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FURTHER 
 
 AND 
 
 STILL MORE IMPORTANT SUPPRESSED 
 
 DOCUMENTS. 
 

PREFACE. 
 
 THE right which every Government possesses to keeji secret 
 its intercourse and negotiations with foreign nations, so long at 
 least as they are still pending, has been most grossly abused by 
 the present Administration. 
 
 Availing themselves of the privilege of secret debate, and of 
 the right to impose injunctions of secrecy on the members of the 
 two houses, they have published just so much, and no more, of 
 the Correspondence of our Government with foreign powers, as 
 would subserve their own views, as would tend to palliate the 
 conduct of France, and exasperate the People against Great 
 Britain. 
 
 It will be perceived by the Documents which we are now about 
 to publish, the authenticity of which may be relied on, and which 
 we challenge Mr. Madison to disavow if he dare, that while the 
 most important facts in the treatment of France to us, and the 
 most interesting opi7tions of Gen. Armstrong, tending to shew the 
 necessity of a war, or of spirited measures against that nation, 
 have been purposely kept back, letters from Mr. Pinckney on the 
 other hand, favourable to Great Britain, and to her ticws and 
 feelings, have been equally suppressed. 
 
 It will be seen, that as the Government professed to take hos- 
 tile ground equally against both, no honourable motives of policy 
 or prudence, no rules of diplomatic delicacy required th* sufipret' 
 sion of tliese letters. 
 
IV 
 
 ■H'c arc happy in being able to give them to the public. We 
 xhall fdace them, in order of time, and accompany them with such 
 explanatory remarks only, as are absolutely necessary to the right 
 understanding of such mutilated extracts. The other parts of 
 the same correspondence will be found by our readers among the 
 documents published by order of the Senate early in the present 
 se8sioj/. 
 
FURTHER 
 
 SUPPRESSED DOCUMENTS. 
 
 THE first Document which we present to the public is an ex- 
 tract of a letter from Mr Armstrong to Mr. Madison, dated 
 Dec. 27, 1807, in which our Minister declares, that every 
 man in France agrees, that the Decrees of the Emperor are 
 impolitic ; but that no man had the hardihood to state this 
 opinion to the Emperor. It results from this correspondence 
 that so great are the apprehensions entertained of the vio- 
 lence of the temper of this tyrant, that we have no means 
 of communicating to him the sense we have of his injustice. 
 As his own ministers dare not express their own convictions, 
 and as the rules of diplomatic forms forbid a direct applica- 
 tion to him, we are obliged to submit to all his caprices, with- 
 out the possibility of remedy. This may be an apology in 
 the minds of the admirers and advocates of this despot, but 
 it proves our case to be hopeless. 
 
 Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison, 
 
 Paris, dec 27, 1807. 
 
 « I FORWARDED to Mr. McElhony a Copy of a second 
 and very extraordinary Decree* of this Government with re- 
 gard to neutral commerce. Whether it be meant to stimulate 
 Great Britain to the commission of new outrages, or to quicken 
 us in repelling those she has already committed — the policy is 
 equally unwise, and so decidedly so, that I know not a man of 
 consideration who approves of it. It is however not less true, 
 that it is as difficult to find one who will hazard an objection to it. 
 
 T c ] ? w ho in this way is permitted to go further than 
 
 any other person, dare not avow his opinion of it, nor (bad as 
 he thinks it) do more than state that the present moment would 
 
 * The Milan Decree of Dec. 17th. 
 
appear to dictate some modifications. To this point he stands 
 engaged to go, and I wait the result with much anxiety. The 
 Emperor is expected here on the last day of the month." 
 
 THE second suppressed Document is a part of the letter of 
 Mr. Madison of the 8th of Feb. 1808, to Mr. Armstrong. 
 The letter was published as a perfect whole. No reference 
 whatever was made to any suppressed extract, nor was it in- 
 timated that any part had been suppressed. 
 
 The part now added originally followed the sentiment, ex* 
 pressed by Mr. Madison, that his Britannic Majesty had de-> 
 clared, " that he would repeal or relinquish his Orders pari 
 passu (with equal pace) with his enemy, France." Mr. Madi- 
 son, in the su/i/iressed extract, now first laid before the pub- 
 lic, adds, that he presumes the British Government did not 
 contemplate the distinction between that part of the French 
 Decrees which operated on land and that part which operated 
 at nea. And the inference is, that Great Britain would not 
 admit the absurd and disgraceful distinction set up by our 
 Government, that the French Decrees so Jar as they affected 
 our trade in their ports were lawful, but so far as they affect- 
 ed our trade on the ocean were unjust : and Mr. Madison 
 concludes with urging a modification only of the French De- 
 crees so far as respects the seizure in their ports, and urges 
 it on the ground, not of our rights secured by treaty, but on 
 the effect it would have on the objects of France. That these 
 objects, the destruction of British commerce, would be as ef- 
 fectually promoted by annihilating our treaty and confining 
 her seizures to her own ports and those of her dependencies 
 as by captures on the ocean. The late report of a relaxation 
 of the Miian decree seems to he founded on this treacherous 
 concession of Mr. Madison, and probably was produced by 
 the mean councils of our cabinet. 
 
 Extract of a letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Armstrong. 
 
 FEBRUARY 8, 1808 
 
 £To follow the paragraph ending with the words " pari passu with 
 his enemy. "3 
 
 " WHETHER these intimations have any reference to the 
 distinction between such parts of the French Decree as operate 
 municipally on shore, and such as operating on the high seas, 
 violate the rights of neutrals, or to a distinction between the 
 former restriction, and the late extension of the Decree with 
 
respect to the United States, Mr. Erskine did not seem autho- 
 rised to say. The probability is, that neither of these distinc- 
 tions entered into the views of the British Cabinet. But it is 
 certainly neither less the duty nor the true policy of the Em- 
 peror ot the French, so to vary his Decree, as to make it con- 
 sistent with the rights of neutrals and the freedom of the seas, 
 and particularly with his positive stipulations with the United 
 States. This may be the more reasonably expected, as nothing 
 can be more clear, as has been already observed, than that the 
 effect of the Decree, as far as it can be carried into effect, would 
 not be sensibly diminished by abolishing its operation beyond 
 the limits of the territorial sovereignty." 
 
