% & 'A 
 
 
 
 
 *^ oV^Ha : ** oV * ;£Smz*\ *++j 
 
 
 °o * 
 
 .cr « 
 
 
 
 4°+ 
 
 \ ***** * J 
 
 -s!*^ 
 
 * 4 r> 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 • * 
 
 V.^ 
 
 ■a ^ r ,* ** ^ - 
 
 
 
 

 4?\ 
 
 +*o« 
 
 . (i ? ^ *.<wfc- y% V?3W /\ 
 
 
 % «* /ate: v^.-aKt w .»»\/ 
 
 
 vV% 
 
 >bK 
 
THE PROBLEMS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 COMING PEACE 
 
 By 
 FELIX MLYNARSKI, Ph. D. 
 
 Delegate of the Polish Supreme National Committee to America 
 
 New York 
 POLISH BOOK IMPORTING CO., Inc. 
 
 1916 
 
J\6 IQ 
 
 MS 
 
 Copyright, 1916 
 By FELIX MLYNARSKI 
 
 P 
 
 7 
 
 MAY 27 1916 
 ©CU431248 
 
 "7^ / 
 
THE PROBLEMS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 COMING PEACE 
 
Some of the other works of the Author: 
 
 Sociology and Epistemology" 
 
 Jaroslav, 1910, 312 pp. 
 
 c t 
 
 l i 
 
 The Problem of the Policy of State 
 Independence" 
 (A Study in the Theory of Politics) 
 
 Lemberg, 1911, 211 pp. 
 
 The Principles of Social Philosophy" 
 
 Vol. I (in print) 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
 
 I. — Introduction 9 
 
 II. — The Turkish Question 19 
 
 III. — The Part of Austria-Hungary 57 
 
 IV. — The Future of Warsaw . 91 
 
 V. — The Causes of the War 14 1 
 
 VI.— The Peace Tribunal 162 
 
Chapter I 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter I. — Introduction 
 
 There are two examples in history which could be 
 compared with the present European war. They are: the 
 struggle between Rome and Carthago and the war of Eng- 
 land against Napoleon. The ancient Carthago is the England 
 of our day; Rome of yore is the present Germany. These 
 were the wars of the greatest power on land with the great- 
 est power on the seas. Only the conflagration of Carthago, 
 when its walls crumbled under the pressure of the Roman 
 legions and centuries later the burning down of Moscow, 
 the smoking ruins of which broke Napoleon's sword, can 
 be compared with the political importance of the present 
 war. This war has deep reasons, employs frightful means, 
 and it is bound to yield most important results. 
 
 No comparison in history can be found for the way in 
 which the present war is conducted. No longer armies 
 are facing each other as was the case in former years, but 
 entire nations are lined up against each other in battle array. 
 No longer thousands are fighting, but millions. There is 
 no longer such a thing as a decisive battle in which one 
 attack is able to crush the enemy. The present efforts pre- 
 sent something rather superhuman ; the individual becomes 
 drowned in the mass of armies of millions of men, having no 
 possibility of overlooking battles fought over hundreds of 
 miles and lasting for months. The soldier becomes an ant 
 rather than an eagle. His consciousness does not seem to 
 exceed the consciousness of a cell in the midst of an organ- 
 ism. The heroism of the individual decreases while the 
 
— 10 — 
 
 heroism of a nation grows proportionately; the individual 
 character plays only a secondary part, while the weight of 
 the national character increases in importance. Not armies 
 but entire nations have entrenched for the last year and 
 deluge each other with fire. Above them all the aeroplane 
 has spread its wings and has been pressed into regular army 
 service. On the seas the submarine has come to the front 
 and changed the technique of naval warfare. Thus, the two 
 supreme triumphs of human ingenuity, the conquest of the 
 air and the conquest of the deep seas, were first enlisted 
 as weapons of wholesale murder before they could serve 
 purposes of human happiness. 
 
 The sacrifices caused by the present war are enormous. 
 The first nine months have cost the warring nations five 
 millions in killed and wounded, not including those who were 
 taken prisoners.* During the same period the expenditures 
 of the principal warring nations amounted to $12,000,000,- 
 OOO.f Thousands of villages and cities were reduced to 
 ruins; all that were spared by the artillery fire were de- 
 stroyed by trench digging; these were the traces which 
 the hurricane of war left behind when it swept the country- 
 side. Famine, misery, contagious diseases followed the 
 warring armies as jackals follow a caravan. The prosperity 
 of nations which were leaders in civilizatory work has been 
 ruined ; ruined was also the happiness of millions of families 
 from whom the war tore away father, husband and brother. 
 Who will tell how many tears have been shed? Who will 
 describe the suffering and the agony? 
 
 The world is horror stricken. 
 
 * According to the estimates of Senator Henri La Fontaine of 
 Brussels, Chairman of the International Peace Union. 
 
 t According to the estimates of the British Prime Minister, 
 Asquith. 
 
— 11 — 
 
 The consciousness of responsibility for the present war 
 grows every day. Slogans of the liberty of nations and per- 
 manent peace appeared on the banners of the warring armies. 
 According to the general opinion, this is perhaps the last 
 act of the human tragedy — to some extent, a "war against 
 war itself."* The idea of peace, but of permanent peace, be- 
 comes slowly something positive. It ceases to be an idea 
 and begins to acquire the form of an actual political goal. 
 The world begins to feel the weight of its own guilt; the 
 majesty of humanity requires some kind of satisfaction. 
 Human society begins to look for a guarantee that this 
 frightful orgy of blood shall not again be repeated. Should 
 war always remain the supreme manifestation of the life of 
 nations just as the death of an individual is the supreme 
 manifestation of his life? Is the heroism of labor going to 
 outweigh, on the scale of history, the heroism of war? 
 
 The present war is immense, but the coming peace must 
 exceed it in its immensity. 
 
 The condition of the coming peace must be the principle 
 of justice. This principle, however, is denied by those, who 
 by their actions prove that according to their opinion the 
 coming peace has to be based on the fact of physical victory. 
 The shadow of every victory is a defeat of the vanquished 
 party, and the resonance of defeat is the thirst for revenge. 
 Justice alone can mitigate this danger and, therefore, the 
 idea of justice can be the only permanent basis for a future 
 peace treaty. The defeat of Austria at Sadowa in 1866 did 
 not sow the seed for a desire for revenge because Bismarck 
 did not take advantage in a brutal way of the physical victory 
 of Prussia, but he limited himself to negotiating a just 
 peace. Austria lost at that time Venice to Italy, and this was 
 
 * E. Vanderwelde. 
 
— 12 — 
 
 in conformity with the theory of nationality which was the 
 tendency of the history of these days. Austria, however, 
 did not lose an inch of her territory to Prussia. The result 
 of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 was different. 
 Prince Bismarck basing himself on the fact of physical 
 victory exploited peace to the disadvantage of France. Ger- 
 many has occupied not only the portion of Lorraine which 
 was nearest Germany in spirit, but has also occupied Alsace, 
 which showed a marked political inclination towards France. 
 A huge contribution of war did not fail to increase the spirit 
 of animosity ; all these elements were the seeds of the com- 
 ing war of revenge. The entire policy of France and the 
 education of the young generation was conceived and de- 
 veloped from this ultimate point of view of revenge against 
 Germany. The fruits that grew from these seeds are ripen- 
 ing in the present conflagration. This example is frightful 
 enough to prove the correctness of the contention that only 
 just peace can be a permanent peace. No permanent peace 
 can be based on blind hatred, on the brutal fact of physical 
 superiority; and, thus, the saving of humanity from the 
 disaster of war can, just as permanent peace, be brought 
 about only by the principle of justice. 
 
 An army can be defeated, but a nation which consciously 
 and bravely goes to war cannot be defeated. A soldier dies 
 on the field of glory, the sword breaks, the rifle in the dying 
 hand does not send out any longer the deadly lead, but the 
 elements of heroism as far as they manifest themselves in 
 heroic acts cannot perish, because they are immortal. They 
 cannot disappear in the conflagration, nor can they be 
 drowned in the deluge of shrapnel. They must outlive the 
 defeat and become the songs of hatred for the future gen- 
 erations, and the flags of future war for revenge. Both 
 parties in the present war are guilty of wholesale murder, 
 
— 13 — 
 
 but on the other hand, both parties, and not only one of them, 
 have to be credited with boundless heroism ; both sides can 
 claim for themselves a capital of heroism and national en- 
 thusiasm. The Germans have astonished the entire world 
 with their smashing march through Belgium and northern 
 France, but France also will have a source of eternal national 
 pride in the battle of the Marne. Amazing are the victories 
 of the allied German and Austro-Hungarian armies over 
 Russia, in the eastern theatre of war, but still Russia too 
 can boast of a series of successes in the beginning of the 
 war. All nations which hitherto led Europe in civilization 
 are ablaze with war-like spirit. The heroism that these 
 nations displayed in a sufficient number of cases insures 
 these nations against eventual downfall and decay ; national 
 honor is safe since it covered itself with new laurel of 
 glory. No Joffre and no Hindenburg shall ever be able to 
 destroy it ; this national honor is a weapon which shall sur- 
 vive even the ultimate defeat, and it shall continue to be 
 sharpened in the arsenal of national life for the future 
 war of revenge in case one of the warring parties should 
 brutally take advantage of her physical victory and thus 
 create in the other nation the feeling of injury. Let us 
 beware of all illusions. The Germans will never be able to 
 destroy France, the beautiful; nor Britain, the proud; nor 
 Russia, the resourceful. It would be, furthermore, rather 
 naive to think that Germany can be smashed and annihilated 
 as one of the leading powers of the world. Not even Na- 
 poleon was able to destroy Germany, and Joffre certainly 
 is not a Napoleon ; in the same way, Hindenburg shall never 
 be able to crush any of the nations which are fighting to- 
 day against Germany. The armies of the one or the other 
 of the warring sides may and undoubtedly will be defeated, 
 but the nations are not going to suffer defeat. The fighting 
 
— 14 — 
 
 power of the army may burst, but the force of the national 
 consciousness shall never break, particularly after going 
 through the hardening process of this gigantic struggle. 
 The defeated armies will take the honor, the tradition of 
 accomplished feats of heroism home with them, and this will 
 give them the possibility of a speedy regeneration after 
 defeat. This is a fact of most decisive importance, because 
 it determines the ability of preparing for revenge should the 
 future treaty of peace be a treaty of brutality and injury to 
 any of the two sides. 
 
 The problem of permanent peace requires that the idea of 
 physical victory should yield before the idea of justice. 
 Therefore, neither the hatred against England nor the hatred 
 against Germany can form the basis for mutual concessions 
 and demands. Hatred is nothing else but a form of moral 
 blindness, and blindness can never lead political wisdom. 
 Blindness bears errors, and an error can never be a substitute 
 for truth. Hatred, moreover, is a powerful breeder of lies, 
 and nothing undermines national health as much as an orgy 
 of lies. This is a weapon which is no less deadly to the in- 
 terests of civilization than the firearms, and the barbarism 
 of lying is one of the greater, if not the greatest barbarism. 
 The program of future peace must be free from this method 
 of fighting. Truth and actualities must be the slogans of 
 just peace; this is the only way to be taken in order that the 
 interests of humanity could dominate over the selfishness of 
 states and nations. 
 
 Over the window in the large meeting room of the Peace 
 Palace at The Hague, the following inscription can be read : 
 
 "Si vis pacem, para iustitiam" 
 
 Let us hope that the victory in this frightful war will be 
 the victory of the idea of justice. It is possible that the 
 
— 15 — 
 
 future peace congress, which will sit as a tribunal over the 
 sufferings of nations and which will construct the founda- 
 tion for the history of the twentieth century, will meet in 
 this very room of the Peace Palace at The Hague. Let us 
 hope that when the peace congress disbands the world will 
 be able to exclaim: 
 
 "Glory be to the humanity and peace to the nations of 
 good will." 
 
Chapter II 
 THE TURKISH QUESTION 
 
— 19 — 
 Chapter II. — The Turkish Question 
 
 The present European war was started for the sake of the 
 freedom of nations. The permanence of future peace must 
 also be based on the same principle. This, however, is a 
 difficult and tangled question with regard to its just solution. 
 
 In the beginning of October of last year, the British Prime 
 Minister Asquith proclaimed the principle that ''the weak 
 have rights and that the strong have duties."* This, how- 
 ever, did not prevent England from joining hands a month 
 later, in November, with France and Russia for the purpose 
 of destroying the independence of Turkey, in spite of the 
 fact that Turkey was and still is "weak." The present 
 European war is conducted in the name of the liberty of na- 
 tions, nevertheless, the partition of Turkey for the purpose of 
 destroying its liberty has been decided upon. There must 
 be, therefore, some tragic misunderstanding in the entire 
 matter. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the world fails to understand Turkey 
 as a nation. Turkey is not a European nation ; different 
 historical elements were active in making up Turkey. Tur- 
 key is the last wave which the Islam has thrown on the 
 shore of Europe. Turks were the same element in the 
 Balkans as the Arabs were in Spain ; the Turks have se- 
 lected the shorter road to Europe which was in vain tried 
 by the Arabs; this road led through Constantinople, which 
 was the capital of the Eastern Roman empire and which 
 survived, while the migration of nations destroyed Rome it- 
 self. The idea of the Roman empire, the "Holy Empire," 
 was since so much more identified in the eyes of the Asiatic 
 nations with the throne of the Sultans of Constantinople. 
 The day when Constantinople fell was an epoch in the 
 
 * Speech of October 3, 1914. 
 
— 20 — 
 
 history of the Islam, which thus conquered the crown of 
 Constantine the Great. The traditions of Rome and those 
 of Mecca became thus united and the conceptions of the 
 Khali f and of Csesar amalgamated themselves in the political 
 consciousness of the Asiatic masses and began to form a 
 close historical relationship. A racial relationship, however, 
 was close enough not to hamper these processes. 
 
 The Turks were very well aware of the charm which this 
 imperial crown had for the people of Asia. Soliman the 
 Magnificent assumed the title of Emperor and denied the 
 right of this title to Charles V, although in the latter's do- 
 mains the sun was never setting. "His successors were once 
 preceded through the streets of Constantinople by twelve of- 
 ficers bearing straws aloft, a faint semblance of the consular 
 fasces that had escorted Quintius or Fabius through the 
 Roman forum."* This was in the middle of the sixteenth 
 century, or, in other words, almost a thousand years after 
 the downfall of Rome in the West, and fifteen hundred years 
 after the victory of Caesar over Pompeius at Pharsalia. Asia 
 has recognized the new condition of things ; in her eyes this 
 incident meant nothing else but a change of the dynasty 
 on the throne of the emperors. There was even triumph and 
 rejoicing over the fact that the Islam, the child of Asia, was 
 able to get a hold of the imperial purple. From then on 
 Constantinople became still more holy, because it became the 
 ''garden of the Khalif." The importance of Turkey as a 
 state grew immensely; the Sultan was, prior to the con- 
 quest of Constantinople, only the "shadow of the Prophet." 
 In Constantinople the glory of the imperial crown fell on 
 the Sultan's head and in this new character of its majesty, 
 
 * James Bryce : "The Holy Roman Empire," page 421, New York, 
 the Macmillan Company, 191 1. 
 
— 21 — 
 
 Turkey, situated on the shore of Europe, survived the en- 
 tire period of modern history. 
 
 Needless to say, this did not fail to have influence and 
 deep effect on the political consciousness of the Asiatic 
 masses. All those who are familiar with the conditions on 
 the Asiatic continent are well aware of the fact that the 
 Sultan even in our day is not only the Khalif, but also the 
 "shadow of Rome" for the people of Western Asia.* When, 
 during the Balkan war, a rumor reached Asia that the Bul- 
 garians had entered Constantinople, it seemed for a while 
 that complete anarchy and ruin would sweep Turkey from 
 the surface of the globe. The victorious battle on the 
 Tjataldja lines which was won by the Turks saved not only 
 Constantinople as a strategical point, but also saved the 
 Turkish state in Asia and insured its. existence as the con- 
 tinuation of the empire of Rome. Soon another triumph 
 came to the Turks, the retaking of Adrianople, which con- 
 tained the tombstones of the first European Sultans. Thus, 
 the prestige of Turkey was saved from destruction and once 
 more the "shadow of Rome'' was victorious. The peace 
 treaty of Bucharest did not kill Turkey as a state, but healed 
 it, because it solved the problem of nationalities in the Bal- 
 kans. Since this problem of nationalities in the Balkan penin- 
 sula became exclusively a Bulgaro-Serbo-Greek problem, 
 Turkey has to some extent ceased to be a European country 
 notwithstanding the fact that Constantinople still lies on 
 the European side of the Bosporus. Turkey can be wounded 
 mortally only by losing Constantinople, because this would 
 be at the same time a blow to the political consciousness of 
 Asiatic Turkey, and because it would destroy the synthesis 
 of the Khalifat and of the Caesarian purple of the Sultan. 
 The Turkish state was based on this very synthesis and can- 
 
 * "Turkey in Europe and Asia," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 11 
 
— 22 — 
 
 not do without it; it is, therefore, necessary to kill first the 
 ''shadow of Rome" before killing Turkey. 
 
 Previous to the Turks' entering Constantinople, the latter 
 had been the seat of eastern Asiatic — Christian separatism 
 and thus became the seat of the schism, and the forming 
 place of the Oriental Church. At the head of this Church 
 was the patriarch of Constantinople, and just as there were 
 two Roman emperors for a while, there were now two popes ; 
 one of them was the legal successor of St. Peter, while the 
 other one resided closer to Palestine, the cradle of Chris- 
 tianity. One of them prevailed in the West, while the other 
 held sway over the East. It was in itself the same historical 
 process, the combination of the cosmopolitan Christianity, 
 with a universal Roman empire. The idea of the "world- 
 church" and the idea of a "world-state" completed each 
 other, both in the West and in the East. The division which 
 sprang from this was only a division of territory in the con- 
 ception of the "Holy empire," and not a division of the idea 
 itself. In theory this process was the same, but as far as its 
 results are concerned, the break proved to be a deeper one. 
 The Orient has never questioned the priority of the imperial 
 crown before the mitre of the patriarch. In the West the 
 papal tiara struggled against the imperial crown for priority 
 of the "spiritual sword" before the "lay sword." The east- 
 ern patriarch was the shadow of the emperor."* In the 
 West the Roman emperor had to make pilgrimages from 
 time to time to the papal Canossa. When Rome fell, yielding 
 to the flood of the migration of nations, the papacy was able 
 to substitute the glory of the papal tiara for that of the 
 imperial crown; Odoaker succeeded in liquidating the ma- 
 terial side of the western Roman empire, but the charm 
 
 * James Bryce, 1. c, page 338. 
 
— 23 — 
 
 exercised by the idea of this empire was stronger than all 
 the invasions of the barbarian nations. This charm was so 
 strong that even Bonifatious VIII, in 1300, when thousands 
 of pilgrims assembled in Rome for the famous jubilee year, 
 appeared before the people wearing a crown on his head, 
 a sword attached to his side, and a sceptre in hand, and 
 publicly spoke from the height of the papal throne, "I am 
 Caesar — I am Emperor."* Under these conditions a peace 
 between the tiara of the popes and the crown of the re- 
 established Roman Empire could never be a permanent one, 
 and, therefore, the struggle between the empire and the 
 papacy was the main characteristic feature of the Middle 
 Ages in Europe. On different occasions the pope in the 
 name of obedience to God publicly demanded the people 
 to disobey emperors and kings. The result of this was the 
 defeat of the papacy, and the political expression of it was 
 the creation of a modern state, which gave birth to all the 
 European nations. All these elements, however, which were 
 the source of the emancipation of European states and na- 
 tions, did not exist in the East and, hence, the European 
 nations are so different from the states and nations of the 
 Orient. 
 
 This is to a certain extent a paradox, but it still contains 
 a lot of truth — that the Islam in its political psychology was 
 closer to Constantinople than western or central Europe. 
 The Islam was primarily a religious movement, from which 
 emanated subsequently political configurations such as 
 Arabia, at first, then Turkey, until finally all of them united 
 under the sceptre of the Sultans of Constantinople. The 
 emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire was not only a sov- 
 ereign of the state, but was at the same time the head of the 
 
 * James Bryce, 1. c, page 109. 
 
— 24 — 
 
 Orthodox Church. The Sultan, on the other hand, was not 
 only the head of the Moslem Church but also of the Moslem 
 state. In the first case the state was older than the Orthodox 
 Church, in the second case again the militant Moslem Church 
 was older than the Turkish state. This was, however, only 
 a difference of age and not a difference in structure. In 
 both cases the church organization was a component part of 
 the state and remained so. The Church was the state, or 
 the state was the Church. The Orient did not go through 
 the experience of the struggle between the Church and the 
 state, and this fact is the basic feature of the political history 
 of the Orient. 
 
 The traditions of Constantinople were preserved until our 
 day by Turkey in Asia and by Russia in Eastern Europe. 
 Russia has taken from Constantinople its religion and the 
 form of state organization. Until our day, the Czar ap- 
 points the Oberprokurator of the Holy Synod, who is the 
 chief of the religious life of Russia ; the Sultan appoints the 
 Sheik-Ul-Islam, who is the chief of the religious life of 
 Turkey. The Turkish Church and the Orthodox Church 
 have essentially the same political character, because they 
 both were influenced by Constantinople. The lay power 
 regulates from the height of the throne the religious life of 
 the country, and the Church is the spine of the state. "The 
 Russians who are as much a religious as a political com- 
 munity, carry with them over the vast space of Northern 
 and Central Asia the traditions of an Empire conterminous 
 with the Church, an Empire which is at once the offspring 
 and the guardian of the Orthodox faith."* This is the 
 characteristic feature which differentiates Russia from Eu- 
 rope and brings the former closer to Asia.f Europe was 
 
 * James Bryce, 1. c, page 351. 
 
 f "The Eastern Question," page 4, Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 
 
— 25 — 
 
 brought up in the traditions of Rome, while Russia, the 
 Balkan Peninsula and Asia were brought up in the traditions 
 of Constantinople. If the Russian nation already is so much 
 different from the rest of Europe, there is hardly any rea- 
 son why one should wonder that the Turks are so much 
 more different. No one can say that Russia is not a na- 
 tion, although her civilization is so much different from the 
 civilization of Europe, its origin being exclusively Con- 
 stantinople and not Rome. In the same way nobody can 
 say that Turkey is not a nation, although Turkey was the 
 result of historical conditions entirely different from ours. 
 Another fact is to be credited to Turkey, and this is that 
 the Islam has brought a portion of the creative elements into 
 the civilization of the world in spite of the fact that the 
 activity of the Islam traveled over the deserts of Asia and 
 Africa, and not over the fertile grounds of Europe. The 
 Arabian schools in Spain have enabled Europe to absorb the 
 teaching of Aristotle. The Islam has not only burned down 
 the library of Alexandria, but it also made public the philos- 
 ophy of Averroes. St. Thomas of Aquinas based his 
 philosophy on the system of Aristotle, and he is the one who 
 represents the acme of the scholastical philosophy. Tur- 
 key absorbed and digested the entire spiritual products of 
 the Islam. It is erroneous to judge Turkey by our standards. 
 It cannot be concealed that Turkey never learned how to do 
 civilizatory work on a larger, world-embracing scale, but 
 this does not mean that Turkey has ceased to develop as 
 a nation. Nowadays the Turkish nation stands armed to 
 the teeth and fights for the maintenance oi its independence. 
 Under the walls of Constantinople the Turks fight better 
 to-day than at Kumanovo, or Lule Burgas in the last Balkan 
 war. The soldiers of France, of England and of Russia 
 are certainly not inferior to the Serbian, Bulgarian and 
 
— 26 — 
 
 Greek soldiers, but the Turks nowadays fight for the defence 
 of the principle of nationality and not against it, as they did 
 in the Balkan war, because they fight for their own inde- 
 pendence. This is the reason why Turkey proved to be so 
 weak from the point of view of imperialistic policy, and still 
 shows to-day enough strength, health, enthusiasm, sacrifice, 
 and heroism from the point of view of nationality. The 
 Turkey of to-day is young, progressive, constitutional, eager 
 to be regenerated, and triumphant over the internal des- 
 potism. During the short breathing spells in this frightful 
 war, when the roar of guns subsides for a while, the con- 
 science of the world must be confronted by the question 
 whether the present European war is in fact a war for 
 freedom and equal rights for all nations ? 
 
 The main adversary of Turkish independence is Russia. 
 It has been an old dream of Peter the Great to gain for 
 Russia an estuary on the Mediterranean. Catherine the 
 Second strained all the resources of her country in order 
 to bring Russia closer to the realization of this dream. This 
 was the so-called "Greek Project," Russia being the incarna- 
 tion of the "Greek Church," and as such considering herself 
 a lawful heir to the inheritance that could be left by the 
 Turks at Constantinople. "Professing the creed of Con- 
 stantinople, Russia claims the crown of the Eastern 
 Caesars."* This is a statement of a historian and politician 
 of the importance of James Bryce, the former Ambassador 
 of Great Britain to the United States. The Orthodox faith 
 has anteceded the Turks in Constantinople, and Russia is 
 bent at present dn wresting the sceptre of the Caesars out 
 of the hands of the Islam. This is the struggle between the 
 Islam and the Orthodox faith for the inheritance of Rome 
 
 James Bryce, 1. c., page 421. 
 
— 27 — 
 
 in Asia. Islam is in the defensive, the Orthodox faith is 
 the attacking party. As a program, this is only a variation 
 of imperialism and not of nationality. The idea of religion 
 is the determining factor of Russian ambition. Russia does 
 not have any other points of attack, neither from the histori- 
 cal nor the legal point of view. Constantinople was never 
 a part of Russia and the Turk ruled on the Bosporus for 
 nearly five hundred years. The conquest of Constantinople 
 was once upon a time the triumph of Turkish imperialism ; 
 the conquest of Constantinople by Russia would mean the 
 triumph of Russian imperialism. No illusion of any kind 
 should be entertained as to the terms of permanent peace 
 when considering conscientiously, justly and with a spirit 
 of responsibility. 
 
 The general belief of the world is that Russia is prompted 
 mainly by economical reasons. In case of war Russian 
 commerce suffers undoubtedly through the closing of the 
 Straits of Constantinople. The Dardanelles is the only route 
 of export from the Black Sea and the south of Russia, where 
 the latter country's agricultural life is concentrated, and 
 where she keeps her huge stores of corn grown in Podolia 
 and Ukraina. The exportation of oil mined in the enormous 
 wells of Caucasus, particularly the exportation from Batum 
 and Noworossiysk, is made over the same route through the 
 Bosporus and the Dardanelles. Four and a half thousand 
 ships of a combined tonnage of 7,000,000 tons carry the 
 merchandise over the Black Sea within one year. Owing 
 to this fact the harbor of Constantinople is one of the largest 
 ports of the globe, and can be compared with London, Ant- 
 werp and Hamburg. It is sufficient to state that the tonnage 
 of ships which, during 1913, entered and cleared at Constan- 
 tinople exceeded the gross tonnage of 17,000,000 tons.* 
 
 * "The Statesman's Year-book," Macmillan & Co., London, 191 5. 
 
— 28 — 
 
 This, however, does not alter the facts. In times of peace 
 the Straits are open to Russian merchant ships ; the question 
 of passage in times of war, to which Russia is not a party, is 
 a question of the freedom of the seas and Straits for neutral 
 vessels, and is by no means the question of tearing away by 
 force a right, resting with somebody else. The closing of 
 the Straits not only harms Russian commerce, but it also 
 harms American commerce. But does this constitute a title 
 for the United States to take Constantinople away from the 
 Turks ? This would be a reductio ad absardiim. The dam- 
 ages suffered by the Russian commerce are by far greater 
 and by far more harmful, but this only gives more right to 
 Russia to try to obtain regulation by treaty of the question 
 of the freedom of the seas and Straits for neutral vessels in 
 times of war. The program that Russia chose was a differ- 
 ent one; it was the program of imperialism. Russia does 
 not care about safeguarding by treaties the principle of free- 
 dom of the seas and of the Straits to neutral vessels, but it 
 tries to occupy Constantinople in order to close it up still 
 more tightly and fortify it for her own benefit and to the 
 detriment of other countries. This endeavor Russia calls 
 her "historical mission" — the religious mission of the tsarate. 
 This, however, cannot conceal the fact that this is a program 
 of conquest and expansion, a program of imperialism, and it 
 is, therefore, in contradiction with the program of the 
 present war. 
 
 The Russian imperialism manifested itself as soon as an 
 Anglo-French fleet approached Constantinople. Elated over 
 the first triumphs of the Russian arms in Armenia, Goremy- 
 kin, the prime minister of Russia, publicly declared in the 
 Duma that the "historical future of Russia acquires more 
 distinct outlines over there on the shores of the Black Sea, 
 and at the walls of Constantinople." This happened on July 
 
— 29 — 
 
 9, 1915.* Members of the Duma of all political parties joined 
 in supporting the prime minister. The leader of the Opposi- 
 tion, MilukofT, a member of the Kadet Party, expressed his 
 positive conviction that the "reaching of the main goal, viz., 
 the Straits and Constantinople, shall in proper time be se- 
 cured by diplomatic means as well as military action." 
 Savienko was applauded for the phrase that — "this great 
 and brilliant achievement is worth living, fighting, and dy- 
 ing for." Their reactionary member, Levaszoff, did not 
 betray any doubt that "the shield of Russia should be at- 
 tached to the gates of Constantinople and that the Orthodox 
 cross should once more shine over the St. Sophia." The 
 utterances of the press and at public meetings were no less 
 bold and explicit than the speeches of the members of the 
 Duma. According to the "statement of the program," which 
 was read off by F. Aristoff, at a Slav reunion in Moscow,f 
 the consequences of the present war "should be the extend- 
 ing of the Russian territory to its natural geographical and 
 strategical boundary, including annexation of Armenia with 
 an estuary to the Mediterranean opposite the Island of 
 Cyprus, the Straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, to- 
 gether with Constantinople." Prince Eugene Troubetzkoy 
 expressed himself without any "strategical" circumlocutions 
 that the "idea of St. Sophia is the idea of a Christian Uni- 
 versal Empire."| Is there any need for more proofs that 
 the question of Constantinople is the question of imperialism 
 with Russia? Kinglake very justly estimated the political 
 psychology of Russia, when he stated years ago that "the 
 statesmen of St. Petersburg have always understood the 
 
 * Reports of the Russian press of the meetings of the Duma. 
 
 t "Gazeta Warszawska," January, 191 5. 
 
 X "Goniec wieczorny," Warsaw, January 3, 1915. 
 
— 30 — 
 
 deep import of the change which the throne of Constantine 
 would bring with it."* 
 
 Prior to the outbreak of the Crimean war, when the 
 Russian armies crossed the Pruth, Czar Nicholas I issued a 
 manifesto in which he stated that, "It is known to all our 
 faithful subjects that the defence of the Orthodox religion 
 was from time immemorial the vow of our glorious fore- 
 fathers.'^ In reply to the intervention of England and 
 France, when the Crimean war had already become a fact, 
 Czar Nicholas I proclaimed in a second manifesto that "Rus- 
 sia fights not for the things of this world, but for the Faith 
 — for the Orthodox faith. But Russia will not alter her 
 divine mission. "J Both manifestoes were read in the churches 
 all over the empire. This mission, understood in that way, 
 has created the conception of the "Holy Russia" as a coun- 
 terpart of the idea of the "Holy Empire." The imperialism 
 obtained the sanction of the religion ; Constantinople as "the 
 capital of the Orthodox Church" shall become the capital 
 of the holy and great Russia. The limits of the "Holy" 
 imperialism must of necessity be monstrous. Domination 
 over the Straits, as Kinglake says, "leads through the heart 
 of an empire into the midst of that world of which men 
 kindle thoughts when they speak of the TEgean and of 
 Greece, and the Jonian shores and of Palestine and Egypt 
 and of Italy and of France, and of Spain and the land of the 
 Moors, and of the Atlantic beyond, and the path of ships 
 on the ocean. "§ This scope of feverish dreams is a very 
 good description, because the limits of Rome reached in fact 
 
 • * A. W. Kinglake : "The Invasion of the Crimea," 1863, Vol. I, 
 page 62. 
 
 t A. W. Kinglake, Vol. I, page 208. 
 
 t A. W. Kinglake, ibidem, Vol. I, page 298. 
 
