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 >py 1 
 
 
IHE CLASSIFICATION 
 
 IE SCIENCES: 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED 
 
 REASONS FOR DISSENTING 
 
 IE PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTR 
 
 HERBERT SPENCER. 
 
 SECOND EDITION. ( WITH AN APPENDIX.) 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 APPLETON AND COMPANY, 
 
 90, 92 & 94 GRAND STREET. 
 
 1870. 
 
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THE 
 
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THE 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 In an essay on " The Genesis of Science," originally 
 published in 1854, I endeavoured to show that the 
 Sciences cannot be rationally arranged in serial order. 
 Proof was given that neither the succession in which 
 the Sciences are placed by M. Comte (to a criticism of 
 whose scheme the essay was in part devoted), nor any 
 other succession in which the Sciences can be placed, 
 represents either their logical dependence or their his- 
 torical dependence. To the question — How may their 
 relations be rightly expressed ? I did not then attempt 
 any answer. This question I propose now to con- 
 sider. 
 
 A true classification includes in each class, those 
 objects which have more characteristics in common 
 with one another, than any of them have in common 
 with any objects excluded from the class. Further, 
 the characteristics possessed in common by the colli- 
 gated objects, and not possessed by other objects, are 
 more radical than any characteristics possessed in 
 common with other objects — involve more numerous 
 
dependent characteristics. These are two sides of the 
 same definition. For things possessing the greatest 
 number of attributes in common, are things that pos- 
 sess in common those essential attributes on which the 
 rest depend ; and, conversely, the possession in com- 
 mon of the essential attributes, implies the possession 
 in common of the greatest number of attributes. Hence, 
 either test may be used as convenience dictates. 
 
 If, then, the Sciences admit of classification at all, it 
 must be by grouping together the like and separating 
 the unlike, as thus defined. Let us proceed to do this. 
 
 The broadest natural division among the Sciences, 
 is the division between those which deal with the ab- 
 stract relations under which phenomena are presented 
 to us, and those which deal with the phenomena them- 
 selves. Eelations of whatever orders, are nearer akin 
 to one another than they are to any objects. Objects 
 of whatever orders, are nearer akin to one another 
 than they are to any relations. Whether, as some 
 hold, Space and Time are forms of Thought.; or 
 whether, as I hold myself, they are forms of Things, 
 that have become forms of Thought through prgan- 
 izcd and inherited experience of Things ; it is equally 
 true that Space and Time are contrasted absolutely 
 with the existences disclosed to us in Space and Time 
 and that the Sciences which deal exclusively with 
 Space and Time, are separated by the profoundest of 
 all distinctions from the Sciences which deal with the 
 
existences that Space and Time contain. Space is the 
 abstract of all relations of co-existence. Time is the 
 abstract of all relations of sequence. And dealing as 
 they do entirely with relations of co-existence and 
 sequence, in their general or special forms, Logic and 
 Mathematics form a class of the Sciences more widely 
 unlike the rest, than any of the rest can be from one 
 another. 
 
 The Sciences which deal with existences themselves, 
 instead of the blank forms in which existences are pre- 
 sented to us, admit of a sub-division less profound than 
 the division above made, but more profound than any 
 of the divisions among the Sciences individually con- 
 sidered. They fall into two classes, having quite dif- 
 ferent aspects, aims, and methods. Every phenomenon 
 is more or less composite — is a manifestation of force 
 under several distinct modes. Hence result two ob- 
 jects of inquiry. We may study the component modes 
 of force separately ; or we may study them in their 
 relations, as co-operative factors in this composite phe- 
 nomenon. On the one hand, neglecting all the inci- 
 dents of particular cases, we may aim to educe the 
 laws of each mode of force, when it is uninterfered 
 with. On the other hand, the incidents of the parti- 
 cular case being given, we may seek to interpret the 
 entire phenomenon, as a product of the several forces 
 simultaneously in action. The truths reached through 
 the first kind of inquiry, though concrete inasmuch as 
 they have actual existences for their subject-matters, 
 
6 
 
 are abstract inasmuch as they refer to the modes of 
 existence apart from one another; while the truths 
 reached by the second kind of inquiry arc properly 
 concrete, inasmuch as they formulate the facts in their 
 combined order, as they occur in Nature. 
 
 The Sciences, then, in their main divisions, stand 
 thus : — 
 
 f that which treats of the forms in \ Abstract / Logic and \ 
 which phenomena are known to us / Science V Mathematics. / 
 
 SCIENCE is < 
 
 in their 
 elements 
 
 that which treats of the 
 k phenomena themselves < 
 
 Abstract- /Mechanics, \ 
 Concrete ( Physics, \ 
 
 Science \Chemisiry,etc./ 
 
 (Astronomy, \ 
 Geology, Biology A 
 Psychology, ' J 
 Sociology, etc. / 
 
 It is needful to define the words abstract and con- 
 crete as thus used ; since they are sometimes used 
 with other meanings. M. Comte divides Science into 
 abstract and concrete; but the divisions which he 
 distinguishes by these names are quite unlike those 
 above made. Instead of regarding some Sciences 
 as wholly abstract, and others as wholly concrete, he 
 regards each Science as having an abstract part, and 
 a concrete part. There is, according to him, an 
 abstract mathematics and a concrete mathematics — an 
 
abstract biology and a concrete biology. He says : — 
 "II faut distinguer, par rapport a tous les ordres de 
 phenomenes, deux genres de sciences naturelles : les 
 unes abstraites, generates, ont pour objet la decouverte 
 des lois qui regissent les diverses classes de pheno- 
 menes, en considerant tous les cas qu'on peut con- 
 cevoir ; les autres concretes, particulieres, descriptives, 
 et qu'on designe quelquefois sous le nom de sciences 
 naturelles proprement dites, consistent dans Implica- 
 tion de ces lois a Phistoire effective des differens etres 
 existans." And to illustrate the distinction, he names 
 general physiology as abstract, and zoology and botany 
 as concrete. Here it is manifest that the words 
 abstract and general are used as synonymous. They 
 have, however, different meanings ; and confusion 
 results from not distinguishing between their meanings. 
 Abstractness means detachment from the incidents of 
 particular cases. Generality means manifestation in 
 numerous cases. On the one hand, the essential 
 nature of some phenomenon is considered, apart from 
 the phenomena which disguise it. On the other hand, 
 the frequency of recurrence of the phenomenon, with 
 or without various disguising phenomena, is the thing 
 considered. An abstract truth is rarely if ever 
 realized to perception in any one case of which it 
 is asserted. A general truth may be realized to 
 perception in all of the cases of which it is asserted. 
 Some illustrations will make the distinction clear. 
 Thus it is an abstract truth that the angle contained 
 
8 
 
 in a semi-circle is a right angle — abstract in the sense 
 that though it does not hold in actually-constructed 
 semi-circles and angles, which are always inexact, it 
 holds in the ideal semi-circles and angles abstracted 
 from real ones ; but this is not a general truth, either 
 in the sense that it is commonly manifested in Nature, 
 or in the sense that it is a space-relation that compre- 
 hends many minor space-relations : it is a quite 
 special space-relation. Again, that the momentum 
 of a body causes it to move in a straight line at a 
 uniform velocity, is an abstract-concrete truth — a 
 truth abstracted from certain experiences of concrete 
 phenomena ; but it is by no means a general truth : 
 so little generality has it, that no one fact in Nature 
 displays it. Conversely, surrounding things supply 
 us with hosts of general truths that are not in the 
 least abstract. It is a general truth that the planets 
 go round the Sun from West to East — a truth which 
 holds good in something like a hundred cases (includ- 
 ing the cases of the planetoids) ; but this truth 
 is not at all abstract, since it is perfectly realized 
 as a concrete fact in every one of these cases. Every 
 vertebrate animal whatever, has a double nervous 
 system ; all birds and all mammals are warm- 
 blooded — these are general truths, but they are 
 .concrete truths : that is to say, every vertebrate 
 animal individually presents an entire and unqualified 
 manifestation of this duality of the nervous system ; 
 every living bird exemplifies absolutely or completely 
 
9 
 
 the warm-bloodedness of birds. What we here call, 
 and rightly call, a general truth, is simply a pro- 
 position which sums up a number of our actual expe- 
 riences ; and not the expression of a truth draivn 
 from our actual experiences, but never presented to 
 us in any of them. In other words, a general truth 
 colligates a number of particular truths ; while an 
 abstract truth colligates no particular truths, but 
 formulates a truth which certain phenomena all in- 
 volve, though it is actually seen in none of them. 
 
 Limiting the words to their proper meanings as thus 
 denned, it becomes manifest that the three classes 
 of Sciences above separated, are not distinguishable 
 at all by differences in their degrees of generality. 
 They are all equally general ; or rather they are 
 all, considered as groups, universal. Every phe- 
 nomenon whatever presents at once the subject-matter 
 for each of them. In the smallest particle of sub- 
 stance we have simultaneously illustrated, the abstract 
 truths of relation in Time and Space ; the abstract- 
 concrete truths in conformity with which the particle 
 manifests its several modes of force ; and the concrete 
 truths expressing the laws of the joint manifestation 
 of these modes of force. Thus these three classes of 
 Sciences severally formulate different, but co-extensive, 
 classes of facts. Within each group there are truths of 
 greater and less generality : there are general abstract 
 truths, and special abstract truths ; general abstract- 
 concrete truths, and special abstract-concrete truths; 
 
10 
 
 general concrete truths, and special concrete truths. 
 But while within each class there are groups and 
 sub-groups and sub-sub-groups which differ in their 
 degrees of generality, the classes themselves differ 
 only in their degrees of abstractness.* 
 
 * Some propositions laid down by M. Littre, in his lately-published book — 
 Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive, may fitly be dealt with here. In the 
 candid and courteous reply he makes to my strictures on the Comtean classifica. 
 tion in " The Genesis of Science," he endeavours to clear up some of the incon- 
 sistencies I pointed out; and he does this by drawing a distinction between 
 objective generality and subjective generality. He says — " qu'il existe deux 
 ordres de generalite, l'une objective et dans les choses, l'autre subjective, abstraite 
 et dans 1' esprit." This sentence, in which M. Littre make subjective generality 
 synonymous with abstractness, led me at first to conclude that he had in view the 
 same distinction as that which I have above explained between generality and 
 abstractness. On re-reading the paragraph, however, I found this was not the 
 case. In a previous sentence he says — " La biologie a passe de la consideration 
 des organes a celles des tissus, plus generaux que les organes, et de la consideration 
 des tissus a celle des elements anatomiques, plus generaux que les tissus. Mais 
 cette generalite croissante est subjective non objective, abstraite non concrete." 
 Here it is manifest that abstract and concrete, are used in senses analogous to 
 those in which they are used by M. Comte; who, as we have seen, regards 
 general physiology as abstract and zoology and botany as concrete. And it is 
 further manifest that the word abstract, as thus used, is not used in its proper 
 sense. For, as above shown, no such facts as those of anatomical structure can 
 be abstract facts , but can only be more or less general facte Nor do I under- 
 stand M. Littre's point of view when he regards these more general facts of 
 anatomical structure, as subjectively general and not objectively general. The 
 structural phenomena presented by any tissue, such as mucous membrane, are 
 more general than the phenomena presented by any of the organs which mucous 
 membrane goes to form, simply in the sense that the phenomena peculiar to the 
 membrane are repeated in a greater number of instances than the phenomena 
 peculiar to any organ into the composition of which the membrane enters. And, 
 similarly, such facts as have been established respecting the anatomical elements 
 of tissues, are more general than the facts established respecting any particular 
 tissue, in the sense that they are facts which organic bodies exhibit in a greater 
 number of cases — they are objectively more general; and they can be called 
 subjectively more general only in the sense that the conception corresponds with 
 the phenomena. 
 
 Let me endeavour to clear up this point : — There is, as M. Littre truly says, 
 a decreasing generality that is objective. If we omit the phenomena of Dissolu- 
 tion, which arc changes from the special to the general, all changes which matter 
 •mdcrgocs are from the general to the special— are changes involving a decreasing 
 
11 
 
 Passing to the sub-divisions of these classes, we find 
 that the first class is separable into two parts — the 
 one containing universal truths, the other non-uni- 
 versal truths. Dealing wholly with relations apart 
 from related things, Abstract Science considers first, 
 that which is common to all relations whatever ; and 
 second, that which is common to each order of rela- 
 tions. Besides the indefinite and variable connexions 
 which exist among phenomena, as occurring together 
 in Space and Time, we find that there are also definite 
 
 generality in the united groins of attributes. This is the progress of things 
 The progress of thought, is not only in the same direction, hut also in the oppo- 
 site direction. The investigation of Nature discloses an increasing number of 
 specialities ; but it simultaneously discloses more and more the generalities within 
 which these specialities fall. Take a case. Zoology, while it goes on multiply- 
 ing the number of its species, and getting a more complete knowledge of each 
 species (decreasing generality) ; also goes on discovering the common characters by 
 which species are united into larger groups (increasing generality). Eoth these 
 are subjective processes ; and in this case, both orders of truths reached are con- 
 crete — formulate the phenomena as actually manifested. 
 
 M. Littre, recognizing the necessity for some modification of the hierarchy 
 the Sciences, as enunciated by M. Comte, still regards it as substantially true 
 and for proof of its validity, he appeals mainly to the essential constitutions of the 
 Sciences. It is unnecessary for me here to meet, in detail, the arguments by 
 which he supports the proposition, that the essential constitutions of the Sciences, 
 justify the order in which M. Comte places them. It will suffice to refer to the 
 foregoing pages, and to the pages which are to follow, as containing the defini- 
 tions of those fundamental characteristics which demand the grouping of the 
 Sciences in the way pointed out. As already shown, and as will be shown still 
 more clearly by and bye, the radical differences of constitution among the 
 Sciences, necessitate the colligation of them into the three classes — Abstract, 
 Abstract-Concrete, and Concrete. How irreconcilable is M. Comte's classification 
 with these groups, will be at once apparent on inspection. It stands thus : — 
 
 Mathematics (including rational Mechanics), partly Abstract, partly 
 
 Abstract-Concrete. 
 
 Astronomy Concrete. 
 
 Physics.... Abstract-Concrete. 
 
 Chemistry Abstract-Concrete. 
 
 Biology Concrete. 
 
