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Hollinger Corp. 
 P H 8.5 
 
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 Copy 1 
 
 HEGEL'S 
 
 First Principle: 
 
 AN EXPOSITION OF COMPREHENSION AND IDEA 
 
 {Begriff und Idee). 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF G. W. F. HEGEL, 
 
 AND ACCOMPANIED WITH AN 
 
 INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 
 
 BY 
 
 WM. T. HARRIS. 
 
 NEW YORK, .... JOHN WILEY & SONS. 
 
 BOSTON, CROSBY & DAMKELL. 
 
 CINCINNATI, BLANCHARD & CO. 
 
 LONDON, TRUBNER & CO. 
 
PROSPECTUS. V^ 2, 
 JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 t 
 
 ANNOUNCEMENT. 
 
 The Editor takes this occasion to announce the commencement of 
 VOLUME IY. of the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. The first 
 number will be ready in January, 1870, and hereafter the Journal will 
 be issued as a regular quarterly and at the usual times, to-wit : Janu- 
 ary, April, July, and October. 
 
 In Vol. IY. will appear, besides other valuable matter, 
 
 I. A complete Translation of the celebrated "Meditations" of Descartes. 
 II. Fragments of Parmenides translated from the Greek original. (Other Greek frag- 
 ments are also to be expected.) 
 III. The Outlines of the Philosophy of Eights, Morals and Religion, by G. W. F. 
 
 He*gel (as given in his Philosophical Propaedeutics). 
 IY. Outlines of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (also, from the Propaedeutics, 
 by Hegel himself). 
 
 l^i^Will you aid the circulation of the Journal in one or more of the 
 following ways : 
 
 1st. By sending $2 for Yol. IY.? 
 
 2d. By sending $5 for the three volumes already published ? 
 
 3d. By inducing any one else to subscribe ? 
 
 TERMS OF SUBSCRIPTION: 
 Two dollars per volume; single number, fifty cents; three volumes (or three copies of 
 either volume), five dollars; ten copies of Vol. III. or IV. for ten dollars. Bound cop- 
 ies of Vol. 1. or of Vol. II can be had at $3 per copy. Back numbers may be had at 
 fifty cents apiece. All subscriptions should be addressed to the Editor, 
 
 WM. T. HARRIS, Box 2398, St. Louis, Mo. 
 
 To English subscribers the price will be 8s. per volume, 2s. per number. 
 
 CONTENTS OF VOLUME III. 
 
 Contents of No. 1. 
 JSew Exposition of the Science 
 
 of 
 
 Knowledge, by Ficlite. 
 Bernard's Analysis of Hegel's ^Es- 
 thetics (Poetry). 
 The Sentences of Porphyry the 
 
 Philosopher. 
 Michael Angelo's " Last Judgment." 
 V. Leibnitz on Platonic Enthusiasm. 
 VI. A National Institute. 
 VII. "VVinckelminn's Description of the 
 Apollo Belvedere. 
 
 II. 
 ILL 
 
 IV. 
 
 Contents of No. 3. 
 
 I. New Exposition of tbe Science of 
 Knowledge, by Fichte. 
 II. Kant's System 'of Transcendental- 
 ism. 
 III. Outlines of Hegel's Logic. 
 
 IV. B enard's Analysis of Hegel's Es- 
 
 thetics. 
 
 V. The True First Principle. 
 
 Contents of No. 2. 
 I. New Exposition of the Science of, 
 
 Knowledge, by Fichte. 
 II. Kant's System of Transcendental- 
 ism, i 
 
 III. Benard's Analysis of Hegel's Es- 
 
 thetics i Poetry). 
 
 IV. Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology. I 
 V. The Speculative vs. the Visionary. 
 
 VI. " He is not Far." 
 VII. Elementary School Education. 
 VIII. Practical Effects of Modern Philoso- 
 phy. 
 
 Contents of No. 4. 
 
 I. New Exposition of the Science of 
 
 Knowledge, by Fichte. 
 IL Beiiard's Analysis of Hegel's Es- 
 thetics. 
 
 III. Berkeley's Doctrine on the Nature of 
 
 Matter. 
 
 IV. Hegel's First Principle. 
 
 V. The Problems of Philosophy at the 
 Present Time. 
 VI. Is Thought the Thinker ? 
 VII. Preface to Vol. III. 
 
HEGEL'S 
 
 First Principle: 
 
 AN EXPOSITION OF COMPREHENSION AND IDEA 
 
 {Begriff und Idee). 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OP G. W. P. HEGEL, 
 
 AND ACCOMPANIED WITH AN ■ 
 
 INTRODUCTION AND EXPLANATORY NOTES 
 
 BY 
 
 \ 
 
 ^ 
 
 ST. LOUIS: 
 
 PRINTED BY GEORGE KNAPP & CO. 
 1869. 
 

HEGEL'S FIRST PRINCIPLE. 
 
 5 
 
 Introduction by Translator 
 
 Science of the C o:\iprehension 
 
 30 
 
 Appendix 
 
HEGEL'S 
 
 FIRST PRINCIPLE 
 
 AN EXPOSITION OF THE COMPREHENSION AND 
 IDEA {Begriff und Idee). 
 
 Translated from the "Philosophische Propädeutik" of G. W. F. Hegel. 
 
 HEGEL'S FIRST PRINCIPLE. 
 
 INTRODUCTION BY TRANSLATOR. 
 
 It has been asserted so often by English writers that Hegel is a 
 Pantheist, or "Panlogisl" and that he holds that all is a relation, or 
 that all is Pure Being (we cannot enumerate here all the absurd no- 
 tions placed to his account) that no small degree of interest should 
 attach to his own statement of his First Principle. In these outlines 
 of the Science of the Comprehension — which are translated from the 
 
6 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 third year's course of the Propaedeutics — he concisely unfolds what ho 
 defines as "the In-and-for-itself-existent, the simple totality, creator of 
 all its determination s." Those who think the terms "concept" or 
 "notion" would answer as English equivalents for the Hegelian "Be- 
 griff," are invited to consider the eighty-eighth paragraph ( § 88 ) of 
 the "Outlines of Hegel's Logic," published on page 278 {Jour. Sp % Phil.) 
 as well as the second paragraph (§2) of the present exposition. 
 
 The exposition of that which is "In-and-for-itself-existent" is not 
 the exposition of "a notion." The First Principle, seized in its im- 
 mediateness, i. e. in its most inadequate forms — superficially — is taken 
 as subjective process of thought, concept, judgment, syllogism. But 
 each of these is seized as an adumbration of the True Principle, which 
 is called "Idea." The region of thought in which the "Science of the 
 Comprehension" starts must be gained by traversing the provinces 
 of the "Objective Logic," which includes the "Science of Being" and 
 the "Science of Essence," i. e. Ontology and ^Etiology (or "Statical 
 and Dynamical," as called by C. C. Everett in his treatise on the 
 "Science of Thought"). This preliminary work may be done by mas- 
 tering the exposition, already referred to, commencing on page 257 of 
 this volume. But in order to connect that exposition more closely 
 with the one here translated, we give a brief survey of the field occu- 
 pied by Philosophic Thought as a whole, and a more detailed exami- 
 nation of the Prima Philosophia, or Science of Science — called Logic 
 by Hegel: 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Philosophy is a closed circle, ending in its beginning; hence no one 
 can begin his system anywhere without making some sort of a pre- 
 supposition. But Philosophy, as absolute science, should have no pre- 
 supposition ; hence any system can become absolute science only as it 
 completes itself to a circle, and thereby supplies the presupposition 
 made in the beginning. Moreover, in a circle a beginning may be 
 made anywhere ; one would expect, therefore, a multitude of begin- 
 nings, according to the caprice of the philosopher. And again, since 
 all arbitrariness — not being adequate to Freedom — produces only what 
 is subordinate to law, these manifold beginnings can be reduced and 
 explained, and their necessary limits drawn. 
 