 § A. W. Kinglake, ibidem, Vol. I, page 57. 
 
— 31 — 
 
 as far as the frontiers of India. As a scope of immediate 
 endeavors of Russian policy, it is obviously an exaggeration. 
 But there remains, however, the reality of the enormous 
 extent of the inheritance of old Rome. Constantinople as a 
 point of departure for this inheritance opens up the road 
 even as far as Palestine. The emperors of Rome had among 
 others the title of "Protector of Palestine," and there is a 
 deep reason for the attempt of the Russians to effect an 
 insignificant landing during the present war in Jaffa. Sug- 
 gestions with regard to the occupation of Palestine can be 
 seen everywhere in the Russian press; these perspectives 
 although distant are unavoidable, because they are the direct 
 result of the inheritance from the Oriental Roman Empire. 
 The question of Jerusalem is a question of historical neces- 
 sity for Russia, at the very moment when Russia succeeds 
 in planting the double cross on the dome of St. Sophia. 
 
 In order to reach this goal, Russia did not hesitate to en- 
 list the services of a legend. The Russian people believe 
 that an Orthodox monk, who was praying in the church of 
 St. Sophia while the Turks entered Constantinople, is still 
 alive in the interior of the walls of this famous church which 
 opened miraculously to receive him. On the day when Chris- 
 tianity regains the church of St. Sophia, its walls will open 
 again and the enchanted monk will be released in order to 
 bless the victorious Czar and "Holy Russia." This is cer- 
 tainly a very clever imperialistic propaganda, because poli- 
 tics joins hands with prayer and the cross closes an alliance 
 with the sword. It is difficult to have a grudge against 
 Russia for this ambition of hers. It is sure on the other 
 hand, however, that the ambitions of Russia, no matter how 
 much hallowed by the aspergill of the Orthodox religion, 
 can't decide the development of the world. The goal of a 
 healthy and just endeavor should be : the lasting peace, the 
 
— 32 — 
 
 destruction of imperialism, and supporting the freedom of 
 countries and nations. Russia, unfortunately, does not be- 
 lieve in that ; the entire Russia believes at the bottom of her 
 heart that the conquest of Constantinople and the making 
 of the latter the capital of great and holy Russia is a goal 
 which must be reached "regardless of the results for Europe, 
 humanity, liberty, and civilization."* Still there is no need 
 to become indignant over this ambition; it does not bring 
 any dishonor to Russia, although it menaces the peace of 
 the world. The "divine mission" of Russia must rather be 
 understood than condemned. All the worldly ambitions can 
 be subordinated to the interests of humanity and even aban- 
 doned for the same reason, but "divine mission" cannot be 
 abandoned under the penalty of a sin and eternal condemna- 
 tion after death. The poor Russian Muzhik! Imbued for 
 centuries with the idea of imperialism, he is told to wait 
 eagerly under the penalty of hell for the downfall of Turkey. 
 When the Russian armies crossed the Pruth, Emperor Nich- 
 olas I spoke of this as the "divine mission of Russia." If 
 Nicholas II ever crosses the Straits, he certainly shall not 
 fail to remember the words of his great-grandfather and un- 
 doubtedly will repeat that "Russia will not alter her divine 
 mission." And why shouldn't he repeat these words, since 
 this mission is Russia's tendency for the last three centuries ? 
 Nobody ever changes a victorious policy, and only silly 
 people believe in such a possibility. Russia must, whether 
 she wants or not, when victorious, to begin to revive the tra- 
 ditions of the Eastern Roman Empire. The weight of the 
 inheritance of Rome will undoubtedly push Russia in this 
 direction, even against the will of the present or any other 
 Czar. The double cross on the dome of St. Sophia will be- 
 
 *N. Danilewskij : "Russia and Europe" (St. Petersburg, 1871). 
 (In Russian.) 
 
— 33 — 
 
 come the sign pointing toward Jerusalem. Over the roads 
 traveled by the Roman legions Russian imperialism shall 
 make its way to the frontiers of India. The question of 
 Constantinople is not only the question of the Straits, it is 
 something more than the question of simply driving the 
 Turks across the Bosporus. 
 
 The question at issue is the domination over Western 
 Asia. 
 
 In Poland, Russia is busy "annexing purely Russian ter- 
 ritory.'' Under this pretext Russia russified the district of 
 Kholm before the war and Eastern Galicia during this war. 
 In the Balkans Russia conducts a Pan-Slavic propaganda 
 which is nothing else but Pan-Russianism,* because it tends 
 to incorporate all Slavic states and nations into one organism 
 of "Greater Russia." In such a case Roumania would have 
 to fall, in order not to block the "natural" continuity of Slav 
 territory, and Greece would be thrown out of Saloniki, which 
 once upon a time was for a brief period in the hands of the 
 Slavs. In Asia, after occupying Constantinople, Russia will 
 begin at once to "annex Orthodox territory." Nicholas I 
 left an example for Nicholas II, and both have inherited the 
 program from Catherine II. The interests of the Orthodox 
 Church which just happen to originate in the shade of the 
 Basilica of St. Sophia shall play the same aggressive part 
 which they did on the eve of the Crimean war. Historical, 
 racial, and religious claims form a threefold source of Rus- 
 sian appetite and political expedience. All these elements are 
 the tools of an imperialistic policy, which is used according 
 to the needs of the moment; this is by no means degrading 
 to Russia, but it imposes the necessity of caution because the 
 seeds of imperialism were never the seeds of peace. 
 
 * Prof. Masaryk : "Zur russischen Geschichte und Religions Phi- 
 losophic" 
 
— 34 — 
 
 The defense of the independence of Turkey, and particu- 
 larly the defense of the Straits and of Constantinople, from 
 the attacks of Russia, was once a dogma of English policy. 
 The treaty of Paris which terminated the Crimean war, pro- 
 claimed this officially because it guaranteed the integrity of 
 Turkey. This was also the reason of the danger of the war 
 between England and Russia in the years 1876-1878, when 
 the Russian army stood under the walls of Constantinople 
 and the English fleet demonstratively entered the Straits, in 
 order to halt the triumphant progress of the Muscovites. 
 Since that time many things have apparently changed. In 
 Paris, Lord Palmerston defended not only the Straits but 
 even the Black Sea and the estuary of the Danube from the 
 appetite of Russia. Beaconsfield at the Congress of Berlin 
 defended only the Straits and Constantinople. Sir Edward 
 Grey in the present European war discarded not only the 
 treaty of Paris but even that of Berlin. The British army 
 and the British navy attacked Constantinople in order to turn 
 it over to Russia. The policy of Great Britain changed 
 its front and works diametrically against the program of 
 Palmerston. Those times are gone forever, when Beacons- 
 field, going to the Congress of Berlin, was greeted at every 
 railroad station in Germany by crowds of people and his 
 car was literally deluged with flowers. The "Times" was 
 elated, together with all England, that "Lord Beaconsfield's 
 journey from the German frontier to Berlin was a veritable 
 triumph. Nothing of the kind, however, for Prince Gortcha- 
 kofL"* To-day the English press speaks of the mistakes of 
 Palmerston and Beaconsfield and suggests that the govern- 
 ment of Great Britain make a present of Constantinople to 
 Russia. The enthusiasm running in this direction, or may be 
 blindness, has gone so far that the "Times" of London, an 
 
 * The "Times," London, 1878, June 14. 
 
— 35 — 
 
 organ of the Tories, representing the good old English tra- 
 ditions of policy with regard to the Oriental question has the 
 courage of printing articles in which the turning over of 
 Constantinople to Russia is considered as extremely advan- 
 tageous for England, because then Russia is going to be 
 "far more vulnerable."* The English army, and particularly 
 the English fleet, have learned by their own dire experience 
 to what extent the possession of Constantinople makes Tur- 
 key "vulnerable." Does Antwerp, occupied by Germany, 
 make the latter also "far more vulnerable" because it brings 
 Germany closer to London? It is still an open question 
 whether the program of Lord Palmerston was a "mistake." 
 This question will be settled at the outcome of the present 
 war ; but at any rate it is an astounding fact that nowadays 
 Germany is defending the program of Palmerston while 
 England seems to betray her own traditions. 
 
 England is animated by the fear for the future of the 
 Suez Canal. England occupied Egypt "for the defense of 
 the canal," when the internal troubles in the land of the 
 Nile in 1881-1882 seemed to jeopardize the safety of navi- 
 gation, f At present England seems to be under the illusion 
 that "the elimination of Turkey relieves Egypt and secures 
 communication with India."$ The idea of the defense of 
 the Suez Canal has always been a national idea of Great 
 Britain. At the time of the Congress of Berlin, the leader of 
 the Opposition, the Duke of Argyll, did not hesitate to sup- 
 port Beaconsfield in so far as the latter's policy involved the 
 principle that "England will never permit at any cost that 
 any power in Europe shall interfere with her direct access 
 
 * Sunday "Times," London, 1915, March 14. 
 
 f John Morley: "The Life of W. E. Gladstone," Book VIII, 
 page 82. 
 
 iThe "Westminster Gazette," 1915, April 16. 
 
— 36 — 
 
 to India."* Egypt protects the Suez Canal and the Suez 
 Canal forms the communication with India and Australia. 
 Deep silence reigned in the House of Lords on April 9, 1878, 
 when on the eve of the Congress of Berlin, Beaconsfield put 
 up the question to England : "Why not march armies in 
 the same way and hold Egypt and the Suez Canal in the 
 same state of trepidation as Constantinople and the Bos- 
 porus were held at that time?"f This was a hint at the 
 Russian armies, which began to descend the southern slopes 
 of Armenia. 
 
 Armenia and Egypt? 
 
 At the first glance this fear seems to be far fetched, but 
 it is real when viewed by those who are familiar with the 
 conditions. The possession of Armenia gives the control 
 over Western Asia; Erzerum and Erzingan dominate the 
 northern part of Asia Minor, and Charput and Malatia 
 control her central and southern portion. Through Bitlis 
 and along the upper part of Tiger a road leads from Armenia 
 as far as Mosul ; Mosul in turn is the gate to Mezopotamia. 
 Another road leads from Charput through Djarbekir as far 
 as Aleppo, which again is the gate to Syria. Domination 
 over Armenia and Khurdistan means the strategical domina- 
 tion over the main roads leading to Asia Minor, Mezopo- 
 tamia, and Syria. Russia is perfectly well aware of the 
 meaning of this fact ; having conquered Kars, she tries now 
 to conquer Erzerum and from there through the Khurdistan, 
 and Khilikia tries to open a window to the Mediterranean. 
 The estuary of the Russian plans in Armenia is Alexan- 
 dretta on the Bay of Iskanderun opposite the Island of Cy- 
 prus. The occupation of Cyprus by England had precisely 
 the purpose of putting the hand on the approach to Alexan- 
 
 * The "Times," London, 1878, Speech of March 17. 
 f The "Times," London, 1878. 
 
— 37 — 
 
 dretta and thus barring the Russian access to the Suez Canal. 
 Beaconsfield made the occupation of Cyprus dependent on 
 the occupation of Kars in Armenia by Russia. Without 
 excluding the sovereignty of the Sultan, England pledged 
 herself to occupy Cyprus as long as Kars shall be occupied by 
 Russia. This fact is an excellent illustration of England's 
 fear that the occupation of the roads of Armenia by Russia 
 would bring the latter, through Mosul, closer to Mezopotamia 
 and through Aleppo and Alexandretta closer to Syria and 
 Egypt. The Russian advance through Armenia against Tur- 
 key, is equal to the formation of a basis for a future advance 
 against Syria and from there, there is but one step to Egypt. 
 The future of Armenia and of Khurdistan is closely identi- 
 fied with the future of the Suez Canal. Egypt will be suffi- 
 cient for protecting the Suez Canal from Turkey, but it will 
 be inadequate to protect the latter from Russia, the moment 
 the latter enters Constantinople and breaks through the 
 natural barrier of the Armenian highlands. 
 
 England goes at present through a period of her history 
 in which she transforms her colonies into states within a 
 state. India, Canada, and Australia have already reached this 
 stage of evolution. It is now Africa's turn ; Egypt in the 
 north and Cape Town in the south form the new political 
 center on the African continent. The railroad connection 
 from Cape Town to Cairo requires an additional railroad 
 connection between Cairo and Calcutta. This plan, however, 
 requires the conquest of Mezopotamia and Arabia in order to 
 gain an immediate connection between Egypt and southern 
 Persia where, by virtue of an agreement of 1907, Russia 
 abandoned all her claims for the benefit of England, and for 
 the price of northern Persia has foregone temporarily her 
 railroad plans in the direction of the Persian Gulf. Under 
 these conditions the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta could 
 
— 38 — 
 
 run exclusively through territories subjected to English con- 
 trol. In order to increase the fertility of the countryside, 
 through which the railroad line from Egypt to India was to 
 run, English ingenuity has long before the war elaborated 
 plans of irrigation and improvements through colonization 
 of the neglected, but once upon a time exceedingly fertile 
 stretches of the country alongside of the Euphrates and the 
 Tiger.* The main prompting motives are of commercial and 
 civilizatory nature, but have above all a strategical meaning 
 of facilitating and increasing the ability of self-defense of 
 England's colonial dominions in Asia and in Africa. This is 
 the purpose which is supposed to console England for her 
 abandoning the policy of Lord Palmerston and Lord 
 Beaconsfield. For the price of Mezopotamia, Arabia and of 
 the Cairo-Calcutta railroad, England tries to think actually 
 of the dismemberment of Turkey in partnership with Russia 
 and France. In such a case Russia would fulfill the first part 
 of her "divine mission," and would enter not only Constan- 
 tinople, but through Armenia, Khurdistan, and Khilikia into 
 the gulf of Iskanderun. The remaining portion of Asia 
 Minor could easily be distributed among Italy, Greece, and — 
 Turkey, because even the latter's enemies cannot conceal the 
 fact that Anatolia is "essentially"! Turkish and the popula- 
 tion is "good and peaceful. "J Syria is intended for France 
 when the contemplated partition of Turkey shall materialize. 
 The Jesuits conducted for a number of years a civilizatory 
 work in Syria for the benefit of France, for which even the 
 socialist, Herve, calls them very reverently "The Fathers." 
 Compared with the shares of Russia and England, Syria is 
 
 * Schemes of Willcock. 
 
 t "Turkey in Europe and Asia," page 19, Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 
 $New York "Times," May 9, 1915 — Gustave Herve: "What is 
 To Be Done with Turkey?" Reprint from "La Guerra Sociale." 
 
— 39 — 
 
 rather a small gain for France, which is menaced by enor- 
 mous financial losses in case of Turkey's dismemberment, 
 because 60 per cent, of the Ottoman debt represents Tur- 
 key's indebtedness to France. The settlement of the bill, 
 however, is intended to be made at the expense of Germany. 
 France hopes to get back Alsace and Lorraine and German 
 colonies in Western Africa. German East Africa is in- 
 cluded, however, in the sphere of English interests, because 
 it borders on the Lake of Tanjanjika and strategically 
 menaces the railroad line from Cape Town to Cairo and the 
 continuation of this line from Cairo to Calcutta. In case of 
 trouble, in the Moslem world, because of the dismemberment 
 of Turkey, the public opinion of England contemplates the 
 transfer of the seat of the Khalifat to Egypt.* Cairo is 
 nearer to Mecca than Constantinople. That means to a cer- 
 tain extent the completion of the entire plan, which seems 
 to tally in the eyes of England with the end of the "Oriental 
 Question," while, as a matter of fact, such a solution would 
 mean nothing else but the end of the first act of this drama. 
 The transferring of the Khalifat to Egypt is an undertak- 
 ing of a very doubtful nature. The old time fanaticism has 
 died out nowadays in the Islamic world. The importance of 
 the Sultan is not based as much upon his purely spiritual 
 dignity, but on the connection of this spiritual dignity with 
 the splendor of the imperial crown. The transferring of 
 the Khalifat to Egypt would in the eyes of the Asiatic na- 
 tions mean the dethronization of the Islam. Such a promo- 
 tion of the Sultan of Egypt at such a price would be nothing 
 else but purely an ornament and political fiction, which is 
 not worth even as much as the bones of one English soldier. 
 The question of the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta pre- 
 
 * "Manchester Guardian," Article on the "Future of Turkey," by 
 Sir W. Ramsay, April, 1915. 
 
— 40 — 
 
 sents a materially different aspect. Arabia and Mezopo- 
 tamia would shield Egypt as soon as England would settle 
 in both countries, and it would mean at the same time a uni- 
 form stretch of territory for a connection between India and 
 South Africa through Egypt and the Sudan. The whole 
 transaction is very tempting at first sight, although the value 
 of such a railroad is rather doubtful when we consider the 
 lower cost of sea transportation through the Suez Canal. 
 England is confronted by enormous possibilities of colonial 
 expansion and civilizatory work. The only question is 
 whether the entire deal is not a little too expensive. 
 
 The railroad from Cairo to Calcutta is not a very safe 
 enterprise in the long run. This railroad can be carried out 
 only at the price of admitting Russia to a partition of Tur- 
 key. This means ipso facto the admission of Russia to the 
 shores of the Mediterranean, both through the Dardanelles 
 and the Gulf of Iskanderun. The internal necessity of the 
 Russian imperialism will then raise the question of the 
 domination of Western Asia on account of the inheritance 
 of the Eastern Roman empire. The holy pilgrimages of 
 Russia to Christ's grave in Jerusalem and the rolling rouble 
 will at once start to prepare the ground. Owing to the pos- 
 session of Armenia, Russia will take strategical advantages 
 of the roads to Mezopotamia and Syria. Erzingan, Charput 
 and Malatia will become the key of the situation. Under 
 such conditions the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta shall 
 not have great strategical importance. Russia will be able to 
 destroy at any time the road along the northern boundary of 
 Persia and interrupt the overland communication of India 
 with Egypt. Through northern Persia the attack is very easy 
 because of a long front line. It is so easy in fact that a band 
 of desperadoes can at any time destroy the track or blow up 
 the bridges and tunnels. Money can always be found in 
 
— 41 — 
 
 Russia for such a purpose. The defense of the railroad 
 line from Egypt is equally difficult because both in Mezo- 
 potamia and in Syria there will always be the danger of a 
 flank attack of the Russian armies through Armenia. After 
 ten years of Russian domination in Armenia, Khurdistan, 
 and Khilikia, the Russian general staff will undoubtedly 
 build a military railroad through the main mountain passes 
 and valleys. An attack on Russia from the side of Syria 
 and Mezopotamia will always be very difficult and very risky 
 owing to the mountain fortifications, while Russian offensive 
 movement down the valley of the Euphrates and the Tiger, 
 or through Aleppo towards Palestine and Egypt, will be 
 easy. Lord Beaconsfield was not mistaken when he feared 
 that the Russian armies might threaten the Suez Canal 
 through Armenia, because they threatened along the same 
 road the entire Asiatic Turkey. The price for which Eng- 
 land wants to build the railroad from Cairo to Calcutta is 
 positively too high. It is a very risky undertaking, still more 
 so because Lord Palmerston's political formula of "peaceful 
 penetration" with the maintenance of the integrality of 
 Turkey does not exclude the plan of the railroad Cairo- 
 Calcutta. Russia, on the other hand, after occupying Ar- 
 menia and Constantinople will at once begin to pray to her 
 Orthodox God to permit her to finish her "holy mission," 
 and plant the double cross on the grave of the Saviour in 
 Jerusalem. The Russian legend shall again place in the 
 walls of the Holy Grave Church some Russian monk anx- 
 iously waiting for the day of the Russian troops entering 
 Jerusalem. 
 
 There was a deep reason for the Russian attempt to land 
 in Jaffa during this present war. 
 
 Turkey is not able to conduct a policy of imperialism. On 
 the east it borders with Persia where the Anglo-Russian 
 
— 42 — 
 
 treaty set up the boundaries of their respective interests, ex- 
 cluding Turkey from all participation. Turkey will not ven- 
 ture without absolute necessity and alone a war with Russia 
 and England, on account of Persia, which does not present 
 for Turkey any such benefit that would make it worth while 
 for Turkey to risk her own independence. To the south 
 there is the Persian Gulf, the Arabic Sea, the Red Sea and 
 the Mediterranean. Turkey does not have sufficient tradi- 
 tion on the seas and she has nothing to gain there. In the 
 West, Constantinople only, together with the fortified line 
 of Tjatalja and Adrianople was left to Turkey. The Balkan 
 war has removed Turkey from the national struggles in the 
 Balkans. Nobody can nowadays conduct a policy against 
 the principle of nationalism for any length of time, and this 
 is still more true of Turkey in regard to Greece, Bulgaria, 
 Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro. A guarantee thereof 
 is given by the strategical character of the Turkish boun- 
 daries in Europe. No offensive movement on a large scale 
 can be started from the line running through Adrianople, 
 Tjatalja and Gallipoli. The strategical character of the fron- 
 tiers of European Turkey is purely defensive since the treaty 
 of Bucharest. There still remains the Egyptian frontier 
 on the line of contact between Asia and Africa. The geo- 
 graphical conditions of Sinai make the defence of Egypt 
 from the East very easy, and attack very difficult. The 
 conditions of Turkish offensive in the direction of the Suez 
 Canal require enormous sacrifices, particularly if the defense 
 of the Suez Canal rests with a strong and well supplied 
 power. These facts decide the problem of Western Asia in 
 favor of maintaining the independence of Turkey. The 
 domination of the Turks in Constantinople neutralizes to 
 some extent Western Asia with reference to European 
 powers. Turkey does not need and cannot embark on a 
 
— 43 — 
 
 policy of imperialism from the shores of the Bosporus. 
 The conditions are different with Russia. Even a rejuve- 
 nated Turkey and with a constitutional form of government 
 cannot become a menace to Egypt. The renaissance of Tur- 
 key is at the same time an emancipation of her national 
 strength. Any step in this direction will weaken the tutelage 
 of Germany by rendering it superfluous. The rejuvenation 
 of Turkey means a loss in the first place to Russia and in 
 the second place to Germany, while for England there re- 
 mains a status quo, because the neighborhood of Turkey will 
 never be as dangerous to the Suez Canal as the proximity 
 of Russia would be after the latter has crossed the Straits 
 and the Armenian mountains. It is impossible to transport 
 the Suez Canal to the moon and, therefore, the one who is 
 less dangerous is the better neighbor, and for this reason 
 the formula of Lord Palmerston does not cease to be bind- 
 ing for England in spite of the fact that Sir Edward Grey 
 apparently has ridden himself of this axiom. For the prize 
 of immediate gain nobody with a sound mind will expose 
 his nation to bankruptcy in the future. So much less Eng- 
 land can be directed over this road — England, which gave a 
 decided political character to many centuries and filled half 
 the world with the work of her genius. 
 
 The danger in case of a victory of Russia is a very real 
 one. A new, terrible weapon of naval warfare came into 
 prominence in this war. This weapon is the submarine 
 which caused a new era in the technique of naval warfare. 
 Within the next few years the improvement of submarines 
 will become a fact which will make the conditions of com- 
 petition on the sea equal to all the powers. Never since the 
 battle at Trafalgar had Europe such a chance against the 
 English supremacy on the sea. It is impossible to be blind 
 any longer and not to see the results of this fact for England 
 
— 44 — 
 
 the very moment that Russia enters Constantinople and 
 opens a window to the Mediterranean, somewhere opposite 
 the Island of Cyprus. The Dardanelles and the Gulf of 
 Iskanderun shall become the basis of operation for the Rus- 
 sian Mediterranean fleet. Then Russia will become "a great 
 naval power," and even "from the Mediterranean she might 
 be expected to expand her operations to the ocean." These 
 are not empty apprehensions, because they were expressed 
 by a professional man, who many times was minister of the 
 Italian navy, Admiral Bettolo.* In case of a war with 
 England, Russian submarines could attack the shores of 
 Egypt, and the blockade of the Suez Canal would be by far a 
 greater achievement than the present blockade of the Eng- 
 lish coast line by Germany. Germany gave the example and 
 Russia will not forget it, since she has some experience in 
 making speedy armaments. The budget of the Russian navy 
 has increased in the years from 1909 to 1913 by 302 million 
 roubles or by 154 per cent. At the same time the expenses 
 of England increased only 29.6 per cent, and those of Ger- 
 many 13.8 per cent. The Russian imperialism, after pene- 
 trating the Dardanelles and the Armenian Mountains, cer- 
 tainly will not spare sacrifices, and submarines are compara- 
 tively inexpensive. 
 
 A word to the wise is sufficient. 
 
 Russia, however, has still another weapon which is not 
 less dangerous for England. "This is Russia's frontier line 
 in Asia. Pamir is the gate to India, and the Persian agree- 
 ment made neighbors of England and Russia in the Iran. 
 The neutrality of Persia is nothing but fiction, even in this 
 war, and so much less could Persia separate Russia from 
 England in case of a war between these two countries. For 
 England, which is not a military power, these conditions pre- 
 
 *The "Evening Post," New York, April to. 1915. 
 
— 45 — 
 
 sent a very serious menace. England can blockade ( ier- 
 many, it can cut of! her military transports and stop them 
 with her guns at Gibraltar, even if Germany succeeds in 
 breaking through the blockade in the North Sea. Germany 
 and England have no frontier line, neither in Europe nor in 
 Asia. On the other hand England cannot cut off Russia, 
 and on the second day of the war Russian armies can start 
 on their march toward Afghanistan, India, Persia and 
 through Armenia over Mosul and Aleppo towards Mezo- 
 potamia and Syria. The isolation of Germany permits Eng- 
 land to raise an army and postpone the decisive struggle 
 until a favorable date; Russia on the other hand can force 
 England to accept a fight because it is England's neigh- 
 bor in Asia, and in a war with Russia England has no time 
 for the raising of an army and cannot procrastinate the 
 struggle. On the second day of the war, English troops 
 must bar the road to the Russians in order to defend 
 India, which is the most precious gem in the British 
 crown. In this light, the safety of the Suez Canal becomes 
 more imperative to-day for England than it was at the time 
 of the Congress of Berlin. Sir Edward Grey has greater 
 obligations in this direction than Lord Beaconsfield ever had. 
 Beaconsfield had to defend the Suez Canal from the Russian 
 fleet, while Sir Edward Grey must nowadays defend the 
 Suez Canal from the piracy of Russian submarines, which 
 will not fail to make a lightning-like appearance in the Medi- 
 terranean the very moment Russia is able to penetrate into 
 Constantinople and force the entrance into the Gulf of 
 Iskanderun. 
 
 It looks like a paradox, but it is a truth at the same time 
 that for England to-day a defeat jointly with Russia is less 
 dangerous than a joint victory with Russia for the prize 
 of Constantinople and Alexandretta. Hence the conclusion 
 
— 46 — 
 
 that the purpose of English policy and strategy in the pres- 
 ent war seems to be a double game: To defeat Russia 
 through Germany and to beat exhausted Germany with her 
 own army. This is for England the only way of victory and 
 the only way which can secure England's future. The vic- 
 tory of England for the prize of the victory of Russia would 
 be a Pyrrhus victory. Constantinople is entirely too great a 
 price to be sold to Russia by England for the price of a tem- 
 porary military advantage in the war with Germany. Eng- 
 land goes jointly with Russia as far as the military end is 
 concerned against Germany, but politically England cannot 
 afford to go jointly with Russia against Turkey. The ques- 
 tion of Constantinople can by no means be a question of 
 compromise but only a question of victory — of England or 
 of Russia, should the liquidation of Turkey become the 
 inevitable outcome. A deep reason prompted the attack of 
 the Anglo-French fleet on the Dardanelles before Russia 
 could menace Turkey from the land side. The attack of 
 England and France on the Dardanelles began simultane- 
 ously with the defeats of Russia in Poland. England pre- 
 ferred to attack the Dardanelles than to accelerate the of- 
 fensive move in France for the purpose of saving Russia. 
 The Dardanelles could not be transferred to the moon for 
 reasons of safety, and all arguments of diplomatic or finan- 
 cial nature cannot possibly conceal the fact that the attack on 
 the Dardanelles after a victory in France would have much 
 greater chances of success. From the point of view of the 
 military situation in France and in Poland, the attack on the 
 Dardanelles was wasting of human life and ammunition. 
 The throwing of the same amount of troops and ammunition 
 on the battle front near Arras, when the majority of the 
 German army was busy attacking Lemberg, could have suc- 
 ceeded in piercing the German front and saving Russia from 
 
— 47 — 
 
 an enormous disaster. This is perfectly easy to understand. 
 The interest of England demanded consciously or uncon- 
 sciously to leave Russia's army to its fate and to attack the 
 Dardanelles in the meantime in order to outdistance the 
 Russians in the race for Constantinople. England has at- 
 tacked Dardanelles in order to cut the way to Suez Canal 
 for Germans, and not with the view of giving out Constan- 
 tinople to Russia. Russia has filed artificial and far-reaching 
 claims to Constantinople, while England threw the first blood 
 on the scales in the same question. It is a well-known fact 
 that blood weighs heavier than claims. The program of 
 Lord Palmerston and Lord Beaconsfield was certainly of 
 some influence in this complicated game, although it worked 
 unnoticed by the masses. 
 
 The arguments for the dismemberment of Turkey are 
 very flimsy indeed. The argument that the national con- 
 sciousness in Western Asia is very indistinct, does not give 
 any right for the dismemberment of Turkey. Doing this, 
 Europe would destroy what Turkey did not have time to ac- 
 complish. Under the domination of England, France, and 
 Russia the national consciousness of the Asiatic masses must 
 necessarily go back because slavery is never constructive. 
 Why should not the masses be left in the hands of Turkey 
 that dominated over them for centuries, and has already 
 elaborated her traditions ? Why take for the benefit of Euro- 
 pean countries the liberty from the Asiatic masses and de- 
 prive them of the hope of ever growing into a nation? In 
 order to sweeten the pill, the Allies are promising to the 
 masses of Asia a better administration. Turkey always had 
 and still has many shortcomings as far as administration 
 is concerned, but the same shortcomings are in existence in 
 Portugal and in the South American republics. Is this, 
 however, a reason for their dismemberment and the destruc- 
 
— 48 — 
 
 tion of their independence? The lack of understanding for 
 the autonomous aspirations is not exclusively a specialty of 
 Turkey. Russia has still less of that understanding and a 
 more reactionary form of government than Young Turkey. 
 It should, furthermore, not be forgotten that on the thresh- 
 old of the twentieth century England found herself on 
 the eve of a civil war for home rule in Ireland. The 
 sin of a centralized government is not an exclusively 
 Turkish sin. Europe has permitted Russia to regenerate 
 and rehabilitate herself in the eyes of the world. Why 
 shouldn't Turkey be given the same chance? Isn't it true 
 that the slogans of the present war are the two principles : 
 "The equality of states," and "the equality of rights."* 
 While the bombardment of the Dardanelles by the English 
 fleet was going on, Sir Edward Grey declared from the 
 speaker's chair that England champions in the present war 
 the freedom of the nations, regardless "whether they be great 
 states or small states. "f All this seems to be some tragic 
 misunderstanding, because at this particular moment nobody 
 has a right to say lies. 
 
