Author 
 
 Title 
 
 Imprint 
 
 16—47372-3 GPO 
 
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 THE 
 
 COMPLETE REPORT 
 
 ORGANIZATION AND CAMPAIGNS ( 
 
 i 
 
 ; 
 
 iN^RMY OF THE POTOMAC, 
 
 BY 
 
 aEORQE B. ]VIcOLELLA.]Sr, 
 
 { 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, 
 
 WITH ms LAST REVISION. 
 
 { 
 
 ^^^^ 
 
&: 
 
 ^M 
 
 7 AUG 1905 
 D.otD, 
 
lil 
 
 THE 
 
 •> 
 
 COMPLETE REPORT 
 
 ON THE 
 
 OEGANIZATION AND CAMPAIGNS 
 
 i <!¥■ 
 
 OF THE 
 
 W 
 o ' 
 
 IT 
 
 ^RMY OF THE POTOMA.C, 
 
 BY 
 
 GEOHaE B. ]VIcOLE LL A.N, 
 
 MAJORrGENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, 
 WITH HIS LAST REVISION. 
 
 FIRST PERIOD.' 
 
 New York, August 4th, 1863. 
 
 BRiG.-bENERAL L. Thomas, Adjutant-General 
 U. S. Army. 
 
 Sir: — I have the honor to submit herein 
 the Official Report of the operations of the 
 Army of the Potomac, while under my charge. 
 Accompanjdng it are the reports of the corps, 
 division and subordinate commanders, pertain- 
 ing to the various engagements, battles, and 
 occurrences of the campaigns, and important 
 documents connected will i its organization, sup- 
 ply and movements. These, 'with list of maps 
 and memoranda submitted, will bo found ap- 
 pended, duly arranged atrd marked for conve- 
 nient reference. 
 
 Charged, in the spring of 1861, with the op- 
 erations in the department of the Ohio, which 
 included the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, 
 and latterly, Western Virginia, it had become 
 my dut}' to counteract the hostile designs of 
 tho ,enemy in Western Virginia, which were 
 immediately directed to the destruction of the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and tho posses- 
 sion of tho Kanawha Valley, with tho tiltimate 
 object of gainnig Wheeling, and the control oi 
 the Ohio River. Tlie successful affairs of Phil- 
 lippi, Rich Mountain, Carrick's Ford, etc., had 
 been fought, and I had acquired possession of 
 all Westeni Virginia, north of the Kanawha Val- 
 ley, as well as of the lower portion ol that val- 
 ley. 
 
 I had determined to proceed to the relief of 
 the upper Kanawha Valley, as soon as provis-. 
 ion was made for the permanent defense of ijic 
 mountain passes leading from tho east intr^ q, ^ 
 region tuider our control, when I received at 
 B(jverly, in Randolph County, on the 2^^st .July 
 1861, hitelligenco of the unfortunate, residt of 
 tlie battle of Manassas, fought on t'^^^at day. 
 
 On the 22d, I received an order '^y telegraph, 
 directing me to turn over my com /^aud to Brig.- 
 General Rosecrans,and repair a't once to Vy?'a8h- 
 ingtou. 
 
 I had already caused recomioissances to be 
 made for intrenchments at the Cheat Moimtain 
 Pass ; also on the Huntersville road, near Elk- 
 water, and at Red House, near the main road 
 from Romney to Grafton. During the afternoon 
 and the night of the 22d, I gave the final in- 
 structions for the construction of these works, 
 turned over the command to Brig.-Gen. Rose- 
 crans, and started, on the morning of the 23d, 
 for Washington, arriving there on the afternoon 
 of the 26th. On the 27th, I assumed command 
 of the Division of the Potomac, comprising the 
 troops in and around Washinghton, on both 
 banks of the river. 
 
 With this brief statement of the events which 
 immediately prccede-d my being called to the 
 command of the troops at Washington, I pro- 
 ceed to an account from such authentic data as 
 are at hand, of my miiitary operations while 
 commander of the Ariny of the Potomac. 
 
 The subjects to be considered, naturally ar- 
 range themselves as follows : The organization 
 of the Army of th.c Potomac; the military events 
 connected wit^i the defenses of Washington, 
 from July, 18,<S1, to INIarch, 1862 ; the campaign 
 on tlic Penvasula. and that in Maryland. 
 
 The gr' .,o,t resources and capacity for power- 
 ful resit-stance, ot the South, at the breaking out 
 ol the rebellion, and the full proportions of the 
 grco.c coiiflict about to take place, were sought 
 t^ bo carefully measured ; and I had also _en- 
 'xcavored, by every means in my power, to im- 
 |)rcss upon tho authorities tho necessity for 
 such immediate aud full preparation as alone 
 would cnnable the government to prosecute 
 the war on a scale commensurate with tlie re- 
 sis tence to be offered. 
 
 On the -Ith of August, 1861, 1 addressed to 
 tlie President, the following meraorandum, pre- 
 pared at his request: 
 
 Memorandum.— The object of tlie present war 
 
 diff'jrs from those in which nariona aro usually 
 
 engaged, mainly in this : That the purpose of 
 
 ■1 ordinarv Avar is to conquer a peace, and make a 
 
ti-eafcy'on ndviwitagoous terma. In this contest 
 it lias become necessary to crnsh a population 
 sufliciently nuraeifous, intellij,'eut and warlike 
 to constitute a nation. Wo have not only to 
 defeat their armed and organized forces in the 
 field but to display such an overwhehning 
 strength as will convince all our antagonists, 
 especially those of the governing, aristocratic 
 class, of the utter impossibillity of resistencc. 
 Our late reverses make this course imperative. 
 Had we been successful in the rscent battle 
 (Manassas), it is possible that we might have 
 been spared the labor and expense of a great 
 e£Fort ; now we have no alternative. Their 
 success will enable tlie political leaders of 
 the rebels to convince die mass of their peo- 
 ple that we are inferior to tliem in force and 
 courage, and to command all their resources. 
 The contest began witti a class ; now it is with 
 a people, our military success can alone restore 
 the former issue. 
 
 By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking 
 their strong places, and pursuing a rigidly pro- 
 tective policy as to private property, and un- 
 armed persons, and a lenient course as to pri- 
 vate soldiers, we may well hope for a perma- 
 nent restoration of a peaceful Union. But, in 
 the first instance, the authority of the govern- 
 ment must be supported by overwhelmhig phy- 
 sical force. 
 
 Our foreign relations and financial credit also 
 imperatively demand that the military action 
 of the government should be prompt and irre- 
 sistible; 
 
 The rebels have chosen Virginia as their bat- 
 tle-field, and it seems proper for us to make the 
 first great struggle there. But while thus di- 
 recting our main efforts, it is necessary to di- 
 minish the resistence there offered us, by move- 
 ments on other points, both by land and water. 
 
 Without entering at present into details, I 
 ■would advise that a strong movement be made 
 on the Alississippi, and that the rebels be dri- 
 ven out of Missouri. 
 
 As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that 
 Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would 
 advise a movement through ti:at State into 
 Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting 
 the Union men of that region, and of seizing 
 the railroads leading from Memphis to the 
 east. 
 
 The possession of those roads by us, in con- 
 nection wdth the movement on the Mississippi 
 would go far towards determining the evacu.'i- 
 tion of Virginia by the rebels. In the meantime 
 all the passes into Western Virginia, from the 
 e^ust, should be securely guarded ; but I would 
 advise no movement from that quarter toward 
 ilichtiiond, uidcss the political condition of Kon- 
 Hjicky renders it in'ipo3sible,or inexpedient for 
 us to make the movement upon Eastern Ten- 
 nessee, through that State. Every effort should 
 however, be made to organize, equip and arm 
 us mamy troops as possible in Western Virginia, 
 iu order to render the Ohio and Indiana regi- 
 ments available for other o|;ierationa. -At as 
 
 early a day aa praoticftble, it would be w«?ll to 
 protect and re-open the Baltiruore and Ohio 
 Railroad. 
 
 Baltimore and Fort Mnnroe should he occu- 
 pied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in 
 our possession. The importance of liarper'a 
 Ferry and the line of the Potomac, in the direc- 
 tion of Leesburg, will be very materially di- 
 minshed so sooti as our force in this vicinity 
 becomes organized, strong and efticient, be- 
 cause |io capable general will cross the river, 
 north of this city, when we have a strong^army 
 here, ready to cut ofi' his retreat. 
 
 To revert to the West, it is probable that 
 no very large additions to the troops now in 
 Missouri, will be necessary to secure that 
 State. 
 
 I presume that the force required for tho 
 movement down the Mississippi, will be de- 
 termined by its commander and the Presi- 
 dent. If Kentucky assumes the right position, 
 not more than 20,000 troops will be needed, 
 together with those that can be raised in that >, 
 State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure th© 
 latter region and its railroads, as well as ultim- 
 ately to occupy Nashville. »» 
 
 The Western Virginia troops, with more 
 than 5,000 to 10,000 from Ohio and Indiana, 
 should, under proper management, suffice for 
 its protection. When we have reorganized 
 our main army here, 10,000 men ought to ba 
 enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 road and the Potomac. Five thousand will 
 garrison Baltimore, 3,000 Fort Monroe, and not 
 more than 20,000 will be necessary, at the ut- j 
 most, for the defense of Washington. 
 
 For the main army of operations, I urge the 
 following composition : 
 
 250 RcsLmeuts of Infantiy, say • ■ - 225,000 mea. 
 100 Field B ilteries. 600 guns - - - - 15.0(X) " 
 
 28 Regiments Cavalry 25,500 " 
 
 5 " Engineer troops • • • 7,500 " 
 
 Total - - ■ 273,000. 
 
 The force must be supplied with the neces- 
 sary engineer and pontoon trains, and with 
 transportation for everything save tents. Its 
 general line of operations should be so direct- 
 ed that water transportation can be availed of 
 from point to point, by means of the ocean and 
 the rivers emptying into it. An essential fea- 
 ture of the plan of opei'ations, will be the em- 
 ployment of a strong naval force, to protect 
 the movements of a fleet of transports intend- 
 ed to convey a considerable body of troops 
 from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, 
 thus cither creating diversions, and rendering 
 it jieccsstiry to detach largely from their main 
 body, in order to protect such of their cities 
 as muy be threatened, or else lauding and 
 forming establishments on their coast at 'an}' 
 favorable places that opportunity might oifer. 
 This naval force should also co-operate with 
 the main army, in its efforts to seize the im- 
 portant sea-board town of the rebels. 
 
 It cannot be ignored that the construction 
 of railroads, has introduced a new and very 
 
important element into war, by the great facili- 
 ties thus given for concentrating at particular 
 positions, large masses of troops from remote 
 sections, and by creating new strategic points 
 and lines of operations. It is intended to over- 
 come this difficulty by the partial operations 
 suggested, and such other us the particular 
 case may require. We must endeavor to seize 
 places on the railways, in the rear of the ene- 
 my's ]K)ints of concentration, and we must 
 threaten their sea-board cities, in order that 
 each State may be forced, by the necessity of 
 its own defense to dimLiiish its contingent to 
 the Confederate army. 
 
 The prupLised moveiacnl down the Missis- 
 sippi, will produce im])urtuHt results in this 
 connection. That advance, and the progress 
 of the main army at the East, will materially 
 assist each other by diminishing the resistance 
 to be encountered by each. The tendency of 
 the Mississippi movement upon all questions 
 connected with cotton, is too well understood 
 by tlie President and Cabinet, to need any illus- 
 tration from me. There is another independ- 
 ent movement which has often been suggested 
 and which has always recommended itseli to 
 my judgment. I refer ;to a movement from 
 Kansas and Nebraska, througli the Indian Ter- 
 ritor}' upon Red River and Western Texas, for 
 the purpose of protecting and developing the 
 latent Union and free state sentiment, well 
 known to predominate in Western Texas, and 
 which, like a similar sentiment in Western "Vir- 
 ginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize 
 that section into a free state. How far it will 
 be possible to support this movement by an 
 advance through New Mexico from California, 
 is a matter which I have not stifficiently ex- 
 amined to be able to express a decided opinion. 
 If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, 
 as bringing hito play the resources and war- 
 like qualities of the Pacific States, as well as 
 identifying them with our cause, and cement- 
 ing the bond of Union between them and the 
 General Government. 
 
 If it is not departhig too far from my pro- 
 vince, I will venture to stiggest the policy of 
 an intimate alliance and cordial understanding 
 with Mexico ; their sympathies and interests 
 are with us ; their antipathies exclusively 
 against our enemies, and their institutions. I 
 think i.t would not be difficult to obtain from 
 the Mexican government the right to use, at 
 least during the present contest, tlie road from 
 Gua\'mas to New Mexico. This concession 
 would very materially reduce the obstacles of 
 the cohnnn moving from the Pacific. A similar 
 permission to use their territory for the x^'is- 
 sage ef troops between the Panuco and the 
 Rio Grande, would enable us to throw a col- 
 umn of troops, by a good road from Tampico, 
 or some of the small harbors north of it, upon 
 and across the Rio Grande, without risk, and 
 scarcely firing a shot. To what extent, if any, 
 it worJd be desirable to take into service and 
 employ Mexicaii soldiers, is a question entirely 
 
 political, on wiiieh I do not venture to offer an 
 opinion. 
 
 The force I have recommended is large, the 
 expense is great. It is possible that a smaller* 
 force might accomplish the* object in view ; 
 but I understand it to be the purpose of this 
 great nation to re-establish the power of its 
 government, and to restore peace to its citi- 
 zens, in the shortest possible time. The ques- 
 tion to be decided is simply this ; shall we 
 crusli the rebellion at one blow, terminate the 
 war in one campaign, or ; shall we leave it for 
 a legacy to our descendants ? 
 
 When the extent of the possible line of op- 
 erations is considered, the force asked for ther 
 main army under in}'' command cannot be re- 
 garded as unduly large. Every mile we ad- 
 vance carries us further from our base of ope» 
 rations, and renders detatchments necessary 
 to cover our communications, while the enemy 
 will be constantly concentrating as he falls 
 back. I propose witli* the force which I have 
 requested, not only to drive the enemy' out of 
 Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy 
 Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, 
 Mobile and New Orleans ; in other words to 
 move into the heart of the enemy's country, 
 and crush out the rebellion in its very heart. 
 
 By seizing and repairing the railroads -.is wO' 
 advance, the difficulties of transportatioii wil) 
 be\Qaterially diminished. It is perhaps, unne- 
 cessary to state, that in addition to the forces 
 named in this memorandum, strong reserves- 
 sliould be formed, ready to supply any losses 
 that may occur. 
 
 In conclusion, I would submit that the exi- 
 gencies of the treasury maybe lessened by 
 malcing only partial payments to our troops} 
 v/hen in the enemy's countiy, and by giving* 
 the obligations of the United States'* for such 
 supplies as may there be obtained. 
 
 Geo. "B. AIcClkllan, 
 
 Major-Gerieral. 
 
 I do not think the events of the war haVe 
 proved these views, upon the methods aqd 
 plans of its conduct, altogether incorrect. They 
 certainly have not proved my estimate of the 
 number of troops and scope of operations too 
 large. It is probable that I did undcr-estimate 
 the time necessary tor the completion of arms 
 and equipments. It was not strange, however, 
 that by many civilians intrusted with authority 
 there should have been an exactly opposite 
 opinion held in both these- particulars. 
 
 The result of the first battle of Manassas had 
 beeii idmost to destroy the morale and organi- 
 zation of our army, and to alarm government 
 and people. Tlie national capital was in dan- 
 ger. It was necessary, besides holding the 
 "enemy in check, to build works for its defense, 
 strong and capaVjle of being held by a small 
 force. 
 
 It was necessary also to create a new army 
 for active operations, and to expedite its or- 
 ganization, equipment, and the accumulation of 
 the materia! of war, and to this not inconsid- 
 
eraLle labor all m.y energies for the next three 
 months were constantly devoted. 
 
 Time is a necessary element in the creation 
 of armies, and I do not therefore think it ne- 
 cessary to more than mention the impatience 
 with which many regarded the delay in the 
 arrival of the new levies, though recruited 
 and pressed forward with unexampled uapidi- 
 ty — the manufacture and supply of arms and 
 equipments, or the vehemence with which an 
 immediate advance upon the enemy's works 
 directly in our front wa& urged by 4 patriotic 
 but sanguine people. 
 
 The President too was anxious for the speedy 
 employment of our army, and although possess- 
 ed of my plans through frequent conferences, 
 desired a paper from me upon the condition of 
 the forces under my command, and the imme- 
 diate measures to be ^aken to increase their 
 efficiency. Accordingly, In tlie latter part of 
 October, I addressed the following letter to 
 the Secretary of War : 
 To THE Hon. Simon Cameron, 
 Secretary of War : 
 Sir, — In conformity with a personal unaer- 
 Btanding with the President, yesterday, I have 
 the honor to submit the following statement of 
 the condition of the army under my command, 
 and the measures required for the preservation 
 of the government and the suppression of the 
 rebellion :- f 
 
 It will be remembered that, in a memorial 1 
 had the honor to address to the President soon 
 after my arrival in Washington, and in my coifl- 
 munication addressed to Lieut-General Scott, 
 under date of 8th of August ; in my letter to 
 the President authorizing him, at his request, 
 to withdraw the letter written by me to Gen- 
 eral Scott ; and in my letter of the 8th of Sep- 
 tember, answering your note of inquiry of that 
 date, my views on the same subject are frankly 
 and fully expressed. 
 
 In these several communications I have 
 stated the force I regarded as necessary to 
 enable this army to advance with a reasonable 
 certainty of success, at the same time leaving 
 the capital and the line of the Potomac suffi- 
 ciently guarded not only to secure the retreat 
 of the main army, in the event of disaster, but 
 to render it out of the enemy's power to at- 
 tempt a diversion in Maryland. 
 
 So much time has passed, and the winter is 
 approaching so rapidly, that but two courses 
 are left to the government, viz., either to go 
 into winter quarters, or to assume the oifensive 
 with forces greatly inferior in numbers to the 
 army I regarded as desirable and necessary. 
 
 If political considerations render the first 
 course unadvisable the second alone remains. 
 While I regret that it has not been deemed 
 expedient, or perhaps possible to concentrate 
 the forces of the nation in this vicinity, (re- 
 iniiining on the dd'eiisive elsewhere,) keeping 
 the attention and ciforts of the government 
 fixed upon this as the vital point, where the 
 issue of the great contest is 'to be decided. 
 
 it may still be that, by introducing unity <-f 
 action and design among the various armies 
 of the land, by determining the courses to be 
 pursued by the various commanders under 
 one general plan, transferring from tlic other 
 armies the superfluous strength not required 
 for the purpose in view, and thus re-inforc- 
 ing this main army, whose destiny it is to 
 decide the controversy, we may yet be able 
 to move with a reasonable prospect of suc- 
 cess before the winter is fairly upon us. The 
 nation feels, and I share that feeling, that the 
 army of the Potomac holds the fate of the 
 country in its hands. The stake is so vast, 
 the issue so momentous, and the effect of the 
 next battle will be so important throughout 
 the future, as well as the present, that 1 con- 
 tinue to urge, as I have ever done since I en- 
 tered upon the command of this army, upon 
 the government to devote its energies 'and its 
 available resources towards increasing the 
 numbers and efficiency of the army on which 
 its salvation depends. 
 
 A statement, carefully prepared by the 
 chiefs of engineers and artillery of this army^ 
 gives as the necessary garrison of this city 
 and its fortifications 33,795 men — say 3.5,0!)!). 
 The present garrison of Baltimore and its de- 
 pendencies is about 10,000. I have sent the 
 chief of my staff to make a careful examina- 
 tion into the condition of these troops, and to 
 obtain the information requisite to enable me 
 to decide whether this number can be dimin- 
 ished or the reverse. At least 5,000 men will 
 be required to watch the river hence to 
 Harper's Ferry and its vicinity ; probably 
 8,000 to guard the. lower Potomac. 
 
 As you are aware, all the information we 
 have from sjaies, prisoners, &c., agree in show- 
 ing that the enemy have a force on the Poto- 
 mac not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled 
 and equipped, ably commanded and strongly 
 intrenched. It is plain, therefore, that to en- 
 sure success, or to render it reasonably 
 certain, the active army should not number 
 less than 150,000 efficient troops, with 400 
 guns, unless some material change occurs in 
 the force iu front of us. 
 
 The requisite force for an advance move- 
 ment by the army of the Potomac maybe thus 
 estimated : 
 
 Column of active operations 150,000 men, 400 guns, 
 
 Garrison of city of Washington 35,000 " 40 " 
 To guard Poto'c to Hrp's Ferry 5,000 " 12 " 
 
 To guard lower Potomac 8,000 " 24 " 
 
 Garrison for Bait, and Annapolis 10,000 " 12 ' 
 
 Total effective force required 208,000 men, 488 guns. 
 
 Or an aggre,gate, present and absent, of 
 about 240,000 men, should the losses by sick- 
 ness. &c., not rise to a higher per-centage than 
 at present. 
 
 Having stated what I regard as the requisite 
 
 force to enable this army to advance, I now 
 
 proceed to give the actual strength of the army 
 
 of the Potomac. 
 
 .The aggregate strength of the army of the 
 
Potomac Dy the ofiScial report on the morning 
 of the 27th inst. was 168,318 officers and men 
 of all grades and arms. This includes the 
 troops at Baltimore and Annapolis, on the up- 
 per and lower Potomac, the sick, absent, &c. 
 
 The force present for duty was 147,695. 
 Of this number 4,268 cavalry were completely 
 unarmed, 3,163 cavalry only partially armed, 
 5,979 infantry imequipped, making 13,410 un- 
 lit for the field, (irrespective of those not j^et 
 sufficiently drilled.) and reducing the effective 
 force to 134,285, and the number disposable 
 for an advance to 76,285. Tlie infantry regi- 
 ments are, to a considerable extent, armed 
 with unserviceable weapons — quite a large 
 number of good arms, which had been intend- 
 ed for this army, were ordered elsewhere, 
 leaving the army of the Potomac insufficiently 
 and, in some case*, badly armed. 
 
 On the 30th of September there were with 
 this army 228 field guns ready for the field, 
 £<> far as arms and equipments are concerned : 
 some of the batteries are still quite raw, and 
 imfit.to go into action. I have intelligence 
 that eight new batteries are en route hither : 
 two others are ready for the field. I will still 
 (if the New York batteries have six guns 
 each) be 112 guns short of the number requir- 
 ed for the active column, saying nothing for 
 the present of those necessary ibr the garri- 
 sons and corps on the Potomac, which would 
 make a total deficiency of 200 guns. 
 
 1 have thus briefly stated our present condi- 
 tion and wants : it remains to suggest the 
 means of supplying the deficiencies. 
 
 First. That all the cavalry and infantrj'- 
 arms, as fast as procured, whether manufac- 
 tured in this country or purchased abroad, be 
 sent to this army, until it is fully prepared 
 for the field. 
 
 Second. That the two companies of the 
 4th artillery, now understood to be en route 
 from Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, be ordered 
 to this arm}', to be mounted at once ; also that 
 the companies of the 3d artiller}', en route 
 from California, be sent here. Had not the 
 order for Smead's battery to come here from 
 Harrisburgh, to replace the battery I gave 
 G-eneral Sherman, been so often countermand- 
 i-d, I would again ask for it. 
 
 Tliird. That a more effective regulation 
 may be made, authorizing the transfer of men 
 from the volunteers to the regular batteries, 
 infantry and cavalry ; that we may make the 
 Ix-st possible use of the invaluable regular 
 "' skeletons." 
 
 Fourth. I have no official information as to 
 the United States' forces elsewhere ; but from 
 the best information I can obtain from the 
 War Department, and other sources, I am led 
 to beheve that the United States troops are, 
 
 In Western Virginia about 30,000 
 
 la Kentu(4:y about 40,000 
 
 tn Missouri about 80,000 
 
 In Fortress Monroe about 11,000 
 
 Total,.... 101,000 
 
 Besides these, I am informed that more thaa 
 100,000 are in progress of organization in other 
 nortliern and western states. 
 ^ I would therefore recommend that, not in- 
 terfering with Kentucky, there should be re- 
 tained in Western Virginia and Missouri a 
 sufficient force for defensive purposes, and 
 that the surplus troops be sent to the army 
 of the Potomac, to enable it to assume tho 
 offensive ; that the same course be pursued in 
 respect to Fortress Monroe, and that no fur- 
 ther outside expeditions be attempted until 
 we have fought the great battle hi front of 
 us. 
 
 Fifth. That every nerve be strained fo 
 liasten the enrollment, organization, and arma- 
 ment of new batteries and regiments of in- 
 fantry. 
 
 Sixth. That all the battalions now raised 
 for the new regiments of regular infantry bo 
 at once ordered to this army, and that the old 
 infantry and cavalry en route from California, 
 be ordered to this army immediately on their 
 arrival in Xew York. 
 • I have thus indicated, in a general manner, 
 the objects to be accomplished, and the means 
 by which we may gain our ends. 
 
 A vigorous employment of these means wiU 
 in my opinion, enable the army of the Poto- 
 mac 1o assume sucocssfully this season, the 
 ofi'ensive operations Avhich, ever since entering 
 upon the command, it has been my anxious 
 desire and diligent effort to prepare for and 
 prosecute. The advance should not be post- 
 poned beyond the 25th of November, if possi- 
 ble to avoid it. 
 
 Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and en- 
 ergy in action, are indispensable. The entjre 
 military field should be grasped as a whole, 
 and not in detatched parts. 
 
 One iDlan should be agreed. upon and pur- 
 sued ; a single will should direct and carry 
 out these plans. 
 
 The great object to be atcompHshed — the 
 crushing defeat of the rebel army [now] at 
 Manassas — should never for one instant be 
 lost sight of, but all the intellect and means 
 and men of the government poured upon that 
 point. The loyal States possess ample force 
 to effect all this, and more. The rebels have 
 displayed energy, unanimity, and • wisdom 
 worthy of the most desperate days of tho 
 French Revolution — should we do less ? 
 
 The unity of this nation, the preservation of 
 our institutions, are so dear to me tliat I have 
 willingl}' sacrificed my priA'ate hap])iness, with 
 tJiG single object of doing ni}' duty to my 
 country. Wlicn the task is accomplished I 
 shall be glad to return to the obsciu-ity from 
 which events have drawn me. 
 
 Whatever the determination of thc-J;overn- 
 ment may be, I will do the best I can with the 
 army of the Potomac, and will share its fate,, 
 whatever may be the task imposed upon me. 
 
 Permit me to add, that on this occasion as 
 heretofore, it has been mv aim neither to ex- 
 
aggerato nor underrate the power of the ene- 
 my, nor fail to express clearly the means by 
 ■which, in my judgment, that power may be 
 broken. Urging the energy of preparation 
 and action, wlii^h has ever been my choice, 
 but with tlie iixed purpose by no act of mine 
 to expose this government to hazard by prema- 
 ture movement, and requesting tliat this com- 
 munication may be laid before the President, 
 
 I have the lionor to be, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, G. B. ]\fcO. Maj.-Gen, 
 
 When I assumed command in Washington 
 on the 27th of July, 1861, the number of troops 
 in and around the city was about 50.000 infan- 
 try, less tlian 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillery 
 men, with nine imperfect field-batteries of thir- 
 ty pieces. 
 
 On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the 
 brigade organization of General McDowell still 
 existed, and the troops were stationed at and 
 in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort 
 Albany, at Fort Piunyon, Roach's Mihs, Cole's 
 Mill, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, witli 
 a detachment at the Theological Seminary. 
 
 There were no troops south of Hunting 
 Creek, and many of the regiments were en- 
 I camped on the low grounds bordering the Po- 
 tomac, — seldom in the best positions for de- 
 fense, and entirely inadequate in numbers and 
 condition to defend the long line .from Fort 
 Corcoran to Alexandria. • 
 
 On the ^laryland side of the river, upon the 
 heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two re- 
 giments were stationed, whose commanders 
 •were independent of each other. 
 *» There were no troops on the important Tcn- 
 all3'town road, or on the roads entering the 
 city from the south. 
 
 The camps were located without regard to 
 purposes of defense or instruction ; the roads 
 were not i^icketed, and there was no attempt 
 at an organization into brigades. 
 
 In no quarter were the dispositions for de- 
 fense such as to offer a vigorous resistance to 
 a respectable body of the enemy either in the 
 positions and numbers of the troops, or the 
 number and cliaracter of the defensive works. 
 Earthworks in the nature of " tetes-de-pont" 
 looked upon the approaches to the George- 
 ■ town aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge, 
 and Alexandria by the Little Paver Turnpike 
 and some simple defensive arrangements were 
 made at the Chain Bridge. With the latter 
 exception, not a single defensive work had 
 been commenced on the Maryland side. 
 
 Tiiere was nothing to pi-event the enemy 
 shelling the city from heights, within easy 
 range, which could be occupied by a hostile 
 column almost without resistance. ]\[any sol- 
 diers had deserted, and the streets of Wash- 
 ington were crowded with straggling officers 
 and meni absent from their, stations without 
 authority, whose behavior indicated the gener- 
 al want of discipline and organization. 
 
 1 at once designated an elTicient staff, after- 
 wards adding to it, as opportunity offered and 
 
 necessity require<l^ wno zealously co-operatea 
 with me in the labor of bringing order out of 
 confusion, reassigning troops and commands, 
 projecting and throwing up defensive works, 
 receiving and organizing, equipping and pro- 
 viding for the new levies arriving in the city. 
 *The valuable services of these officers in 
 tlicir various departments, during this and 
 throughout tlie subsequent periods of the his- 
 tory of the army of the Potomac, can hard!}' be 
 sufficiently appreciated. Their names and du- 
 ties will be given in another part of this re- 
 port, and they are commended to the favorable 
 notice of the War Department. 
 
 The restoration of order in the city of 
 Washington was effected througli the appoint- 
 ment of a provost marshal, whose authority 
 was supported bj^ the few regular troops with- 
 in my conmrand. These troops were thus in 
 position to act as a reserve, to be sent to any 
 point of attack where their services might 
 be most wanted. 
 
 The energy and ability displayed by Col. A. 
 Porter, the provost marshal and his assistants, 
 and the strict discharge of their duty by the 
 troops, produced the best results, and Wash- 
 ington soon became one of the most quiet 
 cities in the Union. 
 
 The new levies of infantry, upon arriving 
 in Washington, were' formed into provisional 
 brigades, and placed in camp in the suburbs 
 of the city for equipment, instruction and dis- 
 cipline. As soon as regiments were in fit con- 
 dition for transfer to the forces across tlie 
 Potomac, they were assigned to the brigades 
 serving there. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. F J. Porter was at first assigned 
 to the charge of the provisional brigades. 
 Brig.-Gen. A. E. Burnside was the next officer 
 assigned to this duty, from which, liowever, 
 he was soon relieved by Brig.-Gen. S. Casey, 
 who continued in charge ot the newly arriving 
 regiments until the army of the Potomac de- 
 parted for the Peninsida, in March, 1862. The 
 newly arriving artillery troops reported to 
 Brig.-Gen. Wm. F. Barry, the Chief of Artillery, 
 and the cavalry to Brig.-Gen. Geo. Stoueman, 
 the Chief of Cavalry. 
 
 By the 15th of October, the number of 
 troops in and about Washington, inclusive of 
 tlie garrison of the city and Alexandria, the 
 city guard, and the forces on the Maryland 
 shore of the Potomac, below Washington, and 
 as far as Cumberland above, the troops under 
 the command of Gen. Dix at Baltimore, and its 
 dependencies, was as follows : 
 
 Total present for duty f.S.SOl 
 
 " Rick fi,2a0 
 
 " in coafiaeiuent i,15G 
 
 Aggri'giite present 143.647 
 
 absent 8,404 
 
 Grand aggregate.-. 152,031 
 
 The following table exhibits sftnilar data 
 for the periods stated, includinji the troops in 
 Maryland and Delaware : 
 
PRESENT. S 
 
 PRKSEKT 
 AND 
 
 ABSENT. 
 
 Grand A g. 
 gregafe 
 
 
 For Duty 
 
 Sick. 
 
 In Oon- % 
 fiaement. 
 
 1861. 
 Dec. 1 
 1862. 
 Jan. 1 
 Feb. 1 
 Mch.l 
 
 169,451 
 
 191.480 
 190.806 
 193,142 
 
 15,102 
 
 14,790 
 14,373 
 13,167 
 
 2,189 11,470 
 
 2,260 11,707 
 2,917 14,110 
 2,108 13,570 
 
 198,213 
 
 219,707 
 222,196 
 221,937 
 
 For convenience of reference, the strength 
 of the army of the Potomac at subsequent 
 periods is given : 
 
 In organizing the army of tlie Potomac, and 
 preparing it for tlie field, the first step taken 
 was to organize the infantry into brigades 
 of four regiments each ; retaining the newly 
 arrived regiments on the itaryland sidp, until 
 their armament and equipment were issued, 
 and they had obtained some little elementary 
 instruction, before assigning them permanent- 
 ly to brigades. 
 
 When tlie organization of the brigades was 
 well established, and the troops somewhat dia^ 
 ciplined and instructed, divisions of three 
 brigades each were gradually formed. 
 
 As is elsewhere stated in this report 
 
 al- 
 
 1862. 
 April 30 
 June 20 
 July 10 
 
 For Duty. 
 
 Sick. 
 
 ; In Arrest or 
 Confiaement. 
 
 Officers] Men. •OfB«ers I Men. 
 
 4,725 
 4, .65 
 3,834 
 
 104.610 
 101,160 
 85,715 
 
 233 
 496 
 685 
 
 5.385 
 10,541 
 15 959 
 
 41 
 44 
 60 
 
 Men. 
 
 35« 
 3:^0 
 213 
 
 Aggre- 
 gate. 
 
 115 350 
 117.226 
 106,466 
 
 By Au- 
 thority, 
 
 11.037 
 27,700 
 34,638 
 
 Without 
 Authority 
 
 887 
 3,782 
 
 Grand Ag- 
 gregate 
 
 present and 
 absent. 
 
 126,387 
 145,813 
 144,886 
 
 tliough I was always in favor of the organiza- 
 tion mto army corps as an abstract principle, I 
 did not desire to form them until the army had 
 been for some little time in the field, in order to 
 enable the general officers first to acquire the 
 requisite experience as division commanders 
 on active service, and that I might be able to 
 decide from actual trial who were best fitted 
 to exercise those important commands. 
 
 For a similar reason, I carefully abstamed 
 from making any recommendations for the 
 promotion of officers to the grade of ilajor- 
 
 General. „ .„ • i 
 
 When new batteries of artillery arrived, 
 they also were retained in Washington until 
 their armament and equipment were com- 
 pleted, and their instruction sufficiently ad- 
 vanced, to justify their being assigned to 
 divisions. 
 
 The same coiu-se was p\u-sued m regard 
 to the cavalry. I rcsrret that circurasUuicee 
 have delayed the Chief of -Cavalry, Gen. Geo. 
 Stoneman, in furnishing his report upon the 
 organization of that arm of service. It will, 
 however, be forwarded as soon as completed, 
 and will, 'doubtless, show tliat the difficult and 
 important duties intrusted to him were effi- 
 ciently performed. He encountered and 
 overcame, as far as it was possible, continual 
 and vexatious obstacles arising from the great 
 deficiency of cavalry arms and Cvquipments, 
 and tho entire inefficiency of many of the re- 
 gimental oflicers first appointed ; this last dif- 
 ficulty was, to a considerable extent, overcome 
 in the cavalry, as well as in the infantry and 
 artillery, by the continual and prompt action 
 of courts-martial and boards of examination. 
 
 As rapidly as circumstances permitted, 
 every cavalry soldier was armed with a sabre 
 and revolver, and at least two squadrons in 
 every regiment with carbinea. 
 
 It was intended to assign at least one regi- 
 ment of cavalry to each division of the active 
 army, besides fcrming a cavalry reserve of the 
 
 regular regiments, and some picket re3;iment8 
 of volunteer cavalry. Circumstances beyond 
 my control renderetl it impossible to carry out 
 this intention fully, and the cavalry Jorce, 
 serving with the army in the field, wa.s never 
 as large as it ought to have been. 
 
 It was determined to collect the regular in- 
 fantry to form the nucleus of a reserve. Tho 
 advantage oi such a body of troops at a 
 critical 'moment, especially in an army con- 
 stituted mainly of new levies, imperfectly dis- 
 ciplined, has been frequently illustrated in 
 military history, and was brought to the atten- 
 tion of the country at the first battle of Man- 
 assas. I have not been disaiipointed in tho 
 estimate formed of the value of these troops. 
 I have always foimd them to be relied on ; 
 whenever they have been brought under fire, 
 they have shown the utmost gallantry and 
 tenacity. 
 
 The regular infantry, which had been col- 
 lected trom distant posts, and which had been 
 recruited as rapidly as the slow progress of 
 reci-uiting for the regular service would allow, 
 added to the small battalion with McDowell's 
 army, which I found at Washington, on my 
 arrival, amounted, on the 30th of August, to 
 1040 men; on the 28th of February, 18o2,to 
 20H2, and on the 30th of April, to 4G03. 
 
 On the 17th of May, 1862, they were assign- 
 ed to Gen. Porter's corps, for organization as 
 a division with the 5th regiment of New lork 
 Volunteers, which joined. May 4th, and the 
 10th New York Volunteers, which joined sub- 
 sequently. They remained from the com- 
 mencement, under the command of Bng.-Gen. 
 Geo. Sykes, ilajor 14th Infantry, U. S. Army. 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 The creation of an adequate artilloi;y estab- 
 lishment, for an army of so large proportions, 
 was a formidable undertaking ; and had it not 
 been that the country possessed, m the regu- 
 lar service, a body of accomplished and oner- 
 
getic artillery ofticers, the .jtask woulil have 
 been almost hopeless. ^. • .j,; , ^ 
 
 The charge of organizing this most impor- 
 tant army was confided to Major (afterwards 
 Brig.-Geu.) W. M. F. Barry, Cl],ief of Artillery, 
 whose industry and zeal achieved the best 
 results. The repert of Gen. B. is appended 
 among the accompanying documents. By re- 
 ferring to it, it will be observed that the fol- 
 lowing principles were adopted as the basis 
 of organization : 
 
 " 1st. That tlie proi:)ortion of artillery should 
 be in the ratio of at least 2i pieces to 1,000 
 men, to be expanded, if possible, to 3 pieces 
 to 1,000 men. 
 
 "2d. That the proportion of rifled guns 
 should be restricted to the system of the U. 
 S. Ordnance Department, and of Barrott, and 
 the smooth bores (with the exception of a few 
 howitzers for special service) to be exclu- 
 sively the 12-pounder gun, of the model of 
 1857, variously called the ' gun-howitzer,' the 
 ' light 12-pounder,' or the ' Napoleon.' 
 ^ " 3d. That each field-battery should, if prac- 
 ticable, be composed of 6 guns, and none to 
 be less than 4 guns, and in all cases the guns 
 of each battery should be of uniform calibre. 
 
 "_4th. That the field-batteries were to be 
 assigned to divisions, and not to brigades, and 
 in the proportion of 4 to each division, of which 
 one was to be a battery of regulars, th(*Te- 
 mainder of volunteers, the captain of the re- 
 gular battery to be the commandant of artil- 
 lery of the division. In the event of several 
 divisions constituting an army corps, at least 
 one-half of the divisional artillery was to con- 
 stitute the reserve of the corps. 
 
 " 5th. That the artillery reserve of the whole 
 army, should consist of 100 guns, and should 
 comprise, besides a sufficient number of light 
 ' mounted batteries,' all the guns of position, 
 and until the cavalry was massed, all the 
 horse artiller3^ ' ' 
 
 " 6th. That the amount of ammunition to ac- 
 company the field batteries, was not to be less 
 than 400 rounds per gun. 
 
 " 7th. A siege train of 50 pieces. This was 
 subsequently expanded— for special service at 
 tlie siege of Yorktown — to very nearly 100 
 pieces, and comprised the unusual calibres, 
 and enormously heavy weight of metal of 2 
 200-pounders ; 5 100-ppunders, and 10 thir- 
 ton-inch sea-coast mortars." 
 i.. As has been before stated, the Chio£ of 
 Artillery reports : 
 
 '• The whole of the field-artillery of the army 
 ©fthe Potomac, July 28th, 1861, was com- 
 prised of 9 imperfectly equipped batteries of 
 39 guns, 650 men, and 400 horses. In March, 
 1862, when the whole army took the fiL-ld it 
 consisted of 92 batteries of 520 guns, 12 500 
 men, and i L,0U0 horses, fully equipped, and in 
 readmess for active field service. Of the 
 whole force, 30 batteries were regulars, and 
 6^ batteries volunteers. During the sliort 
 period of seven months, all of this immense 
 
 S 
 
 amount of material was issued by the Ordnance 
 Dci)artment, and placed in the hands of the 
 artdiery troops after their ai rival in Washine- 
 ton. ^ 
 
 " About one-fourth of all the volunteer, bat- 
 teries brought with them from their respect- 
 ive States a few guns and carriages, but they 
 v?ere nearly all of such peculiar calibre, as to 
 lack uniformity with the more modern and 
 more serviceable ordnance, with which the 
 other batteries were armed, and they, there- 
 fore, had to be withdrawn and replaced by 
 more suitable , material. While about one- 
 sixth came supplied with horses and harness,, 
 less_ than one-tenth were apparently fully 
 equipped for service when they reported, and 
 every one of these required the supply of 
 many deficiencies of material, and very ex- 
 tensive instruction in the theory and practice 
 of their special arm. 
 
 ***** 
 " The operations on the Peninsula by the 
 army of the Potomac, commenced with a full 
 field-artillery force of 52 batteries of 299 gims. 
 To this, must be added the field-artillery of 
 Franklin's division, of McDowell's corps, 
 which joined a few days before the capture of 
 Yorktown, but was not disembarked from its 
 transports for service until after the battle of 
 Williamsburg; and the field-artillery of Mc- 
 CaU's division, of McDowell's corps— 4 bat- 
 teries, 22 guns — which joined in June, a few 
 days before the battle of "Mechanicsville. (June 
 2Gtn, 1862), making a grand total of field-artil- 
 lery, at any time with the army of the Potomac 
 of 60 batteries, of 343 guns. With this large 
 force serving in six corps-d'armee of eleven 
 divisions, and the artillery reserve, the only 
 general and field-officers v^'ere 1 brigadier-gene- 
 ral, 4 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, and 3 
 majors ;_ a number obviously insufficient, and 
 which impaired, to a great degree, in conse- 
 quence of the want ot rank and official influ- 
 ence of the commanders of corps and division 
 artillery, the efficienciy of the arm. As this 
 faulty organization can be" suitably corrected 
 only by legislative action, it is earnestly hoped 
 that the attention of the proper authorities 
 may be at an early day invited to it. 
 
 " When there were so many newly organized 
 volunteer field-batteries, many of whom re- 
 ceived their first and only instruction in the 
 intrenched camps covering Washington, during 
 the three or four inclement months of the win- 
 ter of 1861-62, there was, of course, much to 
 be improved. Many of the volunteer batteries, 
 however, evinced such zeal and intelligence, 
 and availed themselves so industriously of the 
 instructions of the regular officers, their com- 
 manders and the example of the regular bat- 
 teries, their associates, that they made rapid 
 progress, and attained a degree of proficiencj 
 highly creditable." 
 
 The zeal and services of Major A. S. Webb, 
 assistant to General Barry, entitle him to espe- 
 cial praise. At the close of the Peninsula 
 
fainpaign, General Barry assumed the duties 
 of chief x)f artillery of the defenses of Wash- 
 ington, and was relieved in his former position 
 by Ool. 11. J. ilunt, who had commanded tiie 
 artillery reserve with marked skill, and brought 
 to his duties as chief of artillery the highest 
 qualitications. The services of this distin- 
 guished officer in r.e-organizing and re-fitting 
 the bafteries prioE to and after the battle of 
 Anxietam, and his gallant and am'f skillful cou- 
 iluct on tiiat field, merit the highest enconiuins 
 lu my power to bestow. His -assistant, i\[;ij(?r 
 Doull, deserves high credit for his services 
 iud gallantry throughout both campaigns. 
 
 [Derailed statement of the distribution of 
 various regiments and batteries, as they ar- 
 rived in Washington at this period ; and, also, 
 au account of the composition of the army on 
 the 15th of October, 1862, which are given in 
 yiieldon's edition of the Report, are omitted in 
 this edition.] 
 
 ARMY CORPS. 
 
 On the 8tb of j\tarch. 1862. the President di- 
 rected, by the following order, the organization 
 of the active portion of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, into four army corps, and the formation 
 ol a tifth corps, from the divisions of Banks 
 -wd Shields. The loilowing; is the text of the 
 Presideui's order : 
 
 Executive Mansion, 
 Washington, March 8th, 1862. 
 /'resident's General War Order, No. 2. 
 
 Ordered \st. That the Major-General com- 
 manding the Army of tlie Potomac, proceed, 
 forthVith, to organize that part of said armj' 
 designed to enter upon active operations, (in- 
 •iuding the reserve, but excluding the troops 
 lO be left in the fortifications about \Vasiiing- 
 ton), into four arniy corps, to be commanded 
 according to seniority of rank, as follows : 
 
 Isl Corps. To consist of four divisions, and 
 lo be commanded by I\[o,j.-Geu. I. McDowell. 
 
 2d Corps. To consist of three divisions, and 
 to be commanded by iJrig.-Gen. E. V. Sumner. 
 
 'id Corps. To consist of three divisions, and 
 to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. S* P. Heintzel- 
 inan. 
 
 4i/« Corps. To consist of "three divisions, and 
 to be commanded by Brig.-Gen. H D. Keyes. 
 
 2d. That the divisions now commanded by 
 the otTicers above assigned to the commands 
 of army corps, shall be embi-aced in and form 
 part of their respective corps. 
 
 3d. The forces Jeft for the defense of Wash- 
 ington, v/iU lie placed in command of Brig.- 
 tien. -James 'Wadsworth, wiio shall also be 
 Military Governor of the District of Columbia. 
 
 4th. That this order be executed with such 
 promptness and dispatch, as not to delay the 
 commencement of the operations already di- 
 rected to be undertaken by the Army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 5th. A fifth army corps to be conmiandcd by 
 Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, will be formed from his 
 own, and General Shields', late Gen. Lauder's, 
 division. A. Lincoln. 
 
 The follolving order, which v?as made as 
 seem £\g circumstances permitted, exliibits the 
 steps takcli to carry out the requirements of 
 the Preisdent's War Order, No. 2 ': 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Fairfax Court House, Va., March 13, 1862. 
 General Orders, li'o. 101 : 
 
 In compliuuce with the President's Wac 
 Order, No. 2, of March 8th, 1862, the active 
 portion of tho army of ihe Potoma'c is formed 
 into corps, as follows i 
 
 1«/. Corps, Major-Gen. Irwin McDowell, to 
 consist^ for the present, of the divisions of 
 Franklin, ^IcCall, and King. 
 
 2d. Corps, Brig.-Gen. E. V, Sumner, divis- 
 ions. Ptichardson. Blenker and Sedgwick. 
 
 3(/. Corps, Brig.-Geik S. P. Heintzelman, di- 
 jiisions, F. J.Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton. 
 
 Aili. Corps, Brig-Gen. E. D. Keye&, divisions. 
 Couch, Smith, and Casey. 
 
 5<7i. Coi-ps. Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, divisions, 
 Williams and Shields. 
 
 The ciwalry regiments attached'1;o divisions, 
 will, for the present remain so ; subsequent , 
 orders will provide for these regiments, ag- 
 well as for the reserve artillery, regular infan- 
 try, and regular cavalry. ; 
 
 Arrangements will be made to unite the di- 
 visions of each army corps, as promptly as 
 possible. The -commanders of divisions will 
 at once report in person, or where that is im- 
 possible, by letter to the commander of their 
 army corps. By command of 
 
 jMaj.-Gek. McClellax, 
 
 A. V. CoLBURx, Ass't. Adjt.-Gen'l. 
 
 [The details of the organization of the army^ 
 April 1, 1862, are omitted in this edition 
 THE STAFF. 
 
 In a staff charged with labors so various 
 and important as that of the army of the Poto- 
 mac, a chief was indispeusible to supervise 
 the various departments, and to relieve tho 
 commanding general of details. The office of 
 chief-of-staff, well known in European armies, 
 had not been considered necessary in our ■ 
 small peace establishment. The functions of 
 the office were not defined, ■ and, so far as 
 exercised, had been included in the adjutant- 
 general's department. The small number of 
 officers in this department, and the necessity 
 for their employment in other duties, have 
 obliged commanding generals during this war 
 to resort to other branches of the service to 
 fm'nish suitable chiefs-of-staft". 
 
 On the 4th of September, 1861, 1 appointed 
 Colonel R. B. Maroy, of the inspector-general's 
 department, chief-of-staff, and he entered upon 
 service innnediately, discharging the various 
 and important duties with great fidelity, in- 
 dustry, and ability, from this period until I was 
 removed from command at Rectortown. 
 
 Many improvements have been made during 
 the war in oursysnemof stall' administration; 
 but much remains to be done. 
 Our own experience and that of other armies 
 
10 
 
 ajp"ee in determining the necessity i'or an 
 efficient and able stiiff. To obtain tliis, our 
 staff establisbment sliould be based on correct 
 principles and extended to be adequate .to the 
 necessities of the service, and should include 
 a system of staff and Une education. 
 
 the affairs of the adjutant-gcneraFs depart- 
 ment, while I commanded the army of the 
 Potomac, Avere conducted by Brig.-Gen. S. 
 Williams,- assisted bv Lieiit.-Col. James A. 
 Hardie, A. D. C. 
 
 Their management of the department during 
 the organization of tin? army, in the fall and 
 winter of 1861, and during its subsequent 
 "operations in the held, was excellent. 
 
 They were, during the entire period, assist- 
 ed by Capt. Rd. B. Irwin, A. D. C, and during 
 the organization of the army by the following 
 named officers : "^ 
 
 Capt. Jos. Kirkland, A. D. C. ; Capt. Arthur 
 McClpllan,.A. D. C. ; Capt. M. T. McMaiion, 
 A. D. C. ; Capt. W. P. Mason, A. D. C. ; Capt. 
 W. F. Biddlc, A. D. C. 
 
 •^Ty personal staff, when wc embarked for 
 the peninsula, consisted of — 
 
 Col. T. M. Key, additional A. D. C. ; Col. E. 
 II. "Wright, do.,' and Major 6th U. S. Cavalry ; 
 Col. T. T. Gantt, add. A. D. C. ; Col. J. J. Astor, 
 Jr., volunteer aid-de-camp ; Lieut.-Col. A. Y. 
 Colburn, add. A. D. C, and Captain in adjutant- 
 general's department ; Lieut.-Col. N. B. Sweit- 
 zer, add. A. D. C, and Capt. 1st U. S. Cavalry -, 
 Lieut.-Col. E. M. K. Hudson, add. A. D. C. and 
 Capt. 14th U. S. Infantry ; Lieut. Col. Paul Von 
 Radowitz, add. A. D. G. ; Maj. II. Von Ham- 
 merstein, add. A. D. C. ; Maj.'W. AV. Russell, 
 U. S. Marine Corps ; Maj. F. Lecompte, of Swiss 
 armv, volunteer tiid-de-camp ; Capt. Jos. Kirk- 
 land", add. A. B.C. ; Capt. Arthur McClellan, add. 
 A. D. C. ; Capt. L. P. D'Orleana, do. ; Capt. R. 
 D'Orleans, do. ; Capt. M. T. McMahon; do. ; 
 Capt. W. P. Mason, Jr., do. ; Capt. W. F. Biddle, 
 do.; Catp. E. A. Raymond. 
 
 To this number I am tempted to add the 
 Prince de Joinville, who constantly accom- 
 panied mc through the trying campaign of the 
 peninsula, and frequently rendered important 
 service. 
 
 Of these officers, Capt. McMahon was as- 
 signed to the personal staff of Brig.-Gen. 
 Franklin, and Cajtts. Kirkland and Mason to 
 that of r.rig.-Gen. F. J. Porter, during the siege 
 of Vorktown : they remained subsequently 
 with those general officers. 
 
 Major Le'Compte left the army during the 
 eiegc of Yorktown ; Col. Gantt, Col. Astor, Maj. 
 Russell. Capts. L. P. D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, 
 and Raymond, at the close of the Peninsula 
 campaign. 
 
 Before its termination, Capts. W. S. Abert 
 and Chas. R. Lowell, of the 6th U. vS. Cavalry, 
 and Capt. (J. A. Custer, 1st Lieut- 5th U. S. Ca- 
 valry, joined my staff' as aids-de-camp, and re- 
 mained witji me until I was relieved from tiie 
 command of the army of the Potomac. 
 
 All of tliese officers served me with great 
 
 gallcintry and devotion ; 'hey were ever ready 
 to execute any service, no matter how danger- 
 ous, difficult, or fatiguing. 
 INSPEGfOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT. 
 
 The highly important duties of this depart- 
 ment were performed by Col. D. B. Sacket and 
 Major N. II. Davis, to my entire .satisfaction, 
 They introduced many valuable changes in 
 the system of inspections and in (he forms of 
 reports, and so systematized the labors of the 
 inspectors of corps and divisions that excellent 
 results were obtained. The intelligent and 
 energetic perforftiance of their duties by these 
 officers enabled me to keep myself well in- 
 formed of the condition of the troops and cor- 
 rect evils promptly. 
 
 ENGINEERS. 
 
 When I assumed command of the Army o1 
 tlie Potomac, I found Major J. G. Barnard, U. 
 S. Engineers, subseqilently Brig.-Gen. of vol- 
 unteers, (.ccupying the position of chief en- 
 gineer of the army. I continued him in the 
 same office, and at once gave the necessary 
 instructions for the completion of the defences 
 of the capital, and for tlie entire reoi-ganiza- 
 tion of the department. 
 
 Under his direction the entire system ot 
 defences was carried into execution. This 
 was completed before the army departed for 
 Fort Monroe, and is a sufficient evidence of 
 the skill of the engineers and the dihgent la- 
 bor of the troops. 
 
 For some months after the organization of 
 the army of the Potomac was commenced, 
 there were no engineer troops with it ; at 
 length, however, three companies were as- 
 signed. Under the skillful management of 
 Capt. J. C. Duane, U. S. Engineew;, these new 
 companies rapidly became efficient, and, as 
 will be seen, rendered most valuable service 
 during the ensuing campaigns. 
 
 The number ot engineer troops being entire- 
 ly inadequate to the necessities of the army, 
 an effort was made to partially remedy this 
 defect, by detailing the 1 5th and 50th New York 
 Volunteers, which contained many sailors and 
 mechanics, as engineer troops. They were first 
 placed unrley the immediate superintendence 
 of Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, U. S. Engineers, 
 by whom they were instructed in the duties 
 of pontooneers, and became somewhat familiar 
 with those of sa^Jij^ers and miners. Previous 
 to the movement of the army for the Penin- 
 sula, this brigade was placed u^ider the com- 
 mand of Brig.-Gen. D. P. Woodbury, Major 
 U. S. Engineers. 
 
 The labor of preparing the engineer and 
 bridge trains devolved chiefly upon Capt. 
 Duane, who was instructed to procure the 
 new model French bridge train, as I was satis- 
 fied that the India-rubber pontoon was entirely 
 useless for the general purposes of a cam- 
 paign. 
 
 The engineer department presented the fol- 
 lowing complete organization when the array 
 moved for the Peninsula : 
 
li 
 
 Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard, Cliief Engineer ; 
 let Lieut. H. L. Abbott, Top, Engineers, A. D.C. ; 
 Brigade Vol. Engineora, ]5rig.-Gen. Woodbury, 
 comm'g. ; 15th New York Vols., Col. ^IcLeod 
 Murphy ; 50th do.. Col. C. B. Stewart ; Bat- 
 talion 3 Cos. U. S. Engineers, Capt. J. C. Duane, 
 comm'g. ^ 
 
 Companies respectively commanded by 1st 
 Lieut. C.B. Reese, U. S. Enghieers ; 1st C. 
 E. Cross, do. ; 1st Lieut 0. E. Bubcock, do. 
 
 The chief engineer was ably assisted in his 
 d«ities by Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, U. S. 
 Engineers ; 1st Lieut. C. R. Comstock, do. ; 1st 
 Lieut. M. I). McAlester, do. ; 1st Lieut. Mer- 
 rill, do. 
 
 ;Capt. C. S. Stewart, and 2d Lieut. F. U. Far- 
 quhar, U. S. Engineers, joined after the army 
 arrived at Fort M«nroe. 
 
 The necessary bridge equipage for the 
 operations of a large army had been collected, 
 consisting of batteaux with the anchors and 
 flooring material, (French model.) trestles and 
 engineers' tools, with the wagons for tlieir 
 transportation. 
 
 The small number of officers of this corps 
 available rendered it impracticable to detail 
 engineers permanently at the headquarters of 
 corpf and divisions. 
 
 The companies of regular engineers never 
 had their proper number of officers, and it 
 was necessary, as a rule, to follow the prin- 
 ciple of detailiiag engineer officers temporarily 
 where ever tlieir services were required. 
 TOrOGRAPHIOAL ENGINEERS. 
 
 To the corps of Topographical Engineers 
 wus intrusted the collection of topographical 
 information and the preparation of campaign 
 mai)s. Until a -short time previous to the de- 
 parture of the army for Fort Monroe, Ijieut.- 
 ("ol. John W. Macomb, was in charge of this 
 department, and prepared a large amount of 
 valuable material. He was succeeded by 
 13rig.-Gen. A. A. Humphreys, who retained 
 the position throughout the peninsular cam- 
 paign. 
 
 These offiers were assisted by Lieut. H. ^. 
 Abbot, Topographical Engineers ; Lieut. 0. G. 
 Wagner, do. ; Lieut. N. Bowen, do. ; Lieut. 
 John M. Wilson, do. ; Lieut. James H. Wilson, 
 do. 
 
 This number, being' the greatest available, 
 was so small that much of the duty of the de- 
 partment devolved upon parties fui-nisked by 
 Professor Bache, Superintendent 'of Coast Sur- 
 vey, and other gentlemen from civil life. fj^ 
 
 Owing to the entire absence of reliable topo- 
 graphical maps, the labors of this corps were 
 difficult and ardous in the extreme. Notwith- 
 Btauding the energy and ability displayed by 
 General Humphreys, Lieut.-Col. Macomb and 
 their subordinates, who frequently obtained 
 the necessary information under lire, the move- 
 ments of the array were sometimes unavoida- 
 bly delayed by the difficulty of obtaining 
 knowledge of the country in advance. The 
 result of their labors has been the preparation 
 
 of an excellent series of maps, whicfi -will be 
 invaluable to any army traversing the same 
 ground. 
 
 During the campaign it was impossible to 
 draw a distinct line of demarcation between 
 the duties of tlie two corps of engineers, bo 
 that the labors of reconnoissances of roads, of 
 lines for trenches, of fields for battle, and of 
 the positions of the enemy, as well as the con- 
 struction of siege and defensive works, werfe 
 habitually perf(jrmed by detail from either 
 corps as the convenience of the service de- 
 manded. 
 
 I desire to express my higli appreciation of 
 the skill, gallantry, and devotion displayed by 
 the officers of both corps of engiiieers under 
 the most trying circumstances. 
 
 Daring the Maryland campaign I united the 
 two corps under Captain J. C. Duane, U. S. 
 Engineers, and found great advantages, from i 
 this arrangement. "' ' " 
 
 MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 
 
 For, the operations of tiie medical depart-, 
 ment I refer to the reports transmitted here- 
 with, of Surgeon Chas. S. Tripler, and Surgeon 
 JoJiathan Letterman, who, in turn, performed 
 the duties of medical director of the army of 
 the Potomac : the former 'from August 12, 
 1861, until July 1, 18^2, and the latter aftef 
 that date. 
 
 The difficulties to be overcome, in organiz-;',, 
 ing arid making effective the medical depart-' " 
 ment, were very great, arising principally 
 from the inexperience of the regimental medi- 
 cal officers, many of whom were physicians 
 taken suddenly from civil life, who, according 
 to Surgeon Tripler," had to be instructed in 
 their duties from the very alphabet," and from 
 the ignorance of the line officers as to their re- 
 lations with the medical officers, which gave 
 rise to confusion and conflict of authority. 
 
 Boards of examination were instituted, by 
 whicn many incompetent officers were re- 
 moved, and by the successive exertions of 
 Surgeons Tripler and Letterman the medical 
 corps was brought to a very high degree of 
 efficiency. 
 
 With regard to the sanitary condition of tha 
 army while on the Potomac, Dr. Tripler says, 
 that the records show a constant!}' increasing 
 inmiunity from disease. " In October and 
 November, 18G1, with an army averaging 
 130,000 men, we had 7,932 cases of fever of 
 all sorts; of these about 1,000 were reported 
 as cases of typhoid fever. I knew that errors 
 of diagnosis were frequently committed, and 
 therefore this^nuist be considered as the limit 
 of typhoid cases. If any army in the world 
 can show such a record as this, I do not know 
 when or where it was assembled." 
 
 From September, 18G1, to February, 1862,,, , 
 while the army was increasing, the Jiumber oi,- 
 sick decreased from 7 per cent, to 6.18 pej",,_ 
 cent. ; ot these, the men sick in iho regimentai/.' 
 and general hospitals, were less than one-half,,,,, 
 the remainder were slight cases uixler tie.at- . ( 
 
meut in quarters. " During this time, so far 
 as rumor was concerned, the army was being 
 decimated by disease every month." ' • - 
 
 Of the sanitary condition of the army during 
 the peninsular campaign, up to its arrival at 
 Harrison's Landing, Dr. Tripler sa3's : 
 
 " During this campaign the army was favor- 
 ed with excellent health. No epidemic dis- 
 eage appeared. Those scourges of modern 
 armies — dysentery, typhus, cholera — were al- 
 most unknown. We had some typhoid fever, 
 and more malarial fevers ; but even these 
 never prevailed to such an extent as to create 
 any alarm. The sick reports were sometimes 
 larger than we cared to have them, but the 
 great majority of the cases reported were 
 such as did not threaten life, or permanent 
 disability. I regret that I have not before me 
 the retained copies of the monthly reports, so 
 that I might give accurate statistics. I have 
 endeavored to recover them, but have been 
 unsuccessful. My recollection is that the 
 whole sick report never exceeded 8 per cent. 
 of the force, and this included all sorts of 
 cases — the trivial as well as the severe. The 
 army of the Potomac must be considered to 
 have been the most healthy army in the ser- 
 vice of the United States." 
 
 His remarks at the conclusion of his report 
 npon our system of medical administration, 
 and his suggestions for its improvement, are 
 especially worthy of attention. 
 
 The severe labors and privations of the 
 troops during the seven day's battles, had of 
 course a great effect on the health of the army 
 after it reached Harrison's Landing, increasing 
 the number of sick to about 20 per cent, of the 
 whole force. 
 
 The nature of the military operations had 
 also unavoidably placed the medical depart- 
 ment in a very unsatisfactory condition. Sup- 
 plies had been almost entirely exhausted, or 
 necessarily abandoned ; hospital tents aban- 
 doned or destroyed ; and the medical officers 
 deficient in numbers and broken down by 
 fatigue. 
 
 All the remarkable energy 'and ability of 
 Surgeon Letterman were required to restore 
 the efficiency of his department, but before we 
 left Harrison's Landing he had succeeded in 
 fitting it out throughout with the supplies it 
 required, and the health of the army was vast- 
 ly improved by the sanitary measures which 
 were enforced at his suggestion. 
 
 The great haste with which the army was 
 removed from the Peninsula, made it necessa- 
 ry to leave at Fort Monroe, to be forwarded 
 afterwards, nearly all the baggage and trans- 
 portation, including medical stores and ambu- 
 lances, all the vessels being required to trans- 
 port the trooj)s tliemselves and their ammuni- 
 tion ; and when the army of the Potomac re- 
 turned to Washington, after General Pope's 
 campaign, and tlic medical department came 
 once more under Surgeon lietternuiu's control, 
 Jio foimd it in a deplorable condition. 
 
 12 
 
 Tlie ollicers were worn out by the labors 
 they had performed, and the few supplies that 
 had been brought from the Peninsula had been 
 exhausted or abandoned,' so tliat tlie work of 
 reorganization and resupplying had to be 
 again performed, and this while the army was 
 moving rapidly and almost in the face of the 
 enemy. That it was successfully accomplish- 
 ed is shown by the care and attention which 
 the wounded received after the battles of South 
 Mountain and Antietam. 
 
 Among the improvements introduced into* 
 his department by Surgeon Letterman, the 
 principal are, the organization of an ambulance 
 corps, the system of field-hospitals, and the 
 method of supplying by brigades ; all of which 
 were instituted during the Maryland cam- 
 paign, and have since proved verv efficient. 
 QUARTER-MASTER'S DEPARTMENT.] '■■'"■■ 
 On assuming command of the troops in and 
 about Washington, 1 appoiirted Captain S. 
 Van Vliet, A. Q. M., (afterwards Brigadier- 
 General.) Chief Quarter-master to my command, 
 and gave him the necessary instructions for 
 organizing his department, and collecting the 
 supplies requisite for the large army then 
 called for. ^ 
 
 The disaster at Manassas had but recently 
 occurred, and the army was quite destitute of 
 quarter-masters' stores. 
 
 General Van Yliet, with great energy and 
 zeal, set himself about the task of furnishing 
 the supplies immediately necessary, and pre- 
 paring to obtain the still larger amounts which 
 would be required bj' the new troops which 
 were moving in large numbers towards the 
 capital. 
 
 The principal depot for supplies in the city 
 of Washington Avas under charge of Col. D. H. 
 Rucker, A. Q. M., who ably performed his du- 
 ties. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. R. Ingalls, A. Q. M., was placed 
 in charge of the department on the south side 
 of the Potomac. I directed a large depot for 
 transportation to be established at Perryville, 
 on the left bank of the Susquehaima, a i^oint 
 equally accessible by rail and water. Capt. 
 C. G. Sawtelle, A. Q. M., had immediate charge 
 of the transportation in and about Washing- 
 toM, as well as of the large number of horses 
 purchased for' the use of tlie artiiler}'- and cav- 
 alry. The principal difficulties which Gen. 
 A' an Yliet had to encounter arose from the in- 
 experience of the majority of the officers of 
 his department in the new regiments and brig- 
 gades. Tlie necessity of attending personally 
 to minor details rendered his duties arduous 
 and harassing in the extreme. All obstacles, 
 however, were surmounted by the untiring in- 
 dustry of the chief-quarter master and his im- 
 mediate subordinates, and when the army was 
 ])repared to move, the organization of the 
 de])artment was found to be admirable. 
 
 When it was determined to move the army 
 to the peninsula, the duties of providing water 
 transportation were dovolvod, bv the Secretary 
 
of War, upon uis assistant, the Hon. J, Tucker 
 The vessels were 'ordered to Alexandria, and 
 Lient.-Col. Ingulls was placed in immediate 
 charge of the embarkation of the troops, trans- 
 portation, and material of every description. 
 Operations of this nature on so extensive a 
 scale had no parallel in the history of our 
 country. 
 
 The arrangements of Lieut.-Col. lugalls were 
 perfected with remarkable skill and energ}^ 
 and the army and its material, were embarked 
 and transported to Fort Monroe in a very short 
 space of time, and entirely without loss. 
 
 During the operations on the Peninsula, until 
 the arrival of troops at Harrison's Landing, 
 Gen. Van Yliet retained the position of Chief 
 Quartermaster, and maintained the thorough 
 organization and efficiency of his department. 
 
 The principal depots of supplies were under 
 the.immediate chai*ge of Lieut.-Col. Ligalls and 
 
 On the 10th of July^ l8C2, Gen. Tan Yliet, 
 having requested to be Tclieved from duty 
 with the army ojf the Potomac, I appointed 
 Xieut.-Col. Ingalls Chief Quartermaster, and he 
 continued to discharge tlae duties of that office 
 during the remainder of the Peninsular and 
 the Maryland camp^iigns, in a manner which 
 fully sustained the high reputation he had pre- 
 .viously acquii'ed. 
 
 .. The immense amount of labor accomjalished, 
 often under the most difficult circumstances, 
 tl\e admirable system under which the duties 
 of the department were performed, and the 
 entire success which attended the efforts to 
 supply so large an army, reflect the highest 
 credit upon the officers upon whom these 
 onerous duties devolved. The reports of Gen. 
 Van Yliet, and Lieut.-Col. lugalls, with the ac- 
 companying documents, give, in detail, the 
 history of the department, from its organiza- 
 tion until I was relieved from the command of 
 the army of the Potomac. 
 
 SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT. 
 _ On the 1st of August, 1861, Colonel H. I. 
 Clarke, C. S., joined my staff, and at once enter- 
 ed upon his duties as Chief Commissary of the 
 army of the Potomac. In order to realize the 
 responsibilities pertaining to this office, as well 
 as to form a proper estimate of the vast amount 
 of labor which must necessarily devolve jipon 
 its occupant, it is only necessary to consider 
 the unprepared state of the country to engage 
 in a war of such magnitude as the present, 
 aud the lack of practical knowledge on the 
 part of our officers, with reference to supply- 
 ing and subsisting a large, aud, at that time, 
 an unorganized army. Yet, notwitastauding 
 the existence of these great obstacles, the 
 manner in which the duties of the commissary 
 department were discharged, was such as to 
 merit, and call fuii.h the commendation of the 
 entire army. During the stay of the army of 
 the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington, 
 prior to the Peninsular campaign, its subsist- 
 ence was drawn chiefly from the depots which 
 
 13 
 
 had been established by the commi ssary de 
 partment at Washington, Alexandria, Forts 
 Corcoran and Runyon. In the important task 
 of designating and establishing depots of sup- 
 plies, Colonel Clarke was ably seconded by his 
 assistants. Col. Amos Beckwith, C. S., U. S A., 
 Lieut.-Col. Geo. Bell, C. S., U. S. A.. Lieut.-Col. 
 A. P. Porter, C.S., U.S.A., Capt. Thomas Wil- 
 son, C. S., U. S. A,, Capt BrowueU Granger, C.S., 
 U. S. Vols., Capt. W. H. Bell. C. S., U.S. A., 
 Capt.. I H. Woodward, C. S., U. S. Vols., and 
 Captain W. R. Murphy, C. S., I J. S. Vols. For 
 a full knowledge of the highly creditabo man- 
 ner in which each and all of ihe above men- 
 tioned officers discharged their duties,! invite 
 attention to the detailed report of Col. Clarke. 
 The remarks and suggestions contained in this 
 report, are worthy of attention, as affording 
 valuable rules for the future guidance of the 
 subsistence department, in suppljnng armies 
 in the field. The success of the subsistence de- 
 partment of the army of the Potomac, was, in 
 a great measure, attributable to the fact, that 
 the subsistence department at Washington 
 made ample previous provision for sending 
 supplies to the peninsula, and that it always 
 exercised the most intelligent foresight. It 
 morever gave its advise and countenance to 
 the officers charged with its duties and repu- 
 tation in the field , and those officers, I am 
 happy to say, worked with it and together,. ifl 
 perfect harmony, for the public good. ■■ 
 
 During the entire period that I was in oom- 
 mand of the army of the Potomac there was 
 no instance within my knowledge, where the 
 troops were without their, rations from any 
 fault of tlie officers of this department. 
 ORDINANCE DEPARTMENT. 
 This very important branch of the service 
 was placed under tlie. charge of Capt. C. P. 
 Kingsbury, ordnance corps, Colonel and A.D. 
 C. Great difficulty existed in the proper or- 
 ganization ot the department, from the want 
 of a sufficient number of suitable officers to 
 perform the duties at the various headquarters 
 and depots of supply. But far greater obsta- 
 cles had to be sm-mounted, from the fact 
 that the supply of small arms was totally in- 
 adequate to the demands of a large army, and 
 a vast proportion of those furnished, were of 
 such inferior quality, as to be unsatisfactory 
 to the troops, and condemned by their ofiicers. 
 The supply of artillery was more abundant, 
 but of great varipty. Rifled ordnance was just 
 coming into use for the flrst time in this coun- 
 try, and the description of gnn and kind of 
 projectile, which would prove most eflective, 
 and should therefoi'e be adopted, was a mere 
 matter of theory. , "i 
 
 To obviate these difficulties, large quantities 
 of small arms of foreign manufacture were 
 contracted for; private enterprise in the con- 
 struction of arras and ammunition was en- 
 couraged ; and by the timevthe army was or- 
 dered to move to the peninsula, tlie amount 
 of ordnance and ordnance stores was ample. 
 
Much, also, had been done to Dnng the quality 
 both of arras and ammunition, up to the pro- 
 per standard, Boards of officers were in ses- 
 sion continually, during the autumn and winter 
 of 1861, to test thercia'Ave merits of new arms 
 and projectiles. The reports of these boards, 
 confirmed by subsequent experience in the 
 field, have done much to establish the respec- 
 tive claims of different inventions and manu- 
 factories. Durifig the campaigns of the Pen- 
 insula and Maryland, the officers comiected 
 Tvitii the department, were zealous and ener- 
 getic, and kept the troops well supplied, not- 
 withstanding tlie perplexing and arduous iia- 
 iure of their duties. One great source of per- 
 plexity, was the fact, that it had been neces- 
 sary to issue arms of all varieties and calibres 
 giving an equal diversity in tlie kinds of am- 
 munition required. Untiring watchfulness was 
 therefore incumbent upon the officers in charge 
 to prevent confusion anil improper distribu- 
 tion of cartridges. Colonel Kingsbury dis- 
 charged the duties of his office with great 
 
 efficiency,} until the of July, 1862, when 
 
 his health required that he should be relieved. 
 1st Lieut. Thomas Cr. Baylor, ordnance corps, 
 succeeded him, and peformed his duty during 
 tho remainder of the Peninsular and Maryland 
 campaigns, with marked ability and success. 
 The want of reports from Colonel Kingsbury 
 and Lieut. Baylor, renders it impossible for me 
 to enter, at all, into the details of the organiza- 
 tion of the department. 
 PROVOST-MARSHAL'S DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Immediately after I was placed in command 
 of the " Division of the Potomac'" I appointed 
 Col. Andrew Porter, 16th U. S. Infantry, Pro- 
 vost-JIarshal of Washington. All the avail- 
 able regular infantry, a battery, and a squadron 
 of cavalry, were placed under his command ; 
 and by his energetic action, he soon corrected 
 the serious evils which existed, ai|d restored 
 order in the city. 
 
 When the army was about to take the field. 
 General Porter was appointed Provost-Marshal 
 General of the ai"my of the Potomac, and held 
 that most important position until the end of 
 the Peninsular campaign, when sickness, con- 
 tracted in the untiring discharge of his duties 
 compelled him to ask to be relieved from the 
 position he had so ably and energetically filled. 
 The provost-mai'slial general's department had 
 the charge of a class of duties, which had not 
 before, in our service, been defined and group- 
 ed under the management of a special depart- 
 ment. The following subjects indicate the 
 sphere of this department : 
 
 Suppression of marauding and depredations 
 and of all brawk and disturbances. 
 
 Preservation of good order and suppression 
 of drunkeimess beyond the limits of the 
 camps. 
 
 Prevention of straggling on the march. 
 
 Suppression of 'gambUng-hoiiseB, drinking- 
 houses, or bar-rooms and l)rothel8. 
 
 Reguliition of hotels, taverns, markets, and 
 places of public umusemeuU 
 
 14 
 
 Searches, seizures and arrests. 
 
 Execution of sentences of general courts 
 martial, involving imprisonment or capital 
 punishment. 
 
 Enforcement of orders prohibiting the sale 
 of intoxicating liquors, whether by rraflesmen 
 or sutlers, and of orders respectin,: jiassea. 
 
 Deserters from the army. -^ 
 
 Prisoners of war taken from the oiu'Miy. 
 
 Countersigning safe-guards. 
 
 Passes to citizens, within tlie liiu.-s and for 
 purposes of tra'de. 
 
 Complaints of cititizens as to the conduct of 
 the soldiers. 
 
 General Porter was assisted by the follow- 
 ing named officers : 
 
 ''Alajor W. n Wood, 17th U. S. Infantry ; 
 Capt. James ?iicMdlan, A. A. A. G., U. S. Infan- 
 try ; Capt. W. T. Gentry, 17th U. S. Infantry ; 
 Capt. J. W. Forsyth, 18th U. S. Infautrv ; Lieut. 
 J. AV. Jones, 12th U. S. Infantry ; Lient. C. F. 
 Trowbridge, 16th U. S. Infantry ; Lieut. 0. D. 
 Mehaffey, 1st U. S. Infantry. 
 
 The provost guard was composed of the 2d 
 U. S- Cavalry, Major Pleasonton, and a bat- 
 talion of the 8th and 17th U. S. Infautrv, Major 
 Willard. 
 
 After General Porter was relieved. Major 
 Wood was in charge of this department, until 
 after the battle of Antietam, when Brigadier- 
 General Patrick was appointed Provost Mar- 
 shal General. 
 
 COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEAD- 
 QUARTERS. 
 
 When the army took the field, for the ptir- 
 pose of securing order and regularity in the 
 camp of headquarters, and for facilitating its 
 movements, the office of commandant of gen- 
 eral headquarters was created, and assigned to 
 Major G.'O. llaller, 7th U. S. Infantry. Six 
 companies of infantry were placed under his 
 orders for guard and police duty. Among Hi© 
 orders appended to this report, is the one de- 
 fining his duties, which were ahvajs satisfac- 
 torily performed. 
 
 JUDGE-ADVOCATE. 
 
 From August, 1861, the position of judge- 
 advocate was held by Col Thos. (iantt, A. D. C, 
 until compelled by ill health to retire, at Har- 
 rison's Landing, in August, 1862. His reviews 
 of the decisions of courts-martial during this 
 period, were of great utilitj' hi correcting the 
 practice in military courts, diffusing tnw; no- 
 tions of discipline and subordination, and set- 
 ting before the army a high standard of sol- 
 dierly honor. 
 
 Upon the retirement of Colonel G'antt, the 
 duties of judge-advocate were ably performed 
 by Col. Thomas M. Key, A. D. C. 
 SIGNAL COR.i'S. 
 
 The method of conveying intelligence and 
 orders, invented and introduced into the ser- 
 vice by JMaj. Albert J. Myor. signal officer, 
 U. S. A., was first practically tested in large 
 operations, during the organization of the 
 arrav of the Potomac. 
 
Under the direction of Major Myer, a signul 
 corps was formed by detailing oificera and 
 men from the different regiments of volnn- 
 tiers. and instructing them in the use of the 
 fl igs by day, and torches by niglit. 
 
 The chief signal officer was indefatigable in 
 his exertions to render his corps effective, and 
 it soon became available for service, in every 
 division of the army. 
 
 In addition to the flags and torches, Major 
 Mjer introduced a portable insulated tele- 
 graph wire, which could be readily laid from 
 point to point, and which co\ild be used under 
 the same general system. 
 
 In front of Washington, and on the lower 
 Potomac, at any point witliin our lines' not 
 reached by the • military telegraph, the great 
 usefulness of this system of signals was made 
 manifest. But it was not until after the ar- 
 rival of the army upon the Peninsula, and 
 during the siege and battles of that, and the 
 Maryland campaign, that the great benefits to 
 be derived from it on the field, and under fii-e, 
 were fully appreciated. 
 
 There was scarcely an action or skirmish 
 in which the signal corps did not render im- 
 portant services. Often, under heavy fire of 
 artillery, and not unfrequently while exposed 
 to musketry, the officers and men of this corps 
 gave information of the movements of the 
 enemy, and transmitted directions for the evo- 
 lutions of our own troops. 
 
 The report of the chief signal officer, with 
 accompanying documents, will give the details 
 of the services of this corps, and call attention 
 to those iuembers of it who were particularly 
 distinguished. 
 
 TELEGRAPHIC. 
 The telegraphic operations of the army of 
 the Potomac were superintended by Major 
 Thos. J. E>>}vert, and under the immediate di- 
 rection of INIr. Caldwell, who was with 
 
 the corps of operatives attached to my head- 
 quarters during the entire campaigns upon 
 the peninsula and in ilaryland. 
 
 The services of this corps were arduous 
 and efficient. Under the admirable arrange- 
 ments of Major Eckert they were constant!}' 
 provided with all the uaterial for construct- 
 ing new lines, which were rapidly estab- 
 lished whenever the army changed position ; 
 and it was not unfrequently the case that 
 the operatives worked under fire from the 
 enemy's guns, yet they invarialy performed 
 all the duties required of them with great 
 alacrity and cheerfulness, and it was seldom 
 that I was without the means of direct tele- 
 graphic communication with the AVar Depart- 
 ment, and with the corps commanders. 
 
 From the organization of the army of the 
 Potomac, up to Nov. 1, 1862, including the 
 Peninsular and Maryland campaigns, upwards 
 of 1,200 miles of military telegrajth lines had 
 been constructed in connection with the 
 "ij»erations of the army, and. the number of 
 "'^uatives and builders emoloved was about 
 
 15 
 
 To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and en- 
 teri)rising aeronaut, who had the management 
 of the balloons, I was greatly indebted for 
 the valuable information obtained during hia 
 ascensions. . "^ 
 
 1 have more than once taken occasion to re- 
 commend the members of my staff, both ge- 
 neral ami personal, for promotion and reward. 
 I beg leave to repeat these recommendations, 
 and to record their names in the history of the. 
 army of the Potomac as gallant soldiers, to 
 whom their country owes a debt of gratitude, 
 still unpaid, for the courage, ability and un- 
 tiring zeal they displayed during the eventful 
 campaigns in which they bore so prominent a 
 part. 
 POSITION OF THE ARMY, OCT., 18G2. 
 On the 15th of October, the main body of 
 the army of the Potomac was in the immedi- 
 ate vichiity of Washington, with detachments 
 on the left bank of the Potomac as far down 
 as Liverpool Point, and as far up as Williame- 
 port and its vicinity. The different divisions 
 were posted as follows : 
 
 Hooker, at Budd's Ferry, lower Potomac ; 
 Heintzelman, at Fort Lyon and vicinity ; Frank- 
 lin, near the Theological Seminary ; Blenker, 
 near Hunter's Chapel ; McDowell, at Upton's 
 Hill and Arlington ; F. J. Porter, at Hall's and 
 Miner's Hills ; "Smith, at I\f ckall's Hill ; McCiUl, 
 at Langley ; Buell, at Tenallytown, Meridian 
 Hill, Emory's Chapel, &c., on the left bank of 
 the river ; Casey at Washington ; Hunt's Ar- 
 tillery, do. ; Banks, at Darnstown, with De- 
 tachments at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, 
 Williamsport, &c. ; Stone at Poolesville ; Dix, 
 at Baltimore, with detachments on the eastern 
 shore. 
 
 THE AFFAIR AT BALL'S BLUFF. 
 On the 19th of October, ISGl, Gen. McCall 
 marched to Drainesville with his division, in 
 order to cover reconnoissances to be made in 
 all directions the next day, for the purpose of 
 learning the position of the enemy, and of 
 covering the operations of the topographical 
 engineers in making maps of that region. 
 
 On the 20th, acting in concert with Gen. 
 McCall, Gen. Smith pushed strong parties to 
 Freedom Hill, Vienna, Fhnt Hill, Peacock Hill, 
 &c., to accomplish the same purpose in that 
 part of the front. 
 
 These recounoissances were successful. 
 On the morning of the 20th I received tiie 
 ;"ollowing telegram from Gen. Banks' head- 
 quarters : ^^ 
 
 ® Darxestown, Oct. 20, 1861. 
 Gen. Maroy : ' 
 
 Sir, — The signal station at Sngar Loaf tele- 
 graphs that the enemy have moved away from 
 Leosburg. All quiet here. 
 
 R. M. CopKi.AND, A. A. G. 
 Whei'eupon I sent to Gen. Stone, at Pooles- 
 ville, the following telegram : 
 
 Camp GiaKv-iN, Oct. 20, 1861. 
 Brig.-Gcn. C. P. Stone, Poolesville : 
 
 Gen. McClellan desires rao to inform you 
 
16 
 
 tliat Gen. McOall occupied DfaftJoesville, yes- 
 terday, and is still there. Will send out 
 lieavy reconoissances tO'day in all directions 
 from that point. The general desires that 
 yon keep a good lookout. on Lcesb\n-g. to see 
 if this movement has the effect to drive them 
 away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on 
 your part would have the effect to move them. 
 
 A. Y. OoLBURN, Ass'-Adj.Gcii. 
 . Teeming it ]ios8ibIe that Gcn.jMcCaH's 
 niovcraont to Drainesville, together with the', 
 sulis- qnon'. roconnoissances, might have the 
 clR-ct of HKbiciiig the enemy to abandon Lees- 
 l»urg, and the dispatch from .Sugar Loaf ap- 
 pearing to confirm this view, 1 wished Gen. 
 Stone, wiio had only a line of pickets on the 
 river, the mass of his lxoo))S being out of, 
 and beyoml range trom the Virginia bank, to 
 make some display of intention to cross, and 
 also to watch the enemy more closely tlian 
 usual. 1 did not direct him to cross, nor did 
 I intend that he should cross the river in 
 force for the purpose of fighting. 
 
 The above dispatch was sent on. tlie 20th.' 
 and reached G?n. ^lone as early as 11 a.m. of 
 th^. day. I expected him to accomplish all 
 that was intended on the sanio day ; and this 
 he did, as will be seen from the iollowing dis- 
 patch received at my headquarters in AVash- 
 ington, from rooiosville, on the evening of 
 October 20th. 
 To M.\j.-Gkn. McCu<:li,.\k : 
 
 Made a feint of crossing at this place this 
 afternoon, and at the same time started a re- 
 cc)nnoitriug i)arty towards Leesburg from 
 Harrison's Island. The enemy's pickets re- 
 tired to intrenchments. Report of reconnoit- 
 ring party not yet received. I have means 
 of crossing 125 men once in ten minutes at 
 each of two points. River falling slowly. 
 C. P. Stone, Brig. Gen. 
 
 .'Vs it was not foreseen or expected that 
 Gen. McCall would be needed to co-operate 
 with Gen. Stone in any attack, he was directed 
 to fall back from Drainsville to his original 
 camp near Prospect Hill, as soon as there(piir- 
 ed reconnoissances were completed. Accord- 
 ingly he left Drainesville on his return at 
 ab'out 8 1-2 A. M. of the 21st, reaching his old 
 camp at alx>ut 1 p. m. 
 
 In the meantime I was surprised to hear 
 from Gen. Stone that a portion of his troops 
 were engaged on the Virginia side of the river, 
 and at oiice sent instructions to Geji. McCall to 
 remain at Drainesville if he had not left before 
 the order reached him. 
 
 ■ The order did not reach him until his return 
 to his cam]) at Langley. Ke was then ordered 
 to rest his men, and hold his division in readi- 
 ness to return to Drainesville at a moments no- 
 lice, should it become necessary. 
 
 Similar instructions were given to other di- 
 ■visions during the afternoon. 
 
 The first intimation I received from Gen. 
 Stone of the real nature of his movements was 
 ia a telegram as follows : 
 
 . f Edward'b Ferry, 11.10 a m. Oct. 21 . 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McGlellan,— 
 
 The enemy have been engaged opposite 
 Harrison's Island. Our men are behaving ad- 
 mirably. 
 
 C. P. Stonk, Brigadier-Gen. 
 At 2 P. .M. Gen. ]5anks' adjutant-general 
 sent the following: 
 
 Darnstown, Oct. 2!, 1861, 2 p. M. 
 Gen. R. B. Marcy, — 
 
 Gen, Stone safely crossed the river this 
 moaning. Some engagements have taken place 
 on the other side of the river : !iuw important 
 is not known. 
 
 R. M.Coi'Et.ANi), A. A. A. G. 
 Gen. Stone sent the following dispatches on 
 the same day at the hours indicated : 
 
 .Edwards' Ferry, Oct. 21, 18G1, 2. i- .v. 
 Maj.-Gcn. McClellan, — 
 
 There has been sharp firing on the right of 
 oiu' line, and our t:roo])s aj^jiear to be advanc- 
 ing there under Baker. The left under Gor- 
 man, has advanced its skirmishers nearly' one 
 mile, and if the movement contiraies successful 
 will turn the enemy's right. 
 
 C. P. Stoxr. Brigadier-General. 
 .'Edward' Feiry, Oct. 21st. IStjl, 4 p. m. 
 Gen. McClellan,— 
 
 Nearly all my force is across the river. Ba- 
 ker on the right, Gorman on the left, right 
 sharply engaged. 
 
 5 C. P. Stonk, Biigadier-Gcneral. 
 
 Edward's Ferry, Oct. 21, 1861, 9.30 r. m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 I am occupied in preventing further disas- 
 ter, and trj'ing to get into position to redeem. 
 We have lost some of our best commanders — 
 Baker dead, Cogswell a prisoner, or secreted. 
 The wotinded are being carefully and rapidly 
 removed, and Gorman's wing is being cauti- 
 ously witiulrawn. Any advance from Di'aines- 
 ville must be made cautiously. All was re- 
 l)orted going well up to Baker's death, but in 
 the confusion following that, the right wing 
 was outflanked. In a few hours I shall, unless 
 a night attack is made, be in the same position 
 as last night, save the loss of many good men. 
 C, P. Stone, Brigadier-General. 
 Although no more fully informed of the 
 state of affairs, I had, during the afternoon, as 
 a precautionary measure, ordered G%n. Banks 
 to send one Brigade to the support of the 
 troops at Harrison's Island, and to move with 
 the other two to Seneca Mills, ready to suyj- 
 port Gen. Stone if necessary. The 9.30 v. m. 
 dispatch of Gen. Stone did not give mc an en- 
 tire understanding of the state of the case. 
 .'Vware of the difficulties, and perhaps fatal 
 consequences of recrossin.g such a river as the 
 l\)tomac after a repulse, and from tliese tele- 
 grams su])posing his Avhole force to be on the 
 Virginia side, I directed Gen. Stone to intrench 
 himself, .and hold the Virginia side at all haz- 
 ards until re-enforcements could arrive, when 
 he could safely withdraw to the Mar3-land side, 
 or hold his position on the Virginia side, should 
 that ptOYfi aiiyissil).!*}. 
 
17 
 
 Gen. Banks was instructed to move the rest 
 of his division to Edward's Ferry, and to send 
 over as many men as possible before daylight, 
 to re-enforce Stone, lie did not arrive in time 
 to effect this, and was instructed to collect all 
 the canal boats he could find, and use them 
 for crossing at Edwards' Ferry in sufficient 
 force to enable the troops ah'eady there to hold 
 the opposite side. ^ 
 
 On the 22d I went to tlie ground in person, 
 and reaching Poolesville learned for the first 
 time the full details of the aftair. 
 
 The following extracts from the evidence of 
 Gen. Stone before the " Committee on the Con- 
 duct ot the War," on the 5th of January, 1862, 
 will throw further light on this occurrence. 
 
 Gen. Stone saj-s he received the orders from 
 niy headquarters, to make a slight demonstra- 
 tion, at about 11 o'clock a.m of the 20th, and 
 that in obedience to that order he made the 
 demonstration on the evening of the same day. 
 
 In regard to the reconnoissance on the 21st, 
 which resulted in the battle of Ball's Bluff, he 
 was asked the following questions : 
 
 " Queslion. Did this reconnoissance originate 
 with yourself, or had you orders from the Gen- 
 eral-in-Chief to make it ?'' 
 
 To wdiich he replied: "It originated with 
 myself — the reconnoissance." 
 
 " Question. The order did not proceed from 
 General McClellan ?" 
 
 ''Answer. I was directed, the day before, to 
 make a demonstration. That demonstration 
 ( was made the day previous'^ 
 
 " Question. Did you receive an order from 
 the General-in-Chief to make the reconnois- 
 eance ?" 
 
 "Answer. No, sir." 
 
 Making a personal examniation on tne 22d I 
 found that the position on the Virginia side at 
 Edward's Ferry was not a tenable one, but did 
 not think it wise to withdraw the troops by 
 daylight. I therefore caused more artillery to 
 be jdaced in position on the Maryland side, to 
 cover the approaches to the ground held by 
 us, and crossed the few additional ti'oops that 
 the high wind permitted us to get over, so as 
 to be as secure as possible against any attack 
 during the day. Before night-fall, all the pre- 
 cautions were taken to secure an orderly and 
 quiet passage of the troops and guns. The 
 movemeht was commenced soon after dark, 
 xnider the general supervision of Gen. Stone, 
 who received the order for the withdrawal at 
 7.15 P.M. By 4 A.M. of the 24th every thing had 
 reached the ilaryland shore in safetj'. 
 
 A few daj's afterwards I received informa- 
 {',tion, which seems to be authentic, to the effect 
 that large bodies of« the eneujy had been or- 
 dered from Jlanassas to Leesburg, to cut off 
 our troops on the Virginia side. Their timely 
 withdrawal had probiibly prevented a still more 
 serious disaster. I refer to Gen. Sttme's Report 
 of this battle lunuslicd \o the War Department, 
 and his published testimony before the " Com- 
 mittee on the Conduct of the War" for further 
 details. 
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPEDITION, 
 
 The records of the War Department show 
 my anxiety and efforts to assume active offen- 
 sive operations in the fall and early winter. 
 It is only just to say, however, that the unpre- 
 cedented condition of the roads and Virginia 
 soil would have delayed an advance till Febru- 
 ary' had the discipline, organization and equip- 
 ment of the army been as complete at the close 
 of the fall as was necessary, and as I desired 
 and labored, against every impediment, to make 
 them. While still in comman<l only of the ar- 
 my of the Potomac, namely, in early September, 
 I proposed the formation of a corps. of New 
 Englanders for coast service in the' bays and 
 inlets of the Chesapeake and Potomac to co- 
 operate with .my own command, from which 
 most of its material was drawn. %ji 
 
 On the 1st of November, however, I Avas 
 called to relieve Liet.-Gen. Scott in the chief 
 and general command of the armies of the 
 Union. The direction and nature of this coast 
 expedition, therefore, were somewhat changed, 
 as Avill soon appear in the original plan sub- 
 mitted to the Secretary of War, and the letter 
 of instructions later issued to Gen. Burnside, 
 its commander. The whole country indeed 
 had now become the theatre of military opera- 
 tions from the Potomac to and beyond the 
 ilississippi, and to assist the Navy in perfect- 
 ing and sustaining the blockade, it became 
 necessary to extend those operations to points 
 on the sea-coast, Roanoke Island, Savannah, and 
 New Orleans. It remained also to equip and 
 organize the armies of the West, whose condi- 
 tion was little better than that of the army of 
 the Potomac had been. 
 
 The direction of the campaigns in the West, 
 and of the operations upon the sea-board en- 
 abled me to enter upon larger combinations, 
 and to accomplish results the necessity and 
 sdvantage of Avhich had not been unforeseen, 
 but which had been beyond the ability of the 
 single army formerly under my command, to 
 effect. 
 
 The following letters and a subsequent pa- 
 per addressed to the Secretary of War suffi- 
 ciently indicate the nature of those condjina- 
 tions to minds accustomed to reason upon mil- 
 itary operations. 
 
 Headquarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 AVasiiixgton, Sept. 6, 1861. 
 Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to suggest the follow- 
 ing proposition, with the request that the ne- 
 cessary authority be at once given me to carry 
 it out; to organize a force of two brigades of 
 five regiments each of New England men, for 
 the general service — but particularly adapted 
 to coast service. The officers and men to be 
 sufficiently conversant with boat service to 
 manage steamers, sailing vessels, launches, 
 barges, surf boats, floating batteries, itc. To 
 charter or buy for the command a sufficient 
 number of propellers or tug-boats for trans- 
 portation of men and supplies, the machinery 
 
of which should be amply protected by tim- 
 ber : the vessels to have permanent experi 
 enced officers from the merchant service, but 
 to be manned by details from the command. 
 A naval ollicer to be attached to the staff of 
 the commanding officer. The flank companies 
 of each regiment to be armed with Dahlgren 
 boat-guns, and carbines with water-proof cart- 
 ridges ; the otlier companies to have such arms 
 as i may liereaftcr designate, to be uniformed 
 and equipped as the Rhode Island regiments 
 are. Launches and floating batteries, with 
 timber parapets of sufficient capacity to laud 
 or bring into action the entire force. 
 
 The entire management and organization of 
 the force to be under my control, and to form 
 an integral part of the army of the Potomac. 
 
 The immediate object of this force is for 
 operations in the inlets of Chesapeake Bay and 
 the Potomac : by enabling me thus to' land 
 troops at points where they are needed — this 
 force can also be used in conjunction with a 
 naval force operating against points on tho 
 sea-coast. This coast division to bo com- 
 manded by a general officer of my selection. 
 The regiments to be organized as other land 
 forces. Tlie disbursements for vessels, &c., to 
 be maileby the proper department of the army, 
 upon the requisitions of the general command- 
 ing tlie division, with my approval. 
 
 I thnik the entire force can be organized in 
 thirty daj'S, and by no means the least of the 
 advantages of this proposition is the fact, that 
 it will call into the service a class of men who 
 would not otherwise enter the army. 
 
 You will immediately perceive that the object 
 ■ of this force is to fuliow along the coast, and up 
 the inlets am] rivers, the movements of the main 
 army when it advances. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 (x. B. McGlellan, Maj.-Gen. Comdg. 
 
 Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring 
 the requisite vessels, and adapting them to 
 the special purposes contemplated, this expe- 
 dition was not ready for service until January, 
 1862. 
 
 Then in the chief command I deemed it best 
 to send it to North Carolina with the design 
 indicated in the following letter : 
 
 Head-quarters of the army, Washington, Jan. 
 7, 18G2. Jirig.-G-en. A. E. Burnside, Command- 
 ing ExpedUlon. 
 
 GKN'KiiAn: — In accordance with verbal in- 
 structions heretofore given you — you will, 
 after uniting with flag-oflicer Goldsborough, at 
 Fort Monroe, proceed under his convey to 
 Hattoras Iidet, where you v/ill in connection 
 •with him, take the most prompt measures for 
 ■crossing the fleet over the bulkiicad into the 
 waters of the sound. Under the accompany- 
 ■in,g general order constituting tiie Depaitment 
 of North Carolina, you will assiune conunand 
 oi the garrison at ilatteras Inlet, and make 
 such dispositions in regard to that place, as 
 your )flterior operation.s may render necessary 
 — alway.s being careful to provide tor thosafc- 
 
 18 
 
 ty of that very important station in any con- 
 tingency. ^1 
 
 Yo)u- tirst point of attack will be Roanoko 
 Island and its dependencies. 
 
 It is presumed that the navy can reduce tha 
 batteries on the marshes, and cover, the land^ 
 ing of your troops on the main i!^land by 
 which, in connection with a rapid movement 
 of the gun-boats to the northern extremity — 
 as soon as the marsh battery is reduced — it 
 may be hoped to capture the entire garrison 
 of tke place. Having occupied the Island and 
 its dependeocies, you will at once proceed to 
 the erection of the batteries and defenses ne- 
 cessary to hold the position with a small force, 
 should the flag-officer require any assistance 
 in seizing or holding the debouches of the 
 canal from Norfolk — you will please afford it 
 to him. 
 
 The commodore and yourself having com- 
 pleted your arrangments in regard to Roanoke 
 Island, and the waters north of it; you will 
 please at once make a descent on Newbern ; 
 having gained possession of wdiich, and the 
 railroad passing through itjou ^Vill at enco 
 tlirow a sufficient force upon Beaufort, and 
 take the steps neccssarj' to reduce Fort Macon 
 and open that port. When j'ou seize New- 
 bern, you will endeavor to seize the railroad 
 as far west as Goldsborough — should circum- 
 stances favor such a movement. The temper 
 of the people, the rebel force at hand, &c., will 
 go far towards determining the question as to 
 how far west the railroad can be occupied and 
 held. Should circumstances render it advisa- 
 ble to seize and hold Raleigh — the main north 
 and south line of railroad passing through 
 Goldsborough, should be so effectually des- 
 troyed for considerable distances north and 
 south of that point, as to render it impossible 
 for the rebels to use it to your disadvan- 
 tage. A great pohit would be gained in any 
 event, by the effectual destruction of the Wil- 
 mington and Weldon Railroad. 
 
 I would advise great caution in moving so 
 far into the interior as upon Raleigh. Hav- 
 ing accomplished the objects mentioned — tho 
 next point of interest would probably be Wil- 
 mington, the reduction of which may require 
 that additional means shall be afforded you. 
 I would urge great caution in regard to pro- 
 clamations. In no case Avould I go beyond a 
 moderate joint proclamation with the naval 
 commander, which should say as little as pos- 
 sible about politics or the negro, merely state 
 that the true issue for which we are fighting 
 is the preservation of the Union, and uphold- 
 ing the laws of the <reneral government, and 
 stating that all who conduct themselves pro- 
 perly, will as far as possible be protected in 
 their persons and property." 
 
 You will please report your operations as 
 often as an opportunity ofl'ers itselt 
 
 With my best wishes for your success. 
 
 I am, <fcc., k,Q., G. B. McClellan, 
 Maj. Gen. Com'g. in Chief. 
 
OPBRATIONS IN THE WEST AND yOUTH. 
 
 The following letters of instructions were 
 sent to Generals Halleck, Buell, Sherman and 
 Butler ; and I also comaiiMiicated verbally to 
 these officers my views in full, regarding the 
 field of operations assigned to each, and gave 
 them their instructions as much in detail as 
 was necessary at that time. 
 
 Head-Quarters of the Army. 
 Washington, D. C, November 11, 1861. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, U. S. A. 
 Gomel' g. Depi. of Missouri. 
 Gkeerai- : — In assigning you to the com- 
 mand of the Department of Missouri, it is pro- 
 bably necessary for me to state that I have 
 intrusted to you a duty which requires the 
 utmost tact and decision. 
 
 ■ You have not merely the ordinary duties of 
 a military commander to perform ; but the far 
 more difficult task of reducing chaos to order, 
 of changing probably the majority of the per- 
 sonnel of the stafl' of the department, and of 
 reducing to a point of economy consistent with 
 the interests and necessities of the state, a 
 system of reckless expenditure and fraud per- 
 haps unheard of before in the history of the 
 world. 
 
 You will find in your department many gen- 
 eral and staft'-officers holding illegal commis- 
 sions and appointments not recognized or ap- 
 proved by the President or Secretary of War, 
 you will please at once inform these gentlemen 
 of the nulity of their appointment, and see 
 that no pay or allowances are issued to them 
 umtil such time as commissions may be author- 
 ized by the President, or Secretary of War. 
 
 If any of them |give the slightest trouble 
 you will at once arrest him and send him un- 
 der guard, out of the limits of your dei)art- 
 ment, informing them that if they return they 
 will be placed in close confinement. You will 
 please examine into the legality of the organi- 
 zation of the troops serving in the department. 
 When you find any illegal, unusual, or impro- 
 per organizations you will give to the officers 
 and men an opportunity to enter the legal mil- 
 itary establishment under general laws and 
 orders from the War Department ; reporting 
 in full to these head-quarters any officer or 
 organization that may decline. 
 
 You will please cause competent and reliable 
 staff officei's to examine all existing contracts 
 immediately, and suspend all payments upon 
 them imtil you receive the report in each case. 
 Where there is the slightest doubt as to the 
 propriety of the contract, you will be good 
 enough to refer the matter witli full explanation 
 to these head-quarters, statirg in each case 
 "what would be a fair conipcnsition for the 
 services or materials rendered under the con- 
 tract. Discontinue at once the reception of 
 material or services under any doubtful con- 
 tract. Arrest and bring to prompt trial all 
 officers who have in any way violated tlieir 
 duty to the government. In regard to the po- 
 litical conduct of affairs, you Vi'ill please labor 
 
 10 
 
 to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri 
 and the adjacent States, that we are figliting 
 solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold 
 the power of our national government and to 
 restore to the nation the blessings of peace 
 and good order. ^S' 
 
 With respect to military -operations, it is 
 probable, from the best information irf mj 
 possession, that the inicirests of the govern- 
 ment will be best served by fortifying and 
 hoMing in considerable strength, Rolla, Sedalia 
 and other interior points, keeping strong pat- 
 rols constantly movhig from the terminal sta- 
 tions, and concentrating the mass of the troops 
 on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such, 
 ulterior operations as tlie public interests may 
 demand. 
 
