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PEACE WITHOUT DISHONOUR^WAR ..^^ ^ 
 WITHOUT HOPE. 
 
 
 BEING 
 
 A CALM AND DISPASSIONATE 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 INTO THE 
 
 QUESTION OF THE CHESAPEAKE, 
 
 AND THE 
 
 NECESSITY AND EXPEDIENCY 
 
 WAR. 
 
 BY A YANKEE FARMER. 
 
 .JI^'^^^jSoc': 
 
 BOSTON: 
 PR1J«JTED BY GREENOUGH AND STEBBINS. 
 
 1807. 
 
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 mi», Hiat. So«. 
 
TO THE PUBLICK. 
 
 IT cannot he expected^ that a farmer should 
 displaij the ornaments of a polished sfijle — The au- 
 thor has aimed onhj at perspicuitij, impartiality^ and 
 truth. A boldness and freedom characteristick of 
 the real, ancient New-England farmers^ zoill be found 
 stronglij marked in evcrij part of this little essaij. 
 The publick good is the author^s onlij object — true 
 patriotism his onhj stimulus — and the promotion of 
 justice, and vindication of our national good faith, his 
 only aim. 
 
 In these times of party; spirit he cannot hope 
 to escape censure. His love of truth — his display 
 of our own errors — his disposition to render justice 
 to other nations xmll probably be attributed to the 
 basest motives — For such is too often the fashion of 
 the day — to abuse those lohom hdc cannot answer. 
 
 It would not surprise him, if he should even 
 be called an Old Tory or a British hireling ; for he 
 has often remarked that this is a species of argument 
 which never fails of success, xohen all other reasoning 
 or abuse is found ineffectual. But he shall despise 
 the calumnies, and smile at the attacks of all the 
 partizans of war, a few of zvhom, broken in fortune 
 or reputation, can only hope to rebuild both on the 
 ruins of their Country, 
 
TO THE FARMERS, MERCHANTS, AND 
 MECHANICKS OF NEW-ENGLAND 
 
 FELLOW CITIZENS, 
 
 IF at any time a citizen is juftified in making an ap- 
 peal to your underftanding, to your fober reafon — If a cool and. 
 difpaflionate difplay of your danger, and your true interefts be at 
 any period a duty, it furely becomes fuch, when you are threatened 
 with a calamity by which your rights, liberties, property, and lives 
 are to be expofed to the moft imminont danger. * We are told by 
 the publick newfpapers which have ufually been the vehicles of the 
 language of our adminiftration — we are alfo informed, that many 
 very influential men in and out of the adminiftration, concur with 
 the publick papers in declaring, " that War wiU probably take 
 place, and that it is inevitable, unlefs the government of Great- 
 Britain fhould make ample reparation for the attack on our frigate 
 the Chefapcake." We alfo know, that all defcriptions of people in 
 Great-Britain, however oppofed in political opinions, concurred in 
 one fentiment, that Great-Britain never could, and never ought to 
 yield the principle for which they believed that we contend, the 
 right of enlifting and harbouring the defcrters from their publick 
 fhips of war. It is rendered almoft certain, therefore, that Great- 
 Britain, " while {he will explicitly difavow the claim to fearch our na- 
 tional Jloips of war, will neverthelefs contend, that we have no right 
 to enhft her deferters, and proteft them under our publick flag, 
 but that if we do fo condud, and refufe to deliver them on demand, 
 fhe will retake them by force, on a common jurifdidion, the High 
 
 * See the language of the National Intelligencer, and of the Aurora, who 
 confider war as inevitable, unlefs Great-Brit-iin grants reparation for the at- 
 tack on the Chefapeake. Mr. Gallatin, A'Ir. Dearborn, and other publick offi- 
 cers are alledged to have declared that war is to be cxpctiled. 
 
Seas.'' it lucU lli<)\ilcl bo her final dccilion, as we have reafon to 
 fear, fhe cannot punifh Admiral Berkeley without manifeft injuftice 
 to him. 
 
 If, therefore, our adminiftration are fincerc in their determina- 
 tion to go to war, unlefs reparation be made for the attack on the 
 Chcfapcakf, war fccms, as tlicy privately alTert, to be inevitable, 
 unlefs tlie prudent and temperate deliberations of Congrefs, or the 
 feafonablc exprefTion of publick opinion, fliall check this deftruc- 
 tivc, and I may add, rti/Ii policy. War, at all times a publick ca- 
 lamity, becomes peculiarly alarming and dellruftive to a nation, 
 which has been for twenty-four years exclufively devoted to the 
 arts of peace — which has neglefted every mean of national de- 
 fence — which has devoted none of its revenues to a wife prep- 
 aration for war, to wliich all nations are occafionally expofed. 
 It is peculiarly alarming to a nation, governed by an adminiftra- 
 tion not only deftitute of mihtary talents, but who have always 
 avowed their oppofition to every thing like mihtary preparation, 
 and who, while they have profeffed to rely upon the moft frail of 
 all fupports, the juftice of nations, and have therefore neglefted 
 every mean of preparation or defence, have moft unfortunately 
 brought us to the verge of a moft awful precipice, where we have 
 no alternative but either to plunge headlong to a certain and de- 
 ftruAive fate, or to retrace our fteps, as they fay, with ignominy 
 and difgrace. If at a moment fo eventful, and in a pofition fo tre- 
 mendous, any friendly hand (hould point out to us a path by which 
 we might fave both our livee and our honour, one would naturally 
 imagine, that it ought to excite our gratitude, rather than our ha- 
 tred — to merit our thanks, rather than punifhment ; but other 
 doftrines feem to prevail. The friends of the adminiftration, 
 wounded at the true piAure of our fituation, provoked that any 
 man fliould unanfwerably prove fome errors in our own conduft 
 which diminifh the juftice, and of courfe, the neceflity of a war, 
 have advanced an idea novel in the hiftory of free nations, that *" it 
 is treafon to queftion the juftice or expediency of a war," even be- 
 
 ' F.xtrart from tlic Nationnl InteHiKcnccr In anfwcr to Pacificiis, a writer in 
 t!ic Boflon CcntincI, af,'ain(l the necellity of War. 'Jhis may be found in tlif 
 I'allailium, of .Si-ptembtr L"», in ;; piece entitled « Modem Liberty." 
 
fore the only conftituted authority authorized to decide this ques- 
 tion, the Legiflature, had convened to deUberate upon it. 
 
 The example of Great-Britain, whofe tyrannical principles have 
 fo long been the theme of popular harangue, one would think would 
 be conclufive on this point — and that whatever may be done tvith 
 impunity in that monarchical and fevere government, might certainly 
 be permitted in our free and enlightened country. It is well knawu 
 that all the pubUck writers in England, both before and after the de- 
 c'lfton of ParUament,^as to the quellion of war, undertake to arraign 
 itsjuftice, its poHcy, its neceflity, its expedience, their own weaknefs, 
 the means which they have of annoying }:he enemy, and to magnify 
 the refources, power, and talents of their foes : nor can there be 
 found, in a fingle inftance, an attempt to check this freedom of en- 
 quiry, either by profecution or threats. 
 
 If this example, and the explicit language of our own Conftitu- 
 tions were not fufflcient authority, we might cite an illuftrious man, 
 whofe opinions a large part of the community w^ould be unwil- 
 ling to queftion. — Prefident JeflFerfon lays it down as an eftablifhed 
 axiom, " that u.e utmoft liberty of the prefs may be fafely indulg- 
 ed, in fuch a country as ours, and that errors in opinions can do no 
 injury, luhere reafon is left free to combat them." 
 
 If this doftrine be true in ordinary cafes, how much more ftrong 
 its application to the important queftions of war and peace ? — To 
 what terrible confequences would the tyrannical doftrine of the 
 National Intelligencer, above quoted, lead us ? A foreign nation 
 makes an attack which is alledged to be caufe of war : Such an 
 attack muft always involve a queftion of fa£t, and a queftion of law 
 or right. If the opinion of any particular fet of men, even of dig- 
 nified officers, could be conchifive as to thefe t'wo queflions : If no pri- 
 vate citizen who might be in poffeflion of better evidence as to the 
 fadst or better authority as to the law, could divulge thefe fafts, 
 and make known his principles of law, it would follow that our 
 Conftltution would be a dead letter ; — the Legiflature would be- 
 come mere tools in the hands of the executive, and the nation might 
 be involved in all the calamities of war at the pleafure of a fingle 
 man. But the doftrine of the Government paper goes farther, you 
 ran not only not difcufs the queftion of right, but you muft be filent 
 
s 
 
 a» to the refouiccb or ability of thr nation to gain the objeft of the 
 war. The opinion of the Executive is conclufive on this point alfo. 
 The National IntclHgenccr tells the people of the United States, 
 that Great-Britain has done an unprovoled adit, which juftifies a de- 
 claration of war on our part ; — this point, it fays, it is treafon in any 
 body to difprow. — It adds, that this war would be expedient, be- 
 caufc " we can bring Great-Britain to our feet. We can ruin her 
 manufaflurers ; we can ftarve her colonies ; we can take Canada 
 and Nova-Scotia : while the injur}-^ will be trifling to ourfelves, as 
 we can fupply ourfelves as plentifully with foreign goods hy prizes 
 we fliall take, as we are now fupplied by commerce ; and our pro- 
 duce will meet as ready a fale in war as in peace." 
 
 But any attempt to difprove thefe propofitions, cfpecially if made 
 with trulk and ability, it declares to be the high offence of treafon, 
 inafmuch as it tends to prove the opinions o{ great men erroneous, 
 and to difcourage the people from undertaking a war, which tliofe 
 great men have rcfolvcd to wage. 
 
 Braving all the dangers to which thofe writers are expofed, who 
 venture to give light to the people, on this moft intercfting fubjcft, 
 and defpifuig the threats of profecution for treafon, I fhall attempt 
 to develope the principles, to trace the hiftory, and to expofe the 
 faCls in relation to our alledged caufe of complaint againft Eng- 
 land ; — to examine our oivn conduft, and the allegation fo often 
 made, that the attack on our National flag, was wholly without 
 provocation ; and laftly, to confider the expediency of war, in 
 which will be involved, its objefts — the profpeft of fuccefs or de- 
 feat ; our refources, and means of annoyance of our propofed ene- 
 my ; and the power, fituation, and intcrefts of the nation with 
 whom we are about to contend ; and I fliall conclude with confid- 
 ering the effefts of fuch a war, whether it prove fucccfsful or dif- 
 graceful upon our general politicks, interior and exterior, and upon 
 thofe great and permanent intereils, which ought never to be over- 
 looked when we are weighing minor qucllions, or debating upon 
 injuries and incidents which do not affed, or compromife our wel- 
 fare or cxillence. 
 
 It will not be denied, that on the 2M\ day of June lalt, when 
 tlic attack was made on the Chefapeake, the relations between 
 
Great-Britain and the United States, were thofe of peace and 
 amity. — This is proved by the declarations of the Prefident to 
 Congrcfs, and the communications of our Miniftcrs at the Court of 
 Great-Britain, which were laid before that honourable body.* It 
 is farther proved by the language of the Britifli Minifters in and out 
 of Parliament, and by the circumftance of our Minifters extraordi- 
 nary having figned a Treaty of Amity, which fettled all our differ- 
 ences, except the finglc one, of the right of fearch of merchant 
 fhips for Britifli feamen, and on which point, it is faid from good 
 authority, Great-Britain was ready and offered to yield the right 
 of fearch except as it rcfpeftcd the narrow feas, or that portion 
 of the fea which immediately furrounds Great-Britain, and where 
 the danger of the lofs of their feamen, who are their only defence, 
 was peculiarly imminent. 
 
 It cannot be doubted, therefore, that peace, fo much to be de- 
 fired by this country, would not have been interrupted, and that 
 our profitable neutrality would have been continued, had it not 
 been for the affair of the Chefapeake, which cannot be too much 
 deplored. The queftion, therefore, is limited to the examination 
 of the caufes of that unfortunate aft, and of the confequences which 
 ought to rcfult from it. 
 