 THE next Documents in order of time are the suppressed let- 
 ters of Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison of 22d Feb. 1808, 
 and of the 9th March of the same year. 
 
 The first, which in the pure periods of our history would have 
 roused our nation to a flame, contained facts and allegations 
 of the most important tendency, and proofs of a temper, to 
 which no nation ever yet submitted before it was subdued ; 
 we now give it to the public. 
 
 It appears, that Bonaparte declared we should be either " al- 
 lies or enemies ;" that the amount of property sequestered 
 was upwards of one hundred millions of francs, or seventeen 
 millions of dollars, nearly three times as great as the whole 
 amount of British captures during the whole of fifteen years' 
 war ; that our ambassador at Paris, who cannot be charged 
 with too much spirit, declared, that the very magnitude of 
 these sums, rendered all hope of redress abortive — and that 
 he presumed as soon as we should know from him that 
 France had thus definitively taken her ground, " we shovld 
 iMMEDiAf ely take ours." In other words, that we should 
 resist with our whole energies such flagrant insults and vio- 
 lations of our rights. 
 
 Yet this letter is suppressed — and it produced no sentiment of 
 indignation in our submissive rulers. We did take our ground 
 but it was the ground of base submission, of further humi- 
 liation. 
 
 The letter of the 9th of March, hereto subjoined, shews, that 
 Bonaparte had stated, that he would modify his decrees, if 
 we could point out a mode in which he could do it without de- 
 parting from his system ; but Mr. Armstrong explicitly 
 states, that he doubted the sincerity of this declaration. 
 
 In fact he made a proposal for modification to which no reph 
 has ever been given. 
 
Extract of a letter fi»om Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison. 
 
 FEBRUARY 22, 1808. 
 
 " MR. PATTERSON offering so good a conveyance that 
 I cannot but employ it. Nothing has occurred here since the 
 date of my public dispatches (the 17th) to give to our business 
 an aspect more favourable than it then had ; but on the other 
 hand, I have come to the knowledge of two facts, which I 
 think sufficiently shew the decided character of the Emperor's 
 policy with regard to us. These are, first, that in a Council of 
 Administration held a few days past, when it was proposed to 
 modify the operation of the Decrees of Nov. 1806, and Dec. 
 1807, (though the proposition was supported by the whole 
 weight of the Council,) he became highly indignant, and de- 
 clared that these Decrees should suffer no change — and that the 
 Americans should be compelled to take the positive character 
 of either Allies or Enemies : 2d. That on the 27th of Jan. last, 
 twelve days after Mr. Champagny's written assurances, that 
 these Decrees should work no change in the property sequestered 
 until our discussions with England were brought to a close, and 
 seven days before he reported to me verbally these very assurances, 
 the Emperor had by a special decision confiscated two of our 
 ships and their cargoes (the Julius Henry, and Juniata) for 
 want merely of a document not required by any law or usage of 
 the commerce in which they had been engaged. This act was 
 taken as I am informed on a general report of sequestei'ed cases, 
 amounting to one hundred and sixty, and which, at present 
 prices, will yield upwards of one hundred millio?is of francs, a 
 sum whose magnitude alone renders hopeless all attempts at 
 saving it. — Danes, Portuguese and Americans, will be the 
 principal sufferers. If I am right in supposing that the Em- 
 peror has definitively taken his ground, I cannot be wrong in 
 concluding that you will immediately take yours" 
 
 Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Madison. 
 
 9th march, 1808. 
 
 • l THE conversation alluded to in the copy of the letter 
 did not take pkee till the 8th inst. when the Em- 
 
 peror declared that if means could be found to make an excep- 
 tion of the Nov. Decree, that such exception should have his 
 consent." 
 
 Extract from the same to the same. 
 
 15th march, 1808. 
 
 " I STATED in my last letter the substance of a declaration 
 made by the Emperor, viz. that if means could be found to 
 
except American property from the operation of the Decree of 
 Nov. 1806, without infringing the principles of the Decrees, 
 he would immediately make the exception. No time was lost 
 in communicating this declaration to me, and I was invited to 
 point out the means it required, and assured that they should 
 be immediately submitted to his Majesty. Little as 1 liked the 
 proposition, and much as / doubted the sincerity of the declaration 
 out of which it grew, I could not refuse any agency of mine in 
 rescuing so much of the American property sequestered in the 
 ports of France as should come within this new rule. I ac- 
 cordingly wrote the Note (a copy of which is subjoined to this 
 letter) pointing out in a few words the property to which that 
 rule would apply. 1'his note was put into the Emperor's hand 
 by the Prince of Benevento, who, though s,ix days have now 
 ©lapsed, has not yet received an answer." 
 
 THE following Document from Mr. Madison to Mr. Arm* 
 strong, proves that our Government were resolved to give up 
 all claims for the unjust Decrees of France, so far as they 
 operated on land: that Mr. Madison chose to overlook the 
 captures in the West-Indies, stated in his own letter of May 
 22d, 1807: that though Bonaparte had expressly avowed 
 nine months before that his original plan was to extend the 
 Decree of Berlin to American Commerce, Mr. Madison 
 chose to consider the original plan confined to seizures in 
 port ; and that all we wished was, that France should so mo- 
 dify her decrees, as to cut us off from all trade with the 
 Continent, provided they would permit us to navigate the 
 ocean. This hint is said at last to have reached the Imperial 
 ear, and that he has consented to modify, not his Berlin De- 
 cree, but the Decree of Milan, which rendered a forcible 
 boarding by a British cruiser cause of condemnation — Gene- 
 rous Prince ! Thy bounty is equal to thy moderation ! No 
 doubt Mr. Madison will thank the Emperor for this favour, 
 and as before, defend the Berlin Decree as a just and lawful 
 measure. 
 
