opinion : " The power of the school committee of 
 a town to pass all reasonable rules and regulations 
 for the government, discipline, and management of 
 the public schools under their general charge and 
 superintendence is clear and unquestionable. (Gen. 
 Sts. c. 38, § 16;* Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198; 
 Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. 160.) Equally 
 clear is it that the committee of the town of Wo- 
 burn did not exceed their authority in passing an 
 order that the Bible should be read and prayer 
 offered at the opening of the schools on the morn- 
 ing of each day. No more appropriate method 
 could be adopted of keeping in the minds of both 
 teachers and scholars that one of the chief objects 
 of education, as declared by the statutes of this com- 
 monwealth, and which teachers are especially en- 
 joined to carry into effect, is 'to impress on the 
 minds of children and youth committed to their 
 care and instruction the principles of piety and jus- 
 tice, and a sacred regard for truth.' (Gen. Sts. c. 38, 
 
 * " Every town shall, at the annual meeting, choose, by 
 written ballots, a board of school comraittee, which shall 
 have the general charge and superintendence of all the pub- 
 lic schools in town." (Same in Public Sts., c. 44, § 21.) 
 
70 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 § 10 ; St. 1862, c. 57.) We do not mean to say 
 that it would be competetit for a school committee 
 to pass an order or regulation requiring pupils to 
 conform to any religious rite or observance, or to 
 go through with any religious forms or ceremonies, 
 which were inconsistent with or contrary to their 
 religious convictions or conscientious scruples. Such 
 a requisition would be a violation of the spirit of 
 the clause in the Constitution, Pt. 1, Art. II., which 
 provides that no one shall be hurt or molested in his 
 person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the 
 manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of 
 his own conscience ; and it would also be inconsist- 
 ent with the plain intention of the legislature, in pro- 
 viding that no one shall be excluded from a public 
 school on account of religious opinions (Gen. Sts., 
 c. 41, § 9), and in requiring that the daily reading 
 of the Bible in public schools shall be without writ- 
 ten note or oral comment, and in providing that no 
 pupil shall be called on to read any particular version, 
 whose parent or guardian shall declare that he has 
 conscientious scruples against allowing him to read 
 therefrom. (St. 1862, c. 57.) Having in view the 
 manifest spirit and intention of these provisions, an 
 order or regulation, by a school committee, which 
 would require a pupil to join in a religious rite or 
 ceremony contrary to his or her religious opinions, 
 or those of a parent or guardian, would be clearly 
 unreasonable and invalid- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 71 
 
 " But we are unable to see that the regulation with 
 which the plaintiff was required to comply can be 
 justly said to fall within this category. In the first 
 place, it did not prescribe an act which was neces- 
 sarily one of devotion or religious ceremony. It 
 went no further than to require the observance of 
 quiet and decorum during the religious service with 
 which the school was opened. It did not compel a 
 pupil to join in the prayer, but only to assume an 
 attitude which was calculated to prevent interrup- 
 tions, by avoiding all communication with others 
 during the service. In the next place, the regulation 
 did not require a pupil to comply with that part of 
 it prescribing the position of the head during prayer, 
 if the parent requested a child to be excused from 
 it. This was in analogy to the provision already 
 cited in relation to the reading of a particular ver- 
 sion of the Bible contained in St. 1862, c. 57, and 
 takes away all ground of objection to the reason- 
 ableness and validity of the order. 
 
 "Under these circumstances, it not appearing that 
 the plaintiff made any objection to a compliance with 
 the regulation, except in obedience to the will of her 
 father, we are of opinion that her exclusion from 
 the school was justifiable, and furnishes no ground 
 of action." 
 
^2 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 Iowa, 1881.— PerAms v. Directors, 56^ Iowa, 4:19. 
 
 The board of directors in an Iowa district made a 
 rule as follows : " Scholars who shall be guilty of 
 defacing or injuring any school property shall be re- 
 quired to pay all damage. Notice of such damage 
 shall be sent to the parents or guardians of the pupil, 
 and in default of payment the case shall be reported 
 to the president of the board, who may proceed with 
 it according to law. Scholars thus reported to the 
 president shall not afterward be allowed to attend 
 until payment of damages shall be made, or the case 
 otherwise adjusted." While engaged in a game of 
 ball, at a proper time, near the school-house, one of 
 the boys unintentionally, and by accident, batted a 
 ball through one of the windows of the school-house, 
 breaking a glass of about the value of three dollars. 
 His parents refused to pay for it. The superintend- 
 ent of the school would not allow the pupil to at- 
 tend, which action was ratified by the directors, and 
 suit was brought against them. The Supreme Court 
 gave a decision against the directors. 
 
 From opinion : " We are next to inquire whether 
 defendants, as school directors, had authority to pro- 
 mulgate and enforce the rule under which the plain- 
 ti£E was excluded from the school. 
 
 "It will be observed that plaintiff was guilty of no 
 breach of discipline or of any offence against good 
 order. 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 1^ 
 
 " By an accident, and without any evil purpose, lie 
 broke a window glass. The rule requires him to pay 
 the damage done, and in default thereof authorizes 
 the directors to exclude him from the school. We 
 may admit that he ought to pay the damages and is 
 liable therefor. But we think his omission to per- 
 form this duty cannot be punished by his expulsion 
 from the school. The state does not deprive its citi- 
 zens of their property, or their liberty, or of any 
 rights, except as a punishment for a crime. It would 
 be very harsh and obviously unjust to deprive a 
 child of education for the reason that through 
 accident and without intention of wrong he de- 
 stroyed property of the school district. Doubtless 
 a child may be expelled from school as a punish- 
 ment for breach of discipline or for offences against 
 good morals, but not for innocent acts. 
 
 " In this case the plaintiff was expelled, not because 
 he broke the glass, but because he did not pay the 
 damage sustained by the breaking. His default in 
 this respect was no breach of good order or good 
 morals. The rule requiring him to make payment 
 is not intended to secure good order, but to enforce 
 an obligation to pay a sum of money. 
 
 " We are clearly of opinion that the directors have 
 no authority to promulgate or enforce such a rule." 
 
 Note. — The law of New Jersey provides for suspen- 
 sion as penalty for damage to school property : " Any 
 pupil who shall in any way cut, deface, or otherwise 
 
Y4 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 injure any school-house, fences or outbuildings thereof, 
 shall be liable to suspension and punishment, and the 
 parents of sucli pupil shall be liable in damages." 
 
 SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION. 
 
 For case of expulsion for immoral practices out 
 of school, see page 91. (8 Cush. 160.) 
 
 For case of expulsion for refusing to bow the head 
 during prayer, see page 68. (12 All. 127.) 
 
 For cases of expulsion and suspension for tardi- 
 ness and absence, see page 9 (116 Mass. 366), and 
 page 20 (71 Mo. 628). 
 
 For cases of expulsion for refusal to study certain 
 branches, see page 41 (79 111. 567), and page 33 
 (32 Vt. 226). 
 
 For case of expulsion for not paying for glass 
 broken in school-house, see page 72. (56 Iowa, 
 479.) 
 
 For case of refusal to admit scholar because of 
 deficiency in one study, see page 46. (87 111. 303.) 
 
 For case of expulsion for publishing article reflect- 
 ing upon school board, see page 99. (30 Iowa, 
 429.) 
 
 For case where pupil was expelled for attending 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 75 
 
 social parties, contrary to rule of the school board, 
 see page 102. (66 Mo. 286.) 
 
 For case where court intimated that suspension 
 was the proper course to pursue, instead of whip- 
 ping-, where child, in obedience to parent, refuses to 
 study certain branches, see pages 50, 122. (50 Iowa, 
 152.) 
 
 For case of expulsion where scholars were absent 
 from school to attend religious services by command 
 of parents and priest, but without consent of school 
 committee, see page 10. (48 Yt. 444.) 
 
 For case of expulsion of Catholic child for refusal 
 to comply with a rule requiring pupils to read in the 
 Protestant version of the Bible, see page 24 (38 
 Me. 379) ; and for case of suspension of Catholic 
 boy for refusing to lay aside his books during the 
 reading from the Bible, see page 134. (95 111. 263.) 
 
 For case where pupil, after being expelled from 
 school, was ejected from school building while at- 
 tending a public entertainment therein, see page 86. 
 (3 Pitts. R. 264.) 
 
 For case where boy was ejected from the school- 
 house for using saucy and profane language to the 
 school committee, see page 88. (41 Conn. 442.) 
 
 For case of suspension for not declaiming, see 
 page 52. {Kidder v. ChelUs, 59 N. H. 473.) 
 
76 POWER AND AUXHORITY OF 
 
 Massachusetts, 1870. — Hodgkim v. Rockport^ 105 Mass. 475. 
 
 Henry Ilodgkins was expelled from school by the 
 committee of Rockport, Mass., for acts of misconduct 
 which consisted of *' whisperinc;, laughing*, acts of 
 playfulness and rudeness to other pupils, inattention 
 to study, and conduct tending to cause confusion 
 and distract the attention of other scholars from 
 their studies and recitations." Before expulsion the 
 pupil was remonstrated with, and admonished by 
 the teacher and members of the committee. The 
 boy instituted a suit against the town for this exclu- 
 sion from school. The Supreme Court decided that 
 the exclusion was lawful. 
 
 From the opinion : ^' The sixteenth section of 
 chapter thirty-eight of the General Statutes provides 
 that the school committee 'shall have the general 
 charge and superintendence of all the public schools 
 in town.' This general power, by necessary impli- 
 cation, includes the power to make all reasonable 
 rules and regulations for the discipline, government, 
 and management of the schools, and also the power 
 to exclude children from school for sufficient cause. 
 (Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 ; Sherman v. Charles- 
 town, 8 Cush. 160 ; Sjyiller v. Wohurn, 12 All. 127.) 
 And when a scholar is guilty of misconduct which 
 injuriously affects the discipline and management 
 of the school, we think the law vests in the school 
 committee the power of determining whether the 
 welfare of the school requires his exclusion. 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 77 
 
 " They are required by law to visit the schools fre- 
 qaentl}^ for the purpose of inquiring * into the regu- 
 lation and discipline of the schools, and the habits 
 and proficiency of the scholars therein ' (Gen. Sts. 
 c. 38, § 26) ; and they are thus in a situation to judge, 
 better than any other tribunal, what effect such mis- 
 conduct has upon the usefulness of the school and 
 the welfare of the other scholars ; and if they exer- 
 cise this power in good faith, their decision is not 
 subject to revision by the court. 
 
 *' In the case at bar, the committee, acting in good 
 faith, excluded the plaintiff from school on account 
 of his general persistence in disobeying the rules of 
 the school, to the injury of the school. He was guilty 
 of acts of misconduct which, if persisted in, it is 
 clear, might seriously interfere with the discipline 
 and impair the usefulness of the school. Whether 
 they had such an effect upon the welfare of the 
 school as to require his expulsion was a question 
 within the discretion of the committee, and upon 
 which their action is conclusive." 
 
 Vermont, ISH.— Scott v. School District, 46 Vt. 452. 
 
 A teacher in Vermont expelled from her school 
 the son of the prudential committee, for disobedience 
 of the rules of the school. The father, as such com- 
 mittee, insisted upon her taking the boy back. The 
 teacher refused, quit the school, and at the close of 
 the term sued to recover her salary. In this suit, 
 
78 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 which resulted in tlie teacher's favor,, the following 
 principles were laid down by the Supreme Court : 
 
 " The teacher could not perform the duties of her 
 employment without maintaining proper and neces- 
 sary discipline in the school, and when all her other 
 means for doing so failed in respect to the boy, it 
 was her right, and might be her duty, to expel him, 
 to save the rest of the school from being injured by 
 his presence. It >vas not the duty of the teacher, 
 under the contract, to teach , the school without 
 maintaining proper and necessary discipline in it; 
 and if the committee insisted that she should have 
 the boy there, when she could not have him there 
 and the discipline too, it was equivalent to insisting 
 that she should teach the school Avithout the dis- 
 cipline, which she was not bound to do." * 
 
 Wisconsin, 1818.— State v. Barton,^ Wis. 150. 
 
 A teacher in Wisconsin suspended a boy for 
 " continued misconduct," or " general bad conduct," 
 and the suspension was subsequently approved by 
 the school board. In a suit brought to compel his 
 reinstatement, the Supreme Court considered the 
 rights and powers of teachers in matters of suspen- 
 sion and expulsion. 
 
 Extract from opinion : " The teacher is responsir 
 ble for the discipline of his school, and for the prog-^ 
 
 * See Tennessee case, p. 80, and note, p. 82. 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 79 
 
 ress, conduct, and deportment of his pupils. It is 
 his imperative duty to maintain good order, and to 
 require of his pupils a faithful performance of their 
 duties. If he fails to do so he is unfit for his posi- 
 tion. To enable him to discharge these duties ef- 
 fectually he must necessarily have the power to en- 
 force prompt obedience to his lawful commands. 
 For this reason the law gives him the power, in 
 proper cases, to inflict corporal punishment upon re- 
 fractory pupils. But there are cases of misconduct 
 for which such punishment is an inadequate remedy. 
 If the offender is incorrigible, suspension or expul- 
 sion is the only adequate remedy. In general, no 
 doubt, the teacher should report a case of that kind 
 to the proper board for its action in the first in- 
 stance, if no delay will necessarily result from that 
 course prejudicial to the best interests of the school. 
 But the conduct of the recusant pupil may be such 
 that his presence in the school for a day or an hour 
 may be disastrous to the discipline of the school, 
 and even to the morals of the other pupils. In such 
 a case it seems absolutely essential to the welfare of 
 the school that the teacher should have the power to 
 suspend the offender at once from the privileges of 
 the school ; and he must necessarily decide for him- 
 self whether the case requires that remedy. If he 
 suspends the pupil, he should promptly report his 
 action and his reasons therefor to the proper board. 
 It will seldom be necessary for the teacher in charge 
 
so POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 of a district school to exercise this power, because 
 usually he can communicate readily with the dis- 
 trict board, and obtain the direction and order of 
 the board in the matter. But where the govern- 
 ment of a public school is vested in a board of edu- 
 cation (as in the present case) with a more numerous 
 membership than district boards, and which holds 
 stated meetings for the transaction of business, 'the 
 facilities for speedy communication with the board 
 may be greatly decreased, and more time must usu- 
 ally elapse before the board can act upon a com- 
 plaint of the teacher. In those schools the occa- 
 sions which require the action of the teacher in the 
 first instance will occur more frequently than in the 
 district schools. We conclude, therefore, that the 
 teacher has, in a proper case, the inherent power to 
 suspend a pupil from the privileges of his school, 
 unless he has been deprived of the power by the af- 
 firmative action of the proper board." 
 
 Tennessee, 1880. — ParJcer v. School District^ 5 Lea, 525. 
 
 A teacher in Tennessee published certain rules for 
 his school, one of which was as follows: "Pupils 
 must abstain from the common use of tobacco and 
 ardent spirits." The school directors objected to 
 that part in relation to tobacco, and he was em- 
 ployed upon the understanding and condition that 
 the rule in relation to the use of tobacco should not 
 be enforced on the school grounds outside of the 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 81 
 
 scliool-house. After some days he suspended two 
 of the pupils for using tobacco on the school grounds 
 outside the school -house. The directors insisted 
 that the pupils should be restored. The teacher re- 
 fused to abrogate or modify his rule in regard to 
 tobacco and to allow the pupils to continue in 
 school with the privilege of using tobacco on the 
 school grounds; and the directors thereupon dis- 
 charged him. 
 
 In a suit concerning the salary of the teacher it 
 was decided by the Supreme Court that, under the 
 provisions of the state law, the teacher could suspend 
 but not expel, and his decision was subject to the 
 action of the directors. 
 
 The following sections of the law were cited by 
 the court. School directors "to suspend or dismiss 
 pupils when the prosperity or efficiency of the school 
 requires it." "Any teacher of a public school may, 
 for sufficient cause, suspend pupils from attendance 
 on the schools until the case is decided by the board 
 of school directors, which shall be with as little de- 
 lay as possible." 
 
 Extract from opinion : " From these provisions 
 [recited above] it is apparent that a teacher of a 
 public school, while he has the right to suspend a 
 pupil until the case is decided by the directors, can- 
 not, without the concurrence of the directors, per- 
 manently deprive a pupil, within the ages, and resid- 
 ing within the district, of the privileges of the school. 
 6 
 
82 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 The power to dismiss a pupil is alone given to the 
 directors, and their decision must control. 
 
 " The refusal of a teacher to receive and admit to 
 the privileges of the school a pupil whom the di- 
 rectors decide shall be received, or an attempt upon 
 the part of the teacher to dismiss a pupil whom the 
 directors decide shall not be dismissed, is, we think, 
 such * improper conduct' as would authorize the di- 
 rectors to dismiss the teacher, for this would be to 
 deny to the pupils the privileges of the public school 
 secured to them by the law.* 
 
 " It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion 
 as to the wisdom or propriety of the rule in regard 
 to the use of tobacco, about which the controversy 
 arose. It is enough to say that this and all ques- 
 tions of a similar character are by the law intrusted 
 to the wisdom and discretion of the school directors, 
 and their decision must in general be conclusive. If 
 we could in any case control their discretion, the 
 present is not a case for the exercise of such power." 
 
 * The rule as thus broadly asserted apparently conflicts 
 with that expressed in the Vermont case (p. 77), but it is to 
 be noted that the Tennessee case turned upon the provision 
 of the statute cited in the opinion ; and the real issue between 
 the teacher and school board was concerning the adoption of 
 a by-law, and the teacher violated a condition of his employ- 
 ment in enforcing a rule annulled by them. 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 83 
 
 Massachusetts, 1882. — Davis v. Boston, 133 Mass. 103. 
 
 Joseph F. Davis was a pupil in a grammar school 
 in the city of Boston. He refused to submit to cor- 
 poral punishment for disobedience and impertinence 
 in school, and was ordered by his teacher to go to 
 the principal of the school ; he went home instead, 
 but returned after several days and offered to sub- 
 mit to punishment; after the teacher commenced 
 to punish,- the boy refused to submit to further pun- 
 ishment, and, as before, was ordered to report to the 
 principal, and, as before, went home instead ; this 
 was repeated several times. On the last occasion 
 the teacher told him to go home, and told him he 
 could not return to the school until he had taken 
 his punishment. The boy and his father then had 
 an interview with the principal, to whom the boy 
 said he would receive his punishment, but could not 
 say he was willing to receive it. The principal told 
 the boy to go home, and that he would not have 
 him in school unless he said he was willing to be 
 punished. The father then requested of the princi- 
 pal the reasons for excluding his boy, and received 
 the following reply from the principal : " In re- 
 sponse to your request why your boy ' has been 
 excluded from school,' I have to say what you al- 
 ready know: (l) that he has not been absolutely 
 excluded from school ; and (2) that I am willing to 
 receive the boy when he comes in an obedient spirit 
 
64 POWiJR AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 and willing- to receive his punishment, to be given 
 for impertinence 'to his teacher. All'ow me further 
 to state that, if you are dissatisfied with my meth- 
 ods of discipline, you can properly appeal to the 
 school committee." 
 
