s FOR THE PEOPLE S' T H E tl PKIVATE LETTERS LIEUT.-GENERAL SCOTT, AND THE REPLY OF EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN. NEW YORK: HAMILTON, JOHNSON, & FARRELLY, PUBLISHERS, No. 22 Ann Strbet. 1862. Frt.-uh & Wheat, J'rinlers, 18 Ann St., N. Y, THE PRIVATE LETTERS LIEUT.-GENERAL SCOTT, EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S HEPLY NEW YORK: HAMILTON, JOHNSON & FARRELLY, PUBLISHERS, No. 22 Ann Street. 1862. Early in the year 1861, when civil war seemed impending but had not actually broken out, Gen. Scott, then at the head of the army, wrote two papers containing Ms views, professional and political, on the crisis, and the rights and duties which devolved on the Government in the momentous conjuncture. These two papers were subsequently lent to many friends to read, and one of them has recently been pub- lished, without the writer's consent. Therefore, the Old "Warrior has deemed it proper to give to the public himself the second of the papers referred to, lest it also might find its unauthorized way into print. He has, therefore, forwarded it to the National Intelligencer, having added to it a few explanatory " notes," which the lapse of time seemed to render proper. The paper now submitted to the public by Gen. Scott throws a flood of light on the history of the rebellion in its incipient stages, and will inspire every reader with deep interest. It establishes, in the first place, the patriotic anxiety of the wise and watchful General-in-Chief to prepare for the coming storm, and his earnest and re- peated efforts to preva,il on the G overnment to garrison and secure the Southern forts against every possible attack. This paper must have the effect, with every candid mind, of vindicating the character of the illustrious veteran General himself from imputations with which he has been assailed. GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTEllS, October 30, 1860, I emphatically called the attention of the Pre- sident to the necessity of strong garrisons in all the forts below the principal commercial cities of the Southern States, including, by name, the forts in Pensacola harbor. October 31, I suggested to the Secretary of War that a circular should be sent at once to such of those forts as had garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults. — (See my Views, since 'pTinted.) After a long confinement to my bed in New York, I came to this city (Washington) December 12. Next day I personally urged up- on the Secretary of War the same views, viz : strong garrisons in the Southern forts — those of Charleston and Pensacola harbors, at once ; those of Mobile Bay and the Mississippi, below New Orleans, next, &c. I again pointed out the organized companies and the re- cruits at the principal depots available for the purpose. The Secre- tary did not concur in any of my views, when I begged him to procure for me an early interview with the President, that I might make one effort more to save the forts and the Union. By appointment, the Secretary accompanied me to the President, December 15, when the same topics, secessionism, &c., were again pretty fully discussed. There being at the moment [in the opinion of the President] no danger of an early secession, beyond South Carolina, the President, in reply to my arguments for immediately reinforcing Fort Moultrie and sending a garrison to Fort Sumter, said : " The time had not arrived for doing so ; that he should wait the action of the Convention of South Carolina, in the expectation that a commission would be appointed and sent to negotiate with him and Congress respecting the secession of the State and the property of the United States held within its limits ; and, that if Congress should decide against the secession, then he would send a reinforce- ment and telegraph the commanding officer (jMajor Anderson) of Fort Moultrie to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack." 4 GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. And the Secretary, with animation, added : " We have a vessel of war (the Brooklyn) held in readiness at Nor- folk, and he would then send three hundred men in her from Fort Monroe to Charleston." To which I replied, first, that so manj^ men could not be with- drawn from that garrison, but could be taken from New York, Next, that it would then be too late, as the South Carolina Com- missioners would have the game in their hands, b}^ first using and then cutting the wires ; that as there was not a soldier in Fort Sum- ter, any handful of armed secessionists might seize and occupy it &c., &c. Here the remark may be permitted that if the Secretary's three hundred men had then, or some time later, been sent to Forts Moul- trie and Sumter, lyotli would now have been in the possession of the United States, and not a battery below them could have been erected by the secessionists ; consequently the access to those forts from the sea would now (the end of March) be unobstructed and free* The same day. December 15, I wrote the following note : "Lieut. Gen. Scott begs the President to pardon him for supply- ing, in this note, what he omitted to say this morning at the inter- view with which he was honored hy the President. "Long prior to the force hill,, (March 2d, 1833,) ^^rior to the issue of his proclamation, and in y&.rt prior to the passage of the ordinance of nullification, President Jackson, under the act of March 3, 1807, 'authorizing the employment of the land and naval forces,' caused reinforcements to be sent to Fort Moultrie, and a sloop-of-war, (the Natchez,) with two revenue cutters, to be sent to Charleston har- bor, in order, 1, to prevent the seizure of that fort by the nullifiers, and 2, to enforce the execution of the revenue- laws. Gen. Scott himself arrived at Charleston the day after the passage of the ordi- nance of nullification, and many of the additional companies