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 COMMANDERY OF TBE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 
 
 WAR PAPER 55. 
 
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Milifar^ ©rder of tl7e boyal b9^ion 
 
 OF THE 
 
 Onifed States. 
 
 CQMMAWDERY of the DI^TI(ICT of dDLUlV|BIA. 
 
 WAR PAPERS. 
 
 55 
 
 (XKancellorsville, 3/Lay 2 and 3, 1SC3. 
 
 PREPARED BY COMPANION 
 
 Captain 
 
 WILLIAM R. HILLYER, 
 
 U. S. Volunteers, 
 BEAD AT THE STATED MEETING OF NOVEMBER 2, 1904. 
 

 Giit 
 Author 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The motive for this paper on the battle of "Chancellorsville" 
 is the vindication of the Third Corps from the unjust criticisms 
 and unfair quotations compiled from the official reports, by 
 James Beale, late of the 12th Mass. Vols., and published 
 under the title: 
 
 "Chancellorsville: A paper read before the United Service 
 Club of Philadelphia on Wednesday February 8, 1888." 
 
 "Second edition issued in 1892." 
 
 Also for the correction of an error in the official reports 
 reflecting upon the men and officers of the Seventh New Jersey, 
 which appears in the report of the Division Commander, 
 General Joseph B. Carr. 
 
 Without making any quotations from the paper of Mr. 
 Beale, I will refer to its unjust character in general terms. 
 
 He has apparently carefully canvassed the official reports 
 for the sole purpose of gathering together every stricture upon 
 the actions and conduct of individuals and organizations he 
 could find therein, and has collated these censures in such 
 a manner, as to impress the casual reader with the idea that 
 the conduct of the Third Corps from its commander down 
 to the men in the ranks was censurable, and in many cases 
 cowardly and reprehensible. 
 
 Tlie injustice of making isolated extracts from reports 
 showing misconduct of individual officers and organizations 
 and presenting them as a reflection upon a whole corps will 
 be apparent to any reader of Mr. Beale's article who, in connec- 
 tion therewith, reads the pages of this paper. 
 
 If the paper of Mr. Beale was deemed worthy of publication 
 as an historical document, and it seems to have been so 
 
accepted, I desire to enter my protest against this method 
 of making history, and submit to the mihtary student this 
 vindication of the Third Corps and the Seventh New Jersey 
 V'ohmteers, by a statement of the facts as gathered from the 
 official records and my personal participation in the events. 
 I feel assured that when he recalls the fierce charging and 
 countercharging of 25,000 men on one side, and 16,000 on 
 the other, and that in the five hours of bloody unceasing 
 combat, some 14,000 of the 40,000 engaged were either killed 
 wounded or captured and all in the space of a half mile square, 
 he will not wonder that some few of the utterly exhausted 
 fighters, with ammunition expended, in the confusion of 
 retiring marched to the rear. 
 
 W. R. HiLLYER. 
 
Cbaucclbrsbilk 
 
 I have chosen the battle of Chancellorsville for my theme 
 for several reasons: 
 
 First: — Because my regiment, the jth New Jersey, accom- 
 plished more effective work with less loss than in any other of 
 its 25 or 30 engagements. 
 
 Second : — Because some of the fiercest and bloodiest fight- 
 ing of the war took place on the plank road and at Hazel 
 Grove Angle, between the 3d Corps and William's Division of 
 the 12th Corps on the Union side, and three Divisions of 
 Jackson's Corps of Confederates. 
 
 Third : — Because none of the accounts of the battle that 
 I have read has given to the 3d and 1 2th Corps that measure 
 of credit which they deserve for their heroic sacrifices, and 
 the determined and persistent tenacity they displayed on 
 that occasion. 
 
 Fourth: — Because a brilliant campaign of great strategic 
 importance, and auspiciously inaugurated, with every element 
 of success attending its earlier movements, was suddenly 
 changed from offensive to defensive tactics without any 
 explanation, or apparent reason. 
 
 Fifth: — Because, though defeated, Hooker's old division 
 never lost confidence in their old commander, "Fighting 
 Joe," and because he never lost confidence in the men and 
 officers of his Division, as shown by his placing them and 
 Kearney's men to stay the onslaught of victorious Confederates 
 and hold them by the throat until his new lines were established 
 and fortified. 
 
 No official report of this battle by the Commander of the 
 Army, or explanation of his change of plans from an offensive 
 
to a defensive campaign was ever made ; at least none has 
 been published. 
 
 The late General Joseph Dickinson, the Adjutant General of 
 Hooker, at that battle, has compiled in chronological sequence 
 the orders issued and despatches sent by Hooker and Lee, 
 during the progress of the movements, showing Hooker's 
 purposes and how carefully every detail of the campaign had 
 been worked out by a masterly strategist and tactician, and 
 how completely mystified Lee apparently was during the first 
 days of the movement. 
 
 These orders clearly demonstrate to the military student 
 how absolutely dependent the greatest military genius is upon 
 the skill and lo^^alty of his lieutenants. They partially clear 
 the mystery of Hooker's change of plans and the beginning 
 of the failure. 
 
 The responsibility for Hooker's failure at Chancellorsville is 
 not a part of this paper. 
 
 For two years the Army of the Potomac had met defeat 
 in manv attempts to respond to the demands of the newspapers 
 of the North: "On to Richmond! " 
 
 The first Bull Run, Peninsular Campaign, Second Bull Run, 
 and Fredericksburg had so demoralized and disheartened the 
 loyal people of the North that the failure at Chancellorsville 
 seemed the last straw that would break the back of the War 
 party. It encouraged the Peace party and the Copperheads, 
 and stirred up the opponents of the draft to violence in the 
 cities. 
 
 The drooping hopes of the loyal people were two months 
 later fully revived by the glorious news from Meade at Gettys- 
 burg, and Grant at Vicksburg. 
 
 It is not my purpose to dwell upon the general plan of 
 the Campaign, which is, without doubt, familiar to most of 
 our Companions here to-night, but I must touch upon the 
 movements and outline them with the help of the map. 
 
As Captain of the Color Company of the 7th N. J. Volunteers, 
 and as an active participant in all the fighting on Sundav 
 morning on the plank road west of the Chancellorsville house, 
 I feel justified in attempting to narrate some of the details 
 of that part of the engagement. These incidents have for 
 just forty years been vividly impressed upon a verv retentive 
 memory. The pictures of those fearful scenes have never 
 faded, and an account of them, written a few days after our 
 return to camp, published in the Jersey City Daily Journal, 
 has always been at my hand to recall the stirring events and 
 prevent their being too hightly colored by the imagination of 
 the garrulous and boastful old soldier as the autumn of life 
 draws on apace. 
 
 Let us first glance at the events that immediately preceded 
 the campaign. 
 
 When General Burnside on the 12th of December, 1862, 
 made the futile assault on Marye's Heights, he realized what 
 ordinary military intelligence knew beforehand, that it was 
 worse than useless to hurl masses of men at impregnable 
 positions where there could be no other result than slaughter. 
 Withdrawing to the north bank of the Rappahannock, his 
 army returned to their shelter tents and dugouts, and for 
 nearly a month in midwinter were exposed to the severity of 
 the weather, not being permitted to prepare winter quarters. 
 Then came the "mud march" in January, another blunder 
 as disastrous as the first because the loss to the army by 
 desertion of brave, but disgusted and disheartened men and 
 good soldiers, far exceeded the losses of the month before in 
 battle. 
 
 This projected campaign was upon similar lines followed 
 by Hooker a few months later, but the weather fought against 
 the Army of the Potomac and defeated it, as anybody familiar 
 with Virginia roads in January and February could have 
 foreseen. 
 
Once more soaked with rain, covered with mud from head 
 to foot, dispirited and half frozen, the grand army, after days 
 of struggUng to rescue the wagons and artillery from the im- 
 passable roads, returned to its boggy camps and settled down 
 for winter quarters. 
 