 Thus all beginnings may be reduced to three : Subjective, objective, 
 and absolute.* 
 
 The subjective beginning is the starting-point of subjective culture, 
 the beginning which conscious being makes in its first act of knowl- 
 
 * See "System der Wissenschaft," by Karl Rosenkranz (p. 12), for an excellent 
 statement of the Hegelian doctrine on this point. 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 7 
 
 edge. It starts with the Here and -Now, a world of alien objective ex- 
 istences or appearances, and proceeds to prove them and test their 
 validity. The end of its labor is the elevation of itself to a knowl- 
 edge of a fixed, permanent principle, which is adequate to the explana- 
 tion of the objective world. This beginning presupposes a subjective 
 world, and an objective world opposed to it. The result of the pro- 
 cedure carried out fully, explains the origin of this antithesis of subject 
 and object with which it started. This science is the Phenomenology 
 of Mind. 
 
 The objective beginning starts with Being in general, and seeks to 
 find the adequate and true form of objective existence, or what is the 
 true actuality. While the subjective side in the Phenomenology 
 sought to elevate itself to the knowledge of the True, this procedure 
 (beginning with Being) seeks to elevate the Objective to a true exist- 
 ence, and is called Logic by Hegel, but by most others since Aristotle 
 "Metaphysics," although by Aristotle and some others IJpwrrj $doGo<pia 
 {Prima Philosophia). The result of the procedure carried out fully 
 is the comprehension of the Absolute. The first principle, which is 
 efficient and also final cause of all, the immanent cause or causa sui, 
 is God. 
 
 L The absolute beginning, accordingly, is the Idea, as Hegel calls it : 
 trie absolute self-conscious Beason, which is the identity of the theoret- 
 ical and practical, of knowing and being. The procedure made from 
 this beginning is the systematic exposition of the world of Mature and 
 Spirit, as manifestation, realization, and actualization of God, or abso- 
 lute self-conscious Beason.^ The presupposition made by this begin- 
 ning is manifestly the establishment of the Idea as the highest and 
 true form of Being — the result of the Logic. Logic had for presup- 
 position the already existent power, on the part of the thinker, to 
 comprehend, i. e. to think speculatively or exhaustively — sub specie 
 (Bternitatis percipere — the power to apply the test of Universality 
 (self-relation) to any category. 
 
 It is clear that the third beginning — the absolute first principle — 
 must be present as the moving soul in all philosophical procedure. In 
 the Phenomenology, this is the ideal that hovers before the inadequate 
 forms of knowing and exhibits their incompleteness and self-contra- 
 diction. In the Logic, this is again the ideal totality, which the inade- 
 quate categories are unable to express; in their attempt to do this 
 they demand the aid of their opposites, and thus struggle dialectically 
 toward the concrete self-definition of the Idea. * 
 
 The substance of the science {Prima Philosophia') by which one 
 arrives at the Comprehension as the True, may be given compendi- 
 ously as follows, starting at the Second Beginning here mentioned : 
 
8 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 LOGIC. 
 
 I. — Being, 
 (A.)\ If we seize the objective world immediately (without media- 
 tion), we seize it as Being. All categories of Being have this in common, 
 that they are seized as possessing immediate truth, and not as obtain- 
 ing truth through relation to another^} Thus it is with Quality, Quan- 
 tity, and Mode, or the determinations classified under them. 
 
 A short examination will test their claims to this immediate truth : 
 
 (B.) Take, then, the simple Immediate ; admit no mediation into it, 
 
 whether in the definition or in the "meaning" which we attach to it. 
 
 Being shall be simple and self-sufficing, the pure and undetermined 
 
 One: 
 
 1. In this simplicity, therefore, it neither has nor can have any de- 
 termination. 
 
 2. But that which is utterly devoid of determination is likewise 
 devoid of relation, and hence of self-relation, and hence neither exists 
 for itself nor for another. 
 
 3. Hence the simple immediate is an absolute nullity. 
 
 (C.) Thus the categories of Being prove their inadequacy to express 
 reality. The stage of consciousness which supposed that it possessed 
 adequate knowledge through such categories would be naive and self- 
 deceived. (The sensuous consciousness is that stage in the Phenome- 
 nology, wherein the Ego makes the experience that all in Time and 
 Space is mediated, composite, and therefore cannot be known ade- 
 quately except by mediated knowing. ) 
 
 II. — JVega tivity. 
 
 7 f 
 
 The dialectic of Being results in the negation of Being as having 
 
 independence. 
 
 (A.) Hence we have the Negative for the universal result ; the Im 
 
 mediate is the Negative. J ■ 
 
 The dialectic of the Negative. 
 
 1. Negativity is here the Universal or the All (since all is proved to 
 be mediated) j the negative is essentially a relative. 
 
 2. But since the All is the Negative, this Negative can subsist only 
 as self-relative, or a negative of itself. 
 
 3. But a self-negative is a self-cancelling, and hence the opposite of 
 itself while it is itself. 
 
 This gives us the category of Appearance or the Phenomenal — that 
 which is self-nugatory. 
 
 (3.) Pure mediation is therefore pure relation, the world of the Un- 
 derstanding, a world of enchantment. All the antithetical {reflexive) 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 9 
 
 determinations, such as positive and negative, thing and properties, 
 force and manifestation, occur here. 
 
 Pure mediation has truth as opposed to Being. But is it adequate to 
 express true actuality ? 
 
 1. In pure mediation we have the negative related to itself, hence, 
 the following dualism : 
 
 (a) The Negative related to itself is a going of the same to the same 
 and hence Identity, 
 
 (£) But at the same time, since it is a negative relation, it cancels 
 that to which it relates, and hence itself, and thus it repels itself from 
 itself, is pure self-opposition or self-distinction. 
 
 (c) Thus Identity and Distinction are the result of the same activity 
 of the negative. 
 
 2. With this, Pure negativity or pure relativity finds again the repose 
 of Being. In fact, all Being is now seen to be simply the phase of 
 identity which occurs in this dual process of the self-relation of the 
 negative. All becoming and transition in Being was merely the result 
 of our seizing it too narrowly and including only the self-relative phase, 
 or that of identity, and then being compelled to notice the negative 
 self-relation or cancelling of identity. This transpires eternally as 
 the internal nature of all that we call Beings, meaning thereby imme- 
 diate existences, individual things, qualities, quantities, and modes. 
 These are all mere phases — fragments or parts of the Totality, depend- 
 ent upon and conditioned by the Totality. Each Being finds its limits 
 in others, and these in it. So that the part has no being except in its 
 relation to others and through their relation to it. Being is therefore 
 a small segment of the Total, and in considering the dialectic of .Rela- 
 tivity or Negativity we have found what and how Being is. 
 
 3. Thus we have a positive result. Our Whole or total process is a 
 self-determining one, and the three moments of Identity, Distinction, 
 and their Unity, may now be recognized as the triune process of sub- 
 ject-objectivity, i. e. Egohood — consciousness. Our substance — our 
 permanent unity — is not a rigid, lifeless one, but a Personal Subject. 
 
 (C.) If objectivity in its first immediateness is called Being, then we 
 have considered what its presuppositions are; at once finding that it 
 must necessarily depend upon its relations for its entire subsistence. 
 Thus we traced objectivity into the form of duality, i. e. relation — and 
 this form we find possible only as self-relation when we seize it as a 
 whole. We are now prepared to say: "Only the self-determined 
 exists; all else is mere dependent fragment or phase of it, and merely 
 seems — it does not exist, it depends." What this self-determined Being 
 is, must bo. considered : 
 
 1. As self-related Negative, it is the Universal, the Generic, the 
 Simple; it is the undetermined possibility of all. 
 
10 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 2. But since this Negation relates to itself, its activity determines it; 
 the very nature of the Generic creates; hence arises the Particular, the 
 diremption, scission, or internal division produced through self-oppo- 
 sition. 
 