were then en route for the same destination. " President Jackson familiarly said at the time ' that, by the assemblage of those forces, for lawful purposes, he m^^s not making *" The plan invented by Gen. Scott to stop secesssion was, like all campaigns devised by him, very able in its details, and nearly certain of general snccess. The Southern States are full of arsenals and forts, commanding their rivers and strategic points. Gen. Scott desired to transfer the army of the L^nited States to these forts as speedily and as quietly as possible. The Southern States could not cut of communica- tion between the Government and the fortresses without a great fleet, which they can- not build for years, or take them by land without one hundi'ed thousand men, many hundred millions of dollars, several campaigns, and many a bloody siege. Had Gen- eral Scott been able to have got these forts m the condition he desii'ed them to be, the Southern Confederacy would not now esdat."— Part of the euloyi/ pronounced on Secre- tary Floyd {who defeated ScotVs plans) hy the Richmond Examiner^ on Floyd's reception nt that city. GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. 5 war upon South Carolina ; but that if South Carolina attacked them, it would be South Carolina that made war upon the United States.' " Gen. S., who received his first instructions (oral) from the Pre- sident, in the temporary absence of the Secretary of War, (Gen. Cass,) remembers those expressions well. " Scitnrday night, December 15, 1860." _^ December 28. — Again, after Major Anderson had gallantly and wisely thrown his handful of men from Fort Moultrie into Fort Sumter — learning that, on demand of South Carolina, there was great danger he might be ordered by the Secretary back to the less tenable work, or out of the harbor — I wrote this note : " Lieut. Gen. Scott (who has had a bad night, and can scarcely hold up his head this morning) begs to express the hope to the Secretary of War — 1. That orders may not be given for the evacu- ation of Fort Sumter. 2. That one hundred and fifty recruits may instantly be sent from Governor's Island to reinforce that garrison, with ample supplies of ammunition and subsistence, including fresh vegetables, as potatoes, onions, turnips armed vessels be sent to support the said fort. " Lieut. Gen. S. avails himself of this opportunity also to express the hope that the recommendations heretofore made by him to the Secretary of War respecting Forts Jackson, St. Philip, Morgan, and Pulaski, and particuUirh^ in respect to Forts Pickens and McRae, and the Pensacola Navy Yard, in connection with the last two named works, may be reconsidered by the Secretary. " Lieut. Gen. S. will further ask the attention of the Secretary to Forts Jefferson and Taylor, which are wholly national — being of far greater value even to the most distant points of the Atlantic coast and the people on the upper waters of the Missouri, Missis- sippi, and Ohio rivers than to the State of Florida. There is only a feeble company at Key West for the defence of Fort Taylor, and not a soldier in Fort Jefferson to resist a handful of fillibusters, or a row-boat of pirates ; and the Gulf, soon after the beginning of secession or revolutionary troubles in the adjacent States, will swarm with such nuisances,"* December 30. — I addressed the President again, as follows : " Lieutenant General Scott begs the President of the United States to pardon the irregularity of this communication. It is Sunday, the weather is bad, and General S. is not well enough to go to church. ♦ It was not till January 4 that, by the aid of Secretary Holt, (a strong and loyal man,) I obtained permission to send succor to the feeble garrison of Fort Taylor, Key West, and at the same time a company— Major Arnold's, from Boston — to occupy Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island. If this company had been three days later, the fort would have been prc-occupied by Floridians. It is known that the rebels had their eyes upon those powerful forts, which govern the commerce of the Mexican Gulf, as Gibraltar and Malta govern that of the Mediterranean. With Forts Jefferson and Taylor, the rebels might have purchased an early European recognition. S GENEKAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. " But matters of the highest natiorial importance seem to forbid a moment's delay, and, if misled by zeal, he hopes for the Presi- dent's forgiveness. "Will the President permit General S., without reference to the "War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence ? " It is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may be ordered for the sam.e purpose as early as to-morrow. " General S. will wait upon the President at any moment he may be called for." The South Carolina Commissioners had already been many days in Washington, and no movement of defence (on the part of the United States) was permitted. I will here close my notice of Fort Sumter by quoting from some of my previous reports. It would have been easy to reinforce this fort down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay Fort Moultrie had been re- armed and greatly strengthened in every wa}^ by the rebels. ^Many powerful new land batteries (besides a formidable raft) have been constructed. Hulks, too, have been sunk in the principal channel so afi to render access to Fort Sumter from the sea impracticable without first carrying all the lower batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of reinforcing has thus been increased ten or twelve fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be made because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina Commissioners. Afterwards, Secretary Holt and myself tried, in vain, to obtain a ship of war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger-steamer " Star of the West." That vessel, but for the hesitation of the master, might, as is generall^^ believed, have de- livered at the fort the men and subsistence on board. This attempt at succor failing, I next, verbally, submitted to the late Cabinet either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way by the batteries, (increasing in strength daily,) or that Major Anderson should be left to ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns — that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment and by hringing to merchant vessels, helping himself, (giving orders for payment,) or, finally, be allowed to evacuate the fort, which, in that case, would be inevitable. But, before any resolution was taken, the late Secretary of the GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. 