iii'ty tieMa, .a\ A, . — ■'■ ^ .V- K.MUiiJr^i ^SV.\^Om\\ JA ^j.„^V. STATION /J, A. Warren's Brigade. ) . „. , . B. HiicliaiDin's " VSykcs'8 Division. C. Chapmiin's " ) D. Orillin's " ) . „. , • E. Mavtiniiale's " UlorcU's Division. F. Butterfielfl'9 " ) G. McCull's Divisinn, . U. Coucii's Division, 4Ui Army Corps, (Kejes a.) 1 2 !^ rjo -s a ^ 5: 5 oTS 2. p s :?' H ss M 5; C" X ^ X (t ft J^ <■ t "^ bT .a- o M* •^ . THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC: Gen. McCLELLA:N'S EEPOET OF ITS OPERATIONS WHILE UNDER HIS COMMAND WITH MAPS AND PLANS. NEW-YORK : G-. P. PUTNAM, PUBLISHER, 4:4.1 BROADWAY, 1864. Jfcv THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. r*. LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, TRANSMITTING THE REPORT OP MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN UPON THE ORGANIZATION OP THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, AND ITS CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND, FROM JULY TWENTY-SIXTH, ISGl, TO NOVEMBER SEVENTH, 1862. War Dbpartment, WAsniNCTOU City, D. C, December 22, 1863. Sir : In compliance with the resolution dated December fifteenth, 1863, I have the honor to communicate herewith "the report made by Major- General George B. McClellan, concerning the organization and operations of the army of the Potomac while under his command, and of all army operations while he was commander-in-chief." I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Edwin M. Stanton, „ „ ^ Secretary of War. Hon. ocnuTLER Colfax, Speaker of the House of Representatives. EEPOET OF MAJOE-GENERAL GEOEGE B. McCLELLAN". FIRST PERIOD CHAPTEK I. Nkw-York, August 4, 1S63. Sir : I have the honor to submit herein the official report of the operations of the army of the Potomac while under my charge. Accom- panying it ai'e the reports of the corps, division, and subordinate commanders, pertaining to the various engagements, battles, and occurrences of the campaigns, and important documents con- nected with its organization, supply, and move- ments. These, with lists of maps and memo- randa submitted, will be found appended, duly arranged, and marked for convenient reference. Charged, in the spring of 18G1, with the opera- tions in the department of the Ohio, which in- cluded the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and lat- terly Western Virginia, it had become my duty to counteract the hostile designs of the enemy in Western Virginia, which were immediately direct- ed to the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the possession of the Kanawha Valley, with the ultimate object of gaining Wheel- ing and the control of the Ohio River. The successful affairs of Philippi, Rich Mount- ain, Carrick's Ford, etc., had been fought, and I had acquired possession of all Western Virginia north of the Kanawha Valley, as well as of the lower portion of that valley. I had determined to proceed to the relief of the upper Kanawha Valley, as soon as provision was made for the permanent defence of the mountain passes leading from the east into the region under control, when I received at Beverly, in Randolph County, on the twenty-first of July, 18G1, intelligence of the unfortunate result of the battle of Manassas, fought on that day. On the twenty-second I received. an order by telegraph, directing me to turn over my com- mand to Brigadier-General Rosecrans, and repair at once to Washington. I had already caused reconnoissances to be made for intrenchments at the Cheat Mountain pass ; also on the Hunterville road, near Elk- water, and at Red House, near the main road from Romney to Grafton. During the afternoon and night of the twenty-second I gave the final instructions for the construction of these works, turned over the command to Brigadier-General Rosecrans, and started, on the morning of the twenty-third, for Washington, arriving there on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth. On the twen- ty-seventh I assumed command of the division of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washington, on both banks of the river. With this brief statement of the events which immediately preceded my being called to the command of the troops at Washington, I pro- ceed to an account, from such authentic data as are at hand, of my military operations while com- mander of the army of the Potomac. The subjects to be considered naturally ar- range themselves as follows : The organization of the army of the Potomac. The military events connected with the defences of Washington, from July, 18G1, to March, 1862. The campaign on the Peninsula, and that in Mary- land. The great resources and capacity for powerful resistance of the South at the breaking out of the Rebellion, and the full proportions of the great conflict about to take place, were sought to be carefully measured ; and I had also endeavored, by every means in my power, to impress upon the authorities the necessity for such immediate and full preparation as alone would enable the Government to prosecute the war on a scale com- mensurate with the resistance to be offered. r.06 REBELLION RECORD, 1S63. On the fourth of August, 1861, I addressed to the J'rosilciit the following memorandum, pre- pared at his recjut'st : MEMORANDUM. The olijcctof tho present war differs from those in whiih nations are en^Mj,'ed, mainly in this : tliat the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace, and make a treaty on advanta;j:eous terms ; in this contest it has l)ccome necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the Geld, but to display such an over- whelming strengtli as will convince all our an- tagonists, especially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of re- sistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Ifad we been successful in the re cent battle (Manassas) it is possible that we might have lieen spared the labor and expenses of a great elfort Now we have no altern,ative. Their success will etiable the political leaders of the rebels to convince tho mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all their resources. The contest began with a class, now it is with a people — our mili- Uiry success can alone restore the former issue. Hy thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong places, and pvu-suing a rigidly pro- tective policy as to private property' and tniarmed persons, and a lenient course as to private sol- diers, we may well hope for a permanent restora- tion of a peaceful Union. But in tho first in- .stance the authority of the Government must be .supported by overwhelming physical force. Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively demand that the inilitar}' action of the Government should be prompt and irresisti- ble. The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle- field, and it seems proper for us to make the first great struggle there. But while thus directing our main •elf" )rts, it is neces.sary to dimini.sh the rcsist^mce there offered us, by movements on other points botli l)y land and water. Without entering at present into details, I would advise that a strong movement be made on the .Mississippi, and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri. As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would advise a movement tlirough that State into East- em Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that region and of seizing tiie rail- roads U-ading from .Memphis to the east. The possession of these roads by us, in con- nection with the movement on the Mississippi, woidd go far toward determining tlic evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. In the mean time all iho passes into Western Virginia from the cast should be .securely guarded, but I would advise no movement from that quarter toward Kich- nirind, unless the political condition of Kentucky renders it impo.ssiblo or inexpedient for us to make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee tlirough that State. Every effort should, how- ever, be made to organize, equip and arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other operations. At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to protect and reopen the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be occupied by garrisons sufficient to re- tain them in our po.ssession. The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburgh will be very materially diminished so soon as our force in this vicinity becomes organized, strong, and efficient, because no capable general will cross tlic river north of this cit}^, when we have a strong army here ready to cut ofl" his retreat. To revert to the west. It is probal)le that no very large additions to the troops now in Mis- souri will be necessary to secure that State. I presume that the force required for the move- ment down the Mississippi will be determined by its commander and the President. If Ken- tucky assumes the right position, not more than twenty thousand will be needed, together with those that can be raised in that State and East- ern Tennessee, to secure the latter region and its railroads as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville. The Western Virginia troops, with not more than five to ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana, should, under proper management, suffice for its protection. When we have reorganized our main army here, ten thousand men ought to be enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Potomac, five thousand will garrison Baltimore, three thousand Fort Monroe, and not more than twenty thousand will be necessary at the utmost for the defence of Washington. For the main army of operations I urge the following composition : 250 regiments of infixntrj^ say, .225,000 men. 100 field batteries, 600 guns, . . 15,000 " 28 regiments of cavalry, 25,500 " 5 regiments engineer troops, . .. 7,500 " Total, 273,000 " The force must be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains, and with transporta- tion for every thing save tents. Its general line of operations should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of from point to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers enq)tying into it. An essential feature of the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong naval force to protect the movement of a fleet of transports intended to convey a consider- able body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either creating diversions and rendering it necessary for thein to detach largely from their main body in order to protect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else lancfing and 'forming establishments on their coast at any favorable places that opportunity DOCUMENTS. 507 might offer. This naval force should also co- operate with tlie main army in its efforts to seize tlie important seaboard towns of the rebels. It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads has introduced a new and very import- ant element into war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular positions large masses of troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines of oper- ations. It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations suggested, and such otl>ers as the particular case may require. We must endeavor to seize places on the railways in the rear of the enemy's points of concentration, and ■ we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that each State may be forced, by the necessity of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the confederate army. The proposed movement down the Mississippi will produce important results in this connection. That advance and the progress of the main array at the East ■will materially assist each other by diminishing the resistance to be encountered by eacli. The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all questions connected with cotton is too well understood by the President and Cabinet to need any illustration from me. There is another independent movement that has often been suggested and which has always recommended itself to my judgment. I refer to a movement from Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian Territory upon Red River and West- ern Texas for the purpose of protecting and de- veloping the latent Union and free State senti- ment well known to predominate in Western Texas, and which, like a similar sentiment in Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize that section into a free State. How far it w^ill be possible to support this movement by an advance through New-Mexico from California, is a matter which I have not sufficiently ex- amined to be able to express a decided opinion. If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as well as identify- ing them with our cause and connecting the bond of Union between them and the general govern- ment. If it is not departing too far from my province, I will venture to suggest the policy of an ultimate alliance and cordial understanding with Mexico ; their sympathies and interests are with us — their antipathies exclusively against our enemies and their institutions. I think it would not be diffi- cult to obtain from the Mexican government the right to use, at least during the present contest, the road from Guaymas to New-Mexico ; this con- cession would very materially reduce the obsta- cles of the column moving from the Pacific ; a similar permission to use their territory for the passage of troops between the Panuco and the Rio Grande would enable us to throw a column of troops by a good road from Tampico, or some «f the small hai'bors north of it, upon and across the Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot. To what extent, if anj', it would be desirable to take into service and employ Mexican soldiers, is a question entirely political, on which I do not venture to offer an opinion. The force I have recommended is large ; the expense is great. It is possible that a smaller force might accomplish the object in vie\v, but I understand it to be the purpose of this great nation to reestablish the power of its government, and restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest possible time. The question to be decided is simply this : shall we crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate the war in one campaign, or shall we leave it as a legacy for our descendants ? When the extent of the possible line of opera- tions is considered, the force asked for the main army under my command cannot be regarded as unduly large ; every mile we advance carries us farther from our base of operations and renders detachments necessary to cover our communica- tions, while the cnem}^ will be constantly concen- trating as he falls back. I propose, with the force which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New-Orleans ; in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's country and crush the rebellion in its very heart. By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, the difficulties of transportation will le materially diminished. It is perhaps unneces- sary to state that, in addition to the forces named in this memorandum, strong reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur. In conclusion, I would submit that the exigen- cies of the treasury may be lessened by making only partial payments to our troops, when in the enemy's country, and by giving the o))ligations of the United States for such supplies as may there be obtained. Geo. B. McClell.vx, Major-General. I do not think the events of the w^ir have prov- ed these views upon the method and plans of its conduct altogether incorrect. They certainly have not proved my estimate of the number of troops and scope of operations too large. It is probable that I did under-estimate the time ne- cessary for the completion of arms and equip- ments. It was not strange, however, that by many civilians intrusted with authority there should have been an exactly opposite opinion held on both these particulars. The result of the first battle of Manassas had been almost to destroy the moralo and organiza- tion of our army, and to alarm Government and people. The national capital was in danger ; it was necessary, besides holding the enemy in check, to build works for its defence, strong and capable of being held by a small force. It was necessary also to create a new army for active operations and to expedite its organization, equipment, and the accumulation of the material of war, and to this not inconsiderable labor all 508 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-03. my cncr^rics for the next three months were con- Btaritlv ilcvoteil. Tiin'e is a necessary element in the creation ot armies, ami I do not,"thcref(ire, think it necessary to inoTv than mention the imi)atience with which many n-ardetl tlie delay in the arrival of new levies, though recruited and pressed forward with unexampled rapidity, the manufacture and sup- [Jv of arms and ecjuipmcnts, or the vehemence wi'th which an immediate advance upon the enemy's works directly in our front was urged by a patriotic hut sanjijuinc people. The President, too, was anxious for the speedy employment of our army, and although possessed of my plans through frequent conferences, desi- red a pajier from me upon the condition of the forces under my command and the immediate mea.sures to be taken to increase their efficiency. Accordingly, in the latter part of October I ad- dressed the following letter to the Secretary of War : SiK : In conformity with a personal understand- ing with the President yesterday, I have the honor to submit the following statement of the condition of the army under my command, and the measures re(|uireil for the preservation of the Government and the suppression of the rebellion. It will be remembered that in a memorial I had the honor to address to the President soon after my arrival in Washington, and in my communi- cation adikessed to Lieutenant-Gcneral Scott, under date of eighth of August; in my letter to the President authorizing him, at his request, to withdraw the letter written by me to General Scott ; and in my letter of the eighth of Septem- ber, answering your note of inquiry of that date, my views on the same subject are frankly and fully expressed. In these several communications I have stated the force I regarded as necessary to enable this army to advance with a reasonable certainty of success, at llie .same time leaving the capital and tlie line of the Potomac sufllciently guarded, not only to secure the retreat of the main army, in the event of disaster, but to render it out of the enemy's power to attempt a diversion in Mary- land. So much time has passed, and the winter is ap- proaching so rapidly, that but two courses are left to the (iovernment, namely, either to go into winter quarters, or to assume the ofiensive with forces greatly inferior in ntnnbers to the ai'my I regarded as desirable and necessary. If political considerations render the first cijurse unadvisablc, the second alone remains. While I regret that it has not been deemed expedient, or perhaps possi- ble, to concentrate (he forces of the nation in this vicinity, (remaining on the defensive elsewhere,) keeping the attention and efforts of tlie Govern- ment fixed njion this as the vital point, where the issue of the great contest is to be decided, it may still be that, by introducing unity of action ami design among tlie various armies of the land, by determining the courses to be pursued by the various uommandcrs under one general plan, transferring from the other armies the super- fluous strength not required for the purpose in view, and thus reenforcing this main army, whose destiny it is to decide the controversy, we may yet be able to move with a reasonable pros- pect of success before the winter is fairlj^ upon us. The nation feels, and I share that feeling, that the army of the Potomac holds the fate of the country in its hands. The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, and the effect of the next battle will be so import- ant throughout the future, as well as the pres- ent, tliat I continue to urge, as I have ever done since I entered upon the command of this army, upon the Government to devote its energies and its available resources toward increasing the num- bers and efficiency of the army on which its sal- vation depends. A statement, carefully prepared by the chiefs of engineers and artillery of this army, gives us the necessary garrison of this city and its fortifi- cations, thirty-three thousand seven hundred and ninety-five men — say thirty-five thousand. The present garrison of Baltimore and its de- pendencies is about ten thousand. I have sent the cliief of my staff to make a careful examina- tion into the condition of these troops, and to obtain the information requisite to enable me to decide whether this number can be diminished, or the reverse. At least five thousand men will be required to watch the river hence to Harper's Ferry and its vicinity ; probably eight thousand to guard the Lower Potomac. As you are aware, all the information we have from spies, prisoners, etc., agrees in showing that the enemy have a force on the Potomac not less than one hundred and fifty thousand strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly intrenched. It is plain, therefore, that to insure success, or to render it reasonably cer- tain, the active army should not number less than one hundred and fiftj^ thousand efficient troops, with four hundred guns, unless some material change occurs in the force in front of us. The requisite force for an advance movement by the army of the Potomac may be thus esti- mated : Column of active operations, 150,000 men, 400 guns. Garrison of tlie city of AVasliington, 3.^,000 " 40 " To puani the Potomac to Harper's Ferry, 5,' 00 " 12 " To guard tlie Lower Potomac, 8,000 " 24 " Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis, .. 10,003 " 12 " Total effective force required, 203,000 men, 488 guns. or an aggregate, present and absent, of about two hundred and forty thousand men, should the losses by sickness, etc., not rise to a higher per- centage than at present Having stated what I regard as the requisite force to enable this army to advance, I now pro- ceed to give the actual strength of the army of the Potomac. The aggregate strength of the army of the Po- tomac, by the official report on the morning of the twenty-seventh instant, was one hundred and DOCUMENTS. 509 sixty -eight thousand three hundred and eighteen officers and men, of all grades and arms. This included the troops at Baltimore and Annapohs, on the Upper and Lower Potomac, the sick, ab- sent, etc. The force present for duty was one hundred and forty-seven thousand six hundred and ninety- five. Of this number, four thousand two hun- dred and sixty-eight cavalry were completely un- armed, three thousand one hundred and sixty- three cavalry only partially armed, five thousand nine hundred and seventy -nine infixntry unequip- ped, making thirteen thousand four hundred and ten unfit for the field, (irrespective 'of those not yet sufficiently drilled,) and reducing the effective force to one hundred and thirty-four thousand two hundred and eighty-five, and the number disposable for an advance to seventy-six thou- sand two hundred and eighty-five. The infont- ry regiments are, to a considerable extent, arm- ed with unserviceable weapons. Quite a large number of good arms, which had been intended for this army, were ordered elsewhere, leaving the army of the Potomac insufficiently, and, in some cases, badly armed. On the thirtieth of September there were with this army two hundred and twenty-eight field guns ready for the field ; so far as arms and equipments are concerned, some of the batteries are still quite raw, and unfit to go into action. I have intelligence that eight New-York batteries are en route hither ; two others are ready for the field. I vvill still (if the New-York batteries have six guns each) be one hundred and twelve guns short of the number required for the active column, saying nothing, for the present, of those necessary for the garrisons and corps on the Po- tomac, which would make a total deficiency of two hundred guns. I have thus briefly stated our present condi- tion and wants ; it remains to suggest the means of suppl3nng the deficiencies. First, that all the cavalry and infantry arms, as fast as procured, whether manufactured in this country or purchased abroad, be sent to this army until it is fully prepared for the field. Second, that the two companies of the Fourth artillery, now understood to be en route from Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, be ordered to this army, to be mounted at once ; also, that the companies of the Third artillery, en route from California, be sent here. Had not the order for Smead's battery to come here from Ilarrisburgh, to replace the laattery I gave General Sherman, been so often countermanded, I would again ask for it. Third, that a more effective regulation may be aiade authorizing the transfer of men from the volunteers to the regular batteries, infantry and cavalry ; that we may make the best possible use of the invaluable regular " skeletons." Fourth, I have no official information as to the United States forces elsewhere, but, from the best information I can obtain from the War De- partment and other sources, I am led to believe that the United States tioops are : S. D. 33. In Western Virginia, about 30,000 In Kentucky, 40,000 In Missouri, 80,000 In Fortress Monroe, 11,000 Total, 101,000 Besides these, I am informed that more than one hundred thousand are in progress of organi- zation in other Northern and AYestern States. I would therefore recommend that, not inter- fering with Kentucky, there should be retained in Western Virginia and Missouri a sufficient force for defensive purposes, and that the surplus troops be sent to the army of the Potomac, to enable it to assume the offensive ; that the same course be pursued in respect to Fortress Monroe, and that no further outside expeditions be at- tempted until we have fought the great battle in front of us. Fifth, that every nerve be strained to hasten the enrolment, organization and armament of new batteries and regiments of infixntry. Sixth, that all the battalions now raised for new regiments of regular infantry be at once ordered ^ to this army, and that the old infixntry and caval- mI ry en route from California be ordered to this army immediately on their arrival in New-York. I have thus indicated, in a general manner, the objects to be accomplished, and the means by which we may gain our ends. A vigorous employment of these means will, in my opinion, enable the army of the Potomac to assume successfully this season the offensive operations which, ever since entering upon the command, it has been my anxious desire and dilligent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance should not be postponed beyond the twenty-fifth of November, if possible to avoid it. Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action are indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped as a whole, and not in detached parts. One plan should be agreed upon and pursued ; a single will should direct and carry out these plans. The great object to be accomplished, the crush- ing defeat of the rebel army (now) at Manassas, should never for one instant be lost sight of, but all the intellect and means and men of the Gov- ernment poured upon that point. The loyal States possess ample force to effect all this and more. The rebels have displayed energy, unan- imitj'', and wisdom worthy of the most desperate days of the French revolution. Should we do less? The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. When the task is accomplished, I shall be glad to return to the obscurity from which events have drawn me. Whatever the determination of the Government may be, I will do the best I can with the army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. 510 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. Permit inc to adil that, on tliis occasion as here- tcforo, it has lieeii my aim neither to exaggerate nor unJcrratf tliu power of tlie enemy, nor fail to express clearly the means by which, in my judg- ment, tliat |)<)\ver may be broken. Urging the energy <«f |pre|taratioii and action, wliich has ever hoen^niy choice, but with tlic li.vcd purpose by no act of mine to expose the ( iovernincnt to hazard l.y premature movement, and reijucsting that this communication may be laid before the President, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, G. B. MoCi.kllan, M^jor-GeneraL IIoD. Simon Camehon, Socrctary of War. When I assumed command in Washington, on the twenty-seventh of July, 18G1, the number of troops in and around the city was about fifty thou-sand infantry, less than one tliousand caval- ry, and six hundred and fifty artillerymen, with nine imperfect licld-batterics of thirty pieces. ( >n the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organization of (ieneral McDowell still existed, and the iroops were stationed at and in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Ilunyon, Roach's Mills, Cole's Mills, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment at the Theological Seminary. There were no troops south of Hunting Creek, and many of the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac, seldom in the best positions for defence, and entirely inad- equate in numbers and condition to defend the long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. On the Maryland side of the river, upon the heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two regi- ments were stationed, whose commanders were imlepcndent of each other. Tiiere were no troops on the important Tenally- town road, or on the roads entering the city from tho south. The camps were located without regard to pur- poses of defence or instruction, the roads were not picketed, and there was no attempt at an or- ganization into brigades. In no quarter were the dispositions for defence such as to oiler a vigorous resistance to a respect- able body of the enemy, citbcrin the position and immbers of the troop.s, or the number and char- acter of the defensive works. Earthworks, in the nature of tefc.t dc pout, looked upon the ap- proaches to the (ieorgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge and Alexandria, by the Little river turnpike, and some simple (lefensive ar- rangements were made at the Chain Bridge. With tiic latter exception not a single defensive work had been commenced on the Maryland side. There was nothing to prevent the enemy shell- ing the city from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column al- most with'nit resistance. "Many soldiers had de- serted, and the streets of VVashington were crowded with stragcling oflicers and men, absent from their stations without authority, whose be- havior indicated the general want of discipline »nd organization. I at once designated an efficient staff, afterward adding to it as opportunity was afforded and ne- cessity required, who zealously cooperated with me in the labor of bringing order out of confusion, reassigning troops and commands, projecting and throwing up defensive M-orks, receiving and organ- izing, equipping and providing for the new levies arriving in the city. The valuable services of these officers in their various departments, during this and throughout the subsequent periods of the history of the arm}^ of the Potomac, can hardly be sufficiently appre- ciated. Their names and duties will be given in another part of this report, and they are com- mended to the favorable notice of the War Depart- ment. The restoration of order in the city of Wash- ington was effected through the appointment of a provost-marshal, whose authority was supported by the few regular troops within my command. These troops were thus in position to act as a reserve, to be sent to any point of attack where their services might be most wanted The energy and ability displayed by Colonel A. Porter, the Provost Marshal, and his assistants, and the strict discharge of their duty by the troops, produced the best results, and Washington soon became one of the most quiet cities in the Union. The new levies of infantiy, upon arriving in Washington, were formed into provisional bri- gades and placed in camp in the suburbs of the city for eqipment, instruction and discipline. As soon as regiments were in a fit condition for trans- fer to the forces across the Potomac, they were assigned to the brigades serving there. Brigadier- General F. J. Porter was at first assigned to the charge of the provisional brigades. Brigadier- General A. E. Burnside was the next officer as- signed this duty, from which, however, he was soon relieved by Brigadier-General S. Case)'', who continued in charge of the newly arriving regi- ments until tho array of the Potomac departed for the Peninsula, in March, 1862. The newly ar- riving artillery troops reported to Brigadier-Gen- eral William F. Barry, the Chief of Artillery, and the cavalry to Brigadier General George Stone- man, the Chief of Cavalry. By the fifteenth of October, the number of troops in and about Washington, inclusive of the garrison of the city and Alexandria, the city guard and the forces on the Maryland shore of the Po- tomac below Washington, and as far as Cumber land above, the troops under the command of (Jencral Dix at Baltimore and its dependencies, were as follows : Total present for dut)'', 133,201 " sick, .• 9,290 " in confinement, 1,156 Aggregate present, 143, 647 " absent, 8,404 Grand aggregate, 152,051 The following table exhibits similar data for DOCUMENTS. 511 the periods stated, including the troops in Mary land and Delaware : Present. Absent. Total present and absent. Date. For duty. Sick. In confine- ment. Dec. 1,1 SOI, 169,452 Jan. 1. ISlii, 191,4S0 Feb.l.lSfri, 190,806 Mar. 1,1862, 193,142 15,102 14,790 14,36.3 13,167 2,1S9 . 2.260 2,917 2,103 11,470 11,707 14,110 13,570 198,213 219,707 222,190 221,987 For convenience of reference the strength of the arnay of the Potomac at subsequent periods is given. t- CO 00 T-H 00 •inasqi; puu ■jnasa.ul CO 'X) 00 '3'}t:3e.iSav pu^JO cn "^ Tt< ■ 1— 01 •.C}i.ioiu -X' 'X -nv inomi.w . CO 1~ co' ir- 00 .< c? CO J_^ •XjuorjinB .fa t- 5 r-Tt-"^'- r-l (>T 0:1 '-2 3 (M c5 CO (M ^ "S^uSajSgy ic't-^o" s t T-H ,-1 r-l T-H T— 1 bo a CO CO ^ c c »0 CI T— 1 .^ S . s CO 00 CT c Q S -i- S ■s s m S li a 55 1-1 -* ^ rt'^ rt< -* 3 a *. C , 10 r- 1 C5 •iS _• CO -t< ^ »J 0) CO T3 a ^ -o - m •—1 r— * 'O ^ tL, .^ .S Vj E CO CO 10 CO 00 2 a CM "* CO cS •0 . C' .s.« T-( -H d CO r-4 t- •i-S ^ j^ -iTT-rio" 2 p s CO tC' to n i-t o fc- '^ (M CO CO i- co^a)_ c a 11 i TtT'+'co'' c a * -M- o~o~o CO -elfth, ISfil, until July first, 1S(j2, and the latter after that date. The difficulties to be overcome in organizing and making effective the medical department were very great, arising principally from the inexpe- rience of the regimental medical officers, many of whom were phj'sicians taken suddenly from civil life, who, according to Surgeon Tripler, " had to be instructed in their duties from the very alphabet," and from the ignorance of the line officers as to their relations with the medical offi- cers, which gave rise to confusion and conflict of authority. Boards of examination were insti- tuted, by which manj' ignorant officers were re- moved ; and by the successive exertions of Sur- geons Tripler and Letterman, the medical corps was brought to a veiy high degree of efficiency. With regard to the sanitaiy condition of the army while on the Potomac, Dr. Tripler says that the records show a constantly increasing immu- nity from disease. " In October and November, ISrtl, with an army averaging one hundred and thirty thousand men, we had seven thousand nine hundred and tliirty-two cases of fever of all sorts ; of these, about one thousand were re- ported as cases of typhoid fever. I know that errors of diagnosis M'ere frequently oommitted, and therefore this must be considered as the limit of typhoid cases. If any army in the world can show such a record as this, T do not know when or where it was assembled." From September, 18(31, to February, 18C2, while the army was in creasing, the number of sick decreased from 7 per cent to 0.18 per cent. Of these, the men sick in the regimental and general hospitals DOCUMENTS. 521 were less ihan one half; the remainder were slight case ;, under treatuient in quarters. " Dur- ing this tmie, so far as rumor was concerned, the array was being decimated by disease every month." Of the sanitary condition of the array during the Peninsula campaign, up to its arrival at Ilarrihon's Landing, Dr. Tripler says: "Dur- ing this campaign the army was favored with ex- cellent health. No epidemic disease appeared. Those scourges of modern armies — ^ dysentery, typhus, cholera- -were almost unknown. We had some t3'phoid fc^ er and more malarial fevers, but even these never prevailed to such an extent as to create any alarm. The sick reports were sometimes larger than we cared to have them ; but the great majoi'ity of the cases reported were such as did not threaten life or permanent disa- bility. I regret that I have not before me the retained copies of the monthly reports, so that I might give accurate statistics. I have endeavored to recover them, but have been unsuccessful. My recollection is, that the whole sick report never exceeded eight per cent of the force, and this including all sorts of cases, the trivial as well as the severe. The army of the Potomac must be conceded to have been the most healthy army in the service of the United States." His remarks at the conchision of his report upon our system of medical administration, and his suggestions for its improvement, are espe- cially worthy of attention. The service, labors, and privations of the troops during the seven days' battles had, of course, a great effect on the health of the army, after it reached Harrison's Landing, increasing the num- ber of sick to about twenty per cent of the whole force. The nature of the military operations had also unavoidably placed the medical department in a very unsatisfactory condition. Supplies had been almost entirely exhausted or necessarily abandoned; hospital tents abandoned or de- stroyed, and the medical officers deficient in numbers and broken down by fatigue. All the remarkable energy and ability of Sur- geon Letterman were required to restore the effi- ciency of his department ; but before we left Harrison's Landing he had succeeded in fitting it out thoroughly with the supplies it required, and the health of the army was vastly improved by the sanitary measures which were enforced at his suggestion. The great haste with which the army was re- moved from the Peninsula made it necessary to leave at Fort Monroe, to be forwarded afterward, nearly all the bivggage and transportation, includ- ing medical stores and ambulances, all the ves- sels being required to transport the troops them- selves and their ammunition ; and when the army of the Potomac returned to Washington after General Pope's campaign, and the medical de- partment came once more under Surgeon Letter- man's control, he found it in a deplorable condi- tion. Tiie officers were worn out by the labors they had performed, and the few supi)lies that had been broujrht from the Peninsula had been exhausted or abandoned, so that the work of re- organization and re .. applying had to be again performed, and this while the army was moving rapidly, and almost in the face of the enemy. That it was successfully accomplished is shown by the care and attention which the wounded received after the battles of South-Mountain and Antietam. Among the improvements introduced into his department by Surgeon Letterman, the principal are the organization of an ambulance corps, the system of field hospitals, and the method of sup- plying by brigades, all of which were instituted during the Maryland campaign, and have since proved very efficient. quartermastek's department. On assuming command of the troops in and around Washington, I appointed Captain S. Van Vliet, Assistant Quartermaster, (afterward Briga- dier-Genei-al,) Chief Quartermaster to my com- mand, and gave him the necessary instructions for organizing his department, and collecting the supplies requisite for the large army then called for. The disaster at Manassas had but recently oc- curred, and the army was quite destitute of quartermaster's stores. General Van Vliet, with great energy and zeal, set himself about the task of furni.shing the supplies immediately necessary, and preparing to oi)tain the still larger amounts which would be required by the new troops, which were moving in large numbers toward the capital. The principal depot for supplies in the city of Washington was under charge of Colonel D. H. Ruckcr, Assistant Quartermaster, who ably performed his duties. Lieutenant-Colonel R. In- galls, Assistant Quartermaster, was placed in charge of tlie department on the south side of the Potomac. I directed a large depot for trans- portation to be established at Perryville, on the left bank of the Susquehanna, a point equally ac- cessible b}' rail and water. Captain C. G. Saw- telle. Assistant Quartermaster, was detailed to organize the camp, and performed his duties to my entire satisfaction. Captain J. J. Dana, As- sistant Quartermaster, had immediate charge of the transportation in and about Washington, as well as of the large number of horses purchased for the use of the artillery and cavalry. The principal difficulties which General Van Vliet had to encounter arose from the inexperience of the majority of the officers of his department in the new regiments and brigades. The necessity of attending personally to minor details rendered his duties arduous and harass- ing in the extreme. All obstacles, however, were surmounted by the untiring industry of the Chief Quartermaster and his immediate subordinates, and when the ariny was prepared to move the organization of the department was found to be admirable. When it was determined to move the army to the Peninsula, the duties of providing water transportation were devolved by the Secretary of War upon his assistant, the Honorable John S22 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. Tucker. The vessels were ordered to Alexan- dria, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ingalls was placed in immediate charge of the embarkation of the troops, transportation, and material of every de- scription. Operations of this nature, on so ex- tensive a scale, had no parallel in the history of our country. The arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel In- palls were perfected with remarkable skill and energy, and the army and its material were em- barked and transported to Fortress Monroe in a very short space of time, and entirely without I0S.S. During the operations on the Peninsula, until the arrival of troops at Harrison's Landing, Gen- eral Van Vliet retained the position of Chief Quar- termaster, and maintained the thorough organi- zation and efficiency of his department. The principal depot of supplies were under the imme- diate charge of Lieutenant-Colonels Ingalls and Sawtelle. On the tenth of July, 1862, General Van Vliet having requested to be relieved from duty with the army of the Potomac, I appointed Lieuten- ant-Colonel Ingalls Chief Quartermaster, and he continued to discharge the duties of that office daring the remainder of the Peninsula and the Maryland campaigns in a manner which fully sustained the high reputation he had previously acquired. The immediate amount of labor accomplished, often under the most difficult circumstances, the admirable system under which the duties of the department were performed, and the entire suc- cess which attended the efforts to supply so large an army, reflect the highest credit upon the offi- cers upon whom those onerous duties devolved. The reports of General Van Vliet and Lieuten- ant-Colonel Ingalls, with the accompanying docu- ments, give in detail the history of the depart- ment from its organization until I was relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac. SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT. On the first of August, 1861, Colonel H. F. Clark, Commissary of Subsistence, joined my staff, and at once entered upon his duties as Chief Commis.sary of the army of the Potomac. In order to realize the responsibilities pertaining to this office, as well as to form a proper estimate of the vast amount of labor which must necessar- ily devolve upon its occupant, it is only necessary to consider the unprepared state of the country to engage in a war of such magnitude as the pres- ent, and the lack of practical knowledge, on the part of the officers, with reference to supplying and subsisting a large, and at that time, unor- ganized army. Yet, notwithstanding the exist- ence of these groat obstacles, the manner in which the duties of the commissionary depart- ment were discharged was such as to merit and trail forth the conmiendation of the entire army. During the stay of the army of the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington, prior to the Pe- ninsula campaign, its subsistence was drawn chieflv from tUe deu6ts which had been estab- lished by the commissary department at Wash- ington, Alexandria, Forts Corcoran and Runyon. In the important task of designating and estab- lishing depots of supplies. Colonel Clarke was ably seconded by his assistants, Colonel Amos Beckwith, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieutenant-Colonel George Bell, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Porter, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. A. ; Captain Thomas Wilson, Commissary of Subsist- ence, U. S. A. ; Captain Brownell Granger, Com- missary of Subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; Cap- tain W. H. Bell, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. A. ; Captain J. H. Woodward, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; and Captain W. R. Murphy, Commissary of Subsistence, U. S. volunteers. For a full knowledge of the highly creditable manner in which each and all of the above-men- tioned officers discharged their duties, I invite attention to the detailed report of Colonel Clarke. The remarks and suggestions contained in his report are worthy of attention, as affording valu- able rules for the future guidance of the sub- sistence department in supplying armies in the field. The success of the subsistence depart- ment of the army of the Potomac was in a great measure attributable to the fact that the subsist- ence department at Washington made ample pro- vision for sending supplies to the Peninsula, and that it always exercised the most intelligent fore sight. It moreover gave its advice and counte- nance to the officers charged with its duties and reputation in the field, and those officers, I am happy to say, worked with it, and together, in perfect harmony for the public good. During the entire period that I was in command of the army of the Potomac there was no instance with- in my knowledge where the troops were without their rations from any fault of the officers of this department. ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. This very important branch of the service was placed under the charge of Captain C. P. Kings- bury, Ordnance corps. Colonel and Aid-de-Camp. Great difficulty existed in the proper organiza- tion of the department for the M^ant of a suffi- cient number of suitable officers to perform the duties at the various headquarters and depots of supply. But fixr greater obstacles had to be sur- mounted, from the fact that the supply of small arms was totally inadequate to the demands of a large army, and a vast proportion of those fur- nished were of such inferior quality as to be un- satisfactory to the troops, and condemned br their officers. The supply of artillery was more abundant, but of great variety. Rifled ordnance was just coming into use, for the first time in this country, and the description of gun and kind of projectile which would prove most effective, aiul should, therefore, be adopted, was a mere matter of theory. To obviate these difficulties, large quanties of small arms of foreign manu- facture were contracted for; private enterprise in the construction of arms and ammunition was DOCUMENTS. 623 encouraged ; and by the time the army was or- dered to move to the Peninsula the amount of ordnance and ordnance stores was ample. Much also had been done to bring the quality, both of arms and ammunition, up to the proper standard. Boards of officers were in session continually during the autumn and winter of 1861, to test the relative merits of new arms and projectiles. The reports of these boards, confii-mcd by sub- sequent experience in the field, have done much to establish the respective claims of different invent- ors and manufacturers. During the campaigns of the Peninsula and Maryland, the officers connected with the department were zealous and energetic, and kept the troops well supplied, notwithstanding the perplexing and arduous nature of their duties. One great source of perplexity was the fact that it had been necessary to issue arms of all varieties and calibres, giving an equal diversity in the kinds of ammunition required. Untiring watchfulness was therefore incumbent upon the officers in charge to prevent confusion and improper distri- bution of cartridges. Colonel Kingsbury dis- charged the duties of his office with great effi- ciency until the day of July, 1862, when his health required that he should be relieved. First Lieutenant Tliomas G. Baylor, ordnance corps, succeeded him, and performed his duty during the remainder of the Peninsula and Maryland cam- paigns with marked ability and success. The want of reports from Colonel Kingsbury and Lieutenant Baylor renders it impossible for me to enter at all into the details of the organiza- tion of the department. provost-m.-vrshal's department. Immediately after I was placed in command of the "Division of the Potomac," I appointed Col- onel Andrew Porter, Sixteenth regiment infantry, Provost-Marshal of Washington. All the available regular infantry, a battery and a squadron of cav- alry were placed under his command, and by his energetic action he soon corrected the serious evils which existed, and restored order in the city. When the army was about to take the field. General Porter was appointed Provost-^^arshal General of the army of the Potomac, and held that most important position until the end of the Peninsula campaign, when sickness, contracted in the untiring discharge of his duties, compelled him to ask to be relieved from the position he had so ably and energetically filled. The Provost-Marshal General's department had the charge of a class of duties which had not be- fore, in our servi^-e, been defined and grouped under the management of a special department. The following subjects indicate the sphere of this department: suppression of marauding and de- predations, and of all brawls and disturbances, preservation of good order, and suppression of disturbances beyond the limits of the camps. Prevention of straggling on the march. Suppression of gambling-houses, drinking- houses, or bar-rooms, and brothels. Regulation of hotels, taverns, markets, and places of public amusement. Searches, seizures, and arrests. Execution of sentences of general courts-martial, involving im- prisonment or capital punishment. Enforcement of orders prohibiting the sale of intoxicating li- quors, whether by tradesmen or sutlers, and of orders respecting passes. Deserters from the enemy. Prisoners of war taken from the enemy. Countersigning safeguards. Passes to citizens within the lines, and for pur- poses of trade. Complaints of citizens as to the conduct of the soldiers. General Porter was assisted by the following named officers : Major W. H. Wood, Seventeenth United States infantry; Captain James McMillom, acting Assist- ant Adjutant-General, Seventeenth United States inAintry; Captain W. T. Gentry, Seventeenth Uni- ted States infantry ; Captain J. W. Forsurth, Eigh- teenth United States infantry ; Lieutenant J. AV. Jones, Twelfth United States infantry; Lieuten- ant C. F. Trowbridge, Sixteenth United States infantry; and Lieutenant C. D. Mehaffey, Fii'st United States infantry. The provost-guard was composed of the Second United States cavalry. Major Pleasanton, and a battalion of the Eighth and Seventeenth United States infantry, Major Willard. After General Porter was relieved, Major AVood was in charge of this department until after the battle of Antie- tam, when Brigadier-General Patrick was appoint- ed Provost-Marshal General. COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. AVhen the army took the field, for the purpose of securing order and regularity in the camp of headquarters, and facilitating its movements, the office of commandant of general headquarters was created, and assigned to Major G. 0. Ilaller, Sev- enth United States infantry. Six companies of infantry were placed under his orders for guard and police duty. Among the orders appended to this report, is the one defining his duties, which were always satisfactoril}'^ performed. JUDGE-ADVOCATE. From August, 1861, the position of Judge- Ad- vocate was held by Colonel Thomas T. Gantt, Aid-de-Camp,until compelled by ill-health to retire, at Harrison's Landing, in August, 1862. His re- views of the decisions of courts-martial during this period were of great utility in correcting tho practice in military courts, diffusing true notions of discipline and subordination, and setting before the army a high standard of soldierly honor. Upon the retirement of Colonel Gantt, the duties of Judge-Advocate were ably performed by Colo- nel Thomas M. Key, Aid-dc-Camp. SIGNAL CORPS. The method of conveying intelligence and or- ders, invented and introduced into the service by Major Albert J. Mycr, signal officer United State* 624 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-03. ai-my, wa;-i first practically tested in large opera- tions during the organization of the army of the Potomac. Under the direction of Major Myer, a signal corps was formed by detailing officers and men from the diUerent regiments of volunteers and in- structing them in the use of the flags by day and torches by night. The chief signal officer was indefatigable in his exertions to render his corps effective,- and it soon became available for service in every division of the army. In addition to tlie flags and torches, Major ^iyer introduced a portable insulated tele- gi-aph wire, which could be readily laid from point to point, and which could be used under the same general system. In front of Washington, and on the Lower Potomac, at any point within our lines not reached by the military telegraph, the great usefulness of this system of signals was made manifest. Ikit it was not until after the arrival of the army upon the Peninsula, and during the siege and battles of that and the Maryland cam- paigns that the great benefits to be derived from it on the field and under fire were fully appreci- ated. There was scarcely any action or skirmish in which the signal corps did not render important services. Often under heavy fire of artillery, and not unfrequently while exposed to musketry, the officers and men of this corps gave informa- tion of the movements of the enemy, and trans- mitted directions for the evolutions of our own troops. The report of the chief signal officer, with ac- companying documents, will give the details of the services of this coi'ps, and call attention to those members of it who were particularly dis- tinguished. TELEGRAPHIC. The telegraphic operations of the army of the Potomac were superintended by Major Thomas J. Eckert, and under the immediate direction of Mr. Caldwell, who was, with a corps of operators, attached to my headquarters during the entire campaigns upon the Peninsula and in Maryland. 'i'he services of this corps were arduous and efficient. Under the admirable arrangements of Major Eckert they were constantly provided with all the material for constructing new lines, which were rapidly established whenever the army changed position ; and it was not unfrequently the case that the operatives worked under fire from the enemy's guns ; yet they invariably per- formed all the duties required of them with great alacrity and cheerfulness, and it was seldom that I was without the means of direct telegraphic communication with the War Department and with the corpo commanders. From the organization of the army of the Po- tomac up to November first, 18G2, including the Peninsula and Maryland campaigns, upward of one thousand two hundred (1200) miles of military telegraph line had been constructed in connection with tlie operations of the army, and the number of operatives* and builders employed was about two hundred, (200.) To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and enter- prising aeronaut, who had the management of the balloons, I was greatly indebted for the valu- able information obtained during his ascensions. I have more than once taken occasion to recom- mend the members of my staff, both general and personal, for promotion and reward. I beg leave to repeat these recommendations, and to record their names in the history of the army of the Potomac, as gallant soldiers, to whom their coun- try owes a debt of gratitude still unpaid, for the courage, ability, and untiring zeal they displayed during the eventful campaigns in which they bore so prominent a part. CHAPTKB II. On the fifteenth of October the main body of the army of the Potomac was in the immediate vicinitjr of AVashington, with detachments on the left bank of the Potomac as far down as Liverpool Point, and as far up as Williamsport and its vicinity. The different divisions were posted as follows : Hooker at Budd's Ferry, Low- er Potomac ; Heintzelman at Fort Lj-on and vicinitj^; Franklin near the Theological Seminary ; Blenker near Hunter's Chapel ; McDowell at Up- ton's Hill and Arlington ; F. J. Porter at Hall's and Miner's Hills ; Smith at Mackall's Hill ; Mc- Call at Langley ; Buell at Tenallytown, Meridian Hill, Emory's Chapel, etc., on the left bank of the river ; Casey at AVashington ; Stoneman's cavalry at Washington ; Hunt's artillery at Wash- ington ; Banks at Darnestown, with detachments at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, Williamsport, etc. ; Stone at Poolesville •, and Dix at Baltimore, with detachments on the Eastern Shore. On the nineteenth of October, 1861, General McCall marched to Drainsville with his division, in order to cover reconnoissances to be made in all directions the next day, for the purpose of learning the position of the enemy, "and of cov- ering the operations of the topographical engi- neers in making maps of that region. On the twent3'-ninth, acting in concert with General McCall, General Smith pushed strong parties to Freedom Hill, Vienna, Flint Hill, Pea- cock Hill, etc., to accomplish the same purpose in that part of the front. These reconnoissances were successful. On the morning of the twentieth I received the following telegram from General Banks's head- quarters : Darsestown. October 20, 1861. ' Sir : The signal station at Sugar Loaf tele- graphs that the enemy have moved away from Leesburgh. All quiet here. R. M. COPKLAND, Assistant Adjutant-GeneraU General Marcv, Whereupon I sent to General Stone, at Pooles- ville, the following telegram : Camp GnirriN, October 20, 1S61. General McClellan desires me to inform you that General McCall occupied Drainsville yester- DOCUMENTS. 525 day, and is still thero. Will send out heavy reconnoissances to-day. in all directions from that point. The General desires that you will keep a good look-out upon Leesbur2,h, to see if this move- ment has the effect to drive them a\vay. Per- haps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them. A. Y. Coi,BURN, Assistant Adjutant-General. Brig. -Gen. C. P. Stone, Poolesville. Deeming it possil>le that General McCall's movement to Drainsville, together with the sub- sequent reconnoissances, might have the effect of inducing the enemy to abandon Leesburgh, and the despatch from Sugar Loaf appearing to confirm this view, I wished General Stone, who had only a. line of pickets on the river, the mass of his troops being out of sight of, and beyond range from, the Virginia bank, to make some dis- play of an intention to cross, and also to watch the enemy more closely than usual. I did not direct him to cross, nor did I intend that he should cross the river in force for the purpose of fighting. The above despatch was sent on the twentieth, and reached General Stone as early as eleven A.M. of that day. I expected him to accomplish all that was intended on the same day ; and this he did, as will be seen from the following des- patch, received at mj' headquarters in Washing- ton from Poolesville on the evening of October twentieth : Made a feint of crossing at this place this af- ternoon, and at the same time started a recon- noitring party toward Leesburgh from Harrison's Island. The enemy's pickets retired to intrench- ments. Report of reconnoitring party not yet received. I have means of crossing one hun- dred and twenty -five men once in ten minutes at each of two points. River falling slowly. C. P. Stone, Brigadier-General. Major-General McClellan. As it was not foreseen or expected that Gen- eral McCall would be needed to cooperate with General Stone in any attack, he was directed to fall back from Drainsville to his original camp, near Prospect Hill, as soon as the required recon- noissances were completed. Accordingly he left Drainsville on his return, at about half-past eight a.m. of the twenty -first, reaching his old camp at about one p..m. ' In the mean time I was surprised to hear from General Stone that a portion of his troops were engaged on the Virginia side of the river, and at once sent instructions to General McCall to re- main at Drainsville, if he had not left before the order reached him. The order did not raach him until his return to his camp at Langley. He was then ordered to rest his men, and hold his division in readi- ness to return to Drainsville at a monent's notice, should it become necessary. Similar instructions were given to other divisions during the after- noon. S. D. 34. The first intimation I received from General Stone of the i-eul nature of his movements was in a telegram, as follows: Edwards'3 Ferrt, October 21—11.10 a.m. The enemy have been engaged opposite Harri- son's Island ; our men are behaving admirably. C. P. Stone, Brigadier-Genenfl. Major-General McClellan. At two P.M. General Banks's Adjutant-General sent the following : Darnestown, October 21, 1361 — 2 p.m. General Stone safely crossed the river this morning. Some engagements have taken place on the other side of the river — how important is not known. R. M. Copeland, ^ Acting Assistant Adjutant-GeneraL General R. B. Marct. General Stone sent the following despatches on the same day at the hours indicated : Edwards's Ferrt, October 21, 1S6I— 2 p.m. There has been sharp firing on the right of our line, and our troops appear to be advancing there under Baker. The left, under Gorman, lias ad- vanced its skirmishers nearly one mile, and if the movement continues successful, will turn the enemy's right. C. P. Stone, Brigadier-G eneiul . Major-General McClellan. Edwards's Ferrt, October 21, ISCl — 4 p.m. Nearly all my force is across the river. Baker on the right ; Gorman on the left. Right, sharply engaged. C. P. Stone, Brigadier-General. General McClellan. Edwards's Ferrt, October 21, 1861—9.80 p.m. I am occupied in preventing further disaster, and try to get into a position to redeem. We have lost some of our best commanders — Baker dead, Cogswell a prisoner or secreted. The wounded are being carefully and rapidly re- moved ; and Gorman's wing is being cautiously withdrawn. Any advance from Drainsville must be made cautiously. All was reported going well up to Baker's deatii, but, in the confusion following that, the right wing was outflanked. In a few hours I shall, unless a night attack is made, be in the same position as last night, save the loss of many good men. C. P. Stone, Brigadier-General. Major-General McClellan. Although no more fully inforn^ed of the state of affairs, I had during the afternoon, as a pre- cautionaiy measure, ordered General Banks to send one brigade to the support of the troops at Harrison's Island, and to move with the other two to Seneca Mills, ready to support General Stone if necessar}^ The half-past nine p.m. des- patch of General Stone did not give me an entire understanding of the state of the case. Aware of the difficulties and perhaps fatal con- sequences of recrossing such a river as the Poto^ 526 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. mac after a repulse, and from thd^e telegrams supposing his whole force to be on the Virginia side, I directed General Stone to intrench himself, and hold the Virginia side at all hazards until reenforcements could arrive, when he could safely withdraw to the Maryland side, or hold his posi- tion on the Virginia side, should that prove ad- visable. General Banks was instructed to move the rest of his division to Edwards's Ferry, and to send over as many men as possible before daylight to reenforce Stone. He did not arrive in time to effect this, and was instructed to collect all the canal-boats he could find, and use them for cross- ing at Edwards's Ferry in sufficient force to en- able the troops already there to hold the opposite side. On the twenty-second I went to the ground in person, and reaching Poolesville, learnecf for the first time the full details of the aifair. The following extract from the evidence of General Stone before the " Committee on the Conduct of the "War " on the fifth of January, 1862, will throw further light on this occurrence. General Stone says he received the order from my headquarters to make a slight demonstration at about eleven o'clock a.m. on the twentieth, and that, in obedience to that order, he made the demonstration on the evening of the same day. In regard to the reconnoissance on the twenty- first, M'hich resulted in the battle of Ball's Bluff, he was asked the following questions : Question. "Did this reconnoissance originate with yourself, or had you orders from the Gene- ral-in-Chief to make it?" To which he replied : " It originated with my- ijelf — the reconnoissance." Question. " The order did not proceed from (ieneral McClellan ?" Answer. '' I was directed the day before to make a demonstration ; that demonstration was made the day previous." Question. " Did you receive an order fi'om the General-in-Chief to make the reconnoissance ?" Answer. " No, sir." Making a personal examination on the twenty- third, 1 found that the position on the Virginia side at Edwards's Ferry was not a tenable one, but did not think it wise to withdraw the troops by da3dight. I therefore caused more artillery to be jjlaced in position on the Maryland side to cover the approaches to the ground held by us, and crossed the few additional troops that the high wind permitted us to get over, so as to be as secure as possible against any attack during the day. Before nightfall all the precautions were taken to secure an orderly and quiet pas- sage of the troops and guns. The movement was commenced soon after da^k, under the personal supervision of General Stone, who received the order for the withdrawal at fif- teen minutes past seven p.m. By four a.m. of the twenty-fourth every thing had reached the Maryland shore in safety. A few days afterward I received information which seemed to be authentic, to the efifect that large bodies of the enemy had been ordered froni Manassas to Leesburgh, to cut off our troops on the Virginia side. Their timely withdrawal had probably prevented a still more sei'ious disaster. I refer to General Stone's report of this battle, furnished the AVar Department, and his pub- lished testimony before the " Committee on the Conduct of the War " for further details. The records of the War Department show ray anxiety and efforts to assume active offensive operations in the" fall and early winter. It is only just to say, however, that the unprecedent- ed condition of the roads and Virginia soil would have delayed an advance till February, had the? discipline, organization, and equipment of the army been as complete at the close of the fiill as was necessary, and as I desired and labored against every impediment to make them. While still in command only of the army of the Potomac, namely, in early September, I pro- posed the formation of a corps of New-Englanders for coast service in the bays and inlets of the Chesapeake and Potomac, to cooperate with my own command, from which most of its material was drawn. On the first of November, however, I was call- ed to relieve Lieutenant-General Scott in the chief and general command of the armies of the Union. The direction and nature of this coast expedition, therefore, was somewhat chang- ed, as will soon appear in the original plan sub- mitted to the Secretary of War, and the letter of instructions later issued to General Burn- side, its commander. The whole country indeed had now become the theatre of military opera- tions from the Potomac to beyond the Mississip- pi, and to assist the navy in perfecting and sus- taining the blockade it became necessary to extend these operations to points on the sea- coast, Koanoke Island, Savannah, and New-Or- leans. It remained also to equip and organize the armies of the West, whose condition was lit- tle better than that of the army of the Potomac had been. The direction of the campaigns in the West, and of the operations upon the seaboard, enabled me to enter upon larger combinations and to accomplish results, the necessity and ad- vantage of which had not been unforeseen, but which had been beyond the ability of the single army formerly under my command to effect. The following letters, and a subsequent paper addressed to the Secretary of War, sufficiently indicate the nature of those combinations to minds accustomed to reason upon military oper- ations : IlBADQnARTERS ArMT OF THE POTOMAC, 1 Wasuixgton, September 6, ISOl. ) vSiR : I have the honor to suggest the follow- ing proposition, with the request that the neces- sary authority be at once given me to carry it out : to organize a force of two brigades of five regi- ments each, of New-England men, for the gen- eral service, but particularly adapted to coast service — the officers and men to be sufficiently conversant with boat service, to manage steamers, sailing vessels, launches, barges, surf-boats, iioat- DOCUMENTS. 527 ing batteries, etc. To charter or buy for the command a sufficient number of propellers, or tug-boats, for transportation of men and supplies, the machinery of which should be amply pro- tected by timber ; the vessels to have permanent experienced officers from the merchant service, but to be manned by details from the command. A naval officer to be attached to the staff of the commanding officer. The flank companies of each regiment to be armed with Dahlgreu boat guns, and carbines with water-proof cartridges ; the other companies to have such arms as I may hereafter designate ; to be uniformed and equip- ped as the Rhode Island regiments are. Launches and floating batteries with timber parapets of sufficient capacity to land or bring into action the entire force. The entire management and organization of the force to be under my control, and to form an integral part of the army of the Potomac. The immediate object of this force is for oper- ations in the inlets of Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac ; by enabling me thus to land troops at points where they are needed, this force can also be used in conjunction with a naval force oper- ating against points on the sea-coast. This coast division to be commanded by a general officer of my selection ; the regiments to be organized as other land forces ; the disbursements for vessels, etc., to be made by the proper department of the army upon the requisitions of the general com- manding the division, with my approval. I think the entire force can be organized in thirty days, and by no means the least of the advantages of this proposition is the fact that it will call into the service a class of men who would not otherwise enter the army. You will immediately perceive that the object of this force is to follow along the coast and up the inlets and rivers, the movements of the main army when it advances. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, George B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Hon. Simon Cameron, ,' Secretary of War. Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring the requisite vessels, and adapting them to the special purposes contemplated, this expedition was not ready for service until January, IBOS. Then in the chief command, I deemed it best to send it to North-Carolina, with the design indicated in the following letter : Headqdartebs of thb Army, Washington, I January 7, 1S62. f General : In accordance with verbal instruc- tions heretofore given you, you will, after uniting with Flag-Officer Goldsborough at Fort Monroe, proceed under his convoy to Hatteras Inlet, where you will, in connection with him, take the most prompt measures for crossing the fleet over the Bulkhead into the waters of the sound. Under the accompanying general order constituting the department of North-Carolina, you will assume command of the garrison at Hatteras Inlet, and make such dispositions in regard to that place as your ulterior operations, may render necessary, always being careful to provide for the safety of that very important station in any contingency. Your first point of attack will be Roanoke Island and its dependencies. It is presumed that the navy can reduce the batteries on the n^arshes, and cover the landing of your troops on the main island, by which, in connection with a rapid movement of the gunboats to the northern ex- tremity, as soon as the marsh battery is reduced, it may be hoped to capture the entire garrison of the place. Having occupied the island and its dependencies, you will at once proceed to the erection of the batteries and defences necessary to hold the position with a small force. Should the flag-officer require any assistance in seizing or holding the debouches of the canal from Nor- folk, you will please afford it to him. The Commodore and yourself having completed your arrangements in regard to'Roanoke Island, and the waters north of it, you will please at once make a descent on Newborn, having gained possession of which and the railroad passing through it, you will at once throw a sufficient force upon Beaufort, and take the steps necessary to reduce Fort Macon and open that port. When you seize Newbern, you will endeavor to seize the railroad as far west as Goldsborough, should circumstances favor such a movement. The temper of the people, the rebel force at hand, etc., will go far toward determining the question as to how far west the railroad can be safely oc- cupied and held. Should circumstances render it advisable to seize and hold Raleigh, the main north and south line of railroad passing through Goldsborough should be so effectually destroyed for considerable distances north and south of that point, as to render it impossible for the rebels to use it to your disadvantage. A great point would be gained, in any event, hy the effectual destruction of the Wilmington and Wel- don Railroad. I would advise great caution in moving so far into the interior as upon Raleigh. Having accom- plished the objects mentioned, the next point of in- terest would probably be Wilmington, the reduc- tion of which may require that additional means shall be afforded you. I would urge great caution, in regard to proclamations. In no case w )uld I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation r ith the naval commander, which should say as liitle as possible about politics or the negro; merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union, and upholding the laws of tlie general Government, and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, as far as possible, be protected in their persons and property. You will please report your operations as often as an opportunity ofiers itself With my best wishes for your success, I am, etc., etc. Geo. B. McClellan, M;ijor-Genei-iil Commanding ia ChieC Brigadier-General A. K. Burmside, Commanding Expedition. The following letters of instruction were sent 628 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-68. to Generals Halleck, Buell, Sherman, and Cut- ler ; and I also communicated verbally to these officers ni}' views in full regarding the field of operations assigned to each, and gave them their instructions as much in detail as was necessary at that time : Hbadquartrbs of the Army, I AVasiiisgton, D. C, Novenibei- 11, 1861. f Genekai. : In assigning you to the command of the department of Missouri, it is probably unnecessaiy for me to state that I have intrusted to you a duty which requires the utmost tact and decision. You have not merely the ordinary duties of a military commander to perform, but the ftir more difficult task of reducing chaos to order, of chang- ing prob;il)ly the majority of the personnel of the staff of the department, and of reducing to a point of economy, consistent with the interest and necessities of the State, a system of reckless expenditure and fraud, perhaps unheard of be- fore in the history of the world. You will find in your department many gene- ral and staff ofiicers holding illegal commissions and appointments, not recognized or approved by the President or Secretary of War. You will please at once inform these gentlemen of the nullity of their appointment, and see that no pay or allowances are issued to them until such time as commissions may be authorized by the Presi- dent or Secretary of War. If any of them give the slightest trouble, you will at once arrest them and send them, under guard, out of the limits of 3'our department, in- forming them, that if they return they will be placed in close confinement. You will please ex- amine into the legality of the organization of the troops .serving in the department. When you find any illegal, unusual, or improper organiza- tions, you will give to the officers and men an opportunity to enter the legal military establish- ment under general laws and orders from the AVar Department ; reporting in full to these headquarters any officer or organization that may decline. You will please cause competent and reliable staff-officers to examine all existing contracts immediately, and suspend all payments upon them Mntil you receive the report in each case. Where there is the slightest doubt as to the pro- priety of the contract, you will be good enough to refer the matter, with full explanation, to these headquarters, stating in each case what would be a fair compensation for the services or mate- rials rendered under the contract. Discontinue at once the reception of material or services un- der any doubtful contract. Arrest and bring to I)rom[)t trial all officers who have in any wixy violated their duty to the Government. In re- gard to the political conduct of affairs, you will please labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adjacent States that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national Government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and ^'ood order. With respect to military operations, it is pro- bable, from the best infoj-mation in my posses- sion, that the interests of the Government will be best served by fortifying and holding in considerable sti-enjth Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points, ketping strong patrols constajitly moving from the terminal stations, and concen- trating the mass of the troo])s on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations as the public interests may demand. I would be glad to have you make as soon as possible a personal inspectiort of all the import- ant points in your department, and report the result to me. I cannot too strongly impress upon you the absolute necessity of keeping me constantly advised of the strength, condition, and location of your troops, together with all facts that will enable me to maintain that gene- ral direction of the armies of the United States which it is my purpose to exercise. I trust to you to maintain thorough organization, disci- pline, and economy throughout your department. Please inform me as soon as possible of every thing relating to the gunboats now in process of construction, as well as those completed. The militia force authorized to be raised by the State of Missouri for its defence will be un- der your orders. I am. General, etc., etc. George JJ. McCleli.an, M.ijor-General Commanding U. S. A. Major-Gen eral II. W. Halleck, U. S. A., Commanding Department of Missouri. Hbadquarters of thr Armt, I Washingto:^, November 7, ISG'2. j" General: In giving you instructions for your guidance in command of the department of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I merely wish to express plainly the general ideas which occur to me in relation to the conduct of opera- tions there. That portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River is by its position so close- ly related to the States of Illinois and Missouri, that it has seemed best to attach it to the depart- ment of Missouri. Your operations there, in Kentucky, will be confined to that portion of the State east of the Cumberland River. I trust I need not repeat to you that I regard the im- portance of the territory committed to your care as second only to that occupied by the army under my immediate command. It is absolutely necessary that we shall hold all the State of Kentucky ; not only that, but that the majority of its inhabitants shall be warmly in fiivor of our cause, it being that which best subserves their interests. It is possible that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more im- portant than that of our military operations. I certainly cannot overestimate the importance of the former. You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fight- ing ; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general Government over all portions of our ter- ritoiy. AVe shall most readily suppi'css this re- bellion and restore the authority of the Govern- DOCUMENTS. 529 meiit by religiously respecting the constitutional righld of all. T know that I express the feelings and opinion of the President when I say that we are figliting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the general Government. The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic institutions will in no man- ner be intcrferred with, and that they will receive at our hands every constitutional protection. I have only to repeat that you will in all respects carefully regard the local institutions of the region in which you command, allowing nothing but the dictates of military necessity to cause you to de- part from the spirit of these instructions. So much in regard to political considerations. The military problem would be a simple one could it be entirely separated from political in- fluences ; such is not the case. Were the popu- lation among which you are to operate wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your tirst and principal objective point. It so happens that a large majority of the inhab- itants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union ; it therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap or Walker's Gap, on Ivnoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennes- see to rise, while you at the same time cut off the railway communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi. It will be prudent to fortify the pass before leaving it in your rear. Brigadier-General D. C. Buell. Headqitarters of the Armt, I WAsniNGTQN, November 12, 18G2. ) General : Upon assuming command of the department, I will be glad to have you make as soon as por.sible a cai'eful report of the condition and situation of 3'our troops, and of the military and political condition of your command. The main point to which I desire to call your atten- tion is the necessity of entering Eastern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with reasonable chances of success, and I hope that you will, with the least possible delay, organize a column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding dt the same time the main avenues by which the j-ebels may invade Kentucky. Our conversations uu the subject of military operations have been so full, and my confidence in your judgment is so great, that I will not dwell further upon the subject, except to urge upon you the necessity of Tcoepitig mo fully informed as to the state of aflairs, both military and political, and your movements. In regard to political matters, bear in mind that we aie fight- ing only to preserve the integrity of the Union and to uphold the power of the General Govern- meut; as far as military necessity will permit, religiously respect the constitutional rights of all. Preserve the strictest discipline among the troops, and while employing the utmost energv in mili- tary movement-s, bo careful so to tivat the un- armed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. I mean by this that it is the desire of the Government to avoid unnecessary irritation by causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. Where there is good reason to believe that per- sons are actually giving aid, comfort, or informa- tion to the enemy, it is of course necessary to arrest them ; but I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it well to direct that no arrest shall be made except by your order or that of your generals, unless in ex- traordinary cases, always holding the party mak- ing the arrest responsible for the propriet}- of his course. It should be our constant aim to make it apparent to all that their property, their comfort, and their personal safety will be best preserved by adhering to the cause of the Union. If the military suggestion, I have made in this letter prove to have been founded on erroneous data, you are of course perfectly free to change the plans of operations. Brigadier-General D. C. Buell, Commanding Department of the Ohio. IlKADQtTARTERS OF TOR ArMT, f ■Washington, February 11, 1S62. )" General: Your despatches in regard to the occupation of Dafuskie Island, etc., were received to-day. I saw also to-day, for the first time, your requisition for a siege-train for Savannah. After giving the subject all the consideratioii in my power, I am forced to the conclusion that, under present circumstances, the siege and cap- ture of Savannah do not promise results com- mensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When I learned that it was possible for the gunboats to reach the Savannah River, above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested themselves to my mind as its immediate results. First. The capture of Savannah by a " coup de mnhi''' — the result of an instantaneous advance and attack by the army and navy. The time for this has passed, and your letter indicates that you are not accountable for the failure to seize the propitious moment, but that, on the contrary, you perceived its advantages. Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off its supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction by a bombardment. Although we have a long delay to deplore, the second course still remains open to us; and I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, and its bombardment as soon as the thirteen-inch mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am confi- dent you can thus reduce it. With Pulaski, you gain all that is really essential ; you obtain com pletc control of the harbor ; you relieve the block- ading fleet, and render the main body of your force disposable for other operations. I do not consider the posse^^sion of Savannah worth a siege after Pulaski is in our hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of the first import- ance. The expedition to Fernandina is well, and I shall be glad to learn that it is ours. 530 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. But, after all, tlie greatest moral effect would be produced by the reduction of Cliarles-ton and its defences. There the rebellion had its birth ; there the unnatural hatred of our Government is most intense ; there is the centre of the boasted power and coura Washisgton, March 8, 1862. ( Ordered, That no change of the base of opera- tions of the army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of opera- tions until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from the enemy's batteries, and other ob- structions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission. That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be in- tended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the eigh- teenth March instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day. Ordered, That the army and navy coooperate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay. Abraham Lincoln. L. Thomas, Adjutant- General. After what has been said already in regf-rd to the effect of a movement to the Lower Chesapeake it is unnecessary for me to comment upon this document, further than to say that the time of beginning the movement depended upon the state of readiness of the transports, the entire control of which had been placed by the Secretary of War in the hands of one of the Assistant Secre- taries, and not under the Quartermaster General ; so that even if tlie movement were not impeded by the condition imposed, in regard to the bat- teries on the Potomac, it could not have been in my power to begin it before the eighteenth of March, unless the Assistant Secretary of War had completed his arrangements by that time. Meanwhile important events were occurring DOCUMENTS. 