QassJil-Lo:! — Book ^ 4STH Congress, » HOUSE OF EEPRESENTATIYES. ( Mis. Doc. 2d Session. i ) No. 29. War Series. No. III. INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. REPORT OF THE BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS EGrYPT, 18 8 2 LIEUTENANT-OOMMANDEE OASPAE P. GOODEIOH, UNITED STATES NAVY. OFFICE OF NATAL INTELLIGENCE, BURIGA.XJ Oir- ISr^^A^IG-^^TION, NAVY DEPAKTMBNT, 1883. WASHINGTOI^: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 1885. ■ iVi- \ \ vS^"' 48th Congress, ) HOUSE OF EEPEESENTATIVES. j Mis. Doc. 2d Session. \ ■ . ) 1^0. 29. War Series, No. III. INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. REPORT Y^^ 'IT OF THE ^ BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS iisr 18 8 2 LIEUTEITAifT-COMMAEDEE OASPAE P. GOODEIOH, UIv'ITED STATES NAVY. j-S- OFFICE OF NAVAL USTTELLIGENCE, NAVY DEPAE3>M[EMi'j ^ . 1883.: :"''' WASHIITGTOK: GOYEKNMENT PEINTING OFFICE, 1885. J -<.< A CONTENTS Page. Letter of transmittal 7 F J^nrr I. I. — Preliminary 9 The negotiations immediately preceding hostilities. 11. — General Eeview op the Defenses ok Alexandria 13 III. — The Attacking Fleet '25 Alexandra — Inflexible — S ultan — Superb — Temeraire — Invinci- ble — Monarch — Penelope — Gun- vessels. IV. — The Bombardment 31 Order of battle — The action — Eeport of the senior officer of the offshore squadron — Other details, &c. V. — The Effect upon the Ships 40 Alexandra — Inflexible — Invincible — Penelope — Sultan — Superb. VI. — The Fortifications and the Damages sustained by them 46 Silsileh — Pharos — Ada — The Eas-el-Tin Lines — The Hospital Bat- tery — The Central Battery — The Tower Battery — The Light- House Fort — Sale Aga— Unnamed battery — Oom-el-Kabebe — Mex Lines — Mex Fort — Marsa-el-Khanat — Marabout — Ad- jemi. VII. — General Conclusions fi9 fj^:rt II. VIII. — Operations by the British Navy at Alexandria subsequent to the Bombardment 79 The occupation — The landing party from the United States fleet — Arrival of troops — The destruction of Egyptian ammunition — . The naval battery at Kamleh. IX.— Other Operations preceding the Change of Base 87 The land defenses of Alexandria — The occupation of Eamleh — Defenses of Eamleh — The outpost at Antoniades Garden — The reconnaissance in force of August 5 — Operations at other points. X. — The Composition of the Expeditionary Force 97 XL — The Seizure of the Suez Canal and the Change of Base... 105 General report — Work at Port Said — In the canal — At Ismailia — South of Lake Timsah — At Chalouf— Action of M. de Les- seps — British proclamations. XIL— The Campaign 1'J^RT III. XIV.— The Working of the Naval Transport Service 165 XV.— The Armed Trains , 182 One employed at Alexandria — One employed on the Ismailia and Tel-el-Kebir line. XVI. — The Boat Transport on the Sweet Water Canal 190 XVII. — The Naval Brigade at Tel-el-Kebir r.... 196 XVIIL— The Marine Battalions 204 The Eoyal Marine Light Infantry — The Eoyal Marine Artillery. XIX. — The Lines op Communication 208 XX. — The Commissariat and Transport Corps 215 XXL— The Troops 221 The cavalry — The mounted infantry — The infantry. XXII. — The Eoyal Artillery 230 16-pdr. — 13-pdr. — Artillery work during the campaign — El Mag- far — Tel-el-Mahuta and Mahsameh — Kassassin. (For Tel-el- Kebir see p. 146 ante.) XXIIL— The Eoyal Engineers 249 The 8th Company — 17th Company — 18th Company— 21st Com- pany — 24th Company — 26th Company — Establishment of a field company — The pontoon troop — Field park. XXIV.— The Eailway Company 258 XXV.— The Telegraph Troop 266 XXVI. — The Corps op Signalers 277 XXVIL— The Military Police 286 XXVIII. — The Medical Department ' 288 XXIX.— The Army Post-Office - 295 XXX. — The Indian Contingent 297 Peculiarity of organization in Indian regiments — Equipment, fol- lowers, &c. (Kabul scale) — Cavalry — Infantry— The 7-pdr. jointed-steelM. L. E. and the mule battery— Indian rations — Outfit, &c. — Indian transport — Medical arrangements — Vet- erinary department — Historical notes — Action at Chalout^ — Serapeum. (For Tel-el-Kebir see p. — ante.) XXXI. — Miscellaneous '. 333 U. S. FLAasHip Lancaster, 2d Eate, Gravesend, England, May 30, 1883. SiK : In obedience to the Department's order of Angust 29, 1882, 1 have the honor to forward a report upon the British naval and military- operations in Egypt during the past year. The report is based upon personal observation on the spot, upon the accounts of officers present at the several engagements, upon official reports, and other trustworthy documents. * * * My aim has been to make the development and progress of the cam- paign as clear as possible. I have touched upon organization and equipment only in so far as they are of especial interest, as they serve to throw light upon the methods employed, or as they furnish matter deserving analysis and serious attencion. * * * ■ It would give me pleasure if the State Department could be informed of the valuable assistance rendered me by C. Breed Eynaud, esq., our vice-consul at Malta. During my stay in Egypt I experienced nothing but kindness wherever my duty called me. Were I to mention the names of those to whom I am indebted for professional and other courtesies, I should simply have to inclose a list of the British officers of both services with whom I was brought in contact. I should, however, be gratified if some acknowledg- ment other than my own personal thanks could be made to General Lord Wolseley of Cairo, G. C. B., G. 0. M. G., &c., for his hospitable reception of me at his headquarters, and for his kindness in affording me all possible facilities for travel and for obtaining necessary data ; to Admiral Lord Alcester, G. C. B., «&c., for his many acts of politeness, which were only limited, in the direction of technical information, by the confidential nature of many of the official reports ; and to Major G. B. N. Martin, R. A., and Captain George S. Clarke, E. E., for peculiarly valuable assistance at the cost of much trouble, and (in the last case) of great personal discomfort. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, C. F. GOODEICH, • Lieutenant- Commander, United States Navy. To Hon. William E. Chandler, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, B, C. Forwarded. C. H. BALDWIN, Bear-Admiral, Commanding United States Naval Force on Miropean Station. 5 ^BBE,EVI-A.TIO>irS. 1. 3 - M. L. B. L. S. B. Pdr.. Royal Navy. Royal Artillery. Royal Engineers. Royal Horse Artillery. Royal Marine Artillery. Royal Marine Light Infantry. N Battery, A Brigade (Royal Horse Artillery). N Battery, Second Brigade (Mountain Artillery). First Battery, Third Brigade (Field Battery). R Muzzle-loading rifle. R Breech-loading rifle. Smooth-bore. Pounder. 6 R. N R. A R. E R. H. A-... R. M. A.--. R. M. L. I.. N. A N. 2. C^ .Centimetre. A. D. C... .Aide-de-camp. V. C .Victoria Cross. C. B .Commander of the Bath. K.C. B..-. -Knight Commander of the Bath. G. C.B.... -Grand Commander of the Bath. C. M. G... .Commander Saint Michael and Saint George. K. C. M. G . Knight Commander Saint Mi- chael and Saint George. C.S.I . Commander Star India. B. W. G... , British wire-gauge. R. L. G.... .Rifle, large grain. H. M. S... .Her Majesty's Ship. PA.IIT I THE BOMBAEDMENT OF THE FOETIFICATIONS ALEXANDRIA. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERA- TIONS IN EGYPT. PBELIMINAKY. The political events which brought about the bombardment of the fortifications at Alexandria, and the dispatch of a British army corps to Egypt, do not come within the province of this report. It will not, however, be out of place to refer briefly to a few of the i^rincipal feat- ures in the state of affairs immediately preceding hostilities. It will be remembered that by a series of bold, insubordinate, and successful maneuvers, a group of men, for the most part officers in the Egyptian army, had gradually but surely wrested the power from the hands of the Khedive, their legitimate ruler, and had wielded it in such a manner as to paralyze trade, destroy confidence, and cause the foreign population to desert the country by thousands. The religious fanaticism of the Mohammedans, the vast majority of all the sects in Egypt, had been excited to a dangerous pitch. The presence of the French and British fleets, sent to Alexandria early in the year, in the hope that the mere display of their enormous preponderance of force would exert a calming influence, had only served to still further arouse the now practically universal hatred of the European. The country had already almost come to a standstill in all the arts of peace, when the massacre of June 11 completed the destruction of the hopes, yet entertained by a confiding few, that the excitement would pass away and matters return, of their own accord, to their original condition. The forbearance of the foreign residents was sorely tried; yet, officially and privately, everything possible was done to avoid a conflict with the natives. Ships-of-war of all nations collected at Alexandria to receive and shelter or else forward the refugees that were swarming out of the land at the sacrifice of all their possessions, protection from insult and injury on shore being simply out of the question. The military party, openly conceded to be the sole rulers in Egypt, now proceeded to take active steps, strengthening the fortifications of Alexandria, mounting new guns, &c. The British admiral. Sir Beau- champ Seymour, in view of the strained relations then existing, and of the formidable character of the unmounted guns at the disposition of the Egyptians, felt that he could not be justified in permitting suctt 9 10 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. open acts of hostile preparation, which would have for a result the infliction of increased injury upon the fleet he commanded, in the event of an engagement, now almost inevitable. The action which Admiral Seymour proceeded to take is indicated by the following telegram, which he sent on the 5th of July to the Admi- ralty in London : Shall demaud from military governor, to-morrow, cessation of all work on the bat- teries. As French apjiear indisposed to act, shall detain Penelope here until result of demand is known. On the following day he telegraphs again : Military commajider assures me, in reply to my note of to-day, no guns have been recently added to the forts or military preparations made. Dervish Pasha* confirms this statement. No signs of operations since yesterday afternoon, i^robably in obe- dience to Sultan's commands. Shall not hesitate acting if works be continued. * * « This telegram is based upon the following letters of that date : 1. From Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour to the Military Commandant of Alexandria. I have the honor to inform your Excellency that it has been officially reported to me that yesterday two or more additional guns were mounted on the sea defenses, and that other warlike preparations are being made on the northern face of Alexandria against the squadron under my command. Under the circumstances I have to notify your Excellency that unless such proceedings be discontinued, or if, having been dis- continued, they should be renewed, it will become my duty to open fire on the works in course of construction. 2. The reply. To the Admiral of the Brilish Fleet: My Fjriend English Admiral : I had the honor to receive your letter of the 6th July, in which you state that you had been informed that two guns had been mounted anc' that other works are going on on the sea-shore, and in reply I beg to assure you that the said assertions are unfounded. * » * TOULBA. On July 9 Admiral Seymour telegraphs to the Admiralty: With reference to my telegram of the 4th of July, no doubt about armament. Guns are now being mounted in Fort Silsileh. Shall give foreign consuls notice at daylight to-morrow morning, and commence action twenty-four hours after unless forts on the sthmus and those commanding the entrance to the harbor are surrendered. The Admiralty replied directing the admiral to substitute for the word "surrendered" the words "temporarily surrendered for purposes of disarmament." The information upon which Admiral Seymour purposed acting was in the shape of a declaration from a lieutenant of Her Majesty's flagship Invincible, quoted here at length : I, Lieutenant Henry Theophilus Smith-Dorrien, do most solemnly declare that on the morning of the 9th day of July, 1882, at about 7.30 a. m., I drove through the Rosetta * The Turkish commissioner sent to Egypt by His Majesty the Sultan. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 11 gate, and passing the European cemeteries, readied the old quarantine station, where I left, my carriage and proceeded on foot to the fort marked on admiralty chart " Tabia el Silsile," and when within 50 yards of the said fort I observed inside two working parties of Arabs, about 200 strong, under the superintendence of soldiers, parbuckling two smooth-bore guns, apparently 32-pounders, towards their respective carriages and slides, which were facing in the direction of the harbor, and which seemed to have been lately placed ready for their reception. Dated at Alexandria this 9th day of July, 1882. H. T. SMITH-DORRIEN, Lieutenant B. N., H. M. S. Invincible. On the 10th the admiral sent the following letter to Toulba Pasha, the military governor of Alexandria: I liave the honor to inform your Excellency that as hostile preparations, evidently directed against the squadron under my command, were.in progress during yesterday at Forts Isali,* Pharos, and Silsili, t I shall carry out the intention expressed to you in my letter of the 6th instant, at sunrise to-morrow, the 11th instant, unless previous to that hour you shall have temporarily surrendered to me, for the purpose of disarm- ing, the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbor of Alexandria. The answer to the foregoing was signed by Eagheb Pasha, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The translation from the original French is as follows : Alexandria, July 10, 1882. Admiral : As I had the honor to promise in the conversation which I had with you this morning, I have submitted to His Highness the Khedive, in a meeting of the Ministers and principal dignitaries of the state, the conditions contained in the letter you were good enough to address this morning to the commandant of the place, accord- ing to the terms of which you will put into execution to-morrow, the 11th instant, at daybreak, the intentions expressed in your letter of the 6th instant to the commandant of the place, if, before that time, the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the port of Alexandria are not temporarily surrendered to you to be disarmed. I regret to announce to you that the Government of His Highness does not consider this proposition as acceptable. It does not in the least desire to alter its good rela- tions with Great Britain, but it cannot perceive that it has taken any measures which can be regarded as a menace to the English fleet by works, by the mounting of new guns, or by other military preparations. Nevertheless, as a proof of our spirit of conciliation and of our desire, to a certain extent, to accede to your demand, we are disposed to dismount three guns in the bat- teries you have mentioned, either separated or together. If in spite of this offer you persist in opening fire, the Government reserves its freedom of action and leaves with you the responsibility of this act of aggression. Receive, Admiral, the assurances, &c., &c. The rejoinder was as brief and to the point as the letter itself was long and rambling. The latter was handed to the admiral during the night of July 10 and 11. The answer was returned at once. It ran thus : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, and regret that I am unable to accept the proposal contained therein. * Saleh Aga. t Silsileh. 12 BRITISH if AVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. On July 10 the port was deserted by all the shipping that could get away except the Egyptian Government \^essels, which were kept inside and brought close to the Easel-Tin palace, out of the reach of shot, and the inshore squadron of the British fleet, composed of the following ships, viz, the Invincible (flag). Monarch, and Penelope, iron- clads ; the Beacon, Bittern, Condor, Cygnet, and Decoy, gun-vessels, and the Helicon, tender and dispatch-boat. Outside the bar were the five armored shii^s, the Sultan (senior officer's), Alexandra, Inflexible, Superb, and Temeraire, anchored to the eastward of the Corvette Pass, and a large fleet of merchant vessels and men-of war off the month of the Central or Boghaz Pass and placed out of the line of fire of the Egyptian batteries. Pending the preliminary negotiations, and in anticipation of serious Avork in Egypt, the authorities in England had begun preparations of a warlike nature. The channel fleet, which had rendezvoused at Malta, was ordered to leave that port on July 9 for Cyprus, within easy reach of Alexandria, having on board two regiments of infantry and some engineers belonging to the garrison of the former place. Two hired transports, the Nerissa and Ehosina, were to follow immediately with more troops. At home the selection was made of the regiments it was determined to hold in readiness for foreign service ; the details of the commissariat and transport companies were jierfected and draught animals secured, and the various officers of all branches, likely to be needed, were warned to expect definite orders at any moment. The Iris, steel dispatch vessel, with ordnance and other stores, and the Humber, ammunition ship, were sent to Alexandria from Malta, while an additional light iron-clad, the Penelope, drawing but 17 feet 6 inches of water, and manned by men of the coast guard or reserve, sailed from the same port on July 3 to reinforce Sir Beauhamp's fleet. Two days later, the Tamar, troop-ship, with the Boyal Marine Light In- fantry and Eoyal Marine Artillery battalions, left Malta, for Cyprus. Two small iron gun-boats for river service, the Don and the Dee, were sent out from England for contingent use in the Suez Canal, leaving Plymouth on July 9, in tow of the tug Samson. In all the dockyards and arsenals unusual activity prevailed ; extra bodies of workmen were taken on and lio exertion spared to expedite the fitting out of ships and the equipment of men in both the army and the navy ; while out- side, the Naval Transport Department was busy in preparing lists of steamers available as hired transports, and in determining their capac- ity for troops, for stores, and for animals. Before passing to the bombardment, and the damage sustained by the opposing forces, it is necessary to consider the nature and strength, of the position defended and the resources of the attacking fleet. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 13 II. GENERAL BE VIEW OF THE DEFENSES OF ALEXANDEIA. A glance at Plate 1 will show that the main harbor of Alexandria is a long, narrow, natural basin of roughly rectangular shape, extend- ing in a general northeasterly and southwesterly direction, between the mainland and an outlying limestone reef, bounded at one extremity by the shoulder of land terminating at Fort Adjemi, and at the other by the stem of a T-shaped peninsula upon which the city is built. The length of this harbor is between five and six nautical miles, and its aver- age width one and a quarter. The western branch of the T-shaped peninsula is the longer of the two. Upon its farther point is the principal light-house of Alexandria. Stretching beyond this, and separated from it by a small channel navi- gable by boats, is a handsome breakwater, completed in 1874, built upon the reef and inclosing a spacious and well-sheltered x)ort. Beyond the city, to the eastward, is a small circular harbor, termed the New Port? used only by small craft. Through the leef referred to above are three passages. The eastern or Corvette Pass lies close to the breakwater, and affords an entrance for vessels drawing under 18 feet of water. It makes a wide angle with the general direction of the reef. The Boghaz or Central Pass is the main ship-channel. It has a rather awkward turn at its shallowest part. With very smooth water it is navigable by vessels drawing as much as 22 feet. In general terms its direction is normal to the reef. The western or Marabout^Pass is seldom used, the leading-marks being very far inland and rather close together. A skillfni pilot can keep a ship in not less than 23 feet, i^rovided there is no swell on the bar. The distance over which these approaches are distributed (Adjemi being more than 7 nautical miles from Silsileh) and the exposed sit- uation of the town have necessitated the extension of the sea defenses of Alexandria along a line of inordinate length. The fortifications con- sist of nearly continuous series of open works, having closed works at the principal salients. Eeferring to Plate 1, and beginning at the eastern extremity, it will be seen that the defenses are as follows : Bast of the city : 1. Fort Silsileh. [N'orth of the city : 2. Fort Pharos. 3. Fort Ada. 4. The Easel-Tin Lines. 5. The Light-House Fort. 14 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT South of the city : 6. Fort Saleh Aga. 7. Unnamed open battery. 8: Oom-el-Kabebe Fort. 9. Fort Kumaria. Southwest of the city : 10. The Mex Lines. 11. Fort Mex. 12. Mex Citadel or Fort Namusia. West of the city : 13. Fort Marsa-el-Khanat. 14. Fort Marabout. 15. Fort Adjemi. The nomenclature adopted is that of Admiral Seymour's ofBcial report of the bombardment. It must, however, be remembered that several of these works bear other names as well. The sites of the forts were, in the main, selected with good judgment. Silsileh defends the eastern approach, Pharos the eastern and northern, aided in the latter by Ada, the Eas-el-Tiu Lines, and the Light-House Fort. The command of this last fort includes the Corvette and Boghaz Passes and the inner harbor. Any vessel attempting the Corvette or the Boghaz Pass would also be exposed to the fire of Saleh Aga, Oom-el-Kabebe, Kumaria, the Mex Lines, and Mex, while Marsa el-Khanat and Marabout were admirably placed to protect the Marabout Pass. Saleh Aga, Oom-el-Kabebe, and Kumaria were furthermore intended to aid in the defense of the narrow neck of land lying between the Mediterranean on the north, or, strictly speaking, Alexandria Harbor, and Lake Maroeotis on the south. Fort Adjemi is the newest work of all. If ever completed, it will be the strongest point of the sea defense of Alexandria, but it commands a line along which no one would ever dream of approaching, and is, practically, as useless as if planted in the middle of the Sahara. Besides these, an unimportant work on the southern shore of the eastern harbor, variously designated, may be mentioned as existing. This, with Forts Kumaria and Adjemi, took no part in the action of July 11. The PharilTon, incorrectly marked as a fort on all charts, is an ancient square tower now in ruinous condition. It mounts no guns. The land about Alexandria being extremely low, none of these works have any considerable elevation above the sea. They are of old design and construction in every case, (except Adjemi), and they derive their value chiefly from the modern Armstrong muzzle-loading rifles with which the principal among them are armed. To adapt the old fortifica- tions to the new guns, the parapets were sometimes heightened and thickened, embrasures cut, and traverses built. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 15 The guus in these works are mounted in the open, none having over- head protection except those in the casemates of Fort Pharos. In the majority of instances the parapet between the heavy rifles is provided with merlons, while the old-fashioned smooth-bores are mounted -ew. barbette. The rifled guns were generally in batteries apart from the more anti- quated ordnance, although this rule was not observed in Forts Ada and Mex. While guns of nearly every description in their possession were used during the bombardment, the Egyptians placed most reliance upon the Armstrong rifles. The trace of the works was generally irregular, the irregularity sometimes, as in Fort Oom el-Kabebe, reaching the grotesque. The form of the fort, both as to trace and profile, seems to have been gov- erned by the configuration of the ground. The Light-House Fort was the only one with a complete bastioned front. Without exception, in every fort there were buildings, such as shell- stores, barracks, and even magazines, showing well above the crest of the parapet and affording admirable targets to the attack. Of the materials of which the fortifications are constructed it is impos- sible to speak in adequate terms. A limestone, quarried near Mex, so soft that it is simply cut out with sharp tools, bonded with course lime mortar overcharged with sand, formed the retaining walls, and these were backed with sand. The penetration of the British modern pro- jectiles into this masonry could not be accurately determined. In the scarp of the Light-House Fort blind shell buried themselves more than ten feet, the debris behind them preventing the sounding rod from entering further. A similar experience was had at Fort Ada. The parapets are usually formed of light sand, which, in this dry climate, will stand at a slope of about 30°. In the newer batteries the superior and exterior slopes are covered with a light plaster, which splits off freely when walked over. The embrasures have 60° train, as a rule, and their soles a depression of from 3° to 5°. Their cheeks a re revetted with concrete, and the sill is formed generally of a single piece of granite. The interior slopes are vertical and of varying height. The actual crest is , ordinarily 18 inches above the top of the retaining wall, which is either built of regular masonry or of rough rubble laid in mortar. The sides of the ramps, the slopes in rear of the terreplein, &c., have vertical walls. The tracks for the slide trucks of the rifled guns are of iron, laid on stone platforms ; for those of the smooth-bores, of wood (usually rotten), arranged as shown in Fig. 1. 16 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. jShetc^ios xn -pilem/ and section, ^gr.J-. The pivots are secured by wedges in the muzzles of old smooth- ^ bore guns sunk on end in the ma- sonrjj Figs. 2, 3. As a finish, two neatly-fashioned stone steps are laid up to the muzzle of the gun. Great care has been taken to arrange the pieces of the steps radially. As a result they give absolutely no support at a place where support is sadly needed. In very few instances have the pivots thus secured stood the strain of the action without complaining, while in some the smooth-bore gun has started from its bed. In all cases the pivot proved to be the weakest point in the mounting of the guns. The slide of the Arm- strong gan is fitted with two bars or holdfasts (Plate 35), with eyes which slip over the pivot. A key through the pivot holds them in place. The recoil of the gun naturally tends to lift these holdfasts off the pivot. Occasionally the key has broken or been sheared oft', the holdfasts have left the pivot, the slide upended, and the gun been dis- abled (Plate 127). The magazines in these forts are, as a general rule, from 5 to 8 feet below the surface. They lack sufficient overhead protection. But, no rule being without its exceptions in this interesting collection of old- fashioned defensive works, those at Forts Ada and Mex were found to be in dangerously-exposed buildings. The passages leading into the magazines are planned solely with reference to convenience, and seem frequently to have been devised with a deliberate view to ready com- bustion. Ventilation is secured by means of vertical chimneys of the rudest nature, while the lighting arrangements are almost nil^ a large double horn lantern being employed. As if to invite attack, their light- ning-conductors are tall and conspicuous. The floors are boarded and covered with copper or iron ! The only wonder is how any of these in- geniously-designed man-traps could have escaped destruction during the bombardment, or accidental explosion at any other time. The shell-houses are always in the open, and are without any pre- tense of protection. As a consequence, they suffered badly in the ac- tion. The shells seem to have been well cared for, but to have been kept unfilled. Traces were very generally visible of the filling of projectiles during the engagement. The barracks connected with these forts are built in the simjjlest BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 17 fashion. A passage-way runs through the middle of a long room, with an earthen platform on each side, 18 inches high and 7 feet broad. This platform serves as a bed. Along the wall is a shelf, and under- neath the shelf a row of pegs. The windows are uiiglazed, but pro- vided with shutters. There was evidently no lavish waste of funds on the accommodations of a private soldier in Egypt. The ordnance mounted in these works was of the following types : 10-inch Armstrong M. L. R., of 18 tons. 9-inch Armstrong M. L. R., of 12 tons. 8-inch Armstrong M. L. R., of 9 tons. 7-inch Armstrong M. L. R., of 7 tons. 40-pouuder Armstrong B. L. R. SMOOTH-BORES. MORTARS. XV-inch. XX-inch. X-inch, heavy. Xlll-inch, sea service, X-inch, medium. Xlll-inch, land service. X-inch, light. Xl-inch. •6^-inch. • X-inch. X-inch howitzer. The Armstrong guns bear dates ranging from 1869 to 1874. The guns of each caliber are not all of the same pattern. The 10-inch guns were traversed by gearing, the smaller guns by tackles hooked to posts sunk in the ground. Their carriages were all fitted with plate compressors. Apparently in the heat of action the compressors were not always carefully attended to. Eeferring to Plate 27, it will be observed that the rear slide trucks are placed very far in towards the muzzle of the gun. The shock of the recoil, especially if the latter is not controlled by the compressor, and if the gun brings up violently against the rear buffers, would occasion a tremendous shearing strain upon the key through the pivot-bolt, and if this key were to yield, nothing would remain to prevent the gun, carriage and all, from assuming the position indicated in Plate 27. Of the Armstrong guns, one, a 9 -inch, was mounted on a Moncrieff carriage, behind the Khedive's palace in the Kas-el-Tin Lines. It would seem as though no one in authority among the Egyptians knew how to place this heavy and costly gun-carriage, for it was simply stuck up in an open space, towering high in air, and offering an admirable target. The gun was not fired during^the action. The use of the XY-inch S. B.is not clearly established ; but the weight of evidence appears to be against their having been fired. They are believed to have been cast in France about forty years ago. In ex- ternal appearance they resemble the other smooth-bores seen in many of the plates. The 6J-inch guns throw a shot weighing about 36 pounds. In ac- H. Mis. 29 2 18 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. counts of the engagement they are frequently spoken of as 32-pdrs.. They date back to the time of Mehemet Ali. One X-inch howitzer was mounted in Fort Pharos. The carriage is too rotten to have been used. The mortars in the Ras-el-Tin Lines " were used pretty freely at flrst,'^ and a X-inch mortar in marabout was undoubtedly fired. They scored nothing but misses. One hit would have probably given a new turn to the present development of ordnance. The B. L. E. 40-pdrs. were four in number. Two in the lower case- ment of Fort Pharos and one in Mex Citadel were mounted on wooden garrison carriages and were used during the action. The fourth was mounted at the western end of the Ras-el-Tin Lines, on the lift carriage designed by Beverly Kennon, but was not used during the action. The mountings of the S. B. guns were simi3le in the extreme — a wooden slide and top carriage, as shown in Plate 33, generally too^ rotten for safe employment ; wooden quoins for elevating and a quad- rant for laying the gun. The tracks were even more rotten than the carriages. The Egyptian supply of ammunition was enormous. There were two kinds of M. L. E.. shell, common and battering, in lavish profusion. The store of shrapnel was not so great. There was a fair proportion of chilled shot. There were hundreds of barrels of powder. The powder was compressed j^ ^^ in disks, shown in Figs. 4 and 5, manufactured j^. _ by Messrs. Curtis & Harvey. The cartridges appear to have been filled as needed during the engagement. The rudeness of the scales found in or near the magazines must have caused the charge to vary in weight, and may thus ■---o"':'—-^ account for a portion of the great variation in range which was a char- acteristic of the Egyptian practice. The disks described were for use with the rifled guns. For the smooth-bores a large- grained, finely- glazed powder, made by the same English firm, was provided. In addition some barrels of powder from the British Government factory at Waltham Abbey were found in the magazines. At Fort Marabout there was an ample supply of filled cartridges. Their stock of fuzes included Armstrong's combined time and percus- sion fuze, and two simijle percussion fuzes, besides other well-known forms. The former. Figs. 6, 7, and 8, contain two independent trains. The first or percussion train is at the base of the fuze. X is a pellet of ful- minate of mercury, and Y a quick-composition, both carried by a plunger^ «, on the outside of which is turned a broad, shallow grove to receive a brass ring, 6, resting between the lower shoulder of the groove and the cylindrical guard c. The shock of firing dislodges the ring and leaves BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 10 the plunger free, on impact, to rush forward against the steel needle 1,000 to 1,300 yards W. by N. of Mex. Monarch, / I have, &c., F. BEAUCHAMP SEYMOUR, Admiral and Commander-in- Chief. To the Captains and Officers Commanding H. M. Ships at and off Alexandria. * The principal light-house of Alexandria, t Afterwards known as Central Battery, Ras-el-Tin Lines. t Half way between the Tower Battery, Ras-el-Tin Lines, and the Light-House Fort. PX^J^TE 1- ■^a>'?r y Z/}PTIEH ( POLICE 5TAT/ON.) IN THE RUE rRANQ.U£. C . Caha cols (station Houses) A/»£RICAN CoNSLfLATE. £D BY TN£ OUTS/DE- SQUADROM H£N SY TH£ JAirLEXISL£. •' " T£me:raire. yiEQ BY THE //^ SHORE SQUAD ROM Pi^ATi-: 1. MiMMi^a^ A Z/IPTIEH (police STATION.) IN THE RUE FR»NQ,UE. S. C . Cah/icols (station houses) -D. American Consulate. .E.Of^lGINAL LINE ASSUMED BY TH£ OUTSIDE SQUADRO/I. JF.OftlGINAL POSITION TAKEN SY THE iNfLEXItSLE. G „ ., . . .. Temeraihe LINE ASSUMEQ BY WE lf^SHOff£ SQUADRON. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 33 To the foregoing may be added the general instructions to command- ing officers to lire back at any fort that might open on them. The following is the official report of the action as given by Admiral Seymour. The paragraphs relating to individuals only are omitted: Invincible, at Alexandria, July 20, 1882. Sir: 1. In continuation of my official report of proceedings, dated the 19th instant, I liave the honor to submit, for their lordships' information, a more detailed account of the action which took place on the 11th, between the squadron under my com- mand and the forts which defend Alexandria, than I was enabled to forward at that time. . 2. As will be seen by the inclosed order of battle, a copy of which was supplied to each captain, I had decided to make two attacks, one by the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra on the north face of Eas-el-Tin, supported by the iire from the after tur- ret of the Inflexible, anchored off the entrance to the Corvette Pass, thus enhlading the Light-House batteries; the other, by the Invincible, Monarch, and Penelope from inside the reefs,, aided by the fire of the Inflexible's forward turret and the Temeraire, which took up a position close to the fairway buoy of the Boghaz or principal pass leading into Alexandria Harbor. The Helicon and Condor were detailed for duty as repeatiug ships, and the Beacon, Bittern, Cygnet, and Decoy were employed as directed by signal during the day. 3. At 7 a. m. on the 11th I signaled from the Invincible to the Alexandra to fire a shell into the recently- armed earthworks termed the Hospital Battery, and followed this by a general signal to the fleet, "Attack the enemy's batteries," when immediate action ensued between all the ships, in the positions assigned to them, and the whole of the forts commanding the entrance to the harbor of Alexandria. A steady fire was maintained on all sides until 10.30 a. m., when the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra, which had been hitherto under way, anchored off the Light-House Fort, and by their well-directed fire, assisted by that of the Inflexible, which weighed and joined them at 12.30 p. m., succeeded in silencing most of the guns in the forts on Eas-el-Tin ; still some heavy guns in Fort Ada kept up a desultory fire. About 1.30 p. m. a shell from the Superb, whose practice in the afternoon was very good, blew up the magazine and caused the retreat of the remaining garrison. These ships then directed their attention to Fort Pharos, which was silenced with the assistance of the Temeraire, which joined them at 2.30 p. m., when a shot from the Inflexible dismounted one of the heavy guns.* The Hospital Battery was well fought throughout, and, although silenced for a time by a shell from the Inflexible, it was not until 5 p. m, that the artillerymen were compelled to retire from their guns by the fire of the ofi'bhore squadron and the Inflexible. The Invincible, with my flag, supported by the Penel- ope, both ships being at anchor, the latter on one occasion shifting berth, and assisted by- the Monarch, under way inside the reefs, as well as by the Inflexible and Tern, eraire in the Boghaz and Corvette Channels, succeeded, after an engagement of some hours, in silencing and partially destroying . the batteries and lines of Mex. Fort Marsa-el-Khanat was destroyed by the explosion of the magazine after half an hour's action with the Monarch, t About 2 p. m., seeing that the gunners of the western lower battery of Mex had aban- doned their guns, and that the supports had probably retired to the citadel, I called in ' the gun-vessels and gun-boats, and under cover of their fire landed apartyof twelve vol- unteers, under the command of Lieutenant B. E. Bradford, of the Invincible, accompa- *This remark is an error. No "heavy gun," if by that is meant a rifled gun, was dismounted in Fort Pharos. t It was subsequently discovered that the explosion caused by the Monarch's fire was of a store of gun-cotton some distance in rear of the fort. The latter was unharmed, H. Mis. 29 8 34 BRITISH NA.VAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. nied by Lieutenant Richard Poore, of that sliip, Lieutenant tlie Honorable Hed worth. Lanibton (my flag lieutenant), MajorTiilloch, Welsh Regiment, attached to my staff, and Mr. Hardy, midshipman in charge of the boat, who got on shore through the surf and destroyed, with charges of gun-cotton, two 10-inch M. L. R. guns, andspked six smooth- boie guns in the righfc-haud water battery at Mex, and returned without a casualty beyond the loss of one of their boats (Bitteru's dinghy) on the rocks. This was a haz- ' ardous operation very well carried out.* Previous to this, after the action had become general, Commauder Lord Charles Beresford, of the Condor, stationed as repeating ship, seeing the accuracy with which two 10-inch rifled guns in Fort Marabout were • playing upon the ships engaged off Fort Mex, steamed up to within range of his7-incli 90-cwt. gun, and by his excellent practice soon drew off the fire.t I then ordered him to be supported by the Beacon, Bittern, Cygnet, and Decoy, the Cygnet having been engaged with the Ras-el-Tin forts during the early part of the day. I am happy to say, during the action no casualties happened to those vessels, owing, in a great measure, to the able manner in which they were maneuvered, and their ligl^t draught enabling them to take up their position on the weakest point of the batteries. The action gen- erally terminated successfully at 5.30 p. m., when the ships anchored for the night. 4. The force opposed to us would have been more formidable had every gun mounted on the line of works been brought into action, but iu the Ras-elTin batteries few of the large smooth-bores and fewer of the French .36-pounders, bought in the time of Mehemet Ali, were manned, the Egyptians preferring to use the English 10-inch, 9-inch, 8-inch, and smaller muzzle-loading rifled guns. These guns are precisely the same as those which Her Majesty's ships carry, and no better muzzle-loading guns can be found. They were abundantly, even lavishly, supplied with projectiles of the latest description, chilled shot, and the sighting of the guns was excellent. The same may be said of the guns in the Mex Lines, excepting that in them the 36-pounder8 were more used, and that one, if not two, 15-inch smooth-bores t were brought into action in addition to the 10-inch, 9-inch, andsmallerM. L. R. guns fired. Fort Marabout brought two 10-inch M. L. R. gunst into action at long range, shell after shell of which came up towards the inshore squadron in an excellent line, falling from ten to thirty yards short. Not one shell from the guns in the southern batteries burst on board Her Majesty's ships daring the day. 5. I forward for their lordships' perusal the official report of Captain Walter J. Hunt-Grubbe, C. B., A. D. C, of Her Majesty's ship Sultan, who most ably commanded the outside squadron, which bore the brunt of the action, as the accompanying state- ments of the damages sustained by the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra fully testify, I have no account of the damage sustained by the Penelope, as that vessel was shortly * In Fort Mex was but one 10-inch M. L. R, This and its neighbor, a 9-inch gun, were disabled by the landing party (see Plate 37). The wind had freshened slightly, mak- ing quite a surf at the spot where the party landed — marked a on Plate 37 — and adding a sensible risk to the peril of the undertaking.. t These " 10-inch rifled guns" are, in reality, 9-inch guns, on the east face of Fort Marabout, and are shown on Plate 32. The handling of the Condor was most seaman- like. Commander Lord Charles Beresford selected a position on the prolongation of the capital of the northeast bastion, where the guns of the fort could only be brought to bear upon him with great difficulty. Here, at 1,200 yards from the fort, he dropped a kedge and, keeping his ship constantly in motion either by paying out or hauling in his warp, he succeeded in evading the enemy's heavy shot, any one of which might have inflicted serious if not fatal damage. In addition, he made sharp use of his machine guns. When the risk this-ship incurred is considei-ed, it is impos- sible not to couple her share in the action with the operations of the landing party from the Invincible as the two brilliant episodes of the day. t See page 17. . BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 35 afterwards detached from my flag. The upper works of the Invincible and Inflexible were a good deal knocked about, but no serious iujurj'^ was inflicted. No damage was done to the Temeraire or Monarch. It is quite impossible for me to account for the very small loss sustained by Her Majesty's ships on- this occasion, considering the amount of shell and shot wliich struck them, and the injuries inflicted on the hulls of the Sultan, Superb, and Alexan- dra, and in a lesser degree on those of the Invincible, Penelope, and Inflexible ; but I ■may here express my deep regret that Lieutenant Francis Jackson and Mr. William Shannon, carpenter of the Inflexible, should have fallen. The wounded, who when last heard from were doing well, were sent to Malta in the Humber. I hav^, &c., To the Secretary of the Admiraltt. F. BEAUCHAMP SEYMOUR, Admiral and Commander-in-Chief. The special work done by the offshore squadron is this described in the official report of its senior officer : July 14, 1882. Sir: 1. In compliance with your memorandum of the lOth Instant, I have great pleasure in reporting the successful manner in which the offshore squadron, under my per- sonal command, consisting of, at first, the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra, and after- wards the Temeraire and Inflexible, attacked and silenced the earthworks and bat- teries on the 11th instant, comprising Forts Pharos and Ada, the batteries at Hospital Point, the new earthwork, which was of formidable nature, and the Light-House batteries bearing on the harbor. 2. The action was commenced at 6.59 a. m., by the Alexandra firing a shell at the earthwork near Fort Ada, and a few minutes after all the forts replied and the action became general. 3. At this time I was steaming In close order, at about 1,500 yards, past the batter- ies, and was turning in succession with a view to anchor in the order prescribed by you, but before doing so I again repassed. Findiug, however, that the batteries were stronger than was anticipated, and that the Egyptian gunners were far from despicable, making, indeed, very good practice, I deemed it advisable to anchor and obtain the exact range. This was executed with great precision by the squadron, and we soon appeared to be dismounting their guns.* 4. At 10.36 a.m. the Light-House Battery, which had been, earlier in the day, severely handled by the Inflexible, ceased to return our fire, their last rifled gun being disabled, though not before it had given us much trouble. 5. At 12.45 p. m. the Temeraire and Inflexible (you no longer requiring their serv- ices) began to assist in our attack, shelling Forts Pharos and Ada with great effect. 6. By this time the fire was considerably less, but one rifled gun t on the Hospital earthwork, which was impossible to dismount, being invisible from the ship, did us great damage. 7. At 4.32 p. m. shell from the Superb blew up the magazine by Fort Ada, t and that fort and Pharos were hurriedly evacuated. 8. After this the enemy's firing ceased, and, on our side, it was confined to dislodg- ing parties of men, reported from time to time from the tops as reassembling in rear of the earthworks. * More appearance than reality, as will be afterwards shown. tA 7-inch Armstrong M. L. R. tThis magazine was insidethe ibrt. 36 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 9. The ships were handled aud fought in |a manner reflecting great credit on their officers and ships' companies. ******* I have, &c., W. HUNT-GRUBBE, Captain. To Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour, G. C. B., Commander -in- Chief. , The parts omitted above are personal mentions and recommendations. In a dispatch of July 14, Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour further says: On the morning of the l'2th I ordered the Temeraire and Inflexible to engage Fort Pharos, and after two or three shots had been fired a flag of truce was hoisted on Fort Ras-el-Tin,* and I then sent my flag lieutenant, the Honorable Hedworth Lamb- ton, in to discover the reason, and, from his report, there is no doubt it was simply a ruse to gain time; and as negotiations failed, my demand being to surrender the batteries commanding the Boghaz Channel, one shot was fired into the Mex Barrackst Battery earthwork, when a flag of truce was again hoisted. I then sent Lieutenant and Commandisr Morrison into the harbor in the Helicon, and on his going on board the Khedive's yacht, the Mahroussa, he found she had been deserted, and he reported on his return after dark his belief that the town had been evacuated. To these ofiicial reports little need be added. The practice was, in the main, excellent. The fire of the Inflexible and Temeraire appeared to the writer, who was not far from either at the beginning of the ac- tion and during the forenoon, to be particularly'^ good. The Inflexible seemed to use her small 20 pdrs. as range finders, so as not to waste her valuable shot. A shrapnel burst prematurely inside of one of her 81-ton guns, inflicting no damage, its scattering pieces being plainly vis- ible on the water. On board of the Superb the fire from her small guns was stopped on account of the smoke they occasioned. The projectiles from the offshore squadron were heard to " wobble " greatly — noticeably in the cases of the broadside vessels — as indicated by a prolonged and heavy rumbling sound, like that of a distant rail- way train. The Egyptians were overmatched in guns both as to size and num- ber, but the way that they responded to the heavy fire from the Eng- lish fleet was marvelous, standing to their batteries with unexpected and admirable courage. When the Inflexible's 1,700-pound projectiles struck the scarp of the Light-House Fort, immediately underneath an embra- sure, they would throw up a cloud of dust and fragments of stone as high as the light-house itself. To the looker-on it seemed impossible to live under such a fire, yet after a few minutes the dust would clear away and the gun's crew would pluckily toss another shell back at their huge opponent. The Egyptian practice was naturally subjected to keener criticism than the British, as the fall of each shot that failed of its tar- * The Light-House Fort. t Mex Citadel. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 37 get could be distinctly seen. The error was, generally speaking, caused by too much elevation. Certain of the guns were pointed with "con- summate skill," notably one 36-pdr. (6^-inch S. B.) in the citadel of Mex, which hulled the Invincible with persistent accuracy. Of the fuzes used by the British, the greater part were the " general- service percassion." It is impossible to exaggerate the misbehavior of this fuze on the occasion of the bombardment. The most careless wit- ness of the action could not help noticing the frequency of premature explosions, and of failures to explode at all. It is not beyond the limits of fair estimation to set down the number of the latter as reaching sev- eral hundred, while some British officers think the propoition no less than four fifths of all fired. In several instances fuzes were driven bodily into the bursting-charge without exploding the shell. • The stout- est apologist for this fuze, urging that it was designed for use against armored ships, and therefore given a retarded action, could neither ex- pect nor desire a more violent impact than is shown by this fact to have taken place. As a result of the unreliable nature of these fuzes, it may be mentioned that one of the Penelope's 8-iiich shell was afterwards found lying harmless in a magazine containing over four hundred tons of powder. One or two of the British ^hell were split longitudinally into two parts, doubtless by the force of the blow they delivered, which was, how- ever, not sufficient to ignite the fuze. It is proper to remark that the entire subject of fuzes is now being overhauled in England, in response to the universal and loudly-expressed dissatisfaction at their performance during the bombaidment. It has been already stated that the fire was ordered to be slow and deliberate, with the object of husbanding the supply of ammunition. Difficulty was experienced in obtaining the exact number of charges expended, or indeed accurate particulars of many interesting profes- sional matters connected with the bombardment, a spirit of mystery appearing to have prevailed. The following figures may be relied upon as approximately correct : The Monarch fired as follows : 117 12-inch shell from her turret guns; 103 9 and 7 inch shell from her bow and stern guns. The Penelope fired 157 common shell, 38 shrapnel, 36 Palliser shell. She used 1 20" time fuze, 114 10" time fuzes, and the remainder gen- eral-service percussion fuzes. The Superb fired 200 10 inch shell, mostly common, 10 10-inch shrap- nel, and a few 20-pounder shell. The Invincible fired about 220 shell of various kinds, mostly common (as distinguished from shrapnel). A few only were shrapnel and Pal- liser shell. The fuzes were chiefly percussion. She expended between two and three thousand rounds of Nordenfeldt ammunition. The Inflexible^ s stock of ammunition was curretitly reported to have been reduced to 40 battering shell at the end of the day. 38 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. As regards the Saltan, the statement was made, and credibly too, that " she could not liave continued the actio7i for more than an hour longer, as the ammunition was nearly exhaustedJ^ What is true of the Sultan is also doubtless true more or less of the other vessels — an important point, that should be kept in mind. The outside squadron, as will be observed, began the action under way, at the minimum distance of about 1,500 yards, and anchored after passing the batteries a second time, the advantage of knowing the range exactly 'prevailing over the increased risk of being hit. It then moved, from time to time, concentrating its fire on each work in suc- cession until the close of the day. In the inshore squadron the flagship was anchored for the most part at 1,300 yards from Mex, a position from which a clear view could be had, and was kept broadside to the wind on one side, and the batteries on the other, by a kedge carried out to windward. The Monarch and Penelope remained under way, passing and rei^assing the forts. The Penelope adopted the plan of steaming out three-quarters of a mile to- wards the reef and tlen drifting in broadside on, until within about 700 yards, while the Monarch appeared to keep more way on, moving in a line parallel with the shore. These ships exchanged a few shots with Fort Marabout, but at su great a range that they could neither inflict nor receive much damage. Later in the day, when the offshore squad- ron njoved to the eastward to attack Fort Pharos, these two ships passed inside the breakwater and shelled Saleh Aga and the battery between Saleh Aga and Oom-el Kabebe. They would have gone up to the city had they not been recalled by signal. Machine guns were largely employed hy the feet. It is quite impos- sible to determine their exact value at Alexandria, for no record was kept by the Egyptians of their losses. The appearance of the buildings immeti lately in rear of the batteries, scarred and j^itted by Nordenfeldt and Gatling bullets, proves that these weapons must have had some effect. This appearance is more marked at Mex than in the Easel-Tin Lines, a fact which might have been presupposed, the average range be- ing in the former case about one-half that in the latter, and the num- ber of machine guns brought to bear being greater through the re-en- forcement of the inshore squadron by the gun-boats after noon. Had machine guns contributed in any great measure to the result of the fight, they would have left more traces on the guns. Their value against properly constructed forts can hardly be problematical. Jf mounted in the tops, and used at short range, against low parapets, as at Mex, they may be very useful, but in a general engagement at long range, as in the case of the outside fleet, where the fall of the bullets could not be ob- served and the aim corrected, owing to the distance of the object aimed at and the thickness of the smoke, they cannot be considered as really formidable. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 39 The English loss on July 11 is given in the following summary : Ships. ID a § Alexandra 1 2 3 1 6 8 8- 1 Penelope Sultan 2 1 Total 6 27 The Egyptian forces at Alexandria were under the immediate com- mand of Toulba Pasha. From the best sources of information accessi- ble it is gathered that the defenses contained less than 2,000 artillerists. Of infantry and of civilian volunteers there was no lack. The dispo- sition of these trodps has not been positively ascertained. It is known that the important post of Mex was commanded by an adjutant- major, who had with him one captain, three lieutenants, and 150 men. Of this small force one lieutenant was mortally wounded, 50 men killed, and 48 wounded. Another account gives the loss at very much less. In this land it is hard to obtain the truth. Oom-el-Kabebe, as already mentioned, was subjected to the Inflex- ible's lire during the forenoon. Its garrison consisted of 75 men, aided by a considerable number of Arab volunteers. Eighteen of these were wounded by splinters of masonry. In all, along the southern or inside line, from Saleh Aga to Marabout, 65 men were killed and from 150 to 200 wounded. Among the latter were several officers. In the northern line of defenses one officer was killed in the Light- House Fort and one in the Eas-el-Tin Lines. In each of the foregoing, and in Fort Ada, one was wounded. At least 50 men were killed and 150 wounded in these lines, but the record is very vague. Stray pieces of shell are reported by the chief of police to have killed and wounded between 150 and 200 citizens, but this statement must be accepted only for what it is w^orth. It is thought that in the interest of impartiality the native Eg^^ptian semi-official report of this engagementsbould be given. The following, taken from the London Times, is a translation of the account of the bombardment published in El Taif, an Arabic newspaper, the organ of Arabi Pasha : War News. — On Tuesday, 25 Shaban, 1299, at 12 o'clock in the morning (July 11, 7 a. m.), the English opened lire on the forts of Alexandria and we returned the fire. At 10 a. m. an iron-clad foundered off Fort Ada. At noon two yessels were sunk between Fort Pharos and Fort Adjemi. A 1.30 p. ni. a Avooden man-of-war of eight guns was sunk. At 5 p. m. the large iron-clad was struck by a shell from Fort Pharos, the battery 40 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT, was injured, and a white flag was immediately hoisted by her as a signal to cease firing at her, whereupon the firing ceased on both sides, having lasted for ten hours without cessation. Some of the walls of the forts were destroyed, but they were re- paired during the night. The shots and shells discharged from the two sides amounted to about 6,000, aud this is the first time that so large a number of missiles have been discharged in so short a time. At II a. m. on Wednesday the English ships again opened fire and were replied to by the forts, but after a short time the firing ceased on both sides, and a deputa- tion came from Admiral Seymour and made propositions to Toulba Pasha, which he could not accept ******* No soldiers ever stood so firmly to their posts under a heavy fire as did the Egyp- tions under the fire of twenty-eight ships during ten hours. . * . * * # * * * At 9 a. m. on Thursday an English man-of-war was seen to jjut a small screw in place of the larger one which she had been using, and it was then known that her screw had been carried away by a shot from the forts. Ou examining other ships it was observed that eight had been severely battered on their sides and that one had lost her funnel. THE EFFECT UPON THE SHIPS. Two of the armored ship=!, tbe Monarch and the Temeraire, were net injured at all. This immunity was due in the case of the former to her being kept continually in motion; in the latter, to the fact that she was very distant from the enemy's batteries all the forenoon, being brought within short range later in the day, after the Egyptian gun- ners had become demoralized under the severe fireof tlie five preceding hours. The Condor was struck once, receiving a slight wound in the bow. Otherwise the unarmored vessels were not touched, although the Cyg- net took a noticeable part in the morning's attack on the Light- House Fort, engaging from a point well outside of the line, followed by the offshore squadron, and all were exposed at Marabout and afterwards at Mex. The official report of the damage sustained by the Alexandra is given below. This vessel was struck sixty-odd times. It is proper to recall the fact that she is the regular flagship of the British Mediterranean fleet. H. M. S. Alexandra, Alexandria, July 21, 1882. LIST OF DAMAGE TO HULL AND RIGGING SUSTAINED ON THE llTH INSTANT. 1. Three shot-holes in recesses on mess deck, two on j^ort side, one on starboard, the shot or shell carrying away several frames, disabling pump-gear, supporting- stanchion of deck, shield by fire-hearth, ladders, two mess-tables aud their stools and fittings, knocking away soil-pipe of water-closets, besides several small defects caused by shell bursting. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 41 2. Shot-hole in torpedo-lieutenant's cabin, damaging frames, edge-straps, bulk- head of cabin, furniture, and engine-room coamings. 3. Sliot-hole through netting, after part of quarter-deck, port side, carrying away part of wardroom skylight, sashes, rails and stanchions of after-ladder, and stan- chions of staudard compass started. 4. Shot-hole through cabin of staff-commander, completely destroying some furni- ture and damaging more. 5. One shot-hole in captain's cabin on port and one on starboard side, completely destroying furniture in bed-cabin and partially destroying furniture in sitting- cabin. ' 6. Trunk of admiral's skylight completely destroyed. The shell, in falling, dam- aged captain's table in admiral's fore-cabin. 7. Two shot-holes in commander's cabin, completely destroying cabin and all fur- niture, shell bursting in cabin. 8. Steam-pinnace, jiort quarter, utterly destroyed ; stern broken aud bows shat- tered. 9. Several loading-scuttles in upper and main batteries blown away and glasses broken, damaging chains, levers, &c. 10. Sailing-pinnace: shell carried away starboard quarter and port gunwale. 11. Lower part of ventilator to stoke-hole blown away. 12. Fore and aft bridges blown away, and several ridge-stanchions damaged and blown away. 13. Several awning-stanchions broken and blown away, and stanchions in fore- castle damaged, &c. 14. Two shot-holes in fore part of upper deck forward. 15. Sashes of chart-house broken and furniture damaged. 16. Seven streaks of upper deck forward much shattered. 17. Several water-closets slightly damn.ged. 18. Chock of naval-pipe forward slightly damaged. 19. Main royal yard and fore top-gallant yard badly bruised. 20. Shot-hole through starboard side of quarter-deck. 21. Three streaks of deck in staff-commander's cabin badly shattered. 22. Post-of6ce and fittings damaged. 23. Casing of soil-pipes, wardroom closets, blown away. 24. Several side-steps, port side, blown away. 25. Several plates of crown of lower glacis rivet-heads blown off and plates started. 26. Outside plating in wake of mess-shelves on mess deck, port side, broken. 27. Heel of fore-bitts damaged and iron safes in galley broken. 28. Several streaks of deck on mess deck shattered. 29. Plate under upper deck in torpedo-iiat cracked . 30. Several tubes through wings leaky. Twenty-four shot and shell penetrated the ship above the armor-plating, causing a considerable amount of damage to lower deck, galley, cabins, &c. Several shot and shell struck the armor-plating without doing any appreciable damage, but one which impinged on the upper edge of armor-plating just abaft mainmast, port side, indented the plate and made some jagged marks aud holes to the depth of from one-half to one inch. The foremost funnel was struck in three places, the standing rigging in eight, and running rigging in twenty-one places. RICH'D T. GRIGG, Carpenter, H. M. S. Alexandra. 42 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Alexandria, July 21, 1882. LIST OF RIGGING SHOT AWAY. Fore rigging. — Fourth, fitfth, and sixth shrouds shot away on port side just above deadeye. Main rigging. — Second shroud, port side, six ratlines up from sheer-pole ; eighth shroud, port side, twenty-three ratlines up from sheer-pole; third shroud, starboard Bide, nine ratlines up from sheer-pole. Mizzen rigging. — Fourth shroud, starboard side, nine ratlines up from sheer-pole ; main top-gallant stay ; main royal stay. Sunning rigging. — Port fore tack, topmast staysail halliards, fore-truss falls, fore truss tricing lines, foresail tackle, mainsail tackle, main-truss falls, main-truss tricing lines, whips for main buutlines, main vangs, fore vangs, mizzen vangs, main leech- lines, cross-jack lift, starboard main topsail clewlines, port boat's purchase falls, fore and aft, wire, pendant, for placing boats. H. T. BURNETT, Boatswain. No mention, of course, is made of the fact that three of the guns were badly scored by shells bursting within them, and that in two guns the A tube was split. These guns were carefully inspected after each round, and were used until the end of th^ action. The loss of time through this enforced precaution might have proved extremely awkward under other circumstances and in a more evenly-contested engagement. All the recorded damage is such as might naturally be expected in action, except, possibly, IJo. 9 of the carpenter's report. Assuming that this was due to concussion and not to the entrance of a hostile shot into the Alexandra's casemate, an assumption warranted by tiie wording of the report, it falls at once into the same category as the others. In no respect were the Alexandra's powers as a fighting machine impaired by the injuries she received. The official report of the damage sustained by the Inflexible is a "confidential" document. It is kuowu, however, that she suffered a good deal aloft, and that she was pierced under water, presumably, of course, outside of her casemate. The latter wound is said not to have been of a serious nature, but as it involved docking the ship when she arrived at Malta, it must have been too serious to have been rejjaired by the mechanics on board. Its size and location were kept a secret. The after superstructure was perforated by a 10-inch Palliser shell just above the spar deck, on the starboard side. This shell first killed the carpenter, who was at work on a bulkhead in the officers' quarters, then struck a bitt inside, glanced up, and a mortally wounded Lieutenant Jackson, who was directing the fire of a B. L. R. 20-pdr. mounted on the hurricane deck. The luflexible's boat-davits are rigged to bring the boats during ac- tion above the superstructure and clear of the line of fire. The concus- sion of the discharge of her turret guns, burning 370 pounds of powder, BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 43 was so great, whea the guns were fired fore and aft, or nearly so, tliat several of her boats were badly hurt, the planking being torn bodily from the frames. The following is the official report of the injury sustained by the Invincible. Being in a fixed position all day, her range was soon got- ten by the Egyptians, who hulled her repeatedly. Reference has been made to a certain 6J-inch S. B. in Mex Citadel as particularly well served. On account of its masked situ;ition great difficulty was expe- rienced on board the Invincible in obtaining the range in return. A large number of the hits recorded are due to this one gun. H. M. S. Invincible, At Alexandria, July 21, 1882. LIST OF DAMAGES RECEIVED IN ACTION JULY 11. {Commencing forward and working aft.) 1. A dent in the doubliug-plate, under hawse-pipe, 2 Inches in depth and 9 inches in circumference ; the doubling-plate is f inch thick on side, plating | inch. 2. A puncture made by a shot striking the head chute and bringing up against the "water-way of the mess deck, about 3 feet 6 inches above water. 3. A hole made by a shot passing through the ship's side, gouging the deck, carry- ing away the lockers and bulkhead of the chief petty officers' mess, finally lodging in the fire-hearth. 4. A very large dent, about 3 feet farther aft and 3 feet above, starting the plate badly above, 5 feet 6 inches deep between the frames, showing quite an angle where the frames are situated from the outside. 5. A hole on the upper deck, passing through the side, tearing away the wooden water-way and angle-iron of the gutter-way, stopping on. the opposite .side, slightly damaging the shot-racks and spirketing. 6. A hole about 1 foot abaft, on a level with the mess-deck ports, passing through the side, carrying away a mess-shelf, a table leg (or crow's foot), iron stanchions, and torpedo air-pipes, passing on, striking a mess-stool and lockers, finally stopped by striking the iron plating, which is bulged out on the other side. . 7. A shot passing through lower half-port, striking and gouging a piece out of the iron ballards. 8. A hole on the lower deck just before the funnel casing, caused by a shot which passed through the side, carrying away a mess-shelf, hammock bars, two pump stan- chions, and the I'ack in which they were stowed, passing through string of iron lad- der, and severely damaging an iron ventilator. 9. A hole jnst before the upper battery, caused by a shot passing through side, car- rying away cistern-pipe of gun-room officers' water-closet, buckling up the iron bulk- head 1% inch thick, smashing the jamb of the doorway and the cat-block, afld striking the port foremost battery door (armor plated), which was open. 10. A hole just before the bridge, caused by a shot passing through the glacis-plate and the ship's side, and gouging the teak, ^ inch thick, and wood water-way. 11. A hole in the captain's galley, apparently caused by a rocket or splinter, just abaft the fore deadwood. 12. A shot struck the fish-davit, carrying away an iron stanchion and part of the fore-and-aft bridge, then struck the fore bitt-head, which it splintered. 13. Molding on starboard quarter injured by shot or piece of shell. 14. Several ropes aloft were cut away by shot. ROB. H. M. MOLYNEUX, Captain. 44 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The Penelope was hulled eight times during the action, but no serious damage was done. Her commanding officer thought she was not struck by the rifled shell. One 36-pound shot entered the cabin and made an extraordinary corkscrew journey through store-rooms and state-rooms ^j. ^^ until it finally came to rest. j^.ds. The muzzle of No. 2 gun ou the port side was hit by a large round shot, which took off a tapered flake about six inches long and six inches wide on the outer end, without disabling or indeed really damaging the gun. (Figs. 42 and 43.) Un board of the Penelope this bruise was sup- posed to have been the work of a XY-inch shell. Many ropes were cut aloft, and the main-yard was so injured that it had to be replaced. The following is the official report of damages sustained by the Sultan : H. M. Sultan, Off Alexandria, July 14, 1882. 1. Four jilates on starboard side in wake of sheet-anchor partly shot away; one frame broken, one frame bent in, and inside lining smashed in; tumbler of sheet- anchor broken and part shot away ; side scuttle broken ; bulkhead of gun-room closet shot away ; the fore end of hammock berthing shaken and splintered by shell ; voice- pipe from upper battery deck shot away ; gun-room water-closet and connections broken and part shot away ; fore part of fore channel, starboard side, gone; shutters to billboard broken. 2. Upper part of coamings to fore ladder-way shot away. 3. Transporting chock at kuighthead, port side, splintered and part gone ; bow port gone ; upper part of bow port, starboard side, gone. 4. Bulkheads of seamen's head and officers' water-closets, pojt side, much damaged and part blown away ; hole in lower edge of jilate 16 inches by 12 inches; upper edge of plate beneath torn down and edge strip broken. 5. Three steps of the side of the port fore gangway shot away. 6. Hole in side plating of sick-bay, port side, about 8 feet above water-lines, 15 inches in diameter ; one frame broken and bent in; water-way gone ; gutter angle-iron bent in, and ten streaks of inside lining broken ; framing of water-closet in sick-bay, port side, blown away and closet damaged ; bulkhead of sick-bay much damaged by shell ; two rifle-racks on aft deck bi'okeu. 7. Two ward closets much damaged ; hole in side of plating 12 feet above the water- line, 14 inches in diameter ; frame broken, lining smashed in, and two side scuttles broken. 8. Armor plate about 22 feet abaft after gangway and 1 foot above the water-line dented by shot, and plate started. 9. Armor plate under main deck battery, 1 foot 6 inches, dented by shot. 10. Berthing starboard side quarter-deck, cowl-head to ventilator to shaft- alley, starboard side quarter-deck damaged by shell. 11. Hole 16 inches by 10 inches through mainmast, 17 feet from upper battery deck ; voice-pipe from upper battery deck to main-top shot away. 12. Main topmast grazed by shot and lightning-conductor partly gone. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 45 13. Mizzen topmast head and royal truck shot away. 14. Four boats damaged by shell. Running rigging cut through by shot and shell. Approved. W. HUNT-GRUBBE, Captain. The report of the Superb's wounds is quoted below : DAMAGE TO HULL AND RIGGING OF SUPERB DURING ACTION WITH THE BATTERIES AT ALEXANDRIA. 1. The |-inch plating close before the battery on the port side shot through, the projectile (a 10-inch shell) passing through all the frames (ten in number) forming the lower part of the embrasure for the battery port, starting the upper plating about two feet in an upward direction, and starting the outside plating, making a hole in the side 10 feet long by 4 feet deep down to within 3 feet of the water- line, striking the armor plate and bursting. 2. The -J-inch plating a few feet before the fore torpedo-port, port side of mess deck, shot through about 4 feet above the water-line, making a hole 10 inches in diameter. 3. The ^-inch plating close abaft the battery on port side shot through, carrying away the frame angle-iron, and making a hole in the side 12 inches in diameter 5 feet above the water-line. This was a 10-inch solid shot, now on board. 4. The armor plates were struck in two places on the port sitle about 4 feet above the water-line, the one indenting the armor 3 inches ; in the other the mark of the explosion of the shell is visible, and the plate is slightly started, breaking 14 rivet- heads of the plating forming the port sill. 5. The foremast was shot through, making a hole about 12 inches in diameter close to the awning hoop. 6. Stanchion for after bridge shot away. 7. Hammock berthing shot through in two places, carrying away three voice-tubes. 8. Iron plating at lower part of embrasure port, on port side, under the poop, shot through. close to the drop-bolt, breaking the port sill and starting the inside plating, and destroying the buckler port. 9. Both platforms for accommodation-ladders shot away. 10. Leadman's stools shot away. /Standing and running rigging. 