■"^^i^* «.f <^^ ^^^UW^^* ^0 • • * \ '' *) ♦ L!r: ■-'«-'\^l THE PAN=AMERICAN POLICY OF JEFFERSON AND WILKINSON THE PAN-AMERICAN POLICY OP JEFFERSON AND WILKINSON The desire of President Jefferson to gain the Floridas pro- foundly influenced his whole attitude towards Napoleon Bona- parte. Early in 1808 this led the emperor to hint that ^^dth proper subserviency in regard to past commercial exactions and a future alliance against England the American executive might obtain his long-cherished desire. Armstrong, our minister to France, did not fancy the purpose that seemed to animate the French emperor nor the language in which he expressed it, and advised his government to declare war against either France or England, but in either case to seize the Floridas at once. Jeffer- son and Madison did indeed publish Napoleon's imperious de- mand; but at the same time they assumed a mild tone in their in- structions to Armstrong that little comported with vigorous action. They likewise instructed him to assure the imperious autocrat that they "had chosen as the basis for their policy a fair and sincere neutrality among the contending Powers," and were unwdlling to abandon it "for the purpose of obtaining a separate and particular object, however interesting to them." Yet they might be led by British hostility to preoccupy this territory, and in that case would be pleased to know that "the measure [had] received His Majesty's approbation.'" Napoleon made his proposal just as he was about to overthrow the Bourbon power in Spain, for the evident purpose of per- suading the United States to countenance his later plans in re- gard to Spanish-America; but his threat and its accompanying bribe proved equally ineffectual. As Madison wrote Armstrong, Great Britain had views upon Spanish-America as well as Na- poleon, and was equally interested in the neutrality of the Unit- ed States. The latter nation could easily stir up a revolution in Spanish-America, but would not do so if well treated by both belligerents. Upon being informed of this assumption of 1 Henry Adams, History of the United States (New York, 1889-1891), 4:293, 306. Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 213 neutrality the emperor unblusliingly denied the bribe that his ruthless despoiling of Spain had seemed to make possible. - The famous "Dos de Maio" in Madrid presented to Jefferson another opportunity to realize his wish. That memorable up- rising of the Spanish people against their oppressors did not, it is true, greatly arouse Jefferson's sympathy. His "pursuit of Florida," to quote Henry Adams, had enmeshed him too com- pletely for that. Rather, while Bonaparte was occupied with Spain, he anticipated that England would make up with the United States. Then without committing himself to either of the principal contestants he expected to seize West Florida as far as the Perdido as a rightful possession and "the residue of the Floridas" as a reprisal for the spoliations that for years he had vainly urged France and Spain to acknowledge. Thus his policy was an exceedingly selfish one. In carrying it out he pro- posed to gather his new recruits and armed vessels at points where they would be ready to act, the moment Congress au- thorized the blow. He thought he already had a sufficient force near Baton Rouge to attend to that post and he must now pre- pare for the seizure of Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine. The embargo afforded the necessary pretext for massing troops on the St. Mary's and the Tombigbee.^ Early in September Gallatin warned him from New York that, despite the tone of the Washington papers, there was a general feeling in favor of the Spanish patriots.* Yet the president did not abandon his quest for the Floridas, but affected to be puz- zled by Armstrong's earlier advice to seize them at once. The tidings of the victories over the French at Bailen and Vimeiro rendered Napoleon less fomiidable but increased the possibility that England might become the protector of the threatened Spanish colonies. It was with this in mind that the president recorded the determination of the cabinet after its meeting of October 22: "Unanimously agreed in the sentiments which should be unauthoritatively expressed by our agents to influen- tial persons in Cuba and Mexico, to-wit: 'If you remain under the dominion of the kingdom and family of Spain, we are con- 2 Adams, History of the United States, 4:311. 3 Thomas Jefiferson, Writings (Ford ed. — New York, 1892-1899), 9:203. * Jefferson Papers, ser. 3, vol. 7:71. 214 /. J. Cox M- V. H. R. tented; but we should be extremely unwilling to see you pass under the dominion or ascendency of France or England. In the latter case, should you choose to declare independence, we cannot now commit ourselves by saying we would make common cause with you, but must reserve ourselves to act according to the then existing cii'cumstances ; but in our proceedings we shall be influenced by friendship to you, by a iirm feeling that our interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest repug- nance to see you under subordination to either France or Eng- land either politically or commercially.' " ^ It was in keeping with this decision that the president, a week later, answered a communication of William C. C. Claiborne, who as governor of Oi-leans Territory was in a favorable position to know the sentiments of neighboring Spanish officials. Clai- • borne had sent him a Spanish paper that savagely