 In an action against the city for unlawful exclu- 
 sion from school the Superior Court directed a ver- 
 dict for the defendant. The boy then appealed .to 
 the Supreme Court, where the judgment of the 
 lower court was affirmed. It was held the boy was 
 not expelled from school. It Avas also decided that 
 teachers may suspend pupils, but the expulsion rests 
 with the school authorities. 
 
 Opinion : "This action is brought under the stat- 
 ute which provides that a child unlawfully excluded 
 from any public school shall recover damages there- 
 for in an action of tort, to be brought in the name 
 of such child, by his guardian or next friend, against 
 the city or town by which such school is supported." 
 (Gen. Sts. c. 41, § 11 ; Pub. Sts. c. 47, § 12.) 
 
 " The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
 to the plaintiff, tended to show that he was guilty 
 of several acts of disobedience and insubordination 
 in the school, for which the teacher sent him to his 
 home ; that afterwards his father returned with him, 
 and had an interview with the principal of the 
 school, in which the principal said that the school 
 committee would not allow him to punish the plain- 
 tiff unless he said that he was willing to be pun- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 85 
 
 ished, and, upon the plaintiff's refusing to say so, 
 he told him *to go home, and that he would not 
 have him in school unless he said he was willing to 
 be punished.' The father afterwards requested the 
 teacher to state the grounds upon which the boy 
 had been 'excluded from school;' and received an 
 answer, which is set forth in the report. There- 
 upon, without any appeal to the school committee, 
 this action was brought. 
 
 "We are of opinion that the Superior Court 
 rightly ruled that the action could not be main- 
 tained. The intention of the statute is to give a 
 remedy to a child who is unlawfully excluded from 
 school by the proper authorities, who in this matter 
 represent the city or town. A teacher has no au- 
 thority to exclude a child from school, unless he 
 acts under the order of the school committee, of 
 which there was no evidence in this case. The laws 
 vest in the school committee the charge and super- 
 intendence of the schools. They alone have the 
 right to exclude any child from school. 
 
 " If a teacher sends a child home from school, 
 there is no hardship in requiring the parent to ap- 
 peal to the committee. Unless the teacher is acting 
 under some order of the committee, this is the only 
 way of ascertaining whether the proper authorities^ 
 for whose action the city or town is made responsi- 
 ble, have excluded the child. On the other hand, to 
 hold that wlienever a teacher sends a child home aa 
 
•86 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 a punishment the parent may treat it as an expul- 
 sion and sue the 'city or town, would lead to vexa- 
 tious litigation and impair the discipline and useful- 
 ness of the schools. {Spear v. Cummings, 23 Pick. 
 224; Sherman Y. Charlestown^ 8 Cush. 160; Hodg^ 
 kins V. RocJcport, 105 Mass. 475 ; Learock v. Put- 
 naniy 111 Mass. 499.) 
 
 " The plaintiff in this case, therefore, has failed-to 
 show an expulsion from school for which the city is 
 liable under the statute." 
 
 Pennsylvania, 1870. — Hughes y. Goodell, 3 Pitts. Rep. 264. 
 
 The following case is reported in the Pennsylva- 
 nia books, although not a decision of the court of 
 last resort of that state. A decision, however, of so 
 righteous a character as to merit a place here, and 
 the approval of students and their lady friends ev- 
 erywhere. 
 
 A student in a state normal school was, for some 
 not very grievous matter, expelled by the principal 
 from that school and all the normal schools of the 
 state, no matter where situated, and for all time to 
 come. Some time after, an exhibition was given by 
 the school, in the school building, to which all the 
 public were invited and tickets were sold. On the 
 evening of the exhibition the expelled student and a 
 lady friend purchased tickets and were admitted to 
 the hall, taking seats near the centre thereof. About 
 the time the hall was filled the principal and assist- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 87 
 
 ants forcibly put the young man out of the building 
 and out of the school grounds. He then invoked 
 the law to give him damages against them, and was 
 successful. 
 
 From opinion : " While the teachers or directors 
 may expel a scholar from the school for sufficient 
 reasons, and deprive him of its advantages, it does 
 not follow, by any means, that they can inflict a 
 perpetual disability upon the offending student. If 
 he is afflicted with a contagious disease, or possesses 
 sucli a bad moral character as to endanger the health 
 or pollute the morals of those with whom he comes 
 in contact, he may, from motives of public policy, 
 be excluded from their association. 
 
 " But for a technical violation of school regula- 
 tions, while he may be expelled from the school, he 
 cannot be further punished by its guardians by the 
 infliction of disabilities in derogation of his rights as 
 a citizen. ... 
 
 "Now, to say that a student expelled from a 
 school for disobedience to some municipal regula- 
 tion should be excluded from attending a prayer- 
 meeting or public lecture in the school-house or 
 college premises for all time to come, without any 
 evidence of improper conduct or suspicion of im- 
 proper purposes, would be an exercise of tyranny 
 over his private rights not vested in the trustees, 
 directors, or professors of our educational institu- 
 tions. 
 
88 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 " A scholar may forfeit his rights to a place in 
 the school or college by the violation of some rule 
 that involves no moral turpitude. And, so far as 
 appears, that was the condition of this plaintiff. If 
 the rule of right in the professors be as great as is 
 claimed in this case, he might have been sued in 
 trespass or forcibly expelled for attending the fu- 
 neral of his mother upon the premises ten years 
 after his expulsion." 
 
 Connecticut, 18'74. — Peck v. Smith, 41 Conn. 442. 
 
 A district-school committee-man in Connecticut _ 
 went to a school-house to build a fire. He observed 
 some chalk-marks- on the funnel, and asked a large 
 boy, sixteen years of age, who was present with 
 three or four younger pupils, if he knew wht) made 
 them. The boy replied, " I did." The committee- 
 man asked, " What for?" The boy answered, " For 
 nothing but fun ; for no hurt and for no good." 
 The committee then asked him if he could not get 
 off the marks better than he had done. The boy 
 replied, in a saucy way, that he " supposed that he 
 could take a hoe or a scraper and scratch them off 
 a little more ; that the teacher was satisfied with it." 
 The committee then called the boy saucy and im- 
 pudent, and told him he wanted no more of his 
 " lip." The boy gave answer that, in his opinion, 
 the committee-man was the saucier of the two. 
 He advanced towards the boy with hand raised as 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 8^ 
 
 if to strike liim, when the boy began to swear, and 
 " dared him " to strike. He then told the boy he 
 must stop swearing. The boy replied that he would 
 not, for him or any " G — d d — n m — n," and asked 
 the committee-man if he desired him to leave school. 
 The committee-man told him he did not, but wanted 
 him to remain and behave himself. The boy con- 
 tinuing to swear, he was told to take his things and 
 go. Not seeming to haste, he was told to hurry up. 
 lie responded that he wouldn't go until he got 
 ready, whereupon the committee-man took hold of 
 his shoulder and put him out of the school-house, 
 using sufficient force for the purpose. The commit- 
 tee-man was then sued for damages. The Supreme 
 Court decided that the action of the committee-man 
 was justified ; and that it was not an expulsion from 
 the school. 
 
 From opinion : " From the facts detailed in the 
 motion the act of the defendant in removing the 
 plaintiff from the school-house is abundantly justi- 
 fied, and may properly be commended. The school 
 for the day had not commenced. The defendant, 
 being at the school-house performing certain duties 
 connected with the school, called the attention of 
 the plaintiff to certain acts, not specially culpable in 
 character, which he acknowledged he had commit- 
 ted. His bearing and manner were insulting and 
 offensive, and the language in which he indulged 
 was grossly profane. Such language, reprehensible 
 
90 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 at all times, should not have been allowed to pass 
 with impunity from a school-boy of the 'older class, 
 within the walls of a school-house, in the presence 
 and hearing of younger pupils. After being told to 
 leave he so conducted that it was proper to remove 
 him, no unnecessary force being used to attain that 
 object. . . . 
 
 "All the force used against the plaintiff is fully 
 justified, and the judgment for the defendant should 
 not be disturbed. The plaintiff stands here on his 
 legal rights, and is certainly entitled to enjoy them, 
 but his position on this record is such that he 
 should have them in strict measure, not running 
 over." * 
 
 * A teacher in Vermont having forbidden a boy to further 
 attend school unless he would make apology for certain mis- 
 conduct, and he refusing to leave or apologize, sent for the 
 committee, who ordered the boy to apologize or leave. The 
 boy would not leave, and the committee attempted to remove 
 him, when another scholar interfered. The last - mentioned 
 boy was found guilty of an assault and battery upon the 
 committee. {State v. Williams, 2V Yt. '755.) This case and 
 the Connecticut case, Peck v. Smith ( p. 88 ), are the only 
 ones bearing upon the right of school officials to act in per- 
 son in the schoolroom. 
 
 The following opinion of an eminent educational writer 
 upon this point is deemed worthy of insertion here. " Dur- 
 ing the period of visitation the committee have the entire 
 control of the school. For the time being it is their school 
 and the teacher is their servant. They may decide what 
 classes shall be called upon to perform exercises, and in what 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 91 
 
 RIGHTS AND POWERS OVER PUPILS FOR ACTS COM- 
 MITTED OUT OF SCHOOL. 
 
 Massachusetts, 1851. — Sherman v. Charlestown, 8 Cush. 160. 
 
 A girl named Charlotte A. Sherman was expelled 
 from the schools by the school committee of 
 Charlestown, Mass., for acts of immorality and li- 
 centiousness committed outside the school. The 
 laws of that state provide that any child unlawfully 
 excluded from school may have an action for dam- 
 ages against the city or town supporting the school. 
 The girl above named instituted an action, but failed 
 therein, the Supreme Court deciding that she was 
 lawfully excluded. 
 
 From the opinion : " The argument for the plain- 
 tiff is, that it is the right of every child between 
 se.ven and sixteen to go to the public school for 
 instruction; that this right is absolute and inde- 
 
 studies. They may direct the teacher to conduct the ex- 
 amination, or may conduct it wholly themselves, or they may 
 combine both methods. In fine, they may dismiss the 
 teacher for the hour, and pursue the examination in his ab- 
 sence. ... 
 
 *' Should any scholar misbehave himself, or prove refractory 
 or contumacious to the committee, while they are engaged in 
 examining the school, it is presumed they have an authority 
 to suspend, to expel, or to punish on the spot, in the same 
 way that the teacher may do in case of like misconduct com- 
 mitted against himself." — (Horace Mann, Sec. Mass. Board 
 Ed., 10th Rep. p. 183.) 
 
92 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 feasible ; that if a young person, male or female, 
 sustains a bad moral cbaracter, and is guilty of 
 gross acts of notorious misconduct, out of school, 
 provided there is no violation of the rules of the 
 school, and no misconduct in school, such pupil 
 cannot be rightfully excluded for any cause, and of 
 course every exclusion must be wrongful. If such 
 were the intent of the legislature, it is strange that 
 they should have used such a significant qualifying 
 term as that of ' unlawfully,' implying that there 
 might be a lawful exclusion from which no such 
 consequence would follow. 
 
 " On general principles it would seem strange if, 
 in the establishment of such a great public institu- 
 tion as that of the public schools, in the benefits of 
 which the whole community has so deep and vital 
 an interest, there were no power vested anywhere 
 suflScient to protect the schools thus established 
 from the noxious influence of any one whose pres- 
 ence and influence would be injurious to the whole, 
 and subversive of the purposes manifestly contem- 
 plated by their establishment. But the court are 
 of opinion that the schools have not been left by 
 the law without reasonable protection in this re- 
 spect; and that a power is vested in the general 
 school committee, or the master, with their appro- 
 bation and direction, to exclude a pupil, although 
 within the prescribed age of seven and sixteen, for 
 good and sufficient cause; and that the notorious 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 93 
 
 immoral propensities, practices, and habits of any 
 one claiming admission as a pupil, if proved to the, 
 satisfaction of the committee, do constitute a good 
 and sufficient cause for such exclusion. 
 
 " This power is rather to be drawn from the gen- 
 eral provisions of the law on this subject, and their 
 application to the subject-matter, than from any- 
 specific enactment. Such authority must, from 
 the necessity of the case, be conferred in general 
 terms. ... 
 
 " In the first place, it is obvious, indeed, it is stren- 
 uously argued in behalf of the plaintiff, that these 
 schools are established for the benefit of all the in- 
 habitants. The enjoyment of this benefit is there- 
 fore a common, not an exclusive personal, right; 
 then, like other common rights, that of way, for in- 
 stance, it must be exercised under such limitations 
 and restrictions that it shall not interfere with the 
 equal and co-extensive rights of others. Take the 
 case of contagious disease: can it be doubted that 
 the presence of a pupil infected could be lawfully 
 prohibited, not for any fault or crime, or wrong con- 
 duct, but simply because his attempt to insist upon 
 his right to attend, under such circumstances, would 
 be dangerous and noxious, and so an interruption 
 of the equal and common right? It seems to be 
 admitted — if not, it could hardly be questioned — 
 that for misconduct in school, for disobedience to 
 its reasonable regulations, a pupil may be excluded. 
 
94 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 Why so ? There is no express provision in the law 
 authorizing such exclusion. It results by, necessary 
 implication from the provisions of law requiring 
 good discipline. It proves that the right to attend 
 is not absolute and unqualified, but one to be en- 
 joyed by all under reasonable conditions. 
 
 "But it is argued, that though good discipline 
 may be maintained within the school, yet the mas- 
 ter and the committee have no right to look be- 
 yond the walls of the school, to take notice of the 
 conduct of its pupils. We cannot perceive the force 
 of this distinction, pressed to the extent to which 
 the argument attempts to carry it. Truancy is a 
 fault committed wholly beyond the precincts of the 
 school, yet no example is more contaminating, no 
 malconduct more subversive of discipline. May not 
 an incorrigible truant be expelled, not as a punish- 
 ment merely, but as a protection to others from in- 
 jurious example and influence. Children of both 
 sexes, and of various ages, capacities, and suscepti- 
 bilities must be thrown together on their way to 
 and from school, at their amusements out of school- 
 hours, under such circumstances as to exert a pow- 
 erful influence on each other. 
 
 " The power, in the last resort, we think, is vested 
 in the school committee. By Rev. Sts. c. 23, § 10, 
 the inhabitants of every town are required to 
 choose by ballot a school committee, who shall 
 have the general charge and superintendence of all 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 95 
 
 the public schools in such town. In some respects 
 their duties are specially prescribed ; in others they 
 result from the general power of superintendence 
 and visitation. . . . 
 
 " Supposing, then, that the school committee have 
 power, upon a proper occasion, to exclude a pupil, 
 we can have no doubt that open, gross immorality 
 in a female, manifested by licentious propensities, 
 language, manners, and habits, amounting even to 
 actual prostitution, although not manifested in the 
 school, are a sufficient ground on which to prohibit 
 her attending the public school. . . . 
 
 "It must be considered that the power of all teach- 
 ers of schools, and of the committees or other man- 
 agers under whose direction they act, is a parental 
 authority, to be exercised for the best good of the 
 whole. It was said in the argument that if the 
 plaintiff had violated the laws of the country, be- 
 ing of an age to be responsible for her conduct, she 
 was liable to be prosecuted and punished, before 
 the tribunals of justice. Suppose she was so liable, 
 she was not the less unfit to be the member of a 
 public school. The two powers are vested and are 
 to be exercised diverso intuitu, the one to punish of- 
 fences against the law, the other to maintain the 
 purity and discipline of the school, and secure the 
 great public objects for which it was established. 
 The court are therefore satisfied that, upon proof 
 of the facts tendered by the defendants, the school 
 
96 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 committee were justified in excluding the plaintiff, 
 and that sueli exclusion was not wrongful." 
 
 Vermont, 1859. — Zander v. Seaver, 82 Vt. 114. 
 
 Feter Lander, Jr., aged about eleven, attended a 
 school in Burlington, Yt., of which a man named 
 A. B. Seaver was teacher. One day, about an hour 
 and a half after the close of the school in the after- 
 noon, and after he had returned to his home, and 
 while driving his father's cow from the pasture by 
 the teacher's house, Lander called the teacher *' old 
 Jack Seaver." This language was used in the pres- 
 ence of some fellow-pupils and within the hearing 
 of Seaver. The next morning after the school was 
 opened the teacher reprimanded Lander for using 
 the insulting language the evening before, and then 
 whipped him with a small rawhide. The boy then 
 brought action of trespass against the teacher for 
 assault and battery. 
 
 From opinion : " The first question presented is, 
 has a schoolmaster the right to punish his pupils for 
 acts of misbehavior committed after the school has 
 been dismissed, and the pupil has returned home and 
 is engaged in his father's service ? 
 
 " It is conceded that his right to punish extends 
 to school-hours, and there seems to be no reasonable 
 doubt that the supervision and control of the mas- 
 ter over the scholar extend from the time he leaves 
 home to go to school till he returns home from 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 97 
 
 school. Most parents would expect and desire that 
 teachers should take care that their children, in go- 
 ing to and returning from school, should not loiter 
 or seek evil company, or frequent vicious places of 
 resort ; but in this case, as appears from the bill of 
 exceptions, the offence was committed an hour and 
 a half after the school was dismissed, and after the 
 boy had returned home and while he was engaged 
 in his father's service. When the child has returned 
 home, or to his parent's control, then the parental 
 authority is resumed and the control of the teacher 
 ceases, and then, for all ordinary acts of misbehav- 
 ior, the parent alone has the power to punish. It is 
 claimed, however, that in this case the boy, " while in 
 the presence of other pupils of the same school, used 
 towards the master and in his hearing contemptu- 
 ous language, with a design to insult him, and which 
 had a direct and immediate tendency to bring the 
 authority of the master over his pupils into con- 
 tempt, and lessen his hold upon them and his con- 
 trol over the school. This, under the charge of the 
 court, must have been found by the jury. 
 
 " This misbehavior, it is especially to be ob- 
 served, has a direct and immediate tendency to in- 
 jure the school, to subvert the master's authority, 
 and to beget disorder and insubordination. It is 
 not misbehavior generally or towards other per- 
 sons, or even towards the master in matters in no 
 way connected with or affecting the school. For 
 7 
 
98 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 as to such misconduct, committed by the child af- 
 ter his return home from school, we think the par- 
 ents, and they alone, have the power of punish- 
 ment. 
 