11. One 6- inch-wire shroud with iron ratlines shot away ; one top-gallant and one topmast backstay shot away ; one force brace, fore top-sail halliards, runner of jib-stay and fore guy, fore top-gallant sheet, fore top-sail buntlines, and fore top-gallant lift shot away ; main sheet, after-boom topping-lift, and mizzen top-mast rope and cross- jack truss shot away. THOMAS Le H. ward, Captain. The Superb's wound numbered 1 in the foregoing report was to the observer the most striking of all in the fleet. In even a moderate sea the hole described would have been most annoying, resisting temporary plugging and admitting water into an important compartment. The result of the damages just detailed was very slight. Viewed in relation to the circumstances in which the fleet was placed, they were practically nothing. l!^ot a gun was really disabled, nor the fighting qualities of a single ship affected. The following day all were ready and the crews eager to resume the engagement, which could have been continued just so long as the powder and shell held out. 46 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGi'PT. VI. THE FORTIFICATIONS AND THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED B¥ THEM. In this section the fortifications are described in detail and an account given of the part each to»k m the action, together with the effects upon it of the fire from the British fleet. Reverting to Plate 1, it will be seen that Fort Silsileh is the most eastern of the immediate sea defenses of Alexandria. It stauds at the base of a long rocky spit which shuts in the eastern harbor, called gen- erally the New Port. The fort is a small work built around an old martello tower. (Plate 2.) It comprises two concentric batteries on the north face. The terreplein of the upper battery, it will be ob- served, has been widened and the parapet thickened from 15 feet to 36 feet. The proper embrasures have been cut, and two M. L. E. guns, one 8-inch and one 9-inch, have been mounted. These guns point towards the mouth of the harbor, at which place their fire crosses with that from the eastern face of Fort Pharos. Two X-inch shell guns are mounted en barbette on the east face of Silsileh, and more would have been put into position had time allowed. A Xlll-inch mortar completes the arma- ment of this fort, which is said to have fired "a few well-directed rounds" at the Temeraire when she came around to shell Fort Pharos. The Temeraire made no reply, however, and the fort is unscratched. The first fortin thenorthern lineof defense is Pharos, admirably placed to command the eastern harbor and the ai^proaches from the east and north, while the guns on its southern face may be trained directly upon the city itself. It stands upon the site of the famous light-house of Ptolemy Philadelphus, one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. The old castle or keep is a fine specimen of mediaeval Arab architecture, erected at the close of the fifteenth century. The modern fort, built around it, was considerably strengthened in 1852. Its general appear- ance at the present moment, as seen from the shore to the south- ward and westward, is given on Plate 3. It is connected with the city by a long causeway, shown in Plate 12. Plate 4 is a view of the northwest sea-face. From this it will be seen that there were two tiers of guns on this side, the lower in a casemate afleur d^eau, the upper un- covered. Plate 5 gives the plan of the fort as a whole, a horizontal section through the casemate, and horizontal and vertical sections of the magazine. Fig. 48 is a principal section along the line A B, and Fig. 47 an enlarged section of the casemate. These last figures are on Plate 6, which also contains sections through the east and west faces and an index sketch to the principal hits on the northwest scarp. The casemate was chiefly armed with 6^-inch S. B. guns on gar- rison carriages. Two embrasures in the west tower and that marked 17 on the plan, Plate 5, were unoccupied. In embrasures Nos. 3 and BRITISH NAVA.L AND MIFJTAEY OPERATIONS IT EGYPT. 47 8 were the 40pounder B. L. R. Armstrouj? guns already mentioned. Of this casemate it may be said that its walls, only 10 feet in thickness, could offer no adequate resistance to the heavy projectiles thrown at them, and that to work its guns under the fire of the British fleet re- quired great pluck and no prudence. The main strength of Fort Pharos lay in its upper battery. Here the thin walls of the old 'fortress have been thickened from 7 to 28 feet (measured through the base of the superior slope), and M. L. R. guns mounted — two 8-inch and one 10-inch on the northwest face, one 9-inch, on the north face, and two 9 inch on the northeast face. The last two were not used during the bombardment. Plate 7 gives a large-scale plan of this upper battery of rifled guns. Plate 8 shows the additional protection provided for them. The method, so clearly shown here, was adopted in the case of the other and heavier guns not included in the pictures. The west face was armed with four Xinch S. B. guns, of little or no value, even if they could have been brought to bear. The south face mounted a formidable-looking battery of fourteen 6^- inch S. B., bearing on the town. Four Xlll-inch mortars completed the armament. , The series of plates numbered 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11 exhibit the gen- eral condition of the masonry of Fort Pharos after it had been subjected to the pounding of the British fleet. Particular attention is called to the ample breaches made in the west face, as seen in Plate 3. The one to the extreme left is doubtless due to several well-directed and concur- rent shells, exi3loding with unwonted accuracy after being fairly buried. Just to the left of the old castle or keep is another breach, through which the Armstrong guns on the northwest face may be seen. Dif- ferent views of these breaches are exhibited in Plates 8, 11, and 12. (Plate 11 is a view of the ditch between the fort proper and the outer gallery.) As a result of the large breach shown more clearly in Plate 12, the platform under a Xinch S. B. gun is totally ruined, although the gun itself is unharmed. Eecurring to Plate 3, a still wider breach is seen in the parapet of the west face, exposing a second Xinch S. B. gun, likewise put hors de combat. The shot-hole, just above the water, is 15 feet wide and 11 feet high. The scars on the northwest face, the principal one engaged, are given in Plate 4. For the sake of clearness, the sketch, Fig. 44, Plate 6, is added as a key. Hit No.' 1 is due to two shots, one above and to the right of the em- brasure (No. 11 on plan of casemate, Plate 5), the other at the left lower corner. Their effect has been to peel off the outer courses of masonry to the depth of 2 feet or so quite uniformly, and to block the gun in- side the casemate by a large mass of splinters. Hit No. 2 has knocked away 7 feet of the cordon, but has had no serious effect. 48 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. No. 3 appears to have been done by several hits in the same neigh- borhood. Of these, one is worthy of special notice. The shell entered the masonry to the depth of about 3 feet and then burst, blowing out a fine crater and making a huge pile of debris at the foot of the scarp. No. 4 is the result of two 10 inch Palliser shell, one striking the cheek of the embrasure, the other immediately beneath the sole. Both projectiles entered the casemate and wrecked Ihe gun and carriage be- yond imagination. No. 5, a shell cut out a portion of the cheek of the embrasure and burst inside the casemate, disabling the gun by masonry splinters. No. 6 is a deep hole. The projectile is doubtless lodged inside un- burst. The splinters of masonry falling behind it have so plugged the hole as to prevent probing. No. 7, a slice is cut out of the cheek of the embrasure. The gun was probably not seriously aftected by this shot, but it was totally wrecked by the bursting of a shell underneath the carriage. Nos. 8 and 9, a series of surface wounds, due to several shell. No. 10 shows what is left of an embrasure. The gun and carriage inside are hopelessly and shockingly wrecked. The remaining embrasure on the right exhibits no scar, but enough masonry has been knocked off the inner edges to block the gun. The other casemate, Plate 5, in the northeast face, was less injured, not being subjected to so severe or so direct a hammering. Only that embrasure, No. 17, in which no gun was mounted, was struck. These galleries were simply slaughter-houses, a large number of men being killed and wounded, mostly by splinters of stone. The thinness of its walls and the lightness of its ordnance have been already re- marked upon. Nearly all of these guns were used. The condition of the casemate battery is given in the following sched- ule, the numbers being as on Plate 5 : 1. The gun is not hurt, but is unserviceable, being blocked by pieces of stone from the embrasure. 2. The gun and carriage are wrecked. 3. 40 pdr. Armstrong B. L. E. is still serviceable. The left rear pier of the casemate is knocked away. 4. Gun wrecked by a shell which burst under the platform. 5. No damage. 6. Embrasure is broken and beaten, in on the gun. 7. See No. 4, page above. 8. 9, and 10. In good condition. 11. Total destruction of gun-carriage. ' 12. Carriage blocked by debris of the masonry. Passing to the upper or uncovered battery, Plate 5, it is found that the rifled guns were not directly harmed by the British fire. The heaviest, a 10-inch gun, was blocked by the fall of pieces of masonry from the corner tower of the keep, under which it had been very indis- BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 49 creetly mounted. In addition, the sill of the embrasure was dislodged by a well-burst shell. The pivot is unshipped, but this could have been quickly remedied. (Plate 13.) The perfect condition of the 8-inch guns to the westward is shown in Plates 8, 9, and 12. The 9-iuch guns to the eastward, not being engaged, were unharmed. In the northwest angle of the fort were two Xincli S. B. en barbette, which were worked during the bombardment. A well-placed shot has overturned one of the two. (Plate 8.) This is probably the gun referred to in the Admiral's report as having been dismounted by a shell from the Inflexible. Its neighbor, still standing, is said to have been the last gun fired by the Egyptians as the Inflexible steamed away at the close of the day. Of the four guns originally mounted on the west face, two are still serviceable. The smooth-bores on the south front, which overlooks the eastern harbor, were destitute of cover against a rear or enfilading fire. Two of them, in consequence, were disabled. Gun No. 8 of this battery, counting from the eastward, was put hors de combat by the destruction of its platform. (Plate 13.) The place of the gun adjoining is marked on the same plate by the ends of the brackets of the carriage standing on end. The gun itself received a blow square in the breech, which knocked it out of its carriage and over the parapet. It passed through the roof of the kitchen beneath (Plate. 5) and planted itself vertically, with the muzzle down. (Plate 14.) The directness of the blow is indi- cated by the straightness of the path described by the gun in its flight and the absence of the cascabel. The rear face and keep show unmistakable traces of at least twelve good hits each, the rifle-gun battery eight, the left or west face eleven, the casemate, as judged from the inside, eleven, from the outside, eight- een. Many of these marks may have been duplicated, the destruction of the masonry rendering an accurate identification quite impossible. No traces of Gatling or Nordenfeldt bullets or of shrapnel could be dis- covered. The practice on Fort Pharos, it will be remembered, was due to the combined efforts of the five heaviest ships in the fleet. Thirteen blind shell were found in Pharos and two broken 11-inch com- mon shell. The serge bags containing the bursting charge were white and clean. The powder itself was hard and caked. Summing up the damage done to this fort, it is seen — 1st. That one rifled gun, the heaviest of all, was put liors de combat. On account of the proximity of the keep, it could not have been perma- nently served at any time. 2d. That one X-inch S. B. gun* in the upper battery was dismounted. *■ Those on the west face are not considered. H. Mis. 29 4 50 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 3d. That in the northwest casemate seven out of twelve guns were more or less disabled. 4th. That the old fashioned batteries, whether barbette or casemate, aftbrded very inadequate protection. On the other hand, it is also shown — 1st. That five out of six, or, more justly, three out of four, rifled guns were unharmed. 2d. That one X-inch S. B. in the upper battery was still serviceable. 3d. That the four 6^-inch guns in the north casemate were unin- jured. 4th. That two B. L. E. 40-pdrs. and three 6^-inch S. B. in the north- west casemate, five guns out of twelve, were not hurt. 5th. That the modern batteries with thickened parapets gave ample protection against almost the heaviest guns now afloat. In Plate 8 a distent view may be had of Ada, the next fort to Pharos in the northern line of defense. Like Fort Pharos, Ada is built upon an outlying ledge of rocks and is connected with the mainland by a stone causeway. It is an irregu- lar four-sided work, so placed that its principal faces point northeast and northwest, delivering cross-fires in front of Pharos on one hand and of the Kas-el-Tin Lines on the other. The former face is lightly armed with seven X-inch S. B. guns. Back of the north angle of the fort is a cavalier, B, with a solid masonry scarp, mounting one 8-inch M. L. R., capable of a certain amount of train on either front, with a X-inch S. B. mounted on each side. In the northwest face lies the strength of the fort, a modern cavalier with thickened walls (28 feet), carrying one lO-iuch and three 9-inch Armstrong M. L. R. Between this and the bastioned north angle is a low battery of X-inch S. B. guns. In addition to the guns enumerated, there are, as usual, some mortars (five Xllli-nch). Plate 15 gives a general plan of the fort, and Plate 16 the details of the larger rifled-gun battery, Cavalier A. The northeastern face points towards Fort Pharos, and therefore was not exposed to the attack, which was directed mainly against the west- ern battery, where the heavy modern guns were mounted. On Plate 17 is a sketch, Fig. 49, of the principal scars on Cavalier A. 1^0. 1 is a hole made, probably, by a Palliser shell, which penetrated too deep for probing, and now lies ot the bottom unexploded. [N'o. 2 is similar to the foregoing. The wall is shattered for over 3 feet across, and the crater is 4 feet deep. Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6 are similar to Ko. 1, scaling off the outside stone work to the depth of about a foot and making a broad scar 9 feet in widtb extending from the cordon down. Nos. 7 and 8 are like No. 1. No. 9 is particularly noteworthy. One of the Inflexible's shells has entered to the depth of over 8 feet, bursting inside and blowing out the mass of debris 12 feet across, seen lying beneath. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 51 :N"os. 10, 11, 12, and 13 resemble No. 1. No. 14 has burst on the cordon and cut down the scarp about 2 feet. This scarp was pitted all over by shrapnel balls. No machine-gun bullet-marks were detected. The hits on the superior and exterior slopes are sketched on Plate 16. No. ] is the No. 14 just described. It made a good crater, blowing out behind it the material it dislodged on entering. No. 2. The shell struck the exterior slope and burst well, making a large crater, which laps over upon the superior slope, and blowing down a part of the cheek of the embrasure. The damage is more apparent than real. Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are fine craters of various sizes. None, however, are of a serious nature. No. 6 is the best of this series of hits, having been made by a plung- ing shot, which, if it had fallen a few feet either way, would have ruined a 9-inch M. L. R. This crater is 7 feet wide and 9 feet long. No. 7 resembles No. 3. On the superior sloi)e, near hit No. 5, was one of the Inflexible's 16- inch Palliser shell pointing straight out to seaward. Such a position would seem to indicate that the shot had been fired at long range, had become unsteady in its flight, had capsized as it struck, and that enough velocity of rotation was left to roll it out of its bed up to the crest of the parapet. The general good behavior of these shell renders this case interesting because exceptional. The injuries received by the southeastern or shore side of this fort from plunging shot that had passed over the batteries are shown on Plate 18. There are two good hits on the parapet of Cavalier B and ten on its northwest scarp back of the water battery. The latter shows two hits on the parapet. Plate 19 is a view of what was left of the magazine after its ex- plosion at 1,32 p. m. This catastrophe, rendered possible by the ab- surdly insecure position of the magazine, silenced the fort. The num- ber of killed and wounded by this accident could not be ascertained, but it must have been a fair proportion of the garrison. The occurrence itself was a magnificent specimen of pyrotechnics, resembling the erup- tion of a volcano. It is hardly to be wondered at that the fort was "hurriedly evacuated" by the survivors. The high battery seen on the right in this plate is Cavalier B. Passing to the guns, it is found that the largest, a 10-inch Armstrong, was disabled. A shot had struck it on the muzzle, carried away the hold- fasts, and knocked the slide trucks off the tracks. The crew were evi- dently making an- attempt to get the gun into position again at the time of the explosion, for the jacks were found under the slide after the ac- tion. The adjoining 9-inch guns were unharmed. 52 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. In Cavalier B oue X-inch S. B. was dismounted by a shell from the fleet. (Plate 20.) In the lower sea battery one X-inch S. B. was dismounted by a shell and a second was wrecked through the smashing of the slide by a plung- ing shot. Besides the shell from the 81-ton gun already mentioned, three others were found unburst, one 9-inch Palliser, one 10-inch Palliser, and one 10- inch common shell. Summing up the damage done, we find — 1st. That one lO-inch M. L. E. was put hors de combat by the British fire. 2d. That of the smooth-bores which could be brought to bear, three out of seven were disabled, if not dismounted. 3d. That the magazine was exploded, and the fort, in consequence, abandoned. On the other hand — 1st. Four out of the five rifled guns were still serviceable. 2d. The disabled rifled guns could have been restored to efficient working order in a very short time. 3d. The damage done to the walls and parapet was practically insig- nificant, and could have been repaired, where necessary, in a few hours. Immediately southeast of Fort Ada, lying between it and Fort Pha- ros, and placed, so to speak, at the apex of the re-entering angle formed by the coast as it runs from one to the other, is a new work known as Fort Ada Lunette. (Plate 12.) It took no part in the bombard- ment. Passing to the westward the coast recedes and assumes the shape of a narrow bight, about one thousand yards in length, being for the most part a shelving, sandy beach, unprovided with defenses. At the western end of this bight begin the Eas-el-Tin Lines, in a new unfin- ished fortification, called, in Admiral Seymour's report, the Hos- 13ital Battery. By glancing at Plates I and 21 it is seen that these lines are a succession of open works, on the northwest side ot the city, connected by a low parapet of varying form. The position is a strong one by nature, there being sufficient salients to permit, if properly utilized, concentration of fire at any desired point within range. A direct landing is out of the question in view of an outlying reef and of the height and steepness of the bank. An attendant drawback arises from the ijroximity of the city, into which any hostile shell, ricocheting upwards from the parapet, or fired wiJbh too great an elevation, must inevitably fall. This disadvantage is, however, common to all the sea defenses of the northern line. The Eas-el-Tin Lines comprised three rifled-gun batteries, known as the Hospital, Central, and Tower Batteries, the curtains between be- ing provided with smooth-bore guns and mortars. The total armament consisted of one 10-inch, two 8-inch, and t-wo 7-inch Armstrong M. L. E., BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 53 four XV-inch S. B., sixteen X-incb S. B. of various types, eleven 6J-inch S. B. (or 36-pdrs.), and one XX-inch, seven Xlll-inch, and one X-inch nlortars. All of these rifled guns and most of the smooth-bores were worked. In addition were the 9- inch M. L. R. on a Moncrieff carriage, and the B. L. E. 40-pdr. Armstrong, on Kennon's lift-carriage, already mentioned. This last gun is not shown on either plan. It stands about one hundred yards to the eastward of the Light-House Fort. The mounting of this piece is on a simple and ingenious plan, which maybe described in a few words. The gun, on an ordinary carriage, is borne on a counterpoised platform capable of being raised and lowered in a deep pit. (A gasometer will give a rough idea of the system of counterpoises.) At the bottom of the pit are the magazine and shell-room and the load- ing chamber. After firing, the gun is lowered for loading, then raised and fired over the bank. The cost of this system must be very great, and might find its justification in the case of a muzzle-loading gun in an exceptionally exposed position. The Ras-el-Tin Lines were deficient in traverses, while the magazines were subject to the disadvantage of inadequate protection. In rear, at various points, were ample barracks, shell-houses, &c. Incidentally, these served the purpose of defining, with extreme clearness, the target aimed at by the British gunners, to the detriment of the garrison. The details of the Hospital Battery are given in Plate 22. It was unfinished at the time of the bombardment, so that its guns' did not enjoy the full measure of protection which it was designed to give them. This battery was very severely handled, the masonry battered in, and the guns blocked. It is simply impossible to note or even fairly esti- mate the number of hits. The left flank is completely breached and the top of the new expense magazine deeply scored by shells. The wreck- age of the right embrasure was caused by a 16-inch Palliser shell. The battery mounted two 7-inch M. L, R. The guns themselves were un- injured. Subsequently they were transported to Ramleh and mounted there in the British lines of defense. Upon one of them no less than 49 shrapnel marks were counted, some as deep as half an inch. This, a 10-inch shrapnel, must have burst directly in front of the muzzle of the gun and have inflicted terrible damage upon the gun's crew. A shell burst nnder the front track of tliis gun, tore it up, and twisted the left front truck in its socket. In spite of all these disasters, and of the heavy machine-gun fire to which it was subjected, the Hospital Battery was fought until 3 p. m., or for eight hours. This circumstance alone would prove the stubbornness of the defense. It is proper to recall the words of Captain Hunt-Grubbe's official report: "One rifled gun in the Hosjiital earthworks, which it was impossible to dismount, being invis- ible from the shij), did us great damage." The smooth-bores to the westward of the Hospital Battery were nearly all worked more or less. One X-inch gun, marked a on Plate 21, was dismounted by a shell, and another, 6, by its own recoil, having proba- bly been overcharged. 54 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. ^IThe buildings and walls in rear bear evidence of the use of E'orden- feldt and Gratling guns by the fleet. The large modern work, called for the sake of clearness the Central Battery, is drawn on Plate 23, where the principal scars on the parapet are marked. Its relation to its neighbors appears on Plate 21. It suf- fered very severely, receiving the full attention of the broadside vessels in the offshore squadron. No. 1 is a deep cut on the right cheek of the embrasure, but of no practical damage. No. 2 is a similar wound on the other cheek. No. 3 is a good hit under the muzzle of the gun, wrecking the hold- fast. Nos. 4 and 5 are mere scores on the cheek, and may even be due to shrapnel. No. 6 is a fine crater, 11 feet in diameter, made by a well-burst shell. It cannot, however, be considered as a serious wound. No. 7 is a trench 6 feet long, 4 feet wide, and 1 foot deep, scooped out by a glancing shell. No. 8 is a severe wound in the sill of the embrasure, which was totally wrecked. The revetment of the interior slope is gone between the points marked d and e. No. 9 is a scooped trench like No. 7. The 10-inch rifled gun was j)ut completely hors de combat. The right front truck is gone. The compressors appear to have failed, for the gun has recoiled violently and damaged the buffers. The masonry at the pivot has been battered in and the slide trucks are nearly oft' their trgicks. The gun itself was struck on the chase, and the outer tube split 2 feet from the muzzle. Its immediate neighbor, a 9 inch M. L. R., is uninjured. The hold- fast shows a tendency to rise off" the pivot. The remaining gun in this battery experienced a complication of troubles. It was rendered useless through the jamming of a shell in the bore. It was badly hit on the trunnion and on the right carriage- bracket 6 inches in rear of the trunnion. The holdfasts had begun to give way, and the pivot was bent, while the trucks were blocked by the fragments of the ruined embrasure. The third modern battery in the Easel-Tin lines is distinguished by a martello tower around which it is built, and through which it is known as the Tower Battery. It is shown in detail on Plate 24, where the principal hits on the parapet are sketched in. No. 1 was probably made by a glancing shell, which cut 2 feet out of the right cheek of the embrasure of the easternmost 8-inch M. L. E. No. 2 appears to be due to two well-burst shell. The right cheek is knocked away. No. 3 is a very good hit. The masonry at the angle is torn out and thrown down on the tracks, thus blocking the carriage. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 55 No. 4. Several light hits on the superior slope. No. 5 is a^crater about 9 feet across and 3 feet deep, made by a shell which burst after getting fairly buried. The end of the cheek of the embrasure is destroyed, but the gun was not damaged and the resisting power of the battery was unaffected. No. 6 is a breach 10 feet wide in the parapet, and is shown in sec- tion on Plate 24. It did no harm to the guns. No. 7 is a large crater, 10 feet in width by 6 feet in length and 3 feet in depth, caused by a well-burst shell. • No. 8. The right cheek of the embrasure is cut away. The 8-inch Armstrong M. L. E. on the right of the battery was struck under the chase, but was not injured. The right front truck of the top carriage was smashed, and the left bracket was cut through by a splinter of masonry. The gun could have been used again. The other rifled gun was hopelessly wrecked. A shell had apparently fairly entered the embrasure, striking the chase and third coil, and, passing underneath the gun, had exploded inside the carriage. The brackets were blown clean out and the gun permanently disabled. A portion of the Eas el-Tin palace buildings, erroneously termed the harem, was set on fire by shells which were directed against the Tower and Central Batteries, but which overshot the mark and exploded inside this house. It is believed that this is the only building in Alexandria thus fired by British shells. In the Eas-el-Tin Lines the practice of the British fleet is seen to have been vastly more disastrous to the rifled guns than in either Pharos or Ada. Of the seven in all mounted, the 10-inch, one each of the 9 and 8 inch, and both 7-inch guns were disabled, the latter being blocked by masonry splinters. There were thus left but one 9-inch and one 8-inch gun still serviceable. The parapets could all have been restored, temporarily at least, in a single night, and the 10-inch, possibly the 9-inch, and both 7-inch guns made capable of use in a very short time. TJie smooth-iiores suffered but two wrecks, both near the Hospital Battery. The parapet here is so low that the crews could be readily driven from the guns by smaller i^ieces of ordnance, leaving the heavy guns of the fleet comparatively free to devote their entire attention to the rifled guns. The smooth-bore, bowled off" its carriage, was, how- ever, struck by a heavy shell. In spite of 20 pdrs., Nordenfeldts, and Gatlings, these old-fashioned guns were vigorously served, doing much damage to the ships. The Eas-el-Tin Lines terminate to the westward in a well-designed bastioned fort, surrounding the modern light-house of Alexandria. The point on which the fort is situated is called Eunostos Point, and the fort itself has been termed variously as Eunostos, Eas-el-Tin, and the Light House Fort. Plate 1 exhibits the general command of this work — northwest to seaward, west to seaward, in the direction of the 56 BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. channels, across the bar, south and southeast over the harbor. It is built on solid rock, the scarp rising abruptly from the level of the sea, above which, at the height of 28 feet, is the terreplein. The plans and sections of the fort are given on Plate 25, which also shows an enlarged plan of the west or main sea face. The parapet of the original fort had been greatly thickened prior to the mounting of the modern' guns, and at the time of the bombardment the process of further increasing its defensive qualities was still going on. A landing pier and sally-port are on the south side. The main maga- zine is at b on the plan, smaller expense magazines being indicated by dotted lines in most of the traverses. The eastern part of the walled inclosure is a fortified barracks, afford- ing ample accommodation for a thousand men. The land approaches to the fort are commanded by loop-holed chambers, thrown forward. Portions of the northern and southern walls are similarly pierced for musketry. The Light-House Fort mounted one 10 inch, four 9-inch, and one 8-inch Armstrong M. L. R. Of these the latter and one of the 9-inch guns could not be brought to bearon the British fleet. The west curtain car- ried two XVinch and two X-inch cast-iron S. B. guns, which, however, were not manned or fired on July 11. On the north front are three more X-inch S. B. guns, and on the south front a large battery of twenty- one 6^-inch S. B. The four rifled guns on the west face were alone employed on the diiy of the bombardment. They were subjected to an extremely heavy fire (practically from all five ships of the ottshore squadron), which has left well-marted traces. They were all, esi^ecially thosein the south bastion, most indifferently protected, the parapet being dangerously low. On Plate 17, Fig. 51, is a sketch of the we«t face of the right or northern bastion, showing the principal scars. No. 1 is a large pile of debris knocked down by several shells. It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of hits that combined to pro- duce this effect. No. 2 is a hole 15 feet wide, the work of not less than two well-burst shell. The crater is 5 feet deep. No. 3. A shell burst well in the exterior slope, making a gap 9 feet 7 inches wide. No. 4 is a clearly defined crater, 4 feet (3 inches wide, 4 feet high, and 3 feet 6 inches deep. On the scarp of the curtain are eleven hits. The largest, made by a shell from the Inflexible, is shown in Fig, 52, Plate 17. The average depth over the surface is 4 feet and at the hit 8 feet. The eflect of the explosion is certainly extensive, but very little of the exterior slope is brought down, and the parapet is in no way weakened. The other hits on the scarp are of very slight importance ; the projectiles have en- tered to the depth of about 3 or 4 feet each. All these wounds were occasioned by stray shell aimed at the guns in the bastions. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 57 Passing to the curtain parapet, we find (see Plate 25) a number of good hits. No. 5 is a large, well-formed crater, about 9 feet in diameter, extend- ing half way across the parapet. No. 6 is a cut clear down to the cordon from 4 feet above the exterior crest. No. 7 is a trench scooped out of the top of a traverse containing an expense magazine. The trench is 8 J feet long and 6 feet 9 inches wide. No. 8 is a be'autiful breach, made by a plunging shot, cutting down the crest of the parapet along a distance of 12 feet. Fig. 53, Plate 17, is a section through the middle of the gap. The shell must have exploded as soon as fairly buried. The mean thickness of the parapet is 18 feet. The path of the shot through it is 12 feet. No. 9 is a practicable breach at the angle between the curtain and the southern bastion. No. 10 is a good crater in the exterior slope, overlapping the superior slope. Nos. 11, 12, and 13. The corner is knocked down, but little real damage done. No. 14 is a scar on the right cheek of the bastion. No. 15. The shell burst well, blowing away the outer corner of the left cheek. No. 16 is a large, but not serious, crater in the traverse. Nos. 17 and 18 are good craters in the slopes running down over the cordon into the scarp. No. 19 wrecked the embrasure. The right face of the south bastion is shown in Fig. 50, Plate 17. - Hit No. 1 is the same as No. 18, just described. No. 2 is a hole 3 feet deep, 3 feet 6 inches high, and 2 feet 6 inches wide. No. 3 is similar to No. 2. On the ground, 6 feet distant, lies a 10-inch common shell, pointing towards the hole. No. 4 is a hole into which a projectile has penetrated to the depth of at least 8 feet. No. 5 burst on the cordon, making a good crater 7 feet 6 inches long and 4 feet wide. No. 6 is similar to No. 2. No. 7 is a scar made by a 10-inch common shell which burst on im- pact, scaling off the wall over an area 7^ feet long and 4 feet wide to the depth of a foot, Nos. 8 and 9 are two connecting craters made by blind shell. Passing to the inside of the northern bastion, and referring to Plate 26, the damage sustained becomes evident at once. The 9-inch gun mounted in the capital of the bastion has been ren- dered useless by excessive and improperly controlled recoil. A stouter 58 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. forelock through the pivot would have resisted the shearing action of the sudden bump with which the gun came in, would have retained the holdfasts in place and the gun in serviceable condition. The state of its neighbor is the work of, perhaps, the best shot of the day. The gun itself is deeply scored under the chase. After inflicting this wound the shell probably passed inside the carriage and burst, throwing the gun over backwards on top of several of the crew, who were found in that position on the following day. It is possible that the smashing of the trunnion band may have been due to another and previous shell. In the left or southern bastion the lOinch M. L. E. gun was the last to be silenced. It was this gun that killed Lieutenant Jackson on board the Inflexible. The gun was hit on theA-tube, but not damaged, being eventually placed hors de combat by the wrecking of the embrasure. Its neighbor, a 9-inch M. L. E., is said to have been the first gun disabled. It is shown in Plate 27. The embrasure is ruined, the pivot gone, and the gun is on end. It is not impossible that this result may have followed upon the knocking in of the sill of the embrasure, but it is more likely to have been due to a weak pivot, and thus to be a mere duplication of the experience in the northern bastion. The third g'un in this bastion, a 9-inch M. L. E., was not worked during the engagement. It bore upon the harbor. Being well masked, it es- caped injury. The remaining rifled gun in the fort, an 8-inch Armstrong, mounted on the southern or inner face, was not worked. It is seen in Plate 28. It suffered badly from reverse fire. The left training truck is goiie and the embrasure wrecked. The masonry in the neighborhood and the walls of the buildings bear the impression of many Nordenfeldt bullets, shrapnel balls, &c. The buildings within the fort are terribly breached and damaged. The light-house itself did not escape, several hoh^s of various sizes having been made in it by stray shell and shell fragments. The general state of affairs shown in Plate 29 is insignificant in comparison with that of the large shell-houses marked d and e on Plate 25. This fort ceased fire at 10.30 a. m. Extensive as are the damages noted as sustained by the masonry in the Light-House Fort, due to the combined efforts of the offshore squad- ron aided by the Temeraire and the after or starboard turret of the In- flexible, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that in the main the thickened parapets resisteortant problem. There remains no possible doubt that ships engaging forts not superior to them in force gain more in accuracy of fire by anchoring than in safety by keeping under way. A private account of the bombardment, written on board of the Invin- cible and published in the London Standard newspaper, refers to th© Monarch as delivering a less effective fire, in consequence of keeping under way, than her neighbors. Her best work was at Marsa-el-Khanat, but the gun-cotton she blew up there was hundreds of yards in rear of the fort she aimed at. It is proper, at this place, to suggest that the slight damage done to the guns in the fort at Mex can probably be accounted for by the fact that the Invincible, although at anchor, was too distant, and the other ships were under way. 15. One fact which struck the observer in passing through the forts at 74 BKITISH NAVAL AND MILITAKY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Alexandria, in the northern Hue, is the lessened injury inflicted by the ships as they moved to the eastward. The Light-House Fort was entirely disabled ; the batteries in the Eas- el-Tin Lines were silenced, but not entirely put hors de combat. Only one rifled gun was disabled in Fort Ada and one in Pharos. As the at- tacking squadron grew in strength, as it advanced against these works in the order named, and' as the sun had moved out of the gunners' eyes to shine more fully on the target^ an explanation (not the only one, how- ever) is found in the fact that the steady northwest breeze of that day had gradually raised a slight swell, maldng the afternoon practice less effective than that of the morning. This sea can be best described as slight and short, but its influence upon the bombardment is unmis- takable. 16. It follows, as an inference from what has just been stated, that an additional advantage, not generally claimed for vessels with complete fore and aft fire, lies in their ability to ride at anchor, head to sea, and engage a fort, either ahead or astern, from a platform which is as steady as the circumstances can possibly permit. 17. Besides the hints which may be incidentally derived from the foregoing notes, it is well to add, for the guidance of officers command- ing vessels assigned to the task of demolishing fortifications, that there can be but two targets at which it is worth while to direct their fire. The first is the muzzle of any gun actually served.; the second is any build- ing hnown or believed to he a magazine or shell-house which is visible above the i)arapet. All shot not placed in accordance with these rules are shot thrown away. They may make deep holes in the parapet and wound members of the garrison by splinters, but they are without real effect on the powers of the work either for offense or 'defense. It is advisable not to waste time and effort on a gun which may prove to be a quaker or unserviceable, but to confine the attack to the enemy's weapons in use. On the other hand, if an enemy allows an undue accumulation of in- flammable or explosive material in an exposed situation, it will probably be under a roof of some kind. Here lies the chance of igniting it by a well- burst shell. Lightning-conductors, as marking the site of the mag- azine, should be specially sought for, and, if found, fired at. G-euerally speaking, however, the most vulnerable parts of a fortification are the guns mounted in it, and to them most attention should be devoted. 18. Having the essential facts of the last engagement between ships and earthworks at hand, it is impossible not to draw one broad infer- ence — that vessels are not yet and never will be able to fight on even terms with forts. The responsibility of the attack belongs to the former, while the lat- ter gain the credit of a drawn battle. The former cannot continue the action beyond a certain time, limited by the capacity of shell-rooms and magazines. The garrisons of the latter may wait quietly under cover BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 75 until the fire slackens, can then return it with interest, and continue it indefinitely, and absolutely at their own leisure. This disadvantage, and the obligation of assuming the initiative, should be recognized and well weighed before commencing operations. 19. These deductions in no way touch the question of the ability of forts to stop the progress of modern ships. In this respect, and unaided by other modes of defense, by obstructions, &G.,the works at Alexandria would have been utterly powerless against the British feet, which need hardly have paid them the compliment of a passing shot. 20. The success which attended the efibrts of the spiking party at Mex inspires the regret that similar work was not generally attempted by the fleet. It is easy to be wise after the event, and therefore it cannot now be doubted that, in this way, the true state of the morale of the garrison would^have been revealed, and possibly such measures taken as might have prevented the burning of the city. A few hundred men could have seized and held the place on July 12. so great was the fear on the part of the Egyptians, both soldiers and citizens, caused by the bom- bardment — a fear not known, at the time, to the British commander-in- chief. In consequence of the lack of information, this memorable battle was followed by one of the most shocking, wanton, and deplorable ca- tastrophes of the century. 21. The forts at Alexandria were badly bruised, but the more modern parapets were not seriously harmed. In the generality of cases the real damage they sustained could have been easily repaired in a single night. If the bombardment was directed against the forts in this, their defensive capacity, it must be pronounced a failure. If its object was the dismounting of the new rifled guns, it must be conceded that such results as attended the work of the inshore squadron (only one gun of this type being seriously affected), or even such as were achieved by the offshore squadron (less than one-half being permanently disabled), do not justify the verdict of success. In the wider sense of having driven the garrison from their batteries, and having silenced the forts, the fleet was unquestionably victorious. Into this product, however, enters the important element of morale. TJie British, while surprised by the tenacity of their opponents, were the first to confess that men of a stamp at all similar to their own would have accepted the gage thrown down the next day, and have renewed the fight. With a heavier sea running to render the fire of the fleet less accurate, and to embarrass the operation of replenishing its almost empty maga- aines and shell-rooms from the ammunition vessels in the outer road- stead, can any doubt be reasonably entertained that the struggle would have been vastly prolonged, even if the final result had been unaltered? Fj^RT II. THE WAR IN EGYPT. 77 VIII OPERATIONS BY THE BRITISH NAVY AT ALEXANDRIA SUBSEQUENT TO THE BOMBARDMENT. The events of the day immediately following the bombardment have been already briefly referred to (p. 36). To give a clear idea of the de- mands of Admiral Seymour, and of the policy adopted by the Egyp- tians, the following letter is quoted at length. It is the report, to the admiral, of the officer sent to communicate^with the military authorities ashore in response to their hoisting a flag of truce on the Light-House Fort : H. M. S. Invincible, Off Alexandria, July 12, 1882, Sir: 1 have the honor to inform you that on arriving on board the Egyptian yacht Mahroussa I informed the captain that I had your orders to communicate with the military governor of Alexandria. His excellency Toulba Pasha, military governor, just then came alongside in a steam- launch. He told me he was on the point of going out to the British admiral. I told him you could not hold any communication with him until, as a preliminary, Mex Batteries and Adjemi were surrendered, the former to he temporarily occupied by your forces, the offensive defenses of the latter to be destroyed. I carefully poiuted out to the Pasha that these positions were practically in your power, that you did not intend to hoist the British flag or do anything to hurt the susceptibilities of the Egyptian nation, but you required the peaceful surrender as a guarantee of good faith. The Pasha, after a deal of temporizing and begging the question, said he had not the authority to comply with your demands, but must communicate with the Khe- dive, at Eamleh palace, four or live miles distant. I asked him to do so bj'^ telegram. He replied, "There is no telegraph wire" — a mistake on his part. I then (at twenty minutes past 12) informed the Pasha he must give written surrender by 2 p. m. He begged for 3 p. m., pointing out the physical impossibility of communicating with Eamleh under tbat time. I informed him that I could not alter the time, and replied I was convinced that he, the gallant defender of Alexandria, had the power to sur- render what was required, pointing out to him that the forts in question had been silenced by our ships and were no longer in a position to offer any resistance. He then asked, " What will the English admiral do if we cannot accept his terms?" I replied, "Destroy the whole of the fortifications." He then said, "There will be no men in them," to which I replied, "You would be delighted to hear that, as your object was the demolition of the forts, not the destruc- tion of men." The interview then ended, the Pasha ostensibly hurrying to Eamleh to consult the Khedive. The Bittern weighed at 2 p. m. I returned to the Mahroussa, com- pared watches with the captain (2.15 p. m.), and informed him, as time was up and no answer to your demand had arrived, you would recommence fire at 3.30 p. m. ■ He asked me to wait a little longer, as the answer would come directly. I told him I would wait on board the Mahroussa till 2.30 p. m., but had not the authority to change the time for recommencing the fire on the forts, viz, 3.30 p. m. He hurried ashore to inform Admiral Kamil Pasha (sub -minister of marine). 79 80 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. At 2.30 p. m., seeing my boat alongside, he returned and wished for further delay, which I declined, and returned to the Bittern. In my opinion the sole object was to gain time to enable the soldiery and rabble to pillage and burn the town without the danger of a stray shell disturbing their oper- ations. * Commander Brand, of the Bittern, informed me at least 500 troops in heavy march- ing order had evacuated Ras-el-Tin while I was on board the Mahroussa. I have, &c., HEDWORTH LAMBTON, Lieutenant. To Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour, Commander-in-Chief. The following extracts are from Admiral Seymour's official dispatches of the dates mentioned : . [Of July 14.1 - As negotiations failed, * * * one shot was fired into the Mex Barracks Battery earthwork, * when a flag of truce was again hoisted. I then sent Lieutenant and Com- mander Morrison into the harbor in the Helicon, and on his going on board the Khe- dive's yacht, the Mahroussa, he found she had been deserted, and he reported to me, on his return after dark, his belief that the town had been evacuated. This belief was quite correct. Under cover of the white flag, Arabi succeeded in getting his troops safely out of the city, which was given over to the mob for pillage and burning. Some smoke had been ob- served rising from the place before sunset, but after dark the flamea were but too aj>parent. Alexandria had been fired in at least two quar- ters. [Of July 19.] At daylight [of the 13th] the [inshore] squadron was under way, and I proceeded up the harbor and found that the town was on fire in several places, that the harem of the Ras-el-Tin palace was burning, and that the forts were evacuated. As by the most reliable authority I learned that the force of Arabi Pasha had only- moved out as far as Pompey's Pillar, where they "were said to be awaiting us, I had to be cautious in our proceedings, and, as a first measure, I landed a party from the- Invincible and another from the Monarch, under^Captain Fairfax, C. B., A. D. C, to spike or burst the guns between Gabarri and Tsali which bore upon the harbor. While this was being accomplished the gun-boats were sent to the ships outside tO' bring in the marines. Ras-el-Tin itself was occupied and many of the guns bearing on our ships spiked. About the same time I received a visit from Ahmet Tewfik Eff"endi, A. D. C. to his excellency Dervish Pasha, who, accompanied by Colonel Zoh- rab Bey, A. D. C.to H. H. the Khedive, had come in from Ramleh palace, about 4 miles from Alexandria, asking me if I would undertake to receive the Khedive, whos& safety from the mutinous regiments surrounding him gave rise to much apprehension. I at once expressed my readiness and anxiety to be of service to His Highness, and at about 4 p. m. I had the honor to receive him at the gate of the palace, which, fortunately had suffered only to a very slight extent from the fire of the ships ou the 11th instant. [Of July U.] I regret to say that the city of Alexandria had sufiered greatly from fire and pillage. At the same time the guns on the southern shore were being spiked. We occupied the Ras-el-Tin Lines with such men as we could spare. * This, the last shot of the engagement, struck the northeast angle of Mex Citadel. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 81 [Of July 14.] In the evening [of the 13th] a party of blue-jackefcs lauded with a Gatling gun and cleared the streets of the Arabs, who were setting fire to and pillaging the town. [Of July 20.] In the evening [of the liJth] we lauded all the marines from the offshore squadron and got a small patrol into the streets, hut they were of little service. As explanatory of these brief notices, it is proper to state that the first party which landed from the ships was composed of 160 marines and 250 blue jackets from the Monarch, Invincible, and Penelope, under the command of Commander Hammill, of the Monarch. They reached the Easel-Tin palace at 10.30 a. m., seized the western end of the pen- insula, and threw out aline of sentries north and south extending- from • shore to shore. At half past twelve a small party of marines and a Gatling gun's crew from the Monarch pushed on towards the town, occupied the arsenal, and guarded the streets' in the immediate neigh- borhood, making prisoners of the natives who were seen looting just outside of the gates, and firing upon those more remote. The arsenal then became a point of refuge for the Europeans still left alive in the city, who came down, some seventy in number, to seek iJrotection. The Gatling gun was planted to command the principal street leading to the water-front through this part of the place, where there were many buildings burning and in ruins. During the afternoon the blue-jackets were re-embarked, and the ma- rines of the Superb, Inflexible, and Temeraire landed in their stead. The patrolling of the city was begun, a company of Royal Marine Artillerymen, armed as infantry, marching through the Arab and Euro- pean quarters of Alexandria. They shot one or two natives caught in the act of setting fire to houses, and they shot three of the native police who were pillaging a house after having cruelly maltreated the door- keeper, an Arab faithful among the faithless. In the evening the marines were also landed from the Achilles and Sultan. # The Inflexible, Temeraire, and the Achilles, an armored ship which arrived on the 12th, were stationed off Ramleh fo command the land approaches to Alexandria from the southward and eastward. Of the events of July 14, Admiral Seymour says : Employed during the whole of the day landing as many men 'as we could spare from the squadron, and by evening we had occupied the most important positions. Appointed Captain John A. Fisher to take charge of the naval brigade. The fires had occasioned enormous damage in the European quarter, where had formerly stood many fine buildings, for the most part of French and Italian styles of architecture. The incendarism was still going on. JSTot a street here was passable for any distance, all being more or less blocked by the smoking ruins of the fallen houses ; walls were still tumbling down, and the hot air was opaque with lime, dust, and smoke. H. Mis. 29 6 82 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Several ships of the Channel squadron having arrived, their marines were at once landed. The entire city was now occupied. Alexandria being a walled town, the distribution of the force at Cap- tain Fisher's disposal was naturally governed by this fact, and was practically as follows : At the Eamleh gate were marines from the Monarch. At the Eosetta gate were marines from the Temeraire. At the Moharem Bey gate was marines from the Alexandra and Inflexible. At the Fort Kum el-Dik gate were marines from the Sultan. At the Pompey's Pillar gate and Dead gate were marines from the Superb. At the Caracol (B. on map) gate were marines from the Achilles. At the Gabarri railway station were marines and blue-jackets with Gatlings from the Alexandra. At the Zaptieh (A. on map) and the arsenal were marines from the Invincible. It was on this day that an armed force from the United States ships Lancaster, Nipsic, and Quinnebaug, composed of a Catling gun and crew, a 3-inch B. L. E. and crew, and a company of marines, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich, landed, occu- pied the United States consulate, and patrolled a large section of the European quarter of the town, extending to the Eamleh gate. The de- tails of this service, and of the later service performed by Lieutenant Hutchins, are the subject of other official reports. On July 15, in view of a rumor that Arabi meant to attack the city, a large number of blue-jackets and marines with Gatlings were landed from the British ships, each, as a rule, reinforcing its own detachment ashore. The Minotaur's marines strengthened the post at the Eamleh gate, and her blue-jackets the weak part of the defense between Pom- pey's Pillg^ gate and Miniet-el-Bassal, the Alexandra's blue-jackets being stationed in the latter quarter to guard the bridge over the Mah- moudieh Canal. It is now, however, believed that at about this time Arabi withdrew from the immediate neighborhood of Alexandria and encamped towards King Osman and Kafr Dowar, across the isthmus which connects the Alexandrian peninsula with the mainland. The police of the town was placed under the charge of Commander Lord Charles Beresford, of the Condor, with headquarters at the Zaptieh. To him all offenders were sent for investigation of charges and for pun- ishment. This as well as all subsequent action on the part of the British, whether by the army or the navy, was in the name and by the authority of the Khedive, and had for its aim the re-establishment of the latter's shattered power. On July 17 the 17th company of the Eoyal Engineers, 90 men, under Captain E. Wood, and the 1st battalion of the South Stafford- BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 83 shire Regiment (late 38th foot), 860 strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thackwell, which had come from Malta, arrived in H. M. S. Northumber- land and were landed. The former went to Miniet-el-Bassal and began at once the work of improving and repairing the existing defenses. The technical details will be found in the section treating of the work done by the Eoyal Engineers. The 38th marched to the Moharem Bey gate and relieved the marine sentries between Pompey's Pillar gate and the Ramleh gate. This relief was sadly needed, for the men were nearly tired out. No small part of their physical exhaustion was due to the attacks of insects, fleas and mosquitoes, which deprived them of proper sleep. Up to this time a lew hundred men had held the city against a force estimated to be ten times as strong, and in the presence of an inimical and violent popula- tion. The troop-ship Tamar arrived at 2 a. m. of this day, having on board the marine battalions, 600 Eoyal Marine Light Infantry under Lieuten- ant-Colonel Ley, and 300 Eoyal Marine Artillery under Lieutenant-Col- onel Tuson. In the afternoon these troops were landed at Miniet-el- Bassal and took immediate charge of the western lines; that is, from Pompey's Pillar gate to the Mahmoudieh Canal. These battalions formed the advance of the British expeditionary force, and Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, K. C. B., had arrived to conduct their operations. On July 18 the 3d battalion of the King's Eoyal Eifle Corps (late 60th foot), 960-odd men, which had reached the outer roads the day before in the Agincourt, were landed from that ship in a smaller trans- port, the Nerissa, by the same method as was employed in the disem- barkation of the 38th. The 60th went to Moharem Bey gate, relieving the posts of the 38th, which concentrated at the Eosetta gate. The land defense of the city was now definitely assumed by the army, assisted at the Eamleh gate by the marines from the Alexandra, Su- perb, and Temeraire, and elsewhere by the blue-jackets and their G-at. ling guns. The other bodies of marines landed from the ships were employed in patrolling and policing the town, being stationed as fol- lows : -Eas-el Tin palace, half of Agincourt's party. Coast-guard station,* Sultan's party. ' Zaptieh, Monarch's party. Tribunal, t Minotaur's party. Caracol (C. on map), half of Agincourt's party. Caracol (B. on map), Achilles' party. Gabarri station, Inflexible's party. The whole of the marines now ashore were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Legrand, E. M. L. I., who had come out from * Near the arsenal. t Diagonally across tlie street from the American consulate. 84 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. England for this purpose. These carried on the duty of constables, cases being tried at the Tribunal and Zaptieh, in theKue Franque, and then sent to the arsenal for punishment. Strong measures had to be resorted to to keep the large population in order, especially in view of the great temptations aud opportunity for looting. Efforts were, however, made to secure a native police force as a sub- stitute, but the unsettled condition of things and the difficulty of getting trustworthy Egyptians rendered this a long and tedious process. It is impossible to give more than a general account of the work of the navy done ashore in and about Alexandria, for the number of men landed varied from day to day with the actual necessity or in accord- ance with the anticipation of offensive operations by the Egyptians. The term "naval brigade," as meaning a fixed organization, is, there- fore, incorrect in this instance. The matter of rationing these bodies of seamen and marines serving on shore was only difficult in the early days of the occupation, when wheeled and other transport was not easy to obtain and when the streets were blocked by debris. Each ship, therefore, at the outset kept its own landing party supplied with food, the task being performed by those still on board. When the necessity of a more permanent and methodical arrangement became evident, a depot of supplies was established on shore, to which each ship contributed its quota. At this store, rations, as needed, were drawn by the several parties. The grog ration was maintained, and on occasion, after hard work, an extra " tot" was served out. It seemed, however, to be the experience of those officers best placed to judge, that an extra ration of Cocoa was of more practical benefit than an extra ration of rum. The original landing parties carried two days' supplies in their haver- sacks. All hands were dressed in blue, and wore the blue cap, in its white cover, to which was attached a cape or havelock. The riflemen were equipped in heavy marching order, carrying their Martini-Henry rifles, sword-bayonets, and from 100 to 12.0 rounds of ammunition per man. The equipment of the British sailor landed for operations on shore is detailed in the section entitled "The N^aval Brigade." To each gun's crew, 9 pdr. or Gatling, and to each infantry company landed at Alexandria was attached a mess-cook, and each detachment had two pioneers, carrying shovel, pick ax, &c., four stretchermen, and a hospital steward. The subdivisions or pieces were commanded by sub-lieutenants or midshipmen, and the companies by lieutenants. Three 9-pdrs. were mounted in Fort Kumel-Dik, as part of the per- manent defenses of the city, and were manned by blue-jackets from the fleet. After the advance of the arnjy to Eamleh, the marine artillerymen ' BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 85 of the Inflexible were sent out to assist in mounting and working the guns there. Between July 18 and 26 the blue-jackets ashore were stationed at the Pompey's Pillar, Moharera Bey, and Eosetta gates, the Alexandra's de- tachment occupying the Ras-el-Tin peninsula. On July 26 the seameu from the Alexandra, Monarch, Sultan, and Su- perb went out to Ramleh, planting and manning six 9 pdrs., two 7-pdrs., and four Gatlings. This large detachment was under Commander Thomas, of the Alexandra, who was relieved a few days later by Com- mander Hammill, of the Monarch. On July 20 all the marines were withdrawn to their ships, but three days afterwards about 200 were again landed froni the Alexandra and Superb. They were placed at Mex, under Lieutenant-Colonel Legrand, to guard that important outpost. On August 12 they were relieved by a company of the Royal Marine Artillery battalion. Immediately after the bombardment, the work of destroying the offen- sive capacity of the fortifications bearing on the sea was begun. Par- ties of men, mainly from the Hecla (torpedo-supply ship) and the Con- dor, destroyed the ainmuuition in the forts, throwing the powder and shell into the sea. Torpedo detachments from various ships wrecked the guns, all of which were thoroughly spiked. The light guns (6.J-inch S. B.) were hove off tlieir carriages and the rifled guns treated with gun- cotton. If the various plates giving views of these guns are studied, it will be seen that every one of the latter exhibits a slight bulge near the muzzle. The official report on this subject is, unfortunately, a confi- dential document, but it is believed that no gun resisted the detonation of a pound of gun-cotton placed about 18 inches inside the bore. The result is a distortion sufficient to prevent the introduction of the shell, while the external appearance is only altered to the eye of the close pro- fessional observer. A much larger charge than usual must have been employed in the 8-inch gun at Oom-el-Kabebe, whose muzzle is abso- lutely blown off. Hundreds of tons of gunpowder were ruined, and scores of valuable guns rendered useless. The object or necessity of this destruction is hardly evident. The Torpedo stores at Mex received a similar treatment. The cases were punctured freely with pick axes. On about August 20 the defenses of Ramleh were strengthened by the mounting of three 7-inch Armstrong M. L. R. Two were taken from the Hospital Battery, and the third was found unmounted near Mex. Their position is given on Plate 45, at ji. They were conveyed to their site by rail from the railway station at Moharera Bey, and skided into place, the parbuckles being hauled on by a locomotive. The gun- platforms were constructed of heavy balks of timber, sided 8 inches by 10 inches, laid longitudinally and transversely. An anchor for the pivot-bolt was improvised by siukiug a smooth-bore gun, muzzle up, in 86 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. the sand. The railway euibankmeut was used as a parapet, the guns being mounted en barbette. The easternmost of the three guns was placed so as to command a long stretch of road, and therefore needed no lateral train. It was probably the one whose carriage-truck had been injured on July 11. Its slide was lashed in place and backed by heavy timbers against the recoil. A pit was dug in the embankment and a rude magazine built in it, upright and cross timbers forming the sides and top. Sand-bags and earth were piled about it and above, as a pro- tection. This battery was brought up in answer to a 15*"° Krapp gun mounted at King Osnian (Plate 44), but it was very little used, since it had the effect of drawing the Egyptian fire in the direction of the water tower and reservoir immediately in rear, serious damage to which would have been a real calamity. On a slight elevation back of the water tower were the other pieces in the naval battery, two 9-pdrs. on field carriages, firing through a low i^arapet of sand and sand-bags. This battery was manned by about eighty men from the Inconstant, under Commander Parr. They lived in tents and had a regularly organized camp near their guns. The armed train is described elsewhere. On the water the navy was constantly engaged in landing troops and stores and in patrolling the approaches to the westward of Mex and the eastward of Ramleh. In the latter quarter, at certain points, the land is so low as to permit a ship anchored off the coast to throw her shell well up in the direction of Kafr Dowar. Never less than one iron-clad was kept here to prevent an advance from Aboukir or King Usraau. The electric light was useful in the former connection. The navy, it will be seen, took a notable part in the passive defense of Alexandria, as well as in the various skirmishes and reconnaissances between Kamleh and Kafr Dowar. Its part in the reconnaissance in force of August 5 is contained in the account of that action given later. A fitting conclusion to this section is the testimony as to the effi- ciency of the aid rendered by the navy to the army, which is contained in the following letter: Eamleh, Septemier 20. To the Chief of Staff: Sir : I have the honor to request that you will be good enough to bring to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt the excellent work performed on shore by the ofBcers and men of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines during the period I have been in command at Alexandria. All requests from me for their employment on shore have been met with the utmost alacrity and good feeling by Admiral Dowell, C. B.'. The work performed by the several parties has been of an arduous and varied nature, but I particularize the following: Commander Hammett, R. N., with a party of blue- jackets from the Minotaur, landed on the nights of the 31st August and the 1st Sep- tember, and demolished by gun-cotton a house near our advanced posts on the canal, which afforded cover to the enemy. Commander Morrison, R. N., was relieved shortly after my assuming command by Commander Parr, R. N., whose men, under thedirec- BBITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 87 tioa of Lieutenant Scott, R. N., worked in a most praiseworthy and successful manner in mounting three 7-incli M, L. R. gnns on the water-tower position. The sand being very heavy rendered the work most difficult. These guns were effectively used against the enemy's earthworks, under the direction of Commander Parr an* iH in in in 4 in m in in •310BJ •jqSii'BjQ •eaeaoq doojx -rci c^i w CD CO CO (M c^ ca rH 1 -<# (M M CO OJ CD CD CO CD ■<# W CJ C^ C ."« S3t--^'3 •3» 33 3 3 3 O bti O O .0 •H s r a . o -? a a w (O d O a cs a W M g •5 H W W « ^ Jl^ ^a !>3 » O O O O " « M .« ^5 ^ c o. "-I B ■■ ?, cs ca > C8_2 K 00 ® www (> bJL^' +2 ^ 4J t- ■r- 'Z'V CO 'O OD J- COCJ rH CO r-1 3 o o y . si - ti 3 ^3 !>i&'>>t=| -2^ ti: " * a cS ^ < Q e^ TOO BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. O ^ '^ "JS^ IC g cS s ^ s a % ~ (N 00 0-* ,- 1 •UBipaj « oa CO CO CO •nea ^ ■*-*r- CO :£ tp rH •aenbj'Bpi : :- - -^ : rH ' ; •eq.j'BO p9p9qAi-OA4.x g c c o o 00 o o o rH •81JB3-J9^'BM •^ ■ ■* CJ e^ C m Nr(i O .HrK CO T(< CO ■01 -4 r-.lM •<(< ■* ■* oc rH OCT rH rH ^ ■u am pn'B eiaog: c>. ■* g CO CO CO t- o t- CO 00 00 g -JO pa aotestcainoo-ao^ •ei9Ot0O ^OB-UB^ IN j(M • f-H -^ -^ : : - rH rH •* cc S3 5D IP cq o o c O eo CO c- O O •ejao^O i-( CO cs CO p- CO CO •ej90Ego tBasaag rJ^^ : : ^ ^ • : ^ : : : in t> t-t- IT c o CQ lO I t- •%d!iS's. ^ MtXM si bii hri UD : >i bi) ut \% 3AUI8 JO 9:^^(1 02 tf D c 1- a S • "3 s S SB .2&( o ►- i^ H iJ 2 >- h-I 1-4 ^ ^ , _j^ . >> t ■= E o !>3 P( a^ & |J 9 •^- PI i ? 1 c« != a. 3 !5 O > s 4- a " SB 6 •• $ "3 > C +3 1 ^ i «T3 q g a C4 O O 45 -B ,2 C! b bt) « i § 1 .:= p. i -r c« 43 ment. t battalion South Sts shire Kegiment. t battalion Shropshire Infantry. i=t> Ih OHfiH ^^;^ ^ iH .^Tji rt i2 "Ti '^ rd CO -* BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 101 ^M tug •c a OO CD 03 OS •n-* i-t « o 05 CO CO in oo CT «0 O in s t- »l 03 •■o P4 CO ;2S'^ "Og to (M -* ^ -r)< to C.1 (M in IM 00 IM ^§ ■ • IM M • • : : : - : ; CO H r-( o> ?: coo r-l (O CO to -^ 5 CO T-l 1-1 .H '^ ^ rH »q -^ iH -> •* . ^ '. N IN IM rH -* : : r~i ^ iH -^ g CO CO CO in oo(M rHrH -* § O to to J5 00 in (M in to IM IM IMrH ; cQ • I ■ • • 1 1 i M . > . . . . r • : ::;::; ■*. (M -* o i I e "= o 'S. o pq o a, £ • C3 W 1-1 — tS P( ^ © bt a ts cS B Oi-l O -^ Hh^ < i -2 '-' SdO-Bk! .J= . flfe: Bb. B B.^ S 3 )^ 1^ ;^ o . cii-a t? ^A "^ >-i ^ 3 © Ph W « .S 2 M M 00 ©" - > ^ S _fcf J 5 >: M M b£jj W © O C3 Ph <=« £ a „ ^ a ■^ bu o fe-aa S .2 ^ .SH t>2 '>. t« as := T3 © -3 -r u ^ -^ c4 ft § - f-j c 2 © M S §£ © © o iZ'" !^ S o to - ©" ©" '~' ® ITS n3 © .Sf •■^1 « ^ ®-=i 1'-g.|||se Ph p,o^!ii o o 2 9 tog&^ 102 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. hi) bl it) a> ce c3 ca tH s f: ^ ^ R< § n OS a o ■3 s^ 2 -43 ^ a p. R i. a pli to •saeaoq doojx m CO -* lOrH • ■* to to . 00 eo - • rHin CO-* rH o • o CO eq 1 rH • - OS CO in OOO • eo ■CO 00 •I r-i ■JOP saot8Siaiuioo-aou ; ; ■ > o>-« •* rH •8J90©0 IJUBJUBjiV ; ; 1 ; - ■<» ■* ■* O t- t- rH mci-^ toe* eq oco to ei r-i r-i CO ?« M •sieDtpo •Bjoo^o i^Bjenaf) . : : : : : ; : l-~^ N 00 o O tr B(I !3 : "^ <1 3 fl hU<] <1 -^ ^ '. Ji 13 § (C ■■ fe-^ : 1^ ^ a a a ^ ^ ' 4J "SS 1 , '. be .d « CO S^,i^ ; ; ; P 3 ; k-.'S 58 I h^l O ! 1 . ,2 • a : 1 g ) >Cana H.M. Yikin A dint c 5 -a ■a 5 1 ^ 1 • « "r :> : ^ -g ; : : 1^ "-'^ -!»/ a O M i 4 ; § : ^ : i-s 1=^ c .ci o 5° : S 3 o o .o M ^^i 'II I i ; i m CO • r; 3 -^ S 13 5 fl a £ ■ Si in 3 :) A O O 'ZS DO t; '111 \ 5 a usport. ompany comm usport. Si Ml o- ° o s a z 50 .d t Is H ■.2;|-§5' *j X a 5-.a o J 3! C oc BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 103 f' iH t* lO o rM tn • o CJ o> •^ ; ; I co" ; ; CO o N UO c^ to ; 00 (H r-t M « • r-> ^ to ^4 ' to" D?l ^ ■* « ; 1 ; • 1 (O ; ; ; 1 ; O ; C) c^ • 1 '• a> TO M ->*' ■* • 1 • '"' '• 1 ' m IM o n CO *" tn ui Oi m rH ft C^ .-( rH til bbucMtj: e = a d , SOrt ce » J W ^ ^ ' . "S3 ■§ S'S'i-e 1^ H? h5 O « M a a S ?= S t O t-i ^ E ■S ■= = H 1^ O ^ W a 3 a a!3 fi4 te . J5 rrt :r3 (D ^^ r-l iH "T P< fl O w O pq Ph ■ ■ OD "S S m 1- S^fc. 5 a 2 O t3 -^ fl -3 a's ^ 3 104 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. SUMMAET. Troops. Infantry : 1st (er 3rd) brigade 2nd (or 4tli) brigade Divisional troops: • Cavalry , Infantry Koyal Artillery (12 guna)... Koyal Engineers Veterinary Departmf nt Commissariat and transport A rmy Hospital Corps Field hospitals i . . . Post-office department Divisional staff Add warrant officers Total First division. Officers. Men, 93 123 18 30 14 6 4 3 329 2,303 3,058 286 861 398 185 4 208 71 90 3 41 13 7,521 Second division. Officers 123 106 13 30 14 6 4 3 5 16 336 SUMMARY OF COEPS TROOPS. Troops. Cavalry brigade : Cavalry brigade staff Cavalry Royal Horse Artillery (6 guns) Commissariat and transport . .. Army Hospital Corps Postal department Add warrant officers Total Corps Artillery Siege ti-ain , Ordnance-Store Department . Corps Eniiineers Military police. Veterinary department Chaplain's (lepaitn)ent Commissariat and transport Army Hospital Corps . . Field hospitals Post-office department Add warrant officers Total corps troops . Officers. 