 With busy hands we soon forgot our troubles in the construc- 
 tion of huts and decoration of our camps, which we beautified 
 by arches and bowers of evergreens and fully enjoyed for the 
 next three months. 
 
 The authorities at Washington realized that General Burn- 
 side was not the strategist to lead the Army of the Potomac 
 to victory, and Major-General Joseph Hooker was placed in 
 command. 
 
 Meanwhile Lee had sent Longstreet with two divisions of 
 his corps to Southeast Virginia to operate along the coast. 
 
 This left two divisions of the ist Corps and all of Jackson's 
 2d Corps to hold the line of the Rappahannock when Hooker 
 commenced his movement : 
 
 The Army of the Potomac upwards of 90,000 total strength ; 
 
 The Army of the Northern Virginia, about 50,000 total 
 strength. 
 
 General Hooker's old division to which our Jersey brigade 
 had been attached from its first organization, had implicit 
 confidence in his skill in handling large bodies of men, and 
 we felt that we now had a commander with experience as a 
 tactician, if not as a strategist, who would not be vacillating 
 and dilatory when the foe was within reach. 
 
 Three months of resting and drilling, and again we were 
 in motion for the upper fords. 
 
 On April 30, with no opposition, five corps of Hooker's 
 Army, the 2d, 3d, 5th, iith, and 12th, some 60,000 men, 
 were at Chancellorsville on the south side of the Rappahannock 
 river, ten miles west of Fredericksburg, before Tee divined 
 Hooker's intentions. 
 
Meanwhile the demonstrations of the 6th and ist Corps, 
 under vSedgwick below Fredericksburg, had led Lee to expect 
 the main movement would be to turn his right, cut his com- 
 munications with Richmond by cutting the railroad which 
 parallels the river for several miles below the citv. 
 
 These two corps crossed the river with slight opposition, 
 the high bluffs on the north bank affording everv facility 
 for covering a movement of this kind, as Lee relates in his 
 official report. 
 
 This movement was under the immediate command of 
 Sedgwick, who was ordered to press Lee's rear and form a junc- 
 tion with Hooker. 
 
 Reynolds with the first corps was withdrawn and bv a 
 forced march of twenty-six miles arrived at United vStates ford 
 on Sunday morning, and took position on Hooker's right in the 
 new line, and did no more fighting. The total loss of the 
 ist Corps as officially reported was 292 officers and men. 
 
 This was considered by military critics one of Hooker's 
 mistakes, as Reynolds was sadly needed by vSedgwick, and 
 his force was of no use at Chancellorsville. It weakened 
 Sedgwick so that after Hooker's repulse by Jackson, Lee was 
 able to overwhelm him. 
 
 The loss'jof the first corps, above-noted, wae-mostly incurred 
 below the city of Fredericksburg. 
 
 The orders issued by Hooker show that it was his plan that 
 the advance corps should push on towards Fredericksburg 
 as vigorously as possible, driving in the Confederate advance^ 
 and securing the most advantageous position possible, and it 
 was his hope that Banks ford might be uncovered and 
 become available as a line of communication with the north 
 bank. 
 
 It was when Hooker arrived at Chancellorsville, the dav 
 after the army had reached there, and found that his orders 
 had not been carried out, but that the troops had been halted 
 
lO 
 
 there, and Lee given time to get his army in position to check 
 any further forward movement, he ordered the withdrawal of 
 Sykes on the old turnpike road, and Griffin on the river 
 road, and established his lines around Chancellorsville and 
 along the plank road to the west to await Lee's attack. 
 
 Meade, in his report, states that Griffin reached Decker's 
 house on the river road at a point in sight of Banks ford 
 and found no enemy in position in force. 
 
 Sykes met the Confederate advance in force at a point 
 two and a half or three miles beyond Chancellorsville, and 
 not making any connection with Griffin, and the 12th Corps 
 not moving out on the plank road to cover his right, he soon 
 found his wings being enveloped by the superior numbers of 
 Lee, and Hooker ordered a return of all the 5th Corps to his 
 new lines, and that Corps was posted with its extreme left 
 resting on the river at Scott's dam in sight of United States 
 ford. 
 
 This withdrawal of the advance of the army from the com- 
 paratively open country to which these two divisions had 
 reached, marked the change from the offensive to a defensive 
 campaign. 
 
 The densely wooded country around Chancellorsville covered 
 the movements of the enemv, and this retrograde movement 
 uncovered the roads which enabled Jackson to execute his 
 successful flank movement. 
 
 This was the beginning of Hooker's failure in the Chancellors- 
 ville campaign. 
 
 A review of the battle of Chancellorsville would be incom- 
 plete if we omitted to call attention to the history of previous 
 campaigns, and study the movements of vStonewall Jackson, 
 and the part he took in them. Without question Stonewall 
 Jackson was the military genius of the Confederacy. 
 
 How perfect a counterpart was Jackson's movement upon 
 Hooker's right at Chancellorsville to the turning of McClellan's 
 
II 
 
12 
 
 right in June, 1862, at Richmond; when Jackson with his 
 division by a forced march from the Valley suddenly fell 
 upon the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac in the 
 air at Mechanicsville on the north bank of the Chickahominy, 
 cut its long line of communication and compelled its retreat 
 to the James river. 
 
 Then in August marching back to Orange Court House, 
 where Pope with "Headquarters in the Saddle" had advanced 
 south of the Rappahannock to the banks of the Rapidan, 
 and had the long railroad line to Alexandria to protect, Jackson 
 by a forced march around Pope's right fell upon the railroad 
 at Bristow station, where he was met by Hooker with our 
 Division and driven back, and the railroad line kept open. 
 But this movement caused Pope to fall back to Bull Run, 
 where the 2d battle was fought and where Pope was defeated. 
 
 Now, once more, when Lee is confronted by the Army of 
 the Potomac and compelled to come out of his defenses at 
 Fredericksburg, it is recorded by the Confederate generals 
 that he sent for Jackson, his trusted lieutenant, who with his 
 corps of four Divisions was miles below the city of Fredericks- 
 burg watching the movements of Sedgwick, who had not yet 
 crossed the river. Jackson left Early's Division behind and 
 marched rapidlv to Chancellorsville with his three other 
 divisions, arriving the morning of May ist. The records 
 show how much Lee depended upon the strategic genius of 
 Jackson, and before determining his plan of operations awaited 
 his lieutenant's suggestion. j^ 
 
 Jackson again submits to his Commander the old proposal 
 to turn Hooker's right by traversing the roads as shown on 
 the map. Lee assented and left Jackson to execute the move- 
 ment while he awaited the result. 
 
 As stated before, the withdrawal of the 5th Corps, and 
 adoption of the line in front of Chancellorsville uncovered the 
 Furnace and Catharpin roads, which connecting with the 
 
13 
 
 Brock road gave Jackson a route to reach Hooker's right on 
 the plank road beyond the Wilderness Church. 
 
 Jackson had marched his three Divisions some twenty 
 miles on the ist, had formed his plans that night and early 
 on the morning of the 2d, with that wonderful celerity for 
 which his troops had become famous, he traversed the twelve 
 or fifteen miles that placed his three Divisions on the right 
 flank of the nth Corps " in the air," and wholly unprepared to 
 meet an attack from that direction. 
 
 Without waiting to rest his men, the three Divisions in 
 three lines, Rodes,' Colston's and A. P. Hill's, fell upon the 
 unsuspecting Howard with such suddenness and impetuous 
 determination that the rout of the whole corps was most 
 complete and disastrous. 
 
