Glass_ J 5" I ^ 
 Book 'AA-2-. 
 
German Land Hunger 
 
 And Other Underlying 
 Causes of the War 
 
 By 
 
 Munroe Smith 
 
 Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University 
 Doctor of Laws, Amherst, Columbia, 
 Gbttingen, and Louvain 
 
 ^^ 
 
 Reprinted from '^Militarism and Statecraft 
 
Copyright, 1918 
 
 BY 
 
 MUNROE SMITH 
 
 By Trfinwf^T* 
 
 MAY 6 1919 
 
 Zbe 1kntct<erboclier pvesi, flevp ^orh 
 

 GERMAN LAND HUNGER 
 
 AND OTHER UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR 
 
 Toward the end of the nineteenth century and 
 in the early years of the twentieth, a few European 
 and American writers began to note the devel- 
 opment in Germany of disquieting tendencies. 
 A literature demanding the expansion of German 
 influence and power, and hinting or stating that 
 this expansion could be obtained only through war, 
 was growing in bulk and was gaining wide circu- 
 lation. German military force was being per- 
 fected with a concentration of national effort 
 unexampled in history, and a powerful navy was 
 building. In spite of these and other warnings, 
 the world refused to be alarmed. In Europe, 
 where alarm had been endemic for half a century 
 and had quite inevitably taken on the milder 
 form of chronic anxiety, there seemed to be no 
 increase of apprehension. 
 
 Since the outbreak of the World War the early 
 
 alarmists have come into their own. The ground 
 
 203 
 
204 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 they broke has been subjected to intensive cultiva- 
 tion. The recent history of Germany has been 
 minutely studied and the German literature of 
 the last generation has been ransacked in the 
 effort to discover and formulate the underlying 
 causes of the cataclysm. Today we are beginning 
 to make tentative syntheses. 
 
 During the greater part ©f the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, and particularly from the War of Liberation 
 to the Franco-German War, German political 
 sentiment was strongly Liberal. There were few 
 republicans, but there were also relatively few 
 supporters of absolute monarchic power. The 
 dominant ideal was popular government under 
 written constitutions restricting princely authority. 
 Above all things the Germans desired national 
 unity; but they desired liberty as well, and they 
 expected to gain unity through liberty. The Re- 
 volution of 1848 gave them an opportunity to carry 
 out this programme. The failure of the Frank- 
 fort Parliament to give Germany either liberty or 
 unity discredited popular government. Between 
 the years 1864 and 1871 Bismarck unified Ger- 
 many and gave to the German people, not popular 
 
German Land Hunger 205 
 
 government indeed, but at least representative 
 institutions. This he accomplished, in spite of 
 the strenuous opposition of the Prussian Diet 
 from 1862 to 1866, through the Prussian monarchy 
 and the Prussian army. The result of this double 
 experience — the failure of 1848, the triumphs of 
 1866 and of 1 87 1 — was to establish a conviction 
 that democratic government is hopelessly inefhcient 
 and to enhance the prestige of the Hohenzollern 
 dynasty and of the army. A very large portion 
 of the old Liberal party abandoned its traditions ; 
 and in the generation that grew up during and 
 after the establishment of the German Empire 
 there were practically no Liberals of the old school, 
 and few Radicals except the Social Democrats. 
 That Germany was reverting, since 1870, to the 
 monarchic ideal of government, while the rest of 
 Europe continued to move towards democracy, 
 was one of the things that tended to isolate the 
 new Empire from the prevailing currents of Euro- 
 pean thought and feeling. In particular, the 
 influence of France, which had been very great 
 in Germany since the Thirty Years' War, was 
 sensibly lessened. The German attitude towards 
 France was, after 1870, on the whole, one of con- 
 tempt; although the rapidity with which France 
 rallied from the shock of defeat and the growing 
 
2o6 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 stability of the French RepubHc aroused, espe- 
 cially in P.'^ussian military circles, a degree of 
 apprehension. 
 
 Before 1870 there was little of the spirit of 
 militarism in Germany, outside of Prussia, nor 
 was the Prussian people as a whole animated by 
 this spirit. Few Germans even dreamed of 
 military conquests or of world empire. 
 
 Soon after 1870, however, the consciousness of 
 military power and the rapid development of 
 German manufactures and foreign trade began 
 to create new ambitions. Because their chief 
 commercial competitor, Great Britain, had de- 
 pendencies all over the world, the Germans ascribed 
 a probably exaggerated importance to the posses- 
 sion of colonies. By manufacturers and mer- 
 chants, colonies were desired, at first, chiefly as 
 trading posts, which were to facilitate the opening 
 and exploitation of wider markets. This desire 
 was met, to some extent, by the colonial policy 
 inaugurated by Bismarck in 1884-85. Soon, 
 however, there arose a demand for colonies of a 
 different type, colonies of exploitation, from which 
 Germany could obtain the tropical products it 
 needed either for home consumption or for its 
 manufacturing industries. Simultaneously there 
 appeared a demand for colonies of settlement, 
 
German Land Hunger 207 
 
 in which Germany's surplus population could 
 find new homes under the new imperial flag. In 
 so far as such colonies were to be established 
 across the seas, the aspirations of German expan- 
 sionists were largely sentimental. With the de- 
 velopment of German manufacturing industries 
 and the growing demand for labour at home, 
 German emigration, formerly so great in volume, 
 shrank to negligible proportions. There was, 
 however, increasing indignation over the millions 
 of Germans "lost" in the nineteenth century; 
 and the fact that the Germans who were leav- 
 ing the Fatherland to better themselves could 
 not be induced to settle in the colonies that 
 Germany already possessed kept this indignation 
 alive. 
 
 More dangerous to the peace of the world than 
 these aspirations was the growing demand for 
 colonies of settlement in Europe. Those Germans 
 who watched with increasing alarm the objection- 
 able features of modern industrialism — the trans- 
 fer of population from country to city, the 
 growth of luxury and the increase of want, the 
 physical deterioration of the labouring classes, 
 the moral deterioration of the very rich and the 
 very poor, the decreasing birth rate — these 
 demanded colonization to preserve the balance 
 
2o8 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 between the industrial and the agricultural popu- 
 lation. They believed that with the acquisition 
 of territory adapted to agricultural settlement 
 the declining German birth rate would rise again, 
 and that the position of the German people in 
 Europe and in the world would be secured and 
 improved by the renewed natural increase of its 
 population. Efforts to develop "home coloniza- 
 tion" — for example, by the wholesale expropriation 
 of the Prussian Poles — were unsuccessful. Home 
 colonization on any large scale obviously demanded 
 an extension of the boundaries of the German 
 Empire by the conquest of neighbouring territo- 
 ries. To cite one of many utterances : 
 
 To live, to lead a healthy and happy life, we need 
 great tracts of new arable land. With these, im- 
 perialism can and must provide us. . . . Of what 
 use to us is Germanism in Brazil or in South Africa, 
 however successfully it may develop? It will 
 greatly help the expansion of the German race; 
 it will do little for the power of the German Empire. 
 On the other hand, increase of German continental 
 territory and of the number of German peasants 
 . . . will form a protective barrier against the flood 
 of our enemies and will give a firm foundation to 
 our growing power. ^ 
 
 * Albrecht Wirth, Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschichte 
 (1906), p. 235. 
 
German Land Hunger 209 
 
 By the same 
 
 simple plan, 
 That they should take who have the power 
 And they should keep who can, ' 
 
 colonies of settlement and colonies of exploita- 
 tion, to say nothing of more and better trading 
 posts, might be acquired in other parts of the world. 
 These were the sinister impHcations of the demand 
 for "a place in the sun."^ 
 
 In the German mind there gradually developed 
 a vision of a German world empire, based on an 
 expanded Fatherland with a rapidly increasing 
 population, dominating a confederation of states 
 that was to extend from Scandinavia to Asia 
 Minor, holding over-sea possessions of all sorts in 
 eastern Asia, in Africa, in Latin America and in the 
 islands of all the oceans. There appeared a singu- 
 lar and characteristically German theory that the 
 estabhshment of such an empire would redress a 
 historical wrong and would therefore be a triumph 
 of distributive justice. ' ' In the division of the non- 
 European world among the European powers," said 
 Treitschke, ''Germany has always hitherto failed 
 to get its share." 3 Similarly Professor Dove: 
 
 ^ Wordsworth, " Rob Roy's Grave. 
 ^ William II, speech of June i8, 1901. 
 3 Politik, vol. i., p. 42. 
 14 
 
2IO Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 A nation that has won for itself through its own 
 efficiency so important a place in commerce and 
 industry as the Germans have secured cannot 
 possibly stand aside, as it used to do, while other 
 nations, by nature much less industrious, try to 
 secure for themselves in the coming redivision of 
 Africa the lion's share. We mean at last to get 
 what belongs to us, because we need it, because we 
 cannot do without it. . . .^ 
 
 The new land hunger clothed its nakedness 
 with broader and more specious theories. To 
 justify expansion through war, a philosophical 
 doctrine was developed. The theory of the 
 struggle for existence and the survival of the 
 fittest was applied to the competition of nations. 
 German thinkers did not ignore the fact that in 
 human society conscious co-operation had in- 
 troduced a new factor, but they restricted its 
 function to the single group, and they refused to 
 recognize that civilization had developed any group 
 worthy of consideration except the national state. 
 Among national states, the law of survival through 
 struggle maintained unmitigated sway. 
 
 This Neo-Darwinism appealed strongly to the 
 Germans, because of their growing conviction 
 that they were, in all important characteristics, 
 
 * "Die grossen Wirtschaftsgebiete Afrikas," in Weltwirtschaft , 
 vol. v., no. 8 (November, 1915), p. 162. 
 
German Land Hunger 211 
 
 superior to all other nations. Because they were 
 fittest to survive, they were destined to survive; 
 and the fiercer the struggle, the more rapid must 
 be their triumph. Throughout the nineteenth 
 century German historians had been re-writing, 
 and German philosophers had been re-interpreting, 
 the history of Germany, of Europe, and of the 
 world on the basis of an assumed superiority of 
 the Germans. ' They ended by convincing them- 
 selves and their countrymen that this superiority 
 was an established and indisputable fact. The 
 contributions of the Mediterranean and parti- 
 cularly those of the Latin peoples to the civiliza- 
 tion of the world, alike in ancient and in modern 
 times, were minimized; and in so far as they were 
 conceded, they were attributed to infiltrations of 
 Teutonic blood and genius. This national self- 
 glorification, relatively modest in its beginnings 
 and, until 1870, little more pronounced than the 
 self-esteem not infrequently manifested by other 
 nations, was subsequently carried beyond sane 
 limits. German victories in war, German achieve- 
 ments in civil administration and in social organi. 
 