104 31 18 10 32 4 10 13 45 5 32 3 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS. Royal Marine Light Infantry Royal Marine Artillery , Total marines The following are the totals of the principal corps. In the infantry is included the Koyal Marine Artillery Battalion, which was armed as a toot detachment. Officers and men. Infantry 15,642 Cavalry , 2,304 Artillery (including siege train) - 2, 435 Engineers 1, 161 Commissariat and Transport Corps 1, 298 Army Hospit al Corps 313 Army Medical Department ---- 429 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 105 If to these is added the reinforcement of the Indian Contingent, the whole number of men landed in Egypt is found to be in the neighbor- hood of 35,000, while about 6,000 more were on their way or in reserve at near jooints. XI. THE SEIZURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE CHANGE OF BASE. The British operations in Egypt were formally legitimized through the passage by Parliament, on July 28, of the bill granting £2,300,000 sterling for the expense of the expedition. At the moment of which this report now treats the state of. affairs may be briefly summarized as follows : The British had a foothold at Alexandria and at Suez, besides strong naval forces at Port Said and Ismailia. The Suez Canal was still open to traffic, vessels coming and going through it as usual, unmo- lested. Egyptian detachments held Port Said and Ismailia, in the in- terest of Arabi Pasha, who had been declared a rebel by the Khedive. These two ports were the only maritime places of importance to the attack. With the exception of Suez and Alexandria, the whole of Egypt lay in the possession of Arabi and his followers. It was known that these amounted to between 50,000 and 60,000 regulars, including the reserves, besides numberless volunteers generally spoken of vaguely as Bedouins. The ends which General Wolseley had to accomplish were three in number : first, to crush Arabi's forces ; second, to seize Cairo and save it from the fate which had befallen Alexandria ; third, to re-establish the Khedive's authority. The last, while politically embracing the two former, was, in a military sense, their necessary outcome. Eeferring to the map of Lower Egypt, Plate 47, it will be seen that Cairo is at the apex of the delta, a district roughly 110 miles on each side of the triangle which it forms. Through this district run the two principal branches of the Nile, which separate a few miles below Cairo, and which serve as the main arteries ot trade and of a vast system of irrigation canals and ditches. The banks of these canals and the rail- way embanknients are the roads of this country, where wheeled vehicles are practically unknown outside of the larger towns. These embank- ments could have been readily utilized as formidable intrench ments. To engage Arabi in the delta would have been folly. Possessing an intimate knowledge of this network of dikes and water- courses, he could have avoided or sought battle at his own convenience, securing for himself the most advantageous conditions, and, if defeated, could have either retired to other and similar positions, or have carried on a prolonged and harassing guerrilla warfare, trusting to the high water in the Nile, now rapidly rising, to flood the ground in front of the Brit- 106 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. ish, and to defeat them by the malarial fevers which are the concomi- tant of the overflow. He could thus have retreated at comparative leisure, destroying all European property as he withdrew, and, if forced uj) the ISIile Valley, leaving behind him a mass of smoking ruins to mark tlie site of Cairo. The French under Bonaparte in 1798 had marched from Alexandria to Damanhour and up the left bank of the western or Rosetta branch of the Nile to Cairo; but this route could only have been followed by General Wolseley after taking or turning the fortified lines at Kafr Dowar; and it was open to the further objections that along it Arabi could not be forced to fight in the open, and that a wide, deep, and swift river, almost devoid of bridges, lay between it and Cairo. The chances and probable results of a direct advance from Alexandria had been fully considered, and even before he left London General Wolseley had determined upon his plan of campaign, which involved the use of Ismaili i, on the Suez Canal, as a base of operations. He hoped to be able to induce Arabi to fight a decisive battle at some point in the desert where the Egyptians could be absolutely crushed, and then to push on from that point, whatever it might be, and occupy Cairo. This probability of a fair fight in the open was in fact the main object to be sub- served by the selection of this route. As secondary advantages, how- ever, were, first, the relative proximity to Cairo of the base, 96 miles dis- tant by rail over this line, as compared with 127 miles from Alexandria: second, the existence of a railway susceptible of easy defense, for the transportation of supplies from the base; third the greater salubrity of the desert region ; fourth, the possession of a well-sheltered inland haibor, where the operation of disembarking could be conducted without interference from gales of wind or heavy surf. The precautions taken to keep the plan a military secret were thor- oughly successful. It was allowed to be understood that a combined attack on Aboukir and its forts was in course of preparation, and every facility was given to newspaper correspondents to obtain such details as might prudently be made public without exciting too much suspicion as being merely a ruse de guerre. In the mean time. General Wolseley and Admiral Seymour, in full accord, were busily employed in making all the necessarj arrangements for the transportation of troops to Is- mailia and the seizure of the Suez Canal. On August 18, several transports, with troops on board, steamed out- side the harbor of Alexandria and anchored off the Bogzha Pass. De- tailed instructions were issued tor bombarding the forts at Aboukir and for landing the soldiers, as well as for a simultaneous advance on Arabi's left at King Jsman. The troops selected for embarkation were the 1st division, under Lieu tenant-General Willis, C. B. The 1st brigade of this division was composed of three battalions of the Guards. The 2nd brig- ade was incomplete at this time, only the 2nd battalion of the ^brk and Lancaster Regiment (late 81th foot) and the 1st battalion of the West BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 107 Kent Eeg'iment (late 50th foot) having arrived. This deficiency was made good by the marine battalions and th,;3rd battalion of the Fifles. On Saturday, August 19, the various transpoits moved to the eastward in a fleet, escorted by the Inflexible, Minotaur, Superb, andTemeraire, and anchored in regular lines, according to a prearranged plan, in Abou- kir Bay, at 3.30 p.m., the men-of-war leing nearest the beach. The troop- ship Eui)hrates, with the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the Rho- sina, with the Eoyal Marine Light Infantry battalion, and the Nerissa, with the Rifles and the Eoyal Marine Artillery battalion, pushed on to Port Said. These transi)orts experienced singularly bad luck, the last two breaking down en route. The delay resulting was not serious, for their escort, the Alexandra, towed the Nerissa at the reputed rate of twelve knots an hour, while the Euphrates helped the Ebosina. After dark these vessels were followed by the other transports, which left Arabi and Aboukir, in a military sense, da7is Vair. On arriving at Port Said the next morning they found the entire Maritime Canal in the hands of the British navy. The ofiSicial reports descriptive of this operation are quoted at length: H. M. S. Pknelope, Poi-t Said, August 23, 1882, Sir : I have the honor to make the following report of my proceedings after I left Alexandria in the Iris, on the evening of the 16th instant, -with the plan of operations agreed on between Sir Garnet Wolseiey and yourself: 2. I arrived at Port Said the next morning (Thursday) at 10 o'clock, and immedi- ately sent the Nyanza, condenser steamer, with tents, provisions, and 100 men of the Northumberland, to Istnailia, as a reinforcement to Captain Fitz Roy. 3. On Friday morning, the 18th instant, Captain Frtz Roy joined me from Ismailia, and after discussion with him I gave him the accompanying orders with reference to the occupation of that place. 4. I also arranged for the occupation of Port Said by Captain Henry Fairfax, of H. M. S. Monarch, to whom I gave the instructions appended. 5. On Friday evening I brought in two companies of the battalion of Marines from the Northumberland and placed them on board of the Monarch and Iris. 6. M. Victor de Lesseps, who is the working head of the canal company at Ismailia, came on board on the 17th instant and entered into a long discussion, presenting a series of arguments against any possible intention on our part to disembark in the canal, and disputing the grounds of my intimation that I considered Ismailia, both town and port, to be Egyptian. He left with the conviction, I feel sure, on his part, that we, sooner or later, should use the canal for a military purpose, while I had imbibed a conviction that no remonstrance on our part would induce Count Ferdi- nand de Lesseps to willingly accept the position and withdraw his opposition to our doing so. 7. I considered, therefore, that to insure the safe passage of our troops it was abso- lutely necessary that the barges and dredges, &c., should be occupied along the whole line of the canal to Ismailia ; and, further, that it was most desirable that the Kautara telegraph station should be seized and our through telegraphic communication be restored, while Arabi's communication with Syria should be stopped. 8. For this duty I selected Commander H. H. Edwards, of H. M. S. Ready, as an oflScer thoroughly conversant with the canal, and in whose judgment I had confi- dence. 9. He started at 8 p. m. on Saturday evening, the 19th instant, taking the necessary telegraphists, and left the parties told off for each post as he passed up. 108 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAEY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 10. At the same tinie I brought in the remaining three companies of the battalion of Marines, under Liexitenant-Colonel Graham, from the Northumberland, and towards daylight transferred them to the Ready and Dee, with two launches from the Penelope? to facilitate their landing on arrival at Ismailia. 11. The Falcon, which had just arrived from Alexandria, was sent an hour before sunset on the 19th to an anchorage off the coast halfway between Port Said and Ghe- mil, and the Northumberland anchored during the night off Ghemil Fort, the object being to check an exodus of the Arab coal-heavers from Port Said, and to create an impression that our intention was to attack that work. 12. About 4 o'clock a. m. on the 20th the movement was executed simultaneously along the line with complete success, the rebels being completely taken by surprise ; telegraphic communication was restored between Ismailia, Kantara, and Port Said, and the Sj'rian telegraph was under our control. It was found, however, that the latter had been previously disconnected. 13. On your arrival in the Helicon, about 8 a. m. on the 20th, I had intended to pro- ceed at once to Ismailia to reinforce Captain Fitz Roy, who was exposed to the possi- bility of attack by a large force of enemy moving down on him by rail. 14. Circumstances, however, as you are aware, necessitated my remaining at Port Said to see the 1st Division of Transports into the canal, and by their entering I was precluded from going on for some time in my flagship. When night fell, there- fore, I went up to Ismailia in a picket-boat, and arrived about 4 a. m. 15. I immediately landed and joined Captain Fitz Roy and inspected the position he had taken up. It appeared to me to have been admirably chosen, and the works thrown up for the protection of our men by Captain Stephenson's party, with the advantage of Major Fraser's, R. E., advice, to have been thoroughly satisfactory. 16. It is known that three trains full of soldi'rs were moved down by the rebel general from Tel-el Kebir with the view to attempt to retake the place, but he was deterred from making an attack, probably by the shell-fire on the Nefiche station, and after some time spent in observation of our position the trains ran back in the direction from whence they came. 17. I would here draw your particular attention to the effective fire maintained by the Orion and Carysfort on a position which could only be seen from the mast head of the latter at over 4,000 yards' distance— a fire by which a train standing on the rails at the station was twice struck, and the carriages and trucks secured for our own uses. 18. I inclose reports from Captains Fairfax and Fitz Roy and Commander Edwards of their respective share in the operation, and desire to express my sense of the judg- ment, zeal, and ability shown by them in the performance of the difficult and delicate dutes which devolved on them. I have, &c., A. H. HOSKINS, Hear- Admiral. To Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour, G. C. B., &c., Commander-in-CMef, Mediterranean. P. S. — My report would not be complete without my mentioning that I employed Captain Seymour, of the Iris, on the delicate duty of securing the canal company's office at Port Said, and in preventing any information being conveyed through it to their other stations, or to the rebels, a'duty which was performed, as have all others on which I have employed Captain Seymour, entirely to my satisfaction. The following brief note contains the instructions from the Eear- Admiral to Captain Fitz Koy, of H. M. S. Orion, ui)on which the latter seized Ismailia : j H. M. S. Penelope, Port Said, August 18, 1882. Memorandum. Some time before daylight on Sunday morning next you are to Idnd the available force under your command at Ismailia, and proceed to occupy the town, which you BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 109 are to hold until you are reiuforced, which will probably be at the latest within twenty-four hours. It is of the greatest importance that the telegraph office, both of the canal company and the Egyptian Government, should be seized at once and all telegrams prevented from passing. The wasle-weir to the westward of the upper lock should also be seized at once, and held, if possible, until the troops arrive. As this is under the fire of the guns at Nefiche, intrenchments should be thrown up as soon as possible to cover the men. You are to use your own discretion as to supporting this movement with the fire of the ships, but you will bear in miud that it is most desirable that no injury whatever should be done to the town of Ismailia or its inhabitants by any measures which you adopt yourself, and you should use every means in your power to prevent it on the part of others. The Staff Commander of the Orion should be ready to place any ship arriving with troops in the best berths for them to occupy, with a view to the disembarkation and their draught of water. From the verbal communication we have had, the support you may expect from myself and Sir William Flewett is made fully known to you. In the event of your being attacked by a superior force of the enemy, you are to ues ypur own discretion as to falling back upon the ships. Any persons attempting to set fire to the houses should be at once shot. A. H. HOSKINS, Bear-Admiral. To Captain R. O'B. FiTz Roy, M. M. S. Orion. The orders to Captains Fairfax and Seymour, charged with similar work at Port Said, the execution of which would occur in the presence of Bear- Admiral Hoskins, were more detailed : Penelope, at Port Said, August 19, 1882. At 3.30 a. m. on Sunday next, the 20th instant, Port Said is to be occupied in the following manner: 2. The direction of operations will be under Captain Fairfax, of H. M. S. Monarch. 3. The landing party will consist of — From H. M. S. Monarch, 100 seamen, small-arm men, 18 [a] Gatling gun's crew, 48 Royal Marines, 1 Gatling gun. From H. M. S. Iris, 80 seamen, small-arm men, 18 [a] Gatling gun's crew, 28 Royal Marines, 1 Gatling gun. From H. At. S. Northumberland, battalion 200 Koyal Marines. Total, 180 seamen, small-arm men, .36 Gatling-gun crews, 276 Royal Marines, 2 Gat- ling guns. Total strength, 492 men and 2 Gatling guns. 4. The Iris' seamen and marines will at ouce proceed to the outskirts of the town by the Quay Eugenie (Plate LII), and take the right of the line, to extend from the sea to Lake Menzaleh, between the European and Arab towns, i, e., from the right of the Rue du Nord to the beach. 5. They will be followed immediately by the company of the Battalion of Marines from the Iris, who will turn to the left at the Rue de I'Arsenal and form round the north angle of the barracks. 6. The Monarch's seamen and marines will form on the whai f opposite the ship and march by the Rus du Nord to the Consulate, which the marines will take charge of, posting sertries. The blue-jackets will continue on the same line of street, and form on tbe left of the Iris men, extending to Lake Menzaleh, and detaching a party to guard the reservoir and its neighborhood. 110 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 7. The Battalion Company of the Royal Marines of the Monarch will form on the left of the above on the wharf and march after the advance to the south corner of the hari'acks, taking care not to extend into the Rue de 1' Arsenal, so as not to be in the way of the tire of the Iris' detachment. The Egyptian troops are to be summoned to lay doAvn their arms and then marched down to the wharf. 8. One Gatling gun will accompany the advance of the Iris, and the other the Ma- rine Battalion Company of the Monarch to the entrance of the barracks. 9. A sergeant's party is to be kept on the wharf to prevent any attempt being made to fire the cnstom-hoase, round which sentries are to be posted. 10. The Khedive's Governor, now in the Poona, will be on board the Penelope, and land directly the occupation is effected, and aid in the maintenance of order with the police who are known to be loyal. 10a. Arrangements are to be made to send the breakfasts on shore, with anything else that may be wanted, at about 7 a. m. The men are to have a meal of cocoa be- fore lauding. 11. Care is to be taken that men do not land with loaded rifles or load without orders, and it is to be impressed on all the landing party that no firing is to take place without orders, and that it is of the greatest importance to preserve amicable relations both with the white inhabitants of all nations and also with the Arabs, on whom we are dependent for the coaling of the ships. 12. A guard nmst be placed by the Iris over the Governor's house at the earliest opportunity. Arabi's Governor, Rouchdy Pasha, is to be received as a friend if he surrender himself. 13. It is very desirable to secure the Bimbashi,* if possible, and Major Tulloch,t with an interpreter and a small party of picked men, will endeavor to effect this. Prisoners should be put on board the Iris when the Governor has been consulted as to who should be released and who retained as such. 14. Marines will land in blue with helmets, seamen in blue with white cap-covers. As soon as possible a change of white clothing and hats for the se&m en should be sent on shore, and strict attention is to be paid to their appearance on parade and their general tone and bearing. All defaulters are to be sent at once on board the Monarch. A patrol of trustworthy men under an officer is to be told off at once for the main- tenance of discipline amongst our own men, and such patrols as may be necessary to support the Egyptian police must be forthcoming immediately the occupation has taken place. Major Tulloch will be good enough to attach himself to the Governor pro tern., in order to insure requirements for the maintenance of order being promptly made known to Captain Fairfax or the officer deputed by him. Captain Seymour will carry out intlependently my private orders to him. Captain Fairfax will act a;s Military Commandant of Port Said during my absence until the pleasure of the Commander-in-Chief is known. A. H. HOSKINS, Rear-Admiral. To Captain Henry Fairfax, C. B., A. D. C, of H. M. S. Monareh, and Captain Edward H. Seymour, of H. M. S. Iria. For the work to be done in the canal itself, between Port Said and Israailia, the following instructions were given to Commander Edwards by Kear- Admiral Hoskins : Penelope, at Port Said, August 19, 1882. Commander Edwards, of H. M. S. Ready, will start soon after dark this evening with boats containing one company of the Northumberland's landing party. Military commandant. t Military A. D. C. to the Commander-in-Chief. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Ill He is first to occupy the dredges, putting ou board of each an ofiicer and 15 men, to prevent any communication with the shore and toinsure each dredge bing kept close to the bank, out of the way of passing ships. Four days' provitious are to be put on board with each party. Having done this and given his orders to the officers, he is to proceed to Kantara and seize the telegraph office and both the Egyptian and Canal Company's wires, and allow no message to pass through till he is certain it is made either by us or in our Interest. Having done this, he is to take steps to insure all the ships in the canal between Port Said and Lake Timsah bound north, i. e., to Port Said, being gared.* Sir William Hewett, at Suez, has been instructed to allow no ship to enter the canal on Saturday ; therefore it may be assumed that there will be found no ships ou the other side of Lake Timsah. DETAILS OF OPERATION. The following force will leave Port Said soon after nightfall, under Commander H. H. Edwards, who will have charge of the operations, viz : 3 officers and :^5 men of H. M. S. Northumberland ; 4 officers and 56 men of H. M. S. Penelope ; total, 7 officer^ and 91 men. On proceeding up the canal 1 officer and 15 men are to be placed on board of each dredge met with, with orders to get her in to the bank as close as possible, or, if close, not to allow her to be moved. The officers and men of the Northumberland are to be landed at Kantara, wifh the telegraph clerks, who will accompany them and carry out the instructions given them. The remaining officers and men of the Penelope are to be kept ready to occupy any gare which may require it. All steamers met with bound northward, if gared, are to be ordered to remain so. If under way or secured to the bank of the canal, to make fast immediately in the next gare. At the same time a dispatch boat is to be sent back past the next gare to warn followiug vessels not to pass the gare. Until the vessel going north has gared they should make fast to the bank. The party of 1 officer and 10 men to be sent in a boat to occupy the gare station until this has been done, returning in the boat. For this service, a picket boat (Northumberland's), a torpedo boat (Iris), a steam- cutter (Tourmaline's), and steam-pinnace (Monarch's) will be approi>riated. A. H. HOSKINS, Hear-Admiral. In obedience to these orders just quoted, the whole length of the canal was secured by the British. The occurrences at Port Said are thus described in an official report by Captain Fairfax, of the Monarch : H. M. S. Monarch, Fort Said, August 21, 1882. Sir: In pursuance of your orders dated the 19th instant, that at 3.30 a. m. on the 20th I was, with the force named in the margin, t to occupy the town of Port Said, and, if possible, to surprise and capture the soldiers, whilst in the barracks and before they had any time to commit any acts of incendiarism, I made the following disposi- tion of the force under my command : * The canal is, so to speak, a single-track road. The gares are the turnouts or sidings, where the floor of the canal is widened so that ships may pass each other. Garing is the operation of hauling out of the fairway, which is thus left clear. t Already detailed in Rear- Admiral Hoskins' orders. 112 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 1. Lieutenant A. Cook, R. N., with Iris' naval brigade, a Gatling gun, and a company of the Royal Marine battalion, under the command of Captain R. P. Coffin, R. M. L. I., were to land abreast of the Iris and double down the beach, the company of ma- rines turning down the street in which the barracks are situated, and halting imme- diately opposite them, the men from H. M. S. Iris advancing along the beach till they reached the narrow neck of land which separates the European from the native town, there to place sentries across from the sea to the road that passes down the center of it. 2. Commander T. F. Hammill, with two companies of seamen from the Monarch, was ordered to land abreast of the ship, and, doubling through the southern part of the town (leaving half a company to protect the block of buildings in which the British consulate is situated), to push on to the neck of land and form a line of sen- tries from Lake Menzaleh to the road, thus completing with the Iris men a chain of sentries right across from the lake to the sea, and barring escape from the town. 3. The company of the Marine battalion, under Captain F. M. Eden, R. M. L. I., and a Gatling from the Monarch, under Lieutenant Charles Windham, R. N., were to proceed up the center of the town and halt on the other side of the barracks to that occupied by the other company of marines. 4. Arrangements were made that the force should fall in with the least possible noise, so as not to alarm the sentries on the quay. A lighter was planked over, and after dark placed alongside the ship ; this a few minutes before landing was hauled to the shore, and with the launch formed a floating bridge over which the men were able to pass. 5. The Khedive's Governor, who had been living on board the P. & O. steamer, came on board the Monarch at 3 a. m. and landed with me. t £6. Major TuUoch, of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (who gave me much valuable infor- mation and assistance), landed with six marines and secured three out of four sentries on the quay. 7. At 3.30 commenced landing, and succeeded in getting on shore without obser- vation, and all the arrangements made were carried out in every particular. I was accompanied by Major James W. Scott, R. M. L. I., commanding the two companies of the Royal Marine battalion, who posted his men in such a way that escape from the barracks was impossible. 8. The soldiers, who when we arrived appeared to be asleep, were ordered to sur- render. Shortly after 160 fell in and laid down their arms. The Governor having addressed them, they swore allegiance to the Khedive, and his excellency then requested that I would permit them to return to their barracks; but two officers were arrested and sent on board H. M. S. Iris. 9. On Monday afternoon I received a request from the Governor that I should make prisoners of the soldiers, as he found that they were leaving the town, and some were trying to incite the Arabs against the English. I therefore ordered two companies to arrest them in barracks, where only 52 were found. They were marched down to the quay, where they were embarked and sent off to H. M. S. Northumberland. 10. I am much indebted to Commander T. F. Hammill and Major J. W. Scott, R. M. L. I., for the able way in which they executed my orders, the silent and orderly man- ner in which the work was done contributing very much to the success of the imder- taking. 11. The conduct of the officers and men landed gave me entire satisfaction. I have, &c., H. FAIRFAX, Captain. To Rear- Admiral Anthony H. Hoskins, C. B., «fec.. Senior Officer. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 113 It may be well to add here that the Monarch had been so moored in the canal, off the town, that her forward turret guns commanded the main street leading to the quay, while the Iris was to seaward of the Monarch, where she could shell the beach and the Arab town. At 11 p. m. Saturday night the ship's comi3any were called on deck and warned that they would be landed at 3 a, m. Strict silence was enjoined. This order was so carri<^.d out that the peoi^le on board of the French iron- clad La Galissoniere, moored astern of the Monarch and to the same buoy, knew nothing of what was going on. Of the arms surrendered by the garrison of Port Said but one piece was loaded. The military commandant was absent and all the Egyptian sentries were asleep at their posts. The place was held by the ships' marines and blue-jackets until September 16, when they were relieved by 200 Eoyal Marine Liglit Infantry and 100 Royal Marine Artillery who came out from England. The work done in the canal between Port Said and Lake Timsah is thus detailed by Commander Edwards : H. M. S. Ready, at Ismailia, August 22, 1882. Sir: I have tlie honor to report my proceedings in carrying out your orders dated 19th August, in connection with the occupation of certain points ou the Suez Canal. Learning that it was very important that the dredger stationed at the ninth mile should be secured, I placed Lieutenant Davies, of the Penelope, with 20 men, in charge of her. Proceeding up the canal, I informed all vessels bound to Port Said, also the r/a?'e keepers, that ifc would be necessary for the ships to remain in g^are un fcil they received further instructions. I detached Sub-Lieutenant Blomj6eld in Tourmaline's steam-cutter, with six additional hands, to insure the above instructions being com- plied with, have previously obtained a promise from the English shipmasters that they would obey them. After occupying Kantara as instructed, I detached Lieutenant Barnes-Laurence in Iris' torpedo boat to insure the canal being kept clear. He reports that on his return to the gare at Kilometer No. 34, he found the Messageries Maritimes steamer Melbourne leaving, and that oii remonstrating with her captain he was in- formed that the steamer should only be stopped by armed force, and that the first man stepping on board would be the signal to let go the anchor and leave the ship in his hands. Lieutenant Barnes-Laurence, not considering that his instructions warranted the use of force, left to report to me, and sent the Tourmaline's steam-cutter to warn ships coming up from Port Said. Shortly after leaving, he observed the British steamers Ross-shire and Counsellor weigh and follow the Messageries steamer, upon which he chased them and compelled them to haul into the next gare, and having cautioned the mastertJ, who reiterated their promise, he left to rejoin me. Mr. Blomfield informed me on his return that directly the Iris' torpedo boat was out of sight the English ships appear to have again left the qare, as he met them steaming down the canal at a point where it was useless to stop them. The other duties assigned to the party Tinder my command were all punc- tually executed, and on Sunday, the 20th instant, all who could be spared were em- ployed lightening the steamer Kaiteur, aground in the canal, but she could not be moved. In conclusion, I beg to express my thanks to all the officers, especially Lieutenant Barnes-Laurence, of the Iris, Sub-Lieutenant R. G. H. Blomfield, of the Tourmaline, H. Mis. 29 8 114 BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. and Mr. A. H. Freeman, midshipman, of the Monarch, for their zealous attention to my orders, also my great satisfaction with the behavior of the men during nearly 48 hours of continuous hard work. I have, &c., H. H. EDWARDS, Commander. To Rear- Admiral A. H. Hoskins, C. B., Second in Command. The most important place to be seized was Ismailia, while the prox- imity of a large armed force of Egyptians rendered the task dangerous iu the extreme. As elsewhere, the landing of the British was com- pletely unexpected and almost unresisted. The operations at this point are given in Captain Fitz Roy's official report, as follows : Orion, Lake Timsah, August 21, 1882, Sir: I have the honor to report that in accordance with joxir secret, orders of the 18th instant I took possession of Ismailia, the Arab town, and advanced sufficiently towards Nefiche to cover the weir. The force landed consisted of 565 officers and men, comprising 40 marines, one 9- pounder gun's crew, one Gatling, a torpedo engineer party, and 12 riflemen from Orion, one Gatling and one rifle company from Northumberland, and one 7-pounder gun. Coquette's landing party, with 21 Royal Marine Artillery of Northumberland and Carysfort, under Captain Stephenson, C. B., including a company of marines under Captain Gore ; also 100 seamen and marines from the Nyanza, troop-ship, belong- ing to the Northumberland. The enemy were known to have a strong picket at Arab town, several patrols, and a guard at Ismailia, about 2,000 men and sis guns encamped at Nefiche, and a con- siderable number of Bedouins in the neighborhood. At 3 a. m., in perfect silence, the Orion's and Coquette's men landed, the Carys- fort's shortly following, and advanced. The silence was so perfect that Commander Kane surrounded the lock guard before we were discovered. The lock guard fired their rifles and so did our men, and here Commander Kane was wounded by a rifle bullet on the left cheek. The governor's guard laid down their arms to Lieutenant Lenox Napier and the Royal Marine Artillery, under Lieutenant Swinburne. No further resistance was experienced in the town. Commander Kane seized the railway and telegraphs, the Orion's men the canal-lock bridge, town generally, and government house (with the governor), where I established my headquarters. Captain Stephenson and bis party had slight skirmishing in advancing, and in Arab town some of the enemy were killed. The ships, at 3.40 a. m., bombarded the guard-houses at Arab town, firing five rounds of shell each. By 4 a. m. the whole place was occupied as ordered. By intercepted telegrams and reports I ascertained the enemy were making arrangements to forward a large force to Nefiche to at once attack Ismailia and the ships. Considering this, the small force at my disposal, and that the inhabitants were getting alarmed, I determined to dislodge the enemy from Nefiche and destroy their camp and any trains running; therefore Orion and Carysfort commenced a slow bombardment at 11 a. m., at a distance of 4,200 yards. By noon the camp was destroyed and enemy retreating towards Cairo; aleo one train running south severely hit and stopped for a time. The bombardment was stopped for a short time, but at 4 p. m., as another train was seen arriving and discharging men from Cairo way, it was continued, wrecking the train, jamming and apparently overturning trucks on the line, driving every one away, and from the position of the train on the Suez line completely blocking Arabi's communications with his forces BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 115 between Neficlie and Suez by railroad. Tbis was most satisfactory. The squadron was in charge of Commander Moore, Lieutenant Royds having cbarge of the Carysfort and her guns, under Commander Moore's orders. Her mast-heads were the reconnoi- tering and lookout places. The bombardment then ceased until 10 p. m., after which shells were tired at Netiche, at intervals of half an hour, until daylight, to prevent the railway being cleared and to check troops coming by train from the west. My position was still an anxious one. At 6 p. m. 340 marines arrived ; 200 reinforced Commander Kane, 140 Captain Stephenson, who had, with the assistance of Major Eraser, intrenched himself in advance of Arab town. Lieutenant Mapier had secured his admirable position in the Khedive's palace, and I reinforced him with 20 seamen of Northumberland and an officer. I ha^e since heard that on this afternoon Arabi, with 3,000 men in three trains, did advance to withiu a few miles of Nefiche, but re- tired again. During the night the search lights were worked as necessary. At 10.30 p. m. General Graham arrived with the advance guard of the army, rein- forced the different positions, and assumed military command. I was directed to retain command in Ismailia until 4 p. m. the 2l8t August, 1882, when Sir Garnet Wolseley relieved my guards. At 8 a. m. to-day I sent a Gatling gun and crew, uuder Lieutenant Adair and Lieu- tenant King-Harnian, torpedo engineer party, with General Graham, to occupy Ne- fiche, where they now remain. I have also a steam-cutter and the jolly-boat work- ing on the Fresh- Water Canal to Nefiche. The officers and men did their work perfectly. I have to thank Captain Stephenson, Commander Kane, Commander Moore, Major Eraser, R. E., Lieutenants Napier, Royds and King-Harman (who destroyed the railway approaches to my west front in two advanced positions) ; also my first lieutenant, Cross, who had, with a gun, charge of the canal bridge and town approaches specially. Seven prisoners, Arabi's soldiers, were takeh near lock bridge and Arab town, sent on board Orion for two days, and, being disarmed, were allowed to proceed on shore. I had every reason, on the evening of the 20th August, 1882, to expect anight attack in force, so I placed the Ready and the Lee, that had arrived with the marines, close inshore in position that would cover a retreat on oar part through the town. Captain Stephenson brings to my notice the services of Lieutenant Langley, the senior lieutenant of the Carysfort, with the landiug party. I have great pleasure in also specially mentioning this officer to you. Captain Stephenson forwards a letter from Major Eraser, R. E. I have the honor to inclose herewith a report from Captain Stephenson. Major Eraser's report will follow. I have, ifec, ROBT. O'B. FITZ ROY, Captain. To Rear -Admiral Anthony H. Hoskins, C. B., Senior Officer. Captain Stephenson thus describes his particular share in the land- ing: Carysfort, at Ismailia, August 22, 1882. Sir : In accordance with your confidential memorandum, I landed with the force as per margin* at 3.30 a. m. of the 20th, leaving Lieutenant Thomas, H. M. S. North- umberland, with 13 small-arm men, in cbarge of the telegraph station on the pier. I advanced with a strong advanced guard in skirmishing order, under Captain Gore, R. M. L. I., over the canal bridge, through European, native, and Arab towns, meet- ing no opposition. *Seveuty-four small-arm men; 1 field gnu's crew, 12 men ; 1 Gatling gun's crew, 51 men; 24 pioneers, «&.c., 74 marines, 2 captains, and aid-de-camp ; total, 201. 116 BRITISH NAV^L AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 2. Having taken possession of Arab town, I immediately loopholed it and threw up intrencliments, under the guidance of Major Eraser, R. E. The Egyiitian picket retiring was fired upon by the Gatling and 9-pounder guns. Two of the picket were killed, one earring a Remington rifle, but no ammunition. 3. About 8 a. m. three Egyptian mounted officers galloped towards our intrench- ments from Nefiche, waving a flag of truce. They stated that they came to place themselves under my protection, and, receiving their swords and horses, I sent them under escort to you, and now forward their swords. 4. About 10 p. m. General Graham, C. B., V. C, arrived with 300 of the 50th Regi- ment, under Colonel Tyler, whom he placed under my command for the defense of this outpost. 5. About 8 a. m. of the 2 1st, I advanced with the force under Major-General Gra- ham, with two Gatling guns, on Nefiche, which was occupied without opposition, leaving the Gatlings for the defense of the railway bridge. I then returned to Isma- ilia, and embarked two small-avm companies and the 9-pouuder field gun, in accord- ance wit h your orders. 6. In referring to this service it is my pleasing duty to report the satisfactory behav- ior of all under my command. Intrenching the outpost under a burning sun was most trying, and I regret the death of A. Wager, ordinary seaman, from sun-stroke. I would especially like 1o mention the name of Major Eraser, R. E., who was of great assistance in fortifying the Arab town; Captain Gore, R. M. L. I., belonging to H. M. 8. Northumberland, and Lieutenant Langley, senior and gunnery lieutenant of this ship, whose untiring zeal and energy deserve my best thanks. I inclose a report and sketch of the position from Major Eraser, R. E. I have, &c., H. F. STEPHENSON, Captain. To Captain R. O'B. FiTZ Roy, Senior Officer^ Ismailia. The engineer officer who had been sent to act under the orders of Captain Fitz Eoy was the brigade major of the Corps Engineers. His account is of value as further elucidating the situation, and as indicat- ing the technical measures taken to improve the defenses of Ismailia. It is proper to state that where the town ends the desert of light sand begins at once. Major Fraser's report runs as follows : Ismailia, August 26, 1882. Sir: Having been detailed to accompany your force in taking Ismailia, I submit the following as to the part I took under your orders : The enemy being at Nefiche with a force of all arms, it was to be expected that in the first instance he would resist us at the Arab village west of Ismailia. Your force of 200 men, viz, 150 small-arm men, one 9-pounder, and one Gatling, hav- ino- reached the bridge at the water-works about 4 a. m., I took some skirmishers for- ward so as to gain and secure the front for the main body, which came up by the canal. On moving into the open, a number of people appeared on our right front, and as a security I took, by your orders, a party of small-arm men and posted them on the bank in front of the bridge. After a little firing we found we were not attacked, and then organized the de- fense of the village. The village consists of low houses of sun-dried bricks, generally only one story high, with flat roofs and garden walls. There is a good east foreground towards Nefiche, but to the north and west it is more undiilating. The garden walls were cut down, houses loopholed, lateral gaps, and gaps to the rear formed where required". The upper rooms of the few two-storied houses were BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 117 loopholed so .as to give a double tier of fire, aud the ends of streets were closed by shelter trenches. The gnn aud Gatling were intrenched with sand or sun-dried brick parapets, and platforms were made of doors. The spirit bottles were smashed in the grog shops, aud the windows made defensible by filling up with boxes of wood con- taining sand. The sailors' cutlasses proved most useful for loopholing walls, and the shovels we took out enabled us in an hour or two to be in a state to resist serious at- tack. After some hours' labor we could let the men rest and feed. Before sunrise, Arabi Pasha must have learned of our landing by telegraph from Nefiche. Our information from all sources made it appear probable that an attack in force would be made before we could be reinforced ; it was therefore desirable to induce the Arabs to postpone the attack. Finding telegrams arriving from Cairo to the traffic manager, Ismailia, in ignorance of our arrival, I telegraphed in his name to the war minister at Cairo to say 5;000 Eng- lish were already on shore, and asked him to inform the authorities. He acknowledged receipt and said he had done so. An officer, stating himself to be the chief of stalf of Arabi's forces in the district, having come in to surrender, strongly advised the bombardment of Nefiche by the ships to prevent attack. This was done, and the effect was to cause the retreat of three trains of troops that approached Nefiche and the abandonment of a fort at Nefiche, a very remarkable result, considering the place was only seen from the tops and the range was 4,000 yards. In the afternoon I opened communication by placing two canal boats across the Sweet Water Canal, stern to stern. In the fighting line itself a party of Royal Marine Light Infiintry held the shelter trench by the canal, where also was the signaling station. The marines also held the group of houses by the railway, and the bine jackets held the remainder. In the evening, having been reinforced by some 140 marines (Royal Marine Artillery), they were posted along the high canal banks as a sujf^iort for our fighting line. At night we posted sentries 300 to 400 yards to our front and went rounds, aud in the early morning Major-General Graham came in with part of his brigade and bivouacked in our rear. In conclusion I would draw your attention to the very efficient and willing man- ner in which all of your party did the work of intrenching, and the aptitude they showed for such work. I have, »&c., T. FRASER, Major, Brigade Major B. E. To Capt. H. F. Stephenson, C. B., Commanding H. M. S. Carysfori. It is well to add, as a matter of professional detail, that the eighteen men composing the Gatling gun's crew of the Orion were armed with the Martini-Henry rifle ; that they carried two days' provisions in their haversacks, and 120 rounds of ammunition, distributed as follows: One large pouch or ball bag with 40 loose rounds, and two small pouches each containing 40 cartridges in package. The dress was blue serge with straw hats and regulation leggings. Later on, the men improvised jpuggeries. They had no tents. The other Gatling guns' crews were armed according to rule with cutlasses and revolvers. These and the 9-pdr. guns' crews (of eighteen men usually) carried 36 rounds of pistol ammunition. In the gun limbers were eight shell, twelve shrapnel, and four case-shot. This supply was subsequently increased to 75 rounds, of pistol cartridges, all told, by addition sent to the front, while 118 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. the Gatlings had each 1,200 rounds, with two spare cases of 680 car- tridges each under the limbers. With each party went four stretcher- men armed with swords, eight spare-ammunition men similarly armed, two signal-men with kit, armed with swords and revolvers, an armorer with sword, pistol, and sack of tools, and two pioneers, one carrying a shovel slung over the left shoulder, a pick-ax in hand; the other, a saw, file, and hand-ax slung over the shoulder, and a felling-ax in hand. Each pioneer was armed with a bill- hook, saw-backed sword, and revolver. The landing was effected at the central wharf. A large lighter had been secured and on it were placed the Northumberland's and a portion of the Orion's party, about 250 in all. They seized the wharf and main avenue up to the canal lock. The first lighter was followed by a smaller one with the balance of the Orion's men. The " torpedo party," under Lieutenant King Harman, was composed of ten blue-jackets and nine artificers. They carried with them gun- cotton disks and the necessary electrical apparatus for their detonation. This party i^ushed on in the darkness, covered by a company from the Northumberland, and blew up the railway just behind the '■'■canal de ceinture,''^ about 500 yards from the station, using two 9-ounce disks of gun-cotton fired by a platinum wire-bridge fuze (25 grains of fulminate of mercury), insulated wicks, and a portable battery of three Leclanche elements. This done, and railway access to Ismailia being prevented, they retired to the town again. The shelling of Nefiche was a case of firing at a target invisible from the gun. As described by Lieuteuant Langford, R. N., who directed the operation on board the Orion, under Commander Moore, the method appears to have been very simple. From the masthead an angle was taken between the ship's head and Neflche station, just visible, and the gun was trained accordingly bj^ the marks on the racer or training track. In this line of sight was a small bush on the low sand-hill to the west- ward of the lake, which gave the gun-captain a permanent point at which to aim. The distance was pricked olf from the chart and the ele- vation subsequently corrected by watchiug the fall of the shot. The gun used was a 12-inch Armstrong M. L. R. of 25 tons, with common shell weighing 500 pounds, and time fuzes cut to 14 seconds. Fifteen rounds were fired from the Orion, the last being at 8 a. m. of August 21. The same methods were adopted on board the Oarysfort with similar but lessened results, due to the smaller size of her guns, the largest being 7-inch M. L. li. In the southern half of the canal from Lake Timsah to Suez the events of the day were on a smaller scale, but none the less interesting. It will be remembered that Suez had been in the possession of the British navy for nearly three weeks, and that the advance of the Indian Con- tingent, the 1st battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders (late 72d foot), under Lieutenant-Colonel Stockwell, had come up from Aden, where BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 119 tliey had been previously quartered. The following is the report of Rear- Admiral Sir William Hewett, the commander-in-chief of H. M. naval forces in the East Indies, the bulk of whose squadron had ren- dezvoused at the southern end of the Maritime Canal : EuKYALUS, at Suez, August 21, 1882. Sir : On Friday last, the 18th instant, I had the honor of receiving, through Rear- Admiral Hoskius, C. B., a copy of the plan of operations in the Suez Canal, agreed to between yourself and Sir Garnet Wolseley, and your telegram of the 17th instant gave me authority to act on it. 2. Immediately put in train the work to he carried out at Suez, and telegraphed to you that your instructions had been received and would be complied -with. 3. In the course of the same afternoon the rebels were observed intrenching them- selves in our front, and movements of Bedouins on our left flank also called for atten- tion. I consulted with Brigadier-General Tanner, C. B., who commanded the troops, and we agreed that the Naval Brigade would be too weak to hold the place by itself if attacked by a large force, such as we knew to be in our vicinity. I therefore, with the concurrence of the brigadier-general, telegraphed to you that 100 of the Seaforth Highlanders would be detained at Suez until the arrival of the troops from India. 4. Later on, Captain Hastings, whom I had sent in the Seagull to reconuoiter the banks of the canal, returned with a report that showed the information sent me from time to time by Captain Fitz Roy of the movements of the enemy in our direction to be fairly correct ; and the Brigadier-General then agreed with me that it would not be prudent "to send any of the Highlanders away without previously reconnoitering the neighborhood, for, as I have already stated in my telegram, the collection of mili- tary stores at Suez represented a considerable value, and a matter of still more serious consequence was the fact that the town had recently become crowded with women and children, Copt Christians, vrho had sought refuge at Suez from the brutalities of the surrounding Bedouins. 5. On Friday night I caused the telegraph wires to be cut between Suez and the first canal station, and on Saturda.y morning notices were issued that from that date, the 19th instant, until the prohibition was formally,/removed, no ships or boats would be allowed to pass into the canal from the Suez side without my speciaj permission. The damage to the wire on the above occasion was soon repaired, but on the following night I caused the poles which conveyed the line across the creek close to the com- pany's offices to be cut down, and placed a guard over them to prevent their being restored. At the time when it was decided to retain the Highlanders the regiment was already on board the Bancoora. This was on Saturday night, and their disembarkation on Sunday must have had a very puzzling effect upon the officials of the canal company and others who were interested in our movements. It must also have had the happy effect of qualifying any reports that may have reached the rebels that our troops were about to enter the canal. 6. On Sunday morning at daylight 400 Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel Stockwell, were disembarked from the transport and marched 8 miles in the direction of Chalouf, to make a feint attack in our front. Brigadier-General Tanner, C. B., accompanied this force, and at the same time I sent my flag captain, Captain A. P. Hastings, in the Seagull, with the Mosquito in company , and 200 of the Seaforth High- landers, to Chalouf, by the Maritime Canal. 7. The party under Lieutenant-Colonel Stockwell retiirned to Suez at about 4 p. m., without having touched the enemy; but later in the day Captain Hastings returned in a steam-pinnace to report very successful operations from the gun- vessels. It appears that the first that was seen of the enemy along the canal was a small cavalry patrol about 3 miles this side of Chalouf, and on arrival at Chalouf his presence in force was only discovered by a few heads appearing over the railway embankment on the other 120 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. side of tlie Sweet Water Canal, this embankment formiog a natural intrenchment, behind which it was afterwards discovered there was some 600 infantry ready to resist our advance. These men were extremely well armed and accontered, and had a jDlen- tiful supply of ammunition with them. 8. The manner iu which the jjosition was taken reflects the highest credit on Cap- tain Hastings, and I recommended him to your favorable notice. 9. The coolness and dash of the Highlanders and the excellent fire from the ships' tops seem to have been the chief causes of success, and the conduct of all concerned appears to have been in every way creditable, 10. I consider that credit must be given to Lieutenant-Colonel H. Helsham Jones, R. E., for the fact of there now being fresh water at Suez. Opening the look gates above the point occupied kept the canal below full, notwithstanding the waste which took place through a breach made by the enemy in the banks of the canal, which has since, however, been repaired by a company of the Madras SapiJers. 11. I am in hopes that the action taken at Chalouf will do much to secure the safety of the canal, and as the Indian forces are now arriving, the Highlanders will go to Serapeum to-morrow. 12. I beg to recommend to your favorable notice the ofiScers mentioned by Captain Hastings in the accompanying letter. I have, &c., W. HEWETT, Hear- Admiral and Commander-in-Chief on the East Indies Station. To Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour, G. C. B., Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, Captain Hastings' account of the occurrences iQ the Maritime Canal qn August 2 is as follows : H. M. S. Seagull, At Chalouf, Auijust 20, 1882. Sir : I have the honor to submit the following report of my proceedings in command of the force * (as per margin) dispatched this day from Suez to secure the Fresh Water lock at Chalouf. 2. On my arrival oft" the place, which is distant 15 miles from Suez, on the west bank of the Maritime Canal, there were at first but few signs of the enemy's presence ; there was no camp visible, and the first indication we saw of them was a few men's heads showing over the embankment of the railway on the other side of the Sweet Water Canal, which lay between us and the position the enemy occupied. This embank- ment, forming as it did anatural intrenchment, concealed a force of about 600 infant- ry, and in the distance we saw from 40 to .50 cavalry patrolling in the direction of Suez. 3. I first lauded the Highlanders and the landing parties of the Seagull and Mos- quito, without field guns, and then opened fire from the tops of the ships, which were armed as follows : Seagull: In foretop, a 7-pounder boat-gun; in maintop, a Gatling gun. Mosquito: In foretop, a Gatling gun. For some time there was no reply to our fire, but presently we got a volley from the left, which left no doubt as to the enemj^'s position. Previous to this, Captain Leudrum had occupied the lock with G company of the Seaforth Highlanders, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. Helsham Jones, K. E., to whom I am much indebted for his valuable advice and assistance throughout the day, find- ing the gates open, closed them, and so kept the Suez end of the canal full of water. * H, M. S. Seagull, Commander Mather Byles; H. M. S. Mosquito, Lieutenant and Commander the Honorable F. R. Sandilands, and 200 Seaforth Highlanders, commanded hy Major Kelsey. BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 121 Had this not been done, it is needless to say that the canal would have soon emptied itself. Major Gai'nett's company and the men of the Mosqiiito now searched the village between the Fresh Water and Maritime Canals, where the firing was coming from, the advance of this party being protected by the small-arm companies of the Seagull and the remaining companies of the Highlanders, under Brevet Major Fergusson and Captain Hughes-Hallet. Previous to this the skiff of the Mosquito had been transported to the Fresh Water Canal, and I sent Lieutenant E. Rae, of H. M. S. Seagull, to the opposite bank, in her, to examine the enemy's movements. By this time Major Garuett had passed the village, which was found to be deserted, and had pushed his men across the canal by means of a boat obtained by Lieutenant H. G. Lang, of the Highlanders, who in a very plucky manner swam the canal and in the face of a hot fire procured it from under the opposite embankment. Sub-Lieutenant W. O. Story and the men of the Mosquito accompanied the High- landers, and the fire from this party was now so hot that the enemy was soon dis- lodged from his position. Another boat having been procured by Assistant Paymaster Thomas R. B. Rogers^ of H. M. S. Seagull, from the lock end of the canal, the remainder of the ships' land- ing party and the Highlanders were likewise crossed over the water and the enemy was soon in full retreat. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, R. E., accompanied me with his party. Some of the fugitives took the liue of the railway, others went straight into the desert, while a few fled to a hill to the rear of their line, where they were eventually surrounded by Captain Hughes-Hallet and made x)ri80uers of. At this point was captured a 7-pounder brass field piece of French make, from which two rounds had been fired before being seized. We now ceased firing and proceeded to embark our prisoners. The enemy's loss was about 100 killed (includ- ing three officers, one of whom was the officer in command) and 62 prisoners, out of which 27 are wounded, and we have captured a large number of Remington rifles,, with quantities of ammunition and stores. The enemy fought with bravery, but their shooting was most inferior, and, owing to this latter defect, I am happy to say there are only two casualties on our side, viz, Benjamin Davis, A. B. , Euryalus, one of my boat's crew who accompanied me, slightly wounded, and Joseph Fernandez, wardroom steward of the Seagull, one of the stretcher party, severely wounded. Besides the above, I regret to say Corporal Hind and Private Reeves, of the Highlanders, were drowned in trying to cross the canal. The wounded men are receiving every possible attention from Surgeons A. McKinley, of the Mosquito, and L. W. Vasey, of the Seagull, who were attached to the landing parties of their respective ships. The conduct of the seamen and marines under fire was everything that could be desired, and I would wish to express my admiration for the coolness and gallantry of the Highlanders, to which, with the excellent fire from the ships, the success of the day must be attributed. I have to thank Commander Mather Byles, of the Seagull, Lieutenant- Colonel H. Helsham .Jones, E. E., Lieutenant and Commander the Honorable F. R. Saudilands, of H. M. S. Mosquito, aiid Major W, F. Kelsey, of the Seaforth Highlanders for their valuable co-operation and assistance ; and I beg to bring to favorable notice the serv- ices of Lieutenant E. Rae, who commanded the landing party from the Seagull; Sub- Lieuteuant W. O. Story, who commanded the landing xjarty from the Mosquito ; Sub- Lieutenant E. J. Cams Wilson, who worked the Gatling gun in the maintop of the Seagull ; Mr. George Peavitt, gunner, who worked the 7-pounder in foretop of the Seagull; Mr. G. Gore Browne, midshipman, my aid-de-camp, who was most useful to me ; and Mr. T. R. B. Rogers, assistant paymaster in charge, of the Seagull, who rendered good service by bringing the boat from the lock. 122 BKITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. I attach a plan of the position, drawn by Navigating Lieutenant Richard J. Rogers , of H. M. S. Seagull. I have, &c., ALICK P. HASTINGS, Captain. To Rear-Admiral Sir W. N. W. Hewbtt, K. C. B., V. C, Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. The next report is by Major Kelsey, commanding the detachment of the Seaforth Highlanders engaged in the action at Chalouf, and is ren- dred to Captain Hastings : Chalouf, August 20, 1882. Sir : I have the honor to report for your information that on landing at Chalouf on the 20th August, 1882, I found two companies, each company 50 rifles, up in extended order, supported by two others, total 200 rifles. On arriving on the bank of the Fresh Water Canal, the enemy showed, and I opened fire about 11.30 a. m. ; at the same time I sent Captain Lendrum with one company, under the direction of Colonel Jones, R. E., to hold the lock about two miles to eur right. About twenty minutes after the action commenced, I sent a company, under command of Major Garnett, to work round through some houses on our extreme left ; this com- pany was supported by a party of blue-jackets and marines from H. M. S. Mosquito, . under command of Sub-Lieutenant Story, R. N. ; the houses were occupied by Major Garnett, and I reinforced him with half another company of Seaforth Highlanders, under command of Lieutenant Lang. The houses were passed through and the bank of the Fresh Water Canal lined. Major Garnett's party was here checked for some time until a boat was procured by Lieutenant Lang swimming over to the other side, under the enemy's fire, and bringing it back. Sub-Lieutenant Story, R. N., and a party of blue-jackets then crossed and held a house until reinforced by the Seaforth Highlanders, then advanced and took the enemy in flank, who then retreated rapidly. About 4 p. m. Captain Huglies-Hallett took his company across the canal in a boat sent to me by Captain Lendrum from the lock he was occupying. This boat was to wed up by a couple of men of his company, under the direction of Paymaster Rogers, R. N., H. M. S. Seagull. As soon as Captain Hughes-Hallett's company had crossed, the remainder of our line was tat. en across, and -advanced, driving the enemy before it. A party of blue-jackets and marines from H. M. S. Seagull occupied a forward posi- tion in the center of our line during the action, and by their fire kept down the enemy's considerably. The Gatlings in the tops of H. M. S. Seagull and Mosquito kept up a galling fire during the day and did great execution. I beg to bring to your notice the name of Sub-Lieutenant Story, R. N., H. M. S. Mos- quito. Major Garnett reports to me that he led his men in a forward and gallant manner. I regret to have to report the loss of two men of Major Garnett's company by drown- ing ; their names are Corporal David Hind and Private William Reeve. I inclose Major Garnett's report of the occurrence. I have, &c., W. F. KELSEY, Major Commanding Detachment First Battalion Seaforth Highlanders. From the account of this affair given by an officer present, it is learned that the Egyptians engaged were mostly reserve men and old. So harsh had been the measures resorted to in recruiting that many had been brought down from the interior in chains. These chains were secured BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 123 to anklets, were of iron, and weighed about 10 pounds. With such troops it is hardly to be wondered at that the aim should have been indiffereut. They held their pieces at arm's length above the head and discharged them vaguely over the embankments behind which they had taken shel- ter. Even chance shots are neither safe nor welcome, so that the opera- tion was not free from danger, especially in the rear of the lines. To this shooting over may be attributed the slight damage done to the standing and running rigging of the gun-boats in the Maritime Canal. The crossing of the Fresh Water Canal should have been almost im- possible, the boats being so small as to convey but seven or eight at a time, and the canal being so full of reeds as to render swimming difficult and i3erilous. The dash of the British more than counterbalanced the disadvantages of numbers and of an attack on a position of much nat- ural strength. With the exception of the Serapeum stretch, between Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes, where no great annoyance or interruption of tiafific was expected, the whole of the Maritime Canal was in the pos- session of the British navy by nightfall of August 20. . On the following day, the Tourmaline and the Don moored j)erma- nently at Kantara, where the caravan road to Syria crosses the canal, and there established a strongly defended post, while the gun-boats in the southern half completed the link which perfected the chain from Port Said to Suez. Having seized the canal, the navy prepared to protect it. Between Ismailia and Suez this was effected by the Mosquito and Seagull, which patrolled it constantly, no force being permanently landed. In the northern half, the Tourmaline and Don held Kau:ara and the gares adjoining on either side. Strong detachments of sailors from the fleet at Port Said, with Gatlings, were landed at the othev gares, breastworks were thrown up and regular camps established, each in command of a lieutenant. At Port Said a camp was pitched between the European and Arab towns, where never less than 500 blue-jackets and marines were kept. Intrenchments were thrown up across the isthmus from Lake Menzaleh to the Mediterranean, and field pieces mounted. In the canal itself, steam picket-boats, launches, &c., with armed crews, were used as patrols. The fast Thorney croft torpedo launches of the Iris and Hecla were employed as dispatch-boats, making the passage between Port Said and Ismailia in about four hours and a half, their speed not being allowed to exceed ten knots Sunday, August 20, was a busy day. The transport fleet arrived at Port Said from Alexandria and Aboukir early in the forenoon. Had it not been for the action of the master of the French steamer Melbourne, mentioned in the report of Commander Edwards, the transports could have pushed on at once into the canal and towards Ismailia. As it was they were obliged to wait until the way was clear. During this delay, and in anticipation of possible trouble, 300 of the York and Lancaster 124 BKITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Eegiment were put on board H. M. S. Falcon (light-draught gun boat), and a similar number of the West Kent Regiment on board H. M. S. Beacon, to form the advance. These vessels arrived at Ismailia in the evening of the same day. The Kerissa led the transport fleet, followed by the Rhosina, the troop-ship Euphrates, and others. Ismailia was reached that night and the next morning, the only accident being the grounding of the Cata- lonia, with the balance of the West Kent Regiment on board. She took against the west bank at the distance of 7 miles from Lake Timsah^ but did not seriousl^^ interrupt the passage of other vessels. The administration of the Suez Canal was in the hands of the British during Sunday, Mondaj^, and pait of Tuesday, the company's employes having orders from Count Ferdinand de Lesseps, the president, to aban- don their work. When it was found that the British could manage the traffic without the assistance of the French servants of the company — tlie large fleet that IV ent through to Ismailia at this time being piloted by English naval officers — the comj^any became anxious to resume its func- tions. Every obstacle had been thrown in the way of the use of the canal on the part of the British : its neutrality had been invoked, and Count de Lesseps had attempted to carry oft" all the employes from Ismailia, deserting the administration completely. This move was frus- trated by a refusal by the British senior naval officer to permit them to leave Lake Timsah, a fast torpedo launch barring their entrance into the canal. Count de Lesseps finally yielded to the convincing argu ment of facts, and a modus mvendi was agreed to. Prior to this time? his expressions had been characterized by the most open hostility to the English ; he had entertained Arabi at Ismailia, and had imbued that Oriental with his own notion that they would not dare to make nse of the canal as a base of military action on account of the inviola- bility, which it was supposed to enjo3\ There is little doubt that his influence led Arabi to neglect the precaution of blocking the channel, and that practically, although not designedly, M. de Lesseps proved the strongest possible ally that England could have desired or secured. In this connection it may be allowable to quote a telegram from M. de Lesseps, dated at Ismailia August 19 : The English Adniiral at Suez informs the company's chief traffic agent that in con- sequence of orders from his Government he forbids, until the receipt of further orders, any ship, large or small, even the company's boats, to enter the canal, and he will resort to force to prevent any attempt to contraveue these orders. The Admiral more- over has placed a gun-boat at the mouth of the canal. I have protested against this act of violence and spoliation. In a circular of protest, the canal company, from its principal office 11 Paris, says, among other things: The company is obliged to * * * object to any military action by the English Government. And again : The company is obliged to protest against the claim of the English Government, which calls itself the Khedive's agent, to carry out any enterprise on the whole or a BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 125 part of the canal or its dependencies, no one, even with the Sultan's authorization, and, a fortiori, without that authorization, having a right to disturb the company in the free and peaceful enjoyment of its concession. The inference to Americans is obvious that the neutrality of any canal joining the ivaters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans will be maintained, if at all, by the nation which can place and Tceep the strongest ships at each extremity. The exact footiug of the British is defined by the following proclama- tions, the first by the senior naval officer present in that part of Egypt, the second by the commander-in-chief of the expeditionary force : PROCLAMATION. His Highness the Khedive having given the Admiral commanding the British fleet authority to take charge of all places in or near the Maritime Canal as maybe neces- sary for operations against the rebels, Rear-Admiral Hoskins, commanding the British vessels in the Maritime Canal, now takes i^ossession of Port Saidfor the purpose indi- cated, and trusts that all the inhabitants will assist him, as far as lies in their power, in maintaining order and protecting life and property. The Governor, Ismael Pasha Hamdy, ajjpointed by His Highness the Khedive, will resume his office and conduct his duties as formerly. The Captain of H. B. M. S. Monarch will act as military commandant of the gar- rison, and be responsible for the defense of the town against the rebels, and the sup- port of the Khedive's civil authorities against any attempt that may be made a,gainst life or property. The police patrols, which will consist of English soldiers and Egyptian police, will at once arrest all persons causing rovisions, and vast supi^lies of various kinds fell into our hands. The enemy tied along the railway and canal banks, throwing away their arms and equipments and showing every sign of demoralization. Unfor- •tunately there was not at this time in the whole cavalry brigade a troop that could gallop, their long march and rapid advance having completely exhausted the horses, who were not yet fit for hard work after their long voyage from England. The results of the ojjeratious, extending over two days, have been most satisfactory. The enemy has been completely driven from the position at Tel-el-Mahuta, which he had taken such pains to fortify, and upon which he bad, by force, compelled 7,000 peasants to labor. The canal has been cleared for more than half the distance intervening between Ismailia and the delta, and the water supply completely secured to us. The railway line is in our possession for more than 20 miles from this place, and the vigor, dash, and energy displayed by the troops in the sudden forward movement^ made with horses out of condition and from a base hastilj' organized, and where we are still contending with ail the difficulties incidental to raiiid disembarkations, have as- sured to the army an important strategic position, the possession of which cannot fail to influence the future operations of the campaign. Amongst the prisoners taken was Mahmoud Ferui Pasha, who was Chief Engineer to Arabi Pasha, a very important j)ersonage among the rebel chiefs. The enemy were commanded by Rashid Pasha, and the force he had collected at Mahnta and Mahsameh consisted often battalions of infantry (at least 8,000 men), of six squadrons of cavalry, and twenty guns, besides a large force of Bedouins. Owing to the result of the action of the previous day (24th instant) many of his troops had retreated during the night, and upon our guns opening on his works early on the morning of the 25th instant the 7,000 laborers ran away. Rashid Pasha then issued orders for a general retreat. Military operations in Egypt at this season of the year are very trying to the sol- diers engaged, and the complete absence of anything approaching the nature of a road renders all movements most difficult and fatiguing. Owing to the fact of this advance being made before the railway or the telegraph * Household Cavalry; 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards; battery N. A, R. H. A. ; 3rd bat- talion Royal Rifles. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARiT OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 131 lines had been repaired, or the canal cleared of obstrnctions, or any regular system of transport had been effectively organized, considerable exposure without tents, and severe privations as regards food, have been iinpostd upon all ranks. These hard- ships h;i,ve, however, been cheerfully borne, and the conduct of the troops has been everything I could wish. The troops engaged were, upon both the 24th and 25th instant, under the immediate command of Lieutenant- General Willis, C.B., who carried out my views in a most satisfjictory manner. My advanced troops, under Major-General Graham, now hold the Kassassin lock. I cannot praise too highly the manner in which the cavalry, horse artillery, and mounted infantry were handled by Major-General Drury-Lowe, who sxjeaks in the highest terms of the assistance rendered him by Brigadier General Sir Baker Russell, Lieutenant-Colonel Stewart, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant-Colonel Mc- Calmont, brigade major of the 1st cavalry brigade. He also begs me to mention his appreciation of the dash and skill with which the mounted infantry were com- manded by Captain Pigott, of the King's Royal Rifles. I am, &c., G. J. WOLSELEY, J General. To tlie foregoing account it may be well to add that a small naval detachment took part in the operations of the day. It was composed of two Gatlings and 70 marines from the Carysfort and Orion, and was com- manded l)y Captain Fitz Eoy, of the latter vessel. The Marine Infantry battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard S. Jones, had left Ismailia at 4 p. m. the day previous, and had reached El Mag'far at 1.30 a. m. of the 25th. It started again at 4 a. m. with the general advance, and at 5 p. m. was able to march into the Egyptian camj) at Mahsameh, which had been seized by the cavalry in the morn- ing. So good a piece of work deserves record. . The extreme right of the British line was on a ridge about a mile and a half i'rom the center. When Mahsameh station was in plain sight the two guns of battery A. 1 came into action and shelled the fugitives, the cavalry and mounted infantry dashing' in and capturing the camp, which they occupied ijeimanently until the advance on Tel el-Kebir. The stock of provisions captnred was a most welcome addition to the stores in hand, and, in particular, the grain left on the ground in large quantities w^as invaluable, for the horses had been for several days on an extremely short allowance of forage. It will be perceived that the operations of the day did not reach the dignity of an engagement, the Egyptians olSering practically no resist- ance, but falling back on Tel-el-Kebir, where a large camp had been established north of the railway, and where extensive intrenchments were begun along the crest of a range of hills running north and south On August 2n a small force of the 7th Dragoons occupied the lock in the Fresh Water Canal at Kassassin without opposition. This was a most important step, since the possession of the lock gave General Wolseley control of the water in the upper reach of the canal. That it could have been accomplished so readily is but another indication of the ignorance or habitual carelessness of the Egyptians. Later in the day the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the York and 132 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Lancaster Kegiment, and the Eoyal Marine Artillery marched up and established themselves at this point, tlie cavalry withdrawing to Mah- sameh, a mile and a half to the eastward. The force had now completely outrun its commissariat, and for two days the men had lived from hand to mouth. On the third day the navy succeeded in getting a few stores to the front by the Sweet Water Canal, but the prospects were, to say the least, gloomy. On August 27, the distribution of the troops was approximately as follows : At Kassassin lock were a squadron of the 19th Hussars, the York and Lancaster Eegiment, the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the Eoyal Marine Artillery battalion, and two guns of battery K. A. At Mahsameh, the Household Cavalry, the itli and 7th Dragoon Guards, the 2nd Bengal Cavalry and 13th Bengal Lancers, the Mounted Infantry, and the Eoyal Marine Light Infantry battalion. At Tel-el-Mahuta, the 1st brigade (Guards), the liifl.es, the 24th com- pany Royal Engineers, and battery A. 1, E,. A. At I^efiche, the West Kent Regiment. At Ismailia, the 7th, Sth, and 18th companies of Royal Engineers^ besides many other corps landing from the transports. On August 28, the Egyptians made an effort to regain their lost ground by a serious attack on General Graham's force at Kassassin^ as narrated in the official reports given herewith. The first is from Major-General Graham to General Wolseley : Kassassin, August 29, 1889. Sir: I have the honor to report tbat an important engagement with the enemy took place here yesterday, the 28th instant, in which, though attacked by a vastly superior force numerically, tried seriously by exposure to the sun and previous priva- tions, the troops I have the honor to command finally drove back the enemy at all points; and, with the aid of the cavalry under Major-General Drary-Lowe, C. B., inflicted severe chastisement. The portion the advanced brigade occupied at Kassassin is not the best for defense. We are astride the canal (which runs nearly east and west), and hold the bridge and locks. Taking the west as our proper front, on our right the desert rises to a ridge, "with an elevation of from 100 to 160 feet; at a distance of from 2,000 to 3,000 yards there is the millet and palm covered plain of the Ouadj', intersected by a disused branch of the canal. This' ridge, on our right, is obviously a source of danger to a force too weak to occupy it, as I have already observed in a previous report. About 9.30 a. m. on the 28th instant the enemy's cavalry appeared in force on our left front on the north side of the Fresh Water Canal, and I at once heliographed to Major-General Drury-Lowe at Mahsameh. The force under my command, consisting of 57 cavalry, 70 mounted infantry, 1,728 infantry, and 40 artillery, with two 13-pdrs. as detailed in margin,* were at once posted by me under cover, fronting to the *Royal Horse Artillery, twoguns, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.. 40 4th Dragoon Guards, olBcers, non-commissioned offlcers, and men 15 7th Dragoon Guards, officers, non-crmmissioned officers, and. men 42 Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men 611 York and Lancaster Regiment, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men .. 690 Mounted Infantry, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men JO Eoyal Marine Artillery, officers, non-commissioned officers, and men 427 Total 1,895 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 133 north and west, the cavalry and mounted infantry (50) being thrown out on the flanks to observe the enemy's movements while I awaited the development of his attack. About II a. m. it w as reported that a large force of cavalry, infantry, and artillery were being moved round towai'ds our right, behind the ridge. At 12 the enemy opened from two heavy gnus on our left front, afc least 4,000 yards off, the shot from which fell short. The enemy's attack seenied to languish, and about 3 p. m. the officer commanding the Mounted Infantry reported the enemy retiring. i The men had been suffering very mnch from their long exposure to the heat of the eun without food, so I ordered them back to their camps. Major-General Drury-Lowe brought a brigade of calvary within 2 or 3 miles of the camp, and about 3 p. m. with- drew them to Mahsameh, as I had previously requested him not to engage them un- necessarily. At 4.30 p. m. the enemy advanced his infantry in great force, displaying a line of ekirmishers at least a mile m length, with which he sought to overlap my front on the left, supported by a heavy and well directed fire of artillery, with which he searched the camp, wounding a sick officer in the house where I had established my headquarters, but which, as the best building, was now given up as a hospital. My dispositions to meet this attack were as follows: On the left the Marine Artillery were directed to take up a position on the south bank of the canal, where (secure from bidng turned themselves, the canal being 5 to 6 feet deep) they could chock the enemy's advance by a flank fire (the Royal Marine Artillery, therefore, gave fire to west and northwest). In the center the 2d battalion, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, extended a fighting line of three companies, facing west by north, about 800 yards to the right rear (east- northeast) of the Royal Marine Artillery. The supports and reserves of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry were under cover of the railway embankment, facing north. The 2d battalion York and Lancaster extended the fighting line of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry with two and a half companies, keeping the remainder in support and reserve. The position of the infantry was, therefore, an irregular ecAeion, right thrown back. The troop of the 7th Dragoon Guards was kept on this flank, and the two 13-pdrs., now reinforced by two others, took up a position on the ridge. Unfortunately, these guns had only got their ammunition in their limbers, and had soon to cease firing for want of a further supply, though they did good service while it lasted. The Mounted Infantry and detachment of 4th Dragoon Guards occupied a portion of the gap be- tween the Royal Marine Artillery and Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, and all the persistent efforts of the enemy to break through at this point were unavailing, owing to the steady fire of the Royal Marine Artillery and the gallant resistanceof the little band of Mounted Infantry and detachment of 4th Dragoon Guards dismounted and employed as infantry. The enemy made great efforts to overcome this resistance, put- ting a number of men across the canal ; and three times his guns were kept from advancing by their horses and men being shot when trying to press past. In order to support the left, the companies on the left of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, facing north, were spread out along the line of the railway embankment, and a fresh company from the right half battalion was moved to the left to prolong the line. Feeling secure on my left, I turned my attention to the right flank. On the first iiotice of the attack (4.30 p.m.) I sent a message to Major-General Lowe, by helio- graph, and by a mounted officer to Mahsameh, 3 and 4 miles distant, requesting him to move up the cavalry brigade to cover my right flank, and to send forward the Royal Marine Light Infautrj^. At 5 p. m., thinking I saw the cavalry advancing, I sent an order to Major-General Drury-Lowe to bring round his cavalry, under cover of the hill, fall upon the left flank of the enemy's skirmishers, and roll up his line. This order was received and gallantly executed. For an account of this part of the action I beg to refer to MajoF- General Drury-Lowe's own report. 134 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. At 5 p. m. I observed reinforcements coming to the enemy by train, and fearing a charge of cavalry on our exposed right, directed the officer commanding the reserve company of the York and Lancaster to prepare to receive them in line. Near the right of our position, on the line of railway, a Krupp gun, taken from the enemy at Mahsameh, had been mounted on a railway truck'aud was being worked by a gun de- tachment of the Royal Marine Artillery, under Captain Tucker. This gun was ad- mirably served, and did great execution among the enemy. As the other guns had to cease tiring for want of ammunition, Captain Tucker's gun became the target for the enemy's artillery, and I counted salvoes of four guns opening on him at once witli shell and shrapnel; but although evei-ything around or in line was hit, not a man of the gun detachment was touched, and this gun continued to fire to the end, expend- ing 93 rounds. At 6.45 p. m. I ordered au advance, with the object of closing on the enemy's infan- try about the time of the expected cavalry charge. The advance was made very steadily, by the fighting line, in echelon from the left, about COO yards to our west front, when the line fired volleys by companies, the reserves following in rear of the railway embankment. On arriving at the point held by the Mounted Infantry, a message reached me that the Royal Marine Light Infantry had come on to the ground on our right, and, gal- loping back, I at once directed them to advance in order of attack. This advance ■was continued for about 2 or 3 miles, supported by the Duke of Cornwall's Light In- fantry on the left, the York and Lancaster being left behind in reserve, the enemy falling back, only one attempt being made at a stand on our left, which broke at the first volley of the Royal Marines. At about 8.15 p. m. I first heard of the cavalry charge from an officer of the 1st Life Guards who had lost his way. We had now been advancing for an hour and a half in the moonlight, and my two aids-de-camp had had narrow escai^es in mistaking detached bodies of the enemy for our own troops. Fearing some mistake might be made, and seeing no further chance of co-operation with the cavalry, I ordered the marines and Duke of Corn- wall's Light Infantry to retire at 8.45 p. m. On approaching the camp, I called in* the other troops. The accompanying rough sketch shows approximately the position held by the in- fantry during the action. During the night the enemy made no sign; and this morning at daybreak I rode out over the battle-fieid, andhavehad all wounded that were found brought in. I append a detailed list of killed and wounded, an abstract of which is given in the margin.* The corps which suifered most heavily was the Royal Marine Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tuson, whom I would beg to bring especially to your notice. Lieutenant-Colonel Tuson speaks in high terms of the conduct of Major Ogle, Captain ^ List of IdUed and uounded. Organizations. Cavalry (with Gfiipral Graham's force). Eoyal MaiinB Artilleiy Mounted Infiiiitiy Diil 1, arrived from Mahuta, but too late to take part in the engagement. They had been obliged to drop their ammunition wagons in order to get their guns and limbers up. In spite of the wording of General Graham's report, it seems certain that the cavalry charge took place after the enemy had retreated several miles, and at about 9 p. m. From an account of an officer, a witness to the charge, it appears that at this time some of the enemy were ob- served making a movement on General Drury-Lowe's right. The cav- *Three killed and sixteen wounded. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 137 airy advanced, the 4th Dragoon Guards ou the left, the Household €avalry on the right, and the four guns of battery N. A., Eoyal Horse Artillery, in rear of the former. Approaching within 500 or GOO yards of the Egyptians, the guns were unmasked by the cavalry and brought quickly into action, ceasiug fire when the Household Cavalry crossed in front to ride down the enemy. This moonlight charge was the most dramatic as it was one of the most gallant episodes of the campaign. It ended the battle in a brilliant and novel manner. The following telegrams from Arabi Pasha, published in the then •official paper, give his view of this action. The translation is taken from the Loudon Times newspaper: ■ August 28. — Our victorious troops have worsted tlie euemy and made him retreat to Mahsameh, by the strength and power of God. At the present moment the two armies are facing each other at a distance of about 5,000 meters from Al-Mahsameh, and after a little rest, and when the horses have been watered, there will be a charge, pleas© God. Give us the aid of your pure prayers in asking for succor from the Lord Al- mighty. August 28, 7.40 p. m. — The fighting has begun again. Cannon have been firing since 4 p. m. till 7.30 p. m., and still continue. I pray God for help against His enemies. Pray God to help His true believers. Till this hour the fighting continues with cannon and musketry. I thank God for the endurance He has given us, and pray for perfect help and victory. Pray to Him that He may help His servants, the true believers, and disappoint our treacherous enemies. It is now twenty minutes past eight in the evening. August 28, 11.15 p. m.— Thanks be to God, the fighting has ceased on both sides, after a serious jengagement with musketry and cannon, followed by a charge by our cavalry on that of the enemy, when they were in a melee and used their swords against ■each other, after which they separated. God is the best protector. The results of this fight were of the greatest possible importance, small as was the force employed. It became evident, in the first place, that Arabi "felt himself to be strong enough to assume the offensive and thus attempt to regain the prestige which he had lost at Magfar and Tel-el-Mahuta. In the second place, it showed the British that the task they had undertaken was likely to prove more than a parade across the desert, and that their enemy was willing to come within range and hold his own for hours together; but it also showed that he would not stand an attack at close quarters, and that, unless in greatly superior numbers, he might be expected to give way if resolutely assailed. The value of the action in its influence on the morale of the Britisli troops, and especially of the younger recruits, was incalculable. It gave them that self reliance which can only be obtained through actual and successful contact with the enemy. The British left being well supported by the canal and its banks, the most obvious move on the part of the attack was to double up their right and force them back into the canal, cutting off communication with their rear. The Egyptians had no commander capable of realizing the importance of this object, and in consequence the main attack was in front, and the flanking movement half-hearted and unsuccessful. 138 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The burying parties next morning found that many of the bodies liad been shockingly mutilated daring the night. The circumcised had all been spared. The persons committing these outrages followed a fixed plan which they applied to the uncircumcised corpses of both armies. Of these they had lopped off the feet, hands, and genitals, and had deeply gashed the abdomen and the upper part of the forehead. With this battle ends the first part of the campaign. On August 20 Ismailia was seized, on the 26th Kassassin Lock occupied, and on the 28th its possession secured to the British advance after au earnest effort at dislodgment by the Egyptians. The actual distance covered, a matter of 20 miles, is no measure of the result achieved. It must be borne in mind that in spite of certain favorable conditions, of which absence of rain was the principal, the advance was beset with many real difficulties. The railway was broken in several places and blocked at others. There were no locomotives to haul the trucks conveying stores from the base to the front, and the army transport had comi)letely broken down. The draught auimals^ were few and in poor condition, pack-mules were lacking in sufficient numbers, and camels were, practically, entirely wanting. The strong^ army carts, suitable for use on hard European roads, were so heavy as to stick hopelesslj^ in the sand by their own weight. To each wagon designed for two horses not less than six were imperatively^ needed, and the more that could be hitched on the better. The navy was doing all it could to assist in getting supplies forward by the Sweet Water Canal (and its aid was of vital im])ortance at this juncture). For the mo- ment it seemed doubtful whether even the few troops already pusjied ahead could be maintained, and every effort was made towards keeping^ them furnished with the food requisite to enable them to pull through the crisis. To their excellent behavior, under the trying circumstances,, all bear witness. They bore their privation, which was but one degree removed from being perilous, and their discomforts cheerfully and almost good-naturedly, but they suffered severely until the arrival of the loco- motives from Suez made it possible to suppl^'^ them properly. The canal water was practically their sole supply (wells being rare^ scant, and bad), and frequentl}^ this was loathsome. It is of light cof- fee color, due to the mud it contains. Filtration or decantation renders it clear, while its flavor is, normally, extremely sweet and good; but the soldiers, having frequently no means of filtering or settling the water, had to drink it thick and tepid. Its excellent taste had been spoiled by the presence in the canal of the putrefying dead bodies of camels, horses, and human beings, and its innocuousness, in conse- quence, seriously questioned. Latterly it became too bad to supiDort the fish that usually live in it, but that now died in large numbers, contributing their share to its offensiveness. Much labor was expended in cleaning out this reservoir of water, but the damage could not b& entirely remedied. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 13^ In addition to tbis discomfort was the ever-present possibility of cut- ting the railway in rear, or of interrupting the canal traffic by strong- raiding parties. Either of these contingencies would have seriously imperiled the troops at the front. Fears that these contingencies might be realized, combined with short rations, bad water, excessive heat, flies, mosquitoes, hnrd work, inade- quate shelter, sun-stroke, dysentery, and fever, rendered the advance more honorable than either safe or jDleasant. The exertions made to meet the exigencies of the case are detailed under their appropriate heads. It is sufficient here to remark that the fight during the second part of the campaign was for adequate trans- port and for a sufficiency of the bare necessaries of life for the troops^ already thrown to the front. In the mean time the 3d brigade, 2d division, composed of High- landers, had arrived at Ismailia. It was not landed at first, but was retained on the transports in the harbor, pending the solution of the transportation problem. On September 1 General Wolseley telegraphs to the Secretary of State for War, in London : Ismailia, Septemher 1. In reply to your inquiry of 29tli ultimo, circumstances have forced me ahead of transport, but it is rapidly becoming efficient. The necessity of securing a sufficient supply of fresh water in the canal rendered it- imperative to push on as quickly aj possible. My success on the 24th and 25th, and retreat of the enemy, have enabled me to seize [the] two important positions on the canal of El Magfar and Kassassiu Lock, the latter about 20 miles from this place. I am, therefore, in a more forward and favorable position generally than I had anticipated, and am only now waiting till my transport arrangements are more complete, to enable me to make a further move- ment. In the absence of roads I had always calculated on partially using the canal and railway in sending supplies to the front, but the enemy having blocked the former by two large dams, and the latter by an embankment and the partial removal of rails, it has been necessary to get these obstructions removed. I have one engine on^ The line, and expect a second from Suez to-night, and am preparing the land trans- port companies, some of which are now landing, to supplement the other means above indicated. A supply of mules has arrived from Cyprus. I expect 4U0 more from Malta and Italy to-morrow ; and the large suj^ply collected at Smyrna and Beyrout, at last re- leased by Ottoman Government, are on their way. In a desert country like this part of Egypt it takes time to organize the lines of" communication. The above telegram will make abundantly clear the state of ;tffaira during this phase of the campaign. By September 2 the whole of the Indian Contingent had reached Suez, except the 6th Bengal Cavalry, and many of its troops had gone to the^ front. Except for an occasional reconnaissance, bringing about the inter- change of a few shots, and for one real assault, this i:)eriod was one of 140 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. quiet preparation for a further advance, stores first, and then men, be- ing slowly accumulated at Kassassiu. On September G the distribution of the forces was as is shown in the folio wiuff table: Corps. ISMAILIA. •Cavalry : ]9th Hussara Infantiy : lioyal IriaTi Fiiailiera Ko.vmI Marine Li^ht Infantry Koyal Artillerv : C batteiv.'Sil brigade (C. 3) J liattery, 3(1 brigade (J . 3) 1' battca-y, 1 st brigade ( F. J ) 5 battery, 1st brigade, Scottish division. 3clojal Kugiiieeis: 8tli and IStli companies JIal f of A troop Hiilf of C troop 'Commissariat and Transport: 2d, 8tli, 11 til, and 17tli companies Oidniinc(i Stoie Department Army HospitaL Corps Indifin Contingent: 2l)th (I'ltnjaiib) N'ative Infantry Madras Sappers 29tli (Beloochees) Native Infantry 1st battfilion Seaforth Highlanders. 7th Bengal Native Infantry TEL-EL- MAHUTA. 'Cavalry : 4tli Dragoon Guards Infantry : 2d battalion Grenadier Guards 2d battalicm Cold^jtream Guards 1st battalion Scots Guards Jloynl Artillerv: J batlerv, 3d brigade (one-half) (.1. 3) N battery, 2d brigade ( X. 2) I battery, 2(1 brigade (I. 2) 5 biittery, 1st brigade, Scottish division. Hoyal Engini^Pis: 17th and 24th companies Detachment C troop •Commissariat and Transport: 121 h company Armv Hospital Corps: Field Hospital No. 2 Half of No. 1 Bearer company Indi-in Contingent: 13th Bengal Lancers MAHSAMEH. Cavalry : Household Cavalry 7tb Dragoon Guards Koyal Horse Artillery : N battery, A brigade (N. A.) JLrmy Hospital Corps: No. 2 Bearer company KASSASSIN. 'Cavalry : 19th Hussars 4tb Dragoijn Guards Mounted Infantry. Infantry : Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry Koy al Marino Light Infantry Royal West Kent Kinsr's Royal Rifles York and Lancaster Regiment Royal Irish Hoyal Artillery: Royal Marine Artillerv (armed as infantry). G battery, 3d brigade (horse) (G. 3) A battery, Ist brigade (field) ( A. 2) D battery, 1st brigade (field) (D. 1) Officers. Men 31 760 3 101 6 107 G 108 5 132 3 129 12 235 2 75 2 76 21 744 5 78 24 200 9 490 7 251 10 485 32 749 G 512 668 712 700 180 190 G5 Horses. 430 360 500 460 174 172 98 130 140 38 39 7G 73 680 56 850 61 800 56 Gfil 60 689 5.5 735 5» 424 21 174 173 194 153 189 144 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 141 Corps. Kassassin— Continued, Eoyal Enffineers: Half of A troop Hnlfof C troop 17tli and 24th companies Commi.ssariiit and Transport: V2th and 15lh companies ArmT Hospital Corps: Field liospital No. 3 One-half No. 1 Bearer company Indian Contingent: 2d Regiment, bengal Cavalry; 6tli Regiment, Bengal Cavalry 13th Regiment, Bengal Lancers 7th battery, 1st brigade, Northern division Officers. Men. 4 105 5 82 4 138 4 2C0 8 37 4 73 C 180 2 120 4 250 5 247 Horses. 32- 41 25 13^ 198 128 275. lt> (This last battery carried 7-pdr. screw-jointed guns on the backs of mules.) On September 9 the Egyptians made a desperate effort to crusli the British force at Kassassin. The following is the official report of the engagement: Camp Kassassin, Septemler 10, 1882. Sir : I Lave the honor to acquaint you that the enemy made a combined attack yes- terday morning upon this position, one column advancing from the north from the Salihieh direction, the other from Tel-el-Kebir. Arabi Pasha was on the ground, but the attacking troops were commanded by Ali Fehmi Pasha, Rashid Pasha being, it is asserted by prisoners, in disgrace for having lost his camp and guns in the fight of the 25th ultimo, at Mahsameh station. The enemy's force was about thirty guus^ of which we took four, and seventeen battalions of infantry, several squadrons of cavalry, and a few thousand Bedouins. From tbe information I have obtained from prisoners, it would seem that the enemy expected an easy victory, thinking the force here was only a weak advance guard. The troops in camp, when the attack began, were, as below, under the command of Lieutenant-General Willis, commanding Ist division. With these he immediately moved out, attacked and drove back the enemy, ^ho retreated with loss within their line of works at Tel-el-Kebir, from which they opened an angry but harmless fire upon our troojjs. which had been halted beyond the range of their gnns. Our troops moved with great steadiness, and Major-General Graham has especially "brought to my notice the dashing manner in which two Krupp guns were taken by the battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry, and the excellent manner in which that battalion was handled by its commanding otficer, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. Our casualties were 3 men killed and 2 officers and 78 men wounded. Lieutenant Purvis, of H. M. S. Penelope, is amongst those who were severely wounded. He was in command of the naval detachment that was serving the 40-pdr., which is mounted on a railway truck. He is a very good officer, and I have to regret very much the loss of his valuable services with this army. With the exception of five who were too severely injured to be moved by railway, all the wounded were sent to Ismailia last night, and those five were sent there this evening by the Fresh Water Canal. I have, &c., G. J. WOLSELEY, General, Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in Egypt. The troops engaged were those* enumerated in table (p. 140) as at Kassassin, with certain changes. Thus the detachment of 4th Dra- 142 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. goon Guards and the Mounted Infantry bad joined tlie cavalry at Mah sameb ; of the Engineers, A and troops and the 17th company are not included among those that took part in the action, nor are the Com- missariat and Transport companies. Battery IS". A, Eoyal Horse Artil- lery, worked with the Indian cavalry, while half of Battery 5. 1, Scottish division, had come up and established three 25-pdrs. for the permanent defense of the position. These were behind breastworks on the south side of the canal, close to the lock. The camp was situated near this lock, between the railway embank- ment and the canal, in a plain surrounded by hills on the west, north, and east. Two batteries of field artillery, A and D. 1, were in gun-pits north of the camp, facing to the westward, the left of £>. 1 resting on the rail- way. Upon th<' latter were the captured Krupj) 8'^'" gun, worked by Captain Tucker's detachment of Eoyal Marine Artillery, already men- tioned, and a B. L. E. 40-pdr. on an armored truck, manned by blue- lackets from H. M. S. Penelope, described elsewhere. The Egyptian attack was meant to be from two sides — on the west by a sortie of the Tel-el Kebir garrison, and on the north by a body from Salihieh, variously estimated at from 1,500 to 5,000 men. There ai)X)ears to be little doubt that the British came near being surprised. Early in the morning Colonel Pennington, of the 13th Bengal Lancers, going out to the westward to post vedettes, found the Egyp- tians advancing in force. Although but 50 men were with him, he dismounted them behind a ridge, and deliberately opened fire on the advancing enemy, and, when hard pushed, charged five squadrons of cavalry, killing ten men and capturing five horses. Immediate and timely warning of the impending danger was thus given to those in camp, enabling the line of battle to be formed, as shown in the accompany- ing diagram, not drawn to scale : Ilii & 25 D. C. L. I. pounders. Infantry. Artillery. 'Hi Krupp % bcm. D. 1, A. 1. _ Lock Eifles. Marines. :: and Bridge. T. & L. W. K. and Koyal Irish. BI40 pdr. :B.L.E.. 7. 1, G.B. Indian Cavalry N. A. The cavalry and battery I^. A., Eoyal Horse Artillery, were kept back in anticipation of a move from the direction of Salihieh. By about 7 a. m. Arabi had succeeded in posting most of his guns on an eminence known as Ninth Hill, 2,000 yards to the British right front, while his infantry deployed for attack, with the right resting on the BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 143 canal, and then advanced to within 1,200 yards. A few of his troops were south of the canal. The testimony to the accuracy of the Egyptian artillery practice is very geceral, shot after shot falling admirably into the camx) and lines. The shells, however, burst so indifferently as to neutralize the excellence of the aim. Batteries A. 1 and D. 1, partly on account of the enemy's fire and partly because of some uneven ground in their front, soon left the pits and- advanced slightly. These batteries, aided by G. B. and 7. 1 on the right and the railway guns on the left, replied vigorously with shell and shrapnel. The 25-pdrs. did excellent work on the enemy's right on both sides of the canal, sending their jirojectiles over the heads of the British infantry until the advance was begun. Batteries A. 1 and D. 1 shot down the detachments of two of the captured guns, which were seized by the line as it advanced. The other two were carried by a charge of the marines in their forward march. The battalion, in regu- lar formation for attack, came upon a battery of four guns which was playing briskly upon it at the distance of 1,400 yards. Without return- ing a shot, the marines kept on until they were 400 yards away, when they began firing volleys by half companies, still continuing the march. This steady work proved too severe for the Egyptians, who broke and ran, leaving two of the four guns behind. The infantry, also engaged, held its ground for an hour and a half, a forward movement not being permitted until it should be definitely known that no danger was to be apprehended from the north. At 8.30 it was deemed i)rudent to assume the offensive, and the line was ordered to advance, the extren\e right being, however, kept refused. The in- fantry and the four batteries of artillery on its right moved forward about a thousand yards, and reengaged the enemy, who had retired. At 9.30 the advance was resumed, and the Egyptians were slowly driven back into their intrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir. These fortifications were approached to within 5,000 or 6,000 yards, more for the purpose of observation than of assault. At 12.30 the British started to return to Kassassin. In this action the British artillery proved its value, and received credit for the manner in which it was handled. The infantry had less opportunity of distinguishing itself, for the Egyptians were unwilling to engage at short range. The repulse did not take the form of a rout, although little doubt can be entertained that the retreating army would not have stopped at Tel- el-Kebir had a vigorous assault been attempted. In fact, the British troops, both officers and men, were extremely anxious to continue the advance ; General Wolseley, however, would not give his consent, but ordered the withdrawal to Kassassin, merely observing that he was not ready. The Salihieh contingent was late in arriving on the scene of action. 144 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. It failed to unite witli the troops from Tel-el-Kebir, and it was met by the cavalry division, under Major-General Drury-Lowe, in the desert north of the lines. Seeing the impossibility of joining Arabi, in the face of the force unexi^ectedly found ready to receive him, its com- mander withdrew belbre General Drury-Lowe's advance, losing a field gun in his retreat. There was no fighting at this point. The failure of the movement was attributed by the Egyi)tians to their having kept too far to the eastward. The Egyptian version of the affair is worth reading. It runs as fol- lows, and is from a telegram sent by Arabi to the ministry of war at Cairo : September 9. — Last night some monuted Arabs of the province of Sliarkiyeh, belong- ing to the tribes of Nakiat, Tamailat, Ayad, and Halm, rode out towards the enemy at 2 a. m , nnder the command of Ali Bey Ismet, superinteudeut of the Arabs, and with them Captain Abdul Hamid Effeudi Hamdy and 40 cavalry soldiers. They went forward as far as the enemy's outposts, rode at them, and lired a volley, which made them retire, and then the Arabs found forty-five oxen grazing [sicj, which they drove off, while some of the party remained to keep back the enemy. At sunrise the enemy came out with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, and iiring began, and continued on both sides for about an hour. Then the Arabs charged like lions, displaying a cour- age and bravery which enabled them to drive back the enemy, who were much more numerous than themselves. Then they followed the enemy, driving them until they had killed about 100 of them, and dispersed the rest, driving them back into their tents. The Arabs captured the oxen, about 500 meters of torpedo wire, and other military stores, and they returned to their posts victorious. This engagement, in- cluding the attack and pursuit, lasted about six hours. * * * Thanks be to God, not one of the Arabs nor of the soldiers was wounded. Give this news to those under your administration. Also a second telegram, dated September 10 (Arabic) : On this day, September 9, an engag'emenfc took place with the enemy at 5 a. m. Our force was composed of infantry, cavalry, and art.illery, in the two directions of Kas-el-Ouady and of Salihieh. After the enemy had hidden himself behind his in- trenchments at the bridge of Al-Kassassin, our troops retired to their posts in perfect order, and when there was a considerable distance between them the enemy came out of his intrenchments and endeavored to cut off our troops. The engagement lasted till 5 p. m., when the enemy retreated, defeated with great loss, to Al-Kassassin» Thanks be to God, our losses were very small in comparison with those of the enemy. We and our officers and the conquering army, his excellency Mahmoud Pasha Samy," and his officers and soldiers, are all in perfect health, our two divisions being at their post in perfect condition of readiness; and we pray God to give ns the victory over our enemies and to strengthen our courageous men against them, for the sake of the Lord of the beginning and of the end. Amen. O Lord of tho Universe. A more minute account is rendered three days later : Sepieml)er 12. — I give you good news, which will cause you joy and will delight each individual of the people — namely, that the engagement of Saturday (9th Sep- tember) was the most serious battle that has yet taken place between us and tho English, for the force of both armies was very great, and the fighting lasted for twelve hours, with impetuosity and daring, while the cannonade and the discharge of mus- ketry were unceasing, pouring down like rain on the field of battle. Still we lost only * The commandant at Salihieh. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 145 31 men, martyrized, and 150 were slightly, not dangeronsly, wounded, according to the official returns presented by the varions regiments with great exactness and pre- cision. It had been thought that our casualties would have been double that number, owing to the seriousness of the engagement and its long duration. Moreover, from true observation it has been proved to us that the number of the enemy killed and remaining on the field of battle is about 2,500, and their carts were insufficient for carrying off the wounded. * * * lu the writing of dispatches, if in nothing else, Arabi was truly IsTa- poleonic. On September 9 the Highland brigade, under Major-General Alison, K. C. B., started from Ismailia for the front. The lOtli, 11th, and 12th were occupied in bringing up the troops to Kassassiu and in making preparations for a general advance. During the latter part of this second or quiescent period of the cam- paign, reconnaissances were made daily in the direction of Tel-el Kebir, but serious engagements were strictly forbidden. The military habits of the Egyptians were carefully studied. On one occasion Colonel Buller, V. C, C. B., C. M. G.. of the Intelligence Department, managed to get around the enemy's flank as far as Karaini, and to ascertain that his outpostS at night were withdrawn to very near the trenches. The transport question, the only obstacle in tlie way of farther offen-. sive operations on the part of General Wolseley, had received a so- lution which, if not complete, was measurably satisfactory. The rail- way service had been developed to an extent sufficient to permit the accumulation of supplies beyond the needs of daily consumption, and the anxiety which had been exi)erienced in the earlier stages of the campaign had given place to imi)atience to resume the march to Cairo. The war now passes into its last period. The following table gives the disposition and a fairly trustworthy enumeration of the Egyptian forces at this time. In command. lufautry. Artillery. Cavalry. a M Place. £ S 1 no a a a o a "So 1 o Tel-el-Kebir Arabi Paaha, Ali Ru- by Pasha. Toulbn Paaha HiililKhamil 8 2 24. OCC 6, 000 60 40 IS 12 1.000 800 350 350 200 2 1,000 2,500 6,000 5, 000 5, 000 5,000 38, 500 !■> goo Kafr Dowar Mailiuit 1 9nn 5 fl50 Al)"'ukir and Roaetta.. Salihieh Kho"tshid Pasha Mahmoud Samy Pa- sha. Abdul Al Pasha 3 2 4 9. OOC 5, 500 12, 000 200 14, 5?i0 5 200 Darnietta 5,500 12,000 Cairo Total regular.", say, 60,000; total irregulars, say, 34,000; grand total, about 94,000 men. H. Mis. 29 10 146 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. XIII. THE BATTLE- OF TEL-EL-KEBIB AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. To remain behind and guard the line of communication during the forward movement now to be undertaken, the following detail of men was made: Place. British troops. Indian Contingent. 19th Hus- sars. iFtmailia . . Nefi<'lie ... Maliuta Mali.snmeh Kassaa^in 800 of the Maiirhestpr Rejtiment .50 of the Wi'Ht KtMit Kesiiiiii-iit 1(10 of tlie WeKt Ki-nt Reyinnnt .•... 1(10 of 1 lie WeHt Kent Kesimcnt 10 I of the West Kent Kesjiment l'4th aud i'Cth companies Royal Engineers 500 native infantry. 15() nutive infantry. 50 native infantry - loo native infantry. 1 troop. 1 troop. 1 troop. At 2 p. m. on September 12, the army having concentrated at Kas- sas^in, the Ro.yal Irish Fusiliers being the last battalion to arrive, two days' rations were served out for man and beast. At 5 p. m. the men's valises (new pattern of knapsack), blankets, and all baggage were stacrked beside the railway, and a non-commissioned officer and two men detailed from each company to stay by them. After sunset no bugles were allowed to be sounded. The camp was to be left under the command of General Nugent, R. E. The regimental transport was ordered to carry cooking utensils, two days' rations, one day's fuel, butchers' tools, and signaling instruments, together with : s many overcoats or blankets as could be taken without overloading; to be brigaded at daylight of the next day, and to follow along the northern side of the canal. With each battalion were to go the usual water carts and stretchermen (four to each company). The men were to carry two days' provisions in their haversacks, and, before starting, were to fill their water-bottles with tea. Each man had on his person 100 rounds of ammunition, aud 30 additional rounds per man were to follow in rear on mules. After dark all tents were struck and piled near the railway, and the camp fires were lefc burning. The troops formed in order of battle as shown on Plate 49. In the 1st division the formation was by half battalions in cdIuiiius of compuiies ; in tlie 2d division, by half battal- ions in double company columns at deploying intervals, thus: 2d division. 1st division. The batteries of artillery were all placed by 10 p. m., and the other corps formed on them. The men then rested on tht'ir aruis, waiting for the word to advance. The right of the Highland brigade, the guiding BRITISH NAVAL AND MfLlTARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 147 point, was to follow a line of telegraph poles, 100 yanls apart, wbiith had been ])lanted the evening' before by the Telt^^rajth Troon, and when these ended was to be directed by Lieutenant Wyatt Rawson, R. X., naval aid-de-camp to General Wolseley. Tlie vacant space in the front line was covered by a succession of infantry files at intervals of ten paces. Similar files maintained the distance and communication between the leading and supporting; brigades in each division, while the intervals be- tween the artillery and the neighboring infantry brigades were bridged over by mounted non-commissioned officers. The attack on the intrench- ments of Tel el-Kebir was to be made at the point of the bayonet, in the same formation, without change except ia deploying the rear com- panies. During the march several halts were made to rest the troops, one, towards o a. m., being nearly an hour in length. Daybreak was the time fixed for arrival at the fortified lines, and it would have beeu as undesirable to reach them t 'O soon as too late. ,^ The position selected by the Egyptians for a final stand was by nature'*"' the strongest it Avas possible to find in that flat section of country. Near thestatiou of Tel-el-Kebir there is a general and gradual rise of the ground towards the Avest, cidminating in a range of hills that stretch from a point on the railway, about a mile and a half east of the station, northward to Salihieh. Roughly parallel to the Sweet Water Canal is a second series of hills intersecting the first about two miles distant from the railway (at Q on Plate 50). Viewed from the railway this east and west range api)ears as a moderate hill. Its real character, however, is tl)at of a table-land sloping away to the north war 01 £ a II SI SS a) a (0 .S3 E «> j5° *1 1 1 1 2d battalion Grenadier GTiarda... .... 1 9 7 4 17 5.^ 12 34 .... 2d battalion Roval Iriwh 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 """2 1 2 16 1 3 5 "'""i' 3 ]9th Hnssara 5 17 37 29 45 52 20 3 9 Royal Artillery iHt batt.ilion Roval Hishlanders 2 1 7 5 13 14 ' 1 1 4 Ist batt-'ilion Gordon Hi'^hlanders 4 lac battalion ("amerou Hijihiandors 2d battalion Hitlbland Light Infantry 3 li let bmtaliiin Si-aforth Highlanders Native tioops Chaplains 9 48 27 353 22 '■ Since dead. t One since dead. The fullness of General Wolseley's official report renders extensive comment unnecessary ; nevertheless a few words may be added to make the individual parts of the battle more distinct. It may be observed, jjamwi, that the night march offered two great advantages : avoidance of the heat of daytime and a period of fourteen hours' light for pursuit of the Egyptians if defeated. Practically there were three separate but nearly simultaneous in- fantry attacks: by the 1st division, under General Willis; by the 2d division, under General Hamley ; and away on the extreme left, south of the canal, by the Indian Contingent, under Genenil Maci)herson. In point of time, General Haraley's was somewhat earlier than the others, and General Macpherson's the last of the thrive. When the action began, at early dawn, General Willis' leading bri- gade, commanded by Major-General Graham, was about 900 yards from theintreuchments. Partly owing to the difficulty of keeping a ])roper alignment during the night march, partly to the fact that the line of march was not normal to the line of the earthworks, and partly to the confusion created by an Egyptian scout who galloped into his lines, General Willis was obliged to form again under heavy fire, changing front forward on the left com])any before assaulting, adopting the reg- ular attack formation. At 300 yards' distance a volley was fired by the British, after which they rushed up to 150 yards' distance, fired ^a second 154 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. volley, and then reached the ditch. Here the fighting line was joined by the snp[>orts, a last volley delivered, the ditch jumped, and the works cleared at the i)oiiit of tbe hayonet. As soon as the brigade reached the parapet, the Egyi)tians broke and ran, some stoi)ping occasionally to fire back at their imrsners, who chased them tor upwards of a m le, only halting when the artillery had gotten iuside the works and had begun shelling the fugitives. Tbis brigade struck the trenches not 100 yards from the point aimed at. It was longer exposed to the Egyptian fire than were the High- landers, whose attack had begun a few minutes previous and had fully aroused the whole line of the defense, which had been sleeping on their arms behind the parapets. To the Highland brigade, led by Major-G-eneral Alison, fell the task of carrying the lines to tbe left. The first shots were fired at them at 4.55 a. m. from a picket of about 30 men posted 150 yards iij front of the intrenchments, then 300 yards distant from the Highlanders. Immediately^ afterwards the enemy opened with artillery and then with musketry. Without returning this fire the brigade advanced stead- ily for about 100 yards further, when the fire became a perfect blaze. At 150 yards bayonets were ordered to be fixed, and the bugle sounded the advance, when, with a yell, the men charged in the dim light through the smoke, carrying the lines in fine style in the lace of de- termined opposition. The enemy did not run far, but halted at about 60 yards in rear and delivered a heavy cross-fire. The left battalion, the Highland Light Infantry, struck the strong redoubt (Q, Plate 50) ■with a high scarp, which held the center companies for a moment, but the flank conii)aiiies got around it and took it. The rest of the brigade pushed steadily on, driving the enemy before it, and capturing three batteries of field guns. The advance was continued, and Arabi's head- quarters and the canal bridge'seized at 6 45 a. m. The Highland Light Infantry, which had suffered severely, soon afterwards joined the rest of the brigade. The force under the command of General Macpherson was the Naval Light Battery and the Indian Contingent, less the latter's cavalry, one of its two batteries of artillery, and a: considerable number of its infan try, detailed as guards along the line of communication. Tbe advance of this division was by the south bank of the canal, the Ifaval Light Battery of 6 Gatlings accompanying it on the northern side along the railway embankment. ^-'^ General Macpherson started an hour later than the main army, but was within gunshot when the action was begun by the Highland brigade. The Egyptian artilhry at once opened fire down the line of the canal, al- though it was still too dark to see the approaching troops plainly, while the infantry lost no time in opening a lieavy fusilade. The Contingent immediately left the exposed canal bank by which it had been proceed- ing, and took to a more sheltered roadway beside it. The Seaforth High- BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 155 lauders, who were leading, deployed for attack. The first obstacle en- countered was in the shape of a battery of 7-pdr. Lahitte howitzers in gun-pits, barring the way. This was first opened on with case by the niule battery, and then carried gallantly by tlie Seaforth Hijihlanders, •with a rush, at the point of the bayonet. lu continuation of this line of gun-])its was a long shelter trench, which was at once evacuated, the Egyptians retreating into sonie villages near by, whence they were driven by the native Indian troops. On rhe other side of the canal the Naval Gatlings were busily employed firing on the Egyptian lines in front and on either hand. Tlie British advance was not checked ibr an instant, but was continued rapidly into and i)ast the intrenchraents and on to the brdge and rail- way station. One squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, which had remained with General Macphersori, charged the fugitives on the ex- treme left across the cultivated ground. The oi)erations of the Artillery brigade are given in the following Dote by Captain Martin, E. A., aid-de camp to the general commanding '> Seven batteries were formed up iu liue at full intervals between the 4th brigade and the Gxiards brigade. There were intervals of 150 yards on either flnnk between the gnns and the infantry. General Goodeuongh commanded the forty-two gnns in person, and directed their march from the left of the line, keeping up the touch to either flank during the night march. At 4.55 a. m. the first shot was fired by the enemy. About two minutes afterwards the enemy opeued fire all along the intrench ments and from his guns. At this time the line of guns was some 800 yards from the iutrenchments. It was too dark to lay guns, and, moreover, the Highland brigade overlapped the front of four batteries, so General Goodenough awaited the develojiment of the attack and halted. In five or six minutes, seeing from the flashes that the attack was gaining ground, he ordered an advance from the center in eshelon, thus : N. 2 and I. 2. H. 1, J. 3 ; C. 3. .. A. 1 and D, 1. In this order, favored by the darkness, and on the left by smoke, the learling di- vision, N. 2 and I. 2, approached the trenches to about 300 yards. General Gocfdenongh then halted the guns, rode forward into the intreuchmeuts, and finding the attack successful, d rected the leading division to enter. N. 2 led the way in column of route. The first gun cantered into the ditch and over the parapet somehow, bringing down some of the earthwork and making some sort of a way for the other guns. N. 2, fol- lowed by I. 2, rushed through the infantry and came into action beyond them, firing "west and northwest at groups of the enemy, who were falling back, fighting. It be" came daylight suddenly, just before the guns entered the works — time about 5.10 a. m' About 5.15 (as I judge it) Graham's attack approached, and about 5.20 a swarm of ^ jitives came rushing back from his direction (the right attack). About 5.25, N. 2 "was ordered to cease firing, and work down the ridge running southwest to the camp and railway station. This was done, the battery coming into action frequently at close ranges, and keeping the masses of fugitives on the move. I. 2 was directed, a few minutes later, to follow N. 2. The ridge ended some five or six hundred yards from the station. N. 2 reached this ))oint and opened fire at trains moving oif and the fugitives retiring by the railway embankment. I. 2 arrived here just as the firing ended, at 6.40 a m. A. 1 and D. 1, seeing the leading division enter the works, and their front not being covered by infantry, trotted forward and came into action at 200 yards from the in 156 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT trenchmeuts and opened fire with case and sbrapnel. When the parapet in their im- mediate front was silenced, thi^y aj^ain advanced, swung forward the left, and enfi- laded the line of parapets northwards. This was to assist General Graham's attack. On this succeeding, they were ordered southward to silence the outwork (M, Plate LIV), which had been missed by the Highland brigade in the dark. Finding the gorge open, they went for it and settled the matter with a few rounds of case. The Egyptians got a gun or two round to meet them, but before they could do much harm were shot down. A. 1 and D. 1 then made for the camp, bringing in the six guns in the outwork with them. C.3, J. 3, and H. 1, finding the Highland attack snccessful, advanced to the parapet, cleared a way through it, and entered. They came into action successively, beyond the infantry, and fired a few rounds at the enemy falling back. Seeing N. 2 working down the ridge towards the camp and station, C. 3, and subsequently J. 3 and H. 1, followed in that direction. C. 3 came into action at the end of the ridge and tired at the trains moving ofi' and the fugitives near the bridge and station. It ceased fire at 6.40 a. ra. J. 3 and H. 1 were arriving at this time. H. 1 was halted a few minntes un- til the Indian Contingent came up to the bridge over the canal. It was then directed to join that body, and went on to Zagazig. On the extreme right, the Cavalry division, under Major-General DruryLowe, was designedly late in arriving, being fully 2 miles dis- tant when the first shot was fired at the Highlanders. Hearing the sound, it quickened its pace, reaching the intrenclmients in time to per- mit its two horse batteries N. A. and G. B. to take in reverse and enfilade the lines north of General Graham's assault, while the cavalry took up the pursuit of the runaways, as described in the official report, and gal- loped to the railway station, capturing several trains and locomotiv^es. The whole division, cavalry and artillery, united shortly afterwards at the bridge over the canal, prior to advancing towards Cairo. The Egyptians were sleeping in the trenches when the attack was made, and altliough, in one sense, surprised, were nevertheless quite ready. General Haniley thinks the alarm was given by mounted scouts who were met on the march. Yet Arabi and his second in command were both aroused by the noise of the fight, and both, without a mo- ment's hesitation, ran away. The warning could not have been of very great value at the best. The supply of ammunition was practically inexhaustible. At inter- vals of three or four yards were open boxes, each containing 1,050 car- tridges. The fire vyas for the most part ill-directed and too high. It appeared to the British as though they merely rested their pieces on the parapet, loading and firing as rapidly as possible, without stopping to take aim. The fusillade was tremendous while it lasted, but it could only be really effective when the attacking troops were actually on the parapet. By that time the result of the action was beyond doubt. Their artillerists made, as usual, the mistake of using shell instead shrapnel and canister. The former bury themselves in the soft ground to a considerable depth before the percussion fuzes act, and, in conse- quence, the ex[)losion is muffled and comparatively innocuous. Many of the shells actually passed over the heads of the supporting brigades. The trenches, after the battle, were found to be filled with dead, mostly BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPEEATIONS IN EGYPT. 157 bayoneted, and the ground in rear, as far as tlie railway station, was dot- ted with the bodies of those shot down in retreat. The Bi-itish cavalry, sweeping around the northern end of the iutrenchnients, cut down the fugitives by scores, until it become evident; that the rout was complete. After that all were spared who had thrown away their arms and who offered no resistance. Most of the bodies were observed to be lying on their backs facing the trenches, as if the men had stopped to have a parting shot at their pursuers. The Egyj)tian loss in killed alone was not far from 2,000. There was no return of their wounded, the army organization having disappeared, but 534 were treated at Tel el-Kebir during the four days succeeding the battle, 27 capital operations being performed. Of these wounded 202 were soon able to go to their own homes, while the balance were senc to Cairo in charge of Egyptian surgeons. The British medical author- ities did all in their power to alleviate the sufferings of these poor wretches, and furnished tins of meat, bottles of brandy, and skins of water to the railway trucks conveying them away. Man^- more who were slightly wounded must have managed to get to the neighboring villages and eventually to their homes, and thus have escaped enume- ration. It may be remarked, apropos, that the Egyptian hospital ar- rangements were of the most meager description. It is stated, and the statement bears the stamp of credibility, that extremely few superior officers were killed or wounded, and, as has been already mentioned, the two in chief command were the first to escape. Arabi himself mounted his horse and rode rapidly towards Belbeis. There appears to be no doubt that proper leaders, in every sense of the word, were wanting on the Egyptian side, and that the officers set a shocking examjde to the men. It has been humorously, and more or less truthfully, remarked that each officer knew that he would run but hoped his neighbor would stay. The men displayed real courage at Tel-el-Kebir, as the desperate strug- gle in the trenches and their heavy loss in killed abundantly prove. The black regiments, composed of negroes from the Soudan, were espe- cially noticeable for their pluck, fighting bravely, hand to.hand, with the British. More intelligence and less downright cowardice in the upper grades might have converted these men into a formidable army. So many cases are authenticated ot the virulence displayed by the Egyptian wounded, that it is demonstrated beyond question that many of these fellows not only shot at the strerchermen engaged in carrying off the injured, but in some cases actually killed the very Englishmen who had stopped to give them water or to bind their wounds. The Egyptian guns were 8"="" and d""^ Krupp steel B. L. E, of the old pattern (1808), all mounted on field carriages. The small arms were of the well-known Eemingtou make. These showed a defect in design, break- ing readily at the small of the stock. In the previous encounters between the British and the Egyptians, 158 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. the artillery and cavalry had borne the brunt of the fighting? and had carried off the honors, but the battle of Tel-el-Kebir was, as General Wolseley states, an infantry action. The tactics employed, a direct assault without flank movements of any kind, were of the simplest description. The object, to get at close quarters with the enemy and crush him, w as accomplished. After the attack, Arabi's army ceased to exist. In scattered groups it might be found all over Egypt, but as an organization it may be said to have been annihilated. In view of the decisiveness of the victory, comment appears unnec- essary. It may be alleged that the mode of attack adopted was hazard- ous to the degree of imprudence ; that no commander would dare to em- ploy such tactics on European territory ; that a night march of 9 miles could only be foUowed by a properly disposed and immediate assault under circumstances so exceptional as to be providential. It must, how- ever, be remembered that General Wolseley understood liis enemy, knew his military habits and numbers, as well as the ground intervening, had a fairly good idea of his intrenchments, a just ai)preciation of his mor- ale, a strong conviction as to the proper manner of engaging him, and confidence in the officers and men of his own command. What he "would have done had the enemy been of a different character is another question, whose consideration does not come within the province of this report. It seems a sufficient answer to such ciiticisms as are briefly referred to above to remark that the means were adjusted to the end to be reached, and that the justification (if any be needed) of the risks incurred lies in the success which attended them, a success as rare as it was complete. i^^o time was lost in reaping the fruits of the morning's work. Ad- vances were at once ordered in two directions, the one along the rail- waj' to the important railway center of Zagazig, whence a double-tracked road i)r()ceeds to Cairo via Beuhaand a single-tracked road via Belbeis, the other along the Ismailieh or Sweet Water Canal to Cairo. Of these movements General Wolseley speaks in his report of September 16 in the following terms: The enemy w» re pursued to Zagazig, 25 miles from our camp at Kassassin, by tlie Indian C<)ntiiigent, the leading detachment of wliich reached that place, under Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V. C, a liftle after 4 p m., and by the Cavalry division, under General Lowe, to Belbeis, whieh was occupied in the evening. Ma- jor-General Lowe was ordered to push (m wi!h all possible, speed to Cairo, as I was most anxious to save that city from the fate which beffll Alexandria in Jnly last. These orders were ably carried out, General Lowe reaching the great barracks of Abbassieh, just outside of Cairo, at 4.45 p. in. on the 14th instant. The cavalry marched t)5 miles in these two days. The garrison of about 10,000 men, summoned, by Lieiitenant-C<>l nel H. Stewart, assistant adjutant-general to the Cavalry division, to surre d> r, laid down their arms, and out troops took possession of the citadel. A nieswage was sent to Arabi Pasha, through the prefect of the city, calling tipon him to surrender forthwith, which he did un onditionally. He was accompanied by Toulha Pasha, who was also one of the leading rebels in arms against the Khedive. The Guanls, under His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, reached Cairo early on the 15tli instant. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 159 The result of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir has been the entire collapse of the rebellion. The only place that has not, as yet, surrendered, is Daniietta, aud its capture or sur- render can be easily effected at our leisure. The men of the rebel army having laid down or thrown away their arms in their flight, have now dispersed to their homes, aud the country is so rapidly returning to its ordinary condition of peace that I am able to rei)ort the war to be at an end, and that the object for which this portion of Her Majesty's arm^' was sent to Egypt has been fully accomplished. The seizure of Zagazig was effected iii the dashing manner peculiar to all the incidents of the day, aud shows what may be done by a few bold men. The squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry left with the Indian Con- tingent led the way, and when within about 5 miles of the town broke into a gallop. The horses being somewhat fatigued by the hard work of the preceding twenty hours, were not in a condition to keej) To- gether, and, as a consequence, the best got to the front and the others dropi»ed to the rear. The adv^ance of the squadron was, therefore, com- posed of Major R. M. Jennings, Lieutenant Burns-Murdock, R. E., and not above half a dozen trooi)ers. These pushed right into the railway station, where were five trains tilled with soldiers, and seven locomotives- At the sight of this handful of men, the engine-driv^ers either surren- dered or ran away, excejjt one who began opening his throttle, and was shot by Lieutenant Burns-Murdoch, while the Egyptian soldiers, hun- dreds in number and too demoralized to think of resistance, threw away their arms, left the cars, and ran off as rapidly as possible. By 9 p. m. the entire force under General Macpherson had reached Zagazig, not a man having fallen out by the way. In the other direction similar energy was displayed. The Cavalry division crossed the Sw^eet Water Canal at Tel-el-Kebir, and follow ing the canal bank proceeded with all practicable speed, keeping uj) a run- ning fight with Arabi's rear guard. It reached Belbeis that night and bivouacked. Making an early start the next morning (September 14), and leaving the cultivated ground a few miles south of Khankah, to strike across the desert intervening, it reached Cairo at 4.45 p. ra. The garrison of the city was divided into two ])arts: one, from <),000 to 7,(^00 strong, at Abbasieh ; the other, of from 3,000 to 4,(»00 men, at the citadel on a high hill within the city. The former having surremlered at once to General Drury-Lowe, the Mounted Infantry and two squ,-d- rons of the 4th Dragoon Guards were immediately sent to demand the surrender of the latter. The Ej^yptians here, without hesitaiion, submitted to a force not one tenth of their own number. Both garrisons were merely called upon to lay down their arms and accoutermeiits, to go to their homes, and keep the peace, conditions which they accepted ■with cheerful promptness. The leader of the rebellion had caught a train at Belbeis the day be- fore and had gone to Cairo, where he (juickly began preparations for the destruction of the city, drawing up an elaborate plan for a repetition 160 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. of the Alexandria outrage. According to this scheme, the place was divided into a number of districts, and fire was to be simultaneously applit'd, on signal, to certain houses indicated. The vigor displayed by General Drury-Lowe in this march, and his audacity in exacting the yielding of a force securely placed in positions of immense natural and artificial strength, and many times his own in number, Avere attended by results of inestimable value. Arabi's plan of revenge was defeated, and Cairo saved from ruin, while he himself was lodged in prison, and the only body of his followers from whom serious harm could have been anticipated were hurrying to their vil- lages in all possible directions, glad of a return to peaceful and congenial occupations. With the successful issue of the attack on Tel-el-Kebir, the British Commander-in-Chief accomplished the first of his aims, the crushing of the force in armed rebellion against the Khedive. Through the agency of his lieutenant, General Drury-Lowe, the second was achieved in the salvation of Cairo from destruction. So carefully had General Wolseley matured his plans before quitting England, that he had i)redicted his arrival in Cairo on Se[)tember 16. Under the circumstances, an error of one day on his part may be par- doned ; he entered the city with the Guards brigade, by rail, on the morning of the 15th. The submission of the Egyptian troops in various other quarters, Kafr Dowar, Aboukir, Rosetta, Tantah, &c., followed in rapid succession. Damietta, the last fortress to hold out, was evacuated without a struggle on the approach of a British force dispatched from Alexandria, for its subjection, under Major-General Sir Evelyn Wood, on the 23d of the month, when its commander, Abdul Al, from whom resistance had been expected, gave himself u]) unconditionally. The last military object of the war was now reached in the restoration of the Khedive's authority over the whole of Lower Egypt. Steps were immediately taken to send away all the troops, except a small contingent which it was decided to retain in the country until the government could be effectively re-established. The base was changed back again to Alexandria, various corps re-embarked for England, and the Indian Contingent started from Suez. By November 1, the force left in Egypt for the support of the Khedive was about 11,000 men, under Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, K. C. B., and comprised the 2d division of the Army Corps, the 7th Dragoon Guards, 19th Hus- sars, batteries G. B and C. 3, the 17th and 21st companies of Eoyal Engineers, with two battalions of infantry, the 2d Royal Irish, and 2d Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, which, together with two batteries of garrison artillery, were to constitute the garrison of Alexandria. The brigade commanders were changed and stood as follows: 1st brigade, Major General W. Earle, C. B., C. S. L; 2d brigade, Major-General G. Graham, V. C, K. C. B., R. E.; Cavalry brigade, Brigadier-General Wi BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 161 Arbuthnot : in command at Alexandria, Major-Geueral G. B. Harman, 0. B. The troubles with which the Khedive had now to contend were purely political. Their solution bids fair, in point of time, to contrast strongly with that of the military difficulties so resolutely grappled by the British expeditionary force. From the first gun of the bombardment until the occupation of Cairo but sixty-six days were consumed, the campaign proper taking twenty- five in all. The rapidity with which the blow was prepared was the outcome of England's maritime supremacy, but the force with which it was delivered was drawn from skill in plan joined to vigor, courage, and self-confidence in execution. H. Mis. 29 11 PA.RT III. MISCELLANEOUS. 163 XIV. THE WORKING OF THE NAVAL TRANSPORT SERVICE. The entire British sea transport is managed by the Eoyal l^Tavy, and is presided over by a naval officer at the Admiralty, entitled the Di- rector of Transports. The present incumbent is Admiral W. E. Mends. At each principal port at home and abroad, in the colonies, is a Trans- port Officer, in charge of the transport operations at that point. To him all Masters of transports are directly responsible, reporting to him on arrival and every morning afterwards for instructions. The army is represented in this connection by a Military Landing Officer, through whom the commanding military officer transacts all business relating to the sea transport of troops, animals, and material. Practically, the Army states the number or quantity of the latter to be moved and the Navy furnishes the means. The responsibility of the Navy begins at the water-line on embarking or loading, and ends at the water-line on disembarking or unloading. A naval officer may be or may not be sent in each hired transport as Transport Officer. His duties are mainly those of superintendence, the Master not being relieved of his responsibility in any way. He examines and signs all the Master's reports, and ascertains the latitude and longitude daily by observation. It would appear as though the Transport Officer is only really needed on board of a ship commanded by a stupid or malicious Master. The ships employed by Great Britain to convey troops and munKions of war fall under three categories : First, private vessels, belonging to established lines, making regular trips over a fixed route, on board of which passage and freight are secured ; second. Her Majesty's troopers; third, hired transports. The steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Com- pany were, during the campaign, the principal representatives of the first category. In addition to their usual accommodations, these steam- ers were obliged to provide fittings, according to the Government regu- lations, in proportion to the troops carried. The vessels of the second category suffice for the ordinary needs of the army, in times of peace, in exchanging battalions, bringing home invalided soldiers, &c. 166 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The following table is sufficiently descriptive of them : Transport. S ^ Capacity. Crocodile . Euphrates iTuniDa . . . Malabar . . Serapis . . . Orontes... Assistasce Himalaya . Tamar Tons. 6,211 6.211 6,211 6,211 6,211 5,920 2,500 4,690 4,650 4,180 3,900 3,040 4,890 4,030 2,570 1,440 2,500 2,500 200 200 200 200 200 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 800 1,097 1,097 The five first named are of one class, large " Indian troopers," the cost of their maintenance being at the charge of the Indian Government. The soldiers' wives live apart at the forward end of the main deck, where they are bulkheaded off. Their quarters include a spacious hospital and a wash-room, &c. The bunks here are in two tiers of galvanized iron frames. The accompanying series of deck plans of the Jumna (Plates 61, 62, 63, 64, 65) exhibit the internal arrangements of this type more clearly than a written description. The entire equipment of hammocks and mess gear is maintained on board, so that the troops have everything ready on their arrival. They keep clean and in order the parts of the ship devoted to them. Twenty men go to a mess. These steamers can make from 10 to 12 knots continuously. One peculiarity of their construction is not evident from the plans. Between the quarter-deck and forecastle a tier of rooms runs along the ship's side, but within these limits the " saloon deck" is a well. Attention is called to the pontons these ships carry. Mess-tables for the troops rest on a cleat at the side, and the other end is suspended from the beam over- head. The ships are of iron and are provided with water-tight bulkheads and ample pumps for emptying the bilge as well as for. extinguishing fire. They are an integral part of the Eoyal Navy, and are subject to the same discipline. Their routine, however, is adapted to the peculiar service they perform. In ail cases involving the moving of any considerable number of men at a time it is upon the third category, hired transports, that the bulk of the labor must fall. A list of vessels available for this work is al- ways kept at the Admiralty, but in case of need, as when the Egyj)tian expedition was resolved upon, bids are invited by advertisements. The hired transports are all iron screw vessels provided with an adequate number of water-tight compartments, and it is required that they must BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 167 have made at least one long voyage. When not intended exclusively as freight ships they must be not less than 6 feet high between decks, measuring from deck to beam, and the higher the better. If it is con- templated to carry horses in the hold, the height of the latter must be 12 feet or over. The charter is based upon the gross tonnage, so much per ton per month being paid. For the campaign just ended, the prices paid varied according to circumstances, the size, nature, and condition of the ship, the amount of internal fitting needed, &c. For the imperial transports, those bringing troops out Irom England, the average was 20s. 8d. per ton. The Indian transports were more expensive, costing about half as much again, a fact due to the scarcity, at the time, of suitable steamers in the ports of India. The steamer offered for hire is subjected to a rigid inspection inside and out by Naval Transport Officers, who may cause the owner to dock her at his own expense. The engines and boilers are examined by Na- val Engineers. A trial trip at the dock or under way may be exacted. When accepted, the rate of hire represents the charge for her use as a ship, complete in all respects and ready for sea. She can be employed in any manner that may be ordered, to carry troops, animals, or stores, or to serve as a hospital ship. She carries a blue pendant and the blue or naval reserve ensign, with a yellow anchor in the fly. She is given a number, by which she is known and registered. The number is painted on each bow and quarter in figures 3 feet long. The British transports in the Egyptian campaign were all painted black, and carried their num- bers in black on a white rectangular ground. Those which brought the Indian Contingent were lead-colored, and had their numbers painted in red figures. On each a war risk is assumed by the Government equal to her value. The owners must cut the decks for increased ven- tilation and hatchway accommodation where ordered, take down or re- arrange cabins or bulkheads, and they have no claim for compensation for any such alteration or for any restoration at the termination of the service. All special fittings required for the particular duty on which the ship may be employed are put in at the expense of the Government. These fittings are Government property and can be altered or removed at the pleasure of the Admiralty during the charter, but all left stand-' ing at its expiration become the property of the ship-owner. The Government furnishes all provisions, medical comforts, forage, and bedding needed for the troops and animals, or else they are pro- vided by the owners according to a fixed scale of compensation. The owners also provide, on an established schedule, table utensils and other articles for use on troop decks, for cooking, distilling, baking, «&c., tools and other articles employed about horses and mules, receiving a money allowance per man or animal of the number fitted for, and a per diem sum for the number actually carried. Pay begins the day the fittings are completed, provided the ship is in all respects ready for sea. Should the Government elect to put up the fittings, it has the right to ten days without payment. 