7 Navy making diflSculties about the want of suitable war vessels, another Commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When this had pas.'^ed away Secretaries Holt and Toucey, Captain Ward, of the Navy, and myself — with the knowledge of the President (Buchanan) — settled upon the employment, under the Captain, (who was eager for the expedition,) of three or four small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey. At that time (late in Januar}') I have but little doubt Captain Ward would have reached Fort Sumter, with all his vessels. But he was kept back by some- thing like a truce or armistice, [made here] embracing Charleston and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon between the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, &c., and this truce lasted to the end of that Administration. That plan and all others, without a squadron of war ships and a considerable army — competent to take and hold the many formida- ble batteries below Fort Sumter, and before the exhaustion of its subsistence — having been pronounced, from the change of circum- stances, impracticable, by Major Anderson, Captain Foster, (Chief Engineer,) and all the other officers of the fort, as well as by Brig- adier General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers ; and, con- curring in that opinion, I did not hesitate to advise, (March 12th) that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the fort, so long gallantly held by him and his companions, immediately on procur- ing suitable transportation to take them to New York. His rela- tive weakness had steadily increased in the last eighteen days. It was not till January 3d (when the first Commissioners from South Carolina withdrew) that the permission I had solicited Octo- ber 31st was obtained, to admonish commanders of the few South- ern forts with garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults. (Major Anderson was not among the admonished being already straitly beleaguered.) January 3d. To Lieut. Slemner, commanding in Pensacola Harbor : " The General-in-Chief directs that you take measures to do the utmost in your pov/er to prevent the seizure of either of the forts in Pensacola harbor, by surprise or assault, consulting first with the commander of the navy yard, who will probably have received instructions to co-oi^erate with you." (This order was signed by Aid-de-Camp Lay.) It was just before the surrender of the Pensacola navy yard (Jan- uary 12) that Lieut. Slemmer, calling upon Com. Armstrong, ob- 8 GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. tained the aid of some thirty common seamen or laborers, (but no marines) which, added to his forty-six soldiers, made up his numbers to seventy-six men, with whom this meritorious officer has since held Fort Pickens, and performed, working night and day, an im- mense amount ol labor in mounting guns, keeping up a strong guard, &c,, &c. Early in January I renewed, as has been seen, my solicitations to be allowed to reinforce Fort Pickens, but a good deal of time was lost in vacillations. First, the President " thought if no movement is made by the United States, Fort McEae will probably not be oc- cupied nor Fort Pickens attacked. In case of movements by tlie United States, which will doubtless be made known by the wires, there will be corresponding local movements, and the attempt to reinforce will be useless:^— (Quotation from a note made by Aid-de- Camp Lay^ about January 12, o f the President's reply to a message from me.) Next, it was doubted whether it would be safe to send reinforcements in an unarmed steamer, and the want, as usualj of a suitable naval vessel— the Brooklyn being long held in reserve at Norfolk for some purpose unknown to me. Finally, after I had kept a body of three hundred recruits in New York harbor ready for some time— and they would have been sufficient to reinforce temporarily Fort Pickens and to occupy Fort McRae also — the President, about January 18, permitted that the sloop of war Brooklyn should take a single company, ninety men, from Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, and reinforce Lieutenant Slemmer, in Fort Pickens, but without a surplus man for the neighboring ibrt, McRae. The Brooklyn, with Capt. Vodges' company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 22d, and, on the 29tb, President Buchanan, having entered into a quasi armistice with cer- tain leading seceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct, in a joint note, the commanders of the war vessels, off Pensacola and Lieut. Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Capt. Vodges' company unless that fort should be attacked. * [That joint note I never saw until March 25th, but supposed tie * It was known nt the Navy Department that the Brooklyn, with Capt. Vogdes on board, would be obliged in open sea to stand off and on Fort Pickens, and in rough weather might sometimes be fifty miles ofi'. Indeed, if ten miles at sea, the fort miglt have been attacked and easily carried before the reinforcement could have reached the beach, in open sea, where alone it could land. GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. $ armistice was consequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was understood to terminate with it.] Hearing however, of the most active preparations for hostilities on the part of the seceeders at Pensacola, by the erection of new batteries and arming Fort McRae — that had not a gun mounted when it was seized — during the Peace Convention and since, I brought the subject to the notice of the new Administration, when this note, dated March 12th, to Capt. Vogdes was agreed upon, viz : "At the first favorable moment 3^011 will land with j-our company, reinforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same till further orders." This order, in duplicate, left New York by two naval vessels about the middle of March, as the mail and the wires could not be trusted, and detached officers could not be substituted, for two had already ?3een arrested and paroled by the authorities at Pensacola, despatches taken from one of them, and a third, to escape like treatment, forced to turn back when near that city. Thus those authorities have not ceased to make war upon the United States since the cap- ture by them of the navy ja.rd, January 12th. Respectfully submitted. WINFIELD SCOTT. Headquarters of the Army, Washington, March ZOth 1861. In giving the above paper, at the instance of Gen Scott, it may not be improper to publish the following letter, referred to as the one which has appeared in print without his authority, and which, it is asserted in the public papers, the Secretary of State, to whom the letter was written, denies any instrumentality in making public : Washington, March 3, 1861. Dear Sir : — Hoping that in a day or two the new President will have happil}^ passed through all personal dangers, and find himself installed and the honored successor of the great Washington, with 3-0U as the chief of his Cabinet, I beg leave to repeat, in writing, what I liave before said to you orally, this supplement to my printed " views," (dated in October last) on the highly disordered condition of our (so late) happy and glorious Union. To meet the extraordinary exigencies of the times, it seems to me that I am guilty of no arrogance in limiting the President's field of selection to one of the four plans of proceedure subjoined : I. Throw off the old and assume a new designation— the Union party : adopt the conciliatory measures proposed by Mr. Critten^ 10 GENERAL SCOTT'S LETTERS. den or the Peace Convention, and my life upon it, we shall have no new case of secession ; but, on the contrary, an early return of many if not of all the States which have already broken oft" from the Union. "Without some equally benign measure, the remaining Slaveholding States will probably join the Montgomery Confederacy in less than sixty days : when this city, being included in a foreign country, would require a permanent garrison of at least thirty-five thousand troops to protect the Government within it. II. Collect the duties on foreign goods outside the ports of which the Government has lost the command, or close such ports by act of Congress and blockade them. III. Conquer the Seceded States by invading armies. No doubt this might be done in two or three years by a young and able Gen- eral — a Wolfe, a Dessaix, a Iloche — with three hundred thousand disciplined men, estimating a third for garrisons, and the loss of a yet greater number by skirmishes, sieges, battles, and Southern fevers. The destruction of life and propert}' on the other side would be frightful, however perfect the moral discipline of the invaders. The conquest completed, at that enormous Avaste of human life to the North and Northwest, with at least ^250 000 000 added thereto, and cut bono ? Fifteen devastated provinces ! not to be brought into harmony with their conquerors, but to be held for generations by heavy garrisons, at an expense quadruple the nett duties or taxes which it would be possible to extort from them, followed by a Pro- tector or an Emperor. lY. Say to the Seceded States, Wayward sisters, depart in peace. In haste, I remain, very truly yours. WINFIELD SCOTT. Hon. William H. Seward, &c.j &c. EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY, To the Editors of the National Intelligencer : On Wednesday last I received the National Intelligencer contain- ing General Scott's address to the public. This is throughout an undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of the Administration, in regard to the seven Cotton States, now in rebel- lion. From our past relations I was greatly surprised at the ap- pearance of such a paper. In one aspect, however, it was highly gratifying. It has justified me, nay, it has rendered it absolutely necessary, that I should no longer remain silent in respect to charges which have been long vaguely circulating, but are now endorsed by the responsible name of General Scott. I.— The first and most prominent among these charges is my re- fusal to immediately garrison nine enumerated fortifications, scatter- ed over six of the Southern States, according to the recommenda- tion of General Scott, in his " views " addressed to the War De- partment on the 29th and 30th of October, 1860. And it has even been alleged that if this had been done it might have prevented the civil war. This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the influ- ence of Governor Floyd. All my Cabinet must bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of the Administration ; and certain it is that during the last six months previous to the 29th December, 1860, the day on which he resigned his office, after my request, he exercised less influence on the Ad- ministration than any other member of the Cabinet. Mr. Holt was immediately thereafter transferred from the Post Office Department to that of AYar ; so that, from this time until the 4th of