 I would be glad to have you make, as soon 
 as possible, a personal inspection of all the im- 
 portant points in your department and report 
 the result to me. I cannot too strongly im- 
 press upon jou the absolute necessity of keep- 
 ing me constantly advised of the strength, 
 condition, and location of your troops, togeth- 
 er with all facts that will enable me to main- 
 tain that general direction of the armies of the 
 United States which it is my purpose to exer- 
 cise. I trust to you to maintain thorough or- 
 ganization, discipline and economy throughout 
 your department. Please inform me, as soon 
 as possible, of everything relating to the guji- 
 boats now in process of construction, as well 
 as those completed. ' 
 
 The militia force authorized to be raised by 
 the State of Missouri for its defence, will b« 
 under your orders. I am, General, &■., &c., 
 Geo. B. McCleli.an, M. G. Com. U. 3. 
 Headquarters of the Armv, Washington, 
 Brig.-Gen. D. C. Buell : Nov. 7, 1861. 
 
 General, — In giving 3'ou instructions for 
 your guidance, in command of the department 
 of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter 3'ou. I 
 merely wish to express i)lainly the general 
 ideas which occur to me in relation to the 
 conduct of operations there. That portion of 
 Kentucky Avest of the Cumberland. River is, 
 by its position, so closely related to the States 
 of Illinois and Jlissouri that it has seemed best 
 to attach it to the Department of Missouri. 
 Your operations, then, in Kentucky will be 
 confined to that portion of the State east of 
 the Cumberland River. I trust I need not re- 
 peat to you fliat I regard the importance of 
 the territory committed to your care as second 
 only to that occupied by tlie army under my 
 immediate command. And it is absolutely 
 necessary that we shall hold all the State of 
 Kentucky ; not only that, hut that the mnjoritj 
 of its inhabitiinta shall bo AViirndy in favor of 
 our cause, it being that which best subserves 
 their interests. It is possible that the con- 
 duct of our political affairs in Kentucky is 
 more important than that of our military 
 operations. I certainly cannot over estimate 
 the importance of the former. You will please 
 constantly bear in mind the precise issue for 
 
20 
 
 •whicli wo are figlitiiig — Ihat issue is tlie pre- | 
 servation of tlie IJriion, and tlie restoratiou of 
 the authority of llie general goverjiincjit over 
 all portions of our territory. We shall most 
 readily suppress this rebellion and restore the 
 authority of the government by religiously 
 respecting the constitutional rights of all. I 
 know that 1 express the feelings and opinions, 
 of the President when I say thai we are light- 
 ing only to preserve the integrity of the Union 
 and the constitutional authority of the general 
 government. "^ 
 
 The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon 
 it, that their domer-tic institutions will in no 
 manner be interfered with, and that they will 
 receive at our hands every constitutional pro- 
 tection. I have only to repeat that you will 
 in all respects, carefully regard the local in- 
 stitutions of the region in which j'ou com- 
 mand, allowing nothing but the dictates of 
 military necessity to cause you to depart from 
 the spirit of these instructions. 
 
 So much in regard to political considera- 
 tions. The military problem would be a 
 simple one, could it be entirely separated from 
 political influences ; such is not the case. 
 Were the population among which you are to 
 operate, wholly or generally hostile, it is pro- 
 bable that Nashville should be your first and 
 objective point. It so happens that a large 
 majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennes- 
 see, are in favor of the Union ; it therefore 
 seems proper that you should remain on the 
 defensive on the line from Louisville, while 
 you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid 
 marches, by Cumberland Gap, or Walker's 
 Gap, on Knoxuille, in order to occupy the 
 railroad at that point, and thus enable the 
 loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to use, 
 while you at the same time cut off, the rail- 
 way communication between eastern Virginia 
 and the Mississippi. 
 
 It will be prudent to fortify the pass, before 
 leaving it in vour rear. I am, &c., 
 
 Geo. B. M'cCleli^n, M. G. Com., U. S. A. 
 Headq's of the Ariry, Washington, Nov. 12, '61. 
 Brig.-Gen. D. C. Buell, Com. Dep. of the Ohio : 
 
 General, — Upon assuming command of the 
 department, I will be glad to have you make, 
 as soon as possible, a careful report of the 
 condition of your command. The maiii point 
 to which I desire to call your attention, is the 
 necessity of entering eastern Tennessee as 
 soon as it can bo done with reasonable 
 chances of success, and I hope that you will, 
 with the least possible delay, organize a 
 column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding, 
 at the same time, the main avenues by which 
 the rebels might invade Kentucky. Our con- 
 versations on the stibject of military opera- 
 tions have been so full, and my confidence in 
 your judgment is so great, that I will not 
 dwell furtlier on the subject, except to urge 
 upon yon the necessity of keeping me fully 
 informed as to the state of affairs, both mili- 
 tary and political, and your movcmeuts. 
 
 In regard fo political matters, bear in mind 
 that we are fighting only to preserve the in- 
 tegrity of the Union, and to U[)Ii(ild the gene- 
 ral government ; as far as milirary necessity 
 will permit, religiously resjiect the covistitu- 
 tional rights of all. IVescrve the strictest 
 discipline among the troops, and while em- 
 ploying the utmost energy in military move- 
 ments, be careful so to treat tiio unarmed in- 
 habitants as to contract, not widen, the breacVi^ 
 existing between us and the rebels. I mean 
 by this, that it is the desire of the government 
 to ^void unnecessary irritation by causeless 
 arrests and persecution of iadividuals. AVhere 
 there is good reason to believe that persons 
 are actually giving aid, co nfort, or informa- " 
 tion to the enemy, it ^is, of :;ourse, necessary 
 to arrest them ; but I have aiwa_vs foitnd it is 
 the tendency of subordinates to make vexa- 
 tious arrests on mere susjiicion. You will 
 find it well to direct that no arrest shall be 
 made except by yotir order, or that of your 
 generals, itnless in extraordinaiy cases, always 
 holding the party making the arrest respon- 
 sible for the propriety of Jiis course. It should 
 be our constant ann to make it apparent to all, 
 that their property, their comfort, and their 
 personal safety, will be best preserved by ad- 
 hering to the cause of the Union. 
 
 If the military suggestions I have made in 
 this letter prove to have been founded on 
 erroneous data, you are, of course, perfectly 
 free to change the plan of operations. I am, 
 &c., &c., G. B. McClellan, M. G. Cora., U. S. A. 
 Headq's of the Army, Washington, Feb. 14, '62. 
 B.-Gen. P. W. Sherman, C'g. at Port Royal, &c. ; 
 
 General, — Your dispatches, in regard to the 
 occupation of Dafuskie Island, &c., were re- 
 ceived to-day. I saw also to-day, for the first 
 time, your requisition for a siege train for Sa- 
 vannah. 
 
 After giving the subject all the considera- 
 tion in my power, I am forced to the conclu- 
 sion that, under present circtimstancas, the 
 siege and capture of Savannah do not promise 
 results comensurate with the sacrifices neces- 
 sary. When I learned that it was possible for 
 the gun-boats to reach the Savannah River 
 above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested 
 themselves to my mind, as its immediate re- 
 sults. 
 
 First. The capture of Savannah by a ' coup 
 de main,' the result of an instantaneous ad- 
 vance and attack by the army and navy. 
 
 Tlie time for this has passed, and your let- 
 ter indicates that you are not accountable for 
 the failure to seize the propitious moment, 
 but tliat, on the contrary, you perceived its 
 advantages. 
 
 Secorid. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off its 
 supplies, and at least facilitate its reduction 
 by a bombardment. J^ 
 
 Although we have a long delay fo deplore, the 
 second course still remains ojjcn to us ; and I 
 strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski, 
 and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inch 
 
mortars and heavy g'jus reaon you. I am 
 confident you can' thus reduce it. With Pu- 
 laski, you gain all that is really essential ; you 
 obtain complete control of the harbor, you 
 reliev43 the blockading fleet, and render the 
 main body of your force disposable for other 
 operations. " 
 
 I do not consider the possession of Savan- 
 nah worth a siege, after Pulaski is in our 
 hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of 
 the first importance. The expedition to Fer- 
 naudina is well, and I shall bo- glad to learn 
 that it is om-s. 
 
 But, after all, the greatest moral effect would 
 be i^roduced by the reduction of Charleston 
 and its defences. There the rebellion .had its 
 birth ; there the unnatural hatred of our go- 
 vernment is most intense ; there is the centre 
 of the boasted power and courage -of the re- 
 bels. To gain Fort Sumter, and hold Charles- 
 ton, is a task well worthy of our greatest 
 efforts, and eousidei'able sacrifices. That is 
 the problem I would be glad to have you 
 study. Some time must elapse before we can 
 be in all respects ready to accomplish that 
 purpose. Fleets are en route, and armies in mo- 
 tion, which liave certain preliminary objects to 
 accomplish before we are ready to take Charles- 
 ton in hand. But the time will before. long 
 arrive when I shall be prepared to make that 
 movement. In the mean time, it is my advice 
 and wish that no attempt be made upon Sa- 
 vannah, unless it can be carried with certainty 
 by a coup de main. 
 
 Please concentrate your attention and forces 
 upon Pulaski, and Fernandiua. St. Augustine 
 might as well be takeh by way of interlude, 
 while awaiting the preparations for Charles- 
 ton; Success attends us everywhere at pre- 
 sent. Very truly yours, G. B. McC,, Maj. G. C. 
 U.S.A. 
 
 Head-Quarters of the Army," Washington, 
 Feb. 23, 1862. Maj.-General B. F. Butler, U. 
 S. Volunteers, — 
 
 General : — You are assigned to the com- 
 mand of the land forces destined to co-operate 
 with the navy, in the attack upon New Or- 
 leans. You will use every means to keep 
 your destination a profoimd secret, even from 
 your staff officers, with the exception of your 
 chief of staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engi- 
 neers. The force at your disposal, will con- 
 sist of the first 13 regiments named in your 
 meraonindum handed to me in person, the 2lst 
 Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and Cth Michigan, (old 
 and good regiments from Baltimore.) 
 
 Tlic 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and Cth 
 Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Mon- 
 roe. ^ 
 
 Two ctimpanies' of the 21st Indiana, are well 
 drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force 
 already en route for Ship Island, will be suffi- 
 cient for your purposes. 
 
 After full consultation with officers well ac- 
 quainted with the country in which it is pro- 
 posed to operaie. I liave arrived at the conclu- 
 
 21 
 
 sion that (2) two light batteries fully C(juipi)ed, 
 and (1) one vvithout horses, will be all that 
 are necessary. 
 
 This will make your force about 14,400 in- 
 fantry, 275 cavalry, 680 artillery ; total lo 205 
 men. :^ 
 
 The ^commanding general of the Department 
 of Key West, is aulhorized to loan you, tem- 
 pororily, 2 regiments ; Fort Pickens can pro- 
 bably give you another, which will bring your 
 force to nearly 18,000. 
 
 The object of your expedition is one of vital 
 importance, the capture of New Orleans. Th© 
 route selected is up the Mississippi River, and 
 the first obstacle to be encomitered, (perhaps 
 the only one), is in the resistance offered by 
 Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected 
 that the navy can reduce these works ; in that 
 case, you Avill, after their captui"e leave a suffi- 
 cient gaiTison in them to render them perfect- 
 ly secure ; and it is recommended, that on tha 
 upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some 
 troops, be left at the Pilot Station, (at the 
 forks of the river), to cover a retreat in the 
 event ot a disaster. These troops and guns, 
 will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts 
 are captured. 
 
 Should the navy fail to reduce the works, 
 you will land your forces and siege train, and 
 endeavor to breach the works, silence their 
 fire, and carry them by assault. 
 
 The next resistance will be near the English 
 Bond, where there are some earthen batteries ; 
 here it may be necessary for 3-ou to land your 
 troops and co-operate with the naval attack, 
 although it is more than i^robable, that the 
 navj-, unassisted, can accomplish the result. 
 If these works are taken the city of New Or- 
 leans necessarily falls. In that event, it will 
 probably be best to occu]iy Algiers Avith the 
 mass of your troops, also, the eastern bank of 
 the river above the city, it may be necessary 
 to place some troops in the city to preserve 
 order, but if there appears sufficient Union sen- 
 timent to control the city, it may be best for 
 purposes of discipline, to keejj your men out 
 of the city. 
 
 After obtaining possession of New Orleans, 
 it will be necessary to reduce all the works 
 guarding its approaches from the cast, and 
 particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton 
 Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will 
 next claim j'onr attention. 
 
 A feint on Galveston may fivcllitate the ob- 
 jects we have in view. I need not call your 
 attention to the neceesit}' of gaining possess- 
 ion of all the rolling stock you can on (he dif- 
 ferent railways, and oF obtaining control of tha 
 roads themselves. The occupation of Baton 
 Rouge by a combined naval and land fo.rce, 
 should be accomplished as soon as [)ossible 
 after you have gained New Orleans. Then 
 endeavor to open your comnnniication with 
 the northern column by the Misslssi}>pi, always 
 bearing in mind the necessity of occuj>ying 
 Jackson, ATississippi, a-s soon .as you can safely 
 
do so, oillicr uftur, or before you have effected 
 tbe junction. Allow iiotliiiig to divert you 
 from obtaining full possessioti of all the ap- 
 proaclies to New Orleans. "Wlien that object 
 is acconiiilished to its fullest extent, it will be 
 necessary to make a combined attack on jSio- 
 bile, in ordei- to gain possession of the harbor 
 and works, as well as to control the railway 
 ^ij^Tninus at the city. 
 
 *'jln regard to this, 1 will send more detailed 
 instructions as ths operations of the northern 
 column develop themselves. 
 
 I may briefly state that the general objects 
 of the expedition are : First, The reduction 
 of New Orleans and :\11 its approaches ; then 
 Mobile and its defenses ; then Pensacola, Gal- 
 veston, &c. It is probable that by the time 
 Nfew Orleans is reduced it will be hi the pow- 
 er of the government to reinforce the land 
 forces sufficiently to accomplish all these ob- 
 jects ; in the meantime j'ou will please give 
 all the assistance in your power to the army 
 and navy commanders in your vicinity, never 
 losing sight of the fact, that the great object 
 to be achieved is the capture and firm reten- 
 tion of New Orleans. I am, &c., G. B. McC. 
 M. G. C. U. S. A. 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The plan indicated in the above letters com- 
 prehended in its scope the operations of all 
 thearmies in the Union — the army of the Po- 
 tomac a,s well. It was my intention, for rea- 
 sons easy to. be seen, that its various parts 
 should be carried out simultaneously, or near- 
 ly so, and in co-operatian along our whole line. 
 If this jjlan was wise, and events have failed 
 to prove that it was not, then it is unnecessa- 
 ry to (Jefend any delay which would have en- 
 abled the army of the Potomac to perform its 
 share in the execution of the whole work. 
 
 But about the middle of January, 1862, upon 
 recovering from a severe illness, I found that 
 excessive atixiety for an innnediate movement 
 of the array of the Potomac had taken posses- 
 sion of the minds of the administration. 
 
 A change had just been made in the "War 
 Department, and I was soon urged by the 
 New Secretary, Mr. Stanton, to take immedi- 
 ate steps to secure the reopening of the Balti- 
 more and Ohio Railroad, and to free the banks 
 of the lower Potomac from the rebel batteries 
 which amioyed passing vessels. 
 
 Ver}' soon after his entrance upon office, I 
 laid before him, verbally, my designs as to the 
 part of the plan of can)paign to be executed 
 by the army of the Potomac, which was to at- 
 tack Richmond by the lower Chesapeake. 
 ') He instructed me to develop it to the Presi- 
 dent, which I did. Tiie result was, that the 
 President ilisa])proved it, and by an order of 
 January 31. 18(12 substituted one of liis own. 
 
 On the '2Tth of January, 18G2, the following 
 ordor was issued without consultatioiiwith me. 
 
 Executive Mansion, Washingtoc, Jan. 27, 
 1802. President's General War Order, No. 1. 
 
 Ord,ircd: That the 22d day of February, 
 
 1862, be the ihiy for a general movement of 
 the land and naval forces of tlie United States 
 against the insui-gent forces. That, especially 
 the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the 
 army of the Potomac, the army of "Wi-stern 
 Virginia, the army near ]\fumfordsviile, Ken- 
 tucky, the army and flf)tilla at Cairo, and a 
 naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to 
 move on that day. " *», 
 
 That, all other forces, both land and )iaval, 
 with their respective commanders, obey exist- 
 ing orders for the time, and be ready to obey 
 additional orders Avhen dulj' given. 
 
 That the heads of departments, and especi- 
 ally the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, 
 with all their subordinates, and tlie General-in- 
 Chief, with all other commanders and subor- 
 dinates of land and naval forces, will severally 
 be held to their strict and full responsibilities 
 for prompt execution of this order. 
 
 Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 The order of January 31, 1862, is as follows i 
 Executive ^f ansion, "Washington, Jan. 31 , 18G2. 
 
 PREsiDENrs Special War Orders, No. 1. 
 
 Ordered: That all the disposable force of the 
 army of theJPotomac, after providing safely for 
 the defense of Washington, be formed into an 
 expedition for the immediate object of seizing 
 and occupying a point upon the railroad south- 
 westward of what is known as ^fanassas Junc- 
 tion, all details to be in the discretion of the 
 Commander-in-Chief, and the expedition to move 
 before or on the 22d day of February next. 
 
 Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 I asked bis excellency whether this order waf,- 
 to be regarded as final, or whether I could be 
 permitted to submit, in writing, my objections 
 to his plan, and my reasons for preferring my 
 own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore 
 prepared the letter to the Secretary of "War 
 which is given below. Before this had been 
 submitted to the President, he addrcsoed the 
 following note : 
 ExECTTivE Mansion, Washington, Feb. 3, 1 862. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan — JMy Dear Sir: You 
 and I have distinct and different plans for a 
 movement of the array of the Potomac. Yours 
 to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappa- 
 hannock to Urbana, and across and to the ter- 
 minus of the railroad on the York River: mine 
 to move .directly to a point on the railraad 
 southwest of Manassas. 
 
 If you will give me satisfactory answers to 
 the following questions, I shall gladly yield my 
 plan to yours. 
 
 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly 
 larger expenditure of time and monej/ than 
 mine? 2d. Wherein is a victory more certain 
 by your plan than mine ? 3d. Wherein is a vic- 
 tory more valuable by your plan than mine ? 
 4th. Ill fact, would it not be less valuable in 
 this ; that it would break do great line of the 
 enemy's communications, while mine would! 
 .^th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be 
 more dilficult by your plan -than mine? Your- 
 truly, A. LiNCOiJ*. 
 
These questions were substantially auswoicd 
 by tlie following letter of the same date to ihe 
 Secretary of War. 'ft- * 
 
 Headquarters of tlie Army, Washington. Feb. 
 3, 1862. lion. E. M. Si Asms, Sect' i/ of War: 
 Sir, — I aslv your indulgence for the following 
 paper rendered necessary by circumstances. 
 
 I assumed command of the troops in the 
 vicinity of AVashington on Saturday, July 27, 
 1861, s'ix days after the Battle of Bull lUm. I 
 found no ai'my to command ; a mere collection 
 of regiments, cowering on tlie banks of the Poto- 
 mac, some perfectly' raw, others dispirited by the 
 recent defeat. Nothing of any consequence had 
 been done to secure the southern approaches 
 to the capital by means of defensive works — 
 nothing whatever had been undertaken to de- 
 fend the avenues to the city on the northern 
 side of the Potomac. The troops were not onlj- 
 imdisciplined, undrilled, and disjiirited ; they 
 were not even placed in military positions — 
 the city was almost in a condition to have been 
 / taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. 
 
 Without one day's delay I undertook the 
 difficult task assigned io me ; that task the Hon. 
 Secretarj' knows was given to me without my 
 solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have 
 accomplished it will best be shown b}* the past 
 and the present. The capital is secure against 
 attack ; the extensive fortifications erected by 
 the labor of our troops enable a small garrison 
 to hold it against a numerous army ; the ene- 
 my have been held in check ; the State of ^lary- 
 land is securely in our possession ; the detached 
 '"'^unties of Yirginia are again within the jiale 
 
 our laws — and all api)rchen9ion of trouble 
 .11 Delaware is at an end : the enem}" are con- 
 lined to the positions they occiipied before the 
 disaster of the 21st July ; more than all this, 
 I have now under my commaiid a well drilled 
 and reliable army, to which the destinies of the 
 country may be confidently conunitted : this 
 ami}- is 3'oung and untried in battle — but it is 
 animated by the highest spirit, and is capable 
 of great deeds. That so much has been ac- 
 complished and such an army created, in so 
 short a time, from nothing, will hereafter be 
 regarded as one of the highest glories of the 
 administration and the nation, ilany weeks, I 
 may say many months ago, this army ot the Po- 
 tomac was full}' in condition to repel any at- 
 tack ; but there is a vast difference between 
 that and the efficiency required to enable troops 
 to attack successfully an army elated by vic- 
 tory and intrenched in a position long since 
 selected, stutied and fortified. In the earliest 
 papers I submitted to the President,! asked 
 for an effective and movable force far exceed- 
 ing the aggregate now on the banks of the Po- 
 tomac. I have not the force 1 asked for. Even 
 when in a subordinate position, I always looked 
 beyond the operations of the army of the Poto- 
 mac : I was never satisfied in my own mind 
 with a barren victory — but looked to combined 
 and decisive operations. ' When I was placed 
 in command of the armies of the Unit<?d States, 
 
 23 
 I immediately turned mj attention to the whole 
 field of operations, regarding the army of the 
 Potomac as only one, -while the most important, 
 of the masses under my command. I confess 
 that I did not then appreciate the total absence 
 of a general plan, which had before existed — 
 nor did I know that utter disorganization and 
 want of preparation pervaded the "Western 
 armies. I took it for granted that they were 
 nearly, if not quite, in condition to move toward 
 tlie fulfillment of my plans ; I acknowledge that 
 I made a great mistake. I sent at once, with 
 the approval of the Executive, officers I con- 
 sidered competent to 'command in Kentucky 
 and Missouri — their instructions looked to 
 prompt movements — I soon toimd that the la- 
 bor of creation and organization had to be per- 
 formed there ; transportation, arms, clothing, 
 artillery discipline, all were wanting : these 
 things reqiiired time to procure them. The 
 generals in command have done their work 
 most creditabl}- — but we are still delayed. I 
 had hoped that a general advance could bo 
 made during the good weather of December ; 
 I was mistaken. My wish was to gain posses- 
 sion of the Eastern Tennessee Piailroad as a 
 preliminary movement — then to follow it up 
 immediately by an attack on Nashville aud 
 Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possi- 
 ble. I have ever regarded our true policy as 
 being that of fully preparing ourselves, aud 
 then seeking for the most decisive results. I 
 do not wish to waste life in useless battles — 
 but I prefer to strike at the heart. Two bases 
 of operations seem to present themselves for 
 the advance of the array of the Potomac. I st. 
 That of Washington, its present position, in- 
 volving a direct attack upon the intrenched 
 positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, 
 &c., or else a movement to turn one or both 
 flanks of those positions : or a combination of 
 the two plans. The relative force of the two 
 armies will not justify an attack on both flanks ; 
 an attack on his left flanlc alone invoU'es a long 
 line of wagon communication, and cannot pre- 
 vent him from collecting for the decisive bat- 
 tle all the detachments liow on his extreme 
 right and left. Sliould we attack his right 
 flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a cross- 
 ing of the Potomac below that river and near 
 his batteries, we could, perhaps, prevent the 
 junction of the enemy's right with his centre 
 (we might destroy the former), we would re- 
 move the obstructions to the navigation of the 
 Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transpor- 
 Jption by establishing new depots at the near- 
 est points of the Potomac, and strike more di- 
 rectly his main railway communication. •► 
 
 The fords of Occoquan, below the mouth of 
 Bull Paul, are watched by the rebels ; batte- 
 ries arc said to be j>laced on the heights in 
 rear, (concealed by the w^oods,) and the ar- 
 rangement of his troops is such that he can 
 oppose some considerable resistance to a pas- 
 sage of that stream. Information has just 
 been received, to the effect that the enemy 
 
24 
 
 arc iiitrcuohiug a line of heights, cxtencUng 
 from the vicinity of Sangsters, (Union Mills), 
 towards Evansport. Early in January Spri-g's 
 Ford was occupied by Gen. lUiodes, with 
 3,600 men and eight guns. Tiiere are strong 
 reasons for believing that Davis's Ford is oc- 
 cupied. These circumstances indicate, or 
 prove that tlic enemy anticipates the move- 
 ment in question, and is prepared to resist it. 
 Assuming, for the present, that this operation 
 is deterniined upon, it may be well to examine 
 briefly its probable progress. In the present 
 state of aflairs, our columns (for the move- 
 ment of so large a force must be miade in se- 
 veral cohunns, at least five or six,) can reach 
 the Accotink without danger ; during the 
 march thence to the Occoquan, our right flar.k 
 becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax 
 Station, Sangsters, and Union Mills : this dan- 
 ger must bo met by occupying, in some force, 
 cither the two first-named places, or, better, 
 the point of junction of the roads leading to 
 the village of Occoquan. This occupation 
 must be sustained so long as we continue to 
 draw supplies by the roads from this city, or 
 until a battle is won. 
 
 The crossing of the Occoquan should be 
 made at all the fords from ''Volf 's Run to the 
 mouth, the points of crossing not beuig neces- 
 sarily confined to the fords themselves. Should 
 the enemy occupy this line in force we must, 
 with what assistance the flottilla can afford, 
 endeavor to force the passage near the mouth, 
 thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole 
 line, or be taken in flank himself. 
 
 Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it 
 would be necessary to throw a column, by the 
 the shortest route, to Dumfries, partly to force 
 the enemy to abandon his batteries on the 
 Potomac, partly to cover cur left flank against 
 an attack from the direction of .^cquia; and, 
 lastly, to establish our communication witli 
 the river b;^the best roads, and thus give 
 us new depots. The enemy woidd ty this 
 time have occupied the line of the Occoquan 
 above Bull Run, hokMng Brents villc in the 
 force, and perhaps extending his lines some- 
 what further to the south-west. 
 
 Our next step would be to prevent the ene- 
 my from crossing the Occoquan bcl ween Bull 
 Run and the Broad Run, to fall Ujwn our right 
 flank while moving on Brentsville. This 
 might be ofi'octed by occupying Bacon Race 
 Ciiurch and the cross-roads near the mouth of 
 Bull lUui, or still more elfectually, by moving 
 to the fords themselves, and })reventing him 
 from debouching oji our siile. 
 
 These operations would ]iossibly be resist- 
 ed, a.nd it would require some time to cflect 
 them. As nearly, at the same time, as pos- 
 sible, we should gain tlie fords necessary to 
 our jjurposes above Broad Run. Having se- 
 cured our right flank, it would become ueces- 
 sar}' to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we 
 could not leave it between our right flank and 
 tlie main body. The flual movement on the 
 
 railroad must be determined by circumstaucea 
 existing at the time. 
 
 This brief sketch brings out in bold i-elief 
 the great advantage possessed by the enemy 
 in the strong central position he occupies, 
 with roads diverging in everj'- direction, and 
 a strong line of defence, enabling him to re- 
 main on the defensive, with a smaU force on 
 one flank, while he concentrates everything on 
 the other for a decisive action. 
 
 Should we place a portion of OTir force in 
 front of Centreville, while the rest crosses the 
 Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing 
 our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by 
 a distance too great to enable the two parts 
 to suiiport each other, should cither be at- 
 tacked by the masses of the enemy, while the 
 other is held in check. 
 
 I should, perhaj")S, have dwelt more de- 
 cidedly on the fact that the force left near 
 Sangsters must be allowed to remain some- 
 where on that side of the Occoqi;an, until the 
 decisive battle is over, so as to cover oi;r re- 
 treat, in the event of disaster ; unless it should 
 be decided to select and intrench a new base 
 somewhere near Dumfries, a proceeding in- 
 volving much time. 
 
 After the passage of the Occoquan by the 
 main army, tliis covering force could be drawn 
 in to a more central and less exposed posi- 
 tion, say Brimstone Plill, or nearer the Occo- 
 quan. 
 
 In this latitude the weather will,"for a con- 
 siderable period, be very uncertain, and a 
 movement commenced in force on roads in 
 tolerably firm condition, will be liable, almost 
 certain, to be much delayed by rains and 
 snow. It will, therefore, be next to impossible 
 to surprise the enemy, or take him at a dis- 
 advantage by rapid manoiuvres. Our slow 
 progress M-ill enable him to divine our pur- 
 poses, and take his measures accordingly. 
 The probability is, from the best information 
 wo possess, that the enemy has improved the 
 roads leading (o his line of defence, while we 
 will ha\e to work as we advance. 
 
 Bearing in mind what has been said, and 
 the present unprecedented and imijassaWe 
 condition of the roads, it will be evitlent that 
 no precise period can be fixed upon for the 
 movement on this line. Nor can its duration 
 be closely 'calculated ; it seems certain that 
 many weeks may elapse, before it is possible 
 to commence the march. Assuming the suc- 
 cess of this operation, and the defeat of the 
 Aiemy as certain, the question at once arises, 
 as to the importance of the results gained. - I 
 think these results M-oiild be confined to the 
 possession of the field of battle, the evacua- 
 tion of the line of the u])per Potomac by the 
 enemy, and the moral eflect oi the victory ; 
 important results, it is true, but not decisive 
 of the war, nor securing the destruction 
 of the enemy's main army, for he could fall 
 back upon other positions and fight us again 
 and again, should the condition of the troops 
 
poniiit. If he is in no condition to fight us 
 again out of range of the intrenchments at 
 Richmond, wo would find it a very difficult 
 and tedicMS matter to follow him up there, for 
 he would destroy his railroad bridges, and 
 otherwise impede our progress through a 
 region where the roads are as bad as they 
 well can be,, and we Avould probably' find our- 
 selves forced, at last, to change the whole 
 theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route 
 to Richmond, with a smaller available force, 
 and at an expenditure of much more time than 
 were we to adopt the short line at once. We 
 woidd also have forced the enen^y to concen- 
 trate his forces, and perfect his measures at 
 tiio very point where it is desirable to strike 
 him when least prepared. 
 
 11. The second base of ojierations available 
 for the army of the Potomac, is that of the 
 lower Chesa]ieake Bay, Avhich affords the 
 shortest jiossible land route to Richmond, and 
 strikes directl}' at the heart of the enemy's 
 power in the east. 
 
 The roads in that region are passable at all 
 seasons of the year. 
 
 The country now alluded to is much m©re 
 Rivorable for offensive operations than that in 
 front of Washington, (which is. vertf unfavor- 
 able,) much more level, more cleared land, the 
 woods less dense, the soil more sandy, the 
 spring some two or three weeks earlier. A 
 movement in force on that line obliges the 
 enemy to abandon his intrenched position at 
 Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Rich- 
 mond and Norfolk. He must do this ; for 
 should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his 
 destruction can be averted only by entirely 
 defeating us in a battle, in which he must be 
 the asssilant. This movement, if successful, 
 gives us the capital, the communications, the 
 supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; 
 all the Avaters of the Chesapeake would be 
 ours, all Virginia would be in our power ; and 
 the enemy foi'ced ta abandon Tennessee and 
 North Carolina. The alternative presented to 
 the enemy would be to beat us in a position 
 selected b}' ourselves ; disperse or pass be- 
 neath the Caudine Forks. 
 
 Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a 
 perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula 
 upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly 
 covered by the fleet. During the whole 
 movement our flank is. covered by the water, 
 our right is secure, for the reason that the 
 enemy is too distant to reach us in time ; he 
 can only oppose us in front ; we bring our 
 fleet in full iday. 
 
 ASiev a successful battle, our position would 
 be, Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held 
 securely, our centre connecting Burnside with 
 lluell, both by Raleigh and Lyncliburg, Ihiell 
 ill Eastern Teimessce and Northern Alabama, 
 Ifalleck at Nashville and Memphis. 
 
 The next movement wo\ild be to connect 
 with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wil- 
 mington and Charleston ; to advance our cen- 
 
 25 
 
 tre into South Carolina and Georgia, to push 
 Buell either towards Montgomerv, or to unite 
 witii the main army in Georgia, to throw Ilal- 
 leck southward to meet the naval expedition 
 from New Orleans. r 
 
 We should then be in a condition to reduce 
 at our leisure, all the southern seaports ; to 
 occupy all the avenues of communication, to 
 use the great outlet of the Mississippi ; to re- 
 establish our government and arms in Arkan- 
 sas, Louisiana and Texas ; to force the slaves 
 to labor for om* subsistence, instead of that of 
 the rebels ; to bid defiance to all foreign in- 
 terference. Such is the object I ever had in 
 view; this is the general plan which I -hope 
 to accomplish. 
 
 For many long months. I have labored to 
 prepare the army of the Potomac to play its 
 part in the programme ; from the day wlien I 
 was placed in command of all our armies, I 
 have exerted myself to place all the other 
 armies in such a condition, that they too could 
 perform their allotted duties. 
 
 Should it be determined to operate from the 
 lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which 
 promises the most brilliant results, is Urbana, 
 on the lower Rappahaimock. This point is 
 easily reached by vessels of heavy draught, it 
 is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy, 
 it is but one march from West Point, the key 
 of that region, and thence but two marches to 
 Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana, 
 would probably cut off Magruder in*the Penin- 
 sula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before 
 it could be strongly reinforced. Should we 
 fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of 
 the navy, cross the James and show ovu-selves 
 in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy 
 to come out and attack us, for his position 
 would be tintenable, with us on the southern 
 bank of the river. 
 
 Should circumstances render it not advisa- 
 ble to laud at Urbana, we can tise Mob Jack 
 Bay — or the worst coming to the worst, we 
 can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate 
 with complete security, although with less 
 celerity and briUiancy of results, up the Penin- 
 sula. 
 
 To reach whatever point may be selected as 
 a base, a large amount of cheap water trans- 
 portation must be collected, consistuig mainly 
 of canal-boats, barges, wood-boats, schooners, 
 &c., towed by small steamers, all of a very diller- 
 ent character from those required for all previ- 
 ous expeditions. This cancertainly be accom- 
 plished within thirty days from the time the 
 order is given. 1 propose as the best possible 
 plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to 
 select Urbana as a landing-place for the first 
 detatchments. To transport by water four di- 
 visions of infantry with their batteries, the 
 regular infantry, a few wagons, one bridge 
 train, and a few sqnadrons of cavalry, making 
 tlic vicinity of Hooker's position tiie idaco of 
 embarkation for as many as possil)k\ To 
 move tlie regular cavalry imd reserve artillor/ 
 
the remaining bridge trains and wagons to a 
 point some wliere near Cape Lookout, then ferry 
 them over the river by means of North River 
 feny-boats, inarcli them over to the Rap^mhan- 
 iiock (covering the movement by an infantry 
 force near Heathsville) and to cross the Rap- 
 pahannock in a similar way. The expense 
 and difficulty of the movement will thus be 
 vei-y much diminished (a saving of transpor- 
 tation of about 10,000 horses) and the result 
 non'e the less certain. 
 
 The concentration of the cavalry, &c., in the 
 lower counties of ]\[aryland, can be effected 
 without exci ing suspicion, and the movement 
 made without delay from that cause. 
 
 This •movement, if adopted, will not at all 
 expose the city of Washington to danger. 
 
 The total force to be thrown upon the new 
 line Avould be, according to circumstances, 
 from 110 to 140,000. I hope to use the latter 
 number by briuging fresh troops into Wash- 
 ington, and still leaving it quite safe. I fully 
 realize that in all projects offered, time will 
 probably be the most valuable consideration. 
 It is my decided opinion, that in that point of 
 view, the second plan should be adopted. U 
 is possible, nay highly jjrobable, that the 
 weather and state of the roads, may be such 
 as to delay the direct movement from "Wash- 
 ington, with its iTnsatisfactory results and 
 great risks — far beyond the time required to 
 complete the second plan. In the first case 
 wo can fix no definite time for an advance. 
 The roads litive gone from bad to worse — 
 nothing like their present condition has ever 
 been known here before ; they are impassible 
 at present, we are entirely at the mercy of the 
 weather. It is by no means certain that we 
 can beat them at Manassas. On the other 
 line, I rega»d success as certain by all the 
 chances of war. AVe demoralize the enemy 
 by forcing him to abandon his prepared posi- 
 tion for one which we have chosen, in which 
 all is in our favor, and where success must 
 produce iuBuense results. 
 
 My judgment as a general, is clearly in favor 
 of this project. Nothing is certain in war, 
 but all the chances are in favor of this move- 
 ment. So much am I in favor of tlie southern 
 line of operations, that I would prefer the 
 move from Fort Monroe as a base — as a cer- 
 tain though less brilliant movement, than that 
 from Urbana — to an attack upon Manassas. 
 
 I knew that his Excellenc}^ the President, 
 you and I, all agree in our wishes, and that 
 these wishes are to- bring the war to a close, 
 as promptl}' as the means in our possession 
 will permit. I believe that the mass of the 
 people have entire confidence in its. I am 
 gure of it. Li3t us then look only to the great 
 result to bea''complished,and disregard every- 
 thing else. I am, very respectfully, your 
 obedient servant, G. B. McC, M. G. G. 
 iThis letter must have produced some effect 
 upon the mind of the President, since the ex- 
 ecution of his order was not required, although 
 
 2C 
 
 it was not revoked as formally as it had been 
 issited. Many verbal conferences ensued, in 
 which among other things, it was determined 
 to collect as many canal-boats as possible, with' 
 a view to employ them largely in the trans- 
 portation of the army to the lower Chesapeake. 
 Tlie idea was at one time entertained by the 
 President to use them in forming a bridge 
 across the Potomac, near Liverpool Point, in 
 order to throw the array over at that point, 
 but this was subsequently abandoned. It was 
 also found by experience, that it would re- 
 quire muclf time to- prepare the canal-boats 
 for use in transportation to the extent that 
 had been anticipated. 
 
 Finally, on the 27th of February, 18G2, the 
 Secretary of War, by the authority of the 
 President, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assist- 
 ant Secretary of War, to procure at onco 
 the necessary steamers and sailing craft to 
 transport the army of the Potomac to its new 
 field of operations. 
 
 The following extracts from the report of 
 Mr. Tucker, dated April 5th, will show the 
 nature and progress of this well-executed ser- 
 vice : 
 
 • * * * * * 
 
 " I was called to Washington by telegraph 
 on 17th January last, by Assistant-Secretary 
 of AVar Thomas A Scott. I was informed that 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan wished to see me. From 
 him" I learned that he desired to know if trans- 
 portation on smooth water could be obtained, 
 to move at one time, for a short distance, 
 about 50,000 troops,' 10,000 horses, 1,000 
 wagons, 13 batteries, and the usual equipment 
 of such an ,army. He frankly stated to me, 
 that he had always supposed such a move- 
 ment entirely feasible until two experienced 
 quarter-masters had recently reported it im- 
 practicable, in their judgment. A few days 
 afterwards, I reported to Gen. McClellan that 
 I was entirely confident the transi^orts could 
 be commanded, and stated the mode by which 
 his object could be accomplished. A week or 
 more afterwards, I had the honor af an inter- 
 view with the President and Gen. McClellan, 
 when the subject was further discussed, and 
 especially as to the time required. 
 
 I expressed the oi^inion, that as the move- 
 ment of the horses and wagons would have to 
 be made chiefly by schooners and barges, that 
 as each schooner would require to be properly 
 fitted for the protection of the horses, and fur- 
 nished with a supply ot water and forage, and 
 each transport for the troops provided with 
 water, I did not deem' it prudent to assume 
 that such an expedition could start within 
 thirty days from the time the order was 
 given. 
 
 The President and Gen. McClellan both ur- 
 gently 8tate<l the vast importance of an earlier 
 movement. J replied that if favorable winds 
 prevailed, and tliere was great dispatch in 
 loading, tlie time might be materially dimin- 
 ished. 
 
27 
 
 On the 14th of February, [Secretary of 
 War] advertised for tniusports of various 
 descriptions, inviting bids. On the 27th Feb- 
 ruary I was informed tliat the proposed move- 
 ment by -^vater Avas decided upon. That 
 evening tlie quarter-master-general Avas in- 
 formed of the ciecisioji. Directions -Were 
 given to secure the transportation, and my 
 assistance was tendered. 
 
 " He promptly detailed to this duty two 
 most efficient assistants in his department : 
 Col. Rufus Ingalls was stationed at Aiuiapolis, 
 wliere it was then proj^osed to embark the 
 troops, and Capt. Henry C. Hodges was di- 
 rected to meet me in Piiiladelphia, to attend 
 to chartering the vessels. With these aJli"- 
 rangements, I left Washington on the 2Sth 
 February. 
 < * -x- * * * * -x- 
 
 " I teg to hand herewitii a statement, pre- 
 pared by Capt. Hodges, of the vessels char- 
 tered, which exhibits the prices paid, and the 
 ■ Jiarties from whom they were taken, viz. : 
 "113 Steamers, 'at an average 
 
 price per day $215 10 
 188 Schooners " ■*' . . 24 46 
 88 Barges " " . . 14 27 
 
 '■ In thirty-seven days from the time I re- 
 rt'ived the order in Washington, (and most of 
 it was accomplished in thirty days.) these 
 vessels transported frorn Perryville, Alexan- 
 dria, 'and Washington, to Fort Monroe — (the 
 place of departure having been changed, 
 which caused delay) — 121,500 men ; 14,592 
 animals ; 1,150 wagons ; 44 batteries 5 74 am- 
 bulances ; besides pontoon bridges, telegraph 
 )iiaterials, and the enormous quantity of 
 '{uipage, &c., required for an army of such 
 magnitude. The only loss of which I have 
 heard, is eiglit mules and nine barges, which 
 latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles 
 of Fort Monroe, the cargoes being saved. 
 With this trifling exception, not the slightest 
 accident has occurred, to my knowledge. 
 
 " I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, 
 
 for economy and celcritj' of movement, this 
 
 expedition is without a parallel on record. -» 
 
 " .lonN TrcKER, Ass't-Sec. of War." 
 
 THE ENEMY'S BATTERIES ON THE 
 
 POTOMAC. 
 In the meantime the destruction of .the bat- 
 tei'ies on the lower Potomac, by crossing our 
 troops opposite them, was considered, and 
 preparations were even made for throwing 
 Hooker's division accross the river to carry 
 them by assault. Finally, however, after an 
 adverse report from Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard, 
 chief engineer, given below, who made a re- 
 connoissance of the positions ; and in view of 
 the fact that it Avas still out of the poAver of 
 tlie navy department to furnish suitable ves- 
 sels to co-operate Avith the land troops, tins 
 plan was abandoned as impracticable. A 
 close examination of the enemy's works and 
 their approaches, made after tliey were eva- 
 cuated, showed that the decision was a Avise 
 
 one. The only means, therefore, of accomk 
 plishing the capture of these Avorks, so much 
 desired by the President, was by a movement 
 by land, from the left of our lines, on the 
 right, bank of the Potomac, a movement ob- 
 viously uuAvise. 
 
 The attention of tlie Navy Department, as 
 early as Aug. 12, 1861, had been called to the 
 necessity of maintaining a strong force of effi- 
 cient Avar vessels on the Potomac. 
 Headq's, Div'n. Potomac, Wash., Aug. 1 2, 18C1. 
 Hon. GiD. Wem.es, Sec. U. S. NaA^y ': 
 
 Sir,— I ha\'e, to-day, received additional in- 
 formation Avhich convinces me that it is more 
 than probable that the enemy Avill, Avitljin a 
 very short time, attempt to tiu-ow a respec- 
 table force from the mouth of Acquia Creek 
 into ilaryland. This attempt will probably 
 b6 preceded by the erection of batteries at 
 Mathias and White House Points. Such a 
 movement oji the part of the eneniy, in con- 
 nection Avith others probably designed, would 
 place Washington in great jeopardy. I most 
 eariiestly urge that the strongest possible na- 
 val force be at once concentrated near tho 
 mouth of Acquia Creek, and that the most vi- 
 gilant Avatch be maintained day and night, so 
 as to render such passage of the river, abso- 
 lutely impossible. 
 
 I recommend that the Miimesota, and any 
 other vessels available from Hampton Roads, 
 be at once ordered up there, and that a great 
 quantity of coal be sent to that vicinity, suffi- 
 cient for se\'eral Aveeks' supply. At least one 
 strong war vessel should be kept at Alexan- 
 dria ; and I again urge thef concentration of a 
 strong naval force in the Potomac Avithout 
 delay. 
 
 If the naA'al department Avill render it abso- 
 lutely impossible for the enemy to cross tho 
 river below Washington, the security of the 
 capital Avill be great!}' increased. 
 
 I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate 
 compliance Avith these requests. 
 
 I am, sir, verv 1 espectfully, j-our ob't serv't. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, M.-G. Com'g. 
 It Avas on the 27th Sept'r., 1861, that Gen. 
 Barnard, chief engineer, in company Avith Capt. 
 Wyman, of the Potomac Flotilla, had been in- 
 structed to make a reconnoissance of the ene- 
 my's batteries as far as Mathias Point. In his 
 report of his observations, he says : — " Bat- 
 teries at High Point and Cockpit Point, and 
 thence doAvn to Chopawampsic, cannot be pre- 
 A^ented. We may, indeed, prevent their con- 
 struction on certain points, l)ut along here, 
 somewhere, the enemy can establish, in spite 
 of us, as many batteries as he chooses. What 
 is the remedy ? Favorable circumstances, not. 
 to be anticipated nor made the basis of any 
 calculations, might justify and render success- 
 ful the attack of a peculiar battery. To sup- 
 pose that we can capture all, and by mere at- 
 tacks of this kind prevent the navigation 
 being molested, is very much the same as to 
 suppose that tho hostile army in our oaath 
 
28 
 
 front can prevent us building and maintaining 
 field-works to protect Arlington and Alexan- 
 dria, bj (Capturing them one and all as fast as 
 they are .built." .t/* 
 
 In another communication upon the subject 
 of crossing troops for ihe purpose of destroy- 
 ing the batteries on the Virginia side of the 
 Potomac, Gen. Barnard says : 
 
 " The operation involves the forcing of a 
 very strong line of defence of the enemy, 
 and all that we would have to do, if we were 
 really opening a campaign against them there. 
 " It is true we hope to force this line by turn- 
 ing it, by landing on Freestone Point. 
 
 " With reason to believe that this may be 
 successful, it cannot be denied that it involves 
 A risk of failure. 
 
 " Should we then, considering all the conse- 
 quences which may be involved, enter into 
 the operation merely to capture the Potomac 
 batteries ? I think not. 
 
 " Will not the Erricson, assisted by one 
 other gun-boat, capable of keeping along side 
 these batteries, so far control their fire as to 
 keep the navigation sufficiently free as long 
 as we require it ? Capt. Wyman says yes." 
 
 It was the opinion of competent naval 
 officers, and I concur with them, that had an 
 adequate force of strong and well armed ves- 
 sels been acting upon the Potomac from the 
 beginning of August, it would have been next 
 to impossible for the rebels to have construct- 
 ed or maintained batteries upon the banks of 
 the river. The enemy never occupied Mathias 
 Point, nor any other point on the river, which 
 was out of supporting distance from their 
 main army. 
 
 When the enemy commenced the construc- 
 tion of these batteries, the army of the Poto- 
 mac was not in condition to prevent it; their 
 destruction by our army would have afforded 
 but a temporarj'^ relief, unless \ve had been 
 etrong enough to hold the entire line of the 
 Potomac. This could be done either by driv- 
 ing the enemy from Manassas and Aquia Creek 
 by main force, or by manoeuvring to compel 
 them to evacuate their positions. The latter 
 course was finally pursued, and with success. 
 THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILPtOAD. 
 
 About the 20th of Feb., 1862, additional 
 measures were taken to secure the re-opening 
 of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The pre- 
 liminary operations of Gen. Lander for this 
 object are elsewhere described. 
 
 1 had often observed to tiie President, and 
 to members of the Cabinet, that the recon- 
 Btruction of this railway could not be under- 
 taken, \uitil we were in a condition to figlit a 
 battle to secure it. I regarded tjie possession 
 of Winchester and Strasburg as necessary to 
 cover tlie railway in rear, and it was not until 
 the month of February, that I felt prepared to 
 accomplish tliis very desirable, but iiot vital 
 purjjosc. 
 
 The whole of Bank's division, and two bri- 
 gades of Sedgwick's division, were thrown 
 
 across tne river at Harper's Ferry, leaving 
 one brigade of Sedgwick's division to observe 
 and guard the Potomac from Great Falls to the 
 rnouth of the ]\Ionocacy. A sufficient number 
 of troops of all arms, were held in readiness 
 in the vicinity of Washington, either to march 
 via Leesbiirg, or to move by raiito Harper's 
 Ferry, should this become necessary in carry- 
 ing out the objects in view. The subjoined 
 notes from a communication subsequently ad- 
 dressed to the War Department, will suffici- 
 ently explain the conduct of these operations. 
 
 Notes : — " "W^hen I started for Harper's Fer- 
 ry, I plainly stated to the President and Secre- 
 tary of War, that the chief object of the ope- 
 ration would be to open the Baltimore and 
 Ohio Radroad, by crossing the river in force 
 at Harper's Ferry; that I had collected the 
 material for making a permanent bridge by 
 means of canal-boats ; that from the nature of 
 the river, it was doubtful whether such a 
 bridge could be constructed ; that if it could 
 not, I would at least occupy the ground in 
 front of Harper's Ferry, in order to cover the 
 rebuilding of the railroad bridge, and finally, 
 when the communications were perfectly se- 
 cure, move on Winchester. s 
 
 AVhen 1 arrived at the place, I found the 
 batteau bridge neaidy completed ; the holding 
 ground proved better than had been anticipat- 
 ed, the weather was faeorable, there being no 
 wind. I at once crossed over the two brigades 
 which had arrived, and took steps to hurry up 
 the other two, belonging respectively to Bank's 
 and Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty of 
 crossing supplies had not then become ajipar- 
 ent. That night I telegraphed for a regiment 
 of regular cavalry and four batteries of heavy 
 artillery, to come up the next day (Thursday) 
 besides directing Keyes's division of infantry 
 to be moved up on Friday. 
 
 Next morning the attempt was made to 
 pass the canal-boats through the lift lock, in 
 order to commence at once the construction of 
 a permanent bridge ; it was then found for the 
 first time that the lock was too small to permit 
 the passage of the boats, it havhig been built 
 for a class of boats running on the Shenandoah 
 Canal, and too narroAv by so)ne four or six 
 inches for the canal-boats. The lift locks 
 above and below are all large enough for the 
 ordinary boats. I had seen them at Edward's 
 Ferry tlius used : it had always been repre- 
 sented to the iigincers by the military rail- 
 road employees and others, that the lock was 
 large enough, and the difference being too 
 small to be detected by the eye, no one had 
 thought of measuruig it, or suspected any 
 difficulty. I thus suddenly found mjself una- 
 ble to build the permament bridge. A violent 
 gale had arisen, which threatened the safety 
 of olu- only means of conununicalion ; the nai* 
 row ai>proach to the bridge was so crowded 
 and clogged with wagons, that it was very 
 clear that under existing circumstances noth- 
 ing more could bo done than to cross tJ»'er the 
 
20 
 
 baggage and fiiippnes of the two biLgades : of 
 ihese, instead of beiii^ able to cross botli dur- 
 ing the morning, the last arrived only in tiiuo 
 to go over jnst before dark. It was evident 
 tliat the troops under orders, would only be 
 in the way. should they arrive, and that it 
 would not be possible to subsist them for a 
 rapid nvarch for Winchester. It waS therefore 
 deemed necessary to countermand the order, 
 content ourselves with covering the reopen- 
 ing of tlie railroad for the present, and in the 
 mean time use every exertion to establish, as 
 promptly as possible, depots ot forage and 
 subsistence on the Virginia side, to supply 
 llie troops and enable them to move on Win- 
 cheater, independently of the bridge. The 
 next day (Friday) I sent a strong reconnois- 
 sance to Charleston, and under its protection 
 went there myself. I then determined to hold 
 tliat place, and to move the troops composing 
 Lander's and Williams' commands at once on 
 ilartinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus effectually 
 covering the reconstruction of the railroad. 
 
 *' Having done this, and taken all the steps 
 in my power to ensure the rapid transmission 
 of supplies over the river, I returned to this 
 city, well satisfied with what had been accom- 
 plished. While up the river I learned that 
 the President was dissatisfied with the state 
 of affairs — but on ray return here, understood 
 from the Sec, of War, that, upon learning the 
 whole state of the case, the President was 
 full}' satisfied. I contented myself, therefore, 
 with giving to the Secretary a brief statement 
 about as I have written it liere." 
 
 The design aimed at was entirely com- 
 passed, and before the first of April, the date 
 of my departure for tlie Peninsula, the 'rail- 
 road was in running order. As a demonstra- 
 tion upon the left flank of the enemy, this 
 movement no doubt assisted in determining 
 the evacuation of his lines on the eightlrand 
 ninth of March. 
 
 PREPARATIONS TO MOVE FROM WASH- 
 INGTON. 
 
 Upon my return from Harper's Ferry, on the 
 28th of Feb., the preparations necessary to 
 carry out the wishes of the President and Sec. 
 of War. in regard to destroying the batteries 
 on the lower Potomac, were at once under- 
 taken. Mature reflection convinced me that 
 this operation would require the movement of 
 the entire army, for I felt sure that the enemy 
 would resist it with his whole strength. I 
 undertook it with great reluctance, both on 
 account of the extremely unfavorable condi- 
 tion of the roads, and my firm conviction that 
 the proposed movement to tho lower Chesa- 
 peake would necessarily, as it subsequently 
 did, force the enemy to abandon all his posi- 
 tions ui front of Washington. ]5esides, it did 
 not forward my plan of campaign to preci- 
 pitate this evacuation by any direct attack, 
 nor to subject the army to needless loss of 
 
 which could produce no decisive rojsults. 
 The preparations for a movement towards tho 
 Oecoquan, to carry the batteries, were, how- 
 ever, advanced as rapidly as tho season per- 
 mitteil, and I had invited the cominantlcrs of 
 divisions to meet at headquarters on the 8th 
 of Jilarch, for the purpose of giving them tlieir 
 instructions, and receiving their advice and 
 opinions in regard to tlicir conunands, when 
 an interview with the President indicated to 
 me the possibility of a change in my orders. 
 
 His Excellency sent for me at a very early 
 hour on the morning of the 8th, and renewed 
 his expressions of dissatisfaction with the 
 aGairs at Harper's Ferry, and with my plans 
 for the new movement down the Chesapeake. 
 Another recital of the same facts which had 
 before given satisfaction to his Excellency, 
 again produced, as I supposed, tlio same re- 
 sult. The views which I expressed to tho 
 President were reinforced by oie results of a 
 meeting of my general officers at headquar- 
 ters. At that meeting, my plans were laid 
 before the division commanders, and were ap- 
 proved by a majority of those present. Ne- 
 vertheless, on the same day, two important 
 orders were issued by the President, without 
 consultation with me. The first of tliese was 
 tlie General War Order No. 2, directing tho 
 formation of army corps, aud assigning their 
 commanders. 
 
 I had always been in favor of the principle 
 of an organization into army corps," but pre- 
 ferred deferring its practical execution, until 
 some little experience in campaign, and on tho 
 field of battle, should show Avhat general 
 officers were most competent to exercise these 
 high commands; for it must be [remembered, 
 that we then had no officers whose experience 
 in war, on a large scale, was sufficient to 
 prove that they possessed the necessary qua- 
 lifications. An incompetent commander of an 
 army corps, might cause irreparable damage, 
 while it was not probable that an incompetent 
 division commander could cause any very 
 serious mischief. These views had frequently 
 been expressed by me to the President and 
 members of the Cabinet; it v/as, thereforo, 
 with as much regret as surprise, tliat I learn- 
 ed the existence of this order. 
 
 The first order has been given above, tho 
 second order was as follows : 
 Executive ilansion, Washington, March 8,'62. 
 President's General War Order, No. 3. y 
 
 Ordered: That no change of tlie base of 
 operations of the army of the Potomac, shall 
 be made without leaving in and about 'Wash- 
 ington such a force as, in the opinion of tho 
 General-in-Chief, and the commanders of army 
 corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. 
 
 That no more than two army corps (about 
 fifty thousand troops) of said arm}^ of the Po- 
 tomac, shall be moved en I'oute for a new base 
 of operations, until the navigation of the Po- 
 tomac, from Washington to the Chesapeako 
 
 life aud material, by a battle near Washington, I Bay, shall bo freed froru enemy's batterica, ;«i.d 
 
30 
 
 on ascoif;\ini;;g fliat such a movement waB in- 
 lemled, wliile it roliovcd me from the results 
 of ihe uiKiue iiiixiely of my superiors, a))d at- 
 tested the cluiracter of tlie design. Avas unfor- 
 tunate in tJjat the tlien almost impassable 
 roads hetweou our positions arid tiieirs, de- 
 prived us of tl'-o oiiporluniiy for inflicting 
 damage, usually aflVrded by tlie "A'ithdra^val 
 of ;i large arniy in fhe -ace of a poAvcrful ad- 
 j Ycrsary. ^ 
 
 I 'J'he jedremenr, of the enemy, and the occu- 
 I patiou of the abandoned positions, whieli ne- 
 ] cossivriiy followed, presented an opportunity 
 j for llie troops to gain !<ome experience on the 
 mar-/Ii and bivouae, preparatory to the cam- 
 paign, and to get rid of the superfluous hag- 
 gage and other "impediments," -which accu- 
 !iiulatc so easily around an ann\' encamped for 
 a long time in one locality. 
 
 A march to Manassas and back could pro- 
 duce no dela}- in embarking for the lower Chesa- 
 peake, as the transports could not be ready for 
 some time, and it afforded a good intermediate- 
 step between the quiet and comparative com- 
 fort of the camps around Washington, and the 
 rigors of active operations, besides accomplish- 
 ing the important object of determining the 
 positions and perhaps die future designs of the 
 enemy, with the^ possibility of being able to 
 harrass their rear. 
 
 I therefore issued orders during the night 
 of the 9th of ^March for a general Movement of 
 the army*the next morning towards Centreville 
 and ]\Ianassas, sending in advance two regi- 
 ments of cavalry under Col. Averil, with orders 
 to reach Manassas if possible, ascertain the 
 exact condition of affairs, and do whatever he 
 could to retard and annoy the enemy, if really 
 in retreat. At the same time, I telegraphed to 
 the Secretary of War, that it would be neces- 
 sary to defer the organization of army corps 
 until the comi)letion of the projected advance 
 upon Manassas, as the divisions coidd not be 
 brought together in time. The Secretary re- 
 plied, requiring immediate compliance with the 
 President's order ; but on my again represent- 
 ing that this would compel the abandonniont 
 or postponement of the movement to Manassas, 
 he finally consented to its post[)onement. At 
 noon, on the lOtli of March, the cavalry ad- 
 vance, reached the enemy's lines atCentreviJie, 
 passing through his recently occupied camps 
 and works, and iiiuling still burning heaps of 
 military stores and much valuable i)roport7. 
 SECRET SERVICJ']. 
 Tnnnediately after being assigned to the co;n- 
 mand of'tiio troops around Washington, I or- 
 ganized a secret service force under Mr. Allen 
 i'inkerton, whose assumed name was E.J.Allen, 
 a very OKpericnced and elticicut person. This 
 force, up to the time I was relieved from com- 
 mand, was continually occupied in procurii5g, 
 from all possible sources, information regard- 
 ing the strength, positions and movements of 
 the enemv. All spies, " contrabands/' defcer- 
 
 o'ther obstnictions, or until the iresiacr.t shall 
 hereafter give express permissio;;. 
 
 That any n-iovemeut, as aforesaid, en route 
 for a new base of operations, v.'hich may be 
 ordered by the Geueral-in-Chief, ant^ -whicli 
 may be intended to move upon the Chesa- 
 peoike I5ay, shall begin to move upon the bay 
 as early as the iSrhof .Nfarcii inst.,and the Gen. - 
 in-Chief sliall be responsiiile that it so moves 
 as early as that day. 
 
 Ordered: That the army a);d navy co-oper- 
 ate in an immediate ollbrt to capture the ene- 
 my's batteries upon 'the I'oiomac. betv/een 
 Washington and the Ciiesapeake Bay. 
 
 L. Thomas, Adj't. Gen. Ait. f.ivcoi.v. 
 
 After what has been said already in regard 
 to the effect of a movement to the lower Chesa- 
 peake, it is unnecessary for me to comment 
 upon this docitment, further than to say, that 
 the time of begimung the movement, depend- 
 ed upon the state of readiness of the trans- 
 ports, the entire control of which had been 
 placed, by the Secretary of War, in the hands 
 of one of the assistant secretaries, and not un- 
 der the Quartermaster ti-eneral ; so that, even 
 if the movement were not impeded by the con- 
 dition imposed in regard to the batteries on 
 the Potomac, it could not have been iit my 
 power to begin it before the 18th of March, 
 unless the xiss't. Sec'y. of War had completed 
 his arrangements by that time. 
 
 ]\feanwhile iniportant events were occurring, 
 -which materially modified the designs for the 
 8ttbscquent campaign. The appearance of the 
 Merrimac off Old Point Comfort, and the en- 
 counter with the U. S. Squadron on the 8th of 
 March, threatened serious darangement of the 
 plan for the Penisular movement. But the 
 engagement between the Monitor and the ]\[er- 
 rimac, on the 9th of March, demonstrated so 
 satisfactorily the power of the former, and the 
 other naval preparations were so extensive 
 and formidable, that the security of Fort Mon- 
 roe, as a base of operations, was placed be- 
 yond a doubt ; and, although the James River 
 was closed to us, the York River, with its tri- 
 butaries, was still open as a line of water com- 
 munication with the Fortress. The general 
 plan, therefore, remained luidisturbed, al- 
 though less promising in its details than wiien 
 the James River was in our control. 
 
 On Sunday, the 9th of .March, information 
 from various sources iriade it apparent that 
 the enemy was evacuating his positions at 
 Centreville and Mantissas, as well as on the 
 upper and lower Potumac. The President and 
 Secretary of AVar were pi-esent when the most 
 positive information reached me, and 1 ex- 
 pressed to them my intention to cross the 
 river immediately, and there gain the nmst 
 authentic information, prior to determining 
 what, course to pursue. 
 
 ^The retirement of the enemy towards Rich- 
 mond had been expected, as the natural con- 
 
 BCfiucnco of the movement to the Peninsula ; . . 
 
 but their a<loption of this course innnediately 1 tere, refugees, and many prisoners of war, 
 
31 
 
 coming into our lines from the front, were 
 carefully examined — first, by the outpost and 
 division commanders, and theii bymy chiof-of- 
 staff and the provost-marshal-general. Their 
 statements, taken in writing, and in many cases 
 under oath, from day to day, for a long period 
 previous to the evacuation of Manassas', com- 
 prised a mass of evidence whicli, by careful 
 digests and colLxtions, enabled me to estimate 
 with considerable accuracy the strength of the 
 enemy before us. Summaries, showing the 
 character and results of the labors of tlic se- 
 cret S'-rvice force, accompany this report, and 
 Krefer to them for the facts they contain, and 
 as a measure of the ignorance which led some 
 journals at that time, and persons in high office, 
 unwittingly to trifle with the reputation of an 
 army, and to delude the country with Quaker- 
 gun stories of the defenses, and gross under- 
 statements of the numbers, of the enemy. 
 
 The following orders were issued for the 
 examination of persons coming from the di- 
 rection of the enemy : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potoniac, ^Vash- 
 ington, Dec. 16, 1861.— Circuhtr ; The Major- 
 General commanding directs. That all deserters, 
 prisoners, spies, " contrabands," and all other 
 persons whatever, coming or brought within 
 our lines from Virginia, shall be taken imme- 
 diately to the quarters of the commander of 
 the division witliin whose lines they may come 
 or be brought, without previous examination 
 by any one, except so far as may be necessary 
 for the officer commanding the advanced guard, 
 to elicit information regarding his particular 
 post ; That the division commander examine 
 all such persons himself, or delegate such duty 
 to a proper officer of his staif, and allow no 
 oiher pei'sons to hold any communication with 
 them : That he the;i immediately send them, 
 with a sufficient guard, to the provost marshal 
 in this city for further examination and safe 
 keeping ; -and that stringent orders be given to 
 all guards having such persons in charge not 
 to hold any communication with theoi what- 
 ever ; and inrther,that the information elicited 
 from such persons shall be inunediately com- 
 municated to the major-general commanding, 
 or to the chief-of-stafE, and to no other person 
 whatever. 
 
 The major-general commanding further di- 
 rects that a sufficient guard be placed around 
 every telegraph station pertaining to this army, 
 and that such guards be instructed not to al- 
 low any person, except the regular telegra])li 
 corps, general officers, and such stiiff officers as 
 may be authorized by their chief, to enter or 
 loiter around said stations within hearing of 
 the sound of the teiegre.pliic instruments. 
 
 By command of Maj.-Gen. McClcllan, b. Wil- 
 liams, Asst.-Adj.-Gen. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, NV'ash- 
 ington, Feb. 26, 18G2. 
 
 General Orders, No. 27. 
 
 All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and 
 
 other persons coming within oijr lines will be 
 taken at once to tlie provost marshal of the 
 nearest division, who will examine them in 
 presence of the divisio;i conunander, or an 
 officer of his staff designated for the inu-pose. 
 This examination will oiily refer to such infyr- 
 mation as may affect the division and those near 
 it ; especially tiiose remote from general head- 
 quarters. As soon as this examination is com- 
 pleted, and it must be made as rapidly as pos- 
 sible, the persoji will be sent under proper 
 guard to the provost-marshal-general, with a 
 statement of his replies to the questions asked. 
 Upon receiving him tlie provost-marshal-gen- 
 eral will at once send him with this statement 
 to the chief-of-staff of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, wdio will cause the necessary examina- 
 tion to be made. The provost-marshal-general 
 vfill have the custody of all such persons. 
 Division commanders will at once ^mmuni- 
 cate to other division commanders all informa- 
 tion thus obtained which affects them 
 
 By command of Jlaj.-Gen. McClellan, 
 S. Williams, Asst.-Adj.-Gen. 
 In addition to the foregoing orders, the di- 
 vision comihanders were instructed whenever 
 they desired to send out scouts towards the 
 cnemj^to make known the object at headquar- 
 ters, in Older that I might determine whether 
 we had tiie information it was proposed to ob- 
 tain, and that I niigiit give the necessary orderg 
 to other commanders so that the scouts should 
 not be molested by the guards. 
 
 It will be seen from the report of the chief 
 of the secret service corps, dated March 8th 
 that the forces of the rebel army of the Poto' 
 mac at that date were as follows : 
 
 At Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper 
 Occoquan, and vicinity, 80,000 men ; at Brooks's 
 Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, and vicin- 
 ity, 18,000 men ; at Leesburg and vicinity, 4,500 
 men ; in the Shenandoah Valley, 13,000 men ; 
 Total number, 115,500. 
 
 About_ tlu-ee hundred field-guns, and from 
 twenty-six to thirty siege-guns were with the 
 rebel army in front of Washington. 
 
 The report made on the 17th of Jifarch, after 
 the evacuation of Manassas and Centreville 
 corroborates the statements contained in the 
 repoort of the 8th, and is fortified by the affi- 
 davits of several railroad engineers, conductors, 
 baggage-masters, &c., whose opportunities for 
 forming correct estimates were unusually good. 
 These affidavits will be found in the accompa- 
 nying reports of the chief of the secret service 
 corps. 
 
 ENEMY'S WORKS AT AND NEAR MA- 
 NASSAS. — A reconnoissance of the works at 
 Centreville made by Lieut. McAlester, U. S. En- 
 gineers, on March'l4th, 1862, and a survey of 
 those at xManassas made by a party of the 
 U. S. Coast Survey in April, 18G2, confirmed 
 also my conclusions as to the streiiglh of the 
 enemy's defenscH. 
 
 Those at Centreville consisted of two lines, 
 one facing east, and tlie other north. The for- 
 
mcr co.-8.dted of seven works, viz. : o«ic bas- 
 tion-fort, two redoubts, two hniettes, mul two 
 batteries : all containing euibrasiiues fur forty 
 gvuis, and connected by infantry parapets and 
 double capounieres. It; extended along the 
 crest of tlie ridge about one mile and three- 
 quarters from its junction witli the northern 
 front, to ground thickly wooded, and ilnpassa- 
 ble to an attacking column. The northern 
 front extended about one mile and a quarter to 
 Great Rocky Run, and thence three-quarters 
 of a mile further, to thickly wooded impassa- 
 ble ground in the valley of Cub Run. It Con- 
 sisted of six lunettes and batteries. With em- 
 brasures for thirty-one giuis, connected by an 
 infantry parapet in the form of a crcmalliere 
 line with redans. 
 
 At the town of Centreville, on a high hill 
 commanding the rear of all the works within 
 range, was a large hexagonal redoubt with ten 
 embi"ftsures. 
 
 Manassas Station was defended in all direc- 
 tions by a system of detached Avorks, with 
 platforms for heavy guns arranged for marine 
 carriages, and connected by infantrj' parapets. 
 This system was rendered complete by a very 
 large work with sixteen embrasures, which 
 commanded tliQ highest of the other works by 
 about fifty feet. 
 
 Sketches of the reconnoissances above re- 
 ferred to will be found among the maps ap- 
 pended to this report. 
 
 From this it will be seen that the positions 
 selected by the enemy at Centreville and Ma- 
 nassas were naturally very strong, with im- 
 passable streams and broken ground, aflording 
 ample protection to their flaid?;s,and that strong 
 lines of intrenchments swept all the available 
 approaches. 
 
 Although the history of every former war 
 has conclusively shown the great advantages 
 which are possessed by an enemy acting on 
 the defensive and occupying strong positions 
 defended by heavy earthworks, yet, at the com- 
 mencement of this war but few civilians in our 
 country, and, indeed, not all military men of 
 rank, had a just appreciation of the fact. 
 
 New levies that have never been in battle, 
 cannot be expected to advance without cover 
 under the nnuxlerous fire from such defenses, 
 and carry them by assault. This is work in 
 which veteran troops frequently falter, and are 
 repiUsed with loss. That an assault of the en- 
 emy's positions, in front of Washington, Avith 
 the new troops composing the army of the Po- 
 tomac, during the winter of 1861-2, would have 
 resulted in defeat and demoralization, was too 
 probable. The same armj^ though eninx'd to 
 war in many battles hardly fought and bravely 
 won, has thrice, under other generals, sulfered 
 Buch disasters as it was no excess of prudence 
 then to avoid. 
 
 My letter to the Secretary of War, dated 
 February 3d, 18(J2, and given above, expressed 
 the opinion that the movement to the Penin- 
 Bula, would compel tlie enemy to retire from 
 
 32 
 
 , his position at Manassas, and free Washington 
 from danger. 
 
 When the enemy first learned of that plan, 
 they did thiis evacuate Manassas. During the 
 Peninsula campaign, as at no former period, 
 northern Virginia was completely in our pos- 
 session, and the vicinity of Washington free 
 from the presence of the enemy. The groimd 
 so gained was not lost, nor Washington again 
 put in danger, until the enemy learned of the 
 orders for an evacuation of the Peninsula, sent 
 to me at Harrison's Bar, and were again left 
 free to advance northward, and menace the 
 national capital. Perhaps no one now doubts 
 that the best defense of Washington, is a Pe- 
 ninsula attack on Richmond. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER RELIEVING* 
 GEN'L McCLELLAN OF THE COMJIAND- 
 IN-CHIEF. — My order for tlie organization of 
 the army corps, was issued on the 13th of 
 March. It lias been given above. 
 
 While at Fairfax Court House, on March 
 12tli, I was inform-ed through the telegraph, 
 by ;v member of my §taff, that the following 
 document had appeared in the "National In- 
 telligencer," of that morning. 
 
 Exec. Mansion, Washington, March 11, 1862. 
 President's War Order, No. 3. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, having personally taken 
 the field at the head of the army of the Poto- 
 mac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved 
 from the command of the other military de- 
 partments, he retaining command of the de- , 
 pai'inent ot the Potomac. 
 
 Ordered further, That the departments now 
 under the respective commands of Generals 
 Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of 
 that under Gen. Buell as lies west of a north 
 and south line indefinitely drawn through 
 Koxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and de- 
 signated the Department of the Mississippi, 
 and that, mitil other^dse ordered, Major.-Gen. 
 Halleck have command of said department. 
 
 Ordered also, That the country west of the 
 Department of the Potomac, and east of the 
 Department of the Mississippi, be a military 
 department, to be called the Mountain Depart- 
 ment, and that the same be commanded by 
 Maj.-Gcn. Fremont. 
 
 That all the commanders of departments, 
 after the receipt of this order by them, respec- 
 tively report, severally and directly, to the 
 Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and 
 frequent reports, will be expected of all and 
 each of them. Ab. Lincoln. 
 
 Though unaware of the President's inten- 
 tion to remove me from the position of gen- 
 eral-in-chief, I cheerfully acceded to the dis- 
 position he saw fit to make of my services, 
 and so informed him in a note, on the 12th of 
 March, in which occur these words : 
 
 " I believe I said to you some weeks since, 
 in connection with some Western matters, that 
 no feeling of self-interest or ambition, should 
 ever prevent me from devoting myself to the 
 service. 1 am glad to have the opportunity 
 
33 
 
 to prove it, and you will find that, under pre- 
 Bent circumstances, I shall work just as cheer- 
 fully as before, and that no consideration of 
 self will, in any manner, interfere with the 
 discharge-of mj' public duties. Again thank- 
 ing you for official and personal kindness you 
 have so often evinced towards me, I am, <fcc." 
 A RECONNOISSANCE. 
 
 On the 14tli of March, a reconnoissance of 
 a large body of cavalry, with some infantry, 
 under command of Gen. Stoneman, was sent 
 along the Orange and Alexandria railroad, to 
 determine the position of the cnemj^ and, if 
 possible, force his rear across the Rappahan- 
 nock ; but the roads were in such condition, 
 that, finding it impossible to subsist his men. 
 Gen. Stoneman was forced to return, after 
 reaching Cedar Run. Tlie following dispatch 
 from him recites the result of this expedition : 
 Headq's., Union Mills, ]\rarch 16. 1862. 
 
 Col. Colburn : — We arrived liere last even- 
 ing about dark ; we got corn for horses ; no 
 provisions for men ; Bull Run too high to 
 cross ; had we staj'ed an hour longer, we 
 ehould not have got here to-day, owing to the 
 high water in the streams ; felt the enemy 
 cautiously, tuid found him in force at Warren- 
 ton Junction ; saw two regiments of cavalry, 
 and three bodies of infantry, on the other side 
 of Cedar Run ; had we crossed, should not 
 have been able to get back for high water ; 
 had three men of 5th Cavalry hit driving in 
 enemy's pickets ; one slightly wounded in the 
 Jfwliead. 
 
 Enemy acted confidently, and followed us 
 some way back on the road, but did not mo- 
 lest us hi any way. Enemy's force consisted 
 of Stewart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of 
 artillery, and some infantry : railroad bridges 
 all burnt down up to Warrcnton Junction ; 
 Btill entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn 
 at a moment's warning, having dry wood piled 
 upon them ; heard cars running during the 
 nigtit before last, probably bringing up troops 
 from Rappahannock ; heard of two regiments 
 of infantrj' at Warrenton, engaged in impress- 
 ing the miiiiia and securing forage ; heard of 
 a large force of infantry this siJle of Rappa- 
 hannock River, having come up to Warrenton 
 Junction from Acquia Creek day before yes- 
 terday ; bridges all destroyed this side of 
 "■- Broad Run. The aids who take this will give 
 you further particulars. Very respectfully, <tc. 
 Geo. Stone.max, Brig.-Gen. Com'g. 
 DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON. 
 
 The main body of the army was, on the 11th 
 of March, rnoved back to the vicinity of Alex- 
 andria to be embarked, leaving a part of Gen. 
 Sumner's corps at Manassas, until other troops 
 could be sent to relieve it. 
 
 Before it was withi'awn, a strong recon- 
 noissance xmder Gen. Howard was sent to- 
 wards the Rappahannock, the result of which 
 appears in the following dispatch : 
 
 Warrenton Junction, ilarch 29, 1862. 
 
 Gen. S. WilHams : — Express just received 
 
 from Gen. Howard. He drove the enemy 
 across the Rappahamiock bridge, and is now 
 in camp on this bank of and near the Rappa- 
 hannock River. The enemy blew up the 
 bridge in his retreat. There was skirmishing 
 during the march, and a few shots exchanged 
 by the artillery, without any u-^.s on our part. 
 Their loss, if any, is not known. Gen. Howard 
 will return to this camp to-morrow mortiing. 
 E. Y. Sumner, Brig.-Gen. 
 
 The line of the Rappahainiock and the Man- 
 assas Gap railroad was- thus reasonably secure 
 from menace by any considerable body of the 
 enem}'. i * 
 
 On the 13th of March, a council of war was 
 assembled at the Fairfax Court House, to 
 discuss the military status. The President's 
 Order No. 3, of March 8tli, was considered. 
 Tlie following is a memorandum of the pro- 
 ceedings of the council : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fairfax 
 Court House, March 13, 1862. 
 
 A council of the Generals commanding array 
 corps at the headquarters of the arjiiy of the 
 Potomac, were of the opinion : 
 
 I. That the enemy liaving retreated from 
 Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rapi^a-, 
 hanuock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of gen- 
 erals commanding army corps that the opera- 
 tions to be carried on will be best undertaken 
 from Old Point Comfort, between the York 
 and James Rivers. 
 
 Provided — 
 
 1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merriraao, can 
 be neutralized. 
 
 2d. That the means of transportation suffi- 
 cient for an immediate transfer of the force to 
 its new base can be ready at Washington and 
 Alexandria, to move down the Potomac, and, 
 
 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be 
 had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy'a 
 batteries on the York River. 
 
 4th. The force to be left to cover Washing- 
 ton shall be such as to give an entire feeling 
 of security for its safety from menace. — (Una- 
 nimous.) 
 
 H. If the foregoing cannot be, tne army 
 should then be moved against the enemy, be- 
 hind the Rappahannock, at the earliest pos- 
 sible moment, and the means of reconstruting 
 bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking 
 them with material sufficient forjsupplying the 
 army, should at once be collected for both the 
 Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Rich- 
 morid railroads. — (Unanimous.) 
 
 N. B. That, with the forts on the right bank 
 of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on 
 tlie left bank occupied, a covering force in 
 front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would 
 suffice. — (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) 
 
 A total of 40,000 men for tho defense of the 
 city would suffice — (Sumner.) 
 
 This was assented to by myself, and imme- 
 diately communicated to the War Department. 
 The following reply was received the same 
 day: 
 
War Dcparfmetit, March 13, 1862, 
 To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan,— 
 
 The" President, having considered the plan 
 of operations agreed upon b}' yourself and the 
 army corps, makes no objection to the same, 
 but gives the following directions as to its 
 execution : 
 
 1st. ' Leave such force at ^^anassas Junction 
 as shall make it entirely certain that the ene- 
 my shall not repossess himself of that position 
 suid line of communication. 
 
 2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. 
 
 3d. Move the reraaiiulcr of tlie force down 
 the Potomac — choosing a, new base at Fortress 
 Monroe, or anywhere between liere and there , 
 or, at all events, move such remainder ot the 
 army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some 
 route. 
 
 Edwin M. Stantox, Sec. of War. 
 
 My preparations were at once begun in ac- 
 cordance with tliese directions, and on the 
 IGth of March the following instructions were 
 sent to Generals Banks and Wadsworth. 
 lleadq's. Army of the Potomac, March 16, '62. 
 ' Sir, — You will post yonr command in tlie 
 vicinity of Manassas ; intrench yourself strong- 
 ly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the 
 front. 
 
 Your first care will be the rebuilding of the 
 railway from Washington to Manassas, and to 
 Strasburg, in order to open your communica- 
 tions with the Valley of tlie Shenandoah. As 
 soon as Manassas Gap Railway is in running 
 order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four 
 regiments, with two batteries, at or near tiie 
 point wliere the railway crosses the Shenan- 
 doah. Something like two regiments ot ca- 
 vajry should be left in that vicinity to occupy 
 Winchester, and thorougldy scour the country 
 south of the railway and up the Shcnamloah 
 Valley, as well as through Cliester Gap, wiiich 
 might, perhaps, be advaniageously occupied 
 by a detachmcT't of infantry well intrencliod. 
 "Block houses should be built at all the railway 
 bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton 
 Junction, or Warrenton itself, and also some 
 little more advanced ])oint on the Orange and 
 'Alexanilria Ilaihvay, as soon as the railway 
 bridge is repaired. 
 
 Great activity should be observed by tlie 
 'cavalry. Besides the two regiments at Ma- 
 nassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at 
 your disposal, to scout towards the Occoquan, 
 and probably a fourth towards LeesDurg. 
 
 To recapitulate : The most important points 
 ■which should engage your attention are as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 1st.. A strong force, well intrenched, in the 
 vicinity of Manassas, perhaps cvenCenterville, 
 and another force, (a brigade), also well in- 
 trenched, near Strasburg. 
 
 2d. Block houses at the Railway bridges. 
 
 3d. Constant employment of the cavalry well 
 to the front. "^ ' ••■ • ■ ' ' ' • 
 
 4th. Crraiid Guards at Warrenton Junction, 
 and in advance as far as the Rappahannock, if 
 possible. 
 
 34 
 
 5th. Great care to bo exercised to obtain 
 full and early information as to the enemy. 
 
 6th. The general object is to cover the lino 
 of the Potomac and Washington. 
 
 The foregoing is communicated by command 
 of Maj.-Gen. McClellan. 
 
 S. Williams; Assistant-Adjt.-Gfn. 
 To Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, 
 
 Comd'g. 5th Corps Army of the Potomac, 
 lleadq's Army of the Potomac, March 16, '62. 
 
 Sir, — Tlie command to which you have been 
 assigned by instructions of the President, as 
 Military Governor of the District of Columbia, 
 embraces the geograpiiical limits of the dis- 
 trict, and will also include the city of Alexan- 
 dria, the defensive works south of the Po- 
 tomac, from th.e Occoquan to Difficult Creek, 
 and the post of Fort Washington. 
 
 I enclose a list of the troops, and of tho 
 defenses embraced in these limits. 
 
 General Banks will command at Manassas 
 Junction, witli the divisions of AViliiams and 
 Shields, composing ihe 5th Corps, but you 
 should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance in 
 your front— carefully guard the approaches in 
 that quarter, and maintain the duties of ad- 
 vanced guards. You will use the same pre- 
 cautions on either flank. 
 
 All troops not actually needed for the police 
 of Washington and Georgetown, tor the garri- 
 sons north of the Potomac, and for otiier indi- 
 cated special duties, should be moved to th» 
 south side of the river. 
 
 In the centre of your front yon should post 
 the main body of your troops, and proper 
 proportions at suitable distances towards your 
 right and left flanks. Careful patrols will b« 
 made, in order thoroughly to scour the coun- 
 try in front from right to left. 
 
 It is specially enjoined upon you to main- 
 tain the forts and their armaments in the best 
 ]K)Ssiblc order, to look carefully to the instruc- 
 tion and discipline of their garrisons, as well 
 as all other troops under your command, and 
 by frequent and rigid inspections to insure 
 the attainment of these ends. 
 
 The care* of tho railways, canals, depots, 
 bridges and ferries, within the above-named 
 limits, will devolve upon you, and you are to 
 insure their security and provide for their 
 protection by every means in your power. 
 You will also protect the depots of the pub- 
 lic stores, and transmit the stores to troops in 
 active service. 
 
 By means of patrols you will thoroughly 
 scour the neighboring country, south of the 
 eastern branch, and also on your right, and 
 you will use every possible precaution to in- 
 tercept mails, goods, and persons passing un- 
 authori'/x'd to the enemy's lines. The necessity 
 of maintaining good order within your limits, 
 and especially in the capital of the nation, 
 cannot be too strongly enforced. 
 
 You will forward and facilitate the move- 
 ment of all troops destined tor the active part 
 of tho army of the Potomac, and especially tho 
 
35 
 
 4kr»nsit of detachments to their proper regi- 
 ments and corps. 
 
 The charge of the new troops arriving in 
 Wusliington, and all trooi)S temporarily there, 
 will devolve upon j'ou. You will form them 
 into provisional brigades, promote tlieir in- 
 struction and discipline, and facilitate their 
 equipment. 
 
 Report all arrivals of troops — their strength, 
 composition and equipment — by every oppor- 
 tunity. 
 
 Besides the regular reports and returns, 
 which you will be required to render to the 
 adjutant-general of the army, yon will make 
 to these headquarters a consolidated report 
 of 3'onr command every Sunday morning, and 
 montlily returns on the lirst day of each nionth. 
 
 The foregoing instructions are comniuui- 
 cated by command of jNfaj.-Gen. McClcllau. 
 
 S. Williams, Assistant Adgt.-Gen. 
 To Brig.-Gen. J. S. Wadsworth, 
 
 Military (xov. of the District of Ccilumbia. 
 
 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN ON THK 
 PENINSULA. 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 riicologica! Seminar}^ Va., March 19, 1862. 
 Hon. E M. Stanton, Secretarj' of War : 
 
 Sir, — I have the honor to submit the follow- 
 ing notes on the proposed operations of the 
 active portion of the armj^ of the Potomac. 
 
 The proposed plan of campaign is to assume 
 For^ Monroe as the first base of operations, 
 r-> taking the line by Yorktown and West Point 
 I upon Ilichmond as the line of operations, 
 Richmond being the objective point. It is 
 assunied that the fall of Kiclunond involves 
 that of Norfolk and the whole oi Virginia; 
 also that we shall fight a decisive battle be- 
 tween West Point and Iiichmond, to give 
 which battle the rebels will concentrate all 
 their avadable forces, understanding, as they 
 will, that it involves the fate of their cause. 
 It therefore follows : 
 
 Isl. Tliat we should collect all om- available 
 forces and operate upon adjacent lines, main- 
 "taining perfect communication between our 
 lines. 
 
 2a. That no time should be lost in reaching 
 the field of battle. 
 
 The advantages of the Peninsula between 
 the York and James Rivers are too obvious 
 to need explanation. It is also clear tliat West 
 Point should as soon as possible be reached 
 and be our mam depot, that we may have tlie 
 ehortest line of laud transjiortation for our 
 supplies and the use of the York River. 
 
 There are two methods of reaching this 
 point. 
 
 \sL Ey moving directly from Fort Monroe 
 as a base, and trusting to the roads for our 
 supplies, at the same lime landing a strong 
 corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order 
 tp turn the rebel lines of defense south of 
 Yorktown, then to reduce Yorktown and 
 Gloucester, by a siege in all probability, in- 
 rolving a delay of weeks perhaps. 
 
 2c?. To make a combined naval and land" 
 attack upon Yorktown, the first object of the 
 campaign. This leads to the most rapid and 
 decisive results. To accomplish this the iiavj 
 should at once conccnliate upon the York 
 River all their available and most powerful 
 batteries. Its reduction should not, in that 
 case, require many hours. A strbng corps 
 would be pushed up the York, under cover of 
 the navy, directi}' upon ^Vest Point, irnnicdi- 
 ately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could 
 at once eskiblish oiu- new base of operations 
 at a distance of some twenty-five miles from 
 Richmond, witli every facility for develop- 
 ing and bringing into play the whole of 
 our available force on cither or both banks 
 of the James. 
 
 It is impossible to urge too strongly the ab- 
 solute necessity, of the co-operation of the 
 navy, as a part of this progrannnc ; without 
 it the oi)erations may be prolonged for many 
 weeks, and we may be forced to cany in front 
 several strong positions, which, by their aid, 
 could bo turned' without serious loss of cither 
 time or men. 
 
 It is also of first importance to bear in mind 
 the fact already alluded to, that the captm-o of 
 Richmond necessarily involves the prompt 
 fall of Norfolk ; while an operation against 
 Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of tlio 
 campaign, facilitates the reduction of Rich- 
 mond merely by the demoralization of the 
 rebel troops involved, and that after tlio fall 
 of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake 
 the capture of Richmond by the same means 
 which would have accomiilished it in the be- 
 ginning, having meanwhile afforded the rebels 
 am})lc time to i)crfect their defensive arrange- 
 ments, for they could well know from the mo- 
 ment the army ot the Potomac chaiiged its 
 base to Fort Alonroc that Richmoud must be 
 its ultimate object. 
 
 It may be summed up in few words, tlidt, 
 for the prompt success of this cam[)aign, it is 
 absolutely necessary that the navy sliould at 
 once throw its whole available force, its mo^t 
 powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is 
 the most important i)oint — there the knot to 
 be cut. An immediate decison upon tlic sub- 
 ject matter of this conmiunication i^ liighly 
 desirable, and seems called for by tlie exigen- 
 cies of the occasion. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't serv't. 
 Gko. R. McCi.kllan, Alajoi- General. 
 A REDUC'ITON OF FORCE. 
 
 In the meantime the troops destined to form 
 the active army were collected in cu:;.ps con- 
 venient to the points of embarkation, and 
 every preparation made to embark them "as 
 rapidly as possible, when the transports weye 
 ready. 
 
 A few days befoi'e fiailirg for Fort ^Monroe, 
 while still cncjimpcd near Alexandria, I met 
 tile Picsident by a[)poiiitment, on a stetuuer. 
 lie then informed me that he had been strong- 
 ly pressed to take General lUonker's divisloa 
 
36 
 
 from'my command and give it to Greneral Fre- 
 mont. His Excellency was good enough to 
 BUggest several reasons for not taking Blenk- 
 er's division from me. I assented to the force 
 of his suggestions, and was extremely gratified 
 ty his decision to allow the division to remain 
 with the army of the Potomac. It was, there- 
 fore, with sm'prise that I received on the 31st 
 the following note ; 
 
 Exec. Mansion, Wusliington, March 31, '62. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, 
 
 My Dear Sir : — Tliis morning I felt con- 
 Btrained to order Blenker's division to Fre- 
 mont ; and I will write this to assure you that 
 I did so with great pain, understanding that 
 you would wish it otherwise. If 3'ou could 
 know the full pressure of the case, I am con- 
 fident you would justify it, even beyond a 
 mere acknowledgement, that the commander- 
 in-chief may order what he pleases. 
 
 Yours very truly, A. Lincoln 
 , To this, I replied in substance, that I regret- 
 led the order, and could ill-afi'qrd to lose'10,000 
 troops, which had been counted upon in form- 
 ing my plan of campaign, but as there was no 
 remedy I would yield and do the best I could 
 without them. In a conversation with the 
 President a few hours afterwards, I repeated 
 Terbally the same thing, and expressed my 
 regret that Blenker's division had been given 
 to Fremont, from any " pressure" other thain 
 the requirements of the national exigency. I 
 was partially relieved, however, by the Presi- 
 dent's positive and emphatic assurance that I 
 might leave, confident that no more troops be- 
 yond these 10,000 should, in any event, be taken 
 from me, or in any way detached from my 
 command. 
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH 
 VALLEY. 
 
 At the time of the evacuation of Manassas 
 hj the enemy, Jackson was at Winchester, our 
 forces occupying Chai-lestown, and Shield's 
 reaching Bunker Hill on the 11th. On the 
 morning of the 12th, a brigade of Gen. Bank's 
 troops, under Gen. Hamilton, entered Win- 
 chester, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock the 
 evening before, his rear guard of cavahy leav- 
 ing an hour before our advance entered the 
 place. The enemy having made his prepara- 
 tions for evacuation some days before, it was 
 not possible to intercept his retreat. On the 
 13th, the mass of Banks' corps was concen- 
 trated in the immediate vicinity of Winclies- 
 tcr, the enemy being in the rear of Strasburg. 
 On the lOtli Gen. Shields, occupied Strasburg, 
 driving the enemy twenty miles south, to 
 Mount Jackson. 
 
 On the 20th^'the first^division of Banks' 
 Icorps, commenced its movement towards 
 Manassas, in compliance Avith my letter of in- 
 fitructions of the 16th. 
 
 Jackson probably received information of 
 this movement, and supposed that no force of 
 any consequence Avas left in the vicinity of 
 Winchester, and upon the fahing back of 
 
 Shields to that place on the 20th, for the pur- 
 pose of enticing Jackson in pursuit, the latter 
 promptly' followed, whereupon ensued a skir- 
 mish on the 22d, in which Gen. Shields was 
 wounded, and an affair at Winchester on the 
 23d, resulting in the defeat of Jackson, who 
 was pursued as rapidly as the exhaustion of 
 our troops, and tlie difficulty of obtaining sup- 
 plies, permitted. It is presumed that the fuU 
 reports of the battle of Winchester, were for- 
 warded direct to the War Department by 
 Gen. Banks. 
 
 It being now clear that the enemy had no 
 intention of returning by the Manassas route, 
 the following letter of April 1st, was Avritten 
 to Gen. Banks. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Pot(miac, on 
 Board the Commodore, April 1, 18G2. 
 Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, Com'ng Fifth Corps, — 
 
 General : — The change in afiairs in the 
 valley of the Shenandoah, has rendered neces- 
 sary a corresponding departure, temporarily 
 at least, from the plan we some days since ' 
 agreed upon. 
 
 In my arrangements, I assume you have with 
 you a force amply sufficient to drive Jackson 
 before you, provided he is not reinforced 
 largely. I also assume, that you may find it 
 impossible to detach anything towards Manas- 
 sas for some days, probably not until the ope- 
 rations of th» main army have drawn all the 
 rebel force toward Richmond. ^ 
 
 You are aware that General Sumner has for \ 
 some da3's been at Manassas Junction, with 
 two divisions of infantry, six batteries, and 
 two regiments of cavalry, and that a recon- 
 noissance to the Rappahannock, forced the 
 enemy to desiroy the railroad bridge at Rap- 
 pahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexan- 
 dria Railroad. Since that time our cavalry 
 have found nothing on this side of the Rappa- 
 hannock in that direction, and it seems clear 
 that we have no reason to fear any return of 
 the rebels in that quarter. Their movements 
 near Fredericksburg, also indicate a final aban- 
 donment of that neighborhood. I doubt wheth- 
 er Johnson will now reinforce Jackson, with a 
 view of offensive operations. The time is pro- 
 bably passed when he could have gained any 
 thing hj doing so. I have ordered in one of 
 Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson, late 
 Sumner's) to Alexandria for embarkation, Blen- 
 ker's has been detached from the Army of the 
 Potomac, and ordered to report to General Fre- 
 mont. 
 
 Abercrombie is probably at Warrcnton Junc- 
 tion to-day ; Geary is at AVhite Plains. 
 
 Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered 
 out, and arc now on their way to relieve the 
 two regiments of Sumner. 
 
 Four thousand infantry, and one battery, 
 leave Washington at once for Manassas. Some 
 3,000 more will move in one or two days, ^d 
 soon after some 3,000 additional. 
 
 I will order Blenker to march on Sti-asburg, 
 and to report to you for temporary duty, so 
 
37 
 
 that, should you find a large force in your 
 front, you can avail yourself of his aid. As 
 soon as possible, please direct him on Win- 
 chester, thence to report to the adjutant-j:;en- 
 eral of the army for orders, but keep him until 
 you are sure what you have in front. 
 
 In regard to your own movements, the most 
 important thing at present is to throw Jackson 
 well back, and then to assume such a position 
 as to enable you to prevent his return. As 
 soon as the railway communications are re-es- 
 tablished, it will be, probably, important and 
 advisable to move on Staunton, but this would 
 require secure communications, and a force of 
 from 25,000 to 30,000 for active operations. 
 It should also be nearly coincident with my 
 own move on Richmond ; at all events, not so 
 . long before it as to enable the rebels to con- 
 icentrate on you, and then return on me. I 
 * fear that you cannot be readj^in time, although 
 ,it may come in very well with a force less than 
 that I have mentioned, after the main battle 
 ,near Richmond. When General Sumner leaves 
 '^' Warrenton Junctton, General Abercrombie will 
 '' be placed in immediate command of Manassas 
 and Warrenton Junction, under your general 
 orders. Please inform me frequently, by tele- 
 graph, and otherwise, as to the state of thhigs 
 in your front. I am very truly yours, 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Corn'g. 
 ■• P. S. — From what I have jvist learned it 
 would seem that the two regiments of cavalry 
 ntended for Warrenton Junction have gone 
 'to Harper's Ferry. Of the four additional reg- 
 iments placed inider your orders, tw-o should, 
 •as promptly as possible, move by the shortest 
 route on Warrenton Junction. I am, sir, very 
 .respectfully, Your obedient servant, 
 
 Geo. B-. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 This letter needs no further explanation than 
 to saj' that it was my intention, had the opera- 
 tions in that quarter remanied under my charge, 
 either to have resumed the defensive positions 
 marked out in the letter of March 16, or to 
 have advanced General Banlcs upon Staunton, 
 as miglitinthe progress of events seem advis- 
 able. It is to be remembered that when I 
 ■A'rote the preceding and folioiving letters of 
 April 1,1 had no-expectation of being relieved 
 from the charge of the operations in the She- 
 nandoah Valle3' and in front of Wa'shington, 
 the President's War Order No. 5 giving no in- 
 timation of such an intention ; and that, so far 
 as reference was made to tinal operations after 
 ■driving Jackson back and taking such a posi- 
 tion as to prevent his return, no positive 
 orders were given in the letter — the matter 
 being left for future consideration, when the 
 proper time arrived for a decision. 
 TliOOPS LEFT IN AND NEAR WASH- 
 INGTON. 
 From the following letter to the adjutant- 
 general, dated April 1, 1862, it will be seen 
 that I left for the defunse of the national capi- 
 tal and its approaches, when I sailed for tlie 
 Peninsula, 7-3,456 men, with 109 pieces of lig.'it I 
 
 f^ 
 
 artillery, including the 32 pieces in Washings- 
 ton alluded to, but not enumerated in my let- 
 ter to the adjutant-genera!. It will also be 
 seen that I recommended other available ti'oopa 
 in New York (more than 4,000) to bo at onca 
 ordered forward to reinforce them. 
 
 Headquarters, Array of the Potomac, 
 Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. 
 Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. Ai 
 
 General: — I have to request that you will: 
 lay the following commmiication before thek 
 Hon. Secretary of War. •; 
 
 Tlie approximate numbers and positions oft 
 the troops left near and in rear of the Potomacr 
 is as follows : — *> 
 
 Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads 
 under his charge, sufficient to give him 5,00(X 
 for the defense of Baltimore, and 1,988 availa- 
 ble for the eastern shore, Annapolis, &;c. Fort 
 Delaware is very well garrisoned by'about 400' 
 men. 
 
 The garrisons of the fSi'ts around Washing-^ 
 ton amount to 10,600 men, other disposabla 
 tioops now with Gen. Wadsworth being about 
 11,400 men. 
 
 The troops employed in guarding the vari* 
 ous railways in Maryland amount to som» 
 3,359 men. These it is designed to relieve, 
 being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, : 
 and to send forward to Manassas. 
 
 Gen. Abercrombie occupies AFarrenton with 
 a force which including Col. Geary at White- 
 Plains and the cavalry to be at his disposal,, 
 will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces • 
 of artillery. 
 
 I have the honor to request that all the 
 troops organized for service in Pennsylvania 
 and New York, and in any of the Eastern States, 
 may be ordered to Washington. I learn from . 
 Gov. Curtin that there are some 3,500 men. 
 now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I 
 should be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four 
 thousand men from Gen. ^Vadsworth I desire 
 to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with 
 the railroad guards above alluded to, will make 
 up a force under the command of Gen. Aber- 
 crombie of something like 18,639 men. ': 
 
 It is my design to push Gen. Blenker's divi-' 
 sion from Warrenton iqion Strasburg. Ho 
 should remain at Strasburg long enough to al- 
 low matters to assume a definite form in that 
 region, before i5roceeding to his ultimate dca- 
 tination. , .. 
 
 The troops in the valley of "the Shenandoah, 
 will thus be, including Bleiiker s division, 10,- 
 028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery. Banks' 
 5th Corps, which eiuliraces the command of 
 Gen. Shields, 19,687 strong, with 41 guns — 
 some 3,652 disposable cavalry and the railroad 
 guards, about 2,100 men — amount to about 
 35,467 men. 
 
 It is designed to relievo Gen. Hooker by on© 
 regiment, say 850 men, being, with some 500 
 cavalry, 1,350 men on tiie lower Potomac. To 
 recapitulate; — . ' 
 
m 
 
 At Warrentoii there is to be, 
 At Manassas, say, 
 In tlie valley of the Shenandoah, 
 ■On the lower rotomac, 
 
 7,780 men. 
 10,850 '■ 
 35,4(i7 " 
 
 isno " 
 
 ® In all, 55,456 " 
 
 There would thi!S be left for the p;arrisons 
 and the front of Washington under (Jen. Wads- 
 worth some 18,000 men, inclusive of the batte- 
 ries under instruction. 
 
 The troops organizing or ready for service 
 in New York, I learn will probably number 
 more than four thousand. These should be 
 assembled at Washington, subject to disposi- 
 tion where their services may be most requir- 
 ed. I am, very respectfully, your obedient ser- 
 vant, ■ Geo. B. McCleixan, Maj.-(Jen. Com'g. 
 
 The following letter from (Jen. Barrj' shows 
 tliat thirty-two (32) field-guns with men. horses 
 and equipments, were also left in Washington 
 City when the army sailed. These were tlio 
 batteries imder instriTCtion referred to above. 
 Headquarters, Inspector of Artillery, 
 AVashington. Dec. 16, 18G2. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, U. S. A. 
 
 General : — It having been stated in various 
 publie prints, and in a speech of Senator 
 Chandler, of Michigan, in his place in the U. 
 B. Senate, quoting what lie stated to be a por- 
 tion of the testimony of Brig.-Gen. Wads- 
 worth, military governor of Wasliington, be- 
 ■fore tlie Joint Senate and House Committee, 
 on the subject of the war, that j\[aj.-Gen. Mc- 
 Clellan had left an hisuificicnt force for the 
 defence of Washington, and " noi a gun on 
 . wheels." 
 ■ I have to contradict this charge as follows : 
 
 From official reports made at the time to me 
 (the chief of artillery of the army of the Po- 
 tomac) and now in my possession, by the 
 commanding officer of* the light artillery 
 troops left in camp in the cit}' of Washington 
 by your order, it appears that the foUowmg 
 named field-officers were left ; 
 
 Datlery " G " 1st N.Y. Artillery, Capt. Barnes, 
 2 guns ; battery "K" 1st N.Y. Artillery, Capt. | that route 
 Ci-ounse, 6 guns ; battery " L " 2d N. Y. Artil- 
 lery, Capt. Ilobinson, 6 guns ; 9th N. Y. indc- 
 pcndant battery, ('apt. ]\Iorozowi, 6 guns ; 
 16th N. Y. indeijendent battery, (?apt. Locke ; 
 battery " A " 2d battery N. Y. ^Artillery, Capt. 
 Hogan, 6 guns ; battery " \\ '' *2d battery, N. 
 y. Artillery, Capt. McMalion, 6 guns ; total 
 of batteries, 32 guns. 
 
 With the exception of a few horses, which 
 co\ild iiave been obtained from the quarter- 
 master's department in a few hours, the bat- 
 teries were all fit for immediate service, ex- 
 cepting the 16th N. Y. battery, which, having 
 been previously ordered on Gen. Wadsworth's 
 application, to report to him for special ser- 
 vice, was unequipped with either guns or 
 horses. 
 
 I am, gen., very rcspeetfully, your ob't sev't, 
 "Wai. t'\ i'>ARUY. P>.-G. InspcG. of Art., U.S. Army. 
 