 " But where the offence has a direct and immedi- 
 ate tendency to injure the school and bring the mas- 
 ter's authority into contempt, as in this case, when 
 done in the presence of other scholars and of the 
 master, and with a design to insult him, we think 
 he has the right to punish the scholar for such acts 
 if he comes again to school. 
 
 " The misbehavior must not have merely a remote 
 and indirect tendency to injure the school. All im- 
 proper conduct or language may perhaps have, by 
 influence and example, a remote tendency of that 
 kind. But the tendency of the acts so done out of 
 the teacher's supervision, for which he may punish, 
 must be direct and immediate in their bearing upon 
 the welfare of the school, or the authority of the 
 master and the respect due to him. Cases may 
 readily be supposed which lie very near the line, 
 and it will often be difficult to distinguish between 
 the acts which have such an immediate and those 
 which have such a remote tendency. Hence each 
 case must be determined by its peculiar circum- 
 stances. 
 
 " Acts done to injure or deface the schoolroom, 
 to destroy the books of scholars, or the books or 
 apparatus for instruction, or the instruments of pun- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 99 
 
 ishment of the master ; language used to other schol- 
 ars to stir up disorder and insubordination, or to 
 heap odium and disgrace upon the master; writ- 
 ings and pictures placed so as to suggest evil and 
 corrupt language, images, and thoughts to the youth 
 who must frequent the school — all such or similar 
 acts tend directly to impair the usefulness of the 
 school, the welfare of the scholars, and the authority 
 of the master. By common consent and by the 
 uniform custom in our New England schools the 
 master has always been deemed to have the right 
 to punish such offences. Such power is essential 
 to the preservation of order, decency, decorum, and 
 good government in schools." 
 
 Iowa, 1870. — Murphy v. Directors, 30 Iowa, 429. 
 
 The directors of a district in Iowa made a visit 
 to a school, and, after the close of an exercise in 
 rhetoric, made remarks commending and criticising 
 what in their judgment deserved. A few days 
 afterwards one of the pupils, a boy named Murphy, 
 wrote and had published in a newspaper an article 
 which, it was alleged, held the directors up to ridi- 
 cule, was impudent, scandalous, and tended to im- 
 pair the authority and usefulness of the board. The 
 board, learning that said article was creating insub- 
 ordination in the school and inciting disregard of 
 their authority in other pupils, directed the teacher 
 to suspend Murphy until such time as he would 
 
100 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 apologize. The boy instituted action against the 
 directors, and was successful. 
 
 From opinion : "... And this question itself 
 rests upon the extent of the power conferred by 
 statute upon the boards of school directors in re- 
 spect to the suspension of pupils from the privi- 
 leges of the schools. Our statute provides that the 
 directors shall have power to dismiss any pupils 
 from school for gross immorality or for persistent 
 violation of the regulations of the school, and to 
 readmit them, etc. (Rev. § 2054), and it is also 
 made their duty to aid the teachers in establish- 
 ing and enforcing rules for the government of the 
 schools. (Laws of 1862, c. 172, § 27.) 
 
 " The answer in this case does not aver that this 
 plaintiff was guilty of, or even charged with, gross 
 immorality or the violation of any regulation of the 
 school ; nor is.it averred that the article plaintiff is 
 charged with having written and caused to be pub- 
 lished was immoral or done in violation of any reg- 
 ulation of the school. The statute does not author- 
 ize the board of directors to suspend pupils for acts 
 tending to destroy the peace and harmony of the 
 school, or inciting insubordination in others, or for 
 ridicule of the directors, in the absence of any reg- 
 ulation prohibiting such acts. And while we would 
 not interfere with the action of the board within the 
 range of their jurisdiction and legal discretion, we . 
 cannot sanction an exercise of authority not con- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 101 
 
 ferred by statute, or the enforcement of penalties 
 essentially ex post factOj under the guise of sound 
 discretion. "When proper regulations for the gov- 
 ernment of the school are made and brought to the 
 knowledge of the pupils, they may be held to the 
 penalties for their violation ; but for the board to 
 visit the severest penalty within their power upon a 
 pupil for an act out of school not prohibited either 
 expressly or by implication, even by a general regu- 
 lation, it is at variance with both the letter and 
 spirit of our laws." * 
 
 * But in a later case in Iowa, hereinbefore reported (ante, 
 p. 3, 31 Iowa, 662), where expulsion from school was di- 
 rected for violation of rule in relation to absence and tardi- 
 ness, the following rule was laid down and the "Vermont case 
 cited in support of it : "If the effect of acts done out of 
 school - houses reach within the schoolroom during school- 
 hours, and are detrimental to good order and the best inter- 
 ests of the pupils, it is evident that such acts may be forbid- 
 den. Truancy is a fault committed away from school. Can 
 it be pretended that it cannot be reached for correction by 
 the school board and teachers ? A pupil may engage in 
 sports beyond school that will render him unfit to study dur- 
 ing school-hours. Cannot these sports be forbidden ? The 
 view that acts, to be within the authority of the school board 
 and teachers for discipline and correction, must be done with- 
 in school-hours, is narrow and without regard to the spirit of 
 the law and the best interests of our common schools. It is 
 in conflict, too, with authority. See upon this point Lan- 
 der V. Seav€i% 32 Yt. 114; Sherman v. Charlestown^ 8 Cush. 
 160. The doctrine we have above endeavored to state is, 
 in these cases, distinctly announced." 
 
102 POWEE AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 Missouri, ISII.— Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286. 
 
 The school directors of the town of Tipton, in 
 Missouri, made a rule that no pupil should attend 
 social parties during the school terra. A boy named 
 Dritt, with the permission of his father and mother, 
 attended an evening party composed of the young 
 people of the town. And it was alleged their con- 
 duct " was strictly innocent, inoffensive, and moral, 
 tending only to social culture." For thus attending 
 the party, in violation of the rule, he was expelled 
 from school. He then sued the directors, and it was 
 held by the Supreme Court that, while he could not 
 maintain an action against the directors because they 
 had not acted maliciously, they had exceeded their 
 authority in making the rule. 
 
 From opinion : " The directors of a school dis- 
 trict are invested with the power and authority to 
 make and execute all needful rules and regulations 
 for the government, management, and control of 
 such school as they may think proper, not incon- 
 sistent with the laws of the land. Under the pow- 
 er thus conferred the directors are not authorized 
 to prescribe a rule which undertakes to regulate 
 the conduct of the children within the district, 
 who have a right to attend the school, after they 
 are dismissed from it and remitted to the custody 
 and care of the parent or guardian. They have 
 the unquestioned right to make needful rules for 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 103 
 
 the control of the pupils while at school, and un- 
 der the charge of the person or persons who teach 
 it, and it would be the duty of the teacher to en- 
 force such rules when made. While in the teacher's 
 charge the parent would have no right to invade 
 the schoolroom and interfere with him in its man- 
 agement. On the other hand, when the pupil is re- 
 leased, and sent back to his home, neither the teach- 
 er nor directors have the authority to follow him 
 thither and govern his conduct while under the pa- 
 rental eye. 
 
 " It certainly could not have been the design of 
 the legislature to take from the parent the control of 
 his child while not at school and invest it in a board 
 of directors and teacher of a school. If they can 
 prescribe a rule which denies to the parent the right 
 to allow his child to attend a social gathering, ex- 
 cept upon pain of expulsion from a school which 
 the law gives him the right to attend, may they not 
 prescribe a rule which would forbid the parent from 
 allowing the child to attend a particular church, or 
 any church at all, and thus step in, in loco parentis^ 
 and supersede entirely parental authority ? For of- 
 fences committed by the scholar while at school, he 
 is amenable to the laws of the school ; when not at 
 school, but under the charge of the parent or guar- 
 dian, he is answerable alone to him. 
 
 "A person teaching a private school may say 
 upon what terms he or she will accept scholars, and 
 
104 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 may demand, before receiving a scholar to be tangbt, 
 that the parents shall surrender so much of his or 
 her parental authority as not to allow the scholar, 
 during the terra, to attend social parties, balls, thea- 
 tres, etc., except on pain of expulsion. This would 
 be a matter of contract, and no one has a right to 
 send a scholar to such a school except on the terms 
 prescribed by those who teach it. 
 
 ** This is not so in regard to public schools, which 
 every child within school age has a right, under the 
 law, to attend, subject, while so attending, to be gov- 
 erned by such needful rules as may be prescribed. 
 When the schoolroom is entered by the pupil the 
 authority of the parent ceases and that of the 
 teacher begins; when sent to his home the author- 
 ity of the teacher ends and that of the parent is re- 
 sumed. For his conduct when at school he may 
 be punished oi' even expelled, under proper circum- 
 stances ; for his conduct when at home he is sub- 
 ject to domestic control. The directors, in prescrib- 
 ing the rule that scholars who attended a social party 
 should be expelled from school, went beyond their 
 power and invaded the right of the parent to gov- 
 ern the conduct of his child when solely under his 
 charge." 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 105 
 
 DECISIONS IN RELATION TO CORPORAL PUNISHMENT. 
 
 North Carolina, 1837. — State v. Pendergrass^ 2 Dev. & Batt. 
 365. 
 
 A lady teacher in North Carolina, after mild treat- 
 ment had failed, whipped one of her young pupils 
 with a switch, leaving marks upon the body ; which 
 marks, however, disappeared in a few days. The 
 teacher was indicted and tried for assault and bat- 
 tery. The following opinion of the Supreme Court, 
 sustaining her action, is considered as defining the 
 extreme limit of the teacher's authority as to bodily 
 punishment. 
 
 Opinion : " It is not easy to state with precision 
 the power which the law grants to schoolmasters 
 and teachers with respect to the correction of their 
 pupils. It is analogous to that which belongs to 
 parents, and the authority of the teacher is regarded 
 as a delegation of parental authority. One of the 
 most sacred duties of parents is to train up and 
 qualify their children for becoming useful and vir- 
 tuous members of society ; this duty cannot be ef- 
 fectually performed without the ability to command 
 obedience, to control stubbornness, to quicken dili- 
 gence, and to reform bad habits ; and to enable him 
 to exercise this salutary sway he is armed with the 
 power to administer moderate correction, when he 
 shall believe it to be just and necessary. The 
 teacher is the substitute of the parent; is charged 
 
106 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 in part with the performance of his duties, and in 
 the exercise of those delegated duties is invested 
 with his power. 
 
 " The law has not undertaken to prescribe stated 
 punishments for particular offences, but has con- 
 tented itself with the general grant of the power of 
 moderate correction, and has confided the gradation 
 of punishments, within the limits of this grant, to 
 the discretion of the teacher. The line which sepa- 
 rates moderate correction from immoderate punish- 
 ment can only be ascertained by reference to gen- 
 eral principles. The welfare of the child is the 
 main purpose for which pain is permitted to be in- 
 flicted. Any punishment, therefore, which may se- 
 riously endanger life, limbs, or health, or shall dis- 
 figure the child, or cause any other permanent in- 
 jury, may be pronounced in itself immoderate, as 
 not only being unnecessary for, but inconsistent 
 with, the purpose for which correction is authorized. 
 But any correction, however severe, which produces 
 temporary pain only, and no permanent ill, cannot 
 be so pronounced, since it may have been necessary 
 for the reformation of the child, and does not in- 
 juriously affect its future welfare. 
 
 " We hold, therefore, that it may be laid down as 
 a general rule, that teachers exceed the limits of 
 their authority when they cause lasting mischief ; 
 but act within the limits of it when they inflict 
 temporary pain. 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 107 
 
 " When the correction administered is not in it- 
 self immoderate, and therefore beyond the authority 
 of the teacher, its legality or illegality must depend 
 entirely, we think, on the qui animo with which it 
 was administered. Within the sphere of his au- 
 thority the master is the judge when correction is 
 required, and of the degree of correction necessary ; 
 and, like all others intrusted with a discretion, he 
 cannot be made penally responsible for error of 
 judgment, bnt only for wickedness of purpose. The 
 best and wisest of mortals are weak and erring 
 creatures, and in the exercise of functions in which 
 their judgment is to be the guide cannot, be right- 
 fully required to engage for more than honesty of 
 purpose and diligence of exertion. His judgment 
 must be presumed correct^ because he is the judge, 
 and also because of the difficulty of proving the of- 
 fence, or accumulation of offences, that called for 
 correction ; of showing the peculiar temperament, 
 disposition, and habits of the individual corrected ; 
 and of exhibiting the various milder means that 
 may have been ineffectually used before correction 
 was resorted to. 
 
 " But the master may be punishable when he 
 does not transcend the powers granted, if he grossly 
 abuse them. If he use his authority as a cover for 
 malice, and, under pretence of administering correc- 
 tion, gratify his own bad passions, the mask of the 
 judge shall be taken off, and he will stand amenable 
 
108 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 to justice as an individual not invested with judicial 
 power. 
 
 " We believe that these are the rules applicable to 
 the decision of the case before us. If they be, there 
 was error in the instruction given to the jury, that 
 if the child was whipped by the defendant so as to 
 occasion the marks described by the prosecutor the 
 defendant had exceeded her authority, and was guil- 
 ty as charged. The marks were all temporary, and 
 in a short time all disappeared. No permanent in- 
 jury was done to the child. The only appearances 
 that could warrant the belief or suspicion that the 
 correction threatened permanent injury were the 
 bruises on the neck and the arms ; and these, to say, 
 the least, were too equivocal to justify the court in 
 assuming that they did threaten such mischief. We 
 think that the instruction on this point should have 
 been, that unless the jury could clearly infer from 
 the evidence that the correction inflicted had pro- 
 duced, or was in its nature calculated to produce, 
 lasting injury to the child, it did not exceed the 
 limits of the power which had been granted to the 
 defendant. We think, also, that the jury should 
 have been further instructed, that however severe 
 the pain inflicted, and however, in their judgment, 
 it might seem disproportionate to the alleged negli- 
 gence or offence of so young and tender a child, 
 yet if it did not produce or threaten lasting mis- 
 chief it was their dut)^ to acquit the defendant ; un- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 109 
 
 less the facts testified induced a conviction in their 
 minds that the defendant did not act honestly in 
 the performance of duty according to her sense of 
 right, but, under the pretext of duty, was gratifying 
 malice. 
 
 *' We think that rules less liberal towards teach- 
 ers cannot be laid down without breaking in upon 
 the authority necessary for preserving discipline 
 and commanding respect; and that although these 
 rules leave it in their power to commit acts of in- 
 discreet severity with legal impunity, these indis- 
 cretions will probably find their check and correc- 
 tion in parental affection and in public opinion ; 
 and, if they should not, that they must be tolerated 
 as a part of those imperfections and inconveniences 
 which no human laws can wholly remove or re- 
 
 Vermont, 18iQ.— Hathaway v. liice, 19 Yt. 102. 
 
 A Vermont schoolmaster was charged with gross 
 abuse of one of his scholars by beating with clubs, 
 sticks, fists, etc. The teacher demurred, as it is 
 termed in legal phrase, to the declaration or state- 
 ment of injury of the plaintiff, relying by his de- 
 murrer upon his office of schoolmaster ; that the 
 punishment was inflicted by him as such, and was 
 moderate, not proving to the court the real facts in 
 justification. This, under a rule of legal pleading, 
 was admitting the truth of plaintiff's charge, and 
 
110 POWER AND AUTHORITY OP 
 
 defending only upon the point that because he was 
 a teacher he was ilot liable. The Supreme Court 
 overruled his demurrer, and in course of the opin- 
 ion say : 
 
 " We are brought, then, to the question, whether 
 a suflScient justification is disclosed for all that is 
 alleged against the defendant. The plea is based 
 upon the right of a schoolmaster to correct his 
 scholar, a right which has always been practically 
 and judicially sanctioned. But it rests upon similar 
 ground as the right to correct a child or servant, 
 and the chastisement must not exceed the limits 
 of a moderate correction, (l Hawk. P. C. 130; 1 
 Stephen's N. P. 219.) And though courts are bound, 
 with a view to the maintenance of necessary order 
 and decorum in schools, to look with all reasonable 
 indulgence upon the exercise of this right, yet when- 
 ever the correction, as confessed by the pleadings or 
 as proved on trial, shall appear to have been clearly 
 excessive and cruel, it must be adjudged illegal." 
 
 Maine, 184.1,— Stevens v. Fassett, 21 Me. 266. 
 
 In a school in Maine a pupil, a large boy over 
 twenty-one years of age, who had been permitted to 
 occupy the teacher's desk, refused to leave it. The 
 Supreme Court decided that sufficient force could 
 be used by the master to get possession of his chair 
 and desk, and he could ask assistance of others 
 without the direction or knowledo'e of the commit- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. Ill 
 
 tee. The following general principles concerning 
 corporal punishment, and expressing the law as laid 
 down by the common-law writers cited therein, are 
 taken from the opinion. 
 
 " The right of the parent to keep the child in or- 
 der and obedience is secured by the common law. 
 He may lawfully correct his child, being under ago, 
 in a reasonable manner, for this is for the benefit of 
 his education. He may delegate also a part of his 
 parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or 
 schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco pa- 
 rentis, and has such portion of the power of the 
 parent committed to his charge — viz., that of re- 
 straint and correction — as may be necessary to an- 
 swer the purpose for which he is employed. (1 
 Black. Com. 453, 454 ; 1 Hale's P. C. 473, 474.) 
 * The rights of parents [over their children] result 
 from their duties. As they are bound to maintain 
 and educate their children, the law has given them 
 the right to such authority ; and, in support of that 
 authority, a right to the exercise of such discipline 
 as may be requisite for the discharge of their sacred 
 trust.* 'The power allowed by law to the parent 
 over the person of the child may be delegated to a 
 tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the pur- 
 poses of education.' (2 Kent's Com. 169 ,170.) Al- 
 though the town school is instituted by the author- 
 ity of the statute, the children are to be considered 
 as put in charge of the instructor for the same pur- 
 
112 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 pose, and he clothed with the same powej as when 
 he is directly employed by the parents. The power 
 of the parent to restrain and coerce obedience in 
 children cannot be doubted, and it has seldom or 
 never been denied. The power delegated to the 
 master by the parent must be accompanied for the 
 time being with the same right, as incidental, or the 
 object sought must fail of accomplishment. 
 
 "The practice, which has generally prevailed in 
 our town schools since the settlement of the coun- 
 try, has been in accordance with the law thus ex- 
 pressed, and resort has been had to personal chas- 
 tisement where milder means of restraint have been 
 unavailing. . . . 
 