 As a great portion of the irritation which has been produced, 
 excited, and encouraged, has proceeded from an ignorance of the 
 faCls which preceded and accompanied that affair, it will be ufeful, 
 before we enter into an inveftigation of the Law of Nations upoa 
 this fubjeft, to fettle, as far as poifible, thefe/«5j. 
 
 In the fummer of 1 806, a French fquadron of line of battle 
 fliips and frigates having met with a gale upon our coafts, a part of 
 them took refuge in the Chefapeake, to fhelter themfelves from their 
 enemies. This rendered it neceffary for Great-Britain to detach a 
 fquadron to watch the motion of their enemies, and they accord- 
 ingly, as they lawfully might, took their ftation in Hampton 
 Roads. By the Law of Nations, and the principles of an impar- 
 tial neutrality, we owed to both thefe fquadrons, equal proteftion. 
 While we permitted the French to repair and relit their fhips, re- 
 
 ' See the Prefident's Communications to Congrefs, on this fubje(5t 
 B 
 
10 
 
 claim their defcrters, nnd to prepare to encounter their enemies, the 
 laws of hofpitality equally demanded, that we fhould allow equal 
 privileges and indulgence to the Britifli fquadron, and more cfpc- 
 cially that \vc fhould not countenance or encourage any meafures 
 by which their means of encountering their enemy fliould be, wliile 
 they wore under our proteftion, weakened. 
 
 *0n the 7th day of March lall, five Brit'ijlo feamen belonging to 
 the Britidi floop of war Halifax, Lord James Townfhcnd command- 
 er, while employed in weighing the anchor, rofe upon their ofiicer, 
 threatened to murder him, and made off with the boat to the Amer- 
 ican fliorc, where they landed. Their names were, Richard Hu- 
 bert, fail-maker, born in Liverpool ; Henry Saunders, yeoman of 
 the flieets, born in Greenock ; Jenkin Ratford, born in London ; 
 George North, captain of the main-top, born in Kinfale ; and 
 William Hill, boni in Philadelphia ; who entered in a Britifh port 
 voluntarily, viz. in Antigua. 
 
 The faAs of their birth and citizcnfhip were taken from the fhip'a 
 books, and were fvvorn to have been their vivn declarations at the 
 time of their entry on board the fhip. 
 
 The nature of this evidence is conclufive, and its fainiefs \sfiron^ly 
 marked by their not attempting to conceal tlie facl, that one of tlve 
 five was born in Philadelphia. 
 
 The very day after their landing, they were enlifled as part of 
 the crew of the United States fliip Chefapeakc. Perhaps this was 
 done ignorantly, though it is worthy of remark, that an Englifla- 
 man, and cfpecially a Scotchman and Irifliman, may be almnjl as 
 r.Wi/y difcerned from an Amcncan, by thofe who are converfant 
 with failors, as a black man can be diflinguiflied from a white one. 
 It is certain, however, that thcfe men could not have been pofTefTed 
 of American proteftions. The very day after the enhflmcnt. Lord 
 James Townfhend demanded thefe men of Lieutenant Sinclair, the 
 recruiting officer of the Chefapeakc. The government of the 
 United States had, as Captain Barron afTcrts, ordered the recruiting 
 officers not to enl'i/l Brit'ifi defericrs. Thefe defcrters were not at 
 
 * Fi)r thcfe fadls, foe the afl'idavlts of tlic conun;mdiT ;iiul otliccis of the 
 ILilifax, priiitetl in the Trial of Jciikin Ratforii, one of tlic niutiuccr., and re- 
 printed at Bofton. 
 
11 
 
 this time on board the (lup, but at the rendezvous. It naturally oc- 
 curs to aflc, why did not Lieutenant Sinclair, in obedience to the 
 orders of the government, immediately difcharge thefe men ? If he 
 had enhfted them ignorantly, the fp'trltt nay, the letter of his orderij, 
 obliged him to difcharge them as foon as he knew from the higheft 
 authority, their commanding officer, that they were deferters from hio 
 fllip. Many honeft well meaning men have contended, that the 
 word of a publlck officer ought to be refpc£led. 
 
 This is an excellent general principle, and the obfervance of it 
 would tend very much to preferve the peace of nations ; but we 
 fhould not forget that this rule has a double application. It op- 
 erates as much in favour of the officers of other nations as of our 
 own. When, therefore, Lord James Townfhend pledged his word 
 to Lieutenant Sinclau-, that the men whom he had enlifted, contrary 
 to the orders of our government, were his failors, and that the 
 Britifli government had a property in their fervices, it was as much 
 the duty of Lieutenant Sinclair to give full faith to the word of 
 Captain Townfliend, as it was the duty of Captain Humphreys to 
 give credit to the declaration of Captain Barron : — it was ftill 
 ftronger ; — Lieutenant Sinclair did not, could not know that the 
 declaration of Lord Townfhend was untrue ; but Captain Hum- 
 phreys did know that the declaration of Commodore Barron wa« 
 unfounded, and he turned out to be right in the faft. 
 
 Lieutenant Sinclair made an evafive anfwer to the application of 
 Captain Townfhend, and did not deliver or difcharge the men. An 
 application was then made to Captain Decatur, who referred him 
 back to Sinclair. The Britifh Conful applied to the Mayor of 
 Norfolk for thefe men, but without efFeft — and laftly, the Britifli 
 Minifler applied to our government, who replied, that they had on 
 a former occafion ftated their rcafons for not complying with their 
 requefl, and that moreover the men were Americans. 
 
 Thefe men, who, with the exception of Hill, were all native Brli- 
 IJh feamen, and had no claims from refidence or other caufes on our 
 protection, were all continued on board the Chefapeake, while at 
 Wafhington, under the eye of our government. No meafures ap- 
 pear to have been taken to afcertain their claims to our proteftion. 
 No evidence down to this day has ever been publifhed in relation to 
 
1'2 \ 
 
 either of thefe men. We muft conclude, therefore, that they arc, ai 
 the Britifli have proved under oatli,^// native Britifli feamen, except 
 WtU'iam Hill. It cannot be pretended tliat the government are iu 
 pofll'flion of evidence in reJpeEl to them which it does not think it im- 
 portant to pubhfli, becaufe we know that they have been at great 
 pains to coUedl and pubHfh the evidence witli refpeft to three other 
 feamen, whofe cafe has no connexion with the caufc of the attack ' 
 on the Chefapeake. I 
 
 Thefe feamen were among the crew of the Chefapeake at the pe- 
 riod of the faid four feveral, folemn demands, and continued on 
 board till the fliip failed down the river, when four of them deferted- 
 The fifth, Jenkin Ratford, remained on board till after the laft de- 
 mand made by Captain Humphreys, and to which demand Captain 
 Barron replied, that " he knenv of no fiich men as Captain Hum- 
 phreys defcribed." After the aftion, Ratford was found hid in 
 the coal hole of the Chefapeake, and has fince been tried, found 
 guilty of mutiny, and executed. He confefled himfelf to be a na- 
 tive of London, that he had entered his Britannick Majefty's fer- 
 vicc voluntarily ; that he was pcrfuaded to enter on board the 
 Chefapeake, in order to proteft himfelf from the fearch of his ofli- 
 cers, and that on his entering, he was aflced if he had not a fecond 
 name ; that he thereupon entered by the name of Wilfon. As foon 
 as thefe repeated demands and rcfufals were known to the com- 
 mander in chief, Admiral Berkeley, finding, as he alledges, that the 
 feamen of the Britifh fleet were deferting every day, he iflued the 
 order referred to in the note below,* in fubftance direfting the offi- 
 cers of his Majefty's fliips under his command, to require permif- 
 fion of the Captain of the Chefapeake to fearch that (hip, on the 
 high fcas, for the deferters referred to in faid order, and to proceed 
 and fearch for the fame, at the fame time offering a like and recip- 
 rocal permiflion to the American officers. Captain Humphreys, of 
 the Leopard, was entrufted with the execution of this order, and 
 the manner in which he executed it, is too well known to need rcp- 
 v=>tition. Two or three remarks, however, may not be amifs, as an 
 opportunity will not again occur in the courfe of the propofed dif- 
 
 * See Admiral Berkeley's order, prixitcd in tlic Trial of Jenkin Ratford. 
 
13 
 
 cufllon : — 1ft, That another formal demand was made oi their own 
 feamen, by the Britifli officers, before the laft; alternative was re- 
 forted to ; that this demand was couched in terms fo polite and 
 refpedlful, that it would not have been beneath the dignity of Cap- 
 tain Barron to have met it with equal politenefs, and to have ftated 
 the cafe truly to Captain Humphreys, that three of the men de- 
 manded had efcaped, and that the fourth he was ready to dehver ; 
 this would probably have finifhed this unhappy affair. 2d, That 
 nothing in the anfwer of Captain Barron, is a fufficient excufe for 
 his not delivering up Jenkin Ratford, one of the mutineers, thea 
 en board the Chefapeake. 
 
 The reafon affigncd to the Britifh officer, that he was ordered 
 not to fuffer his crew to be muftered, by any but his own officers, 
 does not apply — There was no neceffity of mvjler'tng them at all. 
 At that time it was well known, it mujl have been knoivn on board 
 the Chefapeake, who the men demanded were. And he declares 
 that he had pofitive orders from the Government not to enlift 
 deferters, which amounted to an order to deliver them, if he had 
 enlifted them ignorantly. 
 
 He might therefore have obeyed both thefe orders of the Govern- 
 ment, and have prefcrved the honour of our flag ; and what is more, 
 the honour, faith, and reputation of our officers. By fending on 
 board the Britifli fliip, Jenkin Ratford, of London, a mutineer, and 
 deferter, and accompanying it with a declaration on his honour, 
 that the others had deferted from the Chefapeake, he would have 
 fatisfied Capt. Humphreys, would have fubftantially obeyed the 
 order of our Government not to enlifl; deferters, and have prevent- 
 ed the unhappy cataftrophe. 
 
 3dly. The meannefs of many of our publick papers and refolu- 
 tions, in reprefenting this attack as cowardly, and affaffin-like, can- 
 not be too much condemned by every candid and ingenuous mind. 
 
 The Leopard was a 50 gun fhip, and carried a fmaller number 
 of men than the Chefapeake ; the Chefapeake was a large 44, 
 which our officers have often declared equal to a Britifli 64;. So 
 far from the Britifli officers knowing, that the Chefapeake was un- 
 prepared, it turns out by the charges of our own officers againfl. 
 Barron, that flic was fully prepared. Indeed the Britifli officers 
 
u 
 
 are faid to have avowed to ours, before (he failed, that they were 
 inftrii6led to obtain thefe men by force if they were not given 
 up. Our own officer after having refolvcd to defend his fhip, 
 ought to have nailed his flag to the maft, and to have funk his 
 adverfaiy, or to have gone down himfelf with his flag undiflion- 
 ourcd. It is the difgracc which this conduA fecms to fix 
 upon us, which makes us feel fo pungently. 
 
 Had Capt. Barron vindicated our national honour as he ought 
 to have done, we fliould have fcen this affair in a very different 
 light. We fhould have acknowledged that we were wrong in the 
 principle of en/1/ling their feameny but we might have added, that no 
 nation fhall infult our flag with impunity : we need not indeed 
 have fa'td this ; the fail would fpcak a plainer language. 
 
 After the colours of the United States (hip had been ftruck, 
 the Britifli officers proceeded to fearch for their deferters. 
 
 The rcfult of this fearch was this : — they found Jenkin Rat- 
 ford, one of the feamen demanded — and John Strachan, Daniel 
 Martin, and William Ware, three other deferters, whom they did 
 not fufpeft had been enlifted ; who were not contained in the or- 
 der of Admiral Berkeley, but who are admitted by our Govern' 
 merit to have been deferters from the Britifh frigate Melampus. 
 Thefe men were no more the caufe of the attack, than if the 
 Britifh had found an anchor on board, which had hccn Jlo/en from 
 their fliip, but which they could never expeS to find on board one 
 of our publick fhips. They alfo found twelve other Britifli fea- 
 men, who not being deferters, they fuffered to remain. It 
 turned out therefore, that there were on board the Chcfapeakc, 
 A\hcn file was at Wafliington, five Britifli deferters from the Hali- 
 fax, three deferters from the Melampus, and twelve other Britifli 
 fcamen. 
 