 The 25,000 men that composed the three divisions of Jack- 
 son were massed in regiments in double column at half distance 
 and moved forward upon the poor little ist Division of How'ard, 
 numbering not over 4,000 all told, and overlapping each brigade 
 that attempted to change front across the road, rolled them 
 up into a confused mass of disorganized and panicstricken 
 fugitives. So close did the Confederates press upon the rear 
 of the fleeing troops that before they could pass to the rear 
 of the brigades awaiting the opportunity to fire, the Confede- 
 rates were too close to be checked by the fire and the thin 
 line was outflanked, and, brave as officers and men might be 
 (and a large part of the i ith Corps undoubtedly were as brave 
 ^as any troops in the Army of the Potomac), it was impossible 
 to stand such an overwhelming onslaught. 
 
 The responsibility of the rout rests somewhere, but we 
 have no time to dwell further upon that point. Deven's 
 4,000, which received the first impact, rushed pell-mell through 
 the ranks of Schurz Division, while he and his ofiicers were 
 changing front in the woods across the road. This was 
 scarcely accomplished when they were also overwhelmed and 
 
H 
 
 the one brigade of vSteinwehr's Division, 1,400 men, still 
 further to the rear, had been posted as advantageously as 
 possible, and made a determined stand for a few minutes. 
 
 This attack on the iith Corps began at about 6 P.M., and 
 it was perhaps 9 P. M. before the exultant enemy found them- 
 selves confronted by troops that would not break or yield. 
 At the first news of the disaster Sickles withdrew his corps 
 from its advanced position at the Furnace and hastily forming 
 his lines in the wood across the plank road, vainly strove to 
 rally the panicstricken officers and men as they rushed 
 through his lines to the rear. Here I will quote from the 
 report of Captain Osborne, Chief of Artillery of the 2d Division , 
 3d Corps, who was at the Chancellorsville house with three 
 of his batteries proceeding to take position while the 3d Corps 
 was establishing its new line to check Jackson's advance, 
 about half a mile beyond the house. I think this quotation 
 will justify my description of the stampede of the i ith Corps 
 as "a complete and disastrous rout." In Vol. XXV, of Rebel- 
 lion Records, on page 483, he says, "As we passed General 
 Hooker's headquarters a scene burst upon us which God grant 
 may never again be seen in the Federal Army of the United 
 States. The iith Corps had been routed and were fleeing to 
 the river like scared sheep. The men and artillery filled the 
 road, its sides, and skirts of the field, and it appeared that 
 no two men of one Company could be fciund together. Aghast 
 and terror-stricken, heads bare, panting for breath, they 
 pleaded like infants at the mother's brcdst, that we would 
 let them pass to the rear unhindered. The troops in the old 
 division (Hooker's), unwavering, and the artillery reckless of 
 life and limb, passed through this disorganized mass of men." 
 Remember this was half a mile to the rear of the lines of 
 the 3d Corps, and the terrified men had not yet stopped 
 r;mning. This is but one of several similar accounts in the 
 oriicial reports 
 
15 
 
 Is it any wonder that Hooker should have been disheartened 
 at this appalHng disaster? As he watched the thousands of 
 fugitives, as above described, and reahzed that 10,000 of his 
 troops were worse than useless, can we not feel with him 
 that overwhelming chagrin and distrust of his officers and 
 men and realize the doubts that must have taken possession 
 of the gallant veteran fighter? Does not this, in part, account 
 for Hooker's failure to take advantage of the demoralized 
 and exhausted condition of Jackson's Corps on the afternoon 
 of the 3d and overwhelm it on the flank with his 25,000 fresh 
 troops, the ist and 5th Corps, which had done no fighting? 
 
 The 3d Corps was composed of steadier stuff, and had 
 repelled too many fierce onslaughts of the "Grey backs" to 
 be carried away by any panicky mob of excited men. 
 
 Flushed with victory and nerved to the pursuit of the 
 flying thousands, the Confederates pressed on with so little 
 opposition that even the darkness of the night did not check 
 their advance, so confident were they that it was irresistible. 
 
 But the 3d Corps had met Jackson's men before and knew 
 that they were not invincible, and that a little pluck and 
 steadiness would quickly overcome the impetuous Southern 
 exaltation and change it to retreat. 
 
 And now in the darkness of that Saturday night with the 
 thousands of fugitives pressing through their ranks to the 
 rear, they calmly took their hastily selected lines and met 
 the victors with such a deadly hail of shot and shell that 
 the pursuers themselves were not only completely checked 
 but fell back in confusion. 
 
 See General Colston's report, page 1005, of Vol. XXV of 
 the Rebellion Records, and reports of other Confederate officers. 
 
 Xow while the two armies are "wooing exhausted nature's 
 sweet restorer" for a few hours, and axes of the pioneers 
 are chopping, chopping ceaselessly, and the picks and shovels 
 are aidins: in the effort to shelter the brave defenders from 
 
i6 
 
 the deadly bullets of the morrow, let us look at the strength 
 of the forces that are to confront each other in desperate 
 guage of battle. 
 
 On the Confederate side there lay massed across the plank 
 road about a mile west of Chancellorsville three divisions of 
 Jackson's 2d Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, consist- 
 ing of A. P. Hill's Division, 6 Brigades — 29 Regts. 
 D. H. Hill's or Rodes' Division, 5 " 22 
 Trimble's, or Colston's Division, 4 " 20 " 
 
 Or a total of, 15 " and 71 " 
 
 By a careful estimate, based upon the official reports of the 
 
 strength of about half of the organizations of the three divisions, 
 
 it is believed that 350 men to each regiment would be a fair 
 
 estimate of the average strength of the 71 regiments, making 
 
 a total of infantry at this point on the Confederate side some 
 
 24,850. Of the strength of the artillery there is no full report 
 
 that I have been able to find, but think from the reports there 
 
 must have been at least five batteries, with an average of 
 
 100 men, 50P. Total Confederate strength ;:5,35o, or 25,000 
 
 in round numbers. This is a very conservative estimate. On 
 
 the Union side we have confronting this force, Williams' 
 
 Division of 1 2th Corps, 3 Brigades — 13 Regts. 
 
 , „ , ( Birney's I st Division, t. " i^ " 
 
 3d Corps under _ , . ^. . . 
 
 .^ < Berry s 2d Division, 3 17 
 
 ( Whipple's 3d Div. 3 " 8 " 
 
 12 51 
 
 And some 6 batteries of artillery. 
 
 These 51 regiments did not average over 300 men on the 
 morning of May 3, making a total strength of 15,000 infantry, 
 and 100 men for each battery, 600. Total, 15,600 or say an 
 aggregate strength not over 16,000 as against the 25,000 of 
 the Confederates. 
 
 These constituted all the troops that fought the battle of 
 
Chancellorsville, and neither Confederates or Union side had 
 a single regiment to reinforce their Hnes. The hnes of the 
 5th and 2d Corps, and the 2d Division of i 2th Corps were pressed 
 just enough (so General Lee says), to keep them from sendng 
 reinforcements to Sickles and Williams. The plank road being 
 the weakest point in the Union lines, Jackson was expected 
 to break through it, and Hooker left Sickles and Williams to 
 hold that point without a single regiment of fresh troops to 
 reinforce or relieve, and these 16,000 men held their position 
 for five long hours, fighting from 5 to 10 A. M. The area occu- 
 pied by these 40,000 blue and gray veterans in their operations 
 on Sunday morning did not mvich exceed a half mile square 
 as shown upon the map. The troops were massed on both 
 sides and not strung out in long thin lines, as in ordinarv 
 battles. There was no attempt to overlap the flanks on either 
 side. 
 
 Hooker, before he sought his blanket for a few hours' rest, 
 had already established a new line, and part of it had already 
 been fortified, and the hastily chosen lines in front of Stuart 
 were to be only temporarily held, to check the Confederate 
 assaults in the morning. 
 