March, 1861, which was by far the most important period of the Adminis- tration, he performed the duties of Secretary of War to my entire satisfaction. But why did I not immediately garrison these nine fortifications 13 EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S EEPLY, in such a manner, to use the language of General Scott, " as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup-de-main ridiculous ?" There is one answer both easy and conclusive, even if other valid reasons did not exist. There were no available troops within reach which could be sent to these fortifications. To have attempted a military operation on a scale so extensive by any means within the President's power would have been simply absurd. Of this General Scott himself seems to have been convinced, for on the day after the date of his first " views " he addressed (on the 30th October) sapplemental views to the War Department, in which he states : " There is one (regvlar) company in Boston^ one here, {at the Narrows,) one at Pittsburgh, one at Augusta, (Ga.,) one at Baton Rouge " — in all fioe companies only icithin reach to garrison or reinfoi'ce the forts mentioned in the "i'iewv*." Five companies — four hundred men — to occupy and reinforce nine fortifications in six highly excited Southern States ! The force " within reach " was so entirely inadequate that nothing more need be said on the subject. To have attempted such a military opera, tion with so feeble a force, and the Presidential election impend- ing, would have been an invitation to collision and secession. In- deed, if the whole American army, consisting then of only sixteen thousand men, had been " within reach," they would have been scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was our want of troops that, although General Scott, believing, in opposition to the opinion of the Committee raised in the House of Kcpresentatives, that the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln might be interrupted by military force, was only able to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th March, six hundred and fifty-three men, rank and file of the army ; and, to make up this number, even the sappers and miners were brought from West Point. But why was there no greater force within reach ? This ques- tion could be better answered by General Scott himself than by any other person. Our small regular army, with the exception of a few hundred men, were out of reach, on our remote frontiers, where it had been continuously stationed for years, to protect the inhabitants and the emigrants on their way thither against the attacks of hostile Indians. All were insufficient, and both General Scott and myself had endeavored in vain to prevail upon Congress to raise several additional regiments for this purpose. In recommending this augmentation of the army, the General states in his report to EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. 15 the War Department of November, 1857, that " it wouM not more than furnish the reinforcements now greatly need in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington (T.) Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah." And, again, in his re- port of November, 1858, he says: " This want of troops to give reasonable security to our citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains, can scarcely be too strong'y stated ; but I will only add, that as 'often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to reinforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion." These " views" of General Scott exhibit the crude notions then prevailing even among inteligent and patriotic men on this subject of secession. In the first sentence the General, whilst stating that " to save time the right of secession my be conceded," yet im- mediately says " this is instantly balanced by the correlative right on the part of the Federal Government against an interior State or States to re-establish by force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory." (For this he cites " Paley's Moral and Political Phil- osophy, last chapter." It may be there, but I have been unable to find it.) Whilst it is difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in this passage, he renders what he did not mean quite clear in his sup- plementary " views." In these he says : " It will be seen that the ' views' only apply to a case of secession that makes a gap in the present Union. The falling^ff, say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic States, from the^Potomac south, (the very case which has occurred) was not within the scope of General S.'s "provisional remedies;" that is to say, to establish by force, if neccessary, the continuity of our territory. In his ' views' he also states as follows: " But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of recruiting the frag- ments except by the laceration and despotism of the sword. To effect such result the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play." In the Gene- ral's opinion " a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to allow the fragments of the great Republic to form themselves into new Confederacies, probably four." He then points out what ought to be the boundaries between the new Unions ; and at the end of each goes so far as even to indicate the cities which ought to be the capitals of the three first on this side of the Rocky mountains, to wit, " Columbia, South Carolina," " Alton or Quincy, ^4 EX-PEESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. Illinois," and " Albany, New York," excluding Washington city al- to-ether. This indication of cai itals, contained in the original, now in my possession, is curiously omitted in the version published in the National Intelligencer. He designates no capital for the fourth Union on the Pacific. The reader will judge what encouragement these