 It is tiue tliat Blouker's division, which "is 
 
 included in the forces enumerated by me, wa« 
 under orders to reinforce Gen. Fremont, bul 
 the following dispatch from the Secretary of 
 War, date.l iMarch 31, 1862. will show that I 
 was authorized to detain him at Strasburg 
 until matters assumeil a definite form in that 
 region before proceeding to his ultimate des- 
 tination ; in other words, until Jackson was 
 disposed of, and had he been detained there, 
 instead of moving on to Harper's Ferry and 
 Franklin, with other orders, it is probable 
 that Gen. BatdvS would have defeated Jackson, 
 instead of being himself obliged subsequently 
 to retreat to \Villiamsport. W 
 
 War Dept., Washington, D. C, March 31, "62. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan: 
 
 The order in respect to BIcnker is not de- 
 signed to hinder or .delay the movement of 
 llichardson or any other force. He can re- 
 main wherever you desire him so long as 
 required for yoiu- movements, and in any po- 
 sition you desire. The order is simjdy to 
 jdace him in position for reinforcing Fremont^, 
 as soon as your dispositions -will permit, and ' 
 he may go to Harper's Ferry, by such route 
 and at such time, as j^ou shall direct — state 
 your own wishes as to the movement — ^wheii 
 and how it shall be made. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 
 
 AVithout iiicludhig (Jen. Blenker's division, 
 there were left 67,428 men, and 85 pieces of 
 light artillery, which, ruider existing circum- 
 stances, I deemed more than adequate to in- 
 sure the perfect security of Washington against ' , 
 any force the enemy could bring against it,, 
 for the following reasons : 
 
 The light troops I had thrown forward un- 
 der Gen. Stoneman, in pursuit of tlie rebel 
 army, after the evacuation of IManassas and 
 Centreville, had driven their rearguard across 
 Cedar Run, and subsequent expeditions from 
 Suniner's corps had forced them beyond the 
 Rappahannock ; they had destroyed all the 
 railway bridges behind them, thereby indi- j 
 eating that the}' did not intend to return over 
 Indeed, if they had attempted 
 such a movement, their progress must have 
 been slow and difficult, as it would have in- 
 volved the reconstruction of the bridges, and 
 if my orders for keeping numerous cavalry 
 patrols well out to the front, to give timely 
 notice of any approach of the enemy, had been 
 strictly enforced, (and I left seven rcgimenta 
 of cavalry for this express puiqiose.) they 
 could not, by any possibility, have reached 
 Wasliington before there would have been 
 ample time to coTicentratc the entire forces 
 left for its defense, as well as those at Balti- 
 more, at any necessary point. *j) 
 
 It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to 
 the authorities, that the movement of the army 
 to the Feninsiila, would have the effect to draw 
 olf the rebel army from Manassas to the de- 
 fense of their cajutal, and thus free AVashing- 
 ton from menace. 'I'his ojiinion was confirmed 
 tlic moment the movement commenced or 
 
rather as Boon as the enemy became aware of our 
 
 intentions-; for, with the exception of Juckfiou'e 
 force of some 15,000, which liis instrnctions show 
 to have been irrtended to operate in such away as 
 to prevent McDoweU's corps from being sent to 
 yeinforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude 
 made its appearance in front of Washuigton du- 
 ring the ])rogress of our operations on the I'e- 
 ninsuhi ; nor until the order was given for my 
 return from Harrison's Landing jvas AVashington 
 again threatened. 
 
 Surrounded as Washington was witli numerous 
 and strong fortifications well garrisoned, it was 
 manifest that the enemy conld not aiford to dc- 
 tacli from his main army a force sufficient to as- 
 sail tliem. 
 
 It is proper to remark, that just previous to 
 my departure for Fort Monroe, I scut my chief- 
 of-staff to Gen. Hitchcock, who at that thuc held 
 staff relations with his excellency the President 
 and thc^ Secretary of War, to submit to liim a 
 list of the troops I proposed to leave for the de- 
 fense of Washington, and tlie positions in which 
 I designed posting them. Gen. Hitchcock, after 
 glancing his eye over the list, observed that he 
 was not the judge of wliat was required for de- 
 fending the capital', thatGen. McClellan's position 
 was such as to enable him to understand the 
 subject much better than he did, and he pre- 
 sumed that if the force designated was in his 
 judgment sufficient, nothing more would be 
 required. He was then told by tlie cliief-of- 
 Btaif that I would be glad to have his opinion, 
 as an old and_,experienced officer. To this he re- 
 plied, that as I had the entire control of the de- 
 fenses for a long time, I was tlie best judge of 
 what was needed, and he declined to give any 
 other expression of opinion at tliat time. 
 
 On the 2d of April, the day following my de- 
 parture for Fort Alonroe, Generals Hitchcock and 
 Thomas were directed by the Secretary of AVar 
 to examine and report Avhether the Prwwdent's 
 instructions to me of March 8th and 13th had 
 been complied with. On the same day their re- 
 port was submitted and their decision was, 
 
 " That the requirements of the President, that 
 this city (Washington) shall be left entirely se- 
 cui e, has not lieen full}^ complied with. " 
 
 The President, in his letter to tne on tho 6th 
 of April, says : 
 
 •' And now allow me to ask, do you really think 
 1 should permit the line from llichmond, via. Ma- 
 nassas Junction, to this city to be entirely open, 
 except what resistance could be .presented by 
 less than 20,000 unorganized troops ? " 
 
 In the report of Generals Hitchcock and 
 Thomas, alluded to, it is acknowledged that there 
 was do danger of an attack from the direction 
 of Manassas in these words : 
 
 " In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as 
 the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading 
 to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no 
 intention of returning for the rc-occnpation of 
 tlieir late position, and therefore no large force 
 wo\ild be necessary to hold that position." 
 
 That 03 rumarked before, was precisely the 
 
 39 
 
 view I took of it, and this Avas enforced by th« 
 
 subsequent movements of the enemy. 
 
 In another paragrajjli of the report, it is stated 
 that 55,000 men was the inmiber consfHered ade- 
 quate for the defense of the capital. That Gen. 
 McClellan, in his enumeration of the forces left, 
 had included Banks' army corps, operating in tho 
 Shenandoah Valley, but wliether this corps 
 shoidd be regarded as available for the protect- 
 ion of Washington, they decline to express an 
 (spinion.. 
 
 At the time this report was made, the only 
 enemy on any ap])roach to AV^ashington, wan 
 Jilckson's force, in front of Banks in the Shenan- 
 doah Valley, with the Manassas Gap Railroad 
 leading from this valley to "Washington, and it 
 will be admitted, I presume, that Banks Occupy- 
 ing the Shcnaiidoah Valley, was in the best posi- 
 tion to defend, not only that approach to Wash- 
 ington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and 
 above. Tho numbers of troops left bj' me for 
 the defenses of Wasiiington, as given in my let- 
 ter to the adjutant-general, were taken from the 
 latest official returns of that date, and these, of 
 course, constitute the most trustworthy and au- 
 thentic source, from which such informatioa 
 could be obtained. 
 
 Another statement made by General Hitchcock, 
 before the " Committee on the Conduct of tho 
 War," in reference to this same order, should bo 
 noticed. He was asked the following question : 
 
 " Do you understand now that the movement 
 made by (len, M^cClellan to Fort Monroe, and up 
 tiie York Piver, was in compliance with the re- 
 commendation of the coinicil of generals com- 
 manding corps, and held at Fairfax Court House, 
 6n the 13th of March last, or in violation of it ?" 
 
 To which he replied as follows : 
 
 " I have considered, and do now consider that, 
 it was in violation of the recommendation of 
 that conned, in two important particulars ; one 
 particular, being that portion of this report 
 which represents the council as agreeing to tho 
 expedition by way of the Peninsula, provided, 
 , the rebel steamer Merrimac could lirst be neu- 
 tralized. That important provision Gen. McClel- 
 lan disregarded." 
 
 ***** 
 
 The second i)artieular alluded to by General 
 Hitchcock, was in reference to the troops left for 
 Ihe defense of Washington, which has been dis- 
 posed of above. 
 
 In regard to the steamer Merrimac,! have also 
 stated, that so far as our operations on York 
 River were concerned, the power of this vessel 
 was neutralized. I now proceed to give some 
 of the evidence which influenced me in coming 
 to that conclusion. 
 
 Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, 
 Mr. AVatson, Assistant-Secretary of War, was 
 scut by the President to For.t Monroe, to consult 
 with Flag Officer GuUlsborougli upon this sub- 
 ject. The result of tlu.t consultation is contain- 
 ed in the following extract from the evidence of 
 Admiral GoKlsborougU betbre the '• (\tmnhtteo 
 on the Conduct of tho War" viz.: "I tuld Mr. 
 
WalBon, Assistant-Secretary of War, that the 
 President might mnke his mind perfectly easy 
 about the ^lerrimac going up Yoik River, that 
 she could never get there, for I had ample means 
 to prevent that." 
 
 Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the 
 
 Navy, testifies before the Committee as follows : 
 
 " Gen. McClellan expected the Navy to neu- 
 
 trahze the Merrimac, and I promised that it 
 
 should be done." 
 
 Geu. Keyes, commanding 4th Army Corps, tes- 
 tifies as follows before the Committee : 
 
 " During the time that the subject of the 
 change of base was discussed, I had refused to 
 consent to the Peninsula line of operations, until 
 I had sfnt word to the Navy Department and 
 asl<:ed two questions. Isi. ^V^hether the Merri- 
 mac was certainly neiitralized or not ? 2d. 
 Whetlier the navy was in a condition to co-ope- 
 rate efficiently with the army, to break through 
 between Yorktown and Gloucester Point ? To 
 iotli of these questions answers were returned 
 h the affirmative, that is, tlie Merrimac was neu- 
 Valized, and the uavy was in a conditiou to co- 
 operate efficiently to break through between 
 Fork town and Gloucester Point." 
 OllDRliS FOR THE FORTIFICATION OF 
 
 MANASSAS JUNCTION. 
 Before starting for the Pt3ninsula, I instructed 
 Lieut.-Col. 13. S. Alexander, of the U. S. corps of 
 engineers to visit Manassas Junction and its 
 vicinity, for the purpose of determining upon 
 the defensive works necessary to enable us to 
 hold tliat place with a small force. The accom- 
 pan3'ing letters' from Col. Alexander will sliow 
 wlrat steps were taken by him to carrj'- into effect 
 this iinporiaut order. 
 
 I regret to say that those who succeeded me 
 in command of the region in front of Washing- 
 ton, whatever were the fears for its safety'-, did 
 not deem it necessary to carry out my plans and 
 instructions to him. 
 
 Had Manassas been placed in condition for 
 a strong defense, and its communications secured 
 iH recommended by Col Alexander, the result 
 if GciJ. Pope's campaign would probably have 
 ijceu different. 
 
 Washington, D. C, April, 2, 1862. 
 Sir, — You will proceed to Manassas at as earl}' 
 a moment as practicable, and mark on the grounfl 
 the works for the defense of tlrat place, on the 
 positions which I indicated to you j^esterday. 
 You will find two carpenters experienced in this 
 kind of work, ready to accompany you, by "call- 
 ing on Mr. Dougherty, the master carpenter of 
 the 'i'rcasury Extension. 
 
 The genera] idea of the defense of this posi- 
 tion, is to occupy thiB fringe of elevations, whicli 
 lies about half-way between Manassas depot and 
 the junction of the railroad, with a series of 
 works. Often' to the rear, so that they n:ay be 
 comrn.iiidcd by llie work hereafter to be de- 
 scribed.' ' ■ 
 
 There will be at least four of these works, 
 three of them being on the left of the railroad 
 loading from Alexandria, at tlie positions occu- 
 
 40 
 
 pied by the enemy's work-s. The other on tho 
 right of this road, on the position we Examined 
 ye^fcrda3'. The works of the enemy to the north 
 of this latter position, numbered Nos. 1 and 2 on 
 Lieut. Comstock's sketch, may also form part of 
 the front line of our defenses ; but the sides of 
 these works, looking towards Manassas station 
 should be leveled, so that the interior of the works 
 may be seen from the latter position. 
 
 Embrasures should be arranged in all these 
 works for ^e/J artillery. The approaches should 
 be such, that a battery can drive into the works. 
 The number of eml)rasures in each battery will 
 depend upon its size and the ground to be com- 
 manded. It is supposed that there will be from 
 four to eight embrasures in each battery. 
 
 The other works of the enemy looking towards 
 the east and south, may be strengthened so as to 
 afford sufficient defense in these directions. The 
 work, No. 3, on Lieut. Comstock's sketch^may bo 
 also strengthened and arranged for field artillery 
 when time will permit. This work is in a good 
 position to cover a retreat, which would be made 
 down the valley in which the railroad rtms to- 
 wards Bull Run. 
 
 At Manassas station there. should be a fort 
 constructed. The railroad will pass through 
 this fort, and the depot, if one should be built, 
 should be placed in its rear. This latter work 
 should be regarded as the key of the position. 
 It should be. as large as tho nature of the ground 
 will permit. 
 
 By^ going down the slopes, which are not ^ 
 steep, it may be made large enough to accommo- 
 date 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the position 
 need not be cut away, it will be better to throw 
 up the earth into a large traverse whicli may 
 also be a bomb pr-oof. Its profile should bo 
 strong, , and its ditches should be lla'iketl. It 
 should I'ecoive a heav}' armament of 2i or 32 
 poiuid^s, with some rifled (Parrot) 20 or 30 
 pounders. Its guns should command all tho 
 exterior works, so that these works could be of 
 no ttse to the enemy, sliould he take them. In 
 accommodating the fort to the ground, this con- 
 sideration should not be lost sight of. 
 
 After tracing these works on the ground, you 
 will make a alvctch embracing the whole of them, 
 showing their relative positions and size. This 
 sketch slrould. embrace the junction of the rail- 
 roads and the ground for some distance, around 
 the mainwork. It need not be made with ex- 
 treme accuracy. The distances may be paced or 
 measured Aviik a tape-line. The bearings may 
 be taken by compass. 
 
 Having located the works and prepared your 
 sketch, you will report to Capt. Frederick E. 
 Prime of tlie corps of engineers, who will furm'sh 
 you the nfeans of construction. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 B. S.'AlexaxN-der, Lt.-Col. A. D. C. 
 To (kipt. Fred. II. Munther. Present. 
 
 Washington, D. C, April 6, 1802. 
 Brig-Gen. J. G. Barnard, 
 
 Chief Engineer army of the Potomac. 
 
 Sir, — 1 enclose you herewith a copy o# tho 
 
41 
 
 instructions which I gave to Capt. Munthor, in 
 reference to the tlcfenses ot Manassas?. 
 
 As there has been a new department created 
 (that of the Rappahannock) it is possible that 
 you and T, as well as Gen. McClellan, arc relieved 
 from the further consideration of this subject at 
 the present time. 
 
 I will, howeyer, state for your information, 
 should the subject ever come before you again, 
 that in my opinion the communication with 
 Manassas by land should bfe secured. 
 
 To effect this hi the best manner, so far as my 
 observations extended, I think the bridge over 
 Bull Run, near Union Mills and just above the 
 railroad bridge, should be rebuilt or thoroughly 
 repaired, and that a small work, or perhaps two 
 or three open batteries, should be erected on the 
 adjacent heights, to protect it as well as the rail- 
 road bridge. 
 
 The communication by land would then be 
 through or near Centreville, over the road used 
 by the enemy. 
 
 I write this for fear somethuig should detain 
 mo here, but I hope to leave here to join you 
 <o-raorrow. My health is much improved. 
 Very r<?spectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 B. S. Alexander, Lt.-Col, A.D.C. 
 
 I may be permitted also to mention that the 
 
 ■lans also (unexecuted' by my successor) indi- 
 
 •ated by my letter of instructions to General 
 
 i'.anks dated March 16, 18G2, for intrenching 
 
 Chester Gap and the point where ^he Manassas 
 
 Gap Railroad crosses the Shenandoah, were for 
 
 - the purpose of preventing even the attempt at 
 
 such a raid as that of Jackson iu the month of 
 
 May followintr. 
 
 MILITARY' TNCIDENTS OF THE FIRST 
 
 PERIOD. 
 Before tukii.g up the history of the embar- 
 kation and the Peninsular campaign, I should 
 remark that during the fall and winter of lSGl-2, 
 while the army of the Potomac was in position 
 in front of ^Vashington, reconiioissanccs were 
 made from time to time, and skirmishes fre- 
 quently occurred, which were of great impor- 
 tance in the education of the troops, accustom- 
 ing them te the presence of the enemj', and giv- 
 ing them confifleuce under fire. There were 
 many instances of individual gallantry displayed 
 in these atfairs : the reports of most of them 
 will be found among the documents which accom- 
 pany this report. 
 
 One of the most brilliant of these affairs was 
 that which took place at Drainsville on Dec. 20, 
 L861, when the 3d brigade of McCall's Division, 
 under Brig.-Gen. E. 0. C. Ord, with Easton's 
 Battery, routed and pui-sued four regiments of 
 infantry, and a battery of six pieces. 
 
 The operations of Brig.-Gen. F. W. Lander on 
 the Upper Potomac during the raontlis of Janua- 
 ry and February, 18G2, frustrated tlie attempts of 
 General Juck^on against the Ohio Railroad, Cum- 
 berland, <&c., and obliged him to fall back to 
 Winchester. His constitution was impaired by 
 the hardships he had experienced, and on the 2d 
 of March the fearless General Lander expired, a 
 victim to the excessive fatigues of the campaign. 
 
 SECOND PERIOD 
 
 PART I. 
 
 THE MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA. 
 The council, composed of four corps commancfr 
 ers, organized by the President of the United 
 States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopt- 
 ed Fort Mom'oe as the base of operations for the 
 cftovemeut of the army of the Potomac upon Rich- 
 mond. 
 
 For the prompt and successful execution of 
 the projected operation, it was regarded bj' all 
 as necessary that the whole of the four corps 
 should be employed, with at least the addition of 
 ten thousand men drawn from the forces in the 
 vicinity of Fortress Monroe : that position and 
 its dependencies being regarded as amply pro- 
 tected by the naval force in its neighborhood, 
 and the advance of the main army up the Penin- 
 sula, so that it could be safely left with a small 
 garrison. 
 
 In addition to the land forces, the co-operation 
 of the navy was desired in the projected attack 
 upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, 
 as well as in controlling the York and James Riv- 
 ers for the protection of out flanks, and the use 
 of transports, bringing supplies to the army. 
 With these expectations, and for reasons stated 
 elsewhere in this report, my original plan of mov- 
 ing by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, 
 and the line with Fortress jMonroe as a baso 
 adopted. In the arrangements for the transpor- 
 tation of the army to the Peninsula by water, the 
 vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous 
 mainly at Annapolis, but upon the evacuation of 
 Manassas and the batteries of the lowerPotomac 
 by the enemy, it became more convenient to em- 
 bark the troops and material at Alexandria, and 
 orders to that cticct were at once given. 
 
 In making the preliminary arrangements for 
 the movement, it was determined that the First 
 Corps (Gen. j^IcDowelFs) should move as a unit, 
 first, and effect a landing eitlier at the Sand-Box, 
 some four miles south of l^orktown, in order to 
 turn all the enemy's defenses at Ship Point, How- 
 ard's Bridge, Big Bethel, etc., or else, should ex- 
 isting circumstances render it preferable, land on 
 the Gloucester side of York River, and move on 
 West Point. 
 
 The transports, however, arrived slowly and 
 few at a time. In order, therefore, to expedite 
 matters, I decided to embark the army by divi- 
 sions as transports arrived, keeping army corps 
 together as much as possible, and to collect tho 
 troops at Fortress Monroe. In determining the 
 order of embarkation, convenience and expedition 
 were especially consulted, except that the First 
 Corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to 
 move it in mass to its point of disembarkation, 
 and to land it on either bank of the York, as 
 might then be determined. 
 
 On the 17th of Alarch, Hamilton's division of 
 the 3d corp* embarked at Alexandria, and pro- 
 ceeded to Eort Monroe, with the following or- 
 ders : 
 
 Washington, D. C, March 17, 18G2. 
 Gen. C. S. Hamilton, Comd'g Division : 
 
 You will, on your arriva.1 at Fort Monroe, re- 
 
42 
 
 port to Gen. Wool, and rGqnest him to aeeifjjn 
 yon fjrouiid for encainpiiig your division. Yon 
 will remain at Eort Monroe until further orders 
 from Gen. McClellan. Should Gen. Wool require 
 the services of 3'our division in repelling an at- 
 tack, yon will please obey his orders, and use 
 every effort to carry out his views. 
 
 R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staif. 
 
 On the 22(1 of ^rarch,as soon as transportation 
 •was ready, Gen. Fitz John Porter's division of 
 the same corps embarked. Gen. Heiulzelman 
 was ordered to accompany it, under the follow- 
 iug instructions : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Seminary, March 22, 1862. 
 Cris^-.Gen. S. P. Ileintzelman, Com'g 3d Corps : 
 
 General: — Upon the disembarkation of Por- 
 ter's division at Fort Monroe, I have to request 
 that you will move your two divisions (Porter's 
 and Hamilton's) some three or four miles out 
 fi'om the fort, to find good camping places where 
 wood and water can be readily obtained, and 
 where your position will be good in a defensive 
 point of view. You may find it advisable to 
 place one division on. or near the road leading to 
 Yorktown from Newport News, the other upon 
 that leading to I'^orktown direct from Fort Mon- 
 roe. 
 
 If you find that the nature of the country will 
 permit easy connnnnication and mutual support 
 between the two divisions, it will be best to 
 place one on each road. It will be best to re- 
 main pretty near the fort for the present, in or- 
 der to give the impression that our object is to 
 attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will 
 do well, however, to push strong reconnoissances 
 well to the front, to ascertain tlie position of the 
 enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possi- 
 ble, reinforce you by the 3d division of your 
 corps, and it is poobable that a jiart or the whole 
 of the 4lh corps will also move from Fort Mon- 
 roe : tiiis will probably be determined before 
 your disembarkation is completed, and you will 
 be informed accordingly. 
 
 'My desire would be to make no important 
 move in advance until you are fully prepared to 
 follow it up, and give the enemy no time to re- 
 cover. 
 
 The quartermas'^^rs of j'our corps will receive 
 detailed instructions, in regard, to land transpor- 
 tation, from Gen. Van Vliet. 
 
 It will be advisable to mobi1i:^e your corps with 
 the least possible delay, anvl iiave it prepared for 
 an advance. 1 have directed extra clothing, am- 
 nnmition, etc., to be sent to Fort ^fonroe, so that 
 all deficiencies may l)e supfdied without delay. 
 
 Please report to me frc(piejitly and fully tlie 
 condition of things on the new field of opera- 
 tions, and whatever intelligence you gain as to 
 tlie enemy. 
 
 Engage guides in sivfficient numbers at once, 
 and endeavor to send out spies, I am very truly 
 yours, Geo. B. Mo('Maj.AN, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 
 The remaining divislon.s embarked as rapidly 
 as transports could be 8npi>lied. 
 
 On thclat of April I euibttrked, with the head- 
 
 quarters on the steamer Commodore, and reached 
 Fort Mom-oe on the afternoon of the 2d. 
 
 In consequence of the delay in the arrival of 
 the horse transports at Alexandria, but a small 
 portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artil- 
 lery reserve had not yet completed its disembark- 
 ation. 
 
 I found there the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, and 
 the 5th Regular Cavalry ; the 2d Regular Cavalry 
 and a ^lortion of the 1st had arrived, but not dis- 
 embarked : so few wagons had arrived that it 
 was not possible to move Casey's division at all 
 for sevoral days, while the other divisions wero 
 obliged to move with scant supplies-. 
 
 As to the force and position of the enemy, the 
 information then in our possession was vaguo 
 and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained 
 from the staff officers of General Wool, and Mas 
 simply to the effect that Yorktown was surround- 
 ed by a continuous line of earthworks, with 
 strong water batteries on the York River, and 
 garrisoned by n.ot less than 15,000 troops, under 
 the command of Gen. 5. B. Magruder. Maps 
 which had been prepared by the Toi^ographieal 
 Engineers under Gen. Wool's command were fur- 
 nished me, in which, the AVarwick. River was 
 represented as flowing parallel to, but not cross- 
 ing the road from Newport News to Williams- 
 burg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a real 
 island ; and we had no information us to the true 
 course of the Warwick across the Peninsula, 
 nor of the foMtnidable line of worka which it cov- 
 ered. 
 
 Information which I had collected during the 
 winter placed Gen. Magruder's command at from 
 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of General 
 Huger's force at Norfolk estimated at about 15,- 
 000. It was also known that there were strong 
 defensive works at or near Williamsburg. 
 
 Knowing that Gen. linger could easily spare 
 some troops to reinforce Yorktown, that he had 
 indeed done so, and that Johnston's army of 
 Manassas coidd be broiTght rapidly by the James 
 and York rivers to the same jjoint, I proceeded 
 to invest that town without delay. 
 
 The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, Uni- 
 ted States Topographical Engineers, attached to 
 Gen. Woor& staff, given to me as the residt of 
 several months' labors, indicated the feasibility 
 of the design. It was also an object of primary 
 importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown 
 before the enemy was reinforced sufficiently to 
 enable him to hold in force his works at Big 
 Bethel, Howard's Bridge, Ship Point, etc., on the 
 road from Newport News, This was the more 
 lU'gent as it was now evident that some days 
 must elapse belbre the 1st corps could arrive. 
 
 Everything possible was done to hasten tho 
 disembarkation of the cavalry, artillery aTid wag- 
 ons in the harbor, and on the 3d the orders of 
 march were given for the following day 
 
 There were at Fort Monroe and its vicinity on 
 the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the 3d 
 corps two divisions of the 4th corps, one divis- 
 ion of tlie 2d corps, and Syke's brigade of regu- 
 lar infantry, together with Hunts artillery rie- 
 
43 
 
 Bfrve, and the regiments of cavalry before nam- 
 ed, in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns. Rich- 
 ardson's and Hooker's divisions of the 2d and 
 3d corps had not yet arrived, and Casey's divis- 
 ion of the 4th corps was unable to move for 
 want of wa";ons. 
 
 ANOTHER REDUCTION OF FORCE. 
 
 Before I left Washington an ordei' had been 
 issued by the War Depaitment, placing Fort 
 Monroe and its dependencies under my control, 
 and authorizing me to di-aw from the troops un- 
 der General VVool, a division of about 10,000 
 men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. 
 During the iiight of the 3d I received a telegram 
 from the adjutant-general of the army, stating 
 that, by the Presiden'ts order, I was deprived of 
 ill control over Gen. Wool and the troops under 
 his command, and forbidden to detach any of 
 his troops without his sanction. 
 
 This order left me without any base of opera- 
 tions under my own control, and to this day I 
 am ignorant of the causes wliich led to it. 
 COOPERATION OF THE NAVY. 
 
 On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River 
 was declared, by the naval authorities, closed to 
 the operations of their vessels, by the combined 
 influence of the enemy's batteries on its banks 
 and the confederate steamers Merrimae, York- 
 town, Jamestown, and Teazer. Fkig-oflicer 
 Goldsborough, then in conmiand of the United 
 States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it 
 (and, no doubt, justly) as his highest and most 
 imperative duty to watch and neutralize the 
 Merrimac, and as he designed using his most 
 powerful vessels in a contest with lier, he did 
 not feel able to detach, for the assistance of the 
 army, a suitable force to attack the Avater batter- 
 ies at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was 
 contrary to wliat had been previously stated to 
 me, and materially affected my plans. At no 
 time during the operations against Yorktown was 
 the navy x)rcpared to lend us any material assis- 
 tance in its reduction, until after our land batter- 
 ies had partially silenced the works. 
 
 ADVANCE FROM FORT MONROE. 
 
 I had hoped, let me sa,y, by rapid movements, 
 to drive before me or capture the enemy on the 
 Ptniasula, open the James River, and press on 
 to Richmond before he should be materially re- 
 inforced from other portions of his territorj'. 
 As the narrative proceeds, the causes will be 
 developed winch frustrated these apparently Avell- 
 groimded expectations. 
 
 I determined, then, to. move the two divisions 
 of the 4th corps by the Newport News and 
 Williamsburg road, to take up a position belwcen 
 Yorktown and 'Villiamsburgh, while the two 
 divisions of the 3d corps moved- direct from 
 Fort Monroe upon Yorktown, the reserves mov- 
 ing so as to support either corps, as might prove 
 necessary I designed, should the works at 
 Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious re- 
 Bistance, to land the 1st corps, reinforced, if ne- 
 cessary, on the left bank of the York, or on the 
 Severn, to move it on Gloucester and West Point, 
 in order to take in reverse whatever force the 
 
 enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel 
 him to abundon his positions. 
 
 In the conuneneement of the movement from 
 Fort Monroe, serious difliculties were encountered 
 from the want of ]u-ecise topographic;il informa- 
 tion as to the country in advance. 
 
 Correct local maps were not to bo found, and 
 the country, though known in its general fea- 
 tures, we found to be inaccurately described, in 
 essential particulars, in the only maps and geo- 
 graphical memoirs or papers to winch access 
 could be had ; erroneous courses to*streams and 
 roads were frequently given, and no dependence 
 could be ]>laced on the information thus derivcd. 
 This dilticulty has been fourid to exist with re- 
 spect to most portions of the State of Virginia, 
 through wdiich my military operations have et- 
 tended. Reconnoissances, frequently inider fire, 
 proved the only trustwortliy sources of int\)rma- 
 tion. Negroes, liowcver truthful their reports, 
 possessed or were able to communicate, very 
 little acc'in-atc and no comprehensive topographi- 
 cal information. 
 
 On the 3d the following orders were given for 
 the movement of the 4th : 
 
 " Porter's and Hamilton's divisions, and Ave- 
 rill's cavalry of the 3d corps, and Sedgwick's di- 
 vision of the 2d cor])8, under Brig.-Gen. lleintz- 
 elman, conunanding od corps, will move to-mor- 
 row in the following order: Porter's division, 
 with Averill's cavalry at 6 a.m.. over the Ne\T 
 Afarket and New Bridges to Big Bethel and 
 Howard's Bridge. The division will send for- 
 ward to the batteries whore the Sliip Pointy road 
 intersects the main Yorktown road, a suilicient 
 force to hold that point, and cut \(AY the garri- 
 son of the Ship Point batteries ; the whole di- 
 vision may be used for this purpose, if neccssar 
 ry, and if possible the batteries should be occu- 
 pied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of 
 the division not necessary f(jr this purpose will 
 encamp at Howard's Bridge. 
 
 " Hamilton's division Avill march at 7 a.m., hj 
 the New JMarket Bridge, takuig the direct road 
 to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Iloward'* 
 Creek. 
 
 " Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a.m., by 
 the New Market Bridge, taking the direct road 
 to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard'* 
 Bridge. 
 
 " Brig.-Gen. Keyes, commanding 4tli Corps, M'ill 
 move with Smith's and Couch's diAisions Jit 5 
 a.m., (Smith's division in advance), b}' the James 
 River road ; tlie 5th Regular Cavalry, tempora- 
 rily assigned to this corps, will move with 
 Sinith's division, which will encamp at Young's 
 Mills, throwing forward at least one brigaile t^ the 
 road from Big Bethel to Warwick ; Couch's di- 
 vision will encamp at Fisher's Creek. 
 
 " The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry 
 will move at 8.30 a.m, by the New Market Bridgo 
 to Big Bethel, where it will encamp; on tlio 
 march it will keep in the rear of Sedgwick's di- 
 vision." 
 
 The following is an extract from the orders 
 iKKued on the 4th for the maich of the 5th : 
 
44 
 
 " The following movementa of the army will 
 be carried ©ut to-morrow (5th) : 
 
 " Gen. Ke^'es will move forward Smith's di- 
 vision at 6 A.M., via. Warwick Court House, itnd 
 the road leading near the Old Ship Yard, to the 
 Half ^Vay House on the Yorktown and Wil- 
 liamsburg road. . 
 
 " Gen. Couch's di%'ision will march at 6 a.m., to 
 close up on Gen. Smith's division at the Half 
 Way House. 
 
 "Gen. Keyes* command will occupy and hold 
 the narrow dividing ridge near the Half Way 
 House so as to prevent the escape of the garri- 
 son at Yorktown by land, and prevent reinforce- 
 ments being thrown in. 
 
 ."Gen. Heintzelman will move forward Gen. 
 Porter's two brigades at 6 a.m,, upon the advanced 
 guard, when the entire division will advance to 
 a point about two and three quarters miles from 
 Yorktown, where the road 'turns abruptly to the 
 north, and where a road comes in from AYarwick 
 Court House. Gen. Hamilton's division will 
 move at 6 a.m., and follow Gen. Porter's division, 
 camping as near it as possible. Gen. Sedgwick's 
 division will march at 5 a.m., as far as the War- 
 wick road, which enters the main YorktoM'n road 
 near Dr. Power's house, a^nd will await further 
 orders. 
 
 The reserves will march at 6 a.m., upon the 
 main Yorktown road, halting for further orders 
 at Dr. Power's house ; the infantry leading, the 
 artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear. 
 • " Gen. Sedgwick's division will, for the pres- 
 ent, act with the reserve, and he will receive 
 orders from head-quarters." 
 
 In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 
 5th, it was expected that there would be no seri- 
 ous opposition at Big Bethel, and that the ad- 
 vance of the 3d Corps beyond that point would 
 force the enemy to evacuate the works at 
 Young's Jilills, while our possession of the latter 
 ■v?ould make it necessary for him to abandon 
 those at Howard's Bridge, and the advance 
 thence on Yorktown would place Ship Point in 
 our possession, together with its garrison, unless 
 they abandoned it promptly. The result answer- 
 ed the expectation. 
 
 During the afternoon of the 4th, Gen. Keyes 
 obtained information of the presence of some 
 5,000 to 8,000 'of the enemy, in a strong posi- 
 tion at Lee's Mills : the nature of that position 
 in relation to the Warwick not being at that time 
 understood, I instructed Gen. Keyes to attack 
 and carry this position on coming in front of it. 
 
 Early in the afternoon of the 5th, the advance 
 of each column was brought to a halt : that of 
 Hcintzchnan (Porter's division) in front of York- 
 town, after overcoming some resistance at Big 
 Bethel and Howard's Bridge : that of Keyes 
 (Smith's division) iniexpectedl}' before the ene- 
 my's works at Lee's ilills, where the road from 
 Newport News to AVilliarasbuig crosses "War- 
 wick River. The ])rogrcss of each column had 
 been retarded by heavy rains on that day, which 
 had made the roads almost impassable to the in- 
 fantry of Keye's column and impracticable to all 
 
 but a small portion of the artillery, while the 
 ammunition, provision, and forage could not be 
 brought up at all. 
 
 When Gen. Keyes's approached Lee's Mills his 
 left flank was exposed to a sharp artillery iire 
 from the further bank of the Warwick, -and 
 upon reaching the vicinity of the mill^ he found 
 it altogether stronger than was expected, unap- 
 proachable by reason of the Warwick River, and 
 •incapable of being carried by assault. 
 
 The troops composing the advance of each 
 column were, during the afternoon under a warm 
 artillery fire — the sharpshooters even of the 
 right column being engaged, when covering re- 
 connoissances. 
 
 THE FIRST CORPS WITHDRAWN BY ORDER 
 OF THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 It was at this stage and moment of the cam- 
 paign that the following telegram was sent to 
 me : 
 
 Adjutant General's Office, April 4th, 18G2. 
 Gex. ]\IcClellan, — 
 
 By direction of the President Gen. McDowell's 
 army corps has been detached from the force im- 
 der your immediate command ; and the general 
 is to report to the Secretary of War plotter by 
 mail. 
 
 L. Thomas, Adjutant-General. 
 
 The President having promised in our inter- 
 view following his order of March 31st, with- 
 drawing Blenker's division of 10,00 men from 
 my command, that nothing of the sort should be 
 repeated, that I might rest assured that the cam- 
 paign should proceed with no further deductions 
 from the force upon which its operations liad 
 been planned, I may confess to having been 
 shocked at this order, which, with that of th© 
 31st ult., removed nearly 60,000 men from my 
 command,, and reduced my force by more than 
 one-third after its task had been assigned, its op- 
 erations planned, its fighting begun. To me the 
 blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all 
 my plans for impending operations. It fell when 
 I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left 
 me incapable of continuing operations which 
 had been begun. It compelled the adoption of 
 another, a different, and a lo-!S effective plan of 
 campaign. It made rapid and brilliant opera- 
 tions impossible. It was a fatal error. 
 
 It was now, of course, out of my power to turn 
 Yorktown by West Point ; I had, therefore, no 
 choice left, but to attack it directly in front, as I 
 best could with the force at my command. Re- 
 connoissances made untler fire on that and the 
 following day, determined that the sources of 
 the Warwick River were near Yorktown, com- 
 manded bj- its guns, wliile that stream for some 
 distance from its mouth on the James River was 
 controlled by the confederate gun-boats; that 
 the fords had been destro^-ed by dams, the ap- 
 proaches to which were. generally through dense 
 forests and deep swami)S, and defcnd'eil by ex- 
 tensive and formidable works ; that timber 
 felled for defensive purposes, and the flooding of 
 the roads caused by the dams had mado these 
 works apparently inaccessible and impossible to 
 
45 
 
 turn; that Yorktown was strongly fortified, 
 armed and garrisoned, and connected with tlie 
 defenses of the Warwick by forts and intrciich- 
 ments, the ground in front of which wa§ swept 
 by the guns of Yorktown. It was also ascer- 
 tained that tlie garrisons had been and were 
 daily being reinforced by troojis from JJorfolk, 
 and the army under Gen. J. E. Johnston. 
 
 Heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe 
 impassable and delayed the arrival of trooj)S, 
 ammunition and supplies, vhile storms prevented, 
 for several days, the sailing of transports from 
 Hampton Roads, and the establishment of (Re- 
 pots on the creeks of York River near the army, 
 
 The grouiid bordering the Warwick River is 
 covered by very dense and extensive • forests, 
 the clearings being small and few. This, -^vith 
 the comparative flatness of the country, and the 
 alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, 
 rendered thorough reconnoissances slow, danger- 
 ous and difticult : yet, it -was impossible other- 
 wise to determine whether any assault was any- 
 where practicable, or whether the irfbre tedious, 
 but sure operations of a, siege must be resorted 
 to. 
 
 I made on the 6th dnd 7th, close personal I^e- 
 connoissances of the right and left of the ene- 
 my's positions, which, 'Vvith information acquired 
 already, convinced me that it was best to pi'e- 
 pare for an assault by a preliminary employment 
 of heavy guns, and some siege operations. In- 
 stant assault would have been simple folly. 
 
 On the 7th, I telegraphed to the President as 
 follows : 
 Head-quarters Army ef Potomac, April 7th, 1862. 
 
 To the President, Washington, D. C, — 
 
 Your telegram of yesterday received. Ifi re- 
 ply I have the honor to state that my entire force 
 for duty, amounts to only about (85,000) eighty- 
 five thousand men. Gen. Wool's command, as 
 you will observe from the accompanying order, 
 has been taken out of my control, although he 
 has most cheerfully co-operated with me. The 
 only use that can be made of his command, is to 
 protect my communications in rear of this point. 
 At this time only fifty-three thousand men have 
 joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as 
 my means of transportation Avill permit. 
 
 Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of 
 War of to-night, for the details of our present 
 situation. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-General. 
 
 On the same day I sent the following : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, in front 
 of Yorktown. April 7, 1862, 7 p.m. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War, — 
 
 Your telegram of yesterday, arrived here 
 •\vhile I jvas absent examining the enemy's right, 
 which I did pretty closely. 
 
 The whole line of the Warwick, which really 
 heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly de- 
 fended by detached redoubts, and other fortifica- 
 tions, armed with heavy and light guns. The 
 ayjproaches, except at Yorktown, arc covered by 
 the Warwick, over which there is but one, or at 
 most, two passages, both of which are covered 
 
 by strong batteries. It will be necessary to re- 
 sort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege 
 operations, before Ave can assault. All the pris- 
 oners state that Gen. J. E. Johnston aruived at 
 Yorktown yesterday with strong reinforcements. 
 It seems clear that I •shall have the whole force 
 of the enemy on -my bunds, probably not less 
 than (100,000) one hundred thousand" men, and 
 jiossibly mope. In consequence of the loss of 
 Blenker's division, and the 1st corps, my force is 
 possibly less than that of the enemy, while they 
 hiiye all the advantage of positions. 
 
 I am under great obligations to you for the 
 offer that the whole force and material of the 
 government, will be as fully and speedily under 
 my command as heretofore, or as if the new de- 
 partments had not been created. 
 
 Since my arrangements were made for this 
 campaign, at least (50,000) fifty thousand men 
 have been taken from my command. 
 
 Since *ny dispatch of the 5th instant, five divi- 
 sions have been in close observation of the ene- 
 my, aud frequefitly exchanging shots. When my 
 present command all joins, I shall have about 
 ' (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from 
 which a large force must be taken for guards, es- 
 corts, etc. With this army I could assault the 
 enemy's works, and perhaps carry them ; but were 
 r in possession of their intrenchments, and as- 
 sailed by double my numbers, I should have no 
 fears as to the result, 
 
 Under the circumstances that have been devel- 
 oped since my arrival here, I feel fully impressed 
 with the conviction, that here is to be fought the 
 great battle that is to decide the existing contest. 
 I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as 
 I can get up my siege train, aud shall do all in 
 my power to carry the enemy's works ; but to 
 do this with a reasonable degree of certainty, re- 
 quires, in Diy judgment, that 1 should, if possible, 
 have at least, the whole of the 1st Corps to land 
 upon "the Severn River, and attack Gloucester in 
 the rear. My present strength will not admit of 
 a detachment sufficient for this purpose, without 
 materially impairing tho efficiency of this column. 
 Flag-officer Goldsborough, thinks the works too 
 strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn 
 Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter, 
 and one of the commander of the gunboats here. 
 Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. 
 THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 
 
 I had provided a small siege train, and mode- 
 rate supplies of intrenchmg tools, for such a cou- 
 tingency as the present. Immediate steps were 
 taken to secure the necessary additions. 
 
 While the engineer officers were engaged !n 
 ascertaining the character aud strength of all the 
 defenses, and the configuration of the groinid in 
 front of Yorktown, in order to determine the point 
 of attack, and to develop the approaches, the 
 troops were occupied in opening roads to the de- 
 pots established at the nearest available points 
 on branches of York River. Troojis were brought 
 to the front as rapidly as possible, and on the 
 10th of April the army was posted as follows: 
 Ileintzelnian's corps, composed of Porter's, Hook- 
 
 / 
 
• 46 
 
 sr'a and Hnmilton's division, in front of York- 
 town, extending in the order named from the 
 mouth of Wornilcy's Creek to the Warwick road 
 opposite Winn'a "Mills ; Sumner's corps, Sedg- 
 wick's division only having arrived, on the lett 
 cf Hamilton, extending down the Warwick and 
 opposite the Winn's Mills works ; Keycs's corps, 
 (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) on the 
 left of Sedgwick, facing the works attlie one-gun 
 battery, Lee's- Mills, etc., on the west baiik ot the 
 Warwick. Stunner, after the 6tli of April, com- 
 manded the left wing, composed of his own and 
 Eveves's corps. 
 
 Througliout the preparations for, and during 
 the siege of Yorktown, I kept the corps under 
 Gen. Keyes, and afterwards the loft wing under 
 Gen. Smuncr, engaged in ascertaining tlie cliarac- 
 ter of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, 
 and the enemy intrenched on the right bank, with 
 the intention, if possible, of overcoming them 
 and breaking that line of defense, so as to gain 
 possession of the road to Williamsburg, and cut 
 oif Yorktown from its supports and supplies. 
 The forces under Gen. Ileintzelman were enpiged 
 in similar efforts upon the works between AVinn's 
 Mills and Yorktown. Gen. Keyes's report of the 
 16th of April, enclosing reports of brigade com- 
 manders engaged in reconnoissances up to that 
 day, said, " tliat no part of his (the e-nemy's Hue 
 opposite his) line, as f;\r as discovered, can be 
 taken by assault without an enormous waste of 
 life." Reconnoissances on tlie riglit flank dernon- 
 Btrated the fact tliat the Warwick was not pass- 
 able in that direction except over a narrow dam, 
 the approaches to which were swept by several 
 batteries and intrenchments, whicli could be till- 
 ed quickly with supports sheltered by the timber 
 immediately in rear. 
 
 Gen. Barnard, chief engineer of the Army of 
 the Potomac, whose position entitled his opinions 
 to the highest consideration, expressed the judg- 
 Bient that those formidable works could not, with 
 any reasonable degree of certainty, be carried by 
 assault, den. Keyes, commanding the 4th army 
 corps, after the examination of the enemy's de- 
 fenses on the left, before alluded to, addres.=ed 
 the following letter to tlie Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. 
 Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not 
 etrictly olficial, it describes the situation at that 
 time in some respects so well that I have taken 
 the liberty of introducing it hero. 
 
 Headquarters 4th Corps, 
 Warwick Court House, Va., April 7, 1862. 
 Mi- Dear Senator :— The plan of campaign on 
 this line was made with the distinct understand- 
 ing that four army corps should be employed, 
 and that tlie navy should co-operate in the taking 
 of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) sup- 
 port us on our left by moving gunboats up James 
 lliver. 
 
 To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, which, 
 by the President's order, was to embrace four 
 divisions, and one division (Bienker'b-) of the 2d 
 corps, have been withdniwn aUogethcr from this 
 line of oi)erations, and iVoni the Army of the Po- 
 tomac. At the Bamo time, as I am informed, the 
 
 navT has not the means to attack Yorktown, and 
 is afraid to send gunboata up James lliver for 
 fear of the Merrimac. 
 
 Tlie above plan of campaign was adopted 
 unanimously by Gen. McDowell and Brig.-Gen's 
 Sumner, Ileintzelman and Keyes, and was con- 
 curred in by Maj.-Gen. McClellan, who first pro- 
 posed Urbana as our base. ^ 
 
 This army being reduced by forty-five thousand 
 troops, some of them the be&t in Ihe service, and 
 without tiie support of the navy, the plan to 
 which we are reduced bears scarcely any resem- 
 blance to the one I voted for. 
 
 I command the James River column, and 1 left 
 my camp, near Newport News, the morning of 
 the 4rh instant. I only succeeded in getting ray 
 artillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, 
 and one of my divisions had not all arrived in 
 camp the day I left, and, for the want of trans- 
 portation, has not yet joined me. So you Avill 
 observe that not a day was lost in the advance; 
 and in fact we marched so quickh'and so rapidly 
 that many*of our animals were twent^'-four and 
 fcn'ty-eight hours without a ration of forage. Rut, 
 notwithstanding the ra])idity of our advance, we 
 are stopped by a.line of defense nine or ten miles 
 long, strongly fortified by breastworks, erected 
 nearly the whole distance, behind a stream or 
 succession of ponds no where fordable, one ter- 
 minus being Yorktown and the other ending in 
 tlie James River, wliich is commanded by the 
 enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all 
 around with bastioned works, and on the water 
 side, it and Gloucester are so strong that th» 
 navy are afraid to attack either. 
 
 The approaches on our side are generallj 
 through low, swampy, or thickly-wooded ground, 
 over roads which we are obliged to repair or to 
 make, before we can get forward our carriages. 
 The enemy is in groat force, and is constantly 
 receiving reinforcements from the two rivera. 
 The line in front of us is therefore one of the 
 strongest ever opposed to, an invading force in 
 any country. 
 
 You will then ask, why I advocated such a lino 
 for our operations? My reasons are few, but, I 
 think, good. 
 
 With i)ro])er assistance from the navy, we 
 could take Yorktown, and then, with gunl)i)at3 
 on both rivers, we could beat any force opjiosed 
 to lis on AVarwick liiver, because the shot and 
 shells from the gunboats would nearly overlap 
 across the Peninsula, so that, if the enemy should 
 retreat, and retreat he must, he would have » 
 long way to go without rail or steam transporta- 
 tion and every soul of his army must fall into 
 our hands or be destroyed. 
 
 Another reason for my supporting the new 
 base and plan was, that tliis line, it wKs expect- 
 ed, would furnish water transportation nearly to 
 Richmond. 
 
 Now, supposing wo succeed in breaking 
 through the line ill front of us, wliat can we do 
 next? The roads are very bad. and if tlie enemy 
 retains command of James River, and we do not 
 first reduce Yorktown, it would bo imuosbiblo 
 
for us to subsist this army three marches beyond 
 where it is iiow. As the roads are at present, it 
 is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist 
 in the position it now occupies. 
 
 You will see, therefore, by what I have said, 
 that the force originally intended for the capture 
 of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I 
 thought the four arm}' corps necessary when I 
 supposed the navy would co-operate, and when 
 I judged of the obstacles to be encountered by 
 what I learned from maps and the opinions of 
 officers stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all 
 other sources, how much more should I tiiink 
 tlie full complement of troops requisite, now that 
 the navy cannot co-operate, and now that the 
 dnemy's lines and the number of his guns and 
 men prove to be immeasurably greater tbau I 
 had been supposed to expect ! 
 
 The line in front of us, in the ojjiuion of all 
 tlie military men here who are at all competent 
 to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and 
 the force of tlie enemy capable of being increased 
 beyond the numbers we now have to oppose^to 
 him. Independently of the strengh of the lines 
 in front of us, and of the force of the enemy be- 
 hind them, we cannot advance until we get com- 
 mand of York River or James River. Tiio effi- 
 cient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, 
 absolutely essential, and so I considered it when 
 I voted to change our base from the Potomac to 
 Fort Monroe. 
 
 An iron-c^ad boat must attack Yorktown, and 
 if several strong giuiboats could be sent up 
 James River also, our success will be certain and 
 complete, and the rebellion will soon be put 
 down. 
 
 On the other hand, we must butt against the 
 enemy's works with heavy artillery and a great 
 waste of time, life and material. 
 
 If we break through and advance, both our 
 flanks will be assailed from two great water- 
 courses in the hands of the enemy : our supplies 
 would give out, and the enemy, equal, if not 
 superior, in numbers, would, with other advan- 
 tages, beat and destroy this army. 
 
 The greatest master of the art of war has said 
 that •• if 3'ou Svould invade a country successfully, 
 you must have one line of operations and one 
 array, under one general." But what is our con- 
 dition? The State of Virginia is made to con- 
 stitute the command, in part or wholl}', of some 
 six generals, viz.: Fremont, Banks, McDowell, 
 Wool, Burnside,and McClellan, besides the scrap, 
 OTer the Chesapeake, in th^are of Dix. 
 
 The great battle of the war is to come off. If 
 we win it, the rebellion will be crushed. If we 
 lose it, the consequences will be nior« horrible 
 than I care to foretell. The plan ol campaign I 
 Yoted for, if carried out with tjie means pro- 
 posed, will certiinly suecee 1. If any part of the 
 means jiroposcd ;uo withheld or diverted, I deem 
 it due to myself to say that our success will be 
 luicerlaiii. 
 
 It is no doubt agreeable to the connnaiider oi 
 Uie Istcorps to have a separate department; and. 
 I--; this letter advocates! his return, to Gen. Mc- 
 
 47 
 
 Clellan's command, it is proper to state that I an» 
 not at all influenced by personal remark or dis- 
 like to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to 
 credit all the opinions which have been poured 
 into my ears, I must believe that, in regard to 
 my pressnt line command, I owe much to (icn. 
 McDowell and nothing to Gen. McClellan. But I 
 have disregarded all such officiousness, and I 
 have from last July to the present day, supportr 
 ed Gen. McClellan and ob_>yed all his orders with 
 as hearty a good will ; 8 tliough he had been ray 
 brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I 
 shall continue to do so to the last, and so long as 
 he is my commander ; and I ara not desirous to 
 displace him, and would not if I could. He 
 left "Washington with the understanding that 
 he was to execute a defuiitc plan of campaign 
 with certain prescribed means. The v\i\n was 
 good and the means sufficient, and, without 
 modification, the enterprise 'was certain of suc- 
 cess. But, with the reduction of force and 
 means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a 
 bad plan, witli means insufficient for certain suc- 
 cess. 
 
 Do not look upon this communication as the 
 offspring of despondency. I never desjiond ; 
 and when you see me working the hardest, you 
 may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me, 
 1 am working now, to my utmost. 
 
 Please show this letter to the President, and I 
 should like also that Mr. Stanton should know 
 its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as 
 soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect 
 respect, Your obedient servant, 
 
 E. D. Ketks, Brig.-Gen. Comd'g 4th Army Corps. 
 Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate. 
 
 On the Tth of April, and before tlie arrival of 
 the divisions of Generals Hooker, Richardson and 
 Casey, I received the following dispatches from 
 the President and Secretary of W'ar : 
 
 Washington, April 6, 1862. 8 p.m. 
 
 Gen. G. B. McClellan. — Yours of 11 a.m. to-daj 
 received. Secretary of War informs me that thf 
 forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and 
 Woodbury's Brigade, under your orders, is no* 
 and will not be interfered with. You hav« 
 over one hundred thousand troops with you, in- 
 dependent of Gen. Wool's command. I think 
 3'ou had better break the enemy's line from 
 Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will 
 probably use time as advantageously as you can. 
 A. Lincoln, President. 
 Washington, April G, 18G2. 2 p.m. , 
 
 Gen. G. B. McClellan. — The President directs 
 me to say that your dispatch to him Inis been 
 received. General Sumner's corps is on the road 
 to join you, and will go forward as fast as possi- 
 ble. Franklin's division is now on the advance 
 towards Manassas. There is no meaiis of trans- 
 portation here to send it forward in time to bo of 
 service to you in your ])re8ent operations. Tele* 
 graph frequently, and all in the power of tho 
 government shall bo done to sustain you as occa- 
 sion requires. - __; 
 Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 
 
 By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty 
 
.uood knowledge of the enemy'B works and the 
 obstacles to be overcome. 
 
 Oa that day I received the following letter 
 from the President. 
 
 Washington, April 9th, 1862. 
 Major-General JlcClellau :— 
 
 My Dear H'lr, — Your dispatches, complaining 
 that you are not properl}' sustained, while they 
 do not offend me, do pain me very much. 
 
 Blenker's division was withdrawn from you 
 before you left here, and you know the pressure 
 under which I did it, and, as I thought, acqui- 
 esced in it, certainly without reluctance. 
 
 After you left I ascertained that less than 
 iwenty thousand unorganized men, without a 
 single battery, were all you designed to be left 
 for the defense of Washington and ^lanassas 
 Junction ; and part of this even was to go to 
 Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks' old 
 corps, once designed for ^lanassas Junction, was 
 diverted and tied up on the Imc of Winchester 
 and Strasburg, and could not leave it without 
 again exposing the upper Potomac, and the Bal- 
 timore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or 
 would present, when McDowell and Sumner 
 should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy 
 til turn back from the Rappahannock and sack 
 Washington. My explicit order that Washing- 
 ton should, by the judgment of all the command- 
 ers of army corps, be left entirely secure, had 
 been neglected. It was precisely this that drove 
 me to detain McDowell, 
 
 I do not forget that I was satisfied wath your 
 arrangement to leave Banks at ifanassas Junc- 
 tion ; but when that arrangement was broken up 
 and nolliing was substituted for it, of course I 
 was constrained to substitute something for it 
 myself. And allow me to ask, " Do you really 
 think I should permit the line from PJchmond 
 nia. ilanassas Junction to this city to be entirely 
 open, except what resistance could be presented 
 by twenty thousand unorganized troops ?" This is 
 a question which the country will not allow mc 
 to evade. 
 
 There is a curious mystery about the ninnhers 
 of the troops now with j^ou. When I telegraph- 
 ed yuu on the 6th, saj'ing j'ou had over a hundred 
 thousand with you, I had just obtained from the 
 Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, 
 fi-ora your own returns, makhig 108,000 then 
 with you and en route to you. You now say 
 you will have but 85,000 when all en route to you 
 Bhall have reached you. IIow can the discrep- 
 anc)-- of 23,000 be accounted for ? 
 
 As to General Wool's command, 1 understand 
 it is doing for you precisely what a like number 
 of your own would have to do, if that command 
 was a^vay. 
 
 I Knpi)ose the whole force which has gone for- 
 ward for you is with you by this time, and if so, 
 I think it is the precise time to strike a blow. 
 By delay the enemy will relativel)' gain upon you 
 — that is, he will gain faster, hj fortifications and 
 reinforcements, than you can by reinforcements 
 alone. 
 
 And once more, let me tell you, it is indispen- 
 sable to you that you strike a blow. 7 am 
 
 48 
 
 powerless to help this. You will do me the 
 justice to remember. I always insisted that going 
 down the bay in search of a field, instead of 
 fighting at or near Afanassas, was only shifting 
 and not surmounting a difficulty ; that we would 
 find the same enemy, and the same or equal in- 
 trenchments, at either place. The country will 
 not fail to note — is now noting — that the pre- 
 sent hesitation to move upon an intrenched ene- 
 my, is but the story of Manassas repeated. 
 
 I beg to assure you that I have never written 
 3'ou, or spoken to j'ou, in greater kindness of 
 feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to 
 sustain j'ou, so far as in my most anxious judg- 
 ment I consistently can. But you must act. 
 
 Yours, very trul}', A. Lincoln. 
 
 With great deference to the opinions and 
 wisfies' of His Excellency the President, I most 
 respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which 
 I have presented, and those contained in .the ac- 
 companying letter of General Kej-es, with the 
 reports of General Barnard and other officers, as 
 furnishing a reply to the above letter. His Ex- 
 cellency could not judge of the formidable char- 
 acter of the works before us as well as if he had 
 been upon the ground, and whatever might have 
 been his desire for prompt action (certainly no 
 greater than mine),! feel confident, if he could 
 have made a personal insjaection of the enemy's 
 defenses, he would have forbidden me from risk- 
 ing the safety of the army and the possible suc- 
 cesses of the campaign on a sanguinary assai?' 
 of an advantageous and formidable position,^ 
 which, even if successful, could not have beea ^^ 
 followed up to any other or better result than 
 v.'ould have been reached by the regular opera- 
 tions of a siege. Still less could I forego the 
 conclusions of my most instructed judgment for 
 the mere sake of avoiding the personal conse- 
 quences intimated in the President's dispatch. 
 
 The following extracts from the report of the 
 chief engineer — Brig. -Gen. J. G. Barnard, — em- 
 body the result of our reconnoissances, and give, 
 with some degree of detail, the character and 
 strength of the defenses of Yorktown and the 
 Warwick, and some of the obstacles which the 
 army contended against and overcome. 
 EXTP.ACTS FROM GEN. BARNARD'S RE- 
 PORT. 
 
 " The accompanying drawing — Map No. 2 — 
 gives with accuracy the outline and armament of 
 the fortifications of Yorktov.'n proper, with the 
 detached works immediately- connected with it. 
 
 " The three bastioned fronts looking towards 
 our approaches appear to have been earliest 
 biiilt, and have about 15 feet thickness of para- 
 pet, and 8 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch ; the 
 width varying much, but never leaving lcs3, at 
 top of the scrap, than 15 feet : I think, generally, 
 much more. 
 
 " The works extending around the town, from 
 the western salient of fronts just mentioned, 
 appear to have been finished during the last 
 winter and spring. They have formidable pro- 
 files, 18 feet thickness of parapet, and generally, 
 10 feet depth of ditch. 
 
 ' 
 
" The water-batteries had, generally, 18 feet 
 parapet, the guns in barbette. 
 
 " They were — as well as the works mentioned 
 — carefully constructed with well made sod-re- 
 vetments. 
 
 " There were numerous traverses between the 
 guns, and ample magazines ; how sufficient in 
 bomb-proof qualities, I am unable to say. 
 
 " The two first guns of the works on the 
 heights, bear upon the water as well as the land, 
 and were of heavy calibre. 
 
 " The list herewith, gives all the guns in posi- 
 tion, or for which there were emplacements. 
 The vacant emplacements were all occupied be- 
 ' fore the evacuation by siege-guns, rifled 4j inch, 
 24-pounders and 18-pounders. 
 
 " In Fort Magnider — the first exterior work — 
 there were found 1 8-inch Columbiad, 1 42- 
 pounder, and 1 8-inch siege-howitzer, the two 
 former ' en barbettee.' The sketch will show 
 the emplacements ,for guns on field and siege- 
 carriages, making, I think, with the foregoing, 22. 
 Two of these were placed behind traverses with 
 embrasures covered by bridges. 
 
 " The two external redoubts, with the connect- 
 ing parapets, formed a re-entrant with the fronts 
 of attack, and all the guns bore on our ap- 
 proaches. 
 
 " It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches, 
 were swept by the fire of at least 49 guns, nearly 
 all of which were heavy, and many of them the 
 most formidable guns known ; besides that, two- 
 I thirds of the guns of the water-batteries, and all 
 [fti'he guns of Gloucester, bore on our right bat- 
 Ateries, though under disadvantageous circum- 
 stances. 
 
 I " The ravine, behind which the left of the 
 ' \''orktown fronts of attack was placed, was not 
 \ery difiicult, as the heads formed depressions 
 fli front of their left imperfectly seen by their 
 fj-e, and from which access could be had to the 
 a tches, but we could not be sure of this fact 
 before the evaciTation. The enemy held, by 
 means of a slight breastwork, and rifle trenches, 
 a position in advance of the heads of their ra- 
 Yines, as far forward as t?ie Brunt House. 
 
 " Tlie r.avines, which head between the York- 
 town fortifications and the exterior works, are 
 deep and intricate. They were tolerably well 
 Been, however, by the works which run west- 
 wardly from the Yorktown works, and which 
 were too numerous and complicated to be traced 
 on paper. 
 
 " Fort Magruder, the first lunette on cur left, 
 appears to have been built at an early period. 
 
 " The external connection between this work, 
 was first a rifle trench, probably afterwards en- 
 larged into a parapet, with external ditch, and an 
 emplacement for four guns in or near the small 
 redan in the centre. 
 
 " Behind this they had constructed numerous 
 epaulmcnts with connecting boyans not fully 
 arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended, 
 probably, to protect their camps and reserves 
 against the destructive effects of our artillery. 
 
 " From the ' red redoubt,' these trenches and 
 epaulments, ran to the woods and rivulet wliich 
 brme a head of the Warwick, and continue al- 
 
 49 
 
 most without break to connect with the works at 
 Winn's Mills. This stream just mentioned, (whatr 
 ever be its name, the term ' Warwick,' according 
 to some, applying only to the tidal channel from 
 the James River, up as high as Lees's Mill), was 
 inundated by a number of dams, from near where 
 its head is crossed by the epaulments mentioned, 
 down to Lee's Mill. 
 
 " Below Lee's Mill, the Warwick follows a 
 tortuous course through salt marshes of 200 
 or 300 yards in width, from which the land rises 
 up boldly to a height of 40 or 50 feet. 
 
 " The first group of works is at Winn's Mill, 
 where there is a dam and bridge. The next is. 
 to guard another dam between Winn's and Lee's 
 Mills, (this is the point attacked by General 
 Smith, on the IGth ultimo, and where Lieut. 
 Merrill was wounded; the object of the attack 
 was -merely to prevent the further construction 
 of works, and feel the strength of the position.) 
 A work, of what extent is not now known, was 
 at the sharp angle of the stream, just above 
 Lee's Mill, and a formidable group of works was 
 at Lee's Mill, where there was also a dam and 
 bridge. 
 
 " From Lee's JMill a line of works extends across 
 Mulberry Island (or it is supposed to do so). 
 
 " At Southall's Landing is another formidable 
 group of works, and from here, too, they extend 
 apparently across the James. 
 
 " These groups of field works were connected 
 by rifle trenches or parapets, for nearly the whole 
 distance. 
 
 '• They are far more extensive than may be sujv • 
 posed, from the mention of them I make ; and' 
 every kind of obstruction which the country af- 
 fords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, &c., was 
 skillfully used. The line is certainly one of tht 
 most extensive known to modern times. 
 
 " The country on both sides the Warwick, from 
 near Yorktown down, is a dense forest, with few 
 clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impass- 
 able during the heavy rains we have constantly 
 had, except where our own labors have cordu- 
 royed them. 
 
 " If we could have broken the enemy's line 
 across the isthmus, we could have invested York- 
 town, and it must, with its garrison, have soon 
 fallen into our hands. 
 
 "It Was not deemed practicable, considering 
 the strength of that line, and the difficulty of han- 
 dling onr forces (owing to the impracticable char- 
 acter of the country), to do so. 
 
 " If we could take Yorktown, or drive the en- 
 emy out of that place, the enemy's line was no 
 longer tenable. 'liiiis we could do by siege ope- 
 rations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt 
 the reduction of the place by assault." 
 
 The plan of the approaches and their defenses, 
 as determined upon and finally executed, is ex- 
 hibited in the accompanying map. It was, in 
 words, to open the first parallel as near as possi- 
 ble to the works of the enemy, and under its, pro- 
 tection to establish, almost simultaneously, batte- 
 ries along the whole' front, extending from York 
 River, ou the right, to the Warwick, on the left 
 — a chord of about one mile in length. The prin- 
 cipal approaches were diieoled against the east 
 
end of the main work (wluoh was most heavily 
 armed, and bore both on the water and land), and 
 lay between Wormley's Creek and York River. 
 There, also, were placed the most of the batteries 
 designed to act against the land front, to enfilade 
 the water batteries, and to act upon Ghnicester. 
 I designed at the earliest moment to open simul- 
 taneously with several batteries, and as soon as 
 the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of land 
 between Wormley's Creek and the Warwick, were 
 crippled, and their fire kept down, to push the 
 trendies as far forward as iiecessary, and to as- 
 sault Yorktow^n and the adjacent works. 
 
 The approaches to the batteries, the necessary 
 bridges, and the roads to the depots, had been 
 vigorously pushed to completion, by the troops 
 Under Gens. Keintzelman and Sumner, and were 
 available for infantry, and in some instances for 
 artillery, on the 17th of April, when the batteries 
 and iheir connections were comfnenced, and Ta- 
 bor upon them kept up, night and day, until fin- 
 ished. 
 
 Some of the batteries, on easy ground and con- 
 cealed from the view of the enemj^ were early 
 completed and ai'med, and held ready for any 
 emergency, but not permitted to open, as the re- 
 turn fire of the enemy would interfere too much 
 with the labor on oLher and more important works. 
 The completion of the more exposed and heaviest 
 batteries was delayed by storms, preventing the 
 landing of guns and ammunition. It having been 
 discovered that the enemy were receiving artil- 
 lery stores at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 
 1st, Battery No. 1 was opened with effect upon 
 :he wharf and town. ^ 
 
 On the 22d of April, Gen. Franklin, with his 
 division from Gen. McDowell's cor,ps, had arrived 
 and reported to me. The garrison of Gloucester 
 Point had been reinforced and the works strength- 
 ened ; but as this division was too small to'^de- 
 tach to the Severn, and no more troops could be 
 spared, I determined to act on Gloucester by dis- 
 embarking it on the north bank of the York River, 
 under the protection of the gmiboats. The troops 
 were mainly kept on /board ship while the neces- 
 sary preparations were made for landing them, 
 and supporting them in case of necessity. For a 
 full account of this labor, I refer to the report of 
 Lieut.-Col. B. S.Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, 
 detailed for this expedition. 
 ' While the siege works were being rapidly 
 completed, the roads on the left wing necessary 
 for communication and advance were opened and 
 corduroyed over the marshes, batteries were 
 erected to silence the enemy's guns and drive him 
 from his works at Winn's and Lie's Mills, prepar- 
 atory to the general attack, active reconnois- 
 sanccs were continually going on, and attempts 
 in force made to drive the enemy from the banks. 
 The result of various rcconnoissances made un- 
 der the immediate direction of Gen. W. F. Smith, 
 commanding 2d division, 4th corps, led to the be- 
 lief that the weakest poin. of that part of the en- 
 emy's lines, was opposite a field, where it was 
 ascertained that there was a dam covered by a 
 battery known to contain at least one gun. It 
 was determined to push a (Strong reeonnoissance 
 on this point, to silence the enemy's fire, and as- 
 
 ro 
 
 certain the actual strength of the position, being 
 prepared to sustain the reconnoitering party by a 
 real attack, if found expedient. 
 
 ijcn. WrF. Smith was directed to undertake 
 the operation on the 16th of April. He silenced 
 the enemy's guns, discovered the existence of 
 other woriis, previously concealed and unknown, 
 and sent a siiong party across the stream, which 
 'was finally forced to retire with some loss ; but 
 Gen. Smith intrenched himself in a position im- 
 mediately overlookij\g the dam aiid the enemy's 
 works, so as to keep them tinder control, and 
 prevent the enemy usiig the dam as a means of 
 crossing the Warwick to annoy us. 
 
 Many times towards tLe end of the month, the 
 enemy attempted to drive in our pickets and take 
 our rifle-pits near YorktowiK but always witho*ut 
 success. As the siege prigressd it was with 
 great difficulty that the rifle-pits on the right 
 could be excavated and held, so little covering- 
 could be made against the hot lire of the enemy's 
 artillery and infantry. Their guns continued up 
 to a late hour of the night of tfte 3d of May. 
 
 Our batteries would have been ready to open 
 on the morning of the Gth of J^lay at latest, but 
 on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that 
 the enemy had already been cora]>elled to evacu- 
 ate his position during the night, leaving behind 
 him all his heavy guns iminjureu, and a large 
 amount of ammunition and suf)plies 
 
 For the details of the labors of this siege, I re- 
 fer to the accompanying reports and journals of 
 Brig-Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, charged 
 with the selection and laying out, and comple- 
 tion of the approaches and batteries ; of Brig.- 
 Gen. W. F. Barry, chief of ijrtillery, charged with 
 arming and suppl^'ing with ammunition all the 
 siege and field batteries ; and of Brig.-Gen. Fitz 
 John Porter, director of the siege, to whom was 
 assigned the guaading of the trenches, the assem- 
 bling and distribution of thewotking parties, &c.j 
 &c. 
 
 THE PURSUIT TO WILLIAMSBURG 
 
 Early in the morning of t]ie 4th, upon the ene- 
 my's altandoning his lines at Yorktown, I ordered 
 ail the available cavalry ftrce, with four batteries 
 of horse artillery, under Brig.-Gen. Stoncman, chief 
 of cavalry, in immediate pursuit, by the Yorktown 
 and Williamsburg road, with orders to harass 
 the enemy's rear, and try to cut off such of his 
 forces as had taken the Lee's Mill and Williams- 
 burg road. 
 
 Gen. Heintzelman was directed to send Hook- 
 er's division forward on the Yorktown and Wil- 
 liamsburg road to support Gon. Stoneman; and 
 Gen Smith was ordered to proceed with his divi- 
 sion on the Lee's Jlill and Williamsburg road for 
 the same purpose ; afterward.s the divisions of 
 Gens. Kearney, Couch and Casey were put en 
 route, the first on the Yorktown road, and the 
 otiiers on the Lee's Mill road. These roads unite 
 about a quarter of a mile south of Fort ]\Iagruder, 
 and are connected by cross-roads at several 
 points between Yorktown and Williamsburg. 
 After these directions had been given. Gen. Sum- 
 ner, (the ofiicor second in rank in tlie Army of 
 the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front 
 
51 
 
 aud take immediate charge of operations until 
 my arrival. 
 
 Gen. Stonemau moved forward promptly with 
 his command (consisting of four batteries of liorae- 
 artillery under Lieut.-Col. Hays, the 1st and 6th 
 U. S. cavahy. the 3d Pennsylvania, and 8th Illi- 
 nois and Barker's squadron.) meeting with but 
 little opposition until he arrived in front of the 
 enemy's works, about t\vo nmlcs east of Williams- 
 burg. At a point about eight miles from York- 
 town, in accordance with my instructions he de- 
 tached Gen. Emory with Benson's battery, the 3d 
 Pennsylvania cavalry (Col. Averell) and Barker's 
 squadron, to gain the Lee's ]\Iill road, and endea- 
 vor, with the assistance of Gen. Smith, to cut olf 
 the portion of the enemy's rear-guard, which had 
 taken that route. Gen. Emory had some sharp 
 skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry, and a bat- 
 tery under Gen. Stuart, and drove them in the di- 
 rection of Lee's Mill. Gen. Smith having met 
 with obstructions in his front, had transferred his 
 column by a cross-road to the Yorktown and Wil- 
 liamsburg road, so that Gen. Emory finding no 
 force to co-operate with him was unable to cut 
 off the rear-guard, and they succeeded in escap- 
 ing by a circuitous route, along the bank of the 
 James River. 
 
 The position in which Gen. Stoneman encoun- 
 lered the enemy is about four miles in extent, the 
 right resting on College Creek, and the left on 
 Queen's Creek, nearly three-fourths of its front 
 being covered by tributaries of those two creeks, 
 upon which there are ponds. The ground be- 
 tween the heads of the tributary streams is a 
 cuKivated plain, across which a line of detached 
 •works had been constructed, consisting of P"'ort 
 Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bas- 
 tion front, and twelve other redoubts and epaul- 
 ments for field-guns. 
 
 The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six 
 feet high and nine feet thick, the ditch nine feet 
 ■wide and nine feet deep, filled with water. The 
 length of the interior crest as about 600 yards. 
 The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of 
 small dimensions, having faces of about forty 
 yards. The woods in front of the position were 
 felled, and the open ground in front of the works 
 was dotted with numerous rifle pits. 
 
 The roads leading from the lower part of the 
 Peninsula towards Williamsburg, one along -the- 
 York River — the Yorktown road — and tiie other 
 along the James, — the Lee'a Mill road — unite be- 
 tween the heads of the tributary streams a short 
 distance in front of Fort Magruder, by which 
 they are commanded, and debouch from the 
 woods just before uniting. A branch from the 
 James River road leaves it about one and three 
 qiiarler miles below Fort Magruder, and unites 
 with the road from Allen's Landing to Williams- 
 burg, which crosses the tributary of College 
 Creek over a dam at the outlet of a pond, and 
 passes just in rear of the line of works, being 
 commanded by the throe redoubts on the right of 
 the line. 
 
 ^^. At about the same distance from Fort Magru- 
 der a branch leaves the York River road, and 
 crosses the tributary of Queen's Creek on a dam, 
 and passing over the position and through the 
 
 woous m Its tear, nnaiiy eateib vvimamsDarg. 
 This road is commanded by redoubts on the left 
 of the line of works. 
 
 Gen. Stoneman debouched from the woods with 
 his advance guard— consisting of a part of the 
 1st U. S. Cavalry and one section of Gibson's 
 battery, under the command of Gen. Cook — and 
 the enemy immediately opened on him with seve- 
 ral field-pieces from Fort Magruder, having the 
 correct range and doing some execution. Gib- 
 son's battery was brought into position as rapid- 
 ly as the deep mud would permit, and returned 
 the fire, while the 6th U. S. Cavalry was sent to 
 feel the enemy's left. This regiment passed one 
 redoubt, which it found unoccui)icd,and appeared 
 in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry 
 force, with infantry and artillery, came down upon 
 it ; whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. 
 The rear squadron, under command of Captain 
 Saunders, repelled a charge of the enemy's cav- 
 alry in the most gallant manner. In the mean- 
 time the enemy was being reinforced by infantry, 
 and the artillery fire becoming very hot, Gen. 
 Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, 
 ordered the withdrawal of the battery. This 
 was accomplished, with the exception of one 
 piece which could not be extricated from the 
 mud. The enemy attempted to prevent the 
 movement, but their charges were met by the 1st 
 U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieut.-Colonel 
 Grier, and they were driven back, losing several 
 officers and one stand of colors. Gen. Stoneman 
 then took up a defensive position a short dis- 
 tance in the rear of the first, to await the arrival 
 of the infantry. The advance of General Smith's 
 column reached Skiffs Creek about llj.^ o'clock, 
 aud found the bridge over the stream in flames^ 
 and the road impassable. A practicable route to 
 the Yorktown road having been discovered, the 
 division, by order of General Sumner, moved on 
 by that road, and reached Gen. Stoneman's posi- 
 tion about 5^ o'clock. General Sumner arriving 
 with it, assumed command. .J 
 
 Generals lleintzelman and Keyes also arrived 
 during the afternoon near the Half- Way House. 
 Tlie head of General Hooker's column encounter- 
 ed Smith's division, filing into the road, and was 
 obliged to halt between three and four hours, 
 until it had passed Gen. Hooker then followed 
 on, and at Checcecahe Church turned off, by Gen. 
 Heintzelman's direction, taking a cross-road, and 
 moved out on the Lee's Mill road, thus changing 
 places with Gen. Smith. Marching lart of the 
 night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early 
 in the morning of the 5th. 
 
 General Smith's division, having been deploj'ed 
 General Sumner ordered an attack on the works, 
 in his front, but the lines having been thrown 
 into confusion while moving through the dense 
 forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt, for 
 that night, was abandoned. The troops bivou- 
 acked in the Avoods, and a heavy rain began, 
 which continued ujitil the morning of the 6th, 
 making the roads, already in a very bad condi- 
 tion, almost impassable. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. ' 
 
 During the morning of the 5tli, General Sum- 
 ner recounoitercd the position in Iiia front. 
 
62 
 
 and at 11 o'clock, ordered Hancock's brigade, of 
 Smith's division, to take possession of a work on 
 the enemy's left, which had been found to be 
 tinoccupied. The remainder of Smitli's division 
 occupied the woods in front, witliout being actu- 
 ally engaged. The divisions of Couch and Casey, 
 had received orders during tlie night to march at 
 daylight, but on account of the terrible condition 
 of the roads, and other impediments, were not 
 able to reach the field until after 1 o'clock, p.m., 
 at which time the first brigade of Couch's divi- 
 gion arrived, and was posted in the centre, on 
 Hooker's right. The other two brigades came up 
 during the afternoon, followed by Casey's divi- 
 sion. In the meantime. General Hooker having 
 reconnoitered the enemy's position, began the 
 attack at 1^ o clock, a.m., and for a while silenced 
 the guns of Fort Magruder, and cleared the 
 ground in his front. But the enemy being con- 
 tinually reinforced, until their strength greatly 
 exceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavor- 
 ing to turn his left. For several hours his divi- 
 sion struggled gallantly against the superior 
 numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webber's 
 tattery were lost, and between 3 and 4 o'clock, 
 his ammunition began to give out. The loss had 
 been heavy and the exhaustion of the ti'oops wai 
 very great. At this time the division of General 
 Kearney came up, who, at 9 a.m., had received 
 orders to reinforce Hooker, and who had suc- 
 ceeded, by the greatest exertion, in passing 
 Casey's troops, and pushing on the front through 
 the deep mud. General Kearney at once gal- 
 lantly attacked, and thereby prevented the loss 
 of another battery, and drove the enemy back at 
 every point, enabling Gen. Hooker to extricate 
 himself from his position, and withdraw his 
 •wearied troops. 
 
 Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, as has been 
 mentioned before, was immediately on its arrival, 
 ordered by Gen. Sumner to deploy on Hooker's 
 right. This was promptly done, and the attacks 
 •f the enemy at that point were repulsed. Gen. 
 Peck, held his position until late in tlie afternoon, 
 ■when he was relieved by the other two brigade's 
 of Couch's division, and they were in quiet pos- 
 session of the ground when night closed the 
 contest. 
 
 The vigorous action of these troops relieved 
 Gen. Hooker considerably. Gen. Emory, had 
 been left with his command, on the niglit of the 
 4th, to guard the branch of the Lee's Mill road, 
 "which leads to Allen's Farm, and on the morning 
 of the 5th, it was ascertained that by this route 
 the enemy's right could be turned. A request 
 for infantry for this purpose, was made to Gen. 
 Heintzelman, who, late in the afternoon, sent 
 four regiments and two batteries of Kearney's 
 division, the first disposable troops he had, and 
 directed Gen. Emory to make the attack. With 
 these reinforements,his force amounted to about 
 3,000 men, and 3 batteries. Gen. Emory, on ac- 
 count of want of knowledge of the ground, and 
 the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in this 
 movement. It involved some risks, but if suc- 
 cessful, might have produced important results. 
 A.t 11 a.m., as before mentioned, Gen. Smith re- 
 ceived orders from General Sumner, to send one 
 
 brigade across a dam on our right, to occupy a 
 redoubt on the left of the enemy's line ; Han- 
 cock's brigade was selected for this purpose. 
 He crossed the dam, took possession of the first 
 redoubt, and afterwards finding the second one 
 vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for rein- 
 forcements to enable him to advance further, and 
 take the next redoubt, which commanded the 
 plain between his j^sition and Fort Magruder. 
 and woxild have enabled him to take in reverse, 
 and cut the communication of the troops en- 
 gaged with Generals Hooker and Kearney. The 
 enemy soon began to show himself in strength 
 before him, and, as his rear and right flank were 
 somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for 
 reinforcements. Gen. Smith was twice ordered 
 to join him with the rest of his division, but 
 each time the order was countermanded at the 
 moment of execution ; Gen. Sumner not being 
 willing to weaken the centre. At length, in 
 reply to Gen. Hancock's repeated messages for 
 more troops, Gen. Sumner sent him an order to 
 fall back to his first position ; the execution of 
 which, Gen. Hancock deferred as long as*possi- 
 ble, being unwilling to give up the advantage 
 already gained, and fearing to expose his com- 
 mand by such a movement. 
 
 During the progress of these events I had re- 
 mained at Yorktown, to complete the prepara- 
 tions for the departure of Gen. Franklin's and 
 other troops to West Point by water, and to 
 make the necessary arrangements with the naval 
 conmiander, for his co-operation. 
 
 By pushing Gen. Franklin, well supported, by 
 water to the right bank of the Pamunkey oppo- 
 site West Point, it was hoped to force the enemy 
 to abandon whatever works he might have on 
 the Peninsula below that point, or be cut off. It 
 was of paramount importance that the arrange- 
 ments to this end should be promptly made. 
 
 At an early hour of the morning, I had sent 
 two of my aids (Lieut.-Gol. Sweitzer and Maj. 
 Hammerstein) to observe the operations in front, 
 with instructions to report to me everything of 
 importance that might occur. I received no in- 
 formation from them leading me to sujipose that 
 there was anything occurring of more import- 
 ance than a simple affair of a rear guard, until 
 about 1 o'clock, p.m., when a dispatch arrived 
 from one of them that everything was not pro- 
 gressing favorably ; tliis was confirmed a few 
 minutes later by the reports of Governor Sprague 
 and Major Hammerstein, who came directly from 
 the scene of action. 
 
 Completing the necessary arrangements, I re- 
 turned to my camp without delay, rode rapidly to 
 the front, a distance of some fourteen miles, 
 through roads much obstructed by troops and 
 wagons, and reached the field between 4 and 5, 
 p.m., in time to take a rapid survey of tlie 
 ground. I soon learned that there was no direct 
 communication between our centre and the left 
 under Gen. Heintzelman. The centre was chiefly 
 in the nearer edge of tlic woods situated between 
 us and the enemy. As lieavy firing was heard in 
 the direction of Gen. Hancock's conmiand, I im- 
 mediately ordered Gen. Smith to proceed with 
 his two remaining brigades to support that part 
 
53 
 
 of the line. Gren. Naglee, with his brigade re- 
 ceived similar orders. I then directed our cen- 
 tre to advance to the further edge of the woods, 
 mentioned above, which was done ; and attempt- 
 ed to open direct communication with Gen. 
 Ileintzolman, but was prevented bj the marshy 
 state of the ground in the direction in which the 
 attempt was made. Before Generals Smith and 
 Naglee could reach the field of Gen. Hancock's 
 operations, although they moved with great ra- 
 pidity, he had been confronted by a superior 
 force. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited 
 their onset, and then turned upon them : after 
 some terrific volleys of musketry he charged 
 them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing 
 their whole force ; killing, wounding and cap- 
 turing from 500 to 600 men, he, himself losing 
 only thirty-one men. 
 
 Tills was. one of the most brilliant engagements 
 of the war, and Gen. Hancock merits the highest 
 praise for the soldierly qualities displayed, and 
 his perfect appreciation of the vital importance 
 of his position. 
 
 Night put an end to all the operations here, 
 and all the troops who had been engaged in this 
 contest slept on the muddy field without shelter, 
 and many without food. 
 
 Notwithstanding the report I received from 
 Gen. Heintzelmau dm-ii^ the night, that Gen. 
 Hooker's division had suffered so much that it 
 could not be relied upon next day, and that 
 Kearney's conld not do more than hold its own, 
 without reinforcements — being satisfied that the 
 result of Hancock's engagement was to give us 
 possession of the decisive point of the battle- 
 field — during the night I countermanded the 
 order for the advance of the divisions of Sedg- 
 wick and Richardson, and directed them to 
 return to Yorktown, to proceed to West Point 
 bj water. 
 
 Our loss during the .day, the greater part of 
 which was sustained by Hooker's division, was 
 as follows : killed, 456 ; wounded, 1 ,400 ; missuig, 
 372. Total, 2,228. 
 
 On the next morning we found the enemy s 
 position abandoned, and occupied fort Magriider 
 and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled 
 with tlie enemy's wounded, to whose assistance 
 eighteen of their surgeons were sent by Gen. J. 
 B. Johnston, the officer in command. Several 
 guns and caissons which the enemy could not 
 carry off on account of the mud were secured. 
 
 Col. Averill was sent forward at once with a 
 strong cavalry force, to endeavor to overtake the 
 enemy's rear guard. He found several guns 
 abandoned and picked up a large number of 
 stragglers, but the conditions of the road and the 
 state of his supplies forced him to return after 
 advancing a few miles. 
 
 It is my opinion \that the enemy opposed us 
 here with only a portion of his army. When 
 our cavalry first appeared, there was nothing but 
 the enemy's rear guard in Williamsburg,: al- 
 I though troops were brought back during the 
 night and the next day, to hold the works as 
 long as possible, in order to gain time for the 
 trains, etc., already well on their vf.ay to Rich- 
 mond, to make their escape. 
 
 Our troops wore greatly exhausted by th» 
 laborious march through the mud from their 
 positions in front of Yorktown, and by the pro- 
 tracted battle through which they had just 
 passed ; many of them were out of rations and 
 annnuuition, and one division, in its anxiety to 
 make a prompt movement, had marched with 
 empty haversacks. The supply trains had been 
 forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th, to- 
 allow the troops and artillery to pass to th» 
 front, and the roads were now in such a 
 state, that it was almost impossible to pass even 
 empty wagons over them. Gen. Hooker's divi- 
 sion had sufiored so bad that it was in no condi- 
 tion to follow the enemy even if the roads had 
 been good ; under these circumstances, an imme- 
 diate pursuit was impossible. 
 
 Steps were at once taken to care for and re- 
 move the wounded, and to bring up provisions, 
 ammunition and forage. The condition of tho 
 roads, as has been said, rendered it next to impos- 
 sible to accomplish this by land from Yorktown : 
 a temporary depot was therefore promptly es- 
 tablished on Queen's Creek, and supplies drawn, 
 and the wounded shipped from that point. 
 
 I ADVANCE TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 
 
 The Divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, 
 and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by 
 water to the right baiik of the Paniunkey, in tho 
 vicinity of West Point. The remaining divisions, 
 the train, and the reserve artillery moved subse- 
 quently by land. 
 
 Early on the morning of the~7th. Gen. Franklin 
 had completed the disembarkation of his divi- 
 sion, and had placed it in a good position to 
 cover the landing place, both his flanks and a 
 large portion of the front being protected by 
 water. 
 
 Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division arrived 
 during the morning. 
 
 At about 9, a.m., a large force of the enemy 
 appeared, consisting of Whiting's division and 
 other troops, and between 10 and 11, they at- 
 tacked the part of the line lield by Newton's 
 brigade. * 
 
 'Tiie action continued until 3 p.m., wlien tho 
 enemy retired, all his attacks having been re- 
 pulsed. This aflair, the most important in which 
 the division had been engaged, was highly credi- 
 table to Gen. Franklin and his command. For 
 the details I refer to tliis report, which is here- 
 with submitted. Our loss was 40 killed, 104 
 wounded, and 41 missing. Total 194, which in- 
 cludes a large proportion of officers. 
 
 Cavalry reconnoissances were sent out from 
 Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th, and on the 8th 
 Gen. Stoneman moved, wiili an advance guard of 
 cavalry, artillery, and infantry, to open corarauni 
 cation with Gen. Eranklin. 
 
 As soon as our supplies liad been received, and 
 the condition of the roads had become a little bet- 
 ter, though still very bad, the advance of the re- 
 maining' troops was begun. Smith's division mov- 
 ing on the 8th. 
 
 On the 10th, headquarters were at Roper's 
 Church, 19 miles from Williamsburg. All tlie di 
 visions which liad moved by land (except Hook 
 er's) Ijeiiig in the vicinity of that place. Wo 
 
4^ 54 
 
 were no in direct communication with the portion 
 of the army which had gone by water, and we 
 began to draw supplies from Eltham. On ac- 
 count of the small number and narrowness of the 
 roads in this neighborhood, movements Avere dif- 
 ficult and slow. 
 
 On the 13th, headquarters, and the divisions of 
 Franklin, Porter, Sykes and Smith, reached Cum- 
 berland, which was made a temporary depot. 
 Couch and Casey were then near New Kent Court 
 House, Hooker and Kearney near Roper's Church, 
 and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. 
 
 On the 14th and 15th much rain fell. 
 
 On the 15th and 16tli the divisions of Franklin, 
 Smith and Porter were with great ditficuity mov- 
 ed to White House, five miles in advance. So 
 bad was the road that the ti'ain of one of these 
 divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over 
 this short distance. 
 
 Gen. Stoneman had occupied this place .some 
 days before, after several successful skirmishes, 
 in which our cavahy j^roved superior to that of 
 the enemy. The reports of these affairs are ap- 
 pended. . 
 
 About this time, with the consent of the Presi- 
 dent, two additional corps were organized, viz. : 
 the 5th Provisional Corps, consisting of the divi- 
 sions of Porter and Sykes, and the Reserve Artil- 
 lery, under the command of F. J. Porter ; and the 
 6th Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions 
 of Franklin and Smith, under the command of 
 Gen. W. B. Franklin. 
 
 Headquarters reached White House on the 
 16th, and a permanent depot was at once organ- 
 ized there. 
 
 On the 19th, headquarters, and the corps of 
 Porter and Franklin, moved to Tunstall's Station, 
 five miles from White House. 
 I On the 20th more rain fell. 
 
 On the 21st the position of the troops was as 
 follows : — 
 
 Stoneman's Advance Guard, one mile from New 
 Bridge. 
 
 Fi|^nklin's Corps, three miles from New P>i-idge,' 
 with 
 
 Porter's Corps, at supporting distance in its 
 rear. 
 
 Sumner's Corps, on the railroad, about three 
 miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the 
 rigkt with the left. 
 
 Keyes's Corps, on New Kent Road, near l>ot- 
 . tom's Bridge, with 
 
 Heiutzehnan's Corps, at supporting distance in 
 its roar. 
 
 The ford at Bottom's Bridge was in our pos- 
 session, and the re-building of the bridge, which 
 had been destroyed by the enemy, was com- 
 menced. 
 
 On the 22d headquarters moved to Coal Har- 
 bor. 
 
 On the 2(Jth the railroad was in operation as 
 far as the Chickahominy, and tlie railroad bridge 
 across that stream nearly completed. 
 SKOON'i) PERiui). 
 
 I'AUT II. 
 
 OPERATIONS Hl'^FORE RICn:\fOND. 
 When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light 
 troops readied the luniks of the Cliicl-ahominy 
 
 River, at Bottom's Bridge, they found iliat this, 
 as well as the railroad bridge, about a mile aLove,, 
 had been destroyed by the enemy. 
 
 The Chickahominy in this vicinity is about for- 
 ty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth of 
 heavy forest trees, and bordered by low, marshy 
 bottom-lands, varying from half a mile to a mile 
 in width. 
 
 Our operations embraced that part of the river 
 between Bottom's and Meadow Bridges, which 
 covered the principal approaches to Richmond 
 from the east. 
 
 W'ithin these limits the firm ground, lying above 
 high-water mark, seldom approaches near the 
 river on either bank, and no locality was found 
 within this section, Avhere the high ground came 
 near the stream on both sides. It was subject to 
 frequent, sudden and great variations in tiie vol- 
 ume of water, and a rise of a few feet,overflowed 
 the bottom-lands on both sides. f 
 
 At low water it could be forded at almost any 
 point, but during high water it rose above a ford- 
 ing stage, and could then be crossed only at the 
 few points where bridges had been constructed. 
 These bridges had all been destroyed by the ene- 
 my on our approach, and it was necessary not 
 only to reconstruct these, but to build several 
 others. 
 
 The west bank of the river, opposite the Nev/ 
 and ^rechanicsville bridges, was bordered by ele- 
 vated bluffs, which aftbrded the enemy command- 
 ing positions to fortify, establish iiis batteries 
 enfilading the approaches upon the two princij^a' 
 roads to Richmond, in one night, and resist tiie- 
 reconstruction of the important bridges. This 
 obliged us to select other Ifss exjiosed points foe 
 onr crossings. i. 
 
 As the enemy was not in great force opposite 
 Bottom's Bridge, on the arrival of our left at that 
 point, and as it was important to secure a lodg- 
 ment upon the rJglit bai^ before he should have 
 time to concentrate his forces and contest the 
 passage, I forthwith ordered Casey's division to 
 ford the river and occupy the opjiosite heights 
 This was promptly done on the 20th, and recoi:- 
 noissances were at once pushed out in advance- 
 
 Tliese troops were directed to throw np de- 
 fenses in an advantageous position to secure our 
 left flank. Gen. Ileintzelman's corps was thrown 
 forward in support, and Bottom's Bridge immedi- 
 ately rebuilt. tj— r!?rfi 
 
 In the meantime our centime and right were ad- 
 vanced to the river above, and on the 24th we 
 carried the village of Mechanicsville, driving the 
 enemy out with our artillery, and forcing them 
 across the bridge Avhich tiiey destroyed. Gen. 
 Naglec on the same day dislodged a force of the 
 eneni}- from the vicinity of the " Seven PinSR,"' 
 f)ii the Bottom's Bridge road, and our advance 
 on the left secured a strong position near that 
 place. i 
 
 All the information obtained from deserters, 
 negroes and spies, indicated that the enemy occu- 
 pied in force all the approaches to Richmond 
 from the east, and that he intended to dispirte 
 every step of our advance be3'0Tid the Chicka- 
 hominy, ar.d the passage of the stream opposite 
 onr right. Tliat Iheir army was .ojjpe.rior to ours 
 
55 
 
 in numbers did not admit of a doubt. Strong de- 
 fenses had been constructed around Richmond. . 
 
 Impressed by these facts with the necessity of 
 strengthening the army for the struggle, I did 
 not fail to urge repeatedly upon my superiors the 
 importance of reinforcing the Army of the Poto- 
 mac with every disposable man, in order to in- 
 sure the success of an attack upon tile rebel cap- 
 ital. 
 
 On the lOtli of May I telegraphed as follows :— 
 
 Gamp at Swell's Farm, three miles beyond 
 
 WiUiamsbm-g, May 19, 1862, 5 A. M. 
 Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War : 
 
 From the information reaching me from every 
 source, I regard it as certain that the enemy will 
 meet us with all his force, on or near the Chicka- 
 hominy. They can concentrate many more men 
 than I have, and are collecting troops from all 
 quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from 
 the South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons and 
 guartis, have much reduced my numbers, and will 
 continue to do so. I shall fight the rebel army 
 with whatever force I may Lave ; but duty re- 
 quires me to urge that every efibrt be made to 
 reinforce me Avithout delay with all the dispos- 
 able troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we 
 concentrate all our forces, as far as possible, to 
 fight the great battle now impending, and to make 
 it decisive, 
 
 It is possible that the enemy may abandon 
 Richmond without a serious struggle ; but I do 
 not believe he will — and it would be unwise to 
 count on anything but a'^tubborn and desperate 
 defense, a life and death contest. I see no other 
 hope for him than to fight this battle, and we 
 must win it. I shall fight them whatever their 
 force may be ; but I ask for every man that the 
 Department can send me. No troops should now 
 be left unemployed. Those who entertain the 
 opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond 
 without a struggle, are in my judgment badly ad- 
 vised, and do not comprehend their situation, 
 which is one requiring desperate measures. 
 
 1 beg that the President and Secretary will ma- 
 turely weigh what I say, and leave nothing un- 
 done to compl}'- with my request. If I am not re- 
 kiforced, it is probable that I will be obhged to 
 tight nearly double mj' numbers, strongly intrench- 
 ad. I do not think it will be at all possible for 
 me to bring more than (70,000) seventy thou- 
 sand men upon the field of battle. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 
 On the 14th of May I sent the following tele- 
 gram to the President ;■ 
 
 Camp at Cumberland, May 14, 18C2. 
 
 His Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, President of 
 the U. S. : 
 
 I have more than twice telegraphed to the 
 Secretary of War, stating, that in my opinion 
 the enemy were concentrating all their available 
 force to fight this army in front of Richmond, 
 and that such ought to be their policy. I have 
 received no reply whatever to any of these tele- 
 graphs. 
 
 I beg leave to repeat their substance to your 
 Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration 
 which you Jiave ever accorded to my representar 
 tions and views. All ray information Iruin every 
 
 source accessible to me, establishes the fixed pur- 
 pose of the rebels to defend Richmond agaii^t 
 this army by ofl'ering us battle with all the troops 
 they can collect from cast, west, and south, and 
 my own opinion is confirmed by that of all ray 
 commanders whom I have been able to consult. 
 
 Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have 
 much weakened my force, and will continue ta 
 do BO. I cannot bring into actual battle against 
 the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the' 
 utmost, and with them I must attack in position, 
 ]erobably intrenched, a wuch larger force — ^per- 
 haps double my numbers. It is possible that 
 Richmond may be abandoned without a serious 
 struggle, but the enemy are actually in great 
 strength between here and there, and it wotild b« 
 unwise, atid even insane for me to calculate upon 
 anything but a stifbborn and desperate resistance, 
 if they should abandon Richmond, it maj' well be 
 that it is ioixa with the purpose of making the 
 stand at some place in Virginia south or west of 
 there, and and Ave should be in condition to press 
 them without delay. The confederate leaders 
 must employ their utmost efforts against this 
 army in Virginia, and they will be supported by 
 the whole body of their military officers, among 
 whom there may be- said to be no Union feeling', 
 as there is alse very little among the higher class 
 of citizens in the seceding States. 
 
 I have found no fighting men in this I^eninsula 
 — all are in the ranks of the opposmg foe. 
 
 Even if more troops than I now have should 
 prove inmecessary for purposes of military occu- 
 pation, our greatest display of imposing force in 
 the capital of the rebel government will have the 
 best moral effect. I most respectfully and earn- 
 estly urge upon your Excellency that the oppor- 
 tunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the 
 enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you 
 will cause this army to be reinforced without de- 
 lay by all the disposable troops of the govern- 
 ment. I ask for every man that the government 
 can send me. Any commander of the reinforce- 
 ments, whom your Excellency may designate, 
 Avill be acceptable to me, whatever expression 
 I may have heretofore addressed to you on that 
 subject. 
 
 I will fight the enemy, whatever their force 
 may be, and whatever force I may. have, and I 
 firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our 
 triumph should be made decisive and complete. 
 The soldiers of this army love their government, 
 and will fight well in its support : you may rely 
 upon them. They have confidence in me as their 
 general, and in you as their President. Strong 
 reinforcements will at least save the lives of 
 many of them. The greater our force, the more 
 perfect will be our combinations, and the less 
 our loss. 
 
 For obvious reasons, I beg you to give imme- 
 diate consideration to this communication, and to 
 inform mo fully at the earliest moment of your 
 final determination. 
 
 Geo. B. !M'Clellan, Maj.-Gen. Com. 
 
 To which, on the 18th of May, I received (his 
 reply : 
 
 Ud.-Qu'rs, Depar't Potomac, May 18th. 1362, 
 To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
56 
 
 Comd'g Army uf PoLoiiiac before Richmond. 
 
 General, — Your diypatch to the President, ask- 
 ing reinforcements, ^as been received and care- 
 fully considered. 
 
 The President is not willing to uncover the 
 capital entirely, and it is believed that even if 
 this were prudent it would require more time to 
 effect a junction between your army and that of 
 the Rappahannock, by way of the Potomac and 
 York River, than by a land march. In order 
 therefore to increase the strength of the attack 
 upon Richmond at the earliest moment, Gen. 
 McDowell has been ordered to march upon that 
 city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keep- 
 ing himself always in position to save the capital 
 from all possible attack, so to operate as to put 
 his left wing in coramunication with your right 
 wing, and you are instructed toico-operate so as 
 toes'iblish this commimication as soon -as pos- 
 dlhi^ i 'y extending your right wing to the north 
 cf il ■'imond. 
 
 ; : iS believed that this communication can be 
 saitiy established either north or south of the 
 Pamunkey River. 
 
 In any event you will be able to prevent the 
 enemy's forces from leaving Richmond, and fall- 
 ing in overwhelming force upon Gen. McDowell. 
 He will move with between thirty-five and forty 
 thousand men. 
 
 A copy of the instructions to Gen. ifcDowell 
 is with this. The specific task assigned to his 
 command, has been to provide against any dan- 
 ger to the capital of the nation. 
 
 At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is 
 sent forward to co-operate in the r«duction of 
 Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not 
 to uncover the city of Washington, and you will 
 give no order, either before or after your junc- 
 tion, which can put him out of position to cover 
 this city. You and he will communicate with 
 each other by telegraph or otherwise, as fre- 
 quently as may be necessary for sufficient co-ope- 
 ration. When Gen. M'Dowell is in position on 
 your right, his supplies must be drawn from 
 West Point, and you will instruct your staff-offi- 
 cers to be prepared to supply him by that route. 
 
 The President desires that Gen. McDowell re- 
 tain the command of the Department of tlie Rap- 
 pahannock, and of the forces with M'hich he 
 irtoves forward. 
 
 By order of the President, 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 
 
 From Washington, May 18, 2 p.m. 
 
 It will be observed, this order rendered it im- 
 possible for me to use the James River as a line 
 of operations, and forced me to establish our 
 depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Rich- 
 mond from the north. 
 
 I had advised, and preferred, that reinforbc- 
 ments should be sent by water, for the reasons 
 that their arrival would be more safe and certain, 
 and that I would be loft free to rest the army on 
 the James River, whenever the navigation of 
 that stream should be opened. Tiie land move- 
 ment obliged me to expose my right in order to 
 secure the junction, and as the order for Gei!. 
 McDowell's march was soon countermanded, 1 
 incurred great risk, of wliich tlie enemy finally 
 
 took advantage, and frustrated the plan of the 
 campaign. Had Gen. McDowell joined me by 
 water, I could have approached Richmond by 
 the James, and thus avoided the delays and 
 losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, 
 and would have had tlie army massed in on© 
 body instead of being necessarily divided hj 
 that struam. 
 
 The following is a copy of the instructions to 
 Gen. McDowell. 
 
 War Dep't., Wash'n., D.C., May 17, 1862. 
 To Gen. McDowell, 
 
 Gom'g. Dep't. of Rappahannock, — 
 
 General : — Upon being joined by General 
 Shield's division, you will move .upon Richmond 
 by the general route of the Richmond and Fred- 
 ericksburg R-ai!i-oad, co-operating with the forces 
 under Gen. McClellan, now threatening Rich- 
 mond from the line of the Pamunkey and York 
 Rivers. 
 
 While seeking to establish, as soon as possible, 
 a communication between your left wing, and 
 the right wing of Gen. McClellan, you will hold 
 yourself always in such a position, as to cover 
 the capital of the nation against a sudden dash 
 of the rebel forces. 
 
 Gen. McClellan will be furnished with a copy 
 of these instructions, and will be directed to hold 
 himself in readiness, to establish communication 
 with your left wing, and to prevent the main 
 body of the enemy's armj'- from leaving Rich- 
 mond, and throwing itself upon yorn- column, 
 before the junction of the two armies is effected. 
 
 A copy of his instructions in regard to th«' 
 employment of your force is annexed. 
 