 The battle of Chancellorsville was strikinglv consistent with 
 many other aggressive campaigns of the Army of the Potomac. 
 The army in July, 1861, was led out by McDowell boldlv to 
 attack at Bull Run. The enemy, instead of remaining on 
 the defensive, immediately assumed the offensive. McClellan 
 marched up the Peninsula and sat down in front of Richmond 
 until he was attacked and all of his seven days' battles were 
 on the defensive. 
 
 Pope marched down to the Rapidan "with headquarters 
 in the saddle." Without waiting for him to attack. Jackson 
 marched to his rear and the second Bull Run was another 
 defeat for the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Fredericksburg was an exception as was also Antietam. 
 
i8 
 
 Now Hooker, with a ringing proclamation to his army that 
 defeat awaited Lee, suddenly changes his offensive campaign 
 to one of defense without any explanation, and again it was 
 defeated. 
 
 The losses of the iith Corps, which did not again confront 
 the enemy, was 2,440, of which 1,050, were reported missing, 
 leaving 1,390 killed and wounded. The Confederate loss was 
 very light, as the opposition to their advance seems to have 
 been confined to a few volleys bv the steadiest of the nth 
 Corps regiments, before they broke and fled. The strength 
 of the iith Corps was about 10,000, loss about 14%. 
 
 And now we come to Sunday morning. The Jersey brigade 
 which had been left at United States ford with Seelev's battery 
 as a guard for the bridges, was at midnight- marched to the front 
 to rejoin the Corps, and at 2 A. M. bivouacked for two hours 
 in the rear of the new line established by Sickles. At 4 A. M. 
 we were aroused and moved a few rods to the front, where 
 our division had been placed across the plank road in the edge 
 of the woods. Our regiment was detached and placed in a 
 gap in the first line where no breastworks had been constructed, 
 and there was no material at hand for any defensive barrier. 
 
 This gap was in the line of the ist Division, and about 
 half way from the plank road to the eastern edge of the timber. 
 
 The woods were open in front of us, no undergrowth ob- 
 structed our view through the forest of large pines. The 
 ground sloped gently up for say 200 yards, and there the 
 sky line was visible between the trees. 
 
 We had been here but a short time when just at broad day- 
 light, about 5 A. M., the rebel yells on our right and left 
 told that the struggle had begun. 
 
 It will be observed that the salient angle at Hazel Grove 
 farm where Birney's and Williams' Divisions united, was 
 much advanced beyond the lines. 
 
 This was an elevated point of cleared land, and the objec- 
 
19 
 
 Jac/rion'i Corps 
 
 Sunday morn mi) ' 
 
 
20 
 
 tive point of some of the fiercest assaults of the charging 
 Confederate brigades. It had been occupied by the 3d Corps 
 the night before in the darkness, and it was from this point 
 that Jackson's troops were checked by an enfilading fire as 
 they charged down the plank road in pursuit of the 1 1 th 
 Corps. 
 
 General Stuart, the commander of Lee's Cavalry Corps, had 
 been placed in command of Jackson's Corps after the latter 
 and General Hill had been wounded, and on vSunday morning 
 adopted what seemed to us novel tactics for the action in 
 renewing the assualt. 
 
 The 71 regiments of Confederates in 15 brigades were full 
 of eager anticipation of another walk-over. They were sent 
 in by brigades, the regiments massed in double columns, and 
 as they advanced some of the regiments moving along the 
 plank road, the others upon the hill at Hazel Grove, a gap 
 was opened between them which is mentioned by a number 
 of the brigade and regimental commanders in their reports, 
 and this gap will be referred to later on. 
 
 Practically all the heavy fighting on Sunday morning was 
 at these two points. It seemed to be the purpose of the 
 Confederates to rush upon these points and break through, 
 coming down upon our thin lines on a double quick charge 
 with yells. Lee left Jackson's Corps to finish the task it had 
 begun without reinforcements, while he held the rest of the 
 lines by pressure suflicient to prevent withdrawal. 
 
 Hooker intent on getting his new lines established and 
 fortified, left the 3d Corps and 12th to fight it out till exhaus- 
 tion compelled them to desist. 
 
 Not a single regiment was sent to our assistance on the 
 plank road. 
 
 Behind our line of battle from the plank road to Hazel Grove 
 hill was an open field sloping down to a brook about 75 yards 
 in our rear, then a steep rise or hill some 75 or 100 feet high 
 
21 
 
 on the brow of which 36 earthworks had been thrown up to 
 cover the guns of our 6 batteries, placed there to support the 
 infantry Hues. This was an admirable position (marked on 
 the map as "Fairview"). and enabled the guns to do great 
 execution on the charging masses of the Confederate brigades, 
 both on the plank road and at Hazel Grove on the left. The 
 woods in front made an excellent cover or curtain to shield 
 the artillery from any direct fire of Confederate batteries. 
 The elevation gave a clear range for shot and shell over our 
 heads in the lines below until the Confederates were actually 
 at our breastworks. 
 
 The fearful execution in the Confederate brigades is testified 
 to by the official reports of regimental and brigade commanders. 
 
 All of these guns had an unobstructed command of both 
 the points of attack. 
 
 The Confederate brigades were sent in one after the other 
 in rapid succession. As soon as one was repulsed, another 
 rushed forward, the evident intention being to gradually wear 
 out our men by successive rushes upon these points, and thus 
 the 5 hours were consumed and the endurance of the red stars 
 and the diamonds, as well as their ammunition was at last 
 exhausted. The few rounds of ammunition remaining in 
 some cartridge boxes could not be rammed home in our old 
 smooth bore muskets so foul had they become, and for these 
 reasons at the end we fell back to the Chancellorsville house 
 on the open plain. 
 
 It may be of interest at this point to quote from some of 
 the Confederate commanders. All quotations are from 
 Volume XXV, Part I, Official Records of the War of the 
 Rebellion. 
 
 General A. P. Hill, commanding the Corps after Jackson, 
 was wounded, in his report found on page 885, says: "The 
 enemy (Sickles' 3d Corps about 10 o'clock at night remember) 
 then made an attempt to retake their rifle pits immediately 
 
22 
 
 fronting Chancellorsville, but were handsomely driven back 
 by Heth's brigade of Virginia troops. 
 
 "The enemy during this time had concentrated a most 
 terrific fire of artillery on the head of Hill's Division from 32 
 pieces of artillery- Hill was disabled by this fire. 
 
 "It was thought best not to push the pursuit any farther 
 that night. 
 
 ' ' Next morning all the artillery which could be put in posi- 
 tion having been brought up, the infantry in 3 lines, Colston's, 
 Heth's, or Hill's and Rodes' Divisions, renewed the attack. 
 The enemy were gallantly charged. The combat was furious. 
 Colston's Division having become somewhat disordered and 
 broken, Heth took the advance." 
 
 General Colston, on page 1005, thus describes what Hill 
 alludes to here as "somewhat disordered." 
 
 First he mentions the 3d Corps repulse of their advance 
 at 10 o'clock at night in these words. "The troops were hardly 
 reformed and placed in position when the enemy opened about 
 10 o'clock a furious fire of shot, shell, and canister, sweeping 
 down the plank road and the woods on each side. A number 
 of artillery horses, some of them without drivers, and a great 
 many infantry soldiers belonging to other commands, rushed 
 down the road in wild disorder. But although many casvial- 
 ties occurred at this time in my division, the troops occupied 
 their positions with the utmost steadiness. 
 
 "At this time General Nichols of the Louisiana Brigade 
 had his left leg torn off by a shell, and about this time our 
 great and good, and ever to be lamented Corps Commander 
 (Stonewall Jackson), fell under the fire of some of the men 
 of Lane's brigade." 
 