 There still remains the main argument. The Turks repre- 
 sent the Islam while Russia, France and England represent 
 Christianity. Because of an antagonism against the Islam 
 the entire world is silent, when in the name of freedom of 
 nations a partition of Turkey is contemplated. The question 
 of nationalities ceased long ago to be the question of God ; 
 the Middle Ages as well as the period of religious wars has 
 passed forever. The calamity of Europe was in times gone 
 by the maxim: "Cuius regio, eius religio" ; the maxim: 
 "Cuius religio, eius regio" will by no means be a lesser evil. 
 This is properly the basis on which Russia is founding her 
 
 * L. Cecil Jane : "The Nations At War," London, 1914. 
 t Bechstein Hall, March 22, 1915. 
 
— 49 — 
 
 claims to Constantinople and Jerusalem, because the state 
 religion of Russia happened to originate on the Bosporus. 
 The domination of Russia never reached these regions, and 
 the population inhabitating Constantinople and Jerusalem 
 has no racial community with Russia. Russia's appetite is 
 nothing else but an imperialistic fever, highly dangerous to 
 the peace of Europe. Imperialism never was a basis for 
 the permanent peace and it never shall be. So much less 
 Russian imperialism because it has donned the vestment of 
 the Orthodox Church, and religious imperialism has always 
 been the worst form. The entrance of Russia to Constan- 
 tinople would be the crowning feat of the principle — "Cuius 
 religio, eius regio," and the ground for future aggressive 
 wars. 
 
 The twentieth century cannot afford to propagate the 
 idea of "Cuius religio, eius regio." It can do it much less 
 because in Russia the political reaction and the Orthodox 
 Church form the two sides of one and the same matter. 
 The Orthodox Church supports the despotism of the Czar 
 and the latter protects the Orthodox Church from the in- 
 fluences of constitutionalism and the progress of Western 
 Europe. The Russian Duma is but a fiction of the consti- 
 tution, a fig leaf which conceals the rotten condition of 
 things. The Duma does not participate in government and 
 is, properly speaking, only a consultant body for the gov- 
 ernment, which without any reservation whatsoever is ex- 
 clusively subordinated to the will of the despotic Czar. 
 The democratic strata of society have a very limited repre- 
 sentation, because the reactionary system of elections bars 
 them from the Duma. These are the facts which war time 
 sentiments should not obscure to the eyes of our conscience. 
 The current of freedom foundered and still founders in Rus- 
 sia — on the rocks of the Orthodox Church. The victory of 
 
— 50 — 
 
 Orthodoxy can under these conditions never accelerate the 
 victory of the principle of civic freedom in Russia, because 
 only the defeat of Orthodoxy can facilitate the defeat of 
 the reaction and despotism in Eastern Europe. The day of 
 Russia's entering Constantinople would constitute a triumph 
 for the Orthodox Church and would delay, not accelerate, 
 the day of liberty for Russia's people. Russia is by no 
 means a peevish child that can stop bothering his entour- 
 age for the price of a piece of candy. Therefore, is there 
 any sense in expecting that Russia, after having accom- 
 plished the dream of Peter the Great, Catherine II and 
 Nicholas I, should change the character of the state? No- 
 body changes and nobody can afford to change a victorious 
 policy. Peter the Great, Catherine II and Nicholas I not 
 only suffered from the fever of imperialism, but they were at 
 the same time the pillars of reaction and despotism. The 
 entering of Constantinople will mean a triumph for Russian 
 reaction and not the beginning of a change; Orthodoxy in 
 Russia is still strong enough and too strong that the day 
 of its triumph should mean the day of its future suicide. 
 The partition of Turkey prompted by antagonism toward 
 Islam is from this point of view politically absurd. 
 
 The participation in the war of England and France 
 against Germany has raised the importance of Russia in the 
 public opinion of Western Europe and of America. Unfor- 
 tunately Russia has been put on the same level as England 
 and France. Hatred against Germany helped to develop 
 an apotheosis for Russia. This is quite plausible from the 
 point of view of pure hatred towards Germany, but never 
 from the point of view of justice and truth. 
 
 I — The program of Western Europe is nationalism ; the 
 program of Russia is imperialism. 
 
— 51 — 
 
 II — The program of Western Europe is the expansion 
 of the freedom of nations ; the program of Russia 
 is the expansion in the name of the idea : "Cuius 
 religio, cius regio." 
 
 Ill — The program of Western Europe is the evolution of 
 the individuality of nations ; the program of Rus- 
 sia is the obliterating of the individuality for the 
 benefit of a race or rather of the Slavic Pan- 
 Russianism. 
 
 IV — The program of Western Europe tends towards 
 making constitutionalism and progress permanent ; 
 the program of Russia is to make political reaction 
 permanent through the triumph of Orthodoxy. 
 
 Russia participates in this war in order to gain enough 
 power for destroying what Western Europe promises to 
 bring about at the expense of the blood spilled in this war. 
 For England and France the participation of Russia in the 
 war against Germany is only a matter of passing military 
 alliance. The respective governments are perfectly well 
 aware of this fact and only the interested nations fail to 
 comprehend it. Blind hatred against Germany takes advan- 
 tage of this situation and drives average public opinion to 
 an apotheosis of Russia on the basis of equality with Eng- 
 land and France. In fact, there is no equality of merits, be- 
 cause there is no equality of programs. On the battlefields 
 of the present war not only the question of German imperial- 
 ism is fought, but also the question of Russian imperialism. 
 Whoever, in order to hurt Germany, wants to turn Con- 
 stantinople over to Russia, is blinded by hatred and uncon- 
 sciously plays into the hands of Germany, because he se- 
 cures for the latter a revenge ally when England succeeds to 
 win the war at the highest price to be paid, which means at 
 
— 52 — 
 
 the price of a victory of Russia. It is a political mistake 
 to form political ideas so as to fit the temporary military 
 interests of England and France, and credit Russia in return 
 for her participation against Germany with virtues, which 
 she never possessed and does not possess at present. 
 
 Falsehood can never be a torch of progress. 
 
 The parallelism of the Russian defeats in Poland and of 
 the wasting of human life and ammunition in the Dar- 
 danelles, together with the complete absence of any offensive 
 movement in France, was explained by lack of ammunition 
 and sufficient superiority in numbers. This is, however, a 
 very interesting document. The battle at Arras in the spring 
 was fought at the same time as the battle at Lemberg, where 
 Russia suffered a heavy blow, because the loss of Lemberg 
 undermined the popularity of the war among the Russian 
 masses. It is an exaggeration but it is true to a certain ex- 
 tent that behind the scenes of the war of England against 
 Germany there is an unofficial war going on between Eng- 
 land and Russia for Constantinople. The program of Lord 
 Palmerston still molds the future of England just as it used 
 to mold her past. There is no question that the policy of Sir 
 Edward Grey uses at present different ways and different 
 means. It is even hard to suppose that the English govern- 
 ment should put the question in this form. The logic of 
 facts, however, is stronger than the logic of Sir Edward 
 Grey. England must defeat Russia through Germany and 
 must herself in turn defeat Germany if she wants to win at 
 all and forever. Whether this materializes under the con- 
 scious leadership of Grey or without his being aware of the 
 fact, is of but secondary importance. England has no choice, 
 and must either win or lose in accordance with her entire 
 tradition of Oriental policy. In both cases England will 
 come out of the war with honors. In case of victory it shall 
 
— 53 — 
 
 shed new glory on the Union Jack, and in case of defeat it 
 shall appease the English conscience with conviction that 
 duty has been done. The duty of England, however, has 
 two fronts. Its first and official front is the front against 
 Germany. Its second and unofficial one, is the front against 
 Russia. 
 
 "Alea iacta est!' 
 
 The world has grown accustomed to consider Turkey as 
 the "sick man of Europe.'' It has been overlooked, however, 
 that in Turkey revolution has swept away civic slavery and 
 the peace of Bucharest has abolished the slavery of nations. 
 This fact cannot be obliterated by old journalistic yarns 
 which do not shrink from saying a lie when it comes to fa- 
 cilitate the progress of Russian imperialism. The very 
 moment when the work of regeneration of Turkey was be- 
 gun, the present war broke out ; Russia has decided to finish 
 Turkey instead of curing her. This is certainly a fine exam- 
 ple of political therapeutics. 
 
 Turkey, however, has passed successfully the examination 
 of her maturity. Not everything in Turkey can be explained 
 by Germany's aid. It is true that Turkey derives a great 
 advantage, as far as armaments, money and professional 
 advice is concerned, from her alliance with Germany, but 
 there is a still greater portion of truth in the fact that Tur- 
 key wants to and knows how to derive these benefits. No- 
 body will derive any benefit from arms supplied by some- 
 body else in case the soldier, who has to use these arms is not 
 fond of them for the sake of the idea that he has to defend 
 with these weapons. Turkey fights consciously and wil- 
 lingly for the defense of her independence and it is a ques- 
 tion of luck, rather than of anything else, that she is able to 
 avail herself of Germany's help. 
 
 In the face of these facts, the conscience of the world 
 
— 54 — 
 
 must pronounce itself in favor of Turkey. It is high time to 
 begin to be honest with regard to the slogans of the present 
 war, which is supposed to be a war conducted in the name of 
 liberty. The permanence and justice of coming peace treaty 
 requires imperatively that : 
 
 I — The independence of Turkey be maintained, and 
 Russia not admitted to Constantinople ; 
 II — That guarantees of autonomy be given to Armenia, 
 Syria, and Arabia within the structure of the 
 Turkish Empire and within the frames of the 
 general Turkish constitution. 
 
 There have been and there are unjust wars and unjust 
 peace treaties. History, however, is just in the perspective 
 of the ages. The Nemesis avenges mistakes and faults. The 
 partition of Turkey, in so far as Russia can force it upon 
 Europe, will be one of the acts which will not bring honor to 
 humanity. Following the flag of the liberty of nations one 
 cannot afford to destroy the liberty of the Turkish nation. It 
 would mean throwing the seed of hurricane which may be 
 delayed but which would be bound to come some day and 
 bring revenge for the crime against nationalism. 
 
 History is just in the perspective of ages, although at 
 times it is unjust in the perspective of the moment. 
 
Chapter III 
 THE PART of AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 
 
— 57 — 
 
 Chapter III. — The Part of Austria-Hungary 
 
 The fact that Austria-Hungary co-operates in the military 
 operations with Germany obscures in Western Europe, and 
 particularly in America, the political background of Austria- 
 Hungary's participation in the present war. The entire 
 world looks at Austria-Hungary's part through the specta- 
 cles of hatred against Germany. This is the reason Russian 
 diplomacy was able to make the idea of a partition of 
 Austria-Hungary generally popular. Despotic Russia taught 
 Western Europe and America to condemn a constitutional 
 state such as Austria-Hungary. Russia, which even during 
 the present war did not cease to oppress the conquered 
 nations, began to persuade the world that this oppression 
 is done by Austria-Hungary which, for the last half century, 
 has made the principle of the freedom of the nations the 
 basis of her constitution. Russia was able to gain sympathy, 
 while Austria-Hungary lost much although it has granted 
 long ago what Russia is now promising. The latter has, 
 immediately after the temporary conquest of Eastern Galicia, 
 abolished the Polish autonomy although Galicia never be- 
 longed to Russia. Almost at the same time, on October 3, 
 1914, the Russian cabinet decided to suspend the rest of the 
 autonomy of Finland.* Austria-Hungary, on the other 
 hand, spreads the Polish language and the autonomous free- 
 dom of Galicia wherever her victorious army dislodges Rus- 
 sian domination. These are facts acknowledged by the press 
 of the entire world. This, however, does not prevent the 
 
 * "For a Lasting Peace," Paris, 1915. 
 
— 58 — 
 
 average opinion from demanding the partition of Austria- 
 Hungary and from making Russia the pioneer of the liberty 
 of nations. 
 
 This is far from being just. 
 
 The history of Austria-Hungary is the history of the 
 middle Danube. Austria-Hungary is a huge space, formed 
 by the Alps, the Sudets and the Carpathian Mountains, com- 
 bined into a natural wall. Over this road went at ah times 
 the migrations of nations. Traces of passages of Celts can 
 be found as well as traditions of the migrations of the Goths 
 and of countless numbers of German tribes. Through there 
 went the expansion of Slavic tribes as far as the shores of 
 the Adriatic Sea. There also went the invasion of the Mon- 
 gols. In the territory of the middle Danube there is to be 
 found also the grave of Attila, who was a "scourge of God" 
 for Europe. Here are the graves of the Avares. Finally 
 the Hungarians came from the Far East and by embracing 
 the Christian religion acquired the right of citizenship in 
 Central Europe. The ethnical elements became mixed and 
 the frontier lines of territories became entwined. Nobody 
 was strong enough to dominate the entire valley over the 
 middle Danube and impress its character upon the latter. 
 The Bavarians attempted it and so did the Moravians in 
 the times of Swatopluk; so did the Bohemians under the 
 Premyslides and finally the Hungarians who made several 
 attempts to attack Vienna. These were only temporary his- 
 torical experiments. Uniform ethnical states came into 
 existence and fell apart, but a combined ethnical state sur- 
 vived and developed for the last thousand years. Uniform 
 ethnical kingdoms fell apart and a combined ethnical empire 
 survived. This empire is the monarchy of the Hapsbourgs. 
 The character of Austria-Hungary corresponds with the 
 character of the historical conditions on the middle Danube, 
 
— 59 — 
 
 where nobody was strong enough in order to dominate per- 
 manently the valleys of the Alps, the Carpathians and the 
 Sudets and to mold the multicolor ethnical material into one 
 national body. The territory of Austria-Hungary was for 
 centuries a country through which the nations of the world 
 marched; it is a mixed ground, and every wave sweeping 
 through it has left a certain amount of sediment. 
 
 The seed of Austria-Hungary was planted by Charles the 
 Great during his expeditions into the valley of the Thais. The 
 road he followed from West to East was cut later by German 
 armies when Otto I, the Great, crossed the Alps to go to 
 Rome for the imperial crown. Through there crossed the 
 papal messengers going to the imperial court far back in 
 Germany, or to the banks of the Vistula, where the kingdom 
 of Poland was in the course of construction. Through the 
 valley of the Danube, the echo of the struggle between the 
 empire and the papacy, between the spiritual and the lay 
 sword, penetrated into Northern Europe. This was in 
 the Middle Ages. At the threshold of modern history the 
 Turks appeared on the bank of the Danube and through old 
 Buda tried to make their way to Vienna. Christianity had 
 to confront the Islam in the valley of the Alps, the Carpath- 
 ians and the Sudets ; for two centuries, until the peace treaty 
 of Carlowitz, the valley of the middle Danube was the bat- 
 tlefield of a bloody struggle. As late as 1683 at Vienna, 
 when the king of Poland, John III, Sobieski, combining his 
 army with that of the Hapsbourgs, secured victory for Chris- 
 tianity in Europe. Since then the Orient had to recede to 
 its native heath. 
 
 The traditions of Rome founded Austria on the Danube. 
 The period of struggle with Turkey has established Hungary 
 of to-day. The imperial crown of the Hapsbourgs, an in- 
 heritance from Charlemagne and the Ottons, combined both 
 
— 60 — 
 
 epochs and both of their political offsprings. The idea of 
 Austria-Hungary as a state materialized into historical real- 
 ity. Both elements, the traditions of Rome, and the tradi- 
 tions of the struggles with Turkey, impressed their stigma 
 on the character of Austria-Hungary and made of the latter 
 a complete, natural state, although apparently the ethnical 
 differences would seem to contradict the above contention. 
 This ethnical variety is a natural, historical element in the 
 valley of the middle Danube, and, therefore, Austria-Hun- 
 gary is for these territories a natural form of political exist- 
 ence. Austria is a child of Rome, while Hungary originally 
 came from the Orient, but she matured on the field of glory 
 of centuries-old battles with the Turks. Under the walls of 
 Vienna was enacted the history of both elements and here 
 it is where the synthesis in the form of the imperial crown 
 of the Hapsbourgs was established. The first act of this 
 synthesis was the dowry of the daughter of the Jagellons, 
 when, after the battle of Mohacs she brought the crown of 
 Bohemia and Hungary into the house of the Hapsbourgs. 
 The battle with the Turks under the walls of Vienna was 
 the day of common glory. The covenant between Austria 
 and Hungary in 1867 was the act of their'political maturity. 
 To dismember nowadays Austria-Hungary and to destroy 
 this historical synthesis would mean to create a bloody chaos 
 in the valley of the middle Danube. 
 
 History would have to go back for a thousand years in 
 order to dismember Austria-Hungary. 
 
 From the political point of view, Austria-Hungary has 
 solved on the continent of Europe the same problem which 
 England has analogously solved in her colonial policy. This 
 problem is a problem of co-existence of various national 
 elements within one state. Thus, Austria-Hungary forms to 
 some extent the united states in the valley of the middle 
 
 
— 61 — 
 
 Danube. Section XIX of the constitution of Austria-Hun- 
 gary of the year 1867 provides that "all the nationalities in 
 the state have equal rights and every nationality has an in- 
 tangible right to defend and develop its own nationality and 
 language. Equal rights of all languages in school, office, and 
 public life is acknowledged by the government."* Any cy- 
 clopedia can tell that for half a century all the provinces of 
 Austria-Hungary have their own parliaments, or in other 
 words, an autonomy not only as far as administration but 
 also as far as legislation is concerned. In spite of that, 
 English publications have the effrontery of writing about 
 ''military slavery" in Austria-Hungary or to predict that 
 after the partition of Austria-Hungary her "domination will 
 cease; racial equalities will be established."! It is hard to 
 say what to wonder at? at the injustice or at the ignorance? 
 The fact that in Austria-Hungary national strife is in exist- 
 ence does not alter the truth that Austria-Hungary consti- 
 tutes an asset of the principle of nationalism in Central Eu- 
 rope, and not a liability. In Austria-Hungary there are 
 dissensions among individual nationalities, but there is no 
 oppression of nationalities by the government. No logic of 
 any kind permits to deduct the conclusion that nationalities 
 are oppressed by the government from the fact that strife 
 among nationalities exists in Austria. In Austria-Hungary 
 the government is the arbiter in national dissensions and not 
 an organ of oppression. The nationalism of Austria-Hun- 
 gary is in a process of evolution which of course has its de- 
 fects and shortcomings, but this does not alter the fact that 
 Austria-Hungary is a state in which every nationality has its 
 autonomy and the possibility of development. 
 
 * Dr. Edmund Bernatzik : "Die Oesterreichischen Verf assungs- 
 gesetze," Leipzig, 1906. 
 
 f "New York Times," April 23, Report on the Lecture of G. L. 
 Travelyan, "Grand-nephew" of Macaulay. 
 
— 62 — 
 
 On the eve of the present war England found herself on 
 the brink of a civil war for the home rule for Ireland. Eng- 
 lishmen armed themselves against their fellow countrymen 
 in order to prevent the granting of autonomy to Ireland. 
 Can we conclude from that, that England should be dismem- 
 bered, or that Ireland represents a centrifugal element in the 
 British Empire? The proof was given by the attitude of 
 Ireland after the war against Germany broke out ; it has been 
 shown that the movement in Ireland is only a movement for 
 internal reform and not a movement of treason. Austria- 
 Hungary showed the same symptoms in her internal life, 
 except for the fact that in Austria-Hungary there is nowa- 
 days no more to be found any Ireland, because not one 
 province of Austria-Hungary is without its autonomous par- 
 liament, nor is there any nationality within the state which 
 would not have its own national schools. The tendency of 
 increasing the autonomous liberties proves the vitality of the 
 nationalism in Austria-Hungary and not its lack. The Poles 
 were striving before the outbreak of the war for an increase 
 of the autonomy of Galicia; the Tchechs tried to increase 
 the scope of the competency of their parliament in Prague. 
 The Croatians are struggling for an emancipation of their 
 parliament from the tutelage of Hungary; the Hungarians 
 in turn tried to secure for themselves greater freedom of 
 elbows in their relations to Vienna. The basis, however, 
 for all these aspirations always has been, and always is the 
 existing constitution. The whole movement is the movement 
 of reform and not a movement of disruption. It is a purely 
 internal struggle between the principle of centralization and 
 the principle of federalism, on the background of the already 
 existing autonomy, both political and cultural, of all the 
 nationalities in Austria-Hungary. The discontentment in 
 Austria-Hungary has the same character as the discontent- 
 
— 63 — 
 
 ment of the Irish nation in England. It is a movement of re- 
 form and not a movement of treason. The present war has 
 proved this contention not only as far as England is con- 
 cerned, but also with regard to Austria-Hungary. The 
 old monarchy of the Hapsbourgs has demonstrated the 
 strength, vitality and loyalty of its nationalities. There 
 never was nor is there any rebellion. The Russian 
 rouble which demoralized the Ruthenians in Eastern 
 Galicia and the Serbs on the south was unable to in- 
 fluence the masses. It is easy to influence individuals in 
 order to provoke artificial symptoms of discontentment for 
 the use of a mendacious press, in case masses of the people 
 participate in the political life, and there is no difficulty at 
 any time to find corrupt individuals. In spite of the endeav- 
 ors of Russia and its agitation in the name of "brotherhood 
 of Slavic nations," the Poles, the Tchechs, the Croatians, 
 Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Moravians, Silesians, right 
 along with Hungarians, Germans and even Roumanians, 
 came forward loyally to the defence of their national free- 
 dom against Russia. It is still an unknown fact what the 
 definite physical result of the war will be, but nothing will 
 change the importance of the fact that the nationalism of 
 Austria-Hungary demonstrated in the present war a much 
 greater political power than the Pan-Slavism of Russia. 
 There is nothing astounding in this fact. Nationalism is a 
 program of the liberty of nations, while Pan-Slavism is a 
 program of imperialism. Nationalism is the wave sweeping 
 through the twentieth century, while imperialism is the cur- 
 rent running against this wave. 
 
 Austria-Hungary has solved the problem of autonomous 
 co-existence of many nationalities under the sceptre of one 
 monarch. Germany failed to solve this problem and became 
 guilty of oppressing the Poles, the Danes, and the Alsatians. 
 
— 64 — 
 
 although this oppression was superfluous, to say the least, 
 for the power of Germany. Russia never even attempted to 
 solve this problem and exterminated mercilessly the rem- 
 nants of autonomous life in Poland, in Finland, and in the 
 Caucasus, England was unable in the twentieth century to 
 introduce home rule in Ireland without a civil war. France 
 and Italy have a clear conscience — but they do not have other 
 nationalities under their sway in Europe. Looking impar- 
 tially and justly one must come to the conclusion that the idea 
 of the partition of Austria-Hungary is in contradiction with 
 the idea of nationalism and with the idea of permanent peace. 
 There are, however, opinions which, in the name of the 
 liberty of nations, would like to destroy precisely what the 
 idea of this liberty of nations succeeded in building up in the 
 valley of the middle Danube. 
 
 The program of Russia is Pan-Slavic, or, in other words, 
 the uniting of all Slave nations under the sceptre of the 
 Czar. The capital of Russia thus conceived of shall be Con- 
 stantinople ; it is an idea of a great and holy Russia, and a 
 materializing of this idea requires both the partition of 
 Turkey and the partition of Austria-Hungary. "The road to 
 Constantinople leads through Vienna," said General Ignatieff 
 after the Congress of Berlin. 
 
 Pan-Slavism is a program of race. The conception of 
 race, however, is not synonymous witn the conception of 
 national consciousness, because a race is nothing but crude 
 material on which history works. A nation is determined 
 by the community of language, but above all other things by 
 the history of common existence as a state. The community 
 of language is a tool of economic and civilizatory activity. 
 The community of political tradition is a tool of a collective 
 will directed toward the development of national independ- 
 ence. The community of language admits exceptions but the 
 
— 65 — 
 
 history of common existence as a state is an absolutely 
 necessary feature. In Switzerland there is no community 
 of language but there is a tradition of common independence, 
 and this tradition decides the fate of Swiss nationality. A 
 nation is formed by the existence of a state of its own, and 
 vice versa a nation must perish through lack of the common 
 political existence as a state. Such a lack permits for a while 
 to preserve the ethnographical features of a nation but does 
 not permit the preserving of political features ; it denational- 
 izes politically, although it permits for a while to oppose 
 ethnographical denationalization. Religion, language, art 
 culture, customs can subsist, but the ability for political in- 
 dependence is bound to be exterminated. It is a law of 
 sociological evolution and no phrases about "racial brother- 
 hood" can extenuate the results of this law. Pan-Slavism 
 and Pan-Russianism must consciously or unconsciously form 
 the two sides of the same matter. Pan-Slavism must neces- 
 sarily be anti-national because it is imperialistic. The public 
 opinion in Russia certainly regrets nowadays that Russia 
 has agreed to establish an independent Bulgaria. To Poland 
 Russia has promised only autonomy, but she refuses to 
 recognize Poland's right to an independent existence. "Slav 
 banquets" which during the present war busied themselves 
 with the question of the partition of Austria-Hungary, pro- 
 nounced themselves against the independence of Croatia and 
 even against the independence of Bohemia. This was the 
 cause for a scandal because the Bohemians protested against 
 being denied the right to aspire to political independence. 
 The Russian agitator Saveloff declared that the "Russian 
 nation shall not spill its blood for the formation of a new 
 Bulgaria." This happened in Moscow in the first days of 
 March, 1915, at the meeting of Tchechs and Slovac organi- 
 zations of Russia. The details of the discussions were pub- 
 
— 66 — 
 
 lished by the Utro Rossii and the majority of Russian and 
 Polish newspapers reprinted them. Pan-Slavism is an im- 
 perialistic allegation that "even though there are other Slavic 
 princes, kings, and even czars, yet there is only one and only 
 ruler of Slavdom, Russian Lord and Emperor/'* Pan- 
 Slavism attempts to destroy national individualities in order 
 to help the race. No wonder, therefore, that even the 
 Tchechs, in contradiction to all the press stories about revo- 
 lutions in Prague faithfully perform the duties in the ranks 
 of the Austro-Hungarian armies. The natural instinct of 
 the masses cannot be deceived as easily as eccentrical individ- 
 uals which are not lacking in any nation. The actuality of 
 the nations, however, is manifested by the attitude of the 
 masses and not by the attitude of such eccentric individuals. 
 The means which Russia can throw on the scales are 
 enormous. The population of Russia amounted in 1912 to 
 166,000,000. During the years 1897 to 1912, Russia's popu- 
 lation increased 47,000,000, while at the same time the popu- 
 lation of Germany increased only 12,000,000. Professor 
 Masaryk, a noted Tchechs scientist, has figured out that at 
 the end of the current century the population of European 
 Russia will reach the 400,000,000 mark and, together with 
 Asiatic Russia, the 500,000,000 mark.f Growing at the same 
 rate of increase, the population of Russia will already in 
 1930 reach the figure of 220,000,000. These are calculations 
 based on facts as they were before the war. Let us suppose 
 now that Russia will win and impose upon Europe the par- 
 tition of Austria-Hungary, and even of Turkey. The num- 
 ber of Slavs in the Balkans and in Austria-Hungary amounts 
 
 * "Russian Orthodox American Messenger," second issue, Vol. 
 XVII, page 29. 
 
 t Masaryk : "Zur russichen Geschichte und Religions Philosophic," 
 I, page 275. 
 
— 67 — 
 
 to almost 30,000,000. In spite of the losses suffered during 
 the present war, Russia will be able to become, within fifteen 
 years, a reservoir of 250,000,000 of people, not counting 
 Constantinople and Armenia as far as Khilikia and the Gulf 
 of Iskanderun. Russia was and is a military country. As 
 far as armaments are concerned, she was by no means second 
 to Germany and in certain respect has even outdone the 
 latter. The peace footing of the German army, according 
 to the last military law which frightened the entire world, 
 amounted to about 800,000 officers and enlisted men. The 
 peace footing of the Russian army in the summer of 1914, 
 that means at the moment of the outbreak of the war, 
 amounted to 1,415,000 men. In the winter 1915-1916 the 
 peace footing was expected to reach the enormous figure of 
 1,900,000 rifles and sabres. The amount of reserves in 
 Russia is, of course, inexhaustible. The Russian budget 
 was able to stand such enormous burdens only owing to 
 French loans, because the financial strength of Russia, 
 particularly after the Japanese war, was infinitely inferior 
 to the financial resources of the western powers. France has 
 invested in Russia something like $4,000,000,000. Another 
 advantage of the Russian treasury consisted of two years of 
 exceedingly rich crops. In the future, on the other hand, 
 there will loom brightly the results of an agragrian reform 
 and of the colonization of Siberia.* Since the times of 
 Stolypin and until the end of 1912 almost 1,000,000 inde- 
 pendent peasant farms were established in Russia, and the 
 municipal ownership of ground which kept Russian agricul- 
 ture back and made of the Russian peasant an illiterate in- 
 dividual was abolished. The agrarian productivity was in- 
 creased. In Siberia almost two and a half million colonies 
 were settled in the years 1907 to 1912. Siberia, according 
 * F. Nansen : "Siberien ein Zukunftsland." 
 
— 68 — 
 
 to the explorer of Polar regions, the Norwegian geographer, 
 Nansen, is the country of the future. The colonization of 
 Siberia increases the wealth of Russia and makes of Siberia 
 a reservoir for military conscription, which eventually will 
 facilitate the Russian offensive in Asia. This is, however, 
 only the beginning. Let us suppose now that Russia should 
 dictate peace to Europe. After destroying Turkey and 
 Austria-Hungary, the power of Russian expansion will 
 become the ramrod against the entire west of Europe. The 
 opening of a window on the Atlantic will then become only 
 a question of time. The distance from the Russian frontier 
 to Narwik, the nearest port on the Atlantic in the Gulf of 
 Vest-Fjord, amounts only to 150 kilometers. A railroad 
 line for- purposes of Russian offensive is all ready and ter- 
 minates in Tornea. A second line going through the Lakes 
 of Finland, is also completed. The Russian imperialism 
 having won in the south will strike northward, in order to 
 accomplish, after having entered trie Mediterranean, the 
 second part of its mission and gain access to the Atlantic 
 Ocean. The second part "of the testament of Peter the 
 Great" will be easy to execute. Russia will base herself 
 on her 250,000,000 population and economic evolution will 
 permit her to make armaments without the help of France. 
 The Russian imperialism will dominate its military needs 
 and will confront Europe sure of its strength and inexhaust- 
 ible as to the number of its armies, free to shift its armies 
 from place to place as well as its ships and ammunition. 
 Nobody thinks of changing a victorious policy. Vic- 
 torious Russia will not change also her imperialism. Bryce 
 anticipated this in his clever saying that "the doctrine of Pan- 
 Slavism under an imperial head of the Orthodox Eastern 
 Church has become a formidable engine of aggression in the 
 hands of mighty despotism and a growing race, naturally 
 
— ey — 
 
 drawn to expand its frontiers toward the south."* The 
 power of Germany of to-day shrinks in comparison with 
 the power which a victorious Pan-Slavism might be able to 
 develop some day. Russia will certainly not hesitate to make 
 sacrifices, and the Czar does not need to care about losses 
 of human material. Homer Lea figured out that in the 
 eighteenth century Russia had sent on the field of battle 
 4,910,000 men.f Only 1,380,000 returned home from this 
 orgy of blood. In the nineteenth century another 4,900,000 
 marched out and only 1,410,000 came back to their homes. 
 Russia will not suffer any lack of new millions in the twen- 
 tieth century. Only Pan-Germanism, under the leadership 
 of Berlin, would then be able to combat successfully Russia's 
 preponderance. In this case Europe will have to change 
 the structure of its power in contradiction of the principle 
 of nationalism and on the basis of the principle of the race. 
 The Czar of the Slavs would have to be opposed by the Czar 
 of Teutons. The example of Russia, however, is liable to 
 become contagious and the tolerance of Pan-Slavism gives 
 right of existence to Pan-Germanism. In such a case Eu- 
 rope would have to take a step backward. Such a step 
 backward, however, is neither of interest to European na- 
 tions nor to the interest of progress and peace. The world 
 is not swept to-day by the hurricane of this terrific war in 
 order to pave the road for Pan-Slavism. 
 