 The Britifli officers took away the fmgle feaman whom they 
 found of thofe demanded, and the three other deferters from the 
 Melampus, whom they were not ordered to take, bccaufe they were 
 not known to have been on board. 
 
 The afloniflimcnt and indignation of every American was excited 
 foon after, by the Prcfident's declaration, " that the feamcn de- 
 manded had been previoufly afccrtained to be native citizens of the 
 
ir> 
 
 United States." — That the Britilh Admiral fliould have the hardi- 
 hood to dtmatiff, and to order the retaking by force, native citizens 
 of America, was fo incredible in itfelf, that fome writers ventured 
 to doubt it. This drew out the evidence on both fides, and it 
 turns out mojl unequivocally, that the Prefident was grofsly »////«- 
 formed. No doubt tiie*"- high officers mull rely upon the veracity 
 and accuracy of inferior agents. — Unhappily the fource of the 
 Prefident's information was impure ; and a publick, folemn, nation- 
 al declaration, by the negligence or falfehood of fome fubaltern offi- 
 cer, turns out to be unfiipported by fads. 
 
 The cafe was this : — The Proclamation ftates, that the aft of 
 the Britifli officers was fo much the more unpardonable, " as it 
 had been previoufly afcertained that the feamen demamleel, were 
 native citizens of the United States." 
 
 The e/fence of the criminality confifted in demanding native citi- 
 zens of the United States, and in attacking a fhip of war for not 
 delivering fuch citizens. Now it turns out that all the feamen de- 
 maiided, were native Briti/Jj feamen, and therefore, all this exagger- 
 ate d point of criminality falls to the ground. 
 
 When the publick called upon the Government for the evidence 
 of the citizenfhip of thefe deferters, the Prefident, it is prefumed, 
 called on the inferior officers, on whose report he had made the 
 declaration ; and they, in order to cover their errors, inftead of fur- 
 nifhing the evidence of the citizenfhip of the deferters from the 
 Hahfax, who were demanded, gave the documents in relation to the 
 deferters from the Melampus, who were not demanded, but who 
 being found among the crew of the Chefapeake, were taken out. 
 Thefe documents were publiflied and applied to fupport the pro- 
 clamation, and to prove that the Britifli officers made an attack 
 for the recovery of native Americans. This is now known to be 
 falfe. For an expHcation of this point, fee the notes.* 
 
 * Seamen who deferted from the Halifax, Lord James Townfliend, and who 
 
 were fo often demanded, and for whom the attack on the Chefapeake was made, 
 
 •viz. Richard Hubert, of Liverpool,"] demanded, but efcaped from the Chefa- 
 
 Henry Saunders, of Greenock, | do. do. [peake. 
 
 Jenkin Ratford, of London, !> demanded and taken. 
 
 George North, of Kinfale, I demanded, but efcaped from the Chefa- 
 
 William Hill, of Philadelphia, J do. do. [peake. 
 
 \See the conii/iuaticn of thh iioti in thi n:xt fage?- 
 
\Cy 
 
 In fnA no evidence has yet been, and no evidence ever can be 
 adduced to prove that the feamen demanded^ and whofe proteftion 
 by us was the fole caufe of attack, were Americans ; becaufe they 
 wore and have been proved by tho highcil evidence to be native 
 Brilifh fiiimcn. 
 
 But iiiici- tlic cafe of the men taken from the Melampus, has 
 been blended with that of the others, let us fee how the facts turn 
 out as to them. 
 
 Inllead of fupporting the proclamation, as to the faft of their 
 having been nfcertatned to be native citizens, it turns out, that Capt. 
 Barron had fimply taken the Jlory of the culprits : It turns out 
 further, that one of them was born at Bonaire, in Spanlfli Amer- 
 ica, and was not even a citizen of the United States ; that the two 
 others were black men, born flaves in Maryland, and ftriAly there- 
 fnrvj^ mt nativp /■// /■x/'w r, though natives. That they a// told Capt. 
 Barron a falfehood, in Hating that they had been impreffcd on 
 board the Melampus, becaufe they referred to their former mailer, 
 Capt. Crafts, who dates, that he fufpefted and charged them with 
 theft in England, that they therefore abfconded, and in order to 
 protcft themfelves, entered on board the Melampus voluntarily. 
 Capt. Crafts, pleafed, probably, with getting rid of fuch rafcals, 
 never demanded them either of the Captain of the Melampus, or of 
 the Britiih Government, after they were enlifted, and they remain- 
 ed on board that frigate till they again deferted from her in our 
 country. 
 
 Some honed men doubt, whether the Britidi officers had a right 
 to enlift thefe men ; and if they had, whether they could reclaim 
 them from us, after dcfertion. 
 
 Protelling that it has no connexion with the affair of the Chefa- 
 peake, they not being the nun demanded, I would obfene, that it is 
 not competent for our Government to deny the right of our citi- 
 zens to enter into foreign fervice, in a foreign jurifdiction, becaufe 
 111. The prefent adminiftration and all the party now in power in 
 
 Seamen deferted from the Melampus, 
 
 John Strachan, of Maryland, T not demanded, but taken. 
 William Ware, of Maryland, V do. do. 
 
 Dauicl Martin, of Bonaire, 3 '^^- ^^^ 
 
17 
 
 the United States, oppofcd the plan of the WaHiington auminiftra- 
 tion to prohibit fuch conduft, and they contended that a citizen in 
 time of peace, might expatiate himfelf at pleafure. The famous 
 example of Commodore Barney muft be in every one's recolloftion. 
 
 2dly. The A61 of Congrcfs prohibiting our citizens from enter- 
 ing into foreign fervice within our oiun terr'itoryy is a ftrong, and al- 
 mofl irrefiftible implication that they may do it in other countries. 
 
 3dly. The late anfvver of our Government to the Britifli Min- 
 ifler, that we cannot ftop to enquire of what country a man is a 
 fubjeft, when he offers himfelf to enhft as a foldier or failor, is a 
 perfect anfvver to us upon that fubjeft. And our pradlice from the 
 commencement of our Government to this day, of inviting, and 
 naturalizing the citizens of a// countries, even of nations at war, 
 ought to make us perfectly filent on this topick. 
 
 -Ithly. If a man has a right to enlift in a foreign country, and 
 does fo enlift, figns the articles of war, receives the bounty and 
 wages, he becomes to all intents and purpofes a fubjeft of his 
 newly adopted country, and all our claims over him, and his to our 
 proteftion abfolutely ceafe. To illuftrate this cafe, let us fuppofe 
 that Capt. Barney had delivered up the frigate which he command- 
 ed, to the Britifh in the Chefapeake, and had landed, and the 
 French Government had demanded the delivery of him for the 
 purpofe of punifhment, and had threatened us with war, in cafe of 
 refufal, is there any doubt that we fliould have delivered him up ? 
 And fhould we not be juftly deemed accomplices of his crime, if 
 we fhould refufe ? 
 
 Now the cafe of thefe two blach men, is precifely the fame with 
 that of Capt. Barney. — Mr. JefFerfon calls thern cit izens of t he 
 IJnitedStates ; if fo, their right of expatriation is as great as that of 
 Capt. Barney, or of Mr. JefFerfon ; and when once legally entered 
 into foreign fervice, if they defert, they are as much reclaimable as 
 either ot the. othe rs would be. 
 
 I have briefly confidered the cafe of thefe men belonging to the 
 Melampus, becaufe fome people have or pretend to have, fcruples 
 on this fubjeft ; but I repeat, that the cafe of thefe men forms no 
 part of the real queftion. 
 C 
 
18 
 
 It will conilitutc i.u part of the dilcufllou between the two 
 countries ; it does not affeft the merit or demerit of Admiral 
 Berkeley : He ordered his officers to take Richard Hubert, Jen- 
 kin Ratford, and George Nortli, thefe were all native Englishmen. 
 His officers could find but one of thofe men, but they found three 1 
 others, whom they had no orders to take, but who were deferters. 
 If they were millakcn in thefe three laft men, (luh'tch they ivere 
 not) and had no right to take them, it does not render the order 
 for taking tlie real Engliflimen, and the aftual execution of it by 
 fcizing one of them lefs correR. My brother farmers, will under- 
 fland this better, if I put a cafe jujl Hie it. — A Sheriff has a war- 
 rant to fearch a neighbour's barn for two ftolen horfes, fufpeAed 
 to be concealed there : He enters, and finds one of the Jlolen horfes, 
 and he alfo takes a cow, which he thinks was ftolen from another 
 neighbour. Suppofe it ftiould turn out that he fhould be wrong 
 as to the cow ; does it render the warrant for the horfe illegal, 
 when he really foiuid one of the ftolen horfes concealed there ? 
 
 Thus, then I have confidered, and ftated all the fads as yet 
 afcertained, as to the caufe of this attack ; and it appears, that four 
 trat'tve Britlfh feamen and deferters, who deferted in our territor}', 
 were contrary to orders enlifted and entered in our ftiip Chcfapeake ; 
 that they were demanded of the inferiour officers, and lailly of the 
 Government, and were not delivered ; — that a forcible attack was 
 made to recover thefe men ; and though three of thorn had efcaped, 
 one was aftually found concealed on board of our fhip ; and that 
 twenty Br'it'ijh failors were found to have been entered on board of 
 her. 
 
 I fliall now proceed to examine the principles of the Law of 
 Nations on this subject, and whether we were in good faith obliged 
 to deliver up thefe deferters ? 
 
 The firft qucftion which prefents itfelf on this point is, how far 
 the fubjefts of a nation in time of war, have a right to expatriate 
 themfelves, or to enlift in foreign fervice, even in ordinary cafes, 
 where they have not entered into fpecial engagements with their 
 Sovereign ? — On this point all the writers on the Law of Nations, 
 moft of whom are on the fide of freedom, and the privileges of the 
 citizen, agree, that fubjefts not in publick employ, cannot expa- 
 
19 
 
 ^^ 
 
 triate themfclves while their nation is al 'war. Burlamaqui, Vattel, 
 Grotius, and Puflendorf, all hold the fame opinions, but as it would 
 exceed the limits of this effay, to quote the opinions of all of them 
 at large, I fliall confine myfelf to thofc of Grotius, a Dutch writer, 
 whofe excellent trcatife on the rights of War and Peace, has been 
 confidered a !landard work upon this fubjeft. 
 
 In the XXIVlh fcftion of his Vth chapter, he lays it down as a 
 general principle, that the fubjedls of any nation may change their 
 country at pleafure, to which general rule, he makes the following 
 exceptions : — " And yet herein alfo, wc are to fubmit to natural 
 equity, that it fliould not be lawful when the publick was damnified 
 by it. — For as Proculus obferves, always not that which is 
 profitable to fome one of the fociety is ufually to be obferved, but 
 what is expedient for the whole. 
 
 " But it is expedient for the whole, that in cafe any great debt 
 be contra6led, no citizen fliould forfake the city, until he have 
 firft paid his proportion of it. Alfo, if upon confidence of the number 
 of their citizens, they have begun a ivar, but efpecially if they are 
 in danger to be beftegedj no citizen ought to forfake it, till he have 
 firll provided a perfon as able as himfelf to defend the Common- 
 wealth." 
 
 In this point all the writers on the Law of Nations, are agreed, 
 and if they had been filent, the dictates of common fenfe and natur- 
 al equity, and the firft principles of the focial compadl, would have 
 decided the queftion. 
 
 In the cafe of Great-Britain, all the reafoning of Grotius, applies 
 to the conteft in which flie is now engaged. 
 