 Now we come to his description of the fight and the facts 
 as to the troops that General Hill said were "somewhat dis- 
 ordered." "Early on Sunday morning (May 3), as soon as 
 it was broad davlight, the battle commenced with fury. Our 
 
23 
 
 troops advanced from the breastworks, running perpendicular 
 to the plank road and charged the enemy up the hill (Ha7X'l 
 Grove farm), but were driven back by the enemy (Birney and 
 Williams) . 
 
 "Colston's brigade under Colonel Williams immediately 
 advanced and became hotly engaged. Colonel Williams was 
 wounded, Colonel Walker succeeded him, but was killed. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Thurston took command, and being 
 wounded Lieutenant-Colonel Brown assumed command. Colo- 
 nel ^IcDowxll of ist X. C. was wounded here, and Major Stover 
 killed. By this time the enemy was advancing in very strong 
 force towards the right of our line and the breastworks and 
 were about flanking us on the right. 
 
 "This was a critical moment. The troops in the breast- 
 works belonging mainlv to Pender's and IMcGowan's brigades 
 (North and South Carolina troops), were almost without 
 ammunition and had become mixed with each other, and with 
 fragments of other commands. Thev were huddled up close 
 to the breastwork, 6 and 8 deep. In the meantime the enemy's 
 line was steadily advancing (mark this steadily advancing not 
 in breastworks), on our front and right almost without opposi- 
 tion, until I ordered our troops in the breastworks to open 
 fire." 
 
 "Paxton's brigade having moved across the road, advanced 
 towards the breastworks, but before reaching them General 
 Paxton fell, but the brigade advanced and drove the enemv 
 in confusion. It was at and beyond these breastworks that 
 the division sustained its severest loss. For a time the tide 
 of battle fluctuated. The 3 brigades of this division making 
 several distinct charges and being driven back by superior 
 numbers until at last the enemv were compelled to abandon 
 their works near the Chancellorsville house" 
 
 General Hill, on page 885, speaks of Rodes' Division coming 
 to the support of Hill, and after tremendous fighting all three 
 
24 
 
 divisions being engaged, the enemy was driven out and his 
 works occupied about lo o'clock. 
 
 General Stuart who succeeded Hill in command of the 
 Corps on page 888 says: "In this hotly contested battle the 
 enemy had strong works on each side of the road, those on 
 the commanding ridge being heavily defended by artillery." 
 
 General Heth, on page 891, after describing the repeated 
 charges of the 3 brigades, and their retiring, states, "I cannot 
 conceive of any body of men ever being subjected to a more 
 galling fire than this force. The 3 brigades notwithstanding 
 drove the enemy from his works and held them for some 
 time, but were finally compelled to fall back * * * their 
 right flank was seriously threatened." 
 
 "These brigades fell back to the line of works from which 
 thev first commenced to advance. Many valuable officers 
 and men were lost in the charge, and especially when falling 
 back" On page 894 the commander of Heth's brigade tells 
 of the charging of his regiments and their being compelled 
 to retire to shelter behind the barricade from which they 
 started, where he states many thousands had taken shelter. 
 "Gathering together the remnants and joined by about 1,200 
 troops of different brigades, we led the second charge and 
 soon triumphantly mounted their entrenchments, completely 
 routing them from a position from which it is almost impossible 
 to conceive how an army could be driven. Occupying the 
 position about two minutes they were again flanked and 
 forced to retire by greatly superior numbers." How inconsis- 
 tent this seems that after we are completely routed from such 
 formidable intrenchments, we should return and charge the 
 enemy and drive him out of the stronghold. 
 
 General Lane, commanding the North Carolina brigade of 
 5 regiments, on page 917, says: "I shall always feel proud of 
 the noble bearing of my brigade at the battle of Chancellors- 
 ville, the bloodiest in which it has ever taken a part." 
 
25 
 
 On page 918 he says the brigade lost 12 officers killed, 59 
 wounded, and i missing, total 72 officers; 149 men killed, 
 567 wounded, 121 missing, aggregate loss 909. (This brigade 
 was flanked and routed by the 7th N. J.) Colonel Barbour 
 of the ,^7th N. C, on page 924 says: "I do not hesitate to say 
 that it was the bloodiest battle I have ever witnessed." 
 
 General Rodes, commanding division, on page 944, states: 
 ' ' that the fighting on the center and left was of a most desperate 
 character, and resulted in the loss of many valuable officers." 
 (This was the point held by the 3d Corps across the plank 
 road.) 
 
 It will be remembered that Rodes' Division was sent in 
 after the other two had been repulsed and demoralized even 
 to disorganization, and when the exhausted men of the 3d 
 and 12th Corps had been fighting for hours. He also relates 
 thus: "Ramseur after vainly urging the troops in the first 
 line of intrenchments to move forward, obtained permission 
 to pass them." (These troops were the remnants of the brig- 
 • ades that had charged in the earlier hours and by great slaughter 
 and loss of officers had become demoralized as shown by reports 
 already quoted, and were hugging the breastworks captured 
 the night before.) 
 
 "Ramseur's brigade, dashing over the works, charged the 
 second intrenched line in the most brilliant style. The struggle 
 at this point was long and obstinate, but the charge on the 
 left of the plank road at this time caused the enemy to give 
 way on his (Ramseur's), left, and this combined with the 
 unflinching determination of Ramseur's men carried the day, 
 and gave him possession of the works. Not being supported, 
 he was exposed to a galling fire from the right with great danger 
 of being flanked." (This fire was bv our regiment, the 7th 
 N. J., as will be described later on.) "Notwithstanding re- 
 peated efforts made by Ramseur and myself (Rodes) in person, 
 none of the troops in his rear would move up." (This shows 
 
26 
 
 the demoralized condition of the brigades repulsed in earlier 
 charges.) 
 
 Several of the regimental commanders also refer to this 
 incident, and Colonel Funk commanding Paxton's Stonewall 
 brigade of Virginia troops after the latter had been killed, 
 on page 1013 says: "At the breastworks thrown up by the 
 enemy we found a large number of men of whom fear had 
 taken the most absolute possession. We endeavored to per- 
 suade them to go forward, but all we could say was of but 
 little avail. We moved forward. Here General Paxton fell. 
 We advanced to high ground about the center of the woods 
 where we were hotly engaged about f of an hour." (Now 
 comes the romancing.) He says : "In the meantime the enemy 
 received heavy reinforcements. The brigade unable longer to 
 sustain a conflict so unequal, or to maintain the position with- 
 out support fell back in admirable order (?) to the breastworks 
 where the shattered line was reformed. Under General Stuart's 
 orders we again advanced over the fortifications behind which 
 the demoralized troops formerly mentioned were still crowded 
 and relieved General Ramseur's brigade in our front, who were 
 nobly maintaining their ground with thinned ranks and 
 empty cartridge boxes." What a fairy tale about reinforce- 
 ments for the Union line ! Why was it necessary to fall back 
 several hundred yards to reform his shattered line behind the 
 breastworks, if they retired in admirable order? As I witnessed 
 this brigade break and run, ever}^ man for himself, it appears 
 a ludicrous description to say it retired in admirable order 
 
 This was one of the brigades our regiment flanked, as des 
 cribed later on. 
 
 To close these quotations so graphically describing the 
 efforts of the Confederates to crush in the weakest point on 
 Hooker's line by pounding it with rushes of massed brigades, 
 let me give the report of Rodes, showing how well even at the 
 verv last assualts the exhausted remnants of the artillerv and 
 
27 
 
 infantry of the 3d and 12th Corps held in check and punished 
 these desperate attempts of Rodes' fresh troops. Rodes' 
 Division was the last to move into action on Sunday morning. 
 Colston's (or Hill's) Division came first, then Trimble's (or 
 Paxton's). Rodes says on page 947, that the strength of his 
 division, 5 brigades, was 678 officers, and 7,873 men. He 
 reports his losses: officers, 230; men, 2,700; total loss, 2,976. 
 Of these were captured by the 3d and 12th Corps, 700.' The 
 total losses of the 3 divisions of 1 5 brigades, or 7 1 regiments 
 of Jackson's Corps is reported officially, 7,732; and of artillery, 
 100; a total loss, 7,832, out of 25,000 total engaged, or nearly 
 33^% ■ This loss, beiar in mind, was almost wholly within 
 the little space of half a mile, some of the regiments losing 
 50' , ■ 
 
 Now that you have had from the Confederate officers such 
 vivid pictures of their operations on that bloody field, albeit 
 some of them are highly colored and tinged with romancing, 
 let us turn now to our own lines and see how it came about 
 that 16,000 veterans of the old 3d and 12th Corps were able 
 to practically put out of action 25,000 Confederates on that 
 Sunday morning. 
 