 * To the Swiss professor, Antoine Guilland, we are indebted 
 for an early and penetrating study of the tendency of German 
 historiography in the nineteenth century: L'Allemagne nouvelle 
 el ses historiens: Niebuhr, Ranke, Mommserif Sybel, Treitschke 
 (1899). 
 
212 Militarism and Statecraft * 
 
 zation, German progress in the application of 
 science to industry and the rapid expansion of 
 German commerce — all these heightened German 
 national pride to the point of megalomania. 
 
 ''Megalomania" is the term used by more than 
 one German to describe the Pan-Germanist state 
 of mind. In a pamphlet published in 191 5, 
 Miiller-Holm writes : 
 
 What has caused us to be completely detested 
 by civilized nations is the insufferable attitude of 
 the Pan-Germanists. " Pan-Germanists " is their 
 name in politics; in science they are called *'Race 
 Theorists." Do you wish to know what "Race 
 Theory" is? It is a so-called science, of which the 
 purpose is to prove that the Germans stand first 
 among all nations of the world, that all the achieve- 
 ments of civilization since the beginning of history 
 have proceeded from them, and that the rule of the 
 world fitly and rightly belongs to them. . . . What 
 an impression of Germany's politicians, of the aims 
 of German patriots, must a foreigner derive from 
 these products of national megalomania? One 
 writer expects a "Pan-Germanic Empire," em- 
 bracing "the present Empire; the other Teutonic 
 territories in Europe, including Scandinavia and 
 the Netherlands, as equal partners in the Empire; 
 further, the territories of the Latins in the West and 
 in the Southwest and of Austria's western and 
 southern Slavs, as dependent colonial territories, 
 besides all America south of the Amazon." An- 
 other writer calmly launches the assertion that the 
 
German Land Hunger 213 
 
 cultural value of a nation depends on its percentage 
 of * ' the blond race ' ' ; and on this basis he undertakes 
 to prove, in each individual case, that all the great 
 men of the non-Teutonic nations were of Teutonic 
 blood. . . . The views of these dangerous fanatics 
 quite dominate public opinion.^ 
 
 The writer to whom Miiller-Holm refers, at the 
 close of the passage cited above, is probably 
 Ludwig Woltmann, who asserts that Alexander 
 the Great and Julius C^sar were of the Teutonic 
 type, and conjectures that Napoleon was a de- 
 scendant of the Vandals. Woltmann also iden- 
 tifies Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, Montaigne, 
 Voltaire, and other illustrious Italians and French- 
 men, as Teutons of the full blood. He tells us 
 that Shakespeare and Raphael were Teutons of 
 the half blood, and that they were geniuses, not 
 because of, but in spite of the non-Teutonic blood 
 in their veins. His interpretation of history is 
 even more extraordinary than his ethnology; 
 witness the following statements: 
 
 The entire European civilization, even in Slav 
 and Latin countries, is the work of the Teutonic 
 race. . . . The Papacy, the Renaissance, the 
 French Revolution, and the Napoleonic Empire 
 were achievements of the Teutonic spirit. . . . 
 
 ^ Der englische Gedanke i?i Deutschland: Zur Abwehr des Im 
 perialismus (Munich, 19 15), pp. 132-134. 
 
214 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 Papacy and Empire are both Teutonic organiza- 
 tions for domination, meant to subjugate the world. 
 The Teutonic race is called to circle the earth with 
 its rule, to exploit the treasiires of nature and of 
 human labour power, and to make the passive races 
 servient elements in its cultural development. ^ 
 
 German Neo-Darwinism found an ethical basis 
 in the assumption that the civilization of the 
 world had been developed in the past and was to 
 be perfected in the future through the interna- 
 tional struggle for power and the survival of the 
 nations best qualified for dominion. German 
 supremacy would benefit the whole world. Neo- 
 Darwinism found also a religious basis in the 
 assumption that the struggle for existence and 
 for power was the method of progress ordained by 
 God. One of the popularizers of Pan-Germanism 
 found the assertion of this great truth in the words 
 of Christ: "Many are called, but few are chosen" 
 — words, he told his countrymen, ''whose pro- 
 found wisdom Darwin has enabled us to grasp." ^ 
 German megalomania had already expressed it- 
 self in religious phrases: in the claim that the 
 Germans were "the chosen people" and "the 
 salt of the earth. "^ 
 
 ^ Politische Anthropologie (1903), pp. 255, 290-298. 
 =* Klaus Wagner, Krieg, pp. 145-146. 
 3 William II, speech of March 22, 1905. 
 
German Land Hunger 215 
 
 It is perhaps the most ominous symptom of mod- 
 ern German megalomania that the Germans have 
 desired and have striven to develop a civilization 
 that shall be peculiarly their own, genuinely 
 German. Until the nineteenth century all edu- 
 cated Germans realized that their civilization, like 
 all modern European civiHzation, was a con- 
 tinuation of the ancient Mediterranean civiliza- 
 tion; that we moderns had drawn, as Maine 
 says, our religion from Judaea, our art and letters 
 and philosophy from Greece, our politics and law 
 from Rome . Goethe simply voiced this recognition 
 when he said: 
 
 We Germans are of yesterday. For a century 
 we have indeed made earnest efforts to cultivate 
 ourselves; but a couple of centuries may well pass 
 before so much spirituality {Geist) and higher 
 culture make their way and become general among 
 our countrymen . . . that it will be possible to 
 say of them: **It was long ago that they were 
 barbarians."* 
 
 To Goethe, culture was identical with European 
 civilization. Today, Kultur means something 
 quite different. Modern German philosophers 
 have attempted to explain the difference; they 
 agree on one point only, that German culture 
 
 » Gesprache (Biedermann ed.), vol. vi., p. 125. 
 
2i6 Militarism and Statecraft . 
 
 is something genuinely German {echt deutsch). 
 In the German social life, however, there has 
 never been anything echt deutsch save what was 
 there from the start, what was ur deutsch. In 
 Germany, as in Scandinavia, in England and in 
 North France, every element in the social life 
 that is not barbaric, every idea and every institu- 
 tion that has lifted the people out of barbarism, 
 is of foreign origin. To Germanize civilization 
 in Germany, to weed out everything exotic and 
 to cultivate only the indigenous growths, neces- 
 sarily means a reversion toward barbarism. 
 Such reversions have in fact occurred. Some of 
 them leave other nations unconcerned. If the 
 Germans like their genuinely German architec- 
 ture and sculpture, the fact that other people 
 find these products barbarous is immaterial. 
 The European attitude was indicated, during 
 this war, by the French artist who protested 
 against a demand that Berlin should be treated 
 as the Germans had treated Rheims. ''No re- 
 venge," he said, "could be more adequate than 
 to leave Berlin as it is." Of more serious concern 
 are the German reversions in politics, in ethics 
 and in religion; for these menace the security 
 of the world. In politics the Germans will have 
 neither Roman liberty nor Roman imperium, nor 
 
German Land Hunger 217 
 
 the blend of the two that has been worked out 
 in England. Parliamentary government is not 
 even genuinely Teutonic {echt germanisch) , for it 
 started, not in England, but in Spain. Accord- 
 ingly, the Germans have retained and fortified 
 the Teutonic type of monarchy, which rests on 
 barbaric allegiance to a war lord. Nietzsche, 
 who in other respects admires the Latin civiliza- 
 tion and would retain it, quarrels with Christian 
 ethics and constructs a German system; but his 
 superman is morally the cave man, made more 
 dangerous by his mental acquisitions. In reli- 
 gion they have reverted to the "old God" whom 
 the elder Moltke worshipped and whom William 
 II invokes — a God who has the lineaments of the 
 tribal Jahveh but swings the hammer of Thor. 
 
 Of all the recent German reversions towards 
 barbarism, that which has most astounded the 
 civilized world is the attitude of many if not 
 most German writers towards war. To them war 
 is not an evil, necessary perhaps, but still an evil ; 
 it is a thing good in itself. To this attitude, 
 however, they were inevitably urged by all the 
 forces of feeling and of thought we have examined. 
 National ambition was born of recent successful 
 wars. Confidence in victory was based on the 
 traditional valour of the Teutons; on their re- 
 
2i8 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 corded triumphs since the time when their sav- 
 age ancestors first forced their way over the Alps 
 and across the Rhine to a place in the sun; 
 on the thorough organization and training of 
 their great modern armies, and on the skill and 
 patience with which modern German students 
 of war, the elite of the nation, had adapted all 
 the acquests of science to the ends of slaughter. 
 To ambition and confidence add a conviction that 
 war is the test of a nation's right to survive, and 
 that the progress of the world is achieved through 
 the survival of the fittest nations; add also a 
 belief that victory in war is not only a just biolo- 
 gical and sociological verdict, but also a judgment 
 of God in favour of his chosen people — surely 
 there was here a combination of sentiments and 
 ideas suited to penetrate the national mind along 
 every line of approach and to shape the national 
 soul from the top to the bottom of the social 
 structure. That is why the praises of war were 
 sung by German writers of all sorts and conditions, 
 not only by military writers, but also by histo- 
 rians and publicists, savants and philosophers, 
 poets and ministers of religion. 
 
 Given this national attitude toward war, there 
 is an especially direct threat to the peace and 
 order of the world in the expression which German 
 
German Land Hunger 219 
 
 Neo- Darwinism (with its refusal to recognize 
 the world, even the civilized world, as a society 
 in which co-operation has to any degree displaced 
 or can advantageously displace survival through 
 struggle) has found in legal theory. The dogma 
 of the unlimited and irresponsible sovereignty of 
 the state is accentuated. This dogma is no pro- 
 duct of German or of modern thought. It comes 
 down from the Roman Empire, which included 
 the whole civilized world. The development and 
 co-existence of a number of civilized states has 
 obviously destroyed the original basis of the 
 dogma. Modern states are necessarily members 
 of a society of nations, and no single state can 
 claim, much less exercise, irresponsible power. In 
 Germany, however, and also in other parts of the 
 world, absolute sovereignty is still attributed to 
 the several states, or at least to those states that 
 can be regarded as "powers." It is of course a 
 corollary of this dogma that international rules 
 and customs bind the single state in so far only 
 as it accepts them, and so long only as its peculiar 
 interests do not require their abandonment. It 
 is a further corollary that every treaty is concluded 
 with the tacit reservation, rehus sic stantibus. 
 Other than German writers have asserted this 
 doctrine; but few writers outside of Germany 
 
220 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 have pushed it to the same extreme. In Germany 
 it seems to mean that treaty engagements are to 
 be observed only so long as the conditions that 
 originally made the treaty advantageous continue 
 to exist, and that, so soon as a government sees 
 more profit than risk in repudiating its engage- 
 ments, it is bound, as the trustee of the interests 
 of the nation, to rescind or to break the treaty. 
 When Bethmann-HoUweg characterized a treaty, 
 signed by the accredited representatives of five 
 European powers, as *'a scrap of paper," he faith- 
 fully reproduced the view professed by the 
 majority of German publicists. Here, again, 
 we have a reversion, and one that goes back 
 all the way to barbarism; for without the 
 sanctity of plighted faith there is neither law 
 nor civilization. 
 