 It will not be denied that flie has undertaken this war " in con- 
 fidence of the number, and abihty of her fubjeds ;" nor will it be 
 queftioned, " that flie is not only in danger, but is aftually threat- 
 ened with being heficged''^ by the mofl formidable power which the 
 world has ever feen. We cannot therefore, refift the conclufion 
 of Grotius, that no private citizen of Great-Britain has a right to 
 forfake his country, without providing a perfon equally able to de- 
 fend the Commonwealth. 
 
 If this dodlrine is true with refpeft to private citizens, who are 
 only bound by a tacit and implied contract, how much ftronger is 
 
20 
 
 the principle when apphed to pcrfons in publick employ, bound by 
 an dsprefs agrec-nicnt, obliged by their having received the publick 
 money for their fervices, and on whofe fidelity the cxiftence of the 
 nation more immediately depends ? 
 
 All civilized nations have united in confidering defertion from 
 publick fcrvice, one of the moil heinous offences. 
 
 In America, France, and Great-Britain, it has been often punifh- 
 ed with death. 
 
 If it be therefore the higheft crime, and one of the greateft inju- 
 ries which a fubjeft can do to his country to defert its fervice, can 
 it be neceflary to prove that it is unlawful for a friendly nation to 
 receive, encourage, enlift, and defend by force fuch deferters ? 
 
 In fupport of tlie mouftrous opinion, that it is not unlawful, 
 fome people have remarked, that by the modern ufages of nations, 
 criminals who have committed offences le/s than 7nurder and forgery, 
 are by the courtefy of fuch nations, not demanded when they efcape 
 out of their own country into a foreign one. 
 
 But let me af]<, why are murderers and forgers excepted from 
 the general rule ? Is it not alledged to be, becaufe juftice requires 
 that fuch heinous criminals fhould not efcape punifhment ? Becaufe 
 the peace of the nation, whofe laws have been violated, requires 
 that an example fhould be made of fuch great offenders ? 
 
 And fuppofe that it fhould be more important to a nation to re- 
 quire the delivery of her military deferters, than of the criminals 
 abovcmcntioned, would flic not have a right to require them ? 
 
 On the qucftions of the Colonial trade and of the impreffment 
 of feamcn from our merchant fliips, our Secretary of State founds 
 his chief argument upon the filence of the writers of the Laws of 
 Nations on thofe fubjefts. And cannot the argument be retorted 
 with equal force on this point ? Not a didlum can be produced from 
 any writer to prove that neutral or friendly nations have a right to 
 protcA the deferters from the fervice of belligerents. And yet all 
 thefe writers difcufs the queftion how far nations can harbour the 
 criminals who efcape from other nations ; and if any fuch right as 
 the one for which fome Americans contend, was conceived to 
 cxifl, is it pofTible that fome one of thefe luuncrous writers would 
 not have mentioned il ? 
 
21 
 
 In fadl the acknowledged ufage of all civilized neutral nations, 
 in reftoring fuch dcfertcrs from the armies or (hips of nations at 
 war, the abfolute neccflity of fuch an ufage to the exiftence of 
 nations, perfeAly account for this filence. A faft which took 
 place the laft year, in our own country, proves that tlic French 
 officers view it in this hghi. Admiral Willaumez met with an 
 American brig at fca ; he found in her four dcferters, who had 
 efcaped from the Valcurcufe frigate. Not content with taking 
 them out, he writes a letter* in a moft indignant ftrain, to his Minider 
 at our Court, and dcfires him to demand fatisfaftion for this m'ljcon- 
 du8 ; — not for the mifconduft of one of our publick officers, ia 
 enlifting his men, and refufing to deliver them when demanded, but 
 for the mifcondudl of a private citizen, in daring to employ men, 
 who had been once in the fervice of his Imperial Majejly. This 
 cafe, though an extravagant one, and partaking of the charafter of 
 French domination, is ftrong evidence of the general underftanding 
 of military men, that " deferters from publick fervice cannot be 
 harboured." 
 
 Such feems to have been the impreffion of our own Government, 
 
 ' "To Gen. Turreao, French AmbalTador at Wafliington. 
 
 " MY LORD, 
 
 " You have learnt by the arrival of fome of my fcattered fliips in America, 
 the unfortunate event by which they were feparated from me." [Here Admi- 
 ral Willaumez gives the detail of the tempeft.] That at this date the Foud- 
 royant was nearly new mailed, and proceeds to enforce to General Turrreau, 
 how neceflary it was that the lliips which had put into the American ports in 
 diftrefs, fliould haften to join him at the Havana, where his fquadron if collect- 
 ed and united to the Spanilli force at that place, would in effedt oppofe a 
 flrong fquadron, and double to that of the Englifli, who at Jamaica, have only- 
 two line of battle fliips. Admiral Willameuz further fays, that he purpofed 
 going to Vera Cruz, agreeably to the projedt of the government of the Spanifli 
 colony of Havana, to bring fome miUions of dollars, which he ftates will bo 
 more apropos, as the French Emperor had a right to the payment of one mill- 
 ion of dollars of which the fcarcity was very great at the ifland of Cuba. Ad- 
 miral Willaumez then continues, " I have jufl apprehended four feamen, dcfert- 
 ers from tlie Valcureufe frigate, which I found on board an American brig, 
 where they had engaged at feventcen dollars per moiuh. Now, fir, if you can 
 fucceed in making the American government pay down a compenfation for 
 this mifconducfl, in feducing thus our feamen, you will punifli it by making it 
 I'mart in that point in which it feels moft, viz. its avarice in money, and with 
 fo much the more jufticc, thofe people (meaning the American merchants) have 
 for three years part been continually injuring our marine by feducing our beft 
 feamen from us. (Signed) 
 
 Le C. Ad. P. WILLAUMEZ, 
 On board the Foudroyant, Havana, 25th OiSober, 1806." 
 
22 
 
 :iiid its orders on this fubjeA are conclufive as againll ourfelvcs. It 
 diredcd its officers not to enliil defertcrs from the Br'iUJh jh'tps ; — if 
 this order had been iffued and executed in good faith, we fliould have 
 been fully acquitted, even if dcferters had been unintentionally en- 
 tered and found on board, and the whole weight of unprovoked hof- 
 //7//J', with which Great-Britain has been charged, would have reli- 
 ed upon her officers. — But unhappily for us, after admitting the 
 Law of Nations to be as we have ftated, by ifluing the abovemen- 
 tioncd order, our fubfequentconduft evinces cither a want of fincer- 
 ity in ifluing that order^ or a fubfcquent change in the policy which 
 dilated it. If it had been made with good faith, why was not a 
 regular fornnal enquiry made upon Mr. Erflvine's demand ? Why 
 were not the Britifli officers invited to point out the men, and ex- 
 hibit the evidence of their claim to them ? Was not the demand of 
 a publick. Miniller fufficiently folemn, and did it not require fome 
 notice and rcfpeft ? Could it be imagined that our officers could 
 know tlie deferters by intuition ? or was it prejumed \\\2X. theyjincw 
 them to be on board, tn d'treB breach of the orders aforefaid, not 
 to enliil them ? 
 
 Will it be contended, that they were ignorant who they were, 
 and that they relied upon the culprits coming forth of their own 
 accord, out of a crew of 400 men, and faying " Ecce homines, we 
 dcferve a halter ?" 
 
 It is apparent to every fair and candid man, that if the order 
 was iffijed in good faith, when the Britifh officers gave notice that 
 five of their feamen were enlifted, there was but one plain, upright 
 courfe — to adc the Britifli officers to point out the men. 
 
 But would you deliver up men upon the mere declaration of 
 Britifli officers ? ! ! — Do not be alarmed, I would not ; — but I 
 would inft^itute an official, enquiry, in wliich the Britifli officers as 
 profecutors, fliould be permitted to exhibit their pioofs of their 
 claim to the men charged ; and the allcdged dcferters fliould have 
 ample time, and the aid of Government to fubllanliate their claims 
 to our proteftion. 
 
 This was the courfe of nature, of truth, of good faith, of national 
 juRice. It was the way to avoid mifunderflanding, to fave the 
 lives of our citizens, which have been deftroyed in confcquencc of 
 
23 
 
 the ncgleft of this courfc, to avoid IVar, with which wc are threat- 
 ened. 
 
 There is nothing in this procedure derogatory to our national 
 honour. It was referving the jurifdiAion and trial of the qiicflion 
 to ourfilves. It would have given perfeft fatisfaflion to all par- 
 ties, and would have heightened the confidence of all nations in our 
 good faith. 
 
 It was pecuharly proper in this cafe, becaufc the alledged defer- 
 tion had taken place in our own territory, while the fhips of a 
 friendly power were under our proteftion. We were therefore 
 bound to know, or at leaft to enquire into the fafts, and to render 
 juftice. A refpe8 to our territorial rights, alone prevented the Brit- 
 iHi from retaking their criminals by frefli purfuit. A refpe£l to 
 ourfelves, and to the obligations of an impartial neutrahty, required 
 that we {hould render them that jujl'ice which their refpeB for us pre- 
 vented them from doing for themfelves. 
 
 But why was not this natural and fair courfe of procedure adopt- 
 ed ? The hiftory of the cafe gives the anfwer. Upon fuch an in- 
 veftigation and enquiry, the deferters from the Halifax would have 
 all turned out to be native Britifli fubjefts ; of courfe there could 
 have been no apology for not rejlorlng them. On the other hand, 
 to reftore to thofe enemies of the human race, as I have heard fome 
 perfons call them (hojles humani generis) the very means by which 
 they were to annoy the fleet of our illuftrious friend, the Emperor 
 of the Weft, and this in the vcy face of his augujl reprefentaiive^ 
 would have been to hazard the difpleafure of our firmeft, fafteft 
 friend. In other words, deep rooted, and cultivated antipathy to 
 Great-Britain, and an habitual dread, as well as fuicere partiality to 
 France, forbad the adoption of any meafures, which, by conciUating 
 the former, would tend to render the latter more jealous of us. 
 
 But fome honeft, and a fetu able and refpeAable men, who gd 
 along with us in our opinions to this point, who agree, that the 
 praftice of enlifting Britiili deferters is extremely wrong, and a vi- 
 olation of neutrality, and even in the opinion, that our own conduft 
 in this affair might juftify hojlilities from the government of Great- 
 Britain, ftill contend that Berkeley had no fuch right, that it be- 
 longed only to his government to wage ivar. 
 
24. 
 
 To this opinion two anfvvcrs may be given, both of which are 
 pcrfodly fatisfaftory : — HI, That although this doftrine may be 
 o-cncrally true, and it certainly very much conduces to the peace of 
 nations to maintain it, yet it is an affair altogether between the 
 fubahtrn officer ami his government. Surely no man will be fo mad 
 as to contend, that Admiral Berkeley's having done this aft with- 
 out the authority of his government, is a greater caufe of complaint, 
 a greater infult, or a more iullifiablc ground of hoftility, than if 
 the Britifh government had ordered it. If, therefore, that govern- 
 ment, after revievnng all the conduft of that officer, and the cir- 
 cumftances of provocation, fhall approve the ftcps he took, it will 
 iland prccifely on the fame footing, as if Mr. Erflcine had reported 
 our refufal to deliver the deferters to his government, and that gov- 
 ernment had ifTued an order to re-feize the men by force. 
 