 For the Emperor's understanding of his Berlin Decree, and its 
 original plan, see Armstrong's letter published in the docu- 
 ments, page 20, in which he says, " that the application of 
 that decree to us was the result of the general expressions of 
 the article," and that the Emperor's decision, that il should 
 apply to us, was the declaration of an anterior and positive 
 disposition. 
 
10 
 
 Extract of a letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Armstrong. 
 
 may 2, 1808. 
 
 fTo follow the paragraph ending with the words " will be immediate- 
 taken."] 
 
 " THE repeal of her Decrees is the more to be expected, 
 above all, if Great Britain should repeal, or be likely to repeal 
 hers, as the plan of the original Decree at Berlin did not extend 
 to a violation of the freedom of the seas, and was restricted to a 
 municipal operation for nearly an entire year, notwithstanding 
 the illegal British Order of Jan. 1807, and as a return of France 
 to that restricted scope of her plan, would so immaterially di- 
 minish its operation against the British commerce ; that ope- 
 ration being sO completely in the power of France on land, and 
 so little in her power on the high seas. But although we cannot, 
 if right, demand of France more than a repeal of so much of her 
 Decrees as violate the freedom of the seas, and a great point will 
 be gained by a repeal of that part of them, yet as it may not 
 have the effect of inducing a repeal of the whole illegal system 
 of the British Government, which may seek pretexts, to plead 
 a necessity for counteracting the unprecedented and formidable 
 -mode of warfare practised against her ; it will be desirable, that 
 as little room as possible should be left, for this remaining dan- 
 ger to the tranquil enjoyment of our commercial rights. 
 
 THE following frank, and open letter from Armstrong to 
 Pinkney proves that all hopes of operating on France, either 
 through her justice or wisdom, were wholly vain, and worse 
 than vain, mischievous. 
 
 He adds, that France has become convinced, " that words, and 
 words only are the weapons we can employ." 
 
 This is too severe from a friend — " And you Brutus — then die 
 Caesar." Have the Federalists been unjust in ascribing this 
 pompous boasting character to the Government, when its 
 own officers dare tell it so ? Yet this officer still holds his 
 place. 
 
 Extract of a letter from Mr. Armstrong to Mr. Pinkney. 
 
 Paris, 26th juke, 1808. 
 
 " THE St. Michael arrived at L'Orient, on the first inst. 
 and the government messenger at Paris on the 8th; a passport 
 for the vessel to Falmouth, thence to L'Orient again, was im- 
 mediately requested, but one in the form could not be granted 
 but by order of the Emperor, and this was not given till the 
 
11 
 
 18th ; these circumstances will account for the long detention 
 of your dispatches. We have reason to regret that the views 
 of our government, founded on the justice and wisdom of the 
 belligerent powers, are so little likely to succeed. Attempts of 
 this character made here (and they have not been unfrequentj 
 have hitherto done no good. Nay, the repetition of these may 
 be fairly presumed have done mischief, inasmuch as it has tend- 
 ed to establish a creed, that words in some form or other, are 
 the only means we have to employ. The French Council pf 
 Prizes, which is (I am told) as like the English Court of 
 Admiralty, as one egg is like another, has lately began a career 
 of condemnation. Between the 1st and 15th inst. five cases 
 have been decided, and I am assured that orders have been re- 
 ceived from Bayonne, for condemning all American cases en 
 bloc [in mass.] What has suspended the axe since the 15th, 
 we can but conjecture. It may be presumed that the reflections 
 of the Spanish Junta, on the political and other relations, sub- 
 sisting between Spain and the United States, through the me- 
 dium of the colonies, may have produced the pause. That it 
 is not owing to any conquest which good principles have ob- 
 tained over bad ones, is certain. Are things any better your 
 side the channel ?" 
 
 THE following letter from Gen. Armstrong proves his sense 
 of the folly and inutility, the incompetency and fruitlessness 
 of our Embargo. He recommends vigorous measures 
 against France. The reasons he assigns, his conviction that 
 we can do much against France, and the belief entertained 
 by France that we dare not do any thing against her, while 
 they prove, that France knew our rulers, and had pledges 
 from them, of which he was ignorant, prove also a private 
 good understanding with France, through some other channel 
 than that of our accredited Minister. 
 
 Extract of a letter from Mr. Aiinstrong to Mr. Madison. 
 
 30th augiJst, 1808. 
 
 WE have somewhat overrated our means of coercion, of 
 the two great belligerents to a course of justice. The Embar- 
 go is a measure calculated above any other, to keep us whole, 
 and keep us in peace, but beyond this you must not count upon 
 it. Here it is not felt, and in England (in the midst of the 
 more recent and interesting events of the day) it is forgotten. 
 I hope that unless France shall do us justice, we shall raise the 
 Embargo, and make in its stead the experiment of an armed 
 commerce. Should she adhere to her wicked and foolish 
 
12 
 
 measures, we ought not to content ourselves with doing this. 
 There is much, very much besides that we can do, and we 
 ought not to omit doing all we can, because it is believed here, 
 that we cannot do much, and even that we will not do what we 
 have the power of doing. 
 
 THE letter from Mr. Pinkney which we now present to our 
 readers, fully establishes a truth which we have all of us 
 well known, that Great Britain is earnestly desirous of a 
 good understanding with us — that for the attainment of this 
 object, she will sacrifice every thing but her honour and her 
 essential rights. 
 