 Unless, after this war, the Germans are willing 
 to reconnect themselves with the historical Euro- 
 pean culture, more than Goethe's two centuries 
 may pass before their neighbours will be able 
 to say: "It was long ago that they were 
 barbarians." 
 
 To these German confessions, or rather boasts, 
 of greed and unscrupulousness, foreign statesmen, 
 as President Wilson has said, paid little atten- 
 tion. They "regarded what German professors 
 
German Land Hunger 221 
 
 expounded in their class-rooms and German writ- 
 ers set forth to the world ... as the dream of 
 minds detached from practical affairs, as preposter- 
 ous private conceptions of German destiny."^ 
 Still less attention was paid to this German pro- 
 paganda by the foreign press. The man in 
 the street never suspects, and the student of 
 history does not always realize, how much explo- 
 sive force may slumber within the shell of a theory. 
 Suspicion that might have been aroused by the 
 concrete ambitions displayed in the more recent 
 Pan-Germanist literature was largely disarmed 
 by the very frankness of their avowal. Men 
 who were injudicious enough to say such things 
 need not be taken seriously. It was in fact only 
 the less authoritative expounders of Pan-German- 
 ism who dotted all their i's and crossed all their 
 t's; the more responsible leaders discussed peace- 
 ful penetration, commercial treaties, customs 
 unions, and other methods of expanding German 
 influence without war. The aggressive militant 
 tone taken by such writers as Botticher (alias 
 Paul de Lagarde), Bley, Lange, Wirth, Tannen- 
 berg, and Frymann seemed to put them in a small 
 class by themselves. As for Klaus Wagner, if he 
 were not mad, like Nietzsche, he must be purposely 
 » Flag-Day Address, June 14, 19 17. 
 
222 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 peppering Pan-Germanism in order to make it 
 more marketable. 
 
 Foreign scholars — and few but scholars took 
 the pains to follow this militarist and annexa- 
 tionist literature — forgot that popularizers do 
 more than ' ' solid " writers to mould opinion. And 
 those who knew, or were told by German friends, 
 that at the beer tables German civilians were an- 
 nexing little neighbours and dividing great empires, 
 and who found the fact amusing, forgot that in 
 Germany the Biertischpolitiker does at least as 
 much as the press itself to consolidate sentiment. 
 
 To President Wilson's statement, that little 
 attention was paid by foreign statesmen to the 
 Pan-Germanist agitation, one exception must 
 be made. In France this movement undoubtedly 
 increased the anxiety, not only of statesmen, but 
 also of the entire nation. In France the memories 
 of 1870 had not grown dim. In France appre- 
 hension was kept alive by recurrent crises and notes 
 of warning in the German press. Frenchmen were 
 well aware that it was a fixed idea in German 
 army circles that Germany would never be ''safe" 
 — safe to pursue her aims of domination — until 
 France should be crushed. Of France, through 
 all these years, it might be said, as Keats said of 
 his Titan goddess: 
 
German Land Hunger 223 
 
 There was a listening fear in her regard, 
 As if the vanward clouds of evil days 
 Had spent their malice, and the sullen rear 
 Was with its stored thunder labouring up. 
 
 II 
 
 For the study of the annexation movement in 
 Germany since the outbreak of the World War, 
 a Swiss scholar, S. Grumbach, has given us a 
 valuable mass of material. ' He has been able to 
 use, not only such books, pamphlets, and articles 
 as were published in Germany from August, 19 14, 
 to the end of May, 1916, but also many petitions, 
 tracts, and circulars, printed, mimeographed, or 
 typewritten, that were not published but were 
 privately distributed; and not only such matter 
 as was circulated without governmental inter- 
 ference, but also some important documents of 
 which the reproduction and the circulation were 
 restricted or wholly forbidden. 
 
 Of the industry and conscientious care with 
 vrhich this book has been compiled and edited it 
 would be difficult to speak too highly. The most 
 
 ' S. Grumbach, Das annexionistische Deutschland: Eine Samm- 
 lung von Dokumenten die seit dem 4 August, igi4, in Deutschland 
 offentlich oder gelieim verbreitet wurden; mit einem Anhang: Anti- 
 annexionistische Kundgehungen. Payot & Co., Lausanne, 191 7; 
 X, 471 pp. 
 
224 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 important documents are printed entire. In 
 dealing with books, pamphlets, and articles, 
 Grumbach is of course compelled to confine him- 
 self to extracts; but there is no evidence that he 
 has unfairly wrested passages from their context. 
 There is, indeed, evidence to the contrary; for 
 many of the utterances he cites would be much 
 more startling had he omitted the qualifications 
 that accompany them. Nor does he present 
 demands only without the arguments by which 
 they are supported. He does not confine his 
 book to annexationist literature; he has collected 
 and presented, in a "second part" which forms 
 nearly one-fifth of his book, such protests as he 
 has been able to discover. 
 
 How widely annexation sentiment was diffused 
 in Germany before the war is shown by the rapidity 
 with which demands for annexation were formu- 
 lated by all sorts and conditions of Germans in 
 the very first months of the great conflict. Of the 
 annexationist books and pamphlets from which 
 Grumbach draws longer or shorter extracts, twenty- 
 three were published in the first five months of 
 the war, thirty-six in the year 191 5, thirteen in the 
 first five months of 1 916. Of the publications 
 dated 191 5, some may have appeared and more 
 must have been written in 19 14. These data, 
 
German Land Hunger 225 
 
 so far as they go, militate strongly against the 
 theory that annexation sentiment was created by 
 the war, or that it became general only when 
 the duration of the war begot the feeling that 
 Germany must have something to show for her 
 expenditure of blood and treasure. 
 
 Still stronger evidence of the wide diffusion of 
 annexation sentiment is afforded by the attitude 
 taken by the various German political parties. 
 Before the end of 1914 single leaders of the Na- 
 tional Liberal and Progressive parties — parties 
 representing particularly the middle classes — 
 had openly advocated annexations.' In the 
 course of the following year all German parties 
 except the Social Democrats committed them- 
 selves fully to this programme.'' The Social De- 
 mocratic party steadily repudiated annexations^; 
 but several of its leaders construed this declaration 
 as a repudiation of "conquests" only, and not as 
 excluding such "rectifications of frontiers" in 
 the East and in the West as might be necessary 
 for the protection of the Fatherland. This sacri- 
 fice of their internationalist principles was largely 
 forced upon them by their constituents. In the 
 autumn of 191 4, the Courier, the official organ 
 
 * Grumbach, pp. 71, 104. ^ Ihid.^ pp. 33-40. 
 
 3 Ibid., pp. 429 et se^. 
 IS 
 
226 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 of the German Union of Transportation Workers, 
 which had an enrollment of 100,000 members, 
 expressed the hope that the German flag would 
 wave forever over Antwerp; and Paul Lensch, 
 at one time chief editor of the Leipziger Volks- 
 zeitung, later on the staff of the Hamburger Echo 
 (both Social Democratic), asserted that the right 
 of populations to determine their own destiny 
 must be thrown upon the scrap-heap, and that 
 Bismarck showed himself an ass when he 
 neglected to annex Belfort. In June, 1915, the 
 Frankfurter Volksstimme declared that the Social 
 Democratic party must have a positive programme, 
 and that this must include changes in the map of 
 Europe. In April, 191 6, the same journal gave 
 its support to the demand for German colonies 
 of settlement in eastern Europe. "It is no char- 
 acteristic of socialism," the editor declared, 
 "to place itself in conflict with new develop- 
 ments." In August, 1 91 5, the Harburger Volks- 
 blatt expressed regret that the Social Democratic 
 party had again committed itself to the formula 
 of "no annexations." The staunch Marxist, 
 Kolb of Karlsruhe, and Meerfeld, chief editor of 
 the Kolnische Volkszeitung, pronounced this for- 
 mula un- Marxian. Several Social Democratic 
 members of the Imperial Diet fell promptly into 
 
German Land Hunger 227 
 
 line. Peuss-Dessau pleaded (January 2, 1915) 
 for the annexation of Belgium, in the interest of 
 the Belgians themselves. Landsberg advocated 
 expansion in the East to the line of the Naref, 
 which meant the taking of territory with nearly 
 5,000,000 Slav inhabitants. Oskar Geek, and 
 also the Baden deputies Adelung and Marum, 
 expressed views identical with those of Kolb and 
 Meerfeld.' Finally, the president of this party, 
 Philipp Scheidemann, speaking in the Imperial 
 Diet, April 6, 1916, launched the winged word: 
 
 One must be a political infant to persuade him- 
 self that a whole continent can be set on fire, that 
 millions of men can be killed or wounded, without 
 the removal of a single frontier stone placed by 
 some musty old diplomatist. "^ 
 
 The only poHtical group that has opposed an- 
 nexations consistently, and without quahfications 
 or reservations, is the minority fraction of Social 
 Democrats, led, until his imprisonment, by Karl 
 Liebnecht, and since that time by Hugo Haase. 
 
 It must of course be admitted that the war in- 
 tensified annexation sentiment. If it did nothing 
 else, it furnished new arguments for annexations. 
 The German people, as we know, accepted, in the 
 teeth of all evidence to the contrary, the official 
 
 » Grumbach, pp. vi., vii., 111-119. "" Ihid., pp. 114-115- 
 
228 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 statements that the war was planned by Great 
 Britain and begun by Russia. Of those more 
 intelligent persons who saw that Germany had 
 in fact begun the war, the majority held that if 
 Germany had not forestalled her enemies they 
 would soon have attacked her, and that it was the 
 right and the duty of German statecraft to an- 
 ticipate the impending attack and to wage the 
 inevitable war at a moment when the European 
 situation seemed favourable. Professor Schiemann 
 wrote in 191 5: 
 
 Bernhardi's brave books pointed out, in correct 
 anticipation of events, the necessity of grasping 
 the sword before the conspiracy that menaced 
 Germany came to the point of action.^ 
 
 And later in the same year General Baron von 
 Gebsattel explained: 
 
 We desired this war . . . because we were con- 
 scious that the more resolutely and promptly a 
 people which in any event is to be forced to fight 
 for its existence chooses a favourable moment for 
 drawing the sword, the more easily will the war 
 be conducted and the lighter will be the sacrifices.^ 
 
 Each of these theories, that of defence and that 
 of anticipation, assumed that Germany was a 
 
 ^ Ein Verleumder: Glossen zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, p. 6, 
 '"Das Gebot der Stunde," in Der Panther ^ no. 10 (October, 
 1915), PP- 1178-1179. 
 