 " If the teacher is authorized to inflict corporal 
 punishment for the purpose of securing obedience 
 to his reasonable rules and commands, and thereby 
 to render the school what it is contemplated by the 
 law that it shall be, it follows that he has the 
 right to direct how and when each pupil shall at- 
 tend to his appropriate duties, and the manner in 
 which they shall demean themselves, provided that 
 in all this nothing unreasonable is demanded. It 
 cannot be contended that, as the teacher has respon- 
 sible duties to perform, he is not entitled to the rea- 
 sonable means by which to perform them. He has 
 a right to the house prepared by the district, and 
 the seat in it assigned for his occupation. If a 
 scholar should attempt to debar him from entering 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 113 
 
 the former, or should occupy the latter to the ex- 
 clusion of the teacher, he would be a subject of 
 punishment, and force sufficient, at least, to obtain 
 their possession could be used, if there was an abso- 
 lute refusal on the part of the usurper to surrender 
 them." 
 
 Indiana, 185Z.— Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 291. 
 
 The following opinion as to the right and meas- 
 ure of bodily punishment was rendered in a case in 
 the Supreme Court of Indiana. Action by pupil 
 against teacher for assault. 
 
 " The law still tolerates corporal punishment in 
 the schoolroom. The authorities are all that way, 
 and the legislature has not thought proper to inter- 
 fere. The public seem to cling to a despotism in 
 the government of schools which has been discarded 
 everywhere else. Whether such training be conge- 
 nial to our institutions, and favorable to the full de- 
 velopment of the future man, is worthy of serious 
 consideration, though not for us to discuss. 
 
 " In one respect the tendency of the rod is so ev- 
 idently evil that it might perhaps be arrested on the 
 ground of public policy. The practice has an in- 
 herent proneness to abuse. The very act of whip- 
 ping engenders passion, and very generally leads to 
 excess. Where one or two stripes only were at first 
 intended, several usually follow, each increasing in 
 vigor as the act of striking inflames the passions, 
 8 
 
114 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 This is a matter of daily observation and experience. 
 Hence the spirit of the law is, and the leaning of 
 the courts should be, to discountenance a practice 
 which tends to excite human passions to heated and 
 excessive action, ending in abuse and breaches of 
 the peace. Such a system of petty tyranny cannot 
 be watched too cautiously, nor guarded too strictly. 
 The tender age of the sufferers forbids that its 
 slightest abuses should be tolerated. So long as 
 the power to punish corporally in school exists, 
 it needs to be put under wholesome restriction. 
 Teachers should, therefore, understand that when- 
 ever correction is administered in anger or insolence, 
 or in any other manner than moderation and kind- 
 ness, accompanied with that affectionate moral sua- 
 sion so eminently due from one placed by the law 
 in loco parentis — in the sacred relation of parent — 
 the courts must consider them guilty of assault and 
 battery, the more aggravated and wanton in propor- 
 tion to the tender 5^ears and dependent position of 
 the pupil. . . . All that can be done without the 
 aid of legislation is to hold each case strictly within 
 the rule; and if the correction be in anger, or in 
 any other respect immoderately or improperly ad- 
 ministered, to hold the unworthy perpetrator guilty 
 of assault and battery. . . . 
 
 " The law having elevated the teacher to the place 
 of the parent, if he is still to sustain that sacred re- 
 lation it becomes him to be careful in the exercise 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 115 
 
 of his authority, and not make his power a pretext 
 for cruelty and oppression. (14 Johns. R. 119.) 
 Whenever he undertakes to exercise it, the cause 
 must be sufficient, the instrument suitable to the 
 purpose; the manner and extent of the correction, 
 the part of the person to which it is applied, the 
 temper in which it is inflicted, all should be distin- 
 guished with the kindness, prudence, and propriety 
 which become the station." 
 
 Indiana, 1853.— Gardner v. State, 4 Ind. 633. 
 
 In another school in Indiana a boy named Stew- 
 ard missed in spelling the word "commerce," and 
 refused to try the word again. The teacher, named 
 Gardner, became angry and commenced beating 
 him. He wore out two whips on hira, and in the 
 progress of the chastisement gave a blow or two 
 with his fist on the head, and a couple of kicks 
 in the face. The following is an extract from the 
 opinion of the Supreme Court sustaining a convic- 
 tion of Gardner for assault and battery : 
 
 "... In a recent case v/e had occasion to examine 
 the law relative to the right of teachers to chastise 
 their pupils, Cooper' v. Mc Junking ante, p. 113 (case 
 last cited). 
 
 We adhere to the doctrine there laid down. 
 Such outrages on the child, even though he be tru- 
 ant and perhaps stubborn, are more than parental 
 feeling can bear. To prevent retaliation and breach- 
 
116 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 es of the peace, it becomes a matter of pablic policy 
 to punish the offender. If the law in such cases is 
 properly administered, those whose feelings are out- 
 raged will have no apology for taking redress into 
 their own hands; they will peaceably abide the ad- 
 judication of the courts. If, on the contrary, the 
 law is loosely and indulgently administered, the 
 tendency is to stimulate the aggrieved to seek per- 
 sonal redress. As a matter of public policy, courts 
 and juries should, therefore, hold a strong and stern 
 hand over teachers who abuse their sacred and re- 
 sponsible position." 
 
 Massachusetts, 1855.— Com. v. Randall, 4 Gray, 36. 
 
 Alonzo D. Randall, teacher of a school in Palmer, 
 Mass., punished a girl with a ferule for being obsti- 
 nate, telling falsehoods, and for using insolent lan- 
 guage before and during the punishment. The 
 teacher ceased punishing when the girl acknowl- 
 edged her fault, asked to be forgiven, and promised 
 better behavior. The teacher was tried for an as- 
 sault and battery and found guilty in the lower 
 court. In that court he asked the judge to instruct 
 the jury as follows : " That a school teacher is ame- 
 nable to the laws in a criminal prosecution for pun- 
 ishing a scholar only when he acts malo animo, 
 from vindictive feelings, or under the violent im- 
 pulses of passion or malevolence ; he is not liable for 
 errors of opinion or mistakes of judgment merely, 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 117 
 
 provided he is governed by an Iionest purpose of 
 heart to promote, by the discipline employed, the 
 highest welfare of the school and the best interest 
 of the scholar ; that he is liable in a criminal prose- 
 cution for punishing a scholar only when the amount 
 of punishment inflicted is more than adequate to 
 subdue the scholar and secure obedience to the rules 
 of the school." 
 
 The judge refused to instruct the jury as above 
 requested, but instructed thera as follows : " That a 
 teacher had a right to inflict corporal punishment 
 upon a scholar; that the case proved was one in 
 which such punishment might properly be inflicted ; 
 that the instrument used (a ferule) was a proper 
 one ; that in inflicting corporal punishment a teach- 
 er must exercise reasonable judgment and discretion, 
 and must be governed, as to the mode and severity 
 of the punishment, by the nature of the offence, by 
 the age, size, and apparent powers of endurance of 
 the pupil ; that the only question in this case was 
 whether the punishment was excessive and im- 
 proper ; that if they should find the punishment to 
 have been reasonable and proper the defendant 
 could not be deemed guilty of an assault and bat- 
 tery ; but if, upon all the evidence in the case, they 
 should find the punishment to have been improper 
 and excessive, the defendant might properly be 
 found guilty upon this complaint." 
 
 The teacher was dissatisfied with this ruling, and 
 
118 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 carried the case to the Supreme Court, where the 
 ruling Avas sustained. 
 
 From opinion: "The instructions given tended 
 to justify the defendant in punishing his pupils with 
 greater severity than is consistent with a just and 
 humane exercise of the authority conferred on him 
 by law. To say the least, they were sufficiently fa- 
 vorable to the defendant. If, in inflicting punish- 
 ment upon his pupil, he wont beyond the limit of 
 moderate castigation, and, either in the mode or de- 
 gree of correction, was guilty of any unreasonable 
 and disproportionate violence or force, he was clear- 
 ly liable for such excess in a criminal prosecution. 
 (1 Hawk. c. 60, § 23 ; 1 Russell on Crimes [7th 
 Amer. ed.], 755 ; Bac. Ab. x\ssault and Battery, C.) 
 It is undoubtedly true that, in order to support an 
 indictment for an assault and battery, it is necessary 
 to show that it was committed ex intentione, and 
 that if the criminal intent is wanting the offence is 
 not made out. But this intent is always inferred 
 from the unlawful act. The unreasonable and ex- 
 cessive use of force on the person of another being 
 proved, the wrongful intent is a necessary and legit- 
 imate conclusion in all cases where the act was de- 
 signedly committed. It then becomes an assault and 
 battery, because purposely inflicted without justifi- 
 cation or excuse. Whether, under all the facts, the 
 punishment of the pupil is excessive must be left to 
 the jury." 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 119 
 
 Tennessee, 1859. — Anderson v. State, 3 Head's R. 455. 
 
 While the teacher in a Tennessee school was hear- 
 ing a class, one of the scholars, a small boy named 
 Layne, spoke out and said, "Four and one make 
 five," in a low tone of voice. The teacher inquired, 
 " Who spoke out ?" Layne answered that he did. 
 The teacher called him up, and told him to stand 
 until the class was through. The teacher asked him 
 what he spoke out for. He said he spoke before 
 he thought, and commenced crying, and said he 
 would do so no more. The teacher then told him 
 to pull off his coat ; that no excuse would do. He 
 pulled off his coat. He then hit him about a dozen 
 licks with a switch about as large as his thumb or 
 finger, and two or three feet long. The little boy 
 never had attended the school until the day before. 
 The teacher was found guilty of assault and battery, 
 and the conviction was sustained by the Supreme 
 Court. 
 
 From opinion: "Upon these facts the defendant 
 was clearly guilty of an illegal act. There was no 
 sufficient cause for the whipping. The offence was 
 very slight, and entirely unintentional. It was the 
 first violation of the rules on the part of the little 
 boy ; he was a new scholar, that being his second 
 day in the school, and his apology, repentance, and 
 promise to * do so no more ' ought to have saved 
 him from the lash. The chastisement, under these 
 
120 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 circumstances, was not only cruel, but an unauthor- 
 ized exercise of power. Cases like this are calcu- 
 lated to produce the deeds of violence against teach- 
 ers which so often occur on the part of the parents 
 and brothers of students. 
 
 *' The law has very properly guarded the rights 
 of both parties, where this and similar relations ex- 
 ist. The authority given to the teacher must not 
 be abused, but exercised with discretion and moder- 
 ation. He must necessarily have the power to en- 
 force obedience to his rules, and even to use the rod 
 when necessary, biit not wantonly and without cause. 
 Nor must his chastisement be cruel or excessive, but 
 reasonably proportioned to the offence, and in the 
 bounds of moderation. It is of the first importance 
 that the authority of the schoolmaster should be 
 firmly maintained, but still it must be kept within 
 proper limits. The scholar being helpless, and in 
 the power of his teacher, that power should be re- 
 strained, and not allowed to be wantonly abused 
 with impunity. Where this is done the courts 
 must afford the proper redress, and prevent the 
 temptation from being presented to parents and re- 
 lations to take vengeance into their own hands. 
 The government of a school should be patriarchal 
 rather than despotic. If it be a monarchy, it should 
 be a limited one, and not absolute." 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 121 
 
 Yermont, 1859.— Zander v. Seaver, 32 Yt. 114. 
 
 In the Yermont case of Lander v. Seaver, where a 
 boy was punished for calling his teacher names out 
 of school (see page 96), the court, in relation to 
 corporal punishment, approved the law as expressed 
 in the case of Hathaway v. Rice, 19 Yt. 102 (see 
 page 109), and in 4 Gray, 36 (see page 116). 
 
 From opinion : "... The law, as we deem it to 
 exist, is this : A schoolmaster has the right to inflict 
 reasonable corporal punishment. He must exercise 
 reasonable judgment and discretion in determining 
 when to punish, and to what oxtent. In deter- 
 mining upon what is a reasonable punishment va- 
 rious considerations must be regarded -— the nat- 
 ure of the offence, the apparent motive and 
 di&position of the offender, the influence of his 
 example and conduct upon others, and the sex, 
 age, size, and strength of pupil to be punished. 
 Among reasonable persons much difference prevails 
 as to the circumstances which will justify the in- 
 fliction of punishment, and the extent to which 
 it may properly be administered. On account of 
 this difference of opinion, and the difficulty which 
 exists in determining what is a reasonable punish- 
 ment, and the advantage which the master has by 
 being on the spot to know all the circumstances 
 —the manner, looks, tones, gestures, and language 
 of the offender (which are not always easily described) 
 
122 POWER AND AUTlfORITY OF 
 
 — ^and thus to form a correct opinion as to the neces- 
 sity and extent of the punishment, considerable allow- 
 ance should be made to the teacher by way of protect- 
 ing him in the exercise of his discretion. Especially 
 should he have this indulgence when he appears to 
 have acted from good motives and not from anger or 
 malice. Hence the teacher is not to be held liable 
 on the ground of excess of punishment unless the 
 punishment is clearly excessive, and would be so held 
 in the general judgment of reasonable men. If the 
 punishment be thus clearly excessive, then the mas- 
 ter should be held liable for such excess, though he 
 acted from good motives in inflicting the punish- 
 ment, and in his own judgment considered it neces- 
 sary and not excessive. But if there is any rea- 
 sonable doubt whether the punishment was exces- 
 sive, the master should have the benefit of the 
 doubt." 
 
 Iowa, 1878. — State v. Mizmr, 50 Iowa, 152. 
 
 In the Iowa case hereinbefore cited, page 50 (50 
 Iowa, 152), where a scholar was punished for not re- 
 citing in algebra, the court expressed an opinion upon 
 the subject of corporal punishment. In the lower 
 court the jury received the following instruction : 
 " In the absence of all proof the law presumes that 
 a father or school-teacher punishes a child of 
 the father or the pupil of the teacher for a reason- 
 able cause and in a moderate and reasonable man- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 123 
 
 ner. But this presumption, like all other legal pre- 
 sumptions, may be rebutted by the proof." This 
 instruction was sustained by the Supreme Court. 
 
 From opinion : " It is urged this instruction is 
 erroneous, for the reason that the teacher is not liable 
 because of the punishment inflicted, but only in the 
 event that it was excessive, and the evidence fails 
 to show such was the case. 
 
 " Forty years ago it was held, that * when the 
 correction administered is not in itself immoderate, 
 and therefore beyond the authority of the teacher, 
 its legality or illegality must depend entirely, we 
 think, on the quo animo with which it is adminis- 
 tered. Within the sphere of his authority the mas- 
 ter is the judge when correction is required, and of 
 the degree of correction ; and, like all others in- 
 trusted with a discretion, he cannot be made penally 
 responsible for error of judgment, but only for wick- 
 edness of purpose.' {State v. Pendergrass, 2 Dev. 
 & Batt. 355.) 
 
 "Twenty years later an instruction was refused 
 which announced the rule that a teacher was not 
 amenable criminally unless he inflicted the punish- 
 ment with a bad intent, from vindictive feelings, and 
 an instruction given which recognized the right to 
 chastise a scholar by whipping, and the proof was 
 sufficient to justify the instrument used as being a 
 proper one, but that in ' inflicting corporal punish- 
 ment the teacher must exercise reasonable judgment 
 
124 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 and discretion as to the mode and severity^ of the 
 punishment by the nature of the offence, and by the 
 age, size, and apparent power of endurance of the 
 pupil.' 
 
 " As to this instruction it was said : * The instruc- 
 tions given tended to justify the defendant in pun- 
 ishing his pupils with greater severity than is con- 
 sistent with a just and humane exercise of the 
 authority conferred on him by law. To say the 
 least, they were sufficiently favorable to the defend- 
 ant.' (Commonwealth v. Randall, 4 Gray, 36.) 
 
 " We concur with the Supreme Court of Massa- 
 chusetts in the case last cited, and further than this 
 we have no occasion to go in the present case. But 
 if the rule of the first case cited is the correct one, 
 then we have no hesitation in saying there was no 
 error in the instruction of the court, because the 
 punishment was immoderate and excessive, if the 
 testimony of the witnesses for the state is true, and 
 this was a question for the jury. Any punishment 
 with a rod which leaves marks or welts on the per- 
 son of the pupil for two months afterward, or much 
 less time, is immoderate and excessive, and the 
 court would have been justified in so instructing the 
 jury." 
 
 Indiana, l^^^.—Dannenlwffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295. 
 
 A Catholic priest, having charge of a Catholic 
 school in Indiana, punished a boy under the follow- 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 125 
 
 ing circumstances: He, with others, attended the 
 funeral of a Protestant boy as pall-bearers. When 
 they went to school the next day they were required 
 by the lady teacher in charge, subordinate to the 
 priest, to give an excuse for their absence from 
 school, but they refused to give any. She then gave 
 the boys a note directed to the priest, but they ran 
 home and did not deliver the note. The next day 
 the priest whipped them for their disobedience of 
 the order of the teacher in not delivering the note. 
 The priest was sustained by the Supreme Court, 
 and the case of Cooper v. McJunkin^ 4 Ind. 291, was 
 cited and approved.*"^ 
 
 ♦Dannenhoffer was again indicted for whipping another 
 boy under the same circumstances, and in the court below 
 was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of five dollars. 
 The case came before the Supreme Court in 1881. {Dannen- 
 hoffer V. State, 79 Ind. 75.) On the trial below the defendant 
 was asked this question by his counsel: "State whether or 
 not that Tekulve (the person on whom the battery was 
 charged to have been committed) attended the funeral of 
 Clark had anything to do with the punishment administered 
 on that occasion, or if it was any part of the cause." 
 
 The counsel for the state objected to this question, and the 
 trial judge ruled it out. 
 
 The Supreme Court decided that the question was a proper 
 one, and granted a new trial, saying : " It was important to 
 know whether the defendant punished the boy for going to 
 the funeral, or for other disobedience and insubordination." 
 
126 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 Pennsylvania. — Com, v. Seed, 5 Penn. L. J. K 78 (reported 
 1851). 
 
 This case arose in one of the courts of Phila- 
 delphia. A child had played truant. She was 
 sent by her parent with an elder sister to school. 
 When the door was reached she refused to go in, 
 showing great violence of temper. An assistant 
 teacher endeavored to persuade her to enter, but 
 without effect. The principal then appeared and 
 took her into the room, where the violence continued, 
 manifested by jumping and screaming. The teacher 
 talked mildly to the child, and ordered obedience, 
 and finally threatened a whipping, but all to no pur- 
 pose. She then whipped her with a small rattan. 
 After a few blows she reasoned with the child, but 
 the child continuing to be obstinate the whipping 
 was continued until the child yielded. The teacher 
 was complained of for assault and battery. 
 
