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FROM THE PRINCETON REVIEW, OCTOj^^W55. W' 55 ^ FROM THE PRINCETON REYIEW, OCTOBER, 1855. ^ ♦ » » > The Works of Thomas Beid, D. D, Preface, Notes, and Supplementary Dissertations. By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Edinburgh: 1846. Discussions on Philosophy/ and Literature, Education and University Reform, By Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Se- cond Edition, enlarged. London : 1853. Though of Lord Bacon it was said, by his friend Dr. Har- vey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, " he writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor," it must be admitted, Sir William Hamilton writes it like a philosopher. For he both thinks and writes, more like a pure intelligence, than any man in the history of speculation. In the first place, his diction is the most concise, the most accurate, the most direct, the most compact, and the most vigorous ever used by any writer on philosophy. Familiar with all systems of philosophy ever pro- posed, and their criticisms expository, supplementary and ad- verse, and a master of the languages, in which both the philo- sophies and the criticisms have been written ; he has discovered how much of their errors can be ascribed to the deficiencies of language, both as an instrument and as a vehicle of philosophi- cal thought ; and he has, accordingly, formed a language for 1 himself, adequate to the exigencies of the highest thinking, in the new career of philosophy which he has inaugurated. And his learning, in every department of knowledge supplementary of philosophy, or auxiliary to it, is so abundant, that there seems to be not even a random thought of any value, which has been dropped along any, even obscure, path of mental activity, in any age or country, that his diligence has not re- covered, his sagacity appreciated, and his judgment husbanded in the stores of his knowledge. And, in discussing any ques- tion of philosophy, his ample learning enables him to classify all the different theories which have, at successive periods, been invented to explain it ; and generally, indeed we may say always, he discovers, by the light reciprocally shed from the theories, ideas involved in them which their respective advo- cates had not discriminated ; thereby giving greater accuracy to the theories than they had before. By this mode of discus- sion, we have the history of doctrines concentrated into a focus of elucidation. And the uses of words, and the mutations in their meaning, in different languages, are articulately set forth : thereby enhancing the accuracy and certainty of our footsteps on the slippery paths of speculation. And his own genius for original research is such, that no subtlety of our intelligent nature, however evasive, no relation however indirect or re- mote, no manifestation however ambiguous or obscure, can escape or elude his critical diagnosis. Add to all this ; his moral constitution, both by nature and by education, is harmo- nious with his intellectual, imparting to his faculties the energy of a well-directed will, and the wisdom of a pure love of truth. Therefore it is, that in the writings of Sir William Hamilton there is nothing of that vacillation in doctrine which results from unbalanced faculties. He has built upon the same foun- dation from the beginning. Another notable characteristic is his extraordinary individuality. He seems, in no degree, un- der the influence of what is called the doctrine of the historical development of human intelligence. He confronts the whole history of doctrines, and with a cold critical eye, surveys them as the products of individual minds, and not as the evolutions of a total humanity. Of eclecticism, there is in his creed, not the smallest taint. Truth seems to him the same everywhere. unmodified hj times. Such is the marvellous man, of whose philosophy we propose to give some account. The history of philosophy seems, to the superficial observer, but the recurrence of successive cycles of the same problems, the same discussions, and the same opinions. He sees, in modern philosophy, only the repetition of the dreams of the earliest Greek speculators. Philosophy is to him but labour upon an insoluble problem. To the competent critic, however, it presents a far different view. He sees, in each cycle, new aspects of the problems, new relations in the discussions, and new modes in the opinions — all indicating an advancement, however unequal and halting at times, towards the truth. Here then is, at once, evinced the supreme importance of an enlightened philosophical criticism. It is the preparative and precursor of further progress. The different doctrines which, in successive ages, have been elicited, are so many experiments, furnishing, to the enlightened critic, indications more or less obvious of the true solutions of the problems of philosophy. Sir William Hamilton is the prince of critics in philosophy. In him philosophical criticism has compassed its widest scope, and reached its highest attainments. He is the critic of all ages, equally at home in all. He has sifted all of ancient, all of mediaeval, and all of modern thought, with the most delicate sieve ever used by any critic ; and while he has winnowed away the chaff, he has lost not a grain of truth. The barriers of different languages have not excluded him from a single field : he unlocked the gates of one as easily as another, and entered where he list. With principles of criticism as broad as nature, with learning as extensive as the whole of what has been written on philosophy, with a knowledge of words, and of the things which they denote or are intended to denote, mar- vellously accurate and co-extensive with the whole literature of speculation, with a logic both in its pure theory and modified applications, adequate to every need of intelligence, whether in detecting the fallacies or expounding the truths of doctrine, and with a genius exactly suited to use, with the greatest effect, these manifold accomplishments, he stands pre-eminent amongst the critics of philosophy. As we have seen how he unravels the network of entangled discussions, discriminating the confusions by purifying the doctrines through a more ade- quate conception and expression of them, often correcting the text of the Greek writer, which for centuries had baffled the grammarians, by the light of the doctrine of the author, and in the sequel making the truth educed the starting-point for new development