 Sociology Concrete. 
 
and invariable connexions — that between each kind of 
 phenomenon and certain other kinds of phenomena, 
 there exist uniform relations. This is a universal 
 abstract truth — that there is an unchanging order 
 among things in Space and Time. We come next 
 to the several kinds of unchanging order, which, 
 taken together, form the subjects of the second 
 division of Abstract Science. Of this second divi- 
 sion, the most general sub-division is that which 
 deals with the natures of the connexions in Space 
 and Time, irrespective of the terms connected. The 
 conditions under which we may predicate a rela- 
 tion of coincidence or proximity in Space and 
 Time (or of non-coincidence or non-proximity) form 
 the subject-matter of Logic. Here the natures and 
 amounts of the terms between which the relations are 
 asserted (or denied) are of no moment : the proposi- 
 tions of Logic are independent of any qualitative 
 or quantitative specification of the related things. 
 The other sub-division has for its subject-matter, the 
 relations between terms which are specified quanti- 
 tatively but not qualitatively. The amounts of the 
 related terms, irrespective of their natures, are here 
 dealt with; and Mathematics is a statement of the 
 laws of quantity considered apart from reality. Quan- 
 tity considered apart from reality, is occupancy of 
 Space or Time; and occupancy of Space or Time 
 is measured by the number of coexistent or sequent 
 positions occupied. That is to say, quantities can be 
 
13 
 
 compared and the relations between them established, 
 only by some direct or indirect enumeration of their 
 component units; and the ultimate units into which 
 all others are decomposable, are such occupied posi- 
 tions in Space as can, by making impressions on 
 consciousness, produce occupied positions in Time. 
 Among units that are unspecified in their natures 
 (extensive, protensive, or intensive), but are ideally 
 endowed with existence considered apart from attri- 
 butes, the quantitative relations that arise, are those 
 most general relations expressed by numbers. Such 
 relations fall into either of two orders, according as 
 the units are considered simply as capable of filling 
 separate places in consciousness, or according as they 
 are considered as filling places that are not only sepa- 
 rate, but equal. In the one case, we have that inde- 
 finite calculus by which numbers of abstract existences, 
 but not sums of abstract existence, are predicable. In 
 the other case, we have that definite calculus by which 
 both numbers of abstract existences and sums of 
 abstract existence are predicable. Next comes that 
 division of Mathematics which deals with the quanti- 
 tative relations of magnitudes (or aggregates of units) 
 considered as coexistent, or as occupying Space — the 
 division called Geometry. And then we arrive at 
 relations, the terms of which include both quantities 
 of Time and quantities of Space — those in which 
 times are estimated by the units of space traversed 
 at a uniform velocity, and those in which equal 
 
14 
 
 units of time being given, the spaces traversed with 
 uniform or variable velocities are estimated. These 
 Abstract Sciences, which are concerned exclusively 
 with relations and with the relations of relations, may 
 be grouped as shown in Table I. 
 
 Passing from the Sciences that treat of the ideal or 
 unoccupied forms of relations, and turning to the 
 Sciences that treat of real relations, or the relations 
 among realities, we come first to those Sciences which 
 deal with realities, not as they arc habitually mani- 
 fested to us, but with realities as manifested in their 
 different modes, when these are artificially separated 
 from one another. In the same way that the Abstract 
 Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Abstract-Concrete 
 and Concrete Sciences ; so the Abstract-Concrete 
 Sciences are ideal, relatively to the Concrete Sciences. 
 Just as Logic and Mathematics have for their object 
 to generalize the laws of relation, qualitative and 
 quantitative, apart from related things; so, Mecha- 
 nics, Physics, Chemistry, etc., have for their object 
 to generalize the laws of relation which different 
 modes of Matter and Motion conform to, when seve- 
 rally disentangled from those actual phenomena in 
 which they are mutually modified. Just as the 
 geometrician formulates the properties of lines and 
 surfaces, independently of the irregularities and thick- 
 nesses of lines and surfaces as they really exist; so, 
 the physicist and the chemist formulate the mani- 
 
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15 
 
 festations of each mode of force, independently of 
 the disturbances in its manifestations which other 
 modes of force cause in every actual case. In works 
 on Mechanics, the laws of motion are expressed with- 
 out reference to friction and resistance of the medium. 
 Not what motion ever really is, but what it would 
 be if retarding forces were absent, is asserted. If any 
 retarding force is taken into account, then the effect 
 of this retarding force is alone contemplated : neglect- 
 ing the other retarding forces. Consider, again, the 
 generalizations of the physicist respecting molecular 
 motion. The law that light varies inversely as the 
 square of the distance, is absolutely true only 
 when the radiation goes on from a point without 
 dimensions, which it never does ; and it also assumes 
 that the rays are perfectly straight, which they cannot 
 be unless the medium differs from all actual media in 
 being perfectly homogeneous. If the disturbing 
 effects of changes of media are investigated, the 
 formulae expressing the refractions take for granted 
 that the new media entered are homogeneous ; which 
 they never really are. Even when a compound 
 disturbance is allowed for, as when the refraction 
 undergone by light in traversing a medium of in- 
 creasing density, like the atmosphere, is calculated, 
 the calculation still supposes conditions that are un- 
 naturally simple — it supposes that the atmosphere 
 is not pervaded by heterogeneous currents, which 
 it always is. Similarly with the inquiries of the 
 
16 
 
 chemist. He does not take his substances as Nature 
 supplies them. Before he proceeds to specify their 
 respective properties, he purifies them — separates from 
 each all trace of every other. Before ascertaining the 
 specific gravity of a gas, he has to free this gas from 
 the vapour of water, usually mixed with it. Before 
 describing the properties of a salt, he guards against 
 any error that may arise from the presence of an 
 uncombined portion of the acid or base. And when 
 he alleges of any element that it has a certain atomic 
 weight, and unites with such and such equivalents 
 of other elements, he does not mean that the results 
 thus expressed are exactly the results of any one 
 experiment ; but that they are the results which, 
 after averaging n.any trials, he concludes would be 
 realized if absolute purity could be obtained, and 
 if the experiments could be conducted without 
 loss. His problem is to ascertain the laws of 
 combination of molecules, not as they are actually 
 displayed, but as they would be displayed in the 
 absence of those minute interferences which cannot 
 be altogether avoided. Thus all these Abstract-Con- 
 crete Sciences have for their object, analytical inter- 
 pretation. In every case it is the aim to decompose 
 the phenomenon, and formulate its components apart 
 from one another ; or some two or three apart from 
 the rest. "Wherever, throughout these Sciences, syn- 
 thesis is employed, it is for the verification of analysis.* 
 
 * I am indebted to Prof. Frankland for pointing out an objection that may be 
 
17 
 
 The truths elaborated are severally asserted, not as 
 truths exhibited by this or that particular object ; but 
 as truths universally holding of Matter and Motion in 
 their more general or more special forms, considered 
 apart from particular objects, and particular places in 
 space. 
 
 The sub-divisions of this group of Sciences, may be 
 drawn on the same principle as that on which the 
 sub-divisions of the preceding group Avere drawn. 
 Phenomena, considered as more or less involved 
 manifestations of force, yield on analysis, certain 
 laws of manifestation that are universal, and other 
 laws of manifestation, which, being dependent on 
 conditions, are not universal. Hence the Abstract- 
 Concrete Sciences are primarily divisible into — the 
 laws of force considered apart from its separate modes, 
 and laws of force considered under each of its sepa- 
 rate modes. And this second division of the Abstract- 
 Concrete group, is sub-divisible after a manner essen- 
 tially analogous. It is needless to occupy space by 
 
 made to this statement. The production of new compounds by synthesis, has of 
 late become an important branch of chemistry. According to certain known laws 
 of composition, complex substances, which never before existed, are formed, and 
 fulfil anticipations both as to their general properties and as to the proportions of 
 their constituents — as proved by analysis. Here it may be said with truth, that 
 analysis is used to verify synthesis. Nevertheless, the exception to the above 
 statement is apparent only — not real. In so far as the production of new com- 
 pounds is carried on merely for the obtainment of such new compounds, it is not 
 Science but Art— the application of pre-established knowledge to the achievement 
 of ends. The proceeding is a part of Science, only in so far as it is a means to 
 the better interpretation of the order of Nature. And how does it aid the inter- 
 pretation ? It does it only by verifying the pre-established conclusions respecting 
 the laws of molecular combination ; or by serving further to explain them. That 
 is to say, these syntheses, considered on their scientific side, have simply the pur- 
 pose of forwarding the analysis aj 'the laws of chemical combination. 
 
 2 
 
18 
 
 defining these several orders and genera of Sciences. 
 Table II. will sufficiently explain their relations. 
 
 We come now to the third great group. We have 
 done with the Sciences which are concerned only with 
 the blank forms of relations under which Being is 
 manifested to us. We have left behind the Sciences 
 which, dealing with Being under its universal mode, 
 and its several non-universal modes regarded as inde- 
 pendent, treats the terms of its relations as simple and 
 homogeneous, which they never are in Nature. There 
 remain the Sciences which, taking these modes of* 
 Being as they are connected with one another, have for 
 the terms of their relations, those heterogeneous combi- 
 nations of forces that constitute actual phenomena. 
 The subject-matter of these Concrete-Sciences is the 
 real, as contrasted with the wholly or partially ideal. 
 It is their aim, not to separate and generalize apart 
 the components of all phenomena ; but to explain each 
 phenomenon as a product of these components. Their 
 relations are not, like those of the simplest Abstract- 
 Concrete Sciences, relations between one antecedent 
 and one consequent, nor are they, like those of the 
 more involved Abstract-Concrete Sciences, relations 
 between some few antecedents cut off in imagination 
 from all others, and some few consequents similarly 
 cut off; but they are relations each of which has for 
 its terms a complete plexus of antecedents and a com- 
 plete plexus of consequents. This is manifest in the 
 
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19 
 
 least involved Concrete Sciences. The astronomer 
 seeks to explain the Solar System. He does not stop 
 short after generalizing the laws of planetary move- 
 ment, such as planetary movement would be did only 
 a single planet exist ; but he solves this abstract- con- 
 crete problem, as a step towards solving the concrete 
 problem of the planetary movements as affecting one 
 another. In astronomical language, "the theory of 
 the Moon'' means an interpretation of the Moon's 
 motions, not as determined simply by centripetal and 
 centrifugal forces, but as perpetually modified by 
 gravitation towards the Earth's equatorial protuber- 
 ance, towards the Sun, and even towards Venus — 
 forces daily varying in their amounts and combina- 
 tions. !N*or does the astronomer leave off when he has 
 calculated what will be the position of a given body 
 at a given time, allowing for all perturbing influences ; 
 but he goes on to consider the effects produced by re- 
 actions on the perturbing masses. And he further 
 goes on to consider how these mutual perturbations 
 of the planets cause, during a long period, increasing 
 deviations from a mean state ; and then how compen- 
 sating perturbations cause continuous decrease in the 
 deviations. That is, the goal towards which he ever 
 strives, is a complete explanation of these complex 
 planetary motions in their totality. Similarly with 
 the geologist. He does not take for his problem only 
 those irregularities of the Earth's crust that are 
 worked by denudation; or only those which igueous 
 
20 
 
 action causes. He does not seek simply to understand 
 how sedimentary strata were formed; or how faults 
 were produced; or how moraines originated, or how 
 the beds of Alpine lakes were scooped out. But taking 
 into account all agencies co-operating in endless and 
 ever-varying combinations, he aims to interpret the 
 entire structure of the Earth's crust. If he studies 
 separately the actions of rain, rivers, glaciers, icebergs, 
 tides, waves, volcanoes, earthquakes, etc. ; he does so 
 that he may be better able to comprehend their joint 
 actions as factors in geological phenomena : the object 
 of his science being to generalize these phenomena in 
 all their involved connections, as parts of one whole. 
 In like manner Biology is the elaboration of a com- 
 plete theory of Life, in each and all of its involved 
 manifestations. If different aspects of its phenomena 
 are investigated apart — if one observer busies himself 
 in classing organisms, another in dissecting them, 
 another in ascertaining their chemical compositions, 
 another in studying functions, another in tracing laws 
 of modification; they are all, consciously or uncon- 
 sciously, helping to work out a solution of vital 
 phenomena in their entirety, both as displayed by 
 individual organisms and by organisms at large. 
 Thus, in these Concrete Sciences, the object is the 
 converse of that which the Abstract-Concrete Sciences 
 propose to themselves. In the one case we have 
 analytical interpretation ; while in the other case we 
 have synthetical interpretation. Instead of synthesis 
 
21 
 
 being used merely to verify analysis ; analysis is here 
 used only to aid synthesis. Not to formulate the 
 factors of phenomena is now the object ; but to formu- 
 late the phenomena resulting from these factors, under 
 the various conditions which the Universe present. 
 
 This third class of Sciences, like the other classes, is 
 divisible into the universal and the non-universal. As 
 there are truths which hold of all phenomena in their 
 elements ; so there are truths which hold of all pheno- 
 mena in their totalities. As force has certain ultimate 
 laws common to its separate modes of manifestation, 
 so in those combinations of its modes which constitute 
 actual phenomena, we find certain ultimate laws that 
 are conformed to in every case. These are the laws 
 of the re-distribution of force. Since we can become 
 conscious of a phenomenon only by some change 
 wrought in us, every phenomenon necessarily implies 
 re-distribution of force — change in the arrangements 
 of matter and motion. Alike in molecular movements 
 and the movements of masses, one great uniformity 
 may be traced. A decreasing quantity of motion, 
 sensible or insensible, always has for its concomitant 
 an increasing aggregation of matter ; and, conversely, 
 an increasing quantity of motion, sensible or insensible, 
 has for its concomitant a decreasing aggregation of 
 matter. Give to the molecules of any mass, more 
 of that insensible motion which we call heat, and the 
 parts of the mass become somewhat less closely aggre- 
 gated. Add a further quantity of insensible motion, 
 
22 
 
 and the mass so far disintegrates as to become liquid. 
 Add still more insensible motion, and the mass dis- 
 integrates so completely as to become gas ; which 
 occupies a greater space with every extra quantity 
 of insensible motion given to it. On the other hand, 
 every loss of insensible motion by a mass, gaseous, 
 liquid, or solid, is accompanied by a progressing 
 integration of the mass. Similarly with sensible 
 motions, be the bodies moved large or small. Aug- 
 ment the velocities of the planets, and their orbits will 
 enlarge — the Solar System would occupy a wider 
 space. Diminish their velocities, and their orbits will 
 lessen — the Solar System will contract, or become 
 more integrated. And in like manner we see that 
 every sensible motion on the Earth's surface, involves 
 a partial disintegration of the moving body from the 
 Earth ; while the loss of its motion is accompanied by 
 the body's re -integration with the Earth. In all phe- 
 nomena we have either an integration of matter and 
 concomitant disintegration of motion ; or an integra- 
 tion of motion and concomitant disintegration of 
 matter. And where, as in living bodies, the processes 
 of integration and disintegration of matter and motion 
 are going on simultaneously, there is an integration 
 of matter proportioned to the disintegration of motion, 
 and an integration of motion proportioned to the dis- 
 integration of matter. These, then, are universal laws 
 of that re-distribution of matter and motion everywhere 
 going on — a re-distribution which results in Evolution 
 
23 
 
 so long as the aggregation of matter and dissipation 
 of motion predominate ; but which results in Dissolu- 
 tion where there is a predominant aggregation of 
 motion and dissipation of matter. Hence we have 
 a division of Concrete Science which bears towards the 
 other Concrete Sciences, a relation like that which Uni- 
 versal Law of Relation bears to Mathematics, and like 
 that which Universal Mechanics (composition and reso- 
 lution of forces) bears to Physics. We have a division of 
 Concrete Science which generalizes those concomitants 
 of this re-distribution that hold good among all orders 
 of concrete objects — a division which explains why, 
 along with a predominating integration of matter and 
 disintegration of motion, there must be a change from 
 an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, 
 coherent heterogeneity; and why a reverse re-distri- 
 bution of matter and motion, must be accompanied by 
 a reverse structural change. Passing from this uni- 
 versal Concrete Science, to the non-universal Concrete 
 Sciences ; we find that these are primarily divisible 
 into the Science which deals with the re-distributions 
 of matter and motion among the masses in space, con- 
 sequent on their mutual actions as wholes ; and the 
 science which deals with the re -distributions of matter 
 and motion consequent on the mutual actions of the 
 molecules in each mass. And of these equally general 
 Sciences, this last is re-divisible into the Science which 
 is limited to the concomitants of re-distribution among 
 the molecules of each mass when regarded as mde- 
 
24 
 
 pendent, and the Science which takes into account the 
 molecular motion received by radiation from other 
 masses. But these sub-divisions, and their sub-sub- 
 divisions, will be best seen in the annexed Table III. 
 