 From judge's opinion : " What is there in all 
 this which shows malice or cruelty on the part 
 of the teacher? What is there in the language 
 of the law which shows a 'wicked motive' ? I can 
 see nothing. The teacher required obedience to 
 the rules of the school and it was refused. That 
 punishment is used which she thinks is best cal- 
 culated to produce submission, and in the man- 
 ner and form common in all schools. This au- 
 thority the law has delegated to her, and for the 
 exercise of it, although we might differ in opinion 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 127 
 
 as to the manner in which it was done, at least the 
 court will not punish for or correct an error of judg- 
 ment. But from the facts disclosed I do not think 
 there was even an error in that particular. She 
 entered upon the performance of her duty with 
 moderation and firmness as well as a determination 
 to produce submission, which she pursued till it was 
 accomplished, by the best means which her judgment 
 dictated. In this we think she was right. Had she 
 done less, the directors of the school might with 
 propriety have thought she was culpable ; and for 
 these things the law does not hold her responsible. 
 
 " But it has been said there were marks of violence 
 on the child the next day, caused by blows from the 
 rattan. But this is but a slight circumstance to 
 show the motive. It is much greater evidence of 
 the obstinacy and perseverance of the child. The 
 instrument employed was a small, smooth rattan, 
 certainly a moderation in the instrument used, in 
 these days of improvement in education, and in 
 most that is useful, or which adds to the comfort of 
 man. For many of us can well recollect when the 
 birch or hickory stick, with some rather sharp knots 
 thereon, was the instrument for flagellation, and 
 our parents did not complain. 
 
 "To hold that under such circumstances a teacher 
 should be liable to a criminal prosecution would be 
 subversive of all government and order in our schools. 
 Without a firm controlling power is exercised by 
 
128 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 school-teachers, in exacting obedience, submission, 
 united with quiet' and good order in the schools, the 
 public money is worse than wasted. Obedience to 
 parental authority should be taught in the fami- 
 ly, and must be maintained in our schools, or we 
 shall have no obedience in the laws of our govern- 
 ment. ... 
 
 " The character and interest of the teacher, com- 
 bined with the refinement which education gives 
 to the human mind, in softening the heart, like pa- 
 rental love, is generally found a sufficient protec-. 
 tion for the children. But, if these fail, the law af- 
 fords ample protection against cruelty and oppression, 
 while it is a shield to those who, in their sphere, 
 have, as in this case, only done their duty." 
 
 For cases where the court held that punishing 
 a pupil for refusing to study certain branches was 
 unjustifiable, see p. 34 (35 Wis. 59) and pp. 50, 122^ 
 (50 Iowa, 152). 
 
 The following is the law of New Jersey: 
 
 " No teacher shall be permitted to inflict corporal 
 punishment upon any child in any school in this 
 state." (Rev. Stat. 1877, p. 1087.) 
 
 The following extract is from the New York 
 Penal Code : " The use, or attempt, or offer to use 
 force or violence upon or towards the person of an- 
 other is not unlawful in the following cases, . . . 
 when committed by a parent or the authorized agent 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 129 
 
 of any parent, or by any guardian, master, or teacher, 
 in the exercise of a lawful authority to restrain or 
 correct his child, ward, apprentice, or scholar, and 
 the force or violence used is reasonable in manner 
 and moderate in degree." (Rev. Stat. vol. 4, Penal 
 Code, CO, §223.) 
 
 Note. — An examination of the decisions shows that 
 the courts, with entire unanimity, affirm the right of 
 teachers to administer bodily punishment to compel 
 obedience to their lawful commands; but that upon 
 the measure or degree of the punishment and the lia- 
 bility of the teacher for abuse of the right the courts 
 differ. 
 
 The decisions may be arranged in tw^o classes, re- 
 spectively represented by State v. Pendergrass, 3 Dev. 
 «fe Batt, 365 (N. C. 1837) [p. 105] ; and Com. v. Randall, 
 4 Gray, 36 (Mass. 1855) [p. 116]. The first-named case 
 decides that the teacher acts judicially in determining 
 the necessity and extent of punishment, and is not lia- 
 ble unless he produces lasting injury to body or health, 
 or punishes with malice, bad passion, or wickedness 
 of purpose. The second case is to the effect that the 
 teacher must exercise reasonable judgment, and if 
 he goes beyond the limit of moderate castigation and 
 uses any unreasonable and disproportionate violence 
 or force, either in mode or degree of correction, he is 
 liable in a criminal prosecution. 
 
 The rule established by the first case is supported by 
 Com. V. Seed, 5 Pa. L. J, 78 (p. 126), and is cited and ap- 
 proved in four subsequent cases in North Carolina — 
 State V. Stalcup, 2 Ired. 50 ; Slate v. Black, Winst. 266 ; 
 
130. POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 State V. Rliodes, Phil. 453 ; and State v. AJford, 68 N. C. 
 322 (1873), in wliich Judge Gaston, by whom the opin- 
 ion was given in the Pendergrass case, is spoken of 
 as "humane a judge as ever presided in a court." 
 
 The rule laid down in the Massachusetts case, thougli 
 in substance first announced by the Supreme Court of 
 Indiana in Cooper v. McJunMn, 4 Ind. 291 (1853), is 
 supported by Gardner v. State, 4 Ind. 633 (p. 115); 
 Anderson v. State, 3 Head. 455 (Tenn. 1859) [p. 119]; 
 Lander v. Seavei% 32 Vt. 114 (p. 96); State y. Mizner, 
 50 Iowa, 162 (p. 50); DannenTioffer v. State, 69 Ind. 295 
 (p. 124). 
 
 It is to be presumed, in the absence of evidence to 
 the contrary, that the teacher punishes in the exercise 
 of an honest judgment, and not maliciously; and that 
 the punishment is not excessive. {Anderson v. State, 3 
 Head. 455, Tenn.; Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114; State 
 V. Mizner, 50 Iowa, 152.) 
 
 RULES NEED NOT BE RECORDED ; AND RULES MADE 
 BY TEACHER OR PART OF BOARD, SUBSEQUENTLY 
 RATIFIED BY FULL BOARD, ARE BINDING. 
 
 Above points decided in Hodghins v. Rochport^ 
 105 Mass. 475, ante, p. 76. The court said, " Much 
 of the power of the committee, as to the preser- 
 vation of order and the maintenance of discipline, 
 must necessarily be delegated to its different mem- 
 bers and the teachers, and must be exercised without 
 any vote or record." 
 
 And in Russell v. Lynnfield, 116 Mass. 366, ante, 
 p. 9, the above case was cited, and the court said : 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 131 
 
 " The exclusion which the plaintiff complains of in 
 this case Avas by the school-teacher, acting under the 
 direction of one member of the school committee. 
 It is contended to have been unlawful solely because 
 the rule in question had not been formally estab- 
 lished or confirmed by vote of the school committee, 
 duly entered upon their, records. The school com- 
 mittee are required to have the general charge and 
 superintendence of all the public schools in town, 
 and to keep a record of their votes, orders, and pro- 
 ceedings. (Gen. Stat. c. 38, § 16, 22.) But this does 
 not imply that all rules and orders required for the 
 discipline and good conduct of the schools shall be 
 matter of record with the committee, or that every 
 act in regard to the management of each school in 
 these respects should be authorized or confirmed by 
 formal vote. It would be practically impossible suf- 
 ficiently to provide for such matters by a system of 
 rules, however carefully prepared and promulgated. 
 Much must necessarily be left to the individual mem- 
 bers of the committee and to the teachers of the 
 several schools." 
 
 In State v. Burton^ 45 Wis. 150, ante, p. 78, the 
 court said : 
 
 "... In the school, as in the family, there exist 
 on the part of the pupil the obligations of obedi- 
 ence to lawful commands, subordination, civil deport- 
 ment, respect for the rights of other pupils, and 
 fidelity to duty. These obligations are inherent, in 
 
132 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 any proper school system, and constitute, so to speat, 
 the common law of the school. Every pupil is pre- 
 sumed to know this law, and is subject to it, whether 
 it has or has not been re-enacted by the district 
 board in the form of written rules and regulations. 
 Indeed, it would seem impossible to frame rules 
 which would cover all cases of insubordination and 
 all acts of vicious tendency which the teacher is lia- 
 ble to encounter daily and hourly." 
 
 The above expression of the Wisconsin court was 
 quoted and approved by the Supreme Court of In- 
 diana in 69 Ind. 295, ante, p. 124. 
 
 See Kidder v. Chellis, p. 52, for case where teach- 
 er was sustained in enforcing a rule made by him 
 in relation to declamations, and not ratified by the 
 school committee. 
 
 Note. — In California : " All pupils must comply with 
 the regulations, pursue the required course of study, 
 and submit to the authority of the teachers of such 
 schools." 
 
 lu Kentucky : " All pupils w^ho may be admitted to 
 common schools shall comply with tlie regulations 
 established in pursuance of law for the government of 
 such schools." 
 
 The law of Missouri provides " rules to take effect 
 when a copy of the same, duly signed by a majority 
 of the board, is deposited with the district clerk, 
 whose duty it shall be to transmit forthwith a copy 
 of the same to the teachers employed in the schools." 
 
 In New Jersey: "The ]3upils of the public schools 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 133 
 
 shall comply witli the regulations established in pur- 
 suance of law for the government of such schools, 
 . . . and shall submit to the authority of the teach- 
 er." (See p. 164.) 
 
 In Kcw Hampshire : Rules " being recorded by the 
 town clerk and a copy thereof given to the teachers, 
 and read in the schools, shall be binding upon scholars 
 and teachers." (See p. 151.) 
 
 The law of Rhode Island provides that the rules 
 and regulations shall be put up in each school-house. 
 (See p. 154.) 
 
 In Wisconsin: Rules shall take effect "when a copy 
 of the same, signed by a majority of the board, shall be 
 filed with the clerk." (See p. 158.) 
 
 PERSONS OVER SCHOOL AGE, OR OVER TWENTY- 
 ONE YEARS OF AGE, WHO ATTEND SCHOOL ARE 
 SUBJECT TO ALL RULES OF THE SCHOOL. . 
 
 This point was decided in Stevens v. Fassett, Jr.^ 
 27 Me. 266, ante, p. 110. 
 
 From opinion : " It is not necessary to settle the 
 question whether one living within the district, and 
 not being between the ages of four and twenty-one 
 years, can with propriety require the instructions of 
 town school. If such does present liimself as a 
 pupil, is received and instructed by the master, he 
 cannot claim the privilege, and receive it, and at 
 the same time be subject to none of the duties 
 incident to a scholar. If disobedient, he is not 
 exempt from liability to punishment so long as 
 
134 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 he is treated as having the character wKich lie as- 
 sumes. He cannot plead his own voluntary act, 
 and insist that it is illegal, as an excuse for cre- 
 ating disturbances, and escape consequences which 
 would attach to him either as a refractory, incorri- 
 gible scholar, or as one who persists in interrupting 
 the ordinary business of the school." 
 
 The above opinion is cited and approved in State 
 V. Mizner, 45 Iowa, 248. 
 
 SCHOOL OFFICERS ACTING HONESTLY AND IN GOOD 
 FAITH ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE TO PUPILS 
 OR PARENTS. 
 
 The above proposition is sustained by the weight 
 of authority. A late decision (1880) is that of the 
 Supreme Court of Illinois: School directors made a 
 rule that the teacher might read, as an opening ex- 
 ercise every morning, not occupying more than fif- 
 teen minutes, a chapter from the King James' trans- 
 lation of the Bible. No one was required to be 
 present or participate in such exercise unless he 
 chose to do so, and while such exercise was being 
 conducted every pupil was required to lay aside his 
 books and remain quiet. A Catholic boy, for not 
 laying aside his books, was suspended from " all the 
 rights and privileges of said school until he should 
 express a willingness to comply with the rule." By 
 the school law of the state it was the duty of the 
 directors to "adopt and enforce all necessary rules 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 135 
 
 and regulations for the management and govern- 
 ment of schools," and also authorized to " suspend 
 or expel pupils for incorrigibly bad conduct, and no 
 action shall lie against them for such expulsion or 
 suspension." 
 
 Though by the statute the officers were saved 
 from suit in cases of suspension, etc., the decision 
 did not turn upon this provision, but was based 
 on the general rule of non-liability. 
 
 From opinion : " In the performance of the du- 
 ties imposed by law upon school directors they must 
 exercise judgment and discretion. What rules and 
 regulations will best promote the interests of the 
 school under their immediate control, and what 
 branches shall be taught and what text-books shall 
 be used, are matters left to the determination of the 
 directors, and must be settled by them from'the best 
 lights they can obtain from any source, keeping al- 
 ways in view the highest good of the whole school. 
 Good order can only be obtained by enforcing dis- 
 cipline, and this power is largely committed to the 
 directors. They have the power of suspension or 
 expulsion, tmd they may exercise that power as a 
 means of discipline for the causes mentioned in the 
 statute. The expulsion or suspension of a pupil 
 from the benefits and privileges of the school for 
 what is considered * incorrigibly bad conduct,' implies 
 deliberation and decision on the part of the direc- 
 tors, or, as it is sometimes expressed, they act judi- 
 
136 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 cially in a matter involving discretion in relation to 
 the duties of their office. 
 
 " The declaration in this case contains no averment 
 that defendants, in suspending plaintiff from the ben- 
 fits and privileges of the school, acted either wan- 
 tonly or maliciously. That, we think, is a fatal de- 
 fect in the declaration, and justified the decision of 
 the Court sustaining the demurrer. 
 
 "The absence of such an averment leaves the court 
 freely to indulge the presumption that defendants 
 acted in good faith in the matter of suspending 
 plaintiff from the benefits of the school, whether 
 they erred in their judgment or not. In such cases 
 the law seems to be well settled there can be no 
 action maintained against school officers where they 
 act without malice. 
 
 " The rule is certainly a reasonable one. A mere 
 mistake in judgment, either as to their duties under 
 the law or as to facts submitted to them, ought not 
 to subject such officers to an action. They may 
 judge wrongly, and so may a court or other tribunal, 
 but the party complaining can have no action when 
 such officers act in good faith and in the line of 
 what they think is honestly their duty. Any other 
 rule might work great hardship to honest men, who, 
 with the best of motives, have faithfully endeavored 
 to perform the duties of these inferior offices. Al- 
 though of the utmost importance to the public, no 
 considerable emoluments are attached to these minor 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 137 
 
 offices, and the duties are usually performed by per- 
 sons sincerely desiring to do good for their neigh- 
 bors without any expectation of personal gains, and 
 it would be a very harsh rule that would subject such 
 officers to an action for damages for every mistake 
 they may make in the honest and faithful discharge 
 of their official duties as they understand them. It 
 is not enough to aver the action of such officers was 
 erroneous, but it must be averred and proved that 
 such action Avas taken in bad faith, either wantonly 
 or maliciousl3\ If in the discharge of their official 
 duties such officers simply err, it is what other tri- 
 bunals invested with judicial powers are liable to do. 
 
 "A case not unlike the one before us was before 
 the court in Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 389, and it 
 was ruled, in accordance with what was thought to 
 be a uniform course of decisions, that a public offi- 
 cer, when acting in good faith, is never held liable 
 for an erroneous judgment in a matter submitted to 
 his determination. Were the rule otherwise, no one 
 would be safe in taking upon himself the burdens 
 of an office the duties of which involved the exercise 
 of judgment. 
 
 "In Jackson v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 114, it was held 
 that officers called to exercise their deliberate judg- 
 ment are not answerable for mistakes in law, either 
 civilly or criminally, where their motives are pure 
 and untainted with fraud or malice. The English 
 cases on this subject hold the same doctrine. Han- 
 
138 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 nan v. Tapinnden^ 1 East. 555, declares no action 
 will lie against individuals for acts erroneously done 
 by them in their corporate capacity, from which 
 detriment may happen to another, without proof 
 of malice." McCormicJc v. Burt, 95 111. 263. 
 
 A later decision in Illinois affirms the above. 
 Churchill v. Fewkes^ 1883 (see p. 22). To same 
 point see Britt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286, citing 
 Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 391 ; Spear v. Cum- 
 mings, 23 Pick. 224; Stephenson v. Hall, 14 Barb. 
 222. See also Steivart v. Southard, 17 Ohio, 402, 
 but see 21 Ohio St. R. Q^Q', Weaver v. Devendorf, 
 3 Dcnio, 117; Doioner v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94; Mills v. 
 Dean, 32 N. Y. 489 ; Hines v. Lockport, 50 N. Y. 
 236; 49 Barb. 455; 49 N. II. 199; 37 Conn. 365; 
 48 Mo. 253; 1 Denio, 599; 3 How. 87. 
 
 There is a wide difference of authority upon the 
 question whether or aot teachers are included in the 
 class of officers vested with judicial powers, and not 
 liable for errors of judgment. As this question is 
 involved in the decisions in relation to corporal pun- 
 ishment, the reader is referred to them and the note 
 following, on pages 105-130. 
 
 AUTHORITY OF TEACHER IX CHARGE OF SCHOOL, 
 WITHOUT HOLDING CERTIFICATE OF APPOINTMENT. 
 
 The power and authority of a teacher who has 
 not a certificate of appointment, where such is re- 
 quired by statute, has been much disputed. The 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 139 
 
 subject was thus treated by Horace Mann, an emi- 
 nent educational authority, lOtli Rep. Mass. Board 
 of Education (1847), p. 169, 170: "An important 
 question has been agitated, whether a person ille- 
 gally admitted, or smuggled into a school without a 
 certificate, can legally exercise any of the preroga- 
 tives of a teacher ; whether, for instance, if he should 
 punish or chastise a refractory or vicious scholar, so 
 much only as, under other circumstances, would be 
 held justifiable, he could defend himself from fine or 
 damages in a prosecution or action for assault and 
 battery, instituted against him in a court of law. . . . 
 
 " On the one hand, it is maintained that. a teacher 
 without a certificate can no more justify a punish- 
 ment inflicted by him on a scholar than a sheriff, 
 without a commission, can justify an arrest of per- 
 son, or a seizure of chattels ; nor more than a con- 
 stable or collector can justify the taking of property 
 for non-payment of taxes, when he has received no 
 warrant from the collector to collect them ; no more 
 than a judge who, without a commission from the 
 executive, has usurped the bench, can, with impuni- 
 ty, pronounce sentence of imprisonment or of death 
 ao-ainst an offender arraio;ned at his bar. . . . 
 