 3. But the Generic and its specializing are one unity — the Individual. 
 That which actually exists is neither the pure Generic — which thus 
 isolated would be the pure nought— nor the particularizations which 
 are the results of the negative activity of the former, but the active pro- 
 cess itself as Individual Ego — the complete negativity which elevates 
 the individual out of any determination, restraint, or limit, so that he 
 is always Universal, i. e. the possibility of self-contemplation. I can 
 always, in whatever I am doing, drop at once the object of my con- 
 templation and take up another, or make the empty form of subject 
 the object, by thinking of the pure Ego. No natural Being could do 
 this, for the reason that whatever has essential relations to the With- 
 out, and depends upon other Beings, is not Whole and has no Self. 
 Its negativity is not self-related within it, but without {outside) it. 
 Were the stone conscious, it would know itself as almost utterly out- 
 side itself, or rather its knowing would necessarily be outside of it, i. e. 
 in the Eational being who looks upon it. "Almost utterly," we said, 
 because if utterly, then the stone would melt into the pure space which 
 it occupies. It therefore does take a step towards knowing itself; it 
 falls towards the centre of the planet — a dumb confession that its 
 Being lies outside of it in the centre of the planet. 
 
 One is liable to fall into error here unless he is careful to compre- 
 hend fully the essential point, to-wit : that the individual is no process 
 in the sense that it is " thinking without a thinker." It is kvipyeta 
 (or vo-qaiq) not as an abstract concept, but ij xad" au-ijv, not ideas or ac- 
 tivities in the abstract — as if one should say that the concept or arche- 
 type of a table or house is indestructible, and outlasts all tables or 
 houses, or as if one should say that the ultimate truth is the Correla- 
 tion of Forces, a perpetual circular movement, the eternal passage of 
 force through a series of phases, now electricity, now heat, now at- 
 traction, &c. In these cases no subject in a proper sense is stated 
 or thought by those who hold such doctrines. In the self-relation 
 (^ xa(? aurijv) the monad is stated — "atomic subjectivity" — which, how- 
 ever, finds its truth in Personality, or the "Pro-established Harmony" 
 — not a harmony forced upon the monad, but a harmony into which 
 he ascends by his own activity, dissolving the objective, and widening 
 his subjectivity until the atomic becomes cosmic. Is Goethe or Shak- 
 speare more or less of a person than the semi-cultured man who fears 
 to study those authors too much lest he u lose his personality"? Is 
 not rather the man of most personality he who has broken in most 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 11 
 
 ways the narrow limits of his natural individuality and has given him- 
 self up heart and soul to the greatest geniuses, borrowing negative 
 force from each to cancel his own finitude ? All this movement in the ^ 
 form of self-relation is the achievement of conscious Selfhood. 
 
 But Hegel's greatest merit lies in this : that he does not stop at this 
 point of Platonic idealism, high though it be. He seizes it in its his- 
 tory — as Aristotle did in his time — and rises to the standpoint of the 
 (t Idea," as he calls it — not merely the monad with its self-relation and 
 a pre-established harmony or an abstract world-order, but a concrete 
 realization of all this. He finds the system of freedom, Eattonal 
 Freedom, to be the Substantial World. Not the Systeme du Monde of 
 Laplace, with its blind forces, but a system of the World which is ex- 
 hibited as plastic to the Divine Eeason. Mechanical and Dynamical 
 to matter and finite relations, this immanent principle is the Ideal or 
 Final Cause to the conscious Being. As Dante expresses it : 
 
 Ed & NATURA 
 
 Ch' al somino pinge noi di collo in collo. 
 
 Or, as the Chorus Mysticus in Faust names it : 
 
 Das Ewig Weibliche zieht uns hinan. 
 
 God as self-conscious Eeason : (1) Separating Himself from Himself 
 in the act of knowing Himself as object, thereby creating all forms of 
 chaos and the chaotic; (2) in the recognition of Himself as object, an- 
 nulling the chaos and chaotic, creating the rising spiral of Nature, and 
 resting from creation with the contemplation of His image = self- 
 conscious intelligence in man. The Idea is the Comprehension of 
 Comprehensions, the Truth as the form of the Absolute Actuality = 
 the Self-conscious Divine Eeason.* 
 
 THE SCH^CE OF THE COMPREHENSION. 
 
 Translated from the German of G. W. F. Hegel. 
 
 § 1. Objective Logic is the science of the Comprehension 
 in itself, or the science of the Categories. Subjective Logic, 
 which we treat of here, is the science of the Comprehension 
 as Comprehension, or of the Comprehension of somewhat. 
 It is divided into three parts : 
 
 (1) The science of the Comprehension; 
 
 (2) The science of its Realization ; 
 
 (3) The science of the Idea. 
 
 * See Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. L, pp. 20 & 21, and also pp. 2'M 
 to 240. 
 
12 HegeVs First Principle, 
 
 First Division. 
 
 SCIENCE OF THE COMPKEHENSION. 
 I. — Comprehension. 
 
 § 2. The Comprehension is the Universal, which is at the 
 same time determined ; that which remains in its determina- 
 tion the same "Whole or Universal ; or it is the determinate- 
 ness which comprehends — grasps together — in itself the dif- 
 ferent determinations of an object as unity. 
 
 Note by Translator. — By the Objective Logic we have arrived at the Adequate 
 form of True Being, and this is the self-determined — causa, sui. Now we come to 
 consider it; and we find it as the process of subsumption of itself under itself. 
 At first this is merely formal, for the reason that it subsumes itself only frag- 
 mentarily under its Infinite form. Gradually, however, it comes to subsume 
 itself as a Totality, and when it reaches this goal it is the Idea. 
 
 The Comprehension is the " adequate form of True Being," i. e. it is a Total- 
 ity, and this must be kept in mind constantly in order to understand the dialecti- 
 cal movement in the Judgment and Syllogism. 
 
 § 3. The moments of the Comprehension are Universality, 
 Particularity, and Individuality. It is their unity. 
 
 § 4. The Universal is this unity as positive, self -identical, 
 undetermined unity ; the Particular is the determination of 
 the Universal, Ibut such a one as is cancelled [or reduced to a 
 moment] in the Universal, i. e. the Universal remains in it 
 what it is ; the Individual is the negative unity, or the determ- 
 ination which forms a unity with itself through self-determin- 
 ation. 
 
 § 5. The Universal includes under it the Particular and 
 Individual ; so likewise the Particular includes under it the 
 Individual ; on the contrary, the Individual includes in it 
 the Particular and the Universal, and the Particular includes 
 in it the Universal. The Universal is more extensive than 
 the Particular or Individual, hut the latter are more compre- 
 hensive than the former, which for the reason that it is includ- 
 ed in the Individual is a determinateness of it. The Universal 
 inheres in the Particular and Individual, while the latter are 
 subsumed under the former. 
 
 § 6. Since the Comprehension contains in itself the moments 
 of Individuality, Particularity, and Universality, it is mani- 
 foldly determined with regard to its content, and is the com- 
 prehension of something Individual, Particular, or Universal. 
 
 § 7. The particularizations of the Universal, i. e. determina- 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 13 
 
 tions which have one and the same common sphere, these and 
 likewise the individuals which are subsumed under the same 
 Particular or Universal, are said to "be coordinate ; what is 
 subsumed is also said to be subordinate to that under which 
 it is subsumed. 
 
 § 8. The coordinated particular determinations of the Uni- 
 versal are opposed to each other, and, in case the one is to be 
 taken as the negation of the other, they are contradictory ; 
 but whenever the other also has positiveness and through this 
 falls within the same general sphere as the former, they are 
 opposed merely as contraries. Such determinations, coor- 
 dinated in the tjniversal, cannot co-exist in the Individual ; 
 but those which are coordinated in the Individual are [merely] 
 different ones [i. e. disparate], i. e. they do not have the 
 same universal sphere in their distinction, but are in harmony 
 (accord) with the Individual. 
 
 § 9. The coordinate determinations of the Universal, con- 
 sidered more in detail, are : (1) the one the negative of the 
 other in general, without regard to the question whether they 
 have the same universal sphere or not ; (2) in so far as they 
 have the same sphere in common, and the one determination 
 is positive, the other negative, so that this negativity toward 
 each other constitutes their nature, they are properly termed 
 contradictories ; (3) in so far as they stand in opposition in 
 the same common sphere, or the one is positive in the same 
 sense as the other, and each consequently can be called posi- 
 tive as well as negative in relation to the other, they are con- 
 traries. 
 