 That these great groups of Sciences and their re- 
 spective sub-groups, fulfil the definition of a true 
 classification given at the outset, is, I think, tolerably 
 manifest. The subjects of inquiry included in each 
 primary division, have essential attributes in common 
 with one another, which they have not in common 
 with any of the subjects contained in the other pri- 
 mary divisions; and they have, by consequence, a 
 greater number of common attributes in which they 
 severally agree with the colligated subjects, and dis- 
 agree with the subjects otherwise colligated. Between 
 Sciences which deal with relations apart from realities, 
 and Sciences which deal with realities, the distinc- 
 tion is the widest possible; since Being, in some or 
 all of its attributes, is common to all Sciences of the 
 second class, and excluded from all Sciences of the first 
 class. The distinction between the empty forms of 
 things and the things themselves, is a distinction 
 which cannot be exceeded in degree. And when 
 we divide the Sciences which treat of realities, into 
 those which deal with their separate components and 
 those which deal with their components as united, 
 we make a profounder distinction than can exist be- 
 tween the Sciences which deal with one or other order 
 
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25 
 
 of the components, or than can exist between the 
 Sciences which deal with one or other order of the 
 things composed. The three groups of Sciences may 
 be briefly defined as — laws of the forms; laws of 
 the factors; laws of the products. And when thus 
 defined, it becomes manifest that the groups are 
 so radically unlike in their natures, that there can 
 be no transitions between them ; and that any 
 Science belonging to one of the groups must be 
 quite incongruous with the Sciences belonging to 
 either of the other groups, if transferred. How 
 fundamental are the differences between them, will be 
 further seen on considering their functions. The first, 
 or abstract group, is instrumental with respect to both 
 the others ; and the second, or abstract-concrete group, 
 is instrumental with respect to the third or concrete 
 group. An endeavour to invert these functions will 
 at once show how essential is the difference of 
 character. The second and third groups supply 
 subject-matter to the first, and the third supplies 
 subject-matter to the second; but none of the truths 
 which constitute the third group are of any use as 
 solvents of the problems presented by the second 
 group ; and none of the truths which the second 
 group formulates can act as solvents of problems 
 contained in the first group. Concerning the sub- 
 divisions of these great groups, little remains to be 
 added. That each of the groups, being co-extensive 
 with all phenomena, contains truths that are universal 
 
26 
 
 and others that are not universal, and that these must 
 be classed apart, is obvious. And that the sub- 
 divisions of the non-universal truths, are to be made in 
 something like the manner shown in the tables, is 
 proved by the fact that when the descriptive words 
 are read from the root to the extremity of any branch, 
 they form a definition of the Science constituting that 
 branch. That the minor divisions might be other- 
 wise arranged, and that better definitions of them 
 might be given, is highly probable. They are here 
 set down merely for the purpose of showing how this 
 method of classification works out. 
 
 I will only further remark, that the relations of the 
 Sciences as thus represented, are still but imperfectly 
 represented : their relations cannot be truly shown 
 on a plane, but only in space of three dimensions. 
 The three groups cannot rightly be put in linear 
 order as they have here been. Since the first stands 
 related to the third, not only indirectly through the 
 second, but also directly — it is directly instrumental 
 with respect to the third, and the third supplies it 
 directly with subject-matter. Their relations can 
 thus only be truly shown by a divergence from a 
 common root on different sides, in such a way that 
 each stands in juxta-position to the other two. And 
 only by the like mode of arrangement, can the relations 
 among the sub-divisions of each group be correctly 
 represented. 
 
SEASONS FOR DISSENTING 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE. 
 
 While the preceding pages were passing through the 
 press, there appeared in the Revue des Deux Mondes for 
 February 15th, an article on a late work of mine — First 
 Principles. To M. Auguste Laugel, the writer of this article, 
 I am much indebted for the careful exposition he has made of 
 some of the leading views set forth in that work ; and for the 
 catholic and sympathetic spirit in which he has dealt with 
 them. In one respect, however, M. Laugel conveys to his 
 readers an erroneous impression — an impression doubtless 
 derived from what appears to him adequate evidence, and 
 doubtless expressed in perfect sincerity. M. Laugel describes 
 me as being, in part, a follower of M. Comte. After describing 
 the influence of M. Comte as traceable in the works of some 
 other English writers, naming especially Mr. Mill and Mr. 
 Buckle, he goes on to say that this influence, though not 
 avowed, is easily recognizable in the work he is about to 
 make known ; and in several places throughout his review, 
 there are remarks having the same implication. I greatly 
 regret having to take exception to anything said by a critic 
 so candid and so able. But the Revue des Deux Mondes cir- 
 culates widely in England, as well as elsewhere ; and finding 
 that there exists in some minds, both here and in America, 
 an impression similar to that entertained by M. Laugel — 
 an impression likely to be confirmed by his statement— it 
 appears to me needful to meet it. 
 
28 
 
 Two causes of quite different kinds, have conspired to diffuse 
 the erroneous belief that M. Comte is an accepted exponent 
 of scientific opinion ? His bitterest foes and his closest 
 friends, have unconsciously joined in propagating it. On the 
 one hand, M. Comte having designated by the term " Positive 
 Philosophy" all that definitely- established knowledge which 
 men of science have been gradually organizing into a cohe- 
 rent body of doctrine ; and having habitually placed this in 
 opposition to the incoherent body of doctrine defended by 
 theologians ; it has become the habit of the theological party 
 to think of the antagonist scientific party, under the title 
 of " positivists." And thus, from the habit of calling 
 them " positivists," there has grown up the assumption 
 that they call themselves "positivists," and that they are 
 the disciples of M. Comte. On the other hand, those who 
 have accepted M. Comte's system, and believe it to be 
 the philosophy of the future, have naturally been prone 
 to see everywhere the signs of its progress ; and wherever 
 they have found opinions in harmony with it, have ascribed 
 these opinions to the influence of its originator. It is always 
 the tendency of discipleship to magnify the effects of the 
 master's teachings ; and to credit the master with all the 
 doctrines he teaches. In the minds of his followers, M. 
 Comte's name is associated with scientific thinking, which, 
 in many cases, they first understood from his exposition of it. 
 Influenced as they inevitably are by this association of ideas, 
 they are reminded of M. Comte wherever they meet with 
 thinking which corresponds, in some marked way, to M. 
 Comte's description of scientific thinking ; and hence are apt 
 to imagine him as introducing into other minds, the con- 
 ceptions which he introduced into their minds. Such im- 
 pressions are, however, in most cases quite unwarranted. 
 That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine 
 and method elaborated by Science, is true. But it is not true 
 that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method, 
 
29 
 
 are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry 
 nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature 
 and limits, are appreciably different from what they were 
 before. If they are " positivists," it is in the sense that all men 
 of science have been more or less consistently "positivists;" 
 and the applicability of M. Comte's title to them, no more 
 makes them his disciples, than does its applicability to 
 men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote, 
 make these his disciples. M. Comte himself by no means 
 claims that which some of his adherents are apt, by impli- 
 cation, to claim for him. He says : — " II y a, sans doute, 
 beaucoup d'analogie entre ma phiiosqphie positive et ce 
 que les savans anglais entendent, depuis Newton surtout, 
 par phiiosqphie naturelle ;" (see Acertissement) and further 
 on he indicates the " grand mouvement imprime a Tesprit 
 humain, il y a deux siecles, par Taction combinee des 
 preceptes de Bacon, des conceptions de Descartes, et des de- 
 couvertes de Galilee, comme le moment oil l'esprit de la 
 philosophic positive a commence a se prononcer dans 
 le monde." That is to say, the general mode of thought 
 and way of interpreting phenomena, which M. Comte calls 
 " Positive Philosophy," he recognizes as having been growing 
 for two centuries ; as having reached, when he wrote, a 
 marked development ; and as being the heritage of all men of 
 science. 
 
 That which M. Comte proposed to do, was to give scientific 
 thought and method a more definite embodiment and organi- 
 zation ; and to apply it to the interpretation of classes 
 of phenomena not previously dealt with in a scientific 
 manner. The conception was a great one ; and the endea- 
 vour to work it out was worthy of sympathy and applause. 
 Some such conception was entertained by Bacon. He, too, 
 aimed at the organization of the sciences ; he, too, held that 
 " Physics is the mother of all the sciences ;" he, too, held 
 that the sciences can be advanced only by combining them, 
 
30 
 
 and saw the nature of the required combination ; he, too, 
 held that moral and civil philosophy could not flourish when 
 separated from their roots in natural philosophy ; and thus 
 he, too, had some idea of a social science growing out of 
 physical science. But the state of knowledge in his day pre- 
 vented any advance beyond the general conception : indeed, 
 it was marvellous that he should have advanced so far. In- 
 stead of a vague, undefined conception, M. Comte has pre- 
 sented the world with a defined and highly-elaborated 
 conception. In working out this conception he has shown 
 remarkable breadth of view, great originality, immense fer- 
 tility of thought, unusual powers of generalization. Con- 
 sidered apart from the question of its truth, his system of 
 Positive Philosophy is a vast achievement. But after ac- 
 cording to M. Comte high admiration for his conception, for 
 his effort to realize it, and for the faculty he has shown in 
 the effort to realize it, there remains the inquiry — Has he 
 succeeded ? A thinker who re-organizes the scientific method 
 and knowledge of his age, and whose re-organization is 
 accepted by his successors, may rightly be said to have such 
 successors for his disciples. But successors who accept this 
 method and knowledge of his age, minus his re- organization, 
 are certainly not his disciples. How then stands the case 
 with M. Comte ? There are some few who receive his 
 doctrines with but little reservation ; and these are his dis- 
 ciples truly so called. There are others who regard with 
 approval certain of his leading doctrines, but not the rest : 
 these we may distinguish as partial adherents. There 
 are others who reject all his distinctive doctrines ; and these 
 must be classed as his antagonists. The members of this 
 class stand substantially in the same position as they would 
 have done had he not written. Declining his re-organ- 
 ization of scientific doctrine, they possess this scientific 
 doctrine in its pre-existing state, as the common heritage 
 bequeathed by the past to the present ; and their adhesion to 
 
31 
 
 this scientific doctrine in no sense implicates with M. Cornte. 
 In this class stand the great body of men of science. And 
 in this class I stand myself. 
 
 Coming thus to the personal part of the question, let me 
 first specify those great general principles on which M. 
 Comte is at one with preceding thinkers ; and on which I am 
 at one with M. Comte. 
 
 All knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte ; and 
 this I also hold — hold it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. 
 Comte : since, not only do I believe that all the ideas acquired 
 by individuals, and consequently all the ideas transmitted by 
 past generations, are thus derived ; but I also contend that 
 the very faculties by which they are acquired, are the pro- 
 ducts of accumulated and organized experiences received by 
 ancestral races of beings (see Principles of Psychology). But 
 the doctrine that all knowledge is from experience, is not 
 originated by M. Comte ; nor is it claimed by him. He 
 himself says — " Tous les bons esprits repetent, depuis Bacon, 
 qu'il n'y a de connaissances reelle que celles qui reposent sur 
 des faites observes." And the elaboration and definite esta- 
 blishment of this doctrine, has been the special characteristic 
 of the English school of Psychology. Nor am I aware that 
 M. Comte, accepting this doctrine, has done anything to 
 make it more certain, or give it greater definiteness. Indeed it 
 was impossible for him to do so ; since he repudiates that part 
 of mental science by which alone this doctrine can be proved. 
 
 It is a further belief of M. Comte, that all knowledge is 
 phenomenal or relative ; and in this belief I entirely agree. 
 But no one alleges that the relativity of all knowledge was 
 first enunciated by M. Comte. Among others who have 
 more or less consistently held this truth, Sir William Hamil- 
 ton enumerates, Protagoras, Aristotle, St. Augustin, Boethius, 
 Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Gerson, Leo Hebroeus, Melanc- 
 thon, Scaliger, Francis Piccolomini, Giordano Bruno, Cam- 
 
32 
 
 panella, Bacon, Spinoza, Newton, Kant. And Sir "William 
 Hamilton, in his " Philosophy of the Unconditioned," first 
 published in 1829, has given a scientific demonstration of this 
 belief. Receiving it in common with other thinkers, from 
 preceding thinkers, M. Comte has not, to my knowledge, 
 advanced this belief. Nor indeed could he advance it, for 
 the reason already given — he denies the possibility of that 
 analysis of thought which discloses the relativity of all 
 cognition. 
 
 M. Comte reprobates the interpretation of different classes 
 of phenomena by assigning metaphysical entities as their 
 causes ; and I coincide in the opinion that the assumption 
 of such separate entities, though convenient, if not indeed 
 necessary, for purposes of thought, is, scientifically con- 
 sidered, illegitimate. This opinion is, in fact, a corollary 
 from the last ; and must stand or fall with it. But like the 
 last it has been held with more or less consistency for gene- 
 rations. M. Comte himself quotes Newton's favorite saying 
 — " ! Physics, beware of Metaphysics !" Neither to this 
 doctrine, any more than to the preceding doctrines, has M. 
 Comte given a firmer basis. He has simply re- asserted it ; 
 and it was out of the question for him to do more. In this 
 case, as in the others, his denial of subjective psychology 
 debarred him from proving that these metaphysical entities are 
 mere symbolic conceptions which do not admit of verification. 
 
 Lastly, M. Comte believes in invariable natural laws — 
 absolute uniformities of relation among phenomena. But 
 very many before him have believed in them too. Long 
 familiar even beyond the bounds of the scientific world, the 
 proposition that there is an unchanging order in things, has, 
 within the scientific world, held, for generations, the position 
 of an established postulate : by some men of science recog- 
 nized only as holding of inorganic phenomena ; but recog- 
 nized by other men of science, as universal. And M. Comte, 
 accepting this doctrine from the past, has left it substantially 
 
33 
 
 as it was. Though he has asserted new uniformities, I do 
 not think scientific men will admit that he has so demonstrated 
 them, as to make the induction more certain ; nor has he 
 deductively established the doctrine, by showing that uni- 
 formity of relation is a necessary corollary from the per- 
 sistence of force, as may readily be shown. 
 
 These, then, are the pre-established general truths with 
 which M. Comte sets out — truths which cannot be regarded 
 as distinctive of his philosophy. " But why," it will perhaps 
 be asked, " is it needful to point out this ; seeing that no 
 instructed reader supposes these truths to be peculiar to M. 
 Comte?" I reply that though no disciple of M. Comte 
 would deliberately claim them for him ; and though no 
 theological antagonist at all familiar with science and philo- 
 phy, supposes M. Comte to be the first propounder of them ; 
 yet there is so strong a tendency to associate any doctrines 
 with the name of a conspicuous recent exponent of them, 
 that false impressions are produced, even in spite of better 
 knowledge. Of the need for making this reclamation, 
 definite proof is at hand. In the JSTo. of the Revue des Deux 
 Mondes named at the commencement, may be found, on p. 936, 
 the words — " Toute religion, comme toute philosophie, a la 
 pretention de donner une explication de l'univers. La 
 philosophie qui s'appelle positive se distingue de toutes les 
 philosophies et de toutes les religions en ce qu'elle a renonce 
 a cette ambition de l'esprit humain ;" and the remainder of 
 the paragraph is devoted to explaining the doctrine of the 
 relativity of knowledge. The next paragraph begins — 
 " Tout imbu de ces idees, que nous exposons sans les discuter 
 pour le moment, M. Spencer divise, etc." JNow this is one 
 of those collocations of ideas which tends to create, or to 
 strengthen, the erroneous impression I would dissipate. I do 
 not for a moment suppose that M. Laugel intended to say 
 that these ideas which he describes as ideas of the " Positive 
 Philosophy," are peculiarly the ideas of M. Comte. But 
 
34 
 
 little as lie probably intended it, his expressions suggest this 
 conception. In the minds of both disciples and antagonists, 
 "the Positive Philosophy" means the philosophy of M. 
 Comte ; and to be imbued with the ideas of " the Positive 
 Philosophy'* means to be imbued with the ideas of M. Comte 
 — to have received these ideas from M. Comte. After what 
 has been said above, I need scarcely repeat that the con- 
 ception thus inadvertently suggested, is a wrong one. M. 
 Comte's brief enunciations of these general truths, gave me 
 no clearer apprehensions of them than I had before. Such 
 clarifications of ideas on these ultimate questions, as I can 
 trace to any particular teacher, I owe to Sir "William 
 Hamilton. 
 