 " The pretended teacher is not a teacher. It would 
 be of the worst possible tendency to allow any man 
 to derive lawful authority from the commission of 
 an unlawful act. Public policy requires that a teach- 
 er who has obtruded himself into a school without 
 
140 POWER AND AUTHORITY OF 
 
 the necessary credentials sbould be peremptorily de- 
 barred from pleading his own misconduct in justifi- 
 cation of an act which, if committed out of school, 
 would doubtless be unlawful. . . . 
 
 '' Such is the course of argument usually presented 
 against a teacher without a certificate, in regard to 
 his right to punish. 
 
 " On the other hand, some incline to the opinion 
 that a teacher without a certificate, though not in 
 laiv a teacher, yet is so in fact ; and, while the ac- 
 tual relation of teacher and pupil subsists, all the 
 legal powers of a teacher attach to this relation, and 
 may therefore be exercised by them. If a school 
 kept by a teacher without a certificate is not a pub- 
 lic school, then it must be a private school ; and the 
 teacher of a private school has as clear a right to in- 
 flict punishment, in exigencies as require it, as any 
 other teacher, or as any parent." 
 
 The last view of the matter presented by Mr. 
 Mann is sustained by such decisions as have been 
 published. 
 
 Yermont, \^bb.— State v. Williams, 27 Yt. 755. 
 
 Peter Bean was a prudential committee, and Miss 
 Emily Culver was a teacher in his district. One 
 Henry Williams, a boy sixteen or seventeen years 
 old, refused to obey the lawful and proper com- 
 mands of the teacher, when, and in consequence of 
 such misconduct, he was expelled from school and 
 
SCHOOL OFFICERS AND TEACHERS. 141 
 
 forbidden to attend further until lie would make 
 suitable and proper acknowledgment of such misbe- 
 havior. He again went to the school, and, upon 
 being called upon by the teacher, refused to make 
 acknowledgment or leave the school, whereupon the 
 teacher sent for Peter Bean, the committee, who 
 went to the school-house and requested the said 
 Henry to make acknowledgment to the teacher or 
 leave the school, which he refused to do. Bean 
 then attempted to remove him, when the defendant, 
 Spencer Williams, interfered and resisted. 
 
 The defendant was found guilty, and the question 
 was raised that the existence of the school district 
 and the office of Bean had not been shown. It was 
 decided not necessary. 
 
 From opinion: "But if we were to assume that 
 there was no such school district, and that no evidence 
 was introduced showing that Mr. Bean was one of the 
 prudential committee, we do not see that it would 
 necessarily affect this prosecution. The fact that 
 there was a school, that Miss Culver was its teacher, 
 that one of the pupils was requested to leave for in- 
 subordination and misconduct, and that he refused 
 to do so, are not disputed. Regarding the school, 
 therefore, as a private school, and subject to the 
 discipline and government of Miss' Culver as its 
 teacher, she had a right, for those reasons, to request 
 Mr. Bean to assist her in enforcing her discipline 
 and government; and in so doing Mr. Bean would 
 
142 POWER AND AUTHORITY O^F SCHOOL OFFICERS. 
 
 be justified as her agent and servant. Under sucli 
 circumstances the respondent cannot be justified in 
 the assault and battery of which the jury have found 
 liim guilty." 
 
 For a case directly in point see Kidder v. Chellis^ 
 ante, p. 52. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 STATE LAWS. IN RELATION TO POWERS OF SCHOOL 
 OFFICERS. 
 
 In Alabama: Superintendent of state education 
 " shall exercise a general supervision over all educa- 
 tional interests of the state. . . . He shall prepare and 
 have printed. . . all laws, rules, and regulations pertain- 
 ing to the public-school system of the state, and cause 
 the same to be distributed to the county superintend- 
 ents of education and other officers connected with the 
 school system, for the information of those interested 
 in the educational interests of the state." County su- 
 penntendent " shall have general supervision of the pub- 
 lic schools of the county " and " general superintend- 
 ence." Township superintendent "shall have immedi- 
 ate supervision of the public schools in his township." 
 
 In Arkansas: State superintendent "shall be charged 
 with the general superintendence of the business relat- 
 ing to the free common schools." School directors 
 " shall have charge of the school affairs, and of the 
 school educational interests of their districts." 
 
 In California: State board of education "to adopt 
 rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the laws 
 of this state, for its own government, and for the gov- 
 
144 APPENDIX* 
 
 crnment of the public schools." Superintendent of 
 public instruction '\to superintend the public schools 
 in the state," and to have the school laws printed, to- 
 gether with the rules and regulations, and supply the 
 same to school officers and teachers. Trustees of 
 scliool districts and cit}^ boards of education shall " pre- 
 scribe and enforce rules not inconsistent with law, or 
 those, prescribed by the state board of education, for 
 their own government and the government of schools." 
 
 In Colorado : " The state board of education shall 
 have power to adopt any rules and regulations not in- 
 consistent with law, for its own government and for 
 the government of the public schools." State super- 
 intendent " shall have general supervision of the pub- 
 lic schools of the state." County superintendent "to 
 exercise a careful supervision over the schools of his 
 county." District directors "shall have power to 
 make such by-laws for their own government and for 
 the government of the public schools under their 
 charge as they may deem expedient, not inconsistent 
 with the provisions of law or the instructions of the 
 superintendent of public instruction," and to "en- 
 force the rules and general regulations of the state 
 superintendent." 
 
 In Connecticut: State board of education "shall 
 have general supervision and control of the educa- 
 tional interests of the state." Boards of education in 
 districts " to have the general superintendence of the 
 public schools in the district." Each board of school 
 visitors "shall prescribe rules for the management 
 . . . and discipline of the public schools." 
 
 In Delaware : " The school committee of each dis- 
 
APPENDIX. 145 
 
 trict . . . may make regulations for the government 
 of the school." 
 
 In Florida: Superintendent of public instruction 
 " shall have the oversight, charge, and management of 
 all matters pertaining to public schools," and " pro- 
 vide for teachers such printed instructions, regula- 
 tions, and decisions as he may judge necessary for 
 their use." Board of jjublic instruction " to perform 
 all acts reasonable and necessary for the promotion of 
 the educational interests of the county." School trus- 
 tees " to take the special charge, inspection, and man- 
 agement of all the schools and school interests over 
 which they have been appointed." 
 
 In Georgia : " It shall be the duty of school trus- 
 tees, herein provided for, to supervise the school oper- 
 ations of the sub-districts." 
 
 In Illinois : State superintendent of public instruc- 
 tion " shall have the supervision of all the public and 
 common schools in the state," and " shall make such 
 rules and regulations as may be necessary and expe- 
 dient " to carry out the school act. In districts of 
 two thousand inhabitants the board of directors " to 
 prescribe the method and course of discipline and 
 instruction in the several schools, and to see that they 
 are maintained and pursued in a proper manner," and 
 " to establish all such by-laws, rules, and regulations 
 for the government and for the establishment and 
 maintenance of a proper and uniform systeta of disci- 
 pline in the several schools as may, in their opinion, 
 be necessary." Boards of education in cities of one 
 hundred thousand inhabitants "shall have charge and 
 control of the public schools in such cities," " and 
 10 
 
146 APPENDIX. 
 
 generally to have and possess all the rights, powers, 
 and authority required for the proper management of 
 schools, with power to enact such ordinances as may 
 be necessary or deemed expedient for such purpose," 
 and the same power is given to establish by-laws, 
 rules, and regulations as directors in last-named dis- 
 tricts have. District directors " shall adopt and en- 
 force all necessary rules and regulations for the man- 
 agement and government of the schools." 
 
 In Indiana : The county superintendent " shall have 
 the general superintendence of the schools of his 
 county." School trustees "shall take charge of the 
 educational affairs of their respective townships, towns, 
 and cities." Trustees of graded schools " shall have 
 the care and management" of such. School com- 
 missioners in cities of thirty thousand inhabitants or 
 more " to establish and enforce regulations . . . for 
 the government and discipline of such schools." 
 
 In Iowa: Superintendent of public instruction "shall 
 be charged with the general supervision of . . . all 
 the common schools of the state." Board of direc- 
 tors shall " aid the teachers in establishing and en- 
 forcing the rules for the government of the schools." 
 Principal of county high -school, with the approval 
 of trustees, " shall make such rules and regulations 
 as he deems proper in regard to the . . . conduct 
 and government of the pupils under his charge." 
 
 In Kentucky : Superintendent of public instruction 
 and two professional teachers, who shall be members 
 of the board of education, " shall constitute a stand- 
 ing committee wiio shall prepare rules, by-laws, and - 
 regulations for the common schools of the state, which 
 
APPENDIX. 147 
 
 shall be adopted and enforced under the authority 
 and direction of the county school commissioners, 
 in all cases where the district school trustees shall 
 fail to enforce such." Each school district " shall 
 be under the control of one trustee." And such 
 district trustee " shall visit the school " and " see 
 that the regulations for its government are complied 
 with." 
 
 In Kansas : County superintendent to visit schools, 
 " correcting any deficiency that may exist in the gov- 
 ernment of the school, the classification of the pupils, 
 ... to make such suggestions, in private, to the 
 teachers as he shall deem proper and necessary to the 
 welfare of the school." Boards of education in cities 
 " have power to make all necessary rules for the gov- 
 ernment of the schools of said city under its charge 
 and control," and " to exercise the sole control over 
 the public schools and school property of the city." 
 District directors "shall confer with the teacher in 
 regard to condition and management ; and make such 
 suggestions as in their view would promote the inter- 
 est and efficiency of the school, and the progress and 
 good order of the pupils." 
 
 In Louisiana : The free public schools " shall be un- 
 der the control of a state board of education ;" which 
 has power to " make all needful rules and regulations 
 for the government " thereof. Superintendent of pub- 
 lic instruction " shall be charged with the general su- 
 pervision of all parish boards of education, and of all 
 the common, high, and normal schools of the state." 
 Parish board of directors " to prescribe rules for the 
 government of the free public schools within their 
 
148 APPENDIX. 
 
 jurisdiction not inconsistent with tliis la^ and the 
 rules prescribed by; the state board of education." 
 
 In Maine : State superintendent " to exercise a gen- 
 eral supervision of all the public schools of the state." 
 School committee to " examine the schools, and in- 
 quire into the regulations and discipline tiiereof, and 
 the proficiency of the scholars." Supervisors, when 
 chosen, to have power of school committee. 
 
 In Maryland : " The state board of education . . . 
 shall enact by-laws for the administration of the pub- 
 lic-school system, not at variance with this act." 
 County school commissioners " shall have the general 
 supervision and control of all schools in their respec- 
 tive counties." School trustees " shall exercise a gen- 
 eral supervision over their respective schools, and visit 
 them frequently." 
 
 In Massachusetts: School committees "shall have 
 the general charge and superintendence of all the pub- 
 lic schools." Where superintendents are appointed by 
 vote of city or town they, " under the direction and 
 control of said committee, shall have the care and su- 
 pervision of the public schools." 
 
 In Michigan : " The superintendent of j)ublic in- 
 struction shall have general supervision of public in- 
 struction." He shall prepare and send " such instruc- 
 tions, relating to the organization and government of 
 such schools, . . . as he may deem advisable, to the 
 several officers intrusted with their care and manage- 
 ment." District board " shall have the general care of 
 the school, and shall make and enforce suitable rules 
 and regulations for its government and management." 
 
 In Minnesota: Board of trustees "shall have the 
 
APPENDIX. 149 
 
 general charge of the interests of schools and school- 
 houses in their districts." Boards of education in in- 
 dependent districts " shall have power to superintend 
 and manage, in all respects, the schools of said dis- 
 trict, ... adopt, alter, modify, and repeal rules for 
 their organization, government, and instruction." 
 
 In Mississippi : Board of education " shall regulate 
 all matters arising in the practical administration of 
 the free-school system which are not otherwise pro- 
 vided for." State superintendent of public instruction 
 has "general supervision" of the common schools. 
 School trustees " to look specially after the local in- 
 terests of their schools " 
 
 In Missouri: Board of directors "shall have the 
 power to make all needful rules and regulations for 
 the organization, grading, and government of the 
 schools in their district. Said rules to take effect 
 when a copy of the same, duly signed by a majority 
 of the board, is deposited with the district clerk, 
 whose duty it shall be to transmit forthwith a copy 
 of the same to the teachers employed in the schools; 
 said rules may be amended or repealed in like man- 
 ner. ... It shall be the duty of the board to visit the 
 schools under their care, examine into their condition 
 and the progress of the pupils, advise and consult 
 with the teachers, and to exercise such supervision as 
 will best promote the best interests of the schools." 
 Boards in towns and cities shall perform same duties 
 as other boards. 
 
 In Nebraska : State superintendent to visit schools 
 " and witness and advise with teachers and school offi- 
 cers upon the manner in which they are conducted." 
 
150 APPENDIX. 
 
 County superintendent " to examine carefully into the 
 discipline and modes of instruction . . . and to con- 
 sult with teachers aiid district boards as to the course 
 of study to be pursued, and for the improvement of 
 the instruction and discipline of the school." District 
 board " shall have the general care of the school," and 
 " make such rules and regulations as they may think 
 necessary for the government and health of the schol- 
 ars." Trustees of high -school districts shall have 
 powier "to make such rules and regulations as they 
 may think needful for the government of the schools." 
 Schools in cities and towns " shall be under the direc- 
 tion and control " of their boards of education. 
 
 In Nevada : Superintendent of public instruction 
 shall cause " such instructions as he shall deem nec- 
 essary and proper for the organization and govern- 
 ment of schools to be transmitted to the local school 
 officers, who shall be governed in accordance there- 
 with." County superintendent " to exercise a general 
 supervision over the interests of the public schools in 
 his county." 
 
 In New Hampsliii*e : " Any town may adopt a by- 
 law providing for the choice of a school committee 
 of such number, chosen in such manner, for such 
 terms, with such title, and such powers relating to 
 schools as tliey may think proper." Town board of 
 education " shall have the control and management 
 of the schools of the district . . . and generally shall 
 have and enjoy all the power and authority, and per- 
 form all the duties pertaining to the offices of pru- 
 dential and school committees." School committees 
 " may prescribe suitable rules and regulations for the 
 
APPENDIX. 151 
 
 attendance upon, management . . . and discipline of 
 the schools, whenever they deem the same necessary ; 
 and the same being recorded by the town clerk, and a 
 copy thereof given to the teachers, and read in the 
 schools, shall be binding upon scholars and teachers." 
 High-school committee " shall have the entire charge 
 thereof . . . and generally shall have the same pow- 
 ers and perform the same duties, in regard to such 
 high-schools, as school committees in relation to com- 
 mon schools." Towns and cities may provide for su- 
 perintendent " who shall be vested with such of the 
 powers and charged with such of the duties of the 
 school committee and of the prudential committee 
 ... as may be therein provided." 
 
 In New Jersey : " The general supervision and con- 
 trol of public instruction . . . shall be vested in a 
 state board of education." Said board "shall have 
 power ... to prescribe and cause to be enforced all 
 rules and regulations necessary for carrying into effect 
 the school laws." The state superintendent '^ shall 
 have the supervision of all the schools of the state." 
 County superintendent, with other tasks, ■' to dis- 
 charge other duties of general supervision and super- 
 intendence over the public schools of the county, in 
 accordance with the regulations prescribed from time 
 to time by the state board of education," School 
 trustees shall have power "to make arid enforce rules 
 and regulations, not in conflict with general regula- 
 tions of the state board of education, for the govern- 
 ment of schools, pupils, and teachers," and " to en- 
 force the regulations prescribed by the state board of 
 education." 
 
152 APPENDIX. 
 
 In New York : State superintendent of public in- 
 struction shall visit the common schools of the state 
 " and inquire into ilieir course of instruction, manage- 
 ment, and discipline, and advise and encourage the 
 pupils, teachers, and officers thereof. . . . And cause 
 such information and instructions as he shall deem 
 conducive to the proper organization and government 
 of the common schools, and the due execution of their 
 duties by school officers, to be transmitted to the 
 officers and persons intrusted with the execution of 
 the same." School commissioners "to recommend to 
 trustees and teachers the proper . . . discipline and 
 management of the schools." Board of education of 
 union schools "shall have power to establish such 
 rules and regulations concerning the order and disci- 
 pline of the school or schools, in the several depart- 
 ments thereof, as they may deem necessary to secure 
 the best educational results." And " to have in all re- 
 spects the superintendence, management, and control 
 of said union free schools." 
 
 In New York City : Board of education to " have 
 full control of the public schools and the public- 
 school system of the city," " subject only to the gen- 
 eral statutes of the state upon education," Ward trus- 
 tees, " under such rules and regulations, and subject 
 to such limitations as the board of education may 
 prescribe, to conduct and manage the said schools." 
 City superintendent " to advise and consult with the 
 trustees in relation to the proper studies, discipline, 
 and conduct of the schools, the course of instruction 
 to be used." 
 
 In North Carolina : Superintendent of public in- 
 
APPENDIX. 153 
 
 struction " shall direct the operation of the system of 
 public schools and enforce the laws and regulations in 
 relation thereto." County board of education " shall 
 be charged with the general management of the pub- 
 lic schools in their respective counties . . . and shall 
 see that the school law is enforced." County superin- 
 tendent "shall advise with teachers as to the best 
 methods of instruction and government ; . . .he shall 
 have authority to correct abuses." 
 
 In Ohio : District board " shall make such rules and 
 regulations as it may deem expedient and necessary 
 for its government, and the government of its appoint- 
 ees and the pupils," and " shall have the management 
 and control of the public schools of the district." 
 
 In Oregon : State board of education shall have 
 power " to prescribe a series of rules for the general 
 government of the public schools that shall secure 
 regularity of attendance, prevent truancy, secure and 
 promote the true interests of the schools." Superin- 
 tendent of public instruction " to exercise a general 
 superintendence of the county and district school offi- 
 cers and the public schools of the state." School di- 
 rectors " to employ teachers and assist them in the 
 government of the school." Board of directors in 
 towns of ten thousand inhabitants to "make rules 
 and regulations for the government of said district." 
 
 In Pennsylvania : Board of directors of districts, and 
 controllers in cities and boroughs, " shall exercise a 
 general supervision over the schools of their respective 
 districts." 
 
 In Rhode Island : State board of education has 
 " general supervision and control of the public schools 
 
154 APPENDIX. 
 
 of the state." Public schools to be " under the man- 
 agement of the school committee subject to the su- 
 pervision of commissioner of public schools." School 
 committee "shall make, and cause to be put up in 
 each school- house, rules and regulations for the at- 
 tendance, . . . instruction, government, and discipline 
 of the schools." Superintendent of towns, under the 
 direction and advice of committee, " to exercise such 
 powers as the committee shall assign to him." 
 