 2dly, It is a great miftake to fay, that a fubaltern officer can in 
 no cafe whatever, of his own authority, make reprifals or commit 
 an aft of hoftility. It is true that military men are confidcred in 
 a great meafure as machines, in the hands of their fuperiors ; they 
 are bound to obey orders, and can exercife their difcretion fo far 
 only as is necejfary to the execution of thofe orders. But if in the 
 courfe of fuch duty, an unexpefted incident takes place, which 
 goes to defeat the objeft of their orders, that fame mihtary ftrift- 
 nefs requires that they fliould remove fuch obftacle if prafticable. 
 An officer is fent, as was the commander of the BritiHi fleet in 
 Hampton roads, to watch and prevent the efcape of an enemy — 
 he lands the guns of one of his fhips to careen her. — A neutral rtiip 
 of war, direftly before his eyes, lands and puts the guns on board, 
 and proceeds \.o fea — will any man be fo unrcafonable as to contend, 
 that the Britifli officer cannot purfue fuch fliip, demand his guns, 
 and on refufal, compel by force the furrender of them ? Sliall he 
 fubmit to fee the objeft of his expedition defeated, and report to 
 his government that he conceived it to be more proper that the 
 guns (hould be diplomatically demanded P 
 
 But, fay fome other olijeflors, true, in extreme cafes, the law of 
 felf-j)r(.fervation will juftify an inferior officer in making forcible re- 
 prifals, but was the cafe of Admiral Berkeley fuch an one ? My an- 
 fwer is, that everv officer fo entnillcd, niiiil iud)^e for hinifelf. He 
 
or. 
 
 takes his honour and Hfe in one hand, and his fword in the other. 
 If his government juftifies him, he efcapes — if Hie condemns, he falls. 
 But that Admiral Berkeley had rcafon to apprehend a total do- 
 ftruftion of the Britilh fquadron on our coafts, the following fafts 
 feem toeftabhfli : — 1ft, It is alledgcd that dcfertion had become fo 
 frequent that the Britifli fquadron had loft nearly an hundred men, 
 between March and June, and great rewards had been offered at 
 Halifax, by the Province^ for the apprehenfion of thefe deferters. 
 2dly, Although Captain Barron gave fuch wretched protcAion to 
 the deluded men who entered on board his (hip, ftill the example 
 was fo contagious, that immedialely after three men deferted, landed 
 near Hampton, and were fecntecl by our inhabitants. Nineteen 
 Britifli feamen rofe upon a Britifh cutter, and brought her into the 
 Delaware, where they landed, were protefted, and have not been 
 delivered up ; on the contrary, our newfpapers congratulated " thefe 
 much injured and high fp'irited mcHf" on their fuccefs. Six men ran 
 away with a boat of the Columbine, at New- York — and fix more 
 landed at New- York, from the Jafon, and are all concealed in our 
 country : — and laftly, fixty-five failors rofe upon their officers, in 
 the Jafon, with the intent of efcaping to onr friendly fijores — and 
 thev would have fucceeded, had it not been for the timely and 
 fpirited interference of their officers. This frigate has fmce arrived 
 at Halifax, with fifty of her crew in irons, fo that her cruife againft 
 her lawful enemy was defeated. Can any- one deny, after thefe ex- 
 amples, that the cafe was fo extreme as to juftify an officer in re- 
 forting to force, after every other means had failed ? 
 
 But it muft not be forgotten that the true, and indeed only 
 real queftion between the two nations is, whether the fadls which 
 preceded the attack on the Chefapeake, amounted to fuch a provo- 
 cation, that if reported to the government of Great -Britain, that 
 government would have been authorized to make reprifals, or even 
 to declare ivar againft us ? — Let any man confult the writers on 
 the Law of Nations, or his own feelings of moral propriety, and 
 decide. This is certain, that as a belligerent nation, we fliould 
 1 be the lafl to fubmit to a principle, which in its operation 
 would completely defeat the beft concerted military enterprifes. 
 And aue fhould think that our moderation had been fufficiently 
 
26 
 
 inaiufelled, if, after three fcveral inferior demands, ourpubliek miii- 
 ilters liad made a. formal demand of another foverelgtiy and been re- 1 
 jufed redrrfi. 
 
 But admit, if tl k' pojjiblc, that all the reafoning we have cited is 
 wrong, and th:it we have good caufe of war againft Great-Britain, 
 does it follow, that war is necejfar'ily to be undeitaken ? Are there 
 no cafes in which war, though juftifiable, may be avoided, without 
 difhonour ? Let us liften to Grotius on that point : — " It is better 
 fometimes to remit our own right, than to engage in a doubtful wa: 
 for it," " efpecially if undertaken to exa8 puni/hment'^ — which i; 
 precifely the cafe in this inftance. We have no principle, no inter- 
 eft, no motive for war, but to exafl punjjhment in a doubtful cafe. 
 Again fays Grotius, " No prudent man will adventure in fuch an 
 enterprife, where good fuccefs fliall bring little profit, but when- 
 the leaft mifcarriage may prove fatal." " Grant that our griev- 
 ances are unjuft, and unworthy to be borne, yet it vrill not follow, 
 that we ought, by ftriving againft them, to make our condition j 
 luorfe." Apply it to our prefent cafe. 
 
 If vfefucceed in the war, we gain the right to cover a few Britiflj 
 deferters, whom we do not want, and which, as Grotius fays, will 
 bring little profit ; but we hazard our lives, our liberties, our gov- 
 ernment — we do not hazard our property ; that, together witli 
 our neutral advantages, will inevitably go to enrich our enemy. Bu',. 
 fome people fay, we do not go to war for Briti/h deferters — thofc 
 we do not want — we arc better without them — we go to war t(> 
 make Great-Britain give up the right oifearch of our Jhlps of tuar. 
 
 This is one of thofe errors which certain artful men have pur- 
 pofely interwoven with the cafe of the Chefapeake, with which ii 
 has no connexion. Great-Britain docs not claim this right — Hie will 
 renounce it by treaty — flie at this moment abfolutely diflaims it. 
 The cafe of the Chefapeake was not grounded upon it ; it was ;i 
 reprtfid for a wrong done by us ; for a wrong for which remcd) 
 had boon refufod ; and it is, by the Law of Nations, the only rem- 
 edy Jhort of war. 
 
 • It is not iiTinrobable tliat Admiral Berkeley will be recalled to afcertalii 
 r.ititfa(fl(irily ^vllcl^lo^ the aflair of tin.' Chefapeake is truly a juflifialilc aifl ol 
 'ifjrlfal, or the afTumption of a general right to fearch pubLick (liips, wliici" 
 U|K r ilu-y difclaim. 
 
27 
 
 It was no more founded on the right of fearcli, than if one of 
 our (hips on the high feas, in time of peace, (hould forcibly feize a 
 boat belonging to a BritiHi fliip, with a lieutenant and crew on 
 board, and fliould hold them in durefs after demand ; and thereupon 
 the Britifli captain fliould attack and difable our (hip, and retake 
 his men ; both thefe adls are equally rcprifals for previous injuries, 
 and are both founded on the laws of nature and nations. 
 
 I aflc, once more, is war ahuays to be undertaken, when it is 
 juftifiable ? 
 
 I anfwer, our own praftice proves the contrary. France captur- 
 ed our fliips in violation of the treaty of 1778 — flie afterwards fet 
 up the abominable doftrine of the role d^ equipage., and condemned 
 millions upon it — (he afterwards decreed, that all neutral veffels, 
 having one dollar's value of Britifli manufafturcs on board, fhould, 
 together with their cargoes, be lawful prize ; and feveral more 
 millions fell under this pretext. 
 
 All thefe afts were violations of the law of nations — all of them 
 were caufe of war — yet we did not go to war — we made a treaty, 
 and inftead of her making either acknoivledgment or faiisfaHion for ei- 
 ther of thefe injuries, we explicitly renounced all claims to them. 
 
 Spain (hut the port of New-Orleans, contrary to treaty — (he did 
 it with marked infolence — (he has fince marched armed men into our 
 territory, feized our citizens, and lately has taken pofTelTion of fome 
 of our national military ftores — ftill we have not made war upon 
 Spain, though war would have been juftifiable, and though, both 
 with regard to France and Spain, we had given no caufe of ojfence, 
 as we have done in this cafe to Great-Britain. 
 
 If it be aflced, how it happens that the men who were in favour 
 of war with France and Spain, are oppofed to one with Great- 
 Britain — I anfwer, 1ft, That the injuries of Fiance and Spain were 
 unprovoked, and therefore atrocious : 2d, That thofe of Great- 
 Britain have been provoked^ even by the acknowledgment of oui- 
 government, who ordered its officers not to enlift deferters, which or- 
 ders were openly dif obeyed — and therefore the caufe of war is doubtful : 
 but laftly, Such was the local and political fituation of France and 
 Spain, that they could not injure us, while they were at war with 
 Great-Britain. An impafTable gulph lies between us — but we are 
 
'J8 
 
 vulnerable at every pore by Great-Britain. By her immcnfe and 
 gigantick naval force, (he comes in contatl with us in every fea. 
 To dcftroy our commerct, would be mere fport to her marine ; and 
 although the Editor of the National Intelligencer, and his patrons, 
 may think the ruin of 250,000 merchants a matter of fuch perfeft 
 indifTerence, that he will not fuffer it to mar a fine calculation, yet 
 the people of New-England feel differently. They know that they 
 arc neceffarily a commcrchil people ; they have not one million 
 Haves to labour for their fupport ; they live by the fweat of tlieir 
 oivn brczi's ; their fons, their kinfmen, their friends, are engaged in 
 commerce ; and we farmers of the northern Hates, arc not fo fool- 
 iib as to believe that you can deilroy commerce without inflicting a 
 deep wound upon the interefts of agriculture. 
 
 We are now naturally led to confider the expediency of war, in 
 relation to our means of annoyance, refources, probable loffes, and 
 general effedls. 
 
 In eftimating thefe various branches of this extenfive queftion of 
 expediency, I fhall not enter much into the details, but fhall Hate 
 them with all polTiblc brevity, confillcnt with pcrfpicuity. 
 
 Our means of annoyance, and refources as ftated by the advocates 
 of war, are of two fpecies, diredl and indireft, military and commer- 
 cial. 
 
 Of our military refources one would think that but little need be 
 faid. The jcaloufy of military force always fufficiently ftrong, has 
 been flrengthened by our philofophick adminillration ; the iiecefTity 
 of conforming to the falfe opinions and prejudices by which they ac- 
 quired power, has obliged them to deftroy even the little mihtary 
 and naval force, which their predeccffors had built up. The Prefi- 
 dent has taught the people to believe, that the experience of all 
 nations and of all ages, was of no avail ; that all his predeccffors in 
 power, from Saul to Bonaparte, have been miftakcn in believing in 
 the neceffity of force in order to maintain rrfpni ; that the fenfe of 
 juftice is the linnell hold, and rnifun the mod effettual weapon to 
 proteft our rights, or to avenge injuries. With this all conquering 
 weapon he has marched boldly on, till he has brought us into 
 the field witli a foe, who having been challenged to meet us there, 
 will take the liberty to ufe his oiun weapons. 
 
29 
 
 If our little band of 3000 foldiers, could be drawn off from the 
 defence of a frontier of 5000 miles, and from our tottering forts, 
 more dan"-crous to their defenders than their affailants, and if Mr. 
 Jefferfon could by the force of reafon, pcrfuade our enemies to 
 enter a fmall defile, like that of Thermopylx, perhaps even thi; 
 little knot of heroes might be immortalized by vidlory. So alfo, 
 if our enemies would be gracioufly pleafed to run their line of battle 
 {hips aground in convenient numbers, Mr. Jefferfon 's naval force 
 would be found very effeftive, or, which would be ftill more con- 
 venient, and good humoured on the part of our enemies, if they 
 would fend one fliip at a time, to permit Mr. Fulton to make three 
 or four experiments, we could in the courfe of two years, deftroy 
 the Britifh navy. 
 
 But we have 100,000 militia, and we can by the very cheap 
 procefs of an aft of Congrefs, increafe this number at pleafure. If 
 the war was to be a defenfive one, like the laft, it mull be admit- 
 ted, that this fpecies of force may be calculated upon. But the 
 militia cannot be marched out of the United States, and we have 
 no ufe for them nvithin. 
 
 But they would volunteer their fervices to take Canada and No- 
 va-Scotia. — I do not fay that this achievement is impoffible ; but I 
 am furprifed, that our publick writers fliould be fo httle fparing of 
 our feelings, as to recal thofe two fcenes of our misfortune. — The 
 plains of Abraham, and the Ifthmus of Penobfcot, exhibit no hon- 
 ourable monuments of either our power or conduft. 
 