 From the principles which M. Comte held in common with 
 many preceding and contemporary thinkers, let us pass now 
 to the principles that are distinctive of his system. Just as 
 entirely as I agree with M. Comte on those cardinal doctrines 
 which we jointly inherit ; so entirely do I disagree with him 
 on those cardinal doctrines which he propounds, and which 
 determine the organization of his philosophy. The best way 
 of showing this will be to compare, side by side, the — 
 
 Propositions Jeld ly Propositions which I hold. 
 
 "...chacune de nos con- The progress of our conceptions, 
 
 ceptions principales, chaque and of each branch of knowledge, is 
 
 branche de nos connaissan- from beginning to end intrinsically 
 
 ces, passe successivement alike. There are not three methods 
 
 par trois etats theoriques of philosophizing radically opposed; 
 
 diffdrens: l'etat theologique, but one method of philosophizing 
 
 ou fictif ; l'etat metaphy- which remains, in essence, the same, 
 
 sique, ou abstrait ; l'etat At first, and to the last, the conceived 
 
 scientifiquc, ou positif. Kn causal agencies of phenomena, have a 
 
 d'autres termes, l'esprit hu- degree of generality corresponding to 
 
 main, par sa nature, em- the width of the generalizations 
 
 ploie successivement dans which experiences have determined ; 
 
 chacune de ses recherches and they change just as gradually as 
 
 trois melhodcs de philoso- experiences accumulate. The into- 
 
35 
 
 pher, dont le caractere est 
 essentiellement different et 
 meme radicalement oppose : 
 d'abord la methode theolo- 
 gique, ensuite la methode 
 metaphysique, et enfin la 
 methode nositive." p. 3. 
 
 gration of causal agencies, originally 
 thought of as multitudinous and 
 local, but finally believed to be one 
 and universal, is a process which in- 
 volves the passing through all inter- 
 mediate steps between these extremes ; 
 and any appearance of stages can be 
 but superficial. Supposed concrete 
 and individual causal agencies, co- 
 alesce in the mind as fast as groups 
 of phenomena are assimilated, or seen 
 to be similarly caused. Along with 
 their coalescence, comes a greater ex- 
 tension of their individualities, and 
 a concomitant loss of distinctness in 
 their individualities. Gradually, by 
 continuance of such coalescences, 
 causal agencies become, in thought, 
 diffused and indefinite. And even- 
 tually, without any change in the 
 nature of the process, there is reached 
 the consciousness of a universal causal 
 agency, which cannot be conceived.* 4 
 
 As the progress of thought is one, 
 so is the end one. There are not 
 three possible terminal conceptions ; 
 but only a single terminal conception. 
 When the theological idea of the 
 providential action of one being, is 
 developed to its ultimate form, by the 
 absorption of all independent second- 
 ary agencies, it becomes the conception 
 of a being immanent in all pheno- 
 mena ; and the reduction of it to this 
 state, implies the fading-away, in 
 thought, of all those anthropomorphic 
 attributes by which the aboriginal 
 
 " Le systeme theologique 
 est parvenu a, la plus haute 
 perfection dont il soit sus- 
 ceptible, quand il a substi- 
 tue Taction providentielle 
 d'un etre unique au jeu 
 varie des nombreuses divi- 
 nites independantes qui a- 
 vaient ete imaginees primi- 
 tivement. De meme, le 
 dernier terme du systeme 
 metaphysique consiste a 
 concevoir, au lieu des dif- 
 ferentes entitesparticulieres, 
 
 * A clear illustration of this process, is furnished by the recent mental inte- 
 gration of Heat, Light, Electricity, etc., as modes of molecular motion. If we 
 go a step back, we see that the modern conception of Electricity, resulted from 
 the integration in consciousness, of the two forms of it evolved in the galvanic 
 battery and in the electric-machine. And going back to a still earlier stage, Ave 
 see how the conception of statical electricity, arose by the coalescence in thought, 
 of the previously-separate forces manifested in rubbed amber, in rubbed glass, and 
 in lightning. With such illustrations before him, no one can, I think, doubt 
 that the process has been the same from the beginning. 
 
36 
 
 une seule grande entite ge- 
 nerate, la nature, envisage e 
 comme la source unique de 
 tous les phenomenes. Pa- 
 reillement, la perfection du 
 systeme positif, vers laquelle 
 il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
 soit tres-probable qu'il ne 
 doive jamais l'atteindre, 
 serait de pouvoir se repre- 
 sentor tous les divers phe- 
 nomenes observables comme 
 des cas particuliers d'un 
 seul fait general, tel que 
 celui de la gravitation, par 
 exemple." p. 5. 
 
 idea was distinguished. The alleged 
 last term of the metaphysical system 
 — the conception of a single great 
 general entity, nature, as the source 
 of all phenomena^ — is a conception 
 identical with the previous one : the 
 consciousness of a single source which, 
 in coming to be regarded as universal, 
 ceases to be regarded as conceivable, 
 differs in nothing but name from the 
 consciousness of one being, mani- 
 fested in all phenomena. And simi- 
 larly, that which is described as the 
 ideal state of science — the power to 
 represent all observable phenomena 
 as particular cases of a single general 
 fact, implies the postulating of some 
 ultimate existence of which this 
 single fact is alleged ; and the postu- 
 lating of this ultimate existence, 
 involves a state of consciousness in- 
 distinguishable from the other two. 
 
 "...la perfection du sys- 
 teme positif, vers laquelle 
 il tend sans cesse, quoiqu'il 
 soit tres-probable qu'il ne 
 doive jamais Tatteindre, 
 serait de pouvoir se repre- 
 senter tous les divers phe- 
 nomenes observables comme 
 des cas particuliers d'un 
 seul fait general, p. 5 ... 
 . . . considerant comme ab- 
 solument inaccessible, et 
 vide de sens pour nous la 
 recherche de ce qu'on ap- 
 pelle les causes, soit pre- 
 mieres, soit finales." p. 14. 
 
 Though along with the extension 
 of generalizations, and concomitant 
 integration of conceived causal agen- 
 cies, the conceptions of causal agencies 
 grow more indefinite ; and though as 
 they gradually coalesce into a uni- 
 versal causal agency, they cease to be 
 representable in thought, and are 
 no longer supposed to be comprehen- 
 sible ; yet the consciousness of cause 
 remains as dominant to the last as it 
 was at first; and can never be got 
 rid of. The consciousness of cause 
 can be abolished only by abolishing 
 consciousness itself* {First Princi- 
 ples, § 26.) 
 
 * Possibly it "will be said that M. Comte himself admits, that what he calls the 
 perfection of the positive system, will probably never be reachycl ; and that what 
 he condemns is the inquiry into the natures of causes and not the general recog- 
 nition of cause. To the first of these allegations, I reply tnat, as I understand 
 M. Comte, the obstacle to the perfect realization of the positive philosophy is the 
 impossibility of carrying generalization so far as to reduce all particular tacts to 
 
37 
 
 "Ce n'est pas aux lec- 
 teurs de cet ouvrage que je 
 croirai jamais devoir prou- 
 ver que les idees gouvernent 
 et bouleversent le monde, 
 ou, en d'autrcs termes, que 
 tout le mecanisme social 
 repose finalement sur des 
 opinions. lis savent surtout 
 que la grande crise politique 
 et morale des societes ac- 
 tuelles tient, en derniere 
 analyse, a l'anarchie intel- 
 lectuelle." p. 48.* 
 
 Ideas do not govern and overthrow 
 the world : the world is governed or 
 overthrown by feelings, to which 
 ideas serve only as guides. The 
 social mechanism does not rest finally 
 upon opinions; but almost wholly up- 
 on character. Not intellectual anar- 
 chy, but moral antagonism, is the 
 cause of political crises. All social 
 phenomena are produced by the to- 
 tality of human emotions and beliefs : 
 of which the emotions are mainly 
 pre-determined, while the beliefs are 
 mainly post-determined. Men's de- 
 sires are chiefly inherited ; but their 
 beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend 
 on surrounding conditions; and the 
 most important surrounding condi- 
 tions depend on the social state which 
 the prevalent desires have produced. 
 The social state at any time existing, 
 is the resultant of all the ambitions, 
 self-interests, fears, reverences, in- 
 dignations, sympathies, etc., of an- 
 cestral citizens and existing citizens. 
 The ideas current in this social state, 
 must, on the average, be congruous 
 with the feelings of citizens ; and 
 therefore, on the average, with the 
 social state these feelings have pro- 
 
 cascs of one general fact — not the impossibility of excluding the consciousness of 
 cause. And to the second allegation I reply, that the essential principle of his 
 philosophy, is an avowed ignoring of cause altogether. For if it is not, what be- 
 comes of his alleged distinction between the perfection of the positive system and the 
 perfection of the metaphysical system ? And here let me point out that, by affirm- 
 ing exactly the opposite to that which M. Comte thus affirms, I am excluded 
 from the positive school. If his own definition of positivism is to he taken, 
 then, as I hold that what he defines as positivism is an absolute impossibility, 
 it is clear that I cannot be what he calls a positivist. 
 
 * A friendly critic alleges that M. Comte is not fairly represented by this 
 quotation, and that he is blamed by his biographer, M. Littre, for his too-great 
 insistance on feeling as a motor of humanity. If in his "Positive Politics," 
 which I presume is here referred to, M. Comte abandons his original position, so 
 much the better. But I am here dealing with what is known as "the Positive 
 Philosophy ; " and that the passage above quoted does not misrepresent it, is proved 
 both by the fact that this doctrine is re-asserted at the commencement of the 
 Sociology, and by the fact that M. Comte's adherent, Mr. Buckle, re-asserts it 
 in full. 
 
38 
 
 " . . . je ne dois pas negliger 
 d'indiquer d'avance, comrne 
 une propriete essentielle de 
 l'echelle encyclopedique que 
 je vais proposer, sa con- 
 forniite generale avec l'en- 
 semble de l'histoire scien- 
 tifique; en ce sens, que, 
 malgre la simultaneitereelle 
 et continue du developpe- 
 ment desdiffe rentes sciences, 
 celles qui seront classees 
 comme anterieures seront, 
 en effet, plus anciennes et 
 constamment plus avancees 
 que celles presentees comme 
 
 posterieures." p. 84 
 
 . . . . "Cet ordre est de- 
 termine par le degre de sim- 
 plicity, ou, ce qui revient 
 au me me, par le degre de 
 generalite des phenomenes." 
 p. 87. 
 
 duced. Ideas wholly foreign to this 
 social state cannot be evolved, and if 
 introduced from without, cannot get 
 accepted — or, if accepted, die out 
 when the temporary phase of feeling 
 which caused their acceptance, ends. 
 Hence, though advanced ideas when 
 once established, act upon society 
 and aid its further advance ; yet the 
 establishment of such, ideas depends 
 on the fitness of the society for re- 
 ceiving them. Practically, the popu- 
 lar character and the social state, 
 determine what ideas shall be cur- 
 rent; instead of the current ideas 
 determining the social state and the 
 character. The modification of men's 
 moral natures, caused by the continu- 
 ous discipline of social life, which 
 adapts them more and more to social 
 relations, is therefore the chief proxi- 
 mate cause of social progress. (Social 
 Statics, chap, xxx.) 
 
 The order in which the generaliza- 
 tions of science are established, is 
 determined by the frequency and im- 
 pressiveness with which different 
 classes of relations are repeated in 
 conscious experience ; and this de- 
 pends, partly on the directness with 
 which personal welfare is affected; 
 partly on the conspicuousness of one or 
 both the phenomena between ichich a 
 relation is to be perceived; partly on the 
 absolute frequency with which the re- 
 lations occur; partly on their relative 
 frequency of occurrence; partly on 
 their deyree of simplicity ; and partly 
 on their degree of abstractness. (Fird 
 Principles, § 36). 
 
39 
 
 "EnrSsultat definitif, la 
 mathematique, l'astronomie, 
 la physique, la chiraie, la 
 physiologie, et la physique 
 sociale ; telle est la formule 
 enclyopedique qui, parmi le 
 ties-grand norabre de clas- 
 siiications que component 
 les six sciences fondamen- 
 tales, est seule logiquement 
 conforme a la hierarchie 
 naturelle et invariable des 
 phenomenes," p. 115. 
 
 " On congoit, en effet, que 
 l'etude rationelle de chaque 
 science fondamentale exi- 
 geant la culture prealable 
 de toutes celles qui la pre- 
 cedent dans notre hierarchie 
 enclyopedique, n'a pu faire 
 de progres reels et prendre 
 son veritable caractere, qu* 
 apres un grand developpe- 
 ment des sciences ante- 
 rieures relatives a des phe- 
 nomenes plus generaux, plus 
 abstraits, moins compliques, 
 et independans des autres. 
 C'est done dans cet ordre 
 que la progression, quoique 
 simultanee, a du avoir lieu." 
 p. 100. 
 
 The sciences as arranged in this 
 succession specified by M. Comte, do 
 not logically conform to the natural 
 and invariable hierarchy of pheno- 
 mena; and there is no serial order 
 whatever in which they can be placed, 
 which represents either their logical 
 dependence or the dependence of phe- 
 nomena. (See Genesis of Science, 
 and foregoing Essay.) 
 
 The historical development of the 
 sciences has not taken place in this 
 serial order; nor in any other serial 
 order. There is no "true filiation 
 of the sciences." From the begin- 
 ning, the abstract sciences, the 
 abstract-concrete sciences, and the 
 concrete sciences, have progressed to- 
 gether : the first solving problems 
 which the second and third present- 
 ed, and growing only by the solution 
 of the problems ; and the second 
 similarly growing by joining the first 
 in solving the problems of the third. 
 All along there has been a continuous 
 action and reaction between the three 
 great classes of sciences — an advance 
 from concrete facts to abstract facts, 
 and then an application of such ab- 
 stract facts to the analysis of new 
 orders of concrete facts. (See Genesis 
 of Science.) 
 
 Such then are the organizing principles of M. Comte's 
 philosophy. Leaving out of his "Exposition" those pre- 
 established general doctrines which are the common property 
 of modern thinkers ; these are the general doctrines which 
 remain — these are the doctrines which fundamentally dis- 
 tinguish his system. From every one of them I dissent. 
 To each proposition I oppose either a widely-different pro- 
 
40 
 
 / 
 
 position, or a direct negation ; and I not only do it now, but 
 have done it from the time when I became acquainted with 
 his writings. This rejection of his cardinal principles should, 
 I think, alone suffice ; but there are sundry other views 
 of his, some of them largely characterizing his system, 
 which I equally reject. Let us glance at them. 
 
 How organic beings have 
 originated, is an inquiry 
 which M. Comte deprecates 
 as a useless speculation : as- 
 serting, as he does, that 
 species are immutable. 
 
 M. Comte contends that 
 cf what'is commonly known 
 as mental science, all that 
 most important part which 
 consists of the subjective 
 analysis of our ideas, is an 
 impossibility. 
 
 M. Comte' s ideal of so- 
 ciety is one in which govern- 
 ment is developed to the 
 greatest extent — in which 
 class -functions are far more 
 under conscious public regu- 
 lation than now — in which 
 hierarchical organization 
 with unquestioned authority 
 shall guide everything — in 
 which the individual life 
 6hall be subordinated in the 
 greatest degree to the social 
 life. 
 