 § 10. "With the determination of Contrariety, which is in- 
 different as regards the antithesis of positive and negative, the 
 transition is effected into the Being determined-in-and-for- 
 itself and out of the determinateness-through-others, and by 
 this the mutual participation of the same sphere is differen- y 
 tiated and becomes individuality, whose determinations differ" 
 from each other without a common sphere and are thereby 
 determined in and for themselves. 
 
 II. — Judgment. 
 
 % 11. The Judgment is the presentation of an object as un- 
 folded into the three moments of the Comprehension. It con- 
 tains it : (a) in the determination of individuality as subject ; 
 
14 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 (b) in its determination of universality or its predicate, by 
 which means the subject can also stand in relation to the pre- 
 dicate itself as individuality to particularity and as particu- 
 larity to universality ; (c) the simple relation of the predicate 
 to the subject, without content — the IS, the copula. 
 
 § 12. The Judgment is to be distinguished from the Propo- 
 sition: in the latter something quite individual — an occur- 
 rence — is expressed of a subject, or, as in general propositions, 
 something is affirmed of the subject as having a necessary 
 connection with it, and which it becomes or to which it stands 
 in opposition. Since in the Comprehension the moments are 
 seized as in one unity, in the Judgment also (as presenting the 
 Comprehension), although there is determination, there is do 
 Becoming or antithesis. The inferior determination — the sub- 
 ject — elevates itself to the Universal, which differs from it, i. e. 
 to the predicate ; or is it immediately. 
 
 § 13. In Logic the Judgment is considered according to its 
 pure form without regard to any definite empirical content. 
 Judgments are classified by the relation in which the subject 
 and predicate stand to each other — in how far their relation is 
 through and in the Comprehension, or is a relation of objec- 
 tivity to the Comprehension. Upon the character of this rela- 
 tion depends the higher or absolute truth of the Judgment. 
 Truth is the harmony of the Comprehension with its objectiv- 
 ity. In the Judgment this presentation of the Comprehen- 
 sion and its objectivity begins, and hence the sphere of Truth 
 begins here. 
 
 § 14. Inasmuch as the Judgment is the presentation of an 
 object in the different moments of the Comprehension, it is 
 moreover the exhibition of the Comprehension in its determ- 
 inate Being, not so much because of the definite content which 
 the moments of the Comprehension have, as because in the 
 Judgment these latter issue forth from their (implicit) unity. 
 As the entire judgment exhibits the Comprehension in its de- 
 terminate Being, so this distinction comes again into the form 
 of the Judgment itself. The subject is the object, and the predi- 
 cate is the generality of the same which is intended to express 
 it as Comprehension. The movement of the Judgment through 
 its different species elevates this universality (generality) to 
 a higher stage, wherein it comes to correspond as nearly to 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 15 
 
 the Comprehension as is possible for it in so far as it is a 
 mere predicate. 
 
 A. — Quality of Judgments, or the Judgment of Inherence. 
 
 § 15. The predicate in the most elementary form of the Judg- 
 ment {unmittelbar) is a property which "belongs to the subject 
 in such a manner, that, although it stands in relation to it as 
 universal in general, yet at the same time it is only the par- 
 ticular existence of it, which as such has several determinate- 
 nesses. Universality, the predicate, has here the meaning 
 only of an immediate (or sensuous) universality — a mere pos- 
 sessing in common with others. 
 
 § 16. In the qualitative Judgment the predicate is just as 
 well something universal, which side constitutes the form of 
 the Judgment, as a determined quality of the subject which 
 manifests itself as content. According to the former side, the 
 Judgment takes as its pure form : "the individual is a univer- 
 sal"; according to the latter, the side of content : " the indi- 
 vidual is thus and so determined"; — and this is the positive 
 judgment in general. (" This is good"; " This is bad"; " This 
 rose is red"; " This rose is white," &c.) 
 
 § 17. For the reason that (1) the individual is just as well 
 not universal, and (2) the subject has other determinations 
 besides this one, the qualitative judgment must be expressed 
 negatively in both respects ; hence arises the negative judg- 
 ment. (" This is not good"; " This is not bad"; " This rose is 
 not red, but white" — yellow, &c. ; " This rose is not white, but 
 red," &c.) 
 
 § 18. According to form, therefore, this judgment is : " The 
 individual is not a universal but a particular" ; according to 
 content : " The individual is not thus, but otherwise determ- 
 ined." In both respects this negative judgment is at the same 
 time also positive. In the first respect, the negation is only 
 the limitation of the Universality to the particularity ; in the 
 other respect, only some one determinateness is negated, and 
 through this negation the Universality or the higher sphere 
 makes its appearance. t 
 
 § 19. Finally: (1) According to form, the individual is not 
 a mere particular somewhat — for particularity is more exten- 
 
16 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 sive than individuality — but the individual is only the indi- 
 vidual ; and this is the Identical judgment. 
 
 Conversely: (2) According to content, the subject is not 
 only not this particular determinateness, but also not any 
 other determinateness merely. Such a content is too narrow 
 for the subject. Through this negation of determinateness is 
 cancelled the entire sphere of the predicate and the positive 
 relation which subsisted in the preceding negative judgment; 
 and this gives the Infinite judgment. 
 
 § 20. The mentioned identical and infinite judgments are 
 no proper judgments. That is to say, the mutual relation 
 which subsists between the subject and predicate in the Qual- 
 itative Judgment is cancelled, which relation was this : that 
 there was expressed only some one of the immediate determ- 
 inatenesses of its Being — a determinateness to which belonged 
 only a superficial generality. In the infinite judgment, a uni- 
 versality is demanded which is not a mere individual determ- 
 inateness. The mentioned identical judgment signifies that 
 the subject is determined for and by itself, and is in its de- 
 termination returned into itself [i. e. is completely exhausted 
 by the predicate]. 
 
 § 21. In the identical and infinite judgments the mutual 
 relation of subject and predicate is cancelled. This is to be 
 taken first as that side of the judgment according to which 
 subject and predicate can be regarded as standing through 
 the copula in a relation of identity, abstracting from their dif- 
 ference. In this respect the positive judgment can become 
 inverted in so far as the predicate is taken only in the same 
 extent of significance as the subject is. 
 
 § 22. The negative judgment contains the separation of a 
 determinateness from its subject in such a manner that the 
 subject is still related positively to the universal (though not 
 expressly stated) sphere of the determinateness. Whenever 
 the negated predicate is made the subject, the universal sphere 
 mentioned falls away, and leaves only the non-identity of two 
 determinatenesses in general, and it is indifferent which of 
 them is made subject or which predicate. The negative judg- 
 ment can therefore (and so also the identical judgment) be 
 inverted without altering it. 
 
HegeVs First, Principle. 17 
 
 Note hy Translator. — The qualitative Judgment deals with the Finite — the sphere 
 where the Individual is not a Totality, and where the Universal is only a Common 
 or General, and the Particular some determinateness coordinate with or antithetic 
 to some other. Hence arises its dialectic. It attempts to express its content, but 
 says too much; there is untruth in the content, and untruth again in the form of 
 expression. Hegel traces out, \\ 15-22, the course of the ascending series of judg- 
 ments, pointing out the defects in form and content separately, and at the same 
 time shows their incongruity with each other. These defects and incongruities 
 may be seen readily by any one who will consider that the equality of subject and 
 predicate expressed by the copula IS can only exist in the case where each is the 
 Total Comprehension (i. e. universal as regards extension and "comprehension"). 
 Hence the identical judgment is the true form, and the content falls into the infi- 
 nite judgment. "A red rose is a red rose" as identical judgment, though true in 
 form expresses nothing, but merely implies that its content is self-determined. 
 " The rose is not an elephant," as infinite judgment, likewise expresses nothing, 
 since all relation is denied between the subject and predicate, and not any implied 
 even, as there is in the case of the negative judgment, " The rose is not red, but 
 white," &c. Every sensuous quality is inadequate as predicate to a Totality j \% 
 fails both in extent and in comprehension. This is the positive import of the infinite 
 judgment. With the identical judgment, a "point of indifference" has been 
 reached, and inversion can take place. The form of reflection-into-itself is reached* 
 
 B. — Quantity of Judgments, or Judgments of Reflection* 
 
 § 23. Where judgments can be inverted, the distinction of 
 subject and predicate is ignored. This distinction is however, 
 since it is now cancelled as qualitative, to be taken quanti- 
 tatively. 
 