views, proceeding from so distinguished a source, must have afforded to the secessionists of the Cotton States. I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince every mind why I did not, with a force of five companies, attempt to reinforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi ; Fort Morgan, below Mobile ; Forts Pickens and McRae, in Pensacoia Harbor ; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah ; Forts Moultrie and Sum- ter, Charleston Harbor, and Fort Monroe, in Virginia. These " views," both original and supplementary, were published by General Scott in the National Intelligencer of January 1861, at the most important and critical period of the Administration. Their publication, at that time, could do no possible good, and might do much harm. To have published them, without the President's knowledge and consent, was as much in violation of the sacred con- fidence which ouglit to prevail between the commanding General of the army and the Commander-in-Chief as it would have been for the Secretary of War to publish the same documents without his authority. What is of more importance, their publication was cal- culated injuriously to affect the compromise measures then pending before Congress and the country, and to encourage the secessionists in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into frag- ments. From the great respect which I then entertained for the General I passed it over in silence. It is worthy of remark that soon after the Presidential election^ representations of wbat those " views" contained, of more or less correctness, were unfortunately circulated, especially throughout the South. The Editors of the National Intelligencer, in assigning a reason for their publication, state that both in public prints and in public speeches, allusions had been made to them, and some misap- prehensions of their character had got abroad. II. and III General Scott states that he arrived in Washington on the 12th, and, accompanied by the Secretary of War, held a con- versation with the President on the 15th December. Whilst I have no recollection whatever of this conversation, he doubtless states correctly that I did refuse to send three hundred men to reinforce EX-PEESIDENT BUCHANAN'S EEl'LY. 15> Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie, who had not then removed to Fort Sumter. The reason for this refusal is manifest to all who recollect the history of the time. But twelve days before, in the annual message of the 3d December, I had urged upon Congress the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of the same character with those subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the " Crittenden Compromise." At that time high hopes were enter- tained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Be- sides, I believed, and this correctly, as the event proved, that Major Anderson was then in no danger of attack. Indeed he and his com- mand were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities, and people of Charleston. Under these circumstances, to have sent such a force there would have been only to impair the hope of com- promise, to provoke collision, and disappoint the countr3^ There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the General's memory must be defective. At present, I shall' specify only one. I could not have stated that on a future contingent oc- casion I would telegraph " Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the Forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack ;"' because, with prudent precaution, this had already been done several days before, through a special messenger, sent to Major Anderson, for this very purpose. I refer to Major Buell, of the army. The General's supplementar}^ note of the same day, presenting to me General Jackson's conduct in 1833, during the period of nullifi- cation, as an example, requires no special notice. Even if the cases were not entirely different, I had previously determined upon a policy of my own, as will appear from my annual message. This was, at every hazard to collect the customs at Charleston, and out- side of the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Colcock, the existing collector^ as I had anticipated, resigned his office about the end of December, and immediately thereafter I nominated to the Senate as his successor, a suitable person prepared at any personal risk to do his duty. That body, however, throughout its entire ses- sion declined to act on this nomination. Thus, without a collector. it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue. IV. General Scott's statement alleges that " the Brooklyn, with Capt. Vodges's company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 22d, and on the 29th President Buchanan, having entered into a quasi armistice with certain leadmg seceders at Pen- sacola and elsewhese, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct, 18 EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. in A joint note, the commander of the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieut. Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Capt. Vogdes's company unless the Fort should be attacked." He afterwards states, within brackets, " That joint note I never saw, but suppose the armistice was consequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was understood to termin..te with it." These statements betray a singular want of memory on the part of General Scott. It is scarcely credible that this very joint note, presented in such odious colors, was submitted to General Scott on the day it was prepared, (29th January,) and met his entire appro- bation. I would not venture to make this assertion if I did not pos- sess conclusive evidence to prove it. On that day Secretary Holt addressed me a note, from which the following is an extract : " I have the satisfaction of saying^ that on mhmittivg the paper to General Scott, he expressed himself satisfied loith it, saying that there could he no objection to the arrangement in a military pioint of view, or othencise.