attacked the American policy. In part the president replied: "The truth is that the patriots of Spain have no warmer friends than the Administration of the United States, but it is our duty to say nothing for or against either [faction]." After expressing the opinion of the cabinet in regard to Cuba and Mexico, he added : "We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence fi"om this hemisphere. ' ' The governor was instructed to express this sentiment to any proper characters from either province and particularly to inform them that the American authorities had "nothing more at heart than their friendship." " Despite the protest one feels that the Floridas still played an important part in Jefferson's professed friendship for Spain or her colonies. The eontemporaiy Spanish officials on the imperiled frontier continued to think so and there was much in Jefferson's subsequent utterances and deeds to justify them. In none does this appear so clearly as in his selection of the envoy to convey his new message of friendliness. His choice fell on General James Wilkinson, a former discretlited Spanish pensioner. In this task Wilkinson, the agent, was as thoroughly influenced by personal motives as was Jefferson by the prospect of immediate national gain. 5 Adams, History of the United States, -1:340. •iThomas Jefferson, Writings (Memorial ed. — Washington, 19031004), 12:186. Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 215 AVilkinson's first reference to this propaganda occurs in his letter of March 12, 1807, although in this he mentioned Jeffer- son's earher desire to occupy Cuba. In his view the United States and Great Britain should combine to preserve the western world from Napoleon and his unwiUing ally, the king of Spain. With the aid of the British fleet they could preserve their own territory, occupy Cuba, reduce the Floridas, and give independ- ence to Mexico.^ He evidently made this suggestion to conceal from his superior the true character of Walter Burling 's mission to Mexico City and to induce the president to pay for it. Later in the same month he suggested that an alliance composed of the independent states of Mexico, Peru, and Cuba might, with the aid of the United States, bid defiance to the Old World. It is possible to infer that Wilkinson's references to an Amer- ican alliance were inspired by a desire to neutralize in the mind of the executive the storm of protest that his arbitrary career in New Orleans had aroused. If so, it proved largely ineffective. A like result followed his proposal for common action with Great Britain. The Chesapeake affair destroyed such a possibility. For a time it was doubtful if his vulnerable reputation could withstand the public execration aroused by the Burr trial, the congressional attacks urged on by John Randolph, and the in- vestigation by a military court of inquiry. But in betraying Burr he had gained the support, if not the confidence of Jeffer- son, while his Spanish intermediaiy. Governor Vizente Folch of West Florida, almost perjiired himself in his behalf.' Thus he prospered far beyond Ms deserts, and resplendent in a coat of official whitewash, next appeared before his former Spanish pajTuasters, as the harbinger of a new day of freedom. It is difficult to determine why Jefferson selected Wilkinson for this role. The general's own advocacy may have influenced him, but it is more likely that he also hoped to make the other break with his former Spanish accomplices. Very likely he doubted if Wilkinson had disproved the charges of corrupt deal- ings with the Spaniards. But the narrow escape from convic- 7 Wilkinson to Jefferson, Mareh 12, 1807. Papers Eelative to Burr's Conspiracy, manuscript in bureau of rolls and library, department of state. <* Report of the Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Condxict of General Wilkinson, February 36, 1811 (Washington, 1811), 42-50. Ezekiel Bacon was chair- man of the committee. 216 1. J. Cox Ji- V. H. R. tion must have aroused feelings of repentance in his subordi- nate. By sending him on a mission that would be distasteful to his former bribers, the president might eifectually remove him from further temptation of this sort. At the same time Wilkin- son could serve as well as another to warn the Spanish colonial oflBcials not to cultivate close commercial or political relations with Great Britain, and to proffer the friendly aid of the United States. About a year after he had proposed that Great Britain and the United States should unite in favor of a New World policy, Wilkinson warned Jose Vidal, the Spanish vice consul at New Orleans, against the machinations of the former power. He an- nounced the accession of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain and the presence of a French agent on the Mexican border. He then informed the other that the British officials were also plan- ning a series of intrigues in the Spanish colonies, and desired the United States to make common cause with them. Should the latter refuse to cooperate they would carry on their propa- ganda alone, and would probably include in it an attack on the Floridas and even New Orleans." This possibility, together with the rumor that Burr was re^^^^ng his project, was sufficient to justify Wilkinson's warning. One suspects, however, that he may have designed it to assist the application that he had just made to Folch for an exculpatory letter to be used before the court of inquiry. After this tribunal