 Gladstone mentioned in his memoirs that after the defeat 
 of Napoleon III at Sedan, "Europe has lost a mistress and 
 got a master."J After a "Sedan" of William II, Europe may 
 get back "a mistress," but no more France, only Russia, 
 should Russia succeed in dictating the peace. In such a case, 
 
 * J. Bryce, 1. c, page 421. 
 
 f Homer Lea: "The Day of the Saxon," pages 130-131. 
 
 t John Morley : "The Life of W. E. Gladstone," Book VI, page 357. 
 
— ?0 — 
 
 not only continental Europe but also England shall find her 
 "mistress." 
 
 Victorious Pan-Slavism will avenge the Germans. 
 
 The imperialism of Russia is the continuation of the 
 struggle between the Orient and the Occident, between the 
 traditions of Rome and the traditions of Constantinople. 
 After the downfall of Poland, Russia aims at Turkey and 
 Austria-Hungary ; after the fall of Warsaw she "is press- 
 ing on to Vienna."* Pan-Slavism is the ideology of the 
 Russian attack against Austria-Hungary, just as the inter- 
 ests of the Orthodox religion form the ideology of the 
 attack against Turkey. In this light, the question of Servia 
 shines brightly. 
 
 Servia belongs to the Orthodox Church and is a tool in 
 the hands of Russia. Russian diplomacy has supported the 
 ambitions of Servia in order to use them against Austria- 
 Hungary ; the agitation of the press and the promises of 
 Russia arouse the passions. Bosnia and Herzegovina became 
 the trump in the hands of Russia; Servia has filed her 
 claims to this territory and Russian diplomacy succeeded 
 in persuading public opinion that the claims of Servia are 
 just. 
 
 There are facts, however, that contradict this contention. 
 
 • I. Bosnia and Herzegovina never belonged to Servia, 
 not even in the times of Czar Dushan, when Servia reached 
 the pinnacle of her development.! 
 
 II. Bosnia and Herzegovina formed a part of Hungary 
 before the invasion of the Turks, and at all times were in 
 closer relation with the kingdom of Croatia than with 
 Servia. 
 
 * The "Century Magazine," May, 191 5. 
 
 f "The southern Slavs," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 
 
— 71 — 
 
 III. The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
 mixed. The Serbs are Orthodox, while the Croatians are 
 Roman Catholics and form a more cultured element.* A 
 considerable portion of the population is formed by the 
 Moslems of Slav origin. The Croatians and the Moslems 
 form the majority of the population in Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina to the disadvantage of Servian imperialism. 
 
 IV. The Servians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in 
 Southern Hungary, are immigrants. They were driven into 
 these countries by Turkish oppression from which they tried 
 to escape by going north. This is rather a reason for 
 gratefulness for shelter than a point of departure for 
 imperialism. 
 
 V. The Servians in Austria-Hungary have full national 
 rights on the same level as the Poles, the Tchechs, the 
 Croatians, or in other words, freedom of speech, of religion 
 and autonomy. In the Parliament of Bosnia the Serb 
 language has the same rights as the Croatian language, 
 although the Serbs do not have absolute majority in the 
 population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of late, Minister 
 Bilinski supported the Serbs against the Croatians and the 
 Moslems in order to satisfy Servia and avoid war. 
 
 Ill-will ignores the facts. The center of ill-will was 
 Petrograd from where Servia was incited. Servian im- 
 perialism was a reflection of the imperialism of Russia 
 and the idea of Greater Servia was but a shadow of the 
 idea of Greater Russia. The question of rights became a 
 question of secondary nature. Imperialism is the ideology 
 of conquest and, therefore, ignores both the facts and his- 
 torical truths. The decisive factor is selfishness, which is 
 the arm swinging the sword. Servia fell for the illusion 
 
 * "The Southern Slavs," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 
 
that with the help of Russia she wpuld be able to conquer 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and she formed her entire policy 
 to suit this purpose. In order to further this policy the 
 arm of a Serb threw the bomb in Sarajevo. For the sake 
 of this idea, Archduke Francis Ferdinand had to give his 
 life, although he was an opponent of the Hungarians and 
 a friend of the southern Slavs. This is admitted even by 
 the war-like and inspired English press.* It is also pos- 
 sible that Francis Ferdinand was killed because every step 
 that Austria-Hungary was taking in the interest of Slav 
 nations brought them nearer to Western Europe and drew 
 them away from Russia. 
 
 Somebody in England said after the outbreak of the pres- 
 ent war, "it would be absurd to say that Servia is the cause of 
 the war."f It is sufficient to recall the revelations published 
 by the "Matin," of Paris, in 1913, about the federation of the 
 Balkan states in order to become convinced of the fact 
 that this war was planned by Russia long ago. The "Matin" 
 is a friend of Russia and its testimony, therefore, is 
 much more important for the interests of Austria-Hungary. 
 The federation of the Balkan states was directed against 
 Austria-Hungary and not against Turkey. The intrigue 
 of Russian diplomacy had already then planned an attack 
 upon Vienna, but the logic of the internal conditions in 
 the Balkans first prompted the war with Turkey, and then 
 a fratricidal war against each other. Nowadays, when Rus- 
 sia has finally publicly stated that Constantinople is her 
 ultimate goal, one must be naive to think that Russia 
 was prompted by the desire to defend Servia and that 
 she had attacked Austria-Hungary from sheer Pan-Slavic 
 sentiment. The question of Servia was only a clever pre 
 
 * "The Eastern Question," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 18. 
 f "The Eastern Question," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 5. 
 
— 73 — 
 
 text which permitted Russia to pose as a protector of the 
 oppressed. At the bottom of the thing, however, there 
 were deeper reasons in the background of the scenes for 
 many years. A proof for this contention was the attitude of 
 Russia towards Servia, when the offensive movement of the 
 combined Austria-Hungarian and German armies pushed 
 back the Russians from Galicia. In order to draw Italy into 
 the conflict against Austria-Hungary, Russia has agreed to 
 an eventual occupation of Dalmatia and Albania by Italy, 
 which dealt a painful blow to the aspirations of Servia 
 to get an estuary on the Adriatic. Servia was quick to 
 understand the meaning of this movement. A Servian dele- 
 gation in Petrograd began to threaten to conclude separate 
 peace with Austria-Hungary. At the same time a Servian 
 army invaded Albania in order to save at least Durazzo 
 from the imperialism of Italy. It is, furthermore, an inter- 
 esting fact that the imperialism of Italy began to be con- 
 sidered in Petrograd as more Slavic than Servian. It is, 
 furthermore, a known fact that at the Conference at Lon- 
 don, in 1913, Italy was chiefly instrumental in throwing 
 back Servia from the Adriatic Sea, more so than Austria- 
 Hungary. Italy has also prevented Greece from getting 
 the southern portion of the Epirus. Italy is stronger than 
 Servia and, therefore, Russian sympathies move toward 
 Rome, while Servia was brutally left to her misery, dis- 
 ease, famine, and devastation of the war into which Servia 
 was driven by nobody else but Russia. 
 
 The question of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not so much 
 united with the question of Servia, as with the question of 
 the reorganization of the Kingdom of Croatia within the 
 Hungarian state. In the covenant between Hungary and 
 Croatia, of 1868, there is a provision by virtue of which 
 "Hungary recognizes the inviolability of the territory of 
 
— 74 — 
 
 Croatia and promises to concentrate her endeavor upon 
 completing this territory."* In the first covenant this pro- 
 vision related to Dalmatia, which, from a historical point 
 of view, is a part of the Croatian realm. Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina still belonged in 1868 to Turkey ; at present, how- 
 ever, they can be included in Section 65 of the Croato- 
 Hungarian covenant and on this basis enter, together with 
 Dalmatia, into the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, to 
 be reorganized after the present war. Until the outbreak 
 of the present war, Bosnia and Herzegovina did not belong 
 either to Austria or to Hungary, but were subordinate 
 directly to the common Ministry of Finances of Austria- 
 Hungary. This was only a temporary arrangement which 
 left the door open for the imperialism of Servia because 
 the claims of Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
 temporarily suspended. The reorganization of the kingdom 
 of Croatia- Slavonia permits the solving of the question, in 
 accordance with the requirements of the principle of nation- 
 alism, because: 
 
 1. The Croatians form together with the anti-Servian 
 Moslems the majority of the population of Bosnfa and 
 Herzegovina. 
 
 2. Bosnia and Herzogovina were situated in the sphere 
 of Croatian influence at the time of Croatia's independence. 
 
 The claims of Servia to Bosnia and Herzegovina are 
 contradicted not only by statistics but also by the historical 
 fact that these territories never belonged to Servia. Thus, 
 the claims of Servia are contradicted by statistics and his- 
 tory which are the two criterions of nationalism. The im- 
 migrant Servian population possess in Austria-Hungary 
 the recognition of their national rights for a half century. 
 
 * Dr. Edmund Bernatzik : "Die oesterreichischen Verfassungs- 
 gesetze," Leipzic, 1906, page 586. 
 
— 75 — 
 
 and do not run the risk of losing these national rights 
 after the war. In Russia, on the contrary, even the Poles 
 did not have such national rights as do the Servians in 
 Austria-Hungary. 
 
 As far as constitutional liberty is concerned, the auton- 
 omy of Croatia is greater in extent than the autonomy of 
 other provinces in Austria-Hungary. After Vienna and 
 Budapest comes the Croatian capital of Zagrab (Agram) 
 and not Prague or Lemberg. The Banus (governor) of 
 Croatia is responsible to the Croatian parliament which 
 privilege neither Galicia nor Bohemia possess. As far as 
 the legal side is concerned, there is a former point of attach- 
 ment for a reorganization of the kingdom of Croatia. Dal- 
 matia does not as yet form a part of Croatia "de facto," 
 although she forms a part of the country "de nomine." The 
 question of Dalmatia forms a temporary arrangement which 
 is called in legal parlance of Austria-Hungary a "provisor- 
 ium."* The renewing of the question of Dalmatia and its 
 regulation, together with the question of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina is, from the legal point of view, perfectly admis- 
 sible and bears on territories which, historically speaking, 
 are closely related with each other. This would mean the 
 solving of the problem of southern Slavdom. Servian 
 traditions have in former times gone farther south, towards 
 Saloniki, and not towards the Danube. The maintenance 
 of the independence of Servia and the regulation of the 
 frontier line of Albania and Macedonia decide the ques- 
 tion in the Balkans. The reorganization of the kingdom 
 of Croatia and Slavonia is liable to create a new and vital 
 political unit on the shores of the Adriatic Sea. The lib- 
 erty of nations would find a just realization without any 
 
 * Dr. Edmund Bernatzik : "Die oesterreichischen Verfassungs- 
 gesetze," Leipzig, 1906, page 218. 
 
— 76 — 
 
 injury to Servia. All the rumors about Austria-Hungary's 
 pressing towards Saloniki are an anachronism. The peace 
 treaty of Bucharest has solved the question of the Balkans 
 for the benefit of Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Servia and 
 Montenegro. The Balkan question in its old anti-Turkish 
 conception disappears and at the same time Austria-Hun- 
 gary is losing the occasion for imperialistic attempts. 
 Rumors are current that Archduke Francis Ferdinand con- 
 templated a "trialism," or a combination of Austria-Hun- 
 gary and Croatia on an equal legal basis. It was a very 
 just idea but still it did not protect him from a tragic 
 death in Sarajevo at the hands of a Serb, whose mind 
 had been poisoned by the imperialistic propaganda. It is 
 not Servia's guilt, but the guilt of the party that, behind 
 the scenes, continued arousing artificial ambitions. Ser- 
 vian imperialism, on the other hand, was not directed so 
 much against Austria or against Hungary, as against the 
 Slavic kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia, which has serious 
 claims to Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Servia has none. 
 To destroy these claims of Croatia would be a downright 
 injury ; it is, therefore, nothing strange that under these 
 conditions the Croatians are fighting against Russia and 
 Servia with so much enthusiasm that they have become 
 the heroes of the Austria-Hungarian armies. 
 
 The reorganization of the kingdom of Croatia permits 
 at the same time the solving of the problem of the shores 
 of the Adriatic Sea in Austria-Hungary. Fiume, Pola, 
 and Trieste belong, from the point of view of nationalism, 
 to Croatia and Slavonia, and should not belong either to 
 Servia or to Italy. Both statistics as well as history favor 
 Croatia and Slavonia; the Slavs form the majority of the 
 people on the shores of the Adriatic. This is admitted 
 even by the English press during the present war, although 
 
this fact is by no means convenient to the enemies of 
 Austria-Hungary.* The claims of Servia to Fiume or 
 Trieste are unjust, and the same time is the case with the 
 claims of Italy in spite of the fact that the Italian population 
 forms a considerable percentage in the towns on this shore. 
 The country is essentially Slavic and the village popula- 
 tion is always an autochthon population, a stratum which 
 is historically original, while the population of the cities 
 is mostly an immigrant one. Italians know this and that 
 is why in their claims before the outbreak of the war they 
 championed the idea of forming a miniature state from 
 Trieste and its surrounding territory. They didn't dare to 
 claim Trieste for themselves because the slogan of the 
 present war is nationalism as well as permanent peace. 
 They felt the lack of a legal basis as well as a statistical 
 and historical basis. They disguised their imperialism by 
 pretext of nationalism — one proclaiming the idea of inde- 
 pendence for Trieste and its surrounding territory. The 
 Italian population on the Austrian-Hungarian shore of the 
 Adriatic Sea has perfect freedom of national life, which 
 means liberty of language, religion, municipal home rule 
 and a full share in the constitutional life of the entire 
 state. The only limitations are the equal rights of the 
 Slavic nationalities which form the majority of the popu- 
 lation, which is autochthon and native for centuries since 
 those days when there was an independent Croatia on the 
 shores of the Adriatic. From the historical point of view, 
 the domination of Italy reached as far as the shores of 
 Dalmatia only in the times of ancient Rome and then 
 in the time of the Republic of Venice, and finally once 
 more in the times of Napoleon. The frontier lines estab- 
 lished by Napoleon were the frontier lines of war, and of 
 * "Italian Policy since 1870," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914. 
 
— 78 — 
 
 this fact England is perfectly well aware because no other 
 state combated Napoleon's imperialism as ardently and as 
 persistently as England did. The frontier lines of Venice 
 were frontier lines of conquest and not of nationality. Who- 
 ever knows the secret bridges in the mysterious palaces 
 of Venice will not fail to understand the character of the 
 government exercised once upon a time by the Carthago 
 of the Adriatic Sea. Rome after all owned not only Trieste 
 but also Paris, and the Roman legions extended their tri- 
 umphal march even as far as the banks of the Thames. 
 Does this fact entitle the Italians to raise any claims to 
 France or to England? From the historical point of view 
 the claims of Italy to Trieste are not at all better than 
 the claims to Tunis. History does not confirm the Italian 
 claims, and statistics decide the issue in favor of Croatia 
 and Slavonia. Trieste should in fact be the natural harbor 
 of Croatia regenerated both as far as her boundaries and 
 autonomy are concerned. The Italian attack is directed 
 more against Croatia than against Austria or Hungary and 
 therefore Italy's attitude is in contradiction with the pro- 
 gram of nationalism. Italy may claim at the most some 
 strategical advantages on the frontier of the Tyrol which 
 advantages necessarily must be of a slight significance, but 
 they can never claim with any right either Trieste or 
 Dalmatia which are a territory of Slavic settlement as well 
 as a sphere of Slavic interest for over a thousand years. 
 Austria-Hungary forms a sentinel on the Adriatic; they 
 are the gate through which the thirst of several central 
 European nations for an estuary on the sea is satisfied. 
 These are mostly Slavic nations protected by the wall of 
 the Alps, the Sudets and the Carpathians from the im- 
 perialism of Russia, Germany and Italy. None of these 
 nations could independently and without the co-operation 
 
— 79 — 
 
 of other nations preserve or defend this access to the sea. 
 Austria could not do it, nor could Hungary, nor Bohemia, 
 nor Croatia, not speaking even of the Slovaks, Mora- 
 vians, Silesians, and even Roumanians in Transylvania, who 
 are cut off by the natural barrier of the Carpathians from 
 the Black Sea and the mouth of the Danube. The ques- 
 tion of the Adriatic Sea is a question of first-class impor- 
 tance and of historical necessity for all these nations. A 
 law is nothing else but a form of economic life, and the 
 state is nothing else but an organization of the law. Nations 
 are formed and developed through their own political exist- 
 ence as a state, or, in other words, through the organiza- 
 tion of their legal life within which the economical life 
 of the nation has the possibility of evolution. The Adriatic 
 Sea is the condition of economic life of the nations form- 
 ing Austria-Hungary, and as such, must be the problem 
 of their legal and political life, or, in other words, a ques- 
 tion of existence. The shore of the Adriatic is, therefore, 
 a necessity for the nations of Austria-Hungary, which is 
 not the case with regard to Italy. The latter can conquer 
 the shores of the Adriatic by force, but at the expense of 
 the rights and existence of the economical life of the 
 nationalities of which Austria-Hungary is composed. The 
 annexation of Trieste by Italy would under such condi- 
 tions mean a defeat of nationalism and a victory of imperial- 
 ism. It can hardly be assumed that Italy should go to 
 war in the name of an imperialistic principle while the 
 present war is fought for the sake of nationalism. There 
 is, furthermore, no doubt as to the fact that the attack 
 of Italy is an attack upon the natural boundaries of Austria- 
 Hungary. Nothing permanent could be built in this way ; 
 it is impossible to uphold the principle of nationalism in one 
 place for the price of betraying it somewhere else, because 
 
— 80 — 
 
 thus only political errors and historical injustice can be 
 committed. 
 
 It is hard to find a greater lack of logic as to try to dis- 
 member Austria-Hungary because of the war with Germany. 
 Germany nowadays is a world power. Should Austria- 
 Hungary be dismembered, the German provinces of the 
 Hapsbourg empire would naturally fall to Germany, which 
 would thus gain upper and lower Austria, Tyrol, Styria, 
 Carinthia. From the point of view of national evolution it 
 would mean a triumph for Germany and national unifica- 
 tion would be a balm on the defeat, because Germany as a 
 nation is more numerous than Russia, although Russia is a 
 giant when compared with Germany as a state. Ninety 
 million people under the strong hand government of Berlin 
 would constitute a force able to strike soon for revenge. 
 German militarism has a great routine which would enable it 
 to produce from Greater Germany such a force that Pan- 
 Germanism could easily become the real policy of Berlin. 
 Is the present war conducted for the purpose of creating 
 Pan-Germanism through the partition of Austria-Hungary? 
 The road from Berlin to the Adriatic Sea goes through 
 Vienna. The German settlements in Carnia and Carniola are 
 not far from the Adriatic shore. Berlin is very well aware of 
 the fact that it would naturally become the heir of Vienna in 
 case Austria-Hungary be dismembered. On this basis the 
 government of Berlin would at once begin to seek access to 
 the sea. Vienna and Budapest have better claims to Trieste 
 or Fiume than Belgrade and Rome have. Germany could 
 go to the Adriatic Sea over the body of Austria-Hungary, 
 and, upon reaching the Adriatic, would float her flag in the 
 Mediterranean. This would again constitute a grave danger 
 for England, because Germany could then evade the Straits 
 of Gibraltar and transfer the point of gravitation of her 
 
— 81 — 
 
 armaments to the Mediterranean. The domination of Eng- 
 land over the Suez Canal is safe as long as Germany is cut 
 off from this route. Germany's crossing the Alps would 
 mean the evasion of Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal is the 
 road to India and Australia. This fact is sufficient to make 
 England a friend of Austria-Hungary during the peace ne- 
 gotiations, because Austria-Hungary is a barrier for the 
 imperialism of Germany and does not permit the latter to 
 evade Gibraltar by the way of the Alps and Trieste. Trieste, 
 in the hands of Austria-Hungary, does not constitute any 
 danger for England, because Austria-Hungary does not have 
 and never will have colonial ambitions on the Mediterranean. 
 Austria-Hungary does not have any interest in attacking the 
 Suez Canal, but Germany has. Furthermore, Austria- 
 Hungary is not a toy in the hands of Berlin and shall never 
 become the blind weapon in the hands of Germany. Austria- 
 Hungary will never spend her money for excessive naval 
 armaments for the sake of somebody else's interest. Fur- 
 thermore, Russia and not England is the enemy of Austria- 
 Hungary, and the monarchy of the Hapsbourgs armed itself 
 before this war not against England but against Russia ; this' 
 is one more reason why Austria-Hungary would certainly 
 not arm herself against England after this war. Austria- 
 Hungary, England and France do not have any conflicting 
 interests, and were driven into this war only by the logic of 
 alliances and by the force of military considerations. Any 
 imperialism which Austria-Hungary could possibly display 
 on the Mediterranean would be an abortive movement and 
 besides a very costly one. Austria-Hungary's state reason 
 coincides with that of England and France, but is in contra- 
 diction with the state reason of Russia, or better to say, with 
 Russia's imperialism. Austria-Hungary in this war is allied 
 with Germany against Russia, and that the alliance is at the 
 
— 82 — 
 
 same time very active against England and France is a mere 
 incident. The note in which Sir Edward Grey declared war 
 against Austria-Hungary in the name of Great Britain 
 states explicitly that England was "obliged" to declare war ; 
 the note in question does not contain anything else. No 
 mention is made of any litigious matter at all and only the 
 pure logic of military considerations is set forth. Austria- 
 Hungary and Germany are fighting shoulder to shoulder 
 because the parallelity and not the identity of the interests 
 compel them to do so. England and France are fighting 
 shoulder to shoulder with Russia for exactly the same rea- 
 son. Parallelity is not identity and geometry defines paral- 
 lelity as a condition resulting from the lack of points of con- 
 tact. The military point of view must be strictly distin- 
 guished from the political one. The danger from the part 
 of Russia was the main prompting element of the alliance 
 between Austria-Hungary and Germany. The political 
 genius of Bismarck has taken advantage of the situation, 
 although the memories of the battle at Sadowa did not die 
 out completely as yet. Precisely for the same reason of 
 the danger from the part of Russia, Edward VII did not 
 succeed in drawing Austria-Hungary away from Germany. 
 The Cabinet of Vienna realized it perfectly well that in case 
 of a war with Russia, Austria-Hungary would be isolated 
 and deprived of Germany's help, and London was too far 
 away to help Austria-Hungary in her frontier conflicts with 
 Servia, Italy and Roumania. England, as a rule, always 
 came late in the present war and it would be so much more 
 late in coming to help Austria-Hungary. This considera- 
 tion decided the permanency of the alliance between Austria- 
 Hungary and Germany and at the same time insured Aus- 
 tria-Hungary's safety from Russia's attacks. Any support 
 given to Russia in her threats of a partition of Austria- 
 
— 83 — 
 
 Hungary is in the last analysis a work "pour le roi de 
 Prusse." 
 
 One must be blinded with hatred if he fails to see through 
 that. 
 
 The Hapsbourgs did not forget as yet that the crown of 
 the Roman Emperors was once upon a time resting on their 
 heads. Vienna still resounds with the chimes of the same 
 bells which once proclaimed the glory of Charles V, on whose 
 possessions the sun was never setting. It was a very just 
 remark that was made once that the Austrian empire al- 
 though dating only as far back as 1806, "became respected as 
 the oldest and most conservative."* The throne of the Haps- 
 bourgs is still overshadowed by the imperial purple, by the 
 tradition of Rome. The force of these memories was not 
 extinguished by the defeat of Austria at Sadowa, nor later 
 on by the brilliant development of Berlin, and the emperor 
 of Austria did not cease until now to pass as a legal heir of 
 the crown of the Roman Emperors. The Roman empire 
 became closely intertwined with the Catholic church; the 
 "World-State" and the "World-Church" were elements 
 which completed each other in the conception of the "Holy- 
 Empire." The Catholics in Germany and particularly the 
 Catholics in Austria-Hungary understand it well and under 
 the penalty of treason to the Church they cannot deviate 
 from this conception. On the basis of the fact that the 
 dynasty of the Hapsbourgs is Catholic, the Catholic party 
 in Germany insisted in 1866 upon Austria being the leader 
 of the Germanic World. The Roman Emperor as a universal 
 monarch cannot be a Protestant; this is a dogma of an 
 ideal and political nature at the same time. William II is 
 a Protestant, and this prevents him from filing his claim to 
 the supremacy of the world. He may endeavor to impose 
 
 * J. Bryce, 1. c, page 420. 
 
— 34 — 
 
 this supremacy by sheer force but he has no title to it ; the 
 existence itself of Austria-Hungary is in this respect also a 
 hindrance to Berlin. The fact that Austria-Hungary is in 
 existence means the following: 
 
 I — Division of the German nation into two independent 
 states which, however, agrees with the requirements of the 
 principle of nationalism. 
 
 II — Does not permit Berlin to file a claim of Germany 
 to the inheritance of Rome and to the supremacy over West- 
 ern Europe. 
 
 Bryce perceived with a keen eye of the historian and 
 statesman of great calibre that "it was the tradition of a 
 glorious past when Germany led the world that made the 
 Germans again a united people, the central power of Con- 
 tinental Europe."*' The traditions of Rome did not die out 
 as yet in Central Europe although they died out in France 
 and England, without speaking, of course, of America. The 
 importance of. this question was well understood by England 
 when the latter refused to recognize the abdication of Fran- 
 cis II from the dignity of a Roman Emperor. During the 
 Congress of Vienna, England attempted to "re-establish 
 . . . the Empire," but Prussia, "elated at the glory she 
 had won in the war of independence, "f refused to submit to 
 the supremacy of Austria and succeeded to arouse the pro- 
 test of other German states. It is an almost forgotten fact 
 that England to this day refused to recognize the abdication 
 of the Hapsbourgs from the dignity of Roman Emperors, 
 and the possibility of re-establishing of this dignity did not 
 altogether pass away. The existence of the throne of the 
 Hapsbourgs neutralizes under these conditions the inheri- 
 tance of Rome in Western and in Central Europe. The 
 
 * J. Bryce, 1. c, page 503. 
 f J. Bryce, 1. c, page 416. 
 
— 85 — 
 
 throne of the Hapsbourgs preserves a greater dignity and 
 does not gain in material strength. A dynastical gap be- 
 tween the Hapsbourgs and the Hohenzollerns furthers the 
 interests of peace and equilibrium. The policy of Austria- 
 Hungary on the other hand is and shall always remain the 
 resulting element of the will of different autonomous nations, 
 and, therefore, can never become anti-nationalistic, but must 
 always co-operate with other nations for the welfare of 
 humanity and peace. 
 
 The Allies try, according to a popular version, to strike 
 not as much at the German nation as at Prussia, which is 
 reported to have directed the energy of Germany into a path 
 which is inconsistent with the interests of peace. At the 
 same time, this tendency drives towards the dismemberment 
 of Austria-Hungary. This is an attempt of a compromise 
 between the sympathy of England and France and the in- 
 sinuations of Russian diplomacy which tries to force upon 
 the world the partition of Austria-Hungary. Sound reason- 
 ing indicates that in order to destroy Prussia and spare the 
 German nation, the partition of Austria-Hungary would be 
 a nonsense. There is still some truth in the contention that 
 "the Southern Germans look to Vienna rather than to Ber- 
 lin."* Prussia could be destroyed only by the destruction of 
 the German Empire, which was the result of Prussia's vic- 
 tory over Austria in 1866 and over France in 1871. Should 
 this be done, what could the organization of future Germany 
 be based upon? After eliminating the hegemony of Prussia, 
 it would be necessary to return to the hegemony which Prus- 
 sia eliminated once upon a time. This would mean the 
 hegemony of Austria which was crushed on the battlefield 
 of Sadowa. The independence and the development of the 
 German nation can do without the supremacy of Prussia but 
 
 * L. C. Jane : "The Nations at War," London, 1914, page 192. 
 
— 86 — 
 
 could not possibly do without the supremacy of somebody 
 else. Viewed otherwise, from a different standpoint, the 
 entire program of the Allies with regard to Germany is either 
 a fiction or a huge lie. The idea of reorganizing Germany 
 at the expense of Prussia must naturally go hand in hand 
 with the preserving of Austria-Hungary, in order to make 
 the throne of the Hapsbourgs once more the throne of the 
 German nation. Regardless of the point of view, however, 
 it remains a fact that a strong Austria-Hungary is the guar- 
 antee of equilibrium in Europe. Austria-Hungary is a bar- 
 rier for the imperialism of Russia and to some extent also 
 for the imperialism of Germany. Austria-Hungary protects 
 the Bosporus from Russia and the Adriatic Sea from 
 Germany, and by this fact the throne of the Hapsbourgs 
 goes a good deal towards the re-establishing in Europe of 
 the Roman peace, of the permanent peace of the Caesars. 
 It is impossible any more for the Roman imperialism to be 
 renewed in Austria-Hungary, nor can the old Roman form 
 of domination over the world be revived, but the mission of 
 old Rome in the world has a chance of being regenerated. 
 
 Some day the gates of the temple of Janus will be closed ! 
 
 It was a mistake on the part of England that she did not 
 protect Austria in 1866 against an attack by Prussia. It was 
 equally a mistake of England not to protect France in 1870, 
 and Homer Lea reproaches England from her own point of 
 view for having failed to do so.* In the eyes of English 
 public opinion, the victory of Prussia was considered even 
 as the "triumph of the principle of nationality."! England 
 failed to see that on the battlefields of Sadowa and Sedan 
 the seed of the present war was sown. Bismarck was not a 
 friend of the sea and this to some extent appeased the fears 
 
 * Homer Lea : "The Day of the Saxon." 
 t J. Bryce, 1. c, page 505. 
 
— 87 — 
 
 of England, inasmuch as on land England does not have to 
 be an enemy of Germany. It was a mistake of Lord Pal- 
 merston and of Lord Beaconsfield that they did not protect 
 Austria and France from Prussia, but at least they protected 
 Constantinople from Russia's appetite. The mistake they 
 made did not lie in the fact that they protected Constan- 
 tinople but in their failure to protect Austria and France. 
 A purely opportunistic policy has prevented England from 
 championing the cause of Austria and France in their wars 
 with Prussia ; the same opportunistic policy lowers England 
 still more nowadays and makes Great Britain sell to Russia, 
 Constantinople and the Slavish provinces of Austria-Hun- 
 gary for a temporary military support against Germany. 
 Lord Beaconsfield committed the first mistake and his critics 
 nowadays endeavor to commit the second one. All this must 
 be some tragic misunderstanding, because it is impossible 
 to conceive that England should go in such a broken way 
 against all of her former traditions. 
 
 The considerations which support the argument of pre- 
 serving Austria-Hungary as a first-class power form a por- 
 tion of the conditions for : 
 
 I — The permanence of the coming peace; 
 
 II — The victory of the just principle of nationalism; 
 
 III — The defeat of the imperialism of Russia. 
 In spite of the aroused passions, there will be a place for 
 the following principles among the conditions of the coming 
 peace : 
 
 I — The strengthening of Austria-Hungary as a first- 
 class power against the imperialism of Russia, be- 
 cause Pan-Slavism is the reactionary program of 
 a race and not a progressive program of na- 
 tionalism ; 
 
— 88 — 
 
 II — The solving of the question of Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina through the reorganization of the Kingdom 
 of Croatia and Slavonia in the sense of trialism 
 and in accordance with the teachings of history 
 and statistics, and without injuring Servia, whose 
 claims against Austria-Hungary are dictated by an 
 imperialistic policy, it being only a reflection of 
 Russian Pan- Slavism and inconsistent with the 
 requirements of a just nationalism. 
 