German Land Hunger 229 
 
 peaceful nation surrounded by quarrelsome neigh- 
 bours. Holding this view, it was possible for 
 Germans to insist, with a good conscience, that 
 these dangerous neighbours must in future be 
 restrained. Germany must at least obtain such 
 strategic frontiers as to give her ampler protection 
 against future assaults; and it would be much 
 safer so to cripple her chief enemies that any 
 future attack on their part would be hopeless. 
 This point of view gave annexation sentiment 
 not only a valuable argument but also, what 
 was worth even more, a synonym for annexation 
 which was less crude and which implied justifi- 
 cation — ''guaranties and securities." The Social 
 Democrats, as we have seen, repudiated annexa- 
 tions, but the majority fraction did not reject 
 territorial guaranties and securities. 
 
 The belief that Germany was a peaceful country, 
 which either was or soon would have been assailed, 
 also served to justify the demand that her enemies 
 be punished. In addition to ceding frontier dis- 
 tricts, they must pay the full cost of the war. As 
 the war went on and the costs mounted, and as it 
 became clear that no European country would be 
 able to pay an adequate money indemnity, a new 
 argument for annexation appeared, succinctly 
 expressed in the phrase " indemnity in land." 
 
230 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 Not less important was the appeal to patriotic 
 sentiment that appears in every war. The Ger- 
 man flag was not to be hauled down where it had 
 once waved; the graves of German heroes were 
 not to be left in the hands of their enemies. To 
 this latter sentiment the National Liberal leader, 
 Bassermann, gave an economic expression which 
 perhaps made a special appeal to the German 
 Michael: "We shall know how to hold firmly for 
 all time the lands that have been manured {gediingt) 
 with German blood."' 
 
 Of the annexationist declarations that appeared 
 in Germany during the war, the most significant 
 are two memorials addressed to Chancellor von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg. One of these, dated May 
 20, 191 5, was presented on behalf of six of the 
 most important industrial and agricultural asso- 
 ciations of Germany and was signed by their 
 ofBcial heads. The other memorial was adopted 
 at a meeting held in Berlin, June 20, 191 5, and 
 was signed by 352 professors, 158 schoolteachers 
 and clergymen, 145 superior administrative offi- 
 cials, mayors and members of city councils, 148 
 judges and advocates, 40 members of the Imperial 
 Diet and of state legislatures, 18 retired admirals 
 and generals, 182 manufacturers, merchants, and 
 
 * Grumbach, p. 71. 
 
German Land Hunger 231 
 
 bankers, 52 agriculturists, and 252 artists, writers, 
 and publishers. These two memorials' may 
 surely be taken as representing a very large and 
 very important body of opinion. 
 
 In the second and very much smaller portion 
 of his book,^ Grumbach gives us either in full or 
 in extracts a collection of anti-annexation utter- 
 ances. He separates miscellaneous protests ^'aus 
 dem Burger turn'' from the Social Democratic 
 protests. The Social Democratic material con- 
 sists of petitions and resolutions, manifestoes and 
 circulars, speeches and articles published in jour- 
 nals. The attitude of the independent socialists — 
 we have already seen how little significance is to 
 be attached to the formal declarations of the 
 majority fraction — commands appreciation and 
 admiration. This little group, representing a mi- 
 nority of the great Social Democratic party — how 
 large a minority it is at present impossible to deter- 
 mine — has consistently opposed not annexations 
 only but also the war itself. It has persistently 
 denied that the war was forced upon Germany 
 or was at the outset a defensive war. 
 
 From other than Social Democratic sources 
 Grumbach has been able to collect little anti- 
 annexation material. Over against 142 books, 
 
 ^ Printed in full, Grumbach, pp. 123-140. ' Ibid., pp. 375-459. 
 
232 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 pamphlets, and review articles advocating annexa- 
 tions, he is able to cite only three review articles 
 and three pamphlets voicing protests. One of the 
 three pamphlets was written by Dr. Quidde, the 
 president of the German Peace Society. From 
 this society we have also a set of resolutions, a 
 petition sent to the Imperial Diet, and a speech 
 delivered by Dr. Fried, the editor of the pacifist 
 Friedenswarte, an excellent journal now published 
 in Zurich and excluded from circulation in Ger- 
 many.' For the rest, Grumbach gives us ex- 
 tracts from two leading articles published in the 
 Berliner Tageblatt, and two memorials that were 
 presented to the imperial chancellor and that 
 emanated neither from socialists nor from pacifists. 
 
 One of these is the so-called Delbriick-Dernburg 
 petition. "^ As early as October, 1914, Professor 
 Hans Delbruck published in the Preussische Jahr- 
 biicher an eloquent warning against plans of con- 
 quest. In the spring of 1915, during his visit to 
 the United States, Dr. Dernburg publicly stated 
 that Germany would not annex Belgium nor any 
 other European territory — a statement that eli- 
 cited energetic protests from home journals.^ 
 In July, 19 1 5, Delbruck, Dernburg, and 139 other 
 prominent Germans — professors, government 
 
 » Grumbach, pp. 41 1-415. ^ Ibid., 409-41 1. 3 Ibid., 78, 81. 
 
German Land Hunger 233 
 
 officials, manufacturers, financiers, editors, and a 
 few retired military and naval officers — sent to 
 the imperial chancellor a brief and very carefully 
 worded protest against the annexation propaganda. 
 The petitioners declare that Germany did not 
 enter the war to make conquests; they reject in 
 principle the incorporation in the German Empire 
 of ''peoples politically independent and accus- 
 tomed to independence " ; but they assert also that 
 the occupied regions that Germany will vacate 
 when peace is concluded must not be converted 
 into a bulwark for Germany's enemies. (This, of 
 course, refers mainly to Belgium.) They are 
 not in favour of averting this peril by arrange- 
 ments which must lead ultimately to annexation, 
 but they are confident that victory will bring to 
 the German nation rewards commensurate with 
 its heroic deeds and sacrifices. 
 
 The German nation [they say] can conclude no 
 peace but one that provides secure bases for its 
 strategic needs, for its political and economic 
 interests, and for the unhampered exercise of its 
 strength and its spirit of enterprise at home and 
 on the free sea. 
 
 It is to be noted that this petition does not 
 exclude but, in the phrase "secure bases," specifi- 
 cally reserves guaranties and securities. It will 
 
234 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 be noted also that the German government is to 
 have a free hand in disposing of the destinies of 
 peoples who are not accustomed to self-govern- 
 ment. In the autumn of the same year (191 5) 
 Professor Delbruck published in the Preussische 
 Jahrbilcher^ articles advocating the annexation of 
 the Russian Baltic provinces and the establish- 
 ment of a kingdom of Poland in personal union 
 with the kingdom of Saxony. As an alterna- 
 tive, he suggested giving Poland to Austria. In 
 the same year another of the petitioners, the well- 
 known Pan-Germanist Rohrbach, published a 
 pamphlet in which he advocated the annexation 
 of the Belgian Congo and of the Portuguese colony 
 of Angola. "^ 
 
 This petition was obviously framed for foreign 
 consumption. It was intended to counteract the 
 bad impression created abroad, especially in neu- 
 tral countries, by the annexation propaganda. 
 It may have been intended also to discourage 
 extravagant German hopes and to protect the 
 imperial government against the reaction which 
 would follow disillusion. Grumbach stretches a 
 point in putting this petition among the anti- 
 annexation documents. 
 
 'September, 1915, p. 560; October, 1915, p. 168. 
 ^ Unsere koloniale Zukunft, pp. 14-17. 
 
German Land Hunger 235 
 
 Qtdte another spirit animates the petition pre- 
 sented to the chancellor early in June, 191 5, on 
 behalf of the "New Fatherland Alliance" {Bund 
 Neues Vaterland) .^ The petitioners express their 
 opposition not only to conquests but also to rectifi- 
 cations of frontiers. Such changes, they argue, 
 would not secure Germany against future attacks ; 
 in many instances the proposed new frontiers 
 would be more vulnerable than the old. In the 
 present war Germany's enemies have not been 
 able to attack her coasts; in a future war the 
 German coast line, if extended, as the annexation- 
 ists demanded, to Boulogne, would be far less 
 easily defensible. "* In the great plains of the East, 
 new frontiers would obviously afford no greater 
 security. And at what point could the advance 
 be arrested? If the defence of East Prussia and 
 Silesia demands "protective belts," would not 
 these, when settled by Germans, require pro- 
 tection by new belts? "Is this protective- 
 belt system to be extended in infinitum, until 
 Germany reaches the Arctic and Pacific Oceans? " ^ 
 
 Positive arguments against annexations are 
 found in the internal perils Germany would en- 
 counter in the attempt to rule additional millions 
 
 ^Printed in full, Grumbach, pp. 375-408. 'Ibid., pp. 395-398. 
 ^Ibid., pp. 387-388. 
 
236 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 of alien subjects, and in the external peril she 
 would inevitably evoke by arousing hatred and 
 thirst for revenge in the countries despoiled and 
 by offending the conscience of the civilized world. 
 
 Our experiences tell us . . . that the violation 
 of Belgian neutrality has almost everywhere made 
 a disastrous and altogether lamentable impression 
 on the feelings of neutrals; that this impression, 
 despite the lapse of ten months, is in nowise effaced; 
 that on the contrary it has in many cases been 
 regrettably intensified. . . . 
 
 Members of our Alliance know, from personal 
 impressions, how strong has been the effect of the 
 violation of Belgian neutrality upon the great 
 majority of Americans, even upon those who were 
 friendly to Germany. ... It has been particu- 
 larly difficult to make our appeal to a " state of 
 necessity" intelligible to Americans. . . . 
 
 The annexation of Belgium would be viewed in 
 all countries as the forcible subjugation of a mal- 
 treated free nation, wholly clear of responsibility 
 for her sad fate. With the strong prejudice al- 
 ready existing against us among many peoples, 
 it would have a fearful and long enduring effect. . . . 
 