 § 24. Since the individual determinatenesses which the 
 predicate contained cancel themselves, the predicate has to 
 include the manifold determinations of the subject taken 
 together. Through this circumstance the universality ceases 
 to be a mere community with others. It is the universality 
 which belongs to the subject's own nature, which consequent- 
 ly implies that the subject returns into itself in [is exhausted, 
 by] its predicate. 
 
 § 25. Such a judgment is consequently a judgment of, i&- 
 flection, since Reflection implies the going througli, several 
 determinations of an object and the grasping together, of the 
 same in unity. 
 
 § 26. In so far as the identity of the subject wibh: the predi- 
 cate makes its appearance, the subject is a Universal which 
 is subject through confining it to individuality. The quantita- 
 tive judgment is therefore (1) a singular somewhat which lias 
 in the determination of subject perfect individuality and is a 
 this Universal. 
 2 
 
18 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 § 27. A this is determined in infinitely manifold ways, i. e. 
 it is indefinitely determinable. The predicate of Reflection, 
 since it is a complex, expresses not only the general determ- 
 ination of one This, but also of other This's ; that is to say, 
 the singular judgment goes over (2) into the Particular. 
 
 § 28. The particular judgment in which the subject is de- 
 termined as " some " is only a determined judgment, which 
 can be expressed immediately just as well positively as neg- 
 atively. 
 
 § 29. The subject receives its perfect determination, accord- 
 ing tp extent of form, (3) through the "All-ness" in the univer- 
 sal judgment. Since the "All-ness" enters in place of partic- 
 ularity, and has at the same time the extent of the latter, the 
 extent of the content of the subject must be limited according 
 to it. 
 
 § 30. The subject becomes partly through this a particular 
 as regards its predicate, partly there enters a relation of ne- 
 cessity between subject and predicate. 
 
 Note by Translator. — Judgments of reflection, therefore, are (1) the Singular: 
 " This man is mortal" ; (2) the Particular: " Some men are mortal" ; (3) the Uni- 
 versal: "All men are mortal." They ascend from the Individual to the Univer- 
 sal, and the latter rest upon the perceived necessity in the relation of subject and 
 predicate. 
 
 C. — Relation of Judgments, or Judgments of Necessity. 
 
 § 31. Through the cancelling of the qualitative and quanti- 
 tative determinations, the unity of content of subject and predi- 
 cate is posited, which latter therefore differ only through their 
 form, so that the same object is posited at one time merely as 
 subject; at another, as predicate. 
 
 § 32. Since the subject is a particular somewhat as opposed 
 to its predicate, conversely the subject is now in contradis- 
 tinction to the qualitative judgment a determinateness of the 
 predicate and immediately subsumed under the same. The 
 universality of the predicate expresses, therefore, not merely 
 a complex of determinatenesses of the subject like the predi- 
 cate of Reflection, but the universal internal nature of the 
 subject; and this is the Categorical judgment. ("The body 
 is heavy." " Gold is a metal." " Mind is rational.") 
 
 § 33. In so far as subject and predicate are also distinct, 
 their unity also must be expressed as unity of contraries, i. e. 
 as necessary relation ; and this is the hypothetical judgment. 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 19 
 
 § 34. The Identity of content (which is found in the catego- 
 rical judgment) and the Relation of contraries (in the hypo- 
 thetical judgment) are united in the disjunctive judgment, 
 wherein the subject is a universal sphere or is considered in 
 regard to such a one, and this (universal sphere) constitutes the 
 predicate ; and the particularization or various determinations 
 of the predicate express this. Of these, the one as well as 
 the other belongs to the universal. According to their par- 
 ticularization and in respect to the subject, however, they 
 exclude each other. 
 
 D. — Modality of Judgments, or Judgments of the Relation of the Comprehension 
 
 to Being. 
 
 § 35. In the disjunctive judgment, a Being is posited in the 
 complete series of moments of the Comprehension. Modality 
 of judgments consists in this, that a Being is related to its 
 comprehension as such, and the predicate expresses the con- 
 formity or non-conformity of the two. 
 
 § 36. The first judgment of modality is the assertorical, 
 which contains a mere assertion, inasmuch as only the state 
 or condition of the subject which is tobe compared with the 
 comprehension, and not the comprehension itself is expressed ; 
 hence this judgment has at first only a subjective confirma- 
 tion. ("This deed is bad"; "This remark is true.") 
 
 § 37. Against the assurances of assertorical judgments, 
 therefore, the opposite may just as well be asserted ; the pre- 
 dicate expresses only one of those opposite determinatenesses 
 of which the subject, considered as universal sphere, contains 
 both. This judgment, therefore, passes over into the prob- 
 lematical, which expresses merely the possibility of the con- 
 formity or non-conformity of the given existence to the Com- 
 prehension. 
 
 § 38. The universality of the subject is therefore posited 
 with a limitation which expresses the state or condition in 
 which lies the conformity or non-conformity of the given exis- 
 tence with the Comprehension. The predicate expresses 
 nothing else than this identity or non-identity of the state or 
 condition with the Comprehension of the object. This is the 
 apodeictic judgment. 
 
 Note by Translator. — The correspondence of the classification of judgments \\\\\\ 
 the divisions of the Objective Logic La manifest. Qualitative judgments express 
 the perceptions of hnmediateness or Being; judgments of Reflection and Neces- 
 
20 HegeVs First Principle, 
 
 sity express perceptions of mediation in its three aspects, (a) as Essence, {b) as 
 Phenomenon, (c) as Actuality; judgments of Modality express perceptions of 
 absolute mediation or of the Comprehension. 
 
 A general survey of the classification of Judgments is here given. (See P. VI. 
 Vol. in. Hegel's Great Logic, 2d Ed.) 
 
 A. Judgments of Being: 
 
 a. The positive judgment; 
 
 b. The negative judgment; 
 
 c. The infinite judgment. 
 
 B. Judgments of Reflection: 
 
 a. The singular judgment; 
 
 b. The particular Judgment; 
 
 c. The universal judgment. 
 
 C. Judgments of Necessity : 
 
 a. The categorical judgment; 
 
 b. The hypothetical judgment; 
 
 c. The disjunctive judgment. 
 
 D. Judgments of the Comprehension : 
 
 a. The assertorical judgment; 
 
 b. The problematical judgment; 
 
 c. The apodeictic judgment. 
 
 III. — Syllogism. 
 
 § 39. The syllogism is the perfect exhibition of the Compre- 
 hension. It contains, as such, the judgment with its ground. 
 There are in it two determinations which are united by means 
 of a third which is their unity. It is a comprehension extant 
 as unity (the middle term of the syllogism) and as diremption 
 (the extremes of the syllogism). 
 
 § 40. The relation of the two extremes of the syllogism to 
 the middle term is an immediate one ; their relation to each 
 other, however, is mediated through the middle term. The 
 former, the two immediate relations, are the judgments which 
 are called premises ; the relation which is mediated is called 
 the conclusion. 
 
 § 41. In the first place, the syllogism expresses its moments 
 through the mere form, in such a manner that the middle term 
 is a peculiar determinateness as opposed to the extremes, and 
 the ground or unity of the moments is a mere subjective one. 
 That which is really the primitive is in this case a deduced, 
 and has the signification of a result. 
 
 A, — Syllogisms of Quality or of Inherence. 
 
 § 42. The form of this syllogism I — P — U (Individual — Par- 
 ticular — Universal) — that the Individual is connected with the 
 Universal through the Particular, is the general rule of the 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 21 
 
 syllogism as such. In the first, immediate, syllogism, the 
 Particular or the middle term is a quality or determinateness 
 of the Individual, and, likewise, the Universal is a determin- 
 ateness of the Particular. Therefore a transition might be 
 made from the Individual through another one of its determin- 
 ations (of which it has several) to another universal; and so 
 likewise from the Particular to another Universal, since the 
 Particular also contains within itself different determinations. 
 This syllogism appears to he correct so far as its form is con- 
 cerned, but according to its content arbitrary and contingent. 
 ("Green is a pleasant color; this leaf is green; hence it is 
 pleasant." " The sensuous is neither good nor bad ; but man 
 is a sensuous being; hence he is neither good nor bad." 
 "Bravery is a virtue ; Alexander possessed bravery ; hence he 
 was virtuous." " Drunkenness is a vice ; Alexander was ad- 
 dicted to drunkenness ; hence he was vicious," &c.) 
 