539 which materially modified the designs for the sub- sequent campaign. The appearance of the Merri- mac off Old Point Comfort, and the encounter with the United States squadron on the eighth of March, threatened serious derangement of the plan for the Peninsula movement. But the en- gagement between the Monitor and Merrimac on the ninth of March, demonstrated so satisfac- torily the power of the former, and the other naval preparations were so extensive and formi- dable, that the security of Fort Monroe, as a base of operations, was placed beyond a doubt ; and although the James River was closed to us, the York River, with its tributaries, was still open as a line of water communication with the fortress. The general plan, therefore, remained undisturb- ed, although less promising in its details than when the James River was in our control. On Sunday, the ninth of March, information from various sources made it apparent that the enemy was evacuating his positions at Centreville and Manassas as well as on the Upper and Lower Potomac. The President and Secretary of War were present when the most positive information reached me, and I expressed to them my inten- tion to cross the river immediately, and there gain the most authentic information, prior to de- teniiining what course to pursue. The retirement of the enemy toward Richmond had been expected as the natural consequence of the movement to the Peninsula, but the adoption of this course immediately on ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while it relieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors, and attested the character of the de- sign, was unfortunate in that the then almost impassable roads between our position and theirs depiived us of the opportunity for inflicting dam- age usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the Aice of a powerful adversary. The retirement of the enemy and the occupa- tion of the abandoned positions which necessarih' followed presented an opportunity for the troops to gain some experience on the march and bi- vouac preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other " impedi- ments " which accumulate so easily around an army encamped for a long time in one locality. A march to Manassas and back would produce no delay in embarking for the Lower Chesa- peake, as the transports could not be ready for some time, and it afforded a good intermediate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of the camps around Washington, and the rig- ors of active operations, besides accomplishing the important object of determining the positions and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, with the possibility of being able to harass their rear. I therefore issued orders during the night of the ninth of March for a general movement of the army the next morning toward Centreville and Manassas, sending in advance two regiments of cavalry imder Colonel .Werill with orders to reach Manassas if possible, ascertain the exact condition of affairs, and do whatever he could to retard and annoy the enem}"- if really in re- treat ; at the same time I telegraphed to the Sec- retary of War that it would be necessary to de- fer the organization of the army corps until the completion of the projected advance upon Ma- nassas, as the divisions could not be brought together in time. The Secretary replied, re- quiring immediate compliance with the Presi- dent's order, but on my again representing that this would compel the abandonment or postpone- ment of the movement to Manassas, he finally consented to its postponement. At noon on the tenth of March the cavalry advance reached the enemy's lines at Centreville, passing through his recently occupied camps and works, and finding still burning heaps of mili- tary stores and much valuable property. Immediately after being assigned to the com- mand of the troops around Washington, I or- ganized a secret service force, under Mr. E. J. Allen, a very experienced and efficient person. This force, up to the time I was relieved from command, was continually occupied in procuring from all possible sources information regarding the strength, positions, and movements of the enemy. All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees, and many prisoners of war, coming into our lines from the front, were carefully examined, first by the outpost and division commanders, and then by my chief of staff and the Provost-Marshal General. Their statements, taken in writing, and in many cases under oath, from day to day, for a long period previous to the evacuation of Ma- nassas, comprised a mass of evidence which, by careful digests and collations, enabled me to es- timate with considerable accuracy the strength of the enemy before us. Summaries showing the character and results of the labors of the secret service force accompany this report and I refer to them for the facts they contain, and as a measure of the ignorance which led some jour- nals at that time and persons in high office un- wittingly to trifle with the reputation of an army, and to delude the country with quaker gun sto- ries of the defences and gross understatements of the numbers of the enemy. The following orders were issued for the ex- amination of persons coming from the direction of the enemy : [Circular.] HE.tnQPARTERS ARMY OF THB POTOMAC, ( Washington, December 16, ISCl. ( The Major-Gen eral Commanding directs that hereafter all deserters, prisoner.=;, spies, "contra- band.-^," and all other persons whatever coming or brought within our lines from Virginia, shall be taken immediately to the quarters of the com- mander of the division M'ithin whose lines they may come or be brought, without previous ex- amination b}'- any one, except so far as may be necessary for the officer commanding the ad- vance-guard to elicit information regarding his particular post ; that the division commander ex- amine all such persons himself, or delegate such duty to a proper officer of his staff, and allow no 540 REBELLIOX RECORD, 1862-63. other persons to hold any communication with them; that he tlien immediately send them, with a sulHcicnt <;;iiaid, to tlie provost-marshal in this citv for furtlier examination and safe keepinj^, and that stringent orders he given to all guards having such persons in charge not to hold any communication with them whatever; and fur- ther, that the information elicited from such per- sons shall be immediately communicated to the Majnr-ncneral Commanding, or to the chief of statf, and to no other person whatever. Tlie .Major-Gencral Commanding further directs that a sutlicicnt guard be placed around every telegraph station pertaining to this army, and that such guards he instructed not to allow any person, except the regular telegraph corps, gen- eral ofDcers, and such staff-officers as may be authorized by their chief, to enter or loiter around said stations within hearing of the sound of the telegraph instruments. By command of Major-General McClellan. S. Williams, Assistant Attjutant-General. Headquarters Armt of thk Potomac, ) Washington, February 26, 1S62. J General Order No. 27. All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and other persons coming within our lines, will be taken at once to the provost-marshal of the near- est division, who will examine them in presence of the division commander or an officer of his staff designated for the purpose. This examina- tion will only refer to such information as may affect the division and those near it, especially those remote from general headquarters. As soon as this examination is completed — and it must be made as rapidly as possible — the person will be sent, under proper guard, to the Provost-Marshal General, with a statement of his replies to the questions asked. Upon receiv- ing him, the Provost-Marshal General will at once send him, with his statement, to the chief of staff of the army of the Potomac, who will cause the necessary examination to be made. The Pro- vost-Marshal General,)vill have the custody of all such jtersons. Division coiumanders will at once communicate to other division commanders all information thus obtained which affects them. By command of Major-General McClellan. S. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General In addition to the foregoing orders, the divi- sion commanders were instructed, whenever they desired to send out scouts toward the enemy, to naake known the object at headiiuartiirs, in order that I might determine whether we liad the in- formation it was proposed to obtain, and that I might give the necessary orders to other com- manders, so that the scouts should not be mo- lested by the guards. It will be seen from the report of the chief of the secret service corps, dated March eighth, that the forces of the rebel army of the Potomac, at that date, were as follows : At Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper Occoqnan, and vicinity, eighty tliousand men ; at Brooks's Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, and vicinity, eighteen thousand men ; at Leesburgh and vicinity, four thousand five hundred men ; in the Shenandoah Valley, thirteen thousand men. One hundred and fifteen thousand five hundred men. About three hundred field guns and from twenty-six to thirty siege-guns were with the rebel army in front of Washington. The report made on the seventeenth of March, after the evacuation of Manassas and Centreville, corrobo- rates the statements contained in the report of the eighth, and is fortified by the affidavits of several railroad engineers, constructors, baggage- masters, etc., whose opportunities for forming correct estimates were unusuallj^ good. Thes* affidavits will be found in the accompanying re ports of the chief of the secret service corps. A reconnoissance of the works at Centreville made by Lieutenant McAlister, United States engineers, on March fourteenth, 1862, and a sur- vey of those at Manassas, made by a party of the United States coast survey, in April, 1862, con- firmed also my conclusions as to the strength of the enemy's defences. Those at Centreville con- sisted of two lines, one facing east and the other north. The former consisted of seven works, namely, one bastion fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries ; all containing em- brasures for forty guns, and connected by in- fantry parapets and double caponieres. It ex- tended along the crest of the ridge a mile and three quarters from its junction with the north- ern front to ground thickly wooded and impass- able to an attacking column. The northern front extended about one and one fourth mile to Great Rocky Run, and thence three fourths of a mile further to thickly wooded, impassable ground in the valley of Cub Run. It consisted of six lunettes and batteries with em- brasures for thirty-one guns, connected by an infantry parapet in the form of a cremaillere line with redans. At the town of Centreville, on a higli hill commanding the rear of all the works within range, was a large hexagonal redoubt with ten embrasures. Manassas Station was defended in all direc- tions by a system of detached woi'ks, with plat- forms for heavy guns arranged ibr marine car- riages, and often connected by infantry parapets. This system was rendered complete by a very large work, with sixteen embrasures, which com- manded the highest of the other works by about fifty feet. Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred to will be found among the maps appended to this report. From this it will be seen that the positions se- lected by the enemy at Centreville and Manas- sas were naturally very strong, with impassable streams and broken ground, alfording ample pro- tection for their Hanks, and that strong lines of intrenchments swept all the available ajtproaches. Although the history of every former war has DOCUMENTS. 541 conclusively shown the great advantages which are possessed by an army acting on the defensive and occupying strong positions, defended by heavy earthworlvs ; yet, at the coninienccment of this war, but few civilians in our countr}', and, indeed, not all military men of rank, had a just appreciation of the fact. Xew levies that have never been in battle can- not be expected to advance without cover under the murderous fire from such defences, and carry them by assault. This is work in which veteran troops frequently fixlter and are repulsed with loss. Tliat an assault of the enemy's position in front of Washington, with the new troops com- posing the army of the Potomac, during the win- ter of 18G1-''G2, would have resulted in defeat and demoralization, was too probable. The same army, though inured to war in many battles, hard fought a;nd bravely won, has twice, under other generals, suffered such disasters as it was no excess of prudence then to avoid. My letter to the Secretary of War, dated February third, 18(32, and given above, expressed the opin- ion that the movement to the Peninsula would com- pel the enemy to retire from his position at Ma- nassas and free Washington from danger. When the enemy first learned of that plan, they did thus evacuate Manassas. During the Peninsula campaign, as at no former period. Northern Vir- ginia was completely in our possession, and the vicinity of Washington free from the presence of the enemy. The ground so gained was not lost, nor Washington again put in danger, until the enemy learned of the orders for the evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me at Harrison's Bar, and were again left free to advance northward and menace the national capital. Perhaps no one now doubts that the best defence of Wash- ington is a Peninsula attack on Richmond. My order for the organization of the army corps was issued on the thirteenth of March ; it has been given above. While at Fairfax Court-House on March twelfth, I was informed through the telegraph, by a member of my staff, that the following document had appeared in the Rational Intelli- gencer of that morning : [President's War Order No. .3.] EXECUTIVB ^^ANSTON, 1 Washington, March 11, 1862. ) Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military depart- ments, he retaining command of the department of the Potomac. Ordered further^ That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Hal- leck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the department of the Mississippi ; and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck liave command of said department. S. D. 35. Ordered also, That the country west of the department of the Potomac and east of the dc^ partment of the Mississippi be a military depart- ment, to be called the Mountain department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Fremont. That all the commanders of departments, after the i-eceipt of this order by them, respectively report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them. Abkaiiam Lincoln. Though unaware of the President's intention to remove me from the position of General-in- Chief, I cheerfully acceded to the disposition he saw fit to make of my services, and so informed him in a note on the twelfth of March, in which occur these words : "I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connection with some western matters, that no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, and you will find that, under present circum- stance, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self will in an> manner interfere with the discharge of my pub- lic duties. Again thanking you for the official and personal kindness you have so often evinced toward me, I am," etc., etc. On the fourteenth March a reconnoissance of a large body of cavalry with some infantry, under command of General Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad to deter' mine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the Rappahannock, but the I'oads were in such condition that, linding it im- possible to subsist his men, General Stoneman was forced to return after reaching Cedar Run. The following despatch from him recites the result of this expedition : Hbadquarteks, Unmon Mills, ) March 16, 1862. f We arrived here last evening about dark. We got corn for horses ; no provisions for men. Bull Run too high to cross. Had we staid an hour longer we should not have got here to-day, owing to the high water in the streams. Felt the ene- my cautiously, and found him in force at Warren- ton Junction. Saw two regiments of cavalry and three bodies of infantry on the other side of Ce- dar Run. Had we crossed, should not have been able to get back for high water. Had three men of Fifth cavalry hit driving in enemy's pick- ets; one slightly wounded in the head. Enemy acted confidently, and followed us some way back on the roacl, but did not molest us in any way. Enemy's force consisted of Stuart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of artillery, and some infantry. Railroad bridges all burned down up to Warrenton Junction ; still entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn at a moment's warning, having dry wood piled upon them. Heard cars running during night before last ; probably bring- ing up troops from Rappahannock. Heard of two 542 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. regTments of infantry at Warrenton engaged in impressing the militia and securing forage. Heard of a large force of infantry this side of Rappahan- nock River, having come up to Warrenton Junc- tion from Acquia Creek day before yesterday. Bridges all destroyed this side of Rroad Run. The aids who take this will give you further par- ticulars. Very respectfully, etc., Geohge Stoneman, Brigadier-General Commanding. Colonel CoLBURN. The main body of the army was, on the fif- teenth of March( moved back to the vicinity of Alexandria, to be embarked, leaving a part of General Sumner's corps at Manassas until other troops could be sent to relieve it. Before it was withdrawn a strong reconnoissance, under Gen- eral Howard, was sent toward the Rappahannock, the result of which appears in the following des- patch : Warrenton Jdnction, Marcli 29, 1S62. Express just received from General Howard. He drove the enemy across the Rappahannock bridge, and is now in camp on this bank of and near the Rappahannock River. The enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. There was skirmishing during the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artillery, without any loss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not known. General Howard will return to this camp to-morrow morning. E. V. Sumner, Brigadier-General. General S. Williams. The lino of the Rappahannock and the Manassas Gap Railroad was thus left reasonably secure from menace by any considerable body of the enemy. On the thirteenth of March a council of war was assembled at Fairfax Court-House, to discuss the military status. The Presidefit's Order Number Three, of March eighth, was considered. The following is a memorandum of the proceedings of the council : IIbadqoarters Army of the Potomac, ) I'airfAx CoUKT-HonsE, March 13, 1862. ) A council of the generals commanding army corps, at the headquarters of the army of the I'o- tomac, were of the opinion — I. That the enemy having retreated from Ma- nassas to Gordonsvillc, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals com- manding army corps that the operations to be car- ried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers : Provided, 1st. That the enemy's vessel, Mcrrimac, can be neutralized. 2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to niove down the Potomac ; and, 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries «>n the York River. 4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of secur- ity for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) H. If the foregoing cannot be, the armj^ should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repair- ing railroads, and stocking them with materials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected, for both the Orange and Alex- andria and Acquia and Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.) N. B.— That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of twenty-five thousand men would suffice. (Ke3^es, Hcintzelman, and McDowell.) A total of forty thousand men for the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumner.) This was assented to by myself, and immedi- ately communicated to the War Department. The following reply was received the same day : War Department, March 13, 1862. The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the com- manders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution : 1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication. 2. Leave Washington entirely secure. 3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Mon- roe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. Edwin M. Staxton, Secretary of War. Major-General George B. McClellan. My preparations were at once begun in accord- ance with these directions, and on the sixteenth of March the following instructions M'cre sent to Generals Banks and Wadsworth : HBADQ0ARTBE3 AilMT OF THE POTOMAC, March '. ' '. Potomac, ( 10, 1S02. ( Sir : You will post your command in the vicin- ity of ^fanassas, intrench j'ourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the front. Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Manassas, and to Strasburgh, in order to open your communica- tions with the valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap Railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four re- giments, with two batteries, at or near the point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Some- thing like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester and thor- oughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley, as well as through Chester Gap, which might perhaps be advanta- geously occupied by a detachment of infantry, well DOCUMENTS. 543 intrencherl. Block-houses should be built at all the railway briflges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction and Warrcnton itself, and also some little more advanced point on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, as soon as the railway bridge is repaired. Great activity should be observed by the cav- alry. Besides the two regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your dis- posal, to scout toward the Occoquan, and proba- bly a fourtli toward Leesburgh. To recapitulate, the most important points which should engage your attention are as fol- lows : 1. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vi- cinity of Manassas, perhaps even Centreville, and another force, (a brigade,) also well intrench- ed, near Strasburgh. 2. Block-houses at the railway bridges. 3. Constant employment of the cavalry well to the front. 4. Grand guards at "Warrenton Junction and in advance, as far as the Rappahannock, if pos- sible. 5. Gieat care to be exercised to obtain full and early information as to the enemy. 6. The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac and Washington. The above is communicated by command of Major-Gencral McClcIlan. S. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General. Major-General N. P. Banks, Commanding Fifth Corps, Array of the Potomac. Headqoartebs Armv of thr Potomac, ) March 16, 1862. f Sir : The command to which you have been assigned, by instructions of the President, as Military Governor of the District of Columbia, embraces the geographical limits of the District, and will also include the city of Alexandria, the defensive works south of the Potomac, from the Occoquan to Difficult Creek, and the post of Fort Washington. I inclose a list of the troops and of the de- fences embraced in these limits. General Banks will command at Manassas Junction, with the divisions of Williams and Shields, composing the Fifth corps, but you should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in your front, carefully guard the approaches in that quarter, and maintain the duties of advanced- guards. You will use the same precautions on either flank. All troops not actually needed for the police of Washington and Georgetown, for the garri- sons north of the Potomac, and for other indi- cated special duties, should be moved to the south side of the river. In the centre of your front you should post the main body of your troops, and propci- propor- tions at suitable distances toward your right and left flanks. Careful patrols will be made, in or- der thoroughly to scour the country in front, from rigiit to left. It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain the forts and their armaments in the best possi- ble order, to look carefully to the instruction and discipline of their gari'isons, as well as all other troops under your command, and, by frequent and rigid inspections, to insure the attainment of these ends. The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges, and ferries within the above-named lim- its, will devolve upon you, and you are to insure their security and provide for their protection by every means in your power. You will also pro- tect the depots of the public stores and the transit of stores to troops in active service. By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour the neighboring country, south of the Eastern Branch, and also on your right, and you will use every possible precaution to intercept mails, goods, and persons passing unauthorized to the enemy's lines. The necessity of maintaining good order with- in your limits, and especially in the capital of the nation, cannot be too strongly enforced. You will forward and facilitate the movement of all troops destined for the active part of the army of the Potomac, and especially the transit of detachments to their proper regiments and corps. The charge of the new troops arriving in Washington, and of all troops temporarily there, will devolve upon you. You will form them into provisional brigades, promote their instruction and discipline, and facilitate their equipment. Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, com- position, and equipment, by every opportunity. Besides the regular reports and returns, which you will be required to render to the Adjutant- General of the army, you will make to these headquarters a consolidated report of your com- mand, every Sunday morning, and monthly re- turns on the first day of each month. The foregoing instructions are communicated by command of Major-General McClellan. S. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General. Brigadier-General J. S. Wadsvvohtii, Military Governor of the District of Columbia. The Secretary of War had expressed a desire that I should comnuinicate to tlie War Depart ment my designs with regard to the employment of the army of the Potomac in an official form. I submitted, on the nineteenth of March, the fol lowing : Headqparters Army of the Potomac, ) Theological Seminary, Va., March 19, 1862. ( Sir : I have the honor to submit the following notes on the proposed operations of the active portion of the army of the Potomac. The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base of operations, tak- ing the line of Yorktown and West-Point upon Richmond as the line of operations, Richmond beipg the objective point. It is assumed that the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia ; also, that we shall fight a decisive battle between West-Point and Richmond, to give which battle the rebels will 544 REBELLION llECORD, 1862-63. concentrate all their available forces, understand- ing, as they will, that it involves the fate of tlioir cause. It therefore follows — 1st. That we should collect all our available forces and operate upon adjacent lines, maintain- ing perfect connnunication between our columns. 2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the field of battle. The advantages of the peninsula between York and James rivers are too obvious to need ex- planation ; it is also clear that West-Point should as soon as possible be reached, and used as our main depot, that we may have the shortest line of land transportation for our supplies, and the use of the York Kivcr. There are two methods of reaching this point — 1st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and trusting to the roads for our sup- plies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown ; then to reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving a delay of weeks per- haps. 2d. To make a combined naval and land at- tack upon Yorktown, the first object of the cam- paign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this, the navy should at once concentrate upon the York River all their available and most powerful batteries : its re- duction should not in that case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon "VVest-Point, immediately upon the fall of York- town, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty- five miles fi'om Kichmond, with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James. It is impossible to urge too strongly the ab- solute necessity of the full cooperation of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions which by their aid could be turn- ed without serious loss of either time or men. It is also of first impoi'tance to bear in mind the fiict already alluded to, that the capture of Richmond necessarily involves tlie prompt full of Norfolk, while an operation against Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of the rel)el troops involved, and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake the ca{)ture of Richmond by the same means which would have accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile aftbrded the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements, for they would Avell know, from the moment the army of the Potomac changed its Ikisc to Fort Monroe, that Richmond must be its ultimate object. It may be summed \^^ in a few words, that, for the prompt success of this campaign, it is ab- Bolutely necessai'y that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most important point — there the knot to be cut. An immediate decision u])on the subject-matter of this communication is highly desii'able, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occasion. I am, sir, very respectfully', your obedient ser- vant, George B. McClellan, Major-General. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. In the mean time the troops destined to form the active army were collected in camps conve- nient to the points of embarkation, and every preparation made to eml^ark them as rapidly as possible when the transports were ready. A few days before sailing for Fort Monroe, while still encamped near Alexandria, I met the President, by appointment, on a steamer. He tliere informed me that he had been strongly pressed to take General Blenker's division from my command and give it to Genei-al Fremont. His Excellency was good enough to suggest seve- ral reasons for not taking Blenker's division from me. I assented to the force of his suggestions, and was extremely gratified by his decision to allow the division to remain with the army of the Potomac. It was therefore with surprise that I received, on the thirty-first, the following note : Executive Mansion, | Washingto.v, March 31, 1SG2. ) My Dear Sir : This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Fremont, and I write this to assure j^ou that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it other- wise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the Commander-in-Chief may order what he pleases. Yours, very truly, A. Lincoln. Major-General McClellan. To this I replied, in substance, that I regreted the order, and could ill afford to lose ten thou- sand troops which had been counted upon in forming my plan of campaign, but as there w.a.<; no remedy, I would yield, and do the best I could without tliem. In a conversation with the Pres- ident a few hours afterward I repeated verbally the same thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker's division had been given to General Fremont from any pressure other than the re- quirements of the national exigency. I was par- tially relieved, however, by the President's posi- tive and emphatic assurance that I might be confident that no more troops beyond these ten thousand should in any event be taken from me, or in any way detached from my command. At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by the enemy, Jackson was at Wincliester, our forces occupying Charlestown, and Shieids's reaching Bunker Hill on tlie eleventh. On the morning of the twelfth, a brigade of General Banks's troops, under General Hamilton, entered Winclicster, the enemy having left at five o'clock the evenirg be- DOCUMENTS. 545 fore, his rear-guard of cavalry leaving an hour before our advance entered the place. The ene- my having made his preparations for evacuation some days before, it was not possible to intercept his retreat. On the thirteenth the maijs of IJanks's corps was concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Winchester, the enemy being in the rear of Strasburgh. On the nineteenth General Shields occupied Strasburgh, driving the enemy twenty miles south to Mount Jackson. On the twentieth the first division of Banks's corps commenced its movement toward Manassas, in compliance with my letter of instructions of the sixteenth. Jackson probably received information of this movement, and supposed that no force of any consequence was left in the vicinity of Winches- ter, and upon the falling back of Shields to that place, for the purpose of enticing Jackson in pur- suit, the latter promptly followed, whereupon ensued a skirmish on the twenty-second, in which General Shields was wounded, and an affair at Winchester on the twenty-third resulting in the defeat of Jackson, who was pursued as rapidly a§ the exhaustion of our troops and the difficulty of obtaining supplies permitted. It is presumed that the full reports of the battle of Winchester were forwarded direct to the War Department by General Banks. It being now clear that the enemy had no in- tention of returning by the Manassas route, the following letter of April first was written to Gen- eral Banks : HBADQU.tRTERS ArMT OF THE POTOMAC, ) O.v Board the Commobore, April 1, ISGi. j General : The change in afl[\iirs in the valley of the Shenandoah has rendered necessary a cor- responding departure, temporarily at least, from the plan we some days since agreed upon. In my arrangements I assume that you have with you a force amply sufficient to drive Jack- son before you, provided he is not reenforced largely. I also assume that you may find it im- possible to detach any thing toward Manassas for some days, probably not until the opei-ations of the main army have drawn all the rebel force toward Richmond. You are aware that General Sumner has for some days been at Manassas Junction with two divisions of infantry, six batteries, and two regi- ments of cavalry, and that a reconnoissance to the Rappahannock forced the enemy to destroy the railway bridge at Rappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Since that time our cavalry have found nothing on this side the Rappahannock in that direction, and it seems cK'ar that we have no reason to fear any return of the rebels in that quarter. Their move- ments near Fredericksburgh also indicate a final abandonment of that neighborhood. I doubt whether Johnston will now reenforce Jackson with a view of offensive operations. The time is probably passed when he could have gained any thing by doing so. I have ordered in one of Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson, late Sum- ner's) to Alexandria for embarkation. Blenker's has been- detached from the army of the Potomac and ordered to report to (Jeneral P'remont. Abercrombie is probably at Warrenton Junc- tion to-day. Geary is at Wliite Plains. Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered out, and are now on the way to relieve the two regiments of Sumner. Four thousand infantry and one battery leave Washington at once for Manassas. Some three thousand more will move in one or two days, and soon after some three thousand additional. I will order Blenker to march on Strasburgh and to report to you for temporary duty, so that should you find a large force in your front you can avail yourself of his aid as soon as possible. Please direct him to Winchester, thence to report to the Adjutant-General oi the arra}^ for orders ; but keep him until you are sure what you have in front. In regard to your own movements, the most important thing at present is to throw Jackson well back, and then to assume such a position as to enable you to prevent his return. As soon as the railway communications are reestablished it will be probably important and advisable to move on Staunton, but this would require secure com- munications, and a force of from twenty-five thousand to thirty thousand for active operations. It should also be nearly coincident with my own move on Richmond, at all events not so long be- fore it as to enable the rebels to concentrate on you, and then return on mo. I fear that you cannot Vje ready in time, although it may come in very well with a force less tlian that I have men- tioned, after the main battle near Richmond. When General Sumner leaves Warrenton Junc- tion, General Abercrombie will be placed in im- mediate command of Manassas and Warrenton Junction, under your general orders. Please in- form me frequently by telegraph and otherwise as to the state of things in your front. I am very truly yours, George B. McClellan, Miijor-General Commanding. Major-General N. P. Banks, Commanding Fifth Corps. P. S. — From what I have just learned, it would seem that the regiments of cavalry intended for Warrenton Junction have gone to Harper's Ferry. Of the four additional regiments placed under your orders, two should as promptly as possible move by the shortest route on AVarrcnton Junc- tion. I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient ser- vant, George B.McCi.ellan, Major-General Commanding. This letter needs no further explanation than to say that it was my intention, had the opera- tions in that quarter remained under my charge, either to have resumed the defensive position marked out in the letter of March sixteenth, or to have advanced General Banks upon Staunton as might in the progress of events seem advisable. It is to be remembered that when I wrote the 5t6 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. preee'lin;' and following letters of April first I had no expectation of being relieved from the ch!ir"-e of the operations in the Shenandoah Val- ley, the President's War Order No. 3 giving no in- timation of such an intention, and that so far as reference was made to final operations after driv- ing Jackson back and taking such a position as to"prevent his return, no positive orders were given in the letter, the matter being left for future consideration, when the proper time arrived for a decision. From the following letter to the Adjutant-Gen- eral, dated April first, 1802, it will be seen that I left for the defence of the national capital and its approaches, when I sailed for the Peninsula, seventy-three thousand four hundred and fifty-six men, with one hundred and nine pieces of light artillery, including the thirty-two pieces in AVash- ington alluded to, but not enumerated in my let- ter to the Adjutant-General. It will also be seen that I recommended other available troops in New- York (more than four thousand) to be at once ordered forward to reenforce them. riEAnQn.^RTKRS Armt of the Potomac, ) Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. ) General : I have to request that you will lay the following communication before the Hon. Sec- retary of War. The appro.ximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are as follows : General Dix has, after guarding the railroads jnder his charge, sufficient to give him five thou- sand for the defence of Baltimore, and one thou- sand nine hundred and eighty-eight available for the Eastern shore, AnnajioHs, etc. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about four hundred men. The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to ten thousand six hundred men ; other disposable troops now with General Wadsworth about eleven thousand four hundred men. The troops employed in guarding the various railways in Maryland amount to some three thousand three hundred and fifty-nine men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regi- ments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send for- ward to Manassas. General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force, which, including Colonel Geary, at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount to some seven thousand seven hundred and eighty men, with twelve pieces of artillery. I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and New- York, and in any of the Eastern States, may be (tnlered to Washington. I learn from Governor Curtin that there are some three thousand five hundred men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four thousand men from (ieneral Wadsworth T desire to be ordered to Manassas. Tliese troops, with tlic railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a force under the command of General Abercrombie of something like eighteen thousand six hundred and thirty-nine men. It is my design to push General Blenker's di- vision from Warrenton upon Strasburgh. He should remain at Strasburgh long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination. The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus, including Blenker's division, ten thousand and twenty-eight strong, with twenty-four pieces of artillery ; Banks's Fifth corps, which embraces the command of General Shields, nineteen thou- sand six hundred and eighty-seven strong, with forty-one guns, some three thousand six hundred and fifty-two disposable cavalry, and the railroad guards, about two thousand one hundred men, amount to about thirty-five thousand four hun- dred and sixty-seven men. It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, say eight hundred and fifty men, being, with some five hundred cavahy, one thou- sand three hundred and fifty men on the Lower Potomac. To recapitulate : At Warrenton there is to be, 7780 men At Manassas, say, 10,859 '^ In the valley of the Shenandoah, .... 35,467 " On the Lower Potomac, 1,350 " In all, 55,456 " There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under General Wads- worth, some eighteen thousand, inclusive of the batteries under instruction. The troops organ- izing or ready for service in New-York, I learn, will probably number more than four thousand. These should be assembled at Washington, sub- ject to disposition where their services may be most required, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, George B. McClei.lan, Major-General Commanding. Brig.