rendered its favorable but undeserved verdict, Wilkinson largely ceased to play the part of suppliant with his Spanish correspondents. In his letter to Governor Folch, August 25, 3808, he wrote that Spain was bound to fall under the control of Bonaparte. The Spanish colonies might then declare their independence under a new dj'nasty, with a new order of nobility in which Folch ought to have an important station. If talent for intrigue was a requirement, Folch certain- ly could meet it. The new nation would then have to decide whether to seek European or American alliance. At any rate, as he urged three weeks later, the Spanish colonies must defend 9 Inclosure in letter of Vidal to Iturrigaray, Ai>iil 7, 1808. Marina, 1809 a 1814, Archive General y Publico de la Nacion, Mexico. H. E. Bolton. Guide to Materials for Ihe History of the United States in the Principal Archives of Mexico (Washington, 1913), 183. Vol. T, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 217 themselves. The British could never prevent Spain from suc- cumbing to Bonaparte, although they were extending their influ- ence throughout her colonies wherever possible, and planning to control the whole of them. For the present Napoleon was paying no attention to this phase of the contest, but in the course of two years he would force England to make peace, ceding Span- ish-America to him. When this region inevitably yielded itself, the conqueror would vigorously proscribe his enemies. So Wil- kinson advised Folch to delay assuming sides. "In the mean- time, ' ' he added, ' ' save your province from any European power and let Someruelos take care of Cuba, which may slip into the hands of a false friend." To relieve his suggestion of selfish- ness he added: "My country must undoubtedly sympathize with Spanish-America and if called on will help her. ' ' '" In this warning about West Florida and Cuba Wilkinson had Jefferson's policy in mind. To his patron he now wrote in re- gard to the other project, expressing the "liveliest hopes" in the speedy emancipation of Mexico and South America. Possibly liis hopes were lively because of his expressed desire to partici- pate in this "glorious achievement."" He emphasized the de- sirability and necessity of an "excision of our transatlantic con- nections" by which "we should escape the allurements of inor- dinate wealth and the poisons of luxurious indulgence," and asserted: "Our acquaintance with the European World would gradually subside, fleets and Armies would insensibly become useless to a People of self government; and a persevering re- spect for ancient habits, and a fine adherence to principle, would perpetuate the freedom and happiness of the people of United America, to endless time. ' ' With this in mind he mentioned the credulity wdth which the "feeble uninformed Spaniards" were "surrendering themselves to the interested, officious interfer- i" Inclosures in letter of Foleli to Someruelos. Reservado No. 130, Papeles Pro- eedentes ile la Isla de Cuba, Legajo 1566, Arehivo General de Indies, Seville. This source will be referred to as "Cuban Papers." The same material is found in Estado, Legajo 5550, Arehivo Historico National, Madrid. This correspondence was transmitted through Captain E. P. Gaines at Fort Stod- dert, whose suspicions were so thoroughly aroused, despite his friendship for Wilkin- son, that he made the matter the subject of a personal letter to Jefferson, January 25, 1809. 11 Wilkinson to Jefferson, October 1, 1808. Jefferson Papers, ser. 2, vol. 85:109. 218 /. J. Cox M. V. H. R. eiice of the Britisli" from which Spanish-America was not like- ly to be exempt. He felt that agents should be sent to warn the Mexican authorities against these "insidious enci'oachments " and assure them of American sympathy and offered to convey this message to the Marques de Someruelos, whom he knew per- sonally. The marques was "extremely feminine in his exterior, and of feeble intellect" and "without some seasonable counter- action on our part" the British might "cajole or frighten him" out of Cuba and the Floridas. Wilkinson referred to the sentiments that the Mexicans had already expressed to Burling and to emphasize his own fitness for the proposed mission submitted a memorandum of his answers to some questions from Governor Herrera regarding the attitude of the United States towards Mexico. Wilkinson longed to obtain "some interesting appointment" which would enable him "by irrefragible evidence to strike dumb" his "slanderers and revilers." Probably this desire was strength- ened by the recent suggestion of the secretary of war, made in connection with an order to ascertain the fate of some mem- bers of Pike's party, that the officer sent for this purpose should note the general effect that recent events in Europe had had on Mexico. Such events might produce results "highly interesting to the United States" and demand their "strict at- tention."'- Thus influenced, Wilkinson composed a second let- ter to Herrera covertly suggesting coimuon action in behalf of Spanish-American independence. At the same time he did not neglect his personal affairs, for he asked Herrera to disprove the calumnies of liis enemies in regard to his relations with the Spaniards at the time of Burr's conspiracy.'" Early in November Wilkinson again assured Folch that the Spanish-Americans might count on the assistance of the United States. Despite newspaper reports to the contrary, ninety-nine out of a himdred of his fellow citizens felt the same. Their own affairs with Great Britain and with France were not in a flatter- ing condition. The embargo was to continue under yet greater restrictions. But he piously hoped that God would favor the 12 Secretary of war to Wilkinson, September 8, 1808. Inclosed under date of Sep- tember 3, 1809. Manuseript in Letters Received, in war department. 