168 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The Government supplies all coal, except that burned in the ship's galley for her own crew and for first and second class passengers. The entire charge for wages, food, or other expenses of any sort for oflBcers, crew, or other civilian persons is borne by the owners. The latter must keep the vessel in repair and in readiness to move when desired. If through derangement of hull or machinery she is unable to sail when ordered, the owner forfeits a certain proportion of the hire. The crew must be at least three men to every 100 tons up to 1,000 tons, and three to every 200 additional tons. They must be physically satisfactory, and may if desired be inspected by a medical officer of the navy. The carrying capacity is determined by a competent inspector, and is based upon the following conditions : First-class passengers (officers, &c.) have separate cabins of at least 30 superficial feet of floor ; if two are in one room, the;i of 42 superficial feet. Second-class passengers have such standing berths or other second- class accommodations as the ship affords. These passengers are war- rant officers and their families, staff sergeants, and the like. Third-class passengers (troops) are apportioned to the available berth- ing space, each hammock occupying 6 feet by 16 inches. One-fourth more than the number which can be swung in hammocks at a time may be embarked. The number of horse-stalls that can be erected is equal to the running length of the space chosen, in inches, divided by 27, the width of each stall. It may be fairly estimated that each man occupies 52 and each horse 126 cubic feet. Eoughly speaking, each man conveyed requires from 3 to 4 tons and each horse from 8 to 10 tons of gross tonnage. This mode of looking at the question gives a notion of the magnitude of the task of transporting any large body of troops. The transport is thoroughly inspected before the embarkation of the troops by a board composed of two naval officers, one military staff offi- cer, and one military officer not under the rank of captain. The senior military' medical officer of the station and the surgeon in medical charge of the troops to be embarked accompany the board and express their opinion as to the sanitary arrangements. The embarkation form is given on page 173. After the soldiers are on board a final inspection is held before the ship puts to sea, by two naval officers, one army field officer (not belong- ing to the corps embarked), and one army officer not under the rank^of captain. An army medical officer, not in medical charge of the troops embarked, expresses his opinion as to the sanitary arrangements. The standard of messing for first-class passengers and the number of meals served are the same as on board first-class passenger steamers. Ale, beer, wine, and spirits are only furnished on payment. The sec- BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 169 IPiff. 5S. oiid-class passengers have " a good, respectable table," aud receive a pint of beer or ale daily. Third-class passengers (troops) have the army ration. When more than 50 men disembark a report is made out by the mil- itary commanding officer upon the mess and other arrangements, the cleanliness of the ship, &c. Tbis report is evidence of the way in which the contract has been discharged. The Transport Officer furnishes the Master of the hired transport with a monthly certificate of efficiency, which forms the basis of claim for compensation. For short terms, one month's hire is paid in advance. The final account is not settled until all possible bills have been audited. The document required to obtain a first advance is the embarkation re- turn. The balance of hire is not jiaid until the report by the military commanding officer has been received. The claim for allowance on the score of mess is based on the mess certificate, and in the case of troops supplied on a similar certificate. The following notes are relative to the fittings necessary to the con- version of a vessel into a transport : IsTon-commissioned officers are allowed 20 inches hammock drift. All billets are clearly numbered and assigned. The head and foot hooks are 9 feet apart, and the hammocks overlap 18 inches at each end. When the height from deck to beam exceeds 7 feet, hammock beams are run athwartships at 6 feet 6 inches above the deck. Fig. 55 shows the mess table and I inches as arranged along the ship's side. A batten is run fore and aft at the side. Upon this the outboard end is placed, the inner resting on a trestle. Underneath the table is a shelf 9 inches broad. Along the side of the troop-deck and over the mess tables a long batten is run, with pegs for clothing and accouterments, three for each man. Arm racks of the common pattern are placed as needed. Two broad horizontal pieces are secured to a bulkhead, the upper perforated for the muzzles of the rifles, the lower scored to receive the butts. Temporary latrines are built on deck, at the rate of 3 per cent, of the force fitted for, in covered houses 6 feet high in the Tig.56. clear. Fig, 56. The trough is lined with lead, and a sheet-iron soil-pipe is carried down outside of the ship. Ample water supply for flushing is insisted upon. A comfortable step, a hinged seat, and a grating bottom are exacted. In addition, as many urinals as may be deemed necessary are built of wood, lined with lead, and having a proper discharge-pipe overboard. y^^_A_ 170 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. A house, usually beside the latrines, is built od deck for water- proof coats and caps, and must be large enough to contain one third of those belonging to the troops to be embarked. The sides are fitted with pegs and the ceiling with hooks. This "coat room" is in charge of a non- commissioned officer. The troop hospital is a proper space below, screened off by canvas. These screens can be rolled and stopped up. Standing bunks 6 feet long and 27 inches wide, in one or two tiers, as directed, are built. The frame is of wood, but the bottom of iron netting, 4-inch mesh. Inside the hospital is a dispensary, with drawers or cupboards, work-table, bottle- racks, washstand, &c., all simply but solidly constructed. The ventilation is carefully attended to, the decks being cut and air- pipes put in where ordered. A simple plan forexhausting the foul air was fitted to the transports during this campaign. A steam jet is intro- duced into an iron ventilator. Tubes and ^rooden trunks run through, and from all the horse and troop decks, to connect with the ventilator, and are i^erforated where they are designed to be effective. The steam jet draws the foul air from below through the air trunks and discharges it overboard. When not in use as an aspirator, the steam being shut off, the ventilator cowl is turned to the wind, and the apparatus answers the purpose of an inspirator. The magazine is built of two tiers of crossed deal boards, fastened with copper nails. It must be large enough to hold one hundred rounds per rifle. Other special rooms are also built, including bread rooms, an issuing room, a helmet room, a baggage room, &c., all provided with proper locks or bolts and padlocks. The hammocks are stowed in temporary bins built where ordered, preferably in covered houses on the upper deck. The prison is designed for four men, is 6 feet 6 inches wide, and 12 feet 6 inches long in the clear. It is fitted with three inside removable bulkheads, so as to be divided into four separate cells. The frames are 4 inches square and 2 feet apart, well cleated, top and bottom. The ends and sides are of two layers of f-iuch boards crossed and nailed. A 6-inch space is left at the bottom of the bulkhead and another 18 inches wide at the top, for ventilation. Iron bars i^ inch in diameter and 3 inches apart fill up the space. Each of the four cells into which the inclosure may be divided has a bench, and a stout iron jackstay in the deck, to which violent men may be shackled. The troop galley and bakery are always built on the upper deck. They are simply stout wooden houses of the necessary capacity. The sides and deck are lined with tin or sheet-iron. The floor is paved with tiles laid in cement. The coppers must hold three pints per man and be fitted with proper apparatus. The fittings for the accommodation of troops are such as would nat- urally suggest themselves to an intelligent officer, and therefore have BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 171 been rather referred to than minutely described. The horse-stalls, how- ever, are especially the outcome of long experience. The series of plates, 66 to 70, give the details of the present plan. The stalls are so designed that by lowering the breast rail, parting bars, and haunch rail they may be used for i>ack horses and mules. To shorten up the stall an extra piece 4 inches thick is provided and fastened to the inside of the regular haunch rail. Each deck or com- partment is furnished with one pump (or more if required), to bring fresh water from the hold. When not practicable to have scuppers to convey the urine overboard, it is first collected in tanks below and then pumped into the sea. One or two loose box -stalls are provided for sick horses, and 5 per cent, of the stalls are 6 inches longer and 2 inches wider tban the others. But nine-tenths of the stalls are ever occupied, the other tenth being for shifting the horses. A large number of these stalls are always kept on hand, ready for use. The animals are usually hoisted on board by a steam-winch, in stout slings, and are discharged in the same manner. But few of the transports had loading ports large enough to admit a horse. It is one of the rules in all hired transports that there shall be no smoking below the spar deck. This rule is most imperative. The discipline of the troops embarked is in the hands of the military commanding officer. For sanitary purposes, sawdust (for use about horses particularly), MacDougall's disinfecting powder, chloride of lime, and carbolic acid are freely used. The men are only allowed below during meal hours and at night. The Master of the transport must obey the orders of the Transport Officer on board, the Transport Officer ashore, or of the Senior Naval Offi- cer present. Should there be no naval officer at hand, he must obey the orders of the military or other Government authority. Either the Master or the first officer must sleep on board. The crew must be exercised in lowering and getting boats out and in. In the log- book must be kept a complete record of all that relates to the troops or Government property on board. The log is inspected daily by the Transport Officer in charge. As in the Government service, the Master is liable to punishment for misconduct, the Senior Naval Officer at the first port touched having the power to suspend him from his duties. The Flag Officer of the station can, if necessary, remove him from his ship. For the Master's guidance a set of instructions is furnished him which defines his duties and responsibilities very minutely, especially in regard to the expenditure of the Government stores with which he is instructed. The rationing of the troops and animals embarked is his particular charge, and he always keeps or should keep on hand a sufficient amount of forage, provisions, bedding, &c. Heis subjected to a very rigid system of accounts, quarterly and other returns. By the terms of the charter- party the owners are pecuniarly responsible for any loss of or damage 172 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. to the Government stores arising out of incapacity or negligence on the part of the personnel of the transport. He is responsible for the general ^ood order and condition of the ship, although the troops keep clean the horse and troop decks, &c. The Master is therefore ordered to co-oiDerate to the full extent of his power with the military command- ing officer on board to secure this end. The precautions to be taken against fire are very clearly set forth in orders, and the Master held to a strict observance. These precautions are of the usual nature com- mon to all naval vessels. The crew of the transport and her boats are at all times available for the public service in any desired way. The men are not expected to work more than ten hours in this connection any day in port, nor to do exceptional duty on Sunday. If so exceptionally employed they re- ceive extra compensation according to a fixed scale as shown below. The landing of troops or stores is simple and effective. A petty officer is sent in charge with every lighter or boat load, and is provided with a list of the troops, animals, or stores contained therein. This list, called the "landing note" (see page 174), is signed by the master, and is handed by the petty officer in charge of the lighter to the Military Land- ing Officer. A stub copy is retained on board the transport. From these stubs a report is made the following day to the Transport Officer on shore. The appended form is not in the " Regulations for Her Ma- jesty's Transport," and the other following it is a new form substituted for the old one : Transport No. — 1882 ' ( -^pplicciiiov for extra pay to merchant seamen for working over time. Dates employed (Sun- days in red ink). No. Bank or rating. No. of hours. How employed. Amount. Bemarks. £ «. d. Approved for payment at the undermentioned rates. Officer in charge of working pa/rty. Captain E. JV., Prin. Tran. Oficer. Per day of 10 hours : (1) When employed on exceptional duties away from their own ships during working hours on week days Petty officers, 1«. Bd. per day ; others, 1*. per day. For every extra hour beyond 10 hours : (2) When employed on exceptional duties on working days beyond 10 hours, exclusive of meals either in their own ships or elsewhere.. Petty officers, 7d. per hour; others, 5d. per hour. Por every hour thus employed on Sundays : 3) When employed on exceptional duties on Sundays, whether in their own ships or on duties unconnected therewith Petty officers, lOd. per hour ; others, 7d. per hour. Admiralty letter AG No. 11, f||§, of 11th August, 1882. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 173 a el o •piBoq uo paSBioj jo 'pg^B •eSod •898102: si o •(89AIA1. ,ej9rp -X08 Saiaqijou) giBraajj • (8i9ipioe 3ni9q ^on) 9xbj^ III a,* ^ §11 EH •11 japttn ueipitqo •nenio^ •aaj^ a c3 a •iX agpan ugipxtqQ •namo m -U9H Second-class pas- sengers and their families. •QX jepun u9jpxiqo •ajyi'BM. -dn pnB 91 JO 'nemo m •8piBAvdnpnB9xjo 'naj^ mrrj DO rt '11 t. S 5i .~-2 EHCD 174 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. » [On the reverse side.] Nominal Hit of officers and their families. o r 2 o — 4< Landing Note — Transport No. [Number of lighter, — . Date, , 1882. Hour left ship or shore, — m. Hour cleared, — m. Name of petty officer in charge, .1 PASSENGERS OR HORSES. Regiment or department. Officers. Men. Horses. Office column not to be filled up on board. CARGO. Description. No. of packages. To -whom addressed. Office colamn not to be filled up on board. Maiter. The foregoing paragraphs give a general idea of the hired transport service. Like all organizations, however perfect in theory, it depends nltimately for its successful working upon the intelligence and vigor of those to whom its administration is intrusted. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 175 For the campaign in Egypt the entire local control of the transports "Was given to Captain Harry H, Rawson, E. N., with the title of "Prin- cipal Transport Officer." This officer had, four years previously, been in charge of the disembarkation of troops and stores at Cyprus, where his skill and executive ability won him commendation. Profiting by his experience, he matured his plans before leaving England, and had elab- orated them so thoroughly that, as far as he was concerned, it may be said that no point was neglected and no precairtion omitted which could facilitate the important duty that fell to his lot. Foreseeing the difficulty he might have to encounter if dependent on the naval vessels in port for assistance in the shape of men and boats, he succeeded in obtaining H. M. S. Thalia for the special needs of dis- embarkation. The commanding officer of this vessel, Captain J. W. Brackenbury, was, so to speak. Captain Eawson's second in command. He assumed the title and functions of " Disembarkation Office." The Thalia, 2,240 tons displacement and 1,600 indicated horse-power, technically known as an "armed trooper," is an old wooden corvette with a light spar deck added. On this deck are a few 64-pdrs., with Gatlings, lli^rordenfeldts, and 7-pdr. and 9-pdr. boat-guns. The main deck is usu- ally devoted to troops, of whom she can readily carry a few hundred. In this case she brought out no soldiers. She was given an abnormally large crew, 430 in number, particularly strong in mechanics of all sorts, and an extra supply of boats, one 37 foot steam-pinnace, two 25-foot steam -cutters, besides three pulling cutters and five gigs. She was subject to the immediate orders of the Principal Transport Officer. An electric light for night operations was placed on board of her. At Ismailia, where the greater part of the work was done. Captain Eawson established his office on board the hired transport Nevada (of the Williams and Guion Line), close to the Central Wharf, maintaining communication with the Thalia, the Central Wharf, and the Military Headquarters on shore by means of semaphore and flag signals. Every transport that came out from England brought horse-boats and "flats," so that as the troops arrived at Ismailia the means of land- ing them were always on hand in more than adequate quantity. In all> at this place, there were no less than 60 horse- boats, and flats, and 20 open lighters of various sizes and patterns. The lighters were gotten at Malta, Alexandria, Port Said, and elsewhere, and were collected at Ismailia. Fig. 57 represents a horse-boat. The bow may be either square or sharp. These boats could land ten animals, or Fia.sr. two field guns with their limbers. The cross-braces are hinged and pinned. The flap at the stern lowers to form a gang- plank, which is useful in lauding vehicles as well as animals. The "flats" are square-ended lighters decked over. 176 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. :piff.sa The pontoon-rafts carried by the Indian troopers (Jumna and class), to which reference has been alreadj^ made, were most useful at Ismailia :Fiff.s8. on account of their great capac- ity, each carrying as many as 35 horses at a time. Figs. 58 and 59 represent roughly these rafts as seen when put together. In the top of each pontoon are jogs for receiving four cross-pieces, which are lashed in place to ring-bolts. Upon the chesses or cross-pieces is laid a suitable platform. Each pontoon is of iron, 36 feet long and 5 feet in diameter. Powerful tugs, nine in number, five screw and four paddle, were bought or hired and sent to Lake Timsah. The largest was the Storm Cock, included in the list of hired transports. The lighters were handled mainly by working parties from the Thalia, who were busy day and night. As a rule, a steam-launch was placed between two lighters. The disembarkation of the troops, being conducted on both sides of the ship at once, was rapidly effected without confusiou. By putting the men directly on the large tugs, and using both gangways at once, a bat- talion of infantry could be landed in a very short time. The two Irish regiments, the Eoyal Irish and the Eoyal Irish Fusiliers, were landed at night, with their baggage, in two hours, and the Highland brigade, be- tween 3,000 and 4,000 strong, in three hours, but without baggage. When the articles to be landed were heavj?- and the tugs very busy, the lighters were placed alongside the transport, and, after receiving the freight, the Thalia's men in charge laid out lines, and, assisted by the soldiers, warped themselves ashore. The artillery was chiefly landed in this way on the beach, which is of shelving sand. The other naval vessels in port aided to some extent, mainly in furnishing steam cutters and launches. On board the Thalia the working gangs were detailed from "each part of the ship," so as to keep the men under the petty officers to whom they were accustomed. Although the labor was arduous and incessant, the men enjoyed excellent health throughout. This is attributed by Captain Brackenbury to his rule never to permit a party to begin work at any hour of the day or night without tirst having had at least a bis- cuit and a cup of hot cocoa. This beverage was ready in the galley at all times. As soon as the men returned to the shij) another ration was served out. To attend to the work ashore, a naval officer was kept at each pier, who worked in conjunction with the " Military Landing OfQcer." It may be remarked that wherever the army and navy came in contact during this campaign they pulled together with great harmony and effect. While this circumstance is largely due to the fact that the duties of each BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 177 are sharply and clearly defined, so that no doubt can exist as to tchere the province of the one begins and the other ends, the spirit of mutual accom- modation and good will which marked the relations of the two services was the ultimate cause of this satisfactory result. The task of landing at the base at Ismailia was accomplished rapidly, without a hitch of any sort, and without damage to a man or an animal. The conditions were most favorable — smooth water, norain, and an unva- rying breeze ; but to profit bj^ these favorable conditions, energy and fore- thought were indispensable. The speed and ease with which large bodies of men can be conveyed in these days of steam render possible to a great maritime power like England the landing of an army at a great distance from home in com- paratively little time. The attaeU is vastly more independent now than formerly, and can select its 'point of debarkation without regard to contrary winds and perverse currents. These considerations entail the necessity of efficient defense, no matter how remote the coast may be from powers that are to be dreaded, and are of especial value in connection with our own isolated but not unattackable position. The transports which brought the British troops from England to Egypt accomplished their journey, on the average, in a little more than one-third of the time consumed by Bonaparte's flotilla in 1798 in the pas- sage from Toulon to Alexandria, over a distance less than half as great. The details of the imperial transports are given in the accompanying table, together with the duty they performed. H. Mis. 29 12 178 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Details of the Name. Nyanza . . Osprey . . Caliibria Holland . Euipuaa . Viking .. Tower Hill Pelican Nevada City of New York. Grecian Caspian Prussian , Palmyra . Batavia.. Greece... Canadian . 18 Montreal 19 City of Paris. Orient Iberia Egyptian Monarcli Olympus Cit\ of Lincoln . .. Texas LudgateHill. "Whitley Franco . Italy Tagus Oxenholme Carthage]. Catalonia . Bolivar ... Tonnage. 1, 216 2,031 2,402 732 1,C86 2, 616 1,689 2, 355 2,286 2, 37t 1,718 1,940 1,382 1,628 3, 242 I, 869 2,160 1,993 3,440 2, 2, 552 1, 585 2,601 1,839 2 702 736 3, 238 2, 659 1,250 1,714 2,588 3,093 1,577 653 538 1,869! 200 1, 094 250 1, 290 3 l,3i^5 3, 42) 1 902 •>. 1,40,1 897 1,261 1,245 1 238 1, Oltl 1,089 762 925 1,067 1,036 1,148 1, 093 1,945 l,6J-9 1,364 830 584 978 1,460 403 1,043 1,510 658 951 2,424 1,748 487 221 520 847! 3"** 1.53 120 588 350 020 600 585i 270 a \2 20| 21 Ci 25 400 500 400 400 400 212 450 400 375 450 1,000 750 500 270 350 350 GOO 120 400 200 350 841 064! 400 Place or port at which to be dis- charged. 2[July 1 21 Uu it ed Kingdom, lljiily 21jLoiidon 27 •/,Tn\y 22:Unitcd Kingdom 34 yJulv 22 River Thami^s .. 14l 12i 'i.-JulV I'y.Uuitrd Kingdom. 25 28 z'julV 25 ... do 3 July 28 .- do 2 July 25;.... do 9i 2 38 2 16 42 15 a65 ), 25 6a9V July 24 July 24 July 25 July 24 July 25 July 24 July 24 July 25 July 25 July 24 July 24 July 23 July 24 July 25 Tulv 26 July 25 July 24 July 29 ■fuly 24 July 30 July 28 July 25 1 July 25 July 24 Juiy 28 do do ..do . do .. do ...do .. do ...do ...do .. do .. do ...do .. do ...do ...do ...do ... do Kiver Thames . United Kingdom. Liverpool Docks. Ucited Kingdom. .. do ....do ....do ....do Owners, line, or company. Pen. & Orient. Gen. St. Nav, Co. Xational Collins, London Thistle Hill.. Bird. Williams & Gnion. Inman Allen . do. do Cunard .. ...do ... National. Allen . do . Inman . Orient ... ..do ... Monarch Union.. Thistle Dominion . Hill River Thames National D.N. Shields. ....do Pen. & Orient. Pen. & Orient.. Cunard West Indian.. a At 14 knots; 6 at 11 J to 12 knots. BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 179 Imperial Transports. -Accommo- dation. Troops car- ried. tq o 220 II- 24U14 30 132. 8 176 14 i 2io: 7 I 6631 I 28617 J 1.53 6 15310 5,t29 242 18 7 6 270 13 6,36 Corps. Commissariat stores Port of em- barkation. 11050 55[45 266 If 107 314 219 Houseliold Cavalry London 252 239 do do Commissariat stores 213 1 17 18i]) Co. Royal Engineers | ]2tli Co. Commissariat &:London Tiausport. 178 173 N- A. Royal Horse Artil- Southampton . lei'y. 180 204 B('ar'er Company ; 1 field London hospital; 15ili Co. Com. , & Tians. (i77 58 2d Brigade staff;- 2d Batt. Liverpool York and Limcascer. Kingstown ... 391 286 Pai t of 4th Dragoon Southampton . Guards. 196 150 N. 2, Royal Artillery do 133 92 Signalers; detachment of London 8th Co. Coiimjissariat & Transport. 162 103 11th Co. (Commissariat & . . do Transport. 197 1.53 A. 1. Royal Artillery -. . . Portsmouth. . . 761 55|2dBatt.GreuadierGuards. Queenstown . 226 242 Part of 4th Dragoon Southampton Guards. 8th Company Royal Engi- London . neeis ; railway staff and material. 268 2 .squad ions 19th Hu.'isars Southampton 3 2d Ratt. Royal Irish and Portsmouth 100 men 2d Bearer Com pany. Staffs'lstDiv.&lstBrigade Scots Guards. 2d Batt. Coldstream Guards Date. Aug. 2 Aug. 1 293 152 100 Part of 7th Dragoon Guards. C. 3, Royal Artillery .. 12, Royal Artillery. ... London Kingstown London Aug. Aug. Aug. Auo Aua Aug Remarks. Aug. 13 Aug. 14 Aug. 9 Aug. 11 Aug. 12 Aug. July 31 Aug. Aug. 9 Aug. 10 Aug. 11 Aug. 18 Aug. 16 Aug. 17 ^..do Aug. 21 Aug. 20 Aug. 2-. Fitted as con deuser. 12 knots Twin screw. Aramunition reserve, 1. 1, R. A. G. Eoyal Horse Artillery 2d Battalion Highland Light Infantry ; staff 3d Brigade. Part of 7th Dragoon Guards. Ponton and Telegraph Troops and field park. 5 fiehl hospitals: staff" of Carthago as hospital ship. 1st Batt. West Kent, 4th Brigade .staff. 12th and 15th Companies, and part of I7th Company Commissariat & Trans- port ; 42 meh of 2d Bearer Company. Southampton London July 30 Aus. 1 Aug. 5 9 Aug. 25 Aug. 14 Aug. 12 Aug. 21 Aug. 23 Aug. 22 Aug. 21 Aug. lol 20 Portsmouth. Loudon Aug. Aug. Aug Aufl 12 Portsmouth . . Southampton . London > London Portsmouth Portsmouth Aug. Aug. Aug. 9 Aug. 10 Aug. 4 Aug. 11 Aug. 12 Charter extend- 21 d. I Aug. 17|Charter extend-, 22 ed 2 months, Aug. 22 23 Aug. 22| 24 Aug. 25 Aug. 21 Aug. 20 Aug. 18 Aug.'26 Aug. 21 Aug. 15 Aug. 25 ^ Four ladies as nurses. 180 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Details of the Imperial STame. 35' Ascalon 36 Assyrian Monarch Lusitania. Teviot.... Courland . Arab Capella ... Nepaul ... Marathon. 1,950 1, 2,425.1, 1, 349 438 2, 044 1, Duke of Argyll. 45 Irthington 46 British Prince - . 2,0371,078 3,114 47 Califomian . . 48 Storm Cock. . 49 Recovery — 50Notting"Hill 51 Lisbon. 52Ne6ra . 53 Ehosina 54 Nerissa 55 Manikins Tower. 56 North Britain 57 Lydian Monarch . Stalling Leechmere. Adjutant .. Amethyst . Dalbeattie . Osiris Libra . Kent . Thnrsby Persian Monarch Medway Tana Helen IsTewton . . . Tonnage. M 1, 988 1, 1,553 401 2, 351 362 3, 970 407;3, 832 708 2, 057 803^1, 240 126 3, 169 ...3,359 548 3, 536 I 850,2, 403 1,290 2,548 1,287 91 255 2,616 860 1,397 1,774 1,299 1,803 1,118 671 1,425 544 238 230 1,405 1,961 3,973 1,831 329 484 4,021 474 1, 334 770 2, 107 ■932 2, 706 I 701 2, 000 I 947 2,750 I 6111,729 2, 546 1, 370 3, 915 565 724 1,478 872 1, 224 557 666 300 500 550 250 130 500 450 600 300 200 350 250 250 150 600 120 300 250 260 300 175 500 25 16 2 Aug. 4 19 43 2 July 31 26 21 30 25 15 19 17 35 20 13 28 44 17 il 324' 889, 3961,120 797 2, 275' 1001 39 100 10 230..., 4851,357 110.. .. .il,395 120.. 6551,879 200.. 4771,0,34! 25oL 379 1, 045 176 497 71 2 2 Aug. 1 July 27 Aug. 4 July 31 Aug. 1 3|July 28 ....do ....do ...do Southampton United Kingdom ..do . do 2 July 30 2 July 31 i 3 July 31 2Julv 31 2 July 27 July 28 July 30 9 2 10 2 24 2 10' 2 10 1 16 2 27 2 11 2 7 1 Aug. 2 Aug. 3 June 16 June 16 June 16 June 21 Aug. 9 Aug. 7 Aug. 7 Aug. 11 Aug. 12 Aug. 12 Aug. 15 Place or port at which to be dis- charged. United Kingdom. ...do A. M'or wood, Loudon D. Carrie Union Star Pen. & Orient, Cunard United Kingdom or Bombay. United Kingdom ....do ...do ... do --do United Kingdom or Aden. Bombay, or Calcutta. Gibraltar Alexandria, Malta, Portsmouth or the Kiver Thames. Malta, Alexandria, or Port Said. Malta or United King dom Malta or Alexandria . . Malta United Kingdom . .do .do do .. do Malta Alexandria Aug. 15 United Kingdom. Aug. 16 Aug. 9 Malta or United King dom Gibraltar Owners, line, or company. Monarch. Orient. .. Ducal Princes . West Indian. HiU. Monarch Magdala . Ely Eice. ^Ko final period. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 181 Transports^-ContinueA . Accommo- dation. ( Troops sarried. Corps. Port of em- barkation. Date. Remarks. Sc o p g a a a 6 d 170 1300 1870 1250 [)100 1770 2 90 1780 2 200 4 320 2100 .350 . 200 W o 127 6 26818 55 29 ...11 ...12 6 32 90 36 55 31 14713 196 9 ... 2 153 13 50 6 a o e i . d ^ d ^^ .. 170 1281 1859 1285 9 91 1729 1 81 1772 1211 1 4 323 2 40 ..310 -.183 i w 125 263 54 3 •: 4' 65 55 54 187 150 37 a 1 t a 7. 18 39 20 131 33 35 30 13 14 1 23. 17 . J. 3, Eoyal Artillery 2 squadrons 19th Hussars 1st Batt. Shropshire Regi- ment. Ordnance stores and garri- son artillery (2 batt.). 2d and 7th C. & T. Cos. for Cyprus. 1st Batt. Roy. Irish Fusi- liers. Headquarter and artillery staiis. 1st Batt. Eoyal Highland- ers. J Bearer Company; 2 field hospitals ; horses of R. Irish Regiment. 24th Co. Roval Engineers; pai-t of 17th Co. C. & T. ; horsesof R. I. Fus. Ordnance-S tore Depart- ment. D. 1, Royal Artillery 26th Co. Royal Engineers . Portsmouth . . Southampton . . Kingstown Woolwich . Woolwich Southampton . . Liverpool London Portsmouth Southampton . . Woolwich Portsmouth Southampton . . Aug. 12 Aug. 10 Aug. 10 Aug. 15 Aug. 2 Aug. 8 Aug. 5 Aug. 8 Aug. 8 Aug. 8 Aug. 19 Aug. 8 Aug. 9 Aug. 25 Aug. 22 Aug. 21 Sept. 5 Cyprus Aug. 15 Aug. 19 Aug. 17 Aug. 20 Aug. 21 Aug. 21 Sept. 4 Aug. 19 Aug. 23 35 Charter renew- ed. 36 37 Stopped at Mal- ta 6 days. Hospital ship . . Charter renew- ed. 38 39 40 41 Charter extend- ed. 42 43 44 45 4R 47 Tug ...:.. 48 Salvage tug . . - 49 Mules from l^^atal (turned back at Aden). 50 51 52 1400 - 200 53 54 Conden sing ship. do 55 56 18 1300 268 16 i ;'5 3i6 268 Parts of 8th. 11th, and 12th Cos. C. & T. London Portsmouth Aug. 14 Aug. 16 Aug.27 I 57 58 ...j.. An 59 8 2 350 104 's '4 297 i 95 (3 off., 3 W. 0., 143 men & j 6 horses for Malta) ; mil- 1 itary police, &c. London Aug. 17 Aug. 30 611 "1 do 62 Railway material from Alexandria. J63 ! 64 do 65 do 66 67 1 68 1 69 i 1 70 i 71 j 1 1 72 j 73 i 1 182 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. It may be pointed out that the embarkation of troops was carried on simultaneously at Liverpool, London, Portsmouth, Woolwich, and South- ampton in Eughmd, and at Kingstown and Queenstown in Ireland. The first body of troops to sail from England in the hired transport fleet was the Scots Guards in the Orient, and the last of the fighting line, J bat- tery, 3rd brigade. Royal Artillery, followed two weeks later. The gross tonnage of the fleet was thus distributed : Troops, &c. Tonnage. Cavalry Artillery Infautr y Eoyal Engineers Ordnance-Store Department . Commissariat and Transport Array Huspital Corps Hospital ships Miscellaneous 30, 269 30, 736 38, 968 10, 252 3,971 31, 276 7,615 * Two were shared with the Commissariat and Transport Corps. t Shared with the Commissariat and Transport Corps. XV. THE ARMED TRAINS. ^ Two armed railway trains were employed during the late campaign in Egypt, one at Alexandria antl the other on the Ismailia and Tel-el- Kebir Line. Both were rigged and operated by seamen from the Brit- ish fleet. The former has been described by Lieutenant Barnes, of the TJ. S. S. Nipsio, in a report already made public. The accuracy of this report is sufBcient excuse for quoting it at length. Plates 71 and 72 give general views of the train. . U. S. S. Nipsrc (Third Rate), Alexandria, Egypt, September 8, 1882. Sir : I have tlie honor to report that I have visited aud examiued the armored train used by the English forces in their operations against the Egyptian insurgents under Arabi Pasha. I found Lieutenant Poor, R. N., of H. M. S. Inconstant, in charge, who kindly pointed oat and explained to me its details and the mode of oper- ation. Its components vaiy somewhat at different times, according tq the force it carries, hut may be regarded as consisting of six different parts, as follows: First. One or more vacant platform cars, intended to feel the way and give notice of any obstructions upon the track before they are reached by the more important parts of the train, or to take the shock of torpedoes. Second. A platform car carrying'one gun, a 40-pdr. Armstrong of old pattern, so arranged as to admit of training aV)out four points upon either side. It rests upon a solid platform of wood 4 inches thick, in which is fitted a i)ivot which holds the slide, and with a breeching hitched to a bolt on each side of the car checks the recoil. This BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 183 car is uiiarraored, except at the front end, where, inside the wooden end wall, is an iron plate i^g of an inch in thickness, iuclosmg on three sides a wooden box 3 feet in thickness, and as high as will permit the free working of the gnu, the box being filled with bags of sand and a few others hanging from the plates on the sides. At the rear end of the car is a wooden wall some 3 feet high, on which are hnng the implements for serving the gun. On the floor near by are carried a few rounds of ammunition. Third. The locomotive. This is protected on each side by three bars of railroad iron hung with wire partly covering the boiler, and an inch plate of iron about 2 feet by 4 covering the cylinder, the piston rod, and its connections. The caboose is pro- tected by iron plates f^^ of an inch in thickness, backed with bags»of sand. Although the most vital, this is the weakest part of the train. A large part of the boiler and considerable machinery are exposed, but can hardly be better protected, as the springs will hardly sustain any additional weight. Its armor is the heaviest, but it is not complete. I think lighter armor more completely shielding the locomotive would be preferable, for the train can hardly expect to withstand even the fire of field guns unless at long range, and the rest of the train is designed to be proof only against musketry. Fourth. A platform car protected on all sides by a movable wooden wall 2 inches thick, backed with iron plates .\ of an inch thick, and sand-bags, the sides of a height convenient for tiring over by men kneeling upon the lower tier of sand-bags . Around the walls hang a supply of intrenching tools, such as picks and shovels, and at one end lies a pile of a dozen stretchers. On each side outside is lashed a small spar, a handspike, and several looms of oars or similar small pieces of wood, with short pieces lashed across their ends. These are designed for carrying the gun in case of need. By lashing one of the spars on top of the gun and crossing the other pieces under it, the latter, with the short pieces at their ends, will permit fifty men to get a good hold without crowding. This car is intended, to carry a force armed with rifles. Fifth. A car similar to the one just described and protected in the same way, armed with a Gatling in front and a Nordenfeldt in rear, between which is carried a supply o f ammunition— 5,000 rounds for the former and 12,000 for the latter. This car also carries intrenching tools. Sixth. A platform car protected in the same way as the last two, carrying two 9- pdr. R. H., with a small supply of ammunition. They are intended principally for service ofl" the train, and heavy skids are carried for convenience in putting them off or taking them on the car. At times another car is carried protected like the rest, except that the rear wall is higher and has a port where a Gatling is mounted. A number of drag ropes are carried, so that in case of any accident disabling the locomotive the men may man them on the side away from the enemy and thus draw the train while retreating. One of the cars usually carries a tripod of small spars surmounted by a platform, forming a lookout elevated 20 feet above the train, which commands a good view of the country and makes it difficult for the enemy to conceal his men behind small irregularities of the ground. A second train closely follows the first as a suj)ply and relief train. The front end of its advance car carries a steam-derrick intended for use in clear- ing away wrecks. ' If a car of the fighting train should be demolished by the enemy's fire, or from any cause, the relief train would draw away the cars in rear of it to the nearest switch (and there is one near the point of operations), then return, and, with the derrick, dump the wreck clear of the track, after which it would draw away the rest of the train. This train carries tools and materials for repairing the track, or even laying a new one should it be cut or torn up in their rear; also gun-cotton, torpedoes, and an elec- 184 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. trie battery and wires for destroying by explosives whatever it maybe advisable thus to get out of the way. The most interesting and elaborate feature of the supply train is a magazine car — a platform car protected by wooden walls and iron plates like those in the fighting train. The magazine is in front and further protected by a solid wooden backing of 12 inches on all sides, except in rear, where it is open. Leaving a space high enough for a powder tank, it is covered with a half-inch iron plate, bars of railroad iron laid close together, and above all bags of sand. The rear half of the car is divided by pieces of plank laid across into compartments, in which are stowed shell, shrapnel, and canister for both 40-pdr. and the 9-pdrs. The ammunition is carried by hand from the magazine car to the fighting train, the men running along the railroad under the shelter of its embankment. The supply train also carries a few passenger cars, used as quarters for officers and men, and two box cars for their cooking and messing arrangements; but they are never taken beyond the junction, rear the English lines, at Ramleh. At present these trains pass the day at the freight depot in this city, but at 8 p. m. go out, pass the night reconnoitering between the English and Egyptian lines, and at 6 a. m. return to the city. For a time it was claimed that the armored train did excellent work, but I cannot learn that it was used except as auxiliary to reconnoitering parties. I do not regard it as of much military value, for its operations are limited to one track, and it can be easily avoided or successfully opposed by heavy guns mounted near the track. Arabi Pasha has adopted the latter means, and with his 7-inch rifles has made it dan- gerous for the train to approach nearer than 6,000 yards to his fortifications, which is about the distance of the English lines. The train is armored only sufficiently to withstand rifle fire, nor can it well be protected against the fire of any guns as heavy as it carries. As Arabi's guns are effective at 6,000 yards, and the heaviest in the train at not more than 3,500, it is obvious that at present it is of little use, but it is intended to increase its efficiency by mounting upon it a 9-inch rifle. It was at first intended to advance to the attack supported by a skirmish line, but that plan has been abandoned, and the force, origiually two hundred men, is now re- duced to fifty. Its first use was attended with considerable fighting, and it went through one prolonged engagement, but its operations are now limited to an occa- sional shot with its heaviest gun, which accomplishes little. The train has been manned and operated entirely by blue-jackets from the English fleet. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servaufc, N. H. BARNES, Lieutenant, JJnUed States Navy. To Commander H. B. Seely, U. S. N., Commanding U. S. S. Nipsic, The " 7-mcli rifles" spoken of iu the foregoiug were, iu reality, the 15*'™ Krupj) so frequently referred to in the paragraphs relating- to the operations about Alexandria. The first trip of the train took place on the of July 27. It was com- posed as shown in the fallowing diagram : Fig, 60. mrrOenf&ldt. \ t\ "" f . H o - Gaking 4{)j}ar. The Armed. T^aintm July £Fth . BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 185 So satisfactory were the results of the trip, aud so promising was this mode of warfare, that on the next day the train was made up on a larger scale, as shown below. Tn the gun-truck were rails and pot sleepers for repairing the line where necessary. P^h-T J O ■ I 1^ UlLJ I* I 1^ R r 5 1^ ^i-l-" ' .n, f^^ o T+T 5^ o iSllli ^ ft ^ 1^ KJ ^ I ^ ^ f ^ i^^ -J^ Even this extension seemed inadequate, and on August 4 the train was Ci mposed of no less than nine trucks besides the locomotive, and was arranged as seen in Fig. 62. 186 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The train as thus formed took part in the reconnaissance in force of that day, described on page 166. The cars in front of the steam-crane were pushed forward and un- coupled, the Jocomotive then backing down out of range, with the bal- ance of the train. General Alison bears witness to the excellent prac- tice of the 4()-pdrs. thus mounted on that occasion. The armed train, which had reached the unwieldy development of a movable citadel, was after this divided into two parts — a fighting line and a reserve, so to speak. The composition of these parts is shown in the accompanying diagram. The reserve train was to be kept out of range. In this shape the train did service during the remainder of the month of August. On Sep- tember 3 it was definitely devoted to outpost duty, as described by Lieu- tenant Barnes, the reserve train being left at Gabarri. The working train after this date was made up as shown in Fig. 64. (kmcparur The Armed Trcdn after Sepd.Sd. ^ The personnel was distributed as follows : Men. To the40-pdr 12 TotheGatling 4 To the Nordenfeldt .,., 4 To the Infantry Company 40 Total fighting men 60 This last development may be accepted as the result of five weeks, experience, and as indicating what those in charge thought the best composition for patrol and outpost work over a short line and from a fixed base. To put Lieutenant Barnes' verdict in another form, it may be fairly stated that the sphere of real usefulness of such an armed train lies without the limit of effective range of the enemy''s guns. For serious attack, therefore, it must monnt pieces of greater range than the enemy's, while it will rarely enjoy such freedom from mines and malicious tam- pering with the rails as characterized the operations at Alexandria. The detachment lived in- comparative luxury, being quartered in first- class railway carriages on the dock at Gabarri. The rations were sup- plied by the army commissariat. The health of officers and men was fair. At the outset the drinking water was taken from the same well as that which furnished the locomotive, but as its use was followed by attacks of diarrhoea and dysentery, recourse was had to distilled water. Each man had his blanket and a shift of cloth(,s, both blue and white. The arms were rities and cutlasses. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 187 The value of this train was impaired by the superior range and power of the Krupp gun which the Egyptians mounted, after a short while, in the King Osman lines. Its gunners succeeded in obtaining great accu- racy of i)ractice and in frequently placing its 84- pound shell in danger- ous proximity to the armed train. The 9-inch 12-ton M. L. R. which Lieutenant Barnes speaks of as about to be mounted on a railway truck and used against the Krupp just mentioned, was only ready for service the day after the battle of Tel- el-Kebir. A few experiments were made, first with 15 pounds of pow- der and no shot, then with 30 pounds of powder and a common shell weighing 230 pounds, and lastly with 50 pounds of powder and a 255- pound chilled shell. The truck was left free on the rails, the recoil of the gun being thus converted into retrograde motion of the truck. The results of these trials were considered to be satisfactory. It is, however, open to grave doubt whether so heavy a gun could be permanently or even frequently used on an ordinary line and on a car not specially con- structed to carry so great a weight and to resist so violent a shock. The other armed train employed in Egypt was prepared and manned from H. M. S. Penelope. Upon a four-wheeled open truck a platform was laid of 3 inch planks fore and aft. These planks were bolted through the floor of the truck. On the sides of the truck were placed half-inch steel plates, riveted to the angle-iron frame of the truck. These plates being 6 feet long by 3 wide, and standing on their edges, formed a low breastwork that was Fiq . 65'. BTeastwarTi] Fenelap^ TTcdn. fairly bullet-proof. The top edges of these plates were connected by small lap plates, 6 by 3 inches, bolted with half-inch bolts. Outside of all were awning stanchions bolted to the side of the truck- An awning was fitted to the cars, and from the ridge-rope wer^ sus- pended the belts of the gun's crew. Sand- bags were hung around the car outside of the steel plates. A breast-piece was built up at the front end of the truck, of timber 8 inches square, and was secured firmly to the bottom frame by five 2^-inch stay bolts, as seen in the ac- companying sketch, Fig. 66. Fi^, 66 . Breast -piece, Anned TraiTSs 188 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The magazine was built in an open box-car. Just within the wooden side of the car was stacked a tier of sand-bags, extending around the front and sides, (Figs. 67 and 68,) Inside the sand-bags were thin steel Magazine plates, held in place by long bolts passing between the bags and through the side of the car. The space inclosed within was divided by a transverse steel plate into two compartments, the forward one for shells, the rear for charges. The roof was of loose boards, on which were laid, first, |-inch iron plates, and then sand-bags. The en- trances to the magazine and shell room were open- ings in the roof. The provisions for the men were carried in the Tifft 68. MniMH SheUItaQm Magazine Plan of Anvnvtmitvan Car. Fenelffp^s Janned Trcan, gun truck, and the tents, three in number, were slung underneath. The detachment was composed of twenty-four men in all, equip5)ed with rifle and sword-bayonet and carrying 60 rounds of ammunition. A gunner's mate and an armorer were in the party. The 40-pdr. am- munition consisted of 230 rounds, mostly shrapnel. In action, the gun, having reached its position, was left alone, and the magazine truck run 50 or GO yards to the rear. The supj)ly of ammu- nition was maintained by hand. The first start of the armed train was made on August 26, when it was dragged from Ismailia to ISTefiche by sixteen horses, four abreast. A few days later it returned to Ismailia for certain repairs and im- provements. On September 1 it went to Kassassin. The part it took in the action of Se})tember 9 is described in a verbal account by Sub Lieutenant Erskine, E. N., upon whom the command devolved after the wounding of Lieutenant Purvis, When the infantry was called out under arras, trains were clearly seen coming up from Tel-el-Kebir to within 5,000 yards, where they dis- charged their cargoes of troops and retired. The 40-pdr. opened on the artillery posted on the enemy's right, engaging at about 4,000 yards, but not firing often for fear of infiicting damage on the British infantry in front throiigh the atrippitig of the shell, a not infrequent ocourrenoe. The Egyptian fire was very hot, their shell falliug all about the camp and among the troops. Early in the engagement. Lieutenant Purvis was wounded, losing his left foot. The enemy's advance being checked and his retirement begun, the 40-pdr. was pushed forward by hand to keep within range. Parts of the train were hit several times. One shell burst under a truck which had been placed in front of the gun to explode any mine which might have been laid under the rails, and a second burst near the magazine. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 189 !No real damage was sustained. Having succeeded in securing a pair of horses, Sub-Lieutenant Erskine chased the Egyptians upward of two miles. The 40 pdr. expended about 40 rounds in all, and did good execution. The moral effect of its comparatively large projectiles was, perhaps, of even more influence than its practice. The lack of an engine prevented easy change of position, and the fire was embarrassed by the presence of another gun, the captured 8"™ Krupp, worked by the Royal Marine Artillery, immediately ahead of it on the rails. This was the only engagement in which the Ismailia armed train took part. It shared in the advance on Tel-el-Kebir, where it was not fired. It went on to Zagazig, Benha, and to Tantah, when that town surren- dered to General Alison and the Highlanders. It finally returned to Ismailia for re-embarkation on September 23. At no time during the four weeks spent on shore was the detachment without ample supplies of all kinds. Its sanitary condition was excellent. The men were always in good spirits and looked upon the unusual service which they were called upon to perform as partaking of the nature of a picnic. They expressed themselves to the writer as anxious to pro- long their stay with the army. They had managed to make themselves very comfortable in their train, and even to provide themselves with certain luxuries occasionally. Their cheerfulness and well-being were but another example of the general rule of the war — everywhere the seamen ©iterating on shore were well sheltered, well fed, and glad to re- main on duty with the laud forces. The value of a gun permanently mounted on a railway carriage de- pends mainly upon its size. On the one hand, it must be heavier than the ordinary field piece to justify the sacrifice of mobility entailed, and, on the other hand, a limit to its weight is reached when it becomes impos- sible to give the gun the maximum train its mounting permits with- out incurring an imprudent risk. It is doubtful whether guns weighing more than four or five tons can be advantageously employed in this manner. It finds its most favorable use in defending a long stretch of straight road, near or along which the enemy must advance, attacking with infantry and field pieces. These conditions were fulfilled at Kassassiu, where the armed train did its best work. Against a fianlc attach such a gun is poiverless, and hence is not adapted to independent operations on any scale. 190 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. XVI. THE BOAT TRANSPORT IN THE SWEET WATER CANAL. The selection of the line of the railway from Ismailia to Zagazig along the Fresh Water Caual for the advance, secured to the British expedi- tionary force in Egypt the additional advantage of water transport be- tween the base and the front. The importance of this particular trans- portation is shown by the fact that it was the first established. On of August 21, the day after the seizure of Ismailia, Major-Gen- eral Graham was at Nefiohe with the advance. To retain possession of the railway junction and canal lock at that x)oiut was a military ne- cessity, unless the campaign was to be conducted on the defensive. Graham had to be supi)orted both by reinforcements and material. To get the latter to him was no easy matter, for the railway was broken down and wheeled transport absolutely useless. There remained only the Sweet Water Canal as an available channel. Admiral Seymour, who had come around from Alexandria in the Helicon to Lake Timsah, when addressed on the subject, at once, as was to have been expected, put the thing on a permanent footing. The service was inaugurated that afternoon, when two steam-pinnaces and two cutters, irom H. M. S. Orion, entered the canal through the locks of Ismailia (Plate 48) and took provisions to N^efiche. Eeturn- iug at once to Ismailia, their trips were then continued day and night, as rapidly as possible, for the next seventy-two hours, following up the army in its march to Magfar. Here was encountered an obstacle of the most serious nature, a dam across the canal, which effectually stopped for the moment all further progress by boat to the westward. It had been constructed with the hope of cutting off this practically sole sup- ply of water from the attacking force. There were distillers on board all the steamers in the harbor, which could be employed as a last resource, but to burden the fei^ble transport service with the maintenance of the water ration would have insured perhaps not the failure, but at least the inordinate prolonging of the campaign. The dam at El Magfar gave immense trouble, for it was skillfully built of crossed layers of rushes packed in with mud. It is but scant justice to say of the Egyptians that if they thoroughly understand con- struction in any material, that material is mud. Vain efforts were made to blow it up. It had finally to be picked to pieces and removed by handfuls. Even when destroyed as a dam, parts of it still remained as a bar and gave much subsequent trouble. The boat transport hod developed into a definite service under Com- mander A. W. Moore, R. ^., the second in command of the Orion. As assistants he had one lieutenant at Ismailia, and a second at the front, wherever that might chance to be. A naval engineer was stationed at BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGPPT. 191 each end of the route to insj)ect the machinery of all boats propelled bj^ steam, and at Ismailia a small repair shop was established, with a working- equipment of tools, material, and artificers. In addition to the boats' crews, Commander Moore had a working party of 30 men from the Orion and Penelope, divided between the sta- tions as finally fixed at Kassassin, Tel-el Mahata, El Magfar, and Isma- ilia, at ench of which tents were pitched and a camp routine initiated. These tents were drawn from the army, were six in all, four Bell and two Indian. The boats employed varied in number, size, and kind. The water in the canal grew steadily shallower, the supply above being' shut off by tbe Egyi)tians, who were able to control its flow past t!ie lock at Abou Hamed beyond Telel-Kebir, the leakage into the British lines tlirough the dams at Tel-el-Kebir not being- sufficient to rei)]ace tbe loss by leakage into Lake Timsah, by actual consumption, and by evaporation. Nothing could have been better than a canal transport service if at all permanent or certain, but the decreasing depth of water caused the service to change from day to day, as the heavier boats were gradually withdrawn. The original force was augmented, on Augiist 25 and afterwards, by the purchase of twelve native boats of different sizes. Their capacities ranged from 3 to 10 tons. The rough sketch, Fig. 69, will suffice to give an idea of their general build and appearance. They were deficient in thwart-ship bracing, and would open out when heavily laden. The larger ones could not be loaded to their full capacity on account of lack of water. 192 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Six horse-boats belonging to the naval transport service, and all the steam-launches which the fleet could spare, were also admitted into the canal. The latter boats comprised six steam-pinnaces, each from 35 to 37 feet long, and a 42-foot j^icket-boat from the Alexandra, which, how- ever, drew toe much water to be of any use. These were employed to tow the other boats, lighters, &c., and were in charge of sub-lieutenants or other junior officers. The larger steamers drew 39 inches of water and the smaller 33. Com- mander Moore asked for a minimum depth of 42 inches throughout, after the lock at Kassassin had passed into the possession of the advance. The reach of the canal above this lock was tolerably well filled to the depth of 5 feet 6 inches. It was not, however, deemed prudent to draw upon this supply of water, so greatly needed at the front, by allowing enough of it to flow into the Kassassin-Ismailia reach to secure the depth Commander Moore desired. The first two steam-pinnaces had been thoroughly equipped for contin- gent action with the enemy, one carrying a Nordenfeldt, with its mus- ketry shield, the other a Catling gun, The subsequent necessity of re- ducing the draught as much as possible caused Commander Moore to remove this armament, as well as such other weights as could be dis- pensed with from all the boats in his little fleet. The crews were composed of one coxswain, two seamen, two leading stokers or artificers, and two stokers. The coxswain was armed with a revolver, the rest with rifles. Each man (tarried 60 rounds of ammuni- tion. The kits consisted of one spare suit of blue, a blanket, a water- bottle, haversack, and the usnal pot, pannikin, &c. There were many drawbacks and hitcbes, owing for the most pj,rt to insufficient water in the canal, but no serious injury or avoidable inter- ruption of the traffic. Among the petty sources of inconvenience and discomfort was the frequent fouling of the screws by clothing and other articles which had been thrown into the canal. Near Mahsameh the bed of the canal seemed to be quite covered with rush bags, doubtless used for conveying earth and sand in the construction of trenches, dams, &c. It was no unsual experience to have the screws fouled by these baskets as often as a dozen times In a mile. Again, the shallowness of the water prevented the attainment of satisfactory speed, while the floe mud it contained clogged np the boilers and gave great trouble. A special advantage enjoyed by the men engaged in this service was the catching of fish, particularly an excellent species of mullet, from 5 to C pounds in weight, which abounds in the Sweet Water Canal. Large numbers of these mullet jumped into the boats while under way, being frightened by the noise of the screw. It was rarely that a trip was made without a catch and its welcome addition to the ration. The night work between the army posts was conducted wi'h extreme caution, as the Bedouins might easily have made a raid upon a tow while outside of the defended points of the canal, and have inflicted BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 193 severe damage. In this respect the newer type of boats was preferable, being comparatively noiseless, while the older made a noise which could be heard miles away.* Commander Moore established a species of headquarters at El Magfar, where he kept a full stock of rations for his men. Three days' supplies were drawn at a time from the Orion and taken for issue to this place. The crews of these boats, with but few exceptions, were unchanged throughout the operations, yet this work was severe in the extreme, while life was rendered almost intolerable by the swarms of flies during the day and the mosquitoes at night. To do justice to these pests re- quires a fund of objurgation not at tlie command of the average mortal. Of the men sent back to the shi}) all were on account of sickness, four of tbe number being disabled by mosquito bites. Each boat carried a light in the bow, which was effectually screened from observation from the land by the high canal banks on either hand. Until September 2 the larger boats did the towing up to El Magfar, the smaller ones beyond. Practically the actual towing never extended past Tel-el-Mahuta, on account of the lack of water in the upper part of the reach. From Tel-el-Mahuta to Kassassin the lighters and cargo boats were hauled by mules or horses. It was on this section that Commander Moore's service was supple- mented by the Royal Engineers with their pontoons and special rafts, freight being shifted to them at Tel-el-Mahuta when necessary. A second dam was found at Tel el-Mahuta, larger but less carefully constructed than that at El Magfar. The continued lowering of water m the canal rendered useless the heavy native boats and the lighters, the former requiring 3 feet of water to carry a paying load. It had now come to a point when every inch lost was of vast importance. As a substitute for the heavier craft, Commander Moore obtained eight ship's pulling-boats belonging to the hired transports in Lake Timsah. Being of lighter draught and carry- ing small loads, these boats were handier than the lighters and more easily gotten afloat after grounding. Their employment began on Sep- tember 5. By exercising great care they could be worked to within a raile of the cavalry camp near Kassassin. Between Ismailia and Kassassin the water shoals 3 feet and 4 inches. Thus, on August 28 there was a depth of 5 feet 2 inches at the former, and on September 2 but 4 feet 8 inches, with corresponding depths of 1 foot 10 inches and 1 foot 6 inches at the latter place. The average depth between Kassassin and Tel-el-Mahuta was 2 feet 4 inches, and below Tel-el-Mahuta 3 feet 4 inches. This loss of 6 inches threw out the heavier boats, as before mentioned, and materially reduced the traflac. Before then from 60 to 70 tons of supplies went daily by the canal, and the boats in returning brought back sick and wounded, for whom this mode of transit was especially desirable. * The old engines were similar to those used in our service. H. Mis. 29 13 194 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. By September 6 there liad been sent by the canal from Ismailia to Tel-el-Mahuta 550 tons of provisions. The boat service then stood as follows : Steam launch and pinnace of the Orient ; steam-pinnaces of the Orion, Falcon, Carysfort, Thalia, and Euphrates. Three large boats were thrown out of use by the lack of water. With this diminished fleet, aided by the pontoons of the Royal Engi. neers, the work was urged ahead, in the feeling that the more done the quicker ended. The result reached may be gauged by the fact of the delivery at Kassassin of 48 tons of stores on September 7 and 45 tons on September 8 — a great falling off from the original 60 to 70 tons daily, but still yielding an addition of supplies to the reserve depot well worth the trouble and vexation incurred. In this way the canal service was maintained, the army co- operating with the navy until the march on Tel-el-Kebir. On September 10 Commander Moore began to prepare some of his boats for the special transportation of the wounded from the field of the impending battle. Water transport for men suffering either from painful wounds or diseases involving local inflammations or ulcerated tissues is far pref- erable, there being no noise or jolting ; on the contrary, steady, abso- lute motion, with relative rest. It was presumed that the losses in the next encounter with the Egyptians would be heavy, and it was deter- mined that there should be no ground for complaint as to the treatment of the wounded in particular or any branch of the army medical depart- ment in general. In consequence the arrangements were on a liberal scale and the details carefully worked out. The boats selected for the purpose were two horse and seven ship's boats, ordinary clinker-built cutters, belonging to the hired-transport fleet. These were taken' through the lock at Kassassin into the upper reach of the canal, where they were fitted. Pine boards 1 inch thick- and 12 inches wide were laid fore and aft upon the thwarts, to form an even platform the whole length of the boat. Upon this platform a thick bedding of loose hay was spread. Awnings were rigged and awning curtains were gotten up. Each boat was provided with two breakers of water and tin cups, and had a blue-jacket to steer it. A nurse was detailed for the care of the wounded. On September 13 the boats were divided into four sections, three of two boats each and one of three boats, each section being an independent tow, with a naval lieutenant in charge of every two sections. The tracking was done by sixteen mules, accomjianied by the necessary drivers. The boats followed in rear of the Indian Contingent, laden with the appliances for the establishment of field stations for the tem- porary dressing of wounds. The latter were located on the canal bank near the Egyptian intrenchments. The work began at 9 a. m. From the dressing stations the wounded were put into the boats. As soon as a section was filled it was sent off to Kassassin, to deliver the patients BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 195 to the general field hospital. These disposed of, the section would re- turn as rajjidly as possible to Tel-el-Kebir for another load. At first it might appear that nine boats were insufficient for the work, but it must be remembered that each case had to be examined and the wound bound before the sufferer could be safely transported over even so slight a distance as that which intervened between Tel-el-Kebir and Kassassin. Owing to this circumstance, and to Commander Moore's organization and suijerintendence, the provision proved ample. Deputy Surgeon -General Marston, who had charge of the work at the dressing- station, states that " the transport down the canal was excellent." The lightest cases were, as a rule, most quickly disposed of, the more serious needing longer time and greater attention ; and in the first trips of the boats the majority of the wounded conveyed were but slightly hurt. The two horse-boats alone took down no less than fifty seven. After this the number in each boat was decreased to about nine severe and six mild cases. Two trips were made by each section during the day of the battle at Tel-el-Kebir. Commander Moore says that upwards of 200 men were brought down to Kassassin. The last embarked at 9 p. m., twelve hours after the beginning of the work. The embarking and landing of these sufferers was very distressing, the steep muddy banks of the canal rendering the operation most painful in spite of every care. The military events of this day, resulting in the completion of the campaign and the distribution of the British troops over new lines, ren- dered the breaking up of all stations in the desert possible and desira- ble. The emptying of the field hospital at Kassassin was therefore im- mediately begun. During the two days following. Commander Moore's fleet was employed in removing the wouncPled from Kassassin. The seri- ous cases, for whom water transport was so essential, were all moved in this way. The boats were passed through the Ismailia locks into Lake Timsah and taken alongside the hospital ship Carthage without change. Twenty-six cases on September 14 and twenty on the loth profited by this comfortable mode of conveyance. The water had not yet come down from above to raise the level in the canal. There were still but 14 inches at Kassassin. To obtain a start at this point, when everything was in readiness, the lock-gates were slightly opened, giving a rush of the water into the lower reach, which carried the boats into deeper water, where the animals could tow them to Mahuta. At Mahuta the steam-launches were in waiting to take them to Ismailia. This sad labor completed, the canal service, no longer embarrassed by deficiency of water, was continued for the purpose of aiding in clear- ing out the stations between Ismailia and Tel-el-Kebir, the two points at which the stores hitherto spread over the line across the desert were now being collected. This object was accomplished on September 22, when the men and boats were returned to their respective ships. 196 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAEY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The Sweet Water Canal service commanded the sympathy of those who were in a iDOsition to watch its hard and successful struggle against disheartening circumstances. It received the commendation of those in authority for having achieved all that was humanly possible at a time when comparatively small aoMevements were of great value. XVII. THE NAVAL BRIGADE AT TEL-EL-EEBIB. The equip^nenf of men landed from British ships of tear for military operations is not a matter of individual taste or caprice, hut is uniform and efficient. As a consequence it is possible to assemhle squads, compa- nies, or guns^ crews from a number of vessels, meeting for even the first time, into a homogeneous military organization which is not open to criti- cism as a laughable combination of heterogeneous elements. The dress is always understood to be blue, unless otherwise directed. The white cap-cover is fitted behind, in warm climates, with a havelock or cape, falling upon the shoulders and extending to the temple on each side. The men themselves prefer the straw hat, as lighter and cooler and affording shade to the eyes. In Egypt, after the occupation of Alex- andria, this was the head dress habitually worn. To carry^ his kit each man uses his blanket, which is made into a long roll of uniform pattern, containing shifts of clothes (as ordered), soap, towel, &c., and is carried with the bight over the left shoulder, the ends meeting under the right arm. The leggins areprovided by Government. They are represented in Figs. 70, 71, and 72. They are of stout tanned Tiff, r 2. canvas, bound with leather, and are strong and serviceable. The shaded parts are of leather. The holes for the loops are guarded by brass eyelets. The loops slip each over the one next above, the topmost being passed over the retaining strap, which is buckled. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 197~ The belt is of uncolored leather, and well designed for work. The workmanship is an honest specimen of the saddler's art. The metal parts are of brass. It may be best described as a waist-belt supported by straps which go over the shoulder and cross behind. Figs. 73 and 74 give front and rear views of the belt in use. It appears at first J^. 73. ng.74. sight to have an enormous number of buckles, but these serve the pur- pose of adjustment in all directions, so taht when once fitted the man may wear it with great comfort. The S hook in front permits ready unclasping. When even momentarily halted, the wearer may relieve the strain on the waist, the entire weight then swinging clear of the side by the shoulder-straps. On the latter, in front, are two studs to which the haversack may be attached, while behind they button to- gether at the cross. The ball-pouch is of soft black leather, carried behind. Fig. 74. Other stiff cartridge-boxes, similar to those in our own service, are strung on the belt as needed. The bayonet-frog is on the left side, as usual. Its only peculiarity is a short strap by which the bayonet may be hucMed jf^^rs. in,* The haversack. Fig. 75, is a simple flax canvas bag with a canvas strap to go over the shoulder. Two loops are stitched to the strap near the haversack. When worn by riflemen this is carried at the back, the loops passing over the shoulders and buttoning to the studs already mentioned on the supports of the waist- belt. If worn by a cutlassman, the haversack is un- der the left arm. The water-bottle is a small coopered barrel, shown in Figs. 77, 78, and 79. It is of Italian manufacture, supplied by Guglielminetti Brothers, Turin, and is carried by both branches of the military service. In the navy, riflemen carry it on the belt and cutlassmen under the right arm. The latest * This ari'angemeiit would hardly cost as much as the bayonets we lose annnally overboard in manuina; boats. 