-General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army. The following letter from General Barry shows that thirty-two (32) field-guns, with men, horses, and equipments, were also left in Washington City when the army sailed. These were the bat- teries under instruction referred to above : Headquarters Inspector of Artii.i.krt, ) Washington, December 1 6, 1362. } General : It having been stated in various public prints, and in a speech of Senator Chand- ler, of Michigan, in his place in the United States Senate, quoting what he stated to be a portion of the testimony of Brigadier-General Wads- worth, Military Governor of Washington, before the joint Senate and House committee on the conduct of the M'ar, that Major-General McClellan had left an insufficient force for the defence of VV^ashington, and not a gun on wheels. T liave to contradict this charge as follows : From ofiicial reports made at the time to me, (the Chief of Artillery of the army of the Poto- DOCUMENTS. 547 mac,) and now in my possession, by the com- manding officer of the light artillery troops left in camp in the city of Washington by your or- ders, it appears that the following named field batteries were left: Battery C, First New-York artillery, Captain Barnes, two guns ; battery K, First New-York artillery, Captain Crounse, six guns ; battery L, Second New-York artillery. Captain Robinson, six guns ; Ninth New-York independent battery, Captain Monzordi, six guns ; Sixteenth New-York independent battery. Captain Locke ; battery A, Second battalion New- York artillerj^. Captain liogan, six guns ; battery B, Second battalion New-York artillery, Captain McMahon, six guns ; total of batteries, thirty-two guns. With the exception of a few horses which could have been procured from the quai-termas- ter's department in a few hours, the batteries were all fit for immediate service, excepting the Sixteenth New-York battery, which having been previously ordered, on General Wadsworth's ap- plication, to report to him for special service, was unequipped with either guns or horses. I am, General, very respectfully, Y'^our obedient servant, AY. F. Bakrt, Brif:.-Gen. Inspector of Artillery United States Army. Major-General McClellan, United States Army. It is true that Blenker's division, which is in- cluded in the force enumerated by me, was un- der orders to reenforce General Fremont, but the following despatch from the Secretary of War, dated March thirty-first, 18G2, will show that I was authorized to detain him at Strasburgh until matters assumed a definite form in that region, before proceeding to his ultimate destination ; in other words, until Jackson was disposed of. And had he been detained there, instead of moving on to Harper's Ferry and Franklin, under other orders, it is probable that General Banks would have defeated Jackson, instead of being himself obliged subsequently to retreat to W^illiamsport. War Department, I Washington, D. C, ^rarcll 31, 1S62. j The order in respect to Blonker is not designed to hinder or delay the movement of Richardson, or any other force. He can remain wherever you desire him as long as required for your move- ments, and in any position you desire. The or- der is simply to place him in position for reen- forcing Fremont, as soon as your dispositions will permit, and he may go to Harper's Ferry by such route and at such time as j'ou shall direct. State your own wishes as to the movement, when and how it shall be made. Edwix M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Major-General McClellan. Without including General Blenker's division, there were left si.xtv-seven thousand four hun- dred and twenty-eight men and eighty-five pieces of light artillery, wliich, under existing circum- stances, 1 deemed more than adequate to insure the perfect security of Washington against any force the enemy could bring against it, for the following reasons: The light troops I had thrown forward under General Stoneman in pursuit of the i-ebcl army, after the evacuation of Manassas and Ccntreville, had driven their rear-guard across Cedar Run, and subsequent expeditions from Sumner's corps had forced them beyond the Rappahannock. They had destroyed all the railroad bridges be- hind them, thereby indicating that they did not intend to return over that route. Indeed, if they had attempted such a movement, their progress must have been slow and difficult, as it would have involved the reconstruction of the bridges ; and if my orders for keeping numerous cavalry patrols well out to the front, to give timely no- tice of any approach of the eneni)', had been strictly enforced, (and I left seven regiments of cavalry for this express purpose,) they could not by any possibility have reached Washington be- fore there would have been ample time to con- centrate the entire forces left for its defence, as well as those at Baltimore, at any necessary point. It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to the authorities, that the movement of the army of the Potomac would have the effect to draw off the hostile army from Manassas to the defence of their capital, and thus free Washington from menace. This opinion was confirmed the mo- ment the movement commenced, or rather as soon as the enemy became aware of our inten- tions ; fbr with the exception of Jackson's force of some fifteen thousand, which his instructions show to have been intended to operate in suph a way as to prevent McDowell's corps from being sent to reenforce me, no rebel force of any mag- nitude made its appearance in front of Washing- ton during the progress of our operations on the Peninsula ; nor until the order was given for my return from Harrison's Landing was Washing- ton again threatened. Surrounded, as Washington was, with numer- ous and strong fortifications, well garrisoned, it was manifest that the enemy could not aftbrd to detach from his main army a force sufficient to assail them. It is proper to remark, that just previous to my departure for Fort Monroe, I sent my Chief of Staff to General Hitchcock, who at that time held staff relations with His Excellency the Pres- ident and the Secretary of War, to submit to him a list of the troops I proposed to leave for the defence of Washington, and the positions in which I designed posting them. General Hitch- cock, after glancing his eye over the list, ob- served that he was not the judge of what was rccjuired for defending the capital ; that General McClellan's position was such as to enable him to understand the subject much better than he did, and he presumed tliat if the force designated was, in his judgment, suificient, nothing more would be required. He was then told by tho Chief of Staff that I would be glad to have his opinion, as an old and experienced officer; to '5d8 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63, this he replied, that as T had had the entire con- trol of the defences for a long time, I was the best judge of what was needed, and he declined to give anj^ othc" expression of opinion at that time. On the second of April, the day following my departure for Fort Monroe, Generals Hitchcock and Thomas were directed by the Secretary of AVar to examine and report whether the Presi- dent's instructions to me, of March eighth and thirteenth had been complied with ; on the same day their report was submitted, and their deci- sion was — That the requirement of the President, that this city (AVashington) shall be left entirely se- cure, has not been fully complied with. The President, in his letter to me on the ninth of April, says: "And now allow me to ask, do you realljr think T should permit the line from Richmond, ria Afanassas Junction, to this cit_v, to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than twenty thousand un- organized troops." In the report of Generals Hitchcock and Tho- mas, alluded to, it is acknowledged that there was no danger of an attack from the direction of Manassas, in these words: "In regard to occu- pying Afanassas Junction, as the enemy have de- stroyed the railroads leading to it, it maybe fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and therefore no large force would be necessary to hold that position." That, as remarked before, was precisely the view I took of it, and this was enforced by the subsequent movements of the enemy. In another paragraph of the report it is stated that fifty-five thousand men was the number con- sidered adcqilate for the defence of the capital. That General McClellan, in his enumeration of the forces left, -had included Banks's army corps, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, but whether this coi'ps should be regarded as available for the protection of Washington, they decline to express an opinion. At the time this report was made, the only en- emy on any approach to Washington was Jack- son's force, in front of J>anks in the Shenandoah Vallc}'', with the Manassas Gap Railroad leading from this vallc}' to AVashington ; and it will be admitted, I ])resume, that Banks, occupying the Shenandoah A^alley, was in the best position to defend not only that approach to Washington, but the roads to Harper's Kerry and above. The number of troops left by me for the defence of AVashington, as given in my letter to the Ad- jutant-Cieneral, were taken from the latest olficial returns of that date, and these, of course, consti- tuted the most trustworthy and authentic source from which such information could be obtained. Another statement made by General Hitchcock before the " Committee on the Conduct of the War," in reference to this same order, should be noticed. He was asked the following question : "Do you understand now that the movement maurgti road, with or- ders to harass the enemy's rear, and try to cut off such of his forces as had taken the Lee's Mill and Williamsburgh road. (xencral Heintzelman was directed to send Hooker's division forward on the Yorktown and Williamsburgh road to support General Stone- man ; and Smith was ordered to proceed with his division upon the Lee's Mill and AV^illiajnsburgh road for the same purpose. Afterward, the divi- sions of Generals Kearny, Couch, and Casey, were put en route — the first on the Yorktown road, and the others on the Lee's Mill road. These roads unite about a quarter of a mile south of 500 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. Fort Magriider, and are connected by cross-roads at several points between Yorktown and Wil- liamsburjih. Afti-r these directions had been given, (ieneml Sumner (the officer second in rank in the arniv of the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front and take immedi,ite cliargc of opera- tions until my arrival. (General Stoneman moved forward promptl}- witli iiis eommiuid, consisting of four batteries of horse artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, the First and Sixth United States cavalry, the Third Pennsylvania and Eighth Illinois, and Bar- ker's squadron, meeting with but little opposition until he arrived in front of the enemy's works about two miles e:\st of Williumsburgh.^ At a point al)out eight miles from Yorktown, in accordance with my instructions, he detached (Jeneral Emory with Iknson's battery, the Third Pennsylvania cavalry, (Colonel Averill,) and Bar- ker's squadron, to gain the Lee's Mill road, and endeavor, with the assistance of General Smith, to cut off the portion of the enemy's rear-guard wliich had taken that route. General Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry and a battery under General Stuart, and drove them in the direction of Lee's Mill. (ieneral Smith having met with obstructions in his front, had transferred his column, by a cross-road, to the Yorktown and Williamsburgh road, so that General Eniorj', finding no force to cooperate with him, was unable to cut off the rear-guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a circuitous route along the bank of the James River. The position in which General Stoneman en- countered the enemy is about four miles in extent, the right resting on College Creek, and the left on (Queen's Creek ; nearly three fourths of its front lieing covered by tributaries of these two creeks, ufton which there are ponds. The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, consist- ing of Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulements . field-guns. The])arapet of Fort Magruder is about six feet high and nine feet thick; the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, tilled with water. The length of the interior crest is about six hundred yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of small dimensions, having faces of about forty yards. Tiie woods in front of the position were felled, and the open ground in front of the works was dotted with luunerous ride-pits. The rn:ids leading from the lower part of the Pcninsul-i to Williiimsburgh, one along the York River, (ttie Yorktown rowl,) and the other along the James, (the [.ce's Mill road,) unite between the heads of the tributary streams a short, dis- tance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they arc commanded, and debouch from the woods just before uniting. A branch from the James Uiver road leaves it about one and three fourths of a mile below Fori Magruder and unites with tlio road from Allen's Landing to Williamsburgh, which crosses the tributary of College Creek over a dam at the outlet of the pond, and passes just in rear of the line of works, binng commanded by the three redoubts on the right of the line, at about the same distance from Fort Magruder. A branch leaves the Y'ork River road and crosses the tributary of Queen's Creek on a dam, and passing over the position and through the works in its rear, finally enters Williamsburgh ; this road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the line of the works. General Stoneman debouched from the woods with his advance-guard, (consisting of a part of the First United States cavalry and one section of Gibson's battery, under the command of Gen- eral Cooke,) and the enemy immediately opened on him with several field-pieces from Fort Ma- gruder, having the correct range, and doing some execution. Gibson's battery was brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would per- mit, and returned the fire ; while the Sixth United States cavalry was sent to feel the ene- my's left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, with infantry and artillery, came down upon it, whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. The rear squadron, under command of Captain Saun- ders, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry in the most gallant manner. In the mean time the enemy was being reenforced by infantry, and the ai'tillery fire becoming very hot. General Stone- man, having no infontry to carry the works, or- dered the withdrawal of the battery. This was accomplished with the exception of one piece, which could not be extricated from the mud. The enemy attempted to prevent the movement, but their charges were met by the First United States cavalry, under command of Lieutenant- Colonel Gricr, and they were driven back, losing several officers and one stand of colors. General Stoneman then took a defensive position a short distance in the rear of the first, to await the arri- val of the infantry. The advance of General Smith's column reach- ed Skiff's Creek about half-past eleven o'clock, and found the bridge over that stream in flames and the road impassable. A practicable route to the Yorktown road having been discovered, the division, by order of General Sumner, moved on by that road, and reached General Stoneman's position about half-past five o'clock. General Sunmer, ariiving with it, assumed command. Generals Ileintzelman and Keyes also arrived. During the afternoon of the fourth, near the Half-way House, the head of General Hooker's colunm encountered Smith's division filing into the road, and was obliged to halt between three and four hours until it had passed. General Hooker then followed on, and at Cheesecake Church turned off, by General Heintzclman's di- rection, taking a cross-road, and moved out on the Lee's Mill road, thus changing places with General Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early in the morning of the fifth. DOCUMENTS. 561 General Smith's division having been deployed, General Sumner ordered an attack on the works in his front; but the lines having been thrown into confusion while moving tln-ougli the dense forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt for that night was abandoned. The troops bivou- aclvcd in the woods, and a heavy rain began, which continued until the morning of the sixth, making the roads, already in very bad condition, almost impassable. During the morning of the fifth General Sum- ner reconnoitred the position in his front, and at eleven o'clock ordered Hancock's brigade, of Smith's division, to take possession of a work on the enemy's left, which had been found to be un- occupied. The remainder of Smith's division oc- cupied the woods in front without being actually engaged. The divisions of Couch and Casey had received orders during tlie night to march at daylight ; but on account of the terrible condition of the roads, and other impediments, were not able to reacli tlie field until after one o'clock p.ji., at whicli time the first brigade of Couch's division arrived, and was posted in the centre, on Hooker's right. The other two brigades came up during the afternoon, followed by Casey's division. In the mean time, General Hooker, having re- connoitred the enemy's position, began the attack at half past seven a.m., and for a while silenced the gui s of Fort Magruder and cleared the ground in his front ; but the enemy being continually reenforced, until their strength greatly exceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn his left. For several hours his division struggled gal- lantly against the superior numbers of the ene- my. Five guns of Webber's battery were lost, and between three and four o'clock his ammuni- tion began to give out. The loss had been heavy, and the exhaustion of tlie troops was very great. At this time the division of General Kearny came up, who, at nine a.m., had received orders to reenforce Hooker, and who had succeeded, by the greatest exertions, in passing Casey's troops, and pushing on to the front through the deep mud. General Kearny at once gallantly at- tacked, and thereby prevented the loss of an- other battery, and drove tlie enemy back at every point, enabling General Iloolcer to extricate him- self from his position, and withdraw his wearied troops. Peck's brigade, of Coucli's division, as has been mentioned before, was, immediately on its arrival, ordered by General Sumner to deploy on Hooker's right. This was promptly done, and the attacks of tlie enemy at that point were repulsed. General Peck held his position until late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by the other two brigades of Couch's division, and they were in quiet possession of the ground when night closed the contest. The vigorous action of these troops relieved General Hooker consider- ably. General Emorj'' had been left witli his command, on tlio night of the fourtii, to guard the branch of the Lee's Mill road wliich leads to Allen's farm ; and on the morning of the fifth it was ascertained that by this route the enemy's right could be turned. A request for infantry for tliis purpose was made to General Heintzel- man, who, late in the afternoon, sent four regi- ments and two batteries of Kearny's division — the first disposable troops he had — and directed General Emory to make tlie attack. Witli these reenforcements his force amounted to about three tliousand men and three batteries. General Em- ory, on account of want of knowledge of the ground, and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in tliis movement. It involved some risks, but, if successful; might have produced important results. At eleven a.m., as before mentioned, General Smith received orders from General Sumner to send one brigade across a dam on our riglit, to occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy's line. Hancock's brigade was selected for this purpose. He crossed the dam, took possession of tlie first redoubt, and afterward, finding the second one vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for re- enforcements to enable him to advance farther and take the next redoubt, whicli commanded the plain between his position and Fort Magru- der, and would have enabled him to take in re- verse and cut the communication of the troops engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearny. The enemy soon began to show himself in strength before him, and as his rear and right flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for reenforcements. General Smith was twice ordered to join him with the rest of his division, but each time the order was counter- manded at the moment of execution, General Sumner not being willing to weaken the centre. At length, in reply to General Hancock's repeat- ed messages for more troops. General Sumner sent him an order to fall back to his first posi- tion, the execution of which General Hancock deferred as long as possible, being unwilling to give up the advantage already gained, and fear- ing to expose his command by such a movement. During the progress of these events I had re- mained at Yorktown to complete the ])repara- tions for the departure of General Franklin's and other troops to AVest-Point by water, and to make the necessary arrangements with the naval com- mander for his cooperation. By pushing General Franklin, well supported by water, to the right bank of the Pamunkey, opposite AVest-Point, it was hoped to force the enemy to abandon whatever works he might have on the Peninsula below that point, or be cut off. It was of paramount importance that the arrange- ments to this end should be promptly made at an early hour of the morning. I had sent two of my aids (Lieutenant-Colonel Sweitzer and Ma- jor Hammerstein) to observe the operations in fiont, with instructions to report to me every thing of importance that might occur. I re- ceived no information from thrm leading nie to suppose that there was any thing occurring of more importance than a simple all'air of a rear- guard, until about one o'clock p.m., when a des- patch arrived from one of them that every thing >00 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. Port Magnider, and are connected by cross-roads at several points between Yorktown and Wil- lianisburfrh. AfUr these directions liad been given, Oeneml Sumner Cthe ofTicer second in rank in the army of the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front and take immediiitc charge of opera- tions until my arrival. (icncral Stoneman moved forward promptly witii his command, consisting of four batteries of hors.' artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, the First and Sixth United States cavalry, the Third Pennsylvania and Eighth Illinois, and Bar- ker's squadron, meeting with but little opposition until he airivcd in front of the enemy's works .about two miles cast of Williamsburgh. At a point about eight miles from Yorktown, in accordance with my instructions, he detached (Jeneral Emory with Benson's battery, the Third l\>nnsylvania cavalry, (Colonel Averill,) and Bar- ker's S([iiuilron, to gain the Lee's Mill road, and endeavor, with tlic assistance of General Smith, to cut olf the portion of the enemy's rear-guard wliich hail taken that route. General Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry and a battery under General Stuart, and drove them in the direction of Lee's Mill. (ieneral Smith having met with obstructions in his front, had transferred his column, by a cross-road, to the Yorktown and ^Villiamsburgh road, so that General Emorj% finding no force to cooperate with him, was unable to cut off the rear-guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a circuitous route along the bank of the James Uiver. The position in which General Stoneman en- countered the enemy is about four miles in extent, the right resting on College Creek, and the left on Queen's Creek ; nearly three fourths of its front being covered by tributaries of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds. The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a cultivated plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, consist- ing of Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bastion front, and twelve other redoubts and opaulements . field-guns. Tlie|);u-apet of Fort Magruder is about six feet high au'l nine feet tliick ; the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, filled with water. The length of the interior crest is about six hundred 3'ards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of small dimensions, having faces of about forty y.irds. The woods in front of the position were felled, and the open ground in front of the works was dotted with numerous rille-])its. The ro;ids leading from the lower p.art of the Peninsul-i to AVillijunsburgh, one along the York River, (llie Yorktown roivd,) and the other along the .lames, (the Lee's Mill road,) unite between the hearTOJf, Secretary of War. Our work upon the bridges continued to be pushed forward vigorously until the twentieth, during which time it rained almost every day, and the exposure of the men caused much sick- ness. On the eleventh the following was received from the Secretary of War : Washisgtos, June 11, 1S62. Your despatch of three thirty, (3.30.) yester- day, has been received. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, and which no art or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am striv- ing to the uttermost to render you every aid in the power of the Government. Your suggestions will be inmiediately communicated to General Halleck, with a request that he shall conform to them. At last advice he contemplated sending . a column to operate with Mitchel against Chat- j tanooga. and thence upon East-Tennessee. Buell j reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a criti- '• cal coudition, demanding immediate attention, j Halleck says the main body of Beauregard's j force is with him at Okolona. McCall's force j was reported yesterday as having embarked, and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as possible. Fremont had a hard fight, day before yester- day, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburgh. He claims the victo- ry, but was pretty badly handled. It is clear that a strong force is operating with Jackson for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies. Be assured. General, that there never has been a moment when ray desire has been otherwise than to aid vou with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met ; and what- ever (.'thers may .say for their own purposes, you have never luul, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to sup- port you, or more joyful than I .shall be at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretory of War. Major-Gcneral G. B. McCLELLji.N. On the twelfth and thirteenth General McCall's division arrived. On the thirteenth of June, two squadrons of the Fifth United States cavalry, under the com- mand of Captain Royall, stationed near Hanover Old Church, were attacked and overpowered by a force of the enemy's cavalry, numbering about one thousand five hundred men, with four guns. They pushed on toward our depots, but at some distance from our main body, and, though pursued very cleverly, made the circuit of the amiy, repass- ing the Chickahomlny at Long Bridge. The burn- ing of two schooners laden with forage, and four- teen Government wagons, the desh'uction of some sutler's stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little ecZai, were the precise results of this expedition. On the fourteenth I sent the following to the Secretary of War : Headquabtehs Army of the Potomac, ) Camp Lincoln, June 14, 1S62 — midnight. ) All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage. It ought to be distinctly understood that Mc- Dowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him request- ing that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, General McDowell should wish the gen- eral interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I cannot fnlly control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the bat- tle with what I have, and let others be responsi- ble for the results. The department lines should not be allowed to to interfere with me; but General McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed com- pletely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have en- tire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal considerations to be en- tertained ; you know that I have none. The indications are, from our balloon recon- noissances and fi'om all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in num- bers, and determined to fight desperatelv. G. B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding, Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. On the twentieth the following was communi- cated to the President : DOCUMENTS. 579 Headqfarteiss Armt of the Potomac, ) Camp Lincoln, June 20, 1862 — 2 p.m. f Your Excellency's despatch of (11) eleven a.m. received, also that of General Sigol. I have no doubt that Jackson _has been reen- forced from here. There is reason to believe that General R. S. Ripley has recently joined Lee's army, with a brigade or division from Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from Goldsboro. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the enemy intends evacuating Rich- mond ; he is daily increasing his defences. I find him. everywhere in force, and every reconnois- sance costs many lives, yet I am obliged to feel ray way, foot by foot, at whatever cost, so great are the difficulties of the country; by to-morrow night the defensive works, covering our position on this side of the Chickahominy, should be com- pleted. I am forced to this by my inferiority in numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possi- ble numbers into action, and secure the army against the consequences of unforeseen disaster. I would be glad to have permission to lay before your E.xcellency, by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military atl'airs through- out the whole country. In the mean time I would be pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers and position, of the troops not under my com- mand, in Virginia and elsewhere. Geokge B. McClellan, Miijor-General Commanding. His Excellency, A. Lincolx, President. T« which I received this reply : Washingtok, June 21,1S62 — 6 p.m. Your despatch of yesterday, two (2) p.m., was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military afluirs throughout the whole countrj', as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be b}^ letter than by tele- graph, because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command, in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I can- not, I would rather not transmit either by tele- graph or letter, because of the chances of its reach- ing the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I can- not well leave here. A. Lixcolv, President. Major-General George B. McClellax. To which I sent the following reply : Camp LtscoLS, June 22 — 1 p.m. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of eight p.m. yesterday. Un- der the circumstances, as stated in your des- patch, I perceive that it will be better at least to defer, for the present, the communication I de- sired to make. G. B. McClellan, Major-Oeneral Commanding. His EJxcellencj the President. All the information I could obtain, previous to the twenty-fourth of June, regarding the move- ments of General Jackson, led to the belief that he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiving I reenforcements from Richmond via Lynchburgh and Stanton ; but what his ptn-poses" were did not appear until the date specified, when a young man, very intelligent, but of suspicious appear- ance, was brought in by our scouts from the di- rection of Hanover Court-House. He at first stated that he was an escaped prisoner, from Colonel Kenly's Maryland regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself to be a deserter from Jackson's command, which ho left near Gordonsville on the twenty-first. Jack- son's troops were then, as ho said, moving to Frederickshall, along the Virginia Central Rail- road, for the purpose of attacking my rear on the twenty-eighth. I inmiediately desp:itched two trust}^ negroes to proceed aloi^g the railroad and ascertain the truth of the statement. They were unable, however, to got beyond Hanover Court-Houso, where they encountered the ene- my's pickets, and were forced to turn back with- out obtaining the desired information. On that da}- I sent the following despatch : Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, } June 24, ls62 — 12 p.m. ) A very peculiar case of desertion has just oc- curred from the enemy. The party states that he left Jackson, Wliiting, and Ewell, (fifteen bri- gades,) at Gordonsville on the twenty first; that they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the t\A-enty- eighth. I would be glad to learn, at your ear- liest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. The following is his reply : Washington, June 25, 1S62. We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand men. Some reports place ten thou- sand rebels under Jackson, at Gordonsville ; oth- ers, that his force is at Port Republic, Harrison- burgh, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened ; and General Kelly, that Ewell was advancing to New-Creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this ru- mor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray ; the people decline to give any information of hi.s whereabouts. Within the last two (2) days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the ene- my is circulating rumors of Jackson's ailvancc in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are 580 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. at Middletown, appear to have any acccurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purported to be dated Gordonsville on the fourteenth (14th) in- stant, stated that the actual attack \yas designed for AV'ashington and Baltimore as soon as you attacked Richmond, but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is cer- tainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the Avarning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to 3^ou any further information on tins subject that may be received here. Edwin M. Stantox, Secretary of War. Major-Gcncral McClellan. On the twenty-fifth, our bridges and intrench- ments being at last completed, an advance of our picket-line of the left was ordered, prepara- tory to a general forward movement. Immediately in front of the most advanced re- doubt on the Williamsburgh road was a large open field ; beyond that, a swampy belt of tim- ber, some five hundred j'ards wide, which had been disputed ground for many days. Further in advance was an open field, crossed by the Williamsburgh road and the railroad, and com- manded by a redoubt and rifle-pits of the enemy. It was decided to push our lines to the other side of these woods, in order to enable us to as- certain the nature of the ground, and to place Generals Heintzelman and Sumner in position to support the attack intended to be made on the Old Tavern, on the twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh, by General Franklin, by assailing that position in the rear. Between eight and nine o'clock, on the morn- ing of the twenty-fifth, the advance was begun by General Ileintzelman's corps. The enemy were found to be in strong force all along the line, and contested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object was accomplished. The troops engaged in this affair were the whole of Heintzelman's corps. Palmer's brigade of Couch's division of Reyes's corps, and a part of Richard- son's division of Sumner's corps. For the de- tails I refer to the report of General Heintzel- man. The casualties (not including those in Palm- er's brigade, which have not been reported) were as follows: officers killed, one; wounded, four- teen ; missing, one ; enlisted men killed, fifty ; wounded, three hundred and eighty-seven ; miss- ing, sixty-three ; total, five hundred and sixteen. The following telegrams were sent to the Sec- retary of War, during the day, from the field of operations: Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862 — 1.30 p.m. We have advanced our pickets on the left con- siderablv under sharp resistance. Our men be- haved very handsomely. Some firing still con- tinues. G. B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Hon. E. M. Stanton. Redoitbt No. 3, June 25, 1862—5.15 p.jl The enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance of our picket's lines. Kearny's and one half of Hooker's are where I want them. I have this moment reenforced Hooker's right with a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the work intended for to-day. Our men are behaving splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also. This is not a bat- tle ; merely an affiiir of Heintzelman's corps, sup- ported by Keyes, and thus far all goes w^ell. We hold every foot we have gained. If we succeed in what we have undertaken, it will be a very important advantage gained. Loss not large thus f;u\ The fighting up to this time has been done by General Hooker's divi- sion, which has behaved as usual — that is, most splendidly. On our right, Porter tas silenced the enemy's batteries in his front. G. B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Redoubt No. 8, June 25, 1862 — 5 p.m. The affliir is over, and we have gained our point fully, and with but little loss, notwith- standing the strong opposition. Our men have done all that could be desired. The affair was partially decided by two guns that Captain De Russy brought gallantly into action under very difficult circumstances. The enemy was driven from the camps in front of this place, and is now quiet. G. B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding, Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Also on the same day, the following ; Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) Ca.mp L/Incoln, June 25, 1S62 — 6.15 p.m. ) I have just returned from the field, and find your despatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's ad- vance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong reenforce- ments, in Richmond, yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, (200,000,) including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the ne- ce.-^sity of reenforccments, that this was the de- cisive point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splen- DOCUMENTS. 5R1 did army I have the honor to command, and, if it is destroj^ed by overwhelming; nunibei-s, can at least die with it and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoul- ders ; it must I'est where it belongs. Since I commenced this I have received addi- tional intelligence, confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and no'\v go to the other side of the Chickahomi- ny to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no use in again asking for re- enforcements. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. The report of the chief of the " secret service corps," herewith forwarded, and dated the twen- ty-sixth of June, shows the estimated strength of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from one hundred thou- sand to one hundred and twenty thousand. The same report puts his numbers, on the twenty- sixth of June, at about one hundred and eighty thousand, and the specific information obtained regarding their organization warrants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength. It will be observed that the evidence contained in the report shows the following or- ganizations, namely : Two hundred regiments of infantry and cavahy. including the forces of Jack- son and Ewell, just arrived ; eight battalions of independent troops ; five battalions of artillery ; twelve companies of infantry and independent cavalry, beside forty-six companies of ailillery ; amounting, in' all, to from forty to fiftj'- brigades. There were undoubtedly many others whose designations we did not learn. The report also shows that numerous and heavy earth-works had been completed for the defence of Richmond, and that in thirty-six of these were mounted some two hundred guns. On the twenty-sixth, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enem}'- attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our com- munications and depots of supply. The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been reiterated to my superiors from the inception and through the progress of the Peninsula campaign. I notified the Secretary of War in the follow- ing despatch : IlKADQtTARTERS ArJIT flF THE PoTOM^C, ) Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1S6'2 — 1'2 m. f I have just heard that our advanced cavalry pickets on the left bank of Chickahominy are being driven in. It is probably Jackson's ad- vanced-guard. If this be true, you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate meas- ures, and will do my best to out-manoeuvre, out- wit, and out-fight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if 3'ou learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me. G. B. McClellan, Hon. E. M. Stanton, Major-GeneraL Secretary of War. IlEADQPAr.TERS ArMT OF THE POTOMAC, I Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1S62— 2.30 p.m. ) < Your despatch and that of the President re- ceived. Jackson is driving in my pickets, etc., on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where reenforccments ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of ap- proaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort ^lonroe, and thence ac- cording to state of affairs when they arrive. It is not probable that I can maintain tele- graphic communication more than an hour or two longer. G. B. McClellan, lUajor-GeneraL Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. On the same day I received the following des- patches from the Secretary of War : Washington, June 25, 1862—11.20 p.m. Your telegram of fifteen minutes past six has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the Govern- ment to send j'ou any more reenforccments than has been done, have been so distinctly stated to you by the President that it is needless for me to repeat them. Every effort ha.s been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth, Shields's division and Rickett.s's division are at Manassas. The Presi- dent designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Major-General G. B. McClellan. Washington, June 26, 1862—6 p.m. Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to send you five thousand (.jOOO) men as fast as they can be brought from Manassas to Alexandria and embarked, which can be done sooner than to wait for transportation at Freder- icksburgh. They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by land. Noth- ing will be spared to sustain you, and I have un- doubting f\iith in your success. Keep mc ad- vised fully of your condition. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Major-General G. B. McClellan. But five thousand of the reenforccments spoken of in these communications came to the arm}' of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's Bar, after the seven days. In anticipation of a speedy advance on Rich- mond, to provide for the contingency of our com 582 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63, raunications with the depot at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at the same time to be prepared for a change of the base of our operations to James River, if circumstances should render it advisable, I had made arrange- ments more than a week previous (on the eigh- teenth) to have transports with supplies of pro- visions and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, sent up James River. They reached Harrison's Landing in time to be available for the army on its arrival at that point. Events soon proved this change of base to be, though most hazard- ous and difficult, the only prudent course. In order to relieve the troops of the vSixth corps, on the nineteenth of June General Rey- nolds's and General Seymour's brigades, of Gen- eral McCall's division, -(Pennsylvania reserves,) were moved from Gaines's farm to a position on Beaver Dam Creek, General Meade's brigade being held in reserve in front of Gaines's farm. One regiment and a battery were thrown for- ward to the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, and a line of pickets extended along the Chicka- hominy River between the Mechanicsville and Meadow bridges. As has been already stated, I received, while engaged on the twenty -fifth in di- recting the operations of Heintzelman's corps, information which strengthened my suspicions that Jackson was advancing with a large force upon our right and rear. On this day General Casey, at the White House, was instructed to prepare for a vigorous resistance, and defensive works were ordered at Tunstall's Station. Early on the twenty-fifth General Porter was instructed to send out reconnoitring parties toward Hanover Court-House to discover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Tolopatamoy as far as possible. Up to the twenty-sixth of June the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and north-east. The reasons (the President's anxiety about cov- ering Washington from Fredericksburgh, Mc- Dowell's promised cooperation, partial advance, and immediate withdrawal) which compelled the (•hoicc of this line of approach, and our continu- ance upon it, have been attended to above. Tlie superiority of the James River route, as a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early given, and need not be repeated here. The dissipation of all hope of the cooperation by land of General McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the defence of AVashington, their in- ability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and for- ced an immediate change of base across the Pen- insula. To that end, from the evening of the twenty-sixth, every energy of the army was bent. Such a change of base, in the presence of a powerful enemy, is one of the most difficult undertakings in war. I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew hat it cou Id be trusted equally to retreat or ad- vance, and to fight the series of battles now in- evitable, whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats ; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James River, and get a position whence a success- ful advance upon Richmond would be again pos- sible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith. On the same day General Van Vliet, Chief Quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by my orders, telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, Quar- termaster at the White House, as follows: "Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage's Station, by way of Bottom's Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House, burn every thing that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James River as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast import- ance to establish our depots on James River without delay if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work ; after that you must exercise your own judgment." All these commands were obeyed. So excel- lent were the dispositions of the dilTerent officers in command of the troops, depots, and gunboats, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost evciy thing was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed to pre- vent their falling into the hands of the enemy. General Stoneman's communications with the main army being cut off, he fell back upon the White House, and thence to Yorktown, when the White House was evacuated. On the twenty-sixth, orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy' to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river, as will be seen by the appended telegrams. General Franklin re- ceived instructions to hold General Slocum's di- vision in readiness by daybreak of the twenty- seventh, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of General Porter, to move at once to his assistance without further delay. At noon on the twenty-sixth the approach of the enemy, who had crossed above Meadow bridge, was discovered by the advance pickets at that point, and at half-past twelve p.m. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn. Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were moved forward and deployed on the right of Mc- Call's division, toward Shady Grove church, tc cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Gi-iffin's regiments relieved a portion of Rey- nolds's line just at the close of the action. DOCinilENTS. 583 The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, and the right in thick woods beyond the u|)per road from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor. The lower or river road crossed the Creek at Ellison's Mills. Se3'mour's brigade held the left of the line from the Chickahominy to beyond the mill, partly in woods and partly in clear ground, and Key- nolds's the right, principally in the woods and covering the upper road. The artillerj' occupied positions commanding the roads and the open 'ground across the Creek. Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position generally prepared with a care that great- ly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult along the whole front, and impracticable for artillery, except by the two roads where the main eflbrts of the ene- my were directed. At three p.m. he formed his line of battle, rap- idly advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked «ur whole line, making at the same time a deter- mined attempt to force the passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted by General Reynolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to retire with very heavy loss. A rapid artilleiy lire, with desultory skirmish- ing, was maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed his troops for another effort at the lower road about two hours later, which was likewise repulsed by General Seymour, with heavy slaughter. The tiring ceased, and the ene- my retired about nine p.m., the action having lasted six hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops were en- gaged on this day. The portion of the enemy encountered weie chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed near Mead- ow Bridge and at Mechanicsville. I Reynolds's Brigade, 1 A. Pennsylvania Reserves, ■< Meade's Brigade, VMcCall's Division. ( Seymour's Brigade, ) B. Griffin's Brigade — Morell's Division. Berdan's Sliarp-shooters — Morell's Division. * C. Enemy's Column of Attaclc The information in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced me that Jack- Ron was really approaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam Creek, although so suc- cessfully defjjnded, had its right flank too much in the air, and was too far from the main army to make it available to retain it longer. I there- fore determined to send the heavj' guns at Ho- gan's and Gaines's houses over the Ciiickahomi- ny diiring the night, with as many of the wagons of the Fifth corps as possible, and to withdraw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would bo reasona- bly secure, and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. General Porter cxr- ried out my orders to that effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the Fifth corps ti> the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed as between two fires, and enablooint, as the channel there was so near the soutliern shore that it would not be pos- sible to bring up the transports, should the ene- my occupy it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suiUible point. ' Upon the ter- mination of this interview I returned to Malvern Hill, and remained there until shortly before day^ light. BATTLE OF " NELSON's FARm" OR "gLENDALE." On the morning of the thirtieth. General Sum- ner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's divi- sion to Glendale, (" Nelson's Farm.") General McCall's division (Pennsylvania reserves) was halted during the morning on the New-Market road, just in advance of the point where the road turns off to Quaker Church. This line was formed perpendicularly to the New-Market road, with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Reynolds's brigade, commanded by Colonel S. G. Simmons, of the Fifth Pennsylva- nia, in reserve ; Randall's regular battery on the right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the centre, and Deidrich's and Kanahan's batteries of the artillery reserve on the left — all in front of the infantry line. The country in General McCall's front was an open field, intersected to- ward the right by the New-Market road, and a small strip of timber parallel to it ; the open front was about eight hundred yards, its depth about one thousand yards. On the morning of the thirtieth. General Heint- zelman ordered the bridge at Brackett's Ford to be destroyed, and trees to be felled across that road and the Charles City road. General Slo- cum's division was to extend to the Charles City road. General Kearny's left to connect with Gen- eral Slocum's left. General McCall's position was to the left of the Long Bridge road, in con- nection with General Kearny's left. General Hooker was on the left of General McCall. Be- tween twelve and one o'clock the enemy opened a fierce Cannonade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson, and Naglee's brigade, at White Oak swamp bridge. This artillery fire was con- tinued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed some infantry below our position. Rich- ardson's division suffered severely. Captain Ayres directed our artillery with great effect Captain Hazzard's batterj', after losing many cannoneers, and Captain Hazzard being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. It was re- placed by Pettit's battery, which partially si- lenced the enemy's guns. General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak swamp. At two o'clock in the day the enemy were re- ported advancing in force by the Charles City road, and at half-past two o'clock the attack was made down the road on General Slocum's left, but- was checked by his artillery. After this the enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked General McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was compelled to retire. General McCall, in his report of the battle, says : " About half-past two my pickets were driven in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing, without loss on our part. I DOCUMENTS. 591 *'At three o'clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left centre and another on the right centre to feel for a weak point. They were under cover of a shower of shells, and boldly ad- vanced, hut were both driven back — on the left by the Twelfth regiment, and on the right by the Seventh regiment. '■ For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly here. ... At last the enemy was compelled to retire before the well-directed musketry lire of the reserves. The (Jerman batteries were driven to the rear, but I rode up and sent them back. It was, however, of little avail, and they were soon after abandoned by the cannoneers." . . . " The batteries in front of the centre were boldly charged upon, but the enemy was speedi- ly forced back." . . . "Soon after this a most determined charge was made on Randall's battery by a full brigade, advancing in wedge shape, without order, but in perfect recklessness. Somewhat similar charges had, I have stated, been previously made on Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regiments without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randall's battery, and the Fourth regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. " Its gallant commander did not doubt his abil- ity to repel the attack, and his guns did, indeed, mow down the advancing host, but stul the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns. " It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be removed. Two guns that were, indeed, successfully limber- ed, had their horses killed and wounded and were overturned on the spot, and the enemy, dashing past, drove the greater part of the Fourth regiment before them. " The left company, (B,) nevertheless, stood its ground, with its Captain, Fred. A. Conrad, as did, likewise, certain men of other companies. I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only partial success. "There was no running. But my division, re- duced by the previous battles to less than six thousand, (6000,) had to contend with the divi- sions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest and best among many of the con- federate ai-ray, numbering that day eigliteen thou- sand or twenty thousand men, and it was reluct- antly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated upon them." General Heintzelman states that about five o'clock P.M. (jieneral McCall's division was attack- ed in large force, evidently the principal attack ; that in less than an hour the division gave way, and adds : " General Hooker being on his left, by moving to his right, repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner with great .slaughter. Gen- era] Sunmer, who was with General Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artiUerj and infantry in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss." This attack comnoenced about four p.m., and was pushed by heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery, directed with great piecision, firinic double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, two hundred paces wide, was filled with the enemy ; each repulse brought fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volle}^s and determined charge of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the Thirty-seventh New-York volunteers. General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the woods into the open field. Several bat- teries M-ere in position and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in front. Cap- tain De Russy's battery was placed on the right of General Sumner's artillery with orders to shell the woods. General Burns's brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back ; other troops began to return from the White Oak swamp. Late in the day, at the call of General Kearny, General Taylor's first New- Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, was sent to occupy a portion of General McCall's deserted position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between twelve and one o'clock at night General Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his corps, and soon after daylight both of his divi- sions, with General Slocum's division and a por- tion of General Sumner's command, reached Mal- vern Hill. On the morning of the thirtieth, General Sum- ner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call from General Frank- lin for reenforcements, sent him two brigades, which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. Gen- eral Sumner says of this battle : " The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About three o'clock P.M. the action commenced, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field." Tlie rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about four P.M. At about this time the enemy began to appear in General Porter's front, and at five o'clock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A concen- trated fire of about thirty guns was biought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel 592 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. Warren. The gunboats rendered tnosl efficient aid at this time, and helped to diive buck the enemy. It was very late at night before my aids return- ed to give me the results of the day's fighting along tlie whole line, and the true position of af- fur-s. AVhilo waiting to hear from General Frank- lin, before sending orders to Generals Suumei- and IJeintzehnan, I received a message from tlie latter that General Franklin was falling back ; whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn of my staff, with orders to verify this, and if it were true, to order in Generals Sumner and Ilcintzclman at once. He had not gone far when he met two oflicers sent fiom General Franklin's headquar- ters with thii infoiination that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Generals Sumner and lleintzelinan to fill back also, and definite in- structions were given as to tlie movement which was to commence on the right. The orders met these troops already en route to ^lalvern. In- structions were also sent to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow. General r>arnard then received full instructions for posting the troops as they arrived. I then returned to Ilaxall's, and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak. Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Ilaxall's, whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting conmienced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity. liATTLE OF MALVERN niLL. The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy on the first of July was with the left and centre of our lines resting on Malvern Hill, while the right curved backward through a wooded country towai'd a point below Ilaxall's on James River. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three fourths of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes graduall}^ toward the north and east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for artillery in tliose directions. Toward the north- west the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which extends to James River. From the position of tlie enemy his most obvious line of attaclv would come from the direction of Rich- mond and Wliite Oak swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the ])riiicipal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line, (Syke.s's division on tlie left, Morell's on the right,) witli llie artillery of his two divisions ad- vantageously posteil, and the artillery of the re- serve so disposed on the high grovmvl that a con- centrated fire of .some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in liis front or left. Colonel Tylttv also had, with great exertion, succeeded in getting ten of his siege-guns in position on the higlicst point of the hill. Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter ; next came Kearn}' and Hooker ; next Sedgwick and Richardson ; next Smith and Slo- cum ; tlien the remainder of Kcyes's corps, ex- tending by a backward curve nearlj' to the river. The Pennsylvania reserve corps was held in re- serve, and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on the low ground to protect that flank from any movement direct fi-om the Rich- mond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau, but from thence to the extreme right the troops were more de- ployed. This formation was imperative, as an attacli would probably be made upon our left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber and b}^ barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on James River, placed his gunboats so as to protect our flank, and to command the approach- es from Richmond. Between nine and ten a.m. the enemy com- menced feeling along our whole left wing, with his artillery and skirmishers, as far to the right as Hooker's division. About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed moving toward our right, within the skirt of wc^ds in front of Heintzelman's corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrange- ments were at once made to meet the anticipated attack in t'nat quarter, but, though the column was long, occupying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared, and was not again heard of. The presumption is, that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterward made on our left. About three p.m. a heavy fire of artillery open- ed on Kearny's left and Couch's division, speed- ily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was witliin short musket-range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a deadly volley which entirely broke tlie attacking force and drove them in dis- order back over their own ground. This advan- tage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our line some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire. Sliortly after four o'clock the firing ceased along tlie whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw fi'om the field. Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was station- ed upon Couck's right by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line was surveyed by the General, and every thing held in readiness to meet the coming at- taclv. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing for- ward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Bri- DOCUMENTS. 593 gade after brigade, formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with tlieir dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking column, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few 3'ards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward M'ith the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field. About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were ac- cumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades, as soon as it was considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelmau's troops, to reenforce that part of the line and hold the position. These brigades relieved such regi- ments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended ; but, despite his vastly superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and dark- ness ended the battle of ^ralvern Hill, though it was not until after nine o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire. During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture of the enemy, by throwing shell among his reserves and ad- vancing columns. As the army in its movement from the Chicka- hominy to Harrison's Landing was continually occupied in marching by night and fighting by day, its commanders found no time or opportu- nity for collecting data which would enable them to give exact returns of casualties in each en- gagement. The aggregate of our entire losses from the twent3'-sixth of June to the first of July, inclusive, was ascertained, after arriving at Harrison's Landing, to be as follows : List of the killed, icounded, and missing in the army of the Potomac from the twenty -sixth of June to the first of July, 18G2, inclusive. Corps. Killed. Wounded. Missing. Ag'gate. 1st. McCaU's division,* 253 1S7 1S9 69 620 245 'ig 1240 1076 1051 507 2460 1313 2 60 1531 843 S33 201 11 93 1179 21 97 3,074 2,111 2,073 777 4,273 2,737 23 8(1. Heiiitzelman's, 4Ui. Keyes's, 6th. Pianklin'8, 176 Total, ... 1582 7709 5953 15,249 Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete victory, it was, nevertheless, * Pennsylvania reserves. necessary to fall back still fmthcr, in order to reach a point wliere our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Captain Kndgers, commanding the gun- l)()at flotilla, this coul.i only be done below City Point ; concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrison's Bar as the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage, and ammunition, made it imperative to reach the transports immediately. The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's Land- ing during the night of the thirtieth of June and first of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill. The order pre- scribed a movement by the left and rear. Gen- eral Reyes's corps to cover the mananivre. It was not carried out in detail as regards the divi- sions on the left, the roads being somewhat block- ed by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a rear-guard between his command and the enemy. Colonel Averill, of the Third Pennsyl- vania cavalry was intrusted with tin:; delicate duty. He had under his command his own regi- ment and Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan's brigade of regular infantry and one battery. By a judi- cious use of the resources at his conunand he de- ceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remain- ing himself on the previous day's batlle-fieid until about seven o'clock of the second of July. Meantime General Keycs, having received his orders, commenced vigorous preparations for covering the movement of the entire army and protecting the trains. It being evident tliat the immense number of wagons and artillery carria- ges pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, (Jeneral Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads, after the army had passed, so as to jirevent any rapid pursuit, destroying ctfectually Turkey Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassable by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack from an\' quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words : " I do not think uiore vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy in- stead of away from him. And when it is under- stood that the carriages and tcims belonging to this army, stretcheil out in one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from tlie pres- ence of an enemy, vastly sui)erior in numbers, will be appreciated." The last of the wagouH s^ REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. did not reach the site selected at Harrison's Bar until after dark on the third of July, and the rcar-giiiard did not move into their camp until every tiling was secure. The enemy followed up with a small force, and on the third threw a few shells at the rear-guard, hut were quickly dispersed by our batteries and the fire of the gunboats. Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes for the skill and energy which characterized his performance of the important and delicate duties intrusted to his charge. High praise is also due to the officers and men of the First Connecticut artillery. Colonel Tyler, for the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days, and from Mal- vern'llill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that dis- tance, leaving nothing behind. THIKD PERIOD. On the first of July I received the following from the President : Washington, July 1, 18G2 — 8.80 p.m. It is impossible to reenforce you for your pres- ent emergency. If we had a million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, j^ou must find a place of secu- rity, and wait, rest, and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country and will bring it out. A. Lincoln. Major-General G. B. McClellan. In a despatch from the President to me, on the second of July, he says: "If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army, material and per- sonnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The Governors of eighteen States offer me a levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept." On the third of July the following kind des- patch was received from the President : [Extract.] Washington, July 8, 1862—3 p.m. Yours of half-past-fivc 3'esterday is ju.st receiv- ed. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men, have done the bestj'ou could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thou- sand thanks for it. A. Lincoln. Major-Gencral G. B. McClellan. On the fourth I sent the following to the Pres- ident: IlEADQtIAItTKRS ArmY OF THR POTO.XAC, I IlAHKisuN'ti ll.Mt, J.vMKs KivKK. July 4, 1S6'2. ( I. have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the second instant. I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much require. After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night ; they were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded, the consequences would have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting which had continued from the after- noon of the twent3'-sixth ultimo, in a daily series of engagements wholly unparalleled on this con- tinent for determination and slaughter on both sides. The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enor- mous. That of the ' enemy certainly greatest On Tuesday morning, the first, our army com- menced its movement from llaxall's to this point, our line of defence there being too extended to be maintained by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about four p.m. on the second a heavy storm of rain began, which con- tinued during the entire day and until the fore- noon of yesterday. The roads became horrible. Troops, artillery, and wagons moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and material, was finally brought safe into this camp. The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its inorale^ and M'ould have repelled any attack which the enemy was in con- dition to make. W^e now occupy a line of heights, about two miles from the James, a plain extending from there to the river ; our front is about three miles long ; these heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The gunboats can ren- der valuable support upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front we must hold our ground as we best may, and at whatever cost. Our positions can be carried only by over whelming numbers. The spirit of the army i« excellent ; stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiers exhibit the best results of di.s- cipHne. Our position is by no means impregna- ble, especially as a morass extends on this side of the liigh ground from our centre to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and if so, our front will be the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be deci- sive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded, and prisoners. I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not beaten in any conflict The enemy were unable, by their utmost efforts, to drive us fi-om any field. Never did such a change of base, involving a retrograde movement, and under incessant attacks from a most deter- mined and vastly more numerous foe, partake so little of disorder. We have lost no guns except twenty-five on the field of battle, twenty-one of which were lost by the giving way of McCall's division, under the onset of superior numbers. Our communications by the James River are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musket- DOCUMENTS. 595 ry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every effort to preserve, at least, the personnel of the arm}', and the events of the last few days leave no question, that the troops will do all that their country can ask. Send such reenforcements as you can ; I will do what r can. We are shipping our wounded and sick and landing supplies. The Navy Department should cooperate with us to the extent of its re- sources. Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power in the kindest and most efficient manner. When all the circumstances of the case are known, it will be acknowledged by all competent judges that the movement just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Un- der the most difficult circumstances we have pre- served our trains, our guns, our material, and, above all, our honor. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. The President. To which I received the following reply : WA3HINQT0N, July 5, 1862 — 9 i.M. A thousand thanks for the relief j'^our two des- patches, of twelve and one p.m. yesterday, gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of your- self and officers and men is, and forever will be, appreciated. If you can hold your present position we shall hive the enemy yet. A. Lincoln. Major-General G. B. McClellan, Commanding Army of the Potomac. The following letters were received from His Excellency the President : War Department, I Washington City, D. C, July 4, 1S02. ) I understand your position as stated in j'our letter, and by General Marcy. To rcenforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive with- in a month, or even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I sup- pose,) and about ten thousand, I hope, you will have from Burnside very soon, and about live thou- sand from Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your only care. Save the army, iivst, where you are, if you can, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and of the moans for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that with the aid of the gunboats and the reenforcements mentioned above, you can hold your present position ; provided, and so long as you can keep the James Iliver open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not re- member that you have expressed any ajjprehen- sion as to the danger of having your communi- cation cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention. Yours, very truly, A. Lincoln. Major-General McGlellan. P. S. — If at any time you feci able to take tho offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. A. L. The following telegram was sent on the sot- enth : HBAnqnARTRRS Army of TrtB Potomac, | Berkeley, July 7, 1S62— S..30 a.m. (" As boat is starting, I have only time to ac- knowledge receipt of despatch by General Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming more so. If not at- tacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I havo been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with Flag-Officer Golds- borough last night; he is confident he can keep river open. He should have all gunboats possi- ble. Will see him again this morning. My men in splendid spirits and anxious to try it again. Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in this army. G. B. McClkllan, A. Lincoln, Major-Oenei-al. President. While General-in-Chief, and directing tho op- erations of all our armies in the field, \ had be- come deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and carrying out certain views regard- ing the conduct of the war, which, in my judg- ment, were essential to its objects and its suc- cess. During an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country, these were .so fully con- firmed that I conceived it a duty, in the criticid position we then occupied, not to withhold a candid expression of the more important of these views from the Commander-in-(yliief, whom tho Constitution places at the head of the armies and navies, as well as of the government of the na- tion. The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln : IlKAnQnARTERS ArMT OK THB PoTOMAC, I Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862. ) Mk. President: You havo been fully informed that the rebel army is in the front, with the pur- pose of overwhelming us by attacking our posi- tions or reducing us by blocking our river com- munications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of pos- sible contingencies, to lay before your Excellen- cy, for your jjrivate consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebel- lion, althougli they do not strictly relate to the situation of tliis army, or strictly come within the scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impres.sed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be tho 696 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. cost in time, treasure, and blood. If secession i.s successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disas- ter, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled i)U7-pose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State. The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policj'', cov- erinp; the whole }i;round of our national trouble. The responsibility of dctermininsr, declai-in^^, and Kuppoi'ting such civil and military policy. and of directing the wliole course of national affiiirs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by j'ou, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency. This rebellion has assumed the character of a war ; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon ttie highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, ter- ritorial organization of States, or forcible aboli- tion of slavery should be contemplated for a mo- ment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly pro- tected, subject only to the necessity of military operations ; all private property taken for mili- tary use should be paid or receipted for ; pillage and waste sliould be treated as high crimes ; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and of- fensive demeanor by the military toward citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hos- tilities exist; and oaths, not required by enact- ments, constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servi- tude, either liy supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband, under the act of Congress, seeking military pro- tection, should receive it. The riglit of the (Jov- ernmcnt to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation there- for should be recognized. This i)rinciplc might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular State, thus working manumission in sucii State ; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western \'irginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time. A .system of policy thus constitutional, and per- vaded by the infiuences of Christianity and free- dom, would receive the support of "almost all truly loyal men. would deejily impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it mi"ht be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. Unless the principles governing the future con- duct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radi- cal views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concen- trations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which the}' support would soon cease to exist. In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in- chief of the army, one who possesses your confi- dence, understands your views, and who is com- petent to execute j^our orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplish- ment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself I am willing to serve you in such po.sition as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate serv- ed superior. I may be on the brink of eternity ; and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity toward you and fron» love for my country. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Georoe B. McClellan, JIiijor-General Commanding His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President. I telegraphed to the President on the eleventh as follows : Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I Berkeley, July 11, 1862 — .3 p.m. ) We are very strong here now, so far as defen- sive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again. All in fine spirits. Geokge B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. A. Lincoln, President. • These telegrams were sent on the twelfth, sev- enteenth, and eighteenth, to His Excellency the President : Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I Berkeley, July 12, 1802 — 7.15 a.m. j Hill and Longstreet crossed into New-Kent ( Jounty, via Long Bridge. I am still ignorant wiuit road they afterward took, but will know shortly. Nothing else of interest since last despatch. Rain ceased, and every thing quiet. Men rest- ing well, but beginning to be impatient for an- otiier fight. 1 am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here, but prompt- ly rcenforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we have a little more than half a chance, we can take it. DOCDMEXTS. 597 I dread the effects of any retreat upon the morale of the men. George !>. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. A. LiNCOLX, President. Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) Berkelky, July 17, 1802 — S a.m. f I have consulted fully with (icneral Burnside, and would commend to your favorable consider- ation the General's plan for bringing (7) seven additional regiments from North-Carolina, by leaving Newborn to the care of the gunboats. It appears manifestly to be our policy to concen- trate here every thing we can possibly spare fi-om less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in rebeldoin. Noth- ing should be left to chance here. I would recommend that General Burnside, with all his troops, be oi-dered to this army, to enable it to assume the offensive as soon as possible. Geokge B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. A. LiMcoi-x, President. Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I Berkeley, July 18, ISO'2 — 3 a.m. ) No change worth reporting in the state of affiiirs. Some (20,000j twenty thou.sand to (25,- 000) tvventy-Hve thousand of the enemy at Peters- burgh, and others thence to Richmond. Those at Petersburgh say they are part of Beauregard's army. New troops arriving ria Petersburgh. Am anxious to have determina- tion of Government that no time may be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very precious now, and perfect unity of action necessary. George B. McClellan, , -r Mai or-General Commanding. A. Lincoln, President. The following was telegraphed to General Hal- leck on the twenty -eighth : Headquarters Army of the Potomac, I Berkeley, July 28, 1S02— S a.m. j Nothing especially new except corroboration of report.^ that reenforcements reaching Rich- mond from South. It is not confirmed that any of Bragg's troops are yet here. My opinion is more and more firm that here is the defence of Washington, and that I should be at once reen- forced by all available troops to enable me to ad- vance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army and the cause. I am confident of that. George B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General H. TV. Halleck, Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D.C. On the thirtieth, I sent the following to the General-in-Chief: Headquarters Army of tok Potomac, 1 Berkeley, July 30, 1862 — 7 a.m. | I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army, and that the decision may be to reenforce it at once. AVe are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when energy and decision arc sailly needed. George B. McClellan, Major-Genoral. Major-General IT. W. Halleck, Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. About half an hour after midnight, on the morn- ing of August first, the enemy brought some light batteries toCoggin's Point and the Coles House, on the right l)ank of James River, directly oppo- site Harrison's Li^nding, and opened a heavy fire upon our shipping and encampments. It was continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when tliey were driven back by tlie fire of our guns ; this affair was reported in the following despatch : iRMY OF TRE POTOMAC, I y, August 2, l5t)2 — S A.M. ( Hbadquarters Army of tre Potomac, Berkeley, Firing of night before la,st killed some ten (10) men and wounded about (15) fifteen. No harm of the slightest consequence done to the shipping, although several were struck. Sent party across river yesterday to the Coles House, destro^'ed it, and cut down the timber ; will com- plete work to-day, and also send party to Cog- gin's Point, which I will probably occupy. I will attend to your telegraph about pressing at once ; will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside, and I will stir these people up. I need more cavalry ; have only (3700) three thousand seven hundred for duty in cavalry division. Adjutant-General's office forgot to send Sykes's commission as Major-General, with those of other division commanders • do me the favor to hurry it on. G. B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Major-General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. To prevent another demonstration of this char- acter, and to insure a debouche on the south bank of the James, it became necessary to occupy Cog- gin's Point, which was done on the third, and the enemy, as will be seen from the following des- patch, driven back toward Petersburgh : Headquarters Army of ttiv. Potomac, ) Bekkeley, Augusts, 1SG2— 10p.m. f Coggin's Point was occupied to-day, and tim- ber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I went over the ground myself, and found that Du- ane had, as usual, selected an admirable position, which can be intrenched with a small amount of labor, so as to make it a formidable tefc de pont, covering the landing of a large force. I shall begin intrenching it by the labor of con- trabands to-morrow^ The position covers the Coles House, which is directly in front of West- over. We have now a safe debouche on the south bank, and are secure against midnight cannonad- ing. A few thousand more men would place us in condition at least to annoy and disconcert the enemy very nuich. I sent Colonel Averill this morning with throe hundred (300) cavalry to examine tlie country on the south side of the James, and try to catch some cavalry at Sycamore Church, which is on the 5d8 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. ■main road from Pctersburgh to Suffolk, and some five (5) miles from Coles House. He found a cav- alry force of five hundred and fifty (550) men, at- tackc Berkeley, August 3, 1862. j I hear of sea-steamers at Fort Monroe ; are they for removing my sick ? If so, to what ex- tent am I required to go in sending them off? There are not many who need go. As I am not in any way informed of the in- tentions of the (iovernment in regard to this army, I am unable to judge what proportion of the sick should leave here, and must ask for spe- cific orders. G.B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Major-General H. W. Halleck, Commanding United States Army, Washington. If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it was important that it should be unencumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all interfere with its mobility; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond, from the position we then occupied, there were many cases of slight sickness which would speedily be cured, and the patients returned to duty. As the service of every man would be import- ant in the event of a forward otiensive move- ment, I considered it to be of the utmost conse- (|ucnce that I should know what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the despatch of eleven p.m. on the third, before receiving the following telegram : Washington, August 3, 1S62— T.45 p.m. I have waited most anxiously to learn the re- sult of your forced reconnoissance toward Rich- mond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my tele- gram. It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. DOCUMENTS. 