 But perhaps we might have better fuccefs in another attempt ; 
 perhaps with the lofs of twenty thoufand men, and the expenfe of 
 fifty millions of dollars, we might take, and garrifon thofe provinces, 
 with the exception of the city of Quebeck ; that city we probably 
 could not take.* Suppofe us then in quiet poffeffion of thefc 
 
 * It is furprifing with what confidence men who are totally ignorant of the 
 ftate of thele provinces, boaft of taking them at a flroke. Quebeck was in a 
 ruinous fituation when attacked before, and yet we failed in our attempt, though 
 we had two armies before it. — It has fmce, been thoroughly fortified, and i- 
 now the Gibraltar of America. We have no reafon to doubt, that it would 
 hold out againft the tihole French army, at leaft: as long as Dautzick. We O'l 
 the other hand, are deflitutc of engineers, or military iTvill fufficicnt for fuch an 
 operation. But we fliall be told, that we fliall have French officers, French flcill, 
 French artillery.— And is this our c-.vfjiaikn ? Hie metus ! hcu libertas I 
 
30 
 
 provinces ; of what benefit will tlicy be to us, or what injury tlie 
 lofs of them to our enemy ? To her they have been a conftant 
 fourcc of expcnfe. To us the one would add a mafs of population, 
 hoftile to us in feelings, language, manners, religion, and attached, 
 finccrely, and irrevocably fo, to the nation whofe power and afccnd- 
 ancy we have the highell reafon to dread. Every Canadian is a 
 Frenchman at heart ; flaves to their priefts, they can eafily be per- 
 fuaded to join the imperial banner of France, whenever the Empe- 
 ror lawfully authorized by the Sovereign Pontiff, fhall think proper 
 to difplay it. 
 
 Fifty thoufand Canadians, difciplincd by French veteran officers, 
 after effecting a jundlion with .50,000 Louifianians, who are equally 
 French in charadler and feelings, would become very uncomfortable 
 neighbours to the United States. 
 
 Nova-Scotia does not offer a more tempting prize. — A country, 
 poor, miferable, producing no flaple article, populated by men, em- 
 bittered againft us, by a thoufand recollections, and who, probably, 
 in half a century, will not have forgotten their deep rooted preju- 
 dices againfl us, and our fyflem of government. We cannot, more- 
 over, retain Halifax, without a fuperior naval force. 
 
 It will not be pretended therefore, that our cxifting military 
 means, directed and apphed by our pacifick commander in chief, 
 ought to infpire great confidence in fuccefs. 
 
 But we may be told, and nve are gravely told, that wc have an I 
 immenje revenue. Our overflowing treafury appears to have em- 
 barraffcd our government to find means to employ it. As reafon 
 is Mr. Jcfferfon's only weapon in his exifling contefts with Great- 
 Britain and Spain, and as that cofts no more than Mr. Madifon's 
 falary and clerk hire, he never dreamed that it was poffible that his 
 reafon might perchance fail of producing its efFe6t, and that we 
 fliould iiave occafion fur the ultima ratio rcgum, poiveler and halls. 
 
 It is polTible that fome weak minds may really believe that our 
 revenue is a war rcfource, and that it juHifies our holding a bullying 
 language to Great-Britain. For the information of fuch men, we 
 fhall flate this point briefly. Our revenue in time of peace, is 10 
 millions of dollars, of which nine tenths are derived from impofls 
 on merchandize. This revenue, if it could continue, is but one 
 
31 
 ••••i 
 
 feventeenth part of that of our propofcJ enemy, anil would be 
 
 wholly inadequate to war operations. Four jnilliony of it are 
 
 pledged to pay the intercft of the national debt, which if we fail to 
 do, not a cent •will ever be obtained by loans or othcrwife. The 
 
 remaining fix millions, would defray the expences of a war about 
 three months annually. For the remaining nine months, each year, 
 we mull fcek other means, and incur a new debt. But as it is ad- 
 mitted by Mr. JefFerfon's paper, that our commerce will be deftroy- 
 ed, our revenue founded folely on that commerce, wxWfall 'with it. 
 
 Two refources which our prefent rulers have rendered as unpop- 
 ular as their talents would permit, muft then be reforted to — loans 
 and taxes. 
 
 Paft experience has rendered the monied intereft too wife, to ad- 
 vance their money without the pledge of new taxes ; and even with 
 fuch a pledge., an adminiftration which has avowed its hoftility to 
 publick faith, and the individuals of which openly propofed to cheat 
 the publick creditors, before they came into power, can with a very 
 ill grace propofe to borrow, or expe£l to be believed, when they 
 promife to pay. 
 
 But grant that loans are obtained, and that the war is carried on 
 with fpirit ; taxes muft be raifed to pay the intereft of thefe new 
 loans. The odious fyftcm of excifc muft be revived, and the ad- 
 miniftration muft be compelled to acknowledge by their conduft, 
 the wife forefight of their predecefTors. But as an excife of double 
 the former amount, would only produce as much as the former, 
 owing to the diminution of confumption produced by the diftreffes 
 of war, this fource of revenue will only produce 750,000 dollars 
 per annum. We muft then calculate upon about 20,000,000 dol- 
 lars dirc6t taxes annually, on land and JIaves. In laying this tax, 
 Mr. JefFerfon wnll have occafion for all his 100,000 militia and 
 volunteers ; and if we thouglit him as much of a ftatefman, as his 
 friends pretend to do, we ftiould have fuppofed that this was the 
 motive for raifing them. To bring this part of the happy eftefts 
 of a war for Brttifh deferters, home to the bofoms of the farmers of 
 Maflachufetts, this ftate's proportion of the annual war taxes to be 
 levied on lands, would be about two millions of dollars per annum, 
 or about fixteen times the amount of our ^reicntflate tax, and about 
 
32 
 
 double that of our whole ftatc debt ; and if the war fliould laft five 
 Aears, and there is no profpe(ft of a fliortcr ifTue, wc (hould have 
 j)aid, if we fhould be able, 10 millions of dollars, or a fum equal to 
 eighty years prefent taxes. — Nor is this the worft fide of the pic- 
 tuic ; — as the New-England farmers are in the habit of paying 
 what they owe, as long as they have any thing to pay with, and as 
 the citizens oi fame other dates do not pay till they arc compelled, it 
 would refult, that the chief burden of the war would, as before, fall 
 upon us ; — heavy balances of debts would be accumulated againft 
 tlie fouthern ftates, and, after the peace, we (hould have another 
 a3 of Congrefs to wipe off thefc balances, as was urged with re- 
 gard to thofe contracted during the revolutionary war.* 
 
 Thus then we fee what fort of reliance we can place upon the 
 A.merican army, navy, and revenue, in an ofFenfivc war againfl 
 Great-Britain. 
 
 But we are told, that we can make a predatory war upon the 
 Britifh commeixe, and our adminiftration gives another proof of 
 its fpirit and ability, by propofing to repofe the conduft of the 
 war in the individual enterprize of its citizens. — This is prccifely 
 in charafter : but even this reliance, feeble and humiliating as it is, 
 will fail. — They will permit the people of Maffachufetts, to be as 
 good judges of this fubjcft, as any in the United States. 
 
 Inftead of fitting out their 700 dull failing merchantmen a? pri- 
 vateers, their pad experience teaches them, that with every advan- 
 tage that fyftem cannot be purfued.f Great-Britain towards the 
 
 • Soiitli-Ciinilina is faid to he jiift collecting the tax hiifl in 179S, and wliich 
 rce paid, nearly fevcn years fnicc ; and as (lie pays, I prcfume, no intcreft for 
 tliis delay, it lixs hccii at our cxpenfc. — She has laved 50,000 dollars by this 
 plai'., out of tlie dales wlio paid with puntftuality. 
 
 t Tlie opinions here cxprilTed are perfectly conformable to thofe of our 
 lieloved \\'a(hingt(>n in a cafe limilar but lefs ftron;^. 'I'hefe opinions may 
 be fcen in a letter addrcflitl from the Executive department to Mr. Mon- 
 rot, dated Sept. I'J, ITy.'i — of which the following is an extradt. 
 
 " How prej)oflerous is that policy which recpiircs us to abandon and 
 dedniy the -uery oLjefi, for the frrprvnlioii of which hoftilitics are to be 
 roinmcncetl ! It may not be aniifs," he adds, " to enlarge on the confc- 
 tjiiencc* of our engaging in ti>e war a<^iinft Great-Uritain. 
 
 " I. Seeing llie has the conunand of the fea fand appear.mccs hidicatc flrong- 
 ly that flie will maintain that command.) our commerce might in one year 
 lie annihilated, and tlioufands of our feamen be fluit up or dying in jails 
 and prifon (hips, hi addition to her fleets now in conunill'ion, jirivateer.s 
 would fwarm, as foon as obje<fh fo alluring and fu available as American 
 commerce fliould prefent. 
 
clofc of the lall war, had learned the fecrct of paralyzing this 
 fpecies of hoftility. Can it then be expcftcd, that with no enemy 
 on the ocean, and with double the number of (hips of war, Ihe will 
 fit ftill, and permit us peaceably to rob her citizens ? Every naval 
 officer, and every merchant knows, however ignorant they may be 
 at Wafhington, that fifty fall failing frigates would as completely 
 blockade our ports, and fecure our privateers from the power of 
 doing injury, as if they were under lock and key, or hauled up a la 
 Jefferfon, in the dry docks of the Potomac. 
 
 We proceed then to confider the other branch of our means of 
 annoyance, which may be called commercial warfare. — It is main- 
 tained, that we can by a war bring Great-Britain to an acknowl- 
 edgment of our claims ; by confifcating the debts due to her 
 merchants ; by ruining her manufaAurers ; by refufing to be 
 cloathed ; and by ftarving her Weft-India colonies. Although it 
 would be eafy to (liew, that all thefe meafures would eventually 
 produce more diftrefs to the United States than to Great -Britain, 
 that in all cafes of this nature, the dependance is mutual, and that 
 in fuch contefts, the poorejl ftate always fuffers the moft ; yet I 
 fhall leave this point to the good feiife of my readers, and confider 
 them as operating only on Great-Britain. 
 
 Firft then, we are to carry on the war, and to diftrefs our enemy 
 
 " If we look back to the two laft years of our revolutionary war, a 
 iudcrment may be formed on this point. A ftriking^ dcfedl in her naval 
 arrangements in preceding years, left our ports open for the entry of com- 
 merce, for the equipment of privateers, and the introducStion of prizes. A 
 diiTerent arrangement in the latter part of the war, totally changed the 
 fcene. The fmall privateers were hauled up as unable to cope with arm- 
 ed merchantmen, and the larger privateers were taken. Our Ihipping fell 
 at the fame time a facrifice to the vigilant operations of the Britifli navy. 
 
 " At the prefent moment (1795) her naval power is extended beyond all 
 former examples ; while that of her cuem'us is at Icaft not iucrejfcJ. 
 
 " 2dly. Our landed as well as commercial interefts would fulTer beyond all 
 calculation. Agriculture above the fupply of our own wants, would be fuf- 
 pended, or its produce ptiish on our hands. The value of our lands and ev- 
 ery fpecies of domcftick prop.rty would fink. 
 
 " :5dly. The fources of revenue failing, publick credit would be deftroyed, 
 and multitudes of citizens involved in ruin. The luropL- at large would be 
 plunged from the fummit of profperity into an abyfs of ruin, too fuddeo 
 and too fevere to be patiently borne. To increafe their calamities, direct 
 taxes must be levied to liipport the war ; and it would be happy for u6 
 if we could comtemplate only foreign war, in which all might unite." 
 