 Should we insist upon maintaining demands for 
 annexation which would make any conclusion of 
 peace Impossible within any calculable period, we 
 should do our utmost to drive the neutrals into the 
 camp of our enemies ; we should turn against us first 
 their sympathies and then perhaps their armies. ^ 
 
 » Grumbach, pp. 400-403. 
 
German Land Hunger 237 
 
 In an earlier passage, in which the petitioners 
 dealt with the annexation propaganda in its full- 
 est scope, they wrote: *'A ruthless victor would 
 conjure up against himself the hostility of the 
 whole world and would necessarily succumb to 
 the alliance of all the powers."^ 
 
 From the drunken Germany of the moment the 
 petitioners appeal to the sober statecraft of an 
 earlier generation. With a bitter irony that re- 
 veals a deep patriotic resentment they write : 
 
 What a pitiable palterer was Bismarck, who in 
 1866 let Austria escape without cession of territory, 
 and who in 1871 concluded a premature peace, 
 without fully exploiting the favourable military 
 situation and taking from the French Verdun and 
 Belfort." 
 
 This protest is one of the ablest and one of the 
 most important documents that this war has 
 evoked. The Alliance from which it proceeded 
 numbered among its members, Grumbach tells 
 us, men from many and very different circles — 
 politicians, savants, manufacturers, financiers, and 
 retired diplomatists. It was organized in Novem- 
 ber, 1914, by Baron von Tepper-Laski, "one of 
 the best known of Prussian sportsmen." Its 
 declared purpose was to further 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 377. ' Ibid., p. 384. 
 
238 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 all movements adapted to imbue the policy and 
 diplomac}^ of the states of Europe with the thought 
 of peaceful competition and of combination reach- 
 ing over state lines {iiberstaatlicher Zusammen- 
 schluss), in order to secure political and economic 
 adjustments among civilized nations. This can 
 be achieved only by an abandonment of the system 
 hitherto prevailing, which entrusts to a few per- 
 sons decisions which bring welfare or woe to hun- 
 dreds of millions of human beings.' 
 
 This is neither socialism nor radical pacifism; 
 it is a sane and conservative internationalism, 
 based on national self-government. The pro- 
 gramme of the Alliance closely resembles that set 
 forth' by President Wilson: it hopes to make the 
 world safer through democracy. 
 
 It is a cheering thing that such an association 
 could be formed in Prussia, after the outbreak of 
 the war, and among persons of such standing. 
 It is an inspiring thing that its members should 
 have dared not only to defy the dominant military 
 influences but also to antagonize the opinions 
 prevailing in their own social circles. This peti- 
 tion proves, more conclusively even than socialist 
 or pacifist reactions, that there is today, even in 
 Prussia, a sane and, let us hope, a saving 
 remnant. 
 
 ' Grumbach, p. 409. 
 
German Land Hunger 239 
 
 III 
 
 To list the demands of individual German an- 
 nexationists would be wearisome. To select the 
 most extravagant demands would be interesting 
 but unfair. It may be worth while, however, to 
 indicate how and to what extent the outbreak and 
 progress of the war modified the ante helium aspira- 
 tions voiced or hinted by the Pan-Germanists, 
 and then to examine the concrete demands that 
 may be regarded as representative, that seem 
 to have embodied the hopes and expectations of 
 the great majority of the German people. 
 
 Before the war, expansion over sea was, for 
 obvious reasons, more generally and far more 
 frankly discussed than expansion in Europe. 
 After the outbreak of the war, for equally obvious 
 reasons, over-sea expansion fell into the back- 
 ground. During the period covered by Grum- 
 bach's compilation, the Germans expected, indeed, 
 to recover their colonies in Asia, in Africa, and in 
 the islands of the Pacific; they even hoped to 
 expand some of these colonies and to gain others 
 of greater value. Despite the lessons of history, 
 most Germans apparently believed that over-sea 
 colonies could be retained and even acquired 
 without control of the sea. Some indeed — among 
 
240 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 them Haeckel — assumed that Germany could 
 acquire such control, and that the war would end 
 in the occupation of London.' Many more, 
 however, believed that the British Empire would 
 be hopelessly crippled, if not destroyed, by a 
 Teutonic-Turkish conquest of Egypt.'' Others 
 assumed that the destinies of the world would be 
 determined on the battlefields of Europe. During 
 the first two years of the war, accordingly, much 
 was still written and said about German expansion 
 in Africa and even in China. 
 
 Regarding Latin-America there was a silence 
 so sudden as to be audible. Grumbach's compila- 
 tion contains but two allusions to this part of the 
 world. Both the writers cited insist that there 
 can be no question of political conquests in America. 
 One of them, Herr Alfred Hettner, emits a growl 
 concerning the Monroe Doctrine, which he appears 
 to regard as an obstacle to German "economic 
 and cultural activity. "^ The other. Dr. Karl 
 Mehrmann, "in order to remove from the start 
 any question as to the credibility of our assur- 
 ances," admits that "at times in our country 
 nationalistic covetousness extended {hinuberziin- 
 gelte) to South America." At present, however, 
 
 » Grumbach, pp. 240, 255, 296, 366. 
 
 » Ibid., pp. 138, 160, 225-229. 3 Ibid., p. 300. 
 
German Land Hunger 241 
 
 "the number of our enemies is great enough, and 
 will remain great enough even after the war, to 
 induce us to avoid everything that would unneces- 
 sarily stir up new enemies against us."^ 
 
 About Middle Europe, the Balkans and south- 
 western Asia, on the other hand, much more was 
 written and said after August i, 19 14, than before 
 that date. These regions were already for the 
 most part in the possession of the Central Empires 
 or of their allies. To secure the territorial basis 
 for a coherent world empire, all that was needed 
 was complete control of the Balkan peninsula 
 and an open road to Bagdad — and to British 
 India. After the war, possibly during the war, 
 the allied Middle European states were to be 
 bound firmly together by military conventions 
 and by customs treaties. Eventually they would 
 form a great federal empire, into which would be 
 drawn all the smaller neighbouring states, from 
 the North Cape to the Bosphorus. The European 
 boundaries of this empire would be determined 
 primarily, of course, by the extent to which the 
 Teutonic victories were utilized. With the out- 
 break of the war, the question of German annexa- 
 tions in Europe became a topic of active discussion. 
 In the first five months of the war, nine books and 
 
 ' Ibid., pp. 338-339. 
 16 
 
242 Militarism and Statecraft * 
 
 pamphlets were devoted primarily to this ques- 
 tion, three only to expansion over sea. In the 
 publications that advocated expansion every- 
 where, the necessity of making European annexa- 
 tions was correspondingly emphasized. 
 
 In considering the scope and the character of 
 the annexations demanded in Europe, I shall dis- 
 regard the aspirations of single writers, however 
 prominent and influential, and shall consider 
 only the two important and representative memo- 
 rials described above, that of the six industrial 
 associations and that of the professors. 
 
 Neither of these memorials speaks of ' ' annexing" 
 Belgium, but both demand a degree of German 
 control that would amount to annexation. The 
 six associations say: 
 
 As regards military and customs policy, and also 
 as regards the monetary, banking, and postal 
 systems, Belgium must be subjected to German 
 imperial legislation. Railroads and canals are to 
 be made portions of our transportation system. ^ 
 
 The professors say: 
 
 We must keep Belgium . . . firmly in our hands 
 as regards political and military matters and as 
 regards economic interests. On no point is the 
 German nation more united in its opinion; to it 
 
 ^ Grumbach, p. 125. 
 
German Land Hunger 243 
 
 the retention of Belgiiim is an indubitable matter 
 of honour.^ 
 
 As regards France, the six associations declare : 
 
 The possession of the coast beyond the Belgian 
 frontier, perhaps to the Somme, and therewith an 
 outlet to the Atlantic Ocean, must be regarded as 
 vital to our future importance on the sea. The 
 hinterland that is to be acquired with this coast 
 strip must be sufficient to secure complete strategic 
 control and economic exploitation of the ports that 
 we acquire on the Channel. Apart from the neces- 
 sary acquisition of the ore fields of Briey, any 
 further annexation of French territory is to be 
 made exclusively on considerations of military 
 strategy. It may be asstmied as self-evident, 
 after the experiences of this war, that we . . . 
 cannot leave in the hands of the enemy the forti- 
 fied positions which threaten us, particularly 
 Verdun and Belfort, nor the western slope of the 
 Vosges that lies between them. The acquisition 
 of the line of the Meuse and the French coast on 
 the Channel involves, in addition to the above 
 mentioned ore fields of Briey, also the possession 
 of the coal fields in the Departments of the North 
 and of Pas-de-Calais.* 
 
 The professors formulate similar demands: 
 
 We must ruthlessly weaken France politically 
 and economically, for the sake of our own exist- 
 ence, and we must improve against her our strate- 
 
 i' Ibid., p. 134. ^ Ibid., pp. 125-126. 
 
244 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 gical position. For this purpose, according to our 
 conviction, a thorough improvement of our whole 
 west front from Belfort to the coast is necessary. 
 We must conquer as great a part as possible of the 
 North-French Channel coast, in order to obtain 
 greater strategical security against England and a 
 better outlet to the ocean. ^ 
 
 As regards Russia the six associations explain: 
 
 The need for strengthening also the sound agri- 
 cultural basis of our national economy . . . de- 
 mands a considerable extension of the imperial 
 and Prussian frontiers toward the East, by annex- 
 ing parts at least of the Baltic provinces and the 
 districts lying south of the same, taking into con- 
 sideration at the same time the object of making 
 our East-German frontier defensible from a military 
 point of view.^ 
 
 The professors are less definite, but more elo- 
 quent. They say: 
 
 On our eastern frontier the population of the 
 Russian Empire is increasing at a monstrous rate 
 — at a rate of two and one-half to three mil- 
 lions a year. Within a generation the popula- 
 tion will amount to 250,000,000. Against this 
 overwhelming preponderance on our eastern flank 
 . . . Germany can assert herself only if she sets 
 up a strong barrier . . . and if on the other hand 
 the healthy growth of our own population is fur- 
 thered by all possible means. Such a barrier and 
 
 » Grumbach, p. 134. 'Ibid., pp. 126-127. 
 