 This inquiry, I believe, admits of 
 answer, and will be answered. That 
 division of Biology which concerns 
 itself with the origin of species, I 
 hold to be the supreme division, to 
 which all others are subsidiary. For 
 on the verdict of Biology on this 
 matter, must wholly depend our con- 
 ception of human nature, past, pre- 
 sent, and future ; our theory of the 
 mind ; and our theory of society. 
 
 I have very emphatically expressed 
 my belief in a subjective science of 
 the mind, by writing a Principles of 
 Psychology, one half of which is sub- 
 jective. 
 
 That form of society towards which 
 we are progressing, I hold to be one 
 in which government will be reduced 
 to the smallest amount possible, and 
 freedom increased to the greatest 
 amount possible — one in which 
 human nature will have become so 
 moulded by social discipline into fit- 
 ness for the social state, that it will 
 need little external restraint, but will 
 be self-restrained — one in which the 
 citizen will tolerate no interference 
 with his freedom, save that which 
 maintains the equal freedom of others 
 — one in which the spontaneous co- 
 operation which has developed our 
 industrial system, and is now develop- 
 
41 
 
 ing it with increasing rapidity, will 
 produce agencies for the discharge of 
 nearly all social functions, and will 
 leave to the primary govermental 
 agency nothing beyond the function 
 of maintaining those conditions to 
 free action, which make such spon- 
 taneous co-operation possible — one in 
 which individual life will thus be 
 pushed to the greatest extent consis- 
 tent with social life; and in which 
 social life will have no other end than 
 to maintain the completest sphere for 
 individual life 
 
 M. Comte, not including 
 in his philosophy the con- 
 sciousness of a cause mani- 
 fested to us in all phe- 
 nomena, and yet holding 
 that there must be a reli- 
 gion, which must have an 
 object, takes for his object 
 —Humanity. "This Col- 
 lective Life (of Society) A is 
 in Comte' s system the Etre 
 Supreme ; the only one we 
 can know, therefore the only 
 one we can worship.'* 
 
 I conceive, on the other hand, that 
 the object of religious sentiment will 
 ever continue to be, that which it has 
 ever been — the unknown source of 
 things. "While the forms under which 
 men are conscious of the unknown 
 source of things, may fade away, 
 the substance of the consciousness is 
 permanent. Beginning with causal 
 agents conceived as imperfectly 
 known ; progressing to causal agents 
 conceived as less known and less 
 knowable; and coming at last to a 
 universal causal agent posited as 
 not to be known at all ; the religious 
 sentiment must ever continue to oc- 
 cupy itself with this universal causal 
 agent. Having in the course of 
 evolution, come to have for its object 
 of contemplation, the Infinite Un- 
 knowable, the religious sentiment can 
 never again (unless by retrogression) 
 take a Finite Knowable, like Human- 
 ity, for its object of contemplation. 
 
 Here, then, are sundry other points, all of them important, 
 and the last two supremely important, on which I am 
 diametrically opposed to M. Comte ; and did space permit, 
 I could add many others. Radically differing from him as I 
 thus do, in everything distinctive of his philosophy; and 
 
42 
 
 having invariably expressed my dissent, publicly and 
 privately, from the time I became acquainted with his 
 writings ; it may be imagined that I have been not a little 
 startled to find myself classed as one of the same school. 
 That those who have read 'First Principles only, may have 
 been betrayed into this error in the way above shown, by the 
 ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive Philosophy," I can 
 understand. But that any who are acquainted with my pre- 
 vious writings, should suppose I have any general sympathy 
 with M. Comte, save that implied by preferring proved facts 
 to superstitions, astonishes me. 
 
 It is true that, disagreeing with M. Comte, though I do, 
 in all those fundamental views that are peculiar to him, 
 I agree with him in sundry minor views. The doctrine that 
 the education of the individual should accord in mode and 
 arfangement with the education of mankind, considered 
 historically, I have cited from him ; and have endeavoured 
 to enforce it. I entirely concur in his opinion that there 
 requires a new order of scientific men, whose function shall 
 be that of co-ordinating the results arrived at by the rest. 
 To him I believe I am indebted for the conception of a 
 social consensus ; and when the time comes for dealing with 
 this conception, I shall state my indebtedness. And I also 
 adopt his word, Sociology. There are, I believe, in the part 
 of his writings which I have read, various incidental thoughts 
 of great depth and value ; and I doubt not that were I to 
 read more of his writings, I should find many others.* It 
 is very probable, too, that I have said (as I am told I have) 
 some things which M. Comte had already said. It would be 
 difficult, I believe, to find any two men who had no opinions 
 in common. And it would be extremely strange if two men, 
 
 * M. Comte' s "Exposition" I read in the original in 1S53; and in two 
 or three other places have referred to the original to get his exact words. 
 The Inorganic Physics, and the first chapter of the Biology, I read in Miss 
 Martinean's condensed translation, when it appeared. The rest of M. Comto'a 
 views I know only through Mr. Lewes's outline, and through incidental references. 
 
43 
 
 starting from the same general doctrines established by 
 modern science, should traverse some of the same fields of 
 inquiry, without their lines of thought having any points 
 of intersection. But none of these minor agreements can be 
 of much weight in comparison with the fundamental dis- 
 agreements above specified. Leaving out of view that general 
 community which we both have with the scientific thought 
 of the age, the differences between us are essential, while 
 the correspondences are non-essential. And I venture to 
 think that kinship must be determined by essentials, and 
 not by non-essentials.* 
 
 Joined with the ambiguous use of the phrase "Positive 
 Philosophy," which has led to a classing with M. Comte 
 of many men who either ignore or reject his distinctive 
 principles, there has been one special circumstance that has 
 tended to originate and maintain this classing in my own 
 case. The assumption of some relationship between M. Comte 
 and myself, was unavoidably raised by the title of my first 
 book — Social Statics. When that book was published, I was 
 unaware that this title had been before used : had I 
 known the fact, I should certainly have adopted an alternative 
 title which I had in view.f If, however, instead of the title, 
 
 * In his recent work, Auguste Comte et la Philosophic Positive, M. Littre, 
 defending the Comtean classification of the sciences from the criticism I made 
 upon it in the " Genesis of Science," deals with me wholly as an antagonist. 
 The chapter he devotes to his reply, opens hy placing me in direct antithesis 
 to the English adherents of Comte, named in the preceding chapter. 
 
 f I believed at the time, and have never doubted until now, that the choice 
 of this title was absolutely independent of its previous use by M Comte. While 
 writing these pages, I have found reason to think the contrary. On referring to Social 
 Statics, to see what were my views of social evolution in 1850, when M. Comte 
 was to me but a name, I met with the following sentence : — " Social philosophy 
 may be aptly divided (as political economy has been) into statics and dynamics." 
 (p. 409). This I remembered to be a reference to a division which I had seen in 
 the Political Economy of Mr. Mill. But why had I not mentioned Mr. Mill's name ? 
 On referring to the first edition of his work, I found, at the opening of Book iv., 
 this sentence : — "The three preceding parts include as detailed a view as the limits 
 of this treatise permit, of what, by a happy generalization of a mathematical 
 phrase, has been called the Statics of the subject." Here was the solution of the 
 question. The division had not been made by Mr. Mill, but by some writer 
 (on Political Economy I supposed) who was not named by him ; and whom I did 
 not know. It is now manifest, however, that while I supposed I was giving 
 a more extended use to this division, I was but returning to the original use 
 
44 
 
 the work itself be considered, its ir relation to the philosopny 
 of M. Comte, becomes abundantly manifest. There is decisive 
 testimony on this point. In the North British Revieiv for 
 August, 1851, a reviewer of Social Statics says — 
 
 "The title of this work, however, is a complete misnomer. 
 According to all analogy, the phrase "Social Statics" should be 
 used only in some such sense as that in which, as we have already 
 explained, it is used by Comte, namely as designating a branch of 
 inquiry whose end it is to ascertain the laws of social equilibrium 
 or order, as distinct ideally from those of social movement or progress. 
 Of this Mr. Spencer does not seem to have had the slightest notion, 
 but to have chosen the name for his work only as a means of indi- 
 cating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a 
 scientific manner." p. 321. 
 
 Respecting M. Comte's application of the words statics 
 and dynamics to social phenomena, now that I know what 
 it is, I will only say that while I perfectly understand how, 
 by a defensible extension of their mathematical meanings, 
 the one may be used to indicate social functions in balance, 
 and the other social functions out of balance, I am quite at a 
 loss to understand how the phenomena of structure can be 
 included in the one any more than in the other. But the 
 two things which here concern me, are, first, to point out that 
 I had not "the slightest notion" of giving Social Statics the 
 meaning which M. Comte gave it ; and, second, to explain 
 the meaning which I did give it. The units of any ag- 
 gregate of matter, are in equilibrium when they severally 
 act and re-act upon each other on all sides with equal forces. 
 A state of change among them implies that there are forces 
 exercised by some that are not counterbalanced by like 
 forces exercised by others; and a state of rest implies the 
 absence of such uncounterbalanced forces — implies, if the 
 units are homogeneous, equal distances among them — 
 implies a maintenance of their respective spheres of molecular 
 
 which Mr. Mill had limited to his special topic. Another thing is, I think, 
 tolerahly manifest. As I evidently wished to point out my obligation to some 
 unknown political economist, avIiosc division I thought I was extending, I should 
 have named him had I known who he was. And in that case should not have 
 put this extension of the division as though it were new 
 
45 
 
 motion. Similarly among the units of a society, the funda- 
 mental condition to equilibrium, is, that the restraining forces 
 which the units exercise on each other, shall be balanced. 
 If the spheres of action of some units are diminished by 
 extension of the spheres of action of others, there necessarily 
 results an unbalanced force which tends to produce political 
 change in the relations of individuals ; and the tendency 
 to change can cease, only when individuals cease to aggress 
 on each other's spheres of action — only when there is 
 maintained that law of equal freedom, which it was the 
 purpose of Social Statics to enforce in all its consequences. 
 Besides this totally-unlike conception of what constitutes 
 Social Statics, the work to which I applied that title, is 
 fundamentally at variance with M. Comte's teachings in 
 almost everything. So far from alleging, as M. Comte does, 
 that society is to be re-organized by philosophy ; it alleges 
 that society is to be re-organized only by the accumulated 
 effects of habit on character. Its aim is not the increase 
 of authoritative control over citizens, but the decrease of it. 
 A more pronounced individualism, instead of a more pro- 
 nounced nationalism, is its ideal. So profoundly is my 
 political creed at variance with the creed of M. Comte, that, 
 unless I am misinformed, it has been instanced by a leading 
 English disciple of M. Comte, as the creed to which he has 
 the greatest aversion. One point of coincidence, however, 
 is recognizable. The analogy between an individual organism 
 and a social organism, which was held by Plato and by 
 Hobbes, is asserted in Social Statics, as it is in the Sociology 
 of M. Comte. Yery ' rightly, M. Comte has made this 
 analogy the cardinal idea of this division of his philosophy. 
 In Social Statics, the aim of which is essentially ethical, 
 this analogy is pointed out incidentally, to enforce certain 
 ethical considerations ; and is there obviously suggested 
 partly by the definition of life which Coleridge derived from 
 Schelling, and partly by the generalizations of physiologists 
 there referred to (chap. xxx. §§. 12, 13, 16). Excepting 
 
46 
 
 this incidental agreement, however, the contents of Social 
 Statics are so wholly antagonistic to the philosophy of 
 M. Comte, that, but for the title, the work would never, 
 I think, have raised the remembrance of him — unless, indeed, 
 by the association of opposites.* 
 
 And now let me point out that which really has exercised 
 a profound influence over my course of thought. The truth 
 which Harvey's embryological inquiries first dimly indicated, 
 which was more clearly perceived by Wolff and Goethe, and 
 which was put into a definite shape by Yon Baer — the truth 
 that all organic development is a change from a state of 
 homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity — this it is from 
 which very many of the conclusions which I now hold, 
 have indirectly resulted. In Social Statics, there is every- 
 where manifested a dominant belief in the evolution of man 
 and of society. There is also manifested the belief that this 
 evolution is in both cases determined by the incidence of 
 conditions — the actions of circumstances. And there is 
 further, in the sections above referred to, a recognition of 
 the fact that organic and social evolutions, conform to the 
 same law. Falling amid beliefs in evolutions of various 
 orders, every where determined by natural causes (beliefs again 
 displayed in the Theory of Population and in the Principles 
 of Psychology) ; the formula of Yon Baer acted as an 
 organizing principle. The extension of it to other kinds 
 of phenomena than those of individual and social organiza- 
 
 * Let me add that the conception developed in Social Sialics, dates back to a 
 series of letters on the " Proper Sphere of Government," published in the 
 Nonconformist newspaper, in the latter half of 1842, and republished as a 
 pamphlet in 1843. In these letters will be found, along with many crude ideas, 
 the same belief in the conformity of social phenomena to unvariable laws ; the 
 same belief in human progression as determined by such laws ; tiie same belief 
 in the moral modification of men as caused by social discipline ; the same 
 belief in the tendency of social arrangements "of themselves to assume 
 a condition of stable equilibrium ;" the same repudiation of state-control over 
 various departments of social life ; the same limitation of state-action to the 
 maintenance of equitable relations among citizens. The writing of Social Sialic* 
 arose from a dissatisfaction with the basis on which the doctrines set forth in those 
 letters were placed : the second half of that work is an elaboration of these 
 doctrines ; and the lirst half a statement of the principles from which they are 
 dcducible. 
 
47 
 
 tion, is traceable through successive stages. It may be seen 
 in the last paragraph of an essay on "The Philosophy of 
 Style," published in October, 1852; again in an essay on 
 "Manners and Fashion," published in April, 1854; and 
 then, in a comparatively advanced form, in an essay on 
 "Progess: its Law and Cause," published in April, 1857. 
 Afterwards, there came the recognition of the need for 
 further limitation of this formula ; next the inquiry into 
 those general laws of force from which this universal trans- 
 formation necessarily results ; next the deduction of these 
 from the ultimate law of the persistence of force ; next the 
 perception that there is everywhere a process of Dissolution 
 complementary to that of Evolution ; and, finally, the deter- 
 mination of the conditions (specified in the foregoir g essay) 
 under which Evolution and Dissolution respectively occur. 
 The filiation of these results, is, I think, tolerably manifest. 
 The process has been one of continuous development, set up 
 by the addition of Yon Baer's law to a number of ideas that 
 were in harmony with it. And I am not conscious of any 
 other influences by which the process has been affected. 
 
 It is possible, however, that there may have been influences 
 of which I am not conscious ; and my opposition to M. 
 Comte's system may have been one of them. The presenta- 
 tion of antagonistic thoughts, often produces greater definite- 
 ness and development of one's own thoughts. It is probable 
 that the doctrines set forth in the essay on " The Genesis of 
 Science," might never have been reached, had not my very 
 decided dissent from M. Comte's conception, led me to work 
 them out ; and but for this, I might not have arrived at the 
 classification of the sciences exhibited in the foregoing essay. 
 Yery possibly there are other cases in which the stimulus of 
 repugnance to M. Comte's views, may have aided in elaborat- 
 ing my own views ; though I cannot call to mind any other 
 cases. 
 