13 Wilkinson to Herrera, October 12, 1808. Jefferson Papers, ser. 3, vol. 85:108. Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 219 cause of the just, in which number he included Folch's compa- triots as well as his own.'* Wilkinson's language nettled Folch because of its prophecy if not its hypocrisy. In his reply he called the American's at- tention to the series of defeats that the Spanish people had re- cently inflicted upon the French armies, by virtue of which they might style themselves the Romans of the modern world. For this reason the United States should value their friendship above that of any other power; but he failed to convince the other. While the general still hoped, as every good patriot should, that Heaven would favor "the magnanimous sons of the Peninsula," he feared that the combined armies of Alexander and of Bona- parte would prove irresistible. The colonial leaders should pre- pare for such an untoward event as the fall of the mother coun- try. Should this occur Spanish-America, united, organized, and in alliance with the United States, might bid defiance to all the warring nations of Europe.'^ In this fashion the suspected Spanish pensioner assumes a Pan-American role that places his name among the earliest advocates of the Monroe Doctrine. AVe cannot escape this conclusion unless we prefer to believe that Jefferson inspired his utterances, and this would imply an in- timacy between them that was of little credit to Jefferson. In his letter to Folch, Wilkinson expressed the hope that if his prophecy came true, Folch's "surpassing talents in political sci- ence" would receive adequate recognition. This reiterated wish aroused Folch's suspicion and led him to await with resentful curiosity their forthcoming interview. This was to take place as a result of Wilkinson's recent orders to assemble in New Or- leans "as large a body of troops as possible." '" With his usual desire to make an impression Wilkinson wrote Folch that his force was to number seven thousand.'' It was not this fact alone that alarmed the Spanish governor. His sus- picions were already aroused by the muster of the Orleans mili- tia in keeping with the new military policy of the American gov- ernment. He believed that that government had sold itself to i67. Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 229 assembled company, largely composed of Spanish officials, re- ceived the toast with favor. If, in New Orleans and Baton Rouge, Great Britain seemed the chief obstacle to a Pan-American alliance, France appeared in a similar light to the administration. Evidently Jefferson's books and his farm did not wholly suffice to occupy his attention in retirement, for, on April 19, he wrote to his successor: "I suppose the conquest of Spain will soon force a delicate question on j'ou as to the Floridas and Cuba, which will offer themselves to you. Napoleon will certainly give his consent without diffi- culty to our receiving the Floridas, and with some difficulty pos- sibly Cuba." Eight days later he added : "Napoleon ought to conciliate our good mil because we can be an obstacle to the new career opening to him in the Spanish colonies." The Floridas alone would not be a sufficient reward for American neutrality. Our government would acquire them anyhow at the first outbreak of war and until then did not need them. Napoleon must also agree to the American acquisition of Cuba, if he wished a free hand in Mexico and the remaining colonies.^* This implied doubt in regard to the outcome of Wilkinson's mission and a desire to secure American interests in any event. He wrote W. C. Nicholas that, in case Napoleon continued his commercial exactions, the people of Cuba and the Floridas might proffer themselves to the United States. The situation had greatly changed since the preceding autumn. Then neither France nor Great Britain showed any disposition to compose its differences wdth the United States. Now Madison thought that the former was inclined to be more conciliatory. If, then. Napoleon should attempt to keep the United States from trading with the Spanish colonies, as it had formerly done with Santo Domingo, and should couple this requisition -with an offer to cede the Floridas, it "would pi'esent a dilemma not very pleasant. " ^'^ Evidently his ambition was not so great as his predecessor's who wished to mark our territorial pretensions to the southward by a column on the farther shore of Cuba. In Jefferson's view we could defend this region without a navy and this factor should determine our rule for expansion. 34.Teffer8on, Writings (Memorial ed.), 12:273, 277. 35 James Madison, Writingtt (G. Hunt ed. — New York, 1900-1910), 8:33. 