198 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. ^'tl pattern is covered with gray felt. Its capacity is one quart. It is stout, withstands rough usage, and is cheap, but it is heavy in com- parison with the water it contains. The bands and stopper are of gal- vanized iron. The top view, Fig. 78, gives the shape of the section. The stopper is only removed for filling, the drinking-hole being in it and closed by a wooden plug. The sling is of soft brown leather, as shown in Fig. 77. The weight of a rifleman's equipment in full marching order is as follows : Lbs. oz. Martini-Henry rifle 9 q Bayonet 2 8 Haversack, with 2 days' rations 4 g Water-bottle 2 8 Belt, 3 cartridge-pouches, and bayonet-frog 6 120 rounds of ammunition ." 13 Blanket and kit from 3 pounds upwards, say as a maximum 7 8 (Maximum) total __ 45 It was decided to send a ITaval Light Battery of six Gatliug guns to aid in the assault on Tel-el-Kebir. The organization and command were intrusted to Captain Fitz Roy, R. N., of H. M. S. Orion, the same officer who had occupied Ismailia. Commander Kane, of the Alexandra, was second in command. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 199 200 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAEY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. On September 8 two Gatling-gun limbers were taken ashore at Ismailia and fitted for mule draught. It may be remarked here that ji'Lff.81. the howitzers and machine guns in the Brit- ish navy which are sent on board ship for contingent use on shore are all provided with limbers. Fig. 80 is a view of the Gatling gun and its limber as ordinarily furnished, while Fig. 81 shows how single-trees, &c., were adapted to the ones in question to enable four mules to be hitched to each gun. Arrangements were made for the neces- sary animals and the transport for the bat' tery. On Septem^)er 9 the Humber arrived in Lake Timsah with four more Gatlings and their crews, drawn from the Mediterranean fleet. The following table gives the compositi( n of the battery ; each ship sent its own Gatling : Ships. Alexandra . Carysfort . . Monarch .. Orion Superb Temeraire . Officer conlmanding. Lieut. J . E. Bloxland. Lieut. G. C. Langley Lieut. W. C. Keid Lieut. G. King-Harman. Lieut. T. G. Eraser Lieut. J. Gibbings Total Other officers. 1 surgeon, 1 midship- man. 1 sub-lieutenant 1 sub-lieutenant 1 sub-iieutenant Tents.* Men. Offi- cers. *Al80 1 hospital tent and 1 tent for headquarters ; total, 28. The actual crews were each of 24 men. The remainder were stretcher- men, mule and baggage guards, &c., usually four of the former and two of the latter. In the Orion's detachment were four men as a body-guard to Captain Fitz Eoy, his servant, a gunner's mate, and a signal man. The Carysfort's additional men were artificers. Fourteen of the men in the gun's crew were armed with rifles, the rest of each detachment with cutlasses and revolvers. The small-arm men carried 90 rounds of ammunition, the others 36 rounds. Each man carried his own tin pot and speon. A mess-kettle was sent for every ten men, and one of the crew detailed as cook. To each gun were attached two mule-drivers from the army Commissariat and Transport Corps. The mules were 54 in number, distributed thus : 4 gun-mules to each Gatling 24 3 spare-ammunition mules for each gun 18 2 pack-mules to carry officers' luggage, mess-kettles, &c., to each gun 12 Total 54 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 201 In addition to these pack and draught animals were three horses, one for the commanding officer, one for Commander Kane, and one for the adjutant. The guns and men were landed at 6.15 a. m. on September 10 at Is- mailia. Proceeding to the railway station, they were conveyed by train to Kassassin, arriving at 6 p. m. Here the tents, mules, &c., which had been supplied by the army were in readiness. Camp was at once pitched between the railway and the canal, according to the plan in the accompanying diagram, Fig. 82. JFiff. Sff. EUchen Officer's Tents * « (. s« %> ^ 1 s ^ I ^ ^ JSbspitdl 'ead Quarter's Jj atrin es L atfin es Plan of encampment of naval iattery at Kassassin. The latrines were simple trenches 12 feet long and 3 feet deep, 3 feet wide at the toji and 18 inches wide at the bottom — Fig 76 a and 6, 202 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. For the ofiScers the more elaborate accommodatioD was supplied which is sketched in Fig. 76 c. Into these latrines loose earth and sand were shoveled twice a day by men detailed for the purpose. 'Fiff.7'6. 1^.76c. * • — _3^' ^ The guns' crews took turns in forming guard and in doing fatigue duty, one crew being told off every day for each of these tasks. They were thus, so to speak, in three watches. The following routine was established: ROUTINE OF THE NAVAL BATTERY. 3.30 a. m. Cooks called by the camp-sentry ; fires lighted. 4.30 a. m. Reveille by bugle. 4.45 a.m. Bugle-call "cooks. " 5.00 a. m. Breakfast. 5.45 a. m. Latrine party fall in. 7.30 a. m. Relief guard ; fall in fatigue party ; old guard wash and clean up. 8.00 a. m. Clean arms and guns. 8.30 a. m. Dress bugle; clean up camp ; trice up tent curtains ; put on belts. 9.00 a. m. Bugle-call "advance"; parade; crews fall in in front of guns; arms are inspected ; prayers ; dismiss. 11.45 a. m. Bugle-call " cooks." 12.00 m. Dinner. 3.15 p. m. Fatigue party to draw provisions. 5.00 p. m. Supper; shift into night clothing. 6.00 p. m. Evening parade ; exercise as mule artillery. 6.30 p.m. Latrine party fall in. • , 7.00 p. m. Bugle-call "grog." 8.15 p.m. First bugle, 8.30 p. m. Second bugle ; out all lights in camp. A packing-drill was improvised, as shown in the next paragraph : Gun mim'bers. Duty. 1 to 5 6 to 8 Prepare the limbers. 9 to 14 15 Provide and pack three picketing-poles. Provide and pack one picketing-pole. Provide an 8-gallon breaker of water and lash it in rear of limber. Pack sand-bags on top of limber. 16 17,18 24 Stretchermen provide their stretchers and then assist generally in packing the mules. On September 11 the battery was inspected by Major-Geueral Mac- pherson, the commander of the Indian Contingent, who expressed him- self as much pleased with the good order of the camp and the condition of the battery and men. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYYT. 203 On September 12 camp was struck at 6.30 p. m., and all preparations made for the march. Four men were detailed to look out for the tents and baggage that were to be left behind at Kassassin. Two days' rations were carried in the haversacks, and 90 rounds of small-arm ammunition in the pouches. Everything not essential to actual fighting was discarded. On the 13th, at 1.30 a. m., the battery limbered up and formed on the canal bank in column of sections. At 2 a. m. it started towards Telel- Kebir. The Egyptians opened fire at 4.55 a. m. with shell all along the line, followed by heavy musketry fire on the right of the battery. The rear Gatlings were deployed and a brisk fire begun at once ; first, on some Egyptian cavalry who were in front of the works, and then on the intreuchments themselves. On reaching the lines they were found de- serted ; the enemy had fled. The Gatlings' crews suffered no losses, being, in fact, little exposed, except to shell-fire, which was ordinarily in this campaign comparatively harmless. The enemy seemed to have concentrated his guns on certain predetermined points on the line of the advance, for in places the shells fell thick and fast. By exercising a little care in avoiding these zones of danger much loss was spared. The jS^aval Battery spent the day at Tel-el-Kebir bringing in the wounded and burying the dead. Late in the afternoon it started for Zagazig, bivouacking on the road. On the 17th it returned by rail to Ismailia, where it re-embarked. The commissariat was particularly well cared for. It must be borne in mind that when the battery joined the army this branch of the serv- ice had assumed such a development as to enable Captain Fitz Eoy to draw upon it for supplies. A change was made in the hour for serving out grog, habitual on board ship. The earlier parties had adhered to the naval practice, and had received their tot at noon. The men under Captain Fitz Roy drew it after supper, when the work of the day was entirely completed. The wisdom of this arrangement was evident in the increased enjoyment it yielded the men, as well as in a marked improvement in the afternoon's work. The health of the battery during their short term of service on shore was excellent. But one serious case of illness occurred. On the march only three men were obliged to fall oat. The wheels of the Gatling carriage and limber were too small and the tread too narrow for efficient use in such a sandy country. In many places the entire gun's crew had to assist the draught mules. The organization and the morale of the battery were more than satis- factory. Its work at Tel-el-Kebir was of little real importance, as its attack followed after that of the Highlanders at a sufficiently great in- terval to allow it to profit by the general demoralization of the defense. 1^0 doubt can be entertained that it would have rendered a good account of itself had the defense been more stubborn. 204 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. XVIII. tre marine battalions. 1. The Eoyal Marine Light Infantry. Several reasons combined to attract special attention to this body of men, the largest siugle battalion in the expeditionary force. They were " long-service" men ; they were neither of the army entirely nor yet were they sailors. Their record during the campaign was not only irreproach- able but in every way honorable, and it was known that a royal duke had asked to have them placed under his command with the Guards bri- gade. Their connection with the naval branch of the service is suffi- cient warrant for the separate mention they receive in this report. The minimum stature of recruits is 5 feet 6^ inches, and the term of enlistment twelve years. At the expiration of this period, the marine, if a desirable person, is offered the. opportunity of re-engaging for nine years more. In the majority of instances this opportunity is accepted, the full length of twenty-one years completed, and the good-service pen sion secured. The men who served in Egypt averaged between eight and nine years' service and twenty-seven years of age. The battalion was composed, at the outset, of five companies, taken from the principal barracks in England. Portsmouth and Chatham each furnished 150 privates, and Plymouth 250. These men were not formed into a battalion at home, but were hastly collected on board H. M. transport Orontes, which took on board the first two detachments at Portsmouth on June 27, and sailed at once for Plymouth, where she stopped two hours to receive the remainder. She then went %o Gibraltar. The command of the battalion (now about 600 of all ranks) was given to Lieutenant-Colonel Ley. The haste which characteiized the setting out, therefore, was in unison with the necessities of the case. It is greatly to be regretted that its subsequent movements were so much more deliberate, and that it was not on hand to seize Alexandria the day following the bombardment. At Gibraltar the battalion was shifted into another transport, the Tamar, for the passage to Malta, where it arrived on July 6. It was not even yet too late to reach Alexandria in time, and prudence would, it seems, have dictated their presence there, if merely as a i>recau- tionary measure. Several days were lost in waiting at Malta. The Tamar then started under easy steam, not exceeding 6 knots' speed, with orders to join the Channel squadron at Limasol, in the island of Cyprus. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 205 On reaching her destination, the Taraar found pressing orders to come at once to Alexandria, where she arrived at 2 a. m. of July 7. At day- light she went alongside the mole in the inner harbor, and after noon the marines were disembarked. The latter marched on immediately to Gabarri (see Plate 1), broke open some warehouses, in which the men were billeted, and, without delay, began the guarding of that portion of the city where the existing defenses were weakest. The combined marine battalions, the Royal Marine Light Infantry and the Royal Marine Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tuson, of the latter corps, took a prominent and honorable part in the reconnaissance in force of August 5, described on page 93 et seq.^ their behavior receiv- ing official praise. A second detachment of four companies came out in the Dacca, which touched at Alexandria on August 8, landing Lieutenant-Colonel Howard S. Jones, who relieved Lieutenant-Colonel Ley, invalided. The Dacca then kept on to Port Said, the detachment, under the command of Lieutenant- Colonel S. J. Graham, being there transferred to H. M. S. Northumberland. Two of these companies were lauded at Port Said on August 20, under Major J. W. Scott, to seize the place, as described on page 107, while the balance, under Colonel Graham, were seut to Ismailia in H. M. S. Ready and Dace, and wBre the first troops to arrive at the new base, by that time in the possessioji of the navy. The following day the main body, under Colonel Jones, reached Ismailia from Alexandria in the Rhosina, and later Major Scott's detachment was brought up from Port Said, making a strong battalion of nine companies. On August 25 Company D, under Captain R. W. Heathcote, was de- tailed as General Wolseley's body-guard. The Royal Marine Light Infantry battalion did good work in the ac- tion of August 25, at Tel-el-Mahuta and Mahsameh, after a hard night march. In this engagement the two marine battalions were the only corps that kept up with the cavalry and reached the Egyptian camp at Mahsameh. On the 28th the Royal Marine Light Infantry battalion was called up to Kassassin from its camp at Mahsameh, but too late to be of real service. It was actively engaged on September 9, capturing two Egyptian field pieces by a brilliant charge. In this affair it lost 27 men wounded, some mortally. At Tel-el-Kebir the battalion was on the left of Graham's brigade, in the front line of the attack. Its behavior on this occasion, characterized by its accustomed coolness and steadiness, received well-earned praise. Its loss in this battle was only exceeded by those of two other battalions (see page 153). 206 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The following- table exhibits the strength of the two detachments as originally sent out : Bank, &c. steamer or transport Date of sailing Date of ariival in Egypt . Lieutenant-colonels - . . . Majors Captains (of companies). Adjutant (captain) Paymaster . Quarteitnaster (captain) Staff (captain) Lieutenants Surgeons Staff sergeants Color (orderly) sergeants. Sergeants Corporals Buglers Privates . . Total rank and file. Grand total sent First de- tachment. C Orontes, { Tamar. June 26 July 17 1 2 5 1 • 1 1 10 2 9 5 20 25 20 50C Second de- tachment. > Dacca. July 27 Aug. 8 2 1 4 1 8 1 4 16 20 8 386 451 The entire loss during the campaign from all causes, death, wounds, and disease, up to October 14, was 1"3 officers and 220 men. The invalided are stated by the adjutant, Captain A. St. Leger Burrowes, to have been chiefly trom among the younger members of the battalion, both officers and men. No regular transport was furnished the marines, but 67 mules and 8 Maltese carts were "picked up" at Ismailia. These were not enough to carry one-quarter of the equipment. The water-carts were lost in the sand near Neflche early in the march, but this mishap was remedied to some extent by the fortunate capture of seven camels each carrying two large tin water-tanks. So much has been said in commendation of this battalion that it is impossible not to believe it to have been second to no other body of troops in the field in organization, discipline, and performance. The greater average age of its members, as compared with that of the army proper, doubtless gave them the steadiness often urged in their praise, while to their experience afloat is due that "handiness" which is the characteristic of the sailor, and a most desirable habit on the part of the soldier. In physique, bearing, and military qualities generally the marines ranked very high, and they may point to the favorable notices of their work in official dispatches with honest pride. 2. The Royal Marine Artillery. This detachment was drawn from a corps of trained artillerymen who man a portion of the batteries of Her Majesty's ships of war. They date back in organization to the time when the sailor had nothing to BYITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 207 do with the fighting of the ship. They have been gradually replaced by seamen, whose increased intelligence and careful training have ren- dered them competent to handle with skill the various kinds of ord- nance in the British fleet. That the Royal Marine Artillery is not yet a thing of the past is seen in the fact that to-day it mans one-half of the InjQiexible's 81-ton guns. These artillerists are, in addition, thor- oughly drilled as infantry. In the same transports with the Eoyal Marine Light Infantry bat- talion, the Orontes and Tamar, a detachment of Eoyal Marine Artillery, 300 in number, was sent to Egypt. It was organized as an infantry battalion and was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Tuson. At Alexandria it was associated with the Eoyal Marine Light Infantry. On August 5 the two battalions were combined under Lieutenant- Colonel Tuson, and did the extremely good service already narrated. On August 19, when the base was changed, this battalion was em- barked in the Kerissa, the first of the hired transports to arrive at Is- mailia. The force was strengthened at Port Said by 100 men who had been sent from England in the Dacca to fill vacancies. Landing at Ismailia at 2 a. m. of August 21, the battalion, now numbering between 300 and 400 men, took part in the first advance, that in which Neflche was occupied, marching out with two days' rations in their haversacks and 100 rounds of ammunition in their pouches. It took part in the affair of August 24 at El Magfar, when a small party relieved the worn-out Eoyal Artillerymen at their 13-pdrs., rendering highly efficient and welcome assistance. The following day it did further good service, advancing with the whole line. At 4 p. m. it pushed on to Mahsameh, where it occupied the enemy's deserted camp, and found much-needed I)rovisions. The battalion had been without food all day. The few daj's immediately^ succeeding were marked rather by inad- equacy of rations than by the perilous nature of the work on hand. The men lived, for the time being, mostly on biscuits and such provender as the Egyptians had left behind in their retreat. On the 26th the battalion reached Kassassin. It took an honorable part in the engagement of August 28, and was complimented by the gen- eral in command, Major-General Graham, for its gallant behavior under simultaneous direct and enfilading fire. It operated on the southern bank of the SWeet Water Canal in an exposed and important position. As has been already mentioned, a detachment under Captain Tucker had mounted a captured 8<"" Krupp gun on a railway truck and they worked it skillfully throughout the day. This gun subsequently pushed on with the naval 40-pdr. to Tel el-Kebir, and then to Zagazig, Benha, and Tautah. On September 9 the Eoyal Marine Artillery was again on the extreme left. It repelled a slight attack on the southern side of the canal, de- fending the bridge at Kassassin. 208 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. At Tel-el-Kebir the battalion started oif 600 yards in rear of the Eifles (in the 4th brigade), but during the night was ordered to form General Wolseley's escort. It took, therefore, no active part in the assault, although subjected to distant shell-fire, principally from the advanced redoubt. (M, Plate 50.) The Eoyal Marine Artillery, being less numerous, was less subjected to comment than the Eoyal Marine Light Infantry battalion ; indeed, the majority of casual readers of accounts of the campaign hardly knew of the existence of such a corps; but its work was characterized by the same quiet efficiency, and it received a proportionate and gratifying meed of praise. XIZ. THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION. The British army has been so often engaged in operations conducted "beyond the seas" that its practice has developed a regular system, governing every step of the work of embarking, transporting to the base, disembarking, and forwarding to the front of troops, and animals and supplies of every sort. An important link in this chain is termed officially the " Base and Lines of Communication," which are united and made a separate command, under an officer clothed with ample authority. The proper performance of this arduous and unremunera- tive service, as may be presupposed, calls for great energy and force of character, coupled with administrative ability of a very high order. The province of this officer includes the base and what is called the "advanced depot," together with all the means of transportation and exchange of intelligence employed between the two. Thus be controls the immediate disposition of arriving troops and stores, exercises mili- tary command over the base depot and garrison, directs the starting and other movements of convoys of men and of supply wagons, estab- lishes the train service on the railways, if there be any within his de- partment, regulates the use of the telegraph, provides for the defense of the base and the lines for all transport, including that of the wounded ; in a word, is responsible for everything that reaches the base until it passes out of his care into the camp at the front or is re-embarked on board the transports. The Base and Lines of Communication during the late campaign in Egypt were commanded by Major-General W. Earle, C. S. L, and no officer in the expedition was more unremittingly occupied or had greater difficulties to contend against. The preliminary work at Alexandria, which General Earle reached on August 9, was of no particular moment. The troops from England began arriving on the following day, the Orient leading the van of the hired-transport fleet, with the Scots Guards on board. The handling BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 209^ of these bodies of men, their outfits and supplies, was very simple. The spacious docks at Alexandria were an admirable landing place,, whence the troops were marched at once over good roads to their camps, the most remote of which was only a few miles distant. For the men's kits and camp equipage and the ofiicers' baggage the regimental and other army transport either sufficed or found ready supplement in hired carts and the local railways. The principal of the latter has a branch leading to the wharves, while another, the Eamleh Eailway (owned by a private corporation), leads directly to the position of the main camp at Eamleh. The latter railway was u.sed for the conveyance of both troops and stores. General Earle's labors began in earnest with the change of base from Alexandria to Ismailia. He reached the latter place at 10 p. m. of August 20, and instituted his preparations and arrangements at once On the day following, August 21, Major-General Giaham was atNefiche^ in command of the advance of the army, a small body of about 800 men. Although very near Ismailia in point of distance, the break in the i ail- way prevented the use of trucks for hauling stores to Nefiche, while the sand of the desert intervening, heavier here than anywhere else on the whole line of march, rendered the very small amount of transport then at hand totally inadequate. To supply this deficiency a boat service on the Sweet Water Canal was immediately started by Admiral Seymour, four boat-loads of provisions being sent to General Graham on the first or opening trip. This organization, which is detailed in Section XVIy worked in conjunction with the other means of transport as developed, all being subject to the control of the General commanding the Line of Communications. During this and the next two days, August 21, 22, and 23, the base assumed its characteristic appearance. The different battalions and corps, now landing with all practicable speed, were assigned their re- spective camping grounds, and were given a place to store such ai tides of their kits, baggage, and stores as would not be immediately required on the march across the desert. The best methods of landing horses, mules, men, and materials were being worked out practically, and means sought to increase the landing facilities. The post and telegraph offices were established (operated by volunteers until the regular army troops charged with these duties could arrive), and preparations were made for working the railv ay by means of horsed trucks. The Khedive's palace, a large airy building, was occupied as the base hospital, and the Governor's house as the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. The various base stores of supplies, the sick-horse hospital, and re- mount depot were organized under the Eoyal Engineer, Ordnance-Store, and Commissariat Officers, the Surgeon and Veterinary Surgeon on the staff' of the '' Commandant of the Bases." The plan of Ismailia, Plate 48, gives the general features of the base. When first seized the only landing facilities it possessed were at the H. Mis. 29 14 210 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Central Wharf, a rectaDgular pier-head, with about GO feet of water front and 25 feet wide, built on piles out into 2 fathoms of water. A short, narrow gangway connected this pier-head with a stone wharf, the con- tinuation of the broad avenue which leads directly from the railway sta- tion. This avenue is a fine specimen of macadam. It withstood the continued heavy traffic thrown upon it by its selection as the terminus of a military route without signs of deterioration, and it proved a real blessing to the British. The harbor of Ismailia was formed, as is well known, by dredging out the shallow bed of Lake Timsah, and navigable water approach to the town was only secured at this one point, the Central Wharf. In consequence, the greater part of all heavy articles and stores, men and horses, were landed from here from lighters or from tugs which the depth of water permitted alongside the pier. To relieve the strain on this sole place of disembarkation, additional accommodation was ob- tained west of the Central Wharf. The South Wharf, on piles, is low and well built. The pier-head is 22 feet long and 14 feet wide, and the pier itself a straight jetty 15(5 feet long and 9 feet wide. The water here is too shallow to allow the presence of tugs, but native boats, ships' cutters, and lighters can run alongside with ease. On the beach near by the greater part of the field pieces were landed. At the South Wharf the commissariat began also the work of dis- embarking their stores until the branch railway from the station to the mouth of the Sweet Water Canal was sufficiently advanced. They shifted their operations to this more convenient locality on September 9. The dock they made use of was a platform about 2 feet above the level of the water, 6 feet wide, and 75 feet long, built of wood, and resting on piles, in two parts, separated by a balcony, which had been erected here long before by the Suez Canal Company. The railway was laid on the embankment 12 feet above the landing stage, the slope being mounted by steps and inclined planes, the latter for parbuckling heavy packages, and very useful in breaking up the base. (Fig. 83.) While the con- venience of this wharf was of much importance, a further and very great advantage was found in the transfer of such large quantities of bulky stores, all coming under one department, to a place by themselves, leav- ing the other landing facilities to the undisturbed possession of other corps. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY 0< ERATI0N8 IN EGYPT. 211 When the Indian Contingent arrived, it began at once, with that in- dependence of action which marked all its operations, to provide for its own disembarkation, the Madras Sappers constructing a separate pier. The spot selected was between the Central and South Wharves. A number of low four-wheeled trucks were used as the support of a superstructure, shown in plan in the accompanying diagram (Fig. 84). 66ft. J^ft. -3SJi.- -23fi. Sft. Temporary landing pier of the Indian Contingent at Ismailia. The platform was roughly made of planks, resting on fore-and-aft scant- ling. The depth of water secured was only a little less than 3 feet. The pier was certainly light; indeed, everything connected with the Indian Contingent was light ; but it served the purpose of its design — dry footing. Each wharf was under the charge of an ofi&cer of General Earle's staff, whose duty it was to superintend the work and start everything in the right direction as soon as landed. This officer bore the title of " Military Landing Officer." That this duty was well performed is shown by the fact that blocks never occurred, even on the Central Wharf, which was always the most crowded. A regular system was adopted and adhered to, so that the disembarkation was effected with a minimum of confusion. The cattle and many of the mules were put into the water from the transports and made to swim ashore, while the horses were all landed in the boats described on page 175, or on flats, each horse being accompanied by his own harness or saddlery and other equip- ments. The latter being landed first and carried well up the wharf by fatigue parties; the horses were run ashore to their trappings, were har- nessed or saddled, and led at once to their appropriate places in camp. 212 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYJPT. The value of making haste slowly was shown in the matter of get- ting wheeled vehicles ashore. These, at the outset, were put together on board of the transports, and were often loaded in the lighters along- side, but it was quickly found that the speed sought was really lost, and the process resorted to of landing the carts and wagons empty, or even in cases taken to pieces. The work at the Central Wharf was superintended by Major H. G. MacGregor until September 1, when he was relieved by Major E. H. Sartorius, of the East Lancashire Eegiment. The diligence and abil- ity of these officers received well-merited commendation in official dis- patches. To help matters at the main landing place, a branch railway was laid to it direct from the railway station, so that the stores needed at the front could be put at once into cars and sent off, thus saving one hand- ling, much time, and, what was at least as important, avoiding the piling up of material in the very restricted space on the wharf. The scarcity, amounting almost to a dearth, of native labor, threw, practically, the entire work of moving the stores upon fatigue parties detailed from the different battalions. These fatigue parties were many and large, and kept every one busily employed, with little rest or inter- mission. It is satisfactory to hear, in the words of General Earle, the officer most interested, that '' the troops worked well." The base at Ismailia was under the immediate command of Colonel Sir W. O. Lanyon, K. C. M. G., C. B., 2d West India Eegiment, with the title of " Commandant of the Base.'' The order which prevailed here after affairs had had a chance to settle down to a somewhat per- manent status was admirable. The 1st battalion of the Manchester Eegiment (late 63d foot) had come from India, and had been detailed for duty at the base, where it remained until the end of the campaign. That some should remain and guard the rear while others push ahead to fight is inevitable, but none the less is staying behind a fate hard to bear. It is a duty to testify to the soldierly bearing, neat appear- ance, and cheerfulness of this body of men. To see a fatigue party of them returning to camp at night after many hours' hard work landing and shipping stores was to realize the value of discipline and esprit de corps. One could not avoid the regret that this battalion had no chance to distinguish itself in a more martial way. At the other extremity of the Line of Communication was the "Ad- vanced Depot," under Captain J. H. Sandwith, E. M. L. I., where were kept the stores needed for present consumption. At first this depot was established at Tel-el- Mahuta, but afterwards it was moved to Kassas- sin. Other stations were at intermediate points, each being in charge of a " Station Commandant," responsible for the" transmission of every- thing going to or coming from the army, and for the security of the roads and telegraphs within his district. The Station Commandant is aever interfered with by his seniors except in case of actual attack. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 213 He keeps the Station Coinuiaudants next to him on either side informed of the movements of troops and convoys, so that men, animals, and ma- terial cannot arrive without finding everything in readiness for their reception. He has a staff to aid him in executing his duty, as, for in- stance, a Railway Officer, an Engineer Officer, a Commissariat and Trans- port Officer, an Ordnance-Store Officer, a Surgeon, and a Veterinary Sur- geon, or as many of them as the circumstances of the case may require. He must j^revent disorders and excesses in his district, and hear and investigate all complaints made by natives. He regulates the depart- ure of all convoys or detachments, giving written orders to the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge. The work at these stations, and particularly at the advanced depot, was very heavy. The manual part was performed, as at the base, by fatigue parties of soldiers, often numbering upwards of 200. The limited amount of rolling stock and the rarity of railway sidings rendered it necessary to lose no time in unloading stores sent by train. The quan- tity and nature of the shipment being telegraphed ahead in every in- stance, men and animals in sufficient numbers were always in waiting to clear the cars without dela3\ The cars with stores for the cavalry were uncoupled at Mahsameh and left by the trains on their way out to Kassassin, to be picked up on the return trip. The push of the advance along the railway to the westward, which began immediately after the seizure of Ismailia, continued, with insig- nificant halts, until Kassassin was occupied, on August 26. Each move, increasing the distance from the base and involving the establishment of additional camps to be maintained, rendered the distribution of sup- plies more complex. General Earle, speaking of affairs at this period, says : " The transport of provisions was the difficulty of the moment." The regimental transport had completely broken down. The railway lacked locomotives. The boat service in the Sweet Water Canal was the main dependence, and that was threatened by the steady lowering of the water-level. Luckily, the capture of a large stock of provisions at Mahsameh gave the sadly strained lines of communication a slight respite, and relieved' temporarily the pressing needs of the troops of the advance. The telegraph was repaired and operated by volunteers as far as Tel-el-Mahuta. The tide did not fairly turn, however, until regular trains were established on the railwaj^, after the receipt of the first engine, on August 27. It was a critical time, for the rapid falling of the water in the Sweet Water Canal had reduced the boat traffic by nearly one-half, the slower process of tracking having to be resorted to, and rafts and pontoons substituted for the quicker but deeper boats, while it was not until September 3 that the Commissariat and Trans- port Corps scored its first piece of work on the Lines of Communication. At 5 p. m. of that date, 150 mules, with oats, badly loaded from want of experience, started from Ismailia, reaching Tel-el-Mahuta the follow- ing day. The steady increase in the railway service after August 28 bega.. to 214 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. enconrage tlie hopes of tbose in authority, and on September 5 Gen- eral Earle caased calculations to be made of the supplies needed to form a working reserve at Kassassin for 16,000 men and 7,000 animals. It was found that at least forty railway trucks daily would be required, each truck carrying five tons net. The distribution of these trucks would be as follows : Imperial troops : Tracks. To provide for daily consumption 13 To create a reserve 16 Indian Contingent : To provide for daily consumption 3 To create a reserve 3 Ordnance- Store Department 1 Army Medical Department i Royal Artillery 1 Royal Engineers 1 Regimental and staff luggage, &c 1 Total 40 On September 6 General Earle issued an order to his staff covering the point. He directed that " the canal traffic and all transport by animals will be exclusively devoted to the reserve, and the railway will supply the current wants and do as much as it can for the reserve as well." The object of these calculations and instructions was to accumulate at Kassassin rations for 10,000 men for thirty days. A second estimate was made of the carriage rjequired for tents and other camp equipage, men's valises, officers' light baggage, &c., when the force should move forward. As throwing light on the liberal scale of transport allowed in the British army, this estimate is given at length : Trucks. 15 battalions of infantry, 3 each 45 4 regiments of cavalry, 2 each 8 9 batteries of artillery, 1 each 9 4 companies and troops Royal Engineers, 1 each. 4 Field hospital and bearer companies 8 Staff, «&c 3 Total ■ 77 That is to say, seven railway trains, averaging eleven cars each. In addition to these, provision would have to be made for replacing the ammunition expended in action. The end aimed at began to be approached immediately, but it was only on September 9 that it seemed to be reasonably close at hand. On that day no less than 230 tons of stores went by rail to Kassassin, an excess of 30 tons over the desired amount estimated for on the 5th, and in addition to the delivery by the canal and by pack ani- mals. The work, thus pushed ahead, bore speedy fruit, rendering pos- sible the advance of September 13, which terminated the campaign. At that time 70,000 of the 300,000 reserve rations had been collected at Kassassin for the Imperial Troops, and the Indian Contingent had built up at about the same rate. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 215 The seizure of Cairo and the intervening railway systems extended the scope of the Line of Communications without materially increasing the labor. The whole Egyptian equipment of rolling stock now became available, so that the supply of stores and provisions for the various garrisons could be readily maintained unmolested by rail. The base was changed as rapidly as possible to Alexandria, and by October 1 hardly any signs of its temporary warlike importance were visible at Ismailia. XX. THE COMMISSARIAT AND TRANSPORT CORPS. The important question, in the military art, of land transport, has re- ceived in England a solution which must be regarded as abnormal. The furnishing Of food and transportation is the duty of the Commissariat and the Transport Corps, a civil branch of the army. The latter service la. planned, to all appearances, for contemplated operations in Europe or in other higher civilized parts of the world which are traversed by ample roads of excellent construction. If this anticipation had been realized, the value of the transport'scheme would have beeu tested long ago under the conditions for which it was devised, but as England has had no troops on the Continent either dur- ing the forty years intervening between Waterloo and Sebastopol or the thirty years, nearly, that have elapsed since the Crimean War, and with this one exception has conducted her military operations of the last three-quarters of a century in remote and generally savage countries, the inference is inevitable that the wish to be prepared for a serious although remote contingency has involved the sacrifice of many important and ever-present considerations, and has prevented her army from having a suitable transport service ready at the outset of her numerous and varied expeditions. The organization of the corps is good. The plan of its equipment is, however, entirely lacking in elasticity, in adaptability to the different conditions under which it is constantly called upon to work ; while its parts are heavy and cumbersome to such an extent as to seriously im- pair its efficiency. For convenience the wagons are considered first. The general-service wagon is strong and solidly constructed; it weighs, empty, about a ton. When carrying its full allowance of a ton and a half of load it requires an extremely good road and six powerful horses in excellent condition for its locomotion. Yet upon these wagons de- pend the carefully worked out system of regimental transport and the important packing drill. The moment other modes of conveyance are resorted to, a new distribution of the mess equipment, &c., must be devised, introducing general confusion and discontent. In spite of the lessons of the campaign just concluded, it may be safely predicted that 216 BRITISH NAYAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. ^ff. 63. the transport corps will continue to adhere to this impracticable and imperishable vehicle. The two- wheeled carts, upon which most reliance was placed, were of :Fig.84. the Maltese pattern, Fig. 84. The principal dimensions are as follows : Diameter of wheels, 5 feet; length of shaft, 10 feet; size ofshaft, 2^ inches square ; width of platform at back, 3 feet; width between shafts, 18 inches; net load, about 8 cwt. Somewhat different from the foregoing- was a small hand-cart which could be fitted for mule or donkey draught by the addi- tion of removable shafts of bamboo. The ends and sides of this cart can be lifted off either for stowage or use. The principal peculiarity was the wheel, the spokes being f-iuch iron rods radiating from a heavy cylindrical hub terminat- ing in iron plates. The spokes pass through these plates and are set up with a nut inside. Fig. 85 gives one spoke and shows the hub of this wheel. The water-cart is simply a large cask capable of holding 109 gallons, mounted on wheels, and dravvn ordinarily by It may be broadly stated that none of these wagons were of use except for the local distribution of supplies. In general terms, the transport of the British force in Egypt was as follows : Each battalion had the Maltese carts, two water-carts, 26 draught horses, and 21 pack animals, with a driver to every two horses- Each cavalry regiment had six carts, an am munition- wagon, a forge- wagon, and two water-carts. All this on starting; but what amount of transport each corps possessed at the close of the campaign it is impos- sible to say ; the greater part had been lost in the sand or left behind at the base. This transport, as thus detailed, was a j^art of the permanent organi- zation of the battalion, and was intended on the march to carry rations for one day, together with all the regimental baggage except the tents. It was known as the " regimental transport," a term applied to the regular transport equipment supplied to every battalion of infantry or regiment of cavalry when mobilized. The equipment adopted in Egypt differed mainly from the regulation equipment in the substitution of small carts for large wagons. To each division of the army corps was attached a company of the Commissariat and Transport Corps, consisting of 4 officers and 210 non- commissioned officers and men (see details, page 100 and 101). Thestand- Tip-cart htib and spoke. one horse BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 217 ard equipment comprised 14 riding horses, 180 draught horses, 74 wagons and carts, 4 water-carts, and 3 forge carts. This, technically known as the "Divisional or Departmental Transport," was designed to carry the equipage of the divisional and brigage staffs, the butcheries and baker- ies of the two brigades, and one day's supply of groceries, provisions, and oats for the whole division. With the exception of certain modifications intended to better suit the needs of this particular case, this is the trans- port habitually assigned to a division on a war footing. A similar com- pany was attached to the Cavalry brigade. Except during an advan'ce, the Departmental Transport is supposed to be employed in bringing up supplies from the base to the advance depot. Besides these Commissariat and Transport Companies there were three "Auxiliary Companies," whose duty during an advance was to carry the tents, kits, &c., of the two divisions, and during a halt to operate along the line of communications. As a permanent force engaged on the lat- ter special work, two strong companies were sent out, supplemented by hired teams and pack animals. The majority of the teamsters were Maltese, and are described as " a very bad lot." The composition of an Auxiliary Company, as authorized for the cam- paign in Egypt, is given below : Kank, &c. Commissariat and Transport Corps: Captain • Qiiarterruaster Subalterns . Staff sergeanta Sergeants Corporals Wheelers Collar-maker Farrier and carriage smith Bufilers Privates Artificers : Saddlers Shoeing and carriage smiths. - - Natives : Interpreters Supei intendents Drivers Total all ranks . Animals : Kiding... Pack ... Draught . Spare. ... Total . 4 16 4 12 4 8 216 24 160 240 40 1 5 8 6 222 t8 32 160 4 2'14 40 * One riding horse each for the subaltern, sergeant, corporal, and interpreter ; two riding horses for the superintendents ; total, six. tTwo riding horses for the captain ; one each for the quartermaster, sergeant-major, quartermaster sergeant, farrier sergeant, and interpreter, and one spare horse ; total, eight. 218 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The compauy equipment was as follows : Equipments. Vehicles : Carts Forge carts Water carts , Saddlery : Riding , Pack Breast harness (single sets). Tool-chests: Shoeing and carriage smiths Collar and harness makers. . Wheelers Implements for carts : Axes Spades Picks Lifting-jacks .2 % § P. a n o o ^ a Q ^ ^ a ■3 ^ rt a o o O H m H 28 112 2 114 1 ■• 4 4 1 4 4 6 24 6 30 40 160 160 65 260 4 264 3 12 1 13 1 4 1 5 1 4 1 5 6 24 24 6 24 24 6 24 24 3 12 12 The forge and water carts and one cart were for the use of the section to which they were assigned, leaving as the working strength of each section 40 pack animals and 27 two- wheeled carts, and of the entire company 160 pack animals and 108 two-wheeled carts. It is to these Auxiliary Companies that the bulk of the work on the Line of Com- munications should have fallen until the establishment of the railway service. As will be seen from the above table, the company was divided into four parts, each of which could be used as an independent unit, and this rule, it may be observed, characterizes the composition of all the Commissariat and Transport Companies. The foregoing indicates the theoretical plan. In practice it was found that even the small Maltese cart was immovable with less than four draught animals, so that one-half of the regimental wheeled transport was ineffective at the outset, while the pack animals supplied failed to make up the deficiency. In consequence, the troops were dependent for shelter upon captured Egyptian camps until the railway could bring the tents up. The Commissariat and Transport Corps was utterly un- able to perform this portion of its duty. In anticipation of difficulty in connection with wheeled transport, 700 mules had been bought in Smyrna and 800 in Beyrout, in ample time to meet the troops at Ismailia, but the Turkish Government had refused to allow them to be shipped. Others were purchased elsewhere — in Italy, Spain, South Africa, the United States, &c. — but the three weeks' delay occasioned by the latent hostility of Turkey, and the inability to pro- cure camels, or other substitutes, on the spot, were fatal to the success- ful working of the army transport over the desert that borders on Is- mailia. The wagons and carts were discarded, and the draught ani- BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPEPATIONS IN EGYPT. 2 19 mals utilized by the Eoyal Engineers in hauling trucks on the railway and pontoons and boats on the Sweet Water Canal. Although the army began landing at Ismailia on August 21, it was not until Septem- ber 3 that the Commissariat and Transport began conveying supplies to the front (see page 213), and it only assumed its legitmate functions after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. To this department ordinarily falls the task of handling the stores landed at the base, in order that the troops may be fresh for active mili- tary operations. Here again it failed. Numbering in all about 1,400 men. distributed wherever there were camps, from Alexandria to Kas- sasf 1, too small a force remained at Ismailia to execute this part of its work. Commissary General Morris, the Senior Commissariat Officer of the expedition, having in vain asked in advance for a corps of hired laborers, 400 strong, to supply this deficiency, was obliged to seek relief in large fatigue parties of soldiers, who were thus diverted from their proper sphere of usefulness. Another responsibility of this department is the feeding of the army. The following table is of interest as giving the composition of the daily ration at three different periods. The first column contains the ration as usually supplied ; the second, that ordered after reaching Is- mailia ; and the third, that issued after reaching Cairo. Bation. Bread Biscuit Fresh meat Preserved meat Tea Coffee Su^ar Salt Pepper Lime-jnice Fresh vegetables- - — Compressed vegetables. Soap, on payment Tobacco, on payment . . . Rice Potatoes. ., Rum .* Lb. Oz. 1 4 1 OJ Oi 2 Oh Oglg '■G Oi 8 1 i gill. n. III. Lb. Oz. 1 i 04 Oi 2J Oi 04 8 1 3S 4 gill. Lb. Oz. 12 12 00 00 04 Oi 2i 04 o^\ 04 4 1 '. i None. * Issued with J ounce sugar when fresh vegetables cannot be cured. In II and III the lime-juice formed a part of the daily ration, irrespective of the issue of vegetables. tissued but twice a week. The principal changes are in the amount of bread or the equivalent biscuit, less being required after the hard work of the campaign was over; in the tea, of which the allowance was trebled; in the lime-juice, which was made a steady instead of an alternative issue ; in the fresh vegetables, of which half was curtailed and liberal weights of rice and potatoes substituted; and in the rum, the ration being first greatly re- duced and then stopped entirely. The hygienic value of these modifications is self-evident. In the 220 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGi:PT. case of the grog, it was found that the trooiJS not only needed no stim- ulant in that hot climate, but were actually better off without it. The ration was changed by the Commander-in-Chief's order, based on the recommendation of the Principal Medical Officer. The component parts of the ration are put up as follows, viz : The preserved meat in boxes of 50 pounds ; the bread in bagas of 100 pounds ; the tea in 14-pound tin canisters ; the coffee in square tins, two in a box, whose gross weight is 100 pounds ; the sugar, packed like the coffee, in 60-pound cases ; the salt in 13-pound canisters ; the rum in 10-gallon kegs, weighing 119 pounds; the pepper in cases of six 20 pound canis- ters, weighing 133 pounds gross. The packages vary immensely in weight, and hence introduce great complexity in the operation of packing for transport on the backs of animals, whose loads on both sides must, of course, balance. Two uni- form gross weights for all commissariat parcels, one of 50 and the other of 100 pounds, would yield much convenience and save time and labor in the field. The commissariat animals stood the work very well in the main, very few being used up by the heat and heavy labor, and no special diseases being developed. This result is attributed to liberal feeding, the usual ration being supplemented by extra allowances. Eoughly speaking, when actively employed these animals were given all the forage they could consume. It must be remembered, however, that, unlike the cav- alry, they were never beyond the reach of abundant su]3plies, and the campaign was very short. Not only was the transport service the weakest point in the expe- ditionary force, but it is not an exaggeration to say that it failed com- pletely. In the rapid advance to Kassassin the troops were on several occasions entirelj^ without adequate supplies. The opportune capture of a stock of provisions at Mahsameh alone enabled them to hold the ground they had seized, and saved the cavahy and artillery horses from actual want. The army is stated by its commander to have en- tirely " outrun its transport," but such a state of affairs ought not to have existed at 20 miles from the base. Upon the proper placing of the responsibility for this failure depends the chance of guarding against its recurrence in the future. For a report of this nature it is impossi- ble to obtain the facts necessary to a complete determination of the causes that produced so lamentable a result. Certain considerations, however, are not out of place. The wagon must be light and strong, and be fitted with brakes. Com- missary-General Morris ijrefers the American tj^pe, which, with eight mules, can haul a load of from one to two tons. This wagon was much used at the Caije of Good Hope, and gave satisfaction. Teamsters should never ride, but should walk beside their horses. As to harness, General Wolseley advocates the use of both breast straps and collars, so that a chafed animal may be shifted from one to the other, and his services not lost during convalescence. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILT.TAKY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 221 The possibility that wheeled transport may be impracticable should be met, proper forms of pack-saddles should be adopted, and a well- digested packing drill devised in connection with their use. The chief reason for the break-down in the transport was undoubtedly the attempted adherence to a rigid system, absolutely unsuited to the country in which the operations were to be conducted. The native in- habitants may be generally assumed to understand fairly well their own needs in this particular. In Egypt from time immemorial they have used pack animals exclusively. Had the British transport corps landed at Ismailia with an adequate and well-organized mule train, the heavy desert and the interruptions in the railways would have failed to check the flow of supplies to the front, and the army would have been spared the annoyance of seeming to suffer almost within sight of the base. When the frequency of England's wars is remembered, it seems hard to believe that the outbreak of each should find this important depart- ment without the animals and drivers necessary to the proper placing of at least one army corps in the field. The railways in England are so much more economical carriers of stores that the transport companies exist during peace mainly as cadres. The call to active military preparation means the hurried purchase of thousands of animals at exorbitant prices, and the engaging of hundreds of unknown teamsters at high wages. The money which would be needed for the maintenance, on a war footing, of the eight Commissariat and Transport Companies that ordinarily accompany an army corps, is consumed in the enforced haste of mobilization, while the result is seen in an undrilled mob, often quite as capable of harm as good. During the Egyptian campaign the Government purchased 10,000 mules. A large proportion of these animals were sold immediately after- wards at but a fraction of their cost. The loss incurred by the differ- ence between the selling and the buying prices would have maintained the beasts for many months, and in some cases years. War is expensive at the best, and nations that are liable to be called upon to take part in it find it cheapest in the end, as it is wisest, to be well prepared. XXI. THE TROOPS. I. — THE CAVALBY. A squadron from each of the three regiments, the 1st Life Guards, the 2d Life Guards, and the Eoyal Horse Guards ("the Blues"), which together comprise the Household Cavalry, was sent to Egypt and formed into a regiment about 450 strong. At home, these men, none less than six feet in height, wear a steel cuirass and steel helmet, long cavalry boots, &c., but the exigencies 222 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. of the climate caused the abandoning of this heavy equipment, to the great comfort of the wearers. The cuirass was laid aside, a cork hel- met was substituted for the steel helmet, and, instead of boots, strips of serge (technically known by the Indian name of puttees) were wrapped about the calves of the legs. The other cavalry regiments, the 4th Dragoon Guards, the 7 th Dragoon Guards, and the 19th Hussars, each about 600 strong, were similarly dressed. The organization of a British cavalry regiment on a war footing is given in the following table : Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. Lieutenant-colonels Majors Captains Subalterns Adjutant Paymaster Quartermaster Medical Officer Veterinary Surgeon Total Sergeant-major Quartermaster sergeant Band sergeant Paymaster sergeant Armor sergeant Saddler sergeant Farrier sergeant Sergeant cook Trumpet major Orderly room clerk . . Transport sergeant Troop sergeant-majors Sergeants Farriers Saddlers . . Shoeing smiths Wheelers and saddletree maker. . Trumpeters Corporals Bandsmen Privates Drivers (transport.) Total 24 8 4 8 2 8 32 15 480 22 Horses. 94 480 94 480 * Officers' private horses. The ammunition carried by a regiment of cavalry is as follows : Carbine : Eounds. 30 rounds per carbine 16, 500 In reserve 10, 080 Total carbine ammunition 26, 580 Pistol : 36 rounds per pistol 936 In reserve 1, 200 Total pistol ammunition 2, 136 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 223 The regiment is divided into four squadrons, three of which are com- manded by majors, the fourth by a captain. The establishment of the squadron is given in the following table: Bank. 1 Horses. §0 i 1 1 4 2 6 8 4 2 120 o 4 3 12 1 120 4 Total 150 19 120 4 The equipment of the trooper consisted of sword and Martini-Henry carbine. The latter is carried in a leather bucket at the right side of the saddle. The Household Cavalry carried revolvers in addition and a heavier pattern of sword. All the metal trappings were allowed to rust, in order to avoid reflecting the sunlight. The following tables give the weights carried by the cavalry soldier in marching order : ARTICLES WORN. Lbs. Oz. Helmet 15 Tunic 3 Flannel shirt 1 H Drawers 12^ Trousers 2 6 Braces 4 Socks 4i Shoes 3 3 Spurs 13| Puttees 6 Gloves.. 3J Total 13 5i SADDLERY. Saddle 22 Bridle 4 Breast-plate 1 3 Crupper 12 Pair of saddle-bags 2 12^ Head rope 15 2 shoe-cases and 4 shoes 5 13 Saddlecloth 2 12 Total 40 3i ON THE SADDLE. Hoof-pick Nose-bag 1 Heel rope and shackle 1 Picketing peg Mess-tin 1 Carbine bucket 2 Lbs. Oz. 2 1 2 12* 3i Total 6 IN PKONT OF THE SADDLE. Pair ankle boots 4 Forage cap 5 Cape 2 12 Total ARMS, ETC. Sword and belt, &c 5 12 Haversack 9^ Waterbottle 2 9 Pocket-knife 5 Pouch-belt 9 224 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Arms, etc. — Continued. Lbs. Oz. Pouch and 30 rounds. 3 13 J Carbine 7 8 21 2 Add revolver for Household Cav- alry 2 4 Total 23 6 IN SADDLE-BAGS. 1 flannel shirt 1 1 pair drawers 1 hold-all, containing spoon, comb, &,c 1 1 pair socks 1 towel 1 brush In saddle-bags — Continued. Lbs. Oz. 1 tin of grease 10 1 horse-brush 9 1 curry-comb 12 1 horse-rnbber 9 1 stable-sponge 1 1 oil-bottle 4 Pipeclay, &c 9 Total 7 4i behind the saddle. Cloak 7 1 Trousers 1 9 Corn-sack 1 13 Picketing peg 12^ Total 11 3i Weight of trooper's entire equipment 106 9 If in Household Cavalry 108 13 The equipment, of camp utensils^ &c., iutrenching tools and imple- ments, signaling instruments, &c., varied from the regular establish- ment in but insigniticant particulars, occasioned by the exigencies of the climate and the desire to have no more impedimenta than was necessary. The helmets, ordinarily white, were stained a light brown with tea or umber to render them less visible in the bright light. Blue goggles and veils were issued for the men, and eye-fringes for the horses. The latter were most useful on account of the flies that swarm in Egypt, but the former were very generally discarded by the men, the veils only being habitually used during sleep. The forage ration is 12 pounds of hay and 12 pounds of oats. It was not very strictly adhered to, the supply being too scant at first. After- wards forage was issued very liberally and the horses allowed as much as they could eat. A compressed grain cake, composed mainly of oats, with small pro- portions of beans, hay, and crushed linseed, was tried and found to an- swer the purpose very well. It is proper to state that the veterinary arrangements were carefully ordered and the veterinary staff efficient, everything being done for the animals which the circumstances permitted. The cavalry did excellent service all through the campaign, as detailed elsewhere in official reports. The horses stood the work well, only 210 being lost from all causes up to the end of September, notwithstanding that they were sent out from Ismailia immediately after landing from a long sea voyage, and that they were at times almost starved. Major- General Drury-Lowe attributes this record to the fact that the horses BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 225 were all very carefully selected and none were underbred. He thinks underbred horses would not have pulled through. The relative value of light and heavy cavalry was not tested during the war. The country was not adapted to rapid movements, and the Egyptians were always indisposed to allow the British to approach near enough to charge. On the other hand, the Household Cavalry, in spite of their weight, held their own in all combined movements, and lost noth- ing in comparison with their lighter colleagues. This arm of the service achieved the two most brilliant and dramatic strokes of the campaign — the moonlight charge of August 28, and the seizure of Cairo. As to the first episode, it may be fairly doubted whether the Egyptians would have stood to their guns in broad daylight. The value of their presence on September 9 on the extreme right of the British line was shown in the failure of Arabi to attempt a turning movement by the Tel-el-Kebir force. After the experience of the pre- ceding engagement his men conceived a real dread of the British cav- alry, whose physical efficiency was proportionately enhanced by this increased moral prestige. Judged by its record, the efficiency of the British cavalry in Egypt seems to leave little to be desired. That the result was reached by a general departure, in some cases, from the standard equipment is a fact which should be full of meaning. II. — THE MOUNTED INFANTRY. This corps was organized by Captain H. Hallam-Parr, C. M. G., Somersetshire Light Infantry, from volunteers from different regiments, mostly those in the field. It was actively employed at Alexandria, where no regular cavalry was present, and in all the engagements of the cam- paign from Ismailia to Cairo. At the outset it was composed of 100 men, selected mainly with ref- erence to their skill as marksmen. The other conditions were good conduct and fair horsemanship. These men were provided with horses, and whatever was necessary to their maintenance as a mounted corps, but great exactness of cavalry drill was avoided, and they were strictly kept to the original idea of being mobile sharpshooters. They were engaged in the reconnaissance in force of August 5, leading the left attack with vigor, being honorably mentioned by General Alison in his official dispatch on that occasion. They were brigaded with the cavalry after reaching Ismailia. By wounds or disease they had fallen off to about 40 in number at El Mag- far and Tel-el-Mahuta. Prior to Tel-el-Kebir tbeir ranks were increased to 150. Their services throughout the campaign are constantly spoken of in reports in terms of commendation. Their riding was criticised to their disadvantage, for the average Englishman is exacting in this respect, but the fact that they managed to keep up at all with the cavalry in the H. Mis. 29 15 226 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAKY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. two days' forced march from Mahsameh to Cairo proved their endur- ance on horseback, although it must be confessed they arrived somewhat the worse for the journey. The sharpness of their work is seen in the disproportionately heavy loss they sustained. As an instance it may be noted that every of&cer, with one exception, was either killed or wounded before September 12. Their value was conceded on every hand, and the desirability of such a force in all military operations universally acknowledged. As discussed by those interested, the question assumed the following shape: Is it advisable to crystallize the corps into a permanent organization ? The opinion seemed to be general that it would best serve the purpose of its creation by retaining its quasi-volunteer character, and by offer- ing to men in regiments serving at home, as a species of reward for good conduct and marksmanship, the opportunity of active service in the field. The friends of the troop were very positive in the expression of their belief that the main object of its formation would be lost if per- manently organized, and that it would inevitably grow into a cavalry company, peculiarly armed, to be sure, but still a cavalry company strictly speaking, the time and thought of the men being diverted from sharpshooting to precision of mounted maneuvers and overcareful maintenance of horse trappings. It may be safely taken for granted that in her next war England will not fail to have a comparatively large force of mounted Infantry to supplement her cavalry, its general plan being as simple as that of the hundred or so who did such satisfactory work in Egypt. III. — THE INFANTEY. The basis of organization in this branch is the battalion, and, in gen- eral terms, the scheme is as follows: The battalions are assembled into regiments, bearing, as a rule, some name peculiar to the county where the headquarters are established and from which recruits are meant to be drawn. Two battalions are regu- lars, and two belong to the county militia. In addition are such volun- teer infantry corps as the district possesses. The whole is under one or more titular colonels, who never serve in the cai)acity of regimental commanders, but whose position is ordinarily that of a general officer. A colonelcy, by the way, is a substantial reward for a distinguished military record or an honor accorded to persons high in court circles. That the honor is considered mutual is shown by the fact that H. E. H. the Duke of Cambridge, the Field Marshal Commander-in-Chief, is titu- lar colonel of two cavalry regiments, of three infantry regiments, and of the regiments of Eoyai Artillery and the corps of Eoyal Engineers, while H. E. H. the Prince of Wales is colonel of the three regiments of the Household Cavalry, of the Tenth Hussars, and the Eifle brigade. Of the regular infantry battalions one is supposed to serve at home, BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 227 while the other is abroad. The iutroduction of this j)laQ, with its " ter- ritorial designations," some twelve years since, was attended by the breaking up of the old regimental system and the suppression of numerical titles. Each battalion, the practical working unit (for the regiment as a whole is never united), is under a lieutenant-colonel. The war estab- lishment is as follows : Rank. Lieutenant-colonels Majors Captains Lieutenants, &c Adjutant Paymaster Quartermaster Surgeon Sergeant-major Quaitermaster sergeant. . . Baud sergeant Drum-major Orderly room-clerk . . Armorer sergeant Paymaster sergeant Transpoit sergeant Sergeant cook Pioneer sergeant Color sergeants (orderly ).- Sergeants Buglers Corporals Pioneers and artificers Band Privates Drivers '. Horses. Total 1,096 2 4 4 16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 32 16 41 13 20 904 22 30 I 10 > 1,000 44 44 The personal equipment of the foot soldier is shown in the table sub- joined : Arms and accouterments. Pouches Waist-belt and frog 70 rounds of ammunition. Rifle Bayonet Scabbard Knife and laayard Water-bottle, full Mess-tin Haversack Total 25 7 Articles worn by the soldier. Lb. Oz. 1 00 13 7 13 8 14 1 8 9 6 2 9 1 6* Helmet Frock riannel shirt Trousers Braces Socks Leggings ... Boots Total. -- Lb. Oz. 15 2 6 3J H 13 3 3 11 2| Valise, and articles car- ried in it. overcoat and cape . Shirt Socks. Towel Comb Spoon Polishing brush - . Tin of grease Housewife Sponge Trousers Boots Glengarrj' cap Pocket ledger Valise and straps . . Total..... 20 lit Lb. Oz. 6 10 1 2 44 8 Oi IJ 4i 6i 4i 2 4 3 3 4 2 4 4 The waist-belt and braces of the foot soldier difier materially from those of seamen landed for operations ashore. In appearance they seem 228 BRITISH NA.VAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. an unnecessarily complicated arrangement of straps and buckles, but upon analysis they are found to be a well-considered scheme, having for its aim the attaching of the weights carried in marching so as to throw the strain upon the shoulders and to relieve the hips. The old-fash- ioned knapsack has given place to a soft leather "valine," which is worn at the back below the waist. All parts of the belt and suspension are provided with buckles for the purpose of adjustment to the size and shape of the man. The metal, fittings are of brass, and the leather is undressed. In garrison the lat- ter is pipeclayed. The waist-belt. Fig. 86, has staples on either side of the clasp, to which Fly. 86. Fty.aP. Front of aim 1 I lUl order ; one pouch only. Valise without the overcoat. On may be buckled the suspension straps from the shoulder- braces, this are slipped the ball bag and cartridge pouch. The braces are broad straps passing over each shoulder from the opposite upper corner of the valise. From the ring at the front end of each brace are three straps, Fig. 87, one going to the bottom and one to the top of the valise, which is thus prevented from flapping. The third takes the weight of the articles strung on the belt. The front and back loads are thus made to balance, roughly. Another strap is attached at will to each brace by a loop, and is for the purpose of carry- ing the overcoat, properly rolled up, between the shoulders. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 229 Fig.88. Fig.Sy. Fly. 90. British foot soldier in heavy order. 230 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The mess equipment is worn on top of the valise in a water-proof cover. When in heavy marching order the soldier presents the appear- ance indicated in Figs. 88, 89, 90. In Egypt, the cork helmet was the head dress for all corps. The mess-tin is shown in Fig. 91. Its principal dimensions are 6^ inches by 4 inches by 4 inches. The handle is of brass. The cover serves as a coffee-pot, and has a brass handle, which folds down inside of the cover. Its appearance is given in Fig. 92. It may be remarked that, practically, all the battalions were armed and equipped alike, the designations "light infantry," ''rifles," "fusil- iers," &c., being distinctions without differences. The service arm is the Martini-Henry rifle, caliber 0.45 inch. It has seven grooves. The ball weighs 480 grains, and the powder charge is 85 grains. The piece is sighted up to 1,450 yards, but has an effective range twice as great. XXII. THE ROYAL AUTILLERY. The field artillery of the British army is known as " Mountain Artil- lery" when the pieces and carriages are transported on the backs of pack animals; as "Field Artillery" when the pieces are hauled by horses, the crew being for the most part on foot; and as "Horse Artillery" when the pieces are hauled by horses and none of the crew are on foot. All three classes of thi.s branch of the service were represented in the Egyptian campaign, as will be seen from inspection of the following table, which gives the general details of each battery of six guns. The nature of any battery is sufficiently indicated by its abbreviated title, the brigades of horse artillery being lettered, and those of field and garrison artillery being numbered, while the individual batteries of both horse and field artillery are lettered, and those of garrison ar- tillery are numbered. (Garrison artillery is also distributed territori- ally into Northern, Scottish, London, &c., divisions.) In consequence, a battery spoken of by two letters, as N. A., is of horse artillery ; by a letter and a number, as J.3, is of field artillery ; and by two numbers, as 5.1, Scottish, is of garrison artillery. No matter the corps to which temporarily assigned, the batteries always retain their designations as such a battery of such an artillery brigade. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 231 Corps to which let division . Do M division . . Do Cavalry Corps troops Do Do Do Nature of bat- tery. Title. Field artillery ...do ". ...do . . do . . . . . Horse artillery ...do Field artillery ...do Ammiiniti on reserve. Kind of gnn. M. I. K. 16-pdr. - . do ....do ... do M.L.K. 13-pdr. do ... ... do... ....do... None Established per- O i sonnel. » ? a 1 S . a a a o 1 a O fee d a (3 O f^ "S c 11 i a n d 5 « ^ i a 02 O .a ts a P p ** p O 5 3 o 3 1 g| ft O s £ IB o a s 3 a L 5 3 194 153 .... 6 2 28 17 3 194 153 6 2 28 17 .-? 194 153 6 2 28 17 I 3 194 153 6 2 28 17 3 175 176 6 2 26 16 3 175 176 6 2 26 16 3 168 127 6 2 25 17 3 1B8 127 6 2 25 17 ^ 3 178 207 42 4 6 28 18 The foregoing are ''Imperial Troops." There came from India with the Indian Contingent two batteries, viz, H.l, field artillery, with the now obsolete 9-pdr. gun, and the 7.1, Northern division of garrison ar- tillery, equipped as a mountain battery and carrying the 7-pdr. screw- jointed guns, which will be found described at length in the section treating of the Indian Contingent. It will be observed that here were four distinct calibers to be sup- plied. It may also be remarked that all the pieces, without exception, were of the muzzle-loading type. In addition to the batteries mentioned above, a siege train, based on what is known as the "light unit," was sent to Ism ailia, arriving on September 6. It was partially landed, but not used. Its composition was ten 40-pdr. M. L. R. of 35 cwt.; ten 25 pdr. M. L. R. of 18 cwt.; ten 6.3 inch M. L. R. howitzers of 18 cwt. With it, to work the guns, were four batteries, numbering 16 officers and 550 men, drawn from the Ist London and 1st Scottish divisions of garrison artillery, and enumerated in the table on p. 102. It was brought out for contingent use against Cairo. The gunners, however, remained on board the transport Teviot, at Ismailia, returning to England after the issue of the war was decided, their services happily not being required in Egypt. Six 25-pdr. siege guns, sent from Malta, were planted on the Is- mailia line: three at Kassassin, one at Tel-el-Mahuta, one at Mahsameh, and one aD ITeflche, for the defense of the camps at these points. Those at Kassassin were the only ones used, and they to but a slight extent, on September 9, when they were manned by the 5.1 Scottish division. It is thought well to describe briefly the 16 and 13 pdr. guns, as they were chiefly employed during the campaign, and represent the stand- ard arm of the British field batteries of to-day. The former is repre- sented in Figs. 93, 94, 95, and 96. 