S4 
 
 by rcforting to the old difgraccful fylk-m of confifcation. if th> 
 profligacy and infamy of fuch propofitions have no weight in the 
 eilimation of our fellow citizens, (which I will not believe) they 
 will furely liilen to the maxims of experience, a dear bought expe- 
 rience, and an enlightened policy. How trifling a fum it produced 
 to the nation in the lad war, every publick man knows. — Its only 
 tendency was to fcreen a few fraudulent debtors, who rejoicing in 
 an opportunity to defraud their homji creditors, could of courfe, 
 think it no robbery to defraud the publick. Nothing came into 
 the publick cheft, and even the joy of the fraudulent debtor was 
 extremely Jhort liveJ. At the treaty of peace, Great-Britain, as 
 muft always be the cafe, infift;ed as a fine qua non, upon the reftor- 
 ation of the rights of her bona fide fubjcfts. — The courts were 
 opened to the Britifh creditors, and the debtors were compelled to 
 pay with accumulated intereft : — nor was this the nuorjl part of it ; 
 the Virginia legiflature refufed to obey the publick authority ; it 
 neglefted to open its courts ; their citizens who owed the Britifh 
 merchants, availed theitifelves of this fufpenfion of right, of this 
 Jlate rebellion againft the treaty, and became bankrupt. Great- 
 Britain infifted on redrcfs, for this violation of the treaty, and Mr. 
 .lefTorfon ratified a convention on this fubjeft, and has paid to 
 Great-Britain three millions of dollars, on account of thefe fufpend- 
 ed debts. 
 
 Is our paft; experience then favourable to a repetition of this 
 fyllem of iniquity ? But nations ought to be governed by more 
 extenfive policy ; — mcafures ought never to be reforted to, the 
 tendency of which, is to debafe the morals of the people, and to 
 fink tile national charaftcr. 
 
 If we go to ivar with Great-Britain, it will not be eternal ; — 
 peace mud fooner or later arrive : our intercfts, tlie great and ef- 
 fential intereils of our country, require that Europe fliould be our 
 work fliup : — fo fays Mr. Jefferfon ; fo all fonfible men admit. — 
 Great-Britain is the cheapeft; labourer ; her manufaftures are fuited 
 to our iiabits, and our necelTities. But neither Great-Britain, nor 
 any other nation with whom we may by poffibility be embroiled, will 
 ever trull us, if we pafs confifcation laws, without adding to the price 
 oi the good, a premium for the rifle of a fraudulent confilcation -, 
 
35 
 
 and as all fuch riiks are over eftimated, we fluiU probably pay ten 
 times over, for the paltry and wicked fatisfaftion of robbing her 
 private citizens, who have trullcd their property to ours. 
 
 Such were the enlightened views of Mr. Jay and Prcfidciit 
 Wafhington, and few men had better opportunities of judging of 
 the eifcdls of confifcation. Mr. Jay was dire<^ed, and did accord- 
 ingly agree to an article, which is a permanent one, and ftill in 
 force, ftipulating, " that in all future wars between us and Great- 
 Britain, no confifcation of private debts (hould be made." — Can 
 it then be contended, that in the only cafe in which the article was 
 to operate, it becomes void ? And will it be pretended that nations 
 can make no regulations to foften tlie rigors, and IcfTen the calam- 
 ities of war ? 
 
 Without fuch an article, Great-Britain never would make peace 
 with any nation whom flie fupplics, witliout ftipulating for the 
 payment of debts due to her citizens, and •with fuch an article in her 
 hand, what could any honeft American commiflioners for making 
 peace, fay to her negotiators ? The man muft be hardened indeed, 
 who will contend, that we ought to exercife a power, malum in fc, 
 debafing, corrupting, difgraceful, and in face of a pofitive, humane, 
 and honourable ftipulation. 
 
 But fecondly, we are to ruin the manufaBurers of Great-Britain, 
 at the very profpeft of a war they were to rife in rebellion ; the 
 prophecy on this fubjedl, has turned out already to be partially falfe. 
 
 Inftead of that terror, that violent oppofition to war from the 
 manufaAurers, we hear of no difturbance, and very little uneafinefs. 
 The great manufadluring towns in England, have taken no fteps to 
 prevent a war or to exprefs their anxiety about it ; on the con- 
 trary, we learn from petfons who have arrived from England, that 
 a war with us is at leajl not unpopular, and efpecially in Birming- 
 ham, which is the greateft work fhop for this country. I might 
 reft the argument here, for it will be admitted, that no people are 
 better judges of their intereft, than the manufafturers of England ; 
 and if a war would be fo ruinous to them, they certainly wduld 
 not be quiet as we hionv they luere, though a war was expected. 
 
 But I will give a very brief fummary, to rtiew that a war would 
 npt be very injurious to thefe manufadurers. 
 
111. Their articles arc many of them of the firjl nccefiity, and 
 nations at war with them, mull and will get them, in fpitc of pro- 
 hibitory repjulations. Bonaparte has exerted all his power for five 
 years, to Unit out their manufaflures, and yet his own army, and 
 even court, are openly clothed in them. If 700,000 troops can- 
 not fhut them out of France, will patriotifm without a fword, ef- 
 feft it in America ? Patriotifm did not prevent hundreds of our 
 countrymen from fitting out privateers and taking our own veflels ; 
 many have grown rich by plunder of this fort. Patriotifm does 
 not prevent the flavc trade, though the laws are fo fevercly pro- 
 hibitor)-. In fliort, patnolifm cannot be calculated upon, to effeft 
 that ivhicl) poiver finds it vain to attempt. 
 
 2dly. A much fmallcr proportion of the population of the unit- 
 ed kingdoms of Great-Britain and Ireland, are employed in manu- 
 fafturing for us, than we have ufually thought. — Not more than 
 one fixth part of the population of Great-Britain, is employed in 
 any niatiufadures. Four fifths at leaft of the manufactures of all 
 nations, are confumed at home. Great-Britain exports only about 
 fix milhons worth annually, to America, and it is only the profits 
 on this capital, which flie would lofe, which would not exceed one 
 million. — She might not even lofe that ;— the capital which is now 
 employed in manufafturing for us, may be withdrawn from manu- 
 faAures, and employed in agriculture and commerce, and it would 
 only be the difference of profit between the new employ, and the 
 old, which Hie would lofe. But grant that flic fliould lofe one mil- 
 lion per annum — will that materially affect the policy of a nation 
 whofe leveruie is 40 millions ? Is Great-Britain to be ruined by an 
 additional million ? If that be the cafe, to borrow a phrafe from a 
 writer of our own, " We have only to gather up our garments and 
 fall with decency." If Great-Britain be fo reduced as to be ruin- 
 ed by one million more, Jbe mujl fall, and how long our rights and 
 liberties, and the liberty of the feas will furvive her, I fliall endeav- 
 our to fliew briefly in the conclufion of this fl<etch. 
 
 But laflly, we are to llarve her Weft-India colonies. — It is real- 
 ly afloiiifliing, that men will be fo blinded by their haired to Great- 
 Britain, as to urge and appear to believe fuch abfurd notions. 
 Why did they not flarve during the revolutionary war ? Nova. 
 
Scotia then fupplied them with little or nothing ; fhc can now 
 fiipply them with nearly all they want. They do not take our 
 beef and pork in peace, they are fo dainty ; and yet we talk of 
 ilarving them ! But if they could fupport a war of eight years, 
 wlien Nova-Scotia was a young, uncultivated country, when our 
 privateers fwarmed in thefe feas, and the ocean was covered with 
 the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, how much eafier will it 
 be to fuftain a war, when the provifion veffels of England, can 
 navigate in perfedl fafety, having no one to make thorn afraid ? 
 But do we not view the other fide of the pi6lure ? Pofleffed as 
 they will be of Buenos Ayres, where provifions are cheaper than 
 in any part of the world, is there not danger, that a war with us 
 may turn their attention to other channels of fupply, and thus 
 dellroy, perhaps for ever this branch of our commerce ? 
 
 It will be feen then, that the hope of coercing Great-Britain by 
 commercial warfare, is as delufive and defperate, as by arms ; — and 
 after a long, but bloodlefs war, in which we fliould be called upon 
 to fuffer rather than aft, we fhould probably be obliged to aban- 
 don the claims for which the war was undertaken, unlefs Great- 
 Britain, from caufes totally out of our control, fliould be obliged to 
 yield to the refifl:lefs power of France. 
 
 Let us now take a brief view of the effefts of a Britifli war, up- 
 on ourfelves. — Thofe, who deluded by the language of the war 
 newfpapers, and efpecially Mr. JcfFerfon's, believe, that we are to 
 enter into a war in which Great-Britain will be the only fufferer ; 
 and that we fliall continue to profper as before, will be woefully 
 deceived. Not a man who has any thing to lofe, not a labourer, 
 who depends on the fweat of his brow, but will feel, and rue the 
 effefts of fuch a war : — they will be almofl: equally felt, and per- 
 ceived in the compting-houfes of the merchants ; the parlours of 
 the rich ; and the cottage of the poor. 
 
 The farmer will furrender his cattle to the tax gatherer ; the 
 mechanick will be obliged to hang up his rufl:y tools ; and the 
 children of our indullrious fifliermen, will demand their bread in 
 vain. This is not the pifture of a fourth of July orator— it is 
 fober reality. The National Intelligencer with the fang froid of 
 a true philofopher, configns to beggary 250,000 merchants. He 
 
as 
 
 admits " that commerce will be dcllroyed by a war, and in its 
 fall will crufh its immediate dependents ;" but he infults the un- 
 derftandings of lis New-England farmers, by infmuating that all tie 
 other clalTes of focicty will cfcape its efFcfts. Who are to employ 
 and give bread to the 300,000 mechanicks in our fcaport towns, 
 after the merchants are beggared ? Who are to pay the banks 
 when all the property of their debtors is annihilated by war ? 
 When the banks flop their dividends, and lofe part of their capitals, 
 what will become of the widows and oi-phans who have depofitcd 
 their little modicum in thefe pubhck inflitutions ? When the fmall 
 country banks fail, who will indemnify the farmers who hold their 
 bills ? 
 
 What will become of the country traders, and the farmers, who 
 owe them, when the creditors of the beggared merchants call upon 
 them for immediate payment ? 
 
 It is admitted, by the advocates of war, that commerce will be 
 wholly annihilated ; with that falls our revenue : — the collection 
 of diredl taxes will be found fo flow, and fo unpopular, and the 
 caUs on government will be fo much more prejfmg than thofe of the 
 pubhck creditors, that the intercfl of the national debt will be fuf- 
 pended. The party in power, have always been oppofed to this 
 clafs of publick creditors, and though they have as yet paid piindu- 
 al/y, and have not violated the contraft, it is only becaufe they 
 have had ample means, and it was a convenient engine of power ; — 
 it was a ilrong hold over their political enemies. — But create more 
 preffing exigencies, and thoufands of honeft creditors will be left 
 to ftarve. — This is what they formerly propofed — it would gratify 
 mzny fecret wiflies. 
 
 If a war, then, will annihilate commerce, as the National InteUi- 
 genccr admits, will ruin '2,30,000 merchants, beggar all the me- 
 chanicks immediately dependant on the merchants, injnrc fome, and 
 produce the failure of many of the banking inllitutions — if it will 
 deflroy our revenue, and oblige the government to fufpend the pay- 
 ment uf the interell of the national debt — if, moreover, as a necef- 
 fary confequence, it will cripple, if not bankrupt our infurance 
 companies, can i\\c fdriners hope to efcape the general devaftation ? 
 
 Are there none alive who recoiled the effedls of our revolution- 
 
39 
 
 ary war ? Can agriculture flourini, when there are no buyers i 
 When all the other orders of fociety are ruined, the taxes muft fall 
 upon the land-holders — and we have fhcwn, that the revenue from 
 jmpoft failing, the farmers will be called upon to defray the whole 
 expenfes of the war, which will annually amount to about fixteen 
 times the fum of our prefent State tax. 
 
 Can any agricultural profits meet thefe exigencies ? When our 
 children are called off from the labours of the plough, to thofe of 
 war, can we fupport our famiHes,and pay the extraordinary demands 
 of government ? Let thofe who view thefe as light and tolerable 
 evils, be clamorous for war ; but for my part, I prefer to renounce 
 the right of protecting and enlifting the fubjedls of foreign nations, 
 when our own population furnifhes men fufficient for our commerce 
 and our navy, to embarking in a doubtful conteft, ruinous in its ef- 
 fefts, and uncertain as to its iffue. 
 