 § 43. According to form, the two premises are immediate 
 relations. The form of the syllogism contains, however, the 
 demand that they should be mediated, or according to the 
 common expression, the premises should be proved. But the 
 proof through this form of the syllogism would be only a repe- 
 tition of it, and thus the same demand would recur again ad 
 infinitum. 
 
 § 44. The mediation — and hence the Panic ularity and Uni- 
 versality must therefore be brought in through the moment of 
 Individuality. This gives the second form of the syllogism : 
 U — I — P. This syllogism is correct, in the first place, only 
 in so far as the judgment U — I has validity. In order that this 
 may be the case, U must be Particular. In this case, the Indi- 
 vidual is not really the middle term. The syllogism is brought 
 back to the form of the first, but the conclusion is particular. 
 This syllogism has however, in general, the signification (in 
 contradistinction to the other), that immediate determinations 
 or qualities are connected through individuality, and in so far 
 contingently. 
 
 § 45. The Individual connected with the Particular through 
 the Universal gives the third form of the syllogism : P — U — I. 
 The Universal is here the mediating determination and predi- 
 cate in both premises. But it does not follow that two deter- 
 minations are the same because they inhere in the same in- 
 
22 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 dividual; it follows rather that the two determinations are 
 subsumed under the same Universal, and not that they can be 
 united as subject and predicate. Only in so far as the major 
 premise is negative, and thus can be inverted, does this syl- 
 logism admit of reduction to the first and consequently pos- 
 sess the correct form. (" ISTo finite Being is holy ; God is no 
 finite Being ; hence God is holy.") 
 
 § 46. The objective signification of this syllogism is that 
 the union of particularity with individuality has its ground 
 alone in the identical nature of the two. 
 
 § 47. (1) In this series of syllogisms each of the three de- 
 terminations has in succession constituted the middle term. 
 The reduction of the second and third syllogistic forms is the 
 cancelling of the qualitative. (2) Although each immediate 
 relation of the first syllogism is mediated through the suc- 
 ceeding one, yet each of the latter presupposes the preceding 
 one, i. e. the mediated unity presupposes the immediate iden- 
 tity. 
 
 Note by Translator. — The qualitative Syllogism is realized in all finite existen- 
 ces : in them, only a phase of the totality exists at one time. They belong to Time 
 and Space for the very reason that they (1) are spread out in space, i. e. sundered 
 into self-externality, and (2) are changeable, i e. their Total is only in part real, 
 and for the most part only potential. No thing would change did other potential- 
 ities not exist for it. Since the qualitative Syllogism is the form in which the Uni- 
 versal = Total or Comprehension is realized (i. e. becomes individual) in only one 
 of its particularities (potentialities), it follows that this is the Syllogism of Finitude 
 and perpetual change. 
 
 The finite side of life takes this form ; e.g. one fashion follows another : some 
 special defect or inconvenience being discovered in the former, a new one is adopt- 
 ed with special reference to correcting it ; the latter being a mere particular is de- 
 fective in some other respect, and has in turn to give way. 
 
 That "Truth is the correspondence of an object with the Comprehension" (g 66), 
 is easy to see from this point of view. The Comprehension being the Totality, if 
 an object is in anywise defective it will be because part of its determinations are 
 merely potential and not actual. Alkali is deficient for the reason that its proxi- 
 mate Comprehnsion is its union with acid in the form of salt. No Being has truth 
 except as a Total or as adequate to its Comprehension; out of this it is changeable 
 and perishable. 
 
 B. — Syllogisms of Quantity or Reflection. 
 § 48. The immediate non-qualitative [quantitative] syllo- 
 gism is the mathematical one. The middle term of this syl- 
 logism is only such a somewhat as is equal to the two others. 
 As proposition it is expressed thus : If two magnitudes are 
 equal to a third, they are equal to each other. 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 23 
 
 § 49. Secondly, in the quantitative syllogism, Individuality, 
 not as one individual, but as all individuals, constitutes the 
 middle term. In so far as some one quality belongs to all, 
 this quality is expressed as quality of that universal sphere 
 or of the genus itself to which the individuals belong. This 
 is the syllogism of Induction. 
 
 § 50. The syllogism in which the Universal is the middle 
 term, infers through analogy that, in the case of two sub- 
 jects which are the same according to their general determin- 
 ations, a particular determinateness which belongs to one, 
 also belongs to the other. 
 
 {a. Several individuals have a common nature ; 
 o. One of the individuals has a certain quality ; 
 c. Therefore the other individuals have this quality.") 
 
 (In the case of Induction, the question arises what ought to 
 be the subject or predicate in the conclusion; e.g. "What 
 moves itself with freedom is an animal", or, " An animal is 
 what moves itself with freedom." " The lion is a mammal", 
 or, "What a mammal is, is a lion." In the case of Analogy, 
 on the contrary, the mediation lies in the fact that another 
 individual has the same common nature. While in the case of 
 Induction the particular determinateness of the common na- 
 ture is grounded in the individual, Analogy infers from the 
 common nature the particular determinateness of the Indi- 
 vidual ; e. g. Jupiter and the Earth are planets ; the Earth has 
 inhabitants ; therefore Jupiter has inhabitants.) 
 
 C. — Syllogisms of Relation. 
 
 § 51. The categorical syllogism has for middle term the in- 
 and-for-itself-existing Universality or the nature of the indi- 
 vidual subject, of which, as such, an essential property is 
 expressed and is connected to this subject. 
 
 § 52. The hypothetical syllogism expresses another Being 
 as the ground of some particular Being. If A is, then B is : 
 but A is ; therefore B is. The determinations are no longer 
 in relation as Individual, Particular, and Universal, but a de- 
 termination, B, which in the first place is only in-itself-exist- 
 ent, or potential, is connected with existence through A as 
 middle term, which is existent as well as ground. 
 
 § 53. In the disjunctive syllogism, the ground that a deter- 
 mination is connected with a subject consists in this, that 
 
24 Hegel's First Principle. 
 
 one part of the particular determinations of a total sphere do 
 not belong to it, and consequently the rest do belong to it; 
 or, vice versa. A is either B, C, or D : but it is not B nor C ; 
 therefore it is D. 
 
 § 54. The middle term is therefore the subject as a total 
 (universal) sphere in its complete particularization, and con- 
 tains at the same time the excluding or positing of a part of 
 these its determinations. The subject is as a Universal [total- 
 ity] in itself the potentiality of several determinations. From 
 its Universality [Totality] or Potentiality a transition is to be 
 made to its determinateness or actuality. 
 
 § 55. A survey of the forms of the syllogism adduces the 
 fact that : (1) in the qualitative syllogisms the moments have 
 validity only in their qualitative difference. They need there- 
 fore a mediating link, but this falls outside of them, and is 
 their immediate unity. (2) In the quantitative syllogisms, 
 the qualitative difference of moments is suppressed, and with 
 it the mutual relation and distinction of mediate from imme- 
 diate are obliterated. (3) In the syllogisms of Kelation, the 
 mediation contains at the same time immediateness. There- 
 fore from this the comprehension of an immediateness of 
 Nature or of qualitative difference has made its appearance, 
 which at the same time is mediation in-and-f or-itself ; and 
 this is final cause and process. 
 
 Note by Translator. — The syllogisms are, therefore, 
 
 A. Syllogisms of Inherence: 
 
 a. I_p_U; 
 
 h. TJ— I— P, or P— I— U; 
 
 c. P— U— I. 
 
 B. Syllogisms of Reflection: 
 
 a. A — A — A, or I — I — I: the mathematical. 
 
 b. IT — i-\-i-\-i-\-i-\-&<i. — P: the inductive. 
 
 c. I — U — P : the analogical. 
 