 By order of the President, 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, 
 
 Having some doubts from the wordnig of the 
 foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority 
 over the troops of Gen. McDowell, and as to the 
 time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 
 21st of May I sent this despatch : ^ 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp 
 near Tunstall's Station, Ya. May 21, 1862, 11 p.m. 
 Ilis Excellency Abraham Lirfcoln, 
 
 President of the United States, — 
 
 Your dispatch of yesterday respecting our 
 situation and the batteries at Fort Darling, was 
 received while I was absent with advance, where 
 I have been all this day. I have communicated 
 personally with Capt. Guldsborough, and by let- 
 ter with Capt. Smith. The vessels can do no- 
 ithing witliout co-operation on land, which I will 
 not be in a condition to afford, for several days ; 
 circumstances must determine the propriety of a 
 Sand attack. 
 
 It rained again last night, and rain on this soli 
 
 ■;oon makes the roads incredibly bad for army 
 
 : nansportation. I personally crossed the Chicka- 
 
 lominy to-day, at Bottom's Bridge Ford, and 
 
 ' w ent a mile beyond, "the enemy being about .lalf 
 
 a mile in front. I have three regiments on the 
 
 other bank, guarding the rebuilding of the 
 
 bridge. Keyes's corps is on tlie New Kent Road, 
 
 near Bottom's Bridge. Ilcintzelman is on the 
 
 same road, within supporting distance. Sumner 
 
 is on the railroad, connecting right with left. 
 
 St:oneraan, with advanced guard, is witliin ou9 
 
inilo of New Inulge. Franklin, with two divi- 
 sions, is abuiit two miles this sido of Stoncnum. 
 Porter's division, with tho reserves of iiif;uitr\' 
 and artillery, is within supporting distance. 
 Hea'iquart^rs will probably be at Coal Head to- 
 morrow, one niilo this side of Franklin. All the 
 bridijps over the Chickahominy are destroyed. 
 The enemy are in force on every road leading to 
 Richmond, within a mile or two west of the 
 stream. Their main body is on the road from 
 New Bridge, encamped along it for four or five 
 miles, spreading over the open ground on both 
 sides. Johnston's head-quarter,s are about two 
 miles beyond the bridge. 
 
 All accounts report their numbers as greatly 
 exceeding our own. The position of the rebel 
 forces, the declaration of the rebel authorities, 
 the resolutions of the Virginia legislatiu-e, the 
 action of the city government, the conduct of the 
 citizens, and all other sources of intormation ac- 
 cessible to me, give positive assurance that our 
 approach to Richmond involves a desperate 
 battle between the opposing armies. 
 
 All our divisions are moving towards the foe. 
 I shall advance steadily and carefully, and attack 
 them according to my best judgment, and in such 
 manner as to employ my greatest torce. 
 
 I regret the state ot things as to Gen. McDow- 
 ell's command. One division added to this army 
 for that eifort would do more to protect; Wash- 
 ington than his whole force can possibly do any- 
 where else in the field. Tlie rebels are concen- 
 trating from all points for the two battles at 
 Richmond and Corinth. I would still most res- 
 pectfully suggest Jhe policy of your concentrat- 
 ing here by movements on water. I have heard 
 nothing as to the probabilities of the contem- 
 plated junction of McDowell's torce with mine. 
 1 have no idea when he can start, what are his 
 means of transportation, or when he may be ex- 
 pected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is 
 little hope that he can join me overland, in time 
 for the coming battle ; delays, on my part, will 
 be dangerous. 1 fear sickness and demoraliza- 
 tion. This region is unhealthy for northern men, 
 and unless kept moving I tear tiiat our soldiers 
 may become discouraged. j^At present our num- 
 bers are' weakening from disease, but our men 
 remain in good heart. 
 
 I regret, also, the configuration of the Depart- 
 ment ot the Rappahannock. It includes a por- 
 tion even of the city of Richmond. I think that 
 my own department should embrace the entire 
 field of military operations designed for the cajj- 
 ture and occupation of that city. 
 
 Again I agree with your Excellency, that one 
 good general is better than two bad ones. 
 
 I am not sure that I fully comprehend your 
 orders of the 17th inst., addressed to myself and 
 Gen. McDowell. If a junction is eifected before 
 we occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east 
 of the railroad to Fredericksburg, and witliiu m}'' 
 department. This fact, my superior rank, and 
 the express language of the 62d article of war, 
 will place his command under my orders, unless 
 it is otherwise specially directed by your Excel- 
 lency, and I consider that he will be under my 
 command, except that I am not to detach any 
 
 portion of |his' forces, or give .my orders which 
 can put him out of position to cover Washing 
 ton. If I err ui my construction I desiro to bo 
 at? once set right. Frankness compels mo to say 
 — anxious as I am for an increase of force — that 
 the march of McDowell's force upon liichmond, 
 by the shortest route, will, in my opinion, uncover 
 Washington, as to any interposition by it, as com- 
 pletely as its movement hy water. The enemy 
 cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Wash- 
 ington. 
 
 Should they attempt a movement, which to me 
 seems utterly improbable, their route would be 
 ,hy Gordonsvillo and Manassas. I desire that 
 the extent of my authority over McDowell may 
 jjQ clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and 
 conflicting views may produce some of those in- 
 jurious results which a divided command has so 
 often caused. I would respectfully suggest that 
 this danger can only be surely guarded against 
 by explicitly placing Gen. McDowell under my 
 orders in the ordinary way, and holding me 
 strictly responsible for the closest observance of 
 your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, that it 
 is not necessary for me to assure you that your 
 instructions woiUd be observed in the utmost 
 good faith, and 'that I have no personal feelings 
 which could influence me to disregard them in 
 any particular. 
 
 I believe that there is a great struggle before 
 this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discou- 
 raged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as 
 I can, but in any event 1 shall fight it with all the 
 skill, caution and determination that I possess, 
 and I trust that the result may either obtain for 
 me the permanent confidence of my government, 
 or that it may close my career. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Gomd'g. 
 
 On the 24th I received the following reply : 
 May 24, 1862. From Washington. 24th. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,— I left Gen. Mc- 
 Dowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' 
 command is there, but is so worn that he cannot 
 move before Monday moiming, the 2Ctli. We 
 have so thinned our line to get troops for other 
 places, that it was broken yesterday at Front 
 Roj'al, with a probable loss to us of one regiment 
 infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General 
 Banks m^ome peril. 
 
 The enemy's forces under Gen. Anderson, now 
 opposing Gen. McDowell's advance, have as 
 their line of supply and retreat the road to 
 Richmond. 
 
 If, in conjunction with McDowell's movements 
 against Anderson, you could send a iurco trom 
 your right to cut ofi" the enemy's supplies from 
 Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across 
 the two forks of the Pomunkey, and hitercepl 
 t]^ enemy's retreat, you will i)revent the army 
 now opposed to you from receiving an accession 
 of numbers of ncuriy 1.5,000 men, and if you suc- 
 ceed i%savhig the bridges, you will secure a 
 line of roalroad for supplies in addition to the 
 one you now have. Can you not do this almost 
 as well as not, while you are building the Chick- 
 ahominy bridges ? McDowell and Shields both 
 say they can, and positively will, move Monday 
 morning. I wish you to march cautiously and 
 safely. 
 
58 
 
 You will have command of McDowell after 
 he ioins yon, precisely as your indicated in your 
 long dispatch, to us of the 21st. 
 
 A. Lincoln, President. 
 This information that McDowell's corps would 
 march for Fredericksburg on the following Mon- 
 day (the 2Gth), and that he would be under my 
 command, as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, 
 was cheering news, and I now felt confident that 
 ho would, on his arrival, be sufaciontly strong to 
 overpower the large army confronting xx^. 
 
 At an hour later on the same day I received the 
 following : 
 
 May 24. 1862. From Washington, 4 p.m., '62. 
 Maj.-Geu. G. B. McClellan,— 
 
 In consequence of Gen. Banks' critical posi- 
 tion, 1 have been compelled to suspend Gen. 
 McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy 
 are -making a desperate push upon Harper's 
 Ferry, and we are trying to throw Gen. Fre- 
 mont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in 
 their rear. A. Lincoln, President. 
 
 From which' it w/,11 be seen that I could not 
 expect Gen. McDowell to join me in time to 
 participate in immediate operations in front of 
 Eichraond, and on the same evening I replied to 
 the President thati would make my calculations 
 accordingly. 
 
 It then only remained for me to make the best 
 use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail 
 myself, of all artificial auxiliaries, to compensate 
 'as much as possible for the inadequacy of men. 
 I concurred fully w^ith the President in the in- 
 junction contained in his telegram of the 24th, 
 tliat it was necessary with my limited force to 
 move " cautiously and safely." In view of the 
 peculiar character of the Chickahominy and the 
 liability of the bottom-lands to sudden inunda- 
 tion, it became necessary to construct between 
 Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville eleven new 
 Dridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log- 
 way approaches. 
 
 The entire^ army could probably have been 
 thrown across the Chickahominy immediately 
 after our arrival, but this w^ould have left no 
 force on the left bank to guard our communica- 
 tions, or to protect our right and rear. If the 
 communication with our supply depot had been 
 cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated 
 on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the 
 stage of water as it \Yas for many days after our 
 arrival, the bridges i iirried away, and our means 
 of transportation n >t furnishing a single day's 
 supplies in advance, the troops must have gone 
 without rations, and the animals without forage ; 
 the army would have been paralyzed. 
 
 It is true, I might have abandoned ray commu- 
 nications and pushed forward to Richnioi)4, 
 trusting to the spetMly defeat of the enemy and 
 the consequent fall "f the city, for a renewal of 
 supplies ;■ but the ai'proaches were forti%d, and 
 the town itself w;is surrounded with a strong 
 line of intrcnchmcius requiring a greater length 
 of time to reduce than our troops could have 
 dispensed with rations. 
 
 Under these circumstances, I decided to retain 
 u portion of the army on the left bank of the 
 river until our bridges were completed. 
 
 It will be remembered that the order for the 
 co-operation of Gen. McDowell was simply sus- 
 pended, not revoked, and therefore I was- not at 
 liberty to abandon the northern approach. 
 
 A very dashing and successful reconnoissance 
 was made near New Bridge on the 24th of May, 
 by Lieut. Bowen, Topographical Engineers es- 
 corted by the 4th Michigan Volunteers and a 
 squadron of the 2d U. S. Cavalry, commanded 
 respectively by Col, Woodbury and Capt. Gor- 
 don. 
 
 Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, 
 and, with little loss, drove it back upon its 
 brigade, killing a large number and capturing 
 several prisoners. Great credit is due to the 
 staff officers, as well as to Col. Woodirury, Capt. 
 Gordon, and their commands, for then- conduct 
 on this occasion. 
 
 The work upon the bridges was commenced at 
 once, and pushed forward with great vigor ; but 
 the rains which from day today continued to 
 fall, flooded the valley, and raised the water to a 
 greater height than had been known for twentj 
 years. This demolished a great amount of oui 
 labor ; and our first bridges with their approaches, 
 which were not made with reference io such, 
 extreme high water, were carried off or rendered 
 impassable. We were obliged, with immense 
 labor, to construct others much longer, mo^e 
 elevated, and stable. Our men worked in the 
 water, exposed to the enemy's fire from the op- 
 posite bank. 
 
 On the 25th May I received the following tele- 
 gram. 
 
 Washington, May 23, 18G2. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 Your dispatch received. General Banks was 
 at' Strasburg with about 0,000 men — Shields 
 having been taken from him to swell a columa 
 for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and tlie 
 rest of his force scattered at various places. On 
 the 23d a rebel force of seven to ten thousand 
 fell upon one regiment and two companies guard- 
 ing the bridges at Front Royal, destroying it 
 entirely — crossed the Shenandoah, and on the 
 24th, yesterday, pushed on to get north of Banks 
 to Winchester. Gen. Banks ran a race with 
 them, beating them into Winchester yesterday 
 evening. This morning a battle ensued between 
 the two forces, in which Gen. Banks was beaten 
 back in full retreat towards Martinsburg, and 
 probably is broken -up into a total rout. Geary 
 on the ]\Ianassas Gap railroad, just now reports 
 that Jackson is now near Front Royal with 10,000 
 following up and supporting, as I understand, 
 the fyrce now pursuing Banks. Also that an- 
 other force of 10,000 is near Orleans, following 
 on in the same direction. Stripped bare as we 
 are here, I will do all that we can do to prevent 
 theni crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or 
 above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his forces 
 moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, and 
 Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Har- 
 risonburg, both these movements intended to get 
 in the enemy's rear. 
 
 One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered 
 through here to Harper's Ferry ; the rest of his 
 forces remain for the jircsent at Fredericksbnig- 
 
We are sending such regiments and dribs from 
 here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's 
 Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by 
 calling in militia from adjacent States. We have 
 also eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's 
 Ferry, of which arm there is not a single one at 
 that point. 
 
 This is now our situation. If McDowell's force 
 was now beyond our reach we should be cj^ircly 
 helpless. Apprehensions of something lil#this, 
 and no unwillingness to sustain you has always 
 been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces 
 from you. 
 
 Please understand this, and do the best you 
 can with the forces you have. 
 
 A. Lincoln, President. 
 On the 25th, the following was also received : 
 Washington, May 25, 1862, 2 P. M. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan : 
 
 The enemy is moving north in sufficient force 
 ho drive Gen. Banks before him ; precisely iu 
 what force we cannot tell. He is also threaten- 
 ing Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas Gap 
 Railroad from both north and south — in precisely 
 what force we cannot tell. I think the movement 
 is a general and a concerted one, such as could 
 not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a 
 very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the 
 time is near Avhen you must either attack Rich- 
 mond or give up the job, and come back to the 
 defense of Washington. Let me hear from you 
 instantly. A. Lincoln, President. 
 
 To which I replied as-follows : 
 
 Coal H:arbor, May 25, 1862. 
 Telegram received. Lidependently of it, the 
 time is very near when I shall attack Richmond. 
 The object, of the movement^is probably to pre- 
 vent reinforcements being sent to me. All the 
 information obtained from balloons, deserters, 
 prisoners, and contrabancte, agrees in the state- 
 ment that the mass of the rebel troops are still 
 ni the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to 
 defend it. 
 
 I have no knowledge of Banks' position and 
 force, nor what there is at Manassas, therefore 
 cannot form a definite opinion as to the force 
 igainst him. 
 
 I have two corps across Chickahominy, within 
 BIX miles of Richmond, the others on this side at 
 otj^er crossings, within same distance, and ready 
 to cross when bridges are completed. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, ilaj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President. 
 On the 26th, I received the following : 
 
 Wasbmgton, May 26, 1862, 12.40 A. M. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan : 
 
 We have Gen. Banks' official report. Ht; lias 
 saved his army and baggage, and has made ;;^afc 
 retreat to the river, and is probably safe at T^^il- 
 liamsport. He reports the attacking force at fif- 
 teen tnousand. A. Lincoln, President. 
 On the 26th, I received the following : 
 
 Washington, May 26, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan : 
 
 Can you not cut the Acquia Creek Railroad, 
 also what impression have you as^to intrenched 
 works for you to contend with in front of Rich- 
 mond. Can you get near enough tcf throw shells 
 into the city ? A. Lincoln, President. 
 
 59 
 
 operation 
 Hope to 
 to-night. 
 
 On the same day I sent the following : 
 
 Coal Harbor, May 26, 18C2. 
 ^Uave cut the Virginia Central road in three 
 places between Hanover C. H. and the Chicka- 
 hominy. Will try to cut the other. I do not 
 think Richmond intrcnchments formidable, but 
 am not certain. Hope very soon to be within 
 shelling distance. Have railroad in 
 from White House to Chickahominy. 
 have Chickahominy bridge repaired 
 Nothing of interest to-day. 
 
 Geo. B. McCleli.an, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 His Excellency A. Lincoln, President. 
 The interruption of the railroad here referred 
 to Avas effected by the command of Brig.-Gen. 
 Stoneman, and was intended to prevent the ene- 
 my from (h-awing supplies by that route, or from 
 sendiug reinforcements to Anderson or Jackson. 
 At 10 A. ^I. I also sent the following dispatch : 
 '• Telegrams of last night received. I am glad 
 to know aliairs are not so bad as might have 
 been. I avouUI earnestly call your attention to 
 nty instructions to Gen. Banks, of March 16th, to 
 Gen. Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter 
 of April 1st to the adjutant-general. I cannot 
 but think that a prompt return to the principles 
 there laid down would relieve all probability of 
 danger. I will forward copies by mail. I beg 
 to urge the importance of Manassas and Front 
 Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg. 
 Geo. B. ]\IcClellan, Maj.-Gcn. 
 His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President. 
 Late on the 20Ui I sent the following : 
 
 Camp near New Bridge, 
 May 26, 1862, 7.30 P. M. 
 Have arranged to carry out yourjlast orders. 
 We arre quietly closing in upon the enemy pre- 
 paratory to the last struggle. Situated as I am I 
 feel forced to take every possible precaution 
 against disaster, and to secure my flanks against 
 the probably superior force in front of me. My 
 arrangements for to-morrow are very important, 
 and if successful, will leave me free to sti'ike on 
 the return of the force detached. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen 
 His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President. 
 BATTLE OF HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 
 On the same day I received intelligence that a 
 very considerable force of the enemy was in the 
 vicinity of Hanover Court House, to the right and 
 rear of our army, thus threatening owr communi- 
 cations, and in a position either to reinforce Jack- 
 son, or to impede McDowell's junction, should he 
 finally move to unite with us. 
 
 On the same day I also received information 
 from Gen. McDowell, through the Secretary of 
 War, that the enemy had fallen back from Frede- 
 ricksburg towards Richmond, and that Gen. Mc- 
 Dowell's advance was eight miles south of the 
 Rappahannock. It was thus imperative to dis- 
 lodge or defeat this force, independentlj- even of 
 the wishes of the President, as expressed in his 
 telegram of the 26th. I Entrusted this task to' 
 Brig.-Gen. Fitz Jcrfni Porter, commanding the 5th 
 corps, with orders to move at daybreak on tlie 
 27th. 
 
 Through a heavy lain and c)\'er bad roads, that 
 officer moved liis conmiand as follows : 
 
 Brig.-Gen. W. H. Emory led the advance with 
 
th« 5rti and 6tli regiments D. S. cavalry and Cen 
 son's horse battery of the 2d U. S. artillery tak- 
 ing the road from New Bridge via MeehanicsviUe 
 to Hanover Court Ilouae. 
 
 Gen. ilorell's division, composed of the brig- 
 ades of Martindale, Butterfield, and McQuade, 
 witk Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters, and 
 three batteries under Capt. Charles Griffin, 5th U. 
 S. Artillery, followed on the same road. 
 
 Col. G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional 
 brigade composed of the 5th and 13th New York, 
 the Ist Connecticut Artillery acting as infantry ; 
 the 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry and Weeden's 
 Rhode Island battery moved from his station at 
 Old Church, by a road running to Hanover Court 
 House, parallel to the Pamunkey. After a fa- 
 tiguing march of fourteen miles through the mud 
 and raiii. Gen. Emory at noon reached a point 
 about two miles from Hanover Court House 
 where the road forks to Ashland, and found a 
 portion of the enemy formed in line across the 
 Hanover Court House road. 
 
 Gen. Emory had before this been joined by the 
 25th New York (of Martindale's brigade) and 
 Berdan's sharpshooters ; these regiments were 
 deployed with a section of Benson's battery, and 
 advanced slowly towards the enemy until rein- 
 forced by Gen. Butterfield with four regiments of 
 kis brigade, when the enemy was charged and 
 quickly routed, one of his guns being captured 
 by the 17th New York under Col. Lansing, after 
 haying been disabled by the fire of Benson's bat- 
 tery. The firing here lasted about an hour. The 
 cavalry and Benson's battery were immediately 
 ordered in pursuit, followed bj Morell's infantry, 
 and artillery, Avith the exception of Martindale's 
 brigade. Warren's brigade having been delayed 
 by repairing bridges &c. now arrived too late to 
 participate in this affair ; a portion of this com- 
 mand was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy ^bridges 
 and captured quite a number of prisoners ; the 
 remainder followed Morell's division. In the 
 meantime. Gen. Martindale, with the few remain- 
 ing regiments of his brigade, and a section of ar- 
 tillery advanced on the Ashland road, and found 
 a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry, and ar- 
 tillery in position near Peake's Station on the 
 Virginia Central Railroad : he soon forced them 
 to retire towards Ashland. 
 
 The 25th New York having been ordered to 
 rejoin him. Gen. Martindale was directed to form 
 his brigade and move up the railroad to rejoin 
 the rest of the command at Hanover Court 
 House. 
 
 He sent one regiment up tho railroad, but re- 
 mained with the 2d Maine, afterwards joined by 
 the 25th New York, to guard the rear of the main 
 column. 
 
 The enemy soon returned to attack Gen. Mar- 
 tindale, who at once formed the 2d Maine, 25th 
 New York and a portion of of the 44th New Jer- 
 sey, with one section of Martin's battery, on the 
 New Baidge Road, facing his own position of 
 the morning, and then hold his ground for an hour 
 against largo otldsimtil reinforced. 
 
 General Porter was at Hanover Court House, 
 near the head of his column, when he learned 
 
 bO 
 
 that the rear had been attacked by a largo force, 
 He at once faced the whole column about, re- 
 called the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ash- 
 land, moved the 13th ond 14th New York and 
 Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's assistance, 
 pushed the 9th Massachusetts, and 52d Pennsyl- 
 vania of McQuade'e brigade through the woods 
 on the right (our original left) aud attacked the 
 flank Q^ the enemy, while Butterfield with the 
 83d P^nsylvania, and 16th Michigan, hastened 
 towards thp scene of action by the railroad and 
 through the woods further to the right, and com- 
 pleted the rout of the enemy. During the re- 
 mainder of this and the following day our cavalry 
 was active in the pursuit, taking a number of 
 prisoners. Captain Harrison of the U. S. Ca- 
 valry with a single company, brought in as pris- 
 oners two entire companies of iufantry, with 
 their arms and ammunition A part of Rush's 
 Lancers also captured an entire company with 
 thier arms. 
 
 The immediate results of these affairs were 
 some two hnodred of the enemy's dead, buried 
 by our troops, seven hundred and thirty prison- 
 ers sent to the rear, one 12-pounder howitzer, 
 one caisson, a large number of small arms, and 
 two railroad trains captured. 
 
 Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded 
 and missing. 
 
 The force encountered and defeated was Gen. 
 Branch's division of North Caroliua and Georgia 
 troops, supposed to have been some 9,000 strong. 
 Their camp at Hanover Court House was taken 
 and destroyed. 
 
 Having reason to believe that Gen. Anderson 
 with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I or- 
 dered Gen. Syke's division of regulars to move 
 on the 28th, from New Bridge to Hanover Court 
 House, and remained there until the evening of 
 the 20th, when they reierned to their original 
 camp. 
 
 On the 28th, Gen. Stoneman's command of 
 cavalry, horse artillery, and two regiments of in- 
 fantry, were also placed under General Porter's 
 orders. 
 
 On the same day I visited Hanover Court House 
 whence I sent the following dispatch. 
 
 Hanover Court House, May 28. 2 p. u. 
 Porter's action oi yesterday was truly a glori- 
 ous victor}' — too much credit cannot be given to 
 his magnificent division and its accomplished 
 leader. The rout of the rebels was complete, not 
 a defeat but a complete rout. Prisoners are con- 
 stantly coming in, two companies have this mo- 
 ment arrived, with excellent arms. 
 
 There is no doubt that the enemy are concen- 
 trating everything on Richmond. I will do my 
 begt to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether 
 I calf. 
 
 It is the policy and duty of the government 
 to send mc by water all the well drilled troop» 
 available. I am confident that Washington is in 
 no danger. Engines and cars in large numbers 
 have been sent up to bring down Jaokson's com- 
 mand. 
 
 I may not be able to cut thera off, but will try ; 
 we havo cut all but tho F. &, II R. R. The raal 
 
issues, is in the cattle about to be fought in tiont 
 of Richmond. All our available troops should be 
 collected here, not raw regiments, but well drill- 
 ed troops. It cannot be ignored that a desper- 
 ate battle is before us ; if any regiment of good 
 troops remain unemployed it will be an irrepara- 
 ble fault committed. 
 
 G. B. McClei.lan, Major-General. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War. 
 
 Having ascertained the state of affairs, instruc- 
 tions wei"e given for the operations of the fol- 
 lowing day. 
 
 On the 28th a party under Major Williams, Cth 
 U. S. Cavalry, destroyed the common road bridges 
 over the Famvmkey and the Virginia Central 
 Railroad bridge over the South Anna. 
 
 On the 29th, he destroyed the Frederiksburg 
 and Richmond bridge over the South Anna, and 
 the Turnpike bridge over the same stream. 
 
 On the same day, and mainly to cover the 
 movement of Maj. Williams, Gen. Emory moved 
 a column of cavalry toward Ashland, from Ilan- 
 over Court House, the advance of this column, 
 under Oapt. Chambiiss, 5th U. S. Cavalry, entered 
 Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, 
 destroyed the railroad bridge over Stoney Creek, 
 and broke up the railroad bridge and telegraph. 
 
 Another column, of all arms, under Col. War- 
 ren, was sent on the same day, in the direct road 
 to Ashland, and entered it shortly after General 
 Emory's column had retired, capturing a small 
 party there. 
 
 Gen. Stonemari, on the same day, moved to 
 Ashland by Leach's- Station, covei'ing well the 
 movements of the other column. 
 
 The objects of the expedition having been ac- 
 complished, and it being certain that the 1st 
 corps would not join us at once, General Porter 
 withdrew his command to their camps with the 
 main army, on the evening of the 29th. 
 
 On the' night of the 27th and 28th, I sent the 
 following dispatch to the Secretary of War. 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 Camp near New Bridge, May 28, 1862. 12.30 a.m. 
 
 Porter has gained two complete victories over 
 superior forces, yet I feel obliged to move there 
 in the morning with reinforcements, to secure the 
 complete destruction of the rebels in that quar- 
 ter. In doing so, I run some risk here, but I 
 cannot help it. The enemy are even in greater 
 force than I had supposed. 1 will do all that 
 quick movements can accomplish, but you must 
 send me all the troops you can, and leave to me 
 full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is 
 absolutely necessary to destroy the rebels near 
 Hanover Court House before I can avvance. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War. 
 
 In reply to which, I received the following 
 from" the President : 
 
 Washington, May 28, 1862. 
 Major-General McClellan, — 
 
 i am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter's victory ; 
 Btill, if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am 
 puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fred- 
 ericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you 
 say you have all the railroads but the Richmond 
 an#Fredericksburg. 1 am puzzled to see how, 
 
 lacking that, yoo can have any, except toe scrap 
 from Riclimond to West Point ; the scrap of the 
 Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanover 
 without more, is simply nothing. That the whole 
 of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I 
 think cannot be certainly known to you or me. 
 Saxton, at Harper's Perry, informs us that a large 
 force, supposed to be Jackson's and McEwell's, 
 forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. 
 Gen. King telegraphed us from Fredericksburg, 
 that contrabands give certain information, that 
 fifteen thousand left Hanover Junction Monday 
 morning to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully 
 impressed with the importance of the struggle be- 
 fore you, and shall aid j'ou all I can consistently 
 with my view of due regard to all points. 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 At 6 P.M. of the 29th, I sent the Secretary of 
 War the following dispatch. 
 
 Headquarters. Army of the Potomac, ^ 
 May 29, 1862, C p.m. 
 
 Gen. Porter has gained information, that Gen. 
 Anderson left his position in the vicinity of 
 Fredericksburg, at 4 a.m., Sunday, with the fol- 
 lowing troops : — 1st S. C., Col. Hamilton, 1 bat- 
 talion S. C. Rifles, 3-4th and 38th N. C, 45th 
 Georgia, 12th, 13th and 14th S. C, 3d Louisiana, 
 2 batteries of 4 guns each, namely, Letcher's Va., 
 and Mcintosh's S. C. batteries. General Ander- 
 son and his command, passed Ashland yesterday 
 evening, en route for Richmond, leaving men be- 
 hind to destroy bridges over the telegraph road, 
 which they traveled. This information is relia- 
 ble. It is also positively certain, that Branch's 
 command was from Gordousville, bound for 
 Richmond, whither they have now gone. 
 
 It may be regarded as positive, I think, that 
 there is no rebel force between Fredericksburg 
 and Junction. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, Major-Gen. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 
 
 The following was also sent on the same day : 
 Headquarters. Army of the Potomac, 
 May 29, 1862. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, 
 
 A detachment from Gen. F. J. Porter's com- 
 mand, under Major Williams, 6th Cavalry, des- 
 troyed the South Anna railroad bridge, at about 
 9 A.M. to-day. A large quantity of confederate 
 public property was also destroyed at Ashland 
 this morning. R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staff. 
 
 In reply to which the following was received : 
 Washington, May 29, 1862. 
 Gen. R. B. Marcy : 
 
 Your dispatch, as to South Anna and Ashland 
 being seized by our forces this morning, is re- 
 ceived. Understanding these points to be on 
 the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I 
 heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen, 
 McClellan and his army for the seizure. 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 On the. 30th I sent the following : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 May 30, 1862. 
 
 From tone of your dispatches and President's, 
 I do not think that you at all appreciate the value 
 and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely 
 relieved ray right "flank, which was seriously 
 
62 
 
 threatt'iied, routed and demoralized a consider- 
 able portion of the rebel forces, taken over seven 
 hundred and fifty prisoners, killed and wonnded 
 large numbers ; one gun, many small arms, and 
 much baggage taken. It was one of the hand- 
 somest things in the war, both in itself and its 
 results. Porter has returned, and my army is 
 again well in hand. Another day will make the 
 probable field of battle passable for artillery. It 
 is quite certain that there is nothing in front of 
 McDowell— (Fredericksburg). I regard the burn- 
 ing of South Anna bridges as the least important 
 result of Porter's movements. 
 
 Q. B. McClellan-, Major-Gen. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of ^Var. 
 
 The results of the brilliant operation of Gen. 
 Porter were the dispersal of Gen. Branch's divi- 
 Bion, and the clearing of our right flank and rear. 
 It was rendered impossible for the enemy to 
 communicate by rail with Fredericksburg, or 
 •with Jackson via Gordonsville, except by| the 
 very circuitous route of Lynchburg, and the road 
 "was left entirely open for the advance of McDow- 
 ell, had he been permitted to join the array of 
 xhe Potomac. 
 
 His withdrawal towards Front Royal was, in 
 'my judgment, a serious and fatal error ; he could 
 ■do no good in that direction ; while, had he been 
 permitted to carry out the orders of May 11, the 
 united forces would have driven the enemy with- 
 in the immediate intrenchmentsi^f Richmond be- 
 for'Jackson could have returned to its succor, and 
 probablj' would have gained possession of that 
 place. I respectfully refer to the reports of Gen- 
 eral Porter and his subordinate commanders, for 
 the names of the officers who deserve especial 
 mention for the parts they took in these affairs. 
 But I cannot omit here my testimony to the enerr 
 gy and ability displayed by Gen. Porter on this 
 occasion, since to him is mainly due the suc- 
 cesses there gained. 
 
 OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 
 
 On the 20th of May a recounoissance was or- 
 dered on the south side of the Chickahominy, to- 
 wards James River. This was accomplished by 
 Brig.-Gen. H. M. Naglee, who crossed his brigade 
 near Bottom's Bridge, and pushed forward to 
 Tvithin two miles of James River, without serious 
 resistance, or finding the enemy in force. 
 
 The rest of the 4th Corps, commanded by Gen. 
 E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chickahominy on the 
 23d of May. 
 
 On the 24th, 25th and 26th, a very gallant ro- 
 connoissance was pushed by Gen. Naglee, with 
 his brigade, beyond the Seven Pines, and on the- 
 25th the 4th Corps was ordered to take up and 
 fortify a position in the vicinity of the_ Seven 
 Pines. The order was at once obeyed ; a strong 
 line of rifle-pits opened,- and an abattis construct- 
 ed a little in the rear of the point where the Nine 
 Mile road comes into the AVilliamsburgh road. 
 . On the same day General Heintzejman was 
 ordered to cross with his corps (the 3d), and 
 take a position two miles in advance of Bottom's 
 Bridge, Avatching the crossings of White .Oak 
 Swamp, and covering the left and the rear of ihe 
 left wing of the army. Being the senior officer 
 on that side the river, he was placed in command 
 
 of both corps, and ordered to hold the Seven 
 Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw the 
 troops from the crossings of "White Qak Swamp, 
 unless in an emergency. 
 
 On the 28th Gen. Keyes was ordered to ad- 
 vance Casey's division to " Fair Oaks " on the 
 the Williamsburg road, some three-quarters of a 
 mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving Gen. 
 Couch's division at the line of rifle-pits. A new 
 line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six field 
 guns were commenced, and considerable of the 
 timber in front of the line was felled on the two 
 days following. The picket line was established, 
 reaching from ' the Chickahominy to White Oak 
 Swamp. 
 
 On the 30th Gen. Hcintzelman, representing 
 that the advatice had met with sharp opposition 
 in taking up their position, and that he consider- 
 ed the point a critical one, requested and obtain- 
 ed authorit}' to make such disposition of his 
 troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He 
 immediately advaucad two brigades of Kearney's 
 division about three-fourth^ of a mile in front of 
 Savage's Station, tints placing them within sup- 
 porting distance of Casey's division, which held 
 the advance of the 4th Corps. • 
 
 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 
 
 On the 30 th the troops on the south side of 
 the Chickahominj' were in position as follows ; 
 
 Casey's division on the right of the Williams- 
 burg road, at right angles to it, the centre at 
 Fair Oaks ; Couch's division at Seven Pines ; 
 Kearney's division on the railroad, from near 
 Savage's Station towards the bridge ; Hooker's 
 division on the borders of Wiiite Oak Swamp. 
 Constant skirmishing had been kept up between 
 our pickets and those of the enemy, while these 
 lines were being taken up and strengthened. 
 Large bodies of Confederate troops were seen 
 immediately to the front and right of Casey's po- 
 sition. 
 
 Duricg the day and night of the 30ch of May a 
 very violent storm occurred. The rain, falling in 
 torrents, rendered work on the rifle-pits and 
 bridges impracticable, made the roads almost itu- 
 pa.-sable, and threatened the destruction of the 
 bridges over the Chickahominy. 
 I^The enenjy, perceiving the unfavorable position 
 in which we were placed, and the possibility of 
 destroying that part of our army which was ap- 
 parently cut off from the main body by the rap- 
 idly rising stream, threw an overwhelming force 
 (grand divisions of Gens. D. H. Hill, Huger, Long- 
 street and G. W. Smith) upon the position occu- 
 pied by Casey's division. 
 
 It appears, from the official reports of Gen. 
 Keyes and his subordinate commanders, that, at 
 10 o'clock A. M,, on the 31st of May, an aide-de- 
 camp of Gen. J. E. Johnston was captured by 
 Gen. Naglee's pickets. But little information as 
 to the movements of the enemy was obt;\ined from 
 him, but his presence so near our lines excited 
 suspicion and caused increased vigilance, and the 
 troops were ordered by Gen. Kt^yes to be under 
 arms at 11 o'clock. 
 
 Between 11 and 12 it was reported to Gen. Ca- 
 sey that the enemy were approaciiing in consid- 
 erable force on the Williaiusburg road. AUthis 
 
dine Casey's division was disposed of as follows : 
 Naglee's brigade, extending from the Williams- 
 burg road to the Garuett field, having one regi- 
 ment across the railroad. Gen. Wessels's brig- 
 ade in the rifle-pits, and Geu. Palmer's in the rear 
 of Geu. Wessels ; ouc battery of artillery iu ad- 
 vance, with Gen. Naglee, one battery in rear of 
 rifle-pits, to the riget of the redoubt ; one battery 
 in real- of the redoubt, and another battery un- 
 harnessed in the redoubt. 
 
 Gen. Couch's division, holding the second line, 
 had Gen. Abercrombic's brigade on the right, 
 along the Nine Mile road, with two regiments and 
 one battery across the railroad, near Fair Oaks 
 Station ; Gen. Peck's brigade on the right, and 
 Gen. Devin's in the centre. 
 
 On the approach ot the enemy. Gen. Casey sent 
 forward one of Gen. Palmer's regiments to sup- 
 port the picket Hue ; but this regiment gave way, 
 without making much, if any, resistance. 
 3. Meavy firing at once commenced, and the pick- 
 ets were driven in. Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. 
 Couch to move Gen. Peck's brigade to occupy tlie 
 ground on the left of the Williamsburg road, 
 which had not before been occnpiecl by our 
 forces, and thus to support Gen. Casey's left,, 
 where the first attack was the most severe. 
 The enemy now came on in heavy force, attack- 
 ing Gen. Casey simultaneously in front and on 
 both flanks. 
 
 Geu. Keyes sent to Gen. Heintzelman for rein- 
 forcements, but the messenger was delayed, so 
 that orders were not sent to Gens. Kearney and 
 'Hooker until near 3 o'clock, and it was nearly 5 
 P. M. when Gen. Jamison's and Bairy's brigades, 
 of Gen. Kearney's division, arrived on (he field. 
 Gen. Birney was ordered up the railroad, but, by 
 Gen. Kearney's order, halted his brigade before 
 arriving at the scene of action. Orders were also 
 dispatched for Gen. Hooker to move up from 
 White Oak Swamp, and he arrived after dark at 
 Savage's Station. 
 
 As soon as the firing was heard at headquar- 
 ters, orders were sent to Gen. Sumner to get his 
 command under arma, and bo ready to move at a 
 moment's warning. His corps, consisting of Gens. 
 Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, was en- 
 camped on the north side of the Chickahominy, 
 some six miles above Bottom's Bridge. Each di- 
 vision had thrown a bridge over the stream oppo- 
 site to its own position. 
 
 At 1 o'clock Gen. Sumner moved the two divi- 
 sions to their respective bridges, with instruc- 
 tions to halt and await further orders. 
 
 At 2 o'clock orders were sent from headquar- 
 ters to cross these divisions without delay, and 
 push them rapidly to Gen. Heintzelman's sup- 
 port. This order was received and communicat- 
 ed at half-past two, and the passage was immedi- 
 ately commenced. 
 
 In the meantime Gen. Naglee's brigade, with 
 the batteries of Gen. Casey's division, which Gen. 
 Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to maintain 
 the redoubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelm- 
 ing masses of the enemy. They were reinforced 
 by a regiment from Gen. Peck's brigade. 
 
 The artilleiy under the command of Col. G. D. 
 Bailey, 1st New York Artillery, and afterwards 
 
 63 
 
 under Gen. Naglee, did g^od execution on the ad- 
 vancing columns. Theleltof this position was. 
 however, soon tiu-nod, and a sliarp cross-fire 
 opei^ed upon the gunners and the men in the ri- 
 fle-pits. Col. Bailey, Maj. Van Valkcnburg, and 
 Adj't Ramsey, of the sanie regiment, were killed. 
 Some of the guns in the redoubt were taken, and 
 the whole line was driven back upon the posi- 
 tion occupied by Gen. Couch. The brigades of 
 Gens. Wessels and Palmer, with the reinforce- 
 ments which had been sent them from Gen. 
 Couch, had also been driven from the field with 
 heavy loss, and the whole position occupied by 
 Gen. Casey's division was taken by the enemy. / 
 Previous to this time. Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. 
 Couch to advance two regiments to relieve the 
 pressure upon Gen. Casey's right flank. In mak- 
 ing this movement Gen. Couch discovered large 
 masses of the enemy pushing towards our right 
 and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy col- 
 umn which had been held in reserve, and which 
 was now making its way towards Fair Oaks Sta- 
 tion. Gen. Couch at once engaged this column 
 with these two regiments, but, though reinforced 
 by two additional regiments, he was overpower- 
 ed, and the enemy pushed between him and the 
 main body of his division. With these four resr- 
 iments and one battery Gen. Couch fell back about 
 half a mile towards the Grape-Vine Bridge, where, 
 hearing that Gen. Sumner had crossed, he formed 
 line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station, and pre- 
 pared to hold the position. 
 
 Gens. Berry's and Jamison's brigades had by 
 this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. 
 Gen. Berry was ordered to take possession of the 
 woods on the left, and push forward so as to have 
 a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This movement 
 was executed brilliantly ; Gen. Berry pusning his 
 regiment forward through the woods, until iheu 
 rifles commanded the left of the camp and works 
 occupied by Gen. Casey's division in the morn- 
 ing. Their fire on the pursuing columns of the 
 enemy was very destructive, and assisted materi- 
 ally in checking the pursuit in that part of the 
 field. He held his position in these woods against 
 several attacks of superior numbers, and after 
 dark, being cut off by the enemy fiom the main 
 body, he fell back towards White Oak Swamp, 
 and, by a circuit, brought his men into our lines 
 in good order. 
 
 Gen. Jamison, with two regiments — the other 
 two of his brigade having been detached, one to 
 Gen. Peck and one to Gen. Birney — moved rapid- 
 ly to the front on the left of the Williamsburg 
 road, and succeeded for a time iu keeping the 
 abattis clear of the enemy, but large numbers of 
 the enemy pressing past the right of his line, he 
 too was forced to retreat through the woods 
 towards White Oak Swamp, and in that way 
 gained camp under cover of night. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. Devins, who had held the centre o( 
 Gen. Couch's division, had made repeated and 
 gallant efforts to regain purtiouslof the ground 
 lost in front, hut each time was driven back, and 
 finally withdrew behind the rifle pits' near Seven 
 Pinea. 
 
 Meantime, Gen. Sumner had arrived with tin- 
 advance of his corps, Gen. Sedgwick's division, 
 
at the point held b.v Ql€n. Conch with four regi- 
 ments and one battery. Tlie roads leading from 
 the bridge, were 60 miry, that it was only by the 
 greatest exertion, Gen. Sedgwick had been able to 
 get one of his batteries to the front. 
 
 The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Col. Sul- 
 ly) was immediately deployed to the riglit of 
 Couch to protect the tiank, and the rest of the di- 
 vision formed in line of battle. Kirby's battery 
 near the centre in an angle of the woods. One 
 of Gen. Couch's regiments was sent to open com- 
 municatson with Gen. lleintzelman. No sooner 
 were these dispositions made, than the enemy 
 i;ame in strong force, and opened a heavy fire 
 along the hne. He made several charges, but 
 was repulsed with great loss, by the steady fire 
 of the infantry, and the splendid practice of the 
 battery. AfLer sustaining the enemy's fire for a 
 considerable time. Gen .Sumner ordered five reg- 
 iments (the 3-lth New York, Col. Smith, 82d New 
 York, Lieut.-Col. Hudson, 15th Mass., Lieut.-Col. 
 Kimball, 20th Mass., Col. Lee, 7th Michigan, Maj. 
 Richardson, the three former, of Gen. Gorman's 
 brigade, tlie two latter, of Gen. Dana's brigade) 
 to advance and charge with bayonet. This charge 
 was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our 
 tioops, springing over two fences which were 
 between them and the enemy, rushed upon his 
 lines and drove him in confusion from that part 
 of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for 
 that day. 
 
 During the night, dispositions were made for 
 its early renewal. Gen. Couch's division, and so 
 much of Gen. Casey's as could be collected to- 
 gether, with Gen. Kearney's, occupied the rifle- 
 pits near Seven Pines. Gen. Peck in falling back 
 on the left, liad sncceedid, late in the afternoon, 
 in rallying a considerable number of stragglers, 
 and was taking them once more into the action, 
 when he was ordered back into the intrenched 
 camp by Gen. Kearney. Gen. Hooker brought 
 up his division about dark, having been delayed 
 by the lieaviness of the roads, and the throng of 
 fugitives from the field, through whom, the Colo- 
 nel of the leading regmient (Starr) reports, he 
 " was obliged to force his way with the bayonet." 
 This division bivouacked for the night, in rear 
 of the right of the rifle-pits, on the other side of 
 the railroad. Gen. Richardson's division also 
 came upon the field about' sunset. He had at- 
 tempted the passage of tlie Chickahominy by the 
 bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far 
 destroyed, that he was forced to move Gen. How- 
 ard's and Meagher's brigades, with all his artil- 
 lery, around by Gen. Sedgwick's bridge, while 
 Gen. French's brigade, with the utmost difficult}^ 
 crossed by the other. Gen. Sedgwick's division, 
 with the regiments under Gen. Couch, held about 
 the same position as when the fight ceased ; and 
 Gen. Richardson, on his arrival, was ordered to 
 place bis division on the left, to connect with 
 Gen. Kearney. Gen. French's brigade was posted 
 along ths railroad, and Gens. Howard's and 
 Meagher's brigades, in second and third lines. 
 All his artillcr}' had been left behind, it being im- 
 possible to move it forward through the deep 
 mud, as rapidly as the infantry pushed toward 
 tlie field, but during the rught, the three batteries 
 of the divieion were brought to the front. 
 
 64 
 
 About five o'clock in the morning of the Ist of 
 June, skirmishers, and some cavalry oi the ene- 
 my, were discovered in front of Gen. Richard- 
 son's divieion. Capt. Pettit's battery (B, 1st N. 
 Y.) having come upon the ground, threw a few 
 shells among them, when thej dispersed. There 
 was a wide interval between Gen. Richardson 
 and Gen. Kearney. To close this, Gen. Richard- 
 son's line was extended to the left, and his first 
 line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had they 
 gained this position, when the enemy appearing 
 in large force, from the woods in front, opened a 
 heavy fire of musketry at short range, along the 
 Avhole line. He approached very rapidly with 
 columns of attack, formed on two roads which 
 crossed the railroad. These columns were sup- 
 ported by infantry in line of battle on each side, 
 cutting tien. French's line. He threw out no 
 skirmishers, but appeared determined to carry 
 all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly 
 an hour the first line of Gen. Richardson's divi- 
 sion, stood and ret-arned the fire, the lines of the 
 enemy being reinforced and relieved, time after 
 time, until finally Gen. Howard was ordered, with 
 his brigade, to go to Gen. French's assistance. 
 He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few 
 minutes the fire of the enemy ceased, and his 
 whole line fell back on that part of the field. 
 
 On the opening of the firing in the morning, 
 Gen. Hooker pushed forward on the railroad, 
 with two regiments (5th and 6th New Jersey), 
 followed by Gen. Sickles' brigade. It was found 
 impossible to. move tlie artillery of this division 
 from its position, on account of the mud. On 
 coming near the woods, which were held by the 
 enemy in force. Gen. Hooker found Gen. Birney'g 
 brigade. Col. J. HobartWard in command, in line 
 of battle. He sent back to hasten Gen. Sickles' 
 brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned 
 off to the left by Gen. Heintzelman to meet a col- 
 umn advancing in that direction. He at once 
 made the attack with the two New Jersey regi- 
 ments, calling upon Col. Ward to support him 
 with Gen. Birney's brigade. This was well done, 
 our troops advaiicing into the woods under a 
 heavy fire, and pushing the enemy before them 
 for more than an hour of hard fighting. A charge 
 with the baj'onet was then ordered by Gen. Hook- 
 er, with the 5th and 6th New Jersey, 3d Maine, 
 and SSth and 40th New York, and the enemy fled 
 in confusion, throwing down arms and even cloth- 
 ing in his flight. Gen. Sickles having been or- 
 dered to the right, formed line of battle on both 
 sides of the ^Villiamsburg road, and advanced 
 under a sharp fire from the enemy deployed in 
 the woods in front of him. Aften a brisk inter- 
 change of musketry fire while crossing the open 
 ground, the Excelsior brigade dashed into the 
 timber wiih the bayonet and put the enemy to 
 flight. 
 
 On the right the cnem}'' opened fire after half 
 an hour's cessation, Avhich was promptly respond- 
 ed to by Gen. Richardson's division. Again the 
 most vigorous efibrts were made to break our 
 line, and again tliey were frustrated by the steady 
 courage, of our troops. In about an hour Gen. 
 Richardson's whole line advanced, pouring in 
 their fire at close range, which threw the line of 
 
the enemy back ia some confusion. This was 
 followed up hj a bayonet cliarge, led by Gen. 
 French in person, with the .57th and CG'.h New 
 York, supported by two regiments sent by Gen, 
 Heintzohuan, the 71st and 73d New York, which 
 turned the confusion of the enemy into precipi- 
 tate flight. One gun captured the previous day 
 was retaken. 
 
 Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines 
 held by. them on the 31st, before the attack. On 
 the battle field there were found many of our 
 own and the Confederate wounded, arms, cais- 
 sons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, 
 abandoned by the enemy in his rout. The state 
 of the roads, and the impossibility of his manoeu- 
 vring artillery, prevented further pursuit. 
 
 On the next morning a reconnoissance was 
 sent forward, which pressed back the pickets of 
 the enemy to'w' ithin five miles of Richmond, but 
 ♦ again the impossibility of forcing even a few 
 batteries forward, precluded our holding-perma- 
 neutly this position. The lines held previous to 
 . the battle were therefore resumed. 
 , Gen. J. E. Johnston reports loss of the 
 "♦ enemy in Lousfstreet's and G. W. Smith's. 
 
 divisions at 4,283 
 
 Gen. D. n. Hill, who had taken the ad- 
 vance in the attack, estimates his loss at 2,500 
 
 65 
 
 6,783 
 
 Which would give enemy's loss 
 Our loss in Gen. Sumner's corps 1,223 
 "' Gen.Heintzelman's corps 1,394 
 " Gen. Keyes' corps 3,120 
 
 Total .... 5,737 
 Previous to the arrival of Gen. Sumner upon 
 the field of battle on the 31st of May, Gen. Ileint- 
 zel'man, the senior corps commander present, was 
 in the immediate command of the forces engaged. 
 The first information I received that the battle 
 was in progress, was a dispa'tch from him 
 stating that Casey's division had - given way. 
 During the night of the 31st I received a dis- 
 patch from him dated 8.45 p.m., in which he 
 says : " I am just in — when I got to the front, the 
 most of Gen. Casey's division had dispersed." * 
 * * '•' The rout of , Gen. Casey's men had a 
 most dispiriting effect on the troops as they 
 came np. I saw no reason why wc should have 
 been driven back." * 
 
 ■This official statement, together with other 
 •accounts, received previous to my arrival upon 
 the battle-field, to the effect that Casey's division 
 had given way without making a proper resist- 
 ance, caused me to state in a telegram to the 
 Secretary of War on the let, that this division 
 "gave way unaccountably and discreditably." 
 Subsequent investigations, however, greatly mo- 
 dified the impressions first received, and I accord- 
 ingly advised the Secretary of War of this in a 
 dispatch on the 5th of June. 
 
 The official reports of Generals Keyes, Casey 
 and Neglee, show that a very considerable por- 
 tion of this division fought well, and tliat 
 the brigade of Gen. Naglee is entitled to credit 
 for its gallantry. This division, among the regi- 
 ments of which were eight of comparatively new 
 troops, Wi9 attacked by superior numbers ; yet, 
 
 according to the reports allocked to, it ''stood t' 
 attack for three hours before it was reinforceo. 
 A portion of the division was thrown into great 
 confusion by the first onslaught of the enemy, 
 but the personal efforts of General Naglee, Colo-^ 
 nel Cailey and others, who boldly went to the 
 front and encouraged the rncn by their presence 
 and example at this critical juncture, rallied a 
 great part of the division, and thereby enabled 
 it to act a prominent part in this severely con- 
 tested battle. It therefore afiords me great satis- 
 faction to withdraw the exi^ressiou contained in 
 my first dispatch, and I cordially give my in- 
 dorsement to the conclusion of the division com- 
 mander, " that those parts of his commaKd which 
 behaved discreditably were exceptional cases." 
 
 On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks com- 
 menced, we had two of our lu'idges nearly com- 
 pleted, but the rising waters floated the log-way 
 approaches, and made them almost impassable, so 
 that it was only by the greatest cfibrts that Gen. 
 Sumner crossed his corps and participated; in 
 that hard-fought engagement. The bridges be- 
 came totally useless after this corps had passed, 
 and others on a more permanent plan were com- 
 menced. % 
 
 On my way to head-quarters, after the battle of 
 Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge wlier* 
 Gen. Sumner had taken over his corps on the 
 day previous. At the time Gen. Sumner crossed, 
 this was the only available bridge above Bot- 
 tom's Bridge. I found the approach from 'the 
 right bank for some 400 yards submerged to the 
 depth of several feet, and on reaching the place 
 where the bridge had been, I found a great part 
 of it carried away, so that I could not get my 
 horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bot- 
 tom's Bridge, six miles below, as the only prac- 
 ticable crossing. 
 
 The approaches to New and Mechanicsvill* 
 bridges were also overflowed, and both of them 
 were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries, estab- 
 lished upon commanding heights on the opposite 
 side. These batteries were supported by strong 
 forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits 
 in their front, which would have made it neces- 
 sary, even had the approaches been in the best 
 possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary 
 battle, with but little prospect of success, before 
 a passage could have been secured 
 
 The only available means, therefore, of uniting 
 our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Bich- 
 mond soon after the battle, was to march the 
 troops from Mechanicsville and other points on 
 the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bot- 
 tom's Bridge, and theuce over the Williamsburg 
 road to the position near Fair Oaks, a dis- 
 tance of about twenty-threo miles. In the con- 
 dition of the roads -at that time, this march ^ 
 could not have been made with artillery in less 
 than two days, by which time the enemy would 
 have been secure within his entrenchments 
 around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting 
 the two wings of the army in time to make a vig- 
 orous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of 
 overtaking him before he reached Richmond, 
 only five miles distant from the field of battle, is : 
 simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for s ■ 
 
moment seriously ciitortainecl by pny one con- 
 nected with t!ie army of tiif> Potoraiic. An ad- 
 vance involvjp.u- tri'-.poparalion of tlic two wings 
 by tiic' iinjiassabl.i Cliickahoinii'.y would have ox- 
 posed eacii ti< dcRnt in detail, ^'i'herel'ore 1 held 
 the position uh-f^ady gained, and completed our 
 crossings as rapiilly as possible. 
 
 In the nieai^tiTno the troops at Fair Oaks were 
 directed to strBUgthen their positions by a strong 
 line of intreiicliments, whicii protected them 
 while the bridges were being built, gave security 
 to the trains, liberated a large fighting force, and 
 offered a sale retreat in the event of disaster. 
 
 On the second of June 1 sent the following dis- 
 patch : — 
 
 • ^ Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 "^ New Bridge, June 2d, 1862, 10.30 a.m. 
 
 Oar left is everywhere advanced considerably 
 beyond the positions it occupied before the 
 battle. 
 
 I am in strong liopes tliat the Chickahominy 
 will foil sufficiently to enable me to cross, the 
 right. We have had a terrible time with our 
 communications ; bridges and causeways built 
 with great care, having baeu washed away with 
 the freshet, leaving us almost cut oft' from com- 
 munication. All that human labor can do is being 
 done to accomplish our purpose. 
 
 Please regard the portion of this relating to 
 condition of Chickahominy as confidential, as it 
 wo lid be serious if the enemy were aware of it. 
 I do not yet know our loss ; it has been very 
 heavy on both sides, as tlie fighting was desper- 
 ate; our victory complete. I expect still more 
 fighting before we reach Richmond. 
 
 G. B. MclJr.ELLAN. ^fajor.-Gen. 
 lion. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 
 On the same day I received the following from 
 the Secretary of War :— 
 
 Washington, June 3, 18G2. 
 Maj.-Ge'u, McC. — Your telegram has been re- 
 ceived, and we are greatly rejoiced at your suc- 
 cess, not only in itself, but because of the daunt- 
 less spirit of the troops. You have received, of 
 course, the order maie yesterday in respect to 
 Fortress Monroe. Tlio object was to place at 
 your command the disposable force of that de- 
 partment. The indications are that Fremont or 
 McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, and as kddh 
 as ho is disposed of another large body of troo|)s 
 will be at your service. The intelligence from 
 Halleck shows that the rebels are fleeing, and 
 pursued in force from Corinth. All interest nnw 
 centres in your operations, and full confid'jiice is 
 entertained of your brilliant and glorious success. 
 E. M. S., Sec. of War. 
 OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 
 On the 3rd 1 received the followuig from I'le 
 President : 
 
 Washington, June 3, lKr)2. 
 Maj.-Gen. McC. : — With these continuous rains. 
 I am very an.xious about the Chickahoniiiiy. so 
 close in your rear and crossing your Ime uf (;(i:ii- 
 munication. Ploase look well to it. 
 * A. L., Presiih'iit, 
 
 To which I replied as follows : — 
 Headcpiartera, Army iif the Potomac. N'l-w 
 Bridge, Juno 'M, 18(52. Your dispatch of .') )). in. 
 just recoived. As the Chickahominy has beoi 
 
 fi6 
 
 almo.-^t the only obstacle in my way lor several 
 days, your Excellency may be assured that it has 
 been made, and will continue to be, to protect 
 the communications across it. Nothing of im- 
 [)ortance, except that it is again raining. ^ 
 G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 
 A. L., President, Washington. 
 
 My views of the condition of our army on the 
 4th are explained in the following dispatch to 
 the President : — 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, New 
 Bridge, June 4th, 1862. — Terrible rain storm dur- 
 ing' the night and morning ; not yet cleared off; 
 Otiickahommy flooded ; bridges in bad condition, 
 and still hard at work at them. I have taken 
 every possible step to insure the security of th© 
 corps on the right bank, but I cannot reinforce 
 them from here until my bridges are all safe, as 
 my force is too small to insure my right and 
 rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, 
 as they may probably attempt, I have to be 
 very cautious now. Our Iohs in the late battle 
 will probably exceed 5,000.^ I have not yet full 
 returns. On account of the effect it might have 
 on our own men and the enemy, I request that 
 you will regard this information as confidential 
 for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of 
 the enemy was very considerably greater ; they 
 were terribly punished. I mention these facta 
 now merely to show you that the army of the 
 Potomac has had serious work, and that no child's 
 play is before it. ; 
 
 You must make your calculations on the sup- 
 position that I have been correct from the bo- 
 ginning, in asserting that the serious opposition 
 was to be made here. 
 
 Geo. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 A. L., Pz'esident, Washington. 
 
 And in the following to the Secretary of War on 
 the same day : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, New 
 Bridge, Juno 4tJi, 1862. — Please inform me at 
 once what reinforcements, if any, I can couut. 
 upon having at Fortress j\Ionroe or White House 
 within the nest three days, and when each regi- 
 ment ma3'' be expected to arrive. It is of the 
 utmost importance that I should know this imme- 
 diately. The losses in the battle of the 31st and 
 1st will amount to 7,000. Regard this as confi- 
 ,leutial for the present. 
 
 If I can have five new regiments for Fort Mon- 
 rii.-' and its dependencies, I can draw three more 
 'il i regiments from there safely. I can well 
 ''.;spo3e of V(>ur more raw regiments on my 
 ''•■mmunications. I can well disjiose of from 
 .i'V-.Mi to twunly well-rhilU^d regiments among 
 t'l.- uid brii;adi.'.s. in l)ringiMg them up to their 
 i).i",!i<al effnaive strength, llecruits are espe- 
 cially necessary for tluj rt-gnlir atid volunteer 
 bilterics of artillery, as wi-ll aa for the regular 
 aad volunteer rcg nienls of ini'artry. After the 
 losses in our last lialch-., I trust that 1 will be no 
 longer regarded :is an iihinuist. I lielievc wo 
 liave at Icasl one ui'uv il-'.^;.. tite batilc to fight. 
 Gho. B. McC. Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Hon. K. M. S.. S-c. of W ir. 
 \!.-;o my iisp.acli to the Secretary of War on 
 t H- ."> I. : ' 
 
 II > I l>piarler.s, Army of tho Pjtomac, New 
 
Bridge June 5, 18G2. — Ilained most of the iiiglit — 
 has now ceased, but it is not clca^^. The river 
 still very bigli and troublesome. Enemy opened 
 with several batteries on our brigades near here 
 this morning : our batteries seem to have pretty 
 much silenced them, though some firing still 
 kept up. The rain forces us to remain in statu 
 quo. With great difficulty a division of infantry 
 has been crossed this morning to support the 
 troops on the other side should the enemy renew 
 the attack. I fclt obliged to do this* although it 
 leaves us rather weak liere. 
 
 G. B. McO., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Hon. E. M. S. Sec. of War. 
 
 On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 Washington. June 5, 1862, 8.30, p.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McC, — I will send you five new regi- 
 ments as fast as transportation can take them : 
 the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. 1 in- 
 tend sending you part of McDowell's force as 
 soon as it can return from its trip to Front Roj'al, 
 probably as many as you want. The order to 
 ship the new regiments to Fort Monroe has 
 already been given. I suppose that they may 
 be sent directly to the Fort. Please advise mo of 
 tliis as TO '. desire. E. M. S., Sec. of War. 
 
 On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 '^ June, 7, 18G2, 4 40 p.m. 
 
 Hon. E. M. S., — In repl^' to your dispatch of 
 i p.m., to-day, I have the honor to state that the 
 Chickahominy River has risen so as to flood the 
 entire bottom to the depth of three and four feet. 
 I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, 
 and the men are working night and day, up to 
 their waists in water, to complete them. 
 
 The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, 
 entirelj' impassable for artillery or even cavalry, 
 except directly in the narrow roads, which I'en- 
 ders any general movement either of this or the 
 rebel army utterly out of the question, until we 
 have more favorable weather. 
 
 I am glad to learn that you are pressing for- 
 ward reinforcements so vigorously. I shall be 
 in perfect reacWness to move forward- and take 
 Riclunond the moment McCall reaches here, and 
 the ground will admit tlie passage of artillery. I 
 have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, 
 driving off the rebel pickets, and securing a ver^' 
 advantageous position. 
 
 The rebels have several batteries established, 
 commanding the debouches from two of our 
 bridges, and fire upon our working parties con- 
 tiinialh', but as yet they have killed but very few 
 of our men. G. B. McC, ilaj.-General. 
 
 As I did not think it probable that any more 
 reinforcements would be sent to me in time for 
 the advance on Richmond, I stated in the forego- 
 ing dispatch that I should be ready to move 
 when (Jen. McOall's Division joined me ; but 1 
 did Dot intend to be understood by this, that no 
 more reinforcements were wanted, as will be 
 seen from the following dispatch : 
 
 June 10. 1862. 8:J0 p.m. — 1 have again informa- 
 tion that Beauregard has arrived, and that some 
 of his troops are to follow him. No great re- 
 liance, perhaps uc.ae whatever, can be attached to 
 
 this; but it is possible, and ought to be their' 
 policy. 
 
 I am completely checked by the weather. Th© 
 roads and fields are iiterally impassable for artil- 
 lery, almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy 
 is in a dreadful staLc ; we have another rain 
 storm on our hands. 
 
 I shall attack as 'soon as the weather and 
 ground will permit ; but there will be a delay, 
 the extent of which no one can forsce, for the 
 season is altogether abnormal. ' 
 
 In view of these circumstances, I present for 
 your consideration the propriety of detaching 
 largely from ilalleck's army to strengthen this j 
 for it would seem that llalleck has now no large 
 organized force in front of him, while we have. 
 
 If this cannot be done, or even in connection 
 with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a 
 heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but 
 the one can be done, it v.'ould better coniorm to 
 military p)rincii)les to strengthen this army ; ana 
 even although the reinforcements might not ax 
 rive in season to take part in the attack U2)on 
 Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and 
 tljey would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior 
 movements. 
 
 I wish to be distinctly understood that whene- 
 ver the wxather permits, I will attack with what- 
 ever force I may have, although a larger force 
 would enable me to gain much more decisive re- 
 sults. 
 
 I would be glad to liave ilcCall's infantry sent 
 forward by water at once, without waiting for 
 his artillery and cavalry. . ^ 
 
 If Gen. Prim returns via Washington, please, 
 converse with him as to the condition of affair* 
 here. " G. B. AIcU., Major-Gen. 
 
 lion. E. M. S., Sec.-of-War. 
 
 Our work ui)on the bridges continued to b 
 pushed forward vigorously until the 20th, during 
 which time it rained almost every day, and the 
 exj)osure of the men caused nnich sickness. 
 
 On the 11th the following vv'as received front 
 the Secretary of War. 
 
 Washington, June 11, 1862. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. !McC. — Your dispatch of three 
 thirty (3.30) yesterday has been received. I am 
 fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, 
 and which no art nor skill can avoid, but only 
 endure, and am striving to the uttermost to reu 
 der 3'ou every aid in ti.e power of the Govern 
 ment. 
 
 Your suggestions will be immediately commu 
 nicated to Gen- llalleck, with a request that he 
 shall conform to ihein. At last advice he con 
 tcmplated sending a column to operate with 
 Mitchell against Chattanooga, and thence upon 
 lOt.st Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and 
 Tennessee to be in a critical condition demanding 
 immediate attention. IlalleCk says the main 
 body of Beauregard's force is witli him at Oka- 
 lona. .McCall's force was roportcll 3'esterday as 
 having embarked on its way to join you. It is 
 intended to send the residue of McDowell's force 
 also to join you a3 6])oedily as pos.-uble. Fjomont 
 had a hard fight day before yesterday, wifli 
 Jackson's force at Union Cliurch, eight miles 
 from Harrisonburg. He clainis the victory, but 
 
was pretty badlj handled; it is clear that a 
 strong force is operating with Jackson, for the 
 purpose ot detaiinng the forces here from you. 
 I am xirging as fast as possible the new levies. 
 
 Be assured, general, that there never has been 
 a moment when my desire has been otherwise 
 than to aid you with my wlaole heart, mind and 
 strength since the hour we first met ; and what- 
 ever others may say for their own purposes, 
 you have never bad and never can have any one 
 more truly your friend, or more anxious t) sup- 
 port, or more joyful than I shall be at the suc- 
 cess, which I have no doubt, will soon be achiev- 
 ed bv your arras. E, M. S., Sec. of War. 
 
 On the 12th and 13th Gen. McCaU's divisioQ ar- 
 rived. 
 
 On the 13th of June tv.'o squadrons of the 5;h 
 0. S. Cavalry, under the command of Capt. Roj'a 1, 
 stationed near Hanover Old Church, were attack- 
 ed and overpowered by a foi-ce of the enemy's 
 cavalry, numbering about 15,000 men, Avith four 
 guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but 
 at somri distance from our main body, and, though 
 pursued, very cleverly made the circuit of the 
 army, repassing the Chiclcahominy at Long Bridge. 
 • The burning of two schooners laden with forage 
 and i'ourteen government wagons, the destruction 
 of tome sutlers' stores, the killing of several cf 
 the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, 
 some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and 
 a little eclat, were the precise results of this ex- 
 pedition. 
 
 On the 14th I sent the following to the Sec'y. 
 of War-: — Headq's., Army of the Potomac, Camp 
 Lincoln, June 14, 1862, midnight : ■ 
 
 Ail quiet in every direction. The stampede of 
 last night has passed away. Weather now very 
 favorable. I hope twoda3'S more will make the 
 ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as 
 the bridges are completed^ and the ground fit for 
 artillerj'- to move, at the same time I would be 
 glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. 
 J can use several new regiments to advantage. It 
 fught to be distinctly understood that McDowell 
 and his troops are completely under my control. 
 
 I received a telegram from him requesting that 
 McCall's division might be placed so as to join 
 Uim immediately on his arrival. 
 
 That request does not breathe the proper spirit ; 
 ■whatever troops come to me must be disposed of 
 80 as to do the most good. I do not feel that in 
 such circurastaTices as those in which I am now 
 placed. Gen. McD. should wi3h the general inter- 
 ests to be sacrificed for the jDurpose of increasing 
 his command. 
 
 If I cannot fully control all liis troops, I want 
 none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle 
 Willi what I have, and let others be responsible 
 for the results. % 
 
 The department lines should not be allowed to 
 interfere with me,. but Gen. McD. and all his troops 
 Bcnt to me, should be placed completely at niy 
 disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no 
 other way can they bo of assistance to me. I 
 therefore request that I may have entire and full 
 control. The stake at issue is too great to allow 
 personal considerations to be entertained. You 
 know that I have none. Tho indications are, from 
 
 «8 
 
 our balloon reconnoissances, and from all other 
 sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily in- 
 creasing in numbers, and determined to fight des- 
 perately, G. B. MoC, Maj.-Geu. Com'g. 
 Hun. E. M. S., Secy, of War. 
 
 On the 20th, the following was communicated 
 to the President : — Ildq's. Army of the Potomac,. 
 Camp Lincoln, June 20, 18G2, 2 p. m. : 
 
 Your Excellency's dispatch of (11) a. m. receiv- 
 ed, also that f)f Gen. Sigel. 
 
 1 have no doubt that Jackson has been rein- 
 forced from here. There is reason to believe that 
 Gen. Pi. S. Ripley has recently joined Lee's army, 
 with a brigade or, division from Charleston. 
 Troo})S have arrived recently from Goldsboro. 
 There is not the slightest reason to suppose that 
 the enemy intends evacuating Eichmond ; he is 
 daily increasing his defenses. I find him every 
 where in force, and every reconnoissance cost 
 many valuable lives. Yet I am obliged to feel 
 my Vv'ay foot by foot, at whatever cost, so great 
 are t'ne difficulties of the country. By to-morrow 
 night the defensive works covering our position 
 on this side of the Chickahomiuy should be com- 
 pleted. I am forced to this by my inferiority of 
 numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible 
 numbers into action-, and secure the army against 
 die consequences of unforeseen disaster. I would 
 be glad to have permission to lay before your 
 Excellency by letter or telegraph, my views as to 
 the present state of milittiry affairs throughout 
 the Avhole country. In the meantime I would b« 
 pleased to learn the disposition, as to numbers 
 and position, of the troops not under my com- 
 mand, in Virginia and elsewhere. 
 His Ex'y. A. L., Pres't. G. B. McC, M.-G. Com'g. 
 
 To which I received this rej^ly : 
 
 Washington, June 21, 1862, 6 P. M. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. ]\lcC. — ^Your dispatch of yester- 
 day, two p. M., was received this morning. If it 
 would not divert too much of your time and at- 
 tention from the army under yom* immediate com- 
 mand, I would be glad to have your views as to 
 the present state of military afi'airs throughout 
 the whole country, as you say you would be glad 
 to give them. I would rather it should be bj 
 letter than by telegraph, because of the better 
 chance of secresy. As to the numbers and posi- 
 tions of the troops not under your command in 
 Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with 
 accuracy, >vliich I cannot, I would rather not 
 transmit cither by telegraph or letter, because of 
 the chances of its reaching the enem3\ I would 
 be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot 
 leave your camp, and I cannot well leave here. ^ 
 
 ' A. L., Presidentc 
 
 To which I sent the following reply : 
 
 Camp Lincoln, June 22, 1 p. m. — I have tho hon- 
 or to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram 
 of 8 p. M, yesterday. 
 
 Under the circumstances as stated in your dis- 
 patch, I perceive that it will be better, at least, 
 to defer, for the present, the communication I do- 
 siied to make. G. B, McC.,Maj.-Gcn. Com'g. 
 His Excellency, the President. ^ 
 
 All the inlormation I could obtain, ])reviou3 to 
 the 24th of June, regarding tlio movements of 
 Gen. Jackson, led to tlie behef that h© was at 
 
69 
 
 Godoiisvillc, whera Iua was receiving reinforce- 
 ments from ILicIunond. vin. Lynchburg ;inil Staun- 
 ton ; but what his purposos were did not appear 
 until the date spocilled, when a young man, very 
 intelligent, but of susjucious appearance, was 
 brouglit ill by our scouts from the direction of 
 Hanover Court House. He at lirst stated that he 
 was an escaped prisoner from t'ol. ICenly's Mary- 
 land regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally 
 confessed himself to be a deserter from Jacksons 
 command, which ho left near Gordonsville on the 
 21st. Jackson's troops were then, as he ftaid, 
 moviiig to Fredcrickshall. along t!ie Virginia Cen- 
 tral Railroa<l, for the purpose of attacking my 
 vear on the '28th. I iininediately rtfspatchcd two 
 trusty negroes to proceed along tlie raihoad. and 
 ascertain the truth i.f ijio vstatement. They were 
 unable, however, to get beyond Hanover Court 
 House, where tltey encountered the eneniy's picl:- 
 cts. and wero forced to turn back without obtain- 
 ing the desiroil hif'ormation. On that day I sent 
 the followiiig dispatch : 
 
 JIca<lquarters Army of the Potomac, June 2-i, 
 12 V. .v., 1S62.— -A very peculiar case of desertion 
 has JHst occurred from the enemy. The party 
 states he left Jackson, Whiting and Ewell, fifteen 
 brigades, at Gordonsville, on the 21st ; that they 
 were moving to Fredcrickshall, and that it was 
 intended to attack my rear on the 28th. T would 
 be glad to learn, at your eai'liest convenience, the 
 most exact information you have as to the posi- 
 tion and movenie'.its of Jackson, as well as the 
 sources fi-om which yoiu* information is derived, 
 that I may the better compare it with what 1 have. 
 
 (I. PJ, McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 Hon. Vj. .^^. ?., Secretary of War. «». 
 
 The following is his reply : '*^ 
 
 Washington, June 25, '2.3'\' 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McC. — We have uo definite iuforma- 
 tfon as to the number's or position of Jackson's 
 force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's 
 statement that Jackson's force was, nine daj's 
 ago, forty tlioiisand men. Some reports place ten 
 thousand rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville ; 
 others that his foi'ce is at Port Republic, Harrison- 
 burg and Luray, Fremont yesterday reported 
 rumors that Wostonr Virginia was threatened, 
 «nd G Kelly that Ewell was advancing to New 
 Creek, where Fremont had liis depots. The last 
 telegram fioni Fremont contradicts this rumor. 
 The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's 
 pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The 
 people decUue to give any information of h.is 
 whereabouts. Within the last two days, the evi- 
 dence is strong that for some purpose tho enemy 
 is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in va- 
 rious directions, with a view to concerd the real 
 point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at 
 ihinassas, nor Banks and Frcmoni, who are at 
 Middletown, appear to have any accurate know- 
 ledge of tho subject. A letter transmitted to the 
 department yesterday, purporting to bo dated 
 Gordonsvillo, on the litli inst., stated that the 
 actual attack was designed for VV'ashington and 
 Baltimore, as somi as you attacked Richmond; 
 but that, tho rej>ort was to be circulated that 
 Jackson lv**» gone to liidunoud, in order to mis- 
 lead. This .^eUer looked very much like ^ blind. 
 
 and induces me to suspect that Jackson's reism 
 movement now is toward Richmond. It carao 
 from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, lik) 
 the numerous ruraora put afloat, to mislead. J 
 thiidv, therefore, that while tho warning of the 
 deserter to yciU may also bo a blind, that it could 
 not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you 
 ;'.!;y further iuformati'-u on this subject that may 
 bo received here. E. M. S., Sec. of War. 
 
 On the 25th, our biidgea and intrenchmcnfa 
 being at last completed, an advance of our picket 
 line on the left was (ordered, preparatory to a 
 general forward movement. -^ 
 
 Immediately in front of tlie most advanced 
 redoubt on tho Williamsburg road was a large 
 open field ; beyond that a swampy belt of thnber 
 live hundred y«,rds wide, which had been dis 
 puted ground for many days. Fvu-therin advanca 
 was an open field crossed by the Willamsburg 
 road and the raihoad, and commanded by » 
 rcd.oubt and rifle-pits of the enemy. It was 
 decided to push our lines to the other side of 
 these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain 
 the nature of the ground, and to place Generala 
 Heinfzelman and Sumner in position to support 
 the attack intended to be made on the old Tavern 
 on the 26th or 27t1i by Gen. Fi'anklin, by assauI^ 
 ing that position in the rear. 
 
 Between S and 9 o'clock on tlie morning of tho 
 25tli the advance was begun by Gen. lleintzcl- 
 man's corps. Tlie enemy werS found to be In 
 strong force along the line, and contested thp 
 advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object 
 was accomplished. The' troops engaged in thia 
 aliair were the whole of Ileintzelman's corps, 
 1 'aimer's brigade of Couch's division of Kcycs's 
 corps, and a part of Richardson's division of 
 Sumner's corps. For the details I refer to tho 
 report of Gen. Heintzelman. 
 
 Tiie casualties, (not including those in Palmer's 
 brigade, wiiich have not been reported,) were as 
 follows : — Officers killed I, wounded 14, missing 
 1 : Enlisted men killed 50, wounded SS?, missing 
 63 : Total 516. 
 
 The following telegrams were Bent to tho Se- 
 cretary of War during the day from the field of 
 operations : 
 
 Redoubt, No. 3. June 25, 1862, 1.30 p.m. 
 
 Hon. E. M. S., — We have advanced our pickets 
 
 on the left considerably, under sharp resistanc-. 
 
 Our men behaved v6ry handsomely. Some firing 
 
 still continues. G. B. McC, ^Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862, 3.15 p.m. 
 
 Jlon. B. M. S., Sec of War, — The enemy are 
 making a desperate rcsistango to tho advarut of 
 our picket lines. Kearney's and 0:5^ half of 
 Hooker's arc where Ijjwaiit tbcm. 
 
 I have this moment re-inforced Hookers right 
 with a brigade and .a couple of guns, and hope in 
 a few minutes to finish the woik intended for 
 the day. Our uien are behaving splendidly. VhQ 
 encm.y arc ng'iling v.'cll alsn. 
 
 Thia is not a battle, mondy an affair .-f Heint- 
 zchnaii's corps, supported by Kcye's,and thus far 
 all goes well. We ln'M every fcot wo have 
 gained. If wa succeed in wha: we have under- 
 taken, it will be a very inijiortant advanta'go 
 gained. Loss not large thus far. The lighting 
 
up to this time has been done by Gen. Ilooker'ff 
 division, wliicli has beuaved as iisiuil, tliat ifc 
 most splendidly. 
 
 On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's 
 batteries in his front. 
 
 G. 15. McC, Maj.-Gcn, Comd'g. 
 R,edoubt No. 3, June 2.t, ]S('>2, 5 p.m. 
 Hon. E. M. a.. Sec. of War, — The alilriir is over, 
 and we have gained our point fully, and witli biit 
 little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition. 
 Oiu' men have done all tliat could bo desired. 
 The aftair was partly decided by two guns that 
 Capt. J)e Jlussy brought gallantly into action 
 under very diflicult circumstances. The enemy 
 was driven fiom the camp in front of this place, 
 aud is now quiet. G. B. McC, Maj.Gen. Cora'g. 
 
 Also, on the same day, the following : 
 .^Headquarters. Army of the Potomac, Camp 
 Lincoln. June 2"), 1862, 6.15 p.m. — I have just 
 returned from the field, and found your dispatch 
 in regard to Jackson. 
 
 Several contrabands just in, give information 
 xjonfirming supposition that Jackson's advance is 
 at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beai:- 
 xegard arrived, with strong reinforcements, in 
 Richmond yesterday. 
 
 I incline to think that Jackson will attack my 
 right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200.- 
 000, including Jackson and Beauregard. 1 shall 
 liave to contenci against vastl}' superior odds if 
 these reports be true. But this army will do all 
 in the power of men, to hold their position and 
 repulse any attack. » 
 
 I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but 
 feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I 
 liave nqt failed to represent, repeatedl}^ the ne- 
 cessity of reinforcements, that this was the deci- 
 Bive pohit, and that all the available means of the 
 government, should be concentrated here. I will 
 do all that a General can do, with the splendid 
 army that I have the honor to command, and if it 
 is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at 
 least die with it, and sliare its fate. 
 
 But if the result of the action, which will pro- 
 bably occur to-raorrov/, or within a short time, is 
 a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown 
 on my shoulders, it must rest whei-e it belongs. 
 Since I commenced this, I have received addi- 
 tional intelligence confirnu'ng the supposition in 
 regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's 
 arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-worrow, 
 and now go on the other side of the Chiekahoni'- 
 ny, to arrange for the defence of that side. I feel 
 that there is no use in my again afiking for rein- 
 forcements. G. B. JlcC, Maj.-General. 
 E. M. S.. See. of war. ^' 
 
 NUMBERS OP THE ENEMY. 
 The report of the Chief of the " Secret Service 
 Corps," herewith forwarded, and dated 2(U]\ 
 June, shows the estimated strength of the ent-my, 
 at the tixe of the ev;icuationo[ Yorktown, to have 
 been from 1(10.000 to 120,000. 'i'hc same report 
 pats hip numbcjs on the 2()i:h of June, at about 
 180,000, and th•^ r.pc^cilic iuiormation ohtained re- 
 garding theii oi'ganization, warrants the belief, 
 tJKit tliis estimate did uot cxc(M;d his actual 
 «treiigth. 
 
 It will be observed that the evidence contain- 
 
 70 
 
 ed in the report, shows the following organiza- 
 tions, viz. : — two hundred regiments of infantry 
 and cavalry, including the forces of Jackson and 
 Ewell, just arrived ; eight battalions of inde- 
 pendent troops ; five battalions of artillery ; 
 twelve companies o infantry and indejiendent 
 cavalry, besides forty-six companies of artillery ; 
 amounting in all, to from forty to fifty brigades. 
 There were, inidoubtedly, many others whose de- 
 signations we did not learn. The report also 
 shows that numerous and heavy earth-works had 
 been completed for the defenge of Richmond, 
 and, tnat in thirty-six of these, were mounted 
 some two huudred guns. 
 
 THE SEVEN DAYS. 
 
 On the 26th. the day upon which I had decided 
 as the time for our final advance, the enemy 
 attacked oiir right in strong force, and turned 
 my attention to the protection of our communica- 
 tions and depots of supi)ly. 
 
 The event was a bitter confirmation of the 
 military judgment, which had been reiterated to 
 my superiors from the inception, and through the 
 progress of the Peninsular campaign. 
 
 I notified the Secretary of war in the folllowing 
 dispatch : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp 
 Tjncoln, June 26, 1862, 12 m. — 1 have just heard 
 that our cavalry pickets, on the left Bank of the 
 Chickahominy, are being driven in; it is, x)roba- 
 bly, Jackson's advanced guard. L this be true,. 
 you ina}'' not hear from me for some days, as my 
 communications will probably be cut off. The 
 case is, perhaps, a difiicult one, but I shall resort 
 to desperate meaisiu'es, and Avill do my best to 
 out-manoeuvre, outwit, and out-fight the enemy. 
 Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be 
 discouraged, if you learn that my communications 
 are cut ofiv and even Yorktown ,iu possession of 
 the enemy. Hope for the best, and I Avill not 
 deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me. 
 G. B. McC, Maj.-General. 
 
 E. .M. S., Secretary of Wai*. 
 
 Headquarters, Army oi the Potomac, Camp 
 Lincoln, June 26, 1862. 2.30 p.m. — Your dis- 
 patch and that of President received. Jackson 
 is driving in my pickets, &.C., on other side of 
 the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where 
 reinforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to 
 predict result of approaching battle. It will 
 probably be better that they should go to Fort 
 Monroe, and thence according to state of affairs 
 when they arrive. 
 
 It is not probable that I can maintain telegra- 
 phic communication more than an hour or two 
 longer. G. B. ]\[cC, Major-General. 
 
 lion. E. M. S., Sec. of War. 
 
 On the same day I received the following dis- 
 patch from the Secretary of War : 
 
 Washington, June 25, 1862, 11.20 p.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. MoC— Your telegram of 6.1 u 
 has just been received. The civcnm.stances that 
 have hitherto rendered it impossible for the gov- 
 einment to send you any more reinforcements 
 than has been, done, have bee:: so distinctly 
 stated to you, by the President, that it is need- 
 less tor me to repeat them. 
 
 Every cfibrt has been made l)y the President 
 
and myself to strengthen yon. King's division 
 has reached Falmouth. Shield's division and 
 Rickett's division are at Manassas. The Presi- 
 dent designs to send a part of that force to aid 
 you as speedily as it can be done. 
 
 E. M. S., Sec'y. ofWar. 
 Washington, June 26, 1862, 6 p. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC. : — ^Arrangements are being 
 made rapidly as possible to send 5,000 men, as 
 fast as they can be brought from Manassas to 
 Alexandria, and embarked, which can be done 
 sooner than to wait for transportation at Frede- 
 ricksburg. They will be followed by more, if 
 needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force 
 will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and 
 will operate promptly in your aid by land. No- 
 thing will be spared to sustain you, and I have 
 undoubting faith in your success. Keep me ad- 
 vised fully of your condition. 
 
 E. M. S., Sec'y of War. 
 
 But 5,000 of the reinforcements spoken of in 
 tliese communications came to the army of the 
 Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's Bar 
 after the seven days. In anticipation of a sjieedy 
 advance on Richmond, to pro\nde for the contin- 
 gency of our communications with the depot at 
 the White House being severed by the enemy, 
 and at the same time to be prepared for a change 
 of the base of our operations to James River, if 
 circumstances should render it advisable, I had 
 made arrangements more than a week previous 
 (un the 18th) to have transports with suppKes 
 of provisions and forage, under a convoj^ o gun- 
 boats, sent up James River. They reached Har- 
 rison's Landing in time to be available tor the 
 army on its arrival at this point. Events soon 
 proved this change of base to be, though most 
 hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course. 
 
 In order to relieve the troops of the 6th corps 
 on the 19th of June, Gen. Reynolds and Gen. Sey- 
 'mour's brigades, of Gen. McCall's division (Penn- 
 sylvania Reserves) ,were moved from Gaines's Farm 
 to a position on the Beaver Dam. Creek; Gen. 
 Meade being held in reserve in front of Gaines's 
 Farm. One regiment and a battery were thrown 
 forward to the heights overlooking Alechanics- 
 ville, a line of pickets extended along the Chicka- 
 hominy River, between the Mechanicsville and 
 M.eadow Bridges. 
 
 As has already been stated, I received, while 
 engaged on the 25th, in directing the operations of 
 Ileintzelman's corps, information which strength- 
 ened my suspicions that Jackson was advancing 
 with a large force upon our right and rear. On 
 this day, Gen. Casey, at the White House, was in- 
 structed to prepare for a vigorous resistance, and 
 defensive works were ordered at Timstall's Sta- 
 tion. Early on the 25th, Gen. Porter was in- 
 structed to send out reconnoitering parties to- 
 wards Hanover Court House to discover tlie 
 position and force of the enemy, and to destroy 
 the bridges on the Tolopotamy as far as possible. 
 
 Up to tlie 26th of Juiie, the operations against 
 Richmond had been conducted along the roads 
 leading to it from the east and north-east. The 
 reasons which compelled the choice of this line of 
 approach and our continuance upon it have bevn 
 iillinlod to above. 
 
 71 
 
 The saperiority of the James River route, as a 
 lino of attack and supply, is too obvious to need 
 exposition. My own opinion on that subject had 
 been early given, and need not be repeated here. 
 The dissipation of all hope of co-operation by land 
 of Gen. McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied 
 in the defense of Washington, their inability to 
 hold or deleat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity 
 to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and 
 to the long line of supplies from the White Ilouge 
 to the Chickahojniny, and forced an immediate 
 change of base across the Peninsula. To that 
 end, from the evening of the 26th, every energy 
 of the army was bent. Sucli a base, in the pre- 
 sence of a powerful enemy, is one of the most 
 difficult undertakings in war, but I was confident 
 in the valor and discipline of my brave army, and 
 knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat 
 or advance, and to fight the scries of battles now 
 inevitable, whether retreating Irom victories, or 
 marching through defeats ; and, in short, I had no 
 doubt whatever of its ability, even against supe- 
 rior numbers, to fight its way through to the 
 James, and get a po&ition whence a successful ad- 
 vance upon Richmond would be again possible. 
 Their superb conduct through the next seven 
 days justified my faith. 
 
 On the same day (26th), Gen. Van. Vliet, chief 
 quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by my 
 orders telegraphed to Col. Ingalls, quartermaster 
 at the White House, as follows : " Run the cars 
 to the last moment, and load them with provisions 
 and ammunition. Load every Avagou you liava 
 with subsistence, and- send them to Savage Sta- 
 tion by way of Bottom's^ Bridge. If you are 
 obliged to abandon AVhite House, burn everything 
 that you cannot get off. You must throw all our 
 supplies up the James River as soon as possible, 
 and accompany them yourself with all your force. 
 It will bo of vast importance to establish our de- 
 pots on James River without delay, if we abandon 
 White House. I will keep you advised of every 
 movement so long as the wires work ; after that, 
 you must exercise your own judgment." 
 
 All these commands were obeyed. So excellent 
 were the dispositions of the different officers in 
 command of the troops, dcjiots and gun-boats, 
 and so timely the warnmg of the approach of the 
 enemy, that almost everything was saved, and 
 but a small amount of stores destroyed, to pre- 
 vent their falling into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 Gen. Stoncmau's communications with t'tie main 
 army being cnt off, he fell back ui)on the White 
 House, and thence to Yorktown when the White 
 House was evacuated. 
 
 On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps 
 commanders on the right bank of the Chickaho- 
 miny to be prepared to send as many troops as 
 they could spare on the following day to the left 
 bank of the river, as will be seen from the ap- 
 pended telegrams. Gen. i'ftinklin received in- 
 structions to hold Gen. Slocum's division in readi- 
 ness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing 
 should at tliat time be hcartl in the direction of 
 Gen. Porter, to move it at once to his assistance 
 without further orders. 
 
 BEAVER DAiM CREEK. 
 
 Ai noof,. o:: t'l.t- '.!(>(•!. tlie r.Mpvtvc! ■>. ihv.- one- 
 
my, who had crossed above Meadow Bridge, was 
 diecovcred bj the advanced pioketsat that pohit, 
 and at 12:30 r. m. they were attacked and driven 
 in. All the pickets were now called in, and the 
 regiment and batterj at Mechanic«Tiil» with- 
 dravrn. 
 
 Meade's brigade •vras- ordered up M a reserve 
 in rear of the line, and shortly after Murtindale's 
 and Grifilu's brigades, of Morell's division, were 
 moved forward and deployed on the right of 
 IfcCaU's division, towards Shady Grove Church, 
 to coTer that flank. Neither of thesd three brig- 
 ades, lio w«ver, were warmly engaged, though two 
 of Griflin's regiments relieved a portion of Rey- 
 si£)Ids'8 line just at the close of the action. 
 
 The position of .our troops was a strong one, 
 •itending along the left bank of Beaver Dam 
 Creek, the left resting on the Ghickahominy, and 
 the right in thick woods bej'ond the upper road 
 from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor. The lower 
 or river road crossed tiie creek at Ellison's Mills. 
 Seymour's brigade held the left of the line, from 
 the Cliickahominy to beyond the mill, partly in 
 woods and partly in cleared ground, and Reynolds 
 the right, ])riricipally in the woods and covering 
 th» upper road. Tlie artillery occupied positions 
 •ommanding the roads and4;ho open ground across 
 tlis creek. 
 
 Timber had bcenMlfcd, rifle-pits" dug, and the 
 positioti generally prepared with a care that 
 l^reatly contributed to the success of the day. 
 The passage of fho creek was difllcult along our 
 whole front, and impracticable for artillery, ex- 
 cept by tlm two roads, where the 'main efforts of 
 tlie enemy were directed. 
 
 At 3 p. M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly 
 advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our 
 whole lino, making at the same time a determined 
 attempt to force the passage of the upper road, 
 which was successfully resisted by Gen. Rey- 
 nolds. After a severe struggle ho was forced to 
 retire, with very heavy loss. 
 
 A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmish- 
 ing, was nraintained along the whole front, while 
 the enemy massed his troops for another effort at 
 the lower road, about two hours later, which was 
 likewise repulsed by Gen. Seymour, with heavy 
 slaughter. The firing ceased and the enemy re- 
 tired about 9 p. M., the action liaving lasted six 
 hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, 
 if any, of Jackson's troops were engaged on this 
 day; tho portion of the enemy encountered were 
 chiefly from the troops on the right bank of tho 
 river, who crossed near ileadow Bridge and at 
 Mechanicsville. The infonnation in my posses- 
 sion eoon after the close of this action convinced 
 »;mo that Jackson was really approaching in large 
 force. The position on Beaver Dam Creek, al- 
 though so successfully defended, had its right 
 flank too much in the air, and was too far from 
 the main body (o make it advisable to retain iti 
 longer. I therefore determined tj send the heavy 
 guns at Ilogan's and Gaines's houses over the 
 Cliickahominy during tho night, with as many of 
 the wagons of tho SlIi Corps as possildo, and to 
 •withdraw the corps itself to a position stretch- 
 ing around tho bridges, where it;? flanks would be 
 reaaoT^ably socnr.'*, and it would be within sup- 
 
 porting diskmce of the main army. General 
 Porter carried out my ordcr.s to that effect. It 
 was not advisable at that time, even had it been 
 practicable, to withdraw the 5th (V>rps to tho 
 right batdc of tho Chickahonuny, Such a move- 
 ment wonld have exposed the rear of the army, 
 placed us between two fires, and enablcxl Jack- 
 son's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to 
 James River by crossing the Cliickahominy in the 
 vicinity of Jones Bridge before we couid reach 
 Malvern Hill with our traiuB. I determined, then 
 toresist Jackson witli ^he 5th Corps, reinforced 
 by all our disposable troops, in the new position 
 near the brigade heads, in order to cover the 
 withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to 
 give time for the arrangements to secure the 
 adoption of the James River, as our line of sup- 
 plies in lieu of the Panumkey. The greater part 
 of tlie heavy guns and wagons having been re- 
 moved to tlie right bank of the Cliickahominy, 
 the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops, 
 from Beaver Darn Creek was commenced shortly 
 before daylight, and successfully executed. 
 
 Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to 
 leave the ground. Seymour's brigade covered 
 the rear with the horse batteries of Captains 
 Robertson and Tidball ; but the withdrawal .was 
 so skillful and so gradual, and the repulse of tho 
 preceding day so complete, that although the 
 enemy followed the retreat closely, and some 
 skirmishing occurred, ho did not appear in front 
 of the new line in force till about noon of the 
 .2Tth, when we were prepared to receive him. 
 ; About this time Gen. Porter, believing tliat 
 Gen. Stoneman would be cutoff from him, sent 
 him orders to fall back on the White House, and 
 afterwards rejoin the army as best he could. 
 GAINES^S MILL. 
 On the morning of the 27th of June, during the 
 withdrawal of his troops to Mechanicsville to the 
 selected position already mentioned, Gen. Porter 
 telegraphed as follows ; 
 
 " I hope to do without aid, though I request 
 that Fianklin or some other command be held 
 ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close 
 that I expect to be hard pressed in fi.ont. I hope 
 to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. 
 This is a delicate movement, but relying on the 
 good qualities of the commanders of divisions 
 and brigades, I expect to get back alid hold the 
 new line. 
 
 This shows how closely Porter's retreat was 
 followed. 
 
 Notwithstanding all the efforts used during 
 the entire night to remove the heavy guns and 
 wagons, some of the siege guns were still in po- 
 sition at Gaines's House after sunrise, and were 
 finally hauled oif by hand. The new position of 
 the 5lh Corps was about an arc of a circle, cov- 
 ering the approaches to tlie bridges which con- 
 nected our right wing Avith tho troops on the op- 
 posite side of the river. 
 
 Morell's division held the left lir.e. in a strip of 
 woods on the left bank oi the Ganes's Mill 
 stream, resting its left Hank on the descent tothd 
 Cliickahominy, which was swept by our artiliery 
 on both sides of tho river, and extending into 
 open ground on the riglU towards New Coal 
 
Harbor. In this line Gen. Rulterfield's brigade 
 held tlic extreme left, Gen. AEartindale's jou^ed 
 hia right, and Gen. Gril'nu stiil further to the 
 right, joined the left of Gen. Sykea' division, 
 which, parti J in woods and partly in open 
 ground , extended in rear of Coal Harbor. 
 
 Each brigade had in reserve two of its own 
 regiments ; McCall's division, having been engaged 
 •n tJie day befoii3, was formed in a second lino in 
 rear of the first ; ilcade's brigade on the left, near 
 the Ghickaliomin}'- ; Reynolds' brigade on the right, 
 corering the approaches from Goal Harbor and 
 Dispatch Station to Sumner's Bridge, and Sey- 
 mour's in reserve to the second line still further 
 in rear. Gen. P. St. G. Cooke, with tive companies 
 of the 5th Regular Cavalry, two squadrons of the 
 1st Regidar Cavalry, and three squadrons of the 
 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry (lancers), were posted 
 behind a hill in rear of the position, and near the 
 Cliickahominy, to aid in watching tlio left flank 
 and defending the slope to the river. 
 
 The troops were all in position by noon, with 
 the artillery on the commanding grounil, and in 
 tlie intervals- between the divisions and brigades. 
 Besides the division batteries, there were Robert- 
 son's and Tidball's horse batteries from the artil- 
 . lery reserve; the latter posted on the right of 
 Sykos' division, and the former on the extreme 
 left of the line, in tho valley of the Chickahominy. 
 
 Shortly after noon tho enemy were discovered 
 upproaching in force, and it soon became evident 
 that the entire position was to be attacked. His 
 ikirmishcrs advanced rapidly, and soon the fire 
 becamo heavy along our whole front. At 2 p.m. 
 Gen. Porter asked for reinforcements. Slocum's 
 divison of the 6 th corps was ordered to cross to 
 the left bank of the river by AleAnder's Bridge, 
 and proceed to his support. . 
 
 ■General Porter's first call for reinforcements, 
 through Gen. Barnard, did not reach me, nor his 
 demand for more axes through the same officer. 
 By 3 P.M. the engagement had become so severe, 
 and tho enemy were so greatly superior in num- 
 bers, that the entire second line and reserves Iiad 
 been moved forward to sustain the first line against 
 repeated and desperate assaults along the whole 
 front. At 3.30 Slocum's division reached the field, 
 and was immediately brough't into action at the 
 weak points of our line. On tho left the contest 
 was for the strip of woods running almost at right 
 angles to tho Chickahominy in front of Adam's 
 House, or between that and Gaines's House. The 
 enemy several times charged up to this wood, but 
 were each, time driven back with heavy loss. The 
 regulars otSykes' division on the right also re- 
 pulsed several strong attacks. But bur own loss, 
 under tho tremendous fire of such greatly supe- 
 rior nimiberp, was very severe, and the troops, 
 most of whom had been un^er arms more than 
 two days^wero rapidly becoming exLauated by 
 the masses of fresh men constantly brought against 
 thern. When Gen. Slocum's division arrived on 
 the ground, it increased Gen. Porter's force to 
 some 35,000, who were, inobably," contending 
 against about 70,000 of the enemy. Tho line was 
 severely pressed in several points, and, as its be- 
 ing pierced at any one would have been fatal, it 
 wda unavoidable for Gen. Porter, who was required 
 
 73 
 
 to hold Ilia position until night, to divide Siocum'a 
 division, and send parts of it, even single regi- 
 ments, to the points most threatened. About ^5 
 P.M., Gen. Porter having reported his position |a» 
 critical, French's and Meagher's brigades, of Rich- 
 ardson's division (2d corps), were ordered to crosa 
 to his support. The enemy attacked again, in 
 great force, at 6 p.m., but failed to break our lines, 
 tixough our loss was very heavy. About 7 p.m. 
 they threw fresh troops against Gen. Porter with 
 still greater fury, and finally gained the woodp 
 held by our loft. This reverse, aided by the con- 
 fusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by 
 five companies of the 5th Cavalry, and followed, 
 as it was, by more determined assaults on the re- 
 mainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused a gen- 
 eral retreat from our position, to the hill in rear, 
 overlooking tho bridge. French's and ->Ieagher'a 
 brigades now appeared, driving before them the 
 stragglers, who were thronging toward the bridge. 
 
 These brigades advanced boldly to the front, 
 and by their example, as well as by the steadi- 
 ness of their bearing, reanimated our own troops, 
 and warned the enemy that reinforcements had 
 arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy already 
 repulsed several times, with terrible slaughter, 
 and hearing -the shouts of the fresh troops, failed 
 to follow up their advantage. This gave iin op- 
 portunity to rally our men behind the brigades 
 of Gen. French and Meagher, and they again 
 marched up the^ hill, ready to repulse another 
 attack. During the night our thinned and ex- 
 hausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, 
 and by the following morning all had reached tho 
 other side of the stream. The regular infantry 
 formed the rear guard, and about 6 o clock, on 
 tho morning of the 28th, crossed the river, de- 
 stroying the bridge behind them. 
 
 Our loss in this battle, in killed, wounded and 
 missing, was very heavy, especially in officers, 
 many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken 
 prisoners, while gallantly leading on their men, or 
 rallying them to renewed exertions. It is impos- 
 sible to arrive at the exact numbers loat in this 
 desperate engagement, owing to the series of 
 battles which followed each other in quick suc- 
 cession, and in which the whole army was en- 
 gaged. No general returns were made, until 
 after we had arrived at Harrison's Landing, when 
 the losses for the whole seven days were esti- 
 mated together. 
 
 Although we were finally forced from our first 
 line, after the enemy had been repeatedly driven 
 back, yet the objegls sought lor had been attain- 
 ed. The enemy was held at bay, our siegc-guna 
 and material were saved, and the right wing had 
 now joined the main body of the army. 
 
 The number of guns captured by the enemy at 
 this battle was 22. Three of which were lost by 
 being run off the bridge duriTig the final with- 
 drawal. 
 
 Great credit is due for the efficiency and brav- 
 ery with which this arm of the service (the artil- 
 lery) was fought, and it was not until tlie last 
 successful charge of tho enem}-, that the can- 
 noneers were driven from their pieces, or struck 
 down, and the guns captured. Deidrich's, Kni- 
 eriem's, and Grimmis's batteries, took position 
 
'during the engagement in the front of General 
 Smith's line on the right bank of tlic stream, and 
 v/ilh a battery of siege-guns, served by the First 
 Connecticut Artillery', helped to drive back the 
 encm}' in front of Gen. Porter. 
 
 So threatening were tlie movements of the 
 enemy, on both banks of the Chickahominy, that 
 it was impossible to decide, until the afternoon, 
 where the real attack would be made. Large 
 forces of infantry were seen during the day, near 
 the Old Tavern, on Franklin's right, and threaten- 
 ing demonstrations were frequently made along 
 the entire line, on this side of the river, which 
 rendered it necessary to hold a considerable 
 force in position to meet them. 
 
 On the 26th a circular was sent to the corps 
 comn:aiulers on the right bank of the river, ask- 
 ing them how many of their troops could be 
 spared to reinforce Gen. Porter, after retaining 
 sufficient to hold their ijositions for twenty-four 
 hours. 
 
 To this the folloAving replies were received : 
 Ileadq's. 3d Corps, June 26, 4 p. m. 
 Gen. Pl. B. Marcy : — I think I can hold the in- 
 trcrichracnts with four brigades for twenty-four 
 hours. That would leave two brigades dispos- 
 able for service on the other side of the river ; 
 but the men are so tired and worn out, that I 
 fear they would not be in a condition to fight 
 after making a march of any distance. . . . 
 
 S. P. Heintzelman, Brig.-Gen. 
 Telegrams from Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th 
 and 26th had indicated that the enemy. was in 
 large force in front of Gen's. Hooker and Kear- 
 ney, and on the Charles City road, (Longstreet, 
 Hill and Huger),and Gen. Heintzelman expressed 
 the opinion on the night of the 25th that he 
 could not hold his advanced position without rc- 
 uiforcemcnts. 
 
 Gen. Kcyes telegraphed : 
 
 " As to how many men will be able to hold this 
 j)osition for 21 hours, I must answer, all I have, if 
 the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having 
 at all times appeared to me that our forces on 
 this flank are small enough." 
 
 On the morning of the 27th, the following dis- 
 I)atch was set to Gen. Sumner : 
 lloadq^s. Army of the Potomac, June 27, 8.45 a.m. 
 Gen. E. V. Sumnei- : — Gen. Smith just reports 
 that "six or eight regiments have moved down 
 to the woods in front of Gen. Sumner." 
 
 P. 13. I\[ARcy, Chief-of-Staff. 
 At 11 o'clock A.M., Gen. Sumner telegraphed as 
 follows : — " The enemy threatens an attack on my 
 riglit, near Smith." A t 1 2.30 p.m. he telegraphed : 
 "Sharp shelling on both sides." At 2.45p.m.: 
 " Sharp miiskctr}^ firing in front of Burns. We 
 are replying with artiHery and infantry. The 
 man on the look-out reports some troops drawn 
 Uj) in line of battle aiiout opposite my right and 
 Smitii's left ; the number cannot be made out." 
 