 In South Carolina: State superintendent "shall 
 have general supervision over all the free public 
 schools" and shall cause the school laws of the state, 
 "with such rules, regulations, forms, and instructions as 
 shall be legally prescribed, to be transmitted to the 
 county school commissioners." State board of ex- 
 aminers " to adopt rules and regulations, not incon- 
 sistent with the laws of the state, for its own govern- 
 ment and the government of the free public schools." 
 County school commissioner to visit schools, " noting 
 any deficiencies that may exist, either in the govern- 
 ment of the school or the classification of its pupils, . . . 
 and shall make such suggestions, in private, to the 
 teachers as to him shall appear necessary to the good 
 order of the school and the progress of the pupils." 
 School trustees of districts " shall take the manage- 
 ment and control of the local interests of the same, 
 subject to the supervision of the county board of com- 
 missioners." 
 
 In Tennessee: "Tlie public-school system shall be 
 administered" by state superintendent, county super- 
 intendent, and district-school directors. State superin- 
 tendent has a general power of visitation. County su- 
 
APPENDIX. 155 
 
 perintendent, "to have supervision of the public schools 
 in the county." School directors " to explain and en- 
 force the school laws and regulations, and themselves 
 to observe them, ... to visit the public schools within 
 the district from time to time, and see that they are 
 conducted according to law and with efficiency." 
 Where cities and towns vote to levy and collect 
 school-tax the mayor and board of aldermen "shall 
 have exclusive control and management over the 
 common schools of the city or town." 
 
 In Texas : State superintendent " shall advise and 
 consult witli the school boards of counties, cities, and 
 towns as to the best methods of conducting the pub- 
 lic schools, and shall be empowered to issue instruc- 
 tions and regulations binding for observance on all 
 officers and teachers in all cases where the provisions 
 of the school law may require interpretation in order 
 to carry out the designs expressed therein; also in 
 cases that may arise in which the law has made no 
 provision; and also where necessity requires some 
 rule in order that there may be no hardship to indi- 
 viduals, and no delay or inconveniences in the man- 
 agement of school affairs." If incorporated cities and 
 towns so vote they "may have exclusive control of 
 the public free schools within their limits." The 
 council or board of aldermen of such city or town 
 " are invested with exclusive power to maintain, reg- 
 ulate, control, and govern " the free schools of said 
 town. City council may appoint trustees, who shall have 
 control and supervision of the free public schools. Trus- 
 tees of school districts and committees shall have "the 
 management and control of the free public schools." 
 
156 APPENDIX. 
 
 In Vermont: State superintendent lias powers of 
 visitation. Town superintendents shall also visit, and 
 "shall inform themselves of the discipline and progress 
 in study in such schools, advise the teachers, and 
 adopt the necessary measures for the examination, 
 regulation, and improvement in learning of such 
 schools." Prudential committee "to adopt requisite 
 measures not in conflict with those of the town su- 
 perintendent for the inspection, examination, regula- 
 tion, and improvement of the school." School di- 
 rectors in towns "have the management of the public 
 schools, and may make regulations, not inconsistent 
 with law, for carrying the powers granted them into 
 effect ; and in general shall have the powers and per- 
 form the duties of the prudential committee." 
 
 In Virginia: Public-school system shall be "ad- 
 ministered by ... a board of education, a superin- 
 tendent of public instruction, county superintendents 
 of schools, and district school trustees." The Gen- 
 eral Assembly shall " prescribe the duties of all scliool 
 oflS.cers, and shall make all needful laws and regula- 
 tions to carry into effect tlie free public -school sys- 
 tem." State board of education " to make by-laws 
 and regulations for its own government and for carry- 
 ing into effect the school laws," and "regulate all 
 matters arising in the practical administration of the 
 school system which are not otherwise provided for," 
 State superintendent "shall have general supervis- 
 ion of the public free-school interests of the state." 
 County superintendent to visit all the schools; "to 
 inquire into all matters relating to their manage- 
 ment . . . and discipline, . . . and in general into what- 
 
APPENDIX. 157 
 
 ever concerns tlie usefulness and perfection of the 
 public free schools, under his supervision," District 
 trustees " to explain and enforce the school laws and 
 regulations and themselves to observe the same," and 
 ''to visit the free public schools within the district, 
 from time to time, and to take care that they are con- 
 ducted according to law and w^ith the utmost efficiency." 
 Trustees in towns and cities have same powers and 
 duties as district school trustees. " To make regula- 
 tions for the attendance of pupils upon the schools," 
 and the methods of " government employed." 
 
 In West Virginia : Board of education " shall have 
 general control and supervision of the schools and 
 school interests of their districts." State superintend- 
 ent " shall be charged with the supervision of all 
 county superintendents and free schools of tlie state, 
 and see that the school system is carried into effect, . . . 
 and shall cause such forms, regulations, and instruc- 
 tions as he may judge expedient ... to be from time 
 to time published." County superintendent charged 
 with duties of visitation. Trustee shall visit schools 
 and " make such examination and inquiry as he may 
 deem useful respecting the studies, discipline, and gen- 
 eral condition of the school, and the conduct and 
 proficiency of the scholars ; and give such directions 
 or make such suggestions to the teachers as in liis 
 opinion will promote the interests of the school, and 
 the health, morals, and progress of the scholars." 
 Trustees of sub -districts "shall have charge of the 
 schools therein." 
 
 In Wisconsin : " The supervision of public instruc- 
 tion shall be vested in a state superintendent," and 
 
158 APPENDIX. 
 
 " such other officers as the legislature direct." Dis- 
 trict board "shall have power to make all needful 
 rules for the government of the schools established in 
 the district, such rules to take effect when a copy of 
 the same, signed by a majority of the board, shall be 
 filed with the clerk." Directors of township schools 
 " shall have, in all respects, the supervision and man- 
 agement of all the schools, w^ith full power to adopt, 
 enforce, modify, and repeal, from time to time, all rules 
 and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of this 
 state, necessary for their organization, gradation, and 
 control, and for the instruction given by them in the 
 different branches of education taught therein, and to 
 establish and enforce proper penalties for the vio- 
 lation of such rules." 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 STATE LAWS IN RELATION TO SUSPENSION AND EX- 
 PULSION. 
 
 In Alabama: "Every teacher of a public school is 
 required ... to suspend pupils for grossly immor- 
 al conduct, or persistent violation of the rules and 
 regulations of the school, giving immediate notice to 
 parents or guardians." 
 
 In Arkansas : School directors " may, at the instance 
 of the teacher, suspend from the school any pupil for 
 gross immorality, refractory conduct, or insubordina- 
 tion, or for infectious disease. Provided that such 
 suspension from the school shall not extend beyond 
 the current term." 
 
 In California : Trustees of school districts and city 
 boards of education " to suspend or expel pupils for 
 misconduct." "Continued wilful disobedience or 
 open defiance of the authority of the teacher consti- 
 tutes good cause for expulsion from school, and habit- 
 ual profanity and vulgarity good cause for suspension 
 from school." Teachers to " suspend for good cause 
 any pupil in the school, and report such suspension to 
 the board of trustees or education for review. If 
 such action is not sustained by them the teacher may 
 
160 APPENDIX. 
 
 appeal to the county superintendciit, whose -decision 
 shall be final." 
 
 In Colorado : School board " to suspend or expel pu- 
 pils from school who refuse to obey the rules thereof." 
 
 In Connecticut : The committee of every district 
 " shall suspend during pleasure, or expel from the 
 school for the term, all pupils found guilty, on full 
 hearing, of incorrigibly bad conduct." 
 
 In Delaware : The school committee of each district 
 may provide regulations "for the expulsion of a 
 scholar for obstinate misbehavior." 
 
 In Florida : School trustees " to extend the suspen- 
 sion of, or expulsion from school, of any pupil for 
 gross misconduct, immorality, a disregard of, or persis- 
 tent opposition to, the authority of the teacher. But 
 such restriction is not to be continued after a mani- 
 fest reformation, and a sincere determination to do 
 well in future." Teachers " to suspend pupils from 
 school for ten days for gross immorality, misconduct, 
 or persistent violation of the regulations, giving im- 
 mediate notice to the parent or guardian of the pupil, 
 and to the school trustee of the suspension, and the 
 cause of it." 
 
 In Illinois : District directors, directors in cities of 
 two thousand inhabitants, and boards of education 
 in cities of one hundred thousand inhabitants, have 
 power to suspend or expel any pupil who may be 
 guilty of " gross disobedience or misconduct." 
 
 In Indiana : Township director " may exclude any 
 refractory pupil. . * . But the exclusion of any pupil 
 from the school for disorderly conduct shall not ex- 
 tend beyond the current term, and may be, in the dis- 
 
APPENDIX. 161 
 
 ci'etion of the director, for a shorter period." " The 
 decision of the director in excluding a pupil shall be 
 subject to appeal to the township trustee, whose deci- 
 sion shall be final." 
 
 In Iowa : The majority of the board of directors in 
 independent districts, and sub-directors in sub -dis- 
 tricts, " shall have power, with the concurrence of the 
 president of the board of directors, to dismiss or sus- 
 pend any pupil from the school in their district for 
 gross immorality, for a persistent violation of rules of 
 the school, and to readmit them if they deem it 
 proper so to do." Trustees of county high - schools 
 may suspend or expel pupils who do not " conform to 
 and obey the rules of the school." 
 
 In Kentucky : School trustees, upon complaint of the 
 teacher, " shall have power to expel a pupil." " Every 
 teacher shall have the power ... to suspend from 
 school any pupil for good cause, provided such sus- 
 pension shall be reported, as soon as practicable, to the 
 trustee, by the teacher, and if such action is not sus- 
 tained by him he may appeal to the commissioner, 
 whose decision of the cause shall be final." " Wilful 
 disobedience and defiance of the authority of the 
 teacher, habitual profanity and vulgarity, or other 
 gross violation of propriety or law, shall constitute a 
 good cause of suspension or expulsion from school." 
 
 In Kansas : " The district board may suspend, or au- 
 thorize the director to suspend, from the privileges of 
 a school, any pupil guilty of immorality, or persistent 
 violation of the regulations of the school, which sus- 
 pension shall not extend beyond the current quarter 
 of the school. Provided that the pupil suspended 
 11 
 
162 APPENDIX. 
 
 shall have the right to appeal from the decision of 
 said board of directors to the county superintendent, 
 ■wlio shall, upon a full investigation of tlie charges 
 preferred against said pupil, determine as to his guilt 
 or innocence of the offence charged, whose decision 
 shall be final." 
 
 In Louisiana : Parish board of directors " to dismiss 
 any pupil from free public schools for gross immo- 
 rality, or for persistent violation of the regulations of 
 the school." 
 
 In Maine: School committee may "expel from a 
 school any obstinately disobedient and disorderly 
 scholar, after a proper investigation of his behavior, if 
 found necessary for the peace and usefulness of the 
 school, and restore him on satisfactory evidence of his 
 repentance and amendment." 
 
 In Maryland: District school trustees "shall have 
 l)0wer to suspend and expel pupils for cause. Pro- 
 vided that an appeal shall lie to the board of county 
 school commissioners, whose decision shall be final." 
 
 In Massachusetts : " Every member of a school com- 
 mittee under whose directions a child is excluded 
 from a public school, and every teacher of such school 
 from which a child is excluded, shall, on ai^plication 
 of a parent or guardian of such child, state in writing 
 the grounds and reason for the exclusion." 
 
 " A child unlawfully excluded from a public school 
 may recover damages therefor in an action of tort, 
 to be brought in the name of such child by his guar- 
 dian or next friend, against the city or town by which 
 such school is supported." 
 
 In Michigan : District board " may authorize or order 
 
APPENDIX. 163 
 
 the suspension or expulsion from the school, whenever 
 in its judgment the interests of the school demand it, 
 of any pupil guilty of gross misdemeanor or persis- 
 tent disobedience." 
 
 In Minnesota: Boards of trustees and boards of edu- 
 cation " may suspend or expel pupils for insubordina- 
 tion, immorality, or infectious disease." Boards of 
 education in independent districts " shall have pov/er 
 ... to adopt, alter, modify, and repeal rules ... for 
 suspension, expulsion, and transfer " of pupils. " If 
 any scholar is suspended or expelled from any such 
 school without sufficient cause, or on account of color, 
 social position, or nationality, the board by whose di- 
 rection the offence was committed shall forfeit and 
 pay a fine of fifty dollars for each offence." 
 
 In Missouri : Board of directors have " power to sus- 
 pend or expel a pupil whenever, upon due examina- 
 tion, they become satisfied that the interests of the 
 school demand such expulsion." 
 
 In Nebraska : District board " may authorize or or- 
 der the suspension or expulsion from school, whenever 
 in their judgment the interests of the school demand 
 it, of any pupil guilty of gross misdemeanors or per- 
 sistent disobedience, but such expulsion shall not ex- 
 tend beyond the close of the term." 
 
 In Nevada : School trustees " shall have power to 
 suspend or expel from any public school within their 
 district, with the advice of the teacher, any pupil who 
 will not submit to the reasonable and ordinary rules 
 of order and discipline therein." 
 
 In New Hampshire : " Any scholar may be dismissed 
 from school by the school committee for gross mis- 
 
164 APPENDIX. 
 
 conduct, or for neglect, or refusal to conform to the 
 reasonable rules of the school, and shall have no right 
 to attend the school until restored by the school com- 
 mittee. ... If any scholar, after notice, shall attend 
 or visit a school which he has no right to attend, 
 or shall interrupt or disturb the same, he shall be 
 fined," etc. 
 
 In New Jersey : School trustees " shall have power 
 ... to suspend or expel pupils from school." Teach- 
 ers " shall have power ... to suspend from school 
 any puj)il for good cause, provided that such suspen- 
 sion shall be reported to the trustees as soon as prac- 
 ticable, and if such action is not sustained by them 
 the teacher may appeal to the county superintendent, 
 whose decision shall be final." Pupils " shall submit 
 to the authority of the teacher. Continued and wilful 
 disobedience, or open defiance of the authority of the 
 teacher, the use of habitual profanity or obscene lan- 
 guage, shall constitute good cause for suspension or 
 expulsion from school." (Piif)ils liable to suspension 
 for injury to school property, see p. 72.) 
 
 In North Carolina : " If any pupil should wilfully 
 and persistently violate the rules of school, such pu- 
 pil may be dismissed by the teacher for the current 
 term." 
 
 In Ohio : " No pupil shall be suspended fi'om school 
 by a superintendent or teacher, except for such time 
 as may be necessary to convene the board of educa- 
 tion of the district, or the directors of the sub -district, 
 and no pupil shall be expelled except by a vote of 
 two thirds of such board of directors, and not until - 
 the parent or guardian of the offending pupil has 
 
APPENDIX. 165 
 
 been notified of the proposed expulsion, and permit- 
 ted to be heard against the same, and no scholar shall 
 be suspended or expelled from any school beyond tlie 
 current term thereof." 
 
 In Pennsylvania : Boards of directors in districts 
 and controllers in cities and boroughs " may suspend 
 or expel from school all pupils found guilty, on full 
 examination and hearing, of refractory or incorrigibly 
 bad conduct." 
 
 In Rhode Island : " The school committee may sus- 
 pend during pleasure all pupils found guilty of incor- 
 rigibly bad conduct, or of violation of the school reg- 
 ulations." 
 
 In South Carolina : School trustees " to suspend or 
 dismiss pupils when the prosperity and efficiency of 
 the schools make it necessary." 
 
 In Tennessee : School director " to suspend or dis- 
 miss pupils when the prosperity or efficiency of the 
 school makes it necessary." Any teacher may, "for 
 sufficient cause, suspend pupils from attendance on 
 the school until the case is decided by the board of 
 school directors, which shall be with as little delay as 
 possible." 
 
 In Virginia : School trustees " to suspend or dismiss 
 pupils when the prosperity and efficiency of the schools 
 make it necessary." Teachers may, "for sufficient 
 cause, suspend pupils from attendance on the school 
 until the case is decided by the board of school trus- 
 tees, which shall be with as little delay as possible." 
 " Persons suffering from contagious diseases shall be 
 excluded." A city superintendent " may suspend or 
 dismiss pupils from the public schools provided that 
 
166 APPENDIX. 
 
 the city school board shall have power to reverse his 
 action in the premises." 
 
 In West Virginia • School trustees " may suspend or 
 expel any scholar found guilty of disorderly, refrac- 
 tory, indecent, or immoral conduct, and may refuse to 
 admit such scholar again to the school until satisfied 
 that he "will properly conduct himself thereafter. But 
 trustees shall take no action or proceeding relating to 
 the . . . suspension or expulsion of any scholar from 
 school unless at a meeting of which all the trustees 
 shall have had notice, and when at least two of their 
 number shall be present and concur in such action or 
 proceedings And their action in »uch particular shall 
 be subject to the revision and carrectio-n of the board 
 of education, upon complaint in writing of a majority 
 of the patrons of the school." Directors of high- 
 schools '^ may expel or suspend scholars when neces- 
 sary." 
 
 In "Wisconsin : District board " shall have power to 
 suspend any pupil from the privileges of the school, 
 for non-compliance with the rules established by them, 
 or by the teachers with their consent; to expel from 
 school any pupil who shall persistently refuse or neg- 
 lect the rules above mentioned, whenever, upon due 
 examination^ they shall become satisfied that the in- 
 terests of the school shall demand such expulsion." 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 STATE LAWS IN RELATION TO POWERS OF TEACHERS. 
 
 In Alabama : " Every teacher of a public school is 
 required ... to maintain good order in the school 
 and on the playground," and to " enforce the rules, 
 laws, and regulations relating to public schools." 
 
 In California : Teachers " to enforce . . . the rules 
 and regulations prescribed for the schools. ... To hold 
 pupils to strict account for disorderly conduct on the 
 way to and from school, on the playgrounds, or dur- 
 ing recess." 
 
 In Florida : Teachers "• to require the pupils to ob- 
 serve personal cleanliness, neatness, order, prompt- 
 ness, and gentility of manners, to avoid vulgarity and 
 profanity. ... To enforce needful restrictions upon the 
 conduct of the pupils in or near the school house and 
 grounds, avoiding, at all times, unnecessary severity 
 and measures that are degrading in their tendency." 
 
 In Kentucky : " Teachers shall faithfully enforce in 
 school . . . the regulations prescribed in pursuance of 
 law." Every teacher shall have power and authority 
 to hold every pupil to a strict accountability in school 
 for any disorderly conduct on the way to and from 
 school, or on the playground of the school, or during 
 intermission or recess." 
 