 How was it that our troops inflicted upon these charging 
 brigades such fearful losses? If we fled before them and were 
 routed at every charge as they describe, how did they happen 
 to lose from 30 to 50 per cent, of their commands as they 
 report in killed, wounded and prisoners;* 
 
 Colonel Funk, commander of Paxton's brigade, deftlv intro- 
 duces "heavy reinforcements" as a reason why his brigade 
 fell back in such "admirable order," that they had to get 
 b'ehind the captured Union breastworks to "reform his shat- 
 tered line." I quote his own language. 
 
 The facts are that when this brigade charged down the 
 plank road, the 7th N. J. in the woods and the other regiments 
 of our brigade at the log breastworks, and the artillery poured 
 
28 
 
 such a deadly fire into the flanks and faces of the soHd mass, 
 that they broke and ran Hke sheep, and no reinforcements 
 were sent to the front hne that day as I have before stated. 
 
 I have already described the position of my regiment, the 
 7th N. J. in the front line at the opening of the battle in the 
 morning. The balance of the 2d Division of the 3d Corps 
 (the white diamonds) held the front line across the plank 
 road where the heaviest assaults were made, the ist Brigade 
 a few yards in the rear as a reserve. 
 
 It will be seen by the map that the line of breastworks 
 formed an angle on the right of the road where it entered the 
 woods, so that when the Confederates charged a raking fire 
 was poured into their left flank, and that condition is noted 
 in the reports of a number of the regimental Confederate 
 commanders. 
 
 While the fierce and stubborn fighting described in preceding 
 pages in the language of the Confederate commanders had 
 been taking place on our right at the plank road, and on our 
 left at Hazel Grove farm for perhaps a couple of hours, no 
 enemy appeared in the front of our regiment, so that what 
 little firing was done by the 7th N. J., was at a right oblique 
 when the charges were made, but it was not effective as we 
 were too far away. 
 
 By the topography of the field it came to pass as these brig- 
 ades started upon that charge, as each of them did from the 
 line of breastworks on the other side of the wood, yelling as 
 they ran, those regiments having Hazel Grove as their objective, 
 bore to the right and became separated from those moving 
 down the plank road. Thus a wide gap of several hundred 
 yards was opened and no troops appeared in front of our 
 position as stated above. A number of Confederate reports 
 mention this fact and show how it left their flanks exposed. 
 The Colonel of the 7th N. J. arranged with the Commander 
 of the regiment on our left to move into the woods simulta- 
 
29 
 
 neously, we deflecting to the right so as to bring us within 
 range of the plank road, and the other regiment bearing off 
 to the left towards Hazel Grove. Each regiment thus covered 
 the rear of the other from any attempt of the enemv to sur- 
 round them. 
 
 We moved forward to the summit of the ridge . before 
 described, some 150 yards or more where the ground gently 
 sloped away toward the Confederate lines. Here we halted, 
 but no enemy was in sight though we could see through the 
 open pine forest for some 150 or 200 yards further. 
 
 Lieutenant Johnson with two or three men was sent forward 
 to reconnoitre, but returned in a few minutes on a run report- 
 ing masses of graybacks in the other edge of the woods, and 
 getting ready for another charge. Soon we heard the familiar 
 yell and in a few moments they came into view in double 
 column at half distance with colors flying. 
 
 It was a compact mass of men, a brigade of Virginia troops, 
 and it was a thrilling moment of expectancy and excitement 
 as we wheeled the regiment till parallel to the road and waited 
 till they had passed, which they did, wholly unconscious of 
 our presence on their flank and rear. Our men were cautioned 
 to hold their fire until ordered by the Colonel, and then to 
 aim low as we were on higher ground. At the command 
 "Ready, right oblique! Aim! Fire!" our 300 old smooth 
 bore muskets with buck and ball roared like a sixty-four 
 pounder, and sent a deadly shower of 1,200 shots into the 
 backs of the Virginia graybacks. The surprise was complete, 
 and the execution at short range was fearful. 
 
 Believing they were surrounded, they broke and ran pell- 
 mell to the rear without firing a shot. Some 75 or 100 of them 
 jumped behind trees and cried, "Don't shoot," waiving their 
 hands in token of surrender. Our men charged down and 
 gathered them in with two stand of colors, and sent them to 
 the rear under a small guard. 
 
30 
 
 Apparently the object of thus charging in a mass was to 
 break through our thin Hne bv a rush and then deploy, but 
 evidently the officers responsible for these novel tactics did 
 not count on the Yankees appearing on both flanks and stay- 
 ing there. The Rebel yells did not scare the veterans of the 
 3d Corps. 
 
 We immediately reformed the regiment, reloaded our guns 
 and awaited a repetition of the incident. Another yell ringing 
 through the forest announced fresh troops. This was Paxton's 
 (Stonewall) brigade, and they also passed us on the double 
 quick without being aware of the trap we had laid for them. 
 A single volley at short range poured into their backs sent 
 them also on a run to the rear without firing a shot. Another 
 flag and bunch of prisoners was run in, and so far not a man 
 of the 7th had been lost. 
 
 This is the charge that Colonel Funk described and relates 
 that heavy reinforcements caused his brigade to retire in admi- 
 rable order to reform its shattered ranks behind the breast- 
 works. 
 
 Whether our regiment could have repeated this successful 
 move or not. Colonel Francine was unwilling to assume the 
 responsibility of leaving his position without orders and 
 risking capture, so ordered "about face," and we marched 
 back to our original position in the edge of the wood, loath to 
 leave so soft a snap. Here we found the place occupied by 
 a red star regiment. vStepping over them we moved about 
 50 yards further to the rear, at the brook halted, and directed 
 the men to swab out their guns which had become so foul 
 that many could not ram the cartridges home — a common 
 incident with our old smooth bore muskets and the paper 
 cartridges with buck and ball. 
 
 Meanwhile the 12th Corps regiment had advanced into the 
 woods and we expected they would serve the next brigade 
 to charge with the same medicine that we had given their 
 predecessors. 
 
In a few minutes while our men were still in the act of clean- 
 ing their guns we heard the old familiar yell, and knew that 
 another brigade was coming down the road. This proved to 
 be P.amseur's brigade, and the report of this charge by its 
 commander is found on page 996, of Volume XXV. He reports 
 that when he reached the breastworks he found a portion of 
 Paxton's brigade and Jones' brigade there, but that not a 
 man of them would move when he ordered them to go forward, 
 nor would they move when General Stuart, and corps comman- 
 der, came up and ordered them to advance. So ordering his 
 brigade to "Forward." they leaped over the breastworks and 
 charged with a shout. Paxton's and Jones' brigades it will 
 be remembered were the two we had routed just before. As 
 they came yelling down the road, and we waited to hear a 
 volley from the 12th Corps regiment that would stop their 
 noisy throats, we were filled with dismay, chagrin and indigna- 
 tion at seeing the whole regiment come rushing out of the 
 woods without firing a shot, every man for himself, and not 
 a shot fired at them. Officers and men of the 7th shouted to 
 the fleeing red stars urging them to stop with us and help 
 repulse the charge, but not a man would halt. They went by 
 us on a dead run ancj fled up the hill like a scattered flock of 
 sheep. 
 