 That as to the business of Tribute, which our Government 
 and Members of Congress have shamefully made a subject 
 of complaint, it arose solely from our own minister. He de~ 
 dares that revenue was no object with the British Ministry ; 
 that they offered to place the affair on the footing of the 
 French Decrees, that is, an absolute firoliibition ; and that the 
 course of imposing a duty was adopted as being more agree- 
 able to us ; that they have offered to take it off if more agree- 
 able to our Government, and that our Government and Mi- 
 nister preferred to keep it on as a source of popular com- 
 plaint. 
 
 Mr. Pinkney declares, that the motives of the British Govern- 
 ment would be acceptable to the President. 
 
 Letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr, Madison. 
 
 FEBRUARY 2, 1808. 
 
 H SIR, I had an interview this morning with Mr. Canning, at 
 his own request. One object of the interview related to the 
 Message of the President, of the 27th of October last, of which 
 a newspaper copy had been received from Mr. Erskine. A 
 call for a copy of this message was expected in Parliament, and 
 Mr. C. wished to be in a situation to produce it. I could not 
 assist him, and I suppose the newspaper copy will be consider- 
 ed sufficient. 
 
 " As soon as this subject was disposed of, Mr. C. observed, 
 that he had requested to see me principally for the purpose of 
 conversing with me privately and extra-officially upon the duty 
 proposed to be laid in consequence of their late blockading or- 
 ders, upon cotton intended for re-exportation to enemy-ports 
 upon the Continent. The very few occasional remarks which 
 1 had made upon this subject at our last interview, (already men- 
 tioned in my letter of the ult.)had led him to suppose that it 
 
13 
 
 was only to this mode of excluding our cotton from France, 
 that the United States would be likely to object. And if their 
 object could be accomplished in another way, the measure 
 would cease to be offensive. Having admitted (what indeed 
 was sufficiently obvious before) that they looked to the intend- 
 ed duty upon cotton as a complete prohibition — he said that if 
 it would be more acceptable to the United States that the form 
 of the proceeding should be changed, so as to leave the exclu- 
 sion of cotton from the Continent to the mere effect of the 
 blockade, their desire to consult the feelings and wishes, in 
 whatever did not entirely counteract the great end of the mea- 
 sure, would dispose them to adopt such a modification of their 
 plan. In the course of his explanations upon this point, he in- 
 troduced professions of good will towards our Country, of re- 
 gret that France had imposed upon them the necessity of re- 
 sorting to a step which might be supposed to press with seve- 
 rity upon our interests, and of an anxious desire that a return to 
 a system of equity and moderation on the part of her enemies, 
 would speedily enable Great Britain to abandon (as she would 
 in that case certainly do) the whole of the recent Orders itf 
 Council. He stated that it was peculiarly important towards 
 the first effect of the Orders, (of which it was the object to 
 compel France to relieve the commerce of the world from the 
 oppression of her late Decrees,) that considerable supplies of 
 cotton should not be introduced into the Continent — that it had 
 been hoped and believed, that the United States would not re- 
 ceive harsh or Unfriendly, a constrained attempt by Great Bri- 
 tain to prevent such supplies from being received by the other 
 parties to the war, especially as it was certain that Great Britain, 
 could herself consume the whole of the cotton which we were 
 in the habit of sending abroad, and that they had preferred the 
 imposition of a duty upon cotton to a direct prohibition through 
 the operation of the blockade, because it was consistent with 
 those various and extensive modifications of the blockade to 
 which they had been led, not merely by views of advantage to 
 themselves, but by respect for the convenience and feelings of 
 other nations, and particularly of America. In fine, he wished 
 to know my private opinion, before the subject came before the 
 Parliament, whether an alteration in this respect from a pro- 
 hibitory duty to an absolute interdict, would be likely to be ac- 
 ceptable to us. I replied in as conciliatory a manner as I could, 
 that as soon as I had understood that a duty was to be proposed 
 on re-exported cotton, I had been disposed to take for granted 
 that the object was not revenue but prohibition. 
 
 " That whether the object were the one or the other, it wfcte 
 as he knew, my opinion that the United States would hold that 
 object as well as the means, and the -whole system connected 
 with them, to be utterly inadmissible, and that I did not feel 
 myself authorised to say, to which of the causes he had suggest- 
 
14 
 
 ed, my Government would give the preference, or that it would 
 feel any preference for either. Mr. C. at length asked me, if I 
 should think it worth while to consult my Government on this 
 subject, observing at the same time, that he would not wish it 
 to be done if there was the least danger of giving offence, and as- 
 suring me that what he had said, firoceededfrom motives the most 
 amicable and respectful towards us. He added, that upon reflec- 
 tion this would be the most convenient mode, as it would now 
 give them a good deal of trouble to accommodate their plan, as 
 prepared for Parliament, to a change of so much importance in 
 season to be acted upon. 
 
 " I answered in substance, (as I saw it was his wish,) that I 
 could mention what had passed to you. And that I did not 
 doubt, that the motives of his proposal, whatever might be 
 thought of the proposal itself, would be acceptable to the Presi- 
 dent. He requested me to say to you, that although the neces- 
 sary bills would be proposed, and would pass in Parliament, ac- 
 cording to their first project of a duty, yet that the alteration 
 above suggested, would be adopted whenever it should be 
 known that it would be agreeable to us. 
 
 " I must not trouble you with any reflections upon this con- 
 versation, but it is my duty to say, that although Mr. C.'s man- 
 ner was extremely conciliatory, not a word escaped him to en- 
 courage a hope, that the Orders in Councirwould be in any de- 
 gree abandoned, or that I should gain any thing by urging a re- 
 consideration of them. I threw out some intimations with that 
 tendency, but soon perceived that it could not be useful to fol- 
 low them up. I have the honor to be," Sec. 
 
 THE following letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison is ex- 
 ceedingly favourable as to the views of the British Cabinet, 
 and their wishes to preserve a good understanding with the 
 United States. 
 