German Land Hunger 245 
 
 also a basis for safeguarding the growth of our own 
 population are to be found in the territory that 
 Russia must cede to us. This must be agricultural 
 land, adapted to settlement. Land, that gives us 
 a healthy peasantry, this fresh fountain of all 
 national and political power. Land, that can take 
 over a part of our increase of population and 
 offer to returning Germans, who desire to turn 
 their backs upon the hostile foreign world, a new 
 home in the old home. Land, that increases Ger- 
 many's economic independence ... by enabling 
 her to nourish herself, that provides the needed 
 counterpoise against the advancing industrializa- 
 tion and urbanization of our people, that preserves 
 the equipoise of our economic forces . . . and 
 prevents the perilous lapse into English one-sided- 
 ness. Land, that arrests a declining birth rate, 
 checks emigration and alleviates the dearth of 
 housing facilities {Wohnungsnot). Land, where 
 the process of resettlement and Germanization 
 will open new careers also to the intellectual pro- 
 letariat. Such land, required for our physical, 
 moral, and spiritual health, is to be found first of 
 all in the East. ' 
 
 The petition of the New Fatherland Alliance 
 was elicited by and is a reply to the memorial of 
 the six associations. The Alliance translates the 
 territorial demands of the associations, ''attempt- 
 ing," it says, "to interpret them as modestly as 
 possible," into approximate statements of areas 
 
 ^ Ihid., p. 135. 
 
246 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 and populations to be annexed.' The figures 
 may be tabulated as follows : 
 
 COUNTRIES SQUARE KILOMETRES POPULATION 
 
 Belgium 30,000 7,500,000 
 
 France 20,000 3,500,000 
 
 Russia 80,000 5,000,000 
 
 Totals 130,000 16,000,000 
 
 Both the six associations and the professors are 
 convinced that it would be dangerous to the Ger- 
 man Empire to admit the inhabitants of its annexed 
 districts to full political equality with its German 
 population. The government and administration 
 of Belgium, the associations say, "must be so 
 conducted that the inhabitants shall obtain no 
 influence upon the political destinies of the Ger- 
 man Empire." As regards the populations to be 
 taken over from France and from Russia, the same 
 statement is made. In the case of the French 
 citizens who are to fall under German rule, this 
 recommendation is based on "our experiences in 
 Alsace-Lorraine." The professors are of the same 
 opinion: "To the part of the French population 
 that we take over" and **to the inhabitants of 
 Belgium, no political influence in the Empire is 
 
 ^ Gmmbach, pp. 379, 380. 
 
German Land Hunger 247 
 
 to be conceded." As regards the Slavs, no such 
 statement is made by the professors, because, as 
 we shall presently see, very few Slavs were to be 
 "taken over." The Slavs were to be taken 
 away. 
 
 Rather than attempt myself to characterize 
 these proposals, let me again cite the Alliance: 
 
 How great a task would be imposed upon Ger- 
 many, even in times of peace, if . . . more than 
 16,000,000 inhabitants, almost all animated by the 
 bitterest hostility against everything German, 
 were to be loaded upon the Empire, with its popula- 
 tion of 67,000,000; what perils would be involved 
 in times of peace, to say nothing of times of war— 
 these questions have not wholly escaped the atten- 
 tion of the authors of the Memorial. This explains 
 the fact that they advance a further demand. . . . 
 In the annexed countries government and adminis- 
 tration are to be so conducted that "the inhabit- 
 ants shall obtain no influence upon the destinies 
 of the German Empire." 
 
 In other words, the population is to be ruled by 
 the German Empire without being able to exercise 
 any political rights in the German Empire. . . . 
 This system is to be imposed, not only in the East, 
 upon Russian subjects, but also in the West, on 
 Belgian and French citizens, accustomed to the 
 fullest liberty and to democratic constitutions. 
 
 ... To the monstrous proposal of converting 
 16,000,000 foreign and hostile hiunan beings into 
 compulsory members of the German Empire there 
 
248 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 is thus added a second monstrosity. No sane 
 person will believe that any such forcible subjuga- 
 tion could be permanent. Rather would it be 
 fearfully avenged upon the German nation.^ 
 
 The six associations and the professors concur 
 in certain further recommendations. In Belgium, 
 "the economic enterprises and possessions that 
 are important for the domination of the country," 
 in the districts to be taken from France, "the 
 economic resources to be found in these districts, 
 including medium and large land holdings," are to 
 be taken from their former proprietors and "put 
 into German possession." So the six associations. 
 The professors use only slightly variant terms: 
 they speak of "the enterprises and possessions 
 that give economic power" and they urge that 
 these be "transferred from hostile to German 
 hands." Both memorials suggest that the expro- 
 priated French citizens shall be indemnified and 
 taken over by France, as part of the war indemnity 
 to be paid by that country. Neither memorial 
 explains how the expropriated Belgians are to be 
 indemnified, or what is to become of them. As 
 regards the districts to be ceded in the East, the 
 six associations tersely indicate that "the war 
 indemnity to be paid by Russia must consist 
 
 ^ Grumbach, pp. 380-381. 
 
German Land Hunger 249 
 
 largely in the transfer of private titles to land." 
 The professors are more explicit : 
 
 Russia is over-rich in land, and the land of which 
 she is to cede us political control we shall demand 
 . . . freed for the most part from private titles. 
 . . . The Russian population is not so firmly 
 rooted in the soil as is that of western and central 
 Europe. Russia itself has repeatedly transplanted 
 large parts of its population to remote districts. ' 
 
 Here again the Alliance provides us with an 
 appropriate comment: 
 
 In carrying out the annexations, the Memorial 
 "demands not only measures in the field of public 
 law but also far-reaching attacks upon the right of 
 private property. All possessions that carry with 
 them strong economic and social influence . . . 
 are to pass into German hands. 
 
 This would be a revolution in the economic situa- 
 tion of individuals in the annexed countries such as no 
 modern annexation has carried with it. It recalls — 
 and the comparison is not on the whole favourable to 
 the modern plan — the times of the great migrations 
 of the nations. In those times the Roman citizen 
 holding land in a Roman province conquered by the 
 Teutons was obliged to cede, in one form or another, 
 a part of his possessions to a Teuton conqueror. 
 
 Thus one monstrosity begets another. ^ 
 
 An interesting illustration of the tricks that 
 language can play with conscience is the way in 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 136. ' Ibid., pp. 381-382. 
 
250 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 which the catchword of ''strategic securities,'* 
 which implies only defence against aggression, 
 slides over, first into "political securities," which 
 are to be obtained by transforming Germany's 
 free neighbours into subjects of Germany without 
 political rights, and then into "economic securities, 
 which are to be obtained by ejecting millions of 
 foreign peasants, in order that Germany may not 
 need to buy grain or meat from aliens, and by 
 ejecting the owners of foreign mines and factories, 
 in order that the Germans may gain something 
 approaching a continental monopoly of important 
 manufactures. On this last point the six asso- 
 ciations furnish the chancellor with valuable 
 detailed suggestions. Their memorial includes a 
 careful survey of Naboth's mineral resources.' 
 
 The demands above summarized, especially 
 the demand for wholesale expropriations, may be 
 regarded by the advocates of the economic inter- 
 pretation of history in general, and of this war in 
 particular, as evidence of the truth of their theories. 
 Those who are disposed to lay greater stress upon 
 the psychological interpretation of history, and 
 particularly of war, may however insist that the 
 economic motives discernible in the German an- 
 nexation propaganda are indistinguishable from 
 
 ^ Grumbach, pp. 1 28-131. 
 
German Land Hunger 251 
 
 those which, in private life, animate the burglar, 
 and that the problem that really deserves scien- 
 tific examination is the process of feeling and of 
 thought through which high-minded men come 
 to regard international burglary as a national 
 duty. 
 
 The six associations limit themselves to the prob- 
 lems of German aggrandizement and enrichment. 
 The professors are mindful also of the interests of 
 their allies, or at least of Germany's interests in 
 the proper development of Middle Europe. 
 
 We admit that the blockade by which England 
 has transformed Germany during the period of the 
 war into a closed commercial state has taught us 
 something. It has taught us above all that . . . 
 we must make ourselves as independent as possible 
 in all political, military, and economic matters, on 
 the basis of an expanded and better secured home 
 territory in Europe. Similarly we must organize 
 upon the continent, in immediate connection with 
 our land frontiers . . . the broadest possible con- 
 tinental economic domain. . . . For this purpose 
 it is important permanently to secure Austria- 
 Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, and Asia Minor 
 to the Persian Gulf against Russian and English 
 ambitions. ^ 
 
 We have already seen what ' * security ' ' against 
 foreign ambitions means. What Austria needs for 
 » Ibid., p. 137. 
 
252 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 her security in the way of ''protective belts" is 
 set forth by many German writers. Dr. Albert 
 Ritter, for example, indicates what is necessary 
 for the security of Triest : 
 
 . . . The northern part of Venetia, the districts 
 of Friuli and Tr aviso, up to a line running from 
 the south end of Lake Garda to the mouth of the 
 Piave, must be taken as a glacis at the foot of the 
 Alps in order to ward off from Austria's Adriatic 
 coast all future menace. ^ 
 
 IV 
 
 In a democratic country, especially if its gov- 
 ernment is of the parliamentary type, the ex- 
 istence of a public sentiment so general and 
 so definitely formulated as annexation sentiment 
 appears to be in Germany would make inquiry 
 as to the attitude of the government so un- 
 important as to seem superfluous. In Germany 
 also we may draw from utterances in the press 
 conclusions regarding governmental policy, but 
 for very different reasons. In Germany the re- 
 lation between governmental opinion and public 
 sentiment is almost the reverse of that obtaining 
 in England and in France. Not only is the gov- 
 
 ^ Der organische Aufbau Europas (191 6), pp. 27-28. Dr. 
 Ritter's oen-name is Konrad von Winterstetten. 
 
German Land Hunger 253 
 
 ernment independent of parliamentary majori- 
 ties, but it is also, to a very considerable extent, 
 independent of public sentiment. It needs, as 
 all governments need, the support of the people; 
 but through its control of the press, which is ex- 
 tensive in peace and ten-fold greater in war, it 
 controls the expression and thus largely shapes 
 the substance of national feehng and thought. 
 Under such conditions the attitude of the press 
 is conclusive evidence of the attitude of the 
 government. Grumbach gives us direct evidence. 
 He reprints notices sent April 24 and 25, 191 5, 
 by General Baron von Gayl, in command of the 
 seventh army corps, to two Social Democratic 
 journals. One of these had been guilty of oppos- 
 ing the annexation of Belgium, which, the general 
 says, "wide circles of the nation regard as neces- 
 sary." The other journal had characterized as 
 "phantasies" utterances of Deputy Paasche re- 
 garding the possible acquisition of colonial and 
 European territories, and had praised an essay 
 of Professor Brentano, which, the general says, 
 "in a discussion of the aims of peace, contains 
 serious breaches of the party truce (Burgfriede).'* 
 Both journals are consequently notified, in iden- 
 tical language: "Since your attitude gives me 
 no assurance for the future against offences of 
 
254 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 the kind censured, I impose upon your journal 
 the requirement of approval before publication.' 
 