^'' This requires no comment. That the General had every reason to be satisfied with the arrangement, will appear from the following statement : A revolutionary outbreak had occurred in Florida; the troops of the United States had been expelled from Pensacola and the adja- cent navy yard ; and Lieutenant Slemmer, of the artillery, with his brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pick- ens, where he was in imminent danger every m.oment of being cap- tured by a vastly superior force. Owing to the interruption of reg- ular communications Secretary Holt did not receive information of these events until several days after their occurrence, and then through a letter addressed to a third person. He instantly inform- the President of the fact, and reinforcements, provisions, and mili- tary stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens with- out a moment's unnecessary delay. She left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January. Well-founded apprehensions were, however, entertained at the time of her departure that the reinforcements, with the vessels of war at no great distance from Fort Pickens, could not arrive in time to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of sus- pense, and whilst Lieutenant Slemmer was in extreme peril^ Sena, tors Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, received a telegraphic despatch from Senator Mallorv, of Florida, dated at Pensacola, on the 28th EX-PKESIDENT BUCHANAN'S llErLY. 17 January, witli the urgent request that thcj- should lay it before the President. This despatch expressed an earnest desire to maintain the peace, as well as the most positive assurance that no attack would be made on Fort Pickens if the present status should be pre- served. This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view to the safety of the fort, and to the unhappy effect which an actual collision either at that or an)^ other point might produce on the Peace Convention then about to assemble at Washington. The re- sult was that a joint despatch was carefully prepared by the Secre- taries of War and Navy, accepting the proposal, with important modifications, which was transmitted by telegraph on the 29th, Januar}^ to Lieutenant Slemmer, and to the naval commanders near the station. It is too long for transcription ; suffice it to say it was carefully guarded at every point for the security of the fort and its free communication with Washington. The result was highly fortunate. The Brooklyn had a long pas- sage. Although she left Fortress ]Monroe on the 24th January, she did not arrive at Pensacola until the 6th February. In the mean time. Fort Pickens, with Lieut. Slemmer, (whose conduct deserves high commendation,) and bis brave little band, were placed, by virtue of this arrangement, in periect security until an adequate force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still in our possession. Well might Gen. Scott have expressed his sat- isfaction with this arrangement. The General was correct in the supposition that this arrangement was to expire on the termination of the Peace Convention. V. But we now come to an important period, when dates will be essentially necessary to disentangle the statement of Gen. Scott. The South Carolina Commissioners were appointed on the 22d, and arrived in Washington on the 27th December. The day after their arrival it was announced that Major Anderson had removed from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This rendered them furious. On the same day they addressed an angry letter to the President de- manding the surrender of Fort Sumter. The President answered this letter on the 30th December by a peremptory refusal. This brought forth a reply from the Commissioners on the 2d Januar}^, 1861, of such an insulting character that the President instantly returned it to them with the following endorsement : " This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he de- clines to receive it." From that time forward all friendly, political, 18 EX-PRESIDENT EUCIIAXAN'S EEPLY. nnd personal intercourse finally ceased between the revolutionary Senators and the President, and he was severely attacked by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr. Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had previously been of the coldest character ever since the President's anti-secession message at the commencement of the session of Congress. Under these changed circumstances, Gen. Scott, by note on Sun- day, the 30th December, addressed the following inquiry to the President : " Will the President permit Gen. Scott, without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York harbor to reinforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence ? It is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may be ordered for the same purpose to-morrow." The General seems not to have then knov/n that Mr. Floyd was out of office. Never did a request meet a more prompt compliance. It was received on Sunday evening, December 30th. On Monday morning I gave instructions to the War and Navy Departments, and on Monday evening Gen. Scott came to congratulate mc that the Secretaries had issued the necessary orders to the army and navy officers, and that they were in his possession. The Brooklyn, with troops, military stores, and provisions, was to sail forthwith from Fortress Monroe for Fort Sumter. I am therefore utterly at a loss to imagine why the General, in his statement, should have asserted that " the South Carolina Commissioners had already been many da3^s in Washington and no movement of defence (on tlje part of the United States) was perm.itted." These Commissioners arrived in Washington on the 27th December ; Gen. Scott's request was made to tlie President on the SOth. It was complied with on the 31st, and a single day is all that represents the •' many days " of the General. Again, General Scott asserts, in the face of these facts, that the President refused to allow any attempt to be made — to reinforce Fort Sumter — because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina Commissioners. And still again, that " afterwards Secre- tary Holt and myself endeavored, in vain, to obtain a ship-of-A\ ar for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer ' Star of the W^est.' " Will it be believed that the substi- EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. 