 In accordance wifi orders given on the night 
 of the 2Gth, Gen. S. ocum's division commenced 
 crossing the river to support Gen. Porter, soon 
 after daybreak on the morning of the 27th ; but, 
 as the firing in front of Gen. Porter ceased, the 
 Hi'ivemcnt was suspended. At 2 p.m. Gen. Porter 
 tailed for reinforcements. I ordered them at 
 yuce. and at 3.25 p.m. sent him the following : 
 
 74 
 
 " Slocum is now crossing at Alexander's Bridge 
 with his whole command. Enemy has com- 
 menced an infantry attack on Smith's left. I have 
 ordered down Sunmer's and Heintzelman's re- 
 serves, and you can count on the whole of Slo- 
 cum's. Go on as you have begun." 
 
 During the day the following dispatches were 
 received; Nvhich will show the co'ndition of afiairs 
 on the right bank of the Chickahominy : 
 
 June 27, 1862. 
 To Col. A. V. Colburn, Ass't.-Adj.-Gen. : 
 
 Gen. Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy 
 columns to the right of James Garnett's House, 
 and on the other side of the river opposite it. 
 Three regiments are reported to be moving from 
 Sumner's to Smith's front. The arrangements are 
 very good — made by Smith. 
 
 W. B. Franklin, Brig.-Gen. 
 Afterwards he telegraphed : " The enemy haa 
 begun an attack on Smith's left with infantry. I 
 know no details." 
 
 Afterwards the following : " The enemy has 
 opened'on Smith from a battery of three pieces, 
 to the right of the White House. Our shells are 
 bursting Avell, and Smith tliinks Sumner will soon 
 have a cross fire upon them that will silence • 
 them." 
 
 Afterwards, at 5.50 p.m., the following was sent 
 to Gen. Keyes : "Please send one brigade of 
 Couch's division to these headquarters Avithout a 
 moment's delaj'. A staff officer will be here to 
 direct the brigade where to go." 
 
 Subsequently the following was sent to Gens. 
 Sumner and Franklin : 
 
 " Is there anjjf sign of the enemy being in force 
 in 3'our front ? Can you spare any more force to 
 be sent to Gen. Porter ? . Answer at once." 
 
 At 5.15 P.M. the following w^as received from 
 Gen. Franklin : 
 
 " I do not think it prudent to take any more 
 ti^oops from here at present." 
 Gen. Sumner replied as follows : 
 " If the general desires to trust the defense of 
 my position to the front line alone, I can send 
 French with three regiments, and Meagher with 
 his brigade to the rio,'ht ; everything is so uncer- 
 tain, that I think it would be hazardous to do it." 
 These two brigades were sent to reinforce 
 Gen. Porter, as has been observed. 
 
 At 5.25 I sent the following to Gen. Franklin : 
 " Porter is hard pressed, it is not a question of 
 prudence, but of possibilities. Can you possibly 
 maintain your position until dark with two bri- 
 gades ? I have ordered eight regimeiwts of Sum- 
 ner's to support Portor, one brigade of Couch to 
 this place ; Heintzelman's brigade to go in rear 
 of Sumner. If ^lossible send a brigade to sup- 
 port Porter ; it shojdd follow the regiments or- 
 dered from Sumner." ' 
 
 " If it is possible send another brigade to rein- 
 force Gen. Smith. It is said three heavy columns 
 oF infantry arc moving on him." 
 
 From the foregoing dispatches it will be seen 
 that all disposable troops were sent from the 
 right bank of the river to reiTiforce Gen. Porter, 
 and that the corps commanders were left with 
 smaller forces to hohl their ])osition3 than they 
 deemed adequate. 
 
To luive (hjiju more, even tliough Porter's re- 
 verse liail been prevented, would have had the 
 6til! more disastrous result of imperilling the 
 whole movement across the Peninsula. 
 CHANGE OF BASE. 
 
 The operations of this day proved the numer- 
 ical superiority of the enemy, and made it evi- 
 dent that while' he had a large army on the 
 left bank of the Chickahominy, which liad al- 
 ready tr.rncd our right, and was in position t« 
 intercept the communications with our depots at 
 the White House ; ho was also in large force be- 
 tween our army and Eichmond. I therefore ef- 
 fected a junction of our forces. 
 
 Tliis miglit probably have been executed on 
 either side of the Chickahominy, and if the con- 
 centration iiad been effected on the left bank, it is 
 ]K>ssiblc wo might, with our entire force have de- 
 feated tho enemy there ; but at that time they held 
 the roads leading to the White House, so that it 
 would Li;evo been impossible to have sent forward 
 eupjily trains in advance of the army in that di- 
 rection, and the guarding of these trains would 
 have seriously embarrassed mw operations in the 
 battle. Wo would have been compelled to fight 
 if concentrated on that bank of the river. More- 
 over, we would at once liave been followed by 
 the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of 
 the river operating upon our rear, and if in tlie 
 chances of war, \j'e had been ourselves defeated 
 in the effort, we would have been forced to fall 
 back to the White House, and probably to Fort 
 Monroe ; and as liuth our flanks and rear would 
 ythen liave been entirely cx])Ose'd, aur entire sup- 
 ply train, if not the greater part of the army 
 itself (night have been lost. 
 
 Tlie movements ol the enemy showed that they 
 exi)ected this, and as they themselv<;s ackow- 
 ledged, they were prepared to cut off our retreat 
 hi that direction. I therefore concentrated all 
 our forces on the right bari^c of the river during 
 the night -f (he 2()th and the morning of iBie 
 27th, all our vagoiis, heavy guns, &e^ were ga- 
 tlurcd there. 
 
 T may be aske.i why, after the concentration of 
 our forces on the right haul; of the Chickahominy, 
 witli a large part of the enemy drawn away from 
 Piichniond, upon the opposite side, I did not, in- 
 stead of striking for James River, fifteen miles 
 below that place, at once march directly on Rich- 
 mond. 
 
 It will be remembered, that at thi^ juncture the 
 enenn- was on our rear, and tliere was every rea- 
 Bon to believe that ]ie would sever our communi- 
 cations with our supply depot at the White 
 House. 
 
 We had on hand a limited supply of rations, 
 and if wc had advanced directly on Richmond it 
 would have required considerable time to carry 
 the strong works around that place, during which 
 our men would have been destitute of food ; and 
 even if P»ichmoiid had fallen before our armsythe 
 enemy could still have occupied our supply com- 
 munications between that place? and tho gun- 
 boats, and turned their dfsaster into victory. If, 
 on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated 
 all his forces at Richmond during the progress of 
 our attack, and we had been defeated, we must 
 
 75 
 in all probability have lost our trains before 
 reaching the flotilla. 
 
 Tho battles which continued day after day, in 
 the progress of our flank movement to the James, 
 with the exception of the one at GainesV, Mill, 
 were sjiccesses to our arms, and the closing en- 
 gagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive 
 of all, 
 
 0»i the evening of the 27th of June, I assem- 
 bled the corps commanders at my headquarters, 
 and informed them of the plan, its reasons, and 
 my clioice of route and method of execution. 
 
 Gen. Keyes was directed to move his corps, 
 with its artillery and baggage, across the White 
 Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize strong positions 
 on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover tho 
 passage of the other troops and traii\^. 
 
 This order was executed on the 28th ty noon. 
 Before daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage's 
 Station, and remained there durinj^ the day and 
 night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and 
 supplies of the armj'. 
 
 Orders were given to the different commanders 
 to load their wagons with ammunition and pro- 
 visions and the necessary baggage of the officers 
 and men, and to destroy all property which could 
 not be transported with the army. Orders, were 
 also given to leave with those of tho sick and 
 wounded who could not be transported, a proper 
 comiDlement of surgeons and attendants, with a 
 bountiful supply of rations and medical stores. 
 
 'Jilie large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was, by tho 
 chief commissary. Col. Clarke, transferred to the 
 James River without loss. 
 
 On the mo?-ning of the 28th, while Gen. Frank- 
 lin was withdrawing his command from Golding 
 Farm, the enemy opened upon Gen. Smith's divi- 
 sion, Irom Garnett's Hill, from the valley above, 
 and from Gaines's Hill on the opposite side of 
 ■ the Chickaliominy, and shortly afterwards two 
 Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works 
 about to be evacuated, but this attack was re- 
 pulsed by the 23d New York, and the 49 th Penn- 
 sylvania Volunteers on picket, and a section of 
 Mott's battery. 
 
 Porter's corps was moved across White Oak 
 Swamp during the day and night, and took up 
 positions covering the roads leading from Rich- 
 mond towards White Oak Swamp and Long 
 Bridge. McCall's division was «rdered, on the 
 nigiit of the 28th, to move across the Swamp and 
 take a proper positiou to assist in covering tho 
 remaining troops and trains. During the same 
 night the corps ot Sumner, Heintzclniaii, and tho 
 division of Smith, were ordered to 'an interior 
 hue, the left resting on Keyes's old intrcnclimcnts, 
 and curving to the right so as to cover Savage's 
 Station. Gen. Slocuni's division, of Franklin's 
 corps, was ordered to Savage's Station in reserve. 
 They were ordered to hold this position until 
 dark of tlie 29th, in order to cover (lie withdraw- 
 al of the trains, and then to fall back across tho 
 Swamp and unite -with the remainder of the armj'. 
 
 On the 28th I sent tho following to the Secre- 
 tary of War : x 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Sava?f*i 
 
 Station, June 28, 18G2. 12.20 a. m. 
 I now know the wliolc history o|" the day. On 
 
76 
 
 fehia side of the river, tlio right bank, we repulsed 
 geveral strong attacks : on the left bank onr men 
 did all tliat men could do — all that soldiers could 
 accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly 
 superior numbers soon after I had brought my 
 last reserves into action. The loss on both sides 
 ii terrible. 1 believe it will prove t o be tke most 
 desperate battle of the war. The sad remf5ants 
 of my men behave as men — those battalions who 
 fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still 
 in the best order. My regulars were superb ; 
 »nd I count iipon what are left to turn anotlier 
 battle in company with their gallant comrades of 
 the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand, or even 
 ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow I 
 ©ould .take Richmond ; but I have not a man in 
 reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat, and 
 •ave the material and personnel of the army. 
 
 If Y,'e4iave lost the day, we have yet preserved 
 ©ur honor, and no one need blush for the army of 
 the Potomac. I have lost this battle, because my 
 force was too small. 
 
 I again repeat that I am not responsible for 
 this, and I say it with the earnestness of a gener- 
 al, who feels in his heart the loss of every brave 
 man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. 
 I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this, 
 the governraentmust view the matter in the same 
 earnest light that I do. You must send me very 
 large reiuforcemen.ts, and send them at once. 
 ■ 1 sliaii draw back 1^ this side ©f the Chicka- 
 hominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. 
 Please understaTid that in this battle we have lost 
 nothing but men, and those the best we have. 
 
 In addition to what I have already said, I only 
 wish to say to the President that I think he is 
 wrong in regarding me as ungenerous, when I said 
 that my force was too weak. I merely reiterated 
 s truth, which to-day has been too plainly proved. 
 If at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand 
 fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow. 
 
 I know that a few thousand more men, would 
 have changed this battle from a defeat to a vic- 
 tory ; as it is, the government must not, and can- 
 not, hold me responsible for the result. 
 
 I feel too earnestly to-night, I have seen too 
 many dead and wounded comrades, to feel other- 
 wise tlian that the government has not sustained 
 this aimy. If you do not do so now, tsie game is 
 lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly 
 that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other per- 
 lons in Washington, 
 
 Yon have done your best to sacrifice this army. 
 
 G. B. M^:0., Maj.-Gen., to Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 Sec. of War.^ 
 
 The headquarter's camp at Savage's Station, 
 waa broken up early on tlio morning of the 29th, 
 »nd moved across White Oak Swamp. 
 
 As the essential part of this day's operations 
 was the passage of the trains across tlie Suamp, 
 their protection against attack from the direction 
 of New Market and Riohmond, as well as the im- 
 mediate and secure establishment of our commu- 
 nications with the gun-boats, I passed the day in 
 •xamining the ground, directing tlie posting-of 
 the tn)0i)»,and assiuing the uninterrupted move- 
 ment of the trains. 
 
 In ili» afternoon [ inHlructed Gen. Keyes to 
 
 move during the night to James River, and occu- 
 py a defensive position near Malrern Hill, to se- 
 cure our extseme left flank. 
 
 Gen. F. J. Porter was ordered to follow hint, and 
 prolong the line towards the right. The trains 
 were to be puslied on towards James River in 
 rear of these corps, and placed under the protec- 
 tion of the gnn-boats aS fhey arrived. 
 
 A sharp skirmisli with the enemy's cavalry, 
 early this day on the Quaker Road, showed that 
 his efforts were at^outto be directed towards im- 
 peding our progress to the river, and rendered 
 my presence in that quarter necessary. 
 ALLENS' FIELD. 
 
 Gen, Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oakt 
 on June 29tii, at day-light, and marched Ifis com- 
 mand to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's Field", 
 between Orchard and Savage's Stations. 
 
 Tiie division of Richardson and Sedgwick, were 
 formed on the right of the railroad, facing to- 
 wards Richmond, Richardson holding the right, 
 and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's 
 corps. 
 
 The first line of Richardson's division was held 
 by Gen. French, Gen. Caklweil supporting in tho 
 second. A log building in front of Richardson'* 
 division, was held by Col. Brooks with one regi- 
 ment, (53d Pennsylvania Volunteers.) with Haz- 
 zard's battery on an elevated piece of groimd, « 
 little in rear of Col. Brook's command. 
 
 At 9 A.M., the enemy commenc«d a furious af» 
 tack on the right of Gen. Sedgwick, but were re- 
 pulsed. The left of Gen. Richardson was next 
 attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry 
 tlie position of Col. Brooks. Capt. Hazzard's 
 battery, and Capt. Pettit's .battery, which after- 
 wards replaced it, were served with great effect, 
 while the* 5.3d Pennsylvania kept up a steady 
 fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at 
 last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed 
 the attack three times, but were as often re- 
 pulsed. 
 
 SAVAGE'S STATION. 
 
 Gen. Slociim arrived at Savage's Station at an 
 early hour on the 29lh, and was ordered to cross 
 White Oak Swamp and relieve Gen. Keyes' corpsi 
 As- soon a3 Gen. Keyes was tlius relieved, ho 
 moved towayds James River, which he reached 
 in safety, wiili all his artillery and bagg.agc, early 
 on the morning of the 30th, and took Uja a posi- 
 tion below Turkey Creek Bridge. 
 
 During the morning Gen. Franklin heard that 
 the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, 
 was crossing the Chickahominy in large force, 
 and advancing toward Savage's Station. He com- 
 municated this information to Gen. Suninei* at 
 Allen's Farm, and moved Smith's division, to Sa- 
 vage's Station. 
 
 A little aftQP aoon Gen. Sumner imiterl his 
 forces with those of Gen. Franklin, and assumed 
 command. ■ - • 
 
 I liad ordered Gen. Heintzelman, with his 
 corps, to hold the Williamsburg road until dark 
 at a point where were several field works, and a 
 skirt of timber between tlieso works and the rail- 
 road ; but he fell back before night, and crossed 
 Wiiite Oak Swamp at Brackcti's Ford. 
 
 Gen. Sinnner in his report of the battle of Sa- 
 
vage'8 Station, sajs : *• When tlic enemy rtppear- 
 ed on the AViUiamsburg road, I could not imagine 
 why Gen. Heintzelraau did not attack him, and 
 not till some time afterwards did I learn, to mj 
 ntter amazement, that Gen. Ileintzelman hadjeft 
 the field and retreated with his whole corps 
 (about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. 
 This defection might have been attended with 
 the most disastrous consequences, and although 
 ■we beat the enemy signally and drove him from 
 the field, we should certainly have given him a 
 more crushing blow if Gen. Heintzelman had been 
 there with his corps." 
 
 Gen. Heintzelman, in the report of the opera- 
 tions of his corps, says : 
 
 " On the niglit of the 28th of June I received 
 orders to witlidraw the troops of my corps from 
 the advanced position they had taken on the 25th 
 of June, and to occupy the intrenched lines about 
 ft mile in rear. A map was sent me showing me 
 the positions Gen. Sumner's and Gen. Franklin's 
 corps would occupy. About sunrise the next 
 day our troops clowly lell back to the new posi- 
 tion, cautiously followed by the enemy taking 
 possession of our camps as soon as we left them. 
 From some mssapprehension, Gen. Sumner held 
 a more advanced position than was indicated on 
 the map furnished me, thus leaving a space of 
 about three-fourths of a mile between the right 
 of his corps and Gen. Smith's division of Gen. 
 Franklin's corps 
 
 At 11 A. M., on the 29th, the enemy commenced 
 jlu attack on Gen. Sumner's troops, a few shells 
 falling within my lines. Late in the afternoon 
 reports reached me that the rebels w^ere in posses- 
 sion of Dr. Trent's house, only a mile and a hatf 
 from Savage's Station. I sent several cavalry 
 reconnoissance.s, and finally W'as satisfied of the 
 fact- Gen. Franklin came to my headquarters, 
 when I learned of the interval between his left 
 and Gen. ^Sunuier's right, in which space Dr. 
 Trent's house is. Also that the rebels had re- 
 paired one of the bridges across the Chickahorai- 
 ny, and Avere advancing. 
 
 '' I rode forward to see Gen- Sumner, and met 
 his troops falling back on the Williamsburg road, 
 through my lines. Gen. Sumner informed me that 
 he intended to make a stand at Savage's Station, 
 and for mo to join him to determine upon the 
 • position. This movement of Gen. Sumner's nn- 
 covering my right flank, it became necessary for 
 me at once to withdraw my troops 
 
 " 1 rode back to find Gen. Sumner ; after some 
 delay from the mass of troops in the field, I found 
 ^ him and leariied that the course of action had 
 been determined on ; so returned to my command 
 and to give the necessary orders for the destruc- 
 tion of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provis- 
 ions still remaining on the ground 
 
 '• The whole open space near Savage's Station 
 was crowded with, troops, more thaii I supposed 
 could be brought into action judiciously. An 
 aide frpm the commanding general had in the 
 morning reported to me, to point out a road across 
 the White Oak Swamp, starting from the left of 
 Gen. Kearney's position, and leading by Brack- 
 ett's Ford. • , . . The advance of the column 
 reached the Charles City Road at 6 1-2 p. m., a.ud 
 the reaj" at 10 p. m , without accident. 
 
 'Hie orders given bj me to Generals Suaanw, 
 Heintzelman, and Franklin, wcre_^ to hold tlie posi- 
 tions assigned them until dark. Ab stated bj 
 Gen. Heintzelman, Gen. Sumner did not occup/ 
 the designated position, but as ho "was the senior 
 ollicer present on that side of the White Oak 
 Swamp, ho may have thought that the move- 
 ments of the enemy justified a deviation from 
 the letter of the orders. It appears from his re- 
 port that he assumed command of all the troopi 
 near Savage's Station, and determined to resist' 
 the enemy there, and that he gave Gen. Heintzel- 
 man orders to hold the same position as I had 
 assigned him. 
 
 The aide sent by me to Gen. Heintzelman, t« 
 point out the road across the swamp, was to guid« 
 him in retiring after dark. 
 
 On reaching Savage's Station Sumner's and 
 Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of 
 battle in the large open field to the left of th« 
 railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woode, 
 and the right extending down to the railroad. 
 
 Gen. Brooks, with hie brigade, held the wood 
 to the left of the field, w'here he did excellent 
 service, receiving a wovmd, but retaining his com- 
 mand. 
 
 Gen. Hancock's brigade was thrown into th« 
 woods on the right and front. 
 
 At 4 p. M. the enemy commenced his attack i« 
 large force by the AVilliamsburg road. It vra« 
 gallantly met by Gen. Burns' brigade, supported 
 and reinforced by two ines in reserve, and final- 
 ly by the New York 69th, Hazzard'e and Pettit'i 
 batteries again doing good service. Osborne'a 
 and Bramhall's batteries also took part effectively 
 in this action, which was continued with great 
 obstinacy nntil between 8 and 9 p. m., when th« 
 enemv were driven from the field. 
 
 MOVEMENTS TOWARDS JAMES RIVER. 
 
 Immediately after the battle the orders wer« 
 repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross 
 White Oak Swamp, which was accomplished du- 
 ring the night, in good order. 
 
 By midnight all the troops were on the road to 
 "White Oak Swamp Bridge, Gen. French, with hit 
 brigade, acting as rear guard, and at 5 a. m. ,on 
 tlie'SOth all had crossed, and the bridge was de- 
 stroyed. 
 
 On the afternoon and night of the 29th, I gava 
 the corps commanders their instructions for th« 
 operations of the folldwing day. As stated be- 
 fore, Porter's corps was to move forward to Jamei 
 River, and with the corps of Gen. Keycs, to oc- 
 cupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a lin« 
 perpendicular to the river, thus covering th« 
 Charles City road to Richmond, opening commu- 
 nication with the gun-boats, and covering the pas- 
 sage of the supply trains, which were pushed 
 forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plan- 
 tation. Tke remaining corps were pressed on- 
 ward, and posted so as to guard the approaches 
 from Richmond as well as the crossing of the 
 AN'hite Oak Swamp, over -which the army had 
 passed. 
 
 , Gen. Franklin was ordered to hold the passage 
 of White-Oak Swamp Bridge, and cover the 
 withdrawal of the trains from that point. His 
 command consisted of his own corps, with Geu 
 
Ricluivdsoii's Jivisiou ami fieii. Nagleo'b brigade 
 placed uiuler liis orderH Cor tlie occusion. 
 
 Gcii. Sldcum's division was on the right of the 
 Cliarle.s City road. 
 
 On the nmniing of (lie 30th I a.::;ain gave to the 
 corps commanders within reacli*instractions for 
 posthig their troops. I found tliat, notwith- 
 standing all the efforts of my personal staff an 1 
 other oflicers,the roads were blocked by wagons, 
 and there was great ditllculty iu keeping the 
 trains in motion. 
 
 The engineer officers wliom I had sent forward 
 on the 28th to reconnoitre the roads, had neither 
 returned nor sent me any reports or guides. 
 
 Gens. Keyes and Porter had been delayed, one 
 i-y losing the road, and the other in repairing an 
 old road, and had not been able to send me any 
 information. AVe then kn^w of but one road for 
 the movement of troops and our immense trains. 
 It was therefore necessary to post the troops 
 in advance of this road, as well as our limited 
 knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to 
 cover tiie movements of the trains in rear. 
 
 I thou examined the whole line from the 
 swamj* to the left, giving final instructions for 
 the posting of the troops and the obstruction of 
 the roads towards Richmond, and all corps com- 
 manders were directed to hold their positions 
 until the trains had passed, after which a more 
 concentrated position was to fee taken up near 
 James Iliver, 
 
 Oar force was too small to occupy and hold 
 the entire line from the White-Oak Swamp to the 
 river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse 
 by a movement across the lower part of the 
 swamp, or across the Ghickahominy below the 
 swamp. Moreover the troops were then greatly 
 exhausted, and required rest iu a more secure 
 position. 
 
 I extended ray examinatiohs of the country as 
 far as llaxall's, looking at all the approaches to 
 Malvern, which position I perceived to be the 
 key to our oi)erations in this quarter, and was 
 thus enabled to expedite very considerably the 
 passage of the trains, and to rectify th« positions 
 of the troops. 
 
 Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the 
 different corps commanders to inform them what 
 I had done on the left, and to bring mo infohna- 
 tion of the condition of aff.i rs on the right. 1 
 returned from Malvern to llaxall's, and, liavi'ng 
 made arrangements Un- instant communication 
 from Malvern by signals, went "U board of Cai)t. 
 Rodgers's gun-boat, lying near, to confer witli 
 him in reference to the condition of our .su[)ply 
 vessels, and the state of thnigs on the river. 
 
 It was his opinion tiiat it »\onIl be necessary 
 for the army to fall l)ack to a [josition beiow dity 
 Point, as the channel t'lere was so near tlie 
 southern shore that it would not be possible to 
 bring up tlic transports slionid the enemy occupy 
 it. Ilarrison's Landing was, in his opinion, tiie 
 nearest suitable point. Upon the termination of 
 this interview, I retm-ned to Malv<'rn Hill, and 
 remained there until sliortly before daylight. 
 
 On the morning of tin-. 30th Gen. Sunnier was 
 ordered to march with S.;dgvvJck'B division to 
 Glendale (" Nelson's Farm"). 
 
 78 
 
 Gen. McCaH's division (rennsylvania Reserves) 
 was halted dnring lh« morning on the New Mar- 
 ket road, just in advance of the point where a 
 road turns off to Quaker Church. His line was 
 formed perpendiculariy to the New Market load, 
 with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on 
 the left, and Ileynolu'.*! brigade, coniinanded by 
 Col. S. G. Sinnnons, of the 5th Pennsylvania, in 
 reserve. liandall's regular battery on" the right, 
 Kern's and Cooper "s batteries opposite the sen- 
 tre, and Deitrich's and Kanerhem's batteries, of 
 the artillery reserve, on the left — all in iront of 
 the artillery line. The country in Gen. McCall'a 
 front was open, intersected toward the right by 
 the New Market road, and a small strip of timber 
 parallel to it. The open front was about 800 
 3'ards, its depth about 1,000 .yards. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th Gen. Heintzelman 
 ordered the bridge at Brackett's Ford to be de- 
 stroyed, and trees to be felled across that road 
 and the Charles City road. 
 
 Gen. Slocum's division v>as to extend to tbo 
 Charles City road. 
 
 Gen. Kearney's right to connect with Gen. Slo- 
 cum's left. 
 
 Gen. McCall's position was to the left of the 
 Long Bridge road, in connection with Gen. Kear- 
 ney's left. Gen. Hooker was on the left of Gen, 
 McCall. 
 
 WHITE-OAK SWAMP BRIDGE. 
 Between 12 and 1 o'clk the enemy opened a 
 fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith and 
 Richardson and Naglce's brigade at AVhite-Oak 
 Swamp Bridge, This artillery fire was continued 
 by the enemy through the day, and he crossed 
 some infantry below our position. RichardsoH's 
 division suffered severely. Captain Ayres di- 
 rected our artillery with great eflect. Capt. Ilaz- 
 zard's battery, after losing many cannoneers, and 
 Capt. Hazzard being mortally wounded, was com- 
 pelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's bat- 
 terj^ which partially silenced the enemy's guns. 
 
 Gen. Franklin held his position until after dark, 
 repeatedl}' driving back the enemy in their at- 
 tcm])(s to cross the White-Oak Swamp. 
 
 CHARLES CITY CROSS-ROADS, &c. 
 At 2 o'clock in the daj' the enemy were reported 
 advancing in force by the Charles City road, and 
 at half-'past 2 o'clock the attack was made down 
 the road on Gen. Slocum's left, but was checked 
 by his artillery. After this the enemy, in large 
 force, comprising the divisions of Long.street and 
 A P. Hill, attacked Gen. McCall. whose division, 
 after severe fighting, was compelled to retire. 
 General .McCall, in his report says; .... 
 " Al)oni lialf-past two my pickets wei'e driven 
 in by a strong advance, after some skirmishing 
 without loss on our part. A! 3 o'clock the ene- 
 my sent forward a regiment. <>n the left centre and 
 an ther on the right centre, to feel for a weak 
 point. They were under cover of a shower of 
 shell'.?, and boldly advanced but were both driven 
 hack :u the left by the 12th regiment, and on the 
 
 : i;-!;! ')y the 7th regiment For near- two 
 
 ho'.'.i-s the battle raged hotly here 
 
 " At last the enemy was compelled to retire be- 
 fore the well-directed musketry fire of the reserves. 
 The German batteries were driven to the rear. 
 
79 
 
 but I rodo Tin and. sent them back. It was, how- 
 ever, of little avail, and they were soon after 
 abandoned by the cannoneers. * * * 
 The batteries in front of the centre were boldly 
 charged upon, but the enemy was speedily forced 
 back. * * * . 
 
 ''Soon after this a most determined charge was 
 made on Randall's battery by a full brigade ad- 
 vancing in wedge-shape, without order, but in 
 perfect recklessness. 
 
 ''Suuiriwliat similar charges had, I ha'^e stated, 
 been [irevious'iy made on Cooper's and Kern's bat- 
 teries by single regiments without success, they 
 having recoiled before the storm of cairister hurled 
 against ihem. 
 
 " A Idco result was anticipated by Randall's bat- 
 tery, and tiio 4th regiment was requested not to 
 fire until the battery had done with them. Its 
 gallanl. (Mmmander did not doubt his ability to 
 repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow 
 down the advancing host, but still the gaps were 
 closed, and the enomy came in upon a run to the 
 very muzzle of his guns. 
 
 " It was a perfet torrent of men, and they were 
 in his battery before the guns could be removed. 
 Two guns that were indeed successfully limbered 
 had their horses killed and wounded, and were 
 ovcriurned on the spot, and the enemy dashing 
 past drove the greater part of the 4th regiment 
 before them. Tlie left company (B) nevertheless 
 stood its ground, with its captain, Fred. A. Con- 
 rad, as did likewise certain men of other compa- 
 nies. I had ridden into the regiment and endeav. 
 ored to check them, but with only partial success- 
 There was no running ; but my division, re- 
 duced by the previous battles to less than 6,000, 
 bad to contend with the divisions of Longstrcet 
 and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest 
 anil best among many of the Confederate army, 
 numbering tlia't day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it 
 was reluctantly compelled to give way before 
 heavier force accumulated upon them." 
 
 Gen. Ileintztlman states, that about 5 p.m. Gen. 
 McCull's division was attacked in large force, 
 evidently the principal attack ; that in less than 
 an lidur the division gave way, and adds : 
 
 "Gen. Hooker, being on his left, by moving to 
 the right, repulsed the rebels in the handsomest 
 manner, with great slaughter. Gen. Sumner, who 
 was with Gen. Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also 
 greatly aided with his artillery and hifantry in 
 driving back the enemy. The^' now renewed 
 their attack with vigor on Gen. Kearney's left, 
 and were again repulsed witli heavy loss. 
 
 " 'I'his attack commenced about 4 p.m., and was 
 pushed by heavy masses with the utmost deter- 
 mination and vigor. Capt. Thompson's battery, 
 directed with great precision, firing double 
 charges, swept them back. The whole open 
 Bpace. 200 paces wide, was filled with tlie enemy ; 
 eacli repulse brought fresh troops. The third 
 attack was only repulsed by the rapid vollej's 
 and determined charge of the 63d Pennsylvania, 
 Col Hays, and half -of the 37 th New York Volun- 
 teers.** 
 
 Gen. McCall's troops soon began to emerge 
 froin the woods into the open field. Several bat- 
 teries were in position and began to fire into the 
 woods over the heads of our men in front Cap- 
 
 tain De Pfcussy's battery was placed on tlie right 
 of Gen. Simmer's artillery, with orders to slicll 
 the woods. Gen. Burns's brigade was tlien ad- 
 vanced to meet the enemy, and soou drove liim 
 back. Other troops began to return from the 
 ^\"hite Oak Swamp. 
 
 Later in the day, at the call of Gen. Kearney. 
 Gen. Taylor's 1st New Jersey brigade, Slocum's 
 division, was sent to occupy a portion of Gen. 
 McCall's deserted position, a battery accompany- 
 ing tlie brigade. "They soon drove back the ene- 
 my, who shortly after gave up the attack, con- 
 tenting tliemselves with keeping up a desultory 
 firing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 o'clock 
 at night Gen. Heintzelman, commenced to with- 
 draw his corps, and soon after daylight both of 
 his divisions, with Gen. Slocum's division, and a 
 portion of Gen. Sumner's command, reached Mal- 
 vern Hill. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sunnier, in 
 obedience to orders, had moved promptly to | 
 Glendale, and upon a call from Gen. Franklin for • 
 reinforcements, sent him two brigades, vvhich re- 
 turned in time to participate and render good 
 service in the battle near Glendale. Gen. Sumner 
 says of this battle : C 
 
 " The battle of Glendale was the most severe j 
 action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 I 
 o'clock P.M. the action commenced, and after a ' 
 furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy 
 was routed at all points and driven from the 
 held." 
 
 The rear of the supply trains and the reserve 
 artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about 
 4 P.M. At about this time the enemy began to 
 appear in Gen. Porter's, front, and at 5 o'clock 
 advanced in large force against his left flank, 
 posting artillery under cover of a skirt of tim- 
 ber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern 
 Hill, while with his in fan tr^- and some artillery 
 lie attacked Colonel "Warren's brigade. A con- 
 centrated fire of about tliirty guns were broughi 
 to bear on the enemy, v/hicli, with the infaiiti \ 
 (ire of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him 
 to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Col. 
 Warren. 
 
 The gunboats rendei'cd most efTicient-aid at 
 this time, and helped to drive, back .the enemy. ' 
 It was very late at night befoie my aides fe- 
 turned to give me the result of the day's fighting 
 along the whole Hue, and the true position of 
 affairs. While waiting to hear from Gen. Franklin 
 before sending orders to Gens. Siftnner and 
 Heintzelman, I received a message from the 
 latter that Gen. Franklin was falling back ; where- 
 upon I sent Col. Coburn of my stall with orders 
 to verify this, and if it were true, to order in 
 Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He • 
 had not gone far when he met two ofliceiR from 
 Gen. Franklin's headquarters with the informa- 
 tion that he was fallhig back. Orders were then 
 sent to Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman to fall 
 back also, and definite instructions were given as 
 to the movement, which was to commence on 
 the right. The orders met these troops already 
 en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent 
 to Gen. "Franklin as to the route he was to fol- 
 low. 
 
 General Barnard then received full instructions 
 
m 
 
 for posting the troops as they arrived. 1 then re- 
 turned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern 
 soon after daybreak, accompanied by several gen- 
 eral officers. I once more made' the entire cir- 
 cuit of the position, and then returned to HaxalTs 
 whence 1 went witli Captain Piodgers to select 
 the iinal location for the army and its depots. I 
 returned to i^falvern before the serious fighting 
 commenced, and after riding along the lines and 
 seeing most cause to feel ansious about the riglit, 
 remained in that vicinity. 
 
 MALVERN HILL. 
 
 The position selected for resisting the further 
 advance of the enemy on the 1st of July, was 
 with the left and centre of our lines resting on 
 '• Maivern Hill," while the right curved backwards 
 through a wooded country toward a point below 
 llaxall's on James River. Malvern Hill is an ele- 
 vated plateau about a mile and a half by three- 
 fourths of a mile area, well cleared of timber, 
 and with several converging roads running over 
 it. In front arc numerous-defensible ravines, and 
 the ground slopes gradually toward the north and 
 east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for ar- 
 tillery in those directions. Toward the north- 
 west the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ra- 
 vine which exeends to James River. From the 
 position of the enemj^, his most obvious lines 0/ 
 attack would come from the directions of Rich- 
 mond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost 
 of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, 
 therefore, the lines were strengthened by mass- 
 ing the troops, and collecting the princijjal part 
 of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of 
 the line (Sykes' division on the left, Merell's on 
 the right) with the artillery of his two divisions 
 advantageontly posted ; and the artillery of the 
 reserve so disposed on the high ground that 
 a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be 
 brought to bear on any point in Iris front or left. 
 Colonel Tj'ler also had, witli great exertion suc- 
 ceededin getting ten of his siege guns in posi- 
 tion on the highest point of the hill. 
 
 Couch's division was placed en the right of 
 Porter, next came Kearney and Hooker, nest 
 Sedgwiek and Richardson, next Smith and Slo- 
 cum, then tlie remainder of Kej'cs' corps, ex- 
 tending by a backward curve nearly to the river. 
 The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was held in re- 
 serve and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's 
 position. Que brigade of Porter's Avas thrown 
 to the left on the low ground, to protect the 
 flank from any movement direct from the Rich- 
 mond road. 'J'he line was very strong along the 
 whole front of the open plateau ; but from thcnco 
 to the extreme right, the troops were more de- 
 ployed. This formation was imperative, as an at- 
 tack v/ould probabl}' be made on our left. 
 
 The rigiit was rendered as secure as possible 
 by slasliing the timber and by barricading the 
 roa<!s. C'.i)!P.iiod(>re Rodgers, commanding the 
 flotilla 01! J;vr>es River, placed his gun-boats so 
 as to protect our flanks, and to connnand the ap- 
 proaches from Richmond. 
 
 Between 9 and 10 a. .ai. the enemy commenced 
 feeling along our whole left wing with his artil- 
 lery and skinuisjiers, as far to the right as Hook- 
 er'e division. 
 
 About two o'clock a column of the enemy tv»8 
 observed moving towards our right, within the 
 skirt of woods in front of lleint/.ohnan's corps, 
 but beyond the range of our artillery. Arrange- 
 ments were at once made to meet the anticipated 
 attack in that quarter : but though the column 
 was long, occupying more than two hours in i>ass- 
 ing, it disappeared, and was not again heard of. 
 The presumption is, that it retired by the rear, 
 and participated in the attack afterwards made on 
 our left. 
 
 About 3 1'. M. a hcav}' fire of artillery opened 
 on Kearney's left, find Couch's division, speedily 
 followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on 
 Couch's front. The artillery was replied to with 
 good effect by our own, and the infantry of 
 Couch's division remained lying on the ground 
 until the advancing column^was within short mus- 
 ketry rangCj when they sprang to their feet, and 
 poured in a deadly volley, which entirelj' broko 
 the attacking force, and drove them in disorder y 
 back over their own groiuid. This advantaga 
 was followed up xuitil we had advanced the right 
 of our line some seven or eight hundred yai-ds^ 
 and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us 
 a stronger position, and a better fire. 
 
 Shortly after four o'clock the firing ceased 
 along the whole front ; but no disposition was 
 evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw 
 from the field. 
 
 Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from 
 Richardson's division, was stationed upon Cou6h's 
 right, by Gen. Porter, to whom" he had been err 
 dered to report. The whole line was surveyd bj 
 the generals, and everj'thing held in readiness 
 to meet the coming attack. At G o'clock the ene- 
 my suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with 
 the whole strength of his artillery, and at onco 
 began pushing forward his columns of attack to 
 carrj' the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed 
 under cover of the woods, started at a run to 
 cross the open space, and charge our batteries ; 
 but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and 
 steady vollej^s of our infantry, in every case, sent 
 them reeling back to shelter, and covered the 
 ground with their dead and wounded. In sev- 
 eral instances our infantry withheld their firo 
 jiintil the attacking cohunus, which rushed through 
 the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, 
 had reached within a few j'ards of our lines. 
 They then poured in a single volley, and dashed 
 forward with the ba^j'onet, capturing prisoners 
 and colors, and driving the routed columns in 
 confusion from the field. 
 
 About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were ac- 
 cumulating in front of Porter and Couch, I\Ieagher 
 and Sickles wei'e sent with their brigades as soon 
 as it was considered prudent to withdraw anj, 
 portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's' troops to ' 
 reinforce that part of the line, and hold the posi- 
 tion. These brigades relieved such rcgimei'.ts of 
 Porter's corps and Couch's division, as hail ex- 
 pended their ammunition, and batteries fium tho ' 
 rescj've were pushed forward to reijlace those 
 whose boxes were empty. Until dark tlio enemy 
 persisted in bis efforts to take jmsiticm so tena- 
 ciously defended ; but despite his vastly superior 
 numbers his repeated and desnerate attacks, wore 
 
81 
 
 repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the 
 battle of Jlalveni Hill, flioiigh jl was not until 
 after 9 o'clock that the artillery 'coasod its fire. 
 
 During the whole battle Com. I'od^'^crs added, 
 greatly to the disconifUmo of the enemy, by^ 
 throw'ing shells aiftot-g his rcseijes and advacingj 
 columns. r^ • ■, 
 
 As the army in its movement from the Chicka- 
 honiiny to Harrison's Landing', was contiimally^ 
 occnincd in marching' by tnght and fightrngbyi 
 day, its commanders found no time or onportnni- 
 ty'fov collecting' data, -which would cnabie thcni' 
 to give exact return of casnliltics in each engage- 
 ment. The aggregate of our entire' losses,' from 
 ihe 26th of -Tune to the Hr-^t of July, inclu.sive.w^s 
 ascertained, af^ • ^Tavrison's Landing, 
 
 to be as follov,'- : - 
 List of the hUh-'d, woumM atid missirify, ^'i 'f^''^ 
 
 arnvj offi" Poiomar.from the 2Q'k'Ju-ne,\%^2, 
 
 to tl'w 1-' \-^i(l>/, lBo'.2, inclr^lve. • '" 
 ( . ->. ' Kiiicfr 
 
 1st.— ■Mci-'r.i. !• .cim; Reservt'3 253 
 
 2(1.— S.iuin> .. 
 
 4th.- Ken- s .. 
 
 6th.— Poiti- ■'«! . . 
 
 6th.-- Frankiir.'s 
 Engineers 
 Cavtili-y . . 
 
 187 
 189 
 69 
 6'20 
 245 
 
 Tb'fai;. 
 
 . 19 
 
 .1:582 
 
 Won'd. 
 
 1,24:0, 
 
 1,07G 
 
 1,051' 
 
 507 
 
 2,4(!0 
 
 4,313 
 
 2 
 
 60 
 
 MiflS'g'.' Apfrr. 1 
 ly'jSl 3,074 
 
 848 
 
 833 
 
 201 
 
 1,198 
 
 1,179 
 
 21 
 
 97 
 
 2.111 
 2,07:; : 
 
 777 
 
 4,278 
 
 2,737 
 
 23 
 
 17 
 
 7,709 ■ 5,958 15,219 
 
 MOYEViENT TO ni\.RRrS0N'3 LANDIKG. 
 
 Althir.'-': I'lO result of the battle^'of Malvern 
 was a coH'] '. 't.3 victory, it was ncveHheless ne- 
 cessary to lull bock still fnrtliet, in order. to reach 
 a point where our supplies could be' brought to 
 ts with certainty. As before stated, in the 
 opinion of Capt. "llodgers, commanding the gmi- 
 boat flotilla, this cduld only be dons below Cily 
 Point. Concurring in his opinion, I seleqted Har- 
 .rison's Bar as the new position of our snppliea of 
 food; forage, and ammunition, made it imperative 
 to reach the transports immediately. 
 
 Tiie greater' portion of th.e transportation of the 
 array having b.een started for Harrison's Landing 
 during the night of the 30th of June and 1st of 
 July, the order for the movement of the troops 
 was at once issued npon the final rep'TjTse of the 
 enemy at Malvern Hilh ' • ■'' ' ''" . _ 
 
 The order prescribed a movement by the. left 
 and rear — Gen. Keyes' corps to cover the mancc- 
 vi-e'. It was not carried out in detail as regards ;■ 
 the divisions on the. left, the roads being some- 
 what blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter 
 and Couch were not able to move out as early as 
 had been anticipated, and Porter found it neccs- 
 sar}' to place a rear-guard between his command 
 and the enemy. Col. Averill, of the 3d Pennsyl- 
 vania Cavalry, was entrusted with this delicate 
 duty. He had imder'his command his own regi- 
 ment and Lieut.-Col. Buchanan's brigade of regu- 
 lar infantry, and one battery. By a judicious use 
 of the resonrces at his' command, he deceived the 
 enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left 
 •wing v.'ithoiit bchig attacked, remaining himselt 
 on the previous day's battle-field mitil about 7 
 o'clock' of the 2d July. Ideantime, Gen. Keyes 
 Laving received his orders, commenced vigorous 
 preparations for covering the niov<5ment of the 
 entire army, and protecting the trains. It being 
 
 evident that the immense number of wagons and 
 artillery carriages pertaining to the army couJd 
 not move with celerity along a single road, Gen. 
 Keyes took .advantage of every accident of the 
 ground, to open new avenues, and to facilitate the 
 mo"^cmcnt.' He made preparations for obstruct- 
 nrig the roads a:fter the army had passed, so as to 
 prevent any rai)id pursuit, destroying ciicctually 
 Tm'key Bridge, on the main road, and rendering 
 other roads and approaches temporarily impass- 
 able bjj, felling trees across them.. He kept the 
 traiirs Well closed up, and directed the marcU so 
 tliat the troops cotilcl march on each side of the ' 
 roads, not obstructing the passage, bni. 1.>eing in 
 good position to repel an attack from any qua,^- 
 ter. His dispositions were so successful l.liiit, io 
 use his OAvn words : "I do not think mor.o vehi- 
 cles or more public proi)erty were abandoned on 
 the march froin Turkey Bridge thrtn would have 
 been left, in the' same slate of the roads, if the 
 ami}' had been' moving toward the enemy, in- 
 stead "of away from him; and when it is .under- 
 stood that the carriages and teams belonging to 
 this army, stretched out in one line, would extend 
 U'lt far from forty miles, the energy and caution 
 necessary for their safe withdrawal from the pre- 
 sence of an enemy vastly superior in nmnbers, 
 Avill be appreciated." ,", 
 
 The' last of the wagons did not reach the sitfe 
 selected at Harrison's Bar, until after dark on the 
 3d of July, audi he rear guard did' not move intro 
 their canip' nntil everything was secure. The 
 enemy followed npwith a .?mall ,force,and on tho 
 3d threw a few shells at tho rear guard, but were 
 quickly dispersed by our batteries, and the fire 
 of ■ the gun-boats. 
 
 Great credit must be awarded to Gen. Keyes, 
 for the skill and energy which characterized his 
 performance of the important and delicate duties 
 entrusted to his charge. 
 
 High praise is also du| to the officers and men 
 of the 1st Connecticut Artillery, Col. Tyler, for 
 the manner in which they withdrew all th.e heavy 
 guns during the seven "^days, and from i^Talvern 
 Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads, 
 the teams could, pot be brought within a couple 
 of miles of the position, but these cn#(>-etic sol- 
 diers removed the guns by hand ' '■ ''■ ■+ dis- 
 tance, leaving nothing behhid. 
 
 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CVjrPAIGN. 
 
 On the 1st of July, I received the following 
 from the President : 
 
 Washhigton, July 1,1862. 8.30 p. Jr. Maj.- 
 Gcn. Geo. B.McClei!an,— 
 
 It is impossible to reinforcS'yon for your pres- 
 ent emergency. If we had a million of men, wo 
 coiildnot get them to give you in lime. Wo 
 have not tiie men to send. If you are not strong 
 enough to face the enemy, you must find a place 
 of sc'curity and wait, rest and repair. 
 
 Maintain your ground if you can, but save the 
 army at all evenfs. even if you fall back to Fort 
 Jlonroc. We still have strength enough in th;! 
 country, and will bring it out. . A. Linoolx. 
 
 In a dispatch from the President to mc on the 
 2d of July, he says': 
 
 " If you think you are not strong enongh io 
 
lake R'tchmond just, now, I do not ask you to. 
 Try just now to save the army material and per- 
 sonnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive 
 again as fast as I can. 
 
 " The governors of eighteen states offer ine a 
 new levy of three hundred thousand, which I 
 accept." 
 
 On the 3d of July, the following kind despatch 
 was received from the President: 
 [Extract...) 
 Washington, July 3, 1S62. 3 p. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McO. — Yours of 5.30 yesterday 
 is just received. I am' satisfied that yourself, of- 
 ficers and men have done the best you could. 
 All accounts say better lighting was never done. 
 Ten thousand thanks for it A. Lincoln. 
 
 To G. B. McC. 
 
 On tlie 4tli, I sent the following to the President : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Harri- 
 son's Bar, Jaraes River, July 4, 1862. 
 
 To the President ; — I have the honor to ac- 
 knowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 
 2d instant. 
 
 I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor 
 to give my men the repose they so much reqnire. 
 
 After sending my communication on Tuesday, 
 ihe enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a 
 fierce battle ensued, lasting until night ; they 
 were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their 
 attack succeeded, the consequences would have 
 been disastrous in the extreme. This clos'ed the 
 hard fighting which had continued from the af- 
 ternoon of the 26th ult. in a daily series of en- 
 gagements, wholly unparalleled on this continent 
 for determination and slaughter on both sides. 
 
 The mutual loss in killed and wounded, is enor- 
 mous. That of the enemy certainly greatest. On 
 Tuesday evening the 1st., our army commenced 
 its movement from Haxall's to this point. Our 
 line of defence there, lu?ing too cxteiiiled to be 
 maintained by our wealcened forces. Our train 
 was immense, and about 4 a. m. on the 2d, a heavy 
 storm of rain began, which continued during 
 the entire day, and until the forenoon of yester- 
 day'. 
 
 The r(^d became horrible. Troops, artiller}'', 
 and wagons, moved on steadily, and our whole 
 army, men and material, was finally brought safe 
 into this camp. The last of the wagons reached 
 here at noon yesterdaj'. The exhaustion was 
 very great, but the army preserved its morale, 
 and would have repelled any attack which the 
 enemy was in coiulitiou to make. 
 
 \Vc now occupy a line of heights about two 
 miles from the James, a plain extending from there 
 to the river. Our front is about three miles long. 
 Tliesd lieights command our whole position, and 
 must be maintained. 'J'hc gunboats can render 
 .valuable supi)ort.oa both Hanks. If the enemy 
 attack us in front, we must hold our ground as 
 best we maj', and at whatever cost. 
 
 Our positions can be carried only by over- 
 whelming numbers. The spirit of tlie army is 
 excellent. Stragglers are liiuiing their regiments, 
 and the soldiery exhibit tlie best results of dis- 
 cipline. Our position is b}' no means impregna- 
 ble, espccialiy as a niorass o.xtends on this side of 
 Iho liigh ground from our ceutro to the James ou 
 
 our right. The enemy may attack in vast num- 
 bers, and if so our front will be the scene of a 
 desperate battle which if lost, will be decisive. 
 Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wound- 
 ed, and prisoners, I cannot now approximate to 
 any statement of' our losses, but we ara not beat- 
 en in any conflict. The enemy were unable by 
 their utmost efforts to drive us from any field. 
 Never did such a change of base, involving a 
 retrogade movement, and under incessant attacks 
 from a most deternKned and vastly more nume- 
 rous foe, partake so little of disorder. \Vc have 
 lost no guns except 25 on the field of battle, 21 
 of which were lost hy the giving way of McCall'i 
 division under the onset of superior numbers. 
 
 Our corumunications by the James River are 
 not secure. There are points where the enemy 
 can establish themselves with cannon or musket- 
 ry and command the river, and where it is not 
 certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In 
 case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will 
 still make every cfibrt to preserve at least the 
 personnel of the army, and the events of the last 
 few days leave no question that the troops will 
 do all that their country can ask. Send such re- 
 inforcements as you can. I will do what I can. 
 We are shipping our wounded and sick, and land- 
 ing supplies. The navy departiucMt should co- 
 operate with us to the extent of its resources. 
 Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power, in the 
 kindest and most efficient manner. 
 
 When all the circumstances of the case are 
 known, it will be acknowledged by all competent 
 judges that the movement just completed bj 
 this army is unparalleled in the aimals of war. 
 Under the most diflicult circumstances, we have 
 preserved our trains, our guns, our material, and, 
 above all, our honor. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 To which I received the following repi}' : * 
 Washington, July a, 1662. 9 a. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC,. Commanding army of tho 
 Potomac. 
 
 A thousand thanks for the relief your two des- 
 patches of 12 and 1 r. m. yesterday, gave me. 
 Be assured, the heroism and skill of yourself, of- 
 ficers, and men, is and forever will be apprecia- 
 ted. 
 
 If you can hold your present position, we shall 
 hive the enemy yet. A. Lincoln. 
 
 The following letters were received from his 
 Excellency the President. 
 
 War Department, Washington City, D. C. July 
 4th. 1862. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. SIcC. — I imderstaud your position, 
 as stated in your letter, and by Gen. Marcy. To 
 reinforce you so as to enable you to resume the 
 oflensive within a month, or even six weeks, is 
 impossible. In addition to that arrived and now 
 arriving from the Potomac (about ten thousand, I 
 sujipose), and about ten thousand I hope you will 
 have from Burnside very soon, and about five 
 tlion.sai;d from Hunter a liHic later, I do not eeo 
 how I can send you another man within a month. 
 Under these circiinistanccs, the defensive, for 
 the present, must be your only care. Save the 
 army first, where you arc, if you can, and sec- 
 ondly, by removal, it you must. You, on the 
 ground, must bo tlie judge as to which you will 
 
83 
 
 attempt, and of the means for effecting it. I but 
 give it as my opinion, tliat with the aid of the 
 gunboats aiui the reinforcements mentioned above 
 you can hold your present position, provided, 
 and so long as, you can keep the James lliver 
 open below you. If you are not tolerably conli- 
 dent you can keep the James River open, you 
 had better remove as soon as possible. I do not 
 remember that you have expressed any appre- 
 hension as to the danger of having your commu- 
 uication cut on the river below- you, yet I do not 
 •appose it can have escaped your attention, 
 
 Yours very truh', A. L. 
 
 P.3. — If at any time yon feel able to take the 
 offensive, you are not restrained from doing so. 
 
 A. L. 
 
 The following telegram was sent on the 7th: 
 
 Lisa {quarters. Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
 July 7, 1862, 8.30 p.m. — As boat is starting, I have 
 •only time to acknowledge receipt of dispatch by 
 Gen. Marc}'. Enemy have not attacked. My po- 
 •ition is very strong, and daily becoming more 
 80. If not attacked to-day, I shall laugti at them. 
 I have been anxious about my communications. 
 Had long consultation about it with Flag-o'Hicer 
 Goldsborough last night; he is confident he can 
 keep river 'open. He sliould have all gun-boats 
 possible. Will see him again this morning. My 
 men iu splendid spirits, and anxious to try it 
 again. 
 
 Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, 
 *nd don't lose confidence iu this army. 
 
 A. L., President. G. B. McC. 
 
 Willie General-in-Chief, and directing the oper- 
 ations of all our armies in the field, I had become 
 deeply impressed with the importance of adopt- 
 ing and carrying out certain views regarding .the 
 -conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, were 
 essential to it* objects and its success. During 
 an active campaign of three mouths i!i the eue- 
 tny's country these were so fuliy confirmed that 
 I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we 
 then occupied, not to withhold a candid cxpres- 
 Bion of the more important of these view.s liom 
 the conmiauder-in-chief whom tlie constitution 
 places at tlie head of the armies and navies, as 
 well as of the government of the nation. 'I'he 
 following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln : 
 
 Ileadquaiters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Jiarrison'.s Landings Va., July 7, 1862. 
 
 Mr. President, — You have been fully informed 
 that the rebel army is iu our front, with tlie i>ur- 
 pose of overwhelming us by attacking our posi- 
 tions or reducing us by blocking our river com- 
 munications. I can not but regard our condition 
 as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of pos- 
 Bible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, 
 for your private consideration, my general views 
 concerning the existing state of the rebellion, 
 although they do not strictly relate to the situa- 
 tion of this army, or strictly come within scope 
 of my official duties. These views amount to 
 convictions, and arc deeply impressed upon my 
 mind and heart. Our cause must never be aban- 
 doned; it is the cause of free institutions and 
 self goverimient. The Constitution and the 
 Union must bo preserved, whatever may be the 
 cost in time treasure or blood. If secession is 
 
 successful, other dissolutions are clcirlj^tbbo 
 seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, 
 political faction, or foreign war, shake your sBt^ 
 tied purpose to enforce the equal operation of 
 the laws of the United States upon the people of 
 ever}' State. 
 
 The time has come when the government must 
 determine upon a civil and military polic}' cover- 
 ing the Avhole ground of our national trouble. 
 Tiie responsibility of determining, declaring, find 
 supporthig such civil and military ])olic3\ and of 
 directing the whole course of national affair's In 
 regard to the rebellion must now be assumed 
 and exercised by you, or our cause will bo lost; 
 The constitution gives you power sufticient eveu 
 for thepi'eseut terrible exigency. "^-.t 
 
 This rebellion has assumed the character of 
 war; as such it should be regarded; and it 
 should be conducted upon the highest principles 
 known to Christian civilization. It should not be 
 a war looking to the subjugation of the people of 
 any State in any event. It should not be at all'a 
 war upon poprdation, but against armed forces 
 and political organizations. Neither contiscatio'n 
 of property, political executions of persons, ter- 
 ritorial organization of States, or forcible abolition 
 of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. 
 In prosecuting the war, all private property arid 
 unarmed persons should be strictly protected, 
 subject only to the necessity of military opera- 
 tions. All private property taken fnr military 
 use should be paid or receipted for ; jiillage ai^d 
 waste should be treated as high crimes : all tin- 
 necessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offen- 
 sive demeanor by the military towards citizens 
 promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not 
 be tolerated, except in places where active hos- 
 tilities exist, and oaths not required by ejiaqt- 
 ments constitutionally made, should be ireitlWr 
 demanded nor received. Military government 
 should be confined to the preservation of public 
 <u-der and the protection of political righ'ft. 
 Military power should not be allowed to interfere 
 with the relations of servitude, either by snp- 
 porting or impairing the authority of the master, 
 except for suiiprcssing disorder, as in oth^r 
 cases. Slaves contraliand under th.e act of Cbh- 
 gress, seeking uiilitury protection, should receive 
 it. The riglit of the 'government to appropriate 
 permanently to its own service, claims to slave 
 labor, should be asserted, and the riglit of the 
 owner to compensation therefor should be recog- 
 nized. 
 
 This principle might he extended, up on gro\lnds 
 of military necessity and securit}', to all the slaves 
 within a particular State, thus working manu- 
 mission in such State ; and in Missouri, perhaps 
 in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in 
 Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is 
 only a question of time. 
 
 A 63'stem of policy thus constitutional and coti- 
 servative, and pervaded by the infiuences of 
 Christianity and freedom, would receive the sup- 
 port of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply 
 impress the rebel masseij and all foreign nations, 
 and it might be humbly hopeil that it would cotn- 
 mcnd itself to the favor of the Almighty. 
 
 Unless the orinciples o'ovcrning the futnro oon- 
 
duel, of our stniggle sluill be made known and 
 approved, the cffun to obtain requisite forces 
 will be aln:iost liopclcss. A declaration of radical 
 views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disin- 
 tegrate our i>resent araiies. 
 
 The pohuy of the government must be sup- 
 ported by ooJioontiatious of military powtT. The 
 national forces sliould not be dispersed in expe- 
 ditions, posts of occujiation, and liiinierous ar- 
 mies, but shonld be mauily collected inr.o masses, 
 and brought to bear upon the armies of the con- 
 federate States. Those armies thoroughly de- 
 feated, the political structure which they support 
 would soon cease to exist. 
 
 In carrying out any system of policy which you 
 may form, you will require a commander-in-chief 
 of the army ; one who possesses your confidence; 
 understands your views, and who is competent 
 to execute your orders by directing the military 
 forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the 
 objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place 
 for myself. I am willing to serve you in such 
 position as you may assign me, and I will do so 
 as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. 
 I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I 
 hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have 
 written this letter with sincerity towards you, 
 and from love of my country. Very respectfully, 
 your obedient servant, G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 Ccmd'g. 
 
 ,ttHis Excellency A. L., President. 
 ' 'l telegraphed the President on the 11th as fol- 
 Jows: 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
 July 11, 1862. 3 p.m. 
 
 We are very strong here now so far as defen- 
 eive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us 
 strong enough to advance and try it again. All 
 in fine spirits. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 A. L., President. 
 
 These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th 
 and 18th, to his Excellency the President. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
 July 12, 18G2, 7.15 p.m.— Hill and Longstreet 
 crossed into New Kent County via Long Bridge. 
 1 am still ignorant what road they afterwards 
 took, but will know shortly. 
 
 Nothing else of 'interest since last dispatch, 
 rain ceased and everything quiet. Men resting 
 well, but beginning to be impatient for another 
 
 I am more and more convinced that tin's army 
 ought not to bo withdr.awn from here: but 
 promplly reinforced and thrown again iipoi! Rioli- 
 mond. If we have a littlo more than half a 
 chance wo can take it. I dreaj the effects of any 
 retreat n]>()n the moialc of t!ie men. 
 
 G. B. .McC. to A. r... iVesidejit. 
 
 IJeadquartcrs, Army of the iV'tomac, Berkeley, 
 Jnly 1^. 16C>'1, 8 a.m. — I have Cf-jsultc'd fully with 
 Gen. BurnMdn_ nij,] would comm.cud to yonr fav- 
 orabh- con8:der.iLion the gonenl's plan inv l>ring- 
 ing sevor. '.idditK-nal retnm'^nt'i from Nurtii Caro- 
 lina, i.'V ieavhig Nf^nb^rn to the caro of the gun- 
 boato Ir .ippo:«rH v.Tnifcstiy to be our polii-j^ to 
 conci'utrato here ev^ryt'iuig wo can possibly 
 epare I'lom less in'portani I'ointb. to make sureuf 
 crushing the euciuy at Richmond, which seems 
 
 ■ht here. 
 
 .lat. 
 
 to Maj.-Gen. H. W. U., Comd'g. U". 
 • to tlio general- 
 
 84 
 
 clearly to be the most important ])oint in rebel-- 
 dum. Nothing s!iouidbeIf>ft to chanco here. I 
 Would rocoiumend that Gen. Bunisicie, with all 
 his Troopfe, be ordered to this army, *o enable it 
 to assume the oifensive as .soon as possible. 
 G. B. McO; to A. ]j. ' ^ •■ '- •. ' ,- ■ ■ 
 
 Headquarters, .ivittyofth^ .Potpniac, Beii<c!ey, 
 July 18-, 1862. 8 a.m. — No change worth reporting 
 in the state of affairs. Sonw twenty t>5 twenty - 
 five thousand of enemy at Petersburg, and others 
 theivce to liichmond. Those at Petersburg say 
 they are part of F>eaurc-'gard"s arnv}'. New troojis 
 arriving via Petersburg. Am anxi<ms to have 
 determination of government, that no time nuvy 
 be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very pre- 
 cious now, and perfect unity of action jiecessary. 
 
 G. B. McC. to A. L. . 
 
 The following was telegraphed to Gen. Halleck 
 on the 28th': 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potonuic, Berkeley, 
 July 28, 1862/ 8 a.m. — Nothing especially new 
 except corroboration of reports that reinforce- 
 ments reaching Richmond from South. It is not 
 conBrmed that anAi- of Bragg's troops arf ; 
 My ppinion is more and more fir'" 
 defense of Washington, and t'.! 
 once reinforced by all availalile ;;", 
 me to advance. Retreat would be i' 
 the armv and the cause. I am 'confide ht 
 
 G. B. McC. 
 S. Army. 
 
 On the 30th I sent the followin,^ 
 in-chief: 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac, erkeley, 
 July 30, 1862, 7 p. m. 
 
 I hope that it nray soon be decided what is to 
 be done by his army ; and that the :iecision may 
 bo to reinforce it at once. We are losing much 
 vahiable time, and that at a moment when energy 
 and decision are sadly needed. • 
 
 G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H. W. IL, Com. U. S. A. 
 
 About half an hour after midnight, on the 
 morning of A.ugust 1st, the enemy brought somo 
 light batteries to Coggin's Point and tlie Coles 
 House on tlio riglit bank of James River, directly 
 opposite Harrison's Lai;ding, and opened a heavy 
 firo upon cur ship|iing and encampments. It was 
 continued riipidly tor about tiiirty minutes, when 
 they were driven hack by the fire of our guns. 
 This afffdr was reported in the following dis- 
 patch : Headq's. Armv of the I'otomac, I'erkeley. 
 Aug. 2. .1862, 8 A.M. 
 
 Firing of nr.;ht before ia.'^t killed some 10 men, 
 and woninled about 1.5. No harm of the slight- 
 est conseqno.'ice done to the shipjnng, although 
 several stjiick. Sent part}- across river yester- 
 day to the ('oles House ; destroyed it ami cut 
 down the tim])er ; will complete work to-day ; 
 and also send ])arty to Coggin's Point, which I 
 will probably occupy. 1 will attend to ynnr tele- 
 graph about presshig, at once, will send Hooker 
 out. Give me Bitrnside, and I will stir these 
 jiciiple up. I )ieed more cavalry, liavo only 3,700 
 for iluty in cavalry divisioii. ^j 
 
 ' Ad j -General's office forgot to send- ^ykos's 
 C'lr.-.mission, as maj.-gen.. with those of other odni- 
 m;i,ud'jrs. Do me ihe iavor to hurry it on. 
 
 G. B. MeG. to iL-Geii. H.-W, H. 
 • .Ex" Old "10 .-'ii :£rj. :<uit :n ,\bC.' 
 
85 
 
 To prevent another demonstration of this cha- 
 racter, and to secure a debouche on the south 
 side of tlie James, it became necessary to occuj)y 
 Coggiu's Point, whicli was done on the 3d, and 
 the euemy, as will be seen from the following 
 dispatch, driven back towards Petersburg : 
 
 Ueadq's., Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
 Aug. 3, 1862, 10 p. M. 
 
 Coggiu's Point was occupied to-day, and tim- 
 ber felled so as to make it quite defensible. I 
 went over the ground myself, and found that Du- 
 aae had, as usual, selected an admirable position, 
 which can be intrenched with a small amount of 
 labor, so as to make it a formidable tetc-dc-pont, 
 covering the landing of a large force. I shall be- 
 gin intrencliing it by the labor of contrabands to- 
 morrow. The position covers the Coles House, 
 which is directly in front of Westover. We have 
 now a safe debouche on the south bank, and are 
 secure against midnight cannonading. A few 
 thousands more men would place us in condition 
 at least to annoy and disconcert tlio enemy very 
 much. 
 
 I sent Col. Averell this morning with 300 cav- 
 alry, to examine the country south side of the 
 James, and trj^ to catch some cavalry at Sycamore 
 Qhurch, which is on the maui road from Peters- 
 burg to Suffolk, and some five mijes from Coles 
 Ho.use. ' , , 
 
 lie found a cavalry force of 550 men, attacked 
 them at once, drove in their advanced guard to 
 their camp, where he ha,d a .sharp skitaiis'ii, and 
 dr^'e them oft in disorder. 
 
 *e burned their entire camp, v 
 missary and c[uartcr-mastei's stores, and liion re- 
 turned and recro.gsed the river. lie took but two 
 prisoners, had .one mauwaunded by a ball, and 
 one by. a sabro. cut. Capi !MeTnlosh made a 
 handsomo charge". The '. o, of 
 
 the 5th regulars, and tl)., cav- 
 
 :alry. 
 . Col. Averell conducted this airair,!as he,d<>cs 
 everything he iiucfertakes, to ray entire satisfac- 
 tion., - . ■ ., 
 - G. B. ^leC. to jraj.-Gen.H. ^Y. IT., Com'g. U. S. A. 
 
 On the 1st (ti August, I I'ecelved the following 
 •disp^jchcs : 
 
 Washington, July 30, 18G2. 8 p.xr. 
 
 Maj.-Gcn. G. B. McC. — A dispatch just received 
 from Gen. Pope, says that desei-ters report that 
 the enemy is moving soutlr of James River, and 
 that the force in Ptichmond is very small. I sug- 
 gest that he be pressed in that direction, so as to 
 ascertain the facts of the case. 
 
 IT. W. n., i\Iaj.-Gen. 
 
 Washington, July 30, 1SG2. 8 p.ji.— Maj.-Gen. 
 G. B. McC. — In order to enable you to move in 
 any direction, it "is necessary to relieve you of 
 your sick. The surgeon-general has therefore 
 been directed to make arrangements for them at 
 other places, and the quarter-master-gencral to 
 provide transportation. . I I^ope you will rend 
 them away as quickly as po-ssibio, and a<lvise me 
 M Uicir removal. i 11. W. II., iraj.-Gcn. 
 wIe la clear that tlic general-in-cliiof attaciied 
 some weiglt to the report received from Ge)i. 
 Pope, and I was justified in supposing; r.hat tlie 
 :aiordcr in ri-gard to removing tlio sick, fontcni- 
 
 platcd an offensive movement, rather than a re- 
 treat, as I had no other data than the telegrams 
 just given, from which to form an opinion as to 
 the intentions of the government. The following 
 telegram strengthened me in that belief. 
 
 Washington, July 31, 162. 10 a.m. 
 
 Jlaj.-Gen. G. B. jNIcC. — General Pope again tele- 
 graphs that the encnw is reported to be evacua- 
 ting Richmond, and falling back on Danville and 
 Lynchburg. II. W. II., Maj.-Gen. 
 
 In occupying Coggiu's Point, as already de- 
 scribed,- I was hifluenced by the ncccssi*}' of pos- 
 sessing a secure debouche on the south of the 
 James, in order to" enable me to move on the com- 
 mimications of Richmond in that direction, as well 
 as to prevent a repetition of midnight canouaii- 
 ades. 
 
 To carry out Gen. IlallecFs first order of July 
 30th, it was necessary lirst to gain po.ssession of 
 j\Ialvern Hill, which was occupied b}' the enemy, 
 apitarently in some little force, and controlled iho 
 direct approach to Richmond, Its temporary oc- 
 cupation, at least, was equally necessary in tlis 
 event of a movement upon Petersburg, or even 
 the abandonment ot the Peninsula. Gen. lIooKer, 
 with his own division and Pleasouton'.s cavalry, 
 was therefore directed to gain possession of Mal- 
 vern Hill on the night of the 2d August." He 
 failed lO do so, as the following dispatch recites: 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkley, 
 August 9, 1862. 10.20 p.m. . _ , 
 
 T';:- ;:ioyemcnt undortakcii up. tlie river last 
 
 lod, on account ot" the incompetency of 
 
 The proper steps have bscn taken fp- 
 
 iU\,y lo remed}' this evil, and I hope to be ready 
 
 to-morrow night to carry out your suggestions as- 
 
 to pressing ; at least, to accompli.sh the first in- 
 
 .dispensable step. G. B. JiIcC, M:ij-Gen.,Coind)'g-. 
 
 ' Maj.-Gen. llallcck, Comd'g U. S. A ruiv. 
 
 Oa the 4th Gen. Hooker was rcinforded by Gon. 
 ]3odgwick's division, and, having obtained a knowl- 
 edge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Mal- 
 xi'hi Ilill, and driving tho enemy back towards 
 Richmond. The following is my icport of this 
 aftair at the time : 
 
 . Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862. 1 p.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H, W. Halloek, Comd'g. U. S- Army : 
 General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a 
 very considerable force of infantry and artillery 
 stationed at this i^lace, and carried it handsomely 
 driving the enemy towards New Market, which 
 is four miles distant, and where it is said they 
 have a large force. We have captured 100 pris- 
 oners, killed and wounded several, with a loss on 
 our part of only three killod and eleveii wounded 
 — among the latter two officers. 
 
 I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to 
 act as circumstances may require, after tho re- 
 ' turn of my cavaky reconnoissanccs. 
 
 Tho mass of tlie enemy escaped under the 
 cover of a dense fog, but our cavalry arc still in 
 pursuit, :.nfi I tiust nvjy succeed ni capturing 
 many mor?. 
 
 Thi:^ is a very ;<dvui,t..,ceous i ■ ^•tioll to cover 
 .V.I 'advance on' Richmond, uid only I434 miles 
 distai)t, and I feel confident that, with reinforce- 
 nie'.iib, I could march tliis army (here in live 
 d;n f^. 
 
I this TrisLaiiL learn tiiat sevcr.il brig.ifii'j^ ol t!ic 
 enemy iirc four niilcs from liere, on the Quaker 
 road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet 
 them. ^ 
 
 Gen. ITookei-'s dispositions wore admirable, 
 and his ,oificf-rs and men displayed their usual 
 gallantry. G. B. McO., Major-Gen. 
 
 On U'lC same day the following telegram was 
 sent : 
 
 ^falvern Hill, Aug 5, 1862, 8 p.m. 
 
 Jlaj.-Gen. IT, W. H., Commauding U. S. Army. 
 — Since my last dispatch Colonel Averell has re- 
 turned from a recoinioissancc in the dire'ction of 
 Savage's Station, towards Richmond. He en- 
 countered the 10th Virginia cavalry near "White 
 Oak Swamp Bridge, charged and drove_ them 
 Bonie distance towards Bichmond, capturing 28 
 men and horses, and killing and wounding se- 
 veral. 
 
 Our troops have advanced twelve miles in one 
 direction, and seventeen in another, towards 
 Riclnnond, to-day. 
 
 We have secured a strong position on Coggin's 
 Point, opposite our quartermaster's depot, which 
 ■will effectually prevent the rebels from using ai"- 
 tillery hereafter against our camps. 
 
 I learn this evening that there is a foi-ce of 
 20,000 men about six miles back from this point, 
 on the south bank of the river, what their object 
 is I do not know, but will keep a sharp look out 
 on their movements. 
 
 I am sending off sick as rapidly as onr trans- 
 ports will take thera. I am also doing every- 
 thing in my power to carry out your orders, to 
 push reconnoisances towards the rebel capital, 
 and hope soon to find out whether the reports 
 regarding the abandonment of that place arc true. 
 G. B. McC, Major-Gen. 
 
 To the dispatch of 1 p.m., August 5, the follow- 
 ing ansv/er was received : 
 
 Wasliington, Angnst 6, 1862, .3 a.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gcn. G. B. McC. — 1 have no reinforce- 
 ments to send you. II. W. II. Maj.-Gen. 
 
 And soon after the following : 
 
 Washington, August G, ]862. 
 
 Maj,-Gen. G. B. MeC. — You will immediately 
 seiid a regiment of cavalry and several batteries 
 of artillery to Biu'nside's command at Acquia 
 Creek, It is reported that Jackson is moving 
 north witli a very large force. 
 
 il. W. II , Major-General. 
 
 On the 4(h I had received Gen. Ilalleck's order 
 of the 3d (which appears below), directing mo to 
 withdraw the army to Acquia, and on the same 
 day sent an earnest protest against it. 
 
 A few hours before this, Gen. Hooker had in- 
 formed me that his cavalry pickets reported large 
 bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them 
 in, and that he would probably be attacked at, 
 daybreak. Under these circumstances I had de- 
 tc'injied to support him, but as I could not get 
 tliu whole army in position until tho next after- 
 noon, I concluded, upon the receipt of the above 
 telegram from lite general-in-chief, to withdraw 
 Gen. Hook( r, that there mi.uht be the least jvos- 
 siblc delay in oonformiug to Ocn. ilalleck's orders. 
 1 therefore sent to Gen. llnokor tho following 
 letter : 
 
 86 
 
 Headquartcis, Aimv of the Polomae, 
 Berkeley, August G', 1862. 10 p.m. 
 
 My dear General: — I lind it will not be possi^ 
 ble to get the whole army in position before some 
 time to-morrow afternoon, which will he too late 
 to support you and hold the entire position, 
 should the enemy attack in large torce at day- 
 break, Avhich there is strong reason to suppose 
 he intends doing. 
 
 Should we light a general battle at Malvern, h 
 will be necessary to abandon the whole of our 
 works here, and run tho aisk of getting baci 
 here. ' • 
 
 Under advices I have received from Washing- 
 ton, I think it necessary for you to abandon the 
 position to-night, getting everything awty before 
 daylight.. 
 
 Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with 
 orders to destroy the Turkey Greek Bridge wher 
 they are forced back. 
 
 The roads leading into Ilaxalls from the right 
 should be strongl}' v,-atched, and Haxalls at least 
 held by strong cavalry force and some light bat- 
 teries, as long as possible. 
 
 I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely 
 to your discretion. 
 
 Please signal to tho fleet when the withdrawal 
 is about completed. 
 
 Report frequently to these headquarters. Gen. 
 Sumner w.as ordered up to support you, but will 
 halt where this passes liim. and will inform you 
 where he is. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Gen. J. n., Comd'g at Malvern Hill. 
 
 And the following reply was sent to Gtn. 
 Ilalleck: ^ 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 6, 1862, 11.30 p. m. 
 
 Dispatli of to-day received. I have not quifo 
 four thousand cavalry for duty in cavalry divi- 
 sion, so that I cannot possibly spare any more. I 
 really need many more than I now have, to carry 
 out your instructions. 
 
 The enemy are moving a large force upon 
 jVIalvern Hill. In view of your dispatches, and 
 the fact that I can not place the whole army in 
 position before daybreak, I have ordered Hooker 
 to Avithdraw during the night, if it is po.spible. 
 If he can not do so, I must support him. •Until 
 this matter is developed, I can not send any bat- 
 teries. 1 hope I can do so to-morrow, if trans- 
 portation is on hand., 
 
 I willbbey the ordVr as soon as circumstances 
 will admit. My .artillery is none too nnnerous 
 now. I Jiave only been able to send oil some 
 twelve hundred sick; no transportation. Thero 
 shall be no tlelay that I can avoid. G. B. Mc(!., 
 M;;j.-(jcn. Comd'sr. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. \V. H., Comd'g U. S. Army. 
 
 Five batteries, with their horses and equip- 
 ments com))lete, were embarked on the 7th and 
 8lh. Simultaneously with Gen. Hooker's opera- 
 tions upon Malvern, I despatched a cavalry force 
 under Col, Averell towards Savage's Station, to 
 ascertain if the enemy Avere making any move- 
 ments towards our left flank. He Unmd a rebel 
 cavalry regiment near the White-Oak Swamp 
 Hriilge, and cnmfiletcly routed it, pursuing' well 
 towards Savage's Station. 
 
b7 
 
 These important pieliimnaiy operatione assieted 
 my preparations for the removal of the army to 
 Acquia Creek, and the sending off our eick and 
 supplies was pushed both day and night a3 ra- 
 pidly as the means of transportation permitted. 
 
 Oa the subject of the witlulrawal ot the army 
 from Harrison's Landing, the followmg corres- 
 pondence passed between the Gcneral-in-chiet 
 and myself while the reconuoissances towards 
 Richmond were in progress : _ . 
 
 On the 2d of August I received the following . 
 
 Washington, Aug. 1, 1862, 3.4o p. m. 
 Mai -Gen G. B. McG- :— You have not answered 
 my telegram [of July 30, 8 p.m.] about the re- 
 moval o1- your sick. Remove them as rapidly as 
 possible, and telegraph me when they will be out 
 of your way. The President wishes an answer 
 as early as possible. tt j . a 
 
 To which this reply was sent : Ileadq s, Army 
 of the Potomac, Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862 11 p. m. 
 
 Your telegram of 2d is received. The answer 
 rto dispatch of July 30] was sent this morning. 
 We have about 12,500 sick, of whom perhaps 
 4 000 might make easy marches. We have here 
 the means to transport 1,200, and will embark to- 
 morrow that number of the worst cases. With 
 allthe.meansatthe disposal of the medical di- 
 rector, the reinairider could be shipped in trorn , 
 to 10 davs. It is impossible for me to decide 
 what cases to send off, unless I know what is to 
 be done with this army. 
 
 Were the disastrous measures of a retreat 
 adopted, all the sick who can not march and fignt 
 should be despatched by water. Should the 
 army advance, many of the sick could be of ser- 
 vice at the depots. " If it is to remain here any 
 length of time, the question assumes still a diiiei'- 
 ent phase. , ■, t 
 
 Until I am informed what is to be done, 1 can- 
 not act uiiderstaudingly, or for the good of the 
 service. If I am kept longer in ignorance^ ot 
 what is to be elfected, I cannot be expected to 
 accomplish the obje'ct in view. In the meantime 
 I will do all in my power to carry out what I con- 
 ceive to be your wishes. 
 " G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H. W. H., Com. U. S. A. 
 
 The moment I received the instructions for re- 
 moving the sick, I at once gave the necessary di- 
 rections for carrying them out. With the small 
 amount of transportation at hand, the removal ot 
 the severe cases alone would necessarily take 
 several days, and in the meantime I desired in- 
 formation to determine what I should do with 
 others. 
 
 . The order required mo to send them away " as 
 quickly as possible, and to notify the Gen.-in-Chief 
 when ihey were removed." 
 
 Previous to the receipt of the dispatch of the 
 2'd of August, not havhig been advised of what 
 ihe army under my command was expected to do, 
 or which way it was lo move, if it moved at all, I 
 sent the following dispatch : 
 
 Ileadti's., Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
 Aug. 3, 1862. 
 I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe : are they 
 for removing my sick? If so, to what extent am 
 I required to go in sending them off? 
 There are not many who need go 
 
 As 1 iiin not in any way informed of the intea- 
 tions of the government in regard to tliis army, I 
 am unable to judge what proportion of the sick 
 should leave here, and must ask for specific 
 orders. „ ,„ „ 
 
 G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H. W. H. ^ 
 If the army %vas to retreat to Fort Monroe, it 
 was important that it should be unincumbered 
 with any sick, wounded, or other men who might 
 at all interfere with its mobility ; but if the ob- 
 ject was to operate directly on Richmond from the 
 position we then occupied, there were many cases 
 of slight sickness which would speedily be cured, 
 and the patients returned to duty. As the ser- 
 vice of every man would be important in the 
 event of a forward offensive movement, I con- 
 ceived it to be of the utmost consequence that I 
 should know what was to be done. It was to 
 ascertain this that I sent the dispatch of 11 P. Jt. 
 on the 3d, before receiving the following tele- 
 gram : ^ ,^ 
 
 Washington, Aug. 3,1862. 7.45 p. m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McC— I have waited most 
 anxiously to learn the result of your forced re- 
 connoissance towards Richmond, and also wheth- 
 er all your sick have been sent away, and I can 
 get no ansAver to my telegram. It is determined 
 to withdraw your army from flie Peninsula ta 
 Acquia Creek. You will take immediate measures 
 to effect this, covering the movement the best 
 you can. Its real object and withdrawal should 
 be concealed even from your own officers. Year 
 material and transportation should be removed 
 first. You will assume control of all the means,. 
 of transportation within your reach, and apply 
 to the naval forces for all the assistance they cam 
 render you. You will consult freely with the 
 commander of these forces. Tho entire execu- 
 tion of the movement is left to your discretion 
 and judgment. You will leave such forces a« 
 you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, 
 and other places which we must occupy. 
 
 H. W. H„ Maj-Gen. Comd'g Q. S. A. ^ 
 I proceeded to obey this order with all possi- 
 ble rapidity, tirmly impressed, however, with the 
 conviction that the withdrawal of the army of 
 the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, where its 
 communications had, by the co-operalion of the 
 gun-boats, been rendered perfectly secure, would 
 at the time have the most disastrous effect upon 
 our cause. I did not, as the ooimuanderof that 
 army, allow the occasion to pass without distinct- 
 ly setting forth my views upon the subject to 
 the authorities, as in the following telegram. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkely, 
 Aug. 4,1862. 12 m. , . . , . 
 
 Your telegram of last evening is received, i 
 must confess that it has caused me the greatest 
 pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that 
 the order to withdraw this army to Acquia Creek 
 will prove disastrous to our cause. 
 I fear it will be a fatal blow. 
 Several days are necessary to complete the 
 preparations for so important amovementas this; 
 and while they arc in progress, I beg that car<v, 
 ful consideration may be given to my statomeDts, 
 This army is now in excellent discipline and, 
 condition. We hold a debouche on both bank* 
 
88 
 
 of the James R,ivcr, so (liaL we are free to act in 
 any direction, ami with the assistance of the gun- 
 boats I consider our coinniuuications as now se- 
 cure. We are twenty-five miles from Richinond, 
 and are not likcJy to meet the enemy in force suf- 
 ficient to tiglit a battle, until we have marched 
 fifteen to eighteen miles, whicii brings us practi- 
 cally within ten miles of Richmond. Our longest 
 line of land transportation would be from this 
 point twenty-five miles : but witli the aid' of the 
 gun-boats we can supply the army by water du- 
 ring its advance, cettuhily to within twelve miles 
 of Richmond. 
 
 At Acquia Creek we would be scventy-fiY.e 
 miles from RicTiniond, with land transpbrtdtiou 
 all the way. '.' . 
 
 From here to Fort Monroe, is a march of ab'out 
 seventy miles, for I regard it as impracticable 
 to withdraw this arni^ and its material, except 
 by land. ' '■' 
 
 I iThe result of the movement would thus 'be a 
 marcli of one hundred and forty-five miles to 
 reacfli a point now only twentj'-five miles distant, 
 and to deprive ourselves entire'}'' of the power- 
 ful aid of the gun-boats and water transportation. 
 Add to t'lis the certain demoralization of this ar- 
 my, v.-'iich would.cnsuc,, the terribly dcpresshig 
 ett'c't upon thepicop'lc of.thcNort''i,;u!d tt-estVong 
 prub:!,biiii:y that itwonhl inflin'.'i-c t'o. ■','■■-•; dow- 
 6VS to recognize our advovria: 
 tOTne sufficient reasons t>) ;:i'. 
 duty to'iii-.';o,in Ll: lerms a ' 
 
 onrii;\:ii"i;i;j,\ that may be ; 
 
 4ind thai:, l\a' from rcca.liug Lais army it be ].)i\;iiip|- 
 ly reinforced to enable .it to resiune the offensive. 
 
 It may be said tliat there are tvorfiihfoi"cerne'nts 
 available.' I ])oint fo ]>urnside's force.io that of- 
 P6pe,"not nec^ssai-y to maintain a'strict defensive 
 in front of ^Vasi liiig ton ami liar ncr's Ferry, to 
 ifiose portions of the array of tlio west not rc- 
 qixircd for'a strict defensive there, llcrc direct!}^ 
 in front of this army, is tueheitrfof the rebcHion; 
 it is here that all our rcsoni'ces siuiuldbo collect 
 ed to sirike the blow which will" determine- the 
 fate of the nation,. All points of secondary 'im- 
 portance elscwlicrc' s!io:i! ! Iv^ aUaiidoiied, and 
 ever}' available man h)\y\ a decided vic- 
 
 tory here, and the milil.!. , a of the rebel- 
 
 lion is crushed — ib-niattcrt; not what partial rc- 
 verscs'we may meet with elsewhere.. Here is the 
 true defense of AVasliington ; it isliero on the 
 banks of the James that the fate of the Union 
 'Bliould be deciiled 
 
 Clear in my coir right, strong in tlie 
 
 consciousness that i ...i^. v >^r been, 'and still am 
 actfiated solely by love of my country, knowing" 
 that no ambitious or sellish motives have influ- 
 enced me IVonr the coin'mencement of this war, I 
 do nov\', w't'! T I) 'ver'did in my life before, I c\\- 
 
 ■ may iio rescinded. 
 
 ■ OS )i(it ])r(ivail, I w';!l \> '. i 
 tiad lio.a'l, obi.-y .);>'ur orders to the ui'.nu.sl, of n\y 
 power, directing to the movement, Avhicii I clearly 
 foresee will I)e one of tlie utmost, delicacy and 
 diiUcult}', ■■.v'ii:itevcr skill I jaay possess. 
 
 Whatv; ' csu't may bo, and God grant 
 
 tliatlii!;: i in ii'.y forebodings, I shall al, 
 
 leiist have ...v .utornal dati'iiiic'.tion tliat'l" have 
 writtoji and Kuokcii frankly, u,ud have tiuagliL lo 
 
 do tlic best in my power to avert disaster from 
 niv countr}'. G. B. iMcC, Maj.-t^on. Comd'g. 
 
 ■-Maj.-Gen. II. W. 11., Connbg U. S. A. 
 
 Soon after sending this telegram,! received Iho 
 following in reply to mine of II p.-m. of tiie 3d: 
 Washington, Aug. 4, 18'62, 12.45 r. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. Mc. C: — My telegram to you 
 yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future ope- 
 rations. It was expected that you would havo 
 S(^it oif your sick as directed, without waiting to 
 know what were or would be the intentions of 
 the govennnent respecting future movementa. 
 The President expects that the instructions which 
 were sent to you yestorday, with his ajiproval, 
 will be carried out with aU possible dispatch and 
 caution. .Ti)o quartcr-mttster-gencral is sending 
 to Fort ]\Ionroe all the' traiisportatiou he can col- 
 lect. II. W. II., Maj.-Gen. • •. 
 
 To which tl\e following is my reply : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Pofomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug list 5, 18G2, 7 a. m. 
 
 Your telegram of ycsterilay received, and ia 
 being carried out as [)roniptly as possible. With 
 the means at my command, no human power 
 could have niovetl the sick in the time you say 
 you expected them to be moved. A}. B. i\lcO., 
 Alaj-Gen. 
 
 iMaj.-Gcn. W; H. II. , Cbmd g U. S.'A. 
 
 My" efforts" for bringing; about a change of 
 policy were unsuccessful, as will be seen from 
 t'le following te.egram and letter VeCeivcd by mo 
 i;; reply to mine of 12 m. of the 4th : 
 
 Washington, A":r-.-t :\ 1802, 12 m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G.B. i\rcU.: mot regret tho 
 
 order of ■\Vit!tdraw'-aI"^'m I did the neces- 
 
 sity of giviug it. it will iioL be rescinded, and 
 you will be exj)ccted to execute it with all possi- 
 ble promptness. It is believed that it can bo 
 done now without serious diinger. This may 
 not be so if Hiero should be anj' delay. 
 
 I will write j'ou mv views more fully by mail. 
 11. W. 11/, Maj.-Gen. Couv.l'g U. S. A. 
 
 The letter was as follows : 
 
 '■■ ■' Headquarters of the Army, 
 
 \V;vshington, Aug. G, 18()2. 
 Miij.-Gcn. MoO., Comd'g. .^ci^Bcrkeley.Va. 
 
 (reneral, — Your telegram of ycsterd-ay was re- 
 ceived this morning, and 1 inniiediately telegraph- 
 ed a brief reply, promising to write you more 
 fully by mail. ■' 
 
 You, General, ccrbvinl}'^ could not' havo Dccn 
 more piiincd at receiving my order, than I was at 
 the necessity of issuing it. ''1 'was advised by 
 high oflicers, in whoso judgiuent Iliad great con- 
 fidence, to make the ord6r 'i'ntiiiediately on my 
 arrival licrc, but I determined nOt to do so until 
 I could learn your. wishes from a personal inter- 
 view : and even iifter that interview I tried every 
 viicans in my poacr to avoid withdrawing your 
 army, and delayed my decision 'as l.o:ig as 1 dared 
 to delay it. ' ' -••■'•' 
 
 1 assurp you, General, vt was not a hasty and 
 Hnconsidcred act, but on6 '.hat caused mc more 
 anxious thought than, any odicr of my life. But 
 after full and mature consideration of all the pros 
 andcortii, I Was reluctantly forced to the conclu- 
 &\o\\ that the order must he issued. There was, 
 to my mind, no'nite.riiativc. ' • 
 
 Aiiow uie U) allude to a few of the facts in Iho 
 
casi- You and your officers, at our interview, 
 estimated the enemy's forces in and around 
 l^cluuond at two hundred thousand men. Since 
 then, you and others report that tliey have re- 
 ceived and are ~ receivintj large reinlbrcenients 
 from the South.' •••■ - 
 
 Gen.' Popc'a array, now (Jo'*^erinsj Washington, 
 is only about forty thousand. Your effective 
 force is oiily about ninety thousand. You, arc 
 atjout thirty miles from Richmond, au<l Gen. Pope 
 eighty or ninety, with tho enemy directly bc- 
 tweiertyou, ready to fall with his superior num- 
 bers upon: one or the other, as he may elect. 
 Neither can reinforce the other in case of such 
 an attack. If Gen. Pope s army be diminished to 
 reinforce you, Washington, Mar3dand, and Penn- 
 sylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. 
 If your foi'ce bo reduced to strengthen Pope, you 
 would bo too weak to even hold the position you 
 now occupy, should tho enem}' turn round and 
 attack you in full fore<». In other words, the old 
 army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with 
 the ;'.;e of" tliO enemy directly between 
 
 the an not be united by land without 
 
 exp« •.,.:_ ,n,.ii to destruction, and yet they must 
 be united. To send Pope's forces by water to 
 the V .ii'iisi!; I v- ni.i<T rtresent circumstances, a 
 mil The only alternative is to 
 
 sen Peninsula ■ to some point 
 
 by .UsbWrg, Avliere th6 two 
 
 ari-i- -"'^ 
 
 1. ) some of the objections 
 
 ^v*!' Yoiv <?ay that the witb- 
 
 will cause the 
 
 :rrf, '• which is 
 
 conditioii," I 
 
 iiange of posi- 
 
 •b iLstant base, will 
 
 ;;t discipline, unless 
 
 '■'' H'at demoraliza- 
 
 '^jjl ndt. ' Your 
 
 :'3 right at Han- 
 
 ov ;L position was 
 
 ov • ;. heard that it 
 
 deniorai.'/.-t your iio'.njrf, nut'.vithsranding the 
 
 severe lus-jes they sustained, in eS'ecting'it. 
 
 \ new base on the Kappahaiinock at Freder- 
 ^bnrg brings you within about sixty miles of 
 i;ivliniond, and secures a reinforcement of forty 
 ' or liffy thousand fresh and disci]dined troops. 
 'Moreover, you yourself suggested that a junction 
 might be ertbcted at Yorktown; but that a liank 
 niarcli a'-;'' '' ■ rsthmns would be more hazar- 
 dous t! i to Fort Monroe. Y'ou Avill 
 remeiii ;ctown is two or three miles 
 further aond than Fredericksburg is. 
 ■Be.s: I !■:•.; . i.i \'( t'v-evi T!;riiniond and 
 Was^ii;.) from anv 
 attack , ^ " 
 
 The ] ilio witiidrawal may at 
 
 lirst be M tliiiik the public are 
 
 bcginni necessity, and that 
 
 they wi:: •nhdctiec in a xmited 
 
 army, than 1:1 ,'..3 sc;^.:ir;;t<.! iragmonts. ' ' 
 
 Ikit you <\-iU repjy, why not reiuforce rae herd, 
 so that I can strike' Richmond from my present 
 po^sition? ' To do this you said at our intervie\'^, 
 
 thnt vol! i.-qti'VcuV tliirfv r!,.,,ic.:.,,,l -Tirlitional 
 
 89 
 
 troops. I told you that it was impossible to give 
 you so majiy. You Ihially thought ycu would 
 have "some chance" of success with twenty 
 thousand. But you afterwards tclcgrtphed mo 
 that you would require thirty-five thousand, as 
 the enemy was being largely reinforced. If your 
 estimate of tho enemy's strength was correct, 
 your requisition was perfectly reasonable ; but it 
 was utterly impossible to fill '^ until new troops 
 could be enhsted and orgamzcd, which, would 
 require several weeks. 
 
 To keep your army in its present position un- 
 til it could be so reinforced, would almost destroy 
 it in that climate. The months of August and 
 September are almost fntal to whites who live on 
 that part of James River, and even after j-ou re- 
 ceive the reinforcements asked for, j^ou admitted 
 that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river 
 batteries, before you could advance on Richmond. 
 It is by no means certain that the reduction of 
 these fortifications wotdd not require considerable 
 time, perhaps as much as tliose at Y'orktown. 
 This delay might not only be fatal tp the health 
 of your army, but in the meantime Gen. Pope's 
 forces would bo exposed to the heavy blows of 
 the enemy withoiit the slightest hopf of assist- 
 ance from you. . '"' 
 
 In regard to, the demoralizing effect of a with- 
 drawal from the Penmsula to the Rappahanr.ock, 
 I must reniark that a lai'g'e number of your high- 
 est officers, indeed, a jnojority of those whoso 
 opinions have been reported to nie, are decidedly 
 iu favor of the movement. Even severnl of those 
 who originally advoctited th'c lii _ Tonin- 
 
 sula, now advise its abandoHrnent. 
 
 I halve not inquired, and do not wis;: to know 
 b}-^ whose advice, or for wluit reasons the army of 
 the Potomac was separated into two parts with 
 the enemy between them. I must take things as 
 I find them. I find the forces divide<l, and I wish 
 to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been 
 pre.scntcd for doing this. If you or any one else 
 had presented a better plan, I certainly should 
 have adopted it. ■ But all of your plans require 
 reinforcements, which it is impossible to give 
 3'ou. It is A'ery easj' to asJc for reinforcements ; 
 but it is not so easy to give them when you have 
 no disposable troops at your command. 
 ' I have written very plainly', as I luiderstand 
 the case, and I hope you will give me credit for 
 having fully considered the matter, although I 
 niay have arrived at very different conlusions 
 from your own,. 
 
 Very respcctTully, youv obedient servant, • 
 ; ir. W. II., Gen'.-in-Chief. 
 
 On the Tth T received the following telegram: 
 Washington,. Aug. 7, 18G2. 10 a.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen, G. B. McO. : — You will immediately 
 report the number of sick sent otf since you re- 
 ceived my order ; the nnmber still to be shipped, 
 and the amount of transportation at your dis- 
 posal ; that is, the number of persons that can bo 
 carried on all tjic vessels which by ray order you 
 were authorized to control. 
 
 _ H. W. H., .Maj.-Gen. 
 
 To which \ made this reply : 
 Ilradq's., Ar.iiv of tlie J'ot'c, A-.ig. 7, 'C,2. lO.-lO p.m. 
 
 iMaj.-Oen. H. W. H..C.nn.i; i:!. A. :~In reply to 
 
your despatch of 10 a. m. to-day I report the inim- 
 ber of eick sent off since I received your order, 
 as follows : 3,740, inchiding some that are em- 
 barked ta-iiiglit, and will leave to-morrow morn- 
 ing. The nnmbcr still to be shipped, is, as near- 
 ly as can be ascertained, 5,700. 
 
 The embarkation of five battei-ies of artillcrj', 
 horses, wagons, etc., required most of our availa- 
 ble boats except the ferry-boats. All the trans- 
 ports that can ascAid to this place, have been or- 
 dered up, the}' will be here to-morrow evening. 
 Col. Ingalls reports to me that there are no trans- 
 ports now available for cavalry, and will not be 
 for two or three days. As soon as they can be ob- 
 tained, I shall send off the 1st New York cavahy. 
 After tlie transports with sick and wounded 
 have returned, including some heavy draft steam- 
 ers at Fort Monroe, tliat cannot come to tliis point, 
 we can transport 25,000 men at a time. We have 
 Bomo propellers here, but they are laden with 
 commissary supplies, and are not available. The 
 transports now employed in transporting sick and 
 wounded,. will carry 12.000 well infantry soldiers. 
 Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy draft to 
 come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. 
 Several of the largest steamers have beon used 
 for transporting prisoners of war, and have only 
 been available for the si(5k to-day. 
 
 G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 The report of my chief quartermaster upon tlic 
 Bubject is as follows : 
 
 lieadipiarters, Army of the Potomac, Office of 
 chief Quartermaster, Harrison's Landing, Au"-. 7, 
 I8G2. 
 
 General: — I have the honor to return the }-a- 
 pers herewith, which you sent me, with the fol- 
 lowing remarks : 
 
 AVe are embarking five batteries of artillery, 
 with their horses, baggage, etc., which requires 
 the detailing of most of our available boats, ex- 
 cept the ferry-boats. 
 
 The medical departmen has 10 or 12 of our 
 largest transport vessels which, if disposable, 
 could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some 
 lieavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe, that cannot 
 come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 fir 
 10,000 infantry. 
 
 I have ordered all up here that can ascend lo 
 this depot. They will be here to-morrow evening. 
 As it now is. after tl '; details already made, we 
 cannot transport from this place more than 5,000 
 infantr}'. 
 
 There are no transjorts now available for cav- 
 ahy. From and after to-morrow, if the vessels 
 arrive, I could transpurt 10,000 infanluy. In two 
 or thi'.ce days a regiment of cavalry can be sent 
 if required. 
 
 If you wait and ship from Yorktown or Fort 
 Monroe, after the sick and wounded transports 
 are at my disposal, we can transport 25,000 at a 
 time. The number (hat can be transported, is 
 contingent on circumstances referred to. 
 
 Jlost of the projjcllers here are laden with 
 commissary, or other supplies, and most of the 
 tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft, also la- 
 den with supplies. 
 
 I am very respectfully, your most obedient ser- 
 vant, RuFUR Inqali.s, Ciiicf Quartermaster. 
 C.Mi.n. B. Marcy, Chief of Stafl". 
 
 90 
 
 On the 9th I received this despatch : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 9, 1SG2. 12.45 p. a, 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC— I am of opinion that the 
 enemy is massing his forces in front of Generals 
 Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush 
 them, and move forward to the Potomac. You 
 must send reinforcements instantly to Acquia 
 Creek. 
 
 Considering the amount of transportation at 
 your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory, 
 you must move with all possible celerity. 
 
 H. W. H. Maj-Gen. 
 To wliich I sent the following reply : 
 Headquarters, Array of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
 Aug. 10,1862. ■8 a.m. 
 
 Telegram of yesterday received. The batter- 
 ies sent to Burnside, took the last available trans- 
 port yesterday morning. Enough have since ar- 
 rived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day. 
 _ The sick are being embarked as rapidly as i)os- 
 sible. There has been no unnecessary i\e\ny as 
 you assert, not an hour, but everything has been, 
 and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to car- 
 ry out your orders. 
 ■ G. B. JIcC. to Maj..Gen, H. W. H., Comd'g D. 
 
 CI A J > JO 
 
 b. Army. 
 
 The following report, made on the same day 
 by the officer then in charge of the transisor'ta, 
 ex2>oses the injustice of the remark in the dis* 
 I)atch of the general-in-chief, that, " considering • 
 the amount of transportation at your disposal, 
 your delay is not satisfactory." 
 
 Assistant Quartermaster's office. Army of the 
 Potomac, Harrison's Landing, Ya., Aug. 10, 1862. 
 
 Gen. M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster General U. S. 
 Army, Washington : — Col, Ingalls being himself 
 ill, has requested me to telegraph to you concern- 
 ing the state and capacity of the transports now 
 here. 
 
 On the night of the 8th I despatch.ed eleven 
 steamers, principally small ones, and six schoon- 
 ers, with five batteries of heavy horse artillery^ 
 none of which have yet returned. 
 
 Requisition is made this morning for transports 
 ation of one thousand cavalry to Acquia Creek,^ 
 All tlie schooners that had been cliartered for 
 carrj'ing horses, have been long since discharged 
 or changed into freight vessels. 
 
 A large proportion of the steamers now here 
 are still loaded witji stores, or are in the floating 
 hospital service, engaged in removing the sick. 
 To traTisport the one thousand cavalry to-day will 
 take all the available steamers now here not en- 
 gaged in the service of the harbor. These steam- 
 ers could take a large number of infantry ; but 
 are not v/cll adapted to the carrying of horses, 
 and much space is thus lost. 
 
 Several steamers are expected here to-day, and 
 we are unloading schooers rapidly. !Most of these 
 are not chartered, but are being t dcen for the 
 service required at same rates of pay as other 
 chartered schooners. 
 
 If you could cause a more speedy return of 
 the steamers sent away from here, it would facili- 
 tate matters. C. G. Sawtelle. 
 
 Capt. and A. Q. M. ConuFg Dejiof, 
 
 Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing were 
 very limited, admitting but few vessels at one 
 time. These were continually in use as long aa 
 
there were disposable vessels, and the officers of 
 the medical and quartermaster's departments, 
 with all their available forces, were incessantly 
 occupied, day and night, in embarking and Fend- 
 ing off the sick men, troops and material. 
 
 Notwithstanding the repeated representations 
 I made to the general-in-chief that such were the 
 
 ots, on the lOlh I received the folloAving : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 10, 1862, 12 r. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC. : — The enemy is crossing 
 the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting 
 Gen. Pope to-day ; there must be no further delay 
 in your movements. That which has already oc- 
 curred Avas entirely unexpected, and must be 
 satisfactorily explaiTied. Let not a moment's time 
 be lost, and telegraph me daily what progress 
 you have made in executing the order to transfer 
 your troops. H. W. IT., Maj.-Gen. 
 
 To which I sent this reply : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 10, 18C2, 12.30 p. m. 
 
 Your desjiatch of to-da}' is received. I assure 
 you again that there has not been an}'' unneces- 
 sary delay in carrying out your orders. You are 
 probably laboring under some great mistake as 
 to the amount of transportation available here. I 
 have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off 
 our sick, and the troops you ordered to Burnside. 
 