168 appendix: 
 
 111 New Jersey : " Every teacher sliall have j^ower 
 to hold every pupil accountable iu school for any dis- 
 orderly conduct on the way to or from school, or on 
 playgrounds of the school, or during recess." 
 
 In North Carolina : " It shall be the duty of all 
 teachers of free j)ublic schools to maintain good order 
 and discipline in their respective schools, to encour- 
 age morality, industry, and neatness in all their pu- 
 pils." (For teacher's power of supervision see p. 105.) 
 
 In Oregon : " A teacher's duty while in charge of a 
 school shall be ... to maintain order in school, and 
 conduct himself in such a manner, before his school, 
 as to command respect from his pupils." 
 
 In Virginia : Teachers " shall require of the pupils 
 cleanliness of person and good behavior during their 
 attendance at the school and on the way thither and 
 back to their homes." 
 
APPENDIX D. 
 
 STATE LAWS IN RELATION TO INSULTS TO TEACHERS. 
 
 In Alabama : " If any parent, guardian, or other per- 
 son, from any cause, fancied or real, visit any school 
 and insult any teacher in the presence of his pupils, 
 the person offending by such conduct -shall be liable 
 to a fine of twenty-five dollars, and costs, to be paid 
 into the school revenues of the district." 
 
 In California : " Any parent, guardian, or other per- 
 son who shall insult or abuse any teacher in the pres- 
 ence of the school shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, 
 and be liable to a fine of not less than ten nor- exceed- 
 ing one hundred dollars." 
 
 In Florida: "Any person who shall, within the 
 school-house or grounds, upbraid or insult any teacher 
 in the presence of the pupils shall, upon conviction, 
 be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars." 
 
 In Indiana: " If any parent, guardian, or other per- 
 son, from any cause, fancied or real, visits a school 
 with the avowed intention of upbraiding or insulting 
 the teacher in the presence of the school, and shall so 
 upbraid or insult the teacher, such person, for such 
 conduct, shall be liable to a fine of not more than 
 twenty-five dollars, which, when collected, shall go 
 into the general tuition revenue." 
 
INDEX 
 
 Absence— 
 
 rule as to Page 3 
 
 expulsion for. 10, 22 
 
 rule requiring written excuse for. 22 
 
 suspension for 20 
 
 to attend religious services by comnoand of parents 
 
 and priest 10 
 
 BlBL£ — 
 
 reading of, rule concerning. 24, 134 
 
 rule requiring reading of Protestant version ........ 24 
 
 Cases Repoktei> and Cited : 
 
 A nderson v. State (3 Head. K. 455) » 119 
 
 » " cited 130 
 
 Bendich v. Babcoch (31 Iowa, 562) 3, 101 
 
 Chandler v. Babcock (31 Iowa, 562) 3 
 
 Churchill v. FewJces, (13 Brad. R. 520) 22 
 
 « " cited 138 
 
 Com. V. Randall (4 Gray, 36) 116 
 
 « « cited. 124,129 
 
 Com. V. Seed (5 Penn. L. J. R. 78) 126 
 
 « " cited 129 
 
 Cooper V. McJunhin (4 Ind. 291) 113 
 
 « " cited 125,130 
 
 Dannenhoffer v. State (69 Ind. 295) 124 
 
 " « cited 130 
 
 Dannenhoffer v. State (79 Ind. 75) 125 
 
172 INDEX.- 
 
 Cases Reported and Cited — Continued: 
 
 Davis V. Boston (133 Mass. 103) Page 83 
 
 Donahoe v. Richards (38 Me. 379) 24 
 
 " « cited 8,67,138 
 
 Dritt V. Snodgrass (66 Mo. 286) , 102 
 
 " " cited 138 
 
 Ferriier v. Ti/Ier (48 Vt. 444) 10 
 
 " " cited 67 
 
 Gardner v. State (4 Ind. 633) 115 
 
 " " cited 130 
 
 Guernsey \.PitUn{^2Yt.2'2Q) 33 
 
 " " cited 8 
 
 Hathaway v. Rice (19 Vt. 102) 109 
 
 " « cited 121 
 
 Hodghins v. Rochport (105 Mass. 475) 76 
 
 « cited 130 
 
 Hughes v. Goodell (3 Pitts. Eep. 264) 86 
 
 Kidder V. Chellis (59 N. H. 473) 52 
 
 " cited 68,132,142 
 
 King v. Jefferson City Sch. Board (71 Mo. 628) 20 
 
 Lander y'. Seaver (32 Vt. 114) 94, 121 
 
 " cited 8,101,130 
 
 McCormicTc v. Burt (95 III. 263) 138 
 
 " " cited 23 
 
 Morrow v. Wood(2,b Wis. 59) 34 
 
 « « cited 50,55-58 
 
 Parher v. School Dist. (5 Lea, 525) 80 
 
 Pech V. Sinith (41 Conn. 442) 88 
 
 Perkins v. Directors (56 Iowa, 479) 72 
 
 Rulison y. Post {79 111. 567) 41 
 
 " " cited 50 
 
 Russell y. Lynnjield (116 Mass. 366) 9 
 
 « " cited 130 
 
 Scott y. School Dist. (46 Vt. 452) 77 
 
 Sewell V. Board of Ed. (29 O. St. R. 89) 44 
 
 Sherman v. Charlestown (8 Cush. 160) 91 
 
 •' " cited 8,09,76,101 
 
INDEX. 173 
 
 Cases Reported and Cited — Continued: 
 
 Spiller V. Wohurn (12 All. 1 27) Page 68 
 
 *' " cited 8,76 
 
 State V. Burton (45 Wis. 150) 78 
 
 « " cited 131 
 
 State V. Mizner (50 Iowa,162) 122 
 
 " " cited 63,130,134 
 
 State V. Pendergrass (2 Dev. & Batt. 365) 105 
 
 " " cited 123,129 
 
 State V. Williams (27 Vt. 755) 140 
 
 Stevens v. Fassett (27 Me. 266) 110, 133 
 
 Thompson v. Beaver (63 111. 356) 8 
 
 Trustees v. The People (87 111. 303) 46 
 
 " " cited 62 
 
 Connecticut case, Pech v. Smith (41 Conn. 442) 88 
 
 Corporal, Punishment— 
 
 decisions relating to 105 
 
 not allowable, for refusing to take studies forbidden 
 
 by parent 34, 50 
 
 right of teacher 105 
 
 for disobedience 124 
 
 for truancy 126 
 
 must be moderate 122 
 
 must not be excessive and cruel 109, 119, 121 
 
 for refusal to study certain branches 128 
 
 teacher must not abuse the privilege 115 
 
 right of teacher when resisted 110 
 
 instrument of. 116, 127 
 
 marks of violence 105, 127 
 
 unreasonable and excessive force cannot be used 118 
 
 may be inflicted on pupils over twenty-one years. 122, 133 
 
 right and measure of. / 133 
 
 liability of teacher for error of judgment 138 
 
 note to decisions 129 
 
 Law of New Jersey concerning 128 
 
 « "New York « 128 
 
 Certificate, teacher without, has authority. 62, IDS 
 
174 INDEX. * 
 
 Disobedience, expulsion for ."Page 77 
 
 Excuses for absence. . ., . . .■ 22 
 
 Expulsion— 
 
 decisions relating to 74 
 
 committee to decide what requires 27, 76, 82, 85 
 
 by teacher, will not support action against town or 
 
 city 83 
 
 for absence 10, 22 
 
 . for acts of misconduct 76 
 
 for disobedience 77 
 
 for attending social parties 102 
 
 for immorality out of school 91 
 
 for refusal to bow head during prayer 68 
 
 for truancy 94 
 
 for not reading in Bible, . , 24 
 
 not allowable, for not taking studies not required by 
 
 law 41 
 
 not allowable, for refusal to pay for property in- 
 jured. 72 
 
 terms of, cannot inflict perpetual disability SQ 
 
 teacher has no power of, 83 
 
 state laws, in relation to, see State Laws. 
 
 General Poavers of school officers. 2 
 
 Illinois cases — 
 
 Churchill v. FewTces (13 Brad. R, 520) 22 
 
 McCormich v. Burt (95 111. 263) 138 
 
 Rulison V, Post (79 III. 667). . . , 41 
 
 Thompson v. Beaver (63 111. 356) 8 
 
 Trustees v. The People (87 111. 303) 46 
 
 Indiana cases — 
 
 Cooper V. McJunUn (4 Ind. 291) 113 
 
 Dannenhojfer v. State (69 Ind. 295) 124 
 
 Dannenhojfer v. State (79 Ind. 75) 125 
 
 Gardner v. State (4 Ind. 633) 115 
 
 Insulting teacher, out of school 96 
 
 state law, in relation to, see State Laws. 
 
INDEX. 175 
 
 Iowa cases— 
 
 Beiidick v. Bahcoch (31 Iowa, 562) Page 3, 101 
 
 Chandler v. Bahcoch (31 Iowa, 562) 8 
 
 Murphy v. Directors (30 Iowa, 429) 99 
 
 Perhins v. Directors (56 Iowa, 479) 72 
 
 State V. Mizner (50 loAva, 152) 50, 122 
 
 Maine cases — 
 
 Donakoe v, Richards (3.8 Me. 379) 24 
 
 Stevens v. Fassett (27 Me. 266) 110 
 
 Mann, Horace, opinion on power of officers in schoolroom. . 90 
 " " " of teacher without certif- 
 icate 139 
 
 Massachusetts cases — 
 
 Com. V. Randall (4 Gray, 36) .... 116 
 
 Davis V. Boston (133 Mass. 103) 83 
 
 Ilodghim v. Rochport (105 Mass. 475) 76 
 
 Russell V. Lyyinfield (116 Mass. 366) 9 
 
 Sherman v. Charlestoicn (8 Cush. 160) 91 
 
 Spiller V. Wohurn (12 All. 127) 68 
 
 Misconduct, expulsion for. 76 
 
 Missouri cases — 
 
 Dritt V. Snodgrass {^ Mo. 286) 102 
 
 King v. Jefferson City Sch. Board (71 Mo. 628) 20 
 
 New Hampshire case — 
 
 Kidder V. Chellis (50 N. H. 473) 52 
 
 North Carolina case — 
 
 State V. Pendergrass (2 Dev. & Batt, 365). 105 
 
 Officers, School — 
 
 general powers of .' 2 
 
 acting in good faith, not liable to parents or pupil. . . 134 
 
 power to act in schoolroom. ..,,,.... 90, 141 
 
 opinion of Horace Mann 90 
 
 power over pupils for acts out of school 91 
 
 to decide what requires expulsion 27, 76, 82, 85 
 
 state law in relation to powers of, see State Laws. 
 
176 INDEX*. 
 
 Ohio case— 
 
 Seioell V. Board of Ed, (29 0. St. R. 89) Page 44 
 
 Out of School — ' 
 
 power over pupils for acts 9i 
 
 immorality, expulsion for 91 
 
 insulting teacher 9G 
 
 acts, punishable 97 
 
 publication, ridiculing school directors 99 
 
 acts, within authority of teacher and school board. . . 101 
 
 directors cannot forbid attending social parties 102 
 
 Pennsylvania cases — 
 
 Com. V. Seed (5 Penn. L. J. R. 78) 12G 
 
 Hughes v. Goodell (3 Pitts. Rep. 264) 86 
 
 Prayer, expulsion for refusal to bow head during 68 
 
 Reasonable rule, what is. 2 
 
 Rules — 
 
 as to absence 3 
 
 as to tardiness 3 
 
 cannot be made to cover all cases 131 
 
 made by one member of committee , 131 
 
 need not be recorded 130 
 
 pupils over twenty-one, subject to 133 
 
 requiring written excuse for absence 22 
 
 requiring English composition, is reasonable 33 
 
 what is a reasonable rule 2 
 
 rules in other cases 68 
 
 (^See State Laws.) 
 
 Social parties, expulsion for attending, not allowable. . . . 102 
 
 State Laws, in relation to pupils and rules — 
 
 California 132 
 
 Kentucky 132 
 
 Missouri 132 
 
 New Jersey 132- 
 
 New Hampshire 133 
 
INDEX. 1*77 
 
 State Laws, in relation to pupils and rules — Continued: 
 
 Ehode Island Page 133 
 
 Wisconsin , , . 133 
 
 State Laws, in relation to poAvers of school officers — 
 
 Appendix A 143 
 
 Alabama 143 
 
 Arkansas. 143 
 
 California 143 
 
 Colorado 144 
 
 Connecticut 144 
 
 Delaware 144 
 
 Florida 145 
 
 Georgia 145 
 
 Illinois 145 
 
 Indiana 146 
 
 Iowa 14G 
 
 • Kentucky 146 
 
 Kansas 147 
 
 Louisiana 147 
 
 Maine 148 
 
 Maryland. 148 
 
 Massachusetts. » , . . 148 
 
 Michigan 148 
 
 Minnesota 148 
 
 Mississippi , 149 
 
 Missouri, . . , 149 
 
 Nebraska 149 
 
 Nevada 150 
 
 New Hampshire 150 
 
 New Jersey 151 
 
 New York - 152 
 
 New York City , 152 
 
 North Carolina 152 
 
 Ohio .153 
 
 Oregon 153 
 
 Pennsylvania 153 
 
 Pihode Island 153 
 
 12 
 
178 INDEX, 
 
 State Laws, in relation to powers of school of&cers—jyoniinued: 
 
 South Carolina Page 154 
 
 Tennessee ....>. 154 
 
 Texas 155 
 
 Vermont 156 
 
 Virginia 156 
 
 West Virginia 157 
 
 Wisconsin 157 
 
 State Laws, in relation to expulsion and suspension-r 
 
 Appendix B 159 
 
 Alabama 159 
 
 Arkansas 159 
 
 California 159 
 
 Colorado 159 
 
 Connecticut 160 
 
 Delaware. 160 
 
 Florida 160 
 
 Illinois 160 
 
 Indiana 160 
 
 Iowa 161 
 
 Kansas 161 
 
 Kentucky , • • • • 161 
 
 Louisiana 162 
 
 Maine. 162 
 
 Maryland 162 
 
 Massachusetts 162 
 
 Michigan 162 
 
 Minnesota 163 
 
 Missouri 163 
 
 Nebraska 163 
 
 Nevada 163 
 
 New Hampshire 163 
 
 New Jersey 164 
 
 North Carolina 164 
 
 Ohio 164 
 
 Pennsylvania 165 
 
 Pihode Island 165 
 
INDEX. 179 
 
 State Laws, in relation to expulsion and suspension — Continued: 
 
 South Carolina Page 165 
 
 Tennessee 165 
 
 Virginia 165 
 
 West Virginia 166 
 
 Wisconsin 166 
 
 State Laws, in relation to powers of teachers — 
 
 Appendix C 167 
 
 Alabama 167 
 
 California 167 
 
 Florida 167 
 
 Kentucky , 167 
 
 New Jersey 168 
 
 North Carolina 168 
 
 Oregon 168 
 
 Virginia 168 
 
 State Laws, in relation to insults to teachers — 
 
 Appendix D, 169 
 
 Alabama 169 
 
 California 169 
 
 Florida. 169 
 
 Indiana 169 
 
 Studies — 
 
 corporal punishment for refusing to pursue certain.. . 128 
 not to be enforced against reasonable wish of par- 
 ent , 34, 50 
 
 rules concerning 24 
 
 not required by law, pupils not compelled to take ... 41 
 
 parent has right to determine 46, 50 
 
 suspension for not declaiming 52 
 
 suspension for not studying rhetoric. - 44 
 
 note to decisions on 66 
 
 Suspension — 
 
 decisions relating to.. 74 
 
 for tardiness 3, 9 
 
 for absence 20 
 
 for not writing English composition 33 
 
180 INDEX. , 
 
 Suspension — Continued: 
 
 for not studying rhetoric Page 44 
 
 for not declaiming 52 
 
 for pviblishing article ridiculing directors 99 
 
 for refusing to remain quiet during reading of Bible. 134 
 where teacher enforced rule against wish of directors 80 
 
 power of teacher 79, 80 
 
 state laws in relation to, see State Laws. 
 
 Tardiness — 
 
 rule as to 3 
 
 suspension for 3, 9 
 
 directors cannot bar door against tardy pupils 9 
 
 rule that pupils should be sent to committee for 9 
 
 Teacher— 
 
 authority of, without certificate. 52, 138 
 
 opinion of Horace Mann 139 
 
 power to suspend 78, 80 
 
 has no power to expel 85 
 
 may call assistance 110, 141 
 
 cannot enforce role against wish of directors 80 
 
 liability of, for error of Judgment 138 
 
 not liable for excessive punishment, unless clearly 
 
 so..,.. 122 
 
 insults to, out of school 96 
 
 state laws in relation to, see State Laws. 
 
 state laws in relation to powers of, see State Laws. 
 
 See Corporal Panishnaent. 
 
 Tennessee cases — 
 
 A nderson v. State (3 Head. E. 455) 119 
 
 Parler v. School District (5 Lea, 525) 80 
 
 Truant— 
 
 expulsion of. 94 
 
 corporal punishment for 126 
 
 truancy 20 
 
 Twenty-one years, pupils over, subject to rules 133 
 
 subject to corporal punishment 133 
 
INDEX. 181 
 
 Vermont cases — 
 
 Ferriter v. Tyler (48 Vt. 444) Page 10 
 
 Haihaxoay v. Rice (19 Vt. 102) 109 
 
 Lander v. Seaver (32 Vt. 114) 96, 121 
 
 Scott \. School Dist.iA&^t.^hV) 77 
 
 State V. Williams (27 Vt. 755) 140 
 
 Wisconsin cases — 
 
 Morrow v. Wood (35 Wis. 59) 34 
 
 State \. Burton (45 Wis. 150) 78 
 
A Booh that every Teacher should have. 
 
 METHODS OF TEACHIIG-. 
 
 A HAND-BOOK OF 
 
 PKINCIPLES, DIRECTIONS, AND WORKING MODELS 
 FOR COMMON-SCHOOL TEACHERS. 
 
 BY 
 
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 PRINCIPAL OF THE SAN FRANCISCO GIRLS' HIGH SCHOOL AND 
 NORMAL CLASS. 
 
 12mo, Half Leather, $1 00. 
 
 This book is intended for use in normal schools as a 
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 sal." — F. Louis Sold AN, Principal of Normal School, St. Louis, Mo. 
 
 Copies will be sent, postpaid, on receipt of the price. 
 
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An Interesting Book for Teachers, 
 
 HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL THEORIES. 
 
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 The "History of Educational Theories " concisely and 
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 OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. 
 
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