230 7. J. Cox ^- V- H. B. TuiTeau had already presented the unpleasant "dilemma" that Madison feared. Incensed at the repeal of the embargo, which, unaccompanied by a declaration of war, he regarded as a pro-British measure, he now demanded from the new adminis- tration an explanation of some other current rumors. One re- ferred to a general project to revolutionize Spanish-America. Another specifically charged the American government wdth in- citing secret assemblies in the Floridas, patterned after those that Miranda had organized in Caracas, and encouraging similar measures in Cuba. Finally the anxietj^ in regard to the British fleet at Halifax was simply a pretext to justify the concentration of troops at New Orleans. The French minister professed to believe that these reports were circulated by those who wished to sever the harmony existing between his nation and the United States, yet he had reported them to his court and awaited with interest an explicit answer from the American authorities.^* The president had already written to Jefferson : ' ' Cuba will, without doubt, be a cardinal object with Napoleon." Could he have seen Turreau's dispatch to Champagny of April 22, 1809, he would have been confii'med in this view and doubtful of the immediate future. The French minister claimed that the con- centration of American troops in New Orleans under Wilkinson arose from a desire to cooperate with the independent party in the Floridas, rather than to defend that city against possible British attack. Wilkinson's visit to Havana gave point to an anonymous chai-ge, which he attributed to a clerk in the state department, that the United States was sending revolutionary agents to Mexico, the Floridas, and Cuba. Turreau suggested that his government should use the riots in Cuba that had in- terfered with Wilkinson's mission as a pretext for the immediate seizure of that island. Having thus forestalled the Americans there, the Fi''ench might later occupy the Floridas and Mexico.'' After submitting his pointed inquiries of April 15, Turreau withdrew in a rage to Baltimore. Madison desired to avoid rupture with France and requested Gallatin to call on her min- ister on his way northward and explain the real sentiments of the administration. Evidently Gallatin believed that the presi- 36 Affaires :fitrangei-es, fitats-Unis, 62:123. 37 Affaires fitrangeres, fitats-Unis, 62:121, 122. Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 231 dent's \dews were the same as his own; otherwise, it will be diffi- cult to reconcile Turreau's report of them, if correctly given, with Madison's later action. Gallatin told the French minister that the administration dis- claimed all responsibility for Wilkinson's utterance such as the Norfolk toast. This was to be attributed to "the vanity, the indiscretion and the ordinary inconsistencies of that General," whom the other knew as well as they. If Turreau imagined that Mr. Madison desired the Floridas, he was mistaken. That was Mr. Jefferson 's hobby, but did not represent the views of his cabinet. The Floridas would be desirable only because their possession might prevent misunderstandings ^\ith Spain and se- cure an outlet for the southern states. The administration was in no way responsible for such popular meetings as had taken place there, and they had heard nothing in regard to Wilkinson 's reception by the Spaniards. As for Cuba, the United States would not take it as a gift.^' Gallatin's assurances evidently failed to convince the other. In reporting them Turreau called his supei'ior's attention to the fact that they were accompanied by no favorable action in re- gard to a commercial policy. At the same time Secretary Smith instructed Armstrong at Paris to say that while it was the gen- eral policy of the United States to preserve neutrality towards the Spanish colonies, they would feel free to act otherwise, if necessary to preserve their territorial claims.^^ When the Er- skine agreement resulted in a fiasco, Jefferson wrote Madison that if Bonaparte were wise enough to change his attitude to- ward the United States he must inevitably lead it to declare war against England. In that event he advised the immediate occu- pation of Baton Rouge in order to forestall the British. Our claim to this territory' would justify the step.*" The inconsistencies of Jeft'erson's and Madison's commercial policy thus characterize their attitude towards Spanish-America and even the neighboring West Florida. Jefferson was ready to assist a revolt in the Spanish colonies, should Bonaparte dom- 38 Adams, History of the TJnited, States, 5:37, 38. 39 Smith to Armstrong, May 8, 1809. Instructions, vol. 7, manuscript in bureau of indexes and archives. <« Jeflferson, Writings (Memorial ed.), 12:304. 232 I. J. Cox M- V. H. B. inate Spain. Foi- this he expected the Floridas as his reward. Hence, his desire to open diplomatic relations with them, even through the untrustworthy Wilkinson. At the same time if Bon- aparte should pursue a more favorable commercial policy to- wards us, he miglit purchase our neutrality in respect to his own Spanish-American plans, by the bribe of the same Floridas with Cuba included. His own cabinet did not seem to approve his •\aews, but he persisted in setting them on foot, and even exerted pressure on his successor to continue them. On assuming office, the latter promptly repudiated them, but ere his first adminis- tration was half completed, he was exerting powerful efforts to gain both the Floridas, and at the same time truckling to Bona- parte. Meanwhile the unconscious if not innocent object of so much report and conjecture reached New Orleans. His long delayed arrival represents a distinct anticlimax to what might have proved an interesting diplomatic episode. Wilkinson's inter- views with his former friends Vidal and Folch were as fruitless as his brief \'isit to Havana. To the former he