 Col. Ingalls has more than once informed the 
 Quartermaster General of the condition of our 
 water transportation. From the fact that you 
 , directed me to keep the order secret, I took it 
 for granted that you would take the steps neces- 
 sary to provide the requisite transportation. A 
 large number of transports for all arms of ser- 
 vice, and for wagons, should at once be sent to 
 Yorktown and Fort Monroe. I shall be ready to 
 move the whole army by land, the moment the 
 sick are disposed of. You may be sure that not 
 an hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I 
 fear j'ou do not realize the difficulty of the ope- 
 ration proposed. The regiment of cavalry for 
 Burnside has been in course of embarkatio'n to- 
 day and to-night. Ten si earners were required 
 for the purpose. Twelve hundred and fifty-eight 
 sick loaded to-day and to-night. Oar means ex- 
 hausted, except one vessel retvifning to Fort 
 Monroe in the morning, which will take some 
 five hundred cases of slight sickness. 
 
 The present moment is probably not the proper 
 
 • one for me to refer to the unnecessarily harsh and 
 
 unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, 
 
 however, make no difference in my official action' 
 
 G. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H. W. U. Corad'g U. S. 
 Arm3^ 
 
 On the 11th th's report was made : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potcmac, Berkclv 
 Aug. 11,1862. 11.40 r.M. 
 
 The embarkation of eight hundred and fifty 
 cavalry and one brigade of infantry will be com- 
 pleted by two o'clock in the morning, five hun- 
 dred sick were embarked to-day ; another vessel 
 arrived to-night, and six hundred more sick arc 
 now being embarked. I still have some four 
 thousand sick to dispose of. You have been 
 grossly misled as- to the amount of transporta- 
 tion at my disposal. Vessels loa^ied to their ut- 
 most capacity with stores and others indispensa- 
 
 91 
 
 ble for service here, have been reported to you as 
 available for carrying sick and well. I am send- 
 mg off all that can be unloaded at Fort l^fonroe, 
 to have them return here. I repeat tliat I have 
 lost no time in carrying out your orders. 
 
 G. B. McC, Maj-Gen. Comd'g to Maj-Gon H. W. 
 H. Comd'g U. S. Army. 
 
 On the same day I received the following from 
 the quartermaster in charge of the depot : 
 
 Assistant Quartermaster's Office, Army of the 
 Potomac, Harrison's Landing, Va., Aug. 11, 1862,- 
 
 Colonel :— In reply to the communication froiQ 
 Gen. .Marcy, which was referred to me by you, I 
 have to state that there arc now in this' harbor 
 no disposable transports not already detailed 
 either for the use of the hosi)Ital depavlment, or 
 the transportation of the N. Y. cavalry, or for the 
 necessary service of the harbor. I think the 
 steamers loading, and to be loaded with cavalry, 
 could take in addition, tJn-ee thousand wfantry; 
 these boats are however directed to leave as fast 
 as they are loaded ; some have alrea,dy started. 
 The embarkation of this cavalry regiment is going 
 on very slowly, and it is not in my power to hur- 
 ry the matter, although I have had severai agents 
 of the department, and one commissioned officer 
 at the wharf to render all thje assistance possi- 
 ble. The entire army is this morning turning in 
 to be stored on vessels, knapsacks, officer's bag- 
 gage and other surplus property, and with our 
 limited Avharf facilities, it is impossible, imless. 
 the regular issues of forage, &c. are suspended,, 
 to avoid great confusion and delay with what ia 
 already ordered to be done ; of course, if any in- 
 fantry is ordered to embark on these cavalry 
 transports, the confusion and difficulties will be 
 increased. 
 
 I know of no boats that may be expected here 
 to-day, except the " South America" and " Fanny 
 Cadwallader" (a propeller) which were ordered 
 to be sent back from Fort Mom-oc. 
 
 The transports with the artillery left for Acquia. 
 Creek on the night of the 8th and the morning of 
 the 9th. They were ordered to return nnmedi 
 ately. I am, very respectfully, your obedient 
 servant, T. G. Sawtelle. 
 
 Capt. and A. Q. II. Comd'g Depot. 
 Licut.-Col. Rufus Ingalls, A. D. C. and chief Q. M. 
 Army of the Potomac. 
 
 On the 12th I received the following : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 12. 1802. 12 m. 
 
 Maj-Gen. G. B. ilcClellan —The quartermaster 
 general informs me that nearly every available 
 steam vessel in the country is now under your 
 control. To send more from Philadelphia, Balti- 
 more, and New York, Avould interfere with the- 
 transportation of army supi)lics, and break up 
 the channels of travel by which we arc to bring 
 forward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly 
 thirteen thousand troops to Acquia Creek, in less 
 than two days, and his transports were immedi- 
 ately sent back to j'on. All vessels in the James 
 River and Chesapeake Bay were placed, at your 
 disposal, and it was supposed that eight or ten 
 thousand of your men could be transported dai- 
 ly. In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet 
 of sailing vessels which could be used as trans- 
 ports, "The bulk of your material on shore, it 
 
92 
 
 •was thought, could be sent to Fort Monroe cov- 
 ered by that part of the army which could not 
 get water transportation. Such were the views 
 of tlie government here ; perhaps we were mis- 
 informed as to the facts ; if so, the delay could 
 be explained. Nothing in my, telej^ram was in- 
 tentionally harsh or unjust ; but the delay Avas 
 •Bonn expected, that an 'explanation Avas required. 
 There has been and is the most nrgent necessity 
 for dispatch, and not a single moment must l)e 
 lost in getting additional troo])S in front of 
 Washington. H. W. 11. JTapGcn. 
 
 I telegraphed the following reidy: Ileadq's., 
 Army oi" the Pot'c, Berkeley, Aug. 12, '62, 11 p.m. 
 
 Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It is 
 positivelj^ the tact that no more men could have 
 •embarked heiice than have gone, and that no un- 
 necessary' delay lias occurred. Before' your or- 
 ders received. Col. Ingalls directed all available 
 •vessels to come from ifonroe. Officers have been 
 sent to take personal direction, itave heard no- 
 thing here of JSurnside's fleet. There are some 
 vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic," 
 which draw too much to come here. Hoajntal ac- 
 commodations exhausted this side New York. Pro- 
 pose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases 
 for New York, and to encamp slight cases for the 
 present at Afonroc. In this way can probably get 
 off tlie'8.4t;0 sick still on hand liy day after to- 
 morrow night. I am sure that yon have been mis- 
 informed as to the availability of vessels on hand. 
 We cannot use heavy loaded supply vessels for 
 troops or animals, and such constitute the mass 
 of those here, which have been represented to 
 you as cajrable of transporting this arm}'. I fear 
 you will find very great delay in -embarking 
 troops and marerial at Yorktown and Monroe, 
 both from want of vessels and of facilities for 
 embarkation. At least two- additional Avharvcs 
 shoidd be built at each place. I ordered two at 
 the latter some two weeks ago, but you counter- 
 manded the order. 
 
 I l"arn that wharf, accommodations at Acquia 
 are altogether inadequate for landing troops and 
 sup{)lies to any la|pe extent. Not an hour should 
 be lost ill remedying this. Great delays will en- 
 sue thev6 from shallow water. You will find a 
 large deficiency in horse transports; -sve had 
 nearly 20U when we came here. I learn of only 
 20 \\rovided now ; they carr}' about 50 horses 
 -each. More hospital accommodations should bo 
 provided. We are much impeded here because 
 our wharv(is are used night and day to land cur- 
 rent supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty Avill 
 occur. With all the facilities at Alexandria and 
 Waslungtoii, six weeks about were occupied in 
 embarking this army and its material. 
 
 Burnside's troops arc not a fair criterion for 
 rate of embarkation. All his mcaiis were in hand 
 — his outfit specially prepared for that purpose, 
 and his men habituated to the movement. 
 
 There shall be no muieccssary delay, but I can- 
 not maind'acture vessels. I state these difficul- 
 ties from experience, and because it appears to 
 me that we have been lately Avorking at cross 
 puriioses, because j'ou have not been properly 
 informed by those around j'on v/ho ought to 
 kt!<,w the inherent difficulties of S'lch an mider- 
 takiif 
 
 It is not possible for any one to place this array 
 where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a 
 month. If Washington is in danger now, this 
 army can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is 
 in much better position to do so from here than 
 from Acquia. -Our material can. only be saved by 
 using the whole army to cover it if we are pres- 
 sed. If sensibly v/eakened by detachments, the 
 result might be the loss of much material and 
 many men. I will be at the telegraph office to- 
 morrow morning to talk with you. 
 
 G. B. McC. to II. W. H., Washington, D. C. 
 To the reasons given in the foregoing dispatch, 
 to show why Gen. Burnside's movement from 
 Fort Monroe was not a fair criterion for our ope- 
 rations, the following may be added : 
 
 He was not encumbered by cither sick or 
 wounded men. 
 
 He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons or teams 
 His force consisted of infantrj'- alone; with a few 
 ambulances and officers' horses. 
 
 His baggage was already on the transports 
 where it had remained since his arrival fromv 
 North Carolina, and his men had only to resume 
 their places on board. 
 
 The cavalry and artillery mentiojiod in my dis 
 patches of- the 7th, 10th and 11th were sent^ to 
 supply his-total deficiency in those arms. 
 
 , 1 ma_y<iIso repeat that the vessels used by Gen 
 Burnside had not returned fr-oin Acquia when 
 the army left Ilarrisoii's Bar. . "■ 
 
 It will be seen from the concluding paragraph 
 of the foregoing dispach, tljat in order to h-ive a 
 more direct, speedy and full oxplanatioh of the 
 condition of affairs in the army than I couid by 
 sending a single dispatch by steamer to the 
 ' nearest telegraph ofiice at Jamestown Island 
 some sevcntv niiles distant, and waiting ten hom'S 
 for a r.ep]}', I proposed to .go in pertion to the 
 office.' On my arrival at Jamestown Island there 
 was an interruption in the electric current, Avhicb 
 rendered it necessarj' for me to continue on to 
 Fort Monroe, and cross the Chesapc;ake Bay to 
 Cherry Stone Inlet on the, " Eastern Shore,' 
 where I arrived late n\ the evening and immc 
 diatclv sent the annexed dispatches. 
 
 Cherry Stone, Aug. 13, 1862, lL30.r.w.— Please 
 come to office : wish to talk to you. What news 
 from Pope-? G. B. McO., J; 
 
 Maj.-Gen. II. AY. II., AVasliii:gton. 
 Cherry Stone Inlet, Aug. 14, 1862, 12.oU a.m.— 
 Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you ; 
 found cable broken, and came here. Please read 
 my long telegram. [See above dispatch of Aug, 
 12, 11 I'.M.] All quiet at camp. Enemy burned 
 wharves at City Point yesterday. No rebel 
 pickets within eiglit miles of Coggin's Point yester- 
 da_y. Richmond prisoners state that large force, 
 with guns, left Richmond, northward. Sund-a}'. 
 G. B.^AIcC. Maj.-Gen. ]\laj-Gen. II. W. n.,Wash. 
 To which the following reply was received: 
 Washington, August 14, 18C2, 1.40 a.m.— 1 have 
 read your disjuitch. There is no change of 
 ]ilans. You will send up your troops as rapidly 
 as possible. There is no difficulty in landing 
 them. According to your own accounts tJiere^s 
 now no difliculty in withdrawing your forces. 
 Do so with all possible rapidity. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC. 11. \V. 11., .Maj.-Gen. 
 
93 
 
 Before 1 ha I time to decipher and reply to this 
 dispatch, tlie telegrajjh operator in Wasliington 
 informed nie that Gen. Ilalieck had gone out of the 
 office immediately after writing this dispatch, 
 witliont leavnig'any intimation of the fact for 
 me or waiting for any information as to the ob- 
 ject of my journey across the bay. As there was 
 no possibility of other communication with him 
 at that time, I sent the following dispatch, and 
 returned to Harrison's Landing. 
 
 Chen-y Stone Inlet. Aug. 14, 1862, 1.40 a. m. 
 
 Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. 
 I liad hoped to have had a longer and fuller con- 
 versation with 3'ou, after traveliiig so far for tlu? 
 pm-pose. G. B. McC, ^raj.-Oen. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. W. H. H., Washington, D. C. 
 
 On the 14th and 15tb, and before we had been 
 able to embark all our sick men, two army corps 
 were put in motion tow^irds Fort Monroe. . This 
 was reported in the annexed despatch : 
 
 Headquarters, Armv of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 16, 1862, II p. m. 
 
 Movement has commenced by land and water. 
 All sick will be away to-morrow night. Every- 
 thing being done to carry out your orders. I 
 don t like Jackson s movements, he will suddenly 
 appear where least expected. Will telegraph 
 fully a^iid understandingly in'the morning. G. B. 
 McC., Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H., Washington, D. C. 
 
 The phrase "movement has commenced," it 
 need not be remarked, referred obviously to the 
 movement of the main army, after completing the 
 necessary preliminary movements of the sick, 
 etc., etc. 
 
 The perversion of the terra to wliich the gene- 
 ral-in-chief saw fit to give currency in a letter to 
 the Seci-etary of War, should have been here 
 rendered impossible by the dispatches Avhich 
 precede this of the 14th, which show that the 
 movement really began immediately after the re- 
 ceipt of the order of August 4th. 
 
 The progress made in the movement on the 
 15th was reported in the following dispatches : 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 August 15, 1862, 12 u. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H, W. H., Comd'g U. S. A. :— Col. 
 Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking 
 the remaining brigade of ^McCuH's division, wnth 
 the sick which are constantly accumulating, the 
 transports now disposable will be consumed. 
 
 Two of ray army corps marched last night and 
 this raornrag en route for Yorktown, one via 
 Jones's Bridge, and the other via Barrett's Ferry, 
 '"where Ave have a pontoon bridge. The other 
 corps wUl be pushed forward as fast as the roads 
 are clear, and I hope before to-morrow morning 
 to have tlie entire army in motion. 
 
 A rei>ort has just been received from my pick- 
 ets that the enemy in force is advancing on us 
 from the Chickahoraiu}', but I do not credit it — 
 shall know soon. Should any more transports 
 arrive here before my departure, and the enemy 
 do not show such a force in our front as to re- 
 quire all the troops I have remaining to insure 
 tlie safety of the«land movement wicb its hn- 
 mense train, I shall send every man by water 
 that the transports will canv. G. B. McC., Mai.- 
 Geu. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Poloraac. 
 Berkeley, Aug. 15, 1862, 1.30 i-. m". 
 
 The advance corjis and the trains are fairly^ 
 started. I learn notlving more in relation to re- 
 reported advance of rebels via Jones's Bridge, 
 Siiall push the movement as rapidly as possible. 
 G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. II. W. II., Washington, D. C. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, 
 August 15, 18G2. 10 p.m. 
 
 Coggin's Point is abandoned. The whole of 
 McCall's division, with its artillery', is now on 
 route for Burnside. We have not yet transpor-. 
 tation sufficient for our sick. I hojjc we will get 
 it to-morrow. Porter is across the Chickahominy, 
 near its mouth, Avith his Avagons and the res\.^rve- 
 artillery. 
 
 Heintzelman at Jones's Bridge, with a portion 
 of his corps. They Avill all be up by morning. 
 
 Averell's cavalry on the other side. All quiet 
 thus far. I cannot get the last of the wagons as- 
 far as Charles City Court-house before some time 
 to-morrow afternoon. I am hurrying matters 
 with the utmost rapidity possible. Wagons Avill 
 move all night. %. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington, D. C. 
 
 After the commencement of the movement, it 
 Avas continued with the utmost rapidity, until all 
 the troops arfd material AA'fere en route, both by 
 land and water, on the morning of the 16th. 
 
 Late in the afternoon of that day, Avhen the last 
 man had disappeared from the deserted camps, I 
 followed with my personal staff in the track oi 
 the grand army of the Potomac, bidding farewell 
 to the scene still covered Avith the marks of its 
 presence, and to be forever memorable in history 
 as the A'icinity of its most brilliant exploits. 
 THE RETURN TO THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Previous to the departure of the troops, I had 
 directed Capt. Duane, of the Engineer Corps, to 
 proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth oJ 
 the Chickahominy, and throw across the river at 
 that point a pontoon bridge. This was executed 
 promptly and satisfactorily, under the cover oi 
 gun-boats, and an excellent bridge of about t\v( 
 thousand feet in length Avas ready for the fii'S* 
 ariival of troops. The greater part of the army 
 with its artillery, wagon trains, etc., crossed it 
 rapidly, and in^ perfect order and safety, so that 
 on the night of the 17th, everythuig was across 
 the Chickahominy, except the rear-guard, whicl 
 crossed early on the morning of the 18th, when 
 the pontoon bridge was immediately removed. 
 
 Gen. Porter's corps, Avhich Avas the first ir 
 march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed 
 forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Wil 
 liamsburg, where I had directed hi?li to halt until 
 the army Avas across the Chickahominy. 
 
 On h"is arrival at ^Villiamsburg, however, he 
 received an intercepted letter, Avhich led to the 
 belief that Gen. Pope Avould have to contend 
 against a very heavy force then in his front. Gen 
 Porter, therefore, very properly took tisc rcspon 
 sibility of cov.tinuing his march directly on tc 
 Kew]jort News, which pkn-.e he reached on the 
 moniing of tlie 18th of August, having marclied 
 his corps sixty miles in the short period of tiireo 
 days and one night, halting one day at Uie crosf 
 injr of the Chickaliominv. 
 
The embaikatiou of this corps commenced as 
 Boon as transports were rea,dy, and on tlie 'iOthit 
 had all sailed for Acipiia Creek. I made the fol- 
 lowing report from Barretts Ferry: 
 
 Ueadquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Barrett's Ferry, Chickahomiuy, 
 August 17, 1862, 11a. m. 
 
 Everything is removed from our camp at Har- 
 rison's Bar — no projierty nor men left behind. 
 The Fifth Corps is at Williamsburg, with all its 
 wagons and the reserve artillery. The Third 
 Corps is on the march from Jones's Bridge to 
 Williamsburg, via Diascund Bridge, and has pro- 
 bably passed the latter before this hour. Aver- 
 ell's cavalry watches everything in that direction. 
 
 The mass of the wagons have passed the pon- 
 toon bridge here, and are parked on the other 
 aide. Peck's wagons are now crossing ; his di- 
 vision Avill soon be over. Ileadquarters wagons 
 follow Peck's. I hope to have everything over 
 to-night, and the bridge removed by daylight. 
 May be delayed beyond that time. Came here to 
 Bee Burnside ; otherwise should have remained 
 with the rear-guard. Thus fa#all is quiet, and 
 not a shot iirod that I know of since we began 
 the march. I shall not feel entirely secure until 
 1 have the whole army beyond the Chickahomiuy. 
 I will then begin to forward troops by water as 
 fast as transportation permits. G. B McC, Maj.- 
 Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. W. il. lb, Comd'g U. S. A., Washing- 
 ton, I). C. 
 
 On the 18th and IQthour march was continired 
 to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th 
 the remainder of the army was ready to embark 
 at Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and Newport News. 
 The movement of the main body of the army on 
 this march was covered by Gen. Pleasonton, with 
 his cavalry and horse-artillery. That officer re- 
 mained at llaxall's until the army had ])asscd 
 Charles City Court House, when he gradually fel[ 
 back, picking up the stragglers as he proceeded, 
 and crossed the bridge over the Chickahomiuy 
 after the main body had marched towards Wil- 
 liamsburg. Ilis troops were the last to cross 
 the bridge, and he deserves great credit for the 
 manner in which he performed his duty. Gen. 
 Averell did a similar service in the same satis- 
 factory way, iu covering the march of the 3d 
 Corps. 
 
 As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated 
 here, I camiot close this part of my report with- 
 out giving an expression of my sincere thanks 
 and gratitude to the officers and men I liad the 
 honor to command. 
 
 From the ccfnmicncement to the termination of 
 this most arduous campaign, the army of the Po- 
 tomac always evinced the most perfect subordi- 
 nation, zeal and alacrity in the performance of 
 all the duties required of it. 
 
 Tlie amount of severe labor accomplished by 
 tins army in the construction of intrenchments, 
 roads, bridges, &c., was enormous ; yet all the 
 work was performed with the most gratif3'iiig 
 cheerfulness and devotion to tho interests of the 
 service. 
 
 •During the campaign ten severely contested 
 and sanguinary battles had been fought, besides 
 Humorous amail engagements, in which tho troops 
 
 94 
 
 exhibited tho most det;ormined enthusiasm and 
 bravery. They submitted to exposure, sickness, 
 and even death without a murmur. Indeed they 
 had become veterans in their country's cau5e, 
 and richly deserved the warm commendation _of 
 the government. 
 
 It was in view of these facts that this seemed 
 to me an appropriate occasion for the general-in- 
 chief to give, in general orders, some api)recia- 
 tive expression of the services of the army while 
 upon the Peninsula. Accordingly, on the 18th, I 
 sent him the following dispatch : 
 
 Headquarter?, Army of the Potomac, August 
 18, 1862, 11 P.M. — Please say a kind word to the 
 army, that I can repeat to them in general orders, 
 in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Wil- 
 liamsburg, West Pohit, Hanover Court House, 
 and on the Chickaiiorainy, as well as in regard to 
 the seven days, and the recent retreat. 
 
 No one has ever said au3'th'ing to cheer them 
 but myself. Say nothing about me, merely give 
 my men and officers credit for what they have 
 done. It will do you much good, and strengthen 
 you much with them if you issue a handsome 
 order to them in regard to what they have ac- 
 complishctl. They deserve it. 
 
 G. B. McC, Major-Gen. " 
 Major-Gen. II., Comd'g. U.S. Army, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 As no reply was received to this communica- 
 tion, and no order was issued by the general-in- 
 chief, I conclude that my suggestion did not 
 meet with his ai^probation. 
 
 All the personnel and material of the array had 
 been transferred from Harrison's Landing to the 
 different points of embarkation in the very brief 
 period of five days, without the slightest loss or 
 damage. Porter's Corps sailed from Newport 
 News on the 19th and 20th ; Ileintzelman's corps 
 sailed from Yorktown on the 21st. On that day 
 I received the following telegram from the gcne- 
 ral-in-chi(;f : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 21, 1862, 6 p.m. 
 
 Gen. McC. : — Leave such garrisons in Fort 
 j\Ionroe, Yorktown, &;c., as you may deem pro- 
 per. They will be rejslaced b}' new troops as soon 
 as possible. The forces of Burnside and Pope are 
 hard pushed, and require aid as I'apidiy as you 
 can send it. Come yourself as soon as j'ou can. 
 By all means see that the troops sent have islenty 
 of ammunition. We have no time here to supply 
 them, oreover they Mmay have to light as soon 
 as they land. II. W, II.. M.-Gen Com. 
 
 To which the followuig are replies : 
 Ilcadq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, 
 August 21, 1862, 7.30 P.M. 
 
 Your dispatch of G p-m- received. I have not 
 lost an hour in sending troops, nor will I. Frank- 
 lin is here, and I will try to get some of his 
 troops on board to-night. I had already (udcrcd 
 all the ammunition forward. I will put head- 
 quarters on board ship early to-morrow morning, 
 so that I can leave at a moment's notice. I hope 
 that I can get oiT to-morrow. Shall I go in per- 
 son to xVccpiia, or do you wish to sec me first in 
 Washington? If you wish *t, I can probably 
 ship quite an amount of ammunition for other 
 trooi)8 than this army. 
 
 G B. McC. to'Maj-Gen.IL, Washington. 
 
Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, 
 Aug. 21, 1862, 10.25 p.m. 
 
 I have ample supplies of ammuuition for in- 
 fantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. 
 I can supply any deficieneies that may exist in 
 Gen. Pope's army. Quite a number of rifled 
 field-guns are on hand here. The forage is the 
 only question for you to attend to. Please have 
 that ready for me at Acquia. I want many more 
 schooners for cavalry horses. They should have 
 ■vrater on board when they come here. 
 
 If you have leisure, and there is no objection, 
 please communicate to me fully the state of affairs 
 ^nd your plans. I will then be enabled to arrange 
 details understandingly. 
 
 G. B. McO. to Maj.-Gen. H., Washington. 
 
 Immediately on reaching Fort Mt)nroe, I gave 
 directions for strengthening the defenses of York- 
 town, to resist an attack from the direction of 
 Richmond, and left Gen. Kej'es, with his corps, 
 to perform the work, and temporarily garrison 
 the place. 
 
 I telegraphed as follows on the 22d : 
 
 Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, 
 Aug. 22, 1862, 2.15 p.m. 
 
 Dispatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps 
 is embarking as rapidly as possible. Sunmer's 
 corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as 
 fast as transportation arrives. Keyes is still at 
 Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of defense. 
 I think that all of Franklin's corps will get off to- 
 ■ day, and hope to commence with Sumner to- 
 morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and 
 wagons. 
 
 G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Wash'n. 
 Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, 
 Aug. 22, 1862, 3.40 p.m. 
 
 Two good ordnance sergeants are needed im- 
 mediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new 
 defenses are arranged and commenced. I recom- 
 mend that 5,000 new troops be sent immediately 
 to garrison York and Gloucester. TPliey should 
 be commanded by an experienced general-officer, 
 who can discipline and instruct them. About 
 900 should be artillery. I recommend that a new 
 regiment, whose colonel is an artillery officer, or 
 graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and 
 sent there. A similar regiment is absolutely ne- 
 cessary here. 
 , Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Com. U. S. A. 
 
 On the 23d Franklin's corps sailed. I reported 
 this in the following despatch : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fort 
 Monroe, Aug. 23, 1862. 1.30 p. m. 
 • Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for 
 Acquia in about half an hour. No transports yet 
 for Sumner's corps. 
 
 G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. Maj-Gen. H. W. H., 
 C>omd'g U. S. Army. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 
 
 On that evening T sailed with my staff for Ac- 
 quia Creek, wiier.' I arrived at dayliglit on the 
 Irollowing morniiy?, reporting as follows : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of tho Potomac, Acquia 
 :reck, Aug. 24, 1861. 
 
 1 have reached here, and respectfully report 
 for orders, 
 
 ! G.B. McC. Maj-Gen. Maj-Gen. H. Comd'g U. 
 3. Army. 
 
 95 
 
 I also telegraphed as follovvs . 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Acquia 
 Creek, August 24, 1862. 2 p- m. 
 
 Your telegram received. Morell'd scouts re- 
 port Rappahannock Station burned and abandoned 
 by Pope, without any notice to Morell or Sykes: 
 Tliis was telegraphed you some hours ago. Rey- 
 nolds, Reno, and Stevens, are supposed to be 
 with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to- 
 day. Morell and Sykes arc near Morrisvillo 
 Post Office, watching the lower fords of Rappa- 
 hannock, with no troops between them and Rap- 
 pahannock Station, which is reported abandoned 
 by Pope. Please inform me immediately exactly 
 where Pope is, and what doing ; until I know 
 that, I cannot regulate Porter's movements ; ho 
 is much exposed now, and decided measures 
 should be taken at once. Until I know what my 
 command and position are to be, and whether 
 you still intend t) place me in tho command iu- 
 dicated in your first letter to me, and orally 
 through Gen, Burnside at the Chickahominy, I 
 cannot decide where I can be of most use. If 
 j-our determination is unchanged, I ought to go 
 to Alexandria at once. Please define my position 
 and duties. 
 
 G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. to Maj-Gen. H. W. H^ 
 comd'g U. S. Army. 
 
 To which I received the following reply : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 24, 1862. 
 
 Maj-Gen. McC. — You ask nie for information 
 which I cannot give. I do not know either 
 where General Pope is, or where the enen>y' in 
 force is. These are matters which I have been 
 all day most anxious to ascertain. 
 
 H. W. IL, General-in-chief. 
 
 On the 26th, I received the foUownig : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 26th, 1862. 11 a. m. 
 
 Maj-Gen. G. B. McC. — There is reason to be- 
 lieve that the enemy is moving a large force into 
 the Shenandoah Valley. Reconnoissances will 
 soon determine. Gen. Ileintzelman's corps wa« 
 ordered to report to Gen. Pope, and Kearney's 
 will probably be sent to-day against the enemy's 
 flank. Don't draw any troops down the Rappa- 
 hannock at present. We shall probably want 
 them all in the direction of the Shenandoah. 
 P-erhaps you had better leave Gen. Burnside in 
 charge at Acquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, 
 as very great irregularities are reported there 
 Gen. Franklin's corps will march as soou as it re- 
 ceives transportation. ■*» 
 H. W. H., General-n-Chiet: 
 
 On receipt of this I immediately sailed for 
 Alexandria, and reported as follows : , 
 
 Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 8 a.m. — I arrived 
 here last night, and liave taken mcasnres to as- 
 certain the state of affairs here, and (hat proper 
 remedies may be api)lied. Just received a rumor 
 that railway bridge over Bull Run was burnt lasi 
 night. G. B. .McC. iMajor-Gcn 
 
 Maiof-Gen. II., Comd'g U. S. A. 
 
 Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 9.40 a.m.— The 
 town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers who 
 arc said to be chiefly convalescent.-^. The affairs 
 of the quartermaster's department are reported 
 as going on well. It is said that tho Bull Run 
 bridge will be repaired by to-morrow." The dis- 
 embarkation of Sumner's corps commenced at 
 
i)(j 
 
 Acqula yesterday afternoon. I found that he 
 could reach Har4)ahaiiuock Station earlier that 
 way tlian from liere. G. B. McC. :Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Major-Gen. II. W. IT., Comd'g U. S. A. _ 
 Oil the same day I received the following : 
 
 Washington, August 27, 1862. 
 israior-Cen. I\IeO.— Telegrams from General 
 Porter to General Burnsidc just received says 
 that Banks is at Favctteville. McDowell, Sigt-l, 
 and Uicket's near Warrcnton, Reno on his right. 
 Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to re- 
 inforce Pope. Notliing said of Heintzelman. 
 Porter reports a general battle imminent. FrauK- 
 lin's corps should move out by forced marches, 
 carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be 
 supplied as lar as possible by railroad. Perhaps 
 you may prefer -some other road than to Centre- 
 ville. Colonel Ilaupt has just telegraphed about 
 sending out troops, &c. Please see him and give 
 him your directions. There has been some se- 
 rious neglect to guard the railroad, which should 
 be immediately remedied. 
 
 11. W. n., General-in-Chief. 
 
 I reidied as follows : 
 
 Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 10.20 a.m.— Tele- 
 gram this moment received. I have sent orders 
 to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps 
 at once, and to repair here in person to ^inform 
 me as to his means of transportation. Kearney 
 was yesterday at Rappahannock Station. Porter 
 at Bealton, Kelly's Darnell's, &c. Sumner will 
 commence reaching Falmouth to day. ^Vdhams s 
 Massachusetts Cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth 
 to-day. I loaned Burnside my personal escort, 
 1st squadron Fourth Regulars, to scout down 
 Rappahannock, -l have sent for Couch's division 
 to come at once. As fast as I gain any informa- 
 tion I will forward it, although you may already 
 have it. G. B. ]\IcC., ]\Iajor-Gen. 
 
 ilajor-Gen. 11. W. 11., Washington, D. C. 
 I also received the following telegrams : 
 
 Washington, August 27, 1862. 
 Major-Gen. McC— Direct General Casey to fur- 
 oish you about five thousand of the new troops 
 under his command. Take entire direction of 
 the sending out of the troops from Alexandria. 
 Determine questions of priority in transportation, 
 and the places they shall occupy. Pope's head- 
 quarters are near Warrenton Junction, but I can 
 not ascerkvin the present position of his troops. 
 II. W. II., General-in-Chie.f 
 Washington, Aug. 27, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McC. :— I can get no satisfactory in- 
 formation from the trout, either of the enemy or 
 our trofji^s. There seems to have been great neg- 
 lect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's 
 corps should march in ' that direction as soon as 
 possible. A competent officer shouldbe sent out 
 to take direction of affairs in that vicinity. 
 
 11. W. II., Gen.-in-Chief. 
 
 Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent 
 the following telegram to Generals Heintzelman 
 
 and Porter : , . . t.^- -m^o 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 2 1, 180J. 
 Where are you, and what is stat* of afl'airs ? 
 What troops in your front, right and left ? Sum- 
 ner is now lauding at Acquia. Where is Pope s 
 
 left, and what of enemy '! Enemy bin ucd Bull 
 Run bride-e last night with cavalry force. 
 
 ^ G. B. McC, Ma>-Gen. 
 
 M.-G. lleintz'n, Warrenton, ]\f.-G. Porter, Bealton. 
 
 P. S. If these general ofilcersarti no4. at the 
 places named, nearest operator will V-^'" 
 
 message forwarded. , . " 
 
 I also telegraphed the GQU^ra).-in-CLiiL.i a.s loi- 
 
 laws : - ' ■.. );: , .l j-'' ' 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 27, 62,10.50 p.m. 
 I have sent all the information, I possess to 
 Burnside, instructing him to look out well for his 
 right flank between the Rap|)ahannock and Poto- 
 laac, and to send no trains to Porter without aiv 
 escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed fvt Bull 
 Run last night may trouble Burnside a littk. I 
 have sent to ^ohimunicate with Porter and Heint- 
 zelman via Falmouth, and hope to give, you some 
 definite information in a few. hours. I shall land 
 the next cavalry I get hold of here, and send it 
 out to keep open the comtj-iuuication between 
 Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Manr- 
 assas. Please send me a number of copies of the 
 best maps of present field of ppeiatiqns. ^I can 
 usp no to advantage. 
 
 G. B. McC to ]\Iai.-Gen. 11., Com g. 
 Alexandria, Aug. 27, '62, 11.20 a.m. ^ 
 In view of Burnside's dispatch, just receiveu, 
 would it not be advisable to throw the mass of 
 Sumner's corps here, to move out with Franklin 
 to Centreville or vicinity? If, a decisive battle 
 fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any 
 troops on lower Rappahannock in a dangeroua^ 
 position. They would do better service in front 
 of Washinu-ton. 
 
 G.^B. McC. to ;M.-Geu. IL, Vrashington. 
 Alexandria. Aug. 27, '62, 12.5 h.m. ^ 
 xMy aid has just returned from Gen. Franklin's 
 camp. Reports that Gen's. Franklin, Smith, and 
 Plocum are* all in Washington. He gave the or- 
 der to next in rank to place the corps in readiness 
 to move at ©nee. I learn that heavy firing nas 
 been heard this morning at Centreville, and have 
 sent to ascertain the truth, i can find no cavalry 
 to send out on the roads. . Are the works gar- 
 risoned and ready for defense ? ^^^ , . ^ 
 
 G. B. McC to M.-Gen. H-, Wasiungtoii. 
 Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 12.20 p. ;.. 
 What bridges exist over B-U Run? have 
 steps been taken to construct bridges lor the ad- 
 vance of troops to reinforce Pope, or to enable 
 him to retreat if in, trouble? There should be 
 two gun-boats at Acquia Creek at once, bliall 1 
 push the rest of Sumner's corps liere, or is 1 opo 
 so strong astche re^isonably certain of success? 
 I have sent to,ii)spect the, works near here, and 
 their garrisons. As soon as I can find Gen.: Ca- 
 sey or some other comnianding ofllcer, 1 wili 
 seeto the railway, etc. It would be well to liave 
 them report to me, as,I do not know where liiey 
 ,are. I am trving to find them, and wil lose no 
 time in carrying out your orders "^A oidd like to 
 see Burnside. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 Mai. -Gen. W. }l, AVashington. 
 
 Alexandria, August 27. 1862, 1 .lo p. m. 
 Franklin's artillery have no horses, except tor 
 four guns without caissons ; I can pick up no 
 cavahT. lu view of these facts, will it not be 
 
97 
 
 well to push Sumner's corps here by water as 
 rapidly as possible ; to make immediate arrange- 
 ments for placing; the works in front of Wash- 
 ington in an efficient condition of defense. I 
 have no means of knowing the enemy's force be- 
 tween Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, with- 
 out liis artillery or cavalry, effect any useful 
 purpose in front ? Should not Burnside at once 
 lake steps to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, at 
 the same time covering the retreat of any of 
 Pope's troops who may fall back in that direc- 
 tion. I do not see that we have force enough in 
 hand to form a connection with Pope, whose ex- 
 act position we do not know. Are we safe in 
 the direction of the valley ? G. B. McC, Major- 
 Geu. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. 11., Washington. 
 
 Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 1.35 p. m. 
 
 I learn that Taylor's brigade sent this morning 
 to Bull Run bridge, is either cut to pieces or 
 captured. That the force against them had 
 many guns, and about five thousand infantry, re- 
 ceiving reinforcements every moment. Also, 
 that Gainsville is in possession of the enemy. 
 Please send some cavahy out towards Draines- 
 ville via Cliain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville and 
 Drainesvilie, and go as far as they can. If you 
 will give me even one squadron of good cavalry 
 here, I will ascertain the state of the case. I 
 think our policy now is to make these works 
 perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as 
 soon as possible ; but not to advance them until 
 they can have their artillery and cavalry. I have 
 sent for Col T_yler to place his artillerymen in 
 the works, bs Fwrt Marcy securely held ? ifcC. 
 
 Gqu. H. 
 
 Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 2.30 p. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. 11. W. H., Comd'g U. S. Army :— 
 Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his 
 corps that are within reach. Orders have been 
 sent to Couch to come here from Yorktown with 
 the least possible delay. But one squadron of 
 my cavalry has arrived ; that will be disembarked 
 at once, and sent to the front. If there is any 
 cavalry in Washington it should be ordered to 
 report to me at once. 
 
 I still think that we should first provide for 
 dhe immediate defense of Washington on both 
 ^ides of tlie Potomac. I am not responsible for 
 the past, and can not be for the future, unless I 
 receive authority to dispose of the available 
 troops according to my judgment. Please inform 
 me at once what my position is. I do not wish 
 to act in the dark. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 2.30 p. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Comd'g U. S. A. :— I have 
 just received the copy of a dispatch from Gen. 
 Pope to you, dated lO a.m. this morning, m which 
 he says :' "All tbrces now sent forward should be 
 sent to my right at Gainsville." 
 
 I now have at my disposal here about ten 
 thousand men of Franklin's corps, abouttwenty- 
 eiglit hundred of Gen. Tyler's brigade and Col. 
 Tylev'.s 1st Conjiecticut artillery, wliicli I recom- 
 meml should be held in hand for the dcfensQ of 
 Washington. If you wish me to order any part 
 of this force to the front, it is in readiness to 
 march at a moment*^ notice to any ppintypu may 
 indicate. 
 
 In view of the existing state of things in our 
 front, I have deemed it best to order Gen. Casey 
 to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to 
 move : but not to send them off till further or- 
 ders. G. B. McC, Maj-Gcn. 
 
 On the 28th I telegraphed as follows : 
 
 Headquarters, Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 28, 
 1862. 4.10 ? M. 
 
 Gen. Franklin is with me here. I will know 
 in a few luinutes the condition of artillery and 
 cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move, 
 may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut 
 through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. 
 I have ordered troops to garrison the works at 
 Upton's Hill. They must be held at any cost. 
 As soon as I can see the way to spare them, I 
 will send a corps of good troops there. It is the 
 key to Washington, which cannot be seriously 
 menaced as long as it is held. 
 
 G. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H., Washington, D. C. 
 
 I received the following from the general-in 
 chief. 
 
 Washington, Aug. 28, 1862. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McC. — I think you had better place 
 Snmner's corps, as it arrives, near the guns, and 
 particularly at the Chain Bridge. The principal 
 thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this 
 city, especially in the night-time. Use Cox's and 
 Tyler's brigade, and the new troops for the same 
 object, if you need them. Porter writes to Burn- 
 side from Bristol, 9.30 a. ^r. yesterday, that Pope's 
 J'orces were then movirig on Manassas, and that 
 Burnside would soon hear of them by way of 
 Alexandria. Gen. Cullum has gone to Harper's 
 Ferry, and I have only a single regular officer for 
 duty in the office. Please send some of your of- 
 ficers to-day to see that every precaution is taken 
 at the forts against a raid ; also at the bridge. 
 Please answer. H. W. H., General in Chief. 
 
 On the 29th the following dispatch was tele- 
 graphed : ■ 
 
 Camp Kear Alexandria, Ang. 29, 1862. 10.20 
 A. M. — Franklin's corps is in motion. Started 
 about 6 A. M. I can give him but two squadrons 
 of cavalry. 'I propose moving Gen. Cox to Up- 
 ton's Hill, to hold that important point, with'its 
 works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna 
 via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has 
 two squadrons cavalry. Please answer at once 
 whether this meets yoi;r approval. I have di- 
 rected Woodbury, with the engineer brigade to 
 hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night 
 two regiments to vicinity of Forts " Ethan Allen" 
 and "Marcy." Meagher's brigade is still at Ac- 
 quia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it 
 leaves us without any reliable troops in and near 
 Washington, yet Franklin is too weak alone. 
 AVhat shall be done ? No more cavalry arrived ■ 
 have but three squadrons, Franklin has but for- 
 ty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move 
 more. I do not think Franjclin is in condition to 
 accomplish much if he meets with serious re- 
 sistance. 
 
 I should not have moved him but for yoiu- 
 pressing order of last night. What have you 
 from Vienna and Drainesviile ? 
 
 Geo. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H,. Washington. 
 
 To whicli the following is a reply : 
 
98 
 
 Washington, August 29, 1862, 12 m. 
 
 Major-Gen. McO. — Upton's Hill arrangement is 
 all right. We must send wagons and ammuni- 
 tion to Franklin as fast as tliey arrive. Meagher's 
 brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Leo 
 was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria 
 on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing 
 from Drainesville. 11. W. H., Gen.-in Chief. 
 
 On the same day the following v/as received 
 from his Excellency the President : 
 
 Washington, August 29, 18t)2, 2.30 p.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McC. — Wliat news from direction of 
 Manassas Junction ? What, generally ? A. L. 
 
 To which I replied as follows : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, August 29, 1862, 2.45 
 P.M. — The last news I received from the direction 
 of Manassas was from stragglers, to the eifect 
 that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and 
 retiring towards Thoro'fare Gap. This by no 
 means reliable, 1 am clear that one of two 
 courses should be adopted : 1st. To concentrate 
 all our available forces to open communication 
 with Pope. 2d. To leave Pope to get out of his 
 scrape, and at o}»ce use all our means to make 
 the capital perfectly safe. No middle ground 
 will now answer. 
 
 Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do 
 all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to 
 know what my orders and authority are. I ask 
 for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you 
 gire. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may 
 at once give the necessary orders. It will not do 
 to delay any longer. G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen. 
 
 A. L., President, 
 and copy to Gen. Ilalleck. 
 
 To which the following is a reply : 
 
 Wasliington. August 29. 1862, 4.10 p.m. 
 
 JIajor-Gen. McC. — Yours of to-day just re- 
 ceived. I think your first , alternative, to wit: 
 "To concentrate all our available forces to open 
 communication with Pope," is the right one, but 
 I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. 
 Halleck, aided by your counsels. . A. L. 
 
 It had been officially reported to m« from 
 Washington, that the enemy in strong force was 
 moving through Vienna, in the direction of the 
 Chain Bridge, and had a largo force at Vienna. 
 This report, in connection with the dispatch of 
 the general-in-chief on the 28tli, before noted, in- 
 duced me to direct Franklin to halt his command 
 near Annadale, until it could be determined by 
 reconnoissances to Vienna and towards Manassas, 
 whether these reports were true. General Cox 
 was ordered to send his small cavalry force from 
 Upton's Hill towards Vienna and Drainesville in 
 one direction, and towards Fairfax Court House 
 in the other, and Franklin to push his two squad- 
 rons towards Lewinsvillc, it would have been 
 very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small 
 force beyond Annadale. It must be remembered 
 that at this time we were cut off from direct 
 communication with General Pope ; that the ene- 
 my was, by the last accounts, at Manassas in 
 strong force ; and that Franklin had only from 
 10,000 to 11,00 men, with an entirely insufficient 
 force of cavalry and artillery. 
 
 In order to represent this condition of affairs 
 in its proper light to the general-in-chiof, and to 
 
 obtain definite mstructioua from him, I telegraph- 
 ed as follows : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, August 29, 1862, 12 m. 
 — Have ordered most of the 12th Pennsylvania 
 Cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting 
 duty towards Rockville, Poolesville, etc. If you 
 apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of the 
 river, I had better send a brigade or two of Sum- 
 ner's to near Tenallytown, where, with two or 
 three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, 
 they can watcli Chain Bridge and Tenallytown. 
 Would it meet yotir views to post rest of Sum- 
 ner's corps between Arlington and Fort Corco- 
 ran, whence they can either support Cox, Frank- 
 lin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytown? 
 Fr.iiiklin has only between 10,000 and 11,00 for 
 duly. How far do you wish this force to ad- 
 vance? G. B.-McC. 
 
 Major-Gen. IL, Washington. 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 1 p.m. 
 
 I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch in 
 regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order at 
 once. Please authorize me to attach new regi- 
 ments permanently to my old brigades. I can do 
 much good to new and pld troops in that way. I 
 shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts 
 Allen and Marcy, at least with strong advanced 
 guards- I wish to hold the line tlirough Prospect 
 Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hills. This 
 will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems 
 best to me with all the troops in the vicinity, in- 
 cluding Franklin, who, I really think, ought not, , 
 under present circumstances, to advance beyond 
 Annandale ? G. B. McC to Gen. IT. 
 
 On the same day I received a dispatch from 
 the general-in-chief, in which he asks me why I 
 halted Franklin at Annandale, to^which I replied 
 as follows : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 8 p-m. 
 
 By referring to my telegrams of 10-30 a.m., 12 
 M-, and 1 r-M-, together with your reply of 2.40 
 P.M., you will see why Franklin's corps halted at 
 Annandale. His small cavalry force — all I had to 
 give him — was ordered to push on as far as pos- 
 sible towards Manassas. It was not safe for 
 Franklin to move beyond Annandale under the 
 circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna- 
 Gen- Franklin remained here until about 1 p.M,, -j, 
 endeavoring to arrange for supplies for liis com- 
 mand. I am responsible for both these circum- 
 stances, and do not see that either was in dis- 
 obedience to your orders. Please give distinct 
 orders in reference to Franklin's movements to- 
 morrow. I have sent to Col. Hau.pt to push out 
 construction and supply trains as soon as pos- 
 sible. General Tyler to furnish the necessary 
 guards. I have directed Gen- Banks's supply 
 trains to start out to-night at least as far as An- 
 nandale, with an escort from Gen- Tyler. In re- 
 gard to to-morrow's movements, I desire definite 
 instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be ac- 
 cused of disobeying orders, when I have simply 
 exercised the discretion you committed to me. 
 G. B. McC. to .M-Gen. IL, Wash'n-, D. C. 
 
 On the same evening I sent the following dis- 
 patches : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, '62, 10 p.m- 
 
 Not bearing from you, I have sent orders to 
 
Gen. Franklin to place himself id coramunication 
 with Gen. Pope as soon as possible, and at the 
 same time cover the transit of Pope's supplier-. 
 Orders have been given for railway and wagon 
 trains to move to Pope, with least possible delay- 
 I am having inspections made of all the forts 
 around city by members of my staff, with instruc- 
 tions to give all requisite orders- I inspected 
 Worth and Ward m3-self this evening ; fuuiul 
 them in good order. Reports, so far as heard 
 from, are favorable as to condition of works. 
 G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. II., Washington. 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 10 p. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., General-in-Chief U. S. A., 
 Washington, D. C. : — Your dispatch received. 
 Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 
 o'clock to-mori^ow morning. Sumner lias about 
 fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or 
 artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments 
 is here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of 
 two regiments, much fatigued, came in to-day. 
 Tyler's brigade of three new regiments, but little 
 drilled, is also here. All these troops will be or- 
 dered to hold themselves ready to march to-mor- 
 row morning, and all, except Franklin's, to await 
 further orders. If you wish any of them to move 
 towards Manassas, please inform me. 
 
 Col. Wagner, 2d New York artillery, has just 
 come in from the front. He reports strong in- 
 fantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairfax 
 Court House ; reports rumors, from various 
 sources, that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, 
 are at Manassas. That the enemy with one hun- 
 dred and twenty thousand men, intend advancing 
 on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, 
 with a vie\y of attacking Washington and Balti- 
 more. Gen. Barnard telegraphs me to-night that 
 the length of the line ot fortifications on this side 
 of the Potomac, requires two thousand additional 
 artillery men, and additional troops to defend in- 
 tervals, according to circumstances. At all 
 events, he says an old regiment should be added 
 to the force at Chaih Bridge, and a few regiments 
 distributed along the lines, to give confidence to 
 our new troops. I agree with him fully, and 
 think our fortifications along the upper part of 
 our line, on this side the river, very unsafe with 
 their present garrisons, and the movements of the 
 enemv seem to indicate attack upon those works. 
 G. B.'McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Canip near Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862, 11.30 a. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. IL, General-in-Chief: — Your 
 telegram of 9 a. m. received. Ever since Gen. 
 Franklin received notice that he was to march 
 from Alexandria, he has been endeavoring to get 
 transportation from the quartermaster at Alexan- 
 dria, but he has uniformly been told that there 
 was none disposable, and his command marched 
 without wagons. After the departure of his 
 corps, he procured twenty wagons to carry some 
 extra ammunition, by unloading Banks's supply 
 train. Gen. Sumner endeavored, by application 
 upon the quartermaster's department, to get wa- 
 gons to carry his reserve ammunition, but with- 
 out success, and was obliged to march with what 
 he could carry in his cartridge-boxes. I have 
 this morning directed that all my headquarters 
 vagons that are landed, be at once loaded with 
 
 99 
 
 ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they 
 will not go far towards supplying the deficiency 
 
 Eighty-five wagons were got together by the 
 quartermasters last night, loaded with subsist- 
 ence, and sent forward at 1 a. m., with an escort, 
 via Aiinundale. Every effort has been made to 
 carry out your orders promptly'. The great diffi- 
 culty seems to consist in the fact, that the greater 
 part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria 
 and Washington, has been needed for current 
 supplies at the garrisons. Such is the state of 
 the case, as represented to me b}^ the quartermas- 
 ters, and it appears to be true. I take it for 
 granted that this has not been properly explained 
 to you. G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th, heavy artillery 
 firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax Court 
 House, which I reported to the general-in-chiefj 
 At 11 a. ni. the following telegram was sent: 
 
 Camp near Alexadria, Aug. 30, 1862, 11 a. m. 
 
 Have ordered Sumner to leavo one bi-igade in 
 vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest 
 via Columbia pike on Annandale and Fairfax 
 Court House. Is tins the route you wish them 
 to take ? He and Franklin are both instructed to 
 join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch 
 move out also when he arrives ? G. B. Mc, Maj^ 
 Gen. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H., Washington. 
 
 On the same day I received the following J- 
 Washington, Aug. 30, 1862, 1.45 a. m. 
 
 Maj-Gen. McC, — Ammunition, and particularly 
 for artillery, must be immediately sent forward 
 to Centreville for Gen. Pope. It must be done 
 with all possible dispatch, 
 
 H. W. H., General in Chief. 
 
 To which the following reply was made : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug 30, 1662. 2.10 p w. 
 
 I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artil- 
 lery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance offi- 
 cer, to load up all the wagons sent to him, I 
 have already sent all my headquarters wagons. 
 You will have to see that wagons are sent frooi 
 AVashington. I can do nothing more than gi.Ve 
 the order that every available wagon in Alexafiv 
 dria shall be loaded at once. The order to the 
 brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain nc%r 
 Chain Bridge and Tenallytown should go from 
 your headquarters, to save time. I understand 
 you to intend it also to move. I have no sharp- 
 shooters except the guard around my camp. I 
 have sent off every man but those, and will now 
 send them with the train as you direct. I will 
 also send my only remaining squadron of caval- 
 ry with Gen. Sumner. I can do no more. You 
 now have every man -of the army of the Poto- 
 mac who is within my reach. 
 
 G. B. McC. to Maj.Gen. H. W. H. 
 
 At 10.30 p, M. the following telegram was sent : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862. 10.30 p, 
 M. — I have sent to the front all my troojjs, with 
 the exception of Couch's division, and have giv- 
 en the orders necessary to insure its being dis- 
 posed of as you directed. I hourly expect the 
 return of one of my aides, who will give authen- 
 tic news from the field of battle. 
 
 I cannot express to 3'ou the pain and mortifica- 
 tion I have experienced to-day in listening to the 
 
100 
 
 distant soima of the firing of my men. As I can 
 be of uo furtlier use here, I respectfully ask that 
 if there is a probability of the conflict being re- 
 newed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to 
 the scene of battle with my staff merely to be 
 with my own men ; they will fight none the 
 worse for my being with them. If it is not 
 deemed best to intrust me with the command 
 even of my own army, I simph' ask to be per- 
 mitted to share their fate on tlie field of battle. 
 Please reply to this to-uight. 
 
 I have been engaged for the last few hours in 
 doing w^hat I can to make arrar)gements tor the 
 wounded. I have started out all the ambulances 
 now landed. 
 
 As I have sent my escort to the front, I would 
 be glad to take some or Gregg's cavalry with me 
 if allowed to go. 
 
 G, B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H. W. H. Comd'g U. S. 
 A., Wasliington, D. C. 
 
 To which on the following day I received this 
 answer : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 31, 1862. 9,18 a. m. 
 
 Maj-Gen. McC, — I have just seen your telegram 
 of 11.5 last night. The substance was stated to 
 me when received, but 1 did not know that you 
 asked for a reply immediately, I cannot answer 
 without seeing the President, as General Pope is 
 in command, by his orders, of the department. 
 
 I think Couch's division should go forward as 
 rapidly as possible, and find the battle-field. 
 ys H. W. H., General in Chief, 
 
 On the same day the foUowhig was received : 
 Washington Aug. 31, 1862. 12.45 p. m. 
 
 Maj-Gen. JifcC. — The subsistence department 
 are making Fairfax Station their prnicipal depot. 
 It sliould be well guarded. The oflicer m charge 
 Bhould be directed to secure the depot b}' 
 abattis against cavalry. As many as possible of 
 the new regiments should be prepared to take 
 the field. Perhaps some more should be sent in 
 the vicinitv of Chain Bridge. 
 
 H. W. H., General in Chief. 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC REMOVED 
 
 FROM GEN. McCLELLAN'S COMMAND. 
 
 At 2.30 P.Jh the following (|ispatch Avas tele- 
 graphed . 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 31, 1862, 2.30 p.m. 
 -^Major Haller is at Fairfax Station, with mypro- 
 ost and headquarters guard and other troops. I 
 nave requested four more companies to be sent 
 at once, and the precautions you direct to be 
 taken. 
 
 I have no control over the new regiments ; do 
 not know where they are or anything about 
 them, except those near here. Their command- 
 ing officers and those of the works are not under 
 me. Where I have seen evils existhig under my 
 own eye I have corrected them. I think it is 
 the business' of General Casey to prepare the new 
 regiments for the field, and a matter between him 
 and General iJarnard to order others to vicinity 
 of Chain Bridge. Neither of them is under my 
 command, and by the War Department order I 
 have no right to give them orders. 
 
 Gen. IT., Washington. G. B. McC; ' 
 
 To which the following is an answer : 
 
 Washington, Aiagust 31, 1862, 10.7 p.m. 
 
 Major-Gen. McC. — Since receiving your dis- 
 
 patcli, relating to command, I hare not been able 
 to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have 
 not seen the order as published, but will write 
 to 3'ou in the morning. You will retain the com- 
 mand of everythhig in this vicinity not tcmpora 
 rily to be Pope's army in the field. 
 
 I beg of you to asaist me in this crisis witV 
 3'our ability and experience. T am entirel.y tiref' 
 out. • II. W, H., Gen.-in-(i]iet. 
 
 The order referred to in the preceding di. 
 patches was as follows : 
 
 ^Var Department, August 30. 1862.— The fo: 
 lowing ai'e the commanders of the armies opera: 
 ing in Virginia : 
 
 General Burnside commands his own corps, 
 except those that have been temporarily detached 
 and assigned to General Pope- 
 
 General McClcllan commands that portion of 
 the Army of the Potomac that has not been eeit 
 furward to Gen. Pope's connnand. 
 
 General Pope commands the Array of Virginia 
 and all the forces temporarily attached to it. 
 
 All the forces are under command' of l^Iajo; 
 Gen. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 
 
 E. D. TowNSEND, Assistant-Adj-Gen. 
 
 I was informed bj' Col- Townsend that the 
 above was published by order of the Secretary 
 of War. 
 
 At 11.30 p.M I telegraphed the following : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 31, 1862, 11.30 
 P.M. — The squadron of the 2d Regular Cavalry tiiat 
 I sent with Gen. Sumner was captured to-day, 
 about 2 P.M., some three miles from Fairfax 
 Court House, beyond it on the Tattle River Pike, 
 by Fitzhugh Lee, with 3,000 cavalry and three 
 light batteries. I have conversed with the 1st 
 sergeant, who says that when he last saw them 
 they were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope had 
 no troops on that road, this squadron getting 
 there by mistake. There is nothing of otirs on 
 the right of Centreville but Sumner's corps. 
 There was much artillery firing dtiring the day. 
 A rebel major told the sergeant that the rebels 
 had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the 
 road is filled with Avagons and stragglers coming 
 towards Alexandria. It is clear, from the ser- 
 geant's account, that we were badlj' beaten yes- 
 terday, and that Pope's right is entirely exposed. 
 
 I recommend that no more of Couch's division 
 be sent to the front, that Burnside be brought 
 here as soon as practicable, and that everything 
 available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, 
 includhig the mass of the troops on the railroad. 
 I apprehend that the enemy will, or have by this 
 time, occupied Fairfa!s; Court-llouse, and cut off. 
 Pope entirely, unless he falls back«to-night via 
 Sangster's and Fairfax Station. I think these or- 
 ders should be sent at once. I hate no confi- 
 dence in the dispositions made, as I gather them 
 To speak frankly, and the occasion requires it, 
 there appears to be a total absence of brains, and 
 I fear the total destruction of the army. I licwe 
 some cavalry here that can carry out anj' orders 
 you may have to send. The X)ccasion is grave,; 
 and demands grave measures. The question ia*' 
 the salvation of the country. I learn that ou't' 
 loss yesterday amounted to 15,000- We cannot 
 afford such losses without an object. It is my 
 deliberate opinion that the interests of the na- 
 
101 
 
 tion demand that Pope should fall back to-mght 
 if possible, and not one moment is to be lost I 
 will use all the cavalry I have to watch our right. 
 Please answer at once. I feel confident yon can 
 rely upon the information I give you- I shall be 
 up all night, and ready to obey any orders you 
 give me. 
 
 G. B. ]\rcC., IM-G.. to M.-Gen. H., Washington. 
 
 To which this reply was received : 
 
 Washington, Sept. 1, '62, 1 .30 p.m. 
 
 Maj.Gen, McC? :— Burnside was ordered up 
 very early yesterday morning. Retain remainder 
 of Couch's forces, aiid make arrangements to stop 
 all retreating troops in line of works, or where 
 you can best establish an outer line of defense. 
 My news from Pope was up to 4 p.m., he was then 
 all right. I must wait for- more definite informa- 
 ' tion before I can Order a retreat, as the falling 
 back on the line of the works must necessarily 
 be directed, in case of a serious disaster. 
 
 Give me all news that is reliable. I shall be 
 up all night, and ready to act as circumstances 
 may require. I am fully aware of the gravity of 
 the crisis, and have been for weeks. 
 
 II. W. H., Gen.-in-Chief. 
 
 It will be seen from what has preceded that I 
 lost no time that could be avoided in moving the 
 army of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the 
 support of the army of Virginia ; that I. spared 
 no effort to hasten the embarkation of the troops 
 at Fort Monroe, Newport News and Xoi'^*^"""'"- 
 remaining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass 
 of the army had sailed ; and that after my arrival 
 at Alexandria I left nothing in my power undone 
 to forward supplies and reinforcements to Gen. 
 Pope. I sent with the troops that moved all the 
 cavalry I could get hold of, even my personal 
 escort was sent out upon the line of the railway 
 as a guard, with the provost and camp guard at 
 headquarters, retaining less than 100 men, many 
 of whom were orderlies, invalids, members of 
 bands, etc. ; all the headquarter teams that ar- 
 rived were sent out with supplies and ammuni- 
 tion, none being retained even to move the head- 
 quarters camps. The squadron that liabitually 
 
 rating with and supporting Gen. Pope, that he 
 had " always been a friend of mine," and no-w 
 asked me, a's a special favor, to use my influence 
 in correcting this state of things. I replied, sub- 
 stantially, that I was confident that he was mis- 
 informed, that I was sure, whatever sentiment tho 
 armv of the Potomac might entertain towards 
 Gen. Pope, that they would obey his orders, sup- 
 port him to the fullest extent, and do their whole 
 duty. The President, who was mucli moved, 
 again asked me to telegrapb to "i^itz John 
 Porter or some other of my friends," and try to 
 do away with any feeling that might exist, adding 
 that I could rectify the evil, and that no one else 
 could. I thereupon told him that I would cheer- 
 fully telegraph to Gen. Porter, or do anything 
 else in my power, to gratify his wishes and re- 
 lieve his anxiety, upon which he thanked me 
 very warmly, assured me that he could nevei 
 forget my action in the matter, etc., and left. 
 
 I then wrote the following telegram to Gen. 
 Porter, which was sent to him by the general-in- 
 chief : 
 
 Washington, Sept. 1, 1862. 
 
 ]\Iaj.-Geu. Porter :— I ask of you for my sake, 
 and that of the country, and the old army of the 
 Potomac, that you and all my friends, will lend 
 the fullest and most cordial co-operation to Gen. 
 Pope, in all the operations now going on. The 
 destinies of our country, the honcr of our army, 
 are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheer- 
 ful co-operation of all in the field. This week is 
 the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my 
 friends in tlie army of the Potomac, and that the 
 last request I have to make of them is, that for 
 their country's sake they will extend to Gen. 
 Pope the same support they ever have to me. ~ 
 
 I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, 
 and am doing all I can -to render your retreat 
 safe, should that become necessary. G. B. McO. 
 
 To which he sent the following reply : 
 Fairfax Court House, 10 a. m., Sept. 3, 1862. 
 
 " Tou may rest assured that all your friends, 
 as w.ell as every lover of his country, will ever 
 give, as they have given, to Gen. Pope their eor- 
 
 served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth J cUal ce-operatiou and constant support in tue ex- 
 - - ~ ^-^ i ., , , ^ . , . ■ ^^^^tion of all orders and plans. Our killed, 
 
 with Gen. Burnside, as he was deficient in cav 
 
 ^ ^^' FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 On the 1st of September I went into Washing- 
 ton, where I had an uiterview Avitli the general- 
 in-chief, who instructed me verbally to take 
 command of its defences, expressly limiting my 
 jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and 
 prohibiting me from exercising any control over 
 the troops'" actively engaged in front under Gen. 
 Pope. During this interview, I suggested to the 
 general-in-chief tho necessity of his going in 
 person, or sending one of his personal staff, to 
 the arm/ under Gen. Pope, for the purpose of 
 ascertaining the exact condition of affairs. He 
 sent Col. Kelton, his assistant adjutant-general. 
 
 During the afternoon of the same day. I re- 
 ceived a message from the general-in-chief, to 
 the effect that he desired me to go at once to his 
 house to see the President. The President in- 
 formed me that he had reason to believe that the 
 army of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-ope- 
 
 woijnded. and enfeebled ti-oops attest our devoted 
 dutv." F. J. Porter, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Gen. G. B. i\IcO., Washington. 
 
 Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor 
 at anv other time, did I think for one moment 
 that Gen. Porter had been, or would be in any 
 manner, derelict in the performance of his duty 
 to the riation and its cause. Such an impression 
 never entered my mind. The dispatch in ques- 
 tion was written purely at the request of the 
 President. 
 
 On the morning of tlie 2d, the President and 
 Gen. Halleck came to my house, when the Presi- 
 dent informed me that Colonel Kelton had return- 
 ed from the front ; that our aflaira were in bad 
 condition ; that the army was in full retreat upon 
 the defen-ses of Washington ; the roads filh d 
 with stragglers, &c. He instruoted me to t^lce 
 steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers," to 
 place the works in a proper state of delense.and 
 to go out to meet and take command of the ar-, 
 
102 
 
 my ■when it approached the victnity of the works; 
 then to put the troops in the best position for 
 defense ; committing everything to my hands.* 
 
 I immediately took steps to carry out these or- 
 ders, and I sent an aide to General Pope with 
 the following letter : 
 
 Headquarters, Washington, Sept 2, 1362. 
 ifaj.-Gren. J. Pope, Oom'g. A. V. : 
 
 fieneral, — Gen, llalleck instructed me to re- 
 peat to you tlie order he sent tliis moi'ning to 
 Washington without unnecessary delay. lie 
 feared that his messenger might miss you, and 
 desirt3d to take this double precaution. 
 
 In order to bring troops npon ground witli 
 which they are already familiar, it would be best 
 to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that it 
 may occupy Hall's Hill, etc. ; McDowell's to Up- 
 ton's Hill ; Franklin's to the works in front of 
 Alexandria ; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity ; 
 Coixch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the; 
 Chain Bridge ; Sumner either to Fort Albany or 
 to Alexandria, as may be most convenient. 
 
 In haste. General, very truly yoiirs, 
 
 G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 In the afternoon I crossed tlie Potomac and 
 rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the ad- 
 vance of McDowell's corps, and with it Generals 
 Pope and McDowell. After getting what infor- 
 mation I could from them, I sent the few aids at 
 my disposal to the left, to give instrirctions to the 
 troops approaching in the direction of Alexan- 
 dria ; and hearing artilleiy firing in the direction 
 of the Vienna and Langley road, by which the 
 corps of Sumner, Porter and Sigel were returnmg, 
 and learning from Gen. Pope that Sumner was 
 probably engaged, I went with a singe aide and 
 three orderlies by the shortest line to meet that 
 column. I reached the column after dark, and 
 proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became 
 satislied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be 
 able to reach its intended position without any 
 serious molestation. I therefore indicated to 
 Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were 
 to occupy, sent instructions to Gen. Sumner, and 
 at a late hour of the night returned to Waslung- 
 ton. - 
 
 Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, 
 and was engaged in rectifying the positions of 
 the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure 
 the issuing of tlie necessary supplies, etc. I felt 
 sure on this day tliat wo could repulse an}' at- 
 tack made by the enemy on the south side of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 .=) THfe MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 
 
 • On the 3d the enemy had disappeared from tlie 
 front of Washington, and tlie information which 
 I received induced me to believe that he intend- 
 ed to cross the upper Potomac into Maryland. 
 This materially clianged the aspect of affairs and 
 enlarged the sphere of operations, for in c;is'^ of 
 
 * The following', which was ths only Oider issuo't apuu 
 the subject, was published on the 2d September. It was 
 acciilenfallv omitted in preparing the report. 
 War Departmeut, Adjutant GENERAii'i Ofeice, 
 
 WAsuiNGTOx, Sept. 2, 1862. 
 JI;ij oi-Cleneral McClelhin will have command of the for- 
 tiftcalions of Washington, and df all the troops for the 
 defense of the capital. By or.ler of 
 
 M'tj -Gen IIallkck, 
 • E. n. Tbwnsenh, .ias't Adj't Gencrui. 
 
 a crossing in force, an active campaign would be 
 necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the inva- 
 sion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland. 
 
 I therefore on the 3d ordered the 2d and 12tl> 
 Corps to Tennallytown, and the 9th Corps to a 
 pomt on the 7th Street Road near Washington, 
 and sent such cavalry as was available to the 
 fords near Poolesvillo, to watch and impede the 
 enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. 
 
 On the .5th the 2d and 12th Corps were moved 
 to Rockville, and Couch's division (the only one 
 of the 4th Corps that had been»brought from the 
 Peninsula) to Offut's Cross Roads. 
 
 On tlie 6th the 1st and 9th Corps were ordered 
 to Leesboro, the 6th Corps and Syke's division of 
 the 5th Corps to Tennallytown. ■ 
 
 On the 7th tlie 6th Corps was advanced to 
 Rockville, to which place my headquarters were 
 moved on the same day. 
 
 All the necessary arrangements for the defence 
 of the city, under the new condition of things, 
 had been made, and General Banks was left in 
 command, having received his instructions from 
 rae. , • 
 
 I left Washington on the 7th of September. 
 At this time it was known that the mass of tluj 
 rebel army bad passed up to the south side of 
 the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and 
 and that a portion of that army had crossed into 
 Maryland ; but whether it was their intention tu 
 cross their whole force, with a view to turn 
 Washington by a flank movement down the north 
 bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltiriiore, or 
 to invade Pennsylvain'a, were questions which 
 at that time we bad no means of deterniining. 
 This uncertainty as to the intentions of the enemy 
 obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to marxh 
 cautiously, and to advance the army in sucli 
 order as to continually keep Washington, ainl 
 Baltimore covered, and at the same time to hold 
 the troops well in hand, so as to be able to con- 
 centrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took 
 the direction of Pennsylvania, or to return to the 
 defence of Washington, if, as was greatly feared 
 by the authorities, the enemy should be merely 
 making a feint with a small force to draw off out- 
 army, while with their mahi forces they stood 
 ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to 
 attack the capital. 
 
 In the meantime the process of reorganization 
 rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects 
 of the disastrous campaign upon the otlier side 
 of the Potomac, was rapidly progressing, the 
 troops were regaining confidence, and their for- 
 mer soldierly appearance and discipline was fast 
 returning. My cavalry was pushed out continu- 
 ally in all directions, and all ])0H8ible steps taken 
 to learn the positions and movements of the 
 enemy. 
 
 The following table shows the movements of 
 the army from day to day, up to the 14th of Sepi;- 
 ember. 
 
 [See next page.] 
 
 The right wing, consisting oi the 1st and 9th 
 Corps, under the command of Major-General 
 Buruside, moved on Frederick, the 1st Corps via 
 Brookville, Cooksvillc and Ridgeville, and the 
 yth Corjjs via Damascus and New Market. 
 
 The 2d and 12th Corps, forming tlie centre. 
 
103 
 under the command of General Sumner, moved 
 on Frederick; the former via Clarksburg and 
 Urbana. and the 12th Corps on a lateral road be- 
 tween Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining 
 the communication with the right wing, and cov- 
 ering the direct road from Frederick to Wash- 
 ington. 1 r ,~i 
 
 The 6th Corps under the command of General 
 Franklin, moved to Buckeystown viaDarnestown, 
 Da^vsonville, and Barnville, covering the road 
 from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, 
 and being in a position to connect with and sup- 
 port the centre should it have been necessary (as 
 was supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. 
 Couch's division moved by the "River Road," 
 covering that approach, watching the fords of 
 the Potomac, and ultimately following and sup- 
 supporting tbe 6th Corps. 
 
 The following extracts f i om telegrams received 
 by me after my departure from Washington will 
 show how little was known there i^bout the ene- 
 my's movements, and the fears which were enter- 
 tained for the safety of the capital. 
 
 On the 9th of September, General Halleck tele- 
 graphed me as follows : 
 
 "Until we can get better advices about the 
 numbers of the enemy at Drainsville, I think vre 
 must be verv cautious about stripping too much 
 the forts on the Virginia side. It may be the 
 enemv's object to draw off the mass of our forces, 
 and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side 
 of the Potomac. Think of this." 
 
 'Again on the 11th of Sept., Gen. Ilalleck tele- 
 LTaphed me as follows : , o -t 
 
 '^ " Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel ? 1 
 thing the main force of the enemy is m your 
 front ; more troops can be spared from here." 
 
 This dispatch, as published by the Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the 
 o-eneral-in-chief. reads as follows : " Why not or- 
 der forward Porter's or Sigel's ? If the main 
 force of the enemy is in your front, more troops 
 can be spared from here." 
 
 I remark that the original dispatch as received 
 bv me from the telegraph operator, is in the 
 words quoted above : ■• I thmk the main force, of 
 the enemy, ct'c." 
 
 In accordance with this suggestion, I asked, on 
 the same day, that all the troops that could be 
 r^pared should at once be sent to reinforce me ; 
 but none came. 
 
 On the the 12th I received the following tele- 
 gram from his Excellency the President : 
 
 " Governor Curtin telegraphs me : ' I have ad- 
 vices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at 
 Williamsport, and probably the -whole rebel 
 army will be drawn from Maryland.'" The Pre- 
 sident adds : " Receiving nothing from Harper's 
 Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive infor- 
 mation from Wheeling, that the line is cut, corro- 
 borates the idea that the enemy is recrossing 
 the Potomac. Please do not let him get off with- 
 out being hurt." 
 
 On the 13th Gen. TTalleck telegraphed as fol- 
 lows ; 
 
 " Until you know more certainly the enemy s 
 force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in 
 thus uncovering the capital. 1 am of the opinion 
 
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104 
 
 ^'at tlie enemy will send a small column towards 
 Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direc- 
 tion, then suddenly move on Washington with 
 the forces south of the Potomac, and those he 
 may cross over." 
 
 Again, on tho 14th, Gen. Halleck telegraphed 
 me that "scouts report a large force still on the 
 Virginia side. of the Potomac. If so, I fear you 
 are exposing your left and rear." 
 
 Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the 
 most positive evidence that Lee's army was in 
 front of us, I received the following : 
 
 War Department, Sept. 16, 1862, 12.30 p. m. 
 
 Maj.-Geh'. McC. :— Yours of 7 a. m. is this ino- 
 ment received. As you ^ive me no information 
 in regard to the position of j^our forces, except 
 those at Sharpsburg, of course I cannot advise. 
 I think, however, you will find that the whole 
 force of the enemy in your front has crossed the 
 river. I fear now more than ever tliat they- will 
 recross at Harper's Jerry or below, and turn 
 your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. 
 This has appeared to me to be a part of their 
 plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject. A 
 heavy rain might prevent it. H. W. H., General- 
 in-Chief. 
 
 The importance of moving with all due cau- 
 tion, so as not to uncover the national capital, 
 until the enemy's position and plans were de- 
 veloped, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me ; 
 and as my troops extended from the Baltimore 
 and Ohio Railroad to the Potomac, with the ex- 
 treme, left flank moving along that stream, and 
 with strong pickets left in rear to watch and 
 guard all the available lords, I did not regard my 
 left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it ap- 
 pears from the foregoing telegrams that the 
 general-in-chief was of a different opinion, and 
 that my movements were, in his-judgment, too 
 precipitate, not only for the safety of Washing- 
 ton, but also for the security of my left and rear. 
 
 The precise nature of these daily injunctions 
 against a precipitate advance may now be per- 
 ceived. The general-in-chief, in his testimony 
 before the " Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War," gays : " In respect to Gen. McClellan's 
 going too fast, or too far from Washington, there 
 can be found no such telegram from me to him ; 
 he has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I 
 sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going 
 too far, not from Washington, but from the Po- 
 tomac, leaving Gen. Lee the opportunity to come 
 down the Potomac and get between him and 
 Washington. I thought Gen. McClellan should 
 keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his 
 left rather than his right, so as the more readily 
 to relieve Harper's Ferry." 
 
 As I can find no telegram from the general-in- 
 chief recommending me to keep my left flank 
 nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe 
 that when he gave this testimony he had forgot- 
 ten tho purport of the telegrams above quoted ; 
 and had also ceased to remember the fact, well 
 known to him at the time, that my left, from the 
 time 1 left Washington, always rested on the Po- 
 tomac, and that my centre was continually in po- 
 sition to reinforce the left or right as occasion 
 might require. Had I advanced my left (lank 
 
 along the Potomac more rapidly than the other 
 columns marched upon the roads to the right, ] 
 should have thrown that flank out of supporting 
 distance of the other troops, and greatly exposed 
 it. And if I had marched the entire army in one 
 column along the banks of the river, instead of 
 upon Ave different parallel roads, the column, 
 with its trains, would have extended about fifty 
 miles, and the enemy might have defeated the 
 advance before the rear could have reached the 
 scene of action. Moreover, such a movement 
 would have uncovered the communications with 
 Baltimore and Washington dn our right, and ex- 
 posed our left and rear. 
 
 I presume it will be admitted by every milita- 
 ry man that it was necessary to move the army 
 in such order that it could at any time bo con- 
 centrated for battle, and I am of opinion that this 
 object could not have been accomplished in any 
 other way than the one employed. Any other 
 disposition of our forces would have subjected 
 them to defea't in detached fragments. 
 
 On tlie 10th of December, I received from my 
 scouts information which rendered it quite pro- 
 bable that Gen. Lee's army was in the vicinity of 
 Frederick, br,t whether his intention was to move 
 towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not then 
 known. 
 
 On the 11th I ordered Gen. Burnside to push a 
 strong reconnoissance across the National Road 
 and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad towards 
 New Market, and if he learned that the enemy 
 had moved towards Hagerstown, to press on 
 rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops cbnstant- 
 ly ready to meet the enemy in force. A corres- 
 ponding movement of all the troops in the centre 
 and on the left was ordered in the direction of 
 Urbana and Poolesville. 
 
 On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered 
 Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts 
 of the city and in the streets. On the 13th the 
 main bodies of the right wing and centre passed 
 through Frederick. 
 
 It was soon ascertained that the main body of 
 the enemy's forces had marched out of the city 
 on the two previous days, taking the roads to 
 Boonsboro' and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering 
 it necessaiy to force the passes through the Catoc- 
 tin and South ^fountain ridges, and gain posses- 
 sion of Boonsboro' and Rohrersville before any 
 relief could be extended to Col. Miles at Harper's 
 Ferry. 
 
 On the 13th- an order fell into my hands issued 
 by Gen. Lee, which fully disclosed his plans, and 
 I immediately gave orders for a rapid and vigor- 
 ous forward movement. 
 
 The following is a copy of the order referred 
 to:,,,.., , 
 Ileadq's, Army of North'n Virginia. Sept.. 9, '(^2. 
 Spkcial Ordkrs, No. 191. 
 
 The army will resume its inarch to-morrow, 
 taking the Hagerstown road. Gen. Jackson's 
 command will form the advance, and after passing 
 Middletown, with such portions as he may select, i 
 will take theroute towards Sharpsburg, cross the 
 Poioinac at the most convenient point, -and by 
 Friu.iy niglit take possession of the Baltimore 
 and dliio Railroad, capture sucli oi l^lie enemy as 
 
105 
 
 may be at MArtinsburg. and intercept such as 
 may attempt to escape from Harper s Ferry. 
 
 Gen. Long-street's command will pursue the 
 same road as far as Boonsboro' where it will hal 
 with the reserve, supply, and baggage trams ot 
 
 ^Gen""iiicLaws, with his own division and that 
 of Gen. R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen. Long- 
 street. On reaching Middletown, he will take 
 the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morn- 
 ing possess himself of the Maryland Heights, and 
 endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper s Ferry 
 
 ■ and vicinity. ,. . . r.. ^^ 
 
 Gen Walker, with his division, after accom- 
 plishing the object in which he is now engaged, 
 ^iU cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its 
 rieht bank to Lovettsville, take possession ot 
 Loudon Heights if practicable, by Friday morn- 
 ing IKeyes' ford on his left, and the roadbetween 
 theend of the mountain and the Potomac on his 
 ri<^ht He will, as far as practicable, co-operate 
 wTth Gen. McLaws and Gen. Jackson, m inter- 
 cepting the retreat of the enemy. 
 
 Gen. D. H. Hill's division will form the rear 
 c-uard of the armv. pursuing the road taken by 
 the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, 
 and supply trains, &c., will precede Gen llill. 
 ; Gen. Stuart will detach a squadron ot cayah-y 
 to accompany the commands ot Gens. Longstreet 
 Jackson, and McLaws, and with the mam body ot 
 the cavalry will cover the route of the army, ana 
 bring up all stragglers that may have been left 
 behind. , ^^ ^ i 
 
 The commands of Gen. Jackson, McLaws, and 
 Walker, after accomplishing the objects tor which 
 they have been detached, will join the mam body 
 of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. 
 
 Each regiment on the march, will habitually 
 carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons^ 
 for use of the men at their encampments to pro- 
 cure wood, &c. , 
 
 By command of Gen. R. E. Lee, R- H. Chilton, 
 \ A. G., to xMai.-Gen. D. H. Hill, C. D. 
 HARPERS FERRr. 
 In the report of a military commission, of 
 which-Maj.-Gen; D. Hunter was President, which 
 convened at Washington, for the purpose ot in- 
 vestigating the conduct of certain officers m con- 
 nection with the surrender of Harpers i^erry, 1 
 
 find the following : , , r i n ^ 
 
 " The commission has remarked Irccly on boi. 
 Miles, an old officer, who has been killed in the 
 service of his country, and it can not, irom any 
 motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those 
 in high command, when it thinks such censure 
 deserved. , 
 
 "The general-in-chief has teptihed that (xcn. 
 xVfcC. after having received orders to repel the 
 er.emv invading the State of Maryland, marched 
 only six miles per da,y, on au average, when pur- 
 suing this invading enemy. „ , - , . 
 
 "The general-in chief also testifies that, in his 
 opinion, he could and should have relieved and 
 protected Harper's Ferry; and hi this opinion 
 the commission fully concur." 
 
 I have been greatly surprised that this com- 
 mission, in its investigations, never called upon 
 me. ivH- upon any officer (g my statl, nor, so tar ; 
 
 as I know, upon any officer of the army of the 
 Potomac, able to give an intelligent statement of 
 the movements of that army. But another para, 
 graph in the same report makes testimony from 
 such sources quite superfluous. It is as follows : 
 " By a reference to the evidence, it will be 
 seen that at the very moment Col. Ford aban- 
 doned Maryland Heights, his little army was in 
 reality relieved by Gen. Franklin's and Sumner's 
 corps at Crampton's Gap, within seven miles of 
 his position." 
 
 The corps of Gens. Franklin and Sumner were 
 a part of the army which I at that time had the 
 honor to command, and they were acting under 
 ray orders at Crampton's Gap, and elsewhere, and 
 if as the commission states, Col. Ford's " little 
 army Avas in reality relieved" by those officers, it 
 was relieved by me. . .1 r i 
 
 I had, on the morning of the 10th, sent the tol- 
 lowlng dispatch in relation to the command at 
 Harper's Ferry : ,„... „.r 
 
 Camp near RockviUe, Sept. 10, 18b2, 9.45 a v 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington, D. C. :— OoL 
 Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I under- 
 stand, with nine thousand troops. He can do 
 nothing where he is, but could be of great ser- 
 vice if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be 
 ordered to join me by the most practicable route. 
 G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 To this I received the follciwing reply : 
 " There is no way for Col. Miles to join you at 
 present ; his only chance is to defend his works 
 till you can open communication with him. H. 
 
 W. il." . , . ,. 
 
 It seems necessary for a distinct understanding 
 of this matter, to state that I was directed on 
 the 12th to assume command of the garrison of 
 Harper's Ferry, as soon as I should open commu- 
 nication with that place, and that when I received 
 this order all communication from the direction 
 in which I was approaching was cut off. Up to 
 that time, however. Col. :Miles could, m my judg- 
 ment have marched his command into Pennsyl- 
 vania, by crossing the Potomac ^ Wilhamsport 
 or above, and this opinion was confirmed by the 
 fact that Col. Davis marched the cavalry part of 
 Col. J\liles' command from Harper's Ferry on tho 
 14th takuig the main road to Hagerstown, and 
 he encountered no enemy excepting a small 
 picket near the mouth of the Antielam. 
 
 Before I left Washington, and when tliere, 
 there certainly could have been no enemy to 
 prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Col. 
 Miles. I recommended to the proper authorities 
 t^iat the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be 
 withdrawn via Hagerstown, to aid in covering 
 the Cumberland Valley, or that, taking up the 
 pontoon bridge and obstructing the railroad 
 brido-e it should fall back to tho JIaryland 
 Heights, and there hold out to the last. In this 
 position it ought to have maintained itself many 
 (lavs It was not deemed proper to adopt either 
 of tliese suggestions, and when the matter was 
 left to my discretion it was too late tcr me to do 
 anything but endeavor to relieve the garrisor.. I 
 accordingly directed artillery to be fired by our 
 advance, at frequent intervals, as a signal that 
 relief was at hand. This was done, and as 1 at- 
 
106 
 
 terward.s leaniod, the reports of the cannon were 
 distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry. It was confi- 
 dently expected that Col. Miles would hold out 
 until we had carried the mountain passes, and 
 were in condition to send a detachment to his 
 relief. The left was therefore ordered to move 
 through Crampton'e Pass- in front of Burketts- 
 ville, while the centre and right marched upon 
 Turner',3 Pass in front of Aliddletown. 
 
 It may be asked by those who are not acquaint- 
 ed with the topography of the country in the vi- 
 cinity of Harper's Ferry, wliy Franklin, instead 
 of marching his column over the circuitous road 
 fmm Jefferson via Burkettsville and Brownsville, 
 and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. It 
 was for the reason that I had received informa- 
 tion that the enemy wei-e anticipating our ap- 
 proach in that direction, and liad established 
 batteries on the south side of the Potomac which 
 commanded all the approaches to Knoxville ; 
 moreover the road from that point winds direct- 
 ly along the river bank at the foot of a precipi- 
 tous mountain, where there was no opportunity 
 of forming in line of ])attle. and where the ene- 
 my could have placed batteftes on both sides of 
 the river to enfilade our narrow approaching 
 columns. The approach through Crampton's Pass 
 which debouches into Pleasant Valley in rear of 
 Maryland Heights, was the only' one which of- 
 fered any reasonable prospect of carrying that 
 formidable position. At the same time the troops 
 upon the road were in better relation to the main 
 body of our forces. "> 
 
 On the morning of the 14th a verbal message 
 reached me from Col. Miles, which was the first 
 authentic intelligence I had received as to the 
 condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The mes- 
 senger informed me that on the preceding after- 
 noon Maryland Heights had been abandoned by 
 our troops after repelling an attack of the rebels 
 and that Col. Miles's entire force was concentra- 
 ted at Harper's Ferry : the Maryland, Loudon, 
 and Bolivar Heights having been abandoned by 
 him, and occupied by the enemy. The messen- 
 ger also stated %at there was no apparent reason 
 for the abandonment of the Maryland Heights, 
 and that Col. ililes instructed him to say that he 
 could hold out with certainty two days longer. 
 I directed him to make his way back, if possible, 
 with the information, that I was approaching rap- 
 idly, and felt confident I could relieve the place. 
 
 On the same afteriiocai I wrote the following 
 letter to Col. Miles, and dispatched three copies 
 by three different couriers, on different routes. 
 I did not, however, learn that any of these men 
 succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry. 
 
 Middletown, Sept. 14, 1862. 
 
 Col. D. S. Miles, — Colonel : The army is being 
 rapidly concentrated here. We are now attack- 
 ing the ])as9 on tho Itagerstown road, over the 
 Blue Ridge, A coliunu is about attacking the 
 Burkcstsville and T.oonsboro' Pass. You may 
 count on our making every effort to relieve you ; 
 you may rely upon my speedily accomplishing 
 that object. Hold out to the last extremity. If 
 it is possible, reoccupy the Maryland Heights, 
 with your whole force. If you can do that, I will 
 certainly be able to relieve you. As the Catoc- 
 
 tin Valley is in oiu- possession you can safeljr 
 cross the river at BcrUu or its vicinity, so far as 
 opposition on this side of the river is concerned. 
 Ilold out to the last. 
 
 G. B. McC, Maj-Gen. Corad'g. 
 
 On the previous day I had sent Gen. Franklin 
 the following instructions : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Frederick, Sept. 13, 1862, 6.20 p.m. 
 Major-Gen. W. B. Franklin, Com'g 6th Corps. 
 
 General, — I have now full information as to 
 movements and intentions of the enemy. Jackson 
 has crossed the Upper Potomac to capture the , 
 garrison at Martinsburg, and cut off Miles's re 
 treat toward the west. A division on the south 
 side of the Potomac was to carry Loudon Heights, 
 and cut off his retreat in that direction. McLaws, 
 with his own command and the division of P. II. 
 Anderson was to move by Boonsboro' and Piohr- 
 ersville to carry the ^Maryland Heights. The 
 signal officers inform me that he is now in Pleas- 
 ant valley. The firing shows that Miles still holds 
 out. Longstreet was to move by Boonsboro',^ v 
 and ther^ halt with the reserve trains, D. II. Hill 
 to form the rear guard, Stuart's cavalry to bring 
 up stragglers, &c. We have cleared out all the 
 cavalry, this side the mountains, and north of us. 
 The last I heard from Pleasonton he occupied 
 iliddletown after several sharp skirmishes. A 
 division of Burnside's started several hours ago 
 to support him. The whole of Burnside's com- 
 mand, including Hooker's corps, march this even- 
 ing and early to-morrow morning, followed by the 
 corps of Sumner, and Banks's and Sykes's divi- 
 sion upon Boonsboro', to carr}^ that position. 
 Couch has been ordered to concentrate his divi- 
 sion and join you as rapidly as possible, Without 
 waiting for the whole of that division to join 
 you, you will move at day-break in the -morning 
 by Jefferson and Burkettsville upon the road to 
 llohrersville ; I have reliable information that 
 the mountain pass by this road is practicable for 
 artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occu- 
 pied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon as 
 practicable, and debouch upon Piohrersville in 
 order to cut off the retreat of or destroy MoLaw's 
 command. ' If you find this pass held by the ene- 
 my in large force, make all your disi^ositions for 
 the attack, and commence it about half an hour 
 after you hear severe firing at the pass on the 
 Hagerstown pike, where the main body will 
 attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will 
 be first to cut off, destroy, or capture Jlc'l-aws 
 command, and relieve Colonel Miles. If you 
 effect this you will order him to join you at once 
 with all his disposable troops, first destroying 
 the bridges over the Potomac, if not already 
 done, and leaving a sufficient garrison to prevent 
 the enemy from passing the ford ; you will then 
 return by Rohrersville on the direct road to 
 Boonsboro' if the main column has not succeeded 
 in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the road 
 from Rohrersville to Sharpsburg and Williams- 
 port, in order either to cut off the retreat of Hill 
 and Longstreet towards the Potomac, or to pre- 
 vent the repassagc of Jackson. My general idea 
 is to cut the enemy in two, and beat him in detail. 
 I believe I have sufilcLcntly explained my iuion- 
 
107 
 
 tioii3. I ask of you at this important moment all 
 your intellect, and the utmost activity that a gen- 
 eral can exercise. G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen. Com. 
 
 Aorain on the 14th I sent him the following : 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Frederick, Sept. 14, 1862. 2 p. m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Franklin :— Your dispatch of 12.30 
 just received. Send Lack to hurry np Couch. 
 Mass your troops and carry Burkettsville at any 
 cost. We shall liave strong oi>position at both 
 passes. As fast as the troops come up, I will 
 hold a reserve in readiness to support yon. If 
 you find the enemy in very great force at the 
 pass, let me know at once, and amuse them as 
 best you can, so as to retain them there. In that 
 event I will probably throw the mass of the army 
 on the pass in front of here. If T carry that, it 
 will clear the way for you, and you must then fol- 
 low the cnemv as i-apidly as possible. 
 
 G. IJ. McC, :Maj.-Gcn. Com. 
 SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 
 
 General Franklin pushed his corps rapidly for- 
 ward towards Crampton's Pass, and at about 12 
 o'clock on the 14th arrived at Burkettsville, '-im- 
 mediately in rear of which he found the enemy's 
 infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, 
 with artillery- in strong positions to defend the 
 api^roaches to the pass. 
 
 Slocum's division was formed upon the right 
 of the road leading through the gap, and Smith's 
 upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and 
 Torbet's brigades, supported by Newton, whose 
 activity was conspicuous, advanced steadily npon 
 the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemy 
 were driven from their position at the base of the 
 mountain, wdiere they were protected by a stone 
 wall, and -steadily forced back up the slope until 
 they reached the position of their batteiy on the 
 road well up the mountain. Here they made a 
 stand. The}' were, however, driven back, retiring 
 their artillery in echelon, until, after an action of 
 three hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy 
 hastily fled down the mountain on the other side. 
 
 On the left of the road Brooks's and Irwin's 
 brigades of Smith's division, formed for the pro- 
 tection of Slocum's flank, charged up the moun- 
 tain in the same steady manner, driving the ene- 
 my before them until the crest was carried. 400 
 prisoners from seventeen dilferent organizations, 
 700 stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three 
 colors, were captured by our troops in this bril- 
 liant action. It was conducted by Gen. Franklin 
 in all its details. These details are given in the 
 report of Gen. Franklin, herewith submitted, and 
 due credit awarded to the gallant officers and 
 men engaged. The loss in Gen. Franklin's corps 
 was 11.5 killed, 41G wounded, and 2 missing. The 
 enemy's loss was about the same. The enemy's 
 position was such that our artillery could not be 
 used with any effect. ♦ 
 
 ^The close of the action found Gen. Franklin's 
 advance in Pleasant Valley on the night of the 
 14tli, within three and a half miles of the point 
 on Maryhin^l Heights, (where he might on the 
 same night, or on the morning of the 15lh, have 
 formed a junction with the garrison of Harper's 
 Ferry, had it not been previously withdrawn 
 from M:ivyland Heights,) and within six miles of 
 ILuper's j'\>rry. 
 
 On the nigiit of the 14th the following dispatch 
 was sent to Gen. Franklin : 
 
 Boliviir, Scpc. 15, 1 a.m. 
 
 General, — . . . . The commanding general di- 
 rects that you occupy with your command the 
 road fromRohrersvilie to HariJcr's Ferry, placing 
 a sufficient force at Rohrersville to hold that po- 
 sition, in case it should be attacked by the enemy 
 from IBoonsboro'. Endeavor to open communica- 
 tion with Col. Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking 
 and destroying such of the enemy as 30U may 
 find in .Pleasant Vallo^'. Should you succeed in 
 opening communication with Col. Miles, direct 
 him to join you with his whole command, with 
 all the guns and public property he can carry 
 with him. The remainder of the guns will be 
 destroyed ; the rest of the public property will 
 also be destroyed. You will then proceed to 
 Boonsboro', which place the commanding gener;U 
 intends to attack to-morrow, and join the main 
 body of the army at that place. Should you find, 
 however, that the enemy has retreated from 
 Boonsboro' towards Sharpsburgh, you will en- 
 deavor to fall upon him and cut off his retreat. 
 
 By command of ilaj.-Gen. McClellan. 
 
 G. D. R.,Ool. & A. D..C.,'to Gen. F. 
 
 On the 15th the following were received from 
 Gen. Franklin : 
 
 At the foot of the Mountain in Pleasant Valley, 
 3 m's. from Rohrersvide, Sept. 1 5, 8.50 a.m.)| 
 
 General, — My command started at daylight this 
 morning, and I am waiting to have it closed up 
 here. Gen. Couch arrived about 10 o'clock last 
 night. I have ordered one of his brigades and 
 one battery to Rohrersville, or to the strongest 
 points in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up 
 in line of battle about two miles to our front, 
 — one brigade in sight. As soon as I am 6iu*e 
 that Rohrersville is occupied, I shall move 
 forward to attack the enemy. This may be two 
 hours from now. If Harper's Ferry is fallen, and 
 the cessation of firing makes me fear that it has. 
 it is my opinion that I should be strongly rein- 
 forced. . . . 
 
 W. B. F., M.-Gen. Com. Gth C, to Gen. G. B. McC. 
 Sept. 15; 11 A. M. 
 
 General : — I have received your despatch by 
 Capt. O'Keefe. The enemy is in large force in 
 my front, in two line's of battle stretching across 
 the valley, and a large column of artillery and in- 
 fantry on the right of the valley, looking towards 
 Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me two to 
 one.' It of course will not answer to pursue the 
 enemy under these circumstances. 1 shall com-. 
 municate with Burnside as soon as possible. In 
 the meantime I shall wait here until 1 learn what 
 is the prospect of reinforcement. I have not the 
 force to justify an attack on the force I Bee in 
 front. I have had a very close view of it, and 
 its position is very strong. Respectfully, W. B. 
 Franklin, Maj.-Gen. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC, Comd'g. 
 
 Col. Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 8 a. 
 m. on the 15th, as the cessation of the flrinc: indi- 
 cated, and Gen. Franklin was ordered to remain 
 wlicrc he was, to watch the large force in front 
 of him, and protect our left and rear, until the 
 night of the ICtii, when he was ordered to join 
 
108 
 
 the niaiu lodj ol' tho acmy at Keedysvillc, after 
 sending Couch's division to Maryland Heights. 
 
 While the events which have just been de- 
 scribed were taking place at Crampton's Gap, 
 the troops of the centre and right vising, which 
 had united at Frederick on the 13th, were en- 
 gaged in the contest for the possession ot Turn- 
 • er's Gap. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, Gen. Pleasonton 
 was ordered to send McRej'nolds's brigade and 
 :i section of artillery in the direction of Gettys- 
 burg, and Rush's regiment towards Jefferson, to 
 ommunicate with Franklin, to whom the 6th U. 
 .■^. Cavalry and a section of artillery had previous- 
 ly been sent, and to proceed with the remainder 
 of the force in the direction of Middletowu in 
 pursuit of the enemy. 
 
 ■ After skirmishing with the enemy all the 
 tnorning and driving them from several strong 
 positions, he reached Turner's Gap of the South 
 Mountain in the afternoon, and found the enemy 
 in force, and apparently determined to defend 
 the pass. He sent back for infantry to General 
 Burnside, who had been directed to support him, 
 and proceeded to make reconnoissauce of the 
 position. 
 
 The Sonth Mountain is at this point about 1000 
 feet in height, and its general direction is from 
 north-east to south-west. The National Road 
 from Frederick to Hagerstown crosses it nearly 
 at right angles from Turner's Gap, a depression 
 which is some 400 feet in depth. The mountain 
 on the north side of the turnpike is divided into 
 two crests or ridges by a narrow valley, which, 
 though deep at the pass, becomes a slight de- 
 pression at about a mile to the north. There are 
 two country roads, one to the right of the turn- 
 pike, and the other to the left, which give access 
 to the crests overlooking the main road. The 
 one to the left, called the " old Sharpsburg 
 road," is nearly parallel to, and about half a mile 
 distant from the turnpike, until it reaches the 
 crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the 
 left. 
 
 The other road, called the " old Hagerstown 
 road," passes up a ravine in the mountaui, aboiit 
 a mile from the turnpike, and, bending to the 
 left over and along the first crest, enters the 
 turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit 
 of the pass. 
 
 On the night of the 13th the positions of the 
 afferent corps were as follows : 
 
 Reno's corps, at Middletown, except Rodman's 
 ■livision at Frederick. 
 
 Hooker's corps, on the Monocacy, two miles 
 iVom Frederick. 
 
 Sumner's Corps, near Frederick ; Banks' Corps, 
 ditto ; Sykes's Division, ditto ; Franklin's Corps, 
 at Buckeystown ; Couch's Division, at Licksville. 
 
 The orders from headquarters, for the march 
 ■n the I4th, were as follows : 
 
 13th, 11.20 V k: — Hooker to march at daylight 
 to Middletown. 
 
 13th, 11.30 P.M. — Sykcs to move at 6 a. m., af- 
 ter Hooker, on the Middletown and Hagerstown 
 roao. 
 
 14th, 1 A. M., — Artillery lleserve to follow Sykes 
 closely. 
 
 L3th, 8.45 r. ii — Sumner to move at 7 a. .vi. 
 
 14th, 9 A. M. — Sumner ordered to take the 
 Shookstown road to Middletown. 
 
 13th, C.46 p. M. — Couch ordered to move to 
 Jefferson with his whole division. 
 
 On the 14th, Gen. Pleasanton continued his re- 
 connoissauce. Gibson's battery, and afterwards 
 Benjamin's battery, (of Reno's corps), were placed 
 on high ground io tha left of the turnpike, and 
 obtained a direct fire on the enemy's position in 
 the gap. 
 
 General Cox's division, which had been 'or- 
 dered up to support Gen. Pleasonton, left its biv- 
 ouac near Middletown, at 6 a. m. The first brig- 
 ade reached the scene of action at 9 a. m., and 
 was sent up the old Sharpsburg road by Gen. 
 Pleasonton, to feel the enemy and ascertain if he 
 held the crest on that side in strong force. This 
 was soon found to be the case, and Gen. Cox hav- 
 ing arrived with the othpr brigade, and infor- 
 mation having been received from Gen. Ptcno 
 that the column would be supporfed by the 
 whole corps, the division was ordered to assault y 
 the"'i)osition. «^ 
 
 Two 20-pound Parrotts of Simmons's battery 
 and two sections of McMullin's battery were left 
 in the rear, in position near the turnpike, where 
 they did good service during the day against the 
 enemy's batteries in the gap. 
 
 Col. Scammon's brigade was deployed, and, 
 well covered by skirmishers, moved up the slope 
 to the left of the road, with the object of turning 
 the enemy's right, if possible. It succeeded in 
 gaining the crest and establishing itself there in 
 spite of the vfgorous resistance of the enemy, 
 who was posted behind stone walls and in the 
 edges of timber, and the fire of a battery which 
 poured in canister and case-shot on the regiment 
 on the right of the brigade. 
 
 Col. Crooke's brigade marched in -column, a< 
 supporting distance. A section of I\IcMullin's 
 batter}^ under Lieutenant Croome (killed while 
 serving one of his guns), was moved up with 
 great difficult}'', and opened with canister at very 
 shoi't range on the enemy's infantry, by whom 
 (after having done considerable execution) it 
 was soon silenced and forced to withdraw. 
 
 One regiment of Crooke's brigade was now de- 
 ployed on Scammon's left, and the other two in 
 his rear, and they several times entered the first 
 Ihie and relieved the regiment in front of them 
 when hard pressed. A section of Simmon's bat- 
 tery was brought up and placed in an open space 
 in the woods, where it did good service during 
 the rest of the day. The enemy several times 
 attempted to retake the crest, advancing with 
 boldness, but were each time repulsed. They 
 then withdrew their battery to a point more to 
 the right, and formed columns on both our flanks. 
 
 Il was now about noftn, and a lull occurred in 
 the co.jtcst, which lasted about two hours, dur- 
 ing which the rest of tlie corps was coming up. 
 Gen. AVilcox's division was the first to arrive. 
 When he reached the base of the mountain. Gen. 
 Cox advised him to consult Gen. Pleasonton as to 
 a position. The latter indicated that on the right, 
 afterwards taken up by Gen. Hooker. Gen.AVil- 
 cox was in the act of moving to occupy this 
 
ground wlieii he received an order from Gen. 
 Kcuo to move up the old Sharpsburg road, and 
 take a position to its right, overlooking the turn- 
 pike. Two regiments Avcre detached to support 
 Gen. Cox, at his request. One section of Cook's 
 battery was placed in position near the turn of 
 the road (on the crest), and opened fire on 
 the enemy's batteries across the gap. The divi- 
 sion was proceeding to deploy to the right of the 
 road when the enemv suddenly opened (at 150 
 yards) with a battery, which enfiladed the road 
 at that point, drove otf Cook's cannoneerswith 
 their limbers, and causing a tc^nporary panic, in 
 which the guns were nearly lost. .But the 79th 
 New York and ITtli Michigan promptly rallied, 
 changed front nnder a heavy fire, and moved out 
 to protect iho guns, with Avhich Capt. Cook had 
 remained. Oixler was soon restored, and the di- 
 vision formed in line on the right of Cox, and was 
 kept concealed as much as possible under the 
 hill-side until the whole line advanced. It was 
 exposed not only to. the fire of the battery in 
 front, but also to that of the batteries on the 
 other side of the turnpike, and lost heavily. 
 
 Shortly before this time Generals Burnsidc and 
 Reno arrive.d at the base of the mountain ; and 
 the former directed the latter to move up the di- 
 visions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the 
 crest held by Cox and Wilcox, and to move upon 
 the enemy's position with his whole force as soon 
 as he v.-as informed that Gen. Hooker (who had 
 just been directed to attack on the right) was 
 advanced up the mountain. Gen. Reno then 
 went to the front and assumed the direction of 
 affairs, the positions having been explained to 
 . him by Gen. Ir'leasonton. 
 
 Shortly before this, time I arrived at the point 
 occupied by Gen. Burnside, and my headquar- 
 ters were located there untd the conclusion of 
 the action. 
 