 Under such conditions it is not surprising that 
 few protests against annexations appeared in 
 Social Democratic journals. Even the attitude 
 of the "bourgeois" journals, which, with only- 
 three or four exceptions,^ were openly annexa- 
 tionist, seems less conclusively indicative of public 
 sentiment than of governmental policy. 
 
 The Burgfriede, which General von Gayl invgked, 
 was supposed to bar party controversies during the 
 war. Annexation, accordingly, was to him a party 
 question. Discussion of the aims of the war 
 {Kriegsziele) seems to have been specifically pro- 
 hibited; but it does not appear that any German 
 journal came into collision with the authorities by 
 advocating territorial guaranties and securities. 
 
 In the governmental attitude towards memo- 
 rials, petitions and resolutions of groups, associa- 
 tions and political parties, similar distinctions are 
 noticeable. German newspapers, it is true, were 
 not permitted to print the memorial of the six 
 economic associations nor that of the professors. 
 These were not regarded as suitable articles of 
 export. Since, however, they were adapted to 
 strengthen the German "will to victory," they 
 
 » Grumbach, p. 23. » Ihid.^ preface, p. i. 
 
German Land Hunger 255 
 
 enjoyed unimpeded circulation throughout Ger- 
 many as "confidential printed manuscripts." 
 On the other hand, all printed copies of the protest 
 of the New Fatherland Alliance were seized by 
 the police. The Alliance itself was placed under 
 such surveillance and exposed to such annoyances 
 that it abandoned the attempt to hold meetings. ' 
 The petition and the resolutions of the German 
 Peace Society were not allowed to appear in print ; 
 they were sent to members only in typewritten 
 form. A pamphlet by its president, printed as 
 manuscript, was excluded from the mails. All 
 Social Democratic protests, except those that 
 constituted part of the proceedings of the Imperial 
 Diet or of state legislatures, were excluded from 
 the press, and all copies discovered were seized 
 by the police. Anti-annexation manifestoes and 
 pamphlets, printed in Switzerland, were held up 
 on the frontier. They were subjected, that is, to 
 the same treatment as other anti-government 
 literature, such as T accuse. 
 
 The formal utterances of the German authorities, 
 both in the Empire and in the single states, were 
 guarded. At the outbreak of hostiHties the em- 
 
 * Ihid., p. 409. The " Fatherland" part of its name appears 
 to have been appropriated by a new political party of militarist 
 and annexationist tendencies. 
 
256 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 peror declared that Germany was not waging a 
 war of conquest. This statement was periodi- 
 cally repeated by the civil authorities. On the 
 other hand, both the emperor and his chancellor 
 spoke repeatedly of "guaranties and securities." 
 This phrase was launched by Bethmann-Hollweg 
 in the Imperial Diet, May 28, 19 15. It was 
 received in the Diet and by the press as a declara- 
 tion in favour of annexations. Against this inter- 
 pretation the chancellor interposed no protest. 
 On July 31, 191 5, in an address to the German 
 people, the emperor modified the phrase. The 
 chancellor spoke of guaranties against any future 
 military attack (Waffengang). The emperor de- 
 manded **the necessary military, political, and 
 economic securities" for ''the unimpeded develop- 
 ment of our creative powers at home and on 
 the free sea." In subsequent utterances the 
 chancellor rejected the re-establishment of "old 
 past conditions"; asserted that the guaranties 
 to be demanded by Germany would increase with 
 the duration of the war, that Germany's future 
 position must be "unassailable," that her enemies 
 were no longer to hold "sally-ports" in the East 
 or in the West; and stated that Germany could 
 not permit Belgium to be used by England or by 
 France as a military base (Aufmarschgebiet) , that 
 
German Land Hunger 257 
 
 Germany must have ''political, military, and 
 economic security" against the reconstruction of 
 Belgium as an "Anglo-French vassal state" or 
 as a " military and economic bulwark against 
 Germany," and that Germany could not "again 
 expose the long-oppressed Flemish nationality to 
 Gallicization (Verwelschung) .'^ ^ The allusions to 
 Belgium were taken to signify that this country 
 was to be so divided as to separate the Walloon 
 from the Flemish stock, and that both parts, 
 whether formally annexed or not, were to be kept 
 under German control. Colonial Secretary Solf 
 stated in 19 15 that Germany's colonial possessions 
 must be maintained and increased "without pre- 
 judice to the possible acquisition of territory in 
 Europe." The Prussian minister of the interior, 
 replying in 191 6 to a Social Democratic declara- 
 tion against annexations, said: 
 
 This declaration is not in harmony with the true 
 spirit of the people in this heroic time; least of all 
 will it be intelligible to the men who are fighting 
 for us. . . . The German Empire must build 
 with blood and iron the road to the attainment of 
 its political destiny in the world. ^ 
 
 Neither individual covetousness nor national 
 lust for conquest is peculiar to the Germans. 
 » Grumbach, pp. 5-8. * Ibid., p. 11. 
 
258 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 Even in this war writers and speakers in the coun- 
 tries allied against Germany have advocated 
 annexations, some of which can hardly be viewed 
 as restitutions. Grumbach, however, is quite 
 justified in asserting that 
 
 in no other country are annexations advocated in 
 so immoderate a manner and so openly as in Ger- 
 many, by the most influential political leaders, 
 by orreat political parties, and by the best known 
 university professors. 
 
 He might have added that in no other country 
 has an amiexation propaganda been encouraged 
 by governmental authorities. He is equally justi- 
 fied in saying: 
 
 And even if plans of annexation existed on a simi- 
 lar scale in other countries, which I deny, in esti- 
 mating their danger we could not pass over the 
 question, how far the military situation gives the 
 single countries an}^ practical possibility of making 
 such annexations. . . . The reason why the peril 
 of annexations demanded in Germany is for the 
 moment so great, is that the German arm^^ has 
 occupied Belgium, North France, and the Baltic 
 pro\dnces, and (in co-operation with the Austrians) 
 Poland, Serbia, and Montenegro.* 
 
 And since his book w^as published, the Teutonic 
 armies have occupied the greater part of Rumania 
 and have overrun Venetia. 
 
 » Grumbach, p. iii. 
 
German Land Hunger 259 
 
 The tendencies above examined and analysed 
 were not the sole causes of the World War. As 
 we have already seen, the influence that directly 
 precipitated the war was that of the military 
 authorities. Some of these desired war for its 
 own sake. Those who had no such desire, or 
 were unwilling to acknowledge to themselves 
 that they were actuated by any such desire, felt 
 themselves bound to hasten the war, because 
 they beHeved it to be inevitable, because they 
 thought, and not without reason, that the 
 political situation in Russia, in France, and in 
 Great Britain was exceptionally favourable to 
 their designs, and because, in their opinion, 
 the military superiority of Germany was greater 
 at the moment than it would be later. They 
 feared not only that their enemies would be 
 better prepared, but also that it would be 
 impossible to induce the German people to 
 maintain an armament which, after forty- 
 three years of peace, might well seem in excess 
 of any real needs. Maximilian Harden, who 
 usually reflects with accuracy the opinions 
 that are tending to become dominant, wrote in 
 1913: 
 
26o Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 The nation is unanimous in its complaints. 
 Bismarck would never have made the mistake of 
 asking for his country a military equipment suffi- 
 ciently powerful to fight England, France, and the 
 Slav masses, only to keep it unemployed during 
 long years of peace. ^ 
 
 Later in the same jyear the smouldering dis- 
 content of the nation, fanned into flame by the 
 arrogance displayed by the German military 
 authorities in the Zabern affair, led to an inter- 
 pellation in the Reichstag and to the adoption of 
 a vote of censure by the remarkable majority of 
 293 ayes to 54 nays. When the Reichstag ad- 
 journed. May 20, 1 9 14, the Social Democrats 
 remained seated while the other deputies rose and 
 cheered the emperor; and, when their attitude 
 was reproved by the president, some of them 
 shouted, "That is our affair," and tried to drown 
 the cheers with hoots and hisses. ^ In the opinion 
 of Ambassador Gerard, who was in Germany at 
 the time and through the first years of the war, 
 this episode did much to win the emperor's con- 
 sent to the war. 3 It might well have disquieted 
 a ruler who beheved that "the only pillar on 
 which the realm rested was the army."'' 
 
 ^ Cited in Juge's par eux-mimes (Paris, 1916), p. 42. 
 
 ' Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, chapter iv. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 91. 4 Speech of October 18, 1894. 
 
German Land Hung-er 261 
 
 t> 
 
 There were also class interests in play. Be- 
 sides the manufacturing interests, on which the 
 Socialists, with their hostility to the capitalist 
 system, lay exaggerated emphasis, there was the 
 class interest of the landed aristocracy, and espe- 
 cially of the Prussian Junkers. These resented 
 the rapid enrichment of the mercantile class, and 
 saw in its growing wealth and influence a menace 
 to the power and prestige of their own order. 
 They were disposed to welcome a war in which 
 the German military officers, who are drawn al- 
 most exclusively from the landed gentry, could 
 exhibit their efficiency and reaffirm their impor- 
 tance. The gain would be theirs; the costs, if 
 not defrayed by indemnities, would fall on their 
 bourgeois rivals. The selfishness of their attitude 
 and the meanness of their jealousy were masked 
 even to themselves under a patriotic solicitude 
 for the welfare of the nation, menaced by the 
 corrupting and enervating influences of peace, 
 prosperity, and luxury. 
 
 Dynastic and class interests, however, might 
 not have been sufficiently strong or their repre- 
 sentatives sufficiently unscrupulous to bring on 
 the war. They certainly could not have carried 
 the nation into the war with anything approach- 
 ing the enthusiasm which the German people 
 
262 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 displayed in August, 1914. Such enthusiasm can 
 be awakened only by an appeal to emotions 
 which all can share. The emotions to which 
 appeal was made were fear and cupidity. "The 
 Slav peril," persistently emphasized for years as 
 the chief reason for increasing German armaments, 
 had become, to the German artisans and peasants, 
 a very real and present danger. Their fear pre- 
 disposed them to accept the official legend of a 
 Russian attack. Of even wider appeal, however, 
 were the ambitions whose growth I have out- 
 lined; and if among the many influences that 
 worked together for war any one can be regarded 
 as the chief factor, it was probably the dream of 
 world empire. National ambition, once aroused, 
 appeals alike to sovereign and to subject, to men 
 of every class and of every vocation. In the 
 middle and upper classes it made a far stronger 
 appeal than the Slav peril, which these classes 
 were too intelligent to overestimate. 
 