immediately re- ported the substance of his communication to Captain-General Someruelos. This did not differ materialh' from what Clai- borne had already told the vice consul about the proposed Pan- American alliance. In reply Vidal repeated what he had pre- viously said to the governor — that Spanish-America would probably follow the lead of the mother country and preserve friendly relations with Great Britain. Consequently any hostil- ity between that power and the United States might be an obsta- cle to the proposed Pan-American alliance. Wilkinson claimed to represent the sentiments of the admin- istration and now told Vidal that he expected his country and Great Britain to compose their differences and declare war against France. In that case there would be no objection to in- cluding Great Britain in the proposed alliance. He may have had some intimation of the Erskine correspondence upon which to base his assei'tion. Vidal was inclined to believe that Wilkin- son correctly reported the attitude of his government, for unless the British nation was a party to the suggested alliance, the United States would be more than ever exposed to European Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 23o inacliinations. Yet he felt tliat the western world as a whole was reasonably safe from European invasion. He even sug- gested that the death of the tyrant or some other accident might afford the united and grateful Spanish colonies an opportunity to rescue the mother country from captivity."^ We have as yet no complete evidence that Jefferson instructed Wilkinson to propose a Pan-American alliance to the Spanish officials that he visited. His cabinet had tentatively suggested such a policy before he ordered Wilkinson to New Orleans. That general had more than hinted at it and was only too anx- ious to receive instructions to carry it out. His communications to Somenielos suggest that he had them in reser^^^e but the riots in Havana and the captain-general's attitude gave him no chance to present them. The case was otherwise in New Orleans where his former friends not only gave him the opportunity but even partly suggested the subject matter of his discourse. It is likewise possible that Wilkinson first defimtely heard of the proposed alliance from Vidal and Claiborne, after his arrival in New Orleans. Owing to the lack of discipline among his troops and the havoc already wrought by disease it would be a useless proceeding to assure the Spanish authorities that they had nothing to apprehend from the military forces in New Orleans. They already knew that for themselves. On the other hand the condition of these forces afforded his enemies another opportunity to attack him, and they quickly took advantage of it. Accordinglj' he must employ every possible means to strengthen his tottering influence. He attacked his enemies for seeking to discourage enlistments or to persuade his officers to resign. He appealed to the Spaniards in the interior provinces for addition- al testimony in his favor. At the same time he suggested to the administration a comprehensive plan for immediately occu- pying West Florida and defending New Orleans. In his extrem- ity the suggested alliance offered still another possibility of re- deeming himself. He was fully instructed to interview Folch on another subject. He would add to it the proposed alliance, appeal to their former friendship, tempt the governor's person- al ambition, and lead him to place himself at the head of this 41 Inclosure no. 2 in letter of Vidal to Garibay, April 10, 1809. Cf. n. 32. 234 7. J. Cox M. V. H. R. new movement. Vidal had suggested the necessity of including Great Britain in this alliance, and although without definite in- structions on this point, he incorporated it in his proposal. By this means he would inaugurate a deservedly popular movement, in the glory of which he might be safe from his most persistent foes. In pursuit of this plan, therefore, Wilkinson met Folch at the San Juan bridge, April 28, and conducted him in a carriage to the government house in New Orleans. In the course of their ride together, as he tells us in two separate accounts, they conversed on the fate of Spain and the future interests of her colonies. He reported that Folch fully expected Bonaparte to triumph over Spain, but before that event he hoped the junta would direct him to deliver West Florida to the United States. Mexico must then seek to presei-ve her independence either by joining the United States or forming a confederation of her own. This is in keeping Avitli Claiborne's previous report of the gov- ernor's attitude. Perhaps Wilkinson used this to fabricate the whole interview, or else Folch was playing with him as he had with the Orleans executive. When Folch mentioned the possibility of a Spanish-American confederation, Wilkinson remarked that to it the Floridas would form a "feeble and pernicioiis appendage." Folch assented and stated in case the junta did not act as he hoped, he wouJd apply to the viceroy of Mexico for power to surrender West Florida; failing in that, to the president himself. He declared that Great Britain should never get the province, for it was "as necessaiy to the United States as the drawer is to the case." The astonished Wilkinson observed that "the subject presented a solid ground of Conciliation and mutual Confidence," between their countries, wliich he would gladly promote. Folch declared that he had never before uttered this idea, but