 C. Syllogisms of Relation or Necessity : 
 
 a. Categorical ; 
 
 b . Hypothetica I ; 
 
 c. Disjunctive. 
 
 The movement (or dialectic) of the syllogism consists in mediating each term so 
 that in the higher forms each (term) becomes a complete realization of the Com- 
 prehension (or Totality) ; major and minor premises and conclusion— 'each becomes 
 a complete syllogism in itself. With this the transition is made to the "Realiza- 
 tion of the Comprehension," i. e. to its complete existence, which has three stages 
 of perfection: (1) Mechanical, (2) Chemical, (3) Teleological. In the Teleological, 
 a transition is found to the Idea. (See note on \ 47, subfinem.) Truth = the Idea 
 = Reality (or Objectivity) which exists as a complete systematic Totality = Spirit. 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 25 
 
 Second Division. 
 
 THE EEALIZATIOIT OF THE COMPEEHEj^SION". 
 
 § 56. In the Judgment as well as in the Syllogism, the 
 Comprehension is in immediate reality, i. e. in the indifferent 
 existence of the subject and predicate ; or the extremes of the 
 syllogism are opposed to each other and to the middle term. 
 The Objective consists in this : that these moments become 
 in themselves the whole, so that their Immediateness is pre- 
 cisely this, to be the whole. 
 
 § 57. In the Final Cause, that which is inference and result 
 is at the same time the immediate active cause. It is as a 
 subjective somewhat separated from the external Being which 
 is extant, and the activity consists in the translation of the 
 subjective form into objectivity. In this transition the final 
 cause returns into its comprehension. 
 
 § 58. The syllogism of the activity which is in conformity 
 with design (teleological activity) has three moments : the 
 subjective purpose, the mediation, and the existent (realized) 
 design. Each of these moments is the Totality of all the de- 
 terminations of the syllogism. 
 
 § 59. (1) The subjective purpose contains: (a) the unde- 
 termined free activity of a subject in general, which (b) 
 determines itself or particularizes its universality and gives 
 itself a determined content ; (c) it has the moment of individ- 
 uality, according to which it is negative toward itself, cancels 
 the subjective, and produces an external existence independ- 
 ent of the subject. 
 
 § 60. (2) The mediation or the transition into objectivity 
 has two sides in it: (a) that of objectivity — this is an external 
 thing as means, which, through the power of the subject, be- 
 comes a means, and is turned against external Being ; (b) the 
 side of subjectivity is the mediating activity, which on the one 
 hand brings the means into relation to the purpose (design) 
 and subordinates it thereto, and on the other hand turns it 
 against the objective, and through the cancelling of the deter- 
 minations of the External gives reality to the purpose (or 
 design). 
 
 § 61. (3) The realized purpose (or design) is : (a) Being of 
 
26 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 the objectivity in general, ib) not however a mere immediate 
 Being hut a posited and mediated one, and (c) of the same 
 content as the subjective purpose (or design). 
 
 § 62. The defect of this teleological relation is the im- 
 mediate existence of each of the three moments which 
 enter into mutual relation, for which therefore the relation 
 and the determinations which those moments receive in it are 
 externally brought together. The entire movement of this 
 realization of the Comprehension is therefore, in general, a 
 subjective affair. As objective, the realization is the process 
 as internal relation of the moments of the syllogism according 
 to their peculiar nature. In the process actual objects stand 
 in relation as independent extremes, whose internal determin- 
 ation is however that which causes it to be through the medi- 
 ation of others and to be in union with them. 
 
 § 63. (1) In the sphere of Mechanism objects are united or 
 changed by a third force, so that this union or change does 
 not lie already determined in their nature beforehand, but is 
 external or contingent to them, and they remain consequently 
 in it independent of each other. 
 
 § 64. (2) In the sphere of Chemism [the Chemical] each of 
 the two extremes is : (a) according to its particular Being, a 
 Determinate and at the same time essentially opposite to the 
 other ; (&) as in opposition, in itself a relation to the other. 
 It is not only itself, but it has the peculiarity to exist only 
 in union with the other, or its nature is in itself a tension and 
 active against the other ; (c) the unity of the extremes is the 
 neutral product which constitutes the ground of its relation 
 and of its entrance into the process, but this unity is extant in 
 them only as in-itself-existent (potential) relation. It exists 
 not free for itself anterior to the process. This is the case in 
 Teleology. 
 
 § 65. (3) The higher unity is therefore : that the activity 
 preserves itself in the product, or that the product is self-pro- 
 ducing, and consequently that the neutralizing of the moments 
 is likewise their diremption, or that the quenching of the pro- 
 cess in the union of the extremes is at the same time the 
 rekindling of the process. The activity of this productive 
 product is consequently self-preservation. It only reproduces 
 itself and yet is itself already existent. 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 27 
 
 Tliird Division. 
 
 SCIENCE OF THE IDEA. 
 
 § 66. The Idea is the objective True or the adequate Com- 
 prehension in which particular Being is determined through 
 its immanent comprehension, and in which Existence, as self- 
 producing product, is in external unity with its final cause. 
 The Idea is, not that actuality which corresponds to some ex- 
 ternal notion or other which is already extant, but that which 
 corresponds to its own comprehension ; which, therefore, is in 
 such a form as it ought to be in-and-for-itself, and contains 
 this its comprehension itself. TTie "ideal" is the Idea consid- 
 ered on the side of Existence, but as such a somewhat as is 
 in conformity with the Comprehension. It is therefore the 
 Actual in its highest truth. In contradistinction to the ex- 
 pression Ideal, one would call Idea rather the True considered 
 from the side of the Comprehension. 
 
 § 67. There are three ideas : (1) The Idea of Life; (2) The 
 Idea of Cognition and of the Good ; and (3) The Idea of Sci- 
 ence or of Truth itself. 
 
 I. — Idea of Life. 
 
 § 68. Life is the Idea in its immediate determinate Being, 
 through which it enters the field of Phenomena or of change- 
 able Being, and stands in opposition to inorganic nature and 
 manifoldly and externally determined Being. 
 
 § 69. Life is as immediate unity of the Comprehension and 
 of extant Being, such a whole as contains the parts not for 
 themselves, but through the whole and in the whole, and the 
 whole is just as much through the parts. It is an organic 
 system. 
 
 II. — Idea of Cognition and of the Good. 
 
 ' § 70. In this Idea the comprehension and actuality fall 
 asunder. The former (the comprehension), on the one hand, 
 empty by itself, is to receive its determination and filling up 
 from the Actuality; on the other hand, the latter should re- 
 ceive its determination from the independent determination 
 of the former. 
 
 (1) Cognition. 
 
 § 71. Cognition is the relation of the comprehension and 
 
28 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 actuality. The thinking which concerns only itself, and is in 
 so far empty, becomes replete with a particular content, 
 through this relation, and the particular content is thus ele- 
 vated from Being to universality (universal exhibition of it). 
 
 § 72. The definition expresses of an object which stands in 
 relation to it as an individual or a particular, its genus as its 
 general essence, and the particular determinateness thereof 
 through which it is this object. 
 
 § 73. The classification expresses of a genus or Universal in 
 general, a race, or an order, &c, the particulars in which it as 
 a manifoldness of species exists. These particulars which are 
 contained in a unity, must flow from a common ground of 
 division. 
 
 § 74. Cognition is partly analytical, partly synthetical. 
 
 § 75. The analytical cognition proceeds from a compre- 
 hension or a concrete determination, and develops only the 
 manifoldness of the immediate or identical simple determin- 
 ations which are therein contained. 
 
 § 76. The synthetical cognition develops, on the contrary, 
 the determinations of a Whole which are not contained in it 
 immediately, and do not flow from each other by the principle 
 of identity, but have the form of difference towards each other, 
 and it (synthesis) shows the necessity of their determined re- 
 lation to each other. 
 
 § 77. This happens through Construction and Proof. Con- 
 struction exhibits the comprehension or proposition, partly in 
 its real determinations, partly in behalf of the proof it exhib- 
 its this its reality in its division and dissolution through 
 which its transition into the comprehension begins. 
 