232 BRITISH NAVAL JaND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. I 1 I 1 I BRITISa NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 233 Its technical description is as follows : Material : Exteriot Wrouglit iron. Tube Steel. Length, total Inches, 78. Weight Pounds, 1,344. Preponderance Pounds, T..'). Bore: Caliber Inches, 3.6. Length Inches, 68.4. ( 'apacity Cubic inches, 706. Rifling : System Woolwich. Length Inches, 58.04. Grooves : Number 3. Depth Inch, 0.11. Width Inch, 0.80. Vent, hardened copper Inch, 0.6 from the bottom of the bore. The gun is side-sighted only. The sights are set at a permanent angle of 1° 50' to the left to correct drift. The tangent scale is four-sided and has a sliding leaf for deflection arising from the wind or other irregu- larity. The sides are marked as follow^s : 1st, in degrees; 2d, in tenths of fuze at corresponding ranges; 3d, in jards; 4th, blank. A table contain- ing the same data is attached to the top of the right carriage bracket. The projectiles used with the 16-pdr. are shell, shrapnel, and can- ister. The shell weighs 15 pounds empty, and 16 pounds 3 ounces when filled and fuzed. It is shown in section in Figs. 97 and 98. The shrapnel contain 72 iron bullets of 18 to the pound, and 56 of 84 to the pound, 128 in all. The bursting charge is 1^ ounces of powder, and the total weight of the projectile when ready for firing is 17 pounds 14J ounces. (Figs. 99 and 100.) The canister contains 176 iron balls of 16J to the pound, filled in with clay and sand. It weighs 15 pounds 3 ounces. (Figs. 101 and 102.) The service charge for the gun is three pounds E. L. G. jDowder, giving an initial velocity of 1,355 feet per second. The fuses are either E. L. percussion or the usual Boxer time-fuze. The two types of the former are shown in Figs. 103 and 104, and re- quire no explanation. 234 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Weight Tbs. oxx; CastJron.7X2 PowUer. ...:L2 26. 3 i ^m l_Ove7-TioSu'3.Sa.'^.02" ^ Over studls 3. 8^^.003 JPVff.98. ^^ N. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 235 Fig. 99. iffhff JF- 13- .IS per certtt JBiersttng Cliarge l^oz. Total WeigU IFU. 14^ oz. IttcminKhB. \,_Pverbocbi§^S4^^1" \ ^ Oierstuai3-8''i.O0S^ ' IBpdr. STtrapnel. 236 BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The Boxer fuze is now always supplied of the 15 seconds length, shown in Fig. 105, and, like the percussion fuzes, is too well known to need description. These time and percussion fuzes are common to all calibers, the shells being tapped to a uniform gauge. AverageWeicfM-lSTbs.Soz. i^BoH, IT- IBX-G-ar-WO" Tii Boyal lauoratory percussion fuzes I and II. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 237 The carriage of the 16-pclr. is of irou, mounted on composite wheels. The axletree boxes have guard-irons and foot-rests, so that they may- serve for seats. Each box contains two rounds of ammunition. The limber is also of iron and of the usual form. The shafts are "near and off" (that is, the near shaft is in the center of the limber), and are fitted for single, double, treble, or bullock draught. There are three limber-boxes, the near and oft', each carrying 12 projectiles and as many cartridges. The projectiles are packed on end around the 15 SECONDS. Boxes 15 secoiuls time-fuze. sides of the box, the space within being reserved for the cartridges, an arrangement designed to protect the latter in the event of the limber being hit in action. , The center box, which is smaller than the others, contains an assort- ment of fuzes, friction primers, tools, grease, &c. The working limit of this gun is at about 4,000 yards. At that range the projectile has an angle of descent of 15° 40' and a remaining veloc- ity of 693 feet per second. The time of flight is 14 seconds. 238 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The 16-pdr. presents some points well worthy of analysis. Its weight is 84 times that of the projectile, its length of bore 19 calibers, its system of rifling is antiquated, its powder charge less than one-fifth the weight of the shell, its range small, and its remaining velocity low. These particnlars are not in accord with the tendency of modern ord- nance, and in consequence the gun is being replaced by the newer 13- pdr., an excellent weapon of its type. On account of its being the latest outcome of British experience and thought, a rather detailed ac- count of the gun and its appurtenances is deemed in place. The general appearance of the 13-pdr., Plate 73, is not unlike that of its predecessor, and its mode of construction is the sa»*e — a steel tube and wrought-iron breech coil. It varies, however, mainly in the rifling, in being longer and narrower, and in having a chamber. The principal dimensions, &c., are as follows: Material : Exterior Wrouglit iron. Tube Steel. Leogth, total Inches, 92. Weight Pounds, 896. Bore: Caliber Inches, 3. Length Inches, 84. Total capacity Cubic inches, 617.8- Total area of section Square inches, 7.29. Diameter * Inches, 3.15. Chamber : Length Inches, 14.13. Capacity Cubic inches, 110.38. Rifling : System Modern polygroove. Twist ...Uniformly increasing from one turn in 100 calibers to one turn iu 30 calibers at 9 inches from the muzzle, thence uniform. Length Inches, 69. Grooves : Number 10. Depth.. - Inch, 0.05. Width Inch, 0.509. Means of rotation Copper base expansion ring. Vent, hardened copper 7 inches from the bottom of the bore. The gun is center-sighted only. The sights are set at a permanent angle of 1° 30' to the left to correct drift. The breech sight has a slid- ing leaf. In the upper edge of this leaf is a notch 0.06 inch deep and :Fig.io6. below it a hole 0.05 inch in diameter. *^^ ■ (Figs. 106 and 107.) These correspond to the conical point and the sighting win- dow, fitted with cross-hairs of the muzzle BtarandSront^iglu.n-^ounder sig^it, and are used for rough and fine M. L. B. sighting respectively. The front sight is a removable block of bronze, retained in its seat (a sight mass on the muzzle) by means of a key. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 239 The breech sight is marked to degrees only, a brass range table on the bracket giving other information as desired. In front of the chamber the bore of the gun is reduced by a choke to a diameter of 2.93 inches. This choke prevents the projectiles from entering the chamber and seats them all uniformly. The projectiles used with this gun are of the usual three types, shell shrapnel, and canister. In design they are similar to those for the 16- pdr. shown in Figs. 90 to 95, but differ from them in the substitution of a base ring called the " gas check," which is made of 100 parts of copper to 3 of zinc, and which presents no peculiarity. The service charge is 3 pounds 2 ounces of K. L. G. 2 powder, giving an initial velocity of 1,595 feet per second. The fuzes are identical with those described already. The shell is of cast iron. The base for half an inch is reduced to 1.87 inches in diameter and cast with a circular groove for attaching the gas check, and with twenty radial grooves by which the ring imparts rotation to the shell. The head is struck with a radius of one and a half diameters, the point truncated, bored out, and tapped to receive the fuze. The interior is lacquered with a composition of 12 parts of re-sin, 2 of Spanish brown, and 1 of plaster of Paris thinned with turpentine. Thelengthof the shell is 10.57 inches. The bursting charge is 10 ounces. When empty the shell weighs 12 pounds, and when filled and fuzed 13 i^ounds 6 ounces. The shrapnel is in two parts, the body and the head. The former is a cylinder of cast iron, fitted like the shell with a base ring. The head is of thin charcoal iron 0.148 inch thick, struck with a radius of 1.2 diam- eters, the point being truncated to receive a gun-metal bouching tapped to the fuze-gauge and soldered to the head. Within the head is a wooden block or former. The head is attached to the body by four steel screws. It contains 116 bullets at 34 to the pound, the interstices being filled in with resin. The total weight when ready for use is 13 pounds 2 ounces. A reference to Fig. 94 will make this description clear. The side of the case-shot is made of heavy tin. The top is of sheet- iron, No. 18 B. W, G., and is fixed to the case by turning over and sol- dering the notched ends of the case. A base ring of sheet-iron, jSTo. 12 B. W. G., is riveted to the bottom of the case. There is an inside lin- ing of sheet-iron. No. 14 B. W. G. The contents are 340 mixed metal bullets of 34 to the pound. The length is 9 inches, and the total weight is 13 pounds 7 ounces. (See Fig. 92.) The carriage is of steel. Its general design is made evident in Plate 73. The elevating apparatus (see Plates 73 and 77, Fig. 109) is worthy of especial attention. There are no axletree boxes. The bed on each side is fitted as a seat (see Plate 77, Fig. 108), mounted on springs and having guard-irons and a sliding foot-rest. Leather cases (see Plate 73) are fitted outside each bracket to carry two case-shot and two cartridges. An especial feature is the grease chamber in the front flange of the wheel. (See Plate 79, Figs. 107, 108. ) 240 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Both Steel and iron enter into the construction of the limber (see Plate 75), which has but two boxes. The projectiles, assorted, are carried in steel trays (see Plate 78), which are placed at the sides of the boxes, near the wheels, the inside compartment of each box serving as a recep- tacle for cartridges. These trays are too light. They have a tendency to^pound out of shaj)e in a hard march, and give much trouble in with- drawal. The artillery officers prefer the old plan adopted in the limber- boxes of the 16-pdrs. The shafts are " near and off," and the limber is fitted for single double, or treble draught. st^ The general dimensions of the carriage and limber are as follows : Height of center of gun 43 inches. Length : Carriage : With wheels 8 feet 4 inches. Without wheels 7 feet 3 inches. Axletrees 6 feet 2^ inches. Angle of trail .' 30°. Maximum elevation 16°, Maximum depression 5°. Wheels : Track 5 feet 2 inches. Diameter : 5 feet. Plate 76 represents the ammunition wagon. The front boxes carry seventeen assorted projectiles, stowed vertically about a canvas pocket containing as many filled cartridges. The other wagon boxes hold eighteen projectiles and their charges. The following diagrams give the distribution of the ammunition which habitually accompanies the guns, together with the tools and stores. BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 241 1 f^vel, under. 1st &TJ]Sr Jk.]SrD LTiytBER.. LIMBER. ON FOOTBOARD. 1 cartouche, leather, large. 1 pair drag ropes. 1 swingletrce, short traces, traces for hreast harness, ftamest 2 maUets. 1 felling axe. 1 pickaxe, under. NEAR BOX 3 swords and S carbines I (in cases) 1 spaae. f 1 hill hook. > under. 1 water carriage brush. ) OFF BOX in front of boxes. on top of Ud of box. 1 blanket. 1 com sack. I waterproof cover. S shrapnel, 16Juzes, time, ■wood with detonatorslBsecs. 6 shrapnel. 4 shells. 1 case shot. 18 JiUed cartridges in ca/rtowih. S shrapnel. 18 jUled cartridges in cartouch. B S shrapnel, i5 fuzes, time, wood with detonators ISsecs e shrapneL SshrapneL 4 sh£lls. 1 case shot. on top of lid of box. 1 blanket. 1 corn sack. 1 waterproof cover. 1 camp kettle, under. Knapsack. Knapsack. 2 leather buckets, under. 1 half round tin grease box I in leather 1 oil can. TRAY CONTAINING 18 percussion fuzes B. L. in tin box. §t^ SO fuzes, time, wood, with detonators IS seccs. BO friction tubes. 1 hook borers. 1 cylinder with 6 bits. S sponge cloths. S trace couples. 1 spring spike, 2 common spikes. 1 fv^e extractor. 1 key plug O. S. 1 lanyard. 1 instructions printed, 1 fQled cartridge. 1 tube, drill, dummy, in leather case. 1 case shot in leather case. Slbs. i case under. .B.S I GUN Deflector, under. ON TOP OF SEAT. 2 blanket, 1 Aoaterproof cover. "NEAR' SEAT B TRAY CONTAINING 18 percussion fuses B. L. in tin box. ^0 fuzes, time, wood, with detonators IB $es. of grease, in two tin magazine boxes under. 1 maul under. I .. „ .., -.^ , „„„„„ shajts, spare, under \ .."l^.T '^S' €°- 1 !f???!? 'off" with No. 2 wagon. Knapsack. 1 catridge and 1 shell with lanyard (d/ritt). 1 lb tow, 1 fin for horseshoe nails, in box under TRAY CONTAINING 1 lb. slow match. 1 skein Hambro line. 1 tube pocket with strap. 1 fuze pocket with hookborer TRAY CONTAINING 1 funnel, leather, 1 knife, clasp, 1 port-fire clipper. 1 screw driver, 1 dHft, wood. 1 pair scissors. 1 hold-all with 3 needles and S ozs. of silk. • 1 per division, with 1, S, and 5 ivagons. Weight packed without personal equipment. cfwts. qrs. 'Wagon S6 2 'Limber 18 1 Total 44 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 243 The total supply of ammunition with each gun is therefore — Shrapnel 108 SheU - - 30 Caniater 4 Total... 142 Cartridges 142 Friction tubes 175 Total 317 Time fuses 140 Percussion fuzes 72 Total.--.. - 212 The carriages of C.3 were of a different design and had longer trails, while the ammunition was carried on end in top lid boxes, as with the 16-pdr. The other batteries found that the short trail and its great angle were attended by the disadvantage that in soft soil the trail buries itself at each discharge, necessitating constant change of elevations, and threat- ening accident in some cases by excessive jumping. The 13-pdr. has a working range of about 6,000 yards. For use at that distance the gun has an elevation of 19° 06'; the time of flight of the projectile is 23.7 seconds ; its angle of descent 30° 42' ; its remaining velocity 644 feet per second. A comparison of the new and the old field pieces shows decreased proportional weight of gun to projectile, with greater velocity. Their relative accuracy may be gathered from the following figures, which hold good at the distance of 4,000 yards : With the 16-poimder. With the 13-pounder. Ten per cent, of rounds should fall within — A length of A width of A height of. Yards. 48.4 5.22 13.54 Yards. 38.4 2.28 10.40 These results are obtained by greater length of bore, 68.4 inches in the 16-pdr. and 84 inchea in the 13-pdr., an increase of 9 calibers ; by the use of a chamber ; by the adoption of a gas check or expansion ring, and by the heavier rates of charge to projectile. In the new gun the charge is nearly one-quarter of the weight of the projectile. It is worthy of remark that the use of wet sponges is forbidden with this gun, on the ground of increased residuum in the chamber, after fir- ing, which is difidcult to remove on account of the " choke." G-reat care in sponging is, however, strongly urged. It would strike one accus- tomed to liberal amounts of water in this connection that the care rec- 244 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. ommended would be more in place in the subsequent loading. It is but fair to say that no ill efitects were experienced through the adoption of this rule. As was the case with everything else on wheels, the country proved too heavy for the guns, or the guns too heavy for the country, reducing all movements to a slow and painful drag. Sif *Tiorses were originally assigned to each gun, but it was found necessary to increase the num- ber to ten, fourteen, in fact indefinitely, the war schedule of allowance being a mere estimate of probable needs. The battery drivers carried revolvers only, a special issue for the cam- paign, the other men being armed for the most part with cavalry sa- bers or sword-bayonets, according to the nature of the battery, whether horse or field. Each battery has 24 Martini-Henry carbines. Two are slung on each limber (gun and wagon), on the ammunition boxes above the foot board. The ammunition column, F.I, was designed to convey 30 spare rounds per gun in addition to the assorted projectiles and charges in the limbers and wagons, besides 360,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 40,000 rounds of carbine ammunition, &c. It was a reserve in all respects except that it brought out no guns. Four spare gun carriages were among its stores. It was expected that the column would serve as a distributor of ammu - nition of all kinds from the advance depot to the batteries and battal- ions at the front, the advance depot being in its turn supplied by the railway. The men and horses received the same special issues as those mentioned apropos of the cavalry. As regards mess arrangements, each battery has one cook, who is rarely changed. Each subdivision (gun's crew) is served by an orderly detailed for the day. This man draws the rations and gives them to the battery cook, receives the cooked food when ready, and attends generally to all the mess interests. The various detachments of the Eoyal Artillery embarked between August 3 and 9 at Portsmouth, Southampton, and London. The first to arrive at Alexandria was the field battery A.l, by the Palmyra, on the 14th, and the last the ammunition column, by the Texas, on the 25th of the same month. The artillery of the expedition was under the general command of Colonel W. H. Goodenough, E. A., who was given the local rank of Briga- dier-General. The artillery of the 1st division was commanded by Lieu- tenant-Colonel B. F. Schreiber, E. A., that of the 2d by Lieutenant-Col- onel F. C. Elton, E. A., and the Horse Artillery by Lieutenant-Colonel C. E. Nairnes, E. A. The artillery took no part in the preliminary operations about Alex- andria. The disembarkation was begun at Ismailia on August 22, and was pushed with all speed. The first engagement with the Egyptians in with the artillery took BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 245 part was that of August 24, near El Magfar. At 5 a. in. of that day two 13-pdrs. of Isr.A, Eoyal Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant S. 0. Hickman, started from Ismailia to join General Graham's force, then ordered to advance from IiTefiche. They pushed on at once past Neflche to El Magfar, and came into action on the right of the infantry, behind some low mounds, keeping up an unequal artillery duel all day, the Egyptians having twelve guns to assist this attack. At 5.45 p. m. the remaining four guns of the battery arrived from Ismailia, which they had left at 3 p. m., and the united battery soon silenced the Egyptian artillery, the range being from 2,000 to 2,600 yards. It was then shifted to the other flank near the canal, and an interchange of shell begun with the pieces on the Egyptian right, which lasted until dark. By this time Lieutenant Hickman's division had expended about one hun- dred rounds each, mostly shrapnel. It is difficult to obtain minute details of the effect of the British shell either during this or the subsequent engagements of the campaign. Under the circumstances, it is necessary to accept the main fact, that the enemy's guns were silenced in twenty minutes. On the other hand begins the testimony, which is repeated on every occasion, that the Egyptians served their own guns with unexpected skill. "The enemy- had the range, and burst his shells, as a rule, fairly well." It must be borne in mind that the almospheric phenomena peculiar io that region are hnoivn and understood hy the native, while distressing and misleading to the foreigner, who, on this occasion,had the sun fairly in his eyes after midday. One result of the operations of August 24 was the demonstration that the wheeled vehicles supplied were almost useless in the desert across which the army was now to advance. Except in Lieutenant Hickman's division, all the ammunition wagons had been left behind, " having stuck on the road, where they remained over the following day." To get the guns and limbers along was about all the battery horses could accom- plish even when exerting their greatest efforts. The advance was strengthened during the night of August 24 and 25 by the arrival, among other corps, of battery A.l, and, somewhat later, by two guns each of battery S".2 and battery G.B. In the marcli to the westward a ridge overlooking Tel-el-Mahuta was reached, from whence the Egyptions could be seen at work on their in trench ments. At this point the artillery on both sides began firing, but the duel was of short duration, as the cavalry and horse artillery and two guns of A.l turned the left flank of the Egyptians, who retreated to Mahsameh, throwing away arms, accouterments, and everything in their flight. The good work done by the cavalry and artillery did not cease here, but was repeated on beyond at Mahsameh. When within range of the camp there, the guns which had accompanied the cavalry opened on the camp and railway station, which were speedily evacuated, the mounted troops then dashing in and capturing the place. 246 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIQNS IN EGYPT. The artillery work on August 28 is described from notes of that engagement by Captain G. B. Martin, E. A. (aid-de-camp to General Goodenough), to whom nearly everything that is of interest in this section is due. Two guns of N.A arrived from Mabsameh at Kassassin about 11 a. m. (An 8«™ Krupp gun bad been mounted on a truck and protected by sand-bags and dragged up from Mabsameb. Tbis gun continued in action tbrougbout tbe day, and as soon as tbe men, tbe Royal Marine Artillery, became acquainted witb tbe division on tbe tangent scale it rendered effective service.) Tbe two guns N.A were in action on tbe rigbt of tbe railway for an bour, and tbeu bad to retire for want of ammunition. An ammunition-wagon, wbicb bad been sent after tbe two giins stuck in tbe sand, did not arrive until late in tbe day. Tbe remaining four guns of N.A advanced from Mabsameb witb tbe cavalry in tbe afternoon, and reacbed tbe plateau nortb of Kassassin about 5 p. m. These guns began the firing, which was succeeded by the moonlight charge of the Household Cavalry. The artillery enga-ged in the affair of September 9, at Kassassin, was as follows : iS".A, Eoyal Horse Artillery. G.B, Eoyal Horse Artillery. A.l, Eoyal Artillery. . D.l, Eoyal A.rtillery. 7.1, Northern division, mule battery. 5.1, Scottish division, 3 25-pdr. M. L. E. Eoyal Marine Artillery, 1 8"'"^ Krupp B. L. E. Eoyal Navy, 1 40-pdr. B. L. E. The last two were mounted on railway trucks. Captain Martin goes on to say : Tbe 8<^«^ Krupp was in front of tbe 40-pdr. Tbere being no siding at Kassassin, this could not be remedied. Tbe S"^" gun made good practice at trains bringing on tbe enemy's troops Tbe 40-pdr., being masked, could only fire occasionally Both these guns bad no motive power. Had there been any they would have been ex- tremely useful. The Krupp opened fire at 7.30 a, m,,in reply to some desultory firing of tbe eneriiy. , . Of A.l and D;l he says : These batteries were nortb of the camp, and fired at tbe enemy's guns ('2,000 yards off) and at infantry (about 1,200 yards off). The enemy's guiis were placed on Ninth Hill, their left extending beyond tbe British front and their rigbt resting on the canal, with a few troops south of the canal. The Egyptian fire on the gun-pits was very good. * " * A.l and D 1 left tbe gun^pits and advancedabout 100 yards. D.l fired from here at an Egyptian battery, A.l at two batteries and infantry in right center. About 8.30 a. m., A.l and D.l advanced again, tbis time 1,000 yards to the right front, and continued firing for an hour or so. The enemy's infantry fire continued, but at this time their gun-fire became slacker. * * * Our troops were ordered to advance and drive back the Egyptians. A.l and D. 1 therefore advanced independ- ently for two miles and a half or so, firiug at various ranges. They shot down the detachments of two Egyptian guns, which were taken possession of by our line as it advanced. About 3 miles from Tel-el-Kebir a halt was made, all our artillery keep- ing much tbe same relative distance as they formed with originally. The Egyptians BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 247 retired into their intrenchmeuts. A fiual advance of 1,000 yards or so was made by our side to see the iutrenchments and get an idea of them. At that time we were 5,000 yards or so from them. The action ended at 12.30, and the troops returned to Kassassin. N.A was with the cavalry division on plateau north of camp. * * » This flank was kept refused throughout the day. G.B about 7.30 a. m. was formed up some 1,500 yards to the right of A.l, on the north side of the camp. Their fire was directed chiefly towards the enemy's center. They advanced about 9.30 a. m., when A.l and D.l did, their movements conforming generally to those of the troops in our center. 7.1 came into the space between A.l and G.B about 8.30 a. m. * * * They were also directed by thei movements from our center. Additional technical notes on this action, the principal artillery affair of the campaign, are quoted as of extreme interest. They were made by Lieutenant Apsley Smith, E.. A., aid-de-camp to Lieutenant- Colonel Ilfairnes, E.. A., who directed the artillery on this occasion. The enemy stuck to their guns, and both their elevation and direction were good, but they used chiefly common shell, and with so small a charge (about one pound) the shells dropped at a very high angle, sinking deep, and, though exploding, doing hardly any damage. Except at first against the camp and gun-pits, their fire was not concentrated, but seemed to be directed against whatever battery of ours happened to be firing at or near them. They appeared to make good use of any cover afforded by the ground, and in one case the position of a battery, as shown by the wheel tracks, was remarkably good. I believe their ammunition- wagons Avere kept well in rear, more so than is usual in our own service. One or two of their shrapnel burst on graze, the bullets, ricochetting harmlessly along the ground, but I do not remember seeing any tioie-shrapnel bursts in air. On our side the batteries worked independently as far as the nature of ammunition, range, and object aimed at permitted, though no advance of any extent was made without orders. At first our shells, especially the 7 * and 13 pdrs., burst short and high, but for some time ijrevious to the advance one could see the time-shraxDuel, especially on our left front, causing considerable disturbance among the enemy. Although the batteries fired independently, each battery of six guns fired at the same or about the same object. When once otir artillery was fairly in action, and our infantry in position, the enemy never advanced another yard, and soon showed signs of wavering. But just at first his fire was so quick and accurate that I thought personally we had more guns opposing us than we really had. The light was good, the sun being behind us, but, probably from want of a well-defined object to lay on, I did not hear, except in one case, of any Watkins range-finders being of use. The wagons of our field batteries remained near them and were a good deal exposed. In the advance the batteries hardly worked together sufficiently, the ones in front taking up their position without much regard to a battery x>erhaps still in action behind and to their flank. I heard it remarked, with reference to this and other actions, that in ground like the desert it was a mistake to come into action just behind the crests of ridges, on account of the labor and delay of running up after each round. The two guns on the railway, and the three 25-pdrs., I saw nothing of, but they ex- peinded a lot of ammunition, and I heard made good practice. The 25-pdrs. fired over the heads of our infantry advancing along the railway and canal banks. The 40-pdr. was handicapped bj^ the Krupp in front, and could only fire to its right front. * Of the mtile battery, 7.1, Northern division. 248 BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITAEY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The performance of the artillery at Tel-el-Kebir, being but a phase of the battle and not the principal part of it, is given in the section treating of that action. The experience in Egypt with even the light 13-pdr. shows the car- riage (or indeed any carriage) too heavy for use in such a country. It would seem desirable, for service over light sandy soils, to devise some sort of broad tire capable of ready application to tJie wheels of all vehicles. There were no instances of breakdowns from slightness of construction 5 all the mishaps arose from sheer inability to get the weights across the desert with any speed approaching satisfaction. Such a tire would have proved of value, and its design appears to present no insuperable diffi- culty. An alternate solution of the question might be found in a wooden track, in pieces, which could be shifted from rear to front by hand, as the wheels left them. Under the actual circumstances the draught power had to be increased enormously to obtain even the snail like speed achieved. It is impossible to avoid instituting a comparison between the wheeled and the mountain batteries employed during the campaign, to the ad- vantage of the latter. The former threw heavier shell, but in range the latter was at least equal to the 16-pdr., while its greater mobility, the facility with which it could go anywhere and everywhere, across the desert or even along the narrow banks of the irrigation canals which cover the cultivated portion of Egypt as with a net-work, rendered it most valuable, and in the event of operations in the interior of the delta would have made it invaluable. The gist of this criticism is merely that Egypt is best suited to the employment of mule batteries. The testimony is unanimous as to the value of shrapnel when the fuze is properly cut. The Egyptians did not use this i)rojectile, as a rule, and their shell-fire occasioned more contempt than wounds, the British becoming accustomed to it and ceasing to dread it. The Brit- ish artillery, employing shrapnel almost exclusively, was more effective both physically and morally. The part the two 13-pdrs. took at El Magfar in repelling the attack was as much due to superiority jorojectile as to more able management. No step was made in this campaign towards solving the question of the muzzle-loader versus the breech-loader for a field piece. The Brit- ish had none of the latter type to pit in technical rivalry against their new and admirable 13 pdr., while the Krupp guns of the Egyptians were of the old pattern of 1868, burning too little powder to make them equal to their British competitors at any but short ranges. The skill, intelligence, and vigor which official dispatches attribute to the artillery operations of the campaign testify to admirable organiza- tion, careful equipment, and thorough training, and reflect credit on those immediately charged in the field with the direction of this branch of the British military service. BKITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 249 XXIII. THE BOYAL ENGINEERS. The engineer detachment in the British .expeditionary force in Egypt was composed of six companies, two troops, and a field park, the whole under the command of Colonel 0. B. P. ]^. H. Nugent, 0. B., R. B., to whom was given the local rank of Brigadier-General. The companies, according to their corps numbers, were the 8th, 17th, 18th, 21st, 24th, and 26th, and the troops were A and C. The 8th company receives special mention in Section XXIY of this report, under the title of " the Railway Company," and troop in Sec- tion XXV, which treats of "the Telegraph Troop." The 17th company, under Captain Elliott Wood, R. E., appears to have been a sort of maid of all work. Its ^personnel was composed of 2 cap- tains, 2 lieutenants, 85 non-commissioned officers and men, a total of 89. The company was armed with Martini-Henry rifles and sword-bayo- nets. It came from Malta in H. M. S. Northumberland, arriving at Alexandria on July 17, and was the pioneer of its corps in Egypt. It marched at once to Gabarri, each man carrying a tool of some kind, ready to repair the defenses of the place. The men and officers slept in a large cotton storehouse during their stay in Alexandria. The following paragraphs are taken from notes kindly furnished by Captain Wood : Large quantities of stores, iucluding 50,000 sand-bags aud 1,300 sliovels, had been brought with the company, and were far in excess of what would accompany it in the field. The company had started at a few hours' notice from Malta, and its transport had to be entirely organized, as drivers, even, did not exist. This was at once taken in hand, while defensive works were pushed with all dispatch. These consisted in repairing or retrenching old breaches in the enceinte, one being of great extent ; putting the draw-bridges in working order, laying fougasses, erecting heavy stone barricades, &c., on which working parties of other corps and Arabs were also employed, under the Royal Engineers. The hours for the Sappers were as follows: After breakfast of coffee and biscuit, parade for work at 4.30 a. m. ; 12 to 2 p. m. dinner, cooked at the works; return to quarters at from 5 to 6.30 p. m. On July 22, Lieutenant Heath and a detachment of Royal Engineers removed part of the railway beyond Mellaha Junction. (See Plates 44 and 45.) This operation was conducted under fire from the enemy. On July 24, half the company, under Captain Wood, accompanied the South Staffordshire Regiment and the 3d battalion of the Rifles in the advance to Ramleh, and began at once putting the water-works and water-tower in a state of defense, as detailed on p. 158. On August 7, the 2l8t company. Royal Engineers, landed, so that the half company of the 17th left at Alexandria marched to Ramleh, having been in the mean while occu- pied as before on the defenses, constructing stone block-houses, sinking wells, &c. 250 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The special services rendered by this company -may be briefly men- tioned thus : On July 20. Captain Hyslop and 20 sappers, with a strong covering party, left, by night, in a train from Grabarri, while Lieutenant Thomson started with a similar party from Eamleh. The two detachments met at Mellaha Junction, repaired the lines at that point, and brought some rolling-stock around from Gabarri to the Moharem Bey Line, where it was much needed. On another occasion, reports of an intended flank attack by Arabi caused tbe half company at Ramleh to be suddenly ordered out at midnight to throw up a gun breast- work across the line towards Mellaha Junction. A covering party was thrown forwards as far as the Junction, and a working party from a line battalion assisted on the breastwork, so that a parapet revetted solidly with railway iron and sand-bags was thrown ux) and the party quietly withdrawn. Other technical operations were conducted at Kamleh, some of them in exposed situations almost inviting attack. On the afternoon of August 17, an order was given to embark at Alexandria, and that evening half the company, with 24 carts and six pack animals carrying equipment, started, while the remainder made an early march next day, and the surplus stores came in by train. These consisted of large quantities of sand-bags, tools, and pumps (tripod and Abyssinian or " Nortons"). The transport Nerissa, carrying the 17th company and the Royal Marine Artillery, was the first in the Suez Canal, but eventually stuck hard and fast about three miles from the pier at Ismailia, so that it was not until 2 a. m. on the 21at that a landing was effected in support of the small force holding the place. The Royal Engineers bivouacked in a street, and were early at work landing stores, improving roads (for each man landed with a tool), and making arrangements for watering-places. A Royal Engineer park was started, the railway, towards Nefiche repaired, the extension of the line from the station to the pier commenced,, and the telegraph staff assisted. The water in the Fresh Water Canal was husbanded by stopping the leaks in the locks and raising the overflow of the lower lock. This had to be done afresh when- ever boats were passed up into the canal for water transport. August 24, Lieutenant Heath, with six sappers, three carts, and a working party of 18 of the York and Lancaster Regiment, accompanied the advance of General Graham's force beyond Nefiche, rejiaired the railway under distant shell-fire, reached the daitt on the canal at El Magfar, and commenced hasty defenses. The carts, carrying two of the pontoons brought from Ramleh, drew a heavy shell- fire, but the shells, as usual, being badly fuzed, did no damage. These pontoons were rafted on the canal above the dam and carried rations on to the cavalry when land transport could not keep up owing to deep sands. On August 25, the removal of the dam was commenced, and about midnight on the 26th Captain Wood and 30 sappers arrived by boat and set to work, so that by 4.30 a. m., the 27th, a passage for steam-cutters was just practicable. This dam is met with in all accounts of the advance to Kassassin. It received the united attention of both arms of the service, for Lieu- tenant King-Harman, R. N^., was left behind from the Naval Battery, in its march of the 25th, and was told to do his best to blow up the ob- struction. He had with him a small party of skilled men, charges of gun-cotton, fuzes, &c. He tried the effect of this explosive on the dam, BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 251 varying the conditions each time/ in the hope of success. The heaviest explosion was of a series of charges planted in two parallel lines 8 feet 6 inches apart, 33 pounds of gun-cotton in all. The effect was to cut a trench through the dam and pile up the mud which had been displaced at each end of the trench. Lieutenant King-Harman calls it " a vile job," and says that the means adopted proved inadequate. It was finally necessary to resort to the slower process of removal by hand, and strong parties of The Guards brigade kept at work on it until a sufftcient channel was made through it. Captain Wood continues : A disabled dredge was got into working order and pusted througLt next day for the dam at Tel-el-Mahuta, with Lieutenant Heath's party. This dam was constructed of sand only, about 50 feet thick and 12 feet high above the water, which was here about 70 feet wide. The dam at ElMagfar, however, was far more formidable ; it was formed of long, strong reeds, tied and matted to- gether and solidly compressed by the superincumbent weight, so that neither picks, shovels, specially made hoes, nor rakes could make any impression on the part below water. Telegraph posts, tied together with wire, were bedded in it and piles also driven. Gun-cotton in coffee and biscuit tins, holding from 3 to 10 pounds, was re- sorted to, but the work was continually interrupted in order to haul boats through, and the level of the water was continually falling, so that the work was heavy and continuous. On the evening of August 31 the company started for Kassassiu, marching nine miles across the desert in three hours, the small pack-mules carrying 160 pounds, the large mules drawing 400 pounds, and a couple of spare mules, with lead traces, being ready to hook on in case of a difficulty ; the heaviest stores, such as smith's forge, coal, ten tents, &.c., coming by water on the ponton rafts. Bivouac was formed with carts around, as an attack by Bedouins had been reported probable ; and the next moi'ning Kassassin was reached. Here defensive and other works were at once commenced. Millet was formed into fascines, and strong revet- ments formed by driving the butts of stalks into each row and bending the tops over into the parapet, by which the fascines were securely anchored. The falling of the water in the canal rendered it necessary to send both subalterns back, each with twenty sappers, to the two dams, to widen and deepen the channels. This repeated labor on the obstructions in the Sweet Water Canal earned for Captain Wood's command the equivocal title of " the dam company." The company was exposed on September 9 to the shell-fire of the Egyptian attack, and lost some of its animals. On the 13th of September the company struck camp at 2 a. m., had coffee, and started with the following equipment, having orders to conform to the movements of the army and to open a passage through the dam near Tel-el-Kebir : Eight pack-mules, carrying tool-chests and shovels (30 in a load weigh 160 pounds), and 15 carts, carrying, as usual, two days' forage, rations, valises, tools, demolition stores, rope, wire, sand-bags, reserve ammunition, stretchers, &c. One raft was made of 48 wheeling planks, carrying on it the composite beams and wheelbarrows. Two rafts, formed each of two pontons, and one single ponton, carrying pumps and hose, forge, 2^ cwt. anvil, smith's tools, scaling ladders, sand-bags, gun-cotton, crowbars) shovels, and other stores. Total number of shovels, 200; of sand-bags, 3,000. Abun- dance of bill-hooks, gabion knives, fine wire and spun-yarn for cutting and making millet into fascines was carried. The rafts were attached one in rear of the other, and a couple of mules harnessed on either bank, so as to keep the rafts more easily in the 252 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. middle of the stream and to keep them going when reeds or anything else interfered with the fraction on one side. The company came under shell-fire, pitched camp at the dam, which was in thelines of Tel-el-Kebir, and commenced to remove it forthwith. It was 50 feet thick at the water line, hut of small height, and was only constructed with sand, so that in twenty- four hours it was practically removed, the 17th company being relieved by the 24th and 26th companies, Royal Engineers. Next day the 17th comj)any left its camp for Cairo. ^The transport, with light loads, marching along the railway, reached Benha (42 miles) in two days. This company still remains in Egypt and is stationed at Cairo. The rather lengthy account of its work is warranted by the prominent part it took in all the operations of the campaign and by the light it throws on the difficulties encountered in Egypt and the measures chosen to overcome them. The 18th company of Sappers, 100 strong, under Major W. Salmond, R. E., remained at Ismailia as a reserve at the base, establishing the engineer park, and handling and forwarding as necessary the stores coming under that department. The 21st company, under Captain A. E. Puzy, came from Cyprus to Alexandria on August 8. It numbered a subaltern and 54 men. It con- tinued and concluded the work begun by its predecessor, as well as con- tributing to the defense of the place in other ways. It remains in Egypt as part of the garrison of Alexandria. The 24th comjjany, under Captain C. de B. Carey, R. E,, was attached to the 1st division, forming a portion of the divisional troops. Its^er- sonnel was 2 cai)tains, 3 lieutenants, 1 surgeon, and 185 non-commis- sioned officers and men, a total of 191. It had 37 horses and 10 carts. It joined the 1st division, under General Willis, at Tel-el-Mahuta, on August 26. At this point, aided by fatigue parties from various line battalions, it shared with the 17th company the labor of removing the dam in the Sweet Water Canal. On September 4 this company made an attempt to obtain a supply of drinking water by sinking tube wells. The blocking of the water above, and its enforced retention between the locks at Kassassin and Ismailia, had made it stagnant, the constant traffic through the canal had kept the mud stirred up, while the dead bodies in the canal, whether there by accident or design, had vitiated the water to an alarming extent. The attempt to obtain potable water elsewhere was not crowned with success. Brackish water was found at iive feet below the surface, and although the tubes were driven ten feet further, no improvement in the quality of the water was detected. The army therefore continued to make use of the canal water, and, happily, without experiencing ill re- sults. In other respects the history of this company is the history of the 1st division. The 26th company, under the command of Major B. Blood, R. E., was attached to the 2d division as a field company. In organization, number, and equipment it was similar to the 24th company. For the sake of BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 253 clearness the following table is added, as giving the established organ- ization of a field company of Eoyal Engineers : Rank. Major Captain Lieutenant. Surgeon ... Total Sergeants Corporals Second corporals. Shoeing-smith ... Sappers Drivers Trumpeters Buglers Batmen Total 38 134 165 Horses. 24 24 Total personnel, 203 ; animals, 46 ; wagons, 6. It was even later in reaching the front than its colleagues in the 1st division, only arriving at Kassassin a few days before the battle of Tel- el-Kebir. It took part in this action, being exposed to heavy fire on the extreme left, near the canal bank. After the works were carried, the company was sent to remove a barrier which had been built across the railway as part of the general lines of Tel-el-Kebir, and to dig away the dam in the Sweet Water Canal. These proved no very serious obsta- cles, and disappeared after two or three hours' work. The company then pushed on to Benha. It is now in Cairo as part of the army of occupation. The Pontoon Troop A, commanded by Major E. J. Bond, was not up to the standard organization in either men or equipment. Its personnel was 1 major, 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 1 surgeon, 1 veterinary surgeon, 7 officers, and 194 non-commissioned officers and men, instead of 1 major, 1 captain, 4 lieutenants, 1 surgeon, 1 veterinary surgeon, 1 quartermas- ter, 9 officers, and 320 non-commissioned officers and men. Its equipment was 61 horses, 10 pontoon wagons, and 20 carts (instead of 243 horses, 20 pontoon wagons, 4 trestle wagons, 6 store wagons), and 1 forge cart, besides Berthon's collapsible boats and Blanchard's pon- toons for 3 bridges each. The pontoon bridge is formed of pontoons kept at 15 feet central in- tervals by balks fitting on to saddles resting on central saddle-beams. The number of balks used is five for the advanced bridge and nine for the heavy bridge for siege artillery ; they support chesses, which are kept in position by a riband on each side, racked down by rack- lashings to the outer balk, and leaving a clear roadway of 9 feet. It was calculated that the pontoons should not be immersed to within 254 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY . OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 1 foot from the tops of their coamings when carrying their ordinary loads of infantry, in marching order, in fours crowded at a check, or car- -Fi^.llS. -2l'.7" Weight 7 etui-. Fi^.116. elP Saddle Beam-, it^l lis. End, JJlevation ^'^^m 27hwar&, Top ^ -.-4J.6"- Section, oivA.Ti. Fig. 118. Details of Sitpersirueiure . ScadJi^. ~}}Fvg.ll9 \_ --- tS' 9"—- Weight rS lis. ® -^ 1^ 7 i2"~-r " ^Fiq.120 I Bottom Edqe. H _ Xr> a"- yt^^"zr^^ ' ^^ _ Z) -iS!9 Chess. "^^^IT -4;^ ^ iV Fiff.iai. AlThS.ThicK. -ilO'.O WeLgrhtSOlis. D°C l«l I TnrJl£Sl u\dy of men with entirely different traditions and associations, and had nothing in common with the soldiers whose infractions of discipline they were esiiecially designed to check. The police work in the desert w^as very light, as might have been expected, but it increased greatly after reaching Cairo. The good be- havior of the troops on the whole was a matter of constant remark. The writer of this report takes pleasure in recording, as the result of his own observation, extending over many weeks, the rarity of cases of in- toxication or other misdemeanor, the soldierly bearing, neat appearance, and generally good behavior of the British troops in Egypt. Exceptions to this rule did occur, as a matter of course, one being of a serious and disgraceful nature. Two men of the Royal Irish Eegiment committed a grave crime in the village of Tel-el-Kebir, just after the battle, and received in punishment seven years' iienal servitude. Great dissatisfaction was felt on the part of the British officers with the lack of a means of summary punishment to take the place of flogging. Confinement remains now, practically, the sole mode of punishment. The guarding of one prisoner involves the labor of at least four other men, 288 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPi^RATIONS IN EGYPT. tcJiose services are lost in more useful ways, while the prisoner Jiimself is relieved of disagreeahle, painful, and at times perilous duty, is well shel- tered, well fed, and othericise scrupulously cared for. During the cami)aign, men sentenced to imprisonment of less than six weeks were retained with their regiments or corps; if more than six weeks and less than six months, they were sent to a base prison at Alex- andria, and if of more than six months, the3^ went hack to England. The hands of the Provost-Marshal were greatly strengthened by the co-operation of the native magistrates, who might be trusted to mete out a full measure of justice to inhabitants apprehended in acts prejudicial to the good order of the troops or to the peace of the neighborhood. Under other and ordinary circumstances the Military Police itself must have had cognizance of and jurisdiction in all such cases. The plan of having a separate corps, clothed with special powers, to look after instances of disorder among the troops, derives further war- rant to careful consideration from the success which attended its prac- tice during this campaign. XXVIII. THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. This section is rather a collection of notes, which may serve to make the arrangements and methods adopted in Egypt reasonably clear, than a treatise on the subject of army hospitals and hospital practice in gen- eral. The Medical Department of the British army has undergone within the last fifteen years ira]:)ortant and wide-reaching changes. Formerly the Surgeon was an officer regularly attached to a regiment or corps, and he served with it until promoted to wider fields of usefulness. Identified with the fortunes of the regiment and intimately acquainted with the physical history of the men, his value was great if his sphere was somewhat restricted. The withdrawal of the Surgeons from the direct authority of the Prin- cipal Medical Officer of the station or district, which was involved in their being made subject to their iuimediate military superiors in the corps to which they were gazetted, was regarded with disfavor, and the system known as "unification" was introduced. According to this, a Surgeon is assigned to temporary duty with a particular body of men after they reach their destination. Thus a battalion proceeding to the West Indies would leave England either with its former Medical Officer retained for the voyage out or with one detailed for the time being. On arrival at its post, the local Principal Medical Officer would order one of his subordinates to care for the wants of its members. This unification is a hotly-debated point, much being advanced in way of argument on each side. In its favor are urged a more direct pro- fessional accountability for proper methods and treatment, as well as BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 289 record, an escape from non professional military control, simplification of the hospital service, and increased economy. Against it may be put the testimony of individual representatives of the medical corps, to the effect that the younger officers are not so desirable socially now as formerly ; that the surgeon no longer knows his patients, thus render- ing malingering much more easy than previously; that the medical officers are too anxious for military distinction, pressing to the front to the neglect of their own duty, &c. When doctors disagree, who shall decide ? One result is the concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of the Principal Medical Officer of the Force or District. He exercises command over all officers and men of the Medical Department proper or the Army Hospital Corps, and medical supervision and superintend- ence over all hospitals. These responsible duties were performed in Egypt by Deputy Sur- geon-General J. A. Hanbury, M. B., C. B., with the local rank of Sur- geon General. As his chief assistant, under the title of " Sanitary Officer," was Bri- gade-Surgeon J. A. Marston, M. D., with the temporary rank of Deputy Surgeon-General. It may be well to remark that in England a special corps, the Army Hospital Corps, is organized to carry on the hospital service and to di- rect the " bearer columns " charged with the collection of the wounded after a battle, and their transport to the stations where the wounds are temporarily dressed, prior to removal to the established hospitals. This corps may be described as a sort of lay handmaid to the Medical Depart- ment. Its officers are " Captains of Orderlies " and " Lieutenants of Or- derlies," and it is mostly recruited from the ranks of the army. For the second service mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, the handling of the wounded, what are known as " bearer companies" are formed, the -professional persomiel and equipment being drawn from the Army Medical Department and the Army Hospital Corps, while the necessary animals and drivers are furnished by the Commissariat and Transport Corps. In Egypt, each bearer company was organized as shown in the an- nexed table : o •J? B a o se s 02 a O §0 1/3 73 1 o a 'B d a 1 3 £ o m a g 1 ® e a SS d d s k - p n 1 Horses. Corps. Oflaeers. d d P ^1 4 4 6 2 6 5 5 1 19 1 1 1 1 145 10 61 Commissariat and Transport Corps . . . 55 1 17 Total 4 4 1 1 2 155 55 7 2 6 1 26 78 H. Mis. 29 19 290 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The mules were mainly to carry 26 litters and 60 cacolets iu pairs. A cacolet is a frame for transporting a man in a sitting posture — a sort ot arm -eh air at the side of a mule. Each bearer company has two operating tents and a full equipment of materials for establishing dressing stations. Sick-carriage is provided at the rate of 10 per cent, of the force. Dressing stations are pitched as near the battle-field as practicable, and are indicated by the Geneva Cross. The two bearer companies were divided into half companies. The latter were distributed as follows : Eight half of No. 1 Company, 1st division. Left half of No. 1 Company, 2d division. Eight half of No. 2 Company, cavalry division. Left half of No. 2 Company was htft at Alexandria, for use there and at Eamleh. The field hospital is planned to accommodate 200 patients, and is arranged in four sections. The establishment is as follows : Surgeons- major, 3; Surgeons, 4; Captain of Orderlies, 1. Total officers, 8; non- commissioned officers and men, 37. The field-hospital tent is of the Bell pattern, double fly, and can con- tain four patients. Of these there are fifty, besides ten operating tents and tents for the personnel. The field hospitals were eight in number, distributed as follows : No. 1 at Alexandria. No. 2 was stationed at Tel-el-Mahuta, afterwards at Kassassin, and was attached to the 1st division. It was closed at Ismailia on Septem- ber 21. No. 3 acted as a base hospital at Ismailia for a few days. It after- ward proceeded by rail to Kassassin, and finallj^ to Cairo. No. 4 remained at Ismailia as part of the base hospital until moved to Cairo, after the occupation. No. 5 at Eamleh. No. 6. Of this, one-half remained at Ismailia with the base hospital, the other at Mahsameh, at the cavalry camp. The two were amalga- mated after Tel-el Kebir and brought to Cairo. No. 7 acted as part of the base hospital at Ismailia, and afterwards was transferred to Cairo. No. 8 at Ismailia. Each field hospital had a clever carpenter, capable of making any de- sired form of splint. The mattresses supplied are in four parts (divided transversely), so that any portion may be removed from under a patient for purposes of inspection or operation. Two base hospitals were formed. One at Alexandria, administered by No. 1 field hospital, was supplied with cots from home. Its capacity was 500 beds. A cotton warehouse BRITISH NAVAL, AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 291 was appropriated for this purpose — a large, airy builcling, well adapted to such use. At Ismailia, as already mentioned elsewhere, the Khedive's palace was utilized as the principal base hospital. This is a large two-storied edifice, in the Italian style, with ample wings and high ceilings. It was most valuable in this connection, the walls being thick enough to resist tbe rays of the sun, while the window-shutters permitted the keeping out of tbe brilliant light, and, what was of even more importance, the persistent Egyptian fly. The principal want in this hospital was a sufficient distribution of water. The latrines were even here in shocking condition and of a type not known in Christian countries. Earth-closets were soon provided and the latrines closed. The accommodation aftbrded by the palace was supplemented as needed by tents. The personnel was drawn from No. 4, a portion of l!ifo. 6, and the medical staff of No. 7 and of No. 8 field hospitals. Eeserve hospitals were established at Cyprus and Gozo. The former had 400 beds, with a staff of 8 medical officers, one officer of orderlies, and 20 non-commissioned officers and men ; the latter, 200 beds, with 4 medical officers, one officer of orderlies, and 12 non-commissioned offi- cers and men. Two hospital ships were stationed at Ismailia — the Carthage, a fine, large, new mail steamer of the Peninsular and Oriental Line, and the Courland, designed primarily for wounded and bad cases. Their capacity was 270 beds, and their personnel was 8 medical officers, 1 officer of orderlies, and 26 non-commissioned officers and men. The messing for sick or wounded was at the rate of 36-. 6d. per diem? and was undertaken by the owners. These vessels were supplemented by five auxiliary hospital ships, the Orentos, Tamar, Iberia, Lusitania, and Nepaul, whose services could be utilized as desired. Each was capable of making up, on the average, 300 beds, with a due proportion of medical officers and hospital order- lies. To suj)p]y ice, that essential in medical or surgical practice in hot countries, /owr large ice-machines were sent out. One was mounted at Ismailia, at the mouth of the Sweet Water Canal, and one at Alexan- dria. Two others were brought out in the Carthage, but never set up. Five cwt. of the article was sent daily to the front. As volunteer aids, 23 female nurses and 2 superintendents came from England, members of the Netley National Aid Society. These good woQien and invaluable assistants were distributed as follows: Four nurses on board the hospital ship Carthage. Four nurses at base hospital, Alexandria. Seven nurses at base hospital, Ismailia. One superiuteudent and four nurses at Gozo. One superintendent and four nurses at Cyprus. 292 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The medical comforts were provided on a liberal scale. They con sisted of brandy, champag-ne, other wines of various kinds, soups, beer, milk, arrowroot, jelly, ice, &c. They were distributed among the base and field hospitals for use, besides a large supply at the advanced depot at Kassassin. The hospital diet was the army ration supplemented by such medical comforts as were deemed necessary. The men who became ineffective were s'hipped as fast as possible to England, Malta, &c. It was thought best to keep the hos pitals in Egypt free, as well as to give the sufferers the increased chance afforded by cooler climate and more favorable surroundings. The question of temporary or permanent invaliding was decided later, according to the merits of each case. The diseases mostly encountered were dysentery, diarrhoea, heat apo- plexy, fever, and a small amount of ophthalmia towards the end of the campaign. The number of cases, percentage, &c., could not be deter- mined. The Sweet Water Canal, whose condition has been frequently referred to in this report, did not, as was feared, give rise to disease, or if it was instrumental in producing, for instance, diarrhoea, it could only have been to a very slight extent, for this class of malady was found even among men who drank distilled water exclusively. The muddiness of this particular water was of small moment, as pocket filters were issued to the troops at the rate of one to about every fifteen men ; and lacking these, filters could be readily improvised from tin cans, &c., or the sedi- ment could be precipitated by the addition of a small quantity of alum. It must rather be accepted as a fact that the dysenteric troubles found their cause in the heat and exposure to which the soldiers were sub- jected. Antiseptic surgery was employed from the first. The wounds, when ready for dressing, were washed with very dilute carbolic acid and then dusted with iodoform. The bandages were either of carbolic acid gauze or boracic-acid lint, a protector inclosing all. Before the operation the surgeon's hands and the surgical instruments were dipped in weak car- bolic acid. The results of this treatment were considered to be good, but they had not been worked out in detail or tabulated. Heat apoplexy was probably the only true climatic disease. The arrangements at Tel-el-Kebir comprised a dressing station of twenty-five tents near the dam in the Sweet Water Canal, under Dep- uty Surgeon-General Marston, aided by 2 surgeons-major, 3 surgeons, 3 temporary assistants, and 1 volunteer, 10 in all, with 17 men of the Army Hospital Corps. The plan pursued in each case was : 1st. To give the wounded man a little opium. This had the effect of quieting him until his turn came for operation, 2d. A drink of water was administered and then such food given as ■ seemed advisable— beef, beef *tea, milk, &c. By this time the patient BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 293 was as nearly comfortable as j)Ossible, audcould await without uneasi- ness the leisure of the surgeon. 3d. Examiuation of the wound. 4th. Such operation as was absolutely necessary. 5th. Transport down the canal to Kassassin, the sufferer being thor- oughly nursed and nourished. A medical of&cer accompanied each tow. Three Egyptian tents were utilized at Telel-Kebir. Two amputa- tions were made and numberless other operations. In all, 180 Euro- peans were treated and nourished at this station. The followiug paragraphs are from notes of a conversation with Dep- uty Surgeon- General Marston, and contain some of the suggestions of his experience. The language is not his. Do not hesitate to move a wounded man if necessary. Do not move liim from the stretcher he is on unless necessary. It is far better to move the wounded than have the Avards crow^ded. There are usually too many paraphernalia about a hospital and too much medicine. All medicine should be put up in its most compact and concentrated form. The necessary solution can be made on the spot. The first dressing of a wound on the battle-field should be as simple as possible, for usually there is not time to do the work well. It should be a small bandage lightly put on; otherwise the limb swells above and below and gives pain to the patient and trouble to the operator. Every officer and man should be labeled in some simple and effective way for identification if killed, or wounded beyond the power of speech. Iron tubing | inch in diameter can be fashioned by an ordinarily good smith into a great variety of useful appliances. A very simple yet efficient mode of relieving a wound from pressure is by means of a rough cage made of three wooden battens bent into shape, pushed under the bed-clothes. A large one covered with mosquito netting may be used to keep out insects. On the 'inside at the top a hook is placed, to which is hung a bottle containing antiseptic lotion, with a camel's-hair brush in the mouth of the bottle. The patient, if strong enough, is ordered to use this on his wound or bandage frequently (thus giving him an occu- pation), and to throw it into the fire when the wound is healed. The disposition of olfal is an important point. If a harbor is at hand, an easy method is hy filling the windpipes of slaughtered animals with sand and sinking them in the sea. Onshore, dead animals should be buried to leeward of mounds or sand hills, with reference to the prevailing wind. It was found in Egypt that if buried to windward they were soon uncovered. If it is not possible to bury animals, they should be ripped up and the viscera interred and fire applied to the inside of the body. Lastly, if even this be impracticable, stab the body all over; it will soon dry up and give little or no offense. The dry-earth system of latrines, if well looked to, leaves nothing to be desired. An ounce of MacDougall's powder should be added to every few pounds of earth. If doors and windows are left open, amputations may be made without fear. The stools should be removed twice daily without fail. In dry climates a little carelessness about nuisances buried will produce no harm, but if the weather be rainy it is impossible to take too great precautions in this matter. The necessities of a hospital may be arranged in the followiug order of inij>ortance : 1st. Feeding. 2d. Latrines. 3d. Washing accommodation. 4tb. Nursing and clothing. 5th, and last. Physics. 294 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. In selecting a building for temporary uae as a hospital, the lirst thing to attend to is ample 'movement of air. Knock out window-sashes, make holes in ceilings and in gable ends, but be sure to get fresh air in abundance. Tools, materials, and other accessories are of secondary inportance. A very few appliances will suffice, but the men must be well trained. The practical good sense of the foregoing remarks is obvious, and should be of value to the layman as well as to the professional man. The temperature in Egypt was the only meteorological phenomenen subject to much change. The wind was constant from the northward and the sky rarely clouded. Of rain there was none. The thermometer ranged in the daytime from 90° to nearly 100° Fahrenheit. A few observations on this score may be quoted : August 27, 1 p. m., 94°; August 31, 96°; September 1, evening, 80°; September 11, 11 a. m., 93°, with fresh breeze blowing at the time. Each man carried on his person a supply of lint and bandages for preliminary dressings. The medical comforts issued at Kassassin on September 9 included such unwonted delicacies as iced champagne. Although no pains had been spared by the authorities to provide for the proper treatment of the sick and wounded, it would appear that the details were not always carried out with the same scrupulousness, and much discontent was felt and expressed. One officer who was sent wounded to the Carthage found the food provided scant in quantity and indifferent in quality, while the medical officers on board lived in comparative luxury. His indignant complaint was attended by an im- provement in fare, jke exonerated the medical authorities from blame, attributing the faults to the steamer people, "who had to make three shillings and sixpence worth of food do for one person." But should a wounded officer be obliged to protest against such treatment in a hos- pital ship? Another officer j^resented himself wounded at the field hospital at Kassassin after the night charge of August 28. He found no food or water, and there was no latrine for his use. When he complained of hunger he was merely asked why he had not brought his rations with him. The whole subject has been investigated by a Parliamentary commis- sion, whose report* is not yet made public, but it is believed that the deficiencies were in minor matters, and were mainly experienced in the early stages of the campaign, when all corps were alike hampered by lack of transport. A ready means of recognising the surgeon at a distance is absolutely in- dispensable. Sis uniform should he so distinct from all others that no doubt can exist on this point. *Tbi8 report, contained in a Parliamentary blue-book of over 700 pages, gives much valuable information : Army Hospital Service Inquiry Committee, printed by George E. B. Eyre and William Spottiswoode, East Harding street, Fleet street, Lon- don. Price, 10 shillings.— O. N. I. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 295 XXIX. JPiff.149. Mg.l49. THE ARMY POST-OFFICE, Mail facilities were provided for the army in the field by the only organization in Egypt which contained no regular troops, but was com- posed of volunteers exclu sively. Its members were taken from the 24th Mid- dlesex Eegiment, of the Eifle Volunteer force, a regiment formed ol em- ployes and oificials in the General Post-Office, in London. The corps consisted of Major George H. Sturgeon? 1 captain, 1 staff sergeant, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, and 33 men, all of whom had applied for this serv- ice. The sergeants had all been postmasters at vari- ous branch offices. During their absence they were granted a continuance of their salaries from the Post-OfiSce, and, in addition, received army pay ; that is, sergeants 2s. 4d., corporals Is. 8d., and privates Is. per diem. The non-commissioned officers wore swords and revolvers, the privates swords only. A complete and light field equipment was jirovided, some points of which are worthy of mention as being serviceable and convenient. The tent is shown in Fig. 148. The frame is of round wooden poles, socket-jointed at the middle, about 2^ inches in diameter. The uprights set into square sill pieces, also in two parts, pinned together. The cor- ner junctions are sketched roughly in Fig. 149. The gable-ends are made by longer poles, which project beyond the roof and carry a second ridge pole, over which a second roof or fly may be drawn backwards or forwards as desired. The rear may be raised to make a sort of booth and give increased space under cover. The ground dimensions are 10 feet square. The uprights are secured by rope guys, which run from the upper extremities and are made fast to the sill pieces. The total weight is 156 pounds. The newspaper sorting box is shown in Fig. 150. The back is of canvas. By withdrawing the retaining keys a a the sides can be folded around upon the top and bottom, to which they are respectively hinged. 296 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 1 foot by 10 inches. The hinges at the corners of the pigeon-holes permit the shelves to fold together, and the whole aftair makes a compact package, 4 feet 9 inches by The sorting box for letters is similar in design, but smaller, being 3 feet long by 2 feet wide and 8 inches deep. It has forty pigeon-holes. A very handy sorting jjouch, made of canvas and used at temporary stations, is shown in Fig. 151 . It can be strapped to the ridge pole or eaves pieces of the tent. The portable table has a deal top, to '' which a stamping pad is fixed. The legs fold up underneath, or are spread out and hooked in place, as desired. The sorting boxes are transported in a large canvas bag, together with the table. 3ft. Jp^.isa JMffJJl'. Fig. 152 represents a standing canvas pouch supported by sticks pass- ing through canvas lugs on the outside, and entering canvas caps, as shown. This was convenient when placed at the end of the stamping- table. The office lanterns were 8imj)le tin frames with three glass sides. A field office was established at Ramleh, and one sergeant and four men were left to operate a main distributing office at Port Said. Here BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 297 the mail for each battalion or corps was put into a bag by itself and sent to the front. Field offices were maintained at Mahuta, Mahsameh, and Kassassin, and a daily service kept up after August 27. The home mails were three in number weekly, each way. These post-offices af- forded the same facilities for transmitting small amounts of money as are offered by those of the United Kingdom. The service was carried on to the satisfaction of those in the field, and no complaints were heard. XXX. THE INDIAN CONTINGENT. The soldiers from the United Kingdom, spoken of collectively as "Im- perial Troops," were in large majority in the British expeditionary force in Egypt. They were the earliest to arrive, and some of them still re- main supporting the Khedive's authority. They were the first in indi- vidual importance to the people at home ; they received constant and kindly notice at the hands of the newspaper press ; they were massed together at Tel-el-Kebir, and they won the principal part of the honors of that day. But they were not alone in their work. Soon after reach- ing Kassassin they were joined by a strong detachment of Her Majesty's Indian subjects, known as the "Indian Contingent," a body so peculiar in all respects as to require notice apart, the differences in organization and equipment between it and the Imperial Troops being too great to permit of joint treatment. The approximate strength of the Contingent was to be as follows : European troops 2, 000 Native troops 3, 900 Total eflfective 5,900 To whicli should be added — Native followers 6, 400 Total - 12,300 Horses 1,600 Mules - 4,000 Ponies 700 The force was to be composed of — One battery of field artillery. One battery of mountain artillery. Two companies of sappers and miners. Three regiments of cavalry. Two battalions of British infantry. Three regiments of native infantry. 298 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. It was organized as follows : ARTILLERY. Lieutenant-Colonel T. Van Straubenzee, R. A., commanding. H Battery, 1st brigade, field battery. 7th Battery, Ist brigade, Northern division, mountain battery. SAPPERS AND MINERS. Colonel J. Browne, C. S. I., R. E., commanding engineer. A Company, Madras Sappers and Miners. I Company, Madras Sappers and Miners. CAVALRY BRIGADE. Brigadier-General H. C. Wilkinson commanding. 2d Regiment Bengal Cavalry. 6th Regiment Bengal Cavalry. 13th Regiment Bengal Lancers. INFANTRY BRIGADE. Brigadier-General O. V. Tanner, C. B., commanding. 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders. 7th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry. 20th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry (Punjaub). 