 Mr. Canning received our Embargo, it seems, with great appa^ 
 rent satisfaction, and expressed the most friendly disposition 
 towards the United States, and in the explanations which our 
 minister asked of him in that interview, as to the doubtful 
 parts of their Orders, Mr. Canning replied, " that it was their 
 " sincere wish to shew in every thing connected with the Or- 
 " ders in Council, which necessity only compelled them to 
 " adopt, their anxiety to accommodate them to the feeling* 
 " and interest of the American Government." 
 
 Compare this with the contemptuous silence of Bonaparte, and 
 Mr. Armstrong's declaration, that further solicitation would 
 be injurious. 
 
15 
 
 A letter from Mr. Pinkneij to Mr. Madison. 
 
 LONDON, JANUARY 26th, 1808. 
 
 " SIR — I had the honour to receive this morning your letter 
 of the 23d of last month, inclosing a copy of a message from the 
 President to Congress, and of their act in pursuance of it, laying 
 an Embargo on our vessels and exports. It appeared to be my 
 duty to lose no time in giving such explanations to the British 
 Government, of this wise and salutary measurers your letter 
 suggests. And accordingly I went to Downing-street imme- 
 diately, and had a short conference with Mr. Canning, who re- 
 ceived my explanations with great apparent satisfaction, and took 
 occasion to express the most friendly disposition towards our 
 country. I availed myself of this opportunity, to mention a 
 subject of some importance, connected with the late Orders in 
 Council. 
 
 " I had been told, that American vessels coming into British 
 ports under warning, could not obtain any document to enable 
 them to return to the United States, in the event of its being- 
 found imprudent, either to deposit their cargoes, or to resume 
 their original voyages, although they are not prohibited from re- 
 turning, yet as the warning is indorsed on their papers, the re- 
 turn may be hazardous, without some British documents to 
 prove compliance with it, and give security to the voyage. Mr. 
 C. took a note of what I said, and assured me that whatever was 
 necessary to give the facility in question, would be done without 
 delay ; and he added, that it was their sincere wish to shew, in 
 every thing connected with the Orders in Council, which only 
 necessity had compelled them to adopt, their anxiety to accommo- 
 date them, as far as was consistent with their object, to the feel- 
 ings and interest of the American government and people. I 
 was induced by these observations to mention and to make seve- 
 ral strong remarks upon the duty intended to be imposed on our 
 cotton when re-exported to the Continent, and the adherence to 
 the determination not to allow our vessels warned into British 
 ports, any change of destination. He told me that these sub- 
 jects (with which, however, it was evident he was very little ac- 
 quainted) should be taken into immediate consideration, and that 
 he would let me know the result. I am to have another inter- 
 view with him in the course of a few davs." 
 
 THE letter from Mr. Pinkney, which we now present to our 
 readers, is worthy of all their attention, and will excite the 
 most serious and alarming reflections. 
 
 It may be considered as the grand clue to all the conduct of our 
 administration, during the important and interesting session 
 which is now about to close. In order to understand cor- 
 
16, 
 
 rcctly, and to weigh with judgment, tlic opinions of Mr. 
 Pinkney, it may be useful to state his character, and his po- 
 litical situation, as well as the particular motives, which influ- 
 enced him to take the extraordinary and untenable ground, 
 which he has assumed in this letter. 
 
 Mr. Pinkney was originally a federalist, educated under the pa- 
 tronage of Judge Chase, and first brought into notice under 
 the administration of Washington. In the office of Commis- 
 sioner under the British treaty, in which he acted in con- 
 junction with Mr. Gore, he was so far from holding the opi- 
 nions of the present administration, that he was rather oppo- 
 sed to Mr. Gore and Col. Trumbull, on one of the most im- 
 portant questions which came before the board ; the question 
 of the Colonial Trade. Before the commission had been en- 
 tirely fulfilled, Mr. Pinkney betrayed some strong symptoms 
 of a change of politics, and, on his return to Maryland, he 
 discovered such unequivocal marks of disaffection to his old 
 friends and principles, that Mr. Jefferson was induced to no- 
 minate him to his present important office. Any man who 
 has noticed the course and conduct of political men, must 
 have remarked, that ?iew converts always manifest a zeal, pro- 
 portioned to the diffidence and distrust, which would, and 
 which does naturally arise, with respect to those who sudden- 
 ly change their political opinions. Our republic, though in 
 its infancy, has exhibited many striking examples of this na- 
 ture. 
 
 In the course of the late interesting correspondence with Great 
 Britain, the whole public and private conduct of Mr. Pinkney 
 evinces a fixed determination to retain his place ; to humour 
 and flatter the destructive whims and notions of the present 
 Administration. 
 
 In no instance has this spirit been more strikingly exhibited 
 than in the following letter. 
 
 Mr. Pinkney had learned that the unexpected and astonishing 
 change in Portugal and Spain, had excited a great and ho- 
 nourable sensibility in this country, and that our people, 
 yielding to the influence of these generous feelings, which 
 perfectly coincided not only with their own immediate in- 
 terests but with the public welfare, were extremely urgent to 
 have the intercourse with Portugal and Spain opened. 
 
 Mr. Pinkney, reasoning rather like a French Minister, than an 
 American Representative, with his eyes open only to the 
 cfl'ec;s which such a proper and noble measure would have on 
 1' ranee, rather than its operation on our own interests, or the 
 dictates of generous sympathy, combats with great zeal the 
 policy of opening our intercourse with these two gallant na- 
 tions who were struggling for their freedom. 
 
 The si nsTANCE, and indeed the only argument of weight ur- 
 ged by him is the danger of a rupture with Prance. To avoid 
 
17 
 
 this (in his mind) greatest calamity, we are to forego our own 
 rights and advantages, we are to be cold towards these as- 
 sertors of the rights of mankind, and we are to throw our- 
 selves into the humble train of the vassals of France. 
 