of doctrine, we have admired the matchless abili- ties of the critic, until we should have been exhausted in being dragged along the labyrinths of his mighty ratiocination, had we not been refreshed at every turn by the new light of truth disclosed by the master who was conducting the marvellous enterprise of thought. Bentley did not do more to enlarge the scope, and enrich the learning of British literary criticism, when, by his dissertations on the Epistles of Phalaris, he raised it from the platitudes of the grammarian and the rhetorician to the compass, the life, the interest, and the dignity of philologi- cal and historical disquisition, than Sir William Hamilton has done to give profundity, subtlety, comprehensiveness, and eru- dition to British philosophical criticism, by his contributions to the Edinburgh Review, These articles mark an era, not only in British but in European criticism in every department of philosophy — metaphysics, psychology, and logic. They were translated into the languages of the continent, and their stu- pendous learning, matchless subtlety, and ruthless ratiocina- tion, received everywhere unbounded admiration. The very first article, the one on the doctrine of the infinite-absolute of Cousin, utterly subverted the fundamentals of the proud specu- lations of Germany, and fully exposed the absurdity of the attempt of Cousin to conciliate them with the humble Scottish philosophy of common sense. The continental philosophers saw that a critic had arisen, who, by the might and the majesty of his intellect, and the vastness of his erudition, gave dignity to the humble doctrine which he advocated, and they had all along despised. They began to feel, " A chiel's amang us, takin notes, And faith, he'll prent it." But Sir William Hamilton, the critic, is pnly the precursor of Sir William Hamilton the philosopher. His criticism is but the preparative of his philosophy. They, however, move on together. The state of the philosophy of the world marie this necessary. The calling of Socrates was not more determined by the condition of thought in his time, than the labours of Sir William Hamilton are by the philosophical needs of this age. His erudition and critical skill are as much needed as his matchless genius for original speculation. Either, without the other, would have been comparatively barren of results. And his preferen-ce, like Aristotle, for logic rather than the other branches of philosophy, is the very affection that is desiderated in the great thinker of this age. It seems to be supposed by some, who even pretend to have studied the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, that he has merely rehabilitated the doc- trines of Reid and Stewart. It might, with much more show of truth be said, that Newton only reproduced the discoveries of Copernicus and Kepler. For the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton is a greater stride beyond that of his Scottish prede- cessors, than the discoveries and deductions of Newton are be- yond those of Copernicus and Kepler. Let us then, as far as his published writings and our limits will permit, show what Sir William has done directly to advance philosophy. With Bacon began a movement in modern philosophy, which parallels that begun by Aristotle in ancient,* Aristotle in- augurated the deductive process ; Bacon inaugurated the induc- tive. These are the distinctive features of those systems of philosophy which they advocated ; and they are in accordance with the spirit of philosophizing in the respective eras to which they belonged. Ancient philosophy was more a deduction from principles ; modern philosophy is more an inquiry into principles themselves. Aristotle and Bacon both make logic the para- mount branch of philosophy ; and the forms of the understand- ing the limits of the knowable. Sir William Hamilton's philo- * When we say that Bacon and Aristotle began these respective movements, we do not mean literally, that the movements originated with them, but only that, like Luther's in the Reformation, their labours were so signal and paramount, in these movements, as to be associated pre-eminently with them. No great change ever originates with the person who becomes the most conspicuous in it, in the great spectacle of history. It always has antecedents, produced by the agency of inferior persons. We, therefore, beg, that everywhere, in this article, the principle of this note may qualify our general remarks, even in regard to the claims of originality, which we prefer for Sir William Hamilton, unless our remarks preclude qualifica- tion. 6 sophj Is a preparative and an initial towards the conciliation of the systems of Aristotle and Bacon. Logic, with him as with them, is the paramount branch of philosophy; and his labours all tend to reconcile induction with deduction, and unify in one method these two great processes of thought. His philosophy is, in fact, a climacteric reclamation, vindication, and develop- ment of the one perennial philosophy of common sense, which, like the one true faith, is preserved amidst all schismatic aber- rations, and vindicated as the only true philosophy. It is in the essential unity of human reason returning again and again, from temporary aberrations in different ages, into the same discernments and convictions, that we have the means of verifying the true catholic philosophy. Though there may be nothing in the mutual relations of men, at any given time, nor in the mutual relations of successive generations, that necessarily determines an uninterrupted advance towards truth, yet, notwithstanding the occasional wide-spread and long pro- tracted prevalence of error, the reason of man has hitherto vin- dicated itself in the long run, and proved that, though the newest phase of thought may not, at all times, be the truest, yet the truest will prevail at last, and come out at the goal of human destiny, triumphant over all errors. This is the drift of the history of human opinion as interpreted by enlightened criticism. Sometimes skepticism, recognizing no criterion of truth ; sometimes idealism, knowing nothing but images in ceaseless change ; sometimes pantheism, dissolving all individu- ality, both material and spiritual, in the tides of universal being ; sometimes materialism, believing nothing beyond mate- rial nature, and that man is only a more perfect species of mammalia, and human affairs but the highest branch of natural history ; and other forms of error, each with its peculiar mo- menta and