 Let it by no means be supposed from all I have said, that 
 I do not regard M. Comte's speculations as of great value 
 
48 
 
 True or untrue, his system as a whole, has doubtless produced 
 important and salutary revolutions of thought in many 
 minds; and will doubtless do so in many more. Doubtless, 
 too, not a few of those who dissent from his general views, 
 have been heathfully stimulated by the consideration of them. 
 The presentation of scientific knowledge and method as a 
 whole, whether rightly or wrongly co-ordinated, cannot have 
 failed greatly to widen the conceptions of most of his readers. 
 And he has done especial service by familiarizing men with 
 the idea of a social science, based on the other sciences. 
 Beyond which benefits resulting from the general character 
 and scope of his philosophy, I believe that there are scattered 
 through his pages, many large ideas that are valuable not 
 only as stimuli, but for their actual truth. 
 
 It has been by no means an agreeable task to make these 
 personal explanations ; but it has seemed to me a task not to 
 be avoided. Differing so profoundly as I do from M. Comte 
 on all fundamental doctrines, save those which we inherit in 
 common from the past ; it has become needful to dissipate 
 the impression that I agree with him — needful to show that 
 a large part of what is currently known as "positive 
 philosophy," is not "positive philosophy" in the sense of 
 being peculiarly M. Comte's philosophy; and to show that 
 beyond that portion of the so-called "positive philosophy" 
 which is not peculiar to him, I dissent from it. 
 
 And now at the close, as at the outset, let me express my 
 great regret that these explanations should have been called 
 forth by the statements of a critic who has treated me so liber- 
 ally. Nothing will, I fear, prevent the foregoing pages from 
 appearing like a very ungracious response to M. Laugel's 
 sympathetically-written review. I can only hope that the 
 gravity of the question at issue, in so far as it concerns 
 myself, may be taken in mitigation, if not as a sufficient 
 apology. 
 
 March 12th, 1864. ■ 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 [ The following chapter was contained in the first edition 0/ 
 First Principles. I omitted it from the re-organized second 
 edition, because it did not form an essential part of the new 
 structure. As it is referred to in the foregoing pages, and as 
 its general argument is germane to the contents of those pages, 
 I have thought well to append it here. Moreover, though 1 
 hope eventually to incorporate it in that division of the Prin- 
 ciples of Sociology which treats of Intellectual Progress, 
 yet as it must be long before it can thus re-appear in its per- 
 manent place, and as, should I not get so far in the execution 
 of my undertaking, it may never thus re-appear at all, it seems 
 proper to make it more accessible than it is at present. The 
 first and last sections, which served to link it into the argument 
 of the work to which it originally belonged, are omitted. The 
 rest has been carefully revised, and in some parts considerably 
 altered.~] 
 
 LAWS IN GENERAL, 
 
 The recognition of Law being the recognition of uni- 
 formity of relations among phenomena, it follows that the 
 order in which different groups of phenomena are reduced to 
 law, must depend on the frequency with which the uniform 
 relations they severally display are distinctly experienced. 
 At any given stage of progress, those uniformities will be 
 best known with which men's minds have been oftenest and 
 most strongly impressed. In proportion partly to the 
 number of times a relation has been presented to con- 
 sciousness (not merely to the senses), and in proportion 
 4 
 
50 
 
 partly to the vividness with which the terms of the relation 
 have been cognized, will be the degree in which the con- 
 stancy of connexion is perceived. 
 
 The succession in which relations are generalized being 
 thus determined, there result certain derivative principles 
 to which this succession must more immediately and ob- 
 viously conform. First is the directness with which 
 personal welfare is affected. While, among surrounding 
 things, many do not appreciably influence us in any 
 way, some produce pleasures and some pains, in various 
 degrees ; and manifestly, those things whose actions on the 
 organism for good or evil are most decided, will, ceteris 
 paribus, be those whose laws of action are earliest ob- 
 served. Second comes the conspicuousness of one or both 
 phenomena between which a relation is to be perceived. On 
 every side are phenomena so concealed as to be detected only 
 by close observation ; others not obtrusive enough to attract 
 notice ; others which moderately solicit the attention ; others 
 so imposing or vivid as to force themselves on consciousness ; 
 and, supposing conditions to be the same, these last will of 
 course be among the first to have their relations general- 
 ized. In the third place, we have the absolute frequency 
 with which the relations occur. There are coexistences and 
 sequences of all degrees of commonness, from those which 
 are ever present to those which are extremely rare ; and 
 manifestly, the rare coexistences and sequences, as well 
 as the sequences which are very long in taking place, 
 will not be reduced to law so soon as those which are 
 familiar and rapid. Fourthly has to be added 
 the relative frequency of occurrence. Many events and ap- 
 pearances are limited to certain times or certain places, or 
 both ; and, as a relation which does not exist within the 
 environment of an observer cannot be perceived by him, 
 however common it may be elsewhere or in another age, we 
 have to take account of the surrounding physical circuru- 
 
51 
 
 stances, as well as of the state of society, of the arts, and of 
 the sciences — all of which affect the frequency with which 
 certain groups of facts are observable. The 
 
 fifth corollary to be noticed is, that the succession in 
 which different classes of relations are reduced to law, de- 
 pends in part on their simplicity. Phenomena presenting 
 great composition of causes or conditions, have their essential 
 relations so masked, that it requires accumulated experiences 
 to impress upon consciousness the true connexions of ante- 
 cedents and consequents they involve. Hence, other things 
 equal, the progress of generalization will be from the simple 
 to the complex ; and this it is which M. Comte has wrongly 
 asserted to be the sole regulative principle of the pro- 
 gress. Sixth comes t/ie degree of abstractness. 
 Concrete relations are the earliest acquisitions. Such ana- 
 lyses of them as separate the essential connexions from their 
 disguising accompaniments, necessarily come later. The 
 analyses of the connexions, always more or less compound, 
 into their elements then becomes possible. And so on con- 
 tinually, until the highest and most abstract truths have 
 been reached. 
 
 These, then, are the several derivative principles. The 
 frequency and vividness with which uniform relations are 
 repeated in conscious experience, determining the recognition 
 of their uniformity, and this frequency and vividness depend- 
 ing on the above conditions, it follows that the order in 
 which different classes of facts are generalized, must depend 
 on the extent to which the above conditions are fulfilled in 
 each class. Let us mark how the facts harmonize with this 
 conclusion: taking first a few that elucidate the general 
 truth, and afterwards some that exemplify the special truths 
 which we here see follow from it. 
 
 The relations earliest known as uniformities, are those sub- 
 sisting between the common properties of matter — tangi- 
 
52 
 
 bility, visibility, cohesion, weight, etc. "We have no trace of 
 a time when the resistance offered by an object was regarded 
 as caused by the will of the object ; or when the pressure of 
 a body on the hand holding it, was ascribed to the agency of a 
 living being. And accordingly, these are the relations of which 
 we are oftenest conscious ; being objectively frequent, conspi- 
 cuous, simple, concrete, and of immediate personal concern. 
 
 Similarly with the ordinary phenomena of motion. The 
 fall of a mass on the withdrawal of its support, is a sequence 
 which directly affects bodily welfare, is conspicuous, simple 
 concrete, and very often repeated. Hence it is one of the 
 uniformities recognized before the dawn of tradition. We 
 know of no era when movements due to terrestrial gravi- 
 tation were attributed to volition. Only when the relation 
 is obscured — only, as in the case of an aerolite, where t\e 
 antecedent of the descent is unperceived, do we find the con- 
 ception of personal agency. On the other hand, mo- 
 tions of intrinsically the same order as that of a falling stone 
 — those of the heavenly bodies — long remain ungeneralized ; 
 and until their uniformity is seen, are construed as results of 
 will. This difference is clearly not dependent on compara- 
 tive complexity or abstractness ; since the motion of a planet 
 in an ellipse, is as simple and concrete a phenomenon as the 
 motion of a projected arrow in a parabola. But the ante- 
 cedents are not conspicuous ; the sequences are of long 
 duration ; and they are not often repeated. And that these 
 are the causes of their slow reduction to law, we see in the 
 fact that they are severally generalized in the order of their 
 frequency and conspicuousness — the moon's monthly cvcle, 
 the sun's annual change, the periods of the inferior planets, 
 the periods of the superior planets. 
 
 TVhile astronomical sequences were still ascribed to voli- 
 tion, certain terrestrial sequences of a different kind, but 
 some of them equally without complication, were interpreted 
 in like manner. The solidification of water at a low tempe- 
 
53 
 
 rature, is -a phenomenon that is simple, concrete, and of 
 much personal concern. But it is neither so frequent as 
 those which we see are earliest generalized, nor is the pre- 
 sence of the antecedent so manifest. Though in all "but 
 tropical climates, mid-winter displays the relation between 
 cold and freezing with tolerable constancy ; yet, during the 
 spring and autumn, the occasional appearance of ice in the 
 mornings has no very obvious connexion with coldness of 
 the weather. Sensation being so inaccurate a measure, it is 
 not possible for the savage to experience the definite relation 
 between a temperature of 32° and the congealing of water ; 
 and hence the long continued belief in personal agency. 
 Similarly, but still more clearly, with the winds. The ab- 
 sence of regularity and the inconspicuousness of the ante- 
 cedents, allowed the mythological explanation to survive for 
 a great period. 
 
 During the era in which the uniformity of many quite 
 simple inorganic relations was still unrecognized, certain 
 organic relations, intrinsically very complex and special, 
 were generalized. The constant coexistence of feathers and 
 a beak, of four legs with an internal bony framework, are 
 facts which were, and are, familiar to every savage. Did a 
 savage find a bird with teeth, or a mammal clothed with 
 feathers, he would be as much surprised as an instructed 
 naturalist. Now these uniformities of organic structure thus 
 early perceived, are of exactly the same kind as those more 
 numerous ones later established by biology. The constant 
 coexistence of mammary glands with two occipital condyles 
 to the skull, of vertebrae with teeth lodged in sockets, of 
 frontal horns with the habit of rumination, are generaliza- 
 tions as purely empirical as those known to the aboriginal 
 hunter. The botanist cannot in the least understand the 
 complex relation between papilionaceous flowers and seeds 
 borne in flattened pods : he knows these and like connexions 
 simply in the same way that the barbarian knows the con- 
 
54 
 
 nexions between particular leaves and particular kinds of 
 wood. But the fact that sundry of the uniform relations 
 which chiefly make up the organic sciences, were very early 
 recognized, is due to the high degree of vividness and fre- 
 quency with which they were presented to consciousness. 
 Though the connexion between the sounds characteristic of 
 a bird, and the possession of edible flesh, is extremely in- 
 volved ; yet the two terms of the relation are conspicuous, 
 often recur in experience, and a knowledge of their con- 
 nexion has a direct bearing on personal welfare. Meanwhile 
 innumerable relations of the same order, which are displayed 
 with even greater frequency by surrounding plants and 
 animals, remain for thousands of years unrecognised, if they 
 are unobtrusive or of no apparent moment. 
 
 When, passing from this primitive stage to a more ad- 
 vanced stage, we trace the discovery of those less familiar uni- 
 formities which mainly constitute what is distinguished as 
 Science, we find the succession in which knowledge of them 
 is reached, to be still determined in the same manner. This 
 will become obvious on contemplating separately the in- 
 fluence of each derivative condition. 
 
 How relations that have immediate bearings on the 
 maintenance of life, are, other things equal, fixed in the 
 mind before those which have no immediate bearings, the 
 history of Science abundantly illustrates. The habits of 
 existing uncivilized races, who fix times by moons and barter 
 so many of one article for so many of another, show us that 
 conceptions of equality and number, which are the germs of 
 mathematical science, were developed under the immediate 
 pressure of personal wants ; and it can scarcely be doubted 
 that those laws of numerical relations which are embodied in 
 the rules of arithmetic, were first brought to light through 
 the practice of mercantile exchange. Similarly with geo- 
 metry. The derivation of the word shows us that it ori- 
 
55 
 
 gin ally included only certain methods of partitioning ground 
 and laying out buildings. The properties of the scales and 
 the lever, involving the first principle in mechanics, were 
 early generalized under the stimulus of commercial and 
 architectural needs. To fix the times of religious festivals 
 and agricultural operations, were the motives which led to 
 the establishment of the simpler astronomic periods. Such 
 small knowledge of chemical relations as was involved in 
 ancient metallurgy, was manifestly obtained in seeking how 
 to improve tools and weapons. In the alchemy of later 
 times, we see how greatly an intense hope of private benefit 
 contributed to the disclosure of a certain class of uniformities. 
 Nor is our own age barren of illustrations. " Here," says 
 Humboldt, when in Guiana, " as in many parts in Europe, the 
 sciences are thought worthy to occupy the mind, only so far 
 as they confer some immediate and practical benefit on 
 society." " How is it possible to believe," said a missionary 
 to him, " that you have left your country to come to be de- 
 voured by mosquitoes on this river, and to measure lands 
 that are not your own." Our coasts furnish like instances. 
 Every sea- side naturalist knows how great is the contempt 
 with which fishermen regard the collection of objects for the 
 microscope or aquarium. Their incredulity as to the possible 
 value of such things is so great, that they can scarcely be 
 induced even by bribes to preserve the refuse of their nets. 
 Nay, we need not go for evidence beyond daily table-talk. 
 The demand for " practical science " — for a knowledge that 
 can be brought to bear on the business of life — joined to the 
 ridicule commonly vented on scientific pursuits having no 
 obvious uses, suffice to show that the order in which laws 
 are discovered greatly depends on the directness with which 
 they affect our welfare. 
 
 That, when all other conditions are the same, obtrusive 
 relations will be generalized before unobtrusive ones, is so 
 nearly a truism that examples appear almost superfluous. If 
 
56 
 
 it be admitted that by the aboriginal man, as by tbe child, 
 the co-existent properties of large surrounding objects are 
 noticed before those of minute objects, and that the external 
 relations which bodies present are generalized before their 
 internal relations, it must be admitted that in subsequent 
 stages of progress, the comparative conspicuousness of rela- 
 tions has greatly affected the order in which they were 
 recognized as uniform. Hence it happened that after the 
 establishment of those very manifest sequences constituting 
 a lunation, and those less manifest ones marking a year, and 
 those still less manifest ones marking the planetary periods, 
 astronomy occupied itself with such inconspicuous sequences 
 as those displayed in the repeating cycle of lunar eclipses, 
 and those which suggested the theory of epicycles and eccen- 
 trics ; while modern astronomy deals with still more incon- 
 spicuous sequences, some of which, as the planetary rotations, 
 are nevertheless the simplest which the heavens present. In 
 physics, the early use of canoes implied an empirical know- 
 ledge of certain hydrostatic relations that are intrinsically 
 mere complex than sundry static relations not empirically 
 known; but these hydrostatic relations were thrust upon 
 observation. Or, if we compare the solution of the problem 
 of specific gravity by Archimedes with the discovery of at- 
 mospheric pressure by Torricelli (the two involving me- 
 chanical relations of exactly the same kind), we perceive that 
 the much earlier occurrence of the first than the last was 
 determined, neither by a difference in the irbearings on per- 
 sonal welfare, nor by a difference in the frequency with 
 which illustrations of them came under observation, nor by 
 relative simplicity ; but by the greater obtrusiveness of the 
 connexion between antecedent and consequent in the one case 
 than in the other. Among miscellaneous illustrations, it 
 may be pointed out that the connexions between lightning 
 and thunder, and between rain and clouds, were recognized 
 long before others of the same order, simply because they 
 
57 
 
 thrust themselves on the attention. Or the long-delayed 
 discovery of the microscopic forms of life, with all the phe- 
 nomena they present, may be named as very clearly showing 
 how certain groups of relations not ordinarily perceptible, 
 though in other respects like long- familiar relations, have 
 to wait until changed conditions render them perceptible. 
 But, without further details, it needs only to consider the 
 inquiries which now occupy the electrician, the chemist, 
 the physiologist, to see that science has advanced, and is 
 advancing, from the more conspicuous phenomena to the less 
 conspicuous ones. 
 