 Mr. Pinkney after stating that it would be more agreeable to 
 France that we should take oft" the Embargo wholly, or even 
 take it off as to Great Britain alone rather than remove it as 
 to Spain and Portugal, proceeds to eulogise the Embargo at 
 large, to prtdse the wisdom and energy of that measure, 
 which all intelligent men have now abandoned. 
 
 That Mr. Pinkney should be disposed to frame his letter so 
 as to favour the views of the Administration, will not be 
 surprising to any man who knows the circumstances of his 
 appointment. 
 
 Still, however, i'RU7'if > always unchangeable, and indeed al- 
 most omnipotent, enables us to triumph over these well con- 
 certed diplomatic manoeuvres. 
 
 Mr. Pinkney was sent to Europe as Envoy Extraordinary with 
 Mr. Munroe, in order to negotiate a Treaty. They effected 
 the object of their mission, and in a manner so satisfactory, 
 that they declared to Mr. Jefferson, and Mr. Jefferson sta- 
 ted to Congress, that " all the points in dispute were satis- 
 factorily adjusted." 
 
 The interest of France, however, forbad the ratification of this 
 Treaty, and the pretended Friend of the People, Mr. Jef- 
 ferson, ventured to do what Washington never did, nor would 
 have dared to have done, he rejected this solemn and ad- 
 vantageous Treaty on his own mere authority and opinion, 
 without submitting it to the Senate. 
 
 Mr. Pinkney's powers ceased on the signing this Treaty, and 
 when Mr. Munroe left England, he remained there not as an 
 accredited Minister, but a mere Charge des Affaires, or 
 Agent for Mr, Munroe. It was then necessary to appoint a 
 new Minister, or clothe Mr. Pinkney with powers. 
 
 In February, 1808, Mr. Jefferson nominated him merely as a 
 form, and General Bradley, and all the friends of the Pre- 
 sident in the Senate were instructed, that the appointment 
 was to be negatived, in order to relieve the President from 
 the odium and responsibility of removing a man appointed by 
 himself. 
 
 General Bradley went so far as to move an inquiry into the 
 manner in which he had executed his oftice, and obeyed 
 his instructions, with a view to negative the nomination. 
 
 In the interim, a letter was received from Mr. Pinkney, so 
 fully supporting the views, the whims and destructive notions 
 of the Cabinet, so replete with prejudice and abuse against 
 Great Britain, that the President's friends shamelessly with- 
 drew their objections and inquiries, without any avowed rea- 
 
18 
 
 son, and assented to the appointment of a man whom they 
 found quite suppliant enough, and sufficiently hostile to the 
 Government to which he was agent, to be safely trusted. 
 They knew that in such hands there was no danger of a good 
 understanding or amicable settlement with Great Britain, 
 which of all things they most dreaded. 
 
 We have too high an opinion of Mr. Pinkney's talents to be- 
 lieve these opinions to arise from any thing, but a desire to 
 please his patrons. They were the expected returns for 
 his public honours and emoluments. They were a necessary 
 sacrifice for the reputation of his patrons. 
 
 Will any man, acquainted with the state of Great Britain, be- 
 lieve him when he tells us the Embargo is deeply felt in that 
 country ; that their wheat crop had failed, or was alarming- 
 ly &/iort ! Our mercantile men know better. We know 
 that the Embargo produces no political effect in Great Bri- 
 tain, but that the first operation was the most considerable. 
 The anticipation was more serious than the reality, and eve- 
 ry day while it lessens the effect, diminishes the apprehen- 
 sion. In short, we should be obliged to let Mr. Pinkney 
 down to a low niche in the scale of understanding, if we 
 could not find a refuge for him in his desire to please his 
 poiilical patrons. 
 
 Extract of a private letter from Mr. Pinkney to Mr. Madison. 
 
 LONDON, SEPTEMBER 21, 1808. 
 
 " THE Hope arrived at Cowes from France the 13th. Not 
 having heard from Mr. Canning, although he returned to Lon- 
 don the 16th, I called again yesterday at Downing Street, and 
 was assured that the answer to my note would be sent to-night 
 or early to-morrow morning. Mr. At water will of course be 
 able to leave town on Friday, and embark on Saturday with a 
 copy of it. 
 
 44 I have been told since the arrival of the last British Packet, 
 (but do not believe it,) that there is more probability than I 
 had anticipated, that the late events in Spain and Portugal, 
 (which ought not to be considered as deciding any thing,) will 
 have an effect on public opinion in America against the conti- 
 nuance of the Embargo, and favourable to all the purposes of 
 Great Britain. If this were true, I should think it was deep- 
 ly to be lamented. I may misunderstand the subject, but I 
 cannot persuade myself that any thing that has happened on 
 this side the Atlantic, ought to induce us in any degree to re- 
 treat from our present system. If we should resolve to trade 
 With Spain and Portugal, (Great Britain and France persisting 
 their Orders and Decrees,) in any way to which Great Bri- 
 