 Gen. Sturgis had left his camp at 1 p.m., and 
 reached the scene of action about half past three 
 p,M. Clark's battery of his division was sent to 
 assist Cox's left, by order of Gen. Reno, and two 
 regiments (2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire) 
 were detached by Gen. Reno and sent forward a 
 little distance on the left of the turnpike. His 
 division was formed in rear of Wilcox's, and Rod- 
 man's division was divided, Col. Fairchild's V^S" 
 i ade being placed on the extreme left, andTJol. 
 Harland's under Gen. Rodman's, personal super- 
 I- vision -on the right. 
 
 My order to move the whole lino forward, and 
 take or silence the enemy's batteries in front was 
 f executed with enthusiasm. The enemy made a 
 desperate resistance, charging our advancing 
 lines with fierceness, but they were everywhere 
 routed, and tied. Our chief loss fell on '\Vilcox's 
 division. The enemy's battery was found to be 
 across a gorge .and beyond the reach of our in- 
 fantry, but .its. position was untenable, and i{ was 
 hastily removed and not again put in position 
 near us. But the batteries across the gap still 
 kept a fire of shot and shell. , • , 
 
 Gen. Wilcox praises very higlily the conduct 
 of tlic 17th Michigan in this advance— ^a regin^ent 
 which had been organized scarcely' a month, but 
 which charged the advancing enemy in flank in a 
 
 109 
 
 manner worthy of veteran troops ; and also tiiat 
 of the 45th Pennsylvania, which bravely met 
 them in front. 
 
 Cook's battery now reopened fire ; Sturgis's 
 division was moved to the flank of Wilcox's, oc- 
 cupying the new ground gained on the further 
 side of the slope, and his artillery opened on the 
 batteries across the gap. The enemy made an 
 effort to turn our left about dark, but were re- 
 IHilsed by Fairchild's brigade and Clark's bat- 
 tery. 
 
 At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another 
 effort to regain the best groiind, attacking along 
 Sturgis's front and part of Cox's. A lively fire 
 was kept up until nearly nine o'clock, several 
 charges being made by the enemy and repulsed 
 with slaughter, and we,finally occupied the high- 
 est part of thQ mountain. Gen. Reno was killed 
 iust before sunset, while making a reconnoissance 
 to the front, and the command of the corps de- 
 volved upon Gen. Cox. 
 
 In Gen. Reno the nation lost one of its best gen- 
 eral olficers. He was a skillful soldier, a brave 
 and honest man. 
 
 There was no firing after ten o'clock, and tlie 
 troops slept on their arms, ready to renew the 
 fight at daylight ; but the enemy quietly retired 
 from the front during the night, abandoning their 
 wounded and leaving their dead in large numbers 
 scattered on the field. 
 
 While these operations were progressing on 
 the left of the main column, the right, under Gen. • 
 Hooker, was actively engaged. His corps left 
 the Monocacy early in the morning, and its ad- 
 vance reached the Catoctin Creek about 1 p. m. 
 Gen. Hooker then went forward to examine the 
 groimd. 
 
 At about 1 o'clock Gen. Meade's division was 
 ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno. 
 The following is the order sent : 
 
 September 14. 1 p. m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Hooker, 
 
 General, — General Reno requests that a division 
 of yours may move up on the right (north) of tlie 
 main road. General McClellan desires you to 
 comply with this request, holding your whole 
 corps in readiness to support the movenicnt, and 
 taking charge of it yourself. Sumner's and 
 Banks's corps have commenced arriving. Let 
 General McClellan be informed as soon as you 
 commence your movement. 
 
 Geo. D. Ruggles,Col.,A.-A.-G & A.-D.-C. 
 Meade's division" left Catoctin Creek about 2 
 o'clock, and turned off to the right from the main 
 road on the old Ilagerstown road to ]\Iount 
 Taber Church, where Gen Hooker was, and dc- • 
 ployed a short distance in advance, its right rest- 
 ing about one and a half miles from the turnpike. 
 The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on 
 the mountain side, but did no considerable dam- 
 age. Cooper's Battery "B," 1st Pennsylvania 
 Artillery, was placed in position on high ground 
 at about half-past three o'clock, and fired at the 
 enemy on the slope, but soon ceased by order of 
 Gen. Hooker, and the position of our lines pre- 
 vented any further use of artillery by us on this 
 part of the field. The 1st Massachusetts Cavalry 
 was sent xip the valley to the right to observe 
 
no 
 
 tlie movements, if any, of tho enemy in that di- 
 rection, and one regiment of Meade's Division, 
 posted to watch a road coming in in tlie same di- 
 rection. The otlier divisions were deployed as 
 they came up. General Hatch's on the left, and 
 General Iticketts', which arrived about 5 r. m., in 
 the rear. 
 
 General Gibbon's brigade was detached from 
 Hatch's division by General Duriiside for the pur- 
 pose of making a demonstration on the enemy's 
 centre up the main road, as soon as the move- 
 ments on the right and left had sufficiently pro- 
 grossed. 
 : The 1st Pennsylvania Rifles, of General Sey- 
 mour's brigade, were sent forward as ekirmishers 
 to feel the enemy, and it was found that he was 
 in force. Meade was then directed to advance 
 his division to the right of the road, so as to out- 
 flank them if possible, and then to move forward 
 and attack, while Hatch was directed to take, 
 with hie division, the crest on the left of the old 
 Hagerstown road, Kickett's division being held 
 in reserve. 
 
 Sej^mour's brigade was sent up to the top of 
 the slope on the right of the ravine, through 
 which the road runs, and then move along the 
 summit parallel to the road, while Col. Gallagher's 
 and Col Magilton's brigades moved in tlie same 
 direction along tlie slope and in the ravine. The 
 ground was of the most difficult character for 
 the movements of troops, the hillside being very 
 steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone walls, 
 fences, and timber. The enemy was soon en- 
 countered, and in a short time the action became 
 general along the whole front of the division. 
 The line advanced steadily up the mountain side, 
 where the enemy was posted behind trees and 
 rocks, from which he was gradually dislodged. 
 Duriiig this advance Col. Gallagher, commanding 
 3d brigade, was severely wounded, and the com- 
 mand devolved upon Lieut. -Col. Robt. Anderson. 
 
 General Meade, having reason to believe that 
 the enemy were attempting to outflank him on 
 liis right, applied to Gen. Hooker for reinforce- 
 ments. General Duryea's brigade, of Rickett's 
 division, was ordered up, but it did not arrive 
 until the close of the action. It was advanced 
 on Seymour's left, but only one regiment could 
 open fire before the enemy retired, and darkness 
 intervened. General Meade speaks highly of 
 General Seymour's skill in handling his brigade 
 on tho extreme right, securing by his manoeuvres 
 tlie great object of the movement, the outflanking 
 of the enemy, 
 t While Gen. Meade was gallantly driving the 
 enemy on the right. General Hatch's division Avas 
 engaged in a severe contest for the possession of 
 the crest on the left of the ravine. It moved up 
 the mountain in the following order : twe regi- 
 ments of General Patrick's brigalle deployed as 
 skirmishers, with the other two regiments of the 
 same brigade supporting them : Col. Phelps's bri- 
 gade in line of battalions in mass at deploying 
 distance : General Doubleday's brigade, in the 
 game order, bringing up the rear. The 21st New 
 York having gone straight up the slope, instead 
 of around to the right, as directed, the 2d United 
 .States Sharpshooters was sent out in its place. 
 Pholpa's and Doubleday's brigades were de- 
 
 ployed in turn as they reached the woods, which 
 began about half way up the mountain ; Gen. 
 Patrick, witli his skirmishers, soon drew the fire 
 of the enemj', and found him strongly posted be- 
 hind a fence which bounded the cleared space on 
 the top of the ridge, having in bis front the 
 M'oods, through which our line was advancing, 
 and in his rear a cornfield, full of rocky ledgce, 
 which afforded good cover to fall back if dis- 
 lodged. 
 
 Phelps's brigade'gallantly advanced imder a hot 
 fire, to close quarters, and after ten or fifteen 
 minutes of heavy firing on both sides, (in which 
 Gen. Hatch was wounded while urging on his 
 men), the fence was carried by a charge, and our 
 line advanced a few yards beyond it, somewhat 
 sheltered by the slope of the hill. Doubleday's 
 brigade, now under the command of Lieut.-Col. 
 Hotfinan, (Col. "W^aimvright having been wound- 
 ed), relieved Phelps's, and continued firing for an 
 hour and-a-half, the enemy, behind ledges of rcxks 
 some thirty or forty paces in our front, making a 
 stubborn resistance, and attempting to charge on 
 the least cessation of our fire. About dusk Col- 
 onel Christian's brigade, of Rickett's division, 
 came up and relieved Doubleday's brig-ade, whicli 
 fell back into line behind Phelps. Christian's 
 brigade continued the action for thirty or forty 
 minutes, when the enemy retired, after having 
 made an attempt to flank us on the left, which 
 was repulsed by the 7Cth Now York, and Ith 
 Indiana. 
 
 The remaining brigade of Rickett's division, 
 (General Hart6uft"'s), was moved up in the centre, 
 and connected Meade's left with Doubleday's 
 right. We now had possession of the summit of 
 the first ridge, which commanded the turnpike 
 on both sides of the mountain, and the troops 
 were ordered to hold their j^ositions until furtlier 
 orders, and slept on their arms. Late in the af- 
 ternoon, General Gibbon, with his Itrigade, and 
 one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, 4th U. S. Ar- 
 tillery), was ordered to move up the main road 
 on the enemy's centre. He advanced a regiment 
 on each side of the road, preceded by skirmish- 
 ers, and followed by the other two regiments in 
 double column ; the artillery moving on the road 
 unti' within range of the cnemy'a guns, which 
 wefJI'firing on the column from the gorge. The 
 brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy be- 
 fore it from his positions in the woods and behind 
 stone walls, until it i-cached a point well up 
 towards the top of the pass ; when the enemy, 
 having been reinforced by three regiments, open- 
 ed a heavy fire on the front, and on both flanks. 
 The fight continued until 9 o'clock, the enemy 
 being entirely repulsoii ; and the brigade, after 
 having sut^ered severely, and having expended 
 all its ammunition, including even the cartridges 
 of the dead and wounded, continued to hold tho 
 ground it had so gallantly won until 12 o'eiock. 
 when it was relieved by General Gorman's bri- 
 gade, of Sedgwick's division, Sumner's corps, 
 (excej)t the Cth* Wisconsin, which remained on 
 the field all night.) (]en. Gibbon, in his delicate 
 movement, .handled his brigade with as much 
 precision and coolness, as if upon parade, and the 
 bravery of bis troops could not be excelled. 
 
 The 2d Corps, (Sumner's), and tJie 12th Corpg, 
 
Ill 
 
 (Williams), reached their final positions shortly 
 nfter dark. General Richardson's division was 
 placed near Mount Tabor Church, in a position 
 to support our right if necessary ; the 12th Corps, 
 and Sedgwick's division, bivoucked near Bolivar, 
 in a position to support our centre and left. 
 
 Gen. Sykes's division of regulars, and the artil- 
 lery reserve, halted for the night at Middletown, 
 so that, on the night of the 14th, the Vfhole army 
 was massed in the vicinity of the field of battle, 
 in readiness to renew the action the next day, or 
 to move in pursuit of the esemy. At daylight 
 our skirmishers were advanced, and it was found 
 that he had retreated during the night, leaving 
 his dead on the field, and his wounded uncared 
 for. About fifteen hundred prisoners were taken 
 r>y us during the battle, and the loss to the enemy 
 in killed, was much greater than our own, and 
 probably also in wounded. It is believed that 
 the force opjiosed to ua at Turner's Gap, con- 
 sisted of D. II. Hill's corps, (15,500), and a part, 
 if not the whole of Longitreet's and perhaps a 
 portion of Jackson's ; probably some '30,000 in 
 all. We went into action with about 30,000 men, 
 and our losses amounted to 1,568, aggregate ; (312 
 killed, 1,234 wounded, 22 missing.) 
 
 On the next day I had the honor to receive the 
 following very kind dispatch from hig Excellency 
 the President : 
 War Dep't. Washington, Sept. 15, '62, 2.45 p.m. 
 
 Your dispatch of to-day received. God bless 
 you, aiid all with you. Destroy the rebel army 
 if possible. A. Lincoln. 
 
 To Maj.-Gen. McC. 
 
 A N T I E T A M. 
 On the night of the battle of South Mountain, 
 orders were given to the corps commanders to 
 press forward their pickets at early dawn. This 
 advance revealed the fact that the enemy had 
 left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was 
 ordered ; the cavalry under Gen. Pleasonton, and 
 the three corps under Gen's. Sumner, Hooker and 
 Mansfield, (the latter of whom had arrived that 
 morning and assumed command of the 12th [Wil- 
 liams's] corps,) by the national turnpike and 
 Boonsboro' ; the corps of Gen's. Burnside" and 
 Porter (tho latter command at that time consist- 
 ing of but one weak division, Sykes's) by the old 
 Sharpsburg road ; and Gen. Franklin to move 
 into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville by a 
 detachment, and endeavor to relieve Harper's 
 Ferry. 
 
 Gen's. Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the 
 road from Boonsboro' to Rohrersville, were to re- 
 inforce Frankliri or to move on Sharpsburg, ac- 
 cording to circumstances. 
 
 Franklin niovei towards Browrteville, and 
 Found there a foroe of the enemy much superior 
 in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong po- 
 sition to receive him. 
 
 At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's 
 Ferry indicated the surrender of that place. 
 
 The cava'"-/ overtook the enemy's cavalry in 
 Boonsboro, made a dashing charge, killing and 
 wounding a number, and capturing 250 prisoners 
 and two guns. 
 
 Gen. Richardson's division, of the 2d Corps, 
 pressing the rear guard of the enemy with vigor, 
 
 passed Boonsboro and Keadysville, and came up 
 on the main body of the enemy, occupying in 
 large force a strong position a few milos beyond 
 the latter place. 
 
 It had been hoped to engage the enemy on>th© 
 15th, accordingly instructions were given that if 
 the enemy were overtaken on the march, they 
 should be attacked at once ; if found in heavy 
 force and in position, the corps in advance should 
 be placed, in position for attack, and await my 
 arrival. On reaching the advance position of our 
 troojis, I found but two divisions, Richardson's 
 and Sykes's, in position, the other troops were 
 halted in the road, the head of the columa some 
 distance in rear of Richardson. 
 
 The enemy occupied a strong position on the 
 heigbts, on the West side of Antietam Creek, dis 
 playing a large force of infantry and cavalry, with 
 numerous batteries of artillery, which opened on 
 our columns as they appeared in sight on tho 
 Keadysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, which fire 
 was returned by Captain Tidball's light battery, 
 2d United States Artillery, and Pcttit"s battery, 
 1st New York Artillery. 
 
 The division of General Richardson, following 
 close on the heels of the retreating ■ foe, halted 
 and deployed near Antietam River, on the right 
 of the Sharpsburg road. Gen. Sykes, leading ob 
 the division of regiUars on the old Sharpsburg 
 road, came up and deployed to the left of Gen. 
 Richardson, on the left of the road. 
 
 Antietam Creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by 
 four stone bridges, the upper one on the Keadys- 
 ville and Williamsport road ; the 2d on the 
 Keadysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, some two 
 and a half miles below ; the third about a mile 
 below the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharps- 
 burg road ; and the fourth near the mouth of 
 Antietam Creek, on the road leading from Har- 
 per's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some three miles be- 
 low the third. The stream is sluggish, with few 
 and difficult fords. 
 
 After a rapid examination of the position, / 
 found that it was too late to attack that day, and 
 at once directed the placing of the batteries of 
 position of the centre, and indicated the bivouacs 
 for the difterent corps, massing them near and on 
 both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps 
 were not all in their positions until the next morn- 
 ing after sunrise 
 
 On the morning of the ICth it was discovered 
 that the eneniy had changed the position of Jus 
 batteries. The masses of his troops were, liow- 
 ever. still concealed behind the opposite heights. 
 Their left and centre were upon and in front of 
 the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, hidden 
 by woods and irregularities of the ground ; their 
 extreme left resting upon a wooded eminence 
 near the cross roads to the north of J. Miller's 
 farm, their left resting upon the Potomac. Their 
 hue extended south, the right resting upon the 
 hills to the south of Sharpsburg, near Siiavcley'a 
 farm. 
 
 The bridge over the Antietam, described as 
 No. 3, near this point, was strongly covered by 
 riflemen protected by rifle-pits, stone fencrs. Sec, 
 and enfiladed by artillery. The ground in front 
 of tliis line consisted of undulating hills, their 
 
\V2 
 
 crests in Lurn counuaiuicd by others in their rear. 
 Oil all favorable points the enemy's artillery was 
 posted, and tJieir reserves, hidden from view by 
 the hills on wiiich their line of battle was formed, 
 could maufeuvre unobserved by o'.ir army, and 
 from the shortness of their line, could rapidly re- 
 inforce any point threatened by our attack. Their 
 position stretching across the angle formed by 
 the Totornac and Antietam, their tianks and rear 
 proteced by these streams, was one of the strong- 
 est to be found in this region of country, which 
 is well adapted to defensive warfare. 
 
 On the right near Keadysville, on both sides of 
 the Bharpsburg turnpike were Sumner's and 
 Hooker's corps. In advance, on the right of the 
 turnpike, and near the Antietam river, Gen. 
 Jlichardson's division of Gen. Sumner's corps was 
 posted. Gen. Sykes' division df Gen. Porter's 
 corps was on the left of the turnpike, and in line 
 v,'ith Gen. Richardson, protecting the bridge, No. 
 2, over the Antietam. The left of the line oppo- 
 site to, and some distance from bridge No. 3, was 
 occu])ied by Gen. Burnside's corps. Before giv- 
 ing Gen. Hooker his ordei's to make the movement 
 wiiich will presently be described, I rode to the 
 left of the line to satisfy myself that the troops 
 were properly posted there to secure our left 
 Hank from any attack made along the left bank of 
 the Antietam, as well as to enable us to carry 
 bridge No. 3. 
 
 1 found it necessary to make considerable 
 changes in the position of Gen. Burnside's corps, 
 and directed liim to advance to a strong position 
 in the immediate vicinity of the bridge, and to 
 reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge care- 
 fully. 
 
 In rcarof Gens. Sumner's and Hooker's corps, 
 near Keadysville, Gen. i[ansfield's corps was 
 massed ; the cavalry on the turnpike in rear of 
 Keadysville. On the ridge of the first line of hills 
 overlooking the Antietam, and between the turn- 
 pike and Fry's house, on the right of the road, 
 ■svero placed Capts. Taft's, Languor's, Von 'Klei- 
 7.er'6, and Lieut, Weaver's batteries of 20-pouuder 
 Parrot guns. On the crest of the hill, in the rear 
 and right of bridge No. 3. Capt. Weed's 3-inch 
 and Lieutenant Benjamin's 20-pounder batteries. 
 Gen. Ftanl^iin's corps, and Gen. Couch's division 
 held a position in Pleasant Valley, in front of 
 Brownsville, with a strong force of the enemy in 
 their front. Gen. iforeirs division of Porter's 
 corps was en route from Boonsboro', and Gen. 
 Humphrey's division of new troops, en route 
 from Frederick, iid. About daylight on the 16th 
 the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery On our 
 guns in yjosition which Avas promptly returned, 
 i'heir lire was silenced for the xime, but was 
 frequently renewed during the day. In the lieavy 
 lire of the morning, Major Ariidt, commanding 
 '-;t battalliou 1st New York .A.rtillery was raor- 
 dly wounded, while directing the operations of. 
 his batteries. 
 
 It was aftei noon before I could move the troops 
 to their positions for attack, being compelled to 
 spend the morning in reconnoitering the new 
 position taken up by the enemy, examining the 
 ground, lindiiig fords and clearing their ap- 
 proachofl, and hurrying up the ammunition and 
 
 suj)ply trains, wliich had been delayed by the 
 rapid march of the troops over the few practica- 
 ble a)iproaches from Frederick. These had been 
 crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry and 
 artillery, pressing on with the hope of overtaking 
 the enemy before he could form to resist an at- 
 tack ; many ot the troops were out of rations, on 
 the previous day, and a good deal of their ammu- 
 nition had been expended in the severe action of 
 the i4th. 
 
 My plan for the impending general engagement 
 was to attack the eiiemy's left with the corps of 
 Hooker and Mansfield, supj'orted by Sumner's, 
 and if necessary, Franklin's, and as soon as mat- 
 ters looked favorably there to move the corps of 
 Gen. Burnside agauist the enemy's extreme right, 
 upon the ridges running to the soiith and j:car of 
 Sharpsbiu-g, and having carried their position to 
 press along the crest towards our right; and 
 whenever either of these flank movements should 
 be successful to advance our centre with all their 
 forces then disposable. 
 
 About 2 P.M. Gen. Hooker, with his corps con- 
 sistuig of Gen. Piickett's, ileade's and Double- 
 day's divisions, was ordered to cross the Antie- 
 tam at a ford, and at bridge No. 1 a short dist- 
 ance above, to attack, and if possible turn the 
 enemy's left. Gen. Sumner was ordered to cross 
 the corps of Gen. Mansfield (the 12th) during the 
 night, and hold his own (the 2d) corps ready to 
 cross earl}' the next moiTiing. On reaching the 
 vicinitj' of the enemy's left, a sliarp contest com- 
 menced with the Pennsylvania Pieserves, the ad- 
 vance of Gen. Hooker's corps, near the house oi 
 Dr. Miller. The enemy was driven from the strip 
 of woods where he was first met, the firing lasted 
 until after dark, when Gen. Hooker's corps rested 
 on their arms, on ground won from the enemy. 
 
 During the night Gen. Mansfield's corps, con- 
 sisting of Gen's. Williams's and Green's divisiont, 
 crossed the Antietam at the same ford and bridg« 
 that Gen. Hooker's corps had passed, and bivou- 
 acked on the farm of J. Poffenberger, about a 
 mile in rear of Gen. Hooker's position. At day- 
 light, on the 17th, the action was commenced by 
 the skirmishers of the Pennsylvania Reserves. 
 The whole of Gen. Hooker's corps was soon en- 
 gaged, and drove the enemy from the open field 
 in front of the first line of woods, into a second 
 line of woods beyond, Avhich runs to tlie eastward 
 of and nearly parallel to the Sharpshurg and 
 Hagerstown turnpike. 
 
 This contest was obstinate, and as the troops 
 advanced the opposition became more dctermin 
 ed, and the numbers of the enemy greater. Gen 
 Hooker then ordered up the corps of Gen. Mans 
 fiejd, which tmoved promptly towards the scene 
 oi action. The 1st division. Gen. Williams, was 
 deployed to th.e right on approaching tlie enemy; 
 Gen. Crawford's brigade on the right, its right 
 resting on the Hagerstown turnpike, on his left 
 Gen. Gordon's brigade. The 2d division, fJcii 
 Green's, joining the left of Gordon's, extended ; ■• 
 far as the burnt buildings to the north and easl 
 of the white church on the turnpike. During Iho 
 dcyil'.iyinent that gallant veteran, General Mans- 
 field, fell mortally wounded while examining the 
 gromid in front of his troops. General Hartsuif, 
 
113 
 
 •f Hooker's corps, was severely wounded while 
 bravely pressing forward his troops, and was 
 taken from the field. 
 
 The command of the 12th corps fell upon Gen. 
 Williams. Five regiments of the 1st division of 
 this corps were new troops. One brigade of the 
 2d division was sent to support Gen. Double- 
 day's. The 121tli Pennsylvania Volunteers were 
 pushed across the turnpike into the woods be- 
 yond J. Miller's house, with orders to hold the 
 position as long as possible. 
 
 The line of battle of this corps was lormcd,aiid 
 it became eng'aged at about 7 a.m., the attack 
 being opened by Knapp's Pennsylvania, Cothran's 
 New York and Hampton's Pittsburg batteries. 
 To meet this attack the enemy had pushed u 
 strong column of troops ihto the open fields in 
 front of the turnpike, while he occupied the 
 woods on the west of the turnpike in strong force. 
 The woods (as was found by subsequent observa- 
 tion.) were traversed by the out-cropping ledges 
 of rock. Several hundred yards to the right and 
 rear was a line which commanded the debouche 
 of the woods, and in the fields between was a 
 long line of stone fences, continued by breast- 
 works of rails, which covered the enemy's m- 
 flmtry from our musketry. The same woods 
 formed a screen, behind which his movements 
 were concealed, and his batteries on the hill and 
 tlie rifle works covered from the fire of our ar- 
 tillery in front. 
 
 For about two hours the battle raged with 
 varied success, the enemy endeavoring to drive 
 our troops into the second line of wood, and ours 
 ic. turn to get possession of the line in front. 
 Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the 
 enemy back into the woods near the turnpike. 
 Gen. Green, with his two brigades, crossing into 
 the woods to the left of the Dunker church. 
 During this conflict Gen. Crawford, commanding 
 1st division after Gen. Williams took command of 
 the corps, was wounded, and left the field. Gen. 
 Green, being much exposed and applying for re- 
 inforcements, the 13th New York and 27th Indi- 
 ana, and the 3d Maryland, were sent to his sup- 
 port with a section of Knapp's battery. 
 
 At about 9 o'clock a.m.. Gen. Sedgwick's divl- 
 ■iori of Gen. Sumner's corps arrived. Crossing the 
 ford previously mentioned, this division marched 
 in three columns to the support of the attack on 
 the enemy's left. On nearing the scene of action 
 the columns were halted, faced to the front, and 
 established by Gen. Sumner in three parallel lines 
 by brigade, facing towards the south and west ; 
 Gen. Gorman's brigade in front. Gen. Dana's se- 
 cond, and Gen. Howard's third, with a distance 
 between the lines of some seventy paces. 
 
 The division was then put in motion, and 
 moved upon the field of battle under fire from 
 the enemy's concealed batteries on the hill be- 
 yond the woods, passing di-.gonally to the front 
 across the open space, and to the front of the 
 1st division of Gen. William's corps— this latter 
 division witlidrcv/. 
 
 on the west of the tnrn- 
 encmv before them, the 
 
 Entering the v/uoi!s 
 pike, and drivhig the 
 first line was met by a 
 
 leavy fire of musketry and 
 
 Bliell from the enemy's breastworks and the bat 
 
 teries on the hill commanding me exit liom the 
 woods. lifeantime a heavy column of the enemy 
 had succeeded in crowding back the troops of 
 Gen. Green's division, and appeared in rear of 
 the left of Sedgwick's division. By command of 
 Gen. Sumner, Gen. Howard faced the third line 
 to the rear, preparatory to a change of front, to 
 meet the column advancing on the left, but this 
 line now suCfering from a destructive fire both in 
 front and on its left, which it was unable to re- 
 turn, gave way towards the right and rear incon- 
 siderable confusion, and was soon followed by the 
 first and second lines. 
 
 Gen. Gorman's brigade, and one regiment of 
 Gen. Dana's, soon rallied and checked the advance 
 of the enemy on the right. The second and third 
 lines now formed on the left of Gen. Gorman's 
 brigade, and poured a destructive fire upon the 
 enemy. ■ . _ 
 
 During Gen. Sumner's" attack, ho ordered Gen. 
 Williams to support him. Brig.-Gen. Gordon, with 
 a portion of his brigade, moved forward, but 
 when he reached the woods the left of Gen. 
 Sedgwick's division had given way, and finding 
 himself, as t!ie smoke cleared up, opposed to the 
 enemy in force, with his small command, he with- 
 drew to the rear of the batteries at the second 
 line of woods. As Gen. Gordon's troops un- 
 masked our batteries on the left, they opened 
 with canister, the batteries of Capt. Cothrrn 1st 
 New York, and "1," IstU. S. Artillery, ccn^^m iid- 
 ed by Lieut. Woodruff, doing good service. Un- 
 able to stand this deadly fire in front tiiid the 
 musketry fire from the right, the enemy again 
 sought shelter in the woods and rocks beyond tlie 
 turnpike. 
 
 During this assault Gen's. Sedgwick and Dana 
 were seriously wounded and taken from the field. 
 Gen. Sedgwick, though twice wounded and faint 
 from loss of blood, retained command of his di- 
 vision for more than an hour after his first wound, 
 animating his command by his presence. Gen. 
 Howard assumed command after Gen. Sedgwick 
 retired. 
 
 At the time of Gen. Sedgwick's advance. Gen. 
 Hooker, while iirging on his command, was se- 
 riouslv wounded in the foot and taken from the 
 field. " The repulse of the enemy offered ojipor- 
 tunity to re-arrange the lines and re-oiganue the 
 commands on the- right, now more or l-'^s in con- 
 fusion. Tiie batteries of the Pennsyivrtuia Re- 
 serve,x)n high gromid near I. Pofi'enburger's house, 
 opened fire and checked several attempts of the 
 enemy to establish batteries in front of our right, 
 to turn that flank and enfilade the lines. . _ 
 
 While this conflict was so obstinately raging 
 on the right. Gen. French was pushing his divi- 
 sion against the enemy still further to the left. 
 This division crossed the Antietam at the same 
 ford as Gen. Sedgwick, and immediately in his 
 rear. Passing over the stream in three cohnnns, 
 the division inarched about a mile from the ford, 
 tlicu facing to the left, moved in tlireo lines 
 towards the enemy. Gen. Max Weber's brigace in 
 front, Col. Dwight Morris's brigade ot raw troops, 
 undrilled and moving fon- the lirst time under fire, 
 in the second, and Gen. Kimball's brigade in the 
 tliird. The division was first assailed by a fire of 
 
artillery, but steadily advanced, driving the ene- 
 my's skirmishers, and encountered the infantry in 
 some force at ihe group of liouses on Roulette's 
 farm. Gen. "Weber's brigade gallantly advanced 
 with an imwavering front, and drove the enemy 
 from their position about the houses. 
 
 While Gen. Weber was hotly engaged with the 
 first line of the enemy, Gen. French received or- 
 ders from Gen. Sumner, his corjis commander, to 
 push on with renewed vigor to make a diversion 
 in favor of the attack on the right. Leaving the 
 now troops who had been thrown into some con- 
 fusion from their inarch through corn-fiels, over 
 fences, &c., to form as a reserve, he ordered the 
 brigade of Gen. Kimball to the front, passhig to 
 the left of Gen. Weber. The enemy was pressed 
 back to near the crest of the hill, wliere he was 
 encountered in greater strength, posted in a 
 smikon road nuniing in a north-westerly direction 
 and forming a natural rifle-pit. In a corn-field in 
 rear of this road were also strong bodies of the 
 enemy. As the line reached the crest of the hill, 
 a gallant fire was opened on it from the sunken 
 road and corn-field. Here a terrific fire of 
 musketry burst from both lines, and the battle 
 raged along the whole line with great slaughter. 
 The enemy attempted to turn the left of the line, 
 but were met by the 7th Virginia and 132d Penn- 
 sj'lvania Volunteers, and repulsed. 
 
 Foiled in this, the enemy made a dermined as- 
 sault on the front, but was met b}' a charge from 
 our lines, which drove him back with severe loss, 
 leaving in our hands some 300 prisoners, and sev- 
 eral stands of colors. The enemy having been 
 repulsed by the terrible execution of the batteries 
 and tlie musketry fire on the extreme right, now 
 attempted to assist the attack on Gen. French's 
 division, by assaulting him on his right, and en- 
 deavoring to turn his flank, but this attack was 
 met and checked by the 14th Indiana and Stli 
 Ohio volunteers, and by canister from Capt. Tom- 
 kins's battery, 1st Rhode Island artillery. Hav- 
 ing been luider an alimost continuous fire for 
 nearly four hours, and tlicir ammunition being 
 nearly exhausted, the division now took position 
 immediately below the crest of the heights on 
 which they had so gallantly fought, the enmy 
 makmg no attempt to regain tlieir'lost ground. 
 
 On the left of Gen. French, Gen Richardson's 
 division was hotly engaged. Having crossed the 
 Antietam about 9.30 a.m., at the ford crossed by 
 the other divisions of Sumner's corps, it moved 
 on a line nearly parallel to the Antietam, and 
 formed in a ravine behind the high gromuls over- 
 looking Roulette's house. The 3d (Irish) brigade, 
 commanded by Gen. Meagher, on the right, the 
 2d brigade, connnanded by Gen. Caldwell, on his 
 left, and the brigade commanded by Col. 13rooks, 
 53d Peiuisylvania Volunteers, in support. As thu 
 division moved forward to take its position on 
 the field, the enemy directed a fire of artillery 
 against it, but owing to the irregularities of the 
 ground, did but little damage. 
 
 Meagher's brigade advancing steadily, soon 
 became engageil with the enemy }>osted to the 
 left and in front of Iloulette's house. It continu- 
 ed to advance under a heavy fire nearly to the 
 crest of the liill overlooking Piper's house, the 
 
 1L4 
 
 enemy being posted in the continuation of the 
 sunken road and corn-field, before referred to. 
 Here the brave Irish brigade opened upon tlie 
 enemy a terrific musketry fire. All of Gen. Sum- 
 ner's corps was now engaged, Gen. Sedgwick's 
 on the right. Gen. French in the centre, and Gen. 
 Richardson on the left. The Irish brigade sus- 
 tained its well earned reputation. After suffer- 
 ing terribly in officers and men, and strewing the 
 ground with their enemies as they drove them 
 back, their ammunition nearly expended, and their 
 commander. Gen. Jileagher, disabled by the fall 
 of his horse, shot luider him, this brigade was 
 ordered to give place to Gen. Caldwell's brigade, 
 which advanced to a short distance in its rear. 
 The lines were passed by the Irish brigade, break- 
 ing by company to the rear, and Gen. Caldwell's, 
 by comi)any to the front, as steadily as on drill. 
 Colunel Brook's brigado now became the second 
 line. 
 
 The ground over which Gen's. Richardson's 
 and French's divisions were fighting was very 
 irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills 
 covered with growing corn, enclosed by stone 
 walls, behind- which the enemy could advance 
 unobserved upon any exposed point of our lines. 
 Taking advantage of this, the enemy attempted 
 to gain the riglit of Richardson's position in a 
 corn-field, near Roulette's house, where the divi- 
 sion had become separated from that of General 
 French. A change of front by the .52d New 
 York and 2d Delaware Volunteers, of Colonel 
 Brook's brigade, under Colonel Frank, and the 
 attack made by the 52d Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
 sent further to right by Col. Brooks to close this 
 gap in the line, and tlie movement of the 152d 
 Pennsylvania and 7th Virginia Volunteers, of Gen. 
 French's division, before referred to, drove the 
 enemy from the corn-field, and restored the line. 
 
 The brigade of General Caldwell, with deter- 
 mined gallantry, pushed the enemy back op- 
 l)osite the left .and centre of this division, but 
 sheltered in the sunken road they still held oiu- 
 forces on the right of Caldwell in check. Col. 
 Barlow, commanding the 61st and 64th New 
 York regiments, of Caldwell's brigade, seeing a 
 favorable opportunity, advanced these regiments 
 on the left, taking the line on the sunken road in 
 flank, and compelled them to surrender, captur- 
 ing over three hundred prisoners, and three 
 stands of colors. 
 
 The whole of the brigade, with the 57th and 
 66th New York regiments of Col. Brooks's bri- 
 gade, who had moved these regiment^ into the 
 first line, now advanced with gallantry, driving 
 the enemy before them in confusion into the 
 corn-field beyond the sunken road. The left of 
 the division was now well advanced, when the 
 enemy, concealed by an intervening ridge, en- 
 deavored to turn its left and rear. Col. Cross. 
 5tli N. IT., by a change of front to the left and 
 rear, brought his regiment facing the advancing 
 line. Here a spirited contest arose to gain a com- I 
 inaiiding height — the two opposing forces, mov- j.^ 
 ing parallel to each other, giving and receiving ' 
 fire. The 5th, gaining the advantage, faced to 
 the right and delivered its volley. The enemy 
 staggered, but rallied and advanced desperately 
 
115 
 
 at a charge. B..Miig reinforced by tUc Slst Peim- 
 sylvania regiment, these regiments met the 
 advance by "a counter charge. The enemy fled, 
 leaving many killed, ^vonnded,and prisoners, and 
 the colors of the 4th North Carolina in our hands. 
 ■ Another column of the enemy, advancing un.ler 
 shelter of a stone wall and corn-field, pressed 
 down on the right of the division; but Col. Bar- 
 low again advanced the Gist and G4tli New York 
 against these troops, and. with the attack of Kim- 
 ball's brigade on tlie right, drove thorn from this 
 position. 
 
 Our troops on the left of this part of the line, 
 having driven the enemy far back, they, with 
 reinforced numbers, made a determined attack 
 directly m front. To meet this, Col. Barlow 
 brought his two regiments to their position in line, 
 and drove the enemy through the cornfield into 
 the orchard beyond, under a heavy fire of mus- 
 ketry, and a fire of canister from two pieces of 
 artiUcrj-. in the orchard and a battery further to 
 the right, throwing shell and case-shot. This 
 . advance gave us possession of Piper's house, the 
 ' strong point contended for by the enemy at this 
 part of the line, it being a defensible building, 
 several hundred yards^in advance of the sunken 
 road. 
 
 The musketry fire at this point of the litie now- 
 ceased. Holding Piper's house. General Richard- 
 son withdrew the line a little way to the crest of 
 a hill, a more advantageous position. Up to this 
 time this division was without artillery, and in 
 the new position suffered severely from artillery 
 Are, which could not be replied to. A section 
 of Robertson's horse battery, commanded by 
 Lieut. Vincent. 2d U. S. Artillery, now arrived 
 on the ground, and did excellent service. Sub- 
 sequently a battery of brass guns, commanded by 
 Capt. Graham, 1st U. S. Artillery, arrived, and 
 was posted on the crest of the hill, and soon 
 silenced the two guns in the orchard. A heavy 
 ■ fire soon ensued between the battery further to 
 right and our own. Captain Graham's battery 
 ■was bravely and skillfully served, but, unable to 
 reach the enemy, who had rilled guns of greater 
 range tiian our smooth bores, retired by order of 
 Gen. Ric'iardson, to save it from useless sacrifice 
 of men and hor..i;s. The brave general was him- 
 self mortally wounded while personally directing 
 iUi fire. 
 
 G on. Hancock Avas placed m command of the 
 livisiou after the fall of General Richardson, 
 t; .'u. Meaghei-'s brigade, now commanded by Col. 
 Burke of the 63d New York, having refilled their 
 • cartridge boxes, was again ordered forward, and 
 took position in the centre of the line. The di- 
 vision new occupied one line in close proximity 
 to the enemy, who had taken up a position in the 
 rear of Piper's house. 
 
 Col. Dwight iMorris, with the 14th Connecticut 
 and a detachment of the 108th New York, of Gen. 
 French's division, w.as sent by Gen. French to 
 the support of Piichardson's division. This com- 
 mand was now placed in an interval in the line 
 between Gen. Caldwell's and the Irish Brigade, 
 f ho requirements of the extended line of battle 
 had >o engaged the artillery that the api)lication 
 of G'.neral Hancock for artillery for his division 
 
 conld not be complied with immediately by the 
 chief of artillery, or the corps commanders in hii 
 vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of the 
 vroops, Gei!. Haucook felt confident that he could 
 hold ids po.sition, although suffering from tho 
 enemy's artillery, but was too weak to attack, aa 
 the great length of the line he was obliged to 
 h(dd prevented him from forming more than ouo 
 line of battle ; and, from his advanced position, 
 this line was already partly enfiladed by the bat- 
 teries of the enemy on the right, which were 
 protected from our batteries opposite them by 
 the woods at the Dunker church. 
 
 Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on somo 
 of our troops to the left of his position. General 
 Hancock obtained Hexamer's battery from Gen. 
 Fmnklin's corps, wdiich assisted materially in frus- 
 trating this attack. It also assisted the attack of 
 the 7th Maine of Franklin's corps, which, without 
 other aid, made an attack against the enemy's lino 
 and drove in skirmishers who were annoying our 
 artillery and troops on the right. Lieut. Wood- 
 ruff, with battery " I," 2dU. S. Artillery, relieved 
 Capt. Hexamer, whose ammunition was expended. 
 The enemy seemed at one time to be about mak- 
 ing an attack in force upon this part of tho line, 
 and advancing a long column of infantry towards 
 this division, but, on nearing the position, Gen. 
 Pleasonton opening on them with sixteen guns, 
 they hailed, gave a desultory fire, and retreated, 
 closing the operations on this portion of the field. 
 
 To return to the incidents occurring still fur- 
 ther to the right. 
 
 Between 12 and 1 p. m.. Gen. Franklin's corps 
 arrived on the field of battle, having left their 
 camp near Crampton's Pass at 6 a. m., leaving 
 Gen. Couch with orders to move with his division 
 to occupy Maryland heights. ' 
 
 Gen, Smitli's division led tho column, followed 
 by General Slocum't'. 
 
 It was first intended to keep this corps in re- 
 serve on the east side of the Antietam, to operata 
 on either flank or on the centre, as circumstances 
 might require. But, on nearing Keadysville, tho 
 strong opposition on the right, developed by the 
 attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it neces- 
 sary to send this corps at once to the assistance 
 of the right wing. On nearing the field, hearing 
 that one of our batteries (" A ," 4th U.S. Artillery), 
 commanded by Lieut. Thomas, who occupied 
 the same position as Lieut. Woodruff's battery in 
 the morning, was hotly engaged, without sup- 
 ports, Gen. Smith sent two regiments to its relief 
 from Gen. Hancock's brigade. On inspecting the 
 ground. General Smith ordered tbe other regi- 
 ment of Hancock's brigade, with Frank's and 
 Cowen's batteries, 1st New York Artillery, to the 
 threatened position ; Lieut. Thomas and Capt. 
 Gothran, commanding batteries, bravely held their 
 positions agaiiist the advancing enemy, handling 
 their batteries with skill. 
 
 Finding the enem}' still advancing, the 3d bri- 
 gade of Smith's division, commanded by Colonel 
 Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania Volunteer.«>, was ordered 
 up, and, passing through Lieut. Thomas's bat- 
 tery, charged upon the enemy and drove back 
 tho advance until abreast ot the Dunker Churuh. 
 As the riirht of the brigade came oDDOsitc the 
 
116 
 
 iroodB, it received a des'trnctive firo which 
 checked the advance and threw the brijijade 
 somewhat into confusion. It formed again behind 
 a rise of ground in the open space in advance of 
 the batteries. General French liaving reported 
 to General Franklin that his ammunition was 
 ^ nearly expended, tliat otFicer ordered General 
 JBrooks, with his brigade, to reinforce him. Gen. 
 Brooks formed his brigade on the right of General 
 French, where they remained during the remain- 
 der of the day and niglit, frequently under the 
 fire of the enemy's artillery. It was soon after 
 the brigade of Col. Irwin had fallen behind tlie 
 rise of ground that the 7th Maine, by order of 
 Col. Irwin, made the gallant attack already re- 
 ferred to. • 
 
 The advance of General Franklin's corps was 
 opportune. The attack of the enemy on the' 
 position, but for the timely arrival of his corps, 
 jnust have been disastrous, had it succeeded in 
 piercing the line between Gen. Sedgwick's and 
 French's divisions. 
 
 Gen. Franklin ordered two brigades of Gen. 
 Slocum's division, Gen. Newton's and Col. Tor- 
 bert's, to form in column to assault the woods 
 that had been so hotly contested before, by Gen's. 
 Sumner and Hooker ; Bartlett's brigade was or- 
 dered to form as a reserve ; at this time Gen. 
 Sumner having command on the right, directed 
 further offensive operations to be postponed, as 
 the repulse of this, the only remaining corps 
 available for attack, would peril the safety of the 
 •whole army. 
 
 Gen. Porter's corps, consisting of Gen. Sykes's 
 division of regulars and volunteers, occupied a 
 position on the east side of Antietam Creek, up- 
 on the main turnpike leading to Sharpsburg, and 
 directly opposite the centre of the enemy's line. 
 This corps filled the interval between the riglit 
 ■wing and Gen. Burnside's command, and guarded 
 the yiain approach from the enemy's position to 
 our trains of supplies. 
 
 It was necessary to watch this part of our line 
 ■with the utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should 
 take advantage of the first exhibition of weak- 
 ness here to push upon us a vigorous assault for 
 the purpose of piercing our centre and turning 
 our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our 
 supply trains. Once having penetrated this line, 
 the enemy's passage to our rear could have met 
 ■with but feeV)ie resistance, as there were no re- 
 ECrves to reinforce or close up the gap. 
 
 Towards the miildle of the afternoon, proceed- 
 ing to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's, 
 and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. 
 Several general oflicers had been carried from the 
 field severely wounded, and the aspect of affairs 
 "was anything but promising. At the risk of 
 greatly exposing our centre, I ordered two brig- 
 ades from Porter's corps, the only available 
 troops, to reinforce the right. Six battalions of 
 Sykes's regulars had been thrown across toe An- 
 tietam bridge on the main road, to attack and 
 drive back the enemy's sliarpsliootcrs, Avho were 
 annoying PIcasonton's horse l)atterics in advance 
 of the bridge. Warren's brigade, of Porter's 
 corps was detached to hold a pvsition on Burn- 
 side's right and rear, bo that Porter was left at 
 
 one time with only a portion of Sykes's division, 
 and one small brigade of Morell's division (but 
 little over three thousand men) to hold his im- 
 portant position. 
 
 Gen. Sumner expressed the most decided opin- 
 ion against another attempt during that d-ay to 
 assault the enemy's position in front, as portions 
 of our troops were so much scattered and demo- 
 ralized. In view of these circumstances, after 
 making changes in the positions of some of the 
 troops, I directed the different commanders to 
 hold their positions, and, behig satisfied that this 
 could be done without the assistance of the two 
 brigades from the centre, I countermanded the . 
 order which was in course of execution. 
 
 Gen. Slocum's division replaced a portion of 
 Gen. Sumner's troops, and positions were selected 
 for batteries in front of the woods. The enemy 
 opened several heavy fires of artillery on the j^o- 
 sition of our troops after this, but our batteries 
 soon silenced them. 
 
 On the mornuig of the 17th Gen. Pleasonton, 
 with his cavalry division, and the horse batteries*^ 
 under Captains Robertson, Tidball, and Lieut. 
 Haines, of the 2d U. S. artillery, was ordered tc 
 advance on the turnpike towards Sharpsbnrg 
 across bridge No. 2, and supjiort the left of Sum- 
 ner's line. The bridge being covered by a fire of 
 artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skirmishers 
 were thrown out, and Capt. Tidball's battery ad- 
 vanced by piece, and drove o3 tlio sharpshooters 
 with canister sidhciently to establish the batter- 
 ies above mentioned, which opened on the enemy 
 with effect. The firing .was kept up for about 
 two hours, when, the enemy's fire slackening, the 
 batteries were relieved by Randall's and Van 
 Reed's batteries, U. S. Artillery. About 3 o'clock 
 Tidball, Robertson and Haines returned to their 
 positions on the west of Antietam, Capt. Gibson 
 havirg been placed in position on the east side to 
 guard the approaches to the bridge. These bat- 
 teries did good service, concentrating their fire 
 on the column about to attack Gen. Hancock's 
 position, and comiaelling it to find shelter behind 
 the hills in rear. 
 
 Gen. Sykes's division had been in position since 
 the 10th, exposed to the enemy's artillery and 
 sharpshooters. 
 
 Gen. ]\[orell had come up on the IGth, and re- 
 lieved Gen. Richardson on the right of Gen. 
 Sykes, and, continually under the vigilant watch 
 of the enemy, this corps guarded a vital point. 
 
 The position of the batteries under Gcn.Pleas- 
 anton being one of great exposure, the battalion 
 of the 2J -and 10th United Slates Infantry, under 
 Capt. Dwyer, 4th U. S. Infantry were sent across 
 to assist in driving off the sharpshontt^rs of the 
 cnemv. 
 
 Tiic battalion of the 2d and 10th U. S. Infantry 
 advancing far beyond the batteries, compelled the 
 cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abandon 
 their guns. Few in lunuber and unsn^jported, 
 (hoy were unable to bring them off. The heavy 
 loss of this small body of men attests tl;eir gal- 
 lantry. ■ t 
 
 The troops of Gen. Burnside lield the left of 
 the line oi»posite bridge No. 3. The attack on 
 the ris^ht was to have been suooorted bv an at- 
 
in 
 
 ' ick on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on 
 ho evening of the 16th, Gen. Burnsidc'a corps 
 was moved forward and to the left, and took up 
 i position nearer the bridge. 
 ' I visited Gen.J3urnside'8 position on the IGtli, 
 and after jiointing out to him the proper dispo- 
 sitions to be made of his troops during the day 
 md niglit, informed him thatuie would probably 
 be required to attack the enemy's right on tiie 
 following morning, and directed him to make care- 
 ful reconnoissancos. 
 
 Gen. Burnside's corps, consisting of the divis- 
 ionsjof Gens. Cox, Wilcox, Rodman, and Sturgis, 
 was posted as follows : Col. Brooks's brigade, 
 Cox's division, on the right, Gen. Sturgis's divis- 
 ion immediately in rear. On the left was Gen. 
 Rodman's division, with Gen. Scammon's brigade. 
 Cox's division in support. 
 
 Gen. Wilcox's division was held in reserve. 
 The corps bivouacked in position on the right 
 of the 16th. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered 
 Gen. Burnside to form his troops, and hold them 
 in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, 
 and to await further orders. 
 
 At eight o'clock an order was sent to him by 
 Lieutenant Wilson, To})ographical Eengineers to 
 carrj' the bridge, then to gain possession of the 
 heights beyond, and to advance along their crest 
 upon Sluirpsburg and its rear. 
 After some time had elapsed, not hearing from 
 ' him, I despatched an aid to ascertain what had 
 been done. The aid returned with the informa- 
 tion that but little progress had been made. I 
 then sent him back with an order to Gen. Burn- 
 aide, to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at 
 ' ill hazards. The aide returned to me a second 
 ■■.ime, with the report that the bridge was still 
 in the possession of the enemy. Whereupon I 
 directed Col. Sackett, Inspector General, to deliv- 
 er to Gen. Burnside my positive order to push 
 forward his troops without a moment's delay, 
 and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point 
 of the bayonet, and I ordered Col. Sackett to re- 
 main with Gcu. Burnside and see that the order 
 was executed jn-omptly. 
 
 After these three hours' delay, the bridge was 
 carried at 1 o'clock by a brilliant charge of the 
 51st New York and .'ilst Pennsylvania Volunteers. 
 I Other troops were then thrown over and the op- 
 posite bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the 
 heights beyond. 
 
 A halt was then made by Gen. Burnside's ad- 
 vance until 3 P.M., upon hearing which I directed 
 • one of my aides — Col. Key — to inform Gen. Burn- 
 side that I desired him to push forward his troops 
 with the utmost vigor and carry the enemy's jio- 
 sition on the heights; that the movement was 
 vital to our success ; that this was a time when 
 we must not stoj) for loss of life if a great ol)joc1: 
 could be thereb}- accom])lished. That if, in his 
 judgment, his attack would fail, 1o inform me so 
 at once, Ihat his tro(i])S might be withdrawn and 
 used elsewhere on the field. He replied tliat he 
 would soon advance, and would go up the hill as 
 far as a battery of the enemy on the left would 
 permit. Upon this re])ort 1 again iminedialely 
 sent Col. Key to Geu. Burrside, with orders to 
 
 advance at once, if possible, to flank the battery 
 or storm it and carry the heights, repeating thai 
 if he considered the movement impracticable to 
 inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. 
 The advance was then gallantly resumed, th« 
 enemy drivenfrom their guns, the heights hand- 
 somely carried, and a portion of the troops even 
 reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By thi» 
 time it was nearly dark, and strong reinforce 
 ments just then reaching the enemy from Har» 
 pcr's Ferry, attacked Gen. Burnside's troops oil 
 their left flank, and forced tliem to retire to a lower 
 line of hills nearer the bridge. 
 
 If this important movement had been consum» 
 mated two hours earlier, a position would liava 
 been secured upon the heights from which our 
 batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of 
 the enemy's line, and turned their right and rear. 
 Our victory might have been mncl» more decisive^ 
 'J'he following is the substance of Gen. Burn- 
 side's operations, as given m his report: 
 
 Col. Crook's brigade was ordered to storm th« 
 bridge. This bridge. No. 3, is a stone structure 
 of three arches, with stone parapets. The banka 
 of the stream on the opposite side are precipi- 
 tous, and command the eastern approaches to 
 the bridge. On the liill side immediately by the 
 bridge was a stone fence running parallel to the 
 stream, the turns of the roadway as it wound up 
 the hill were covered by rifle pits and breast- 
 works of rails, &c. These works and the woods 
 that covered the slopes were iilled with the ene- 
 my's riflemen, and batteries were in position to 
 enfilade the bridge and its approaches. 
 
 Gen. Rodman w^as ordered to cross the feud b®- 
 low the bridge. From Col. Crook's positioa it 
 was found impossible to carry the bridge. 
 
 Gen. Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from 
 liis division for that purpose. He sent forward 
 the 2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire. These 
 regiments made several successive attacks in the 
 most gallant style, but were driven back. 
 
 The artillery of the left were ordered' to con- 
 centrate their fire on the woods above the bridge. 
 Col. Crook brought a section of Capt. Simmon's 
 battery to a position to conmiand the bridge. 
 The 51st New York, and 51st Pennsylvania, were 
 then ordered to assault the bridge. Taking ad- 
 vantage of a small spur of the hills which ran 
 parallel to the river, they moved towards the 
 bridge. From the crest of this spur thoy rushed, 
 witii bayonet fixed, and cleared the bridge. 
 
 The division followed the storming iiarty, also 
 the brigade of Col. Crook, as su]iport. The enemy 
 withdrew to still higher ground, some live or six 
 hundred yards beyond, and o])ened a fire of ar- 
 tillciy on the troops in the new positions on tli© 
 crest of the hill above the bridge. 
 
 Gen. Rodman's division succeeded in crossing 
 the ford, after <i shaip fire of musketiy and ar- 
 tillery, and joined on the loft of Sturgis; Scam- 
 mon's J)rigade crossing as su])port. Gen. Wil- 
 cox's division was ordered Across to take position 
 on (ien. Sturgis's right. ~ 
 
 Tliese dispositions being completed about 3 
 o'clock, the command moved forward, except Stur- 
 gis's division loft in reserve. (Ilurk's and Oarreiri 
 batteries accoinpaniod R.odman'8 division ; Cook'* 
 
ll« 
 
 lottery with Wilcox's division, and a section oi 
 Biraraons's battery with Crook's brigade. A sec- 
 tion of Simmon's battery, and Mullcuburgli's and 
 McMulllii's batteries were in position. The order 
 for the advance was obeyed by tlie troops with 
 alacrity. Gen. Wilcox's division, with Crook ni 
 support, moved up on both sides uf tlie turn- 
 pike leading from the bridge to Sliarpsburg. 
 Gen. Rodman's division, supported by Scam-, 
 mon's brigade, on the left of Gen. Wilcox. The 
 enemy retreated before the advance of the trooiis. 
 The 9th New York, of Gen. Hodman's division, 
 captured one of the enemy's batteries, and held 
 it for some time. As the command was driving 
 tbe enemy to the main heights on the left of the 
 town, the light divi urn of Gen. A. P. Hill arrived 
 fipon the field of ba tie, from Harper's Ferry, and 
 -with a heavy artillery lire made a strong attack 
 on the extreme left. To meet this attack, the left 
 division diverged from the line of march intended, 
 and opened a gap between it and the right. To 
 fill np this, it was necessary to order the troops 
 from the second line. Daring these movements. 
 Gen. Rodman was mortally wounded. Col. Har- 
 land's brigade, of Gen. Hodman's division, was 
 driven back. Col. Scammon's brigade, by a change 
 of front to rear on bis right flank, saved the l(;ft 
 from being driven completely in. The fresh 
 troops of the enemy pouring in, and the accumu- 
 lation of artillery against this command, destroyed 
 all hope of its being able to accomplish any thing 
 more. ^ 
 
 It was now nearly dark. Gen. Sturgis was v,r- 
 dered forward to support the left. Notwithstand- 
 ing the hard work in the early part of the day, 
 his division moved forward Avith spirit. With 
 its assistance, the enemy were checked and held 
 at bay. 
 
 The command was ordered to fall back by Gen. 
 Cox, wdio commanded, on the field, the troops 
 engaged in this attack beyond the Antietam. The 
 artillery had been well served during the day. 
 Ni-^ht closed the long and desperately contested 
 battle of the 17th. Nearly 205,000 men, and 500 
 pieces of artillery, Avere for fourteen hours en- 
 gaged in this memorable battle. We had attack- 
 ed the enemy in a position selected by the ex- 
 perienced engineer then in person directing their 
 operations. "We had driven them from their line 
 on one ilank. and secured a footing within it on 
 the other. The army of the Potomac, notwith- 
 standing tlie moral cOect incident to previous re- 
 verses, had achieved a victory over an adversary 
 invested with the prestige of recent success. 
 Our soldiers slept that night, conquerors, on a 
 field won by their valor, and covered with the 
 dead a".d wounded of the enemy. 
 CONDITION OF THE ARMY AFTER ANTIE- 
 'K TAM. 
 
 The night, however, brought with it grave re- 
 8ponKii)ilitifs. Whether to renew the attack on 
 the ISlli, or to defer it, even with the risk of the 
 enemy's retirenioiit, was the question befors me. 
 After a night of anxious deliberation, and a full 
 and careful eurvcy of the situation and condition 
 of cm army, and the streiiglh and jiosinon of the 
 enemy. I concluded that the bucccss of an attack 
 on the 18th vsas not certain. 1 am aware of the 
 
 fact, tiiat under ordiii.i'.y circumsiaucts, a general 
 is expected to risk a battle if )ic liaH a reasonable 
 pr(jspe'-.t of success ; but at this critical juncture, 
 I should have had a narrow view of the condition _ 
 uf the country, had I been willing to hazard an- 
 other battle with les.s than an absolute as.^^urance 
 of success. At that moment — Virginia^ lost. 
 Washington menaced, Maryland _ invaded — the 
 national cause could afford no risks of defeat. 
 One battle lost, and almost all would have been 
 lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it 
 pleased on "Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, 
 or New York. It could have levied its supplie.- 
 from a fertile and undevastatod country;, extorted 
 tribute from wealthy and poitulous cities; and 
 nowhere east of the Alleghanies, was there an- 
 other organized force able to arrest its march. 
 
 The following are among the consideration?; 
 which led me to doubt the certainty of success 
 in attacking before the 19th. 
 
 The troop.s were greatly overcome by the fa- 
 tigue and eshaustion attendant upon the long 
 continued and severely contested battle of the ' 
 17 th, together with the long day and night marin- 
 es to wiiich they had been subjected during n . 
 previous three days. 
 
 The supply trains were in the rear, and man^s 
 of the troops had suffered from hunger. They re- 
 quired rest and refreshment. 
 
 One division of Sumner's, and all of Hooker'^ 
 corps, on the right, had, after fighting most valiant- 
 ly for several hours, been overpowered by nuni- 
 bers, driven back in great disorder, and mud. 
 scattered ; so that they were for the time so::: - 
 what demoralized. 
 
 In Hooker's corps, according to the returr 
 made by Gen. Meade, commanding, there wen 
 but 6729 men present on thelSth: whereas, o;. 
 the morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 mei. 
 present for duty m the same corps, showing th;.t 
 previous to, and durhig the battle, CoG4 men wei'. 
 separated from their command. 
 
 Gen. Meade, in an official communication upo;. 
 this subject, dated Sept. 18, 18G2, says: "I enclose 
 a field return of the corps made this afternoon, 
 which I desire you will lay before the conunand- 
 ing-general. I am satisfied the great reductior. 
 in the corps since the recent engagements, is not 
 due solely to the casualties of battle, and that a 
 considerable number of men are still in the rear, 
 some having dropped out on the march, and 
 many dispersing and leaving yesterday during 
 the fight. I think the efficiency of the corps, so 
 far as it goes good. To resist an attack in our 
 present strong position, I think they may be de- 
 pended on ; and I hope they will perform dutv 
 in case we make an attack, though 1 do not think 
 their morale is as good for an offensive as a d( 
 fcnsive movement." 
 
 One division of Sumner's Corps had also been 
 overpowered, and was a good deal scattered and 
 demoralized. It was not deemed by its corps 
 commander, in iiropcr condition to attack the 
 enemy vigorously the next day. ^ , , , 
 
 Sumo of the new troops on the left, although 
 many of them *.ught well during a part of the 
 battle, and are entitled to great credit, were, at 
 
119 
 
 «io dO30 of the action, driven back, and their I 
 
 "^V^^t, of.the 18th, Gen.. Burnside re 
 quested me to send him another Jvision to ass t 
 Si holding his position on the other side of t e 
 Sitietam and to enable him to .s'lthdraw his 
 ^rpTinx'e should bo attacked by a superior force 
 He gave me the impression that if he ^veie a. 
 Scked again that morning, he .v'ould not be able 
 S make a very vigorous resistance I visited Ins 
 position early, detemined to send General Mc^- 
 Fell's division to his aid, and directed that it should 
 be placed on this side of the Antie am, in order 
 that ii-might cover the retreat of his own corps 
 from the other side of tlie Antietam, shonld that 
 become necessary, at the same time it was in po- 
 sition to reinforce our centre or right, if tha ^^ele 
 needed. Late in the afternoon, I found that al- 
 though he had not been attacked, General Burn- 
 side had withdrawn his own corps to this siceot 
 the Antietam, and sent over Morell s division alone 
 to hold the opposite side. . 
 
 \ A larere number of our heaviest and most effi- 
 cient batteries- had consumed all their ammuni- 
 tion on the 16th and Hth, and it was impossible 
 to supply them until late on the following day. 
 
 Supplies of provision and forage had to be 
 brought np and issued, and infantry_ammunition 
 distributed. , , ^ , , ^^^ 
 
 Finally reinforcements to the number of 1-1,0UU 
 men, to say nothing of troops from Pennsylvania 
 had not arrived, but were expected during the 
 
 ^The 18th was therefore spent in collecting the 
 disnersed eiving rest te the fatigued, removing 
 the wounded, burying the dead and the necessary 
 oreparations for a renewal of the battle. 
 
 Of the reinforcements, Couch's division,. march- 
 ing with commendable raT)idity, came up into po- 
 
 sition ai a late hour in the morning. Humphrey 8 
 division of new troops, in their anxiety to par- 
 ticipate in the battle, which was raging when 
 they received the order to march from Frederick, 
 at about half past 3 p. M-on the 17tb, pressed for- 
 ward during the entire night, and the mass ot the 
 diviston reached the army on the following morn- 
 iiio- Having marched more than twenty-three 
 mfles after 4 1-2 o'clock on the preceding after- 
 noon, they were of course greatly exhausted, and- 
 needed rest and refreshment. Large remforce- 
 ments expected from Pennsylvai;j- never arrived. 
 During the 18th, orders were given for a re- 
 newal of the attack at daylight on the ^^tb. 
 
 On the night of the 18th, the enemy, after pass- 
 ing troops in the latter part of the day from the 
 Virginia shore, to their position behind Sharps- 
 burg, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the 
 design of abandoning their position aud retreat- 
 ing across the river. , . ,. , r o. 
 As their line was but a short distance from the 
 river, the evacuation presented but httle difficul- 
 ty, and was effected before daylight. t 
 
 About 2,700 of the enemy's dead were, under 
 the direction of Major Davis, assistant-inspector- 
 general, counted and buried upon the battle-beld 
 of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been 
 previously buried by the enemy. This is conclu- 
 sive evidence that the enemy sustained much 
 greaterlossthanwe. 
 
 Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 
 fifteen thousand stand of small arms, aud more 
 than six thousand prisoners, were the. trophies 
 which attest the success of our arms m the 
 battles of South Mountain, Cramptons Gap, and 
 
 Antietam. , , .i. „^ 
 
 Not a single gun or color wo^ lost by our army 
 during these battles. 
 
120 
 
 Tabular Report of Ga&uoilie* in (he Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Aniieiam, on th«^ 
 
 IG^/i and ll'th of September, 1862. 
 
 f " ' ' 
 
 1st Corps. 
 
 JIAJ.-GEy. HOOKER. 
 
 1st Division 
 
 r ' 
 
 General 
 Officers 
 
 Other 
 Officera 
 
 Enlisted Men 
 
 Aggregate 
 
 Grand 
 
 Aggreg. 
 
 ^3 
 
 B 
 
 o 
 
 
 'a 
 o 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 
 •73 
 
 a 
 
 98 
 
 153 
 
 97 
 
 o 
 
 p: 
 
 669 
 898 
 449 
 
 "m 
 .22 
 
 7^ 
 
 
 95 
 137 
 
 23 
 
 862 
 
 1188 
 
 569 
 
 2d Division 
 
 3d Division 
 
 Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 348 
 
 2016 
 
 255 
 
 2619 
 
 2d Corps. 
 
 .4AJ.-GEN. SUMNER. 
 
 1st Division 
 
 
 
 1 
 2 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 41 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 39 
 
 .50 
 89 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 192 
 355 
 
 272 
 
 819 
 
 13 
 
 7 
 
 20 
 
 860 
 1577 
 1271 
 
 3708 
 
 92 
 13 
 
 105 
 
 24 
 .321 
 203 
 
 548 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 212 
 
 355 
 293 
 
 860 
 
 13 
 
 8 
 
 21 
 
 900 
 1579 
 1322 
 
 3801 
 
 24 
 
 321 
 
 •203 
 
 548 
 
 1136 
 2255 
 1818 
 
 2d Division 
 
 3(] Division. 
 
 Total 
 
 5209 
 
 5th Corps. 
 
 MAJ.-GEN. F. J. PORTER. 
 
 1st Division. 
 
 94 
 13 
 
 107 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 108 
 22 
 
 130 
 
 2d Division 
 
 
 Artillery Reserve 
 
 Total 
 
 
 
 5fh Corns. 
 
 ._ MAJ.-GEN. FRANKLIN. 
 
 1st Division 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 65 
 
 58 
 
 27: 
 
 2 
 31 
 
 65 
 373 
 
 2d Division 
 
 Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
 33£ 
 
 33 
 
 438 
 
 9 th Corps. 
 
 MAJ.-GEN. BURNSIDE. 
 
 1 st Division 
 
 
 
 — 
 
 2 • 
 7 
 8 
 5 
 
 22 
 
 9 
 6 
 
 1.5 
 
 20 
 
 29 
 
 40 
 
 7 
 
 3,5 
 2G 
 
 "cT 
 
 1 
 
 44 
 121 
 212 
 
 33 
 
 410 
 
 15! 
 
 107 
 
 1 
 
 259 
 
 264 
 493 
 743 
 145 
 
 1645 
 
 .^27 
 
 481 
 
 15 
 
 1323 
 
 8 
 
 7 
 20 
 70 
 23 
 
 120 
 
 54 
 
 30 
 
 1 
 
 ""85 
 
 46 
 128 
 220 
 
 38 
 
 432 
 
 160 
 113 
 
 1 
 
 274 
 5 
 
 281 
 
 7 
 on 
 
 337 
 
 670 
 
 1073 
 
 213 
 
 2d Division 
 
 
 783 "^^ 
 
 4tk Division 
 
 152 
 1741 
 
 862 
 
 .507 
 
 15 
 
 1384 
 
 9 
 23 
 
 23 
 120 
 
 
 2293 
 
 12th Corps. (Gen. Banks.) 
 
 iriUG.-GEN. WILLIAMS, Com'g. 
 
 1st Division 
 
 54 
 30 
 
 1 
 •85 
 
 1076 
 
 650 
 
 17 
 
 1743 
 
 9 
 
 28 
 
 2d Division 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Total 
 
 :maj.-gen. COUCH'S 
 
 Division 
 
 BRIG. -GEN. PLEASONTON'S 
 Cavivlry Division 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 U)10 
 
 9416 
 
 1043 
 
 12469 
 
121 
 
 Head-Qnavters Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Sharpsburg, Sept. 29, 1862. 
 Official S. W., As«isti«it Adj't Gen. 
 
 An estimate of the forces under tho confeder- 
 ate General Lee, made up by direction of Gen. 
 Banks from information obtained by the exaninia- 
 ion of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., previous 
 to the batte of Antietam, is ,as follows : 
 
 Gen. T. J. Jackson's Corps, - 24.778 Men 
 
 '■ James Longstrecet's Corps, 23,342 " 
 
 •' D. II. Hill's 2 Divisions, 15,52o " 
 
 " J. E. B. Stuart's Cavairy, 6,400 " 
 
 " Riuisom's and Jcnkin.s's Brigades, 3,000 || 
 Forty-six Reg'ts not inciud'd in above, 18,400 " 
 Artillery, estimated at 400 guns, - -*- 6,000 " 
 
 Total, 97,445 " 
 
 These estimates give tlio actual numbers of 
 
 men preset and fit for duty. 
 Our own forces at tho battle of Antictam were 
 
 as follows : 
 
 1st Corps, 14,856 Men 
 
 2nd Corps, - - 18.813 '| 
 
 5tli Corps, (one division not ar'd,) 12,930 
 
 6th Corps,--- 12,300 " 
 
 9th Corps, : 13,819 " 
 
 12th Corps, 10,126 |'^ 
 
 Cavalry Division, 4,320 
 
 •Total inaction, 87,164 " 
 
 OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 
 When our cavalry advance reached thenvcr on 
 the morning of the 19th, it was discovered that 
 nearly all the enem\s forces had crossed into Vir- 
 ginia during the night, their rear escaping under 
 the cover of eight batteries, placed in strong po- 
 sitions upon the elevated bluffs on the opposite 
 
 bank. - , n 
 
 General Porter, commanding the oth Corps, or- 
 dered a detachment from Griffin's and Barnes's 
 brigades, under General Griffin, to cross the river 
 at dark and carry the enemy's batteries. This 
 Nv'as gallantly done under the fire of the enemy. 
 Several guns, caissons, etc., were taken, and their 
 supports driven back half a mile. 
 
 The informal ion obtained during the progress 
 .if this affair, indicated that the mass ol the ene- 
 my had retreated on the Charlestown and Mar- 
 (.insburg roads towards Winchester. To verify 
 his, and to ascerlain how far the enemy had re- 
 u;ca('tcd. General Porter was authorized to detach 
 f.om his corps, on the morning ot the 20th, a re- 
 . ounoilering party in greater force. This detacli- 
 ncnt crossed the river, and advanced about a 
 nilo, when it was attacked by a large body ot 
 :ho enemy lying in ambush in tlie woods, and 
 driven back across tiic river with considerable 
 loss. Tliis recomioisance showed that the euemy 
 was still in force on the Virginia bank of the Po- 
 tomac. prejKvred to resist our fivtlier advance. 
 
 It wa> reported to me on the 19th tliat General 
 Stuart had made his appearance at Wiiliamsport 
 Willi some four thousand cavalry and six pieces 
 of artillery, and tliat ten thousand infantry were 
 marching on the same peuit from the direction o ' 
 Winchester. I ordered General Coucli to march 
 at once with his division, and a part of Plca-an- 
 ton's cavalry, witli Frankiin's corps within bud- 
 
 porting distance, for the purpose of endeavoring 
 to capture this force. General Couch made a 
 prompt and rapid march to Wiiliamsport, and at- 
 tacked tho enemy vigorously, but they made their 
 escape across the river. 
 
 I dispatched the following telegraphic report to 
 the general-in-chief : 
 
 Ileadq's, Army of the Potomac, Sharpsburg, 
 Sept. 19. 1862. 
 
 Maj.-Gcn. It. W. Halleck, Comd'g. U. S. Army,— I 
 have tho honor to report that Maryland is entirely 
 freed from tho presence of the enemv, who has 
 been driven across the Potomac. No fears need 
 now be entertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. 
 I shall at once occui)y Harper's Ferry. 
 
 G. B. M'cClellan, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 On tho following day I received this telegram: 
 
 Wasliington, Sept. 20, 1862. 2 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. ]\icC,— AVe are still left entirely 
 in the dark in regard to your own movements and 
 those of the enemy. Tiiis should not be so. You 
 should keep me advised of both, so far as you 
 know them. II. W. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief. 
 
 To which I answered as follows: 
 Headq's, Army of the Potomac, near Sharpa- 
 burg, Sept. 20. 1862. 8 l.M. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Ilallcv^k, Gen.-in-Chief, Washington. 
 Tour telegram ot to-day is received. I telegraphed 
 you yesterday all I knew, and had uothi'ng more 
 to inform you of until this evening. Williams's 
 corps (Banks's) occupied Maryland Heights at 1 
 P.M. to-day. The rest of the army is near here, 
 except Couch's division, which is at this moment 
 engaged with the enemy in front of Wiiliamsport. 
 Tlie enemy is retiring via Charlestown and Mar- 
 tinsburg on Winchester. He last night re-occu- 
 pied Wiiliamsport by a small force, but will bo 
 out of it by morning. I think, he has a force of 
 infantry near Sharpstown. 
 
 I regret that you find, it necessary to couch 
 every dispatch I have the honor to receive from 
 vou, in a spirit of faultfinding, and that you have 
 not yet found leisure to say one ^ord "in commen- 
 dation of the recent achievements ot this army, or 
 even to allude to them. 
 
 I have abstained from giving the number of 
 guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, &c., captured, 
 until I could do so wnth some accuracy. I hope 
 by tc-morrow evening to be able to give at least 
 an approximate statement. 
 
 G. B. iMcClellan, Maj.-Gcn. Comd'g. 
 On the same day I telegraphed as follows: 
 Headq's. Armv of the Potomac. Se].t. 20, 1802, 
 Mai -Gen. H. \V. Halleck, Comd'g U. S. Army. 
 As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side of 
 the Potomac, must in a great measure be depen- 
 dent for supplies of ammunition and provisions 
 upon llicluuoiid,! would respectfully suggest that 
 General Banks be directed to send out a cavalry 
 IV.rce to cut their supply communications oppo- 
 site Washington. 'J'ins would seriously cmbarass 
 their operatmiis. and will aid this army materially. 
 G. 15. iMeClellaii,J\Iaj.-Geu. Conurg. 
 Maryland Ile'ghts were occupied by Gen. Wil- 
 liams's corps on this day, and on the 22d Gen. 
 Sumner took possession of Harper's Ferry. •. 
 
 It will be remembered that at the time I was 
 assicned to the command of the forces for tlie do- 
 
122 
 
 feiisu ol' the national capital, on the 2d day of Sep- 
 Icinbcr, 18G2, the greater part of all the available 
 troops were suffering under tUe disheartening in- 
 Hiiences of the serioiis defeat they had encoun- 
 tered during the brief and unfortunate campaign 
 of General Pope. Their numbers were greatly re-» 
 duced by casualities — their confidence was much 
 shaken, and they had lost something of that esp7'il- 
 du-corps which is indisi^ensable to the efficiency 
 of an array. Moreover they had left behind, lost, 
 or worn out the greater part of their clothing and 
 camp equipage, which required renewal before 
 they could be in proper condition to take the field 
 again. 
 
 The intelligence that the enemy was crossing 
 the Potomac into Maryland, was received in Wash- 
 ington on Ihe 4th of September, and the Army of 
 the Potomac was again put in motion, under my 
 direction, on the following day — so that but a 
 very brief interval of time was allowed to reor- 
 ganize, or procure supplies. 
 
 The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and 
 Antietam, fougiit by this Army a few days after- 
 wards, with tlie reconnoissances immediately fol- 
 lowing, resulted in a loss to us of ten general offi- 
 cers, many regimental and company ofHcers, and a 
 large number of enlisted men ;' amounting in the 
 aggregate to 15,220. Two army corps had been 
 badly cut up, scattered and somewhat demoral- 
 ized in the action of the 17th. 
 
 In Gen. Sumner's corps alone, 41 commissioned 
 ofiicers and 819 enlisted men had been killed ; 4 
 general officers, 89 other commissioned officers, 
 and 3,708 enlisted men had been wounded; be- 
 sides 548 missing ; making the aggregate loss of 
 this splendid veteran corps, in this one battle, 
 5,209. 
 
 - In Gen. Hooker's corps the casualities of the 
 same engagement amoimted to 2619. 
 
 The entire army had been greatly exhausted by 
 unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, 
 and want of slofip and rest, previous to the last 
 battle. 
 
 When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into 
 Virginia, the means of transportation at my dis- 
 posal were inadequate to furnish a single day's 
 supply of subsistence in advance. 
 
 Many of the troops were new levies, some of 
 whom had fought like veterans, but the morale of 
 others had been a good deal impaired in those 
 severely contested actions,and they requii'cd time 
 to recover, as well as to acquire the necessary 
 drill and discipline. \ 
 
 Under these circumstances, I did not feel au- 
 thorized to cross the river Avith the main army, 
 over a very deep and dillicult ford in pursuit of 
 the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force 
 on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, 
 which was liable at any time to rise above a ford- 
 ing stage, between my army and its base of supply. 
 
 I teleg aplicd on the 22d to theGeneral-in-cliief 
 as follows : 
 
 " As soon as the d^igencies of the service will 
 admit of it, this army should be 'reorganized. It 
 is absolutely necessary to secure its efiiciency, 
 that the old skeleton regiments should be filled 
 up at once, and officers appointed to supply the 
 nuiiierou.-* existin«r vacancies. There are instances 
 
 where captains are commanding regiments, and 
 companies are without a single commissioned offi- 
 cer." 
 
 On the 23d, the following was telegraphed to 
 the General-in-chief : 
 
 Ileadq's, Army of the Potomac, Near Shepherds- 
 town, Sept. 23, 1862. 9.30 a.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gem H.W. IIalleck,Gen.-in-Chief, Wash'n. 
 
 From several different sources, I learn that Gen. 
 R. E. Lee is still opposite to my position at Lees- 
 town, between Shepherdstown and Martinsburg, 
 and that Gen. Jackson is on the Opequan Creek, 
 about three miles from its mouth, both with large 
 force. Theiis are also indications of heavy rein- 
 forcements moving towards them from Winches- 
 ter and Gharlestown. I have therefore ordered 
 Gen. Franklin to take position with his corps at 
 the cross roads, about one mile northwest of Ba- 
 kersv'ille, on the Bakersvillc and Williamport road, 
 and Gen. Couch to establish his division near 
 Downsville, leaving sufiicient force at Williams- 
 port to watch and guard the ford at that place. 
 The fact of the enemy remaining so long in our 
 front, and the indications of an advance of rein- 
 forcements, seem to indicate that he will give us 
 another battle with all his available force. 
 
 As I rnentioned to you before, our army has 
 been very much reduced by casualities in the re- 
 cent battles, and in my judgment all the reinforce- 
 ments of old troops that can possibly be dispensed 
 with around AVashingtou and other places, should 
 be instantly pushed forward by rail to this army. 
 A defeat at this juncture would be ruinous to our 
 cause. I cannot think it possible that the enemy 
 will bring any forces to bear upon Washington 
 till after the question is decided here, but if they 
 should, troops can soon be sent back from this 
 army by rail to reinforce the garrison there. 
 
 The evidence that I have that reinforcements 
 are coming to the rebel army, consists in the facts, 
 that long columns of dust extending from Win- 
 chester to Charlestown, and from Gharlestown jc 
 this direction, and also troops moving this way, 
 were seen last evening. This is corroborated by 
 citizens. Gen. Sumner, with his corps and Wil- 
 liams's (Banks's), occupies Harper's Ferry, and the 
 surrounding heights. I think he will be able to 
 hold his position until reinforcements arrive. 
 G. B. McClellan, Maj-.Gen. 
 
 On the 27tli I made the following report: 
 
 Ileadq's, Army of the Potomac, Sept. 27, 1862. 
 10 A.M- 
 
 Ma!.-Gcn. Ilalleck, Gen.-in-Chief, Washington- 
 All the hiformation in my possession, goes to 
 prove that the main body of the enemy is concen- 
 trated not far from Martinsburg, with some troops 
 at Charlestown, not many in VVinchcster. Their 
 movements of late, have been an extension towards 
 our right, and beyond it. They are receiving re- 
 inforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of 
 conscripts, perhaps entirely so. 
 
 Tiiis army is not now in condition to undertake 
 another campaign, nor to bring on another battle, 
 unless great advantages are offered by some mis- 
 take of the enemy, or pressing military exigencies 
 render it necessary. We are greatly deficient i'. 
 officers. Many of the old regiments are reduc ^ ' 
 to mere skeletons; the new regiments need v.- 
 
vs. 
 
 struction. Not a do-y shuuld be lost in lillmg the 
 old regiments— our main dependence ; and m sup- 
 plying vacancies among the officers by pronu>tion. 
 My present purpose is to hold the army about 
 as it is now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure and 
 watching the river closely, intending to attack tlic 
 enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. 
 
 Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the 
 eacat advantage of a secure dcbouche, but we 
 cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad 
 bridge is finished, because we cannot otherwise 
 supply a greater number of troops than Ave now 
 have on the Virginia side at that point. When 
 the river rises so that the enemy eannot cross in 
 force I purpose concentrating tlie army some- 
 where near Harper's Ferry and there acting ac- 
 cording te oircumstances, viz ; moving on Win- 
 chester, if from the position and attitude of the 
 enemy, we arc likely to gain a great adv.antage by 
 doing so, or else devoting a roasonable time to 
 the organization of the army instri>etion of the 
 new tioops, preparatory to an advance on what- 
 ever line may be determined. In any event I re- 
 gard it as absolutely necessary to send new regi- 
 ments at once to the old corps, for purposes of in- 
 struction, and that the old regiments be fillecl at 
 once. I have no fears as to an attack on Wash- 
 ington by the line of Manassas. Holding Harp- 
 er's Fe.iry as I do. they will not run the risk oi 
 an attack on their flank and rear, while they have 
 tlie garrison of Washington in their front. 
 
 I rather apprehend a renewal of the attemp' 
 on Jfaryland, should the rfver remain low for a 
 great length of time, and should they receive 
 considerable addttion to their force. 
 ^ I woukl be glad to have Peck's division as soon 
 as possible. I am sin-prised that Sigel's men 
 should have been sent to Western Virginia, with- 
 - out my knowledge. The last I oeard from you 
 on the subjecr, was, that they were at my dispo- 
 sition. In »the last battles, the enemy was un- 
 doubtedly greatly superior +<:> us in number, and 
 it was only by very hare fighting that we gained 
 the advantages we did. As it was the result at 
 one period was very doubtful, and we had all we 
 could to win the day. If the enemy receives con- 
 siderable reinforcements, and we none, it is possi- 
 ble that I may have too much on my hands in the 
 next battle. 
 
 ]\Iy own view of the proper policy to be pur- 
 sued, is, to retain in Washington merely the force 
 nece.?sary to garrison it, and to send everything 
 else available to reinforce this army. The rail- 
 ways give us the means of promptly reinforcing 
 Washuigton. should it become necessary. If I 
 am r inforced as I ask, and am allowed to take my 
 owe course, I will hold myself responsible for 
 the city of Washington. Several persons, recent- 
 ly from Richmond, say that there are no troops 
 there except conscripts, and they few in number. 
 I hope to be able to give you details as to late 
 battles by this evening. I am about starting 
 again fur Harper's Ferry, 
 
 Ot. D. McCi.i-:i.i.A.v. Maj-Gen. Comd'g. 
 REORGANIZATION AND HUl'l'LTES- 
 The work of reorganizing, drilling, and Br.]>- 
 plying the army I began at the earliest momee.t. 
 The different corps were etationed along the riv- 
 
 er in the l.^'si pvtiiu.iutH cu covei- ana guaraihe 
 fords. The greul exleiil ot ihe river front, tron> 
 near WashingUm to Cmabcrland, (some one liuii- 
 drcd and litly miles), together with the hn« ot 
 the Eullimoro and Uhio Ilaihoad was to bo care- 
 fully watched and guarded, to prevent, if possi- 
 ble tho enemy's rayls. Reconnqissanccs upon 
 the' Virginia side of the river, for the purpose oi 
 learning the enemy's positions and movements, 
 were mado frequentlv, so that our cavalry, which, 
 from the time we left Wasliington, had perform 
 ed the most laborious service, and had from the 
 commeucement been deficient in numbers, was 
 found totally Inadequate to tne requirements ot 
 the army. , ^, , 
 
 This overwork had broken down the greater 
 part of the horses, disease had appeared among 
 them, and but a very small portion of our or.gi 
 nal cavalry force was fit for service. 
 
 To such an extent had this arm become reduced 
 that when Gsd. Stucfi't made his raid into rennsyl- 
 vania, on the 12th of October with 2,000 men, 1 
 could only mount 800 men to follow him. 
 
 Harper's Fer.Ty was occupied on the 22d, and 
 in order to prevent a catastrophe similar to the 
 one which had happened to Col. :Milcs, I iinmedi- 
 ately ordered Maryland. Bolivar, and London 
 Heights to bo strongly lortified. This was dona 
 as far as the time and mefcs at our disposal per- 
 mitted. ,1 • J- 
 
 The main army of the enemy during this timo 
 remained in the vicinity of Martlnsburg and 
 Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and 
 coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks, 
 forcibly takng their property where it was not 
 voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroy- 
 ing railroads. , 
 
 On the first day of October, His Excellency the 
 President, honored the army of the Potomac with 
 a visit, and remained several days, during which 
 he went through the different encampments re- 
 viewed the troops, and went over the battle-fields 
 of Pouth Mountain and Antietam. I had the op- 
 portunity during this visit to describe to htm tiio 
 operations of the army since the time it lelt 
 Washington, and gave him my reasons for not 
 following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac. 
 On the 5th of October the division of General 
 Cox (about 5,000 men,) was ordered from my 
 command to Western Virginia. . 
 
 On the 7tli of October I received the following 
 
 telegram : ^y^g|^ij,gtoj,_ d. q., Oct. G, 1862. 
 
 Mai -Gen. McClehan:— I am instructed to tele- 
 graph you as follows : The President directs that 
 you cross the Potomac and give battle to tlio 
 enemy, or drive him south. Your army must 
 move now, while the roads are good. If you 
 cross the river between the enemy and Washing- 
 ton and cover the latter by your operations, yon 
 can' be reinforced wiUi 30,000 men. If you move 
 up tlie valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 
 12 000 or 15,000 can be* yit to you. The Presi- 
 dent advises the interior nne between Washington 
 and tho enemy, but does not order it. He is vciy 
 desirous that your army move as soon as pos!?il)l('. 
 You will immediately report what lino you adi..pt, 
 and when vou intend to cross the river. Also, ru 
 
124 
 
 what point the reinforcementa are to be sent It 
 is necessary that the plan of your o|ieruiiuns be 
 positively determined on before orders are given 
 for building bridges and repairing railroads. I 
 »m directed to add, that the Secretary of War and 
 the Geiieral-in-chief fully concur ivith the i'rcdi- 
 dont in these instructions. ^ 
 
 II W. H., General-in-Chief. 
 At this time Gen. Avcrell, with the greater part 
 of our efficient cavalry, was in the vicinity of 
 Cumberland, and Gen. Kelly, the commanding 
 pfficer, liad that day reported that a large force 
 of the enemy was advancing on Col. Campbell at 
 St. John's Run. This obliged me to order Gen. 
 Averill to proceed with his force to the support 
 of Col. Campbell, which delayed his return to the 
 army for several daj's. 
 
 On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the river 
 at McCoy's Ferry, with 2,000 cavalry and a bat- 
 tery of horse artillery, on his raid into Maryland 
 and Pennsylvania, making it iTecessary to use all 
 our cavalry against him. This exhausting ser- 
 vice completely broke down nearly all of our 
 cavalry horses, and rendered a remount absolutely 
 indispensable, before we could advance on the 
 Bnemy. 
 
 The following were the dispositions of troops 
 made by me to defeat the purposes of this raid. 
 
 Gen. Averell, then at Green Spring, on the 
 Upper Potomac, was ordered to move rapidly 
 iown upon the north side of the river, with all 
 [lis disposable cavalr}', using every exertion to 
 jet upon the trail of the enemy and follow it up 
 rigorously. 
 
 Gen. Pleasonton, with the remaining cavalry 
 force, was ordered to take the road by Cavetown, 
 Earmon'a Gap, and Mcchanicsville, and cut off 
 he retreat of the enemy, should he niake for any 
 )f the fords below the position of the main army. 
 His orders were to pursue them with the utniost 
 •apidity, not to spare his men or horses, and to 
 iestroy or capture them if possible. 
 
 Gen. Crook, at that time commanding Cox's 
 livision at Hancock, en route for Western Vir- 
 ginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in cars, 
 ind remain in readiness to move to any point 
 ibove, should the enemy return in that di- 
 •ection, keeping his scouts well out on all the 
 .-oads leading from the direction of Chambers- 
 burg to the Upper Potomac. 
 
 The other commanders between Hancock and 
 [larpcr's Ferry were instructed to keep a vigi- 
 ant watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to 
 prevent the escape of the rebels within these 
 limits. 
 
 Gen. Burnslde was ordered to send two bri- 
 gades to the ilonocacy crossing, there to remain 
 in cars, with steam up, ready to move to any 
 point on tlio railroad to which Stuart might be 
 aiming. AV'hile Col. Rush, at Frederick, was di- 
 rected to keep his lancers scouting on the ap- 
 proaches from Chiuubersbiiv?, so aa to give timclv 
 notic-o to the comniavido^T the two brigades at 
 the MoiiO'Mcy crossing. 
 
 C«;-n. Soii'iaan, whoso head-quarters wer': then 
 at I'oolrsvillo, occupying wuh hi" division the dif- 
 ferojit f'irdd on the river btlow the mouth of tlis 
 Monocacy. was directed to keep hia cavalry v/cll 
 
 out on the approaches from the direction of 
 
 Frederick, so as to give him time to mass hi« 
 troops at any point where the enemy might at- 
 temjit to^ cross the Potomac in his vicinity. Ho 
 was informed of Gen. iieasontons movements. 
 
 Aticr the orders weiu given for covering all 
 the fords upon the river, 1 did not think it pos- 
 sible for Stuart to recross, and I believed that tho 
 capture or destruction of his entire force was 
 perfectly certain, but owing to the fact that my 
 orders were not in all cases carried out as I ex- 
 pected, he effected his escai^c into Virginia with- 
 out much loss. 
 
 Tiie troops sent by Gen. Burnside to the Mono- 
 cacy, owing to some neglect in not giving the ne- 
 cessary orders to the commander, instead of re- 
 maining at the railroad crossing as I directed, 
 marched four miles into Frederick, and there re- 
 maiued.'until after Stuart had passed the railroad 
 only six miles below, near which point it was 
 said he halted. for breakfast. 
 
 Gen. Pleasonton ascertained, after his arrival 
 at ^lechanicstown, that the enemy v/ere only 
 about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty re- 
 treat towards the mouth of the Monocacy. He 
 pushed on vigorously, and near to its mouth over- 
 took them with a part of his force, having march- 
 ed seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours, and 
 hiving left many of his horses broken down upon 
 the road. He at once attacked Avith his artillery, 
 and the firing continued for several hours, during 
 which time, he states that he received the sup- 
 port of a small portion of Gen. Stonen)an's com- 
 mand, not sufScient to inflict any material damage 
 upon the enemy. > 
 
 Gen. Stout^nan reports, that in accordance with 
 his instructions, he gave all necessary orders for 
 intercepting the return of the rebels, and Col. 
 Staples, commanding one of the brigades, states 
 that he sent two regiments of infantry to the 
 mouth of tho Monocacy, and one regiment to 
 White's Ford. Tiiat on tlic morning of the 12th, 
 about 10 o'clock he, by Gen. Stoneman's order, 
 inarched the remaining three regiments of his 
 command from Poolesvire towards the mouth of 
 the Monocacy ; that before getting into action, 
 he was relieved by Gen. Ward, who states that 
 he reported to Gen. Pleasonton with his command 
 while the enemy was crossing the river, and was 
 informed by him (Gen. Pleasonton) that he was 
 too late, and that nothing could be done then. 
 
 Gen. Pleasonton, in his report of this affair, 
 says : 
 
 " It was at this time that Col. Ward reported 
 to me from Gen. Stoneman's division, with a bri- 
 gade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry,- and a sec- 
 tion of artillery. I told him that his command 
 could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed 
 the river. These are the only troops th.at I knew 
 of, that were in that vicinity, and this was tho 
 first intimation that I received that any troops 
 v/ere cjidcavoring to assist me in capturing tho 
 rebels. I suco'-ided in prevcntiiig the enemy 
 from cios!.-;i;i;; at tho- month -'f t;if ^I'mocacy. and 
 drove liim to Whirl's F<>rd. tlui-*; mih.-s i-d.iw. 
 Had AVhitc's Fov.l br-oii oc^.-n'.iod by i.nv f..rpc of 
 ours previous to tli-' ti.n^c .-f liio •>,;'>np:iii(ii! by ilie 
 enemy, the capture of Stuarfd vviiolo iurco uo'iIJ 
 
125 
 
 have be«a certain and inevitable ; but with my 
 small force, ^vllich did not exceed one-fourth of 
 the enemy's it was not practicable for nie to 
 occupy that ford, while the enemy was in front." 
 
 It would seem from the report of Gen. Stone- 
 man that the disposition he made of his troops 
 previous to the arrival of Stuart, was a good one. 
 He sUitioned two regiments at the mouth of the 
 Mouocacy, and two regiments at White's Ford, 
 the latter in the very place where the crossing 
 was made, and the former only three miles off, 
 with a reserve of three regiments at Poolesville, 
 ionio six miles distant. Gen. Plcasonton's report 
 shows that from tlte time the firing commened, 
 untif th& enemy were across the river, was about 
 four and a-half hours. Gen. Stoneraan states, that 
 he started the reserve from Toolesville at about 
 9 o'clock ; but it appears from the report of Gen. 
 Pleasonton, that it did not reach him till half-past 
 one. 
 
 ^ At the time I received the order of October 6th 
 to cross the river and attack the enemy, the ar- 
 my was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large 
 part of our troops were in want of shoes, blank- 
 ets, and other indispensable articles of clothing, 
 notwittistanding all the efforts that had been made 
 since the battle of Autietam, and even prior to 
 that date, to refit the army with clothing as well 
 as horses! I at once consulted with Col. Ingalls, 
 the chief quartermaster, who believed that the 
 necessary articles could be supplied in about 
 three days. Orders were immediately issued to 
 the different commanders who had not already 
 Bent in their requisitions, to do so at once, and all 
 the necessary steps were forthwith taken by me 
 to insure a prompt delivery of the supplies. The 
 requisitions were forwarded to the proper de- 
 partment at Washington, and I expected that the 
 articles would reach our depots during the three 
 days specified ; but day after day elapsed, and on- 
 ly a small portion of the clothing arrived. Corps 
 commanders, upon receiving notice from the 
 quartermasters that they might expect to receive 
 their supplies at certain dates, sent their trains 
 for tliem, which after waiting, were conopelled to 
 return empty. Several instances occurred Avhere 
 these trains went back and forth, from the camp 
 to the depots, as often as four or five different 
 times, without receiving their supplies; and I 
 was informed by one corps commander, that his 
 wagon train had travelled over l.oO miles, to and 
 from the depots, before he succeeded in obtain- 
 ing his clothing. 
 
 The corps of Gen. Franklin did not get its 
 clothing until after it had crossed the Potomac, 
 and was moving into Virginia. 
 
 Gsii. Reynold's corps was delayed a day at Ber- 
 lin to com[)lete its supplies, and Gen. Porter only 
 completed his on reaching the vicinity of Harp- 
 sr's Ferry. 
 
 ^I made every exertion in my power, and my 
 quartermaster did the same, to: nave these sup- 
 plies hurried forward rapidly, and I was repeat- 
 edly told that they had filled tlie requisitions at 
 Washington. and that the supplies had been for- 
 warded. Bat they did not come to ns, and of 
 course were inaccessible to the army. I did not 
 fail to tnake frequent representations of this con- 
 
 dition of things to the General-in chiet.and it ap- 
 pears that he referred the matter to the quarter- 
 master-general, who constantly rei)licd tliat the 
 supplies had been promptly ordered : notwith- 
 standing this they did not reach our depots. 
 
 The following extracts are from telegrams up- 
 on this subject. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, October 
 11,1 §62 
 .\[aj-Geu. Ilalleck, General.in-cliief, Washington: 
 
 . . . " We have been making every effort to 
 get supplies of clothing for this army, and Col. 
 ingalls has received advices that it has been for- 
 warded by railroad, but owing to bad manage- 
 ment on the roads, or from some other cause, it 
 comes in very slowly, and it will take a much 
 longer time than was anticipated, to get articles 
 that are absolutely indispensable to the army, un- 
 less the railroad !j4anagers forward supplies more 
 rapidly." G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac, October 
 11, 1862. 
 
 Maj-Gen. H. W. H — "I am compelled agam to 
 call yonr attention to the great deficiency pf shoes 
 aiid'other indispensable articles of clothing that 
 still exist in some of the corps of this army. 
 Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, 
 who based his calculations upon information re- 
 ceived from W^ishington, that clothing would be 
 forwarded at certain times, corps connnanders 
 sent then- wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's 
 Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and 
 has not yet arrived. Unless some measures are 
 taken to insure the prompt forwarding of these 
 supplies, there will necessarily be a correspond- 
 ing delay in getting the army ready to move, as 
 the men cannot march without shoes. 
 
 " Every thing has been done that can be dons 
 at these headquarters, to accomplish the desired 
 results." Geo. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 October 15, 7.30 p. m., 1862. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. H.,Gen.-in-Chief : "I am using 
 every possible exertion to get this army ready to 
 move. It was only yesterday that a part of our 
 shoes and clothing^arrived at HagcrstowMi. It is' 
 being issued to the troops as rapidly as possible.' 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 October 1.5, 1862, 7.30 p. m. 
 
 Col. R. Ingulls, care Col. Rucker, Quarter-Mas- 
 ter, Washington: "Gen. Franklin reports that 
 there is by no means as much clotiiing as was called 
 for, at Hagerstown. I think, therefore, you had 
 better have additional supplies, especially of 
 shoes, forwarded to Harper's Ferry as soon as 
 possible." B. B. M., Chief-of-Stalf. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 October 16, 18 ;l'. 
 
 Col. R. Ingalls, Care Col. Rucker, Quarter- Mas- : 
 ter, AVashington : Gen. J.. F. Reynolds just tele- ' 
 graphs as follows : " My quarter-master reports j 
 ?hat there are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knap- \ 
 sacks, at Hagerstown. He was aide to procure ■ 
 only a complete supply of overcoats and pants, i 
 with a few socks, drawers, and coats. Ttiis j 
 leaves many of the men yet without a shoe. My | 
 requisitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes." j 
 
126 
 
 Pleaso pasli the sli;ies aiul etoclilngs up to 
 Harper's Ferry aa fast, as |)OH.sibk'. 
 
 R. 15. M., aiief-of-Stuff. 
 Headquarters, Army of tlie rotoraac, 
 Camp near Kiioxville, Md., Oct. 10, 1862 
 Col. C. G. Sawtelle, Depot Quarter-Master, 
 Washington : You did right in sending clothing 
 to Harper's Ferry. You will not be able to send 
 too much or too quickly. We want blailkets, 
 shoes, canteens, &c., very much. 
 
 R. Ingalls, Lt.-Col. & A. D. C, C. Q, M. 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Knoxville, Md., Oct. 10, 1862. 
 (/apt. Augustus Boyd, Quarter-Master, Philadcl- 
 plra: Shipments to Hagerstown must be made 
 direct through, to avoid the contemptible delays 
 at Harrisburg. If Col. Grossman was ordered to 
 aend clothing, I hope he has sent it, for the sufftr- 
 ing and impatience are excessive. 
 
 R, I., Lt. Col. k A. D. C, C^ief Qr.-Master. 
 Headquarters Army of tlie Potomac. 
 I' Camp near Knoxville, Oct. 13, 1862. 
 
 ' Capt. Geo. II. AVeeks, Depot Quarter-Master, 
 Hagerstown : Has the clothing arrived yet? if 
 not, do yon know where it is ? What clothing 
 was taken by the rebels at Chambersburg ? Did 
 they capture any property that was en route to 
 you ? Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg ? 
 Send an agent over the road to obtain information, 
 »nd hurry un the supplies. Reply at once. 
 R. I., Lt.-Col. & A. D. C. Chief Qr.-Master. 
 Sharpsburg, Oct. 10, 1862. 
 Gen, Ingalls, — I have just returned from Ha- 
 gerstown where I have been for the clothing for 
 this corps. There was nothing there but over- 
 coats, trowsers, and a few uniform coats and 
 socks. There were not any shoes, blankets, shirts 
 or shelter tents. AVill you please tell me where 
 and when the balance can be had ? Shall I send 
 to Harper's Ferry for them to-morrow? The 
 corps surgeon has just made a requisition for 45 
 hospital tents. There are none at Hagerstown. 
 
 Will you please to inform me if I can get them 
 at Harper's Ferry ? 
 
 Fielding Lowry, Capt. and Quartermaster. 
 Hagerstown, Oct. 15, 1862. 
 Col, Ingalls, Quartermaster, — I want at least 
 ten thousand suits of clothing, in addition to 
 what I have received. It should be here now. 
 G. W. Weeks, Acting Quartermaster. 
 Harper's Ferry, Oct. 22-1862. 
 GEn. Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, &c. — We 
 have bootees 12,000 : great coats, 4,000 ; drawers 
 and shirts are gone ; blankets and stockings near- 
 ly so. 15,000 each of these four articles are 
 wanted. Alex. Bliss, 
 
 Captain and Acting Quartermaster. 
 McClellan's Headquarters, Oct. 21, 11 a. m. '62. 
 Captain D. G. Thomas, Military Storekeeper, 
 Washington, — Please send to Capt. Bliss at Harp- 
 er's Ferry 10,000 blankets; 12,000 caps; 5,000 
 overcoats; 10,000 pairs bootees ; 2,000 pairs ar- 
 tillery and cavalry boots ; 15,000 pairs stockings; 
 15,000 pairs drawers ; 15,000 pairs pants. 
 
 The clotliing arrives slowly ; can it not be hur- 
 ried along faster. May I ask you to obtain au- 
 thority for this sliipment. Rufus Ingalls. 
 Lt.-Col. and A. D. C, Cliief Quartermaster. 
 
 Hagerstown, Oot. 30. 
 
 Col. Ixgai.lr, — Clothing has arrived this morn- 
 ing. None taken by rebels. Shall I supply 
 Franklin, and retain portions for Porter and Rey- 
 nolds until called for. G. W. Weeks, 
 Capt. and Ass't Quartermaster. 
 
 The following statement taken from a report of 
 the chief quartermaster with the army, will 
 show what progress was made in supplying the 
 army with clothing, from the 1st of September, 
 to the date of crossing the Potomac on the Slat 
 of October, and that the greater part of the cloth- 
 ing did not reach our depots until after the 15th 
 of October. 
 
 [See next page.] 
 
 Col. Ingalls, chief quartermaster, in his report 
 upon this subject says : 
 
 " There was great delay in receiving our cloth- 
 ing. The orders were promptly given by me, and 
 approved by General Aleigs, but the roads were 
 slow to transport, particularly the Cumberland 
 Valley Road. 
 
 "For instance, clothing ordered to Hagerstown 
 on the 7th October for the corps of Franklin, 
 Porter, and Reynolds, did not arrive there until 
 about the 18th,' and by that time, of course there 
 were increased wants, and changes in the position 
 of troops. 
 
 "The clothing of Sumner arrived in great 
 quantities near the last ot October, almost too lat« 
 for issue, as the army was crossing into Virginia. 
 
 "We finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's Ferry, 
 pai'tly on the cars just arrived, and partly in 
 store." 
 
 The causes of the reduction of our cavalry 
 force have already been recited. The difticultj 
 in getting new supplies from the usual sources 
 led me to apply for aud obtain authority for the 
 cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their 
 own horses. The following are the telegrams 
 and letters on this subject : 
 
 Headquarters, Army oF the Potomac, 
 Oct. 12, 1862, 12.45 p.m. 
 Muj.-Gen. IT., Gen.-in-Chief : 
 
 It is absolutely necessary that some energetic 
 means be taken to supply the cavalry of this ar- 
 my with remount horses. The present rate of 
 supply is 4050 per week for the entire army here 
 and in front of Washington. From this number 
 the artillery draw for their batteries. 
 