 How the degree of absolute frequency of a relation affects 
 the recognition of its uniformity, we see in contrasting certain 
 biological facts. The connexion between death and bodily 
 injury, constantly displayed not only in men but in all in- 
 ferior creatures, was known as an instance of natural causa- 
 tion while yet deaths from diseases were thought super- 
 natural. Among diseases themselves, it is observable that 
 unusual ones were regarded as of demoniacal origin during 
 ages when the more frequent were ascribed to ordinary 
 causes : a truth paralleled among our own peasantry, who by 
 the use of charms show a lingering superstition with respect 
 to rare disorders, which they do not show with respect to 
 common ones, such as colds. Passing to physical illustra- 
 tions, we may note that within the historic period whirl- 
 pools were accounted for by the agency of water-spirits ; but 
 we do not find that within the same period the disappearance 
 of water on exposure either to the sun or to artificial heat 
 was interpreted in an analogous way : though a more mar- 
 vellous occurrence, and a much more complex one, its great 
 frequency led to the early recognition of it as a natural uni- 
 formity. Rainbows and comets do not differ much in con- 
 spicuousness, and a rainbow is intrinsically the more involved 
 phenomenon ; but chiefly because of their far greater com- 
 monness, rainbows were perceived to have a direct dependence 
 
5* 
 
 on sun and rain while yet comets were regarded as signs of 
 divine wrath. 
 
 That races living inland must long have remained ignorant 
 of the daily and monthly sequences of the tides, and that 
 tropical races could not early have comprehended the pheno- 
 mena of northern winters, are extreme illustrations of the 
 influence which relative frequency has on the recognition of 
 uniformities. Animals which, where they are indigenous, 
 call forth no surprise by their structures or habits, because 
 these are so familiar, when taken to countries where they 
 have never been seen, are looked at with an astonishment 
 approaching to awe — are even thought supernatural : a fact 
 which will suggest numerous others that show how the local- 
 ization of phenomena in part controls the order in which they 
 are reduced to law. Not only however does their localization 
 in space affect the progression, but also their localization in 
 time. Facts which are rarely if ever manifested in one era, 
 are rendered very frequent in another, simply through the 
 changes wrought by civilization. The lever, of which the 
 properties are illustrated in the use of sticks and weapons, is 
 vaguely understood by every savage — on applying it in a 
 certain way he rightly anticipates certain effects ; but the 
 wheel- and-axle, pulley, and screw, cannot have their powers 
 either empirically or rationally known till the advance of the 
 arts has more or less familiarized them. < Through those 
 various means of exploration which we have inherited and 
 added to, we have become acquainted with a vast range of 
 chemical relations that were relatively non-existent to the 
 primitive man. To highly-developed industries we owe both 
 the substances and the appliances that have disclosed to us 
 countless uniformities which our ancestors had no oppor- 
 tunity of seeing. These and like instances that will occur 
 to the reader, show that the accumulated materials, and pro- 
 cesses, and products, which characterize the environments of 
 complex societies, greatly increase the accessibility of various 
 
59 
 
 classes of relations ; and by so multiplying the experiences 
 of them, or making them relatively frequent, facilitate their 
 generalization. Moreover, various classes of phenomena 
 presented by society itself, as for instance those which 
 political economy formulates, become relatively frequent, and 
 therefore recognizable, in advanced social states ; while in 
 less advanced ones they are either too rarqly displayed to 
 have their relations perceived, or, as in the least advanced 
 ones, are not displayed at all. 
 
 That, where no other circumstances interfere, the order in 
 which different uniformities are established varies as their 
 complexity, is manifest. The geometry of straight lines was 
 understood before the geometry of curved lines ; the proper- 
 ties of the circle before the properties of the ellipse, parabola, 
 and hyperbola ; and the equations of curves of single cur- 
 vature were ascertained before those of curves of double 
 curvature. Plane trigonometry comes in order of time and 
 simplicity before spherical trigonometry ; and the mensura- 
 tion of plane surfaces and solids before the mensuration of 
 curved surfaces and solids. Similarly with mechanics : the 
 laws of simple motion were generalized before those of com- 
 pound motion ; and those of rectilinear motion before those 
 of curvilinear motion. The properties of equal- armed levers 
 or scales, were understood before those of levers with un- 
 equal arms ; and the law of the inclined plane was formulated 
 earlier than that of the screw, which involves it. In chemis- 
 try, the progress has been from the simple inorganic com- 
 pounds to the more involved or organic compounds. And 
 where, as in the higher sciences, the conditions of the explo- 
 ration are more complicated, we still may clearly trace 
 relative complexity as determining the order of discovery 
 where other things are equal. 
 
 The progression from concrete relations to abstract ones, 
 and from the less abstract to the more abstract, is equally 
 obvious. Numeration, which in its primary form concerned 
 
60 
 
 Itself only with groups of actual objects, came earlier than 
 simple arithmetic ; the rules of which deal with numbers 
 apart from objects. Arithmetic, limited in its sphere to con- 
 crete numerical relations, is alike earlier and less abstract 
 than Algebra, which deals with the relations of these rela- 
 tions* And in like manner, the Calculus of Operations comes 
 after Algebra, both in order of evolution and in order of ab- 
 stractness. In Mechanics, the more concrete relations of 
 forces exhibited in the lever, inclined plane, etc., were un- 
 derstood before the more abstract relations expressed in the 
 laws of resolution and composition of forces ; and later than 
 the three abstract laws of motion as formulated by Xewton 
 came the still more abstract law of inertia. Similarly with 
 Physics and Chemistry, there has been an advance from 
 truths entangled in all the specialities of particular facts 
 and particular classes of facts, to truths disentangled from 
 the disguising incidents under which they are manifested — 
 to truths of a higher abstractness. 
 
 Brief and rude as is this sketch of a mental development 
 that has been long and complicated, I venture to think it 
 shows inductively what was deductively inferred, that the 
 order in which separate groups of uniformities are recog- 
 nized, depends not on one circumstance but on several cir- 
 cumstances. The various classes of relations are generalized 
 in a certain succession, not solely because of one particular 
 kind of difference in their natures ; but also because they 
 are variously placed in time and in space, variously open to 
 observation, and variously related to our own constitutions : 
 our perception of them being influenced by all these con- 
 ditions in endless combinations. The comparative degrees 
 of importance, of obtrusiveness, of absolute frequency, of 
 relative frequency, of simplicity, of concreteness, are every 
 one of them factors ; and from their unions in proportions 
 that are never twice alike, there results a highly complex 
 process of mental evolution. But while it is thus manifest 
 
61 
 
 that the proximate causes of the succession in which relations 
 are reduced to law, are numerous and involved ; it is also 
 manifest that there is one ultimate cause to which these 
 proximate causes are subordinate. As the several circum- 
 stances that determine the early or late recognition of uni- 
 formities are circumstances that determine the number and 
 strength of the impressions which these uniformities make 
 on the mind, it follows that the progression conforms to a 
 certain fundamental principle of psychology. We see d 
 posteriorly what we concluded a priori, that the order in which 
 relations are generalized, depends on the frequency and 
 impressiveness with which they are repeated in conscious 
 experience. 
 
 Having roughly analyzed the progress of the past, let 
 us take advantage of the light thus thrown on the present, 
 and consider what is implied respecting the future. 
 
 Note first that the likelihood of the universality of Law 
 has been ever growing greater. Out of the countless co- 
 existences and sequences with which mankind are environed, 
 they have been continually transferring some from the group 
 whose order was supposed to be arbitrary, to the group 
 whose order is known to be uniform. And manifestly, as 
 fast as the relations that are unreduced to law become 
 fewer, the probability that among them there are some that 
 do not conform to law, becomes less. To put the argument 
 numerically — It is clear that when out of surrounding phe- 
 nomena a hundred of several kinds have been found to occur 
 in constant connexions, there arises a slight presumption that 
 all phenomena occur in constant connexions. When uni- 
 formity has been established in a thousand cases, more varied 
 in their kinds, the presumption gains strength. And when 
 the known cases of uniformity amount to myriads, including 
 many of each variety, it becomes an ordinary induction that 
 uniformity exists everywhere. 
 
62 
 
 Silently and insensibly their experiences have been press- 
 ing men on towards the conclusion thus drawn. Not out of 
 a conscious regard for these reasons, but from a habit of 
 thought which these reasons formulate and justify, all minds 
 have been advancing towards a belief in the constancy of 
 surrounding coexistences and sequences. Familiarity with 
 concrete uniformities has generated the abstract conception 
 of uniformity — the idea of Law ; and this idea has been in 
 successive generations slowly gaining fixity and clearness. 
 Especially has it been thus among those whose knowledge of 
 natural phenomena is the most extensive — men of science. 
 The mathematician, the physicist, the astronomer, the che- 
 mist, severally acquainted with the vast accumulations of 
 uniformities established by their predecessors, and themselves 
 daily adding new ones as well as verifying the old, acquire a 
 far stronger faith in law than is ordinarily possessed. "With 
 them this faith, ceasing to be merely passive, becomes an 
 active stimulus to inquiry. Wherever there exist pheno- 
 mena of which the dependence is not yet ascertained, these 
 most cultivated intellects, impelled by the conviction that 
 here too there is some invariable connexion, proceed to ob- 
 serve, compare, and experiment ; and when they discover 
 the law to which the phenomena conform, as they eventually 
 do, their general belief in the universality of law is further 
 strengthened. So overwhelming is the evidence, and such 
 the effect of this discipline, that to the advanced student of 
 nature, the proposition that there are lawless phenomena 
 has become not only incredible but almost inconceivable. 
 
 This habitual recognition of law which already distin- 
 guishes modern thought from ancient thought, must spread 
 among men at large. The fulfilment of predictions made 
 possible by every new step, and the further command gained 
 of nature's forces, prove to the uninitiated the validity of 
 scientific generalizations and the doctrine they illustrate. 
 Widening education is daily diffusing among the mass of 
 
63 
 
 men that knowledge of these generalizations which has been 
 hitherto confined to the few. And as fast as this diffusion 
 goes on, must the belief of the scientific become the belief of 
 the world at large. 
 
 That law is universal, will become an irresistible con- 
 clusion when it is perceived that the progress in the dis- 
 covery of laics itself conforms to law ; and when this percep- 
 tion makes it clear why certain groups of phenomena have 
 been reduced to law, while other groups are still unreduced. 
 When it is seen that the order in which uniformities are 
 recognized, must depend upon the frequency and vividness 
 with which they are repeated in conscious experience ; when 
 it is seen that, as a matter of fact, the most common, impor- 
 tant, conspicuous, concrete, and simple, uniformities were the 
 earliest recognized, because they were experienced oftenest 
 and most distinctly ; it will by implication be seen that long 
 after the great mass of phenomena have been generalized, 
 there must remain phenomena which, from their rareness, 
 or unobtrusiveness, or seeming unimportance, or complexity, 
 or abstractness, are still ungeneralized. Thus will be 
 
 furnished a solution to a difficulty sometimes raised. When 
 it is asked why the universality of law is not already fully 
 established, there will be the answer that the directions in 
 which it is not yet established are those in which its estab- 
 lishment must necessarily be latest. That state of things 
 which is inferable beforehand, is just the state which we find 
 to exist. If such coexistences and sequences as those of 
 Biology and Sociology are not yet reduced to law, the pre- 
 sumption is not that they are irreducible to law, but that their 
 laws elude our present means of analysis. Having long ago 
 proved uniformity throughout all the lower classes of rela- 
 tions, and having been step by step proving uniformity 
 throughout classes of relations successively higher and higher, 
 if we have not yet succeeded with the highest classes, it may 
 
64 
 
 be fairly concluded, that our powers are at fault, rather 
 than that the uniformity does not exist. And unless we 
 make the absurd assumption that the process of generaliza- 
 tion, now going on with unexampled rapidity, has reached 
 its limit, and will suddenly cease, we must infer that ul- 
 timately mankind will discover a constant order of mani- 
 festation even in the most involved and obscure phenomena. 
 
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 EDUCATION: 
 
 INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL, 
 
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 Part I. What Knowledge is of Most Worth. 
 
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 the age. — North American Review. 
 
 Its subjects are treated with profound ability and remarkable clearness of thought 
 and extent of research. — N. T. Observer. 
 
 We think it the most important book on the education of children ever written.— 
 American Agriculturist. 
 
 Profound in analysis, p-actical in suggestion, and sagacious in theory. — md« 
 ptndmt. 
 
 It throws a rare light upon the importance of studying the natural unfolding of 
 the powers, and ministering to them the proper food at the proper time. — Albion. 
 
 Barely have we seen a book of more cogent reasoning than this.— N. Y. EteninQ 
 Poet. 
 
Woiks of Herbert Spencer published by If. .Appleton & Co. 
 
 A NEW SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 FIRST PRINCIPLES. 
 
 Vol. Large 12mo. 515 Pages. Price $2 00. 
 
 Contents : 
 Part First. — The Unknowable. 
 
 ouaptei i. Religion and Science; II. Ultimate Religious ideas; ILL 
 Ultimate Scientific Ideas; IV. The Relativity of all Knowledge; V. The 
 Reconciliation. 
 
 Part Second. — Laws of the Knowable. 
 
 I. Laws in General; II. The Law of Evolution; III. The same con- 
 tinued; IV. The Causes of Evolution; V. Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and 
 Force ; VI. The Indestructibility of Matter ; VII. The Continuity of Motion ; 
 VIII. The Persistence of Force ; IX. The Correlation and Equivalence of 
 Forces; X. The Direction of Motion ; XI. The Rhythm of Motion; XII. The 
 Conditions Essential to Evolution ; XIII. The Instability of the Homoge- 
 neous; XIV. The Multiplication of Effects; XV. Differentiation and Inte- 
 gration ; XVI. Equilibration ; XVII. Summary and Conclusion. 
 
 In the first part of this work Mr. Spencer defines the province, limits, and 
 relations of religion and science, and determines the legitimate scope of 
 philosophy. 
 
 In part second he unfolds those fundamental principles which have been 
 arrived at within the sphere of the knowable ; which are true of all orders 
 of phenonema, and thus constitute the foundation of all philosophy. The 
 law of Evolution, Mr. Spencer maintains to be universal, and he has here 
 worked it out as the basis of his system. 
 
 These First Principles are the foundation of a system of Philosophy 
 bolder, more elaborate, and comprehensive perhaps, than any other which 
 nas been hitherto designed in England. — British Quarterly Review. 
 
 A work lofty in aim and remarkable in execution. — Corrihill Magazine. 
 
 In the works of Herbert Spencer we have the rudiments of a positive 
 Theology, and an immense step toward the perfection of the science of Psy- 
 chology.— Christian Examiner. 
 
 If we mistake not, in spite of the very negative character of his own re- 
 sults, he has foreshadowed some strong arguments for the doctrine of a posi- 
 ixve Christian Theology. — New Eng lander. 
 
 As far as the frontiers of knowledge, where the intellect may go, there is 
 BO living man whose guidance raav more safelv be trusted. — Ailanti* 
 Monthly. 
 
Works published by D. Appleion & Co. 
 
 THE CORRELATION AND CONSERVATION 
 
 FORCES 
 
 A SERIES OF EXPOSITIONS BY GROVE, MAYER, HELMHOLTZ, 
 FARADAY, LIEBIG, AND CARPENTER. 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION. 
 
 BY E. L. YOTJMANS. 
 
 The work embraces : 
 
 I.— THE CORRELATION OF PHYSICAL FORCES. By 
 W. R. Geove. (The complete work.) 
 