 When the front line of Ramseur's brigade reached our 
 breastworks the men dropped upon their knees and began 
 firing upon the fugitives. It was about 150 yards from where 
 the 7th was in line to the plank road at the breastworks. This 
 was the mistake of Ramseur's men. The halt caused the rear 
 ranks to close up in a solid mass, and every shell from our 
 36 guns which were fired point blank as fast as they could 
 be loaded, caused a frightful slaughter, and for a few moments 
 we stood and watched the fearful sight. 
 
 There were no other Union troops on our side of the plank 
 road, so Lieutenant-Colonel Price, who now had command of 
 
the 7th, ordered us to charge, which we did until we reached 
 a point where our fire would be effective, say about 100 yards, 
 when we opened an enfilading fire into their right flank. At 
 this point for a few moments we received a hot fire, and here 
 nearly all the casualties in the 7th took place in a short space 
 of 15 or 20 minutes. One officer and 5 men killed, 6 officers 
 and 35 men wounded, total 47. This was the lightest loss 
 of any regiment in the brigade. 
 
 After firing two or three rounds Colonel Price ordered us 
 to charge, and the Confederates broke and ran — what there 
 was left of them. The space in front of our breastworks was 
 covered a solid mass of their dead and wounded, and many 
 too scared to run away, were captured with two stand of colors. 
 It was a horrible sight. Thus the 7th N. J. at small cost had 
 to its credit a capture of 5 stand of colors, and over 200 prisoners 
 and had put to rout three brigades of the enemy with a loss 
 of some 200 or 300 killed and wounded, and not a shot fired 
 bv the regiment from any shelter. 
 
 Ramseur reports his total strength 1,509; total losses, 788, 
 more than 50%. Of this loss our regiment gathered in when 
 we charged over the breastworks, 108 prisoners. One of the 
 flags captured was a small silk regimental color, inscribed 
 "2d North Carolina vState Troops," with the dates "May 5, 
 1762, and May 5, 1862," if I remember the dates. As our 
 men jumped over the breastworks, I halted the color guard 
 on our side and stood upon the logs watching the Johnnies 
 running away. Suddenly a couple of guns that had been 
 brought down the road in the rear of the brigade, opened fire 
 upon us with canister, apparently not more than 100 yards 
 away. At the first discharge I saw the flash and felt the 
 wind of the shots as they whirred past my head. A man I 
 did not know of another Company was struck by a shot and 
 his knee shattered as he stood on the log beside me. I called 
 to the men to look out, but they were already scrambling back 
 
33 
 
 to our side. We reformed and marched up the hill to the open 
 plain at the rear of our artillery where General Sewell was 
 gathering the remnants of the brigade together. He reports 
 that he had the colors of all the 6 regiments, but many of the 
 officers and men of the other regiments had become separated 
 in falling back through the woods. Captain Healy, command- 
 ing Sewell's regiment, the 5th N. J., and the bulk of the 2d 
 N. Y., had moved off on the opposite side of the Foad and 
 marched to the rear. 
 
 Meanwhile the Confederate batteries finding our infantry 
 withdrawn had advanced, and the shells were falling and burst- 
 ing around us very lively. In a very short time another 
 Confederate brigade, which from official report appears to 
 have been Paxton's brigade under Colonel Funk, who says 
 he was ordered to relieve Ramseur, who had been compelled 
 to retire, advanced together with remnants of other brigades. 
 Colonel Funk relates: "We again advanced over the fortifica- 
 tions behind which the demoralized troops were still crouched. 
 Seeing some confusion among the enemy who occupied the 
 embrasures on the crest of the hill" (this was the retirement 
 of our 36 guns that fell back as the infantry were withdrawn), 
 he continues "I ordered the brigade to charge which thev did 
 with the utmost enthusiasm, driving the enemy from his 
 works, and before them for f of a mile. We took their works. 
 The enemy was driven pell-mell around the Chancellor house." 
 So much for Colonel Funk's imagination. This charge which 
 he describes in such glowing terms, was wholly without opposi- 
 tion as we, the last regiment to leave the front line, had marched 
 to the rear immediately upon the repulse of Ramseur, and 
 were already quietly lying in line in the open field where we 
 saw Funk's (Stonewall) brigade charge up the plank road and 
 deploy behind the artillery embrasures that he mentions, 
 and open fire upon our little remnant of a brigade. General 
 Sewell on his horse waved his sword and called the New Jersey 
 
34 
 
 boys once more to up and at them. Exhausted as we were 
 we did not hesitate, but sprang to our feet and with ringing 
 cheers again rushed across the field, and before we had covered 
 half the distance, the Stonewall brigade broke and ran down 
 the hill and into the woods. Our men gathered in a number 
 of prisoners that crouched behind the emplacements afraid 
 to run, sent a few scattering shots after the fleeing graykacks, 
 as they disappeared in the wood, and then marched back by 
 the flank to the Chancellorsville house, and that ended our 
 part in the battle of Chancellorsville. Our casualties were 
 almost nothing in this last charge, as the Johnnies broke and 
 ran before they had the range of our line. To further illustrate 
 Colonel Funk's delightful faculty for romancing, his descrip- 
 tion of this last movement will be given as a rich specimen of 
 the way military glory is manufactured out of whole cloth. 
 
 Colonel Funk and his regimental commanders explain this 
 last retreat by saying that they saw some troops behind the 
 Chancellorsville house moving down to flank them, and as 
 another brigade on their left had fired one volley and ran, 
 leaving their flank uncovered, they were compelled to retire, 
 which, Colonel Funk says, "they did like veterans, the enemy 
 dared not follow." Our brigade moved to the rear of the new 
 lines which had been strongly fortified by those troops not 
 engaged in the fight, and here we for the first time since supper 
 the night before were able to break our fast and rest. 
 
 Colonel Funk says one- third of his brigade had fallen. His 
 brigade (the Stonewall) made the last charge on the Confede- 
 rate side, and the New Jersey brigade the last on the Union 
 side, but there was for a short time after this some sharp 
 fighting as the 12th and 2d Corps lines were withdrawn within 
 the new line. 
 
 General Sewell and the Count de Paris describe this last 
 charge of our brigade in commendatory terms, and for his 
 conspicuous gallantry on that occasion General Sewell received 
 
00 
 
 the medal of honor. From these accounts, both Confederate 
 and Union, it will be seen that the claims of the Confederate 
 commanders that we fought in strong fortifications, is refuted 
 by their own words, for they relate that after charging and 
 driving us out of our formidable breastworks, we by counter 
 charges compelled them to retire from these same formidable 
 works. The fact is the barricades were scarcely high enough 
 for our kneeling men to rest their guns upon. At the plank 
 road I stepped upon the top log and stood upon it, and our 
 men hopped over it at a single leap. 
 
 The strongworks that Stuart declares protected the 36 
 guns on Fairview Heights, were simple mounds of dirt thrown 
 up in front of each gun, not even sufficient to cover the gunners 
 The emplacements are still to be seen 36 in number, and speak 
 for themselves. I saw them two years ago. All of these 
 "formidable works" were constructed in the darkness of the 
 night before by the tired men after the rout of the i ith Corps, 
 and upon a hastily selected line, to check the pursuit, and 
 consisted of a few logs laid up about knee high. 
 
 Now that Hooker had withdrawn within his new line behind 
 the strongworks, Lee seeing that his lines would not be again 
 assailed sent a strong force to assist Early in driving Sedg- 
 wick back across the river, which accomplished, the troops 
 returned, and, Lee says in his report, that his preparations 
 for attack were completed, and on the morning of May 6, 
 when "his lines advanced, he found that Hooker had retired 
 to the north bank of the Rappahannock. This ended the 
 campaign. 
 