19- 
 
 tain would not object, we must suspend the Embargo as to 
 those Countries only, or as to tbose Countries and Great Bri- 
 tain, or we must repeal it altogether. The temptation to the 
 first of these courses is, even in a commercial sense, inconsi- 
 derable — the objection to it endless. The object to be gained 
 (if no more was gained than ought to be gained) would be 
 trifling. There could indeed be no gain. An inadequate mar- 
 ket redundantly supplied, would be more injurious than no 
 market at all — it would be a lure to destruction and nothing more. 
 A suspension of the Embargo so limited in its nature as this 
 would be, (supposing it could be in fact what it could be in 
 form,) would have a most unequal and invidious operation in 
 the different quarters of the Union, of which the various com- 
 modities, would not in the ports of Portugal and Spain, be in 
 equal demand. A war with France would be inevitable — 
 and such a war, (so produced,) from which we could not hope 
 to derive either honour or advantage, would place us at the 
 mercy of Great Britain, and on that account would in the end 
 do more to cripple and humble us, than any disaster that could 
 otherwise befal us. The actual state of Spain and Portugal is 
 moreover not to be relied upon. My first opinion on that sub- 
 ject remains. But even the most sanguine Avill admit that 
 there is great room to doubt. The Emperor of France is evi- 
 dently collecting a mighty force for the reduction of Spain, and 
 Portugal must share its fate. And even if that force should be 
 destined (as some suppose) first to contend with Austria 
 — the speedy subjugation of Spain is not the less certain. If 
 France should succeed, Spain and Portugal would again fall 
 under the British Orders of November, as well as under the 
 operation of the French Decrees. Our cargoes would scarcely 
 have found their way to the ocean in search of the boasted mar- 
 ket, before they would be once more in a state of prohibition, 
 and we should in the meantime have incurred the scandal of 
 suffering an improvident thirst of gain to seduce us from our 
 principles into a dilemma presenting no alternative but loss in 
 all the senses of the word. 
 
 " But it is not even certain, what Great Britain would herself 
 finally say to such a partial suspension of the embargo. She 
 would doubtless a.tjirsl approve of it. But her ultimate course 
 (especially if war between France and the United States, were 
 not the immediate consequence, or if the measure were even- 
 tually less beneficial to herself, than might be supposed at the 
 outset) ought not to be trusted. That she should approve at 
 first, is hardly to be questioned, and the considerations upon 
 which she would do so, are precisely those which should dis- 
 suade us from it. Some of these are — .the aid it would afford 
 to her allies, as well as to her own troops co-operating with 
 them, and its consequent tendency to destroy every thing like 
 system in our conduct — its tendency to embroil us with France,. 
 
20 
 
 its tendency to induce us by overstocking a limited market, to 
 make our commodities of no value — to dissipate our capital — 
 to ruin our merchants without benefiting our agriculture — to 
 destroy our infant manufactures without benefiting our com- 
 merce — its tendency to habituate us to a trammelled trade, and 
 to fit us for acquiescence in a maritime despotism. But there 
 are other reasons — our trade with Spain and Portugal while it 
 lasted, would be a circuitous one with Great Britain and her 
 Colonies, for their benefit. Our productions would be carried 
 in the first instance to Spain and Portugal, would be bought 
 there for Biitish account, and would find their way to the West- 
 Indies or enter here, as British convenience might require, and 
 thus, in effect, the Embargo be removed as to Great Britain, 
 while it continued as to Prance, and we professed to continue it 
 as to both. And if any profits should arise from this sordid 
 traffic, they would become a fund .to enable us to import into 
 the United States, directly or indirectly, the manufactures of 
 Great Britain, and thus relieve her in another way, while her 
 Orders would prevent us from receiving the commodities of her 
 enemy. It would be far better openly to take off the Embargo 
 as to Great Britain, than Avhile affecting to continue it as to 
 that power, to do what must rescue her completely (and that 
 too, without advantage to ourselves) from the pressure of it, at 
 the same time that it would promote her views against Prance, 
 in Portugal and Spain. 
 
 As to withdrawing the embargo as to Great Britain, as well 
 as Spain and Portugal, while the British orders are unrepealed, 
 the objections to that course are just as strong now as they were 
 four months ago. The change in Spain and Portugal (if it were 
 even likely to last) cannot touch the principle of the Embargo, 
 as regards Great Britain, who reasserts her Orders of November, 
 in the very explanations of the 4th July, under which we must 
 trade with those countries, if we trade with them at all. If we 
 include Great Britain in the suspension and exclude Prance, we 
 do now what we have declined to do before, for the sake of a de- 
 lusive commerce, which may perish before it can be enjoyed, 
 and cannot in any event be enjoyed with credit, wnh advantage, 
 or even with safety. We take part at once with Great Britain 
 against France, at a time the least suited that could be imagined 
 to such a determination, at a time when it might be said we 
 were emboldened by French reverses, to do what before we 
 could not resolve upon, or even tempted by a prospect of a scan- 
 ty profit, exaggerated by our cupidity and impatience to forget 
 what was due to consistency, to character and permanent pros- 
 perity. We sanction too the maritime pretensions which insult 
 and injure us; we throw ourselves bound hand and foot upon 
 the generosity of a Government that has hitherto refused us jus- 
 tice, and all this when the affair of the Chesupcake, and a host 
 of other wrongs are unredressed, and when Great Britain has 
 
21 
 
 just rejected an overture which she must have accepted with ea- 
 gerness if, her views were not such as it became us to suspect 
 and guard against. To repeal the Embargo altogether would be 
 preferable to either of the other courses, but wouid notwith- 
 standing be so fatal to us in all respects, that we should long feel 
 the wound it would inflict, unless indeed some other expedient,* 
 as strong at least and as efficacious in all its bearings, can (as I 
 fear it cannot) be substituted in its place. War would seem to 
 be the unavoidable result of such a step. If our commerce 
 should not flourish in consequence of this measure, nothing 
 would be gained by it but dishonour. And how it could be car- 
 ried on to any valuable purpose it Avould be difficult to shew. If 
 our commerce should flourish in spite of trench and British 
 edicts, and the miserable state of the world, in spite of war with 
 France, if that should happen, it would I doubt not, be assailed in 
 some other form. The spirit of monopoly has seized the Peo- 
 ple and Government of this country. We shall not under any 
 circumstances be tolerated as rivals in navigation and trade — it is 
 in vain to hope that Great Britain will voluntarily foster the naval 
 means of the United States. All her prejudices — all her calcu- 
 lations are against it. Even as allies we should be subjects of 
 jealousy. It would be endless to enumerate in detail the evils 
 which would cling to us in this new career of vassalage and 
 meanness, and tedious to pursue our backward course to the ex- 
 tinction of that very trade to which we had sacrificed every thing 
 else. 
 