 On the battlefields of the present war, the moral achieve- 
 ment of nationalism in Austria-Hungary won a victory. 
 The world has convinced itself that a structure erected by a 
 thousand years and by a half century of constitutional 
 regime is not a house of cards which can be blown to pieces 
 by the first blow of the hurricane of war. 
 
Chapter IV 
 THE FUTURE of WARSAW 
 
91 — 
 
 Chapter IV. — The Future of Warsaw 
 
 The map of Europe contains a great political paradox. 
 This paradox is the line of the Vistula, which is one 
 of the main rivers of central Europe. Its upper part 
 is in the hands of Austria-Hungary; the middle part 
 in the hands of Russia and the lower part in those 
 of Germany. On the upper part of the Vistula lies 
 the town of Cracow where the old Polish Kings 
 are buried; in the middle part of the Vistula is Warsaw, 
 the capital of Poland, while Danzig, the old Polish harbor 
 town, lies at the mouth of the Vistula. It certainly is a 
 paradox which shows geographically the political slavery of 
 Poland. Cut in three parts, the Vistula is a river of slavery 
 and the river of the great Polish suffering. 
 
 The paradox of the Vistula is the strategical and eco- 
 nomical expression of what Clemenceau has called "one of 
 the biggest crimes in history."* 
 
 The present war has been called a war fought for the 
 liberty of nations. Ten millions of troops have been rushed 
 into the valley of the Vistula, and from the Baltic Sea to the 
 Carpathian Mountains there is one vast struggle going on, a 
 struggle for which there is no comparison in history. The 
 main issue in this enormous struggle is the fate of Warsaw, 
 the capital of Poland. From the strategical point of view it 
 is a question of the Vistula — from the political point of view 
 it is a question of Poland's future. On the banks of the 
 Vistula, justice is meted out for the partition of Poland and 
 
 * "L'Homme Libre," August 16, 19x4. 
 
— 92 — 
 
 the three powers, which once upon a time dismembered 
 Poland, are finally facing each other as enemies, arrayed 
 for a final settlement. The Polish question which hitherto 
 united them began to be a bone of contention; under the 
 pressure of military necessity, both sides were compelled to 
 approach the Polish nation, which ages ago settled on the 
 banks of the Vistula and occupies the theatre of the present 
 war. 
 
 The time came for making promises. 
 
 The proclamation which a year ago the German and the 
 Austro-Hungarian armies distributed in Russian-Poland 
 stated that the armies of these countries were bringing 
 "Liberty and Independence"* to Poland. This was the first 
 ray of hope for the Polish nation. A few days later an- 
 other promise came, this time from the opposite party. On 
 August 15, 1914, the late Russian Commander-in-Chief, 
 Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolajevitch, proclaimed that the 
 intention of Russia is to unite Poland under the sceptre of 
 the Czar. "Poland shall be reborn under this sceptre, free 
 in faith, in language, in self-government." The armies of 
 the western nations gave the hope of independence — the 
 armies of the eastern power have limited the future of 
 Poland to autonomy. The aforesaid proclamations, how- 
 ever, were proclamations issued only by commanders-in- 
 chief, and not by their respective governments. 
 
 Poland knew long ago that the war would practically draw 
 closer, and she prepared herself so as not to be surprised and 
 to have a plan of action. During the war in the Balkans, 
 Poland advanced her preparations considerably. Old and new 
 organizations began secretly or openly to work with fewer in 
 order to be able, in case of a war between Austria and 
 
 * "Nowa Reforma," Cracow, August, 1914. 
 
— 93 — 
 
 Russia, to form their own military representation and throw 
 it in the game and fight for Poland's independence. Out- 
 wardly, Poland made her first political demonstration in 
 European politics in the summer of 1913. Polish military 
 organizations and independence parties sent a delegation to 
 London, where at that time a conference of ambassadors of 
 European nations was in session, and it deposited with Sir 
 Edward Grey and all the ambassadors assembled in con- 
 ference a memorandum on the question of Poland. This 
 memorandum was nothing else but a program of Poland's 
 attitude in the war which at that time was already antici- 
 pated. This memorandum called Europe's attention to the 
 fact that in case of a war, Poland would throw her lot with 
 Austria-Hungary against Russia because under present po- 
 litical conditions such an action means the only real road 
 to independence for Poland. The moment when the antici- 
 pated war broke out Poland did not need to make her action 
 dependent on any of the aforesaid proclamations which the 
 armies of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia distributed 
 all over Poland's territory. 
 
 On August 5, 1914, the first Polish patrol composed of 
 members of Polish military organizations left Cracow and 
 crossed Russia's frontier, headed for Kielce in Russian Po- 
 land. This patrol was followed by other detachments num- 
 bering several thousand of men. All of them were revolu- 
 tionary troops trained in a military organization which for a 
 good many years carried on the work openly in Galicia and 
 under cover in Prussian and in Russian-Poland ; in these or- 
 ganizations young men were trained for military purposes in 
 order to be able to form, in case of war between Austria and 
 Russia, a military representation of Poland. The plan 
 elaborated long ago began to work. The frontier posts 
 which for over a hundred years separated Cracow from 
 
— 94 — 
 
 Warsaw were pulled down ; they were pulled down by the 
 Polish revolutionary soldiers who were the first to cross 
 the frontier in order to bring liberty to Russian-Poland. 
 This happened on August 5th — precisely fifty years after 
 the Russian government in Warsaw, through the hangman's 
 noose, executed the last five members of the last Polish 
 National Government. This date of August 5th was a fes- 
 tival and the day of the beginning of a new fight for inde- 
 pendence. At the head of the movement stood Joseph 
 Pilsudzki, a Russian subject. The road to Kielce was open 
 for him because the Russian armies retreated for strategical 
 reasons and the armies of Austria-Hungary had not arrived. 
 Neither was there any proclamation from any of the warring 
 powers. The action of the Poles outran the coming events. 
 In Kielce, where for a while no other armies had made their 
 appearance and which was occupied only by the Polish 
 troops, the independence of Poland was proclaimed. The 
 churches resounded with Polish national anthems for which 
 hitherto Russian government deported the people to Siberia. 
 Polish flags showing the historical White Eagle were once 
 more floating over the city showing their white and crim- 
 son colors to the eyes of the enthusiastic people. The ranks 
 of the Polish revolutionary army began to swell by a large 
 number of volunteers who were able to escape the Russian 
 orders of mobilization. 
 
 One must have gone through slavery himself in order to 
 understand and appreciate the feelings of a nation throwing 
 off the shackles of its slavery. 
 
 On August 3, 1914, proclamations of a secret National 
 Government were posted in Warsaw which summoned the 
 nation to rise against Russia and join hands with the de- 
 tachments of the Polish revolutionary army which was com- 
 ing up from the Galician frontier. A young Pole, a member 
 
— 95 — 
 
 of the Polish conspiracy, was caught by a Russian police 
 while posting the aforesaid bills, and on the next day a volley 
 shot from the rifles of an executionary squad ended his life 
 in the citadel of Warsaw. He was the first victim of the 
 war. About two weeks later the proclamation of the Rus- 
 sian commander-in-chief was issued; in this proclamation, 
 from fear of the awakening revolutionary spirit, a promise 
 of autonomy was made to Poland. It was not enough for 
 a nation that had older political traditions than Russia but, 
 above everything else, the promise came too late. The action 
 of the Poles not only came ahead of the armies of both 
 sides but also of their promises. In Galicia all the political 
 parties succeeded in uniting and in getting into communica- 
 tion with the secret National Government in Warsaw. Be- 
 cause of the freedom of action in Galicia the center of grav- 
 ity of the entire movement was shifted from Warsaw to 
 Cracow from where the first signal for the war of inde- 
 pendence was issued. On the basis of an agreement between 
 the secret and open political parties in Galicia and Russian- 
 Poland, which form together two-thirds of the organized 
 parties in Poland, the Supreme National Committee was 
 organized in Cracow on August 16, 1914; this committee 
 until now has the supreme sway over the destinies of the 
 nation. It is a political representation of Poland in the 
 present war and it is a nucleus of the Polish state, should 
 the conscience of the world awake and should Poland gain 
 her independence. All the detachments of the Polish revolu- 
 tionary forces which were in garrison in Kielce, received the 
 name of "Polish Legions" from the Supreme National Com- 
 mittee. Thus the actual force of the nation, elements 
 organized openly or secretly, and based on an entirely demo- 
 cratic principle, declared themselves against Russia and 
 formed an alliance with Austria-Hungary. The Russian 
 
— 96 — 
 
 promises did not succeed in halting them nor did so the 
 memories of the ill-treatment suffered by the Poles to a 
 great extent at the hands of Prussia. 
 
 The policy of every nation must be a real one, that means 
 it must be based on facts, on real conditions of work and 
 not on fantastic dreams. Nobody has any right to condemn 
 republican France for allying herself with despotic Russia, 
 although French money subsidized the struggle of Russian 
 reaction against the progressive movement. Nobody has 
 the right to blame England for going hand in hand with 
 Russia, although ten years ago England perfectly consciously 
 defeated Russia by the Japanese in Eastern Asia. Nobody 
 has the right to condemn Servia for allying herself with 
 Turkey against Bulgaria in the second Balkan war, although 
 grass has not grown as yet on the graves at Kumanowo and 
 Lule Burgas. In the same way, nobody can condemn Poland 
 for allying herself with Austria-Hungary and throwing her 
 forces against Russia. Every nation has a "ratio status" 
 of its own, which determines the direction of its policy. 
 This "ratio status" is the result of historical traditions and 
 of material conditions for action. Positive results can be 
 reached only through positive means. The road to Berlin does 
 not lead through the moon but along the strategical line of 
 the Rhine or the Vistula. The road from Italy to Trentino 
 leads through the Alps but not across the ocean. It is useless 
 to vociferate against the Germans when the ammunition 
 gives out on the road to Berlin. A certain purpose requires 
 positive means and the reality of the means is determined 
 by the facts and the conditions on the theatre of a war or of 
 politics. The alliance of Poland with Austria-Hungary was 
 the result of the Polish "ratio status" and of real conditions 
 which already beforehand decided that only by an alliance 
 with Austria-Hungary and by a war against Russia, Poland 
 
— 97 — 
 
 can become free and independent. Whoever thinks that the 
 decision of Poland was influenced by feelings, sympathies, 
 promises or fantastic hope, is mistaken. Poland did not stop 
 to compare the injuries she suffered from Prussia with 
 those she suffered at Russia's hands. This would have been 
 a childish policy or a policy of nervous artists. Not feelings 
 but interest decided the issue. Poland does not fight nowa- 
 days because of a desire of revenge against Russia nor be- 
 cause of a desire of showing her gratitude to Austria-Hun- 
 gary. The anti-Polish policy of Russia was real and sincere, 
 but the Polish anti-Russian policy was in no degree less sin- 
 cere and less real. Poland understands and respects the 
 "ratio status" of other states and other nations, even that of 
 Russia, but Poland puts on the same basis before the world 
 her own "ratio status" and fights for its realization. 
 
 Arms do not terminate war although they decide battles. 
 An army with its blood establishes facts but the conclusions 
 from these premises are drawn by the diplomats when the 
 peace treaties are negotiated. The Polish question is not 
 going to be decided on the battlefield, although battles arcs 
 decided on Polish grounds. The Polish question shall come 
 up together with the whole mass of political questions during 
 the coming peace congress regardless of the form which the 
 latter shall have. This is the goal for which the Polish 
 hopes are aimed, and the work done by the Polish Legions 
 paves the way to this goal. 
 
 One hundred years ago the Congress of Vienna was in 
 session. The Napoleonic hurricane came to an end and then 
 diplomacy started bargaining. The Polish question was one 
 of the foremost among the issues confronting the Congress. 
 Who did revive the Polish question in Europe? Polish 
 troops followed the eagles of Napoleon in his expedition 
 against Russia in 1812. The Polish army was headed by 
 
— 98 — 
 
 Prince Joseph Poniatowski. The Polish army commanded 
 by him was the army of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw es- 
 tablished by Napoleon in 1807 at the peace treaty of Tilsit. 
 Poland has established right at the very beginning of the 
 Napoleonic era a military representation on the side of 
 France. Then appeared for the first time the idea of Polish 
 Legions. By way of Italy, Egypt and even Santo Domingo 
 in America the Polish legions began their march to Warsaw. 
 The road was a long one and cost a heavy toll of blood, but 
 finally it led the legions to their intended goal. The Polish 
 legions were not animated only by hatred when combating 
 Russia nor did they help France only because of any feeling 
 of sympathy. There were feelings even very keen, strong 
 and sacred feelings, but they were far from deciding the 
 Polish policy. The decisive factor was the desire of creating 
 a Polish military representation on the background of Na- 
 poleonic wars in order thus to create a representation for 
 the Polish aspirations for freedom and in order to confront 
 Europe with the Polish question. Liberty can be gained only 
 by blood and iron and therefore the flag carried by the Polish 
 legions of a hundred years ago was such a flag of blood and 
 iron. The glory which fell upon this flag of the legions 
 became the glory of the Polish nation, and it was because of 
 the merit of these legions that the Grand Duchy of Warsaw 
 was established at the peace treaty of Tilsit. 
 
 Napoleon was defeated, and his defeat meant at the same 
 time the military defeat of the Polish cause. The com- 
 mander of the Polish army, Prince Joseph Poniatowski, a 
 hero known very well to-day all over Europe and a field- 
 marshal of Napoleon's army, was drowned in the River 
 Elster while covering the retreat of Napoleon from Leipzig. 
 The Polish cause, however, did not perish. In spite of the 
 military defeat the Polish legions of the Napoleonic army 
 
— 99 — 
 
 caused the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland with a 
 separate parliament and a Polish army in Warsaw. The fact 
 that the Polish army helped Napoleon against Russia and 
 thus against England did not obscure the view of the Cabinet 
 of London. England did not hesitate to support the Polish 
 cause against Russia although Russia was an ally of England 
 in the latter's life and death struggle against Napoleon. The 
 attack which in the battle of Leipzig Prince Joseph Ponia- 
 towski led against the village of Probstheida occupied by 
 Russian troops commanded by Emperor Alexander I him- 
 self, was therefore something more than a mere incident of 
 this "battle of nations." By conquering Probstheida, Prince 
 Joseph Poniatowski "was conquering the capital of the 
 future Kingdom of Poland under the eyes of this Kingdom's 
 future monarch."* Prince Joseph Poniatowski perished 
 and only remnants of the Polish regiments were left when 
 the Napoleonic epopee came to an end. The blood and iron, 
 however, have done their work : Polish regiments have com- 
 pelled Europe to look at them as the representatives of the 
 Polish state. Czar Alexander I had to yield to the opinion 
 of Europe ; and the Poles, although they lost militarily, they 
 won, however, a political victory. They won the Kingdom 
 of Poland which was supposed to be the nucleus for the 
 future full reconstruction of Poland. Unfortunately, several 
 years later Russia has broken the treaty of Vienna and 
 abolished the constitution of the young state. 
 
 The example set by the Polish legions of a hundred years 
 ago serves to-day as a guide for the Polish legions in the 
 present war. The example of Prince Joseph Poniatowski 
 is nowadays the guide of Pilsudzki in the present war. 
 Regardless of the military result the fact will remain on 
 the records of history that in the great European war 
 
 * S. Askenazy : "Ksi^ze Jozef Poniatowski," 1913, page 292. 
 
— 100 — 
 
 Poland created her own military representation to remind 
 the world of the fact of her bloody and heroic existence 
 to force the world to face the question of Polish inde- 
 pendence. The future Congress will decide the issue, but 
 the blood of the Polish legions will be the seed of liberty 
 when finally the conscience of the world will awake and "one 
 of the biggest crimes in history will have an end."* This is 
 the basis of the Polish "ratio status" in the period of 
 Poland's subjugation. Nobody had the right to demand that 
 Poland should act against this "ratio status" of hers nor that 
 it should follow the inspiration of the moment or believe in 
 and wait for the fulfilment of somebody's promises. Poland 
 exists between the hammer and the anvil, and every other na- 
 tion would take the same course that Poland did, and the same 
 course that the Polish legions took in the present war. This 
 road agrees with the Polish traditions against Russia and 
 with the Polish alliance with Austria-Hungary. The rea- 
 son for this is a very simple and a very real one : the creat- 
 ing of a military representation was impossible in any other 
 way. The first year of the European war has proved this 
 contention by the force of facts. The attempt of Russia 
 to organize a Polish legion in Warsaw against Austria- 
 Hungary and Germany failed sadly and there is no Polish 
 legion siding with Russia. On the other hand, the Polish 
 legions against Russia and in alliance with Austria-Hungary 
 are developing fast and have reached already the figure of 
 many thousands of men. The evacuation of Warsaw in- 
 creased the numerical strength of the Polish legions con- 
 siderably. So the actual facts proved which side showed 
 more possibility and actual opportunity : the decision proved 
 to be a practical one against Russia and for an alliance with 
 Austria-Hungary. 
 
 * Clemenceau, 1. c. 
 
— 101 — 
 
 Poland is not a free country. Every male citizen in 
 Poland is compelled to serve in either the Russian or the 
 German or the Austro-Hungarian army. The outbreak of 
 the war came as suddenly as a thunder-bolt from a clear 
 sky. The mobilization in Russia, Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary took about a million men away from Poland within 
 twenty-four hours. The rest of able-bodied Polish men 
 were confronted by the possibility of being called to the 
 colors as the war continued. To-day we can safely say 
 that after the first year of the war is over there remained 
 in Poland only women, children and old people. How could 
 an army be formed under such conditions ? The best judg- 
 ment and the greatest sympathies cannot possibly raise an 
 army when men are lacking. Recruiting cannot be done on 
 the moon nor can officers be made over night and the 
 question of an army is not a question of improvising one. 
 The mobilization of the Polish Legions therefore on the 
 background of the mobilization in Russia, Germany and 
 Austria-Hungary could only be conducted on the basis of 
 the logic of actual conditions and not on the basis of 
 feelings, of sympathies or dispositions. The territory in 
 which the recruiting for Polish Legions was possible was 
 the left bank of the Vistula in the Kingdom of Poland. 
 Galicia and Posen could not furnish an adequate supply of 
 recruits because they form together only 20 per cent, of 
 the historical territory of Poland, and besides the mobili- 
 zation of Austria-Hungary and of Germany goes quicker 
 than the mobilization of Russia. This is the first fact of 
 great importance, because owing to this fact the Russian 
 mobilization was compelled to leave against its very inten- 
 tions a large material of men for purpose of Polish policy. 
 It was of no less importance that the Russian mobilization 
 is less exact, that it proceeds more slowly, and that 
 
— 102 — 
 
 Russia possesses 80 per cent, of the Polish historical terri- 
 tory and the old Polish capital of Warsaw. Those were the 
 real conditions which regardless of the sympathies or the 
 antipathies decided beforehand that by waging war against 
 Russia only on the territory of Russian-Poland could the 
 recruiting for the Polish Legions have any chance of suc- 
 cess. 
 
 The map will show that the frontiers of Russian-Poland 
 are flanked on the north by the Prussian frontier and on 
 the south by the frontier of Galicia. In case of war there 
 was a danger for the Russian armies in Russian-Poland that 
 Austria-Hungary and Germany, which have a speedier 
 mobilization, would by a flank attack from the north and 
 from the south, cut them off on the Vistula and destroy 
 them before the reserves from the interior of Russia would 
 be able to reach the theatre of war. Russia was made 
 aware of this danger long ago by «ome of her best generals 
 such as Dragomirow, Hurko and even Kuropatkin. Accord- 
 ing to their judgment Russia had to evacuate in the first 
 few weeks of the war the left bank of the Vistula for 
 strategical reasons so that the reserves coming up from the 
 interior of Russia would have a shorter road for getting 
 to the battle line and thus be able to reach the seat of war 
 before the armies of the enemy would be able to move for- 
 ward from the north and from the south. This was known 
 both in Poland and in Western Europe. France was afraid 
 of this possibility as France was compelled to depend on 
 a speedy offensive movement of Russia in the direction of 
 Berlin and on this plan were based the hopes of France 
 to protect Paris from a violent onrush of the German armies. 
 This was a decisive fact for Poland. The evacuation of the 
 western provinces of Russian-Poland by the Russians meant 
 in case of the outbreak of the war the stopping of the 
 
— 103 — 
 
 Russian mobilization in these districts. The western dis- 
 tricts of Russian-Poland are chiefly industrial. Here are 
 to be found large coal mines in the valley of Dabrowa and 
 of Sosnowiec, and besides there is a number of industrial 
 centres such as Cz^stochowa or Nowo-Radomsk. The out- 
 break of the war closed the factories and the mines : the 
 masses of laboring men were thrown out of employment, 
 and as Russia had to retreat there was left for the Polish 
 legions ready and very useful material of men. Thus the 
 Polish legions recruited the majority of their soldiers from 
 these sections of the country. Eighty per cent, of the 
 soldiers in the Polish Legions were recruited in Russian- 
 Poland and the majority among them came from the indus- 
 trial districts which Russia had to evacuate in the begin- 
 ning of the war temporarily for strategical reasons. This 
 was an anticipated fact but still it played a decisive part 
 in the Polish policy. The mobilization of Poland had to be 
 necessarily directed against Russia if it was to be of any 
 use and if it was to give results. 
 
 The rest of the task of organization rested with Galicia 
 which for over half a century enjoyed the benefits of 
 autonomy within the general constitution of Austria-Hun- 
 gary. "Galicia has not been unhappy."* In Posen there 
 are no Polish schools nor Polish university: in Russian- 
 Poland there was a university, but a Russian one, and all 
 schools were Russian too while private schools suffered from 
 exceedingly heavy restrictions on the part of the Russian 
 Government. In Posen, the Commission of Colonization 
 originated by Bismarck bought up Polish land and settled 
 it with Germans. In Russian-Poland the "Bank wfoscianski" 
 has done the same for over fifty years and colonizes Polish 
 
 "The Germans," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, page 12. 
 
— 104 — 
 
 land with Orthodox Russian peasants. In Lithuania and 
 Little Russia the Poles are absolutely forbidden to buy land 
 nor to sell to anyone except a Russian. Thus a Pole can- 
 not acquire land which actually belongs to the Poles, neither 
 in Lithuania or in Little Russia. Czar Nicholas I invented 
 the system of destroying the Polish nation and Bismarck 
 became his apt pupil. This was done very much to the 
 disadvantage of Russia and of Germany and brought great 
 harm to Poland. The development of the Polish nation thus 
 remained under the most trying conditions, whereby great 
 mistakes were committed in Petrograd with regard to 
 the Polish question and still greater ones were committed 
 by Berlin. The friendship between Germany and Russia 
 was the basis for oppressing Poland. The celebration of 
 the 500th anniversary of the victory of Grunwald, where 
 the combined forces of Poland and Lithuania annihilated 
 the power of the Teutonic Knights, could not be celebrated 
 in Warsaw but only in Cracow in spite of the fact that 
 not Russia but Austria-Hungary was in alliance with Ger- 
 many. The monument of the victory over the Germans 
 could be erected, and in fact still stands in Cracow but 
 could not possibly stand in Warsaw. This is enough said 
 to the initiated. It is a basis for understanding the policy 
 of Poland in the present war. Owing to her autonomical 
 freedom Galicia was able to become the territory on which 
 the preparations for the future war of independence could 
 be carried on. The best material of men from Russian- 
 Poland took refuge in Galicia where these elements could 
 be instructed militarily in special Polish military organiza- 
 tions. Thus Galicia educated the officers for the present 
 Polish legions and only Galicia was able to do it. The 
 first detachments of the Polish Legions which crossed the 
 Russian frontier north of Cracow were skeleton detach- 
 
— 105 — 
 
 ments composed only of officers and under-officers. On the 
 left bank of the Vistula there were waiting for them the 
 Polish recruits who were spared by the Russian mobiliza- 
 tion and only too anxious to fight for their own sacred 
 cause of independence. 
 
 This, however, was an old program and not a new one 
 by any means. 
 
 In the years 1876-1878 when there was a danger of a 
 war between Austria-Hungary and Russia on account of 
 the Balkan situation all the political parties of Poland united 
 in order to prepare a new revolution against Russia in alli- 
 ance with Austria-Hungary. For this purpose a "Con- 
 federation of the Polish Nation" was formed which played 
 the part of a political representation of the nation. The 
 movement was headed by Prince Sapieha who was assisted 
 by Rev. Albin Dunajewski who subsequently was Bishop 
 of Cracow and Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. 
 In those times England was on terms of friendship with 
 Germany and protected Constantinople from the appetite 
 of Russia. Thus England worked behind the stage in organ- 
 izing a Polish revolution against Russia. The plan of the 
 revolution consisted of marching armed and well organ- 
 ized detachments of revolutionary armies into Russian- 
 Poland from Galicia : these detachments were intended to 
 be the nucleus of the future Polish army. Russian-Poland 
 was expected to furnish the men and Galicia the officers. 
 The English Government was well informed of the entire 
 plan and even promised to help quietly by furnishing arms 
 and money. Cardinal Manning, who was famous all over 
 England took part in a secret meeting of Polish politicians 
 in Vienna: at this meeting important decisions were taken 
 in case the war should really break out. There was no war, 
 however, but the Congress of Berlin completed the diplo- 
 
— 106 — 
 
 matic defeat of Russia. A tradition was left behind in 
 Poland, however, to that effect that England has under- 
 stood the Polish "ratio status" which prompted the Poles 
 to avail themselves of their liberties in Galicia in order 
 to prepare a revolution in Russian-Poland. For forty years 
 ever since the Congress of Berlin, Poland did not discon- 
 tinue her policy and constantly instructed young men in 
 secret and in open organizations of military nature. Poland's 
 policy was not altered by the fact that Austria-Hungary 
 entered into an alliance with Germany which has lasted 
 for over thirty years and furnished ample time to recon- 
 sider the matter: Poland's policy was not altered even 
 when Prussia began a systematic oppression in Posen and 
 England failed to protest against such treatment of the 
 Poles. Just at this particular time England ceded Heligo- 
 land which became the basis for Germany's naval power. 
 Several years later England preferred to threaten France 
 with war on account of the Fashoda incident than to inter- 
 vene at Berlin for the protection of the Poles although 
 the oppression of the Poles in Posen by Prussia violated the 
 treaty of Vienna of 1815. Bismarck was not fond of the 
 sea and Poland is not Belgium and Warsaw does not face 
 London. Poland felt bitterly over being abandoned to her 
 fate by Western Europe, but she did not deter her from fol- 
 lowing her anti-Russian policy. 
 
 When after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 in 1908 by Austria-Hungary, the danger of war became 
 imminent to Poland, new organizations were added to those 
 which existed since the time of the Congress of Berlin and 
 preparations were going on feverishly. The Polish "ratio 
 status" did not change at all since the time when Cardinal 
 Manning conferred in Vienna with representatives of Poland 
 on the details of a revolution against Russia. To-day Eng- 
 
— 107 — 
 
 land is militarily allied with Russia: the English tactics 
 changed, but the conditions in Poland did not. Cardinal 
 Dunajewski is also dead, but another dignitary of the Roman 
 Catholic Church, Bishop Bandurski, is a member of the 
 Supreme National Committee. The only change that has 
 occurred is that Poland's sufferings became greater and 
 deepe A ~. Should this be the reason why England no longer 
 understands the Polish "ratio status," although England has 
 understood it and recognized it forty years ago under 
 analogous conditions for Poland? 
 
 Poland has been and is still in a most precarious position. 
 She could not do anything else but fight against Russia, 
 and in order to do this she had to draw her recruits from 
 Russian-Poland and her supply of officers from Galicia. 
 This was not prompted by feelings but by actual conditions 
 of things. Not because of blind hatred but because of absolute 
 necessity was Poland compelled to direct her main attacks 
 against Russia. Warsaw the Capital of Poland and besides 
 eighty per cent, of Poland's territory was in Russia's hands 
 or in other words, Russia held the trunk of Poland's body. 
 It is therefore quite natural that the Polish attack had to 
 be directed against Russia. 
 
 On October 2, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Government 
 drafted a diplomatic note addressed to all neutral coun- 
 tries in which the said government officially recognized the 
 Polish Legions as combatants. This important document 
 ended as follows: 
 
 "Any action on the part of Russia which would imply a 
 refusal to recognize the Polish Legions as a combatant 
 party would constitute a flagrant violation of the provisions 
 of the Convention of The Hague and against which the Gov- 
 ernment of Austria-Hungary already now files a most cate- 
 gorical protest." 
 
— 108 — 
 
 This note was published by the "Fremdenblatt" of Vienna, 
 which is the official organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 Thus the Polish military representation obtained an official 
 sanction. The Polish soldier became a political factor in 
 Europe because the note of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
 ernment secured for him the protection of international law. 
 The future peace congress has therefore a perfect freedom 
 of action with regard to the Polish question. When some 
 time in the future the hostilities will be suspended this 
 moment will find the Polish Legions in the field. Regard- 
 less of the military result of the war this is going to be a 
 fact which from the former point of view will greatly facili- 
 tate the reviving of the Polish question at the time of the 
 coming peace congress. According to international law 
 Poland is only a combatant party but is not a belligerent 
 one because there is only a Polish nation and no Polish 
 state. Hitherto only a Polish military representation is rec- 
 ognized in the world-war; nevertheless, the Polish Legions 
 can constitute a material as well as a formal point of 
 departure for the initiative in the Polish question when the 
 future peace congress will meet. Poland hopes that the 
 conscience of the world will awake and that historical jus- 
 tice is going to be done. Poland did everything on her 
 part to organize a military representation of her own, and 
 it is now Europe's turn to bring about the happiness of 
 humanity and the freedom of nations when this awful war 
 will come to an end. 
 
 The note of Austria-Hungary with regard to the Polish 
 Legions has greatly alarmed Russia. Petrograd decided 
 therefore at once upon an attempt of organizing in .Warsaw 
 of Polish Legions for the purpose of combating against the 
 Germans. It was an intrigue intended for provoking a vol- 
 untary fight between the Poles themselves and thus killing 
 
— 109 — 
 
 the Polish question from the international point of view. 
 Organizing two military representations is absurd. The 
 danger for Poland was great and because of unemployment, 
 famine and particularly because of the mistakes made by 
 the policy of Prussia with regard to Poland in the times 
 preceding the war it was comparatively easy for Russia to 
 mislead individuals. Poland is an oppressed country, with- 
 out a government after all, and therefore every individual 
 has a free hand to act as he pleases. Oppression has accus- 
 tomed the nation to the principle of "liberum censeo," which 
 principle permits every individual to consider himself as his 
 own governor. The level of political enlightenment of the 
 masses is not equal in all parts of Poland, where, by the way, 
 the schools are in other hands than those of the Poles 
 and where a general oppression prevails. Russia therefore 
 determined to destroy what the legions of Cracow have 
 accomplished politically. In November, 1914, that means 
 about four months after the Polish Legions have crossed 
 the Russian frontier, Czar Nicholas II has commissioned 
 his Chamberlain, Count Wielopolski, to organize in Warsaw 
 a Polish National Committee as a competition to the Supreme 
 National Committee of Cracow. The right hand and in 
 fact the brain of Count Wielopolski's action was a confi- 
 dential man of the Russian Government, a former member 
 of the Duma, Roman Dmowski. A portion of the Polish 
 nobility and of the moneyed bourgeoisie supported this 
 movement. 
 