 G. B. Mctl, Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 
 The general-in-chief, in a letter to me, dated 
 Washington, D.C., Oct. 14tii, 1862, replies to this 
 dispatch in the following language : 
 
 " I have caused the matters complained of ih 
 3'our telegrams of the 11th and Tith to be inves- 
 tigated." .... 
 
 " In regard to horses, you say that the present 
 rate of supply is only 150 per week for the entire 
 army liere and in front of Washington. I find 
 from the records that the issues for the last six 
 weeks has been 8,754, making an average per 
 week of 1459." 
 
 1050 is the number staled in the origin.al dis- 
 ]iatch now in my possession, and as not only 
 figures were used, but the number was written 
 out in full, I can hardly see how it is possilile for 
 
StMement of Clothing and Equijiaga received at 
 the different Depots of ike Army of the Polo- 
 mac, from the \st of September, 1862, 
 to the ^Ut of October, 1862. 
 
 127 
 
 v 
 
 H 
 c 
 
 0] 
 
 From Sept. 
 Ist to Oct. 
 6th 
 
 From Oct. 
 6th to Oct- 
 15th 
 
 From Oct. 
 15th to 
 Oct. 25th.. 
 
 From Oct. 
 25th to 
 Oct. 31st. . 
 
 Received at 
 the Depots. 
 
 -J 
 -J 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 CO 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 o 
 o 
 
 I—" 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 -J 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 Drawers 
 
 to 
 
 or 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 
 1— ' 
 to 
 
 o 
 o 
 o 
 
 (— ' 
 
 1— ' 
 
 o 
 o 
 o 
 
 o 
 o 
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 Forage Caps 
 
 to 
 
 to 
 
 to 
 
 CO 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 o 
 «^ 
 to 
 
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 o 
 to 
 
 or 
 
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 o 
 o 
 
 Stockings 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 1—' 
 to 
 
 o 
 
 Sack Coats 
 
 ro 
 
 tn 
 O 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 to 
 
 o 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 to 
 
 o 
 o 
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 Cav'y. Jackets 
 
 to 
 oo 
 to 
 
 to 
 
 to 
 
 o 
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 00 
 
 to 
 
 o 
 o 
 o 
 
 »— ' 
 o 
 to 
 to 
 
 Ol 
 
 o 
 
 o 
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 Canteens 
 
 C5 
 
 o 
 
 to 
 to 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 1—' 
 00 
 
 00 
 
 •-a 
 
 00 
 CO 
 
 to 
 
 CJt 
 
 en 
 ti 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 Flannel Shirts 
 
 CO 
 
 to 
 
 00 
 
 oo 
 «o 
 
 to 
 
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 o 
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 c 
 
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 00 
 
 to 
 
 C5 
 
 o 
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 Haversacks 
 
 o 
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 I—" 
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 o 
 
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 Trowsers 
 (.Mounted) 
 
 to 
 to 
 00 
 
 to 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
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 o 
 
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 Boots 
 
 1 to 
 
 i to 
 1— ' 
 
 o 
 
 
 o 
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 CO 
 
 o 
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 1— ' 
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 Shelter Tents 
 
 Co 
 o 
 
 
 00 
 
 CO 
 
 o 
 to 
 
 to 
 
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 Camp Kettles 
 
 
 
 tn 
 
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 o 
 
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 o 
 
 o 
 
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 Mess Pans 
 
 to 
 -J 
 
 o 
 
 
 -J 
 -I 
 
 o 
 
 1—' 
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 o 
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 CO 
 
 yl 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 Overcoats 
 (Foot) 
 
 tTl 
 
 1— ' 
 
 o 
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 tJi 
 
 o 
 
 CJi 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 1— ' 
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 o 
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 -ivtillery 
 Jackets 
 
 cc 
 
 tn 
 
 O 
 
 o 
 
 
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 Blankets 
 
 '-a 
 
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 o 
 
 CO 
 tn 
 
 O 
 
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 00 
 
 1— ' 
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 Overcoats 
 (Mounted) 
 
 
 
 
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 lO 
 
 o 
 
 Felt Hats 
 
 ■f>- 
 
 -1 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 to 
 to 
 
 CJ» 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 I—" 
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 o 
 
 en 
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 <rr> 
 
 Infantry Coats 
 
 ■M 
 
 to 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 to 
 o 
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 o 
 
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 o 
 o 
 
 to 
 o 
 
 <o 
 
 o 
 
 'I'rowsers 
 
 (Foot) 
 
 vO 
 
 
 o 
 
 o 
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 -T 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 to 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 o 
 
 Bootees 
 
 
 
 KS 
 
 to 
 
 to 
 
 
 Knit Shirts 
 
 the telegraphic operator to have made a mistake 
 in the transmission of the message. 
 
 Headquarters Ann}- of tlie Potomac, 
 October 14, 18C2. 7 p. m. 
 Major. -Gen. H. W. II., Commander-in-Chief: 
 Wich my small cavalry force it is impossible for 
 me to watch the line of the Potomac properly, 
 or even make the reconnoissancca that are neces- 
 sary for our movements. This makes it necessary 
 for me to weaken my line very much, by extend- 
 ing the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. 
 Tliis will continue uutil the river rises, and it will 
 be next to impossible to prevent the rebel cavalry 
 raids. My cavalry force, as I urged this morning, 
 should be largely and immediately increased 
 under any hypothesis, whether to guard the 
 river or advance on the enemy, or both. 
 
 Geo. B. MoC.. Major-Gen oral. 
 The following is an extract from the official re- 
 port of Col. Ingalls : 
 
 " Immediately after the battle of Autietara, 
 efforts were made to supply deficiencies in cloth- 
 ing and horses. 
 
 •' Large requisitions were prepared and sent 
 in. The artillery and cavalry required large 
 numbers to cover losses sustained in battJe, on 
 the march, and by diseases. Both of these arms 
 were deficient when they left Washington. 
 
 " A most violent and destuctive disease mnde 
 its appearance at this time, which put nearly 
 4,000 animals out of service. Horses reported 
 perfectly well one day, would be dead lame the 
 next, and it was difficult to foresee where it 
 would end or wdiat number would cover the 
 loss. They were attacked in the hoof and tongue. 
 No one seemed able to account for the appearance 
 of this disease. Animals kept at rest would 
 recover in time, but could not be icorked. I made 
 application to send West and purchase horses at 
 once, but it was refused on the ground that the 
 outstanding contracts provided for enough ; but 
 tliey were not delivered siifficienthf fast, nor in 
 sufficient numbers, until late in October and early 
 in November. I was authorised to buy 2,500 
 lato in October but the delivery was not com- 
 pleted until late in November, after we had reach- 
 ed Warrenton." 
 
 In a letter from Gen. Meigs, written on the 
 14th of October, and addressed to the general-in- 
 chicf, it is stated, "There have been issued, 
 therefore, to the army of the Potomac, since the 
 battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 
 9,254." 
 
 What number of horses were sent to General 
 Pope before his return to Washington, I have no 
 means of determining, but the following state- 
 ments, made upon my order by the chief quarter- 
 master witli the army, and who had means for 
 gaining accurate information, forces upon my 
 mind the conclusion that the quarter-master-gcn- 
 eral was in error : 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 
 0. Q. M., Office, October 31, 1862. # 
 llorscs. 
 Horses purchased since 6th Sept. 1862, by 
 
 Col. Ingalls, Chief Quarter-master, and 
 
 issued to the forces under the immc- 
 
 ditite command of Major-General Goo. B. 
 
 McClcilan 1,200 
 
128 
 
 IsRiied aiul turned out to the above force 
 by Cai^t. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter- 
 master (in Wasliington) ----- 2,261 
 iBSuod to forces at and near Washingion, 
 
 wliieli have since joined this command 3o2 
 Totalpurchased by Col. Ingalls, and issued 
 and turned over by Capt. Dana to the ^ 
 forces in tliis immediate connnand - - 3.L13 
 Issued by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quar- 
 ter-master, t) the forces in the vicunty 
 
 of Washii gto'i • , - 3,363 
 
 Grand total purchased by Col. R. Ingalls, 
 Chief Quarter-master, and issued and 
 ' turned over .by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assis- 
 tant Quarter-master, to the entire ariny 
 of the rotomac and the forces around ^ ^ 
 Washhi-ton ..------- (,li 6 
 
 About 3,000 horses have been turned over to 
 the quarter-master department by ofliccrs, as un- 
 fit for service. Nearly 1,500 should now be 
 turned over also, behig worn out and diseased. 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 F. j\I., Lt.-Col. & Quarter-master. 
 This official statement made up from the re- 
 ports of the quarter-masters who received and 
 distributed the horses, exhilnts the true state of 
 the case, and gives the total nimiber of horses 
 received by the army of the Potomac and the 
 troops around Washington, during a period of 
 eio-ht weeks, as 7,176, or 2,078 less than the num- 
 biTr stated by the qnarter-master-general. 
 
 Supposing that (1,500) fifteen- hundred were 
 issued to the army under Gen. Pope previous to 
 its return to Washington, as Gen. ileigs states, 
 there would still remain (578) five hundred and 
 eeventy-eight horses which he does not account 
 
 The letter of the gcneral-in-chief to the Secre- 
 tary of War, on the 28th of October, and the let; 
 ter of Gen. Meigs to the general in-chief, on the 
 14th of October, convey the impression that, upon 
 my urgent and repeated applications for cavalry 
 and artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, 
 I liad reoeived a much greater number than was 
 really the case. , ,, ^ „ 
 
 It will be seen, from Col. l^Iye* report, that all 
 of the horses alluded to by Gen. Meigs, only 
 (3 813) three thousand eight hvnulred and thirteen 
 came to the army, with which I was ordered to 
 follow and attack the enemy. Of course the re- 
 mahider did not in the slightest degree contribute 
 to the efficiency of the cavalry or artillery of this 
 army with which I was to cross the river, neither 
 did they in the least facilitate any preparations 
 for carrying out the order to advance upon the 
 enemy, as the gcneral-iu-chicf's letter might seem 
 
 to' imply. 
 
 Durin'^ the same period that we were receiving 
 the hordes alluded to, about (3,000) three thou- 
 sand of our old stock were turned into the quar- 
 ter-master's department, and 1,500 more reported 
 as in such condition that they ought to be turned 
 in as unfit for service, thus leaving the active army 
 Gom:^ 700 short of the number required to make 
 good existing deliciencies, to say nothing of pro- 
 vidin<«- remounts for men whose horses had died 
 or been killed during the campaign, and those 
 previously dismounted. 
 
 Notwithstanding all the elforts made to obtam 
 a remount, there were, after d( ducting the force 
 engaged in picketing the river, but about a thou- 
 sand serviceable cavalry horses on the 21st day 
 of October. 
 
 In a letter, dated October 14th, 1862, the gene- 
 ral-in-chief says : " It is also reported to me that 
 the number of' animals with your army in the field 
 is about 31.000. It is believed that your present 
 proportion of cavalry and of animals is much 
 larger than that of any other of our armies." 
 
 What number of animals our other armies had 
 I am not prepared to say, but military men in 
 European armies have been of the opinion that 
 an army to be efficient, while carrying on active 
 operations in the field, should have a cavalry 
 force equal in numbers to from one-sixth to one- 
 fourth of the infantry force. ]\ly cavalry did not 
 amount to one-twentieth part of the army, and 
 hence the necessity of giving every one of my 
 cavalry soldiers a serviceable horse. 
 
 Cavalry may be said to constitute the antennas 
 of an army; It scouts all the roads in front, on 
 the flanks, and in the rear of the advancing 
 columns, and constantly feels the enemy. The 
 amount of labor falling upon this arm during tho 
 Maryland campaign was excessive. To personi 
 not familiar with'the movements of troops, and 
 the amount of transportation required for a large 
 army inarching away from water or railroad com- 
 munications, the number of animals mentioned 
 by the general-in-chief may have appeared unne- 
 cessarily large, but to a military man who takes 
 the trouble to enter into an accurate and detailed 
 computation of the number of pounds of subsist- 
 ance and forage required for such an army as 
 that of the Potomac, it will be seen that the 31,000 
 animals were considerably less than was abso- 
 lutely necessary to an advance. As we were re- 
 quired to move througli a country which could 
 not be depended upon for any of our supplies, it 
 became necessary to transport every thing _ in 
 wagons, and to be prepared for all emergencies. 
 I duLnot consider it safe to leave the river with- 
 out subsistence and forage for ten days. 
 
 The official returns of that date show the aggre- 
 <-ate strength of the army for duty to have been 
 about 110,000 men of all arms. This did not in- 
 clude teamsters, citizen employees, officers ser- 
 vants &c., amounting to some 12,000 men, which 
 cvives' a total of 122,000 men. The subsistence 
 alone of this armv, for ten days, required for its 
 transportation 1,830 wagons at 2,000 pounds to 
 the waijon, and 10,980 animals. 
 
 Our cavalry horses, at that time, amounted to 
 5 046 and our artillery horses to 6,836. 
 
 ' To transp(u-t full forage for these 22 8G2 ani- 
 mals for ten days required 17,832 additional ani- 
 mals, and this forage would only supply the en- 
 tire number, (40,694) of annuals with a RmaL 
 fraction over half allowance for the time spcci- 
 
 ^It will be observed that this estimate does not 
 embrace the animals necessary to transport quar- 
 termaster's supplies, baggage, camp-eqnipage, 
 ambulances, reserve ammunition, forage tor olU- 
 cer's horses, etc. etc, which would grearly aug- 
 ment the nocessixry transportatioiv 
 
V 
 
 1-29 
 
 It rnaj very truly bo said that we did iiiaku the 
 marcl) witii the means at our disposal, but it will 
 be reinoinl5ered that wc met with no serious op- 
 position from t!iG. enemy, neither did we encoun- 
 t-sr delays fi-qm a,!!}- other cause. The roads were 
 in excellent condition, and tlie ti-oops marched 
 with the most commendable order and celerity. 
 
 If we. had met. with a determined resistance 
 from the enem^', and onr progress had been very 
 much retarded tl\ereby, we would have constnned 
 our supplies before ihey could have been renewed. 
 A proper estimate of my responsibilities as the 
 commander of that army did not justily me in 
 basinjj my preparations for the exhibiHon npon 
 the supposition tliat 1 was to have an'uninterrupt- 
 ed march. On the contrary it was mj'' duty to 
 be prepared for all emergencies, and not the least 
 important of my responsibilities was tlie duty of 
 making ample provision for supplying men and 
 animals with rations and forage. 
 
 Knowing the solicitude of the President for an 
 early movement, and sharing with him fnlly his 
 anxiety for prompt action, on the 21st of Octo- 
 ber I telegraplied to the General-in-chief as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 Headqnarte.ts, Armv of the Potomac, October 
 21,1862. 
 
 iftij-Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, 
 Washington. — Since tlie receipt of the President's 
 order to move on the enemy, I have been making 
 every exertion to get this army supplied with 
 clothing absolutely necessary for marcinnfr. This 
 I am happy to say, is now nearly accomplished ; 
 I have also, during the same time repeatedly' urged 
 upon 3'on the importance of supplying cavalry 
 and artillery horses, to replace those broken down 
 by hard service, and steps ha,vo been taken to in- 
 sure a prompt delivery. Oar cavalry, even when 
 well suppled with horses, is much inferior in 
 numbers to that of the enemy ; but in efficiency 
 has proved itself superior. So forcibly has tliis 
 been impressed upon our old regiments by repeat- 
 ed successes, that the men are full}' 'persuaded 
 tiitt they are equal to twice tUeir number oi reb- 
 el cavalry. 
 
 Exclusive of tht> cavalry force now engaged in 
 picketing Ihc river, I have not at present over 
 about cue tliousand horses for service. Officers 
 have been sent in various directions to pui'chase 
 liorsea, and I expcoi liiem soon. Without more 
 cavalry horses our communications, from the mo- 
 ment we march, would be at the mei'cy of the 
 large cavalry forces of the enemy, and it would 
 not be possible for us to cover our flaid^s proper- 
 ly, or to obtain the necessary information of the 
 position and movements of the enemy in such a 
 way as to insure success. Jfy experience has 
 shown the necessity of a large and efficient cav- 
 alry force. Under the foregoing circumstances I 
 beg leave to ask whether the President desires 
 me to march on the enemy at o'nce, or to await 
 the reception of the new horses, every possible 
 step having been taken to insure their prompt 
 arrival. G. B. McClellan, Maj-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 On the same day Gen. Ilalleck replied as fol- 
 lows : ^ 
 WashingUm. Oct. 21, 1862. 3 p. ji. 
 
 Your telegraph of 12 m. has been submitted to 
 
 the President. He directs me to say.'thst he naa 
 no change to make in his order of tlio 6th inst. 
 If you have not been, and are not now in condi- 
 tion to obey it, you Avill be able to show such 
 want of ability. The President does not expect 
 impossibilities ; but he is very anxiou-? that all 
 this good weather should not be wasted in iiiao 
 tivity. 
 
 Telegraph when you will move, and on what 
 linos you propose to march. 
 
 H. \V. IL, Gen.-in-Chief. 
 }Iaj--Gen. G. B. JtcClellan. ^ * 
 
 From the tenor of th'.g dispatch I conceived 
 that it was left for mj' judgment to decide • 
 whether or not it was possible to move witli 
 safety to the army at that time, and this respou- 
 sibility I exercised with the more confidence ill 
 view of the strong assurances of his trust in rhd 
 as commander of that army, with which the 
 President had seen fit to honor me during his last 
 vielt. ■ '"' • ■ - 
 
 ■ The cavalry requirements -syithout which an 
 advance would have been in the highest degrco 
 injudicious and unsafe, were still wanting. 
 
 The country before us was an enemy's country, 
 where the inhabitants fi^-iiished to the enemy 
 every possible assistance, providing food for men 
 and forage for animals, giving All information con- 
 cerning our movements, and rendering every aid 
 in their power to the enemy's cause.. ' ; '• • ' 
 
 It was manifest that we should find- it, as we' 
 subsequently did, a hostile district, where avo 
 could derive no aid from tlie inhabitants that 
 would justify dispensing with the active co-opera- ' 
 tion of an efficient cavalry force. AccordingI)', I 
 fixed upon the 1st of November as the earliest \ 
 date at which the forward movement could well 
 be commenced. • 
 
 The general-in-chief, in a letter lo.the-Secrefary 
 of War on the 28th of October, says: "In my 
 opinion there has been no sucli want of supplies 
 in the army under Gen. McCkdlan, as to prevent 
 his compliance with the orders to ad vancfe against 
 the enemy." . 
 
 Notwithstandinp- this opinion expressed by 
 such high authority', I am compelled to S;)y again 
 that tlie delay in the reception of necessary sup- 
 plies up to that date, had left the aimy in a con- 
 dition totally unfit to a^lvance against the enemy j 
 that an advance under the existing circumstances 
 would, in my judgment, have been attended with 
 the highest degree of peril, with great sutTcring 
 and sickness among the men, and with iirmiincnt 
 danger of being cutoff from our supplies l)y the 
 superior' cavalry force of the enemy, and with no 
 reasonable prospect of gaining any advantage 
 oyer him. 
 
 I dismiss this subject with the remark, that I 
 have .fou'iid it imjiossiblc to resist the force of 
 my own convictions, that the commander of an 
 army, who, from the time of its organization, has 
 for eighteen months been inconstant coinnuuiica- 
 tion with its ofliccrs and men, the greater part of 
 the time engaged in active service in the fieUl, 
 and who has exercised this command in manv 
 battles, must certainly be considered coinpefcii't 
 to determine whether his ami}' is in ])roper con- 
 dition to advance ou the enemy or not ; and he 
 
130 
 
 aanst necoesarily possess greater facilities for 
 forming a correct judgment in regard to the wants 
 of Ills men, and the condition of his supplies, 
 tlian the general-in-chief in his oflice at Washing- 
 ton City. 
 I ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. #• 
 
 The movement from Washington into Maryland, 
 ■which culminated in the battles of South Moun- 
 tain and Antietam, was not apart of an offensive 
 campaign, with the object of the invasion of the 
 enemy's territory, and an attacli upon his capital, 
 but was defensive in its purposes, although often- 
 sive in its character, and would be tcchnlLally 
 called a " defensive-offensive campaign." 
 
 It was undertaken at a time when our army 
 had experienced severe defeats, riiid its object was 
 to preserve the national capital and Baltimore, 
 to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and to 
 drive the enemy out of Maryland. These pur- 
 poses were fully and finall}'' accomplished b}' the 
 tattle of Antietam, which brought the army of 
 the Potomac into Avliat might be termed an acci- 
 dental position on the upper Potomac. 
 
 Having gained the immediate object of the 
 campaign, the first thing to be done was to insure 
 Maryland from a return of the enemy ; the second, 
 to prepare our own armjr, exhausted by a series 
 of severe battles, destitute to a great e-xtent of 
 supplies, and very deficient in artillery and cav- 
 alry horses, for a definite offensive movement, 
 and to determine upon the line of operations for 
 a further advance. 
 
 At the time of the battle of Antietam the Poto- 
 jnao was very low, and presented a comparatively 
 weak line of defense, unless watched by large 
 masses of troops. Ths re-occupation of Harper's 
 Perry, and the disposition of troops above that 
 point, rendered the line of the Potx>mac secure 
 against everything except cavalry raids. No time 
 ■was lost in placing the army in proper condition 
 for an advance, and the circumstances which 
 caused the delay after the battle of Antietam have 
 teen fully enumerated elsewhere. 
 
 I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicinity 
 as a proper base of operations for a movement 
 •upon Richmond. I still considered the line of the 
 Peninsula as the true approach, but, for obvious 
 reasons, did not make any proposal to return to it. 
 
 On the 6th of October, as stated above, I Avas 
 ordered by the President, through the general-in- 
 chief, to cross the Potomac and givQ battle to the 
 enemy, or drive him south. Two lines were pre- 
 sented for my choice: 1st. Up the valley of the 
 Shenandoah, in which case I was to have 12,000 
 to 15,000 addi.ional troops : 2d. To cross between 
 the enemy and AVa«hington, that is, east of the 
 Blue Ridge, in which event I was to be reinforced 
 with 30,000 men. 
 
 At first 1 determined to adopt the line of tlic 
 Shenandoah, lor these reasons : The Harper's Fcr- 
 Tj' and Winchester Railroad, and the various turn- 
 pikes converging upon Winchester, afforded su- 
 perior facilities for supplies. 
 
 Our cavalry being weak, this line of communi- 
 cation could be more easily protected. There 
 •was no advantage in interposing, at that time, the 
 Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah between the eue- 
 vay and lu^eelf. 
 
 At the period in question the Potomac was stil 
 very low, and I apprehended that if I crossed the 
 river below Harper's Ferry, the enemy would 
 promptly check the movement by recrossing into 
 Maryland, at the same time covering his rear byoc- 
 cupying in strong force the passes leading thi-ough 
 the Blue Ridge fiom the southest into the She- 
 nandoah Valley. 
 
 I anticipated, as the result of the first course, 
 that Lee would fight me near W^inchester, if he 
 could do so under favorable circumstances ; or 
 else that he would abandon the lower Shenan- 
 doah and leave the army of the Potomac free to 
 act upon some other line of operations. If he 
 abandoned the Shenandoah, he would naturally 
 fall back upon his railway communications. I 
 have since been confii-mcd in the belief, tliat if I 
 had crossed the Potomac below Harper's Ferry in 
 the early part of October, General Lee would have 
 recrossed into jHaryland. 
 
 As above explained, the army was not in condi- 
 tion to move until late in October, and in the mean- 
 time circumstances had changed. 
 
 The period had arrived when a sudden and 
 great rise of the Potomac might be looked for at 
 any time ; the season of bad roads and difiicult 
 movements was ajiproacliing, which woidd natu- 
 rally deter the enemy from exposing himself voa-y 
 far from his base, and his movements all appeared 
 to indicate a falling back from the river towards 
 his supplies. Under these circumstances 1 felt at 
 liberty to disregard the posibility of the enemy 
 recrossing the Potomac, and determined to select 
 the line cast of the Blue Ridge, feeling convinced 
 that it would secure me the largest accession of 
 force, and the most cordial support of the Presi- 
 dent, whose views from the beginning were in 
 favor of that line. 
 
 The subject of the defense of the line of the 
 upper Potomac, after the advance of the main 
 army, had long occupied my attention ; I desired 
 to place Har]>er's Ferry and its dependencies in a 
 strong state of defense, and frequently addressed 
 the general-in-cliief upon the subject of the erec- 
 tion of field-works and permanent bridges there, 
 asking for the funds necessary to accomplish the 
 purpose. Alth-ougli I did my best to explain as 
 clearly as I was able that I did not wish to erect 
 permanent works of masonr3',and that neither the 
 works nor the ijermanent bridges had any refer- 
 ence to the advance of the army, but solely to the 
 permanent occupation of Harper's Ferry, I could 
 never make the General-in-chief understand my 
 wishes, but was refused the fuiids necessary to 
 erect the field-works, on the ground that there 
 was no appropriation for the erection of perma- 
 nent fortifications; and was not allowed to build 
 the pcrmaneid. bridge on the ground that the main 
 army could not be delayed in its movements until 
 its completion. Of course I never thought of de- 
 laying the advance of the army for that purpose, 
 •end so stated repeatedly. 
 
 On the 25th of October I sent the General-in- 
 chief the following telegram; 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, October, 
 25, 1862. 10.45 p. m. 
 
 Maj-Gen. Halleek, General in chief, Washing- 
 ton, — As the moment is at hand for the advance 
 
131 
 
 of the army, a qiiestjon arises fur the decision of 
 the general in chief; which ;ill:hnngl\ perhaps im- 
 plicitly decided by the IVesfdcntin his letter nl 
 tho 13th, should be clearly presented ijy me, as I 
 do not regard it as in my province to determine 
 it. This question is the extent to wliich the line 
 of the Potomae should be guarded, after the ar- 
 ray leaves, in order to cover Maryland and Penn- 
 sylvania, from invasion by large or small parties 
 of the enemy. It will always be somewhat difticult 
 to guard tlie immediate line of the river, owing 
 to its great extent and the numerous passages 
 which exist. It has long appeared to me that the 
 best way of covering this line would be by occu- 
 pying Front pLoyal, Strasburg. Wardensville and 
 .Moretields, at the debouches of the several val- 
 'eys in which they are situated. These points, 
 or suitable places iji their vicinity, should be 
 strongly inti-enched and permanently held ; and 
 great advantage of this arrangement would be 
 tlie covering the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, 
 and an essential part of the system would be the 
 construction of tlie link of railway from Win- 
 chester to Strasburg, aud the rebuilding of the 
 Manassas Gap Railway bridge over the Shenan- 
 doah. 
 
 The intreuchmcnt of Manassas Junction would 
 complete the system for the defense of the ap- 
 proaches to Washington and the Upper Potomac. 
 Many months ago I recommended this arrange- 
 ment, in fact gave orders for it to be carried into 
 effect. I still regard it as essential under all cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 The views of the chief engineer of this army 
 in regard to the defenses and garrison of Harp- 
 er's Ferry and its dependencies are in your pos- 
 session. 
 
 The only troops under my command outside of 
 the organization of the army of the Potomac, are 
 the Maryland Brigade, nnder Gen. Kenly, the 
 64:th Pennsylvania, Col. Voss ; 12th Illinois Cav- 
 alry, and Col. Davis's 8th New York cavalry ; to- 
 tal, 2,894 infantry, one battery, and about 900 
 cavalry men. There are also two of my regi- 
 ments of cavalry, (about 650 men) guarding the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, between Hancock 
 and Cumberland. 
 
 As I have no department, and command simply 
 an active army in tho field, my responsibility for 
 the safety of the line of the Potomac and the 
 States north of it, must terminate the moment I 
 advance sofarbej'ond that; line as to adopt anoth- 
 er for my base of operations. The question for 
 the general in chief to decide, and which I ie- 
 gai'd as beyond ni}' province, is this : 
 
 1st. Shall the p-.ifety of Harper's Ferry, and the 
 line of the Potouitic, be regarded as assured by 
 the advance of the army south of the Blue Ridge 
 and the line left to take care of itself ? 
 
 2d. If it is deemeed necessary to hold the line 
 or that hereinbefore indicated in advance of it, 
 how many troops shall be p aced there, at what 
 points, and in wiia>, numbers, and of what compo- 
 fiition at each, and whence shall they be supplied, 
 i. e. from this aamy or from other sources ? 
 
 Omitting the detached troops mentioned above, 
 and the small garrisons of Hoonsboro and Fred- 
 erick, the last returns shww the sti-ength of tliis 
 
 army for duty, to be about i->ne hunilrcd a.id six- 
 ti'on thou,-aiid oilioers and men. This ir. eludes 
 the ilivisions of Stoneman and Whipple, but does 
 not include Heiutzelman, Sigel and Bayurd. 
 
 If Harper's Ferry and the river above are ren- 
 dered fully secure, it is possible tiiat the active 
 army, if it sppplies the garrisons, may be reduced 
 so much as to be inadequate to the purposes con- 
 templated ; if is is preserved intact, Marylan.d, 
 Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore ;uid Ohio" Rail- 
 road may be unduly exposed. 
 
 1 leave the decision ol thi-se grave questions to 
 the general in chief. 1 know notning of the num- 
 ber of troops in Baltimore, &c. 
 
 .•in important element in the solution of this 
 problem, is the fact that a great portion of Bragg'a 
 army is probably now at hberty to unite itself 
 with Lee's command. 
 
 I commence crossing the river at Berlin in the 
 morning, and must ask a prompt decision of thci 
 questions proposed herein. 
 
 G. B. McC, Maj.-Gen. Cora, 
 
 To which I received tho following reply : 
 
 Washington, Oct. 26, "02, 1.35i'.si. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. iMcC : 
 
 In addition to the command which you had 
 when I came here, you also have the greater part 
 of that of Maj.-Gen. Pope, iloreover, yf)U have 
 been authorized to use any troops within your 
 reach in Gen. Wool's department, and in Western 
 Virginia. Gen. Banks's conmiand is also u)»der 
 your direction, with the single restriction, that 
 he is not to remove troops from Washington, im- 
 til he has notilied me of his orders. Since j'ou 
 left Washington, I have advised and suggested 
 in I'elation to your movements, but I have given 
 you no orders. I do not give you any now. The 
 government has intrusted you with defeating and 
 driving back the rebel army in your front. I 
 shall not attempt to control you in the measures 
 you may adopt for that purpose ; you are inform- 
 ed of my views, but the President has left you at 
 liberty to adopt them or not, as you may deem 
 best. You will also exercise your own discretion 
 ill regard to what points on the Potomac, and the 
 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad are to be occupied 
 or fortified. I will only add that there is no ap 
 propriation for permanent intrenchments on that 
 line. Moreover, I think it will be tune enough 
 to decide upon fortifying Front Ro3'al, Strasburg, 
 Wardenville and Morcfiehl, when tho enemy is 
 driven south of them, and they come into our 
 possession. I do not think that we need have 
 any immediate fear of Bragg's army. You are 
 within 20 miles of Lee's, while Bragg is distant 
 about 400 miles. 
 
 H. W. JL, Gen.-in-Chief. 
 
 And on the 29th I sent the following': 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Oct. 29, 'G2, 1.15 p.,M. 
 
 JLaj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washingtoji : 
 
 On the 25th instant, I sent you a dispatch, re- 
 questing you to decide what stejis should be 
 taken to guard the line of the Potomac, when 
 the army leaves here. To this 1 received your 
 reply, that I had been intrusted by tho President, 
 witli defeating and driving away tho rcbci army, 
 that you had given mo no orders heretofore, did 
 
132 
 
 not i^ive ma anv then, etc. Under tlieso circum- 
 stances, 1 have only to make siich 'arrangements 
 for c-narding this extended line sin the means at 
 mv disposal will }->ermit, at the same lime keep- 
 ing in view the extreme necessity of maintaining 
 the moving army in adequate force to meet the 
 rebel army before ws. 
 
 Tlie dispositions I have ordered are as tollows, 
 viz.: 30,000 men to be left at Harjier's Ferry, one 
 brio-ade of infantry in front of ^larpsburg ; K^n- 
 ly's brigade of infantry at Williarasport ; Kelly s 
 brigade, including Col. CambeU's 54tli Pennsyl- 
 vania Infantry, at Cumberland ; and between tluit 
 poiJit and Hancock I have also, lei t four sraull 
 cavalry regiments, to patrol and watch th« river 
 and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Cum- 
 berland down to Harper's Ferry. 
 
 I do not regard tbis ibroe afi sufficient to cover 
 eecm-ely this "great extent of ''line. 'but I do not 
 feel iustihed in detaching any more troops from 
 my moving cobmms. I would therefore recom- 
 inend tliat some new regiments of infantry and 
 cavalrv be sent t6 strengtlieii the forces left by 
 
 jne. - ' 
 
 There should be a brigade of infantry and sec- 
 tion of artillery m t!ie vicinity of Cherry Run ; 
 anotber brigade at Hancock, an additional brig- 
 ade at Wiliiamsport, one regiment at llagerstown, 
 and one at Cliambersburg, witli a section of artd- 
 leryat each place if possible. This is on the 
 supposition tliat the enemy retain a considerable 
 cavalry force west of the i31ue Ridge. If tliey go 
 east of it, the occupation of the points named m 
 my disptitch of the 25th inst., will obviate the 
 necessity of of keeping many of tliese troops on 
 
 the river. '■,'",'' r' ^ 
 
 There are now several hnndred ofonr wound- 
 ed, including Oen. Richardson, in the vicinity of 
 Sharpsburg, that cannot possibly bo uiovcd at 
 
 ^'^I repeat that ido noi Idok .uiiJofiitbe-forees:! 
 have been able to leave from ihir, ar'my, as sufli- 
 cient to prevent cavalry raids into I.Iaryland and 
 PeTinsylvania, as cavalry is the only det5cripti0Tj 
 of troops adequat^e to this service, and lam, as 
 you are aware, deficient in thi« arm. 
 
 Goo. B. McClellan, Mai.-Gen. Gomd g. 
 
 To wh'Ch I received, on the 30t.h, this reply : 
 Washington, Oct. 30, 1862. 11.30 a.m. 
 
 Mai.-Gen. G. \i McOlellan,— Your- telegram of 
 yesterday wa* received late last evenings Tho 
 troops proposed for Thorough faro Gap will be 
 Bent to thsct piace whenever you are in position 
 for their ooii' ration, as previovisly stated ; but no 
 new rctrlmenfcs can be $entfrom hero t,o the Up-, 
 pp..- Potomac The guarding of tha line is loit 
 tc> your own discretion, with the taoops now un- 
 der your command. . ^„ . „ 
 ^ ^ : n. W. IT. Goh.-iivChicf 
 
 I accordingly loft the 12t}» Corps at Harper's 
 JVM-ry. detatchiti.; one brigade to the vicnnty of 
 SharpHSun.-;. Gen. Mordl waa i)lrtced in com-' 
 mao'l of the bne fron) the mou'.b of the Antiet.;im 
 to CnmVxiriand. (J?n. Slocuin in command of Har- 
 per's Ferry and tho ilnc ea;;t of the mouth ot the 
 Antiotarn. 
 
 Tho orders <;ivcn to tlicsc ofncors vrero as Lol- 
 
 Head-Qnartei-K, Army oi the Potomac, \ 
 
 Oct. 29, 18G2. 1 P.M. f ' 
 
 ; Gen. II. W. Slocum, Comd'g Army Corps, Har ; 
 jier's Ferry, — Tho general commanding directs 
 that you send one brigade of your corps, to march 
 at once to the position now occupied by Gen. R' 
 J. Porter's corps in front of Sharpsburg, to -watck i 
 and guard the line of the river from the ford ne^ir 
 the I'noutbof the Antietam Creek to the month>of 
 the Opequan Creek. The officer in command will 
 also take steps to afford proper protection to the 
 sick and wounded in the hospitals 'n the vicinity 
 of Shar))sburg and Bcyonsborc The regiment 
 now at Boonsboro' will be placed under bis or- 
 ders. Gen. Kcnly,at Wiliiamsport, will guard the 
 river from the mouth of the Opequan above, in- 
 chnling the ford at;the moutlr of the Opequan. 
 
 The"commandirg general also directs that you 
 take immediate steins to establish tho remainder 
 (if'yonr coriisas follows, viz., one brigade on Mary- 
 land Heights, one brigade on Lomion lieights,with . 
 the remainder on Bohvar Heights -.nd at Harper's 
 Ferry... These dis])ositions should" be jnade at 
 once, so that Gen. Corrch can move with his corps. 
 Please acknowledge receipt of this. 
 
 R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staff. 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, ). 
 October 31, 1862. ) 
 
 Gen. G. W. :N[orell, Comd'g Upper Potomac. . 
 General,— I am instructed by the commanding 
 general to say to you, that he has selected you to 
 perform the highly inqjortant and responsible 
 duty of taking charge of, and commanding the 
 troops left for tho defence of the line of the Po- 
 tomac River, from the mouth of the Antietam to 
 Cumberland, as well as any other troops that may 
 hereafter be sent for tho yuotection of tho JMary- 
 land and Pennsylvania frontier, within tho limits 
 of the line herein specified. The force which has 
 been left to guard the line, is not deemed ade^ 
 qnute to prevent cavalry raids, but it is all that 
 tlie commanding general feels authorized to de- 
 tach iVom the army of the Potomac at the present 
 tune, and it devolves upon you to make the best 
 use of this force in your power.. Tou wi^l have 
 foiu- cavalry regiments under your command, 
 wliicb should be distribvded along the river, as 
 to watch all the available fords, and give timely 
 notice to thb infantry or tlie approach or any force 
 of rebels., i.- ■ !■ . '' ■ , ^ 'i. 
 
 You will afford all the protection m your power 
 TO the Baltimore and Oliio Railroad. 
 . ;Y6u will endeavor to prevent any cavalry_raidB 
 uito ilaryland and Pennsvlvania. 
 
 You w"dl take steps to have all the sick and 
 wounded of our army, as well as of the rebel 
 anny,; wi thin vour lines, properly taken care of, 
 until they can be sent to general hospitals, or 
 digohaiged or paroled. 
 
 ■'You will mako your headquarters at llagers- 
 toiwiiy and ocoaisionally viait the different parts of 
 ydnrlLiie.- ;■ '.' ,, .^ z, 
 
 iYou will please report promptly to these 
 hdadqnarters; everything of importance that oc- 
 curs within tho limits of your command. Iho 
 tin Of brigades now at Cumberland. Wiliiamsport, .. 
 and Biiarp-^burgh. iuchiding the Mth IVnnsylvaina.' 
 Voltrnt^'crsncar Cumberland, will be under you^ .k 
 
; On'ais^I^St'Kof October the portiHon • b)-jfl*^' at i 
 Berlin <«i;f c'dnstnicted;' th61-e bciri^ alru\rly ■'ono 
 across the Potomac, 'and anotlior aiT'^tes' the 
 Slicnaiidoali at Harper'.^ Forry^ , • 
 
 Oii (he 26th two divieiote dr'theOtTiCorfisAnd 
 P. leaffdarou's brijji'i'di.' of cnvftliy; 'crtsfeeci a^-Buv- 
 J/ii aiKl occupied Lq>oi,Uvi!rq'. '" ! - '{ ;;■ '.' ■' 
 
 ' T(i<5 lst,'Gth, and"' DtJi rAifps/trje cavaliy'itiiir 
 resp.rve artillery, crds^ed' at Eui-lin, botween the 
 2d!.h of October an iflie LM ()t"N(jT6inb'i:'r. 
 
 The 2d and '5th' r*6rp=?ci-o?,seil at Kaii')er's Fcrrj 
 between the 29t!.- o1 Gclobcr 'and' 1st of Kovcni- 
 
 h^r-, ■■■'",.■; '■::":'■'■'■■::" ]■ ■ : ■ ' _ 
 
 ""■ H^civy-l-aitts'delafed'tK6^' inovemeTit' Cdftsider- 
 ab!y inthe beu:intiiiis, and tlie 1st, oth, and' 6tb 
 Corps were obliged to halt at least one day at tilie 
 crossuigs, to complete, as far as possible, the 
 necessary supplies that conld not be prociu'cclat 
 an earlier period. 
 
 The plan of campai^ I. aidopted, dnr'jng' the 
 advance, iras to move the army -well in hand 
 parallol to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrcnton ^as 
 ilio point of direction for the main body eeis;ng 
 each pass in the Blue Ridge by detachments, as 
 *e approached it, and gnardirig them after t^'c 
 had passed, as long as they -would enable the 
 enemy to tronble onr commnnications with t';c 
 Potomac. It was espected tliat we wonld unite 
 with the 11th Corps and Sickles's division near 
 Thoronghfare Gap. We depended npon Harper's 
 Ferry arid Berlin for supplies, niitil the j\faiiassas 
 Gap Railway was reached ; when that occurred 
 ihe passes in our rear were to be abandoned, and 
 the army massed ready for actfon or movement 
 in a:ny direction. ■ 
 
 It was my intention, if npon readhing Asbby's, 
 or any other pass, I fouiid that the en'emy were 
 in force between it and the Potomac, in the valley 
 :)f the Shenandoah, to move into tlie valley and 
 ondeavor to gain their rear. I hardly boped to 
 ac<;omplish tliis, but did not expect that by strik- 
 ing in between Culpepper Gotu't House and Little. 
 Washington, I could either separate their army 
 ;ind beat them in detail, or else force them to con- 
 •enti-ate as far back as Gordonsville. and thus 
 !)Iace the army of the Potomac in position either 
 ;o adopt the Fredericksburgh line of advance 
 upon Richmond, or to be removed to the Penin- 
 sula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossi- 
 ble to supply it by the. Orange and 'i:lexandna 
 Railroad beyond Culpepper., ' ' 
 
 ^On the 2Vth of October, the remaining divisions 
 of the 9th Corps crossed at Berlin, and Pleason- 
 ton's cavalry advanced to Purcellville. The con- 
 centration of the Gth Corps, delayed somewliat by 
 intelligence as to the movements of the enomy 
 near Hedgesville, &c., was commenced on this, 
 day ; and the 1st Corps was already in motion 
 tor Berlin. 
 
 On the 28tb the 1st Corps and the general 
 headquarters reached Berlin. 
 
 On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and 
 
 • ..•.imped near Lovettsville ; the 2d Corps com- 
 
 •■.'1 the passage of the Shenandoah; the ^i.h 
 
 cinity 
 
 ., . , . , Joona 
 
 omo'.j .fcne SthCorps reauherf Harper's F<irry,one 
 divi.iion ei'o;ssir47t,:io Shenandoah.' .:r:,-i 
 
 . On the Ist; of November the IstCoi-ps moved 
 to -.Purceflvine -and Hann'Uou ; the 2d Corps to 
 y'Q'»dgrOYe ; ili'e.r>t1i Corps to Hiilsborwigh ; th* 
 Grh- Corps reaclrei^ Berlin; one division croBsnig'. 
 PieasoT^ ton's cAv^i'liy ocenpied Philemon t,: having 
 awharpskirmisli tfere, nndatBloomflold. 
 • On NdVember 2d the 2d'Cori)s occupied Snicfe 
 er'a Gap; the Sth Corps Snickers ville : the 6tli 
 Corps crossed the Potoma'c; and encamped near 
 Wlieatland ;*■ the 9th Goi'ps advanced to Bloom- 
 field,. Union, and Philemont. Pieasonton drove 
 the enemy oftt of Union ;■ Averell was ordered f» 
 join Pieasonton. The enemy offered no seriotis 
 resistance to the occupation of Snicker's Gap, 
 but advanced to gain possession of it with a 
 column of some 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, who 
 were driven back by a few rounds from our rifled 
 guns: - , .: : 
 
 On the 3d the 1st Corps moved to Phih^nK. '- 
 jUnion, Blorafield, &c. ; the 2d Corps to t e vl- - 
 tity of Uppcrvillc ; the 5th Corps remaintd ai 
 ■Snicker's Gap ; the Gth Corps moved to Purcell, 
 ville ; the 9th Corps moved tov/ards Upperville, 
 ;Plea3ontan drove the enemy out of Uppervilla 
 after a severe fight. 
 
 ■ On' the 4th the 2d Corps took possession of 
 ■Ashley 's'Gap ; the Gth Corps reached Union : the 
 Oth Corps Upperville ; the cavalry occupied Pied- 
 mont. 
 
 On the 5th the Ist Corps moved to Rectortown 
 and White Plains ; one division of the 2d Corps 
 to the intersection of the Paris and Piedmont with 
 the Upperville-and Barber's road ; the 6th Corps 
 ito t!;c Aldic turnpike, east of Upperville ; the 
 9th Corps beyond the Manassas Road, between 
 Piedmont and Salem, with a bridge at Manassaff 
 Gap ; the cavalry under Averell had a skirmish at 
 Manassas Gap, and the brigade of Pioasontou 
 gained a handsome victory over superior num- 
 bers- at Barber's cross-roads ; Bayard's cavalry 
 had some sharp skirmishing in front of Salem. 
 
 Oh the Gth the 1st Corps advanced to AVarren- 
 jton ; the 2d to Rectortown ; the 5th Corps com- 
 menced its movement from Snicker's Gap to 
 White Plains ; the 9th Corps to Waterloo and 
 jvicinity, on the Rappahannock ; the 11th Corps 
 was aj; New Baltimore, Thoroughfare, and Hope- 
 iWcH's Gaps ; Sickles' division guarding the 
 prange and Alexandria railroad from Manassas 
 IJunction, towards Warrenton Junction ; the ca- 
 ivalry near Flint Hill; Bayard to cut off what 
 jtiiere might be in Warrenton, and to procf r-d to 
 jthe Rappahannock Station. ' Q 
 
 ; November 7, Gen. Pieasonton was ordeicd to 
 jrnove towards J.ittle Washington and Sperryville, 
 and thence towards Culpepper Court House. , 
 
 November 8th, the 2d Corps moved lialf way 
 to Warrenton ; the 5th Corps to New Baltimore. 
 November 9(h, tlie 2d and 5th Corps reached 
 Warrenton ; the Gth Corps New Baltimore. 
 
 Late on the night of the 7tlj, 1 received an or- 
 der relieving me from my conunand of the armv 
 
134 
 
 of tlip I'ntoinnc. find iliioctlng mo M turn it ovci 
 U) GoM. Jliinmitlo. \vhicli '<■ ai once aul. 
 
 I liu.l iilrctidv given tlie owlcrs tor llio move- 
 ments of tho 8tli ai.ri 9ili ; tlicso orders were car- 
 rictl inU> clTocr. witlnnit cliungc. 
 
 'I'ho posltio!. ill which i loft the army, f>.G lUr 
 rcBtilt of the ..r-iors 1 hiul Rivc.'ii. was au lollovvs: 
 
 Tlic 1st, 2.1 an..! r,:h Corps, reso.rve ava.ier/, 
 and general liea.l-MnartcrP ai Wiirrcntr-.n ; tuc .ai. 
 Corps on tlie line of tlio Kuppahannodc. in the 
 vicinitv of Waterloo ; the uih Cc.rus at Ncw/.ai- 
 tiniorc"; tl:c 1 1 th Corps at New B-..jt;nvM-c, Uaincs. 
 ville and 'L'horonghfare Cap ; hick.o.s a flrvidioi, oi 
 the 3d Cori.son the Orange una AicNa>idria nal- 
 road from M'cinassua Junction to VVarrcr.coii .luric 
 
 iTKule the attempt to divide the enemy, as before 
 SiTggeBted, and could, he have been brought to a 
 battle within reach --f uiy t^ui.phes, 1 ctinnut doubt 
 that the rr-suit would h;..ve Iceu a brjlliaut victo- 
 ry for our army. 
 
 ' Oil tho luthof Novembor Gon. Fleasoidon was 
 ntca<;ked hy fjOV;j:st'.-p>Jt. with one divisiuji of in- 
 faxii.rv, and Stuaris ca\ airy, but repulsed the at- 
 
 ta.;ic; 
 
 Thic iudicatcB the rel;divo positum ot our ai- 
 lay Lind thai of the enemy at tlio time I was re- 
 lieved fr.i-ii the coromund. ^^^^.^n 
 
 OK.GANiZ.vTI0N AND aFA'ER.lL COMDLCT 
 Or MILITAi;.Y OPKHATION'S. _ 
 
 It would be iinpo.s.siblc to participate in oper- 
 
 .• ,., T'"'' Z^'Z "^;.^;ir;;;noJir;a • ar^nn. .uci. as those described in the foregoing 
 
 t.on ; l''-so.ao,. ^ og ^l-^^^'^^;' „, ,,,,,3. without forndng llxed opini 
 
 AmisRviile, Je,.^. -.-•■, — , ... . 
 
 Hazel River, facing Longstreet s, six mdes horn 
 Culpepper Court Uousc ; Bayard near Kuppahan- 
 nock Station. , 
 
 Tiie army was thus massed near A^arrenton, 
 ready to act in any requireil direction, perlcctly 
 i. hand, and in admirable condition and spirits 
 I. lioubt whether during the whole period that 1 
 had tlie honor to (command the army ot the 1 00- 
 mac, it was in such excellent condition to tight a 
 
 great battle. ,./■>, n 
 
 When I gave up the command to Gen. liuii;.- 
 side the best niformation in oui possessioii indi- 
 cated that I.ongstreet was immediately m our 
 front near Culpepper ; Jackson with one perhaps 
 •\)0th of the mils near Chester and ihorntons 
 Gaps, with the mass of their forces west ot ihe 
 Blue Ridge. The reports from General rieason- 
 ton in the advance, indicated the possibility ol 
 separating the two wings of the enemy s torces. 
 and eitlier beating Longstreet separately or iorc- 
 in- him to fall back, at least, upon GordonsviUe, 
 to'effect bis junction with the rest of tlie army. ^ 
 The foUovviug is from the report ot General 
 
 Phasonlon : ,►,,,- t i 
 
 "At this time, and from the 7Lh mst., my ad- 
 vance pickets were on IIuzcl river, within six 
 miles of Culpepper, besides havnig my Hank piclc- 
 ets towards CUestor and Thorntons (xaps,^extend- 
 ed to Gaines's Cross Roads, mid Newbys Cross 
 Roads with numerous patrols in the directions 
 of WoolviUe, Little Washington, and bperry- 
 villc. Tlie information gained by these parties, 
 •And also from deserters, prisoners, contrabcnds, 
 as well as citizens, established the tact ot Long- 
 street with his command beirg at Culpejper. 
 while Jackson with D. JL Hill, witli their respect- 
 ive commands, were in the Shenandoah \ alley, 
 on the Western side of the Blue Ridge, covering 
 Chester and ThornU)n's Gaps, and expecluig us 
 to attempt to pass through and attack them. As 
 late as tlio 17th of November, a contraband just 
 from Strasburg came into my camp and reported 
 that D. It. iiiU's cori)S was two mdf.s beyonrl 
 that place, on the railroad to Mount Jankson. 
 Hill was tearing up the road and destroying the 
 bridtces under the impression that we intended 
 to follow into that valley, and was en route tor 
 Staunton. Jackson's corps wai» between btras- 
 burg and Winchester. Evvell and A. P. UiU were 
 
 witii Jackson. , t 1 1 i i 
 
 l.bid I remained in coniinaiul, 1 suoulil have 
 
 ^ ions upon sub- 
 
 icJds connected with the organi/.ation of our ar- 
 mies and the general conduct of military opera- 
 tions. , 1 • 1 4. 
 
 This report wouhl bo incomplete without a 
 brief allusion to some general considerations which 
 have been Ihnily impressed ux)OU mebv the events 
 vviiich have occurred. 
 
 To my mind the most glaring defect ni onr ar- 
 mies is the absence of system in the appoint- 
 ment and promotion of general and other olhcers 
 and the want of means for the theoretical instruc- 
 tion of the mass of ofHcers. 
 
 The expansion of the army was so great and &o 
 rapid at the commencement of the existing war, 
 that it was perhaps impossible, in the great^scar- 
 city of bistructed officers, to have adopted any 
 uthercou.se than that which was pursued ; but 
 the time has arrived when measures may be in- 
 itiated to remedy ex'sting defectii and provide 
 against their recurrence. 
 "1 think that the army should be regarded as a 
 permanent one. that is to say, its aflairs should bo 
 administered precisely as if all who belonged, to 
 itha 1 made it their jn-ofessionfor lile: and those 
 rules fur promotion &c., which have been found 
 necessary in the besl; foreign arm es to excite 
 bono: able emulation, produce an espril du corps. 
 and secure efficiency, should be followed by us. 
 
 All officers and soldiers should be made to feel 
 that merit, that is to say, courage, good conduct, 
 the knowledge and performance of the duties 01 
 their grade, and fitness to exercise those ot a su- 
 perior grade, will ensure to them advancement in 
 their profession, and can alone secure it ior them. 
 Measures should be adoj.ted to secure the the- 
 oretical instruction of stafl' ofiicers at least, who 
 should as far as possible be selectea from oOicers 
 having a mildary education, or who have seen 
 actnal service in the field. '^ 
 
 The number of cade'uS at the military academy 
 should he at once increased to the greatest _ex- 
 Imi permitted by the capacity of tho institution. 
 The re-ular army should be increased an.l 
 maintained comidele in numbers and efficieney. 
 
 A well oiganized system of recruiting and ol 
 depots for instruction should be adopted, in order 
 t,c keep the ranks of the regiment full, and sup- 
 l)lv promptly losses arising from batt.e or disease. 
 This is especially necessary for the artillery ano 
 civalrv arms of the service, which, from the be- 
 gumingof tiie war, have rendered great servicr. 
 
135 
 
 >\'liicii have never been fully appreciated by 
 y but their comrades. We need also large bod- 
 tejs of well instrncted engineer troops. 
 
 In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns, 
 the directions should be left to professional sol- 
 diers : a statesman may, perhaps, be more com- 
 petent than a soldier to determine political ob- 
 jects and direction of a campaign, but those once 
 decided upon, everything should be left to the 
 responsible military head, without interference 
 from civilians. In no other manner is success 
 probable. The meddling of individual members 
 or committees of Congress with subjects which, 
 ■'from lack of experience, they are of course inca- 
 pable of comprehending, and which they are too 
 apt to view through the distorted medium of 
 partizan or personal prejudice, can do no good, 
 and is certain to produce incalculable mischief. 
 
 I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to 
 the President for the constant evidence given me 
 of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to 
 sustain the military plans which my judgment 
 led me to urge for adoption and execution. I 
 cannot attribute his failure to adopt some of those 
 plans, and to give that support to others which 
 was necessary to their success, to any want or 
 confidence in me, and it only remains for me to 
 regret that other counsels came between the con- 
 stitutional commander in chief and the general 
 whom he had placed at the head of his armies, 
 counsels which resulted in the failure of grear 
 campaigns. 
 
 If the nation possesses no generals in service, 
 competent to direct its military affairs Avithout 
 the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner 
 it tinds them and places them in position tUe bet- 
 ter will it be for its fortunes. 
 
 I may be pardoned for calling attention to the 
 iiemorandum submitted by me to the President 
 on the 4th of August, 1861, my letter to him of 
 July Tth' 1862, and other similar communications 
 to hiinandto the Secretary of War, contained in 
 this report. I have seen no reason to change in 
 ;u)y material regard the views there expressed. 
 
 After a calm, impartial and patient considera- 
 tion of the subject, a subject which demands the 
 closest thought on the part of every true lover 
 oF his country, I am convinced that by the prop- 
 er employment of our resources, it is entirely pos- 
 sible to bring this war to a successful military 
 issue. I believe that a necessary preliminary to 
 the re-estabiishment of the Union, is the entire 
 defeat o" virtual destruction of the organized 
 military power of the Confederates, and that such 
 a result should be accompanied and followed by 
 conciliatory measures ; and that by pursuing the 
 political course I have always advised, it is pos- 
 sible to bring about a permanent restoration of 
 the Union; a reunion by which the rights of 
 both sections shall bo preserved, and by which 
 both parties shall preserve their self-i'espect 
 while tli^jy respect each other. 
 CONCLUSION. 
 In this report I have confined mj-gelf to a phiiii 
 narrative ot such facts as are necessarj'- for the 
 purposes of history. Where it was possible I 
 liave preferred to give these facts in the lan- 
 .■riiag*- of dispatches, written at the time of their 
 
 occurrence, rather tlian to attempt a new reljfc- 
 
 tion. 
 
 The reports of the subordinate commanders, 
 hereto annexed, recite what time and apace would 
 fail me to mention here, those individual instancea 
 of conspicuous bravery and skill by which every 
 battle was marked. To them I must especially 
 refer, for without thetn, this narrative would be 
 incomplete, and justice fail to be done. But I 
 omit to tender to my corps commanders and to 
 the general officers under them, such ample re- 
 cognition of their cordial co-operation and their 
 devoted services, as those reports abuudautly 
 vouch. 
 
 I have not sought to defend the armj-^ which I 
 had the honor to command, nor myself, against 
 the hostile criticisms once so rife. 
 
 It has seemed to me that nothing more was re- 
 quired than such a plain and truthful narrative, 
 to enable those whose right it is to form a cor- 
 rect judgment on the important matters involved. 
 This report is, in fact, the history of the army 
 of the Potomac. During the period occupied ia 
 the organization of that army, it served as a bar- 
 rier against the advance of a lately victorious 
 enemy, while the fortification of the capital was 
 in progress, and inider the discipline which it 
 theu received it acquired strength, education, and 
 some of that experience which is necessary to 
 success in active operations, and which enaliled 
 it afterward to sustain itself under circumstances 
 trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skir- 
 mishes occurred along the lines, conducted with 
 great gallantry, which inured our troops to tho 
 realities of war. .< 
 
 Tho army grew into shape but slowlj'-, and the 
 delays wiiich attended on the obtaining of arms, 
 continued late into the winter of 1861-2, were no 
 less trying to the soldiers than to the peo[)le of 
 the country. Even at the time of I lie organiza- 
 tion of the Peninsular campaign, some of the 
 finest regiments were without rifles, nor were 
 the utmost exertions on the part of the military 
 authorities adequate to overcome the obstacles 
 to active service. 
 
 When at length the army was in condition to 
 take the field, tlie Peniiisular campaign was phinr- 
 ned,aud entered upon with entliusiasni by officers 
 and men. Had this campaign been followed up 
 as it was designed, I caimot doubt that it would 
 have resulted m a glorious triumph to our arms, 
 and the permanent restoration of the power of 
 the government in Virginia and North Carolina, 
 if not throughout the revolting States. 'It was, 
 however, otherwise ordered, and instead of re- 
 porting a victorious campaign, it has been my 
 duty to relate the heroism of a reduced arn)y, 
 sent upon an expedition into an ejiem3''s country, 
 there to abandon one, and originate another new 
 cami^aign, which might and wonid have been 
 successful if sup])orted with n[)iu-eciation of its 
 necessities, but which failed because of the re- 
 peated failure of promised support, at tlie most 
 critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal mo- 
 ments. 
 
 That heroism surpasses ordinary dc8cri[>tion. 
 Its illustration must be left for the pen of tiie his- 
 torian in times of calm reflection, wIkjh tJie nation 
 
136 
 
 shall be looking back to the, past from the midsit; 
 of peaceful da'vs. .m'II 
 
 For ine, now, it is Rufficiont to sajf, thatimy; 
 comrades were victors on every field save ,one,' 
 and there the endurance, ofya shiglc corps accoiu- 
 plished the object of its fightiug.aud by securing^ 
 to the army its transit to, the i James, loft to -the 
 enemy a ruinous and barren victory. 
 
 The army of the Potomac was first reduced _by 
 tlio withdrawal- fro^i my coraiual-id of the division 
 o^f Gen. lilenker. which waa ordered to tl\p I^Ioun- 
 iain Department, under Gen. FremQnt, , \Ye;had 
 scarcely landed on, the Peninsula, when- it was 
 further reduced by a dispatch, revoknig a pre- 
 vious order giving me command of Fortress Mpn- 
 Toc, and ui>der vvdrich I liad expected to take ten 
 thousand men from that point, to aid in our oper- 
 ations. Then, when under fire. before the i de- 
 fences of Yorkfcown, we received the ncv.'s of tlie 
 •withdrawal of Gen. McDowell's corps, of, about 
 35,000 men. This completed the overthrow of 
 the original plan of the campaign. About one- 
 third of my ciitire army, (five divisions of out of 
 fourteeu, one -of the.. nine reijnainwg being httle 
 larger than a ^)rigade), was' thn:; ;;:;;: -a from me.^ 
 Instead of a'rapid ,:;vdvajiqe 1 plannea, 
 
 aided by. a. flank nioyementi'. ■ • ,;; •'■''■j;^'®/' ^'' 
 was only left to besie^'c YorktoWiL.^ That siege 
 was successfully conducted by -the, array,,, and 
 ■when these strong works at Icngtli yiclcled to our 
 approaches, the troops rushed forwayd^to the 
 B?J.ng,uinary but successful battle of Willrams- 
 bni'p) an^i thus .opened an almost unvcs,i.&tQd ad- 
 Trance, to tlie hanl^s of the Ghickahon]iiny._ , Rich- 
 mond lay before tliem, surrounded witii fortifica- 
 -lions and guarded by an army larger than our 
 own ; but the prospect did not shake the courage 
 of the brave men who composed iny-cpm}-^iand. 
 Relyin'j; still on tlie'. support Avhlch the yaatness 
 of our uudcrtakivg, aud'tlie grand results , depend- 
 ing on ojjrsucceas, seemed; to dnsure i^s, we 
 pressed forward, 'the, ■w.catlie.r v.ms. stormy be-; 
 yond precedent, "the, deep soil of the Peninsula 
 ■wii,s at times one vast morass. The Ghickciho- 
 ininy rose to a higher stage t'lan had been known 
 for 'years bf^fpre. "Pursuing the advance, the 
 cr.9Sflings were ,scized,i and., the tight wing ex-; 
 tended to effec'fc.a junction. wi'tJi rciuforcemeDts 
 now promised .an.d eariii^stly ^ degircd,- and upon 
 ijie arrival of which the complete svtccess of the 
 campaign seemed clear. ,' The 'briltiant battle of 
 Hanover Court House was fouglit, which opened 
 the way fpr tjiC'tirst corps, with the aid ,of which, 
 had it come, wo, should then have .gonewvto; the 
 enemy's capital. It iueyer^ came. The bravest 
 array could not do more,, uiider such overwhelm- 
 ing disappointment, than the army ot the Poto- 
 mac then did. Fair Oaks attests their courage 
 and endurance, when they hurled back again and 
 again the vastly superior forces of the enemy. 
 "'B^it mortal men could not accomplish the miracles 
 that seem to liave been expected of them. But 
 one course was left; a flank march in the face of 
 a powerful enemy, to another and better base, 
 one of the most' hz:irdous movements in war. 
 Tiie army of the Potomac liolding its o,wn safety, 
 and almost the s:;ifety of our cau-se, in its hands, 
 was e.cpial to the. occasion.. The ,Sevcn Davs are 1 
 
 classical in American history ; those days in which 
 the nol)le soldiers of the Union and the Constitu- 
 tion fought an'overwhplming enemy by day, o,nd 
 retreated from successive victories by, iiighl, 
 through a week of jDattle, , cloising 'the terrible 
 scenes of coufiict with tlic ;e,v.er, mcroorable vic- 
 toryat' Malvern, wliere they (\wv\i bade, beaten 
 and shattered, tlie entire eastevu army of the con- 
 federacy, and tluis secured: f<n- Uiemselyesa place 
 of'rest,and a'p.oint for a new advance upon th.? 
 capital from the banks of tfie -Jamss. 
 
 .Richinond wasstill within oiir grasp, .had the 
 array of the Potomac been reinforced' and permit- 
 ted to advance. But counsels, \vhich I cannot 
 birt think snbsequejit events proved mnvise, prc- 
 vadpd in Wasiungton, and ^^ye were ordered to 
 abandon,. tKe:campaign. Never did soldiers bet- 
 ter deserve tlie.thaiiks of a, nation than the arnr,- 
 of the Potomac for the ' deeds of the Pe:iinsuiar 
 ca^npaigi!, ai>d although that meed was withheld 
 from, them bvtiic 'authorities, I mix'. pcrsuad'.?.d 
 tliey have received the applau'se^of 1,he American 
 peopl<i. , The.'army of ■the;3Potomac vyas .' i;ecallo-.I 
 from within, sight'of pjcj^mond, andi'ncorporatc.l 
 v/ith 'li'hc army of Yirghiia. ' Tlio disappouilmci>t;s 
 of: the cpmpaigivon 'the :Per4insu!aV,liad not clani])- 
 :encd '.their; 'ardor' or d'imii,iishcd tlieiv. jiatrioL-Biii. 
 Tlrey foug^it^'well, fai,tbTillly,^gi^lIantly uiiderj^ ;.. 
 Pope ; yet ^yere compelled to fall back on V\ ; ,.• 
 ingt'oa,'' defecated and' almost demQrali7.ed_ 'I'.u:- 
 enemy no longer ocoupied in guarding his ow-. 
 capital, poured liis'troops nortliv;ard, entered^ ]s'. - 
 rylaud, threatened Pennsylvania, and even V, n. ■ ^ 
 ington itself. Elated by his recent victories, -.vr. i 
 assurtid'that our .troops -were disorganized au i 
 dispirited, he was confident thai the 'seat of war 
 was now permaiScntly transferred to, the loyal 
 States, and' that Ids own. exhausted soil was to, bo 
 relieved from th,e burden of supporting tv/o hos- 
 tile armies. But he did not understand the spir- 
 it which animated the soldiers of the Union. I 
 shall rtot, nor can I living forget tliat, when I was 
 iordered to tbt command of the troops for the de- 
 fense of tliecapitcd, the soldiers, with whom I. had 
 shared so much, of ihp anxiory^and pain and suf- 
 jfering of the war ,drad not lost their confidence in 
 ine as tlVeir commander. They sprang to my call 
 with all their ancient vigc:--. discipline and cojir- 
 a"-e. I led them into ]\Iaryland. Fifteen days 
 after bhey had fallen back defeated, before ,Wash- 
 iu'^rton, they vanrpiished the enemy ou the rugged 
 helglits of South Mountain,, jiursued Jiim to tlu^ 
 hard fought field of Antietam. and drove hnn 
 broken and disap' ' Ihe Potomac into 
 
 Virginia. ,■.!,■ -I'l 
 
 The army had ncci oi r^;,!,. .liter the tcrnbi!^ 
 
 .experience's, of battles and' raarch.es, with scarcely 
 an ■ interval of repos'3, 'which they had ^. gone 
 through from the tiuie of leaving for the Peum- 
 Bula. the return to Washington, t.hc defeat in Vir- 
 ginia, the victory at South Mountain, and agaiu 
 at Antietam.it was not surprising that they were, 
 in a large degree, destitute of the absolute ne- 
 cessaries to effective duty. Shoes were worn out, 
 blankets were lost, clothing was in rags ; m short 
 the army was unfit for active service, and an in- 
 to'rval for rest and equii)raent was necessary. 
 Wlien the slowly, forwarded supplies came to 
 
1-h 
 
 x\3, 1 led the 'army across thteriyfeif I'fetl'ovat^l'and 
 rofreshed, in good order ,nnd discipline, ai'uV fol- 
 lowed the reiireating''l^G t(> -a ^position where! 
 was coinlident of 'decisive victory, when in the 
 midst of theuiovcinentjWhilemy advanced j!;nard 
 was ■actually irt^'bontaGt- with'" the enemy, I was 
 removed:from the commands 'i ar'j'l ■• ''' 
 
 I aia devoutiy f^rataful to God thattny last cam- 
 paign Avitii this bfave. a,ruiy was- crowned with a 
 victory which saved tlioiuitiqu from 'the greatest 
 X^eril it had then undergone. 
 
 I have not accomplished my purpose, if, by 
 tl^is report, the army of the Potunaap is npt_p]ac(^d 
 Migti on tlie iroli of the historic arMea'ofJ the 
 world. ,..; I ,;^; , .^ (^ ..j'^O -, ,";A (.'lU '"■ ' 
 
 Its deeds ennolile tho nation "'to '"^lucli it 'be- 
 longs. Always: ready for hafetle, ahya3'S'-firm, 
 steadfast and trustworthy, I never' called oh Itjn 
 
 vain; rior wiu the pat;6n 'ever have caus^ io. at- 
 tribute its want of' sifccc^a, as und6r_ other com- 
 manders, to any fiiilurc,hf patriotism or bravery 
 iu that noble body of American soldiers. 
 
 No man can justly charge upon, any portion of 
 that army, from the commanding general to the 
 private, any lack of«devbtion to the service of 
 the UnitsJd'ftltStes government, and to the cause 
 ,of the ..Co.nBtjtAijti'o^Tiand t)io Union. Tl^ey bave 
 proved tiieii?' fealty in much eorrow, suffering, 
 danger, and through the very shadow of death. 
 Their comrades dead on all tho fields where we 
 fought, have scayqcly more claim to the honor of 
 3, nation's reverence tliati the sut-vlvors to ■ jt]ie 
 jus^cQ of a nation's gratitude. ., ^■^i." 
 
 latnsir, very respectfully, yoiit obedient" ser- 
 vant, 'i^. f;-:Y I T. L ; V' j \/ ; ► ■ , , 
 
 'GeQkge^. Mi;Ci.^LiiAN,-Maj-Gea. U. S. A, 
 
 APPEN.DIX 
 
 A. 
 
 OKGANIZATiok AKD DISTRIBUTION. 
 
 Tho degig.natioi]s of the different Batteries of Artillery, both Regular and YoliinteeV, folIo"W within 
 
 a few pages. • ■ : ■■.■';;'" • ■ i ;, ,'.;' > . ■ ■,','';^. "■ . .,■• ,.- ' ■ 
 
 • The following distribution of Regiments and Raitteries was'maaaas a preu'ni'iflarY'organit?itl0n of 
 the forces at kuid, shortly after my arrival at Washington. ■' • 
 
 The Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry, as fast as collected and brought into primary organisation, 
 v/ere assi"-ned to Brigades and Divisions as indicated in the subjoined statements. / ' '■ ■ 
 
 o^:^.n ANiZATr 
 
 THE DIVISION OP THE P0'4:'0MAC. 
 August 4th, 1861. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GBNERAL HUN'TER'S BRIGADE. 
 23d Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 25tli " -■■'■'■ " ■■ • ' '■ " ■' 
 35th ■" " " . 
 
 37th 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL TIEINTZELMAN'S 
 ' BRIGADE. ■ 
 
 5th Regiment Maine Volunteers. 
 16th- " NewTork " 
 
 26th . " 
 27th 
 
 Tidball's Battery {''. A") 2d U. S. Artillery. , 
 BRIGADIEll-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN'3 ' 
 
 :,; ; BRIGADE. 
 14th Regiment ISTew York Volunteers. 
 
 9th " J^Iassachusctts " 
 
 De Kalb " New York 
 
 4th " Michigan " 
 
 Ilamilton's Battery (" E") 3d U.. S. Artillery. 
 Company"!" 2d " Cavalry. 
 BRIG.-GBNERAL KEARNEY'S BRIGADE. 
 
 1st Regiment New Jersey Vohmteers. 
 
 ij^a./ . « . -. " . • " w 
 
 '■'3d ■ " "■ ■ •■■ '^''■" 
 
 Green's Battery (' G") 2d U. S. Artillery. 
 Companv " G" 2d " Cavalry. 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL HOOKER'S BRIGADE. 
 1st Regiment Ivlassachusetts Volunteers. 
 11th 
 
 2d Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers. 
 26 th '* Pennsylvania " 
 
 COLONEL KE YES'S BRIGA.DE. 
 22d Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 24th 
 
 30th' " " « 
 
 l^th " " State Militia. 
 
 BRIG.-GENERAL FRANKLIN'S BRIGADE. 
 
 15th Regiraeiit New York A'^olunteers. 
 
 18th 
 
 31st " " 
 
 32d « " " 
 
 Piatt's Battery (" M") 2d U. S. Artillery. 
 
 Comp'y"C"New York (Lincoln) Cavalry. 
 
 COLONEL BLENKER'S BRIGADE. 
 8th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 27th "" -I '^ ' " ^ ■ ■'* 
 27th " Pennsylvania '"' 
 
 GaribaldiGaiard', Now York " 
 
 COLONEL RICHARDSON'S RRTGADE. 
 12th Regiment New York Valuuteers. 
 2d " Michigan " 
 
 3d 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL STONE'S BBIGADB. . 
 34th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 Tammany " " 
 
 Ist " " " 
 
 2d " New York State Militia. 
 
COLONEL WM. F. SMITirS BRIGADB. 
 
 S(l Rogimeni Vermont Volunteers. 
 ^ Cth " MaiiiQ " 
 
 2d " Vermont " 
 
 33d " New York " 
 
 Company " 11" 2d U. S. Cavalry. 
 Captain ilott's New York Battery. 
 
 COLONEL COUCH'S BRIGADE. 
 2d Regiinout Rliode Island Volunteers' 
 7th " Massachusetts " 
 
 138 
 
 10th Regiment Maseachusofcta Volunteers. 
 36th « New York 
 The 2d Regiment Maine Volunteers, 
 
 2d " Wisconsin " and the 
 
 13th " New York " Btationed 
 
 at Fori (Jorcoran. 
 The 2l8t Regiment New York Volunteers, 
 
 stationed at Fort Runyon. 
 The 17t]i Regiment Now York Volunteers, 
 stationed at Fort EUsworth 
 
 By October the new levies had arrived in Bufficient numbers, and the process of organizdtiou was 
 BO far carried on, tliat tlie construction of Divisions had been effected. 
 The following statement exhibits the composition of the Ai-my, October 15th, 1861. 
 
 ORGANIZATION OF 'THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 
 October I6th, 18G1. 
 
 BRIG.-GENERAL STONEMAN'S CAVALRY 
 COiMMAND. 
 6th U. S. Cavalry. 
 4th Pemisylvania Cavalry. 
 
 Oneida Cavaliy (1 Company). 
 11th Peiuisylvaiiia Cavalry (Uarlans). 
 
 Barker's Illinois Cavalry (1 Company). 
 II. 
 COL. n. J. HUNT'S ARTILLERY RESERVE. 
 Battery " L' 2il U. S. Artillery. 
 - « «' A" " " 
 
 " « K" 3 J « " 
 
 CI II T,T> II « « 
 
 " " K" 4th " " 
 
 « "11" 1st" " (Lient Hall) 
 
 " "A" 5th" « 
 
 ITT. 
 CITY GUARD, RRTG.-OENERAL ANDREW 
 
 roin'Eii. 
 
 Clavaln/. 
 Companies " A" and " E" 4th U. S. Cavalry.. 
 
 Ar tiller 2/. 
 Battery " K" 5th U. S. Artillery. 
 
 Infantry. 
 Battalion 2d U. S. Infantry. 
 
 " 3d " '' 
 
 Company 8th " " 
 
 1st " 
 " Sturgis Rifles (Illinois Volunteers.) 
 
 IV. 
 BANKS' DIVISION. 
 Cavalry. 
 Sdlleg't. N. Y. Cavalry (Van Alen) 4 Companies. 
 ArtUlerij. 
 Best's Battery " I" 4th U. S.'Artillery. 
 Detaclunent i)th N. Y. Artillery. 
 Matthew's Battery " F" 1st Peiuisylvania Artillery. 
 Tompkins' Buttery '• A" 1st Rhode Island. 
 
 In fat) try. 
 Abero'ombie's Brig. /S^^ifes-'.s Brig. Giyi'flo7is Brig. 
 12tli Maaa. Vols. 3J Wjs. Vo'ls. 2d MaBS. Vols. 
 
 12 th Ind. " 9 th N. Y. S. M. 28 th Y. Y. « 
 
 16th " « 29th Penn.VoL 19th " « 
 
 30th Pean. " 13th Mass. " 5th Conn. «, 
 
 46th Penn. " 
 28 th " « 
 IstMd. " 
 MCDOWELL'S DIVISION. 
 Cavalry. 
 2d New York Cavalry (Harris' Light) Col. DaviesJ 
 
 Artillery, 
 Battery " M" 2d U. S. Artillery. 
 " "G"lst « 
 
 Infantry. 
 Keyes's Brig. Waclswortlis Briq. King's Brig. 
 14th N. Y. S. M, 12th N. Y. Vols.^ 2d Wis. Vols. 
 22d " Vols. 21st " " 6th " 
 
 24th " " 23d " " 7th " 
 
 30th " " 35th " " 19th Ind. " 
 HEINTZELMAN'S DIVISION. 
 Cavalry. 
 let New Jersey. Col. Halstead. 
 
 ArtiUei-g. 
 Thompson's Battery " G" 2d U. S. Artillery. 
 Infantry. 
 Richardson's B. Sedgwick's B. Jameson's B. 
 2nd Mich. Vols. 3rd iMaino Vols. 32d Penn. Vola. 
 2i-d " " 4th " " 63rd " 
 
 5th " " 38th N.Y. " 61st " 
 
 37th N.Y " 40th " " 45th " 
 
 Ponn. Vols. (Wild Cat Reg't.) 
 F. J. PORTER'S DIVISION. 
 
 Cava/ri/. 
 3rd Ponn. Cav. [Kentucky Cav.] Col. Averell. 
 8th " " Col. Grogg. 
 
 Arlillertf. 
 Bat'y "E" 2nd U. S. Artillery. 
 
 'E" 3rd 
 
 MorcWs B. 
 14tli N. Y. Vols. 
 33rd Penn. " 
 4th Mich. " 
 9th Mass. '* 
 
 Note. — Transferred to 
 Sherman's Exped. 
 Infmfry. 
 Martindale's B. Butt-erfuMs B. 
 13th N. Y. Vols. .'iOth N. Y. Vols. 
 2iid Maine " Stockton's I M R 
 — N. Y Do K R 83 Punii. Vols. 
 18th Mass. Vol. 17th N.Y. Vols. 
 2;"Uh " 
 
FRANKLIN'S DIVISION. 
 Cavalry. 
 lat New York Cavalry. Col. McReynolds. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Bat'y "D" 2nd U. S. Art'y. tlexainer's B.N. Y. V. 
 " "G" " " 
 
 Infaniri/. 
 Kearney's B. Slocmri's B. Neicton's B. 
 
 let N. J. Vols. 16th N. Y. Vols. 15th N. J. Vols. 
 2nd " " 26th " " 18th " 
 3rd " " 27th " " 31st " 
 4th " " 6tli Maine " 32d " 
 STONE'S DIVISION. 
 Cavalrif. 
 6 Companies 3rd N. Y. (Van A ten) Cavalry. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Kirby's Bat. "I" IstU. S. Bunting's 6th N. Y. I. B. 
 Vaughn's " "B" 1st R. I, 
 
 Infantry. 
 Gorman's Brigade. Lander's Brigade. 
 
 2nd N. Y. S. M. lOtli Mass. Vols. 
 
 1st Minn. Vols. , 20 th " " 
 
 — N. Y. Vol. (Tarn. R.) 7th Mich. " 
 15th Mass " Com. Mass. Sharpshooters 
 
 34th N. Y. " 
 
 BAKER'S BRIGADE. 
 
 . Penn Vols. [1st Calil'ornia.] 
 
 [2nd California.] 
 "alifornia.J 
 
 139 
 
 — " " [3rd 
 
 BU ELL'S DIVISION 
 
 Artillery. 
 Battery "D" 1st Penn. Artillery. 
 "11" " 
 
 Ivfantry. 
 Couch'.'! Brig. Graham's Grig. Peck's Brig. 
 
 2nd R. I. Vols. 23rd Penn. Vols. 13th Penn. Vol. 
 "til Mas.s. " 31st " " 21st " 
 10th Mass. '■■ C7th N. Y. [IstL. I.] Vols. 
 
 62d N. Y. V. 
 Anderson Zou. 
 36th N. Y. Vols. 05th N. Y. V (1st U. S.Chass.) 
 
 55th N. Y. Vol. 
 McOALL'S DIVISION.* 
 Cnvahy. 
 Ist Penn. Reserve Cavalry. Col. Bayard. 
 
 ArlilleJ')/. 
 Easton's Battery "A" Ist Penn. Artiller3^ 
 Cooi)er's " "B" 1st " " 
 
 Kein's " "G" 1st " . « 
 
 In/anlrt/. 
 
 Mendcx Brig. Brig. Brig. 
 
 1st Ritlcs Penn. Res. 5th P. II. Inf. lOtli P. R." Inf. 
 4th Penn. Res. luf. Ist " " Cth " " 
 3rd " " " . 8 th " " 9 th " « 
 7th " '• " 12th "■ " 
 
 ilth " " " 
 2„d '■ '■• " 
 
 HOOKER'S DIVISION. 
 
 C'uvcilry. 
 
 8rd Ind. Cav. [6 Companies]. Lieut.-Col. Cartel-. 
 
 Artilleri/. 
 
 Elder's Battery -E" let l3. S. ArtiUeiy. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Brigade. Sickles' Brigade. 
 
 1st Mass. Vols. IstReg't Ex. Brig. N. Y. Vols. 
 Ilth " " 2nd " " " " " 
 
 2ndN. H " 3rd " " " « « 
 
 20th Penn. " 4th " " " " " 
 
 let Mich. " 5th " " " " « 
 
 SMITH'S DIVISION. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 5lhPenn. Cav. (Cameron Drags). Col. Friedman. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Ayre's Battery "F" 5th U. S. Artillery. 
 Mott's 2nd New York Independent Battery. 
 Barr's Battery "E" Ist Penn. Artillery. 
 
 Infantry. 
 Brigade. Steven's Brig. IlancocJcs Brig. 
 
 2nd Verm't Vols. 33d N. Y. Vols. 47tli Penn. Vols. 
 3rd " " 79th " S. M. 49th " « 
 4tli " " 0th Maine Vols 43rd N. Y. " 
 5th " " 49th N. Y. " 5th Wis. 
 
 Cos. "B" and "E" Berdan's Slirpshooters.. 
 
 Note.— The 47th Penn. Vols, and the 79tli N 
 
 Y. S.M. transferred to Gen. Sherman's E.xpeditiou- 
 
 CASEY'S PROVISIONAL BRIGADE. 
 5th N. J. Vols. — Penn. Vols. (R. II. Reg't.) 
 6th « « Battahon D. C. Vols. 
 
 7th " " 40th Penn. " 
 
 8 th " " 4th N. H. " 
 
 Note. — Round Head Regiment transferred to 
 Gen. Sherman's Enpedition. 
 
 V. 
 
 GARRISON OF ALEXANDRIA. BRIG-GEN. 
 
 MOiNTGO.MERY. 
 
 Military Governor. 
 
 Penn. Volunteers, (Cameron Guards). 
 
 GARRISON OF FORT ALBANY. 
 
 14th Mass. Volunteers. 
 
 GARRISON OF FORT RICHARDSON. 
 
 4th Connecticut Volunteers. 
 GARRISON OF Fort WASHINGTON. 
 (Jompany "D" Ist'U. S. Arlilleiy. 
 
 "H" 37th N. Y. Volunteers. 
 
 " U. S. Recruits uuassigned. 
 
 VL 
 
 DIX'S DIVISION, BALTIMORE. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Company Penn. Cavalry. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Bat'y "1" 2nd U. S. Art'y. 2nd Mass. Batterj. 
 
 " — N. Y. Art'y. 
 
 Infantry. 
 3rd New York Volunteers. 
 4th 
 5th 
 
 17th Mass. " 
 
 25th " " 
 
 21st Indiana " 
 
 6th Michigan " 
 
 4th Wisconsin " 
 7th Maine " 
 
 2v.d Maryland Battalion. 
 Reading City Guards. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 I'add a Statement of the Ors;anvzation- and Composition of the Iroops on April xst, commeYiortig 
 witli tlie portion of the Array of the Potomac, whijch went to the Peninsula.? -giving alterwards the 
 Regiments and Batteries left on the Potomac and ifn i\Mrylaftd, a^d \arguua after, April lat,,i{^t>^. 
 
 'PROOPS OF teE ARMY OF THE jPOio^ilAlC; SENT TO :^B't^M 
 
 • LEY PwEBERVB. BRIG.-Gi:.:>. P.* BT. G. 
 
 '■',:'■ v.; : 600KE. - 
 
 Jimoi-i/'s Brigade. ', • . ; Bhflce's .Brigade. 
 5th-U. S. CaYalry. • ■ ls,t II: S;. Cavalry. 
 6th ■" " SthPenn. " 
 
 6 til Peu: 1 . " Barker's Bqviaarou Pd. Cav y. 
 
 11. : '''"■■' 
 
 ARTILLERY RE3I^RVE. COL. U. -L ITUNT. 
 Gralur: • ^ '•- '" '■^- - '■ '^■' ' ^' !■ - CNapbleon 
 
 ' [gans. 
 6 " '■ 
 2 1 ■• 6 20-pds. 
 
 [Parrott guns. 
 2d G 3-in. oi'dnauce 
 2d " 6 3-in. ordnance 
 [guns. 
 2d " 6 3-in ord. , " 
 M" 8d " 6 10-pds. Parrott 
 [guns. 
 ■• G" 3d " 6 3-in. ord. " 
 = K" 3d" 4 10-pds Parrott 
 [guns, 
 4th " G'Napoleou " 
 4th " 6 
 
 5th " 6 3-in. ord. " 
 5j.h " 4 Napoleon " 
 olh " 4 10-pds. ^ 
 
 Parrotts V S"ns 
 2 Napo'n 
 AETILLEP r RESmYB 
 
 Randal'... 
 Carlisle's " 
 
 Pobbei'tson's " 
 
 Bonron's " 
 
 t:.. 
 
 Edvv'ard s 
 
 Gihson's " 
 Livingston's ' 
 
 Howe's ' 
 
 D0R1!!=!?V'S ' 
 
 Weed's 
 Smead"s ' 
 AiuesiVi " 
 
 "E" 
 
 M' 
 
 ■ C" & ' 
 
 F" k ■ 
 
 " G" 
 
 '•r" 
 
 " K" 
 
 "A" 
 
 Diederick's Bat'y " A' 
 Yoegelie's • "■ "B" 
 Knieriem's " " C" 
 Grimm's " " D" 
 
 BU.6 20-pd.Par- 
 ' 4 "[rottgns 
 ' 4 " " 
 ' 6 32-pdnow 
 
 100 guns. 
 
 ]U: 
 
 VaLUNTEER ENGl n^EER TROOPS. "GEN. 
 WOODBURY. 
 15th New YuiQi Volunteers. 
 oOth 
 REGULAR ENGINEER TROOPS. CAPT. 
 DUANE. 
 ■ lompanies " A," "B." and " C," V- S. Engineers. 
 ARTILLERY TROOPS WITH BIEGE TRAIN. 
 IstConnectlcut Heavy Artillery. Gol. Ti/ler. 
 INFANTRY RESERVE (Rcgtilar Brigade). 
 Gen. Si/Ices. 
 9 Go's 2iid U-. S. Infantry. 
 7 " 3rd " 
 10 " 4th " 
 5th Rest. N. Y. Vols. Col. G. K. Warren. 
 
 8 Go's lOth andl7th.B. S- Infentry. 
 6 Go's, nth 'U. S. Tnfimtrv. 
 
 8 " 12 th 
 
 9 " 14th 
 
 SECOND CORPS. GEN; SUMNER. 
 
 Ca-oalry.- 
 8th IlHnois' Cavalry. Gol. FarnswortJi. 
 i One Squadron 6th' New York Cavalry. 
 
 RICHARDSON'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery, • 
 Clark's Bat'y. " A" & " G" 4tfi U. S. 6 Napoleon g!is 
 'Frank's " " G" 1st N.Y. G lO-pds Parrott 
 
 Pettit's " . " B" 1st " 6 " [guns. 
 Hogan's " "A" 2d " G " 
 
 Infantry. 
 Howard's Brig. Meaglier's Brig. 
 'U\\ N. H. Vols. , 69th'N. Y. Vols. 
 iSlst Penn. " G3rd " 
 61st N.Y. " 88th; « __ 
 64th " " ■' --P^'^ 
 
 SEDGWICK'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery. 
 ' I" IstU. S.. 6 Napoleon gns. 
 «A"i 4T.T r ^10-pd.Par. 1 .,^„ 
 "A lstR.L6 2i2-pd.HoziS"'- 
 
 '' ^'^ ^212-pd.Hozp"^- 
 *-6 3-in. ordnance gns 
 
 Frejich-s Brig. 
 52d N.Y. Vols. 
 57 th " 
 66th " " 
 53rd Penn. " 
 
 Kirb}'ii Bat'y. 
 Tompkin's " 
 
 *Dartlctt s " 
 bweu's 
 
 ' Infantry. 
 
 Gormwis Brig. , Burn's Brig. . Bana's Brig. 
 2d N. Y- S. M. 69th Penn. Vols. 19 th Mass Vols. 
 15th Mass. Vol. 71st .'•' " 7th Mich. " 
 ■M N. Y. "* 72nd '■ " 42nd N. Y. " 
 1st Minn. " lOGth " " 20th Mass. " 
 
 Note,— jB/ewfcer's Bivision detached and afi- 
 Bigned to the Mountain Bepartmenl ,■•■>: ^ 
 SfllRD CORPS. GENERAL HEINTZELMAN. 
 i* Cavah'y. 
 
 \ ■• 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry. Col. Aver rU 
 t ' ; : .': - : PORTER'S DIVISION 
 
 Griffin's- Ba,t'y "K" 5th U. S. <: lO-pds. Parrott 
 
 Weden's "-("C'R. L — — [m^- 
 
 '^lartiii's " " 0" Mas«. 7 Napoleon Guns. 
 
 tillcn's '• — C 3-in ordn. guns. 
 
 fed Mahie Vols. 14th N.Y. Vols, 
 ISthMSiss. " 4th Mich. " 
 22nd " " 9th Mass. " 
 i25thN. Y. " 82nd Penn. " 
 13th N. Y. " 
 1st Bcrdau Sharpshooters 
 
 Buiterf/Ms Brirj. 
 17thN.Y.,VolB. 
 63rd Penn. " 
 44th N. Y. " 
 Stockton's Mich. 
 12th N. Y, Vols. 
 
HOOKER'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery. 
 
 Hah s Bal J. rL IstU. S. 6 ^ i2-pd. How. \ 
 
 14i 
 
 gns 
 
 Sraitivs " 4thN.T.Bat'y.610-pds. Parrott 
 Braraliall's 6tli " " 6 3-m ordnance " 
 Osboru's "D"lstN:T.A4 " 
 
 Infcmtri/. 
 
 Sickle's Brig. Naff lee's Brig. Col. Starr's Brig. 
 
 Is t Excelsior (N.Y.) 1st Mass. Tols. 5tkN.J.Vols- 
 
 2nd 
 3rd 
 4lh 
 5tk 
 
 nth 
 
 2Gth Ponn. 
 2ud N. n. 
 
 6 til 
 
 7 til 
 
 8 th 
 
 HAMILTON'S DIVISION. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Thompson's Bat'y " G" 2d US 6 Napoleon gnns. 
 
 Beam's " 
 
 Randolph's " 
 
 .Jameson's Brig 
 105th Pe. Vols. 
 63rd " " ' 
 57th « « 
 87feh N. Y. " 
 
 gns. 
 
 2d Mich. Vol 
 3]d " 
 5 th " 
 37th N. Y. " 
 
 2 jNapoieon 
 
 «E"R.I.Gtl?-l'V^'' 
 
 2 Napoleon. 
 
 Infantry. 
 Birney's Bri/j 
 
 38 th N.Y. Vols, 
 40th " " 
 3rd Maine " 
 4tli " " 
 
 FOURTH CORPS. GENERAL KEYES.' 
 Cavalry. 
 
 COUCH'S DIVISION. 
 
 A rtitlery. 
 McCortliy's Bat'y- " C" IstPenn. 4 la-pd Par. gns. 
 Flood's " "D'Tst " 6 " " " 
 
 Miller's " "B"lst " 4 Napoleon " 
 
 Brady's " '^ F^' 1st " 4 10-pd. Parrott. 
 
 Infantry. 
 Graliain's Brig. P eric's Brig. 
 
 67th N.Y. vis. (1 L.L) 98th Pe. Vis, 
 102d " " 
 93rd " " 
 62d N.Y- " 
 55th " " 
 S^riTH'S DIVISION. 
 Artillerij 
 
 Ayres' Bat'y. " F" 5th U.S. 
 
 65 th " " (I U.S. C) 
 23rd Penn. " 
 
 3l8t " " 
 
 6Ist " " 
 
 Brig. 
 
 2d R.I. Vis. 
 7 til Mass. 
 10th " •' 
 
 SGthN.Y." 
 
 ^ 4 10-pd. Par. j 
 
 <5 2 -Napoleon, fg"^- 
 
 , 4 10-pd. Par- 
 
 2 Napoleon 
 
 4 3-in. ordnance. 
 
 77 th 
 49 th 
 
 Mott's " 3d N.Y. Bat'y 
 
 Wheeler's "E" 1st N.Y. 
 
 Kennedy's 1st N.Y. Batteay 6 " " " 
 
 Infantry. 
 Hancoclcs Bri<j. Brook's Brig. Bnvrdaan's Bri^/. 
 5th Wis. Vols.' 2d Verm't Vol. 33d N. Y. Vols. 
 49th Penn. " 3d " 
 43d N. Y. " 4th " 
 6th Maine " 5th " • " 7th Maine " 
 6th " 
 CASEY'S DIVISION. 
 
 AriiUery. 
 Regan's Bat'y, 7th N. Y. Bat'y. 6 3-iHordn. guns. 
 Fitch's " 8th " " 6 " " 
 Bates' « "A" IstN.Y. Art. 6 Napoleon " 
 Spratt's " " H" 1st " " 4 3-iu. ordn. " 
 
 Infanlry. 
 
 Keim's Brig. Palmer's Brig. If^'lff- 
 
 85th Penn. Vol. 85t!i N. Y. Vol. 104Lh Penn. Vol. 
 lout " " 98Lh " " 52d- " 
 
 lOSd Penn Vols. 92d N. Y. Vols. 
 
 96th N. Y. 
 
 81st 
 93d 
 
 56th N. Y. 
 100 th "' 
 nth I^laine 
 
 PROVOST GUARD. 
 . 2nd U. S. Cavalry. 
 Batfah'on 8th and 17th U. S. Infantv)-. 
 AT GENERAL HE.VDQUARTERS. 
 2 Cos. 4th. U. S. Cav. 1 Co. Oneida Cav. (N.Y. Vol.) 
 The following trOops of the army of the Poto- 
 mac were left behind, or detached, on and in front 
 of the' Potomac for the d«fence of tlvat line, April 
 Ist, 1862. Franklin's and McOail's divisions at 
 snbseqncnt and different dates joined tlie 
 active portion of the army on the Pcninsnla. 
 Two Brigades of Shield's division joined at Har- 
 2-i.son's Landing. 
 
 FIP^T CORPS. GENERAL McDOWELL. 
 
 ■ ■ Cavalry. '■ 
 
 1 $t New.Ybrk Cavalry. 4th New Y'ork Cavaky.! 
 
 2d ' .' ' " IstPciui. " ■ 
 
 Sharpshooters. 
 
 2d Regiment Berdan's Sharpshooters. 
 
 FRANKLIN'S DIVISION. 
 
 Artillei-y, 
 
 Pla tt's Bat'y "D" 2d U.S. 6 Napoleon gnns. 
 
 Porter's " 
 
 Hoxamer's 
 Wilson's 
 
 "A" Mass. 
 "A" N. J. 
 
 Ifewton^s Brig. 
 18th N.Y. Vols. 
 31ist " 
 32d " " 
 95 th Penn. " 
 
 j 4 10 pd Parrott ) 
 
 "] 2 12pdHowit's (^"^''^ 
 
 - 1410 pd Parrott | 
 
 ^ \ 212pd Howit's fS"» 
 
 F" 1st N. Y. Art'y 4 3-in. ordnance. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Slocuiris Brig. 
 
 16th N. Y. Vols 
 
 27th " 
 
 5th .Alaine " 
 
 96th Penn. ** 
 
 McCALL'S DIVISION. 
 
 Ariillery. 
 
 Seymour's Bat'y "G" 5 th U.S. 6 Napoleon guns. 
 
 Eaton's " "A" 1st Penn. 4 " 
 
 Cooper's. " "B" Ist . " 6 10-pd Parrott gns. 
 
 fO" 1 ^+ f( ^ 2 10-pd Parrott ) , 
 'C 1st 6 , ,r, 1 u •, r 2: liS. 
 412-pdHowits J ° 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 3Ieade's Brig. Ords Brig. 
 
 t. 3d Penn Res. Rgt. 6th Penn L'gt. 
 
 4tli " " " 9 th " 
 
 7th '' " " 10th " " 
 
 8 '■ " " nth " « " 12th « 
 
 1 Perini Reserve Rifles. 
 
 KING'S DIVISION. 
 
 ArllUery. 
 
 Gibbon's Bat'y "B" 4th U.S. 6 Napoleon guns, 
 
 Monroe's " "D" 1st R. L 6 10-pd Pairuttguns. 
 
 Gerrish's '' "A" N. H. 6 Napoleon " 
 
 Durreh's " Penn. 6 10-pd Parrott guns. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Brigade. Patriclcs Brig. Avgur^sBrig. 
 
 2d Wis. Vols. 20th N. Y. S. hi. 14th N. Y. S. M. 
 
 6th " " 21st " Vols. 22d " Vols. 
 
 7th " " 23d " "^ 24th " " 
 
 19. hind. « 25th " " 30th " " 
 
 FIFTH CORPS. GENERAL BANKS. . 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Ist Maine Cavalry. 5th New York Cavahy. 
 
 1st Vermont " 8th " " 
 
 Ist Michigaa " Keyea's Bat. Penn. Cav'/, 
 
 Kearney's Brig 
 
 LstN. J Vols. 
 
 2d " 
 
 3d " 
 
 4fcli- " • " 
 
 Ke ill's 
 
 Reynold :i Brig. 
 
 1 Penn Res. R" 
 
 2 " " 
 
 5 " " ' 
 
142 
 
 1st R. I. Cavaky. 18 Cos. Maryland Cavalry. 
 
 j^ 1 Squadron Virginia " 
 
 ^ Unattached. 
 
 28tli Pa. Vols. 4th Re^. Potomac H. G. (Md.Vols.) 
 WILLIAMS' DIVISION. 
 
 A rtillery. 
 Best's Battery "F" 4th U. S. C Napoleon guns. 
 Hampton's " Maryland 4 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
 Thompson's" " 4 " 
 
 Mathew's " "F" Penn. 6 3-in. ordnance " 
 Cothran's " "M ' 1 N. Y. G 10-pds. Parrott " 
 Knapp's " Penn. G " 
 
 McMahon's " N. Y. 6 3-in. ordnance " 
 
 Infantry. 
 Jbercrombie's Brig. — Brig. — Brig. 
 
 12th Mass. Vols. 9 N.Y. S..M 28 N. Y. Vs. 
 
 2d " " 29 Pa. Vols. 5 Conn. " 
 
 16th Ind. " 27 Ind. " 46 Pa. " 
 
 1 Pot. H. Brig. (Md.Vol.) 3 Wis. " 1 Md. " 
 1 Co. Zou. d'Af. (Pa. Vol.) 12 Ind. " 
 
 13 Mass." 
 SHIELD'S DIVISION. 
 
 Arlillerr/. 
 
 Clark's Bat. "E"4th U. S, 6 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
 
 T 1) « iit»i tTT ^ 4 10-pds. Parrott )..,,^^, 
 Jenk a " "A" 1st Va. G 2 Q_^^^lg a t g^i"« 
 
 Davy's " "B" 1st Va. 2 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
 Huiitington's"'A" 1 Ohio 6 I3-pds. James " 
 ^ ,. , ,, ,,T)>i u /. 2 12-p.How'r ) 
 Robmson's ""L"l " G ^ 6-p. guns, f S™^" 
 4 Ohio Inf. 1 6-p. gun. 
 Infantry. 
 Britrade. Brigade. Brigade. 
 
 14th Ind. Vols. 5th Ohio Vols. Tth Ohio Vols. 
 4th Ohio " 62d " " 29th " " 
 8th " " GGth " " 7th " " 
 7th Va. " 13th Ind. " 1st Va. " 
 67tl)OhIo " 39th 111. " 11th Penn."- 
 
 84th Penn. " Andrew Sharp's- 
 
 GENERAL WADSWORTH'S COMMAND. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 1st New Jersey Cavalry, At Alexandria. 
 4tli Pennsylvania " East of the Capitol. 
 
 Artillery and Infantry. 
 10th New Jersey Vols. Bladensburg Road. 
 104th N. Y. Vols. Kalorama Heights. 
 
 1st Wis. Heavy Art'y. Port "Cass," Va. 
 3 Batteries N. Y. " Forts "Ethan Allen" and 
 
 "Marcy." 
 Dapot N.Y. Light Art'y. Camp "Barry." 
 2d D. C. Vols. AVashington City. 
 
 2GLli Pa. " "G" St. Wliarf. 
 
 2Gth N. Y. " Fort Lyon. 
 
 9r)th " " Camp "Thomas." 
 
 9.ith " " Alexandria. 
 
 88tli Pa. " (Dctaohm't.) " 
 91 at " " Franklin Sq. Barracks. 
 
 4lh N. Y. Art'y. Forts "Carroll" and"Gre- 
 
 ble." 
 H2th Pa. Vols. Fort " Saratoga." 
 
 76th N.Y. Vols. Fort " Massachusetts." 
 
 59 th " " " "Pennsylvania." 
 
 88th Pa. « (Detachm't.) " " Good Hope." 
 99 th " " " "Mahan." 
 
 3d N. Y. Light Art'y. Forts " Ward," " Worth" 
 
 and " Blenker." 
 107th Pa. Vols. Kendall Green. 
 
 54th " " " " 
 
 Dickerson's Light Art'v.East of the Capitol. 
 86th N. Y. Vols. " " 
 
 88th Pa. " (Dctach't.) " " " 
 
 f Forts "Alban3',""Tel- 
 linghast," " Richard- 
 14 Mass. "Heavy Art'y -j son,""Runyon,""Jack- 
 56 Penn. " | son," " Barnard," 
 ["Craig," "Scott." 
 4th U. S. A r t'y (Detachment) j Fort " Wash'ton. ' 
 37th N.Y. VoUDetachraent) \ " 
 97th " " Fort " Corcoran." 
 101st " " 
 12th Va. " 
 91st N. Y. " 
 
 IN CAMP NEAR WASHINGTON. 
 6th New York Cavalry. Dismounted. 
 10th " 
 
 Swaim's " " " 
 
 2d Pennsylvania " " 
 
 (These troops, 3,359 men, were ordered to re- 
 port to Col. Miles, commanding Rail Road Guard, 
 to relieve 3,306 older troops, ordered to be sent 
 to Manassas to report to Gen. Abercrombie.) 
 GENERAL DIX'S COMMAND. (BALTIMORE.) 
 Cavalry. 
 1st Maryland Cavalry. Detachment of Cavalry, 
 Purnell Legion. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Battery " I" 2d U. S. Artillery. 
 " — Maryland Artillery. 
 " " L" 1st New York Artillery. 
 2 Independent Batteries, Penn. Artillery. 
 Infantry. 
 3d New York Volunteers. 
 4th 
 
 11th Pfennsylvania " 
 87th 
 
 111th « " 
 
 21st Massachusetts " (Detachment.) 
 
 2d Delaware " 
 
 2d ]\[aryland " . - „ 
 
 1st Eastern Shore Homo Guards (Maryland Vols.) 
 2d " " " 
 
 Parncll Legion 
 
 2 Battalions 
 
 Note. — Mr. Allen Pinkeutox was the trust- 
 worthy and efficient chief of the Secret Service 
 Corps. He is mentioned under his assumed name 
 Mr. E. J. Alljen. 
 
 Capt. G. a. Custar, additional A. D.C. and Lieu- 
 tenant U. S. Cavalry, was added to the Staff of the 
 Commanding General when on the Chickahominy. 
 
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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