 Except in its intensity and its extent, its ap- 
 parent prevalence among all classes of the people, 
 there is nothing really novel, nothing unprece- 
 dented, in the German land hunger. There is 
 nothing new even in the theory of a mission. 
 Again and again, in the history of the world, a 
 nation that has been too successful in war, and 
 
German Land Hunger 263 
 
 tcK) easily successful, has developed lust for power 
 and has sought to cover the nakedness of its ambi- 
 tion with the drapery of such a theory, with the 
 assumption that its rule will benefit its conquered 
 enemies. It was the mission of the Greeks to 
 carry into Asia a finer civilization, as it was the 
 mission of the France of Louis XIV to render a 
 like service to central Europe. It was the mis- 
 sion of Rome to confer upon all peoples the boon 
 of just and equal laws. The Empire of the Haps- 
 burgs was charged with the duty of defending 
 and diffusing orthodox religion. The armies of 
 the first French Republic crossed the Rhine in 
 order to free their neighbours from princely 
 tyranny; those of the first Napoleon overran 
 Europe to abolish feudaHsm and to establish legal 
 equality; those of the third Napoleon went into 
 Italy to complete this work and to establish the 
 principle of nationality. Even in the United 
 States, although it has never been a military 
 power, the consciousness of latent military energy 
 and of potential superiority in war has bred, at 
 least in some minds, national ambition; and with 
 ambition has appeared, from time to time, the 
 perilous notion of a mission. Some of our coun- 
 trymen have thought it our mission to secure 
 the reign of law throughout Latin America — a 
 
264 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 theory closely akin to that of Roman imperialism. 
 Some are talking today as if it were our mission 
 and that of our allies to compel our enemies to 
 abandon monarchic government, as if we had 
 entered and were waging this war, not to make the 
 world safe for democracy, but to make it unsafe 
 for monarchy — a theory indistinguishable from 
 that which led revolutionary France, in passing 
 from the defensive to the offensive, to establish 
 on its frontiers a fringe of little republics — repub- 
 lics that afterwards fell, with France itself, into 
 the hands of a military autocrat. 
 
 With us, however, these dangerous notions are 
 sporadic, not general. In the existing world 
 crisis we are glad that our allies stand, as we do, 
 for popular self-government as well as for the reign 
 of law. We feel that the establishment of demo- 
 cratic government in Germany would facilitate 
 the conclusion of a lasting peace, lessen the peril 
 of future war, promote international co-operation 
 and place international law on a firmer basis. 
 We see that this war has already strengthened 
 the forces of democracy in every nation; and we 
 believe that the triumph of the cause we have 
 espoused will discredit military monarchy in 
 Germany as in every other nation ; but we did not 
 enter nor are we waging this war in order to 
 
German Land Hunger 265 
 
 force upon Germany or upon any other nation a 
 change in its governmental system. 
 
 National land hunger, national illusions of a 
 world mission, militaristic sentiment — these may 
 appear sporadically, they may even become domi- 
 nant, for a time, in any nation. Whether they 
 are characteristic of any nation is a question of 
 degree and of duration. In the case of nations 
 as in that of individuals, all the traits and ten- 
 dencies that constitute character are human. 
 Differences of character result from different com- 
 binations of these universal traits or, in an older 
 phrase, from the way in which ''the elements are 
 mixed." We may go further and assert that the 
 seemingly new spirit, good or bad, which an indi- 
 vidual or a nation exhibits in a crisis is usually 
 marked by the further development of traits that 
 were already strongly developed and by the sup- 
 pression of other traits that were always less 
 developed. It is all a question of degree. Insan- 
 ity itself, at least in many of its forms, exhibits 
 no traits that are not found in sane people: it is 
 marked by the development of some trait or traits 
 beyond the degree of variation which is sufficiently 
 common to be regarded as normal. Men may be 
 unreasonably suspicious of their fellows or un- 
 reasonably assured of their own importance aPxd 
 
266 Militarism and Statecraft • 
 
 yet be within the line of sanity, but exaggeration 
 of either trait may amount to mania. From this 
 point of view, it seems permissible to say that a 
 nation may be at least temporarily insane. The 
 fact that so many Germans, apparently most 
 Germans, believe without evidence that they 
 were about to be attacked by their neighbours 
 suggests that the nation was afflicted by the 
 mania of persecution. Another indication of a 
 disordered national mind is the reiterated state- 
 ment, made before as well as after the outbreak 
 of the war, that no other nation is able to under- 
 stand Germany. Couple with this the fact that 
 German writers assert that Germans fully under- 
 stand the psychology of other nations, that they 
 alone have this capacity, and that this superiority 
 qualifies Germany to direct the destinies of the 
 world; add to this the apparent acceptance of 
 these claims by most of their countrymen, and it 
 seems quite justifiable to say that German na- 
 tional pride has developed into megalomania. 
 The undoubted fact that some Germans are quite 
 free from such hallucinations does not invalidate 
 this judgment, for these sane Germans testify 
 that the sentiments and opinions which they com- 
 bat are general and dominant. 
 
 Granting that the dangerous tendencies that 
 
German Land Hunger 267 
 
 have been so startlingly exhibited in the modern 
 German mind have been discernible in other 
 nations that have grown too powerful through war, 
 that, from the historical point of view, these ten- 
 dencies seem almost inevitable, let us not forget 
 that history shows us how these tendencies have 
 been counteracted. In the destruction that fol- 
 lows pride, in the nemesis that chastises v^pis^ 
 Hebrew sages and Greek tragedians found a divine 
 retributive justice. Treitschke himself, writing 
 not as a political theorist but as a historian, notes 
 how Germany was punished, in the Thirty Years' 
 War, for the effort of its rulers to revive Roman 
 imperialism and to extend their power over other 
 peoples. "In the merciless justice of history," 
 he tells us, ''those who lusted to rule the world 
 were cast under the feet of the stranger." ' 
 
 Nemesis, however, not only avenges, but also 
 purifies. When victory has corrupted the soul 
 of a people, defeat is salutary. In this sense we 
 may accept Treitschke's famous saying: "The 
 living God will take care that war shall always 
 return as a terrible medicine for the human race."' 
 In chastisement, religious sentiment has always 
 found an exhibition, not of divine justice only, 
 but also of divine benevolence. Today, as was 
 
 » Deutsche Gcschichte, vol. i., p. 5- ' Politik, vol, i., p. 78. 
 
268 Militarism and Statecraft * 
 
 the case a century ago, when the alHed Russians, 
 Germans, and EngHsh overthrew Napoleon, the 
 defeat of an empire may be the salvation of a 
 people. 
 
 VI 
 
 Nothing short of a decisive defeat of Germany 
 will secure the existence and development of the 
 society of free nations. So often as this is im- 
 perilled by the ambition of a single power, there 
 must be a general war ; and every such war must 
 be fought to a finish. 
 
 Deeply moved as we are by the havoc and 
 horror of the war now raging, — a war that al- 
 ready has slain or crippled millions of men, has 
 destroyed much of the fruit of centuries of peace- 
 ful toil and is casting upon generations yet un- 
 born burdens that threaten to be unbearable, — 
 earnestly as we desire its speedy ending, we yet 
 believe that a bad peace would be a greater evil 
 than this worst of wars. If military force, or- 
 ganized and perfected through half a century with 
 unexampled persistency of purpose and concen- 
 tration of effort, loosed suddenly and wantonly 
 upon neighbours more peacefully minded and less 
 fully prepared, directed, with deliberate disre- 
 
German Land Hunger 269 
 
 gard of the customs and laws of modern warfare, 
 not only against armed enemies but also against 
 non-combatants and neutrals — if such force, so 
 used, should emerge from this conflict with any 
 appreciable advantage, with any gain of territory 
 or influence, the peace that should register such 
 a result would be a bad peace. It would rob the 
 world of what is worth far more than goods or 
 lives — faith in justice. Encouraging lawless ag- 
 gression, it would sow the seeds of countless future 
 wars. 
 
 We believe that the moment at which aggres- 
 sion, fully prepared, has secured its utmost prob- 
 able gains in the occupation of neutral and enemy 
 territory, the moment at which resources long 
 husbanded for such aggression are beginning to 
 fail, while the more peaceful nations, worsted by 
 surprise, are now first attaining efficient organiza- 
 tion of their larger populations and superior 
 wealth, is not the moment at which a just and 
 lasting peace can be secured. 
 
 That moment, we believe, will come only when 
 right is victorious. From Belgium to Armenia 
 right is still on the scaffold ; from Brandenburg to 
 the Bosphorus wrong is still on the throne. Peace 
 patched up today could not but leave the moral 
 issues of the war unsettled; and such a peace 
 
270 Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 could be nothing more than an armistice. Far 
 better than such a peace is further warfare, to the 
 end that those who have given their Hves for 
 national freedom and international justice shall 
 not have died in vain. 
 
Militarism and Statecraft 
 
 By Munroe Smith 
 
 Crown Octavo. 61* net 
 
 This volume contains, in revised and expanded form, the 
 following studies, originally published in 1915-1917: 
 Military Strategy versus Diplomacy, in Bismarck's time and 
 
 afterwards ; 
 Diplomacy versus Militsury Strategy ; How the Central Empires 
 
 might have played the diplomatic game ; 
 The German Theory of Warfare, and the results of its applica- 
 tion; 
 German Land Hunger, and other underlying causes of the war ; 
 
 Also, in an Appendix: 
 Correspondence with Theodore Roosevelt. 
 
 European Comments 
 
 " Having just finished a perusal of your article on ' Military 
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 expressing warm admiration for its . . . clearness and 
 cogency, as well as for its high standard of accuracy and its 
 penetrating insight. ... I hope your article will be published 
 separately, perhaps somewhat enlarged. It is a permanent con- 
 tribution to history." — Letter from Viscount Bryce. 
 
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 aussi bien par la forte documentation que par la penetration de 
 Vanalyse."— Letter from Prof. LEON DUGUIT, Faculty of Law, 
 Bordeaux. 
 
 " Professor Munroe Smith. . . leads us coolly and quickly 
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 distance to do so." — Introduction to the Dutch translation of 
 ''Military Strategy versus Diplomacy,'' by W. DE VEER. 
 
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