 II.— CELESTIAL DYNAMICS. By De. J. R. Maybe. 
 
 III.— THE INTERACTION OF FORCES. By Peof. Helm- 
 
 HOLTZ. 
 
 IV. — THE CONNECTION AND EQUIVALENCE OF 
 FORCES. By Peof. Liebig. 
 
 V.— ON THE CONSERVATION OF FORCE. By Db. 
 Faeaday. 
 
 VI.— ON THE CORRELATION OF PHYSICAL AND VI 
 TAL FORCES. By De. Caepenteb. 
 
Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appleton & Co. 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS OF UNIVERSAL PROGRESS 
 
 A SERIES OF DISCUSSIONS. 
 
 1 Vol Large 12mo. 470 Pages. Price 
 
 CONTENTS : 
 
 American Notice of Spencer's New System of Philosophy. 
 L Progress : its Law and Cause. 
 II. Manners and Fashion. 
 
 III. The Genesis of Science. 
 
 IV. The Physiology of Laughter. 
 
 V. The Origin and Function of Music. 
 
 VI. The Nebular Hypothesis. 
 
 VII. Bain on the Emotions and the Will. 
 
 VLTI. Illogical Geology. 
 
 IX. The Development Hypothesis. 
 
 X. The Social Organism. 
 
 XI. Use and Beauty. 
 
 XII. The Sources of Architectural Types. 
 
 XIII. The Use of Anthropomorphism. 
 
 These Essays constitute a body of massive and original thought upon a 
 large variety of important topics, and will be read with pleasure by all who 
 appreciate a bold and powerful treatment of fundamental themes. The 
 general thought which pervades this book is beyond doubt the most impor- 
 tant that the human mind has yet reached. — N. Y. Independent. 
 
 Those who have read the work on Education, will remember the ana- 
 lytic tendency of the author's mind — his clear perception and admirable ex- 
 position of first principles — his wide grasp of facts — his lucid and vigorous 
 style, and the constant and controlling bearing of the discussion on practical 
 results. These traits characterize all Mr. Spencers writings, and mark, in 
 an eminent degree, the present volume. — N. Y. Tribune. 
 
 We regard the distinguishing feature of this work to be the peculiarly 
 Interesting character of its matter to the general reader. This is a great 
 literary as well as philosophic triumph. In the evolution of a system of 
 Philosophy which demands serious attention, and a keen exercise of the in- 
 tellect to fathom and appreciate, he has mingled much that is really popular 
 and entertaining. — RocJiester Democrat. 
 

 Works of Herbert Spencer published by I). App.eton db Co. 
 
 ESSAYS: 
 
 MORAL, POLITICAL, AND ESTHETIC. 
 
 In one Volume. Large 12mo. 386 pag-es. 
 
 contents: 
 I. The Philosophy of Style. 
 II. Over-Legislation. 
 
 III. Morals of Trade. 
 
 IV. Personal Beauty. 
 
 V. Representative Government. 
 VI. Prison-Ethics. 
 
 VII. Railway Morals and Railway Policy. 
 VIII. Gracefulness. 
 IX. State Tamperings with Money and Banks. 
 X. Reform : the Dangers and the Safeguards. 
 
 " These Essays form a new, and if we are not mistaken, a most popular installment 
 of the intellectual benefactions of that earnest -writer and profound philosopher, Her- 
 bert Spencer. There is a remarkable union of the speculative and practical in these 
 papers. They are the fruit of studies alike economical and psychological; they touch 
 the problems of the passing hour, and they grasp truths of universal application ; they 
 will be found as instructive to the general reader as interesting to political and social 
 students." — Boston Transcript. 
 
 •' These Essays exhibit on almost every page the powers of an independent human- 
 itarian thinker. Mr. Spencer's ethics are rigid, his political views liberalistic, and his 
 aim is the production oi the highest earthly good."— Methodist Quarterly R&vieie. 
 
 " It abounds in the results of the sharp observation, the wide reach of knowledge, 
 and the capacity to write clearly, forcibly, and pointedly, for which this writei Is pre- 
 eminent. The subjects are all such a.s concern us most intimately, and they are treated 
 with admirable tact and knowledge. The first essay on the Philosophy of Style is 
 worth the cost of the volume ; it would be a. deed of charity to print it by itself, anc 1 
 send it to the editor of every newspaper in the land." — New Englander. 
 
 " Spencer is continually gaining ground with Americans ; he makes a book for our 
 more serious moods. His remarks upon legislation, upon the nature of political insti- 
 tutions and of then- fundamental principles; his elucidation of those foundation truths 
 which control the policy of government, are of peculiar value to the American Btu- 
 dent."— Boston Post. 
 
 "This volume will receive the applause of every serious reader tor the profound 
 earnestness and thoroughness with which its views are elaborated, the infinite scientific 
 knowledge brought to bear on every question, and the acute and subtle thinking dis- 
 played in every chapter."— N. W. Christian Advocate. 
 
 "A more instructive, suggestive, and stimulating volume has not reacued us i» • 
 'tug timo."— P) evidence Journal. 
 
Work* of Herbert Spencer published by D. AppUton db Co. 
 
 The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, 
 
 THE 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 
 
 Vol. I. 475 pages. (Now in press.) 
 
 CONTENTS: 
 
 Part I. — The Data of Biology. 
 
 I, Organie Matter. — II. The actions of Forces on Organic Matter. — III. Th< 
 ve-actions of Organic Matter on Forces. — IV. Proximate Definition of 
 Life. — V. The Correspondence between Life and its Circumstances. — 
 
 VI. The Degree of Life varies as the Degree of Correspondence.— 
 
 VII. The Scope of Biology. 
 
 Part II. — The Inductions of Biology. 
 
 I. Growth. — II. Development. — III. Function. — IV. Waste and Repair. — 
 V. Adaptation. — VI. Individuality. — VII. Genesis. — VIII. Heredity. — 
 
 IX. Variation. — X. Genesis, Heredity, and Variation. — XI. Classifica- 
 tion. — XII. Distribution. 
 
 Part III. — The Evolution of Life. 
 
 I. Preliminary. — II. General Aspects of the Special-creation-hypothesis. — 
 III. General Aspects of the Evolution-hypothesis. — IV. The Arguments 
 from Classification. — V. The Arguments from Embryology. — VI. The 
 Arguments from Morphology. — VII. The Arguments from Distribution. 
 — VIII. How is Organic Evolution caused ? — IX. External Factors. — 
 
 X. Internal Factors. — XI. Direct Equilibration. — XII. Indirect Equili- 
 bration. — XIII. The Cooperation of the Factors. — XIV. The Converg- 
 ence of the Evidences. 
 
 All these works are rich in materials for forming intelligent opinions, even where 
 we are unable to agree Avith those put forth by the author. Much may be learned from 
 Jiem in departments in which our common Educational system is very deficient. The 
 active citizen may derive from them accurate systematized information concerning hii 
 highest duties to society, and the principles on which they are based. He may gain 
 clearer notions of the value and bearing of evidence, and be better able to distinguish 
 between facts and inferences. He may find common things suggestive of wiser thought 
 —nay, we will venture to say of truer emotion — than before. By giving us fuller reali- 
 zations of liberty and justice his writings will tend to increase our self-reliance in the 
 creat emergency of civilization to which Ave have been summoned.— Atlantic MonVdv 
 
Works published by D. Appleton & Co. 
 
 A NEW 
 
 CLASS-BOOK OF CHEMISTRY. 
 
 BY EDWARD L. YOUMANS, M. D. 
 460 Pages. 910 Engravings. Price $1 75. 
 
 Tiie Class-Book of Chemistry, published some ten years ago, has been rewritten, re 
 illustrated, and much enlarged, and now appears as an essentially new work. Its aim 
 Is to present the most important facts and principles of the science in their latest as- 
 pects, and in such a manner as shall be suitable for purposes of general education. This 
 volume brings up the science to the present date, incorporating the new discoveries, the 
 corrected views, and more comprehensive principles which have resulted from recent 
 Inquiry. Among these may be mentioned the newly-received doctrines of the nature 
 of Heat, the interestiDg views of the Correlation and Conservation of Forces, the dis- 
 coveries in Spectrum Analysis, and the new and remarkable researches on the artificial 
 production of organic substances, and on the crystalloid and colloid conditions of mat 
 ter, with many other results of recent investigations not found in contemporary test- 
 books. 
 
 For philosophical accuracy of arrangement, clearness of statement, and felicity of il- 
 lustration, the Class-Book is unsurpassed. — A 7 ". Y. Teacher. 
 
 Prof. Toumans possesses a rare faculty for bringing the intricacies of science right 
 within the comprehension of the masses of readers, and his book presents all the in- 
 terest of a novel. — Boston Post. 
 
 The most recondite topics are placed in a transparent light before the common mind, 
 the language is eminently choice and attractive, not an unwieldy paragraph, scarcely n 
 superfluous word can be found from the beginning to the end of the work, and, in spite 
 of the extreme economy of expression, there is no apparent constraint or formality, but 
 every page flows smoothly and gracefully along, presenting a rare model of lucid and 
 agreeable didactic statement. — A. Y. Tribune. 
 
 The chapters on the Mutual Eelations of the Forces, and on the Dynamics of Vege- 
 table Growth, are alone worth the price of the volume. — B. F. Leggett, Prof. Nat. 
 Science, Whiteicater College, Ind. 
 
 The present volume exhibits plentiful traits of what we believe we have before 
 called Prof. Youmans' educational genius. — Methodist Quarterly Review. 
 
 Unrivalled as a practical treatise. Its introduction on the " Origin and Nature of 
 Scientific Knowledge" should be read by every teacher. — Mass. Teacher. 
 
 One of its peculiar merits is that it can all be taught. — Prof. Phelps, N. J. for- 
 mal School. 
 
 Clear, accurate, recent, and imbued with the enthusiasm of its author. — R. M. Man- 
 ley, Pres. N. II. Fern. College. 
 
 It i3 eminently terse and compact, is amply and lucidly illustrated, and few tf our 
 many class-books that have crossed the ocean and been welcomed in Europe, are calcu- 
 lated to do us more credit than this admirable work, — A". Y. Independent. 
 
 A thorough perusal of the book enables us to pronounce it the bett elementiiry 
 chemistry that has been written in our language. It is penetrated by a fearless yet dis- 
 ciplined scientific spirit, and is completely up to the level of the latest discoveries id 
 the science of which it treats. We have read it with all the interest usually given to 
 romance. — New Nation. 
 
 This manual is distinguished from most other Class-books in setting almost whollj 
 asido what is merely technical and experimental, for the sake of the completest possible 
 exhibition of the principles of the subject. For the thorough student, and even for the 
 general reader, a careful, lucid, and connected exposition of the- new views was needed, 
 Buch as we are glad to acknoAvledge in the present volume. The author has given an 
 intellectual value to his treatise very much abov* the 6tand;<rd aimed at in similar 
 <rorks. — Christian Examiner. 
 
Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appltton & Co. 
 
 The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. 
 
 THE 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 
 
 Vol. I. 475 pag-es. (Now in press.) 
 
 CONTENTS: 
 
 Part I. — The Data of Biology. 
 
 L Organic Matter. — II. The actions of Forces on Organic Matter. — III. Th« 
 re-actions of Organic Matter on Forces. — IV. Proximate Definition of 
 Life. — V. The Correspondence between Life and its Circumstances. — 
 
 VI. The Degree of Life varies as the Degree of Correspondence.— 
 
 VII. The Scope of Biology. • 
 
 Part II. — The Inductions of Biology. 
 
 I. Growth. — II. Development. — III. Function. — IV. Waste and Repair. — 
 V. Adaptation. — VI. Individuality. — VII. Genesis. — VIII. Heredity. — 
 
 IX. Variation. — X. Genesis, Heredity, and Variation. — XL Classifica- 
 tion. — XII. Distribution. 
 
 Part III. — The Evolution of Life. 
 
 L Preliminary. — n. General Aspects of the Special-creatiou-hypothcsis. — 
 III. General Aspects of the Evolution-hypothesis. — IV. The Argument* 
 from Classification. — V. The Arguments from Embryology. — VI. The 
 Arguments from Morphology. — VII. The Arguments from Distribution. 
 — VIII. How is Organic Evolution caused ? — IX. External Factors.— 
 
 X. Internal Factors. — XI. Direct Equilibration. — XII. Indirect Equili- 
 bration. — XIII. The Cooperation of the Factors. — XIV. The Converg- 
 ence of the Evidences. 
 
 All these works are rich in materials for forming intelligent opinions, even where 
 we are unable to agree with those put forth by the author. Much may be learned from 
 .hem in departments in which our common Educational system is very deficient. The 
 active citizen may derive from them accurate systematized information concerning hil 
 highest duties to society, and the principles on which they are based. He may gain 
 clearer notions of the value and bearing of evidence, and be better able to distinguish 
 between facts and inferences. He may find common things suggestive of wiser thought 
 —nay, we will venture to say of truer emotion — than before. By giving us fuller reali- 
 zations of liberty and justice his writings will tend to increase our self-reliance in the 
 freat emergency of civilization to which we have been summoned.— Atlantic. Mnnthh 
 

 
 
 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 11 Mil! Ill 
 
 111! 
 
 010 133 621 9 
 
 Works of Herbert Spencer published by D. Appleton & Co. 
 
 EDUCATION: 
 
 INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, AND PHYSICAL, 
 
 1 Vol. 12mo. Price $3 50. 
 
 Part I. What Knowledge is of Most Worth. 
 
 II. Intellectual Education 
 
 III. Moral Educatiou. 
 
 IV. Physical Education. 
 
 These discussions are able, vigorous, and suggestive.— American Journal oj 
 Science,. 
 
 They are undoubtedly among the most philosophical and important of the rocen' 
 issues of the American Press.- -Dr. John W. Draper. 
 
 It is masterly and valuable beyond all other books on the theme. — Rev. T. Stan 
 King. 
 
 These papers are clearly and gracefully written, and illustrate the author's &esl 
 and vigorous spirit, his power of separating the essential from the accidental as wel 
 as his success in grasping the main features of the subject.— A tlantic Monthly. 
 
 His book contains more good sense in a small compass, than any book on Educa 
 tion we have ever seen. — Rev. Dr. Hill, Pres. Harvard College. 
 
 In breadth of philosophical view, for depth of research in all directions, and fo 
 surprising familiarity with the details of nearly every department of science, Ml 
 Spencer has no competitor among English writers on Education. — Prof. W. F. Phelpt 
 Pi'in. N. J. Normal School. 
 
 It is a mighty book. — Anson Smyth, State School Coin, of Ohio. 
 
 The most philosophical and able discussion of the principles of Education that ha 
 > it appeared.— D. II. Cochran, Prin. N. Y. State Normal School. 
 
 It happily illustrates the importance of an intelligent knowledge of physical scienc 
 as an element of education. I have read it with much pleasure and profit. — Prof, i 
 Silliman, Jr. 
 
 The entire volume claims diligent study, and is replete with suggestions that int) 
 mately concern all parents and Educators. Its author is one of the great thinkers o 
 the age. — North American Revieto. 
 
 Its subjects are treated with profound ability and remarkable clearness of thoug) 
 and extent of research. — N. T. Observer. 
 
 We think it the most important book on the education of children ever written.- 
 American Agriculturist. 
 
 Profound in analysis, practical in suggestion, and sagacious in theory.— inrf. 
 pendent. 
 
 It throws a rare light upon the importance of studying the natural unfolding • 
 the powers, and ministering to them the proper food at the proper time. — Albion. 
 
 Rarelv have we seen a book of more cogent reasoning than this.— A 7 . 1". Kteni* 
 Post. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 010 133 621 9