 During all revolutions there were loyal parties, which dis- 
 trusted the sword and were apt to believe in deceitful prom- 
 ises. The French Revolution had its loyalists and so had it 
 American revolution in times of Washington. 
 
 The first utterance of the Committee of Warsaw was the 
 proclamation of November 25, 1914, in which a protest was 
 
— 110 — 
 
 made against the Supreme National Committee : the authors 
 of this proclamation, however, did not have the courage of 
 denying the fact that Austria-Hungary was "the only state 
 in which our national rights had met with a measure of 
 recognition."* The autonomy of Galicia has been in force 
 for over half a century, while the autonomy under Russian 
 sovereignty was hitherto only a promise of the commander- 
 in-chief. Under such conditions and because of a number 
 of other practical considerations which were explained above, 
 the Committee of Warsaw was necessarily without real 
 backing among the Poles. All democratic parties refused 
 to support the Committee in question: the latter tried to 
 gain in importance by co-operating with the Committee of 
 the Polish members of the Russian Duma in Petrograd. 
 Russian-Poland used to elect to the Russian Duma 
 only fourteen deputies out of a population of 12,000,000. 
 Besides, the election law was of the most reactionary nature 
 and deprived the masses of the people of any influence what- 
 soever. For these reasons the Poles boycotted the Russian 
 Duma since the reactionary times of Stolypin and only the 
 nobility and certain elements of the moneyed bourgeoisie 
 took part in the election. This condition of things was cor- 
 rectly estimated by the London "Times," which, after the 
 outbreak of the war and after the declaration of loyalty 
 on the part of the Polish members of the Duma, has ques- 
 tioned the political value of their move because "chosen on 
 the franchise and in the conditions which exist," they cannot 
 "speak for the whole people."f The London "Times" is a 
 newspaper of high standing and therefore had its doubts, 
 which by the way were quite justified, whether the Polish 
 
 * "Poland, Russia and the War," by Alma Tadema, London, 1914, 
 page 21. 
 f The "Times," London, August 17, 1914. 
 
— 111- 
 nation will be able "to forget 1830 and 1863?" Reality has 
 soon manifested itself in spite of the artificial propaganda 
 made by the press. The Committee of Warsaw supported 
 the Russian plan of organizing a Polish Legion on Russia's 
 side. A most spirited propaganda was carried on for three 
 months and failed completely. The nation did not back up 
 the action, and no army can be raised on paper nor by spilling 
 streams of ink and making a propaganda. Several hundred 
 of misled volunteers were quietly incorporated into the 
 Russian army : thus the entire undertaking failed politically. 
 The Russian intrigue came to a naught and the moral stand- 
 ing as well as the numerical strength of the Polish Legions 
 organized in Cracow was increased considerably. 
 
 The reasons for Russia's failure in Warsaw were very 
 grave ones. Russia promised autonomy to Poland but she 
 did not promise independence. While the war that is waged 
 at the present time is conducted for the sake of the liberty 
 of nations Russia only offered autonomy which by the way 
 was only administrative and not legislative. To the Poles 
 it meant only uniting under one yoke instead of under three 
 which was far from being a program of independence. All 
 illusions were swept away by the Corriere della Sera of 
 Milano which stated that the Czar has purposely failed to 
 sign the proclamation with regard to the Polish cause.* The 
 "Gofos Moskwy" confirmed this by betraying the fact that 
 the manifesto of Grand Duke Nicholas was not backed up 
 at all by the Russian Government and that this was merely 
 a tactical move which was required from Russia by Gen- 
 eral Joffre. The attitude of the Russian Government dur- 
 ing the war gave conclusively justified the suspicions of 
 Poland since Russia did not cease for one moment to ex- 
 terminate all aspirations for Polish independence. The 
 
 * "For a Lasting Peace," Paris, 191 5, page 23. 
 
— 112 — 
 
 Russian Government has forbidden to put the White Eagle, 
 which is the national emblem of Poland, on the flags of the 
 Legion that Russia attempted to organize in Warsaw, and 
 even Polish national anthems were sternly prohibited by 
 the police.* While this was going on the Russian Govern- 
 ment abolished autonomy in Eastern Galicia which was 
 then occupied by the Russian armies and began to proceed 
 with the russification of this province. 
 
 Eastern Galicia never formed a part of Russia and 
 belonged to Poland ever since 1340. From the ethnograph- 
 ical point of view it has a mixed population the majority 
 of which is Ruthenian in the eastern district of the said 
 province. This, however, does not justify at all Russian 
 imperialism. The Ruthenians and the Russians have just 
 as much in common as the Belgian Walons have with France 
 or the Belgian Flamands with Holland. Does this entitle 
 France or Holland to annex Belgium? The imperialism 
 of Russia, however, did not possess any nationalistic scru- 
 ples in spite of the fact that international law does not 
 permit a legal annexation of an occupied territory. Count 
 Bobrinski, the Russian Governor of Eastern Galicia, de- 
 clared right upon his arrival in Lemberg that he "shall 
 introduce here the Russian language, Russian law, the Rus- 
 sian state administration," and that "the Polish Diet shall 
 not be convoked. "f In consequence thereof the Polish 
 university as well as all educational institutions, both Polish 
 and Ruthenian, were closed at once. Every possible auton- 
 omy has been abolished at once and instead the Russian 
 despotic and anti-democratic system of government was 
 introduced. Tshichatshef, who advocated the separation of 
 the province of Kholm from Russian-Poland, in the Russian 
 
 * "Nowa Gazeta," Warsaw, November u, 1914. 
 f "For a Lasting Peace," page 23. 
 
— 113 — 
 
 Duma has with a knowledge of the Russian Government 
 outlined a plan for colonizing Galicia with Russian Orth- 
 odox peasants.* Only the defeat of the Russian armies 
 and the liberation of Lemberg has saved Galicia from the 
 activity of the Russian "Bank wfoscianski" which distin- 
 guishes itself from the Prussian Commission of Coloniza- 
 tion only by the fact of being older. Besides religious tol- 
 erance was abolished and the Greek Orthodox religion was 
 introduced forcibly. The Greek Catholic Church which for 
 centuries was united with the Roman Church was slated as 
 a victim. And Russia attempted to introduce religious per- 
 secution into Eastern Galicia after having already made a 
 bloody debut of a similar action in the province of Kholm, 
 in Lithuania and in the Ukraina. History, however, has 
 already passed a sentence on this action of Russia by say- 
 ing as follows: "In Poland's ancient provinces, inhabited 
 by the united Greeks, the government obliged the people to 
 sign addresses to the Czar, asking him for the restoration 
 of the Orthodox religion. Those who refused to sign were 
 put into prison or deported. f The culminating point of 
 the Russian method of converting to the Orthodox religion, 
 was the year 1875. In Kroze few volleys had been fired 
 into praying crowds of Greek Catholic worshipers, and in 
 other parts of Russian-Poland thousands of people were 
 deported to Siberia, and thus the Greek Catholic Church 
 has been destroyed in Eastern Poland. At once after the 
 temporary occupation of Lemberg by the Russian armies the 
 Russian Bishop Eulogius came on a similar mission to East- 
 ern Galicia. His action has soon manifested itself. The 
 "Russkij Inwalid" published in January, 1915, the news that 
 Bishop Eulogius had submitted to the Holy Synod in Petro- 
 
 * "Nowoje Wremia," Petrograd, April 15, 1915. 
 
 f M. Seignobos : "Contemporary History," 1910, page 422. 
 
— 114 — 
 
 grad a report in which he insisted upon "abolishing in 
 Galicia of the spiritual Greek Catholic hierarchy because 
 the Russian law does not recognize the Greek Catholic 
 Church."* 
 
 Sapienti sat. 
 
 "Slavic brotherhood and liberating the Poles from Prus- 
 sian oppression" proved in practice to be nothing else but 
 introducing of Russian oppression into autonomous Galicia 
 which was the last refuge of free Polish thought. The zeal 
 of Russia in this direction unfortunately proved to be a 
 universal one. No voice of protest was raised by anybody 
 in Russia and once more voices became loud suggesting the 
 exclusion of the Polish question from the questions to be 
 decided by the future peace congress. The Russian reac- 
 tionary party as well as the progressive party joined 
 hands in order to prevent the Polish question to become 
 something else than "an internal problem of Slavdom," 
 which in practice meant nothing else but an internal problem 
 of the Russian Government. It is useless to speak about the 
 reactionary party because its feelings toward Poland were 
 only too well known. It was more painful that even Briant- 
 shaninov, a truly liberal Russian politician agreed with the 
 reactionary party that "Europe should under no circum- 
 stances take any part in the settlement of the mutual 
 relations between Russia and Poland. "f The progressive 
 "Utro Rossiji" went still further, and considered the sug- 
 gestions of turning over the Polish question for settlement 
 to England, France and Russia, even with exclusion of Aus- 
 tria-Hungary and Germany, as "illegal and criminal," be- 
 cause the organization of future Poland "does not of right 
 
 * "Goniec," Warsaw, January 17, 1915. 
 
 f "Kurjer poranny," Warsaw. March 11, 191 5. 
 
— 115 — 
 
 rest with any congresses at all."* Anybody, however, who 
 would suggest that the fate of Poland should not depend 
 upon the mercy of the victor was threatened with deporta- 
 tion to Siberia. 
 
 Independence can either be an absolute one or can ac- 
 quire the form of a state within a state, as such is the case 
 with Hungary or with Bavaria. Russia is opposed to such 
 either form of independence as far as Poland is concerned. 
 Russia is afraid of an absolute independence of Poland be- 
 cause such an independence of Poland would keep Russia 
 away from Central Europe and would stop Russia's pressure 
 on the road leading through Vienna to Constantinople. 
 Russia is furthermore afraid of Poland as a state within the 
 state under the domination of Russia because the freedom 
 of Poland could turn out to be contagious for Russia herself 
 and particularly for Finland and the Caucasus. The free- 
 dom of Poland is a danger to reactionary government and to 
 despotism. The fear of progress prompted Russia to prom- 
 ise Poland in the present war nothing else but autonomy, 
 administrative and not legislative at that. 
 
 The Russian plan with regard to Poland created an 
 impression in Western Europe and particularly in America, 
 because it has promised the uniting of the entire Poland 
 under the sceptre of the Czar. The Russian plan has thus 
 promised one yoke instead of three and has thus apparently 
 simplified matters. All these beautiful phrases, however, 
 concealed a truly Byzantinic perfidy. Poland has ethno- 
 graphical as well as political boundaries : the first ones are 
 boundaries of actual settlement while the other ones are 
 boundaries of the Polish State which has ceased to exist. 
 Russia decided to apply to the eastern portion of Poland 
 the ethnographical principle and to the western portion of 
 * "Goniec wieczorny," Warsaw, January 7, 191 5. 
 
— 116 — 
 
 Poland the historical principle. Acting on this basis Russia 
 has separated before the war the province of Kholm from 
 Russian-Poland, and during the war, Eastern Galicia from 
 Austrian-Poland, whereby she assumed the point of view 
 that the territory settled by the Ruthenians in Galicia 
 reaches as far as the upper course of the Dunajec. In con- 
 tradiction with the historical fact that neither the province 
 of Kholm nor Eastern Galicia have ever formed a part of 
 the Russian State, and in contradiction with the ethno- 
 graphical fact that the Ruthenians are not Russians, Russia 
 considered the province of Kholm and Galicia as far as the 
 course of the upper Dunajec as Russian territory and en- 
 deavored to eliminate them from Polish influence. This 
 meant nothing else but cutting slices away from Poland 
 in the east promising at the same time to extend the boun- 
 daries in the west. For Kholm, Lemberg, Przemysl, and 
 Nowy Sacz Russia promised to Poland, Cracow, Silesia, 
 Posen, Danzig, and Koenigsburg. Cracow used to be the 
 crowning place of the Polish Kings, Posen was the cradle of 
 Poland, Danzig was Poland's harbor on the Baltic Sea, 
 Silesia fell apart from Poland even before the end of the 
 Middle Ages and was not a part of Poland at the time of 
 Poland's partitions, while Koenigsburg was the capital of a 
 feudal principality of Poland and not the capital of a Polish 
 province. Koenigsburg was the capital of East Prussia 
 which was built up in the Middle Ages by the Teutonic 
 Knights during their wars against Slav tribes. The program 
 of Russia in the west agreed, therefore, with the historical 
 traditions of Poland and not with the ethnographical con- 
 siderations. This program apparently flattered the Polish 
 national pride but in outlining this program Russia was 
 prompted by different and very selfish reasons. The boun- 
 daries of historical Poland agree with the boundaries needed 
 
— 117 — 
 
 by Russian strategical considerations on Russia's western 
 frontier. These considerations form the question of the 
 Vistula line of defence. The uniting of Polish territories 
 under the sceptre of the Czar would solve very advantage- 
 ously for Russia the paradox of the Vistula, which before 
 the war passed through three different states. By uniting 
 Poland the Vistula would become an internal river of the 
 Russian Empire and the frontier would move west as far 
 as the upper Oder. In the first year of this war the Russian 
 press has on different occasions stated quite plainly that 
 strategical considerations are pushing Russia as far west as 
 Frankfort on the Oder. 
 
 The forcible pushing of the frontier of future Poland 
 in the westerly direction, and at the same time cutting off the 
 genuine Polish soil in its eastern part, raises the relative per 
 cent, of the German element in Poland to the disadvantage 
 of the native element. Eastern Prussia is inhabited by 
 2,064,175 people, but there are only 16 per cent, of Poles. 
 Eastern Prussia never was a Polish province, but only a 
 principality held in feudal tenure. In Western Prussia the 
 population numbers 1,703,477, but the per cent, of Poles is 
 35, especially so on both banks of the Vistula River which 
 used to be a road to the sea at the time of the Polish kingdom. 
 The Province of Posen, the cradle of the Polish state, has 
 2,099,831 people, and in this number there are only 765,000 
 Germans. The lower, middle and upper Silesias are in- 
 habited by 5,225,962 people. Poles inhabit mostly upper 
 Silesia, their number being 1,158,789. All of these provinces 
 constitute the so-called Prussian part of former Poland, 
 lost by Poland at the time of her partition, or before it, as, 
 it was the case with Silesia and Eastern Prussia. The Polish 
 population on this entire area numbers 3,646,446. The 
 German population in both Eastern and Western Prussia ».s 
 
— 118 — 
 
 2,922,699; in the Province of Posen, 765,000; in Silesia 
 4,067,173, totaling 7,754,822. Consequently there are here 
 twice as many Germans as Poles.* The cause of this pre- 
 ponderance of German element is the fact that Silesia and 
 Eastern Prussia were undergoing a process of Germaniza- 
 tion still in the Middle Ages, and they did not belong to 
 Poland at the time of her partition. The Russian plans to 
 make the Vistula an internal river of the Russian empire en- 
 dangers the Polish ethnographical interests, since they in- 
 troduce too large a percentage of Germans into the Polish 
 organism. 
 
 When the ethnographical data of Russian-Poland, West- 
 ern Galicia and of Prussian-Poland, which provinces Russia 
 promised to reunite, are compared, the danger becomes very 
 evident. The population of Russian-Poland is 12,467,300, 
 of which Poles number 9,115,220; Germans, 618,590; Jews, 
 1,660,490. The population of Galicia is 8,025,675, Poles 
 claim 4,000,000, Ruthenians 3,674,000 and Germans 212,000. 
 Russia intends to annex Eastern Galicia up to the line of 
 the lower San, lower Wislock, and upper Dunajec. In other 
 words, for the "United Poland" there would be left only two 
 "governments," that of Cracow and that of Tarnow. In 
 doing this Russia separates ethnographically about 2,500,000 
 Poles in the middle, and Eastern Galicia and leaves them a 
 prey to russification. This plan allows "United Poland" 
 only 1,500,000 Poles out of Galicia. The ethnographical 
 aspect of Poland thus "United" would be as follows : 
 
 Russian-Poland 9,115,220 Poles 
 
 Western Galicia 1,500,000 " 
 
 Polish provinces retaken from 
 
 Prussia 3,646,446 " 
 
 Total 14,261,666 Poles 
 
 * According to "The New International Yearbook," New York, 
 1914, and according to Polish statistics. 
 
— 119 — 
 
 The number of Germans on the same area would be : 
 
 (1) In the parts retaken from Prussia, 7,754,822 people — 
 if Silesia and Eastern Prussia would also be united with 
 Poland. 
 
 (2) In Russian-Poland, together with the Jews, 2,279,080. 
 
 (3) In Western Galicia 212,000, and together with those 
 Jews who do not claim to be Poles, about 500,000. 
 
 The total number of Germans and Jews in Poland "Re- 
 united," according to the Russian prescription, would be 
 10,533,902. 
 
 It is plain now that such a plan only furthers German 
 interests if the historical frontiers of Poland are extended 
 in the westerly direction, while at the same time its eastern 
 possessions are separated from it. The Jewish jargon is 
 only a corrupted German, and the Jews were always in 
 middle Europe, and especially in Poland, the vanguard of 
 Teutonism. In denning the boundaries of Poland, and using 
 the ethnographical key in the east, and the historical key in 
 the west, Russia would create an ethnographical paradox, a 
 state with a mixed population, where sooner or later a serious 
 internal strife would be bound to arise. That is what Russia 
 is aiming at, since then the Russian government would play 
 the part of a peacemaker. The national strifes would render 
 the normal development of the autonomy impossible, and 
 would soon enable Russia to retake the power to Petrograd. 
 The life of the promised autonomy would be a short one and 
 the triumph of despotism early. 
 
 It is hard to assume that Europe would permit of the 
 strategical occupation by Russia of the upper Oder River. 
 Practically this is the only plan of occupation of the upper 
 Silesia and perhaps of small parts of the middle and lower 
 Silesia. Under these circumstances the number of Germans 
 within the boundaries of Poland "United" by Russians 
 
— 120 — 
 
 would be lower, but the ratio would be at any rate that 
 of eight Germans and Jews, to fourteen Poles. This 
 is entirely too large a ratio to reflect favorably on the in- 
 ternal conditions of the future state. The Germans consti- 
 tute a rich, capable and aggressive element. The Jews are 
 by no means inferior to them as far as aggressiveness is 
 concerned, and they represented always, with their culture 
 and language, the vanguard of Germanism in middle Europe. 
 Both of them possess enormous financial resources, which 
 they would throw upon Poland, devastated by war, in order 
 to buy out the land and seize the industry with the help of 
 foreign money. Russia never hesitated in her internal af- 
 fairs to employ the Germans against the Poles, and still less 
 would she hesitate to use them for the annihilation of auton- 
 omy of Poland "United," under the Czar's sceptre. A terri- 
 fying picture for Poland ! It is by no means an empty 
 phrase that the Jewish jargon is only corrupted German, 
 and that the Jews were and still are, in middle Europe, the 
 vanguard of Germanism. Jewish journalists frequently 
 stated that the Jewish jargon "belongs to the great family 
 of German languages, and that the Jews, despite the 500 
 years spent in the Slavic environment, preserved the German 
 language, and even to-day belong to the German cultural 
 stock."* As a consequence many of the Jewish leaders, who, 
 up to the time of expulsion of Russians from Galicia, wooed 
 Russia, now look up to the favors of victorious Berlin that 
 it may support Jews against Poles, since the Jews form in 
 Poland a "German cultural island." 
 
 There was a sly reservation in the manifesto in which 
 Nicolai Nikolayevitsh promised Poland reunion and auton- 
 omy under the sceptre of the Czar — "There is but one thing 
 
 * Sonntagsblatt der "New Yorker Staatszeitung," 18, 7, 1915. "Die 
 osteuropaeische Judenf rage und der Krieg," by Dr. Malamed. 
 
— 121 — 
 
 that Russia expects from you, that you respect the rights 
 of those nationalities with which history has bound you." 
 This was an attempt to check-mate the future of Poland 
 with the Jewish question. The Jewish press of the whole 
 world, basing itself on the above manifesto, started to de- 
 mand equal national rights for Jews in Poland. Russia is 
 known all over for her antisemitic feelings. Up to the latter 
 days of this war, the Jews were not permitted to settle in 
 Russia proper. The area permitted for Jewish settlement is 
 more or less coincident with the area of the former Kingdom 
 of Poland. The center of gravity of the Jewish question was 
 by means of terrorism and pogroms transferred toward the 
 Vistula. As the result of this partial policy of Petrograd, 
 the percentage of Jews on Polish soil rose to a higher degree 
 than anywhere else. In Russian-Poland the Jews constitute 
 13.71 per cent, of the 12,464,300 total population. In 
 Lithuania and Polish-Ruthenia the percentage is somewhat 
 higher. It is an artificial result of the antisemitic policy of 
 the Russian government which routs the Jews from Russia 
 proper and takes "fatherly" care of them in Poland. The 
 manifesto of Prince Nikolai struck the same note, although 
 it enveloped it discreetly with an appeal to justice. 
 
 The public opinion in Russia saw through it at once. 
 Prince E. Trubeckoi, a recognized authority in Russian 
 political life, published an address in which he expressed his 
 satisfaction and hope that Russia, after the victory, will be 
 able to solve two of her most vexing problems, namely, the 
 Polish and Jewish question.* And Milukoff, the leader of 
 the Liberals in Russia, pointed out very clearly the parallel- 
 ism of both questions in his daring statement that "the coun- 
 try across the Vistula is not exclusively inhabited by Poles, 
 but that there exists another nationality, the Jews, who have 
 
 *"Russkoje Wiedomosti," io, 31, 1914. 
 
— 122 — 
 
 a right to be considered as a separate people, though being 
 in the minority."* The same Russia which could not afford 
 to grant equal civic rights to the Jews wants future Poland 
 to grant them more, namely, the recognition of separate na- 
 tional rights, which Jews do not possess anywhere else in 
 Western Europe, and in America. Both the philosemitic 
 progressive party and the antisemitic reactionary party joined 
 hands in order to sustain the former Russian policy toward 
 the Jews, the policy which can only bring detriment to Po- 
 land. Instead of abolishing the boundary of Jewish settle- 
 ment in the east, and granting the Jews equal civic rights, 
 Russia wants to expand the area of their settlement to the 
 west in order to create artificially with the aid of Jews and 
 Germans national strife on the Vistula, and be able to abolish 
 under this pretext the promised autonomy. Russia wants to 
 create Judeo-Poland and thus facilitate the final russification 
 and destruction of Poland. 
 
 In their attitude toward the Polish question, the Jews 
 joined hands with Russia. "The Jewish press in the Polish 
 .provinces welcomed the Polish manifesto with almost hys- 
 terical enthusiasm." The Jewish dailies in Warsaw said 
 editorially that the Jews "are deeply grateful to the Russian 
 commander-in-chief because in his manifesto to the Poles 
 he did not forget to mention the other nationalities whose 
 fate is bound up with that of the Poles," and it is to be ex- 
 pected "that, in accordance with the manifesto, the Poles will 
 respect the rights of the other nationalities within their pro- 
 vinces.'^ Even in America, which was the centre of the 
 anti-Russian-Jewish activity, a definite change can be ob- 
 served. The same Jewish press, which a few years ago tried 
 to influence the government to break off the commercial 
 
 * "The Globe," New York, March I, 1915. 
 t "The Day," February 18, 191 5. 
 
— 123 — 
 
 treaties with Russia, is now elated by "Purishkewitsh, the 
 Black Hundred Leader in the Duma, having kissed the scroll 
 of Torah."* They started in this war a general white- 
 washing of Russia and a simultaneous slandering of Poland, 
 intimating that "the pogrom policy abandoned by the Russian 
 government was taken up in another form by the Poles !"f 
 A whole machinery of slander and impudent lies was set in 
 motion so as to finish up the unfortunate nation visited by 
 all the calamities of the present war. 
 
 With lies, however, one cannot go far. 
 
 The note of the Jewish Bund proved beyond doubt that 
 there were never any pogroms in Poland arranged by Poles. 
 In December, 1914, Mr. Herman Bernstein publicly an- 
 nounced that "the Poles resolved to methods of barbarism 
 in their policy of Jew-hatred — their hands are smeared with 
 the blood of the Jews in Poland ; a nation of pogrom-makers 
 is unworthy of independence.''^ About a year afterward, 
 when the same Mr. Bernstein returned from Europe, he 
 ceased to speak about the "Polish pogroms," and at the first 
 interview when landing on the continent attested that "for 
 their military defeat on the battlefield, the Russian authori- 
 ties made military pogroms against their own peaceful Jew- 
 ish population. "§ The main argument that Poles instigated 
 Russian soldiers to the pogroms is puerile and ludicrous. 
 Russia having in her record Kishenieff, Siedlce and Bialy- 
 stok does not need any instigation. In spite of that, the 
 Jewish press does not stop flirting with Puriskewitsh, al- 
 though the latter is a deputy from Kishenieff, and endeavors 
 to direct public opinion against the independence of Poland. 
 
 * "New York Sun," and "The Day," 2, 18, 191 5. 
 
 f 1. c, Bernstein Herman. 
 
 X "The Day," December 13, 1914. 
 
 § "The New York Times " October 18, 191 5. 
 
— 124 — 
 
 These are the facts which show plainly that the Jews aid the 
 Russian project of solving the Polish question and try to 
 subdue the independence of Poland. The Jews themselves 
 do not believe in any change in Russia, and that is the reason 
 why they would gladly welcome the expansion of their settle- 
 ment in the westerly direction in Poland, remaining at the 
 same time in connection with Russia. In the internal politics 
 they would be certain of the German aid, because in Poland 
 the Jews are always the vanguard of Germanism. As far as 
 commerce is concerned, they calculate on the capture of the 
 eastern markets in Asia. In the wake of the Russian sword, 
 if the latter were capable of opening the gates of Constan- 
 tinople, Jewish money would pour into China and India 
 where it would displace the capital of the Western European 
 nations and pave the way for the Russian army. Thus the 
 Russian imperialism and the Jewish commercial expansion 
 were brought close together in the present war. 
 
 Poland was always friendly to Jews, especially the demo- 
 cratic, aspiring Poland. In the insurrection of 1863 the 
 Jew, Wohl, was the treasurer of the national government, 
 and the banker, Kronenberg, was one of the important per- 
 sonages. Before the very outbreak of the uprising, when 
 the Russian soldiers were shooting at the Polish church 
 procession on the streets of Warsaw as it emerged from the 
 cathedral of St. John, the cross which fell from the hands 
 of a Pole shot dead by a Russian soldier was picked up by 
 a Jew and the demonstration was led by a Jew. It was only 
 due to Russian influence that the friendly relations between 
 Poles and Jews were brought to an end. Russophilism and 
 antisemitism in Poland are but two aspects of the same thing. 
 Roman Dmowski, who in the present war was the main- 
 spring of the Russophilic committee, was, before the war, 
 the leader of the antisemitic movement. The attitude of the 
 
— 125 — 
 
 Jews toward the Polish cause proved to be identical with 
 that of the Russophilic antisemites in Warsaw. Democratic 
 Poland fighting for her liberty is just as Anti-Russian 
 as it is not, and never was, antisemitic. This question has 
 been sifted during the present war by Prof. Dr. W. L. 
 Jaworski, the president of the Polish Supreme National 
 Committee : 
 
 "Antisemitism, no matter in what form it would appear, 
 might bring only an injury to our national interests. The 
 shortcomings of the Polish commerce and industry can 
 neither be removed by antisemitism nor by national dem- 
 agogism; they could be removed only by wide reforms that 
 would enable them to establish better hygiene of the inner 
 social and economic relations in general; that would raise 
 the standard of culture among the wide masses, and that 
 would offer new openings for new fields in industry and for 
 general development. 
 
 "Only f rank and decided declaration that regenerated 
 Poland would not maintain the policy of antisemitism, the 
 policy of chicanery and persecution, might help to make 
 Jews better citizens on one hand, and on the other hand it 
 would check the wide anti-Polish crusade carried on now by 
 Jews abroad. Leaving Russia and turning to Western 
 Europe, Poland must follow the example given by the coun- 
 tries of Western Europe in solving the Jewish question, 
 namely, Poland must gain sympathy of Jews by granting 
 them equal rights of citizens. At the same time, we must 
 emphatically demand of Jews that they become the true 
 citizens of the country — that they act for the interest of the 
 country, and work for her development. This end could be 
 secured only by giving the Jews in Poland access to the 
 sources of welfare and culture. As in Western Europe, 
 Jews have become either good Frenchmen, Englishmen, 
 
— 126 — 
 
 Italians or Germans, so we have the right, too, to demand of 
 our Polish Jews to become good Poles and be real good 
 citizens of Poland." 
 
 Poland cannot and will not recognize any hyphenated 
 Poles ! 
 
 For the sake of historical accuracy, I take the liberty to 
 assert that the attack of the Jewish press on Poland, not only 
 here in America, but also all over the world, was made sud- 
 denly and without any endeavor on the part of the Jews to 
 come to an understanding with the Polish Supreme Na- 
 tional Committee regarding the policy of future Poland on 
 the Jewish question. The enmity of the Jews against the 
 Poles plainly manifested itself in this country of free speech 
 and free press, by the failure to insert vindications of the 
 Poles against a wave of calumnies thrown at the Polish na- 
 tion, the first step being made by George Brandes, who wrote 
 an open and most unjust letter. Jewish nationalists were 
 very well aware of the fact that Poland, not being anti- 
 semitic in general as a nation, must, however, be anti- 
 zionistic when the zionism or Jewish nationalism endeavors 
 with Russian or German aid to create the Judeo-Poland. 
 
 Those who think that the Jewish question in Poland means 
 an antagonism against the Jews are grossly mistaken. It is 
 something entirely different, inasmuch as the war made on 
 the Polish nation by the Jewish nationalistic party all over 
 the world tends to obtain for the Jews in Poland not the 
 rights of equal citizenship, but a recognition of a distinct na- 
 tional franchise in order to make of Poland a country of 
 mixed nationality and thus to create, with the help of Russia, 
 a precedent for the revision of the entire Jewish question in 
 Europe and possibly also in America in the near future. The 
 following quotation may serve as an illustration : "In order 
 that Jews may be assured of equality in civil and political 
 
— 127 — 
 
 life it is essential that they be accorded recognition as a na- 
 tional group in Poland," and "it is hardly probable that any 
 sensible Jew will object to the Jewish demand for equal 
 recognition with the Ruthenians, the Czechs, the Slavs of 
 the Austrian Empire."* 
 
 The attitude of the whole world toward the Jewish ques- 
 tion can be expressed by the formula of the French revolu- 
 tion: 'The Jews as a nation should be deprived of every- 
 thing, but the Jews as men should be assured of every- 
 thing."! This is the principle of equal civic rights for Jews 
 without granting them separate national rights. Contrary to 
 this, the Jews demand in future Poland equal recognition for 
 their jargon as a national tongue. Even Western Europe 
 has not as yet grown up to the national concubinage, and 
 Poland is still less ready to outdo the whole world in the 
 Jewish question. Jewish nationalism does not lie within the 
 practical political demands. Natura non facit saltus. The 
 development of democracy in Europe must at first separate 
 the idea of national consciousness from the idea of owning 
 the soil.. Only then will it be possible for a nation to exist 
 within a nation. At present the whole world stands on the 
 basis of the principle of the French revolution, and Poland, 
 being in the throes of this terrible war, cannot indulge in 
 risky experiments. 
 
 Russia understands that in case of her eventual victory 
 over the Germans, there will come a time when the Germans 
 will start the war of retaliation — no matter what key Russia is 
 going to use in making the frontiers of the "United Poland." 
 Both the ethnographical and the historical keys bring Russia 
 closer to Berlin. The victory of Russia would not weaken 
 Germany as much as it would weaken Prussia within the 
 
 * "Dos Yidische Folk," New York, November 12, 1915. 
 f Clermon Tonners, 21, 12, 1789, in the National Assembly. 
 