601 Its real object and withdrawal should be con- cealed even from your own officers. Your matei'ial and transportation should be removed first. You will assume control of all the means of transportation within your reach, and ai)plv to the naval forces for all the assist- ance they can render you. You will consult freely with the commander of these forces. The entire execution of the movement is left to your discretion and judgment. You will leave such forces as yon may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places, which we must occupy. H. W. TLVLLECK, Majrvr-General Commamiing United States Army. Major-General Geo. B. McClellan. I proceeded to obe}'^ this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, where its communications had by the cooperation of the gunboats been rendered perfectly secure, would, at tliat time, have the most disastrous effect upon our cause. 1 did not, as the commander of that army, al- low the occasion to pass without distinctly set- ting forth my views upon the subject to the au- thorities in the following telegram : Heaiiquarters Armt or the Potomac, ) Berkkley, August 4, 1862—12 m. ) Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess tliat it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Acquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as thi.s, and while they are in prog- ress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements. This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James River, so that we are free to act in any direction ; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications as now secure. We are twenty-five (25) miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) miles, which brings us practically within ten (10) miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five (25) miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within twelve (12) miles of Richmond. At Acquia Creek we would be seventy-five (75) miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way. From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy (70) miles, for I regard it as impractica- l)Ie to withdraw this army and its material, ex- cept by land. The result of the movement would thus be a march of one hundred and forty-five (145) miles to reach a point now only twenty-five (25) miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water trans- portation. ^ Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of tlie North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries ; and the.se appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, it may be promptly reenforced to enable it to resume the offensive. It may be said that there are no reenforce- ments available. I point to Burnside's force ; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry ; to those portions of the army of the West not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion ; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will deter- mine the fate of the nation. All points of secondar}'^ importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here ; a decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere; here is the true defence of Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be de- cided. Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that T have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did m my life before, I entreat that this order ma)^ be rescinded. If ray counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey 3"our orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. Whatever the result may be — and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings — I shall at least have tlie internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert dis- aster from my country. G. B. McClellan, Major-Geneial Commanding. Major-( August 7, ISG'2. ) Grneual : T have the honor to return the pa- pei's herewith which you sent mc, with the fol- lowing remarks : We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, etc., which reijuires the detailing of most of our available boats, ex- cept the ferry-boats. The medical department has ten or twelve of our largest transport vessels, which, if disposable, could carry twelve thou- sand men. Besides, there ai"e some heavy-draught steamers at Fort Mom-oe that cannot come to this 604 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. point, but which can carry ciiiht thousand or ten tlioiisand infantry. I have ordered all >ip licre that can ascend to this depot. They will be here to-morrow even- ing. As it now is, after the details already made, we cannot transport from this place more than five thou.sand infantry. There are no transports now available for cav- alry. From and after to-morrow, if the vessels arrive, I could transport ten thousand infantry. In two or three days a regiment of cavalry can be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport twenty-live thou.sand at a time. The number that can be transported is contingent on circumstances referred to. Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary or other supplies, and most of the tugs ai'e necessary to tow off sail craft also laden with supplies. I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, Kufus Incjalls, Cleneral R. B. MarCT, Chief Quartermaster. Cbief of Staff. Oil the ninth I received this despatch; WA.SHINGTON, August 9, 1863—12.45 p.m. I am of the ojHnion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals Pope and Burn- side, ancl tiiat he expects to cru.sh them and move forward lo the I'l'tumac. You mii^l send reenforcements instantly to Acquia Creek. Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity. II. W. IIai-leck, Mijor-General. Major-General G. B. McClellan. To which I sent the following reply: IlRAnQITARTERS ArMV OF THE FOTOMAC, I Berkeley, August 10, lSfi'2 — 3 a.m. f Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries sent to Burnside took the last available transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavahy to-day. The sick are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert — not an hour's— but every thing has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out your orders. G. B. McCi,ei,i,an, Miyor-Oeneral Commanding, Major-Gcncral H. W. Hai.i.kck, Commanding United States Army. The following report, made on the same da} by the officer then in charge of the transports, expo.ses the injustice of the remark in the des- patch of the General-in-Chief, that, "considering the amount of transportation at your disposal your delay is not satisfactor3^" AS.SISTANT Quartermaster's Office, | Army of the Potomac, > Harriso.n's Landino, Va., August 10, 1SC2. j Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has requested me to telegraph to you concerning the state and capacity of the transports now here. On the night of the eighth T despatched eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six schooner.s, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of which have yet returned. Requisition is made this morning for transpor- tation of one thou.'Kind cavalry to Acquia Creek. All the schooners that had been chartered for carrying horses have been long since discharged, or changed into freight vessels. A lai-ge proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded with stores, or are in tlie floating hospital service engaged in removing the sick. To transport the one thousand cavalry to-day will take all the available steamers now here not engaged in the service of the harbor. These steam- ers coidd take a large number of infantry, but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and much space is thus lost. Several steamers are expected here to-day, and we are unloading schooners rapidly ; most of these are not charter- ed, but are being taken for the service required, at same rates of pay as other chartered schooners. If 3'ou could cause a more speedy return of the steamers sent away from here, it would fjxcilitate matters. C. G. Sawtelle, Captain and Assistant Quartermaster, Commanding Depot. General M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster General United States Army, Washington. Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing were very limited, admitting but few vessels at one time. These were continually in use as long as there were disposable vessels, and the officers of the medical and quartermaster's departments, with all their available forces, were incessantly occupied day and night in embarking and send- ing off the sick men, troops, and material. Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the General in-Chief that such were the facts, on the tenth I received the following ; WAsniNGTON, August 10, 1862 — 12 p.m. The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting General Pope to-day ; there must be no further delay in your move- ments ; that which has already occurred was en- tirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily ex- plained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress you have made in executing the order to transfer your troops. H. W.Halleck, Miij or- General. Major-General G. B. McClellan. To which I sent this reply : Headquarters Army of the Potomac ) Berkeley, August 10, 1862—11.80 p..m. ) Your despatch of to-day is received. I assure you again tliat there has not been any unneces- sary delaj' in cai'rying out your orders. You are probably laboring under some great mistake as to the amount of transportation avail- ble here. I have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off our sick, and the troops you ordered to Burn- side. Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed DOCUMEN'm 605 the Quartermaster General of the condition of our water transportation. From the fact that you directed me to keep tlie order secret, I took it for gi'anted that you would take the steps necessary to provide the requisite transportation. A large number of transports for all arms of service, and for wagons, should at once be sent to Yorktowu and Fort Monroe. I shall be ready to move the whole army by land the moment the sick are disposed of You may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize the difficulty of the operation proposed. The regiment of cavahy for Curnside has been in course of embarkation to-day and to-night ; (10) ten steamers were required for the purpose ; (1258) one thousand two hundred and fifty-eight sick loaded to-daj^ and to-night. Our means exhausted, except one vessel re- turning to Fort Monroe in the morning, which will take some (500) five hundred cases of slight sickness. The present moment is probably not the proper one for me to refer to the unnecessary, harsh, and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, make no difference to my official action. G. B. McClellan, Mnjor-General Commanding. Major-General H. TV. Halleck. Coibmanding United States Array. On the eleventh this report was made : Headquarters Armt of the Potomac, t Berkelkt, August 11, 1SC2— ll.yO p.m. f The embarkation of (850) eight hundred and fifty cavahy, and (1) one brigade of infantiy will be completed by (2) two o'clock in the morning ; (500) five hundred sick were embarked to-da3^ Another vessel arrived to-night, and (GOO) six hundred more sick are now being embarked. I ^ill have some (4000) four thousand sick to dis- pose of. You have been greatly misled as to the amount of transportation at iny disposal. Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, and others indispensable for service here, have been reported to you as available for carry- ing sick and well. I am sending off all that can be unloaded at Fort Monroe to have them return here. I repeat that I have lost no time in carry- ing out your orders. G. B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Major-Gcneral H. W. Halleck, Commanding United States Army. On the same day I received the following from the Quartermaster in charge of the depot : Assistant QrARXERMASTEii's Office, Army OF the Pdtom Harrison's Landi.sg, August Colonel : In reply to the communication from General Marry, which was referred to me by you, I have to state that there are now in this harbor no disposable transports not already detailed, either for the use of the hospital department, for the transportation of tlie First New-York cavalry, or for the necessary service of the har- bor. 1 think the steamers loading and to be Sup. Doc. 39 l's Office, | )tomac, y ust 11, 18G2. ) loaded with cavahy could take in addition throe thousand infantry. These boats are, however, directed to leave as fast as they are loaded ; some have already started. The embarkation of this cavalry regiment is going on very slowly, and it is not in my power to hurry the matter, although I have had several agents of the depart- ment and one commissioned ofiicer at the wharf, to render all the assistance possible. The entire army is this morning turning in, to be stored on vessels, knapsacks, officers' baggage, and other surplus property, and with our limited wharf facilities it is impossible, unless the regular is- sues of forage, etc., are suspended, to avoid great confusion and delay with what is already order- ed to be done. Of course, if any infantry is or- dered to embark on these cavahy transj)orts, the confusion and difficulties will be increased. I know of no boats that may be expected here to day, except the South America and Fanny Cadwallader, a propeller which was ordered to be sent back from Fort Monroe. The transports witli the artillery left for Acquia Creek on the night of the eighth and the morn- ing of the ninth. They were ordered to return immediately. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, C. G. Sawtelle, Captain and A. Q. .M., Commanding Depot. Lieutenant-Colonel Rufl's Ingalls, a. I). C. and Cldef Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac On the twelfth I received the following : Washington, August 12, 1362 — 12 u. The Quartermaster-General informs me that nearly every available steam ves.sel in the coun- try is now under your control. To send more from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New-York, would interfere with the transportation of arnij'^ supplies and break up the channels of travel by which we are to bring forward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly thirteen thousand (l.S,000) troops to Acquia Creek in less than two (2) days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. All vessels in the James River and the Chesapeake Bay were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that (8) eight or (10) ten thousand of your men could be trans])orted daily. In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet of sailing vessels which could be used as tran.s- ports. The bulk of your material on sliore it was thought could be sent to Fort Monroe, covered by that part of the army whicli could not get water transportation. Such were the views of the Government here ; perhaps we were misin- formed as to the facts. If so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was inten- tionally harsh or unjust, but the delay was so unexpected that an explanation was required. There has been, and is, the most urgent neces- sity for despatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington. II. W. IIalleck, Major-General. Major-Gcncral G. B. McClellan. 606 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. I telegraphed the following reply : IlEADQnAnTERS AUMT OF THE POTOMAC, I liEHKKLEY, AugUSt 12, 1862 — 11 P.M. j Your despatch of noon to day received. It is positively the fact that no more men could have been embarked hence than have gone, and that no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before your orders were received, Colonel Ingalls directed all avai'able vessels to come from Monroe. Officers havt; been sent to take personal direction. Have heard nothing here of Burnside's fleet. There are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic, which draw too much to come here. Hospital accommodations exhausted this side New-York. Propose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases, for New-York, and to encamp slight cases for the present at Monroe. In this way can probably get ofi" the (3400) three thousand four hundred sick, still on hand, by day after to-morrow night. I am sure that you have been misinformed as to the availability of vessels on hand. We can- not use heavily loaded supply vessels for troops or animals ; and such constitute the mass of those here, which liave been repi-esented to you a.s capable of transporting this army. I fear you will find very great delay in embark- ing troops and material at Yorktown and Mon- roe, both from want of vessels and of fiicilities of embarkation ; at least two additional wharves should at once be built at each place. I ordered two at the latter some (2) two weeks ago, but you countermanded the order. I learn that wharf accommodations at Acquia are altogether inadequate for landing troops and supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should be lost in remedying this. Great delay will ensue there from shallow water. You will find a vast deficiency in horse transports. We had nearly two hundred when we came here ; I learn of only (20) twenty provid- ed now \ they carry about (50) fifty horses each. More hospital accommodations should be provided. We are much impeded here because our wharves are used night and day to land cur- rent supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty will occur. With all the facilities at Alexandria and Wash- ington, (6) six weeks about were occupied in em- barking this army and its material. Burnside's troops are not a fivir criterion for rate of embarkation. All his means were in hand, his outfit specially prepared for the pur- j)0se, and his men habituated to the movement. There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. I state tliese diffi- uulties from experience, and because it appears to me that we have been lately working at cross purposes, because you have not been properly informed by those around you, who ought to know the inherent difliculties of such an under- taking. It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it ; it is in much better position to do so from here than from Acquia. Our material can only be saved by using the whole army to cover it, if we are pressed. If sensibly weakened by detachments, the result might be the loss of much material and many men. I will be at the telegraph office to-morrow- morning. G. B. ^IcClem.an, Major-General. Major-Gen. II. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. To the reasons given in the foregoing despatch, to show why General Burnside's movement from Fort Monroe was not a fair criterion for our op- erations, the following may be added : He was not encumbered by either sick or wounded men. He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons, or teams. His force consisted of infantry alone, with a few ambulances and officers' horses. His baggage was already on the transports, where it had remained since his arrival from North-Carolina, and his men had only to resume their places on board. The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my des- patches of the seventh, tenth, and eleventh, were sent to supply his total deficiency in those arms. I may also repeat that the vessels used by General Burnside had not returned from Acquia Cieek when the army left Harrison's Bar. It will be seen by the concluding paragraph of the foregoing despatch that in order to have a more direct, speedy, and full explanation of the condition of affairs in the army than I could by sending a single despatch by steamer to the near- est telegraph office at Jamestown Island, some seventy miles distant, and waiting ten hours for a reply, I proposed to go in person to the office. This I did. On my arrival at Jamestown Island there was an interruption in the electric current, which ren- dered it necessary for me to continue on to Fort Monroe, and across the Chesapeake Bay to Cher- ry Stone Inlet, on the "eastern shore," where I arrived late in the evening, and immediately sent the annexed despatches : Cherry Stone, August 13, 1SG2— 11.30 p.m. Please come to office ; wish to talk to ymi. What news from Pope ? G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General H. W. Halleck, VYashington. Crerrt Stone Inlet, August 14, 1SG2 — 12.30 a.m Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you ; found cable broken, and came here. Please read my long telegram. (See above despatch of Au- gust twelfth, eleven p.m.) All quiet at camp. Knemy burned wharves at City Point yesterday. No rebel pickets within eight (8) miles of Coggin's Point yesterday. Richmond prisoners state that large force with guns left Richmond northward on Sunday. G. B. McClellan, Major-GeneraL Major-General II. W. Halleck, Washington. To which the following reply was received : DOCUMENTS. 607 Washington, August U, 1SG2— 1.40 a.m. I have read your despatch. There is no chan,i:;e of plans. You will send up j'our troops as rap- idly as possible. There is no dilfleulty in land- ing them. According to your own accounts, there is now no ditHculty in withdrawing your forces. Do so with all possible rapidity. il. W. IIalleck, Major-General. Major-General G. B. McClellan. Before I had time to decipher and reply to this despatch, the telegraph operator in Washington informed me that General Halleck had gone out of the office immediately after writing this des- patch, without leaving any intimation of the fact for me, or waiting for any further information as to the object of my journey across the bay. As there was no possibility of other communication with him at that time, I sent the following des- patch, and returned to Harrison's Landing : Cherry Stone Inlet, August 14, 1SG2 — 1.40 a.m. Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. I had hoped to have had a longer and fuller con- versation with you, after travelling so far for the purpose. G. B. McClellan, M;yor-General. Major-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. 0. On the fourteenth and fifteenth, and before we had been able to embark all our sick men, two army corps were put in motion toward Fort Mon- roe. This was reported in the annexed despatch : Headquarters Army of the potomac, BiSRKELEV, August 14, 1S02 POTOMAC, ) )G2— 11 P.M. ( Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be away to-morrow night. Every thing being done to carry out your orders. I don't like Jackson's movements ; he vvill sudden- ly appear when least expected. Will telegraph fully and understandingly in the morning. G. B. McClellan. Major-General. Major-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D.O. The phrase " movement has commenced," it need not be remarked, referred obviously to the movement of the main army, after completing the necessary preliminary movements of the sick, etc. etc. The perversion of the term, to which the Gen- eral-in-Chief saw fit to give currency in a letter to the Secretary of War, should have been here rendered impossible by the despatches which precede this of the fourteenth, which show that the movement really begun immediately after the receipt of the ordei" of August fourth. The progress made in the movement on the fif- teenth wa.s reported in the following despatches : Ueauquariers Aiuiy of the Potojuc, I August 15, 1S02— 12 M. ( Colonel Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking the remaining brigade of McCall's di- vision, with the sick, who are constantly accu- mulating, the transports now disposable will be all consumed. Two of my army corps marched last night and this morning en route for Yorktown — one via Jones's Bridge, and the other/-;;? Hai-rett's Ferry, where we have a pontoon-bridge. The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as the roads are clear ; and [ hope before to-morrow morning to have the entire army in motion. A report has just been received from my pick- ets that the enemy in force is advancing on us from the Chickahominy, but I do not credit it; shall know soon. Should any more tran.sports arrive here before my deparkire, and the enemy do not show such a force in our front as to re- quire all the troops I have remaining to insure the safety of the land movement, with its immense train, I shall «end every man by water that the transports will carry. G. B. McClei-lan, Major-GeneraL Major-General H. W. Halleck, Commanding U. S. A. Headquarters Army of the Potom.«c, ( Berkeley, Aujjust 15, 1SG2— 1.30 P.M. ) The advance corps and trains are fairly started. I learn nothing more in relation to reported ad- vance of rebels via Jones's Bridge. Shall pu.sh the movement as rapidly as possible. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D.C. Headquarters Army of tub Potomac, I Berkeley, August 15, 1S62— 10 P..M. ) Coggin's Point is abandoned. The whole of McCall's division, with its artillciy, is now en route for Burnside. AVe have not yet transportation sufficient for our sick. I hope we will get it to- morrow. Porter is across the Chickahominy, near its mouth, with his wagons and reserve artillery. Ileintzelman at Jones's Bridge with a portion of his corps. They will all be up by morning. Averill's cavalry on the other side. AU quiet thus far. I cannot get the last of the wagons as far as Charles City Court-House before some time to-morrow afternoon. I am hurrying matters with the utmost rapid- ity possible. Wagons will move all night. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C. After the commencement of the movement, it was continued with the utmost rapidity, until all the troops and material were en route both by land and water, on the morning of the si.xteenth. Latfe in the afternoon of that day, wben the last man had di.sappeared from the deserted camp.s, I followed with my personal staff in the track of the grand army of the Potomac; bidding farewell to the scenes still covered with the mai'ks of its presence, and to be forever memorable in history as the vicinity of its most brilliant exploits. Previous to the departure of the troops, I had directed Captain Duane, of the engineer corps, to proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth of the Chickahominy, and throw across the river at that point a pontoon-bridge. This was executed prompt- ly and satisfactorily under the cover of gunlioats ; and an e.xcellent bridge of about two thousand 608 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. feet in length was ready for the first arrival of troops. The c;ruater part of the arm}', with its artillery, wagon-trains, etc., crossed it rapidly, and in per- fect order and safety, so that on the night of the seventeenth every thing was across the Chicka- hominy, except the rear-guard, which crossed early on the morning of the eighteenth, when the pontoon-bridge was immediately removed. General Poi'tcr's cor{)s, which was the first to march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed forward rapidly, and on the sixteenth reached Williamsljurgli, where I had directed him to halt until the entire army was across the Chicka- hoin".ny. On his arrival at Williara.sburgh, however, he received an intercepted letter, which led to the belief that General Pope would have to contend against a very heavy force then in his front. Gen- eral Porter, therefore, very properly took the re- sponsibility of continuing his march directly on to Newport News, which place he reached on the morning of the eighteenth of August, having marched his corps sixty miles in the short period of three days and one night, halting one day at the crossing of the Chickahominy. The embarkation of this corps commenced as soon as transports were ready, and on the twen- tieth it had all sailed for Acquia Creek. I made the following report from Barrett's Ferry : IlEADQrARTERS ARMT OF THE POTOMAC, j Barhett's Fekrv, Chickahominy, > August IT, 1SG2— 11 A.M. ) Every thing is removed from our camp at Har- rison's I?ar. No property nor men left behind. The (oth) Fifth corps is at Williamsburgh witli all its wagons and the reserve artillery. The C-'u]) Third corps is on the march from Jones's Bridge to \Villiamsburgh via Diamond Bridge, and has probabl}' passed the latter before this hour. Av- erill's cavalry watches every thing in that direc- tion. The mass of the wagons have passed the pon- toon-bridge here, and are parked on the other side. Peck's wagons are now crossing ; his divi- sion will soon be over. Headquarters wagons follow Peck's. I hope to have every thing over to-night, and the bridge removed by daylight. May be delayed beyond that time. Came here to see Burnside, otherwise should have remained with the rear-guard. Thus far all is quiet, and not a shot that I know of since we began the march. ■ I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the whole army beyond the Chickahominy. I will then begin to forward troops by water as fast as transportation permits. G. B. AIcCr.Ei.LAN, Major-General Commanding. Major-General' H. "W. Halueck, Commuiuliuj,' United States Army, WasUington, D. C. On the eighteenth and nineteenth, our march w-as continued to Williamsburgh and Yorktown, and on the twentieth tlie remainder of the army wus ready to cml)ark at Yorktown, Fortress Mon- roe, and Newport News. The movement of the main l)ody of tlie army on this march was covered by General Pleasan- ton with his cavalry and horse artillery. That officer remained at Haxall's until the army had passed Charles City Court-House, when he gra- dually fell back, picking up the stragglers as he proceeded, and crossed the bridge over the Chick- ahominy, after the main body had marched to- ward Williamsburgh. Ilis troops were the last to cross the bridge, and he desei'ves great credit for the manner in which he performed this duty. General Averill did a similar service, in the same satisfactory way, in covering the march of the Third corps. As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here, I cannot close this part of my report with- out giving an expression of my sincere thanks and gratitude to the officers and men whom I had the honor to command. From the commencement to the termination of this most arduous campaign, the army of the Potomac always evinced the most perfect subor- dination, zeal, and alacrity in the performance of all the duties required of it. The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army in the construction of intrenchments, roads, bridges, etc., was enormous ; j'ct all the work was perfoi'mcd with the most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests of the service. During the campaign ten severely contested and sanguinary battles had been fought, besides numerous smaller engagements, in which the troops exhibited the most determined enthusi- asm and bravery. They submitted to exposure, sickness, and even death, witliout a murmur. Indeed, they had become veterans in their coun- try's cause, and richly deserved the warm com- mendation of the Government. It was in view of these facts that this seemed to me an appropriate occasion for the General-in- Chief to give, in general orders, some apprecia- tive expression of the services of the army while upon the Peninsula, Accordingly, on the eigh- teenth I sent him the following despatch : Hbadquarters Aumt of the Potomac, ) August 18, 1802—11 P.M. f Please say a kind word to my army that I can repeat to them in general orders in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, ^Villiamsburgh, AYest- Point, Hanover Court-House, and on the Chicka- hominy, as well as in regard to the (7) seven days and the recent retreat. No one has ever said anj' thing to cheer them but myself Say nothing about me. Merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done. It will do yon much good, and will strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it. G. B. McClkli.an, Major-Geueral. Major-Gcncral IIalleck, "Washington, D. C. As no reply was received to this commimica- tion, and no order was issued by the General-in- DOCUMENTS. 600 Chief, I conclude that suggestion did not meet with his approbation. All the personnel and material of the army had been transferred from Harrison's Landing to tlie different points of embarkation in the very brief period of five days without the sliglitest loss or damage. Porter's troops sailed from Newport News on the nineteenth and twentieth. Ileint- zelman's corps sailed from Yorktown on the twen- ty-first. On that day I received the following telegram from the General-in-Chief: Wasiiingion, August 21, 1SC2 — 6 p.m. Leave such garrisons in Fortress ^loin-oe, Yoi'ktown, etc., as yon may deem proper. They will be replaced by new troops as rapidly as pos- sible. The forces of Burnside and Pope arc hard pushed, and recpiire aid as rapidly as you can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can. By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of annnunition. We have no time here to supply them. Moreover, they may have to fight as soon as they land. n. W. Hallkck, Majnr-General ComraauJiiig United States Army. General McClellan. To which the following are replies : Headquakters Armv of tub Potomac, ( FoKTKKSs Mo.NKOK, August 21, 1802 — 7.80 P.M. j Your despatch of (6) six p.m. received. I have not lost an hour in sending troops, nor, will \. Franklin is here, and I will try to get some of liis troops on board to-night. I had already or- dered all the ammunition forward. I will j)ut headquarters on board ship early to-morrow morning, so that I can leave at a mo- ment's notice. 1 hope that 1 can get off to-mor- row. Shall 1 go in person to Aoiuia, or do you wish to see me first at Washington 'i If yon wish it 1 can prol)abIy ship quite an amount of ammunition for other troops than this .army. G. B. McClki.lan. M:ijor-General. Major-Gencral IIalleck, Washington, D. C. IlKADQUARTERS ArMV OF THK I'OTnMAC, ) Four Mo.NKOK, August 21, 1&02 — 10.20 r.M. | I have ample supplies of ammunition for in- fantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. I can supply any deficiency that may e.\'ist in General Pope's army. Quite a number of rifled field-guns are on band here. Tlie forage is the only question for 3'ou to at- tend to ; please have that ready for me at Acquia. I want many more schooners for cavalry horses ; they should have water on hand when they come Jiere. If you have leisure, and there is no objection, please communicate to me fully the state of affairs, and your plans. I will then be enabled to arrange details understandingly. G. B. iMcCl.ELLAN, Mujor-General. Major-Gcneral 1L\lleck, Washington. Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe, I gave directions for strengthening the defences of York- town, to resist any attack from the direction of Richmond, and left General Keye.s, with his corps, to perform the work, and temporarily gar- rison the place. 1 telegraphed as follows on the twenty-second : IlEAnQtIARTERS ArMY OP TUB PoTOMAO, (^ KoTR Monroe, August 22, 1S(J2— 2. 1.^ p.m. ) Despatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps is embarking as rapidly as possible. Sumner's corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as fast as transportation arrives. Keyes is still at Yin-ktown, putting it in a i)roper state of defence. I think that all of Franklin's coips will get off to-day, and hope to commence with Sumner to- morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and wagons. G. B. McCm;i,i,'an, M:ij()r-Geiieral. Major-Gen. IL W. IIalleck, Washington, D. C. HEADQnARTBRS ArMT OP TUB POTOMAO, I Fort Monroe, Augu.sl 22, 1SG2— a.40 p.m. ) Two (2) good ordnance sergeants are needed inunediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new defences are arranged and connnenced. I recommend that (5000) live thousand new troops be sent immediately to garrison York and Gloucester. They should be commanded by an experienced general officer, who can discipline and instruct them. About (900) nine hundred should be artillery. I recommend tliat a new regiment, whose colonel is an artillery ofliccr, or graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and sent there. A similar regiment is al).solutely necessary here. G. B. McClicij.an, Jlajor-Gfuerul. Major-General II. W. IIalleck, Ci)mmaniling United Statea Army. On the twenty-third Franklin's corps sailed. I reported this in the following despatch : IInMlQUARTRRS ArMY OF THE PoTOMAC, ) Fort JIo.nroe, August 23, 1602— l.:iU p.h. ( Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for Acquia in about half an hour. No transports yet for Sumner's corps. G. B. McClellan, Major-Ocueral. Major-General H. W. IIalleck, Commanding United Stales Army. On that evening I sailed with my staff for Acquia Creek, where I arrived at daylight on the following .morning, reporting as follows: IIeadqitartkr» Army of the Potomac, ) AuyuiA Creek, August 24, 1S{J2. J I have reached here, and respectfully report fo" orders. G. B. McClkllan, Major-GcneraL Major-General IIalleck, Commanding United States Army. I also telegraphed as follows : IIradqiiartkrs Army of thb Potomac, ) Acquia Chkkk, August 24, 1302 — 2 p.m. | Your telegram received. Morell's scouts re- port Rappahannock Station burned and al).uidon- ed by Pope, without any n(jti(3e to Morell or Sykes This was telograi)hed you some hours ago. Keynold.s, Reno, and Stevens lire suppos- 610 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. ed to be with Pope, a^4 nothing can be heard of them to-day. Morcll and Sykes are near Morris- ville Post-()ffice, watching the lower fords of Rap- pahannock, with no troops between there and Rappaliannock Station, which is reported aban- doned by Pope. Please inform me immediately exactly where Pope is, and what doing ; until I know that, I cannot regulate Porter's movements ; he is much exposed now, and decided measures should be taken at once. Until I know what my command and position are to be, and M-hether you still in- tend to place me in the command indicated in your first letter to me, and orally through Gene- ral Burnside, at the Chickahominy, I cannot de- cide whore I can be of most use. If your deter- 7nination is unchanged, T ought to go to Alexan- dria at once. Please define my position and duties. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-Gcneral H. W. Hallock, Commanding United States Army. To which I received the following reply : Washington, August 24, 1S62. You ask me for information which I cannot give. I do not know either where General Pope i.s, or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have all day been most anxious to ascertain. II. W. Hali.eck, General-in-CIiief. Major-General McClellan. On the twenty-sixth I received the following : Washington, August 26, 1S62 — 11 a.m. There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenandoah Valley. Ileconnoissances will soon determine. General Ileintzclm.'uVs corps was ordered to report to General Pope, and Kearny's Avill probably be sent to-day against the enemy's flank. Don't draw any troops down the Ra{)pahannock at pre- sent ; we shall [)robably want them all in the di- rection of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had better leave General Burnside in charge at Acquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great ir- regularities are reported there. General Frank- lin's corps will march as soon as it receives trans- portations. H. W. HAT,r,E(^K, Coramander-in-Cliief. ^Major-General G. B. McClellan. On receipt of this I immediately sailed for Alexandria, and reported as follows : Alexandria, August 27, 1SC2— S a.m. I arrived here last night, and have taken meas- ures to ascertain the state of affairs here, and that proper remedies may be applied. Ju.st received a rumor that railway bridge over Bull Run was burned last night. G. B. McCi.ellan', Major-General, ilaj or- General II. W. Halijcok, Coinmanding United States Army. Ai.KXANDKiA, August 27, 1862—9.40 A.M. The town is quiet, although quite full of sol- diers, who are said to be chietly convalescents. The affiiirs of the quartermaster's department are reported as going on well. It is said that the Bull's Run bridge will be re- paired by to-morrow. The disembarkation of Sumner's corps commenced at Acquia yesterday afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappa- hannock Station earlier that way than from here. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General H. W. IIalleck, Commanding United States Army. On the same day I received the following : Washington, August 27, 1S62. Telegrams from General Porter to General Burn- side, just received, say that Banks is at Fayette- ville ; McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts near AVar- renton ; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction, to reenforce Pope. Noth- ing said of Ileintzelman. Porter reports a gen- eral battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied, as for as possible, by railroad. Perhaps you may pre- fer some other road than to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just telegraphed about sending out troops. Please see him, and give him your di- rections. There has been some serious neglect to guard the raih'oad, which should be immediately remedied. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. Major-General McClellan. I replied as follows : Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10 a.m. Telegram this moment received. I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to in- form me as to his means of transportation. Kearny was yesterday at Rappahannock Sta- tion ; Porter at Bealton, Kellip, Barnetts, etc. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to- day. Williams's Massachusetts cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day. I loaned Burnside my personal escort (one squadi'on Fourth regulars) to scout down Rappa- hannock. I have sent for Couch's division to come at once. As fast as I gain any information I will for- ward it, although you may already have it. G. B. "McClellan, Major-General. Major-Gen. II. W. IIalleck, Washington, D. C. I also received the following telegrams : Washington, August 27, 1S62. Direct General Casey to furnish you about five thousand of the new troops under his command. Take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria. Determine questions of priority in transporta- tion, and the places they shall occupy. Pope's headquarters are near AV^arrenton Junction, but I cannot ascertain the present position of his troop.s. II. W. IIalleck, General-in-ChJet Major-General McClellan. DOCUMENTS. 611 Washington, August 27, 1S02. I can get no satisfactorj'' information from the front, either of the enemy or of our troops. There seems to have been f^reat ne.i^lect and care- lessness about Manassa,s. Franklin's corps should march in that direction as soon as possible. A competent officer sliould be sent out to take di- rection of affiiirs in that vicinity. H. W. Hallkck. General-in-Chief. Major-G eneral McClem, a n. Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent the following telegram to Generals Heintzelman and Porter : Alexandria, August 27, 1362 — 10.30 a.m. Where are you, and what is state of alfairs — what troops in your front, right, and left ? Sum- ner is now landing at Acquia. Where is Pope's left, and what of enemy ? Enemy burned Bull Run bridge last night with cavalry force. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General IIeintzelmax, Warrenton. Major-General Poktek, Bealton. P. S. — If these General Officers are not at the places named, nearest operator will please have message forwarded. I alsp telegraphed to the General-in-Chief as follows : Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10.50 a.m. I have sent all the information I possess to Burnside, instructing him to look out well for his right flank, between the Rappaliannock and Potomac, and to send no trains to Porter without an escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed at Bull Run last night may trouble Burnside a little. I have sent to communicate with Porter and Heint- zelman, via Falmouth, and hope to give you some definite information in a few hours. I shall land the ne.xt cavalry I get hold of here, and send it out to keep open the commnnication between Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Ma- nassas. Please send me a number of copies of the best maps of present field of operations. 1 can use fifty (50) to advantage. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General IIalleck, Commanding United States Army. Alexandria, August 2T, 1862— 12..'50 a.m. In view of Burnside" s despatch, just received, would it not be advisable to throw tlie mass of Sumner's corps here, to move out with Franklin to Centreville or vicinity ? If a decisive battle is fought at AVarrenton, a disaster would leave any troops on Lower Rappahannock in a danger- ous position. They would do better service in front of Washington. G. B. McClellav, Major-General. Major-General Halleck, Washington, U. C. Alexandria, August 27, 1802 — 12.5 p.m. My aid has just returned from General Frank- lin's camp; reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that heavy firing has been heard this morning at Centreville, and have sent to ascertain the truth. I can find no cavalry to send out on the road.s. Are the works garrisoned and ready for defence ? G. I}. McI'licllan, Major-General. Major-General IIalleck, Washington. Ai.kxan'dhh, August 27, 1802—12.20 p.m. What bridges exist over Bull Run ? Have steps been taken to construct bridges for the ad- vance of troops to rcenforce Pope, or to enable him to retreat if in trouble? There should be two gunboats at Acquia Creek at once. Shall I pu.sh the rest of Sumner's corps here, or is Pope so strong as to be reasonably certain of success ? I have sent to inspect the works near here and their garrisons. As soon as I can find General Casej", or some other commanding officer. I will see to the rail- way, etc. It would be well to have them report to me, as I do not know where they are. I am trying to find them, and will lose no time in car- rying out 3'our orders. Would like to see Burn- side. G. B. McClellav, >L\ior-Ofneral. Major-General II. W. IIalleck, Washington. Alexandria, August 27, 1802 — 1.15 p.m. Franklin's artillery have no horses, except for (4) four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrange- ments for placing the works in front of Wash- ington in an efficient condition of defence ? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force be- tween Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front ? Should not Burnside take steps at once to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction ? I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley ? G. B. McClellan, Major-Genera' Major-General IIalleck, Washington. Alkxandria, August 27, 1802 — 1.35 p.m. I learn that Taylor's brigade, sent this morn- ing to Bull Run Bridge, is either cut to pieces or captured. That the force against them had many guns, and about (-jOOO) five thou.sand infantry, re- ceiving reenforcements every minute ; also, that Gainesville is in po.s.scssion of the enemy. Please send some cavalry out toward Drainsville, via Chain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville and Drains- ville, and go as f;ir as they can. If you will give me even one squadron of good cavalry here, I will ascertain the state of the case. I think our policy now is to make these works perfectly safe, C12 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possi- ble, but not to advance them until they can have their artilleiy and cavalry. I have sent for Col- onel Tvler to place his artillerymen in the works. Is Fort Marcy securely held ? 'G. B. McClkllan, General IIaLLECK. Jlajor-Genenil. Alkxanpria, Aucfiist 27, 1SG2— 2.30 p.m. Sumner has been ordered to .send here all of his corps that are within reach. Orders have been sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown with the least possible delay. But one squadron of my cavalry has arrived ; that will be disem- barked at once and sent to the front. If therq is any cavalry in Washington, it should be ordei-ed to report to me at once. I still think that we .should first provide for the immediate defence of Washington on both sides of the Potomac. I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, mdess I receive authority to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. Please inform me at once what mj'^ position is. I do not wish to act in the dark. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General H. W. Halleck, Commanding United States Army. Alexandria, August 27, 1S62 — 6 p..m. I have just received the copy of a despatch from General Pope to you, dated ten a.m. this morning, in which he says : 'AH forces now sent forward should be sent to my right at Gaines- ville.' I now have at my disposal here about (10.000) ten thousand men of Franklin's corps, about (2800) two thousand eight hundred of General Tyler's brigade, and Colonel Tyler's First Con- necticut artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for defence of Washington. If )'ou wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a mo- ment's notice to any point you may indicate. In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order General Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to move, but not to send them off until further orders. • G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General IT. W. IIalleck, Commanding United States Army. On the twenty-eighth I telegraphed as follows : IIkadquarters Camp ne^r Alexandria, ( August 28, 1802 — I.IO P.M. f General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not j-et in condition to move ; may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the ]y an I suggested. I have ordered troops to gar- rison the works at TTpton's Hill. They must be held at any cost. .\s soon as I can see the way to spare them, I will send a cor[)s of good troops there. It is the key to Washington, which can- not be seriously menaced as long as it is held. G. B McClellan, Major-General. Major-General IIalleck, Washington, D. C. I received the following from the General-in- Chief: Washington, August 2S, 1862. I think you had better place Sumner's corps as it arrives near the guns, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The principal thing to be feared now is a cav- alry raid into this city, especially in the night- time. Use Cox's and Tyler's brigade, and the new troops for the same object, if you need them. Porter writes to Burnside from Bristow, half- past nine a.m. 5^esterday, that Pope's forces were then moving on Manassas, and that Burnsidp would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. General Collum has gone to Harper's Ferry, and I have only a single regular officer for duty in the ofRce. Please send some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is taken at the forts against a raid ; also at the bridge. Please answer. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. Major-General McClellan. On the twenty-ninth the following despatch was telegraphed : Camp near Alkxandria, | August 29, 1862— lO.SO a.m. ( Franklin's corps is in motion ; started about (fi) six A.M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Up- ton's Hill, to hold that important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna, via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has (2) two squadrons of cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the engineer brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached, last night, two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and JIarcy. Meagher's brigade is still at Acquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washing- ton. Yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived ; have but (;3) three squadrons. Franklin has but (40) forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not tiiink Franklin is in con- dition to accomplish much if he meets with seri- ous resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainsville ? G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General PIalleck, Washington, D. C. To which the following is a reply : WA.>iniNt;Tos, August 29, 1862—12 m. Upton's Hill arrangement all risiht. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterdny. Fitz- DOCUMENTS. 613 Husrh Lee was, it is said on good authorit}', in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing from Drainsville. H. W. IIalleck, Major-General McClELLAN.I GeneraUn-Chief. On the same day the following was received from His Excellency, the President : AVashixgtos, August 29, 1S62— 2.30 p.m. What news from direction of Manassas Junc- tion ? What generally ? A. Lincoln. Major-General ^IcClellan. To which I replied as follows : Camp nkar Ai.EX.\NnRi.4, I August 29, 1S62— 2.45 p.m. ( The last news T received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy M'cre evacuating Ccntreville and re- tiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted : First, to concentrate all our available forces to open communications with Pope ; sec- ond, to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what ji'ou wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer. G. B. McCi>Er,i.AN, A. LiXCOr.N, Major-General. President, And copy to General Halleck. To which the following is a reply : Washington, August 29, 1S62 — 1.10 p.m. Yours of to-day just received. I think j'our first alternative, to wit, "to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope" is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General IIalleck, aided by your counsels. A. Lincoln. Major-General McClellan. It had been officially reported to me from Washington that the enemy, in strong force, was moving through Vienna in the direction of the Chain Bridge, and had a large force in Vienna. This report, in connection with the despatch of the General-in-Chief on the twenty-eighth, before noted, induced me to direct Franklin to halt his command near Anandale until it could be deter- mined, by rcconnoissances to Vienna and toward Manassas, whether these reports were true. Gen- eral Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry force from Upton's Hill toward Vienna and Drainsville in one direction, and toward Fairfax Court-House in the other, and Franklin to push [ his two squadrons as far toward Manassas as pos- i sible, in order to ascertain the true position of, the enemy. I With the enemy in force at Vienna, and toward Lewinsville, it would have been very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small force beyond Anandale. It must be renK'ml)ered that at that time we were cut off from direct communication with General Pope ; that the enemy was, by the la.st accounts, at Manas.sas in strong force, and that Franklin had only from ten thousand to eleven thousand men, with an entirely insuffi- cient force of cavahy and artillery. In order to represent this condition of affairs in its proper light to the General-in-Cliief, and to obtain definite instructions from him, I telegraph- ed as follows : Camp near Alexandria. | August 29, lSi;2— 12 m. f Have ordered most of the (1 '2th) Twelfth Penn- sylvania cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting duty toward Rockville, Poolsville, etc. If you apprehended a raid of cavahy on your side of river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sumner's to near Tcnallytown, where, with two or three old regiments in Forts Allen and Jlarcy, they can watch both Chain Bridge and Tenallytown. Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and Fort Cor- coran, whence they can either suppoi-t Cox, Frank- lin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytown ? Franklin has only between (10,000) ten thou- sand and (11,000) eleven thousand for duly. How far do you wish this force to advance? G. B. McGlki.i>an, ALijor-Gcneral. Major-General IIalleck, "Washington. Camp near Alexandria, | August 29, 1SG2— 1 p.m. | I anxiously await repl}' to my last despatch in regard to Sunnier. AVish to give the order at once. Please authoi-ize me to attach new regiments permanently to my old brigades. I can do mucli good to old and new troops in that way. I .shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcy, at least with strong advanced-guards. I wish to hold the line througii Prospect Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, includ- ing Franklin, who I really tln'nk ought not, under present circumstances, to advance l)eyond Anan- dale ? G. B. McCi,i:llan, M:yor-General. General IIalleck. On the .same day I received a despatch from the General-in-Chief, in which he asks me why T halt- ed Franklin in Anandale, to which I replied as follows : Camp NEAR Al.RXANDRIA, 1 August 29, 1S02— 10.30 a.m. ( By referring to my telegrams of half-past ten A.M., twelve M., and one p..ir., together with your reply of forty-eight minutes i)ast two p.m., you will'see why Franklin's corps halted at .\nandale. His small cavalry force, all I had to give him, was ordered to push on as far as possible toward Ma- nassas. 614 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. General Franklin remained here until about one P.M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to j'our orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Frank- lin's movements of to-morrow. I have sent to Colonel Ilaupt to push out construction and sup- ply-trains as soon as possible. "General Tyler to furni.sh the necessary guards. I have directed General Banks's supply-trains to start out to-night at least as fiir as Anandale, with an escort from General Tyler. In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me. G. B. McClell.^n, Major-General. Major-General PIalleck, Washington, D. 0. On the same evening I sent the following des- patches : Cajtp near Alkxandria, I August 2a, 1862—10 p.m. ) Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to General Franklin to place himself in communica- tion with General Pope as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope's sup- plies. Orders have been given for railway and wagon- trains to move to Pope with least possible delay. I am having inspections made of all the forts around the city by members of my staff^ with in- structions to give all requisite orders. I inspected Worth and Ward myself this even- ing ; found them in good order. Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable as to condition of works. (;. B. McClellam, Major-General. Major-Ciorieval IIai,i.i:ck, Washington. Camp nkak .^lfxasdria, 1 Au^tust 20, 1S02— 10 P.M. J Your despatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at six o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has aliout fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with two bat- teries of artillery. Men of two regiments, much fa- tigued, came in to-day. Tyler's brigade of three new regiments, but little drilled, is also here ; all tbcse troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all except Franklin's to await further orders. If you wish any of them to move toward Ma- nassas, please inform me. Colonel Wagner, Second New-York artillery, has just come in from the front. He reports strong infantry and cavahy force of rebels near Kan-fax Court-Iioiise. Reports rumors from vari- ous sources that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, ure at Manassas. » That the enemy, with one hundred and twenty thousand men, intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view of attack- ing Washington and Baltimore. General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of the line of fortifications on this side of the Potomac requires two thousand additional artillery men, and additional troops to defend in- tervals, according to circumstances ; at all events, he says an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain Bridge, and a few regiments distri- buted along the lines to give confidence to our new troops. I agree with him fully, and think our fortifications along the upper part of our line on this side the river very unsafe with their pre- sent garrisons, and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon those works. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. General H. W. Halleck, General-ia-Cliief United States Army, Wasliington, D. C Camp near Alexandria, August 30, LEXAXDRIA, I , 1862— 11.30 A.M. (■ Y'^our telegram of nine a.m. received. Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been en- deavoring to get transportation from the quarter- master at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been told that there was none disposable, and his com- mand marched without wagons. After the de- parture of his corps, he procured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition, by unloading Banks's supply train. General Sumner endeavored, by application upon the Quartermaster's department, to get wa- gons to carry his reserve ammunition, but with- out success, and was obliged to march with what he could carry in his cartridge-boxes. I have this morning directed that all my head- quarter wagons that are landed be at once load- ed with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin ; but they will not go far toward supplying the deficienc}'. Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermasters last night, loaded with subsist- ence, and sent forward at one a.m. with an es- cort via Anandale. Every effort has been made to carry out your orders promptly. The great difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. Such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermasters, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you. G. B. McClellan, Major-General IIaLLECK, Major-General General-in-Chief. On the morning of the thirtieth heavy artil- lery firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax Court-House, which I reported to the General-in- Chief. At eleven a.m. the following telegram waa sent : DOCUMENTS. 615 Camp kkab Alexandria, ) August 30, 1^62—11 A.M. f Have ordered Sumner to leave (1) one brigade in vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest via Cohiinbla pike on Anandale and Fairfax Court-llouse. Is this the route yoxx wish them to take ? He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly a» possible. Shall Couch move out also when he arrives ? G. B. McClellan, Miijor-General. Major-General Halleck, Washington. On the same day I received the following : Washington, August 30, 1862 — 1.45 p.m. Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be imniediatel}'' sent forward to Centreville for General Pope. It must be done with all pos- sible despatch. II. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. General McClellan. To which this reply was made : Camp near Alexandria, 1 August 30, 1S62— 2.10 p.m. f I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artil- lery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance offi- cer to load up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my headquarters wagons. You will have to see that wagons are sent from Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available wagon in Alexan- dria shall be loaded at once. The order to the brigade of Sumner that I di- rected to remain near Chain Bridge and Tenally- town should go from your headquarters to save time. I understand you to intend it also to move. I have no sharp-shooters except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and will now send them with the train as you direct. I will also send my only remain- mg squadron of cavalry with General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the army of the Potomac who is within my reach. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. Major-General H. W. Halleck. At half-past ten p.m. the following telegram was sent : Camp near Alexandria, ) August 30, 1S62— 10.30 p.m. ( I have sent to the front all my troops with the exception of Couch's division, and have given the orders necessary to insure its being disposed of as you directed. I hourly expect the return of one of my aids, who will give authentic news from the field of battle. I cannot express to you the pain and mortifi- cation I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully .ask that, if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more ; they will fight none the worse for my being with them, j If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be i)crmitted to share their fate on tlic field of battle. Please reply to this to-night. I have been engaged for the last few liours in doing what I can to make arrangements for the wounded. I have started out all the ambulances now landed. As I have sent my (Escort to the front, I would be glad to take some of Gregg's cavalry with me, if allowed to go. G. B. McClellan, Major-GeneraL Major-General H. W. ITalleck, Commanding United States Army, Wasliington, D. C. To which, on the following day, I received this answer : WAsaiNOTON, August 31, 1SG2— 9.1S a.m. I have just seen your telegram of five minutes past eleven last niglit. The substance was stated to me when received, but I did not know that you asked for a reply immediately. I cannot an- swer without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, by his orders, of the de- partment. I think Couch's division should go forward as rapidly as possible and find the battle-field. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chlef. Major-General McClellan. On the same day the following was received : Washington, August 81, 1SC2 — 12.4r) p.m. The subsistence department are making Fair- fax Station their principal depot. It should be well guarded. The officer in charge should be directed to secure the depot by abatis against cavalry. As many as possible of the new regi- ments should be prepared to take the field. Per- haps some more should be sent to the vicinity of Chain Bridge. H. W. Halleck, General-ia-Ohief. Major-General McOLellan. At half-past two p.m. the following despatch was telegraphed : Camp kbar Alexandria, ) August 31, 1S02— 2.30 p.m. J Major Haller is at Fairfax Station with my pro- vost and headquarters guard and other troops. I have requested (4) four more companies to be sent at once, and the precautions you direct to bo taken. Under the War Department order of yesterday I have no control over any thing except my staff, some one hundred men in my camp here, and the few remaining near Fort Monroe. I have no con- trol over the new regiments — do not know where they are, or any thing about them, except those near here. Their commanding officers and those of the works are not under me. Where I have seen evils existing under my eye I have corrected them. I think it is the business of General Casey to prepare the new regiments for the field, and a matter between him and Gen- eral Barnard to order others to the vicinity of 616 EEBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. Chain Bridge. Neither of them is under my command, and by the War Department order I have no right to give them orders. G. B; McClellan, Major-General. General IIalleck, "Washington. To vrhich the following is an answer : Washington, August 31, 1862— 10.7 p.m. Since receiving your despatch, relating to com- mand, I have not been able to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have not seen the order as published, but will write to you in the morn- ing. You will retain the command of every thing in this vicinity not temporarily belonging to Pope's army in the field. I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out. H. W. IIalleck, Oeneral-in-Chief. General McClellan. The order referred to in the preceding despatch was as follows : War Department, August 30, 1862. The following are the commanders of the ar- mies operating in Virginia ; General Burnside commands his own corps, except those that have been temporarily detached and assigned to General Pope. General McClellan commands that portion of the army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's command. General Pope commands the army of Virginia and all the forces temporarily attached to it. All the forces are under the command of Major-Gen- eral Halleck, General-in-Chief E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. I was informed by Colonel Townsend that the above was published by order of the Secretary of War. At half-past eleven p.m. I telegraphed the fol- lowing : Camp near Alexandria, ) August 31, 1862—11.30 p.m. j The squadron of Second regular cavalry that 1 sent with General Sumner was captured to-day about two P.M. some three miles from Fairfax Court-Housc, beyond it on the little River pike, by Fitz-ITugh Lee, with three thousand cavalry and three light batteries. I have conversed with the first sergeant, who says that when he last saw them they were with- in a mile of Fairfax. Pope had no troops on that road ; this squadron getting there by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right of Ccntre- villc but Sumner's corps. There was much ar- tillery firing during the day. A relicl major told the sergeant that the rebels had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the road is filled with wagons and stragglers coming toward Alexandria. It is clear from the sergeant's account that we were badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's right is entirely exposed. I recommend that no more of Coucli's division be sent to the front, that Burnside be brought here as soon as practicable, and that every thing available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, including the mass of the troops on the railroad. I apprehend that the enemy will, or have by this time occupied Fairfax Court-House and cut off Pope entirely, unless he falls back to-night via Sangster's and Fairfax Station. I think these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in the dispositions made as I gather them. To speak frankly — and the occa- sion requires it — there appears to be a total ab- sence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army. I have some cavalry here that can carry out any orders you may have to send. The occasion is grave, and demands grave measures. The question is, the salvation of the country. I learn that our loss j^esterday amounted to fifteen thousand. We cannot afford such losses without an object. It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that Pope should fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to bo lost. I will use all the cavalry I have to watch our right. Please answer at once. I feel confident that you can rely upon the information I give you. I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any orders you give me. G. B. McClellan, Major-General. General Halleck, Washington. To which this reply was received : Washington, September 1, 1862 — 1.30 a.m. Burnside was ordered up very early yesterday morning. Retain remainder of Couch's forces, and make arrangements to stop all retreating troops in line of works or where you can best establish an entire line of defence. My news from Pope was up to four p.m. ; he was then all right. I must wait for more definite information before I can order a retreat, as the foiling back on the line of works must necessarily be directed in case of a serious disaster. Give me all additional news that is reliable. I shall be up all night, and ready to act as cir- cumstances may require. I am fully aware of the gravity of the crisis, and have been for weeks. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. Major-General McClellan. FOURTH PERIOD. On the first of September I went into Wash- ington, where I had an interview with the Gen- eral-in-Chief, who instructed me, verbally, to take command of its defences, expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and prohibiting me from exercising any control over the troops actively engaged in front under General Pope. During this interview I suggest- ed to the General-in-Chief the necessity of his going in person, or sending one of his personal staff, to the army under General Pope, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of af- DOCUMENTS. 617 fairs ; he sent Colonel Kelton, his Assistant Ad- jutant-General. During the afternoon of the same day I receiv- ed a message from the General-in-Chief, to the effect that he desired me to go at once to his house to see the President. The President informed me that he had reason to believe that the army of the Potomac was not cheerfully cooperating with and supporting Gen- eral Pope; that he had "always been a friend of mine ;" and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. I replied, substantially, that I was con- fident that he was misinformed ; that I was sure, whatever estimate the army of the Potomac might entertain of General Pope, that they would obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty. The President, who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to "Fitz- John Porter, or some other of my friends," and try to do away with any feeling that might exist ; adding, that I could rectify the evil, and that no one else could. I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to Genei-al Porter, or do any thing else in my power to gratify his wishes and relieve his anxiety ; upon which he thanked me very warmly, assured me that he could never forget my action in the matter, etc., and left. I then wrote the following telegram to General Porter, which was sent to him by the General- in-Chief: Washington, September 1, 1S62. I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and the old army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cor- dial cooperation to General Pope, in all the oper- ations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful cooperation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Sa}' the same thing to my friends in the army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that, for their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me. I am in charge of the defences of Washington, and am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessar3^ Geo. B. McClellan. Major-General Pouter. To which he sent the following reply : Fairfax ConRT-HousE, 10 a.m., I September 2, 1SC2. f You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, Vo General Pope their cordial cooperation and con.stant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty. F, J. POKTER. General GEOiifiE P.. McClellan, Major-General Commanding, Washington. Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor at any other time, did I think for one moment that General Porter had been, or would be, in any manner derelict in the performance of his duty to the nation and its cause. Such an im- pression never entered my niind. The despatch in question was written purely at the request of the President. On the morning of the second the President and General Halieck came to my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front; that our all'airs were in a bad condition ; that the army was in full re- treat upon the defences of Washington ; the roads filled with straggler.s, etc. ■ He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the strag- glers ; to place the works in a proper state of de- fence, and to go out to meet and take command of the army, when it approached tlie vicinity of of the works, then to place the troops in the best position — committing every thing to my hands. I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and sent an aid to General Pope with the following letter : Headquarters, Washington, ( September 2, 1SC2. ( General : General Halieck instructed me to report to you the order he sent this morning to withdraw your army to Washington, without un- necessary delay. He feared that his messenger might miss you, and desired to take this double precaution. In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are already familiar, it would be best to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that it may occupy Hall's flill, etc. ; McDowell's, to Up- ton's Hill ; Franklin's, to the works in fi-orrt of Alexandria ; Heintzelman's, to the s.ame vicinity ; Couch, to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the Chain Bridge ; Sumner, either, to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most convenient. In haste, General, very truly yours, Geo. B. McClei.lan, Major-General United States Army. Major-General John Pope, Commanding Army of Viginia. In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the advance of McDowell's corp.s, and with it Gene- rals Pope and McDowell. After getting what in- formation I could from them, I sent the few aids at my disposal to the left to give instructions to the troops approaching in the direction of Alex- andria; and hearing artillery firing in the direction of the Vienna and Langiey road, by which the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel were return- ing, and learning from General Pope that Sum- ner was probably engaged, I went, with a single aid and three orderlies, by the shortest line to meet that cohmm. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sunmer's) would be able to reach its intended position with- out any serious molestation. I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sin'el the positions they were to occupy, sent in- structions to General Sumner, and at a late hour of the night returned to Washington. 618 REBELLION RECORD, 186^-63. Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rectifying the positions of the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary supphes, etc. I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any attack made by the enemy on the south side of the Potomac. On the third the enemy had disappeared from the front of AVashington, and the information which I received induced me to believe that he intended to cross the Upper Potomac into Mary- land. This materially changed the aspect of af- fairs, and enlarged the sphere of operations ; for, in case of a crossing in force, an active campaign would be necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland. I therefore, on the third, ordered the Second and Twelfth corps to Tenallytown, and the Ninth corps to a point on the Seventh street road near Washington, and sent such cavalry as was avail- able to the fords near Poolesville, to watch and Impede the enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. On September fifth, the Second and Twelfth corps were moved to Rockville, and Couch's divi- sion (the only one of the Fourth corps that had been brought from the Peninsula) to Offut's Oross-Roads. On the sixth, the First and Ninth corps were ordered to Leesburgh ; the Sixth corps, and Sykes's division of the Fifth corps, to Tenally- town. On the seventh, the Sixth corps was advanced to Rockville, to which place my headquarters were moved on the same day. All the necessary arrangements for the defence of the city, under the new condition of things, had been made, and General Banks was left in command, having received his instructions from me. It will be seen from what has preceded that I lost no time that could be avoided in moving the army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the ' support of the army of Virginia ; that I spared no effort to hasten the embarkation of the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News, and Yorktown, remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass of the army had sailed ; and that, after my ar- rival at Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone to forward supplies and reenforcements to General Pope. I sent, with the troops that moved, all the cavalry I could get hold of Even my personal escort was sent out upon the line of the railway as a guard, with the provost and camp-guards at headquarters, retaining less than one hundred men, many of whom were orderlies, invalids, members of bands, etc. All the head- quarters teams that arrived were sent out with supplies and ammunition, none being retained even to move the headquarters camp. The squadron that habitually served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth with General Burn- side, as he was deficient in cavalry. I left Washington on the seventh of >Septem- ber. At this time it was known that the mass of the rebel army had passed up the south side of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburgh, ;>nd that a portion of that army had crossed into Maryland ; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force with a view to turn Wash- ington by a flank movement down the north bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which, at that time, we had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the intentions of the ene- my obliged me, up to the thirteenth of Septem- ber, to march cautiously and to advance the army in such order as continually to keep Washington and Baltimore covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania ; or to return to the defence of AYashington, if, as was greatly feared by the authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood ready to seize the first favorable oppor- tunity to attack the capital. In the mean time the process of reorganization, rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of the Potomac, was rapidly progressing ; the troops were regaining confidence, and their former sol- dierly appearance and discipline were fast return- ing. My cavalry was pushed out continually in all directions, and all possible steps were taken to learn the positions and movements of the en- emy. The following table shows the movements of the army, from day to day, up to the fourteenth of September : (See page 619.) The right wing, consisting of the First and Ninth corps, under the command of Major-Gen- eral Burnside, moved on Frederick ; the First corps via Brooksville, Cooksville, and Ridgeville, and the Ninth corps via Damascus and New- Market. The Second and Twelfth corps, forming the centre, under the command of General Sumner, moved on Frederick ; the former via Clarksburgh and Urbana, the Twelfth corps on a lateral road between Urbana and New-Market, thus main- taining the communication with the right wing, and covering the direct road from Frederick to Washington. The Sixth corps, under the com- mand of General Franklin, moved to Buckeys- town via Darnestown, Dawsonvillc, and Barnes- ville, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a position to connect with and support the centre, should it have been necessary (as was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's division moved by the " river road," covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and support- ing the Sixth corps. The following extracts from telegrams, received by me after my departure from Washington, will show how little was known there about the ene- my's movements, and the fears which were en- DOCUMENTS. 619 tertained for the safety of the capital. On the ninth of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows : "Until wo can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Drainsville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping, too much, the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forcea and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this." September 4. September 6. September 9. September 10. BURNSIDB. Niath corps, Reno, Seventh street road . . . Upton Hill Leesburgh Bronkville First corps, Hooker, Leesburgh 8CMNKR. Twelfth corps, Williams, Tenallytown Rockville Damascus. Clarksburgh. Barnesville. Poolesville. Rockville. Second corps, Sumner, Tenallytown Rockville FRASKUN. Sixth corps, Franklin, Alex. Seminary Tenallytown Offut's Cross- Roads . . Tenallytown Mouth of Seneca Sykes's division, September H. September 12. September 13. September 14. BURNSIDB. Ninth corps, Reno, New-Market. Frederick Middleburgh South-Mountain. South-Mountain. First corps, Hooker., Ridgeville, New-Mar- ket, camp on the Monocacy, Ijamsville Cross-Roads Urbana SCUNEK. Twelfth corps, Williams Damascus Second corps, Sumner, Clarksburgh Frederick FRANKLIN. LickenwellCross-Road. Buckeystown. Sicksville Burkettsville. Urbana Again, on the eleventh of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows : " Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel ? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front; more troops can be spared from here." This despatch, as published by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the General-in-Chief, reads as follows : " Why not order forward Porter's corps or Sigel's ? If the main force of the enemy is in your front, more troops can be spared from here." I remark that. the original despatch, as re- ceived by me from the telegraph opeiator, is in the words quoted above, "/ thinlc the main force of the eneiny" etc. In accordance with this suggestion, I asked, on the same daj^ that all the troops that could be spared should at once be sent to reenforce me, but none came. On the twelfth I received the following tele- gram from his Excellenoy the President : " Gov- ernor Curtin telegraphs me: 'I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at WiUiams- port, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland.' " The President adds : "Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Mar- tinsburgh to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is re-crossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt." On the thirteenth General Halleck telegraphed as follows : "Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Wash- ington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over." Again, on the four- teenth, General Halleck telegraphed me that "scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are ex- posing your left and rear." Again, as late as the sixteenth, after we had the most positive evidence that Lee's entire army was in front of us, I received the following : War Departmekt, September 16, 1862—12.8 p.m. Yours of seven a.m. is this moment received. As you give me no information in regard to the position of your forces, except that at Sharps- burgh, of course I cannot advise. I think, how- ever, you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river ; I fear now more than ever that they will re-cross at 620 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-68. Harper's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject ; a heavy rain might prevent it. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. Major-General McClellaj*. The importance of moving with all due cau- tion, so as not to uncover the national capital until the enemy's position and plans were devel- oped, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me ; and as my troops extended from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to the Potomac, Avith the ex- treme left flank moving along that stream, and with strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard all the available fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it appears from the foregoing telegrams that the General-in-Chief was of a different opinion, and that my movements were, in his judgment, too precipitate, not only for the safety of Washing- ton, but also for the security of my left and rear. The precise nature of these dail3Mnj unctions against a precipitate advance may now be per- ceived. The General-in-Chief, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says: "In respect to General McClellan going too fast or too slow from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him. He has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. I thought General McClellan should keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry." As I can find no telegram from the General-in- Chief recommending me to keep my left flank nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe that when he gave this testimon}'^ he had forgot- ten the purport of the telegrams above quoted, and had also ceased to remember the fact, well known to him at the time, that my left, from the time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and my centre was continually in position to reenforce the left or right, as occasion might require. Had I advanced my left flank along the Potomac more rapidly than the other columns marched upon the roads to the right, I should have thrown that flank out of supporting distance of the other troops and greatly exposed it. And if I had marched the entire army in one column along the bank of the river instead of upon five different parallel roads, the column, with its trains, would have extended about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated the advance before the rear could have reached the scene of action. Moreover, such a movement would have uncovered the communications with Baltimore and Washington on our right, and ex- posed our right and rear. I presume it will be admitted by every military man that it was ne- cessary to move the army in such order that it could at any time be concentrated for battle ; and I am of opinion that this object could not have been accomplished in any other way than the one employed. Any other disposition of our forces would have subjected them to defeat in detached fragments. On the tenth of September I received from my scouts information which rendered it quite proba- ble that General Lee's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, but whether his intention was to move toward Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not then known. On the eleventh, I ordered Gene- ral BuiTiside to push a strong reconnoissance across the National road and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, toward New-Market, and, if he learned that the enemy had moved toward Ha- gerstown, to press on rapidly to Frederick, keep- ing his troops constantly ready to meet the ene- my in force. A corresponding movement of all the troops in the centre and on the left was or- dered in the direction of Urbana and Poolesville. On the twelfth, a portion of the right wing en- tered Frederick, after a brief skirmish at the out- skirts of the city and in the streets. On the thirteenth, the main bodies of the right wing and centre passed through Frederick. It was soon ascertained that the main body of the enemy's forces had marched out of the city on the two previous days, taking the roads to Boons- boro and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering it necessary to force the passes through the Catoc- tin and South-Mountain ridges, and gain posses- sion of Boonsboro and Rohrersville before any relief could be extended to Colonel Miles at Har- per's Ferry. On the thirteenth, an order fell into my hands, issued by General Lee, which fully disclosed his plans, and I immediately gave orders for a rapid and vigorous forward movement. The following is a copy of the order referred to: SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 119. HEADqnARTERS ArMT of NORTnERS TlEQINIi, ( September 9, 1862. f The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Jlagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after pass- ing Middletown, with such portion as he may se- lect, take the route toward Sharpsburgh, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday night take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburgh, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as Boonsboro, where it will halt with the reserve, supply and baggage trains of the army. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen- eral Longstreet; on reaching Middletown, he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Marylaml Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. DOCUMENTS. 621 General Walker, with his division, after accom- plishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Ijovettsville, take possession of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Fiiday morn- ing ; Ke3-s's Ford on his left, and the road be- tween the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co6p- erate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. General 1). H. Hill's division will form the rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main bod3\ The reserve artillery, ord- nance and supply trains, etc., will precede Gene- ral Hill. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cav- alry to accompany the commands of General Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have been left behind. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro or Hagers- town. Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to pro- cure wood, etc. By command of General R. E. Lee. R. H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant-General. f Major-Gcneral D. H. Hill, Commanding Division. In the report of a militarj^ commission, of which Major- General 1). Hunter was President, which convened at ^Vashington for the purpose of in- vestigating the conduct of certain officers in con- nection with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, I tind the following : " The commission has remarked freely on Colo- nel Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot, from any motives of delicacy, refrain from censvu'ing those in high command when it thinks such cen- Euae deserved. " The General-ia-Chief has testified that General McClellan, after having received orders to repel tlic enemy invading the State of Maryland, march- ed only six miles per day, on an average, when pursuing this invading army. "The General-in-Chief also testifies that, in his opinion, he could and should liave relieved and protected Harper s Ferry, and in this opinion the commission fully concur." I have been greatly surprised that this com- mission, in its investigations, never called upon me, nor upon any officer of my staff, nor, so far as I know, upon any officer of the army of the Potomac able to give an intelligent statement of the movements of that army. But another para- graph in the same report makes testimony from such sources quite superfluous. It is as follows: "By a reference to the evidence it will be seen that at the vei-y moment Colonel F'ord abandoned Sup. Doc. 40 Maryland Heights, his little army was in reality relieved by Generals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap, within seven miles of his ])osition." The corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner were a part of the army wliich I at that time had the honor to connnand, and they were acting un- der my orders at Crampton's Gap and elsewhere ; and if, as the commission states. Colonel Ford's "httle army was in reality relieved" by those officers, it was relieved by me. I had, on the morning of the tenth, sent the following despatch in relation to the command at Harper's Ferry : Camp near Rocrville, ) September 10, 1802—9.45 a.m. ) Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand, with nine thousand troop.s. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me by the most practicable route. George B. McCi.ellan, MaJor-GeneraL Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. To this I received the following reply : There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present; his only chance is to defend his works till you can open communication with him. II. W. Halleck, Geokge B. McClellan, Major-General. It seems necessary, for a distinct understand- ing of this matter, to state that I was directed on the twelfth to assume command of the garrison of Harper's Ferry as soon as I should open com- munications with that place, and that when I re- ceived this order all communication from the di- I'ection in which I was approaching was cut off. Up to that time, however, Colonel Miles could, in my opinion, have marched his coimnand into Pennsylvania, by crossing tiie Potomac at AVil- liamsport or above ; and this opinion was con- firmed by the fact that Colonel Davis marched the cavahy part of Colonel Miles's command from Harper's Ferry on the fourteenth, taking the main road to Ilagerstown, and he encountered no ene my except a small picket near the mouth of the Antietam. Before I left AYashington, and when there cer- tainly could have been no enemy to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Colonel Miles, I re- commended to the proper authorities that the garrison of Harper's Fei'ry should be withdrawn via Ilagerstown, to aid in covering the Cumber- land Valley ; or that, taking )ip the pontoon-liridgo and obstructing the railroad bridge, it siiould fall back to the Maryland Heights, and there hold out to the last. In this position it ought to have maintained itself for many days. It was not deemed proper to adopt either of these suggestions, and when the matter was left to my discretion it was too late for me to do any thing but endeavoi lO re- lieve the garrison. I accordingly directed artil- lery to be lired by our advance at frecjucnt inter- &22 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. vals as a signal that relief was at hand. This was done, and, as I afterward learned, the reports of the cannon were distinctly heard at Harper's Ferr}-. It was confidently expected that Colonel Miles would hold out until we had carried the mountain passes, and were in condition to send a detachment to his relief The left was there- fore ordered to move through Crampton's Pass in front of Burkettsville, while the centre and right marched upon Turner's Pass in front of Middletown. It may be asked by those who are not ac- quainted M'ith tlie topography of the country in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, why Franklin, in- stead of marching his column over the circuitous road from Jefferson via Burkettsville and Browns- ville, was not ordered to move along the direct turnpike to Knoxville, and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. It was for the reason that I had received in- formation that the enemy were anticipating our approach in that direction, and had established batteries on the south side of the Potomac which commanded all the approaches to Knoxville ; moreover the road from that point winds directly along the river bank at the foot of a precipitous mountain, where there was no opportunity of forming in line of battle, and where the enemy could have placed batteries on both sides of the river to enfilade our narrow approaching col- umns. The approach through Crampton's Pass, which debouches into Pleasant Valley in rear of Mary- land Heights, was the only one which afforded any reasonable prospect of carrying that formi- dable position ; at the same time, the troops upon that road were in better relation to the main body of our forces. On the morning of the fourteenth a verbal message reached me from Colonel Miles, which was the first authentic intelligence I had received »s to the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The messenger informed me that on the preced- ing afternoon Maryland Heights had been aban- doned by our troops after repelling an attack of the rebels, and that Colonel Miles's entire force was concentrated at Harper's Ferry, the Mary- land, Loudon, and Bolivar Heights having been abandoned by him, and occupied by the enemy. The messenger also stated that there was no ap- parent reason for the abandonment of the Mary- land Heights, and that Colonel Miles instructed him to say that he could hold out with certainty two days longer. I directed him to make his way back, if pos- sible, with the information that I was approach- ing rapidly, and felt confident I could reheve the place. On the same afternoon I wrote the following letter to Colonel Miles, and despatched three copies by three different couriers on different routes. I did not, however, learn that any of these men succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry : Middletown, September 14, 1862. Colonel : The army is being rapidly concen- trated here. We are now attacking the pass on the Hagcrstown road over the Blue Ridge. A col- umn is about attacking the Burkettsville and Boonsboro Pass. You may count on our mak- ing every effort to relieve you. You may rely upon my speedily accomplishing that object. Hold out to the last extremity. If it is possible, reoccupy the Maryland Heights with your whole- force, if you can do that, I will certainly be able to relieve you. As the Catoctin Valley' is in our possession, you can safely cross the river at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as opposition on this side of the river is concerned. Hold out to the last. George B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Colonel D. S. Miles. On the previous day I had sent General Frank- lin the following instructions : Headquarters Army or the Potomac, | CAifP NEAR Frederick, v September 13, 1862— 6.20 p.m. j General : I have now full information as to movements and intentions of the enemy. Jack- son has crossed the Upper Potomac to capture the garrison at Martinsburgh and cut off Miles's retreat toward the West. A division on the south side of the Potomac was to carry Loudon Heights and cut off his retreat in that direction. McLaws with his own command and the division of R. 11. Anderson was to move by Boonsboro and Rohrersville to cany the Maryland Heights. The signal officers inform me that he is now in Pleasant Valley. The firing shows that Miles still holds out. Longstrcet was to move to Boonsboro, and there halt with the reserve corps ; D. H. Hill to form the rear-guard ; Stu- art's cavalry to bring up stragglers, etc. We have cleared out all the cavalry this side of the mountains and north of us.. The last I heard from Plcasanton he occupied Middletown, after several sharp skirmishes. A division of Burn- side's command started several hours ago to sup- port him. The M'hole of Burnside's command, including Hooker's corps, march this evening and early to-morrow morning, followed by the corps of Sumner and Bank.s, and Sykes's divi- sion, upon Boonsboro to carry that position. Couch has been ordered to concentrate his divi- sion and join you as rapidly as possible. With- out waiting for the whole of that division to join, you will move at daj-break in the morning by JelTerson and Burkettsville upon the road to Rohrersville. I have reliable information that the mountain pass by this road is practicable for artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occu- pied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as practicable, and debouch upon Rohrersville in order to cut off the retreat of or destroy Mc- Lavv's command. If you find this pass held by the enemy in large force, make all your disposi- tions for the attack and commence it about half an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown Pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture Mc- Laws's command and relieve Colonel Miles. If DOCUMENTS. 62d you efTcct this, yon will order him to join yovi at once with all his disposable troops, first destroy- ing the bridges over the Potomac, if not already done, and, leaving a sufficient garrison to pre- vent the enemy from passing the ford, you will then return by Rohrcrsville on the direct road to Boonsboro, if the main column has not suc- ceeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the road to Rohrcrsville, to Sharpsburgh and Williamsport, in order either to cut off the re- treat of Ilill and Longstreet toward the Potomac, or prevent the repassage of Jackson. ^ly gen- eral idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail. I believe I have sufiiciently explained my intentions. I ask of you, at this impoi-tant moment, all your intellect and the utmost activ- ity that a general can exercise. Georoe B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Major-Ocneral W. B. Franklin, Commanding Sixth Corps. Again on the fourteenth, I sent him the fol- lowing : Headquarters Armt o? tub Potomac, J Khederick, September 14, 1S62— 2 P.M. j Your despatch of half-past twelve just received. Send back to hurry up Couch. Mass your troops and carry Burkettsville at any cost. VV^e shall have strong opposition at both passes. As fast as the troops come up I will hold a reserve in readiness to support you. If j-ou find the enemy in very great force at any of these passes let me know at once, and amuse them as best 3'ou can so as to retain them there. In that event I Mill proVjably throw the mass of the army on the pass in front of here. If I carry that, it will clear the way for you, and you must follow the enemy as rapidly as possible. Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding. Major-General Franklin. General Franklin pushed his corps rapidly for- ward toward Crampton's Pass, and at about twelve o'clock on the fourteenth arrived at Bin-- kettsville, immediately in rear of which he found the enemy's infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, with artillery in strong posi- tions to defend the approaches to the Pass. Slo- cum's division was formed upon the right of the road leading through the Gap, and Smith's upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's andTorbett's brigades, supported by Newton, whose activity was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemj^ were driven from their position at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, steadily forced back up the slope until they reached the position of their battery on the road, well up tlie mountain. There they made a stand. They were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery in echelon until, after an action of three hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy hastily fled down the mountain on the other side. On the left of the road, Brooks's and Irvin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the pro- tection of Slocum's flank, charged up the moun- tain in the same steady manner, driving the enemy before them until the crest was carried Four hundred prisoners from seventeen diticrent organization.s, seven hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three colors, were captured by our troops in this brilliant action. It was conducted by General Franklin in all its details. These details are given in a report of General Franklin, herewith submitted, and due credit awarded to the gallant otllcers and men engaged. The loss in General Franklin's corps was one hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and six- teen wounded, and two missing. Tlie enemy's loss was about the same. The enemy's position was such that our artillery could not be used with any effect. The close of the action found General Franklin's advance in Pleasant Valley on the night of the fourteenth, within three and a half miles of the Point on Maryland Heights where lie might, on the same night or on the morning of the fifteenth, have formed a junc- tion with the garrison of Harper's Ferry had it not been previously wilhdi-awn from Maryland Heights, and within six miles of Harper's Ferry. On the night of the fourteenth the following despatch was sent to General Franklin : Bolivar, September 15—1 a.il General: ....... The Commanding General directs that you oc- cupy, with your command, the road from Rohrcrg- ville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sufficient force at Rohrensville to hold that po.sition in case it should be attacked by the enemy from Boons- boro. Endeavor to open communication with Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking and destroying such of the enem}' as, you may find in Pleasant Valley. Should you succeed in open- ing communication with Colonel Miles, direct him to join you with his whole command, with all the guns and public property that he can carry with him. The remainder of the guns will be spiked or destroyed ; the rest of the public property will also be destroyed. You will then proceed to Boonsboro, which place the Com- manding General intends to attack to morrow, and join the main body of the army at that place ; should you find, however, that the enemy have retreated from Boonsboro toward Sharpsburgh, you will endeavor to fall upon him and cut off his retreat. By command of Major-General McClellan. George D. RL(;GLi:i<, Colonel and Aid-dc-Campt General Franklin. On the fifteenth, the following were received from General Franklin : At thb foot of In Pleasant Vallet, three Si Mount Pi.basant, ) Mtl.KS KKOM KollllERSTILLK, V uptemberlS — S.SOa.m. ) General: My command started at daylight this morning, and I am waiting to have it closed up here. General Couch arrived about ten o'clock last night. I have ordered one of hia brigades and one battery to Rohrcrsville or to the strongest point in its vicinity. 'J'he enemy is di-awn up in line of battle about two miles to 624 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. our front, one brigade in sight. As soon as I am sure that Kohrersville is occupied I shall move forward to attack the enemy. This may be two hours from now. If Harper's Ferry has fallen — and the cessation of firing makes me fear that it has — it is my opinion that I should be strongly reenforced. W. B. Franklin, Major-General, Commanding Corps. General G. B. McClellan. September 15 — 11 a.m. Genehal : I have received your despatch by Captain O'Keefe. The enemy is in large force in my front, in two lines of battle stretching across the valley, and a large column of artillery and infantry on the right of the valley looking toward Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me two to one. It will of course not answer to pur- sue the enemy under these circumstances. I shall communicate with Burnside as soon as pos- sible. In the mean time I shall wait here until I learn what is the prospect of reenforccment. I have not the force to justify an attack on the force I see in front. I have had a very close view of it, and its position is very strong. Respectfully, W. B. Fkanklin, Major-General. General G. B. McClellan, Commanding. Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at eight A.M. on the fifteenth, as the cessation of the firing indicated, and General Franklin was order- ed to remain where he was to watch the large force in front of him, and protect our left and rear until the night of the sixteenth, when he was ordered to join the main bod_v of the army at Keedysville, after sending Couch's division to Maryland Heights. While the events which have just been described were taking place at Crampton's Gap, the troops of the centre and right wing, which had united at Frederick on the thirteenth, were engaged in the contest for the possession of Turner's Gap. On the morning of the thirteenth. General Pleasanton was ordei'cd to send McReynolds's brigade and a section of artillery in the direction of Gettj'sburgh, and Rush's regiment toward Jef- ferson to communicate with Franklin, to whom the Sixth United States cavalry and a section of artillery had prcviou.sly been sent, and to pro- ceed with the remainder of his force in the direc- tion of Middlctown in pin-suit of the enemy. After skirmishing with the enemy all the morning, and driving them from several strong positions, he reached Turner's Gap of the South- Mountain in the afternoon, and found the enemy in force and apparently determined to defend the Pass. He sent back for infantry to General Burnside, who had been directed to support him, and proceeded to make a reconnoissance of the position. The South-Mountain is at this point about one thousand feet in height, and its general direction is from north-east to south-west. The national road from Frederick to llagerstown crosses it nearly at right angles through Turner's Gap, a depression which is some four hundred feet in depth. The mountain on the north side of the turn- pike is divided into two crests, or ridges, by a narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the north. There are two country roads, one to the right of the turnpike and the other to the left, which give access to the crests overlooking the main road. The one on the left, culled the "Old Sharpsburgh road," is nearly parallel to and about half a mile distant from the turnpike, until it reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the left. The other road, called the " Old llagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the mountains about a mile from the turnpike, and bending to the left over and along the first crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pass. On the night of the thirteenth, the positions of the different corps were as follows : Reno's corps at Middletown, except Rodman's division at Frederick. Hookei*'s corps on the Monocacy, two miles from Frederick. Sumner's corps near Frederick. Banks's corps near Frederick. Sykes's division near Frederick. Franklin's corps at Buckeystown. Couch's division at Licksville. The orders from headquarters for the march on the fourteenth were as follows : Thirteenth, half-past eleven p.m. — Hooker to march at daylight to Middletown. Thirteenth, half-past eleven p.m. — Sykcstomove at six A.M. after Hooker, on the Middletown and llagerstown road. Fourteenth, one a.m. — Artillery reserve to fol- low S3'kes closeh^ Thirteenth, forty -five minutes past eight p.m. — Turner to move at seven a.m. Fourteenth, nine a.m. — Sumner ordered to take the Shookstown road to Middletown. Thirteenth, fort3--five minutes past six p.m. — Couch ordered to move to JcfTerson with his whole division. On the fourteenth, General Pleasanton contin- ued his reconnoissance. Gibson's battery and af- terward Benjamin's battery (of Reno's corps) were placed on high ground to the left of the turnpike, and obtained a direct fire on the enemy's position in the gap. General Cox's division, which had been order- ed up to support General Pleasanton, left its bivouac, near Middlctown, at six a.m. The First brigade reached the scene of action about nine a.m., and was sent up the old Sliarpsburgli road by General Pleasanton to feel the enemy and as- certain if he held the crest on that side in strong force. This was soon found to be the caso ; and General Cox having arrived with the other bri- gade, and information having been received from General Reno that the column would be support- ed by the whole corps, the division was ordered to assault the position. Two twenty-pounder DOCUMENTS. 625 Parrotts of Simmons's battery and two sections of McMullan's battery were left in the rear in posi- tion near the turnpike, where they did good ser- vice during the day against the enemy's batteries in the gap. Colonel Scanimon's brigade was de- ployed, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved up the slope to the left of the road with the ob- ject of turning the enemy's right, if possible. It succeeded in gaining the crest and establishing itself there, in spite of the vigorous efforts of the enem}-, who was posted behind stone walls and in the edges of timber, and the fire of a battery which poured in canister and case-shot on the regiment on the right of the brigade. Colonel Crooke's brigade marched in columns at support- ing distance. A section of McMullan's batter}^ under Lieutenant Croome, (Idlled while seiwmg one of his guns,) was moved up with great diffi- culty, and opened with canister at very short range on the enemy's infantry, by whom (after having done considerable execution) it was soon silenced and forced to withdraw. One regiment of Crooke's brigade was now de- ployed on Scammon's left, and the other two in his rear, and they several times entered the first line and relieved the regiments in front of them when hard pressed. A section of Sumner's bat- tery was brought up and placed in the open space in the woods, where it did good service during the rest of the da}''. The enemy several times attempted to retake the crest, advancing with boldness, but were each time repulsed. They then withdrew their battery to a point more to the right, and formed columns on both our flanks. It was now about noon, and a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about two hours, during which the rest of the corps was coming up. General Wilcox's division was the first to arrive. When he reached the base of the mountain. General Cox advised him to consult General Pleasanton as to a position. The latter indicated that on the right, afterward taken up by General Hooker. General Wilcox was in the act of moving to occiipy this ground, when he received an order from General Reno to move up the old Sharpsburgh road and take a position to its right, overlooking the turnpike. Two regiments were detached to support General Cox, at his request. One section of Cook's battery was placed in po- sition near the turn of the road, (on the crest,) and opened fire on the enemy's batteries across the gap. The division was proceeding to deploy to the right of the road, when the enemy sudden- ly opened (at one hundred and fift}^ yards) with a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, drove olf Cook's cannoneers with their limbers, and caused a temporary panic, in which the guns were nearly lost. But the Seventy-ninth New- York and Seventeenth Michigan promptly rallied, changed front under a heavy fire, and moved out to protect the guns with which Captain Cook had remained. Order was soon restored, and the di- vision formed in line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed as nnichas possible under the hill- side until the whole line advanced. It was exposed not only to the fire of the battery in front, but also to that of the batteries on the other side of the turnpike, and lost heavily. Shortly before this time Generals Burnsideand Reno arrived at the base of the mountain ; and the former directed the latter to move up the di- visions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Wilcox, and to move upon tlie enemy's position with his whole force as soon as he was informed that (Jeneral Hooker (who had just been directed to attack on tlie right) was well advanced up the mountain. General Reno then went to the front and as- sumed the direction of affairs, the positions hav- ing been explained to him by General Pleasanton. Shortly before this time I arrived at the point oc- cupied by General Burnside, and my headquar- ters were located thereuntil the conclusion of the action. General Sturgis had left his camp at one P.M., and reached the scene of action about half- past three p.m. Clark's battery, of his division, was sent to assist Cox's left, by order of General Reno, and two regiments (Second Maryland and Sixth New-Hampshire) were detached by General Reno and sent forward a short distance on the left of the turnpike. His division was formed in rear of Wilcox's, and Rodman's division was di- vided ; Colonel Fairchilds's brigade being placed on the extreme left, and Colonel llarland's, under General Rodman's personal supervision, on the right. My order to move the whole lino forward and take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was executed with enthusiasm. The enemy made a desperate resistance, charging our advancing lines with fierceness, but they were everywhere routed and fled. Our chief loss was in Wilco.x's division. The enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge and beyond the reach of our infantry ; but its po- sition was made untenable, and it was hastily re- moved and not again put in position near us. But the batteries across the gap still kept up a fire of shot and shell. General Wilcox praises very highly the conduct of the Seventeenth Michigan in this advance — a regiment which had been organized scai'cely a month, but which charged the advancing enemy in flank in a manner worthy of veteran troops ; and also that of the Forty-fifth Pennsylvania, which bravely met them in front. Cook's battery now reopened fire. Sturgis's division was moved to the front of WIIco.k's, oc- cupying the new ground gained on the further side of the slope, and his artillery opened on the batteries across the gap. The enemy made an effort to turn our left about dark, but were re- pulsed by Fairchilds's brigade and Clark's battery. At about seven o'clock the enemy made an- other effort to regain the lost ground, attacking along Sturgi-s's front and part of Co.x's. A lively fire was kept up until ncai-ly nine o'clock, several charges being made by the enemy and repulsed with slaughter, and we finally occupied the high- est part of the mountain. General Reno was killed just before sunset, while making a rcconnoissancc to the front, and 626 REBELLION RECORD, 1862-63. the cominarul of the corps devolved upon Gen- eral Cox. In General Reno the nation lost one of its best general officers. He was a skilful soldier, a brave and honest man. Tliei'c was no firing after ten o'clock, and the troops slept on their arms ready to renew the fight at daylight ; but the enemy quietly retired from our front during the night, abandoning their wounded, and leaving their dead in large numbers .scattered over the field. While these operations were progressing on the left of the main column, the right under General Hooker was actively en- gaged. His corps left the Monocacy early in the morning, and its advance reached the Catoctin Creek about one p.m. General Hooker then went forward to examine the ground. At about one o'clock General Meade's division was ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno. The following is the order sent : September 14 — 1 p.m. General : General Reno requests that a divi- sion of 3^ours may move up on the right (north) of the main road. General McClellan desires you to comply with this request, holding your whole corps in readiness to support the move- ment, and taking charge of it yourself. Sumner's and Banks's corps have commenced arriving. Let General McClellan be informed as soon as you commence your movement. Georce D. Ruggles, Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Aid-de-Camp. Major-General Hooker. Meade's division left Catoctin Creek about two o'clock, and turned off to the right from the main road on the old Hagerstown road to Mount Tabor church, where General Hooker was, and deploy- ed a short distance in advance, its right resting about one and a half mile from the turnpike. The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on the mountain side, but did no considerable damage. Cooper's battery B, First Pennsylvania artillery, was placed in position on high ground at about half-past three o'clock, and fired at the enemy on the slope, but soon ceased by order of General Hooker, and the position of our lines prevented any further use of artillery by us on this part of the field. The First Massachusetts cavalry was sent up the valley to the right to observe the movements, if any, of the enemy in that direc- tion, and one regiment of Meade's division was posted to watch the road coming in the same direc- tion. The other divisions were deployed as they came up. General Hatch's on the left, and Gen- eral Ricketts's, which arrived at five p.m., in the rear. General Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's division by General Burnside, for the purpose of making a demonstration on the enemy's centre, up the main road, as soon as the moveuients on the right and left had sufficiently progressed. The First Pennsylvania Rifles of General Seymour's brigade were sent forward as skirmishers to feel the enemy, and it was found that he ^^as in force. Meade was then directed to advat\ce his division to the right of the road, 80 as to outflank them if possible, and then to move forward and attack, while Hatch was di- rected to take with his division the crest on the left of the old Hagerstown road, Ricketts's divi- sion being held in reserve. Seymolir's brigade was sent up to the top of the slope, on the right of the ravine, through which the road runs ; and then moved along the summit parallel to the road, while Colonel Gallagher's and Colonel Magilton's brigades moved in the same direction along the slope and in the ravine. The ground was of the most difficult character for the movement of troops, the hillside being very steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone walls and timber. The enemy was very soon encountered, and in a short time the action be- came general along the whole front of the divi- sion. The line advanced steadily up the mount- ain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, from which he was gradually dislodged. During this advance Colonel Gal- lagher, Commanding Third brigade, was severely wounded ; and the command devolved upon Lieu- tenant-Colonel Robert Anderson. General Meade having reason to believe that the enemy were attempting to outflank him on his right, applied to General Hooker for reen- forcements. General Duryea's brigade of Rick- etts's division was ordered up, but it did not arrive until the close of the action. It was ad- vanced on Seymour's left, but only one regiment could open fire before the enemy retired and darkness intervened. General Meade speaks highly of General Sey- mour's skill in handling his brigade on the ex- treme right, securing by his manoeuvres the great ,. object of the movement, the outflanking of the enemy. While General Meade was gallantly driving the enemy on the right, General Hatch's division was engaged in a severe contest for the posses- sion of the crest on the left of the i-avine ; it moved up the mountain in the following order : two regiments of General Patrick's brigade de- ployed as .skirmishers, with the other two regi- ments of the same brigade supporting them. Colonel Phelps's brigade in line of battalions in mass at deploying distance, General Doubleday's brigade in the same order bringing up the rear. The Twenty- first New-York having gone straight up the slope instead of around to the right, as directed, the Second United States sharp-shooters was sent out in its place. Phelps's and Double- day's brigades were deployed in turn as they reached the woods, which began about half up the mountain. General Pati'ick with his skir- mishers soon drew the fire of the enemy, and found him strongly posted behind a fence which _- bounded the cleared space on the top of the ;■ ridge, having on his front the woods through ^ which our line was advancing, and in his rear a corn-field full of rocky ledges, which afforded good cover to fall back to if dislodged. Phelps's brigade gallantly advanced, under a hot fire, to close quarters, and after ten or fifteen minutes of heavy firing on both sides (in which General Hatch was wounded while urging on his DOCUMENTS. 627 men) the fence was carried by a charsrc, and our line advanced a few yards beyond it, somewhat sheltered by the slope of the hill. Doublcday's brigade, now under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Iloflman, (Colonel Wain- wright having been wounded,) relieved Phcl])S, and continued firing for an hour and a half; the enemy behind ledges of rocks, some thirty or forty paces in our front, making a stubborn resistance, and attempting to charge on the least cessation of our fire. About dusk Colonel Christian's bri- gade of Ricketts's division came up and relieved Doubleday's brigade, which fell back into line behind Phelps's. Christian's brigade continued the action for thirty or forty minutes, when the enemy retired, after having made an attempt to flank us on the left, which was repulsed by the Seventy-fifth New-York and Seventh Indiana. The remaining brigade of Ricketts's division (General Hartsutf's) was moved up in the centre, and connected Meade's left with Doublcday's right. We now had possession of the summit of the first ridge which commanded the turnpike on both sides of the mountain, and the troops were ordered to hold their positions until further orders, and slept on their arms. Late in the afternoon General Gibbon, with his brigade and one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, Fourth ar- tillery,) was ordered to move up the main road on the enemj^'s centre. He advanced a regiment on each side of the road, preceded by skirmishers, and followed by the other two regiments in double column ; the artillery moving on the road until within range of the enemy's guns, which were firing; on the column from the gorge. The brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy from his positions in the woods and be- hind stone walls, until they reached a point well up toward the top of the pass, when the enemy, having been reenforced by three regiments, opened a heavy fire on the front and on both flanks. The fight continued until nine o'clock, the^enemy being entirely repulsed ; and the bri- gade, after having suffered severely, and having expended all its ammunition, including even the cartridges of the dead and wounded, continued to hold the ground it had so gallantly won until twelve o'clock, when it was relieved by General Gorman's brigade of Sedgwick's division, Sum- ner's corps, (except the Sixth Wisconsin, which remained on the field all night.) General Gib- bon, in this- delicate movement, handled his bri- gade with as much precision and coolness as if upon parade, and the bravery of his troops could not be excelled. The Second corps (Sumnei^'s) and the Twelfth corps (Williams'.s) reached their final positions shortly after dark. General Richardson's divi- sion was placed near Mount Tabor church, in a position to support our right, if necessary ; the Twelfth corps and Sedgwick's division bivouack- ed around Bolivar, in a position to support our centre and left. General Sykes's division of regulars and the artilery reserve halted for the night at Miildle- town. Thus, on the night of the fourteenth the whole army was massed in the vicinity of the field of battle, in rct^liness to renew the action the next day, or to move in jnirsuit of the ene- my. At daylight our skirmishers were advanc- ed, and it was found that he had retieated dur- ing the night, leaving his dead on the field, and his wounded uncared for. About one thousand five hundred prisoners were taken by us during the battle, and the \o•:■>^ to the enemy in killed was much gniater than our own, and, probably, also in wounded. It i;5 be- lieved that the force opposed to us on Turner's Gap consisted of D. H. Hill's corps, (fifteen thou- sand,) and a part, if not the wliole, of Long- street's, and perhaps a portion of Jackson's, pro- l)ably some thirty thousand in all. We went into action with about thitty thou- sand men, and our losses amounted to one thou- sand five hundred and sixty-eight aggregate, (three hundred and twelve killed, one thousand two hundred and thirty-four wounded, and twen- ty-two missing.) On the next day I had the honor to receive the following very kind despatch from His Excellency the President : War DErARTMEST, Washisgtok, I September, 15, lsC'2— 2.4r) r.M. ( Your despatch of to-day received, (jod bless you, and all with you; destroy the rebel army if possible. A. Lincoln. Major-Gencral McClellan. On the night of the battle of South-!Mo\mtain, orders were given to the corps conmianders to press forward the pickets at early dawn. Thib advance revealed the fact that the enemy had left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was or- dered: the cavalry, under General Pleasanton, and the three corps under Generals Sumner, Hooker, and i^Iansfield, (the latter of whom had arrined that morning and assumed command of the Twelfth, Williams's col-i)s,) by the national turnpike and Boonsboro ; the corps of (Jenerals Burn.,ide and Porter (the latter command at that time consisting of but one M'eak division, Syke-s's) by the old Sharpsburgh road, and General Frank- lin to move into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrcrs- ville by a detachment, and endeavor to relicva Harper's Ferry. Generals Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from Boonsboro to Rohrersville to reen- force Franklin, or to move on Sharpsburgh, ac- cording to circumstances. Franklin moved toward Brownsville and found there a force of the enemy, uuich superior in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong posi- tion to receive him. At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's Ferry indicated the sur- render of that place. The cavalry overtook tho enemy's cavalry in Boonsboro, made a daring charge, killing and wounding a number, and capturing two hundred and fifty pi