29th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry (Beloochees). ADDITIONAL. 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment. A reserve to this force was established at Aden, which is officially, if not geographically, a portion of India, composed of two native regiments, the 4th and 31st Madras Native Infantry. Approximate contemplated strevgth, -. 0*700 AM » c P.5 c P-00 c, • P' jg+j O OT (^ ? a o 3 « IH (M cS ^ o ^ W 6 o w ^ g o HIM p|_) ES 0,2 H^ ■-HrH ,H r-4 ft5 « 2 I 8:5 « b T-l 00 rl i-H 1^ . ©•04 1: - V X5 O cS O ii c wo BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 305 e.g M IE PTS-O-Brca rCTS 3 a a = s cl a a o p s a = B 3 P< o c o o o o o ^ Rp^ftHMa, ftp. (M o in o o lo o -o t-1 C» — I -«< i-l . C -= ■« « -C 13 3 C a i= a a o a = a s B pjO c o o o CM o o o o m r-1 00 r-i ■<# r-t — < T3r- a a a a o o PiPi o o CO Tji EC CO a fl a a o o Poin ■WIS a a a a CO CO tH i-*a-^«o a'^'^'"**»w — w aaaaaaaaa Saaaaaaaa p,o o o o o o o o ^ PhPJ 5 <^|Zi .£ > "^ o Z p © a a S S 00 _a; S ^ o s: g 1-S.i a a P -P a >; 306 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Kahul scale of followers. Followers, &c. Officers Native officers Muleteers Camelmeu Litter bearers Litter beaiers Mates (in charge of litter parties) . Pony V)oy and pony Drivers Artificers and workmen Hospital establishment Bazaar m £.9 a g.!;^, 8 plicants for future vacancies, a roster amounting in some cases to many times the possible wants, and that, on enlistment, the recruit must make a cash deposit of from £30 to £35 sterling (roughly I'rom $150 to $175). This deposit is to cover tbe expense of his outfit, including his mount, his uniform, his share of tent and mess equipment, everything, in fact, except his arms and ammunition. It is returned to him when discharged. Every two troopers have one follower, as groom and servant, and one pony to carry their kits, tent, &c. This tent is a light canvas shelter, weighing but 30 j)Ounds. The pony can always carry these articles and two days' rations. If a larger quantity of provisions be ordered to be carried, the transport department supplies the necessary mules. The entire expense of maintaining the follower and pony is borne by the two troopers jointly. Moreover, in India, the trooper has to feed and clothe himself and feed his horse. It is evident that but little can remain of his pay at the end of the month ; still, something is saved, and the accumulation continues slowly but surely, for a native's wants are slight, and his groom (or syce) usually finds and cuts forage for horses and pony in the 0{)en fields. The six troops are again divided into three squadrons. In order to prevent too great concert of thought and action, the plan was adopted after the Indian mutiny of introducing heterogeneous and opposing ele- ments into each military unit. As a general rule, therefore, one squad- ron in every regiment is composed of Sikhs, one of Mohammedans, and one of Hindoos. Other races are also drawn upon for squadrons occa- sionally, but these three make the most frequent combination. The natural jealousy existing between these people serves to suppress coa- lition on the one hand, and, on the other, to stimulate a wholesome spirit of emulation. 308 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. This arrangement its not without its disadvantages, however, caste and prejudice briuj>ing great complexity into tlie internal ecouoQiy of the camp, as to cooking, &c., and particularly as to latrines. The powers of punishment lodged in the hands of the Commandant are very extensive, including imprisonment up to two years, dismissal, and the minor methods universal in military services. Flogging is still permitted, its abolition in the British army not having affected the Indian troops. The offenses are usuallj- of a mild character, for the men are very docile. They require, however, a special treatment on the iiart of their officers, many small points of discipline essential with Europeans being entirely and j)urposely overlooked with them, while in other re- spects they are subjected to a very taut rein. The Commandant holds a species of police court twice a week, when all the officers, British, native, and non commissioned, that can be spared from duty are present. Here breaches of discii^line are adjudged, com. plaints, requests, &c., heard and attended to. Much of the good feel- ing in these composite bodies depends upon the publicity of these "dur- bahs," every effort being made to cultivate respect for and confidence in the justice and probity of the sui)erior officers. As the uniform and kits are generally maintained by the natives themselves, all regimental expenditures involving them directly or indirectly are discussed on these occasions, materials and manufactured articles being purchased by contract in open board, where every one has the right of speech. Each man pays 2 rupees a month into a regimehtal remount found, which is used to replace horses worn out in ordinary service. The Grovernmeut furnishes substitutes for animals that are killed or disabled either in action or through fatigue incurred in long marches or through excess- ive exposure. Great attention is paid by the commandant to physical education and technical sports, such as tent-pegging, mounted sword exercise, swim- ming i)arades across rivers on horseback, steeple-chases with prizes, &c. The drill is according to the British tactics, even the English words of command being retained, bat very rigid adherence to the details is neither exacted nor expected. The principles above mentioned for the cavalry hold as well for the infantry, being modified in application to suit the altered circumstances of the case. The foot soldier receives less pay, about £1 sterling per month, but his expenses are proportionately less. He has no horse or pony to keep, and his tentage and other camp equipage are supplied and transported for him. On enlistment he receives a bounty of 30 rupees, and after eight- een months' service he is allowed 4 ruj^ees aunually for clothing. The composition of an infantry regiment in India is similar to that of a British battalion, viz, eight companies. The war strength is, how- ever, much less. For the Egyptian campaign the. total effective was ordered to be 832 of all ranks. The service arm is the Snider rifle. BRITISH NAVAL AND MfLlTARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 309 When the difiSculty of living fairly well and putting aside for a rainy day in a country so poor as India is considered, together with the pres- tige enjoyed by the soldier as belonging to the Queen's service, the cer- tainty of being above want, the probability of retiring with a good pen- sion, and the comparatively high social class from which the recruits are drawn, it is not to be wondered at that Her Majesty's native In- dian troops should be a fine set of men. In fact, they exhibit their pride and self-respect in a singularly dignified bearing and in a mili- tary record of much merit. jSTothing could surj^ass the grace with which these men walked their posts as sentries or executed their ma- neuvers, while their small-arm drill is precise and formal to the verge of solemnity. On outposts the cavalrymen are peculiarly valuable. They are very keen-sighted, alert, and alive to their responsibility. The main fault these troops exhibit is an absolute incapacity to un- derstand that anything wanted by the Queen's soldiers should not be seized at once and as a matter of course. The formality of requisition and })ayment produces in their minds a feeling of good-humored con- tempt. Having the might, they marvel at not being permitted to ex- ert it. The engineer equipment was particularly strong in sand-bags and water-troughs (both iron and wood), and about five miles of steel rails were sent out, with all of their fittings. In the railway work done by the Indian sappers at Ismailia the j)laut from England was used. The telegraph outfit was of a light overhead wire. . The artillery was fitted out with 500 rounds per gun and 300 rounds per carbine ; the infantry with 500 rounds per rifle ; the cavalry with 300 rounds per carbine. Of the two batteries in the Indian Contingent, one of 9-pdrs. was known as H battery, 1st brigade. Its oflicers were a major, a captain, and three lieutenants, besides a surgeon and a veterinary surgeon. The 9-pdr. gun is being replaced by newer and more powerful pieces. It may, therefore, be dismissed with but few words of description. In form it resembles the 13-pdr. Its caliber is 3 inches, its length of bore is 66 inches. It has but three grooves, and it throws studded projectiles (similar to the 16-pdr.) of the usual type. H.l was only engaged at Tel-el-Kebir. The other battery, technically 7.1, Northern divison, consisted of six 7-pdr. screw-jointed steel guns. Fig. 153, designed and made by Sir William G. Armstrong & Co. These guns are in two parts, each weigh- ing two hundred pounds, a practicable load for a pack animal. The gun is specially intended as a mountain howitzer of high power. It is thought that the results of practical experience had with these guns warrant a detailed account of their construction, equipment, and per- formances. The gun is separated into two i3ortions underneath the trunnion band 310 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. ' .,P^-^' B, Fig. 153, wliicb slips loosely over the chase A. At the end towards the breech, B is threaded internally. This female thread corresponds with a male thread cnt on the front end of the breech portion, C. An ordinary pipe- coupling will give an idea of the prin- ciple. To make the joint tight, a steel ring or gas check is inserted between the nose on the breech portion and the seat in the muzzle portion, after the manner of a gasket. The parts of the gun are easily han- jPiff.isa.. died by three men. A leather cap over the thread on the breech part (see Fig. 154) protects it from injury, while a soft wooden plug, with a leather apron, performs the same oflSce for the female thread on the muzzle portion. The general descrip- tion of the gun is as follows: Length : Nominal inches. Total do... Of breech portion do... Of muzzle portion do... Of bore ...do... Of rifling do... Preponderance (average) 17 pounds at 24 inches from center of trunnions. Caliber inches.. Weight (average) : Of breech portion pounds. . Of muzzle portion do Total do ... . Rifling : Grooves — Number Width :. . inch . . Depth do . . . 68.25 70.45 25.7 45.5 66.5 55.5 2.5 200 200 400 8 0.5 0.05 Spiral increasing from 1 iu 80 at breech to 1 in 30 at muzzle. Commencing at 11.17 inches from bottom of bore. Vent of hardened copper, 5. 56 inches firom bottom of bore. Powder ^chamber enlarged to2.56iu. diam. The gun is sighted on right side only, and the tangent scale set at au angle of 1°, to correct drift. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN . EGYPT. 311 The' following sights are supplied with the gun: One tangent scale of steel, graduated in degrees from Qo to 15°. The head of the scale has a slow-motion arrangement for reading to minutes, and a deflection J^g.lSS. I''ia.l56. J^.:isr. Method of uncoupling gun. leaf. Immediately beneath the sighting-notch is a small circular hole, which is used for fine laying in combination with the cross- wire fore- sight. One foresight, screwed into a sight-ring shrunk on to the chase in front of the trunnions. It consists of an ordinary hog-backed sight, standing on a small open frame containing cross-wires. The gun consists of three parts — the chase. A; the trunnion, Bj and the breech-piece, C. ^'ta. IS 8. C 312 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Fig. 159. Gun uncoupled. On service, the trunnion is always attached to the chase, but slides loosely o^ it? being prevented from coming oft" by the fore-sight ring. To insure the breech-piece and chase coming together correctly, a key is fixed on the end of the chase, and this key enters a recess cut in the corresponding end of the breech piece. A steel gas-check is fitted into the joint, but this gas-check remains permanently in the breech-piece, and it is not necessary to remove it. When the breech. and chase ends of the guns are placed together they are firmly connected, simply by screwing the truniiiou, which may be regarded as a connecting nut, until the lines on the trunuion and breech-piece correspond, or nearly so. The band is run up by hand as far as possible, then a protecting-ring of iron is put over one trunnion and struck sharply with a sledge, which is ordinarily carried alongside of the trail of the gun. In the joining of the two parts the gun is always placed vertically, the breech sitting in an iron block placed in the toe- plate of the trail, and shaped to receive the cascabel, through the ring of which an iron bar is passed. (Figs. 155, 156, 157.) By this means the breech is prevented from turning through the effect of the blow. The trunnions are stamped T and S, respectively, to indicate which is to be struck to tighten and which to slacken. The projectiles are shown in the figures 160, 161, 162, and 163. The case shot has 78 bullets of 16^ to the pound, filled in with clay and sand. (Fig. 160.) The shell (Fig. 161), weighs, empty, 6 pounds 12 ounces ; when filled and fuzed its weight is 7 pounds 6 ounces. The bursting charge is 4 ounces of powder. The shrapnel are of two patterns, as shown in Figs. 162 and 163, both weighing 7 pounds 6 ounces. The old pattern contains 40 bullets at 55 to the pound, and 48 at 40 per pound ; the new has o^ bullets at 26 to the pound, and 18 bullets at 32 to the pound, and 10 segments. In both, the bursting charge is one- half ounce powder. The time fuzeemployed has already been described (see page 19). The percussion fuze is given in section in Fig. 164. The charge is 1 pound 8 ounces of R. L. Gr. powder, in a serge bag. All the ammunition is of Armstrong's make, that house supplying the battery complete in every detail except men and mules. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPK RATIONS IN EGYPT. 313 Case Shot- 7 Tbs. SheU,7Tb&6oz.,Tow3.ef, 4rOz. The carriage is formed of two bracket sides of plate steel, the edges of which are flanged outward to give the rigidity of angle irons, with less weight. These bracket sides are connected by three steel transoms and a steel toe-plate, and are formed to receive the gun trunnions and steel axletrees. A brass mounting following the form of bracket side and of trunnion and axletreeis fitted to each bracket, to give stiffness aiid bear- ing surface. The axletrees are removable for purposes of transport. The wheels are 3 feet in diameter, the spokes and felloes of wood, the tire of iron, and the nave gun-metal. The carriage is fitted with a stool-bed of T-iron, the front of which hooks loosely upon a cross-bar carried by the bracket sides, and at the rear has a cross-bar, the ends of which rest in notched racks riveted to the brackets. A sliding brass quoin is attached to the stool-bed by clips. The quoin is worked, as required, by a hand- wheel which turns a screw resting in the end of the stool-bed and working through a screwed i3art of the quoin, A cap of wood is laid on the face of the quoin to cushion the shock and prevent indentation of the surface. A toggled check-rope is passed through the wheels and over the toe. 314 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Shrapnel, FTb. 6oz. Old, Tattem,. TawOer^oz. Fig, 163. Shrapnel, Plb. 6oe. 2^0w 'Pattern. T'awdi'er'^ons. Fesrcussiarb-lShcse. under the trail handspike, to lash the wheels and check the recoil on firing. Upon each bracket there is a staple and strap to secure it when packed on a saddle. A grease-tin is carried on the bracket side. DIMENSIONS AND WEIGHTS. Feet. Inches. Height, center of gun "^ 2 Length of carriage with wheels !J 1 L ength of carriage without wheels 4 2f Length of asletree -^ 7 Angle of trail 33° BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 315 Elevation, maximum : Bottom step J 25° Second step 17° Third step 7° Top step 2° Depression, maximum, top 10° 316 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Wheels : Feet. Inches. Track '. 3 Diameter 3 Cwts. Qis. Lbs. Carriage complete, but without gun 4 2 20 Trail 1 27 Wheels - 1 2 25 Elevating arrangement 1 11 Dismounting block and trunnion collar 1 18 Axletree ---- 2 23 The parts of the gun and carriage, the equipment, and ammunition are all carried on the backs of mules, in specially-designed pack-saddles. The i)rojectiles and charges stow in strong leather cases showu in the accompanying drawings, Figs. 166 and 167. Each gun requires six JPiff.166. jnff.167: C. Case Shot. JO. Shea . ^. ShrccpneZ. Section on AS. n TvithlJid removeU, A mnntn ition boxes — leather. mules for the first line, the loads being distributed among them as fol- lows : Muzzle portion first mule. Breech portion second muJe. Carriage third mule. Axle, coupling block, trunnion guard, elevating gear, and two store- boxes fourth mule. Wheels fifth mule. 6 ammunition boxes - - sixth mule. In each box were five shrapnel, two shell, and one canister, and eight charges, making, with those carried on fourth mule, fifty-two rounds with the piece. In action each gun is attended by a second line of five saddled mules as reliefs to the first five enumerated above, of three more mules carry- ing a reserve of forty-eight rounds of ammuuitiou, and four spare mules, one of which is saddled as a spare-ammunition mule. Altogether, each gun requires eighteen mules in the fighting lines. A pioneer mule accompanies each subdivision (pair) of guns, and three others are loaded with tool's of various kinds. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 317 The following is the detail of the weights carried by the battery mules : First gun mule. Lbs. Oz Chase and trunnions of the gun 200 Canvas apron Leather cap (on gun) 4 8 Gun cradle, with straps 5^0 8 2 wooden gun bearers 7 4 Saddle and bridle 19 PJcKeting chain 2 8 Nose-bag 2 8 Spare shoes and nails 1 10 Tarpaulin, 6 by 4 feet . ._ 6 Surcingle 1 Total 2(54 14 318 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Second gun mule. Breech of gun Leather vent apron Leather cap on gun Gun cradle, with straps 2 iron gun bearers Saddlery as on first gun mule . Lbs. Oz. 200 1 7 19 8 13 32 10 Total 272 3 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATLONS IN EGYPT. 319 Third guv mule. Ll)8. Oz. Carriage, without wheels, axletrees, or elevating gear 167 Carriage cradle, with straps 21 Trail handspike ou carriage 5 8 Rammer and sponge, with cap and jointed handle, on carriage 8 12 Set of priming wires on carriage 4 Sledge, on carriage 7 4 Tin grease-box, filled 1 5 Saddlery as ou first gun mule 32 10 Total 243 11 320 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Fourth gun mule. Lbs. Oz. Cradle 21 Steel axletree 79 Elevating gear 39 Disruoiiutiug block and trunnion guard 47 2 leather boxes for stores, tools, &c., and four canisters and cartridges 71 13 Saddlery ns on first mule 32 10 Total : 290 7 BKITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 321 Fifth gun iiiiile. Wheels Axle arms, with girth aud strap Saddlery, picketing chains, nose-bag, shoes, tarpaulin, t&c Lbs. ( 5z. 193 14 4 . 45 10 Total , H. Mis. 29 21 252 14 322 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. ^ g Amnninition mule. IM. Oz. 3 leather ammunition boxes 41 8 •2 canvas cartridge-bags 2 12 16 cartridges . . '^^ 12 combination fuzes - 7 3 () percussion fuzes ^ 2 6 4 shell, filled '. 29 10 shrapnel 70 2 case-shot - 14 I Sundries 1 Saddlery as on first gun mnle !>2 1 ^ Eeaping hook, stable gear, &c 29 H Total .<■ 255 '.I BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 323 Eacli gun's crew consists of 9 men. The total pef^sonnel of the battery was 106 British non-commissioned officers and men and 147 fighting natives, drivers, &c., all enlisted men. There was the usual allowance of artificers, viz, a farrier, four shoeing smiths, two collar makers, and two wheelers. The number of I'ollowers is given in jireceding tables. Besides the battery-mules were 82 others for tianspoiting the camp equipage, kits, cooking utensils, &c. These make up a total of 230. As additional transport, 78 mules were allotted to the battery, sufficient to carry 6 days' rations. The men are unmounted, except the sergeant-major, the quartermas- ter sergeant, two trumpeters, a farrier sergeant, and the collar-maker. The muleteers who drive the baggage mules (one to three mules) are h'ired followers and not enlisted men. The same may be said of the water-carriers, nine in number, who distribute water on the march. When it is remembered that this was tbe first battery equipped with these jointed guns, the comparatively small number of defects in design and construction developed by actual service is quite noteworthy. The saddles are being constantly modified into the object of less- ening the height of the load. The gun portions will, of course, always be transported, as now, on the baok of the animal, and fore and aft, so to speak, but the load is a difficult one to carry, being both heavy and top-heavy. The girths must be kept extremely tight, or else sore backs and accidents ensue. The mules carrying these loads are more frequently relieved than the others. Of all the gun loads, the wheels are the easiest to carry, as they balance perfectly and have a low center of gravity. The brass facing on the bracket (Fig. 165) which receives the axle is too light and yields under the shock of the heavy recoil. In nearly all the carriages this part had Mff.nrd. been strengthened by iron plates riveted on by the battery smiths. (Fig. 174.) The rear sight socket, a piece of copper screwed into the gun, is liable to work loose and affect the pointing, while it is exposed to injury in mount- ing and dismounting. Similarly, the front sight screws into 2^ Q,Qi\i\)QX Slrengihenwg jyUte on ear- bouching, which frequently moves in its seat. riage-iraeket. The trunnions being fixed and the breech free to turn about its axis if sufficiently urged, it is noticed that firing the gun is apt to slacken the joint, the passage of the shell along the bore tending to unscrew the breech from the trunnion band. No accident has as yet arisen on this score, because the guns are carefully watched and the coupling set up afresh whenever necessary. The existence of a leak of gas at the joint would be shown by its exit througli an escape channel drilled in the center of each trunnion. 324 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. The feather-marks on the outside of the gun, to indicate that the joint is properly made, are exact only when the gun leaves the maker's hands. Ill practice it is found th^t each gun requires separate adjustment, so that it becomes highly necessary for every crew to know its own gun, not only in order to have no leakage of gas, but also to make the allow- ance in sighting occasioned by the rotation of the breech portion away from the normal position in one direction or the other. The vent projects beyond the surface of the gun, as seen in Fig. 153, in order to give the necessary length of socket for the friction tube. Great care has been taken that no accident to the vent should arise from this peculiarity of construction. It would appear, however, desir- able to devise some other equivalent scheme. The recoil is very heavy, owing to the lightness of the gun and car- riage, but this disadvantage is unavoidable. The cascabel hole and bearer are inconvenient in practice. Lieuten- ant H. H. Eogeis, E. A., one of the officers of the battery, ^ suggests that the knob be shaj)ed as shown in Fig. 175, the I straight bar to fill into the dismounting block (made square ! J ^" section), and thus holding the breech against turning. In .7 C— ^ place of the iron bearer he would substitute a stout wooden bar, with an iron devil's claw. form^^Tlas- ^ wooden bearer through the trunnion holes is used for cabelknoh, handling the carriage. If this is not placed and maintained fairly, an awkward lift results during the operation of packing on the mule. It would be well, as suggested, to do away with this bearer, and replace it by a pair of short iron levers, 14 inches long, permanently hinged to each bracket. When not in use, they would be close to the carriage ; when in use, they would stand at right angles to it. The proof of the practicability of jointed guns is found in the fact that the construction of others in three pieces is seriously contemplated in official circles. It is probable that the interruj)ted screw will be tried in this connection as an experimental substitute for Armstrong's coup- ling. Against the disadvantages of the 7-pdr., some of which are enumer- ated above (a portion remediable, the others inherent in the system), must be weighed the comparatively high powers in this its earliest expression, burning more than one-fifth of the weight of its projectile in powder, giving a good muzzle velocity (1,440 feet per second), and working range of 4,000 yards ; its lightness and transportability j the ease and rapidity of coming in action, the evolution requiring only 35 seconds; its ability to go wherever a mule can find footing,* the accuracy of its fire, and the size of the shell it throws. The piece and equipment were spoken of in high terms by the officers of the battery after several years' acquaint- ance and experience ynth. it, these terms amounting to positive enthu- siasm. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 325 The battery left Bombay on August 9 aud readied Suez on tbe 22d, where it remained several days inactive. It arrived at Ismailia on Se|)- t^mber 2. On the morning of the 4th it started for the front, reaching Kassassin the next morning, having bivouacked at Tel-el-Mahuta. At 9 a. m. it wa5 ready for work, having with it all the camp equipage and 6 days' provisions for man and beast. (The usual rate of progress of a mule battery is somewhat over 4 miles an hour on a good road.) The 7-pdrs. took part in the fight of September 9, being at gun-drill when the Egyptians made their appearance. They fired between 50 aud 60 rounds before the enemy withdrew. The guns were limbered up, X)ushed ahead, and brought into action again at 2,800 yards, the Egyp- tians now "running like hares." A second advance was made and the battery engaged for a third and last time, the total exj)enditure of am- munition being 90 rounds per gun. The practice was excellent. One shrapnel alone is credibly reported to have killed ten Egyptians — good work for so light a piece at such long range. At Tel-el-Kebir the battery accompanied the Indian Contingent along the south bank of the Sweet Water Canal, coming into action in echelon divisions right and left, engaging a battery of seven Lahitte howitzers in gun-pits on the canal bank, in advance of the main line of defenses, as well as the guns in the redoubts on either side of the canal. For a few minutes the fire was ver^^ hot. After the lines were carried by the Seaforth Highlanders, the 7-pdrs. shelled the native village lying south of the intrenchments. A heavy redoubt on the other side of the canal, about 1,800 yards distant, was still giving uiuch trouble with its cross- fire on the advancing troops, when the screw-guns concentrated their fire on it and blew up its magazine.* After this the battery shelled the Egyptians, who were running away from all points, and advanced past the intrenchments, firing at the main camp and the railway station. The battery then ceased its fire, having expended about 60 rounds ot ammunition, mostly shrapnel, during the action. With the balance of the Indian Contingent it went to Zagazig, mak- ing at the start an awkward mistake in marching two miles up the wrong side of the canal and having to retrace its steps to the bridge at Tel-el-Kebir. From Zagazig it proceeded with the Contingent to Belbeis, Khankah, and Cairo, the only corps of British troops that marched the entire distance from Ismailia. From the time of leaving its post on the northwest frontier of India, near Abbottabal, until it reached Cairo, not a single animal was lost, and the men enjoyed nnusually good health. Before the Indian Contingent left Bombay three months' advance pay was given to every man and officer desiring it, aud arrangements for re- *T]iis statement is made on the authority of Lieutenant Rogers. 326 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. mittances were perfected in all details. This shows the care which marked the organization and preparation of this force. Long experience and constant practice in the field, marching and campaigning for years together, have brought these troops to a high pitch of facility in movement and transport. Before starting on this expedition every person knew his own duty, and if it was necessary, he could readily know his neighbor's duty as well, each point being worked out and clearly put in a pamphlet issued for the occasion by the military department of the Indian Government. A three months' supply of provisions was shipped with the Contin- gent. The ration for native troops was as follows : Atta* ) ponnds . . 2 or > Rice ) do 1^ Dhalt ounces.. 4 Ghee do.... 2 Salt do.... Of Onions do 1 Peppers do 0^ Chillies do.... 0^ Turmeric do 0^ Once a week one pound of fresh meat was issued, the rice or atta allowance being reduced one-half on that day. Tea and sugar are given to the sick and wounded only, but may be issued on special occasions after great fatigue or exposure or in a bad climate. Tobacco is issued on payment at the rate of one ounce per diem. The price charged is the first cost to the Government. For followers the ration was simpler, viz : Wheat flour or rice pounds. . 1^ Dhal ounces.. 4 Ghee do 1 Salt do.... 0|^ The forage ration for horses was 8 pounds of grain daily, with 14 pounds of hay in lieu of grass. For ponies the ration was half that for a horse. The commissariat and other stores used in India are put up, as far as possible, in packages of the uniform weight of 100 pounds. The advantage of this plan lies in the facility with which animals may be loaded, these packages necessarily balancing, no matter what their na- ture, on opposite sides of the saddle. The economy of time and trouble is obvious. * Atta is the native tlour. t Dahl is a species of grain. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 327 An extra issue of clothing, &c., was made for the occasion, as shown in the following table : Articles. Waterproof sheets Jerspj'B. Boota, pairs Puttees, oil payment Extra blanket Canvas frock for shipboard . . . Flannel belt Suart tin mug for shipboard linimock. pillow, &c Shoes (native), pairs Blanket, country Lascar or follower's coat Great-coat Pyjamas Tin canteen Haversack When campaigning-, a small grant of money, called hatta, is made to men of all grades. It varies accordingto the rank of the recipient, and is supposed to compensate to some extent for the expense of getting ready, for fitting out generally, and for wear and tear of clothing on active service. In Egypt the hatia was increased by one-half to followers and by other proportions to the native troops. The Transport Department, under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Haj- ter, was ])articularly strong and well up to its work. As before stated, the troops in India are constantly in the field. Marching is a habit with them, and the preparations for a move a matter of small moment. The mode of packing the equipment is a subject of careful drill, according to a regularly established system. In the words of a distinguished British officer, speaking of this sys- tem, "even the colonel's mnstard-pot has its own place." Wheeled vehicles were definitely discarded and pack-animals exclu- sively employed. A large number of camels were to have been secured at Suez, but this expectation was not realized. The animals allotted for regimental transjiort, together with rations for two weeks, were, as far as possible, shij)ped on board the same steamer with the troops. This wise provision enabled the latter to march to the front as soon as landed at Ismailia, without waiting. The result was in marked contrast with the delay occasioned by the dilato- riness of the British Transport Service. The liberality of the scale upon which the Indian Transport was or- ganized is seen in the fact that the sick-bearers or litter men numbered over 1,400, and the muleteers, &c., belonging to the Transport Corps proper, including non-commissioned officers, drivers, veterinary and far- riers' establishment, saddlers, and other artificers, no less than 1,900 more. The nature of the country in which the operations were to take 328 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. place was thus appreciated in advance . and every precaution taken to insure adequate and practicable in odes of conveyance. The impression prevailed in the early stages of events tbat the In dian Contingent would march from Suez across the desert to Cairo, a line offering vastly more difficulties and obstacles than that actually selected. The fact that the x)reparations made would have sufficed for the greater undertaking made the lesser the more easy of accomplish- ment. The Transport Corps supplied animals and drivers to each regiment^ &c., to carry out the provisions of the Kabul scale, and to convey two days' rations and stores in addition. To every eight drivers there was a native sergeant, and to every two sergeants a native officer (entitled jemadar) of standing equivalent to that of our warrant officers. The Transport Corps was thus arranged in units of 25 animals, 24 pack and 1 spare, the sections being capable of indeiinite combination or division. The drivers were public followers, unarmed non-combatants. They wore a simple blouse of drab drilling under a broad leather belt, with A. T. on the buckle. With the exception of the 20th Bengal and 29th Bombay Eegiments, which sailed from Karachee, and the Aden reserves, which sailed from Madras, the troops were all embarked at Bombay. The recently constructed Prince's Dock at that port rendered the einbarkation simple in the extreme. Each transport was tirst taken alongside a coal-shed, the bunkers filled with coal, and the internal fittings put up in accordance with the Transport Regulations. She was then hauled a short distance ahead, abreast of large warehouses, whence she received her stores of all kinds, provisions, forage, &c., and finally moved close to the railway terminus. The troops were kept back ill the hills, twelve hours distant from Bombay, and were only brought to the seaboard when the transport was ready to receive them. Each detachment was railed alongside its own transport in the morn- ing, and embarked without delay or confusion, a few hours only being required to get 400 men on board from the time of reaching Bombay until steaming out of the dock. In spite of every exertion on the part of the central authorities, and of their well-digested code of rules, a number of animals were badly damaged on the voyage to Aden through careless stabling, as the ships had to cross the Arabian Sea in the trough of the swell raised by the southwest monsoon. The 13th Bengal Lancers is stated to have lost over 40 horses through injuries and overcrowding. The same orderly method which marked the embarkation prevailed at Ismailia. The readiness of each corps as landed to proceed at once in obedience to orders elicited the commendation of those in a position to" observe. Nor was this commendation qualified by any subsequently developed deficiency. It is stated by an officer of high standing that BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 32& "the commissariat and transport of this contingent were simply per- fect." The medical arrangements were based on a hospital provision for 15 per cent, of sick of the estimated effective strength of the force, and for 3 i)er cent, of the estimated number of followers; that is, for 815 sick^ one-third being accommodated in field hospitals and two-thirds in gen- eral hospitals. A base hospital was established at Suez. The old system of regimental hospitals has been abandoned. Under the present rSgime the surgeon attached to any corps is supposed to render only such temporary assistance as may be required in camp, on the march, or during an action, sending all cases needing treatment for more than twentj^-fonr hours to the field hospital, if there be one at hand. In action they apply but the first dressings to wounds, and are not to undertake any serious surgical operation. Field dressings were sup- plied in packages of uniform pattern. They were composed of pieces of dressing (simple ointment with 2 per cent, carbolic acid spread on the lint), a piece of gutta-percha tissue, and some pins. The field hospitals were equipped for 100 beds each, and were in four sections, each a working unit by itself. The personnel consisted of 1 senior surgeon, or surgeon-major, in charge, 4 assistants, 7 apothecaries,, or other medical subordinates, and 20 ward servants (nurses). In the wards for the native troops it was necessary to have the nurses of proper caste, out of respect to religious prejudice. Besides, there was a long list of cooks, water-carriers, sweepers, scavengers, writers, storekeepers^ carpenters, a cutler, tailors, washermen, &c., in all 80 men. The outfit of stores was an estimated supply for three months. The instruments, surgical apparatus, and library of professional books were selected. Under the head of "medical conforts" were such articles as brandy (3 dozen), Tarragona wine (6 dozen), lime juice, sago, arrowroot and barley, extract of beef, condensed milk, concentrated soups, pre- served potatoes, compressed vegetables, &c. For the European sick the usual field ration was supplemented by such medical comforts as were necessary. The diet for the native sick consisted of such parts of the ration as they could consume, with one-half ounce tea and three-fourths ounce sugar (for tea), 2 ounces rice, and 1 ounce sugar (for rice), with medical com- forts. In addition to the foregoing articles were full sets of toilet and kitchen utensils, special clothing, bedding, lamps, &c. Each field hospital flew the Geneva Cross. The tentage was on a liberal scale — 29 double fly and 34 single-fly tents (the former 12 by 8 feet and the latter 12J by 10 feet) to each field hospital. In providing for the carriage of the sick all ambulances were discarded and only litters employed. Of these there were* 290 in all, 68 doolies (large litters) and 222 dandies, with the requisite bearers, mates, &c., 330 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. divided into three bearer columns, each in charge of a warranted med- ical officer, as shown in the following table : Coi-ps; 'No. 1 Bearer column No. 2 Bearer column No. 3 Bearer column Litters. Bearers. 5 19 5 19 4 19 57 476 475 475 1,426 It will be seen that nearly 300 wounded could be transported at once. With each litter were two leather water-bottles. The columns again were divided into live companies of 100 men each, under the supervision of one "sirdar" or superintendent, and the com- panies into sections ot25 each, under a " mate." It may be well to explain that these litters are simply cots slung from poles, which rest on the shoulders of the bearers. The duties of the lat- ter included general work in and about the hospitals, pitching and striking tents, &c. The veterinary department appears to have been the weak point of the expedition — four officers to over 6,000 animals. In this respect the Indian Contingent contrasts unfavorably with the Imperial Force, in which the veterinary arrangements were especially well ordered. The "bazar," an authorized sutler's establishment, found its place in the Contingent, as seen in the table, page 300. Another exprej^sion met with in the same table may need a word of explanation. "Conservancy" is used to denote the general cleaning of camps, the care of latrines, &o. In this force the duty fell to certain of the followers attached to the various corps for the purpose. The probability of warlike operations in Egypt began to assume definite shape after the massacre at Alexandria on June 11, and the possibility of dispatching a force from India was seriously considered in that country. The Indian Government, acting under instructions from home, began at once preparing an expeditionary body, to be held subject to telegraphic orders. The selection of the regiments was made, the men and officers warned to be in readiness to* start at a moment's notice, the stores and equipments were collected at Bombay, and a list of steamers available for transport duty was made out. The first detachment to start was Company I, Madras Sappers, in the Malda, which left Bombay on July 21. It was intended to accumulate a number of troops at Aden, distant only about 1,200 miles from Suez, while awaiting definite sanction for their employment in Egypt. The war may be said to have begun officially on July 28, when the British Parliament agreed to the vote of credit for the expenses of the BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY' OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 331 expedition. The following clay the Indian Government issued an order for the embarkation of its portion of the force, although, technically, the co-operation of Indian troops was only authorized on the 31st, when a resolution was ofl'ered in the lower house of Parliament, and passed by both branches, authorizing the diversion of enough of the Indian revenue to cover the necessary outlay. This sum was subsequently estimated to be about £1,800,000 sterling. On August 8, the advance of the now well-known Indian Contingent, consisting of one company of Sappers and Miners and the 1st battalion of the Seaforth Highlands (late 72d foot), arrived from Aden at Suez, which had been previously occu]>ied by British blue-jackets and marines of the East India squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hewett. Here the troops just named n^nained until August 20, the day previously agreed upon for the seizure of the Suez Canal, when 400 of them marched 8 miles to the northward towards Chalouf, returning at 4 p. m. without having encountered the enemy. They suffered severely from the heat, having moved out in heavy order, under the terrible sun, over the sands of the desert. The balance of the battalion took part in the operations of the day, as detailed in Section XI of this report, which treats of the seizure of the canal. The day following, August 21, the main body came up the canal in the Sphinx, a small hired steamer, which joined the gun-boats Mosquito and Seagull at Chalouf. (See Plate 47.) The latter, with two compa- nies of the same battalion, remained at Chalouf to guard that portion of the canal, while the Mosquito, with the Sphinx following, i)ushed on slowly to the northward, landing from time to time to recounoiter. The results were only negative. Near the southern end of the Little Bitter Lake is a lock in the Sweet Water Canal, where it was known that the Egyptians had been encanii)ed. The gun-boat shelled this place on ap[)roaching, i)rior to the landing of a party of the Highland- ers. The camp was found deserted and a sluicegate in the canal open, through which the water was running freely into the desert. The gate was closed, the telegra[)h line destroyed (severing communication be- tween Nefiche and the stations near Suez), and the detachment returned to the ships, having tired at a small party of Egyptians, who took to their heels at once. The Mosquito and Si)hinx now < rossed the Bitter Lakes and passed into the short stretch of 7 miles intervening between them and Lake Timsah. At Serapeum, 2^ miles from the Bitter Lakes, the land is higher than at any other point in the southern half of the canal, with a rocky substratum, furnishing an admirable position for the defense or blocking of the canal. It was supi^osedthat the Egyptians would make a stand here. For this reason the place was shelled from a distance. There being no response to the fire, the Seaforth Highlanders landed. Finding none of the enemy in sight, they marched a mile inland to close anotheropened lock in the Fresh Water Canal. This done they returned 332 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. to Serai)eiim, where they encamped for several days. Serapeum was the only point on the canal even temporarily guarded by the army. The troops from India proper began to arrive at Suez on August 20, the 7th Eegiment of Bengal Native Infantry preceding. On the 21st Major- General Macpherson arrived in the Hydaspes and assumed gen- eral command. The impression which had originally prevailed that the Indian Con- tingent would operate independently from Suez, as a base, towards Cairo, as an objective point, now gave place to the certainty of joint action with the British troops along the Ismailia-Zagazig line. Guards from the Contingent were established at the various railway stations between Suez and l^fefiche, at Serapeum, Fazoid, Geneff'e, aud Chalouf? to protect the railway, which afforded the only means of getting loco- motives to Ismailia. The 13th Bengal Lancers were the first to reach the front, a detach- ment arriving at Ismailia on August 25 and pushing on immediately to Malisameh. Two days later the Cavalry Division, under Major-General Drury-Lowe, had been strengthened by portions of the 2d Bengal Cavalry and 13th Bengal Lancers. On the 29th the Seaforth Highlanders left Serapeum for Ismailia, and with all convenient speed the Contingent was concentrated at Kassassin, Its military operations from this time on merge into those of the army as a whole. Instead of acting as an independent unit at Tel-el-Kebir, its brigade of cavalry joined General Drury-Lowe, and one of its two batteries (H.l) was attached to the Artillery Brigade, under Brigadier General Good- enough, E. A, There was thus left but a comparatively small force under General Macphersou's immediate command. This force was made up of the Seaforth Highlanders, such portions of the three native infantry regiments as were left after supplying entire guards from Suez to Is- mailia and parts of the guards from Ismailia to Kassassin, a squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, and a company of Madras Sappers, Asso- ciated with it on the other side of the canal, and acting under General Macphersou's orders, were the Naval Light Battery, the Naval 40-pdr. railway gun, and the captured 8 centimeters Krupp, also on a railway truck. Excellent work was done in this part of the battle-field, and twelve guns were captured. The dash displayed by the Indian Contingent rivaled that shown by the 2d and Highland brigades, on the right of the line. The details of the fight are given elsewhere, together with the high praise awarded the Contingent by the Commander in-Chief. One instance may be permitted to show the stamina of the Indian trooper aud his ho-rse. The last detachment of the Contingent to arrive in time for the fight was a troop of the 6th Bengal Cavalry. After a sea voyage of sixteen days, it landed at Ismailia at 8 p. m, on Septem- ber 11, At 11 p, m, it started for Kassassin, which it reached the fol- lowing afternoon. It joined the cavalry division, marched on Tel-el- Kebir, aud thence to Cairo, not a man or horse haviug fallen out on the BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 338 way duriug the three days of forced marching'. Cavalry capable of such a performauce is not cavalry to be thought lightly of. As a hasty review of the work done by the Indian Contingent, it may be broadly stated that whatever duty it was called upon to execute was accomplished rapidly, quietly, and well. A long campaign might have developed defects in organization, administration, or morale not manifest during the scant fortnight of its share in the war in Egypt. On this point speculation is open to all. But taking the Contingent upon its record, one is forced to the conclusion that Lord Beaconsfleld's so- ealled '^coup de thedtrs^^ in 1878, when Indian troops were brought to Malta as a reserve in the event of hostilities with Russia, was a real menace, whose complete meaning was only made clear four years later. These oriental soldiers of the British Empire can be brought on any field of action by the scores of thousands (there are about 17,000 cav- alry and 100,000 infantry habitually under arms); indeed, the number has hardly any limit. That the practice, once begun, of drawing upon this reserve will ever be abandoned, should future complications require a sudden reinforcement of her military strength, cannot be hoped for by any possible enemy of England. It must, on the contrary, be taken into account in the problem as a factot capable of aloiost indefinite ex- j)ansion. The recovery of Great Britain's former military prestige was merely a question of time and opportunity, but it is impossible not to believe that for this recovery she is indebted, to a certain extent, to the real worth and unbounded possibilities of her Indian Contingent. XXXI. MISCELLANEO US. In this section are gathered such items and conclusions as are of in- terest, either technical or general, but which do not find a proper place in the preceding subdivisions of the report. ARAB MARES. 1. It was remarked as a singular and suggestive fact that among the horses captured from the Egyptians or found in various parts of the country as occupied there were no Arab mares. These valuable and usually unpurchasable animals must have been very carefully hidden, in the fear that they might possibly fall into the hands of the British. FOULNESS OP LAKE TIMSAH. 2. The speedy return of the base to Alexandria after the battle of Tel- el-Kebir was further advisable on account of the condition of Lake Timsah. There is no tide in this harbor, only a slight general set of 834 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. tbe water iu the Suez Canal accordiug to the season. The presence of so many ships packed closely together in the small basin had resulted in the accumulation underneath them of all sorts of tilth, rubbish, offal, &c., thrown overboard. Through the lack of a strong cleansing cur- rent, the water had no chance of adequate renewal, and hence was very foul, while the bottom, as found on heaving up an anchor, was reeking and noisome. BERTHING CAPACITY OF LAKE TIMSAH. 3. The normal capacity of Lake Timsah as a hfe,rbor was greatly en- hanced b^'' the fact that the wind was constant in direction. In conse- quence the transports could be anchored in lines abreast, close to each other, without regard to the ordinary necessity of " swinging room." The berthing of the arriving shii:)s was in charge of Staff" Commander Patch, E. N., of the Orion, who was appointed Harbor Master. So well was this duty ]>erformed that the port, which had been pronounced by the president of the Suez Canal Company barely sufficient for two ves- sels, was made to contain no less than ]03 at one time. THE BELL TENT. 4. The regulation army tent is of the Bell pattern, 10 feet high and 12 feet G inches in diameter at the base. There are two flies inside and out, with ventilating holes at the top. It is intended to accommodate 15 men. At the bottom is a deep flap, which can be buttoned up to ad- mit air. The pole is 2 inches in diameter, in two parts (for convenience of transport and storage), connected by a socket joint. COINCIDENCE OF THE TERMINATION. . OF THE CAMPAIGN WITH THE NILE HIGH WATER. 5. The annual high water iu the Nile occurs towards the end of Sep- tember, and the water falls but very slowly for several weeks. The coincidence of the termination of the campaign with the Nile rise was more than a mere matter of chance. Had Arabi not been crushed at Tel-el-Kebir, the result to the British force would have been very dam- aging. With full control of the water-flow in the numerous canals and ditches spread out over Egypt, the Egyptians could have carried on a strong defensive fight, with all the advantages on their side. TACTICAL PROBLEMS OF THE CAMPAIGN. G- It can hardly be .said that any tactical problems were solved in the campaign. It was demonstrated that a night march in attacking order could be made to end in a successful engagement, but it may be considered as legitimately permissible to question the possibility of repeating the advance ou Tel-el-Kebir under other and less favorable conditions of soil, atmosphere, and enemy. BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 335 INCREASED PROBABILITY OP ATTACK AT DAWN IN THE FUTURE. 7. On the other hand, General Wolseley has proved by the logic of events the efficacy of the strategy involved in an attack at early dawn, a point always urged by him as the outcome of the improvement in modern 'weai)ons. In future wars it may be safely predicted that the deleuse will be frequently subjected to assaults at this moment, and will be forced to increased vigilance and stronger outposts towards the end of the night to repel the enemy or keep him at a distance until the day has completely broken. The campaign was fruitful in at least one strategical lesson of great importance. CONCERNING UNIFORM. 8. Contrary to generally received ideas, the red coats of the British were less conspicuous than the white or blue uniforms worn by the Egyptians. Visibility is merely a matter of background, aiter all, and the sand and glaring light of the desert were relatively worse for the latter than the former. Towards the end of September, a gray serge tunic was issued for trial to the troops in Egypt. It looked much cooler than the garment it re- placed, and it would certainly stand the wear and tear of a campaign far better. The appearance of most of the British coats was very bad. They were stained with perspiration, spotted with dirt and grease, and were' altogether far from creditable, although the marks were an un- avoidable sequence of hard Mork and rough campaigning. They were in marked contrast with the "khakhi" dress of the Indian Contingent^ a drab color, with which the cotton drilling used in the hot season in India is dyed. Absolutely, of course, one was as clean as the other, but rela- tively the khakhi looked fresh and neat, while the red serge was hoije- lessly begrimed. The traditions of an army are not lightly to be neglected. England's soldiers in any other color but the immemorial scarlet can hardly be conceived, but a suitable attire for active service in hot climates was greatly needed by them when in Egypt. Such an attire could easily be found in the color and material which have stood the test of Indian campaigning. THE DESTRUCTION OF EGYPTIAN AMMUNITION. 9. The experience at Alexandria after the bombardment, when all ammunition found in the Egyptian magazines was destroyed, was re- peated at Tel el Kebir on a similarly large scale. As Arabi's army had disappeared, and, i)ractically, the whole of Lower Egypt was in the hands .of the British, and, furthermore, as the latter were acting in the name of the Khedive to re-establish his au- thority, there was certainly no necessity for this measure. Its object is not evident. 336 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. MILITARY BARRACKS AT ABBASIEH. 10. The military establishment at Abbasieh is on the edge of the desert to the north and east of Cairo, and was intended for a school of instruction. The barracks are large and well planned in all respects, are provided with ample wash-rooms, &c. A mortar battery and some siege guns were mounted on the desert side. Accoaimodation was avail- able here for about 5,000 men. The condition of these barracks when the Egyptians marched out was filthy beyond words. Sleeping apartments and corridors had been used as latrines, and the walls were infested with vermin. EGYPTIAN FIELD PIECES. 11. The field guns employed by the Egyj^tians were of three types : 9 and S*'" Krupp steel B. L. R., and Lahitte O*'"" M. L. E. howitzers of bronze. Lettering these types A, B, and C, the following is the return of artillery captured during the campaign on the Ismailia and Tel-el- Kebir line: ■ Date. Place. I Type. No. i Aug. 25 1 Sept. 9 9 9 13 13 13 Tel-el-Mahuta A B A C A B C 6 2 1 1 42 10 7 do do Tel-el-Kebir do do The principal particulars of these guns are given in the next table: Width in Weight in kilograms. Length of gun in me- ters. .g Height of ^ 1 1 <<-i o a centimeters. 13 1 P< .s 1 o Weight of shell pounds. wheels in meters. .2 • ^ 5 'S w m g 1 a (S g § i u <& a 5 o v< o 1 Lb. oz. Lb. oz. Lbt. A 16 7 1.4 395 2.02 1 8 14 10 1.56 1.24 1.60 1.65 11 B 12 7 1.1 269 1.93 1 9 14 1.56 1.24 .99 1.65 7 C 6 2.2 2.5 1 1.32 .95 1 11 8 6 5 1.20 \ .98 1 1.20 C .84 \ .66 1.40 .87 ! NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. 12. The writer of this report was impressed by the intelligence dis- played by the non-commissioned of&cers whom he observed, as well as by the very large share they seemed to have in the business routine of the companies. THE RESERVES. 13. He was also very especially impressed by the physique and good bearing of the men of the reserves, of whom no less than 11,030 out of BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 337 11,650 responded to the call. Of the balance, the absence of 135 could be satisfactorily accounted for. About 1,500 joined various regiments and 15,000 still remained at home. As the first real test of the new army- system, this result is certainly encouraging. This new system has for its object the passing of a large number of men annually through the active line, in order that a numerous and well-trained reserve nitiy be formed. It is in this way that England purposes building up a large regular force ready for mobilization, trusting to the militia and volun- teers for effective supplement. OFFICERS. 14. This report would be in complete without mention of the character of the British officers as a body. The most indifferent observer could not fail to notice on their part a desire to be in the midst of the work, whether campaigning or fighting; a cheerful manner under even the most trying circumstances; and a commendable spirit of good-fellowship. Their great object was to secure the opportunity of distinction and to profit by it when secured. If for- tunate in this respect, the troubles and hardships incident to their life were as nothing. The Commander-in-Chief was supported by a set of officers who only required permission to go ahead and do their duty — the execution followed at once, and was marked by intelligence, zeal, and perseverance. It is impossible not to attribute this morale to the fact that their ^ro- motion is always by selection, captains retiring at forty years of age, majors at forty-five, &o. This is not the place to discuss the general question of how the flow of advancement should be regulated, but none the less is it a duty to record the conviction that the plan adopted in the British army (while not free from abuse or gross favoritism) produced, in the body of officers who controlled and carried out the operations in Egypt, a corps of young, actire, zealous, and capable men, of whom no service^ however high its standard, need be ashamed. THE PRACTICE OF MENTIONING JUNIORS IN DISPATCHES. 15. To this circumstance is due one of the most marked features of all the official reports, whether naval or military. Every officer^s record is based mainly on the commendation Jie receives from his superiors as officially expressed. The practice is an inherent part of correspondence relating to deputed work, and is unsparingly resorted to when the case seems to warrant it. The sense of duty well done may be all an officer has a right to expect, but until human nature changes entirely, even the most conscientious person will not fail to find a stimulus to still greater exertions in the field or more prolonged and earnest labors in the cabinet in the thought that his efforts, if successful, will ber H. Mis. 29 22 338 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. come imri of the annals of the service to which he devoted Ms life without rese^'ve. BALLOONS WERE NOT USED. 16. When the character of the country ov er which General Wolse- ley marched to Tel-el Kebir is considered, the failure to employ balloons for the purpose of lookout and reconnaissance is explicable only on the assumption that the means were not on hand in England. The flatness and barrenness of the desert made it absolutely impossible to approach unobserved frx)m a very moderate elevation. It would seem as though captive balloons would have been among the first provisions for the campaign, as they certainly would have been among the most useful. LONG SERYICE VERSUS SHORT SERVICE. 17. The principal technical issue of the war in Egypt was the merits of the short- service system, a bone of contention even to-day in the British army. Whether long service (twenty one years) men would have done bet- ter is a question attended with all the difiUculty which is proverbially involved in the proving of a negative. They might have been hardier, more seasoned, indeed the evidence drawn from the record of the marines is clear on this point (the younger men furnished more than their quota of invalids), but that they would have behaved with more steadiness on the march and more coolness in the fight cannot be shown. ISTo system can be satisfactory which does not provide for a leaven of old soldiers. It takes time to teach the recruit that the enemy feels exactly as uncom- fortably as he feels himself, and the best master is a comrade in ranks to whom fighting is no new matter, and who stands to his work because it is his duty and his habit to do so. The preseut tendency of army reform is toward a happy combination of the old and new systems, retaining such features of the one as will yield a supply ot capable non-commissioned officers and a nucleus of hardened campaigners, and of the other as will continue the process of swelling the reserves by annual increments of trained men, ready to return when wanted to fill their old battalions up to the war strength. Given a few years for the results of the method to manifest them- selves, it is not to be doubted that the British infantry will be counted, as of old, most formidable, and its presence on a European battle-field as a potent factor in the result. THE CAMP AXON AS A WHOLE. 18. While the enemy encountered in Egypt was not of a nature to develop the highest qualities of the British soldier, still, as a fairly ade- quate trial of the scheme which has been in operation for the last dec- ade, the campaign, although full of lessons in detail, must be regarded also as a bounding in promise for the future. BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 339 TJxNTFGE^IS AND EQUIP^IENT TOO ELABORATE. 19. One great danger threatens the organization as a whole in the tendency to increase the equipment beyond the needs of actual work. Thorough preparation for fighting should he the first care of those in authority. Subordinate only to that is the reduction of the outfit to a least possible amount. It seems ill-advised, to say no more, to adhere in time of peace to uniforms, trappings, and paraphernalia generally ichich are ^mhesitatingly discarded ichen icar hreaJcs out. Of the armies of all the larger European powers, that of England is unquestionably most open to this criticism. It may, however, be safely predicted that this objection will not hold much longer, so determined are the persons responsible for the well-being of the army to render it as efficient as is possible. Much opposition will be met, for a more conservative body than English army officers cannot be found, but prejudice and opposi- tion will hardly iirevail in the face of the real necessities of the case, now completely understood. THE CTTATIACTER OF THE EaYPTIANS. 20. Prom the time Alexandria was first occupied until the war was ended, the Egyptians may be said to have invariably wasted their opportunities. At hardly any time was Alexandria even reasonably secure. Eamleh could have been turned by a night advance, and the city taken, for the garrison was weak to imprudence. The neglect to seize or block the Suez Ganal is almost incredible. That Arabi should have been guided by the interested counsels of M. de Lesseps is but a further proof of his utter incapacity. Every phase of the campaign was marked by stupidity on the part of the Egyptian commanders, while cowardice on that of the rank and file was shockingly frequent. The British expeditionary force, with certain reservations already specified, did its work well, but no one can believe that the nature of this work was a real measure of the ability of Eng- land's soldiers. FINAL EECOMMENDATIONS. 21. The extensive employment and valuable services of seamen on shore during the campaign are not features peculiar to the British navy alone. In our service, parties of blue-jackets and marines are frequently landed in various parts of the world for police duty in cases of emer- gency, panic, or distress, and in times of general peace their perform- ancces make up the real active history of the Xavy. These parties are not organized alike, while their equipment, ranging over the whole field of individual taste, is in marked contrast with the uniformity observed in certain foreign services. This report cannot find a better ending than in the urgent recommen- dation to abolish so-called " battalions " from our ships of war, and sub- 340 BEITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. stitute in their stead homogeneous " landing parties,''^ capable of self- supporting and sustained action in the field at some little distance from the base, and of indefinite combination at will into efficient naval bri- gades. The details of such a scheme must be worked out by a central authority,. and their observance be insisted upon as a better criterion than the now^ popular and (con rispetto) burlesque dress-parade. PJL^TE Z. M.L.R. Armstrong. % XtN, 5wooTH Bore • Mortar \ \ Section THROueH A.B. Section through CD. Bottom of Ditch is ioft. above sea level I'ORT SILSJLEH, fo& :o s 1 Scale of f>LA^ Scale or sections 100 Yos PLATE 3. o w o O H CD I— I P W w o X O w w CO 00 < m O C^ H O llf'il.?WKtfi^ PLATE l?JjJ^TlSi 5 D \il.OPDFI.S.Z,.M. ^X/nHowitzek. tPsAlS OF P'i.A Tos 'O wT P»LATE 6. PORT PHAROS. FiG.44. Skltch of scarp M.W.FACE Fig. 45. q I Section THROUGH west face FI&.46. -rrrrr/ Sec -rr7-r7-rrfy. '&777y7777-fr!^ EAST FACE ^■^ V// ////////■'*// 'h7777777 Fig. 47. Horizontal Section through casement Fis 48. Section throush f; NORTH WEST FACE Scale in feet plate: 7. rORT PHAROB PLfiJVOF RIFLED CU/V aPiTTERY. PLATE 8. < Q < H CC O Uh O ° < w K > H < O 5 >^ s D^ o W w H o: w ^ ID K PLATE 9. w h < DQ o z O a. H o Q or < m o m cr: w (-• -< p, w PLATE 10. w W o J o < H (/} lu H P O CO o a^ f-H o )i PLATE 11. Q W kJ a ffi o (iT W w cA J O J Ct^ < K PLH J W h :r; p^ » o o [^ g fc s O w H < o m < C/3 l^ w J % m ^ >< w w H J CO [i< W 2; ^ H X H Ph" [i. ^ O < w o z 00 o D^ M W Q ^ ^ ^ 4 . •) PLATE 12. \ PLATE 13. Q W cq < CO Q Z o GO O <1 Oh H o \J PLATE 14. fa o o IX H K H K O P o K ffi H CO J S J PQ W W fa Q h fal X W H O ^ ;^ HH K ^^ ^ o O CO Q H W fa fa N N o P Q s W hJ 14 ^ o o P m H CO m <; Q ^ Z < (X w O p g P S o O fa >-z, CO CO Q < •< ^ ^ fal Z X P o O H CO S s fal H X H fa O PL^VTE lo. \ ^[nch Smooth Sof^E. • MOKTAR. FORT ADA. •so ■j'^ffOS PL^TE 16. /I ■.'ii/v THRou . Section throuoh 6 ^?>-^, Scale im feet PI^^^TE -25. mUSE FORT, SCALE PLATE -35. THE LIGHT HOUSE FORT. SCALE PLATE 26. O w O X H O w [^ o g h (X w ft: o o '■ i o: ' 'X ■ 2 O \-l-'' . c^ j^:' i S t PLATE 27. TV,';. wo-^^s-ii'iMttit ^0,^ ^t^ \ss?,v.. THE SOUTHERN BASTION OF THE LIGHT HOUSE FORT. FIRST GUN DISABLED. PLATE 28. o o D O CO PLATE 29. H O CO O X H O o o h PLA.TE 30. FORT SALEH AQA ftXm. Smooth Bores 6/4 IN Smootm Bores. C Mortar Scale, of plan . PLATE 31. I^X^ATE 32. i M.L R. Armstrong • Xitg. Smooth BoT^e 6/a IN Smooth Bore • Mortar I*I-ATE 32. ^OBT MARABOVT. PLATE 33. 5 o o Ui m w ffl <: w o o o o w PLATE 34. ■ ' 7, 5 M 1 m -r( H CO ffl <: <; h. t< o , z ^ o w H S o o ^ o S o l^ W o W D? H cq p^ W D K o H o [/) ^ Q p^ 2; w D o 0^ w ^ PLATE 35. PQ m < J 00 O Q W w X m^TE 36, .^ NORTH t, . A. /?/>? J- TR or/ &. PLATE 36. kM.I,.AffMST0or/< w o o p^ o w PLATE 40. o ft; o w lf0't'M.:: : PLATE 41 h 00 S o o w o (X < m :z: UJ H < PLATE 42. O H h O O Q w M o >< o PLATE 43. O u H o w H O o u h /y}A r/tm j^ GflRo\ y,LL\ G/iR 'f^ -ft* THE POSITION AND DJSfEJVSIVE WURKS AT RAMLEH. PI. ATE 45. PL^TE 46. THE OUTPOST AT ANTON lADES GARDEN. ^^.i"'5""^ 'TTTT/TTTT. SecT/of/ OF re/voe atj JPaa/IPET AT. C Sec^/OA/ AT.A^'. Secr/o/vs /it poia/ts o/v PLATE XLJX SCCTION THf^OlJ&H f^EOOUBT Tny SSCT/OA/ or f/fl-WOPAL BATTE/^Y jk SecT/oAf or Rcoouar, j , I'LJ^TE 47. 3730 ^ E»LA.TE 48. PORT SAID HAFLBOM, AIkiyiTS^MfuiNJSAJ\r Sea or, Af!AB Toyvm ISMAILIA. J) I's'ktfa'S/lftY S-^tLW^y. C.2ineo'Y£s J-'alac.c usav/ii G C'^A/At- LOCK Ano Bf^iOGC ■fSHAfJCM fiAtL.rfAY TO f/£^/^, C^ CsNTFSAL wharf: Jl rToOTM V/HA Rf 7- IflOlAN COAfr//V&ErJ-r'S WHARF, jM.£AC9UAFtTi:RS. JtRoyAUer/al'^ER PAfifi. n?I,-£VTE 49. -2^ MILES DrVls.'ON ^ Mm, Gen. ORijRY Lowe rN.A £ R.H.A.^ !3 PPRS (^G.a, ; 1st. Division Lt 6en Wi-^lis n 1st. Bricadc SI Sir BftKER RuistLi. Household C/\valry 4th. Oracoon Guards . f7TH. - y &| SncBrkjaoe mounted lN^■A^4^RY Bkig Gen. Wilkinson > 6th. Bencal Cavalry I 13th. •' LfXNCtRS. \ PoRTiON OF I 2nd. Bengal Cavalry ; ^ ToftK 15^ I 2nd Sl.ANCASTeR OR ' D ^ ROYAL 1 tSRieADE gSjRISH GUARUS ^'"*" ^ ^HOVAl BRISADE MAJ.GENi?",^J!^ DOKE G-'.UHMA 't 3rd HiGWLAlSO Sricaoe IRISH MARINE OF N (NFANTRr l>ClKHnU0HT Eg Art:ll£.ry I 3rio«dk 1 Bric. Gen 5 GoSDENOUCH . !<-- - (oao YOS. N =- ^ SOVAL i MHICHUANDERE • ra 4th, &acoRDO?J Brisase Grenadiers .Scots, Colustreaw A Satt. 1st. Brig :. •• " I N C J 2. NO 3^3 Lt Coi. f.^_ 1000" YOS.. InlNGS j ROYAL j RlTLE i CijRPS. DyKE or Ammunition Column ) escorteo by Company West Ke«t Regt. D Head Quarters .^il!:£T£LECRAPH Scam E RON , . "" M r'i'^ " , . 3 .'iSltBURNKf'.r.lgl (-*»'^'«'»l-'-S ESCORTED BY Shi6Ui./(nd l-ir.«i Immntry Roval Marine Artillery AMD rRaop iSTK Hussars TLoao YDS. Zno. Division Sir Edward Hmwley THE MARCH ON TEL-EL -KEBIR Septewtber 13 11^. 188g. MULE BATTERY 5EAF0RTH HiCHLANDERsI 3 a .n 6 LP 3"tEI£C. 1 TROOP Inoiain CoNTiNeeiMT Major GE.NeaAL Sir Herbert T Macpherson V.C. PLATE 50. THE LINES OF TEL EL KEBIR PLATE 51. l«. ■%>::^ ••.V,\»'; >'%: -tf'' PC PQ W J W H PLATE 52. W m w J w h m O Q W o O W h PLATE 53. S w w w H H <: w o w H W H PLATE 54. GO < m < o h o GO h o p W (X- w w h PL^TE 55. A Plan of battery on north ^ BANK OF CANAL ,'^ Revet MEMT rushcs i AND IVIUD PLASTER. / B .™2. A - K Section on ^ tz' \^ ^ =...„- '^77777777 NORMAL SECTION CANAL BANK REAR ELEVATION AND SECTION OF CANAL BAhIk PARAPET NO REVETMENT Plan or sheltcr 7ovos /777777 C "^ "EAR OF PARAPET 77 ^ z'thick at top"\ D Section of a shelter 30yos back ItTERIOR v/^"'^' Plan ano section of gun cniplacement S~'e AfuuxuuMuil \iB\"\ West OF yrxi////j/jjhj//////. { / I \ l''***'»PeT Revetment moo plaster ano sthaw-^ ^ F Plan of retrenchment for horses and magazine in rear of gun £ s^yos.back MAGAZINE IN REAR OF ANOTHER eUK "^^^^rrA'^ SCALE of Plans. ns o lo tfi 30 *9 sc ^T. 3CA"Le oFsreriONS le s o ic 20 so *f> soft. T»LA-TE 56. H. Section tkrough traverse in tront or gap and adjacent parapet /' v.. ..; ^^y— >v ^^. Section or shelter in rear of gap. LEMGTH or SHELTER 54'. •*.'., '^'"^^ /e' / Orrrn-rTTrrrrrr: I.J. Section of parapet BETWEEN IaNoJ. ''^ Section of smelter in rear OF THe ABOVE >>„_^ ..'^,'*, .,„y JY^. Section OF PARAPET trom^toK. '^rD^y^.,^'^' r ^"tmrrrrr L. Retrenchment IN RE Aft OF GUN L. length 60 yds. -fj'S" 3' This is the average style of shelter rrTrTTTrrrrrrijL IN REAR or PARAPETS \ M \ ^ ' 1 ' Outwor\for eight guns '.firing THadimH Ewg^^AsuRnf Section or Mhin WoP^K Section of EnvClopes. 3' 3c,^L£ OF Sections _L- I I I»I.^TE 57. .V SfCT/O/V T/tetOUO-M Bf,TT€RY :PlANOF^ OUN f>IT/M fiteAH Of O.P. r _^_^ ^ \ :::::.:S U -"™ J PLA-TE 58. SiJALE OF Sections, 10 s o JPI^ATE 50. SeorioA/ AT V. scal£ »J<, w Trace or RCOOUBT w SCAIC Of^ PLAN o '•> ro Jf ,c •>» f^t-r fVbf!K a£A/£»ALLY SIMILAR TOSATTCfty U. BUT 0/VI.Y roR rouR c-uns Tue PARAPCr HEP£ IS one FOOT A.'CHjr/?. The secT/oiv or thc ENven-arir /^ THE ^AMC AS V '•^ BOV SccTioN AT X TrrTTZ^.-i. ^^^j'/Z/Xa'y'W///, The PARAPET M£PE IS BUT ^UST BEC-U/V. jRACe Oe B/ITTERY '.Y '^a/ITTERr \Y \ \ / 7j U/vr/zv/sNca £Mff/>A,suPie xSc:cT/o^ or ASOi'£ iHi: EA'^CLC^r /S 0,Wl.r S£i?U/V /A/ /^LACe-^ /» iT a re so JO "^^/rr/r. PLi^^TK <;o. Secy/o/^ of^ A. c lNT£fi!oR f?£:y£T/vT£-/\f7 ea>w^/ST'S ap^f4 oao/rs/o/vAt, a/j/jsj ft/is Fv/^c.-^-TLY a.u.w snatiT. ZOyAHos /-v /7£-'»^ Af3C TWO S/iELT£PiS £>icfi ^Y/ifiOS LOA/G- Ahr-O -t^ re£.r HIG-H fr7AOE or S-/tf=iTM ^Ot-LECT&n //V gASni:r.:. JO ,17' •^PecTio d Sscr/c "IT' /r M' JV' 7///J" S'/tf^L ^C£-A7£-A/T N/fS T/fREC ROtJOH I>LATK 61. Plan of Upper Deck of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship "Jumna". lifgl Ifc ^Sey I Xodnr- fin- Wtui?. /)«*>, Grtir. T ^*. " 1 my hjuh 1 KmSt. KmJ.' i PI.. XT I-; fii. IhMe Plan of Mess Saloon Waists and Waists and Seamen's Quarters of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship "Jumna". P PLATE 02. Plan of Main Troop Deck of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship'Jum NA . IM.Alh; U.J. MUOjir^f OfdUy fyitdoi'tp. Jjodderwilff sa 87 66 SS ■ 3* fS 82 m so 1 78 176' 1 77 76 1 7S Ti- - 1 ^■^" ss 56 SI S8 se ea 61 62 63 64 « 66 67 es 69 » 7/ 7? Military Dhi Womjerv^ (^hjxirter>s j\u- ■'!»• 3!:3!i\33 ■ 10 ryiediiipt. Trci 1.9 . 20 i 2/ . 22 P»LATE 6 4 Plan of Lower Saloon, Lower Troop Deck and Steerage OF Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship "Jumna". HUATK 6 4. [atjCJ PL.A.TE G3. Plan of Hold of Her Majesty's Indian Troop Ship "Jumna" dd MIDSHIP SECTION OF TRANSPORT ^___ IT-ATEee Showuui MlUiiffs (vr Nurses. I>LJ^TE 67. PLATE 68- DETAILS OF SINGLE HORSE STALLS. CROSS SECTtON JSckin^Bcixi-rl. ihis HOC A pbig V removed. aUciving the jiarixng fiat- to drvp 2 viCcKes. Scale. % bidv tc a Foot. PLA-TE 69. V j^ DETAILS OF SINGLE HORSE STALLS. PLAN B.B iBolt^- JiotlOuf Shcfe (aboul- every S^StaUJ %Iiotbi- \^\\\ m- Side Bain or Ptxrtin^ Bar d>^3 Sianrhien Pccrtouf Bar 9\ S' StxaKMarv PLAN A. A sH; Stancfdorv ^ Whtfrlhursr WaterCourse WccterCdurse Tf&tar^iiurwe AlhwarVship Rail .6, 4 2Battaie Z Baitenv Curb bvltedytcDeck^&U-hwl ofStanchUm, 6 r4' Scale^z Sieh to a/Foot. Gtrb / hocJv toDedb ii « (( PLATE 70. DETAILS OF SINGLE HORSE STALLS. FRONT ELEVATION 'Stijwla47n B (iifli Ouisne Sivrh- ','fi Jncli tc n Foot. PLATE 71. PLATE 72. < p < X w < h Q W < w h T*i:.ATE 73. I»L^TE 74. CO a 2 o < o N Q U -1 O fTnnT.!> 1 -•g 5/4 i '<»i Pi?-.*®*- .. .- ^« «s. J" J* h: «k -<^ ^ •« 5 s» -to f^ 1^ I i j^ ^ .t '^ 5 2 St S ^3 ,^S-5'^ ^ M V '^ 'x) !0 5^ ^ 2 S-IS I PLATE 75. PIRATE 76. I*JL,A-TE 77. PECULIAR FEATURES OF 13 P9. EQUIPMENT, FIG. 1 08 rr mm r»LA.TE 78. PECULIAR FEATURES OF S3 P£, EQUIPMENT. H BOX FOR GUN AND WAGON LIMBER I ! AND HIND WAGON. FIG. 1 10 -1 ^^M^^M?^^^:^^^^^^^^^^^^^ NOT E . Tfrn c^tCfivT' vf fdfirj ' ( yt'agon. hccr i^9 lAe .