 Let us look at the losses of the 3d Corps and Williams' 
 Division of the 12th, and compare them with those of the 
 Confederates already referred to and stated. As stated before, 
 the 71 Confederate regiments with the artillery aggregated 
 about 25,000 men, and the official report of the losses is 
 7,832 total. On the Union side, as stated before, there was 
 
36 
 
 an aggregate of about 16,000 engaged, 51 regiments and some 
 6 or 8 batteries, with a total loss officially reported of 5,731 — 
 a loss of about 30 to 333% on either side. One man out of 
 every three engaged ought to satisfy men that there was 
 severe fighting in that 5 hours on Sunday morning, May 3, 
 1863, and when we contemplate that these 40,000 fighting 
 men occupied a space of a few city squares, and some 10 
 or 12,000 of them fell on the field, we must admit that it was, 
 as many of the Confederate commanders relate, a desperate 
 and bloody battle. 
 
 So much for the losses of the two bodies that confronted 
 each other on the plank road and at Hazel Grove farm. 
 
 I shall not attempt to detail the operations of either side 
 at other points in the lines, but will refer briefly to the other 
 Corps. 
 
 The 2d Division of the 12th Corps occupied the line facing 
 towards Fredericksburg, immediately to the left of Williams. 
 No assaults were made upon any other points than those 
 described, but General Lee in his official report states that 
 he directed a steady pressure all along the line to hold our 
 troops in place. The line as shown by the map, made a right 
 angle at Hazel Grove, so that the 2d Division was subjected 
 to a galling, enfilading fire from artillery and musketry during 
 the entire engagement at Hazel Grove Heights^ and its losses 
 were very heavy. 
 
 The 16 regiments, about 4,800, lost 1,206, of which 444 were 
 missing, leaving killed and wounded, 762. 
 
 The 2d Corps occupying the line on the left of the 12th 
 held the two roads from Fredericksburg, and were on this 
 account more heavily pressed than any other part of the 
 line. The front of the 2d Corps was covered during the 
 whole engagement by a heavy skirmish line under immediate 
 direction of Col. Nelson A. Miles, until he was desperately 
 wounded. 
 
The two divisions, some 30 regiments, or 9,000 men, lost 
 1,815, of whicn 720 were reported missing; total killed and 
 wounded, 1,095. 
 
 The 5th Corps, occup}ing the line from the left of the 2d to 
 the river bank, was not confronted on the 2d or 3d by any. 
 Jine of the enemy, and did no fighting or skirmishing, except 
 when Sykes was in the advance on the 30th and ist. The 
 losses were very light, the 3 divisions, 35 regiments, and 3 
 batteries numbering 11 or 12,000; total losses, 700, of vhich 
 were missing 159, killed and wounded 541. 
 
 The rst Corps was not in the fight here. 
 
 The iith Corps I have already reported losses. 
 
 It may be a matter of interest to look a httle into the losses 
 of particular regiments to see which were more irleritorious 
 in their desperate steadiness. 
 
 The total losses of the 3d Corps, with a total strength of 
 about 13,500, was 4,119, or just 30%, but there was missing 
 of this number some 1,100 men. This heavy loss in missing 
 is accounted for by the confusion of the night of the 2d when 
 in the darkness the 3d Corps was withdrawn from the furnace, 
 and thrown across the path of the victorious Confederates, 
 there was an inextricable mixing up of the i ith Corps, pursuing 
 Confederates, and 3d Corps regiments, and nearly all the 
 prisoners were taken at this time. 
 
 Some of the regiments, like the 7th N. J., suffered very light 
 losses owing to favorable situations, but others like the 5th 
 and the 8th N. J., which regiments held the point at the 
 plank road, lost nearly 40 and 50^, , . 8th N. J. reported 258 
 muskets in line at commencement of the engagement, lost 
 125, only 6 of whom were missing, and these 6 were witlunil 
 doubt killed or wounded. 
 
 The 5th N. J. reports a total strength of 320; lost, 121. 
 
 The nth N. J. lost 169, which must have been over 50% 
 of its strength though there is no record of the number taken 
 
38 
 
 into the fight. This regiment under its brave old Colonel, 
 Robert McAllister, shows the heaviest loss in killed and 
 wounded of any of the regiments in our division, but it was 
 a gallant fighting regiment because its leader was cool, fearless, 
 and a shining example of what a regimental commander should 
 be to inspire his men with pluck and persistent steadiness. 
 At Gettysburg the nth N. J. earned fresh laurels for bravery 
 and dogged stubbornness, where it stood its ground on the 
 right of the 3d Corps, on the Emmettsburg pike, until out of 
 a total strength of 275 officers and men, 154 fell, killed and 
 wounded ; over 50% . I mention this because General Robert 
 McAllister was worthy of especial mention, and because I 
 saw his gallantry in the Wilderness campaign of 1864, when 
 he commanded our brigade. 
 
 In bringing this article to a close I desire to vindicate some 
 of these valiant organizations from unfavorable and erroneous 
 criticisms that have appeared in official reports and historical 
 essays. 
 
 I have already pointed out several inaccuracies and imaginary 
 inventions in the reports of the Confederate commanders, and 
 in turning to those of our own commanders, I am impelled 
 to record my correction of a statement that is not true concern- 
 ing my own regiment, and which if left uncontradicted, would 
 reflect unjustly upon the brave officers and men of that 
 devoted band who held the front to the last. 
 
 General Joseph B. Carr, commanding the 2d Division of 
 the 3d Corps, after the death of General Berry, on page 445 
 of Volume XXV, says: "According to the report of his brigade 
 commander, Col. Louis R. Francine, of the ytli N. J. Vols., 
 left the line without proper authority, and proceeded with 
 about 400 of Jn's men to the U. S. ford. At this critical period 
 of the engagement, he could illy be spared and the loss of his 
 men was severely felt. I would respectfullv suggest that the 
 Major-General commanding Corps, call for Colonel Francine's 
 explanation regarding his conduct on this occasion." 
 
39 
 
 Here we have, in the official reports, written by the com- 
 mander of our division in the quiet of the camp, and with all 
 the officers who participated at hand to set him right, this 
 misleading statement which is thus given the stamp of official 
 verification. 
 
 As commander of the Color Company of the 7th N.J. Vols., 
 I am in position to declare that Colonel Francine did not take 
 any of his men to the rear. The regiment had but about 
 300 men for duty that morning, and when Colonel Francine 
 left the regiment, just before we repulsed Ramseur's brigade 
 (our last charge), he turned the command over to Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Price, none of the men went with him. We were in 
 the front line of battle, and remained there with the colors 
 until our ammunition was exhausted, and our muskets so foul 
 we could not load them. 
 
 Captain Healy, commanding the 5th N. J., states that 
 when his regiment, after it had exhausted its ammunition, 
 fell back from the plank road, he met Colonel Francine of the 
 7th taking a party of men to the rear, and learning that he 
 had assumed command of the brigade, he joined him and 
 marched to the ford. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Olmstead of the 2d N. Y. also states 
 that he was ordered back to the river by the Assistant Adjutant 
 General of the brigade, where he joined the brigade under 
 Colonel Francine. Colonel Sewell states that he had the 
 colors of all the 6 regiments of the brigade with, him at the 
 last charge at the Chancellorsvillc house, and I know thai 
 no part of the 7th X. J. went to the rear, 'fhe 5lh and 2d 
 N. Y. are the only troops reported by their commanding 
 officers to have gone with Colonel Francine, and the state- 
 ment of General Carr fixing upon the 7th N. J. the stigma 
 of having deserted its place in the front line, is one of those 
 errors that history should not perpetuate. 
 
40 
 
 I only select this one error because it affects me individually, 
 and can be corrected from my personal knowledge. How 
 manv errors occur in other reports, I am not able to say.