criteria of knowledge, have in reiterated succession, in different ages of the world, prevailed as systems of philoso- phy ; yet the reason of man has, nevertheless, under the gui- dance of some master mind, returned to the one perennial phi- losophy of common sense, and reposed In the natural conviction of mankind, that an external world exists as the senses testify, and that there is in man an element which lifts him above the kingdom of nature, and allies him in responsible personal indi- viduality with a divine, eternal, and personal God. The great office of the critic of philosophy, at this day, is to trace the footsteps of this perennial philosophy through the history of human opinion in all its manifold mutations, perver- sions, and aberrations ; and to note its features, observe the paths it walks in, and its method and criteria of truth. This Sir William Hamilton has done. He has shown that the doc- trine of common sense, as the basis of all philosophy, has pre- vailed for more than two thousand years. He has adduced one hundred and six witnesses, Greek, Roman, Arabian, Italian, Spanish, French, British, German, and Belgian, to its truth. Amongst the many Greek witnesses, Aristotle is found, amongst the Roman, Cicero, amongst the Italians, Aquinas, amongst the French, all the great philosophers from Des Cartes to Cousin, both inclusive ; amongst the Germans, Leibnitz, Kant, Jacobi, and even Fichte, with a host of others; thus showing, that what is sometimes thought, even by those from whom we might expect better things, to be the superficial foundation of British philosophy, is in truth the only foundation on which the reason of man can repose. Philosophers, amidst all their efi'orts to break away from the common beliefs of mankind, have at last been compelled to come back to them as the only ultimate cri- terion of truth. "Fichte (says Sir W. Hamilton,) is a more remarkable, because a more reluctant confessor to the para- mount authority of belief than even Kant. Departing from the principle common to him, and philosophers in general, that the mind cannot transcend itself, Fichte developed, with the most admirable rigour of demonstration, a scheme of idealism the purest, simplest, and most consistent which the history of philosophy exhibits. And so confident was Fichte in the neces- sity of his proofs, that on one occasion he was provoked to im- precate eternal damnation on his head, should he ever swerve from any, even the least of the doctrines which he had so victo- riously established. But even Fichte, in the end, confesses that natural belief is paramount to every logical proof, and that his own idealism he could not believe." With the great fact before us, so triumphantly reclaimed and vindicated by Sir William Hamilton, that philosophers 8 have never been able to find any other criterion of truth than the common sense of mankind, we will now proceed to show what is its doctrine. The philosophy of common sense is the doctrine, in its de- velopment and applications, that our primary beliefs are the ultimate criterion of truth. It postulates, that consequents cannot, by an infinite regress, be evolved out of antecedents: but that demonstration must ultimately rest upon propositions, which in the view of certain primary beliefs of the mind, neces- sitate their own admission. These primary beliefs, as primary, must of course be inexplicable, being the highest light in the temple of mind, and borrowing no radiance from any higher cognition by which their own light can be illuminated. Be- hind these primary beliefs the mind cannot see — all is nega- tion ; because, while these primary beliefs are the first energy of the mind, they are also its limitation. The primary facts of intelligence would not be original, were they revealed to us under any other form than that of necessary belief. As elements of our mental constitution, as essential condi- tions of intelligence itself, these primary beliefs must, at least in the first instance, be accepted as true. Else, we assume that the very root of our intelligence is a lie. All must admit some original bases of knowledge in the mind itself, and must assume that they are true. The argument from common sense is therefore simply to show, that to deny a given proposition would involve a denial of a primary belief, an original datum of consciousness ; and as the primary belief or original datum of consciousness must be received as veracious, the proposition necessitated by it must be received as true also. It is manifest, that in arguing on the basis of our primary beliefs, they cannot be shown to be mendacious, unless it be demonstrated that they contradict each other, either imme- diately in themselves or mediately in their consequences. Be- cause, there being no higher criterion by which to test their veracity, it can only be tested by agreement or contradiction between themselves. We will now apply this doctrine, and in discussing the appli- cation, we will explicate the doctrine more fully. In the act of sensible perception we are, equally and at tlie same time, and in the same indivisible act of consciousness, cognizant of ourself as a perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived, which are apprehended as a synthesis inseparable in the cognition, but contrasted to each other :'n the concept as two distinct existences. All this is incontestaKy the deliverance of consciousness in the act of sensible percep- tion. This all philosophers, without exception, admit as Sifaet, But then, all, until Reid, deny the truth of the deliverance. They maintain that we only perceive representations within ourselves, and by a perpetual illusion we mistake these repre- sentations for the external realities. And Reid did not fully extricate himself from the trammels of this opinion. For while he repudiated the notion, that we perceive representa- tions distinct from the mind though within the mind, he fell into the error, that we are only conscious of certain changes in ourselves which suggest the external reality. But Sir William Hamilton has, by the most masterly subtlety of analysis, incon- testably shown, that we are directly conscious of the external objects themselves, according to the belief universal in the common sense of mankind. It is manifest, that the whole question resolves itself into one of the veracity of consciousness. All admit that conscious- ness does testify to the fact that we perceive the external reality. To doubt this is to doubt the actuality of the fact of c