19 tution of the '•' Star of the ^\'est," for the powerful steamer Brooklyn, of which he now complains, was by the advice of Gen. Scott him- self ? I have never heard this doubted until I read the statement. At the interview already referred to between the General and myself, on the evening of Monday the 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not received the South Carolina Com- missioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet it might be considered an improper act to send the Brooklyn with reinforcements to Fort Sumter until I had received an answer from them to my letter of the preceding day ; that the de- lay could not continue more than forty-eight hours. He prom.ptly concurred in this suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the orders were not transmitted to the Brooklyn on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January 1 received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the mean time, however, the General had become convinced, by the representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and the Navy informed me, to secure secrec}^ and success and reach the fort, would be to send a fast, side-wheel, mercantile steamer from New York with the reinforcement. Accordinglv the " Star of the "West" was selected for this duty. The substitution of this mercantile steamer for the Brooklyn, which would have been able to defend herself iu case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by me to the high military judgment of General Scott. The change of programme required a brief space of time ; but the " Star of the AYest" left New York for Charleston on the evening of the 5th of January. On the very day, however, when this ill-fated steamer left N av York, a telegram was despatched by Gen. Scott to Col. Scott to countermand her departure ; but it did not reach its destination until after she had gone to sea. The reason for this countermand shall be stated in the language of Secretary Holt, to be found in a letter addressed by him to Mr. Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior on the 5th of March, 1861, and published in the National Intelligencer. Mr. Holt says : " The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thompson) was not more cordially sanctioned by the President than it was by General Scott and myself; not because of any dissent (rom the order on the part of the President, but because of a letter received that day from Major xinderson, stating, in effect, that he regarded himself secure in his position ; and yet more from intelligence w^hich late on Sat- 20 EX-PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S REPLY. iirday evening (5tli Januaiy, 18G1) readied the Department, that a heav}^ ])atterY Imd been erected among the sand hills at the entrance to Charleston Harbor, which wonld probably destroy any unarmed vessel (and such was the " Star of the West'") which might attempt to make its way to Fort Sumter. This important information sat- isfied the Government that there was no pre.-ent necessity for send- ing reinforcements, and that when sent they should go, not in a vessel of commerce, but of war. Hence the countermand was despatched by telegraph to New York ; but the vessel had sailed a short time before it reached the officer (Col. Scott) to whom it was addressed." A statement of these facts, established b}^ dates, proves con- •clusively that the President was not only willing but anxious in the bi-iefest period to reinforce Fort Sumter. On the 4th January, the day before the departure of the Star of the West from New York, as General Scott in his statement ad- mits, succor was sent to Fort Taylor, Key West, and to Fort Jeffer- son, Tortugas Island, which reached these points in time for their security. He nevertheless speculates on the consequences which might have followed had the reinforcements not reached their des- tination in due time, and even expresses the extraordinary opinion that, with the possession of these Forts, " the rebels might have purchased an early recognition," I shall next advert to the statement that the expedition under Captain Ward, " of three or four small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey," was kept back by something like a truce or arm- stice, [made here], embracing Charleston and Pensacola harbors, agreed upon between the late President and certain principal sece- ders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, &c. "And this truce lasted to the end of the Administration.' Things altogether dis- tinct in their nature are so often blended in this statement that it is difficult to separate them. Such is eminently the case in con- necting the facts relative to Charleston with Pensacola. Having already treated of the charge of having kept back rein- forcements from Pensacola, I shall now say something of the cliaro-e of having also kept them back from Cliarleston. Neither a truce, nor quasi truce, nor anything like it, was ever concluded between the President and any human authority concerning Charleston. On the contrary, the South Carolina Commissioners, first and last, and all the time, were informed that the President could never surreu-