 § 78. The Proof seizes the dissolved parts, and produces 
 through comparison of their relations to each other that union 
 of the same which constitutes the expressed relation of the 
 whole in the Theorem ; or it shows how the real determina- 
 tions are moments of the Comprehension, and exhibits in their 
 mutual relation the Comprehension in its totality. 
 
 § 79. In this cognition, which in its strictest form is the 
 geometrical, (1) the construction does not proceed from the 
 comprehension, but is a contrivance that has been discovered 
 which shows itself to be adopted with special reference to the 
 proof; in other cases, it is only an empirical description. (2) 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 29 
 
 In the [synthetical or mathematical] proof, instead of analyti- 
 cal determinations otherwise well-known or settled, syntheti- 
 cal propositions are brought in from outside and the subject- 
 matter under consideration subsumed or united under them. 
 The proof receives through this the appearance of contin- 
 gency, since it exhibits necessity merely for the insight, not 
 the internal necessity of the object itself and its own process. 
 
 (2) The "Thou Shalt" or the Good. 
 
 § 80. In the Idea of cognition the Comprehension is sought, 
 and it ought to be adequate to the object. In the Idea of the 
 Good conversely, the comprehension passes for that which has 
 the first importance and as the in-itself-existing final cause, 
 which ought to be realized in the Actuality. 
 
 § 81. The in-itself-Good, since it has yet first to be realized, 
 stands in opposition to a world and nature which does not 
 correspond to it, and which has its own laws that are under 
 necessity, and is therefore indifferent to the laws of freedom. 
 
 § 82. The Good is as absolute final cause, on the one hand, 
 in itself to be carried out without any regard to consequences, 
 since it has an actuality committed to its charge which is in- 
 dependent of it, and may utterly thwart it. 
 
 § 83. At the same time, however, it is implied that the act- 
 uality in its true nature harmonizes with the Good ; or there 
 is a faith in a moral order of the world. 
 
 III. — Idea of Scientific Knowledge, or Truth. 
 
 % 84. The absolute Knowing is the comprehension which 
 has itself for object and content, and consequently is its own 
 reality. 
 
 § 85. The course or the method of the Absolute Knowing is 
 both analytical and synthetical. The development of that 
 which is contained in the comprehension — analysis — is the 
 evolution of different determinations which are contained in 
 the comprehension, but are not as such immediately give?i, and 
 for this reason the procedure is at the same time synthetical. 
 The exposition of the comprehension in its real determina- 
 tions proceeds from the comprehension itself, and that which 
 constitutes the proof in the ordinary cognition is here the 
 return into unity on the part of the moments of the compre- 
 
30 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
 hension out of the diversity into which they have gone ; this 
 result is therefore Totality — a comprehension which has "be- 
 come replete and a content to itself. 
 
 § 86. This mediation of the comprehension with itself is 
 not only a course of subjective cognition, but likewise the 
 internal movement of the object itself. In the absolute cogni- 
 tion, the comprehension forms the beginning, and is also the 
 result. 
 
 § 87. The progress to further comprehensions, or to a new 
 sphere, is likewise pointed out as necessary through what has 
 preceded. The comprehension which became reality is at 
 the same time again become a unity which must exhibit the 
 movement of the realization in itself. But the development of 
 the antithesis contained in it is not a mere dissolution into 
 the moments from whence it has originated, but these mo- 
 ments have now another form through the fact that they have 
 gone through the unity. In the new development, they are 
 now posited as that which they are, through their relation to 
 each other. They have received, consequently, a new determ- 
 ination. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 [Note by Translator. — The following passages are translated from the Complete 
 Logic of Hegel and inserted here for the purpose of setting forth more clearly the 
 position and significance of the Idea as Hegel conceives it. J 
 
 (Vol. Y. Complete Works, p. 317 of 2d ed.) 
 
 "'The Absolute Idea, as it has here been developed, is the 
 identity of the Theoretical and Practical — each of these sides 
 being inadequate by itself for the reason that the Idea is in 
 those spheres only an unattainable Ideal which hovers before 
 the seeker. The Theoretical and Practical Ideas [i. e. of Cog- 
 nition and the Good] are each a synthesis of endeavor — of an 
 eternal striving which realizes the Idea only partially ; each 
 is a continual transition into the other [from the Practical to 
 Theoretical and from Theoretical to Practical] ; but since nei- 
 ther side can unite both in one, they remain standing in con- 
 tradiction. The Absolute Idea as the Rational Comprehen- 
 sion which, in its reality, encounters only itself, is on account 
 
HegeVs First Principle. 31 
 
 of this immediateness of identity with the Objective, on the 
 one hand, a recurrence of the sphere of Life. [The first 
 sphere of the Idea is Life. But the Absolute Idea, too, pos- 
 sesses the Immediateness of Life, but Life in a higher sense 
 than in Nature ; it is, in fact, Divine Life, as Hegel goes on to 
 say.] But it has also cancelled this form of its immediateness 
 and contains in itself the highest antithesis. The Compre- 
 hension here is not merely Soul, but free subjective Com- 
 prehension, which exists for itself and possesses Personal- 
 ity — the practical^ in -and -for -itself -determined, objective 
 Comprehension, which as Person is impenetrable atomic 
 subjectivity — but which likewise [as Theoretical] is not mere 
 all-excluding individuality, but also for-itself-existing univer- 
 sality or Cognition, and as such recognizes, in its object, it- 
 self as object. [The Reasonable self-consciousness is the one 
 which recognizes in the world the supreme might thereof as 
 Reason, and hence sees everywhere the Becoming of Reason, 
 or — in the language of Theology — ' God in his manifestation 
 as Creator — as maker of his Image.'] All else [than the Ab- 
 solute Idea] is error, darkness, opinion, striving, arbitrariness, 
 and perishableness ; the Absolute Idea alone is Being, ever- 
 lasting Life, self-knowing Truth, and is All Truth." 
 
 (Again, p. 339:) 
 
 "The Richest [result of scientific procedure] is therefore 
 the concretes t and most subjective ; and that which with- 
 draws itself into the simplest depth, the mightiest and most 
 comprehensive. 
 
 " The highest^ steepest summit is the pure Personality, 
 which alone) through the absolute dialectic forming its nature, 
 includes and holds all in itself, for the reason that it 
 elevates itself to freedom — to that simplicity which is the 
 primitive [i. ef 'from Eternity'] Immediateness ', [i. e. Being 
 which is not involved with others] and Universality [i. e. it is 
 simple self-consciousness ; as Hegel expresses it in the Ency- 
 clopedia, Vol. L, § 236 (Vol. VI. Complete "Works, 2d ed.) : 
 'This (i.e. the Absolute Idea) is the w<fy«s vorjffewz which Aris- 
 totle characterized as the highest form of the Idea.'] 
 
32 HegeVs First Principle. 
 
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 [For a conclusion to this translation, the following passage 
 from Erdmann's GescliicMe der Philosophie (Yol. II. p. 599) 
 is offered as a neat statement of the content and relation of 
 the whole Logic :] 
 
 " The categories treated in Logic are the general rational 
 relations, which, because they rule every rational system, are 
 called souls of all actuality, but, because they are everywhere 
 the equally ruling laws, and are not affected by the distinc- 
 tions of Nature from Spirit, they are abstractions, so that 
 Loaic leads into a shadow realm." 
 
 " The entrance into it is necessary for the reason that the 
 problem of all science, i. e. to recognize Reason in the different 
 spheres, can be solved only when one knows, first, what Rea- 
 son is, and, secondly, how to find it. Both these things, and, 
 only these, Logic teaches — the former through the perfect de- 
 termination of the Comprehensions of Reason, and the latter 
 through its being a science of Method. Hence Logic is Philo- 
 sophia Prima, the true one. Hegel's definition of Logic=it is 
 the science of the Idea in the abstract elements of Thinking 
 asserts that it considers the Truth (not merely its abstract 
 form) but how it shapes itself in abstract thought — hence not 
 as intuited (Nature) nor as self-conscious (Spirit). With the 
 word Begriff, which he takes in the wide sense that he gives 
 to it as title of the third part, he means : the internal self- 
 active nature, or the essence which impels itself into Being ; 
 
 
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