itiollows so closely his interview with Claiborne in Baton Rouge that one is tempted still more to regard that as the real source of Wilkin- son's reports. The general closes by advising his superiors to send an agent immediately to confer with Folch on the surrender of his province," which he suggested might be hastened by ' ' an *- J. W. to Madison, May 1, 1S09. Calendar of the Correspondence of James Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 235 indemnity" to its officials. This was a natural but sinister sug- gestion in view of the charges already pending against the gen- erah If we are inclined to regard as genuine this report of the in- terview between Wilkinson and Folch, we may find evidence to corroborate it in Claiborne's contemporary correspondence. The latter wrote that while Folch was in New Orleans he freely ex- pressed himself as favoring the independence of Spanish-Amer- ica. He also conveyed the impression that most of his fellow oflScials entertained the same views. Claiborne, however, doubt- ed if the people were prepared for such a step. They were "de- plorably ignorant, unusually superstitious, for the most part poor, indolent and easih' controlled by their priests." Any at- tempt on their part at self government, therefore, would be fol- lowed by "scenes affecting to humanity." The anarchy then prevailing in Havana suggested the possibility of reenaoting there another Santo Domingo. Claiborne thought that neither Mexico nor Cuba single handed could long maintain its independence. With the people soon losing their enthusiasm it would be impossible to keep them out of the clutches of France or Great Britain. In such a contin- gency the latter might demand a commercial monopoly as its re- ward and this course would prove as injurious as the rule of Joseph Bonaparte. Claiborne felt that it would be impossible to maintain much longer the policy of neutrality that the United States had hitherto observed between the rival factions in Spain. "The interest of the United States requires that all European influence should be banished from the continent of Amei"ica," he echoed, and ' ' the i^resent crisis is favorable to the accomplish- ment of so desirable an object." He closed by stating that he forebore to ad\-ise the government further." It was well that he did so, for he was simply paraphrasing Jefferson's missive of the preceding October. Folch 's own letters to his superiors are tilled ^rith strong ex- pression of loyalty to Ferdinand VII, and he offered to serve Maainon (Washiugton, 1894-1895), 726; also 38 Miseellaneous Letters, filed uuder date of January 1, 1813, in bureau of indexes and archives. « aaiborne to Smith, May 14, 1809. Claiborne Correspondence, 5. Parker, Cal- endar of Papers, no. 7567. 236 /. J. Cox ^i- V. H. R. Spain against the invader. These letters and his own subse- quent course certainly show him in no sense as a champion of Spanish-American independence. Yet it is probable that the reports of Wilkinson and Claiborne in regard to his willingness to deliver West Florida may have some foundation, for a year and a half later he actually made such an offer. It is likely, too, that when his offer came, the administration conceived extrava- gant hopes from it based on his earlier conversations with these American officials. On the other hand it is equally likely that, while conferring with them, the Spaniard knowingly conveyed more than his real view's. He despised Claiborne and distrust- ed Wilkinson, and may have thought himself justified in deceiv- ing them and the government they represented. From it, if not from its immediate agents, he apprehended the most imme- diate peril to his dominions. So far as his letters from New Orleans are concerned, one might infer that Wilkinson's mission was simply to reassure him upon this point. The general delivered to him a communi- cation similar to the one already given Someruelos, to explain the assembling of American troops at New Orleans. Folch ad- mitted that this movement had caused him some anxiety, appre- ciated the good intentions of the United States, and assured Wilkinson that his own were friendly.** When, however, Folch returned to Pensacola, he unbosomed himself to his superior. His letter on this occasion clearly shows that Wilkinson's elabor- ate explanation of the presence of troops in New Orleans was largely a pretext suggested by Jefferson to conceal their real purpose — the opening of diplomatic relations with the Spanish colonies. Wilkinson tried to show Folch, so the latter wrote, that Spain was bound to succumb to Bonaparte. According to Claiborne's report the Spanish governor already believed this, but he ob- viously did not wish his superior to think so. In such an event it would be highly desirable to forai an alliance to include Span- ish-America, Brazil, the United States, and, if necessary, Eng- land. The addition of the last-named power was probably an ■I* Wilkinson to Folch, May 3, 1809; Folch to Wilkinson, May 4, 1809. J. A. Rob- ertson, List of Documents in Spanish Archives . . . of Which Transcripts are Preserved in American Libraries (Washington, 1910), nos. 5168, 5169. Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 237 after-thought inspii'ed by the interviews with Vidal, or by pre- liminaiy information in regard to the abortive Erskine conven- tion. In case the Spanish colonies declared their independence, it would be desirable for them to have an agent near the United States, and Folch himself would most acceptably fill that office because he knew so thoroughly all the factors involved. This additional evidence afforded by Wilkinson's interview mth the Spanish governor serves as a link in Jefferson's poUcy and ex- plains the general's correspondence of the preceding autumn. Folch told Wilkinson, so he wrote Somenielos,^^ that while he felt flattered at this expression of confidence in himself, he thought that children ought not to be in haste to divide a par- ent's property before her death. Furthermore he had no inten- tion of beginning a policy that he could not carry through. Be- lieving that both Wilkinson and Claiborne represented the ideas of their government, he pointed out to his superior that the pro- posed alliance might serve to rescue the mother country from Bonaparte. Possibly he desired thus to protect himself, should any report of his views as given to Claiborne or to Wilkinson chance to reach Someruelos. Folch assured the latter that Amer- ica, well governed and united, would be inaccessible to Bona- parte. Should his ambitions tempt him, the voyage would mark the beginning of his overthrow and the climate, its end. The Corsican, however, would hardly venture to repeat on so exten- sive a scale his experience in Santo Domingo, j'et the governor assured the captain general that he was ready to act against him as Someruelos might desire. In communicating Folch 's dispatches to his superiors, Som- eruelos observed that he was unable to appreciate Folch 's con- versations with Claiborne and with Wilkinson, for that official had not reported them in sufficient detail. He advised the gov- ernor to remedj^ his reports in that respect. He also expressed his surprise that Folch had ventured to discuss such delicate subjects and advised him to shun this course in the future, for the Americans simply desired to draw out the views of the Span- iards and later turn them to their advantage. The uniform re- ply to suggestions for independence and alliance should be that «5 Foleh to Someruelos, May 23, 1809. Robertson, List of Documents, no. 5170. 238 7. J. Cox M. V. H. R. the Spaniards would die to preserve the union of the two Amer- icas with Spain/" Despite the firmness of tone that Someruelos assumed towards his superiors, or that Folch emploj'ed with him, there is a sug- gestion that each heUeved that a speedy catastrophe was inevi- table, but wished to shield himself from any responsibility for it. Folch also attempted to play off Claiborne against Wilkin- son in an endeavor to ascertain if both correctly reported the attitude of their superiors, while Vidal evidently worked with him to the same end. At the same time Folch expressed him- self so as to arouse American hopes in regard to the Floridas and establish his influence with their officials in case he had to rely upon them in an extremity. In this way in the crisis of 1810-1811, he managed through the American authorities to pre- serve Mobile from a filibustering expedition, and at the same time remained in good standing with his superiors. Such was the influence of the Florida question that it led American and Spanish officials alike to adopt a shifting course of duplicity. That this influence was marked in the case of Wilkinson is shown by his communication of May 12 to the secretary of war. Folch was still in the city and his own army disorganized, but he suggested an elaborate plan to defend the region, of which West Florida constituted the danger point.*' A week later, after the Spanish governor had left New Orleans but before he had reached Pensacola, Wilkinson reported that a "commotion" threatened to break out in that city. Folch was likely to call upon him for assistance. He might be overthrown either "by the usurpation of the Spanish subjects or by the enterprise of the American settlers." In view of possible public advantage he wished to receive instructions at the earliest possible mo- ment.*' In reply the secretary of war wrote him, July 22, 1809 : "It is the continued wish and instruction of the president that no interference of any kind in the affairs and territories of Spain should take place, or be encouraged, or permitted, by any person or persons, whether civil or military belonging to or under the «6 Someruelos to G. F. O., October 8, 1809. Cuban Papers, Legajo 157. <' Wilkinson, Memoirs, 2:351. ts/birf., 2:357. Vol. I, No. 2 Jefferson and Wilkinson 239 authority of the United States."" E\ddently the protests of the French minister were beginning to affect the administration, although Canning's repudiation of the Erskine agreement con- tributed to the same end and warned it not to complicate its for- eign policy further. Thus ended the first effort of the United States to initiate a Pan-American policy. Jefferson, in retire- ment, could not force his successor to continue his mistaken policy, nor support his unworthj^ protege. The latter was obliged to resign his command and come northward in an un- availing attempt to clear himself from charges of inefficiency as well as of personal corruption. Isaac Joslin Cox unrveesity of cincinnati *9 Wilkinson to N. Salcedo, August 31, 1809. MSS. Internas Provincias Interras, vol. 239, Expediente 2, p. 33, Arebivo General, Mexico. P D o. V-^' -^s" ^ , %. ••• A^ <* -vvT^ 0^ '^ • •'• • - » A J. a\ V • • ' ^°-n^. '- v<;;v..V-y..... '' v^'Vii..°V--->°..... ^-..<^ /TVT^ ,0*" ^^. '»..' A <. °o v«^ ^OBBS BROTHERsN 'lI8R1'!< 8IS0INC CO, INC ) V ST flucusnuE, ftfl^^/ <■ ♦ «? <>>■, »^