— 128 — 
 
 German empire. Prussia cannot submit to this weakening 
 for any length of time and she will not lack means and 
 cleverness to draw the German empire into her plans of 
 revenge. Russia must take into account that the German war 
 of revenge in the east will have the support of England, 
 since England is the enemy of German ambitions on the sea 
 and in colonial enterprises, but she is not Germany's rival on 
 land, and especially not in Eastern Europe. England, after 
 having defeated Germany on the sea, and having ousted the 
 Germans from Belgium, will gladly attack the victorious 
 Russia with German hands on the first occasion, so as not 
 to permit the excessive overgrowth of Russia. These are 
 the factors which guide Russia's policy in Poland in the 
 present war. Russia must, due to her aggressive traditions, 
 gravitate toward the Oder, and the road to the Oder leads 
 over the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. This 
 tendency is couched in Russian diplomatic language in the 
 phrase — "Uniting Poland under the sceptre of the Czar." 
 In reality it means the securing of her eventual western 
 frontiers, in order to make the best use of her numerical 
 superiority in the future inevitable retaliatory war with 
 Germany and Austria. Politically the Russian plan tries to. 
 poison Poland with an excess of Germans and Jews, which 
 process would facilitate the digestion of the occupied terri- 
 tories and absolute conquest of the Vistula. 
 
 The game has been going on for a year. 
 
 There was no greater strategical mistake on the part of 
 Russia than her victory over Hindenburg at Warsaw. Hin- 
 denburg's offensive was merely a strategical provocation to 
 draw the centrum of the Russian army to the left bank 
 of the Vistula, and then to threaten with flank attacks both 
 Russian wings, and not permitting any movement westward 
 for fear of losing the lines of communication. The defence 
 
— 129 — 
 
 of Warsaw was the beginning of the defeat of Russia on the 
 Vistula. The paradox of the Vistula, Austria holding the 
 upper course, Russia the middle, and Germany the lower, 
 proved its inherent danger. The strategical road toward the 
 west does not run through Warsaw so long as Cracow and 
 Danzig do not belong to the aggressor. Dragomirow, Hurko 
 and Kuropatkin were right in advising Russia to follow 
 Kutuzow's plan which originated in his combat with Napo- 
 leon. With the Mazurian Lakes in the north and the Car- 
 pathian passes in the south, endangering both wings of the 
 Russian army, Russia cannot attack successfully either 
 Vienna or Berlin. The Russian offensive movement through 
 Warsaw forces the Russian army to assume an arched posi- 
 tion, with the center directed toward the west and both 
 flanks running backwards, one along the Mazurian Lakes 
 and the other along the Carpathian Mountains. Such a 
 strategical position is synonymous with defeat. With Poland 
 divided into three parts and the strategical difficulty of the 
 Vistula created thereby, the only way for Russia to victory 
 is to follow Kutuzow's method and retire beyond the Niemen 
 and Bug rivers. Strategically it means the evacuation of 
 Russian-Poland in the first period of the war. Politically it 
 signifies the superfluity of Russian-Poland for Russia. The 
 Russian rule over Poland has no political, no historical, no 
 moral basis, not even a strategical one. For Poland it means 
 injury, for Russia it means an unnecessary burden of false 
 imperialism. History administered justice to Russia by her 
 terrible defeat, and gave her warning for the future. Only 
 an independent Poland can solve easily the strategical diffi- 
 culty of the Vistula. 
 
 The independence of Poland has not only a historical 
 foundation, but also a strategical one. The partition of 
 Poland renders the Russian offensive westward impossible. 
 
— 130 — 
 
 In the present condition of Poland, the road to Vienna or 
 Berlin does not lead through Warsaw; on the contrary, 
 Austria-Hungary and Germany dominate the Russian line of 
 fortresses of Warsaw, Deblin* and Modlin,f as long as they 
 possess the Mazurian Lakes and the Carpathian Mountains, 
 while the road toward the east is open for them. This is the 
 fundamental contrast in the strategical interests of Germany 
 and Austria on one side, and Russia on the other. This 
 contrast can only be removed by the independence of Poland. 
 Let us assume for the sake of argument that Poland will be 
 restored after the present war. In the future war of retalia- 
 tion, Poland by the power of her existence only will defend 
 Russia against an out-flanking movement from the side of 
 the Mazurian Lakes and Carpathian Mountains. Poland 
 remaining neutral, the territory about the middle of the 
 Vistula cannot be made the field of military operations. It 
 is hardly conceivable, however, that Poland could stay neu- 
 tral in such a war. It will be the war for the possession of 
 the Vistula line! If we assume that Poland would turn 
 against Russia, then the line of conflict will be formed by 
 the rivers Niemen, Bug and Dniester. In other words, Rus- 
 sia will be free from danger of flank attacks upon her wings 
 and will have the possibility of the frontal attack in the 
 westerly direction. In case Poland would turn against 
 Germany and Austria-Hungary, Warsaw would be in danger 
 of a flanking attack from the side of the Mazurian Lakes 
 and Carpathian Mountains, which fact equalizes in favor of 
 Germany and Austria the numerical superiority of Russia. 
 The new partition of Poland between Austria and Germany 
 will deprive them of the possibility of the flanking move- 
 ment, since it will not restore Poland but only remove Russia 
 
 * Ivangorod. 
 
 f Novo-Georgievsk. 
 
— 131 — 
 
 from Warsaw. This will only be favorable for Russia, 
 since it will facilitate her eventual frontal attack on the 
 whole line, leaving her flanks secure in a good strategical 
 position. Only the neutrality of independent Poland may 
 be a factor for insuring a permanent peace, since it will 
 render difficult the Russian offensive toward the west, as 
 well as that of Austria and Germany toward the east. Be- 
 sides this, a line of Polish fortresses on the Niemen, Bug 
 and Dniester would also materially assist in guaranteeing 
 peace. 
 
 There is a difference in power a free nation can display 
 from that of an enslaved nation. The free and independent 
 Poland will soon become the center of Slavic creative power 
 in harmony with the interests of Western Europe, and with- 
 out political Russophilism. Poland even now neutralizes 
 the Russian influence in the Slavic world, since she is an 
 older historical unit than Russia. The Balkan states are 
 free, but their civilization is inferior to that of Russia and 
 that is why the Balkans are such favorable soil for Russian 
 political propaganda. The equilibrium of Europe can only 
 be maintained by the division of the Slavic world. In War- 
 saw, the Roman cross and the traditions of Rome; in Mos- 
 cow, and on the Dnieper, the cross and the traditions of 
 Constantinople. This does not mean the separation of two 
 religious systems only. Two different cultures, sympathies, 
 arts, and finally, two different forms of political law should 
 be separated from each other. Constantinople was the 
 breeding place of the Caesarian despotism; Rome, on the 
 other side, due to the strife between the Papacy and the 
 Roman emperors, was the source of the emancipation of 
 states and nations and in the last instance of the citizen. All 
 these factors constitute the boundary line between the civil- 
 ization of Western Europe and that of Russia. Poland al- 
 
— 132 — 
 
 ways was the vanguard of the west. Poland was the father- 
 land of Copernicus, "who stopped the sun in its course." 
 The investigation of Birkenmajer in the archives of Stock- 
 holm settled finally the nationality of Copernicus in favor 
 of Poland.* The system of Copernicus forms the basis of 
 the modern conception of the universe. If it had not been 
 for Copernicus, Newton could not have accomplished his 
 work or he would have to be Copernicus first. The physics 
 of Gallileo is also the echo of the work of Copernicus. Po- 
 land had no freedom for the last hundred years. Oppres- 
 sion restrained the Polish schools and made it very difficult 
 for the Polish nation to participate in the great work of 
 civilization. Illiteracy and misery are set loose in Poland 
 and have all the prospects of unlimited development which 
 is denied to science and enterprise. Poland is not permitted 
 to study and work. Such is the curse of life in slavery! 
 The Polish creative genius could not, however, be sup- 
 pressed. Chopin's music and Mickiewicz's poetry already 
 after the downfall of Poland became the common spiritual 
 good of the whole world. Sienkiewicz and Curie-Skfodowski 
 won Nobel prizes. In the scientific circles of the world 
 are known the names of Smoluchowski, Raciborski, March- 
 lewski, Godlewski, Morozewicz, Romer, Abramowski, Roz- 
 wadowski, Zaremba, Olszewski, Kostanecki, Ochorowicz, 
 and numerous others. That is the achievement of a nation 
 of 20,000,000 people and possessing but two universities, 
 one in Cracow and one in Lemberg. As soon as the Russian 
 army occupied Lemberg, one of the first steps taken was the 
 closing of the Polish University. Warsaw, a Western Euro- 
 pean city in the real sense of the word, in tradition and cul- 
 ture, a city numbering about 1,000,000 inhabitants, the 
 capital city of 20,000,000 people, having a glorious and great 
 * Expedition of Cracow's Academy of Sciences. 
 
— 133 — 
 
 history, did not possess a university ! This was a fact which 
 humiliated western civilization, and for this civilization in 
 general has to be thankful to Russia, which proclaimed in 
 this way the "Slavic Brotherhood" on the Vistula. Liberty 
 will stimulate the Polish genius and this will enrich the world 
 with new elements, and the Polish nation will regain the 
 power to "play the part in Europe to which it is entitled by 
 its numbers, its culture, and its genius."* 
 
 The Congress of Vienna recognized and based its work 
 upon the principle of legitimism. It was the conservative idea 
 contrary to all the achievements of the Napoleonic era. 
 Legitimism did not recognize the will of the nation; it sup- 
 ported legitimate authority, especially monarchy, on the 
 grounds of hereditary rights. Belgium was returned to the 
 Netherlands, the principality of Warsaw was annihilated, 
 and Italy redivided. This cast the seeds for the revolution 
 in Belgium, and the still more sanguine uprising in Poland. 
 Italy had to have her Garibaldi. May the future peace con- 
 gress not repeat the mistakes of the Congress in Vienna! 
 Russia still to-day does not recognize the rights of nations 
 in practice, placing the race above the rights of a nation, a 
 principle very much inferior to the principle of legitimism. 
 To Poland Russia promises autonomy in internal adminis- 
 tration. This is less than the Congress of Vienna did, and 
 which transformed the principality of Warsaw into a state 
 within a state and did not only make an autonomic province 
 of it. Poland hopes that if ever a future congress should 
 not make it a sovereign state, it will at least deal with her 
 according to the Vienna treaties, and will not allow ap- 
 proaching the Polish problem on the basis of the manifesto 
 of Duke Nikolas. The Congress of Vienna, although taking 
 
 * "The Manchester Guardian," 19, 12, 1915. — 'The New Poland," 
 by Bruce Boswell, of Liverpool University. 
 
— 134 — 
 
 the principle of legitimism as the point of issue, granted 
 Poland the character of a state within a state; a separate 
 diet, an army, it obliged the Russian Czar to crown himself 
 Polish King in Warsaw. Will the future congress, which 
 will assemble under the banner of freedom for nations, have 
 the courage to step below this principle when dealing with 
 the Polish question? 
 
 The attitude of Poles as a nation devoid of political liberty 
 was determined by real facts and not by sympathies : 
 
 I. — Administrative and legislative autonomy existed in 
 Galicia while Russian and German Poland did not 
 enjoy these advantages. 
 II. — Private military schools could only be established 
 in Galicia. Consequently, Polish youths from 
 Russian and Prussian-Poland went to Galicia 
 since in the former two provinces any military 
 work had to be secretly carried on, and, conse- 
 quently, not very effectively. The beginning of 
 this political system dates back to the years 1876-8, 
 when with the unofficial aid of England an up- 
 rising against Russia, in alliance with Austro- 
 Hungary, was organized. 
 III. — Only in Russian-Poland, on the left bank of the 
 Vistula, were there enough recruits for the Polish 
 military representation in the case of European 
 war, since Russia had, for strategical reasons, to 
 evacuate the western governments of Russian 
 Poland with the outbreak of the war, and this 
 prevented the Russian authorities to mobilize in 
 the mining and industrial districts of Russian- 
 Poland. 
 IV. — During the Congress of Vienna, one hundred 
 years ago, England entered into a secret treaty 
 
— 135 — 
 
 with France and Austria against Russia, in spite 
 of the fact that Russia was a faithful ally of Eng- 
 land in her war against Napoleon. 
 V. — At the Congress in Vienna, England supported the 
 Polish interests against Russia, although the Pol- 
 ish regiments were fighting with Napoleon against 
 England. 
 VI. — Poland wanted and could form a military repre- 
 sentation only against Russia and in alliance with 
 Austria-Hungary. That it was practicable was 
 proven by the development of the Polish legions 
 in Cracow and an absolute failure of Russian en- 
 deavors in Warsaw to form a competitory legion. 
 VII. — Russia occupies 80 per cent, of the historical 
 Polish territory, and Warsaw is the capital city 
 of Poland. Under these conditions the war of 
 Austria with Prussia in 1866 could not, and did 
 not revive the Polish question, but the possibility 
 of war between Austria and Russia was always 
 and must always be associated with the prepara- 
 tion of the Polish uprising against Russia and 
 in alliance with Austria-Hungary. 
 VIII. — The military interests in the present war do not 
 coincide with the political interests, consequently 
 the formation of the Polish legions against Rus- 
 sia, and in alliance with Austria-Hungary, does 
 not free any one from the obligation of supporting 
 the Polish independence. 
 Poland went along the way of her ratio status and of 
 practical possibilities. She could not forget for a moment 
 that Warsaw is not Antwerp, and that Warsaw is not located 
 in front of London on the other side of the Channel. Eng- 
 land must fight in order to support Belgium, but England 
 
— 136 — 
 
 may limit the support of the Polish question to the war on 
 paper. The Polish uprising in 1830 broke out when Czar 
 Nikolas I, in the name of the reactionary principle of legit- 
 imism, wanted to send the Polish army to Belgium in order 
 to crush her struggle for independence. That did not in- 
 fluence England in the following year to save Warsaw from 
 the Russian superior forces, although it was Warsaw which 
 saved Belgium. The blood of the Polish heroes of the upris- 
 ing of 1863 created nothing more than sympathy in Western 
 Europe. The Congress of Vienna obliged not only Russia 
 but also Prussia to respect the rights of the Polish nation. 
 Prussia at the time of Bismarck adopted the anti-Polish 
 policy in the Province of Posen. Bismarck did not like the 
 sea, so England preferred to keep quiet and to forget diplo- 
 matically the treaty of Vienna. On November 9, 1896, a 
 Prussian order was issued, changing the Polish flag cf the 
 Province of Posen and substituting it with the Prussian 
 colors. On February 10, 1897, Minister Von der Recke 
 made a brutal speech in the Prussian diet defending the 
 above order. England remained silent; still worse, she 
 preferred to terrorize France in her Fashoda dispute, instead 
 of claiming of Berlin the observance of the treaties of 
 Vienna concerning the Polish rights. England did not for- 
 get her treaties with Belgium, but alas, how soon she did 
 forget those concerning the Polish cause. Nobody enters 
 war for someone else's pleasure ; nobody sheds the blood of 
 his nation for the other people's interests only. Such is the 
 logic and truth of history. Poland understands it, but she 
 wants also other nations to understand her position. If 
 those, who in the present war proclaimed the watchword of 
 the independence of nations, are sincere, Poland hopes that 
 the future peace congress will adopt one of two alternatives : 
 
— 137 — 
 
 I. — Either absolute independence of Poland, or 
 II. — Restoration of Poland as a state within another 
 state. 
 
 Both alternatives prohibit the submittance of Polish ter- 
 ritory to another dismemberment. 
 
 The union of the Polish provinces under the sceptre of 
 the Czar, and on the basis of the manifesto of the Grand 
 Duke Nikolas, will be, in spite of all appearances, only an 
 injustice to Poland. A Polish state within a federation of 
 German states would be an anomaly. A Polish state in 
 union with Austria-Hungary on the basis of a triple union 
 would be a favorable solution of the problem. But happi- 
 ness and full justice can only be brought about by absolute 
 independence, since this form of political existence was lost 
 by Poland due to the "crime" of the partition.* 
 
 The hurricane of war which at present envelops Warsaw 
 with the cloud of smoke rising from the battlefields, and 
 with rivers of blood spilled in the greatest war of the ages 
 will give birth to Poland's future. And above this blood- 
 soaked soil of Poland the Polish legions unfurled their ban- 
 ner of Red and White, and await the help of all nations 
 having the good will to help. 
 
 * Clemenceau. 
 

Chapter V 
 THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 
 

141 
 
 Chapter V. — The Causes of the War 
 
 The war which is waged now is the war of giants : it is a 
 struggle in which both sides do not shrink from anything in 
 order to win. No such recklessness was seen since Napo- 
 leon's time when the English fleet bombarded Copenhagen 
 in order to force Denmark to break her neutrality. 
 
 No feelings of sympathy nor any diplomatical sophisms 
 can possibly conceal the fact that through Belgium leads 
 a road as well to Paris as to Essen, of Krupp fame, or in 
 other words, to Berlin. Essen is situated about fifty miles 
 from the Belgian frontier. Dire necessity is the law of the 
 war of giants : the determination to win is nothing else but 
 the desire to avoid death. It is the hurricane which destroys, 
 annihilates and undermines every law and has no respect 
 for anything else but for force guiding toward victory. 
 Such a hurricane threatened Belgium from two sides. What 
 choice did Belgium have? To ally herself with Germany 
 and to open a road to Paris meant a war with France and 
 England, while, on the other hand, to ally herself with 
 France and England necessarily meant a war with Germany ; 
 in both cases devastation of the country and forfeiting of 
 liberty was to be expected. 
 
 Belgium therefore had to choose between the two evils. 
 Under such conditions only the calculation of probability, 
 who is going to be the victor, can serve as a guide. Such 
 calculation is the method of the materialistic policy. Lon- 
 don has always excelled in this method and has calculated 
 with perfect calm, long before the outbreak of this war, that 
 
— 142 — 
 
 in order to subdue Germany it was necessary to combine a 
 huge superiority of forces. Diplomatic mines were ex- 
 ploded quietly and under ground. Russia, with her elemen- 
 tary power of half of Asia and Europe, the rich and heroic 
 France, the distant Japan on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, 
 and finally Servia, Montenegro and Italy, and possibly other 
 allies and brothers in arms became the war apparatus of 
 England, and that was intended for replacing the army that 
 England was lacking on large scale. The war between Eng- 
 land and Germany was brewing in Europe ever since 1900, 
 in which year Germany had amazed the world by her power- 
 ful naval program. There cannot be two masters of the seas, 
 and there is only room for one, for master of all, or none if 
 there are but equal rights for all. Therefore London pre- 
 pared for this war everything, because even the English 
 child was perfectly aware of the fact that the war that was 
 to come would be a war for life or death. 
 
 Finally the hour of the struggle came. 
 
 Nobody entertained any doubt in the first few months of 
 the war as to the fact that Germany is bound to lose. In- 
 spired telegrams made this propaganda quite successful. 
 Newspapers exaggerated small encounters and insignificant 
 battles were given the importance of another . . . Waterloo. 
 The world read this news and became convinced that the 
 end of the war will come soon and that victory will be with 
 England. The same news were also read by the English who 
 expected to join the fray with full force in the spring of 
 1915 in order to throw their army into the balance for the 
 benefit of France. The English press campaign, however, 
 proved to be a complete strategical failure, because the Eng- 
 lish were thus taught to underestimate the danger: reading 
 continuously about the crushing of Germany and the victori- 
 ous march (of the press) on Berlin, Vienna or Budapest, 
 
— 143 — 
 
 they began to think that there is no need for them on the 
 battlefields of Europe. Why to go there when Germany 
 is already crushed by the Russian "steam-roller," and 
 may at any time ask for mercy of Sir Edward Grey? The 
 still worse feature of the thing was that this boasting of 
 England was read by the Germans. The haughty answer 
 given in the fall of 1914 by Lord Kitchener, to the question 
 as to the probable end of the war: "I do not know when 
 the war is going to end but all I know is that it is only going 
 to start in May of the next year," was a great victory for . . . 
 Germany. Berlin listened, kept silent and worked full blast. 
 Factories were running day and night, and reserves were 
 drilling without undue haste of being sent to the front. 
 Every German was becoming more and more convinced of 
 the necessity of sacrificing his life for the cause of his coun- 
 try, while every Englishman at the same time was taught by 
 degrees to underestimate the danger. Finally the much 
 heralded month of May came around : it was the month of 
 an enormous triumph for Germany, Austria-Hungary and 
 Turkey. The Russian armies were smashed to pieces in 
 Galicia, and on the western front came a shortage of . . . am- 
 munition. In the Dardanelles the Turkish military glory 
 became once more firmly established after the defeats sus- 
 tained in the Balkan war. The war, in fact, began in May 
 but it took a turn which was entirely different from the one 
 predicted by the press. 
 
 The world continues, however, to believe that the defeat 
 of Germany is a foregone conclusion. This fact explains 
 the situation of Belgium before the war. Belgium knew that 
 there was a hurricane coming from two sides and, therefore, 
 the Belgian Government calculated the probability of vic- 
 tory. The calculation showed that Germany cannot win, and 
 even to-day, after the war has lasted a year, and in spite of 
 
— 144 — 
 
 the immense victory of Germany, the calculation of material 
 forces rather justifies the expectations of England than those 
 of Berlin. Belgium has decided not to permit the Germans 
 to go across the Belgian territories and has thus sided with 
 those who had expectations to win. There is no doubt and 
 could not have been at any moment that the war shall violate 
 the frontiers of Belgium, either in the direction of Paris 
 or in the direction of Essen. The line of the Meuse was too 
 strongly fortified for Germany to venture a crossing, but the 
 German line of the Rhine is not any easier to break for a 
 French offensive movement. 
 
 English war publications frankly admit that the German 
 offer to Belgium was advantageous for the latter even in case 
 Belgium had to be incorporated into the German Federation 
 on the same basis as Bavaria or Saxony.* These were 
 "alluring prospects," because they could have put Belgium 
 into the world market and double her national wealth. In 
 spite of that Belgium refused the Germans the privilege of 
 passing through her territory but admitted the English to 
 Antwerp. The "world" has passed the sentence of death 
 upon Germany, and Belgium could not therefore accept any 
 offer from an outlaw. The war began and an ocean of 
 blood has separated the nations. Great deeds of heroism 
 became the monuments of mutual hatred: Belgium by her 
 gallantry gained the sympathy and the respect of the entire 
 world and not only of the "world" of the "condottieri" of 
 the press. This, however, does not alter the fact that the 
 road to success led through Belgium, both for Germany and 
 for France as well. It was a dire necessity which nothing 
 could avert. 
 
 The attitude of England in the case of Belgium is quite 
 
 *"What Europe Owes to Belgium," Oxford Pamphlets, 1914, 
 page 13. 
 
— 145 — 
 
 clear. Antwerp in the hands of Germany means another 
 London, but a German London within a few decades. Ant- 
 werp lies nearer to the great seas than Hamburg, and once 
 more there is no room for two capitals like London, particu- 
 larly not enough room on the Channel. It doesn't injure Eng- 
 land's reputation at all that her "ratio status" compels Eng- 
 land to defend Belgium, because by doing so she defends 
 London at the same time. The fact that England has an 
 interest in defending Belgium does not interfere with the 
 principle of nationalism for which Belgium is fighting nowa- 
 days and gallantly spilling her blood. In the battle of Water- 
 loo England, in alliance with Prussia, defended Belgium 
 from France, and in the battle of the Marne she defended 
 Belgium, in alliance with France, against Germany. It has 
 been since the times of Pitt a doctrine of the English policy 
 not to permit any of the European great nations to get a 
 hold of Antwerp. It isn't, therefore, sufficient nowadays 
 to say that the struggle in Western Europe is conducted 
 simply for the protection of "weak" Belgium. This is true 
 to a certain extent, at least apparently, but going to the 
 roots of the matter it can be seen quite easily that the 
 defence of Belgium is the result of other reasons. The 
 actual causes of the war in the west of Europe are entirely 
 different and are just as deep and just as far reaching as in 
 the east: these causes are older and deeper than the mere 
 violation of the neutrality of Belgium by Germany or the 
 attack of Austria-Hungary on Servia. 
 
 Generally speaking the colonial imperialism of Germany 
 is passing as the main cause of the war. There is a great 
 amount of truth in this statement, because Germany is in her 
 evolution which can inspire fear. Germany as a nation 
 counts about 70,000,000 of people in the German Empire 
 alone, whereby the Germans of Austria-Hungary are not 
 
— 146 — 
 
 counted at all. The German emigration dropped to a. 
 paltry figure of 15,000 of emigrants per year while the yearly 
 increase in population amounts to 800,000. Commerce and 
 industry are developing with unprecedented rapidity. In 
 the years 1902-1907 or, in other words, within five years 
 the exportation and importation increased more than from 
 1881 to 1902, or, in other words, during twenty years. The 
 amount of German traffic in 1902 amounted to two and 
 three-quarter billions of dollars, while in 1907 it increased to 
 four and one-quarter billions. The annual increase ex- 
 ceeded one-quarter of a billion. In 1912 the total of the 
 export trade of Germany exceeded the huge sum of five 
 billion dollars. Before the outbreak of the war the propor- 
 tion of German trade and the English trade was 21 :27, while 
 as late as 1890 the entire commerce of Germany amounted 
 to less than the importation to England.* The country is 
 half agricultural and half industrial, or in other words it is a 
 world in itself, and is able to provide alone for its needs. 
 Besides the spirit of the nation is highly developed and the 
 Germans can work like ants and fight like lions when their 
 God, that means Germany, requires the sacrifices of the 
 individual. All these characteristic features form the mate- 
 rial and moral basis for an expansion on a large scale. The 
 more intensive the life of a nation is, the more territory it 
 requires ; this is an old biological law applying both to indi- 
 viduals and to nations. The instinct of the German na- 
 tion could not possibly help to be influenced by this law, and 
 expressed this by making huge naval armaments intended 
 for the purpose of protecting by them the colonial im- 
 perialism of Germany. 
 
 Germany, which thus far has kept aloof from the sea, soon 
 entered into a keen competition with England ; in this respect 
 
 * P. Rohrbach : "Germany's Isolation," Chicago, 1915. 
 
— 147 — 
 
 Germany has made great strides forward in spite of the fact 
 that she lacked the great traditions of a sea-faring people. 
 In 1890 German diplomacy succeeded in getting Heligoland 
 from England. London did not anticipate that this small 
 island in the North Sea shall some day become the operating 
 basis for the German Navy. Ten years after acquiring Heli- 
 goland the first German Naval program was made public 
 and astonished the world by its extent, its accuracy and its 
 ambitions. Then England, getting nervous, made another 
 mistake which was worse than the selling of Heligoland 
 to Germany, and this mistake consisted of devising a new 
 type of battleships which were the pinnacle of engineering 
 skill. These were the dreadnoughts which are nothing else 
 but floating fortresses. Apparently this step meant a prog- 
 ress for England but in reality it was not progress but retro- 
 gression. German engineering proved to be equal to that of 
 England. At the London Exposition of 1851, Alfred Krupp 
 made a successful debut by exhibiting a steel block weighing 
 2,000 kilgorams alongside of an English steel block weigh- 
 ing 1,000 pounds. Every year thereafter increased the tech- 
 nical capacity of Germany as far as steel industry is con- 
 cerned, which permitted Germany to outdistance everybody 
 else in land armaments and partly in naval armaments also. 
 German dreadnoughts were soon ploughing the seas just 
 as the English did. Thus Germany has acquired the chance 
 of being a competitor of England because the type of older 
 ships of which England had a large supply could not possibly 
 come into account against the modern dreadnoughts. As 
 far as the number of ships is concerned England is still the 
 leading power ; as far as the quality is concerned the dread- 
 nought types gave Germany a chance of entering into com- 
 petition with England. Germany had very few ships of the 
 old times, but the dreadnoughts have helped them materially, 
 
— 148 — 
 
 inasmuch as the older types of ships had to be put back into 
 the second battle line. When the war broke out the propor- 
 tion of the English navy to the German navy was ten to 
 sixteen as far as the first-class fighting units were concerned. 
 This is the arithmetical way of expressing a mistake made 
 by England in building dreadnoughts. Germany has thus 
 come closer to the shores of England because she changed 
 in their own favor the proportion of the respective naval 
 forces of England and Germany. With regard to sub- 
 marines Germany has outdistanced the entire world and has 
 even created a menace for England, the danger of a block- 
 ade. 
 
 A blockade of England ? 
 
 The history of many centuries is shown in this question. 
 A new competitor began to knock at the gates to all seas 
 which gates were in times gone by hermetically closed by 
 England. The Germans began to look for new territories for 
 their commerce and their industry. Their economical pros- 
 perity became the basis for their colonial imperialism which 
 was nothing else but a form of this economical prosperity. 
 Statistics showed every year that as far as commercial and 
 industrial expansion as well as the expansion of naval arma- 
 ments is concerned Germany was speedily catching up with 
 England. The British supremacy on the seas began to feel 
 the German competition and there can be no two masters of 
 the seas, but only one or none, or all should have the equal 
 rights which in turn means nothing else but freedom of the 
 seas. Thus the war became imminent because Germany 
 could not stop her economical evolution and England could 
 not without struggle give up the inheritance of a long series 
 of generations and could not yield the supremacy on the seas 
 for which they spilled streams of blood. Germany could not 
 stop her progress nor could England betray her historical 
 
— 149 — 
 
 tradition. This is nobody's fault, but there are reasons 
 which are far stronger than the desire for peace, and the 
 fault for these conditions should be equally charged to all 
 humanity because the latter's war technique is so much 
 superior to the technique of the peace. 
 
 The English supremacy on the seas was based on the 
 inaccessibility of the British shores and the superiority in 
 war vessels. The first pillar of British supremacy was great 
 Britain's "splendid isolation," the second one her naval 
 power. The present war already has, in the first year, 
 shaken the first of both pillars. Above the seas the air fleet 
 made its appearance, while under the sea the submarines 
 began their deadly work of destruction. The system of naval 
 warfare has been considerably changed, and the inaccessi- 
 bility of the British shores is a thing of the past. The 
 dreadnoughts are peacefully moored in various bays while 
 the war service is done by submarines and scouting aero- 
 planes : the air fleet on the one hand and the submarines on 
 the other hand made the men-of-war an anachronism. The 
 aeroplane, the dirigible balloon and the submarine accom- 
 plished a thing which a year ago still seemed to be a fantastic 
 dream: they made England a part of the European conti- 
 nent. Since February 18, 1915, the date on which Germany 
 began a blockade of the English coasts, by means of sub- 
 marines, England forms part of the European Continent. 
 The importance of this date was still increased by the fact 
 that on June 1, 1915, a dirigible balloon appeared above 
 London for the first time and dared to throw ninety bombs 
 on the metropolis of one-half of the world. The "splendid 
 isolation" of Great Britain became an empty phrase. This 
 fact is a marking stone of a new epoch in the history of the 
 world. Even the greatest defeat of .Germany cannot in any 
 way alter this fact: a new epoch was thus started on the 
 
— 150 — 
 
 seas, but it is still an open question who is going to be the 
 author of the first chapter of the new book of the future. 
 
 The submarine in the hands of Germany became the same 
 thing that the boats of the Norman Vikings used to be in 
 the Middle Ages. Since the time of the Norman Conquest 
 the British shores did not see any other conqueror. Does 
 not history show at times a tendency to repeat itself ? 
 