 I have faid that the war, which we are called upon to wage, 
 would be a war withoiit hope. I have endeavoured to fliew that we 
 can place no reafonabie reliance on our oiun refources in an ofFenlive 
 and extraneous war againft Great-Britain : but I fliall be told, that 
 we may calculate upon the aid of France, Spain, Holland, and 
 Ruflia. Indeed, we have been already told, that fuch an alliance 
 would fecure us fuccefs.* Without entering into the impolicy of 
 thus embarking in the wide field of European politicks, let us ad- 
 mit that we do fo embark, and that the utmoft fuccefs crowns our 
 efforts — let us fuppofe our enemy, Great-Britain, proftrate at the 
 feet of the allied powers — would our fituation be ameliorated ? 
 Should we be confidered as principals, or, like the other allies, as 
 humble vaflals in the train of the vi£lor ? Rome too had her allies, 
 but was their fituation lefs dependant than thofe of the vanquifhed ? 
 
 * We already perceive, by the fubjoined account of the celebration of the 
 late French vidtoines in Georrria, that fome of our citizens have already con- 
 neAed our deflinies with thofe of France. This article is copied from the 
 Palladium, of Odt. 2.—" Savannah, Sept. 12. On Saturday, the 12th inftant, a 
 numerous company of republicans aflembled at the Filature, to celebrate the 
 vidlories of the French nation over the allies of England — events leading to the 
 peace "and profperity of thefe U. States — the Hon. Edward Telfair, Prefident, 
 William Stephens, and Peter H. Morel, Efq'rs. Vice-Prefidents." — Are we neu- 
 tral ? Are Ruflia and Pruflia our friends .' Is it ufual to rejoice over the de- 
 ftrudbion of one's friends ? 
 
40 
 
 Grant all that is affumedy that Britain is the tyrant of the ocean — 
 will the man who fubjiigatcd the brave and inoffcnding Swifs, who 
 annihilated the republick of Italy, to place a diadem on his own 
 brow, who compelled the ftubborn Dutchman, our friend and ally,* 
 to receive a mailer, after 100 years of unexampled rcfiftance 
 to Dpprt-ffion — who has left not one fhred of liberty or independ- 
 ence, through the vaft, populous, and powerful regions, over which 
 his viAorious arms have extended, be delicately or fcrupuloufly re- 
 gardful of the maritime rights of nations ? 
 
 Having conquered the continent of Europe, he exclaimed, " all 
 I want are commerce, colonies andJh'ipsJ''' Can any virtuous and high- 
 minded freeman of our country believe, that in procuring the grat- 
 ification of thefe wants, he will be more fcrupulous or tender of the 
 rights of other nations, than he has been in attaining the vaft and 
 immeafurable power which he now pofFefres ? 
 
 It may perhaps be thought by fome, that I have been too free in 
 my cenfures of the prefent adminiilration, that I have intimated 
 that they have rather courted, tlian fought to avoid, the prefent 
 ftate of mifundcrftanding between us and Great-Britain. I con- 
 fefs that if fuch Ihould be the inference, it would not be an unfair 
 one. I have always been apprehenfive, that the marked partiality 
 or dread of France, and the deep-rooted hollility to Great-Britain, 
 which they have invariably difcovered, would lead to unpleafant 
 confequences. It is well known, to all men who have noticed the 
 courfe of our political hiilory, that the perfons now adminiftering 
 the government of the United States, have avowed, both before 
 and fince they came into power, a fettled oppofition to Great- 
 Britain. 
 
 • Hollantl lias been one of our fafteft, firnicft friends — (lie took tin early and 
 an liuncfl part in favour of our liberties. Her aid was not, as the French direc- 
 Uiry fay theirs was, the" fruit of a bafe fpeculatiou." The Dutch love freedom 
 — leventy yearn war for the attainment of it, had endeared it to them. Who 
 would have ima;,nned that imr prefent adminiflration woulil have been the fnft 
 to inlult a nation, to whom we were boinid by lo many ties of pjratitude, by 
 coii^jratulaiinjf their upflart tyrant tin his accellion to the throne ? Who would 
 luvc thought that our republican Preluleiit would have been fo eager to ad- 
 drcft liitt " di-arly beloved brother of Holland?" What would have Been 
 fciid of Waihinjjton, if he /-ji/tluis put the leal to tyranny, efiiecially when 
 tuvin;,' no niinifJer at that Court, 'here tould be no necellity of laying any thing 
 on the lubjei'l ? .Sed lemjwra mutantur et nos muiamur cum illis ! 
 
41 
 
 It is of no moment to confider the private motives which have 
 led to this undue prejudice. It is fufficicnt to fay that the faft 
 exifts, and is avowed and juftified in Mr. JefFcrfon's paper, the Na- 
 tional Intelligencer. 
 
 They even declare that we ought to go back to tlie events of the 
 
 revolutionary war, to fliarpen our refentments againft Great-Britain. 
 
 Whether thefe prejudices had any fharc in inducing the Prefidcnt 
 
 ' to fend back, the treaty, made by his oivn minifters extraordinary, 
 
 I fhall not undertake to decide ; but I take the liberty to make 
 
 on this topick three remarks. 
 
 1ft, That it is a thing unexampled in the hiftoiy of nations, to 
 fend back a treaty made by authorized agents, unlefs they were ei- 
 ther coiTupt, exceeded their authority, or compromifed the moft ef- 
 fential interefts of the State, in either of which cafes the minifters 
 ought to be recalled. 
 
 2d, That it is unreafonable to expeft in a publick treaty with 
 another nation, that every article fliould be in our own favour — 
 fomething muft neceflarily be given up on both fides, or a ftate of 
 hoftility never could ceafe. The only queftion ought to be, wheth- 
 er it was as good, as under all the circumftances of the cafe, we 
 had a right to expedl ? It is believed that this treaty, on the whole, 
 was fuch an one as the United States ought to have accepted. 
 
 3d, That there was no foundation for the report, that there was 
 annexed to the treaty a condition which the United States ought 
 not to have acceded to. 
 
 It may perhaps occur to fome of our readers, convinced as they 
 will be of the impolicy of entering into a war with Great-Britain, 
 and of the total incompetency of our means to carry on fiich a 
 war, to afl<, Is it good policy to expofe the weaknefs of our coun- 
 try to the world ? Does it not betray a want of patriotifm, to pub- 
 lifti our opinion of our own mifconduft, and to endeavour to prove 
 that we are unable to cope with a nation with whom we may pofll- 
 bly be embroiled ? This is a fpecies of popular error, too common 
 with many defcriptions of perfons in our country'. 
 
 With my juftilication on this topick, I ftiall clofe this addrefs to 
 my fellow-citizens. 
 
 F 
 
42 
 
 > 
 
 111 all free govcinnieiits, publick opinion mull eventually direA 
 the mod important meafures of the adminiftration. When once ex- 
 prcfTod by the legal *cnnJl\tuUd authorities^ it is binding upon all the 
 citizens, though it is^/7/ competent for them to ufe the prcfs, in 
 
 • We fay, that when cxprefTec! by the conf.itutcJ aulloritiis, this publick opin- 
 ion oii^ht to be treated witli tlie hi^^hift rcfpiii ; and one would iiave fuppofed, 
 that in a country like ours, which boafts ot its light and information, a con- 
 trary opinion ctnild not prevMl : but the National Intelligencer, in its ferious 
 rcafoninjf, confiders the exprellum of the publick opinion, by the poi)ulace in 
 about Itf^h'f mercantile towns as binding on <;// i/m- citizens. \n reply to fome 
 rciifonings, endeavouring to fliew that war would not be juftifiable, that paper ' 
 remarks, that it is unnecelVary to enter iiUo the difculVion of the jufbcc of a war, 
 "the people have decided that queflJon — they have lul/UJ it, unlefs ample rep- 
 aration be made." 
 
 'J'he Chronicle holds the fame language. 
 
 Now we undertake to lay, that the numbers and the violence difphyed on 
 this occalion, were lefs than thofe which appeared in oppoGtion to the Britifb 
 Treaty — every one of the fame great cities was in oppolition to t/jat inflru- 
 ment — but, happily for our country, Walliington did not miflake the clamoursr 
 of a multitude in a great city, which />,:jiea/>/e mi-/i think it more prudent to go 
 with than to oppofe, in the firfl pcjroxyfms of its rage, for the ■zciH of the people. 
 Governor .Sullivan and SherilT Allen tried at that time the effect of oppoli- 
 tion. and tiiey had very convincing proofs of tlie wifdom, good fenfe, and rea- 
 fon.iblencfs of an infuriated populace. 
 
 It is ridiculous to call the proceedings at the State-Houfe, in Bofton, the 
 fenfe of the inhabitants of Maffachufetts. Thofe of us who were near enough 
 to Bofton to lift up the fplendid veil with whicli thefe things are covered, 
 know, that neither that meeting, nor the one figned by William Cooper, were 
 corre»fl cxjireffions of the publick will. 
 
 The hiftory of thefe meetings is briefly this r — Tke cool and judicious men of 
 both parties in Bofton, were oppofed to having any meeting on the fubjecft, 
 and openly expreffed their difapprobation of them. Not that the inhabitants 
 of this metropolis are ever behind tlicir fellow-citizens in their zeal to vindicate , 
 the rights, and maintain the honour of their country — but they thought that j 
 we were too ignorant of the fadts, and too uncertain of the true courfe to be 
 purfucd.to venture to give a decided opinion ujjon tlie fubjeifb. .Such was 
 the temper of the inhabitants, when a relpecfl for the citizens of Norfolk, in- 
 duced tlie Seleiflmen to call a town-meeting. At this meeting, it is well known 
 that fo great an uncertainty prevailed, as to the true policy to be adopted, that I 
 the inhabitants, on the propofition to appoint a committee, did not generally 
 vote on either fide, and the rcfpe^able Moder.itor, thinking that tlie luke- 
 warmnefs tlifcovered was not fufficiently refpetflful for the occalion, intimated 
 the |)ropriety of more apparent zeal, and aclually put the qucflion a fecond time. 
 This fl.«e of fat'b is well known, and liie Editor of the Aurora, at Philadel- 
 phia, lias an arch allulion to it, when he obferved, tliat the refoliitions of Bof- 
 ton were force-meat. The Chronicle repeated this wit againfl its own town, 
 aiul yet h:u the effrontery to cite thefe refolutions, as exprelVivc of the publick 
 will. It may be faid, that this goes to prove that many individuals ac^cd with 
 infinccrity. 
 
 I alk. Iiow people muft be cxpe»fted to ai5l in a popular government, when 
 the paffion!) are fuddenly and violently inflamed ? Tq foothe m , pcrfuadi, 
 ur oppofe and inflame ? 
 
 RD-94 
 
43 
 
 order to efFeft a change in the adminiftration, or a repeal of tlio 
 meafurcs. 
 
 But as this pubhck opinion may be dircfted or forcftalled by 
 artful and defigning men, or may be mifdirefted by error or paflion, 
 it is not only the right, but the duty of thofe who believe that fuch 
 errors exift, to endeavour to correft them. 
 
 When, therefore, a party of men, from finiftcr or from honejl 
 motives, mifreprefent the condutl of a foreign nation, prefent an 
 unnatural and diftorted view of fafts, appeal to the publick paffions, 
 attempt to filence all oppofition, rcprefent our ability to wage war 
 in a moft extravagant light, magnify our means of injuring our en- 
 emy, and diminifli her power and ability to injure us, and efpecially 
 if all this be done while the queftion is ftill open, and before the 
 Legiflature, who are alone authorized to decide it, are convened — 
 it is the moil fo/emn duty which a citizen is ever called upon to exer- 
 cife, to correal fuch falfe ftatements, to remove erroneous impref- 
 fions, and to endeavour to conduft his fellow-citizens froin the mazy 
 labyrinth of error and prejudice, into the paths of light and truth. 
 Such an office I have, with confcious inability, attempted to exe- 
 cute : — Happy, if my feeble efforts fhall in any degree contribute 
 to preferve my beloved country from the dangers which furround it. 
 

 
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