 " On the other hand if we persevere we must gain our pur- 
 pose at last. By complying with the little policy of the mo- 
 ment, we shall be lost. By a great and systematic adherence to 
 principle, we shall find the end to our difficulties. The Embar- 
 go and the loss of our trade are deeply felt here, and will be 
 felt with more severity every day — The wheal] harvest is likely 
 to be alarmingly short, and the state of the Continent will aug- 
 ment the evil. The discontents among their manufacturers 
 are only quieted for the moment by temporary causes. Cotton 
 is rising and soon will be scarce. Unfavourable events on the 
 Continent will subdue the temper unfriendly to wisdom andjus- 
 
 * "This strong measure, equally efficacious, is the present Non- 
 " Intercourse, proposed by Mr. Giles. We see how exactly the ad- 
 " vice of this supple minister has been followed. We refused to aid 
 " Spain and Portugal by taking off the Embargo as to them, and we 
 " now adopt his recammendation of a strong substitute." 
 
 f That the public may judge of Mr. Pinkney's correctness and preju- 
 dices, we would observe that flour or wheat does not exceed its average 
 price in time of war in Great Britain. The truth is, this letter, if not 
 written here and sent out to be signed by Mr. Pinkney, was designed 
 to forward the views of the President, as to keeping on the Embargo. 
 
22 
 
 tice, which now prevails here. But above all, the world will I 
 trust be convinced that our firmness is not to be shaken. Our 
 measures have not been without effect. 1'hey have not been 
 decisive, because we have not been thought capable of perseve- 
 ring in self-denial, if that can be called self-denial, which is no 
 more than prudent abstinence from destruction and dishonour. 
 
 " I ought to mention that I have been told by a most respect- 
 able American merchant here, that large quantities of such 
 woollen cloths as are prohibited by our non-importion act, have 
 been and continue to be sent to Canada, with the view of being 
 smuggled into the United States. 
 
 " I need not tell you that I am induced to trouble you with my 
 hasty reflections, because I think you stand in need of them. I 
 give them merely because I believe that you are entitled to know 
 the impressions which a public servant on this side of the water 
 receives from a view of our situation. I have the honour to be 
 with the sincerest attachment and respect, dear sir, your obe- 
 dient servant. (Signed) WILLIAM PINKNEY." 
 
REFLECTIONS 
 
 OjY THE FOREGOING INTERESTING STATE PAPERS, 
 
 THE importance and interest of the foregoing- Documents 
 are too obvious to require very elaborate remarks ; but it may- 
 be useful to state briefly the inferences which irresistibly pre- 
 sent themselves upon reading them. 
 
 The first idea, which we cannot keep back even with the 
 most charitable feelings, is the unparalleled duplicity and hy- 
 pocrisy manifested by our Government in pretending to give 
 the People the true state of their diplomatic intercourse with 
 foreign nations, while facts vastly more important than any 
 heretofore published, were knowingly suppressed. 
 
 This duplicity is enhanced beyond belief, by the knowledge 
 that while the Government pretended to give some Documents 
 as professed extracts, and others as whole and entire letters, 
 these latter were in fact as mutilated as the former, and we are 
 now enabled to give the public whole pages which are to be in- 
 serted in letters heretofore published as pe\fectly complete. 
 
 2dly. That while the Government have been passing reso- 
 lutions, and adopting or rather proposing measures leading to 
 War, while they have called upon the people to su/i/iort them 
 in these most serious measures, and while they have deluded 
 a small part of the citizens into expressions of approbation, and 
 into declarations that both the belligerents have given us equal 
 cause of complaint, it turns out that the most interesting facts, 
 the most insulting and injurious conduct of the Emperor of 
 France, have been suppressed, and the most pacific expres- 
 sions and friendly explanations of Great Britain have been with- 
 held — with what views let the public decide. 
 
 3dly. That Gen. Armstrong, our Minister at Paris, advised, 
 and long ago expected measures of resistance and hostility to 
 France — that he declared, that we were considered a wordy 
 and windy nation, which did not dare proceed beyond resolu- 
 tions, and that our Embargo was wholly ineffectual as to its ob- 
 jects. 
 
 Lastly. It is apparent, that if our people have been so roused, 
 so convinced of the partiality and hypocrisy of the Administra- 
 tion in consequence of the glimmering of light which was per- 
 mitted to escape through the mutilated dispatches before pub- 
 
24 
 
 lished, through the speeches of our patriotic members of Con- 
 gress, and the commentaries upon the public Documents here- 
 tofore given to the public, their indignation could hardly have 
 been restrained, if this whole irresistible torrent of light had 
 been at once darted forth upon their astonished and affrighted 
 minds. 
 
 In addition to the evidence thus reluctantly extorted and 
 finally obtained without the consent of the Administration, of 
 their devotion to France, the whole correspondence proves be- 
 yond a question, that Mr. Armstrong was never in the con- 
 fidence of Mr. Jefferson — that he never entered into his views 
 perfectly, and that the real intercourse has been carried on 
 either through Monsieur Turreau, or some private confidential 
 agent. The sending out Mr. Coles, the President's private 
 Secretary, is very strong corroborative evidence of what the 
 Documents themselves would lead us almost necessarily to 
 presume. 
 
 One single reflection will occur to every thinking and consi- 
 derate man, that if our exertions to resist the corrupt and de- 
 structive course of Administration were heretofore thought ne- 
 cessary, the present documents prove them to be doubly im- 
 portant. If those exertions have been heretofore crowned with 
 signal success, we ought not to doubt that our reward will in 
 future be not less abundant or satisfactory. 
 
 FLATBUSH, (^V. Y.) 
 PRINTED MARCH 4, 1809. 
 
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