 England became so used to her supremacy on the seas that 
 she cannot give this supremacy up without any struggle. 
 The opportunistic policy shall continue to uphold this con- 
 servative attitude of England but England must henceforth 
 take the two following facts into account : 
 
 I — The change in the technique of naval warfare exposes 
 England to the danger of a compulsory loss of the supremacy 
 on the seas. 
 
 II — The principal colonies of England became already 
 politically ripe, and the abolishing of English supremacy 
 on the seas does not necessarily involve, as it could have been 
 in former times, the loss of these colonies. 
 
 Canada, Egypt, South Africa, India and Australia are 
 states within a state and not ordinary colonies. In the pres- 
 ent war they demonstrated so much conscious loyalty and 
 spirit of sacrifice for the mother-country that England may 
 remain calm and can look with pride upon the fruits of her 
 colonial policy. Not England defending her colonies but the 
 colonies are defending England in the present war. This 
 may be a paradox but it permits us to see more clearly an- 
 other real and new fact and that is that the English colonies 
 can and undoubtedly will protect themselves at any time. 
 This is a fact which did not exist actually in international 
 politics although it has existed potentially. The present war 
 is a powerful incentive for a political evolution of the Eng- 
 lish colonial dominions and creates at the same time guaran- 
 
— 151 — 
 
 tees for the safety of England in the future. The supremacy 
 on the seas ceases to be for England a question of life or 
 death. The historical mission of England, based on the 
 supremacy on the seas is, practically speaking, ended with 
 glory and with honor. The colonies ceased to be for Eng- 
 land a dead block, a market of slaves, and they became 
 conscious political organisms ; these colonies are states within 
 a state, well prepared for purposes of self-defence, and very 
 well able to increase the armaments should such emergency 
 arise. The sacrifice of the supremacy on the seas for the 
 prize of strengthening of the English colonial dominions 
 would solve the question of the seas without injury to Eng- 
 land and for the benefit of the world and of permanent 
 peace. 
 
 No phrase nor any sentimental feeling can possibly dis- 
 guise the fact that the seas are under the control of England, 
 nor can the fact be concealed that neutral countries and par- 
 ticularly the United States are thus exposed to a great loss. 
 The English supremacy grew out of force and was based on 
 force and it is lawful in so far as law is a form of power. 
 The formula of Bismarck is the formula of English su- 
 premacy of the seas. The German submarines, however, 
 are directing their attacks on this condition of things and 
 the German system of blockading England is an answer 
 to the English blockade of Germany. Tooth for tooth and 
 eye for eye, and while this goes on the losses of the neutral 
 countries are increasing every day. All sympathies and all 
 grievances should be left aside because the interests of the 
 future generations require that this war should put an end 
 not only to the supremacy on land but also to the supremacy 
 on the seas. The close follower of every privilege, and 
 particularly of a privilege based on power, is jealousy. The 
 German submarines which were specially trained for pur- 
 
— 152 — 
 
 poses of blockading England originated on account of the 
 British supremacy on the seas. Improvement of the sub- 
 marines will bring about the liquidation of the English 
 supremacy on the seas sooner or later, and even a victory of 
 England over Germany in the present war cannot possibly 
 avert this future from England. A naval blockade in the 
 old sense of the word begins to be too expensive since the 
 German submarines have attacked the English privileges 
 on the seas. England, with her great political talent, begins 
 to feel it already and shall not fail to comply with the 
 changed condition of things. Germany also understands 
 the new conditions and advocates the freedom of the seas : 
 Germany feels very well that it can defeat England on the 
 seas only at the price of an expedient which at the same 
 time jeopardizes German ambitions for a supremacy on the 
 seas. The question of a blockade ceases to be what it was 
 in the time of Napoleon and during all the wars of the 
 nineteenth century. Nowadays, the question of the blockade 
 according to the provisions of the English supremacy on the 
 seas brings about disastrous consequences owing to the 
 counter-blockade by the submarines. This is a reducing of 
 the question to an absurdum, but a bloody absurdum after 
 all. The tragedy of the Lusitania is not only a monument to 
 German inconsiderateness but also a tombstone to the Eng- 
 lish system of English blockading. For England it was a 
 political Trafalgar, although from a military point of view 
 it was nothing but a mere trifle. The question of feeling 
 towards Germany should in no way obscure the issue and 
 hatred, or sympathy shall under no circumstances serve as 
 the only guide for shaping the fate or the happiness of na- 
 tions. Regardless of sympathy for England or for Germany 
 the program of the freedom of the seas should become the 
 
— 153 — 
 
 program of neutral countries. The idea of the freedom of 
 the seas is the idea of the progress of the world. 
 
 The system of blockading which intends to starve out the 
 civilian population of a country is incompatible with the 
 requirements of modern progress. Germany replied with 
 the tragedy of the Lusitania. This is the curse of every 
 evil that it generates still greater evils and the good name of 
 humanity has to pay the bill for these extravagant acts. It 
 is high time to finish these atrocities for the sake of dignity 
 of humanity and of permanent peace. The idea of the free- 
 dom of the seas with the exception of artificial canals such 
 as the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal or the Kiel Canal, is 
 becoming a historical necessity and it should not be tolerated 
 that this great idea be reduced to an empty phrase. It is, 
 furthermore, contrary to the interests of neutral countries, 
 and particularly to the interests of the United States, that 
 the idea of the freedom of the seas should become a political 
 monopoly of Germany. The freedom of the seas should 
 become a real program of neutral countries and not a 
 temporary expedient of diplomatic intrigues. The appear- 
 ing of submarines increases the actuality of the question. 
 Because of a new fact coming into existence, a new legal 
 formula must be found. The old formulas are not sufficient 
 for the new situation. 
 
 Let us hope that the coming peace congress shall not be 
 as late on the question of the seas as the Congress of 
 Vienna hundred years ago was late on the question of land. 
 
 According to a well-established version German mili- 
 tarism is together with Germany's colonial imperialism, 
 another cause of the war. This statement is half true and 
 half false. Militarism as a system of universal military 
 service must in the first place be distinguished from the 
 question of military preparedness. As far as militarism 
 
— 154 — 
 
 is concerned France was and is the leader because her rate 
 of growth of the population is constantly on the decrease. 
 The return to the three years' term of military service in 
 France was the top notch of militarism in Europe because 
 it has increased in an unprecedented way the accuracy of 
 recruiting. The German system was less accurate because 
 the increase of the population in Germany shows an up- 
 ward movement. Russia is a giant both as to her territory 
 and her population, and owing to these two factors the 
 militarism in Russia can be less intense than in Germany 
 which is smaller than Russia, or than in France which is 
 losing constantly in population. These few facts already 
 are sufficient to show that the question of militarism should 
 not be confused with the question of military preparedness. 
 
 From the statistical point of view the conditions were 
 highly interesting before the outbreak of war. The peace 
 footing of the French army was increased owing to the 
 three years' term of military service to 768,300 men while 
 the peace footing of the German army showed a total of 
 619,000 officers and men. Germany replied by a new mili- 
 tary law and increased the numerical strength of her army 
 on peace footing to 751,000 in total. Russia has at the 
 same time increased her fighting strength from year to year 
 and maintained all the time an army superior in strength 
 to the armies of France and Germany combined. In the 
 winter of 1913-1914 the peace footing of the Russian army in 
 Asia and in Europe numbered 1,870,000 men. In the win- 
 ter 1915-1916 the peace footing of the Russian army was 
 expected to reach the huge figure of 1,900,000 men in total. 
 All these figures apply to the peace footing of the army 
 and do not include the reserves to be drafted into service 
 in case of a general mobilization or of war. 
 
 From the economical point of view the three years' term 
 
— 155 — 
 
 of service meant a great burden for France because it 
 deprived the industry of too much labor. The keeping of 
 the huge army in times of peace and equipping this army 
 with up-to-date war material meant a financial burden for 
 Russia far above the country's financial strength. Russia 
 has for many years already contracted enormous loans in 
 Paris in order to save herself from bankruptcy. France has 
 invested in Russia four billions of dollars ; the war was there- 
 fore for Russia the only way of saving the finances of the 
 country from disaster by winning a victory over Germany. 
 Without a war Russia was confronted by the phantom of 
 bankruptcy while a victorious war opened up prospects of 
 saving the country from financial disaster. Germany did 
 not have to fear bankruptcy because she had enough money 
 of her own and besides her system of armaments did not 
 undermine Germany's economical possibilities inasmuch as 
 the increase of population permitted an expansion of pro- 
 duction as well as an expansion of armaments. France had 
 money and a high political culture, but she did not have 
 enough men. Russia on the other hand, did not have 
 either money or culture equal to the culture of the western 
 European nations but she had a surplus of men. Germany 
 alone combined all the elements such as the sufficient sup- 
 ply of money, of men and of political culture. These fea- 
 tures show why the danger of German armaments was 
 greater than the danger of armaments of France or Rus- 
 sia, in spite of the fact that the armaments of Germany 
 were on a smaller scale than the armaments of the two 
 other countries. France was the most militaristic coun- 
 try of Europe and Russia had the largest army while Ger- 
 many stuck to the middle golden road and consequently the 
 greatest military efficiency. This is the secret of German 
 successes. 
 
— 156 — 
 
 Since the times of Sedan and particularly since the 
 alliance between Russia and France was formed, the ques- 
 tion of armaments became the question of life and death 
 of Germany. The alliance between France and Russia pro- 
 voked already in the first year of its existence the Fashoda 
 incident and the danger of a war between France and 
 England, but Germany which was just engaged in building 
 her fleet had to expect necessarily that the traditional friend- 
 ship between England and Germany will soon change into 
 a traditional hostility. Bryce has estimated justly the situ- 
 ation of Germany in the centre of Europe with her frontiers 
 open to the west and to the east and explained the unity of 
 Germany by the "external pressure which the presence of 
 two neighboring powers, France and Russia has applied. An 
 immense and highly disciplined army has been deemed a 
 necessity."* It isn't the fault of France that she re-estab- 
 lished the three years' term of military service in order to 
 have an army on peace footing exceeding the one of Ger- 
 many. Nor is it the fault of Russia that for French money 
 she kept in times of peace an army stronger than that of 
 France and Germany combined. It isn't the fault of Ger- 
 many, either, that she has brought her army on peace foot- 
 ing to the same strength as France and that Germany had 
 more money than Russia at her disposal. The method of 
 mutual accusations and vilifications only leads astray and 
 does not bring anybody nearer to the truth. 
 
 The signal for starting the war came from Vienna where 
 the war against Servia had been decided upon. The logical 
 consequences of alliances and military considerations have 
 at once started a general conflagration. This does not 
 mean by any means that the entire guilt for starting the 
 
 * J. Bryce, 1. c, page 493. 
 
— 157 — 
 
 war should be charged to Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
 The Central European powers have selected the moment of 
 the explosion as well as the place of starting the hostility, 
 but the question of peace or war was not entirely depending 
 on their decision. The superiority of material forces was 
 from the beginning on the side of England, France, Russia, 
 Japan, Italy, Belgium, Servia and Montenegro. The cal- 
 culation pointed to a disadvantage on the side of Berlin 
 and Vienna, and the weaker side therefore selected the time 
 and the place of the outbreak of the war in order to counter- 
 balance thus the inferiority of their material forces. 
 
 In the fall of 1913 France called the recruits of two 
 consecutive years to the colors. This move was dictated by 
 requirements of military nature resulting from the re- 
 establishment of the three years' term of military service. 
 Only one year of older soldiers has been retained under 
 arms because the soldiers who have served full two years 
 in accordance with the law hitherto in force have been dis- 
 charged. Thus the remaining soldiers had to drill the 
 recruits for two years at once. From the professional mili- 
 tary point of view it was unfavorable because it rendered 
 any possible mobilization very difficult and hindered the 
 first strategical moves in case war should break out. The 
 calling of two years of recruits to the colors could be done 
 only by lowering the age limit for enlistment. Thus the 
 age limit was reduced from twenty-one years of life to 
 twenty years. Consequently in the fall of 1914 France 
 had to call to the colors recruits, 20 years of age, and at the 
 same time, by virtue of the new law, had to retain for the 
 third year of service those who trained the first two cate- 
 gories of recruits. France expected to have in 1915 four 
 years of soldiers under arms at the same time and not 
 three as it should be: such a condition greatly facilitated 
 
— 158 — 
 
 the mobilization and increased the power of the first attack. 
 In the same year, 1915, the effective strength of the Rus- 
 sian army was expected to reach the figure of 1,900,000 
 men, which figure by the way meant the strength of the 
 Russian army on peace footing. The fall of 1915 would 
 thus bring to Austria-Hungary and to Germany a disad- 
 vantage with regard to the proportion of strength for the 
 first attack. The summer of 1914 on the other hand, pre- 
 sented a favorable term because then the chances for a 
 speedy mobilization of the French army were rather poor. 
 In fact the war hung in the air for a long time already, 
 and all the expedients of peace have been exhausted at the 
 conference of the ambassadors in London during the Balkan 
 wars. Already then a number of questions were left un- 
 settled and over Europe hung the moment of calm which 
 generally precedes a storm. The shots in Sarajevo which 
 killed the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary were the 
 spark which ignited the mine laid long ago. Austria-Hun- 
 gary and Germany seized the opportunity of selecting time 
 and place in the conflict which was inevitable for quite a 
 few years already. The code of honor has been lived up 
 to because the weaker side selected the time and the place 
 of the struggle. Humanity, however, had to suffer and 
 wade again through an ocean of blood. 
 
 The average public opinion charges the full responsi- 
 bility for the war to the Central European powers. This 
 judgment, however, is very one sided and therefore unjust. 
 Strictly speaking Russia has to bear the brunt of the bur- 
 den of responsibility. Russian imperialism has since the 
 time of Peter the Great, under the disguise of a religious 
 propaganda, endeavored to crush Turkey in order to trans- 
 fer the capital of the Czars to Constantinople and fly the 
 Russian flag on the Mediterranean. The Russian imperial- 
 
— 159 — 
 
 ism has also wielded the arms of Pan-Slavism, of racial 
 affiliation and of uniting the Slavs for the interest of Pan- 
 Russianism, against Austria-Hungary. These methods of 
 Russian imperialism are old, and stood the test in several 
 wars and innumerous intrigues. The entire world has to 
 pay the bill for these Russian methods in the present war. 
 Russia, bent on the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary 
 has forced the latter, soon after the Congress at Berlin, 
 into an alliance with Germany, although the memories of 
 the Austrian defeat by Prussia on the battlefield of Sadowa 
 were still alive. Intending to destroy Turkey Russia has 
 recently alienated the latter from England and pushed Tur- 
 key into an alliance with Berlin. The continental imperial- 
 ism of Russia which did not end after the Congress of 
 Berlin permitted Germany to increase her power owing to 
 Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary and subse- 
 quently with Turkey. This condition was the main basis 
 for Germany's colonial ambitions which were developed 
 after the retirement from office of Prince Bismarck. Ger- 
 many felt safe in Central Europe and this prompted her 
 naval ambitions of later years. Finally the Balkan war 
 broke out in which Russia made the false promise to Bul- 
 garia with regard to Roumanian neutrality only in order 
 to prompt Bulgaria into a war against Servia, Montenegro 
 and Greece. As soon as the second Balkan war broke out 
 the promises of Russia proved to be utterly false and Bul- 
 garia suffered a terrible defeat. Russia was always against 
 any increase of Bulgaria's power because the latter showed 
 herself always more independent from Petrograd than Servia 
 who willingly played the part of Russia's tool. The defeat 
 of Bulgaria at Bregalnitza decided Bulgaria's sympathy 
 for Germany and Austria-Hungary. Thus the imperial- 
 ism of Russian Pan-Slavism opened a road leading directly 
 
— 160 — 
 
 from Berlin through Vienna and Sophia to Constantinople, 
 which fact made the attack of the Allies on the Dardanelles 
 extremely difficult in the present war. Thus Izwolskij the 
 Russian Ambassador in Paris was quite justified in his 
 alleged saying that the present war is "his war." It mat- 
 ters little whether Izwolskij actually said this or not: it 
 remains a fact that the continental imperialism of Russia 
 formed the basis for the colonial imperialism of Germany 
 because it pushed Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria 
 into the sphere of influence of Berlin. The actual facts 
 put the blame rather on Russia than on the Central Euro- 
 pean powers. It would be a political shortsightedness to 
 claim that only a defeat of Germany can solve the question 
 of armaments in a way which would be advantageous to a 
 permanent peace. Petrograd was for many years past 
 by no means a smaller source of a danger of war. Further- 
 more, who is going to compel Russia to abandon her con- 
 tinental imperialism after she has entered Constantinople 
 and has penetrated into Western Asia over the Armenian 
 Mountains ? 
 
 The mistake lies deeper. 
 
 The responsibility for the war should be charged entirely 
 to the anarchy of armaments and not to militarism. If 
 an individual wants to rule on the basis of the theory "sic 
 volo sic iubeo," humanity calls it anarchy. Nations are 
 also liable to fall into anarchy the moment they adopt the 
 principle "sic volo sic iubeo." The will of a country with 
 regard to military armaments is a dogma which is respected 
 by international law. Humanity defines independence as 
 the principle of free-hand of the nations or as the principle 
 of anarchy of armaments. The extent of armaments is not 
 subject to any control from the outside but depends upon 
 the determination and desire of every individual nation. 
 
— 161 — 
 
 This being the case no permanent peace can be preserved 
 nor can those who apply the aforesaid principle be blamed 
 for doing so. The present war is nothing else but the 
 result of this traditional formula and the armaments of 
 France, Germany and Russia were based on nothing else. 
 It isn't Germany's fault that her population is increasing 
 nor that there is an increase of her national wealth and 
 power which rendered their armaments more efficient and 
 more dangerous than the armaments of other countries. 
 The condemning of Germany and the sparing of Russia 
 or France obscures the issue, although it has many appear- 
 ances of correctness. The centre of gravity lies in the 
 anarchy of armaments, and the future peace congress will 
 have above all to settle first the question of armaments 
 before attacking those who may, against the will of the 
 world, insist upon sticking to the traditional theory of 
 armies and armaments. The present international law rec- 
 ognizes the principle of the anarchy of armaments, but the 
 future international law must under all circumstances dis- 
 continue to acknowledge this principle. This is a program 
 for creating honest, real and genuine bases for a perma- 
 nent peace, and in compliance with this program the future 
 peace congress will have to take away from the nations 
 the liberty of making armaments, and will have to entrust 
 the making of changes in the rate of armaments to a peace 
 tribunal which will be based on a special international 
 agreement. The future peace congress will have to solve 
 not only the question of naval armaments but also the 
 question of armaments on land; and not only to regulate 
 the danger of supremacy on the seas but also the danger 
 of supremacy on land. These are the two parts of the 
 same question; regulating the one at the expense of the 
 other one will leave humanity in the same plight as hitherto. 
 
— 162 — 
 
 Onesidedness generates always the feeling of an injury, 
 and the consequence of such a feeling is the desire for 
 revenge. 
 
 Humanity has mastered the technique of the war but was 
 hitherto unable to master the technique of peace. Owing 
 to this, arise certain problems which are beyond the power 
 of humanity and which cannot be solved without blood- 
 shed. Among these problems were also the causes of the 
 present war or, in other words, the continental imperialism 
 of Russia, the colonial imperialism of Germany and English 
 supremacy on the seas. The weight of these complicated 
 questions, burdened besides by the tradition of centuries 
 has broken the dam and caused a flood of disasters. Mil- 
 lions are perishing on the battlefields, famine penetrates 
 the dwellings of the families and hatred has poisoned the 
 hearts of nations. Mothers weep not only in France but 
 also in Germany because the tragedy of war is just in 
 distributing the share of grief. The question is whether 
 humanity will succeed to be just in distributing the share 
 of happiness when the foundations for the peace, let us 
 hope a permanent one, are going to be laid. 
 
 This is possible in principle. 
 
 The idea of independence does not necessarily require 
 the anarchy of armaments. A nation can be free without 
 having a free hand as to armaments. The future peace 
 congress must not only revise the frontiers but must also 
 revise the international law. 
 
 The latter task is the more important one. 
 
Chapter VI 
 THE PEACE TRIBUNAL 
 
— 165 
 
 Chapter VI. — The Peace Tribunal 
 
 One hundred years ago the Napoleonic period came to an 
 end at the Congress of Vienna which attempted to save the 
 old order of things in the name of the principle of legitimism. 
 History did not permit of retrogression. Napoleon fell as 
 the god of war, but his armies had crossed Europe from one 
 end to the other, and disseminated everywhere the seeds of 
 the ideas which were originated by the French Revolution. 
 Wherever the armies of Napoleon came, there originated the 
 idea of civic freedom, and national consciousness was 
 awakened. Some nations awoke for the purpose of co- 
 operating with Napoleon, others for the purpose of com- 
 bating him. This, however, will not alter the fact that Napo- 
 elon was after all the one who spread the ideas of French 
 Revolution all over the world. The militarism of Napoleon 
 was defeated, but his democratic ideas and his ideas of na- 
 tionalism have won an overwhelming victory. 
 
 There will come finally a time when the present European 
 war will come to its end. Then humanity will lay down 
 arms and peace, calm and justice will reign once more. 
 Looking at the things from a broader historical point of 
 view, we can perceive already now that German militarism 
 is completing at present the work begun by Napoleon. One 
 hundred years ago the militarism of France was spreading 
 the ideas of nationalism and democracy. German militarism 
 to-day is bringing in the harvest. The burden of the results 
 exceeds the causes and the burden of human deeds grows 
 over the heads of their perpetrators. German militarism 
 
— 166 — 
 
 unconsciously forms the prompting element of progress al- 
 though its purpose is to reach more concrete and selfish re- 
 sults. Napoleon's campaigns also were not always aware 
 of what elements they were bringing into history. 
 
 Militarism means universal compulsory military service. 
 This is in other words a return to former times when every 
 member of a community of men was compelled to take up 
 arms for the defense of the community within which he 
 lived. General mobilization nowadays calls to the colors 
 everybody and anybody — poor and rich, educated and un- 
 educated — in other words, all citizens without distinction as 
 to the station of life. Wealth and educational level must 
 come and serve the cause of their country. Militarism made 
 the army a democratic and a national institution. The sword 
 ceased to be the privilege of certain classes oi society. The 
 idea of duty towards the country has made all men equal by 
 force of the executive power of the state. The present war 
 is still more completely finishing the task. In the trenches, 
 men of all strata of society meet and a common duty and 
 common sufferings establish between them a tradition of 
 brotherhood. Man is meeting man in close contact on the 
 background of this war, which after all is the war of militar- 
 ism. 
 
 The ways of history are strange. 
 
 Militarism accelerates democracy although it « does not try 
 to accomplish it consciously and directly. Nothing becomes 
 lost in the chaos of life. The individual does not perceive 
 the subsequent results of his actions, but these results are 
 noticed by history. What becomes lost in the apperception 
 of the individual becomes recorded by the apperception of 
 history. This is the feature of the creative power of his- 
 tory, or, in other words, the feature of progress. The logic 
 of progress is rational, owing to the efforts of an individual, 
 
— 167 — 
 
 and irrational, owing to the masses. A pearl can be found 
 even in a heap of mud; while proceeding rationally — pearls 
 have to be looked for at the bottom of the sea. Militarism is 
 not an organization for a purpose of a political propaganda, 
 but in spite of that, militarism does more for democracy 
 than many political parties. The genius of Napoleon was 
 in too many instances looking only for the blind triumph of 
 the brutal material force, but in just as many and in more 
 instances it has brought about the triumph of nationalism 
 and democracy, although not directly bent on doing so. In 
 the battle of Waterloo, the militarism of Napoleon was 
 crushed for the price of a national regeneration of Germany. 
 The casualism of the epoch of Napoleon apparently 
 triumphed over causality. The present war follows the 
 same road. The results will exceed the causes, casualism 
 shall triumph over causality, and irrationalism over rational- 
 ism. New lights will shine on the horizon of humanity al- 
 though the work of wholesale murder on the battlefields is 
 blind. While the flames of the present war are raging, 
 foundations are laid for the twentieth century and possibly 
 even for a longer period of history. Someone may have a 
 hatred for Germany, just as England had a hatred for 
 Napoleon, or the Old World for Rome, but still the armies 
 of Rome carried the sparks of Greek genius from the bound- 
 aries of India as far as the Ultima Thule. The figure of 
 Napoleon becomes more and more identified with the history 
 of nationalism and of democracy. When the clouds of 
 smoke obscuring the present battlefields will be dispersed, 
 then real progress will appear from under the iron mask of 
 German militarism. 
 
 Militarism as a system of military duties is both dem- 
 ocratic and national, consequently progressive. The evil 
 lies not in the universal military duty, but in the anarchy of 
 
— 168 — 
 
 armaments, which forces the nations to make too large ex- 
 penditures for the sake of military preparedness in the time 
 of peace. From this point of view it is not paradoxical to 
 assume, that militarism will be more firmly established in 
 Europe after this war, and that it will even invade England. 
 England became to-day a part of the continent, when the 
 submarine and the aeroplane removed the "splendid isola- 
 tion." Militarism will cross the Channel and invade Eng- 
 land. The system of recruiting will pass into oblivion just 
 as the mercenary armies did. It is delusion to look for the 
 end of militarism after this war. The danger for permanent 
 peace does not lie in militarism, only in the anarchy of 
 armaments. The abolition of militarism and return to the 
 system of mercenaries will not prevent the anarchy of arma- 
 ments. It will facilitate it. The latter is not the result of 
 militarism — because it is older than militarism. The only 
 way out of it is to form an international law regulating the 
 armaments. A general treaty should oblige all the civilized 
 states not to change the system of armaments or the army 
 on peace footing without the permission of the peace court. 
 This would mean a definite change in the practice up to the 
 present day — a practice which is as old as human misery. 
 
 An individual is not an angel — still less a community. As 
 long as criminal acts are committed among the individuals, 
 so long will such acts be committed among the states. It 
 does not mean that the question of peace cannot be regulated 
 by law. The fact of war does not exclude international law, 
 just as the fact of murder does not exclude criminal law. The 
 fact that international law might be violated does not under- 
 mine its authority. Even civil law is being violated by the 
 wicked or powerful, but the transgressor is punished while 
 the law remains intact. It is a mistake to minimize the im- 
 portance and authority of international law by pointing at 
 
— 169 — 
 
 its violation. General education is here at fault. The 
 idea that international law is worthless is not true, although 
 it is popular. 
 
 Law knows physical persons and legal entities without, 
 however, specifying them; the definition of a person ac- 
 cepted by the civil or the criminal law is of a general nature. 
 In international law on the other hand, the conception of a 
 legal entity is specified as : Germany, France, England, etc. 
 This conception refers to the legal entities vested with 
 sovereign authority or in other words to political organisms, 
 alias states, strictly defined as to time and geographical 
 limits. Under such circumstances the international law nec- 
 essarily must be a code of treaties concluded between and 
 binding those aforesaid sovereign legal entities. Any other 
 conception of international law is absurd from the point of 
 view of logic. 
 
 International law, as any other law, is based upon the 
 general character of culture, morals, science, and social 
 economy. These all constitute premises of the international 
 law. A certain order of international law becomes binding, 
 as soon as the treaties of both parties concerned are ratified 
 by both of them. It is not the formula of the treaty, but the 
 signature of the interested state, that makes a law out of 
 the treaty. International law imitates civil law regulating 
 the mutual relations between the states. The executive power 
 is principally invested, as in any other company, in the hands 
 of other partners, or here in those states in relation to which 
 any state did not live up to the treaty or infringed upon the 
 law. England is the executor of her treaty with Belgium in 
 the present war. The future peace court must be based upon 
 similar principles of executive power if it is to limit the 
 anarchy of armaments and inclinations to war. Although 
 the idea of a perpetual peace is an abstract one, the idea of 
 
— 170 — 
 
 a lasting peace is within practical possibilities. The plan of 
 a peace court is to-day only a pium desiderium. It has not 
 the signature of all the parties concerned, consequently it is 
 not and has not the validity of law. Let us assume that the 
 horrors of the present war will force Europe to take up this 
 question and realize it. The future peace congress realizing 
 the idea of a peace court will have to define its competency 
 or to give it the form of a law. In other words, to insure 
 executive power, the treaties must be ratified. In order to 
 be on a really working basis, the peace court must, in the 
 interests of peace, make it certain that the system of ar- 
 maments or the army on peace footing must be approved by 
 and cannot be changed without the permission of the peace 
 court. The peace court can regulate the use of the sword, 
 just as a civil court regulates the use of money. As the civil 
 courts do not eradicate thefts or larceny, so the peace court 
 cannot be expected to remove forever the danger of war. 
 An enormous achievement will however be left ; that is the 
 limitation of the anarchy of the sword guarded by the sanc- 
 tity of the law. 
 
 Nations are not immortal but form only transitory forms 
 of existence in the history of human progress. Perhaps there 
 will come a time when nations will resolve themselves in a 
 higher unit of their life. In the dawn of history, chieftains 
 of peoples called states to life. The states became the cradles 
 of nations. Perhaps the nations will create in the future a 
 new form of existence: "mankind," which still is only in the 
 realm of moral and religious dreamland, but not in a con- 
 crete, practical and political form. 
 
 In the dawn of history, man was the property of the 
 sovereign. As the development went on, he became the 
 property of the state. The state made him a member of the 
 nation, which is a historical brotherhood, founded upon the 
 community of historical traditions and language. 
 
— 171 — 
 
 What is the next step ? 
 
 A permanent peace and cultural penetration will bring 
 nearer the epoch of brotherhood in the name of civilization 
 of all free nations. This will be a new and higher form of 
 political consciousness but as yet it scarcely buds on the tree 
 of history. The nations will join hands in work toward com- 
 mon good and duty. The day will come when the truth of 
 God — "Treuga Dei" — will reign among the nations, as it 
 does among the individuals. This is an old and sacred dream, 
 as old and sacred as is human suffering. The pagan Plato 
 worked for it, and so did St. Augustine. Are we, the con- 
 temporary generation, now bathed in the blood of the present 
 war, capable of bringing nearer the day of triumph for 
 mankind ? 
 
 In the agony of the present war the answer to this ques- 
 tion is being born. There must be victors and there must be 
 the victims in this war, but there should be no wronged 
 ones, if the future peace is to heal the bleeding wounds. 
 
 The coming peace should for the sake of justice accept 
 for a basis the following five principles : 
 
 I. — Settlement of the divergent interests of England, 
 France, and Germany by the means of colonial 
 possessions, particularly in Africa, so as to pre- 
 vent violation of the principle of liberty of na- 
 tions by territorial changes on a greater scale in 
 Western Europe. 
 
 II. — Enforcement of the principle of liberty of nations 
 in the eastern theater of war by reconstructing 
 Poland in the first place, thus preventing Pan- 
 Slavism which, if established, would inevitably 
 bring forth as a reaction a Pan-Germanism or 
 Pan-Romanism. 
 
— 172 — 
 
 III. — Re-establishment of the freedom of the seas. 
 
 IV. — Submitting the question of land and naval ar- 
 maments, or, in other words, the question of 
 changing the peace-footing of the army and navy, 
 to the control of the special peace tribunal, the 
 legal authority and executive power of which 
 should be based on a specially ratified, interna- 
 tional treaty. 
 
 V. — Sparing the vanquished from utter destruction by 
 abstaining from exacting excessive war-contribu- 
 tions. 
 May the conscience of nations awake ! 
 
 Cleveland, Ohio, July, i9 I 5- 
 
 W92 
 
»°r». 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 :. -w 
 
 
 
 *oV 
 
 ^ 
 

 r <L *'7V^ A 
 
 
 
 
 BOOKBINDINC H *> V * ' * °* ^* j5> *LlC/* > 
 
 S Grants ille Pa tt Vt> *^Fo| 
 
 >* .•••.*<